Credibility in Compliance and Punishment: Leader Specific Punishments and Credibility

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The ability of nation A to compel nation B to grant it concessions depends upon the credibility with which A can commit to punish B for noncompliance. Discarding traditional unitary actor approaches, we assume policy in each nation is set by mortal political leaders and model the compliance/punishment relation between A and B in a noisy infinitely repeated setting. If nations utilize leader specific punishment, that is target policies against leaders rather than the nations they represent, then leaders improve the credibly of their threats to punish noncompliance since citizens have incentives to depose leaders to restore national integrity.

The limits of international cooperation and the limits to which nation A can compel another nation, B, to shifts its policies to A's liking depend upon the extent to which nation A can credibly commit to punish nation B for noncompliance. We combine recent theoretical insights of Leader Specific Punishments (McGillivray and Smith 2000) and design of international organizations (Rosendorff 2004; Rosendorff and Milner 2001) to examine how much cooperation and compliance can be enforced in a noisy environment of imperfect information. We show that when domestic political institutions are such that the domestic replacement of leaders is easy, as it is in democratic nations, punishment strategies targeted against individual leaders increase the credibility of punishment and compliance and hence increase the range of conditions under which nation A can credibly compel nation B.

Traditional liberal approaches to international cooperation emphasize the role of reciprocal punishments in generating a commitment to an agreement (Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Keohane 1984). Although these approaches often attempt to integrate domestic politics, most often in the form of shaping national preferences, the liberal paradigm typically analyses interstate relations from the perspective of unitary actor nations. Here we shift the unit of analysis from the nation state to individual leaders. Building on McGillivray and Smith's (2000) concept of Leader Specific Punishments (LSP), we assess the impact of having sanctions and punishments targeted against individual leaders rather than the nations they represent. We derive how the limits on compliance and cooperation depend upon domestic political institutions and show how the pattern of interactions between states depend upon domestic political institutions and leader turnover. Leader specific punishments enable higher levels of cooperation and compliance to be credibly implemented.

McGillivray and Smith (2000, 2004, 2005) introduced the concept of leader specific punishment (LSP) in the context of the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma game to show that punishments targeted against individual leaders rather than nations per se improve the range of conditions under which cooperation is possible provided domestic political institutions allow for the relatively easy replacement of political leaders. The basic idea behind LSP is that nation A punishes nation B for cheating or reneging on an agreement for only as long as the leader in nation B who implemented the cheating remains in power. In this context, if β is the leader of nation B then nation B's reputation or integrity really belongs to leader β. Similarly, nation A's reputation is associated with its leader α. Since under LSP, A holds a grudge against β rather than B, the replacement of

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leader β provides the opportunity to normalize relations between states.

Recent accounts of U.S. relations with Yugoslavia and Iraq illustrate the leader specific nature of U.S. security and sanctions policy. U.S. policy explicitly targeted sanctions against the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic of Yugoslavia and Saddam Hussein of Iraq. The removal of these leaders ended economic sanctions and reinvigorated relations. McGillivray and Stam (2004) show a systematic relationship between leader turnover and termination of economic sanctions. Since leader turnover restores cooperative relations and ends punishment, LSP strategies provide the citizens of a nation with an incentive to depose any leader who incurs the ire of foreign states. By removing such a leader the citizens can end the punishment phase and normalize relations. This provides citizens with a motive to replace leaders following the breakdown of cooperation. Since political leaders want to retain office, leaders who are easily replaced avoid actions that endanger international cooperation. Through this mechanism the level of cooperation obtainable between nations with easily replaced leaders is much higher than the level of cooperation possible between unitary actor states. In the context of cooperation between ethnic groups, Fearon and Laitin (1996) show that intragroup punishment can enhance the prospects for intergroup cooperation.

While insightful, the McGillivray and Smith (2000) model considers only the simple case of the prisoners' dilemma with its binary choice to cooperate or defect in a world of perfect information. Here we generalize the study of LSP by considering an infinitely repeated compliance/punishment game of policy disagreements between nations A and B in a noisy environment with mortal (i.e., not infinitely lived) leaders. The basic interaction between nations A and B is as follows. At time t, β, the leader of nation B, picks a policy x_{Bt} between 0 and 1. We assume that nation B (or at least the political elite of that state) want to set the policy as high as possible. In contrast, nation A wants policy set as low as possible. Given policy choice x_{Bt} nation B receives a payoff of x_{Bt}, while A's payoff is $(1 - x_{Bt})$. We examine the extent to which nation A can compel nation B to maintain policy below some specified threshold, h, through the threat of sanctioning noncompliance.

The nature of the policy disagreement in the compliance/punishment game can be thought of in two ways. First, the game speaks directly to attempts by nation A to compel nation B to alter its policies to A's wishes. Examples of such interactions are commonplace. For instance the U.S. pressures nations to improve their human rights records, assist in the war on terror, help stem the flow of illegal drugs, and uphold international copyright laws. In these examples nation A requests that nation B sets policy away from what B would ideally choose, $x_{Bt} = 1$, by threatening sanctions as punishment if B's policy is observed above the threshold h. A second alternative interpretation of the model is that it represents half of a cooperative arrangement. Trade agreements can be thought of in this context. The threshold h represents the limit of the tariffs B can impose in A's exports. The other (unmodeled) half of the agreement specifies A's concessions to B. Although the results of the model have implications for cooperative agreements, for ease of language, we focus on the first compliance/punishment case.

