ORGANIZATIONAL COHESION AND MILITARY COUP OUTCOMES

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While the study of military coups has embraced a wide range of approaches and analytical foci, the two most common categories involve questions dealing with two basic levels of analysis: the socio-political system and the military subsystem.[1] Essentially, the questions asked center on attempts to delineate the characteristics or attributes of the system/subsystem believed to facilitate or hinder the occurrence of coups. Hence, the different levels of analysis usually function more as different clusters of variables, from which one might hope to extract meaningful relationships, rather than as full-fledged behavioral models with rival assumptions. A recent empirical review of the systemic literature (Thompson, 1975a) has argued that the explanatory role of the system vis-à-vis coup politics may be generalized through the process of regime vulnerability. Regime vulnerability develops when governmental structures and leaders have lost or are in the process of losing bases of political support other than the military. The development of regime vulnerability, in turn, is variably associated with: (1) previous histories of vulnerability, (2) background conditions related to the development of regime support relationships such as levels of economic development and social mobilization, and (3) processes of deterioration in the performance of govern-

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mental functions in the economic and public order sectors. Frequently, analysts give the impression that these variables represent forces "pulling" the military into political action. Ostensibly complementary to these so-called systemic pulls or weaknesses are the "pushes" of the military subsystem. That is, the strengths (or, in some cases, the very weaknesses) of the military organization–in terms of its size, armament, hierarchical discipline, cohesion, and socialization capabilities–seem to tend to propel the military into action against a relatively incapacitated regime.

Of the two basic approaches, the systemic focus has received the most empirical attention to date. As a consequence, this article will examine some aspects of the comparatively understudied subsystemic perspective on military coup-making behavior by concentrating on the evaluation of several pertinent generalizations with military coup data. More specifically, Fossum's (1968) analysis of 105 Latin American coups (1907-1966) suggested that there were distinctive relationships among the ranks of the coup-makers, the civilian/military nature of the ousted regime, and the type of new regime installed after a successful coup. These findings raise several questions deserving further examination. First, Fossum assumes that coup-maker rank is indicative of the extent of cohesion within the military subsystem. While this may be frequently the case, evidence is available which casts doubt on the validity of the assumption. Other facets of coup-making behavior need to be examined in order to assess the apparent connection between rank and internal cohesion. Second, if structural facets of the military organization predict–to whatever extent–the nature of coup outcomes, the relationships presumably should be universal and not merely restricted to Latin American coup behavior. Consequently, Fossum's findings need to be examined over a wider geographical scope if we are to be more certain about the correct level of generalization.[2] Third, it may be profitable to ask whether the structural nature of the post-coup ruling arrangement makes any difference to the arrangement's tenure. Given the ostensibly greater potential for conflict within collective arrangements (juntas) as opposed to more hierarchical structures (single executives), it is possible to hypothesize that after a successful coup the tenure of collective executives is more likely to be shorter than the tenure of single executives. If this is true and if the nature of the post-coup regime is, in turn, dependent upon the cohesion of the military organization, then military subsystemic cohesion may be a partial determinant of post-coup regime tenure and the subsequent probability of more coups. Should this be the case, the legitimacy of subsystemic approaches for the etiology of military coup behavior would be reinforced

even though it is quite likely that organizational cohesion is simultaneously related to such systemic attributes as ethnic and linguistic homogeneity.

ORGANIZATIONAL COHESION, RANK, AND COUP PLANNING LEVELS

The most obvious political resource of the military is their direct access to the state's ultimate means of control. Command of relatively organized and available, skilled, and armed manpower renders a military organization's leadership a potentially significant group in politics. Moreover, whatever traits military institutions may be considered to share in the abstract sense (see Kolkowicz, 1967: 23), most possess some variable capacity for instilling corporate values and attitudes in personnel belief systems. Via the socializing processes of recruitment, training, indoctrination, professionalization, as well as cohort/career patterns, some sense of common identity is produced which can be quite useful to the defense and advancement of organizational interests.

