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Author(s): Donna Bahry

Source: *Slavic Review*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (Autumn, 1993), pp. 512-554

Published by:

Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2499722>

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# **Society Transformed? Rethinking the Social Roots of Perestroika**

**Donna Bahry**

Since the early days of perestroika, explanations for the Soviet opening to reform have emphasized the critical role of post-Stalin social transformation. Rising levels of education, changing patterns of social mobility and increasing urbanization seemed to create a new set of values and expectations by 1985 at odds with the Soviet system's traditional controls. If the initiative for restructuring came from the upper reaches of the political hierarchy, the pressures for change appeared to come from below. In contrast, assessments since the Soviet collapse have been more mixed. With the costs of reform mounting, calls for an "iron hand" and local resistance to market mechanisms suggest doubts about both capitalism and democracy: the results of Russia's April 1993 referendum seemed to be an endorsement of radical reform but only a minority of eligible voters actually approved Yeltsin's program;<sup>1</sup> and survey data a few months earlier had indicated public support for a new coup in Moscow.<sup>2</sup> Either the grand social and political transformation that unleashed perestroika was quickly reversed or its impact was exaggerated.

In either case, we are left with a fundamental question: how much did individual values change? As Remington observes, arguments about Soviet society's grand transformation generally leave the political side of the equation unfinished.<sup>3</sup> Few analysts agree on which values shifted, by how much and why. If discontent increased, did it focus primarily

I would like to thank the National Science Foundation, the National Council for Soviet and East European Research, and the College of Letters and Science and the Institute of Governmental Affairs, University of California at Davis, for research support; Carol Nechemias and Ada Finifter, for comments; Alex Inkeles, Fred Wyle and Joe Berliner for their advice on locating and interpreting materials from the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System; Adam Ulam for his assistance in making the materials available; and Carol Bowman and the Times Mirror Center for People and the Press for allowing me to use their data.

1. On the first question, "Do you trust the President of Russia, Boris N. Yeltsin?" 58.7% of those voting said yes; but when the vote is weighted for turnout, then Yeltsin received a "yes" from only 37.7% of eligible voters. Similarly, on the second question, "Do you approve of the socio-economic policies carried out by the President and Government of the Russian Federation since 1992?" the percentages were 53.0 and 34.0 respectively. Calculated from the voting returns in *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (19 May 1993): 2.

2. In one 1992 poll for Russian television, some 58% of respondents indicated that they would support a new putsch; 68% thought an authoritarian government would mean a higher standard of living, and 65% thought it would mean a lower crime rate (cited in *RFE/RL Research Report* 1 [17 July 1992]: 80).

3. "Regime Transition in Communist Systems: The Soviet Case," *Soviet Economy* 6 (1990): 160–90.

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on the regime, as the authors of *The Soviet Citizen* had contended, or on the system itself?<sup>4</sup> If it did focus on the system, was that due to the “triumph of modernization theory” or to the failure of the old social contract?<sup>5</sup> Was disaffection common across the board, or was it concentrated chiefly among new generations with only a dim memory of past sacrifices?

The available evidence offers few clear answers. Depending on the data one selects, modernization either led to more support for the core values of the Soviet system or it undermined them.<sup>6</sup> The impacts of generational replacement and of rising educational levels are equally ambiguous. Measuring change is especially difficult, given the scarcity of reliable surveys on individual attitudes before 1985. Most studies have had to rely on cross-sectional data, chiefly from the end of the Gorbachev era. If these reveal support for democratic institutions or for economic reform, the assumption is that such values must be the product of social changes unleashed years earlier.

I argue here that extending the analysis back in time yields a very different set of conclusions. *In the aggregate*, the desire for reform under Gorbachev was similar to that of the late Stalin years on many questions: most people wanted some political liberalization and some tolerance of private enterprise. However, the composition of the reform constituency changed over time and relatively modest cleavages under Stalin grew into substantial ones by the end of the Brezhnev era. Arguments about post-Stalin social transformation thus tend to underestimate earlier support for reform and to overstate the magnitude of value change since then. My analysis draws on newly available data to assess three critical turning points in Soviet politics: the last years of the Stalin era and the transition to collective leadership, the end of the Brezhnev period and the onset of reforms, and the final year of the Soviet era itself. I concentrate on basic elements of the Soviet order, from state control of the economy and the maintenance of political controls to the provision of social welfare and social justice. These were the key issues addressed in Inkeles and Bauer's seminal work on *The Soviet Citizen* and they offer a unique opportunity to trace individual values from Stalin to Gorbachev. They are also at the core of the controversy over restructuring after 1985 and can thus provide some important insights into the development of constituencies for

4. Alex Inkeles and Raymond Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen: Daily Life in a Totalitarian Society* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

5. Lucian W. Pye, “Political Science and the Crisis of Authoritarianism,” *American Political Science Review* 84 (1990): 3–19.

6. Throughout this paper, I use the terms “values,” “attitudes” and “preferences” interchangeably. In all cases, they refer to fundamental beliefs about the desired relationship between state and society. They reflect what Inkeles and Bauer viewed as the “system.” The “regime,” in contrast, referred to the leaders and institutions responsible for day-to-day administration. Cf. David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965); and “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975): 435–57.

reform. In keeping with *The Soviet Citizen*, the geographical focus here is on Russia and Ukraine. While they are not necessarily representative of attitudes in other republics, their size and political importance make it especially critical to understand the dynamics of mass support in these two new states.

In their pioneering study of daily life under Stalin, Inkeles and Bauer concluded that the Soviet public accepted many of the system's most fundamental norms. *The Soviet Citizen* found a strong constituency for state control of the key means of production, a comprehensive welfare state, and a paternal but benign government that would regulate political life for the good of its citizens.<sup>7</sup> People shared more of the Soviet mindset than images of totalitarian society had implied. Even refugees who claimed they would "keep nothing" if the Soviet system were dismantled still agreed with its basic principles. Inkeles and Bauer concluded that the "crucial change in Soviet society is that now the main outlines of the system seem to enjoy the support of popular consensus."<sup>8</sup> Support was especially high among the youngest cohorts, and intellectual and white-collar workers. These groups were most inclined to say that they had been in favor of the system, and they were more convinced that life in the USSR would be better if only a different leader (such as Bukharin) had come to power.<sup>9</sup> The young, particularly among the intelligentsia, were also more egalitarian and collectivist, and more favorable to the idea of government control of industry, though there was much less acceptance of state control in light industry and consumer goods (sector "B") than in heavy industry (sector "A").<sup>10</sup> Generational differences emerged, too, when people explained how their attitudes toward the regime changed over time. Older respondents who had once favored it grew disaffected over Bolshevik policies, especially collectivization and the purges; the young mostly did so when they were able to see life outside the USSR. Inkeles and Bauer saw these cleavages as a natural product of both socialization and of social change. They suggested that the young and the professional and intellectual classes had been exposed more thoroughly to the agents of official socialization and appeared to take the system as a given.<sup>11</sup> These groups, Inkeles and Bauer noted, also re-

7. An earlier, non-quantitative analysis of Harvard Project findings was presented in Raymond A. Bauer, Alex Inkeles and Clyde Kluckhohn, *How the Soviet System Works*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956).

8. *The Soviet Citizen*, 397.

9. This generation gap in support for the system was also emphasized by Harvard Project respondents themselves: many noted explicitly that it was the young people in the USSR who favored the Soviet order.

10. Alice S. Rossi, *Generational Differences in the Soviet Union* (New York: Arno Press, 1980), 295–97. This was a dissertation, based on data from the Harvard Project and completed in 1957; it was later published in Arno Press's dissertation series.

11. Younger interviewees reportedly had a rebellious streak, and many were disillusioned over the difference between what they were taught about the Soviet system as children and what they experienced of it as adults. Harvard Project researchers concluded, though, that the young simply came to accept Soviet reality and accommodate to the system (Bauer, et al., *How the Soviet System Works*, 115–16).

flected the impact of modernization, from rapid industrialization and greater social mobility to unequal material rewards. Their acceptance of the system prompted Inkeles and Bauer to conclude that support for the Soviet order would increase with the rise of new generations and the expansion of higher education.

Harvard Project interviews did reveal a variety of grievances, but Inkeles and Bauer found that most focused on highly specific issues: reducing the arbitrariness and harshness of the terror, improving living standards and upgrading welfare state programs. Material deprivation was an especially sensitive question: respondents from all social groups, from the intelligentsia to the peasantry, felt they received too little reward for their contributions to society. And few people saw either the regime, its leaders or the Party in a favorable light. When complaints did focus on the system, they implied a mixed agenda for reform. Almost everyone wanted some political liberalization, though they disagreed on exactly which rights they would expand. Virtually all interviewees credited the system for its success with rapid industrialization but approval of the Soviet economic setup did not extend across the board. If people believed that the state should control the “commanding heights” of the economy, they were also convinced that light industry and especially agriculture should be mostly private. The desired economic model was not stalinist but NEP. Harvard Project interviews also highlighted other tensions in state-society relations. New generations had aspirations for higher education and higher-status jobs that could not all be accommodated by the post-War economic system. Moreover, higher education and higher status meant different values.<sup>12</sup> Workers put a premium on increased material rewards and job security, while the intelligentsia and professionals valued greater autonomy.

Inkeles and Bauer contended that a regime seeking to maintain political control in these circumstances would do best to court blue-collar strata: higher living standards and improved working conditions would yield measurable increases in working class support. Investing in peasants would have a similar return. Since their hostility to the collective farm system was couched in terms of poor working conditions, long hours, and low and insecure pay, an improvement in their material circumstances might go far in boosting regime legitimacy in the countryside.<sup>13</sup> The authors of *The Soviet Citizen* thus all but predicted the social agenda of the Khrushchev and Brezhnev years. The results initially appeared to be a success: the public into the 1970s

12. Inkeles and Bauer report, for example, that questions about parents' influence on children's career choices reflected a substantial shift. Cohorts raised after the revolution were encouraged to give more emphasis to self-expression and self-determination; earlier generations had been encouraged to choose according to family traditions. Similarly, those in non-manual occupations reported much less emphasis on traditional values (*The Soviet Citizen*, 226–28).

13. Rossi, *Generational Differences*, 363–64.

seemed to accept the basic outlines of the Soviet order. Broad social guarantees, modest increments in living standards and a retreat from earlier campaigns to remake society appeared to mute the discontents that had emerged in Harvard Project interviews.<sup>14</sup> By the end of the 1970s, however, analysts came to argue that growing dissatisfaction had eroded the old "bargain."<sup>15</sup> As Gorbachev acceded to power, many concluded that social changes unleashed after Stalin had undermined public support for the very system.<sup>16</sup>

Yet despite the consensus on society's grand transformation, there is little agreement on which values changed or on the mechanism that transformed them. The most widely accepted explanation projects a shift in values due to modernization: a highly educated, urbanized and mobile public appeared unlikely to tolerate the old system's heavy-handed controls.<sup>17</sup> Rising levels of education would presumably breed a population less and less willing to accept one-sided arguments or facile logic, and more inclined to question what they were told.<sup>18</sup> Increasing social differentiation would make it ever more difficult for the regime to rely on old formulas to generate political support.<sup>19</sup> Alternate models focus on regime performance and on generational change. If the social contract of the post-Stalin years promised economic security and a quiet life in exchange for political quiescence,<sup>20</sup> then faltering economic conditions would threaten the state's store of political capital.<sup>21</sup> The "deal" might vary for different strata, however: for workers, higher wages and social guarantees in exchange for po-

14. Walter Connor, "Dissent in a Complex Society," *Problems of Communism* 22, no. 2 (1973): 40–55; "Generations and Politics in the USSR," *Problems of Communism* 24, no. 5 (1975): 20–31; Seweryn Bialer, *Stalin's Successors: Leadership, Stability, and Change in the Soviet Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980).

15. John Bushnell, "The 'New Soviet Man' Turns Pessimist," *Survey* 24, no. 2 (1980): 1–18; Gail W. Lapidus, "Society Under Strain," *The Washington Quarterly*, 6 (Spring 1983): 29–47.

16. Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon: A Historical Interpretation* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Blair Ruble, "The Soviet Union's Quiet Revolution," in George W. Breslauer, ed., *Can Gorbachev's Reforms Succeed?* (Berkeley: Berkeley-Stanford Program in Soviet Studies and Center for Slavic and East European Studies, 1990).

17. S. Frederick Starr, "Prospects for Stable Democracy in Russia" (Columbus: Mershon Center Occasional Paper, Ohio State University, 1991); Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon*.

18. Jerry F. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980).

19. Blair Ruble, "The Social Dimensions of *Perestroika*," *Soviet Economy* 3 (1987): 171–83. Remington ("Regime Transitions") contended that it was not the progress of modernization but its discontinuities that prompted change. Higher education, for example, had swelled far more rapidly than the job market warranted, and had thus led to substantial underemployment.

20. George W. Breslauer, "On the Adaptability of Soviet Welfare-State Authoritarianism," in Karl W. Ryavec, ed., *Soviet Society and the Communist Party* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), 3–25; Breslauer, *Khrushchev and Brezhnev as Leaders: Building Authority in Soviet Politics* (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1982).

21. Bushnell, "The 'New Soviet Man'"; and Lapidus, "Society Under Strain."

litical acquiescence; for professionals and intellectuals, whose numbers outpaced the availability of good jobs, competition and insecurity.<sup>22</sup> The decline in public support could also be traced to the emergence of new generations. If political and economic conditions shifted radically over time, new cohorts would come of age with fundamentally different values.<sup>23</sup> On the other hand, they could be less accepting of old orthodoxies simply because they were now more educated than their fathers and grandfathers.<sup>24</sup>

These arguments are persuasive but incomplete. None specifies which values should have changed and none distinguishes among levels of support. The standard assumption, for example, is that modernization would breed a demand for greater political freedom; but would it make people more or less favorable toward public ownership of the means of production? Some pioneering work on political development suggested that such broad social changes would incline people to favor more rather than less government involvement in economic life.<sup>25</sup> The decline of the state's ability to uphold its social contract should prompt increasing discontent, but would that lead people to reject the idea of the welfare state or only to demand improved implementation?

