Coups, Rivals, and the Modern State

Why Rural Coalitions Matter in Sub-Saharan Africa

Beth S. Rabinowitz

Coups, Rivals, and the Modern State

State development in Africa is risky, even life-threatening. Heads of state must weigh the advantage of promoting political and economic development against the risk of fortifying dangerous political rivals. This book takes a novel approach to the study of neopatrimonial rule by placing security concerns at the center of state-building. Using quantitative evidence from 44 African countries and in-depth case studies of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, Beth S. Rabinowitz demonstrates that the insecurities of the African state make strategically aligning with rural leaders critical to political success. Leaders who cultivate the goodwill of the countryside are better able to endure sporadic urban unrest, subdue political challengers, minimize ethnic and regional discord, and prevent a military uprising. Such regimes are more likely to build infrastructure needed for economic and political development. In so doing, Rabinowitz upends the long-held assumption that African leaders must cater to urban constituents to secure their rule.

Beth S. Rabinowitz is Assistant Professor at Rutgers, State University of New Jersey. Her research focuses on political leadership and state development in sub-Saharan Africa.

Coups, Rivals, and the Modern State

Why Rural Coalitions Matter in Sub-Saharan Africa

Beth S. Rabinowitz

Rutgers, State University of New Jersey

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom

One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA

477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia

314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre,
New Delhi – 110025, India

79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906

Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge.

It furthers the University's mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence.

www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781108420464
DOI: 10.1017/9781108333740

© Beth S. Rabinowitz 2018

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press.

First published 2018

Printed in the United Kingdom by TJ International Ltd. Padstow Cornwall

A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Names: Rabinowitz, Beth, author.
Title: Coups, rivals, and the modern state : why rural coalitions matter in sub-Saharan Africa / Beth Rabinowitz.
Description: New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2018. | Includes bibliographical references.
Identifiers: LCCN 2017053785 | ISBN 9781108420464
Subjects: LCSH: Political stability – Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Coalitions – Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Coups d'etat – Africa, Sub-Saharan. | Africa, Sub-Saharan – Politics and government. | Côte d'Ivoire – Politics and government. | Ghana – Politics and government. | Presidents – Côte d'Ivoire. | Presidents – Ghana. | Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 1905–1993. | Nkrumah, Kwame, 1909–1972.
Classification: LCC JQ1879.A15 R33 2017 | DDC 320.96–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017053785

ISBN 978-1-108-42046-4 Hardback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For my mother, Barbara Cowen, my
ever devoted champion

Contents

List of Figures *page* ix
List of Tables x
List of Plates xi
Acknowledgements xii

Introduction 1

Part I Setting the Stage 7

1 A New Theory of Coalition Politics 9

2 Patterns of Rule in Africa 32

3 Rural Alliances and Coup Risk: Testing the Theory 52

Part II Forging Coalitions 73

4 Alienating Rural Allies – Kwame Nkrumah 1947–1957 75

5 Aligning with Regional Foes – Félix Houphouët-Boigny 1945–1960 95

Part III Consolidating Power 111

6 An Urban Strategy Unravels – Kwame Nkrumah 1957–1966 113

7 A Rural Strategy Builds a Nation – Félix Houphouët-Boigny 1960–1980 140

Part IV Reversal of Fortune 167

8 Reviving the State – J. J. Rawlings 1979–1999 169

9 Losing the Periphery – Henri Konan Bédié 1980–1999 197

10 Structure Not Strategy? Examining Alternative Explanations 223

Conclusion 236

Bibliography 246
Index 297

Plates are to be found between pp. 116 and 117.

Figures

1 Forms of neopatrimonialism *page* 10
2 Rural/urban strategies in relation to forms of patrimonialism 13
3 Population density in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana 25
4 Topography in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana 27
5 Economic base in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, CIA World Factbooks 29
6 Population size in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, CIA World Factbooks 29
7 Unfavorable agricultural policies and coup risk 53
8 Unfavorable rural political policies and coup risk 56
9 Distribution of RPS scores on 0–7 scale 59
10 Survivor function by category of RPS 65
11 Effect of RPS on regime duration (with indication of type of exit) 65
12 Life expectancy at birth, Ghana 1977–2000 192
13 Mortality rate, infant, both sexes (per 1,000 live births) 192
14 Immunization of DPT and measles, Ghana 1981–1995 193
15 Crude birth rate, Ghana 1975–2000 (per 1,000 population) 193
16 Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire net ODA and official aid received (current US$), 1980–2000 230

Tables

1 Ideal-typical rural strategy *page* 19
2 Ideal-typical urban strategy 20
3 Case study comparisons 23
4 Ethnic fractionalization in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana 24
5 Examples of successful and unsuccessful leaders 34
6 Examples of successful and unsuccessful SAP leaders 41
7 Protocol for coding Rural Political Score (RPS) 58
8 Probability of surviving coup risk 67
9 Probability of surviving coup risk and civil war onset 69
10 Probability of surviving coup risk with relatively autonomous monarchy 71
11 Expelled and defecting CPP leaders, 1951–1962 82
12 Political parties in Lower Côte 1945–1957 99
13 June 1951 elections 104
14 Opposition leaders in 1961 cabinet 107
15 CPP government investment in 32 state-owned corporations 125
16 Ethnic breakdown of Nkrumah's cabinet 131
17 Ethnicity of anti-Nkrumah conspirators 137
18 *Fêtes nationales* held outside Abidjan 146
19 Coopted urban opposition leaders, 1959 152
20 Changes in the value of production (in millions of F. CFA) 157
21 Composition of government expenditure on economic services, 1985–1991 (percentages) 186
22 Percentage of non-Ivoirians in Côte d'Ivoire by sub-prefecture, from 1988 census 199

Plates

1 Félix Houphouët-Boigny campaigning in 1945 in Treichville, Abidjan
2 The Moro Naba, powerful Mossi king and Houphouët ally, pictured with French President Vincent Auriol, June 26, 1953
3 President De Gaulle receives President Félix Houphouët-Boigny at the Elysée, June 26, 1965
4 Kwame Nkrumah, wearing 'prison graduate' cap with Kojo Botsio (left) and Komla Agbeli Gbedemah (right), c. 1959
5 Nkrumah's arch-nemesis, King of Ashanti, Prempeh II, sitting at a meeting of the Ashanti House of Chiefs, c. 1959
6 Premier of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah standing on reviewing platform during CPP rally, c. 1959
7 Revolutionary PNDC billboard, c. 1985
8 Deportation of Ghanaians from Nigeria, February 1983
9 Rawlings and Gaddafi, the 18th anniversary of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli, Libya, August 1987
10 Ivory Coast National Assembly President Henri Konan Bédié (left) sits next to Ivory Coast Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara during a ceremony in Abidjan, January, 14, 1993
11 Young demonstrator beaten by police in Abidjan during antigovernment protests in the lead up to 1995 Ivoirian presidential elections

Acknowledgements

So many people have helped this book come to fruition. First and foremost, Steven K. Vogel and Catherine Boone who have stayed with me throughout. Catherine Boone has been my indispensable role model and guide. Her willingness to read every draft and provide trenchant feedback has been of vital importance to me. I also want to thank Steve Vogel who believed in me from the first. His sage advice, insightful critiques, and general support made publication of this book possible. There have been countless others who offered me feedback or help along the way, among them my colleagues, Richard Harris, Paul Jargowsky, and Marie Chevrier, as well as those whose advice I sought, Michael Watts, Tim Kelsall, Ralph Austin, Lauren MacLean, and Nicolas van de Walle.

Above all, I am indebted to the people in Ghana and Abidjan, who extended their aid and hospitality to me, even when they stridently disagreed with the positions propounded in this book. Those to whom I am particularly grateful are Elvis Kosi, Esther Ewool, Hayford Kofi, Honorable Alidu Addrisu, Isaac Epaaennir, Desmond Neketia and Josiah Okyere, Claude Médard Gombleu Kouadi, Aboudoulaye Touré, Lanciné Gon Coulibaly, Tiho Tagouelbe, Bazin Yao, Joachim Boguhe and the Elleingand family, Eric, Grace, Edgar and Noa, who provided me with a home away from home.

Introduction

Over the past three decades, sub-Saharan Africa has undergone promising changes. Most countries have instituted regular multiparty elections. Military rule has been on a steady decline. With this increased stability, Africa has seen unparalleled economic growth. So much so that sub-Saharan growth rates exceeded those of the world economy for the first two decades of the new millennium.[1]

Yet there are troubling trends as well. The vast majority of low-income countries is found south of the Sahara.[2] African states grapple with food insecurity, high unemployment, poverty, poor infrastructure, environmental degradation, and low integration in the global economy. Nor has political liberalization been wholly progressive. One-third of the states identified as "not free" in 2017 by Freedom House were in sub-Saharan Africa.[3] In many instances, African presidents have been able to work around multiparty elections and remain in power for two, three, and in some cases, even four decades. Countries like Burundi, South Sudan, Somalia, and the Central African Republic have continued to be on the precipice of civil conflict. And although there are fewer coups, since 2000, 14 presidents have been successfully overthrown.[4]

This confusing mixture of economic growth, democracy, instability, and authoritarianism brings to the fore a fundamental question in comparative politics: how do states build predictable institutions that allow for stability, economic prosperity, and the peaceful transference of power? Broadly speaking, political scientists have held that political and economic

[1] See UN Economic Commission on Africa and African Union, "Dynamic Industrial Policy in Africa," Economic Report on Africa 2014. However, much of this growth rate was steered by a global spike in commodity prices.

[2] Of the 39 heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs), all but six (Afghanistan, Bolivia, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua) are in sub-Saharan Africa. See http://web.worldbank.org.

[3] https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-scores (accessed April 7, 2017).

[4] Burkina Faso (2014), Guinea-Bissau (2003, 2009, 2012), Central African Republic (2003, 2012), Mali (2012), Niger (2010) Madagascar (2009), Guinea (2008, 2009), Mauritania (2008), Comoros (2001), Democratic Republic of Congo (2001).

development is contingent upon the advancement of institutions that increase state responsiveness: a free press, multiparty elections, strengthened civil society, and free markets. However, this interpretation is based largely on an ahistorical reading of state development (Booth & Cammack 2013). Our most compelling accounts of European states underscore that responsive institutions came only after the slow but steady centralization of state power.[5]

To understand political development in the African context, we, therefore, need a better understanding of how states transition from having *authority over people* to having *authority over the national territory*.[6] Achieving control over the national territory requires two central accomplishments: the state needs to domesticate rural political bosses, and it has to build infrastructure that connects disparate parts of the territory. Once these two objectives have been achieved, it is possible to create a national economy that is interlinked, to more efficiently tax the population, and to more successfully institute political reforms.

Accordingly, the first step toward state development is establishing command over the territory. The proposition advanced here is that controlling the territory requires cultivating the political cooperation of local and regional elites across the countryside. I term this process 'political consolidation.' Political scientists tend to overlook political consolidation as a crucial step toward state development, focusing on economic development, state consolidation, or democratic consolidation. They thereby miss the central role local and regional elites play in enabling or deterring state transformation. If the task before us is to understand what strategies "are likely to combine state building, democracy, and economic growth," it is essential that we undertake "studies of the actual exercise of power and the building of institutions" (Joseph 2015: 227). My argument is that understanding the exercise of power in relation to institution-building requires an account of how neopatrimonial rulers strategically manage the authority and influence of rural and regional competitors.

As such, this book makes the case that leadership is decisive to political outcomes. Without a doubt, institutions and inherited circumstances structure the scope of possible actions political players can undertake. Several factors may influence a head of state's policies, such as the country's resource endowments, the regime's relationship with external powers, or whether the regime is opposed by a large centralized kingdom, to name a few (Boone 2003). Nonetheless, within these constraints, a wider range of

[5] See Fukiyama 2011, Ertmann 1999, Tilly 1992, Bendix 1980, Polanyi 1944.
[6] For more discussion of the central relationship between state-building and control over the periphery in Africa, see Boone 2003, Herbst 2000, Migdal 1988, Hyden 1983.

tactical possibilities is open to leaders than is often recognized in the scholarship. As Widner observes, "character matters in the way leaders incorporate the features of the political landscape social scientists so often take as given into their decision making" (1994: 152).

Leadership is particularly central in the African context, where power is fused in the presidency. Formal institutions remain largely governed by patrimonial logic. Hierarchical relationships of dependency and loyalty pervade governing systems. This systemic clientelism reinforces the centralization of authority and resources: power becomes concentrated, judiciaries have little to no autonomy, and legislatures act as rubber stamps. In addition, because of the zero-sum nature of politics in sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of both access to resources and of higher levels of risk in losing power, policy choices are often derivative of immediate political imperatives. As a result, the strategic choices leaders in sub-Saharan Africa make are more critical to political outcomes and have farther-ranging consequences than they might otherwise have in more institutionalized states.

Although I am making a strong case for agency, I am not suggesting that African leaders function in a vacuum. Just as it has been argued that the alliance of classes of actors was critical to political outcomes in early modern Europe, in contemporary Africa, the continuing transformation of predominately agrarian societies has empowered particular classes of interests to shape the political landscape. At the same time, the relative geographic concentration of ethnic groups, as well as the persistence of traditional networks tying urban communities to rural ones, has kept ethnic mobilization a central form of politicization. Above all, the insecurities of the African state make the capacity to forge strategic alliances with strong opposition leaders critical to political success or failure. The upshot is that rural populations and chiefs are vital to political outcomes in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, by systematically differentiating approaches leaders use to incorporate rural constituents, we can unpack what it means to develop more or less effective neopatrimonial rule. That is what this book sets out to do.

The following chapters will show that leaders who cultivate the goodwill of the countryside are better able to endure sporadic unrest in the cities, subdue the real dangers posed by political challengers, quiet ethnic and regional discord, and prevent a military uprising. Less fettered by these threats, such regimes are more likely to build roads and bring electricity to isolated rural communities, paving the way for national development.

Organization of This Book

This book is divided into four parts. The heart of the study is a comparison of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, neighboring countries with similar populations, geography, and economies that nonetheless followed diametrically opposing trajectories. After 40 years of stability, Côte d'Ivoire experienced its first coup and was subsequently torn apart by civil war. In contrast, Ghana emerged out of decades of repeated coups and economic turmoil to become one of the most consolidated democratic systems in Africa. Why did these comparatively similar countries reverse their fates?

Part I, "Setting the Stage," lays the theoretical groundwork for investigating this question. Chapter 1 introduces a new model of coalition politics in Africa based on two ideal-typical approaches: a *rural political strategy* and an *urban political strategy*. Leaders who implement a rural political strategy support chieftaincy, prioritize small-scale agriculture, and offer rival ethno-regional elites power-sharing opportunities. This enables the center to strengthen the economy, reduce ethnic tensions, foster a stable political environment, and focus on state development. Leaders who do not follow a rural political strategy implement what I characterize as an *urban political strategy*. Scarce resources are used to buy off potentially destabilizing urban groups, areas outside of the ruling clique's ethno-region are marginalized, traditional agricultural is neglected, and local elites are disempowered. Over time, these policies weaken the economy, undermine development, and destabilize the state. Chapters 2 and 3 apply the model to regimes across Africa from 1960 to 2000. Chapter 2 presents a multiple case study analysis that illustrates the value and utility of analyzing a wide assortment of regimes in terms of this typology. Chapter 3 substantiates the probabilistic claims about the relationship between rural strategies and regime stability with formal statistical models.

Parts II–IV apply these analytic constructs to the study of Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Each part introduces paired country chapters focused on a particular epoch. To highlight similarities and differences among the cases, the narratives address in sequence: (a) what ethno-regional opposition emerged; (b) what steps were taken to address it; (c) how each leader's response to opposition influenced state-building policy choices; (d) the cumulative impact these choices had on the country's economic development; and (e) how all of these factors ultimately impacted the security forces.

Part II covers the period from the end of WWII to independence, roughly 1945–1959. This section unpacks what it means to use a rural

political strategy to consolidate politically, by examining the independence leaders' rise to power and the tactics each man used to forge political coalitions. Chapter 4 examines Kwame Nkrumah's accession to the prime ministership of the Gold Coast and his strategies for creating a one-party state. It shows that Nkrumah's party structure alienated critical allies and rural elites, setting the stage for future developments. Chapter 5 provides a parallel examination of independence leader and the first president of Côte d'Ivoire, Félix Houphouët-Boigny. The chapter traces how Houphouët's commitment to working across party lines and incorporating competing ethno-regional elites allowed him to dominate the field and set the stage for his political consolidation of the state.

Part III focuses on the initial period of state consolidation in each country, roughly 1960–1970. It investigates the relationship between following a rural political strategy and state-building. Each chapter focuses on the types of policies each independence leader implemented as he worked to consolidate control over his government. Chapter 6 traces how Nkrumah implemented urban biased policies with the intention of bolstering his political base. Instead, his policies undermined the economy and took a toll on the administrative capacity of the state. These combined effects politicized the military and resulted in his ouster in a coup. In a parallel manner, Chapter 7 shows how Houphouët's rural strategy enabled him to consolidate politically and develop the state. Using the power of patronage and developing innovative institutional solutions, Houphouët kept regional elites incorporated into the state structure. He was, therefore, able to undermine ethno-regional politicization and repress urban discontent. As a result, he managed to grow his economy, develop state capacity, and minimize politicization in his military.

Part IV seeks to explain the reversal that both countries underwent by examining the SAP period, roughly 1980–2000. Chapter 8 traces the leadership choices of J. J. Rawlings, the president who finally put an end to Ghana's coup trap. The chapter shows that Rawlings' commitment to rural development and willingness to work through traditional elites enabled him to consolidate himself politically and thereby begin the arduous process of rebuilding the state. Chapter 9 shows that Houphouët-Boigny's successor Henri Konan Bédié's rejection of Houphouët's strategic model of compromise and elite cooptation led to his downfall. His implementation of jingoistic policies undermined the regime's support in the north and the west, and ultimately brought about his ouster.

Finally, Chapter 10 functions as a coda for the in-depth studies. The chapter addresses several alternative structural and institutional explanations for outcomes in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire at both periods. The examination shows that all four men faced serious obstacles when they came to power. However, valuable opportunities were presented to each as well. In demonstrating that each man had more room to maneuver than is typically acknowledged, the chapter illustrates that each president's assessment of risk and response to fortune critically helped decide his fate.

The book's conclusion discusses the broader implications the study has for thinking about a number of issues, including the importance of political consolidation to economic development and democratization and ways in which the findings of this study relate to political processes in ethnically factionalized countries in regions outside of sub-Saharan Africa.

Part I

Setting the Stage

1 A New Theory of Coalition Politics

Being a head of state in sub-Saharan Africa can be extremely dangerous. By the turn of the twenty-first century, roughly two-thirds of Africa's former presidents had been killed, imprisoned, or banished to a foreign country.[1] Even today, "political life is highly dependent on the politicians and factions to keep it civil and non-violent" (Jackson & Rosberg 1984: 427).

Though decolonization assured African states external sovereignty, it did not secure internal sovereignty. The borders of African states were drawn on maps by European representatives concerned with identifying each European power's sphere of influence in the region. Having little knowledge of the continent, the borders they demarcated incorporated an unrelated assortment of clans, villages, religious orders, and kingdoms, each with its own system of leadership. From the outset, political authority was splintered across multiple power centers – each representing a variety of local, regional, and national institutions and each vying with the center for allegiance (Hagmann & Péclard 2010; Lund 2006).

This complex web of competing power structures has made state development south of the Sahara politically chancy, even life-threatening. Heads of state have to weigh the advantage of promoting economic development against the risk of inadvertently fortifying rival political powerbases (Dunning 2005: 452). The center needs to be confident that it can *literally* survive the strengthening of the periphery. As Bueno de Mesquito and Smith note, "Since roads run in two directions, one must be careful not to build too many roads or, especially, roads to the wrong places" (2011: 115). Without such reassurances, heads of state are unlikely to build infrastructure to connect disparate areas of the territory, and even less likely to initiate political reforms that could empower adversaries.

Security concerns are thus a central, if not the paramount factor that impacts development choices in Africa. Today, it is broadly recognized that presidential strategies are critical to political and developmental

[1] See Goldsmith 2001: 81.



Figure 1 Forms of neopatrimonialism

outcomes in Africa. An increasing emphasis has been placed on the importance of strategic coalition building, elite bargaining, and agricultural policies. This renewed appreciation for political leadership has been welcome, but it has not gone far enough. A central piece of the puzzle has remained largely overlooked: the relationship between the very tangible threats African leaders face and their decision-making processes. What is needed, therefore, is a systematic investigation into how perceptions of risk affect leadership choices and long-term state planning (Goldsmith 2001).

Accordingly, the analysis of neopatrimonialism presented here places risk perception squarely at the center. It does so by distinguishing between two broad approaches African leaders take to contain internal challengers: one that works toward 'political consolidation,' the other toward 'power consolidation (see Figure 1).'

Political consolidation represents a *proactive* and *inclusive* approach to governance. The goal is to develop a broad political coalition. Ruling elites place a premium on fostering allegiances with disaffected regions and their representatives. Achieving political consolidation involves managing – rather than repressing – strong political competitors. It might be thought of as a de facto form of consociationalism.[2] Rival elites are given a stake in supporting the government and its policies through offers of patronage, informal power-sharing mechanisms, and ad hoc concessions.

In contrast, power consolidation involves *defensively* managing political challengers. The primary objective is to weaken political rivals by limiting

[2] See Lemarchand's (2007) discussion of formal vs. de facto consociationalism.

their access to national riches (along with their ethnic cohorts). Leaders *exclude* powerful opponents by forcefully displacing and stifling ethno-regional challengers, especially when the government fears its adversaries have a competing power base (W. C. Reed 1998: 18).[3]

Political consolidation requires a level of political shrewdness and a crucial sort of strategic calculus. The leadership must recognize that stable conditions are maximized when strong political competitors are incorporated rather than sidelined. Regimes that achieve political consolidation survive and thrive because they are able to foster higher levels of cooperation. Using proactive cooptation, the regime can induce compliance with its policies and goals with less coercion. This in turn allows it to curb the threat of extra-constitutional removal and political subversion.Consolidating politically thus allows a regime to better manage the insecurity and uncertainties that arise from having multiple challenges to the center's authority, particularly in the early years when political tenure is most tentative. Having reduced political uncertainty, the regime can focus on longer-term goals and multi-regional development.

Whereas political consolidation enables leaders to focus on long-term goals and practice 'developmental' rule, power consolidation undermines economic growth and state development. Fear dictates critical state actions. Only trusted groups receive state patronage. Infrastructural investments that could integrate the territory and peripheral populations are foregone. In the most extreme predatory cases, power is sustained by bankrupting the state, spreading terror, and atomizing the populations. The president and his/her coterie appropriate almost all of the country's wealth. So little is invested in infrastructure and public goods that the state decays. As state capacity deteriorates, lines of transportation and communication are cut off, commerce is choked, and regions become increasingly isolated. The population becomes so impoverished and divided that it is unable to challenge the center.

In a nutshell, functional neopatrimonialism depends on a sufficient degree of security – and that, in turn, requires that leaders consolidate politically, i.e., peaceably incorporate rival leaders and disaffected regions. Consolidating politically does not preclude the possibility that a leader will use dysfunctional or repressive tactics. Yet, without it, the odds of a regime achieving functional rule are slim at best.

[3] Bach's differentiation between 'regulated' and 'predatory' rule highlights many of the same attributes (2012: 29). However, Bach does not tie forms of neopatrimonialism to mechanisms for overcoming security concerns, nor does he link these forms of rule to particular political strategies.

'Rural' and 'Urban' Political Strategies

The question that arises is *how* does one best consolidate politically? I argue that because African states have weak infrastructural power and are poorly institutionalized, political consolidation is most likely to be achieved when leaders build coalitions that incorporate elites from a number of regions and localities. With rural roots, leaders are able to minimize the pervasive threat of ethno-regional competitors and sustain greater command over the periphery. This frees them up to focus on infrastructure and economic development.[4]

In the African context, building inclusive local and regional coalitions requires implementing what I characterize as a *rural political strategy*. Leaders work harder to integrate localities into the body politic. They do so by empowering local elites and symbolically incorporating multiple ethnic regions. A rural strategy is in its essence a politics of inclusion (see Figure 2).

Leaders who do not follow a rural political strategy follow what I characterize as an *urban political strategy*. An urban political strategy represents a politics of fear because the leadership is preoccupied with the more immediate threat of destabilizing urban riots. Instead of prioritizing the integration of rural areas into the body politic, the regime is primarily concerned with keeping organized urban constituents placated. Using an urban political strategy is an ineffective means to consolidate politically because it is a defensive posture focused on short-term gains.[5]

In fact, rural coalitions are central to success in Africa for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, communal identities – be they ethnic, regional, or clan – continue to link individuals morally, socially, and economically. Most Africans have strong ties to their natal villages. Even modern elites maintain rural homes and have strong connections with family residing in the villages (Gemmeke 2008; Boone 2003; Gugler 2002; Mamdani 1996). Some sustain farms to supplement their incomes. Others send critical resources home to village members. Villages can provide urban dwellers a retreat at times of political and economic uncertainty. Perhaps most importantly, villages are spiritual and moral centers. They are home to ancestral shrines. The moral

[4] This analysis and model complement political settlements typologies of neopatrimonial rule. In effect, political settlements scholars categorize different approaches to 'political consolidation.' They are developing typologies to assess how different constellations of rural policies relate to different outcomes. This study is, in a sense, a 'prequel' to the political settlements literature, in that it provides a basis for understanding why rural policies are critical to development in the first place. For more on political settlements, see Kelsall 2016; Booth 2015; Booth et al. 2015; Lindemann 2011; Khan 2010.

[5] For a discussion on African leaders' focus on short-term gains, see Goldsmith 2001.



Figure 2 Rural/urban strategies in relation to forms of patrimonialism

necessity of being buried in the home village continues to form one of the most potent factors that tie city people to their rural "home" (Geschiere & Gugler 1998: 311).

At the same time, ethnic groups are still relatively concentrated in Africa (Mozaffar et al. 2003). Though people across the region have become increasingly mobile, villages tend to be delineated along ethnic and chieftaincy lines. This local clan and ethnic concentration of peoples strengthens the perception that the provision of state goods, such as roads, bridges, schools, health centers, water pumps, and the like, benefits particularistic groups rather than diverse communities. 'Native sons' who have made it in politics, and even those living in the urban areas, are expected to ensure these crucial services are provided to their traditional communities. In return, political patrons hope to sustain the support of their native constituencies. The cumulative effect is that political officials are primarily rewarded for how effectively they provide socioeconomic benefits to their 'kin' and ethno-regional networks rather than for actions they take with regard to public matters (Lindberg 2003: 124).

Rural areas are also vital to the productive capacity of the state. When farmers and rural elites become disaffected, they can undermine the economy and endanger food supply. Agricultural policies are, therefore, central to political stability and regime success. Rural coalitions can even be important for coup proofing (see Chapter 3). Just as urban dwellers are tied to the countryside, so too are members of

the security forces. Prejudicial policies against particular ethno-regional elites can easily spur a vicious cycle of repression and resentment. Bienen explains the process:

> Political leaders are extremely vulnerable at the outsets of their rules . . . They may move quickly to eliminate opposition leaders, but early violence is often restricted to use against limited elite targets. However, in Africa, if one removes opponents, especially violently, their ethnic cohorts are mobilized. (1993: 282)

As ethnic tensions escalate, fearful regimes tend to pack the armed forces with ethnic groups friendly to the regime, or to create paramilitary organizations made up of trusted ethnic groups to neutralize the existing security apparatus (Horowitz 1985: 465). Such defensive attacks to the military command structure, however, can bring about the very coups they are designed to avert (Thompson 1975: 485). Minimizing the power of regional elites through cooptation, rather than repression, can be a powerful means of staving off a forced removal.

Therefore, the ability of elites to mobilize followings along ethno-regional identities is ever-present. Conversely, injustices perpetrated against a particular region or locality can turn significant segments of the urban population, including important divisions of the military, hostile to a regime. For these combined reasons, rural political alliances are essential for political consolidation and political stability. Regimes that build effective rural coalitions are better able to withstand incessant urban unrest, curb ethno-regional competitors, and prevent military politicization.

Viability of 'Rural' and 'Urban' Categories

A 'rural political strategy' and an 'urban political strategy' represent ideal types – stylized depictions of political strategies. Leaders who follow a rural political strategy will not be able to coopt all those who oppose them, nor will they work favorably with all regions or all regional representatives. Indeed, almost all African heads of state have had some degree of urban bias and have privileged their own ethnic groups. But some have pursued statecraft and state building much more effectively than others. The argument here is that, overall, the leaders who broadly support chieftaincy, incorporate a number of established ethno-regional competitors, and privilege smallholder agriculture develop more functional rule than those who do not.

Even so, it might be objected that the terms 'rural' and 'urban' are too broad. 'Rural' encompasses a wide range of social structures, economies, and geographies that incorporates an even wider swath of people of different classes, interests, and ideologies. Above all, the intricate nature of rural-

urban networks renders the categories of 'rural' and 'urban' blurry at best. Rural elites are also multifarious and exercise different degrees of communal authority, legitimacy, and autonomy; nor do they necessarily live much of the time in rural areas or even prioritize agriculture. Regimes' relationships with rural elites and rural areas reflect this diversity and complexity. States' policies differ dramatically across regions (Boone 2003). Almost all regimes develop positive relationships with some chiefs while suppressing others.

Despite these objections, a strong reason for differentiating between 'rural' and 'urban' strategies is that historically sub-Saharan states have been characterized by the dominance of the largest (primate) city (World Bank 2013: 90; Chinsinga 2008; Kessides 2006).[6] In most sub-Saharan countries economic distribution continues to be skewed toward the largest metropolitan area, usually the commercial capital. The commercial capital typically represents the principal domestic market, the chief manufacturing center, and the primary trading connection with the rest of the world. Most central government offices, corporate headquarters, and financial centers are located in the commercial capital. Political elites keep their primary domiciles there and the most important military garrisons are stationed there. The commercial capital has historically also received a disproportionate share of the total national expenditure on education, health, and infrastructure, as well as greater subsidies on water, electric power, diesel fuel, and public transport. As a result, the largest city continues to play a dominant role in the economy.

On the other hand, investment in regional cities that could help integrate the rural hinterland into the body politic has been limited (Kessides 2006). There tends to be a concentration of large-scale industry in and around the commercial capital. As a consequence, the primary city receives a higher percentage of central government expenditures on goods, services, and compensation of employees, resulting in a "paucity of better-paying, non-farm jobs in smaller towns" (Global Monitoring Report 2013: 90). Secondary towns often function more as "consumption cities" where farmers sell their products and buy services and imported goods, than as manufacturing centers (Storeygard 2013). The urbanization process in sub-Saharan Africa has in this way furthered regional imbalances (Behrens & Bala 2013; Chinsinga 2008). For all these reasons, the broad 'rural/urban' dichotomy can provide important analytic leverage.

[6] Of the 49 countries in sub-Saharan Africa, only 4 do not have primate cities: South Africa, Tanzania, Nigeria, and Mozambique. In all the rest, the primate city accounts for between 22 and 60 percent of the urban population (by way of contrast, the largest city in the United States accounts for 7 percent of the total urban population). See Kessides 2006: table A1.

Accordingly, the term 'rural' is used in juxtaposition to what has conventionally been understood by 'urban' interests. Urban interests are generally defined as co-extensive with 'civil society groups' in the primary city – organized interest groups like salaried workers, students' unions, professional classes, civil servants, labor unions, churches, etc., as well as unorganized members of civil society – particularly unemployed youth. Urban political strategies are employed to appease these interests by creating jobs, augmenting wages and benefits, and keeping the costs of food and imports low through price controls. Conventionally it has been held that focusing on these 'civil society' interests is necessary to sustain political order and consolidate power.

An alternative means to foster political stability and social order is to provide patronage to elites that represent ethno-regional interests. Ethno-regional interests are focused on the advancement of a particular region and members of the ethnic group most closely associated with that region. These interests are shaped by the relative geographic concentration of ethnic groups and natural resources. In Africa, customary law also promotes the articulation of interests along ethno-regional lines because it places rights and resources in the custody of communities overseen by traditional elites. The combined effect of these structural conditions and sociopolitical institutions has meant that ethno-regional interests continue to play a critical role in sub-Saharan African politics.

'Urban' and 'rural' interests can certainly overlap. Urban interests may include civil society groups in regional cities, as well as ethno-regional elites who have their primary domicile in the commercial capital and who may, furthermore, hold important civil service jobs. By the same token, the provision of infrastructure and jobs in regional cities may more closely align with ethno-regional interests than what has typically been associated with 'urban' interests. An alternative way to categorize these strategies would be as 'civil-society' vs. 'ethno-regional' strategies. However, these terms are cumbersome and do not readily relate to the terminology used in African and comparative studies. Therefore, I believe the essence of the difference is more effectively encapsulated by using the terms 'urban' and 'rural.'

In summary, I am arguing that there are urban/rural patterns of coalition politics that can be distinguished and, moreover, that it is fruitful to make such distinctions. Following a rural approach is important because it allows regimes to consolidate politically by more effectively managing political opponents who would otherwise have a destabilizing effect on the state. By supporting local and regional elites and promoting rural development a regime can better avert economic decline, minimize ethnic-

mobilization, and suppress military politicization. Leaders who cater to organized urban interests therefore actually fare less well than those who use their political capital to support farmers and traditional elites.

Defining and Measuring a Rural vs. Urban Political Strategy

It is all well and good to theorize about the importance of rural actors to political outcomes, but how can this be measured and analyzed? To begin with, it is helpful to distinguish what a rural political strategy is *not*.

A rural strategy does not refer to rural development policies per se, nor even to a set of policies focused on the peasantry. The focus is on how well leaders develop alliances to sustain control of the periphery, e.g., how effectively regimes coopt established powerbrokers, particularly chiefs, in multiple regions. Neither does a rural strategy solely concern resource distribution. The real scale of economic resources provided to regions may be less important than the symbolism of incorporating elites and communities. Regional groups can at times be pacified with nominal concessions and visible largesse that do not translate into genuine empowerment. Lemarchand observes, "exclusion, rather than greed alone, is the key factor behind most African conflicts" (2007: 2). A rural political strategy enables a regime to achieve political consolidation by minimizing exclusion rather than by providing sufficiently equitable resources across multiple regions.[7]

Finally, a rural political strategy encompasses more than elite bargaining. Adding ethnic representatives to the cabinet or ministries may be a significant measure, but it is often not sufficient to win the cooperation of rural areas.[8] Which elites are chosen is critical. Coopting ethno-regional representatives who are not respected by the community may do little to diminish ethno-regional disaffection. The political integration of localities is practically and symbolically achieved with the assimilation of elites into the party government, who are esteemed by their communities.

What *does* differentiate a rural political strategy is that rural constituencies are seen as pivotal to political stability and economic development. Emphasis is placed on harnessing the political clout of local and ethno-regional competitors. Political capital is spent on the symbolic incorporation of a number of regions.

[7] For example, a study of rural voters based on 2014–2015 data from the Afrobarometer finds that rural voters are more supportive of presidential candidates than their urban counterparts, despite limited concrete improvements. See https://dailybrief.oxan.com/Analysis/GA202754/.

[8] For a discussion of political stability and cabinet-building strategies, see Francois, Reiner, & Trebbi 2015; Arriola 2009.

If a rural strategy is in its essence a politics of inclusion, an urban political strategy, in contrast, represents a politics of fear. The leadership is preoccupied with the more immediate threat of destabilizing urban riots. Instead of incorporating ethno-regional competitors into the machinery of the state and devising development plans to address ethno-regional discontent, scarce resources are used to buy off potentially riotous urban groups, regardless of the harmful economic and political effects. Traditional elites and rural constituents in areas outside of the ruling clique's own ethno-region are overlooked, disregarded, and/or marginalized.

Most critically, following a rural strategy involves the political incorporation of *localities*. This is a crucial distinction because, whereas granting autonomy to regions can weaken a regime by strengthening rival power centers (Migdal 1988), "localized reform in favor of the peasantry ... consolidates the social base of the regime" (Mamdani 1996: 214). Beyond the positive effects of gaining local chiefs' support, the promotion of rural self-administration helps atomize regional identities. It does so by directing political competition to the local level. Local competition channels political discontent away from the center and weakens ethno-regional appeals, thereby neutralizing regional contenders vying for state power. In this way, empowering localities can effectively splinter ethno-regional mobilization. Therefore, devolving power to local elites can fortify the center's control over the periphery.[9]

As ideal types, these two strategies are used heuristically. They are tools to examine similarities and deviations among concrete cases. Despite the fact that almost all regimes use a combination of rural and urban strategies, one can assess how closely leaders adhere to one or the other. One can evaluate the degree to which a regime has implemented a rural political strategy by examining whether it gives legal status to chieftaincy, allows chiefs to partake in local administration, supports smallholders, successfully coopts several powerful regional elites, deconcentrates government, or allows for local elections. All such actions can contribute to the overall success of the regime, but there is no particular constellation that is necessarily more successful than another. Nor is there a one-to-one correlation between any of the given elements of a rural political strategy and a specific

[9] This line of reasoning is, in fact, repeatedly found in Africanist scholarship. For example, Chinsinga observes of Malawi that, what "might look like decentralization from the centre may actually turn out to be a centralizing force" (2006: 271). Seely extrapolates from her study of Mali that "Decentralisation preserves the top of the hierarchy, and prevents further undermining of the structure by a trouble-making or separatist group" (2001: 505). And Widner attributes Kenyatta's success largely to his ability "to focus the attention of politicians on local issues and on the formation of alliances across communities, while limiting their power to force agendas on one another" (1992: 73).

Table 1 *Ideal-typical rural strategy – developing cross-regional cooperation*

Rural Political Base:
• Political roots in the countryside
• Party developed out of rural political organization
• Rhetorical support of 'peasants' and agriculture
• Frequent trips to the countryside
• Inclusion of locally supported regional traditional elites/notables in central government
Support of Chieftaincy:
• Administrative incorporation: traditional elites are free to run localities according to their precepts
• Laws protecting chieftaincy, including constitutional protections and national representative bodies
• Chiefs symbolically incorporated in national politics with the creation of a House of Chiefs or an Upper House
Devolution of Power:
• Political decentralization: open local elections enabling local notables to be popularly chosen for representation
• Fiscal decentralization: local administrations are granted funds to administer at will
• Established ethno-regional rivals are given positions in government and parastatal organizations
Deconcentration of Agriculture:
• Promotion of export agriculture that empowers individual farmers
• Favorable producer prices
• Access to inputs and credit
Rural Development Focus:
• Government promotion of small-scale farming and rural (re)settlement

outcome. Rather, the more of these attributes are implemented, the higher the likelihood of success (see Tables 1 and 2[10]).

A rural political strategy is, thus, understood as an 'ideal type' in the same manner that we understand 'democracy' or 'market economy' to be ideal types. We generally accept that democracies have multiple components and different effective combinations can produce different levels of democracy. One cannot have democracy without free, multiparty elections, but, as has been shown repeatedly, elections do not in and of themselves make for effective democracy. Other factors that contribute to a democracy's success are a free press, an independent judiciary, freedom of assembly, etc. We therefore often rank countries in terms of *how* 'democratic' they are by assessing these various factors. Similarly, a 'market economy' has a number of dimensions, the most basic of which is that the state allows price incentives to drive trade. However, a market economy also requires infrastructural

[10] Typology first presented at the African Studies Association 2011 Annual Meeting. Also see Rabinowitz 2013.

Table 2 *Ideal-typical urban strategy – forestalling urban unrest*

Urban Political Base:
• Political roots in organized labor or student movements
• Party leaders primarily urban elite or union leaders
• Rhetorical support of modernization, anti-feudal, anti-tradition
• Weak links to the countryside
• Exclusion of regional powerbrokers from central government
• Incorporation of less-established regional elites in party and government
Suppression of Chieftaincy:
• Prohibition of chiefs from participation in local political administration, replacement with state agents (courts, policing, resource distribution)
• Laws usurping chieftaincy
• Prohibition of chiefs participating in national politics
Centralization of Government Administration:
• All administration directed by the president and government ministries
Centralization of Agriculture:
• Promotion of export agriculture primarily through state-owned/operated agents
• Neglect of small-scale producers
• Unfavorable producer prices
• Inaccessibility or low accessibility of farming inputs and credits
Urban Developmental Focus:
• Job creation for urban youth and school-leavers

capacity, some sort of trade regulation, and rule of law to protect property rights. There is no set constellation of institutions used to develop a market economy (Soskice & Hall 2001). Yet we can assess *the degree* to which any given state has a market economy.

In like manner, a rural strategy, at its bare minimum, has to empower local elites from several regions. But that can be achieved in many ways. The greater the number of approaches taken in combination with one another, the more successful a regime will be. As with 'democracy,' the more a regime approximates an ideal rural political strategy, the more stable and functional it is likely to be.

In concrete terms, a regime following a rural political strategy places a high premium on supporting chieftaincy, incorporating established ethno-regional elites, supporting smallholder agriculture, and implementing rural development projects, such as improving rural roads, schools, health services, water, etc. Traditional leaders are allowed to hold official positions in local administrations and/or on local councils and to oversee diverse local activities, like policing, courts, and development projects. Such policies allow chiefs to maintain positions of respect in their communities and to have greater leverage over how local resources are distributed. Ethno-regional competitors may be allotted economically powerful positions in government

ministries, local, regional, and central government administrations, and/or in powerful parastatal organizations and enterprises. In best-case scenarios, regimes implement economic policies favorable to cross-regional development, investing in rural infrastructural projects in several regions and policies that support farmers.

With an urban political strategy, leaders are less focused on cross-regional cooperation, and more focused on forestalling urban discontent and suppressing ethno-regional competitors. Although the head of state may cater to his/her own ethno-regional faction, the primary political and economic focus is on creating jobs for urban youth and keeping urban food costs low to stay in power (Bates 1981). Pricing policies favor urban consumers over rural producers. Little is done to build rural infrastructure or to support farming extension programs outside of the incumbent regime's home region. Powerful ethno-regional competitors are excluded from the central government and administrative positions. In their stead, less-established regional representatives may be chosen to hold positions in the party, government, and parastatal organizations. Chiefs are given little control over local development, and limited or no access to state resources. In the end, the neglect of rural communities undermines the economy, undermines multiple regional interests, and destabilizes the state.

Because this study is focused on coalition politics rather than development, the relative merits of rural policies are differently assessed. For example, producer prices have traditionally been used as a measuring rod of rural support. This approach has been critiqued because pricing policies and even service provision used to promote small-scale agriculture tend to favor wealthier farmers who have clout in rural areas (and are often chiefs), but may do little to help the peasantry. Higher producer prices, therefore, do not necessarily produce desired development objectives. Yet favoring wealthy rural powerbrokers is precisely what can make these policies politically advantageous.

It is also objected that pricing policies differ for each crop. Therefore, prices that are high for one crop might benefit only one region and have a limited impact on cross-regional development. But building rural coalitions primarily involves a different set of policies. It requires the buy-in of rural elites – chiefs. To achieve this, regimes need to institute laws and local administrative structures that benefit local elites in several areas. Unlike pricing policies, these center-periphery institutions can have similar effects across the territory.

Similarly, many studies have found that decentralization policies frequently fail to promote the interests of the most disadvantaged sectors within local communities or to improve the distribution of resources. The authoritarian structure of local communities too often enables established

local elites, especially chiefs, to monopolize positions of prominence in local administrations (Ribot & Oyono 2005; Chinsinga 2005). However, this study is not focused on how effectively decentralization promotes representative government or the more efficient distribution of local resources, but rather whether it enables leaders to incorporate competing local and regional elites. Accordingly, critiques of decentralization generally underscore the political efficacy of the strategies emphasized here.

Research Design

The thesis of this book is that by using a rural political strategy, a regime can better manage internal rivals, what I have termed 'consolidating politically'. That is because a rural strategy enables leaders to create stronger ethno-regional coalitions and to develop broader-based support (both rural and urban). As corollary to this thesis, I posit that once a regime has consolidated politically, it is more likely to focus on longer-term goals. Therefore, regimes that have consolidated using a rural political strategy should be more apt to build state capacity, grow the economy, and possibly even introduce political reforms. In contrast, regimes that do not use a rural political strategy are less successful at incorporating strong rivals. They are more likely to resort to defensive measures to manage security threats (real or imagined) by, on the one hand, buying off urban constituents who can potentially launch destabilizing protests, and, on the other hand, excluding and suppressing rivals. This defensive approach tends toward destructive policies that undermine state capacity, economic growth, and the possibility of political reform.

To explore these hypotheses, I use a mixed-methods approach. Two levels of analysis are included: a Medium-N analysis of 135 regimes in 44 African countries from 1960 to 2000, and an in-depth, qualitative analysis of four regime cases in two comparatively similar countries.

The Medium-N analysis begins with a multiple case study analysis. Cross-case comparisons are used to identify patterns across regimes. Each regime is assessed in terms of the critical components of a rural political strategy: the degree to which they allowed for local autonomy, how they addressed chieftaincy, how much they supported traditional farming, and whether they took steps to have cross-ethnic representation in the upper echelons of government and the economy (see Tables 1 and 2). Typical as well as a-typical cases are identified and discussed. Failed leaders are identified as those who were ousted early in their rule, who prompted civil war, or who became predatory; successful leaders are those who were better able to promote national cohesion and political stability.

Table 3 *Case study comparisons*

	Ghana	Côte d'Ivoire
Independence Regimes	Nkrumah (1957–1966) *Instability (economic failure, coup)*	Houphouët (1960–1994) *Stability (economic growth)*
SAP Regimes	J. J. Rawlings (1981–1999) *Stability (economic growth/ democratization)*	Bédié (1994–1999) *Instability (ethnic conflict, coup, civil war)*

The multiple case study analysis establishes the viability of analyzing regimes in terms of these broad patterns of rule and illustrates that the typology is applicable in a wide array of circumstances. The study shows that leaders who politically incorporated rural areas by devolving power to local traditional elites, supporting traditional farming, and incorporating ethno-regional elites were more successful at achieving functional rule than those who centralized government administration, centralized and/or industrialized agriculture, and tried to curtail powerful regional elites.

The multiple case-study analysis is followed by a quantitative study of 44 sub-Saharan countries from 1960 to 2000. A series of survival and hazard models is used to test whether politically incorporating local populations increases the probability of surviving the most dangerous risks African heads of states face – being subject to a forced removal and the outbreak of civil war. To measure the degree to which a regime incorporated localities, I create a composite index, a 'Rural Political Score' (RPS). Each regime in the sample is coded on the basis of this index and assigned a corresponding RPS. All the models find a robust correlation between having a higher RPS and the higher likelihood of surviving risks over time.

To further probe these findings, I present in-depth case studies of regimes in two similar countries at different epochs: Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire (see Table 3). The in-depth analyses concretize what is meant by a rural and an urban political strategy and demonstrate how each is related to political and developmental outcomes. Through process tracing, I uncover what it means to manage internal rivals through diplomacy and patronage and illustrate how doing so relates to functional neopatrimonialism. The studies are based on fieldwork conducted in 2009, 2010, and 2014, drawing from extensive archival research as well as interviews. As with the multiple case study analysis, each of the in-depth case studies are analyzed in terms of the criteria outlined in Tables 1 and 2.

Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire were chosen because they are similar countries with divergent outcomes: Ghana went from instability to stability

Table 4 *Ethnic fractionalization in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana*

Côte d'Ivoire	Ghana
Akan 42.1%	Akan 45.3%
Voltaiques or Gur 17.6%	Mole-Dagbon 15.2%
Northern Mandes 16.5%	Ewe 11.7%
Krous 11%	Ga-Dangme 7.3%
Southern Mandes 10%	Guan 4%
Other 2.8%	Gurma 3.6%
	Grusi 2.6%
	Mande-Busanga 1%
	Other tribes 1.4%
	Other 7.8%

Source: CIA World Factbook, www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/html (accessed February 11, 2012)

at roughly the same time as Côte d'Ivoire went from stability to instability (see Table 4). Indeed, there is a long history of scholarly comparison of these two states (McCauley 2013; MacLean 2010; Boone 2003; Zartman 1997; Woronoff 1972; Foster & Zolberg 1971). These neighboring countries have comparable population sizes, levels of ethnic fractionalization, economies, climates, and terrains. Both have economies based on similar exports: cocoa in Ghana, cocoa and coffee in Côte d'Ivoire. Topographically, they are divided between a fertile forest belt in the south and dry savannah in the north. The roughly 20 million inhabitants in both countries are split between less-privileged, predominately Muslim tribes in the north and wealthier, predominately Christian, Akan peoples in the south (see Figures 3–6).

By comparing similar cases with different outcomes, I can control for several alternative explanations of political instability, such as change in global commodity prices, type of terrain, and ethnic fractionalization. In this way, the case selection allows for an investigation of what differs about these cases apart from these shared structural vulnerabilities.

Not only are Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire similar countries with divergent outcomes – they diverged from one another twice. That is why four case studies are presented: two of leaders who came to power during the independence period, and two of leaders who presided over the Structural Adjustment Period. Pairing cases by epoch allows for an examination of why one country stabilized and the other destabilized despite their having faced the same global constraints.

The comparisons show that the two unsuccessful leaders neglected important regional interests and suppressed powerful ethno-regional

© Copyright 2007 by World Trade Press. All Rights Reserved.

Figure 3 Population density in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana

competitors. Eventually their defensive measures politicized the military, which led to the ousting of the president. In contrast, the two leaders who achieved political consolidation developed alliances with



Figure 3 (cont.)

strong ethno-regional competitors and promoted chieftaincy and small-scale farmers. This allowed them to stabilize the state, develop their economies, and build state capacity.

MALI
BURKINA FASO
GUINEA
LIBERIA
GHANA
C Ô T E D ' I V O I R E
ATLANTIC OCEAN
Gulf of Guinea
Abidjan
Yamoussoukro
Bouaké
Korhogo
Man
San-Pédro
Grand-Lahou
Tabou
Sassandra
Bouna
Tanda
Bondoukou
Aboisso
Dimbokro
Daloa
Gagnoa
Divo
Lakota
Soubré
Duékoué
Bangolo
Odienné
Séguéla
Katiola
Dabakala
Bouaflé
Agnibilékrou
Abengourou
Adzopé
Agboville
Tiassalé
Issia
Guiglo
Toumodi
Sinfra
Zuénoula
Vavoua
Mankono
Bébou
Ferkessedougou
Tingrela
Niéllé
Boundiali
Tiébissou
Bocanda
Daoukro
M'bahiakro
Bongouanou
Dabou
Grand-Bassam
Bingerville
Jacqueville
Sikensi
Tiébissou
Yamoussoukro
Kouassi-Datekro
Toumodi
Bocanda
Kotiobi
Kokumbo
Prikro
Ouellé
Tiébissou
Didievi
Bonzi
Nofou
Mbatto
Akoupé
Affery
Ebilassokro
Yakassé
Bianouan
Daboissue
Abié
Kossandji
Ayamé
Koffikro
Aboutie
Adiake
Ebobo
Bonoua
Newtown
Halfassini
Anyama
Bakanda
Youhouli
Dabou
Bingerville
Cosrou
Nzida
Guitri
Didizo
Didokro
Tiassalé
Lakota
Gagnoa
Guiberoua
Guépaouo
Oumé
Issia
Sinfra
Zuénoula
Bouaflé
Daloa
Vavoua
Bonefla
Sakassou
Bébou
Bouaké
Katiola
Dabakala
Mankono
Séguéla
Touba
Tanda
Bondoukou
Bouna
Bouaké
Korhogo
Ferkessedougou
Boundiali
Odienné
Tingrela
Niéllé
Bangolo
Duékoué
Guiglo
Man
Danané
Biankouma
Tabou
San-Pédro
Sassandra
Grand-Lahou
Abidjan
Aboisso
Abengourou
Agnibilékrou
Daoukro
M'bahiakro
Bongouanou
Dimbokro
Adzopé
Agboville
Tiassalé
Divo
Lakota
Soubré
Gagnoa
Oumé
Issia
Guiglo
Toumodi
Sinfra
Zuénoula
Vavoua
Bouaflé
Daloa
Bébou
Bouaké
Katiola
Dabakala
Séguéla
Touba
Tanda
Bondoukou
Bouna
Korhogo
Ferkessedougou
Boundiali
Odienné
Tingrela
Niéllé
Bangolo
Duékoué

© Copyright 2007 by World Trade Press. All Rights Reserved.

Figure 4 (cont.)

Comparable Economies	
Cote d'Ivoire	Ghana
GDP - composition by sector	
agriculture: 28.2% industry: 21.3% services: 50.6% (2010)	agriculture: 33.7% industry: 24.7% services: 41.6% (2010)

Figure 5 Economic base in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, CIA World Factbooks

Comparable Population Size	
Cote d'Ivoire	Ghana
Total Population	Total Population
21,058,798	24,339,838
49% Urban (2008)	50% Urban (2008)

Figure 6 Population size in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, CIA World Factbooks

Study Limitations

The central limitation of this study is it cannot systematically address how the effects of these distinctive approaches might alter as democracy becomes institutionalized. Given that the period under study is 1960 to 2000, the majority of the regimes analyzed are nondemocratic neopatrimonial regimes. Nor do the in-depth case studies provide adequate leverage for this question. Though the comparison of J. J. Rawlings and Henri Konan Bédié was chosen because both men came to power during the Structural Adjustment Period, they did so in two different decades. Whereas J. J. Rawlings took over Ghana in December 1981, Bédié did not assume the presidency until December 1994. By that time, the momentum and pressure to democratize, both domestically and internationally, had intensified. In my case analysis, I do painstakingly

provide evidence to support the claim that Bédié might have overcome the pressures posed by multiparty elections had he strategically thought about the importance of key regional constituents. Yet, as a research design, the case comparison does not allow for a comparative assessment of the impact of these forces on each leader.

Nonetheless, some preliminary observations can be made about the relationship between the typology developed here and democracy. My thesis is that political consolidation is best achieved by implementing a rural political strategy. Given that winning elections is dependent upon consolidating political support, the strategies outlined here should become increasingly common as democracy takes hold. And in fact, recent studies indicate that this is so. In particular, it appears that with democratization, traditional elites are gaining prominence and chieftaincy is being strengthened (Baldwin 2015; Koter 2013; Mapedza 2007; Williams 2004). Indeed, since the 1990s, countries across sub-Saharan Africa have added amendments or adopted constitutions that explicitly protect chieftaincy, including Lesotho (1991), Ghana (1992), Togo (1992, 2005), South Africa (1993), Zambia (1996), Cameroon (1996), DRC (2005), and Côte d'Ivoire (2014). Others have passed acts to guarantee state remuneration to chiefs, such as Zimbabwe's Traditional Leaders Act of 1998, Kenya Chiefs' Act (Amendment) of 2009, and Niger's *statut de la chefferie traditionnelle en République du Niger* (2015). These observations suggest that following a rural political strategy may be even more critical to presidential success in the context of multiparty elections.

Analyzing how presidents manage security concerns may also be useful for predicting which presidents will promote or derail the democratic process. Many presidents who introduced multiparty elections appear to have first tried to safeguard themselves against future retribution. Leaders as disparate as Ahmadou Ahidjo in Cameroon, Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Joaquim Chissano in Mozambique, Hassan Gouled Aptidon in Djibouti, and Léopold Senghor in Senegal positioned handpicked successors, apparently with the expectation that the prerogatives they and their coalitions enjoyed – as well as their future security – would be preserved by the new administration. In other cases, transitioning leaders obtained legal immunity from future prosecution. Mathieu Kérékou in Benin, Abdoulaye Wade in Senegal, J. J. Rawlings in Ghana, and Ramaema in Lesotho willingly left office – but only after creating indemnity clauses in the constitution.

Other long-standing presidents introduced multiparty elections believing they could control the outcome and remain in power. Some won this gambit, others lost. Those who lost have often refused to step down, such

as Denis Sassou Nguesso of the Republic of Congo and Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi. In both countries, the likelihood of civil conflict is quite high. It is therefore extremely probable that at least part of the reason Nguesso and Nkurunziza are holding onto power is they have genuine security concerns. These leaders and their political coalitions may fear they will be subject to retribution if they leave office.

The absence of security concerns may also explain why the handful of sub-Saharan countries with parliamentary systems have relatively robust democracies. In a parliamentary system the transference of leadership can be readily achieved without a change to the ruling party. Hence, parliamentary systems inherently reduce the risk of future retribution from new entrants to power.

At the same time, the introduction of multiparty competition poses new threats to incumbent regimes, especially regimes that came to power before the expectation of electoral transitions took hold. Several coups and attempted coups in the twenty-first century came in response to an attempt to extend presidential term limits. Even leaders who initially used a rural political strategy to consolidate their hold on the state may, over time, resort to increasingly repressive measures to sustain control. Such has been the case with Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Paul Kagame in Rwanda, and Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia. Some may even become predatory. Thus, in Zimbabwe as threats to Robert Mugabe's hold on power began to mount in the 1990s, with external and internal pressures to democratize, his regime became increasingly repressive and kleptocratic (although at the same time he increased the prerogatives of chiefs).

A final consideration to take into account when thinking about changes related to democratization is the fact that regular election cycles naturally shorten a leader's time-horizons. Though this does not appear to have changed the importance of a rural political strategy for political consolidation (as evidenced by studies on successful presidential electoral strategies in Africa), it could affect the willingness of leaders to pursue development. Under such circumstances even leaders who implement such strategies may not initiate economic development.

Taken together, these observations suggest that research on the intersection between democratic rule, internal security concerns, and rural strategies is a fruitful area for future study.

2 Patterns of Rule in Africa

The role of political leadership in African politics is both central and problematic for Africanist scholars. Analyses of leadership first went out of vogue in the 1980s, when it became clear that differences between the most radical leftist and the most avowed capitalist leaders were not that pronounced. By that time, almost all regimes in sub-Saharan Africa had developed autocratic one-party states (Collier 1982). Even a quintessential anticommunist like Felix Houphouët-Boigny was almost as state-centered and distrustful of indigenous capitalists as his ideological antithesis, Kwame Nkrumah.

Nonetheless, by the 1990s, the role of political leadership came back into prominence as it became evident that some leaders were more successfully implementing Structural Adjustment Programs and/or multiparty elections than others. Scholars began to reexamine how the dispositions of leaders and their political imperatives have driven divergent outcomes.[1] In more recent years, studies have focused on the importance of presidential strategies to an array of outcomes. It has been found that African leaders who develop broad-based ethnic coalitions are more likely to survive in office[2] and promote economic development.[3] Other studies find presidents who secure the support of rural chiefs can bolster their legitimacy (Englebert 2000), and increase their likelihood of winning elections.[4] Development economists argue that authoritarian leaders who implement pro-agricultural policies are better at growing their economies.[5]

As important as these advances are, they do not take into account the way in which security threats impact African leaders' decision-making processes. The theory presented in the previous chapter is that only after achieving a stable political environment are neopatrimonial leaders likely to embark upon infrastructural projects necessary for economic development

[1] See Gyimah-Boadi & Van de Walle 1996; Gray & McPherson 2001; Van de Walle 2001.
[2] See Francois, Reiner, & Trebbi 2015; Arriola 2009.
[3] See Kelsall 2011; Lindemann 2011. [4] See Baldwin 2014; Koter 2013.
[5] See Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2014; Kelsall 2013, 2011; Kelsall et al. 2010.

and state integration; and leaders who support rural constituencies are better able to create a stable political environment. Hence, whether leaders align with rural or urban interests will largely determine how functional their rule will become.

But how can such a model be applied to real-world cases? To explore the viability of the rural/urban model, this chapter presents a multiple case-study analysis of paradigmatic African regimes from 1960 to 2000. Leaders are assessed in terms of their relative successes and failures. Failed leaders are identified as those who were ousted early in their rule, who prompted civil war, or who became predatory. Successful leaders are those who were better able to promote national cohesion and political stability. Understanding that every historical period presents political leaders with particular constraints and opportunities, the examination is divided into two epochs: the independence period, roughly from 1960 to 1980; and the Structural Adjustment Period (SAP), from 1980 to 2000.

The cross-case analysis shows that regardless of what epoch they came to power, or whether leaders identified as 'socialist' or 'capitalist,' those who politically incorporated rural areas by *devolving power to local traditional elites or decentralizing* were more successful than those who centralized government administration or tried to curtail powerful regional elites; and regimes *supportive of traditional farming* were more successful than those that tried to centralize and/or industrialize agriculture.

The following narrative is divided into four sections. The first and second sections examine the rural/urban patterns of independence leaders and SAP leaders, respectively. The third and fourth sections use illustrative cases to address two central concerns: first, how this typology might apply to leaders who only partially implemented rural strategies, and second, how the typology is relevant even when external actors directed military interventions against the incumbent leader.

I Independence Leaders

Failed Independence Leaders

At independence, newly emergent African leaders faced several imminent challenges. They had inherited incomplete and extremely variable colonial administrative systems that made it difficult to consolidate power across their territories (Herbst 2000). To make matters worse, they had new government bureaucracies to staff with few citizens sufficiently educated to do so. The majority of the population was rural and illiterate, while the urban areas were only marginally developed. In addition, the independence

Table 5 *Examples of successful and unsuccessful leaders*

Failed Independence Period Leaders	
Coup within 10 years	Mali – Mobido Keïta
	Benin – Hubert Maga
	Burkina Faso – Maurice Yaméogo
	Comoros – Ali Soilihi
	Uganda – Milton Obote
	Ghana – Kwame Nkrumah
Extreme predation	Equatorial Guinea – Macías Nguema
	Uganda – Idi Amin
Civil war onset	Somalia – Syaad Barre
	Ethiopia – Mengistu
	Mozambique – Michel Samora
	Angola – António Agostinho Neto
Successful Independence Leaders	
Political stability and economic development	Côte d'Ivoire – Houphouët-Boigny
	Botswana – Seretse Khama
	Kenya – Jomo Kenyatta
	Cameroon – Ahmadou Ahidjo
Political stability	Tanzania – Julius Nyerere
	Zambia – Kenneth Kaunda
	Senegal – Léopold Senghor

leaders had almost insurmountable economic challenges. Their economies, based on mono-export crops, were highly dependent on former colonial powers. There was almost no industrial base, leaving the new states heavily dependent upon expensive imports for all their capital goods. At the same time, they had to contend with growing populations and low levels of food production. Irrespective of the choice of political alignment, each man's success was shaped by his overall approach to state-building.

Whether right- or left-leaning, almost all the failed independence leaders had shallow roots in the rural areas and little regard for traditional farming (see Table 5). This is especially true for the countries that became embroiled in coup traps, such as Benin, Burkina Faso, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mali, the Comoros, the Central African Republic, and Uganda. What has been written of Burkina Faso in the 1970s might have been written of any of these countries:

> the rural areas, where approximately 95 per cent of the six million population live, were largely forgotten. The villages have a medieval atmosphere, untouched by modern life ... Education was so neglected that even now it is conservatively estimated that 95 per cent of the population is illiterate. Health care provisions

were equally shameful . . . No infrastructural investment was made. (Brittain 1985: 41)

Some leaders neglected rural areas because they came to power with a very tenuous grasp on the state. Both the Central African Republic (CAR) and Guinea-Bissau had the misfortune of losing charismatic independence leaders thus bequeathing to these countries a founding president bereft of political vision. In CAR, David Dacko was foisted into the position of head of state in 1959, after his cousin and leader of the independence struggle, Barthélemy Boganda, died in a plane crash. Whereas Boganda "had highly developed political and organizational skills and built [his party] into a machine of over-whelming strength and organizational depth" (Le Vine 1968: 13), Dacko came to power with no popular support. He was wholly dependent upon the metropole for his survival. Under his rule, "Central African political life centered entirely around [a] privileged caste, who seemed to be entirely indifferent to the low standard of living of the thousands in the villages" (Kalck 1971: 117).

Similarly, in Guinea-Bissau, independence leader Amílcar Cabral's success was due to his "experience in and understanding of the countryside . . . [his] extreme emphasis on the importance of political mobilisation and on the cadres' ability to live with and relate to the villagers continued throughout the war" (Chabal 1981: 88). But Cabral was assassinated one year before independence. His successor and brother Luiz Cabral's political base was the educated, urban elite. Luiz Cabral had neither the political judgment nor the skill to continue Amílcar's legacy. Instead, "the new state leadership found it difficult to resist the appeal and ideology of urban life and development" (Chabal 1983a; Forrest 1987).

Others came to power as labor union activists with only tentative ties to chiefs and farmers. Emerging from middle-class anticolonial movements, their initial base of support was drawn from urban leftist groups. Their central focus was, therefore, on creating employment for urban youth and keeping down urban living costs vis-à-vis low farmgate prices. In many cases, leftist independence leaders' failure to develop rural support also came from the fact that they tried to emulate the Soviet Union's rapid industrialization of farming. In Ghana, São Tomé e Príncipe, and Guinea-Bissau, the industrialization of farming was particularly damaging. In Guinea-Bissau, by 1980, "food shortages revealed the depth of the government's failure to sustain agricultural development and focussed [*sic*] discontent on the Luiz Cabral regime" (Chabal 1983a: 202). That year, Cabral was ousted in a coup.

Other 'revolutionary' leaders, such as those in Mali, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Equatorial Guinea, were inspired by Mao and sought to rapidly transform agriculture by forcing peasants onto collective farms. At the same time, they attacked chieftaincy as a feudal relic and tried to suppress powerful chiefs. Mali's first president, Modibo Keïta, initiated reforms that became so unpopular that "Keïta's regime progressively managed to alienate important sectors of the population such as the peasants, the army, and the merchants" (Rosa de Jorio 2003: 830). All of this culminated in his ouster in a coup d'état in 1968.

For still others, squeezing export producers helped undermine powerful centralized kingdoms that historically controlled the territory's export trade. Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and Milton Obote in Uganda had to overcome the power of the centralized kingdoms that controlled most of the country's central exports (Boone 2003). Their fight against these powerful kingdoms played a central role in their choice to suppress producer prices and neglect rural areas.

Neglect of rural areas was most pronounced among the most predatory African leaders, such as Francisco Macías Nguema, whose cruelty earned him the nickname of the 'Pol Pot of Africa,' and Idi Amin, known as the 'Butcher of Uganda' for his brutality. In both cases, the narrowing of their support base accompanied their increasing ruthlessness. During his reign, Macías filled "the Council of Ministers with close relatives and other Mongomo associates" (Wood 2004: 548) while marginalizing "other national constituents and ethnic groups" (N'gom 2009: 99). In a like manner, Idi Amin increasingly relied on his small Kakwa ethnic group from northwestern Uganda (Glentworth & Hancock 1973).

The failure to implement a rural political strategy also appears to have played a critical role in the onset of civil war. Long-term wars in Mozambique, Angola, Somalia, and Ethiopia originated in part from a fundamental rural/urban divide. A principal factor that gave rise to Somalia's destabilization was the fact that "The Somali political leadership lacked an attachment either to livestock or to agriculture . . . [and failed] to support the traditional sectors of the economy" (Samatar 1992: 633). When Syaad Barre came to power in 1969, he further suppressed traditional elites. "Under the slogan of 'socialism unites, tribalism divides,' clan and kinship ties were officially banned and the new government promised to root out any reference, verbal or written, to clanship" (Ahmed & Green 1999: 117). As critical, Barre politically excluded groups from the north. Southern Somalis "held all major posts in the new government, and a majority of seats in the parliament" (Ahmed & Green 1999: 116). Once Barre was ousted from power, his

cumulative policies had so divided the country that it collapsed into civil war.

Similar patterns are found in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. In Mozambique the leaders of the party that assumed power at independence, FRELIMO, were from ethnic groups that had historically formed the urban core. At the first session of the FRELIMO Council of Ministers, the leadership decided to abolish chieftaincy in the hopes of bringing about "the 'total transformation' of rural Mozambican society" (West & Kloeck-Jens 1999: 456). FRELIMO quickly implemented a Marxist agenda that alienated the peasantry, forcibly resettling thousands of town dwellers on collective farms, and degraded traditional leaders and healers (Bayart 1993: 66). In response, the opposition party, RENAMO, emerged as a political and military force committed to protecting rural interests. Similarly, in Angola, the party that gained power at independence, the MPLA, "did not take root in the countryside and represent[ed] above all urban creole interests" (Malaquias 2000: 96; Bayart 1993: 66). In Ethiopia, the Marxist military regime that assumed power in the 1970s also implemented disastrous Soviet-inspired development policies in the countryside, so destabilizing the state that it was ravaged by war for two decades.

Successful Independence Leaders

There were, however, a number of independence leaders – pro-socialist and pro-capitalist – who were successful at consolidating themselves politically. Though 'patrimonial,' these rulers are noteworthy for having fostered a greater sense of national unity and presiding over stable societies. They include Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Ahmadou Ahidjo in Cameroon, Félix Houphouët-Boigny in Côte d'Ivoire, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Seretse Khama in Botswana, Léopold Senghor in Senegal, and Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia (see Table 5). Each of these men was more focused on rural development and/or balancing ethno-regional representation and most were supportive of traditional authority.

It is probably fair to say that all independence leaders implemented urban-biased policies to build up their industries and strengthen their support base. However, many of the successful leaders were relatively less urban biased. Kenyatta and Houphouët were singular in their pro-agricultural policies. Both men believed traditional agriculture was essential to the growth of their national economies and key to building a strong state. Moreover, they both understood that rural elites were critical to reaching these aims. They therefore increased producer prices and farming extension services (Widner

1993: 25; Bates 1981). Similarly, it has been argued that Ahidjo was less motivated by concerns for urban consumers than most (Van de Wall 1989).

This is not to say these efforts benefited the mass of smallholders.[6] A central motivation for both Houphouët and Kenyatta was to privilege wealthy farmers critical to their support base (Bates 1981). Particularly in the case of Kenyatta, the cross-regional benefits of his agricultural policies were limited. Nonetheless, the support of small-scale agriculture and wealthy rural elites was important to the overall success of the economy and stability of the state. Even when concrete development did not follow, rhetorical support of farmers and rural areas was often central to how these leaders built up their broader base of support. Thus, despite the fact that Kenneth Kaunda's economic policies deeply disadvantaged rural areas, his government was "particularly adept at strengthening its rural base" (Negi 2010: 220). He repeatedly stressed the importance of rural development (Ollawa 1978: 103), and his political ideology of humanism "suggested that the authentic Zambia was that of villagers and agricultural production" (Larmer 2010: 51).

Crucially, those leaders who had an initial rural political base were better able to weather the economic storm engendered by the worst of their urban-biased policies. For example, the first presidents of Tanzania and Senegal, Julius Nyerere and Léopold Sédar Senghor, respectively, are known as textbook examples of urban-biased leaders. Yet both men developed strong rural bases of support early on. Much of Nyerere's success during the independence struggle came from his ability to "command the support and respect of the peasantry," which he achieved by traveling around the country and meeting "as large a percentage of his countrymen as any head of state on earth" (Verbit 1971: 343). His party was built up from village development communities in virtually every locality. At independence, the new Tanzanian local administration was based on locally elected councils. Not until 1972, after a decade in power, did Nyerere abolish the elected councils and implement the worst of his urban-biased policies. But by then, Nyerere had already consolidated political power. Moreover, Nyerere rhetorically continued to support farmers. His "*Ujamaa* ideology stressed that the nation's primary activity was agriculture, and implied that cities themselves, particularly Dar es Salaam, were parasites on the nation's agricultural sweat" (Brennan 2006: 400). Even when Nyerere stepped down from the presidency in 1985, despite serious economic decay, he sustained strong support (Barkan 1994: 88).[7]

[6] For a critical assessment of the agricultural policies of several of these leaders, see Bayart 1993: 60–70.

[7] Also see Miguel 2004; Costello 1996; Amey & Leonard 1979.

The first president of Senegal, Senghor, also solidified his political position early on by establishing strong political links to rural areas. He worked assiduously to cement ties to the *sufi* orders and *marabouts* who command followings throughout Senegal. In addition to frequently visiting *marabouts* in the rural areas, Senghor created a system of power sharing. Local notables were encouraged to consolidate political networks and use those networks to support the regime (Boone 1998). But Senghor also implemented disastrous urban-biased policies. He squeezed the peasantry, paying very low producer prices. Extracted surplus was used to pay off urban constituents who only weakly supported his government. By 1967, after a series of peasant rebellions, Senghor began to lose the support of the religious leaders he so counted upon. Wisely, he began to restructure his policies. First he increased producer prices. Then he forgave peasant debt. Finally, in 1972, he began formally decentralizing government. In so doing, Senghor was able to sustain his power and partially restore his losses (Clark 1999; Venghroff 1997; Boone 1992; Mbodj 1992).

Unlike the failed leaders who tried to dismantle the institution of chieftaincy and suppress paramount chiefs, the successful independence leaders were, by and large, supportive of traditional institutions. Senghor was extremely careful to use the strong traditional *sufi* orders to anchor his regime in rural areas. Under Kenyatta, chiefs and sub-chiefs were appointed as local government administrators and made up almost one-third of the *harambee* representatives, as well as members of Community Development Committees, both of whom directed local development (Ngau 1987 529).

This even holds true when traditional chiefs' responsibilities were diminished at independence. What is essential is the degree to which each regime supported chieftaincy as an institution and provided chiefs avenues of official recognition and local control. Thus, the independence leader in Botswana, Seretse Khama, has been critiqued for having limited chiefs' powers and for disempowering non-Tswana chiefs. Nonetheless, he also allowed chiefs to hold central positions in local government and to represent communities. Khama did so in part by strengthening local District Councils, creating a separate House of Chiefs to act as an advisory body to the central government, and appointing chiefs to the Land Board (Nyati-Ramahobo 2002; Werbner 2002a; Jones 1983; Frank 1981; Picard 1979; Gillett 1973; Proctor 1968). In a like manner, Kenneth Kaunda reduced the role chiefs had in local administrative government (Gould 2010). But Kaunda also gave chiefs legal protection, by introducing "to parliament the House of Chiefs which made recommendations to the governing body on tribal boundaries and was generally responsible for resolving any tribal conflicts" (Owusu 2006: 5). These

latter cases very clearly contrast with the radical leftist regimes in Equatorial Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Ghana, Mozambique, Angola, or Somalia that tried to supplant traditional elites and, in some cases, even to eradicate chieftaincy.[8]

Above all, the leaders who were most successful at statecraft and promoting political stability developed coalitions that incorporated established elites from multiple regions. Ahmadou Ahidjo coopted elites from each province and major ethnic group (Krieger 1994: 608–609). Kenneth Kaunda was "a master of the ethnic and provincial arithmetic when making appointments" (Burnell 2005: 119; Rakner 2003). Houphouët-Boigny used "the spoils of a booming export crop economy to link local elites to a powerful state through the mediation of a dominant party" (Crook 1997: 216). This is not meant to suggest that these men coopted all those who opposed them or that they worked favorably with all regions. Kenyatta notoriously imprisoned important Luo opponents. Houphouët brutally crushed rebellions of the Sanwi and the Bété. Each of these leaders also privileged his own ethnic group and natal region. Houphouët-Boigny's government heavily favored his ethnic group, the Baoulé. Ahidjo gave preferential treatment to his hometown, Garoua in the north, and Kenyatta privileged the Kikuyu. However, to put these men in the same category as presidents who created 'ethnocracies' or 'clanocracies' (like Francisco Macías Ngeuma) or squeezed peasants to the point of breaking (like Mobido Keïta and Syaad Barre) is to miss critical differences. It is what prohibited African scholars from seeing beyond these common patrimonial practices to what might differentiate successful presidents from unsuccessful ones.

Yes, they were *all* repressive, they *all* had urban bias, and they *all* privileged their own ethnic groups. But some pursued statecraft and state-building much more effectively. Overall, the regimes that broadly supported chieftaincy, incorporated a number of established ethno-regional competitors, and privileged smallholder agriculture developed more 'orderly rule' than those that did not. The same can be said for the SAP regimes that followed them.

II Structural Adjustment Period Leaders

The SAP period (post-1980) posed new challenges to African leaders. Many were inheriting failing states with radically dysfunctional

[8] Nyerere also attacked chieftaincy as a feudal institution. He, however, provides an exceptional case because chiefs were far less powerful in Tanzania. Moreover, Nyerere's party incorporated respected rural leaders.

Table 6 *Examples of successful and unsuccessful SAP leaders*

Failed SAP Period Leaders	
Coup within 10 years	Burkina Faso – Thomas Sankara
	Comoros – Ali Soilih, Ahmed Abdallah
	Uganda – Milton Obote (II)
	Côte d'Ivoire – Henri Konan Bédié
Successful SAP Leaders	
Political stability and economic development	Ghana – J. J. Rawlings
	Uganda – Yoweri Museveni
	Malawi – Bacilli Muluzi
	Mali – Alpha Konaré
Political stability	Senegal – Abdou Diouf
	Somaliland – Council of Elders

economies. Almost all had mounting external debt, caused by the international liquidity problems of the 1960s and 1970s and exacerbated by the oil crisis and global recession of the 1970s. In response, a new orthodoxy had taken hold in Washington and the multilateral lending institutions. Donor aid was now conditional. Highly indebted countries would be eligible to receive assistance only if they restructured their bloated public sectors, decentralized their administrations, reinvigorated agriculture through price incentives, and eliminated popular, but dysfunctional protectionist policies. The global political order had also changed. Soviet funding had begun to dry up and Cuba and Libya (and to a lesser extent North Korea) had emerged as the new influential leftist regimes. These circumstances created new opportunities and constraints for emerging leaders.

Many of the regimes that sustained stability during the SAP period believed World Bank and IMF reforms could be at least partially advantageous to them (see Table 6). They were therefore more willing to end prejudicial pricing policies for agriculture and implement some degree of decentralization. In Malawi, Bacilli Muluzi "saw decentralization as critical to [his regime's] expansion of legitimacy" (Ndegwa & Levy 2004: 313). For Daniel arap Moi in Kenya, administrative decentralization was a way to shore up a political base outside of Kenyatta's Kikuyu circles (Barkan & Chege 1989). Similarly, for Paul Biya in Cameroon, local elections were a way to coopt chiefs and their supporters (Jua 1995 44).

For others, liberal economic reforms were in concert with their own ideologies. In Senegal, Senghor's successor, Abdou Diouf, himself a technocrat, came to power predisposed toward liberal economic policies. Diouf's main goal was to return the financial management of the country

to orthodox norms (Mbodj 1992: 13). Similarly, in Tanzania, where Nyerere had reluctantly begun IMF reforms, his successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, embraced them as the necessary means of improving the economy.

The same is true even for leftist regimes of the period. In the 1980s, a new brand of revolutionary leaders emerged in sub-Saharan Africa. The new leftists were influenced not by the Soviets and the Chinese, but rather by Cuba, Tanzania, and Libya. Among them are J. J. Rawlings in Ghana, Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso, and Mathieu Kérékou in Benin. Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, Qaddafi's *Little Green Book*, and Nyerere's *ujamaa*, they sought to end elite corruption, return 'power to the people,' and focus on food security and peasant agriculture. To do so, they built grassroots socialist cells in every locality and workplace. These 'Revolutionary Committees' (RCs) were made responsible for community development, local policing, and community farming. The RCs later became the basis of formally decentralized administrative systems.

The most successful of these radical reformers were Yoweri Museveni in Uganda and J. J. Rawlings in Ghana, who were particularly adept at fusing the rhetorical and institutional forms of their 'revolutions' with IMF and World Bank strictures. Museveni stabilized Uganda after multiple coups and civil war;[9] Rawlings ended Ghana's 15-year coup trap. Both of these leaders also resuscitated devastated economies. They did so by initiating agricultural reform and thoroughgoing decentralization programs. Their success was also due to the fact that these two men understood rural elite cooperation was critical to the success of these endeavors. Rawlings quickly ended the anti-feudal, anti-capitalist purges that had been set off by his June 4th Revolution. Museveni restored some of the autonomy of the Buganda kings. Both leaders allowed chiefs significant participation in local development and decentralized government administration. They both were also willing to work with Western 'imperialist' lending institutions, which enabled them to expand the productive capacity of the state.

Another successful reformer who emerged in the SAP period was Alpha Konaré in Mali. Though not a Cuban-styled leftist, Konaré began Mali's first decentralization and fostered a wider base of regional support, particularly from the alienated north (Seely 2001).[10] Like so many of the other 'rural-oriented' leaders, such as Houphouët, Nyerere, and Rawlings, Konaré was effective at cultivating a rural following. For the 1992 presidential elections, when other candidates sent delegates to the countryside,

[9] Because of these accomplishments, I classify Museveni as a successful reformer, though he became increasingly authoritarian and dictatorial.

[10] There are several critiques of Konaré's decentralization program as well as others discussed here. See Ribot & Oyono 2005.

"Konaré himself . . . visited every *circonscription* and many *arrondissements* throughout the country" (Vengroff 1993: 558). Once in power, to further support rural areas, "Local, self-determined communes were by law accorded administrative and fiscal control over health, education and some infrastructure" (Seely 2001: 499–500). Though Konaré's *de jure* reforms were implemented unevenly and with fits and starts, he did allow chiefs to serve as local administrators and to compete in periodic local elections.[11]

It is sometimes assumed that the reformers' success was primarily due to IMF and World Bank funding. Yet their achievements cannot be solely attributed to the fact that they signed agreements with international finance institutions (IFIs). Before Museveni, SAP reforms in Uganda failed miserably. In the wake of the Amin years, Obote's government was starved for revenue. He signed an IMF agreement in 1981 with stringent adjustment conditions. But Obote did not use the new funds to develop the productive base of the economy. He neither decentralized his government nor developed rural infrastructure. In his last year in office, inflation rose to 150 percent, exports plummeted, and growth rates declined by 10 percent (Robinson 2006). By 1984, Obote's position was so weakened that he defensively promoted military officers who were ethnically related to him ahead of others to buttress himself in power. Instead, he prompted his second ouster (Bunker 1987). Similarly, in Mali, Moussa Traoré's government signed two agreements with the IMF and World Bank before Konaré came to power, in 1981 and again in 1988. However, Traoré used the new system to pass on lucrative contracts to political supporters. What liberalization occurred in the cereal markets brought few rewards to the majority of farmers. The greatest scandal occurred in the 1980s, when it was alleged those *proche de Moussa* built large homes with aid money earmarked to fight the droughts of 1972–1974 and 1985 (the infamous '*villas de la secheresse*'). These actions alienated the north, where 300,000 Tuaregs had been left destitute. All in all, decentralization and supporting rural development was never a genuine part of Traoré's agenda and the programs largely failed. Traoré's use of aid, instead, contributed to the country's continued unrest. He was ousted in 1990 (Seely 2001; Turrittin 1991: 103; Imperato 1989; Staatz et al. 1989).

Ultimately, the efficacious reformers of the SAP period were successful because IMF and World Bank reforms were commensurate with their own policy agendas. They were as concerned with decentralization, improving agriculture, and supporting rural communities as the Bretton

[11] See Villalón & Idrissa 2005; Clark 2000; Ribot 1999: 10; Vengroff 1993.

Woods Institutions. Those that did not share these goals suffered the consequences.

III Mixed Patterns of Rule

There are of course exceptions to these patterns of rule. Several leaders only partially supported rural areas. Yet even in mixed cases, a pattern emerges: leaders who implemented terrible agricultural policies but politically incorporated local and/or regional elites were more successful than those who introduced policies supportive of small-scale farming but alienated traditional and regional elites. Illustrative cases from the Gambia and Madagascar reveal how these patterns work.

The Gambia

In the Gambia, independence leader Dawda Jawara (1964–1994) was ousted in a coup after decades in power. The reasons for his downfall are fairly straightforward: Jawara heavily taxed the farmers and rapidly expanded the government sector. These poor economic policies were exacerbated by rampant corruption. Nor did Jawara invest significantly in infrastructure or rural development. As a result, the economy was run into the ground (Parfitt 1995). By the end of his term, the population had suffered so much that he was easy to oust. His ill-fated choice to briefly join Senegal and then to keep the upper echelons of the military in the hands of foreigners was sufficient provocation for junior officers to execute an unopposed coup.

However, Jawara ruled for 30 years before he was toppled. In looking at his political strategies, it is possible to explain his longevity within the schema presented here. Jawara came into power on a platform denouncing urban exploitation with a solid rural base of support. He also allowed for a more thorough political decentralization than most of his contemporaries. From the early 1960s, the Gambia had elected local councils that were responsible for local development and administering local funds.

Most importantly, Jawara's rule was quite singular. Unlike virtually every other independence leader in sub-Saharan Africa, Jawara never created a one-party state. Until the coup of 1994, the Gambia had the distinction of being the longest continuous democracy in Africa. During his time in office, five elections were held, one every five years.[12] As

[12] Though he certainly exploited the advantages of incumbency, outspending his opponent, he allowed relatively free and fair multiparty elections throughout his rein. He also had a hands-off approach to the press (Diene-Njie 1996).

uniquely, Jawara exercised relatively little state repression. He was actually known as a strong advocate for human rights (Diene-Njie 1996; Wiseman 1996; Salley 1990). Because he did not depend on repression to hold power, at independence he even chose not to create a large standing army. Instead, he kept factions in line through negotiation. Not until an abortive coup in 1981 did he decide to build up defensive forces. To do so, he made the fateful mistake of forming a union with Senegal (Wiseman 1996; Salley 1990). Thus, arguably, Jawara's political openness, combined with the absence of a significant military force, helped to keep his government stable despite the neglect of the productive base of the economy.

Madagascar

Madagascar may also seem out of keeping with this analysis at first. Whereas the independence leader of Madagascar, Philibert Tsiranana (1960–1972), was forced out of power despite agriculturally favorable policies, radical leftist Didier Ratsiraka (1975–1993, 1997–2002) was able to hold onto power for 16 years and later survive two elections despite implementing classic urban-biased policies – squeezing agriculture, building up industry, and privileging the urban workforce. Nonetheless, the rural-urban typology is useful in understanding these outcomes as well.

