by the *real* thing (e.g., the real Italians, the real Oxbridge graduates, etc.), countless strategies have been adopted, from rituals to certificates, from uniforms to legislation. Landa reminds us that the signal is an economic asset in itself, something people would like to acquire or forge in order to be recognized as insiders of a certain network. Even assuming that a signal is protected by a group, its nature may enable an individual to acquire it, whether or not others like it. Intermarriage, name changing, language learning, accent modulation are some possible strategies, subject to different degrees of piracy and protection. Even though the guardians of a group's membership may put a lot of effort in their job, some may pass through the net. A sound theory of signals should be able to account for the relative plasticity of each signal vis-à-vis the mechanisms groups use in order to protect the signal's authenticity. Landa's work is a fundamental stepping-stone of such a theory.

The Rebel's Dilemma. By Mark Irving Lichbach. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995. Pp. xxii + 514. $45.00.

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The Rebel's Dilemma is an impressive attempt to organize and catalog a large number of solutions that have been proposed for the collective action problem and to apply these solutions to a vast literature in political science and sociology on political dissent, reform, and revolution. Some may quarrel with Lichbach's typology of solutions or with his interpretation of specific studies, but this is an ambitious compilation that will prove useful to those who wish to come to grips with political, economic, and sociological studies of social protest.

The book is organized into four parts. Part 1 reviews the collective action problem (equated here with the prisoner's dilemma) and contrasts rational choice theories against theories of protest that are based on discontent and relative deprivation, which Lichbach regards as their main competition in the field of political dissent.

Part 2 elaborates on 21 sets of solutions to the collective action problem that have emerged in the literature. These solutions are organized under four broad categories—market, community, contract, and hierarchy—based on the degree to which each solution relies on deliberation and the prior existence of social institutions. Market solutions, in his typology, do not resort either to existing institutions or to formal agreements. Instead, these solutions affect contribution levels by exogenously changing the cost-benefit parameters of the collective action problem. Community solutions, on the other hand, assume that dissidents build on social solidarity and group memberships. Solutions in this category rely on the principle that regular interaction in a community promotes higher levels

of cooperation. Political activism that is coordinated by historical traditions is an example of this kind of solution, as are bandwagon solutions to collective action that hinge on common knowledge about what fellow members of the community plan to do. Lichbach also considers the application of psychological and moral incentives to be examples of community solutions, since social values and norms and participatory benefits all stem from community foundations.

In contract solutions, individuals bargain over what institutions to create in order to overcome the collective action problem. In this category fall more formal agreements that dissenters make, such as tit-for-tat exchanges in which cooperation is given on a contingent basis. Finally, solutions based on hierarchy consider how collective action can be stimulated by organizations, patrons, and governments that subsidize or coerce individual contributions. These solutions focus on locating entrepreneurs, providing selective incentives, enforcing agreements, and monitoring contributions.

Part 3 examines the political conditions under which particular solutions are manifest as well as the unintended consequences that often follow from solving collective action problems. According to Lichbach, the exact course that political dissent takes depends on the strategic exchange between protesters and the state. He argues persuasively that collective action models usually do not provide a sophisticated account of the conditions under which states will either make concessions to protesters or resist them. The state's response to political activism is especially complicated when the link between protest and public goods is mediated by a variety of institutions, such as elections, legislatures, and courts, and when there is a variety of patrons, organizations, and interest groups, in addition to the protesters themselves, who are pressuring for change. What is required, then, are models of collective action that are able to incorporate these additional factors into the production function relating demands to the supply of public goods.

Part 4 evaluates rational choice theories of activism against alternatives that trace dissent to discontent and alienation. Lichbach focuses on whether the rational choice program provides additional, verified insights into collective action, and whether these insights are different and better than those deduced from alternative theories. Some of this discussion is limited by his decision to use Gurr's *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton University Press, 1970), with its psychological and individualist basis, as his major foil. Readers may wish that Lichbach had, in addition, confronted the implications of rational choice theories against an array of alternatives such as political process models, resource mobilization theory, critical mass theories, and state-centered models. Nevertheless, what he shows is that a broad selection of research on collective dissent, only a fraction of which adopts an explicitly economic approach, can be unified considerably by the assumption that protesters are instrumentally rational actors. Although Lichbach concludes that rational choice theories provide addi-

tional insights compared to alternative theories, he is not entirely sanguine about the approach. In particular, he argues that the theories do not fare well in predicting either aggregate levels of dissent or the timing of outbreaks. Also, Lichbach recommends more elaborate microfoundations and greater attention to macrosociological relationships between state and society. More work also needs to be done on how preferences and demands are shaped by social forces. Therefore, although Lichbach clearly favors rational choice theories, the tone of the book is pleasantly moderate, and there is a balanced discussion of theoretical and empirical research that falls outside of this tradition.

One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict. By Russell Hardin. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995. Pp. xiv + 288. $24.95.

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The conventional wisdom of the social sciences is that collective action is good in its consequences, that rational individual actors fail to accomplish it, and hence that arrangements must be established that encourage collective action. Russell Hardin claims the opposite of all three of these propositions. Collective action, as manifested in ethnic mobilization, is, more often than not, disastrous in its consequences. But there are many and strong rational reasons to engage in it. Hence the problem is to discourage it.

The book is a treatise on some key problems of social and political theory, written in the blinding light of the contemporary events of ethnic violence in the former Yugoslavia and elsewhere. It is written with acute moral sensitivity by a utilitarian individualist who not only wishes to explain what is going on in the world, but also tries to score points against the political practice, as well as the philosophical theory, of communitarianism. In a nutshell, rather than suffering from too little cooperation, the world suffers from too much "coordination," the latter term meaning pseudoascriptive, strategically invoked, interest-driven, fear-induced, coercively imposed, socially exclusive loyalty to group-specific conventions.

In arguing this formidable agenda, the author goes "as far as possible with a rational choice account" (p. 16), relating interests and resources, not the agents' understandings and declared motivations, to behavioral outcomes. People do what they do, not because they believe it to be the right thing to do, but because given payoffs (which someone aiming at higher order payoffs may have manipulated) lead them to do so. The result is rational coordination based on group conventions and identifications—a mode of behavior that is so tempting because it is, in contrast to the alternative of cooperation, costless to those who engage in it.

But, alas, not for those who do not. Every convention involves exclu-