Yet for all the trappings of homogeneity and unity, the armed forces are also variably permeable to nonmilitary groups and interests, and hierarchical discipline is not all that manuals on the chain of command might have us believe. Sources of organizational heterogeneity and disunity include those of professional and generational orientations, tribe, region, religion, rank, political preferences, and intramilitary factions and rivalries. While none of these factors is likely to promote the internal cohesion of the military organization, the effects of cohesion remain a multifaceted phenomenon. Janowitz (1964: 68) has suggested a possible curvilinear quality by observing that a higher degree of cohesion strengthens the military capability to act in politics, while a low degree of cohesion may lead to a greater propensity to act in politics. Alternatively, internal cleavages may give a military organization a greater appreciation for political caution lest overt action solidify the cleavages at the expense of institutional solidarity and stability (see Einaudi, 1969: 12). Further a military coup led by one ethnoregional group can precipitate a chain of coups led by rival groups, as has occurred in Nigeria and to a lesser extent in Syria. If, then, it is unrealistic to portray armed forces as monolithic political actors, and since the presence of variable degrees of subsytemic heterogeneity appears to be just as much of a universal attribute of military organizations as is corporate socialization, it seems quite likely that intraorganizational cohesion and cleavages are significant factors in the "push of the military subsystem."

TABLE 1
Distribution of Military Coup Leadership Ranks (1946-1970)

Leadership Ranks	World N	World %	Latin America N	Latin America %	Arab World N	Arab World %	Southeast and East Asia N	Southeast and East Asia %	Sub-saharan Africa N	Sub-saharan Africa %
Senior	114	44	55	44	18	39	17	50	18	50
Middle	82	32	46	37	16	35	8	24	7	19
Junior	22	9	9	7	3	7	2	6	5	14
NCO	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0
Enlisted	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mixed										
Senior/Middle	27	11	8	6	7	15	6	18	3	8
Senior/Junior	2	1	1	1	1	2	0	0	0	0
Middle/Junior	7	3	4	3	1	2	0	0	2	6
Junior/NCO	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	3	0	0
NCO/Enlisted	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	3
	257	100	124	99	46	100	34	101	36	100

Percentage entries are rounded; thus the columns do not always sum to exactly 100%.

Beyond counting the number of coups that reflect factional and ethnoregional processes at play, it is difficult to attack directly these cohesion questions with empirical data susceptible to the testing of generalizations. One avenue which has been pursued with some success, however, focuses on coup-maker rank as an indicator of organizational cohesion. If military institutions acted in politics as organizational wholes, one might reasonably expect most military coups to be led by the most senior officers in deference to the principles of seniority, discipline, and unity. In order to test this expectation, an attempt was made to code the leadership of each military coup (1946-1970) according to rank: senior, middle, junior, NCO, enlisted, or various combinations of the five.[3] Table 1 summarizes the discovered distributions and reveals that most military coups are not led by the most senior officers. In fact, if one combines the senior/middle category—which frequently denotes cases of middle-ranking officers coopting one or more senior officers to augment or legitimize their intramilitary weight and position—with the middle-ranking category, the resulting distribution suggests that military coup leadership is predominantly and approximately equally divided between middle and senior-ranking officers.[4] The only regional exception is provided by the coups of sub-saharan Africa where the command structure is much less likely to be elongated. Thus it is apparent that military institutions do not always act in politics as organizational wholes. The question that then arises is whether or not it is valid to accept senior leadership as an indicator of relatively unified or cohesive institutional action.

As it happens, there is some slippage in the rank-organization connection. Generals may be leading their respective officers or they may be serving themselves, just as lesser-ranking officers may perceive themselves as acting on behalf of their organization, unit, or some group inside or outside the military subsystem. Lee's (1969: 21) "level of military intervention" index is helpful in narrowing this ambiguity. If a military organization can maximize its discipline and command system advantages only by remaining united, there are at least three levels of coup planning: headquarters, specific unit(s), and ad hoc groups of armed plotters. Table 2 displays the proportion of senior and nonsenior leadership associated with the three planning levels. While nonsenior leadership is not common at the headquarters level, 43% of the coups led by senior officers were less centralized efforts and presumably reflect less organizational cohesion than the senior leadership-headquarters planned variety. This would suggest both that rank alone is not an adequate indicator of organizational cohesion and that a superior indicator might be constructed by merging

TABLE 2
Leadership Rank and Coup Planning Level

Coup Planning Level	World				Latin America				Arab World				Southeast and East Asia				Sub-saharan Africa			
	Senior		Non-Senior		Senior		Non-Senior		Senior		Non-Senior		Senior		Non-Senior		Senior		Non-Senior	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Headquarters	65	57	13	9	28	51	9	13	9	50	0	0	11	65	1	6	12	67	2	11
Unit(s)	40	35	108	76	21	38	47	66	7	39	25	89	6	35	15	88	5	28	14	78
Ad hoc Plotters	9	8	22	15	6	11	15	21	2	11	3	11	0	0	1	6	1	5	2	11
	114	100	143	100	55	100	71	100	18	100	28	100	17	100	17	100	18	100	18	100
Significance Levels:	(.000)				(.000)				(.000)				(.001)				(.003)			