The empirical evidence raises even more questions. In the case of modernization, certainly rising levels of education and professionalization were dramatic under Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Yet the process had been equally (if not more) dramatic under Stalin. Social transformation then led Inkeles and Bauer to conclude that modernization had generated support for the system. The final chapter of *The Soviet Citizen* argued that the creation of an urban, industrial state had done much to generate public acceptance of the basic features of Soviet socialism. Inkeles and Bauer also demonstrated that higher education and professional advancement did not necessarily make people more critical of the system and its principles; the "modern sector" was typically less critical. In the case of the social contract, the impact of the new consumerism after Stalin and of changes in living standards was hardly clear-cut. Evidence from the Brezhnev era suggested that the least privileged felt the most satisfied with their lives and the most wedded to Soviet values; people with higher status and more material benefits ranked among the most discontented.<sup>26</sup>

22. Victor Zaslavsky, *The Neo-Stalinist State: Class, Ethnicity and Consensus in Soviet Society* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1982).

23. Bialer, *Stalin's Successors*; Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*; Donna Bahry, "Politics, Generations and Change in the USSR," in James R. Millar, ed., *Politics, Work and Daily Life in the Soviet Union* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 61–99.

24. Jeffrey W. Hahn, "Continuity and Change in Russian Political Culture," *British Journal of Political Science* 21 (1991): 393–421.

25. Reinhard Bendix, *Nation-Building and Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 6.

26. James R. Millar and Elizabeth Clayton, "Quality of Life: Subjective Measures of Relative Satisfaction," in *Politics, Work and Daily Life*, 31–60; and Brian D. Silver, "Political Beliefs of the Soviet Citizen: Sources of Support for Regime Norms," in *Politics, Work and Daily Life*, 100–41.

These questions aside, the evidence is simply at odds over how much individual values actually changed. Some of it suggests, for example, that relatively little shifted from the publication of *The Soviet Citizen* to the 1970s. Under Brezhnev, as under Stalin, emigrant interviews showed widespread support for a strong but benevolent state with public control over the means of industrial production, extensive social welfare programs and some limits on civil liberties.<sup>27</sup> People felt disaffected from the regime and anxious to have more political freedom; but they also wanted a state that would guide its citizens for their own good. Interviews also pointed to generational change: the young by the 1970s expressed less support for the system than their predecessors in the Harvard Project had shown.<sup>28</sup>

Later research found greater disaffection. Surveys of those who left the USSR at the end of the Brezhnev era and in the post-Brezhnev years revealed less favorable views of state control of the economy, and of restrictions on civil liberties. They also showed that younger generations were not simply less enthusiastic than their counterparts in the Harvard Project, but openly critical of the Soviet order. The major cleavages in the Stalin era had been reversed: the groups who had been most supportive of the system under Stalin now were the most inclined to reject it.<sup>29</sup> More recent interviews from the former USSR have extended the debate. For example, Gibson, Duch and Tedin find significant backing for political reform, from competitive elections to other key political rights, while Miller concludes that the demand for change was still relatively limited even in 1990.<sup>30</sup> In Miller's analysis, more people in Russia and Ukraine were supportive of an authoritarian

27. Stephen White, "Continuity and Change in Soviet Political Culture: An Emigre Study," *Comparative Political Studies* 11 (October 1978): 381–95; *Political Culture and Soviet Politics* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1979); Zvi Gitelman, "Soviet Political Culture: Insights from Jewish Emigres," *Soviet Studies* 29 (1977): 543–64.

28. White, "Continuity and Change"; and *Political Culture*.

29. Donna Bahry, "Politics, Generations and Change in the USSR"; William Zimmerman, "Mobilized Participation and the Nature of the Soviet Dictatorship," in *Politics, Work and Daily Life in the Soviet Union*; and Silver, "Political Beliefs."

30. James L. Gibson, Raymond M. Duch and Kent L. Tedin, "Democratic Values and the Transformation of the Soviet Union," *The Journal of Politics* 54 (May 1992): 329–71; and Gibson and Duch, "Emerging Democratic Values in Soviet Political Culture," in Arthur M. Miller, William M. Reisinger and Vicki L. Hesli, eds., *Public Opinion and Regime Change: The New Politics of Post-Soviet Societies* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), 69–94, esp. p. 80; Arthur Miller, "In Search of Regime Legitimacy," in *Public Opinion and Regime Change*, 95–123. Gibson and Duch, for example, note that only a minority of respondents in a 1990 survey of the USSR preferred order over freedom, or would sacrifice freedom of thought, speech or protest to protect society from different or extremist views ("Emerging Democratic Values," 77). They also report that over 60% of their interviewees endorsed a multiparty system (*ibid.*, 83). Miller finds that, in a 1990 sample of Russia and Ukraine, more than half of the respondents preferred an orderly society over the freedom to demonstrate, and just over half thought that multiple parties would be good for the system ("In Search of Regime Legitimacy," 100–01).

regime than of a democratic one. Finifter and Mickiewicz contend that levels of support depended on the issues at stake.<sup>31</sup>

Changes in values among key subgroups are also controversial. While most analysts confirm the existence of a political generation gap, some see it as a sign of true generational replacement while others see it as the result of rising levels of education among younger cohorts.<sup>32</sup> The impact of education prompts even more disagreement. For Silver, greater education generally means more acceptance of private rather than state involvement; for Ray Duch, it means more rather than less support for market-type reforms. Finifter and Mickiewicz suggest the opposite: education increases support for collective, rather than individual, solutions.<sup>33</sup> Still other evidence suggests that there is little if any connection: Slider, Magun and Gimpel'son conclude that higher education is correlated with some measures of support for privatization but not with others, and the relationships vary from one former republic to another.<sup>34</sup> There is, then, much more agreement about the fact of social transformation than about its political legacy. If the evidence shows that modernization both increased and decreased support for the Soviet system, and that rising levels of education generated both less and more support for collectivist policies, then our models of change in public values need to be reassessed.

Data for this analysis come from several surveys. For the Stalin era, the data are from the Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System (referred to here as HP), on which *The Soviet Citizen* was based. The HP survey was conducted in the United States and western Europe with respondents who last resided in the Soviet Union in the 1930s and

31. Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," *American Political Science Review* 86 (1992): 857-74.

32. See Gibson, Duch and Tedin, "Democratic Values"; Finifter and Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System"; and Hahn, "Continuity and Change."

33. Silver finds that higher education generally means less support for state ownership and control in heavy industry and agriculture, or state provision of medical care ("Political Beliefs," 125). Duch reports that the more the education, the greater the support for a combined measure of price reform, individual responsibility in the job market and private ownership ("Tolerating Economic Reform: Popular Support for Transition to a Free Market in the Former Soviet Union," *American Political Science Review* [forthcoming]). Finifter and Mickiewicz show that 51% of their sample believed that "the state and government should be mainly responsible for the well-being and success of people," while 49% believed that "people should look out for themselves, decide for themselves what to do for success in life." And the higher the education, the more people in their sample preferred state/government rather than individual responsibility (Finifter and Mickiewicz, 859, 869).

34. Darrell Slider, Vladimir Magun and Vladimir Gimpel'son, "Public Opinion on Privatization: Republic Differences," *Soviet Economy* 7 (July-September 1991): 256-75.

early 1940s. The project allowed Inkeles and Bauer to draw on data from two sets of interviews: 2,718 "Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaires" and 331 in-depth "Life History" (LH) or personal interviews. Respondents came from both urban and rural areas, and were overwhelmingly Russian and Ukrainian.<sup>35</sup> The paper-and-pencil questionnaire had mostly closed-ended questions; the life-history interview was entirely open-ended and typically extended over several days. The data cards from the original Harvard Project for both surveys have been lost, and the original paper-and-pencil questionnaires were destroyed. However, the transcripts of the "Life History" interviews were preserved, and were recoded at New York University.<sup>36</sup> They provide the basis here for a re-analysis of public values in the late Stalin era. The 331 respondents ranged in age from 22 to 73 and the sample was stratified to insure balanced representation by age, occupation categories and gender. Although the LH interviews were only one of two main sources for *The Soviet Citizen*, they appear to be representative of the larger survey. Inkeles and Bauer, for example, reported several parallel analyses of individual values drawing on both data sets and found essentially the same relationships in each set of interviews.<sup>37</sup> Harvard Project analysts also examined the overlaps more systematically, by administering both the Life History interview and the Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaire to 46 respondents, one month apart. The results showed high rates of agreement between the two survey formats.<sup>38</sup> On demographic data (defined in the Harvard Project's report as sex, year left USSR, nationality, party membership, Komsomol membership and highest educational level), the rate of correspondence was 98 percent. Other types of questions, especially hypothetical and evaluative ones, evoked almost as much consistency, with the level of agreement at 80 percent or higher.<sup>39</sup> The two surveys also revealed a great deal of consistency when the same question was asked using different formats. That is,

35. The survey asked for respondents' nationality, but did not ask them to identify the specific place where they had resided in the USSR. However, many of their descriptions of work and home life referred to homes in Russia and Ukraine.

36. The recoding was conducted as a "blind" process, i.e., coders could refer to the original HP categories but not the actual results; the recoded data could then be compared with the original as a control. The rates of agreement were extremely high. See the description in Donna Bahry, "Methodological Report on Recoding of the Harvard Project Life History Interviews," *Soviet Interview Project Working Papers*, no. 46 (1988).

37. Cf. views on civil liberties in *The Soviet Citizen*, 248.

38. The results are reported in Edward Wasiolek, *Responses by Former Soviet Citizens to a Questionnaire vs. Life History Interview, Harvard Project on the Soviet Social System, Report to the Director* (Maxwell Air Force Base, mimeo, July 1954).

39. Respondents in the Life History interviews proved more inclined to give answers that would flatter American interviewers and themselves, and they tended to be somewhat more negative toward the USSR. Also, respondents were more likely in person to admit that they had belonged to the Komsomol. It appears that the LH data were the more accurate on this count: data from the LH interviews on Komsomol membership by age cohort and gender are virtually identical with later surveys.

closed-ended questions in the PPQ evoked much the same answers as did open-ended questions in the LH interviews.

For the Brezhnev era, my analysis relies on 1856 interviews from the Soviet Interview Project General Survey I (referred to here as SIP I) with people who left the USSR from 1979 through 1982, and were between the ages of 21 and 70 on the date of their arrival in the US.<sup>40</sup> The interviews were conducted between March 1983 and January 1984; questions focused on respondents' "last normal period of life in the USSR," the time just before their lives changed in connection with the decision to emigrate. The average length of the interviews was three hours; the field work was conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC); and the sample was basically from small and large cities. The SIP General Survey II, conducted in 1986, repeated most of the same questions among 572 people who had left from 1982 through 1985. While respondents came from virtually all 15 republics of the USSR, the analysis here is limited to those from Russia and Ukraine.<sup>41</sup>

For the end of the Soviet era, I rely on the Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" survey, conducted in spring 1991 by stratified random sampling in European Russia, Ukraine and Lithuania. The total sample sizes were 1123, 586 and 501, respectively. The study was conducted by researchers at the Institute of Sociology in Moscow, Luhans'k University and the University of Vilnius. Only the data on Russia and Ukraine are included here.

For validation on particular questions, I also rely on two additional surveys. One was conducted in eight regions of Russia (Russia-91) in November-December 1991 by Best Market Research in Moscow, and coded and cleaned at the University of California, Davis. The 1728 interviews were self-administered. The sample was a multi-stage stratified design, with respondents selected by quota in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novgorod, Omsk, Tambov, Nizhnii Novgorod and Irkutsk *oblasti* and Krasnodar *krai*. It focused on respondents from the center city and a sampling of rural areas within each region. A second survey was conducted in Russia in November-December 1992 by ROMIR, with 1393 people, using face-to-face interviews and a stratified, systematic random sample.

Can such different surveys be compared? Certainly the data should not be accepted uncritically, especially where questions evoke negative responses from emigrants about the Soviet order. But, as Inkeles and Bauer carefully demonstrated, emigrant respondents did not necessarily reject the fundamentals of the system. While many Harvard Project respondents said to "change everything" when asked what they would keep or change of the Soviet system, more specific questions showed

40. Here, only those people who were at least 18 years old in their "last normal period of life in the USSR" are included in the analysis.

41. I report fewer of the SIP findings here, since much of the data has already been analyzed elsewhere.

that they agreed with the basics, from state ownership of heavy industry and welfare programs to limits on civil liberties. Interviewees of the same generations and social strata in the Soviet Interview Project General Surveys I and II responded much the same.

The more important question for our purposes is whether emigrant interviews can tell us anything meaningful about critical relationships: relative levels of support for different elements of the system, between old versus young, between the less educated and people with a college degree, and so on. Do the patterns make sense, in light of recent "local" surveys within the USSR? The results are encouraging. It should be no surprise that the Soviet system's industrial performance would garner higher ratings than its record on the farms, from emigrants and residents alike. It might be more surprising to discover that similar generational cleavages emerge, in both "local" and in emigrant interviews. But this simply tells us that emigrants experienced the same broad social trends that affected daily life in the USSR. The data, then, suggest that respondents in the emigrant surveys were not unrepresentative of the society in which they had grown up, gone to school, worked, served in the army, married and begun their families. This is not to say that there were no biases. Rather, the biases were predictable and controllable. The SIP surveys, for example, had a preponderance of Jewish respondents. Yet the impact of nationality depended very much on the question asked: Russian and Jewish respondents disagreed in their evaluations of nationality policies, but their views of economic and political institutions were remarkably similar.<sup>42</sup> On the other hand, consensus among ethnic groups on key political and economic issues was no guarantee of agreement on the nationality question. The impact of having emigrated also seems to have been relatively minor.<sup>43</sup> That is, the fact of being in the west did not necessarily lead people to reject the key elements of the Soviet system.<sup>44</sup>

42. Donna Bahry, "Surveying Soviet Emigrants: Political Attitudes and Ethnic Bias," *Soviet Interview Project Working Papers*, no. 50 (1989). Similarly, Russian and Ukrainian interviewees in the Harvard Project were at odds over nationality policy and ethnic relations in Ukraine, but they had virtually the same values when the questions turned to economic organization, individual rights or social welfare.

