1

Introduction

"The simplest political system is that which depends on one individual.
It is also the least stable."
Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968, 18)

1.1 TWO PUZZLES ABOUT AUTHORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS

As newly independent states, Tanzania and Guinea seemed to be on the same trajectory of durable authoritarian rule. Tanzania, under the founding presidency of Julius Nyerere, was a single-party state, led by the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) party. TANU politicians filled the National Assembly, which met on a regular basis. Presidential and legislative elections have been held every five years, like clockwork since 1965, as stated in the constitution.

This stability has lasted for decades. Nyerere, the first postindependence leader, retired after the 1985 presidential elections. Power was swiftly handed over to Nyerere's handpicked successor, Ali Hassan Mwinyi, and the ruling party continued to control over the government. The same regime remains in power today. The ruling TANU/CCM party continues to dominate Tanzanian politics[1] – even surviving the introduction of multiparty elections in 1995. Since independence, the country has undergone four peaceful leadership transitions and is one of the longest reigning autocracies in Africa.

Like Tanzania, Guinea had a ruling party, legislature, and regularly held elections as a newly independent state. Under the founding presidency of Ahmed Sekou Toure, Guinea was a single-party regime, led by

[1] TANU was renamed Chama Cha Mapindui (CCM) in 1977, following the merger of Tanzania and Zanzibar, although the party remained largely the same.

the Parti democratique de Guinee (PDG) party. PDG politicians filled the National Assembly, which conducted two regular sessions every year. Presidential elections were held regularly in 1961, 1968, 1974, and 1982, and National Assembly elections were held in 1963, 1968, 1974, and 1980, as stated in the constitution.

Yet these institutions did not provide long-term stability in Guinea. In 1984, Sekou Toure died of a heart attack after being airlifted to Cleveland, Ohio for emergency heart surgery while on a trip to Saudi Arabia. Before succession plans could be finalized, the military seized power in a coup d'état and the leader of the coup, Colonel Lansana Conte, claimed the presidency. The PDG was immediately disbanded, the National Assembly was dissolved, and the constitution was abolished. In short, the regime died with its leader.

Why did regime outcomes in Tanzania and Guinea diverge so drastically? Why was the authoritarian system in Guinea unable to survive the death of the leader, even with a full set of nominally democratic institutions in place? Sekou Toure had a ruling party, a legislature, and regularly held elections. He was even a socialist who aimed to replicate the Soviet state. Nonetheless, the regime fell in Guinea, and these institutions themselves were swiftly wiped out after the death of the leader.

These vignettes raise the first puzzle of the book: what explains differences in authoritarian regime outcomes, if not differences in quasi-democratic institutions?

One possible consideration is that we need to look beyond the most common types of quasi-democratic institutions – such as parties and legislatures, which are quite prevalent across authoritarian regimes – and consider more subtle forms of variation. Indeed, Guinea and Tanzania *did* differ in one important institution: adoption of executive constraints.

Since independence, presidents in Tanzania have had a number of institutional constraints on their authority. During the tenure of the founding president Nyerere, term limits and detailed leadership succession procedures became enshrined in the constitution, and these rules remain in place today. According to the constitution, presidents are limited to two terms in office (Article 40), and in the case of the president's death or incapacitation, the vice president is the designated successor (Article 37). The presidential cabinet, which is filled with TANU party elites, exists as a genuine power-sharing organization rather than a hallow endorsement device. Since independence, all presidents have maintained fully functional cabinets, and all key cabinet positions, such as the vice presidency and defense ministry, have been appointed to elites on a regular basis. Critically, appointments for the position of vice president

are infrequently shuffled, which endorses an elite in this position as a clear and stable successor in accordance with constitutional rules regarding succession.

By contrast, Sekou Toure faced very few constraints on his presidential authority. The constitution of Guinea did not specify clear succession procedures, promoting the image that Sekou Toure was an irreplaceable leader, nor did it include term limits.[2] Within the presidential cabinet, Sekou Toure maintained clear dominance. The roles of prime minister and defense minister were eliminated over half the time he was in office. When a defense minister was appointed, elites who filled this position were shuffled frequently. In fact, the average tenure of this appointment under Sekou Toure was under three years.

Moreover, although the regime in Guinea under Sekou Toure had a ruling party, legislature, elections, and a constitution, these institutions did not function to tie the leader's hands. In fact, Sekou Toure exploited these institutions to amplify his own power. The ruling party, the PDG, was used primarily as a mouthpiece to promote the leader's own ideology and policies, rather than as a forum for elite power sharing (Adamolekun 1976; Camara 2005). Although the National Assembly of Guinea met regularly twice a year, its only formal function was to endorse legislation and budgetary requests that were put forth by Sekou Toure. As described by Jackson and Rosberg (1982): "Most laws originate simply and swiftly in the decrees and edicts of the ruler. As the supreme authority in the land, not only do his opinions prevail over all others, but they 'become laws as they are uttered'" (212). In this case, institutions clearly did not constrain the leader.

In sum, although Tanzania and Guinea had similar looking parties and legislatures on the surface, these two cases had very different patterns of executive constraints that shaped the power of the president.

This raises a second puzzle of the book: why do some authoritarian rulers adopt executive constraints while others do not?

This book will offer new insights on both of these puzzles. The primary thesis of this study is that autocratic regime institutionalization – the creation of rules and procedures that tie the leader's hands by empowering other elites – is key to understanding patterns of regime durability in dictatorships. Concrete examples of such measures include constitutional rules specifying the leadership succession order or term limits, in addition to the appointment of elites to high-ranking cabinet positions, such as the vice presidency. I will demonstrate that these institutions provide explicit

[2] In fact, the constitution stated explicitly that the president may be reelected without mention of term restrictions.

constraints on executive power by providing high-level state access to other elites, therefore empowering them with resources and their own independent influence.

This argument stands in contrast with the conventional wisdom that nominally democratic institutions, such as parties, legislatures, or elections, drive authoritarian stability. A key assumption in much existing scholarship is that these institutions generally have the organizational capacity to constrain leaders and facilitate elite power sharing. As this chapter will show, parties and legislatures have become extremely commonplace in dictatorships, yet most are organizationally weak and overly reliant on the influence of particular leaders. Rather than assuming that the existence of parties or legislatures can effectively constrain leaders, this book examines the creation of explicit executive constraints within constitutions and power-sharing appointments in presidential cabinets. While it is certainly true that not all autocratic institutions are merely instances of window dressing, it is also important to recognize that not all institutions successfully constrain leaders.

Importantly, this book addresses the key question of how certain types of institutions constrain leaders. After all, a leader who can create an institution can also disassemble it as well. How do institutions have any bite in dictatorships? I argue that institutions can credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites. When an elite is appointed to a key cabinet position, such as vice president or the minister of defense, he is given access to power and resources that allow him to consolidate his own base of support. The appointment of elites to these key cabinet positions creates a focal point around these individuals and identifies them as credible challengers to the incumbent. Over time, the delegation of authority shifts the distribution of power away from the incumbent by identifying alternative leaders that elites can rally around if the president were to renege on distributive promises. Institutions that empower and identify specific challengers help to solve elite coordination problems, therefore better allowing them to hold incumbents accountable. Institutionalization limits executive power by creating conditions that actually *threaten* the leader.

My theory underscores the point that the existence of a democratic façade is not of primary importance. Rather, institutions constrain when they change the underlying distribution of power within the ruling coalition. When a leader institutionalizes the regime, she hands the (figurative) sword to someone else while pointing it at herself. This helps to explain why nominally democratic institutions cannot necessarily explain why some regimes are institutionalized systems while others remain personalist

dictatorships. This is especially true when parties or legislatures are empty vehicles that simply *amplify* the authority of an incumbent, rather than constraining them.[3] Institutions matter, not because they establish de jure rules, but when they affect de facto political power.

The theme of how political order becomes established and institutionalized has long been a fundamental question in the study of comparative politics. In a seminal study, Huntington (1968) first emphasized the concept of political institutionalization, arguing that the strength of societies depends on the strength of political organizations and procedures. Organizational durability depends on the extent to which the functions and procedures of these groups become institutionalized – the process by which the institutions themselves acquire "value" and "stability." Importantly, he highlights the need to separate institutions from leaders:

> so long as an organization still has its first set of leaders, so long as a procedure is still performed by those who first performed it, its adaptability is still in doubt. The more often the organization has surmounted the problem of peaceful succession and replaced one set of leaders by another, the more highly institutionalized it is. (Huntington 1968, 14)

This book approaches Huntington's "organization" as the authoritarian regime itself, and examines how executive power in dictatorships can become institutionalized, such that the regime does not depend on any particular set of leaders to survive. How does an authoritarian regime evolve from a government run by "big men" to a system run by rules?

1.2 EXAMINING REGIME OUTCOMES: PERSONALIST RULE AND INSTITUTIONALIZED SYSTEMS

The world of authoritarian regimes varies considerably in the extent to which politics is governed by set rules, procedures, and norms or controlled by a single personalist strongman.[4] Consider, for example, the well-known cases of highly institutionalized dictatorship in twentieth-century China and Mexico. The People's Republic of China, which was established in 1949 by Mao Zedong and the Communist Party of China (CCP), is characterized as a hierarchical system with established norms

[3] I do not claim that all parties and legislatures are window-dressing institutions that do not constrain leaders. Some autocracies, such as in China, the former Soviet Union, or Mexico under the PRI, have well-organized parties and legislatures that do not merely rubber-stamp legislation. However, in many autocracies, these institutions are incredibly weak and do not serve to empower specific elites.

[4] This book uses the terms "dictatorship," "authoritarian regime," and "autocracy" synonymously.

and procedures that govern leadership promotion. The state constitution is considered the highest law – its authority stands above the leader and the ruling party. Since 1949, the regime has undergone four peaceful leadership transitions and remains in power today.

Mexico under the rule of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) can be characterized similarly as a regime run by established rules and norms. Stable authoritarian rule was established in Mexico in the years following the end of the Mexican Revolution. In 1929, President Plutarco Elías Calles founded the ruling party as a means of institutionalizing elite power sharing that had been established in the resolution of the revolution.[5] Under these agreements, presidents serve one six-year term in office and never seek reelection. The incumbent also handpicks their successor, who then becomes the next president. Elite politics in Mexico would run like clockwork according to these rules for the next 70 years. The PRI regime remained in power until 2000, when it lost the presidential election to an opposition party, the National Action Party (PAN).

In both of these cases, the regime lasted beyond the dictatorship of a single individual to become a system run by rules. Importantly, the process of leadership succession was routinized, allowing for the continuity of the regime beyond the founding leader. Yet, such stable outcomes are not always the story in the world of dictatorships.

Now consider the Democratic Republic of Congo under the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko or the Dominican Republic under Rafel Trujillo – regimes where a highly personalist leader ruled without constraints on his power. Mobutu seized power in the Democratic Republic of Congo through a coup, five years after independence was granted in 1960. During his rule, Mobutu centralized power around himself, rather than sharing it with other elites. He named himself the head of all important political institutions including the minister of defense and single-handedly decided all appointments and promotions within the regime, often purging elites at will. Mobutu remained in office for 28 years until he was deposed by Laurent-Désiré Kabila during the First Congo War in 1997.

The Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic was a similar story. Rafael Trujillo came to power through a coup in 1930. Upon taking office, he concentrated his personal authority by declaring martial law and killing regime opponents.[6] By the end of his rule, Trujillo had more public

[5] The party was initially called the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR). It was eventually renamed the PRI in 1946.

[6] It is estimated that 500,000 people were killed by the regime's secret police during the Trujillo era.

statues of himself on display in the Dominican Republic than any other world leader at the time. After 31 years in power, Trujillo was assassinated in 1961. Three years later, a democratically elected leader took office but was deposed in a coup four months later.

In both of these cases, the regime failed to survive past a single strongman leader. Yet it is important to remember that single leaders can sometimes remain in office for relatively long periods of time, and this perceived longevity speaks nothing to the institutional quality of the regime. Mobutu and Trujillo both remained in power for three decades. During those periods, the regime retained a façade of stability through the leaders' iron-tight personalist grip on power. However, as Huntington cautioned, this "simple political system" that depended on one individual was, in reality, the least stable form of autocracy. The regime simply could not survive past its founding leader.

These broad patterns extend beyond a few individual cases. Despite a surge in scholarship on authoritarian stability, the world of dictatorships is filled with Mobutus and Trujillos. Leaders often take power (and lose power) via coups, which occur with tremendous frequency. In fact, coup d'états make up the vast majority of nonconstitutional exits from office for dictators (Singh 2014; Svolik 2012). From 1950 to 2014, a total of 235 failed coup attempts and 236 successful coups were carried out in dictatorships. In 1963 and 1966, 12 successful coups were carried out in a single year. In 1991, 10 coups were attempted but failed, in addition to four successful coups that were carried out (Powell and Thyne 2011). Figure 1.1 displays the number of failed and successful coups that have been carried out in dictatorships between 1950 and 2014.

Beyond persistent coup threats to incumbents, leadership transitions are often violent and disruptive, and many regimes fail to survive past the departure of individual leaders. Figure 1.2 displays the number of peaceful and violent leadership transitions over time. From this graph it is easy to see that violent leadership transitions are extremely common. From 1946 to 2008, almost half (44 percent) of all autocratic leadership transitions did not occur peacefully.[7] Even when dictators manage to remain in office until voluntarily retirement or a natural death, elites often wait in the wings, eager to usurp power forcefully, as in the case of Guinea after Sekou Toure. The continuity of the average authoritarian regime when faced with a leadership transition is far from guaranteed. In sum, the

[7] I define a peaceful transition as one where the outgoing leader exits power via regular means and the incoming leaders enters power via regular means – to be defined more precisely later (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).



Figure 1.1 Number of failed and successful coups in autocracies



Figure 1.2 Number of violent and peaceful leadership transitions in autocracies

stability of authoritarian regimes varies widely across countries and over time. Differences in stability stem both from threats to leaders while they are in power as well as the durability of the regime in light of leadership transitions. While some dictatorships cease to exist after the death of a single personalist leader, other regimes develop into stable and institutionalized systems.

1.3 SOMETIMES WINDOW PANES, BUT OFTEN WINDOW DRESSING

To explain variation in regime outcomes, recent studies of dictatorship have focused on the role of nominally democratic institutions[8] – such as parties and legislatures – in order to promote authoritarian durability.[9] The general consensus is that institutions matter, even in autocracies. This finding has been hugely important in advancing theories of authoritarian rule – earlier works on dictatorships had completely written off parties, legislatures, and elections as shams. As Gandhi (2008) notes, prior work tended to assume that the presence of authoritarian institutions was little more than "mere window dressing" (xv). The recent "institutional turn" in comparative authoritarianism has rightfully renewed attention to the role of formal institutions in autocracies by highlighting ways in which leaders can benefit strategically from these institutions.[10]

Despite these important advancements in the literature on authoritarian institutions, the presence of parties, legislatures, and elections cannot explain variation in regime outcomes simply because most contemporary dictatorships employ a wide range of institutions. From 1946 to 2008, autocratic leaders maintained a ruling party 87 percent of the time. During that same period, authoritarian regimes had legislatures 85 percent of the time (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Figure 1.3 displays the proportion of autocratic countries with ruling parties and legislatures over this period. It is clear that the vast majority of these countries have these institutions in place.

Autocratic constitutions and elections have been just as common. From 1946 to 2008, 93 percent of all autocracies had constitutions (Elkins, Ginsburg, and Melton 2014). During that same period, a total of 2,122

[8] This book uses the terms "quasi-democratic" or "nominally democratic" institutions in autocracies and "authoritarian institutions" synonymously.

[9] See Bracanti (2014), Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009), Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2018), Gehlbach, Sonin, and Svolik (2016), Lagace and Gandhi (2015), Magaloni and Kricheli (2010), and Pepinsky (2014) for recent surveys of the literature on authoritarian institutions.

[10] "Institutional turn" phrase borrowed from Pepinsky (2014).



Figure 1.3 Proportion of autocratic countries with nominally democratic institutions

elections were held in 124 countries – 707 presidential elections and 1,415 legislative elections (Hyde and Marinov 2012).[11]

These numbers are not simply being driven by a post-Cold War proliferation of institutions. From 1946 to 1990, 84 percent of authoritarian regimes had parties, 80 percent had legislatures, and 92 percent had constitutions. Moreover, 1,165 elections were held during that time period – 338 presidential elections and 827 legislative elections. The typical post-Second World War autocracy has had parties, legislatures, elections, and constitutions while in power. In other words, the presence of authoritarian institutions is simply unremarkable and there really is minimal variation in the existence of institutions in modern autocracies.

Moreover, most ruling parties fail to outlive the death of the founder. 61 percent of ruling parties do not survive more than a year past the founding leader's death or departure from office, as illustrated in Figure 1.4. Even in cases where the first leader experienced a nonviolent exit from power, only 58 percent of ruling parties outlive the leader. Furthermore, 43 percent of ruling parties that are coded as part of dominant-party regimes fail to survive a year past the departure of the first

[11] The percentage for ruling parties, legislatures, and constitutions are calculated as the percentage of country–year observations that had the institution. The election numbers are presented as counts.



Figure 1.4 Number of years ruling parties remain in power past the founding leader

leader (Meng 2019). In sum, the existence of many ruling parties seems to rely heavily on the influence of a single leader.

We then have a contradiction. On one hand, existing theories argue that these institutions are supposed to help regimes survive. Yet, the data shows that authoritarian institutions are incredibly common and frequently do not outlive individual leaders. The average authoritarian regime often cannot survive independently of particular leaders and regime instability has persisted.

I argue that this seeming contradiction exists because scholars have been focusing on the *existence* of institutions, rather than the *content* of these institutions – in particular whether the leader is constrained. Simply having a ruling party or legislature does not necessarily mean that the rules or procedures governing these organizations are institutionalized. In fact, the *appearance* of democratic-like institutions, such as ruling parties, often obscures the true lack of constraints on the executive.

This book examines the causes and consequences of autocratic regime institutionalization. The first half of the book presents a theory of how institutionalized regimes emerge by explaining the conditions under which autocratic leaders choose to implement constraints on their authority after coming into power. In examining the origins of institutionalized regimes, this book provides a clear mechanism for the question of *how* institutions constrain leaders in dictatorship. After all, if autocratic leaders can create institutions, then they can also dismantle them as well.

How then, do rules and procedures have any bite within inherently weakly institutionalized environments? The second half of the book shifts from explaining the causes of regime institutionalization to examining the consequences of institutionalization on key outcomes, such as leader tenure, coup vulnerability, and leadership succession.

1.4 AUTOCRATIC REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION: A DEEPER LOOK

Since regime institutionalization is a key concept of this book, I first provide a brief discussion of this term. I define autocratic regime institutionalization as the creation of rules and structures that govern the distribution of power and resources within the ruling coalition. Importantly, within authoritarian systems, institutionalization depersonalizes the ways in which the regime is run by constraining the leader's ability to make arbitrary decisions in the future. Institutionalized regimes are autonomous organizations, capable of functioning regardless of which leader is in power. One of the key features of an authoritarian state is that power is concentrated in the hands of a small group of elites – and often – in the hands of a single dictator. Since institutions are especially prone to predation by autocratic leaders, institutionalization strengthens regimes by implementing rules, procedures, and structures that promote organizational autonomy and permanence. When we think about the durability of an autocratic regime, the extent to which there are structures and procedures in place to guard against personalist rule is critically important.

Institutionalization can occur at many levels of government and within any kind of organization. Scholars of party-system institutionalization, for instance, argue that parties can be more or less institutionalized depending on the extent to which competition occurs, whether the organizations have stable roots in society and whether the parties are perceived to be legitimate (Mainwaring and Scully 1995). When regimes, organizations, or procedures become embedded and valued within society, the interests of the masses become tied to the organizations and rules themselves. As a result, it becomes difficult to for elites to single-handedly revoke or alter existing institutions.

So why does this book focus on elite politics and the institutionalization of power at the very top, rather than the process by which these rules become embedded into societal interests? This study focuses on institutionalization at the very highest echelons of power because the ability to solve the problem of leadership succession is a first-order challenge facing all dictatorships. Regimes cannot become institutionalized without first constraining the leader – it is a necessary first step in order to transform

a regime of one man into a self-sustaining organization. Before institutionalization at the societal level can occur, rules and procedures must first gain stability and permanence at the elite level. This study therefore focuses on the institutionalization of elite politics, notably the creation of procedures that regulate leadership transitions and mechanisms of elite appointments within presidential cabinets.

To measure regime institutionalization, I present original cross-sectional time-series data on executive constraints in all countries within sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010. Sub-Saharan Africa has a long and dynamic history of personalist regimes, military dictatorships, and party-based rule, providing a rich setting in which to examine variation in regime institutionalization. I collect historical data on state constitutions and presidential cabinets, for which I have comprehensive yearly records for 46 countries in sub-Saharan Africa. From these historical records, I document the creation of executive constraints, hierarchical positions, and implementation of rules and procedures that structured the distribution of power. Since institutionalized regimes are those that can outlive individual leaders, my measures focus on the creation of an autonomous government, including the development of formal leadership succession policies. I document whether term limits and formal succession policies exist within the constitution. A regime with constitutional rules specifying how leaders will be replaced and the length of their tenure represents a more highly institutionalized organization because it has internal mechanisms to perpetuate itself beyond the lifespan of a single leader.

Beyond formal constitutional rules, I also consider the development of norms surrounding regular presidential cabinet appointments as measures of *informal* institutionalization. In particular I focus on whether top ministerial posts – the positions of vice president, prime minister, and the minister of defense – are filled on a regular basis. The appointment of elites to key "power positions" demonstrates a willingness of the leader to delegate authority and share power. The appointment of key posts to other elites is not a trivial matter when it comes to presidential cabinets within sub-Saharan Africa. Presidents frequently eliminated cabinet positions or appointed themselves to top cabinet posts because they were hesitant to share power with other elites.[12] Cases in which presidents appointed top cabinet positions to other elites represent regimes with higher levels of institutionalization because decision-making authority is

[12] Jose Eduardo dos Santos, for instance, the first president of Angola, named himself as his own vice president for a number of years while he was in power. Hastings Banda, the first president of Malawi, appointed himself as the minister of defense during his entire tenure, from 1964 until 1993.

not concentrated entirely within the hands of the leader. Furthermore, by delegating responsibility and authority to other elites within the cabinet, ministerial appointments allow the regime to function independently of the leader.

This appointment of elites to key cabinet positions, especially over ministries that control valuable resources, is not a small or meaningless handout. The goal of capturing power, especially within sub-Saharan Africa, is to control the state. Having access to the state provides elites with the ability to control the economy. This was especially true during the decades immediately following independence due to the agricultural and subsistence nature of most African economies. The government was and continues to be the main source of funding for development projects, employment, and the distribution of scarce resources to localities. Having authority over a piece of the central government represents a great deal of power for elites.

By examining norms surrounding regular cabinet appointments, this book argues that institutionalization can occur when informal institutions constrain leaders[13] – the process is not solely restricted to the domain of formal constitutional rules. When the appointment of cabinet officials becomes regularized, for instance, this creates the expectation that the president will delegate cabinet positions to other elites in the future. The appointment of elites to the presidential cabinet represents a dimension of institutionalization that is informal, yet plays a key role in constraining executive power. Regime institutionalization can be achieved even in the absence of ruling parties or legislatures.

Figure 1.5 displays the proportion of autocratic countries in Africa with executive constraints from 1960 to 2010. When we conceptualize regime institutionalization in this way, the frequency with which dictators are constrained suddenly looks very different – especially when compared with Figure 1.3. In the first decade after independence, less than a quarter of countries within sub-Saharan Africa had any constitutional constraints in place. This contrasts sharply with statistics of the frequency of ruling parties or legislatures during the same period, which were in place upward of 80 percent of the time. Even in the two decades after the end of the Cold War, only about 50 to 80 percent of countries in Africa had formal executive constraints, compared with over 90 percent of countries that have parties, legislatures, and constitutions during this period.

This book provides an alternative perspective on democratization in Africa. Almost three decades after the introduction of multiparty

[13] Following existing studies, I define informal institutions as unwritten rules that are "created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 727).



Figure 1.5 Proportion of autocratic countries in sub-Saharan Africa with executive constraints

elections, true democracy continues to elude most African nations. Despite the high expectations of these seemingly democratic institutions, elites still continue to control the system in many countries. By contrast, this book contends that the real story of Africa in the 1990s was not democratization; it was institutionalization. As Figure 1.5 illustrates, one of the most dramatic changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War is that authoritarian regimes in Africa became much more institutionalized, along constitutional dimensions as well as through cabinet appointments. Many leaders went from being unconstrained in their rule to accepting formal limits on their authority in constitutions. Presidents went from serving as their own vice president and defense minister to delegating these powers to other elites. This book will show that the most dramatic change that occurred in Africa in the 1990s was not that ordinary citizens could vote in multiparty elections[14] – it was that elites recalibrated the political system amongst themselves to entrench their stability.[15] Credible elite power-sharing set the stage for more durable authoritarian rule, even with the introduction of nominally democratic institutions.

[14] Although the introduction of multiparty elections was indeed an important movement toward political liberalization. Prior to the end of the Cold War, single-party elections dominated the political landscape in most African regimes.

[15] This argument echoes Albertus and Menaldo's (2018) study of elite-driven democratization.

1.5 CAUSES OF REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION

1.5.1 Why Do Some Leaders Adopt Executive Constraints?

The first half of the book tackles the question of how institutionalized forms of dictatorship emerge. Why do leaders choose to institutionalize their regimes after coming into power if institutionalization ties their own hands and under what conditions would they do so?

Building on insights from prior scholarship I argue that regime institutionalization is a mechanism that allows autocratic leaders to create a semiautonomous structure that can enforce joint rule. I present a game-theoretic model in which regime institutionalization shifts the distribution of power against the leader in the future period of a two-period bargaining game. Institutionalization alleviates commitment problems in elite bargaining by empowering elites, therefore providing them with the ability to hold autocrats accountable for promises made about future rent distribution.

1.5.2 How Do Institutions Constrain?

A key question that emerges in this discussion is how institutions provide commitment power in dictatorships. After all, one of the defining characteristics of an authoritarian regime is that no independent authority can guarantee promises to divide spoils. Authoritarian regimes are, by definition, weakly institutionalized environments. Moreover, a leader who can create an institution can also disassemble it as well. How do institutions have any bite in dictatorships?

I argue that institutions can credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites. Institutions matter, not because they establish de jure rules, but when they affect de facto political power. In the context of this book, the establishment of executive constraints empower elites by providing them with access to the state. When an elite is given a key cabinet position, such as vice president or the minister of defense, he is given access to power and resources that allows him to consolidate his own base of support. Elites who are appointed to positions of authority within the regime then become focal points for other elites. They become obvious potential challengers to the incumbent if she were to renege on promises to distribute rent. This is particularly true if a particular appointee, such as the vice president, is designated in the constitution as the legal successor to the incumbent. In such a case, a particular elite is publicly declared the number two authority within the regime, allowing other elites to

coordinate around them. Even when leaders have the ability to choose who they appoint to these key positions – as they often do – the simple act of delegating authority shifts the underlying distribution of power between the leader and her appointees. In the model, this mechanism is formalized as a shift in the future distribution of power against the leader. When a president institutionalizes the regime, she voluntarily helps to solve the elite collective action problem by identifying and empowering particular individuals who become more capable of unseating her in the future.

If regime institutionalization seems to weaken leaders, why would any autocrat choose to tie their own hands after coming into power? The model shows that autocratic leaders are most likely to place constraints on their own authority when they enter power vulnerable and highly susceptible to being deposed. Because per-period transfers are often insufficient to buy quiescence from exceptionally strong elites, weak leaders remain in power only by delegating authority to elites as an accountability mechanism that guarantees their access to future rents. On the other hand, exceptionally strong leaders who have already consolidated power by the time they come into office have no incentives to create institutionalized mechanisms for rent distribution because they face very low likelihoods of being deposed. A weak autocratic leader is therefore better off taking actions to tie her own hands because doing so lengthens her time in office. It is important to clarify that these constraints are essentially forced on weak incumbents; they reluctantly institutionalize under duress when faced with elites who can credibly remove them.

My theory stresses the path dependent nature of regime institutionalization. How a leader enters power and the extent to which they have already consolidated their authority when they enter office determines, in large part, whether regime institutionalization will occur. In the model, even if the leader receives a particularly weak draw of power in the initial period, and anticipates being much stronger in the future, commitment problems that arise in the present swamp future distributive considerations. Leaders make decisions about institutions at the start of their tenure, and these institutional decisions shape the rest of their rule.[16]

This theory suggests an ironic twist of fate. Initially strong leaders are never incentivized to build credible ruling organizations because they are able to remain in power without making institutional commitments to other elites. Yet personalist strategies of rule are ultimately destabilizing in

[16] In this sense, the initial period of a leader's tenure can also be considered a critical juncture.

the long run, especially upon the death of the ruler. Conversely, initially weak autocrats who lack a strong basis of support must pursue the counterintuitive strategy of committing to give power away when they are most vulnerable. Doing so allows such leaders to buy support from elites who would otherwise jump at the opportunity to depose them. Yet at the same time, these self-interested actions generate stable power-sharing institutions, setting the stage for durable authoritarian rule.

Empirical patterns of institutionalization in sub-Saharan Africa support this argument. Founding presidents who came into office immediately following independence – especially those who were influential leaders of mass independence movements – benefitted from extreme legitimacy and high levels of popular support. Such leaders, like Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire or Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, were seen as the "founding fathers" of the newly independent African states. Both leaders, like most other founding presidents, did not appoint a vice president during their tenure and lacked constitutional constraints on their power.

Presidents who came into power via coups, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire or Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo, were also much less likely to institutionalize their regimes along formal and informal dimensions. One of the most precarious risks to any civilian incumbent is the threat of a military takeover. When the leader is the head of the military, however, this threat is diminished. Autocrats who successfully come into power through coups demonstrate that they have control over the coercive apparatus that allowed them to launch a successful coup in the first place. Since they retain control over the military, coup leaders do not need to institutionalize the regime in order to remain in power.

The end of the Cold War was also a watershed event that changed the dynamics of regime institutionalization. Beginning in the 1990s, international norms abruptly shifted toward favoring democratization and political liberalization. Leaders who had ruled as single strongman dictators were now facing condemnation in light of changing international norms, therefore shifting the distribution of power in favor of elites. As a result, levels of formal and informal institutionalization increased sharply. This discontinuous jump in the levels of institutionalization after 1990, as illustrated in Figure 1.5, is very evident when graphed over time (especially when compared with minimal changes in the existence of parties, legislatures, and constitutions, as illustrated in Figure 1.3). In fact, this sharp increase in institutionalization also explains why leadership transitions have become increasingly peaceful in the post-Cold War era.

1.6 CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION

1.6.1 Do Executive Constraints Promote Autocratic Stability?

After taking into account the endogenous emergence of executive constraints, the book reexamines the debate over the relationship between institutionalization and autocratic durability. Does the creation of executive constraints have stabilizing properties for autocratic leaders and regimes? The second half of this book examines these questions for a number of key regime outcomes: length of leader tenure, coup vulnerability, and leadership succession.

Despite the general consensus that institutionalized forms of dictatorship tend to be more stable, the empirical record of the relationship between institutions and regime stability has been surprisingly mixed. In a seminal study, Geddes (1999a) finds that single-party regimes remain in power for longer periods of time compared with personalist regimes. Since then, many scholars have expanded on this argument that ruling parties can prolong the lifespan of authoritarian regimes because they serve a number of stabilizing functions.

At the same time the empirical finding in Geddes (1999a) has been challenged by other scholars who do not find a statistically significant relationship between strong parties and regime longevity. Smith (2005), for instance, shows that the significant effect of single-party regimes is driven primarily by two outliers: Mexico and the Soviet Union. Using a different dataset, Gandhi (2008) does *not* find evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the presence of parties and legislatures and autocratic survival. She argues that we should not observe a significant effect because leaders endogenously respond to threats with "appropriate" degrees of institutionalization.

How do we make sense of these divergent empirical findings? Should we observe a significant effect of institutionalization on stability? This book heeds Pepinsky's (2014) call to address the "nagging problem" that remains within the scholarship on authoritarian institutions. He notes that "[if] institutions under authoritarian rule are vulnerable to manipulation because political actors believe that institutional manipulation can shape political outcomes in their favor, then it is also true that factors that explain the origins of (and changes in) dominant parties also directly affect those political outcomes" (631). When we consider the effects of institutionalization on regime stability, we must consider that leaders make decisions to institutionalize based on underlying threats to their authority.

The first half of this book makes the case that leaders make strategic decisions about whether to institutionalize their regimes, depending on their strength, vis-à-vis other elites. Because institutionalization is an endogenous process, executive constraints should only have an observable effect when we condition on initial leader strength. Strong leaders who have already consolidated power when they take office do not need to rely on power-sharing institutions to remain in power. Their rule is secure with or without institutional mechanisms. We therefore should observe little or no effect of institutionalization on regime durability for strong leaders.

For leaders who are weak, however, building an institutionalized regime does promote stability. Leaders who are highly vulnerable to being deposed by their fellow elites require executive constraints in order to make credible commitments to share power and resources. Institutionalization should therefore lengthen the time horizons and lessen coup risk, but primarily for weak leaders.

Since initially strong leaders are likely to be able to remain in power regardless of whether they institutionalize or not, a regression model that regresses institutionalization on regime stability without taking into account differential effects based on leader type will likely result in either a diminished effect of institutionalization or a null effect, both of which would be inaccurate.

To address this endogenous institutional choice, I incorporate an interaction term between regime institutionalization and leader strength which accounts for differential effects of institutionalization based on whether the leader was initially strong or weak. Using founding presidents and postcoup leaders as proxies for strong leaders, I find when we condition on initial leader strength, institutionalization does indeed have a stabilizing effect for weak leaders but little or no effect for strong leaders.

1.6.2 *Are Institutionalized Regimes More Likely To Undergo Peaceful Leadership Transitions?*

Finally, I also consider whether highly institutionalized regimes are more likely to undergo peaceful leadership transitions. The central challenge facing the survival of all authoritarian regimes is how the regime can transform from a dictatorship of one man to a self-sustaining system that is governed by rules. Dictatorships inherently lack mechanisms of electoral competition and leadership succession. Incumbents often remain in office for long periods of time, making it difficult to establish norms of leader turnover. Elections – even when they exist – are largely meant to sustain, rather than disrupt, the incumbent's regime. As a result, the

process of peacefully transferring power from one leader to another is often quite precarious in dictatorships.

I argue that the creation of constitutional succession rules and the designation of a de facto successor play a critical role in regulating the process of authoritarian succession. Take the case of the first presidential succession from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel arap Moi in Kenya in 1978. The Kenyan constitution includes a provision that reads: "If a President dies, or a vacancy otherwise occurs during a President's period of office, the Vice President becomes interim President for up to 90 days while a successor is elected." Near the end of Kenyatta's rule, a faction within the ruling Kenya African National Union (KANU) party tried to contest the authority of then-vice president Moi on the grounds that he was not a member of the dominant ethnic group. Moi and his supporters were able to dispute these claims by relying on the constitutional procedure governing presidential succession (Karimi and Ochieng 1980; Tamarkin 1979; Widner 1992).

Importantly, however, I argue that only certain types of rules are effective in promoting leadership succession. Constitutional rules that identify a clear line of succession are the most effective in regulating the transfer of power because such policies establish certainty and predictability about the actors who are expected to come into office. This provides elites with a stake in maintaining the existing regime in order to reap rewards from the succession order. Term limits, on the other hand, are much less effective in facilitating peaceful leadership transitions because they do not empower specific elites in the way that succession policies do by designating an heir apparent. Because term limits do not identify an alternative leader that elites can coordinate around, term limits do not resolve the collective action problem elites face in holding the incumbent accountable.

This distinction between term limits and succession procedures is an excellent illustration of the following property that mentioned at the start of the chapter: institutions matter, not because they establish de jure rules, but when they affect de facto political power. On paper, it would seem like term limits are an extremely powerful tool to prevent executive overreach. In practice, however, it is a less effective institutional constraint compared with succession procedures because term limits alone do not change de facto political power.

It is also important to note that the peaceful transition of power is an unintended consequence of strategic institutionalization by leaders. Incumbents plan for succession not out of concern for the stability of the regime after they die, but because they do not want to be preemptively deposed by elites who will compete for the presidency in the absence of

a designated successor. Although incumbents institutionalize in order to stabilize their own rule, these self-interested actions benefit their successor, who, once appointed, has every incentive to remain loyal to the current regime in the hope of becoming the next incumbent. In turn, these self-reinforcing succession plans promote regime stability in the long run.

In an analysis of all postindependence leadership transitions in sub-Saharan Africa, I show that regimes with constitutional succession procedures and a designated successor are significantly more likely to undergo peaceful leadership successions. A regime that has constitutional leadership succession rules is about 60 percent more likely to undergo a peaceful transition compared with one without any formal rules regulating succession. The designation of an informal successor has a similar effect.

Altogether these results suggest that institutionalization does indeed matter for regime longevity, as long as we condition on the endogenous emergence of institutions. In fact, an important lesson of this book is that parties, legislatures, constitutions, and elections can matter greatly, but the effectiveness of these institutions depends crucially on the strength and level of institutionalization of these institutions themselves.

Figure 1.6 summarizes the theoretical argument made in Part II of the book. Initially strong leaders do not institutionalize their regimes because they do not need to do so to stay in power. Such regimes appear to be long lasting and stable while the founding leader is still alive. However, upon the death of the founding leader, the regime undergoes conflict if succession plans have not been formulated or institutionalized. Initially weak leaders who do institutionalize are able to stabilize their tenure, compared with initially weak leaders who do not institutionalize. Furthermore, institutionalized regimes are significantly more likely to undergo peaceful leadership transitions. Somewhat ironically, regimes that originate with weak leaders are much more likely to become durable and long lasting autocracies.



Figure 1.6 The effect of regime institutionalization on leader and regime outcomes

1.7 THIS BOOK'S CONTRIBUTIONS: AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES

This book makes a number of contributions to studies of authoritarian regimes. First, it highlights – both theoretically and empirically – the importance of examining the content rather than existence of authoritarian institutions. By providing data on the details of these institutions, I am able to examine the extent to which autocratic leaders truly tie their hands via formal or informal rules and procedures. Despite the wide prevalence of parties or legislatures, there are important differences in the institutional makeup of dictatorships when we examine the content of executive constraints.

This study reveals these differences by presenting new evidence of how regime institutionalization varies along key dimensions of executive constraints. In doing so, I operationalize a key variable to which many scholars have referred but often do not carefully define nor measure systematically. These measurement decisions have important substantive implications, both for our understanding of the frequency of institutionalized forms of dictatorship but also for our ability to accurately test arguments centering on the relationship between institutional strength and regime durability. The literature on authoritarian parties, for instance, has made the case that ruling parties may play an important role in regulating leadership succession. However, this argument has had limited empirical verification due to data limitations. By contrast, I show that constitutional succession rules and the designation of a successor (which are sometimes, but not always, embedded in party-based regimes) positively associate with regulated transitions. Ruling parties, without taking into account the quality of the institutional arrangements, simply have no effect on their own.

This measurement contribution builds on Geddes' (1999a) path-breaking work on regime typologies. In a seminal study, she classifies all autocracies into regime types: party, personal, military, or hybrids of these categories. This classification scheme was one of the earliest studies to codify differences in the institutional quality of dictatorship and stimulated a large body of work that followed. However, the regime typologies framework is subject to a number of measurement concerns. First, placing regimes into time-invariant categories obscures institutional change over time.[17] This is a significant limitation because leaders within the same regime often make very different decisions about the extent to which they

[17] Although it is possible for countries to be coded as different regimes over time, most are not. Furthermore, this coding scheme does not allow for variation within regimes. See Chapter 4 for the full discussion.

are willing to defer to institutions. Take China as an example. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) currently rules China as a strong and autonomous party machine. The CCP has an extensive organizational hierarchy and well-defined norms regarding promotion within the party ranks. By contrast, China under the rule of its founding leader, Mao Zedong, was significantly less institutionalized than it is today. Mao arbitrarily purged and promoted party officials at will and launched political campaigns, such as the Hundred Flowers Movement and the Cultural Revolution, in order to eliminate his rivals. According to the regime typology framework, China is coded as a single-party regime since 1949, despite this institutional variation over time.

Furthermore, regime typologies are composed of mutually exclusive categories that are often insufficiently nuanced to capture differences between countries coded within the same category (Svolik 2012). China under the rule of the Communist Party is very different compared with Guinea under the (superficial) rule of the PDG, though both are coded as single-party regimes. Rather than creating mutually exclusive categories, this book creates disaggregated indicators of regime institutionalization that capture changes in institutional quality over time.

Moreover, the measures presented in this book are objectively coded in a transparent way that can be verified and replicated. Although Geddes (2003) outlines a clear set of guidelines that were employed to categorize regimes into different categories, a number of these criteria used to code regime types require the researcher to make subjective decisions about how to code the regime.[18] It is also not clear what the individual responses to these criteria were, making it difficult to interpret regime categories that are an aggregation of these individual criteria. By contrast, the measures presented in this book are all disaggregated and were constructed by simply observing whether certain constitutional rules or cabinet appointments existed.[19] The coding scheme therefore does not require the researcher to make subjective judgment calls and is easily replicable by other researchers.

In fact, I demonstrate that regime institutionalization is not synonymous with the presence of nominally democratic institutions. Very

[18] Examples of subjective criteria include: "Does the party have functioning local level organizations that do something reasonably important, such as distribute seeds or credit or organize local government?" or "Has rule of law been maintained?". The possibility of measurement error based on subjective coding rules is also heightened by the fact that the dataset spans multiple regions and time periods and often rely on information from various country experts.

