INTERNATIONAL INTERACTIONS
2017, VOL. 43, NO. 3, 537–561
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1188093

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Do Civil Wars, Coups and Riots Have the Same Structural Determinants?

Cristina Bodea[a], Ibrahim Elbadawi[b], and Christian Houle[a]

[a]Michigan State University; [b]Dubai Economic Council

ABSTRACT

The literature on political instability focuses on institutional and leader survival or outcomes like civil wars and coups. We suggest that this approach overlooks lower levels of instability and that isolating outcomes understates the likelihood that they are manifestations of similar structural determinants. We extend the notion of instability to encompass jointly but distinctly civil wars, coups, and riots. Our explanation focuses on the role of political institutions and the related ethnopolitical strife over state power. Using data from 1950 to 2007, we find that the three outcomes share some determinants such as a factional partial democracy and the exclusion from power of a large proportion of the population; the inverted U-shaped effect of political institutions is driven by a subset of semi-democracies; and there is a substitution relationship between civil wars and coups emerging from the composition of governing coalitions.

KEYWORDS

Civil war; coup d'état; riots; political institutions; social groups

Much of the literature on political instability focuses on the survival of political institutions (Gates, Hegre, Jones, and Strand 2006; Gurr 1974), leader survival (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow 2003; Goemans 2008), overall political violence (Muller and Weede 1990) or particular outcomes like civil wars (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Fearon and Laitin 2003) or coups d'état (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Londregan and Poole 1990; Powell 2012). Yet the literature also suggests that various forms of instability are related and merge into one another under specific conditions (Gurr 1970). For example, Sambanis (2004:268) notes that "… we discard a lot of useful information that explains how we end up having a civil war," and Fearon (2004:289) suggests that "both coups and peripheral insurgencies are strategies for using violence to take power."

The article proceeds in two steps. First, we argue that broad political regime changes or leader survival overlook underlying lower levels of instability. On the other hand, neatly isolating outcomes (most prominently civil war, but also coups d'état) understates the likelihood that they are

CONTACT Cristina Bodea bodeaana@msu.edu Michigan State University, Department of Political Science, 316 S. Kedzie Hall, East Lansing, MI 48824, USA.
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed on the publisher's website.

manifestations of similar conditions. Therefore, we extend the notion of political instability to encompass *jointly* but *distinctly* civil wars, coups d'état, and riots. Our approach captures and unifies two key aspects of instability: the use of violence and the use of irregular means to achieve political aims. Second, we aim to understand what factors are conducive to social peace and whether the different types of instability have similar underlying structural determinants. Our key research question is: What explains the various dimensions of instability? While prominent accounts of the determinants of civil war emphasize opportunity (Collier and Hoeffler 2004) or insurgency feasibility (Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Fearon and Laitin 2003), we take a fresh look at the role of political regimes and social factors. We draw on existing theories of institutions and contentious politics and argue that explanations of instability should focus both on the role of regime characteristics and on the related ethnopolitical strife over state power. To test our arguments, we use Goldstone, Bates, Epstein, Lustik, Marshall, Ulfelder, and Woodward (2010) for a fine-grained categorization of political regimes and Wimmer, Cederman, and Min (2009) for a political account of ethnic group relations.[1]

Our empirical findings use data from 1950–2007 and alternative definitions of coup d'état and civil conflict, to verify robustness. We have three main findings: First, our results do not show support for a strict inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and instability: Among anocracy types, only partial democracies with factional politics increase the risk of instability. Partial nonfactional democracies are not more likely than autocracies or democracies to see instability. In addition, partial autocracies only increase the risk of coup d'état. The substantive effect of institutional variables is on par with the effect of income per capita, a key explanatory variable in the study of instability. Second, the risk of riot, coup d'état, and civil war increases when a larger proportion of the population is excluded from access to government power on ethnic grounds. Third, we identify differences between conditions favorable to coup d'état and civil war: The fragmentation of the governing coalition resulting from including multiple ethnic groups increases the risk of civil war but reduces the risk of coup d'état. Moreover, the inclusion of a demographically large junior coalition group also increases the likelihood of a coup. This evidence points in the same direction as work carried out at the group level for countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Roessler 2011), suggesting that, when designing ruling coalitions, leaders face a trade-off between exposure to civil war and coup.

This article contributes to the emerging literature on the question of whether diverse forms of political violence share similar determinants (Cunningham and Lemke 2014; Houle Forthcoming; Powell 2014; Roessler 2011). Our

[1]An early version of the argument was discussed in Bodea and Elbadawi (2007).

analysis adds to the literature by introducing more refined measures of ethnic exclusion and political institutions; by demonstrating that the three outcomes we study indeed share several determinants, like partial factional democracy and ethnic exclusion; and by showing that there is a substitution relationship between civil war and coup d'état emerging from the design of governing coalitions that extends beyond the African continent.

In addition, we find that the inverted U-shaped effect of political institutions is almost completely driven by a subset of semidemocracies—partial factional democracies. While Goldstone et al. (2010) have already shown that partial factional democracies are particularly prone to civil wars, we extend this finding to coups and riots and further show that other forms of anocracy are not more unstable than full autocracies and full democracies. Moreover, we show that countries that exclude a large proportion of the population because of their ethnicity are more likely to endure riots, coups, and civil wars. Although Wimmer et al. (2009) have already reported a similar finding for civil wars, we are the first to show that this variable has the same effect on coups and riots.

Civil Wars, Coups, and Riots

Defining *political instability* involves conceptual and empirical choices that are not necessarily clear cut. For example, Goldstone et al. (2010:191) use instances of large civil wars and other types of "undesirable political instability," including major adverse changes in political institutions, genocides, and politicides. Gates et al. (2006) identify institutional changes by setting author-defined thresholds for movements in the Polity score components for competitiveness of executive recruitment, constraints on the executive and popular participation. The literature on leader tenure is probably the least arbitrary in the choice of events to be explained, but it misses civil wars that do not see leadership change or failed coups d'état (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Goemans 2008).

In our case, civil wars, coups d'état, and riots are qualitatively different events, and here we discuss how they can be plausibly considered elements of political instability. Our focus is both on the shared features of violence and irregular means to achieve political aims, as well as on the interconnectedness of these events. Civil wars and coups d'état are most clearly associated with the breakdown of national political institutions and are the most consequential events. Civil wars are large domestic conflicts involving casualties and fighting between the state and organized nonstate actors, seeking "either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies" (Fearon and Laitin 2003:76). Therefore, we follow the literature and associate such wars with political instability (Goldstone et al. 2010; Smith 2004).

Coup d'état is an irregular transfer of a state's chief executive, operated illegally by the military or other insider elites, which sometimes involves force or the threat of force but need not involve casualties (Powell and Thyne 2011). Like Powell and Thyne (2011), we view coups as distinct from civil wars. In particular, coups are staged by regime insiders, such as members of the military or the police forces, or civilian members of the government. In fact, one of the definitional features of coups is that they take place "without overt mass participation" (Morrison and Stevenson 1971:13). Civil wars, on the other hand, require the participation of the masses. Moreover, coups are staged to overthrow the chief executive, while civil wars may sometimes have other aims, such as taking control of a region or influencing policies. Unfortunately, the previous empirical literature has often conflated coups and civil wars. Powell and Thyne (2011), for example, report that 38 armed conflicts in the Prio/Uppsala data set—which is often used to capture civil wars—and five civil wars in the Correlates of War data set are actually coups.

