Moreover, the authors point to such important issues as demand-bearing groups, regimes, information flows, and magnifiers without examining the process at hand in a systematic way. What variables in the political environment are at work and interacting with each other that can explain why information is (or is not) being diffused across intranational or international borders? In making these observations, I do not wish to raise doubts about the value of this wide-ranging analysis of nationalism in the new Europe; rather, I want to point to other, related areas that might be developed in order to give the reader a fuller picture of the various dynamic elements at play.

The Rebel's Dilemma. By Mark Irving Lichbach. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. 514p. $45.00.

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In *The Rebel's Dilemma*, Mark Irving Lichbach presents a tour de force of the collective action research agenda with regards to the study of dissent, rebellion, and revolution. His book is monumental and pivotal, but not because it reveals any new theoretical insights or explains a particularly vexing empirical anomaly. Rather, it consolidates over three decades of research on collective action problems and sets the agenda for future studies of collective dissent and rebellion.

Lichbach starts by segmenting the study of collective dissent into two broadly defined research programs: deprived actor (DA) theories and collective action (CA) theories. The former paradigm holds that rebellion results from psychological factors (e.g., frustration) caused by shared deprivations. In essence, the DA program is a demand-based theory of collective dissent. But Lichbach argues that demand is not enough; collective rebellion needs to be supplied. CA theorists, Lichbach included, posit that dissent is a public good (PG) and that for rebellion to be successful, dissenters must overcome the ever-present prisoners' dilemma (PD). The PG-PD nature of rebellion forms the core of the rebel's dilemma: While psychological frustration may create a constituency of potential rebels who could best address their grievances through mutual cooperation, no individual dissenter has an incentive to participate in group protest. Not surprisingly, Lichbach's analysis relies heavily on Mancur Olson's *The Logic of Collective Action* (1965).

Since Olson, CA theorists have "discovered" numerous solutions to the rebel's dilemma. Lichbach classifies these solutions into four broad categories—Market, Community, Contract, and Hierarchy. Market solutions (e.g., lower the costs of participation) serve as the baseline for collective dissent as these solutions require no preexisting structures or community. Community, Contract, and Hierarchy supplement solutions to the rebel's dilemma where Market solutions are insufficient.

One of the book's principal shortcomings is that the divisions between these four groups lack analytical precision. For example, Lichbach discusses ideology and symbols as Market solutions, whereas they also could qualify as Community solutions (e.g., overcoming mutual ignorance). Likewise, Hierarchy-based solutions appear under the Contract heading and vice versa. However, this apparent flaw in Lichbach's analysis actually bolsters one of his central arguments: Each categorical solution (e.g., Contract) to the rebel's dilemma is incomplete in explaining any and all incidents of collective dissent. Specific solutions in each category necessarily complement solutions in other categories. Furthermore, no one specific solution (e.g., locate patrons) is inherently necessary for rebellion to occur. In other words, of the two dozen solutions proposed by CA theorists for overcoming the rebel's dilemma, none is either necessary or sufficient.

With so many potential solutions to the rebel's dilemma available, Lichbach wonders why collective dissent is not more prevalent. This is where he introduces the state into the analysis. Whereas rebel entrepreneurs work to solve their collective action problem, state leaders attempt to aggravate the rebel's dilemma. In doing so, however, states have their own PG-PD problem to manage. State elites need to maintain cooperation among themselves lest rebels divide and conquer them. Generally, state leaders have the advantage over rebels in that they have already solved their collective action problem; hence, successful rebellion is comparatively rare. Unfortunately, Lichbach does not develop this fascinating subtheme further, but rather leaves it for a forthcoming volume.

The multiplicity of solutions to the rebel's dilemma that are neither necessary nor sufficient has a further implication for the scope of theory in studies of collective dissent. Lichbach argues convincingly that there cannot be a grand theory of rebellion. Context matters. Dissident entrepreneurs will pick and choose among all potential solutions according to specific environmental constraints. Thus, one of the major tasks for CA theorists studying rebellion is to specify what particular circumstances lead to a given mix of solutions to the rebel's dilemma.

Finally, and perhaps most important, Lichbach evaluates the analytical and empirical strength of the CA program as it currently stands. First, he begins by arguing that each categorical solution to the rebel's dilemma is logically incomplete: "Contract requires Market.... Market requires Community" and so on (pp. 279–80). As a result, CA theories fail in terms of scientific predictability. With no single solution to the rebel's dilemma being either necessary or sufficient and given the enormous number of permutations that logical incompleteness implies, successful rebellion will invariably surprise scholars. However, one could debate Lichbach as to whether future predictability is either a central or even a desired goal of social science.

Lichbach also compares the CA theories to the DA research program according to Lakatosian and Popperian criteria. The former criterion evaluates one theory against an alternative on the basis of whether it provides additional and true information about empirical observations, while the latter requires different and better information for a given theory to be more valuable than another. On average, CA theories of collective dissent outperform the DA perspective on both criteria. Interestingly, Lichbach gives the DA agenda more credit than is perhaps due. At several points in his comparative evaluation he attributes the explanatory power of DA theories to CA solutions and gives the DA perspective high marks for this. While, this should demonstrate the explanatory advantage CA theories have over DA theories, Lichbach never acknowledges this.

Undoubtedly, many scholars will disagree with Lichbach over the specifics of the various solutions to the rebel's dilemma he proposes. Some may even disagree with the CA approach altogether, although they do so in the face of strong evidence and argumentation to the contrary. But for those sympathetic to the CA program, *The Rebel's Dilemma* is an invaluable work. Lichbach brings together various strands of CA research in a comprehensive effort to show what has been accomplished in the field and then defines a convincing research agenda for the future. He suggests that future CA-based studies of dissent should focus on the psychological microfoundations of rationality (including the role of culture and norms), as well as considering more explicitly macrostructures (e.g., the state) that constrain rational action. Despite not providing any new theoretical insights into collective dissent per se, this book is a major step forward. It will have an enormous impact in the field of conflict studies and belongs on the shelf of anyone even casually interested in dissent, rebellion, and revolution.