43. Harvard Project respondents, who had emigrated and had been exposed to systems of private ownership of industry in the west, continued to endorse basic government controls of major economic sectors à la NEP. And although they had seen the greater political freedom in the west, they were by no means anxious to import it wholesale to the USSR. Rather, they preferred a benign state that would retain some political controls for the benefit of the citizenry. The same was true for interviewees in the Soviet Interview Project: respondents rejected some political controls, such as residence permits, but accepted others, such as state controls on the media.

44. Harvard Project researchers did discover some emigration effects, based on country of destination: while educated and intellectual/professional émigrés in the US and Germany gave virtually identical responses, less educated, blue-collar respondents differed in the two countries on one crucial set of questions. Those in the US were even more positive about the Soviet welfare state than were émigrés living in Germany. Inkeles and Bauer reasoned that adaptation may have been more difficult for the US group, and that the respondents in Germany would more closely reflect sentiments inside the USSR (*The Soviet Citizen*, 58–59).

Reliance on different surveys does, of course, demand careful interpretation, especially when questions are formulated somewhat differently in each one. For this reason, the analysis focuses on the degree of conflict and consensus *within* each sample. Responses are compared across samples where the questions touch on parallel issues. Even so, varying question formats could skew the results. To evaluate their impact, I compared items within surveys and I repeated some items in subsequent ones. In the Harvard Project, for example, respondents were asked both closed- and open-ended questions on the issues treated here. The differences in formulation did not significantly influence the results. The vast majority of respondents approved of state control of heavy industry and of private agriculture, whether the question was open- or closed-ended.<sup>45</sup> Similarly, respondents offered basically the same opinions about state controls over specific individual rights, even when question formats varied. In later surveys, some items were repeated and some were posed in contrasting formats to test for question effects. With few exceptions, format alone had relatively little effect.<sup>46</sup> The results are noted here in the text and notes, in relation to specific questions.

For comparability, this analysis starts from the core questions posed in *The Soviet Citizen*, using the same measure of generational differences and the same explanatory variables.<sup>47</sup> My approach differs from *The Soviet Citizen* on two counts, however. While Inkeles and Bauer focused primarily on occupational class cleavages, I rely instead on level of education to capture distinctions in social status. This is a necessity due to a lack of information about how "class" had been coded in the Harvard Project.<sup>48</sup> The impact of education is also central to the current debate about post-Stalin social change in the USSR, and to recent empirical work on public values. In addition, where *The Soviet Citizen* employed complex cross tabulations among different variables (performed with punch cards on a countersorter), I rely on multivariate

45. See Table 1 and Rossi, *Generational Differences*, 295. The recoded data on ownership in light industry do turn out to be somewhat different from the original HP results, apparently because the question was answered by only a small subset of respondents in the Life History interviews.

46. That is, the same question posed in different ways evoked much the same answer. This is not to argue that question wording, order or other issues of survey design have no impact; rather, their effects need to be examined question-by-question.

47. Actually, Inkeles and Bauer, and Rossi used several different age breaks to measure generational differences. In some parts of their analysis, respondents were divided into two groups, under 35 years old and 35 or older; in other parts of the analysis, the age break is 40 or 45. Rossi also relies on finer categories, based on 10-year intervals, and that is the approach I use here.

48. None of the Harvard Project materials indicated how occupational class had been coded. Thus the occupation-based categories in *The Soviet Citizen* could not be replicated precisely enough to make them the basis for the entire analysis. Harvard Project papers deposited in the Harvard Archives did include a partial list of the actual codes used for some respondents and, judging from these, assignment to particular categories was closely related to a respondent's education.

analysis to control for varied personal characteristics such as gender, residence in a big city, material dissatisfaction, that mediate the relationships between generation, social status and individual values.

Two other issues also deserve mention. First, although I refer to the "Stalin era," "Brezhnev era," and so on, my concern is with the configuration of mass support at the end of each period. Surveys conducted in other years might yield different results. Such fluctuations should be relatively modest, though, where survey questions ask about fundamental values (rather than, say, approval ratings of an incumbent leader). To take one example, our data reveal that more than three fourths of respondents in 1950–1951 and 1991 called for state control of heavy industry. It is unlikely that these percentages somehow declined and then increased again in the intervening years. In fact, other studies from earlier in the Brezhnev era yielded much the same picture.<sup>49</sup> The trends between surveys can therefore be gauged against what our theories and our other evidence would predict. Second, I should note that page limits require some selectivity in the data that can be presented here. The analysis itself covered each key issue from each survey for all three time periods, including checks on the effects of posing questions in different ways; but it generated more results than can be included in the confines of a single article. I excluded tables that yielded the same basic conclusions as those presented here. These additional findings are cited in the text and notes.

One of the cardinal values defining the Soviet system's claim to legitimacy was industrial transformation. When Harvard Project interviews were conducted in 1950–1951, rapid industrialization appeared to have near-universal backing.<sup>50</sup> Yet the striking feature of attitudes toward public ownership then was not widespread support for state control of the means of production, but a consensus on a mixed economy. People were nearly unanimous on preserving the state's role in heavy industry, but they were also convinced that farming and most light industry should be private (Table 1).<sup>51</sup> Some would allow collec-

49. See, for example, White's "Continuity and Change."

50. Rossi noted that the high rate of approval for state control might in fact be simply an endorsement of the traditional values of the tsarist state. However, the oldest and most traditional elements of the population were *least* supportive of a broad state role, and that suggests that it was not simply "tradition" which led people to support public ownership.

51. For example, a Russian chief bookkeeper from Rostov (LH case 1493) and a *kolkhoznitsa* from Poltava (LH case 1719) offered essentially the same answer on government economic controls: "I would keep state ownership of heavy industry, mines, factories (large ones), railways, utilities. . . . Small and medium factories I think the government could give to cooperatives or rent them to individuals. . . . I would liquidate the collective farms and 'sovkhоз' [sic] and would promote individual ownership of the land" (LH case 1493).

**Table 1.**  
**Support for State Control of Means of Production, Stalin and Gorbachev Eras**  
 $(\%)$  preferring state control<sup>a</sup>

Stalin era:	Heavy industry	(N)	Light industry	(N)	Agriculture	(N)
Total:	86.5 <sup>b</sup>	(185)	16.1 <sup>c</sup>	(137)	0.7 <sup>d</sup>	(297)
By year of birth: <sup>e</sup>						
< 1900	76.5	(51)	10.3	(39)	0.0	(73)
1900–10	95.5	(44)	14.7	(34)	3.1	(65)
1911–20	86.5	(52)	24.3	(37)	0.0	(81)
1921–30	89.5	(38)	14.8	(27)	0.0	(78)
By education:						
< secondary	85.2	(61)	13.0	(46)	0.0	(119)
Completed secondary	84.2	(57)	22.5	(40)	1.2	(86)
Completed higher	89.6	(67)	13.7	(51)	1.1	(91)
Gorbachev era:	Heavy industry	(N)	Light industry	(N)	Agriculture	(N)
Total <sup>f</sup>	84.5	(1657)	26.4	(1678)	6.1	(1655)
By year of birth:						
1900–10	100.0	(6)	43.1	(6)	28.8	(7)
1911–20	95.2	(74)	51.2	(72)	19.8	(73)
1921–30	96.4	(219)	41.3	(219)	10.1	(211)
1931–40	94.4	(271)	32.6	(278)	9.0	(268)
1941–50	87.5	(223)	30.4	(222)	3.5	(223)
1951–60	79.7	(338)	18.2	(345)	3.8	(342)
1961–70	74.0	(407)	18.6	(417)	3.5	(412)
1971–73	75.8	(118)	11.6	(119)	2.8	(118)
By education:						
< secondary	93.1	(272)	49.0	(274)	15.6	(269)
Completed secondary	84.9	(980)	24.7	(995)	4.8	(986)
Completed higher	78.4	(384)	15.8	(387)	2.8	(381)

<sup>a</sup>Here and in all other tables, responses of “don’t know” or “hard to say” are excluded.

<sup>b</sup>This was posed as a probe for the question of what respondents would keep or change in the Soviet system (for the question wording, see Table 2); thus it was open-ended, with no predefined response categories. Here, the percentages represent those people who favored keeping heavy industry under state ownership and/or control, as opposed to the people who wanted to introduce some private enterprise in sector A. Other responses were coded as favoring either a mixed system or one of private ownership/control. A closed-ended question on state ownership in the Harvard Project’s Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaire yielded extremely similar results: 84% of 2009 interviewees would keep heavy industry under state control; response patterns among different generations and social groups are also parallel to the ones here. See Rossi, *Generational Differences*, 296.

<sup>c</sup>This question, too, was a probe in the item on what to keep/change. The percentages indicate those respondents favoring state control/ownership of light industry. On this question, the results do not fit as well with those from the original Harvard Project coding. *Ibid.*

<sup>d</sup>The question was “Suppose we had a government that would work only for the welfare of the people and would want to organize agriculture in a way most desirable to everybody. Which do you think would be better: collectivized agriculture or private farming?” In this table the percentages indicate those who favor collectivized agriculture. For this item, even those favoring “collective farming” felt that it should be voluntary. On a parallel, closed-ended question in the PPQ, over 90% of respondents rejected the collective farm system. *Ibid.*, 349.

<sup>e</sup>Age breaks have been selected in order to replicate the findings in Rossi, *Generational Differences*. I use year of birth rather than age at time of interview, however, since the interviews were conducted in 1950 and 1951.

<sup>f</sup>The question is “As I read from a list, tell me if you think this activity should be mainly run by the state, or mainly run privately?” 1=state; 2=private. People who volunteered answers such as “some of each” or “both” were assigned a code of 3. The data here indicate the percentage choosing “state.” The percentages saying “private” were 2.9 for heavy industry, 20.4 for light industry and 77.5 for agriculture. Figures in parentheses for the Times Mirror survey are weighted numbers of respondents.

Sources: Harvard Project Recode (1950–1951); Times Mirror “Pulse of Europe” Survey (1991).

tives in agriculture, but only if they were voluntary.<sup>52</sup> If social transformation after Stalin did indeed erode the old base of support, we should see individual values moving much more toward private enterprise in heavy industry. The surveys, however, indicate that people continued to favor a mixed economy (Table 1). Brezhnev-era interviewees showed little support for exclusive state control in farming, but more support for state control in Sector A.<sup>53</sup> By 1991, the preferred model of the economy was still a variant of NEP (Table 1).<sup>54</sup>

Equally important, acceptance of key features of the economic system went hand in hand with calls for reform over time. People who endorsed central planning and a strong state role in the economy were also the ones to advocate economic reform. One indication comes from questions about what elements of the Soviet system people wanted to keep and change. When Stalin-era respondents were asked what they

52. David Hoffman offers archival evidence on the hostility toward collectivization in "The 'Peasantization' of the Soviet Working Class: Peasant In-Migration, Political Socialization, and the Decline of Labor Protest in the 1930s," International Working Papers Series 1-91-16 (The Hoover Institution, 1991). Merle Fainsod provides a more detailed description in *Smolensk under Soviet Rule* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 238-305.

53. Stephen White's interviews with emigrants to Israel in 1976 show a pattern very similar to that in the Harvard Project and the Times Mirror surveys: there was near-unanimous agreement that heavy industry should be in state hands and that agriculture should be private. See "Continuity and Change," 386-87. Questions in the Soviet Interview Project asked people whether heavy industry and agriculture should be exclusively state-run or exclusively private, with answers arrayed on a 7-point scale of 1=private, 7=state. For heavy industry, the average score was 4.5 (among 1674 respondents); and for agriculture, it was 2.2. Support for state ownership in heavy industry thus appears to be lower than in the other surveys, in part because of question format. To measure the effect, I included the same question in a "split-halves" experiment in a 1992 survey of Russia (Russia-92): a random half of the respondents were asked the question using a 7-point scale, and the other half were asked the same question in the format used in the 1991 Times Mirror survey. While the data are still being cleaned, preliminary evidence suggests that the 7-point scales did have some influence on the overall *level* of support for state ownership: people tended to choose answers toward the middle of the scale rather than the end-points. However, the question format did not appear to influence the relationships analyzed here among different issues and different generations and levels of education.

54. The question in the 1991 Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" survey used a slightly different term ("fermerstvo" rather than "sel'shoe khoziaistvo") for agriculture and this appears to skew the answers somewhat toward the private end of the scale. A similar question asked in a USIA-ROMIR study of Russia in June 1992 revealed that roughly one third of respondents would keep agriculture in state hands. These two surveys also offer some additional evidence on the effect of question formats. In the "Pulse of Europe" survey, the questions on ownership of the means of production posed two possible answers, "mainly state" or "mainly private"; answers of "mixed" or "both" could be volunteered but were not read to respondents. The June 1992 USIA-ROMIR survey offered four answer categories: exclusively state, mainly state, mainly private or exclusively private. In the latter, 82% of respondents would keep heavy industry "exclusively" or "mainly" under state ownership; the corresponding percentage for the Times Mirror study was 84.5%. I would like to thank Steve Grant and Richard Dobson for discussing the USIA-ROMIR findings with me.

would preserve, 52.9 percent mentioned state ownership and central planning; when asked what they would replace, 70.9 percent mentioned some aspect of the economic system (Table 2). And it was the people saying to "keep" the economic system who called for reform (Table 2). Their preferences were quite explicit: they wanted heavy industry, banking, transport and the like under state ownership, while allowing private activity in agriculture and consumer goods.<sup>55</sup> Later surveys yield a similar conclusion: although fewer people spontaneously mentioned the economic system as something to keep, those who *would* "keep" it were, again, also the ones wanting to retain state ownership in the commanding heights of industry and privatize agriculture (Table 2).<sup>56</sup>

However, this basic agreement on a mixed economy through the years masks a critical shift among key subgroups of the population. Where the young and the educated were slightly more positive toward government control of major industry before 1953, new and educated cohorts of the Brezhnev and Gorbachev years proved to be less so.<sup>57</sup> They did not necessarily want to privatize sector A; most still favored public ownership or a mix of state/private property. In contrast, older and less educated interviewees appeared to be *more* accepting of state ownership in farming and consumer goods under Brezhnev and Gorbachev than they had been under Stalin (Figure 1, see insert). This apparent increase in support might, of course, be due to differences in sampling; but other evidence implies that such groups had good reason to view the state's role more favorably after 1953.<sup>58</sup>

55. The same point, that acceptance of state ownership in heavy industry did not preclude support for reform of other sectors, can also be tested by estimating the correlation between the answers. As Table 12 shows, there was no connection between them.