Coups have been connected to political instability via the leadership survival literature (Goemans 2008). In addition to leadership turnover, we consider coup attempts as well because they also disrupt the effectiveness of governance and change the incentives of leaders. Coup risk and civil war are intrinsically connected via the role of the military (Belkin and Schofer 2003). A related point is made by Acemoglu, Ticchi, and Vindigni (2009), who show in a formal model that weak governments may allow an ongoing civil war to continue because of fear that a strong military may attempt a coup d'état.

Riots are violent clashes or demonstrations, which can be spontaneous or organized. Some riots are large, and others can be rather small, and some are directed against the government, while others target specific social groups. Not all riots are a "direct breakdown of the political system" (Morrison and Stevensen 1971:360), yet they do involve violence, and a history of such events can have serious consequences. Horowitz (2001), for example, argues that ethnic riots are a candid barometer of ethnic relations and informally relates riot incidence with civil war, forced migration, extremism, polarization of sentiment, and coup d'état. Also, violent protests may elicit a similarly violent response on the side of the government, leading to cycles of violence and repression. Furthermore, participation in violent riots creates individual experience or even leadership in the practice of violence (Tilly 2003). Because riots are fundamentally violent and can have deleterious consequences, we argue for their inclusion in the study of political instability. This allows us to actually test both whether riots have similar determinants to civil wars and coups d'état and whether riot incidence leads to further escalation in the form of civil war and coup d'état. We view riots, however, as distinct from both coups and civil wars. Contrary to coups, riots are usually not carried out by members of the state apparatus. Even when regime insiders play an important role—for example, by supporting the objectives of the riot—the

masses remain the key actor. In addition, unlike coups, riots are not necessarily attempts at seizing power. Riots also differ from civil wars in that they do not involve *sustained* fighting between the government and an organized nonstate actor. Although riots involve violence, their intensity and the level of organization of the opposition rarely reach the level of a civil war.

Although they involve different actors, we believe that civil wars, coups, and riots are all different forms of instability that may share similar structural determinants. For example, weak political institutions could be vulnerable to all forms of instability. In fact, Goldstone et al. (2010) have shown that civil wars, adverse regime changes, genocides, and politicides have similar root causes. Moreover, whether a group is a regime insider or outsider in the first place may be a choice of the ruler. By studying these different forms of instability simultaneously—some of which are driven by insiders and others by outsiders—we are able to better understand the trade-offs faced by leaders as they design ruling coalitions.

The selection of the outcomes of interest—coups, civil wars, and riots—necessarily requires choices that could be argued to be somewhat arbitrary. However, we believe that coups, civil wars, and riots share two key attributes that justify grouping them together: (1) they involve violence or at least the threat of violence, and (2) they are attempts to achieve political goals through irregular means. Although coups do not always involve combat, they are still violent and, at the very least, rest on the threat of violence. Outcomes that do not share these two attributes, such as nonviolent campaigns, are excluded from the analysis. Moreover, our key hypothesis is that coups, civil wars, and riots share some of the same social and structural determinants, notably regarding political institutions. In particular, we argue that partial factional democracies are more likely to experience all three forms of violence. Therefore, we exclude forms of political violence that are likely not driven by the same factors, such as terrorist attacks. A large literature already examines the relationship between regime types and terrorist attacks, arguing that democracies should see the highest incidence of terrorist events, and this view is supported by the data (Braithwaite and Li 2007; Eubank and Weinberg 2001; Li 2005; Pape 2003). In addition, domestic terrorism appears to be an actual strategy during civil war (Findley and Young 2012; Thomas 2014). Therefore, it is unclear how to separate civil war as an outcome from terrorist attacks as a strategy used in civil war. This equivalence can complicate our empirical estimations, as standard models of civil war include a control for "ongoing conflict," which could de facto be definitionally equivalent to a dependent variable based on terrorist attacks.

While our approach is novel, it is related to recent research on the topic. This includes work on leader tenure (Goemans 2008); research investigating the determinants of nonviolent protest, violent rebellion, and civil war (Regan and Norton 2005); work on regime changes, civil wars, and riots

(Smith 2004); and research examining the effect of a large number of independent variables on the onset of 10 different forms of domestic political violence (Cunningham and Lemke 2014).

The Role of Regime Type and Coalition Power Politics

Political Institutions

Much of the literature has shown that strong autocracies and strong democracies experience the least political instability. For example, Muller and Weede (1990) find that overall political violence measured as death rates is significantly lower for regimes with both high and low capacity for repression. They argue that, at one end, severe repression inhibits mobilization and reduces the likelihood of success. At the other end, the availability of peaceful means for political action makes rebellion undesirable. In the middle, intermediate levels of repression results in rebellion being more attractive than peaceful collective action. This finding is replicated when the dependent variable is specifically coded as civil war onset, rather than political violence (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates, and Gleditsch 2001). In this work, semidemocracies are weak, incoherent regimes mixing authoritarian and democratic features, in which repression still occurs and leads not just to grievances but also to collective action that is facilitated by relative political openness. Further, the survival of political institutions has been shown to be a feature of consistent democracies or autocracies (Gates et al. 2006:893). In this account, inconsistent regimes are unstable because of features allowing elites to challenge executive authority (very likely in irregular fashion) and because groups and individuals lack incentives to support democracy.[2]

Substantially less work has investigated the connection between political institutions and coups d'état and riots. Also this work has mixed findings regarding the inverted-U relationship effect of political institutions. In the case of coups, the U-shaped relationship to political institutions is suggested by the argument that (1) weak states will see more coups (Jackman 1978; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993), that (2) political participation reduces the likelihood of coups (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Luttwack 1968), but that (3) autocracies decrease the opportunities to initiate a coup because of effective coup-proofing strategies (Belkin and Schofer 2003). For example, Belkin and Schofer (2003) find that the competitiveness of the political system, the degree of regulation of participation, and the strength of civil society significantly predict the occurrence of new coups d'état.[3] Thyne (2010), however, shows that for a sample of Latin American countries,

[2]The inverted-U relationship is also found in Smith (2004).

[3]Earlier work also finds that broad participation reduces the coup risk (Jackman 1978; Johnson, Slater, and McGowan 1984).

democracy does not affect the likelihood of a coup d'état. Also, Powell (2012) does not find a robust inverted-U relationship between coups and regime type.

Riots have received even less systematic attention, and the sparse work has had mixed results, with Smith (2004) finding an inverted-U relationship for peaceful demonstrations, riots, and strikes lumped together and Urdal (2006) failing to identify such a robust relationship for riots and violent demonstrations. In the case of riots, the past literature suggests that the U-shaped relationship to political institutions need not be very strong. Eckstein and Gurr (1975:452) consider that low-level conflict is "a price democracies have to pay for freedom." Also, Regan and Norton (2005) argue that initial mobilization and low levels of violence involve low costs and low levels of government repression. They also suggest that no side payments may be needed, and grievance may be enough to observe low levels of violence. In this situation, neither democracy nor autocracy may be better at deterring riots than anocracies.