The world is a noisy place. As such it is not always possible to directly observe nation B's policy. For example, nation A cannot perfectly monitor nation B's human rights record. When nation B decides how many people to torture, it cannot be certain how many of these instances will be reported in nation A. While nation B's policy is x_{Bt}, nation A observes $y_{Bt} = x_{Bt} + \varepsilon_{Bt}$, where ε_{Bt} is a stochastic error with iid distribution $F(\varepsilon_{Bt})$. For convenience we assume $F()$ is continuous, concave, and twice differentiable with full support. We restrict attention to the exponential distribution. See Downs and Rocke (1995), Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983) for related models.

The probability, p, that nation B is found in breach of the "rules" defined by the threshold h increases as the policy choice x_{Bt} increases. Specifically, $p = \Pr(y_{Bt} > h) = \Pr(x_{Bt} + \varepsilon_{Bt} > h) = 1 - F(h - x_{Bt})$. The higher nation B sets its policy choice, the greater the rewards from the policy but the more likely it is to be caught breaking the rules. This is one of the fundamental trade-offs nations face when setting policy (Downs and Rocke 1995).

When leaders set policy one of their essential considerations is the consequence of being "caught." If there is no effective punishment for being caught then nations pay little heed to the rules. In contrast, if detected violations result in harsh punishments then leaders are more likely to set policy low so as to reduce the risk of being caught. We assume nation A can apply sanctions to nation B. These sanctions impose a cost c_B on nation B and cost nation A c_A to send. The key insight of leader specific punishments is that in political systems where leader replacement is relatively easy citizens will depose leaders who in some sense do not "play by the rules." We say a leader has integrity but loses it if she does not play by the rules. In the current context, α maintains her integrity by sanc-

tioning β whenever appropriate. Leader β loses her integrity if her policy is observed to cross the threshold, $y_{Bt} > h$. Once in breach of such a threshold, β's integrity depends upon her willingness to apologize by making additional policy concessions. The willingness of the citizens to depose their leader to restore national integrity magnifies the effective size of the sanction that a leader faces by endangering a leader's hold on office. Domestic institutions and leader turnover shape the compliance/punishment relationship.

In international relations most formal models consider repeated relations between nations or leaders as interactions between infinitely lived agents. Of course, leaders are not infinitely lived and are subject to the same actuarial risks that we all face. We explicitly model mortality, with each leader surviving each round of the game with probability λ and dying with probability $(1 - \lambda)$. Leader mortality shapes relations between states. When sanctions are leader specific, leader turnover rejuvenates relations between states. Although the risk that the game ends is often given as an interpretation for discounting, we explicitly separate discounting from survival. All players have a common discount rate, δ. Unless interactions are between genuine unitary actors, conflating discount rates and mortality mischaracterizes interstate relations. Although mortality means the end of a payoff stream for a leader, for citizens a leader's death can reinvigorate relations and improve their payoffs.

The compliance/punishment relationship is based on the credibility with which nation A can punish nation B. Nation A can enforce compliance by immediately punishing nation B if nation B is caught cheating, $y_{Bt} > h$. Although scholars have examined such mechanisms (see Downs and Rocke 1995; Green and Porter 1984; McGillivray and Smith 2005; Porter 1983), few interstate relations are based on immediate punishment. Usually when alleged violations occur, nations engage in dialogue and allow each other the opportunity to make redress before punishments are applied. Institutions, such as the WTO's dispute resolution mechanism (www.wto.org), provide nations the opportunity to explicitly "apologize."

In international trade it is often difficult to distinguish between a policy designed to uphold a nondiscriminatory domestic environmental standard, something allowed under WTO rules, and a discriminatory protectionist measure designed to inhibit trade, which is not allowed under WTO rules. The world is a noisy place. In terms of our model, the dispute resolution mechanism's judicial panel decides whether the observed policy (y_{Bt}) breaks the rules. That is the panel judges whether $y_{Bt} > h$. Once found in breach of an agreement, nation B has an opportunity to redress the harm caused to nation A. If nation B does not do so then the WTO authorizes nation A to take retaliatory sanctions. Rosendorff (2004) and Rosendorff and Milner (2001) show the ability to "opt out" of the agreement and then apologize increases the robustness of the WTO's institutions. Not only does the ability to apologize allow nations to recover from accidental default, but Rosendorff argues nations are more willing to enter agreements when they know they can temporarily opt out in response to unanticipated domestic demands for protection.

The opportunity to "apologize" is a common feature within compliance/punishment relations. For instance, in 1997 the U.S. Congress threatened to remove Mexico's certification as an ally in the war on drugs. This threat followed a variety of incidents which suggested widespread corruption in those Mexican law enforcement agencies responsible for drug enforcement. Perhaps most noticeable was the arrest of General Jesus Gutierrez Rebello, head of newly created National Institute to Combat Drugs, on corruption charges. It was alleged that he worked for the Juarez drug cartel. Following these revelations, and the subsequent U.S. threat to decertify Mexico, Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo implemented wide ranging reforms of Mexico's antidrug forces which succeeded in restoring Mexico's reputation as a partner in the war on drugs (Hinojosa 2002).

We believe opportunities for compensation, rather than immediate punishment, are the norm and explicitly model these opportunities within our analysis of the compliance/punishment game mechanism. We say B has broken the rules if $y_{Bt} > h$. In the next period, nation B can "apologize" to nation A through additional policy concessions, that is by setting $y_{Bt} \leq h_0$ where $h_0 < h$. For both technical convenience and to reflect increased monitoring of malfeasants, we assume that once nation B has been caught cheating $(y_{Bt} > h)$ then its policies are perfectly monitored until its reputation is restored, i.e., $y_{Bt} = x_{Bt}$. In terms of the McCubbins and Schwartz distinction (1987), this is to say that after the "fire alarm" sounds "police patrols" perfectly monitor behavior. Although such monitoring is clearly not costless, this assumption simplifies the analysis and keeps the focus on the optimal policy in the compliance/compellance relationship.