56. Other surveys suggest that people also judge the need for state versus private ownership based on the size of enterprises, preferring to keep larger ones under state control. See e.g., Boris Z. Doktorov, *Perspektivy razvitiia predprinimatel'stva v SSSR* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi tsentr obshchechechecheskikh tsennostei, 1991), 16.

57. This is also borne out by the results of a survey of economic values by sociologists at the St. Petersburg branch of the Institute of Sociology. Respondents with higher education were markedly less supportive of the justification for collectivization, the termination of NEP, equalization of wages or of detailed planning. See V. V. Safronov, "Massovye ekonomicheskie predstavleniiia: istoricheskii aspekt," in *Teoretiko-empiricheskoe izuchenie ekonomicheskogo soznaniia na puti k tipologizatsii* (Moscow: Institut sotsiologii Rossiiskoi Akademii nauk, 1992), 106. I am indebted to Boris Doktorov, of the St. Petersburg branch of the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of Sciences, for bringing these findings to my attention.

58. It may be, of course, that this difference simply reflects the disparate samples. That is, the higher level of approval of state control in 1991 might simply mean that the workers and peasants in the Harvard Project sample were unusually negative toward the system. In fact, Inkeles and Bauer concluded that workers and peasants were the most hostile to the Soviet order. They constructed a "hostility index" to determine whether people would refuse to credit the regime even for its basic achievements in areas such as health care and cultural facilities; workers and peasants proved the least likely to say that there had been improvements in these areas. However, this

**Table 2.**  
**Support for Political and Economic Change, Stalin and Brezhnev Eras<sup>a</sup>**  
 (% saying "keep" and "change")

Stalin era:	Keep economic system <sup>b</sup>	(N)	Change economic system <sup>c</sup>	(N)	Keep political system <sup>d</sup>	(N)	Change political system <sup>e</sup>	(N)
Total	52.9	(293)	70.9	(316)	10.9	(293)	68.4	(316)
By year of birth:								
< 1900	52.7	(74)	65.8	(76)	8.1	(74)	68.4	(76)
1900-10	58.7	(63)	79.4	(68)	11.1	(63)	64.7	(68)
1911-20	56.1	(82)	75.0	(88)	12.2	(82)	68.2	(88)
1921-30	44.6	(74)	65.1	(83)	12.2	(74)	72.3	(83)
By education:								
< secondary	46.9	(113)	70.3	(128)	8.0	(113)	71.1	(128)
Complete secondary	49.4	(83)	67.4	(89)	10.8	(83)	64.0	(89)
Complete higher	63.5	(96)	75.5	(98)	14.6	(96)	68.4	(98)
Of those saying "keep," % also saying "change":								
Economic system	80.0							
Political system	71.9							
Brezhnev era: <sup>c</sup>	Keep economic system	(N)	Change economic system	(N)	Keep political system	(N)	Change political system	(N)
Total	6.0	(752)	46.6	(797)	19.9	(752)	65.0	(797)
By year of birth:								
1905-10	23.1	(13)	26.7	(15)	7.7	(13)	40.0	(15)
1911-20	9.4	(106)	51.8	(112)	23.6	(106)	61.6	(112)
1921-30	4.3	(116)	43.4	(129)	20.7	(116)	64.3	(129)
1931-40	6.7	(194)	46.4	(209)	19.6	(194)	68.9	(209)
1941-50	4.4	(229)	48.7	(238)	19.2	(229)	64.3	(238)
1951-60	4.3	(94)	43.6	(94)	19.1	(94)	67.0	(94)

By education:						
< secondary	3.4	(117)	46.1	(128)	19.7	(128)
Complete secondary	5.9	(339)	47.4	(359)	20.9	(359)
Complete higher	7.1	(296)	46.1	(310)	18.9	(310)
Of those saying "keep," % also saying "change":						
Economic system	70.3					
Political system	66.3					

<sup>a</sup>The questions were: "Let us suppose that the bolshevik regime were removed and a new government came to power. What things in the present system would you allow to remain? What things would you be sure to change?" Up to four answers were coded on each of these two questions; only the first three are counted here, in order to yield results comparable to similar questions in later surveys. Percentages here are based on the number of respondents giving a valid answer; since people could give more than one answer, the percentages across add up to more than 100%. Note that questions about keeping and changing the economic system were not spontaneous; for respondents who did not mention it voluntarily, the interviewer was to follow up with a question on what they would do about the economy. This means that the percentages mentioning it as something to keep or change are higher than they would be for a purely open-ended question. When the keep/change question was asked with no follow-up in the Harvard Project's self-administered Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaire, 15.8% of respondents volunteered that they would keep state ownership in some form; at least 55% would change the collective farm system or introduce some private initiative (Inkeles and Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, 236, 245). Rossi shows, further, that the percentages varied by social status: 8% of workers but 22% of intellectuals opted to keep some aspect of the economic system (*Generational Differences*, 455). Responses here on elements of the political system to keep are spontaneous and are in line with the results reported in Rossi, *Generational Differences*, 455. It should be emphasized that the questions are meant to capture the salience of an issue for respondents, relative to other features of the Soviet system they might keep or change. For example, while 52.9% would keep some element of the economic system, the other 47.1% mentioned other things to keep. Thus people who did not mention the economy were not necessarily negative toward state ownership.

<sup>b</sup>Elements of the "economic system" to be kept include any response about central planning, state ownership or control of means of production and distribution, and the like. They do not include responses about personal incomes or changes in consumer goods. Most responses in this category to *keep* refer to heavy industry, natural resources, banking and transport.

<sup>c</sup>As with items to keep, responses here refer to planning and ownership. They do not include references to personal welfare or consumption. A majority of the responses call for allowing private property and private enterprise.

<sup>d</sup>"Government, political system" includes communism, the political system, the constitution, the system of soviets, "order."

<sup>e</sup>The questions: "Think for a moment about the Soviet system with its good and bad points. Suppose you could create a system of government in the Soviet Union that is different from the one which currently exists. What things in the present system would you want to keep in the new one? Anything else?" [LIST UP TO THREE ITEMS.] "What things in the present Soviet system would you be sure to change?" [LIST UP TO THREE ITEMS.] These were asked of a random 1/3 of the full sample. All of the responses are spontaneous; no probes were used to ask about specific features of the system. Thus the number of people *mentioning* the economic system is much lower than that for the Stalin era presented here.

Sources: Harvard Project Recode (1950-1951); Soviet Interview Project, G1 Survey (1983-1984).

Thus there was indeed a constituency for economic reform by 1991, but it had emerged well before the Gorbachev era. Relatively few people in any survey from the Stalin years onward endorsed exclusive state control of the farms or of light industry. The renewed public discussion of NEP in the 1980s was, then, more than academic; it resonated with public views of the most desirable economic system. In fact, when people said they favored a market economy, "market" generally implied NEP. Among people who "approved" or "strongly approved" of the adoption of a market economy as of 1991, more than three fourths would still keep heavy industry under state control (Table 3). Similarly, of those interviewees who *disapproved* of a market, 11.3 percent would nevertheless make light industry private, and another 47.7 percent favored a mix of state and private control in that sector; 68.1 percent would make farming private.<sup>59</sup> Virtually the same picture emerged when people were asked whether they favored or opposed the sale of land (see Table 3).


NEP's appeal was not difficult to understand. As Harvard Project interviewees explained, the risk of huge private monopolies dominating economic life was far greater in the commanding heights of industry than in consumer goods or farming. State ownership in steel, machine-building and the like also seemed more effective. The huge new factories that went up under Stalin offered visible proof of creating new capacity, in contrast to collectivization and the squeezing of the consumer sector. Even after conditions on the farms and in the stores had improved, heavy industry was still portrayed as functioning better (at least in terms of plan fulfillment), while farming and light industry seldom seemed to measure up. The "success" of heavy industry appeared to be less salient for later generations, however. While people who came of age in the 1920s, 1930s and 1940s could still see the tangible evidence of economic transformation, younger generations had no such clear reference point. Rather, they saw an ongoing domestic debate about declining growth rates and partial reforms, widening problems in the east European economies, and often doubtful results when Soviet-style public enterprise and planning were adopted

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measure is ambiguous; the achievements were in fact most visible and accessible to higher-status urban groups. Blue-collar strata were simply describing the reality of the pre-war Soviet system. Nor did the workers and peasants in the HP sample have experiences or backgrounds (such as a higher incidence of trouble with the Party or police) that would make them more negative toward the system than other interviewees. Note, too, that their criticisms of the economic system, especially of the collective farms, focused on the low wages, long hours and harsh working conditions. Since these were ameliorated under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, the modest increase in support for state/collective farming makes sense.

59. The support for private farming might seem to be anomalous, given the numbers of surveys claiming to show public resistance to the idea. It appears that the questions here tap a willingness to endorse *private initiative* in the countryside; other issues, such as free purchase and sale of land, are more controversial.

**Figure 1. Support for State Control**



**Notes to Figure 1:**

The datapoints represent the average score for the cohort born in the decade up to and including the year noted on the chart. Thus data for the year 1920 are the average for people born 1911-1920. For the last cohort, the score represents the average for people born 1971-1973. For the questions, see Table 1.


**The sources:**

Stalin era: Harvard Project (1950-1951)


Gorbachev era: Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" Survey (1991)

## for State Economic Controls

**People with Secondary Education**



**People with Higher Education**




### Key

- Gorbachev Era Heavy Industry
- Stalin Era Heavy Industry
- Gorbachev Era Light Industry
- Stalin Era Light Industry
- △— Gorbachev Era Agriculture
- ▲— Stalin Era Agriculture

the year  
the last

**Figure 2. Support for State Control**



**Notes to Figure 2:**

As for Figure 1. The questions are from Table 9.

The sources:


Stalin era: Harvard Project (1950-1951)

Gorbachev era: Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" Survey (1991)

**Key**

- Stalin Era
- Gorbachev era

## Support for State Controls on Media



**Table 3.**  
**Attitudes toward the Market and toward State Control of the Means of Production, Gorbachev Era.<sup>a</sup>**

% Who prefer that means of production be:	Of those people who:			
	Approve/Disapprove adoption of market economy <sup>b</sup>		Approve/Disapprove sale of land <sup>c</sup>	
	Approve	Disapprove	Approve	Disapprove
<b>Heavy Industry</b>				
State	81.7	90.4	78.3	95.7
Mixed	14.8	8.4	17.9	3.4
Private	3.5	1.2	3.8	0.8
Total %	100	100	100	100
N	(893)	(571)	(895)	(611)
<b>Light Industry</b>				
State	16.0	42.5	16.9	40.6
Mixed	57.4	45.8	55.2	48.9
Private	26.6	11.6	27.9	10.5
Total %	100	99.9	100	100
N	(909)	(576)	(911)	(611)
<b>Farming</b>				
State	2.5	13.9	1.8	14.8
Mixed	15.1	16.2	13.6	19.4
Private	82.3	69.9	84.7	65.9
Total %	99.9	100.0	100.1	100.1
N	(905)	(561)	(913)	(589)

<sup>a</sup>Of those who approve/disapprove of adopting a market economy and of the sale of land, the percentage who favor state, mixed or private control in each sector.

<sup>b</sup>The question: "Overall, do you strongly approve, approve, disapprove, or strongly disapprove of efforts to establish a free market economy?" 1=strongly approve; 2=approve; 3=disapprove; 4=strongly disapprove. Entries here are collapsed so that "approve" includes answers 1 and 2; "disapprove" includes answers 3 and 4.

<sup>c</sup>The question was: "Do you favor or oppose farmers being able to sell land that they own?" 1=favor; 2=oppose.

Source: Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" Survey (1991).

in the Third World. They also had more opportunities to see and evaluate some of the alternatives.

Along with the transformation of heavy industry, the Soviet state's welfare programs also garnered widespread support in the Stalin era. Health, education, welfare and employment guarantees ranked among the key elements of the Soviet order that people most wanted to keep (Table 4)—although few interviewees were satisfied with the level or quality of such public programs. Individual views differed, however, when it came to specifics. The idea of state employment guarantees found near universal backing but calls to eliminate inequality were much less popular (Table 5a). Most people also ranked personal freedom above economic security.

**Table 4.**  
**Salience of Welfare State Programs, Stalin, Brezhnev and Gorbachev Eras.**

% Saying keep welfare state programs <sup>a</sup>	Stalin	(N)	Brezhnev	(N)	Gorbachev	(N)
Total	62.0	(284)	63.7	(529)	69.1	(1068)
By year of birth:						
< 1900	61.4	(70)				
1900–10	56.5	(62)	50.0 <sup>b</sup>	(10)	—	
1911–20	61.3	(80)	56.6	(76)	76.5	(17)
1921–30	68.1	(72)	68.8	(80)	46.1	(89)
1931–40			62.5	(144)	63.0	(146)
1941–50			64.5	(166)	70.9	(230)
1951–60			69.8	(53)	71.9	(285)
1961–70					73.0	(248)
By education:						
< secondary	57.8	(109)	57.8	(64)	48.3	(151)
Completed secondary	70.7	(82)	67.0	(233)	72.1	(628)
Completed higher	58.7	(92)	62.1	(232)	73.4	(286)

<sup>a</sup>The figures indicate the percentage of respondents voting to keep education, health care, social welfare and job security in response to the question of what should be kept of the Soviet system (for question wording, see Tables 1 and 3).