We use the approach proposed in Goldstone et al. (2010) to comparatively test the effect of political institutions on civil wars, coups, and riots. Most studies that use political institutions as an explanatory variable use the Polity scale (ranging from −10 to 10), a three-category measure (democracy, anocracy, and dictatorship) based on the Polity scale, or a binary measure identifying democracies versus autocracies (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Goldstone et al. (2010) use two components of the Polity data—the openness of executive recruitment and the competitiveness of political participation—to generate a five-category measure of institutions: democracies, autocracies, partial autocracies, partial factional democracies, and partial nonfactional democracies. Goldstone et al.'s (2010) partition of political institutions is presented in the online appendix. There are three reasons we favor this measure: (1) it is shown to have good predictive power for rare events like civil war; (2) it manages to isolate coherently across two specific dimensions of the Polity score the idea of consistent or self-enforcing institutions (Gates et al. 2006); and (3) it offers a desirable partition of the varied mix of institutions that make up the amorphous anocracy category (Vreeland 2008).

Institutional Hypotheses

Figure 1 presents the contrasting arguments discussed earlier regarding the effect of semidemocracy on riots, coups, and civil wars. If anocracies see more instability because of an incoherent mix of institutional features, then all three types—partial autocracies, partial factional democracies, and partial nonfactional democracies—should see more civil wars and coups d'état. If instead the problem of semidemocracies is a specific combination of institutional openness and political participation channeled through networks

	Civil Wars		Coups		Riots	
Conditions	**Mechanisms**	**Expected Outcomes**	**Mechanisms**	**Expected Outcomes**	**Mechanisms**	**Expected Outcomes**
Semi-democracy	Weak and incoherent regimes	Higher likelihood of civil war in all semi-democracy types	Weak and incoherent regimes	Higher likelihood of coup in all semi-democracy types	Weak and incoherent regimes are ill equipped to address grievances or insure effective policing and rule of law	Higher likelihood of riot in all semi-democracy types
	Combination of institutional openness and political participation channeled through networks rooted in traditional authorities	Higher likelihood of civil war only in partial factional democracies	Combination of institutional openness and political participation channeled through networks rooted in traditional authorities	Higher likelihood of coup only in partial factional democracies	Combination of institutional openness and political participation channeled through networks rooted in traditional authorities	Higher likelihood of riot only in partial factional democracies
					Low costs to collective action; and low probability of repression	Riots are not more (or less) likely in semi-democracies
Ethnic Exclusion	Reduces the legitimacy of the regime	Higher likelihood of civil war	Reduces the legitimacy of the regime	Higher likelihood of coup	Reduces the legitimacy of the regime	Higher likelihood of riot
Central government fragmentation	Increases risk of infighting among coalition members; and weakens the regime to threats from excluded groups	Higher likelihood of civil war	Creates coordination obstacles; and lessens the fear of exclusion	Lower likelihood of coup		None
			Creates fragmented and/or competing coalitions	Higher likelihood of coup		
Size of members of the governing coalition		None	Coups waged by larger groups are more likely to be successful	Higher likelihood of coup		None
Newly excluded group	Increases grievances	Higher likelihood of civil war	Increases grievances	Higher likelihood of coup	Increases grievances	Higher likelihood of riot
			Decreases the capacity to stage a coup	Lower likelihood of coup		

Figure 1. Summary of the main arguments on the effects of political institutions and social factors on civil wars, coups, and riots.

rooted in traditional identities, then we should see that partial factional democracies, in particular, have the highest risk of instability.

Our expectations regarding the effect of anocracy on riots are more ambiguous. While the previous literature offers arguments suggesting that neither democracies nor autocracies may be better than anocracies at deterring riots, one could also argue that weak and incoherent regimes may be particularly ill equipped in addressing grievances or deterring protest, which may encourage riots. Moreover, based on the literature on social mobilization (discussed in the following) the particular type of factional anocracy could also encourage more rioting.

Social Groups

Political institutions and rules mediate the demands and positions of contending social groups. However, power dynamics among groups also condition the kind of institutions that emerge in a society and thus, can directly influence instability. In fact, work following Lipset and Rokkan (1967) suggests that political institutions reflect social cleavages and that the independent effect of institutions should be limited. Thus, to properly show the effect of political institutions, we account for the relationships among social groups. Ethnicity has been the one cleavage receiving the largest amount of attention in the civil war literature, so we focus our attention on ethnic

groups and the power relations among them, based on new research by Wimmer et al. (2009).[4]

In the study of civil war, prominent scholars have found limited evidence for the idea that social diversity or polarization is a determinant of the onset of civil war, emphasizing instead the material and geographic conditions that favor insurgency (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Others still stress the idea that social characteristics can explain civil conflict (Elbadawi and Sambanis 2002; Reynal-Querol 2002; Sambanis 2001; and even Collier et al. 2009), and some find that diverse or polarized societies are more likely to experience ethnic civil war or civil conflict more broadly (Esteban, Mayoral, and Ray 2012; Reynal-Querol 2002; Sambanis 2001). Also, more recent work finds that exclusion from government on ethnic criteria increases the risk of civil war (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010b; Wimmer et al. 2009).

The early literature on the determinants of coups d'état has also focused prominently on the role of social mobilization and structure (Jackman 1978; Johnson et al. 1984; Kposowa and Jenkins 1993). Such work examines the effect on coup d'état of factors like ethnic polarization, fractionalization, and dominance, both in the general population and within the elites. In particular, this early research focuses on African cases, and the evidence points to polarization and fractionalization as increasing the risk of coups, while dominance has a mixed effect. Subsequent work on coups d'état (Belkin and Schofer 2003; Londregan and Poole 1990; Powell 2012) and on leader turnover (Goemans 2008) abandons completely the early focus on social factors.

Relations among social groups are argued to be relevant for riot incidence as well, although little evidence is available for global samples. Horowitz (2001:14), for example, writes that ethnic riots represent a "full expression of ethnic sentiment." Wilkinson (2004) argues that riots in India are a result of elite manipulation of particular identities in the run-up to elections and finds riots to be more likely in states where governing parties do not need to rely on minority support to govern. Urdal (2008) studies the effect of ethnic relations on low levels of violence across the Indian states. He finds that low-intensity armed conflicts (including intercommunal violence, political assassinations, and rioting) cannot be systematically linked to variables such as religious heterogeneity, linguistic fractionalization, or the relative growth of the Hindu population. On the other hand, a specific count measure of Hindu-Muslim riots is strongly associated with higher religious heterogeneity and states with a non-Hindu-majority population. However, as in the case of coups d'état, other recent quantitative literature on global samples of riots is

[4]Ethnicity may not be the most salient cleavage for all our outcomes. In particular, riots tend to be driven by local policies. However, given our use of macrolevel data, ethnic cleavages have the best data coverage.

not directly interested in the role of ethnic group relations (Smith 2004; Urdal 2006).