When Tsiranana came to power, he actually had strong rural support. His weakest support was in the urban areas, particularly where large unions had organized in opposition to his party. A masterful politician, he was adept at speaking to the rural population. "Like Julius Nyerere, he had been the teacher, the indefatigable rural speechifier, the expert on his people's needs and wants" (Allen 1995: 62). During the first decade of his administration, the Republic of Madagascar enjoyed institutional stability and Tsiranana earned a reputation as a genuine statesman. Tsiranana also implemented relatively successful agricultural policies. His government spent freely on agricultural inputs and rural infrastructure and services. His strategy "resulted in modest growth in agricultural production and GDP, low inflation, and manageable balance-of-payments positions" (Barret 1994: 450).

However, Tsiranana ruled with an iron fist. His authoritarian policies in the countryside began to undermine his rural support base. Tsiranana replicated the former colonial organization of the countryside. Traditional collectivities, *fokon'olona*, were subverted: customary leaders were replaced by state-appointed village chiefs, and local administrative units, 'communes,' were drawn as subdivisions for tax collection without regard to traditional community boundaries. By 1970, rural discontent

was so deep in the south, peasants revolted. The revolt was crushed, but the suppression of the uprising took its toll on Tsiranana. He was forced to dissolve the government in May 1972. Five months later, Tsiranana resigned as president and handed over power to General Gabriel Ramanantsoa. Arguably, Tsiranana's political skill earned him enough popular support to avoid military intervention as long as he did, despite his overbearing rural administration.

It was three years later that Navy Commander Didier Ratsiraka led the second of Madagascar's forced removals and then implemented radical leftist reforms. Ratsiraka was deeply influenced by Maoism, Nyerere's self-reliant *ujamaa*, and North Korea. Unlike Tsiranana, he created local revolutionary cells based on the 'traditional' democratic community, the '*fokon'olona*' (Allen 1995: 80). Ratsiraka's greatest political strength was his capacity to keep opposition leaders within his camp. To neutralize regional elites, he gave them access to resources and enabled them to build up their own political networks. Yet Ratsiraka's disastrous economic policies bankrupted the state. Peasant farmers were so heavily taxed that the country lost much of its vanilla trade to the black market. "By the early 1990s, the golden-egg goose had been all but killed" (Cadot et al. 2006: 3). With a deteriorating economy and only partial political reform, Ratsiraka was forced out of power in 1993.

As with Jawara, Ratsiraka's treatment of rural elites – not his economic policies – arguably enabled him to avoid insatiability as long as he did, while Tsiranana's alienation of key rural elites undermined his power.[13]

IV The Question of Neo-imperialism: The Comoros vs. Benin

The Comoros is an improbable case to include as an example of leadership and political outcomes, given France's extensive intervention in that country. France either directed or sanctioned several coups in the Comoros launched by French mercenary Robert Denard. But on closer inspection, the instability in the country was also a function of leadership policies. Indeed, the very same Robert Denard, who successfully conducted four coups in the Comoros, was quickly repulsed by Mathieu Karaoke's forces in Benin in 1977. A comparative examination of the political strategies of the leaders Denard attempted to remove in both countries illustrates these points.

[13] Also see Raison-Jourde & Roy 2010; Barrett 1994; Mukonoweshuro Oct. 1990.

The Comoros

Denard's first coup in the Comoros brought Ali Soilih to power in 1976, one year after that country's shaky independence. With Soilih, it appears France got more than it bargained for. Soilih embarked on a revolutionary Maoist program. His attempts to restructure traditional society and the economy drew ire not only from large foreign financial concerns, but also from the traditional elite. Soilih limited the privileges of the *muftis* (Muslim jurists who interpret Islamic law), abolished customary forms of marriage and funeral ceremonies, and tried to rescind the use of the veil for women.

Soilih's primary support came from urban youth. He fortified his support base by lowering the voting age to 14 and putting teenagers in positions of responsibility. Several government bureaucracies were dismantled and handed over to 'popular' committees run by gangs of teenagers. He also mobilized Comoran youth into a Red Guard-styled revolutionary militia, the Moissy, which violently attacked conservative elders, particularly in villages. In two years, Soilih's acutely unpopular reforms, combined with a deepening economic crisis, completely eroded support for his government. Several attempts were made on Soilih's life. By 1978, when 50 former French paratroopers landed at Itsandra Beach north of the capital, the regular armed forces offered no resistance. Comorans rejoiced.

Unfortunately, Denard's mercenaries exchanged one oppressor for another. Soilih was replaced by the first president Denard had ousted, Ahmed Abdallah. Most of Abdallah's backing was from his native island of Anjouan. Other than that, he had little support. Initially, he introduced popular reforms. He granted each island its own legislature and control over local taxes. He also restored Islam as the state religion. Yet Abdallah failed to establish a government that included adequate representation for the people on the outlying islands of Njazidja, Nzwani, and Mwali. Moreover, Abdallah did little to support local agriculture or food production. Himself a major vanilla exporter, the president protected the large plantation owners' interests. He refused to divest valuable land used in vanilla production to smallholders, limiting the cultivation of corn and rice for domestic consumption. Abdallah was also a major rice importer. He therefore refused to impose tariffs on imported rice. During his presidency, rice imports drained as much as 50 percent of Comoran export earnings (Hassan 2009; Walker 2007; Mukonoweshuro 1990).

Having little support among the populace, Abdallah relied almost entirely on Denard's presidential guard to sustain power. The approximately 400-strong primarily indigenous Comorans led by French and

Belgian mercenaries were known as *les affreux* ('the frighteners') and operated outside the chain of command of the Comoran armed forces. With their harsh tactics and widespread repression, resentment against the Guard mounted. In 1985, 30 Comoran troops of the Guard mutinied against their European officers. The rebellion was quickly squelched and President Abdallah used the mutiny as a pretense to round up dissidents. The political situation began to destabilize. In 1989, during a referendum on a constitutional amendment to extend presidential term limits, voters smashed ballot boxes and set the governor's office on fire. A bomb was found outside the home of the minister of finance. More than 100 people were arrested.

Fearful that Denard would have him deposed, Abdallah had Denard sign a decree that called for the disarmament of Denard's presidential guard. That night Denard's men assassinated Abdallah (Hassan 2009; Walker 2007; Mukonoweshuro 1990).[14]

Benin

Only one year after Denard successfully ousted Abdallah and put Ali Soilih in power, he tried to take out the leftist leader in Benin, Mathieu Kérékou. However, Kérékou, unlike Abdallah and Soilih, had the loyalty of his military and the population at large. As a result, when Bob Denard's mercenaries arrived in the airport in Cotonou on January 16, 1977 and drove into the city, the Beninese military was able to chase the intruders back to the airport in a matter of hours (Heilbrunn 1999: 51).

When Kérékou came to power in 1972, his success was far from certain. His was the fifth coup the country had experienced in only 10 years. It was his revolutionary assertions that made him a target of Denard and France. In November 1974, Kérékou announced that Marxism-Leninism would be the official national ideology. The government then nationalized several companies, including the banking and insurance industries (Dossou-Yovo 1999). Moreover, despite his leftist platform, Kérékou faced multiple urban strikes in his first years in power. So much so that in 1975, he arrested

[14] Also see Hassan 2009; Helen Chapin Metz, ed. *Comoros: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: GPO for the Library of Congress, 1994. *Comoros Constitution and Citizenship Laws Handbook: Strategic Information and Basic Laws*. Washington, DC: International Business Publication, 2013 edition, pp. 41–43. *Africa A to Z: Continental and Country Profiles*, ed. P. Esterhuysen. Africa Institute of South Africa, 2013, pp. 142–147. Katharine Murison, *Africa: South of the Sahara*. London: Europa Publications, 2004, pp. 1246–1247. Union of the Comoros: Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper, "Context of the Union of the Comoros," IMF Country Report No. 10/190, July 2010; *Encyclopedia of African History*, ed. Kevin Shillington. New York: Taylor & Francis Group, 2005. pp. 499–502.

hundreds of student and union leaders. He even had an important leftist leader in the military assassinated.

Kérékou initially solidified popular support in large part by implementing reforms in education, health care, and local government, particularly in the rural areas (Allen 1992b: 65). Kérékou was one of the first of the new brand of leftist reformers. Like the others, Kérékou created revolutionary grassroots cells with elected representatives, which became the basis of his local government administration. And though Kérékou's anti-feudal policies prohibited traditional elites from running in local elections, his radical Marxist-Leninist agenda was so inconsistently instituted that by the 1980s, it had come to be referred to as 'laxisme-böninisme' (Le Meur 1999: 193). As a result, the government barely touched traditional authority at the village level. Chiefs' sons and relatives often became local representatives and traditional elites sustained power in their communities (Heilbrunn 1999; Le Meur 1999; Bierschank & de Sardon 2003).[15]

This is not to deny that Kérékou developed relatively shallow roots in the countryside.[16] Moreover, Kérékou's agricultural policies proved disastrous. Farmers remained highly taxed. The economy deteriorated as peasants increasingly sold their products across the border. Nonetheless, "in an important regard, Kérékou survived in power because he decentralized rule. A core within the regime never seriously threatened the centers of traditional authority in the country's three regions" (Heilbrunn 1999: 50). Indeed, Kérékou weathered the economic storm for two and a half decades. By 1990, the economic situation had reached critical proportions. Before he could be removed by the military, Kérékou sagely called for a national conference in which he was popularly voted out of office. Kérékou willingly stepped down and subsequently remained so popular that he was elected back into office only five years later, remaining for two terms.

Thus, even in this most extreme case of foreign penetration, rural political strategies were critical. In the Comoros, successive regimes' hostility to and neglect of regional populations weakened the state and undermined any political or military support that might have enabled the leaders to withstand neo-imperialist pressures. In contrast, Kérékou was able to survive his most critical first decade in office despite France's hostility to his socialist policies, in part, because his initial rural policies

[15] This analysis of Kérékou conflicts with Riedl's (2014). However, the conflict stems from the fact that my analysis is focused on the early and mid-1970s, when Kérékou was first building support for the regime, while Riedl is focused on later developments.

[16] See Riedl 2014.

buoyed him through his first decade in office, allowing him to consolidate politically and keep the support of his military.[17]

V Conclusion

In the end, SAP regimes, like the independence rulers before them, faced similar structural opportunities and constraints. And like their predecessors, each leader's success was tied to the degree to which his own conception of statecraft and nation-building promoted rural areas.

In both epochs, leaders who promoted political decentralization and traditional agriculture proved the most successful. No leader followed a 'pure' ideal-typical rural strategy. But those who came closest to the ideal had better success at establishing stable rule. Above all, the regimes that permitted local elites to direct their communities were more successful at stabilizing their regimes than those that tried to improve agriculture but lost traditional elite support. This is further underscored by the fact that a significant number of leaders who used these strategies left office peacefully and/or introduced multiparty elections, including Rawlings, Houphouët, Ahidjo, Kérékou, Nyerere, Konaré, Mandela, and Kaunda.

From this study a number of patterns emerge. The most successful leftist regimes emulated Cuban, Tanzanian, and Libyan models of socialist development based on self-directed local rural cells and peasant agriculture, without punishing traditional elites (Museveni, Rawlings). Far less successful were those who either followed the Soviet model and attempted to industrialize and radically centralize, or used strict Maoist reforms, restructuring the local peasantry and extracting excessive resources from them without having first built up rural support (Cabral, Nkrumah, Keïta, Mengistu, Samora Machel Barre, Macías). Similarly, pro-Western regimes that promoted smallholder agriculture and were willing to grant some autonomy to local/regional elites were more successful at statecraft (Houphouët, Kenyatta, Kaunda), than regimes who allied with former colonial powers but neglected the rural areas (Dacko, Bokassa, Tombalbaye). Above all, the regimes that permitted local elites to direct their communities were more successful than those that did not.

This study illustrates that many cases can be analyzed with the ideal-typical schema I propose. Of course there are always multiple factors that contribute to the success or failure of a president. In some instances, other dynamics may outweigh the importance of these coalition strategies.

[17] See also Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardan 2003; Mongbo 2001; Bierschenk and Mongbo, 1995; Tingbe-Azalou 1997; Bianco, David. "Kérékou, Ahmed (Mathieu) 1933–." *Contemporary Black Biography*. 1992. Retrieved May 21, 2015 from Encyclopedia.com: www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-2870300044.html.

Regimes that control extensive resource wealth or that come to power after a protracted civil war may be able to solidify political control without incorporating traditional elites or regional competitors. Yet, even in these circumstances, the most noteworthy leaders do follow a rural political strategy. Oil-rich Gabon's relative political stability has often been attributed to the careful ethnic balancing practiced by its first president, Omar Bongo. Similarly, though Somalia is still ripped apart by war, the Republic of Somaliland in the northwestern corner of the territory has been a peaceful federation since 1991. Somaliland' s unique success has been directly attributed to the political incorporation of traditional elites and balancing of clan interests (Ahmed & Green 1999: 123). Clan elders devised a unique system that balanced "clan representation and relied on elders for successful negotiations, peace building and reconciliation" (Dorman 2006: 1089).

It therefore appears that the degree of success and failure of a considerable number of African presidents can be, in large part, explained by examining the urban or rural coalitions these leaders formed, and the degree to which they supported ethno-regional elites.

3 Rural Alliances and Coup Risk: Testing the Theory

At least since the storming of the Bastille, political leaders and scholars alike have understood that urban mobs can pose an existential threat to the powers that be.[1] With the Arab Spring of 2011, the world again witnessed the capacity of urban riots to set radical change in motion. Between 2011 and 2014, several long-standing autocrats were forced out of power as a result of escalating unrest in their capital cities.[2] Indeed, historically, African governments have perceived destabilizing urban riots as their primary threat.

Why then should rural chiefs and peasant farmers be central to a regime's ability to control its political environment? Even more to the point, why would rural strategies have any bearing upon the conduct of the military? To investigate these questions, this chapter presents theoretical arguments followed by a quantitative study of the relationship between rural alliances and the risk of military intervention.

I Rural Policies and the Armed Forces: Theoretical Arguments

Rural policies can directly impact the armed forces in several ways. For one thing, rural neglect can lead to economic hardship that directly impacts the military rank and file (see Tables 7). When farmers are not supported, they often choose exit strategies – selling export crops across the border for higher returns, or abandoning export crops altogether. The state begins to lose critical export revenue. At the same time, when rural development is foregone, food staples consumed in the urban areas become more difficult to come by. This type of economic recession hits the lower and middle ranks of the armed forces the hardest. The top military brass is far more insulated from the effects of declining living standards and military cutbacks (Kandeh 2004). Not surprising, junior

[1] This chapter is coauthored with Paul Jargowsky.
[2] Ben Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt, Gadhafi of Libya, Saleh of Yemen, and Blaise Compaoré of Burkina Faso.

Figure 7 Unfavorable agricultural policies and coup risk

and middle-ranking officers, who command troops or battalions that can be efficiently mobilized, have frequently been coup-makers in Africa. Strategies that reduce the probability of food shortages and productive decline are, therefore, less likely to bring about disaffection of these ranks and to lower coup risk.

More broadly, political legitimacy in Africa depends on a regime's "resonance with local cultures" (Clark 2006: 133; Schatzberg 2001). In the African context, this means political legitimacy hinges, in large part, on how chiefs and local authorities are treated. A Ghanaian Member of Parliament stated it to me this way:

> People worship their chiefs. Chiefs are the custodians of the land and of tradition. People respect their chiefs. The government provides for their basic needs; they have fear of the government. But the chiefs have both the fear and respect of the people.[3]

Given the continued power of chieftaincy and the geographic concentration of clan and lineage groups, the support of chieftaincy and ethno-regional contenders strengthens a regime's legitimacy. With greater legitimacy, chances decrease that the military and the general population will deem extralegal measures justified (Clark 2006). Therefore, on this account as well, the support of chieftaincy and ethno-regional elites can reduce the probability of a coup or forced removal.

However, the most essential way in which rural support impacts the armed forces is in terms of ethnic politics. Because divisions within sub-Saharan militaries reflect broader societal divisions, "the military can become a hotbed for ethnic resentment and an instrument for the advancement of ethnic claims to power" (Horowitz 1985: 443). As a conspirator in the 1966 Ghanaian coup put it, "The officer's roots are in the countryside, and the outcome of this is that the officer becomes identified almost always with the 'folk back home'" (Ocran 1977: 64). In sub-Saharan Africa, class solidarities and cross-cutting cleavages tend to be weak. Military cliques, like political parties, generally form along ethnic and sub-ethnic ties (Kandeh 2004).

[3] Interview with Honorable Member Allidu Iddrissu, MP of West Mamprusi, Walewale, Ghana, August 17, 2009.

The persistence of ethnic ties in the military is in large part a vestige of colonial administrative polices. Whereas colonial administrations generally recruited their military rank and file from relatively disadvantaged regions, they frequently choose to train individuals from better educated ethnic groups for their officer corps (particularly in West Africa). Consequently, the ethnic divisions in society were replicated in the armed forces. (Harkness 2014; Nugent 2004: 208; Howe 2001; Horowitz 1985). These legacies persist in African militaries today. As a result, African security forces can be easily affected by local and ethno-regional discontent.

Frequently, it is actually a regime's ethnically skewed policies that bring ethnic solidarities in the military to prominence. Fearful regimes commonly seek to strengthen themselves "by packing [their armed forces] with members of ethnic groups friendly to the regime . . . or [neutralizing] them by creating rival paramilitary organizations" (Horowitz 1985: 465). However, such attacks on the existing military command structure tend to bring about the very coups they were designed to avert. Thompson observes, "One of the ironies of coup politics is that there is a tendency for weak and weakening leaders, desperately attempting to establish or retain control, to be the most likely and frequent sources of threat to potential military coup-makers" (1975: 485). These types of actions triggered coups in Uganda in 1977 and 1985, Guinea-Bissau in 1980, CAR in 1966, Ghana in 1966 and 1972, Sierra Leone in 1967, and Liberia in 1980 (Harkness 2014; Kandeh 2004; Horowitz 1985).

Indeed, ethnic recruitment in the military is pervasive (Trimberger 1978). Throughout Africa, rulers have built armies and paramilitary organizations according to an 'ethnic security map' (Young 1994: 241). "[I]n many African armies and security forces, informal links and structures of power based on such factors as ethnic, family and political connections, count for much more than formal hierarchy and lines of command" (Hutchful cited in Howe 2001: 37).

The 1980 coup in Guinea-Bissau illustrates how all of these factors can be translated to a military coup. During the drought between 1977 and 1979, the government distributed international rice donations primarily to its urban base. "With 80 per cent of the rice normally being grown by the Balanta, their discontent was directly transmitted to the soldiers, the vast majority of whom continued to retain direct ties with their rural homes, so that these economic and ethnic variables merged to further prepare the political stage for military intervention" (Forrest 1987: 102).

Of course there is always a complex mixture of motivations behind any seizure of power. Yet, in ethnically divided societies, there is quite frequently an ethnic component (Harkness 2014; Jenkins & Kposowa 1992). "The skewed composition of regimes and officer corps reinforces the apparent

importance of ethnicity, facilitates the interactions of officers (including conspiratorial interactions) on an ethnic basis, and may also increase the tendency for politicians and officers to view others' actions as ethnically motivated" (Horowitz 1985: 471).

Even when the proximate cause of a coup comes from a new set of state actions that threaten key members of the military, these threats are often the last in a series attempts made by a regime to neutralize its regional opponents. As Luckham observes, "ethnic conflict and state disintegration have to a significant degree derived from the security practices of ruling classes" (1994: 23).

For example, the 1966 coup in Ghana against Nkrumah is not generally considered an ethnically motivated coup. Yet there are several ways in which ethnicity was central to the course of events that transpired. At the time, the Ghanaian officer corps was dominated by ethnic groups associated with the political factions most feared by Nkrumah's regime, Ewes, Gãs, and, to a lesser extent, Akans. The first assassination conspiracy against Nkrumah came from opposition Ewe politicians in league with Ewe junior officers. To defend himself from his own military, Nkrumah built up paramilitary forces led by his co-ethnic Nzimas and northerners. He also passed over Ewe and Gã officers in line for promotion. Right before the coup, Nkrumah dismissed a popular Gã general and had plans to dismiss and possibly arrest two prominent Ewes in the security forces. In response, the coup was conducted by a coterie of Ewes in association with Gã and Akan officers (Baynham 1988).

This pattern can be found even in personally motivated coups, such as Idi Amin's overthrow of Milton Obote. Decalo argues, the "[m]ore cogent reasons for the Amin coup would be purely personal ones" (1986: 111–112). However, here too ethno-regional politics was at the center of the events (Nugent 2004; Ingham 1994; Horowitz 1985). In particular, "Obote's attempt to ensure army loyalty by Langi and Acholi promotions [was] correctly identified [by Amin] as Obote's attempt to maneuver against him and buildup of the countervailing military force" (Glentworth 1973: 250). Within a year, Amin took charge of the state in a bloodless coup. As the Amin coup demonstrates, it is difficult to disentangle personal ambition and corporate military interests from ethno-political fears. More often than not, these concerns are imbricated with one another.

Three decades ago, Horowitz speculated that the most successful coup-proofing measure would be "the use of political ingenuity to prevent ethnic conflict from reaching the point at which it spills across civil military boundaries" (1985: 557). A rural political strategy is just that. Very simply, when a regime coopts rather than fears competing elites, chances diminish that key groups in the military will become targeted and will, in turn, target the regime (see Figure 8).

Figure 8 Unfavorable rural political policies and coup risk

II Research Design

To test these theoretical arguments, I undertake a quantitative study. The hypothesis I seek to test is whether following a rural political strategy reduces the probability of the military mobilizing against the regime.

Sample

The sample includes countries of all colonial backgrounds and regions, of different sizes, and with different resource endowments. Regimes in power for less than nine months, provisional/transitional governments, and regimes that came to power prior to 1955 were excluded. The final sample size is 135 regimes in 44 sub-Saharan countries.[4]

Independent Variable

To operationalize a rural political strategy, I code regimes in 44 countries from 1960 to 2000 on how effectively they promoted traditional elites and local autonomy. Using this original dataset, a composite index is created, a 'Rural Political Score' (RPS). Each regime is coded on seven measures from which the cumulative RPS is created. The prediction is that as RPS scores increase, the probability of a coup or war onset will decrease and survival rates will increase.

The idea that chieftaincy and local politics have a bearing on regime stability has not been explored, and is frankly the least intuitive aspect of this theory. Studies have found a correlation between elite cooptation and stability (Francois, Reiner, & Trebbi 2015; Arriola 2009), as well as between elite cooptation, pro-agricultural policies, and economic development (Kelsall 2013; Booth & Golooba-Mutebi 2012; Kelsall & Booth 2010). Modeling the effects of local political incorporation on the likelihood of regime survival is, therefore, a critical test of the theory.

[4] Countries not included are: the small island nations of Mauritius, Cape Verde, and the Seychelles, the city-state of Djibouti, and Nigeria because its federal structure complicates the coding of local political incorporation.

The political incorporation of localities is also, arguably, a better barometer of rural support. For example, representations of different ethnic groups in the cabinet and government have been used as proxies for rural support (Francois, Reiner, & Trebbi 2015; Arriola 2009). But these proxies have serious limitations. Even when regimes make visible appointments of token ethnic representatives, unless those representatives have community support, such maneuvers will have little political import; particularly if locally respected ethnic leaders continue to be excluded or even repressed. As a result, increasing the size of the cabinet or the percentage of ethnicities represented may be a red herring. Henri Konan Bédié is a prime example. During his five years in power, he increased the size of his cabinet twice to bolster his political position and included various ethnic groups. Yet Bédié continued to exclude the one political leader most respected by the community, Alassane Ouattara. As a result, these strategic attempts failed. Bédié was ousted from power one year later.

Even the introduction of higher producer prices can be a problematic measure of rural support. With crops regionally circumscribed, an increase in the producer price of one major export crop may not help a number of other areas. Moreover, given the diversity of crops grown across the continent, it is difficult to develop a comparable scale across countries and across time. The relationship between pricing policies and farmer support has become even harder to measure since the liberalization of African agriculture in the 1990s.

To further complicate things, there are no accurate statistics for either farmer extension programs or rural infrastructure in sub-Saharan Africa across the period studied. Even today such data are spotty at best. On the other hand, it is possible to determine whether chieftaincy was given legal support or whether relatively free local elections were institutionalized.

The seven proxies that make up the composite RPS index were drawn from three dimensions: political support base, levels of political devolution, and support of chieftaincy (see Table 7). Coding was based on primary and secondary sources, using an average of 10 sources and a minimum of four to ensure information was triangulated.[5] An RPS score of 7 represents the ideal-typical rural political strategy. In fact, in my sample, the mean RPS score is only 2.14 (see Figure 9).

[5] To determine the reliability of RPS as a measure, the alpha Cronbach test was used. The test establishes the extent to which all the factors that make up a composite index are measuring the same concept. Cronbach's alpha for RPS is 0.74, indicating that RPS is an internally consistent index. George and Mallery (2003) provide the following rule of thumb: >0.9 is Excellent; >0.8 is Good; >0.7 is Acceptable; >0.6 is Questionable; >0.5 is Poor; and <0.5 is Unacceptable (p. 231).

Table 7 *Protocol for coding Rural Political Score (RPS)*

I. Support-base upon assuming power
(1) Base
1 = Predominately rural
0.5 = Populist with an appeal to segments in both urban and rural areas
0 = Predominately urban and restricted in the rural areas to home region, or military-backed
II. Political devolution
(2) Local councils
1 = Free elections
0.5 = Elections + appointments
0 = Appointed/party-controlled
(3) Fiscal decentralization
1 = Devolution of annual funds to local administrations
0.5 = Funds available for locally initiated projects
0 = Central control of all local and regional funding
(4) Administrative decentralization
1 = Deconcentrated
0.5 – Nominally deconcentrated – policies poorly implemented
0 = Centralized
III. Chieftaincy
(5) House of Chiefs (or chiefs appointed to the Upper House)
1 = Yes
0 = No
(6) Chiefs in village administration
1 = Officially incorporated into local administration
0.5 = Chiefs administer by default, not officially
0 = Regime attempts to supplant chiefs at the local level
(7) Legal chiefs
1 = Chiefs expressly recognized in the constitution
0.5 = Islam expressly recognized in the constitution
0 = No mention of chieftaincy or Islam in the constitution

For 'Levels of political devolution,' each factor is measured individually, rather than as a continuous variable. This choice was made to reflect the fact that each element – deconcentration, political decentralization, and fiscal decentralization – can be implemented separately or conjointly, and each can have separate political impacts.

I have included administrative deconcentration even though it is often argued that deconcentration *disempowers* local authorities (Munyao & Barrett 2007; Ribot & Oyono 2005; Boone 2003). It is possible, however, that deconcentration actually gives regional and local powerbrokers greater leverage over the distribution of resources. Local stakeholders are closer to the decision-making process. Deconcentrated officials are therefore potentially more attuned to local realities and preferences. In



Figure 9 Distribution of RPS scores on 0–7 scale

addition, deconcentration often requires an increase in territorial administrative units, which can give local communities greater autonomy – especially where new boundaries are used to create more ethnically homogenous units to satisfy political demands (Boko 2002).

Moreover, though deconcentration can merely shift responsibilities from central government officials in the capital to those working in the regions, provinces, or districts, it can also improve local administrative capacity. Therefore, deconcentration may more efficaciously increase local capacity than decentralization (Pinto 2004), particularly given the financial weaknesses of local governments and difficulties with accountability that come with decentralization (Lodenstein & Dao 2011; USAID 2010; Wunsch 2001). As a result, in some instances deconcentration may offer a qualitatively greater political transformation at the local level than political or even financial devolution.

Coding regimes with asymmetrical time frames presents a number of potential problems. To address this, each regime is coded on the basis of the policies it enacted during its first 10 years in office. Focusing on the first 10 years makes the coding more consistent and militates against the possibility that what is being measured is the effects of incumbency, rather than the efficacy of the policies themselves. The 10-year cut-off was chosen because it has been found that political risks significantly decrease after a decade in power (Gates et al. 2006; Sanhueza 1999; Bienen & Van de Walle 1992).

This finding is also consistent with my sample. The change in coup likelihood after 10 years strongly suggests that strategic choices made during these least certain years are the most critical to coup proofing.

Control Variables

Against RPS, the effects of 13 competing explanatory factors are tested. First, 'chiefs' and 'localities' are not all alike; sociopolitical organization and resource endowments vary greatly across the interior of most states. Moreover, European colonial administrations differently empower chiefs within their territories. Therefore, some chiefs and regional groups are far more empowered and autonomous vis-à-vis the center than others (Boone 2003).

To test whether relative chieftaincy autonomy impacts regime survival, I use two proxies. First, I use a dummy variable for each colonizing power in the sample: Britain, France, Portugal, Belgium, and Other (Spain, South Africa, or slave resettlement). The expectation is that in former British colonies, where chiefs were given greater autonomy under indirect rule, regimes will be more prone to military intervention. I also code whether a regime faced a relatively autonomous and powerful monarchy.[6] The expectation is that leaders who confront a strong, centralized monarchy will be less able to manage regional competitors, and, hence, more likely to destabilize than leaders who face largely segmented rural populations.

Another factor that might impact regime stability is the epoch in which the regime came to power. After 1980, with the end of the Cold War and increased conditional aid, the political climate on the continent was radically altered. I therefore code regimes on whether they came to power before or after 1980. The prediction is that regimes that came to power prior to 1980 will be more likely to succumb to military interventions.

Neo-imperialism should also be important. Though Western scholars rarely take into account the impact of foreign governments on coup politics, there is clear evidence of Western involvement in coup plots across Africa, particularly during the Cold War era.[7] As a proxy for neo-imperialism,

[6] Countries coded with powerful monarchies are: Ethiopia, Burundi, Rwanda, Lesotho, Swaziland, Ghana, Uganda, and Burkina Faso. Because some monarchies were dissolved soon after independence (as in Ethiopia, Rwanda, and Burundi), this variable is coded at the regime level.

[7] For example, a number of official documents have come out that show the CIA was involved in coup plots against Nkrumah. See 'Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968,' Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 251, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 11, 1965, 3–3:30 p.m.; *The Socialist Forum of Ghana, The Great Deception, Second Edition*. Accra, 2007; Baynham 1988: 143, 156; Afrifa 1967.

I code each regime on whether it was leftist when it came to power. The expectation is that left-leaning, communist-sympathizing regimes are at higher risk of military intervention.

Finally, a regime's risk of facing a coup has been found to be highly associated with previous coups (Londregan & Poole 1990). I therefore take into account whether a regime came to power in a country with previous coups. As a corollary to this, military governments should be expected to be more prone to coups. I therefore code each regime for whether it was a military government.

In addition to my codes, I use data from a number of different sources. To see if coup likelihood is associated with how repressive a regime is, I use the 'POLITY2' index data from the Polity IV dataset.[8] The index ranks regimes from -10 to +10, on their level of political competitiveness and openness. The expectation is that more repressive regimes are more likely to destabilize.

Higher ethnic and religious divisions have also been found to be associated with political destabilization. To test RPS against these factors, I use Montalvo and Reynal-Querol's (2005) coding of ethnic fragmentation and religious polarization.

Finally, I use four African Development Indicators (ADI).[9] I use rate of urbanization to see if urban population growth contributes to greater destabilization and coup likelihood. Level of economic prosperity has long been associated with increasing political risk. Therefore, I include average annual GDP per capita, to see how it correlates with the increased hazard of forced removal. Last, having valuable resources has been found to have a destabilizing effect on developing countries. To test this relationship, I include annual data on the percent of GDP a regime received from either oil or mineral exports.

Dependent Variable

The outcome being measured is how effectively a rural political strategy enables a regime to manage the threat military intervention. Two measures of military intervention are used: being ousted in a coup, or the onset of civil war. In this study, a 'coup' is defined as: *the sudden, often violent extra-constitutional overthrow of an existing government enforced by a militarized group.* The definition includes any extra-constitutional removal backed by the military or the police force. Though it is likely

[8] See Polity IV Annual Time-Series, 1800–2015, www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.
[9] http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=africa-development-indicators (accessed June 2014).

that the mechanisms, and hence risks, differ in forced removals, the dataset includes too few cases of forced removal to make any meaningful statistical differentiation between these outcomes.

The coding for civil war onset is based on the Correlates of War (COW) Intra-Conflict Dataset.[10] Conflicts fought on foreign soil are excluded (for example, I do not include South Africa's involvement in the Mozambique civil war as a civil war), as are those that lasted for a very short duration and those with very low casualty rates.[11] However, short conflicts with very high death tolls, such as the genocides in Rwanda in 1994 and Burundi in 1972, are included. Again, this is because the models are being used to test the ability of a regime to manage security threats. Overcoming a short-lived conflagration with limited impact is indicative of a regime's ability to overcome domestic challengers. In addition, I do not count regimes that came to power *during* a civil war. In the latter case, it is too difficult to establish the relationship between the regime's policies and the continuation of that war.

Other measures of political instability, such as riots, demonstrations, attempted coups, and coup plots, are not included. This choice was made because what is being investigated is not whether regimes experience challenges to their rule – the assumption is that they will – but how they *manage* such challenges. Indeed, almost all presidents in Africa prior to 1990 were subject to at least one coup plot. Even Julius Nyerere, an African president renowned for having created a politically stable environment, had to overcome a coup attempt. Moreover, following a rural political strategy is not expected to end all coup attempts or forms of instability, but it is expected to significantly improve a regime's ability to *control* security threats. Thus, foiled coups (be they attempted or plotted), and popular demonstrations that do not result in an ouster or civil war by definition reflect effective strategies for addressing security threats.

The Model

The first model used is with the Kaplan-Meier nonparametric estimate of the survivor function. This method records the proportion of regimes that have not experienced removal or war onset by time t. The Kaplan Meier nonparametric estimate also accounts for censoring, i.e., the possibility that

[10] Correlates of War (COW) Intra-Conflict Dataset version 4.1, http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/COW-war (accessed June 16, 2016).

[11] The Zanzibar Arab–Africa conflict of 1964, which only lasted three days, the Shaba secessionist movement, which ended in a month, and the Oromo liberation movement, which lasted less than three months.

some regimes end without a coup or onset, by a democratic transition, by death in office, or by reaching the end of the data collection window before a coup occurs.

However, this nonparametric method does not model the hazard rate directly, nor does it estimate the magnitude of the effects of covariates. To establish both the hazard rate and magnitude of the effects, a Cox proportional hazard model (Cox 1972) is used. A Cox proportional hazard model is analogous to a multiple regression model in that it tests the difference between survival times of particular groups while allowing for the test of multiple factors.

Within the Cox model, regimes become at risk of forced removals or the onset of civil war on the day they are founded. They remain at risk until: (1) they experience a coup or civil war onset; (2) they end by other means, such as an election or natural death; (3) they are right-truncated by the end of the data collection window (December 31, 2015). The hazard of regime i in country j experiencing a coup is modeled as:

$$h_{ij}(t) = h_0(t)\exp\left(\alpha RPS_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\beta}'\mathbf{X}_j + \boldsymbol{\gamma}'\mathbf{Y}_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\delta}'\mathbf{Z}_{ijt}\right), \qquad [1]$$

where h_0(t) is the baseline hazard for time t; RPS_{ij} is the rural political score for regime i in country j; X_j is a vector of country-level variables; Y_{ij} is vector of regime-level variables; and Z_{ijt} is a vector of time-varying variables; and α, β, γ, and δ are the coefficients to be estimated. Time is measured to the day, starting with 0 on the first day, but the estimated hazards are yearly rates with values scaled by 365.25.

Using the Cox model enables one to model the effect of each variable independently. With the Cox model one can measure the ratio of coup hazards in two regimes that are in all respects equal, but differ by one unit of RPS. This is given by:

$$\frac{h_{ij}(t) \mid (RPS_{ij} = RPS_0 + 1)}{h_{ij}(t) \mid (RPS_{ij} = RPS_0)}$$
$$= \frac{h_0(t)\ \exp\ (\alpha(RPS_0 + 1) + \boldsymbol{\beta}'\mathbf{X}_j + \boldsymbol{\gamma}'\mathbf{Y}_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\delta}'\mathbf{Z}_{ijt})}{h_0(t)\ \exp\ (\alpha(RPS_0 + \boldsymbol{\beta}'\mathbf{X} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}'\mathbf{Y}_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\delta}'\mathbf{Z}_{ijt})} = \exp\ (\alpha)$$

Thus, e^{α} is the relative change in removal/onset hazard associated with a one-unit increase in RPS. The same argument is applied to all variables in the model, substituting the appropriate coefficient in place of α.

All estimates are expressed as hazard ratios rather than raw coefficients. If a variable's hazard ratio is greater than one, the risk of a political hazard

is positively correlated with the variable; if it is less than one, it is negatively correlated. Though Cox models are continuous-time models, the data are divided for each regime into a separate record for each year or part of a year to accommodate time-varying variables.[12]

Equation 1 assumes the baseline hazard is the same for all countries. As a robustness check, a model allowing for country-specific baseline hazards is also used:

$$h_{ij}(t) = h_{0j}(t)\exp\left(\alpha RPS_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\gamma}'\mathbf{Y}_{ij} + \boldsymbol{\delta}'\mathbf{Z}_{ijt}\right). \qquad [2]$$

In the latter model, $h_{0j}(t)$ is the baseline hazard for country j at time t. Accordingly, country-level variables, X_j, drop out because they are implicitly incorporated in the country-specific baseline hazards. Finally, given that regimes are nested within countries, all the models are estimated with robust standard errors that allow for the possibility that hazards are correlated across regimes within countries.

The Results

The Kaplan-Meier results are striking. Figure 10 displays the Kaplan-Meier survivor function, using three categories of RPS: (i) low (RPS<2), (ii), middle (RPS> = 2<4), and (iii) high RPS (RPS> = 4). At every point in time, those regimes with above average RPS survive at a higher rate and for a longer duration than those with average or below average RPS. Importantly, the model illustrates that what is predictive of survival is the higher combination of the components of the rural political strategy, rather than any one factor in isolation, validating the use of a rural political strategy as an ideal-type.

The effects of RPS on regime duration are equally striking. Figure 11 presents a scatter plot of the correlation between RPS scores and the length of time a regime is in office. The scatterplot further indicates whether a regime ended in a coup, or through a normal 'exit' such as elections or natural death in office, or if a regime was still in power when the data collection period ended ('right censored'). The pattern is quite distinct. The vast majority of coups occur to leaders with RPS scores of less than 3 and within the first 10 years of power. Regimes with an RPS below 1 have a particularly high rate of coups. In contrast, the vast majority of leaders who did not experience a coup and/or remained in power beyond 10 years had relatively high RPS scores.

[12] Dividing the time at risk of a unit of analysis in this way has no effect on the coefficients or standard errors of non-time-varying coefficients.



Figure 10 Survivor function by category of RPS



Figure 11 Effect of RPS on regime duration (with indication of type of exit)

Cox Proportional Hazard Models

In addition to the survival model, three series of Cox proportional hazard model are run. The first uses 'coup' as the hazard failure; the second uses 'coup' plus 'war-onset.' In addition, because 74 percent of the observations of relatively autonomous monarchies occur in British colonies, it is not possible to use the two dummies in one model. Therefore, a third series of models is run that replaces the colony dummy with the monarchy dummy.

Table 8 reports the results of the first series of models. The most striking finding is the *only* factor that significantly predicts survival in *all* the models is RPS. Model 1 is the base model. It shows the effect of RPS on coup hazard, only using former colony as a control. The hazard ratio is 0.73, suggesting that the annual coup hazard declines by 27 percent for every one percentage-point increase in RPS. This effect is significant, but does not take into account other covariates that may be correlated with RPS.

Model 2 adds regime-specific controls: regime type, epoch, previous coups, and ideological orientation. With these additional controls, RPS remains significant, though the effect is reduced. As predicted by other studies, having previous coups is highly predictive of a regime being ousted, doubling the probability of a regime being taken out in a successful coup. Also significant is epoch: regimes that came to power after 1980 are 80 percent less likely to be ousted. However, neither the ideological orientation nor the type of regime has any significant effect.

Model 3 adds country-specific controls (ethnic fragmentation and religious polarization), and time-varying controls (urban population growth and GDP per capita). Even including all these additional factors, RPS increases its significance and effect: a one-point increase in RPS reduces the probability of coup by 55 percent. Previous coups also increase the hazard ratio, from twice the hazard to four times the hazard more for each additional previous coup.

As expected, an increase in GDP per capita is highly significant, reducing the probability of coup-ouster by 80 percent. Ethnic fragmentation is also significant – though not in the expected direction. An increase of the number of ethnic groups significantly *decreases* coup probability by 90 percent. In these models, colonial power also becomes significant: regimes in former Belgian colonies are more likely to suffer coups relative to regimes in former British colonies.

In Model 4, oil and mineral wealth are added. Even factoring in the effects of resource wealth, RPS retains its strong significance, increasing the effect, with a probability of ouster decreased by 59 percent. The effect

Table 8 *Probability of surviving coup risk*

Failure: Coup	(1) base	(2) +regime	(3) +country	(4) +resources	(5) fixed effects
RPS	0.728**	0.747*	0.449***	0.414***	0.394***
	(−2.84)	(−1.99)	(−3.32)	(−3.35)	(−5.14)
Colonizer (Britain as referent)					
Portugal	0.375	0.902	1.399	2.370	
	(−0.85)	(−0.08)	(0.35)	(0.84)	
France	1.899	1.172	0.574	0.197*	
	(1.25)	(0.25)	(−0.83)	(−2.03)	
Belgium	1.354	1.153	0.0415**	0.0299**	
	(0.52)	(0.21)	(−2.60)	(−3.03)	
Italy	0.968	1.455	2.755	1.815	
	(−0.05)	(0.55)	(1.60)	(1.02)	
Other	0.982	1.620	2.945	0.758	
	(−0.02)	(0.65)	(1.36)	(−0.36)	
Leftist Regime		0.545	0.622	0.261	0.205
		(−1.50)	(−1.17)	(−1.46)	(−1.46)
SAP		0.196**	0.336	0.198	0.133**
		(−3.16)	(−1.47)	(−1.91)	(−2.74)
Previous Coup		1.906***	3.701***	4.625***	5.069***
		(3.60)	(4.99)	(3.75)	(3.96)
Military Regime		0.883	0.769	1.637	1.915
		(−0.35)	(−0.61)	(1.08)	(1.26)
Polity2		1.048	1.010	1.074*	1.033
		(1.58)	(0.40)	(2.13)	(0.91)
Ethnic Fragmentation			0.0933**	0.0638*	
			(−3.10)	(−2.33)	
Religious Polarization			0.159**	0.0726*	
			(−2.85)	(−2.27)	
Log GDP per capita			0.196***	0.273*	0.351
			(−4.67)	(−1.97)	(−1.60)
% Growth Urban Population			1.079	1.049	1.247*
			(0.83)	(0.55)	(2.26)
Oil Rents (% of GDP)				0.968	0.956*
				(−1.53)	(−2.01)
Mineral Rents (% of GDP)				1.071	1.050
				(1.57)	(1.02)
Fixed-Country Effects	**NO**	**NO**	**NO**	**NO**	**YES**
Regime-Years	1835	1764	1414	1097	1188
Regimes	135	132	111	89	97
Countries	44	42	36	36	40
Pseudo R2	0.0476	0.103	0.232	0.314	0.391
Initial LL	−326.5	−319.3	−248.5	−148.7	−167.5
Final LL	−310.9	−286.5	−190.8	−102.0	−102.0
Chi-Squared	18.57	38.60	150.8	108.3	720.8

Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country
* p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

of previous coups also increases its effect: regimes are almost five times as likely to be ousted for every previous coup. Most surprising, however, is that when oil and mineral revenue is taken into account, GDP per capita *loses all significance*. This may indicate that GDP per capita is important because it is related to a regime's ability to support the military, rather than to the positive effects of spreading wealth across the population. Of equal note is the only regime-specific factor that is significant is the relative openness of a regime – yet not in the anticipated direction. The more politically open the country, the higher the probability of coup ouster.

To further test the robustness of the RPS score as a predictor of forced removals, an additional fixed-effects model is run that controls for unobserved country-specific correlates. Including country-fixed effects also offers a better control for differing types of rural organization and chieftaincy.

Model 5 reports the country-fixed-effects model. RPS is still strongly significant and actually increases its effect, lowering coup probability by 60 percent. Again, previous coup has the strongest effect. As expected, coming to power after 1980 significantly reduces the probability of ouster, while urban population growth significantly increases it. Unexpectedly, however, in this model oil wealth is negatively correlated with coup hazard, suggesting that increased oil wealth *decreases* coup probability – a finding that again suggests that oil wealth may be important because it can provide a regime with funds to contain the military.

Within the dataset, there are 76 cases of coups and 20 of civil war onset. However, of the 20 cases of onset, 14 began with forced removal. That leaves only six unique cases of civil war onset. I therefore do not test civil war onset as its own variable. Instead, I add 'onset' to 'coup' in second series of models to check if adding civil war onset limits the effects of RPS.

Table 9 shows the same series of models, but this time civil war onset is included with coup as the hazard failure. The effect of RPS is virtually identical to the first series of models reported in Table 8. There is little change in the t-values or the effect sizes of RPS; and as with the first series of models, RPS is significant across all the models, suggesting that RPS has a significant effect on civil war onset, as well as on coup probability.

There are, however, three substantive changes. First, in this second series of models, 'previous coups' does not predict failure. This suggests that previous coups are not related to civil war onset. Second, Italian colonies are much more highly correlated with failure in these hazard models. That most likely reflects the fact that the two former Italian colonies in the sample, Ethiopia and Somalia, had extended civil wars.

Table 9 *Probability of surviving coup risk and civil war onset*

Failure: Coup + Civil War Onset	(6) base	(7) +regime	(8) +country	(9) +resources	(10) fixed effects
RPS	0.704***	0.719*	0.446***	0.415***	0.456***
	(−3.39)	(−2.57)	(−3.86)	(−3.64)	(−4.54)
Colonizer (Britain as referent)					
Portugal	1.141	2.843*	2.159	4.478	
	(0.20)	(2.00)	(1.42)	(1.86)	
England	2.020	1.351	0.790	0.290	
	(1.42)	(0.51)	(−0.37)	(−1.40)	
Belgium	1.633	1.461	0.111*	0.0376**	
	(0.87)	(0.61)	(−2.38)	(−2.72)	
Italy	1.051	1.480	9.844***	10.05***	
	(0.07)	(0.56)	(4.11)	(4.20)	
Other	0.915	1.319	3.622*	1.812	
	(−0.12)	(0.39)	(2.00)	(0.93)	
Leftist Regime		0.575	0.705	0.364	0.183
		(−1.56)	(−0.95)	(−1.08)	(−1.47)
SAP		0.302**	0.566	0.411	0.215
		(−2.69)	(−0.82)	(−0.93)	(−1.86)
Previous Coup		1.070	0.866	1.479	1.315
		(0.23)	(−0.47)	(0.97)	(0.58)
Military Regime		1.049	1.016	1.055	0.991
		(1.62)	(0.62)	(1.86)	(−0.27)
Polity2		1.626**	2.862***	3.628**	3.855**
		(3.01)	(4.51)	(3.03)	(2.84)
Ethnic Fragmentation			0.113**	0.0544**	
			(−3.25)	(−2.67)	
Religious Polarization			0.216**	0.135	
			(−2.64)	(−1.96)	
Log GDP per capita			0.192***	0.278	0.259
			(−5.16)	(−1.79)	(−1.89)
% Growth Urban Population			1.029	1.031	1.149
			(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.97)
Oil Rents (% of GDP)				0.972	0.952
				(−1.13)	(−1.86)
Mineral Rents (% of GDP)				1.051	0.991
				(1.53)	(−0.28)
Country-Fixed Effects	**NO**	**NO**	**NO**	**NO**	**YES**
Regime-Years	1725	1654	1316	1034	1125
Regimes	135	132	110	85	93
Countries	44	42	36	35	39
Pseudo R2	0.0512	0.0904	0.218	0.280	0.349

Table 9 (*cont.*)

Failure: Coup + Civil War Onset	(6) base	(7) +regime	(8) +country	(9) +resources	(10) fixed effects
Initial LL	−351.4	−343.8	−262.7	−154.1	−172.9
Final LL	−333.4	−312.7	−205.4	−110.9	−112.6
Chi-Squared	25.98	43.89	158.3	81.89	1435.3
Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses	25.98	43.89	158.3	81.89	1435.3

Standard errors clustered by country
* p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

The other important change is that the measure of political openness is very significant in all of these models, but again not in the anticipated direction. For every one-point increase in the index toward political openness, the probability of failure increases – by as much as four times in Models 9 and 10.

Finally, Table 10 shows models that substitute the monarchy dummy for the colonizer dummy (the two dummies being too closely correlated to be used in the same model). As expected, having a powerful monarchy is strongly predictive of political instability. In Model 11, the base model, regimes that faced a powerful monarchy are more than twice as likely to be ousted in a coup, and six times more likely in Model 14. Yet all the other outcomes are almost identical to the other series of models that used the colonial dummy. Most importantly, RPS is significant in all of these models as well, and its effects are little changed.

Conclusion

Across all the models, a higher RPS significantly decreases a regime's political hazard ratio. The effect is robust with respect to a variety of model specifications and covariate patterns. The quantitative study therefore suggests that using a combination of tactics to politically incorporate local elites substantially reduces the risk of coups and civil war onset.

Most surprising of all is the fact that *only* RPS is significant across all model specifications. Moreover, the more controls added, the stronger its effects. Also surprising is the fact that in none of the models does the ideological orientation of a regime have significance.

Table 10 *Probability of surviving coup risk with relatively autonomous monarchy*

Failure: Coup	(11) base	(12) +regime	(13) +country	(14) +resources
RPS	0.712***	0.711**	0.570***	0.520***
	(−4.27)	(−2.93)	(−3.98)	(−4.46)
Powerful Monarchy	2.227***	1.842	3.617*	5.744***
	(3.45)	(1.90)	(2.44)	(3.50)
Leftist Regime		0.561	0.494	0.344
		(−1.60)	(−1.40)	(−1.37)
SAP		0.187**	0.294	0.215*
		(−3.23)	(−1.91)	(−2.16)
Previous Coup		1.899***	2.797***	2.933***
		(4.23)	(5.49)	(4.16)
Military Regime		0.824	0.939	1.430
		(−0.54)	(−0.15)	(0.78)
Polity2		1.050	1.044	1.123**
		(1.67)	(1.31)	(2.67)
Ethnic Fragmentation			1.010	0.460
			(0.01)	(−0.73)
Religious Polarization			0.103	0.0651*
			(−1.90)	(−2.33)
Log GDP per capita			0.352***	0.447
			(−3.36)	(−1.54)
% Growth Urban Population			1.038	0.991
			(0.53)	(−0.15)
Oil Rents (% of GDP)				0.972
				(−1.39)
Mineral Rents (% of GDP)				1.078*
				(2.08)
Regime-Years	1835	1764	1414	1097
Regimes	135	132	111	89
Countries	44	42	36	36
Pseudo R2	0.0402	0.107	0.199	0.279
Initial LL	−326.5	−319.3	−248.5	−148.7
Final LL	−313.3	−285.0	−199.1	−107.2
Chi-Squared	27.26	30.09	95.90	74.22

Exponentiated coefficients; t statistics in parentheses
Standard errors clustered by country
* p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001

A regime's anti-Western stance may, therefore, be less responsible for coup threat than is commonly assumed.

The models also confirm that structural conditions are critical to political stability. Inherited conditions, such as a history of coups, the

presence of a disproportionately strong and centralized monarchy, having oil wealth, the rate of urbanization, the level of economic growth, the number of ethnic groups, and, to a lesser extent, colonial legacies, do increase the likelihood of very serious political destabilization. Yet the fact that rural political strategies remain consistently and significantly correlated with lowered political risks underscores the fact that leadership strategies can appreciably impact political outcomes.

These findings, therefore, lend credence to the least intuitive aspect of this theory – i.e., that chieftaincy and local politics can even have an impact on the actions of the military. To better understand how this translates into real-life situations and elucidate how these strategies work, it is necessary to undertake a much more thorough analysis of leadership strategies. It is to this objective that Parts II–IV are dedicated.

Part II

Forging Coalitions

In 1957, an historic meeting took place between the leaders of the independence struggle in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Both men were larger-than-life figures. In Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah was the first man to lead any sub-Saharan country to independence. In the Lower Côte, Houphouët-Boigny had become a heroic figure after effecting the abolishment of forced labor throughout French West Africa and unifying the independence movement across French West African territories.

Yet these two leaders could not have been more different. They were men of different temperaments, backgrounds, and political persuasions. Having risen from obscurity, Nkrumah's formative years radicalized him and molded him into a talented political organizer. He became an avowed socialist and an anti-imperialist committed to Pan-Africanism. In contrast, Houphouët-Boigny was a chief and one of the wealthiest cocoa farmers in Côte d'Ivoire. He was socially conservative, deeply respectful of tradition, and a committed anticommunist.

These dichotomies were reflected in the two men's state-building strategies. For Nkrumah, only a sweeping renovation of Ghanaian society and freeing of imperial ties could transform the fledgling country into a modern state. In contrast, Houphouët believed political independence would be impossible without having achieved economic prosperity. He therefore chose political gradualism, relying heavily on foreign investment and French political support as a means to ensure Ivoirian economic growth.

At their historic meeting, Nkrumah rebuked Houphouët for being "pro-colonialist." In response, Houphouët-Boigny reportedly challenged Nkrumah to meet again in 10 years, to see whose approach would prove more successful, Nkrumah's socialist experiment or Houphouët's strong partnership with France. For some, Houphouët's wager might have been regarded as a sucker's bet. At the time, Ghana was substantially ahead of Côte d'Ivoire. It had a civil service recognized as one of the best in Africa, the most advanced roadway and transportation system, and one of the highest per capita incomes on the continent.

As it turned out, Nkrumah lost much more than a bet. Shortly after independence, Ghana began its precipitous fall. Nkrumah was ousted in a

coup in February 1966, sending Ghana into a 15-year tailspin. By the end of 1981, the country had been through five coups and was facing a full-scale economic crisis that was destroying the very fabric of society.

In contrast, Houphouët's strategy for economic growth and development was remarkably successful. Surrounded by neighboring states embroiled in coups – Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Togo – Côte d'Ivoire became an oasis of peace and prosperity in West Africa. By the end of the first decade of independence, Houphouët had begun to build up what was coined the 'Ivoirian Miracle.' Reaping the benefits of high world prices for coffee and cocoa, and prudently diversifying the economy to bolster it against inevitable dips in the world market, the state had been able to build roadway systems and ports, improve communications, and develop industry. Abidjan, the capital, was regarded as the 'Paris of West Africa' with its impressive skyscrapers, intricate freeway system, and exclusive European shops. The city became a playground of the wealthy and a Mecca for migrant workers from neighboring countries. At the end of the 1970s, Côte d'Ivoire had even overtaken Ghana as the primary exporter of cocoa.

Nkrumah's failure is related to a number of unfavorable conditions he inherited. He had to contend with rival power centers supported by the British civil service that were set on his destruction. When cocoa prices began dropping in the mid-1960s, Western powers increased Ghana's economic woes by implementing punishing funding conditions that undermined Nkrumah's ability to build an independent industrial base. Finally, the CIA was implicated in a number of plots against Nkrumah.

Similarly, Houphouët's unparalleled success is linked to several inherited institutional factors. The French electoral system, based on party lists rather than on competitive local and district elections, was more conducive to power sharing than the electoral system introduced in Ghana. Houphouët's traditional opposition was much weaker than the traditional opposition in the Gold Coast. Furthermore, Houphouët inherited a state that controlled the territory's export trade, whereas in the centralized Akan kingdoms, Ghana dominated the cocoa trade and most of the wealth in the territory (Boone 2003).

While all of these factors were relevant, this section will demonstrate that each man's leadership was equally critical. Nkrumah's entrenched ideological positions and removal from local realities led him to neglect traditional agriculture and prohibited him from forging necessary alliances with conservative rural elites. In contrast, Houphouët was able to subdue most ethno-regional politicization in the country, as well as in his military. Without fear of ethnic entrepreneurs, Houphouët was better able to consolidate himself politically and focus on the task of economic and state development.

4 Alienating Rural Allies – Kwame Nkrumah 1947–1957

Nkrumah's beginnings were promising. He inherited the most developed state in western colonial Africa. The colony's roadway system surpassed that of other African territories many-fold. The territory was also the world's largest producer of cocoa and had one of the highest per capita incomes in sub-Saharan Africa. Nkrumah's political inclinations were equally encouraging. Many of his early choices were pragmatic and prudent. As the first African leader of the Gold Coast government, he incorporated opposition leaders in his cabinet and implemented policies supportive of cocoa farmers.

At the same time, some very dark clouds were visible on the horizon. The more power Nkrumah was given, the more dogmatic and rigid he became. He increasingly alienated his own supporters and suppressed his opposition. By the time the country gained independence, little evidence was left of the pragmatism of his earlier years.

I The Origin of Nkrumah's Opposition

Nkrumah's Beginnings: From Poor Fishing Village to the Head of State

In 1947, the first all-African political party, the United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), was launched in the Gold Coast, the British territory soon to become Ghana. The leaders of the UGCC were men of 'substance' and social position – men like Dr. J. B. Busia, of royal Akan heritage with a doctorate degree from Oxford, and J. B. Danquah, a prominent lawyer related to the paramount chief of the powerful Akan state, Akim Abuakwa. With few ties to the masses, these elites needed someone to organize the party, someone who could reach 'ordinary folk.' A friend suggested Nkrumah and a formal invitation was sent to him in London where he was residing. After a short deliberation, Nkrumah accepted the position as general secretary of the UGCC,

and in 1947, Nkrumah left England to begin his political career in the Gold Coast.

So commenced this odd association of the young, socialist revolutionary Kwame Nkrumah with conservative Gold Coast intellectuals. Indeed, Nkrumah's path to politics could not have been more different than that of the leaders of the UGCC. Neither he nor his family were people of distinction or royalty. Nkrumah was born in a poor fishing village in the west of Ghana, a member of a small Akan tribe, the Nzima. He attended a Catholic missionary school and became a pupil teacher at the age of 16. His fortunes began when a visiting educator noted Nkrumah's talents and recommended him for Government Training College in Accra. Nkrumah received a post at the prestigious Achimota College and in 1930 was appointed head of a junior school in Axim. There, Nkrumah got involved in politics and decided to pursue higher education abroad. He went to Nigeria to convince a distant relative to fund his studies. Thus, in 1935 Nkrumah departed Ghana to attend Lincoln University in Pennsylvania (Rooney 2007: 21–28).

At Lincoln, Nkrumah became engrossed in Pan-African politics and student organizing. By 1944, he was in London heading the West African Students' Union. He became further radicalized after attending the Fifth Pan-Africanist Congress in Manchester in 1945. Inspired by the conference, he and five other activists[1] founded the West African National Secretariat (WANS), and secretly organized an underground, revolutionary socialist group aligned with the Communist Party of Great Britain (Rooney 2007: 28–44).

Though his ideology and political activities were antithetical to the UGCC leadership, Nkrumah was in fact an extremely capable organizer. Back in the Gold Coast, Nkrumah was able to develop a national party with great alacrity. He launched a mass political education campaign, personally traveling to every village and town. He forged alliances with trade unions, cooperative societies, ex-soldiers' unions, farmers' associations, and women's associations. His office at Salt Pond became a "non-stop factory," printing membership cards and collecting dues (Davidson 1989: 52–61).

But the ill-conceived appointment of Nkrumah as UGCC party secretary was short-lived. In 1949, Nkrumah departed from the UGCC to form his own national party, the Congress People's Party (CPP). Unlike the UGCC, Nkrumah's CPP was anticolonial and anti-elite privilege. With its electrifying slogan of 'Self-Government Now,' the CPP quickly

[1] WANS founders were Nkrumah, Nikoi, Kojo Botsio, Bankole Awoonor-Renner, Wallace-Johnson, Bankole Akpata. See Sherwood 2012.

became a magnate for disgruntled groups, especially those with little clout in society: clerical workers, petty traders, veterans, youth groups, and disaffected sub-chiefs (Rathbone 2000: 33; Austin 1964: 26–27).

At the same time, anticolonial politics was taking hold in the Gold Coast. Boycotts, strikes, and arrests were becoming commonplace. To address the growing unrest, the British sought to maintain the status quo as much as possible. They made public their plans to slowly transition power away from the British to the chiefs and intelligentsia by creating the Gold Coast National Assembly, with 75 African members – 70 appointed and five elected by popular vote (Davidson 1989: 72).

In response, Nkrumah issued a call for 'immediate self-government,' and launched a nonviolent resistance movement modeled after Gandhi's, his 'Positive Action' campaign. On January 11, 1950, the governor-general declared a state of emergency. Widespread arrests were made. Nkrumah and several CPP activists were imprisoned (Basil Davidson 1989: 72–73; Austin 1964: 114).

Despite the unrest, the colonial administration went ahead with the Assembly elections on January 8, 1951. To the colonial administration's dismay, the Congress People's Party won by a landslide in both the rural areas and towns. Nkrumah and several other imprisoned CPP leaders had been allowed to contest the election from their prison cells. Prominent traditional and intellectual elites were defeated, including a number of UGCC leaders and their supporters. Nkrumah was so popular, he was overwhelmingly elected to represent the principal seat in Greater Accra, with 22,780 of the 23,122 votes cast (Davidson 1989: 80).

The CPP in Power

The CPP's remarkable success marked a radical shift in power relations in the Gold Coast. Nothing like it had been remotely considered; no preparations were made. The establishment had assumed the rural majority would elect a coalition of chiefs and conservative intellectuals. The CPP was expected to win only a few seats, supported by its urban 'Verandah Boys,'[2] and to constitute nothing more than "a vocal minority" (Bing 1968: 143). But everything had been reversed. Winning the majority of elected seats in the Assembly, the CPP was now the majority party and entitled to form the new government.

Five days after the election, Governor Arden-Clarke released CPP leaders from prison, and, with that, a new era began in the Gold Coast.

[2] Nkrumah's followers were contemptuously so named for being too poor to own a bed and having to sleep on the verandah. See Basil Davidson 1989: 57.

Upon Nkrumah's release, the governor-general summoned him to the Castle. Clarke offered Nkrumah shared rule and the promise of independence 'soon' if he would be 'sensible and moderate' and abandon his call for immediate independence. There would still be a colonial government and the governor-general would retain his powers, but it would be a step toward independence (Davidson 1989: 81–82).

This was undoubtedly a difficult choice for Nkrumah. His party's galvanizing slogan, 'Self-Government Now,' had forced the opposition to adopt the far less stirring phrase: 'Self-Government at the Soonest Possible Moment.' By accepting Clarke's terms and joining the colonial government, Nkrumah risked looking as if he had capitulated to the British and was no better than the conservatives he opposed. But Nkrumah undoubtedly realized that working within the government would better enable him to set the pace of change. Whatever his reasoning was, Nkrumah accepted this distasteful but necessary compromise.

As leader of the new African Assembly, Nkrumah made a number of pragmatic decisions. He created an executive council balanced among different interests. Particularly important was the choice to include Ashanti and northern representatives on the council. Of equal importance was the appointment of E. C. Quist as speaker, a distinguished lawyer and the first African to be on the Crown Counsel in 1914. Quist's appointment allayed British fears that Nkrumah's agenda would be too radical.

Nkrumah also worked hard to keep sight of cocoa farmers' interests. This was most evident in the CPP's prudent management of Swollen Shoot, a rapidly spreading pathogenic virus that infects cacao trees. Swollen Shoot presented a potential flashpoint for Nkrumah's new government. In the 1940s, the colonial administration had introduced an aggressive policy of cutting out infected trees. The policy enraged farmers, who were forced to chop down seemingly healthy cocoa trees that take five to seven years to mature. During the 1951 election campaign, CPP representatives promised to suspend the cutting-out policy. After the election, still mindful of its campaign promises, the CPP initially suspended cutting out entirely, but the CPP Commission of Enquiry found the virus could only be contained by resuming the unpopular practice. The commission ominously warned that if cutting out recommenced, violent protests and general unrest would ensue. It, therefore, advised that the government proceed cautiously.

The new government heeded the commission's advice. It launched a multifaceted propaganda campaign, the 'New Deal for Cocoa.' Field agents worked closely with local development groups, farmers' unions, and chief farmers to explain the necessity of cutting out infected trees to resistant cocoa farmers. The New Deal also introduced monetary

incentives. The producer price for cocoa was increased to an unprecedented 80*s.* a load. Farmers were paid 4*s.* compensation for every live tree cut down. A further 2*s.* was provided for three years to offset replanting costs. So successful was the New Deal for Cocoa that when, in October 1952, compulsory cutting out was reintroduced, no serious protest arose (Austin 1964: 160–161).

The Emergence of Opposition Movements – 1951–1956

Despite these achievements, there were clear signs Nkrumah's leadership style would lead to problems in later years. Within five years, several opposition parties had formed, the creation of which was directly linked to Nkrumah's poor strategic decisions.

The first indication of problems to come was Nkrumah's refusal to work with opposition leaders. When the CPP assumed the leadership of the government in 1951, Nkrumah revealed the depths of his antipathy for the opposition. In his first speech to his assemblymen, he informed them of "the dangers and difficulties that lay ahead of them when they took their seats in the Assembly" (Nkrumah 1957: 139). Nkrumah underscored that:

> Our party was the only one in the country that had [the aim of 'Self-Government Now'] and therefore it would be impracticable for it to work with those who held different views . . . As far as we were concerned there should be no compromise on this point. Coalition with the other political groups in the country, as we knew them, would be dangerous. (139)

Not only did Nkrumah choose to stonewall his opposition, between 1951 and 1954, he publicly expelled prominent CPP leaders from the party. As a result, a large number of Nkrumah's close associates turned against him (see Tables 11).

The first expulsions came after radical youth leaders publicly criticized the CPP for the slow pace of change. Such internal dissent was not good for the CPP, but it was far from ruinous. Though young and idealistic, none of these youth leaders held central positions in the government. They might, therefore, have been assuaged with the offer of prestigious government or party appointments. In Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët-Boigny was to use such tactics repeatedly, with great success. Instead, the CPP chose to handle the situation severely. In January 1952, an emergency meeting of the National Executive was convened to discuss the 'disruptive attitude' of several members of the National Secretariat. Their "demeanour and activities" were found "detrimental to the Party" (Austin 1964: 167–169). The troublemakers were expelled from the party.[3] A second round of

[3] Dzenkle Dzewu, Mate Kole, H. P. Nyemetri, and E. S. Nartey.

expulsions followed almost immediately.[4] All those expelled had been critical to the early organization of the party.[5]

Also expelled were prominent CPP members with ties to cocoa farmers. The loss of these cocoa activists was to have serious ramifications for the government. Prior to 1950, "the rural masses – the farmers, the farm-laborers, the small-village traders and craftsmen – were only marginally engaged in the organised nationalist movement" (Beckman 1976: 52). Understanding the political dynamics on the ground, the CPP cocoa activists were able to rally farmers to the CPP cause by capitalizing on the hostilities between smaller cocoa farmers, wealthy cocoa merchants, and the traditional elite.[6] By 1951, they had successfully coopted several farmers' institutions.

The most important cocoa activist was Ashie Nikoi, a leader of the Farmers' Union of the British West African Growers. Nikoi had a strong following, particularly among migrant farmers in Akim Abuakwa. A long-time anti-colonialist, Nikoi met Nkrumah at the Fifth Pan-African Congress in Manchester and was among the founding members of the revolutionary West African National Secretariat (WANS). When he returned to the Gold Coast, Nikoi joined the CPP. According to one account, Nikoi had even proposed the CPP's symbol of the red rooster.[7]

During the time of 'Positive Action,' Nikoi shared a prison cell with Nkrumah, where they discussed the need to create a national farmers' union. Upon their release, Nikoi was given free rein to develop one.[8] Afterward, he was made a member of the CPP Central Committee and in 1949, he cofounded the Ghana Farmers' Congress.[9] In addition to mobilizing farmers, Nikoi helped the CPP overcome farmers' hostility to the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), a government monopsony with the power to peg cocoa prices. Farmers, who might have been incensed by the CPP's choice to maintain this hated colonial institution, were mollified when Nikoi was appointed to the Board. Nikoi was also central to the CPP's highly successful Swollen Shoot policy. He influenced the

[4] J. G. Swaniker, K. G. Kyem, Kojo Nkrumah, and Saki Scheck.

[5] Dzenkle Dzewu and Saki Scheck were leaders of the Committee on Youth Organization (CYO) (the organization that splintered from the UGCC to form the CPP); H. P. Nyemitei was acting CPP general secretary during the period of 'Positive Action,' and E. S. Nartey, the eastern regional secretary. See Austin 1964: 81.

[6] See "Government Statement on the Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Local Purchasing of Cocoa." Accra: Ministry of Information, 1967, p. 2 (8); Young 1981: 183.

[7] See "The Tragic End of Gã Politicians" by Nikoi Kotey, *Modern Ghana*, March 3, 2005.

[8] See Jibowu Report, pp. 29.

[9] The Ghana Farmers' Council was launched in July 1951 by A. Casely Hayford, Kojo Mercer (chairman of the Cocoa Marketing Board), A. Y. K. Djin (managing director of the CPC), R. R. Amponsah, B. E. Dwira, and D. E. Asafu Adjaye.

Commission of Enquiry's report, the recommendations of which were largely followed.

After the loss of major cocoa interests like Nikoi,[10] the CPP's Farmers' Council had shallow roots in the cocoa areas. The CPP appointed people from within its urban base to critical cocoa institutions like the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC) and the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB). Without cocoa interests represented in the CPP leadership, the country's critical cocoa institutions focused on expanding job opportunities 'for the boys,' rather than guaranteeing fair prices to farmers (Beckman 1976: 64). The absence of farmer representation in the new coalition also led to one of the most destructive decisions made by the CPP. Five years later, when the government was warned not to peg cocoa prices, it did not heed the advice.

The expulsions of the youth leaders and cocoa farmers were followed by a second round of expulsions that targeted the workers' base of the radical left wing of the party.[11] The radical leftists, many of whom lived "in comparative simplicity, some of them in the slum areas in Usshertown in Accra" (Apter 1955: 210), had become vocal about the venality of the new CPP ministers. They publicly accused CPP leaders of abandoning the populist revolution to get their hands in the 'honeypot,' and called for the party to renew its commitment to socialism (Davidson 1989: 127). They also derided the government press for its increasing exaltation of Nkrumah as "Man of Destiny, Star of Africa, Hope of Millions of down-trodden blacks, Deliverer of Ghana, Iron Boy, Great Leader of Street Boys, personable and handsome Boy from Nzima" (Austin 1964: 281–282).

Among the government's critics were powerful trade union leaders, such as Anthony Woode and Turkson Ocran (founders of the largest trade union in the Gold Coast, the Trade Union Congress (TUC)), as well as Pobee Biney (head of the powerful Railway Workers' Union).[12] By

[10] The fallout came when Nikoi sought to create a cocoa purchasing monopoly. Given Nikoi's strong following among farmers and his goal of strengthening farmers' bargaining power, it is not surprising that Nkrumah was unwilling to give him so much authority. Nikoi resigned in protest. Soon after, Nkrumah created the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC), but it was primarily used to extract as much wealth from cocoa growers as possible, to support CPP faithful. Within a few years, the CPC "was bankrupt, riddled with scandal and a major source of resentment in Ashanti Cocoa areas." See Young 1981: 184.

[11] Anthony Woode, president of the Ghana TUC, and Turkson Ocran, the TUC general secretary. See Austin 1964: 168, 89.

[12] Pobee Biney was chairman of the 'Ghana People's Representative Assembly' called by Nkrumah to formally establish the Congress People's Party. During the 1951 election, he ran as a CPP member and successfully defeated the most influential chief of the Colony, Nana Sir Tsibu Darku IX. See Padmore 1953: 85.

Table 11 *Expelled and defecting CPP leaders, 1951–1962*

Ex-CPP Militants	Ethnicity (Region)	Occupation	CPP Affiliation	Prison Graduate	New Party Affiliations
Kwesi Lamptey	(Sekondi)	Science Teacher, Mfantisipim School	National Acting Deputy Chairman		GPC/NLM/UP
Dzenkle Dzewu	Gã	General President of the Ex-servicemen's Union	Manchester Pan-African Congress/Ghana League of Patriots/ CYO/Ghana Farmers' Congress		GPC/NLM/Gã Shifimo Kpee/UP
Ashie Nikoi	Gã	Wealthy Cocoa Farmer	Manchester Pan-African Congress/Founder Ghana Farmers' Congress	YES	GPC/NLM/Gã Shifimo Kpee/UP
Saki Scheck	(Takoradi)	Editor of *Takoradi Times*	Ghana League of Patriots/ CYO/National Secretariat/ Private Secretary of Nkrumah	YES	General Secretary of GPC/NLM
B.F. Kusi	Ashanti	Large Trader	National Assembly Representative		GPC/NLM/UP
H.P. Nyemitei	Ashanti	First President of the Meteorological Workers' Union	Former acting General Secretary of CPP/National Secretariat, Secretary	YES	GPC
Nuh Abubekr	Ashanti	n/a	National Assembly Representative		NLM
N. Mate Kole	Manya Krobo	n/a	National Secretariat, Treasurer/Ghana Farmers Congress/Personnel Officer of the Cocoa Marketing Board		GPC/NLM

E.S. Nartey	n/a	n/a	Eastern Secretary/National Secretariat		
Kurankyi Taylor	Ashanti	Lawyer	Manchester Pan-African Congress, West African Students' Union (WASU)	√	NLM/UP
Anthony Woode	n/a	President of the Ghana TUC		√	Restored to CPP
Turkson Ocran	(Sekondi)	General Secretary TUC		√	Restored to CPP
Pobee Biney	(Sekondi)	Locomotive Driver	Vice-chairman of Gold Coast TUC	√	Restored to CPP
Bankole Awoonor-Renner	(Muslim)		West African Students' Union	√	Founder MAL/UP
Kofi Bour	Ashanti	Farmer	Chief farmer in the United Ghana Farmers' Council		NLM
R.R. Amponsah	Ashanti		Education Officer/Liaison Officer for CMB in West Germany		NLM/General Secretary UP
Victor Owusu	Ashanti	Lawyer			NLM/UP
Joe Appiah	Ashanti	Lawyer	Manchester Pan-African Congress/President WASU/ Prime Minister's Rep in London		NLM/UP
Kolma A. Gbedemah	Gã	Secondary School Teacher	National Secretariat/Minister 1951–1961	√	Exile

Sources: Austin (1964); Padmore (1953); Adzakey (1972–1973); McFarland (1985); Davidson (1989); Allman (1993): Bing (1989).

August 1952, the unionists were joined by other prominent CPP men,[13] all of whom charged that "the compromise had gone too far, the chance of movement towards self-government too slow" (Davidson 1989: 128).

Though these critics may have posed some menace to the new CPP government, Nkrumah had a lot of room to counter them. He and his core associates, K. A. Gbedemah and Kojo Botsio, were extremely popular. They were distinguished 'Prison Graduates' who had successfully led the independence struggle. Moreover, the leftist critics had been effectively silenced once it was clear that the British were working on the arrangements for independence (Austin 1964: 169–170). Despite these advantages, Nkrumah expelled these disgruntled elements in October 1952.[14]

All of these expulsions quickly came back to haunt Nkrumah. By May 1952, an opposition party, the Ghana Congress Party (GCP), was launched with Dr. K. A. Busia at its helm. For the first time, the conservatives were joined by ex-CPP militants: Dzenkle Dzewu, Ashie Nikoi, Mate Kole, H. P. Nyemitei, Saki Scheck, B. F. Kusi, and Kwesi Lamptey.[15] The opposition was not, as yet, a coherent force. "There were numerous quarrels among this ill-assorted group" (Austin 1964: 181; Apter 1955, 1966). Yet the writing was on the wall. The same ex-CPP leaders were to emerge again and again within the opposition.

Another CPP adherent turned opposition leader at this time was Bankole Awoonor-Renner. Awoonor-Renner was one of the few 'Bolshevists' of his day and possibly the first black African to study in Moscow during the 1920s (Weiss 2006; Davidson 1989). Awoonor-Renner first met Nkrumah in London, where he likely influenced Nkrumah's views on socialism and African unity.[16] He helped found the WANS and served as its first president. Upon returning to the Gold Coast in 1948, Awoonor-Renner threw his support behind Nkrumah, recruiting

[13] Kurankyi Taylor, a prominent lawyer; De Graft Johnson, a tutor in the University College; and two journalists, Eric Heymann, later editor of the *Evening News*, and Cecil Forde, later editor of the *Ghanaian Times*.

[14] Davidson (1989) conjectures that Nkrumah expelled the leftists fearing the British would turn against him if they suspected the CPP was infiltrated by communists. In contrast, Austin (1964) argues that the leftists posed no threat, as they were "small in number" and "had little weight behind them" (169). Apter (1955) makes the most interesting claim, contending that Nkrumah purged the radicals because they were loyal to K. A. Gbedemah, who headed the party while Nkrumah was in jail. Eliminating them thus wiped out any possibility of Gbedemah sustaining an independent following.

[15] Kwesi Lamptey had run as the CPP representative for Sekondi-Takoradi in the 1951 election and had been the national acting deputy chairman of the CPP.

[16] Before Nkrumah arrived in London, Awoonor-Renner published a pamphlet, *The West African Soviet Union*, proposing a federation of West African socialist states to lead the fight for African unity. The aims of the WANS mirrored those espoused in Awoonor-Renner's pamphlet. Awoonor also collaborated with Nkrumah on a political treatise, *The New Africa*. See Davidson 1989.

Muslims in Greater Accra into the CPP. While Awoonor-Renner was imprisoned as a leader of Positive Action, his wife was elected to the Accra Council on the CPP ticket (McFarland 1985: 43).

But by mid-1951, Awoonor-Renner had become angered by Nkrumah's concessions to the British. In addition, Nkrumah had alienated the Muslim community. Before the election, Nkrumah promised the Muslim community in Accra land for a mosque. After the election, that land was granted to the YWCA (Hanretta 2011). Thus, in 1952, even this hard-core, Pan-African leftist "abandoned his radical aims and joined forces with the conservative opposition, becoming leader of the splinter party called the Moslem Association" (Davidson 1989: 127).

Nkrumah's difficulties with the extreme left wing of his party mirrored the experiences both Houphouët and Rawlings would later encounter. All three suppressed radical leftist ideologues in their coalitions immediately after achieving power. But only under Nkrumah did the radicals join conservatives to fight him. These events, therefore, underscore how much more vulnerable Nkrumah was to leftist detractors because of his weak rural base.

II Ethno-regional Alienation

As serious as the expulsions/resignations of these important CPP leaders were, they might have been managed had it not been for four critical decisions made by Nkrumah that further alienated regional groups: (1) neglect of northern chiefs; (2) attempts to control the 1954 elections; (3) freezing of cocoa producer prices; and (4) failure to address concerns voiced by the Gã. As a result, even more formidable opposition parties were launched.

Loss of the North

The first important regional loss came from the north. At the time, the British ruled the northern territories as a separate protectorate. As the north was far less developed than the south, the northern traditional elites feared that, after independence, a southern-dominated government based in Accra would neglect their region. What the northern traditional elites most wanted was some guarantee that the north would be given equal representation and resources once the British left. But those reassurances never came.

By the end of 1953, the northern chiefs had grown even more fearful of Nkrumah's government, when the only northern representative in the government, Minister of Works and Communications J. A. Braimah, was

forced to resign in the face of corruption charges.[17] To make matters worse, only Braimah was found guilty of misconduct, despite widespread allegations of CPP corruption. Altogether, this was the last straw for the north. Apter observed at the time, "considerable resentment must have been felt in the north that Braimah was forced to resign and left holding the bag for sins which they felt all the cabinet ministers were guilty of on a larger scale" (1955: 299).

A few months after Braimah's resignation, the northern chiefs launched their own party: the Northern People's Party (NPP). It proved a pivotal moment. Because of the chiefs' power in the north, "their nominees won twelve of the twenty-one seats in the Northern Territories" (Bing 1968: 157). It was, thus, the northern chiefs and not the intellectuals that became the CPP's official opposition in the Assembly.

This was one of many lost opportunities for Nkrumah. The loss seems to have been all the more avoidable because the northern chiefs were not opposed to the CPP's platform. "On the contrary, what they wanted was its application in their area as a priority" (Bing 1968: 157). It is therefore surprising that, in the face of upcoming elections, Nkrumah did not try harder to negotiate with the northern chiefs. The northern chiefs' sense of repudiation after the Braimah scandal was predictable. A more sensitive politician might have seen the potential rift and understood the importance of the northern representatives to his overall strategy. But Nkrumah neglected the issue until it was a *fait accompli*.

Election of 1954

Ultimately, Nkrumah's failure in the north was because Nkrumah neither anticipated the political rift nor appreciated its import. These faults were to come up in spades in the lead-up to the 1954 elections. Though the CPP's electoral success did vindicate the party, the election was also a strong indication of problems to come.

The central mistake made was in the handling of local candidacies. The CPP Central Committee decided to handpick candidates for every local race. This strategy, though successful in 1951, had become untenable now that the party was more diverse and enfranchisement had been made universal. Having limited knowledge of the grassroots, the Central Committee made several blunders and became subject to an onslaught of protests and counter protests (Austin 1964: 4–5). To make matters worse, the CPP instructed

[17] See *Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Mr. Braimah's Resignation and Allegations Arising Therefrom*. Ministry of Interior, Accra, 1954, pp. 10, 14.

constituent secretaries to send as many names as they saw fit to the National Executive. A flood of applicants came in, with which there was "no effective machinery to cope" (Austin 1964: 221).

Instead of ensuring loyal candidates at the local level, more than 100 CPP members angered by not being nominated by the National Executive decided to run as independents. Nkrumah tried to heal the rift by personally visiting two-thirds of these constituencies. "Nevertheless, by April 1954 the party began to divide into obstinate, local groups which remained unmoved by appeals for discipline and unity" (Austin 1964: 216). All told, 81 CPP members ran against official CPP candidates. In the north, *all* the seats were contested by 'rebel' candidates. Several 'expelled' CPP members also ran as independents, particularly in Ashanti, among them Kwesi Lamptey, Nuh Abubekr, and B. F. Kusi along with former CPP ministers J. A. Braimah and Dr. Ansah Koi.

Nkrumah was enraged by these betrayals. As before, his response was swift and extreme. He called a mass rally in Kumasi to publicly expel the 'rebels' from the party. Nkrumah even described himself as "an executioner" who "turned a deaf ear to pleas and excuses" because "they lacked team spirit and they should be made an example of" (Nkrumah 1957: 207). The ramifications of these expulsions were immediate. "More than a fifth of all the votes [in Ashanti went] to CPP rebels, expelled by Nkrumah from the CPP, who had persisted in their candidatures" (Davidson 1989: 141; Austin 1964: 218).[18]

The Cocoa Duty Ordinance

As bad as the expulsions, loss of the north, and election mismanagement were, Nkrumah's most serious political blunder came one month after the election, with the passage of the Cocoa Duty and Development Funds (Amendment) Bill. This ordinance froze the price of cocoa at 72 shillings for the next four years. This policy was especially inflammatory at that moment. "[B]ecause the world price of cocoa had increased to £450 per ton, it was confidently expected that, after the election of 1954, the CPP government would announce a substantial increase on the 1953 price of 72 shillings a load" (Rooney 1982: 156–157). To announce that the price of cocoa would be frozen "immediately following an election, when hopes had been raised, was folly" (Austin 1964: 254).

[18] Nkrumah claims he had considered this outcome. "I was aware of the probable outcome of this, namely that with so little feeling of loyalty towards the CPP most of the 'rebels' would support any party that offered them the chance to stand" (1957: 207).

The poor choice of timing was all the more given that three months earlier, the chief regional officer of Ashanti, A. J. Loveridge, warned the government "that any provocation could easily stir up Ashanti nationalism and unite the various opposition groups into a powerful and dangerous movement" (Rooney 1982: 157). The general manager of the United Africa Company, Sir Patrick Fitzgerald, even advised the government to slightly *increase* the cocoa price and then maintain it, to reconcile farmers to having a ceiling. Rather than heeding Sir Patrick's advice, the government attacked him in the press for being "meddlesome" (Austin 1964: 254).

Part of the reason for this foolhardy choice was the new government was chaffing under British control and eager to introduce its own, more expansive development agenda. The CPP government believed that suppressing producer prices would allow it to increase its revenue and restructure the economy. Moreover, the CPP was primarily concerned with protecting urban consumers. An official statement from the Cocoa Marketing Board made this explicit: "Increase cocoa prices abnormally today and tomorrow prices in the stores will be sky-rocketed" (Austin 1964: 254). So focused on their urban constituents, neither Nkrumah nor his advisors had the political sensibility to gauge the immense costs such a move would engender among cocoa farmers. As Loveridge predicted, the passage of the Coca Duty stirred up Ashanti nationalism.

The ordinance inflamed cocoa farmers, who felt they "who laid the golden egg [were] being fleeced for the benefit of party officials and high ranking ministers" (Appiah 1990: 236–237). Anger against the cocoa peg merged with brewing discontents over repeated allegations of corruption and mismanagement of the Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB) and the Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC), as well as the political expulsions in Kumasi (Rooney 1982: 166–167).

Though the response to the ordinance was predicted, what was not anticipated was that the people leading the charge in Ashanti would be former CPP adherents. On August 22, a former member of the CPP's United Ghana Farmers' Supreme Council, Kofi Bour, called the first of a series of farmers' meetings in Asawase to address the new ordinance. From this meeting, a new farmers' organization, 'The Council for Higher Cocoa Prices,' was launched. Kofi Bour was named its chairman. The new Council proved to be a lightning rod for other disaffected groups. Three days later, the farmers were joined by members of the Asante Youth Association (AYA), one of Nkrumah's staunchest support bases in the region. The next week, expelled 'rebels' signed on,[19]

[19] Also included was M. K. Apaloo, long-time Togoland Congress opposition leader.

including Kwesi Lamptey and Ashie Nikoi (Allman 1993: 45; Austin 1964: 258–259).