Compliance, Punishment and Credibility

Constructivist scholars, such as Chayes and Chayes (1995), Hathaway (2002, 2004) and Raustiala and

Slaughter (2002), argue that as nations honor international agreements then the agreements develop legitimacy that help ensure future compliance. Proponents of these arguments are quick to cite the high levels of compliance within international organizations as evidence. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996; see also Gilligan 2004) argue instead that compliance is high because agreements are shallow, with agreements written to codify the policies that nations wish to implement anyway. In the context of our model, if the threshold is set at $h = 1$ then nation B can implement its preferred policy and never be found in violation of the agreement, so compliance and punishment are moot points. As an empirical matter, international agreements vary enormously, not only in the concessions they seek from parties but also in their arrangements for monitoring (that is observing y_{Bt}) and specifying what actions are sanctionable in the event of a rules violation. The WTO specifies rules, a monitoring mechanism, and enforcement through sanctions. Arms control treaties, by contrast, although providing detailed rules and verification mechanisms, rarely, if ever, specify what to do in the event of a violation. Other agreements, such as the Kyoto environmental agreements, specify nothing beyond broad policy goals. That is, Kyoto specifies neither a monitoring mechanism nor a punishment scheme in the event that nations fail to comply. The result has been widespread noncompliance.

The principal problem in compliance/punishment arguments is that without a credible threat of punishment for noncompliance, nation B will never shift its policy position to comply with the rules. Yet, if it is costly to punish, as in our model ($c_A > 0$), then nation A has no myopic incentive to sanction nation B for noncompliance. To ensure compliance, not only does nation A need a stick with which to punish nation B, but nation A must also be able to commit to use the stick if B breaks the rules. A credible commitment to punish nation B is essential to A's ability to compel nation B.

Scholars have formally modeled the credibility problem from the context of the chain-store paradox (Selten 1978). The original chain-store model examines the behavior of a firm which is a monopolist in a number of local markets. Rival firms consider entry into each of these markets. If the competitor enters the market then the chain store can either compete at market prices with its rival or it can enter a price war with its new competitor by selling products at below cost. This price war imposes losses on both itself and the competitor in the local market. Of course, in any single local market it is not credible for the chain store to enter a price war. However if there are multiple markets and the chain store demonstrates its willingness to punish any rival who enters one of its markets, then the chain store can deter rivals from entering in other local markets. Unfortunately, such a commitment lacks credibility. If rivals have already penetrated all but one of the chain store's local markets, then a competitor's entry into the last market suggests a price war has no impact on future entry decisions and only harms the chain store. Hence the chain store does not defend the last market. Now consider the penultimate local market. Whatever happens in this market, tomorrow the chain store will not defend the last market. Knowing this, there is nothing to be gained from defending the penultimate market. Repeating this argument in each preceding market shows how the credibility of the price-war threat unravels. Scholars have solved the credibility problem by assuming that a "crazy" type exists who prefers a self-defeating price war to competition (Kreps and Wilson 1982). However, it is troubling that the maintenance of A's reputation requires such a technical fix.

Alt, Calvert, and Humes (1988) model hegemonic control by assuming that while it is generally costly to punish dissent, sometimes the hegemon can do so costlessly. By punishing any first-round defector the hegemon might hope to convince states contemplating defection in the second round that it is a type of hegemon that is likely to be able to punish with low cost. Although Alt, Calvert, and Humes show that this mechanism can sometimes work, it is not credible for the hegemon to always punish in the first round, and the maintenance of a reputation is stochastic.

Despite our reservations, the value of a reputation for an external audience is a common theme that deserves serious consideration (for discussion see Sartori 2005). Therefore, we assume that nation A receives a payoff of R if it maintains an honest reputation. Such an exogenous reward makes sense in the context of multilateral relations. If we think of a commitment by N states to make concessions to nation A, then the payoff R can be thought of as $(N - 1)$ times the payoff from having state B comply with A's rules. As we shall show, when leader replacement is difficult, this exogenous payoff plays a crucial role in maintaining credibility, suggesting that, absent accountable domestic political institutions, leaders can only maintain their credible commitment to sanction in multilateral situations. In contrast, when leader removal is easy then LSP ensures a credible commitment to punish even in bilateral situations (i.e., absent R).

A Model of Compliance and Punishment

In order to enforce compliance, nation A must commit to sanction B for past transgressions. To describe the conditionality of prior play of the game on current strategies, we use Markovian state variables to describe the pertinent features of the history of previous play, and we characterize Markov Perfect Equilibria (see Fundenberg and Tirole 1991, chapt 13, for definitions). The Markov assumption means players base their strategies only on the state variable, which in this case contains the relevant information about past play. The behaviors we describe are sustainable as Subgame Perfect Equilibria.