Closely related to arguments over whether social structure affects the degree of conflict in a society are questions about the exact nature of the relationship. Ethnicity may matter mainly because of the number of interests that it generates, in which case indexes of fractionalization should proxy well for the mechanism. Yet, a more satisfying and sophisticated view endows ethnic groups with agency and strategy vis-à-vis each other and the state. Thus, in earlier work, ethnic dominance is argued to increase the ability and incentives of majorities (groups that make 45%–90% of the population) to exploit minorities, which in turn increases the risk of civil conflict (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Also, based on rent-seeking models, the risk of civil conflict is argued to be higher when the distribution of social characteristics across a country's population is bimodal and social polarization—a situation in which two social groups have the same size—is high (Esteban and Ray 1994). These are, however, relatively narrow views of what may matter in the relationship among domestic ethnic groups that focus on the relative size of groups. More broadly, Wimmer et al. (2009) argue that the state is at the center of the ethnic power struggle and that "(ethnic) exclusion from state power and competition over the spoils of government" breeds ethnic animosity (Wimmer et al. 2009:317). In this case, traditional measures of diversity do not capture the key issue that some ethnic groups have access to the state while others are excluded.

Indeed, using the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data set (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010a), Wimmer et al. (2009) show that, controlling for political institutions, exclusion from state power leads to a higher risk of civil war in general (as well as to fighting initiated by the excluded groups), and ethnic fragmentation of government power leads to infighting among elites. Also based on the EPR data, Roessler (2011) finds that, in sub-Saharan Africa, a group that is excluded from state power is less likely to engage in a coup d'état against the government and that governments facing a high risk of coup engage in strategic group exclusion. Additionally, he shows that an excluded ethnic group poses a larger risk of initiating civil war against the government.

Social Group Hypotheses

The different hypotheses with regard to the effects of social group variables on riots, coups, and civil wars are, once again, shown in Figure 1. Ethnic exclusion has been argued to lower the legitimacy of the regime, thus making it easier for rebels to mobilize among their coethnics (Wimmer et al. 2009). Similarly, we expect exclusion to increase the risk of civil war. Exclusion is likely to affect the risk of coup d'état via a related causal mechanism. While coups do not require mass participation, the

citizenry needs to acquiesce to the change of political leaders for a coup d'état to be successful. This is more likely to happen in regimes that have low legitimacy. We expect then that states excluding larger proportions of their populations would be more coup prone. At its core, ethnic exclusion from power is linked to underprovision of private and public goods to the excluded population, which very likely leads to economic, political, or symbolic grievance against the state and the included population. Such ethnic politics may also lead to a domestic security dilemma and to violent mobilization and countermobilization of ethnic groups (Wimmer et al. 2009:321). Our expectation is that rioting behavior may also be a result of such ethnic tensions proxied by exclusion.

In addition, intracoalition dynamics is likely to affect instability, although here our predictions differ across different forms of instability. We expect that the ethnic fragmentation of governing coalitions raises the risk of the civil war outcome. Wimmer et al. (2009) argue that infighting among included coalition groups is more likely in the case of more ethnically fragmented governing coalitions. They posit that shifting alliances within the governing coalition increase the fear of losing out in the competition over government spoils and therefore increase the chance that included groups risk civil war against the government. More broadly, actors outside the governing coalition may view ethnic fragmentation as a weakness of the government, perceive an increasing chance of winning a civil war against such a government, and therefore wage war.

For coups d'état, we have mixed expectations. On the one hand, Roessler (2011) finds that in sub-Saharan Africa, central government fragmentation reduces the chances that a particular ethnic group will perpetrate a successful coup d'état. This may be the case both because fragmentation makes coordination difficult among power holders and because groups fear exclusion relatively less in more-inclusive coalitions. If this logic holds, we should expect that coup d'état risk is lower in more-fragmented governments. However, if we extrapolate the logic of Wimmer et al. (2009) for infighting to the coup d'état outcome, we should expect that coup d'état risk increases for more-fragmented governing coalitions.

Furthermore, we have reasons to expect that the size of included groups matters for coup d'état risk. Roessler (2011) finds that larger groups are more likely to participate in successful coups, linking this finding to the likelihood that such groups are better represented in the military and thus have better access to the technology of coup d'état. To the extent that a coup is carried out by members of ethnic groups other than the group of the leader, we expect that including larger groups in one's coalition increases coup d'état risk.

Finally, we expect that the exclusion of an ethnic group should increase both the likelihood of civil war and of riot because it creates grievances. Regarding coups, however, our predictions are more ambiguous. On the one

hand, as argued by Roessler (2011), groups that are excluded from power have a lower capacity to stage coups. As stressed previously, by definition, coups are staged by regime insiders (including members of the military). On the other hand, however, recent exclusion creates grievances that may incentivize members of the newly excluded group, such as members of the military that have not been purged yet, to wage a coup.

Research Design and Data

The unit of analysis is the country-year. We use the country-year rather than the ethnic group-year (Roessler 2011) as our unit of analysis for two main reasons. First, ethnic groups are not the only actors that can carry out coups, civil wars, and riots. Using the ethnic group-year as our unit of analysis would thus force us to drop coups/civil wars/riots that were not instigated by ethnic actors. Second, our main purpose is to examine the country-level factors, such as political institutions, that are the most conducive to instability. The main sample covers 6,705 observations on 149 countries between 1950 and 2007. The sample decreases to 6,355 observations when all our control variables are included (Model 2, Table 1).

In our theoretical account, riots, coups, and civil wars are alternative outcomes of the same propensity for violence or irregular contestation of political power. To test this view of instability, a multinomial model is required (however, all results are robust to the use of regular logic regressions; see the online appendix). We use an unordered multinomial logit model with four outcomes: riot, coup, civil war, and a "peace" or "no new conflict" (the reference category). In the online appendix, we analyze the benefits and drawbacks for using a multinomial model, as well as how the multinomial can be replaced by estimating a series of binary logit models in which the reference category is adjusted.

The Dependent Variable

All our outcomes have issues of definition and measurement, so we use multiple sources to verify the robustness of the results. We use alternative definitions for civil war onset, based on widely used measures in the literature: the Prio/Uppsala data (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Erikson, Sollenberg, and Strand 2002) and the Correlates of War data (COW) (Sarkees and Wayman 2010).[5] Powell and Thyne (2011) report that 38 of the armed conflicts

[5]The Prio/Uppsala measure uses a low threshold of 25 battle deaths per year to identify a conflict, and we regard a conflict as a new conflict onset if it occurs 2 years after the previous conflict (Ross 2012). This definition captures the onset of smaller-scale conflict, the reignition of dormant conflict, and also early onsets of large-scale conflicts. In the COW data set, in order to qualify as an intrastate conflict, a war needs to result in at least 1,000 battle deaths per year and involve sustained fighting between at least two organized groups. The COW data set excludes one-sided massacres.

included in the Prio/Uppsala data set and five of those in the COW data set are actually coups. Therefore, we purge the coups identified by Powell and Thyne (2011) from both data sets on civil conflict/civil war and rightly identify the events in those country-year observations as coups.

We also use two data sources for coups d'état, coding both successful and failed coups: Powell and Thyne (2011) and the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP) (Marshall and Marshall 2014).[6] Powell and Thyne (2011) is our main indicator of coups because the authors make sure to exclude all riots and civil wars from their data set. The main analysis uses the data of Prio/Uppsala and Powell and Thyne (2011). The models using the COW and the CSP data are reported in the online appendix. Riots are based on the Banks Cross National Time Series (CNTS) Data Archive (Banks 2011) and are defined as any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens involving the use of physical force. In principle, it is possible that some coups or civil wars are mistakenly identified as riots in the Banks data set. If that were the case, we would expect the overwhelming majority of observations with either coups or civil wars to have also been coded as having a riot. Yet, only about one-third of the observations with coups and civil wars have concurrently experienced a riot (32.85% and 33.63% respectively).[7] Moreover, even if a small number of riots were in fact coups or civil wars, it would not affect our results because of the way the dependent variable is constructed in our multinomial logit regressions (see the following). Whenever a riot happens during the same year as a civil war (or a coup) we code that observation as having experienced only a civil war (coup).