[19] My approach is similar to the measurement strategies used in Gandhi (2008) and Svolik (2012).

often data on the presence of institutions has substituted for data on the content of institutions. However, comparisons of my institutionalization measures with existing datasets that focus on the existence of autocratic institutions verify that simply having parties or legislatures does not mean that executive constraints on the leader exist. Moreover, many regimes that have been coded as dominant-party regime types are also not very institutionalized. Even aggregate Polity scores of executive constraints ("XCONST") display massive inconsistencies when compared to the presence of constitutional term limits and succession procedures. In sum, existing variables of autocratic institutions are poor predictors of regime institutionalization and do not reflect the extent to which the leader is constrained.

This book also contributes to the literature on comparative political institutions by developing a theory of why dictatorships vary in institutional strength. I build on a small but growing literature of institutional change in developing or transitional states (Gryzmala-Busse 2007; Helmke 2017; Levitsky and Murillo 2009; Miller 2020; Opalo 2019). This book also highlights the role of informal institutions in regulating political power (Gryzmala-Busse 2010; Helmke and Levitsky 2004; 2006; Lauth 2000; Mershon 1994) – a topic that has received very limited attention within the autocratic context (Tsai 2007). It is also in conversation with studies that examine how and when institutions become self-reinforcing in otherwise weakly institutionalized settings (Ginsburg and Simpser 2013; Greif and Laitin 2004; Mahoney and Thelen 2010; Nalepa 2010; Negretto 2013; Pierson 2000; Przeworski 2015; Thelen 2004). However, while most of these studies explain why and how institutions evolve in newly democratic or quasi-democratic settings, I focus my attention on explaining institutional change within dictatorships.

As a second key contribution, this book ties the origins of institutions to their consequences in a comprehensive account of the causes and consequences of autocratic regime institutionalization. Scholars have only recently begun to examine why some leaders create institutional arrangements rather than relying on private transfers to maintain elite support. Early studies either took the existence of a dominant party as exogenous (as noted explicitly in Magaloni 2008)[20] or identified multiple strategies of rule (repression, informal cooptation, or institutions) without

[20] She states: "A key question that emerges from this discussion is why not all dictators create political parties if these play such powerful roles at minimizing their risk of being overthrown by members of the ruling coalition. My account does not address the question of origins – how successful and credible political parties get established in the first place" (11).

specifying the conditions under which leaders would choose to rule with or without institutions (Haber 2006). As Reuter (2017) notes, "we know much more in political science about the equilibrium characteristics of dominant parties ... than we do about how these equilibria come to be established in the first place" (13).

A growing number of studies are now considering how institutional equilibria emerge in dictatorships. Gandhi (2008) and Gandhi and Przeworski (2007) first highlight the notion that institutions emerge endogenously when they benefit leaders. Brownlee (2007) argues that intra-elite conflict during the early years of the regime necessitates the creation of dominant parties, and Slater (2010) argues that elites create strong states and durable parties when they face "endemic threats" to their existences. Other studies have also highlighted the role of external threats (Paine 2019; Smith 2005) and revolutionary conflict (Huntington 1968; Levitsky and Way 2012; 2013) in creating conditions that facilitate the development of strong party institutions or elite power-sharing. Three recent studies have dealt with this question of institutional creation most directly and point to the key mechanism of commitment problems between leaders and elites that motivates the creation of power-sharing institutions (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Reuter 2017).

This book differs from these existing accounts by examining the origins of executive constraints in constitutions and presidential cabinets rather than the origins of the parties and legislatures. In fact, historical evidence often suggests that many ruling parties are not strategically created, but instead, inherited by leaders. Within my sample of African countries, for instance, virtually all leaders came into power with a preexisting party in place immediately following independence. These ruling parties were created prior to decolonization not as elite power-sharing devices, but rather as pro-independence organizations (Bienen 1970; 1978; Zolberg 1966; 1969) or parties that were used to participate in preindependence elections (Collier 1982). Rather than arguing that leaders make strategic decisions to create institutions, this book argues that leaders make strategic decisions to institutionalize their regimes after coming into power.

In providing a comprehensive account of both the causes and consequences of institutionalization, this book is able to take into account endogenous decisions to institutionalize when estimating the effects of these institutions. Scholarship examining the effects of institutions on regime durability has generally developed in isolation from studies of the origins of these institutions. Yet the consequences of institutions are intimately related to where these institutions come from. This book considers how the strategic origins of institutionalization have an effect on the

consequences of such rules and procedures. In doing so, I aim to separate the effects of institutions on regime outcomes from the effects of the underlying power distributions that drove leaders to create these institutions in the first place.

1.8 WHY AFRICA? THIS BOOK'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO AFRICAN POLITICS

To study regime institutionalization, this book takes a broad look within a particular region: I examine all 46 countries within sub-Saharan Africa from the end of independence through 2010. To my knowledge, this is one of the few studies of authoritarian politics within sub-Saharan Africa[21] – and one of the few that is comprehensive in the coverage of countries within the region.

It is a bit surprising that sub-Saharan Africa as a region has been underrepresented in the study of authoritarian politics. Every country within Africa was an authoritarian state following independence in the 1960s.[22] The majority of countries within Africa remain authoritarian today. Countries like Tanzania, Cameroon, and Mozambique have been governed by the same group of elites that took power after independence was granted. These ruling elites were able to retain power despite the emergence of democratic pressures that surfaced at the end of the Cold War, and these regimes remain clearly authoritarian today. Even a country such as Botswana that is considered by many to have fair elections has been governed by the same ruling party since independence in 1966. In short, the politics of dictatorship has been, and in many cases continues to be, the politics of sub-Saharan Africa.

Beyond current authoritarian regimes in Africa, this book is also important for understanding the politics of countries that are newly democratized, such as Malawi or Kenya, or those that are in the process of democratizing, such as Liberia. Pressures to democratize did not arise in Africa until the 1990s and transitions away from authoritarianism have occurred very recently, with many still ongoing. The legacies of authoritarian rule often persist in these new or fledgling democracies and

[21] A few exceptions include Carter and Hassan (2019), Hassan (2020), and Opalo (2019). Other studies have examined the effect of authoritarian legacies on democratization in Africa, without focusing explicitly on the politics of authoritarian rule (Bleck and van de Walle 2018; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Cheeseman 2015; LeBas 2013; Posner and Young (2007); Riedl 2014).

[22] Only the island of Mauritius has been considered a democracy since it gained independence in 1968.

frequently hinder the consolidation of democratization. This study is in conversation with studies of democratization in Africa by examining the authoritarian backdrop in which political reforms take place (Arriola 2013; Bleck and van de Walle 2018; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Cheeseman 2015; LeBas 2013; Riedl 2014). Studies of newly democratized African countries indicate that party systems and the strength of opposition parties in the democratic era are shaped by the activities of these parties from the authoritarian era (LeBas 2013; Riedl 2014). Leaders often use cabinet positions to buy off opposition politicians, therefore hampering the creation of strong opposition coalitions. Importantly, they are able to do so without explicitly violating any electoral rules (Arriola, DeVaro, and Meng 2017; Buckles and Gandhi 2017). Incumbency advantages gained during the authoritarian period allow incumbents to subvert genuine democratic competition while still allowing for multiparty elections. This book is also in conversation with Roessler (2011, 2016), which examines which types of elites (out-groups versus in-groups) leaders choose to share power with in order to balance between threats of coups and civil wars. By contrast, this study examines the conditions that motivate leaders to delegate authority to other elites in the first place. In sum, the study of dictatorships in Africa both past and present is essential for our understanding of politics in Africa today.

In studying Africa through the lens of authoritarian politics, this book challenges a number of conventional wisdoms that have prevailed in the study of African politics. Scholars have historically argued that regimes in Africa have often been dominated by "big men" (Bienen 1970; 1978; Decalo 1976; 1990; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Zolberg 1966; 1969) and that leaders rely primarily on informal patronage-based rule to stay in power (Arriola 2009; Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015). In contrast with these dominant perspectives, I provide empirical evidence that some African autocrats do indeed rule through institutionalized mechanisms that regulate and depersonalize power, even during the most authoritarian decades prior to the end of the Cold War. Institutions are not uniformly weak in Africa, and variation exists both across countries and over time.

1.8.1 Reinterpreting Contemporary African Politics

Following the end of the Cold War in 1990, many African countries began to introduce multiparty elections (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Although scholars acknowledged that these elections were often marked by electoral fraud, intimidation of opposition forces, or media censorship, the general consensus in the academic literature (and in the policymaking

world) was that most African countries were in the process of democratizing. However, despite the presence of multiparty elections in much of sub-Saharan Africa for the last 30 years, many incumbents and ruling parties have maintained a solid grip on power (Bleck and van de Walle 2018). In short, authoritarian regimes continue to persist, albeit under the façade of shallow democratic institutions. Yet scholarly discussions of African politics remain centered on trying to understand problems of democratization, rather than trying to understand how autocracies have evolved and adapted to post-Cold War conditions.

This book proposes a radical reinterpretation of contemporary African politics: that the institutionalization of regimes beginning in the 1990s reinforced authoritarian rule, rather than ushering in real democracy. In order to really make sense of African politics today, we need to stop trying to understand these regimes as problematic democracies, and analyze them instead as institutionalized autocracies.

As my data on executive constraints demonstrate, following the end of the Cold War, regimes in Africa became much more institutionalized as leaders established power-sharing mechanisms in order to maintain support from fellow elites. Rather than offering citizens true access to power, incumbents and elites consolidated their stranglehold on political power, all while keeping the appearance of governing through democratic-seeming institutions. The majority of African countries have now introduced term limits and succession policies in their constitutions, in addition to regularizing the appointment of elites to key cabinet positions.

However, as I argue, the institutionalization of these regimes has resulted in authoritarian stability, rather than regime weakness or transition to democracy. By diffusing power among many ruling elites, leaders and incumbent regimes actually solidified their grip on power by maintaining elite support through these institutionalized pacts of long-term rent distribution. Along with the introduction of multiparty elections – which in reality did little to threaten incumbents since most opposition forces remained weak – the introduction of power-sharing institutions allowed authoritarian leaders to remain in power by limiting their absolute authority. In the post-Cold War world, constrained authoritarianism is stable authoritarianism, and this mode of governance persists across much of sub-Saharan Africa.

There are also important advantages to theorizing about authoritarian stability by examining African dictatorships. There have been many seminal studies of authoritarian institutions and strategies of rule in twentieth-century China and Mexico[23] – countries that do indeed have exceptionally

[23] One cannot say the same, for instance, of Djibouti or Mauritania.

strong institutions and have been very long-lived. It is undoubtedly important to understand these cases: China has the largest population in the world, and Mexico under the rule of the PRI was one of the longest-lived modern autocracies. However, the emphasis on these countries has likely biased our existing theories. As a result of a large number of studies that focused on a limited set of countries, theories were often built around cases that resemble outliers rather than the modal authoritarian country. This is also especially problematic when arguments that were constructed around especially successful cases are then generalized using broad large-N variables (such as the presence of parties) when these data cannot adequately capture institutional quality.

By contrast, sub-Saharan Africa as a region provides a uniquely good opportunity in which to theorize about authoritarian politics more broadly due to variation in institutional quality across regimes and over time. Authoritarian rule in Africa has ranged from stable and highly institutionalized regimes, such as in Kenya or Mozambique, to military forms of government, such as in Ghana or Benin, to personalist one-man dictatorships, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire or Idi Amin of Uganda. In other words, this book does not focus solely on regimes that are stable and long-lived. Moreover, states within sub-Saharan Africa share a number of economic and historical similarities, allowing me to hold a number of macro-conditions constant.

The postcolonial nature of African states also provides an ideal setting in which to study the emergence of institutionalized systems. The enterprise of governing in sub-Saharan Africa after decolonization was primarily one of state building. The institutions that had been set up by colonial administrations were primarily used to extract rather than to govern. When African leaders finally came to power, they had to reconstitute institutions of authority, and this provided the opportunity for these leaders to shape presidential power. The postcolonial experience in Africa, like many other postcolonial nations, allows researchers to examine how contemporary institutions are created in new states.

I focus my analysis on regimes within sub-Saharan Africa but maintain a broad comparative approach by including all countries within the region in my study, rather than focusing on a single case study. This design allows me to collect and analyze country-level data on executive constraints without relying on broad measures that do not provide enough detail or accuracy. At the same time, I am able to retain a comparative approach by studying 46 countries over a time span of 50 years, which is more amenable for making generalizable arguments about authoritarian regimes more broadly.

In addition, this book takes a multimethod approach by combining game theory, time-series cross-sectional data analysis, and illustrative case evidence. There has been a recent push toward studies that link formal and empirical analysis. The combination of different approaches helps scholars triangulate between various types of evidence that have different comparative advantages (Aldrich, Alt, and Lupia 2007; Granato and Scioli 2004). The advantage of applied game theory is that formal models "make arguments more transparent both to those making them and to those to whom the arguments are made" (Powell 1999, 29). Using a model, I am able to identify clear tradeoffs leaders are faced with when deciding whether to institutionalize the regime, as well as consider the effects of other competing factors. I am also able to clearly identify assumptions that model is making and validate these assumptions using empirical evidence. By collecting time-series cross-sectional data on executive constraints, I am able to test the theoretical arguments produced by my model. While the model's aim is to establish internal validity, statistical analyses help to establish external validity. In addition, by taking measurement very seriously, this book is able to examine the consequences of institutionalization on a wide range of outcomes that has had limited empirical verification due to limitations on existing data. Finally, this book also uses illustrative case evidence to provide examples of mechanisms and specific cases that exemplify broader trends that are found in the data. In doing so, I can provide a more concrete sense of the different types of strategies autocratic leaders used to retain power over the last five decades within sub-Saharan Africa. Altogether, it is my hope that the combination of multiple types of inquiry and different kinds of evidence help to build a thorough and compelling case.

1.9 PLAN OF THE BOOK

The aim of this book is to explain how executive constraints on autocratic leaders emerge and examine the effects of institutionalization on regime durability. I alternate between treating regime institutionalization as the dependent variable and independent variable. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on institutionalization as the dependent variable by explaining how executive constraints emerge and how they become self-sustaining. Chapter 4 lays the groundwork for the empirical analysis of this book. It discusses how I conceptualize regime institutionalization, describes my dataset, and compares my measures against other existing datasets on authoritarian institutions. Regime institutionalization remains the *dependent* variable in Chapter 5, which provides empirical evidence of the relationship between leader strength and regime institutionalization. Chapters 6 and 7 treat regime institutionalization as the *independent* variable by

examining whether executive constraints promote autocratic stability and peaceful leadership succession. While the first three chapters of the book are largely theoretical, Chapters 4 through 7 are primarily empirical.

Chapter 2: Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?

This chapter presents a theory of why and when leaders institutionalize their regimes after coming into power. I argue that leaders institutionalize their regimes in order to make credible commitments about future rent distribution to other elites. I present a formal model in which institutionalization shifts the future distribution of power away from the leader in a two-period bargaining game. The model shows that autocrats who enter power in a position of strength relative to other elites will not institutionalize the regime because they never face commitment problems in bargaining. Weaker leaders without such guarantees of stability are more likely to pursue a strategy of institutionalization because doing so provides benefits of stable rule.

Chapter 3: Two Illustrative Cases

This chapter presents two illustrative case studies: Cameroon (a highly institutionalized regime) and Côte d'Ivoire (a weakly institutionalized regime). The first president of Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo, entered power extremely weak. Ahidjo was not an influential independence leader – he was a close ally of the French colonial administration who inherited his position of power upon independence. To compensate for extremely low levels of popularity, Ahidjo used cabinet appointments as a means to buy support from other elites. By contrast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the first president of Côte d'Ivoire, entered power already extremely influential. He had been a renowned independence fighter for decades and there were no other elites of similar political stature in Côte d'Ivoire by the time he took office. Houphouët remained in power for three decades as a personalist strongman ruler, but the regime collapsed soon after his death due to the absence of institutionalized structures.

Chapter 4: How Should Institutionalization Be Measured?

This chapter lays the empirical groundwork for the central concept of the book. I discuss how I conceptualize and operationalize autocratic regime institutionalization, presenting the dataset and explaining in detail the coding strategy. I show that other commonly used datasets of authoritarian institutions, such as regime typologies and Polity scores, do not accurately measure the extent to which leaders are constrained.

Chapter 5: What Are the Causes of Regime Institutionalization?

This chapter provides a cross-national test of the theory that was presented in Chapter 2. I show that initial leader strength systematically determines patterns of regime institutionalization. Leaders who were influential independence movement leaders or those who came to power via a coup tend to institutionalize less because these types of leaders enter office with distinct advantages over other elites. I also show that the end of the Cold War is associated with a sharp increase in institutionalization as African leaders lost access to military and economic aid from external sponsors.

Chapter 6: What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Autocratic Stability?

This chapter examines the effects of institutionalization on autocratic stability by examining leader tenure and coup threats. I find that executive constraints lengthen the tenure of weak leaders but have no effect on leaders who are strong. Similarly, I find that weak leaders who institutionalize are significantly less likely to face coup attempts, but there is not a strong effect of institutionalization on coup vulnerability for strong leaders. These results show that institutionalization does indeed matter for regime durability, as long as we condition on the endogenous emergence of institutions.

Chapter 7: What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Leadership Succession?

This chapter provides evidence that regime institutionalization matters greatly for the most critical regime outcome: peaceful leadership succession. I argue that institutionalized succession procedures regulate the process of peaceful leadership transitions. I show that regimes with formal succession rules written into the constitution and leaders who designate a clear successor are significantly more likely to undergo successful leadership transitions.

Chapter 8: Conclusion

The final chapter concludes by summarizing five key claims made in this book. I discuss each of the claims and highlight the empirical and theoretical contributions of these findings. I then consider the implications of autocratic regime institutionalization for future studies of institutional design, democratization, and democratic backsliding.

2

Why Do Leaders Institutionalize?

> "Montesquieu observed that, at the birth of new polities, leaders mold institutions, whereas afterwards institutions mold leaders."
> Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work* (1993, 26)

A central question this book addresses is how institutionalized forms of autocracy emerge. Why do some leaders implement executive constraints after coming into power while others do not?

On one hand, institutionalization provides some compelling benefits for leaders. The introduction of this book previewed some key findings from Chapters 6 and 7, namely that regimes that are institutionalized are significantly less vulnerable to being overthrown by coups. Moreover, institutionalized succession procedures allow leaders to remain in power for longer periods and protect them from being preemptively deposed over succession conflicts. If executive constraints promote leader and regime stability, then why don't all leaders institutionalize their regimes?

Now consider the flip side of this question. I defined regime institutionalization as the creation of rules and procedures that structure the distribution of power and resources. This necessarily entails constraining the personal authority of the leader. If the process of institutionalization involves voluntarily creating rules and procedures that place immovable restriction on one's own authority, why would any dictator ever undertake such measures?

In fact, many autocratic leaders have avoided creating such limitations on their power. The Democratic Republic of Congo under the dictatorship of Mobutu Sese Seko, for instance, lacked formal institutionalized rules, and elites were routinely purged at the will of the leader. Power was concentrated around Mobutu alone, from the time he seized power via a coup and throughout his 28-year rule (Jackson and Roseberg 1982). Uganda under the dictatorship of Idi Amin Dada was characterized as having a "pattern of random and continued violence" and an "uncontrolled reign of terror"

(Decalo 1976; Committee on Foreign Relations 1978). After taking power through a coup in 1971, Amin purged the army and polices forces, often using extermination squads. Within a year of taking power, Amin had an estimated 10,000 people killed and around 1,500 political prisoners imprisoned. These massive purges created large personnel gaps in state institutions. Amin filled these vacancies "by a series of bizarre promotions from the ranks that completely bypassed the few middle-level [non-coethnics] who were not purged" (Decalo 1976, 213).

Why do some autocratic leaders institutionalize their regimes, while others do not? In this chapter, I will argue that regime institutionalization allows autocratic leaders to create a semiautonomous structure that can enforce joint rule. I present a formal model in which an autocrat chooses a level of regime institutionalization at the start of a two-period bargaining game. In the model, institutionalization shifts the future distribution of power in favor of elites, therefore alleviating commitment problems in bargaining by enhancing the ability of elites to overthrow the leader in the future period.

A main finding from the model is that autocratic leaders are likely to place constraints on their own authority when they enter power weak and susceptible to being deposed. Because per-period transfers are often insufficient to buy quiescence from exceptionally strong elites, initially weak leaders remain in power by making themselves even weaker by providing other elites access to the state in return for their support. Even if the leader receives a particularly weak draw of power in the first period and is, in the future, quite strong relative to elites, the need to alleviate commitment problems in the first period swamps future distributive considerations. As Montesquieu observed, leaders make decisions about institutions at the start of their tenure, and these institutional decisions shape the rest of their rule.

Importantly, this chapter addresses the key question of how certain types of institutions constrain leaders. After all, a leader who can create an institution can also disassemble it as well. How do institutions have any bite in dictatorships? I argue that institutions can credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between leaders and elites. When an elite is given a key cabinet position, such as vice president or the minister of defense, he is given access to power and resources that allow him to consolidate his own base of support. Over time, these positions shift the distribution of power away from the president by identifying alternative leaders that elites can rally around if the president were to renege on distributive promises. Institutions that empower and identify specific challengers help to solve elite coordination problems, allowing them to better hold incumbents accountable. This mechanism demonstrates how institutions become self-enforcing.

The model also illuminates a counterintuitive argument for power sharing. The model shows how initially weak autocrats can better secure their hold on power by giving it away to the very elites who are most capable of unseating them. By building institutions that empower potential challengers, the leader hands the (figurative) sword to someone else while pointing it at herself.

The theory underscores the point that the existence of a democratic façade is not of primary importance. Rather, institutions constrain when they change the underlying distribution of power within the ruling coalition. This helps to explain why the presence of nominally democratic institutions cannot necessarily explain why some regimes are institutionalized systems while others remain personalist dictatorships. This is especially true when parties or legislatures are empty vehicles that simply amplify the authority of an incumbent, rather than constraining them. Institutions matter, not because they establish de jure rules, but when they affect de facto political power.

2.1 INSTITUTIONS AS COMMITMENT DEVICES

2.1.1 *The Fundamental Problem of Autocratic Rule*

One of the main findings from recent scholarship on dictatorships is that autocratic leaders are plagued by a fundamental paradox: extremely powerful governments cannot credibly commit to share power with or distribute rents to elites, opposition groups, or larger segments of society. This is the challenge that Svolik (2012) refers to as the "problem of authoritarian power-sharing." This credibility problem affects many dimensions of leaders' rule, and existing scholarship has explored the various ways in which commitment problems arise.

Commitment problems stemming from absolute power hamper autocrats' abilities to stave off threats that emerge from outside the regime. Scholars have noted that commitment problems make it difficult for leaders to credibly promise opposition parties or nonregime elites that they will receive a steady stream of rents into the future (Blaydes 2010; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Lust 2006). Commitment problems also prevent leaders from convincing the masses that they will receive future redistribution when the threat of revolutionary is transitory (Acemoglu and Robinson 2001; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006).

However, existing research shows that the most critical threats leaders face generally come from their own inner circle. It is well established that the majority of autocratic leaders lose power through elite coups, rather than revolutions. From 1946 to 2008, 68 percent of nonconstitutional exits

from office of autocrats resulted from coups, compared with only 11 percent that resulted from popular uprisings (Svolik 2012). For dictators to survive they must maintain support from their closest allies. My account therefore focuses on how leaders maintain support from their own regime elites.

Credibility problems affect autocrats' abilities to maintain support from inside of the regime (Cox 2016; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Haber 2008; Magaloni 2008; North and Weingast 1989; Stasavage 2003). As Magaloni notes, dictators need to commit to "not abuse their 'loyal friends,' [but] this commitment is hard to establish" (2). Studies that focus on intra-elite commitment problems argue that power sharing between leaders and elites is sustained only when elites have mechanisms that allow them to check predation from leaders. In order for elites to be able to effectively hold leaders accountable, they must be able to coordinate a viable threat of rebellion (Boix and Svolik 2013; Myerson 2008). Yet, a viable threat of rebellion from elites is often far from guaranteed in an autocratic setting.

Most existing accounts of the commitment problem within the leader's inner circle argue that a lack of information hinders elite collective action (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Boix and Svolik 2013; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Myerson 2008). These studies argue that secrecy within authoritarian governments prevent elites from being able to coordinate and communicate with each other. The lack of transparency also hinders elites' abilities to monitor leader compliance. Furthermore, in regimes where rules and norms are not clearly established, it is difficult for elites to agree on what exact actions constitute a transgression. In sum, these studies argue that information problems form the key barrier for elite collective action, therefore preventing them from effectively keeping the despot's absolute power in check.

2.1.2 Institutional Solutions

To address commitment problems stemming from asymmetric information, existing scholarship has generally focused on the creation of nominally democratic institutions that can serve as "forums" for elite coordination. These studies argue that parties and legislatures promote transparency and allow elites to interact, fostering coordination among them (Boix and Svolik 2013; Myerson 2008). Constitutions establish clear guidelines about what constitutes rule breaking, therefore eliminating ambiguity that might prevent elites from knowing when to coordinate on a rebellion (Albertus and Menaldo 2012).

Yet, if parties, legislatures, and constitutions do indeed solve intra-elite commitment problems, then the introduction of these institutions should be

strongly correlated with regime durability. However, as I argue in the introduction of this book, nominally democratic institutions are extremely prevalent, even in unstable dictatorships, and therefore cannot fully explain variation in regime durability. A number of existing studies also show that the presence of ruling parties is not strongly correlated with regime durability, and the majority of these parties do not last beyond the tenure of a single leader. These findings cast doubt on the claim that intra-elite commitment problems stem primarily from information problems and that these problems can be solved through the creation of nominally democratic institutions.

By contrast, I argue that intra-elite commitment problems arise due to dynamic power shifts between leaders and their allies.[1] Elites rebel when they predict that power will shift adversely in the future, so that they will become weaker if they wait to act. As Albertus and Menaldo (2012) note, regime elites tend to be at the "apex" of their power at the start of the regime when they are well organized (292). When leaders are in a state of vulnerability, elites would prefer to depose the dictator in the current period when they have the advantage, rather than wait for the distribution of power to shift against them in the future.

My characterization of the commitment problem as a result of dynamic power shifts contrasts with existing models of authoritarian politics which assume that elites cannot coordinate due to static information problems. Instead, my approach is related to a broad class of formal models that examine shifting power as a cause of international war (Fearon 1995; Powell 2006) and models of democratization that result from commitment problems (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). However, these existing models do not propose solutions for leaders to relinquish or undercut their power in order to prevent conflict from occurring in equilibrium.[2]

If autocratic leaders face intra-elite commitment problems that result from shifting power, what types of institutional solutions can they implement to stabilize their rule? I propose a mechanism where leaders take actions to endogenously shift the future distribution of power by arming elites with access to state resources. Such access can take the form of presidential cabinet appointments, such as to the office of the vice president or minister of defense. Credible executive constraints can also take the form of formal rules that codify this delegation of power, such as procedures regarding promotion or leadership succession. Credible executive constraints emerge when elites are given real access to power within the state.

[1] In fact, as the model will show, commitment problems that arise due to dynamic power shifts can occur even with full information.

[2] In Acemoglu and Robinson's model of democratization, elites cannot voluntarily give up power in order to prevent the masses from rebelling.

Appointing elites to key cabinet positions, especially over ministries that control valuable resources, endows them with the ability to shape policy and target material resources to their supporters and constituents. This access allows elites to consolidate their own independent power base, thus shifting the distribution of power away from the leader. The appointment of elites to powerful positions within government and formalization of the hierarchy of power in the constitution thus provides elites with de facto power necessary to sustain long-run promises about rent distribution. These measures change the future distribution of power, countering commitment problems that would have otherwise arisen if power had been allowed to shift unchecked.

A few existing studies of interstate conflict also model leader decisions to endogenously change the distribution of power (Debs 2014; Powell and dal Bo 2013). However, these models focus on leaders who take actions to strengthen or consolidate their power by investing in military capabilities, rather than weaken themselves by binding their hands. By contrast, I stress a mechanism in which leaders voluntarily weaken themselves to counter changes in the future distribution of power that could trigger conflict.

Finally, I also build on studies in comparative political economy that consider how domestic institutions can tie the leader's hands and provide credible commitment. A number of studies argue that the English Crown was able to credibly commit not to alter property rights only after transferring control over taxation to parliament (Cox 2016; North and Weingast 1989). Similarly, in his examination of public debt in early modern Europe, (Stasavage 2003) notes that it was common for rulers to "delegate authority with the express intent of improving their credibility. So for example, a ruler might give a group of officials the right to manage public revenues so as to ensure full debt repayment" (3). Haber, Maurer, and Razo (2003) demonstrate that a similar solution was used to achieve economic growth in revolutionary Mexico by granting key economic actors direct access to decision-making inside the state. However, these studies do not focus on the conditions under which leaders undertake these institutional choices. Building on these ideas, I specify when autocratic leaders voluntarily tie their hands in order to provide credible commitment power.

To sum up, this chapters claims that commitment problems arise when elites lack the de facto ability to counter future shifts in power. Only after leaders provide elites with direct access to key government offices can credible commitments be sustained and self-enforcing. This mechanism explains why simply creating a focal point by establishing constitutional rules or allowing elites to communicate within a ruling party are insufficient in solving intra-elite commitment problems that arise due to shifting power.

It is important to note that while this chapter examines why certain types of executive constraints emerge, I do not seek to explain the creation of parties or legislatures in dictatorships. In fact, historical evidence often suggests that many ruling parties are not strategically created, but instead, inherited by leaders. Within my sample of African countries, for instance, virtually all leaders came into power with a preexisting party in place immediately following independence. These ruling parties were created prior to independence not as elite power-sharing devices, but rather as pro-independence organizations (Bienen 1970; 1978; Zolberg 1966; 1969) or parties that were used to participate in preindependence elections (Collier 1982). Similarly, autocratic legislatures do not tend to predate political parties (Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland 2010). Together, this evidence suggests that autocratic leaders often do not have total control over the set of institutions that are available to them when they take power.

Rather than arguing that leaders make strategic decisions to create institutions, this book argues that leaders make strategic decisions to institutionalize their regimes after coming into power. Importantly, institutionalization can occur with or without the presence of formal institutions such as parties or legislatures (though these institutions are very commonly found). Political parties were banned in Swaziland in 1973, and this law remains intact today. Despite the absence of parties, Swaziland has stable prime minister appointments and constitutional succession rules. Parties were banned in Ethiopia from 1960 through the early 1980s, but the prime minister and defense minister positions were filled and remained stable during those years. Equatorial Guinea under the rule of Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo did not have a ruling party for the first six years the leader was in power, but the cabinet had stable vice president and defense minister appointments. Meanwhile, Niger under the presidency of Hamani Diori did have a ruling party, the Nigerian Progressive Party (PPN), but no institutionalized occurred; the regime did not have formal leadership succession policies and key cabinet appointments were kept empty.

If the creation of formal organizations such as parties is often historically determined, do dictators really have control over the content of state constitutions? Historical accounts of how constitutions were drafted in the newly independent African states corroborate the claim that leaders – especially founding presidents – were given extraordinary leeway and authority to construct their constitutions as they desired. Zolberg's account of the constitutional process in the newly independent Ivory Coast highlights the fact that founding president, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, had total control over the contents of the document.

When work began on [drafting the constitution], most opposition leaders were either in exile or had rejoined the [ruling Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI) party]. There were no organs of public opinion in which the projects might be discussed. The constitution of 1959 was therefore framed by a government and an assembly dominated by a single party, itself controlled by one man. The decision-making process itself reveals that Houphouet-Boigny and his lieutenants, accountable only to one another, were unusually free to institutionalize their own political preferences . . . . The constitution was . . . approved with almost no debate in the Assembly on March 26, 1959. (Zolberg 1966, 250–251)

Leaders who came after the founding presidents also had control over the content of state constitutions. Denis Sassou Nguesso, who came to power in the Republic of Congo in 1979, issued a presidential decree in 1984 that created a constitutional council. This consultative body (that was, in practice, accountable only to Sassou Nguesso) determined the constitutionality of treaties and laws before their adoption by the National People's Assembly. At the same time, he then shut down the constitutional chamber of the Supreme Court (Radu and Sommerville 1989). It is important to note that even though these leaders may have the opportunity to remove the constitutional constraints their predecessors implemented, they will not necessarily do so if it is not in their own best interest.

2.2 A THEORETICAL MODEL

I will now formalize my theory and identify the conditions under which autocratic leaders will institutionalize their regimes. I first present a baseline model where the current and future distribution of power is common knowledge. I show that leaders who enter power weak are more likely to create constraints in order to remain in power. I then present a model extension that introduces uncertainty about the future distribution of power and show that conflict is possible in equilibrium when there is imperfect information about the leader's strength in the future.

2.2.1 *Model Set Up*

Formally, imagine a two-player, two-period bargaining game in which an Autocrat (A) and a regime Elite (A) divide a set of benefits or "pies" normalized to size 1.[3] I will refer to the Autocrat using a female pronoun and the Elite using a male pronoun.

[3] As I argue in Section 2 of the chapter, intra-elite commitment problems arise due to shifts in power, rather than information problems that prevent elite coordination. Since this model does not focus on elite collective action problems, I treat the coalition of elites as a single player (E) in the model.

In the first period, A offers x_1 to E, who can accept the division or reject it. If E accepts A's offer in that period, then A and E receive payoffs of $1 - x_1$ and x_1, respectively, and A remains in power. The game continues onto the second period, and A makes a new offer.

If E rejects A's offer in the first period, then conflict occurs. Elite defections are known to be one of the primary drivers of authoritarian breakdown, and the removal of support can be extremely dangerous for incumbents (Haggard and Kaufman 1995; Reuter and Gandhi 2011). Research on military coups has shown that they rarely succeed without substantial civilian support. Militaries often oust governments during periods of crisis when citizens express discontent with the civilian leader's incompetence or mismanagement of the economy (Geddes 2009).

If conflict occurs, A will be deposed with probability p_t. We assume that $p_1 > p_2$ so that power shifts against elites in the second period. Elites are often strongest at the start of the regime when they are well organized, before the leader has a chance to consolidate power (Albertus and Menaldo 2012). Conflict ends strategic decision-making in the game, and the winner receives all future benefits. If fighting occurs in period 1, then the winner consumes the pie for both periods. If fighting occurs in period 2, then the winner consumes the pie for the final period. However, fighting is costly and destroys a fraction of the pie. If conflict occurs, then only a fraction $\sigma \in (0, 1)$ of the pie remains.

At the start of the game A decides whether to institutionalize her regime by establishing executive constraints. Since credible executive constraints provide elites with access to the state, we model it as a shift in the future distribution of power away from the leader. Executive constraints are represented by the parameter $g \in [0, 1 - p_2]$. If A selects $g > 0$, then the second period distribution of power will be $p_2 + g$. Any positive value of g will shift the entire distribution of power away from A in the second period. A's offer in period 2 is affected by the institutional decision she makes at the start of the game.[4]

This setup reflects the fact that most leaders establish constraints near the start of their tenure. Leaders frequently draft new constitutions after

[4] We assume that A does not value g inherently. She does not consume g; it only affects the extent to which the distribution of p_2 shifts. In other words, A only cares about the *results* of g, rather than the inherent level of g. This assumption reflects the idea that leaders do not have a preference ordering about the strategies they use to rule. Instead, I assume that they care only about maximizing rents and time in office, rather than the continuation of the regime after their death.

taking power, and in the case of postindependence regimes, many amend existing constitutions adopted from the colonial period at the onset of their rule (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Zolberg 1969). As I demonstrate in Chapter 5, the vast majority of constitutional succession rules and term limits are created within the first four years of a leader's tenure.

I also assume that the regime is not institutionalized at the start of the game and that leaders can only establish constraints, rather than remove or weaken constraints on executive power. I relax these assumptions in an extension of the model that is presented in Appendix C at the end of this chapter. In the modified version of the game I allow for leaders to set negative values of g, which essentially allows them to remove existing constraints. However, since we are focusing primarily on the creation of institutionalized regimes, the baseline model restricts our attention to positive levels of g.

The game proceeds as follows:

1. At the start of the game, A selects $g \in [0, 1 - p_2]$ and E observes this choice.
2. A offers $x_1 \in [0, 1]$.
3. E accepts or rejects the offer of x_1.
   a. If E rejects the offer, conflict occurs. If conflict occurs, A is deposed with probability p_1 and remains in power with probability $1 - p_1$. Fighting is costly and only a fraction σ of the pie remains after fighting. The winner of the fight consumes the remainder of the pie for both periods, and the loser gets nothing for both periods.
   b. If E accepts the offer, then E receives x_1 and A receives $1 - x_1$.
4. If conflict did not occur in period 1, the game moves on to period 2. A offers $x_2 \in [0, 1]$.
5. E accepts or rejects the offer of x_2.
   a. If E rejects the offer then conflict occurs. If conflict occurs, A is deposed with probability $p_2 + g$ and remains in power with probability $1 - p_2 - g$. Fighting is costly and only a fraction σ of the pie remains after fighting. The winner of the fight consumes the remainder of the pie for the second period, and the loser gets nothing for the second period.
   b. If E accepts the offer, then E receives x_2 and A receives $1 - x_2$. The game ends.

Figure 2.1 presents the game tree.



Figure 2.1 Game tree: baseline model

2.3 SOLVING THE BASELINE MODEL

In the following section we first establish the conditions under which *A* will not institutionalize. We then derive equilibrium levels of institutionalization and show that *A* will prefer to institutionalize when faced with a commitment problem in period 1. The equilibrium solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium. The full proofs for the baseline model are presented in Appendix A at the end of this chapter.

2.3.1 No Institutionalization

When will the leader decide *not* to institutionalize the regime? In this section, we show that an autocrat who initially enters power strong will not face a commitment problem in period 1. She therefore does not need to establish constraints in order to make an offer that is acceptable to the elite.

Assume that a commitment problem never exists. If that is the case, then *A* can always make an offer x_t that can always be accepted in both periods. In period 1, *A* makes *E* indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer by satisfying the following condition:

$$\begin{aligned} EU_E(reject) &\leq EU_E(accept) \\ 2\sigma p_1 &\leq x_1 + V_E \end{aligned} \tag{1}$$

V_E denotes the continuation value of accepting the offer and moving onto period 2 for *E*. In the second period, *A* will hold *E* down to his reservation price by offering the expected utility of rejecting (since there are no future offers to condition on). V_E is therefore equal to *E*'s period 2 expected utility of fighting. Plugging V_E into equation (1) allows us to solve for x_1^*. Formally, *A* will make the following offer in period 1:

$$x_1^* = max\{0, 2\sigma p_1 - \sigma p_2\} \tag{2}$$

Whether *A* will always be able to make this offer depends on her relative strength in period 1. The largest possible per-period offer *A* can make is

equal to the entire size of the pie, which is normalized to 1.[5] Since A cannot commit to future offers, each per-period offer cannot exceed 1.

Proposition 2.3.1: *When $p_1 \leq \frac{1}{2\sigma} + \frac{p_2}{2} \equiv \hat{p}$, then A can always make an offer x_1 that can induce an acceptance by E. For all $p_1 \in [0, \hat{p}]$, there exists an $x_t \leq 1$ such that $E[U_E(reject)] \leq E[U_E(accept)]$.*

Proposition 4.1 tells us that if A is strong when she first enters power, she will not institutionalize. Recall that p_1 is the probability that A will be deposed, therefore when p_1 is sufficiently low, A enters power in a position of strength. Because the probability that E can successfully depose A is very low, A will be able to make an offer that will match E's expected utility of rejecting, and commitment problems will not occur. In this scenario, A will not institutionalize in equilibrium because she does not need to in order to sustain peaceful bargaining.

How does the threshold of peaceful bargaining without institutionalization, denoted by $\hat{p}$, change relative to the future distribution of power?

Proposition 2.3.2: *As A's period 2 strength decreases, the range for peaceful bargaining without institutionalization increases. Formally, $\frac{\partial \hat{p}}{\partial p_2} > 0$.*

Put together, Propositions 4.1 and 4.2 produce some interesting counterintuitive results. When A enters power strong, she will not institutionalize because she can make an offer that will satisfy E. In this case, peaceful bargaining can be sustained without institutionalization, where E has no guarantees over future rent distribution. However, keeping A's initial strength constant, as p_2 increases, E's continuation value also increases. When E can rely on future de facto power, this puts less pressure on the period 1 offer. In this case, peaceful bargaining can also be sustained without institutionalization due to a different mechanism. When E becomes more powerful in period 2, he will not need to fight in period 1 because he is guaranteed future rent distribution through increasing de facto power.

2.3.2 Institutionalization

Now let's assume that $p_1 > \hat{p}$. An offer x_1 large enough to induce an acceptance from E cannot be made without some positive level of institutionalization $g > 0$.

[5] If p_1 is very small relative to p_2, $2\sigma p_1 - \sigma p_2$ can actually be a negative number. Because offers are restricted to be within $[0, 1]$ we must restrict x_1 to nonnegative numbers.

2.3.2.1 *Finding the Equilibrium Level of Institutionalization.* In period 1, E will accept an offer only if the following condition is satisfied:

$$\begin{aligned} EU_E(reject) &\leq EU_E(accept) \\ 2\sigma p_1 &\leq x_1 + V_E \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Lemma 2.3.1: *If $p_1 > \hat{p}$, A will always offer $x_1 = 1$.*

If peaceful bargaining cannot be sustained without institutionalization, A will always prefer to set x_1 as large as possible in order to take pressure off g. Not only is x_1 a per-period offer with no lasting consequences for the second period of the game, g is also a less efficient mechanism for increasing E's continuation value, compared with x_1.

To find the equilibrium level of institutionalization, g^*, we first observe that E's continuation value is once again equal to his expected utility of rejecting the offer in period 2. V_E is therefore equal to $\sigma(p_2 + g)$. Plugging V_E into equation (3) allows us to solve for the equilibrium level of institutionalization:

$$g^* = 2p_1 - p_2 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \tag{4}$$

As long as A sets $g = g^*$, she will be able to make an offer $x_1 = 1$ that will satisfy E in period 1.[6] In the appendix we show that A will always be able to set $g = g^*$.[7]

2.3.2.2 *Comparative Statics.* We take comparative statics of g^* with respect to key parameters of interest.