the rank and planning level variables. Consequently, a simple dichotomy, senior leadership-headquarters planned (SLHP) coups versus nonsenior leadership-headquarters planned (NSLHP), will be employed as a measure of the degree of organizational cohesion reflected by military coup attempts. Although it is not possible to use this indicator to test the direct relationship between military cohesion and the propensity to coup, it is possible to attempt to trace the influence of cohesion (as operationalized) upon coup outcomes, which may in turn lead us indirectly back to the question of coup propensities. Three aspects of coup outcomes will be examined: the immediate success or failure, the type of post-coup ruling arrangement, and the tenure of the post-coup ruling arrangement. The examination will explicitly focus on the testing of three hypotheses:

(1) SLHP coups are more likely to be successful than NSLHP coups.
(2) Successful SLHP as opposed to successful NSLHP coups, are more likely to result in single executive post-coup ruling arrangements than the collective executive type.
(3) Single executive post-coup ruling arrangements are more likely than the collective executive type to have a longer tenure.

As in the cases of Tables 1 and 2, the tests will be conducted on the total 1946-1970 coup N (world) as well as on the four regions where military coups have been the most frequent since the end of World War II: Latin America, the Arab World (the Arab Middle East and North Africa), Southeast and East Asia, and sub-saharan Africa. The military coups of the following states are included in the first aggregation but excluded from the regional examinations: France, Portugal, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Nepal. Given the nature of the data, the statistical procedures to be employed will be kept fairly simple. Tests of statistical significance will be reported where conceivably appropriate but not because it is believed that they have much meaning in the context of a nonrandom sampled data base. Nevertheless, it is clear (see Morrison and Henkel, 1970) that the manner in which such tests may and/or should be employed is not subject to a high level of consensus. Therefore, the significance test outcomes will be reported for the benefit of those readers who wish to use them as auxiliary criteria for assessing the reliability of the findings. The familiar chi-square will be used where N size is greater or equal to 20, amended by Yates' correction for continuity when cell entries fall below 5. Fisher's exact test of significance will be employed for tables with N sizes of less than 20. More crucial to an evaluation of the findings and their

interpretation, in this writer's view, are the fluctuating and diminishing N sizes which appear in the regional breakdowns and when control variables are introduced. However, there is little that can be done to measurably increase the data population for the immediate future. Hence, the customary caveat concerning the tentativeness of the reported findings is particularly valid for the present research.

ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1. Military coups may have one of three immediate outcomes: success, failure, or compromise. A successful coup requires the removal of the chief executive and a post-coup ruling arrangement which is satisfactory to the coup-makers and which survives for at least a week. Failures must involve a recognizable and recorded physical attempt to seize control. The less common compromise coup may come about in two ways. A chief executive may be successfully removed but resistance to the coup-makers may remain sufficiently strong to dictate a post-coup arrangement other than that originally planned. Alternatively, both attacking and defending forces may lack sufficient strength to decide the immediate contest. In these cases, some temporary solution is usually accepted until one team or the other gains the upper hand at a later date.

Hypothesis 1: SLHP coups are more likely to be successful than NSLHP coups.

Not too surprisingly, Table 3 demonstrates that the senior leadership-headquarters planned coup has had a very high success rate. In fact, during the 1946-1970 period, SLHP coups were about twice as likely as NSLHP coups to accomplish their immediate mission. There is an obvious tactical explanation for this development. The most serious threat to aspiring military coup-makers usually comes from other military officers who are prepared to defend the incumbent regime leadership. SLHP coups, almost by definition, are unlikely to meet much internal resistance beyond that expected of a small palace guard. Thus, the SLHP coup is likely to be bloodless and of short duration. By maximizing the political resource advantages of the military organization, few SLHP coups are likely to fail.

Hypothesis 2. Having confirmed the first hypothesis, it is appropriate to move onto the subject of post-coup ruling arrangements. Fossum's (1968)

Latin American data indicated that generals preferred "strongman" arrangements or a single military executive as opposed to collective junta structures, which were preferred by lower-ranking officers. This finding was explained by noting that less senior officers tend to lack legitimacy as representatives of the military organization and therefore attempt to demonstrate their representativeness through a collegial executive. While this explanation stems from Fossum's emphasis on rank, it applies equally well to the SLHP/NSLHP distinction. Coups which reflect greater organizational cohesion are in a better position to supplant the incumbent structure with that of the military leadership. Coups reflecting less cohesion are apt to be executed by often diverse coalitions which require a less hierarchical structure–at least until a post-coup "pecking order" can

