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Teorell, Jan.

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PATHWAYS FROM AUTHORITARIANISM

Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell

Axel Hadenius *is professor of political science at Lund University in Sweden. His main interests are international democratization and state administrative capacity. He is the author of* Democracy and Development *(1992) and* Institutions and Democratic Citizenship *(2001).* ***Jan Teorell*** *is associate professor of political science at Lund University. His articles on comparative democratization, intraparty democracy, and political participation have appeared in* Studies in Comparative International Development, Party Politics, Scandinavian Political Studies, *and* European Journal of Political Research.

What conditions provide fertile soil for democratic advancement? Are some nations endowed with traits conducive to democratization while others are doomed to a cycle of authoritarianism? These questions have been at the heart of a fifty-year quest to determine the basic preconditions for democracy. Modernization theorists have asserted the primacy of socioeconomic development while others have identified culture and religion, diversity, oil and natural resources, and diffusion effects as factors that might advance or hinder a country's prospects for democratic change. Our understanding of democratization is, however, far from complete.

Unlike the majority of past studies, which assume that all nondemocratic nations face similar obstacles to democratization, we explore here institutional requisites for democracy. Are certain authoritarian regimes more likely to break down and, if so, are certain types more likely to democratize? Do the institutional attributes of the authoritarian regime affect a country's prospects for democratic transition?

To answer these questions we develop a new typology of authoritarian regimes—based on Barbara Geddes's seminal contribution[1]—covering 191 countries in the world from 1972 to 2003. Our results show that different types of authoritarianism have different propensities for survival and for democratization. Hence an institutional attribute—the

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nature of the authoritarian regime—should be considered in any discussion of democracy's preconditions.

The classical theories on nondemocratic regimes devised during the 1950s and 1960s were based primarily on a distinction between totalitarianism and authoritarianism.[2] These categories soon grew obsolete, as it became clear that very few regimes fit the totalitarian type, while the authoritarian category was too inclusive.[3] Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan have refined the typology by adding the categories of "post-totalitarianism" and "sultanism" to the classical distinction.[4] We would argue, however, that the payoff of this typological strategy is limited. The criteria entering the classification are questionable, and no attempt is made to apply the model systematically over time, or to a broad range of cases. As Richard Snyder and James Mahoney put it, several of the insights furnished by Linz and Stepan are "idiosyncratic" and "apply to just one country."[5]

Larry Diamond puts forth a more ambitious and wide-ranging attempt at regime classification.[6] Diamond explores "hybrid regimes" that are neither fully democratic nor "politically closed authoritarian." And depending on the degree of competitiveness within them, he classifies hybrid regimes as "competitive authoritarian" or "hegemonic electoral authoritarian," leaving a residual category of "ambiguous regimes." He applies this typology to 192 countries in 2001, clearly showing into which category each country falls.

We have several objections to this analytical schema. First, as Diamond admits, the country classifications "are offered more in an illustrative than a definitive spirit."[7] The exact coding criteria—especially for the judgment of borderline cases—are never stated explicitly. Nor is any attempt made to classify countries over time or to assess the typology's utility in explaining independent outcomes (such as democratization).

More importantly, instead of drawing on truly categorical regime traits (and thus on the *qualitative* differences between authoritarian regimes), Diamond's classificatory schema delineates groups of countries located at different intervals along a single continuous (quantitative) dimension—the degree of competitiveness. This is the main drawback of the regime classifications most closely associated with Diamond's (and those from which he partly draws his terminology)—Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way's "competitive authoritarianism"[8] and Andreas Schedler's "electoral authoritarianism."[9] If the degree of competitiveness were the only dimension along which authoritarian regimes differed, we would need no regime typology. Instead, a continuous measure of competitiveness—serving as a rough proxy for the level of democracy—would be sufficient.[10] That said, the designation of a particular nondemocratic regime type characterized by multiparty competition is an important contribution that we shall draw upon.