The formal model is an infinitely repeated version of the compliance/punishment game:

1) β, the leader of nation B, picks policy $x_{B,t} \in [0, 1]$. The outcome of the policy, $y_{B,t} = x_{B,t} + \varepsilon_{B,t}$, is observed by all players, where $\varepsilon_{B,t}$ is a stochastic error with distribution $F()$ if the state variable $Z_{Bt} = 0$, and $\varepsilon_{B,t} = 0$ otherwise.
2) α the leader of nation A decides whether or not to sanction B.
3) The citizens in nation A decide whether or not to replace their leader, α. The citizens in nation B then decide whether or not to keep leader β. (We assume there is an infinite pool of potential challengers such that, once removed, leaders have no prospects of returning. Challengers are identical to incumbents in every way.)
4) Players receive payoffs based upon the outcome of the game.
5) Both leaders face mortality risks: with probability λ_j leader j survives; with probability $(1 - \lambda_j)$ leader j dies and is replaced by another leader.
6) The state variable $Z_t = (Z_{At}, Z_{Bt})$ is updated according to the passage of play.

The payoffs for the stage game are as follows: The citizens B and the leader β of nation B receive the payoff $U_B(x_t, s_t) = x_{B,t} - s_t c_B$, where x_{Bt} is leader β's policy choice, s_t is A's choice of whether to sanction and c_B is the cost of the sanctions if they are applied. Players in nation A receive the payoff $U_A(x, s) = (1 - x_{Bt}) - s_t c_A + R(1 - Z_{At})$, where R is the value of having a good reputation at the start of the period and c_A is the cost of sanctioning.

In addition to these payoffs from the interaction between nations A and B, players receive domestic payoffs. Each leader, β and α, receives a payoff of Ψ if they are retained. The payoff Ψ represents the inherent value of holding office, which is assumed to be large: $\Psi >> 1$. Office holding is the primary motivation of leaders. The citizens in nation A pay a cost r_A to replace leader α. Similarly the citizens in nation B pay the cost r_B to replace β.

Obviously the past histories of this game can be extremely complex. In subgame perfect equilibrium strategies can depend upon the entire history of play. While it is often easy to informally describe the pattern of play, a formal description of a player's strategy is often tedious and difficult to write down. Therefore, we restrict attention to specific features of previous play that we describe with the state variables.

Z_{At} and Z_{Bt} are the standings of states A and B at time t. Initially each nation starts in good standing, and this good standing is restored with the replacement of its leader (either by the citizens or mortality): $Z_{B0} = 0$, and $Z_{A0} = 0$. Strictly speaking a nation's standing belongs to its leader. Leader replacement reinvigorates a nation's integrity. Leader α (that is nation A) maintains a good standing unless she fails to sanction when she should. Once her standing is tarnished, $Z_{At} = 1$, her nation has a poor standing until she is replaced.

Nation B's leader, β, also starts in good standing. If her observed policy actions are above the threshold, $y_{Bt} > h$, then she is said to have been caught cheating and her reputation becomes $Z_{Bt+1} = 1$. If $Z_{Bt} > 0$ and leader β apologizes, that is to say she plays $y_{Bt} \leq h_0$, then her reputation improves $Z_{Bt+1} = Z_{Bt} - 1$. If, however, she fails to apologize then the state variable increases: $Z_{Bt+1} = Z_{Bt} + 1$. Each time leader β fails to apologize her state variable increases and each time she apologizes it decreases. Nation B's reputation follows this pattern unless either nation A falls into poor standing or leader β is replaced in which case nation B's standing is refreshed.

All the equilibria we describe provide β with an opportunity to apologize before sanctioning starts. Downs and Rocke (1995), Green and Porter (1984), and Porter (1983) characterize equilibrium with punishment schemes that do not allow for apology. As with most infinitely repeated games, there are many equilibria. It is therefore important to argue why we focus on the equilibria that we do. Apology is an important feature of many real world interactions between nations that helps provide flexibility to the institutional framework. Within this genre of equilibria we focus on maximizing enforcement and compliance of the rules. Of course from an economist's perspective compliance is not as important as efficiency. Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983), for

example, characterize efficiency when there are underlying returns from nations A and B cooperating. However, the conflict in our model is inherently distributional and as such efficiency is of less concern. Indeed, in the compliance game Pareto efficiency implies any outcome without sanctions. Given our political focus on distributional concerns, we characterize how leader specific punishments and domestic institutions increase the parameter space in which full compliance can be attained. From the perspective of nation A, domestic political institutions that allow for the easy replacement of leaders and a focus on leader specific punishments will be welfare improving.

We now briefly describe play along the equilibrium path for the base case. Given she is in good standing ($Z_{Bt} = 0$) leader β plays $x_{Bt} = x^*$. If in the previous period she was caught cheating then she plays $x_{Bt} = h_0 < h$. In higher states she either apologizes ($x_{Bt} = h_0$ if $Z_{Bt} \leq \overline{Z}$) or sets $x_{Bt} = 1$ (if $Z_{Bt} > \overline{Z}$). At the point $Z_{Bt} > \overline{Z}$ leader β would have to apologize too many times to make restoring relations with A worthwhile.

Leader α sanctions if she is in good standing ($Z_{At} = 0$) and if nation B was caught cheating in the past and failed to apologize ($Z_{Bt} > 1$ or ($Z_{Bt} = 1$ and $y_{Bt} > h_0$)); otherwise leader α does not sanction. In the base case, that we examine first, citizens never replace their leaders.

Continuation values describe the expected payoff from playing the game given the state variables. We use the notation $V_\alpha(Z_{At}, Z_{Bt})$ to describe the expected payoff for leader α from playing the game starting in state (Z_{At}, Z_{Bt}). We use parallel notation for other actors.