Ultimately, the truest measure of value of a scholarly work is the degree to which it stimulates the reader's own intellectual development. *The Rebel's Dilemma* has provided me with more food for thought than any book I have encountered in recent years. I anxiously await Lichbach's companion volume, *The Cooperator's Dilemma*.

Remaking the Italian Economy. By Richard M. Locke. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995. 232p. $29.95.

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The ability of the Italian economy to flourish despite all the obstacles thrown in its way by the political system has long been noted and occasionally even studied in systematic fashion. Unsuccessful efforts in the 1980s to provide a more predictable framework of industrial relations by imitating arrangements in place elsewhere (especially Northern Europe) have also received considerable scholarly attention. And at least since the path-breaking work of Bagnasco's *Tre Italie* (1977) and Trigilia's *Grandi partiti, piccole imprese* (1986), Italian and other specialists have underscored the importance of local territorial and institutional arrangements in explaining not only political success but also patterns of social stability and economic adaptation.

Richard Locke's *Remaking the Italian Economy* is thus informed by a rich literature and, even without broader ambitions, its original research (a fieldwork- and document-based analysis of transformation in the auto and textile-apparel industries in contrasting milieux) would represent a solid contribution and merit our attention. But Locke also takes off from this research to suggest alternative ways of viewing both Italian and more general processes of industrial transformation, and these efforts are persuasive and provocative enough to make this a first-rate study.

The first two chapters provide an admirably synthetic summary of Italy's structural strengths and weaknesses, as well as of efforts to revive and restructure the economy in the 1970s and 1980s. Lack of political will, bureaucratic foot-dragging, and outright sabotage marked efforts at large-scale change in that period. But Locke reminds us that reformist designs were shot through with contradictory assumptions or practices as well. He then analyzes (chapter 3) profound modifications to the industrial relations system during the same period. And here he shows how extensive reforms put in place in the 1970s and 1980s not only lacked internal coherence, but often backfired: "Initiatives aimed at abating the peculiarities of the Italian system instead accentuated them" (p. 75). This was the result not so much of muddle-headedness as of unintended consequences, with policies designed for one set of conditions producing dramatically different results as circumstances changed. Such processes worked in especially poignant ways among the unions: altering its strategic focus to adapt to one set of conditions, the Catholic CISL found itself disoriented and weakened when those conditions were no longer operative.

Locke then addresses the auto and textile industries (chapters 4 and 5, respectively), comparing Fiat in Turin and Alfa-Romeo in Milan in the first instance and the range of experiences in the country's premier textile district, Biella, in the other. These cases are well chosen for the purposes of Locke's study and also for the contribution they make to the broader discussion of Italian territorial and sectoral differentiation.

The author's major argument follows from much of the literature, namely, local differences really matter in explaining why firms in some areas are much more able to adapt than others. Particularly important is the sociopolitical network that evolves in a given locality. Arguing from this framework, Locke goes beyond much received wisdom in demonstrating that local differences exist and are significant *within* one area, the North, often portrayed as homogeneous. Polarization and frontal class conflict have long been accepted as characteristic of Turin, but Milan, despite intense conflict during the period of peak mobilization, provides a setting in which labor and management worked out a far more conciliatory style of conflict resolution to the mutual benefit of each. In contrast to Fiat's zero-sum game, restructuring was actually negotiated and was less disruptive and painful at Alfa Romeo.

The inclusion of textiles and apparel as well as automobiles is important methodologically: by choosing industries that differ radically along so many dimensions and showing their adjustment strategies during the same period, Locke is able to argue convincingly that local context—and not some technology-specific variable—plays an important role in shaping strategic choices. And nowhere was there more successful adaptation than in the Biella district. Chapter 5 provides a brief and fascinating history of textiles as well as of class relations in Biella. Here we find a rich and complex network of relations between labor and capital and, equally important, among capitalists—not always noted for their cooperative behavior. The restructuring of the 1980s was thus marked by a decentralization of production that seemingly paralleled wider trends, but in Biella the decentralization process was exceptional: it occurred amidst considerable consultation among owners, with labor's cooperation, and without the weakened unions and declining wages that were a by-product of similar changes elsewhere. Moreover, no single pattern of restructuring occurred; myriad options were tried and several met with success. Skeptics might wish to withhold judgment until other cases are subjected to similar scrutiny, for there is much that makes Biella exceptional (above all a catastrophic flood in the 1960s, discussed by Locke, that forced areawide cooperation). Still, the overwhelming weight of all the evidence presented does support the author's findings.

These findings are presented to demonstrate the importance of local variations in explaining Italy's economic successes (and failures). But they also form part of a broader argument, namely, that under present conditions it is more useful to view the Italian economy—or any advanced capitalist economy for that matter—not as a single "national system," but rather as a much less coherent *composite* of diverse subnational patterns that often coexist uneasily within a country's boundaries (Locke identifies polycentric, polarized, and hierarchical local orders). The particular mix between types of local economies characterizes each national economy far more accurately than any presumedly hegemonic pattern. Nor is it necessary for there to be a single dominant form. Some countries may have a prevalence of one pattern, e.g., Germany has more polycentric locales. Other countries, including Italy, have a more balanced distribution. This framework makes it much easier to pinpoint why and in which sectors (geographical and