<sup>b</sup>This group was born between 1905 and 1910.

Source: Harvard Project Recode (1950–1951); Soviet Interview Project G1 Survey (1983–1984); Russia–91 (1991).

Social transformation after Stalin did relatively little to alter public belief in the state's basic obligation to care for its citizens. Individual values in later surveys still leaned consistently toward what Peter Reddaway has termed the "nanny state."<sup>60</sup> Social welfare continued to rank at the top of the list of elements to keep (Table 4).<sup>61</sup> And later surveys indicated continuing disagreement about specific social guarantees. While most people wanted the state to insure minimum food and shelter for its citizens, many in 1991 were also willing to say that the government should allow unemployment (Table 5b).

Perceptions of the system's ability to deliver on social justice appear to have shifted much more dramatically over the same period. Under Stalin, the system seemed unjust to virtually everyone; in later years, it appeared far more selective in its treatment of different social strata. One indicator is a set of questions about which groups received too much or too little for their contributions to society: respondents in the Stalin era answered that *everyone*—from peasants to professionals—received too little. Only party and state officials were perceived

60. Peter Reddaway, "The End of the Empire," *New York Review of Books* (7 November 1991): 53–59.

61. However, once the collapse of the USSR became obvious, by the winter of 1991, "order" and maintenance of the USSR and/or unity was more salient than social welfare for the least educated and some older respondents (see Table 4). They still believed that the state should provide for its citizens (see Table 5b).

**Table 5a.**  
**Attitudes Toward Economic Security and Social Welfare,  
 Stalin Years<sup>a</sup>**

By social status and age <sup>f</sup>	% saying:					
	Government should guarantee work <sup>b</sup>	Government should forbid inequality <sup>c</sup>	Prefer job security over advancement <sup>d</sup>	Prefer economic security over freedom <sup>e</sup>		
<b>Peasants</b>						
>50	89 (35)	25 (12)	86 (35)	26 (34)		
41–50	81 (75)	30 (23)	72 (68)	14 (66)		
31–40	85 (101)	26 (30)	72 (90)	26 (82)		
<30	86 (83)	44 (34)	73 (76)	15 (74)		
<b>Workers</b>						
>50	83 (98)	24 (34)	84 (89)	24 (80)		
41–50	84 (169)	33 (60)	77 (155)	13 (147)		
31–40	89 (229)	42 (77)	77 (224)	12 (215)		
<30	94 (128)	48 (36)	73 (124)	12 (113)		
<b>White collar</b>						
>50	83 (199)	45 (115)	84 (191)	15 (189)		
41–50	80 (147)	25 (89)	75 (149)	15 (139)		
31–40	94 (161)	41 (76)	68 (162)	15 (155)		
<30	89 (55)	55 (24)	65 (52)	17 (54)		
<b>Intelligentsia</b>						
>50	74 (129)	38 (89)	80 (123)	8 (128)		
41–50	86 (135)	43 (93)	69 (134)	12 (126)		
31–40	86 (173)	32 (107)	48 (168)	13 (164)		
<30	84 (81)	34 (40)	43 (76)	9 (80)		

<sup>a</sup>These data are from the Harvard Project's Paper-and-Pencil Questionnaire and are available only by social status.

<sup>b</sup>The question was: "In some countries the government guarantees work for everyone. Are you in favor of this or against it?"

<sup>c</sup>The question: "Should a government permit some people to be rich and some poor or should it forbid such inequality?"

<sup>d</sup>The item was: "In general, what kind of job do you prefer? A job that pays fairly well and is secure, but offers little opportunity for advancement, or a job that pays less and is not secure but offers good opportunities for advancement?"

<sup>e</sup>The question: "What kind of government do you prefer? A government which guarantees personal freedom, such as the right to criticize the government, worship freely, etc., but does not assure you a job, or a government which guarantees a decent standard of living but does not assure you of these personal rights?"

<sup>f</sup>The definition of social status and the age breaks used here are those adopted by Rossi. Since the questionnaire was fielded in 1950–1951, the age breaks are nearly identical with those used in other parts of the analysis here.

Source: Rossi, *Generational Differences*, 298–300.

as reaping more than they deserved. All social strata shared a common sense of deprivation, even though rewards were highly differentiated (Table 6). However, people did differ in their willingness to increase rewards to others. Those with the highest social status were the most egalitarian, the most inclined to say that everyone got too little. Workers and peasants felt that they themselves received too few rewards, but they were somewhat less charitable toward "higher" strata.<sup>62</sup>

62. This part of the analysis rests on differences among occupational classes because the data on these questions for the Stalin era are available only from published Harvard Project results.

**Table 5b.**  
**Attitudes Toward Economic Security and Social Welfare,  
Gorbachev Era.**

	% saying:					
	Prevent unemployment <sup>a</sup>	(N)	State should guarantee basic living standards <sup>b</sup>		Prefer equality over freedom <sup>c</sup>	
			(N)	(N)	(N)	(N)
Total	32.9	(1590)	83.7	(1668)	40.7	(1506)
By year of birth:						
1900–10	61.7	(3)	87.5	(8)	58.4	(6)
1911–20	75.5	(65)	94.8	(77)	65.8	(60)
1921–30	60.3	(216)	90.2	(204)	65.1	(183)
1931–40	42.2	(274)	84.6	(280)	46.4	(249)
1941–50	27.3	(201)	83.9	(223)	37.3	(194)
1951–60	22.0	(327)	81.2	(372)	31.7	(317)
1961–70	22.7	(394)	80.6	(407)	34.2	(384)
1971–73	9.4	(111)	80.4	(97)	27.3	(112)
By education:						
< secondary	63.9	(259)	90.5	(241)	62.1	(245)
Completed secondary	31.4	(934)	84.6	(951)	38.4	(886)
Completed higher	16.2	(379)	79.2	(457)	32.0	(355)

<sup>a</sup>The question: "Some people feel that there should be no unemployment in our country, even if it means that our economy will not be improved and modernized in the near future. Others feel some unemployment in our country is acceptable, if that's what it takes to improve and modernize the economy. Generally, which position comes closer to your point of view?" 1=no unemployment; 2=accept some unemployment.

<sup>b</sup>The question is: "The state should guarantee every citizen food and basic shelter." 1=agree completely; 2=mostly agree; 3=mostly disagree; 4=completely disagree. Here, the percentages indicate those who completely or mostly agree.

<sup>c</sup>The item: "What's more important in our society—that everyone be free to pursue their life's goals without interference from the state or that the state play an active role in society so as to guarantee equality?" 1=freedom; 2=equality.

Source: Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" Survey (1991).

By the 1980s, the sense of universal deprivation had diminished. Most people still believed that the political elite was overpaid but only certain groups (farmers, workers, doctors) were singled out as receiving too little (Table 7a).<sup>63</sup> Some strata, such as workers or intellectuals/

63. Since questions in the later survey asked about people in specific occupations, it might be that the answers reflect only judgments about those occupations and not the broader social categories named in the Harvard Project. However, a factor analysis of the SIP responses confirms that even when questions were asked about specific occupations, people tended to group them in broad class terms (the data are not shown). The results yield three factors, for "authorities" (Party, KGB, military), "workers, farmers, employees" (*kolkhozniki*, retail clerks, factory workers, doctors), and "professionals and intellectuals" (industrial managers, professors). Thus the question

**Table 6.**  
**Perceptions of Distributive Justice, Stalin Era: Which Groups Receive Less Than They Deserve?\***

	As rated by (%):				
	(1) All	(2) Intellectuals	(3) White-Collar workers	(4) Workers	(5) Peasants
<b>Class</b>					
Receiving Less than Deserved					
Peasants	98	99	99	98	97
Workers	93	93	93	93	94
White-collar workers	74	83	88	66	59
Intellectuals	62	74	72	51	50
N	(2347)	(623)	(659)	(727)	(338)

\*These data are from the Harvard Project Paper-and Pencil Questionnaire. The question was: "In each society each social class has a definite investment in the well-being of society, and in its turn receives a definite reward from society. Certain classes get more out of society than they deserve; some classes less, and others just what they deserve. Below is cited a list of classes in Soviet society. We would like you to indicate which of these you think receive more, which less, and which receive what they deserve. Check the line which you think correct for each."

Source: Inkeles and Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, 301.

professionals, were no longer seen as quite so deprived. And the old egalitarianism was less apparent among younger cohorts and higher-status groups. Newer generations and the more educated were now less inclined than before to see the "laboring classes" as deprived; and they were more inclined to increase their own rewards (Table 7b). Almost identical patterns emerged when the questions were repeated in late 1991 and in 1992 (the data are not shown).<sup>64</sup>

The old ethic of redistribution had begun to lose its appeal, especially among new cohorts and college graduates. By 1991, the young

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taps the same perceived social cleavages as did the comparable question in the Stalin era. Only doctors seem to defy this class divide, apparently because of their relatively low pay and longer hours, and the perceived value of their work.

64. In Russia-91, the questions about which groups received too much or too little included specific occupations, as asked earlier in SIP. The answers are similar, with a few differences: after the collapse of the consumer sector, more open corruption and rising inflation, retail sales clerks were no longer rated as being under-rewarded. And by late 1991, "obkom first secretary" was no longer a salient category. Instead, the survey asked about a "deputy to the Supreme Soviet"; people responded that deputies also received too much. In 1992, the questions referred to various social groups, such as peasants, workers, white-collar employees and so on. The results bear out the tendency for more highly educated respondents to want to raise rewards for professionals and to be less inclined to redistribute to manual classes.

**Table 7a.**  
**Perceptions of Distributive Justice, Brezhnev Era: Which Groups Receive Less Than They Deserve?<sup>a</sup>**

	As rated by (%):			
	All	Intellectuals/ Professionals	White-Collar workers	Workers
<b>Group Receiving Less than Deserved:<sup>b</sup></b>				
<i>Workers, Peasants, Employees</i>				
Collective farmer	88.8	89.8	87.8	88.1
Doctor	89.2	93.5	86.4	82.8
Salesclerk in dept. store	71.5	71.1	70.9	72.5
Worker in auto plant	62.8	58.4	66.5	68.4
<i>Intellectuals, Professionals</i>				
Professor at MGU	20.0	23.4	20.0	15.2
Industrial manager	7.8	9.4	6.0	5.2
<i>Authorities</i>				
Colonel in military	4.5	3.7	5.1	5.6
Colonel in KGB	1.5	1.1	1.5	2.0
Obkom 1st secretary	1.6	1.5	1.1	1.9

<sup>a</sup>The question: "Did each of the people listed receive the pay they deserved, or did each one receive too much or too little?" what they deserved=1; too much=2; too little=3.

<sup>b</sup>Since the question focuses on income rather than overall rewards or benefits, it might be that a question on total rewards would yield somewhat different results. However, this seems unlikely: the ratings presented here for income earned are highly correlated with those for identical questions on influence and privilege in the SIP survey. In other words, "income" is seen as closely connected with the more general distribution of rewards in society.

*Source:* Soviet Interview Project General Survey I (1983–1984).

and highly educated were much more willing to endorse private, rather than state, responsibility for some elements of individual welfare (Table 5b). The youngest generations also came to be the most negative toward leveling (Table 7b). The disagreements went beyond the perceived fairness of rewards: different generations and social groups came to have divergent standards for judging the reward system itself. Over time, younger and more highly educated interviewees felt more dissatisfied with the same material conditions.<sup>65</sup> Thus, for example, while nearly all respondents in the Brezhnev era felt that meat and especially other consumer goods had been in short supply where they lived, younger generations with more schooling were even more inclined to complain (Table 8). And when asked which period in Soviet history witnessed the greatest gap in privileges, these same groups were most

65. See also the results in Millar and Clayton, "Quality of Life"; and Silver, "Political Beliefs."

**Table 7b.**  
**Perceptions of Distributive Justice by Generation and Education,**  
**Brezhnev Era<sup>a</sup>**

Factor scores by:	Groups seen as receiving "too little"			
	"Authorities" <sup>b</sup>	"Workers, farmers, employees" <sup>c</sup>	"Professionals" <sup>d</sup>	
<b>Year of birth:</b>				
1905–10	−0.03 (26)	2.92 (26)	−0.81 (26)	
1911–20	0.28 (161)	−1.14 (161)	−1.87 (161)	
1921–30	−0.16 (192)	2.35 (192)	−1.24 (192)	
1931–40	−1.24 (354)	0.44 (354)	−0.13 (354)	
1941–50	1.08 (413)	−0.15 (413)	0.52 (413)	
1951–60	−0.10 (180)	−2.43 (180)	2.17 (180)	
<b>Education:</b>				
< secondary	3.28 (134)	−1.31 (134)	−3.96 (134)	
Completed secondary	1.14 (587)	0.61 (587)	−1.06 (587)	
Completed higher	−1.83 (605)	−0.30 (605)	1.91 (605)	

<sup>a</sup>The entries are average factor scores (multiplied by 10) for each category, derived from responses to the questions in Table 7a. The original factor scores have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. The higher the score, the more the group is perceived as being under-rewarded. Since the question focuses on income rather than overall rewards or benefits, it might be that a question on total rewards would yield somewhat different results. However, this seems unlikely: the ratings presented here for income earned are highly correlated with those for identical questions on influence and privilege in the SIP I survey. In other words, "income" is seen as closely connected with the more general distribution of rewards in society.

<sup>b</sup>Including *obkom* first secretary, colonel in the KGB, colonel in the military.