Credibility, Compliance, and Punishment

LSP influence the credibility and depth of international agreements. We start with a base case in which citizens never remove their leader. Through exploration of key aspects of the equilibrium, we explain how LSP shape the credibility of punishments within the equilibrium. At the request of the editor, for brevity full characterizations of equilibria and proofs are consigned to the appendix. For convenience we will frequently use a numerical example where $F(q) = 1 - e^{-\frac{q}{.05}}$, $\delta = .9$, $\lambda_B = .8$, $\lambda_A = .8$, $h_0 = 0$, and $h = .5$.

Base Case LSP (with no endogenous leader replacement)

Proposition 1: Base Case Leader Specific Punishments (equilibrium 1).

If the costs of leader removal are high (as formally defined in the appendix), the cost of imposing sanctions for nation A are modest $\left(c_A \leq \delta\lambda_A \frac{(\delta\lambda_A(1-\delta\lambda_A)(1-\lambda_B))V_\alpha(0,0) - \delta\lambda_A(1-\lambda_B)\Psi + (1-\delta\lambda_A)R}{(1-\delta\lambda_A)(1+\delta\lambda_A(1-\lambda_B))}\right)$,

where $V_\alpha(0,0) = \frac{(1+\delta\lambda_{Ap}\lambda_B)(\Psi+R+1) - \delta\lambda_{Ap}\lambda_B h_0 - x^*}{(1-\delta\lambda_A)(1+\delta\lambda_{Ap}\lambda_B)}$, *and sanctions impose high costs on nation*

$$\left(c_B \geq \frac{(-\lambda_B\delta_p - 1 + \lambda_B\delta)h_0 + \lambda_B\delta_p + 1 - \delta\lambda_B x^*}{\lambda_B\delta_p + 1}\right),$$

then there exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which leader α *always sanctions if leader* β *fails to apologize and leader* β *immediately apologizes if caught cheating* ($x_{B,t} = h_0$). *When leader* β *has an honest reputation* ($Z_{B,t} = 0$) *she sets policy at* x^* *which solves* $p\lambda_B\delta + 1 + \lambda_B\delta\frac{dp}{dx}(h_0 - x^*) = 0$, *where* $p = 1 - F(h - x^*)$ *and* $\frac{dp}{dx} = F'(h - x^*)$.

In the base case, citizens never remove their leaders. Leader α sanctions if and only if nation B has crossed the line ($y_{Bt} > h$) and not apologized. In the initial state leader β plays policy $x_{Bt} = x^*$; if she crosses the line ($y_{Bt} > h$) then she apologizes in the next period ($y_{Bt} = h_0$). Should A ever lose its good standing ($Z_{At} = 1$) then β maximizes policy, $x = 1$. Should β need to apologize too many times, such that restoring good relations is not worthwhile, ($Z_{At} = 0$, $Z_{Bt} > \overline{Z}$) then β maximizes policy ($x = 1$) and accepts that sanctions will be applied in perpetuity.

We start by deriving β's optimal behavior when she has an honest reputation, $Z_{Bt} = 0$. The continuation value $V_\beta(Z_{At}, Z_{Bt})$ is the expected value for leader β of playing the game starting in state (Z_{At}, Z_{Bt}). In the initial state, ($Z_{At} = 0$, $Z_{Bt} = 0$), leader β plays policy x^*. With probability $p = \Pr(x^* + \varepsilon_{it} > h) = 1 - F(h - x^*)$ nation B is observed to cross the line and breach the threshold h. That is, nation B is observed to break the rules. Following such a breach, in the next period the state variable will be ($Z_{At} = 0$, $Z_{Bt} = 1$) and nation B apologizes by setting $x_{Bt} = h_0$. This restores the state to the initial ($Z_{At} = 0$, $Z_{Bt} = 0$). Leader β's continuation value in state (0, 1) is $V_\beta(0, 1) = \Psi + h_0 + \delta\lambda_B V_\beta(0, 0)$, which is the value of office holding and the value of the policy h_0 plus the discounted value of playing the game tomorrow given that the leader survives, which occurs with probability λ_B.

Leader β's continuation value for the initial state (0, 0) is $V_\beta(0, 0) = (\Psi + x^\star) + p\delta\lambda_B V_\beta(0, 1) + (1 - p)\delta\lambda_B V_\beta(0, 0)$, that is the value of office holding and policy $x^\star$ plus the discounted (and mortality risk decreased) payoff associated with future play, which with probability p is $V_\beta(0, 1)$ and with probability $(1 - p)$ is $V_\beta(0, 0)$. Substituting in the value for $V_\beta(0, 1)$ yields that $V_\beta(0,0) = \dfrac{\Psi + x^\star + p\delta\lambda_B(\Psi + h_0)}{(1-\delta\lambda_B)(p\delta\lambda_B + 1)}$, where $p = 1 - F(h - x^\star)$. To ensure it maximizes her payoff, leader β picks the value of $x^\star$ that maximizes $V_\beta(0, 0)$, which implies the first-order condition $p\lambda_B\delta + 1 + \lambda_B\delta\dfrac{dp}{dx}(h_0 - x) = 0$. For our numerical example $x^\star = .417$ and the probability that β is caught cheating is $p = .189$.