In order to construct the multinomial dependent variable, we need to decide on how to treat country-years that experience multiple outcomes. For example, El Salvador experienced a successful coup in 1979, which is also the year the civil war started. In 1971, Pakistan experienced both a coup d'état and the onset of civil war. Also, Argentina saw both riots and coup d'état in 1970, 1971, or 1976. While the outcomes are not ordered to the extent that we can estimate an ordered logit model, we rank war as the outcome involving the highest instability level, followed by coups and then riots. We view civil wars as usually more destabilizing than coups and riots because they are typically associated with more violence and instability. Moreover, we view coups as creating more instability, on average, than riots because they occasion the transfer of executive power. The impact of riots is generally (albeit not always) more limited.

Thus, if a country experiences either a coup or a riot and the onset of war in the same year, we code the multinomial outcome as a war. Similarly, if a

[6]The analysis only uses successful and failed coups since, as argued by Powell and Thyne (2011), plotted and alleged coups are often fabricated by governments to justify repression. Moreover, data on plotted and alleged coups are less reliable because such events do not generate as much media coverage. The correlation between the two series is 0.78.

[7]A total of 19% of the observations in the full sample experience a riot.

country experiences both a riot and a coup in the same year, we code the multinomial alternative as a coup. To account for the fact that one form of instability (riots) can trigger other forms of instability (coups), we control for the history of riots and coups and for whether a country is currently experiencing a civil war.

The way we operationalized our dependent variable in the multinomial logit models is imperfect. Coups, for example, are not necessarily more destabilizing than large violent riots. Therefore, we also adopt three other strategies. First, we run three individual logit models (one for each form of instability) with the same reference category ("peace"). For example, in the riot model, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the country has experienced a riot—no matter if it has also endured a coup/civil war or not—and 0 if it has been free from riots, coups, and civil wars ("peace"). Cases in which a country has experienced either a coup or a civil war but not a riot are omitted from the riot model, which is similar to the way multinomial models are estimated. The dependent variables for the coup and civil war models are constructed in the same way. In all three models, the reference category is the absence of any form of instability. Second, we run three "regular" logic models (ilogit models with different reference categories). In this case, in the coup model, for example, the dependent variable takes the value 1 if a coup was staged and 0 otherwise, no matter if a riot or a civil war occurred or not. Finally, we again run three "regular" logit models but control for whether the country also experienced the two other forms of instability. For example, in the riot model, we include control variables for whether there is a civil war onset or a coup during the same year. All the additional results are available in the online appendix.

Key Explanatory Variables

We use a five-category measure of political regime from Goldstone et al. (2010), relying on two underlying components of the Polity IV score: The measure of executive recruitment and the competitiveness of political participation.[8] The online appendix illustrates how these variables are constructed. Executive recruitment shows the ways superordinates come to occupy their positions (Polity IV manual 2012), and the competitiveness of political participation refers to the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena (Polity IV manual 2012). Full autocracies involve repressed political participation and no leader elections. Partial autocracies involve either some degree of competitive political participation or elections for the executive, but not both. Partial democracies see some degree of political participation and election of political

[8]There are multiple criticisms of the use of Polity IV –10 to 10 scale (see Cheibub et al. 2010; Gleditsch and Ward 1997; Vreeland 2008).

leaders. However, only full democracy is characterized by both competitive elections of leaders and fully competitive political participation.

Further, among partial democracies, we distinguish those countries that are characterized by factional politics, countries with political factions that "promote particularist agendas that favor group members to the detriment of common, secular and cross-cutting agendas" (Polity IV manual, 2012:27). We choose to treat interregnum periods (code –77) and transition periods (code –88) in the Polity IV series as a distinct category, as they are characterized either by the collapse of the state or by fluidity between characteristics of new and old regimes. This category is troubling because 19 of the Fearon and Laitin (2003) civil wars occur in regimes coded as –77 or –88 by Polity. Other studies use interpolated data to manage the issue, but that inflates the anocracy category, aiding research to identify an inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and civil war. Similar to other studies, we treat interruption periods in the Polity IV series (code –66) as missing data. In our estimations, the regime indicator variables are lagged one year, and the reference category is full autocracy.

We also use a number of indicators of ethnic group power relations based on the EPR data. To measure ethnic exclusion, we employ the proportion of the population that includes members of ethnic groups that are excluded from power. An ethnic group is defined as being excluded if it has a status below "junior partner" in the EPR. Central government fragmentation is measured as the number of ethnic groups included in the governing coalition (the number of ethnic groups that are at least junior partners). We also include the size of members of the ruling coalition: size of senior partner(s) and size of junior partner(s). Our last key explanatory variable is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if at least one ethnic group has been excluded from the governing coalition within the last 3 years.

In our first model, we control for the lagged log of income per capita[9] and the lagged history of violent conflict by including a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if a country experienced a coup in the past 5 years; we count the number of years with riots in the past 5 years[10] and include a dummy variable measuring whether a civil war was ongoing in the previous year. We then estimate a second model that includes more control variables: the lagged log of the country's population, lagged past institutional instability, the log of the estimated percentage of country's mountainous terrain, as well as a measure for oil wealth.[11] Because the status of the military is a major risk factor for coup

[9]Previous studies find strong evidence that poverty fuels instability (especially civil wars and coups) (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Londregan and Poole 1990).

[10]For the first 5 years in a country's time series, we compute the variable for the available years only rather than drop the observations.

[11]Income per capita comes from Treisman (2015). Population size is based on World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). The mountainous terrain variable is the logged share of the country's area covered by mountains (EPR). Institutional instability is coded 1 if a country has experienced a change in Polity IV of three points or more in the previous 3-year period. Oil wealth is a dummy variable for countries with oil exports that make more than 30% of total exports (Fearon and Laitin 2003; updated from the WDI).

d'état, we include a lagged indicator for military regimes.[12] In addition, the second model includes decade dummy variables, regional dummies, and dummies for French and British colonial rule, to control for unobserved heterogeneity and common shocks.

Results and Analysis

We first discuss the distribution of each outcome of our dependent variable across the different regime types. Full democracies and full autocracies are much more stable than semidemocracies. However, not all anocracies are equally unstable. Partial factional democracies are particularly likely to experience riots, coups, and civil wars, while partial nonfactional democracies are much more stable. In fact, partial nonfactional democracies are *less* likely to experience coups than full autocracies. Transitional regimes are also highly unstable, and partial autocracies are vulnerable to coups. These differences in the distribution of outcomes across regime types are statistically significant, as shown in the online appendix: Partial factional democracies, in particular, differ significantly from full democracies (p value <.001), full autocracies (p value <.001), partial autocracies (p value = .014), and partial nonfactional democracies (p value <.001).

The findings from the multinomial logit regressions are shown in Table 1. These models use the measures of civil conflict and coup d'état of Prio/Uppsala and Powell and Thyne (2011) respectively. The coefficients in the Tables and the robust standard errors are displayed distinctly for the three instability alternatives. Model 1 controls only for GDP per capita and the history of civil wars/coups/riots, while model 2 includes all the control variables along with decade and region dummy variables.