<sup>c</sup>Includes auto worker, collective farmer, department store clerk and doctor.

<sup>d</sup>Includes professor at MGU and manager of industrial enterprise.

*Source:* Soviet Interview Project General Survey I (1983–1984).

likely to see their own era as the worst.<sup>66</sup> Thus perceptions of inequality had grown while differences in rewards diminished. Over the years from Stalin to Brezhnev, the popular meaning of "social injustice" seems to have shifted in emphasis from absolute to relative deprivation. And while there was widespread agreement that the system was unfair, different strata had very different notions of what a "fair" system would provide. These changes imply a shift in ideology among key groups: if the young and relatively privileged strata of the Stalin years favored a more egalitarian system to protect the manual classes, their counterparts under Brezhnev and Gorbachev now had less enthusiasm for this key tenet of the workers' state.

Questions on the preferred model of the economy and on basic social welfare guarantees reveal growing cleavages in Soviet society over the years. In contrast, questions on civil liberties always reflected more disagreement. Virtually everyone endorsed some degree of lib-

66. Bahry, "Politics, Generations and Change."

**Table 8.**  
**Perceived Shortages, Brezhnev Era.**

	Meat <sup>a</sup>	(N)	Goods <sup>b</sup>	Other (N)
Total	78.5%	(541)	95.2%	(532)
By year of birth:				
1905–10	52.9	(16)	93.3	(14)
1911–20	75.0	(98)	88.0	(94)
1921–30	76.3	(88)	93.7	(86)
1931–40	83.5	(128)	97.5	(125)
1941–50	78.4	(144)	98.2	(147)
1951–60	83.8	(67)	98.7	(66)
By education:				
< secondary	66.7	(90)	81.5	(81)
Completed secondary	80.5	(272)	97.4	(272)
Completed higher	81.3	(179)	98.1	(179)

<sup>a</sup>The question: "We have heard that sometimes there are shortages of meat and dairy products in state stores in the Soviet Union. Thinking about the city or town where you lived in [the end of your last normal period of life in the USSR], would you say that the state stores usually had a large enough supply of meat and dairy products, or that usually there was a shortage (deficit)?" 1=usually had enough; 2=usually were shortages. These questions were asked of a random 1/3 of the total sample.

<sup>b</sup>Respondents were asked: "We have heard that in the Soviet Union there are some other goods, such as cars, fashionable clothing, and furniture, that are frequently in short supply. Was this true [in your city/town] in [the end of your last normal period of life in the USSR], or not?" 1=yes, true; 2=no, not true. Asked of a random 1/3 of the sample.

Source: Soviet Interview Project General Survey 1 (1983–1984).

eralization in every time period, but people were divided over which rights to grant and how much of a state role to retain. They called for expanding civil rights in general, but also wanted to retain controls when it came to particular situations.<sup>67</sup> Disagreements were all too visible among Stalin-era respondents. People split almost evenly on questions of freedom of the press, speech and religious teaching; as Table 9 indicates, roughly half wanted to maintain some restrictions in each domain (Table 9).<sup>68</sup> However, on most questions, relatively few people endorsed the *existing system's pervasive controls*. Eighty-five percent, for example, favored a freer press (but with extensive state regulation) and 83 percent would allow some teaching of religious beliefs, even if they were incorrect. On the other hand, roughly half would

67. Cf. Inkeles and Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, 246–48.

68. Many people, for example, wanted more and diverse sources of information. However, they also believed that the state should have its own media in order to explain its policies and educate the masses, and they wanted to insure that the government would punish people or newspapers that "spread false information and attack morals or the government" (LH case 1493).

**Table 9.**  
**Support for Political Controls, Stalin and Gorbachev Eras**  
**(% Supporting Controls)**

Stalin era:	The press <sup>a</sup>	(N)	Teaching "incorrect" religious beliefs <sup>b</sup>	(N)	Speech <sup>c</sup>	(N)
Total	51.8	(253)	59.0	(200)	52.2	(268)
By year of birth:						
< 1900	58.4	(53)	57.7	(45)	56.6	(60)
1900–10	52.8	(53)	65.7	(45)	54.2	(59)
1911–20	51.4	(70)	55.8	(52)	46.5	(71)
1921–30	46.8	(77)	56.9	(58)	47.4	(78)
By education:						
< secondary	47.0	(100)	57.3	(75)	57.7	(111)
Completed secondary	55.6	(72)	54.7	(64)	52.7	(74)
Completed higher	55.1	(80)	66.7	(60)	43.9	(82)
Gorbachev era:	Ban book <sup>d</sup>	(N)	Increase newspaper censorship <sup>e</sup>	(N)	Limit parties <sup>f</sup>	(N)
Total	65.5	(1557)	25.7	(1531)	59.8	(1484)
By year of birth:						
1900–10	100.0	(4)	41.2	(3)	41.5	(3)
1911–20	88.0	(64)	61.2	(58)	87.9	(58)
1921–30	87.8	(200)	44.7	(181)	81.3	(178)
1931–40	77.6	(255)	32.9	(255)	66.7	(255)
1941–50	67.9	(206)	27.9	(207)	53.7	(196)
1951–60	62.4	(322)	18.3	(318)	53.8	(310)
1961–70	48.9	(393)	14.9	(399)	53.9	(381)
1971–73	46.2	(113)	14.9	(111)	41.5	(103)
By education:						
< secondary	86.8	(245)	43.2	(226)	81.4	(224)
Completed secondary	64.3	(929)	24.5	(909)	56.8	(863)
Completed higher	55.7	(363)	19.3	(378)	54.2	(377)

<sup>a</sup>The question in the Harvard Project was: "What should the government do about the press?" The percentages represent respondents who favored at least some government controls.

<sup>b</sup>This question followed several others: "What do you think the relation between church and state should be? A. Do you think that the state should ever interfere in matters of religion? B. For example, how about people who hold beliefs which are incorrect: should they be permitted to teach them?" Percentages in the table are those people who would impose at least some restrictions on religious teaching.

<sup>c</sup>The question: "A group of English students were walking through a public park singing songs. They approached a place where a Communist orator was addressing a crowd. A policeman stopped them and asked them not to sing while passing the crowd since this would disturb the speaker. Do you think the English policeman was right in protecting the Communist orator from being disturbed?" Responses focused on the right of the orator to speak and the conditions under which respondents would allow him to do so. The data here are the percentages who would impose at least some restrictions on the right to speak.

<sup>d</sup>The question: "Books that contain ideas dangerous to society should be banned from public school libraries." 1=Completely agree, 2=agree, 3=disagree, 4=completely disagree. The percentages here are those people who agree or completely agree.

<sup>e</sup>The question was: "Would you approve or disapprove of placing greater constraints and controls on what newspapers print?" 1=approve; 2=disapprove. Percentages here are those who approve.

<sup>f</sup>The item was: "Some people feel that in a democracy all political parties should be allowed, even those that do not believe in the democratic system. Others feel that even in a democracy certain political parties should be outlawed. Generally, which position comes closer to your view?" 1=allow all; 2=outlaw some. Percentages in the table are those who would "outlaw some."

Sources: Harvard Project Recode (1950–1951); Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" Survey (1991).

still limit freedom of speech; and roughly half were reluctant to grant freedom of association to groups whose aim was to attack the government.<sup>69</sup> Disagreements about which rights to protect also emerge in later surveys. In 1991, more than half of all respondents would ban a book with dangerous ideas from the schools and over fifty percent would ban some political parties (Table 9).<sup>70</sup> Fewer people were willing to accept a return to the old system's more restrictive censorship of the press.

These issues too evoked growing cleavages by age and education. Such disparities had been modest at best under Stalin: the young and highly educated then were not significantly more liberal or conservative than anyone else. While they endorsed broader rights in some circumstances, they also wanted to see limits in others (Table 9).<sup>71</sup> By the time of perestroika, cleavages had widened: the post-Soviet *Citizen* generations, especially the ones with a college degree, were markedly more liberal across the board on individual rights (Table 9).<sup>72</sup> The cleavages are especially clear where the questions touch on similar issues in different surveys, for example, on controls over the media. The generations interviewed in the Harvard Project give very similar answers in 1950–1951 and 1991. Roughly half opted for some control of the press under Stalin; after the introduction of glasnost', nearly as many opted for an increase in press censorship (see Figure 2). In contrast, younger generations by 1991, both with a college degree and without, once again proved to be far less enthusiastic about the state's role.

Every survey, then, reveals both discontent with and disagreement over the state's political controls on its citizens, from Stalin to Gorbachev. People called for a degree of liberalization even in the Stalin years, but they were at odds on the specifics. By 1991, they were still at odds; but their disagreement now had a more pronounced generational cast to it.

All of the evidence thus points to fundamental and growing cleavages by generation and education after Stalin. The tables, though, do not tell us whether these relationships are independent: whether the "generation gap" actually reflects rising levels of education or real

69. Rossi suggests that some respondents may have interpreted the word "attack" literally, as an effort to overthrow the government by force. Yet the percentages on this question (roughly half of respondents would prevent such a group from meeting) are in line with others endorsing some limitation of individual rights.

70. Gibson and Duch, in "Emerging Democratic Values" (80), also find a mixed reaction to the question of controls over the media: in their 1990 survey of the European USSR, only 54% of respondents were willing to allow private radio, television and newspapers to coexist alongside state-owned ones.

71. Rossi shows that the young were more inclined to allow people to say things detrimental to the state. But they were less willing than others to allow meetings held to attack the government (*Generational Differences*, 304–5).

72. The same cleavages emerge in data on the late Brezhnev era (the data are not shown).

differences in life experiences among successive cohorts. Nor do the data thus far indicate whether the effects of either age or schooling hold independently of other influences, from the impact of urbanization to gender to dissatisfaction with living standards. To untangle these rival effects, Tables 10 and 11 present multiple regression results for support of state economic and political controls.<sup>73</sup> Several other factors are included as explanatory variables. To capture the impact of urbanization, I include a measure of residence in major urban areas.<sup>74</sup> Interrepublic differences are captured by a dummy variable for residents of Ukraine. In addition, variables have also been added to reflect the effects of gender and level of material dissatisfaction.<sup>75</sup> The results confirm, first, the key role of generational change. From the state's economic controls over the commanding heights of industry to political freedoms, cohort differences are significant. Those born in 1900–1910, and 1921–1930 proved to be more positive toward the state's role in heavy industry, once other factors were controlled; people who came of age before and after had less enthusiasm for government ownership (Table 10).<sup>76</sup> It was the generations who came of age under Stalin who seemed to buy most enthusiastically into the Soviet model of economic control. Yet even they did so only partially. If they accepted state ownership of steel, machinery and the like, they were much less certain about the state's role on farms.<sup>77</sup> They were generally

73. Given the relatively small sample from the Harvard Project, I report multiple measures of the level of significance for individual coefficients. Questions on social welfare are excluded from the regression analysis, since the raw data from the Stalin years are not available on these issues.

74. Note that each survey treated the issue of place of residence somewhat differently. Face sheets for the Harvard Project interviews included data on whether respondents had mostly lived in a village, a small, medium or large city, or a combination of these. Given the upheavals of the wars, the early Soviet period, collectivization and the like, most people had lived in several very different settings. SIP included questions on the exact place of last residence; and the Pulse of Europe Survey included a field-coded question on respondents' current place of residence. I also ran the regression analysis using residence in a *rural* area rather than a major urban one. The results prove to be essentially the same as in Tables 10 and 11, with rural inhabitants somewhat more in favor of state controls over the economy and over individual rights; urban residents are less so.

75. I also included a measure of occupational status in some of the analysis (i.e., a dummy variable with a "1" if a person was employed in a professional or intellectual field, and a "0" otherwise). But this proved difficult to interpret. Occupation was often so closely connected with education that it washed out in the statistical analysis. And in the Times Mirror survey, "occupation" was not asked of nearly a quarter of respondents then on pension; this would mean dropping virtually all pension-age respondents from the statistical analysis.

76. In the Harvard Project, it seemed to be the combination of age and education that mattered. When I included an interaction term for the older and less educated cohort (born before 1900 and with less than complete secondary education), they turned out to be significantly ( $p \leq .05$ ) less positive than others toward state ownership in sector A.

77. The impact of cohort differences on acceptance of state control in light industry in the Stalin era are not as clear. My analysis reveals that there were no signif-

**Table 10.**  
**Regression Analysis of Support for State Control of the Economy<sup>a</sup>**

Independent variable <sup>c</sup>	Stalin era			Brezhnev era			Gorbachev era		
	Heavy industry (1)	Light industry (2)	Agriculture (3)	Heavy industry (1)	Agriculture (3)	Heavy industry (1)	Light industry (2)	Light industry (2)	Farming (3)
Big city	.041	-.086	.009	.015	.013	-.087**	-.174**	-.128**	
Ukraine	—	—	—	.054	.020	.087**	.037 <sup>b</sup>	.037 <sup>b</sup>	.008
Material dissatisfaction	.036	-.059	-.120*	-.232**	-.208**	-.066**	-.035 <sup>b</sup>	-.035 <sup>b</sup>	-.001
Occupation-Professional/ Intelligentsia	.239**	-.028	-.121*	.015	.023	—	—	—	—
Education:									
Completed secondary	-.070	.097	.229**	-.067*	-.052 <sup>b</sup>	.046	-.149**	-.130**	
Completed higher	-.038	.093	.186**	-.086**	-.068*	-.030	-.250**	-.163**	
Year of birth:									
< 1900									
1900-10		.169*	.042	.009					
1911-20		.073	.101	-.115 <sup>b</sup>					
1921-30		.157*	.063	-.101	.028	-.031	-.012	-.043	-.107**
1931-40					.057*	-.003	-.029	-.085*	-.133**
1941-50					-.076**	.006	-.087*	-.040	-.181**
1951-60					-.083**	.029	-.157**	-.135**	-.200**
1961-70							-.250**	-.195**	-.244**
1971-73							-.164**	-.186**	-.166**
Female									
R <sup>2</sup>	—	-.063	-.075	-.060	.084**	.062**	.091**	.102**	-.011
N		.041	0	.053	.101	.043	.080	.122	.057
	163	121	265	1639	1752	1612	1628	1610	

\* Significant at p ≤ .10

\*\* Significant at p ≤ .05

<sup>a</sup>For the Stalin and Gorbachev eras, the dependent variables are scaled as 1=private; 2=mixed; and 3=state. For the Brezhnev era, the dependent variables are 7-point scales, where 1=private, and 7=state. The numbers are standardized regression coefficients. Because these are truncated dependent variables, I also

ran logistic regressions for each equation presented here, using two variants: first, with state=1 and mixed/private=0; and second, with private=1 and mixed/state=0. The results turned out to be substantively the same as those presented here. For questions in the Stalin and Gorbachev eras, see Table 1; for the Brezhnev era, see note d below.