In contrast with the literature on "competitive/electoral authoritari-

anism," Geddes's typology highlights qualitative distinctions between authoritarian regimes.[11] Drawing partly on the work of Samuel Huntington,[12] Geddes distinguishes personalist, military, and single-party regimes; she also includes "amalgams" or hybrids of these three generic types. In our view, Geddes's study is the single most important contribution to the literature on nondemocratic regime types. Using data with extensive country coverage from the postwar period, she shows that some regime types are less stable than others. Military regimes are the most fragile and their life expectancy is the briefest. Personalist regimes tend to last longer, while one-party states are the most enduring. Geddes offers an elegant explanation—expressed partly in game-theoretical terms—for this pattern of variable stability.

Despite the merits of Geddes's contribution, there is considerable room for improvement. First, her study omits some important types of nondemocratic regimes, most notably monarchies and "competitive" or "electoral" autocracies. Second, we feel hesitant to designate "personalism" as a regime type. A better approach, we shall argue, is to treat personalism as a continuous trait that may be more or less present in a regime. Third, Geddes makes no distinction between true one-party regimes (where no opposition is allowed) and dominant-party regimes (where a single party rules yet opposition parties compete). Finally, unlike Geddes, we do not restrict our attention to the effect of regime type on survival. The demise of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily signify the commencement of democratization, as one authoritarian regime may simply give way to another. We look therefore at the effect of regime type on the prospects for democratization. To our knowledge, this is the first time such a study has been carried out on a global scale and with such extensive time coverage.

A Typology of Authoritarian Regimes

To develop a typology of authoritarian regimes, we first must broadly delineate the boundary between democracies and autocracies. This presupposes a qualitative (dichotomous) distinction between democracy and autocracy. It could be argued that it is an advantage, in general, to apply a continuous—rather than a dichotomous—conception in which degrees of democracy (or autocracy) can be distinguished, but in which no discrete cutoff point separating the two need be identified.[13] For certain research questions, however, a dichotomous approach is appropriate. This is the case for our analysis.

Using the mean of each country's Freedom House and Polity scores, converted to a scale from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic), we distinguish democracies from autocracies at a score of 7.5—the authoritarian family consisting of all regimes with a score below that point.[14] We chose this threshold value by estimating the mean cutoff

point separating democracy from autocracy in five well-known categorical measures of democracy—those of Adam Przeworski et al.,[15] Scott Mainwaring et al.,[16] and Garry Reich,[17] along with the categorical thresholds for democracy of Freedom House and Polity. Since the Freedom House data only go back to 1972, our period of investigation begins there.

At the core of our authoritarian regime typology is a distinction between three different modes of maintaining political power, probably the three most prevalent throughout history: 1) hereditary succession, or lineage; 2) the actual or threatened use of military force; and 3) popular election. These three modes of power maintenance correspond to three generic types of regime: monarchy, the military regime, and the electoral regime. These three regime types are not, however, mutually exclusive (although one of the three possible combinations—military monarchy—never appears in our data).

Monarchies are those regimes in which a person of royal descent has inherited the position of head of state in accordance with accepted practice or the constitution (one cannot simply proclaim oneself a monarch[18]). Importantly, we only apply this classification to countries where the sovereign exercises real political power; ceremonial monarchies (Britain, for instance) are thus excluded. Primogeniture—the passage of the crown from father to eldest son—need not be practiced, however, for the state in question to be a monarchy. The "dynastic" Gulf monarchies, for example, where successors are chosen by a consensus of the royal family, are classified as monarchies. Moreover, the fact that power has once passed from father to son, as in Syria (Hafez al-Assad to Bashar al-Assad) and North Korea (Kim Il-sung to Kim Jong-il), does not a monarchy make. The transfer of power must take place in accordance with accepted practice or the constitution. The regime in Saudi Arabia, where power is transferred between members of the Saudi royal family, is thus a typical monarchy.