"So it came about, at this most critical time in the nation's birth, that the 'traditional opposition' of the chiefs and men of substance and other local separatists, was combined with the opposition of commoners" (Davidson 1989: 142). A predominately Ashanti populist movement was formed. The Asantehene's chief linguist (official speaker), Bafour Osei Akoto, was chosen to head the party movement. On Sunday, September 19, in the Prince of Wales Park, Akoto ritually slaughtered a sheep and swore the Great Oath of Ashanti to a large, cheering crowd. The National Liberation Movement (NLM) was launched. Others continued to join. "The NLM gathered up an enormous variety of subsidiary discontents as it spread through Ashanti" (Austin 1964: 267). By October, 53 chiefs on the Ashanti State Council had sworn a solemn pledge to support the NLM. The Asantehene also publicly came out in support of the new movement, donating £20,000 to the cause (Davidson 1989; Austin 1964).

Not only traditional elites were brought on board. The NLM incorporated many local and executive CPP members in Ashanti, in effect transferring "the pattern of organization from [the CPP] to the [NLM]" (Austin 1964: 269).[20] Four of the most prominent Ashanti CPP leaders, Kurankyi Taylor, Victor Owusu, R. R. Amponsah, and Joe Appiah, held a joint press conference to explain why they had chosen to abandon the CPP. All the reasons cited were related to policy choices that were the direct outcome of the CPP government's urban bias: the low peg of cocoa, the government's refusal to investigate charges of corruption at the Cocoa Purchasing Company, the dispensing of 'jobs to the boys' regardless of qualifications, and the pernicious attacks on the institution of the chieftaincy (Appiah 1990: 240–241).

Appiah's defection must have been particularly hurtful to Nkrumah. The two men had a long friendship. Appiah was a delegate to the Fifth Pan-African Conference in Manchester and the president of the West African Students' Union (WASU), and had been Nkrumah's close companion in England. Later, Appiah acted as Nkrumah's representative in London. Nkrumah was even supposed to be the best man at Appiah's wedding.[21] The defection of the other CPP members is equally striking:

[20] In the 1956 Legislative Assembly, 4 of the 13 NLM representatives were former CPP men: Kurankyi-Taylor, R. R. Amponsah, Victor Owusu, and Joe Appiah. See Allman 1993: 152–153.

[21] Appiah (1990) offers a very graphic depiction of the closeness they shared: "Nkrumah and I had stood in the same bath and used the same water and one towel; I had inserted into his rectum native suppositories from his dear mother and held his legs against the

Amponsah had formerly been the CPP education officer as well as the liaison officer for the Cocoa Marketing Board in West Germany; Victor Owusu, a respected lawyer, had been "an outspoken defender of the CPP" (Appiah 1990: 240; Bing 1968: 153; Austin 1964: 268). Thus, with the poor organization of the 1954 elections and the combustible cocoa duty ordinance, Nkrumah had united CPP adherents – the Ashanti Youth Association, CPP rebels, former Ghana Farmers' Council leaders, and CPP executive members – with the chiefs, all of whom now sought revenge on Nkrumah and his People's Party (Austin 1964: 265).

The starkness of this political blunder is all the more marked when compared to the very careful attention given to farmers' concerns over Swollen Shoot just three years earlier. Nkrumah's 'New Deal' was carefully thought out and politically astute. In fact, it was argued that the CPP's ability to handle the Swollen Shoot crisis was central to its early success (Adamafio 1982; Rooney 1982). But somehow, by 1954, that political sense had been lost.

Here, the influence of Nikoi and other important farmers expelled in 1952 becomes evident. In 1954, just as in 1951, there were warnings that violence would erupt if campaign promises were ignored. In September 1954, Loveridge expressed his growing fear that the situation was becoming dangerous in Ashanti. In a personal communiqué to Arden-Clarke, he warned of the potential dangers, but also suggested there was time to rectify things: "I think the whole movement depends upon cocoa . . . if [the cocoa-duty ordinance] was removed, the reason for the movement's existence, the 'victory' would be short-lived and I think it would be worthwhile suffering it" (Rooney 2007: 158). No one in the CPP heeded his warning. Instead of trying to allay cocoa farmers' fears, the remaining CPP Ashanti representative, Krobo Edusei, speaking to the Legislative Assembly in 1954, proclaimed, "The Cocoa Purchasing Company is the product of a master brain, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and it is the atomic bomb of the Convention People's Party."[22] At a time when cocoa farmers were fearful that the CPP was trying to eradicate them, such a proclamation must have been far from reassuring.

By the end of November 1954, "Roaming bands of young men wielding every kind of dangerous weapon and shouting *"Ya ti"* (short for "we have torn ourselves from the rest of the country") were all over [Kumasi]" (Appiah 1990: 237). The party was able to marshal resources from the

wall for a minute, as instructed, before releasing him to go to the lavatory. He had become a friend in the fullest and truest sense: but when he saw what was wrong and refused to put it right, he ceased to be a moral being and a friend" (p. 243).

[22] "Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company," 1956, p. 26.

most powerful paramount chiefs in Ghana, the Asantehene in Ashanti and the Akim Abuakwa in the Eastern Region. These paramount chiefs levied fines from sub-chiefs and used stool revenues to fund the NLM and its 'Action Troopers,' who were battling the CPP government throughout Ashanti and the Eastern Region (Nkrumah 1957: 271–272). As divisions deepened and violence began to spread across the territory, the Ashanti Ex-servicemen's Organization, another central pillar of the CPP, "repented for [its] action against the Golden Stool" and was welcomed back by the Asantehene (Rooney 2007: 182).

Nkrumah's policy choices, at this sensitive moment, tipped the scales in Ashanti. In the 1954 elections – only a couple of months before the passage of the Cocoa Duty Ordinance – the intellectuals and the chiefs had little support (Appiah 1990; Bing 1968). Ashanti "was so enamored with the CPP that she had given all but one of her twenty-one parliamentary seats to that Party" (Appiah 1990: 243). Even in June and July of that year, "there was hardly a sign of the conflict that was soon to break out. At the national level, all was quiet" (Austin 1964: 251). With the chieftaincy and the traditional classes under attack, the NLM was now able to coalesce a number of regional parties, unifying the opposition. Almost all of these parties were 'chiefs' or conservative parties, among them, the Northern People's Party (NAP) led by the Tolon Na and the Muslim Association Party (MAP) led by the paramount chief of the *zongo* (the Muslim 'stranger' community in Kumasi). They joined forces with the Togoland Congress, which represented the interests of the Volta Region.

The unified opposition began to press the British government for new elections and a federal constitution to prevent the 'abuse of power' and the 'growth of dictatorship' (Austin 1964: 180, 276–277). Things came to a head when the Asantehene destooled a number of 'rebellious' Brong chiefs under his dominion who had been organizing for the CPP in the northwestern-most part of Ashanti. Nkrumah responded by using the power of the state now vested in him. In November 1955, the CPP passed the Amendment to the State Council (Ashanti) Ordinance. This gave the governor-general the right to overturn unfair destoolments, undermining the historical prerogative of the most powerful chiefs in the territory.

Though Nkrumah's action against the Asantehene are understandable, so serious was the passage of the amendment that it precipitated the first violent attack against Nkrumah. On November 10, 1955, at eight o'clock in the evening, Nkrumah's Accra home was bombed (Nkrumah 1957: 218). To make matters worse, whether or not justified, these policy choices alienated the British, putting Nkrumah's hard-fought plans for independence in jeopardy. Before Nkrumah introduced the amendment, the British government was more supportive of Nkrumah's

call for unification than the opposition's untenable federalist and separatist claims. Colonial Secretary Alan Lennox-Boyd felt it critical to keep the Gold Coast a unified state. And though a strong core within the civil service and the British government had always despised Nkrumah, the governor-general of the Gold Coast, Sir Arden-Clarke, was a Nkrumah advocate. With Arden-Clarke's support and Britain's determination to create a unified, independent Gold Coast, any talk of federalism might have fallen on deaf ears. But with the NLM's ability to exploit the States Council Bill to stir up fears of Nkrumah's dictatorial tendencies, the British government began listening to the opposition's demand for strong regional governments to check Nkrumah's power.

By the end of 1955, "the NLM had gained sufficient support in the country and in London to make [independence in 1956] impossible" (Rooney 1982: 179). The CPP was forced to hold a new round of general elections in 1956. In the end, the NLM leadership proved wildly overconfident. The 1956 election begot the CPP another overwhelming victory. Nonetheless, Nkrumah had to pay for the loss of British support with the postponement of independence. Even worse, once independence was granted, the constitution imposed by the British showed how far the opposition had influenced events. The new government was forced to accept strong regional governments and protections for chiefs.

Loss of the Gã

Just as the problems that emerged in Ashanti can be traced to the CPP's poor political strategies, so too can the emergence of another regional/ethnic movement: the Gã Shifimo Kpee. During the early anticolonial movement, Nkrumah had aligned with Gã 'commoners' and sub-chiefs in the Greater Accra region. The Gã had overwhelmingly voted for Nkrumah in 1951 when he ran as the Greater Accra representative from prison.

Yet, by 1956, Nkrumah's Gã supporters felt their interests were not being looked after. That year, the Accra regional executive of the Gã CPP submitted a memorandum to the Central Committee signed by 49 members, including leading figures in the Accra region. The memorandum expressed concerns over issues 'affecting the welfare' of Gã municipal and rural constituencies (Austin 1964: 373). The foremost concerns were that no Gã representative had been assigned ministerial or secretarial positions, and that the Estate Building project, ostensibly initiated to address long-standing housing problems in Gã areas in Accra, was housing CPP ministers. The resolution ominously advised that these issues were engendering "a ferment for an eruption likely to blow up any time" and that the group had chosen to send the resolution so that "the Hon. Dr. Kwame

Nkrumah" "be made known of it before it is too late if he seems not to know it or does not know it" (Austin 1964: 374).

Despite the warning, Nkrumah failed to address these concerns. A few months later, an association was created 'to protect the interests of the Gã people.' The two men chosen to head the Gã Shifimo Kpee were none other than expelled CPP leaders Ashie Nikoi and Dzenzle Dzewu. The party was quickly joined by Gã 'youth' – Nkrumah's constituency. Even Gã ex-servicemen, originally indispensable to the CPP's rise, joined the movement in anger over the government's handling of the Estate Building project (Austin 1964: 374–375). Just as with the NLM, an anti-CPP Gã party was launched by formerly staunch CPP adherents (Apter 1966; Austin 1964: 964).

By the time of independence, three of the five serious opposition groups were headed by former CPP leaders: the NLM (Appiah, Owusu); the Gã Shifimo Kpee (Nikoi, Dzewu) and the MAL (Bankole-Renner). It is not surprising that subsequently, when regional/ethnic-based parties were banned in 1957 and opposition parties came together under the umbrella of the United Party (UP), one-third of the UP's Executive Working Committee had been prominent CPP figures.[23] In fact, the first person tried for an attempt on Nkrumah's life was former CPP education officer R. R. Amponsah.

III Conclusion

Nkrumah's opposition was determined neither by strong ideological rifts nor by regional/ethnic divisions. Even the Ashanti movement was catalyzed by the CPP's poorly chosen cocoa policy, in the wake of expulsions that had undermined the CPP's organization in the region. The enmity individuals developed toward Nkrumah was in response to his policies and his poor handling of *local* and *regional* concerns. As a result, radical leftists came into partnership with the most conservative elements in Ghanaian politics.

It is true that Nkrumah took over a relatively decentralized state with autonomous powerbrokers, the most powerful of whom were cocoa growers. But cocoa farmers were not homogeneous. The competing

[23] The United Party combined the NLM, the NPP, the MAP, the Togoland Congress, the Anlo Youth Organization, and the Gã Shifimo Kpee. The officers were: National Chairmen: Dr. J. Hutton-Mills, Deputy Chairman J. A. Braimah [a former minister]; National Treasurer Mrs. Nancy Tsiboe [from the Ashanti Pioneer]; Working Committee: Dr. Busia, S. D. Dombo, Obetsibi Lamptey, M. K. Apaloo, Joe Appiah [ex-CPP], Attoh Okine, Bankole Awoonor-Renner [ex-CPP], K. Y. Attoh, Ashie Nikoi [ex-CPP], Kwesi Lamptey [ex-CPP], Dr. Asafu Adjaye, and Dr. Danquah. See Austin 1964: 384.

interests of cocoa cooperative 'big-men,' smallholder farmers, and traditional elites had been effectively exploited by the CPP in 1951. That electoral success had shown that the CPP could balance government centralization with cocoa farmers' interests.

Moreover, the government already had the Cocoa Marketing Board in place, enabling it to control cocoa revenue. Though there would clearly be discontent, Nkrumah had enough carrots to keep a significant number of farmers on his side: the ability to provide loans, extension services, inputs, and raise producer prices. These were the means Houphouët would use to keep farmers committed to his regime while continuing to extract sufficient revenue from commodity exports. Indeed, Nkrumah's all-or-nothing approach was arguably that much more imprudent given the fact that the cocoa farmers did have more autonomy.

The urban bias of the Nkrumah administration infected its capacity to deal effectively with central and sensitive issues. The government's determination to implement its own development agenda intensified the problem. Nkrumah and his advisors were more concerned with gaining complete control over cocoa exports than with finessing political support among the farmers. The CPP's failure to understand the strategic importance of keeping farmers and chiefs on board, therefore, was critical to how events unfolded.

In the end, Nkrumah's mishandling of local politics born from his inability to stomach dissent and his uncompromising vision were critical factors that contributed to the rise of opposition movements in the early years. Over the years, Nkrumah was not to learn from these mistakes. The same choices were made later, more virulently and with more serious repercussions.

5 Aligning with Regional Foes – Félix Houphouët-Boigny 1945–1960

I The Rise of the One-Party State

Like Nkrumah, in the early 1950s, Houphouët was challenged by ethno-regional parties – conglomerations of the intelligentsia, professional classes, and established chiefs. And as in the Gold Coast, lacking popular support, these parties were propped up by the colonial administration. Houphouët also faced a small, racist settler population violently opposed to African nationalism and later an internationally supported, communist party opposed to Houphouët's relations with France. But where Nkrumah intensified political divisions both within and without his own party, Houphouët skillfully minimized them.

Houphouët's political shrewdness was manifest early on. His genius lay in his ability to build coalitions of disparate interests and groups. As Houphouët himself said, "If unity had not been in our heart, we should have discovered it in our head" (Zolberg 1964: 74). By 1959, Houphouët had cajoled almost all his opponents, including the racist *colons*, to join his party ticket. He did so by creating "a culture of dialogue, compromise, rewards, punishment, forgiveness and reintegration" (Langer 2004: 20, 37).

The Early Years: Houphouët's Ascent and His Regional Opponents

Houphouët's political career and the politicization of territory of the Lower Côte began with the end of World War II, as the territory seesawed between right- and left-wing French governments. The French interwar government, the Popular Front (a coalition of socialist and communist parties), brought new opportunities to African subjects. Africans were allowed to form trade unions and even participate in Marxist study groups (Zolberg 1964: 65). During this period, Houphouët helped found the first export producers' union representing large European and African planters, the Syndicate agricole de la Côte d'Ivoire (SACI).

But the Popular Front government was short-lived. In 1939, Germany occupied France. The Vichy administration implemented the most rapaciously racist policies the territory had witnessed. Whatever gains African *évolués* made were lost. All Africans were brutally compelled to produce commodity quotas for the metropole without adequate compensation. Wealthy African planters were even forced to labor on white-owned farms under harsh conditions (Woronoff 1972).

Taking away the African elite's hard-won rights politicized them in new ways. Prior to the Vichy regime, wealthy African planters saw little common cause with poor Africans. They believed their interests were aligned with those of white planters (Zolberg 1964: 61). Indeed, Houphouët's family had always supported the French colonial government. His uncle, a canton chief (a position created by the French to collect taxes and organize forced labor), was assassinated because of his close ties to Europeans.[1] Houphouët, only five at the time, was next in line for the chieftaincy. The colonial administration sent Houphouët to the elite École William Ponty secondary school in 1919 and then the prestigious École de Médecine (Jules Carde) de l'Afrique Occidentale Française in 1921, where he earned qualifications as a medical assistant. Houphouët was later appointed canton chief in Akouè, a canton of 36 villages in the eastern part of the territory. At the same time, Houphouët inherited his family's cocoa plantations, making him one of the wealthiest African farmers in Côte d'Ivoire.

Yet, the more involved Houphouët became with cocoa farming, the more politicized he grew. As the international economy worsened, the Vichy administration intensified its exploitation of African planters. When the cocoa and coffee markets bottomed out, it was the wealthy African farmers who suffered the losses. White settlers were allowed to maintain their production levels, but "the indigenes who produced 45,000 tons [of cocoa] saw their production tumble to 4,000."[2]

To Houphouët's dismay, the Syndicate agricole failed to respond to the African planters' plight. Houphouët explained when giving testimony in 1950, "we thought that this society was going to be able to defend us against large wholesalers. But alas! . . . No action was taken in favor of the planters, neither to defend against forced recruitment, nor in the weighing of their products, nor in the placement of their products."[3] He, therefore, determined "to take the defense of our interests into our own hands . . . we could not allow for the ruin of agriculture upon which the whole population of our territory was dependent."[4]

[1] "Audition du M. Houphouët-Boigny, Sceance du mercredi 31 mai 1950." In (ed.) M. Damas, *Rapport No 11348 Sur Les Incidents Survenus En Côte d'Ivoire, Tome I,* Abidjan: Assembly Nationale, March 1965, p. 11. [Abidjan Archives B-217].

[2] Ibid., p. 6. [3] Ibid., p. 4. [4] Ibid., p. 6.

His opportunity came with Germany's defeat in 1944. France briefly returned to an interim leftist government, headed by the leader of the Free French Forces, General Charles de Gaulle. In the territory of the Lower Côte, de Gaulle installed Governor André Latrille, a former French resistance leader. The new governor faced heavy resistance from pro-Vichy, white colonial settlers in the Côte, the *colons*. Under siege, Latrille decided to break the *colons*' control of the economy. Accordingly, he began to cultivate relationships with African capitalists, among them Houphouët-Boigny. In August 1944, Latrille approved the formation of Houphouët's Syndicat agricole africain (SAA), the first all-African planters' union, "signaling the beginning of the end for settler/trader dominance" (Rapley 1993: 44).[5]

The Free French government also offered Houphouët political opportunities. In 1945, de Gaulle introduced elections in France's overseas territories. Prior to this, only a few Africans had citizenship or voting rights. The vast majority held the dubious legal status of 'subjects'. Now, for the first time, citizens and subjects were allowed to select representatives for the French Constituent National Assembly. Each group was to vote for its own representatives on a unified slate. In the Lower Côte, each slate included nine subjects and nine citizens. Houphouët shrewdly realized if subjects, representing the majority of the electorate, formed a unified voting bloc and supported a single slate, they could win representatives. He, therefore, fashioned the Bloc Africain, an all-African slate of citizens and subjects (Zolberg 1964: 68–69).

It was at this moment when Houphouët's early opposition was born. The whites, fearing Houphouët's Bloc Africain and the popularity of his campaign to reform the cocoa industry, recruited 13 candidates – African chiefs and *évolués* – to run against him on separate tickets. Four out of the five opposition leaders recruited from the Lower Côte were to become Houphouët's staunch opponents: Alphonse Boni and Kinzeme Binzème, two Agnis from the wealthy southeast, who had studied law in France; Adrien Dignan Bailly, a Bété from Gagnoa who had been active in French socialist politics in Paris; and Tiadiane Dem, a successful northern businessman with an accounting degree from the École Premiere Supérieure of Bingerville, and son of one of Samory's lieutenants (Zolberg 1964: 70).

With no party institutions and little time to prepare, the 14 candidates had to develop parties from preexisting organizations. From his broad-based SAA, Houphouët was able to mobilize territory-wide support of both

[5] Syndicat founders: Joseph Anoma, Fulgence Brou, Gabriel Dadie, Djibril Diaby, George Kassi, Kouame N'guessan, Amadou Lamine Toure, and Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Houphouët was elected president because he was the youngest and most dynamic. See Loucou 1992: 41.

wealthy farmers and peasants. The other *évolués* turned to ethnic associations. In the southeast, Boni and Binzème launched the Party Progressites from an Agni 'improvement society' founded in 1934. Though primarily supported by Agni, the Progressites set up one affiliate branch in the north, under the direction of Tidiane Dem (Loucou 1992: 63). In the central west, Adrien Dignan Bailly organized the Bété population under the banner of the French Socialist Party, Parti socialist, section Française de l'International Ouvriere (SFIO). In the north, Sékou Sanogo developed L'Entente des Indépendants de la Côte d'Ivoire (EIDCI) from an ethnic association representing Malinké and Muslims primarily from Odienné and Séguéla. In the southwest, Etienne Djaument later created the Bloc Democratique Eburnéen to represent Kru ethnic groups (Loucou 1992; Dozon 1985) (see Tables 12).

Although the opposition parties could not match Houphouët's extensive organization, there were Indépendants, Socialistes, and Progressistes in almost every community (Zolberg 1964: 129–131). Most of their supporters had close ties to the colonial administration or were susceptible to the administration's punitive threats. They included canton chiefs and their followers, civil servants, and planters who feared incurring the wrath of the colonial administration lest it refuse to provide them laborers to work their land.[6] In addition, as in Ghana, the administration was able to divide populations along competing local loyalties. Thus, though Houphouët was a Baoulé, he faced a Baoulé opposition party, the Union des Indépendants de la Côte d'Ivoire (UICI).

Nonetheless, the Bloc Africain had broader appeal than any of its competitors. It had not only superior organization, but also a superior platform. Many of his *évoulé* opponents were out of touch with the average peasant's concerns. Houphouët alone supported popular reforms, like expanding education and developing infrastructure. But his most popular campaign promise was for the abolition of forced labor (Zolberg 1964: 72). Ending forced labor had become Houphouët's fundamental goal during the Vichy regime and a central focus of the Syndicate Agricole.[7] Like Nkrumah, therefore, being the only candidate expressly opposed to the hated colonial power structure all but guaranteed Houphouët's success. Accordingly, Houphouët received enthusiastic support across the territory.

The campaign against forced labor also allowed Houphouët to forge critical relationships with powerful northern chiefs. At the time, the majority of African laborers were conscripted from the Upper Côte (modern-day

[6] Interview with three chiefs in Daloa, August 2009.
[7] Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965.

Table 12 *Political parties in Lower Côte 1945–1957*

Region	Leaders	Party	Ethnic Association	Ethnic Group
Southeast (Aboisso, Abengourou)	Kacou Aoulou, Alphonse Boni, Kinzeme Binzème	Parti Progressiste	Parti Progressive out of the Association pour la Defense des Interets des Autochtones de la Côte d'Ivoire (ADIACI)	Agni, Attie
North (Odiénné, Korhogo, Séguéla)	Tidiane Dem, Sékou Sanogo, Vamé Doumouya, Capri Djédjé, Bema Coulibaly	Entente des Indépendants de Côte d'Ivoire (EIDCI)	Odienné Ideal	Malinké, Sénoufo
West (Gagnoa, Daloa)	Dignan Bailly	Section Française de l'International ouvriere (French Socialist Party)	Originaries de l'Ouest	Bété
Southwest (Sassandra)	Etienne Djaument	Bloc Democratique Eburnéen	Union des Originaires des Six Cercles de l'Ouest (UOCOCI)	Kru
Center (Bouaké, Toumodi)	Blaise N'dia Koffi	Union des Indépendants de la Côte d'Ivoire (UICI)		Baoulé

Burkina Faso) and Korhogo (the most populous region in the north of the Lower Côte). In 1945, Houphouët traveled first to Korhogo to meet with the Sénoufo chief, Gbon Coulibaly, and then to Ouagadougou to meet the powerful Moro Naba of the Mossi. These two potentates annually provided the colonial regime 6,500 and 30,000 laborers, respectively.[8] Houphouët's historic trip was so successful that the chiefs granted Houphouët 1,500 voluntary workers from Korhogo and 3,5000 from Upper Volta – the first voluntary workforce recruited in the territory.

The historic election was held in October 1945. SAA supporters were arrested, bridges were sabotaged, and one man was killed. Despite these intrigues, Houphouët's ticket won in a second round with an unexpectedly large percentage.

Formation of the PDCI

When Houphouët ran for the French National Assembly the following year, he dominated the field. This was because of his monumental victory in the First National Constituent Assembly. On March 1, 1946, Houphouët co-introduced a bill proposing the abolition of forced labor in all of the France's overseas territories. Having been an integral part of his campaign, the bill's passage was seen as Houphouët's triumph. "Overnight, Felix Houphouët-Boigny became a mythical hero who had imposed his will upon the French" (Zolberg 1964: 74). "From then on, no one could stand up to Houphouët as a popular leader" (Woronoff 1972: 36). When, one month later, Houphouët launched the Parti democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), "Thousands of Africans offered him their devoted support ... Within the year there were 85,000 paid-up adherents and by 1950, ten times that number" (Woronoff 1972: 36–37).

The Syndicate Agricole furnished the PDCI its mass of supporters, material resources, and organizational structure; it was its "traditional sprit" and "agrarian core" (Loucou 1992: 42). But the party also needed a modern, urban base. It therefore aligned with salaried workers, important unions, ethnic/regional associations, Marxist study groups, and cultural associations. In the 1947 election, the PDCI candidate proved "invincible." Houphouët won 98 percent of the Lower Côte votes and faced no opposition in the Upper Côte (Loucou 1992: 63–65; Zolberg 1964: 75–76).

Victorious, Houphouët's political savvy came to the fore. Despite his overarching political stature, he pushed for unification of all opposing parties. As he was to do time and again, Houphouët did not want to

[8] Houphouët Testimony, 1965, Tome I, p. 8.

sideline or alienate his opponents. He even invited the racist *colons* to join his party ticket. Though rebuffed by the *colons*,[9] the PDCI-RDA did successfully align with the Progressistes. But this fragile coalition fell apart within a year after yet another reversal in France's political climate.

One Step Back: Alliance with the Communist Party

As great as these early victories were, the battle had not yet begun. New developments in 1947 allowed the full wrath of the *colons* to be felt. The change in the PDCI's fortune was precipitated by Houphouët's strategic alliance with the Communist Party in 1947.

Africans were grossly underrepresented in the French National Assembly, holding a mere 13 of the 627 seats. General de Gaulle's new colonial administrative structure had four administrative levels in which Africans had representatives: local, territorial, regional (Federations of West African (AOF) and Central Africa (ACF)), and the French National Assembly. But only in the National Assembly were political decisions effected. With this in mind, three months after the founding of the PDCI, in mid-October, Houphouët helped organize the Bloc africaine in the Côte, an all-African voting bloc in the French National Assembly. The aim was to increase African influence over political debates, particularly over the parameters of the new French constitution to be adopted. Out of this voting bloc, the Pan-African Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA) organization was inaugurated.

Yet, even in unity, the RDA's influence was nugatory. The RDA therefore made a strategic alliance with the Parti Communiste de France (PCF) (Woronoff 1972: 38). With 182 seats, the PCF had the largest representation in the Assembly. For Houphouët, the alliance with the Communists was purely strategic. Unlike Nkrumah, Houphouët-Boigny never shared the Communist Party's ideology, not even its desire to end capitalist exploitation. The RDA wanted to end colonial abuses and strengthen territorial control, but under Houphouët's leadership, the organization supported union with France rather than independence. As Houphouët remarked: "I, a bourgeois landowner, I would preach the class struggle? That is why we aligned ourselves with the Communist Party, without joining it."[10]

Benefits initially accrued to the PDCI-RDA from this new affiliation. There were some negative repercussions. Several African parliamentarians broke ranks with the RDA and formed a separate parliamentary

[9] See Houphouët Testimony, Tome I, Séance du mercredi 28 juin 1950, 1965, p. 33.
[10] Kenneth B. Noble, "Felix Houphouët-Boigny, Ivory Coast's Leader since Freedom in 1960, Is Dead." *NY Times*, December 8, 1993.

group, the 'Overseas Independents' (IOM), and conservative members abandoned the party. But with PCF support, the RDA was able to include clauses in the proposed constitution for the immediate enfranchisement of all Africans as full citizens, the end of the two-tiered (citizen/subject) electoral system, and the legalization of union activism. The RDA's union with the PCF, moreover, undoubtedly strengthened Houphouët's partnership with the leftist colonial administration. Latrille was a member of the progressive left and his chief of staff was closely associated with the Communist Party. Latrille supported the PDCI in multiple ways. He helped Houphouët secure a large American car and petrol for campaign trips. In one incident, he allegedly ordered his commandant to register all SAA members, regardless of their voting eligibility. Latrille even deposed the Indénié king in Abengourou who supported the Progressistes and installed Houphouët-Boigny's brother-in-law, Amoakon Dihye, in his stead (Widner 1994: 167; Loucou 1992: 63; Zolberg 1964: 72).[11]

However, the RDA's communist benefactors very quickly turned into a dangerous liability. In the emerging Cold War climate, anticommunist fears, coupled with humiliating and bloody rebellions in Algeria in 1945 and Madagascar in 1947, ignited a right-wing backlash in France. The right stirred up anger over the destruction of the empire and, with that, fears of the left-wing government and its progressive draft constitution.

By January 1947, the leftist government had collapsed. Communist members in the cabinet were dismissed and the PCF went into open opposition. The new right-wing regime removed all communist and progressive leaders in the colonies. Latrille, Houphouët's benefactor, was recalled. When the new governor, Georges-Louis-Joseph Orselli, proved too soft on African 'communists,' he too was recalled.[12] Finally, the archconservative Laurent Élisée Péchoux arrived in November 1948 "to restore the colonial power's prestige" (Woronoff 1972: 39).

With Péchoux at the helm, war with the *colons* began in earnest. From January 1949 to January 1950, the territory witnessed a string of colonial atrocities. The administration's violent campaign against the PDCI-RDA was assisted by Houphouët's regional opponents, now strengthened by Péchoux: Kacou Aoulou, Dignan Bailly, Etienne Djaument, and Tidiane Dem. Kacou Aoulou, the leader of the southeastern Agni, revived the Progressiste Parti. Teacher Etienne Djaument, who had originally brought western support to Houphouët's candidacy in 1945, created the Bloc Democratique Eburnéen supported by people of Kru origin in the west. Dignan Bailly, the Bété *évolué* from Gagnoa, revived the French Socialist Party (Section Française de l'International ouvriere (SFIO)).

[11] Houphouët's Testimony, Tome I, 1950, pp. 25–26. [12] Ibid., pp. 37–39.

Tidiane Dem, the Muslim leader from the north, along with long-time opposition leader Sékou Sanogo, expanded the ethnic association, the Idéal d'Odiénné, into a northern political party, the Entente des Indépendants de Côte d'Ivoire (Loucou 1992: 85). In Abengourou, Houphouët's brother-in-law, Amoakon Dihye, who had been enthroned by Latrille as the king of the Indénié, was deposed, and the former king, Kouassi Bonzou, was re-enthroned.[13]

Things came to a head in Abidjan-Treichville on February 6, 1949. PDCI-RDA supporters and opposition members (likely instructed by Péchoux) violently faced off. Shooting erupted; riots ensued (Amondji 1986: 51). The colonial administration used the incident to persecute the PDCI-RDA, hoping to "so weaken the party that it would wither away" (Loucou 1992: 86–87). Thirty thousand supporters of the PDCI-RDA were imprisoned on flimsy evidence, including eight party leaders. Houphouët avoided arrest only because he had diplomatic immunity as a French parliamentarian. By 1950, thousands were imprisoned, hundreds wounded, and more than 50 Africans killed.

Aligning with Foes: Houphouët's Repli-tactique

Before the violence had reached such a pitch, Houphouët-Boigny had decided to work with the administration. As early as May 1948, Houphouët-Boigny opened strategic talks with the governor of the French West African territories (AOF), Paul Béchard.[14] Conducting talks with Béchard could not have been easy. Houphouët's followers were deeply skeptical of Béchard, who as the upper commissioner of the AOF was largely responsible for the repression perpetrated against the RDA.[15] Nevertheless, Houphouët was determined to follow this course. The talks led to meetings between Houphouët-Boigny and Minister of Overseas Territories François Mitterrand. Eventually a deal was struck: the French government would end its repression of the RDA, political prisoners would be released, and oppressive colonial administrators would be dismissed. In return, the RDA would renounce communism and support France.

In 1950, Houphouët introduced his new policy, initiating what came to be known as his 'repli-tactique': gaining French economic support in exchange for what was seen by many as "un véritable 'immobilisme politique'" (Vingaud 1956: 572). On October 18, 1950, the RDA publicly severed all ties with the PCF. Houphouët was now free to align with the ruling French coalition (Loucou 1992: 96). By 1951, the new

[13] Ibid., pp. 25–27. [14] Ibid., p. 34; Loucou 1992: 93–96. [15] Ibid., p. 36.

Table 13 *June 1951 elections*

Party	Candidates	# Votes
PDCI-RDA	Houphouët-Boigny + Ouezzin Coulibaly	67,200
Union Française	Sékou Sanogo + Kacou Aoulou	35,336
Union Républicaine	Dignan Bailly + Vamé Doumouya	5,881
Entente Ethnique Eburnéenne	E. Djaument + Kassoum Coulibaly	1,341
Union Démocratique		1

Source: Zolberg 1964: 139.

alignment was bearing fruit. In that year, the port of Abidjan was inaugurated, Governor Péchoux and several anti-PDCI colonial officials were transferred out of the territory, and PDCI-RDA prisoners were released. Subsequently, Houphouët served on several French cabinets.

With his power restored in 1951, Houphouët again launched a politics of national unity. The same year Nkrumah advised his followers to avoid compromise, PDCI-RDA members were instructed to "practice a politics of reaching across party lines" (Loucou 1992: 102). Overtures were made to all of the central opposition leaders.

At first, Houphouët's calls for unification fell on deaf ears. The colonial administration pushed Sékou Sanogo and Kacou Aoulou to create a north–south alliance between the Progressistes and the Indépendants to run against the PDCI-RDA in the upcoming June elections (Loucou 1992: 105). Not to be outdone, Dignan Bailly and E. Djaument each created north–south coalitions to contest the election. Even Houphouët presented a north–south coalition, with Ouezzin Coulibaly representing the non-Mossi populations from the Upper Côte.

To aid the opposition, the administration struck nearly half the voters from the rolls in the PDCI-supported Baoulé *cercles* and multiplied the electorate tenfold in the opposition strongholds of Abengourou and Odiénné (Zolberg 1964: 137–138). Despite this vote tampering, the PDCI secured 61 percent of votes cast and Houphouët won the first seat (Zolberg 1964: 139) (see Tables 13).

With another decisive victory behind him, Houphouët announced that, rather than go it alone, his party preferred joining with Europeans and Africans in a union for the economic development of the territory (Woronoff 1972: 80). As before, overtures were made to all the competing African and *colon* leaders, even those whose actions had hurt the PDCI-RDA. On October 6, 1951, in the Géo André Stadium in Abidjan, Houphouët formally launched the call for the union of all political parties.

In his historic speech, Houphouët proclaimed, "hatred and anger, even if legitimate," would have to be set aside "for the realization of a common program of economic and social progress." He called upon "all men and all women . . . regardless of color" to join together to form a "union of all men of good will, regardless of our respective politics and in the higher interest of Côte d'Ivoire and the Republic of the French Union."[16]

To make the affiliation more palatable to his opponents, PDCI assemblymen associated with the Communist Party were replaced by moderate PDCI leaders. In essence, the party returned to its roots. "The new recruits were mostly SAA officials, more business-minded than most members of the PDCI executive and party leaders who had not been into the forefront of the battle" (Zolberg 1964: 154).

By the end of the year, the PDCI reached an agreement with the Indépendants, as well as Dignan Bailly of the Socialistes, and even some leading members of the SFIO and the conservative French party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Français (RPF). The new electoral coalition, 'Union pour le development economique de la Côte d'Ivoire' (UDECI), included one-fourth of the French expatriates. The UDECI increased the PDCI's seats in the Territorial Assembly from 28 to 50, and captured all but 4 of the 32 seats in the National Assembly. None of the competing parties had any success. Sékou Sanogo, E. Djaument, Kacou Aoulou, and Capri Djédjé were even defeated in their home constituencies (Loucou 1992: 103–105; Woronoff 1972: 80; Zolberg 1964: 151–155).

The final fusion of parties was made possible by France's introduction of a new, more decentralized overseas system on June 23, 1956, the Loi-Cadre (Welch 1987: 178). With this territorial devolution, elites jockeying for limited political positions became amenable to putting aside their differences and joining the PDCI.

Echoing the event for unity held five years earlier, Houphouët convened a large rally in the Géo André Stadium in Abidjan to announce the union of political parties. Representatives from all the major parties took turns speaking, including E. Djaument and Kacou Aoulou. The central difference between the 1951 and 1956 rallies was that this time, opposition parties were dissolved: the Parti Progressiste, the Bloc Democratique Eburnéen, the Entente des Indépendants, and the Party de l'Union Française "disappeared from Ivoirian political life" (Loucou 1992: 108). Though the SFIO refused to disband, it too rallied to the new program. Dignan Bailly told his followers:

[16] Félix Houphouët-Boigny, "Solennelle Déclaration Publique au Stade Géo André à Abidjan," 6 octobre 1951. *Anthologie des Discours 1946–1978 Félix Houphouët-Boigny Tome I*. Abidjan: CEDA, 1978, p. 88. Also see Loucou 1992: 104.

> [T]he hour of reconciliation and of political truce has come. It is why, my dear compatriots and friends, who have always followed me, I ask of you to rally as I have to the great cause of the RDA to share tomorrow, all together, the responsibility of power and work in union and peace for the progress of our dear country: Côte d'Ivoire. (quoted in Loucou 1992: 118)

Including the *colons* on the PDCI ticket was not without political risks – it alienated urban constituents. In November 1956, serious clashes broke out in Abidjan when private workers called a three-day strike to protest the inclusion of *colons* on the UDECI's coalition slate for metropolitan elections (Amondji 1984: 171; Woronoff 1972: 81). But Houphouët remained undeterred. In the end, the 1956 election results exceeded even PDCI expectations. The party took 86.8 percent of the votes. In contrast, the runner-up, the Sékou Sanogo–Kakou Aoulou list, took only 6.7 percent (Vingaud 1956: 580).

Remarkably by 1959, almost *all* the regional opposition leaders had been coopted. With the exception of Kinzeme Binzème and Sékou Sanogo, "the followers of the former opposition parties had become the activist base of the PDI-RDA, such that their principal leaders obtained seats on the municipal councils and as deputes" (Loucou 1992: 109). Among the elected PDCI deputies to the Legislative Assembly were: Dignan Bailly, Etienne Djaument, Alphonse Boni, Tidiane Dem, and Kacou Aoulou.

On August 7, 1960, the Ivory Coast became an independent state. Out of the 14 ministers in Houphouët's first government, 9 had formerly been in open opposition. By 1961, that number had increased to 10 (see Table 14). Several other former opposition leaders were in the Assembly, including the Bété leader from Gagnoa, Dignan Bailly. Thus, between 1951 and 1959, while Nkrumah progressively fragmented his party, turning stalwart supporters into virulent opposition leaders, Houphouët cajoled or forced nearly all his opponents to join his party-government.

There was, however, one major setback in this triumphal march toward unity: the small Agni kingdom of Sanwi in the southeast made a bid for succession in 1959. The PDCI had always had low levels of support in the area. The Agni kingdoms of Sanwi, Indénié, and Mourou had signed early treaties with the French allowing their kings to preside over their territories and exempting them from onerous forced labor practices. The Agni also inhabited the wealthiest region in the territory. Located in the southeast where cocoa farming was first introduced, they resented Houphouët's encroachment on their monopoly over the lucrative trade, with his promotion of the pioneer cocoa-farming settlements of Baoulé and savannah peoples in their region.

Table 14 *Opposition leaders in 1961 cabinet*

3 Parti Progressistes	Kacou Aoulou, Minister of Construction and Urbanism
	Tidiane Dem, Minister of Animal Husbandry
	Alphonse Boni, Minister of Justice
6 Student Leaders	Charles Donwahi, Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives
	Joachim Bony, Minister of National Education
	Amadou Koné, Minister of Public Health and Population
	Jean Banny, Minister of Defence and the Civil Service
	Alcide Kacou, Minister of Public Works, Transportation, Post and Telecommunications
1 Union Leader	Camille Gris, Minister of Work and Social Affairs

Source: "Le Ministere, 1961," *Fraternité Matin*, 6 Janvier 1961, No. 89, p. 1.

By 1953, the Sanwi state saw itself under threat. The final straw came in January 1959, when conflict erupted between the Sanwi and the Ehotilé, the traditional 'vassals' of the Sanwi state. Houphouët sent in police to subdue the area. Believing his state to be under siege, the Sanwi king, Amon N'Doffou III, proclaimed his kingdom an autonomous region (Zolberg 1964: 291–293). Houphouët responded immediately. The king and 29 of his followers were arrested, ultimately receiving 10-year prison sentences. Additionally, the *chefferie supérieure* was terminated and all Aboisso *chefs de canton* supporting the king were replaced by politically reliable appointees. Sanwi leaders who escaped the dragnet set up a government in exile on the border in Ghana (Diarra 1997: 50–54; Zolberg 1964: 292).

The Sanwi revolt underscores the importance of aligning with rural interests. In Sanwi, where Houphouët was unable to coopt the traditional elite, he used the same tactics Nkrumah did – arrests, detentions, and the replacement of prominent chiefs with political allies. It would take more than a decade for him to regain the ground he lost in the region. Houphouët's rural strategies and capacity to incorporate his opponents were therefore critical to his success.

II Conclusion

There were several reasons for Houphouët's initial success. First among them was Houphouët's strategic calculus. Never incensed by disloyalty, Houphouët knew how to capitalize on mutual interests and minimize conflict. Not only did he accommodate people of divergent backgrounds, he understood the importance of keeping the enemy close at hand. As his

close associate Mamadou Coulibaly later revealed, Houphouët's appeal for union was a tactical move to disorganize his adversaries.[17]

Also important were Houphouët's personal achievements. Houphouët had the "double quality of being a man of letters and of being a chief which permitted him to be accepted by the new elite, as well as by traditional elites" (Loucou 1992: 41). In his role as *Médecin*, he had been posted in many regions and gained the trust of different ethnic groups. By organizing the Association des Chefs Coutumiers, he extended his influence to traditional leaders across ethnic groups (Zolberg 1964: 73).

Even in his personal life, he was a 'master of ethnic calculus.' His first marriage strategically linked him to both a royal Agni lineage through his wife's mother's line and to the Senegalese 'citizen' community through her father. In addition, "he was one of the richest African farmers in the entire country," giving him the "personal means to finance a political campaign" (Zolberg 1964: 73–74). As Houphouët himself explained:

> I did not come from a royal Baoulé family. My family was only a small vassal of the king. It was because of the diverse functions that I have occupied that, at the moment when the *syndicat agricole Africain* was created, it was to me that people turned to preside over it. I was in some ways the union between different social circles.[18]

Houphouët also benefited from the fact that his political agenda supported rural constituents across classes: large planters, small-scale planters, and the peasantry. The PDCI's rural network helped it achieve high electoral majorities, even in the face of severe intimidation (Vingaud 1956: 572, 580). Above all, his focus on ending forced labor won him the support of rich and poor Ivoirians alike.

It is true that opposition parties in the Côte were largely hollow. But, to some extent, so were the opposition parties in the Gold Coast in 1951, when the chiefs and the intellectuals experienced crushing electoral defeats. Houphouët was no more compelled to incorporate failed opposition leaders in his ticket than Nkrumah. Without their support, the PDCI could have easily controlled the political environment. But Houphouët was not content to defeat his enemies. He understood the danger of having disgruntled *colons* and regional elites operating outside his political edifice. Instead, Houphouët used every victory as an olive branch to coopt his opponents. A decade later, the Progressistes, Tidiane Dem, Kacou Aoulou, and Alphonse Boni, were still in Houphouët's government.

Even granting that much of Nkrumah's opposition was wealthier and more independent than Houphouët's (though not the *colons*),

[17] See Zolberg 1964: 152.
[18] Houphouët Testimony, Séance du mercredi 31 mai 1950, 1965, p. 12.

Houphouët's dogged determination to align with *colons, évolués*, and traditional elites opposing him stands in relief to Nkrumah's repeated expulsions of his own supporters. Houphouët's capacity to keep regional leaders in his party government, who might otherwise have built independent support bases, was an important piece of the political stability he fostered.

Similarly, Houphouët benefited from French support, but only after he made the dangerous choice of turning against the strongest faction in his own coalition – his urban support network – to negotiate with the despised colonial administration. In fact, his political gamble was not without consequences. It brought about the first and only significant schism within his party.

Overall, Houphouët's ability to keep disparate groups under one umbrella was central to his success. And this he achieved because the PDCI never demanded local loyalties be supplanted. Rather, PDCI members were remarkably disparate, including normally antagonistic elements such as wealthy planter-chiefs and leftist youth. "No attempts were made to integrate chiefs and young men, or Bété and Dioula, at the local level" (Zolberg 1964: 76). The PDCI became "a highly flexible organizational weapon" (Stryker 1971: 87); "an organization for the masses rather than as a mass organization" (Zolberg 1964: 185). It functioned more as a sort of 'federation of tribes,' with territorial *sous-sections* acting as indirect 'caucuses' of villages and towns, than as a party system with local chapters (Zolberg 1964: 114–116).

Just as the looseness and openness of the PDCI reflected Houphouët's leadership strengths, the CPP's enforced loyalty and conformity mirrored Nkrumah's leadership flaws. Unlike Houphouët's PDCI with its loosely federated structure that allowed for the adherence of incompatible local interests, the CPP became "a movement, monopolistic, demanding total loyalty and defining its friends and its enemies in terms of that loyalty" (Apter 1966: 285).

Nkrumah was a charismatic, visionary leader and a master of political mobilization, but he was a poor statesman. Neither a negotiator nor a compromiser, Nkrumah was intolerant of dissent. For Nkrumah, "disloyalty or psychological betrayal offended him most . . . He could accept the idea of having enemies, but he could not accept opponents. A Ghanaian was either with him or against him" (Apter 1968: 775). Though a handful of expelled CPP leaders were brought back into the fold,[19] for the most part, Nkrumah would not countenance any departure

[19] Anthony Woode, Turkson Ocran, and Pobee Biney.

from his party line. He punished those who resisted him or critiqued his government, rather than coaxing them back into the fold.

Nkrumah had neither Houphouët's disposition nor his wisdom when it came to managing people with competing political visions. Unlike Houphouët, who under similar circumstances almost always figured out a power-sharing scheme to placate all but the most hardened opposition, Nkrumah was unable or unwilling to do so. As a result, Houphouët continually expanded party membership by coopting competing elites, while Nkrumah increasingly alienated supporters, creating formidable enemies. These patterns were to be indicative of each man's independent rule and, ultimately, determinative of his fate.

Part III

Consolidating Power

With independence, Nkrumah and Houphouët were finally able to chart their own courses. Freed from the constraints of British oversight, Nkrumah embarked upon the revolutionary restructuring of Ghana. He sought to model Ghana's development after the great industrial successes of the Soviet Union and China. Houphouët-Boigny, in contrast, remained close to France, courting Western investment and political support.

Their state-building strategies critically affected how each man handled his opposition. Nkrumah continued to deeply distrust ethno-regional elites. This led him to undermine his civil service, eliminate technocrats from policymaking, and embark upon unfeasible development projects. His commitment to his urban base and rapid industrialization destructively impacted small-scale agriculture. By 1965, the cocoa industry, once the pride of the territory, was in serious decline, as was the country's impressive infrastructure. Nkrumah's fear of challengers also intensified. So much so that he undermined the chain of command of his security forces. All of these policies led to his loss of broad political support. When the military and police turned against him, very few tears were shed.

Unlike Nkrumah, Houphouët-Boigny continued to use patronage and his ability to broker disputes to coopt potential challengers. His skill at managing competing ethno-regional elites and support of small-scale agriculture enabled him to build the economy. These political successes allowed him to use the profits gained from a period of high world commodity prices to build roadway systems and ports, improve communications, and develop industrial centers. At the same time, focusing the majority of the population on the country's economic success helped mute ethnic politicization. As a result, he maintained the support of his military and the stability of the state until his death in the 1990s.

6 An Urban Strategy Unravels – Kwame Nkrumah 1957–1966

Nkrumah's independent rule did not begin until 1960. When he first assumed power, he was under the constraints of the British-designed 'Lennox-Boyd constitution,' greatly limiting his control of the state. The independence constitution slowed down Nkrumah's centralization of power. It may, ironically, have been responsible for Nkrumah's ability to hold onto power longer. Only once all checks on Nkrumah were eliminated were the deep flaws in his character revealed. His incapacity to assess political situations and respond appropriately led to his quick and decisive fall. In less than six years, Nkrumah – who had achieved the apex of power and appeared to be invincible – was quickly and dramatically removed from power with virtually no popular support left.

I Power Consolidation

Overwhelming Regional and Local Authorities – 1957–1959

Independence was granted the Gold Coast on March 6, 1957. Though a great triumph, it was not an unmitigated success. Independence came with strings. Nkrumah's government was forced to accept a constitution antithetical to its own principles and aspirations. As Nkrumah had expected, the British government "concede[d] the shadow of independence in order to avoid granting its substance" (Bing 1968: 188).

Although the Lennox-Boyd 'compromise' constitution stopped short of creating a federal system, it stipulated there would be five interim Regions in the new country: the Ashanti, Eastern, Northern, Trans-Volta and Western Regions. Each was to have a Regional Assembly with broad powers. Chieftaincy would be protected, and the independence of the civil service safeguarded. None of this was acceptable to Nkrumah.

In addition, the British made it virtually impossible for Nkrumah to amend the constitution. Instead of the usual practice, wherein a constitution

can be altered by a two-thirds vote in the Parliament, any amendment to the Lennox-Boyd constitution would have to be approved by two-thirds of the Regional Assemblies before going before the National Assembly. This meant that four out of the five Regional Assemblies would have to sign on. Given that Nkrumah had the support of only three, the British had effectively impeded Nkrumah's ability to transform the quasi-federal system (Bing 1968: 196).

With the constitution so constructed, Nkrumah took over a government that greatly limited his powers. The first three years of independence, therefore, should be regarded as an interim period in which the CPP maneuvered to gain full control over the state. Most of the government's initiatives at this time were geared toward 1958, when the constitution stipulated that the interim Regional Assemblies would be replaced by official assemblies. Only if the CPP government could gain control of these regional institutions would it be able to implement its own constitution. With this in mind, it is understandable that the government's first key decisions were focused on breaking the power of Nkrumah's regional opponents.

The fight against the opposition began as soon as the legislative session began. Nkrumah started by plucking off the lowest-hanging fruit: Muslim 'strangers.' In its first legislative sessions, the government passed 'the Ghana Nationality and Citizenship Act,' 'the Immigration Act,' and, in July, 'the Deportation Act.' Deportation orders were immediately issued for the two conservative Muslim leaders, Imam Abbas of Accra and Alhaji Amadu Baba, the Zerikin Zongo in Kumasi. Their deportation was a victory for Nkrumah on two counts. The Imam and the Zerikin were leaders of the Muslim Association Party (MAP), whose platform opposed the CPP. The two men were also 'clients' of the Asantehene. Expulsions of other prominent Muslim leaders and traders followed. The CPP then installed its own supporters to head *zongo* ('stranger') communities, effectively eliminating organized Muslim opposition in the south. All told, between 1957 and 1960, approximately 359 people were deported (Mikell 1989a; Bing 1968: 217; Austin 1964: 19).

Soon after, the government began to hit the most powerful chieftaincies. Early in 1958, "every pro-NLM chief in Ashanti was removed from office with the exception of the Asantehene who was spared only after he had made a public declaration of support for 'the government of the day'" (Austin 1964: 377–378). Next, Nkrumah went after the paramount chief of Akim Abuakwa, the most prominent funder of the NLM. On June 23, 1958, the government passed the 'The Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act', giving the central government full control over all the chiefs'

revenues. At the Assembly's next sessions, the government took over chiefs' revenues in Ashanti, the Northern Territories, and the Volta.[1]

However, the most decisive action was taken in April 1958. The Lennox-Boyd constitution left Nkrumah an important loophole: a 'Regional Constitutional Commission' was to be established within three months of independence to determine the organization and power of the regional powers. Nkrumah was able to appoint all the members of the Commission. The CPP-dominated Commission recommended that the British interim Regional Assemblies be replaced by elected ones. Angered by these recommendations, the opposition boycotted the regional elections held that October, ensuring CPP control over all the Assemblies. With full control over all the Regional Assemblies, Nkrumah was now able to amend the constitution. The subsequent 'Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act 1958' passed without any opposition. By December 1958, the Lennox-Boyd constitution had been nullified, and in the following spring, the Regional Assemblies were abolished (Bing 1968: 192, 196; Austin 1964: 380).

The CPP government could now put the final nail in the coffin against resistant paramount chiefs. March 25, 1959, was a particularly important date. On that day, the government passed a succession of acts that further undermined chieftaincy and local authority, starting with 'The Chiefs (Recognition) Act, No. 11' that gave the central government the power to replace chiefs at will and to punish any resistance with imprisonment or fines. The government also passed 'The Brong-Ahafo Region Act, No. 18', which established Brong-Ahafo as a sixth region, no longer subject to the Ashanti House of Chiefs.[2]

At the same time, Nkrumah began to build his repressive powers. After several men charged with instigating riots in Togoland were acquitted on technicalities – against Nkrumah's wishes – the CPP government passed its notorious Preventive Detention Act (PDA). The act gave the government power to arrest and detain anyone for up to five years without trial.[3]

[1] With 'The Ashanti Stool Lands Act' and 'The Councils (Northern Territories and Trans-Volta/Togoland) Dissolution Act.'

[2] The Brong were conquered by the Ashanti in the eighteenth century. The Asantehene installed several chiefs in the region. By independence, the area was divided between chiefs loyal to the Asantehene and those who wanted to end his suzerainty. A similar pattern emerged in the area south of the Brong, among the Ahafo. The 'rebellious' chiefs of both areas joined forces with Nkrumah in 1955. Nkrumah promised independence from Ashanti if they supported him. In 1959, Nkrumah made good on his promise by creating the Brong-Ahafo region. See Rathbone 2000 and *Brong Kyempim: Essays on the Society, History and Politics of the Brong People*. Edited by Kwame Arhin. Accra: Afram Publications (Ghana) Limited, 1973.

[3] See "Statement by the Government on the Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Matters Disclosed at the Trial of Captain Benjamin Awhaitey before a

It was used almost immediately to imprison nearly all Gã leaders suspected of supporting the Gã Shifimo Kpee, including Ashie Nikoi and Dzenkle Dzewu. By the time of the 1966 coup, the PDA had become an instrument of terror. Detention without trial had been extended for up to 10 years, and it was alleged that Nkrumah had imprisoned 1,300 political prisoners without trial[4] (Bing 1968: 248, 270, 273; Austin 1964: 381).

In many respects, Nkrumah's draconian laws enacted between 1957 and 1959 were successful. By the end of 1959, "The United Party practically vanished" (Adamafio 1982: 46–47). Most opposition leaders were in exile or imprisoned, and chiefs' powers were all but eliminated. Returning to Ghana in 1960, Austin wrote:

> How different is the Ghana scene today! The Ashanti movement has been crushed, the State has not merely held together but is in process of extending its boundaries in a wider union, Accra has become an important centre in pan-African affairs, a single party holds the country in its grip and Nkrumah rules over a radical party-controlled republic defined as 'socialist at home, neutralist abroad'. Indeed, those who entertain fears for the new republic are uneasy not that the Government may be unable to govern, but that its rulers will rule only too well. (Austin 1961: 424).

Thus, at the dawn of the new decade, Nkrumah appeared to be there to stay. Nkrumah's electoral victories in 1959 allowed him to introduce a republican constitution in 1960, placing him unquestionably at the helm. The position of governor-general was abolished and all authority was vested in the newly created Office of the President. By the end of 1960, "of the thirty-two Opposition Members elected to the Ghana Parliament in 1956, seventeen [had] joined the Government" (Bing 1968: 284).

With the opposition thus chastened, there was a brief possibility of détente. Though many opposition leaders "had a deep, instinctive dislike of everything that Nkrumah and the CPP stood for" (Austin 1964: 369), the strength of this group was questionable. Once Nkrumah had gained independence, the CPP's dramatic success and the allure of its power had taken all the air out of the opposition. Austin opined that, "given the growing awareness of the power of the Accra government . . . it was not unreasonable to argue that . . . if the CPP were to make no other move

Court-Martial and the Surrounding Circumstances." W.P No. 10/59. Accra: Printed by the Government Printer.

[4] Other legislation followed in the summer of 1959. In July, "The Offences against the State (False Reports) Act' made any false statement or report injurious to the state or government a punishable crime, whether or not the accused knew the statement was false. "The National Assembly (Disqualification), No. 16 1959" made it possible to eliminate National Assembly representatives accused of a crime. Soon after came the 'The Sedition Act' and 'The Treason Act.'

Plate 1 Félix Houphouët-Boigny campaigning in 1945 in Treichville, Abidjan. Photo by AFP/Staff/Getty Images.

Plate 2 The Moro Naba, powerful Mossi king and Houphouët ally, pictured with French President Vincent Auriol, June 26, 1953. Photo by Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images.

Plate 3 President De Gaulle receives President Félix Houphouët-Boigny at the Elysée, June 26, 1965. Photo by Keystone-France/ Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images.

Plate 4 Kwame Nkrumah, wearing 'prison graduate' cap with Kojo Botsio (left) and Komla Agbeli Gbedemah (right), c. 1959. Photo by Mark Kauffman/Contributor/Getty Images.



Plate 5 Nkrumah's arch-nemesis, King of Ashanti Prempeh II, sitting at a meeting of the Ashanti House of Chiefs, c. 1959. Photo by Mark Kauffman/Contributor/Getty Images.



Plate 6 Premier of Ghana Kwame Nkrumah standing on reviewing platform during CPP rally (note placard in support of Prevention Detention), c. 1959. Photo by Mark Kauffman/Contributor/Getty Images.



Plate 7 Revolutionary PNDC billboard, c. 1985. Photo by William F. Campbell/The LIFE Images Collection/Getty Images.

Plate 8 Deportation of Ghanaians from Nigeria, February 1983. Photo by Eric Préau / Contributor/Getty Images.

Plate 9 Rawlings and Gaddafi, the 18th anniversary of the Libyan Revolution in Tripoli, Libya, August 1987. Photo by Francois Lochon/ Contributor/Getty Images.

Plate 10 Ivory Coast National Assembly President Henri Konan Bédié (left) sits next to Ivory Coast Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara during a ceremony in Abidjan, January, 14, 1993. Photo by Issouf Sanogo/AFP/ Getty Images.



Plate 11 Young demonstrator beaten by police in Abidjan during anti-government protests in the lead up to 1995 Ivoirian presidential elections. Photo by Christophe Simon /AFP/Getty Images.

against the opposition alliance than to offer its members inducements to join the government party, the uneasy coalition of regional local parties would quickly fall victim to its own internal differences" (1964: 368–369).

Yet the CPP government continued to deeply distrust the old regime and anyone connected with it. Nkrumah gave no indication that he wanted to compromise or develop any kind of power-sharing scheme. He and his advisors did not see the importance of keeping their enemies in their camp. More than that, they were eager to exercise unrestrained power – to finally defeat the old regime and redraw the political contours of their newly independent country.

II Free Rein and Poor Politics

On July 1, 1960, Ghana became an independent republic in the commonwealth. In his swearing-in ceremony as Ghana's first president, Nkrumah incorporated all the symbols of Ashanti kingship: the special Kente cloth, a Golden Stool, and a Golden Staff. He even assumed the title of *Osagyefo*, an Ashanti warrior title meaning the 'Redeemer' or 'Conqueror.' Nkrumah's appropriation of Ashanti royal symbols signaled his broader intention to centralize power in his own person.

Over the next five years, Nkrumah focused on transforming Ghana into a socialist state. Where Nkrumah had started his political sojourn with some pragmatism, now impatience and distrust became the hallmarks of his regime. His one-time close associate, Tawia Adamafio, describes how:

> Nkrumah could be aptly described as 'Africa's Man in a Hurry'. He always said: 'Tawia, Ghana must run all the way. We cannot afford to walk at ease. There is too much to be accomplished and we are only just starting.' This made him rather impatient and always eager to adopt unorthodox methods and short cuts of solving problems. (Adamafio 1982: 68)

The CPP government began fashioning a modern society out of the shell left behind by the British. A period of unparalleled construction ensued. Factories were erected to supply Ghana with almost anything one could desire: shoes, furniture, bottled beer and soda. Primary and secondary schools were built throughout the countryside. A technical university was inaugurated to train Ghana's future engineers. Important state buildings were erected in the capital.

Nkrumah's crowning achievement was arguably the construction of the Akosombo dam. Plans for the dam had existed for over a decade, but it was Nkrumah who saw the project through. He understood the dam was essential to Ghana's economic growth. It was realized because of Nkrumah's single-minded commitment. He went through repeated

rounds of negotiations with US presidents and companies to gainsay the necessary capital and technical support. Once built, the dam provided greatly needed power and electricity throughout the southern regions.

Nonetheless by 1965, much of the rosy blush of these achievements had faded. Nkrumah's use of short cuts and 'unorthodox methods' ultimately undermined the economy and transformed Ghana into a proto-police state modeled after the Soviet Union. Ambitious projects were begun without the planning that would enable them to be sustained. Little provision was made for the maintenance of the country's infrastructure. Trained teachers were in short supply, leaving the new schools that dotted the countryside underserved. Many of the factories were poorly managed, underutilized, and overstaffed. Sorely needed public funds were squandered on large prestige projects. Nkrumah himself became increasingly removed from Ghana devoting most of his time to fostering a 'united Africa.'

With the CPP's focus on developing a state-planned economy and rapidly industrializing Ghana, its urban bias became more pronounced. Notwithstanding the regime's objectives, its urban biased policies had the unfortunate effect of impoverishing the rural areas while increasing urban living costs. Within six years, Nkrumah's promise had turned to failure.

Turn to the Left

Prior to independence, Nkrumah had not been an ideologue. He believed in state-led growth and Pan-Africanism, but he was not a communist and had genuine reservations about the Soviets (Packham 2004). The first event that turned him toward the Eastern Bloc was the war of independence in Congo. Already committed to freeing the African continent of colonialism, Nkrumah went to the aid of the fledgling republic and its newly elected leader, Patrice Lumumba. But the freedom fight in the Congo came to a tragic end in January 1961. Lumumba was captured, brutally tortured, and murdered under mysterious circumstances. Lumumba's death had a profound impact on Nkrumah. It radicalized him and fueled what was to become his consuming fear of Western powers. In a speech given a few months after Lumumba's death, Nkrumah pronounced, "The revival of colonialism in the Congo is sufficient evidence and warning of the treacherous character of imperialism and its menace even to independent states and of the danger of the new colonialism which is more subtle but equally vicious."[5]

[5] "A Message from Osagyefo Dr. Kwame Nkrumah, President of the Republic of Ghana on the Third Anniversary of Africa Freedom Day, April 15th 1961," in *Selected Speeches of Dr.*

With this growing distrust of the West, Nkrumah made his first visit to the Eastern Bloc in early 1961. He spent several months traveling through the Soviet states and China and returned deeply impressed by their successes (Packham 2004; Killick 1978: 45). For their part, the Soviets treated Nkrumah as a hero, awarding him the Lenin Peace Prize and offering him financial, technical, and military support (Mahoney 1983: 158). All of this influenced Nkrumah's choice to build a 'vanguard socialist party' and to attempt to rapidly industrialize Ghana.

At the same time, Nkrumah came under the sway of radical leftists in his party. One man in particular, Tawia Adamafio, had an especially pernicious effect on Nkrumah. A masterful rhetorician, Adamafio knew how to pander to Nkrumah's weakness for sycophancy. It was he who developed the myth of Nkrumah as the unassailable *Osagyefo*. By 1959, Adamafio had become CPP general party secretary. In that role, Adamafio relentlessly pressed Nkrumah to purify the party, to rid it of 'neo-colonialist forces' and 'petty-bourgeoisie, national opportunists,' and to expel all British still serving in the armed forces, the police, the civil service, and the university. Under his influence, Nkrumah intensified ideological education of the party and administration as a means "to build a Vanguard Party for the work of socialist reconstruction" (Adamafio 1982: 31). In short order, Adamafio's socialist study groups and youth party gained ascendency over CPP ministers, who were warned "to tow the party line or get out" (Adamafio 1982: 35).

Adamafio's influence splintered Nkrumah's party even further. In January 1960, Nkrumah removed his long-time friend Kojo Botsio as secretary of the CPP central committee. By July 1960, Adamafio had turned against K. A. Gbedemah, the minister of finance and second most important CPP leader. Their falling out began when Adamafio insisted that the civil service's "archaic snail-pace methods of work" was obstructing "expeditious progress" (Packham 2004: 159). His solution was to impose "an intensive socialist education" of the civil service, so as to "eliminate the bourgeois and petty bourgeois mentality" and "redeem them from the colonial mentality which negated their usefulness to the African revolution" (Adamafio 1982: 76). Gbedemah stringently objected to the politicization of the civil service, which he saw as a dangerous threat to administrative effectiveness. In response, Adamafio, speaking as the CPP party secretary, reminded Nkrumah that "the party was the foundation of all his power" and that "If at any election in future, the party failed, he and all his glorified civil

Kwame Nkrumah, First President of the Republic of Ghana. Vol. 2. Compiled by Samuel Obeng. Accra: Afram Publications (Ghana) Limited, 1961, p. 78.

servant ministers would pack up" (Adamafio 1982: 52). Under this threat, Nkrumah came to Adamafio's side of the dispute.

In May 1961, Adamafio replaced Gbedemah as minister of state for presidential affairs. That September, charges of dereliction of duty and corruption were brought against several of the old guard, including Gbedemah, Botsio, Krobo Edusei, and A. E. Inkumsah.[6] The following October, all four were removed from government, leaving the CPP "bereft of its early leaders" (Austin 1964: 407). The political coup was complete when the old guard was replaced by Adamafio's faction: Adamafio took over the position of minister of establishment, his protégés Coffee Crabbe and Ako Adjei were named minister of information and minister of foreign affairs, respectively, and his close associate Kwaku Boateng became the executive secretary of the CPP and was later named minister of the interior.

The loss of Gbedemah had a number of serious consequences for the future course of events. First, Gbedemah went into exile and joined the subversive forces working against Nkrumah. He worked secretly with the CIA on assassination plots (Mahoney 1983) and eventually joined forces with Dr. Busia and the exile community in Lomé (Bing 1968: 153). More decisively, his leaving seriously impacted the direction of the CPP's economic planning. "Under the strong but conservative hand of Minister of Finance Gbedemah, fiscal policy was used as an orthodox tool of economic stabilization" (Killick 1978: 154). With his departure in 1961, any restraint on Nkrumah's spending ambitions was removed. "Nkrumah was able to shift the whole emphasis of fiscal policy from a pursuit of domestic and external equilibrium to nothing much more than a search for resources to match the government's expenditure plans" (Killick 1978: 154).

III Policy Implications

Rapid Industrialization

As the undisputed head of state, Nkrumah was finally able to focus on his central goals: eradicating the colonial structure of Ghana's economy and promoting Pan-Africanism. To achieve the latter, Nkrumah believed Ghana had to make a 'total break' from traditional agriculture. He saw subsistence farming as an inferior form of activity that promoted "conservatism and acquisitiveness" rather than socialist values (Killick 1978: 46).

[6] Some of these men had embezzled large amounts of money. Inkumsah in particular had infamously bought his wife a gold bed.

Unlike Houphouët, who chose to build his export industry by expanding smallholder production, Nkrumah "had little faith in the modernizing capabilities of Ghana's millions of small-scale peasant farmers" (Killick 1978: 46). His urban bias was made explicit in an address to Parliament in October 1962, when Nkrumah declared: "We must produce food so cheaply that even the worker earning the minimum wage of 6s. 6d. a day can be fully fed for not more than 2d. s day" (Dadson 1970: 26).

In order to launch his revolution, the state's administrative apparatus would have to be transformed. No longer would the CPP be subject to 'outmoded planning models' of overseas advisors. His central concern was to end bureaucratic 'red-tapism' and adopt 'revolutionary methods.' Freed of the constraints of 'orthodoxy,' the CPP government pursued accelerated state-led industrialization. However, without any checks to his authority, Nkrumah's rush to industrialize and eradicate urban unemployment brought about the degeneration of the economy.

In October 1961, the existing Development Commission was dissolved and replaced by the State Planning Committee, directly responsible to the president. With Gbedemah and the CPP's former economic advisor, respected economist Arthur Lewis, out of favor, the government hired a team of Hungarian experts to draw up the broad lines of the plan. The new Seven-Year Plan was far more 'ambitious' than any that preceded it. Expenditures more than quadrupled. Whereas the previous development plan guided by Gbedemah and Lewis projected investment in agriculture and industry at £24.6 and £25.3 million, respectively, in the Seven-Year Plan, these projections had grown to £176.6 and £206.4 million (Ewusi 1974: 9).

The outlandish budget was justified by equally farfetched expectations of rates of industrialization. The plan projected that over seven years, 500,000 new jobs *a year* would need to be filled in industry and modernized agriculture. The CPP publication *Programme of the Convention People's Party for Work and Happiness*, published a few years earlier, had explained that "large pockets of unemployment in the urban areas" and "hidden" or "underemployment" of the rural work force resulted from the "agrarian character of the economy." Therefore, with "diversification and mechanisation of agriculture" a "substantial force of surplus labor" would be "released from the rural areas and transformed into industry." The pamphlet's authors even projected over the "Seven-Year Plan Period unemployment will have been *abolished* in Ghana" (1961: 32, italics mine). So great did the planners anticipate the need to speedily absorb laborers into the vast industrial schema, they recommended elementary education be shortened from 10 to eight years to keep pace with demand.

From exile, Gbedemah published a pamphlet, entitled: "It will not be "*Work and happiness for all"!: An open letter: being also an appeal to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and comment on and criticism of the proposed new 7 year Ghana Development Plan.*" Gbedemah stridently critiqued the Seven-Year Plan for "the vastness of the proposals," arguing that it was "over-ambitious, not only for a 7-year period, but wrong in concept for even a 14 year plan." He concluded with a direct appeal to Nkrumah:

> If I may say so, I don't think it is fair for a small country such as Ghana, unlike some other big countries with hundreds of millions of population, also to try to make a 'great leap forward'. We can be original in our ideas and try to learn from the mistakes others have made before us, can't we Mr. President? (Gbedemah 1962: 14)

Gbedemah was to be proven right. Over the next five years, as Nkrumah's government centralized and radicalized, the economy began to unravel.

From 1961 to 1962, the public sector took over virtually every part of the economy. There was the Ghana Tyres Corporation, the Ghana Laundry Corporation, the Ghana Brick and Tile Corporation, and the Star Bakery Corporation, as well as larger enterprises like the Black Star Shipping Corporation, the Ghana Airways Corporation, the Ghana States Farms Corporation, and the Ghana National Construction Corporation.

A central impetus behind the drive toward rapid industrialization was Nkrumah's desire to address urban unemployment. As Dadson explains, "the entire socialist sector of the economy [was] established as a device to solve the unemployment problem" and to attract "the rural educated youth into the industry" (1970: 214). With employment as the primary focus of the government's industrialization policy, state enterprises became dysfunctionally overstaffed, keeping "on average, at least twice as many clerical workers as other firms of the same size and type" (Killick 1978: 259).

To pursue his revolutionary objectives, Nkrumah had to circumvent the civil service, whose intransigence and antipathy to socialism impeded reform. In 1961, Nkrumah accelerated the Africanization of the civil service. Appointments to senior administrative positions became based on party affiliation rather than educational qualifications. To sideline the ministries, Nkrumah created 'Secretariats' wholly responsible to him. He created a Labour Secretariat that ran parallel to the Ministry of Labour, a Chieftaincy Secretariat that managed chieftaincy affairs, a Publicity Secretariat that took over the functions of the Ministry of Information, etc. In this way, the Office of the President came to control every aspect of the central administration (Amonoo 1981).

Though Nkrumah was pursuing laudable goals, the effects of his policies were disastrous. Under the old system, ministries followed civil service procedures: conducting feasibility studies and assessing the creditworthiness of contractors before embarking on major development projects. Now all such procedures were disbanded – nothing was properly vetted; no checks were put on spending. In the absence of proper oversight, "New projects appeared which had never been envisaged in the Plan but were now being pushed by contractors willing to pay commissions to the persons who accepted them . . . New enterprises were distributed among party functionaries as private fiefs, enabling them to give patronage to relatives, friends and supporters" (Rimmer quoted in Killick 1978: 140).

With such poor oversight, a myriad of problems emerged. Large capital projects were irrationally chosen. "Through the inexperience and venality of Ghanaian officials, as well as the greed, bribery and political machinations of project salesmen from both East and West, the Government contracted for many overpriced, poorly designed enterprises" (Esseks 1975: 41). Several enterprises were located in areas as political rewards, with little regard to practicality. A glass factory was located in a Krobo area, long-time CPP adherents, putting it miles away from the main points of consumption and increasing the already high transportation costs endemic to the industry. A corned beef factory was constructed in Bolgatanga, for which no provision was made to supply beef; its machines lay idle. Two sugar factories were erected in Komenda and Sutsuare where no sugarcane was grown and little planning was made for how the cane would be transported to feed the machines. The Komenda factory stood idle for more than a year because it also lacked a water supply system (Killick 1978: 231; Afrifa 1967: 91).

Beyond the inefficiencies, the strategy of accelerated industrialization was poorly suited to the conditions of the country. Part of the problem was little to no distinction was made between 'industrialization' and 'development.' As a result, the traditional sector, representing more than 60 percent of the labor force, was largely ignored. Instead, the government focused on advanced technologies. Factories ill-suited to the conditions in Ghana were "imported wholesale" (Killick 1978: 178). Over the next five years, expenditure on new machinery, virtually all of which was made abroad, increased 34 percent (Esseks 1975: 40). At the same time, the CPP's success at expanding elementary education led to a rural exodus, contributing to rising urban unemployment. By 1962, "Massive urbanization was under way as educated Ghanaian youth left rural areas for opportunities in the city" (Mikell 1989a: 183).

The situation was made worse by terrible import licensing policies made the situation worse. To encourage fledgling national industries,

the CPP limited the allocation of import licenses for raw materials, spare parts, and capital equipment. Instead of encouraging industrial growth, the policies created disastrous shortages (Killick 1978; Afrifa 1967: 90). Shortages reached such proportions by 1964 that "Scarcities of sugar, drugs, tyres and vehicle spare parts were reported ... the following year, milk, flour and fabrics began to disappear from the shops for prolonged periods. Municipal water systems ran out of water-purifying chemicals; hospitals reported shortages of X-ray fluid, vaccines and other vital supplies" (Esseks 1975: 38).

The economy worsened when world cocoa prices began to fall in 1960 and the balance of payments deficit increased as overseas companies began repatriating large portions of their profits (Packham 2004: 160). Nor did overseas capital investment amount to anything near the economic planners' projections. The financing of these under-producing enterprises became dependent upon suppliers' credit, with very high interest rates. With imports decreasing and money being pumped into the economy, inflation soared (Esseks 1975: 40).

All of this resulted in industrial failure on a colossal scale. A report prepared for Parliament in 1964 by the Ministry of Finance found almost all of the 32 state-owned corporations it received accounts from were working at deficits (see Table 15). The Ministry found several large government enterprises, such as the Ghana National Construction Corporation, not only paid exorbitant salaries to workers and administrators, but also kept on 'redundant labor' "as a result of Government policy to reduce unemployment."[7] Other corporations failed because they had almost no market share and exceedingly low sales, like the Workers and Farmers Company, which consistently operated with less cash than it needed for day-to-day expenses. Still others operated far below capacity, such as the Vegetable Oil Mills Corporation and the Cannery Corporation. For some corporations, the losses were compounded by the fact that the government had taken them over with severe debts.

Agriculture

As bad as the government's industrial policies were, the agricultural policies were possibly worse. In 1962, it was decided to introduce mechanized farming on a large scale. The Ghana State Farms Corporation (SFC) was established "to produce food-stuffs and agricultural raw materials for

[7] "The Financial Position of State Corporations." *The Budget 1965*. Accra: Ministry of Finance, 1964, p. 15.

Table 15 *CPP government investment in 32 state-owned corporations*

Government direct capital investment	25,545,571
Government loans	12,104,414
Total	*39,649,985*
Accumulated losses	15,120,391
Accumulated profits	1,244,137
Net accumulated losses	*13,876,284*

Source: The Financial Position of State Corporations. Accra: Ministry of Finance, 1964

industry at competitive prices by using modern and most economic methods of farming."[8] By 1965, the government was operating 105 farms all over the country, many of which were mechanized.

Over time, as a higher portion of agricultural expenditures went to government farms, support for peasant farmers declined (Killick 1978: 205; Miracle & Seidman 1968: 35). Nkrumah began to dismantle the system in place. The provision of extension services was transferred from the Ministry of Agriculture to the United Ghana Farmers' Council of Cooperatives (UGFCC). But the UGFCC lacked the expertise and administrative capacity, as well as the motivation, to handle its expanded responsibilities. Farming extension services were soon hampered by serious shortages, in part due to the reduction of imports like machetes, fertilizers, and seed, but also because of the UGFCC officers' incompetence and venality.[9] As export revenue contracted, the government eliminated subsidies to farmers to help combat disease and infestations. By 1965, subsidies for motorized spraying machines were completely removed; farmers had to pay inflated prices for whatever spraying machines were available.[10]

Farmers' access to land was also curtailed. The state requisitioned farmers' lands while prohibiting farmers from obtaining permits to initiate or expand their agricultural businesses (Mikell 1989a: 184). As the state farms displaced peasants, fear spread that the state would take over all their farmland, further alienating smallholders (Dadson 1970).

Not only did state farms take land and supplies away from peasant farmers, their performance was dismal. By 1965, there was little to show for the 19.8 million cedes in subventions the government had sunk into

[8] "The Financial Position of State Corporations." *The Budget 1965*. Accra: Ministry of Finance, 1964, p. 22.

[9] *Part II. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company*. 1956, p. 51.

[10] Ibid., p. 50.

the corporation. Though liberally equipped with tractors and other imported machinery, it succeeded in planting only 10 percent of its available acreage. Food crop harvests were for the most part negligible, except for rice and maize. The only modicum of success was found among some rubber and oil palm plantations, particularly those in the Western Region (Mikell 1989a; Killick 1978; Esseks 1975; Dadson 1970).

There were several reasons for the failure of the state farms. Mechanized farming faced serious challenges no one anticipated:

> Anthills, steep slopes, stumps, roots and rocks caused damage to machines. Cleared land tended to erode when exposed to the heavy rains. Improper operation of machinery and frequent breakage led to increased costs for spare parts and made it necessary to set up local workshops and servicing units. Lack of scheduled maintenance programs and lack of skilled fitters aggravated the problems. (Miracle & Seidman 1968a: 11)

Farmers were inadequately trained and educated:

> Skilled labor was scarce. Most employees had no education. The laborers worked in groups under the supervision of a headman who possessed seniority, although he frequently lacked adequate skills. Even estate factory men were semi-literate and learned their skills on the job. (Miracle & Seidman 1968a: 12)

The SFC's dysfunctions were also fueled by the CPP's fear of technocrats. From its inception, "The members of party branches had been fed on venom against persons of the well-educated class" (Adamafio 1982: 57). In the 1960s, the CPP still harbored a general "distrust of white-collar agriculturalists" (Dadson 1970: 131), claiming they "'lived in an Ivory tower' at the experiment stations and 'lorded it over the farmers'" (Miracle & Seidman 1968a: 31). This sentiment was most extreme in the agricultural division of the Workers' Brigade, which refused to recruit anyone educated beyond secondary school.

Having few competent mangers, farm production programs suffered from the absence of overall agricultural planning objectives (Dadson 1970: 131). State farms became both labor- and machine-intensive, resulting in overstaffing and underused machinery (Killick 1978). Even with a high number of workers, state farms proved one-fourth as productive as ordinary peasants (Mikell 1989a: 184).

Though the express reason behind the SFC was to lower food costs, in actuality, far greater emphasis was placed on producing raw materials for Ghanaian industries. Rubber, jute, and oil seed crops were promoted above others (Dadson 1970: 72–73). Though the Northern and Upper Regions held the greatest possibility for producing high-caloric food, few farms were sited there. This was against the stated

objectives of the Seven-Year Plan, which underscored the need to increase production in the north because of its potential to increase food supply. Instead, the SFC's greatest expansion was in the Western Region, where oil and rubber plantations were among the most successful of the whole scheme (Dadson 1970: 152–153). Perhaps not coincidentally, many of the successful oil-palm plantations were sited near Half Assini and Dix Cove, the region of Nkrumah's ethnic group, the Nzima.

All in all, Nkrumah's agriculture policy hinged on the success of the state farms, and they were a dismal failure. State farms were established with little planning, had acute shortages of trained personnel and supplies, and most of the machines and equipment were usually out of service. Farmers began defecting from cooperatives as it became clear that the SFC was taking them away from productive time on their own farms. The SFC's low productivity impacted industry. Low levels of food production led to soaring food costs and widespread discontent (Killick 1978: 206). A critical study of state farms concluded that, "If the Government of Ghana had used the same amount of money and organizational talent that were expended on the state farm programs, to develop techniques and provide incentives for small famers, there would probably have been a far greater increase in domestic food production (Miracle & Seidman 1968b: 46).

Failed Rural Political Policies

In terms of rural political gains, the CPP initially won many rural adherents with its popular policies and administrative innovations. Nkrumah successfully expanded primary and secondary education. Improvements were made in rural health, water, roads, and communications. The CPP also had success in penetrating into the rural areas. Regional Commissioners (RCs) and District Commissioners (DCs), appointed on the basis of party involvement, replaced colonial government agents and preexisting Village Development Committees were incorporated into the party. All these party institutions acted as the eyes and ears of the central government.

However, these same institutions over time alienated several village communities. Many RCs became satraps, holding the strings for development funds, contracts, and promotions (Woronoff 1972). DCs generally appointed favorites to local councils, often against the wishes of the communities. Far from encouraging local self-determination, Village Development Committees tended to advance the party faithful at the community's expense. In many localities, chiefs became rival centers of power and loyalty. In some instances, DCs and Village Development Committees came into direct conflict with traditional

authorities, particularly in former UP strongholds. Excluding traditional authorities from local government further eroded rural support (Amonoo 1981: 160–161).

Similarly, when the UGFCC assumed control over inputs, services, loans, and development assistance after 1962, the government moved large numbers of farmers into its orbit (Mikell 1989a: 179). But these successes were not without costs. Farmers complained the UGFCC imposed high interest rates on loans. Corruption was alleged to be widespread (Miracle & Seidman 1968a: 35–36). By the time of the coup, the UGFCC was seen, "in the popular mind, as the CPP's weapon to reduce the farmers of Ghana into a submissive docile rural mass" (Dadson 1970: 284).

Cocoa-growing regions were the hardest hit. In 1961, Nkrumah made the UGFCC the sole licensed buying agent for the Cocoa Marketing Board. The takeover undermined the autonomy of cocoa growers and vested greater power in Accra. Even CPP members involved in the cocoa trade cooled toward the CPP (Mikell 1989a: 177).

Despite worsening living conditions and rising food prices, the government imposed higher taxes on cocoa growers. It extracted 'voluntary contributions' from farmers with compulsory savings schemes.[11] When the government was forced to lower cocoa producer prices in 1965, farmers' real income fell 70 percent below the lowest recorded level during the Great Depression.

Cumulatively, these government policies led to the contraction of the cocoa industry – Ghana's lifeblood. Rising food costs drove up labor costs, forcing farmers to cut back on hired hands. Migrant laborers working in the cocoa industry left Ghana for neighboring Côte d'Ivoire, where wages and living costs were better.[12] Increases in government-sector employment drained labor away from private agriculture. Youth left farms for the prospect of urban jobs. Eventually, as producer prices dropped, farmers stopped investing in new cocoa plantings (Mikell 1989a; Miracle & Seidman 1968).

Thus, although the CPP extended its control in the periphery, for the most part it whittled away its rural support. Just as in 1953, the regime imposed order on localities without sensitivity to local conditions. Instead, the UGFCC and the Workers' Brigade terrorized populations. By 1965, the regime's early achievements in rural areas were overshadowed by its oppression and economic failures. "It was only a question of

[11] *Economic Survey* 1962, p. 34, paragraph 71.
[12] *Part II Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Affairs of the Cocoa Purchasing Company*. 1956, p. 41. See also Mikell 1989a.

time before both rural and urban reactions . . . demanded some form of change" (Mikell 1989a: 187–188).

IV Nkrumah and the Military

Arguably one of the most significant turning points for Nkrumah's government came after an attempt was made on his life in the small northern town of Kulungugu. Nkrumah emerged from the experience a changed man. Seriously paranoid, he took actions that dangerously eroded his support base. The more he tried to shore himself up against real and perceived threats, the more enemies he made. Over the next three years, he undermined the judicial system, dealt harshly with 'suspected' opposition leaders, and increased surveillance on ordinary citizens. Most serious of all, he built up a paramilitary force that undermined Ghana's traditional military.