<sup>b</sup>Significant at  $p \leq .15$ .

<sup>c</sup>Variables used in the analysis:

#### Harvard Project

Big city: data taken from Harvard Project Life History face sheets indicating type of area in which respondent spent most of his or her life. Classifying people proved difficult, however, given the turbulence of World War I, the Civil War and collectivization. Most people had moved between urban and rural areas. Material dissatisfaction: an index based on responses to three questions: whether respondents felt that they had adequate food, clothing and housing. The more they felt these were inadequate, the higher the score.

Education: for "completed secondary," respondents were coded as 1 if their highest education was completed secondary school, and 0 otherwise. For "completed higher," respondents were coded as 1 if they had completed a VUZ, institute, military college or conservatory, and 0 otherwise.

#### Soviet Interview Project

Big city: coded as 1 if respondent lived in a city of 1 million or more at the end of the "last normal period of life" in the USSR, 0 otherwise.  
Ukraine: coded as 1 if respondent lived in Ukraine at the end of the "last normal period of life" in the USSR, 0 otherwise.

Material dissatisfaction: a composite score based on responses to five items. "In (END OF LNP), how satisfied or dissatisfied were you with . . . a) your housing?, b) (your/your family's) standard of living?, c) public medical care?, d) your job?, e) the availability of consumer goods in your town? Response categories:

(2) Very dissatisfied, (1) Somewhat dissatisfied, (-1) Somewhat satisfied, (-2) Very satisfied.

Education: for "completed secondary," respondents were coded as 1 if their highest education was completed secondary school, and 0 otherwise. For "completed higher," respondents were coded as 1 if they had completed a VUZ, institute, military college or conservatory, and 0 otherwise. State ownership: For heavy industry, the question was: "Some people in the Soviet Union say that the state should own all heavy industry. Others say that all heavy industry should be owned privately. Where would you have placed yourself on this issue in (END OF LNP)? 1 = Heavy industry be run privately; 7 = state should own heavy industry. For agriculture, the question was: "Some people in the Soviet Union believe that the state should control production and distribution of all agricultural products. Others believe that all agricultural production and distribution should be private. Where would you have placed yourself on this issue in (END OF LNP)??" Here, 1 = state should control production and distribution of all agricultural products.

Female: 1 if female, 0 if male.

#### Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" Survey

Big city: coded as 1 if identified in survey as residing in a large city, 0 otherwise.  
Ukraine: coded as 1 if respondent lived in Ukraine, 0 otherwise.

Material dissatisfaction: based on a question of whether respondent was very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all satisfied with current personal financial situation. Here, the higher the score (from 1 to 4), the less the satisfaction.

Education: for "completed secondary," respondents were coded as 1 if their highest education was completed secondary school, and 0 otherwise. For "completed higher," respondents were coded as 1 if they had completed a VUZ, institute, military college or conservatory, and 0 otherwise.

Female: 1 if female, 0 if male.

Source: Harvard Project Recode (1950-1951); Soviet Interview Project General Survey I (1983-1984); Times Mirror "Pulse of Europe" Survey, (1991).

negative on this issue, even under Stalin (Table 10).<sup>78</sup> The effects of generational replacement also show in questions on individual rights. As noted earlier, age differences were rather modest under Stalin: people wanted some liberalization within a strong state, regardless of age. Successor generations came to be significantly more negative toward the state's controls. And it was not simply linear age that set people apart, as the dummy variables for different cohorts reveal (Table 11). Those born after World War II, and especially after 1950, had fundamentally different values from their elders.

Higher education had a less consistent impact. Under Stalin, the more educated differed little from other groups in their views of the state's role in industry; but they were slightly more supportive of its role in agriculture, once other factors are added in. They were more likely to endorse collectives, albeit voluntary ones. Later, however, the impact of higher education shifted: the college-educated came to be less enthusiastic, and the less educated, more positive toward state controls in both the factories and the farms (Tables 10–11). The effect of education also shifted with respect to individual rights. People with a college degree were not significantly more or less inclined than others to endorse broad civil liberties in the Stalin years.<sup>79</sup> But later generations with higher schooling were far more liberal in their views of individual rights, especially by 1991 (see Table 11).

Differences between Russia and Ukraine on these issues also appear to be somewhat mixed. With age, education and other factors controlled, respondents from Ukraine showed more inclination to endorse the state's role in heavy industry as of 1991, but were not much different from their Russian counterparts on questions of ownership in light industry and farming (Table 11). Similarly, respondents from Ukraine were less likely to approve of increased censorship, but more conservative on other issues of individual rights (Table 11).

One other factor deserves mention as well. Material dissatisfaction proved to be significant on several questions, suggesting that the less the satisfaction, the less the support for some forms of political or

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icant age effects (see Table 10 and note 44). This may be due to the fact that relatively few people responded. Data from the PPQ suggested that the younger the interviewee, the more supportive of state control, although the effect of age varied from one social group to another. On the other hand, higher social status meant less support (Rossi, *Generational Change*, 296).

78. Inkeles and Bauer, and Rossi suggest that young peoples' negative views of collectivization were in many cases acquired in the displaced persons camps, based on the stories they had heard. Yet many respondents in the 30-to-40 age group did see collectivization for themselves, making them doubt that it had been worth the enormous costs. Younger people recounted stories they had heard from family and friends at home.

79. They were somewhat more inclined to grant greater freedom of speech (see Table 9). Note, though, that the question on speech is open to different interpretations, since it asked whether a communist orator should be allowed to speak undisturbed. It may be that people were responding to the fact that the speaker was a communist when they were judging whether to let him speak.

economic regulation. Yet even material dissatisfaction was strongly colored by generational differences. For the Stalin years, younger interviewees felt slightly (though not significantly) *more* satisfied with their basic material conditions (the data are not shown). Under Brezhnev and Gorbachev, the same cohorts remained the more satisfied. Succeeding generations, in contrast, were significantly less content. So, too, were urban residents and people with low incomes. Despite the claim that money did not matter much to individual citizens under the traditional Soviet order, a higher income meant greater material satisfaction.

Along with the growing differences by generation and education, individual values also came to be more consistent over the years: if people endorsed mixed or private ownership in light industry, they were now more likely to do so for heavy industry too. Their counterparts in Stalin's time had viewed the question of public versus private control separately for each sector, with less consistency in their answers (Table 12). Attitudes on individual rights also came to be more closely connected. For the late Stalin years, there was little correlation among answers on controls over media, speech and religion;<sup>80</sup> by 1991, answers on specific questions were all related.<sup>81</sup> Similarly, there had been little coherence or "constraint" in individual views on economic policy and on civil liberties in the Harvard Project: people who favored a broad state role in the economy were no more or less inclined than others to call for limits on individual rights. By the Brezhnev and Gorbachev eras, the answers reflected more consistency across these questions (Table 12). If the Stalin era witnessed isolated discontents with particular types of state controls, the public of later years had come to have a much more sophisticated view of the interrelations between various issues.<sup>82</sup>

I began by noting a paradox: under Gorbachev, analysts contended that a profound social transformation had undermined support for the old Soviet system; after Gorbachev, the constituency for the old

80. Rossi emphasizes the same point in her analysis of PPQ data: differences by age and social status on questions of free assembly, for example, are at odds with those for freedom of speech (*Generational Differences*, 303–6).

81. One reason may simply be the increase in levels of education over time. But this does not seem to be the case: the correlations among issues hold *within* each level of education.

82. Data on the Brezhnev era reveal much the same pattern of correlations among issues as under Gorbachev. These correlations—or the lack of them under Stalin—were not limited to the specific questions listed in Table 12. The same patterns also obtain on other items related to state economic and political controls. Nor are the increasing correlations among individual questions over time a product of changing question content or format. The surveys here included multiple questions with different formats and the results are similar whatever the formulation. Thus the changes in individual consistency cannot be attributed to the questions themselves.

**Table 11.**  
**Regression Analysis of Support for Limits on Individual Rights<sup>a</sup>**

Independent variable	Stalin era				Brezhnev era				Gorbachev era			
	Control press (1)	Control speech (2)	Control religion (3)	Censor media/art (4)	Require residence permits (5)	Increase censorship (6)	Ban book (7)	Ban some parties (8)	Require residence permits (5)	Increase censorship (6)	Ban book (7)	Ban some parties (8)
Big city	-.075	-.075	-.191**	.026	.027	-.222**	-.063**	-.136**	-.098**	-.107 <sup>b</sup>	-.020**	-.141**
Ukraine	—	—	—	.189**	.023	—	—	—	—	—	—	.039
Material dissatisfaction	.032	-.088	.064	-.074*	-.177**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Occupation-Professional/ Intelligentsia	.024	.024	.118	-.003	-.070**	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Education:												
Completed secondary	.089	-.010	-.103	-.041	-.051 <sup>b</sup>	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Completed higher	.039	-.070	.033	-.090	-.038	-.340**	-.182**	-.054 <sup>b</sup>	—	—	—	—
Year of birth:												
< 1900												
1900-10	—	-.121 <sup>b</sup>	-.010	.001	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1911-20	—	-.096	-.064	.069	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1921-30	—	-.113	-.073	.117	.008	-.075**	-.275*	-.014	—	—	—	—
1931-40					—	-.090 <sup>b</sup>	-.096**	-.078*	—	—	—	—
1941-50					—	-.142**	-.089**	-.652**	—	—	—	—
1951-60					—	-.194**	-.061**	-.820**	—	—	—	—
1961-70					—	—	—	-.972**	—	—	—	—
1971-73					—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

**Table 11. Continued**

Independent variable	Stalin era			Brezhnev era			Gorbachev era		
	Control press (1)	Control speech (2)	Control religion (3)	Censor media/art (4)	Require residence permits (5)	Increase censorship (6)	Ban book (7)	Ban book (8)	Ban some parties (8)
Female	.013	.141**	-.058	.136**	.017	.245**	.078**	.102*	
R <sup>2</sup>	0	.018	.020	.110	.050		.154		
% predicted						76.1%		62.2%	
N	240	249	188	566	1783	1524	1521	1488	

<sup>a</sup> Significant at p ≤ .10<sup>\*\*</sup> Significant at p ≤ .05

<sup>a</sup> Equation 1—support for state controls on the press; 2—controls over right to speak; 3—state should prohibit teaching of incorrect religious beliefs. For the text of the questions, see Table 9. Equation 4—state should censor art and media with undesirable content; 5—state should require residence permits. Equation 6—increase state controls on media; 7—state should ban books with dangerous ideas from schools; 8—state should ban some parties. Text of the questions is provided in Table 8. The numbers in equations 6 and 8 are logistic regression coefficients, since the dependent variables are binary. All others are standardized ordinary least squares coefficients. For definitions of variables, see Table 10. For the questions from the Stalin and Gorbachev eras, see Table 9. For the Brezhnev era, the questions are as follows: on censorship, the measure is a composite index covering 5 items, asking “During your [LNP], did you believe that the government should ban or allow movies, plays or books that . . . a) portrayed ethnic or national stereotypes? b) presented political ideas contrary to government policy? c) presented explicit descriptions or portrayals of sex? d) presented abstract art? e) presented scenes of brutality and violence?” 1 = allow, 7 = ban. A score was computed for each respondent who answered at least three of these items. The question was asked of a random 1/3 of respondents. For residence permits, the question was: “Some people in the Soviet Union believe that people should be required to have residence permits to live in the large cities so that the authorities can plan public services. Others think that people should be completely free to live where they want.” 1 = free to live where they want; 7 = state should require residence permits.

<sup>b</sup> Significant at p ≤ .15

Sources: Harvard Project Recode (1950–1951); Soviet Interview Project General Survey I (1983–1984); Times Mirror “Pulse of Europe” Survey, (1991).

**Table 12.**  
**Correlations Among Issues<sup>a</sup>**

Stalin era	Control press	Control speech	Control relig.	State own agr.	State own heavy ind.
Control speech	.048 (247)				
Control relig.	.013 (187)	.055 (193)			
State own agr.	-.041 (241)	-.150* (253)	-.028 (190)		
State own heavy ind.	.317* (151)	.068 (157)	.002 (117)	.001 (176)	
State own light ind.	.045 (112)	.037 (113)	-.079 (89)	.236* (130)	.048 (129)
Gorbachev era	Ban book	Ban some parties	Increase media controls	State own light ind.	State own heavy ind.
Ban some parties	.126* (271)				
Increase media controls	.287* (276)	.318* (266)			
State own light ind.	.230* (302)	.159* (280)	.358* (289)		
State own heavy ind.	.235* (304)	.063 (280)	.106 (290)	.224* (323)	
State own agr.	.121* (295)	.153* (274)	.197* (285)	.276* (316)	-.052 (316)

<sup>a</sup>The data are two-tailed Kendall correlation coefficients; those significant at  $p \leq .05$  are indicated with an asterisk. To avoid inflating significance levels because of differences in sample size, the coefficients for the Gorbachev era were calculated for a random sample of 350 respondents out of the total in the Pulse of Europe Survey. Number of cases is listed in parentheses below each coefficient. For the questions, see Tables 1 and 9.