Proposition 2.3.3: *As A's period 1 level of strength decreases, the equilibrium level of institutionalization increases. Formally,* $\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial p_1} > 0$.

As p_1 increases, A faces a more intense commitment problem in period 1, which increases the need for institutionalization. Interestingly, however, we find the *opposite* relationship between the equilibrium level of institutionalization and the future distribution of power, p_2.

[6] Changing the functional form of g does not alter the results substantively. For instance, if g was inefficient, say some input $\hat{g}$ would only shift the distribution by $f(\hat{g})$ such that $f(\hat{g}) < \hat{g}$, A will not be more or less likely to institutionalize. See Appendix A at the end of this chapter for discussion.

[7] Recall that g is bounded above by $1 - p_2$, therefore A can establish the equilibrium level of institutionalization only if $g^* \leq 1 - p_2$.

Proposition 2.3.4: *As A's period 2 level of strength decreases, the equilibrium level of institutionalization decreases. Formally,* $\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial p_2} < 0$.

If A is weaker in period 2 this means E has higher levels of de facto power in the future. This expected high draw of p_2 alleviates the need for institutions to ensure peaceful bargaining.

Finally, we can also consider how the equilibrium level of institutionalization g^* changes with respect to the cost of fighting, σ.

Proposition 2.3.5: *As the cost of fighting decreases, the equilibrium level of institutionalization increases. Formally,* $\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial \sigma} > 0$.

Recall that σ is the portion of the pie that remains after a period of conflict. Increasing levels of σ suggests that conflict is getting *less* costly. As conflict gets less destructive, the period 1 payoff of rejecting an offer increases because a larger portion of the pie is preserved in the case of conflict. Under these circumstances, it becomes harder to buy E off, therefore requiring higher levels of institutionalization.

2.3.2.3 Determining A*'s Equilibrium Behavior.* We have derived the equilibrium level of institutionalization, g^*, required for peaceful bargaining – but will A always prefer to implement $g = g^*$? We consider the tradeoffs A faces when she decides whether to institutionalize.

Proposition 2.3.6: *(Benefits of Institutionalization). If A sets* $g = g^*$, *then conflict does not occur in equilibrium.*

Proposition 2.3.7: *(Costs of Institutionalization). A's second period consumption is decreasing in g. Formally,* $\frac{\partial(1-x_2)}{\partial g} < 0$.

Institutionalization comes with costs and benefits for A. On one hand, if A sets $g = g^*$ then conflict will not occur in either period of the game. A is therefore able to pocket the surplus saved from not fighting in her period 2 consumption.[8] On the other hand, as g increases, A's second period consumption decreases. This is because g shifts the second period distribution of power in favor of E. The higher g is, the larger x_2 must be in order to induce an acceptance from E.

In the appendix, we demonstrate that A's expected utility from institutionalizing is larger than her expected utility of fighting in period 1. In other words, $EU_A(g = g^*) \geq EU_A(g = 0)$. When faced with a commitment problem, A will always prefer to institutionalize.

[8] Recall that if a commitment problem occurs in period 1, then A will set $x_1 = 1$ and consume nothing in the first period.



Figure 2.2 Graphing equilibrium results

Proposition 2.3.8: *The equilibrium of the game can be characterized as following:*

1. ***No Institutionalization:*** *If* $p_1 \leq \hat{p}$, *A will set* $g = 0$. *In period 1, A will offer* $x_1 = x_1^*$, *and in period 2, A will offer* $x_2 = \sigma p_2$. *In each round, E will accept each offer if* $EU_E(accept) \geq EU_E(reject)$ *and reject otherwise.*
2. ***Institutionalization:*** *If* $p_1 > \hat{p}$, *A will set* $g = g^*$. *In period 1, A will offer* $x_1^* = max\{0, x_1^*\}$, *and in period 2, A will offer* $x_2^* = \sigma p_2$. *In each round, E will accept each offer if* $EU_E(accept) \geq EU_E(reject)$ *and reject otherwise.*

Figure 2.2 presents the equilibrium results graphically. The graphs show that institutionalization occurs only when the autocrat enters power weak. Leaders do not institutionalize when the probability of being deposed in the first period is sufficiently low. The figure also illustrates that dictatorships become more institutionalized as the probability of deposing the leader in period 1 increases.

2.3.3 Discussion

The model makes a number of important predictions, which we summarize in this section. First, the model shows that there are two different types of autocratic rule, which differ based on the leader's relative strength when she first comes into office. Leaders who enter office initially strong are never incentivized to institutionalize because their initial likelihood of being deposed is very low. Such leaders prefer not to empower elites by providing them access to the state because they are always able to make a per-period transfer that elites will accept. As a result, peaceful bargaining can be sustained in a no-institutionalization equilibrium where

initially strong autocrats remain in power but do *not* provide elites with access to the state.

On the other hand, leaders who enter office initially weak are incentivized to institutionalize because they cannot sustain peaceful bargaining without shifting the future distribution of power in favor of elites. Empowering elites in the second period relaxes demands on the first period transfer by raising the elite continuation value, which allows initially weak autocrats to made credible future promises to elites. Although doing so weakens the leader in the future, she is willing to institutionalize in order to remain in power for both periods of the game. In this case, peaceful bargaining can also be sustained in an institutionalization equilibrium where initially weak autocrats remain in power only *by* providing elites with access to the state.

These two different types of autocratic rule have one very important feature in common: both initially strong leaders and initially weak leaders who institutionalize remain in power for both periods of the game. In other words, conditional on the weak type institutionalizing, the leader will be able to remain in power for the same length of time as the initially strong type.

This feature highlights an important empirical point, which we will return to in Chapter 6: scholars should not assume that regimes that are long-lived have strong institutions. Leader tenure does not serve as a useful proxy for the quality of institutions due to the strategic nature of institutionalization. Initially weak leaders are incentivized to institutionalize in order to remain in power because they would otherwise face commitment problems in bargaining and risk being deposed by elites. When weak leaders institutionalize, they can indeed remain in power for longer periods of time.

Initially strong leaders, on the other hand, can remain in power regardless of whether they have strong institutions or not, because they do not face commitment problems in bargaining. In fact, as the model shows, leaders who enter power strong do not institutionalize yet are able to remain in power for both periods of the game. We should therefore expect to see a systematic relationship between leader tenure and institutional strength only when we condition on initial leader strength. This may help to explain why existing empirical studies, which do not condition on leader strength have found inconsistent relationships between the presence of strong institutions and leader tenure (for instance, see Gandhi 2008; Lucardi 2017; Smith 2005).

These results provide some interesting contrasts with findings from existing models. In the Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) model, a main finding is that democratization is most likely to occur if the poor pose

a credible threat of rebellion *infrequently* (loosely speaking, when the leader is frequently strong). By contrast, in my model, constrained rule is most likely to occur when the leader enters power weak.[9] What accounts for this difference? In the Acemoglu and Robinson model, the poor can stage a revolution only when nature draws a low cost of rebellion (in the language of the A & R model, when $\mu = \mu_H$). Furthermore, if the poor stage a revolution, it is guaranteed to succeed. In other words, when the poor choose to rebel, they are *guaranteed* a postrevolutionary income of $1 - \mu$ in every future period. Because of this, in a world where the poor are very unlikely to hold a credible threat of rebellion (in the language of the A & R model, when q is low), that makes periods where they can stage a rebellion extremely valuable. Therefore, when the poor pose a credible threat of rebellion infrequently, they would prefer to revolt whenever they can because the probability of being able to do so is very low in the future.

By contrast, in my model, elites can always remove support of the autocrat; they are not, by assumption, constrained to rebel only in periods where the autocrat is weak. Furthermore, when elites initiate conflict, they are not guaranteed to win. Therefore an elite who has a temporarily good draw of p_t does not feel compelled to rebel against the autocrat as long as the autocrat can make an offer x_t that can satisfy the elite.[10]

2.4 MODEL EXTENSION: UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE FUTURE

In the baseline model, the distribution of power is common knowledge. Both players observe p_1 and p_2 at the start of the game. I now relax this assumption and introduce uncertainty about the future distribution of power, p_2. I show that, consistent with the baseline model, leaders will institutionalize when they enter power initially weak. However, in the modified version of the game, conflict is possible in equilibrium when leaders cannot establish a high enough level of institutionalization in order to satisfy elites.

At the start of the modified game, p_1 is common knowledge but p_2 is not observed by either player. Both players know the distribution from which p_2 will be drawn, but neither knows what the precise value of p_2 will be. If the game moves onto the second period, Nature selects p_2 and

[9] Note that in the Acemoglu and Robinson model, elites are the analogous player as the autocrat (A) in my model, and the poor are the analogous player as the elite (E) in my model.

[10] Unlike in the Acemoglu and Robinson model, where the probability that elites will be unseated jumps discontinuously from 0 to 1 if the poor initiate a revolution, p_t is a continuous parameter in my model.

both players observe this draw before bargaining occurs. p_2 is uniformly distributed on $[p_m - \mu, p_m + \mu]$, so that p_m represents the mean draw of p_2.[11] At the start of the game, A decides whether to institutionalize in light of uncertainty surrounding what the future distribution of power will be.

While it is reasonable to expect that leaders and elites have accurate information about their relative strength in the current period, uncertainty surrounding the future distribution of power can easily arise in dictatorships. Positive or negative economic shocks, changes in foreign aid, or shifts in international norms can shift the distribution of power in favor of or against the leader in future periods. Thus, leader strength can be affected by external shocks that are difficult to predict when they first take power.

At the start of the modified game, A decides whether to institutionalize. This decision is represented by the parameter $g \in [0, 1 - (p_m + \mu)]$. If A selects $g > 0$, then p_2 will be drawn from a modified uniform distribution of $[p_m - \mu + g, p_m + \mu + g]$. Any positive value of g will shift the entire distribution of power away from A in the second period. If A sets $g = 0$, then p_2 will be drawn from the original uniform distribution, $p_2 \in [p_m - \mu, p_m + \mu]$.

Figure 2.3 illustrates how g shifts the future distribution of power.

The modified game proceeds as follows:

1. At the start of the game, A selects $g \in [0, 1 - (p_m + \mu)]$ and E observes this choice.
2. A offers $x_1 \in [0, 1]$.
3. E accepts or rejects the offer of x_1.



Figure 2.3 Distribution of p_2

[11] We assume that μ is sufficiently small, such that $p_m - \mu > 0$ and $p_m - \mu < 1$.

   a. If E rejects the offer then conflict occurs. If conflict occurs, A is deposed with probability p_1 and remains in power with probability $1 - p_1$. Fighting is costly and only a fraction σ of the pie remains after fighting. The winner of the fight consumes the remainder of the pie for both periods, and the loser gets nothing for both periods.
   b. If E accepts the offer, then E receives x_1 and A receives $1 - x_1$.
4. If conflict did not occur in period 1, the game moves on to period 2. Nature selects $p_2 \in [p_m - \mu + g, p_m + \mu + g]$. Both players observe this draw.
5. A offers $x_2 \in [0, 1]$.
6. E accepts or rejects the offer of x_2.
   a. If E rejects the offer then conflict occurs. If conflict occurs, A is deposed with probability p_2 and remains in power with probability $1 - p_2$. Fighting is costly and only a fraction σ of the pie remains after fighting. The winner of the fight consumes the remainder of the pie for the second period, and the loser gets nothing for the second period.
   b. If E accepts the offer, then E receives x_2 and A receives $1 - x_2$. The game ends.

Figure 2.4 presents the game tree of the modified game.

When we introduce uncertainty about the future distribution of power, one important difference emergences: conflict is possible in equilibrium. In the baseline model, autocrats are able to implement equilibrium levels of institutionalization in order to ensure peaceful bargaining. As we demonstrated, weak autocrats will always institutionalize when faced with a commitment problem, therefore conflict never occurs in equilibrium.

We now demonstrate that when the players face uncertainty about the future distribution of power, p_2, A will not always be able to establish sufficiently high levels of institutionalization to ensure peaceful bargaining.



Figure 2.4 Game tree: model extension

As a result, fighting can occur in period 1. The full proofs for the modified game are presented in Appendix B at the end of the chapter.

Similar to the baseline model, when p_1 is sufficiently low, A will not institutionalize because she is always able to make an offer x_1 that E will accept. However, when A enters power weak, a commitment problem will arise in period 1 if $g = 0$. We can establish that there exists some $g^* > 0$ that would allow A to make an offer $x_1 = 1$ that can satisfy E in period 1. For this game, $g^* = 2p_1 - p_m - \frac{1}{\sigma}$.

Will A always be able to set $x_1 = 1$? In the modified version of the game, g is bounded above by $1 - (p_m + \mu)$. Therefore g^* is feasible only if $g^* \leq 1 - (p_m + \mu)$.

Proposition 2.4.1: *As long as p_1 is sufficiently small, A will be able to set $g = g^*$ in order to allow a peaceful bargain to go through in period 1. Formally, as long as $p_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sigma} - \frac{\mu}{2} \equiv \overline{p}$, there exists a $g = g^*$ such that $E[U_E(reject)] \leq E[U_E(accept)]$.*

A key implication of Proposition 2.4.1 is that conflict *will* occur in equilibrium if p_1 is not sufficiently small. When $p_1 > \overline{p}$, even if A were to set g to the highest possible level, she still cannot prevent conflict from occurring in period 1 because the level of institutionalization (g^*) necessary to allow all bargains to go through peacefully is larger than the maximum possible value of g. We establish in the appendix that A still always prefers to institutionalize when faced with a commitment problem, however, now she cannot always do so.

Proposition 2.4.2: *The equilibrium of the modified game can be characterized as following:*

1. ***No Institutionalization:*** *If $p_1 \leq \hat{p}$, A will set $g = 0$. In period 1, A will offer $x_1 = x_1^*$, and in period 2, A will offer $x_2 = \sigma p_2$. In each round, E will accept each offer if $EU_E(accept) \geq EU_E(reject)$ and reject otherwise.*
2. ***Institutionalization:*** *If $p_1 > \hat{p}$ and $p_1 \leq \overline{p}$, A will set $g = g^*$. In period 1, A will offer $x_1^* = max\{0, x_1^*\}$, and in period 2, A will offer $x_2^* = \sigma p_2$. In each round, E will accept each offer if $EU_E(accept) \geq EU_E(reject)$ and reject otherwise.*
3. ***Conflict:*** *If $p_1 > \hat{p}$ and $p_1 > \overline{p}$, A will set g to any $g \in [0, 1 - (p_m + \mu)]$. In period 1, A will offer any $x_1 \in [0, 1]$, and in period 2, A will offer $x_2^* = \sigma p_2$. In each round, E will accept each offer if $EU_E(accept) \geq EU_E(reject)$ and reject otherwise.*

The introduction of imperfect information regarding the future distribution of power produces an important prediction: conflict is possible in equilibrium. If A is unable to implement a high enough level of institutionalization, then E will always reject the period 1 offer, and A will be unable to prevent fighting from occurring in equilibrium. Unlike the baseline model, where strong and weak leaders can remain in power for similar lengths of time, the modified version of the game predicts that some dictatorships will be short-lived.

2.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter sought to understand why we see differences in the organizational capacity of authoritarian regimes by examining the creation of constraints limiting executive power. Constraints bind only when they provide elites with access to important government positions, empowering them to hold the incumbent accountable to promises about rent distribution. Through a formal model I demonstrated that strong autocrats who enter power with a low probability of being deposed are less likely to institutionalize. Initially weak autocrats without such guarantees of stability are more likely to pursue institutionalization in order to maintain support from elites. Importantly, rather than assuming that institutions constrain leaders, I show *how* institutions can provide credible commitment power by shifting the future distribution of power in favor of elites. The next chapter of the book illustrates the primary findings of the model through two illustrative case studies of Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire.

Appendix A Proofs: Baseline Model

Proof of Proposition 2.3.1. A must make an offer $x_1^* = max\{0, 2\sigma p_1 - \sigma p_2\}$ in order to induce an acceptance from E. However, A faces a budget constraint of 1, the size of the entire pie. Under what conditions does the optimal offer required not exceed the size of the entire pie?

$$\begin{aligned} x_1^* &\leq 1 \\ 2\sigma p_1 - \sigma p_2 &\leq 1 \\ p_1 &\leq \frac{1}{2\sigma} + \frac{p_2}{2} \equiv \hat{p} \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

As long as the first draw of p_1 is sufficiently small, A will always be able to make an offer x_1^* that can induce an acceptance from E.

Proof of Proposition 2.3.2. It is easy to see that as p_2 increases, $\hat{p}$ also increases:

$$\frac{\partial \hat{p}}{\partial p_2} = \frac{1}{2} > 0 \tag{6}$$

Proof of Lemma 2.3.1. A must choose values of x_1 and g such that the following equation is satisfied:

$$2\sigma p_1 \leq x_1 + V_E \tag{7}$$

What is V_E? We know that one of two things must happen in period 2. It is possible A cannot make an offer that satisfies E, and E decides to reject the offer. If this happens, then E's continuation value is equal to his expected utility of fighting. The only other possible outcome is that A can make an offer that satisfies E in period 2. However, A will always try to make the cheapest possible offer to E, which is exactly his expected utility of fighting. Therefore we know that V_E is simply equal to E's expected utility of fighting in period 2. Plugging in E's expected utility of fighting into the equation produces the following inequality:

$$\begin{aligned} 2\sigma p_1 &\leq x_1 + \sigma EV(p_2) \\ 2\sigma p_1 &\leq x_1 + \sigma(p_2 + g) \\ 2\sigma p_1 - \sigma p_2 &\leq x_1 + \sigma g \end{aligned} \tag{8}$$

Since each unit of g is weighted by σ, it is more efficient to increase x_1 in order to satisfy the inequality, rather than g.

To solve for g^*, we first observe that A must ensure that V_E is large enough in order to satisfy the following equation:

$$2\sigma p_1 \leq 1 + V_E \tag{9}$$

To determine the continuation value, note that if the game moves peacefully onto the second period, there will never be fighting. Even if $p_2 = 1$ and $\sigma = 1$, A can always offer $x_2 = 1$. Therefore we know that V_E is simply equal to E's expected utility of rejecting in period 2, since A will always try to make the cheapest possible offer to E.

$$\begin{aligned} V_E &= EU_E(reject) \\ &= \sigma EV(p_2) \\ &= \sigma(p_2 + g) \end{aligned} \tag{10}$$

We now plug E's continuation value into the equation and solve for g.

$$\begin{aligned} 2\sigma p_1 - 1 &\leq V_E \\ 2\sigma p_1 - 1 &\leq \sigma(p_2 + g) \\ g^* &= 2p_1 - p_2 - \frac{1}{\sigma} \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

We can establish that changing the functional form of g does not alter the results substantively. Instead of assuming that $w(g) = g$, let's assume that institutions are extremely efficient, such that $h(\widetilde{g}) > \widetilde{g}$ (in other words, $h(\cdot)$ is concave). How would $\widetilde{g}^*$ compare with g^*? We know that $g^* = 2p_1 - p_2 - \frac{1}{\sigma} = h(\widetilde{g}^*) > \widetilde{g}^*$. Therefore, $g^* > \widetilde{g}^*$. Unsurprisingly, when institutions are efficient, lower levels of institutionalization are required to sustain peaceful bargaining.

Interestingly, however, this does not change the threshold, $\hat{p}$ of institutionalization, nor does it make A more or less willing to institutionalize, compared with when $w(g) = g$. First, note that g does not affect the calculation of the threshold, $\hat{p}$. Second, recall that A does not value g inherently. She does not consume g, it *only* affects the extent to which the distribution of p_2 shifts. In other words, A only cares about the *results* of g, rather than the inherent level of g. Therefore, even if g was inefficient, say if $f(\hat{g}) < \hat{g}$, A will still always be willing to institutionalize.

Proof. We show that A will always be able to set $g = g^*$. Recall that g is bounded above by $1 - p_2$, therefore A can establish the equilibrium level of constraints if $g^* \leq 1 - p_2$.

$$\begin{aligned} g^* &\leq 1 - p_2 \\ 2p_1 - p_2 - \frac{1}{\sigma} &\leq 1 - p_2 \\ p_1 &\leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sigma} \end{aligned} \tag{12}$$

Since $\sigma \in [0, 1]$, equation (12) is always true.

Proof of Proposition 2.3.3. It is easy to see that as p_1 increases, g also increases:

$$\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial p_1} = 2 > 0 \tag{13}$$

Proof of Proposition 2.3.4. It is easy to see that as p_2 increases, g decreases:

$$\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial p_2} = -1 < 0 \tag{14}$$

Proof of Proposition 2.3.5. It is easy to see that σ increases as g^* increases.

$$\frac{\partial g^*}{\partial \sigma} = \frac{1}{\sigma^2} > 0 \tag{15}$$

Proof of Proposition 2.3.6. This proof follows directly from the construction of g^*, which is the minimal level of g that guarantees that the following condition is true: $EU_E(reject) \leq EU_E(accept)$. If $g \geq g^*$, then E will always accept in period 1. If the game makes it to period 2, then conflict will never occur because $p_2 < 1$ by assumption, therefore A will always be able to make an offer x_2 that can induce an acceptance by E.

Proof of Proposition 2.3.7. A's second period consumption is simply $1 - x_2$, since she can always make an offer x_2 that can induce an acceptance by E. It is easy to see that $1 - x_2$ is decreasing in g:

$$\frac{\partial(1 - x_2)}{\partial g} = -\sigma < 0 \tag{16}$$

Proof. We show that A will therefore always prefer to institutionalize if $p_1 > \hat{p}$. First we observe that A will set $g = g^*$ in equilibrium only if the following condition holds:

$$EU_A(g = g^*) \geq EU_A(g = 0) \tag{17}$$

The expected utility of A not institutionalizing is equal to the expected utility of E rejecting the offer x_1. This can be expressed as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} EU_A(g = 0) &= EU_A(E\_rejects) \\ &= 2\sigma(1 - p_1) \end{aligned} \tag{18}$$

If A chooses to institutionalize, she will set $g = g^*$ and $x_1 = 1$. As long as A sets $g = g^*$, E will accept the period 1 offer.

$$\begin{aligned} EU_A(g = g^*) &= EU_A(E\_accepts) \\ &= (1 - x_1) + V_A \\ &= 0 + V_A \end{aligned} \tag{19}$$

A gets to pocket the portion of the pie that she doesn't offer to E, therefore her continuation value is the size of the pie minus the expected value of the period 2 offer, x_2.

$$V_A = 1 - EV(x_2) \tag{20}$$

In period 2, A will make the cheapest possible offer to E, so in expectation, x_2 will be equal to the expected value of fighting for E.

$$EV(x_2) = \sigma(p_2 + g^*) \tag{21}$$

Plugging g^* into equation (21) produces the following:

$$EV(x_2) = 2\sigma p_1 - 1 \tag{22}$$

We plug this back into A's continuation value:

$$\begin{aligned} V_A &= 1 - EV(x_2) \\ &= 2 - 2\sigma p_1 \end{aligned} \tag{23}$$

To verify that A will always prefer to institutionalize, we check whether A's expected utility of setting $g = g^*$ is larger than A's expected utility of setting $g = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned} &EU_A(g = g^*) \geq EU_A(g = 0) \\ &2 - 2\sigma p_1 \geq 2\sigma(1 - p_1) \\ &1 \geq \sigma \end{aligned} \tag{24}$$

Equation (24) is always true by assumption. A will therefore always prefer to institutionalize if $p_1 > \hat{p}$.

Proof of Proposition 2.3.8. We break the proof of Proposition 2.3.8 into two parts. First we establish the No Institutionalization equilibrium.

Proposition 2.3.1 has already established that if $p_1 \leq \hat{p}$ then A can always make an offer x_1 that can induce an acceptance from E in period 1. Therefore in the No Institutionalization equilibrium, A's best response is to set $g = 0$.

In the second period of the game, A's strict best response is to offer $x_2 = \sigma p_2$ because doing so allows her to pocket the surplus saved from not fighting while offering the smallest possible amount that will induce an acceptance from E. E's best response is to accept an offer that is at least as good as his expected utility of fighting in the second period.

Moving to the first period of the game, A will always choose to set $x_1 = x_1^*$ to ensure peaceful bargaining, rather than choosing to fight because her expected utility from fighting is strictly less.

A's expected utility from peaceful bargaining is equal to $2 - (x_1^* + x_2^*) = 2 - 2\sigma p_1$. A's expected utility from fighting in period 1 is equal to $2\sigma(1 - p_1)$. We can show that A's expected utility from peaceful bargaining is higher than her expected utility from fighting in period 1:

$$\begin{aligned} &EU_A(x_1 < x_1^*) < EU_A(x_1 = x_1^*) \\ &2\sigma(1 - p_1) < 2 - 2\sigma p_1 \\ &\sigma < 1 \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

Since $\sigma \leq 1$ by assumption, equation (25) is always true. Therefore A's strict best response is to offer $x_1 = x_1^*$ in period 1. Once again, E's best response is to accept x_1^* because it is, by construction, the smallest possible offer that can induce an acceptance by E in period 1. We have therefore established a unique equilibrium when $p_1 \leq \hat{p}$.

Now we establish the Institutionalization equilibrium. Here, we assume that $p_1 > \hat{p}$ (otherwise we would be in the No Institutionalization equilibrium) and that a peaceful offer cannot be made in period 1 without setting $g = g^*$.

If the game reaches a second period of bargaining, then A can always make an offer that will satisfy E. A's strict best response in period 2 is to offer $x_2 = \sigma p_2$ because doing so allows her to pocket the surplus saved from not fighting while offering the smallest possible amount that will induce an acceptance from E. E's best response is to accept an offer that is at least as good as his expected utility of fighting in the second period.

Moving to period 1, A can make an offer $x_1 = 1$ that will ensure peaceful bargaining as long as $g \geq g^*$, or she will not be able to make any offer that will satisfy E if $g < g^*$. We show that if A can make an offer $x_1 = 1$, given that $g = g^*$, she will choose to do so, rather than choosing to fight.

We have already established from Lemma 2.3.1 that if $p_1 > \hat{p}$, then A will always offer $x_1 = 1$. If she chooses to do this, then her total expected utility over the two periods is simply the expected utility of $1 - x_2$, since she receives nothing in period 1. We show that $EU_A(x_1 < 1) < EU_A(x_1 = 1)$.

A's expected utility from fighting in period 1 is equal to $2\sigma(1 - p_1)$. To calculate $EU_A(1 - x_2)$, we first establish x_2 given that $g = g^*$. We know that $x_2 = EV(p_2)\sigma$.

$$\begin{aligned} EV(x_2) &= \sigma(p_2 + g^*) \\ &= \sigma p_2 + \sigma\left(2p_1 - p_2 - \frac{1}{\sigma}\right) \\ &= 2\sigma p_1 - 1 \end{aligned} \tag{26}$$

A's two-period expected utility from peaceful bargaining is equal to $1 - EV(x_2) = 2 - 2p_1\sigma$. We show that this is strictly larger than A's expected utility from fighting in period 2.

$$\begin{aligned} EU_A(x_1 < 1) &< EU_A(x_1 = 1) \\ 2\sigma(1 - p_1) &< 2 - 2\sigma p_1 \\ \sigma &< 1 \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

Once again, since $\sigma \leq 1$ by assumption, equation (27) is always true. Therefore, it is always the case that setting $x_1 = 1$ produces a larger

expected utility for A than fighting in period 1. A's strict best response, given that $g = g^*$ is to offer $x_1 = 1$ in period 1. E's best response is to accept $x_1 = 1$ because by construction, g^* ensures that E's expected utility of accepting $x_1 = 1$ is greater than or equal to his expected utility of fighting in period 1.

We now move to the very start of the game, where A decides what to set g. We have already established that the following is always true: $EU_A(institutionalize) \geq EU_A(not\_institutionalize)$. Therefore if $p_1 > \hat{p}$, then A's best response is to set $g = g^*$ at the onset of the game.

Appendix B Proofs: Model Extension

We demonstrate that, similar to the baseline model, when A enters power sufficiently strong, she will not establish constraints because she will always be able to make an offer x_1 that E will accept. Unlike the baseline model, when we introduce uncertainty over the future distribution of power p_2, conflict is possible in equilibrium when A cannot establish a high enough level of constraints because $g^* > max(g)$.

First we establish that when A enters power sufficiently strong, she does not face a commitment problem in bargaining, and therefore does not institutionalize. Assume that a commitment problem never exists. If that is the case, then A can always make an offer x_t that can always be accepted in both periods. In period 1, A makes E indifferent between accepting and rejecting an offer by satisfying the following condition:

$$\begin{aligned} &EU_E(reject) \leq EU_E(accept) \\ &2\sigma p_1 \leq x_1 + V_E \end{aligned} \tag{28}$$

In the second period, A will hold E down to his reservation price by offering the expected utility of rejecting. V_E is therefore equal to E's period 2 expected utility of fighting. E's expected utility of fighting is equal to σp_m. Plugging V_E into the equation above allows us to solve for x_1^*. Formally, A will make the following offer in period 1:

$$x_1^* = max\{0, 2\sigma p_1 - \sigma p_m\} \tag{29}$$

Whether A will always be able to make this offer depends on her relative strength in period 1. Since A cannot commit to future offers, the largest possible period 1 offer she can make is $x_1 = 1$. We plug in $x_1 = 1$ and solve for p_1. When $p_1 \leq \frac{1}{2\sigma} + \frac{p_m}{2} \equiv \hat{p}$, then A can always make an offer x_1 that can induce an acceptance by E.

Similar to the baseline model, when $p_1 \leq \hat{p}$, A does not face a commitment problem in bargaining, and therefore does not institutionalize.

However, when $p_1 > \hat{p}$, A cannot make a period 1 offer that E will accept if $g = 0$. A needs to set $g > 0$ in order to prevent conflict from occurring in period 1.

In period 1, E will accept an offer only if the following condition is satisfied:

$$\begin{aligned} &EU_E(reject) \leq EU_E(accept) \\ &2\sigma p_1 \leq 1 + V_E \end{aligned} \tag{30}$$

To find the equilibrium level of institutionalization, g^*, we first observe that E's continuation value is, once again, equal to his expected utility of rejecting the offer in period 2. V_E is therefore equal to $\sigma(p_m + g)$. Plugging V_E into the equation above allows us to solve for the equilibrium level of institutionalization:

$$g^* = 2p_1 - p_m - \frac{1}{\sigma} \tag{31}$$

As long as A sets $g = g^*$, she will be able to make an offer $x_1 = 1$ that will satisfy E in period 1. However, we show that A will not always be able to set g at a high enough level if $g^* > max(g)$.

Proof of Proposition 2.4.1. We established above that as long as A sets $g = g^*$, she will be able to make an offer, x_1, that E will accept and conflict will not occur in period 1. However, g is bounded above by $1 - (p_m + \mu)$ because it is drawn from the following distribution: $g \in [0, 1 - (p_m + \mu)]$. To see why g is bounded above by $1 - (p_m + \mu)$, refer to Figure 2.3. g shifts the entire distribution of p_2 upward, and the largest value the upper bound of p_2 can take is 1. Therefore the largest possible value g can take is the distance between 1 and the upper bound of the original distribution of p_2, $p_m + \mu$.

A can set $g = g^*$ only when $g^* \leq 1 - (p_m + \mu)$.

$$\begin{aligned} &g^* \leq 1 - (p_m + \mu) \\ &2p_1 - p_m - \frac{1}{\sigma} \leq 1 - (p_m + \mu) \\ &p_1 \leq \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{2\sigma} - \frac{\mu}{2} \equiv \overline{p} \end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

A can set $g = g^*$ only when $p_1 \leq \overline{p}$. When $p_1 > \overline{p}$, even if A were to set g to the highest possible level, it would not be high enough to prevent conflict in period 1.

***Proposition* 2.4.2.** Proposition 2.4.2 establishes the following equilibrium: No Institutionalization, Institutionalization, and Conflict. First, we note that the No Institutionalization and Institutionalization equilibrium follow an identical logic as the No Institutionalization and Institutionalization equilibrium that was established in the baseline model version of the game. The reader can therefore refer to the proof of Proposition 2.3.8 for these equilibria.

We now address the Conflict equilibrium. If the game reaches a second period of bargaining, then A can always make an offer that will satisfy E, since $p_2 \leq p_m + \mu$, which is strictly less than the total size of the pie. A's strict best response in period 2 is to offer $x_2 = \sigma p_2$ because doing so allows her to pocket the surplus saved from not fighting while offering the smallest possible amount that will induce an acceptance from E. E's best response is to accept an offer that is at least as good as his expected utility of fighting in the second period.

Moving to period 1, we have already established through Proposition 2.3.1 that A will not be able to set g high enough to induce an acceptance from E in period 1. In other words, conflict is inevitable in equilibrium if $p_1 > \overline{p}$. Since this is the case, any offer $x_1 \in [0, 1]$ is a best response, since no offer will be able to satisfy E in period 1. Therefore in the conflict equilibrium, A can offer any $x_1 \in [0, 1]$. E's best response is to accept x_1 only if $EU_E(accept) \geq EU_E(reject)$. Since this equation will never be satisfied in the conflict equilibrium, E will always reject the offer.

Moving back to the start of the game, since $p_1 > \overline{p}$, then $g^* > 1 - (p_m + \mu)$. In other words, no level of institutionalization will be high enough to prevent conflict. Since this is the case, any level of institutionalization $g \in [0, 1 - (p_m + \mu)]$ is a best response, since no level of g is high enough to prevent conflict. A can therefore select any $g \in [0, 1 - (p_m + \mu)]$.

Appendix C Model Extension: Removal of Institutionalization

In the baseline model, we assumed that the regime is not institutionalized at the start of the game. The autocrat's decision is limited to positive values of g. Now we relax the assumption that the regime is not institutionalized when the autocrat first comes into power, and allow the autocrat to de-institutionalize.

In this extension of the model we allow for A to remove constraints by allowing A to set negative levels of g. Negative levels of g shifts power in favor of A in the second period. In other words, A can remove existing constraints by setting negative levels of g and decreasing her average

probability of being deposed in the second period. In the modified version of the game, A can select g from a distribution of $g \in [-p_2, 1 - p_2]$, and everything else remains the same as the baseline model.

First, we establish that A will not choose to de-institutionalize unless $p_1 < \hat{p}$. Recall from the baseline model that if $p_1 > \hat{p}$, she will need to institutionalize in order to maintain peaceful bargaining. We therefore restrict our attention to cases where $p_1 < \hat{p}$. In period 1, A needs to make sure the following condition holds:

$$\begin{aligned} &EU_E(reject) \leq EU_E(accept) \\ &2\sigma p_1 \leq x_1 + V_E \end{aligned} \tag{33}$$

When $p_1 < \hat{p}$, then A can set $x_1 = 1$ and $g = 0$. However, if $p_1 < \hat{p}$, then the left hand side of equation (33) will be strictly less than the right hand side of the equation. In that case, then A can offer $x_1 < 1$ or set $g < 0$. Observe that A will prefer to offer $x_1 < 1$ over setting negative levels of g, since g is weighted by σ. In other words, A will prefer to keep scaling down x_1, rather than setting $g < 0$ because it is more efficient. However, if A sets $x_1 = 0$ and the LHS of the equation is *still* strictly less than the RHS of the equation, then A will want to remove institutions by setting negative levels of g. When we plug $x_1 = 0$ into equation (33), we see that $g^* = 2p_1 - p_2$.

Finally, we note that, unlike in the baseline model, *incomplete* removal can occur in equilibrium. Recall that in the baseline model where $g > 0$, A had to set $g = g^*$ when $p > \hat{p}$, otherwise E would reject the period 1 offer and conflict will occur in equilibrium. However, when A sets $g < 0$, E no longer has veto power. In fact, A is removing constraints precisely because she can satisfy equation (33) even when $x_1 = 0$. Recall that g is bounded below by $-p_2$, since it is drawn from the distribution $g \in [-p_2, 1 - p_2]$. In cases where negative levels of g^* are actually more negative than $min(g) = -p_2$, A cannot remove constraints as much as she wants to. However, unlike in the case of $g > 0$, incomplete removal will not trigger conflict. Therefore if $g^* < 0$, then A will set $g = min\{-p_2, g^*\}$.

3

Two Illustrative Cases

How do institutions constrain leaders and under what conditions do autocrats establish institutionalized regimes? The model in Chapter 2 produced three important mechanisms and findings that address these questions. This chapter will present illustrative case studies of Cameroon (a highly institutionalized regime) and Côte d'Ivoire (a weakly institutionalized regime), two countries in sub-Saharan Africa that have experienced decades of authoritarian rule. The goal of this chapter is to use these case studies to highlight key insights from the model.

I choose to focus on Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire due to the comparability of these countries. They share similar histories, economies, geography, and populations. Both cases are former French colonies[1] located in West Africa, and they were granted independence in the same year. Both countries have similar population sizes and degrees of ethnic heterogeneity within the population. They both have large port cities along the Atlantic coast and generally stable economies. In fact, as Figure 3.1 illustrates, the gross domestic product (GDP) of both Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire has grown along very similar trajectories from 1960 to 2010. These similarities allow me to hold background conditions constant while exploring important differences in the independent and dependent variables.

I first present the case of Cameroon, which is an example of a regime with high levels of institutionalization under the founding president, Ahmadou Ahidjo. I show how Ahidjo, who was an initially weak leader, used institutional bargains in order to maintain support from other elites – therefore establishing a rule-based system. Unlike other founding leaders,

[1] As will be discussed later in this chapter, a small sliver of Cameroon was controlled by the British, but the country was mostly under French colonial rule. British rule in Cameroon was very limited, as the French took the vast majority of the land (four-fifths of the total area of Cameroon) – including the capital city of Yaounde. Francophile elites and politicians have always dominated the executive in Cameroon.



Figure 3.1 Yearly gross domestic product (GDP) of Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire

such as Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal or Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire, Ahidjo was not a renowned, charismatic, popular independence leader. He was initially encouraged to run for office by the French colonial authorities and was perceived to be a part of the colonial machine. When independence was granted, Ahidjo ascended to the presidency as a highly unpopular leader. To compensate for this initial lack of support, Ahidjo distributed important cabinet positions to other elites, including appointing Paul Biya to the position of prime minister – the designated constitutional successor to the president. In 1982, power was transferred peacefully from Ahidjo to Biya, and the same regime remains in power today.

I juxtapose the case of Cameroon against Côte d'Ivoire under the rule of the founding president, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, which is an example of a regime with low levels of institutionalization. Houphouët was a renowned independence leader, who lobbied for the right to self-governance throughout French West Africa. Upon taking power, Houphouët was extremely influential and faced very few credible challenges to his authority. Throughout his tenure, Houphouët centralized power within his cabinet, leaving key ministerial positions, such as the vice presidency, vacant. Houphouët died while in office in 1993, and power was transferred to Henri Konan Bédié. However, Bédié's claim to the presidency was tenuous, as Houphouët had intentionally left

succession plans vague while he was in power. The military launched a coup d'état in 1999 and removed Bédié from office.

Before I present the cases of Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire, I will first summarize the main claims developed in Chapter 2. This summary will highlight the connective tissues that link the analysis from the formal model with substantive details of the cases.

3.1 THE FORMAL MODEL SUMMARIZED

The model presented in Chapter 2 produced a number of insights and findings. Here, I summarize three key aspects of the model that will be highlighted in the case studies. First, I argued that institutions constrain leaders only when they empower specific elites. The model formalized this mechanism as a shift in the underlying distribution of power away from the leader. Executive constraints have the power to bind the leader's hands when they provide elites with direct access to the state. When an elite is given an important cabinet position, such as the vice presidency or minister of defense, they gain control of the entire ministry and its resources. Within the context of sub-Saharan Africa, this is an especially valuable source of power because the government was and continues to be a main source of funding for development projects, employment, and the distribution of resources to localities. Having authority over a piece of the central government provides elites with a great deal of power.

The case of Cameroon will demonstrate how elites who were given important cabinet positions used this access to power to build up their own coalitions. Cabinet ministers frequently fill their ministries with coethnics and bureaucrats from their home region. They have discretion over funding and the distribution of resources to localities. State coffers provide elites with a rich access to sources of patronage in order to reward their supporters.

Moreover, when an elite is appointed to an important ministerial position, they become a focal point for other elites. This is especially true if the constitution specifies a succession order. If, for example, the vice president is listed as the designated successor in the constitution, then the elite in the position of vice president is formally and publicly declared as the second highest ranked member in the government. Executive constraints that empower particular ministers help solve coordination problems amongst elites by providing a clear signal of the most influential elites in the regime. This eliminates conflict within elites about who would be the most likely challenger to the leader. Similar to the "crown prince problem" famously identified by Herz (1957), when the leader identifies

a successor, that person automatically becomes a potential challenger simply by the designation of an alternative center of power.

This mechanism is well illustrated by a comparison of the first leadership transitions in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire. In Cameroon, Ahidjo appointed Biya as his prime minister in 1975 – the constitutionally designated position to succeed the president. Seven years later, Ahidjo voluntarily retired and passed power to Biya, citing health reasons. In part, due to the legitimacy of the constitutional succession procedure, Biya maintained control of the regime – even in light of an attempted coup a year after his ascension to the presidency. By contrast, in Côte d'Ivoire Houphouët largely avoided designating a successor, keeping the position of vice president vacant throughout most of his rule. Toward the end of his rule, he reluctantly designated Bédié as his successor, but factional battles over succession persisted, and Bédié was not able to consolidate power upon Houphouët's death. Six years later, Bédié was deposed in the country's first coup d'état since independence.

Second, the model showed that leaders who initially enter power weak must make the counterintuitive decision to give power away to elites in order to maintain support of the regime. Leaders who enter power already strong face weak elites who do not pose a credible threat of launching a successful rebellion against the regime. Strong leaders can therefore always pay off weak elites without making long-term institutional commitments. Leaders who enter power weak, on the other hand, face a commitment problem in the initial period. In this case, if elites were to try to depose the leader, they would likely succeed. In order to survive in power past this initial period, weak leaders must make institutional guarantees of rent distribution to elites. This is achieved by creating executive constraints that empower elites, solidifying their future ability to hold the leader accountable by transferring state resources and influence to them.