Interfering with Security Apparatus

On August 1, 1962, the president and his retinue were returning from a visit with the president of Upper Volta (Burkina Faso). A stop was scheduled along the route in Kulungugu, a small village in the north, where the president was to be greeted by a group of admirers. As Nkrumah stepped out of his car, a hand grenade exploded, just missing him, but killing two people, including a small boy about to present the *Osagyefo* a bouquet of flowers. Though Nkrumah was only slightly wounded, he was deeply shaken.

On September 2, another attempt was made on Nkrumah's life. A bomb exploded outside his residence, killing three children and wounding many others. Two more explosions in Accra followed. In all, 15 people were killed and 256 injured. A state of emergency was declared in the Greater Accra and Tema townships and a 5:30 P.M. curfew imposed. Police and the army conducted house-to-house searches. Armored cars were positioned around the city.[13] The blockade lasted until the end of 1963, by which time more than 500 people had been imprisoned under preventative detention orders (Baynham 1988).

Almost immediately after the Kulungugu explosion, suspicion fell on Adamafio. Those angered by Tawia's thirst for power were finally able to strike back. It was charged that Adamafio and his associates suspiciously and uncharacteristically placed themselves several cars back in the motorcade, as if privy to the assassination attempt ahead of time. On August 29,

[13] *Daily Graphic*, Monday, September 24, 1962, No. 3,730, p. 1.

Adamafio and two of his close associates and fellow Gãs, Coffee Crabbe and Ako Adjei, were arrested under preventive detention orders. The case eventually went before the Supreme Court, where all three were acquitted because of insufficient evidence. Nkrumah, infuriated by this verdict, dismissed one of the justices, Sir Arku Korsah, and signed into law an executive order allowing him to reverse the Supreme Court's decision. During the retrial, the three were found guilty and sentenced to death (later commuted).

These events further eroded Nkrumah's support. With Sir Arku Korsah's dismissal, Nkrumah lost support among the members of the old establishment still working with him.[14] Even the radical leftist lawyer Geoffrey Bing, considered by many Nkrumah's legal henchman, admitted that this "was the one moment when I seriously considered resignation" (Bing 1968: 311).

With Adamafio's clique eliminated, a few of the old CPP guard regained their standing. Kojo Botsio and Krobo Edusei were named foreign minister and minister of agriculture, respectively. However, Nkrumah's erratic behavior had undermined the confidence of his own associates. Nor was Nkrumah able to restore several of his former allies. Despite periodic offers of amnesty, his opponents harbored such deep hatred for him that his offers were rebuffed. In an open letter, Gbedemah wrote, "Your assurances of protection and immunity from molestation are too watery for me not to see through their shallowness" (1962: 10). After Danquah died in prison and his family was forbidden to give him an elaborate funeral, Appiah proclaimed that "My hatred for the regime grew to such proportions that I was prepared now to risk everything I possessed in this world, including life itself, for the total destruction of this abominable Frankenstein monster that my poor country had created in all sweet innocence" (1990: 271).

Nkrumah himself became increasingly isolated and paranoid. Suspicious of virtually everyone, he made infrequent visits to his own ministries. After July 1962, a strong security cordon was built around the *Osagyefo* in Flagstaff House. Nkrumah even had sealed water brought to him out of fear of being poisoned (Packham 2004: 173). A U.S. State Department memo dated February 24, 1963, relays that "Nkrumah had not been out of his castle since January 2."[15]

[14] Like Sir Tsibu Darku, chairman of the Cocoa Marketing Board, and Sir Emmanuel Quist, former speaker of the National Assembly. Justice Van Lare, who had been on the court, resigned. See Packham 2004: 167; Bing 1968: 310.

[15] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 238, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, DC, February 12, 1964, 4:30 P.M. (Source: Department of State, Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330,

Table 16 *Ethnic breakdown of Nkrumah's cabinet*

Year	Akan		Ewe		Gã-Adangbe		Guan		Northern		Total
	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No	%	No
1952	3	37.5%	1	12.5	2	25	1	12.5	1	12.5	8
1954	6	54.5	1	9	1	9	1	9	2	18	11
1956	8	61.5	1	7.6	1	7.6	1	7.6	2	15.3	13
1965	13	68.4	0	0	1	5	2	10.5	3	15.7	19

Source: Asante & Gyimah-Boadi 2004 (combined tables 10 and 11, p. 70)

As his trust in others eroded, Nkrumah turned to his small ethnic group, the Nzima. By 1965, the president had no Ewes in his cabinet, despite the fact that they make up almost 13 percent of the Ghanaian population (see Table 16). Yet he had appointed *three* Nzimas to his cabinet, who make up only 1.2 percent of the population (Asante & Gyimah-Boadi 2004).

The intelligence services also came under Nzima control. It began with Nkrumah's appointment of Ambrose Yankey, an Nzima, as his personal advisor. In early 1963, Yankey helped Nkrumah establish a special intelligence unit, putting particular emphasis on recruiting Nzimas (Packham 2004: 167). Soviet agents were hired to train Yankey's unit in surveillance techniques. Spies, men and women, were instructed to uncover any dissension against the CPP and stationed everywhere, including factories, offices, shops, public transport, political rallies, and drinking establishments. The special intelligence unit also monitored other intelligence and security organizations. Nkrumah rapidly promoted another Nzima, M. M. Hassan, eventually making him the first director of military intelligence (Baynham 1988: 136). At the same time, the CPP youth organizations, the Ghana Young Pioneers and the Workers' Brigade, were all militarized (Packham 2004: 167; Baynham 1988: 135).

Despite these security measures, Nkrumah failed to prevent another attempt on his life. On January 2, 1964, a police constable on duty at Flagstaff House fired five shots at Nkrumah, missing him, but killing his personal bodyguard who shielded the *Osagyefo*. The response was immediate. The police constable, Seth Ametwee, was tried and hanged. Within a week, the entire police force was reorganized and disarmed. Its special guard

February 1964. Secret. Drafted by Willis C. Armstrong. Approved in M on February 24, in S on February 27, and by the White House on February 24. The meeting took place at the White House. The source text is labeled "Part IV of VI.")

at Flagstaff House was dissolved and responsibility for Nkrumah's personal security was transferred to the Presidential Detail Department (PDD). The senior police staff, including the police commissioner, assistant commissioner, and superintendent, were dismissed, many imprisoned at Nsawam Prison under preventive detention orders (Packham 2004: 173; Baynham 1988: 133–135).

Following Kulungugu, Nkrumah also began arming his presidential guard. Originally established in 1960 as a ceremonial regiment, it was now renamed the President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR). Everything required for the Guard Regiment was given top priority. It received Soviet equipment, including armored cars, field artillery, high-velocity AK-47 rifles, and special uniforms. Its members were also given special training in the USSR (Baynham 1988; Ocran 1977). In July 1965, the POGR was officially detached from army command.

Distrusting his majority Ewe, Gã, and Ashanti officer corps, Nkrumah put his special forces under the direction of two northerners: Major-General C. M. Barwah, a Dagomba, and Lieutenant-Colonel David Gbon Zanlerigu, a Fra-Fra from the extreme north. These two men were the only northerners trained as officers under the British. Zanlerigu was appointed the commander of the POGR and Barwah was made the liaison officer between the guard and the regular forces. Against normal army protocol, Nkrumah consulted Barwah rather than his General Chief of Defence Staff, who kept Guard Regiment operations secret from regular army forces (Ocran 1977).

Thus Nkrumah created a dual security apparatus that mirrored his dual government administration. Just as fear of his civil servants had driven him to create Secretariats under the Office of the President, he now created a second army, answerable to him alone and with no ties to the British. Resources were diverted away from the regular armed forces to support the Guard Regiment. Where the Guard Regiment was outfitted with new weaponry and equipment, the regular armed forces languished with non-functioning radios, beaten up vehicles, and extreme supply shortages (Baynham 1988: 138).

By 1965, Nkrumah appears to have been suffering from a nervous breakdown. The U.S. ambassador to Ghana sent a telegram in April reporting that during his conversation with Nkrumah, the president broke down:

> At this point Nkrumah, who had been holding face in hands, looked up and I saw he was crying. With difficulty he said I could not understand ordeal he had been through during last month. Recalled that there had been seven attempts on his life. Also that

he was upset with problem executions. ("You know why I commuted the sentences?" I replied I assumed it for humanitarian reasons. "It was for Africa, for Africa.")[16]

At the same time, Nkrumah's popularity plummeted. Increased surveillance of the population, with the special intelligence unit, Ghana Young Pioneers (GYP), and the militarization of the Workers' Brigade, had a chilling effect. Afrifa describes how:

> Between 1961 and 1966 the old regime of Kwame Nkrumah had instilled fear into every Ghanaian. There were security men and women everywhere and no one trusted his friend. Fathers did not trust their sons who had been indoctrinated with the young Pioneer ideas, neither did husbands trust their wives. It was a reign of terror. (1967: 37)

Austin depicts a similarly grim picture: "Local opposition continued to rise . . . Hardly a family did not have friends or relatives in Preventive Detention" (1968: 785–6).

By 1965, the CPP itself was unraveling. "Intrigue and manipulation, factionalism and internal conflict increased until the party was so riddled with opportunism that instead of becoming a nucleus for a new society, it was a bundle of competitive interests – hardly an effective organization" (Apter 1968: 782). Apter describes the profound change Ghana had undergone. "From a fraternal, open, populist society, Ghana began to change into something else. Fear and a conspiratorial undercurrent became noticeably common" (Apter 1968: 782).

Several subversive plots were hatched between 1964 and 1966, although all abortive.[17] Despite the worsening morale of his offers and the impoverished condition of his troops, on November 25, Nkrumah asked the Parliament for authorization to send troops to Rhodesia. This exceedingly unpopular proposal made an imminent coup almost certain. "[B]y the first week of January 1966, the impending doom was being whispered between trusted friends, including even some ministers of state, regional commissioners and party activists" (Appiah 1990: 271). Even Michael Dei-Anang, Nkrumah's close associate and the director of the African Affairs Secretariat, principal secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs described how "Everyone had an eerie sense of things not being right somehow and I was personally unhappy about something

[16] Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 252. Telegram From the Embassy in Ghana to the Department of State, Accra, April 2, 1965, 6 P.M.

[17] See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 251, Memorandum of Conversation, Washington, March 11, 1965, 3–3:30 P.M.; Baynham 1988: 143, 156; Afrifa 1967.

being 'in the air' without being able to identify it specifically" (Davidson 1989: 202).

When the Nigerian president was ousted a fortnight before Nkrumah's peace mission to Vietnam, "an atmosphere of restlessness and impending drama began to prevail" within the rank and file, as soldiers began "waiting impatiently for 'our coup'" (Baynham 1988: 154). The week before his departure, there were reports of military plots. His aides urged him not to leave the country, but Nkrumah ignored their warnings (Mahoney 1983: 158).

The Coup

Nkrumah was in Peking, en route to Hanoi, on February 24, 1966, when Major A. A. Afrifa, Colonel E. K. Kotoka, and Inspector-General of Police J. W. Harlley proclaimed over Ghanaian radio that Nkrumah's government was over. 'Operation Cold Chop,'[18] the code name for the coup plot, had begun in the early morning hours. Colonel Kotoka and Major Afrifa used the cover of scheduled maneuvers in preparation for the Rhodesian intervention to bring their battalion to Accra. In a coordinated effort, the police arrested all major CPP leaders and politicians around the country.

The coup was relatively bloodless and over quickly. Armed resistance to the insurgents was restricted to the environs of Flagstaff House, where one of the Guard Regiment and seven soldiers were killed. General Barwah was the only ranking officer to die, allegedly while resisting arrest (Baynham 1988: 189). Describing his impression of the coup two years later, Apter wrote:

> Few tears were shed over Nkrumah's downfall. There was rejoicing in the streets. The life-size statue of Nkrumah in front of Parliament House was pulled down and smashed. (Apter 1968: 787)

It is often charged that the CIA orchestrated the 1966 coup. In fact, there is clear evidence of U.S. involvement in several coup attempts against Nkrumah. CIA documents discuss the possibility of Ankrah taking over the Ghanaian government in February 1964 – two years before the actual coup. The U.S. ambassador was clearly informed by an agent in contact with the military leaders of Ankrah, Otu, and Harlley's coup plot.[19]

[18] The coup plot was so named because 'chop' was the slang term for food, and 'cold chop' could be had with little work. See Baynham 1988.

[19] See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 257; and The Socialist Forum of Ghana, *The Great Deception, Second Edition.* Accra, 2007.

Yet Nkrumah's defeat cannot be wholly explained as a function of outside forces. Other leftist leaders, like Fidel Castro, survived for decades even though the CIA had just as much desire to eliminate them. Arguably, what was more critical to the success of the coup was the fact that Nkrumah's policies had alienated the military, the police, and the majority of the Ghanaian population.[20] Indeed, immediately after Nkrumah's ouster Apter found, "There is little sentiment for his return. Most of his friends seem relieved he is gone" (1968: 759). As Davidson argues:

> One would have to be very naïve to imagine that no such influences were upon the scene, though the actual manner and degree of their involvement remain obscure . . . But the crucial fact about the *coup* was that the vast majority of people appear to have made absolutely no objection to it. And this must be traced not to any great enthusiasm for the *coup*-makers, except in the ranks of the traditional opposition, but to the decay of the CPP as a party of the people. (Davidson 1989: 208)

One of the clearest pieces of evidence that the 1966 coup resulted from Nkrumah's poor policies is the change of heart of his officer corps. Several officers supportive of the 1966 coup had only nine years earlier, in 1957, supported the court-martial of a young Captain for conspiring against the government. Interviewed years later, the officers still felt that Captain Awhaitey's actions had been illegal and constituted unprofessional behavior. In fact, two of the officers who passed sentence on Captain Awhaitey were principal participants in the 1966 coup: Ocran and Kotoka (Baynham 1988).

A number of factors contributed to this change of attitude. Ethnic politics appears to have played a role. The officer corps under Nkrumah was largely Ewe and Gã. Yet Nkrumah repeatedly passed over Ewe and Gã officers for promotion. A similar pattern was evident within the command of the paramilitary forces. Though the Ewe were disproportionately represented in the officer corps, all four of Nkrumah's alternative security forces – The Guard Regiment, Military Intelligence, the Workers' Brigade, and Special Intelligence – were directed by Nzimas or northerners who received training from the Soviets (Baynham 1988).[21]

[20] Excerpts from CIA cables summarized in a Memorandum for the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Helms, dated February 25, 1966, further support this view. See Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXIV, Africa, Document 257.

[21] Kraus expresses reservation on placing so much emphasis on ethnicity. He points out that Nkrumah had made several appointments of Ewe and Gãs in his party and government. See Kraus 1990: 581. However, Ewe and Gã officers made up the majority of the senior police and army staff. Nkrumah actually had little choice but to promote them.

Equally critical was the fact that Nkrumah's partnership with the Soviets threatened the established military command. The Ghanaian officer corps had been trained at the British academies of Sandhurst and Eaton Hall. Nkrumah's decision in 1961 to send recruits to Eastern Europe for training and to receive military supplies from the Eastern Bloc was perceived by the established military as a threat to the cohesiveness of the military. Nkrumah also subjected the military to socialist indoctrination (Mahoney 1983: 171; Price 1971a: 402).

Afrifa and Ocran published accounts of the coup soon after it occurred. They both describe the military's outrage over the fact that the armed forces were reduced to wearing tattered uniforms and forced to make do with extreme supply shortages and deteriorating equipment, while the Guard Regiment enjoyed "kingly treatment" (Afrifa 1967: 100), "receiving the best of everything! The best of equipment, the best of rations, the best of morale" (Ocran 1968: 34). Ocran refers to Nkrumah's interference in the military administration and operations as a "deliberate tactic" to "liquidate the Regular forces" (Ocran 1968: 80) and claims that Nkrumah's "second Army" was designed to "gradually strangle the Regular Army to death" (Ocran 1968: 37). He describes how "Army authorities" feared the cadets trained in the Soviet Union would be used "to replace us, the so-called 'bourgeois and colonialist-oriented officers,'" in "a communist-inspired take-over of the Government" (Ocran 1968: 14).

Furthermore, at least some members of the officer corps appear to have supported the opposition from the outset. Nkrumah himself suspected his officer corps was sympathetic to the opposition. After his ouster he claimed he had inherited "an African officer corps which contained a high proportion of individuals who were either actively hostile to the CPP and myself and who were anti-socialist in outlook" (Nkrumah 1966: 38). There is circumstantial evidence that this was so.

Nine of those involved in the planning of 'Operation Cold Chop' were Ewes from Anlo, the most vociferously anti-CPP region in southern Volta (see Table 17).[22] The other plotters were from conservative backgrounds, such as Lieutenant-Colonel John Addy, who came from a privileged Gã family, and Lieutenant L. A. Okai, from a wealthy Akwaupim family in

Moreover, after Kulungugu, Nkrumah's most important Gã appointees were in preventive detention. See Baynham 1988.

[22] M. K. Apaloo, the head of the Togoland Congress who was arrested for the first conspiracy plot against Nkrumah, was from Anlo, as was the ex-CPP minister in exile Kolma Gbedemah.

Table 17 *Ethnicity of anti-Nkrumah conspirators*

Conspirator	Conspiracy	Ethnicity
Captain Awhaitey	Awhaitey Affair	Ewe
Modesto K. Apaloo	Awhaitey Affair	Ewe (Anlo)
Reginald Reynolds Amponsah	Awhaitey Affair	Gã
Brigadier General Joseph M. Michel	Alleged plot	Ewe
Lieutenant-Colonel Crabbe	Alleged plot	Gã
Obetsibi Lamptey	Kulungugu	Gã
Police Constable Seth Ametwee	1964 shooting	Ewe
General Joseph A. Ankrah	Alleged plot	Gã
General Stephan J. Otu	Alleged plot	Akwaupim
Commissioner of Police John Kofi Harlley,	Operation Cold Chop (inner circle)	Ewe (Anlo)
Deputy Commissioner of Police Anthony Deku	Operation Cold Chop (inner circle)	Ewe (Anlo)
Captain Francis Kwashie	Operation Cold Chop (inner circle)	Ewe (Anlo)
Lieutenant-Colonel Kotoka	Operation Cold Chop (inner circle)	Ewe (Anlo)
Lieutenant-Colonel Alphonse le Sage Kattah	Awhaitey Affair, Operation Cold Chop	Ewe (Anlo)
Lieutenant-Colonel Clement Tevie	Awhaitey Affair, Operation Cold Chop	Ewe (Anlo)
Major Dedjoe	Operation Cold Chop	Ewe (Anlo)
Captain Avevor	Operation Cold Chop	Ewe (Anlo)
Captain (acting Major) Akawsi Amankwa Afrifa	Operation Cold Chop	Ashanti
Major I.A. Ashitey	Operation Cold Chop	Gã
Lieutenant-Colonel John Addy	Operation Cold Chop	Gã
Captain AM Tetteh	Operation Cold Chop	Gã
Major Victor Coker-Appiah	Operation Cold Chop	Fanti
Colonel Ocran	Operation Cold Chap	Fanti

Source: Simon Baynham, *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana.* London: Westview Press, 1988

the cocoa-growing Eastern Region. Major Afrifa came from a long line of chiefs who served as commanders in the Ashanti army. In his account, Afrifa charged that Nkrumah had marshaled "the 80 per cent illiterate citizens around himself" against "the rightful authors of Ghana's Independence – men who were his hosts" (1967: 54). He also expressed anger over how Nkrumah, the "upstart," "trampled underfoot" Ashanti honors by abrogating to himself the paraphernalia and titles reserved for Ashanti kings (1967: 115). Indeed, one of the conspirators, Lieutenant-Colonel Alphonse Kattah, was involved in several conspiracies,

including the first assassination plot launched against Nkrumah (Baynham 1988: 157).

Thus, Nkrumah's poor management of his military, in combination with the failing economy and dysfunctional party administration, paved the way for the successful *coup d'état*. In the end, Nkrumah's increasingly repressive measures designed to suppress his opposition created the gathering storm that destroyed him. The centralization of power in the Office of the President, the creation of the Soviet-trained POGR to displace the military and the police, the surveillance of the Young Pioneers, the spread of undercover spies, the unpredictable dismissal of judges, police, and army officers, the increasingly irrational government spending, and his own withdrawal from Ghanaian life all conspired to create a situation in which a coup, whether in February 1966 or soon after, had become inevitable.

V Conclusion

So many tragedies are associated with Nkrumah. The greatest may be that his analysis of neo-imperialism and prognosis for the African continent was extraordinarily insightful. Nkrumah rightly understood that only a unified Africa could compete in the world economy. In many ways, Nkrumah's disdain for orthodoxy is understandable. He was a man who had achieved the impossible, launching the emancipation of a subjugated continent in less than a decade. During the same time frame, he himself had gone from being a penniless student to a world leader.

It seems his brilliance outstripped his time and his capabilities. "He was a revolutionary without a plan – a visionary, but not a builder. The combination was a disaster – not only politically, but economically as well" (Apter 1968: 788). The tragedy of Nkrumah is so palpable that even a participant in the 1966 coup, Colonel Afrifa, expressed similar sentiments:

> Kwame Nkrumah could have been a great man ... At the beginning of his political career Nkrumah represented the hopes and aspiration of black people all over the world ... One cannot underrate his impact on African politics and his contribution to the emancipation movement of the black people in their quest for dignity and a place in history ... It is sad that a Ghanaian becomes a stateless vagabond in a strange land, among people whose language he does not understand and whose ways are strange to him ... But like Napoleon he will die in exile and we Ghanaians will mourn his better part. (Afrifa 1967: 121–123)

In the end, despite the enormous challenges he faced, Nkrumah's fall was due to his feeble leadership and extreme urban bias: his drive to suppress ethno-regional opponents rather than coopt them, his irrational approach to industrialization, his disdain for peasant agriculture and traditional elites, and his promotion of urban 'school leavers' over educated technocrats. As a result, Nkrumah "wanted a revolution; instead he got a shambles" (Killick 1978: 41, 195).

7 A Rural Strategy Builds a Nation – Félix Houphouët-Boigny 1960–1980

Houphouët's political success is primarily due to his strategic approach to state-building. Houphouët fostered an image of himself as the country's benevolent patriarch, '*le Vieux*,' guiding the well-being of his people. *Le Vieux* personally mediated conflicts in all sectors of society, including public-sector demands, regional and local disputes, and discontent within the military. His system, dubbed '*Le modèle houphouétiste*,' emphasized integration, open migration, and foreign participation (and penetration) in the economy. It was characterized by the use of compromise, negotiation, and reward. With *'Le modèle houphouétiste*,' most potential challengers were peacefully incorporated into the system (Almås 2007; Langer 2004; Kieffer 2000; Bakary 1984).

L'Houphouëtisme is also a quintessential example of a 'rural political strategy.' Houphouët used economic incentives to coopt actual and prospective ethno-regional challengers. His ability to keep them in the fold was due in large part to his development agenda. Houphouët's central priority was developing the country's export sector by expanding the existing agricultural system and supporting small-scale farmers. He also tried to develop multiple poles of development within the territory and used an informal ethnic quota system to ensure that representatives from all major ethnic groups had positions in state institutions.

Therefore, unlike Nkrumah's Ghana, where most political agitation came from the leaders of former ethnic/regional parties, under Houphouët, most political unrest was urban: riots against foreign laborers, university student protests, civil servant strikes, and unemployment demonstrations. Nonetheless, urban unrest never presented a serious threat to the PDCI regime.

I *Le modèle houphouétiste*

Houphouët's success at political consolidation is reflected in the fact that Côte d'Ivoire had relatively little ethnic politicization. Even violent incidents in Gagnoa and Aboisso did not provoke broader conflicts. This was because

Houphouët's rural political strategy hollowed out the possibility of competing powerbases. The most influential, educated, and politicized ethnic leaders were coopted. His system at once offered power and riches to potential adversaries while removing them from their home constituencies. With the most important regional elites and young intellectuals coopted, the emergence of a would-be ethnic entrepreneur was almost entirely eliminated.

These outcomes were achieved through three main strategies: first, Houphouët pacified rural elites by incorporating them into the state bourgeoisie; second, his territorial administration undermined ethnic politicization; third, he developed novel institutional solutions to address discontent. Finally, when all other approaches failed, Houphouët used extreme force to repress his opponents.

Pacification of Rural Elites

Though his own ethnic group, the Baoulé, was undeniably privileged, Houphouët worked to ensure a relative balance of ethnic representation. He used an informal ethnic quota system to fill important party, government, and administrative positions. Party government members were appointed to the same powerful corporate boards and shared private business concerns; directors of large Ivoirian companies and parastatal companies were drawn from a variety of ethnic groups. This ensured that "virtually all the country's ethnic groups [were] represented in the bourgeoisie" (Rapley 1993: 121). The most powerful families were even encouraged to intermarry. Houphouët-Boigny was himself related to several powerful Ivoirians through marriage, including Philippe Yacé, Lambert Amon Tonah, Marcel Laubhouet, Lambert Aka, Amadou Thiam, the Zinzou family, and Mathieu Ekra (Rapley 1993: 50, 111–115; Woods 1988: 109; Cohen 1973: 62, 234; Jeffries 1972: 250).

In this way, Houphouët's system created a multiethnic political bourgeoisie. Ethnic politicization was further contained by Houphouët's choice to direct funds to rural areas through national elites. Virtually all political oligarchs, though based in Abidjan, maintained regional support bases: "the Coulibalys in Korhogo and Boundiali, the Konés in Kouto, Leon Amon in Dimbokro, the Ekra-Ametheir-Niamke network in Bonouwa, the Houphouët-Boigny's in Yamoussoukro; the list goes on" (Rapley 1993: 121). National Assembly deputies, PDCI members, and ministers were directed to create 'hometown associations' or *mutuelles* to attract development projects to their villages and regions. "The President's object was to rely on urban elites under his influence to channel ethnic demands" (Woods 1994: 469). This practice became

express government policy at the 1965 PDCI Congress, when Houphouët announced that establishing a *mutuelle* was "a necessary condition of entry into the political bureau of the party" (Woods 1994: 469).

At the same time, Houphouët was critically sensitive to regional issues. When, for example, in 1962 concerns were raised that the north and center west were not sufficiently represented at the highest levels of the state, Houphouët "gave firm instructions in April 1962 for the promotion of these two national regions" (Diarra 1997: 96). Soon after, Maurice Sery Gnoleba, from the central west, was appointed treasure payer general and Mamadou Coulibaly from the north was named president of the Economic and Social Council. Again, in 1970 after the difficult period of agitation around the country, careful consideration was given to ethnicity. Among his new ministers, Houphouët chose a popular Bété from Daloa, a leading Agni from Aboisso, two men from the forest peoples, and three more from coastal groups (Cohen 1973: 149).

Houphouët also took precautions to avoid intergenerational rifts. Young, educated technocrats, who might otherwise have attempted to undermine the old bourgeoisie, were incorporated into the governing structure. Yet, unlike Nkrumah, Houphouët never abandoned his core supporters. Though some were shifted around, once in power almost no one was dropped from his administration (Crook 1989: 216). The first generation of Ivoirian leaders, including the founders of the SAA, such as Joseph Anoma, Gabriel Dadie, Alphonse Assamoi, and the first leaders of the RDA, like Germain Coffi Gadeau, Camille Gris, and Ekra Mathieu, commanded power and wealth throughout Houphouët's tenure and even beyond.

Territorial Administration

Suppression of ethno-regional politicization was also made possible because Houphouët depoliticized the countryside. He did so by making coffee and cocoa prices the chief political focus, while ignoring most other social and political issues (Rapley 1993: 56; Stryker 1971: 86). With the population so heavily focused on economic development, "All other concerns [became] secondary including Pan-Africanism and neo-colonialism, as well as the rivalry between Bété aspirations and Baoulé power" (Jeffries 1972: 224).

Houphouët's approach to territorial control was the inverse of Nkrumah's. Where Nkrumah shrank and weakened the administrative apparatus, replacing it with his party machine, Houphouët built up the state's technocratic capacity and allowed the PDCI machine to wither away (Amondji 1986:99). Over the course of the 1960s, the PDCI ceased

to function as a link between localities and the capital. It remained an important channel for the politico-elite to access the center, but was allowed to atrophy as a territorial vehicle for mobilizing regime support. Neither used as a means to control villages nor supervise rural development, the PDCI was replaced by new public and semi-public administrations (Cohen 1973: 234; Jeffries 1972: 219, 244–245; Stryker 1971: 91).

In the early 1960s, Houphouët introduced a new prefectural administrative system. Regional and local administration was devolved to *prefets* and *sous-prefets*, respectively, who were able to act autonomously from the ministries in Abidjan. These deconcentrated administrators were given power to approve, fund, and oversee all kinds of services – from hospitals, to schools, to electricity.[1] The new system achieved a number of aims. It increased government efficiency, widened its scope, and extended its influence throughout the territory (Jeffries 1972: 155; Stryker 1971: 92). At the same time, the prefectural system undermined "the development of sub-national politics" because it allowed for "only superficial participation of the rural masses in the political process" (Jeffries 1972: 245).

Perhaps most importantly, it further undermined ethno-regional mobilization. This was because *prefets* and *sous-prefets* were routinely rotated around the country. In addition, Houphouët generally appointed either young men of lesser stature or from 'stranger' communities (especially Dioula). Without status or local connections, deconcentrated administrators were unable to act independently of the regime and made beholden to Houphouët for their political survival (Boone 2003). Thus, the deconcentrated administrative system impeded the emergence of powerful regional challengers.

Though the depoliticization of the rural areas hindered ethno-regional challengers, it allowed chieftaincy to thrive. Not beholden to party officials for their selection, villages chiefs could be chosen according to traditional rules of succession. Moreover, traditional chiefs were allowed to perform political, administrative, and traditional duties. They supervised villages and *campements*, dispensed justice, and mediated disputes (Chauveau 2000: 211; Handloff & Roberts 1991: 155; Cohen 1973: 243; Jeffries 1972: 168, 179–180). In fact, *sous-prefets* were often highly dependent upon village chiefs, given that they were generally strangers to the community and nearly as dependent upon interpreters as his colonial predecessor (Stryker 1971: 95).

Thus, in Houphouët's system, neither *sous-prefets* nor the PDCI secretary-general had as much influence as the village chief. Villages

[1] Interview with three chiefs in Daloa, September 2009.

were so autonomous that in 1970 most were "as yet untouched by any administrative presence" (Stryker 1971: 94). For poor prefectures, the lack of state penetration resulted in serious neglect. But in wealthier areas, both chiefs and their communities benefited from their autonomy. Thus, the *chef du quartier* in Yamoussoukro was responsible for overseeing the local courts and the gendarmerie, as well as public health services.[2] When the government initiated a matching community development fund, Les Fonds Regional d'Amenagement Rural (FRAR), traditional authorities were allowed to identify desired development projects and organize village support for it.[3] In surprising contradistinction to Ghana, even village chiefs in the traditional cocoa-growing regions were able to thrive. Their power was augmented because of their crucial involvement with the coffee-cocoa trade: resolving disputes over land, wages, and the performance of the labor force, as well as recruiting labor for the village (Jeffries 1972: 142, 191).[4]

Furthermore, Houphouët allowed traditional chiefs to hold positions of prominence. Before independence, Houphouët helped establish the Syndicat des Chefs, a chiefs' union that advocated for better salary scales, more favorable recruitment and promotion, additional clerical help, guarantees of tenure, and retirement pay. Chiefs were even allowed to serve as National Assembly representatives. Others were elected to the Conseils Généraux (Zolberg 1964: 288–289). Important political figures, like Philippe Yacé, were made chiefs of their natal villages. At important functions chiefs were frequently asked to perform a libation and benediction to open the proceedings.[5]

As a result, the PDCI was generally supported by the traditional elite. Houphouët did, however, allow the hated institution of the Canton *chefferie* to die off. The system had been created as part of the French administration. In a few instances, canton chiefs were appointed from venerated traditional leaders, like the Agni kings in the southeast and the Sénoufo king in the north. But most canton chiefs were imposed on the population by the French regime. Assigned primarily to tax and recruit forced labor, they became a symbol of colonial despotism and were widely despised.

[2] Ibid. [3] Ibid., also see Jeffries 1972: 184.

[4] MacLean's study of this region finds chiefs less autonomous than their counterparts in Ghana. But this reflects the timing of her study. Whereas Jefferies assesses the strengthening of cocoa chiefs in the 1970s, MacLean's study is of the region post-1990, after the Ghanaian state had so withered away that local communities were forced into self-sufficiency and chieftaincy became central to everyday survival. See Maclean 2010.

[5] Interview with chief and former deputy of Yamoussoukro, Abidjan, September 2009.

After independence, canton chiefs ceased to be paid state servants and those who died were not replaced. Yet no one was forcibly removed from office or attacked by the regime, as the paramount chiefs in Ghana had been. Many communities informally sanctioned canton chiefs who had supported the colonial administration. Former Indépendants and Progressistes were often ostracized. In Séguéla, the Indépendants could not be buried in the cemetery, and in Man, punitive expeditions were taken against the former 'traitors' of 1948–1951. Officially, these actions were deplored, though little was done to prevent them (Zolberg 1964: 187). One of the only prefectures in which canton chiefs were subject to state sanctions was Aboisso after the Sanwi revolt. There, the *chefferie supérieure* of Aboisso was discontinued and all *chefs de canton* were replaced with politically reliable appointees. But this was the exception.

Altogether, by strengthening local chiefs, weakening regional institutions, and promoting politico-elite absenteeism, Houphouët's system effectively narrowed ethnic loyalties, strengthening his control over the periphery.

Institutional Ingenuity

In addition to the successful cooptation of potential rivals and the effective transformation of the territorial administration, Houphouët used concrete measures to subdue ethno-regional discontent.

One means Houphouët devised to build support in politically sensitive areas was to rotate the Ivoirian Independence Day celebration, or *fête nationale*, as a way to dispense patronage. Starting in 1964, a different city was chosen each year to host the national celebration (see Table 18). Most were chosen from the less privileged north and west. The two exceptions are Abengourou and Gagnoa, where support of the regime was precarious. In anticipation of the national event, funds were poured into the regional capital for all kinds of urban renewal projects: road construction, water and sanitation improvements, electrification projects, the building of hotels and government buildings, etc. The *fête* was also an opportunity for the state to display its repressive power. During the celebration, in addition to dignitaries and troops of traditional dancers, the army marched through the center of the town in full regalia, with all its weaponry.

These events were well publicized, and in many cases the construction was quite extensive. In preparation for the 1970 *fête* in Gagnoa, the state built a triumphal roadway, public gardens, and two artificial lakes. Principal roads were asphalted and lit, secondary roads paved, telephone and water systems improved. A residence was built for the president,

Table 18 Fêtes nationales *held outside Abidjan*

1964	Bouaké
1965	Korhogo
1967	Daloa
1968	Abengourou
1969	Man
1970	Gagnoa
1971	Bondouku
1972	Odienné
1975	Dimbokro
1978	Séguéla
1979	Katiola

another for the *prefet*, and a third for the general secretary. New amenities were constructed, such as a modern hotel with air conditioning and a swimming pool, and a new sports stadium named after a prominent independence leader from Gagnoa, 'Biaka Boda.' They even constructed a new neighborhood of 40 houses.[6]

In most cases, the state's largesse only addressed the tip of the iceberg of rural development needs. Tremendous regional disparities persisted between the relatively impoverished north and far west and the wealthy southern areas clustered around Abidjan. Nonetheless, the *fête* helped spark an economic resurgence in regional cities (Cohen 1973: 239) and helped build a positive image of the state and its 'fatherly' leader.

Houphouët's final strategy for keeping ethnic areas contained was his use of foreigners for political support and economic development. His dependence upon 'stranger' populations began during the anticolonial struggle. Wealthy Dioula traders who funded and transported the PDCI-RDA's operations became PDCI secretary-generals in many localities and later were appointed *prefets* and *sous-prefets* throughout the territory, controlling local administrations and development policies (Zolberg 1964).

Houphouët also used migrant populations to expand cocoa production. In the early 1960s, at the 'Houphouët-Boigny Cinema' in Daloa, Houphouët famously pronounced: "*la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur*" ("the land belongs to those who develop it").[7] This dictum became akin to a legal proclamation. Waves of Baoulé, Dioula, Burkinabe, Malians, and Guineans migrated to the fertile forest belt.

[6] *Indépendance An 10 – Gagnoa, 7 Aout 1970*, Minister of the Interior (Abidjan Archives).
[7] Interview with major three chiefs in Daloa, September 2009.

The promotion of settlement farming helped the government control economically crucial agricultural regions. As indigenous groups became steadily outnumbered by settlers in the east, west, and southwest, their political cohesiveness and effectiveness at challenging the state was undermined (Boone 1995, 2003; Hecht 1983). Later, foreign populations were even central to his electoral success.

Keeping an Ear to the Ground

In general, Houphouët kept attuned to changes in regional and local attitudes. Though never willing to release the reins of power, Houphouët understood the importance of maintaining popular legitimacy and was able to devise institutional solutions to do so.

On several occasions Houphouët replaced local PDCI leaders with former opposition leaders as a means to win back the support of populations alienated by the administration's representatives. By 1970, unpopular *prefets* had been transferred from quite a few regional capitals, including Gagnoa, Daloa, Abengourou, and Korhogo (Jeffries 1972:143; Cohen 1971: 243; Zolberg 1964).[8] This was a move unimaginable for Nkrumah, who positioned loyal party members at every level and turned a blind eye to the effects of their behavior on local populations. As time progressed, Houphouët increasingly decentralized his administration. In the 1980s, he introduced regional and local elections and increased the number of mayoralties from 38 to 136 to give smaller towns more autonomy.

A quintessential example of Houphouët's institutional ingenuity was his introduction of the National Days of Dialogue. During the first decade of PDCI rule, most forms of political participation were closed off. By 1969, discontent was widespread, as anger grew over the government's dependence on foreign labor and capital, and the stymying of political expression (Cohen 1974b: 119–120). The government knew it had to act. Houphouët himself said in an interview in 1966, "if the people are unhappy, their leaders are forced to become oppressors to silence them. When the leaders become too oppressive, the people are forced to revolt against them" (Médard 1982: 72).

In response to the increasingly precarious situation, the government introduced *des Journées Nationales du Dialogue*: a series of direct meetings between the president and representatives of social and political organizations in the country. The president opened the first session of the Dialogues on the last day of September 1969. Originally expected to take

[8] See also Rabinowitz 2013: 101–103.

six weeks, the Dialogues lasted through December, as more and more groups were accommodated. All told, 33 mass meetings were held. Houphouët met with teachers, students, trade union leaders, employers, the Lebanese community, tenants, construction entrepreneurs, transporters, pharmacists, doctors, bookstore owners, and sports clubs. Additional meetings were held for the women's union, the native community of Abidjan (the Ebrié), high-ranking government officials, and the army (Cohen 1974b: 120). Houphouët set the tone for the procedures, pronouncing at one of the first sessions, "The meeting this morning must be held under the sign of frankness and confidence; total confidence of one another, absolute frankness and without any restrictions," and closed his remarks by simply saying, "I am listening to you" (Cohen 1994: 122).

It is difficult to gauge how candid individuals were and to what extent the president's assurances of freedom of speech were trusted after years of political repression. Nonetheless, the Dialogues do appear to have provided a forum for the expression of discontent, which the one-party system had precluded, however limited. Over the course of the Dialogues, all kinds of issues were raised, including critiques of the government's relations with France, charges of nepotism and Baoulé domination of the government, the dearth of affordable public housing, the continuation of one-party rule, and the slow pace of Ivoirianization. Direct attacks were even made against individual ministers.

Moreover, Houphouët made sure to carry through on his promises. Unpopular ministers were removed and replaced with younger, educated technocrats. At the local level, *prefets* and *sous-prefets* were transferred, local administrations were revamped, and party elections held. New associational groups were formed that continued to influence government policy, including a number of hometown associations and regional development associations. A new salary scale was introduced for civil servants. Indemnities were paid to the Ebrié, the indigenous population in Abidjan who had been disadvantaged by the rapid urbanization of the area (Cohen 1974b: 163–164). By their close, the Dialogues appear to have restored Houphouët's popularity (Widner 1994; Woods 1994; Loucou 1992: 74, Cohen 1974b).

One concrete outcome was the government increased its focus on regional disparities. In response to concerns raised during the Dialogues, Houphouët toured the north from March to April 1974, visiting towns from Odienné to Dikodougou. He met with and listened to the grievances of farmers in the least-developed sub-prefectures, as well as to those of the northern educated cadre. Following the president's visit, a *Programme du Nord* was drawn up. More than CFAF20 billion was allocated for development schemes in the northern and central regions

(den Tuinder 1978: 75). The National Dialogues became institutionalized. Several more were held in the 1970s and the 1980s. In addition to providing a safety valve for popular discontent, they offered a means for the government to replace corrupt ministers with *jeunes cadres dynamiques* (JCDs) (Toungara 1995: 21), diminishing the likelihood that young intellectuals would seek extralegal avenues for political expression.

Thus, unlike Nkrumah who became more rigid and removed from local realities, Houphouët tried to keep abreast of popular concerns and adapt to circumstances. The difference between the two leaders is illustrated by the way they each addressed indigenous groups in the capital city. In both countries, the indigenes were deeply disadvantaged as the new governments expropriated land in the capital for national development and patronage purposes. In 1956, Gã constituents sent Nkrumah a letter informing him of their anger over the government's neglect. Their central complaints were inadequate housing and low representation in the upper strata of the party state. When Nkrumah ignored their concerns, one of the most violent anti-CPP groups emerged, the Gã Shifimo Kpee. Many of Nkrumah's would-be assassins were, at least tangentially, connected to the Gã Shifimo Kpee and the group was likely responsible for multiple bombings in Accra. In Côte d'Ivoire, Houphouët also ignored the plight of the Ebrié. But once informed of their discontents during the National Dialogues, the government paid out 361.8 million F. CFA to 916 individuals for the expropriation of their land (Cohen 1974b: 150–151). As a result, Ebrié discontent was never formally organized and never presented any threat to the state.

II The State's Repressive Power: Urban Opposition

With his regime securely rooted in the rural areas, Houphouët used more repression than concession against mobilized urban groups. Houphouët's draconian tactics were similar to those Nkrumah implemented to consolidate state power. But unlike the *Osagyefo*, who primarily targeted powerful chiefs, Houphouët focused on organized urban interests. The process began with the suppression of labor and student unions in 1959, reached its apotheosis with a series of purges between 1963 and 1964, and culminated with mass arrests of union and student protesters at the end of the decade.

Urban Opposition

Houphouët's urban opposition took shape while still under French rule. In the late 1940s, to create an effective party Houphouët had forged an

odd 'federation' of traditional and modern elements. By 1948, union members, most of whom were urban Marxist intellectuals, had supplanted the planter elite in the PDCI and RDA governing bodies. The wealthy planters of the Syndicate Agricole Africain shied away from radical politics. Their concern was attaining economic parity with white planters. It was the union leaders who waged the anticolonial struggle. Once the battle with the *colons* had ended, the union leaders' anticolonial ideology presented a serious obstacle to Houphouët's determination to win French support. The urban, leftist faction quickly came into conflict with Houphouët and the conservative wing of the party (Loucou 1992: 49; Amondji 1986: 70; Zolberg 1964: 76).[9]

Houphouët's refusal to consider independence made matters worse. Despite growing anticolonial fervor, Houphouët wanted French West Africa to be part of a greater Franco-African federal community. Outraged union leaders accused Houphouët of traitorously abandoning the anticolonial struggle. Thus, Houphouët faced a crisis similar to Nkrumah's in 1951, when trade unionists and student radicals criticized his rate of reform. But where Nkrumah expelled his critics, Houphouët did the opposite.

In August 1952, Houphouët met leftist opposition leaders. After days of deliberation and despite Houphouët's suffering an illness, the parties came to an agreement. On August 21, the leader of the radical wing of the PDCI, Jean-Baptiste Mockey (a PDCI-RDA 'martyr,' who had been imprisoned during the 'time of troubles') and six of his followers published a communiqué in the August issue of *Afrique noir* proclaiming their fidelity to the party and its president (Loucou 1992: 99). Mockey became one of Houphouët's foremost lieutenants. In 1957, he was appointed minister of the interior in the Conseil de Gouvernement de la Loi-cadre. Later, in Houphouët's first independent government, he was named vice-prime minister and then minister of the interior (Amondji 1986: 32).

But the cooptation of Mockey and his affiliates did not end matters. Several urban associations remained hostile to Houphouët's capitulatory politics, particularly those affiliated with Pan-Africanist movements. With tensions increasing, urban unrest mounted. Yet Houphouët remained undeterred in his rejection of independence and his support of a Franco-African federal community. Multiple strikes were held over

[9] Members of two unions formed the core of the RDA constituent congress: le Comité d'études franco-africains Côte d'Ivoire (CEFACI) and the Groupe d'Études Communists (GEC). Many future PDCI-RDA leaders came from these unions, including Germain Coffi Gadeau, J. B. Mockey, Albert Paraiso, Jean Delafosse, and Ekra Mathieu. See Loucou 1992: 44–47; Amondji 1986: 41.

the course of 1958 (Woronoff 1972: 88) and on September 28, during the celebration over the victorious yes vote to sustain the Franco-African community, a bomb exploded in Abidjan (Diarra 1997: 49).

The failure of the PDCI to address the mounting rage led to tragedy in October. A xenophobic association in Abidjan, the Ligue des Originaires de la Côte d'Ivoire (LOCI),[10] channeled student and worker frustration against 'stranger populations' from Togo and Dahomey (Benin). On the night of October 24, "the hunt of the Daho-Togolese transformed the Treichville neighborhood into a field of battle" (Diarra 1997: 55). Homemade bombs exploded; homes and shops were raided. Refugees fled to the old port of Abidjan (Notes of the Month 1961: 517). By October 26, there were 20,000 reported victims (Diarra 1997: 55).

Eventually, the LOCI leaders were imprisoned and calm was restored. Houphouët's response was, as always, to curb the influence of malcontents by coopting them. Soon after Houphouët established a youth wing of the PDCI-RDA, the Jeunesse-RDA de la Côte d'Ivoire (JRDACI), through which several prominent student leaders were coopted into the PDCI. Three members of the JRDACI executive were even appointed to the PDCI politburo – including the central founder of the LOCI, Christian Groghuet (Woronoff 1972: 90).

Having silenced the student unions, Houphouët still had to overcome the labor unions. Over the first half of 1959, Houphouët unsuccessfully tried to force the unions to separate from the most powerful Pan-African union, the Union générale des travailleurs d'Afrique noire (UGTAN). In October 1959, the secretary-general of UGTAN in Côte d'Ivoire (UGTAN-CI) was arrested and banished to Guinea. In response, public-sector workers held a general strike. The government struck back. The army arrested strikers, including almost all the union leaders. Two hundred thirty civil servants were fired and 319 suspended. The strike collapsed within a week (Dagbo 2002: 47; Woronoff 1972: 88).

In response to the antigovernment activism of 1959, Houphouët instituted repressive laws giving the state authoritarian powers. In August, the government added a series of articles to the penal code. Just like Nkrumah's hated Preventive Detention Act, Article 1 of the penal code stipulated that anyone found guilty of actions deemed to compromise public security or 'throw discredit on political institutions' could be imprisoned for up to five years. Article 2 made it illegal to subsidize any 'subversive' activities; Article 4 criminalized the publication, diffusion, divulgence, or reproduction of false or misleading information about

[10] Established by Christian Groghuet and Paul Pépé, two disgruntled students returning from Paris.

Table 19 *Coopted urban opposition leaders, 1959*

Organization	Leader
CGT Comité Intersyndical du Secteur Privé	Camille Gris
Railroad Workers' Union	Gaston Fiankan
Teachers' Union	Amoah Tanoh
Student Leaders	Charles Donwahi
	Jean Konan Banny
	Amadou Koné
	Aoussou Koffi,
	Camille Alliali
	Alicide Kacou
	Augustin Djessou Loubo
	Joachim Bony

the government. Houphouët used these measures to control his urban opposition, with the "arrest of student leaders and the banishment of union activists" (Loucou 1992: 120).

Like Nkrumah, Houphouët also took greater command of the military. In 1963, he instituted the new Ministry of the Armed Forces, Youth and National Service, headed by M'Bahia Ble Kouadio from his intelligence services. The following month, the General Secretariat for Defense under the direct control of the president was created. "From that moment forth, the management of national defense and security became the business of a triumvirate, consisting of the President of the Republic, the Minister of the Armed Forces and of National Service and of the Defense General Secretary" (Kadet 2012: 271).

However, unlike Nkrumah, carrots were used to accompany the sticks. By the end of 1959, most of the prominent student and union leaders were incorporated into Houphouët's new government. Several union activists were given important government positions. Camille Gris, the leader of the powerful Confédération Générale des Travailleurs (CGT) resisted the longest, but finally succumbed when given a ministerial position (Loucou 1992: 118–119; Amondji 1986: 71). (See Table 19.)

Nonetheless, the initial cooptation of leftist leaders was short-lived. In mid-1962, the government announced it had discovered a 'communist-inspired' plot to overturn the government. One-third of the PDCI leadership was arrested, including the three ministers coopted from student movements: Amadou Koné (Health), Joachim Bony (Education), and Charles Donwahi (Agriculture). Sixty-four were convicted (Loucou 1992: 139; Amondji 1984: 184–186). The purges did not end there. In

September 1963, the discovery of a second conspiracy was made public. Again trials were held. More than 90 people were brought before the Security Court. Almost all of the accused ministers had been coopted from student or labor unions and had been on the forefront of earlier leftist antigovernment movements. Twenty-seven were condemned, including seven cabinet ministers.

The *complots* led to one of the most chilling incidents in Houphouët's reign. Ernest Boka, the former head of the Supreme Court, was arrested after resigning in protest over the unlawful January arrests. On April 6, 1964, Boka was found dead in his prison cell. Boka's death may have been the unintentional result of injuries inflicted by overzealous guards. The official report stated that Boka had committed suicide, but most of the population did not believe the official story (Loucou 1992: 140).

This was close to the nadir of Houphouët's career. Still, "Houphouët's personal charisma, in addition to his past achievements – notably the ending of forced labour and French oppression – guaranteed little loss of popular support through this period of internal dissension, confusion and uncertainty" (Toungara 1990: 31). At the same time, the death of Boka sent a clear message and may have helped secure the regime against further incidents.

Just as Nkrumah used the Alavanyo riots to introduce repressive laws, Houphouët used these alleged plots against the regime to do the same. On January 17, 1963, the *L'utilisation des Personnes* was passed, enabling the government to remove agitators from urban centers. With this law, the government could 'assign' a new residence or job to anyone whose actions were deemed 'prejudicial to the economic and social promotion of the nation' (*Journal Officiel*, January 17, Loi no. 63–4). At the same time, surveillance of students redoubled (Cohen 1974b: 78).

The government's willingness to use its repressive apparatus was put to the test at the end of the decade when student agitation in France and Senegal spilled over into Côte d'Ivoire. The regime responded with extreme crackdowns. In January 1967, students at Abidjan University went on strike in support of anti-French student demonstrations in Madagascar. The government arrested 315 people; many were forcefully drafted into the army.[11] Again, in May 1969, about 150 university students in Abidjan held a strike. After one day, soldiers and the police occupied the university. All foreign students were expelled; all Ivoirian students were arrested and sent to the Akouédo military camp outside Abidjan, where they spent a week before being released. Striking students in other cities, such as Bouaké, were attacked with tear gas and hundreds

[11] Francis Wodié was among those arrested. See Wodié 2010: 66–68.

were arrested (Wodié 2010: 73; Cohen 1974b: 78–81; Michel Delaborde 1969: 250).

The government's response to union strikes in the summer of 1969 exemplifies the state's capacity and willingness to use extreme force to subdue urban protest. On September 30, unemployed workers, *sans-travail*, took to the streets in Treichville and Adjamé to protest the government's failure to Ivoirianize the civil service. The situation turned chaotic as "groups of unemployed in all *quartiers* of the city . . . were running through the markets upsetting stalls in protest against mass unemployment" (Cohen 1974b: 105). The administration's response was swift and harsh. Soldiers surrounded the crowd; 1,600 prisoners were transported to the Akouédo military camp, held for more than three months, and then sent to 'agricultural training camps' in the interior (Cohen 1974b: 105). The government made some concessions. The following year, civil servants' salaries were raised by 10 percent and a nominal Ivoirianization of the government had begun. But for the most part, the policy was to use decisive force.

As repressive and punitive as the PDCI response to the *complots* was, Houphouët was, nonetheless, able to reestablish positive relationships with many of the leaders he had persecuted. Houphouët used political pardons to dampen the possibility of further anti-regime mobilization. In 1966, 96 people convicted for the 1964 *complots* were released from prison. One year later, Houphouët declared amnesty for all remaining political prisoners (Lamb 1988: 128). The last political prisoners released included J. B. Mockey, Kacou Aoulou, Camille Gris, Jean Konan Banny, and Amadou Koné.[12]

These men were not only released. Most were given valuable land grants and/or sinecures and several were politically resuscitated (Cohen 1974b: 45). As late as 1978, prominent men imprisoned during the period of the *complots* were still members of the executive committee of the PDCI, including Alphonse Boni, Alcide Kacou, J. B. Mockey, and Jean Banny. Still others were on the party Committee of Directors, like Gaston Fiankan and Camille Gris. Some also held important positions in the government. For example, J. B. Mockey was made minister of health, and Alphonse Boni became president of the Supreme Court.[13]

Houphouët's ability to restore sworn enemies was critical to his success. It also marks his acute understanding of the integral relationship between rural and urban politicization. The *complots* of 1963 and 1964

[12] Le Communique du Bureau Politique, *Fraternité Matin*, No. 733, Friday, May 12, 1967, p. 1.

[13] See *Les Elites Ivoiriennes*, EDIAFRIC-LA Documentation Africain 1978.

had particularly targeted urban leftists from the two groups most problematic for Houphouët. A large number of those accused in the first purges were elites from Gagnoa, while the second round of purges heavily targeted Agni intellectuals.[14] The pardons were a central tool used to pacify anti-regime sentiment in those regions.

Altogether, urban protest, though recurrent and sometimes quite large, never threatened Houphouët's regime. Ultimately, Houphouët's rural political strategy enabled him to ride out the instabilities of the cities and turn his attention to economic development.

III The 'Ivoirian Miracle'

Houphouët's rural political strategies were integral to the Ivoirian miracle. Rather than focusing on urban employment and industrialization, Houphouët sought to develop the economy through large- and small-scale farming. His policies succeeded at minimizing urban drift and supporting large- and small-scale planters alike. Houphouët also promoted technocrats rather than political hacks. All of this allowed for the unparalleled development of the Ivoirian economy and state capacity. Though regional disparities persisted and rural poverty was barely addressed in the most impoverished areas, the government's ability to engage the population in its economic agenda minimized ethno-regional discontent, adding to the stability of the state.

The 'Ivoirian Miracle'

In contradistinction to Nkrumah, Houphouët believed the peasantry was key to the country's economic promise. The government extolled the "brave and hardworking peasant population to whom we owe the general prosperity of our dear Côte d'Ivoire."[15] Houphouët referred to himself as "The Nation's number one peasant" (Lamb 1988: 118) and promised to "grant particular and loving attention to the rural masses" (Touré 1982: 232–233). As he explained in 1960:

[14] In fact, the *complots* were likely related to the clandestine fight waged between Nkrumah and Houphouët. Nkrumah was ethnically related to the Agni and supported the Sanwi government in exile. With Nkrumah's dedication to ending neo-imperialism in Africa and Houphouët's anticommunist stance, both men believed the other was plotting against him. Once Nkrumah was ousted, the threat of communist infiltration was deemed over. The political pardons were initiated just a few months after the 1966 coup.

[15] Houphouët-Boigny, "Discours pronounce a Adzopé," May 24, 1959, *Anthologie de Discours*. Abidjan: CEDA, 1978, pp. 281; Touré 1996: 236–237.

> Ivory Coast is poorer than a number of African States . . . on account of the lack of mineral and hydraulic resources. This explains why Ivory Coast has had to look things in the face and has found that there is only one way out: calling upon its peasants to put forward the maximum effort in the national exploitation of its soil, which has fortunately shown itself bounteous in the extreme. (Scipion 1966: 377)

In concrete terms, these objectives were pursued by encouraging foreign investment in large plantation schemes and infrastructure, while incentivizing as many small-scale farmers as possible. Peasants were never 'squeezed' to the point of breaking. Instead the government regularly increased producer prices, expanded extension programs, and supplied farmers with an array of necessary inputs such as fertilizer, insecticides, disease-resistant seeds and trees, and machetes. From 1960 to 1975, there were only *upward trends* in cocoa and coffee producer prices. By the late 1970s, Ivoirian cocoa farmers averaged 50 percent of the world price (Rapley 1993: 132–133; den Tuinder 1978: 81).

With such favorable agricultural policies, the country achieved astounding economic growth. GDP grew on average more than 7 percent a year. Ivoirian GDP per capita was second on the continent only to petrol-producing countries like Algeria, Libya, and Gabon. In its first 15 years, production of coffee and bananas almost doubled, while cocoa production increased sixfold, surpassing the government's expectations (den Tuinder 1978: 39). By 1977–1978, Côte d'Ivoire had overtaken Ghana as the world's first supplier of cocoa and had become the world's largest producer of coconuts and exporter of tinned pineapple (Rapley 1993: 79; Fauré 1982).

One of the most remarkable Ivoirian achievements was its increase in food production (see Table 20). Growth rates in food crops went from 3 percent annually in 1965–70 to 4 percent in 1970–75. Food production was so successful that by the mid-seventies, despite increasing urbanization, the country's dependence on imports dropped (den Tuinder 1978: 43–44). From 1970 to 1975, Côte d'Ivoire was actually self-sufficient in rice.[16]

Other policy choices helped this impressive economic development. Houphouët's commitment to pioneer farming hugely contributed to substantial increases in cocoa and coffee production (see Table 20). To ensure its continuation, Houphouët worked to contain the country's xenophobia. His administration focused on the prosperity foreign labor was helping the country attain. Immigrants also provided the majority of labor on large-scale oil, coconut, and palm plantations (den Tuinder 1978: 39, 43). Despite periodic tensions, by the 1970s, hundreds of thousands of

[16] Interview, professor of geography, Abidjan, November 2009.

Table 20 *Changes in the value of production (in millions of F. CFA)*

Category	1960	1965	1970
Food Crops	36,295	43,263	48,054
Husbandry and Hunting	3,586	3,937	5,565
Industrial Agriculture and Agricultural Exports	22,357	33,262	49,063
Logging	7,253	16,709	23,500
Fishing	2,218	2,974	3,700
Total	71,709	100,145	129,882

Source: Deuxieme Esquisse du Plan quinquennal de Development 1971–1975 (Tableau No. 1, p. 87), Abidjan Archives 3.33/58

families were involved in cocoa and coffee cultivation, many of whom were from Burkina Faso and other neighboring countries. Incentives were so strong that in 1974, it was estimated that one out of five people was directly involved in cocoa farming (Gbetibouo & Delgado 1984: 123).

Unlike Nkrumah, who distrusted the educated elite and kept them out of important decision-making, Houphouët built an effective bureaucratic system. He worked to retain highly trained personnel, though many were foreign-born. In Houphouët's government, 68.4 percent had university degrees, many of whom were scientists. Projects were overseen by experienced technocrats and carried out by qualified personnel operating under clearly delineated objectives (Crook 1989; Bakary 1984: 38–39; den Tuinder 1978: 43, 26).

As a result, Houphouët avoided the most glaring inefficiencies that developed under the Nkrumah government. When siting plants and industries, careful consideration was made of the proximity of a proposed project to railways, or ports and raw materials. Agro-industrial centers were designed as '*Grand Blocs*' with plantations, factory complexes, and housing for all the personnel and laborers. The administration even built schools and clinics for the staff.[17] Different poles of industry were planned in the north, center, and southwest: sugar production in the north (Borouto Koro, Ferké I, Ferké II, Mara Badiasa, Zueoula); palm, oil, and rubber plantations in forest regions of Aboisso, Divo, and Sassandra; and textile factories in Bouaké, Dimbokro, and Agboville.[18]

In addition, Houphouët was far more successful at diversifying the economy than Nkrumah. Ghana's dependence upon cocoa increased

[17] Ibid. [18] Ibid.

during Nkrumah's reign. In 1960, cocoa accounted for 59 percent of Ghana's exports. By 1967, it had increased to 65 percent. During the same time frame, Côte d'Ivoire's coffee exports decreased as a percentage of total exports from 48 percent to 38 percent, and cocoa exports declined from 22 percent of total exports to 18 percent. Because Ghana remained heavily dependent on cocoa exports, when world cocoa prices fell, it faced serious foreign exchange shortages and suffered negative trade imbalances. In contrast, Côte d'Ivoire by the 1970s had a balance-of-trade surplus (Due 1969: 640).

Houphouët understood the political and economic importance of keeping the population immersed in agriculture. In the 1970s, the government introduced its first campaign to encourage rural resettlement, the Programme le Retour a la Terre. In presidential speeches and media campaigns, youth were exhorted to help increase national prosperity by returning to their family farms to cultivate. In 1973, the Office National de Promotion Rurale (ONPR) was inaugurated to direct training programs for returning farmers (den Tuinder 1978: 42). Though the Programme le Retour a la Terre had limited success,[19] Côte d'Ivoire achieved a 2 percent lower rate of urbanization than the African average in the late 1970s (Brayton 1979: 237).

Another way the government attempted to minimize urban drift was by slowing the expansion of primary education. This was "a difficult undertaking in view of the strong popular support and enthusiasm for primary education."[20] The government's justification of this policy was an implicit critique of Nkrumah's populist promotion of basic education:

> in developing countries education policy too often proves to be an expensive and ineffective myth . . . The choice made here is thus that of an education policy, which promotes resolutely selective training . . . It may be disappointing in comparison with education policies whose objectives are more ambitious, but unrealistic. However, this policy has the virtue of taking into account the possible without forgetting the desirable.[21]

[19] Overall, the programs failed to encourage settlement beyond three years. Incentives were too low to dissuade educated youth from pursuing opportunities in urban centers. Programs were also poorly managed. In one rice program, ministers appropriated 100 hectares of land and monopolized the threshing machines, leaving little for the youth the program was designed to service. Anonymous interview with professor of urban studies, Cocody University, Abidjan, 2009.

[20] "The Economy of the Ivory Coast," International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association, Report No AF-6a, April 30, 1963, p. 6.

[21] "Deuxième esquisse du plan quinquennal de développement 1971–1975," Abidjan: Ministere du Plan, June 1970, p. 327 (Abidjan Archives 3.33/58).

Where primary education was intentionally limited, a great amount of resources was dedicated to higher education. In 1973, education accounted for 32.6 percent of the government's budget, the highest portion spent on education in the world (den Tuinder 1978: 75). Investments were made in secondary and tertiary education – particularly in studies abroad in engineering and the hard sciences.

Altogether the country's rapid growth and increased standard of living were due to Houphouët's choice to focus on traditional agriculture, trust in technocrats, and minimize urban drift as much as possible. His rural policies therefore were integral to the Ivoirian miracle.

IV Houphouët and the Military

Houphouët's urban suppression had no impact on the armed forces, and his rural strategies contributed to his success at maintaining the loyalty of his armed forces. There were episodes in the 1970s and again in the 1990s when Houphouët came closest to losing military support. But his ability to quickly gauge the dangers posed and to devise innovative responses allowed him to sustain military support even through periods of dire economic crisis.

Building the Military

Houphouët's approach to the military was relatively unique and grew out of his broader objectives and tactics. In 1960, all the security forces were under French military command (Kadet 2012: 271; Welch 1987: 179–180). Houphouët, who believed Côte d'Ivoire's development would be possible only with French cooperation, saw this as an advantage. He understood that using French forces would insulate the government from threats from its military command and lower the country's economic burden (Brayton 1979: 243).[22]

Consequently, Houphouët decided to keep a significant French military presence. In 1961, he concluded an agreement with France that provided hundreds of French marines be stationed adjacent to the Abidjan airport in Port-Bouët (ensuring additional French forces could be brought to Abidjan in a few hours if necessary). Even as Ivoirian troops were recruited over time, France continued to train and supply the Ivoirian forces (Welch 1987: 181; *Africa Confidential* 1973: 6).

[22] Ivoirian military expenditure was among the lowest in Africa at only 1.5 percent GNP per capita, compared to the African average of 3.02. See Brayton 1979: 243.

Côte d'Ivoire's political stability during this period is often attributed to French military support. Yet, to whatever extent the French military presence acted as a deterrent against internal insurgencies, it did not assure Houphouët of his own safety. As new security threats emerged, Houphouët took further precautions. At the time of the *complots*, Houphouët began to shore up his control of the military command structure. Like Nkrumah, he centralized command under the direction of the president and founded a 'Baoulé' militia, the Garde Présidentielle et Milice (later renamed the Republican Guard). The 600-man independent battalion of select troops were chosen from the president's tribal group. Overtime, his Baoulé militia became a formidable weapon, used for special assignments to protect the regime (Loucou 1992: 129; Brayton 1979: 243). Houphouët strengthened his Baoulé Guard by keeping it in the capital while dispersing his other forces around the territory.

At the same time, Houphouët never undercut the command structure of his regular forces. He neither interfered with established training regiments nor did he undermine military morale by underpaying his regular forces. Rather, he "took care not to upset the conservative values of the military establishment by insisting on its direct subordination to the PDCI ... [Unlike] Nkrumah [who] openly espoused CPP dominance over the officer corps, a policy that ... resulted in deep unrest among supposedly apolitical officers" (Welch 1987: 182).

After an alleged coup attempt in 1973, Houphouët restructured the military. In a brilliant stroke, he used the deconcentration of the administration as a means to coopt the military itself. In November 1974, 10 of the brightest young officers were assigned as *sous-prefets* around the territory, transforming the army into 'an army for national development.' The new *sous-prefets* were given uniforms with a bee insignia to signify their role as productive builders of society.[23]

The administrative incorporation of bright, junior military officers was triply strategic: it dispersed capable young officers, making it more difficult for them to collude; it removed them from large urban centers; and it increased the state's capacity to monitor the periphery (Fauré & Médard 1982: 137). Later these men were promoted to *prefets* in multiple regions. To further foster "public spiritedness" in the military and reinforce "solidarity between the military and the Nation" (Kadet 2012: 272), Houphouët devised several new institutions, such as the Military Fire Fighters in 1974, and the Army Rural Corps of Engineers in 1976.[24]

[23] Anonymous interview with one of the officers recruited by Houphouët, Abidjan, 2010. Also see *Fraternité Matin, 10ème année*, numero 29, Mardi 5 novembre 1974, p. 2.
[24] See also Brayton 1979: 242; T. D. Roberts et al., 1991: 204.

Houphouët also incorporated the upper brass into the state bourgeoisie. After a decade in power, in 1974, Houphouët finally replaced the expatriates still heading his armed forces with Ivoirian officers. A month later he brought two military officers into his cabinet for the first time.[25] Other military officers were appointed chief administrative officers in the health services and national airlines. Military men were also made CEOs of public enterprises. Through these means, the military elite was integrated into the politico-bourgeoisie, ensuring they shared the same privileges and outlook. Indeed, "What might best be described as a convergence of views. . .emerged in Côte d'Ivoire" (Welch 1987: 182).

Last but not least, Houphouët prevented his army from being dominated by a single ethnic group. His general staff included: General Ouattara Dakin, a Taguana from Katiola (north); General Guéï, a Yacuba from Biankouma (west); General Zézé Baroan Bertin, a Bété from Issia (west); General Palenfo, a Lobi from Bouna (northeast); General Coulibaly, a Sénoufo from Korhogo (north); and Admiral Lamine Fadiga, a Mahoka from Touba (west) (Kouadio 2009: 127).

For all these reasons Bakary projected that a coup in Côte d'Ivoire was relatively unlikely. The gradual integration of the military into the political and administrative institutions, the various material benefits they received, as well as the fact that "the ethno-regional or social divisions in the army (especially the officers or NCOs) are the same as those shape society as a whole" (1991: 45–46) all created a loyal force.

Averting Coups

Houphouët's ability to keep his armed forces contained was also related to his ability to stave off ethno-regional mobilization. This is best demonstrated by the two areas in which Houphouët's system of regional incorporation was least successful: Aboisso and Gagnoa. In both prefects small, violent rebellions were launched, in 1969 and 1970, respectively. Aboisso and Gagnoa were the areas most adversely affected by Houphouët's policy of 'pioneer farming.' In both areas, cocoa growing was introduced early and tensions between indigenes and migrant workers, particularly Baoulé and Dioula, had existed for a long time. And in both areas, local politicos were heavily targeted by the regime.

It was in Aboisso that the Sanwi king had been imprisoned and his whole *chefferie* replaced. Though pardons were made in 1961, the

[25] Commander of the Navy, Lieutenant Commander Lamine Fadiga, named secretary for maritime affairs, Commander of the Gendarmerie, Commander Ousenan, named secretary of the interior.

educated elite from the region were targeted and imprisoned for a second time during the *complots* of 1964, including J. B. Mockey and Kacou Aoulou. This second wave of Agni political prisoners was pardoned in 1966, after Nkrumah was toppled. The largest assault came when a second separatist movement was sparked in 1969.[26] The revolt was crushed by government troops with extreme force.

Yet the suppression of the Agni in Aboisso did not spark an insurrection within the security forces. Few Agni were in the armed forces and even fewer were in the officer corps (Kieffer 2000: 34; Handloff 1991: 192; Roberts et al. 1973: 412–416). In fact, Houphouët derisively described how the Agni "never liked military service. They paid foreigners from other regions to do their military service in their place."[27] Thus, antigovernment mobilization of the Sanwi did not greatly impact the armed services.

The situation in Gagnoa was different. Unlike the Agni, Kru ethnic groups from the western regions had a significant presence in the military.[28] As in Aboisso, opposition from Gagnoa was quite vociferous in the early years. [29] Houphouët's early and long-standing regional opponent Dignan Bailly, the leader of the Socialistes, was a son of Gagnoa. Feelings in the area hardened further after the mysterious death of Victor Biaka Boda, a populist PDCI leader from Gagnoa. Boda inexplicably disappeared in January 1950 after openly opposing Houphouët's *replitactique.* Many in Gagnoa believe Houphouët had him 'removed' because of his anti-French stance. Again, after independence, Bété leaders from Gagnoa were targeted during the first *complot* – including Dignan Bailly, Capri Djédjé, Zadi Nicodeme. According to Diarra, almost all political and traditional leaders of the region were imprisoned (Dagbo 2002: 48; Diarra 1997: 48; Biaka 1993: 67).

But the worst repression in Gagnoa came in 1970, when the government crushed a small political uprising. The rebellion consisted of several dozen poorly trained young men and peasants armed with hunting rifles. The ragtag band was led by a returned student from France, Kragbé Gnagbé, who had been thwarted in his attempt to launch an opposition party in Côte d'Ivoire. Houphouët had tried his usual tactic of cooptation to silence Gnagbé, offering the young man a position in the administration, but Gnagbé refused. In defiance, Gnagbé went into hiding and wrote a political manifesto, proclaiming himself 'Chancellor' of the new state of 'Ébrurnie' and 'Commander and Chief' of its 'National Popular

[26] See Brayton 1979: 243 and "Le Sanwi revendique son traité de protectorat," *Fraternité Matin*, Mardi 3 aout 2010, p. 5.
[27] See Houphouët Testimony, Tome I, p. 29.
[28] Miscellaneous interviews, Abidjan, August 2014.
[29] Sometimes leading to violent exchanges. See Alliali 2008: 25.

Army.' The proclamation was tantamount to a call for the secession of the western forest region.

Following his proclamation, Gnagbé led his small peasant militia to take over the local gendarmerie. At midnight on October 26, 1970, the insurgents removed Ivoirian flags from the police precinct and the office of the sub-prefecture and replaced them with the Eburnéen flag. The next day, a firefight ensued with local police and gendarmes. Seven people were killed (Dozon 1985: 347; Dagbo 2002).

Despite the rebellion's trifling size, the government brought in the military to put down the uprising. The subsequent carnage was completely out of scale to the threat Gnagbé's 'army' posed. The number of causalities has never been satisfactorily established, but even the lowest estimates range from 1,000 to 4,000. The sense of political alienation in Gagnoa appears to have multiplied after the massacre. As Marshall-Fratani observes, "the 'Guébié genocide' has remained fundamental in Bété collective memory" (2009: 21; Kouadio 2009). Gagnoa remained a center of opposition. In 1980, Houphouët's most important opposition leader, Laurent Gbagbo, was from Gagnoa. Gbagbo's party, the Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), rallied the Bété throughout the 1990s.

There is circumstantial evidence that the Gagnoa massacre impacted Houphouët's military. Soon after these events, a genuine military conspiracy was uncovered in 1973. The conspiracy was plotted by 12 junior officers, almost all of whom were Kru, specifically Guéré and Bété. According to the government's official statement, the 'ringleaders' began plotting against the regime in 1970, the same year as the Gagnoa massacre. And though the plotters did not have a definitive date, there was a vague expectation that the coup would take place on Independence Day, the anniversary of the troubles in Gagnoa in 1970.[30] In addition, the two men most critical to the plotting of the insurrection, first Lieutenant Boni Bi Golé and later Captain Sio, appear to have known and been sympathetic to Kragbé Gnagbé.[31] Though there is no reason to believe that any of the accomplices were directly aligned with Gnagbé, it is likely that the events in Gagnoa factored into the decision to revolt against Houphouët.[32]

[30] '"Verdict du procès militaire": – les conspirateurs de 1973.' *Fraternité Matin* No. 2617, Jeudi 2 Aout 1973, p. 1. Also see Chappell 1989: 689; *Africa Confidential*, 14 (1973): 5–6; *Africa Dairy*, 13 (1973): 6538, 6589–6590; *Africa Year Book and Who's Who*, 1977, p. 478.

[31] See Wodié 2010: 108–111, 166; *Africa Diary*, 13: 6538; *Africa Research Bulletin*, 1973: 2887.

[32] Interview with a chemistry instructor from the Guéré village of Coulibaly, Abidjan, August 12, 2014; interview with Francis Wodié, August 11, 2014.

Thus Houphouët's suppression of the Bété in Gagnoa came the closest to jeopardizing Houphouët's hold on the military. Accordingly, Houphouët took measures to subdue that threat. Soon after the 1973 plot was discovered, Houphouët appointed the first Guéré representative as a minister. And in 1978, the first Bété was named chief of staff of the armed service, General Zézé Baroan Bertin.

All in all, the rebellions in both Gagnoa and Aboisso underscore the seriousness of Houphouët's failure to contain local elites. Houphouët's choice to use force solidified regional opposition. In a different light, however, the fact that the Sanwi rebellion was not joined by other Agni groups and that the Bété of Daloa did not identify with the Bété massacre in Gagnoa can be seen as a testament to Houphouët's success in stemming ethnic politicization. Houphouët's weakening of regional identities enabled him to practice a successful form of domestic 'divide and rule.'[33] Even in 1973, the plotters were unable to attract a sufficient cohort to turn against the government. By and large, the military remained a reliable pillar of the regime, even toward the end of Houphouët's reign when strains in the system were evident.

Denouement

By 1980, the political machine Houphouët had constructed was deteriorating. The first signs of decay came when several strikes engulfed the country in 1980, particularly in Abidjan. Houphouët shut them down with his typical mixture of suppression, followed by some concessions. But as cocoa prices continued to fall, Houphouët could no longer sustain the spending programs he used to shelter the population. He was forced to drastically cut prices paid to coffee and cocoa producers (Rapley 1993: 57). In 1990, the minister of finance announced civil servants' salaries would be cut in accordance with the IMF's Structural Adjustment Program. Virtually every major group took to the streets, including nurses, doctors, traders, train workers, bus drivers, hospital workers, police, firefighters, and security forces (Samba Koné 1991).

During these times of upheaval, the military's fidelity was put to the test. Between 1990 and 1993, there were three mutinies, but none had political overtones and none led to serious problems. The mutiny in 1990 was the most spectacular. Between 500 and 900 conscripts

[33] For example, Houphouët blamed Bété deaths in Daloa on radicals from Gagnoa. As a result, Bété in Daloa did not perceive Houphouët's actions in Gagnoa as targeting them. Interview with three major Daloa Bété chiefs, Daloa, September 2009. Also see Jeffries 1972: 224.

commandeered a convoy of taxis and army lorries to take over the Abidjan airport. Despite a personal request from Houphouët, France did not come to his aid. Mitterrand refused to send in the 1,000 French troops stationed nearby at Port Bouët. According to French sources, "Mr. Mitterrand's response could be summarised by a polite reminder that interference in a former colony belonged to another age."[34]

Only because Houphouët still commanded the loyalty of his presidential guard was the revolt quickly quelled. Within hours, the guard surrounded the airport and took back control. The next day Houphouët met the mutineers to address their concerns. Their demands were simple. They were conscripts who wanted their two-year service extended out of fear of not being able to find work in the difficult economy. After Houphouët promised to lengthen their service and handed out some money, the mutiny was over.[35]

Similarly, in 1993, 45 corporals in the presidential guard mutinied in Abidjan. Houphouët promised them higher pay and the mutiny was over. A few days later, 250 of their counterparts in Yamoussoukro took over the presidential palace, demanding the same pay. Houphouët immediately flew to Yamoussoukro to meet the mutineers. After promising them a pay raise within reason, the whole event was over (Bayle 2007: 29–30). On all three occasions, Houphouët was able to end the mutiny within a day with the promise of higher pay.

Thus, even in this fragile political situation, Houphouët was able to hold onto power and the support of his military. In 1990, the country held its first contested presidential election. The election reinvigorated Houphouët's position by exposing the limits of his opposition and winning back regional elites who had defected to other parties. Though there was fraud, it was clear that Houphouët had won the majority – particularly in the rural areas, which remained his stronghold (Crook 1997).

Though by 1990 Houphouët's tightly controlled system had outlived its viability, his clever political calculus allowed him to avert a *coup d'état*. Ultimately, Houphouët's understanding of the importance of incorporating potential regional opponents, his genuine commitment to negotiation, and his prioritization of agriculture proved central to his ability to consolidate political power and develop a stable state.

[34] Paul Webster, "Ivory Coast Calls Crisis Meeting as French Refuse to Intervene." *The Guardian* (London), May 18, 1990.

[35] Mark Huband, "Ivory Coast Leaders Meet for Crisis Talks," UP International, May 17, 1990; Paul Webster, "Ivory Coast Mutineers Seize Airport," *The Guardian* (London), May 17, 1990. Also from anonymous interview with former army colonel, Abidjan, November 2011.

V Conclusion

It is undeniable that Nkrumah had serious obstacles to overcome. He had many internal enemies from the beginning of his rein. But so too did Houphouët. It is hard to imagine that the enmity the conservatives felt for Nkrumah surpassed the enmity the white *colons* felt for Houphouët. It is true that the *colons* did not control as much of the territory's wealth as the cocoa chiefs in the Gold Coast, but they did control most of the international trade. And though cocoa had been more centralized under the French administration than the British, the British had established the powerful Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), a government monopsony with the power to set cocoa prices.

In addition, by 1957 there was a moment when the cocoa chiefs' strength had been sorely tested in Ghana. Had Nkrumah been a different kind of leader he might have worked out a more conciliatory scheme. But he did not. There were no speeches about reaching across party lines or working together for the greater good. He chose instead to attack Muslims, chiefs, and technocrats. Nkrumah's erratic behavior undermined the confidence not only of his enemies, but even of his close associates. Houphouët, in contrast, was able to bring back into the fold men who should have become his hardened enemies. He understood the dangers of provoking the hatred of powerful ethno-regional elites. His whole system was built on a careful ethnic calculus.

Ultimately, Nkrumah did not have the leadership skills he needed to keep powerful elites on his side, nor did he appreciate the importance of supporting traditional agriculture and rural areas more broadly. His failure was a failure of urban bias and rural neglect. Just as importantly, Houphouët's success was in understanding the importance of sustaining ethno-regional coalitions, in supporting traditional agriculture, and in his willingness to negotiate with anyone.

Part IV

Reversal of Fortune

In December 1981, a 34-year-old flight lieutenant, Jerry John Rawlings, toppled the Ghanaian government for the second time in as many years. Rawlings' 'Second Coming' proved the decisive turning point for Ghana. By the end of the twentieth century, Ghana had metamorphosed from one of the greatest tragedies of postcolonial Africa to its shining star. The new regime was able to rebuild the state's infrastructure, revamp the health care and educational systems, and create a stable political environment. In 1992, Rawlings finally ended military rule; he left office in 2000 in a peaceful transfer of power through open elections. By 2008, Ghana had the distinction of being one of only three countries on the continent to have successfully passed Huntington's 'two-turn over test.' Today, Ghana remains one of the most promising economies in sub-Saharan Africa.

At the same time, after decades of stability, Côte d'Ivoire began its descent into political chaos. In December 1993, the country's independence leader and president of 33 years, Houphouët-Boigny, died of cancer. His successor, Henri Konan Bédié, introduced xenophobic policies that alienated Muslims and northerners throughout the country. After five years of rising instability, Bédié was ousted in the country's first coup. The coup was followed two years later by a civil war that lasted until an unsteady truce was worked out in 2006 and a power-sharing government formed in 2007. It took another five years for relative peace to be established.

What led to this dramatic reversal of fortune?

Explanations for Rawlings' success and Bédié's failure have been largely attributed to structural conditions. It has been argued that the timing of Rawlings' assumption to power was fortuitous. It came at the dawning of a new period, when international donors were taking a renewed interest in Africa. As a result, Rawlings was able to receive substantial economic support that allowed him to rebuild Ghana's infrastructure and resuscitate her export trade. Moreover, his policy choices were dictated by the IMF and the World Bank and had little to do with Rawlings himself.

On the other hand, Bédié was thrust into a difficult position, following one of the most competent and popular African presidents at a time of economic and political uncertainty. The Ivoirian economy had been in steady decline for two decades. Land competition in the cocoa belt had deeply intensified. As a result, anti-Muslim sentiment was on the rise at the same time that the introduction of multiparty elections had mobilized the population. The combination of these factors meant that Bédié had inherited a highly combustible situation.

This section will argue that the situations both men faced were more complex, and the outcomes far less certain, than these narratives suggest. It will show that the odds of success were not in Rawlings' favor and, moreover, that his commitment to rural development was central to that success. Similarly, Bédié had several advantages when he assumed power that he squandered. Ultimately, his feeble political leadership and his incapacity to understand the broader ramifications of his actions were largely responsible for the untoward events that led to his ouster and Côte d'Ivoire's decline.

8 Reviving the State – J. J. Rawlings 1979–1999

I The Early Years – 1979–1983

Birth of the Revolution

Jerry John Rawlings was catapulted onto the national stage on May 15, 1979. On that day, he and 15 air force officers and airmen held a group of generals hostage. Their intention was to warn the upper brass of broad discontent in the armed forces and to advise them to immediately punish the most corrupt members of the military elite.

Indeed, for almost a decade, Ghana had been under corrupt military rule. General Acheampong's failed socialist policies had decimated the economy. The decay of the state had become so great that the social fabric of Ghana had begun to unravel. "By 1975 corruption permeated every sphere of life and its prevalence had made bribery, embezzlement and larceny an everyday occurrence" (Chazan 1982: 6). People of all walks of life were scrounging for basic amenities. The advanced decay of the road system, combined with a scarcity of automobile parts and limited fuel supply, had made the transportation of goods so difficult that even accessing vegetables grown in the interior had become a tremendous undertaking. At the same time, the regime's complicated system of import licensing, price controls, and currency inflation had made simple imports like soap and cloth so difficult to come by that everyone had begun to engage in hoarding of some kind. So much so that "Toilet paper was worth more than gold."[1] Though a new military regime was preparing to return to civilian rule, corruption remained rampant, top military officials had gone unpunished, and the economy was continuing to plummet.

Not surprisingly, the military government saw the junior officers' 'forced talk' with the generals as a mutiny. Rawlings was duly imprisoned and sentenced to execution. However, the government failed to anticipate that Rawlings' highly publicized trial would give Rawlings a national

[1] Interview with Valerie A. Sackey, former director of the Castle Information Bureau, Tema, November 8, 2010.

platform. During televised proceedings, Rawlings railed against the military government for not rectifying the 'tarnished image' of the armed forces. He asserted the only way to wipe out the nationwide corruption and to reverse the "nasty state of affairs" was by "going the Ethiopian way" and using "bloodshed to clean up the country"– starting with the armed forces (Yeebo 1991: 25). Rawlings' declarations resonated with the general public. The justness of Rawlings' charges and his personal charisma "provided the tinder that led to the socialist explosion."[2]

On June 4, 1979, a group of young officers freed Rawlings from prison, toppled the military government, and placed Rawlings at the helm. True to Rawlings' words, once in power, his military junta, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), began a bloody 'house-cleaning' campaign to rid the country of corruption. Several of the top military leadership, including former heads of state General I. K. Acheampong and Lieutenant General F. W. K. Akuffo, were executed by firing squad. The pent-up rage was so great that citizens marched in the streets chanting 'Let the Blood Flow.' Throughout the country, soldiers went on a rampage as they tried to retrieve items that had been hoarded, maiming and killing many traders (National Reconci[li]ation Commission 2004(2): 48).

But, remarkably, within three months, the AFRC, under Rawlings' leadership, had restored some measure of order. Pillaging and rampaging soldiers had been reined in and the first national election in a decade was held. Rawlings gained even greater credibility when, in September 1979, he ceded office to the newly elected Third Republic, headed by Hilla Limann.

Thus, when Rawlings staged a second coup less than two years later, despite the fact that he was unseating a democratically elected government, he was still widely popular. Under Limann, few visible changes had been made. The infrastructure continued to deteriorate, black marketeering flourished, and commodities remained scarce.[3]

Upon assuming power, Rawlings announced he was launching a 'holy war' aimed at reconstructing Ghanaian society to cleanse it of its ills – rampant corruption, class privilege, and the neglect of the needs of the

[2] *National Reconciliation Commission*, Vol. 2, Accra, October 2004, p. 46.