Military regimes are states "in which military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threatened use of force."[19] Thus in a military regime the armed forces may exercise political power either directly or indirectly by controlling civilian leaders. Regimes where persons of military background are chosen in open elections that have not been controlled by the military are not classified as military. Chile during the rule of General Augusto Pinochet from 1973 to 1989 was a typical military regime. *Rebel regimes* form a special subcategory of military regimes. They include cases where a rebel movement (one not formed out of the regular armed forces) has taken power by military means and where the regime has not yet been transformed. The Democratic Republic of the Congo since 1997—after Laurent Kabila's rebel Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire overthrew the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko—is an example.

Electoral regimes constitute a heterogeneous set of countries, each of which holds popular elections for parliament or executive office. Among electoral regimes, there are three broad types: the no-party regime, the one-party regime, and the limited multiparty regime. Elections are held in *no-party regimes* but *all* political parties (or at least candidates representing a party) are prohibited. Elections in such regimes may display an element of competition, but only among individual candidates. The Maldives is an example.

In *one-party regimes,* all parties but *one* are forbidden (whether formally or de facto) from taking part in elections. North Korea, where the Workers' Party of Korea is the only legal party, is a notable example. A small number of nonparty candidates may also be allowed to take part and get elected (as was the case in Iraq under Saddam Hussein). There also may be satellite parties that are autonomous in name but cannot take an independent position (as in China). Competition between candidates from the same (ruling) party may also occur (as in Tanzania up to 1995). It is not enough, we must stress, for a regime to call itself a one-party state; elections must actually be held. In Cuba, for example, the Fidel Castro–led regime that took power in 1959 described itself in such a fashion. Not before 1976, however, was a constitution instituted that required one-party elections to be held. Up until that year, therefore, Castro's state qualified as a rebel regime; only thereafter was it a one-party state.

Limited multiparty regimes hold parliamentary or presidential elections in which (at least some) independent or opposition candidates are able to participate. This classification holds even when opposition parties voluntarily refrain from taking part in elections (such boycotts are typically carried out to protest against prevailing conditions). The point is that elections take place where there is a degree of competition between candidates who either represent different parties or who choose to act as individuals. This does not mean the elections in question are otherwise free and fair (we are talking here, after all, about authoritarian regimes): Certain groups may be excluded and the process may in various ways favor one side. This is therefore the category in our schema that corresponds most closely to Levitsky and Way's "competitive authoritarianism" and Schedler's "electoral authoritarianism." Until 2000, Mexico was a typical example of a limited multiparty system.

Distinguishing one-party regimes from limited multiparty systems can be difficult, as there are many regimes that are formally multiparty but in which one party is overwhelmingly dominant (as was the case in Mexico, where the Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] dominated for 70 years). In these cases, we differ from Geddes and others who classify them as one-party states. To differentiate the one-party from multiparty regimes, Geddes uses two criteria: 1) alternation in government and 2) the governing party's share of the vote in elections (multiparty

government does not exist if the governing party wins more than two-thirds of the vote). The purpose of the first criterion, it appears, is to focus on systems where the electoral process—some token elements of competition notwithstanding—is tilted to such an extent that the government always wins. If the purpose, however, is to probe patterns of change and stability among different regime types, it is not well-advised to define a regime type on the basis of government turnover, which in itself involves an implicit time factor. We therefore choose not to rely on government stability as a criterion for distinguishing among regime types.

The second criterion (share of the vote) is more useful. There is, however, little *prima facie* reason to treat cases where a party has achieved heavy dominance through multiparty elections as equivalent to those where a true one-party regime prevails and just a single party is allowed to take part in elections. It may be that regimes of the two types behave the same way (this seems to be the argument); this, however, is a question that should be left open for empirical inquiry. Accordingly, we control for party dominance *within* limited multiparty regimes in two ways. First, we create a nominal subcategory called *dominant-party regimes,* in which (following Geddes's second criterion) we include regimes with parties taking more than two-thirds of the vote. In the descriptive analysis that follows, we use this categorical notion to probe the significance of one-party dominance within multiparty regimes. Since a cutoff point of two-thirds is arbitrary, however, we also include a continuous measure of one-party dominance—the proportion of seats held by the largest party within limited multiparty systems.[20]

In sum, there are five main autocratic regime types: monarchy, military, no-party, one-party, and limited multiparty. Moreover, there can be hybrids (or amalgams) combining elements from more than one regime type. Monarchies, for example, may carry out elections in various forms: multiparty elections, no-party elections, and also (in the case of Iran under the shah in the 1970s) one-party elections. The same goes for military regimes.