In this base case equilibrium leader β apologizes because she knows if she does not then she will be subject to indefinite sanction by nation A. Yet, much as we saw in the chain store paradox, the whole equilibrium is supported on the threat that nation A will punish noncompliance in every state. How credible is this threat? Once $Z_{Bt} > \overline{Z}$, leader β prefers to set policy to $x_{Bt} = 1$ and endure sanctions rather than apologize Z_{Bt}. Once in one of the states $Z_{Bt} > \overline{Z}$, A's sanctions have no prospect of influencing nation B's behavior. Yet, if α does not sanction in these states the credibility of the whole equilibrium unravels. To see why, suppose that α ends sanctions in states $Z_{Bt} > \overline{Z}$, sanctions are after all ineffective in such settings. Given that by failing to apologize once more leader β can end sanctions and adopt her more preferred policy ($x_{Bt} = 1$), leader β never apologizes in state $\overline{Z}$. Leader α gains nothing by sanctioning in state $\overline{Z}$ and therefore should not sanction. Repeating this logic by induction, α's entire credibility to sanction collapses in a manner akin to that described in the chain store paradox.

In order for A to maintain its credibility to sanction in all possible states requires that sanctions are not too costly to nation A. Specifically, α can only credibly commit to sanction under all circumstances if $c_A \le \dfrac{(1-\lambda_B\delta)(\lambda_B\delta p + 1)R + \delta\lambda_A(1-\lambda_B)x^\star + \delta^2\lambda_A\lambda_{Bp}(1-\lambda_B)h_0}{(1-\lambda_B\delta)(\lambda_B\delta_p + 1)}$ $= .953R + .202$.

To understand α's credibility it is essential to consider the origins of this limit on the cost of sanctioning. If α fails to sanction when it should punish nation B then α loses all her credibility. In future rounds no nation will be accommodating to nation A. Hence α's payoff is $1 - x_{Bt} + \Psi + R + \delta\lambda_A(V_\alpha(1, 0))$, where $V_\alpha(1,0) = \dfrac{\Psi}{1-\delta\lambda_A}$. If α sanctions then she retains her credibility and her payoff is $1 - x_{Bt} - c_A + \Psi + R + \delta\lambda_A(V_\alpha(0, Z_{Bt+1}))$, where Z_{Bt+1} describes the state in following rounds given play in the current round. The worst this payoff can be is in a state $Z_{Bt+1} > \overline{Z}$, at which point nation B has to apologize too many times to make apology worthwhile. Instead, in these states β sets $x_{Bt} = 1$ and endures sanctions in future periods. In such a setting, leader α continues sanctioning until leader β dies and relations are restored. Hence only if $c_A \le \delta\lambda_A(V_\alpha(0, Z_{Bt}) - V_\alpha(1, 0))$ for all Z_{Bt} is leader α's commitment to sanction credible.

In the base case, credibility is obtained through two paths. First, A does not have to sanction indefinitely because leader β is mortal and, if she dies, or is otherwise replaced, then sanctions end; nation B's record as an unapologetic noncomplier is wiped clean. This reduces the expected length of sanctions. Second, if nation A does not sanction defector B then it loses all credibility vis-à-vis other states. As a result, nation A loses the payoff R, which it receives for maintaining its external reputation. This payoff of R greatly enhances the maintenance of credibility. However, as $R \to 0$ and leader β becomes more stable in office, $\lambda_B \to 1$, then sanctions need to become costless in order for nation A to credibly maintain its commitment to sanction unapologetic transgressors.

The base case suffers from the same credibility problem as the chain-store paradox. If leader α is easily replaced then leader specific punishments resolve nation A's commitment problem by linking leader survival to a willingness to sanction.

Domestically Accountable Leaders and Credible Punishment

If leader α ever fails to punish a nonapology then she loses her integrity and it becomes impossible for her to credibly commit to sanction in the future. Nation B will never again comply with the rules once α has revealed her inability to commit to punish. As long as α remains the leader of nation A, nation B will not comply. Yet under LSP strategies, nation A's reputation is restored by replacing leader α. By deposing their leader, the citizens in nation A restore their national reputation and restart nation B's compliance. If the value of restoring their nation's reputation, which is derived from B's compliance, is greater than the cost of leader removal then the citizens depose

their leader if she fails to punish noncompliance appropriately.

If the costs of leader removal in nation A are sufficiently modest, then leader α can commit to punish nation B's noncompliance and failure to apologize. If leader α does not sanction, then she will be domestically deposed. Since retaining office is the primary goal of political leaders and a failure to punish appropriately costs a leader her job, leaders can commit to punish. We examine this commitment through equilibrium 2. Since in most regards this equilibrium 2 is identical to the base case (equilibrium 1), we state the differences between equilibria 1 and 2 below and defer the formal characterization to the appendix.

Proposition 2: Leader Specific Punishments with Sanction Costs (equilibrium 2).

If the cost of removing leader α *is low* $(r_A \leq \delta\lambda_A \frac{1-\delta}{1-\lambda_A\delta} \frac{1-x^*\lambda_B\delta p(1-h_0)+R(1+\delta\lambda_B p)}{(1-\delta)(\lambda_B\delta p+1)}$ $= 1.6283 + 2.571R)$, *and* $c_A \leq \Psi + \lambda_A\delta\lambda_B R + \delta\lambda_A(1-\lambda_B) \frac{(1+\delta\lambda_A p\lambda_B)(\Psi+R+1) - \delta\lambda_A p\lambda_B h_0 - x^*}{(1-\delta\lambda_A)(1+\delta\lambda_A p\lambda_B)}$ $= 1.514\Psi + 1.090R + .321$, *then there exists a MPE in which leader* α *always sanctions nations caught cheating that fail to apologize (either* $Z_{Bt} = 1$ *and* $y_{Bt} > h$ *or* $Z_{Bt} > 1$*) and the citizens in nation A remove* α *should she fail to sanction when she should.*

The major difference between equilibrium 2 and its base-case predecessor (equilibrium 1) is that if leader α fails to sanction when *B* does not apologize then the citizens remove her. Since leaders are primarily driven by office-holding motives, to preserve their jobs, leaders sanction even when it is costly to do so and pointless in terms of leader β's future compliance. Unlike the chain-store paradox or the base-case equilibrium 1, there is little danger of equilibrium 2 "unravelling." Leaders sanction to preserve their jobs, not because the sanctions are an effective foreign policy.