The comparison of Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire highlights this finding. Ahidjo entered power in Cameroon extremely weak due to the perception that he was an ally of the French colonial administration and therefore had simply inherited his position of power from the outgoing authorities. As a result, Ahidjo could not rule alone; he used important cabinet positions to make institutional commitments to elites and solidified limitations on his personal executive authority through constitutional rules. On the other hand, Houphouët entered office after independence as the single most powerful politician in Côte d'Ivoire. He had long built a reputation as a freedom fighter not only within his own country but also for all Africans in the region. Upon ascending to the presidency, he systematically shut out elites from his own party and coalition from positions of power, preferring to keep French technocrats in the bureaucracy. This

strategy of personal rule allowed Houphouët to remain the single most important figure in Ivorian politics throughout his tenure.

Initial weakness has long-term consequences. Leaders who enter power especially weak must institutionalize the regime in order to avoid being deposed in the first period. This is true regardless of whether the leader would have been stronger in future periods; without institutionalizing after coming into power, the leader would not have made it to a future period! The period right after a leader comes into power is therefore a critical juncture: the initial distribution of power between the leader and elites determines the institutional makeup of the regime in the long run. Since institutionalization shifts power in favor of elites, it is self-reinforcing. The leader's initial decisions to create executive constraints shape the long-term trajectory of the regime.

The institutional arrangements established under Ahidjo largely remain in Cameroon today. Biya has been in power since 1982, and there has never been a coup d'état or civil war in Cameroon.[2] The regime in Côte d'Ivoire fell six years after Houphouët's death, as his successor was deposed in a coup in 1999. There have also been two civil wars – the first from 2002 to 2007 and the second from 2010 to 2011 – since the first presidential transition.

Third, the model illustrated that initially weak leaders who institutionalize the regime and strong leaders who do not institutionalize can *both* stay in power for long periods of time. Indeed, in the model, conflict never occurs because initially weak leaders prefer to institutionalize in order to maintain support of elites. Likewise, conflict also never occurs in regimes with strong leaders because elites do not pose a credible threat. The empirical implication of this finding is that we generally should not observe a systematic relationship between leader longevity and executive constraints because institutionalization is an endogenous process.

Ahidjo was the president of Cameroon for twenty-two years, from 1960 until his voluntary retirement in 1982. Houphouët was the president of Côte d'Ivoire for thirty-three years, from 1960 until his death in 1993. It is also difficult to know how long Ahidjo would have remained in the presidency if he had not voluntarily retired due to ill health. Regardless, both leaders remained in power for decades despite two very different models of rule.

[2] Though in recent years an anglophone separatist movement has emerged in Cameroon. The country has also experienced insurgent violence from Boko Haram. Cameroon experienced an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1984, as this chapter will later discuss.

3.2 CAMEROON UNDER AHIDJO: HIGH LEVELS OF REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The case of Cameroon under the presidency of Amadou Ahidjo is an example of a regime with high levels of institutionalization. Cameroon has consistently had formal succession policies written into the constitution since the country gained independence. Article 9 of the constitution states: "In the event of the Presidency falling vacant for any reason whatsoever, the powers of the President of the Federal Republic shall automatically devolve upon the Vice-President until such time as a new President is elected." In 1975, the title for the office of vice president was changed to prime minister, and the succession clause in the constitution was amended to reflect the change in title for this office. This stands in contrast with the case of Côte d'Ivoire, in which the constitution under Houphouët lacked detailed succession rules almost the entire time he was in power.

Key cabinet ministerial positions were consistently filled and remained quite stable under Ahidjo. Importantly, the office of vice president/prime minister was almost always filled.[3] Not only is this position the "second in command" within the cabinet, the person in this office is the designated constitutional successor. In addition, cabinet rotation rates under Ahidjo were relatively low. Throughout his tenure, Ahidjo only had three different vice presidents. Ahidjo also appointed a minister of defense the entire time he was in power. This pattern of cabinet stability contrasts starkly with the Houphouët government, which did not have a vice president or prime minister over 90 percent of the time Houphouët was in power. Houphouët also kept the minister of defense position vacant a third of the time he was in power.

The fact that Cameroon, especially in the first decades after independence was granted, had high levels of regime institutionalization may come as a surprise. The existing scholarship on colonial legacies generally claims that former British colonies had stronger institutions that kept rulers in check as well as more robust legal traditions (Hayek 1960; La Porta et al. 1998; Landes 1998). Cameroon was largely a French colony prior to independence, yet institutional checks on executive power were established, and most of these constraints were created early on during Ahidjo's rule.

[3] For a short period during Ahidjo's rule, from 1973 to 1974, the office of the vice president was eliminated from the cabinet. In 1975 the title of the office of vice president was changed to prime minister and was added back to the cabinet. From 1975 through until the end of Ahidjo's rule, Paul Biya was appointed as prime minister.

For the past three years, Cameroon's English speaking regions (the areas formerly ruled by the British) have started to engage in separatist conflict against the French-dominated Cameroon government. However, for most of Cameroon's history – and especially during the time period that is highlighted in the case study for this book (1960–2010) – this linguistic cleavage was not particularly salient. Moreover, I argue that Cameroon is an example of a regime with high levels of institutionalization, making it durable against threats. The fact that the regime in Cameroon has persisted, *despite* these separatist conflicts, provides additional support for the argument that the regime is highly institutionalized.

3.2.1 Background and History

Cameroon is a country located in Central Africa though it borders the Atlantic Ocean on its western side. It currently has a population of 23.44 million and about 55 percent of the population lives in urban areas (World Bank 2016). Cameroon shares a border with Nigeria, Chad, the Central African Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, and the Republic of the Congo. The capital and second largest city of Cameroon is Yaoundé, located in the central region of the country. Douala, located on the Atlantic coastline, is the largest city in Cameroon, and is the economic center of Cameroon and largest seaport in Central Africa.

Cameroon has an extremely heterogeneous population, with over 250 different ethnic groups. It is considered one the most linguistically diverse countries in the world. Though groups such as the Bantoid, Bamileke, Bantu, Kirdi, and Fulani comprise of large numbers, no particular ethnic group dominates the population of Cameroon. Roughly two-thirds of the population is Christian, and less than a quarter of the population, notably the Fulani tribe (of which Ahidjo was a member), is Muslim.

The economy of Cameroon is roughly one of the ten largest economies within sub-Saharan Africa. For the first two decades after independence, agriculture made up the bulk of Cameroon's economy, and important cash crops included cocoa, coffee, cotton, and bananas. In 1977, Cameroon began producing and distributing oil. It is now the sixth largest oil producer in sub-Saharan Africa, though agriculture remains a large part of the Cameroonian economy. Its current GDP is US$34.8 billion (World Bank 2016).

Cameroon gained independence in 1960 after decades of colonial rule by Germany, England, and France. Prior to colonization, the territory was organized into chiefdoms and kingdoms, including the Bornu Empire. Colonial rule in Cameroon began when Germany established the territory as a German protectorate in 1884. Germany's loss in the First World

War resulted in a partition of the territory between the French and the British in 1916. This agreement divided the country into two territories – the French took the vast majority of the land in the country (four-fifths of the total area of Cameroon), and the British took the remaining land. Under this agreement, the two Cameroons became League of Nations mandated colonies under France and the United Kingdom (Le Vine 1964, 4–8).

3.2.2 Ahidjo's Rise to Power: Initial Leader Weakness

Amadou Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroon, entered office weak and vulnerable to being deposed. Unlike other founding presidents in newly independent African countries, Ahidjo was not a national independence hero. On the contrary, he largely inherited his position of power from the colonial government and remained a close ally of France throughout his tenure. As a result, Ahidjo was largely perceived to be a collaborator of the French colonial authorities and was initially very unpopular. As Joseph (1978) notes, "In spite of the efforts of the propagandists of the regime, President Ahidjo cannot be considered a heroic figure from the nationalist past ... it is a matter of historical fact he was initially "fabricated" and brought to power by the colonial regime" (76).[4]

Ahidjo was born in northern Cameroon to a Muslim Fulani family in 1924. His father was the local Fulani village chief. In 1939, Ahidjo began attending Ecole Primaire Supérieur, a secondary school in Yaoundé, with the goal of beginning a career in civil service. In 1942, Ahidjo joined the state bureaucracy by becoming a post-office radio operator. Over the next few years, his appointment in the civil service would take him to several posts across Cameroon (Glickman 1992; Ngoh 1987).

Meanwhile, in Cameroon, emerging parties and political elites began to lobby for independence. One of the earliest major parties to call for independence and the reunification of British and French Cameroon was the Union des Populations du Cameroun (UPC). The UPC, which was formed in 1948, grew out of the French communist-oriented trade unions that had formed near the end of the Second World War. The UPC was strongly in favor of self-government, and two of its major platforms involved independence from France and the reunification of British and French Cameroon (Ngoh 1987).

[4] Joseph also notes that "in view of his uncertain and controversial origins, [Ahidjo] is not strongly identified with any particular ethnic group," making it even more difficult for him to have a mass popular following (77).

In 1951, Ahidjo joined the Bloc Democratique Camerouanis (BDC) as one of the founding members of the party. The BDC was much less radical than the UPC, and it was initially opposed to lobbying for immediate independence from France. In 1958, Ahidjo broke from the BDC and formed his own party, the Union Camerounaise (UC).

It is important to stress that a cohesive and unified independence movement never developed in Cameroon. This was partly because Cameroon was divided into British and French territories, with each side having regional factions with difference goals and approaches toward independence (DeLancey 1989; Rubin 1971). More importantly, the colonial administration actively stymied the independence movement by encouraging the development of more moderate political parties. Since these other political parties, such as the BDC, tended to favor the status quo rather than call for immediate independence, the French supported the creation of these parties to serve as a counterweight against the popular UPC. In 1955, the colonial administration banned the UPC, driving the party underground (Ngoh 1987).

In addition to encouraging the development of politically moderate parties that did not call for immediate independence, the French also sought out African elites who would be reliable allies for the colonial administration. They were eager to find young Cameroonian civil servants who were educated and trained by the French, and could act as a counterbalance against the nascent independence movement inspired by the UPC (Joseph 1978).

In 1956, in response to growing agitations for independence from French West African colonies, the French National Assembly passed the "Loi Cadre," which gave overseas territories increased self-governance including the ability to create national assemblies and internal governments. Elections were held in 1956, and Ahidjo's party, the UC, won a large share of seats in the territorial assembly, since the more radical (and popular) UPC party remained banned from politics.

Though Cameroon had not yet gained independence, the first Cameroon government was formed out of these 1956 elections. The first prime minister, Andre-Marie Mbida resigned in response to a ministerial crisis and unpopular policies less than a year into the position (Le Vine 1964). This provided Ahidjo, who had been Mbida's vice premier and minister of the interior, with the opportunity to rise to the post of prime minister in 1958 (Ngoh 1987, 150). As prime minister of the French Cameroon territory, Ahidjo remained a close ally of the French authorities and even conducted military attacks against the underground UPC independence movement (DeLancey 1989, 40).

Cameroon achieved full independence from France on January 1, 1960, and Ahidjo was elected as the first president of the newly independent

country three months later. A year later, British Cameroon voted to reunify with the newly independent territory, and on October 1, 1961, Cameroon became a federal republic. However, Ahidjo began his tenure in a position of weakness, relative to other political and economic elites in the country. There were three main reasons for his initial weakness.

First, Ahidjo was never perceived as a nationalist fighter, and in fact, was accurately known to be a close collaborator of the French, allowing him to inherit his position of power. The French authorities actually *encouraged* Ahidjo to run for office in the first place because they viewed him as a politician who would act in the interest of the colonial state. The colonial administration even referred to the "Ahidjo option": given that independence seemed to be increasingly inevitable, the French authorities preferred to have Ahidjo as head of state (Joseph 1978, 46). As DeLancey (1989) notes, "Ahidjo owed his rise to the presidency of Cameroon entirely to French manipulations" (281). Ahidjo was perceived largely as a "French tool" and this image made him deeply unpopular (Le Vine 1964, 173). In response, France made a number of attempts to convey the image that Cameroon was a self-run government. In 1959, France initiated the Statue of the Cameroun, which gave Cameroon full internal autonomy.

Yet the image of Ahidjo as a "French tool" was not a false perception. In fact, Ahidjo maintained close relations with France throughout his tenure in order to encourage continued French investment in the Cameroon economy. Even after the Statue of the Cameroun was passed, the statute still preserved French jurisdiction over money and exchange rates, foreign policy, frontier security, and the right to intervene in the event of armed insurrection or war. In fact, DeLancey (1989) argues that Ahidjo's ability to maintain support from the French by protecting French investments was one of the key aspects of his strategy for rule (41, 58). French business, commercial, and industrial investors dominated the nonagricultural sectors of the economy in Cameroon, and major development projects were often funded by private French investment. This stands in stark contrast to the approach of many other African independence leaders, such as Sekou Toure of Guinea, who voted for immediate and complete severance of ties (including trade) with France in 1958.

A second major reason why Ahidjo entered power weak relative to other elites is because his ethnic group, the Fulani, did not produce any of the major exports. Though the Fulani dominated cattle herding and trade in the northern region, they did not produce any of the major cash crops and were not the leading economic elites in Cameroon. By contrast, ethnic groups in the south, such as the Bamileke and Bassa, were the leading producers of cocoa and coffee – the major cash crops in Cameroon. In the years leading up to independence, one southern group in particular, the

Bamileke, became some of the richest farmers in Cameroon, and began to expand into other areas of commerce. By the end of the Second World War, the Bamileke began to compete for land and labor with French plantation owners (Arriola 2013).

In the 1950s, the Bamileke became one of the colonial administration's (and by proxy, Ahidjo's) primary opposition forces. As they became more economically powerful, the Bamileke began to seek political influence. They threw their support behind the UPC – the radical independence party that was banned by the French in 1955. By the time Ahidjo became president in 1960, the Bamileke were a formidable opposition – not only due to their economic strength but also their ability to mobilize southern interests (Konings 2007; van de Walle 1993).

A third source of Ahidjo's initial weakness was that Cameroon, having been split into two colonial territories (British Cameroon and French Cameroon), was not a unified state when Ahidjo first came to power. Recall that French Cameroon gained independence in 1960 and British Cameroon voted to reunify with the independent territory in 1961. Yet from 1960 through 1963, Eastern Cameroon (which was formerly British Cameroon) maintained its own separate cabinet in the federal government. Even though Ahidjo was the president of the Cameroon, the regional government of East Cameroon was largely out of his political control. It wasn't until 1972 that Ahidjo was successful in abolishing the federal system of government and centralized power in Yaoundé (DeLancey 1989, 54).

3.2.3 *Ahidjo in Power: Creating Institutional Constraints*

Upon taking power, Ahidjo needed to create official structures that would allow him to buy the support of key elites. He did this by creating constitutional limits on his own authority that empowered other elites (in particular, by naming a prime minister who would serve as his successor) as well as the distribution of cabinet positions in exchange for support from elites. As Takougang (2004) argues, "with the tremendous resources of the state at his disposal, [Ahidjo] could use them to maintain the loyalty of various groups and regions to himself" (75).

Ahidjo systematically used cabinet positions in order to secure support from other elites. His ruling strategy is perhaps best summarized by DeLancey (1989): "The essence of [Ahidjo's] party was the cohesion of a few important people, each of whom brought in his/her loyalists to the party" (52). Importantly, the "important people" who were brought into the government comprised of would-be challengers to Ahidjo.

[Ahidjo] treated his opponents firmly, sometimes harshly, but made sure that even his bitterest enemies had both the chance of joining his side and of actively sharing in the perquisites of rule. That he was never vindictive is to his credit: Mbida was repeatedly offered various portfolios, Okala came out of prison to become an ambassador, and several former UPC leaders have taken high and well-paying jobs in government. (Le Vine 1964, 181)

Charles Assale, for example, the leader of the Mouvement d'Action Nationale, a regional party in Eastern Cameroon, was offered the position of prime minister of East Cameroon. "Such positions not only honored the individuals concerned but also gave them access to sources of patronage with which to reward their supporters" (DeLancey 1989, 52). Elites who opposed Ahidjo's policies or refused to support his regime were shut out of the cabinet and state bureaucracy.

Ministerial appointments provided "a majority opportunity for Ahidjo to reward influential people in society – or even to build influence for individuals – and to tie them to him" (DeLancey 1989, 59). Once appointed, why did elites not defect? The positions in the presidential cabinet gave these elites the ability to provide his followers with jobs and resources he controlled through the ministry. This chain dependency is illustrated by the following example: From 1970 to 1981 the Minister of Posts and Telecommunications was Emmanuel Egbe Tabi. Tabi was from the Anglophone region of Mamfe. During that time, Tabi filled his ministry with other Anglophones, who were otherwise underrepresented in the predominately Francophone bureaucracy. Anglophones were even appointed to post-office positions in French speaking parts of the country. Moreover, many of the higher positions within the ministry went to bureaucrats who were from Tabi's home region – the Mamfe area (DeLancey 1989, 59).

To sum up, on one hand, ministerial appointments empowered elites by providing them the influence and resources to reward their supporters and consolidate their authority. Yet on the other hand, these appointments tied these ministers to the Ahidjo regime and provided them an incentive to continue supporting the incumbent in order to maintain their own positions within the cabinet. As Takougang (2004) argues,

through this system of appointments to cabinet and other important government and party offices that was based on regional and/or ethnic representation, Ahidjo was able to maintain the loyalty of most groups in the country. That is because these high-ranking appointees in turn were able to tie their respective regions and groups to the president by building their own network of support through the provision of administrative and party jobs. (76)

Ahidjo also took great pains to make sure that elites from various regions, ethnicities, and religions were represented in his cabinet. "The

cabinet as a group was an arena for Ahidjo to play 'ethnic arithmetic' or 'ethnic balancing'" (DeLancey 1989, 60). He also ensured regional representation: East (French) Cameroon and West (British) Cameroon were both represented in the cabinet. Ahidjo's presidential cabinet in 1975, for example, included six ministers from the north, eight from the central-south, seven from the west, and two from the east (Kofele-Kale 1986, 73). Power-sharing, however, came at a cost. As this chapter will later show, Ahidjo's own ethnic and regional elites did not control the majority of the cabinet seats. Power-sharing under the Ahidjo regime required that the leader relinquish (some) control over the state.

Finally, Ahidjo also struck bargains with traditional chiefs. At independence the *lamidos* (Fulani chiefs) still dominated the northern region of the country. Even though Ahidjo was a Fulani from the north, he was unpopular with the *lamidos*, who believed that Ahidjo wanted to modernize society, therefore weakening their authority (Ngoh 1987, 152). To gain their support, Ahidjo created a constitutional stipulation that stated that the status of traditional chiefs would be protected. He also filled key cabinet appointments, such as the minister of the interior, with elites that the *lamidos* favored. However, Ahidjo made it clear that in exchange for these benefits, he expected the *lamidos* to support his rule (Joseph 1978, 53).

It is important to acknowledge that, in addition to institutional strategies of rule, Ahidjo also relied on repression and force to maintain his grip on power on the wider population. Where certain parties or elites refused to be coopted, Ahidjo used police and military repression. Though opposition parties were technically legal, individuals who attempted to establish other political parties were arrested or tortured (DeLancey 1989, 63). However, these repressive tactics were generally reserved for the broader citizenry and potential opposition. For his most inner circle of elites, Ahidjo relied on institutional forms of cooptation.

3.2.4 *Ahidjo Constrained, Biya Empowered: The Presidential Transition*

Our discussion of Cameroon concludes with an example of how institutions constrained the leader. In 1982, Ahidjo voluntarily retired from the presidency due to health reasons, transferring power peacefully to his prime minister and constitutionally designated successor, Paul Biya. Though he stepped down, Ahidjo had hoped to retain informal control of the presidency. These attempts culminated in a failed coup attempt, which was successfully thwarted by Biya. Ahidjo had empowered Biya by giving him access to the state as well as constitutional legitimacy as his

successor, therefore Ahidjo could not simply control Biya as a puppet president. The first presidential transition in Cameroon provides a useful test to examine whether institutionalization truly does shift power from leaders to elites in a meaningful way. It also demonstrates how Ahidjo became constrained by the very institutions he created while he was in power.

Since independence, the Cameroon constitution has always included stipulations regarding the process of leadership succession. Article 9 of the constitution states: "In the event of vacancy of the Presidency for whatever cause the powers of the President of the Federal Republic shall without more devolve upon the Vice-President until election of a new President." In 1977, the title for the office of vice president was changed to prime minister, and the succession clause in the constitution was amended to reflect the change in title for this office (Article 7).[5]

When Ahidjo appointed Paul Biya as his prime minister in 1975, Biya became the designated successor to the presidency. Biya served as Ahidjo's prime minister for seven years, leading up to the presidential transition. Notably, Biya was a Christian from Southern Cameroon, in contrast with Ahidjo, who was an ethnic Fulani Muslim from the north. Biya began his political career in Ahidjo's government soon after independence was granted. He served in various ministerial positions, such as the director of the Ministry of National Education and minister of state, and worked his way up the cabinet (Glickman 1992).

On November 4, 1982, after being in power for twenty-two years, Ahidjo – citing health concerns – voluntarily retired from the presidency and passed power down to his appointed successor, Biya. In announcing his retirement, Ahidjo expressed his support for Biya, stating in a radio broadcast:

> Fellow Cameroonians, my dear countrymen, I have decided to resign my duties as Head of State of the United Republic of Cameroon ... I request all of you Cameroonians to give your full confidence and whole-hearted support to my constitutional heir, Mr. Paul Biya. He merits the confidence of all, both at home and abroad. (Ngoh 1987, 300)

Although Ahidjo stepped down from the presidency, he clearly expected to retain influence and control over the Biya presidency. Notably, after stepping down as president, Ahidjo continued to serve as the chairman of the ruling Cameroonian National Union (CNU) party. In fact, in an interview two months after the leadership transition, Ahidjo, whose only

[5] From 1977 to 1979, the succession order was changed to the president of the National Assembly and then prime minister. In 1979, the constitution was amended so that the prime minister was the direct successor.

remaining official title was party chairman of the CNU, asserted that the party takes precedence over the government (Konde 2012).

As Ahidjo's prime minister Biya had maintained an image of a technocrat and made it clear that he had no ambitions to compete with Ahidjo (Mbaku and Takougang 2004). After acceding to the presidency, however, Biya made a number of administrative and policy changes that diminished the influence of Ahidjo's allies in favor of his own power base. This included multiple cabinet reshuffles in which most of Ahidjo's appointees were replaced. Within a year Biya replaced over half the cabinet he had inherited from Ahidjo. Biya also undertook administrative reforms, most notably dividing the northern region – Ahidjo's home district – into three provinces (CIA 1983; 1984).

In response to Biya's consolidation of power, Ahidjo tried to reclaim his influence. He reportedly attempted to introduce a constitutional amendment that would increase his own authority as chairman of the party while reducing the powers of the president. He asked his remaining ministers who had not been replaced in the cabinet reshuffle to resign in protest – none of whom did (Ngoh 1987, 309–310).

On April 6, 1984, members of the palace guard who were loyal to Ahidjo attempted to launch a coup against Biya. It is believed, though not verified, that Ahidjo himself help to orchestrate the coup. This coup failed, in part because of tactical mistakes, and also because the coup plotters failed to gain support of key members of the armed forces. Though the constitutional succession provisions was clearly not the only reason Biya was able to retain power in light of the failed coup attempt, it conferred legality and legitimacy to his claim to the presidency (Hughes and May 1988).

Chapter 2 opened with the following observation by Montesquieu: "At the birth of new polities, leaders mold institutions, whereas afterwards institutions mold leaders" (qtd in Putnam 1993, 26). Much like Montesquieu's remark, after relinquishing power to his successor, Paul Biya, Ahidjo was shut out of returning to power by the very institutions that he put in place himself. Moreover, the constitutionally designated succession procedures ensured that Ahidjo could not renege on promises to transfer power to Biya. As Ngoh (1989) argues, Ahidjo "realized that after twenty-five years as the undisputed strongman in Cameroon, he had to play second fiddle to Paul Biya – something he was not prepared to do" (319).

Paul Biya remains in power in Cameroon today – even surviving the introduction of multiparty elections in 1992. How did he remain in power despite demands for political liberalization in the 1990s? In large part, Biya benefited from the fact that the transfer of power took place long before pressures to introduce multiparty elections arose by the end of the Cold War. By 1991, Biya had already been in power for almost a decade.

He therefore had already secured his tenure through a combination of cooptation through institutionalized mechanisms of power sharing as well as coercion by the time he was forced to introduce multiparty competition.

By contrast, as the case of Côte d'Ivoire will demonstrate, Houphouët's successor, Bédié, came into office right after the introduction of multiparty elections. In addition to his already weak claims of legitimacy due to the absence of institutionalized succession mechanisms, he did not have the benefit of time in the way that Biya had.

3.3 CÔTE D'IVOIRE UNDER HOUPHOUËT: LOW LEVELS OF REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Unlike Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire is an example of a regime with low levels of institutionalization. For most of Houphouët's rule, specific constitutional rules designating the successor order were not established. In 1975, a constitutional succession order was created. Article 11 of the constitution stated: "In case of the death or incapacitation of the President his functions are carried out by the President of the National Assembly." Yet Houphouët continuously amended this constitutional rule, creating uncertainty about who the designated successor would be. In 1980, the constitutional rule was changed so that the designated successor would be the vice president. In practice, however, Houphouët kept the vice president position vacant during this entire period, intentionally avoiding the designation of a second in command. In 1987, the succession order was changed to the president of the National Assembly and then the vice president. In 1990, the constitution was amended once more, so that the constitutional successor was the president of the National Assembly.

In addition, key cabinet ministerial positions were routinely left vacant under the Houphouët administration. From 1960 to 1981, Houphouët's cabinet did not have a clear "second in command" position. During these two decades, there was not a vice president or prime minister in the presidential cabinet. In 1982, the position of vice president was created but it was left vacant every year from 1982 to 1985. In 1986, the position of vice president was eliminated from the cabinet, which once again lacked a "second in command" position from 1986 to 1990. In short, for the vast majority of Houphouët's rule he never designated an informal successor, nor did he appoint a prime minister or vice president. From 1960 to 1990, this position was either eliminated from the cabinet or it sat empty. It wasn't until 1991 – two years before his death, that Houphouët created a prime minister position. Moreover, the minister of defense position was also kept vacant a third of the time Houphouët was in office.

This case study will demonstrate how Houphouët entered power in a position of extreme strength – he had already completely consolidated political authority within Côte d'Ivoire even before entering office. After coming into power, Houphouët systematically shut out Ivorian elites from positions of power, preferring to rely on French technocrats or by appointing less influential members of other ethnic groups to cabinet positions. In the language of the formal model from Chapter 2, Houphouët entered office with an extremely favorable draw of the distribution of power – no other elite possessed the ability to depose him. As a result, Houphouët did not need to institutionalize power-sharing arrangements to remain in power. He remained in power for over three decades as a personalist leader. The collapse of the regime after the death of Houphouët and the two civil wars that followed in the 2000s is perhaps surprising, given that Côte d'Ivoire was considered the economic miracle of West Africa in the 1980s. Yet without institutionalized mechanisms for power-sharing, personalist rule could not sustain the regime in the long run.

3.3.1 Background and History

Côte d'Ivoire, also known as the Ivory Coast, is a country located in West Africa, bordering the Atlantic Ocean on its southern coast. It currently has a population of 23.7 million and about 55 percent of the population lives in urban areas (World Bank 2017). Côte d'Ivoire shares a border with Guinea, Liberia, Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ghana. The capital of the country is Yamoussoukro, though it is only the sixth largest city. The port city of Abidjan, located on the Atlantic coastline, is the economic center of Côte d'Ivoire. It is the largest city in Côte d'Ivoire, with a population size of almost five million, and is the fourth largest city in Africa.

Though it is not as ethnically heterogeneous as Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire is home to at least sixty different ethnic groups and dialects. The Akan is the single largest ethnic group in the country, comprising of roughly 37 percent of the population. Within the Akan the Baoulé is the largest subgroup, and this is the tribe that Houphouët belonged to. There is not one dominant religion in Côte d'Ivoire, and Muslims and Christians each make up about a third of the population.

Côte d'Ivoire has the second largest economy in West Africa and is currently the fourth largest exporter of goods within sub-Saharan Africa. The economy is heavily dependent on agricultural exports, and almost 70 percent of the population works in agriculture. Since independence, its main cash crops have been coffee, cocoa beans, and palm oil. Côte d'Ivoire experienced extraordinary growth and prosperity in the first few decades

of independence. Its GDP grew by as much as 360 percent in the 1970s and it was considered the "economic miracle" of West Africa (Daddieh 2001). The current GDP in Côte d'Ivoire is US$40.39 billion, and it is the world's largest exporter of cocoa beans (World Bank 2017).

Côte d'Ivoire gained independence in 1960 after decades of French colonial rule. Prior to colonization, the territory was organized into several states and kingdoms. European contact was established in the late 1800s. Côte d'Ivoire was designated a French protectorate in 1843, becoming a French colony in 1893. In response to growing agitations for independence, France began to grant increased measures of self-governance for its colonies, including representation in the French Constituent Assembly, of which Houphouët was a representative. He would serve as one of the most influential African representatives for fourteen years leading up to independence. Côte d'Ivoire achieved full independence on August 7, 1960, with Houphouët as the country's first president.

3.3.2 Houphouët's Rise to Power: Initial Leader Strength

Political rule under Houphouët is perhaps best summarized by the opening sentence of Aristide Zolberg's (1969) definitive volume on politics in Côte d'Ivoire: "Political life in the Ivory Coast has been centered in recent years around the activities of one man: Félix Houphouët-Boigny ... By 1957, three years before the country became independent, [he] had gained a virtual monopoly over access to public office at all levels" (3). As Jackson and Rosberg (1982, 145), observed, the government of Côte d'Ivoire is "the government of virtually one man" and no other politicians achieved similar political stature under Houphouët's rule.

Houphouët was a major player in Ivorian politics from the very beginning. He was born into a family of hereditary chiefs of the Baoulé group and became chief of the Akoué tribe through hereditary succession at a very young age. Beyond his family's high status, Houphouët further elevated his prominence upon his first marriage. His first wife was of royal Agni lineage through her mother and was Senegalese through her father. Through this marriage, Houphouët acquired kinship ties and alliances with other ethnic groups in Côte d'Ivoire as well as Senegalese elites (McGovern 2011, 151; Zolberg 1969, 73).

Houphouët attended the Ecole William Ponty, an elite college in Senegal that was attended by many young Africans who would eventually be important independence politicians in their countries (other students included Modibo Keita of Mali, Hamani Diori of Niger, Mamadou Dia of Senegal, and Maurice Yaméogo of Burkina Faso). He then attended the Ecole de medicine de l'AOF (French West Africa School of Medicine) in

Senegal, becoming a medical aide by 1925 – one of the first Baoulé to achieve this status. Houphouët served in colonial medical service in various parts of Côte d'Ivoire until 1940. During this time, upon seeing their mistreatment by the colonial administration, he became interested in helping to organize cocoa and coffee farmers (McGovern 2011).

When his uncle died in 1940, Houphouët inherited large amounts of land in his village and was appointed the chief of his Akoué tribe. From then on, Houphouët would go on to begin his political career as one of the richest African farmers in the entire country. His economic status served as an important symbol of a growing "Ivory Coast bourgeoisie" and it also provided him with the ability to finance his political campaigns (Zolberg 1969, 73–74).

In 1944, Houphouët along with other African elites, established the Syndicat Agricole Africain (SAA), an African agricultural union within Côte d'Ivoire. Importantly, the SAA was the first quasi-political party that agitated for better conditions and some measures of self-governance for Africans within Côte d'Ivoire. Its goals were to secure premiums for African producers, to obtain a quota of imported cloth and agricultural commodities, etc. The eight elites who founded the SAA, including Houphouët, were all traditional leaders who were leading planters and literate in French. By the end of 1944, membership to the SAA had grown to 8,548 and nearly half of the members were Baoulé. Out of the founders, Houphouët was the only Baoulé, and he was elected president of the organization when the SAA held its first congress in Abidjan in September 1944 (Zolberg 1969, 67).

There are two main reasons why Houphouët was able to consolidate power early and begin his presidency in an extremely strong position. In the years between 1944 and independence in 1960, two major developments cemented Houphouët's stature as a leading politician and national hero in Côte d'Ivoire. The first was his election to the French Constituent Assembly and subsequent creation of his party, the Parti Democratique de la Côte d'Ivoire (PDCI), as well as a pan-African coalition that would become the basis of the independence movement within French West Africa. Though in reality, Houphouët maintained close ties with Paris even after independence,[6] his leadership in these independence organizations solidified his image as a freedom fighter and founding father to an independent

[6] There is a famous story that on the eve of independence, Houphouët met with Kwame Nkrumah, the founding president of Ghana. Nkrumah favored a policy of completely breaking ties with the British, while Houphouët favored a closer relationship with the French. The two men agreed to meet again a decade later to see which approach worked better. Nkrumah was deposed in a military coup six years after independence (Woronoff 1972).

Côte d'Ivoire. The second major development was that of a bill in the French Assembly to abolish forced labor in West Africa. Houphouët played a major role in shepherding this bill through the legislative process. This achievement won Houphouët the national spotlight as the Ivorian politician who stood up to the French. From that point on, his moral and political authority within Côte d'Ivoire would be unparalleled. I will discuss both of these major developments in detail below.

In 1946, a law was passed that granted French citizenship to all people living in French colonial territories. Citizenship came with the ability to vote and participate in French elections.[7] The ability to elect representatives for the French Assembly provided Côte d'Ivoire limited measures of political representation and a seat at the table. It also provided Houphouët, who would serve for fourteen years in the French National Assembly, with the opportunity to consolidate power as the top politician in Côte d'Ivoire.

That same year an election was held to select a politician who would represent Côte d'Ivoire in Paris. This was the first real opportunity that most Africans had to express their political concerns and preferences within the French Constituent Assembly. For these elections, European and African politicians formed candidate lists that were composed of both African and French representations. By contrast, Houphouët formed a list that consisted of a coalition of Côte d'Ivoire tribes and foreign Africans, one of the few proposals to exclude whites altogether. As a result, many other African candidates withdrew their lists in support of Houphouët's slate. Houphouët's list easily won both rounds of voting, and he was elected to the French National Assembly (Zolberg 1969, 69).

A year later, building on the foundations of the SAA, Houphouët formed his own political party, the PDCI. During the 1946 French Constituent Assembly elections, Houphouët ran under his new party label, and swept the elections, winning 98 percent of the vote in Côte d'Ivoire districts (Zolberg 1969, 76). When Houphouët won, the PDCI became the first successful independent African political party. Within a year, the PDCI had an estimated 80,000 members, and from then on, the PDCI gained so much influence that no African candidate could be elected without the endorsement of the party, and by extension, Houphouët. The French colonial administration often tried to undermine the PDCI. Prior to elections, they promoted anti-PDCI candidates and tried to organize ethnic and regional associations alliances that could challenge the PDCI's

[7] Initially, however, suffrage was far from universal. Many restrictions were placed, for instance, French literacy was a requirement for voting. In 1956, the Loi Cadre bill was passed, guaranteeing universal suffrage for all French citizens.

monopoly over political power. All efforts failed. Houphouët continued to dominate elections, even as other PDCI candidates lost.

Houphouët's continued presence in the French Constituent Assembly had an important consequence. Representatives of the French Assembly enjoyed a special privilege available only to its members: they were immune from prosecution and could not be put in jail. After failing to fully discredit the PDCI, the French administration began to use coercive strategies to eliminate the influence of African elites by prosecuting and jailing politicians once they lost an election (therefore losing their parliamentary immunity privilege). Yet Houphouët continued to win every election and therefore was immune from persecution. On the eve of independence, he stood alone at the top of Ivorian politics (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999).

The second most important development in Houphouët's ascension to power was his successful proposal to outlaw forced labor within the colonies in French West Africa. Forced labor was established by the French in Côte d'Ivoire in the 1920s. Côte d'Ivoire was one of the few countries in West Africa with a significant settler population. French settlers owned about a third of cocoa and coffee plantations in the country. In reaction to increased migration of African farmers from Côte d'Ivoire to Ghana, the colonial government established the practice of forced labor in Côte d'Ivoire. Although those who were "recruited" in this fashion "were paid by their employers, wages were extremely low, and the government strictly supervised the performance of the contract they were forced to accept" (Zolberg 1969, 56). This practice was especially detested by Ivorians, who viewed the system as one that worked to the sole advantage of the Europeans.

On March 1, 1946, a bill was proposed by Houphouët calling for the abolition of all forms of forced labor in overseas France. The French viewed this as a minor item – they did not even hold a floor debate to discuss the bill, and it was passed. To Africans, however, this was one of the most significant achievements of Africa's emancipation from France (Woronoff 1972, 36–37). To people within Côte d'Ivoire, the bill not only removed a hated symbol of colonial rule throughout all of West French Africa. It was also the achievement of an Ivorian – therefore elevating both Houphouët and his independent movement across the region. "Overnight, Félix Houphouët-Boigny became a mythical hero who had imposed his will upon the French" (Zolberg 1969, 74).

For many years, people throughout the country – often encouraged by the PDCI – firmly believed that unless Houphouët remained in office, forced labor would be reinstated. The gratitude he earned from his countrymen "has remained a foremost element in his political power and it has prevailed over the hesitations of many followers who questioned his later policies"

(Zolberg 1969, 74–75). To provide a sense of what this bill meant to Africans, a member of the Legislative Assembly explained:

> It was very simple. The peasants of my region suffered a great deal from forced labor. In my own family, there were twenty-four men and boys, but most of the time there were few around to work for the family. The others were out slaving for the commandant. When politics began, President Houphouët said he would do everything to eliminate this barbarous practice, I decided that this was for me, and I followed him. We didn't know whether he could do it, but he kept his word. Since then, I have followed him blindly and I shall continue to do so as long as he remains faithful to this principle. (Interview with El Hadj Moussa Kone, 1959, qtd in Zolberg 1969, 75)

After years of incremental representation in the French National Assembly, Côte d'Ivoire finally gained independence on October 31, 1960. The country's first constitution was drafted by Houphouët and a small circle of elites, and it was approved by the National Assembly unanimously without debate (Zolberg 1969, 252). Presidential and legislative elections were held, and Houphouët was the only presidential candidate on the ballot. On November 27, 1960, he became the first president of Côte d'Ivoire.

3.3.3 Houphouët In Power: Ruling Without Constraints

Upon taking power, Houphouët ruled Côte d'Ivoire as a one-man dictator. Zolberg (1969), for instance, notes that the independence constitution was "framed by a government and an assembly dominated by a single party, itself controlled by one man" (25). Houphouët's strategies of personalist rule encompassed several important factors. For one, he was charismatic. Handloff (1991) discusses the "myth of Houphouëtism," where the leader portrayed himself as the paternalistic founding father of the country. Houphouët transformed himself into a "transcendent symbol of unity to the disparate groups in Côte d'Ivoire, and his charismatic authority supplanted the traditional authority of the local chiefs" (143). In fact, as McGovern (2011) notes, "the cult of personality that grew around Houphouët was so great that he was able to move the capital of Côte d'Ivoire to his home village of Yamoussoukro in 1983" (16).

Houphouët also benefited from strong economic growth in the first two decades following independence. From 1960 to 1980 Côte d'Ivoire experienced one of the highest rates of economic growth among the nonoil exporting African countries. Houphouët resisted imposing high taxes on cash crops to fund urban development projects, in part because his own group, the Baoulé, dominated cocoa and coffee farming (Arriola 2013). Moreover, he maintained financial ties with France, relying on French investment, technology, and funding to develop the country's economy

and administrative infrastructure (Handloff 1991, 144). The "Ivorian Miracle" resulted in the development of impressive roadway and highway systems and Abidjan, the main economic hub, became known as the "Paris of West Africa" (Rabinowitz 2018, 74).

Most importantly, Houphouët did not empower other elites through institutionalized power-sharing mechanisms, and instead, retained his status as the single most powerful politician in the country. The first part of this strategy was the use of French bureaucrats to run the state, rather than appointing Africans. There were many educational requirements to work within the bureaucracy, and Houphouët maintained these restrictions. Since Africans had limited opportunities to obtain a university degree, they were shut out of top positions. The highest ranks of the state remained in the hands of European technocrats (Zolberg 1969, 100–101). As Jackson and Rosberg (1982) note, "the French managerial elite in particular has provided loyal and capable agents who have contributed greatly to the overall effectiveness of both the state and the private sectors of the economy and enabled Houphouët to monopolize political power" (146).

Furthermore, Houphouët shut out the most influential members of his own ruling coalition from the cabinet. In making government appointments, Houphouët maintained a relative balance of ethnic representation.[8] He used an informal ethnic quota system to fill important party, government, and administrative positions (Zolberg 1969, 141). Yet within his presidential cabinet, "Houphouët has been careful to insure that all major ethnic groups are represented – but *not* by their most prominent politicians" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 148 emphasis added). In this way, Houphouët was able to maintain support of various groups through ethnic balancing, while at the same time, preventing the strongest elites from accessing state power. "The cabinet is less a collegial body of powerful and independent incumbents and more a technical advisory body to the ruler. In recent years there has been an increase of young technocrats both in the cabinet and in the bureaucracy. Of the thirty-six ministers in 1974, only six were Houphouët's old political party colleagues" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 147–148).

In addition, the Ivorian constitution was extremely weak under Houphouët. Presidential power was expanded by combining it with the functions of prime minister while subordinating the role of the National Assembly (Handloff 1991, 147–148). Côte d'Ivoire was also the first of the former French colonies to abandon the parliamentary system and adopt the presidential system. The chief executive, who is both head of

[8] Though he still favored his own Baoulé group, especially for top positions.

state and head of government, is given the power to appoint a cabinet that is not accountable to the National Assembly (Zolberg 1969, 108).