In addition to the main regime types and their amalgams, we have identified several minor types of authoritarian regimes. In a *theocracy,* decisive political power lies in the hands of a religious elite (Iran since 1979). Temporary regimes, the purpose of which is to carry out a transition, are classified as *transitional regimes* (for example, Togo from 1991 to 1993).[21] There are also countries in which the central government does not in reality control the state's entire territory. This may be due to *civil war* (Somalia since 1991) or *occupation* by foreign troops (Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989). Finally, we have a residual category called *others,* which includes a few cases that do not fit any regime type in our schema (for example, Libya since 1977 and Lesotho from 1972 to 1985).

FIGURE 1—REGIME TYPE FREQUENCIES BY YEAR



In order to avoid multiple observations per country-year, we have classified hybrid monarchies in this figure as monarchies and hybrid military regimes as military regimes. An almost identical pattern emerges, however, if the partially overlapping "main" categories are used instead. The diverse "other" category, including from four to twelve countries each year, has been excluded from the Figure.

There is also good reason to consider the element of personalism in political life. Personalist regimes (or "sultanist" regimes, as they sometimes are called) display distinctive features, such as discretionary rule and the concentration of power in the hands of a single person. Geddes, as we have discussed, classifies personalism as a regime type of its own. Yet we concur with Paul Brooker, who argues that the existence of personal rule is "only a secondary or supplementary feature of a regime."[22] We therefore treat the degree of personalism as a property that may be more or less present in any regime.[23]

The frequency with which the head of government is replaced serves as our indicator of the degree of personalism characterizing a regime. In personalist systems, leadership changes are rare, for the logic of the system requires a personal persistence in power. For each regime we have calculated the mean years of tenure for presidents or heads of government. Admittedly, this is a crude proxy for the concentration of power in the hands of a single person. A regime might grant its leaders absolute power, even as these leaders are then rapidly replaced. We would, however, argue that as a rule the longer each chief executive stays in power, the more power will be concentrated in his or her hands.

Global Trends, 1972–2003

Figure 1 illustrates broad trends from 1972 to 2003. In the 1970s and 1980s, military regimes and one-party states were the most common form of authoritarian government. Since the early 1990s, however, re-

gimes of this type have receded sharply. In their place, limited multiparty regimes have emerged as the most prevalent form of authoritarianism. The number of governing monarchies (which prevail predominantly in the Muslim world), however, has remained remarkably stable (15 in 1972 compared to 13 in 2003). This result is largely determined by the time period under investigation. Over the last 100 years, many monarchies have broken down. Those that survived into the early 1970s, however, have since proven resilient.

Table—Average Life Span of Regimes, 1972–2003

Regime	Average Life Span (Years)
Monarchy	25.40
One-party	17.80
No-party	12.90
Military	11.10
Dominant limited multiparty	9.97
Nondominant limited multiparty	5.87
Democratic multiparty	17.50

From 1972 to 2003, limited multiparty government was the most frequent form of authoritarian rule (1,277 country-years). One-party regimes (969 country-years) and military regimes (852 country-years) were also prevalent, while military/one-party states were the most frequent of the hybrid regimes (205 country-years). Other common hybrid forms were military/multiparty (132 country-years) and monarchy/no-party (137 country-years).

Of the various regimes, limited multiparty systems have the highest average level of democracy (4.6). Among these multiparty systems, those without a dominant party (in which the largest party takes less than two-thirds of the vote) have a higher average level of democracy (5.5) than do dominant-party systems (4.0). Yet the latter are still far more democratic than pure one-party systems (1.3).