We first point out the effect of institutional variables, where several findings stand out. The first is that two variables increase *all types of instability*: Riots, coups, and civil wars are all more likely in regimes that have been coded in the previous year as partial factional democracies. While Goldstone et al. (2010) have already reported that partial factional democracies are particularly prone to civil wars, this article is the first to extend this finding to coups and riots. Also, riots, coups, and civil wars are more likely in transitional or interregnum regimes, although the results on coups and civil wars are only statistically significant once the control variables are included (Model 2). Second, we do not find support for a strict inverted U-shaped relationship between political institutions and instability: Among anocracy types, only factional partial democracy increases the risk of instability. In fact, partial nonfactional democracies are very likely to have instability risks similar to those of democracies, and partial autocracies only increase the

[12]Variable equals 1 for both direct and indirect military rule (Banks CNTS Data).

Table 1. Multinomial Logit: Determinants of Instability—Riots, Coups, and Civil Wars.

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Riots	Coups	Civil Wars	Riots	Coups	Civil Wars
Ongoing civil war in past year	0.0725	0.188	0.571***	−0.0537	0.449**	0.0169
	(0.104)	(0.152)	(0.177)	(0.115)	(0.175)	(0.172)
Coup attempt in past 5 years	−0.257**	1.262***	0.260	−0.373***	0.841***	0.277
	(0.111)	(0.133)	(0.176)	(0.128)	(0.155)	(0.215)
# years with riots in past 5 years	0.673***	0.395***	0.395***	0.483***	0.307***	0.267***
	(0.0266)	(0.0479)	(0.0571)	(0.0304)	(0.0560)	(0.0657)
Transitional and interregnum regime[a]	0.455**	0.428	0.455	0.692***	0.574**	0.763**
	(0.208)	(0.269)	(0.329)	(0.231)	(0.291)	(0.364)
Full democracy[a]	−0.0407	−2.671***	−0.679*	−0.254	−2.572***	0.671
	(0.130)	(0.757)	(0.370)	(0.205)	(0.956)	(0.573)
Partial autocracy[a]	0.177	0.629***	−0.226	0.187	0.708***	0.0513
	(0.134)	(0.173)	(0.288)	(0.147)	(0.204)	(0.316)
Partial factional democracy[a]	0.378***	0.618***	0.459**	0.428***	0.920***	0.860***
	(0.122)	(0.179)	(0.217)	(0.140)	(0.221)	(0.269)
Partial nonfactional democracy[a]	0.0434	−0.499**	−0.0686	0.117	−0.0701	0.0995
	(0.122)	(0.253)	(0.247)	(0.146)	(0.302)	(0.312)
Excluded population	0.301*	0.528**	0.927***	0.470**	0.645**	0.776**
	(0.182)	(0.263)	(0.306)	(0.214)	(0.310)	(0.384)
Size of senior partner	−0.194	−0.589*	−0.210	0.0982	0.0475	0.0493
	(0.152)	(0.351)	(0.313)	(0.164)	(0.368)	(0.353)
Size of junior partner	−0.710**	1.267***	−0.419	−0.163	1.152**	−0.305
	(0.312)	(0.449)	(0.510)	(0.357)	(0.507)	(0.619)
# included groups	0.0919***	−0.128**	0.186***	0.0502	−0.103	0.141***
	(0.0315)	(0.0621)	(0.0466)	(0.0364)	(0.0704)	(0.0513)
Newly excluded group	−0.0628	0.316	0.304	0.119	0.519*	0.415
	(0.239)	(0.259)	(0.320)	(0.260)	(0.270)	(0.334)
Log GDP/capita[a]	0.0396	−0.224***	−0.249**	0.0371	−0.288**	−0.289**
	(0.0473)	(0.0827)	(0.102)	(0.0749)	(0.134)	(0.138)
Log Population[a]				0.350***	−0.00561	0.387***
				(0.0357)	(0.0632)	(0.0641)
Log Mountainous terrain				−0.0386	−0.0757	0.146**

(*Continued*)

Table 1. (Continued).

	Model 1			Model 2		
	Riots	Coups	Civil Wars	Riots	Coups	Civil Wars
				(0.0331)	(0.0637)	(0.0736)
Instability				0.0956	0.0410	0.0638
				(0.124)	(0.160)	(0.213)
Oil				−0.150	0.0347	0.688***
				(0.128)	(0.207)	(0.211)
Military regime[a]				−0.0368	0.399**	0.487**
				(0.146)	(0.188)	(0.234)
Former British colony				0.202*	−0.142	−0.0759
				(0.108)	(0.201)	(0.251)
Former French colony				−0.0641	−0.00679	0.00563
				(0.143)	(0.198)	(0.258)
Constant	−2.862***	−1.916***	−2.340***	−8.722***	−2.302	−10.14***
	(0.378)	(0.662)	(0.801)	(0.963)	(1.604)	(1.917)
Region dummies	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Decade dummies	N	N	N	Y	Y	Y
Number of Events	1,061	306	203	1,021	292	195
Log pseudo likelihood/Pseudo R^2		−4,282.9/0.14			−3,916.6/0.177	
Observations	6,705	6,705	6,705	6,355	6,355	6,355

Note. *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%. Robust standard errors in parentheses. [a]is lagged one year.

likelihood of coup d'état. Moreover, while democracies do not lower the risk of riot or civil war, they significantly reduce the chance that a country will see a coup d'état.

Other work has raised questions about the robustness of the U-shaped relationship among political institutions and civil war onset. Vreeland (2008) makes the argument that the inverted U-shaped relationship between the Polity score and the likelihood of a civil war onset may be driven by the way the Polity score is coded. He claims that the coders of the Polity score have used the presence of political violence as evidence of factionalism.

We adopt several strategies in order to make sure that our results are not driven by the way factionalism has been coded. First, following Hegre et al. (2001) and Fearon and Laitin (2003), we lag our independent variables—including partial factional democracies—and our dependent variable is the *onset* of a civil war/coup/riot. Therefore, a civil war/coup/riot in the current year cannot explain why a regime has been classified as factionalized in the previous year, meaning that our findings are not tautological.

However, it is still possible that a history of political violence may influence the coding decisions and increase the likelihood of a civil war/coup/riot in the next period, hence creating a spurious positive relationship between factionalism and civil war/coup/riot. To address this possibility, we follow Goldstone et al. (2010) and Gleditsch, Hegre, and Strand (2009) and include extensive controls for countries' history of violence and for interregnum regimes. Thus, we cannot attribute the findings on political institutions to underlying low levels of violence. Instead, our evidence suggests that political institutions have an important role. That is, a "polarized politics of exclusive identities or ideologies, in conjunction with partially democratic institutions" (Goldstone et al. 2010:198) increases the risk for all our outcomes.

Finally, Marshall and Cole (2012) have reexamined the coding of the Polity data. Their findings contradict the assertion of Vreeland (2008:3) that the Polity score is contaminated by the conflation between factionalism and political violence. According to them, "periods coded as 'factional' were distinguished by the forms of political organization and the qualities of political participation and not by scattered or systematic acts of violence."