TABLE 3
SLHP/NSLHP and Initial Coup Outcomes

	SLHP		NSLHP		Significance Levels
	N	%	N	%	
World					
Successful	59	91	49	27	
Non-successful	6	9	130	73	(.000)
	65	100	179	100	
Latin America					
Successful	25	89	19	21	
Non-successful	3	11	70	79	(.000)
	28	100	89	100	
Arab World					
Successful	8	89	15	41	
Non-successful	1	11	22	59	(.026)
	9	100	37	100	
Southeast and East Asia					
Successful	10	91	6	27	
Non-successful	1	9	16	73	(.002)
	11	100	22	100	
Sub-saharan Africa					
Successful	11	92	8	36	
Non-successful	1	8	14	64	(.006)
	12	100	22	100	

TABLE 4
SLHP/NSLHP and Post-Coup Regime Structures

Post-Coup Regime Structure	World				Latin America				Arab World				Southeast and East Asia				Sub-saharan Africa			
	SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Single Executives	44	74	25	51	16	64	10	52	7	88	9	60	6	60	3	50	10	91	3	37
Collective Executives	15	26	24	49	9	36	9	48	1	12	6	40	4	40	3	50	1	9	5	63
	59	100	49	100	25	100	19	100	8	100	15	100	10	100	6	100	11	100	8	100
Significance Levels:	(.02>p>.01)				(.7>p>.5)				(.5>p>.3)				(.549)				(.024)			
Single Executives																				
Military	29	49	9	18	7	28	5	26	6	75	4	27	5	50	0	0	8	73	0	0
Civilian	15	25	16	33	9	36	5	26	1	13	5	33	1	10	3	50	2	18	3	37
Collective Executives																				
Military	10	17	18	37	7	28	7	37	1	12	3	20	2	20	0	0	0	0	5	63
Other	5	9	6	12	2	8	2	11	0	0	3	20	2	20	3	50	1	9	0	0
	59	100	49	100	25	100	19	100	8	100	15	100	10	100	6	100	11	100	8	100

be established and maintained. If, then, the structure of post-coup ruling arrangements reflect the extent of cohesion possessed by the military organization involved, one would expect:

> Hypothesis 2: Successful SLHP coups, as opposed to successful NSLHP coups, are more likely to result in single executive post-coup ruling arrangements than the collective executive type.

Post-coup political structures do not always fall into convenient pigeonholes. Nor is it always clear where the primary powers of decision-making reside. It was found, however, that post-coup ruling arrangements could be classified as primarily belonging to one of the following classes: (1) single military executive, (2) military junta, (3) civilian-military junta, (4) single civilian executive, (5) single civilian executive/military junta, or (6) civilian junta. For the purposes of the present analysis, categories three, five, and six were merged to form a "collective other" type.

The data summarized in Table 4 support the second hypothesis but not in a uniform fashion. In all five geographical aggregations, SLHP coup-makers have clearly opted for single executive structures over collective arrangements. Furthermore, the SLHP coup-maker preference for single executives is consistently stronger than NSLHP preferences for either type of post-coup structure. The lack of uniformity is revealed by the general lack of preference demonstrated by NSLHP coup-makers. Only in sub-saharan Africa have NSLHP coup-makers tended to opt for collective executives. However, if one goes beyond the single-collective discrimination, patterns of structural choice become more distinct. SLHP coup-makers consistently tend to create single military executives except in the Arab world and in Latin America. Vis-à-vis the exceptions, it is worth noting that if one halves the 1946-1970 period and attention is restricted to the more recent twelve and one-half years, Latin American SLHP coup-makers also have tended to choose single military executives. Within the same temporal focus, the Arab NSLHP preference for single civilian executives diminishes. These two facts perhaps suggest that the interregional differences are partially due to coup behavior learning processes, as well as to the extent to which military organizations are open to civilian influences. The assumption here is that, of the four main coup-making regions, the Latin American and Arab militaries are the least insulated from civilian society. Hence, there has been a tendency—due either to an initial reluctance to rule or a desire for societal legitimacy—to

seek greater post-coup civilian participation in these two regions.[5] Nevertheless, the tendency to seek civilian participation in post-coup regimes has noticeably declined over time.

Hypothesis 3. The results of the analysis reported in Table 4 suggest one way in which organizational attributes may have an impact on the political system. Still, the connection of the cohesion/SLHP/post-coup ruling arrangement relationship to the etiology of coups is less than complete. To make the connection more evident, a further question about coup outcomes requires investigation. Namely, is there any relationship between post-coup structure and the tenure of the arrangement? If the answer is affirmative, then some evidence for tracing an indirect link between organizational attributes, post-coup regime tenure, and coup cycles will have been uncovered.