The ruling party and legislature under Houphouët was similarly weak. The PDCI, which had been a political machine during the independence era, began to atrophy once Houphouët came into power. Though the PDCI routinely won all seats in the National Assembly, this was purely because opposition parties were shut out. By the mid-1960s, party structures fell prey to factionalism and were "inadequate instruments of control over the administration and over the population" and "did not provide an effective network of political communication" (Zolberg 1971, 21). Similarly, under Houphouët the National Assembly served only to rubber stamp executive decrees and instructions (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 147–150).

3.3.4 Weak Institutions, Regime Collapse: The Aftermath of Houphouët's Death

Beginning in the 1980s, due to a sharp decrease in world cocoa prices, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a severe economic crisis. To make matters worse, Houphouët refused to export Ivorian cocoa from 1987 to 1989, in hopes of driving world prices up, but this strategy failed, severely weakening the economy of Côte d'Ivoire (McGovern 2011, 145). The country's debt increased, and crime rose dramatically in Abidjan due to unemployment. In 1990, hundreds of civil servants went on strike, forcing Houphouët to allow multiparty elections (Gyimah-Boadi and Daddieh 1999). On October 28, 1990, Côte d'Ivoire held its first multiparty elections. The main opposition candidate was Laurent Gbagbo, the leader of an opposition party, the Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI). Houphouët won the election, receiving 82 percent of the vote, and remained in office.

However, the question of presidential succession loomed large. Houphouët, now 85 years old, had always avoided designating a clear successor. Constitutional rules regarding the succession order had changed several times throughout the three decades of Houphouët's rule. The designated successor vacillated between the vice president (though this office was always left vacant) and president of the National Assembly.

Furthermore, the nature of "one-man politics [raised] the question of succession" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 1152). Due to the fact that Houphouët ruled Côte d'Ivoire as a personalist dictatorship where power was centralized around him, there was not an obvious politician of similar stature who would clearly serve as the presidential successor. After public speculation about the presidential succession for over a decade, Houphouët was finally pressured into naming a successor, designating Henri Konan Bédié for the job (Rabinowitz 2018, 201–202).

Henri Konan Bédié had served in the Ivorian government since independence. He was Côte d'Ivoire's ambassador to the United States and Canada, then the minister of economy and finance. In 1980, Bédié was elected to the National Assembly, where he was then subsequently elected as the president of the National Assembly, the position he served from 1980 through to Houphouët's death in 1993.

In 1987 the constitution was amended to specify that the president of the National Assembly would succeed the president in the event of the incumbent's death or incapacitation. Despite the creation of this constitutional rule, Houphouët did not publicly support Bédié as his designated successor. The lack of clear and early support from Houphouët of his designated heir resulted in Bédié's lack of legitimacy as the presidential successor.

In 1991, two years before Houphouët's death, a power struggle over the impending presidential succession emerged between Bédié and Houphouët's newly designated prime minister, Alassane Ouattara. The position of prime minister was created in 1991, and it was the first time a second in command position had been created *and* filled in the presidential cabinet since independence in 1960. In response to the financial crises that had developed in the 1980s, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pressured Houphouët to appoint Ouattara, a former IMF economist who had been educated in the United States, as prime minister. Two factions, one supporting Bédié and the other supporting Ouattara emerged during this period (Konate 2004; McGovern 2011).

Houphouët died on December 7, 1993, and immediately following his death, Bédié announced on state television that he had assumed the presidency. However, having failed to consolidate power prior to Houphouët's death, Bédié entered power weak. On one hand, there is some evidence that Bédié tried to institutionalize his regime. Important cabinet positions, such as prime minister and defense minister, were always filled and were relatively stable. However, Bédié shut out one key challenger: Ouattara. He purged the cabinet of anyone who supported Ouattara and introduced a new electoral law that was clearly aimed at preventing Ouattara from running in future elections (McCauley 2017; Rabinowitz 2018).

On December 23, 1999, Bédié was ousted in a coup that was staged by members of the military who were linked to Ouattara. While Bédié was out of the capital celebrating Christmas with his family, a group of soldiers took over the airport, government television station, and radio station. Many of the officers who led the coup had personal connections with Ouattara – one officer had been a member of Ouattara's guard. The armed forces did not step in to defend Bédié, and the regime ended due to the coup (Rabinowitz 2018).

The regime in Côte d'Ivoire fell due to the absence of institutionalized power-sharing mechanisms. Since Houphouët entered office extremely powerful and influential, he did not need to establish institutional constraints in order to share power with other elite opponents: viable challengers simply did not exist. Although Houphouët was able to remain in power without institutionalizing, the regime did not persist long after his death. Due to the lack of clear succession planning, Bédié entered office weak and lacking legitimacy as Houphouët's heir. Although there is some evidence that Bédié tried to use ministerial appointments to coopt elites, he shut out his prime opponent, Ouattara, which later led to a coup.

3.4 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POWER SHARING IN PRESIDENTIAL CABINETS

In this final section, I analyze data on ethnicities of cabinet ministers to demonstrate that power sharing was more prevalent in the Ahidjo regime compared with the Houphouët regime. While ethnic favoritism prevailed under Houphouët, Ahidjo routinely appointed non coethnics to his cabinet, even appointing leaders from other ethnic groups to top cabinet positions, such as prime minister, minister of finance, and minister of defense.

I use data from Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (2015), which includes comprehensive data on the ethnicities of cabinet ministers in fourteen African countries from 1960 to 2010, including Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire. The descriptive statistics paint a clear picture of ethnic favoritism in Côte d'Ivoire in contrast to elite power sharing in Cameroon.

Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroon, was an ethnic Fulani, but he appointed many non coethnics to his cabinet. On average, Ahidjo had twenty-three ministers in his presidential cabinet. The smallest cabinets, from 1963 to 1964, had thirteen ministers, and the largest cabinet, in 1982, had thirty-three ministers. There are 496 total minister–year observations (excluding the president) during Ahidjo's rule from 1960 through 1982. Summary statistics are presented in Appendix Table 3.1.

Ahidjo did not favor ethnic Fulanis in his cabinet, only assigning 12 percent of all cabinet ministerial positions to his coethnics. The same pattern emerges, even if we restrict the sample to top ministerial posts: only 24 percent of top ministerial posts were assigned to ethnic Fulanis.[9]

[9] Top ministerial posts, as defined by Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi (2015), include vice president, prime minister, defense, budget, commerce, finance, treasury, economy, agriculture, justice, and state/foreign affairs.

Moreover, Ahidjo offered cabinet positions to elites from opposing groups. The Bamileke and Bassa groups were the leaders and supporters of the UPC party, which was the main challenger to Ahidjo's administration. Yet, 33 percent of total cabinet portfolios and 24 percent of top ministerial positions were assigned to Bamileke or Bassa elites.

By contrast, Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the first president of Côte d'Ivoire, systematically favored his coethnic Baoulés in his cabinet appointments. On average, Houphouët had twenty-five ministers in his presidential cabinet. The smallest cabinet, in 1964, had ten ministers, and the largest cabinet, in 1987, had forty ministers. There are 862 total minister–year observations (excluding the president) during Houphouët's rule from 1960 through 1993.

In contrast to Ahidjo, Houphouët did favor ethnic Baoulés in his cabinet, assigning 26 percent of all cabinet ministerial positions to his coethnics. Tellingly, 50 percent of all top ministerial posts were assigned to Houphouët's coethnics.

Figure 3.2 graphs the percentage of coethnics each leader appointed to top ministerial posts throughout their tenure. The graph shows that Ahidjo often shared power with important regional elites by appointing leaders of other ethnic groups to top cabinet positions. As a result, the share of top cabinet positions that went to elites from his own group were often quite low. By comparison, Houphouët did not use cabinet appointments as a power-sharing mechanism, and appointed elites from his own ethnic group at a much higher rate.

A possible counterargument to this analysis is that leaders in Africa simply assign cabinet portfolios in accordance with the population share of various ethnic groups (Francois, Rainer, and Trebbi 2015). Since Fulanis (Adhijo's group) consists of 9 percent of the population in Cameroon, we should expect Ahidjo to assign a smaller share of cabinet positions to Fulani elites. On the other hand, the Baoulé (Houphouët's group) consists of 21 percent of the population in Côte d'Ivoire. One can make the counterargument that Houphouët distributed many cabinet ministries to elites of his own group simply because he was just making cabinet appointments that were consistent with the population size of the group.

Yet this argument does not hold when we examine changes to cabinet appointments over time. The population sizes of ethnic groups in Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire generally do not change over time (Vogt et al. 2015). Yet, we do see differences in the distribution of cabinet positions to coethnic elites. In the 1980s, Côte d'Ivoire experienced a severe economic crisis. Unemployment and crime rose dramatically, and Houphouët's government was blamed for these conditions. From Figure 3.1 we can see that there was



Figure 3.2 Ethnic favoritism in president cabinets
Note: The graphs portray the percent of top cabinet positions that were assigned to elites from the same ethnic group as the president.

a sharp drop in coethnic appointments in Houphouët's cabinet, going into the 1980s, the period where Houphouët was significantly weaker.

The proportion of coethnic cabinet appointments under Ahidjo also fluctuated with time. Figure 3.1 shows that when Ahidjo initially came into office he made virtually no coethnic cabinet appointments. As this chapter discusses, this was because Ahidjo was especially weak when he first became president upon independence. Over time, as Ahidjo consolidated his authority, he began to make more coethnic appointments. Yet, it is important to note that despite these changes over time for each leader, ethnic favoritism was always higher in Côte d'Ivoire under Houphouët compared with in Cameroon under Ahidjo.

3.5 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented two case studies that illustrated the mechanisms and findings articulated by the formal model in Chapter 2. First, I discussed the case of Cameroon, a highly institutionalized regime under the presidency of Ahmadou Ahidjo. Ahidjo entered power weak relative to other elites, largely because he inherited his position of power from the outgoing French colonial authorities. I argued that in order to retain support from other elites, Ahidjo established checks on his own authority and delegated

power to other elites through the appointment of key cabinet positions. Importantly, he designated a prime minister, Paul Biya, who was the constitutional successor to the president. The leadership transition from Ahidjo to Biya occurred peacefully and Biya remains in power today.

I then presented the case of Côte d'Ivoire, a weakly institutionalized regime under the presidency of Félix Houphouët-Boigny. Houphouët, who had been a renewed independence leader in the decades prior to his presidency, entered power extremely strong relative to other elites. As a result, he did not have to make institutional concessions to other elites in order to remain in power simply because there were no other elite challengers of his stature. During most of Houphouët's tenure, key cabinet positions were left vacant and a constitutional successor was not established. Upon his death, Houphouët's successor (who had essentially been designated at the last moment) took office but was soon deposed by the military in a coup. Though Houphouët was able to remain in power as a strongman leader, the regime fell soon after his death.

The next chapter will present data on regime institutionalization in all African dictatorships from 1960 to 2010. While this chapter presented more fine-grained evidence of the theoretical argument and mechanisms, we will now take a step back and examine systematic evidence of the relationship between initial leader strength and regime institutionalization.

Appendix

Appendix Table 3.1 *Summary statistics*

	Ahidjo (Cameroon)	Houphouët (Côte d'Ivoire)
Mean number of cabinet ministers	23	25
Total number of minister–year observations	496	862
Number of minister–year observations with coethnic appointee	59	220
Percentage of cabinet appointments with coethnic appointee	12%	26%
Total number of minister–year observations for top posts	154	295
Number of minister-year observations with coethnic appointee for top posts	37	118
Percentage of cabinet appointments with coethnic appointee for top posts	24%	50%

4

How Should Institutionalization Be Measured?

One of the core arguments of this book is that autocratic regimes vary drastically in the extent to which they are institutionalized. This chapter lays the empirical groundwork for this claim by presenting detailed data on regime institutionalization. In doing so, I also provide a discussion of how we should define and measure autocratic regime institutionalization – a key concept often used, but not well operationalized – in the literature.

I define regime institutionalization as the creation of rules and procedures that structure the distribution of power and resources within the ruling coalition. In an autocratic setting, regime institutionalization serves to tie the leader's hands. This chapter presents an original time-series cross-sectional dataset measuring regime institutionalization in forty-six countries in sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010. I discuss my coding strategy in detail and present examples of each type of executive constraint. I also summarize general trends and patterns in the data to provide a broad perspective of what institutionalization looks like within sub-Saharan Africa and how it differs across countries.

This chapter also compares this dataset against other commonly used datasets of authoritarian institutions, such as regime typologies (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014). I show that regime typologies often do not reflect the extent to which executive constraints are in place, and many countries coded as party-based regimes are not very institutionalized at all. In addition, I also compare my measures of institutionalization against other commonly used datasets of institutional strength – Polity (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016) and V-Dem (Coppedge et al. 2016).

Another important implication that emerges from this chapter is that countries in sub-Saharan Africa vary widely in their level of institutionalization, even during the decades of authoritarian rule following independence. A small number of recent studies document that African countries have become more institutionalized over time, especially after the end of the Cold War (Posner and Young 2007). Others show that African party

systems in the multiparty era are not as uniformly un-institutionalized as previous scholars have argued (Riedl 2014). Yet scholarly consensus about the quality and presence of executive constraints in African autocracies, especially during the decades immediately following independence, has not changed. Scholars routinely write off institutions from that period, and politics prior to the 1990s is believed to have been driven primarily by "big man rule" and personalist dictatorships (Bienen 1978; Decalo 1976; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Zolberg 1966). By contrast, the data presented here tells a different story. African politics was not uniformly un-institutionalized during the Cold War era – some incumbents did indeed regulate power through formal or informal institutions. These mechanisms help to explain why some dictatorships have lasted for decades, even surviving the introduction of multiparty elections.

4.1 CONCEPTUALIZING AUTHORITARIAN REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Before I define regime institutionalization it is first helpful to note what I mean by "regime." I consider a regime as the set of rules, norms, and institutions that govern the way in which the government is run. Most relevant for this study, these rules determine the way in which leaders enter and exit office. A regime can have multiple leaders, as long as these leaders enter and exit office according to established rules and norms. I consider an irregular leadership turnover – often due to the forced exit of a leader and/or the entry of a leader via a coup – as signaling a break in the regime (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).[1]

For instance, the Gambia experienced a regime change in 1994 when the armed forces staged a coup and deposed Gawda Jawara – the leader who had been in power since 1962. Ghana also experienced a regime change in 1993 when it became classified as a democracy (more on how I define democracy later) – though the leader did not change. Flight lieutenant Jerry Rawlings took power via a coup in Ghana in 1979. In the early 1990s, in response to increasing pressures to democratize, Rawlings legalized political parties and allowed for multiparty elections to occur in 1992. Although Rawlings won the elections, and remained the president of Ghana, these elections were considered free and fair, and importantly - there has been party and leadership turnover since then. Ghana is therefore coded as having a regime break in 1993. Finally, Tanzania has remained the same regime since independence, despite having multiple

[1] This definition of an autocratic regime is similar to Svolik's (2012) definition of a "ruling-coalition spell."

leaders. Since independence was granted in 1961, Tanzania has had five different presidents, but the same ruling coalition has remained in power, and the ways in which the incumbent is selected has not drastically changed.[2]

I define autocratic regime institutionalization as the creation of rules, procedures, and hierarchies that structure the ways in which power and resources are distributed within the ruling coalition. Examples of this include establishing leadership succession procedures or creating rules that govern elite promotion. When a leader institutionalizes the regime, she takes actions that constrain her ability to take arbitrary actions in the future. Autocratic regime institutionalization occurs when executive constraints are created that tie the leader's hands.

My conceptualization of institutionalization closely follows Huntington's (1968) definition of political institutionalization as "the process by which organizations and procedures acquire value and stability" (12). In particular, Huntington identifies several key features of institutionalization that are most relevant for the survival of authoritarian regimes. First, adaptability and the ability to outlive the founder is a key characteristic of institutionalized organizations (13). Second, autonomy and the ability of an organization to exist independently of particular actors is a key feature of institutionalization. According to Huntington, an organization that is merely an instrument of a leader lacks autonomy and institutionalization (20).

This discussion is also related to Levitsky and Murillo's (2009) discussion of institutional strength.[3] They argue that institutional strength should be judged across two dimensions: enforcement and stability. Strong institutions are those that political elites comply with in practice. This conceptualization of institutional strength ties directly with my discussion of regime institutionalization. Regimes with institutionalized

[2] Note that this conceptual discussion of "regime" does not affect the coding decisions for this project because the measures of institutionalization I construct operate at the country–year level, not at the regime level.

[3] Much of the discussions of institutionalization has centered around the institutionalization of political parties, rather than regimes. Huntington (1965), for instance, defines party institutionalization as the process by which parties become established and acquire value and stability. Levitsky (1998) likens institutionalization to the entrenchment of the "rules of the game" that shape the expectations, payoffs, and behavior of actors in his discussion of the Peronist party in Argentina (p. 80). Panebianco (1988) argues that institutionalization transfers authority from the leader to the party, and very few charismatic parties survive this transfer. Research on party system institutionalization also describes strong party organizations as having independent status and value, not subordinated to the interests of ambitious leaders (Mainwaring and Scully 1995).

practices – those governed by stable rules that do not shift with changing circumstances – are durable regimes that are likely to survive leadership transitions precisely because they have rules that can outlast the circumstances in which they were initially created.[4]

In the context of an authoritarian regime, institutionalization has several important implications. First, the creation of rules and procedures depersonalizes the ways in which the regime operates by constraining the autocratic leader's ability to make arbitrary decisions in the future. This is especially relevant in dictatorships, where power is often concentrated in the hands of a single leader. When a leader establishes term limits, for instance, she loses the ability to decide arbitrarily when and whether she will step down from office. This kind of depersonalization can also happen through the creation of merit-based promotion within the executive. Regimes with set rules, procedures, and hierarchies that regulate elite promotion are more institutionalized compared with systems in which a single incumbent can appoint or purge elites at any time without constraint.

Second, institutionalization can empower other elites by establishing hierarchical positions and rules regarding the appointment of elites to important positions. A regime with a presidential cabinet in which elites are appointed to important ministerial portfolios, such as defense or finance, represents a regime in which power and resources are not entirely concentrated within the hands of the leader. Such a regime is more institutionalized compared with a presidential cabinet in which the incumbent holds all the important portfolios herself, and there are no established rules or norms for the appointment of these positions.

However, it is important to note that institutionalization does not always result in the empowerment of other elites. Some types of executive constraints only limit the incumbent. Term limits on their own create restrictions on the length of time that the incumbent can remain in office, but do not specify who will replace the incumbent or how that replacement process will occur.

Third, institutionalization separates the ruler from the regime. Importantly, an institutionalized regime is one that can perpetuate its own existence beyond the influence of an individual leader. A regime that is not institutionalized is a government of one: the ruler. The ability

[4] My conceptualization differs from Slater's (2003) view that highly institutionalized regimes do not necessarily have to contain institutions that constrain leaders, as long as the institutions have "infrastructural power" – the ability to implement and execute the leader's demands. By contrast, I argue that the ability to keep the executive in check is a necessary and central component of institutionalization.

to survive beyond a particular leader is of particular importance in authoritarian regimes. Elections in democracies serve as a reliable vehicle in which future incumbents are selected without interrupting the regime. The absence of such procedures in autocracy is often the greatest weakness of dictatorships; how a regime can perpetuate itself beyond a particular leader is not an automatically clear process. This challenge is often exacerbated by the fact that many leaders give themselves the title of "president for life" or claim to have godlike qualities, implying that they are irreplaceable. Unsurprisingly, many leadership transitions within authoritarian regimes are violent and irregular, and the majority of regimes are unable to survive past the death or departure of the first leader.

Institutionalized regimes resemble autonomous organizations, capable of functioning regardless of which leader is in power. They tend to have mechanisms in place to regulate leadership succession. Regimes with high levels of institutionalization also have rules and autonomous organizational structures that ensure that the regime can function after the current incumbent departs office. When we think about the quality of autocratic regimes, the extent to which there are structures and procedures in place to guard against personalist rule and perpetuate the survival of the ruling coalition are of critical importance.

4.1.1 How Do Institutions Differ from Institutionalization?

While institutions are rules, institutionalization is the entrenchment of those rules. Existing scholarship generally defines formal institutions as rules that shape and constrain the behavior of political actors. In the first sentence of his book, North (1990) defines institutions as "the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (3). According to North, "institutions reduce uncertainty by providing a structure to everyday life" (3). Following North's definition, Lauth (2015) further notes that "[i]nstitutions are a set of rules … The set of rules also creates and shapes social order in such a way that the behavior of all actors involved in that social order is predictable. Institutions affect performance by voluntarily following the rules or being motivated by the threat of sanctions" (Lauth 2015, 57).

However, as Huntington (1968) stresses, all institutions vary in their degree of institutionalization. In their review of the literature on institutional strength in comparative politics, Levitsky and Murillo (2009) stress that institutional strength should be treated as a variable, rather than an assumption, especially in the context of developing countries or

authoritarian states, where rule-making environments are less established. They argue that "institutions are stable to the degree that they survive not only the passage of time but also changes in the conditions – i.e., underlying power and preference distributions – under which they were initially created and reproduced" (117). In terms of my conceptualization, institutions are stable when they are institutionalized.

It is important to note here that while institutions are most commonly defined as rules that constrain and shape behavior, another approach is to think about institutions as equilibrium behavior. Knight (1992), for example, treats self-enforcement as the defining criterion of institutions. In other words, according to this approach, institutions are simply equilibria in which actors do not have any incentives to deviate – regardless of whether the equilibrium is beneficial to the parties involved and regardless of whether they are formally codified. I do not conceptualize institutionalization in line with this school of thought. In fact, a regime that is, in equilibrium, highly predatory but stable, is an example of an un-institutionalized regime.[5] This book focuses on institutions as rules and conceptualizes regime institutionalization as the establishment of rules that constrain the incumbent.

4.1.2 Can Informal Institutions Constrain?

Much of the literature on authoritarian institutions has focused either on "parchment institutions" (Carey 2000) – formal rules that are written down such as laws, regulations, constitutions – or on nominally democratic institutions such as parties, legislatures, or elections. But does institutionalization have to occur on paper? Can informal rules and norms constrain the behavior of executives? Helmke and Levitsky (2004, 725) rightly emphasize that informal institutions have "remained at the margins of the institutionalist turn in comparative politics," even though informal norms structure political behavior and are highly influential for political outcomes.

I follow Helmke and Levitsky's definition of informal institutions as "socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially sanctioned channels" (727). This definition builds on North's (1990) argument that norms can be considered institutions in that they create rules that incentivize or constrain behavior. They contrast this concept against formal institutions, which are defined

[5] As a parallel example, a country might be stuck in an equilibrium where there are high levels of corruption that operate in defiance of formal regulatory institutions, but I would not consider corruption practices to be a set of institutions.

as "rules and procedures that are created communicated, and enforced through channels widely accepted as official" (727).[6]

The rules of the game that structure political outcomes are often informal – even in democracies – but this is especially the case in authoritarian regimes where politics is often weakly institutionalized. A commonly cited example of a highly influential informal institution is the way in which incumbents chose future presidents in twentieth-century Mexico. Under the rule of the PRI, sitting presidents had the right to choose their successors, and this practice was known as the *dedazo* ("big finger"). From 1934 through 2000, this mechanism facilitated eleven regular leadership turnovers (Langston 2006). Other common examples of informal institutions include corruption and clientelism (see Hicken 2011 and Treisman 2007 for surveys on these topics), although informal institutions do not always produce negative outcomes. Tsai (2007), for instance, illustrates how rural villages in China provide public goods where village temple associations reinforce norms of social obligation.

When discussing informal institutions in developing and undemocratic countries, we often think of clientelistic and patronage-based practices that expand executive power. Presidents in Africa – especially in the period immediately following independence – have frequently been labeled patrimonial (or neo-patrimonial) leaders (Zolberg 1966). Scholars agree that African politics is often driven by clientelistic practices in which the president has complete authority over distributive decisions. Leaders often use cabinet portfolios as patronage to buy elite support (Arriola 2009), and they can even be used to coopt opposition politicians (Arriola, DeVaro, and Meng 2018; Buckles and Gandhi 2017). Presidents in many Latin American countries also have informal authority over state institutions that lead to relatively unconstrained executives (O'Donnell 1994; Hartlyn 1994).

What often goes overlooked, however, is that informal institutions can also be used to *constrain* executives. In fact, autocratic leaders are often informally constrained in the extent to which they can monopolize rents by their commitments to share resources with elites. This type of informal constraint is especially effective when backed by credible threats of deposition. I argue that regime institutionalization can indeed be carried out via informal institutions. The primary function of institutionalization in autocratic regimes is to constrain the executive, and the mechanism of tying the leader's hands can happen formally or informally.

[6] Formal rules include state institutions (parties, legislatures, and courts) as well as state-enforced rules (constitutions and legislation).

In present day China, for instance, the appointment of the politburo standing committee – the highest echelon of power within the ruling Chinese Communist Party – has consistently followed three unwritten norms. First, officials within the politburo and the politburo standing committee retire by a set age limit. Officials are expected to retire by the time they are sixty-eight, and generally do not receive appointments after they turn sixty-seven. Minister-level officials are expected to retire at the age of sixty-five, and lower-level officials are expected to retire at the age of sixty. Second, officials who are appointed to the politburo standing committee are routinely drawn from existing officials within the politburo. Appointments follow a specific path to promotion. Third, among eligible politburo members, appointments to the standing committee are generally made on the basis of age (Miller 2017). Since appointment are made according to these norms, the president faces limitations on who he can appoint to the standing committee.

At the same time, as Thelen (1999a) cautions, norms and informal institutions should "exert some independent power over individual behavior" beyond simply reinforcing formal institutions (377). In Chapter 6, I show that the appointment of stable vice presidents, prime ministers, and defense ministers secures autocratic rule by lengthening incumbent tenures and alleviating coup threats. Chapter 7 demonstrates that the appointment of a de facto successor through the office of the vice president/prime minister promotes peaceful leadership succession beyond the existence of constitutional succession rules.

4.1.3 When Does Institutionalization Take Hold?

The reader may also be wondering when institutionalization actually takes hold: when institutions are created or when they are tested? For instance, if a leader implements leadership succession policies is the regime institutionalized along this dimension when the constitutional rule is first created? Or does the regime become institutionalized at the moment of the leadership transition when the succession procedure follows the constitutional rule?

I argue that institutionalization takes hold soon after the institutions are created, since rules that credibly constrain leaders shift the distribution of power in favor of elites.[7] The longer these rules are kept in place, the more time elites have to consolidate their authority by using the resources

[7] Recall that in the formal model presented in Chapter 2, positive levels of institutionalization increase the likelihood that the autocrat would be deposed if fighting were to occur in the second period.

and influence afforded by positions of power. Moments where constitutional rules are tested allow researchers to observe whether institutionalization has actually taken place. As Chapter 6 will show, most instances of leadership transitions do actually follow the procedures laid out in the constitution (if such a rule existed). Chapters 6 and 7 will also discuss how leaders are more likely to violate term limits, making such rules a weaker form of regime institutionalization.

4.2 MEASURING REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Now that we've conceptualized regime institutionalization, how should this variable be measured? Developing high-quality indicators of authoritarian institutions poses some real challenges. Dictatorships are frequently closed off, therefore restricting or completely eliminating access to reliable and accurate information. Moreover, conventional measures of institutional strength in democracies cannot simply be imported to autocracies due to the lack of free and fair political competition. For example, while electoral results from presidential or legislative elections can serve as a credible measure of incumbent or party strength in democracies, the same approach cannot be imported to autocracies because election results are often either falsified or do not reflect the true preferences of citizens.

This section introduces my original dataset on regime institutionalization in all sub-Saharan African countries, from 1960 to 2010. I present measures of institutionalization that reflect the extent to which the regime is autonomous from the leader. Since institutionalized regimes are those that can outlive individual leaders, several of my measures focus on the extent to which formal leadership succession policies exist. A regime with clear and specific succession procedures represents a more institutionalized organization because it has internal mechanisms to perpetuate itself beyond the lifespan of a single leader. Another important dimension of institutionalization is the extent to which the regime is able to function independently of the leader. To gauge this dimension of institutionalization, I present additional measures reflecting the extent to which other elites fill key cabinet positions. Such cases where decision-making authority is not concentrated entirely within the hands of the leader also represent regimes with higher levels of institutionalization. I collect historical data on state constitutions and presidential cabinets, for which I have comprehensive records for every country and year in my dataset. From these records, I document the creation of executive constraints, hierarchical positions, and implementation of rules and procedures that structure the distribution of power.

4.2.1 Defining the Sample: What Qualifies as an Authoritarian Regime?

Before I discuss my measurement strategy, it is useful to first define the sample of countries that fall within the scope of this study. What qualifies as an authoritarian regime? Many scholars have recently reevaluated this question.[8] There are two general camps. On one hand, the minimalist definition of democracy requires political actors to acquire positions of power through "competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Shumpeter 1947, 269). Democracies are therefore defined through competitive elections and regimes that fall short of this requirement are considered autocracies. On the other hand, one can also consider a broader notion of "democracy" by focusing not only on free and fair elections but also on citizen access to impartial information, and the extent to which freedoms (such as the freedom of speech or assembly) are upheld (Dahl 1972).

For my analysis in this book, I define an authoritarian regime as a country in which executives do not come to power through competitive national elections. For the coding of regimes, I follow Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010) criteria. They define an autocracy as a country in which any of the following criteria are violated: (1) the executive is selected either by a popular vote or the election of a committee for the purposes of executive selection (such as the Electoral College in the United States); (2) the legislative is elected either directly or indirectly by popular election; (3) multiple political parties are legally allowed to exist in the regime and the legislature; and (4) there has been alternation in the party that is currently in power.

The last criterion, referred to as the "Botswana Rule," is particularly relevant when studying regimes within sub-Saharan Africa. As Przeworski et al. (2000) and Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010) discuss, some regimes may allow for multiparty elections only because they are confident that the opposition will lose or because the opposition will not be allowed to take office if they win. If a ruling party has never lost an election or has not stepped down after losing an election, then it is difficult to ascertain whether the regime is a true democracy or whether it is simply an autocracy that allows for multiparty elections without the real intention of ceding power. We can therefore only be certain that a regime will indeed allow for party alternation in cases where the opposition is allowed to take office after winning an election.

Within sub-Saharan Africa a number of countries led by ruling parties have never experienced party alternation since the ruling party took power after independence. Angola, for instance, has always been ruled by the

[8] See Diamond 2002; Gandhi 2008; Geddes 2003; Przeworski 2000; Svolik 2012.

Moviemento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (MPLA), despite holding multiparty elections in 1992, 2008, and 2012. Although multiparty elections were introduced in 1992, Tanzania has never had party alternation, and the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM)[9] has always won presidential elections and legislative majorities. The Polity scores for Angola and Tanzania during the period of multiparty elections remain low – ranging between –6 and –1. In sum, simply having the appearance of multiparty elections is not sufficient in guaranteeing that a country has democratized, especially when the incumbent and ruling party have never been tested by an electoral loss. Party alternation is therefore a key criterion in defining regime type.

In addition to the criteria delineated by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland (2010) I further require that a country must be coded as a democracy for over ten years in order to be considered a truly consolidated democracy. There are a number of countries that have brief periods in which they are coded as democracies by Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), but then revert back to authoritarianism. Ghana, for instance, is coded as a democracy from 1969–1971 and 1979–1980, but was considered an autocracy for long periods before and after those intervals. A truly consolidated democracy should not be easily dismantled and requiring that countries must be coded as democracies for over ten years eliminates countries that only appear democratic for short periods of time.[10]

In sum, to derive my sample of authoritarian regimes I start with all countries in sub-Saharan Africa. Countries enter the dataset either at the year of independence or in 1960,[11] and remain in the dataset either until they democratize (following the criteria discussed above) or until 2010. The final sample includes forty-six countries from 1960 to 2010. Appendix Table 4.1 lists all the countries, leaders, and time periods that qualify as authoritarian regimes and therefore are included in this study.

An alternative way of creating my sample of cases would have been to utilize Polity scores (Marshall, Jaggers, and Gurr 2011) and drop cases that fall below a certain numerical threshold. This procedure more closely reflects the Dahl conceptualization of democracy in which the quality of political

[9] The CCM was created in 1977 after the former ruling party, the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), merged with the ruling party of Zanzibar, following the merger of the two countries.

[10] Using this coding scheme, the following countries and time periods are considered democratic and therefore dropped from the sample: Benin after 1991, Cape Verde after 1990, Ghana after 1993, Kenya after 1998, Madagascar after 1993, Malawi after 1994, Mali after 1992, Mauritius for the whole period, Nigeria after 1999, Sao Tome and Principe after 1991, Senegal after 2000, and Sierra Leone after 1998.

[11] Only Ghana and Guinea gained independence a few years prior to 1960. Liberia and Ethiopia were never colonized. Each of these three countries enter the dataset in 1960.

competition and institutions are taken into account. However, I do not base my coding of authoritarian regimes on Polity scores for three main reasons.

First, the vast majority of countries in Africa do not meet the minimalist definition of contestation of power through competitive elections, at least not until the 1990s. The "less stringent" criterion is sufficient to identify the authoritarian sample of cases in this region. Second, Polity uses criteria about the quality of executive constraints and competitiveness to create an aggregated score.[12] Since I am examining constraints on executive power, I do not want to eliminate cases by using a coding scheme that takes into account the quality of institutions and constraints on the executive. Doing so would risk eliminating cases of highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes in my final sample. Third, Polity scores do not reflect party alternation; therefore, a case such as Botswana can score exceptionally high despite not having had party alternation in the executive.

4.2.2 *The Data*

I define institutionalization as the creation of hierarchies, rules, and procedures that structure the distribution of power and resources within the ruling coalition. An important implication of institutionalization within authoritarian regimes is that it functions to constrain the leader's ability to make arbitrary decisions. In order to operationalize this concept, I create measures that focus on the extent to which the leader's hands are tied. Such constraints can take the form of formal constitutional rules that explicitly limit the leader's authority. In particular, I focus on the creation of constitutional leadership succession procedures that dictate how a peaceful transition of power should occur, thereby prolonging the tenure of the regime beyond a single leader.

I also focus on the establishment of clear hierarchical positions by examining the extent to which the president is willing to distribute important cabinet positions (such as vice president, prime minister, and defense minister) to other elites. The creation of stable cabinet appointments limits the incumbent's power by placing other elites in a position of power or influence within the presidential cabinet. It also reflects the process of institutionalization by creating an independent hierarchy and decision-making apparatus separate from the leader. In sum, these measures promote the creation of an independent functioning organization and also serve to limit the authority of a single leader.

[12] One of the component variables of Polity scores is "XCONST," which reflects the extent to which there are institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of the executive. A comparison of my measures of executive constraints and XCONST is discussed later in this chapter.

4.2.3 Formal Institutions: Autocratic Constitutions

To construct my measures of regime institutionalization, I utilize the Europa World Year Book (1960–2010), which has yearly records of all executive posts, ministerial positions, and constitutions for all countries in sub-Saharan Africa. First, I examine the creation of leadership succession rules within constitutions. Scholars have identified constitutions as useful mechanisms that can establish formal rules and procedures in a public way that holds autocrats accountable (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Ginsburg and Simpser 2013). In fact, autocratic constitutions are also a type of "focal point" for elites, creating a universally observed set of rules and enforcement behavior surrounding the incumbent.

For every country–year observation, I document whether the constitution had an amendment outlining procedures governing presidential succession. The Kenyan constitution, which has been in effect since independence in 1963, includes specific instructions for succession. Chapter II, Part I, Section 6 reads:

(1) If the office of President becomes vacant by reason of the death or resignation of the President … an election of a President shall be held within the period of ninety days immediately following the occurrence of the vacancy.
(2) While the office of the President is vacant, the functions of that office shall be exercised –
    a. By the Vice President

(Peaslee and Peaslee Xydis 1974, 341)

The transfer of power from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel arap Moi during the 1978 presidential succession in Kenya illustrates the importance of succession rules. Near the end of Kenyatta's rule, a faction within the ruling KANU party tried to contest the authority of then-vice president Moi on the grounds that he was not a member of the dominant ethnic group. Moi and his supporters were able to effectively dispute their claims by utilizing the policy governing presidential succession outlined in the constitution (Tamarkin, 1979, 21–26).

Beyond this particular case, constitutional succession rules play a significant role in promoting successful leadership transitions. In the chapter 7, I show that regimes with constitutions that outline specific succession procedures are significantly more likely to undergo peaceful leadership succession. Furthermore, once in place, succession rules are not easily overturned. In my sample, conditional on creating a constitutional amendment governing the rules of succession, 74 percent of these procedures have been left intact.

If succession rules do exist, I also distinguish whether the procedures specify *who* would succeed the president, rather than simply providing vague rules about nominating a successor. Unlike the Kenyan constitution, which specifies that the vice president should become the interim president, the constitution of Angola provides guidelines that are much vaguer. Article 33 of the constitution states: "In case of the death, resignation, or permanent impediment of the President of the Republic, the Council of the Revolution will designate from among its members the person who will exercise temporarily the charge of President of the Republic" (Blaustein and Flanz 1976, 6).

In addition to succession rules, I examine the creation of constitutional term limits. Scholars have increasingly pointed to term limits as a key type of executive constraint in authoritarian regimes, particularly in African states after the end of the Cold War (Posner and Young 2007). According to Svolik (2012), "a term limit on a leader's tenure therefore amounts to a line in the sand: Compliance is easily and publicly observable. Term limits thus both embody a compromise about the limited authority of any single leader and provide an unambiguous signal of commitment to such a constraint" (198). Scholars and practitioners within sub-Saharan Africa pay particular attention to the creation of term limits, arguing that "term limits are a necessary bulwark against abuse of power, especially when electoral systems are weak" (Louw-Vaudran 2016).

For every country–year observation, I record whether the constitution includes term limits. The constitution of the Democratic Republic of Congo, for instance, from 1978–1996 included a clause stating that the President would be elected for a seven-year term, renewable only once. Article 66 of the constitution of Ghana has included the following provision since 1993: "(1) A person elected as President shall … hold office for a term of four years … (2) A person shall not be elected to hold office as President of Ghana for more than two terms" (Peaslee and Peaslee Xydis 1974). Executives with formal term limits written into the constitution represent leaders who are operating within more highly institutionalized regimes.

4.2.4 *Informal Institutions: Presidential Cabinets*

In order to codify informal constraints on presidential power, I turn to the appointment of key positions within the presidential cabinet. For every country–year observation, I document the name of the president, the name of the vice president, prime minister, and minister of defense if one had been designated.

The appointment of a vice president (VP) or prime minister (PM)[13] – so-called "second-in-command" positions – represents the creation of a hierarchical structure within the executive as well as a distribution of authority to other elites. Designating a second-in-command, a very visible national position, casts another elite as a potential focus of power and possible successor to the executive. In fact, we can even think of the act of naming a second-in-command as the autocrat solving the collective action problem for other elites as an alternative leader to rally around.[14] The creation of these positions, therefore, reduces reliance on a single autocrat and promotes the survival of the regime past the tenure of the first leader.

Moreover, within African presidential cabinets, most presidential successors were former vice presidents or prime ministers. Under the Cameroon Union (UC) in Cameroon, for instance, Paul Biya had been the prime minister in 1975 under the presidency of Ahmadou Ahidjo before becoming president himself in 1982. To verify that this was indeed the larger pattern in my data, I code the previous positions of presidential successors. The data reveals that the position of vice president or prime minister is often a stepping stone for the presidency. Table 4.1 provides a full summary of previous positions held by presidents in my sample, conditional on a peaceful transfer of power. The data show that 23 percent of all former presidents held the position of vice president or prime minister. Minister of defense, the state/interior, and finance are also commonly held portfolios by elites who later became the incumbent. For successions that were peaceful, the vast majority of successors were chosen within the president's cabinet.

I also analyze past positions of incumbents who came into power via irregular means. Table 4.2 provides a full summary of previous positions held by presidents in my sample, conditional on a nonpeaceful transfer of power. Most of the leaders in this sample came into power via a coup. Unsurprisingly, these leaders commonly had military backgrounds. Even for the leaders in this sample who were in the presidential cabinet before

[13] Vice presidents and prime ministers are functional equivalents within this particular context. All the countries in my sample either have one or the other. No cabinet has both a vice president and a prime minister, although a small number of countries have multiple vice presidents.

[14] In fact, many presidents were extremely hesitant to assign the second-in-command position to another party elite. Jose Eduardo dos Santos, the first president of Angola, named himself as his own vice president for a number of years while he was in power. Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the first president of the Ivory Coast, created a vice-president position, but kept the post empty the entire time he was in power. These two cases (and other similar instances) are coded as *not* having the second-in-command position filled by another elite.

Table 4.1 *Previous positions of autocratic leaders (conditional on peaceful leader entry)*

Leader's previous position	Count	Percent
Within the presidential cabinet		
Vice president/ prime minister	25	23%
Minister of defense/security	15	14%
Minister of state/ interior	12	11%
Minister of finance	11	9%
Minister of planning	7	6%
Minister of foreign affairs	6	5%
Minister of natural resources	6	5%
Minister of development	5	5%
Minister of health	3	3%
Minister of education	3	3%
Miscellaneous portfolios	18	16%
Total (within cabinet)	111	100%
Outside of the presidential cabinet		
Legislature	5	26%
Judicial system	5	26%
Military	5	26%
Opposition	3	16%
Unions	1	5%
Total (outside of cabinet)	19	100%

Notes: The leaders included in this table entered office through regular means, so coups and irregular leader entries are excluded from this sample. The first president of each country is not included in this sample because I am interested in the path of promotion after independence was granted. Only leaders who were in office for three years or longer are included in this sample. Leaders sometimes have multiple positions before entering office. For example, Festus Mogae, who was the president of Botswana from 1998 to 2007 had multiple cabinet positions from 1990 until 1997. He was the minister of finance from 1990 to 1997, minister of development and planning from 1990 to 1997, and vice president from 1992 to 1997. Each of these portfolios are recorded in this table.

their ascension to power, the most frequently held positions were the minister of defense, vice president, or prime minister.