Among the other main regime types, no-party states score higher (2.6) than do monarchies or military regimes (2.1 and 2.0, respectively). Among the hybrids, the military/one-party type is marked by a particularly low score (1.1). This is no surprise: These regimes combine two highly repressive forms of government.

Our data confirm Geddes's finding that military dictatorships are more short-lived than one-party regimes.[24] Yet of the five main authoritarian regime types, limited multiparty regimes are the most fragile, with an average lifespan of about nine years during the period investigated (see Table 1).[25] Military regimes are next (11.1 years), followed by no-party regimes (12.9 years). Governing monarchies are by far the most enduring regimes (at least during the period of study). Their average lifespan—25.4 years—is eight years longer than that of one-party states (17.8 years) and approximately twenty years longer than that of the nondominant limited multiparty regimes. They also exhibit greater stability than do democratic multiparty systems (17.5 years). One-party states and dominant-party multiparty systems—often classified simi-

larly—have strikingly different average lifespans (17.8 years versus about 10 years for the latter), while dominant-party multiparty systems last on average about six years longer than pure multiparty systems.

How does personalism relate to the lifespan of regimes? Among the main regime types, monarchies (not surprisingly) have the longest tenure for persons wielding executive power (19.3 years). One-party and no-party states look somewhat similar (9.9 and 11.4, respectively), while military regimes and limited multiparty regimes each exhibit lesser degrees of personalism (6.4 and 6.0, respectively). Thus in monarchies and one-party dictatorships greater power is concentrated in the hands of the leader, while in military and limited multiparty systems power is less dependent on the particular person at the helm.

This general pattern makes intuitive sense. The relatively frequent changes of person at the top level of military regimes reflect the tensions often found in military ranks between different branches (army, air force, and so on); between different command levels (top brass versus lower-level officers); and between different generations and cohorts. For regime types within the military subset, the turbulence is greatest in rebel regimes, which also have exceptionally short lifespans, most likely because the structures that promote cohesion and mitigate conflict within militaries are often less developed amongst these military-usurper regimes.

The relatively brief executive tenure within limited multiparty regimes reflects the dynamics of party competition which, combined with higher levels of political freedom, enhance the effectiveness of electoral accountability mechanisms. Personalism does, however, vary greatly within the broad multiparty regime type. The small group of governing monarchies that hold multiparty elections, for instance, is characterized by higher levels of personalism, while dominant-party regimes also exhibit more personalistic properties than do multiparty systems without a dominant party. Yet even these dominant-party regimes are less personalistic than one-party states.

There is a strong (and statistically significant) correlation between years of executive tenure and the lifespan of authoritarian regimes (Pearson's r=.79 among 448 nondemocratic regime periods). Thus again we confirm Geddes's findings (although with different and better methods): Personalist regimes last longer.[26]

Are our findings robust or merely a reflection of our period of investigation? The patterns of regime duration that we discern could be a product of "right censoring," as our period of observation stops arbitrarily in 2003. We do not, therefore, know the breakdown date of every regime in our analysis. Thus limited multiparty systems, which constituted the large majority of authoritarian regimes in 2003 (see Figure 1), may appear artificially stable, while military and one-party systems—most of which broke down around 1990—appear fragile.

To control for this problem, we apply "survival analysis" to deter-

mine the rate at which regimes will survive or break down. The general pattern of stability is maintained. Monarchies are (in statistically significant terms) the most stable regime type, followed by one-party states, which in turn are significantly more stable than military and limited multiparty regimes. Furthermore, regime stability's relationship to different levels of democracy is curvilinear. The most durable regimes are either highly authoritarian or strongly democratic; it is the semiauthoritarian and semidemocratic regimes that are the most fragile.

Regime Transitions and Democratization

The breakdown of an authoritarian regime does not necessarily signal the onset of democratic transformation. In fact, from 1972 to 2003, 77 percent of transitions from authoritarian government resulted in another authoritarian regime. Only 23 percent of such transitions led to democracy.[27] For the list of transitions classified as transitions to democracy, see the Table at *www.journalofdemocracy.org/gratis/HadeniusGraphic-18-1.pdf*.