Hypothesis 3: Single executive post-coup ruling arrangements are more likely than the collective executive type to have a longer tenure.

To tackle this question, a cutting point of two years' regime survival was established. Those arrangements lasting two years or less were considered relatively "short-lived"; those surviving more than two years were designated relatively "long-lived." Implicit to this cutting point is the notion that very little can be accomplished in less than two years' time. Furthermore, roughly half (51%) of the 1946-1970 post-coup regimes did manage to remain in place for more than two years. Table 5 reports the results of the post-coup structure-tenure distributions. It is apparent that hypothesis three is also supported by the data. Single executives are more likely that collective executives to survive more than two years. However, in Latin America and especially in Asia, the survival advantages of a single executive versus its collective counterpart appear to be slight. Still, it would be extremely difficult to overlook the obvious distinction between civilian and military structures. Post-coup military arrangements, whether of the unitary or collective type, have tended to outlast post-coup civilian structures. One reason for this may be that civilian leaders do not serve as well as military leaders in protecting or advancing the corporate well-being of the military organization, a significant cause of military coups in the first place.

Do then single executive structures tend to outlast juntas because of the inherent nature of their structure or because SLHP coups tend to result in single executives? The evidence would seem to discount—although not to reject—the inherent structural explanation. Whereas single military execu-

tives tend to fare better than collective military executives (except in sub-saharan Africa), collective civilian arrangements do not always fare worse than single civilian executives. However, there is really no need to choose one explanation over the other. What seems most plausible is that the two variables–rank leadership/planning level and post-coup regime structure–reinforce one another. Since rank leadership-planning level must precede regime structure, the mutual reinforcement explanation may be tested by examining the relationship between leadership rank/planning level and tenure, while controlling for post-coup regime structure.

TABLE 5
Post-Coup Regime Structure and Tenure

	Executive Structure				Single Executive				Collective Executive			
	Single		Collective		Military		Civilian		Military		Other	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
World												
Two yrs. or less	33	48	22	56	13	34	20	65	13	46	9	82
More than two yrs.	36	52	17	44	25	66	11	35	15	54	2	18
	69	100	39	100	38	100	31	100	28	100	11	100
	(.5>p>.3)				(.02>p>.01)				(p = .100)			
Latin America												
Two yrs. or less	15	58	11	61	5	42	10	71	7	50	4	100
More than two yrs.	11	42	7	39	7	58	4	29	7	50	0	0
	26	100	18	100	12	100	14	100	14	100	4	100
	(.9>p>.8)				(.3>p>.2)				(p = .544)			
Arab World												
Two yrs. or less	7	44	4	57	3	30	4	67	2	50	2	67
More than two yrs.	9	56	3	43	7	70	2	33	2	50	1	33
	16	100	7	100	10	100	6	100	4	100	3	100
	(.7>p>.5)				(P = .182)				(p = .262)			
Southeast and East Asia												
Two yrs. or less	5	56	4	57	1	20	4	100	2	40	2	100
More than two yrs.	4	44	3	43	4	80	0	0	3	60	0	0
	9	100	7	100	5	100	4	100	5	100	2	100
	(p = .324)				(p = .039)				(p = .286)			
Sub-saharan Africa												
Two yrs. or less	5	38	3	50	3	38	2	40	2	40	1	100
More than two yrs.	8	62	3	50	5	62	3	60	3	60	0	0
	13	100	6	100	8	100	5	100	5	100	1	100
	(p = .072)				(p = .751)				(p = .500)			

TABLE 6
SLHP/NSLHP and Post-Coup Regime Tenure, Controlling for Post-Coup Regime Structure