The substantive effect of institutional variables is large and clearly similar in size to the effect of income, which has been argued to be a key factor affecting both coup d'état (Londregan and Poole 1990) and civil conflict (Fearon and Laitin 2003). The online appendix reports the predicted probabilities of riot/coup d'état/civil war when varying the value of the explanatory variables that have achieved statistical significance. Becoming a transitional or interregnum regime increases the risk of riots and coup d'état in the following year by about 36% and more than doubles the risk of civil war. A full democracy is about 12 times less likely to see a coup d'état

compared with a dictatorship, whereas a partially autocratic regime is 76% more likely. A partial factional democracy increases the risk of riots by 22% and almost doubles the risk of coup and civil war.

In addition to institutions, one of the social conflict variables has a consistent and independent effect on instability: Riots, coups, and civil wars are more likely when a larger proportion of population is excluded from government power. When we vary the size of the excluded population from the 50th percentile to the 90th percentile, the risk of riot increases by 14%, the risk of coup by 24 %, and the risk of civil war by 33%. This result differs somewhat from that of Roessler (2011), who finds that ethnic groups that are excluded from power are less likely to stage coups. However, the unit of analysis of Roessler (2011) is the ethnic group-year, whereas ours is the country-year. Therefore, these results do not necessarily contradict each other. It seems plausible that while ethnic groups that are excluded from power are less likely to initiate a coup—for example, because they are not well represented in the military—countries that exclude a large share of the population are more likely to fall victims to coups because of the exclusive nature of the regime.

The other social conflict variables have weaker effects. We find that, in cases where ethnicity is a relevant cleavage, the inclusion of a larger number of ethnic groups of the governing coalition reduces the risk of coup d'état but increases the risk of civil war and riot. However, its effect on riots and coups is not robust to the inclusion of the extended set of control variables. Similar to work done only for sub-Saharan Africa (Roessler 2011), we find some evidence that, when designing ruling coalitions, leaders face a trade-off between civil war and coup d'état. The inclusion of a larger number of small ethnic groups reduces the risk of coup d'état, while such center fragmentation increases the risk of civil war. Moreover, the inclusion of a demographically large junior coalition group increases the risk of coup d'état. When varying the size of the junior included group from the 50th percentile (0% of population) to the 90th (44% of the population) percentile, the risk of coup d'état increases by 59%.

Several other factors are important for our models of instability. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a history of riots consistently increases instability across our three categories, and the size of the effect is large. Clearly, our models use macro data and are weakest in predicting the risk of riots. Still, regardless of whether past riots are due to grievance or better ability to overcome collective action, our framework allows us to estimate the change in instability risks for substantively interesting situations and point to the very damaging effect of a history of riots. We can look, for example, at the predicted risks faced by long-standing, nonmilitary autocratic regimes like Assad's Syria or Mubarak's Egypt, when varying the history of riots from zero to one. Nearly 40% of all autocracies have had at least 1 year with riots in the past 5 years.

According to our estimations, a single year with riots in the past 5 years increases the risk of further riots by 47% and the risk of coup d'état and civil war by 24% and 19% respectively.

A history of coup d'état and military regimes, unsurprisingly, increases the chance of coups. A country that experienced a coup in the past 5 years has more than doubled its risk of seeing another coup in the current year. Military regimes have a 41% and 54% higher chance of coup d'état and civil war respectively. Also, a history of coups d'état is a robust indicator of lower risk of riots, suggesting, perhaps, an expectation of more repression and thus having a small dampening effect on riot occurrence.

Income per capita affects the risk of instability, although it is robustly statistically significant only in the case of coups and civil conflicts. The oil export dummy increases the risk of civil war. Similarly, countries with large mountainous areas are more likely to experience civil wars. Among the control variables, our most surprising result is that we do not find that countries that have recently experienced institutional instability—measured as a 3-point change in the Polity score over the last 3 years—are more likely to experience civil wars. However, when we exclude our key institution dummy variables and the controls for recent coups and riots, instability does foster civil war, and the relationship is significant at the 5% level (online appendix).

Conclusion

In this article we look at the effects of political institutions and ethnic group relations on political instability, operationalized as civil wars, coups d'état, and riots. We argue that our approach better captures lower levels of instability than work focused on the survival of political institutions or leaders. It also better identifies periods of social peace than the literature focused solely on civil wars or coups d'état, and thus it allows us to test whether our outcomes are alternative manifestations of similar root causes. With respect to the determinants of instability, we return to ideas present in earlier work suggesting that both political institutions and the relationships among social forces can be expected to exert an influence. We use the Goldstone et al. (2010) five-category measure of political institutions to test the previously posited U-shaped relationship between such institutions and our three instability outcomes—civil wars, coups d'état, and riots. The results suggest that partial factional democracies are more likely to experience all three types of instability. It must be noted, however, that this result may not apply to *all* forms of violence. As discussed earlier, for example, previous literature has found that full democracies are the most likely to experience terrorism. We also use the Ethnic Power Relations data (Wimmer et al. 2009) to test the effect of ethnic exclusion and governing coalition fragmentation on political instability.

Our findings suggest that the literatures on different manifestations of instability ought to be more closely connected. By studying different forms of instability simultaneously, we can determine whether they share similar determinants. Moreover, studying these events simultaneously enables us to assess whether rulers face a substitution effect between different forms of instability while designing governing coalitions, as suggested by Roessler's work on sub-Saharan Africa. We find that the ethnic composition of the governing elites may generate a substitution relationship between coups d'état and civil wars.

Our results also have very important implications for policies aimed at reducing instability. They suggest that since coups, civil wars, and riots often share common root determinants, a unified set of strategies may be employed to prevent their occurrence. The results also imply that the inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and instability is driven by a single type of anocracy: partial factional democracies. There are thus relevant implications for the design of institutions in transitioning democracies: Semidemocracies are particularly vulnerable to diverse forms of instability when at least some of those who govern are selected through elections and the competing interests taking part in the elections are based on parochial or ethnic-based political factions. Among other things, our results point to the importance of developing strong secular and cross-cutting political groups before the introduction of elections in transitioning democracies.

Finally, the literature on civil conflict has moved away from country-year studies, and disaggregation has been very useful to match rebel locations with local conditions and thus be more precise with regard to the locally driven incentives of rebel groups. Disaggregation, however, cannot preclude a focus on national-level politics and institutions or how groups relate to each other and vie for control of resources at the national level. Dysfunctional national politics creates the background conditions that may lead groups to think they would not be treated fairly or to fear that resources on their territory would be appropriated by the central government with little in return. Our results thus suggest that future research on political instability and violence should consider mechanisms that operate at both the country and the group levels.

Acknowledgments

An early version of this article was published as World Bank Working Paper 4397, November 2007, with the title "Riots, Coups and Civil War: Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Debate." We thank the editors of *International Interactions*, two anonymous reviewers, Michael Bratton, and Jakana Thomas for important suggestions on how to improve the most recent version of our article. Replication materials are available at the

dataverse page maintained by *International Interactions* at http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/internationalinteractions.

References

Acemoglu, Daron, Davide Ticchi, and Andrea Vindigni. (2009) Persistence of Civil Wars. NBER Working Paper No. 15378.

Banks, Arthur S. (2011) *Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive*. Available at http://www.databanksinternational.com.

Belkin, Aaron, and Evan Schofer. (2003) Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47(5):594–620.