What then are the patterns of regime transition among the regime types in our schema? First, *monarchies tend to oscillate from pure monarchism to highly restricted forms of electoral monarchism*. Pure monarchies most often are transformed into no-party monarchies (in which partyless elections are held), but sometimes may transition to a multiparty system within the monarchical framework. In most cases, there is a subsequent return to pure monarchy. Such oscillations are the typical pattern for monarchies.

Second, *pure one-party states exhibit a complex pattern of change*. They transition with similar frequency to three other forms of authoritarian rule—dominant multiparty systems, nondominant multiparty systems, or pure military regimes.

Third, *military regimes transition most frequently to limited multiparty systems*. Military/one-party regimes, however, most commonly transform into pure military regimes, indicating that the military element often exhibits the most influence (only Taiwan made a transition to a pure one-party state). Military/multiparty systems, on the other hand, most frequently transition to democracy, suggesting that the plural element of these regimes tends to win out. Finally, in a majority of transitions from military rebel regimes, the outcome is a pure one-party system. These regimes seem to carry a strong monolithic tendency.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, *the majority of transitions from nondominant-party (that is, more competitive) limited multiparty regimes result in democracy*. For the dominant-party variety, a shift to a more competitive multiparty system is the most common. Therefore, an authoritarian multiparty regime without a single dominant party is the typical stepping-stone to democratization. This is not surprising, since

FIGURE 2—TRANSITIONS TO DEMOCRACY, 1972–2003



Entries are the raw probabilities, expressed as percentages, of each transition occurring (n=5191 valid country-years). Only transitions occurring more than ten times have been included.

these regimes hold elections with a degree of openness and contestation and allow some basic political liberties. As a result, regimes of this type are more amenable to incremental improvements.[28] Our global inquiry thus supports the findings of Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle with respect to Africa:

> Getting to democracy is easier from a regime in which competition is encouraged and the main challenge is to broaden participation; getting to democracy is much more difficult from a regime that has no tradition of political competition, however inclusive and participatory it might be.[29]

These findings are confirmed when we examine the regimes that preceded democratic multiparty systems. In the majority of cases, the preceding regime was a limited multiparty system without a dominant party. Transitions from a dominant-party system or a pure one-party state to a democracy were far less common. Both of these regime types are similarly resistant to crossing the democratic threshold. Most resilient, however, are governing monarchies, from which no transitions led to democracy.

Figure 2 illustrates the main pathways to democracy. Each path illus-

trates the probability, expressed as a percentage, of a particular regime transition. For the majority of regime types, the main path to democracy passes through the nondominant-party limited multiparty system, which in turn has the strongest chance of becoming democratic.[30] Dominant-party multiparty systems are highly unlikely to transition directly to democracy, as are pure military systems. These regimes most often pass through a stage of more competitive limited multiparty government. One-party systems have more varied paths to democracy—indirectly through transition to a military or dominant-party system, more directly through nondominant-party multiparty government, or directly (though this is less likely). Thus for one-party countries that do not directly transition to democracy, a shift to nondominant limited multiparty government will raise the prospects for democratization.[31]

Does limited multiparty authoritarianism remain the prime pathway to democracy when we control for other factors? A series of dynamic regression analyses indicates that—all other possible determinants of democratization being equal—limited multiparty systems are more likely to democratize.[32]

Authoritarian regimes are heterogenous, diverse in both their resiliency and their tendency to democratize. As our analysis shows, limited multiparty authoritarian governments hold the greatest prospects for democratization; they are fragile, occupying the unstable middle of the spectrum from autocracy to democracy, and they are most likely to make a transition to democracy. That multiparty regimes have become the most common form of authoritarian government is, therefore, a hopeful sign for the future of democracy.

NOTES

An extended version of this article has been published as a Kellogg Institute Working Paper *(http://kellogg.nd.edu/)*. For information on data and rules of classification, as well as the survival and regression analyses referenced, see this paper.

1. Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2 (1999): 115–44.