					Single Executive				Collective Executive				Single Executive				Collective Executive			
													Military		Civilian		Military		Other	
	SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP		SLHP		NSLHP	
World	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Two yrs. or less	26	44	29	59	16	36	17	68	10	67	12	50	8	28	5	56	8	53	12	75	5	50	8	44	5	100	4	67
More than two yrs.	33	56	20	41	28	64	8	32	5	33	12	50	21	72	4	44	7	47	4	25	5	50	10	56	0	0	2	33
	(.2>p>.1)				(.02>p>.01)				(.5>p>.3)				(.3>p>.2)				(.5>p>.3)				(.8>p>.7)				(p = .273)			
Latin America																												
Two yrs. or less	14	56	12	63	8	50	7	70	6	67	5	56	2	29	3	60	6	67	4	80	4	57	3	43	2	100	2	100
More than two yrs.	11	44	7	37	8	50	3	30	3	33	4	44	5	71	2	40	3	33	1	20	3	43	4	57	0	0	0	0
	(.7>p>.5)				(.7>p>.5)				(p = .500)				(p = .311)				(p = .546)				(p = .500)				(p = 1.00)			
Arab World																												
Two yrs. or less	2	25	9	60	1	14	6	67	1	100	3	50	1	17	2	50	0	0	4	80	1	100	1	33	0	0	2	67
More than two yrs.	6	75	6	40	6	86	3	33	0	0	3	50	5	83	2	50	1	100	1	20	0	0	2	67	0	0	1	33
	(.3>p>.2)				(p = .055)				(p = .571)				(p = .333)				(p = .333)				(p = .500)				(p = 1.00)			
Southeast and East Asia																												
Two yrs. or less	4	40	5	83	2	33	3	100	2	50	2	67	1	20	0	0	1	100	3	100	0	0	2	67	2	100	0	0
More than two yrs.	6	60	1	17	4	67	0	0	2	50	1	33	4	80	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	100	1	33	0	0	0	0
	(p = .074)				(p = .012)				(p = .628)				(p = 1.00)				(p = 1.00)				(p = .300)				(p = 1.00)			
Sub-saharan Africa																												
Two yrs. or less	5	46	3	38	4	40	1	33	1	100	2	40	3	38	0	0	1	50	1	33	0	0	2	40	1	100	0	0
More than two yrs.	6	54	5	62	6	60	2	67	0	0	3	60	5	62	0	0	1	50	2	67	0	0	3	60	0	0	0	0
	(p = .626)				(p = .509)				(p = .500)				(p = 1.00)				(p = .700)				(p = 1.00)				(p = 1.00)			

Table 6 suggests that there is an initial relationship: SLHP coups are more likely than NSLHP coups to install ruling arrangements which last more than two years, except in sub-saharan Africa. When one controls for post-coup regime type, the initial relationships are uniformally strengthened. SLHP coups (as opposed to NSLHP coups) that produce single executive structures are more likely to last more than two years, except again in sub-saharan Africa. Equally compatible with the reinforcement approach is the tendency for NSLHP coups (as opposed to SLHP coups) that install collective executives to be more likely to last more than two years, with the exception this time of Southeast and East Asia.

Nevertheless, and as was the case in Table 5, Table 6 also reveals that the SLHP/NSLHP-tenure relationship is even stronger when military/civilian structural distinctions are introduced. More than 70% of the successful military coups which were led by senior officers, planned at the headquarters level, and resulted in a single military executive survived more than two years. With the exception of the Asian cases, more than half (56%) of the successful NSLHP coups leading to collective military executives were of the "longer-lived" variety. Equally interesting is the fact that SLHP coups leading to single civilian executives generally fared slightly better than NSLHP coups with the same outcome. This last finding may be interpreted as further reaffirming the SLHP-tenure connection. Hence, there would appear to be sufficient evidence to justify the merging of hypotheses two and three:

> Successful SLHP coups, as opposed to successful NSLHP coups are more likely to result in single executive post-coup ruling arrangements than the collective executive type and more likely to have a longer tenure than the collective executive type.

A RIVAL INDICATOR AND HYPOTHESIS

There is at least one rival hypothesis worthy of consideration in view of the findings of this article. Fossum (1968: 285) found that there was some relationship between the number of services participating in Latin American coups and the structure of the post-coup regime. When one service executed a successful coup, a "military president" was the most frequent outcome, whereas juntas were the most frequent outcome when more than one service participated. Given the underlying concern of this article with the influence of organizational cohesion, it should not be difficult to realize the relevance of the nature of interservice coup cooperation. One would expect that, other things being equal, the more

services involved on the attacking side, the more cohesive the organizational action. The problem with this formulation is that not all military organizations subscribe or can afford to subscribe to the conventional subdivision of army, navy, and air force units.[6] Table 7 in fact, suggests that if one wishes to examine the rival participation index of cohesion, it would be wise to exclude the Arab world and sub-saharan Africa on grounds of incomparability. During the 1946-1970 period, Arab and African states had few naval personnel, and the air force only began to become a significant political factor in the Arab world as of the early 1960s.

Hence, restricting attention to Latin America and Southeast and East Asia, the following findings, reported in Table 8, seem particularly pertinent: (1) the greater the number of services participating, the greater the proportion of successful outcomes; (2) approximately 75% of the cases where all three services participated involved senior rank leadership and headquarters planning; (3) 75% or more of the SLHP cases with all three services participating were successful; and (4) in Latin America, 65% of the successful coups involving all three services installed post-coup regimes which survived more than two years. These findings could be interpreted as suggesting that coups involving all three services reflect greater organizational cohesion than those coups involving one or two services.