In addition, I document whether the person in the vice president or prime minister position remains fairly constant over time, or whether the person in this position is rotated very frequently. Accounting for cabinet rotation rates is particularly important in the context of elite politics in sub-Saharan Africa. African leaders routinely practiced the "revolving

Table 4.2 *Previous positions of autocratic leaders (conditional on irregular leader entry)*

Leader's previous position	Count	Percent
Outside of the presidential cabinet		
Military	41	93%
Opposition	3	7%
Total (outside of cabinet)	44	100%
Within the presidential cabinet		
Minister of defense	8	44%
Vice president/ prime minister	4	22%
Minister of planning	1	6%
Minister of the interior	1	6%
Misc. minor portfolios	4	22%
Total (within cabinet)	18	100%

Notes: The leaders included in this table entered office through irregular means – the modal method of irregular leader entry is via a coup. The first president of each country is not included in this sample because I am interested in the path of promotion after independence was granted. Only leaders who were in office for three years or longer are included in this sample.

door" policy of constantly rotating important cabinet ministers in order to prevent any one person from amassing too much power (Dickie and Rake 1973; Jackson and Rosberg 1982; Hassan 2017). Moreover, since vice presidents are largely perceived to be de facto successors, presidents often strategically rotate those in the second-in-command position to prevent any particular elite from amassing too much power or influence. In order to account for strategic rotation, I create a variable that measures the stability of key appointments.

An example is helpful here. Consider Seretse Khama, who was the first president of Botswana from 1966 to 1980. Quett Masire was appointed as the vice president throughout Khama's entire tenure, and in fact succeeded Khama to become the next president. In this case, Masire had a stable vice president for fourteen years during his tenure. On the other hand, Felix Houphouet-Boigny, the first president of Cote d'Ivoire from 1960 to 1991, did not appoint a vice president or prime minister the entire time he was in office. Finally, Idriss Deby, who has been the president of Chad since 1991, has been rotating his vice presidents practically on a yearly basis since taking power. From 1991 to 2005, Deby named ten different vice presidents. There have only been five years for which the vice presidency was held by the same person as the previous year during Deby's tenure.

In the context of my sample, if a president keeps the same person in the vice president position for longer periods of time, this would be interpreted as a higher degree of de facto institutionalization compared with a president who rotates the person in the vice president position every year. In order to determine the stability of the second-in-command position, I create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the person in the vice president or prime minister position is the same person as the previous year. Cases where this is more frequently true can be interpreted as having higher degrees of institutionalization.

Additionally, I document whether a minister of defense was appointed for every country–year observation. The defense portfolio is an especially important ministerial position because it represents control of military force. As such, presidents were extremely reluctant to appoint other elites as the defense minister. In fact, the defense portfolio is the most commonly kept portfolio by the presidents themselves. Whether the president delegates this position to someone other than himself is therefore a key component of institutionalized power sharing. The distribution of this portfolio has significant consequences. In Chapter 6, I show that having an independent minister of defense significantly lowers the risk of coup attempts.

Finally, I consider the extent to which the person appointed as the minister of defense was rotated on a yearly basis. Similar to the second-in-command position, I create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the person appointed to be the defense minister was the same person as the year before. Cases with lower levels of rotation can be interpreted as having higher degrees of institutionalization.

It is important to note that even when leaders have the ability to choose who they appoint to them key positions – as they often do – the act of delegating authority to any other elite serves as a constraint on the leader. As outlined in Chapter 2, when elites are appointed to influential ministerial positions – and especially when the chain of command is formalized in a constitutional succession order – this results in a shift in power away from the leader in favor of the elite. This is true even if the elite was a former ally of the leader. In fact, existing research shows that "allies" tend to pose the most dangerous threats to autocratic leaders! European monarchs, for instance, were most frequently overthrown by their own family members (Herz 1957; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Kokkoknen and Sundell 2014; Tullock 1987) and African leaders are often deposed by their own coethnics (Roessler 2016). In sum, the appointment of *any* elite to a position of influence within the presidential cabinet constrains the leader by empowering that particular elite with state resources and the visibility of a position of power.

A clear advantage of this dataset is that it is objectively coded in a way that can be verified and replicated. Rather than hand-coding cases according to subjective criteria, this data was constructed by simply observing whether certain constitutional amendments or cabinet appointments existed, therefore the coding scheme did not require the researcher to make judgment calls. In addition, the indicators distinguish between de facto and de jure forms of institutionalization and allow us to disentangle the regime from the leader. Another advantage is that this data is presented as disaggregated indicators. Researchers can therefore decide which dimensions of institutionalization are most relevant to the research question at hand. Alternatively, the researcher can also choose to aggregate certain indicators into an institutionalization "score," although they are not obligated to do so since the measures are presented separately.

To summarize, my dataset produces the following seven indicators that serve as measures of regime institutionalization. Each variable is coded as country–year units and takes the form of a dummy variable.

1. *Successor policy:* is there a constitutional amendment specifying the rules of succession?
2. *Successor (strict):* is there a constitutional amendment specifying exactly who would succeed the president in the case of his death?
3. *Term limit:* are there constitutional term limits?
4. *VP/PM appointed:* was a vice president or prime minister appointed?
5. *VP/PM same:* was the person appointed to the vice president or prime minister position the same person as the year before?
6. *Defense appointed:* was a minister of defense appointed?
7. *Defense same:* was the person appointed as the minister of defense the same person as the year before?

4.3 EXECUTIVE CONSTRAINTS IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: GENERAL TRENDS AND PATTERNS

What does the empirical data on executive constraints within sub-Sharan Africa look like? This section provides a descriptive summary of the data and highlights some general trends and patterns both across countries and over time.

Figure 4.1 displays cross-sectional differences in institutionalization across all the countries in my sample.[15] Each section of the pie chart

[15] Because a number of the variables are highly correlated with each other (as I will discuss below), I only include *successor policy*, *term limits*, *VP/PM same*, and *defense same* in these graphs.



Figure 4.1.a Cross-sectional differences in institutionalization

illustrates the proportion of years for which each country had one, two, three, or all four dimensions of institutionalization in place. Black sections represent the proportion of years for which the country had all four dimensions in place. Dark grey sections represent the proportion of years for which the countries had three dimensions in place, and so on. White sections represent the portion of years for which the country had no dimensions in place.



Figure 4.1.b Cross-sectional differences in institutionalization

Countries that have darker circles can be interpreted as being more institutionalized on average, although these graphs do not take into account change over time.[16] Since these graphs show proportion of years, the reader should be reminded that some countries gained independence earlier than others, so the length of time countries are included in the sample sometimes differs. Over 70 percent of the countries in my sample either gained independence prior to 1970 or were never colonized and such countries enter my dataset in the 1960s. A small number of

[16] Appendix Table 4.2 includes a summary of institutionalization scores by country.

countries gained independence later – for instance, Zimbabwe did not gain independence until 1980 and therefore has fewer years included in the dataset.

It is clear from the graphs that countries across sub-Saharan Africa differ widely in terms of level of institutionalization. Namibia, for instance, is clearly a case with high levels of institutionalization. Since gaining independence in 1990, Namibia has had formal succession rules and term limits in the constitution without interruption since the start of the regime. A vice president and minister of defense have been appointed in the presidential cabinet every year, and these appointments have been extremely stable. A constitutional leadership succession was carried out peacefully in 2005 when the first president of Namibia, Sam Nujoma, handed power to his successor, Hifikepunye Pohamba.

Contrast Namibia with Togo, a country that has had much lower levels of institutionalization. Togo, which gained independence from France in 1960, has never had constitutional term limits, and formal succession policies were in place only after 1992. No elites were appointed to the vice president or minister of defense position for the first three decades after independence. When elites were appointed to these cabinet positions after the end of the Cold War, they were heavily rotated and replaced every two to three years.

Besides cross-sectional differences, levels of regime institutionalization have also changed over time. Figure 4.2 illustrates the proportion of countries with executive constraints graphed over time.

The trends documented in this graph suggest that various dimensions of institutionalization seem to rise together. Countries also appear to become increasingly more institutionalized over time, although it's important to note that by the end of the data, 2010, only about half of countries in sub-Saharan Africa have formal or informal executive constraints. There is a sharp increase in the prevalence of term limits in the early 1990s, and in general, more countries became institutionalized after the end of the Cold War.

Returning to the case of Togo, even though the country was almost entirely un-institutionalized from 1960 to 1990, it has become more institutionalized in recent decades. Following the end of the Cold War, formal succession policies were created under then-president Eyadema Gnassingbe, who also began to appoint elites to the vice president and minister of defense cabinet positions. The regime in Togo today is much more institutionalized that it was in previous decades.

How do various dimensions of institutionalization relate to each other? Do the measures move together and therefore act as complements to each other? Or do certain types of executive constraints substitute for other



Figure 4.2 Over time changes in institutionalization

types of constraints? Table 4.3 provides a correlation matrix of the seven measures.

The first key takeaway is that no two measures are negatively correlated, so there does not appear to be evidence of substitution between different dimensions of institutionalization. In other words, it appears unlikely that a leader would choose not to appoint a minister of defense because she has appointed a vice president.

This observation is, in itself, an interesting finding because it remains an open question whether informal institutions compete with or strengthen existing formal institutions. Scholars have noted that when informal institutions arise, they can often undermine or weaken formal institutions (Gryzmala-Busse 2010; Borocz 2000b). Corruption serves as such an example. Grzymala-Busse argues that "informal institutions serve as templates and substitutes for formal choices. Even as they compensate for formal institutions, informal rules can subvert them. Informal institutions also reify formal rules by defining and expanding their domain, and by providing incentives and information to follow formal institutions" (311). On the other hand, informal institutions can also help strengthen formal institutions. "Informal rules may generate precedents and prevalent practices that are then formalized for efficiency's sake" (Gryzmala-Busse 2010, 321). They can support and reify formal institutions by "delineating the domains where formal institutions rule – and by providing information and enforcement that promote the functioning of formal institutions" (324).

Table 4.3 *Correlation matrix of seven dimensions of institutionalization*

	Successor policy	Successor (strict)	Term limits	VP/PM appoint	VP/PM same	Defense appoint	Defense same
Successor policy	1						
Successor (strict)	**0.855**	1					
Term limits	0.413	0.424	1				
VP/PM appoint	0.187	0.238	0.292	1			
VP/PM same	0.159	0.166	0.192	**0.618**	1		
Defense appoint	0.209	0.221	0.186	0.203	0.122	1	
Defense same	0.199	0.190	0.120	0.134	0.239	**0.644**	1

Note: Bolded numbers indicate two dimensions that are highly correlated ($r > 0.6$)

A second important takeaway is that some measures are highly correlated with each other. Having succession rules is highly correlated with having strict succession rules ($r = 0.855$), appointing the same VP/PM is highly correlated with appointing a VP/PM ($r = 0.618$), and appointing the same defense minister is highly correlated with appointing a defense minister ($r = 0.644$). This is not surprising since each of these variables is just a stricter version of the corresponding variable. In much of my empirical analysis, I exclude measures that are highly correlated with another indicator of institutionalization.

4.4 REGIME TYPOLOGIES

How do my measures of regime institutionalization compare with other existing datasets of authoritarian institutions? Autocratic regime institutionalization is difficult to operationalize, and there are not many existing datasets that measure this concept directly. Perhaps the most direct way in which regime institutionalization has been codified is through the regime typologies framework.

In a seminal study, Geddes (1999a) classifies all autocratic regimes into one of the following regime types: military, single-party, personalist, or hybrids of these categories. These classifications are based on whether control over "policy, leadership selection, and the security apparatus is in the hands of a ruling party (dominant-party dictatorships), a royal family (monarchy), the military (rule by the military institution), or a narrow group centered around an individual dictator (personalist dictatorship)" (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014, p. 318).

Single-party regimes are defined as regimes in which the "party has some influence over policy, controls most access to political power and government jobs, and has functioning local-level organizations" (Geddes 1999a, 31). By contrast, in personalist regimes, leaders have "consolidated control over policy and recruitment in his own hands, in the process marginalizing other officers' influence and/or reducing the influence and functions of the party" (Geddes 1999a, 31). Military regimes are defined as those "governed by an officer or retired officer, with the support of the military establishment and some routine mechanism for high level officers to influence policy choice and appointments" (Geddes 1999a, 31).

Geddes' study and associated dataset have made immense contributions to scholarship on authoritarian politics. It set the agenda for renewed interest in the study of nondemocratic regimes outside of the industrialized world and stimulated a large body of recent work on the policies, institutions, and consequences of autocratic rule.[17] However, the use of typologies as an indicator for regime institutionalization has resulted in four central problems – two theoretical and two measurement driven.

First, placing regimes into time-invariant categories obscures institutional changes over time. This is a significant limitation because leaders within the same regime often make very different decisions about the extent to which they implement executive constraints. Founding leaders, for instance, are often much more personalist than their successors (Bienen and van de Walle 1989). Regimes tend to become less personalist over time, especially after multiple leadership transitions.

Take the cases of Mexico under the rule of the PRI and China – perhaps two of the most commonly cited examples of highly institutionalized dictatorships. They are both coded as party-based regimes for the entire duration of the party's tenure.[18] Although these regimes eventually became strong and autonomous organizations, they were significantly less institutionalized under their first leaders. The PRI under Plutarco Elias Calles and the CCP under Mao Zedong resembled personalist regimes, where each respective leader had consolidated control, reducing the parties' influence. Calles, the founder of the PRI,[19] controlled the actions and decisions of three presidents after him during what is referred to as the Maximato Period. It was not until the fourth president, Lázaro Cárdenas, that the regime established real leadership turnover norms

[17] According to Google Scholar, Geddes (1999a) has been cited almost 300 times. Geddes (1999b), an annual review article covering the same material as Geddes (1999a), has been cited over 1,500 times.

[18] The PRI was in power from 1929–2000 and the CCP has been in power since 1949.

[19] Known as the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR) at the time.

where power was handed over to the successor after the president's term ended (Buchenau 2006).

Mao was a similarly personalist founding leader. He promoted and purged elite politicians at will and launched political campaigns, such as the Hundred Flowers Movements and Cultural Revolution, during which he arbitrarily purged officials who he deemed critical of the regime (Meisner 1986). Over time, as Deng Xiaoping came into power, the CCP eventually became an organization in which party promotion followed established norms and procedures. In sum, many regimes change drastically over time, and this is impossible to capture using a single time-invariant regime category.[20]

Second, categorical distinctions between authoritarian regime types are often insufficiently nuanced and obscure variation in institutional strength *within* regime types. Take the category of dominant-party regimes. The Soviet Union and China are coded as dominant-party regime types, and they indeed were ruled by strong parties with organizational autonomy that lasted through several leadership transitions. However, the category of dominant-party regimes also includes cases such as the PDG in Guinea or Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK, also known as the Khmer Rouge) in Cambodia. These parties, unlike the highly institutionalized communist parties, were entirely concentrated around a single charismatic leader and were not able to survive past the death and ousting of the leader.[21]

Third, regime typologies are composite indices that aggregate various dimensions of leaders, institutions, and military structures into a single category. As a result, it is difficult for researchers to identify the effects of individual institutions (Pande and Udry 2006). Some regimes, for instance, appear to be party-based, when in actuality the party is attached to a strong and charismatic leader who merely exploits the party as a personal vehicle to amplify his authority.

The Union Soudanaise – Rassemblement Democratique Africain (US-RDA) under Modibo Keita in Mali, for instance, is coded as part of a dominant-party regime. Yet national policies were determined entirely at the discretion of Keita alone, and the US-RDA lacked institutionalized rules and permanent structures. Eight years after taking power, Keita was deposed in a coup and the party was banned. Although Keita, who was

[20] It is possible for countries to be coded as different regime types over time, but most countries are not coded as very many different types. The average country is coded as two different types of regimes over an average time span of forty-four years, and the average regime coding lasts about eighteen years.

[21] The opposite scenario is sometimes true as well: not all cases coded as military or personalist regimes are equally unconstrained.

also a self-proclaimed socialist, portrayed Mali as a one-party state, the ruling party was actually extremely weak.

Fourth, although Geddes outlines a clear set of guidelines that were employed to categorize regimes into different categories, a number of these criteria used to code regime types require the researcher to make subjective decisions about how to code the regime. Examples of subjective criteria include: "Does the party have functioning local-level organizations that do something reasonably important, such as distribute seeds or credit or organize local government?" or "has rule of law been maintained?". The possibility of measurement error based on subjective coding rules is also heightened by the fact that the dataset spans multiple regions and time periods and often relies on information from various country experts. An example of criteria that relies on different country sources includes: "Does the country specialist literature describe the politburo-equivalent as a rubber stamp for the leader?" Different country experts from various regions may have different standards for evaluating institutions making it difficult to know whether the criteria are being applied uniformly. Moreover, it is not clear what the individual responses to these criteria are, nor how the responses to these criteria are aggregated to produce single regime categories.

4.4.1 Comparison of Institutionalization and Regime Typologies

In this section, I compare my indicators of regime institutionalization with data on regime typologies. I find that there are a number of discrepancies between my measures of institutionalization and regime typologies. Many regimes that have been coded as dominant-party regimes are actually not very institutionalized at all, and some regimes that have been coded as part of personalist or military regimes actually have a number of executive constraints in place.

The dataset that was introduced in Geddes (1999a) was updated and rereleased by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014). I will refer to the updated dataset as the GWF dataset for the remainder of this chapter. GWF covers all country–years with autocratic governments between 1946 and 2010 in independent countries. From this country–year data, GWF creates a list of 280 autocratic regimes with their start and end dates, as detailed by their codebook. Similar to the earlier regime datasets, GWF classifies all autocratic regimes in their dataset into one of the following regime types: monarchy, personal, military, party, party-personal, party-military, military-personal, party-personal-military, oligarchy, indirect military.

Since GWF is cross-sectional, I collapse the country–year panel data from my Africa sample into regime-level observations in order for my

dataset to be comparable with the GWF regime-level observations. The resulting cross-sectional dataset has eighty-three regime-level observations.[22] Since my original measures of regime institutionalization are dummy variables, to transform them into cross-sectional indicators I calculate the percentage of years for which a dimension of institutionalization was implemented. For instance, a leader that was in power for twenty years and had a vice president for ten of those years would score a .50 on that particular dimension of institutionalization.[23]

Table 4.4 provides a comparison between my measures of institutionalization and regime type for the Africa subsample. Shaded cells represent disagreement between the assigned regime type and institutionalization score on that particular dimension. For instance, a number of regimes that are coded as party-based had a vice president or prime minister less than 70 percent of the time in which the regime was in power. This disagreement is highlighted by having shaded cells under the dimension "second named" for those parties. In addition, a number of regimes that are coded as military or personalist actually have a vice president or prime minister more than 70 percent of the shaded cells.

A comparison of GWF and my measures of institutionalization reveals a high number of discrepancies. Out of eighty-three regimes in Table 4.4, only fifteen do not have any shaded cells. In other words, 82 percent of the observations have an inconsistency between the assigned regime typology and at least one dimension of institutionalization. This finding is consistent with other studies that argue that the GWF typology better reflects the later years of party institutionalization but is a poor representation of earlier years (Lucardi 2017).

The comparison reveals that many regimes that are coded as dominant-party by GWF are actually not very institutionalized at all. Mali under the rule of the Sudanese Union scores zeros for all seven dimensions of party institutionalization, making it the least institutionalized regime in the dataset. Niger under the rule of the Nigeria Progressive Party scores zeros on five out of seven dimensions. Party-based regimes in the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, and Madagascar each score zeros on

[22] I only focus on comparisons of *pure* regime types, leaving out hybrid regime types, such as party-personal, party-military, military-personal, or triple hybrid types. These types of hybrid regimes are excluded because it is not clear whether these regimes are highly institutionalized or not. For instance, should a researcher expect a party-personal regime to be highly institutionalized (due to the presence of some party attributes) or not institutionalized (due to the presence of some personalist attributes)?

[23] Formally, the measure is calculated as following:

$$\textit{percent years with institutionalization} = \frac{\sum \textit{years with institutionalization}}{\sum \textit{years in power}}$$

four out of six dimensions of institutionalization. In sum, many regimes that are coded as dominant-party perform very poorly when we examine their institutionalization scores.

A closer examination of the cases that exhibit much disagreement also highlights the ambiguity of the GWF coding scheme. Take the example of Niger from 1960 until 1974. The Nigerian Progressive Party scored zeros

Table 4.4 *Comparison between institutionalization and regime type*

GWF case	Regime type	Success rules	Success (strict)	Term limits	VP/PM appoint	VP/PM same	Defense appoint	Defense same
Party-based regimes and monarchies (institutionalized)		<50%	<50%	<50%	<70%	<50%	<70%	<50%
Angola 75–NA	Party				■	■		
Botswana 66–NA	Party		■				■	■
Ethiopia 91–NA	Party	■	■					
Gambia 65–94	Party	■	■	■			■	■
Guinea 58–84	Party		■	■	■	■		
G. Bissau 74–80	Party	■	■	■	■	■		
Ivory Coast 60–99	Party		■	■	■	■		
Kenya 63–02	Party		■				■	■
Madagascar 60–72	Party	■	■	■			■	■
Mali 60–68	Party	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mozambique 75–NA	Party							
Namibia 90–NA	Party							
Niger 60–74	Party	■	■	■	■	■		■
Rwanda 62–73	Party			■	■	■		
Senegal 60–00	Party			■		■		
Sierra Leone 68–92	Party					■	■	■
Tanzania 64–NA	Party							
Zambia 67–91	Party	■	■	■				■
Zambia 96–NA	Party							
Zimbabwe 80–NA	Party			■				
Ethiopia 89–74	Monarchy	■	■	■				
Swaziland 68–NA	Monarchy			■			■	■
Personalist and military regimes (not institutionalized)		>50%	>50%	>50%	>70%	>50%	>70%	>50%
Benin 60–63	Personal				■	■		
Benin 63–65	Personal				■	■	■	■
Benin 72–90	Personal							
Burkina Faso 60–66	Personal							
Burkina Faso 66–80	Personal						■	
Burkina Faso 82–87	Personal						■	■
Burkina Faso 87–NA	Personal	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Cameroon 83–NA	Personal	■	■		■		■	■
CAR 03–NA	Personal	■	■	■	■	■		
CAR 60–65	Personal							
CAR 79–81	Personal				■			
Chad 82–90	Personal							
Chad 90–NA	Personal	■	■	■	■		■	
Rep Congo 60–64	Personal	■	■					
Rep Congo 97–NA	Personal	■	■	■			■	■
DRC 60–97	Personal			■				
DRC 97–NA	Personal	■	■	■				
Gambia 94–NA	Personal	■	■		■	■		
Ghana 81–00	Personal				■		■	
Guinea 08–10	Personal	■	■	■	■			
Guinea 84–09	Personal							
G. Bissau 02–03	Personal	■	■	■	■		■	
G. Bissau 80–99	Personal	■	■		■			
Ivory Coast 00–NA	Personal	■		■	■		■	■
Ivory Coast 99–00	Personal				■		■	

Table 4.4 *(continued)*

GWF case	Regime type	Success rules	Success (strict)	Term limits	VP/PM appoint	VP/PM same	Defense appoint	Defense same
Personalist and military regimes (not institutionalized)		>50%	>50%	>50%	>70%	>50%	>70%	>50%
Liberia 80–90	Personal						■	■
Liberia 97–03	Personal	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Madagascar 09–NA	Personal	■	■	■	■		■	
Madagascar 75–93	Personal				■	■	■	■
Malawi 64–94	Personal	■	■					
Mali 68–91	Personal							
Mauritania 08–NA	Personal	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Mauritania 60–78	Personal						■	
Mauritania 78–05	Personal	■	■		■		■	
Niger 96–99	Personal			■	■		■	
Sierra Leone 97–98	Personal	■	■	■	■			
Somalia 69–91	Personal				■	■	■	■
Sudan 69–85	Personal	■	■		■			
Sudan 89–NA	Personal	■	■	■	■	■	■	■
Togo 60–63	Personal							
Togo 63–NA	Personal							
Uganda 66–71	Personal				■	■	■	■
Uganda 71–79	Personal						■	■
Uganda 80–85	Personal				■	■	■	■
Uganda 86–NA	Personal	■	■		■	■		
Benin 65–67	Military						■	
Benin 67–69	Military						■	
Benin 69–70	Military							
Burkina Faso 80–82	Military						■	
Burundi 87–93	Military				■	■		
Chad 75–79	Military				■	■		
Ghana 66–69	Military				■	■	■	
Ghana 72–79	Military							
Madagascar 72–75	Military							
Mauritania 05–07	Military	■	■	■	■	■		
Nigeria 66–79	Military							
Nigeria 83–93	Military						■	■
Sierra Leone 67–68	Military				■			
Sudan 58–64	Military							
Sudan 85–86	Military				■		■	

Note: Shaded cells represent dimensions of party institutionalization that are in disagreement with the regime typology coding. For example, for party-based regimes, "Second Appoint < 70%" means that the regimes listed in this column are coded as party-based regimes, but have a second in command appointed less than 70 percent of the time. For non party-based regimes, "Second Appoint >80%" means that the regimes listed in this column are NOT coded as part of party-based regimes, but have a second in command appointed more than 80 percent of the time. NA refers to regimes that were still in power as of 2010.

on six out of seven dimensions of institutionalization, making it one of the weakest regimes in my sample, yet it is coded as part of a party-based regime by GWF. Even when we look at the case description in the GWF codebook, the leader does not appear to constrained at all.

Niger (1960–74)
Start: 8/3/1960 Independence under single-party rule. The PPN won the December 1958 preindependence election with help from the French. Prior to independence, the most popular rival party was outlawed and its leaders jailed. Power was centralized under Diori, who controlled ministerial appointments without parliamentary scrutiny, could appoint and dismiss civil servants and military officers, and could decree and veto laws […]. End: 4/15/1974 Coup led by the Army Chief

of Staff ousted the civilian government[…] . (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2012, 82)

It is difficult to know why the PPN in Niger was coded as part of a party-based regime, rather than a personalist regime (or at least a party-personal regime), in part because regime typologies are aggregate measures. The advantage of disaggregated indicators of institutionalization is that the researcher can clearly observe the extent to which the regime fulfills certain requirements (such as having leadership succession rules) and make decisions based on transparent criteria.

The comparison of the two datasets also reveals that a number of regimes that were coded as military or personalist are actually quite institutionalized. Several regimes that are coded as personalist actually exceed the threshold of institutionalization for many dominant-party regimes. Although Burkina Faso, under the presidency of Blaise Compaore, is coded as a personalist regime, it had an appointed prime minister and minister of defense for the majority of Compaore's tenure.[24] The constitution of Burkina Faso also had succession procedures and term limits during most of this period.

4.5 COMPARISONS WITH OTHER EXISTING DATASETS

The final section of this chapter presents graphical comparisons of my institutionalization measures against two other commonly used datasets of institutional strength – Polity (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016) and V-Dem (Coppedge et Al. 2016). The comparisons show that while existing variables can provide broad impressions of institutional strength, they are often not sufficiently nuanced to accurately capture disaggregated dimensions of executive constraints.

First I compare my disaggregated indicators of executive constraints against the "XCONST" variable from the Polity dataset. "XCONST" is described as a variable that

> refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision- making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities. Such limitations may be imposed by any "accountability groups." In Western democracies these are usually legislatures. Other kinds of accountability groups are the ruling party in a one-party state; councils of nobles or powerful advisors in monarchies; the military in coup-prone polities; and in many states a strong, independent judiciary. The concern is therefore with the checks and balances between the various parts of the decision-making process. (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers 2016, 24)

[24] Recall that the data goes up until 2010, though Compaore was in power until 2014.



Figure 4.3 Comparison between institutionalization and XCONST variable

"XCONST" is coded on a seven-point scale, where higher scores are interpreted as more institutionalized and lower scores are interpreted as less institutionalized.

Figure 4.3 provides a comparison of my institutionalization scores and the "XCONST" variable from the Polity dataset. The graph reveals many inconsistencies between the "XCONST" coding and observed executive constraints in sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, while 100 percent of countries that scored a six on the XCONST variable have constitutional succession rules in place, less than 75 percent of countries that scored a seven on the XCONST variable (a higher institutionalization score) have constitutional succession rules in place.

I also provide comparisons between my institutionalization measures and two V-Dem measures of executive oversight: legislative constraints on the executive and judicial constraints on the executive. It is important to note that these V-Dem measures should not be considered substitutes for my measures of executive constraints. Instead, these comparisons reveal that there are important differences across different types of executive constraints. Simply having strong legislative oversight does not imply that the regime automatically has strong constitutional rules that constrain the president.

I compare my regime institutionalization measures against the "legislative constraints on the executive index" variable. This question was



Figure 4.4 Comparison between institutionalization and V-Dem measure of legislative constraint

coded by asking experts the following question: "To what extent is the legislature and government agencies (e.g. controller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman) capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive?"

Figure 4.4 provides a comparison of the legislative constraint scores against my regime institutionalization measures. While the two variables appear generally correlated, some important differences arise. For instance, a greater proportion of countries in my sample that score a 0.5 on the V-Dem legislative constraint index have constitutional succession rules in place compared with countries that score a 0.75 on the V-Dem legislative constrain index. This suggests that simply having legislative constraints in place does not automatically guarantee the existence of certain executive constraints, such as constitutional succession rules.

Finally, I also conduct a comparison of my institutionalization measures against the "judicial constraints on the executive index" variable. This question was coded by asking experts the following question: "To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion?"



Figure 4.5 Comparison between institutionalization and V-Dem measure of judicial constraint

Figure 4.5 presents a comparison between my regime institutionalization measures and the V-Dem measures of judicial constraint. Perhaps unsurprisingly, the two variables do not appear to be very closely related, which implies that judicial constraints should be analyzed separately from executive constraints.

4.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter presented an original dataset of autocratic regime institutionalization in all sub-Saharan regimes from 1960 to 2010. First I discussed how I conceptualize and operationalize autocratic regime institutionalization more generally, then I presented the dataset by explaining my coding strategy and showing descriptive findings. Finally I compared my dataset to other commonly used datasets of authoritarian institutions, such as regime typologies, Polity scores, and V-Dem measures.

The rest of the book will be primarily empirical and will use this dataset to test my arguments about the causes and consequences of regime institutionalization. The next chapter will test the theoretical argument made in Chapter 2 and show that there is a relationship between initial leader

strength and levels of institutionalization. Chapters 6 and 7 will demonstrate that institutionalization does indeed have regime stabilizing effects by examining outcomes such as the length of leader tenure, coup risk, and leadership succession.

Appendix

Appendix Table 4.1 *List of countries and leaders included in this study*

Country	Leader	Years
Angola	Antonio Agostinho Neto	1976–1979
	Jose Eduardo dos Santos	1980–2010
Benin	Hubert Maga	1960–1963
	Sourou Migan Apithy	1964–1965
	Christophe Soglo	1966–1967
	Emile Derlin Zinsou	1968–1969
	Hubert Maga	1970–1971
	Mathieu Kerekou	1972–1990
Botswana	Seretse Khama	1966–1980
	Quet K. J Masire	1981–1997
	Festus G Mogae	1998–2007
	Seretse Khama Ian Khama	2008–2010
Burkina Faso	Maurice Yameogo	1960–1965
	Sangoule Lamizana	1966–1980
	Saye Zerbo	1981–1982
	Thomas Sankara	1984–1987
	Blaise Compaore	1988–2010
Burundi	Michel Micombero	1967–1976
	Jean–Baptiste Bagaza	1977–1987
	Pierre Buyoya	1988–1992
	Sylvestre Ntibantunganya	1994–1995
	Pierre Buyoya	1996–2002
	Domitien Ndayizeye	2003–2004
	Jean–Pierre Nkurunziza	2005–2010
Cameroon	Ahmadou Ahidjo	1960–1982
	Paul Biya	1983–2010
Cape Verde	Aristides Maria Pereira	1976–1990

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1 *(continued)*

Country	Leader	Years
CAR	David Dacko	1960–1965
	Jean–Bedel Bokassa	1966–1979
	David Dacko	1980–1981
	Andre Kolingba	1982–1993
	Ange–Felix Patasse	1994–2002
	Francois Bozize	2003–2010
Chad	Francois Tombalbaye	1960–1974
	Felix Malloum	1976–1978
	Goukouni Oueddei	1980–1982
	Hissene Habre	1983–1990
	Idriss Deby	1991–2010
Comoros	Ali Soilih	1976–1977
	Ahmed Abdallah Abderemane	1979–1989
	Said Mohamed Djohar	1990–1995
	Mohamed Taki Abdoulkarim	1996–1998
	Assoumani Azali	1999–2006
	Ahmed Abdallah Sambi	2007–2010
Congo DRC	Joseph Kasavubu	1961–1965
	Mobutu Sese Seko	1966–1996
	Laurent–Desire Kabila	1997–2000
	Joseph Kabila	2001–2010
Cote d'Ivoire	Felix Houphouet–Boigny	1960–1993
	Henri Konan Bedie	1994–1999
	Laurent Gbagbo	2001–2010
Djibouti	Hassan Gouled Aptidon	1978–1998
	Ismael Omar Gelleh	1999–2010
Equatorial Guinea	Francisco Macias Nguema	1969–1979
	Teodoro Obiang	1980–2010
Eritrea	Issaias Afewerki	1993–2010
Ethiopia	Haile Selassie I	1960–1973
	Tafari Bante	1974–1976
	Mengistu Haile Mariam	1977–1990
	Meles Zenawi	1991–1994
	Negasso Gidada	1995–2001
	Girma Wolde Giorgis	2002–2010
Gabon	Leon M'Ba	1960–1967
	El Hadj Omar Bongo	1968–2009

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1 *(continued)*

Country	Leader	Years
Gambia	Dawada Jawara	1970–1993
	Yahya Jammeh	1994–2010
Ghana	Kwame Nkrumah	1960–1965
	J.A. Ankrah	1966–1968
	Edward Akufo–Addo	1970–1971
	I.K. Acheampong	1972–1978
	Hilla Limann	1980–1981
	Jerry Rawlings	1982–2000
Guinea	Ahmed Sekou Toure	1960–1983
	Lansa Conte	1984–2008
Guinea Bissau	Luis De Almeida Cabral	1974–1980
	Joao Bernardo Vieira	1981–1998
	Kumba Yala	2000–2002
	Joao Bernardo Vieira	2005–2008
Kenya	Mzee Jomo Kenyatta	1964–1978
	Daniel arap Moi	1979–2002
Lesotho	Bethuel Pakalitha Mosisili	2000–2010
Liberia	William Tubman	1960–1970
	William Richard Tolbert	1971–1979
	Samuel Kanyon Doe	1980–1990
	Amos Claudius Sawyer	1991–1993
	Charles Ghankay Taylor	1997–2002
	Gyude Bryant	2004–2005
	Ellen Johnson–Sirleaf	2006–2010
Madagascar	Philibert Tsiranana	1960–1971
	Gabriel Ramanantsoa	1972–1974
	Didier Ratsiraka	1976–1992
Malawi	Hastings Kamuzu Banda	1965–1993
Mali	Modibo Keita	1960–1968
	Moussa Traore	1969–1990
Mauritania	Moktar Ould Daddah	1960–1978
	Mohamed Khouna Ould Haidalla	1980–1984
	Maawiya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya	1985–2004
	Ely Ould Mohamed Vall	2005–2006
	Sidi Mohamed Ould Cheikh Abdellahi	2007–2008
Mozambique	Samora Moises Machel	1976–1986
	Joaquim Alberto Chissano	1987–2005

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1 *(continued)*

Country	Leader	Years
	Armando Emilio Guebuza	2006–2010
Namibia	Samuel Daniel Nujoma	1990–2004
	Hifikepunye Pohamba	2005–2010
Niger	Hamani Diori	1960–1973
	Seyni Kountche	1974–1987
	Ali Saibou	1988–1992
	Mahamane Ousmane	1993–1995
	Ibrahim Bare Mainassara	1996–1998
	Tandja Mamadou	2000–2004
	Mamadou Tandja	2005–2009
Nigeria	Alhaji Abubakah Tafawa Balewa	1960–1965
	Yakubu Gowon	1966–1974
	Olusegun Obasanjo	1976–1979
	Alhaji Shehu Shagari	1980–1983
	Muhammadu Buhari	1984–1985
	Ibrahim Babangida	1986–1992
	Sani Abacha	1994–1997
Republic of Congo	Abbe Fulbert Youlou	1960–1963
	Alphonse Massamba–Debat	1964–1967
	Marien Ngouabi	1970–1976
	Joachim Yhombi–Opango	1977–1978
	Denis Sassou–Nguesso	1979–1992
	Pascal Lissouba	1993–1997
	Denis Sassou–Nguesso	1998–2010
Rwanda	Gregoire Kayibanda	1962–1972
	Juvenal Habyarimana	1973–1993
	Pasteur Bizimungu	1994–1999
	Paul Kagame	2000–2010
Sao Tome	Manuel Pinto Da Costa	1976–1990
Senegal	Leopold–Sedar Senghor	1963–1980
	Abdou Diouf	1981–1999
Sierra Leone	Milton Augustus Striery Margai	1961–1963
	Albert Michael Margai	1964–1966
	Banja Tejan–Sie	1968–1970
	Siaka Probyn Stevens	1971–1985
	Joseph Saidu Momoh	1986–1991
	Valentine Esegragbo Melvine Strassar	1992–1995

(continued)

Appendix Table 4.1 *(continued)*

Country	Leader	Years
Somalia	Aden Abdullah Osman	1961–1967
	Abdirashid Ali Shermarke	1968–1969
	Mohamed Siad Barre	1970–1990
	Abdullahi Yussuf Ahmed	2006–2008
	Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed	2009–2010
South Africa	Nelson Rolihla Mandela	1994–1998
	Thabo Mbeki	1999–2008
	Jacob Zuma	2009–2010
Sudan	Ibrahim Abboud	1960–1964
	Ismail Al–Azhari	1966–1969
	Jaafar Al Nemery	1970–1974
	Gaafar Mohamed Nimeri	1976–1984
	Ahmad Ali Al–Mirghani	1986–1987
	Omar Hassan Ahmad Al–Bashir	1989–2010
Swaziland	Barnabas Sibusiso Dlamini	2000–2010
Tanzania	Julius Kambarage Nyerere	1962–1985
	Ali Hassan Mwinyi	1986–1995
	Benjamin William Mkapa	1996–2005
	Jakaya Mrisho Kikwete	2006–2010
Togo	Sylvanus Olympio	1960–1962
	Nicolas Grunitzky	1963–1966
	Gssingbe Eyadema	1967–2004
	Faure Gssingbe	2005–2010
Uganda	Milton Obote	1963–1970
	Idi Amin	1971–1978
	Milton Obote	1981–1985
	Yoweri Museveni	1986–2010
Zambia	Kenneth David Kaunda	1964–1991
	Frederick Chiluba	1992–2001
	Levy Patrick Mwanawasa	2002–2008
	Rupiah Banda	2009–2010
Zimbabwe	Robert Mugabe	1980–2010

Appendix Table 4.2 *Summary of institutionalization scores by country*

Country	Successor policy	Successor (strict)	Term limits	VP/PM appoint	VP/PM same	Defense appoint	Defense same
Angola	1	0.542	0.542	0.480	0.342	0.885	0.714
Benin	0.400	0.400	0.440	0.180	0.080	0.460	0.240
Botswana	1	0.311	1	1	0.866	0.088	0.044
Burkina Faso	0.440	0.440	0.440	0.500	0.340	0.820	0.500
Burundi	0.348	0.348	0.325	0.534	0.255	0.441	0.255
Cameroon	1	1	0.260	0.800	0.560	1	0.720
Cape Verde	0.857	0.857	0.857	1	0.857	0.971	0.714
CAR	0.440	0.440	0.260	0.500	0.180	0.320	0.100
Chad	0.580	0.280	0.280	0.560	0.220	0.680	0.300
Comoros	0.485	0.485	0.800	0.742	0.228	0.200	0.057
Congo DRC	0.166	0.166	0.625	0.395	0.145	0.395	0.145
Cote d'Ivoire	0.980	0.480	0.200	0.400	0.240	0.780	0.580
Djibouti	0.545	0.545	0.878	1	0.818	0.939	0.727
Equatorial Guinea	0.289	0.289	0.078	1	0.631	0.342	0.236
Eritrea	0.722	0.722	0.722	0	0	1	0.833
Ethiopia	0	0	0.200	0.880	0.680	0.960	0.680
Gabon	0.180	0.160	0.200	0.980	0.800	0.640	0.480
Gambia	0.350	0.350	0	0.975	0.775	0.125	0.075
Ghana	0.454	0.318	0.340	0.500	0.363	0.704	0.363
Guinea	0.420	0.020	0.020	0.480	0.340	0.540	0.320
Guinea Bissau	0.722	0.722	0.333	0.777	0.277	0.750	0.250
Kenya	1	1	0.413	0.934	0.739	0.413	0.326

(continued)

Lesotho	1	1	0	1	0.818	0	0
Liberia	0.860	0.860	0.560	0.640	0.460	1	0.680
Madagascar	0.380	0.380	0.260	0.920	0.620	0.700	0.420
Malawi	0.733	0.733	0.355	0.377	0.266	0.288	0.133
Mali	0.380	0.380	0.500	0.460	0.260	0.580	0.320
Mauritania	0.380	0.380	0.100	0.460	0.240	0.660	0.320
Mozambique	1	0.571	0.571	0.742	0.600	1	0.885
Namibia	1	1	1	1	0.857	1	0.761
Niger	0	0	0.140	0.580	0.300	0.600	0.280
Nigeria	0.560	0.500	0.420	0.600	0.460	0.660	0.380
Rep Congo	0.400	0.340	0.280	0.780	0.500	0.560	0.320
Rwanda	1	1	0.416	0.395	0.229	0.625	0.458
Sao Tome	1	1	0.571	0.771	0.285	0.828	0.514
Senegal	1	1	0.319	0.680	0.468	0.957	0.659
Sierra Leone	0.708	0.708	0.708	0.958	0.479	0.083	0.041
Somalia	0.176	0	0.235	0.970	0.617	1	0.529
South Africa	1	1	0.882	1	0.647	1	0.705
Sudan	0.440	0.440	0.240	0.860	0.420	0.660	0.340
Swaziland	1	1	0	1	0.636	0	0
Tanzania	0.723	0.723	0.723	1	0.765	0.702	0.510
Togo	0.360	0.360	0.060	0.440	0.180	0.400	0.260
Uganda	0.326	0.326	0.217	0.847	0.608	0.543	0.413
Zambia	0.434	0.434	0.413	0.934	0.500	0.739	0.413
Zimbabwe	1	1	0	0.741	0.516	0.709	0.548

5

What Are the Causes of Regime Institutionalization?