[3] The timing of the coup may have been influenced by fear of judicial retribution for the violent excesses of the first coup. It was believed that the Supreme Court justices were about to repeal the immunity given to the 1979 coup leaders in the 1979 constitution, so as to prosecute those responsible for the human rights abuses of the June 4, 1979 coup. The court had already disregarded the constitution's Transitional Provisions section 15(2) that stipulated that courts had no jurisdiction over matters relating to the execution, legislation, or judicial acts of the AFRC when it ruled people had been wrongfully imprisoned by the AFRC (*National Reconciliation Commission*, Vol. 2, 2004).

broader population. The force of Rawlings' convictions and the sincerity of his presentation galvanized people. So much so that the December 31 coup came to be referred to as Rawlings' 'Second Coming' and J. J. Rawlings as 'Junior Jesus.'

The new military junta, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), began to quickly implement its revolutionary agenda. One of Rawlings' first steps was to open political relations with Libya.[4] Domestically, the regime announced it was bringing "the act of government to the doorstep of the people."[5] On January 5, during Rawlings' first major broadcast to the nation, he called upon Ghanaians to form "local Defence Committees at all levels of our national life – in the towns, in the villages, in all our factories, offices and work places and in the barracks" (quoted in Oquaye 2004: 97). Though the mandate for these Defence Committees was vague, it was understood that Peoples' Defence Committees (PDCs) would be responsible for local development, while Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs) would protect workers' rights and both would create cooperative farms to help fight against the food shortages. In the first months of 1982, the press was full of pictures of PDCs cleaning up blocked sewage drains, repairing potholes, and establishing communal farms. J. J. Rawlings, the chairman of the PNDC, was himself depicted in the government media with his sleeves rolled up, helping in the cleanup and farming efforts.

At the same time, wealthy Ghanaians were targeted. Those accused of hoarding were publicly humiliated, stripped, and beaten. The Citizens' Vetting Committee was created in February, with the power to investigate anyone for tax evasion. Hundreds of people were imprisoned, their property confiscated.[6] Soon after, People's Tribunals were established in each community. In the first year, hundreds of cases were brought before these tribunals and harsh sentences were imposed. Stealing was tried as a capital crime (Ray 1986: 103). The excesses of the revolution were so acute that the well-to-do went out in ragged clothing and poor sandals to avoid being targets of soldiers and youth rampaging through the streets.[7]

The Unlikely Road to Reform – Overcoming Internal Divisions

That such a radical regime would move within six months to work with the IMF and implement liberal economic reforms was hard to imagine. Nonetheless, within a few months, Rawlings recognized he would have

[4] *Daily Graphic*, January 2, 1982, p. 1.
[5] Interview with P. V. Obeng, Accra, October 19, 2010.
[6] *Ghanaian Times*, Wednesday, February 3, 1982, No. 7501, p. 1.
[7] Interview with JSL Abbey, Accra, September 20, 2010.

to change tack and begin negotiations with international funding institutions (IFIs) like the IMF and the World Bank. But doing so presented very serious dangers.

Rawlings' credentials as the leader of the 'true Ghanaian revolution' were in part built on his criticism of former regimes' complicity with the West. During the course of the first half of 1982, Rawlings attacked the Limann government in several speeches for seeking foreign investment. He referred to previous government agreements as examples of 'exploitation' and promised to 'ensure that this exploitation should cease' (Yeebo 1991: 48). As the man who had executed generals Acheampong and Akuffo for forsaking the Ghanaian people, and who had proclaimed upon taking power that if he failed the revolution he would willingly face a firing squad, his *volte-face* was clearly a dangerous proposition.[8]

Moreover, in 1982, the organizational base of the new government was in the hands of the radical left. The military junta's central support came from the June Fourth Movement (JFM), named in honor of the first Rawlings coup in 1979. The Movement's platform was to break all "ties with imperialism, namely the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the governments and multinational companies of North America, Western Europe and Japan," and to "quickly build a Bolshevik-style revolutionary party" (Ray 1986: 41). During January 1982, JFM chapters staged marches in most cities and towns in support of the December 31 coup and the new PNDC government.

The JFM also formed the nucleus of the new regime. Four of the seven members of Rawlings' military junta's primary governing body, the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), were founding members of the JFM,[9] and two others had a strong affinity to the JFM.[10] Several other JFM members were in the upper levels of the second highest governing body, the National Defence Committee (NDC) (Yeebo 1991: 55; Ray 1986: 47).

However, there was another faction vital to Rawlings' 'Second Coming.' This faction, later known as 'the Rawlings faction,' was made up of academics and professionals, many of whom were members of the more moderate leftist party, the New Democratic Movement (NDM). They included among their ranks: Captain (Ret.) Kojo Tsikata and his

[8] In Jon Kraus' estimation, Rawlings' delayed response was because he was 'highly emotional' and slow to make changes rather than to any clear strategic plan on his part (Notes from Kraus received in November 2012). Whether the delay was purposeful or not, it could not have been an easy political decision. Rawlings must have been aware of some of the dangers. Herbst also argues that Rawlings' decision to work with the IMF was made at great personal risk. See Herbst 1993.

[9] Rawlings, Sergeant Daniel Alolga Akata-Pore, Chris Bukari Atim, and Zaya Yeebo.

[10] Joachim Amartey Kwei and Adjei Boadi.

brother Tsatu Tsikata, P. V. Obeng, Justice Apaloo, Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, and brothers Kwamena and Atu Ahwoi. Like the JFM, the NDM espoused socialist reform, but believed that socialism would have to be achieved in steps based on an understanding of Ghanaian society, not by forcing through a Marxist-Leninist agenda. Though the NDM was not in the PNDC cabinet, NDM members were highly represented on the PNDC's advisory councils (Ray 1986).

In addition to their ideological differences, these two factions had important social differences. The JFM leadership was mainly composed of students from the north. They had a large following in the Upper Region, particularly among youth and members of the military (Ray 1986: 41). In contrast, the NDM leadership was largely made up of older professionals, many of whom were university teachers. And, where the JFM was seen as a 'northern' organization, the NDM was perceived as a 'southern' one and, more specifically, Ewe-dominated (Ray 1986: 27–50).[11] Given the very different backgrounds, orientations, and expectations of these two factions, it is not surprising that they soon came into conflict.

In the first few months of the 'revolution,' the radical forces appeared to be ascendant. Of the junta leaders, two were especially formidable because each had his own political base. The first was Chris Atim. Atim was a radical student leader who had been critical in mobilizing student support for the regime. The second was Sergeant Akata-Pore. Akata-Pore, a junior officer, provided the PNDC with its links to leftists in the military, particularly among the lower ranks. To cross either would prove very dangerous to Rawlings. The Ruling Council also included JFM member Joachim Amartey Kwei, a labor leader who was removed by Limann for organizing a strike at the Ghana International Holding Corp.[12]

In February, Chris Atim established the 'Interim National Coordinating Committee' (INCC) and appointed himself chairman. As chairman, he had the power to direct and coordinate the actions of all the new People's Defence Committees (PDCs) and Workers' Defence Committees (WDCs).[13] The INCC therefore gave Atim independent control over the political base of the PNDC. Even more troubling for the 'Rawlings faction' was that INCC operations extended to the military and the police (Oquaye 2004: 153–154).

[11] The clique is often referred to as the 'Dzulekofe mafia,' Dzulekofe being the Volta town where the Tsikata family, Rawlings' mother, and several Ewe intellects in the PNDC were from (Oquaye 2004: 121; Yeebo 1991: 52). This was not entirely accurate. The Ahwoi brothers were Sefwi from the Western Region and P. V. Obeng an Ashanti.

[12] See "Council Named to Rule Ghana." *New York Times*, January 13, 1982.

[13] At the same time, Atim also created the Cadre Training Centre to train ultra-leftist revolutionaries.

Atim was having international successes as well. He was the leader of delegations to Libya, Cuba, and Eastern Bloc countries. In March, he signed agreements with several socialist countries, though the aid he negotiated for was negligible. Bulgaria pledged USD $300,000, Hungary 3,000,000 forints, and the German Democratic Republic 200,000 marks for the supply of drugs and hospital equipment. In addition, the USSR and the Czechs agreed to revive some projects abandoned after the fall of Nkrumah.[14]

Unlike the radicals, Rawlings had little confidence in the capacity of the socialist bloc to provide sufficient economic support. While Atim was on tour, Rawlings appointed the National Economic Review Committee (NERC) to assess the economic situation. The Committee's leading economic advisor was Dr. Joe S. L. Abbey, a professor at the University of Ghana, Legon, who had served as both chief statistician and assistant economic advisor for the Acheampong regime as well as chief economic advisor under Akuffo. The chair of the Committee was Kwesi Botchwey, a distinguished leftist law professor at the University of Ghana who had organized the NDM at Legon.[15] These two men were to become the central technocrats who steered Rawlings' economic policies.

At Rawlings' behest, Abbey gathered evidence of the dire straits Ghana was in. In early 1982, he and Rawlings toured the country by helicopter. From the air, both men saw the ravages that drought and bushfires had reaped on cocoa trees and other crops, as well as the tragic state of the once impressive road system. Abbey was also a member of the early delegations sent to Libya. He found that the Libyans were offering far too little and asking for far too much.[16]

As a result of the disappointing negotiations with Libya and other socialist states, Abbey pressed Rawlings to open negotiations with the World Bank. He argued that nothing the Western institutions could put on the table would be unacceptable given the extreme situation the country faced. Moreover, his own assessment of what was required to resuscitate the economy was not far removed from the orthodoxy being propounded in Washington. In his estimation, addressing the entrenched problems in the Ghanaian economy would require the resuscitation of cocoa, adjustment of the cedi, and retrenchment of the public sector.[17]

[14] See *Ghanaian Times*, Friday, April 23, 1982, No. 7,568, p. 1.
[15] Interview with Joe Abbey, Accra, September 20, 2010.
[16] For example, in discussions about joint ventures in food production, the Libyans demanded predetermined quotas. Abbey argued that the situation in Ghana was too dire and the country needed time before food could be exported anywhere. Similar problems emerged when negotiating terms for gold mines. Interview with Joe Abbey, Accra, September 20, 2010.
[17] Ibid.

Rawlings gave Abbey the green light to develop a proposal to be used as a basis for negotiating terms with donor institutions.[18] Abbey drew up what was named the 'Economic Recovery Programme' (ERP), which he submitted to the IMF. Negotiations were begun in secret.[19]

Not long after, the radicals began to make moves against the chairman of the PNDC. On June 18, 1982, the first abortive coup was launched against Rawlings. By August, the PNDC ruling Council, which had never been a coherent body, was fracturing. The political unraveling was furthered by an untoward event that dramatically challenged the legitimacy of the 'Rawlings faction.' On June 30, 1982, the media exploded with news of the abduction of three Supreme Court justices. Three days later, the justices' bodies and that of a retired army officer were found gruesomely burned on the side of the road. Suspicion immediately fell on Rawlings and his advisors, particularly because the murdered justices had taken decisions against the radical actions of Rawlings' interim AFRC government and wanted to reverse the immunity the AFRC had been given.[20] Rumors abounded that Kojo Tsikata had been responsible for the abduction of the justices and that the keys to the truck used to transport the victims had been found lying on J. J. Rawlings' desk. This was the nadir for Rawlings' faction. The murder of the justices gave strength to the beleaguered professional classes, as well as the estranged leftists.

The final showdown came after an IMF delegation visited Ghana. Rumors began circulating that the National Economic Review Committee (NERC) was conducting negotiations without the approval or consultation of the junta's Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC). On August 27, Rawlings called an emergency meeting of a Joint Committee comprising all PNDC secretaries, members of the NDC, and the NERC. At that meeting, Abbey for the first time publicly admitted that the government had been in contact with the IMF. He also informed the meeting that Dr. Botchwey was in Washington and an immediate decision had to be made as to whether Ghana would accept the Fund's terms. The meeting erupted as the leftists assailed Abbey's proposals. They argued that these fiscal adjustments, tried unsuccessfully by previous regimes, would not address Ghana's deep-rooted neocolonial dependence. Abbey was called a "nation wrecker" and charged with consciously trying to undermine the revolution (Yeebo 1991: 118).

The next day, the Economic and Political Committee was formed to replace Botchwey and Abbey's National Recovery Economic Committee,

[18] See Martin 1991: 239. [19] Ibid.
[20] See *National Reconcil[i]ation Commission*, Vol. 2, 629 (2004); *Ghanaian Times*, Monday, July 5, 1982, p. 1.

the two men now regarded as traitors to the revolution.[21] The Committee's program "identified imperialism as Ghana's main enemy" and had as its centerpiece the "building of a peoples' economy," which would be developed out of popular participation (Yeebo 1991: 120–126).

At the same time, Rawlings and his faction were under increasing pressure. Fallout from the murder of the judges had turned a number of important PNDC members against Rawlings and lowered his popular support (Yeebo 1991: 150).[22] The leftists, who still controlled the media, launched an anti-IMF, anti-devaluation campaign. Articles appeared regularly in the *Daily Graphic*, the central newspaper, with headlines like "The Revolution or the IMF" and "Devaluation Not the Answer." The press charged that economic restructuring was "an imperialist ploy to destabilize the 31st Revolution" (Hansen 1991: 118–119). The most vituperative attack came from the JFM's paper, the *Workers' Banner*, whose editors referred to the IMF as a "financial monster, the mercenary headquarters of imperialist monopoly companies" and claimed that the IMF wanted to "sabotage the economy, destroy the revolution and thus ensure the continued exploitation and oppression of our people" (Hansen 1991: 119).[23]

Given the enormous political pressure Rawlings was under, Western officials began to wonder whether the government would be able to sustain its agreements (Hansen 1991: 121). Despite the radicals' attempts to mobilize against Rawlings, the 'Rawlings faction' forged ahead with the IMF. It was a decision with very serious consequences. From October 1982 to January 1985, seven coup attempts were launched against Rawlings, most led by northerners and members of the JFM (Ray 1986: 106–111). In the end, the radicals were crushed. In December 1982, Atim resigned and fled the country as did Akata-Pore. Amartey Kwei was executed for the murder of the judges. Many other radical leftists were arrested or dismissed. By the first anniversary of the 'revolution,' Rawlings seemed to have contained the radical threat.

All the same, when Rawlings chose to stay the course with the IMF, the risks had been quite real and the outcome unsure. In the final analysis, Rawlings' choice to move toward the IMF and introduce reforms was born from his own assessment of the situation. Though there must have been pressure from the donor institutions, many of Rawlings' basic

[21] The new committee included NDM and UF members, as well as august radical leftist economists, such as Samir Amin from Egypt and Eskor Toyo from Nigeria. See Hansen 1991: 112.

[22] The scandal led to the resignation of key PNDC members, including moderate PNDC leader Brigadier Nunoo-Mensah and respected lawyer Johnny Hansen. Rawlings abruptly terminated the investigative committee into the murders. See Ray 1986.

[23] Though the paper had a low readership and may not have been emblematic of popular opinion, it underscores the tensions of the day.

premises had not changed. From the start, Rawlings' regime had wanted to decentralize, downsize government, and offer greater compensation for producers. As P. V. Obeng underscores, "We chose decentralization to respond to the quest to our own promise to devolve authority . . . it was part of our agenda from day one."[24]

Thus, though the IMF had undoubtedly pressed the PNDC leadership to make painful changes they may not have undertaken as quickly as they did, the PNDC's redirection has to be understood as driven as much by internal developments as external ones. In fact, Rawlings' real success was in slowing the rate of reform and incrementally implementing devaluation – in opposition to IMF and World Bank directives (Herbst 1993).

I Political Survival: Forging Critical Rural Alliances 1983–1985

Populist Nonsense Gives Way to Popular Sense

Though Rawlings had survived several coup attempts, at the end of his first year in power, his position was still precarious. As the PNDC failed to "deliver the goods," "support for Rawlings' second revolution lessened" (Howard 1983: 474). According to Anaman, "The common slogan of the general public after 1983, the year of the most severe drought in the country's history, could be summed up with a common saying of the Akan people of Ghana, *obiara ba, saa na obeye*, meaning that 'whoever comes to power, will do the same'" (2006: 11). In short, the tide could easily have turned for Rawlings. A number of critical choices allowed Rawlings to contain the situation and consolidate himself politically. Central among them, the PNDC began to forge new alliances with alienated segments of the population, including chiefs.

Initially, the PNDC made little effort to incorporate chiefs into the party. Although from its inception the regime was focused on decentralizing and resuscitating agriculture, the PNDC's primary support base was urban. Chiefs were seen as a feudalistic relic to overcome as part of the class struggle. In the heady days following the December coup, chiefs were vilified along with the wealthy elite. Many chiefs, especially the wealthy and powerful, were alienated by the excesses of the early days of the revolution. Some were even publicly stripped and beaten by 'youths' for hoarding.

[24] Ibid.

But by 1983, Rawlings had begun to recognize that his economic and agricultural objectives could not be met without traditional support. As P. V. Obeng explains, "A lot of us started as very leftist, idealistic – we were very hot – and all institutions that were colonial and feudal and whatever were looked upon with suspicion. But then, when we started stabilizing we knew that we needed to get allies to partner with us in our programs."[25]

Rawlings began to indicate the new direction of the PNDC in national addresses. In his 1983 Independence Day speech, Rawlings invited "the professionals, men and women of religion, chiefs, the lodges and everyone to break out of their insulating walls and shells and give the national effort a push" (Oquaye 2004: 166; Yeebo 1991: 180). That August, Rawlings declared that "Populist nonsense must give way to popular sense. Many of us have spent too much time worrying about who owns what, but there can be no ownership without production first."[26]

Speeches were accompanied by actions. The first critical realignment came on the heels of the October and November coup attempts. On December 28, 1982, Rawlings appointed the Nandom-Naa, the most important chief in the Upper Region, to his cabinet. Hansen observed, "A few months earlier, this appointment of what one would call a feudalist to such a high office would have been inconceivable ... Ideologically it signaled the period of the renunciation of class war and the beginning of class peace, a theme which was to come up more frequently in the further pronouncements of Rawlings" (Hansen 1991: 127).

In early 1984, the PNDC dissolved the PDCs/WDCs and replaced them with Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). For the first time, membership in local Defence Committees "was open to all persons or citizens of Ghana who were prepared to abide by and defend the basic objectives of the revolution" (Oquaye 2004: 167). The symbols for the CDRs reflected the new tenor of the regime. Where the motto of the PDCs/WDCs had been "Power to the People" and its symbol an upraised fist; the motto for the CDRs was "Mobilise, Defend and Produce" and its symbol a soaring eagle (Oquaye 2004: 173).

These changes were also reflected in Rawlings' cabinet. By the end of 1985, moderates had replaced the radicals. The new vice president of the PNDC was Justice D. F. Annan, a retired Court of Appeal judge, highly respected within the legal profession and among the middle classes. Radical trade unionist Amartey Kwei was replaced by more moderate trade unionist Ebo Tawiah. After the departure of Akata-Pore and Adjei-Boadi, no other

[25] Interview with P. V. Obeng, former co-coordinating secretary of the PNDC, Accra, October 19, 2010.

[26] J. J. Rawlings, radio and television broadcast on August 28, 1983, quoted in Nugent 1995: 113.

noncommissioned officer or lower-ranking member of the military was included in the PNDC. In addition, two NDM advisors were appointed to the PNDC: Captain Kojo Tsikata was made responsible for foreign affairs and national security, and P. V. Obeng was named chairman of the Committee of Secretaries. Kwesi Botchwey's position was also formalized. He was appointed secretary for economic and financial planning.

Thus the regime made a concerted effort to bring on board the traditional and established classes that had been alienated by the early zeal of the revolution. The rhetorical shifts and new strategic alliances Rawlings made were part of a deliberate plan to move the country past the heightened tensions that had come to dominate the second of half of 1982 as well as to help move forward the PNDC's new rural development agenda.

Nigerian Expulsions 1983

Also critical to Rawlings' rural agenda was the way in which the regime managed the expulsion of 1.2 million Ghanaians from Nigeria. In January 1983, Nigeria announced it was expelling all Ghanaian residents from the country. It is difficult to imagine the announcement coming at a worse moment.[27] At the time, the PNDC's popularity was plummeting, the international community was extremely hostile to it, and the economy was in shambles. Worst of all, Ghana faced its most critical drought in recent history. In 1983, fires and famine scourged the countryside. Hunger had become so widespread that people had come to refer to the protruding collarbones on the emaciated sufferers as 'Rawlings' chains.'[28] The situation could have been explosive.

What turned this potentially devastating event into a windfall was the way the regime's strategists addressed the tragedy. As soon as the government received word of the expulsions, the PNDC formed the National Emergency Relief Committee to direct the resettlement process. The Committee determined that refugee camps would present problems of sanitation, disease, and crime. Instead, all returnees would be reintegrated into their original communities. To do so, the deportations and resettlements would be organized in military fashion. Reception centers were set up at the Tema Trade Fair Centre. Minibuses, *tatas*, trucks, and ships were dispatched to Nigeria to pick up the refugees and bring them to

[27] Some argue that the humanitarian crisis enabled the regime to implement its economic reforms with less opposition than it would have otherwise faced, and gave the PNDC good reasons to slow the rate of implementation prescribed by the IMF. See Nugent 1995: 113–115.

[28] Interview JSL Abbey, Accra, September 20, 2010.

the centers.[29] There, returnees received medical attention, small parcels of food and money, and some amenities like blankets. The returnees were then transported in articulated trucks back to their regional capitals and provided enough money to ensure they could make it to their villages.

The government also attempted to use the humanitarian crisis to unify the country. Rawlings called upon churches, chiefs, and individuals to aid in the efforts. He made direct appeals to behave charitably toward the returnees and not to harbor anger or resentment against them.[30] He urged chiefs to allocate land to the returning people, saying, "This gesture will enable them to contribute their quota to the development of the country."[31]

The capable handling of the tragedy helped earn the PNDC international credibility. At the time, the BBC reported,

> It is commendable that the PNDC Government has decided to meet the challenge posed by the Nigerian decision by taking measures to transport Ghanaians back home and to rehabilitate them. The Government also deserves commendation for not allowing itself to be provoked into taking measures that will fuel any anti-Nigerian sentiments in the country.[32]

Valerie Sackey, Rawlings' propaganda spokesperson, remembered,

> That was just about the tipping point. Before that just about any respectable government in the world thought that we were just a bunch of raving loonies and it was after that they began to talk sense. After they had sent all their press men to say, "Where are the refugee camps?" and [to their surprise] they were told that [the returnees] had been sent home. (Interview, Tema, November 8, 2010)

Even more importantly, the way the regime managed the reintroduction of the returnees played a crucial role in Rawlings' ability to develop rural political alliances. To help reintegrate the returnees back into society, the PNDC launched the National Mobilisation Programme. Understanding that these were economic migrants who would need some form of occupation, the returnees were organized into 'Mobisquads' in towns and villages and directed to run community development projects.[33]

[29] "Nigeria's Outcasts: The Cruel Exodus," *Newsweek*, February 14, 1983, p. 32; "The Refugees Returning to Ghana," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, February 1, 1983, Tuesday. Text of report (accessed at LexisNexis *Academic*, June 5, 2013).

[30] *Ghanaian Times*, Saturday, January 29, 1983, p. 1.

[31] "Ghana Admits Its People from Nigeria," *New York Times*, January 30, 1983, Sunday, Late City Final Edition, section 1, p. 3.

[32] See "Ghana and Nigeria's Expulsion of Illegal Aliens," BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 27, 1983, Thursday (accessed at LexisNexis *Academic*, June 5, 2013).

[33] Interview with P. V. Obeng, Accra, October 19, 2010.

By providing rural employment, the Mobisquads helped further the PNDC's agenda to rehabilitate the countryside and to reverse rural-urban drift. Their establishment also cemented political support for the regime in the rural areas (Mikell 1989b). Indeed, the regime understood that the creation of the Mobisquads would enable the PNDC "to trap their energy, their desire, their thankfulness for bringing them home."[34]

The Mobisquads became a critical means for the PNDC to anchor itself in the rural areas and central to the government's rural political strategy. Though the Mobisquads were originally launched to deal with the returnees, they were quickly expanded to incorporate any under-employed youth who wanted to join. Throughout the 1980s, the Mobisquads were the cornerstone of several of the rural development projects the government pursued. In the early years, they were central to the government's campaign to resuscitate the cocoa industry. Subsequently, they were involved in a host of activities, including sanitation work, well drilling, block-farming projects, food-relief programs, and non-formal education programs (PAMSCAD Report, May 1994; Mikell 1989b).

Rawlings is known for his unpredictable nature and irascibility. Yet his trust in technocrats was terribly important. The ability of the PNDC to avert disaster in the face of the Nigerian expulsions was due to the success with which the technocrats organized the returnees and their foresight in placing them in Mobisquads. Equally important were Rawlings' rhetorical choices. The success with which the humanitarian crisis was managed importantly contributed to the regime's subsequent achievements.

The Northern Factor: Coup Proofing

Even after the radical leftists had been purged from the government, a serious threat loomed. The purges of the radical leftists had been perceived as ethnically motivated.[35] Purged PNDC and NDC members were mostly from the Upper Region, the area from which a significant portion of the armed forces hailed. The Upper Region was also the area that Limann was from and had been the only area that launched protests against the December 31 coup. Even worse, the JFM had won the PNDC support in the area in 1982; the same JFM members who were ousted and humiliated. Managing the 'northern factor' was therefore critical to Rawlings' ability to sustain power (Yeebo 1991: 48–51).

To address the potential northern threat, Rawlings made a number of tactical moves. Two weeks after news of Atim's resignation and the

[34] Ibid. [35] See *National Reconcil[i]ation Commission*, Vol. 2, 2004, p. 115.

capture of two leftist 'rebels,' Rawlings announced as part of his general decentralization plan that he would be creating two regions out of the Upper Region.[36] This was a long-held wish of the chiefs and people in the western part of the Upper Region who had been forced to travel to Bolgatanga, more than 300 kilometers to the east, for most of their resources. Having a regional capital in the Upper West was a real coup for the area. In turn, winning over the traditional leaders who wielded enormous influence over their people was immensely important for the regime. Rawlings made his second move just before the end of the year. On December 28, Rawlings announced he was appointing the Nandom-Naa, one of the most important chiefs in the Upper West, to the PNDC.

As expected, the promise of a separate region and appointment of the Nandom-Naa had an immediate effect. On December 30, the Nandom-Naa organized a durbar for the chiefs and people of Wa and Bozing "to express their gratitude to the government in its intention to create a separate region for the area."[37] At the durbar, the Nandom-Naa "called on the people of the Upper West to justify the creation of the region by working harder than before . . . [and to] embrace the government agricultural program and intensify food production."[38] A couple of weeks later, a delegation of chiefs and progressive youth organizations called on the PNDC chairman at the Castle "to reaffirm their support for the PNDC and to express their appreciation to it for the creation of the Upper-West Region."[39] Soon after, the Nandom-Naa undertook "negotiations with private investors in Western Europe to help implement a three-year medium term Economic Recovery Programme in the Nandom Traditional Area in particular and in Ghana in general."[40]

These two political maneuvers were designed "to blunt the edge of any ethnic response which might arise as a result" of the expulsion, arrests, and executions of the radical leftists, many of whom "came from the Northern and Upper Regions" (Hansen 1991: 127). When the Nandom-Naa died in August 1984, Rawlings accompanied the body in a procession in Accra. He then replaced the Nandom-Naa on the PNDC with another northerner, Alhaji Mahama Iddrissu, "to placate non-radical elements within the country, the northerners and Muslim community" (Oquaye 2004: 133). The succeeding Nandom-Naa, Naa Puoure Puobe Chiir VII, also developed a close relationship to Rawlings and the regime. Soon after his enskinment, he began to advocate on their behalf in Western Europe for development funding.[41]

[36] *Ghanaian Times*, Friday, December 17, 1982, No. 7771, p. 1.
[37] *Ghanaian Times*, December 31, 1982, No. 7781, p. 1. [38] Ibid. [39] Ibid.
[40] *People's Daily Graphic*, Friday, January 14, 1983, No. 7792, p. 1.
[41] *People's Daily Graphic*, January 31, 1986, p. 5.

The PNDC also began to visibly support the Upper Regions. In March 1984, the PNDC resumed a discontinued anti–yellow fever program in the Upper West and immunized 3,200 people.[42] The 1984 Independence Day celebration was launched with special prayers for the nation led by Muslim leaders around the country.[43] The PNDC even began native-language broadcasts for the Builsa. Though a small ethnic group in the Upper East, the Builsa made up a disproportionate percentage of the security forces.[44]

In subsequent years, Rawlings increasingly focused on the underprivileged north. In 1987, the Food for Infants and Mothers program was primarily channeled to the Northern Region. Rawlings expressly stated that the Non-formal Education and Development Programme was launched "to reduce substantially adult illiteracy, especially in the Northern and Upper East and Upper West Regions, as well as other deprived and depressed local communities."[45] To increase northern access to kerosene and LPG gas, the government introduced a scheme to establish petroleum storage depots, beginning with Tamale and Buipe.

Critically, the PNDC committed itself to "supplying electricity to the northern parts of Ghana from the national transmission grid" as a way "to ensure regional balance."[46] In 1988 and 1989, Rawlings toured the country to inaugurate the National Electrification Scheme to bring electricity to every rural capital in the country. At the inauguration of the first electrical power grid in the Upper East Region, Rawlings emphasized the historic reversal his regime was making by choosing to serve these neglected regions:

> [S]ince the 1960s the benefits of this great accomplishment have concentrated in the southern part of the nation, covering hardly more than a quarter of Ghana's land area . . . the PNDC's determination to extend to all Ghanaians not merely access to basic needs but to conditions which will enable the fulfillment of our vast human potential, led us to plan together with the Volta River Authority, to extend reliable electricity supplies to every part of this nation. I am sure that the year 1989 will be long remembered by the people of Wa, Sunyani, Kete Krachi and Tamale as the year when the vitalizing spark of electricity lit up their homes and hopes.[47]

[42] *People's Daily Graphic*, Saturday, March 17, 1984, p. 1.
[43] *People's Daily Graphic*, March 1, 1984, p. 1; March 3, 1984, p. 8.
[44] Interview with Valerie Sackey, Tema, November 8, 2010.
[45] J. J. Rawlings, *Unity Is Strength: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC 1st Jan–31st Dec 1989*, Vol. 8. Accra: Ghana Information Services Division, 1990, p. 106.
[46] J. J. Rawlings, "'The Vitalizing Spark of Electricity' – Inauguration of the National Grid in the Upper East Region at Bolgatanga, on Tues, 10th April, 1990," in *Towards a Greater Tomorrow: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC 1st Jan–31st Dec 1988*, Vol 7. Accra: Ghana Information Services Division, 1989, p. 9.
[47] Ibid, pp. 48.

Though progress was slower than promised, in 1992, extensive work was begun to bring electricity to the Upper East, Upper West, and Northern Regions. In the years that followed, the PNDC set up a separate northern utility to provide the region with discounted electrical rates.

In the early years, Rawlings faced a series of coup attempts, mainly led by northern leftists. Yet the coup plotters never developed sufficient support either within the armed forces or the general population. Rawlings' quick response to these threats was to build important northern alliances and launch aid to gain northern support. His strategic choices kept his detractors at bay and enabled him to stay in power for another decade.

II Policy Implications – Development from 1984 to 1990

Rawlings had consolidated control over the state by the late 1980s. His capacity to do so was related to his critical decision to redirect the state's energies toward the rural areas. PNDC channeled resources toward rural, underprivileged areas, which bolstered his ability to resuscitate the economy and stabilize the state – despite growing urban discontent.

Rural Development

The period from 1984 to 1988 was the period in which the Rawlings regime began to "institutionalize its relationship with rural people" (Ninsin 1991: 58). Rhetorically and symbolically, Rawlings intensified his support of the peasantry, while the urban populations were increasingly vilified (Nugent 1995: 137; Chazan 1991: 36; Ninsin 1991: 60). The Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives' *Rural Manifesto* declared that "As a group, the urban rich and poor have exploited the majority in the rural areas for a long time."[48] Rawlings' rhetoric echoed these sentiments: "Our fellow citizens in the rural areas create the wealth to sustain the urban areas under conditions which increasingly threaten their own existence."[49]

The chairman of the PNDC also became more visible in the rural areas. "[D]uring the post 1985 period [Rawlings] developed a strong inclination to interact more with rural populations. In more dramatic instances he camped by villages, worked with them on community projects and held

[48] *The Rural Manifesto (Policies, Plans and Strategies of the Ministry of Rural Development and Co-operatives to Effect Accelerated Rural Development in Ghana* (Accra: Ministry of Rural Development and Cooperatives, 1984), p. 1, quoted in Nugent 1995: 138.

[49] *Unity Is Strength: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC 1st Jan–31st Dec 1989*, Vol. 8. Accra: Ghana Information Services Division, 1990, p. 41.

durbars with them" (Ninsin 1991: 62). He also furthered his alignment with traditional rural elites. Toward the close of the decade, "Rawlings and his entourage made a special point of attending chiefly durbars throughout the country. At these events, Rawlings identified publicly with the concerns of the chiefs" (Nugent 1995: 205).

The Rawlings regime was particularly focused on rejuvenating Ghana's moribund cocoa industry. From the outset, one of the PNDC's central concerns was to recuperate export earnings. Because of the complete disrepair of the roads and railroads and the scarcity of trucks and auto parts, when Rawlings came to power, thousands of tons of cocoa were left to rot in silos and warehouses in the hinterland. The PNDC launched an all-out 'cocoa evacuation' campaign to bring cocoa to the ports.[50] Universities and technical schools were closed for the semester and students were required to join the national Student Task Force, whose primary focus was carrying bags of cocoa to the harbor. In less than a month, the students carried 53 railway vanloads of cocoa to the Tema Harbor.[51] The regime also summoned technical experts, civil servants, and related industry leaders to the Castle to develop a cohesive cocoa strategy. Several state-owned industries, like the Cocoa Services Division of the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board, donated labor and vehicles and other forms of support to help in the cocoa removal drive.[52]

By 1985, the PNDC had begun to restore the cocoa industry, not least because the government continued to raise the price paid to cocoa farmers. Much of the government's early infrastructural projects were focused on road repair and the construction of storage silos in cocoa-growing regions. The regime also initiated the Akuafo Cheque system in August 1982 as a way to help curb cocoa smuggling. The system paid farmers directly by check for the cocoa they sold. It was "a major success" because it "reduce[d] the practice whereby cocoa purchasing clerks cheated farmers of considerable amounts of money" (Ninsin 1991: 60). As important were negotiations Rawlings began in 1982 with Dutch company Reshiga Limited to buy waste cocoa for pharmaceutical and cosmetic products. By the end of March 1984, cocoa farmers were able to sell rotten cocoa, rather than throwing it away at a loss.[53]

More broadly, the regime took concrete steps to further its rural development agenda. After the major fires had been put out (both literally and figuratively), development priorities turned to increasing food production,

[50] *Ghanaian Times*, Saturday, January 16, 1982, No. 7486, p. 3.
[51] *Ghanaian Times*, Friday, January 22, 1982, p. 1. [52] Ibid., p. 3.
[53] *People's Daily Graphic*, March 29, 1984, p. 1.

Table 21 *Composition of government expenditure on economic services, 1985–1991 (percentages)*

	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991
Fuel and Energy	00.8	00.9	00.8	00.7	00.0	00.3	00.04	00.7	00.0
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	848.2	626.1	424.4	828.8	323.8	919.4	727.6	727.3	222.6
Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction	999.9	113.1	07.7	09.9	09.5	66.3	06.6	09.0	05.8
Roads and Waterways	828.8	737.4	232.1	424.0	343.5	848.3	444.9	242.0	151.4
Transport and Communication	07.7	10.2	222.8	424.4	313.9	09.8	07.1	08.5	07.9
Other	06.6	111.2	111.2	212.2	06.3	114.9	313.7	212.6	10.3

Source: State of the Ghanaian Economy in 1992. Accra: The Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), University of Ghana, Legon, 1993.

rehabilitating rural infrastructure, and addressing underdevelopment in the poorest regions, particularly in the north. The regime ramped up its rhetorical support of farmers. National Farmers' Day was introduced in 1985 to formally celebrate and award productive farmers. Rawlings personally underscored his commitment to rural development on several occasions. Such was the case in his speech on March 4, 1988, for the inauguration of the Afram Plains Agricultural Project:

> To give you some idea of the importance which we attach to agriculture, let me inform you that under the 1988 development budget, an amount of over C11 billion cedis has been devoted for the Agricultural Sector. This is 16.6% of the total national development budget and is second only to Roads and Highways, which has nearly C19billin, or 28% of the total and which, by making transport of inputs and produce easier also helps our farmers. In addition, the government has obtained a loan of $25 million from the African Development Fund, to ensure an adequate supply of inputs such as fertilizers, fishing nets, raw materials for the manufacture of agriculture tools, etc.[54]

The allocation of expenditures on economic services from 1983 to 1991 reflected the regime's stated priorities (see Table 21). In 1983, nearly one half of the expenditures went to agriculture. Thereafter, it

[54] *Towards a Greater Tomorrow: Selected Speeches of Flt. Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC 1st Jan–31st Dec 1988*, Vol. 7. Accra: Ghana Information Services Division, 1989, p. 7.

stayed fairly consistently at one quarter. The rehabilitation of roads and ports consumed one-third of the first ERP budget and was almost half of the government's expenditures from 1987 until 1991.

A central part of the PNDC's renewed rural commitment was embodied in the launching of the Programme to Mitigate Against the Social Costs of Structural Adjustment (PAMSCAD), on June 9, 1987, by P. V. Obeng. The program's stated objectives were to redress "the deprivations endured by the productive rural majority."[55] PAMSCAD initiated several rural poverty-alleviation programs, including a program for the distribution of food to lactating mothers and infants in partnership with the World Food Organization, and the 'Communities Initiative Programme' focused on funding community-organized development projects, such as building schools, digging wells, constructing latrines, and rehabilitating feeder roads. PAMSCAD also took under its umbrella the placement of retrenched civil servants into agriculture and other semiskilled jobs and the Mobisquads were charged with administering these services.

Another initiative undertaken at this time was the introduction of a new local government system in 1988. The new district assembly system had three important innovations. First, districts were increased from 65 to 110, augmenting the power of localities. Second, unlike the preceding systems, the new local government was mandated to include chiefs: assembly members were to be one third popularly elected, one third chiefs, and one third government appointees. Finally, funds were ceded directly to the assemblies from the central government. The District Assembly Community Fund (DACF) was created to which the government was mandated to dispense at least 5 percent of its expenditure annually.

Because one-third of the district assemblies were state appointees, it has been charged that the district assemblies were designed to increase state control over localities. Yet a significant number of appointees were from the professional classes or unions opposed to the PNDC, including prominent trade unionists Mr. Ahiable of the Teachers' and Educational Workers' Union and Mr. Yalley of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union. The PNDC even appointed an outspoken Ashanti nationalist, Baafour Osei Akoto, to the Kumasi Metropolitan Assembly. As Nugent concludes, "On the whole these were not the sort of people who could be counted on to agree meekly with every policy of central government" (1995: 177).

[55] *A Program of Structural Adjustment*. Report Prepared by the Government of Ghana for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana, Paris, May 1987, pp. 10, 18–19.

In the end, plagued by dysfunctions, corruption, and inefficiencies, the district assemblies proved far less successful at local development than the reformers had hoped. Politically, however, the new local government apparatus helped solidify rural support. It provided a means for the PNDC to forge alliances "with the most influential powerbrokers at the community level" (Nugent 1995: 205). The local elections also gave the regime "a new capacity to tap and mobilize rural support" (Kraus 1991: 149).

This was made manifest by the high levels of rural participation in local district assembly elections. Rural areas averaged more than 60 percent turnout. In contrast, urban turnout was quite low. The participation rate was only 44 percent in Greater Accra. In Kumasi, the second-largest metropolis, it was 44.3 percent and only 11 percent in Legon. As Chazan observes, "This distribution was indicative of the relative strength of the PNDC in the countryside and its waning credibility in the cities" (Chazan 1991: 37).

In some races, high turnout was due to the opposition's ability to 'get out the vote' in the hopes of undermining the power of the PNDC locally (Herbst 1991: 89). But even this represents part of the political success of Rawlings' decentralization program: local elections allowed political dissatisfaction to be channeled toward local contests, relieving some of the pressure building up against the regime nationally.

Of course, Rawlings did not win over all rural areas. Ashanti and the Eastern Regions remained hostile to the PNDC, despite the fact that cocoa growers from those regions were beneficiaries of PNDC policies. This is not surprising, given these two regions had historically been closely linked to conservative political parties. Moreover, many wealthy cocoa farmers and chiefs suffered extreme indignities during the early days of the revolution and never overcame their antipathy for the regime.[56]

Yet, overall, in the 1980s, the Rawlings regime made a concerted effort to address long-standing regional inequities, woo traditional leaders, and resuscitate agricultural productivity around the territory. As a result, Rawlings was able to build grassroots support in the countryside, particularly in the formerly neglected northern areas and the Volta Region and several of the cocoa areas in Northern Brong Ahafo and the Western Region. With its rural development, the PNDC began to increase food production and stabilize the economy. This, in turn, enabled Rawlings to solidify his hold on the state and prevent the military from splintering against him.

[56] Interview with Nana Ofori Yeboah, Twafourhene Atebubu, August 2009, Techiman.

Urban Discontent

While Rawlings was building a faithful rural following, his appeal in the urban areas was plummeting. As the PNDC increased allocations for rural development, it ended popular subsidies on goods and services consumed primarily in urban areas. Subsidies for secondary school and university student housing and food were discontinued. "[A]fter 1985 everyone except the destitute had to pay for hospital services and for drugs" (Nugent 1995: 168). By the end of the 1980s, only a handful of price controls were still in place. Rawlings even went out of his way to underscore that the choice to remove price controls was made to reverse the favorable terms of trade that urbanites had over their rural counterparts (Herbst 1993: 62–63).

The government also undertook a serious 'retrenchment and redeployment' program of skilled and semiskilled urban workers. By December 1992, 60,937 employees had been cut, among them messengers, typists, clerks, charwomen, watchmen, cleaners, artisans, drivers, etc. The government encouraged retrenched workers to 'redeploy' to the rural areas. Many were enrolled in the new, rural Food-for-Work Programme under PAMSCAD, of which approximately "30,000 opted and registered to undertake farming as their alternative source of employment and livelihood."[57] Nevertheless, a large number stayed in urban areas with few employment prospects and decreasing living standards.

Normally perceived as the 'third rail' in African politics, the PNDC was willing to weather the inevitable storm that this rise in urban living costs would engender. And weather it, it did. Throughout the 1980s, the PNDC was confronted with a series of workers' strikes and student demonstrations:

> [B]etween 1985 and 1988 the government had to contend with demands from almost all the key political groups in the country, including labor and students, manufacturers and professional politicians. Workers backed their demand for a living wage and improved working conditions with severe criticisms of the government's economic and social policies and a demand for constitutional rule as well as protection for civil liberties. Students of the country's three universities criticized the government's education and economic reform policies and demanded a return to constitutional rule. Neither was the business community, especially manufacturers happy with the government's open trade regime, which hurt local industry. (Ninsin 1991: 56–57)

Although the government gave occasional concessions to students and unionists,[58] for the most part it cracked down on them. After 1985, the

[57] *PAMSCAD Report as at 31st December*. Accra: PAMSCAD Secretariat, May 1994, p. 14.
[58] For example, the government reversed its decision to eliminate leave allowances for employees after there was a huge outcry against the proposal in 1987. See Herbst 1993: 70.

government "relentlessly ferreted out and detained or intimidated critics and organized opposition" (Ninsin 1991: 55). In response to a series of strikes and student protests in June 1987, the government closed down all three universities in Accra and dismissed and arrested prominent student leaders (Nugent 1995: 179).

The government "embarked on a deliberate policy of de-unionizing" (Ninsin 1991: 56). Some unionized workers' groups were denied the right to organize.[59] Others were "systematically depleted through retrenchment [and] privatization of state enterprises"(Ninsin 1991: 56). For example, in September 1988, the government sold the Ghana Textile Printing Company (GTP) and dismissed all the workers, who were forced to reapply for jobs. In other enterprises as well, "A number of workers were eased out in this fashion" (Nugent 1995: 172).

The PNDC also cracked down on union leaders. The general secretary of the TUC, L. G. K. Ocloo, was hounded by security forces and threatened with trumped-up corruption charges. Eventually, Ocloo went into exile and was replaced with the more tractable A. K. Yankey, who defended the government's unpopular minimum wage legislation (Nugent 1995: 181–182).

In short, by 1987, the government had lost "decisive support among urban-based classes" (Ninsin 1991: 57). The PNDC did try to coopt and incorporate the middle classes, but met with little success, especially among the professional classes. On the whole, Rawlings' political and economic strategies of the 1980s were geared away from the urban areas and toward rural constituents.

Although urban strikes and demonstrations spiked during this period, the regime's stability was never seriously threatened. Continued coup attempts were put down relatively quickly. Unlike Nkrumah, major portions of the military never turned against Rawlings and he was able to stay in power for two decades.

III Effects of Rawlings' Rural Strategy

By 1990, most scholars agree that the terms of rural–urban trade had been reversed. Chazan sums up the transformation:

> [T]he more notable outcome of the structural Adjustment Program [was] the reversal of the terms of trade between the rural and urban areas. Hikes in producer prices and infrastructural rehabilitation meant that the lot of many rural communities improved, while residents of the cities carried the burden of the reform

[59] Such as workers at the Customs, Excise and Preventive Services (CEPS) and the Ghana Board Corporation (GBC).

program. Statistics showed that the exodus from the rural areas had been halted and that people were returning to the countryside. The socioeconomic processes that had supported the urban bias of the past had been replaced by a more dispersed pattern of resource allocation. (Chazan 1991: 34)

According to a World Bank study, "significant reverse migration is occurring from non-agricultural to agricultural occupations since the introduction of Ghana's reform program" (Jeager 1991: vi). The study found that agricultural exports rebounded after real producer prices were nearly doubled and concluded that Ghana is "a striking example of both how deleterious the effects of bad economic policies can be and how changing those poor policies can have a dramatic effect for agriculture and for the economy overall" (Jaeger 1991: 39). Interestingly, among the reasons cited for Ghana's economic success was the additional labor brought to the agricultural sector by the incorporation of expelled workers from Nigeria.

That said, it is important to acknowledge that not all of Rawlings' actions benefited the rural areas and some took time to take effect. Many of the development projects were plagued with inefficiencies. And though the PNDC sought to forge alliances with traditional elites, several important chiefs were also removed by the PNDC.[60]

There is therefore a debate within the scholarship about whether the rural areas actually benefited from the regimes' initiatives. Herbst noted in 1993 that "people in the rural areas are still absolutely poorer than they were in the mid-1970s," and that significant gains to cocoa farmers would not be realized for seven years, when the new trees the government helped farmers plant began to crop (Herbst 1993: 83). Several scholars at the time also emphasized that even among cocoa farmers, only a small number of wealthy planters saw any improvement in their incomes (Herbst 1993; Kraus 1991; Ninsin 1991).It is also charged that Rawlings' reintroduction of school fees and decentralization measures shifted a considerable tax burden onto the rural areas, (Kraus 1991; Ninsin 1991). In 1987, the government acknowledged that "serious nutritional deficiencies persist" and "living standards have been further eroded."[61]

Though it is difficult to gauge how much improvement actually reached the rural majority, major indicators support the observation that "the change in economic conditions since the extraordinary depressed years

[60] Rawlings used the Chieftaincy (Amendment) Law, 1993 (PNDCL 307) to remove many chiefs. See *National Reconciliation Commission*, Vol. 2 2004, p. 54.

[61] *A Program of Structural Adjustment*. Report Prepared by the Government of Ghana for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana, Paris, May 1987, p. 17.



Figure 12 Life expectancy at birth, Ghana 1977–2000
Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank Group, March 2011.



Figure 13 Mortality rate, infant, both sexes (per 1,000 live births)
Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank Group, March 2011

of 1982–1983 is palpable to anyone who has been in Ghana" (Kraus 1991: 129). From 1982 to 1990, life expectancy increased from an average of 52 years of age to 58, while infant mortality and birth rates decreased (see Figures 12, 13, 14, 15).

In addition, the rural areas made some clear gains. According to a PAMSCAD report, the Food-for-Work Programme in the north assisted 222 rural communities in the cultivation of 2,357.5 acres of arable land



Figure 14 Immunization of DPT and measles, Ghana 1981–1995
Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank Group, March 2011



Figure 15 Crude birth rate, Ghana 1975–2000 (per 1,000 population)
Source: African Development Indicators, World Bank Group, March 2011

under agroforestry and afforestation. Approximately 8,000 peasant farmers and their 32,000 dependents were the beneficiaries of the program.[62] Other studies found an appreciable growth in agricultural production. For example, in the Hohoe District of the Volta Region, between 1984

[62] *PAMSCAD Report as at 31st* December. Accra: PAMSCAD Secretariat, May 1994, p. 13.

and 1986, Mobisquads rehabilitated 4,000 hectares of abandoned cocoa farms.[63]

Perhaps the most important gains cannot be gauged by econometric figures. As Nugent argues, "It is hard to exaggerate the political impact [of new roads] in areas where poor roads had long been a source of grievance" (1995: 206). And it was not just roads. The PNDC had for the first time started to provide underserved rural areas with pipe-borne water, schools, immunization campaigns, and, later, electricity. The introduction of television and radio to rural areas helped people in isolated villages feel a part of the national community. The open encouragement of cocoa and food farmers also induced many farmers to support PNDC policies.

While the benefits to the rural areas are debated, the same is not true of the urban areas. There seems little question that organized urban groups fared worst under the PNDC. And yet, despite plummeting urban support, the regime was able to stay in power, stabilize the polity, and develop the economy. Rawlings' success in reversing the long-standing urban bias in government policy and his choice to promote rural areas – by decentralizing government, empowering local rural elites, offering favorable terms to producers, offering incentives for rural resettlement, and expanding rural infrastructure – were the keys to his achievements.

The greatest proof of the positive impact of Rawlings' rural policies is manifest in Rawlings' party's rural electoral successes after the introduction of multiparty elections. The areas where Rawlings focused the most attention – the Volta, the new cocoa-growing areas of the Western Region, such as Sefwi-Aowin and parts of Brong-Ahafo, and the formerly neglected areas in the north, particularly in the Upper East, Upper West and Northern Brong-Ahafo – all became solidly supportive of Rawlings' government throughout the 1990s. In most of these regions, the party's strength was still manifest after Rawlings' departure from power. Even in the 2004 and 2008 elections in Ghana, the party Rawlings established, the National Democratic Congress (NDC), held large majorities in all these regions.

Focusing on the rural areas and the neglected north enabled Rawlings to bring onboard rural chiefs and their followers. Initially, this was critical to making sure that the northern constituencies, particularly those in the security forces, did not turn against the PNDC after the 'revolutionary' leftist faction had been purged. Concentrating on rural areas and promoting traditional leaders also enabled Rawlings to resuscitate the export economy and increase food production during the critical years of the

[63] Also see Oquaye 2004: 456.

1980s. These combined policies allowed Rawlings to consolidate politically and prevent the military from turning against him.

In its first decade, the Rawlings regime had done what is conventionally thought not to be done by African governments: it had developed a rural base of support and spurned its urban constituents – and in the absence of multiparty elections. And though there were some bumpy moments, the regime was never really put into jeopardy. The realignments begun in 1983 and continued through the 1990s enabled the government to sustain political stability and reverse years of economic degradation. The ability of the PNDC strategists to respond to changing circumstances and adopt new tactics was critical in both these regards.

IV Conclusion

In the end, Rawlings' success cannot be simply construed as due to his being forced by circumstances to follow the dictates of the IMF and World Bank. It was never a foregone conclusion that the PNDC would adopt reforms. Even Limann, Rawlings' conservative predecessor, had been reluctant to adopt IMF reforms, though he faced the same structural problems as Rawlings. Despite continual pressure from the IMF and World Bank, fear of the potentially destabilizing effects of devaluation kept Limann from reaching any agreement with the Fund[64] – and Limann did not have radical revolutionaries in his cabinet to whom he was indebted!

Neither the plans for decentralization, retrenchment of the civil service, nor the focus on export agriculture had come wholly from the IMF. They emerged, in large part, out of the PNDC's commitment to end corruption by decentralizing government, its conviction that independence rested first and foremost on food self-sufficiency, and its recognition of the need to rehabilitate the productive base of the economy. Thus, even if it is conceded that Rawlings was left with few choices, the extent to which Rawlings was able to restructure the economy and restore stability to the state has to be understood as, in major part, due to the regime's willingness to undertake such measures in the first place. To explain Rawlings' success, therefore, either in terms of funding or timing is simply insufficient.

Nor can Rawlings be understood to have implemented rurally oriented policies solely as an attempt to build up rural electoral support. Rawlings

[64] *Liberia and Ghana – Policy Challenges in West Africa: A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate.* Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 1982. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations in June 1982, pp. 15–16.

did step up infrastructural projects in the run-up to the elections in 1992 in part to buy rural votes (Oelbaum 2002). But the infrastructural projects undertaken had been planned long before and were consistent with the regime's initial policy objectives. Moreover, the push for elections forced the regime to make greater concessions to *urban* voters. In 1992, Joe Abbey convinced Rawlings to partially capitulate to labor's demands for increased wages because Abbey feared that, if there were anti-regime demonstrations, Rawlings might suspend elections, which would have had grave implications for continued donor support.[65] After 1992, the government's relations with business also substantively improved (Oelbaum 2002: 307).

Arguably, the most important element in Ghana's success was the 'Rawlings Factor': Rawlings himself. Though he transformed over the years, Rawlings never swayed from his core objectives. "Rawlings displayed a combination of astuteness and self-preservation on the one hand and consistency in the pursuit of his transforming mission on the other" (Chazan 1991: 35). Throughout his time in office, he continued to deliver the message to the Ghanaian people of the need for sacrifice and hard work; and he continued to be regarded as incorruptible – even by his detractors (though that became less and less so for his ministers). Yet, at the same time, Rawlings was able to adapt to changing circumstances, read the impact of his policies on the Ghanaian people, and respond accordingly.

In the end, J. J. Rawlings successfully presided over a stable polity for two decades. He took over a state that had all but collapsed and left one in its stead with real institutions and political stability. What is more, he left power after being openly defeated in the polls in 2000, setting the stage for Ghana's future democratic success. Overall, Rawlings' success has to be understood as due to his leadership and more specifically to his willingness to carry through the crucial resuscitation of his country's failed productive base by sacrificing his political capital in the urban areas.

[65] Interview with Abbey, September 2010.

9 Losing the Periphery – Henri Konan Bédié 1980–1999

Despite presiding over a resurgent economy for most of his presidency, Bédié was forced out of power before finishing his first term in office. At face value, Bédié appears to have followed a rural strategy. Bédié's productive policies favored the rural areas and he was the first to decentralize government administration. However, Bédié's cumulative policies alienated rural areas and mobilized ethnic political leaders in the capital. In an attempt to impede his long-time adversary, Alassane Dramane Ouattara (ADO), Bédié introduced a series of inflammatory, jingoistic policies and exclusionary citizenship laws. These fostered ethnic conflict in the rural areas, alienating large parts of the countryside and mobilizing ethnic counterparts in the urban areas as well as within the military. In the end, the coup against Bédié was led by generals affiliated with the ethno-regional movements that supported Ouattara – the very opponents Bédié had tried to suppress. Bédié's attempt to undermine his regional opposition increased its strength, alienated the military, and ultimately led to his ouster.

I Inherited Circumstances

When Bédié assumed the presidency he faced severe challenges. Almost anyone would have been hard-pressed to follow in the footsteps of Houphouët-Boigny, a popular, charismatic leader who was the 'father of the nation.' In addition, the economy was in a steady decline. In the mid-1970s, the Ivoirian economy began to plummet. The effects of falling world prices and global recession were compounded by Houphouët's over-commitment to costly sugar complexes in the north. Adding to these economic woes, Houphouët had developed a penchant for prestige projects, particularly in Yamoussoukro, his natal village. From a sleepy town, Yamoussoukro was transformed into the country's capital with eight-lane boulevards and the largest Catholic cathedral in the world.

More broadly, the country was plagued by a number of problems typical of developing nations. Industry was still heavily concentrated in Abidjan and suffered from high dependence upon expensive, semi-finished imports

and underutilization (den Tuinder 1978: 50). Most trade was still controlled by foreigners, as was the ownership of the top industrial firms (Boone 1993: 72; Rapley 1993: 83). Though urban drift was not as severe as in other countries, it was a serious issue, with an increasing number of Ivoirians migrating to the urban centers.

Arguably the most severe of these challenges was the tensions building over 'foreigners.' With Houphouët's open-door policy, by 1988, one quarter of the population of Côte d'Ivoire was foreign-born. The majority was Muslim from Burkina Faso and neighboring northern states who had settled in the south and west, where pioneer cocoa plantations had been established (see Table 22). Declining cocoa prices and increased land pressures contributed to growing tensions between these '*allogène*' settlers and longer-established '*autochthone*' inhabitants in the countryside (Straus 2012; D. Woods 1999). In the cities, foreigners were accused of controlling trade and a large portion of the economy. Houphouët's encouragement of the foreign vote in the 1990 presidential elections only added to the xenophobic climate.

All of these factors pointed to the fact that Houphouët's successor was going to face troubled times. The question is whether these structural conditions *determined* the outcomes that came to pass. The argument here is that political leadership was critical in tipping the scales.

An Inauspicious Beginning

Bédié's career began in the 1950s. As one of the first university students to return from Paris, he was appointed the first Ivoirian ambassador to the United States. With this promising start, Bédié quickly rose to prominence in Ivoirian politics. From 1966 to 1977, he served as the economic and finance minister. Bédié was actually the architect of the 'Ivoirian Miracle.' His success won him international recognition. He had a set back in 1977 when he became embroiled in a scandal and was dismissed from government. But by 1980, Houphouët had resurrected his career and even appeared to be grooming Bédié for the presidency. At Houphouët's behest, Bédié run unopposed to represent Daoukro. Soon after, Houphouët appointed Bédié president of the National Assembly, the second most powerful position in the government.[1]

But Bédié's certain future was put into jeopardy with the arrival on the Ivoirian political stage of Ouattara in 1990. That year marked a watershed

[1] It is not clear why Houphouët put so much stock in Bédié. It may be Houphouët felt less threatened by Bédié, who had little charisma, being more of a technocrat than a political leader. Some believe Bédié was Houphouët's illegitimate son. Others emphasize that Bédié was Baoulé, which allowed Houphouët to keep things in the clan.

Table 22 *Percentage of non-Ivoirians in Côte d'Ivoire by sub-prefecture, from 1988 census*

Sub-prefecture	%	Sub-prefecture	%	Sub-prefecture	%	Sub-prefecture	%	Sub-prefecture
Abidjan	36.4	Bouaflé	24.8	Divo	40.9	Man	17.7	Sinfra
Abengourou	47	Bouaké	27.5	Duékoué	28.6	Manokono	5	Soubré
Aboisso	48.8	Bouna	8.1	Ferkéssedougou	15.2	M'Bahiakro	16	Tabou
Adzopé	22.9	Boundiali	9.2	Gagnoa	29.2	Odienné	6.6	Tanda
Agnibilékrou	50	Dabakala	4.6	Grand-Lahou	43.6	Oumé	33.7	Tengrela
Bangolo	9.4	Daloa	30.7	Issia	28.3	Sakassou	4.8	Touba
Béoumi	4.2	Daoukro	28.3	Katiola	10.8	San Pedro	38.9	Toumodi
Biankouma	6.4	Danané	13.8	Korhogo	14.9	Sassandra	44.8	Yamoussoukro
Bondoukou								
National Total: 25.8%								

Source: Le Nouvel Horizon, No. 57, October 18, 1991, p. 5

for both Bédié and the country as a whole. Everything changed. The country was to experience economic and political reforms on an unprecedented scale.

The transformation began with drastic changes to the economy. At the time, growth levels were stagnating, average incomes were falling at an alarming rate, and global producer prices were in decline. In 1980, the IMF stepped in. On March 15, Economic and Finance Minister Koumoué Koffi released a communiqué announcing that, as a result of negotiations with the IMF, the government would be initiating austerity measures and radically reducing civil service salaries. Overnight, the capital was engulfed by demonstrations. Virtually every sector took to the streets in protest: students, professors, teachers, researchers, doctors, pharmacists, surgeons, veterinarians, dentists, bank employees, transportation workers, railroad employees, taxi drivers, army recruits, police, firemen, prison guards, mill workers, civil servants, paramedics, fish peddlers, etc.[2]

Facing the possibility of an ignoble ouster, Houphouët was forced to make drastic changes. The finance minister was sacked and the IMF sent in its own man to fix the situation: Alassane Ouattara. Ouattara, who at the time was serving as the governor of the Central Bank of West African States, was given the task of turning around the country's moribund economy without precipitating a full-scale revolt. Within weeks, the government announced it was annulling the salary cuts and initiating a new 'Ouattara Plan' to address the economic crisis (Koné 1991: 84). In November, Ouattara was made prime minister (a position that had not formerly existed), placing him at the head of the government, though Houphouët remained its titular head.

Placing Ouattara so close to the center of power became immediately controversial. It was widely believed that Houphouët had been forced to create the position of prime minister for Ouattara to reassure the donor community. Many Ivoirians saw Ouattara as an outsider. He had not lived in the country since childhood, had very little to do with the Ivoirian political elite or even Ivoirian culture, was married to a French woman, and had adopted manners and a lifestyle that were far more European than African. Though Ouattara was born in Côte d'Ivoire, he had spent the majority of his life elsewhere. As a teenager, he attended secondary school in Upper Volta (today Burkina Faso); he then pursued advanced degrees in the United States. From 1968 on, he worked as an economist for the International Monetary Fund and the Central Bank of West African States. He also served as director of the African Department and as

[2] See Samba Koné 1991.

governor of the Central Bank of West African States.[3] Moreover, he was a conservative economist, which put him at odds with many of the established political elite, as well as leftist intellectuals.

To further complicate matters, multiple parties were officially introduced in Côte d'Ivoire on April 30, 1990. The process began on March 2 with the largest prodemocracy demonstration held in Côte d'Ivoire's history. Thousands took to the streets in Abidjan and Bingerville. Prodemocracy demonstrations continued throughout the month. During the 1980s, several opposition parties had formed originally organizing underground. Most were quite small, headed by urban, socialist intellectuals,[4] but one party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), made greater inroads. Its leader, Laurent Gbagbo, was a prominent opposition figure who had been jailed several times. By 1990, Gbagbo had a significant – though not quite national – following.[5] As a result of the prodemocracy protests, Gbagbo was finally allowed to contest the November 1990 presidential elections.

The political opening of 1990 also sparked the birth of a new faction within the PDCI, led by Djéni Kobina. In May 1990, Kobina, one of the '*jeunes cadres dynamiques*' coopted by Houphouët into the PDCI government, founded the Coordination pour la Renovation du PDCI. The *renovation* movement attracted young technocrats in the party positioned against the old corrupt party leadership. The young technocrats advocated for more transparency and responsiveness within the PDCI. At the Eighth Party Congress in July 1990, Kobina's faction helped push forward Ouattara's economic program (Fofana 2009).

In the meantime, Houphouët's health was deteriorating. He was now 85 years old. Speculations about the presidential succession had occupied the nation for more than a decade, but Houphouët resisted making any statement about who he intended to have follow him or when he would step down. With the creation of the new position of prime minister, Houphouët was finally forced to name his successor. On November 6, Houphouët had the National Assembly pass Loi N° 90–1529, which included Article 11. Article 11 stipulated that in the event of death, resignation, or incapacity of the president, the president of the National Assembly would become the interim head of state until new elections were held within the next year. The only further stipulation was that the

[3] See Ouattara's biography on his own official site, as well as on the IMF site, www.ado.ci/rubrique.php?lg=en.

[4] Le Parti Ivoirien de Travailleurs (PTI), l'Union des Socio-democrates (USD), le Parti Socialiste Ivoirien (PSI).

[5] His supporters were urban intellectuals, students, unionists, and leftists. He had a strong following among the Bété populations, particularly in Gagnoa, and smaller pockets of support in the north and southeast.

interim head of state would be confirmed by the Supreme Court. It therefore established that Bédié – not Ouattara, the prime minister, nor Phillip Yacé, the former secretary-general of the PDCI – would be the interim constitutional successor.[6]

With all these pressures, the PDCI, a relatively coherent party for decades, began to break into factions. ADO, the prime minister and functional head of government, and Bédié, the president of the National Assembly and heir apparent, were naturally pitted against one another. It is likely that their competing positions as the country's leading economists – Bédié the architect of the country's historical economic plan and Ouattara the new economic reformer – did not help matters. The PDCI was divided into Bédiéstes and Alassanistes. Later an additional faction formed, the Yaciestes, who supported the former secretary-general of the PDCI Philippe Yacé as the next head of state.[7] For the most part, the Alassanistes were the 'new' men of the party – technocrats who had benefited or would potentially benefit from the reformist agenda, while the Bédiéstes were of the old guard, men like Dona-Fologo, the secretary-general of the PDCI. In addition to the old guard, Bédié had the support of many of the new-generation PDCI members who had been recruited in 1990 and did not want their career prospects put in jeopardy by denying Bédié the presidency (Crook 1997: 224).

Along with the legalization of parties came the legalization of the press. Several alternative newspapers emerged affiliated with the new political parties, among them *le Nouvel Horizon* and *le Voie*. The new opposition press began to attack both Bédié and Ouattara. At first, Ouattara was attacked for being an IMF stooge serving the interests of France. But as time progressed, the attacks against Ouattara became more insidious. It was charged that he was a foreigner, a Burkinabé (i.e., from Burkina Faso) not an Ivoirian citizen, and therefore not entitled to serve as head of state. He was also charged with being a '*nordiste*.'[8] In April 1992, a series in *le Nouvel Horizon* claimed that "The Political Men" behind Ouattara had a "strong tribal or regionalist" make-up, adhered to Islam, and shared "disproportionate ambition."[9]

At the same time, the opposition and the reformist factions within the PDCI began to attack the legality of Article 11. Bédié's opponents

[6] *Journal Official*, "Numero Special, N°43, Mercredi 7, Novembre 1990, Loi N° 90–1529 du 6 Novembre 1990 portant modification des articles 11,12 et 24 de la Constitution.
[7] *Le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 169, December 10, 1993, p. 5.
[8] "M. Alassane Ouattara: L 'mouton' du sacrifice," *le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 21, February 11, 1991, p. 3.
[9] "Les Hommes Politique," *le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 81, April 3, 1992, pp. 4, 5, 6. See also Fofana 2009.

charged that the amendment was tantamount to the promulgation of "hereditary succession," creating a "neo-pharaonique," "monarchical republic" designed to keep the Baoulé in power. Calls were made for the courts to review the constitutionality of the amendment.[10] Concerns over the imminent succession intensified in 1993, as Houphouët, approaching his 88th year, was diagnosed with prostate cancer and spent several months abroad in France receiving treatment.

Such was the state of affairs when, on December 7, 1993, the Ivoirian public learned that the father of the nation had died. Within hours of Houphouët's death, Bédié, escorted by several dozen soldiers, forced his way into the state television station and announced to the nation that Houphouët was deceased and that he had assumed the office of the presidency. Given the assemblage of forces opposed to Article 11, it is understandable that Bédié acted quickly, but his unseemly choice to muscle his way into the television station shocked many.[11] Though the constitution clearly stated the president of the National Assembly was supposed to become the interim head of government, it also stipulated that the Supreme Court had to confirm the succession. Yet Bédié had not waited for the Supreme Court nor a third party to make the public announcement. Instead, he himself announced his succession.

Part of the reason for Bédié's actions appears to be his fear of an impending coup on the part of Ouattara's supporters. According to one source, at 3:00 A.M. on the morning of December 8, Bédié convened a meeting with Generals Tany and Guéï and Minister of Defense Leon Konan Koffi, asking them not to respond to any summons from the prime minister. It was also reported that the following day, Ouattara met with several military leaders, including General Coulibaly and Colonel Palenfo (both of whom were to take part in the 1999 coup), after which the defense minister and the chiefs of the army, the air force, and the police all pledged their loyalty to Ouattara.[12]

[10] The Supreme Court was crippled at the time. Its president, Lanzeni Coulibaly, had left his post and had not been replaced. It was reported that the government removed Coulibaly from office fearing that he would align with Ouattara against Bédié (presumably because he was a northerner) and would strike down the amendment. "A Qui Profite l'Absence d'Houphouët? *Le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 162, October 22, 1993, pp. 8–9.

[11] BBC Summary of World Broadcast, December 10, 1993, Friday, "AFP Reports Controversy over Succession Following Death of Houphouët-Boigny"; *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), December 10, 1993, p. A9; Cindy Shiner, "Ivoirian Crisis Ends," *The Washington Post*, December 10, 1993, p. A52.

[12] "Le film de la demission d'Alassane Ouattara," *le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 171, December 24, 1993, p. 4. "Power Struggle Is Simmering in Ivory Coast," *New York Times*, December 9, 1993. "PM of Ivory Coast Loses Power Struggle; Speaker Succeeds Houphouët-Boigny," *The Gazette* (Montreal, Quebec), December 10, 1993.

Although key members of the Ivoirian military establishment may have sided with Ouattara, France did not.[13] It was reported that 35 highly trained French commandos, "Spooks," were prepared to arrest Ouattara.[14] It was also reported that Bédié had sent a high-ranking French officer accompanied by Ivoirian officers to arrest the prime minister.[15] Not wanting to force a constitutional crisis (or perhaps simply outgunned), on December 9, Ouattara publicly announced his resignation.[16] Soon after, he accepted the post of deputy director-general of the IMF in Washington and left the country (Crook 1997: 225).

Thus, in a manner of speaking, the first serious Ivoirian coup was prevented in 1993 by France. Ironically, it is often argued that Bédié lost his presidency because he did not have French backing. The truth is at the beginning Bédié did have French support. It was, therefore, his to lose.

I Policies and Their Effects

Politics Unravels

It was quite clear that the presidential succession would be bitterly contested. Bédié's 'self-proclamation' (as it was derisively labeled) incited massive criticism, raised doubts about the legitimacy of his status, and exacerbated existing tensions. One could argue that Bédié was forced to move quickly to ensure his hold on power. However, his subsequent decisions less equivocally demonstrate his poor political judgment.

Two days after his 'self-proclamation,' Bédié purged all the members of the government believed to be Ouattara associates.[17] Bédié also purged Ouattara loyalists in the civil service, the party, and the government media.[18] As a result, Bédié lost potential allies, further dividing the government and weakening his hold on his own party.[19] He had not learned from Houphouët the importance of keeping the enemy within

[13] "Après la mort d'Houphouët la France installe Bédié," *le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 169, December 10, 1993.

[14] "L'insulte de la France aux Ivoiriens," *la Voie*, No. 668, December 11–12, 1993, p. 4.

[15] "Le film de la demission d'Alassane Ouattara," *le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 171, December 24, 1993, p. 4.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Patrice Kouamé, Henriette Dagri Diabeté, Jacqueline Oblé, Adama Coulibaly, Nibi Zana, and Grah Claire. Those most opposed to Ouattara were promoted: Laurent Dona-Fologo, Pierre Kipré, and Faustin Kouamé all gained cabinet positions (Fofana 2009: 26).

[18] Including Ali Coulibaly, the head of Ivoirian TV1, Koné Moussa, the editor of *Ivoir Soir*, and Yacouba Kebé, the managing director of *Fraternité Matin*. See Crook 1997: 226.

[19] From anonymous interview with former cabinet member, Abidjan, November 2010.

his own ranks. And he certainly had not developed the political skills that would have enabled him to do so. Thus, "In some respects it could be said that the PDCI engaged in a self-fulfilling prophecy; in acting as if [there] were a Muslim conspiracy, it produced the very kind of reaction which it most feared" (Crook 1997: 226).

Bédié did try to negotiate with other opposition leaders. In the best Houphouët tradition, he met with all the remaining opposition party leaders, including Gbagbo and Wodié, offering them positions in the government. Yet only one opposition leader agreed to join his cabinet, Zadi Zaourou, from l'Union des Socio-democrates (USD).[20] Bédié also maintained Houphouët's system of ethnic quotas in the cabinet, choosing representatives from most regions.[21] And in Bédié's first declaration to the nation he promised: "The country will be governed for all, Ivoirians and foreigners living on our soil."[22]

Despite these positive gestures, Bédié was not a true negotiator nor a facilitator. The first serious indication of his poor political calculus was made on November 23, 1994, when Bédié introduced a new electoral code. Drafting a clear election code was not in itself unreasonable. However, the new code included Article 49, a controversial requirement that all presidential candidates provide proof that both their parents were born in Côte d'Ivoire. This made citizenship requirements for presidential candidates stiffer than those for ordinary citizens, who were only required to have *either* their mother or father born in the country. In addition, the code stipulated that presidential candidates had to live in the country continuously for five years before the election.[23] The exclusionary criterion was seen as an attempt to block Ouattara from contesting the presidency, whose father was believed to be a Burkinabé and who had lived outside of the country most of his life.

Introducing Article 49 proved a fateful decision. In the face of building ethnic tensions between 'northerners' and 'southerners,' the code became an immediate lightening rod. Ironically, one of Ouattara's own policies had contributed to the growing hostilities. In 1990, his government had

[20] "Une équipe hybride à l'assaut d'une crise economique profound," *la Voie*, No. 672, December 16, 1993, p. 2.

[21] His first cabinet included: Lancine Gbon Coulibaly, former FPI Dona-Fologo, Gaston Ouassenan and Fadika Lamine Koné (north); Achi Atsain and Ezan Akele (southeast); and Maurice Kakou Guikahue, Bernard Zadi Zaoucou, and Pierre Kipre (central west). See list of government ministers printed in *la Voie*, No. 672, December 16, 1993, pp. 2.

[22] "Trop pressé, Bédié se fourvoie," *la Voie*, No. 666, December 9, 1993, p. 4, from text of Bédié's proclamation to the nation on December 7.

[23] "Projet de loi portant Code electoral," *Fraternité Matin*, December 9, 1994, p. 3. For all other citizens, the laws required then (and still require) that only one parent be born in Côte d'Ivoire

required that foreign residents purchase a resident alien card, '*carte du séjour*.' Petty authorities began to extort money indiscriminately from anyone who appeared to be of northern or Muslim descent without documentation, regardless of their actual citizenship status. Even the FPI journal, *la Voie*, in 1991 described how "Operation Carte de Séjour" had "overtones of surgical removal" that had increased insecurity.[24]

Soon after the introduction of the *carte du séjour*, an anonymous tract allegedly appeared, the '*Charte du Nord*'. This charter infamously championed the creation of a Great North. According to the document subsequently printed in *Fraternité Matin* in 2010, the charter's stated goal was to strengthen the underprivileged north by politically unifying its peoples so as to create greater equity in Côte d'Ivoire and to support Ouattara.[25] It was immediately labeled a racist, xenophobic document that had originated with Ouattara's followers.[26] Some southerners charged that it was part of a broader plot on the part of northerners and Muslims to take over the country.[27] The detractors ignored the fact that the charter promoted multipartism and a unified Côte d'Ivoire, and that its authors equally endorsed Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Dona-Fologo as rightful candidates for succession.[28]

Whatever the truth may be behind the intent and authorship of the *Charte du Nord*, it did make manifest the sense of disenfranchisement northern people felt at the time. The charter expressly stated that it was initiated in response to the poisonous political situation created by Ouattara's detractors, who denied his rightful citizenship and whose pernicious discourse was turning all northerners into second-class citizens:

> [After 1989, there was a] general outcry orchestrated by supporters of the regime and other Ivoirians in the forest zone, challenging Alassane Ouattara's status as an Ivoirian. For them he is a Burkinabé. Every son of the North is generally outraged and shocked by the conduct of the Ivoirian forest zone. For them, the bearer of a name that sounds Dioula or Sénoufo is, *ipso facto*, a foreigner, an Ivoirian by circumstance. Do you not hear all day long, "You Dioula this, you Dioula that"? This view leads to behavior that poisons our ability to live together. Our initiative is . . . [a] reaction to this state of affairs without creating a rupture. ("La première charte du Nord," *Fraternité Matin*, August 5, 2010, p. 5; translation mine)

Another testament to the fragile political climate came soon after the appearance of the *Charte du Nord*. In 1992, a second tract was circulated, this one entitled *La République des Peuples du Nord de la Côte d'Ivoire*.

[24] Olivier Guei Konan, "Carte de séjour, insécurité, les étrangers et nous," *le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 57, October 18, 1991, p. 5.
[25] "La première charte du Nord," *Fraternité Matin*, August 5, 2010, pp. 4–5.
[26] See Sandlar 2005: 297. [27] See Gnakalé 2006: 107.
[28] "La première charte du Nord," *Fraternité Matin*, August 5, 2010, pp. 4–5.

Unlike the notorious *Charte de Nord*, this tract called for the people of the north to secede from Côte d'Ivoire in no uncertain terms (Pape & Vidal 2002: 301–302). And unlike the *Charte du Nord*, its author is undisputed. Alpha Blondy, the venerated reggae artist from the north, wrote the tract in protest after being denied an Ivoirian passport. In a later interview with *Notre Voie*, Blondy admitted that he had printed the leaflet as "a kind of warning" and called for secession because people of northern origin were being treated as foreigners.[29] Neither Ouattara's nor Bédié's government took any real steps to pacify this growing sense of alienation. Instead, in July 1994, Bédié's government tripled the cost of the residence permits, the *cartes de séjour*, for noncitizens, while greatly reducing the cost of national identification cards for citizens.[30]

Thus by November 1994, when Bédié's electoral code was promulgated, although Alpha Blondy's treatise was no longer in circulation, it was clear that excluding Ouattara from the electoral process on the grounds of citizenship would fan the flames of a highly combustible situation. Moreover, there seems to have been little reason for Bédié to have done so. Even if Bédié believed Ouattara to be a Burkinabé,[31] a savvier tactician would have understood such actions would only increase Ouattara's strength. In 1994, Ouattara was not particularly popular (Rapley 1995: 119–121). He was *the* figure most closely associated with externally enforced SAPs. He was reviled by many urban leftists who saw his economic policies as 'ultra-liberal,' 'antisocial,' and a betrayal of the Ivoirian system (Wodié 2010: 155). Ouattara did not even have high levels of support in the north. As late as 2009, northern villages surrounding Korhogo were divided, with the elders citing the PDCI's end of forced labor and the introduction of roads and health care as reasons to support Bédié against the unknown Ouattara.[32] In addition, the Bété areas in the central west were galvanized for Laurent Gbagbo. Under such circumstances, it was highly unlikely that Ouattara had the requisite levels of support to win an election.[33]

[29] "Alpha Blondy interviewé par Notre Voie (partie 1)," *Notre Voie*, No. 2217, October 19, 2005 (accessed at alphablondy.info, November 20, 2010).

[30] U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 – Côte d'Ivoire, February 26, 1999, available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6aa5f4.html (accessed January 4, 2010).

[31] Suggested in anonymous interviews with former members of Houphouët's cabinet, Abidjan, November 2010.

[32] Anonymous interviews conducted with villagers and chiefs in six villages surrounding Korhogo, July 2009.

[33] Chirot argues Ouattara would have won the election. But there seems little evidence of this. In my anonymous interviews with two former ministers serving at the time, both said they believed it was unlikely Ouattara could have won the election. Also, at the time, Rapley wrote: "ADO remains deeply unpopular among many Ivoiriens for the economic

This conjecture is supported by the results of the National Assembly elections the following December. Ouattara's party (Rassemblement des républicains, RDR) won 19 seats, Gbagbo's (FPI) 13, whereas the PDCI took 155 seats. Even in the north, the RDR carried less than half of the constituencies and in Abidjan, where PDCI opposition had its highest levels of support, the two opposition parties combined took only 2 of the 19 seats.[34]

Thus, if Bédié had allowed ADO to run, he might in all likelihood have slowed down the opposition movement. He might even have found a way to include ADO and Gbagbo in the government. Particularly after the positive effects of 1994 devaluation of the CFA had begun to be felt throughout the economy.

Economic Opportunities

Though Bédié's political beginnings were inauspicious, his economic beginnings were propitious. That was so for several reasons. First, on January 1, 1994 the Franc CFA was devalued. The devaluation quickly buoyed the Ivoirian economy.[35] Inflation briefly soared to 32.2 percent, but quickly dropped off and stabilized at an average of 2 percent per annum. Domestic demand began to recover, rising from about 8 percent share of nominal GDP in 1993 to 16 percent in 1998.[36]

The positive effects of the devaluation were boosted by resurgent aid flows. Foreign assistance was doubled between 1993 and 1995 (Figure 16). The international community also helped reduce the country's external debt burden. Between 1994 and 1997, the government signed three debt agreements: the 1994 Paris Club debt rescheduling, the 1996 London Club agreement and the 1997 G-7 decision to include Côte

reforms he introduced during his tenure. Moreover, his opponents have effectively, though perhaps not fairly, tarred his movement with a particularist brush, identifying it as a northern and Muslim coalition." See Chirot 2006: 69; Rapley 1995: 120.

[34] The RDR carried: 3 of 6 districts in Ferkessédougou; 5 of 11 in Korhogo, 1 of 6 in Mankono; 4 of 12 in Odienné; 3 of 8 in Séguéla (the FPI took 2). The FPI was relatively strong in the west, taking all 3 districts in the department of Gagnoa, 1 of 2 in Issia, 1 of 4 in Guiglo, 1 of 3 in Danane, as well as 3 of 5 in the southeastern district Adzopé. On the other hand, all the seats in Divo and Daloa went to the PDCI. See "Tous Les Résultats," *Fraternité Matin*, No. 9400, February 13, 1996, pp. 1, and "La Liste Compléte des Élus,"pp. 12–19.

[35] Houphouët had resisted devaluation of his currency because he saw it as a mark of failure. Anonymous interview with former minister in Houphouët's government, Abidjan, November 2010.

[36] IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/107, "Côte d'Ivoire: Selected Issues and Statistical," August 2000.

d'Ivoire in the IMF-World Bank debt forgiveness initiative for heavily indebted poor countries.[37]

At the same time, cocoa prices, long in decline, began to revive. From September 1993 until 1997, prices remained on an upward trajectory. The government passed these increases on to producers. Producer prices went from 44 percent of export prices (CFAF 316 per kilo) at the beginning of the 1994/95 agricultural season, to about 63 percent of export prices (CFAF 575 per kilo) during the first half of the 1998/99 agricultural season.

Resurgent cocoa prices were accompanied by unprecedented levels of production. This was because improved tree varietals planted in the late 1980s and early 1990s went into production in 1995. In 1995, the country achieved an historic output of 1.2 million tons of cocoa. These high output levels were sustained until 1999 (IMF 2000: 9, 35). Bédié's cotton programs in the north also proved quite successful. Cotton production increased almost 9 percent annually over this period (IMF 2000: 9).

Cumulatively, these factors contributed to an impressive recovery. Economic growth skyrocketed from 0.7 percent to an average of 5 percent per annum. Starting in 1995, Côte d'Ivoire experienced its first sustained improvement in per capita GDP since the late 1970s. With the sizeable reduction in its debt burden, the overall fiscal deficit was also reduced, from 11.9 percent of GDP in 1993, to 2.3 percent in 1996.

As a result, activity in almost all sectors of the economy picked up. Trade and commerce increased so considerably that the volume of traffic at the port of Abidjan rose by 21 percent, making Côte d'Ivoire the third largest in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of volume (IMF 2000: 10). Thus, by 1995, the economic situation had improved "dramatically" and "a consumer boom was under way in both the rural and urban areas" (Crook 1997: 230).

Bédié did in fact use these economic improvements to implement policies favorable to both urban and rural populations. Soon after assuming the presidency, Bédié announced he was increasing civil servant salaries by 15 percent and giving the army a pay raise.[38] The government also increased health and education spending by roughly 20 percent annually. Between 1995 and 1997, the state constructed about 700 new classrooms and 50 new clinics (IMF 2000: 21).

At the same time, the government began to revive the country's declining infrastructure. In 1996, the government showcased its infrastructural

[37] (www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm, accessed March 10, 2011).
[38] "Les 15% de Bédié divisent les militaries." *La Voie*, No 1115, June 14, 1995, p. 2.

plans to donors and journalists with a film entitled *Les 12 Travaux de l'Eléphant d'Afrique*. The 12 large infrastructural projects were to include the development of two toll highways, three toll bridges, construction of a long-distance bus station, and an Olympic stadium in Abidjan.[39] Work was begun on a major road to connect Korhogo with Odienné and another to connect Angré with Abobo.[40] The most important project was the construction of a major artery to connect the east and the west of the country, from Abidjan to San Pedro, named the coastal route (*la 'Côtière'*).

Several of Bédié's development projects directly benefited rural areas. In June 1994, the government announced it was dedicating 3 million CFA to a 'national road maintenance program'. Secondary and tertiary roads around the country were slated to be repaired and paved, starting in the underserved northern districts.[41] Electricity was brought to 408 villages for the first time between 1995 and 1997.[42] During the same time period, the government also built 1,382 housing units in multiple rural areas.[43]

Thus, Bédié began with a number of things going in his favor. He benefited from the positive effects of the devaluation and the upturn in world commodity prices. He had the support of France and the international donor community. And even though the opposition had made some headway, the PDCI was still the most recognized and respected party countrywide. He therefore had a genuine chance of winning widespread support. If Bédié had simply rescinded Article 49 of the electoral code (or better yet, had never introduced it in the first place), the situation might have been salvaged.

Ultimately, Bédié's own policies were his undoing. Every step of the way Bédié made choices that strengthened his opposition, divided the Ivoirian population, and undermined the political capital he could have gained from the country's economic recovery.