Bell, Curtis, and Jun Koga. (Forthcoming) The Causes and Outcomes of Coups During Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*.

Bodea, Cristina, and Ibrahim Elbadawi. (2007) Riots, Coups and Civil War: Revisiting the Greed and Grievance Debate. World Bank Working Paper 4397.

Braithwaite, Alex, and Quan Li. (2007) Transnational Terrorism Hot Spots. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 24:281–296.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. (2003) *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. (2010a) *Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset*. Available at http://www.epr.ucla.edu/.

Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. (2010b) Why Do Ethnic Groups Rebel? *World Politics* 62(1):87–119.

Cheibub, José A., Jennifer Gandhi, and James R. Vreeland. (2010) Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited. *Public Choice* 143(1–2):67–101.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. (1998) On Economic Causes of Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 50:563–573.

Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. (2004) Greed, Grievance and Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 26:563–595.

Collier, Paul, Anke Hoeffler, and Dominic Rohner. (2009) Beyond Greed and Grievance. *Oxford Economic Paper* 61(1):1–27.

Cunningham, David, and Douglas Lemke. (2014) Beyond Civil War. *Civil Wars* 16(3):328–345.

Eckstein, Harry, and Ted R. Gurr. (1975) *Patterns of Authority: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry*. New York: Wiley.

Elbadawi, Ibrahim, and Nicholas Sambanis. (2002) How Much Civil War Will We See? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(3):307–334.

Esteban, Joan, Laura Mayoral, and Debraj Ray. (2012) Ethnicity and Conflict. *American Economic Review* 102(4):1310–1342.

Esteban, Joan, and Debraj Ray. (1994) On the Measurement of Polarization. *Econometrica* 62 (4):819–851.

Eubank, William, and Leonard Weinberg. (2001) Terrorism and Democracy: Perpetrators and Victims. *Terrorism and Political Violence*13(1):155–164.

Fearon, James. (2004) Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others? *Journal of Peace Research* 41(3):275–301.

Fearon, James, and David D. Laitin. (2003) Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War. *American Political Science Review* 97(1):75–89.

Findley, Michael G., and Joseph K. Young. (2012) Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Temporal Approach to a Conceptual Problem. *Perspective on Politics* 10(2):285–305.

Gates, Scott, Håvard Hegre, Mark P. Jones, and Havard Strand. (2006) Institutional Inconsistency and Political Instability. *American Journal of Political Science* 50(4):893–908.

Gleditsch, Kristian S., and Michael D. Ward. (1997) Double Take: A Re-examination of Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Polities. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41 (3):361–383.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Håvard Hegre, and Håvard Strand. (2009) Democracy and Civil War. In *Handbook of War Studies III: The Intrastate Dimension*, edited by Manus Midlarsky. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Erikson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Håvard Strand. (2002) Armed Conflict, 1945–99: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 39(5):615–637.

Goemans, Hein E. (2008) Which Way Out? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(6):771–794.

Goldstone, Jack A., Robert Bates, David Epstein, Michael Lustik, Monty Marshall, Jay Ulfelder, and Mark Woodward. (2010) A Global Forecasting Model for Forecasting Political Instability. *American Journal of Political Science* 54(1):190–208.

Gurr, Ted R. (1970) *Why Men Rebel*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Gurr, Ted R. (1974) Persistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800–1971. *American Political Science Review* 68(4):1482–1504.

Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. (2001) Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? *American Political Science Review* 95(1):33–48.

Horowitz, Donald L. (2001) *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Houle, Christian. (Forthcoming) Why Class Inequality Breeds Coups but Not Civil Wars. *Journal of Peace Research*.

Jackman, Robert W. (1978) The Probability of Coups d'État. *American Political Science Review* 72(4):1262–1275.

Johnson, Thomas M., Robert O. Slater, and Pat McGowan. (1984) Explaining African Military Coups d'État, 1960–1982. *American Political Science Review* 78(3):622–640.

Kposowa, Augustine J., and Craig J. Jenkins. (1993) The Structural Sources of Military Coups in Postcolonial Africa, 1957–1984. *American Journal of Sociology* 99(1):126–163.

Li, Quan. (2005) Does Democracy Promote or Reduce Transnational Terrorist Incidents? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(2):278–297.

Lipset, Martin S., and Stein Rokkan. (1967) *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives*. Toronto: The Free Press.

Londregan, John B., and Keith Poole. (1990) Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power. *World Politics* 42(2):151–183.

Luttwak, Edward N. (1968) *Coup d'État: A Practical Handbook*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Marshall, Monty G., and Benjamin R. Cole. (2012) Societal Systems Analysis and the Problem of Factionalism in Emerging Democracies. Paper presented at the 2012 joint meeting of the International Studies and British International Studies Associations, Edinburgh, June 22.

Marshall, Monty G., and Donna Ramsey Marshall. (2014) Coup d'État Events: 1946–2013. Code Book, Center for Systemic Peace.

Morrison, Donald G., and Hugh M. Stevenson. (1971) Political Instability in Independent Black Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 15(3):347–368.

Muller, Edward N., and Erich Weede. (1990) Cross-National Variation in Political Violence. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 34(4):624–651.

Pape, Robert. (2003) The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism. *American Political Science Review* 97(3):343–361.

Powell, Jonathan M. (2012) Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'État. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58(1):169–196.

Powell, Jonathan M. (2014) The Strategic Logic of Tolerating Rebellion. *African Security Review* 23(4):329–338.
Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne. (2011) Global Instances of Coups from 1950–2010: A New Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research* 48(3):249–259.
Regan, Patrick M., and Daniel Norton. (2005) Greed, Grievance and Mobilization in Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49(3):319–226.
Reynal-Querol, Marta. (2002) Ethnicity, Political Systems and Civil Wars. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 46(1):29–54.
Roessler, Philip. (2011) The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa. *World Politics* 63(2):300–346.
Ross, Michael. (2012) *The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Sambanis, Nicholas. (2001) Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 45(3):259–282.
Sambanis, Nicholas. (2004) What Is Civil War? *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48(6):814–858.
Sarkees, Meredith Reid, and Frank Wayman. (2010) *Resort to War: 1816–2007*. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Smith, Benjamin. (2004) Oil Wealth and Regime Survival in the Developing World, 1960–1999. *American Journal of Political Science* 48(2):232–246.
Thomas, Jakana L. (2014) Rewarding Bad Behavior: How Governments Respond to Terrorism in Civil War. *American Journal of Political Science* 58(4):804–818.
Thyne, Clayton. (2010) Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitation? *Journal of Peace Research* 47(4):449–461.
Thyne, Clayton. (Forthcoming) The Impact of Coups d'État on Civil War Duration. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*.
Tilly, Charles. (2003) *The Politics of Collective Violence*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Treisman, Daniel. (2015) Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover. *American Journal of Political Science* 59(4):927–942.
Urdal, Henrik. (2006) A Clash of Generations? *International Studies Quarterly* 50(3):607–629.
Urdal, Henrik. (2008) Population, Resources and Violent Conflict. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(4):590–617.
Vreeland, James. (2008) The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 52(3):401–425.
Wilkinson, Stevenson I. (2004) *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wimmer, Andreas, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Brian Min. (2009) Ethnic Politics and Armed Conflict. *American Sociological Review* 74(2):316–33.