2. Juan Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000).

3. Paul Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government & Politics* (New York: St. Martin's, 2000).

4. Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

5. Richard Snyder and James Mahoney, "The Missing Variable: Institutions and the Study of Regime Change," *Comparative Politics* 32 (October 1999): 117.

6. Larry Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 21–35.

7. Diamond, "Thinking About Hybrid Regimes," 28.

8. Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 51–65.

9. Andreas Schedler, "The Menu of Manipulation," *Journal of Democracy* 13 (April 2002): 36–50.

10. See Michael Bratton and Nicholas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). They use this approach in their study of transitions to democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. Using a second dimension (the level of participation), they show how higher levels of competition in the *ancien régime* had the effect of improving prospects for democratization in the early 1990s.

11. Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?"

12. Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).

13. Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39 (Winter 2005): 87–106; and Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, "Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy," *C&M Working Papers* 6 (August 2005), *www.concepts-methods.org/working_papers/20050812_16_PC percent206 percent20Hadenius percent20& percent20Teorell.pdf.*

14. As we have shown in Hadenius and Teorell, "Assessing Alternative Indices of Democracy," the combined FH/Polity index outperforms all rival indices in an independent assessment.

15. Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

16. Scott Mainwaring, Daniel Brinks, and Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, "Classifying Political Regimes in Latin America, 1945–1999," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 36 (Spring 2001): 37–65.

17. Garry Reich, "Categorizing Political Regimes: New Data for Old Problems," *Democratization* 9 (Winter 2003): 1–24.

18. This applies to Jean Bédel Bokassa, military dictator of the Central African Republic, who in 1977 declared himself "emperor of the Central African Empire." In our classification, he was still a military ruler, not a monarch.

19. Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1977), 2.

20. This continuous measure is used in the survival and regression analyses reported below.

21. A transitional regime can only last in our schema for up to three years; after that, it is given a different and more fitting classification.

22. Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes.*

23. Brooker, *Non-Democratic Regimes*; and Dan Slater, "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia," *Comparative Politics* 36 (October 2003): 81–102.

24. Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?"

25. The average lifespan only counts the years regimes existed during the period 1972–2003.

26. Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization After Twenty Years?"

27. This is based on the most fine-grained regime classification (including dominant multiparty systems as a nominal category, as well as the minor types). Of 344 authoritarian regime periods that ended in regime change, democracy emerged on 79 occasions, or 23 percent of the time.

28. Staffan Lindberg, "The Surprising Significance of African Elections," *Journal of Democracy* 17 (January 2006): 139–51.

29. Bratton and van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa,* 273.

30. The probability of a limited multiparty system transitioning to democracy is conservatively estimated in Figure 2, since we exclude all transitions from limited multiparty systems to democracy in which the country in question has before transited in the opposite direction, from democracy to limited multiparty authoritarianism. In this way we avoid double counting cases that hover around our threshold criterion of 7.5 and thus make multiple transitions from limited multiparty authoritarianism to democracy. If these excluded transitions are included, the probability (expressed in percentages) of a transition from nondominant limited multiparty systems to democracy increases from .52 to .87. As a sensitivity check, we have also shifted the threshold criterion for the democracy up to 8.0 and down to 7.0, neither of which changes the results substantially.

31. The estimated transition probabilities from one-party systems are likely to be somewhat overestimated in Figure 2, since we have classified all new countries being formed as a result of the breakups of the Soviet Union and the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in 1991 as being independent cases of transition from one-party regimes. An alternative would have been to treat these cases like all postcolonial countries, that is, as new regimes without a regime legacy. If this latter procedure is followed, the most notable change in the results is that the path from one-party to limited multiparty regimes is substantially decreased (from .33 to .15). The strongest path, from limited multiparty systems to democracy, is unaffected by this change.

32. Not only is multiparty authoritarian government an important explanatory factor under these demanding controls, but the inclusion of the regime typology in the regression analyses also enhances the variance explained. These results are also robust to changes in the democracy cutoff up to 8.0 or down to 7.0.