In the international relations literature, domestic costs, such as the loss of office, paid by leaders who renege on promises are referred to as audience costs (Fearon 1994; Guisinger and Smith 2002; Leeds 1999; Schultz 2002; Smith 1998). While much of the literature considers these costs as exogenous, here the costs are endogenously derived with the citizens having incentives to remove leaders who do not follow through on sanctions. Indeed the leader specific strategies encourage citizen to punish leaders who fail to sanction, even when the sanctions are not in the citizens' interests. There is a range of sanction costs, specifically

$$\delta\lambda_A \frac{(1-\delta\lambda_A\lambda_B)(p\delta\lambda_A\lambda_B+1)R+\lambda_A\delta(1-\lambda_B)(1-x+p\delta\lambda_A\lambda_B(1-h_0))}{(p\delta\lambda_A\lambda_B+1)(1-\delta\lambda_A\lambda_B+\delta\lambda_A)(1-\delta\lambda_A)}$$

$$< c_A \leq \Psi + \lambda_A\delta\lambda_B R + \delta\lambda_A(1-\lambda_B)\frac{(1+\delta\lambda_{Ap}\lambda_B)(\Psi+R+1)-\delta\lambda_{Ap}\lambda_B h_0 - x^*}{(1-\delta\lambda_A)(1+\delta\lambda_{Ap}\lambda_B)}$$

(which for our numerical example translates into $.95305R + .20195 < c_A \leq 1.514\Psi + 1.090R + .321$), under which nation A can not compel nation B under equilibrium 1 but can under equilibrium 2. That is to say, LSP allow leaders to commit themselves to a much greater extent than could either a unitary actor or the citizens. Of course, to some extent this means that accountable leaders act contrary to the interests of their citizens by punishing even when the cost of doing so is high. However, precisely because accountable leaders can so credibly threaten to punish, they induce high levels of compliance and so don't have to carry out these threats. Democracy, or other institutional arrangements that make leader removal easy, increase nation A's credibility and so enable A to induce greater compliance, which is welfare improving for the citizens of nation A.

The Compliance of Accountable Leaders and LSP

When leader α is politically accountable then the credibility of nation A's threat to punish transgressors is enhanced which makes compliance easier to maintain. Democratic states such as the United States should be better able to commit to punish their errant satellites than authoritarian states. Next we consider the consequences of political institutions in nation B. If nation B's leader is relatively accountable, as would be the case if B were democratic, then leader β is more likely to apologize for any transgressions and is potentially less likely to be caught cheating in the first place. We demonstrate in equilibrium 3 that if the cost of leader removal in state *B* is moderate, such that the citizens would remove β to avoid sanctions, then leader β is more likely to apologize for being caught cheating.

Proposition 3: Leader Specific Punishments with Domestically Accountable Leaders and Single Apology (equilibrium 3).

If the cost of leader removal in nation A is low $(r_A \leq \delta\lambda_A \frac{1-\delta}{1-\lambda_A\delta} V_A(0,0)$, *where*

$V_A(0,0) = \dfrac{\delta\lambda_{Bp}(1-h_0) + \delta\lambda_{Bp}R + 1 - x^* + R}{(1-\delta)(1+\delta\lambda_{Bp})}$), *the cost of leader removal in nation B is moderate* $(r_B \geq ((1-\delta)V_B(0,0) - h_0),\ r_B \leq \delta\lambda_B \dfrac{-1+c_B+(1-\delta)V_B(0,0)}{1-\delta\lambda_B}$, *and* $r_B \leq -\delta\lambda_B\ (1 + \delta\lambda_B)\ h_0 + \lambda_B\delta\ (1 - \delta)\ (\delta\lambda_B + 1)\ V_B(0,\ 0)$, *where* $V_B(0,0) = \dfrac{x^* + h_0\delta\lambda_{Bp}}{(1-\delta)(1+\delta\lambda_{Bp})}$, *and sanctions are not extremely costly for A (as defined in the appendix), then there exists a Markov Perfect Equilibrium in which the citizens in nation B remove leader* β *if she fails to apologize and the citizens of nation A remove leader* α *if she does not sanction when appropriate. Provided both nations are in good standing* ($Z_{At} = 0$, $Z_{Bt} = 0$), β *sets policy* $x_{Bt} = x^*$ *which solves* $p\lambda_B\delta + 1 + \lambda_B\delta\dfrac{dp}{dx}(h_0 - x^*) = 0$.

On the equilibrium path, equilibrium 3 is identical to the base case. What differs is that this equilibrium exists for a far wider range of sanctions costs. As we have already shown above, when α is easily removed nation A can commit to sanction transgressors more credibly that would be the case otherwise. When nation *B* also has accountable political institutions then it can credibly commit to apologize under a wider range of conditions than would be the case if leader β were unaccountable.