The Opposition Movement

With the new electoral code, the opposition now had a rallying cry. Ouattara became a symbol of Muslim/northern disenfranchisement.

[39] "12 Projets, 2000 Milliards Pour une Révolution" *Fraternité Matin*, February 23, 1996, p 2; "Les 12 Travaus de l'Éléphant d'Afrique: La Banque Mondiale Approuve," *Fraternité Matin*, March 12, 1996.

[40] "Axe Angré-Abobo: Le bitumage a commencé," *Fraternité Matin*, October 25, 1994.

[41] "3 milliards pour pistes rurales: Ce que l'État donne a chaque region," *Fraternité Matin*, June 22, 1994, pp. 8.

[42] "408 Localités Électrifées," *Fraternité Matin*, May 28, 1998, p. 10.

[43] "Habitat Rural: 1.382 Logements Construits En Un An," *Fraternité Matin*, May 16–17, 1998, p. 4.

He, like they, was considered a 'false' citizen pitted against the 'true' southern, Christian Ivoirians. A new party in support of Ouattara, the Rassemblement des républicains (RDR), was born out of Djéni Kobina's PDCI splinter group on October 5, 1994. By April, the RDR had joined forces with Gbagbo's FPI party and smaller opposition parties to form the Front républicain. The coalition party was expressly organized to contest the electoral code. Throughout the spring and summer of 1995, the Front républicain organized marches to demand its repeal. By July, the RDR had nominated Ouattara as the party's presidential candidate.

Bédié's reaction to these developments was to dig his heels in further. His government refused to negotiate or change its position. With the government intransigent, the Front determined it would make the country 'ungovernable' until the law was changed. Anti-government demonstrations became larger and increasingly violent (Crook 1997: 230). Massive demonstrations were held in Abidjan in June, July, and August. In September, the opposition press reported sit-ins, marches, and demonstrations taking place around the country, the largest of which was a *grand marche* in Abidjan on September 15.[44]

Still the government remained unflappable, insisting that the laws of the state could not be abrogated in the streets (Crook 1997: 230). PDCI officials accused the RDR of endangering the nation with their anti-republicanism and undermining the country's social cohesion.[45] Minister of Security Marcel Dibonan Koné stated at a press conference that anyone found to be a member of the student group associated with Gbagbo's FPI, the Fédération estudiantine et scolaire de Côte d'Ivoire (FESCI), would be considered an "outlaw." Brutal police raids were conducted against FESCI and hundreds of its members were arrested and held 'incommunicado.'[46]

By mid-September, with the government still refusing to negotiate with the opposition, Djéni Kobina called for an 'active boycott' of the elections. Crook explains, "This was a euphemism for a concerted attempt to actively sabotage the elections, that is, physically prevent them from happening" (1997: 233). In a television interview on September 17, Kobina reportedly did not "hide his wish to promote violence as a means to fight the government and force them to retract the *Code électoral.*"[47] Throughout October, violence escalated, as the death toll of

[44] "Toute La Côte d'Ivoire Dans La Rue Contre Le Code Électoral," *la Voie*, no 1191, September 1995, p. 1.

[45] "Le Code electoral," *Fraternité Matin*, December 24, 1994, p. 6.

[46] *"The Best School": Student Violence, Impunity and the Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire*. New York: Human Rights Watch, 2008.

[47] See U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 – Côte d'Ivoire, February 26, 1999, available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6aa5f4.html (accessed January 4, 2010).

both police and civilians mounted.[48] The worst violence occurred right before the election. A series of attacks were made against Baoulé settlers by indigenous Bété in villages around Gagnoa, the FPI's stronghold. About 18 people were killed and 4,000 Baoulés were forced off the land they occupied (Bayle 2007: 48–50; Crook 1997: 234–235).[49]

Perhaps the most significant event occurred on the eve of the election. General Robert Guéï, the man Houphouët had brought in to deal harshly with urban protests in the early 1990s and later promoted to chief of staff, refused to obey the government's orders to dismantle the "active boycott" (Kadet 2012: 273). In an interview in September 1995, Guéï made the extraordinary statement that "it was not the place of the army to settle the problems of public order."[50] Coming from the man whose forces in 1991 had conducted raids on dormitories in Yopougon – smashing windows, breaking down doors, killing one student, raping and injuring several more – Guéï's statement was tantamount to insurrection. Immediately after the election, Guéï was dismissed as army chief of staff and appointed minister of sports. One year later, he was accused of attempting to foment a coup with officers from the west (Guérés and Bété). Guéï was sacked and 18 other officers were accused of plotting a coup against the government (Kieffer 2000: 32).

It is difficult to explain why the head of the army overtly turned against Bédié, if not because of Bédié's policies. Guéï, though not a Muslim, was a Yacouba, a minority group from the west of Côte d'Ivoire. Before the succession, there had been speculation about where Guéï's loyalties would lie.[51] Unlike other military officers, Guéï neither endorsed nor opposed Bédié's assumption of the presidency.[52] Later Guéï even claimed that he had dissuaded Colonel Lassana Palenfo (then security minister in Ouattara's government) from undertaking a coup against Bédié.[53] Nonetheless, during the antigovernment protests of 1995, Guéï refused to aid in the government crackdown. Bédié's policies appeared to have turned the head of the army against the regime.

[48] See Crook 1997; Bayle 2007: 48–50.

[49] Also see "Les Baoulé ont tous regagné leurs plantations," *la Voie*, No. 1275, December 26, 1995, p. 2.

[50] "Laissez l'armée en dehors de votre démocratie," *la Voie*, No. 1187, September 9–10, 1995.

[51] A-t-il des hommes dans l'armée?" *le Nouvel Horizon* No. 83 April 17 1992, pp. 4. "Pourquoi l'armée doit se tenir a l'écart," *Le Nouvel Horizon*, No. 167, November 27, 1993, p. 7.

[52] Days before the succession, it was reported that Guéï had met with his benefactor, Houphouët, and afterward pledged his and the army's support of Article 11. See "Guéï soutien le PDCI de Bédié," *la Voie*, No. 665, December 4, 5, 6, 7, 1993.

[53] Tom Kamara, "Côte d'Ivoire: Implications of the December 1999 Coup d'état," UNHCR Report, April 2000. Writenet Paper No. 01/2000, p. 5.

Despite the violence, the elections were held as scheduled on October 22. With the main opposition leaders either having been banned from participating or having chosen to boycott the elections, Bédié won the presidency by a landslide. He gained 96 percent of all the votes cast, even higher than Houphouët's 86 percent in 1990. Once the presidential election was over, the protests ended. All the opposition parties participated in the national elections the following December.

In the final analysis, had it not been for the electoral code controversy, it is unlikely that Ouattara would have made it so far. As Akindès explains,

> Between 1992 and 1995, in both the North and the South, ADO was perceived as a technocrat, whose lifestyle set him at a distance from ordinary people . . . This mobilization has to be linked to the political effects of [Bédié's policies] which encouraged the populations in the North to organize politically in order to resist what they considered as being a spiral of a process of exclusion. (2004: 35)

Bédié's own actions inadvertently created the very thing he had hoped to crush.

It is true that northern migrations had become a contentious issue in Côte d'Ivoire. The introduction of electoral politics added to the political uncertainty. These structural conditions clearly increased the likelihood of political destabilization. These factors underscore how important political leadership was at that juncture. Indeed, xenophobia was not new in Côte d'Ivoire. It first reared its ugly head in the anti-Dahomean riots of 1958 (see Chapter 7). As in 1958, the historic moment required capable political management and a leadership committed to muting ethnic tensions.

At the same time, Bédié did not only inherit problems. He also benefited from devaluation, resurgent cocoa process, and international support. Rather than focusing so keenly on eliminating his opposition, he could have used these positive circumstances to bolster his presidency. Instead, Bédié's defensive policies intensified the growing divisions in the body politic. His decision to seek political gain from the increasingly toxic political climate ultimately deepened the noisome schism in the country, setting the stage for the 1999 coup and the subsequent civil war.

Introduction of 'Ivoirité'

Perhaps as a consequence of his easy electoral victory, Bédié's strategic choices did not improve in the ensuing years. This was made most evident in the ideological orientation Bédié adopted for the PDCI under his presidency. In a radical departure from '*houphouëtisme*,' Bédié introduced the doctrine of '*ivoirité*.' In the simplest terms, *ivoirité* was a proclamation

that Côte d'Ivoire was to be a country for '*ivoiriens*' and '*ivoiriennes*.' The new party doctrine was designed to move the PDCI away from Houphouët's open-door policies; *ivoirité* was both a renunciation of Houphouët's inclusion of noncitizens in elections and the economy, as well as Houphouët's close association with France.[54]

Candidate Bédié first used the term *ivoirité* to describe the PDCI's new orientation during his 1995 presidential campaign (Boa 2009: 77; Touré 1996: preface). In a speech delivered on August 26, 1995 to a PDCI-RDA convention in Yamoussoukro, he proclaimed:

> Through the unity of the nation, and what is essential to it . . . we continue to assert our cultural distinctiveness, and to foster Ivoirian uniqueness, what we can call *ivoirité*. What we aspire to achieve is an original synthesis, fertilized by tradition and modernity. This synthesis, it goes without saying, is not made manifest by political power in and of itself; it is realized by the unity of all citizens. (quoted in Loucou 1996: 22–23, translation mine)

His supporters contend Bédié meant this to be a call for the political participation of all Ivoirian citizens in the building of a modern nation-state; even as a utopic vision of the future (Boa 2009: 77). Yet, given the context in which it was introduced – i.e., during the campaign of 1995, when protest marches were taking place around the country about exclusionary citizenship requirements – it is difficult to see its use in such innocuous, let alone glorious, terms. Rather, it was evident that this policy reorientation would fuel anti-foreigner and anti-Muslim sentiment (Contamin & Losch 2000: 121).

The relationship between *ivoirité* and anti-Muslim/northern sentiment was made transparent in a group of essays published in 1996 by a group of PDCI ideologues.[55] The first essay, written by respected historian Jean-Noël Loucou, then serving as the director of the Office of the President, explains that *ivoirité* had become "an anxiety, a necessity and a project" in large part because an increasing number of migrants from "neighboring African countries" with "higher birth-rates" had produced a "massive foreign presence" that was threatening "to destroy the socio-economic balance of the country" (1996: 19–21). The fear of Muslims underlying the new PDCI doctrine was also made explicit in a report issued in October 1998 by the Conseil Economique et Social, which found that "the inflow" of Muslim immigrants had "considerably modified the

[54] For more on *ivoirité*, see Marshall-Fratani 2006: 9–43.

[55] CURDIPHE (Cellule Universitaire de Recherche et de Diffusion des Idées et Actions Politiques du Président Henri Konan Bédié, or University Research Cell for the Dissemination of Ideas and Policy Actions of President Henri Konan Bédié). The book issued from CURDIPHE conferences held between 1995 and 1996.

pre-existing religious balance," and that "an upset in the balance of this sort, in such a sensitive sphere, could lead some people to endeavor to exploit religious affiliation for political ends, which is a disservice to national harmony and unity and a threat to the social peace so dear to our country" (Akindès 2004: 29).

The xenophobic basis of the government's ideology soon assumed tangible form. In December 1997, Bédié introduced a new landownership law that led to the expulsion of long-time settlers from their farms. The *Réforme foncière*, or 'Reformed Land Use Law,' established that land title would no longer be transferred from traditional owners to 'users' by virtue of their having worked the land. The reform law officially reversed de facto government policy, which had been based upon Houphouët's dictum that "the land belonged to those who tilled it" (see Chapter 3).

A mass expropriation of settlers' farms ensued. Many of those dispossessed had been peacefully operating their farms for decades. Even those who had legitimately bought orchards from indigenous owners were accused of illegally occupying Akan or Kru land. Northern settlers were expelled from Baoulé and Kru lands; Baoulé settlers were expelled from Kru lands. By the late 1990s, opposition newspapers were filled with reports of northerners being attacked and discriminated against, particularly in the southwest and in Abidjan (Azam 2007: 219; State Department Report 1998). In 1999, conflicts with Kru landowners and settled 'Burkinabé' resulted in an estimated 20 deaths. By November, approximately 12,000 Burkinabé had returned home. As Toungara explains, "The nearly two million Burkinabé who had made Côte d'Ivoire their home and been allowed to vote under Houphouët now found themselves disenfranchised" (Toungara 2001: 67–68).

Opposition Resurgent

In addition to fanning ethnic conflict, Bédié stonewalled the growing opposition movement and tried to shore up his hold of the state. But the steps he took to guarantee the impregnability of his position further undermined his domestic support and eventually alienated international donors.

In the early spring, Bédié introduced a law with several amendments to the constitution. The proposed law included an extension of presidential term limits from five to seven years, the creation of a new senate whose members would be nominated by the president, and presidential power to suspend elections for reasons of national security. It also maintained the controversial citizenship requirement in the electoral code.

The proposed law renewed the passions of the 1995 presidential election. The PDCI supermajority passed the law in June. In protest, parliamentary members of the FPI walked out and the RDR parliamentary group registered its opposition with a block vote against its passage.[56] Soon after, the president of the FPI called for national protests against these constitutional reforms. In response to Gbagbo's call for renewed protests against the constitutional amendment, marches and events were launched around the country. The largest was a demonstration in Abidjan on September 7, attended by an estimated 200,000 people. With the threat of disorder and increasing international pressure, Bédié was finally forced to enter into negotiations with his opponents.

In an attempt to head off the opposition, Bédié made new additions to his cabinet.[57] He increased the number of ministerial positions from 32 to 36. In March, the mayor of Korhogo and the number two man in the RDA, Adama Coulibaly, joined the government as minister of transportation. With another cabinet shuffle in August, Francis Wodié finally agreed to join the cabinet after having refused in 1993 and again in 1995, hoping it would help dampen tensions and avert civil war.[58] The addition of Adama Coulibaly was intended to be particularly strategic. Korhogo and Odienné had become centers of the RDR opposition since the 1994 uprising. The regions were also central to Ouattara's political machine. But the gain for Bédié proved minimal. Coulibaly was expelled from the RDR as a sell-out. As a result, Bédié's attempt to neutralize the opposition in Korhogo came to naught.

Bédié did have one success. In a tactically smart move, Bédié held separate negotiations with the leaders of the FPI and the RDR. In so doing, he was able to split the movement. The negotiations with the FPI concluded with an agreement on December 18, 1998. The FPI promised to rescind its demands for the repeal of Article 49 of the electoral code, in exchange for a guarantee of transparency in the electoral process and repeal of the other proposed constitutional reforms. The government also agreed to grant amnesty to all those arrested during the 1995 active boycott. Thirty-three people serving terms ranging from three years to life imprisonment were released on December 24. In contrast, the RDA refused to make any pact or to concede anything to Bédié as long as he upheld the citizenship clause in the constitution. They criticized Gbagbo

[56] "Le FPI Abandonne l'Hémicycle," and "Le 'Nos' de Deputés RDR," *Fraternité Matin*, July 1, 1998, pp. 3.

[57] "Ivory Coast; Bédié Drops Seven in a Cabinet Reshuffle," Africa News, Panafrican News Agency, August 11, 1998; "Ivory Coast: Hard Road to Travel for Ivoirian Cabinet," Africa News, Panafrican News Agency, August 14, 1998.

[58] Interview Wodié, Abidjan, August 2014. See also Fofana 2009: 87.

and the FPI for selling them out to the government (Fofana 2009: 87–88; U.S. State Department Report 1998).

This small ray of hope was quickly occluded by other events. Bédié's poor governance had begun to take a toll on the economy. Between 1998 and 1999, Côte d'Ivoire's GDP growth decelerated, falling below 3 percent in 1999. A major contributor to the economic decline was the 40 percent drop in world cocoa prices (IMF 2000: 8). Government policies had also added to the country's economic woes. Fiscal fraud hastened the economic slowdown. By 1997, the budget was in serious arrears resulting from unrecorded off-budget spending and *depenses engagees non ordonnances*, or DENOs (spending committed for which payment orders have not been issued). DENOs doubled from 3.8 percent of GDP at the end of 1998 and to more than 7 percent of GDP by the end 1999. Special tax exemptions had also multiplied fivefold, increasing from CFAF 17.8 billion in 1996 to CFAF 80.8 billion in 1999. The misallocation of resources undermined most of the large development projects Bédié initiated in 1996. By 1998, a huge chunk of the great 'Côtière' route had fallen into the river, rendering the road impassable, and the northern route never really got under way (IMF 2000: 17–19).

Worse still, because of the political turmoil and economic scandals, Bédié lost the support of international donors. In June 1999, the European Union released an audit report that found the Ivoirian government had defrauded US$34.5 million of its funds. Even more damaging, the monies were earmarked for poverty relief and should have been used for the provision of health care services and local development. Soon after, the IMF discovered CAISTAB, the state's cocoa and coffee monopsony, could not account for US$220 million.

The effects of these scandals were quite grave for Bédié's government. The World Bank, which had been pressuring Bédié to liberalize the cocoa market, used the CAISTAB scandal to force the government to liquidate the institution. It was replaced with the Nouvelle CAISTAB, a public-private concern in which the state held only a minor stake. Price protections for cocoa and coffee farmers were ended, bringing about the first cocoa farmer protest the country ever experienced.

By September 1999, all donor funds had been suspended. This meant that more than US$700 million of combined IMF and World Bank credit facilities would not be dispersed.[59] Bédié blamed these decisions on Ouattara, who he claimed was tarnishing his reputation and influencing

[59] CDD, London, December 26, 1999; *Africa Confidential*, January 23, 1998, 39(2), 8; *Global Witness*, June 2007, 47.

the IMF against him.[60] To whatever extent Ouattara might have lobbied against Bédié from within the IMF, it was clear that Bédié's government's failures had also brought about the distrust of the international donor community.

Altogether, by 1999, whatever economic gains the government had made were undermined by its failure to manage itself and the increasing ethnic tensions its policies engendered across the country. All of this would contribute to Bédié's final fall.

Escalation

In 1999, a new course of violent protest was initiated when Bédié tried to prevent Ouattara from running in the upcoming 2000 presidential election. In August, Ouattara, who had been serving abroad as the deputy director general of the IMF, formally announced his intention to run for the presidency. Once again, Bédié officially denied Ouattara the right to run in the presidential race because of his questionable citizenship status. The decision led to the arrest of about 400 people protesting the government's decision in front of Ouattara's Abidjan residence.[61]

This time, Bédié tried to reach an accord with Ouattara. On September 18, the two men met at Bédié's request. Allegedly, Bédié offered Ouattara the prime ministership if he would agree to abandon his presidential bid (Cornwell 2000: 89). If true, Ouattara did not take the bait. Failing to come to any agreement, Bédié renewed his efforts to block Ouattara's candidacy.

On September 22, the government began an official investigation of Ouattara's identity papers, charging they had been forged. Protests escalated. They reached an apex on October 27, after it was announced that a court in northern Dimbokro, Ouattara's place of birth, had annulled his Ivoirian nationality certificate because of irregularities. Thousands took to the streets. Riot police used tear gas, rubber bullets, and stun grenades to disperse the crowds.[62] Twenty leaders of the RDR were rounded up, including 10 senior party officials.[63] On November 11, a high court convicted the RDR leaders for fomenting violence. Seven were sentenced

[60] Tom Kamara, "Côte d'Ivoire: Implications of the December 1999 Coup D'état," UNHCR Report, April 2000. Writenet Paper No. 01/2000, p. 9.

[61] *Africa Research Bulletin*, September 1–30, 1999:13687; Terence Neilan, "Ivory Coast: Opposition Seized," *New York Times*, September 16, 1999, p. 12.

[62] Glenn Mckenzie, Associated Press, October 27, 1999.

[63] Among them RDR Secretary-General Henriette Diabaté, president of RDR's parliamentary group, N'Golo Coulibaly, and Deputy Secretary General Amadou Gon Coulibaly. See Stephane Orjollet, "Côte d'Ivoire Police Arrest 10 Senior Opposition Officials," Agence France Presse, October 27, 1999, p. 17.

to two years in prison, including members of the National Assembly (Wodié 2010: 180). Despite the rising tensions, Bédié had an arrest warrant issued for Ouattara, on the grounds that Ouattara had used forged birth documents to support his eligibility to run in the October 2000 elections.[64] Bédié then banned weekday public demonstrations for six months.

By mid-December, Bédié appears to have wanted to scale things back. He allowed some 15,000 Ouattara supporters to gather in Abidjan at a 'freedom' rally. Then, on December 22, in a radio address to the nation, Bédié intimated that he was willing to release the RDR political prisoners and pardon the seven party leaders, if Ouattara respected a "minimum code of good behavior."[65]

But these concessions were not enough to stem the tide. On December 23, soldiers begin a mutiny in the streets of Abidjan. By Christmas day, the government had fallen with General Robert Guéï's military junta in control.

II Bédié and the Military

The Coup

The mutiny began on the night of December 23, when six NCOs of the Para-Commando Rapid Deployment Force (FIRPAC) seized control of the arsenal at the Akouédo military camp in Abidjan. The mutiny spread rapidly.

Despite the urgency of the situation, Bédié does not appear to have taken the matter very seriously. Instead of addressing the mutineers, he flew home to Daoukro to celebrate Christmas with his family. As events unfolded, his advisors pressed him to return to Abidjan. Bédié reluctantly returned to the capital, but, even as soldiers continued to rampage through the streets of Abidjan – shooting into the air, commandeering people's cars, looting, and spreading fear and mayhem – Bédié refused to meet with them in person. Instead, he delegated the negotiations to his senior ministers (Cornwell 2000: 80–82).

By 3:00 A.M. on Christmas morning, the mutineers had taken over the airport and set up roadblocks across the two bridges linking the northern and southern parts of Abidjan. Soon after, they took over the government television and radio station.[66] At 5:00 A.M., Bédié reportedly received a

[64] IRN West Africa news update, December 10, 1999.
[65] Fabienne Pompey, "Ivoirian President Tells Opposition to Behave if Leaders Want Amnesty," Agence France Presse, December 22, 1999.
[66] "Military Uprising in Côte d'Ivoire," Agence France Presse, December 23, 1999.

phone call from General Robert Guéï, the former chief of staff of the army, who had been dismissed from government in 1997 after being accused of plotting a coup. According to one account, Guéï claimed the mutineers had taken his wife hostage to force him to represent their demands, which he urged Bédié to take seriously. By the time Bédié agreed to meet the mutineers, General Guéï had already joined the soldiers at the television station to broadcast that Bédié's regime was ended (Cornwell 2000: 80–82). Immediately afterward, soldiers released the seven imprisoned RDR party leaders.[67]

Several things suggest this mutiny was not spontaneous. It is true that the mutineers claimed they began the mutiny because of inadequate pay (Kieffer 2000: 36–39). Yet the mutiny actually began at 3:00 A.M. on December 23, when the six original mutineers went to the home of Côte d'Ivoire's military commander, General Maurice Tauthuis. The six were fired upon by the general's personal guards and one was shot. The remaining five retreated back to Akouédo, where they distributed weapons to other soldiers. According to Cornwell (2000), the group had gone to General Tauthuis' home as "representatives" to "present their grievances" to him. But if their honest intention had been to demand back pay, it is odd that they should choose to go to the home of the chief of ground troops in Abidjan at 3:00 A.M. and engage in a firefight with his security forces.

Other factors indicate that this may have been a planned event. The original six mutineers were all members of the elite commando unit FIRPAC (Force d'intervention rapide para-commando), formerly under General Guéï's command prior to his dismissal for allegedly plotting against the Bédié government. Even more suspiciously, according to Francis Wodié, five months before the mutiny, on August 4, 1999, the assistant secretary-general of the Council of Ministers had announced to the government that General Guéï was organizing a movement within the army, the Movement for National Health (le Mouvement de salut national, Mosana), aiming at bringing about a coup d'état (Wodié 2010: 180). In seeming confirmation of this, when asked about the coup a few days afterward, President Rawlings replied that he was not surprised about the events in Côte d'Ivoire because, in his words, "We picked up information from sources in that country which suggested an uncertain situation. We therefore made efforts at the last ECOWAS Summit in Lomé to prevent the potential danger by advising President Bédié, but he assured us that those issues were purely legal and not political which could be solved internally."[68]

[67] Ibid.
[68] "ECOWAS Condemns Coup in Côte d'Ivoire," Xinhua General News Service, December 29, 1999.

Whether the coup was planned or spontaneous, those who assumed power afterward were clearly affiliated with the opposition. As Cornwell observes, "The association of the senior members of the [junta] with Alassane Ouattara was lost on nobody" (2000: 82). Soon after their assumption to power, Laurent Gbagbo accused the junta of favoring Ouattara and supporting the RDR. All nine officers in the new junta were from the north or the west, and many had personal connections to Ouattara. The head of the junta was General Guéï, a Yacouba from the west, removed by Bédié from the government in 1997; the second in charge was General Lassana Palenfo, a Lobi from Odienné in the northwest, who had served as his security minister and maintained a close relationship with Ouattara. Another close Ouattara associate was General Abdoulaye Coulibaly, a Sénoufo from Korhogo who had been Houphouët's personal pilot and was in command of the air force under Ouattara (Kieffer 2000: 32).[69]

The original mutineers also had political connections with the opposition. Most participated in the student protests of the mid-1990s. Three had been protest leaders at their respective high schools and one had been a member of Ouattara's guard. According to Kieffer, several of the noncommissioned and middle-ranking officers from the northwest and north believed their career prospects had been compromised by the shift in political discourse. "Examples of shelved General Guéï, Palenfo, or Coulibaly ... and even biased recruitment of the Ivoirian army, reinforced this sense of accelerated exclusion" (Kieffer 2000: 36).

The mutineers claimed to have the support of the marines, the police, the Republican Guard, the Armed Battalion, and the First Infantry, as well as the troops stationed in the provinces.[70] Indeed, no one defended Bédié's presidency. Houphouët's loyal Presidential Guard had quickly come to his defense during the large 1990 mutiny. Even Nkrumah had had loyal guards, some of whom gave their lives to defend his presidency. But not so for Bédié. During the course of the mutiny, Bédié made a plea over the radio to: "all active forces in Côte d'Ivoire, military, civilian and traditional, to resist and do everything to oppose and rapidly defeat this

[69] Other junta members were Colonel Mathias Doué and Naval Captain Djikalou St Cyr (both military prefets removed by Bédié); Naval Lieutenant Sama Henri Cesar; Chief Petty Officer Zohin Honore; Staff-Sergeant Boka Yapi Laurent; and Major Mouasasi Grena. See *African Security Review*, 2000, Vol. 9:1; Ellenbogen 2002: 118–122; Tom Kamara, "Côte d'Ivoire: Implications of the December 1999 Coup d'état," UNHCR Report, April 2000. Writenet Paper No. 01/2000, p. 17.

[70] Ibid.

grotesque and backward attempt at a military coup."[71] Not one member of his 13,900-strong armed forces responded.

III Conclusion

Ultimately, Bédié was ousted from power, not because France refused to step in, but because his own security forces failed to do so. It is clear from Houphouët's example that mutinies can be quelled. Houphouët put to rest three mutinies at the end of his presidency with no help from France. Nor was the demise of Bédié's regime due solely to the economic downturn of the late 1990s. The economic situation had clearly worsened by 1999, but it was nowhere near as dire as that which Houphouët faced in 1990.

In the end, Bédié's own policies led to his loss of domestic support, his loss of international support, and, finally, his loss of military support. Bédié's failings as a leader and his incapacity to understand the broader ramifications of his actions ushered in his forced removal from power. Sadly, Bédié's legacy bequeathed to Côte d'Ivoire an explosion of violence that took a terrible toll on the country and its citizens.

All in all, Bédié was a technocrat, not a political leader. He had neither the vision that would have allowed him to turn his inherited situation around nor the finesse to enable him to build an effective coalition. As a result, Bédié adopted poorly thought-out, politically expedient, defensive measures that eroded his political support. In the end, Bédié's inability to effectively manage his ethno-regional competitors brought about his ignoble descent.

[71] "Mutineers in Côte d'Ivoire Seize Control of Abidjan, Announce Coup," Agence France Presse, December 24, 1999.

10 Structure Not Strategy? Examining Alternative Explanations

Why did Côte d'Ivoire, a highly stable state, destabilize so spectacularly, while Ghana, one of the least developed countries in West Africa, emerged as the region's shining star? This book makes the case that these outcomes can be largely explained by presidential strategies. However, placing so much emphasis on leadership may be objected to, particularly when so many structural/institutional arguments can be used to explain the success and failure of the four leaders analyzed here.

Certainly, structural and institutional factors contributed to the fates of these men. Yet it is also true that all of these presidents came to power with a number of things in their favor. Likewise, they all also had very serious obstacles to surmount. Indeed, contemporary scholars looking at the circumstances each man inherited predicted the reverse outcomes. In the early decades of independence, many viewed Ghana as the obvious frontrunner. Apter in 1955 described the Gold Coast as "the most hopeful spot on the map of Africa, if one is concerned with African freedom and self-government" (Apter 1955: 120). The same sentiment was echoed by the U.S. ambassador to Ghana from 1962 to 1965, Bill Mahoney, who reminisced how "Everyone was hopeful. Those were absolutely optimistic times for hope. Ghana was singular in the sense that it had everything."[1]

The reverse was true of the prognostications for both countries in the post-SAP period. In 1984, Robert Price described Ghana as in a crisis "so severe that it might accurately be termed a crisis of economic, if not political, survival" (Price 1984: 165). In the same vein, in 1982, Chazan held that "The second populist experiment in Ghanaian politics merely reaffirms, at this juncture, the fragility of state power and the limitations placed on its wielders in the midst of the breakdown of the state" (Chazan 1982: 483). Another long-time scholar of Ghanaian politics, Richard Jeffries, projected in 1982 that the most likely scenario would be that

[1] Interview, *History Nkrumah Part III*, UCTV History (accessed on www.youtube.com, January 4, 2011).

the Rawlings government would "muddle through" implementing "minor" and "ineffective" economic policies, which would be politically safe, but would "almost certainly also result in the further disintegration of Ghana as an effective nation-state" (Jeffries 1982: 317).

In contrast, few, if any, scholars imagined Côte d'Ivoire would experience such rapid political disintegration. In 1995, Rapley found in small ways things were improving in Abidjan. So much so that he that wrote how for the time being "Houphouët-Boigny leaves behind a stable polity," in which Henri Konan Bédié "appears secure in the presidency" and "the political dominance of the Ivoirian industrial bourgeoisie, the central feature of the country's politics, appears unlikely to weaken" (Rapley 1995: 119–121). And as late as 1997, Tesse Bakary asserted that "Côte d'Ivoire has been and will long continue to be governed in its ways of managing conflict by coherent values and a normative set of codes, as well as by a self-reproducing and cohesive ruling class" (Bakary 1997: 93).

That reality so dramatically diverged from what contemporary scholars took to be fairly certain ends, at the very least, suggests that circumstances did not entirely dictate what came to pass. To further elucidate these points, this chapter reexamines many of the inherited conditions assumed to be most critical to each leader's fate and queries whether any of those conditions determined the history that unfolded.

Structural Conditions Compared

With respect to the independence leaders, there were several inherited conditions that contributed to Nkrumah's failure and Houphouët's success.[2] Nkrumah took over a newly independent state that had been only recently united. The British colonial administration had divided the Gold Coast into four regional subdivisions: the Colony, Ashanti, the Northern Territories, and Togoland, each with its own charter. In addition, under the British colonial system, local kingdoms and powerful chieftainships were allowed to administer their regions. In contrast, French administration of the Lower Côte was highly centralized. Only a handful of small centralized kingdoms in the east had been granted administrative autonomy – kingdoms nowhere near as powerful as the Ashanti in Ghana. Therefore, the state administration Houphouët-Boigny inherited lent itself to greater integration than that which Nkrumah inherited.

[2] For a lengthier discussion of the sociopolitical contexts and the constraints this placed on these two independence leaders, see Boone 2003.

Furthermore, in the Gold Coast, the Ashanti and Akim kingdoms controlled cocoa – the cornerstone of the territory's economy. Establishing state hegemony over the cocoa industry was critical to Nkrumah's development plans. From the get-go, Nkrumah was pitted against powerful, centralized, and wealthy Akan kingdoms. In contrast, in Côte d'Ivoire, the French tightly controlled the cocoa industry. Houphouët-Boigny inherited monopoly control over his most important export. Moreover, he was quickly able to gain even greater ascendency over the cocoa industry by fragmenting it through the promotion of 'pioneer' farming. Houphouët therefore faced less opposition as he established control over the economy.

Finally, Nkrumah presided over a far more educated and politically mobilized population than did Houphouët. In the Lower Côte, by 1950, only eight individuals had received overseas education. The majority of civil servants were brought in by the French from other parts of their West African territories. Things could not have been more different in the Gold Coast, where education levels were the highest in West Africa. Several Ghanaians had advanced law degrees. Altogether, Nkrumah faced a more formidable opposition than Houphouët and was harder pressed to take command over the cocoa revenues he so needed.

However, the differences between the leaders were not necessarily as drastic as this outline suggests. In fact, in many ways, Houphouët-Boigny's opposition was similar to Nkrumah's. Like Nkrumah, Houphouët was opposed by wealthy chiefs, lawyers, and intellectuals organized into ethnic parties – all of whom were supported by the colonial administration. Houphouët also faced a growing sense of disenfranchisement on the part of the Bété in the central west and the Agni in the east, who actually tried to secede.

In addition, there were other fault lines that could have become salient in the newly independent Côte d'Ivoire. The long-standing exploitation of northern laborers in the interest of the development of southern cocoa might have been used to fracture the body politic. Added to this, the civil service was largely in the hands of foreigners either from France or other French West African territories. In 1958, anti-foreigner demonstrations engulfed Abidjan. These were the very factors that bore poisonous fruit at the end of the century – but it is not clear that they might not have been at play much earlier had Houphouët not managed the situation very carefully, particularly given the slowness of his Ivoirianization of the civil service.[3]

[3] Houphouët did not seriously begin an 'Africanization' policy until the 1970s and it was not really enforced until the 1980s. This was much slower than most other African countries – especially Ghana, which Africanized both the civil service and the military quite rapidly in 1961.

Also, unlike Nkrumah, Houphouët had to contend with a rabidly racist settler population, who violently opposed African nationalists throughout the 1950s. Though they amounted to no more than 300 families, they had strong ties to France and controlled much of the cocoa trade that existed in the country. No such population existed in the Gold Coast. Finally, there was a developed communist movement with international support, which had mobilized the urban areas, particularly the trade unions, and opposed Houphouët-Boigny's close relationship to France.

Knowing the history of Côte d'Ivoire, it is difficult to imagine any of these groups seriously challenging Houphouët. Nonetheless, it was due in no small part to Houphouët's clever assemblage of these various forces that such divisions did not play a more serious role in Ivoirian politics. Indeed, though the opposition was more formidable in Ghana than in Côte d'Ivoire, there were ways in which Nkrumah intensified political divisions, while Houphouët skillfully minimized them. The opposing speeches each man made in 1951 best illustrate this. Whereas Nkrumah advised his party members that "Coalition with the other political groups in the country, as we knew them, would be dangerous" (Nkrumah 1957: 139), Houphouët "recommended to his party to avoid frictions with adversarial parties and to practice a politics of reaching across party lines" (Loucou 1992: 102). Thus, where Houphouët brought his adversaries into his party, Nkrumah pushed them farther away.

Furthermore, several structural factors might have greatly benefited Nkrumah. Nkrumah's party had wide levels of support around the nation – much more widely spread than any other political faction – and, unlike Houphouët, his platform was designed to keep the urban areas solidly behind him. Nkrumah also inherited a far more developed state with an extensive roadway system that surpassed that of Côte d'Ivoire by many fold. In 1959, Ghana already had 1,820 miles (4,714 km) of bitumen-surfaced roads, and 2,473 miles of gravel roads,[4] whereas in 1958, Côte d'Ivoire had less than 232 miles (600 km) of bitumen-surfaced roads and few gravel roads.[5] In fact, the transportation system was described as "the envy of sub-Saharan Africa of the late 1950s" (Price 1984: 164).

In addition, "the new Ghanaian state was seen as blessed with an efficient and professional public service bureaucracy" (Price 1984: 164). Bill Mahoney, the U.S. ambassador to Ghana from 1962 to 1965, recalled that Ghana "had educated people, it had considerable infrastructure, three universities, schools, lawyers, doctors – it had everything going

[4] Ghana Economic Survey 1963, 1965.
[5] World Bank – Côte d'Ivoire Highway project, 1968, Report No.TO-619a, File Copy.

for it."[6] The new country had one of the highest per capita incomes in Africa and "was the world's largest producer of cocoa beans and possessed an imposing array of mineral resources, including gold, diamonds, manganese, and bauxite" (Price 1984: 163). As for Côte d'Ivoire, Samir Amin summed up its position relative to Ghana: "Le Ghana dispose en réalité encore d'une dizaine d'années sur la Côte d'Ivoire" (quoted in Ewusi 1974: 34).

Likewise, structural conditions contributed to the success that Rawlings achieved and the failure of the Bédié regime. For one thing, Rawlings' success has been attributed to the large amounts of monetary support Ghana received from the international community for implementing Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs). Furthermore, Rawlings took over a Ghana that had little means of going lower; the economy was in shambles. And Rawlings faced little political opposition (Chazan 1982). The implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs, therefore, was potentially not as difficult as in Côte d'Ivoire, where there was a long history of state development and prosperity and restructuring of the economy would likely be far more destabilizing. According to Anaman, "an important contributing factor to the general population's receptivity to a major structural adjustment programme [in Ghana] was the unavailability and high cost of food" (2006: 15, 12).

As for Bédié, not only was he succeeding one of the most competent and popular African presidents, he also faced strengthening opposition to his presidency. Laurent Gbagbo, an established opposition leader, was joined by 'reformers' from within Bédié's own party who supported his central rival, Alassane Ouattara. To make matters worse, in the 1980s, high debt, decreasing cocoa prices, and retractions in aid had started to unravel the Ivoirian political machine. By 1990, the distribution of patronage funds was drastically reduced. Local government bodies became steadily more corrupt and infrastructure was beginning to deteriorate. The 'pioneer' cocoa-production system Houphouët had established was placing increasing pressure on land, straining relations between migrant laborers and indigenous populations in the countryside (Chauveau & Bobo 2005; Chauveau 2000; Woods 1999). By 1994, the combination of increased land competition, competitive electoral politics, and international economic pressures had created a toxic brew, particularly following the death of the country's founding father and patriarch of 40 years.

[6] Interview, *History Nkrumah Part III*, UCTV History (accessed on www.youtube.com, January 4, 2011).

Nevertheless, equally significant structural factors might have harmed Rawlings and benefited Bédié. As Ocran observed, "Unless the military government is able to muster the resources of the country for the improvement of the economy and take positive measures to get on to its own feet in the first instance, which is impossible with most African countries, it soon finds itself in rather difficult economic straits" (Ocran 1977: 93). It was far from evident that Rawlings would have the capacity to do so.

In 1982, Ghana was experiencing extreme food shortages. Cocoa exports and mining were half of what they had been two decades earlier. Economic deterioration had eroded Ghana's systems of health care, education, transportation, and communication:

> Unable to obtain paper, books, and food to feed its boarding students, the educational system was showing signs of disintegration . . . Hospitals could not function for lack of basic medicines and essential supplies such as anesthetics and bandages, not to mention the shortage of qualified doctors as economic decline took its toll in personnel seeking better opportunities outside the country . . . And the transportation system, once the pride of Ghana, was literally in ruins – the railroad's rolling stock was decrepit, if functioning at all; the motorways were, in many areas, a mélange of pits and holes, with tarmac giving way to laterite, and the latter to bush. (Price 1984: 165)

The fact that the Rawlings regime was "actively persecuting professionals, calling them 'parasites' and 'counter-revolutionaries'" (Howard 1983: 486), only exacerbated the situation by creating a major exodus of the skilled personnel Rawlings so desperately needed (Howard 1983; Chazan 1982).

Even more troubling, to rebuild the economy Rawlings had to alienate his urban base at a time when his hold on power was so dependent upon that base. Rawlings emerged on the world stage as a radical socialist at the end of the Cold War. Soviet funding had all but dried up. Rawlings had no allies in the West, and his socialist allies offered insignificant financial aid. His critical decision to abandon his regime's staunch socialist orientation and begin to work with the IMF and World Bank led to the first major division within his own government. As a result, Rawlings faced a succession of coup attempts launched by his former allies.

At the same time, Rawlings' revolution unleashed young men around the country who had begun to take matters into their own hands – meting out unjust punishment and cloaking their own personal vendettas in the language of revolutionary righteousness. Within the first 18 months of his rule, the militants in his own camp had begun to undermine popular support for his government throughout the countryside, just as his Economic Recovery Programme was undermining his support in the capital.

On top of all this, in 1983, the situation turned dire when 1.2 million Ghanaians were expelled from Nigeria. "[R]eturning Ghanaians were faced with massive food and goods shortages, a crippled transport system and an economic infrastructure in a state of total disrepair" (Brydon 1985: 585). And this was at a time when the country was facing its most critical drought and famine was beginning to plague the countryside: "Already in February the harmattan was being considered the most severe for years. Then the rains, which should have begun in March/April, failed . . . For the first time in her history, Ghana was beginning to experience famine" (Brydon, 1985: 575).

Thus things could have gone rapidly downhill for Rawlings. Indeed, "support for Rawlings' second revolution lowered throughout 1982 as he failed to "deliver the goods" (Howard 1983: 474). By 1983, "the initial jubilation . . . gradually turned into disillusionment as the military rulers failed to deal with the problems of the country" (Anaman 2006: 11). All in all, the odds of success were decidedly not in Rawlings' favor.

In contrast, Bédié had inherited a strong, centralized state with no history of political upheaval. "In the 1990s, Côte d'Ivoire had a better infrastructure than most African countries, heavy French support, and a foundation on which to rebuild a healthier economy" (Chirot 2006: 67). Moreover, there was no history of coups in Côte d'Ivoire, which, at the time, seemed like a remote possibility. Though the economy had been in turmoil in the early 1990s, the worst had passed. Despite the privatization of several state-owned industries and the devaluation of the currency, remarkably few trade union strikes occurred between 1994 and 1997[7] (in stark contrast to the manifold trade union strikes that both Rawlings and Houphouët faced). This was because Bédié's devaluation of the Franc CFA in 1994 brought the economy out of its deep recession.[8]

At the same time, several other factors were bolstering the economy. The state was reaping some of its largest cocoa harvests at a time when cocoa prices were resurgent.[9] Aid was pouring into the country – almost *triple* the amount that Ghana was receiving (see Figure 16). The government was also allowed to sign three debt agreements, relieving pressure on the national economy.[10] Thus by 1995, the economic situation had begun to "dramatically improve," "the producer price of coffee had risen

[7] The strikes that occurred were fomented by student organizations and opposition parties primarily over the political suppression of both groups. Strikes led by trade unions or directly related to economic concerns came after 1998.

[8] IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/107, "Côte d'Ivoire: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix," August 2000.

[9] Ibid.

[10] The Paris Club debt rescheduling in 1994, a London Club agreement in 1996, and the 1997 G-7 decision to include Côte d'Ivoire in the IMF-World Bank debt forgiveness



Figure 16 Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire net ODA and official aid received (current US$), 1980–2000
Source: World DataBank | World Development Indicators

by 3000 percent in cash terms and this, together with new international credits, meant that a consumer boom was under way in both the rural and urban areas" (Crook 1997: 230).

Given that econometric studies have repeatedly found "the probability that a government is overthrown in a coup d'état is substantially influenced by the rate of economic growth" (Londregan & Poole 1990: 152), the growth of the Ivoirian economy seemed to favor the Bédié regime. Indeed, "the outbreak of civil conflict that followed was hardly inevitable . . . That none of this helped to forestall civil war was a function of political developments that significantly magnified both the country's economic problems and its ethnic divisions" (Chirot 2006: 67).

Finally, Bédié had a serious political disadvantage because he was forced to hold multiparty elections almost immediately after assuming power. In contrast, Rawlings had more than a decade to consolidate his regime before he had to introduce elections. The question is whether this institutional constraint better explains Bédié's fall than his leadership choices.

initiative for heavily indebted poor countries (www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2846.htm, accessed March 10, 2011).

As is carefully documented in Chapter 9, it is highly likely that Bédié could have avoided the worst of the political unrest and won the 1995 election (and possibly even the 2000 election) if he had simply allowed ADO to run as a candidate. There is little reason to expect that anyone could have seriously challenged Bédié's bid for the presidency in the early 1990s – least of all Ouattara. Before Bédié introduced his inflammatory citizenship law to prohibit ADO from running, the latter had very limited support. He was widely reviled in the urban areas for having enforced Structural Adjustment Programs and was not well known in the countryside. It is true that Bédié's party was losing ground in the capital and among select populations, but in 1994, the party of Houphouët still had widespread backing across the country.

Indeed, in the subsequent parliamentary elections, Alassane Ouattara and Laurent Gbagbo won only 19 and 13, seats respectively, whereas Bédié's ruling party took 155 seats! This lends support to the hypothesis that the problems that ensued were less about the introduction of multiparty elections and more about the way in which Bédié handled those elections.

On the other hand, if Rawlings had faced elections immediately after his assumption to power, he might have lost, but he might well have won. Though there is no way to assess this counterfactual, according to most accounts, in early 1982, Rawlings was an extremely popular figure. Rawlings was seen as a champion of the people who would cleanse the state of its ills. It is true that as the first year progressed his popularity waned. It may be less likely that he would have won an election in the fall of 1982 or early 1983, but even that is difficult to say. No other contender had the same stature as Rawlings. However, this is precisely what is being argued of Bédié. Although Bédié himself was not a charismatic leader, the PDCI was so well known that Bédié arguably had little to worry about from other electoral contenders. Bédié's strategic choices certainly contributed to the end effect.

J. J. Rawlings' success and Bédié's failure are often attributed to the circumstances they inherited. However, Rawlings' initial situation was not demonstrably better than Bédié's. Arguably the challenges that Rawlings faced upon assuming power – famine, infrastructural degeneration, political chaos, and the influx of a massive number of refugees – were at least as severe as the political schisms Bédié inherited. Moreover, it was Bédié who started with Western support – not Rawlings. Bédié received considerable bilateral and multilateral aid his first years in office. And, Bédié had other economic advantages that might have helped mitigate the simmering ethnic hostilities developing in the country. Rawlings, on the

other hand, was distrusted by the Reagan administration and had to overcome his most tenuous period without Western support. It was not until 1988 that Ghana received significant aid (see Figure 16).

Imperial Intervention

One structural factor warrants particular attention: the impact of foreign governments on each regime's fate. Although it would be foolhardy to deny foreign involvement, the question is whether such involvement was decisive. Strong arguments have been made to support the view that it was.

With respect to Ghana, it has been argued that Nkrumah was undermined by Western powers, whereas Rawlings received massive amounts of Western aid and support. Indeed, Nkrumah's anti-imperialist rhetoric, relations with Eastern Bloc countries, and support of anticolonial struggles made him easy fodder for Cold War fear-mongers. He was denied crucial financing, and there is clear evidence that the CIA supported anti-Nkrumah plots throughout the 1960s and that it was even in contact with the 1966 coup leaders (see Chapter 2).

Nonetheless, Rawlings' situation in the early 1980s was not so dissimilar from Nkrumah's. Rawlings' relations with Libya and Cuba had put him in the crosshairs of the Reagan administration. At the time, his government alleged numerous CIA plots were carried out against it. The PNDC believed that the sudden expulsion of 1.2 million Ghanaians in 1983 was instigated by the Nigerian government at the behest of the United States in the hopes of destabilizing the regime.[11] Two years later, a number of CIA agents were arrested in Accra, among them a former commander of the most important military barracks in Accra, who was in command from 1982–1983, when several coup attempts were launched against Rawlings.

Again, in 1986, eight U.S. mercenaries were seized off the coast of Brazil with six tons of weaponry. The mercenaries reportedly admitted they were headed for Ghana to join a coup funded by a Ghanaian dissident with CIA ties. The CIA even conducted a 'spy swap' with Ghana in 1985. J. J. Rawlings' cousin Michael A. Soussoudis was tried and sentenced to 20 years in prison for two counts under the espionage act. Within days of his sentencing, Soussoudis was turned over to the Ghanaian ambassador on the condition that he promptly leave the

[11] Interview with P. V. Obeng, Accra: October 19, 2010. Also see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, "Rawlings on Nigeria's 'Conspiracy': Obeng's Talks with African Envoys," February 16, 1983, Wednesday, Text of report (accessed at LexisNexis Academic, June 5, 2013).

country. In exchange, eight Ghanaians, described by U.S. officials as "of interest to the United States," along with their families were flown to an unidentified African country.[12]

To protect himself from these various conspiracies, Rawlings built a formidable security apparatus (with Cuban and Libyan support, not Western aid). But so had Nkrumah, who had surveillance officers and troops who were armed and trained by the Soviets. Given all these similarities, it is quite plausible that, without the loyalty of his own armed forces, Rawlings might have succumbed to a (CIA-backed?) coup, as Nkrumah before him.

Furthermore, although International Financial Institutions (IFIs) eventually financed Rawlings, they were cautious at first. As late as August 1986, the U.S. government, angered by Ghana's rhetoric and 'Castro-style foreign policy,' threatened to cut off all aid to Ghana. Moreover, even after aid had begun pouring into Ghana in 1986, the aid received was "substantially below" the average aid per person given to other African countries (Herbst 1993: 132).

Therefore, there seems little evidence to support the idea that Rawlings was kept in power by Western aid; rather, what was critical was Rawlings' tactical use of that aid. In point of fact, in the early 1990s, the lion's share of aid was also going not to Ghana – but to Côte d'Ivoire. Côte d'Ivoire's aid doubled as soon as Bédié took power, from $763 million to $1.6 billion (see Figure 16). If aid was responsible for anyone's stability it should have been Bédié's.

With respect to Côte d'Ivoire, it is frequently argued that Houphouët's presidency was secured by French military support, whereas Bédié's was not. However, this is slightly misleading. The fact is the French initially supported both leaders and, moreover, withdrew their support from both before they left office. During Houphouët's last years, the French no longer could be counted upon. In 1990, when more than 500 military conscripts mutinied and took control of the Abidjan airport, Mitterrand refused to send in the 1,000 French troops stationed right nearby at Port Bouët – despite a personal request from Houphouët. According to French sources, "Mr. Mitterrand's response could be summarised by a polite reminder that interference in a former colony belonged to another age."[13] The mutiny was ended because Houphouët's presidential guard was able to quickly quell the revolt. In contrast, in 1999, when France again refused to intercede in Abidjan as a small band of soldiers mutinied in

[12] Philip Hager & Ronald J. Ostrow, "U.S. Swaps Spy for 8 Ghanaians Who Aided CIA." *LA Times*, November 26, 1985.

[13] Paul Webster, "Ivory Coast Calls Crisis Meeting as French Refuse to Intervene." *The Guardian* (London), May 18, 1990.

the streets, no security forces came to Bédié's aid – not even after Bédié issued a direct radio plea. Rather, "the country's paratroopers, marines, infantry and armoured units had abandoned Bédié. Even his presidential guard let him down."[14] These parallel events, therefore, lend credence to the idea that the success of the 1999 coup was due to the absence of Bédié's domestic military support, rather than France's actions.

Thus, though foreign actors clearly aided regimes and abetted coup plotters, there is reason to doubt their machinations would have been decisive had each leader not strengthened/weakened his position vis-à-vis the military and society at large. Ultimately, Nkrumah and Bédié failed because they hollowed out their political bases, which caused them to lose support of their militaries. Houphouët and Rawlings survived because they worked diligently to prevent such an outcome by making tactical choices and fostering regional alliances.

Conclusion

In conclusion, there are strong reasons to doubt that existing circumstances preordained the outcomes that came to pass. Certainly it is undeniable that by the 1990s, Houphouët's system of political checks and balances had deteriorated. Likely, Côte d'Ivoire was headed for more difficult times no matter who led the country. But that Côte d'Ivoire would suffer a coup d'état and then slide into civil war was not a foregone conclusion. Likewise, it was clear in the 1980s that Ghana had nowhere to go but up and that Rawlings was left with few options. But that Ghana would become one of the highest-growing economies on the continent and eventually the paragon of political stability and democratic governance was far from conceivable in the 1980s.

Without a doubt, political actors are presented with domestic and global conditions beyond their control that shape any possible course of action. As Karl Marx observed, "Man makes his own history, but he does not make it out of the whole cloth; he does not make it out of conditions chosen by himself, but out of such as he finds close at hand."[15] Yet structural conditions can almost always support a number of different outcomes. How leaders respond to their inherited circumstances has enormous political implications, particularly in weakly institutionalized states where the whims of the head of state can have far-reaching

[14] "Guéï, Côte d'Ivoire's New Leader, Longtime Foe of Bédié," Agence France Presse – English, December 27, 1999, Monday.

[15] Karl Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, Third Edition*. Trans. Daniel De Leon. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr & Company, 1913, p. 9.

ramifications. For these reasons, this study is part of a growing trend among Africanists that places greater weight on political leadership. The typology of urban and rural political strategies presented here is an endeavor to develop an analytic model that lies at the intersection between leadership and structure, vision and institutional constraints, *virtú* and *fortuna*.

Conclusion

Africanists today are developing a renewed vocabulary for discussing the relationship between state and society in the African context.[1] This book attempts to contribute to this larger endeavor by examining how state–society relations have influenced state development south of the Sahara. It makes the case that because African leaders are highly vulnerable to political and military challenges, a leader's capacity to develop a state and implement reform becomes contingent upon strategic rural alliances.

In the broadest terms, this study shows that rural strategies enable leaders to overcome one of the central problems endemic to neopatrimonial rule. "Personalistic rulers" tend to be "overly sensitive to threats to their authority." Feeling vulnerable, they "set about weakening all independent centers of power beyond their control" (Goldsmith 2001; Bratton & Van de Walle 1997: 84). Such repression undermines a regime's political support as well as the economy. Leaders who use a rural political strategy are better able to subdue independent power bases without jeopardizing their control over critical regional areas or ethnic groups in the security forces. Following a rural political strategy is therefore critical to stability and state development.

The qualitative and quantitative analyses of African regimes from 1960 to 2000 in Chapters 2 and 3 illustrate that the rural-urban typology introduced here can be a fruitful way to analyze political leadership across a large number of cases. Both chapters show that leaders in Africa who had extreme urban bias and who profoundly neglected the periphery rule were those who became most abusive. The leaders who supported ethnoregional elites, chieftaincy, and traditional agriculture developed functional forms of neopatrimonial rule.

In the process, this study reverses the understanding of the efficacy of urban bias. Urban bias does not generally bolster a leader's power. Instead of stabilizing the state, urban bias undermines the economy, embroiling the

[1] A good example of this is Cammet and McLean (2014).

government in a losing battle against spiraling discontent and unrest. Therefore, regimes that are dependent upon their urban base and have narrow roots in rural areas generally weaken their rule. Without effective rural coalitions, a regime becomes increasingly fearful of ethno-regional competitors and more likely to resort to destructive policies that undermine political cohesion and economic development.

The examination of Nkrumah in Chapters 4 and 6 offers the clearest illustration of this latter point. Nkrumah's inability to negotiate with strong rivals and build a diverse political coalition undermined his ability to develop the state. To protect himself from real and perceived enemies in his civil service and armed forces, Nkrumah developed dysfunctional governing systems. His dual administrative system subverted state planning, while his dual military structure alienated the military and police force. Repeated political dismissals further weakened his regime. His policies only worsened as his fear and paranoia of his adversaries mounted. By the end, Nkrumah, who had started as the savior of Africa, had so weakened the state that his own presidency could not be sustained.

Similarly, Chapter 9 illustrates that the strategic choices Bédié made to control his opposition weakened his government. Trying to contain ethno-regional adversaries by introducing xenophobic policies gave rise to a fierce anti-government movement. Bédié's continual fight against this building ethno-regional movement only exacerbated ethnic tensions and provoked continual unrest in the capital and regional cities around the country. As disaffection with the government intensified, Bédié lost international support and the support of his military. Bédié's policies not only led to his own downfall, but ultimately set the stage for civil war.

In contrast, regimes that use a rural political strategy to develop a broad-based coalition are able to consolidate themselves politically and to stabilize the state. As Chapter 7 shows, Houphouët's ability to incorporate ethno-regional elites enabled him to depoliticize the countryside, dampening ethnic mobilization in rural and urban areas. Potentially powerful adversaries were given valuable properties and positions of power and encouraged to channel state patronage to their communities. When regional discontent escalated, innovative measures were adopted to reduce it. Supporting small-scale agriculture helped stay economic decline as well as urban migration. Having used a rural political strategy to minimize the power of political contenders, Houphouët was able to grow the economy and build state capacity.

The same was true for J. J. Rawlings. More than the others, Rawlings had to overcome immediate threats to his regime and his own safety. Losing the support of key military and urban leaders in his junta in his first

year in power could easily have spelled his demise. Having to incorporate more than 1 million Ghanaians deported from Nigeria at a time of severe drought, famine, and political uncertainty might have taken a disastrous toll on his regime. Rawlings' skill at forging a broad ethno-regional coalition allowed his government to not just survive, but to begin the difficult task of transforming the country. Chapter 8 traces how Rawlings' ability to incorporate powerful northern chiefs coupled with his choice to promote the economic development of the north were critical to his gaining the support of the regions from which most of his troops were recruited. As a result, despite repeated coup attempts, Rawlings maintained the loyalty of his armed forces. Having consolidated politically, he was able to focus on rebuilding Ghana's decimated infrastructure and economy. His determination to decentralize government and reverse Ghana's long-standing urban bias was critical to his political and economic success.

Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire Today

Since 2000, a number of changes have taken place in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. The Ivoirian civil war ended in 2007 and the first postwar multiparty elections were held three years later. The 2010 elections led to a brief resumption of hostilities, but peace was restored within four months. After the fighting ended, Alassane Ouattara assumed the presidency he had so long sought after. In the 2015 Ivoirian presidential election, Ouattara won a second term with no electoral violence, although the opposition boycotted.

At the same time, there are still some worrying signs. Among the western Kru populations, alienation continues to run high. When Ouattara came to office, several opposition leaders and military elites from the area went into exile in the bordering states of Liberia and Ghana. A number were arrested and humiliated, including former president Laurent Gbagbo. Gbagbo's arrest came after he denied the authenticity of the internationally recognized elections and refused to leave office. His rejection of the electoral results triggered hostilities between government troops and the northern militias supporting Ouattara. In April 2011, Gbagbo was captured by foreign-supported troops and extradited to face charges of crimes against humanity at the International Criminal Court. For Gbagbo's followers, who believe that Ouattara, not Gbagbo, is the war criminal, this was a bitter injustice. To add insult to injury, at the time of his arrest, the international press released photos of an unkempt Gbagbo being humbled by his captors. The international community's degrading treatment of Gbagbo has left his followers deeply incensed.

There also remains a potential for violent land disputes in the far western areas. In March 2013, Human Rights Watch reported several attacks on Ivoirian villages near the Liberian border that were related to land dispossession.[2] If Ouattara is able to build infrastructure and increase prosperity in enough regions in the south, it is likely that he will be able to effectively manage the disaffection of the Kru populations in the west.

A lot will ride on how the 2020 presidential elections are conducted. A possible indication of things to come is the constitutional referendum Ouattara pushed through in October 2016. The referendum established the position of vice president for the first time in Côte d'Ivoire's history. With only 42 percent turnout, the referendum was not an unmitigated success for the administration, but it allowed Ouattara to place Daniel Kablan Duncan as second in command. Duncan is an experienced technocrat from the southeast of the country. Duncan's appointment as vice president undermined two powerful northerners: the president of the National Assembly, former northern rebel leader Guillaume Soro; and Ivorian Prime Minister Amadou Gon Coulibaly, who has long been associated with northern interests. Both of these men are distrusted by non-northern populations. It therefore appears that Ouattara is trying to bolster his support among the Akan populations and to solidify a northern–southeastern coalition. The choice of Duncan may also indicate that Ouattara is hoping to depart from office in 2020 with a loyal successor in place. The referendum, therefore, may herald a promising future for Côte d'Ivoire. If Duncan were to win the presidency, though it could pave the way toward de facto one-party rule, it could also help institutionalize the peaceful transference of power. Such transitional strategies have been used to institute democratization in several countries, including Zambia, Botswana, Senegal, and Kenya.

Ghana, for its part, seems well on the way toward democratic consolidation. Several peaceful elections have followed in the wake of Rawlings' departure. Today, Ghana has a proliferation of civil society organizations as well as an independent electoral commission. And, because of Ghana's unique political traditions, the country has one of the only genuine two-party systems in the region: one party derived from the Nkrumahist/Rawlings tradition (the National Democratic Congress, NDC), the other from the Busia-Danquah tradition (the New Patriotic Party, NPP). When Rawlings was elected out of office,

[2] Human Rights Report 2014: Côte d'Ivoire, Events of 2013, www.hrw.org/world-report/2014/country-chapters/cote-divoire (accessed June 2016).

his opposition, the NPP, took power. They held the presidency for two cycles, in 2000 and 2004. The NDC won back power in 2008 and 2012 by very slim margins. The last presidential election, held in November 2016, once again passed the baton to the NPP after a very close race. The alternation between these two parties is arguably what has allowed Ghana to continue developing its economy and has likely gone a long way towards solidifying Ghana's democracy.

Yet there are reasons to withhold judgment. Although elections have been upheld, each election has been bitterly contested. There are also potential political flashpoints over the country's new offshore oil industry, and urban discontent has increased as economic conditions have worsened. Any of these instabilities could tip the scales away from political reform. Nonetheless, as things stand today, Ghana appears to be one of the region's best hopes for successful democratic consolidation.

More broadly, across Africa, as multiparty elections have taken hold, many leaders have started to converge around the strategies outlined here. Studies indicate that in those countries that hold regular multiparty elections, there has been increased focus on incorporating local elites and chieftaincy in many cases has been strengthened. This may bode well for the future stability of the continent and for democracy.

Nonetheless, there is still a long road ahead. Given the continued strength of presidencies and central governments in Africa, it is critical that we understand what types of political strategies increase the chances for security and success. It is my hope that the typology developed here will ultimately aid in this enterprise.

African Exceptionalism

Today, Africa appears to be on a slow, but steady movement toward democratization. The hope this inspires has sometimes colored the way in which these trends have been interpreted. A prevailing assumption has been that democracy will be a cure-all for the continent's ills. With democratization, African governments will become less arbitrary and more responsive. Once democratized, therefore, Africa will achieve peace and economic prosperity. In this vein, Bratton and Chang argue, "the strength of states (or their stateness) is related, powerfully and positively, to the level of democracy" (2006: 1061). The goal, accordingly, is to empower civil society and limit political tenure. Why then focus on how the center can strengthen itself vis-à-vis the periphery?

The argument here is that by singularly focusing on democracy, analysts run the risk of ignoring critical intermediate steps. "Before multi-party

competition and elections can have these positive effects on leaders, Africa's competitive political systems must become institutionalized" (Goldsmith 2001: 10). As attested to by democratic failures in Iraq and Libya, democracy introduced in highly factionalized and polarized societies can also weaken states (Hawksley 2010; Collier 2009; Mann 2005). Liphardt's observation that "it is difficult to achieve and maintain stable democratic government in a plural society" (1977: 1) is strikingly relevant today.

It may be that for democracy to increase the 'stateness' of states, other preconditions are required. Indeed, the causal chain may go in the opposite direction. Just as Huntington (1968) argued that political and economic development are two separate goals with different logics and trajectories, state-building and democratization do not necessarily go hand in hand. Even Bratton and Chang acknowledge this when they recognize that what is vital to democracy is a legitimate political order, which they define as rule of law (2006: 1061). But if genuine democracy comes with political order and rule of law, what factors contribute to the likelihood leaders will introduce the necessary changes to establish them?

The thesis of this book is that in weakly institutionalized states the establishment of political order comes from the capacity of a regime to consolidate itself politically – that is to attain the compliance of both the urban areas and the periphery. This compliance requires the effective cooptation of ethno-regional powerbrokers and traditional elites. Interestingly, Bratton and Chang recognize that Western Europe followed such a process. They note that European "state building was facilitated by regime change, at first when aristocratic groups held the king accountable but ultimately when the authority of the state was legitimized by democratic consent" (2006: 1062). Yet they fail to analyze this as a two-step process.

In Europe and Asia, incorporating the rural landed elite into governing institutions was a slow and deeply contested progression. As Barrington Moore observes, "modern, secular society had to slowly [push] its way up through the vigorous and much tangled overgrowth of the feudal and ecclesiastical order" (1966: 4). The history of monarchies in Asia and Europe "is a story of rivalries, intrigues, assassinations, and military campaigns among the great nobles, who desired access to positions close to the throne" (Bendix 1980:65). Whether states established an uneasy balance of power between landed barons and the king as in England and Japan, or the king eroded the nobles' autonomy as in France and China, the ability of the king to incorporate the landed elite was vital to the center's capacity to unify the state. Only long after the landed elite had

been integrated into the ruling structure was general enfranchisement achieved.

Thus, centralization in Europe and Asia preceded democratization and proceeded over centuries. It was achieved in large part once the center wrested control from localities over three critical factors: religion, land, and force. Organized religion was particularly important for political centralization (Fukuyama 2011; Bendix 1980). The unifying effects of an established state religion enabled kings and emperors to develop strong states in China and Japan (Buddhism); Russia (Orthodox Church); France, Italy, Spain, and Germany (Roman Catholicism); and England (Church of England). State religions formed the basis of incipient administrative and legal structures, and helped the center gain control over extensive lands. Most importantly, the adoption of a unifying religion allowed the center to transfer legitimacy away from ancestral and localized forms of worship to the central ruler.[3]

A centuries-long process in most European and Asian countries was telescoped into a matter of decades or less in newly independent African countries. Carved out as a result of European competition, modern African states subsumed existing monarchies as well as a multitude of other political orders. Most African governments today must compete with local political institutions in which local elites – not the center – represent religious authority. On one end of the spectrum are centralized kingdoms in which the king continues to be a quasi-national, spiritual leader. On the other end, ancestral worship, animism, spirit possession, and magic remain widespread. All are highly decentralized practices that reinforce ties to ancestral lands and traditional leaders. In Europe and Asia, the struggle for political centralization was often a struggle against these very practices.[4] In Africa, this struggle continues.[5] As a result, loyalty and authority remain fragmented throughout the territory. Instead of empowering the state, religious authority reinforces the power of local elites and regional identities.[6]

[3] For example, Bendix (1980) notes how in China "Buddhism as a common faith could help overcome the political and religious divisions among the clans because it was not bound up with ancestor worship," while in Japan Buddhism "helped turn the attention of the people toward the capital and the imperial court" (p. 68).

[4] For example, see Bendix's description of the political consolidation in Japan, 1980, pp. 65.

[5] This may explain why so many African independence leaders presented themselves as quasi-godlike figures. See Mbembe 1992.

[6] It may be argued that America is a democracy born from decentralized religious communities. But America never had a landed aristocracy to displace. The landed gentry were themselves the leaders of the new political order. Moreover, the United States began with very limited enfranchisement.

Land-tenure systems in sub-Saharan Africa also differ from those in most modern Western states. Whereas European states developed a largely homogenous property-rights system, in Africa land is legally bifurcated: the urban sector operates under a private property-rights regime, while rural areas are subject to customary law in which traditional authorities are entrusted with the management of the land (Mamdani 1996). Medieval Europe arguably had a similarly bifurcated legal system.[7] The transformation to a largely uniform property system[8] took centuries and involved the steady dissolution of the land-based economy and with it the power of the landed elite. Unlike Europe, African governments inherited *modern* states with bifurcated land-tenure systems. The legal bifurcation of land tenure both empowers and undermines the center's control over people and critical resources. Because traditional elites administer land, they wield control over the resources people require for their livelihoods and well-being. As Boone observes, where landownership, labor, and capital are related to political collectivities, "subnational territories can begin to resemble political enclaves, fiefdoms, or 'mini-states'" (2014: 312). Though the state has the power to preempt these customary rights, it is precisely such preemptions that can mobilize anti-government sentiment.

Decentralization of religion and land has thus worked to divide political authority in Africa. At the same time, the African state was bequeathed the monopoly over the legitimate use of force within its territorial boundaries. This has enabled the center to maintain supremacy within its territory and command over its resources. But given that authority and loyalty are bisected along the other critical axes, political power arguably has come to hinge to a far greater extent on the loyalty of the president's security forces. The centralization of force under the command of the presidency coupled with the bifurcation of political authority may have ironically continued to make African regimes unstable.

The historical development of the modern African state helps explain why rural politics remains so vital to stability in sub-Saharan countries. Under such conditions, leaders need to devise successful domestic geopolitical strategies. Arriving at this involves the symbolic and political incorporation of localities – particularly, as represented by established traditional elites. Therefore, to achieve political stability leaders must

[7] Towns were inhabited predominantly by free citizens increasingly related to one another through contract and private property rights, whereas peasants in rural areas were under the dominion of lords. See Mumford 1961: 316–317; Polanyi 1944.

[8] All modern Western states have more than one land-tenure system (e.g. privately owned, state-owned, and, in many instances, tribally owned lands), but the majority of the territory is available as private property.

build a workable partnership with elites from multiple rural areas. The leaders who develop functional rule in sub-Saharan Africa implement such strategies.

Broader Implications

Above all, this study examines how political consolidation can be achieved in factionalized societies. Lessons from sub-Saharan Africa are applicable more broadly. Looking at sectarian violence from Burundi and South Sudan to Iraq and Afghanistan, it is clear we need to develop a better understanding of when and why elite bargains fail. Decades ago Liphardt observed, "when a society is riven with sharp cleavages and when memberships and loyalties do not overlap but are concentrated exclusively within each separate segment of society, the cross-pressures that are vital to political moderation and stability will be absent" (1977: 10). In weakly institutionalized states with highly factionalized societies, local elites commonly control the distribution of land and resources, symbolically represent their communities, perform sacred rites and duties, and/or sanction in-group behavior. Under such conditions, the incorporation of local powerbrokers becomes critical to political development. Leaders who incorporate local powerbrokers are better able to overcome their fear of competing regional powerbases and thus to pursue beneficial state-building policies.

The study has other implications as well. For one thing, it suggests that empowering localities can be critical to state security and development. However, empowering (rather than coopting) competing regional actors can also destabilize a regime. Therefore, federalism may not be the best means to foster political development in some highly factionalized countries. At the same time, this study indicates that decentralization is unlikely to advance the weakest members of society or to result in more equitable distribution of local resources. Where traditional power structures are still dominant, decentralization is more likely to empower local elites (Ribot & Oyono 2005; Boone 2003). Decentralization can, thus, help strengthen the center vis-à-vis ethno-regions, but does not necessarily strengthen local communities.

The study also provides an answer to the difficult chicken-and-egg conundrum: do economically developed states become politically stable, or do politically stable states become economically developed? The answer here is the latter. For a state to develop, the center has to invest in the periphery. That requires political will. "Leaders need a minimal degree of protection in office to undertake development" (Goldsmith 2001: 96). Most of all, they need assurance that developing the periphery

will not empower their political opponents (Dunning 2005). Regimes fearful of elites with competing power bases are less likely to build the necessary infrastructure to bring about economic development. The study suggests that given sufficient political protections, "rulers and other leading politicians might begin to value the limited security of official tenure more highly than the uncertain possession of personal power" (Jackson & Rosberg 1984: 439). Therefore, the political incorporation of the periphery is key to both economic development and democratic consolidation.

In the broadest terms, this study suggests that it is valuable to resuscitate rural/urban analyses in the great tradition of Barrington Moore and Samuel S. Huntington. Such analyses went by the wayside after interest in the dramatic peasant revolutions of the early twentieth century ebbed. But patterns of political organization around the globe suggest the continued importance of studying political life in terms of these social configurations. In countries as disparate as Iran, Thailand, Bolivia, and the United States, the breakdown in political support along urban/rural lines has steered important political outcomes.

It is possible that, as sub-Saharan states become increasingly urbanized, the distinctions outlined here will become less significant. But so long as chieftaincy and customary land tenure continue to play a central role in African politics, the observations in this study will likely remain relevant.[9] International and domestic pressure may make it more likely that coup leaders will speedily restore democratic rule. The institutionalization of regular elections may be increasing the power of civil societies as well. However, the prevalence of strong presidencies and neopatrimonial systems is unlikely to disappear any time soon. How regimes consolidate themselves in office and manage political competitors will therefore be central to the future success of most African countries.

[9] Afrobarometer surveys indicate that trust in traditional elites continues to trump trust in government. See Working Paper No. 34, March 2004 and Working Paper No. 108, 2008.

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Ghanaian Government Reports

A Program of Structural Adjustment, Report prepared by the Government of Ghana for the Fourth Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana, Paris (May 1987).

Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Functions, Operations and Administration of the Workers Brigade, Minority Report, Ministry of Information [1967?].

Commission of Enquiry into Wenchi Affairs Report of the Commissioner. Report by Mr. Justice Jackson. Accra, Gold Coast: Government Printing Dept. (1952).

Commission on the Structure and Procedures of the Ghana Civil Service, Vol. III. Accra: Management Development and Productivity Institute, 1978 (GPC/A637/5,000/9/78).

Economic Recovery Program 1984–1986, Volumes I, II. Report Prepared by the Government of Ghana for the Meeting of the Consultative Group for Ghana, Paris November 1983. Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation (October 1983).

Economic Survey 1962, Presented to the National Assembly by the President, July 1963. Accra: Central Bureau of Statistics.

Government Statement on the Report of the Committee Appointed to Enquire into the Local Purchasing of Cocoa. Accra: Ministry of Information (1967).

Guidelines for the Five-Year Development Plan, 1975–80. Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation (January 1975).

Labour Redeployment Programme July 1987–31st December 1990: Achievements, Problems and Prospects. Project No. GHA/87/013/A/01/99.

Main Report of the Commission on the Structure and Procedures of the Ghana Civil Service, 1974–1976.

National Programme for Economic Development (Revised). Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation (July 1987).

National Reconciliation Commission. Vol. 1, 2, 3. 2004. Accra: s.n.

PAMSCAD Report as at 31st December. Accra: PAMSCAD Secretariat (May 1994).

Programme of the Convention People's Party: For Work and Happiness. Accra: CPP Central Committee (1961).

Report and Financial Statements by the Accountant-General and Report Thereon by the Auditor-General for the Year Ended 30th September, 1962. Prepared by N. W. Sabine, Auditor-General. Accra: The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Ghana Statistics Bureau (1964).

Report from the Select Committee on Federal System of Government and Second Chamber for the Gold Coast. Accra: Government Printing Dept. (December 1961).

Report of a Commission into the Affairs of the Akim Abuakwa State by Commissioner J. Jackson. Accra: Government Printing Dept. (1958).

Report of the Commission of Enquiry into Mr. Braimah's Resignation and Allegations Arising Therefrom. Accra: Government Printing Dept. (1954).

Report of the Sixth Liaison Officers and Mobisquad Leaders' Conference Aug 1991. Accra [Ministry of Information].

Report on the Enquiry into Matters Disclosed at the Trial of Captain Benjamin Awhaitey Held on the 20th and 21st January 1959 before a Court-Martial Convened at Giffard Camp, Accra, and the Surrounding Circumstances. Accra: Government Printing Dept. (1959).

Rural Communities in Ghana. Report of a national rural community survey carried out as part of the third round of the Ghana Living Standards Survey 1991–1992. Accra: Ghana Statistical Service (1993).

Seven-Year Plan for National Reconstruction and Development: Financial Years, 1963/64–1969/70. Accra: Government Printing Dept. (1964).

Statement by the Government on the Recent Conspiracy, White Paper (December 1961).

Statement by the Government on the Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Matters Disclosed at the Trial of Captain Benjamin Awhaitey before a Court-Martial and the Surrounding Circumstances. W. P. No. 10/59. Accra: Printed by the Government Printer.

Summary of PNDC's Budget Statement and Economic Policy for 1983, presented by Dr. Kwesi Botchwey, Thursday, April 21, 1983. Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation, presented.

The Cocoa Sector: Background Paper No 1 of 4 Prepared for the Ghana Policies Programme for Adjustment Report. Tema: Ghana Publishing Corp. 1983, No. 4702-GH (October 14).

The Financial Position of State Corporations. In *The Budget 1965*. Accra: Ministry of Finance (1964).

The Great Deception, Second Edition: The Role of the CIA and Rightwing Forces in the Overthrow of Nkrumah. Accra: The Socialist Forum of Ghana (2007).

The Manufacturing Sector: Background Paper No. III of 4. Prepared for the "Ghana: Policies and Program for Adjustment" Report No. 4702-GH issued on October 3, 1983. Working Paper of Western Africa Programs Department I. Division B. Accra: Ghana Publishing Corporation (October 1983).

The State of the Ghanaian Economy in 1992. Accra: The Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research (ISSER), University of Ghana, Legon.

The State of the Ghanaian Economy in 1997. Accra: The Institute of Statistical Social and Economic Research (ISSER) University of Ghana, Legon (July 1998).

Treason Trial: The State versus Robert Benjamin Otchere, Joseph Yaw Menu, Tawia Adamafio, Ako Adjei, Hugo Horatio Cofie-Crabbe: Full Text of Opening Address by

Attorney-General at the High Court (Special Criminal Division) in Accra on August 9, 1963. [London]: Ghana High Commission, Information Division.

Ivoirian Government Reports

3e Congres du Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire, 19–20-21 Mars 1959 RDA. [Abidjan Archives 3.32/32].

10e anniversaire operation San Pedro. ARSO [Abidjan Archives].

Anthologie des Discours 1946–1978, Tome I. Abidjan: CEDA (1978).

"Auditions de M. Houphouët-Boigny, deputé," Séance du mercredi 31 mai, 7 juin, 28 juin, 4 juillet. In M. Damas (ed.), *Rapport No 11348 Sur Les Incidents Survenus En Côte d'Ivoire, Tome I*. Abidjan: Assembly Nationale, March (1965). Abidjan Archives B–217.

Bilan et Comptes de l'exercice 1966. Abidjan: Societe Ivoirenne de Construction de Gestion Immobiliere, Mai 1968 (SICOGI). [Abidjan Archives].

Côte d'Ivoire 1965 Population. Etudes Regionales 1962–1965 – Synthese. Abidjan: Ministre du Plan, Juilliet 1967. [Abidjan Archives].

Côte d'Ivoire 1965: Etudes Regionales 1962–1965 – Synthese. Ministere du Plan, Abidjan, Octobre 1968. [Abidjan Archives, 3.33/178].

Côte d'Ivoire An XI – Les Relais du Développement. [Archives Abidjan: P124 /xi/ 7/ R7].

Côte d'Ivoire 1965 Emploi: Etudes Regionales 1962–1965 – Synthese. Ministere du Plan. Paris: MAIND (Octobre 1968). [Abidjan Archives 3.33/178].

Côte d'Ivoire An 10: Une Progression Ininterrompue. Ministere de l'Information. Abidjan [Abidjan Archives].

Deuxieme Esquisse du Plan quinquennal de Developpement 1971–1975. Abidjan: Ministere du Plan, June 1970. [Abidjan Archives 3.33/58].

Direction de l'animation et de la productivite: Documents de travail internes travaux prepartation au plan quinquennal 1971–1975. Premiere Serie/A. Rapport No. 04, "La Main d'Oeuvre Etrangere." Abidjan (Fevrier 1968). [Abidjan Archives 3.33/95].

Etudes d'Amenagement Integre des bassins versants region nord (korhogo, boundiali, feressedougou), Structuratoin du milieu rural. Ministere du Plan. BNEDT-DRC, Juilliet 1975. [Abidjan Archives].

Extraits de la Loi-programme des investissements publics 1976–1977-1978. Ministre du Plan, Abidjan (Fevrier 1976) (adopted December 26, 1975). [Abidjan Archives, 3.33/73].

Independence An Man, 7 Aout 1969. [Abidjan Archives].

Independence Gagnoa An – 10, 7 Aout 1970. [Abidjan Archives].

Inventoire Economiqie et Sociale de la Côte d'Ivoire 1947–1958. Ministere des Finances des Affaires Economique et du Plan, Service de la Statistique. Ministere du Plan Documentation 31. [Abidjan Archives].

Journal Official de la Republique de Côte d'Ivoire. Ministere d'Interior. [Abidjan Archives].

Katiola 19eme Anniversaire de l'Indepedance. Programme Officiel des Fetes. Abidjan: Ministere du l'interior. [Abidjan Archives]

La Côte d'Ivoire en Chiffres, edition 96–97. Abidjan: Ministere de l'Economie et des Finances (22 Juillet 1997). [Abidjan Archives].

La Main d'Oeuvre Etrangere. Direction de l'Animation et de la Productivite: Documents de Travail Internes Travaux Preparatoires au Plan Quinquennal 1971–1975, Premiere Serie/ A, Rapport No. 04. Ministere du Plan, Abidjan (Fevrier 1968). [Abidjan 3.33/95].

L'Industriel de Côte d'Ivoire: Les Industries en 1963 Bulletin de Liason du Syndicat des Industries. [Abidjan Archives 6.68/24].

Perspectives de Développement Economique et Social. Le Développement Agricole, Agriculture – Elevage – Forets – Peche. Ministere des Finances des Affaires Economiques et du Plan, Janvier 1964. Abidjan: National Printer (31 Juillet 1967). [Abidjan Archives].

Problemes Poses Par Le Développement A Base Regionale En Côte D'Ivoire. Abidjan: Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer (ORSTOM) (1971). [Abidjan Archives 3.30/38].

Rapport No 11348 Sur Les Incidents Survenus En Côte d'Ivoire, Tome I. Edited by M. Damas. Abidjan: Assembly Nationale, March 1965. Abidjan Archives B–217.

Repertoire Politique et Administratif 1979. Abidjan: Ministere de l'Information. [Abidjan Archives].

Situation Economique de la Côte d'Ivoire 1962. Ministere des Finances des Affaires Economiques et du Plan, Direction de la Statistique et des Etudes Economiques et Demographiques.

Statistiques Agricole 1971. Direction des Statistiques Rurales et des Enquetes Agricoles, Ministere de l'Agriculture des Eaux et Forets. [Abidjan Archives].

Statistiques Agricole 1982. Direction des Statistiques Rurales et des Enquetes Agricoles, Ministere de l'Agriculture des Eaux et Forets. [Abidjan Archives].

International Reports and Working Papers

Africa Watch. (1992). Ghana Revolutionary Injustice: Abuse of the Legal System under the PNDC Government. News from Africa Watch (January 31, 1992), IV(1).

African Development Bank. (1997). Sao Tome and Principe Bank Group Portfolio Review Report. Country Programmes Department, Central Region, September. www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Evaluation-Reports/ADB-BD-WP-97–101-EN-SCANNEDIMAGE.045.PDF. Retrieved on March 10, 2012.

African Development Bank. (2009). Economic Reform Support and Financial Governance Programme (PAREGF). Union of the Comoros, Appraisal Report. M. Osege, Team Leader. www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-andOperations/AR%20Comor02%20En.pdf (accessed June 1, 2011).

African Development Bank. (2009). Rural Infrastructure Rehabilitation Support Project (PARIR). Central African Republic Project Appraisal Report, Team Leader, M. Ayachi (October 2009).

Declassified U.S. State Department Documents, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957 Volume XVIII; 1958–1960 Volume XIV; 1961–1963 Volume XXI; 1964–1968 Volume XXIV, Africa.

Human Rights Watch. (2008). "The Best School": Student Violence, Impunity and the Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. New York: Human Rights Watch (May).

IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/107, "Côte d'Ivoire: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix" (August 2000).

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada. (1992). Ghana: Information on the Date of Founding of the Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ) Including Whether There Were Informal Meetings Held before Its Founding (April 1, 1992), GHA10599, available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6ac1790.html (accessed June 23, 2011).

Institute of Economic Affairs. (2006). Factors that Enabled Successful Economic Reform and Recovery in Ghana from 1983 to 2006. Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs. IEA Monograph No. 11 (December).

International Monetary Fund and The International Development Association. (2001). Central African Republic: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy. Paper and Joint IDA-IMF Staff Assessment of the Interim PRSP. Approved by Callisto Madavo and Kemal Dervis (IDA) and by Amor Tahari and Anthony R. Boote (IMF), IDA/SecM2001-0001 (January 3, 2001).

Tidemand, P., et al. (2010). *Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Tanzania In-Country Assessment Report*. USAID, September.

UNHCR. (2000). Côte d'Ivoire: Implications of the December 1999 Coup d'état. UNHCR Report, April 2000. Writenet Paper No. 01/2000.

USAID. 2010. Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Mali In-Country Assessment Report. September. www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/mali_in_country_assessment.pdf. Retrieved on February 28, 2012.

U.S. Department of State. (1999). U.S. Department of State Country Report on Human Rights Practices 1998 – Côte d'Ivoire (February 26, 1999).

U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (1982). *Liberia and Ghana – Policy Challenges in West Africa: A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate*. Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations in June 1982. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

World Bank. (1994). Federal Islamic Republic of the Comoros Poverty and Growth in a Traditional Small Island Society. Population and Human Resources Division Department III Africa Region, Report No. 13401-COM, September 29.

World Bank. (1995). Cameroon – Diversity, Growth, and Poverty Reduction. Population and Human Resources Division Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office, Report No. 13167-CM (April 4, 1995).

World Bank. (1998). Cameroon: Country Assistance Strategy – Progress Report. IDA/R98-14 (February 18, 1998).

World Bank. (2008). *Decentralization in Guinea: Strengthening Accountability for Better Service Delivery*. Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building Unit (AFTPR) Africa Region. Report No. 38664-GN.

World Bank. (2013). *Rural-Urban Dynamics and the Millennium Development Goals*. Global Monitoring Report. Washington, DC: World Bank. DOI: 10.1596/978–0-8213–9806-7.