TABLE 7
Relative Distribution of Number of Services Participating in Military Coups (1946-1970)

	Number of Services Participating					
	1		2		3	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Latin America	83	62	29	22	21	16
Arab World	37	76	11	22	1	2
Southeast and East Asia	27	75	4	11	5	14
Sub-saharan Africa	37	100	--	--	--	--

Services participating in the opposition to a coup attempt are excluded from this enumeration.

However, an examination of the relationship between service participation and post-coup regime structure suggests something different. In Latin America, there is little difference demonstrated vis-à-vis coups involving one service or three services and their post-coup preferences for single versus collective executives, although differences do arise when one inspects the military/civilian composition of the post-coup regimes. Only in Asia is it accurate to state that the greater the number of participating services, the greater the probability of a collective executive outcome, and the fewer the number of participating services, the greater the probability of a single executive. Given the findings reported in Tables 4 and 8, this would seem to suggest that, while there is undoubtedly some overlap in the

TABLE 8
Selected Coup Data According to the Number of Services Participating (1946-1970)

	Number of Services Participating					
	1		2		3	
	N	%	N	%	N	%
Latin America						
Proportion successful	27	33	11	38	15	71
Proportion SLHP	6	9	3	11	16	76
Proportion successful SLHP	6	35	3	30	14	93
Proportion with tenure of more than two yrs.	10	37	3	27	9	60
Proportion resulting in single executives	13	48	7	64	8	53
Military	4	15	5	46	5	33
Civilian	9	33	2	18	3	20
Proportion resulting in collective executives	14	52	4	36	7	47
Military	10	37	3	27	6	40
Other	4	15	1	9	1	7
Southeast and East Asia						
Proportion successful	10	37	3	75	4	80
Proportion SLHP	7	28	1	25	3	75
Proportion successful SLHP	6	67	1	33	3	75
Proportion with tenure of more than two yrs.	5	50	1	33	2	50
Proportion resulting in single executives	7	70	1	33	1	25
Military	5	50	0	--	0	--
Civilian	2	20	1	33	1	25
Proportion resulting in collective executives	3	30	2	67	3	75
Military	2	20	1	33	3	75
Other	1	10	1	33	0	--

measurement of SLHP and number of participating services, the two indices are not measuring the same thing, organizational cohesion, to the same extent. Furthermore, SLHP coups are more likely to be successful than coups involving all three services. This would suggest that coups involving all three services are more likely than SLHP coups to encounter resistance, probably of a military nature. The combination of these arguments with the fact that service participation cannot be examined on a universal basis[7] leads me to conclude that while the service participation variable is not irrelevant to military coup outcomes, it is neither a superior nor necessarily an alternative (to the SLHP/NSLHP distinction) indicator of organizational cohesion.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Relying on a merger of leadership rank and the organizational level of planning to imperfectly measure the cohesion of military organizational involvement in coups, three hypotheses linking organizational cohesion and coup outcomes have been examined and substantiated to varying degrees. Military coups reflecting greater organizational cohesion (as operationalized) are more likely to be successful and more likely to result in post-coup collective military executives. Collective executives are generally less likely to survive as long as single executives. Military coups reflecting less organizational cohesion, then, are probably somewhat more likely to lead to more coups. These findings indirectly contribute to our empirical understanding of the etiology of the military coup and, more directly, to the nature of post-coup military rule. But they also reinforce the analytical position that the study of the military subsystem is a worthwhile approach to improving our knowledge of military political behavior.[8] One would think that this was fairly self-evident. Nevertheless, some advocates of the systemic perspective (Rapoport, 1962; North, 1966; Huntington, 1968; Feldberg, 1970) have chosen to deny any validity to the argument that the study of military organizational structures and processes is an important route to knowledge on the political behavior of armed forces personnel. To some extent, this may be traceable to the failure of such organizational indicators as personnel size and defense expenditures to perform as good predictors of military political behavior. But there is, of course, much more to the subsystemic perspective than these variables would indicate. So it is fairly surprising that it is only quite recently that more moderate arguments have appeared recognizing that to

choose one approach over the other is unwarranted especially in the continued absence of conclusive empirical findings (Needler, 1969; Stepan, 1971; Price, 1971).[9]