Under what conditions will autocratic leaders institutionalize their regimes? Chapter 2 presented a theoretical model demonstrating how institutionalization ties the hands of the autocrat by shifting the future distribution of power between elites and the leader. It also made a prediction that leaders who enter power initially strong are less likely to institutionalize their regimes because they do not need to create institutionalized mechanisms of rent distribution to remain in power. Chapter 3 illustrated these dynamics through case studies of Cameroon and Côte d'Ivoire.

This chapter tests the theoretical argument made in Chapter 2 on the full set of countries within sub-Saharan Africa. I test the argument using two different research designs. First, I will present a series of cross-sectional regressions focusing on the ways in which leaders obtained power. Second, I will present a differences-in-differences design using my time-series data on regime institutionalization.

The formal model presented in Chapter 2 argued that the initial distribution of strength between the leader and elites affected the leader's decision to institutionalize the regime. Using a series of cross-sectional regression, I will demonstrate that initial leader strength is indeed associated with levels of regime institutionalization. To measure leader strength, I propose that the ways in which leaders obtain power determine their initial level strength vis-à-vis elites once they enter office. In particular, I focus on the following three comparisons:

First, I compare founding presidents with their successors. When we examine all autocratic leaders within sub-Saharan Africa, we expect the first president immediately following independence to be stronger than the leaders who subsequently took power, largely due to the "founding father" persona many of these first leaders adopted, which made them extremely popular.

Second, I compare leaders within the set of postindependence regimes. Within the set of leaders who came into power immediately following independence, those who founded mass movements (such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Côte d'Ivoire) tended to be much stronger compared with leaders who essentially inherited their position of power through a close alliance with the outgoing colonial authorities (such as Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon).[1]

Third, I compare leaders who took power through coup d'etats against leaders who do not. Leaders who successfully enter power via coups have coercive control upon taking power and can be interpreted as stronger leaders compared with elites who do not exert the same kind of control over the military.

Using these three strategies, I show that leaders who enter power already strong are less likely to institutionalize the regime at the start of their tenure, even if this initial advantage does not last indefinitely.

In addition, I leverage the end of the Cold War as a causal identification strategy by showing that leaders with access to natural resources institutionalized their regimes at lower rates compared with leaders without access to natural resources. I first show that autocratic regimes in Africa generally became more institutionalized following the end of the Cold War. This trend reflects the increasing demands leaders faced in the 1990s to implement democratic-seeming institutions, though as I argue, these power-sharing measures likely buttressed authoritarian durability, rather than usher in true democracy. Then, through a differences-in-differences design, I show that leaders who had access to natural resource rents, such as oil, institutionalized at lower rates compared to leaders who did not have access to oil rents. This provides additional empirical support that in light of exogenous shocks to the distribution of power, leaders who are stronger do not need to institutionalize.

5.1 OBSERVABLE IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT

The formal model presented in Chapter 2 illustrates how institutionalization empowers elites and outlines the conditions under which autocrats choose to implement executive constraints. I will quickly summarize the main finding from the model that is most relevant to the empirical tests presented in this chapter.

[1] It is helpful to remind the reader that we are interested in the leader's *relative* level of strength compared with elites. While the first strategy compares founders and successors in the entire sample of leaders, the second strategy focuses on variation in leader strength within the subset of leaders who took power immediately following independence.

The model showed that leaders who enter power initially strong vis-à-vis other elites are less likely to institutionalize the regime. This is because initially strong leaders do not have to worry about commitment problems arising in the future bargaining round. Commitment problems arise only when elites are very strong relative to the leader in the first period because are likely to succeed in a rebellion if they were to try to depose the leader. In such circumstances, leaders need to institutionalize the regime in order to remain in power because doing so effectively transfers access to the state to elites, therefore guaranteeing their future rents.

If instead, the leader enters power relatively strong, then elites cannot demand a large share of rents because they do not have a credible threat of rebellion in the first period. In this case, the leader does not have to institutionalize the regime in order to remain in power because she can make a distributive offer that elites will accept in the first period of the game.

In short, the model argues that levels of regime institutionalization are determined primarily by initial leader strength. This chapter will test the following hypothesis:

> ***Hypothesis 1***: Initially strong autocratic leaders are less likely to institutionalize their regimes.

5.2 JUSTIFYING THE MODEL'S ASSUMPTIONS

Before turning to the empirical test, I will first provide some empirical evidence of two key assumptions made in the model. The first key assumption the model makes is that leaders institutionalize at the beginning of their tenure. Recall that the model assumes that leaders make decisions about institutionalization after observing the initial draw of power. If this is the case, then we should expect to see institutionalization occur near the beginning of leaders' tenures.

I provide empirical evidence that the creation of constitutional succession procedures and term limits do indeed occur within the first few years of leaders coming into power. In fact, about half of these rules are created within the leader's first year of entering power. To show this, I calculate the number of years into the leader's tenure constitutional succession rules or term limits were created. For example, Agostinho Neto, the first leader of Angola, implemented formal succession rules the first year he came to power, in 1976. Aristides Pereira, who became the first president of Cape Verde in 1975, created formal succession rules in 1981 – six years after taking power.

I limit the time frame to rules created between 1960 and 1990, since the end of the Cold War provided an exogenous shock to the distribution of power of leaders, resulting in renewed incentives to institutionalize (as this chapter will later discuss). I also focus primarily on the creation of formal rules in this subsection because informal power-sharing measures – the designation of vice presidents, prime ministers, and defense ministers – are much more likely to have interruptions or gaps. For example, Hamani Diori, the first president of Niger, appointed a defense minister for about 60 percent of the time he was in office. He began to appoint a defense minister six years after the start of his term, but there was a one-year gap in 1971 in which a defense minister was not appointed. Similarly, Denis Sassou Nguesso, who was president of the Republic of Congo from 1979 to 1992, appointed a defense minister from 1981 to 1984, and again from 1991 to 1992.

From 1960 to 1990, I recorded all instances of "institutional spells" for constitutional succession procedures and term limits. For instance, succession procedures have existed within the Cameroon constitution since 1960. These rules remained in place through 2010. Succession rules in Cameroon from 1960 to 2010 constitute one institutional spell. For each institutional spell, I then recorded when during the leader's tenure that particular rule was created. Returning to the Cameroon example, succession rules were created in 1960, the first year of Ahmadou Ahidjo's rule. That observation would therefore score a 1 because the rule was created in the first year of Ahidjo's tenure.

Table 5.1 displays summary statistics of the number of years into the autocrat's tenure the rule was implemented.

The data shows that where formal executive constraints exist, they are usually created within the first few years of the leader's tenure. From 1960 to 1990, there were fifty-three instances in which

Table 5.1 *How long into their tenure do leaders create formal executive constraints?*

	Number of institutional spells	Mean number of years	Median number of years
Leadership succession	34	3.8	1
Term limits	19	4.3	3
Total	53	4	2

Note: Sample includes rules created between 1960 and 1990.

a constitutional succession rule or term limits were created. In 49 percent of those instances, the rule was created in the first year of the leader's tenure. Conditional on being created, the average rule was implemented in the fourth year of the leader's tenure. The median leader creates a formal rule in the second year of taking power. In other words, most leaders institutionalize their regimes near the beginning of their term. This is consistent with the theoretical argument that leaders make institutionalization decisions based on the initial draw of power, which is generally determined by the ways in which they obtain power.

A second key assumption the model makes is that once implemented, institutionalization persists into the future. Recall that the model assumes that the leader's decision to institutionalize at the start of the game affects the future distribution of power between the leader and elite. For institutionalization to shift the future draw of power, these rules should remain in place through the second period of the game.

It is important to note that my argument about institutional persistence pertains mostly to uninterrupted regime spells. When regimes fall – particularly when leaders are deposed in coups – new leaders set up their own institutional arrangements. In cases where the leader institutionalized the regime, therefore creating lasting regimes that survive multiple leadership transitions, power-sharing arrangements constructed in the 1960s and 1970s have persisted over time. For example, the regime in Tanzania (which has been in power since independence) has maintained leadership succession policies and stable cabinet appointments since the 1960s and this continues today. However in cases where a personalist leader did not institutionalize, leading to the downfall of the regime (either after the leader's death or due to a coup), the institutional makeup of the regime changes after one regime ends and the next one begins. For example, Ghana's first president pursued very limited amounts of institutionalization and he was deposed in a coup six years after taking power. After the coup, the military suspended the constitution therefore eliminating the leadership succession policy that had been in place. In this case, the institutional arrangements that were initially created did not persist after the fall of the regime.

I provide empirical evidence that constitutional rules, once created, do generally tend to remain in place. The majority of constitutional succession rules and term limits are not removed or revoked once they are created. To demonstrate this, I return to my analysis of institutional

Table 5.2 *Do constitutional rules persist, once created?*

Institution	Number created	Number remaining	Percent remaining
Constitution	83	42	51%
Conditional on the constitution not being revoked			
Successor	43	32	74%
Term limits	37	27	73%

spells. Once again, I focus primarily on the creation of formal constitutional rules because the appointment of elites to key cabinet positions frequently has interruptions or gaps.

From 1960 to 2010, I recorded all instances of "institutional spells" for constitutions, constitutional succession rules, and term limits. During that time period, there were eighty-three instances in which a constitution was created. Out of these eighty-three constitutional spells, the constitution remained in place through the end of the dataset 51 percent of the time. Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 5.2. Constitutions are frequently suspended or revoked during periods of regime change or in the aftermath of a coup.

Given that leaders often suspend constitutions after regime change, I argue that in order to answer the question of whether leaders revoke constitutional succession rules, we should condition on the constitution *not* having been suspended or revoked. In cases where the constitution was revoked, it is difficult to know whether the leader would have kept succession rules intact if the entire constitution had not been suspended. Therefore, we are able to observe whether succession rules were kept in place only for succession rules in constitutions that were not eventually suspended.

Conditional on the constitution not being suspended, there were forty-three instances where a constitutional succession rule was created. In 74 percent of these cases, once created, the succession rule was kept in place through the end of 2010. Moreover, conditional on the constitution not being suspended, there were thirty-seven instances where term limits were created. In 73 percent of these cases, once created, term limits were kept in place through the end of 2010. In other words, constitutional succession rules and term limits generally remain in place, when they are created.

5.3 CROSS-SECTIONAL DESIGN: DATA AND MEASUREMENT

Now we turn to testing the hypothesis that leaders who enter power initially strong are less likely to institutionalize the regime. This section summarizes the measurement approach I take – especially with regards to measuring the distribution of power between leaders and elites.

The analyses in this section are cross-sectional, and the unit of observation is the leader, since the primary independent variable is initial leader strength. I will return to the time-series structure of the dataset later in the chapter when I present a differences-in-differences research design.

5.3.1 Independent Variables: Measuring Leader Strength

The independent variable for the empirical tests in this chapter is the incumbent's risk of removal if challenged by elites. In other words, we are interested in measuring the leader's initial strength, vis-à-vis other elites. Measuring the distribution of power between political actors in authoritarian contexts is a nontrivial challenge. The absence of electoral and formal political competition (such as presidential or legislative elections) obscures accurate information about the true strength of incumbents relative to other elites.

The main relationship that is explored in the model is the leader's strength when she first enters office and how this affects her decisions to institutionalize at the start of the game. (Recall that the model's main findings are centered around p_1, the draw of the leader's relative power in the first period, rather than the distribution of p_t.) To measure this initial draw of power, I examine the ways in which postindependence leaders came to power within sub-Saharan Africa.

I generate three strategies, based on this historical approach, to approximate the distribution of power between incumbents and elites. The first strategy compares the first president of each country against their successors. First presidents were generally bolstered by initial excitement over independence, and were therefore quite popular. Moreover, presidents often strategically designate weak elites as their successor, due to fears of being deposed by their appointees. We should therefore expect founding leaders to be strong leaders compared with their successors.

It is important to note that all my measures reflect *relative* leader strength, not *absolute* leader strength. I am arguing that founding leaders are, in general, stronger compared to their successors. This does not mean that all founding leaders are, in absolute terms, extremely strong, nor does it assume that all founding leaders are uniformly strong. It simply means that when we compare founding leaders against nonfounding leaders, founding leaders are stronger than their counterparts.

The second strategy focuses on the set of leaders who were the first presidents of the newly independent African states after decolonization. Within these postindependence regimes, leaders who had led robust social movements were extremely popular and perceived as the "founding father" of the newly independent states. Such leaders were much stronger compared with leaders who essentially inherited their positions of power through close relationships with the outgoing colonial power.

Third, I focus on leaders who came into power through coups. Such incumbents have coercive control upon taking power and therefore can be interpreted as stronger leaders compared with elites who do not have control over the military.

The strategy of focusing on the initial distribution of power has a distinct empirical advantage – it lessens the concern that the relationship between institutionalization and the distribution of power is endogenous. Since the process of institutionalization shifts the distribution of power in future periods, it would be difficult to untangle the effect of the incumbent's average level of strength because institutionalization affects the future distribution of power.

By contrast, when we focus on the initial distribution of power that exists as the leader enters office, the incumbent has not made her decision to institutionalize yet. This initial measure of leader strength is therefore plausibly exogenous to the degree of institutionalization that is implemented after the leader takes office. I now discuss each of the strategies in turn.

5.3.1.1 Founding Presidents. When founding presidents first take power, they tend to be extremely influential and popular. In their study of African leaders Bienen and van de Walle (1989) argue that the first leader following independence enjoyed a special legitimacy and mass support during their tenure. Other scholars have also observed that founders of authoritarian regimes tend to be highly influential and charismatic, often becoming personalist dictators during their rule (Chehabi 1998; Panebianco 1988). Being a founding father of an autocracy therefore serves as an indicator of a strong leader.

Within sub-Saharan Africa, the leader's initial popularity was often also boosted by the fact that the country had just gained

independence. Jomo Kenyatta, the first president of Kenya, is a prime example of the immense power he acquired simply by being associated with the founding of the independent Kenya state.

> [Kenyatta] served as a popular symbol of the new Kenyan nation: in the public mind it was difficult to distinguish between the two. For almost three decades Kenyatta and Kenya were as one … The Kiswahili term of respect *Mzee*, meaning "wise old man" became Kenyatta's unofficial title as father of his country, with the connotation of paternal authority and sanctity. But more than the nation or its people he symbolized the Kenyan state: the patriarch of Kenya … his position was virtually unassailable. (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 99)

On the other hand, leaders who take power by succeeding another president are frequently much weaker and less popular compared with their predecessors. By the end of the tenure of the founding leader, initial excitement over independence and the creation of a new republic faded quickly in many African states (Bienen and van de Walle 1991; Boone 2014; Jackson and Rosberg 1982). Therefore, leaders who subsequently come to power following the first president involuntarily lose the advantages that were endowed to the "founding fathers" as a result of the passage of time away from independence.

In addition, presidents sometimes strategically choose successors who they believe do not have the charisma and influence to preemptively depose them (Tullock 1987). Therefore, successors often start out less influential then their previous incumbents by design. Daniel arap Moi, for instance, was Jomo Kenyatta's designated successor for many years before Kenyatta died. While Moi was vice president and at the start of his tenure as president, he was not perceived to be a strong leader. "Before Jomo Kenyatta died in 1978, many observers of Kenya's politics considered his vice president, Daniel arap Moi, to be unintelligent. 'Moi' jokes made the rounds of Kenya's political circles. Yet Moi has been in power more than a decade and is now considered a canny political leader" (Bienen and van de Walle 1991, 6).

Moreover, would-be successors often reinforce this dynamic while their predecessors are still in power because it is dangerous for appointed heirs to amass too much power while their predecessor is still in office. "Although Moi served as vice president for twelve years, [he] had acted primarily as Kenyatta's agent in building bridges between the country's different cultural communities and had little opportunity, *perhaps little inclination*, to articulate his own views" (Widner 1992, 134). In his ascension to the presidency, Moi also did

not attempt to frame himself as a nationalist figure in the fight for independence, despite the fact that he had been an active figure in Kenya's preindependence politics.[2] In sum, often by design, successors are generally much weaker than their predecessors when they first take office.

To summarize, the founding president of the country following independence was often quite strong relative to other elites. We should therefore expect first presidents to be less likely to institutionalize their regimes. For this strategy, I create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader was the first president of the regime and a 0 otherwise.

5.3.1.2 Strong Nationalist Leaders. My second strategy focuses on variation within the sample of leaders who were founding presidents. In the two decades leading up to independence, political movements emerged in virtually all colonized territories within Africa. On one hand, many of these organizations were active independence movements that lobbied for liberation from the European powers. The leaders of these independence movements, such as Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya or Sekou Toure of Guinea, enjoyed high levels of popularity and mobilized large bases of support (Boone 2014; Collier 1982; Levitsky and Way 2012; Mamdani 1996). A number of these leaders participated in armed struggles against the colonial powers, which afforded them extremely high levels of legitimacy upon taking power (Huntington 1968; Levitsky 2012).

Felix Houphouet-Boigny of the Ivory Coast is an example of such a figure. Houphouet-Boigny had been a famed advocate for independence early on in the movement for self-government. In 1946, he founded the Rassemblement Democratique Africain (RDA) – a pan-African organization consisting of multiple political parties from French colonies that lobbied for independence. That same year, Houphouet-Boigny also founded the Parti Democratique de la Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI) to fight for self-determination within the Ivory Coast. Even before independence was granted, the PDCI – controlled by Houphouet-Boigny – dominated politics. Jackson and Rosberg (1982) describe Houphouet-Boigny as dominating all aspects of political life

[2] In fact, prior to independence, Moi cofounded the Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), a rival political party to KANU, which advocated for a federal system. He also harbored rebel fighters on his farm during the Mau Mau Uprising that was fought against the British in the 1950s (Widner 1992, 135).

"since the first stirrings of nationalist politics in 1946," controlling the state bureaucracy and National Assembly with "stern and unrelenting control" (145–147). The government of the Ivory Coast under Houphouet-Boigny was the government of "virtually one man" (145).

Conversely, in states in which active independence movements did not emerge, preindependence parties existed to participate in elections that were overseen by the colonial authorities. In such organizations, high-ranking politicians were often perceived as part of the colonial bureaucracy. Such politicians essentially inherited their positions of power after decolonization but were not shielded by the same influence and mass following that surrounded pro-independence leaders. I interpret these preindependence statesmen who did not lead mass movements as weak autocrats compared to independence leaders.

Ahmadou Ahidjo, the first president of Cameroon, is a prime example of such a case. In the decades prior to independence, Ahidjo was encouraged to run for office by the French authorities, who viewed him as a politician who would act in the interest of the colonial state. In fact, the colonial administration even referred to the "Ahidjo option" – given that independence seemed to be increasingly inevitable, the French authorities preferred to have Ahidjo as head of state (Joseph 1978, 46). Ahidjo did indeed take the office of the presidency upon independence, but experienced very low levels of popular support. "In spite of the efforts of the propagandists of the regime, President Ahidjo cannot be considered a heroic figure from the nationalist past . . . it is a matter of historical fact that he was initially "fabricated" and brought to power by the colonial regime" (Joseph 1978, 76).[3] As a result, upon taking power Ahidjo needed to create official structures that would allow him to buy the support of key elites – the *lamidos* (chiefs) who still controlled much of the northern regions. He created a constitutional stipulation that stated traditional chiefs would be protected, and filled key cabinet appointments with elites that the lamidos favored. However, Ahidjo made it clear that in exchange for these benefits, he expected the lamidos to support his rule.

To sum, within the sample of founding presidents, there is variation in terms of the strength of these leaders upon taking office. Presidents such as Ahmadou Ahidjo who came to power by inheriting their positions from the colonial state tended to lack the popularity

[3] Joseph also notes that "in view of his uncertain and controversial origins, [Ahidjo] is not strongly identified with any particular ethnic group," making it even more difficult for him to have a mass popular following (77).

and influence of nationalist figures. He therefore had to institutionalize the regime in order to buy support from other elites. Strong nationalist figures, such as Felix Houphouet-Boigny, were exceedingly popular upon taking office at independence. Such leaders did not need to institutionalize their regimes because they did not face a credible threat from other elites and had very low likelihoods of being deposed. Within the sample of first presidents, we should therefore expect that strong nationalist leaders are less likely to institutionalize the regime after coming into power.

To code this variable, I looked for leaders who fought in independence wars, those who were jailed by the colonial state for pro-independence activities, or those who spearheaded wide-reaching pro-independence movements.[4] Such leaders entered power strong, compared with postindependence leaders who inherited their positions from the outgoing colonial power. I create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader was a strong independence movement figure and a 0 otherwise.

5.3.1.3 Coup Leaders. For my third strategy, I focus on leaders who came into power through coups. One of the most precarious challenges to any civilian incumbent is the threat of military takeover. When the leader is the head of the military, however, this threat is diminished. Moreover, autocrats who successfully come into power through a coup demonstrate that they have control over the coercive apparatus that allowed them to launch a successful coup in the first place (Gehlbach and Keefer 2011). We should therefore expect successful coup leaders to be less likely to institutionalize their regimes because they have control over the military.

This argument builds on existing studies of coups and military governments, although the literature on this topic is somewhat limited. Geddes (2009) examines variation in the creation of institutions in military regimes that emerge out of successful coups. She argues that leaders of military regimes that are run by highly professionalized militaries are less likely to rely on civilian institutions in order to share power since the threat of being ousted is credible. In un-professionalized militaries, leaders cannot be certain that lower-ranked officers will comply with their orders. They are therefore more likely to empower civilian institutions in order to

[4] For my coding of independence leaders and preindependence statesmen, I rely on Morrison (1989), Clodfelter (1992), and historical accounts.

act as a counterbalancing force against the threat posed by other military officers. Geddes uses the ranking of the officer as a proxy for the level of professionalism in the military. She argues that coups led by junior officers demonstrate a lack of discipline in the military. Coups led by generals, on the other hand, tend to have the unified support of the military. Unfortunately, the study does not break down how Geddes codes junior and senior officers, so it is unclear what officer rankings are associated with the categories of seniority in this study.

Singh (2014) makes the case that the success of coups depends on the level of seniority of the officer, primarily because senior officers have more access to resources that facilitate the execution of a successful coup. Coups that are carried out from the top – namely by generals – are most likely to succeed because senior officers have more influence and authority that allow them to shape expectations about the likelihood of a successful coup early on in the process. Coups that are carried out by mid-ranking officers – majors, lieutenants-colonels, and colonels – succeed about half the time because mid-level officers can usually seize symbolic targets and gain access to broadcast capabilities, such as the radio. Finally, coups that come from the very bottom of the officer corps – those organized by enlisted men or very junior officers – are least likely to succeed because these officers lack the influence and personal resources to convince others that their coup will succeed.

Singh's argument resonates with the officer rankings available in my data. Out of seventy coup leaders who became the president of the regime, I have data on the officer rankings of fifty-three leaders. Generals make up 38 percent of coup leaders and 40 percent are mid-level officers (such as majors and lieutenant colonels). Only 22 percent had ambiguous titles or were clearly very low ranked (such as a squadron commander). In other words, the majority of the coup leaders in my dataset (78 percent) were mid- to high-ranking military officers who had reasonable control over the military upon seizing power in a coup.

Returning to Geddes's (2009) thesis, we should therefore expect that the majority of coup leaders in my sample would be less likely to institutionalize the regime because they are high-ranking officers who have already demonstrated that they have control over the military and coercive apparatus of the state. They therefore do not need to rely on civilian institutions in order to stay in power. In sum, coup leaders in my sample should be associated with lower levels of regime institutionalization. For this strategy, I create a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader entered power through a coup and a 0 otherwise.[5]

[5] To code this variable, I relied on Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009, Powell and Thyne 2011, and various leaders biographies.

5.3.2 Dependent Variables: Regime Institutionalization

The primary dependent variable (DV) for the empirical analyses is the level of regime institutionalization. Since we are primarily concerned with the leader's initial draw of power, our units of analysis are cross-sectional and the analysis conducted at the leader level. I transform my time-series institutionalization measures into cross-sectional units at the leader level. Since my original measures of regime institutionalization are dummy variables, to transform them into cross-sectional indicators I calculate the percentage of years for which a dimension of institutionalization was implemented. For instance, a leader who was in power for twenty years and had a vice president for ten of those years would score a .50 on that particular dimension of institutionalization.[6]

To sum, the cross-sectional version of the institutionalization scores report the proportion of years for which a leader implemented a particular dimension of institutionalization. These scores range from 0 to 1, with higher scores indicating higher levels of institutionalization. I present findings using both my seven disaggregated measures of institutionalization, as well as an aggregate institutionalization score that was calculated using Item Response Theory (IRT). The IRT institutionalization score is a continuous measure, ranging from 0 to 1.[7]

5.4 CROSS-SECTIONAL DESIGN: EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND FINDINGS

I now present the findings from empirical analyses focusing on how leaders enter power as an indicator of their initial draw of strength. The analyses in this section are cross-sectional, and the unit of observation is the leader, since the primary independent variable is initial leader strength. In the following section, I will present an alternative test which returns to the time-series structure of the dataset by examining changes in levels of institutionalization before and after the end of the Cold War.

The estimating equation used for the empirical models in this section is the following:

[6] Formally, the measure is calculated as following:

$$percent\ years\ with\ institutionalization = \frac{\sum years\ with\ institutionalization}{\sum years\ in\ power}$$

[7] Details on this method are included in the Appendix at the end of this chapter.

$$Y_i = \alpha + \beta leader\ strength_i + \delta X_i + \gamma W_c + \epsilon_i$$

where Y_i are my measures of institutionalization, estimated separately. The unit of analysis is the leader, and the outcome variables are cross-sectional, calculated as the percentage of years in which the leader implemented a particular dimension of institutionalization. Since the outcome variable is a continuous institutionalization score, I use ordinary least squares (OLS) for the analysis in this section. $leader\ strength_i$ is a dummy variable indicating whether the leader is coded as a strong or weak leader using the strategies detailed above, and β is the main parameter of interest. X_i is a set of leader-specific characteristics, and W_c is a set of country-specific characteristics. ϵ_i is the error term. All models include robust standard errors clustered at the country level.

Should the results in this section be interpreted as causal or correlational? Since the analysis is based on cross-sectional observational data and ordinary least squares regressions, there are limits to the extent with which we can interpret the results as causal. In all of the models, I included controls for the most likely confounders or alternative explanations. These controls include leader-specific characteristics, such as the number of years the leader was in office, whether the leader has a military background, and whether the leader has a ruling party. I also control for country-specific characteristics, such as GDP per capita, oil production per capita, the size of the country, the size of the population, a measure of ethnic fractionalization, and colonial controls (identity of the colonizer, size of settler population). However, we cannot completely eliminate the possibility of reverse causality or omitted variable bias, so the reader is encouraged to interpret the results from the cross-sectional analysis as correlational. The goal of this chapter is to provide empirical support for the theoretical argument made in Chapters 2 and 3 that initially strong leaders are less likely to institutionalize.

5.4.1 Founding Presidents

My first strategy uses founding presidents as a proxy for strong leaders. I restrict the time period for this sample to include only observations from 1961 to 1991, because the end of the Cold War resulted in a shift in the distribution of power for all leaders in the continent (I explore this event later in the chapter). The results are actually stronger when we include post-Cold War observations, but



Figure 5.1 Founding leaders versus subsequent leaders

these findings are inflated by exogenous changes that occurred after 1991. This sample also excludes leaders that came into power via coups. I make this restriction because founding presidents never came into power via coups – they are all civilian leaders. I therefore only include successors who were also civilian leaders as well in order to facilitate a more consistent comparison.[8]

Figure 5.1 illustrates the results from this analysis, and the full regression table is reported in Appendix Table 5.1. Recall that the main independent variable for this analysis is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the president was a founding leader. The results show that founding presidents are significantly less likely to institutionalize along formal dimensions – they are less likely to create strict succession policies and constitutional term limits. Although the coefficients for informal institutions are also negative for first presidents, the difference is not statistically significant. This suggests that some founding leaders may have used appointments to key cabinet positions as a way of maintaining support from elites, especially as their initial popularity from independence began to wane.

[8] I only exclude leaders who came into power via coups – I do not exclude leaders who have a military background who did not come into power via coups.

5.4.2 Strong Nationalist Leaders

My second strategy looks at the subsample of first presidents after independence, and argues that leaders who were strong nationalist figures experienced high levels of influence and popularity upon taking office. These leaders therefore did not need to institutionalize the regime in order to stay in power. This sample is also restricted to the pre-1991 time period. The sample only includes leaders from the first regime. I define a first regime as the first continuous regime after independence. As soon as a regime experiences a violent deposition, it drops out of the sample. Leaders are defined as a "strong independence movement leader" if they started a mass movement or party during the independence era to lobby against the colonial powers. Leaders who were jailed for pro-independence activities or who were important actors in armed combat are also coded as strong independence movement leaders.

These results are illustrated in Figure 5.2 and the full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 5.2. Recall that the main independent variable for this analysis is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the president was a strong nationalist leader. Strong nationalist leaders are significantly less likely to have formal strict succession rules, and they are also significantly less likely to



Figure 5.2 Strong nationalist leaders versus presidents allied with outgoing colonial powers

appoint a vice president or prime minister. The coefficients on most other dimensions of institutionalization are also negative, though not statistically significant.

A potential concern is that nationalist leaders who fought in independence wars might be systematically different from nationalist leaders who led peaceful independence movements. To account for this possibility, I run a robustness test that controls for a leader's participation in an independence war. The results from this robustness check are reported in Appendix Table 5.3. Even when controlling for participation in an independence war, nationalist leaders institutionalize less on the aggregate institutionalization score and they are also less likely to create leadership succession policies. The coefficients on most other dimensions of institutionalization are also negative, though not statistically significant.

5.4.3 Coup Leaders

My third strategy uses coup leaders as a proxy for initial leader strength. Leaders that successfully come into power via coups have control over the military and coercive apparatus of the state. They therefore face a lower probability of being overthrown and therefore are less likely to institutionalize.

These results are illustrated in Figure 5.3, and the full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 5.4. Recall that the main independent variable for this analysis is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the president came into power via a coup. The results show that coup leaders are much less likely to institutionalize along all dimensions of institutionalization, and these differences are statistically significant across all dimensions. These results still generally hold when we break down the sample into different time periods. Appendix Table 5.5 reports the results on a subsample of the data that is restricted from 1960–1991, and the results remain the same. Appendix Table 5.6 reports results on a subsample of the data that is restricted to the post-Cold War period (1992–2010), and postcoup leaders remain less likely to institutionalize, although some results lose their significance. This may be a result of the fact that coups have generally become less common in the post-Cold War period.

I also examine variation within coup leaders. Geddes (2009) makes the claim that high-ranking officers should be less likely to rely on civilian institutions because they have also consolidated control over the military apparatus upon taking power. Low-ranking officers who



Figure 5.3 Coup leaders versus noncoup leaders

come into power via a coup should be more likely to institutionalize because their grip on authority is less established. I examine levels of institutionalization within the subset of coup leaders and find that officers who are ranked at the level of "general" are less likely to keep formal constitutions in place, compared with coup leaders who have lower ranking military statuses (such as majors or colonels). I find some weak evidence for this claim. Most of the dimensions of institutionalization are negatively correlated with rank, though most fail to be statistically significant. Interestingly, I find the opposite to be true of defense minister appointments (and stable defense appointments). Both of these are positively correlated with high-ranking officers, and these relationships are statistically significant. Results from these regressions are reported in Appendix Table 5.7.

In addition, I run a robustness check that takes into account the concern that low-ranking coup leaders might not be strong at all. I create a dummy variable, "High-ranking coup leader," that takes a value of 1 for leaders who come into power via a coup and held a rank of general at the time of the coup. The variable takes a value of 0 for all other observations, including coup leaders who hold a low ranking. The analysis is reported in Appendix Table 5.8 and the results remain consistent.

5.4.3.1 Alternative Hypotheses: Coup Traps and Military Commissions. Are coup leaders less likely to institutionalize simply because they fall into coup traps and therefore are not in power for very long? When we compare the mean and distribution of the number of years in office of coup leaders and noncoup leaders, it is clear that there is not a significant difference between the two groups. Coup leaders remain in office for an average of 8.21 years and noncoup leaders remain in office for an average of 8.62 years. This difference is not statistically significant (p-value=0.74). Moreover, the distributions of time in office between the two groups do not look very different either. The number of years in office for all coup leaders ranges from one to thirty-seven, and for noncoup leaders, this variable ranges from one to forty-one. It is therefore not the case that coup leaders institutionalize less simply because they are in power for significantly shorter periods of time.[9]

A second possible alternative explanation is that coup leaders and military governments do not rely on civilian institutions at all; even if they wanted to create an institutional power-sharing mechanism, they would do so through a military commission, rather than through the presidential cabinet. Therefore, the observation that coup leaders do not make key cabinet appointments such as vice president, prime minister, or defense minister does not imply that the regime is weakly institutionalized; military leaders may simply institutionalize through different channels.

I consider this alternative hypothesis by collecting data on the creation of military commissions. Since the alternative argument is that coup leaders are actually institutionalizing through other mechanisms rather than cabinet appointments, I restrict the observations in this section only to coup leaders who did not appoint a vice president or prime minister. The goal is to find out whether coup leaders who did not name a second in command in the presidential cabinet did so through a military commission. For every leader–year observation for which a coup leader did not appoint a vice president or prime minister in the cabinet, I record whether the leader established a military commission. I define a military commission as a committee of military elites whose positions take precedence over the state presidential cabinet.[10]

[9] In all the models, I also control for the number of years in power.

[10] This information is available from the Europa World Year Book (1960–2010). Military commissions may have various names: "revolutionary council," "national redemption government." However, as long as it is clearly a body composed only of military elites whose authority supersedes the state executive, I consider this body a type of military commission.

I find that the majority of coup leaders who do not appoint a vice president or prime minister also do not create military commissions. Out of ninety-one total leader–year units, military commissions are created only 36 percent of the time. Out of twenty-nine leaders in this sample who were in power for more than one year, only nine had commissions the entire time.[11]

Importantly, for *all* of these observations, cabinets were *never* completely suspended. In other words, coup leaders who did decide to establish military commissions kept the executive cabinets alongside the commissions – although the military commissions appear to have taken precedence over civilian institutions. However, coup leaders are more likely to have removed key appointments within the cabinet – suggesting a lower level of institutionalization along these dimensions.

5.4.4 What About Rebel-Group Regimes?

A possible additional explanation for variation in regime institutionalization is that regimes that were led by rebel-group parties that fought for independence, such as the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO) or the MPLA in Angola, tend to be strong and institutionalized organizations. Huntington (1968) first introduced this argument, claiming that party-based regimes that emerge out of sustained revolutionary or nationalist struggles are more durable compared with regimes that came into power without such a struggle.

Recent studies have extended this theory, arguing that parties and elites who face strongly organized enemies – often emerging out of revolutions or liberation conflicts – tend to build strong parties and regimes to manage such threats (Smith 2005). Levitsky and Way (2012; 2013) argue that armed conflict, usually taking the form of revolutionary struggles or independence wars, provide ruling parties with a crucial source of cohesion that facilitates stable autocratic rule. Other scholars have also argued that rebel-group governments that emerge out of civil war often benefit from high levels of elite solidarity, organizational structures developed during wartime, and legitimacy from winning the conflict. This provides such postconflict governments with distinct incumbency advantages, allowing them to consolidate autocratic rule (Dresden 2017; Lyons 2016).

In contrast with this dominant view, some scholars suggest that organizations that are built for fighting and coming to power are not

[11] The average size of a military commission is sixteen members.

necessarily well equipped to govern. In his discussion of independence parties in Africa, Welch (1970) asserts that the guerrilla style tactics and organization of parties that were engaged in anti-colonial activities became considerably less effective for creating a self-governing state after independence. In fact, Lyons (2016) notes that "insurgent groups are often violent, fractious, and support all-or-nothing policies, all characteristics that make them unlikely candidates for successful peacetime regimes" (2–3). As Slater points out "revolutionary parties tend to fragment once their shared enemy is vanquished – especially when that enemy is a departed colonial power, as in Burma or Indonesia" (2010, 52).

In fact, detailed case studies of mass-based independence movements in Africa suggest that even during the height of independence struggles, many organizations were plagued with weak organizational structures. Mulford (1967), who details the creation and organization of the United National Independence Party (UNIP) in Zambia, argues that the party had "almost no funds and lacked sufficient numbers of able and dedicated prepared to devote themselves to the laborious task of party organization" (143). Bienen (1970) observes similar organizational weakness in Tanzania, noting that "TANU's rapid growth into a mass movement in the 1960's was characterized by an absence of central direction, due largely to the fact that there existed neither a central staff nor a firm base for central finances" (43).

These organizations were also frequently strung together by temporary goals of gaining independence that were soon replaced by challenges of how to distribute patronage and implement power sharing in the new regime. Bienen notes that a central problem facing Julius Nyerere, the first leader in Tanzania after independence, was that not all party elites from the preindependence era could be afforded top government positions – a source of dissatisfaction that his opponents could exploit. "It was one thing for TANU to organize and become the dominant national movement; it was quite another to establish an effective government over many small-scale and dispersed communities after independence ... overcoming parochialisms for the sake of organizing a national movement is very different from ruling a society" (1970, 43). In sum, these studies cast some doubt on the claim that all revolutionary or pro-independence organizations were strong, well organized, and fully capable of dealing with the challenges of governing postcolonial states.

So are rebel-group regimes likely or unlikely to be institutionalized upon taking power? My theory suggests a more nuanced answer. On one hand, regimes that emerge out of independence wars have already eliminated

armed rivals within the government by the time they take power.[12] Moreover, the elites who take control of the regime after the conflict ends tend to be the military leaders who were responsible for winning the independence wars; in these cases, civilian elites either do not exist or are irrelevant. These leaders tend to be extremely popular and influential, similar to strong nationalist figures that emerge out of peaceful independence movements. Levitsky and Way (2012) note that armed conflict produces revolutionary leaders with "extreme legitimacy and unquestioned authority." It is precisely this "unquestioned authority" that allows leaders that emerge out of independence wars to be strong relative to other elites. Based on this logic, we would therefore expect these leaders to be less likely to institutionalize their regimes.

However, unlike nationalist figures or founding presidents that came into power after *peaceful* independence movements, former rebel-group leaders have a distinct weakness – the existence of other military elites who have the capacity to overthrow them. Unlike coup leaders, who tend to act with the assistance of very few other actors, independence wars require extensive rebel groups that are led by multiple military actors. Leaders of rebel-group regimes need to ensure that they retain the support of military leaders who participated in the independence wars and do so by institutionalizing along dimensions particularly relevant for coercive actors: the defense minister cabinet post (Meng and Paine 2020).

I argue that leaders of regimes that came into power by fighting independence wars should be more likely to institutionalize their regime along two particular dimensions: the appointment of a defense minister and the appointment of a stable defense minister. I test this argument by creating a dummy variable, "rebel group," that takes a value of 1 if the regime came into power by fighting an independence war. For my coding of rebel-group parties and independence wars, I refer to Clodfelter (1992) and the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (Gledditsch et al. 2002). I refer to the UCDP definition of conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths" (Gledditsch et al. 2002). Countries with rebel-group governments include Angola, Cape

[12] Although in some of these countries, there are multiple rebel-groups that fought for independence. Angola, for instance, had UNITA (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola) in addition to the MPLA and Mozambique had REMANO (Mozambican National Resistance) in addition to FRELIMO. These other rebel-groups, however, did not take office or have any say in the government after independence was granted.



Figure 5.4 Rebel-group leaders versus nonrebel-group leaders

Verde, Eritrea, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

The empirical analysis supports my argument. The results are illustrated in Figure 5.4, and the full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 5.9. Recall that the main independent variable for this analysis is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the regime came into power by fighting an independence war. Former rebel-group leaders are significantly more likely to make defense minister appointments and are also more likely to keep these appointments stable. Such leaders are also more likely to establish formal succession rules, which supports studies that claim that revolutionary groups are institutionalized. These results remain robust when we split the sample into different time periods. Appendix Table 5.10 reports results on the sample that is restricted to the 1960–1991 time period, and Appendix Table 5.11 reports results on a sample that is restricted to the post-Cold War period.

5.5 DIFFERENCES-IN-DIFFERENCES DESIGN: THE END OF THE COLD WAR

I also use the end of the Cold War as an exogenous shock to test my argument about institutionalization and leader strength using a differences-in-differences approach. While the regressions reported

in Section 5.4 are correlational, the research design presented in this section can be interpreted more confidently as identifying a causal effect. After the end of the Cold War, international norms shifted abruptly in favor of democratization and political liberalization. Power abruptly and exogenously shifted against autocratic leaders. In order to remain in power, leaders had to institutionalize. However, I demonstrate that leaders with access to natural resources institutionalized less compared with leaders without access to natural resources following the end of the Cold War.

Before presenting results from the differences-in-differences design, I first show evidence that all autocratic regimes became more institutionalized beginning in the 1990s. Following the end of the Cold War, autocratic leaders felt increased pressures to implement institutions that appeared democratic as international norms shifted in favor of democratization and political liberalization (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Levitsky and Way 2010).

For the analyses in this section, I retain the time-series structure of my data. Observations are country–year units, and the main dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if a particular dimension of institutionalization was in place for that year. I create a dummy variable, "cold war", that takes a value of 1 for years prior to 1991, and a 0 otherwise. For each model, I include country fixed effects, so that I am comparing each country to itself pre- and post-Cold War.