World Bank. Preliminary Statement of the Government on the Poverty Reduction Strategy and Medium-Term Economic Policies. Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, I-PRSP, Central African Republic, http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTPRS1/Resources/Country-Papers-and-JSAs/cenafrica_iprsp.pdf (accessed May 10, 2011).

World Bank and International Monetary Fund. (2001). Central African Republic – Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (I-PRSP) and Joint Assessment (English), # 2001/01/0320442.

News Sources

Africa Research Bulletin

Côte d'Ivoire: 100 Hommes de Pouvoir. Paris: Indigo Publications, 1996.

Fraternité Matin

Ghana Times

Ghanaian Times

Jeune Afrique

la Voie

le Nouvel Horizon

Les Elites Ivoiriennes, Numéro spécial du Bulletin de l'Afrique noire. Paris: EDIAFRIC – La Documentation africaine, 1978.

New York Times

Notre Voie

People's Daily Graphic

The Gazette (Montreal, Quebec)

The Guardian (London)

Agence France Presse

Associated Press

BBC Summary of World Broadcasts

IRN West Africa News Update

Xinhua General News Service

Ivoirian Interviews

Francis Woodié, President of the Constitutional Court 2011–2015, Abidjan, August 11, 2014.

Anonymous Interviews

Chief of Yamoussoukro and Former Deputy of Yamoussoukro, Abidjan, July 2009.

Chief of Korhogo and Former PDCI Deputy, Korhogo, August 2009.

Chiefs in Chiefs in villages outside of the city of Korhogo (Doka, Kombolokoura, Teguere, Kafiokade), August 2009.

Cooperative Organizer, Agence Nationale au Développement Rural (ANADAR), Korhogo, August 2009.

Director of Protocol, Daloa, August 2009.

Director of Regional Agriculture of the Savannah, Korhogo, July 2009.

Director of the Center for the Research of Architecture and Urban Studies, Abidjan, July 2009.
Editor, *La Notre Vois*, Abidjan, July 2009.
Employee of the Bureau Formation Conseul en Développement (BFDC), Korhogo, August 2009.
Former Army Colonel, Abidjan, November 2010.
Former PDCI Secretary of Daloa, Daloa, August 2009.
FPI Organizer in Daloa 1990–1994, Daloa, August 2009.
Local Government Official, Daloa, August 2009.
PDCI Minister 1990–1994, Abidjan, November 2010.
PDCI Minister 1990–1999, Abidjan, November 2010.
Professor of Geography, Cocody University, Abidjan, July 2009.
Professor of Urban Studies, Cocody University, Abidjan, July 2009.
Three Agents, Bureau National d'etudes Techniques et de Developpement (BNETD), Département de l'Agriculture et de l'Aménagement Rural, Abidjan, November 2010.
Three Chiefs in Daloa, Daloa, August 2009.

Ghanaian Interviews

Albert Lutterodt, Head of Audience Research, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, Accra, August 2009.
Alijah Ada, NDC Party Secretary Walewale, Walewale, August 2009.
Amadou Sulleye, Director of Research Monitoring and Evaluation of the Electoral Commission, Accra, September 2009.
Ben Bukari Yahaya, NDC Secretary Berekum, Berekum, August 2009.
Chiefs and Elders in Tamale, Tamale, August 2009.
Elders in Tolon, Tolon August 2009.
Honorable Alidu Addrisu, MP West Mamprusi, Mamprusi, August 2009.
Janet Yobo Adjei, Women's Organizer NDC Berekum, Berekum, August 2009.
Dr. Joe S. L. Abbey, Former PNDC Economic Advisor, Accra, September 20, 2010.
Joe Yaw Abrefah, Private Secretary to the Omanhene Wenchi, Wenchi, August 2009.
Joseph Boahene Aido, Chief of Wasa, Berekum, August 2009.
Nana Afia Abrafi, Queen Mother Techiman, Techiman, August 2009.
Nana Akouku Sarpong, Paramount Chief, Agogo August 2009.
Nana Ashalley Botchway, Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, Accra, August 2009.
Nana Kwame Kyere, Sub-chief Berekum, Berekum, August 2009.
Nana Ofori Yeboah, Twafourhene Atebubu, Techiman, August 2009.
Nana Okkofo Dartey III, Gysaahene, Berekum, August 2009.
Nana Oppon Basawruau II, Adontehene of Berekum, Berekum, August 2009.
Nana Oseiam Amankwado II, Chief of Nanasuana, Berekum, August 2009.
Nana Yeboah Krodi, Dormaa Aduanahene, Dormaa, August 2009.
P. V. Obeng, PNDC Chairman of the Committee of Secretaries 1982–1992, Accra, September 2010.
S. S. Nayina, Regional Minister Northern Region, Tamale, August 2009.

Valerie A. Sackey, Former PNDC Director of the Castle Information Bureau, Propaganda Secretary, J. J. Rawlings Aide, Tema, October 2010.

Constitutions and Acts

Constitution of Angola, 1992. www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ao00000_.html. Retrieved on May 18, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Benin, 1990. http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Benin1990English.pdf. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of Burkina Faso, 1991. www.sggcm.gov.bf/SiteSggcm/textes/constitution.html. Retrieved on March 2, 2010.
Constitution of the Republic of Cameroon 1972. www.prc.cm/instit/consti.htm. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Cameroon, L'organisation des chefferies traditionnelles, April 2011. www.atangana-eteme-emeran.com/spip.php?article2229.
Constitution of the Central African Republic, 1995. http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/CentralAfricanRepublic1995English%28Summary%29.pdf. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of the Central African Republic, 2004 with Amendments through 2010. www.parliament.am/library/sahmanadrutyunner/kentronakanafrikyan.pdf. Retrieved on May 2, 2016.
Constitution of the Central African Republic, 2013. www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Central_African_Republic_2013?lang=en. Retrieved on May 2, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Chad, 1965, amended in 1965 and 1967. https://books.google.com/books?id=Q2ICyUltcvIC&pg=PA105&lpg=PA105&dq=chad+constitution+1965&source=bl&ots=z0yJy4dVYf&sig=IGkIhqqbVGUISy1FDXq_tjWWy70&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiOnumf6ZjMAhXIGB4KHSs7BXgQ6AEIODAF#v=onepage&q=chad%20constitution%201965&f=false. Retrieved on May 4, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Chad, April 1996. http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Chad1995English.pdf. Retrieved on May 4, 2016.
Constitution of the Union of the Comoros, 1996. http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Comoros, 1996English.pdf. Retrieved on March 2, 2010.
Constitution of the Republic of Congo, 2001. www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Congo_2001.pdf?lang=en. Retrieved on May 5, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Congo, 1992. www.google.com/search?q=Congo-Brazzaville+-+Constitution%7B+Adopted+on%3A+15+March+1992+%7D&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8. Retrieved on May 5, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire, 1960. www.ethnonet-africa.org/data/ivoir/const1960.htm#const1960. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of Eritrea, May 1997. http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Eritrea1997English.pdf. Retrieved on April 14, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Gambia, 1997. www.ncce.gm/files/constitution.pdf. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1960. www.francisbennion.com/pdfs/fb/1960/1960–001-ghana-constitution.pdf. Retrieved April 7, 2016.

Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1976. www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/docs/ELECTRONIC/31976/101268/F1513408204/GHA31976.pdf. Retrieved on April 7, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Ghana, 1992. www.judicial.gov.gh/constitution/second_schedule/home.htm, Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of the Republic of Guinea Bissau, 1984, amended in 1991, 1993, 1996. www.icnl.org/research/library/files/Guinea-Bissau/guineabissau.pdf. Retrieved on April 7, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau, 1984. http://confinder.richmond.edu. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of Kenya Act No. 5, 1969. www.kenyalaw.org/lex/rest//db/kenyalex/Kenya/Legislation/English/Amendment%20Acts/No.%205%20of%201969.pdf. Retrieved on April 25, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Kenya, 1963. www.kenyalaw.org/kenyalaw/klr_app/frames.php. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of Madagascar, 1992. www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/ma00000_.htmlConstitution of the Republic of Malawi, 1994. www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/mw/mw002en.pdf. Retrieved on April 18, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Mali, 1992. http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Mali.pdf. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of the Republic of Sénégal, 1967. http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Senegal_%28Verfassungen%29.pdf. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of the Republic of Sénégal, 1963. http://mjp.univ-perp.fr/constit/sn1963.htm. Retrieved on March 30, 2016.
Constitution of the Somali Democratic Republic, 1979. www.worldstatesmen.org/Somalia-1979.doc. Retrieved on May 9, 2016.
Constitution of the Somali Republic, 1960. http://somalitalk.com/dastuur/1960.html. Retrieved on May 9, 2016.
Constitution of Somaliland, 2000. www.somalilandlaw.com/body_somaliland_constitution.htm. Retrieved on May 9, 2016.
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania, 1977. www.tanzania.go.tz/images/constitutioneng.pdf. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution de la République du Togo, Mai 1963. www.wdl.org/fr/item/2541/. Retrieved on March 15, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1962. www.buganda.com/const62 m.htm. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995. www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ug/ug023en.pdf.
Constitution of Zambia, 1991. www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/zm/zm052en.pdf. Retrieved on March 10, 2016.
Constitution of the Republic of Zimbabwe, 1979 (amended). http://aceproject.org/ero-en/regions/africa/ZW/zimbabwe-constitution-of-zimbabwe-2008–1. Retrieved on March 2, 2012.
Constitution of Zimbabwe (1980) as amended 2007. www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/constitution-zimbabwe-1980-amended-2007.
Interim Constitution of Somaliland, 1997. www.somalilandlaw.com/1997_Interim_Constitution.htm. Retrieved on May 9, 2016.

Kenya, The Chiefs' (Amendment) Bill, 2009. www.kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/bills/2009/200909.pdf. Retrieved April 25, 2016.
Laws of Kenya, Chiefs' Act 128, Rev. 2011. http.faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/ke/n102000.pdf. Retrieved on April 24, 2016.
Malawi Independence Act, 1964, Chapter 46. www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1964/46/pdfs/ukpga_19640046_en.pdf. Retrieved on April 18, 2016.
Republic of Namibia, Council of Traditional Leaders Act 13, October 1997. www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/na/na021en.pdf. Retrieved on April 19, 2016.
Republic of Namibia, Local Authorities Act, August 1992. http://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/nam82645.pdf. Retrieved on April 19, 2016.
République du Niger, Loi N° 2015–01, statut de la chefferie traditionnelle, janvier 2015. http://faolex.fao.org/cgi-bin/faolex.exe?rec_id=146499&database=faolex&search_type=link&table=result&lang=eng&format_name=@ERALL. Retrieved on April 21, 2016.
République du Niger, statut de la chefferie traditionnelle en modifiée et complétée par la loi 2008. www.coderural-niger.net/IMG/pdf/Loi_chefferie_modifiee.pdf. Retrieved on April 21, 2016.
Sierra Leone, Chiefdoms Council [Removal] Act, 1974. www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1974–13.pdf. Retrieved on May 12, 2016.
Sierra Leone, Chiefdoms Treasury Act, 1975. www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/1975–6.pdf. Retrieved on May 12, 2016.
Sierra Leone, Chieftaincy Act, 2009. www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/2009–10.pdf. Retrieved on May 12, 2016.
Sierra LeoneIndependence Act, 1961. www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/Sierra%20Leone%20Independence%20Act%201961.pdf. Retrieved on May 12, 2016.
South Africa, Organized Local Government Act, 1997. www.gov.za/sites/www.gov.za/files/a52-97_0.pdf. Retrieved on April 1, 2016.
South Africa, Remuneration of Public Office Bearers Act 20, 1998. www.remcommission.gov.za/MediaLib/Home/Library/Legislation/Remuneration%20of%20Public%20Office%20Bearers%20Act%2020%20of%201998.pdf. Retrieved on April 1, 2016.

Books and Journal Articles

Aalen, L. (2002). *Ethnic Federalism in a Dominant Party State: The Ethiopian Experience 1991–2000*. Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute.
Abarry, A. (1984). A traditional poetry of the Ga of Ghana. *Journal of Black Studies*, 14(4), 493–506.
Abba, S. (1990). La chefferie traditionnelle en question. *Politique africaine*, (38), 51–60.
Abbey, Dr. J. L. S. (1998). The political process and management of economic change. *Paper Prepared for the Commonwealth Secretariat*. London: Commonwealth Secretariat (December).
Abegaz, B. (2005). Multilateral development aid for Africa. *Economic Systems*, 29(4), 433–454.
Adamafio, T. (1982). *By Nkrumah's Side: The Labour and the Wounds*. Accra: Westcoast Publishing House.

Adelman, K. L. (1975). The recourse to authenticity and negritude in Zaire. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 13(01), 134–139.

Adem, T. A. (2004). "Decentralised there, Centralised here:" Local governance and paradoxes of household autonomy and control in north-east Ethiopia, 1991–2001. *Africa*, 74(04), 611–632.

Adzakey, N. K. (1972–1973). *Ghana Who's Who*. Accra: Bartels Publications (Ghana) Ltd.

Aerni-Flessner, J. (2014). Development, politics, and the centralization of state power in Lesotho, 1960–75. *The Journal of African History*, 55(03), 401–421.

Africa Confidential (1973). 14, 5–6.

Afrifa, Colonel A. A. (1967). *The Ghana Coup, 24th February 1966*. London: Cass.

Aguilar, R. and Å. Stenman. (1997). Guinea-Bissau: From structural adjustment to economic integration. *Africa Spectrum* 32(1): 71–96.

Agyeman-Duah, B. (1987). Ghana, 1982–6: The politics of the P.N.D.C. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25(4), 613–642.

(2008). *Ghana Governance in the Fourth Republic*. Tema: Digibooks Ghana Ltd.

Ahmed, I. I. and R. H. Green (1999). The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction. *Third World Quarterly*, 20(1), 113–127.

Akindès, F. (2003). Côte d'Ivoire: Socio-political crises, "Ivoirité" and the course of history. *African Sociological Review*, 7(2), 11–28.

(2004). *The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d'Ivoire*. Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet.

(2011). *Côte d'Ivoire: a réinvention de soi dans la violence*. Dakar: Codesria.

Alderman, H. and G. Shively (1996). Economic reform and food prices: Evidence from markets in Ghana. *World Development*, 24, 521–534.

Allen, C. (1989). Benin. In *Benin, The Congo, Burkina Faso: Marxist Regime Series*. London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 5–138.

(1992). Restructuring an authoritarian state: "Democratic renewal" in Benin surviving democracy? *Review of African Political Economy*, 54, 42–58.

Allen, P. M. (1994). *Madagascar: Conflicts of Authority in the Great Island*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Allman, J. M. (1993). *The Quills of the Porcupine: Asante Nationalism in an Emergent Ghana*. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Almås, G. (2007). The political implications of economic adjustment. Perspectives on Côte d'Ivoire: Between political breakdown and post-conflict peace, 10–67.

Alpers, E. A. (1974). Ethnicity, politics, and history in Mozambique. *Africa Today*, 21(4), 39–52.

Amey, A. B. and D. K. Leonard (1979). Public policy, class and inequality in Kenya and Tanzania. *Africa Today*, 26(4), 3–4.

Amin, S. (1967). *Le Développement du capitalisme en Côte d'Ivoire*. Paris: de Minuit.

Amondji, M. (1984). *Félix Houphouët et la Côte-d'Ivoire: l'envers d'une légende*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

(1986). *Côte-d'Ivoire: le P.D.C.I. et la vie politique de 1944 à 1985*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Amonoo, B. (1981). *Ghana 1957–1966: The Politics of Institutional Dualism*. London: George Allen and Unwin (Publishers) Ltd.

Amponsah, N. and K. Boafo-Arthur (2003). *Local Government in Ghana: Grassroots Participation in the 2002 Local Government Elections, 19–48*. Legon/Ibis, West Africa: Department of Political Science.

Anaman, K. A. (2006). *Factors that Enabled Successful Economic Reform and Recovery in Ghana from 1983 to 2006*. Accra: The Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA).

Anin, T. E. (1991). *Essays on the Political Economy of Ghana*. London: Selwyn Publishers.

Ansoms, A. (2008). Striving for growth, bypassing the poor? A critical review of Rwanda's rural sector policies. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 46(01), 1–32.

(2009). Re-engineering rural society: The visions and ambitions of the Rwandan elite. *African Affairs*, 108(431), 289–309.

Appiah, J. (1990). *Joe Appiah: The Autobiography of an African Patriot*. New York: Praeger.

Apter, D. (1955). British West Africa: Patterns of self-government. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 298 (March), 117–129.

(1955). *The Gold Coast in Transition*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

(1966). Nkrumah, charisma, and the coup. *Daedalus*, 97(3), 757–792.

(1968). *Ghana, Political Parties and National Integration in Tropical Africa*, J. S. Coleman and C. G. Rosberg (eds.). University of California Press, 259–317.

Arriola, L. (2009). Patronage and political stability in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 42(10), 1339–1362.

Aryeetey, E., et al. (2000). *Economic Reforms in Ghana: The Miracle and the Mirage*. Africa World Press.

Asante, R. and E. Gyimah-Boadi (2004). Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector in Ghana. UNRISD Project on Ethnic Structure, Inequality and Governance of the Public Sector. www.unrisd.org/unrisd/website/document.nsf/%28httpPublications%29/8509496C0F316AB1C1256ED900466964?OpenDocument (accessed June 2012).

Austin, D. (1961a). Ghana since independence. *The World Today*, 17(10), 424–435.

(1961b). Elections in an African rural area. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 31(1), 1–18.

(1963). The uncertain frontier: Ghana-Togo. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 1(2), 139–145.

(1964). *Politics in Ghana, 1947–1960*. Oxford University Press.

(1974). *Ghana Observed: Essays on the Politics of a West African Republic*. New York: Africana Publishing Company.

Ayee, J. A. (1994). *An Anatomy of Public Policy Implementation: The Case of Decentralization Policies in Ghana*. Aldershot: Avebury.

(1996). The measurement of decentralization: The Ghanaian experience, 1988–92. *African Affairs*, 95, 31–50.

Azam, J.-P. (2001). The redistributive state and conflicts in Africa. *Journal of Peace Research*, 38(4), 429–444.

Azevedo, M. J. (2005). *The Roots of Violence: A History of War in Chad*. Routledge.

Bah, M., et al. (2003). Changing rural–urban linkages in Mali, Nigeria and Tanzania. *Environment and Urbanization*, 15(1), 13–24.

Bahadur, M. F. and G. McCord (2004). Ending Africa's poverty trap, *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity*, 2004(1), 117–240.

Bakar, Saïd A. (1998). Small island systems: A case study of the Comoro Islands. *Comparative Education*, 24(2), Special Number (11), 181–191.

Bakary, T. (1984). Elite transformation and political succession. In *The Political Economy of Ivory Coast*, William I. Zartman and Christopher Delgado (eds.). New York, Praeger.

Bakary-Akin, T. (1991). *Côte d'Ivoire: une succession impossible?: essai*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

(1997). *Political Polarization over Governance in Côte d'Ivoire, Governance as Conflicting Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa*, I. W. Zartman (ed.). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Baldwin, K. and E. Mvukiyehe (2011). The Effects of Participatory Processes for Selecting Leaders: Evidence from Changes to Traditional Institutions in Liberia. Unpublished manuscript.

(2015). Elections and collective action: Evidence from changes in traditional institutions in Liberia. *World Politics*, 67(04), 690–725.

Ball, J. (2005). Colonial labor in twentieth-century Angola. *History Compass*, 3(1), 10.1111/j.1478–0542.2005.00168.x.

Bamou, E. and W. Masters (2007). Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Cameroon. Agricultural Distortions Working Paper 42. Washington, DC: World Bank, December.

Barkan, J. D. (1994). *Beyond Capitalism vs. Socialism in Kenya and Tanzania*. Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Barkan, J. D. and M. Chege (1989). Decentralising the state: District focus and the politics of reallocation in Kenya. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(3), 431–453.

Barkan, J. D. and F. Holmquist (1989). Peasant–state relations and the social base of self-help in Kenya. *World Politics*, 41(3), 359–380.

Barrett, C. B. (1994). Understanding uneven agricultural liberalisation in Madagascar. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32(3), 449–476.

Barry, B. S. (ed.). (2007). *Conflict, Livelihoods, and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau* (Vol. 88). World Bank Publications.

Bates, R. (1978). The issue basis of rural politics in Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 10(3), 345–360.

(1981). *Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. University of California Press.

(2008). *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late Century Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

Baudais, V. and E. Sborgi (2006). The general elections in Niger, November 2004. *Electoral Studies*, 25(1), 161–168.

Baxter, J. and K. Somerville (1989). Burkina Faso. In *Benin, The Congo, Burkina Faso: Marxist Regime Series*. London: Pinter Publishers Ltd., 240–286.

Bayart, J.-F. (1980). One-party government and political development in Cameroon. In *An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual Cameroon Republic since Reunification*, N. Kofele-Kale (ed.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 159–191.

(1993). *The State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly*. London: Longman.

Bayart, J.-F., et al. (1999). *The Criminalization of the State in Africa*. International African Institute.

Bayle, B. (2007). *Côte d'Ivoire, 1993–2003: autopsie d'une déchirure*. Montpellier: Université Paul-Valéry.

Baynham, S. (1976). Soldier and state in Ghana. *Armed Forces and Society*, 1(5), 155–168.

(1985). Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?: The case of Nkrumah's national security service. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(1), 87–103.

(1986). *Military Power and Politics in Black Africa*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

(1988). *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Baynham, S. and G. Mills (1987). Lesotho: Between dependence and destabilisation. *The World Today*, 43(3), 52–54.

Bechir, M. A. (1997). The Impact of the Colonial legacy on Civil–Military Relations in Africa: Chad and the Sudan as Comparative Case Studies (Doctoral dissertation, Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School).

Becker, H. (2006). "New Things after Independence": Gender and Traditional Authorities in

Beckman, B. (1976). *Organising the Farmers: Cocoa Politics and National Development in Ghana*. Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies.

Bédié, H. K. (1997). *Discours and Messages à la nation ivoirienne, Tome 1, 7 Decembre 1993–31 Decembre 1994*. Abidjan: Documentation Ivoirienne.

Behrens, K. and A. P. Bala (2013). Do rent-seeking and interregional transfers contribute to urban primacy in sub-Saharan Africa? *Papers in Regional Science*, 92(1), 163–195.

Belkin, A. and E. Schofer (2003). Toward a structural understanding of coup risk. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47, 594.

Bendix, R. (1980). *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. University of California Press.

Bening, R. B. (1983). The Ghana–Togo boundary, 1914–1982. *Africa Spectrum*, 18(2), 191–209.

Benjamin, C. E. (2008). Legal pluralism and decentralization: Natural resource management in Mali. *World Development*, 36(11), 2255–2276.

Benjaminsen, T. A. (1997). Natural resource management, paradigm shifts, and the decentralization reform in Mali. *Human Ecology*, 25(1), 121–143.

Bennett, V. P. (1975). Military government in Mali. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 13, 249–266.

Bennoune, M. (1978). The political economy of Mauritania: Imperialism and class struggle. *Review of African Political Economy*, 5(12), 31–52.

Berg, E. (1960). The economic basis of political choice in French West Africa. *The American Political Science Review*, 54(2), 391–405.

(1971). *Structural Transformation versus Gradualism: Recent Economic Development in Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization*, P. Foster and A. Zolberg (eds.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 187–230.

Berhane, Y. and U. Hogberg (1999). Prolonged labour in rural Ethiopia: A community based study. *African Journal of Reproductive Health*, 3(2), 33–39.

Bernstein, H. (1981). Notes on state and peasantry: The Tanzanian case. *Review of African Political Economy*, 21, 44–62.

Berry, S. (1989). Social institutions and access to resources. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 59(1), 41–55.

Berthélemy, J. C., et al. (1996). *Growth in Senegal: A Lost Opportunity?* Long-Term Growth Series. Paris: Development Centre, OECD.

Biaka, D. (1993). *La "disparition" du patriote ivoirien Victor Biaka Boda: plaidoyer pour libérer sa dépouille mortelle*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Bienen, H. (1993). Leaders, violence, and the absence of change in Africa. *Political Science Quarterly*, 108(2), 271–282.

Bienen, H. and M. Gersovitz (1985). Economic stabilization, conditionality, and political stability. *International Organization*, 39, 729–754.

Bienen, H. and J. Herbst (1996). The relationship between political and economic reform in Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 29, 23–42.

Bienen, H. and N. Van de Walle (1992). A proportional hazard model of leadership duration. *The Journal of Politics*, 54(3), 685–717.

Bierschenk, T. and J.-P. Olivier de Sardan (1997). Local powers and a distant state in rural Central African Republic. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(3), 441–468.

(2003). Powers in the village: Rural Benin between democratisation and decentralisation. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 73(2), 145–173.

Bierschenk, T. et al. (2001). Institutionalizing the PRSP approach in Benin. ODI PRSP Institutionalisation Study, www.odi.org.uk/pppg/institutionalisation.html. Retrieved on February 5, 2012.

Bing, G. (1968). *Reap the Whirlwind: An Account of Kwame Nkrumah's Ghana from 1950 to 1966*. London: MacGibbon and Kee, Ltd.

Bingen, J. R. (1998). Cotton, democracy and development in Mali. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 36(2), 265–285.

Birmingham, W. (1957). The economy of Ghana. *Africa Today*, 4(3), 9–13.

Boa, T. (2009). Ivoirité, Identité culturelle et intégration africaine: logique de dédramatisation d'un concept. *Synergies Afrique Centrale et de l'Ouest*, 3, 75–83.

Boahen, A. (1989). *The Ghanaian Sphinx: Reflections on the Contemporary History of Ghana, 1972–1987*. Accra: Asempa Publishers. The J. B. Danquah Memorial Lectures 21st Series (February 1988).

Boeck, F. D. (2001). Garimpeiro worlds: Digging, dying and "hunting" for diamonds in Angola. *Review of African Political Economy*, 28(90), 549–562.

Boex, J. and J. Martinez-Vazquez (2003). Local Government Reform in Tanzania: Considerations for the Development of a System of Formula-Based Grants. Working Paper 03–05. The Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.

Boko, S. H. (2002). *Decentralization and Reform in Africa*. Springer Science and Business Media.

Boone, C. (1992). *Merchant Capital and the Roots of State Power in Senegal, 1930–1985*. Cambridge University Press.

(1993). Commerce in Côte D'Ivoire: Ivoirianisation without Ivoirian traders. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31(1), 67–92.

(1995). Rural interests and the making of modern African states. *African Economic History*, 23, 1–36.

(1998). State building in the African countryside: Structure and politics at the grassroots. *Comparative Politics*, 27(4), 445–463.

(2003). *Political Topographies of the African State: Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*. Cambridge University Press.

(2014). *Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics*. Cambridge University Press.

Booth, D. and F. Golooba-Mutebi (2014). Policy for agriculture and horticulture in Rwanda: A different political economy? *Development Policy Review*, 32(s2), s173–s196.

Bourdet, Y. and I. Persson (2001). Reform policy, growth and poverty in Burkina Faso. *Africa Spectrum*, 36(2), 169–201.

Bowen, M. L. (2000). *The State against the Peasantry: Rural Struggles in Colonial and Postcolonial Mozambique*. University of Virginia Press.

Brahim, K. S. (1988). The roots of African despotism: The question of political culture. *African Studies Review*, 31(1) (April 1988), 9–31.

Branch, D. and N. Cheeseman (2008). Democratization, sequencing, and state failure in Africa: Lessons from Kenya. *African Affairs*, 108(430), 1–26.

Bratton, M. and E. C. Chang (2006). State building and democratization in sub-Saharan Africa forwards, backwards, or together? *Comparative Political Studies*, 39(9), 1059–1083.

Bratton, M. and E. Masunungure (2011). The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980–2010. Research Paper 09, Policy and Practice for Development Leaders, Elites and Coalitions, The Development Leadership Program (DLP), January 2011.

Bratton, M. and N. Van de Walle (1997). *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge University Press.

Brautigam, D. (1996). State capacity and effective governance. *Agenda for Africa's Economic Renewal*, 81–108.

Brayton, A. (1979). Stability and modernization: The Ivory Coast model. *World Affairs*, 141(3), 235–249.

Bredeloupe, S. (2003). La Côte d'Ivoire ou l'étrange destin de l'étranger. *Revue européenne des migrations internationales*, 19(2), 85–113.

Brennan, J. R. (2006). Blood enemies: Exploitation and urban citizenship in the nationalist political thought of Tanzania, 1958–75. *The Journal of African History*, 47(03), 389–413.

Brietzke, P. (1976). Land reform in revolutionary Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 14(04), 637–660.

Brittain, V. (1983). Ghana's precarious revolution. *New Left Review*, I(140), 50–61.

(1985). Introduction to Sankara and Burkina Faso. *Review of African Political Economy*, 32, 39–47.

Brown, C. K. (1985). *Rural Development in Ghana: Policies and Programmes during the First Republic*. Paper Presented at the Symposium on the Life and Work of Kwame Nkrumah. Organized by the Institute of African Studies. Legon: University of Ghana, Legon, April 1985.

Brown, D. (1980). Borderline politics in Ghana: The national liberation movement of western Togoland. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18(4), 575–609.

Brydon, L. (1985). Ghanaian responses to the Nigerian expulsions of 1983. *African Affairs*, 561–186.

Bunker, S. G. (1984). Agricultural and political change in the Ugandan economic crisis. *American Ethnologist*, 11(3), 586–589.

(1987). *Peasants against the State*. University of Chicago Press.

Burgess, S. (1997). Smallholder voice and rural transformation: Zimbabwe and Kenya. *Comparative Politics*, 29(2), 127–149.

Burnell, P. J. (2005). From low-conflict polity to democratic civil peace: Explaining Zambian exceptionalism. *African Studies*, 64(2), 107–133.

Busia, K. A. (1978). *Ghana's Struggle for Democracy and Freedom: Speeches, 1957–69*. Accra: Danquah Memorial Publishing Company.

Byerlee, D., et al. (2006). Managing food price risks and instability in a liberalizing market environment: Overview and policy options. *Food Policy*, 31(4), 275–287.

Cadot, O., et al. (2006.) *The Elimination of Madagascar's Vanilla Marketing Board, Ten Years On*. Discussion Paper No. 5548, Centre for Economic Policy Research, (March).

Cammett, M. and L. M. MacLean (eds.). (2014). *The Politics of Non-state Welfare*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Campbell, B. (1970). Neocolonialism, economic dependence and political change: A case study of cotton and textile production in the Ivory Coast 1960 to 1970. *Review of African Political Economy*, 2, 36–53.

(1974). Social change and class formation in a French West African state. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 8(2), 285–306.

(2000). Réinvention du politique en Côte d'Ivoire et responsabilité des bailleurs de fonds multilatéraux. *Politique africaine*, 78, 142–156.

Carter, J. (1962). Independence for Uganda. *The World Today*, 18(9), 373–382.

Chabal, P. (1981). National liberation in Portuguese Guinea, 1956–1974. *African Affairs*, 80(318), 75–99.

Chabal, P. (1983a). Party, state, and socialism in Guinea-Bissau. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 17(2), 189–210.

Chabal, P. (1983b). *Amilcar Cabral: Revolutionary Leadership and People's War*. Cambridge University Press.

Chabal P. and J.-P. Daloz (1999). *Africa Works. The Political Instrumentalization of Disorder*. Bloomington: International African Institute in association with James Currey and Indiana University Press.

Chanie, P. (2007). Clientelism and Ethiopia's post-1991 decentralisation. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(03), 355–384.

Chappell, D. (1989). The nation as frontier: Ethnicity and clientelism in Ivorian history. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 22(4), 671–696.

Charlick, R. B. (1978). Access to "elite" education in the Ivory Coast – the importance of socio-economic origins. *Sociology of Education*, 51(3), 187–200.

(2001). Popular participation and local government reform. *Public Administration and Development*, 21, 149–157.

(2004). Niger. *African Studies Review*, 47(02), 97–107.

Chaudhry, K. A. (1993). The myths of the market and the common history of late developers. *Politics and Society*, 21, 245–245.

Chauveau, J-P. (2000). Question foncière et construction nationale en Côte d'Ivoir: Les enjeux silencieux d'un coup d'État. *Politique africaine*, 78, 94–125.

(2001). La loi ivoirienne de 1998 sur le Domaine foncier rural et l'agriculture de plantation villageoise. Une mise en perspective historique et sociologique. Unité de recherche IRD RÉFO.

Chauveau, J.-P. and S. K. Bobo (2005). Crise foncière, crise de la ruralité et relations entre autochtones et migrants sahéliens en Côte d'Ivoire forestière. *Outre-terre*, 2(11), 247–264.

Chauveau, J.-P. and J. Richard (1977). Une "périphérie recentrée": àpropos d'un système local d'économie de plantation en Côted'Ivoire. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, 17(68), 485–523.

Chazan, N. (1982). Development, Underdevelopment and the State in Ghana. Boston University, Working Papers Series (58).

(1982). The new politics of participation in tropical Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 14(2), 169–189.

(1983). *An Anatomy of Ghanaian Politics: Managing Political Recession, 1969–82*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

(1991). The political transformation of Ghana under the PNDC. In *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*, D. Rothchild (ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 21–47.

Chem-Langhee, B. (1983). The origin of the southern Cameroons House of Chiefs. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 16(4), 653–673.

Childs, G. M. (1970). The chronology of the Ovimbundu kingdoms. *The Journal of African History*, 11(02), 241–248.

Chinsinga, B. (2005). The interface between tradition and modernity: The struggle for political space at the local level in Malawi. *Civilisations*, 54(1, 2), 255–274.

(2008). *Exploring the Politics of Land Reforms in Malawi: A Case Study of the Community Based Rural Land Development Programme (CBRLDP)*. University of Manchester.

Chirot, D. (2006). The debacle in Côte d'Ivoire. *Journal of Democracy*, 17(2), 63–77.

Clark, A. F. (1999). Imperialism, independence, and Islam in Senegal and Mali. *Africa Today*, 46(3, 4), 149–167.

Clark, J. F. (2007). The decline of the African military coup. *Journal of Democracy*, 18(3), 141–155.

Clark, S., et al. (1995). Ten thousand Tonga: A longitudinal anthropological study from southern Zambia, 1956–1991. *Population Studies*, 49(1), 91–109.

Clarke, W. S. (1992). *SOMALIA: Background Information for Operation Restore Hope. 1992–1993*. Army War College of Strategic Studies Institutional Carlisle Barracks.

Clignet, R. P. and P. Foster (1964). Potential elites in Ghana and the Ivory Coast: A preliminary comparison. *The American Journal of Sociology*, 70(3), 349–362.

Cohen, D. L. (1970). The Convention People's Party of Ghana: Representational or solidarity party? *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 4(2), 173–194.

Cohen, M. A. (1973). Myth of the expanding centre: Politics in the Ivory Coast. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11, 227–246.

(1974a). Urban policy and the decline of the machine: Cross-ethnic politics in the Ivory Coast. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 8(2), 227–234.

(1974b). *Urban Policy and Political Conflict in Africa: A Study of the Ivory Coast*. University of Chicago Press.

Colin, J. P., et al. (2007). Outside the autochthon-migrant configuration: Access to land, land conflicts and inter-ethnic relationships in a former pioneer area of lower Côte d'Ivoire. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(01), 33–59.

Collelo, T. and H. D. Nelson (1990). *Chad: A Country Study*. Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.

Collier, P. (2009). *Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places*. New York: HarperCollins Publishers.

Collier, R. B. (1982). *Regimes in Tropical Africa: Changing Forms of Supremacy, 1945–1975*. University of California Press.

Compagnon, D. (1992). Dynamiques de mobilisation dissidence armée et rébellion populaire: le cas du mouvement national Somali (1981–1990). *Africa*, 47(4), 503–530.

Contamin, B. and B. Losch (2000). Côte d'Ivoire: la voie étroite. *Politique africaine*, 77, 117–128.

Coplan, D. B. and T. Quinlan (1997). A chief by the people: Nation versus state in Lesotho. *Africa*, 67(01), 27–60.

Cornwell, R. (2000). Côte d'Ivoire: Asking for it. *African Security Review*, 9(1), 80–93.

(2000). The war for independence. In *Angola's War Economy*, J. Cilliers and C. Dietrich (eds.). Institute for Security Studies, 43–67.

Costello, M. J. (1996). Administration triumphs over politics: The transformation of the Tanzanian state. *African Studies Review*, 39(01), 123–148.

Coulibaly, L. G. (2005). *Côte d'Ivoire: Au coeur du bois sacré*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Covell, M. (1987). *Madagascar: Politics, Economics and Society*. London: Frances Printer Ltd.

Cox, P. and R. Kessler (1980). Aprés Senghor'– a socialist Senegal? *African Affairs*, 79(316), 327–342.

Crabb, J. H. (1978). The coronation of Emperor Bokassa. *Africa Today*, 25(3), 25–44.

Crook, R. C. (1989). Patrimonialism, administrative effectiveness and economic development in Côte d'Ivoire. *African Affairs*, 88(351), 205–228.

(1990). State, society and political institutions in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana. *IDS Bulletin*, 21: 24–34. doi: 10.1111/j.1759–5436.1990.mp 21004005.

(1996). Democracy, participation and responsiveness: A case study of relations between the Ivorian communes and their citizens. *Public Administration*, 74, 695–720.

(1997). Winning coalitions and ethno-regional politics: The failure of the opposition in the 1990 and 1995 elections in Côte d'Ivoire. *African Affairs*, 96(383), 215–242.

(2003). Decentralisation and poverty reduction in Africa: The politics of local-central relations. *Public Administration Development*, 23, 77–88.

Currie, K. and L. Ray (1978). The Kenya state, agribusiness and the peasantry. *Review of African Political Economy*, 38, 89–96.

Daddieh, C. K. (1988). The management of educational crises in Côte d'Ivoire. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 26(4), 639–659.

Dadson, J. A. (1970). Socialized Agriculture in Ghana, 1962–1965. Dissertation, Harvard University.

Dagbo, J. G. (2002). *L'affaire Kragbé Gnagbé: un autre regard 32 ans après* (Vol. 1). Nouvelles éd. ivoiriennes.

Dalby, D. (1967). The military take-over in Sierra Leone. *The World Today*, 23(8), 354–360.

Danquah, F. K. (2003). Sustaining a West African cocoa economy: Agricultural science and the Swollen Shoot contagion in Ghana, 1936–1965. *African Economic History*, 3, 43–74.

Darboe, M. (2004). Gambia. *African Studies Review*, 47(2), 73–82.

Darnolf, S. and L. Laasko (eds.). (2003). *Twenty Years of Independence in Zimbabwe: From Liberation to Authoritarianism*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.

Dashwood, H. S. (2002). Council inequality, leadership, and the crisis in Zimbabwe. *International Journal*, 57(2), 209–226.

David, S. (1996). Restructuring the local state in post-apartheid cities: Namibian experience and lessons for South Africa. *African Affairs*, 95(378) (January 1996), 51–84.

Davidson, B. (1989). *Black Star: A View of the Life and Times of Kwame Nkrumah*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

De Jorio, R. (2003). Narratives of the nation and democracy in Mali: A view from Modibo Keita's memorial. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, 43(172), 827–855.

De Mesquita, B., R. Siverson, and G. Woller (1995). War and the survival of political leaders: A comparative study of regime types and political accountability. *American Political Science Review*, 89(4), 841–855.

De Visser, J., et al. (2010). *Local Government Reform in Zimbabwe: A Policy Dialogue*. Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape.

De Waal, A. (2006). Chad in the firing line. *Index on Censorship*, 35(1), 58–65.

Decalo, S. (1973). Military coups and military regimes in Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 11(1), 105–127.

(1973). Regionalism, politics, and the military in Dahomey. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 7(3), 449–478.

(1980). Chad: The roots of centre–periphery strife. *African Affairs*, 79(317), 491–509.

(1985). African personal dictatorships. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(2), 209–237.

(1990). *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints, Second Edition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

(1992). The process, prospects and constraints of democratization in Africa. *African Affairs*, 91(362), 7–35.

(1997). Benin: First of the new democracies. In *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*, J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier (eds.). Boulder CO: Westview Press.

DeGraft-Johnson, J. C. (1958). *African Experiment: Cooperative Agriculture and Banking in British West Africa*. London: Watts.

Dei, G. J. S. (1992). The renewal of a Ghanaian rural economy. *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines*, 26(1), 24–53.

Dei-Anang, M. (1964). *Ghana Resurgent*. Accra: Waterville Publishing House.

Delaborde, M. (1969). New developments in French-speaking Africa. *Civilisations*, 19(2), 241–251.

Den Tuinder, A. B. (1978). *Ivory Coast: The Challenge of Success: Report of a Mission Sent to the Ivory Coast by the World Bank*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Deriu, P. (1995). Beyond the micro-project: A new strategy in Benin. *Development in Practice*, 5(3), 251–254.

DeSardan, J. P. O. (1999). L'espace public introuvable. Chefs et projets dans les villages nigériens. *Revue Tiers Monde*, 139–167.

Dettman, P. R. (1974). Leaders and structures in "Third World" politics: Contrasting approaches to legitimacy. *Comparative Politics*, 6(2), 245–269.

Di Lorenzo, A. and E. Sborgi (2001). The 1999 presidential and legislative elections in Niger. *Electoral Studies*, 20(3), 470–476.

Diarra, S. (1997). *Les faux complots d'Houphouët-Boigny: fracture dans le destin d'une nation (1959–1970)*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

Dickovick, J. T. (2013). Foreign aid and decentralization: Policies for autonomy and programming for responsiveness (No. UNU-WIDER Research Paper WP2013/044).

Dickovick, J. T. and R. B. Riedl (2010). *Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Final Report and Summary of Findings*. Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Dickson, E. (1998). Through the prism of a local tragedy: Political liberalisation, regionalism and elite struggles for power in Cameroon. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 68(3), 338–359.

Dietrich, C. (2002). *Hard Currency: The Criminalized Diamond Economy of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Its Neighbours*. Partnership Africa Canada.

DiJohn, J. (2010) State Resilience against the Odds: An Analytical Narrative on the Construction and Maintenance of Political order in Zambia since 1960. Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers series 2, 75. London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Djéa, J.-L. (2009). *Histoire récente de la Côte d'Ivoire: le Sphinx aux portes du palais*. Abidjan: Sésame Édition.

Dlamini, S., J. I. Rugambisa, and M. B. A. Belete Masuku (2010). Technical efficiency of small-scale sugarcane farmers in Swaziland: A case study of vuvulane and big bend farmers. *African Journal of Agricultural Research*, 5(9), 935–940.

Doornbos, M. and J. Markakis (1994). Society and state in crisis: What went wrong in Somalia? *Review of African Economy*, 21(59), 82–88.

Dorman, S. R. (2003). NGOs and the constitutional debate in Zimbabwe: From inclusion to exclusion. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29(4), 845–863.

(2006). Post-liberation politics in Africa: Examining the political legacy of struggle. *Third World Quarterly*, 27(6), 1085–1101.

Dos, S. D. (1983). Cabinda: The politics of oil in Angola's enclave. *African Islands and Enclaves*, 7, 101.

Dozon, J.-P. (1985). *La société bété: histoires d'une "ethnie" de Côte-d'Ivoire*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

(2000). La Côte d'ivoire entre démocratie, nationalism et ethnonationalisme. *Politique africaine*, 78, 45–62.

(2011). *Les clefs de la crise ivoirienne*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

Due, J. M. (1969). Agricultural development in the Ivory Coast and Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7(4), 637–660.

Dunning, T. (2005). Resource dependence, economic performance, and political stability. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(4), 451–482.

Easterly, W. and R. Levine (1997). Africa's growth tragedy: Policies and ethnic divisions. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 112(4), 1203–1250.

Eboe, H. (1986). New elements in militarism: Ethiopia, Ghana, and Burkina. *International Journal*, 41(4), 802–830.

EIDIAFRIC. (1978). *Les Elites Ivoiriennes, Numéro spécial du Bulletin de l'Afrique noire.* Paris: EIDIAFRIC – La Documentation africaine.

El-Kikhia, M. O. (1983). Chad: The same old story. *Journal of African Studies*, 10(4), 127.

Ellenbogen, A. (2002). *La succession d'Houphouët-Boigny: entre tribalisme et démocratie*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Ellis, F. and G. Bahiigwa (2003). Livelihoods and rural poverty reduction in Uganda. *World Development*, 31(6), 997–1013.

Englebert, P. (1996). *Burkina Faso: Unsteady Statehood in West Africa*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Englebert, P. and N. Sangare (2010). Comparative Assessment of Decentralization in Africa: Burkina Faso Desk Study. Report prepared for the United States Agency for International Development.

Ertman, T. (1997). *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Esseks, J. D. (1975). Economic policies. In *Politicians and Soldiers in Ghana 1966–1972*. D. Austin and R. Luckham (eds.). London: Cass, 37–61.

Evans, P. B. (1989). Predatory, developmental, and other apparatuses: A comparative political economy perspective on the third world state. *Sociological Forum*, 4(4), 561–587.

Ewusi, K. (1974). *Economic Development Planning in Ghana*. New York: Exposition Press, Inc.

(1983). The regional dimensions of industrialization in Ghana. *Technical Publication* (42). Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, Legon: University of Ghana, Legon.

(1987). *Structural Adjustment and Stabilization Policies in Developing Countries: A Case Study of Ghana's Experience in 1983–1986*. Tema: Ghana Publishing Corporation.

Eyzaguirre, P. B. (1989). The independence of Sao Tome E Principe and agrarian reform. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(4), 671–678.

Fanthorpe, R. (2001). Neither citizen nor subject? "Lumpen" agency and the legacy of native administration in Sierra Leone. *African Affairs*, 100(400), 363–386.

Fatton, R., Jr. (1987). *The Making of a Liberal Democracy: Senegal's Passive Revolution, 1975–1985*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Fauré, Y. (1993). Democracy and realism: Reflections on the case of Côte d'Ivoire. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 63(3), 313–329.

Fauré, Y. A. and J. F. Médard (1982). Classe dominante ou classe dirigeante? In *État et Bourgeoisie en Côte-d'Ivoire*, Y. A. Faure and J. F. Médard (eds.). Paris: Karthala, 125–148.

Fearon, J. and D. Laitin (2003). Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. *American Political Science Review*, 97, 75–90.

Ferguson, J. (1992). The country and the city on the Copperbelt. *Cultural Anthropology*, 7(1), 80–92.

First, R. (1970). *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup d'état*. London: Allen Lane.

Fisher, H. J. (1969). Elections and coups in Sierra Leone, 1967. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7(04), 611–636.

Fjelde, H. (2009). Buying peace? Oil wealth, corruption and civil war, 1985–99. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(2), 199–218.

Flint, L. S. (2003). State-building in central southern Africa: Citizenship and subjectivity in Barotseland and Caprivi. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 36(2), 393–428.

Floyd, B. and L. Tandap (1980). Intensification of agriculture in the Republique Unie du Cameroun. *Geography*, 324–327.

Fofana, L. (2009). *La longue marche du RDR*. Saint-Maur-des-Fossés: Editions Sépia.

Fonge, F. P. (2004). Cultivating an economic crisis in Cameroon: The rhetoric versus the reality of planned liberalism. *The Leadership Challenge in Africa:*

Cameroon under Paul Biya, J. Mukum Mbaku and J. Takougang (eds.). Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 337–357.

Forrest, J. B. (1987). Guinea-Bissau since independence: A decade of domestic power struggles. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25(1), 95–116.

(1992). *Guinea-Bissau*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Forster, P. G. (1994). Culture, nationalism, and the invention of tradition in Malawi. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32(3), 477–497.

Frank, L. (1981). Khama and Jonathan: Leadership strategies in contemporary southern Africa. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 173–198.

Frynas, J. G., et al. (2003). Business and politics in São Tomé e Príncipe: From cocoa monoculture to petro-state. *African Affairs*, 102(406), 51–80.

Frynas, J. G. and G. Wood (2001). Oil and war in Angola. *Review of African Political Economy*, 28(90), 587–606.

Fukuyama, F. (2011). *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*. Profile Books.

G. M. C. (1958). Trouble in French West Africa. *The World Today*, 14(12), 513–518.

Gallego, F. A. and R. Woodberry (2010). Christian missionaries and education in former African colonies: How competition mattered. *Journal of African Economies*, 19(3), 294–329.

Galli, R. E. (1989). The political economy of Guinea-Bissau: Second thoughts. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 59(3), 371–380.

(1990). Liberalisation is not enough: Structural adjustment and peasants in Guinea-Bissau. *Review of African Political Economy*, 49, 52–68.

Garnier, C. (1963). Banana boat to Abidjan. *Africa Today*, 10(8), 4–8.

Gates, S., et al. (2006). Institutional inconsistency and political instability: Polity duration, 1800–2000. *American Journal of Political Science*, 50(4), 893–908.

Gbagbo, L. (1982). *La Côte-d'Ivoire: économie et société à la veille de l'indépendance, 1940–1960*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Gbedemah, K. A. (1960). *1960–61 Budget Speech*. Accra: Government Printing Dept.

(1962). *Ghanaians, Our True Freedom Must Be Won Now*. S.I.: s.n.

(1962). *It will not be "Work and happiness for all"!: An open letter: Being also an appeal to Dr. Kwame Nkrumah and comment on, and criticism of the proposed new 7 year Ghana Development Plan*. S.I.: s.n.

Gbetibouo, M. and C. Delgado (1984). Lessons and constraints of export crop led growth: Cocoa in Ivory Coast. In *The Political Economy of Ivory Coast*, I. Zartman and C. Delgado (eds.). Praeger Publishers.

Gemmeke, A. B. (2008). *Marabout Women in Dakar: Creating Trust in a Rural Urban Space* (Vol. 3). LIT Verlag Münster.

Gershenberg, I. (1972). Slouching towards socialism: Obote's Uganda. *African Studies Review*, 15(1), 79–95.

Geschiere, P. (1993). Chiefs and colonial rule in Cameroon: Inventing chieftaincy, French and British style. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 63(2), 151–175.

Geschiere, P. and J. Gugler (1998). The urban–rural connection: Changing issues of belonging and identification. *Africa*, 68(3), 309–319.

Ghislain, C. K. (1979). Zaire: "The roots of the continuing crisis." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17(3) (September 1979), 381–407.

Gillett, S. (1973). The survival of chieftaincy in Botswana. *African Affairs*, 179–185.

Glentworth, G. and I. Hancock (1973). Obote and Amin: Change and continuity in modern Uganda politics. *African Affair*, 237–255.

Gnakalé, V. (2006). *Laurent Gbagbo: pour l'avenir de la Côte d'Ivoire*. Paris: L'Harmattan.

Gocking, R. (1996). Ghana's public tribunals: An experiment in revolutionary justice. *African Affairs*, 95(379), 197–223.

Goldsmith, A. A. (2001). Risk, rule and reason: Leadership in Africa. *Public Administration and Development*, 21(2), 77–87.

(2004). Predatory versus developmental rule in Africa. *Democratization*, 11(3), 88–110.

Good, K. (1968). Kenyatta and the organization of KANU. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 2(2), 115–136.

(1988). Zambia: Back into the future. *Third World Quarterly*, 10(1), 37–53.

Goody, J. (1968). Consensus and dissent in Ghana. *Political Science Quarterly*, 88(3), 337–352.

Gould, D. J. (1977). Local administration in Zaïre and underdevelopment. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15(03), 349–378.

(2010). *Left Behind: Rural Zambia in the Third Republic*. African Books Collective.

Gould, J. A. and M. S. Winters (2012). Petroleum blues: The political economy of resources and conflict in Chad. In *High-Value Natural Resources and Peacebuilding*, P. Lujala and S. A. Rustad (eds.). London: Earthscan.

Gow, B. A. (1997). Admiral Didier Ratsiraka and the Malagasy socialist revolution. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(3), 409–439.

Gray, C. (1998). Cultivating citizenship through xenophobia in Gabon, 1960–1995. *Africa Today*, 45(3/4), 389–409.

Gray, C. and M. McPherson (2001). The leadership factor in African policy reform and growth. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 49(4), 707–740.

Gray, L. C. (2005). What kind of intensification? Agricultural practice, soil fertility and socioeconomic differentiation in rural Burkina Faso. *The Geographical Journal*, 171(1), 70–82.

Graybeal, N. L. and L. A. Picard (1991). Internal capacity and overload in Guinea and Niger. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 29(02), 275–300.

Grebalé, G. T. (2001). *Intrigues politiques de 1990 à 1993: le dernier coup du "vieux."* Abidjan: SNEPCI.

Griefenow-Mewis, C. (ed.). (2009). *On Results of the Reform in Ethiopia's Language and Education Policies*. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz Verlag.

Groelsema, R. J. (1998). The dialectics of citizenship and ethnicity in Guinea. *Africa Today*, 411–421.

Grootaert, C. and R. Kanbur (1993). The Lucky Few amidst Economic Decline: Distributional Change in Côte d'Ivoire as Seen through Panel Data Sets, 1985–88. WB Working Papers, country operations WPS 1113, March 1993.

Grundy, K. W. (1964). Schools for all. *Africa Today*, 11(2), 4–6.
Gugler, J. (2002). The son of the hawk does not remain abroad: The urban–rural connection in Africa. *African Studies Review*, 45(01), 21–41.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. (1993). *Ghana under PNDC Rule*. London: Codesria.
Gyimah-Boadi, E. and R. Jeffries (2000). The political economy of reform. *Economic Reforms in Ghana: The Miracle and the Mirage*, E. Aryeetey, J. Harrigan, and M. Nissanke (eds.). Oxford: James Currey, 32–50.
Hagberg, S. (2002). "Enough is enough": An ethnography of the struggle against impunity in Burkina Faso. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 40(2), 217–246.
(2004). Political decentralization and traditional leadership in the Benkadi Hunters' Association in western Burkina Faso. *Africa Today*, 50(4), 51–70.
Haggard, S. and R. R. Kaufman (2008). *Development, Democracy, and Welfare States: Latin America, East Asia, and Eastern Europe*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Hagmann, T. (2005). Challenges of decentralisation in Ethiopia's Somali region. *Review of African Political Economy*, 32(104/105), 449–455.
Hagmann, T. and D. Péclard (2010). Negotiating statehood: Dynamics of power and domination in Africa. *Development and Change*, 41(4), 539–562.
Hambly, W. D. (1934). Occupational ritual, belief, and custom among the Ovimbundu. *American Anthropologist*, 36(2), 157–167.
Hammond, J. L. (2011). The resource curse and oil revenues in Angola and Venezuela. *Science and Society*, 75(3), 348–378.
Handloff, R. E. (1987). *Area Handbook Series: Mauritania: A Country Study*. Washington DC: Library of Congress Federal Research Division.
Handloff, R. E. and T. D. Roberts (1991). *Côte d'Ivoire: A Country Study*. 3rd edition. Washington, DC: Library of Congress Federal Research Division.
Hanretta, S. (2011). "Kaffir" Renner's conversion: Being Muslim in public in colonial Ghana. *Past and Present*, 210(1), 187–220.
Hansen, E. (1968). Ghana: Background to revolution. *Transition*, (35), 24–28.
(1991). *Ghana under Rawlings: Early Years*. Lagos: Malthouse Press.
Hansen, E. and P. Collins (1980). The army, the state, and the "Rawlings revolution" in Ghana. *African Affairs*, 79(314), 3–23.
Hansen, H. B. and M. Twaddle (1991). *Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change*. London: James Currey.
Harkness, K. A. (2014). The ethnic army and the state: Explaining coup traps and the difficulties of democratization in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 0022002714545332.
Harsch, E. (1998). Burkina Faso in the winds of liberalisation. *Review of African Political Economy*, 25(78), 625–641.
Hassan, H. A. (2009). The Comoros and the crisis of building a national state. *Contemporary Arab Affairs*, 2(2), 229–239.
Hawksley, H. (2010). *Democracy Kills*. Palgrave Macmillan.
Haynes, J. (1991). Human rights and democracy in Ghana: The record of the Rawlings regime. *African Affairs*, 90, 407–425.
Hecht, R. M. (1983). The Ivory Coast "miracle": What benefits for peasant farmers? *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 21(1), 25–53.

(1984). The transformation of lineage production in southern Ivory Coast. *Ethnology: An International Journal of Cultural and Social Anthropology*, 23, 261–277.

Heilbrunn, J. R. (1997). Commerce, politics, and business associations in Benin and Togo. *Comparative Politics*, 29(4), 473–492.

Henderson, W. (1990). Seretse Khama: A personal appreciation. *African Affairs*, 89(354), 27–56.

Herbst, J. (1991). Labor in Ghana under structural adjustment: The politics of acquiescence. In *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*, D. Rothchild (ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 173–192.

(1993). *The Politics of Reform in Ghana, 1982–1991*. University of California Press.

(2000). *States and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Heywood, L. M. (1987). The growth and decline of African agriculture in central Angola, 1890–1950. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 13(3), 355–371.

Hickey, S. (2005). The politics of staying poor: Exploring the political space for poverty reduction in Uganda. *World Development*, 33(6), 995–1009.

Hilhorst, D. and M. Van Leeuwen (2000). Emergency and development: The case of Imidugudu, villagization in Rwanda. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 13(3), 264–280.

Hodder-Williams, R. (1980). Kenya after Kenyatta. *The World Today*, 36(12), 476–483.

Holm, J. D. (1972). Political stability in Lesotho. *Africa Today*, 19(4), 3–16.

(1982). Liberal democracy and rural development in Botswana. *African Studies Review*, 25(01), 83–102.

Hope, K. R. (2000). Decentralisation and local governance: Theory and practice in Botswana. *Development Southern Africa*, 17(4), 519–534.

Horowitz, D. I. (1985). *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*. University of California Press.

Houphouët-Boigny, F. (1957). Black Africa and the French Union. *Foreign Affairs*, 35(4), 593–599.

Howard, R. E. (1983). The full-belly thesis: Should economic rights take priority over civil and political rights? Evidence from sub-Saharan Africa. *Human Rights Quarterly*, 5(4), 467–490.

Howard, W. (1988). The succession crisis. *Africa Report*, 33(3) (May/June), 53–55.

Howe, H. M. (2001). *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Hugh, M. (1985). Swaziland: Decolonisation and the triumph of "tradition." *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(4), 643–666.

Hughes, A. and D. Perfect (1989). Trade unionism in the Gambia. *African Affairs*, 88(353), 549–572.

(2006). *A Political History of the Gambia, 1816–1994*. University of Rochester Press.

Huizer, G. (1973). The Ujamaa village program in Tanzania: New forms of rural development. *Comparative International Development*, (June), 183–207.

Huizinga, J. H. (1959). Unique experiment in French Black Africa. *African Affairs*, 58(230), 25–33.

Huntington, S. (1968). *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Hutchful, E. (2002). *Ghana's Adjustment Experience*. Oxford: James Currey.

Hyden, G. (1980). *Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured Peasantry*. University of California Press.

Ibrahim, J. (1994). Political exclusion, democratization and dynamics of ethnicity in Niger. *Africa Today*, 41(3), 15–39.

Imon, B. (1980). Equatorial Guinea: "The Terror and the Coup." *The World Today*, 36(2), 65–71.

Imperato, P. J. (1989). *Mali: A Search for Direction*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Ingham, K. (1994). *Obote: A Political Biography*. London: Routledge.

International Crisis Group. (2007). Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State. Africa Report N°136 – 13 December. www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/africa/central-africa/centralafricanrepublic/Central%20African%20Republic%20Anatomy%20of%20a%20Phantom%20State.pdf (accessed May 20, 2012).

International Monetary Fund. (2002). Mali: Fourth Review under the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility Arrangement and Request for Waiver of Performance Criteria – Staff Report. IMF Country Report No. 02/157, August.

International Monetary Fund. (2003). Democratic Republic of São Tomé and Príncipe: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). IMF Country Report No. 05/332.

International Monetary Fund and the International Development Association. (2001). Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy. Country Report: Central African Republic, Paper and Joint IDA-IMF Staff Assessment of the Interim PRSP. (IMF), IDA/SecM2001-0001, January 3.

Ismail I. A. and R. G. Herbold (1999). The heritage of war and state collapse in Somalia and Somaliland: Local-level effects, external interventions and reconstruction. *Third World Quarterly*, 20(1), 113–127.

Israel, A. M. (1992). Ex-servicemen at the crossroads: Protest and politics in post-war Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30(2), 359–368.

J. L. (1970). New developments in French-speaking Africa. *Civilisations*, 20(2, 4), 270–278, 554–571.

J. L. (1971). New developments in French-speaking Africa. *Civilisations*, 21(1), 99–111.

Jackson, P. (2005). Chiefs, money and politicians: Rebuilding local government in post-war Sierra Leone. *Public Administration and Development*, 25(1), 49–58.

Jackson, R. H. and C. G. Rosberg (1982). Why Africa's weak states persist: The empirical and the juridical in statehood. *World Politics*, 35(01), 1–24.

(1984). Personal rule: Theory and practice in Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 16(4), 421–442.

Jaeger, W. (1991). The Impact of Policy in African Agriculture: An Empirical Investigation. World Bank, Policy Research and External Affairs Working Papers 640, March 1991.

Jagger, P. and J. Pender (2006). Influences of programs and organizations on the adoption of sustainable land management technologies in Uganda. *Strategies for Sustainable Land Management in the East African Highlands*, J. Pender, F. Place, and S. Ehui (eds.). Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute.

Jamal, V. (1978). Taxation and inequality in Uganda, 1900–1964. *The Journal of Economic History*, 38(2), 418–438.

Jamal, V. and J. Weeks (1988). The vanishing rural-urban gap in sub-Saharan Africa. *International Labour Review*, 127(3), 271–292.

James, W. M. (2011). *Historical Dictionary of Angola*. 2nd edition. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press.

Janowitz, M. (1964). *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*. Columbia University Press.

Jeffries, L., Jr. (1972). Sub-nationalism, politics in the Ivory Coast Republic. PhD thesis, Columbia University, New York.

Jeffries, R. (1982). Rawlings and the political economy of underdevelopment in Ghana. *African Affairs*, 81(324), 307–317.

(1992). Urban popular attitudes towards the Economic Recovery Programme and the PNDC government in Ghana. *African Affairs*, 91(363), 207–226.

(1993). The Ghanaian elections of 1992. *African Affairs*, 92(368), 331–366.

(1998). The Ghanaian elections of 1996: Towards the consolidation of democracy? *African Affairs*, 97(387), 189–208.

Jensen, N. and L. Wantchekon (2004). Resource wealth and political regimes in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(7), 816.

John, A. M. (1976). Lessons of Angola. *Foreign Affairs*, 54(3), 407–425.

John, R. (1995). Côte d'Ivoire after Houphouet-Boigny. *Review of African Political Economy*, 22(63), 119–121.

Jones, D. S. (1983). Traditional authority and state administration in Botswana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 21(01), 133–139.

Jordán, M. (1997). *Chokwe*. The Rosen Publishing Group.

Joseph, R. (2015). *Inclusive Growth and Developmental Governance. The Oxford Handbook of Africa and Economics: Volume 1: Context and Concepts*, 213–232.

Jua, N. B. (1995). Indirect rule in colonial and post-colonial Cameroon. *Paideuma*, 4, 39–47.

Kaba, L. 1977. Guinean politics: A critical historical overview. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15(01), 25–45.

Kadet, B. G. (2012). The Ivorian National Defense and Security System: Management assessment and outlooks. *American Journal of Social Issues and Humanities*, 2(5), 270–283.

Kaiser, P. J. (1996). Structural adjustment and the fragile nation: The demise of social unity in Tanzania. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(2), 227–237.

Kalck, P. (1971). *Central African Republic: A Failure in De-colonisation*. Trans. by Barbara Thomson, London: Pall Mall Press.

Kamissoko, G. (1996). *L'après Houphouet-Boigny: Bédié, l'héritage et l'avenir*. Abidjan: CEDA.

Kandeh, J. D. (1992). Politicization of ethnic identities in Sierra Leone. *African Studies Review*, 35(1), 81–99.

(2004). *Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan.

Karin, A. and S. Gilbert (2008). Oil and Governance Report: A Case Study of Chad, Angola, Gabon, and Sao Tome é Principe. IDSA

Kasfir, N. (1991). The Ugandan elections of 1989: Power, populism and democratization. In *Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change*, H. Bernkt Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds.). London: James Currey, 247–279.

Kauzya, J. M.(2007). *Political Decentralization in Africa: Experiences of Uganda*. Rwanda and South Africa: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, New York, December.

Kebede, M. (2006). Gebrehiwot Baykedagn, Eurocentrism, and the decentering of Ethiopia. *Journal of Black Studies*, 36(6), 815–832.

Keeley, J. and I. Scoones (2000). Knowledge, power and politics: The environmental policy-making process in Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38(01), 89–120.

Keese, A. (2011). Understanding colonial chieftaincy from its final phase: Responses to the crisis of an institution in French-ruled West Africa and beyond, 1944–1960. *Africana Studia*, (15).

Keifer, G.-A. (2000). Armée ivoirienne: le refus du déclassement. *Politique africaine*, 78, 26–44.

Kelsall, T. (2008). Going with the grain in African development? *Development Policy Review*, 26(6), 627–655.

(2013). *Business, Politics, and the State in Africa: Challenging the Orthodoxies on Growth and Transformation*. Zed Books.

Kelsall, T. and C. Mercer (2003). Empowering people? World Vision and "transformatory development" in Tanzania. *Review of African Political Economy*, 30(96), 293–304.

Kenneth L. A. (1975.) The recourse to authenticity and negritude in Zaire. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 13(1), 134–139.

Kessides, C. (2006). *The Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction*. Washington, DC: Cities Alliance.

Kherallah, M., et al. (2000). *The Road Half Traveled: Agricultural Market Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa*. International Food Policy Research Institute.

Killick, T. (1978). *Development Economics in Action: A Study of the Economic Policies in Ghana*. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd.

Kingsland, J. L. (1982). Resource allocation decisions in Gambian local councils. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 16(2), 213–232.

Kiwuwa, D. E. (2013). Democracy and the politics of power alternation in Africa. *Contemporary Politics*, 19(3), 262–278.

Kjaer, A. M. (2004). "Old brooms can sweep too!" An overview of rulers and public sector reforms in Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 42(3), 389–413.

Koch, K. (1989). World's largest church rises in Africa. *Los Angeles Times*, January 28, 36.

Koenig, D. and T. Diarra (1998). The environmental effects of policy change in the West African savanna: Resettlement, structural adjustment and conservation in western Mali. *Journal of Political Ecology*, 5, 23–52.

Kokora, P. D. (1999). *Le Front populaire ivoirien: de la clandestinité à la légalité: le vécu d'un fondateur*. Paris: Harmattan.

Koné, S. S. (1991). *1990, une année pas comme les autres*. Abidjan: Presses de la MICI.

Konings, P. (1981). Peasantry and State in Ghana: The Example of the Vea Irrigation Project in the Upper Region of Ghana. African Studies Centre, Working Papers No. 5/1981. Leiden: African Studies Centre.

Konings, P. and F. B. Nyamnjoh (1997). The Anglophone problem in Cameroon. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 35(2), 207–229.

Kraus, J. (1969). On the politics of nationalism and social change in Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7(1), 107–130.

(1976). African trade unions: Progress or poverty? *African Studies Review*, 19(3), 95–108.

(1990). Review: *The Military and Politics in Nkrumah's Ghana* by Simon Baynham. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 23(3), 580–582.

(1991) The political economy of stabilization and structural adjustment in Ghana. In *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*, D. Rothchild (ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 119–156.

(1991). The struggle over structural adjustment in Ghana. *Africa Today*, 38(4), 19–37.

Krieger, M. (1994). Cameroon's democratic crossroads, 1990–4. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32(4), 605–628.

Kuteesa, F., et al. (2010). *Uganda's Economic Reforms: Insider Accounts*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kuusi, S. (2009). *Aspects of Local Self-Government in Swaziland*. The Association of Finnish Local and Regional Authorities.

Kwaku, K. (1976). Tradition, colonialism and politics in rural Ghana: Local politics in Have, Volta Region. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 10, 71–86.

Kyle, S. (2003). *Political and Economic Prospects for Mozambique and Angola*. No. 2003, 03. Staff paper/Cornell University, Department of Applied Economics and Management, 2003.

Ladley, A. and D. Lan (1985). The law of the land: Party and state in rural Zimbabwe. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 12(1): 88–101.

Ladouceur, P. (1972). The Yendi chieftaincy dispute and Ghanaian politics. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 6(1), 97–115.

Lamb, D. (1988). A different path. *Wilson Quarterly*, 12(4), 114–131.

Langer, A. (2004). Horizontal Inequalities and Violent Conflict: The Case of Côte d'Ivoire. University of Oxford, Centre for Research on Inequality, Human Security and Ethnicity, CRISE Working Paper No. 13, November 2004.

Larmer, M. (2006). "The hour has come at the pit": The mineworkers' union of Zambia and the movement for multi-party democracy, 1982–1991. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 32(2), 293–312.

(2006). A little bit like a volcano – The United Progressive Party and resistance to one-party rule in Zambia, 1964–1980. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 39(1), 49–83.

(2010). Historical perspectives on Zambia's mining booms and busts. In *Zambia, Mining and Neoliberalism: Boom and Bust on the Globalised Copperbelt*, 31–58.

Larmer, M. and G. Macola (2007). The origins, context, and political significance of the Mushala rebellion against the Zambian one-party state. *The International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 40(3), 471–496.

Larsen, A. (2003). Decentralisation in Namibia: A case study of the Erongo Region. *The Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies*, 1, 1–16.

Lassailly-Jacob, V. (1986). Un exemple éphémère de planification du développement: I'AVB en Côte d'Ivoire centrale. *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 26(103), 333–348.

Laurent, S. (1970). Formation, information et développement en Côte d'Ivoire. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, 10(39), 422–468.

Le Billon, P. (2001). Angola's political economy of war: The role of oil and diamonds, 1975–2000. *African Affairs*, 100(398), 55–80.

Le Meur, P.-Y. (1999). Coping with institutional uncertainty: Contested local public spaces and power in rural Benin. *Africa Spectrum*, 34(2), 187–211.

(2006). State making and the politics of the crontier in central Benin. *Development and Change*, 37(4), 871–900.

Le Pape, M. and C. Vidal (2002). *Côte d'Ivoire L'Annee Terrible 1999–2000*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

Le Vine, V. (1968). The coup in the Central African Republic. *Africa Today*, 15(2), 12–14.

(1975a). Corruption in Ghana. *Transition*, (47), 48–61.

(1975b). *Political Corruption: The Ghana Case*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

(2004). *Politics in Francophone Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner Publishers.

Leach, J. (1981). Managing rural development in Botswana. *Public Administration and Development*, 1(4), 265–270.

Leduka, R. C. (2007). Recycled fable or immutable truth? Reflections on the 1973 land-tenure reform project in Lesotho and lessons for the future. *Africa Today*, 53(3), 91–111.

Lefort, R. (2007). Powers – mengist – and peasants in rural Ethiopia: The May 2005 elections. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(02), 253–273.

Legum, C. (1974). *Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1973-(1974)*. London: Rex Collins.

Lemarchand, R. (1981). Chad: The roots of chaos. *Current History*, 80(470), 414.
(2007). Consociationalism and power sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *African Affairs*, 106(422), 1–20.
Lentz, C. (1995). "Unity for development": Youth associations in north-western Ghana. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 65(3), 395–429.
(2007). *Ethnicity and the Making of History in Northern Ghana*. Accra: Woeli Publishing Services.
Leonard, D. K. (1991). *African Successes: Four public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development*. University of California Press.
Levin, R. 1988. Contract farming in Swaziland: Peasant differentiation and the constraints of land tenure. *African Studies*, 47(2), 101–120.
Levy, B. and S. J. Kpundeh (2004). *Building State Capacity in Africa: New Approaches. Emerging Lessons*. Washington, DC: World Bank Institute.
Lindberg, S. I. (2003). "It's our time to 'chop'": Do elections in Africa feed neo-patrimonialism rather than counter-act it? *Democratization*, 10(2), 121–140.
Lindemann, S. (2011). The ethnic politics of coup avoidance: Evidence from Zambia and Uganda. *Africa Spectrum*, 3–41.
Lionel, C. (ed.). (1994). *The Transition to Independence in Namibia*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Liphardt, A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Lipton, M. (1977). *Why Poor People Stay Poor: A Study of Urban Bias in World Development*. London: Temple Smith.
Lodenstein, E. and D. Dao (2011). Devolution and human resources in primary healthcare in rural Mali. *Human Resource Health*, 9, 15.
Logan, B. I. and D. Tevera (2001). Neoliberalism, regime survival, and the environment: Economic reform and agricultural transformation in Zimbabwe in the 1990s. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 35(1), 99–138.
Logan, I. B. and K. Mengisteab (1993). IMF-World Bank adjustment and structural transformation in sub-Saharan Africa. *Economic Geography*, 69(1), 1–24.
Londregan, J. B. and K. T. Poole (1990). Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power. *World Politics*, 42(2), 151–183.
Loucou, J.-N. (1984). *Histoire de la Côte d'Ivoire*. Abidjan: CEDA.
(1992). *Le multipartisme en Côte d'Ivoire: essai*. Abidjan: Neter.
(1996). De l'ivoirité. In *L'ivoirité ou l'espirit du nouveau contrat social du Président Henri Konan Bédié: actes du forum CURDIPHE du 20 au 23 mars 1996*, S. Touré (ed.). Abidjan: Presses universitaires de Côte d'Ivoire.
Loxley, J. (1991). *Ghana: The Long Road to Recovery, 1983–90*. Ottawa: North-South Institute.
Luckham, R. (1994). The military, militarization and democratization in Africa: A survey of literature and issues. *African Studies Review*, 37(02), 13–75.
Luke, D. F. (1988). Continuity in Sierra Leone: From Stevens to Momoh. *Third World Quarterly*, 10(1), 67–78.

Lund, C. (1997). Legitimacy, land and democracy in Niger. *Review of African Political Economy*, 24(71), 99–112.

(2001). Precarious democratization and local dynamics in Niger: Micro-politics in Zinder. *Development and Change*, 32(5), 845–869.

(2006). Twilight institutions: Public authority and local politics in Africa. *Development and Change*, 37(4): 685–705.

Lungu, G. F. (1983). Administrative responsibility in a developing country: Theoretical considerations and the case of Zambia. *Public Administration and Development*, 3(4), 361.

Luttwak, E. (1979). *Coup d'États: A Practical Handbook*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Lwanda, J. (2006). Kwacha: The violence of money in Malawi's politics, 1954–2004. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 32(3), 525–544.

Lynch, G. and G. Crawford (2011). Democratization in Africa 1990–2010: An assessment. *Democratization*, 18(2), 275–310.

M'bare, N. (2009). Memories, displacement, and the construction of national identity in the poetic production of Equatorial Guinea. *Afro-Hispanic Review*, 28(2), Equatorial Guinea (Fall 2009), 97–112.

MacLean, L. M. (2010). *Informal Institutions and Citizenship in Rural Africa: Risk and Reciprocity in Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire*. Cambridge University Press.

Maclean, S. J. (2002). Mugabe at war: The political economy of conflict in Zimbabwe. *Third World Quarterly*, 23(3), 513–528.

Maclure, R. (1994). School reform in Burkina Faso. *Comparative Education*, 30(3), 239–254.

Magnusson, B. A. (2001). Democratization and domestic insecurity: Navigating the transition in Benin. *Comparative Politics*, 33(2), 211–230.

Mahoney, R. D. (1983). *JFK: Ordeal in Africa*. Oxford University Press.

Maina, H. (ed.). 2013. *Eritrea: A Nation Silenced: Country Report*. Article 19 Kenya and Eastern Africa, London: Free World Centre.

Mains, D. (2004.) Drinking, rumour, and ethnicity in Jimma, Ethiopia. *Africa*, 74(03), 341–360.

Makumbe, J. (2010). Local Authorities and Traditional Leadership. Local Government Working Paper Series No. 2, Community Law Centre, the University of the Western Cape.

Malaquias, A. (2000). Ethnicity and conflict in Angola: Prospects for reconciliation. *Institute for Security Studies*.

(2007). *Rebels and Robbers: Violence in Post-colonial Angola*. Nordic Africa Institute.

Mamdani, M. (1996). *Citizen and Subject*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Manley, A. (2003). Togo: After Eyadéma. WriteNet. Paper (14).

Mann, M. (2005). *The Dark Side of Democracy: Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. Cambridge University Press.

Marcus, R. R. and P. Razafindrakoto (2003). Participation and the poverty of electoral democracy in Madagascar. *Africa Spectrum*, 38(1), 27–48.

Marina, P. T. (2009). From the margins of the state to the presidential palace: The Balanta case in Guinea-Bissau. *African Studies Review*, 52(2), 47–67.

Markakis, J. (1981). The military state and Ethiopia's path to "socialism." *Review of African Political Economy*, 8(21), 7–25.

Marshall, M. G. and B. R. Cole (2008). *Global Report on Conflict, Governance and State Fragility 2008*. Foreign Policy Bulletin: The Documentary Record of United States Foreign Policy, 18(01), 3–21.

Martin, G. (1976). Socialism, economic development and planning in Mali, 1960–1968. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 10(1), 23–46.

Martin, P. M. (1977). The Cabinda connection: An historical perspective. *African Affairs*, 47–59.

Massigli, R. (1957.) New conceptions of French policy in tropical Africa. *International Affairs*, 33(4), 403–415.

Maundeni, Z. (2005). Succession to high office: Tswana culture and modern Botswana politics. In *40 Years of Democracy in Botswana: 1965–2005*, Z. Maundeni (ed.), 80–93.

Mayersen, D. (2011). A political monopoly held by one race: The politicisation of ethnicity in colonial Rwanda. In *Directions and Intersections Conference: Proceedings of the 2011, Australian Critical Race and Whiteness*, D. Riggs and C. Due (eds.), Australia, 167–180.

Mazrui, A. (1966). Nkrumah: The Leninist czar. *Transition*, 26, 8–17.

Mbassy Njie, C. (1996). *Gambia: The Fall of the Old Order/The Senegambia Confederation and Beyond*. Dakar: Cheikh Anta Diop Publishing Company, Inc.

Mbembe, A. (1992). Provisional notes on the postcolony. *Africa*, 62(01), 3–37.

Mbodj, M. (1992). La crise trentenaire de l'économie arachidière. Momar-Coumba Diop (ed.).

McCracken, J. (1998). Democracy and nationalism in historical perspective: The case of Malawi. *African Affairs*, 97(387), 231–249.

(2002). The ambiguities of nationalism: Flax Musopole and the northern factor in Malawian politics, c. 1956–1966. *Journal of Southern African Studies*. 28(1), 67–87.

McDougall, E. A. (2005). Living the legacy of slavery. *Cahiers d'études africaines*, 3, 957–986.

McFarland, D. M. (1985). *Historical Dictionary of Ghana*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.

McGowan, P. (2003). African military coups d'état, 1956–2001: Frequency, trends and distribution. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 41, 339–370.

Meijer, G. and D. Birmingham (2004). "Angola from Past to Present." From Military Peace to Social Justice? The Angolan Peace Process.

Mengisteab, K. (2001). Ethiopia's ethnic-based federalism: 10 years after. *African Issues*, 29(1/2), 20–25.

Michael, G. S. (1982). "Le mal zairois": Why policy fails in Zaire. *African Affairs*, 18(324), 337–348.

Migdal, J. S. (1977). Urbanization and political change: The impact of foreign rule. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 19(3), 328–349.

(1988). *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or nation? Nation building and public goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. *World Politics*, 56(3), 327–362.

Mikell, G. (1986). Ghanaian females, rural economy and national stability. *African Studies Review*, 29(3), 67–88.

(1989a). *Cocoa and Chaos in Ghana*. New York: Paragon House.

(1989b). Peasant politicisation and economic recuperation in Ghana: Local and national dilemmas. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(3), 455–478.

Miles, W. F. (1993). Traditional rulers and development administration: Chieftaincy in Niger, Nigeria, and Vanuatu. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 28(3), 31–50.

(1995). Tragic tradeoffs: Democracy and security in Chad. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(01), 53–65.

Miracle, M. P. (1970). The smallholder in agricultural policy and planning: Ghana and the Ivory Coast, 1960 to 1966. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 4(3), 321–332.

Miracle, M. P. and A. Seidman (1968a). *Agricultural Cooperatives and Quasi-cooperatives in Ghana, 1951–1965*. University of Wisconsin, Land Tenure Center (51).

(1968b). *State Farms in Ghana*. University of Wisconsin, Land Tenure Center (43).

Monga, Y. (2000). "Au village!": Space, culture, and politics in Cameroon. *Cahiers d'Études Africaines*, 40(160), 723–749.

Mongbo, R. (2008). State building and local democracy in Benin: Two cases of decentralised forest management. *Conservation and Society*, 6(1), 49.

Montalvo, J. G. and M. Reynal-Querol (2005). Ethnic polarization, potential conflict, and civil wars. *American Economic Review*, 95(3), 796–816.

Mooketsi, B. (2005). *The Legal Framework of Intervention Forces in Africa Case Study-Lesotho*. Army War College Carlisle Barracks.

Moore B., Jr. (1966). *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Moore, J. E. and G. Annaler (1979). The villagisation process and rural development in the Mwanza region of Tanzania. *Human Geography*, 61(2), 65–80.

Morton, A. (1998). *Moi: The Making of an African Statesman*. London: Michael O'Mara Books Limited.

Mozaffar, S., et al. (2003). Electoral institutions, ethnopolitical cleavages, and party systems in Africa's emerging democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 97(3), 379–390.

Mozart, W. F. (2009). *La crise ivoirienne: tragedie d'une renaissance*. [Côte d'Ivoire]: Togouna Édition.

Mudoola, D. M. (1991). Institution-building: The case of the NRM and the military. In *Uganda 1986–9, Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change*, H. Hansen and M. Twaddle(eds.). London: James Currey, 230–247.

Mugyenyi, J. B. (1991). IMF conditionality and structural adjustment under the national resistance movement. In *Uganda 1986–9, Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change*, H. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds.). London: James Currey, 61–78.

Mujaju, A. B. (1976). The role of the UPC as a party of government in Uganda. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 10(3), 443–467.

Mukhtar, M. H. (2003). *Historical Dictionary of Somalia*. Scarecrow Press.

Mukonoweshuro, E. G. (1990). State "resilience" and chronic political instability in Madagascar. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 24(3), 376–398.

(1990). The politics of squalor and dependency: Chronic political instability and economic collapse in the Comoro Islands. *African Affairs*, 89(357), 555–577.

Mukwena, R. M. (2001). *Situating Decentralisation in Zambia in a Political Context*. Tangier: African Training and Research Center in Administration for Development.

Mumford, L. (1961). *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects*. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World.

Munyao, K., et al. (eds.) (2007). *Decentralization and the Social Economics of Development: Lessons from Kenya*. Cromwell Press.

N'Diaye, B. (2001). *The Challenge of Institutionalizing Civilian Control: Botswana, Ivory Coast, and Kenya in Comparative Perspective*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.

N'Diaye, B. (2005). Not a miracle after all . . . Côte d'Ivoire's downfall: Flawed civil–military relations and missed opportunities. *Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of Military Studies*, 33(1), 89–118.

N'gom, M. B. (2009). Writing from exile: Memories, displacement, and the construction of national identity in the poetic production of Equatorial Guinea. *Afro-Hispanic Review*, 97–112.

Nabudere, W. D. (1980). *Imperialism and Revolution in Uganda*. London: Onyx Press.

Ndegwa, S. N. (2002). *Decentralization in Africa: A Stocktaking Survey*. World Bank, Africa Region.

Ndegwa, S. N. and B. Levy. (2003). The Politics of Decentralization in Africa: A Comparative Analysis. Paper presented at Regional Workshop on Governance and Public Management (Johannesburg, South Africa) organized by the Africa Public Sector Reform and Capacity Building Unit and The World Bank Institute, The World Bank, June 9–11.

Ndlovu-Gatsheni, S. J. (2008). Robert Mugabe's liberation war credentials: ZANU-PF's winning card? *Elections in Zimbabwe: Analysis and Commentary on the 2008 Zimbabwe Presidential and Parliamentary Elections, #3.08*. Cape Town: Heinrich Böll Stiftung.

Ndoye, O. and D. Kaimowitz (2000). Macro-economics, markets and the humid forests of Cameroon, 1967–1997. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 38(2), 225–253.

Negi, R. (2010). The mining boom, capital, and chiefs in the "New Copperbelt." *Zambia, Mining and Neoliberalism: Boom and Bust on the Globalized Copperbelt*, 209–236.

Nelson, H. D., et al. (1975). *Area Handbook for Guinea*. Washington, DC: American University Foreign Area Studies.

Newitt, M. (1984). *The Comoros Islands: Struggle against Dependency in the Indian Ocean*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Ng'ong'ola, C. (1986). Malawi's agricultural economy and the evolution of legislation on the production and marketing of peasant economic crops. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 12(2), 240–262.

Ng'weno, A. (1994). *Poverty and Growth in a Traditional Small Island Society*. Population and Human Resources Division, Department III Africa Region, World Bank Report, September 29, 1994.

Ngasongwa, J. (1992). Tanzania introduces a multi-party system. *Review of African Political Economy*, 54, 112–116.

Ngau, P. M. (1987). Tensions in empowerment: The experience of the "harambee" (self-help) movement in Kenya. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 35(3), 523–538.

Ngolet, F. (2000). Ideological manipulations and political longevity: The power of Omar Bongo in Gabon since 1967. *African Studies Review*, 43(02), 55–71.

Ninsin, K. A. (1985). *Political Struggles in Ghana 1966–1981*. Accra: Tornado Publications.

(1991). The PNDC and the problem of political legitimacy. In *Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*, D. Rothchild (ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 49–68.

Njie, C. M. (1996). *Gambia: The Fall of the Old Order/The Senegambia Confederation and Beyond*. Dakar: Cheikh Anta Diop Publishing Company, Inc.