To be sure, the debate has always been somewhat one-sided. Military subsystem analysts have tended to be sociologists (Janowitz, 1964; Lissak, 1970; Luckham, 1971) who, while acknowledging the utility of systemic examinations, were professionally inclined toward an organizational focus. By and large, it seems to have been political scientists who have overracted in their stress on the explanatory superiority of the systemic approach. The position underlying this article is that both approaches are capable of explanatory payoffs, just as both possess inherent limitations. To argue otherwise is seemingly difficult to justify, for systemic and subsystemic perspectives on the military coup are frequently only tackling opposite sides of the same analytical coin, regime vulnerability. Just as economic deterioration and a lack of socioeconomic development–systemic weaknesses–contribute to a regime's vulnerability to seizure, military subsystemic strengths, such as organizational cohesion, may also facilitate such seizures and thereby increase a regime's relative vulnerability. Alternatively, when members of the armed forces take power through coups, a relative lack of military organizational cohesion will presumably contribute to subsequent regime vulnerability. Thus, both systemic and subsystemic factors *may facilitate* the occurrence of military coups as well as *influence* the specific nature of the outcomes of attempted coups.[10] The analysis of the "push of the military subsystem" merely stresses the military side of the regime-military equation where other analysts prefer to emphasize the sociopolitical background of the regime side. Both sides of the "equation" deserve simultaneous and integrated consideration along with other factors in future research, for neither of the two approaches is in a position to offer a full explanation on its own.

NOTES

1. Other approaches include foci on coup-maker grievances (Thompson, 1973) and on regional and global influences on domestic conflict (e.g., Li and Thompson, 1975).

2. The data to be employed in this study were taken from a military coup data set (Thompson, 1972) in which a military coup is defined as occurring whenever members of the regular armed forces remove or attempt to remove a state's chief executive through the use or threat of the use of force. The data set includes a

number of variables on the 274 military coups which occurred in 59 states between 1946 and 1970. Data sources included 171 political histories and country/case studies, eight regional and nonregional news summaries, and the New York *Times* and the *Times* (London).

3. The coding of leadership rank depended on the specific hierarchical structure of each military organization. In most cases, generals and admirals were considered senior ranks; colonels, majors, and their naval equivalents were middle ranks; captains and lieutenants and their naval equivalents were junior ranks; and so forth. In some states, however, the senior military officers held comparatively low ranks. For example, the senior army officer in Burundi of the mid-1960s was a captain. When that captain led a series of coups, the initial coding problems gradually disappeared as successful leaders promoted themselves to "more appropriate" ranks.

4. This finding also has relevance for Deutsch's (1966: 154-155) contention that coups are often led by colonels because of their middle-level strategic position within the military heirarchy. These middle-level officers, it is pointed out, are close enough to the troops to prevent effective communication between the lowest and the highest ranks yet sufficiently aloof to allow for intercolonel conspiratorial activities. While Deutsch's explanation seems plausible and certainly is not refuted by the data, it is clearly incomplete, since most military coups are not led by middle-ranking officers.

5. See Perlmutter (1969) for a possibly relevant discussion of the transition of the military political roles of the military from arbiters to rulers.

6. Nonmilitary actors also participate in the execution of military coups. Four categories are pertinent: paramilitary units, police, armed civilians, and unarmed civilians. However, their participation has been excluded from the present analysis.

7. For that matter, there is a problem of comparability within the Latin American and Asian regions. A number of these states possessed only small navies and air forces during the 1946-1970 period. For example, of those states which experienced military coups in the two regions, there is considerable dispersion evident when one computes the proportion of the armed forces which are army personnel: Latin America (1955) low: 57.1% (Peru), high: 100% (Panama); Latin America (1965) low: 49.2% (Venezuela), high: 100% (Panama); Southeast and East Asia (1955) low: 72.6% (Thailand), high: 96.9% (South Korea); and Southeast and East Asia (1965) low: 67.2% (Thailand), high: 92.0% (Cambodia).

8. One hastens to point out that the data analyzed in this article do not cover the full spectrum of military subsystemic concerns. For instance, one of the relevant topics not touched upon here–one which has received some empirical attention with mixed findings–is the relationship between political behavior and military assistance (see Wolf, 1965; Powell, 1965; Brown, 1969; Gutteridge, 1969; Schmitter, 1973; Rowe, 1974).

9. For one of the few empirical published comparisons of indicators from the two approaches, see Wells (1974).

10. I have argued elsewhere (Thompson, 1973, 1975a, 1975b) that coup occurrences appear to be more fundamentally dependent upon the nature and intensity of coup-maker grievances, a topic which is not always adequately treated by either societal or organizational analysts.

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