If leader β fails to apologize then nation A sanctions nation B. However, given the leader specific nature of punishments, the citizens in nation B can avoid the consequences of sanctions by replacing leader β. If the citizens depose leader β then they pay cost r_B. The criteria that $r_B \geq \delta\lambda_B((1-\delta)V_B(0,0) - h_0)$ ensures that the citizens in nation *B* prefer to give their leader the opportunity to apologize rather than depose her immediately, providing the apology can be made before sanctions. The condition $r_B \leq \delta\lambda_B \dfrac{-1+c_B+(1-\delta)V_B(0,0)}{1-\delta\lambda_B}$ ensures that citizens in nation *B* prefer to replace their leader rather than be subject to sanctions in subsequent periods. This later condition ensures that the citizens replace their leader if she refuses to apologize ($y_{Bt} > h_0$) after having previously been caught cheating.

The threat to leader β's tenure in office ensures she apologizes. If β apologizes having transgressed the threshold in the previous period ($Z_{Bt} = 1$), then her payoff is $h_0 + \Psi + \delta\lambda_B V_\beta(0,0)$. If she does not apologize then she is removed from office, which is worth $x_{Bt} - c_B$. When office-holding motivations dominate, leader β can be guaranteed to apologize to save her job.

Equilibrium 3 assumes that replacing leader β is not so easy that the citizens instantly replace her before she has the opportunity to apologize. Even in democratic systems dismissal is rarely so instantaneous as to deny leaders the opportunity to apologize. However if a leader can be replaced instantaneously at very low cost then citizens can avoid having to apologize by replacing their leader if she is caught cheating. Since policies observed to be above the threshold ($y_{Bt} > h$) cost a leader her job, in such a setting leader β reduces her policy choice from that characterized here ($x_{Bt} < x^*$) to mitigate the deposition risk. We characterize this possibility as equilibrium 4 in the appendix. It is reminiscent of McGillivray and Smith's (2000) original formulation of leader specific punishments as it precluded opportunities to apologize.

Accountable political institutions help ensure the survival of international regimes. Democracies and other forms of accountable government produce incentives for hegemonic leaders to be credible in their threats and for leaders in other states to "play by the rules." While autocrats might choose not to apologize when they are detected cheating, democrats rush to apologize. As Rosendorff and Milner (2001) show, democratic leaders prefer institutional arrangements that give them the opportunity to apologize. Leaders are happy to apologize rather than lose their jobs. The ability to apologize prior to punishment means leaders need not distort their policies in fear of any accidental error leading immediately to sanctions.

Conclusions

Credible punishments are essential for enforcing compliance. This paper explicitly analyzes how leader specific punishments, leader mortality, and the ease of leader replacement affects the conditions under which compliance can be maintained through the threat of sanctions. The focus on individual leaders, rather than the nations they represent, shows that many credibility problems are solved through leader specific punishments. If α, the leader in nation A, directs punishment for noncompliance against state B only for as long as the aberrant leader of state B (β) remains in power, then A's threats of punishment are more credible that would be the case if A and B were the standard unitary actors present in traditional models of international relations. Since leader β is not immortal, the leader in state A knows that a commitment to leader specific punishment is not an open-ended commitment. Further, the desire to end sanctions encourages the citizens of state B to remove aberrant leaders.

When domestic political institutions make such removal easy then noncompliance jeopardizes β's term in office. To avoid loss of tenure β is likely to be compliant and to apologize quickly for any accidental noncompliance. Inclusive domestic political institutions enhance compliance.

Domestic institutions that make leader removal easy also strengthen a leader's commitment to punish noncompliance. If leader α's failure to punish noncompliance jeopardizes her nation's future credibility (and hence ability to enforce future compliance), then the citizens of nation A are keen to replace α. For this reason, easily replaced leaders zealously maintain their integrity by punishing noncompliance, even if it is widely suspected that sanctions will not produce future compliance. Such commitments can unfortunately lead to poor ex post outcomes, with nation A maintaining damaging sanctions that have little prospect of successfully forcing apology or compliance from B. However, in expectation, these ex post losses are offset by the improvement in the ex ante probability that A will successfully compel nation B to comply with A's wishes in the first place.

The movement away from the unitary actor conception of nations toward a consideration of the survival-induced motivations of political leaders is a growing trend in the study of international relations (see for example Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003 and Goemans 2000). While traditional research paradigms, such as realism and liberalism, have equated the interests of the leader and the state, their motivations differ. There is growing recognition of this distinction within international relations scholarship. As this paper shows, conditioning behavior on leaders, rather than the abstract concept of the state, increases the depth and breadth of compliance that can be maintained. This has important implications for the design of international institutions and agreements. It also suggests that nations can greatly leverage the concessions they can extract from other states by explicitly focusing threats of punishments for noncompliance against leaders.

While there is some evidence of leader specific punishments in some policy areas (McGillivray and Smith 2004; McGillivray and Stam 2004), the use of leader specific policies is by no means universal. Our arguments suggest a leader specific focus could improve the performance of international institutions. Given the prescriptive nature of our results, it is beholden on us to discuss whether such mechanisms are really practical. By explicitly pointing to leader specific punishments, leaders, at least democratic ones, can dramatically increase what they can commit to. Yet, such improvements come with costs as leader specific punishments require leaders to stake their tenure in office on their ability to comply and punish noncompliance. If, as we believe, leaders are primarily driven by office holding goals, then leaders avoid any potential risk to tenure. This suggests that leaders are reluctant to stake their survival in office on their ability to honor an international agreement. Yet, if such a commitment improves the quality of citizens' lives in one nation, then it is attractive for potential challengers to make such offers. States with competitive political processes are the states that are most likely to adopt any form of leader specific punishment, and it is such nations that will obtain concessions from other states and be able to credibly commit to deep international agreements.

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