Nkrumah, K. (1957). *Ghana: The Autobiography of K. Nkrumah*. Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson and Sons.

(1961). *I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African Ideology*. New York: Praeger.

(1961). *Selected Speeches of Osagyefo Dr. K. Nkrumah, First President of the Republic of Ghana*. Volume II. Accra: Afram Publications.

(1962). *Miscellaneous Addresses of K. Nkrumah (1962)–1965*. Accra, Tema: State Publishing Corporation.

(1968). *Dark Days in Ghana*. New York: International Publishers.

(1973). *Revolutionary Path*. New York: International Publishers.

Nolutshungu, S. C. (1996). *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad*. University of Virginia Press.

Nugent, P. (1995). *Big Men, Small Boys and Politics in Ghana*. New York: Pinter.

(1999). Living in the past: Urban, rural and ethnic themes in the 1992 and 1996 elections in Ghana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(2), 287–319.

Nwajiaku, K. (1994). The national conferences in Benin and Togo revisited. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32(3), 429–447.

Nyamnjoh, F. (2003). Chieftaincy and the negotiation of might and right in Botswana democracy. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 21(2), 233–250.

Nyamnjoh, F. and M. Rowlands (1998). Elite associations and the politics of belonging in Cameroon. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 68(3), 320–337.

Nyanteng, V. K. (1978). *The Declining Ghana Cocoa Industry: An Analysis of Some Fundamental Problems*. Legon: Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, Technical Publication Series (40).

Nyati-Ramahobo, L. (2002). Ethnic identity and nationhood in Botswana. *Minorities in the Millennium: Perspectives from Botswana*, 17–27.

(2002). From a phone call to the High Court: Wayeyi visibility and the Kamanakao Association's campaign for linguistic and cultural rights in Botswana. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28(4), 685–709.

O'Brien, Jay. (1976). Bonapartism and Kenyatta's regime in Kenya. *Review of African Political Economy*, 6, 90–95.

Ochieng, C. M. O. (2007). Development through positive deviance and its implications for economic policy making and public administration in Africa: The case of Kenyan agricultural development, 1930–2005. *World Development*, 35(3), 454–479.

Ochieng., E. O. (1991). Economic adjustment programmes in Uganda 1985–9. In *Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change*, H. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds.). London: James Currey, 43–61.

O'Connor, M. (1972). Guinea and the Ivory Coast – contrasts in economic development. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 10(3), 409–426.

Ocran, A. K. (1968). *A Myth Is Broken: An Account of the Ghana Coup d'état of 24th February, 1966*. Accra: Longman, Green and Co. Ltd.

(1977). *Politics of the Sword: A Personal Memoir on Military Involvement in Ghana and of Problems of Military Government*. London: Rex Collings Ltd.

Oelbaum, J. (2002). Populist reform coalitions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Ghana's triple alliance. *Canadian Journal of African Studies/La Revue canadienne des études africaines*, 36(2), 281–328.

Okeke, B. E. (1982). *4 June: A Revolution Betrayed*. Enugu, Nigeria: Ikenga Publishers.

Olympio, S. E. (1960). Togo: Problems and progress of a new nation. *Africa Today*, 7(2), 5–7.

Omeje, K. (2004). The state, conflict and evolving politics in the Niger Delta, Nigeria. *Review of African Political Economy*, 31(101), 425–440.

(2007). *Conflicts in West Africa*. na.

Omiti, J. M., et al. (2000). Some policy implications of the resurfacing of rural factor markets following agrarian de-collectivization in Ethiopia. *Human Ecology*, 28(4), 585–603.

Oquaye, M. (2004). *Politics in Ghana, 1982–1992: Rawlings, Revolution, and Populist Democracy*. Accra: Tornado Publications.

Orobator, S. E. (1984). Civil strife and international involvement: the case of Chad (1964–1983). *Africa: Rivista Trimestrale Di Studi E Documentazione Dell'Istituto Italiano per L'Africa E L'Oriente*, 39(2), 300–316.

Orre, A. and N. Pestana (2014). Arguments for democratic decentralisation in Angola: If challenges remain the same, why delay the autarquias? *Angola Brief*, April, 4(6).

O'Toole, T. (1997). The Central African Republic: Political reform and social malaise. In *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*, J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier (eds.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 109–128.

Ottenheimer, M. and H. Ottenheimer (1994). *Historical Dictionary of the Comoro Islands*. London: The Scarecrow Press.

Ouattara, A. (2008). L'armée dans la construction de la nation ivoirienne. In *Frontières de la citoyenneté et violence politique en Côte d'Ivoire*, J. B. Ouédraogo and E. Sall (eds.). Dakar, CODESRIA.

Owusu, M. (1970). *Uses and Abuses of Political Power: A Case Study of Continuity and Change in the Politics of Ghana*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

(1989). Rebellion and tradition: Reinterpreting coups in Ghana. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 31(2), 372–397.

(1997). Domesticating democracy: Culture, civil society, and constitutionalism in Africa. *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 39, 120–152.

Oyono, P. R. (2004). Forward, two steps back? Paradoxes of natural resources management decentralisation in Cameroon. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 42(1), 91–111.

Packham, E. S. (2004). *Africa in War and Peace*. New York: Nova Science Publishers.

Padmore, G. (1953). *The Gold Coast Revolution: The Struggle of an African People from Slavery to Freedom*. London: D. Dobson.

Parfitt, T. W. (1995). Adjustment for stabilisation or growth? Ghana and the Gambia. *Review of African Political Economy*, 22(63), 55–72.

Parker, A. N. (1997). Participation and decentralization in rural development: Lessons from the Lesotho Highlands Water Project. *Agrekon*, 36(4), 501–512.

Pazzanita, A. G. (1996). The origins and evolution of Mauritania's second republic. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(04), 575–596.

(1999). Political transition in Mauritania: Problems and prospects. *The Middle East Journal*, 44–58.

Pearce, J. (2004). War, peace and diamonds in Angola: Popular perceptions of the diamond industry in the Lundas. *African Security Studies*, 13(2), 51–64.

Peaslee, A. J. (1974). *Constitutions of Nations, Volume 1, Africa*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Péclard, D. (1998). Religion and politics in Angola: The church, the colonial state and the emergence of Angolan nationalism, 1940–1961. *Journal of Religion in Africa*, (1998), 160–186.

Peemans, J. P. (1975). The social and economic development of Zaire since independence: An historical outline. *African Affairs*, 74(285), 148–179.

Pellow, D. and N. Chasen (1986). *Ghana: Coping with Uncertainty*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Peters, P. E. and D. Kambewa (2007). Whose security? Deepening social Conflict over "customary" land in the shadow of land tenure reform. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(3), 447–472.

Phiri, K. M. (2000). A case of revolutionary change in contemporary Malawi: The Malawi army and the disarming of the Malawi Young Pioneers. *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Military Studies*, 1(1).

Picard, L. A. (1979). Rural development in Botswana: Administrative structures and public policy. *The Journal of Developing Areas*, 13(3), 283–300.

(1986). Traditionalism, the bureaucracy, and local administration: Continuity and change in Swaziland. *Journal of African Studies*, 13(4), 116.

Pichard, L. A. (1979). District councils in Botswana – A remnant of local autonomy. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 17(02), 285–308.

Pick, H. (1961). Independent Mauritania. *The World Today*, 17(4), 149–158.

Pinto, R. F. (2004). Service delivery in Francophone West Africa: The challenge of balancing deconcentration and decentralisation. *Public Administration and Development*, 24(3), 263.

Pitcher, M. (1991). Sowing the seeds of failure: Early Portuguese cotton cultivation in Angola and Mozambique, 1820–1926. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 17(1), 43–70.

(1996). Recreating colonialism or reconstructing the State? Privatisation and politics in Mozambique. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 22(1), 49–74.

(2004). Conditions, commitments, and the politics of restructuring in Africa. *Comparative Politics*, 36(4), 379–398.

Place, F. and K. Otsuka (2001). Tenure, agricultural investment, and productivity in the customary tenure sector of Malawi. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 50(1), 77–99.

Polanyi, K. (1944). *The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time*. Boston: Beacon Press.

Posner, D. N. (1995). Malawi's new dawn. *Journal of Democracy*, 6(1), 131–145.

(2007). Regime change and ethnic cleavages in Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 40, 1302–1327.

Potts, D. (1985). Capital relocation in Africa: The case of Lilongwe in Malawi. *The Geographical Journal*, 151(2), 182–196.

(2010). *Circular Migration in Zimbabwe and Contemporary Sub-Saharan Africa*. Boydell and Brewer.

Powell, E. (1984). *Private Secretary (Female)/Gold Coast*. London: C. Hurst.

Powell, G. B. (1982). Party systems and political system performance: Voting participation, government stability and mass violence in contemporary democracies. *American Political Science Review*, 75(4), 861–879.

Price, R. (1971a). A theoretical approach to military rule in new states: Reference group theory and the Ghanaian case. *World Politics*, 23(03), 399.

(1971b). Military officers and political leadership: The Ghanaian case. *Comparative Politics*, 3(3), 361–379.

(1984). Neo-colonialism and Ghana's economic decline: A critical assessment. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 18(1), 163–193.

Pringle, R. (2006). Mali's unlikely democracy. *The Wilson Quarterly*, 30(2), 31–39.

Proctor, J. H. (1968). The House of Chiefs and the political development of Botswana. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 6(01), 59–79.

Pryor, F. L. (1990). Changes in income distribution in poor agricultural nations: Malaŵi and Madagascar. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 39(1), 23–45.

Quarcoopome, S. S. (1992). Urbanisation, land alienation and politics in Accra. *Research Review*, 8(1,2), 40–54.

Quick, S. A. (1977). Bureaucracy and rural socialism in Zambia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 15(03), 379–400.

Rabinowitz, B. S. (2011). *Reversal of Fortune: Regime Strategies and Changes in Political Stability in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, 1950–2000*. Paper Presented at the 54th Annual Meeting, African Studies Association, Washington, DC, November 19.

(2013). Urban Bias and the Roots of Political Instability: The Case for the Strategic Importance of the Rural Periphery in Sub-Saharan Africa (Doctoral dissertation, University of California, Berkeley).

Rahmato, D. (1993). Agrarian change and agrarian crisis: State and peasantry in post-revolution Ethiopia. *Africa*, 63(01), 36–55.

Raison-Jourde, F. and G. Roy (2010). *Paysans, intellectuels et populisme à Madagascar: de Monja Jaona à Ratsimandrava, 1960–1975*. Paris: Éditions Karthala.

Rakner, L. (2003). *Political and Economic Liberalisation in Zambia 1991–2001*. Nordic Africa Institute.

Randrianja, S. and S. Ellis (2009). *Madagascar: A Short History*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Ranger, T. (1980). The changing of the old guard: Robert Mugabe and the revival of ZANU. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 7(1), 71–90.

Rapley, J. (1993). *Ivoirien Capitalism: African Entrepreneurs in Côte d'Ivoire*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(1995). Côte d'Ivoire after Houphouet-Boigny. *Review of African Political Economy* 22(63), 119–121.

Rathbone, R. (2000). *Nkrumah and the Chiefs: The Politics of Chieftaincy in Ghana, 1951–1960*. London: James Currey.

Rawlings, J. J. (1989). *Towards a Greater Tomorrow: Selected Speeches of Flt-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC, 1st Jan–31st Dec 1988*. Vol. 7. Accra: Information Services Dept.

(1990). *Unity Is Strength. Selected Speeches of Flt-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC, 1st Jan–31st Dec 1989*. Vol. 8. Accra: Information Services Dept.

(1991). *Freedom, Justice and Accountability – Essential for Nation Building. Selected Speeches of Flt-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings Chairman of the PNDC, 1st Jan–31st Dec 1990*. Vol. 9. Accra: Information Services Dept.

(1996). *Towards Stability and Development: Selected Speeches*. Accra: Information Services Dept.

Rawlings, J. J. and B. Holecek (1993). Paying the piper. *Transition*, 62, 158–174.

Ray, D. I. (1986). *Ghana: Politics, Economics, and Society*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(1996). Divided sovereignty traditional authority and the state in Ghana. *Journal of Legal Pluralism*, 37–38, 171–202.

Reed, M. C. (1987). Gabon: A neo-colonial enclave of enduring French interest. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 25(02), 283–320.

Reed, W. C. (1998). Protracted patronage, truncated armed struggle, and political consolidation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 18–21.

Reilly, C. (1993). Improving the Effectiveness of Agricultural Policy Reform in Africa: Rice Market Liberalization in Madagascar. APAP II Collaborative Research Report No. 355, Prepared for Agricultural Policy Analysis Project, Phase II (APAP II) and USAID/AFR, September 1993.

Reno, W. (1998). *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(2003). Political networks in a failing state: The roots and future of violent conflicts in Sierra Leone. *International Politics and Society*, 2, 29–43.

Reynolds, J. (1999). *A Crude Awakening. The Role of the Oil and Banking Industries in Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets*. London: Global Witness.

Reyntjens, F. (2006). Post-1994 politics in Rwanda: Problematising "liberation" and "democratisation." *Third World Quarterly*, 27(6), 1103–1117.

Ribot, J. C. (1999). Decentralisation, participation and accountability in Sahelian forestry: Legal instruments of political-administrative control. *Africa*, 69(01), 23–65.

Ribot, J. C. and P. R. Oyono (2005). The politics of decentralization. In *Towards a New Map of Africa*, B. Wisner, C. Toulmin, and R. Chitiga (eds.). London: Earthscan, 205–228.

Richard, H. S. (1995). State disintegration and ethnic conflict: A framework for analysis. *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 541, 75–88.

Riddell, R. (1993). The future of the manufacturing sector in sub-Saharan Africa. In *Hemmed In: Response to Africa's Economic Decline*, T. M. Callaghy and J. Ravenhill (eds.). Columbia University Press, 215–247.

Riedl, R. B. (2014). *Authoritarian Origins of Democratic Party Systems in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.

Rimmer, D. (1966). The crisis in the Ghana economy. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 4(1), 17–32.

(1992). *Staying Poor: Ghana's Political Economy, 1950–1990*. Oxford: Pergamon Press.

Roberts, S. (1964). The constitution of Malawi, 1964. *Journal of African Law*, 8(3), 178–184.

Robertson, C. (1983). The death of Makola and other tragedies. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 17(3), 469–495.

Robinson, M. (2006). Uganda. *IDS Bulletin*, 37(2), 14–26.

Rola-Rubzen, et al. (2001). Agricultural economists and world poverty: Progress and prospects. *Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics*, 45(1), 39–66.

Rooney, D. (1982). *Sir Charles Arden-Clarke*. London: Rex Collings.

(2007). *Kwame Nkrumah. Vision and Tragedy*. African Books Collective.
Rosenbaum, A. and M. V. Rojas (1997). Decentralization, local governance and centreperiphery conflict in Sierra Leone. *Public Administration and Development*, 17(5), 529.
Rösing, F. W. (1977). Anthropometry of six tribal populations in Angola. *Zeitschrift für Morphologie und Anthropologie*, 168 (H.1), 107–122.
Rothchild, D. (1991). Ghana and structural adjustment: An overview. *In Ghana: The Political Economy of Recovery*, D. Rothchild (ed.). Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
Rudebeck, L. (1988). Kandjadja, Guinea-Bissau 1976–1986: Observations on the political economy of an African village. *Review of African Political Economy*, 41, 17–29.
Sachs, J., et al. (2004). Ending Africa's Poverty Trap. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2004(1), 117–240.
Sahn, D. E. and A. Sarris. (1994). The evolution of states, markets, and civil institutions in rural Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32(2), 279–303.
Saine, A. (2008). The Gambia's 2006 presidential election: Change or continuity? *African Studies Review*, 51(1), 59–83.
(2009). *The Paradox of Third-Wave Democratization in Africa: The Gambia under AFPRC-APRC Rule, 1994–2008*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Sallah, T. M. (1990). Economics and politics in the Gambia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28(4), 621–648.
Sallinger-McBride, J. and L. A. Picard (1989). Rural development areas in Swaziland: The politics of integrated rural development. *Comparative Politics*, 22(1), 1–22.
Samatar, A. I. (1992). Destruction of state and society in Somalia: Beyond the tribal convention. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 30(04), 625–641.
(2004). Ethiopian federalism: Autonomy versus control in the Somali Region. *Third World Quarterly*, 25(6), 1131–1154.
Samuel, D. (1985). African personal dictatorships. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 23(2), 209–237.
Sandlar, C. (2005). Le National-Régionalisme De La Charte Du Nord. *Outre-Terre*, 2(11), 295–307.
Sanhueza, R. (1999). The hazard rate of political regimes. *Public Choice*, 98(3), 337–367.
Sankara, T. (1985). The "political orientation" of Burkina Faso. *Review of African Political Economy*, 12(32), 48–55.
Sarwar, L. K. (1991). Structural adjustment in Uganda: The initial experience. In *Changing Uganda: The Dilemmas of Structural Adjustment and Revolutionary Change*, H. Hansen and M. Twaddle (eds.). London: James Currey, 20–43.
Scarritt, J. R. (1971). Elite values, ideology, and power in post-independence Zambia. *African Studies Review*, 14(01), 31–54.
Scharnagl, R. (2003). *Towards Democracy and Market Economy*. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Index.
Schissel, H. (1986). Conte in control. *Africa Report*, 31(6), 21.

Schmidt, E. (2007). Cold War in Guinea: The Rassemblement Démocratique Africain and the struggle over Communism, 1950–1958. *The Journal of African History*, 48(1), 95–121.

Schneider, L. (2004). Freedom and unfreedom in rural development: Julius Nyerere, Ujamaa Vijijini, and villagization. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 38(2), 344–392.

Schroven, A. (2010). The people, the power and the public service: Political identification during Guinea's general strikes in 2007. *Development and Change*, 41(4), 659–677.

Scipion, P. (1965). New developments in French speaking Africa. *Civilisations*, 15 (2, 3, 4), 248–257, 420–432, 552–566.

(1966). New developments in French speaking Africa. *Civilisations*, 16(3), 376–390.

(1967). New developments in French speaking Africa. *Civilisations*, 17(1, 2), 129–142.

Seely, J. C. (2001). A political analysis of decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg threat in Mali. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39(3), 499–524.

Seibert, G. (2003). Coup d'état in São Tomé e Príncipe: Domestic causes, the role of oil and former "Buffalo" Battalion soldiers. African Security Analysis Programme, Occasional paper, October 10.

(2006). *Comrades, Clients and Cousins: Colonialism, Socialism and Democratization in Sao-Tome and Principe*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill.

Seidman, A. W. (1978). *Ghana's Development Experience*. Nairobi: East African Publishing House.

Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. (1982). *Liberia and Ghana – Policy Challenges in West Africa: A Staff Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations. United States Senate*. Washington, DC: U.S. G.P.O.

Shao, J. (1985). Politics and the food production crisis in Tanzania. *Issue: A Journal of Opinion*, 14, 10–24.

Shepherd, G. (1963). Ghana's "good neighbor" prospects. *Africa Today*, 10(9), 35–37.

Sherwood, M. (2012). Pan-African Conferences, 1900–1953: What did "Pan-Africanism" mean? *The Journal of Pan African Studies*, 4(10).

Shorter, A. (1972). *Chiefship in Western Tanzania: A Political History of the Kimu*. Oxford University Press.

Simensen, J. (1974). Rural mass action in the context of anti-colonial protest: The Asafo Movement of Akim Abuakwa, Ghana. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 8(1), 25–41.

Skinner, E. P. (1963). Strangers in West African societies. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 33(4), 307–320.

(1988). Sankara and the Burkinabe Revolution: Charisma and power, local and external dimensions. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 26(3), 437–455.

Smiley, X. (1979). Zimbabwe, southern Africa and the rise of Robert Mugabe. *Foreign Affairs*, 58, 1060.

Smith, L. (2007). Voting for an ethnic identity: Procedural and institutional responses to ethnic conflict in Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 45(04), 565–594.

Smoke, P., et al. (2010). USAID Comparative Assessment of Decentralization. Africa: Uganda Desk Study. USAID, September.

Snyder, F. G. (1965). *One-Party Government in Mali: Transition Toward Control*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Solway, J. S.(2002). Navigating the "neutral" state: "Minority" rights in Botswana. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28(4), 711–729.

Southall, A. (1980). Social disorganisation in Uganda: Before, during, and after Amin. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 18(4), 627–656.

Southall, R. (1994). The 1993 Lesotho election. *Review of African Political Economy*, 21(59), 110–118.

Southall, R. and R. Fox (1999). Lesotho's general election of 1998: Rigged or de rigeur? *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(4), 669–696.

Speirs, M. (1991). Agrarian change and the revolution in Burkina Faso. *African Affairs*, 90(358), 89–110.

Staatz, J. M., et al. (1989). Cereals market liberalization in Mali. *World Development*, 17(5), 703–718.

Stahl, M. (1989). Capturing the peasants through cooperatives – The case of Ethiopia. *Review of African Political Economy*, 16(44), 27–46.

Stambuli, P. K. (2002). *IMF/World Bank Economic Models and Dynamics of Political Transition in Malawi*. Presented at Conference on "Malawi after Banda: Perspectives in a regional African context," Centre of Commonwealth Studies, University of Stirlin, Scotland, September 4–5.

Staniland, M. (1975). *The Lions of Dagbon: Political Change in Northern Ghana*. Cambridge University Press.

Stark, F. M. (1980). Persuasion and power in Cameroon. *Canadian Journal of African Studies*, 14(2), 273–293.

Storeygard, A. (2013). Farther on Down the Road: Transport Costs, Trade and Urban Growth in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper, (6444).

Strandsbjerg, C. (2000). Kerekou, God and the ancestors: Religion and the conception of political power in Benin. *African Affairs*, 99(396), 395–414.

Straus, S. (2012). Wars do end! Changing patterns of political violence in sub-Saharan Africa. *African Affairs*

(2015). *Making and Unmaking of Nations: War, Leadership and Genocide in Modern Africa*. New York: Cornell University Press.

Straus, S. and C. Taylor (2009). Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2007. In APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper.

Stryker, R. E. (1971). Political and administrative linkage in the Ivory Coast. In *Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization*, P. Foster and A. R. Zolberg, (eds.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 73–102.

Sundiata, I. K. (1990). *Equatorial Guinea: Colonialism, State Terror, and the Search for Stability*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Tadesse, M. and J. Young (2003). TPLF: Reform or decline? *Review of African Political Economy*, 30(97), 389–403.

Takougang, J. (1997). Cameroon: Biya and incremental reform. *In Political Reform in Francophone Africa*, J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier (eds.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 162–181.

(2004). *The Demise of Biya's New Deal in Cameroon, 1982–1992, the Leadership Challenge in Africa: Cameroon under Paul Biya*, J. M. Mbaku and J. Takougang (eds.). Trenton: Africa World Press, Inc., 95–123.

Tangri, R. (1978). Central-local politics in contemporary Sierra Leone. *African Affairs*, 77(307), 165–173.

Taube, G. (1993). Social dimensions of adjustment (SDA), conceptual issues and empirical evidence from Tanzania and other African countries. *Africa Spectrum*, 28(2), 165–183.

Taylor, I. (2005). The developmental state in Africa: The case of Botswana. *The Potentiality of "Developmental States" in Africa*. Dakar: CODESRIA.

Terraciano, A. M. (1997). Contesting land, contesting laws: Tenure reform and ethnic conflict in Niger. *Columbia Human Rights Law Review*, 29, 723.

Terrence, L. (1996). Closing the transition: The May 1995 elections in Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34(1), 121–142.

Thomas-Slayter, B. P. (1987). Development through Harambee: Who wins and who loses? Rural self-help projects in Kenya. *World Development*, 15(4), 463–481.

(1992). Politics, class, and gender in African resource management: The case of rural Kenya. *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 40(4), 809–828.

Thompson, W. R. (1975). Regime vulnerability and the military coup. *Comparative Politics*, 7(4), 459–487.

Thompson, W. S. (1969). *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966: Diplomacy, Ideology, and the New State*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Thompson, V. and R. Adloff (1965). *The Malagasy Republic: Madagascar Today*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Thornton, J. (1981). Early Kongo–Portuguese relations: A new interpretation. *History in Africa*, 8(1981): 183–204.

Tice, R. D. (1974). Administrative structure, ethnicity, and nation-building in the Ivory Coast. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 12(2), 211–229.

Tingbe-Azalou, A. (1997). Cultural dimensions of urban–rural relations in Benin. The case of Abomey and its hinterland. In *Rural–Urban Dynamics in Francophone Africa*, Jonathan Baker (ed.). Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainsinstitutit, 79–89.

Titley, B. (1997). *Dark Age: The Political Odyssey of Emperor Bokassa*. McGill-Queen's University Press.

Topouiz, D. (1989). Guinea: Conte's challenge. *Africa Report*, 34, 38–41, 209–232.

Tordoff, W. (1994). Decentralisation: Comparative experience in Commonwealth Africa. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 32(4), 555–580.

Tordoff, W. and R. Young (1994). Decentralisation and public sector reform in Zambia. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 20(2), 285–299.

(1999). The presidential election in Gabon. *Review of African Political Economy*, 26(80), 269–277.

Toungara, J. M. (1990). The apotheosis of Côte d'Ivoire's Nana Houphouet-Boigny. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 28(1), 23–54.

(1995). Generational tensions in the Parti Démocratique de Côte d'Ivoire. *African Studies Review*, 38(2), 11–38.

(2001). Ethnicity and political crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. *Journal of Democracy*, 12(3), 63–72.

Touré, S. (1996). *L'Ivoirité, ou, L'esprit du nouveau contrat social du Président Henri Konan Bédié: actes du forum CURDIPHE du 20 au 23 mars 1996, Abidjan*. Abidjan: Presses Universitaires de Côte d'Ivoire.

Trimberger, E. K. (1978). *Revolution from Above: Military Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru*. Transaction Publishers.

Tripp, A. (2001). The politics of autonomy and cooptation in Africa: The case of the Ugandan women's movement. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39(1), 101–128.

(2004). The changing face of authoritarianism in Africa: The case of Uganda. *Africa Today*, 50(3), 3–26.

Tronvoll, K. (2001). Voting, violence and violations: Peasant voices on the flawed elections in Hadiya, southern Ethiopia. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 39(04), 697–716.

Turrittin, J. (1991). Mali: People topple Traoré. *Review of African Political Economy*, 18(52), 97–103.

Udelsmann, R. C. and A. P. Tavares (2012). Angola's planned and unplanned urban growth: Diamond mining towns in the Lunda provinces. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies*, 30(4), 687–703.

Unknown. (1955). "Profile: Mr. Julius Nyerere." *Africa Today*, 2(1), 14–16.

(1961). Notes of the month. *The World Today*, 17(3), 89–94.

Van de Walle, D. (2000). Choosing Rural Road Investment to Help reduce Poverty. The World Bank Development Research Group Public Economics, Working Paper 2458, October.

Van de Walle, N. (1989). Rice politics in Cameroon: State commitment, capability, and urban bias. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 27(4), 579–599.

(2001). *African Economics and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999*. Cambridge University Press.

Van Dijk, H. (2011). Decentralization and the articulation of local and regional politics in central Chad. In *Land, Law and Politics in Africa*. J. Abbink and M. de Bruijn (eds.), 334–352.

Van Donge, J. K. and A. J. Liviga (1986). Tanzanian political culture and the cabinet. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 24(4), 619–639.

Varshney, A. (ed.). (1993). *Beyond Urban Bias*. London: Cass.

Venghroff R. and L. Creevey (1997). Senegal: The evolution of a quasi democracy. In *Political Reform in Francophone Africa*, J. F. Clark and D. E. Gardinier (eds.). Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 204–222.

Vengroff, R. (1993). Governance and the transition to democracy: Political parties and the party system in Mali. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 31(4), 541–562.

Verbit, G. P. (1971). Review: TANU builds the nation. *Yale Law Journal*, 81(2), 334–358.

Verdier, I. (1996). *Côte d'Ivoire: 100 Hommes de Pouvoir, 1ere edition*. Paris: Indigo Publications.

Vignaud M. (1956.) Les élections du 2 janvier 1956 en Côte d'Ivoire. *Revue française de science politique*, 6(3), 570–582.

Vine, V. T. (2008). Nation-building and informal politics. *International Social Science Journal*, 59(192), 155–167.

Walker, I. (2007). What came first, the nation or the state? Political process in the Comoro Islands. *Africa: The Journal of the International African Institute*, 77(4): 582–605.

Wallis, M. and R. D. A. Henderson (1983). Lesotho 1983: Year of the election? *The World Today*, 39(5), 185–193.

Wantchekon, L. (2003). Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World Politics*, 55(03), 399–422.

Ware, G. (1965). Somalia: From trust territory to nation, 1950–1960. *Phylon*, 26(2), 173–185.

Watson, J. H. A. (1963). French-speaking Africa since independence. *African Affairs*, 62(248), 211–222.

Webersik, C. (2004). Differences that matter: The struggle of the marginalised in Somalia. *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute*, 74(04), 516–533.

Weinstein, W. (1966). Mauritanian rainbow. *Africa Today*, 13(6), 12–15.

Weiss, H. (2006). The making of an African Bolshevik: Bankole Awoonor Renner in Moscow, 1925–1928. *Ghana Studies*, 9, 177–220.

Welch, C. E., Jr. (1987). *No Farewell to Arms?: Military Disengagement from Politics in Africa and Latin America*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Welsh, D. (1996). *Ethnicity in sub-Saharan Africa*. International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944–), 477–491.

Werbner, R. (2002a). Challenging minorities, difference and tribal citizenship in Botswana. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28(4), 671–684.

(2002b). Cosmopolitan ethnicity, entrepreneurship and the nation: Minority elites in Botswana. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 28(4), 731–753.

West, H. G. and S. Kloeck-Jenson (1999). Betwixt and between: 'Traditional authority'and democratic decentralization in post-war Mozambique. *African Affairs*, 98(393), 455–484.

Westwood, J. (2001). *The Amazing Dictator*. Legon: Blue Volta Associates.

Wheeler, D. L. (1969). The Portuguese army in Angola. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 7(03), 425–439.

Widner, J. A. (1988). Houphouët's Achilles' heel. *The Wilson Quarterly*, 12(5), 163–165.

(1991). The 1990 elections in Côte d'Ivoire. *A Journal of Opinion*, 20(1), 31–40.

(1992). *The Rise of a Party-State in Kenya: From "Harambee" to "Nyayo!"* University of California Press.

(1993). The origins of agricultural policy in Côte d'Ivoire. *Journal of Development Studies*, 29(4), 25–59.

(1994). Two leadership styles and patterns of political liberalization. *African Studies Review*, 37(1), 151–174.

Wilkins, M. (1989). The death of Thomas Sankara and the rectification of the People's Revolution in Burkina Faso. *African Affairs*, 88(352), 375–388.

William C. R. (1998). Protracted patronage, truncated armed struggle, and political consolidation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. *A Journal of Opinion*, 26(1), 18–21.

William F. S. M. (1995). Tragic tradeoffs: democracy and security in Chad. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33(1), 53–65.

Wiseberg, L. S. and G. F. Nelson (1977). Africa's new island republics and U.S. foreign policy. *Africa Today*, 24(1), 6–30.

Wiseman, J. A. (1996). Military rule in the Gambia: An interim assessment. *Third World Quarterly*, 17(5), 917–940.

(1997). Letting Yahya Jammeh off lightly? *Review of African Political Economy*, 24(72), 265–269.

Wodié, F. (2010). *Wodié: mon combat pour la Côte d'Ivoire: entretien*. Abidjan: NEI-CEDA.

Wood, G. (2004). Business and politics in a criminal state: The case of Equatorial Guinea. *African Affairs*, 103(413), 547–567.

Woods, D. (1988). State action and class interests in the Ivory Coast. *African Studies Review*, 31(1), 93–116.

(1989). *State Formation and Northern Integration: A Political Economy Analysis of Resource Exchange and Regional Development in the Ivory Coast between 1880–1980*. PhD dissertation, The University of Chicago.

(1994). Elites, ethnicity, class, clientelism, and "hometown" associations in the Côte d'Ivoire: An historical analysis of state–society links. *Africa*, 64(4), 465–483.

(1999). The politics of organising the countryside: Rural cooperatives in Côte d'Ivoire. *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 37(3), 489–506.

Woods, T. (1992). "Bread with freedom and peace . . . ": Rail workers in Malawi, 1954–1975. *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 18(4), 727–738.

Woronoff, J. (1972). *West African Wager: Houphouet versus Nkrumah*. Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press.

Wunsch, J. S. (2001). Decentralization, local governance and "recentralization" in Africa. *Public Administration and Development*, 21(4), 277–288.

Yacoob, M. and M. Kelly (1999). *Secondary Cities in West Africa: The Challenge for Environmental Health and Prevention*. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Comparative Urban Studies Occasional Papers Series, 21.

Yeager, R. (1972). Micropolitical dimensions of development and national integration in rural Africa: Concepts and an application. *African Studies Review* 15(3), 367–402.

Yeebo, Z. (1991). *Ghana: The Struggle for Popular Power; Rawlings: Savior or Demagogue?* London: New Beacon Books Ltd.

(1995). *The State of Fear in Paradise: The Military Coup in the Gambia and Its Implications for Democracy*. London: Africa Research and Information Bureau.

Yengoh, G. T., et al. (2010). Paths to attaining food security: The case of Cameroon. *Challenges*, 1(1), 5–26.

Young, C. (1981). *Cooperatives and Development: Agricultural Politics in Ghana and Uganda*. Madison: University of Wisconsin.

(1994). *The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Young, D. J. (2009). Is Clientelism at Work in African Elections?: *A Study of Voting Behavior in Kenya and Zambia*. Afrobarometer Working Paper No. 106, Accra: Centre for Democratic Development.

Young, J. (1996). Ethnicity and power in Ethiopia. *Review of African Political Economy*, 23(70), 531–542.

(1998). Regionalism and democracy in Ethiopia. *Third World Quarterly*, 19(2), 191–204.

Zartman, I. W. (1995). *Collapsed States: The Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate Authority*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

(1997). Introduction. In *Governance as Conflicting Management: Politics and Violence in West Africa*, I. William Zartman (ed.). Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.

Zartman, I. W. and C. K. Delgado (1984). *The Political Economy of the Ivory Coast*. New York: Praeger.

Zolberg, A. R. (1963). Mass parties and national integration: The case of the Ivory Coast. *The Journal of Politics*, 25(1), 36–48.

(1964). *One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

(1971). Political development in the Ivory Coast since independence. In *Ghana and the Ivory Coast: Perspectives on Modernization*, P. Foster and A. Zolberg (eds.). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 13–21.

Index

Abbas, Imam, 114
Abbey, Dr. Joe S.L., 171, 174, 175, 179, 196
Abdallah, Ahmed, 41, 47, 48
Abengourou, 99, 102, 103, 104, 145, 146, 147, 199
Abidjan, x, xi, 74, 96, 104, 105, 106, 141, 143, 144, 146, 148, 151, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 197, 199, 201, 204, 208, 209, 210, 211, 215, 216, 218, 219, 220, 222, 224, 225, 233, 248
Abobo, 210
Aboisso, 99, 107, 140, 142, 145, 157, 161, 162, 164, 199
Abubekr, Nuh, 82, 87
Accra, 60, 80, 81, 85, 86, 91, 92, 114, 115, 116, 119, 124, 128, 129, 133, 134, 149, 170, 171, 174, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 186, 189, 190, 193, 232, 246, 247, 248, 250, 252, 255, 256, 257, 260, 262, 266, 269, 278, 283, 284, 287, 296 (see also Greater Accra Region)
Acheampong, General Ignatius Kutu, 169, 170, 172, 174
Action Troopers, 91
Adamafio, Tawia, 90, 116, 117, 119, 126, 129
Addy, Lieutenant-Colonel John, 136
Adjaye, Dr. Asafu, 80, 93
Adjei, Ako, 120, 130, 172, 178
Adjei-Boadi, Joseph, 178
Adzopé, 155, 199, 208
Afghanistan, 1, 244
African Development Indicators, 61, 192, 193
African planters, 95, 96, 97
Afrifa, Major (Colonel) A. A., 60, 123, 133, 136, 137, 256
Agni, 97, 98, 99, 102, 106, 108, 142, 144, 155, 162, 164, 225
agriculture, 14, 15, 19, 20, 36, 38, 40, 41, 43, 45, 47, 50, 57, 96, 121, 127, 128, 139, 147, 158, 165, 166, 177, 186, 187, 191, 195, 263, 266, 272, exports, 191, inputs, 19, 20, 45, 94, 128, 156, 186, policies, ix, 10, 32, 37, 38, 44, 45, 49, 56, 124, 156, industrialized, 23, 33, 35, 121, subsistence farming, 120 (see also pioneer farming, producer prices, smallholder production)
Ahidjo, Ahmadou, 30, 34, 37, 38, 40, 50
Ahwoi, Atu, 173
Ahwoi, Kwamena, 173
Aka, Lambert, 141
Akan, 24, 55, 74, 75, 76, 131, 177, 215, 225, 239
Akata-Pore, Sergeant Daniel A., 172, 173, 176, 178
Akele, Ezan, 205
Akim, 80, 225
Akim Abuakwa, 75, 91, 114, The Akim Abuakwa (Stool Revenue) Act, 114
Akindès, Francis, 213
Akouè, 96
Akouédo military camp, 153, 154, 219
Akpata, Bankole, 76
Akuffo, Lieutenant General Frederick W. A., 170, 172, 174
Akwaupim, 137, 136
Alassane Dramane Ouattara, 197, 200, 202, 204, 205, 207, 208, 211, 213, 218, 231
Alavanyo riots, 153
allogène, 198
Amadu, Alhaji, 114
Amartey Kwei, Joachim, 172, 173, 176, 178
Ametwee, Police Constable Seth, 131
Amin, Idi, 36
Amin, Samir, 34, 43, 55, 176, 227
amnesty, 130, 154, 216, 219 (see political pardons)

Amon, Leon, 141
Amon-Tonah, Lambert, 141
Amponsah, Reginald Reynolds, 80, 83, 89, 90, 93, 137
Anaman, K.A., 177, 227
ancestral shrines, 12
Angola, 34, 36, 37, 40, 274
Angré, 210
Ankrah, Lieutenant General Joseph Arthur, 134
Anlo, 93, 136
Annan, Justice D.F., 178
Anoma, Joseph, 97, 142
anti-colonial movement, 35, 76, 77, 92, 146, 150, 232
anti-Dahomean riots, 213 (see also xenophobia)
Aoulou, Kacou, 99, 102, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 154, 162
Apaloo, Justice Frederick K., 173
Apaloo, M.K., 88, 93, 137
Appiah, Joe, 83, 88, 89, 93, 130, 133, 137, 257
Apter, David, 86, 133, 134, 223
Aptidon, Hassan Gouled, 30
Arden-Clarke, Govenor-General Charles, 77, 78, 90, 92
armed forces, 14, 47, 52, 53, 54, 132, 136, 159, 161, 162, 169, 170, 184, 222, 233, 237, 238 (see security forces)
army, 36, 45, 55, 129, 132, 135, 138, 145, 148, 151, 153, 160, 161, 163, 165, 200, 203, 209, 212, 220, 221 (see also military, security forces, coup)
Army Rural Corps of Engineers, 160
arrests, 77, 107, 149, 153, 182 (see also prison, imprisonment)
Asantehene, 89, 91, 114, 115
Asawase, 88
Ashanti, xi, 78, 81, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 132, 137, 173, 187, 188, 224, 225, Golden Stool, 91, 117, The Ashanti Stool Lands Act, 115
Asia, 241, 242
Assamoi, Alphonse, 142
Atim, Chris Bukari, 172, 173, 174, 176, 181
Atsain, Achi, 205
Attoh, K.Y., 93
Austin, Dennis, 116, 133
authoritarianism, authoritarian, 1, 293
autochthone, 198
Awhaitey, Captain Benjamin, 115, 135, 137
Awoonor-Renner, Bankole, 76, 83, 84, 85, 93
Bakary-Akin, Tessy, 161, 224
Balanta, 54
Banny, Jean Konan, 107, 152, 154
Baoulé, 40, 98, 99, 104, 106, 108, 141, 142, 146, 148, 160, 161, 198, 203, 212, 215
Baoulé militia, 160
Barre, Syaad, 34, 36, 40, 50
Barwah, Major-General C.M., 132, 134
Béchard, Paul, 103
Bédié, Henri Konan, viii, 5, 23, 29, 41, 57, 167, 168, 197, 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 233, 234, 237, 259, 275, 278, 293
Belgium, Belgian, 48, 60, 66, 67, 69
Benin, 30, 34, 42, 46, 48, 74, 151, 277
Bertin. General Zézé Baroan, 161, 164
Bété, 40, 97, 98, 99, 102, 106, 109, 142, 161, 162, 163, 164, 201, 207, 212, 225
Biankouma, 161, 199
Biney, Pobee, 81, 83, 109
Bing, Geoffrey, 116, 130
Binzème, Kinzeme, 97, 98, 99, 106
Biya, Paul, 41
Bloc africaine, 97, 98, 101
Bloc Democratique Eburnéen, 98, 99, 102, 105
Blondy, Alpha, 207
Boateng, Kwaku, 120
Boda, Victor Biaka, 146, 162
Boganda, Barthélemy, 35
Boka, Ernest, 153, 221
Bolgatanga, 123, 182, 183
Bolivia, 1, 245
bomb, bombings, 48, 90, 91, 129, 149, 151
Bondoukou, 199
Bongo, Omar, 51
Boni Bi Golé, Lieutenant, 163
Boni, Alphonse, 97, 99, 106, 107, 108, 154
Bonouwa, 141
Bony, Joachim, 107, 152
Bonzou, Kouassi, 103
Boone, Catherine, 243
Botchwey, Dr. Kwesi, 173, 174, 175, 179
Botsio, Kojo, xi, 76, 84, 119, 130
Botswana, 34, 37, 39, 239, 272, 274
Bouna, 161, 199
Boundiali, 141, 199
Bour, Kofi, 83, 88
boycott, 77, 115, 211, 212, 213, 216, 238
Bozing, 182
Braimah, J.A., 85, 86, 87, 93

Bratton, M., 240, 241
British colonies, 60, 66, 75, colonial administration, 77, 78, 85, 88, 98, 111, 119, 166, 224, 257, 266, 269
British government, iv, 77, 78, 84, 85, 91, 92, 113, 114, 115, 132, 136 (see also England)
British civil service, 74
Brong, 91, 115
Brong-Ahafo Region, 115, 188, 194, The Brong-Ahafo Region Act, No. 18., 115
Buganda, 42
Builsa, 183
Buipe, 183
Bulgaria, 174
Burkinabé, 146
Burkina Faso, (see Upper Volta)
Burundi, 1, 31, 60, 62, 244
Busia, Dr. Kofi Abrefa, 75, 84, 93, 120, 239

Cabral, Amílcar, 35
Cabral, Luiz, 35
Cameroon, 30, 34, 37, 41
carte du séjour, 206
Castle the, 78, 169, 182, 185, 253
Castro, Fidel, 135, 233 (see also Cuba)
Central African Republic (CAR), 1, 34, 35, 249, 250, 251, 253, 260, 273, 274, 277, 285
Cesar, Naval Lieutenant Sama Henri, 221
Chang, E.C., 240, 241
Charte du Nord (northern charter), 206, 207
Chazan, Naomi, 188
chefferie, 107, 144, 145, 161, 255
chiefs, 3, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 30, 31, 32, 35, 36, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 52, 53, 58, 60, 77, 89, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 97, 98, 107, 108, 109, 115, 116, 127, 137, 143, 144, 145, 149, 164, 166, 177, 178, 180, 182, 185, 187, 188, 191, 194, 203, 207, 225, 251, 252, 254, 269, 273, 283, 287, canton chiefs, 96, 98, 107, 144, 145, paramount chiefs, 39, 75, 91, 114, 115, 145 (see also traditional elites, Asantehene, Akim Abuakwa, Nandom-Naa)
chieftaincy, 4, 13, 14, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 30, 36, 37, 39, 40, 53, 56, 57, 58, 60, 68, 72, 91, 96, 115, 122, 143, 144, 236, 240, 245, 270, 275
chieftaincy Acts, 30
Chiir VII, Naa Puoure Puobe, 182 (see also Nandom-Naa)
China, 42, 111, 119, 241, 242
Chissano, Joaquim, 30
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 24, 29, 60, 74, 120, 134, 232, 233, 247
citizenship, 97, 197, 205, 206, 207, 214, 215, 216, 218, 231, 262, 270, 279
civil service, civil servants, 16, 73, 92, 98, 111, 113, 119, 122, 132, 148, 151, 154, 164, 185, 187, 195, 200, 204, 225, 237
civil society, 2, 16, 239, 240, 285
civil war, civil conflict, x, 1, 4, 22, 23, 31, 33, 36, 42, 51, 61, 62, 63, 68, 70, 167, 213, 216, 230, 234, 237, 238
Claire, Grah, 204
cocoa, 24, 73, 74, 75, 78, 80, 81, 85, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 96, 97, 106, 111, 124, 128, 137, 142, 144, 146, 156, 157, 161, 164, 166, 168, 174, 181, 185, 188, 194, 209, 213, 217, 225, 226, 227, 229, 269, exports, 24, 94, 158, 228, farmers, 75, 80, 88, 90, 93, 94, 164, 185, 188, 191, industry, 128, 225, trade, 74, 96, 128, 144, 217, 226, cocoa duty ordinance, 90, cocoa evacuation campaign, 185 (see also producer prices), Cocoa Marketing Board (CMB), 80, 81, 82, 88, 90, 94, 128, 130, 166, 185
Cocoa Purchasing Company (CPC), 81, 88, 89, 90, 125, 128
coffee, 96, 156, 158, 164, 217, exports, 24, 158, production, 156, trade, 96, 144 (see also producer prices)
cold war, 60, 228, 232
colons, 95, 96, 97, 101, 102, 106, 108, 150, 166, 226
commercial capital, 15, 16
Communist Party of Great Britain, 76
Comoros, 1, 34, 41, 46, 47, 48, 49, 249, 250, 253, 271, 283, Comoran Armed Forces, 48
Compaoré, Blaise, 52
competing powerbases, 9, 141, 244
Compulsory Savings Schemes, 128
Confédération Générale des Travailleurs, CGT, 152
Congress People's Party (CPP), x, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 109, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 121, 123, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 149, 160, expulsions, 79, 80, 81, 84, 85, 87, 88, 90, 93, 109, 150

Conseils Généraux, 144, Constitution (Repeal of Restrictions) Act 1958, 115
Cornwell, Richard, 221
corruption, 42, 44, 86, 88, 89, 120, 128, 169, 170, 188, 190, 195, 277
Côte d'Ivoire, ix, x, 4, 5, 6, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 34, 37, 41, 73, 74, 79, 96, 99, 105, 106, 128, 140, 149, 150, 151, 153, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 167, 168, 198, 199, 200, 201, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 230, 233, 234, 238, 239, 293 (see also Lower Côte)
Coulibaly, Adama, 204, 216
Coulibaly, Ali, 204
Coulibaly, Amadou Gon, 218, 239
Coulibaly, Bema, 99
Coulibaly, Gbon, 100
Coulibaly, General Abdoulaye, 161, 203, 221
Coulibaly, Kassoum, 104
Coulibaly, Lancine Gbon, 205
Coulibaly, Mamadou, 108, 142
Coulibaly, N'Golo, 218
Coulibaly, Ouezzin, 104
Coulibaly, Lanzeni, 203
coup, coup d'état, ix, x, 1, 4, 5, 13, 14, 22, 23, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 68, 70, 71, 73, 74, 116, 120, 128, 133, 136, 138, 155, 161, 163, 165, 167, 168, 170, 171, 172, 175, 176, 177, 178, 181, 182, 184, 190, 197, 200, 203, 204, 212, 213, 219, 220, 221, 222, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 238, 245, 256, 263, 268, 270, 278, 280, 284, 296
coup attempts, 31, 46, 62, 134, 160,
coup plots, 60, 62, 74, 120, 133, 153, 232
coup proofing, 60
Crabbe, Coffee, 120, 130, 137
Cuba, 41, 42, 50, 174, 232, 233 (see also Castro)
currency devaluation, 176, 177, 195, 208, 210, 213, 229
customary land-tenure, 245
customary law, 16, 243
Czech Republic, 174

Dacko, David, 35
Dadie, Gabriel, 97, 142
Dagomba, 132
Dakin, General Ouattara, 161
Daloa, 98, 99, 142, 143, 146, 147, 164, 199, 208
Danane, 208
Danquah, Dr. Joseph Boakye, 75, 93, 130, 239
Daoukro, 198, 199, 219
Dar es Salaam, 38
Darku IX, Nana Sir Tsibu, 81, 130
Davidson, Basil, 135
de Gaulle, General Charles, 97, 101
de Graft Johnson, Joseph W.S., 84
debt, 39, 41, 208, 209, 227, 229
decentralization, 21, 33, 39, 41, 42, 43, 44, 49, 50, 58, 59, 93, 105, 147, 177, 182, 188, 191, 194, 195, 197, 238, 242, 244, 266, 294, deconcentration, 58, 59, 160, 286, devolution, 58, 59, 105
Dei-Anang, Michael, 133
Delafosse, Jean, 150
Dem, Tiadiane, 97, 98, 99, 102, 103, 106, 107, 108
democracy, democratization, 1, 2, 6, 19, 20, 23, 29, 30, 31, 44, 239, 240, 241, 242, 250, 262, 266, 272, 273, 275, 278, 279, 281, 283, 284, 285, 296
democratic rule, 31, 245
demonstrations, 62, 140, 153, 189, 190, 196, 200, 211, 219, pro-democracy, 201 (see also protests, strikes)
Denard, Robert, 46, 47, 48
Diabeté, Dagri Diabeté, 204
Diarra, Samba, 162
Dignan Bailly, Adrien, 97, 98, 99, 102, 104, 105, 106, 162
Dihye, Amoakon, 102, 103
Dikodougou, 148
Dimbokro, 141, 146, 157, 218
Diouf, Abdou, 41
Dioula, 109, 143, 146, 161, 206
District Assembly Community Fund (DACF), 187
District Assembly system, 187, 188
Divo, 157, 199, 208
Dix Cove, 127
Djaument, Etienne, 98, 99, 102, 104, 105, 106
Djédjé, Capri, 99, 105, 162
Djibouti, 30, 56
Dombo, S.D., 93
Dona-Fologo, Laurent, 202, 204, 205, 206
Donwahi, Charles, 107, 152
Doué, Colonel Mathias, 221
drought, 54, 174, 177, 179, 229, 238
Duncan, Daniel Kablan, 239

durbars, 182, 185
Dzewu, Dzenkle, 79, 80, 82, 84, 93, 116

Eastern bloc, Eastern Europe, 118, 136
Eastern Region, 91, 137
Eaton Hall, 136
Ebrié, 148, 149
economic development, economic growth, i, 1, 2, 4, 6, 9, 11, 12, 15, 17, 22, 23, 31, 32, 56, 72, 73, 74, 104, 142, 146, 155, 156, 230, 237, 238, 241, 245, 275, 285, economic reform, 41, 171, 179, 189, 208 (see also prosperity)
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP), 175, 182, 228, 274
Edusei, Krobo, 90, 120, 130
Ehotilé, 107
Ekra, Mathieu, 141, 142, 150
Ekra-Ametheir-Niamke network, 141
elections, x, 19, 30, 31, 32, 44, 45, 63, 64, 77, 78, 81, 84, 85, 86, 87, 90, 91, 92, 100, 104, 106, 115, 119, 165, 167, 170, 194, 196, 201, 205, 207, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 230, 231, 238, 239, 240, 245, 258, 266, 275, 277, 282, 291, 293, 294, metropolitan, 106, multiparty, 1, 2, 19, 30, 32, 44, 50, 168, 194, 195, 230, 231, 238, 240, 241, presidential, 42, 165, 198, 201, 213, 216, 218, 219, 239, 240, National Assembly, 208, 231, introduced in Lower Côte, 97, introduced in the Gold Coast, 77, 78, local elections, 18, 19, 41, 43, 49, 57, 58, 74, 147, 188
electricity, 3, 143, 145, 183, 184, 194, 210 (see also infrastructure)
Élisée Péchoux, Governor Laurent, 102, 104
elites, 2, 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 40, 44, 46, 49, 51, 55, 75, 105, 110, 141, 155, 166, 238, 242, 244, 245, 294, educated elite, 77, 157, 162, elite bargaining, 10, 17, 244, local elites, 4, 12, 18, 20, 21, 40, 50, 70, 164, 240, 242, 244 (see also chiefs, traditional elites), landed-elite, 241, planter-elite, 150, political elite, 96, 141, 143, 145, regional elites, 2, 5, 14, 16, 18, 20, 22, 23, 33, 44, 46, 50, 108, 141, 165, rural elites, 5, 13, 15, 21, 37, 38, 46, 74, 141, 185, 194
England, 69, 76, 89, 241, 242 (see also British)
Entente des Indépendants de Côte d'Ivoire (EIDCI), 98, 99, 103
Equatorial Guinea, 34, 36, 40
ethnic group, ethnic groups, 3, 13, 14, 16, 36, 37, 40, 54, 55, 57, 66, 72, 98, 108, 127, 131, 140, 141, 161, 162, 183, 236
ethnicity, 55, 135, 142, 270, 273, 279, 280, 294
ethnic associations, 98, 103
ethnic balancing, 51
ethnic conflict, 23, 55, 197, 215, 291
ethnic fractionalization, 24
ethnic mobilization, politicization, 3, 17, 111, 140, 141, 164, 237
ethnic tensions, 4, 14, 205, 213, 218, 237
ethnic leaders, 57, 141
ethno-regional, elites, 4, 5, 12, 14, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 23, 25, 26, 40, 51, 53, 111, 166, 222, 236, 237, mobilization, 18, 143, 161, opposition, 4
Europe, European, 2, 3, 9, 48, 60, 74, 95, 172, 182, 200, 217, 241, 242, 243
évolués, 96, 97, 98, 109 (see also elites)
Ewe, 24, 55, 131, 132, 135, 136, 173
exile, 107, 116, 120, 122, 136, 138, 155, 190, 238
exports, export crops, 34, 36, 43, 52, 61, 94, 158
ex-soldiers' union, 76
extension services, 37, 94, 125

factories, factory, 76, 123, 126, 131, 157, 171 (see also industrialization)
Fadiga, General Lamine, 161
famine, 179, 229, 231, 238
Farmers' Union of the British West African Growers, 80
farming extension programs, 21, 57, 156 (see also agriculture)
faux complots, 153, 154, 155, 160, 162, 266
federalism, 92, 244, 280, 289
Férké, 208
fête nationale, 145, 146
feudal, feudalism, 20, 36, 40, 42, 49, 177, 178, 241
Fifth Pan-Africanist Congress, 76
Fitzgerald, Sir Patrick, 88
Flagstaff House, 130, 131, 134
food costs, 21, 126, 128
food production, food crops, 34, 47, 127, 156, 174, 182, 185, 188, 194
Food-for-Work program, 192
forced labor, 73, 96, 98, 100, 106, 108, 144, 207

Forde, Cecil, 84
foreigners, 44, 146, 162, 198, 205, 207, 225 (see also xenophobia, *ivoirité*, stranger communities)
Fra-Fra, 132
Française de l'International Ouvriere (SFIO), 98, 102, 105
France, 46, 47, 48, 49, 60, 67, 73, 95, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 111, 148, 153, 159, 162, 165, 202, 203, 204, 210, 214, 218, 219, 222, 225, 226, 233, 241, 242, colonial administration, 96, 98, 103, 104, electoral system, 74, Free French government, 97, military, 47, 159, 233, support in Côte d'Ivoire, 151, Free French Forces, 97 (see also Vichy government)
French National Assembly, 100, 101
Franco-African federal community, 150, 151
French Overseas Territories, 97, French West Africa (AOF), 73, 101, 103, 150, 225, French Central Africa (ACF), 101
Freedom House, 1
Front populaire ivoirien (FPI), 163, 201, 205, 206, 208, 211, 212, 216, 217, 252
Front républicain (FR), 211

Gã, 55, 80, 82, 83, 85, 92, 93, 116, 130, 132, 135, 136, 149
Gã Shifimo Kpee, 92, 93, 116, 149
Gabon, 51, 156, 270, 275, 283, 288, 293
Gaddafi, Muammar, xi, 42
Gadeau, Germain Coffi, 142, 150
Gagnoa, 97, 99, 102, 106, 140, 145, 146, 147, 155, 161, 162, 163, 164, 199, 201, 208, 212, rebellion and massacre, 163
Garoua, 40
Gbagbo, Laurent, 163, 201, 205, 207, 208, 211, 216, 221, 227, 231, 238
Gbedemah, Kolma A., xi, 83, 84, 119, 121, 130, 136
Géo André Stadium, 104, 105
German Democratic Republic, Germany, 83, 90, 96, 97, 174, 242 (see also Eastern bloc)
Ghana, i, ix, x, ix, 4, 5, 6, 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 34, 35, 36, 40, 41, 42, 53, 54, 55, 60, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 88, 90, 91, 98, 107, 111, 114, 115, 116, 117, 119, 120, 121, 123, 124, 127, 129, 131, 132, 134, 137, 140, 144, 145, 156, 157, 166, 167, 169, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 234, 238, 239, 240, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 294, 296
Ghana State Farms Corporation (SFC), 124, 125, 126, 281
Ghana Young Pioneers, 131, 133, 138, 286
Gnagbé, Kragbé, 162, 163
Gold Coast, 5, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 81, 83, 84, 92, 95, 108, 113, 166, 223, 224, 225, 226, 246, 247, 257, 285, 286 (see also Ghana)
Gold Coast National Assembly, 77
Greater Accra Region, 77, 85, 92, 129, 188 (see also Accra)
Grena, Major Mouasasi, 221
Gris, Camille, 107, 142, 152, 154
Groghuet, Christian, 151
Guéï, General Robert, 161, 203, 212, 219, 220, 221
Guiglo, 208
Guikahue, Maurice Kakou, 205
Guinea, 151
Guinea-Bissau, 35, 40, 54

Half Assini, 127
Hanoi, 134
Hansen, Johnny, 176
harambee, 39
Harlley, Inspector General J.W., 134, 137
Hassan, M.M., 131
Heymann, Eric, 84
Hohoe District, 193
hometown associations, 141, 148
Honore, Chief Petty Officer Zohin, 221
Horowitz, Donald, 55
Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, vii, xi, 5, 23, 32, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 50, 73, 74, 79, 85, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 121, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 197, 198, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 207, 208, 212, 213, 214, 215, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 229, 231, 233, 234, 237
houphouëtisme, 213

House of Chiefs, xi, 19, 39, 58, 115, 263, 286
Human Rights Watch, 211, 239, 249
Hutton-Mills, Dr. J., 93

Iddrissu, Alhaji Mahama, 182
Iddrissu, Allidu, 53
Idéal d'Odiénné, 103
immunization campaigns, 194
imports, 15, 16, 34, 47, 123, 125, 156, 169, 197
imprisonment, 9, 40, 77, 85, 103, 115, 116, 129, 132, 150, 151, 154, 161, 162, 169, 170, 171, 216, 220 (see also arrests, prison)
indemnity clauses, 30
Indénié king, 102, 103
independence leaders, 5, 33, 34, 35, 37, 39, 44, 45, 146, 167, 224, 242
independence struggle, 35, 38, 73, 84
indirect rule, 60
industrialization, 35, 111, 121, 123, 139, 155 (see also factory)
infrastructure, i, 1, 2, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 21, 43, 44, 45, 57, 98, 111, 156, 167, 170, 186, 194, 209, 226, 227, 229, 231, 238, 239, 245 (see also electricity, roads, railroads)
infrastructural capacity, 12
infrastructural power, 20
infrastructural projects, 21, 32, 185, 196, 210
Inkumsah, A.E., 120
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 41, 42, 43, 48, 164, 167, 171, 172, 175, 176, 177, 179, 195, 200, 201, 202, 204, 208, 209, 217, 218, 228, 229, 250, 251, 273, 278, 282, 291 (see also Structural Adjustment Program, World Bank)
Iran, 245
Iraq, 241, 244
Issia, 161, 199, 208
Italy, 67, 69, 242
ivoirité, 213, 214, 278 (see also Muslims, foreigners, xenophobia)

Japan, 172, 241, 242
Jawara, Dawda, 44, 45, 46
Jeffries, Richard, 223
Jeunesse-RDA de la Côte d'Ivoire (JRDACI), 151
June Fourth Movement (JFM), 172, 173, 176, 181

Kagame, Paul, 31
Kakwa, 36
Karaoke, Mathieu, 46
Katiola, 146, 161, 199
Kattah, Lieutenant-Colonel Alphonse, 137
Kaunda, Kenneth, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 50
Kebé, Yacouba, 204
Keïta, Modibo, 34, 36, 40, 50
Kenyatta, Jomo, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 50
Kérékou, Mathieu, 30, 42, 48, 49, 50
Kete Krachi, 183
Khama, Seretse, 34, 37, 39
Kikuyu, 40, 41
kingdom, 2, 9, 36, 74, 106, 107, 224, 225, 242
Kipre, Pierre, 205
Kobina, Djéni, 201, 211
Koffi, Aoussou, 152
Koffi, Blaise N'dia, 99
Koffi, Koumoué, 200
Koffi, Leon Konan, 203
Koi, Dr. Ansah, 87
Kole, Mate, 79, 82, 84
Komenda, 123
Konaré, Alpha, 41, 42, 43, 50
Koné, Amadou, 107, 152, 154
Koné, Fadika Lamine, 205
Koné, Marcel Dibonan, 211
Korhogo, 99, 100, 141, 146, 147, 161, 199, 207, 208, 210, 216, 221
Korsah, Sir Arku, 130
Kotoka, Colonel E.K., 134, 135, 137
Kouadio, M'Bahia Ble, 152
Kouamé, Faustin, 204
Kouamé, Patrice, 204
Kouto, 141
Kraus, Jon, 135, 172
Krobo, 123
Kru, 98, 99, 102, 162, 163, 215, 238, 239
Kulungugu, 129, 132, 136, 137
Kumasi, 87, 88, 90, 91, 114, 187, 188
Kusi, B.F., 82, 84, 87

L'utilisation des Personnes, 153
République des Peuples du Nord de la Côte d'Ivoir, 206
labor unions, 16, 151, 153 (see trade unions)
Lamptey, Kwesi, 82, 84, 87, 89, 93
Lamptey, Obetsibi, 93, 137
Langi, 55
Latrille, Governor André, 97, 102, 103
Laubhouet, Marcel, 141
Laurent, Staff-Sergeant Boka Yapi, 221

le Nouvel Horizon, 202
le Voie, 202
leadership, 2, 5, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 31, 32, 35, 36, 37, 46, 72, 74, 76, 79, 81, 92, 101, 109, 139, 152, 166, 168, 170, 173, 177, 196, 198, 201, 213, 223, 230, 235, 236, 263, 269
Lebanese, 148
leftist leaders, leftist regimes, 32, 41, 42, 48, 50, 135, 152 (see also socialism)
Legon, 174, 186, 188, 247, 257, 262, 268, 284, 294
Lemarchand, René, 17
Lennox-Boyd Constitution, 92, 113, 114, 115
Lennox-Boyd, Colonial Secretary Alan, 92
Les Fonds Regional d'Amenagement Rural (FRAR), 144
Lesotho, 30, 60, 256, 259, 264, 272, 277, 281, 285, 291, 294
Lewis, Arthur, 121
Liberia, 54, 195, 238, 239, 250, 258, 290
Libya, xi, 41, 42, 50, 52, 156, 171, 174, 232, 233, 241
Ligue des Originaires de la Côte d'Ivoire (LOCI), 151
Limann, Hilla, 170, 172, 173, 181, 195
Lincoln University, 76
Liphardt, Arend, 241, 244
Little Green Book, 42
Lobi, 161, 221
local government, 39, 49, 128, 187, 188, 273
local administration, 19, 20, 22, 58, 146, 148
local communities, 21, 59, 144, 183, 244
local councils, 20, 44, 127
local powerbrokers, 58, 244 (see also elites)
local revolutionary cells, 42, 46, 49, 50
Loi-cadre, 105, 150
Lomé, 120, 220
London, 48, 75, 76, 83, 84, 89, 92, 137, 165, 208, 217, 248
long-term goals, 11, 22
Loucou, Jean-Noël, 214
Loveridge, A.J., 88, 90
Lower Côte, x, 73, 95, 97, 99, 100, 224, 225 (see also Côte d'Ivoire)
Luckham, Robin, 55
Lumumba, Patrice, 118

Maga, Hubert, 34
Mahoka, 161
Mahoney, U. S. Ambassador to Ghana Bill, 223
Malawi, 41
Mali, 34, 36, 41, 42, 43, 74
Man, 145
Manchester, 76, 80, 82, 83, 89, 263
Mandela, Nelson, 50
Mankono, 208
Maoism, 46, 47, 50
Marshall-Fratani, Ruth, 163
Marx, Karl, 234
Marxism, 37, 49, 95, 100, 150, 173, 256, 259
mercenaries, 47, 48, 232
military, i, 3, 5, 14, 15, 17, 25, 33, 37, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 58, 60, 61, 68, 72, 74, 111, 119, 129, 134, 136, 137, 138, 140, 152, 153, 154, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 179, 188, 190, 195, 197, 203, 204, 212, 219, 220, 221, 222, 228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 236, 237, 238, 241, 272, 278, 280, 281, 294, 296 (see also army, security forces, coup)
military command, 14, 54, 136, 160
military government, 61, 169, 170, 228
military regime, 37, 169
military junta, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 219, 221, 237
military intervention, 46, 52, 54, 60, 61
military politicization, 14, 17
military rule, 1, 167, 169
military ranks, rank and file, 52, 54, junior and middle ranking officers, 53, officer corps, 54, 55, 132, 135, 160, 162, soldiers, 54, 134, 153, 170, 171, 203, 219, 220, 233, 290
Military Fire Fighters, 160
Mitterrand, Françios, 103, 165, 233
mobisquads, 180, 181, 187, 194
Mockey, Jean-Baptiste, 150, 154, 162
Moi, Daniel arap, 41
Mongomo, 36
Moore, Barrington, 241, 245
Moro Naba, xi, 100
Mossi, 100, 104
Mourou, 106
Moussa, Koné, 204
Mouvement de salut national (MOSANA), 220
Mozambique, 15, 30, 34, 36, 37, 40, 62
Mugabe, Robert, 31
Muluzi, Bacilli, 41
Museveni, Yoweri, 31, 41, 42, 43, 50

Muslim Association Party (MAP), 91, 93, 114
Muslims, 85, 98, 166, 167, 198, 206, 214, anti-Muslim sentiment, 168, 214
Muslim leaders, 114, 183, marabouts, 39, muftis, 47, sufi orders, 39 (see also foreigners, *ivorité*)
mutiny, mutineers, 48, 164, 165, 169, 219, 220, 221, 222, 233
Mwali, 47
Mwinyi, Ali Hassan, 42

N'Doffou III, Amon, 107
Nandom-Naa, 178, 182
National Democratic Congress (NDC), 172, 175, 181, 194, 239, 240
National Democratic Movement (NDM), 172, 173, 174, 176, 179
National Dialogues, 147, 148, 149
National Economic Review Committee (NERC), 174, 175
National Emergency Relief Committee, 179
National Liberation Movement (NLM), 82, 83, 89, 91, 92, 93, 114 (see also Ashanti)
National Mobilisation Programme, 180 (see mobisquads)
neoimperialism, 49, 60, 138, 155
neopatrimonialism, ix, 10, 11, 23, clientelism, 3
neopatrimonial regimes, 2, 29
neopatrimonial rule, i, 3, 12, 236 (see also patronage)
New Deal for Cocoa, 78, 79, 90, 292
New Democratic Movement (NDM), 172
New Patriotic Party (NPP), 86, 93, 239, 240
Ngeuma, Francisco Macías, 34, 36, 40
Nguesso, Denis Sassou, 31
Nicodeme, Zadi, 162
Niger, 30, 74
Nigeria, xi, 15, 56, 74, 176, 179, 180, 229, 232, 238, expulsions from, 179, 180, 181, 191, 229, 232, 262
Nikoi, Ashie, 76, 80, 81, 82, 84, 89, 90, 93, 116
Njazidja, 47
Nkrumah, Kwame, vii, x, xi, 5, 23, 32, 34, 36, 50, 55, 60, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 101, 104, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 125, 127, 128, 129, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 139, 140, 142, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155, 157, 158, 160, 162, 166, 174, 190, 221, 224, 225, 226, 232, 233, 234, 237, 257
Nkurunziza, Pierre, 31
Non-Formal Education and Development Programme, 183
North Korea, 41, 46
Northern People's Party (NPP), 86, 91
Northern Region, 183, 184, 252
Northern Territories, 85, 86, 115, 224
Nsawam Prison, 132
Nugent, Paul, 187
Nunoo-Mensah, Brigadier, 176
Nyemitei, H.P., 80, 82, 84
Nyerere, Julius, 30, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42, 45, 46, 50, 62
Nzima, 55, 76, 81, 127, 131, 135
Nzwani, 47

Obeng, Paul Victor, 171, 173, 177, 178, 179, 180, 187, 232
Oblé, Jacqueline, 204
Obote, Milton, 34, 36, 41, 43, 55
Ocloo, L.G.K., 190
Ocran, Lieutenant General Albert Kwesi, 136, 137, 228
Ocran, Turkson, 81, 83, 109
Odienné, 98, 99, 146, 148, 199, 208, 210, 216, 221
Office of the President, 116, 122, 132, 138, 214
Okai, Lieutenant L. A., 136
Okine, Attoh, 93
Operation Cold Chop, 134, 136 (see also coup)
Orselli, Governor Georges-Louis-Joseph, 102
Osagyefo, 117, 119, 129, 130, 131, 149, 283 (see also Nkrumah)
Osei Akoto, Baafour, 89, 187
Otu, Major General Stephen J., 134, 137
Ouagadougou, 100
Ouassenan, Gaston, 205
Ouattara, Alassane Dramane, xi, 57, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 211, 212, 213, 216, 217, 218, 219, 221, 227, 231, 238, 239
Oumé, 199
Ousenan, Commander, 161
Owusu, Victor, 83, 89, 90, 93

Palenfo, General Lassana, 161, 203, 212, 221
pan-African, 76, 85, 101, 116, 151
pan-Africanism, 73, 118, 120, 142
Paraiso, Albert, 150
paramilitary, 14, 54, 55, 129, 135
parastatal, 19, 21, 141
Paris, 74, 97, 151, 187, 191, 198, 208, 229, 246, 248, 251, 256, 258, 260, 264, 266, 267, 269, 270, 276, 277, 294
Parti Communiste de France (PCF), 101, 102, 103
Parti democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 109, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 151, 152, 154, 160, 162, 201, 202, 205, 207, 208, 210, 211, 213, 214, 216, 231
Parti Progressiste, 98, 101, 102, 104, 107, 108, 145
Parti socialist, section Française de l'International Ouvriere (SFIO), 98
party elections, 148
Party Progressites, Progressites, 98
patronage, 5, 10, 11, 16, 23, 111, 123, 145, 149, 227, 237 (see also neopatriimonialism)
peasantry, 17, 18, 21, 37, 38, 39, 50, 108, 155, 184, 261, 287 (see also preiphery, smallholder production, rural areas)
Peking, 134
Pépé, Paul, 151
periphery, 21 (see also rural areas)
pioneer farming, 106, 146, 147, 156, 161, 198, 225, 227, 264 (see also agriculture, cocoa)
police, 61, 107, 111, 131, 134, 135, 138, 153, 163, 164, 173, 200, 203, 211, 212, 218, 237
political base, 5, 35, 38, 41, 173
political consolidation, 10, 11
political pardons, 154, 155, 161, 219 (see also amnesty)
political prisoners, 103, 116, 154, 162, 219 (see also imprisonment, prison)
political reforms, 2, 9, 22, 200
political rivals, political competitors, i, 10, 11, 19, 22, 23, 145, 237, 245
political stability, i, 1, 4, 13, 14, 16, 17, 22, 23, 32, 33, 38, 40, 41, 45, 51, 56, 60, 71, 109, 111, 155, 160, 167, 190, 195, 196, 233, 234, 236, 240, 243, 244, 260, 287, 291
Popular Front, 95, 96
Port Bouët, 159, 165, 233
Portugal, 60, 67, 69
Positive Action campaign, 77, 80, 85
power consolidation, 10, 11
power sharing, 4, 10, 39, 74, 110, 117, 167, 278
predatory rule, 11, 22, 31, 33, 36
prefets, 143, 146, 147, 148, 160, 221
presidency, 3, 29, 38, 47, 198, 204, 205, 209, 213, 218, 221, 222, 224, 227, 231, 233, 237, 238, 239, 240, 243
President's Own Guard Regiment (POGR), 132, 134, 135, 138
Presidential Guard, 47, 48, 132, 165, 221, 233
Preventive Detention Act (PDA), 115, 116, 130, 132, 133, 136, 151
Price, Robert, 223
primary education, 158
prison, 77, 80, 92, 107, 130, 153, 154, 170, 200, 219, 232 (see also arrests, imprisonment)
Prison Graduates, 84
producer prices, 19, 20, 21, 36, 37, 39, 57, 79, 85, 88, 94, 128, 156, 190, 191, 200, cocoa, 74, 80, 81, 88, 124, 142, 156, 158, 164, 166, 198, 209, 217, 227, 229, coffee, 74, 142, 156, 229, pricing policies, 21, 41, 57 (see also cocoa, coffee)
professional class, 16, 95, 172, 173, 175, 178, 187, 190, 228 (see also elites)
Programme du Nord, 148
Programme to Mitigate Against the Social Costs of Structural Adjustment (PAMSCAD), 181, 187, 189, 192, 193, 246
prosperity, 1, 61, 73, 74, 155, 156, 158, 227, 239, 240 (see also economic development)
protests, 22, 78, 86, 181, 216, 218, anti-government protests, 212
Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC), 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 194, 195, 232, 247, 249, 252, 253, 263, 271, 274, 283, 287

Quist, Sir Emmanuel Charles, 78, 130

railroads, 157, 185, 200, 228 (see also infrastructure)
Ramaema, Major-General Elias Phisoana, 30
Ramanantsoa, General Gabriel, 46

Rapley, John, 224
Rassemblement Démocratique Africain (RDA), 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 142, 146, 150, 151, 214, 216
Rassemblement des réspublicains (RDR), 208, 211, 216, 218, 219, 220, 221, 268
Ratsiraka, Navy Commander Didier, 45, 46
Rawlings, Flight Lieutenant Jerry John, vii, xi, 5, 23, 29, 30, 41, 42, 50, 85, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 188, 189, 190, 191, 194, 195, 196, 220, 224, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 237, 238, 239, 252, 253, 271, 284, 287, 296
Reagan administration, 232 (see also United States, CIA)
Réforme foncière (Land Reform Law), 215
Regional Assemblies, 114, 115
regional coalitions, 12, 22, 166
Regional Constitutional Commission, 115
regional development, 11, 21, 148
religion, 47, 178, 242, 243, 285, 291
repli-tactique, 103, 162
Republic of Congo, 1, 31, 253
Republican Constitution, 116
Republican Guard, 160, 221
research design, 30
resource wealth, 51, 66, oil wealth, 68, 72
Revolutionary Committees (RCs), 42, 127
Rhodesia, 133
rice, 47, 54, 126, 156, 158
roads, road system, 3, 9, 13, 20, 74, 75, 111, 127, 145, 169, 174, 185, 187, 194, 207, 210, 226
rule of law, 20, 241
Rural Political Score (RPS), ix, x, 23, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71
rural political strategy, x, 4, 5, 12, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 30, 31, 33, 36, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 64, 107, 140, 141, 155, 159, 181, 197, 236, 237
rural areas, 12, 13, 15, 17, 21, 23, 33, 34, 35, 36, 38, 39, 43, 44, 49, 50, 58, 77, 121, 123, 127, 128, 141, 143, 149, 165, 166, 181, 184, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194, 197, 210, 237, 243, 244
rural coalitions, 12, 14, 21, 51, 52, 180, 237
rural constituents, 3, 18, 108, 190
rural development, 5, 16, 17, 20, 37, 38, 43, 44, 52, 143, 146, 168, 179, 181, 185, 188, 189, 272, 277, 278, 289
rural neglect, 52, 54, 166
rural policies, 12, 21, 49, 159, 194
rural populations, 3, 60, 184, 209
rural support, 21, 35, 45, 50, 53, 57, 128, 188
Russia, 242 (see also Soviet Union)

Sackey, Valerie, 169, 180, 183
San Pedro, 199, 210
Sandhurst, 136
Sankara, Thomas, 41, 42
Sanogo, Sekou, 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106
sans-travail, 154
Sanwi, 40, 106, 107, 145, 155, 161, 162, 164
Scheck, Saki, 80, 82, 84
schools, 13, 20, 143, 157, 185, 187, 194, 221, 226
security forces, 4, 14, 54, 55, 111, 135, 159, 162, 164, 183, 190, 194, 220, 222, 234, 236, 243 (see also army, military, coup)
security threats, security risk, political risk, 22, 32, 62, 160
Séguéla, 98, 99, 145, 146, 208
Self-Government Now, 76, 78, 79
Senegal, 30, 34, 37, 38, 39, 41, 44, 45, 153, 239, 261, 264
Senghor, Léopold, 30, 34, 37, 38, 39, 41
Sénoufo, 99, 100, 144, 161, 206, 221
separatist movement, 92, 162
settlers, 212, 215, expropriation of land, 212, 215
Seven-Year Plan, 121, 127
shortages, 35, 53, 124, 125, 127, 132, 136, 158, 171, 228, 229
Sierra Leone, 54, 255, 265, 268, 273, 275, 278, 288, 289, 292
Sio, Captain, 163
small-scale farming, 4, 14, 18, 19, 20, 21, 26, 36, 38, 40, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 94, 98, 108, 111, 121, 125, 126, 140, 155, 156, 162, 237, 243, 267 (see also agriculture)
socialism, revolutionary socialism, 42, 46, 47, 48, 49, 76, 80, 111, 121, 122, 138, 171, 172, 194, 228, 262, radical leftist regimes, 40, radical leftists, 81, 93, 119, 176, 181, 182
socialism, socialist, 33, 36, 37, 42, 49, 50, 73, 76, 81, 84, 95, 98, 116, 117, 119, 120, 122, 136, 169, 170, 173, 174, 201, 228, 258, 280, 287
Soilih, Ali, 34, 41, 47, 48
Somalia, 1, 34, 36, 40, 51, 68
Soro, Guillaume, 239
sous-prefets, 143, 146, 148, 160

Soussoudis, Michael A., 232
South Sudan, 1, 244
Soviet Union, Soviet, 35, 37, 41, 50, 84, 111, 119, 131, 136, 138, 228 (see also Russia, Eastern bloc)
Spain, 60, 242
St Cyr, Naval Captain Djikalou, 221
state development, 2, 4, 9, 11, 74, 227, 236
state building, 2, 5, 14, 34, 40, 140, 241, 244
state capacity, 5, 11, 22, 26, 155
State's Council Ordinance, 91
stranger communities, 91, 114, 143, 146, 151 (see foreigners)
strategic alliances, 3, 21, 101, 179
strikes, 48, 77, 106, 129, 140, 150, 151, 153, 154, 164, 173, 189, 190, 203, 229, 290 (see also demonstrations, protests)
Structrual Adjustment programs (SAPs), 207, 227
Structural Adjustment period (SAP), x, 5, 23, 24, 29, 33, 40, 41, 42, 43, 50, 67, 69, 71, 223
students, 148, 151, 153, 173, 185, 189, 198, 200, 201, 228, unions, 16, 149, 151, protest, 140, 190, 221
sub-Saharan Africa, i, 1, 3, 6, 9, 15, 16, 23, 30, 32, 42, 44, 53, 56, 57, 73, 75, 167, 209, 226, 243, 244, 245, 286, 287, 291
sugar complexes, 197
Sunyani, 183
support base, 36, 37, 38, 47, 58, 129, 177
Sutsuare, 123
Swollen Shoot, 78, 80, 90, 265
Syndicat agricole africain (SAA), 97, 98, 100, 102, 105, 142
Syndicat des Chefs, 144
Syndicate agricole de la CI (SACI), 95, 96

Taguana, 161
Tamale, 183
Tany, General Joseph, 203
Tanzania, 15, 30, 34, 37, 38, 40, 42
Tauthuis, General Maurice, 220
Tawiah, Ebo, 178
taxation, taxes, 2, 45, 144, 171, 191, 217
Taylor, Kurankyi, 83, 84, 89
technocrat, technocrats, 41, 111, 126, 139, 142, 148, 155, 157, 159, 166, 174, 181, 198, 201, 202, 213, 222, 239
Tema, 129, 169, 179, 183
Tema Harbor, 185
Thailand, 245
The Gambia, 44, 289
World Food Organization, 187
Thiam, Amadou, 141
Togoland, 88, 91, 93, 115, 136, 224, 262, The Councils (Northern Territories and Trans-Volta Togoland) Dissolution Act, 115
Togoland Congress, 88, 91, 93, 136
Tolon Na, 91
Touba, 161, 199
Toyo, Eskor, 176
trade unions, 76, 95, 226, 229, union leaders, 20, 49, 81, 148, 150, 151, 152
traditional agriculture, 4, 22, 23, 33, 34, 37, 50, 74, 120, 159, 166, 236 (see also agriculture, smallholder production)
traditional leaders, traditional elites, 5, 16, 17, 19, 23, 30, 33, 36, 37, 40, 47, 49, 50, 51, 56, 80, 89, 94, 107, 108, 109, 139, 144, 162, 182, 188, 191, 194, 241, 242, 243, 245 (see also chiefs, chieftaincy, elites)
Traoré, Moussa, 43
Tsiboe, Nancy, 93
Tsikata, Captain Kojo, 172, 173, 175, 179
Tsikata, Tsatu, 173
Tsiranana, Philibert, 45, 46
Tswana, 39
Tuaregs, 43

Uganda, 31, 34, 36, 41, 42, 43, 54, 60, 254, 262, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 274, 275, 276, 278, 281, 282, 284, 288, 289, 291, 293, 296
ujamaa, 38, 42, 46 (see also Nyerere)
unions (see trade unions)
Union des Indépendants de la Côte d'Ivoire (UICI), 98
Union générale des travailleurs d'Afrique noire (UGTAN), 151
Union pour le development economique de la Côte d'Ivoire (UDECI), 105
Union pour le development economique de la Côte d'Ivoire (UDECI), 105, 106
United Ghana Farmers Council of Cooperatives (UGFCC), 125, 128
United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC), 75, 76, 77, 80
United Party (UP), 93, 116
United States (USA), 15, 41, 48, 60, 130, 132, 133, 174, 175, 195, 198, 203, 204, 207, 211, 249, 250, 258, 264, 266, 267, 271, 274, 275, 278, 280, 287, 290, 295, 296 (see also CIA)
Upper Côte, 98, 100, 104
Upper East Region, 183, 184, 194

Upper Region, 173, 178, 181, 182, 276
Upper Volta, 34, 41, 42, 52, 60, 74, 100, 129, 157, 198, 200, 202
Upper West Region, 182, 183, 184, 194
urban areas, 13, 33, 45, 52, 121, 184, 189, 190, 194, 196, 197, 209, 226, 230, 231, 237, 241
urban constituents, i, 12, 22, 39, 88, 106, 195
urban consumers, 21, 38, 88
urban discontent, 5, 21, 184, 240
urban drift, 155, 158, 159, 181, 198
urban population, 14, 15, 61, 66, 68
urban protest, 154, 155, 212
urban riots, 12, 18, 52
urban unrest, i, x, 14, 140, 150
urban workers, 189
urbanization, 15, 61, 72, 123, 148, 156, 158
urban bias, 5, 14, 37, 38, 39, 40, 45, 94, 121, 139, 166, 191, 194, 236, 238
urban political strategy, 4, 12, 14, 18, 21, 23

Van Lare, Justice, 130
vanilla, 46, 47
Verandah Boys, 77
Vichy government, 96, 97, 98 (see also France)
Vietnam, 134
Village Development Committees (VDC), 127
Volta Region, 91, 115, 129, 136, 173, 188, 193, 194, 276, 294 (see also Togoland)
Volta River Authority, 183

Wa, 182, 183
Wade, Abdoulaye, 30
Wallace-Johnson, 76
wealthy farmers, 38, 98
West African National Secretariat (WANS), 76, 80, 84
West African Students Union, 76, 83
Western Region, 126, 127, 173, 188, 194
white farmers, 96, 150 (see also colons)
Widner, Jennifer, 3
Wodié, Francis, 153, 163, 205, 216, 220
Woode, Anthony, 81, 83, 109
Workers' Brigade, 126, 128, 131, 133, 135
World Bank, 41, 42, 43, 167, 172, 174, 177, 191, 192, 193, 195, 209, 217, 226, 228, 229, 250, 251, 258, 266, 274, 278, 282, 283, 291, 293 (see also International Monetary Fund, Structural Adjustment Program)
World War II, 4, 95

xenophobia, 151, 156, 167, 198, 206, 213, 215, 225, 237, 270 (see also Muslims, foreigners, *ivoirié*)

Yacé, Philippe, 141, 144, 202
Yacouba, 161, 204, 212, 221
Yamoussoukro, 141, 144, 165, 197, 199, 214, 251
Yankey, Ambrose, 131, 190
Yeebo, Zaya, 172

Zambia, 30, 34, 37, 38, 239
Zana, Nibi, 204
Zanlerigu, Lieutenant-Colonel David Gbon, 132
Zaoucou, Bernard Zadi, 205
Zaourou, Zadi, 205
Zenawi, Meles, 31
Zimbabwe, 30, 31, 254, 261, 262, 265, 266, 267, 276, 278, 279, 282, 286, 290