Sources: Harvard Project Recode (1950–1951); Times Mirror “Pulse of Europe” Survey, 1991.

system has appeared to be much more durable. Neither interpretation quite fits the evidence. On questions of the government's role in the economy, there was less of a sea change in core public values than the arguments about social transformation have implied. Clear majorities from the late Stalin years onward favored a mixed system reminiscent of NEP. People did not lose their enthusiasm for state monopolies in farming and consumer goods production; many had reservations from the beginning. Public values also consistently favored the welfare state, though preferences shifted over the years from more to less comprehensive social guarantees. The ideal welfare state by 1991 had more room for private initiative. Attitudes towards civil liberties also remained “consistent” over time: virtually all surveys reveal support for

political liberalization, and all show public disagreement over the rights people would grant and the role they would allow to the state. Most people desired more freedom and limits on the government's intrusions into their lives, but many also wanted to retain some controls.

Thus political liberalization and economic reform did have mass support in 1985, but the demand for change dated at least back to the post-War years. It is difficult to find evidence that public values in any of the time periods examined here ever fit the mold of stalinism.<sup>83</sup> The constituency for reform had, however, changed by the time Gorbachev emerged as general secretary. The modest generational and educational cleavages in *The Soviet Citizen* had reversed and widened into major fault lines. Equally important, the nature of discontent with the system changed over time: isolated criticisms of individual sectors of the economy or of controls on individuals gave way to alternative ideologies. While people in the late Stalin years found much to condemn in the regime's abuses of civil liberties, they were far from consistent in defining the types of rights they *would* grant; nor was there much correspondence between answers on state control of the economy and controls over individuals. By the 1980s, public values had crystallized around alternative visions of state-society relations. People who endorsed broader freedom in one sphere, be it press or publishing or the right to strike, were now also more likely to call for less state control in other areas. Soviet society's "revolution of the mind" was not simply a shift toward greater dissatisfaction, it was a shift in the way people saw linkages between discrete issues.<sup>84</sup>

These results suggest a number of conclusions. One is the durability and insight of the Harvard Project's basic findings. Where questions are similar in later surveys, they reveal a good deal of continuity in the answers of different cohorts through the years. Inkeles and Bauer's observations about the post-Stalin regime's social contract also held over time. As they anticipated, the highest payoff from the new consumerism after Stalin would come in increased blue-collar support. *The Soviet Citizen* highlighted too the critical distinction between opposition to the regime and support for the more basic values of the Soviet system. Later evidence showed the same pattern of dissatisfaction with the Party and its leaders, but continued approval of key parts of the Soviet model.<sup>85</sup>

Still, some of the standard interpretations of the Harvard Project's findings need to be reassessed. It was not true, as is sometimes asserted, that the results indicated widespread support for the Soviet system

83. Cf. Starr, "Prospects for Stable Democracy."

84. Cf. Ruble, "The Soviet Union's Quiet Revolution"; and Ellen Carnaghan, "A Revolution in Mind: Russian Political Attitudes and the Origins of Democratization under Gorbachev," Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1992.

85. See Donna Bahry and Brian Silver, "Public Perceptions and the Dilemmas of Party Reform in the USSR," *Comparative Political Studies* 23 (1990): 171-209.

under Stalin.<sup>86</sup> Interviews then actually revealed more support for the Soviet order of the 1920s, from NEP's mixed economy to its marginally greater tolerance in political and social life (in comparison with the high Stalin years). Nor was it true that the stalinist system had managed to socialize new generations and the most highly educated into accepting its fundamental values: support among these groups was far too selective to be simply the product of schooling or indoctrination. If they favored some political controls, they were nonetheless anxious to have a less restrictive political order. They took pride in the achievements of rapid industrialization, but they had no such enthusiasm for collectivization or the takeover of the consumer sector. In fact, people who were the most favorable toward the basic outlines of the economic order were also the ones to call for reforms. The higher levels of support among the Stalin era's young and highly educated imply that they judged the system less by what they had been taught than by its visible and tangible results. This is especially apparent on questions dealing with the economy. On the less visible and tangible issues, such as individual rights, they were more ambivalent.

The evidence also casts some new light on the models that have been employed to explain the social roots of perestroika. The most compelling explanation is generational change: the data underscore the distinctiveness of new cohorts. In the Stalin era, it was the "relics" of the tsarist order, the old and less educated, who tended to object more to the new one. Younger and more educated cohorts then, the prime beneficiaries of rapid development, proved to be more positive toward the Soviet system and they remained the most positive from the Stalin years onward (see Table 13).<sup>87</sup> The generations who came before and after took a much dimmer view of core Soviet values and had different reference points for judging them.<sup>88</sup> The old social base of the system thus had a limited lifespan. The uneven pattern implies that the divergent views stemmed from generational replacement and not simply changes over the life-cycle. As Figures 1 and 2 illustrate,

86. Inkeles and Bauer were far more careful in their conclusions than common interpretations of their work generally acknowledge. They did emphasize the basic acceptance of many regime norms, something that was unexpected given the nature of their sample. But they also devoted a good deal of attention to the limits on public support.

87. Inkeles and Bauer argued that the Soviet system had raised the aspirations of the new and educated cohorts, and then tied them to the regime's goals. This made control over careers and employment even more of a lever to insure conformity (*The Soviet Citizen*, 288–90).

88. Katerina Clark offers a similar argument about generational change among the intelligentsia: the new generations who emerged under Stalin as the arbiters of intellectual life had "reduced intellectual horizons" given the isolation that accompanied Stalin's revolution. Unlike their counterparts in the 1920s, they had less experience or knowledge of the world beyond Soviet borders. See "The 'Quiet Revolution' in Soviet Intellectual Life," in Sheila Fitzpatrick, Alexander Rabinowitch and Richard Stites, eds., *Russia in the Era of NEP* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 210–30.

support generally followed an inverted "U," with Stalin-era cohorts more positive about the traditional system.<sup>89</sup> The age differences hold, moreover, independently of education: the generation gap did not arise simply from differences in schooling. If the oldest people in the Harvard Project compared the system unfavorably with its predecessor, later generations came of age as the system was becoming discredited and as the USSR moved away from its isolation under Stalin. Their formative years witnessed Khrushchev's attacks on stalinism and more open and pointed discussion about the need for reform. They not only gained more opportunities to see how other countries lived, they saw increasing debate about the effectiveness and relevance of the communist model among Soviet client states. And over time, they were exposed to increasing feedback that the model was flawed. They also witnessed the reversal from thaw to political "freeze" under Brezhnev; closing off even modest political liberalization heightened the sense of contradiction between public and private life.<sup>90</sup> The change in the regime's claim to rule was no less important. The transition from building communism in the 1920s and 1930s to welfare-state authoritarianism in later years brought a shift from sacrifice to entitlement, and a corresponding change in the criteria new generations would apply in judging the system.<sup>91</sup> The decline in support for redistribution and the increase in discontent with the same material conditions testify to the rise of different standards.

The evidence presented here helps, too, in rethinking arguments about the impact of the social contract under Brezhnev. Less educated, blue-collar strata then proved to be more satisfied and more positive toward the basic elements of the system (i.e., state economic controls). But their numbers were diminishing relative to professional and white-collar workers. The "decline" of the social contract thus appears to have been a decline in the value of blue-collar support to the leadership.<sup>92</sup> In fact, Gorbachev's reforms seemed to aim precisely at forging a new deal with a constituency of professionals and intellectuals.<sup>93</sup>

Arguments about modernization are more difficult to untangle.

89. Note, though, that the Times Mirror survey's very small number of respondents born up to 1910 should make us cautious in interpreting the results for this cohort in the Gorbachev era.

90. Older generations experienced the same events; but as Inkeles and Bauer noted, they found ways to accommodate the contradictions.

91. See e.g., Breslauer, "On the Adaptability"; James R. Millar, "The Little Deal: Brezhnev's Contribution to Acquisitive Socialism," in Terry L. Thompson and Richard Sheldon, eds., *Soviet Society and Culture: Essays in Honor of Vera S. Dunham* (Boulder: Westview, 1988), 3–19.

92. Peter Hauslohner, "Gorbachev's Social Contract," *Soviet Economy* 3 (1987): 54–89; Janine Ludlam, "Reform and the Redefinition of the Social Contract under Gorbachev," *World Politics* 43 (January 1991): 284–312.

93. Linda Cook, "Brezhnev's Social Contract and the Gorbachev Reforms," *Soviet Studies* 44, no. 1 (1992): 37–56. For one outline of the strategy, see Tatyana Zaslavskaya, *The Second Socialist Revolution: An Alternative Soviet Strategy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990).

Some are undoubtedly true, for example, with respect to the impact of increasing subjective social differentiation. The surveys employed here reveal growing disagreement over a variety of issues, from the state's role in the economy to the guarantee of "social justice." The spreading dissensus not only made old political formulas less effective, it also complicated life for reformers: no single reform plank was likely to satisfy all or even most constituents. On the other hand, my analysis highlights several problems in relying on modernization theory to explain the opening to reform. Social transformation under Khrushchev and Brezhnev seems to have had little impact on support for economic restructuring: preferences for reform in the 1980s and early 1990s were too similar to those in 1950 under Stalin.<sup>94</sup> In each era, the desired model was a mixed economy. And in each era, those people who endorsed key elements of the system (state ownership in heavy industry) were the same people interested in changing it (in farming and consumer goods).

The desire to limit state economic controls did intensify among new and more highly educated generations. Yet even among these groups, the economic model of choice resembled NEP. Few even in 1991 were willing to hand the commanding heights of industry over to private ownership. Moreover, since younger and more highly educated generations had been more positive toward the state's monopoly in heavy industry under Stalin, it is difficult to see how modernization alone could explain both the rise and the decline of support for this key Soviet precept.<sup>95</sup> The fact of increased education, in particular, did not automatically produce a more critical stance toward the system. The growing gap between the less- and more-educated over time might reflect political selectivity: the people who obtained advanced schooling in the Stalin years may have done so *because* they were more supportive of the regime on key issues. Yet some of the evidence belies this argument. In the Harvard Project, higher education meant greater support for the Soviet system as a whole, even among people who had obtained their degrees before the revolution. When people were asked if they had once favored the regime or had always been opposed, it was the most highly educated of all ages who said they had once favored it (Table 13). Thus the shifting impact of education cannot be attributed simply to political selectivity. Rather, the difference seems to stem from the changing value and content of increased schooling. Broadening access over time devalued the payoffs, as did the narrowing

94. Questions asked in the SIP I survey showed that people did not necessarily ascribe goods shortages or other economic problems to public ownership per se. They tended to view such lapses in terms of planning failures or other errors.

95. The Harvard Project did find that younger and more highly educated cohorts had a greater desire for autonomy on the job and for more creative or meaningful work, values typically associated with modernizing society. Yet the young and the college-educated were not demonstrably more critical toward state controls (except in agriculture).

**Table 13.**  
**General Support for the Soviet System, Stalin Era.**  
(% "Once in Favor")\*

	Percent	(N)
Total	40.4	(287)
By year of birth:		
< 1900	24.7	(77)
1900–10	39.3	(56)
1911–20	48.1	(79)
1921–30	50.0	(74)
By education:		
< secondary	27.0	(115)
Completed secondary	40.3	(77)
Completed higher	56.4	(94)
By education and year of birth:		
< secondary		
< 1900	17.2	(29)
1900–10	5.9	(17)
1911–20	24.0	(25)
1921–30	44.2	(43)
Completed secondary		
< 1900	11.8	(17)
1900–10	38.5	(13)
1911–20	48.0	(25)
1921–30	54.5	(22)
Completed higher		
< 1900	36.7	(30)
1900–10	61.5	(26)
1911–20	69.0	(29)
1921–30	66.7	(9)

\*The Life History interviews included a section in which respondents were asked to detail the history of their attitude toward the Soviet system. These were coded into three categories: "once in favor," "indifferent," and "always opposed." The percentages here indicate those who were once in favor.

Source: Harvard Project Recode (1950–1951).

of wage differentials after Stalin. And, of course, higher education grew less politicized and more demanding.<sup>96</sup>

At a minimum, then, the evidence raises some doubts about the modernization argument. Social transformation implies broad-gauged changes in values, but support for key elements of the Soviet order has been much more selective. These results should not be surprising,

96. Cf. Hough, *Soviet Leadership in Transition*. It may also be that the system's instrumental view of education, with its emphasis on service to the state, reinforced the perception of a system in decline. If people with college-level or higher schooling were expected to help identify and solve social and economic ills, they would be most likely to experience frustration over problems that did not respond to traditional cures.

given the poor showing of modernization theory in explaining other cases of regime transition.<sup>97</sup> They point, rather, to a mix of deligitimation and a narrowing of the regime's social base.<sup>98</sup>

Finally, the analysis here helps to put some of the political choices after 1985 in perspective. Our data show public values at the end of the Soviet era poised between the partial reforms of the Gorbachev years and the more radical platform of Yeltsin and Gaidar. Most people supported political liberalization and at least limited economic change along the lines of NEP. It is not necessarily true that they were wedded to the old Soviet system, though they might welcome the stability of the Brezhnev years over the chaos of the post-Soviet transition. Still, a public desire for limited change confronts reformers with a dilemma. It may impose a less radical agenda, but the impact cannot easily be contained within prescribed limits or only selected institutions. Instead, changes develop a momentum that can overwhelm even well intentioned reformers, as the Gorbachev era demonstrated all too well.

97. See e.g., Peter H. Smith, "Crisis and Democracy in Latin America," *World Politics* 43 (1991): 608–34; and Karen L. Remmer, "New Wine or Old Bottlenecks? The Study of Latin American Democracy," *Comparative Politics* 23, no. 4 (1991): 479–95.

98. Robert H. Dix, "The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes," *Western Political Quarterly* 35 (1982): 554–73.