Results from the baseline analysis are reported in Appendix Table 5.12. This sample includes all observations from 1960 to 2010. Across the board, leaders were significantly less likely to institutionalize the regime during the Cold War. However, beginning in the 1990s, autocratic leaders were much more likely to implement formal and informal executive constraints. This presents an alternative perspective on democratization in Africa. As the results show, one of the striking changes that occurred at the end of the Cold War is that authoritarian regimes became increasingly institutionalized. These measures allowed autocratic leaders to stabilize their regimes in light of changing geopolitical circumstances. Even with the introduction of multiparty elections, many African regimes remain staunchly nondemocratic today.

I also use the end of the Cold War as an exogenous shock to test my argument about institutionalization and leader strength using a differences-in-differences approach. In the 1990s, international norms abruptly shifted toward favoring democratization and political liberalization. While few countries became true consolidated

democracies during this time, many autocrats suddenly became faced with increasing pressures to appear more democratic.

In the language of the model, leaders faced an exogenous shock to their authority at the end of the Cold War, therefore shifting the distribution of power in favor of elites. Leaders who became weaker institutionalized their regime in order to remain in power.

Autocrats with access to natural resource rents, however, were more insulated from this shock compared with their counterparts who did not have access to such rents. This is because access to oil provides leaders with a constant source of revenue that does not rely on the collection of taxes (Dunning 2008). We can therefore expect leaders with access to natural resources to be stronger compared with leaders without access to resource rents.

The estimating equation used for the empirical models in this section is the following:

$$Y_{it} = \alpha + \beta oil_{\mathrm{i}} + \gamma postCold\ War_{\mathrm{t}} + \delta oil * postColdWar_{it} + \phi_i + \epsilon_{it}$$

where Y_i are my measures of institutionalization, estimated separately. oil_i is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the country has access to oil from 1990 to 2000 – the period immediately after the shift in the distribution of power following the end of the Cold War – and a 0 otherwise. $postColdWar_t$ is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 for years between 1960 and 1990, and a 1 otherwise. ϕ_{i} represents country fixed effects, and ϵ_{it} is the error term. All models include robust standard errors clustered at the country level. δ is the main parameter of interest, as it estimates differences in levels of institutionalization before and after the Cold War for countries with and without oil. We should expect leaders with access to oil rents to institutionalize at lower rates following the end of the Cold War, compared to leaders who did not have access to oil rents after the end of the Cold War.

Figure 5.5 illustrates the results for the successor variable. It shows that leaders who did not have access to oil institutionalized at much higher rates compared with leaders who did have access to oil after the end of the Cold War (along the particular dimension of constitutional succession rules). As the graphs illustrate, there was a general trend toward higher levels of institutionalization for both oil rich and nonoil rich leaders. However, even taking into account generally higher levels of institutionalization after 1990, nonoil rich leaders, who can be interpreted as weaker, institutionalized at much higher rates. The full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 5.13, and the results show that the interaction term between oil and post-Cold War is consistently



Figure 5.5 Were leaders with access to oil revenues less likely to institutionalize after the end of the Cold War?

negative. In light of exogenous shocks to the distribution of power, leaders who are stronger do not need to institutionalize their regimes.

Readers may wonder whether the same difference-in-differences approach may be applied using changes in access to foreign aid, especially from the United States or the Soviet Union. The conventional wisdom is that many African countries received economic and military support from the major powers during the Cold War, and this foreign aid ceased after the end of the Cold War. It turns out that this perceived trend is not empirically supported when we look at the data. Virtually all countries in sub-Saharan Africa received military and economic aid from the United States during and after the Cold War. In fact, the amount of aid the United States provides to most African countries has actually increased since 1990.

To verify this empirically, I rely on data from USAID,[13] which provides annual reports on economic and military assistance the United States has provided to other countries since 1945.[14] I calculated the total amount of military and economic aid each country within my dataset received from the United States from 1960–1990 and from 1990–2010.

[13] USAID, https://explorer.usaid.gov/.

[14] To the best of my knowledge reliable aid data from the Soviet Union is not available.

The first striking finding is that virtually every country within sub-Saharan Africa has received foreign aid from the United States during the Cold War period, and these countries continue to receive foreign aid from the United States. The second striking finding is that aid flows from the United States have actually increased since the end of the Cold War, and this is true for all but two countries in my sample.[15] On average, for countries that received more aid following the end of the Cold War, the rate of foreign aid received increased by 30 percent. To sum, the United States provided foreign aid to all countries in sub-Saharan Africa during the Cold War and continues to provide aid to these countries. Due to the steady flow of aid from the United States, we cannot use a shock in access to foreign aid as a proxy for a shift in the distribution of power because an abrupt shock did not occur.

5.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter provided empirical evidence of the theoretical claims made in Chapter 2 that there is a systematic relationship between initial leader strength and levels of regime institutionalization. Using my dataset of regime institutionalization and several proxies of leader strength based on the way in which leaders came to power, I tested my theoretical argument using a cross-sectional approach and a differences-in-differences approach. I showed that founding presidents, nationalist leaders, and postcoup leaders (all of whom can be interpreted as initially strong) were less likely to institutionalize their regimes. I also showed that following the end of the Cold War, leaders with access to oil rents were less vulnerable in facing pressures to institutionalize.

This chapter treated regime institutionalization as the main dependent variable and addressed the question of under what conditions leaders will institutionalize. By contrast, the next two chapters will treat regime institutionalization as the main independent variable and ask the question of whether institutionalized regimes actually perform better on a number of key outcomes. We now turn to examining the effects of regime institutionalization.

[15] Togo and Mauritius are the only two countries for which the total amount of aid received from 1991 to 2010 was lower compared with total amount of aid received from 1960 to 1990. However, both of these countries continue to receive substantial foreign aid from the United States.

Appendix Description of Aggregate Institutionalization Score

Using my measures of party institutionalization I create an aggregate institutionalization score using Item Response Theory (IRT) (de Ayala 2009; Embretson and Reise 2000; Hambleton, Swaminathan, and Rogers 1991; McDonald 1999). IRT is used to measure unobservable characteristics; in this case, party institutionalization is the latent variable of interest. Latent traits cannot be measured directly, but they can be quantified using several items designed to measure the level of the latent trait; in this case, my six indicators of institutionalization are used to constraint the latent variable. To create my score of party institutionalization, I use the "irt" function in Stata (14.2). The process produces an aggregate score for every party-year. Summary statistics are presented below.

	Observations	Mean	Standard Deviation	Min	Max
Institutionalization score	1,293	.445	.115	.284	.648

Appendix Table 5.1 *Founding leaders*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
First president	−0.054**	−0.152	−0.287**	−0.240**	−0.092	−0.075	−0.106	−0.103
	(0.025)	(0.158)	(0.140)	(0.093)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.136)	(0.110)
Military	−0.108***	−0.434***	−0.351**	−0.224*	0.049	0.001	−0.398**	−0.250**
	(0.024)	(0.151)	(0.156)	(0.116)	(0.193)	(0.159)	(0.160)	(0.119)
Party	0.074***	0.330*	0.063	0.120	−0.024	−0.069	−0.027	0.041
	(0.025)	(0.163)	(0.199)	(0.143)	(0.140)	(0.125)	(0.143)	(0.130)
Years in power	0.001	0.011	0.013*	−0.004	−0.006	0.003	0.007	0.010
	(0.001)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.004)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.006)
GDP per capita	0.041***	0.201***	0.029	0.107	0.105*	0.105*	−0.010	−0.034
	(0.013)	(0.063)	(0.090)	(0.066)	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.088)	(0.048)
Oil production	−0.040***	−0.194***	−0.053	−0.123*	−0.051	−0.042	0.010	0.027
	(0.012)	(0.048)	(0.082)	(0.065)	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.080)	(0.042)

(continued)

Appendix Table 5.1 *(continued)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Population	0.015*	0.101	0.054	−0.016	0.056	0.077*	0.110*	0.071
	(0.009)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.055)	(0.053)	(0.044)	(0.063)	(0.045)
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.026	0.056	0.149	−0.150	0.302	0.107	−0.103	−0.056
	(0.035)	(0.277)	(0.267)	(0.244)	(0.260)	(0.199)	(0.251)	(0.178)
Constant	0.268***	−0.671	−0.216	0.462	−0.049	−0.412	−0.290	−0.228
	(0.070)	(0.596)	(0.563)	(0.440)	(0.533)	(0.460)	(0.625)	(0.426)
Observations	93	62	62	62	62	62	62	62
R-squared	0.433	0.363	0.217	0.194	0.131	0.147	0.204	0.213

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. The sample only includes observations from 1960 to 1991 and coup leaders are excluded for comparability since first presidents were never coup leaders. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 are the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: ***p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

Appendix Table 5.2 *Strong nationalist leaders*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Nationalist leaders	−0.050**	−0.200	−0.229*	−0.094	−0.306*	−0.240*	0.056	−0.022
	(0.020)	(0.124)	(0.125)	(0.071)	(0.154)	(0.132)	(0.140)	(0.104)
Party	0.057**	0.241	−0.083	0.142	−0.037	0.019	0.064	0.132
	(0.025)	(0.159)	(0.198)	(0.120)	(0.149)	(0.114)	(0.199)	(0.163)
Years in power	0.001	0.010	0.013*	−0.002	−0.005	0.001	0.001	0.004
	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)
GDP per capita	0.051***	0.194***	0.017	0.146*	0.113*	0.127**	0.032	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.061)	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.060)	(0.052)	(0.082)	(0.037)
Oil production	−0.045***	−0.169***	−0.013	−0.145*	−0.068	−0.074	0.001	0.027
	(0.016)	(0.049)	(0.056)	(0.082)	(0.049)	(0.044)	(0.076)	(0.032)
Population	0.042***	0.221***	0.177**	0.027	0.087	0.090	0.175**	0.133**
	(0.013)	(0.070)	(0.071)	(0.049)	(0.069)	(0.056)	(0.083)	(0.057)

(continued)

Appendix Table 5.2 *(continued)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.043	0.015	0.142	−0.364	0.235	0.067	−0.163	−0.015
	(0.077)	(0.447)	(0.406)	(0.370)	(0.404)	(0.298)	(0.470)	(0.320)
Constant	0.028	−1.618***	−1.323**	0.018	−0.227	−0.474	−0.925	−0.828*
	(0.101)	(0.563)	(0.607)	(0.424)	(0.600)	(0.501)	(0.667)	(0.453)
Observations	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
R-squared	0.465	0.384	0.262	0.270	0.245	0.265	0.214	0.301

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Sample includes only observations from 1960 to 1991 and only includes leaders from the first regime. I define first regime as the first continuous regime after independence. As soon as a regime experiences a violent deposition, it drops out of the sample. Leaders are defined as a "strong independence movement leader" if they started a mass movement or party during the independence era to lobby against the colonial powers. Leaders who were jailed for pro-independence activities or who were important actors in armed combat are also coded as strong independence movement leaders. This sample does not include leaders who are coup leaders (by definition this is not possible) or those with a military background. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 are the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.3 *Strong nationalist leaders, controlling for participation in war*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Nationalist leaders	−0.058**	−0.275**	−0.218*	−0.064	−0.263	−0.218	−0.011	−0.092
	(0.022)	(0.128)	(0.125)	(0.067)	(0.155)	(0.132)	(0.126)	(0.093)
Participation in war	0.064*	0.499*	0.060	−0.072	−0.164	−0.020	0.071	0.140
	(0.035)	(0.290)	(0.492)	(0.160)	(0.257)	(0.222)	(0.249)	(0.264)
Party	0.018	0.034	0.012	0.144	−0.082	−0.082	−0.131	−0.082
	(0.039)	(0.189)	(0.289)	(0.219)	(0.174)	(0.138)	(0.166)	(0.143)
Years in power	0.002	0.016*	0.010	−0.004	−0.007	0.001	0.009	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)
GDP per capita	0.049***	0.215***	0.023	0.118*	0.067	0.087**	0.060	0.019
	(0.015)	(0.065)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.076)	(0.032)
Oil production	−0.044***	−0.203***	−0.017	−0.108	−0.008	−0.023	−0.042	−0.013
	(0.015)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.068)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.071)	(0.030)
Population	0.041**	0.237***	0.188**	0.007	0.050	0.057	0.184**	0.141***
	(0.016)	(0.076)	(0.074)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.042)	(0.072)	(0.043)

(continued)

Appendix Table 5.3 *(continued)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.023	0.128	0.070	−0.389	0.235	0.095	0.006	0.155
	(0.078)	(0.450)	(0.441)	(0.307)	(0.406)	(0.274)	(0.502)	(0.265)
Constant	0.018	−1.936**	−1.541*	0.176	0.150	−0.193	−0.805	−0.750*
	(0.131)	(0.718)	(0.861)	(0.488)	(0.521)	(0.388)	(0.593)	(0.370)
Observations	41	41	41	41	41	41	41	41
R-squared	0.513	0.473	0.283	0.404	0.429	0.458	0.393	0.554

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Sample includes only observations from 1960–1991 and only includes leaders from the first regime. I define first regime as the first continuous regime after independence. As soon as a regime experiences a violent deposition, it drops out of the sample. Leaders are defined as a "strong independence movement leader" if they started a mass movement or party during the independence era to lobby against the colonial powers. Leaders who were jailed for pro-independence activities or who were important actors in armed combat are also coded as strong independence movement leaders. "Participation in war" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader participated in an independence war, and 0 otherwise. This sample does not include leaders who are coup leaders (by definition this is not possible) or those with a military background. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 are the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.4 *Coup leaders*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Coup leader	−0.08***	−0.31***	−0.23***	−0.15**	−0.20**	−0.18***	−0.19***	−0.16***
	(0.020)	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.070)	(0.080)	(0.064)	(0.061)	(0.045)
Military (non-coup)	−0.026	−0.198**	−0.106	0.020	0.045	0.079	−0.133	−0.046
	(0.025)	(0.091)	(0.088)	(0.111)	(0.091)	(0.072)	(0.093)	(0.068)
Party	−0.005	0.103	0.010	−0.045	−0.144	−0.157	−0.157	−0.152*
	(0.034)	(0.131)	(0.162)	(0.135)	(0.115)	(0.097)	(0.146)	(0.086)
Years in power	0.001	0.010**	0.007*	−0.004	−0.005	0.004	−0.003	0.006**
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
GDP per capita	0.023***	0.081***	0.071***	0.070***	0.039***	0.041***	−0.004	−0.009
	(0.006)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.020)	(0.009)	(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Oil production	−0.019*	−0.097**	−0.085**	−0.045	−0.004	−0.004	0.028	0.019
	(0.010)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.026)	(0.019)
Population	0.013	0.017	0.022	0.046	0.022	0.029	0.106**	0.074**
	(0.011)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.026)	(0.048)	(0.033)

(continued)

Appendix Table 5.4 *(continued)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Ethnic fractionalization	0.003	0.025	0.027	−0.018	−0.012	0.038	−0.091	0.001
	(0.059)	(0.254)	(0.269)	(0.174)	(0.123)	(0.092)	(0.195)	(0.129)
Constant	0.313***	0.236	0.139	−0.034	0.592**	0.104	−0.104	−0.261
	(0.087)	(0.349)	(0.366)	(0.283)	(0.273)	(0.233)	(0.418)	(0.284)
Observations	158	158	158	158	158	158	158	158
R-squared	0.210	0.224	0.136	0.117	0.136	0.195	0.144	0.166

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. This sample includes the entire time period. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 are the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.5 *Coup leaders (Cold War sample)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Coup leader	−0.06***	−0.29***	−0.17**	−0.03	−0.25***	−0.20***	−0.18**	−0.18***
	(0.014)	(0.073)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.085)	(0.064)	(0.079)	(0.052)
Military (non-coup)	−0.062***	−0.347***	−0.196*	−0.058	0.059	0.058	−0.313*	−0.183*
	(0.020)	(0.099)	(0.108)	(0.100)	(0.158)	(0.138)	(0.157)	(0.095)
Party	0.081***	0.429***	0.206	0.155	0.049	−0.002	−0.054	0.011
	(0.025)	(0.116)	(0.160)	(0.118)	(0.121)	(0.109)	(0.104)	(0.095)
Years in power	−0.000	0.004	0.004	−0.006	−0.012**	−0.002	−0.005	0.003
	(0.001)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
GDP per capita	0.054***	0.211***	0.102	0.169**	0.087*	0.074	0.012	−0.024
	(0.015)	(0.055)	(0.086)	(0.066)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.080)	(0.042)
Oil production	−0.048***	−0.194***	−0.100	−0.164**	−0.033	−0.009	0.007	0.032
	(0.013)	(0.043)	(0.080)	(0.063)	(0.048)	(0.050)	(0.071)	(0.036)
Population	0.013	0.056	0.038	0.013	0.012	0.032	0.112**	0.081**
	(0.009)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.032)

(continued)

Appendix Table 5.5 *(continued)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Ethnic fractionalization	−0.006	−0.006	0.058	−0.040	0.109	0.006	−0.037	−0.020
	(0.038)	(0.227)	(0.244)	(0.171)	(0.240)	(0.160)	(0.271)	(0.148)
Constant	0.231***	−0.323	−0.224	−0.068	0.478	0.062	−0.298	−0.328
	(0.069)	(0.353)	(0.311)	(0.279)	(0.404)	(0.299)	(0.439)	(0.278)
Observations	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107
R-squared	0.375	0.385	0.158	0.145	0.162	0.176	0.153	0.192

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. This sample includes observations from 1960 to 1991. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 are the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.6 *Coup leaders (post-1991 sample)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Coup leader	−0.068**	−0.249**	−0.211*	−0.196	−0.009	−0.067	−0.152	−0.123
	(0.028)	(0.111)	(0.112)	(0.131)	(0.081)	(0.095)	(0.104)	(0.085)
Military (non-coup)	−0.040	−0.225*	−0.191	−0.066	0.017	0.033	0.048	−0.035
	(0.036)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.173)	(0.056)	(0.076)	(0.097)	(0.100)
Party	−0.059	−0.005	0.025	−0.275	−0.276	−0.248**	−0.208	−0.334***
	(0.048)	(0.183)	(0.182)	(0.204)	(0.196)	(0.113)	(0.229)	(0.120)
Years in power	0.004*	0.018**	0.017**	−0.000	−0.000	0.013**	0.000	0.015**
	(0.002)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.006)
GDP per capita	0.011**	0.038**	0.027	0.035*	0.015	0.029***	−0.029	−0.018
	(0.004)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.022)	(0.011)
Oil production	−0.019***	−0.105***	−0.092***	−0.028	−0.025	−0.027**	0.038**	0.030**
	(0.005)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.019)	(0.012)
Population	−0.006	−0.071	−0.067	0.023	−0.037	−0.002	0.018	0.031
	(0.014)	(0.058)	(0.060)	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.033)

(continued)

Appendix Table 5.6 *(continued)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Ethnic fractionalization	0.040	0.086	0.074	0.126	0.071	0.137	0.004	0.152
	(0.080)	(0.274)	(0.274)	(0.335)	(0.124)	(0.101)	(0.162)	(0.150)
Constant	0.529***	1.233**	1.184**	0.366	1.203***	0.369	0.706	0.054
	(0.118)	(0.472)	(0.494)	(0.471)	(0.327)	(0.283)	(0.424)	(0.284)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
R-squared	0.234	0.272	0.199	0.120	0.136	0.231	0.100	0.236

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. This sample includes observations from 1992 to 2010. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 is the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.7 *Variation within coup leaders*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
High rank	−0.034	−0.167	−0.168	−0.085	−0.012	−0.036	0.166*	0.085*
	(0.022)	(0.106)	(0.109)	(0.077)	(0.097)	(0.065)	(0.084)	(0.049)
Yrs in power	0.003**	0.013**	0.013**	0.001	−0.001	0.009**	−0.011**	0.004
	(0.001)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)
Constant	0.360***	0.190***	0.182**	0.237***	0.586***	0.169***	0.585***	0.148**
	(0.017)	(0.063)	(0.065)	(0.063)	(0.091)	(0.044)	(0.077)	(0.054)
Observations	69	69	69	69	69	69	69	69
R-squared	0.063	0.101	0.095	0.011	0.000	0.071	0.056	0.049

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. This sample includes only coup leaders. The dependent variable is the percentage of years during which the leader had a constitution in place. For the independent variable, "high rank" refers to coup leaders with a "general" ranking. OLS used. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.8 *High-ranking coup leaders only*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
High-rank coup leader	−0.087***	−0.355***	−0.288***	−0.150*	−0.165	−0.183**	−0.088	−0.127**
	(0.024)	(0.104)	(0.098)	(0.075)	(0.104)	(0.084)	(0.077)	(0.057)
Military (non-coup)	−0.004	−0.119	−0.053	0.061	0.104	0.126*	−0.067	0.001
	(0.024)	(0.086)	(0.084)	(0.105)	(0.092)	(0.071)	(0.089)	(0.064)
Party	−0.003	0.108	0.011	−0.041	−0.135	−0.153	−0.144	−0.145
	(0.036)	(0.137)	(0.164)	(0.137)	(0.115)	(0.094)	(0.150)	(0.090)
Years in power	0.002	0.011***	0.009*	−0.004	−0.004	0.005	−0.003	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.002)
GDP per capita	0.025***	0.090***	0.077***	0.075***	0.046***	0.047***	0.004	−0.003
	(0.005)	(0.019)	(0.022)	(0.019)	(0.010)	(0.013)	(0.018)	(0.014)
Oil production	−0.020*	−0.100**	−0.087**	−0.046	−0.006	−0.006	0.026	0.018
	(0.010)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.028)	(0.020)
Population	0.015	0.024	0.028	0.049	0.025	0.033	0.106**	0.076**
	(0.011)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.033)	(0.027)	(0.049)	(0.035)

(continued)

Ethnic fractionalization	0.023	0.103	0.084	0.018	0.035	0.081	−0.049	0.038
	(0.054)	(0.221)	(0.245)	(0.166)	(0.141)	(0.114)	(0.207)	(0.133)
Constant	0.259***	0.026	−0.019	−0.130	0.470*	−0.011	−0.203	−0.356
	(0.090)	(0.365)	(0.365)	(0.282)	(0.277)	(0.244)	(0.429)	(0.296)
Observations	158	158	158	158	158	158	158	158
R-squared	0.169	0.192	0.126	0.105	0.102	0.167	0.106	0.132

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. This sample includes the entire time period. "High-rank coup leader" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 only if the coup leader held the rank of general at the time of the coup; all other observations (including low-ranking coup leaders) are coded as a 0 for this variable. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 is the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.9 *Rebel groups*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Rebel group	0.066*	0.222*	0.153	0.125	−0.051	−0.005	0.343***	0.352***
	(0.034)	(0.114)	(0.098)	(0.132)	(0.089)	(0.094)	(0.066)	(0.067)
Military	−0.050***	−0.221***	−0.146**	−0.082	−0.102	−0.072	−0.130*	−0.070
	(0.016)	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.062)	(0.072)	(0.063)	(0.066)	(0.049)
Party	−0.013	0.075	−0.008	−0.060	−0.117	−0.140	−0.217	−0.212***
	(0.038)	(0.136)	(0.172)	(0.153)	(0.132)	(0.106)	(0.135)	(0.077)
Years in power	0.001	0.010**	0.007	−0.005	−0.006	0.003	−0.003	0.005*
	(0.001)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	0.020***	0.074***	0.067***	0.066**	0.048***	0.047***	−0.022	−0.027
	(0.007)	(0.021)	(0.020)	(0.026)	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.017)	(0.023)
Oil production	−0.015	−0.085**	−0.075**	−0.033	0.002	0.005	0.044	0.038
	(0.011)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.024)
Population	0.015	0.023	0.027	0.053	0.037	0.042	0.103**	0.070**
	(0.011)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.032)

(continued)

Ethnic fractionalization	−0.010	−0.007	−0.001	−0.059	−0.060	−0.009	−0.111	−0.020
	(0.057)	(0.248)	(0.261)	(0.171)	(0.130)	(0.101)	(0.192)	(0.124)
Constant	0.294***	0.162	0.081	−0.072	0.479	0.014	−0.091	−0.235
	(0.090)	(0.363)	(0.363)	(0.282)	(0.290)	(0.253)	(0.397)	(0.282)
Observations	158	158	158	158	158	158	158	158
R-squared	0.189	0.209	0.123	0.105	0.087	0.120	0.183	0.226

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. This sample includes the entire time period. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 is the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.10 *Rebel groups (Cold War sample)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Rebel group	0.036	0.305**	−0.021	−0.133	−0.202	−0.109	0.333**	0.349**
	(0.032)	(0.134)	(0.234)	(0.141)	(0.138)	(0.102)	(0.158)	(0.145)
Military	−0.067***	−0.290***	−0.203***	−0.109	−0.204**	−0.145*	−0.218**	−0.160***
	(0.016)	(0.069)	(0.070)	(0.067)	(0.090)	(0.077)	(0.090)	(0.051)
Party	0.071**	0.336**	0.216	0.194	0.151	0.064	−0.167	−0.096
	(0.032)	(0.131)	(0.180)	(0.148)	(0.150)	(0.125)	(0.114)	(0.091)
Years in power	0.001	0.010	0.006	−0.006	−0.014**	−0.003	0.001	0.008**
	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.003)
GDP per capita	0.054***	0.210***	0.107	0.167**	0.095*	0.081	0.005	−0.032
	(0.014)	(0.046)	(0.087)	(0.068)	(0.053)	(0.052)	(0.070)	(0.035)
Oil production	−0.047***	−0.192***	−0.102	−0.162**	−0.028	−0.005	0.011	0.039
	(0.012)	(0.035)	(0.080)	(0.065)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.064)	(0.031)
Population	0.018*	0.075*	0.050	0.020	0.020	0.037	0.130***	0.094***
	(0.009)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.028)

(continued)

Ethnic fractionalization	−0.017	−0.031	0.031	−0.070	0.021	−0.060	−0.047	−0.039
	(0.037)	(0.223)	(0.234)	(0.159)	(0.232)	(0.164)	(0.269)	(0.142)
Constant	0.188**	−0.568	−0.337	−0.073	0.458	0.040	−0.501	−0.489*
	(0.072)	(0.352)	(0.309)	(0.265)	(0.417)	(0.311)	(0.393)	(0.249)
Observations	107	107	107	107	107	107	107	107
R-squared	0.408	0.411	0.168	0.175	0.128	0.119	0.198	0.267

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. This sample includes observations from 1960 to 1991. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 is the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.11 *Rebel groups (post-1991 sample)*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Rebel group	0.038	0.108	0.187*	0.082	−0.027	−0.004	0.338***	0.284***
	(0.026)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.149)	(0.092)	(0.112)	(0.096)	(0.072)
Military	−0.049*	−0.219**	−0.168*	−0.122	−0.002	−0.022	−0.000	−0.032
	(0.025)	(0.095)	(0.099)	(0.123)	(0.051)	(0.058)	(0.105)	(0.080)
Party	−0.067	−0.023	−0.005	−0.295	−0.273	−0.253**	−0.272	−0.384***
	(0.047)	(0.185)	(0.182)	(0.204)	(0.195)	(0.111)	(0.201)	(0.104)
Years in power	0.003	0.016*	0.014	−0.003	−0.000	0.012**	−0.008	0.009
	(0.002)	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.006)
GDP per capita	0.009*	0.033**	0.017	0.033	0.016	0.030***	−0.044***	−0.031*
	(0.005)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.024)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.018)
Oil production	−0.016***	−0.099***	−0.083***	−0.021	−0.025*	−0.024**	0.059***	0.045***
	(0.005)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.014)	(0.010)	(0.016)	(0.014)
Population	−0.006	−0.074	−0.074	0.026	−0.035	0.003	0.014	0.023
	(0.014)	(0.058)	(0.057)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.045)	(0.034)

(continued)

Ethnic fractionalization	0.041	0.090	0.083	0.121	0.067	0.129	0.009	0.162
	(0.078)	(0.271)	(0.272)	(0.328)	(0.125)	(0.099)	(0.162)	(0.147)
Constant	0.532***	1.262**	1.241**	0.347	1.184***	0.332	0.751*	0.120
	(0.114)	(0.478)	(0.480)	(0.447)	(0.325)	(0.306)	(0.388)	(0.291)
Observations	80	80	80	80	80	80	80	80
R-squared	0.238	0.278	0.216	0.114	0.136	0.218	0.147	0.294

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. This sample includes observations from 1992 to 2010. All models use OLS. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. The dependent variable for models 2–8 is the disaggregated dimensions of institutionalization. All the dependent variables are the percentage of years in which the leader institutionalized. Significance levels: *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.12 *Were autocratic regimes less institutionalized during the Cold War?*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Cold War	−0.112***	−1.888***	−2.721***	−3.684***	−2.856***	−1.067***	−1.873***	−0.844***
	(0.014)	(0.536)	(0.539)	(0.571)	(0.508)	(0.245)	(0.411)	(0.233)
Constant	0.646***	2.581***	3.415***	4.378***	4.107***	3.631***	4.512***	1.537***
	(0.014)	(0.536)	(0.539)	(0.571)	(0.479)	(0.245)	(0.411)	(0.233)
Observations	1,751	1,198	1,280	1,517	1,468	1,664	1,477	1,660
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R2	0.538	0.247	0.327	0.441	0.360	0.206	0.277	0.181

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. For models 2–8, pseudo R-square statistics are reported. I retained the panel structure of the data for these regressions. Model 1 uses OLS and models 2–8 are logit models. The dependent variable for models 2–8 is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if that dimension of institutionalization was in place for that year. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 5.13 *Differences-in-differences test*

VARIABLES	(1) Aggregate score	(2) Successor	(3) Successor (strict)	(4) Term limit	(5) Second appoint	(6) Second same	(7) Defense appoint	(8) Defense same
Post-Cold War	0.121***	2.640***	4.757***	3.913***	3.457***	1.302***	2.301***	0.855***
	(0.020)	(0.893)	(0.994)	(0.810)	(0.634)	(0.296)	(0.594)	(0.277)
Oil	−0.013	−0.439	−0.286	0.367	1.205***	1.189***	0.077	0.601**
	(0.013)	(0.305)	(0.240)	(0.990)	(0.129)	(0.273)	(0.228)	(0.266)
Oil*post-Cold War	−0.027	−1.848*	−3.57***	−0.512	−1.578	−0.643	−1.038	−0.029
Constant	0.390***	−0.126	−0.44***	−3.596***	0.134*	−1.753***	0.148	−1.619***
	(0.011)	(0.230)	(0.064)	(0.747)	(0.074)	(0.212)	(0.160)	(0.184)
Country FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,751	1,708	1,751	1,745

Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Model 1 uses OLS and models 2–8 are logit models. The dependent variable for models 2–8 is a dummy that takes a value of 1 if that dimension of institutionalization was in place for that year. The dependent variable for model 1 is a continuous score that was created by the IRT model. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

7

What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Leadership Succession?

In this chapter, we now turn to examine the effects of institutionalization on key regime outcomes. In particular, we focus on whether highly institutionalized regimes are more likely to undergo peaceful leadership transitions. One of the fundamental challenges of continued authoritarian rule is the transfer of power from one leader to another. Yet dictatorships inherently lack mechanisms of electoral competition and leadership succession. Incumbents often remain in office for long periods of time, making it difficult to establish norms of leader turnover. Elections – even when they exist – are largely meant to sustain, rather than disrupt, the incumbent's regime. As a result, the process of peacefully transferring power from one leader to another is often quite precarious in dictatorships.

How can autocratic regimes overcome this fundamental challenge of leadership succession? In this chapter I argue that constitutional succession rules and the appointment of a de facto successor play a critical role in regulating the transfer of power. The institutionalization of a clear line of succession provides certainty in the chain of command. Designated successors have an incentive to uphold the existing regime, since preserving the status quo is the best guarantee that they will become the next incumbent. Leaders who plan for succession are therefore less likely to be deposed in a coup. Moreover, regimes with succession procedures are significantly more likely to undergo a peaceful transition of power because succession planning transforms conflict over succession from a single-shot game after the leader's death into a dynamic process in which elites compete for power peacefully within the political arena.

However, I argue that only certain types of rules are effective in promoting peaceful leadership succession. Constitutional amendments that identify a clear line of succession are the most effective in regulating the transfer of power. Such policies establish certainty and predictability about the actors who are expected to come into office, providing these elites with a stake in maintaining the existing regime in order to reap

rewards from the succession order. Term limits, on the other hand, are much less effective in facilitating peaceful leadership transitions because they do not empower specific elites in the way that succession policies do by designating an heir apparent. Because term limits do not identify an alternative leader that elites can coordinate around, term limits do not resolve the collective action problem elites face in holding the incumbent accountable.

Importantly, the argument made in this chapter departs from the argument made in Chapter 6 in the following way. In this chapter, I argue that when estimating the effect of institutionalization on leadership succession outcomes, we do not need to condition on the initial strength of the leader. This is because peaceful succession outcomes are an unintended consequence of regime institutionalization. As Chapter 6 demonstrated, self-interested leaders institutionalize their regimes in order to insulate themselves against coup attempts. At the same time, these measures – namely the creation of constitutional succession rules and the appointment of a de facto successor – create certainty surrounding the line of succession, therefore paving the way for a peaceful leadership transition. While leaders do not necessarily care about the outcome of the regime after their death, the measures they take to stabilize their rule while in power nonetheless create conditions for the peaceful transfer of power.

This chapter makes two important contributions to theories of leadership succession in dictatorships. First, it is one of the few studies to test mechanisms of peaceful leadership change in autocracies. Though the politics of succession is considered to be one of the central challenges of autocratic rule, the mechanisms that facilitate peaceful leadership transitions are not well understood for modern dictatorships. A limited number of studies on this topic have focused on the role of hereditary succession and ruling parties.

Early studies of leadership succession by Tullock (1987) focused on importance of hereditary succession and primogeniture, and his theories have since been extended and tested on pretwentieth century European monarchies (Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Kokkonen and Sundell 2014). However, the vast majority of authoritarian regimes today are not monarchies. In fact, only 7 percent of all autocratic regimes from 1946 to 2010 are coded as monarchies, and out of those monarchies only two remain in power today (Geddes, Wright, and Franz 2014).[1] Furthermore, I show in this chapter that hereditary succession is incredibly rare in modern dictatorships. Within my

[1] Out of 280 autocratic regimes from 1946 to 2010, nineteen are coded as monarchies.

dataset only 5 percent of leadership transitions (whether peaceful or not) were between family members.

A second group of studies suggests that ruling parties play an important role in facilitating leadership succession. Scholars posit that an essential role of ruling parties is that they help to mitigate and manage elite conflict, providing an arena for politicians to compete for power and resources (Brownlee 2007; Geddes 1999b; Magaloni 2008). Parties can also provide a mechanism for elite power sharing (Boix and Svolik 2013; Svolik 2012). Through these mechanisms, ruling parties can help facilitate peaceful leadership transitions. However, in this chapter, I provide empirical evidence that the presence of a ruling party is never a strong predictor of peaceful leadership succession.

A second important contribution of this chapter is that it emphasizes the fact that peaceful transitions of power have indeed occurred within sub-Saharan African, even during the most authoritarian decades. Past scholarship on leadership succession in sub-Saharan Africa has generally held a pessimistic view about the prospect of peaceful or constitutional transitions. Sylla and Goldhammer (1982), for instance, refer to the challenge of succession as the "Gordian Knot of African Politics." Jackson and Rosberg (1982) predicted that "power politics rather than institutionalized conventions and procedures may have to resolve the succession issue" (69). By contrast, this chapter demonstrates that not all leadership transitions that take place within autocracies in sub-Saharan Africa are unregulated or driven solely by violence. Instead, I show that institutional mechanisms can play an important role in promoting peaceful successions. Regimes that are institutionalized are significantly more likely to experience continuity across leadership transitions.

7.1 DO DICTATORS CARE ABOUT LEADERSHIP SUCCESSION?

As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, dictators institutionalize their regimes not necessarily because they care about succession politics but in order to stabilize their own rule. After all, readers may have been wondering why a dictator would care about leadership succession if the transfer of power occurs after the leader has already died or left power. However, it turns out that the problem of how to extend executive authority to another elite is a concern not only to others in the regime, but also to the dictator herself. As Herz (1957) so aptly summarizes: "It also colors, in anticipation, so to speak, the entire situation during the dictator's life and rule. To the dictator it poses a problem and constitutes

a danger. To his aids it is a temptation. To the bystander, within and without, it is fascination" (20).

Scholars originally believed that dictators were quite wary of naming formal successors due to the "crown prince problem." Herz famously argued that by grooming a successor, incumbents create their own worst enemy. The mere designation of an alternative center of power makes leaders vulnerable to being deposed prematurely by their own chosen successor. According to Herz, by naming a successor, the ruler voluntarily shifts the center of power away from herself, putting herself at risk of being deposed by her own appointee.

Yet not planning for succession is also equally dangerous for the regime as well as the dictator herself. When autocratic leaders die without designating a successor a coordination problem emerges among regime elites because it is not clear who the de facto successor should be (Kokkonen and Sundell 2014). Such power vacuums in the aftermath of the death of the leader often invite coups (Frantz and Stein 2017) or even civil wars (Kokkonen and Sundell 2020) as elites vie for the incumbency.

In addition, leaders may actually endanger themselves by not planning for succession. In the absence of an institutionalized succession order, elites may be incentivized to preemptively try to take power through coercion in anticipation of eventual conflict over succession. Indeed, many dictators seem to fall prey to this dilemma, as the majority of autocratic leaders from 1946 to 2008 have been deposed via nonconstitutional means (Svolik 2012). In fact, leaders themselves often support the institutionalization of succession policies because it buffers them from coup attempts (Frantz and Stein 2017). In sum, succession planning promotes stability during the incumbent's tenure as well as for the regime as a whole during the critical moments of leadership transition.

This argument builds on recent literature highlighting the importance of constitutions in supporting autocratic rule (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Ginsburg and Simpser 2014). Constitutional rules matter greatly because they are publicly observable, therefore elites can condition their behavior and credibly threaten to punish autocratic leaders who violate existing rules. Autocratic constitutions are most helpful when they can serve as "focal points" for elites by reducing ambiguity around a clear set of rules and enforcement behavior (Albertus and Menaldo 2012; Hadfield and Weingast 2013).[2] In fact, Ginsburg and Simpser (2014) argue that

[2] This argument is also related to Fearon's (2011) concept of "self-enforcing democracy" whereby elections provide citizens with a commonly understood set of rules and procedures that allow them to credibly protest if the leader violates election principles.

constitutional documents may even be especially helpful in autocracies because the creation of clear and observable rules eases coordination problems and creates a self-enforcing system – one that can operate in the absence of a strong judicial system because deviations may be punished using force. In this way, formal institutions can also serve to "tie the leader's hands" and help make autocratic commitments credible, precisely because creating constitutional rules makes leaders vulnerable to being deposed if they violate the terms (North and Weingast 1989; Myerson 2008).

In this sense, the "crown prince problem" that Herz highlights actually helps keep leaders in power. Because the process of designating a successor and formalizing the line of succession shifts the distribution of power in favor of elites, they are able to credibly sanction the leader in the event that the leader reneges on distributive promises. As the model in Chapter 2 emphasized, autocratic leaders can enhance the stability of their own tenure by empowering other elites. This dynamic seems to play out empirically as well. As the results from Chapter 6 demonstrate, leaders who create constitutional succession rules and appoint a vice president or prime minister do indeed face fewer coup attempts.

7.2 HOW DOES SUCCESSION PLANNING PROMOTE REGIME STABILITY?

Beyond preventing elites from preemptively launching coups in hopes of capturing power, how does institutionalized succession planning promote regime stability? I argue that regimes with constitutional amendments specifying the process of leadership turnover are more likely to undergo peaceful transitions compared with those without such formal rules.

In particular, three main mechanisms drive the relationship between formal succession planning and peaceful transfers of power. First, constitutional succession rules provide certainty and clarity surrounding the chain of command. As a result, designated successors have an incentive to protect the incumbent and existing regime, since preserving the status quo is the best guarantee that they will become the next incumbent. Once named, successors can also start to build their own alliances in anticipation of the leadership transition. Therefore, a clear line of succession protects the regime from other potential elite challengers.

The transition in Kenya from President Jomo Kenyatta to Vice President Daniel arap Moi illustrates this mechanism well. Kenya's first presidential transition occurred peacefully in 1978 upon the death of Jomo Kenyatta, the country's first president after independence, although the struggle over the succession process occurred in

the final years of Kenyatta's presidency. Kenyatta, a highly influential figure in the country's struggle for self-determination, took office upon independence in 1964. In 1967, he named Daniel arap Moi as his vice president, a position that Moi served for eleven years through the transition. Notably, Moi was not a member of Kenyatta's Kikuyu ethnic group – a power-sharing mechanism by design. Cabinet positions were often utilized as implicit contracts to maintain support across various ethnic groups and factions, and Kenyatta always appointed non-Kikuyus as vice president (Arriola 2009; Karimi and Ochieng 1980; Widner 1992).

The Kenyan constitution, which has been in effect since independence in 1963, includes specific instructions for succession. Chapter II, Part I, Section 6 reads:

(1) If the office of President becomes vacant by reason of the death or resignation of the President . . . an election of a President shall be held within the period of ninety days immediately following the occurrence of the vacancy.
(2) While the office of the President is vacant, the functions of that office shall be exercised –
    a. By the Vice President

(Peaslee and Peaslee Xydis 1974, 341)

Members of the Kikuyu faction within the government did not want Moi to ascend to the presidency because they feared that they would lose valuable resources and influential positions that they enjoyed under the Kenyatta presidency. Furthermore, they feared that the constitutional succession rules solidified Moi's role as successor to the presidency. In the case of Kenyatta's death, Moi would quickly use his role as interim president to consolidate power within ninety days to confirm his new role (Karimi and Ochieng 1980, 15).

In September of 1976, the Kikuyu faction, now calling themselves the "Change the Constitution" group, proposed that the constitutional succession rule be changed so that the speaker of the National Assembly (a position within the faction's control) would be the interim president, rather than the vice president. They called a meeting to discuss these constitutional changes, and twenty MPs attended. Moi and his supporters immediately responded by obtaining signatures from ninety-eight MPs (including ten cabinet ministers) who opposed the proposed amendment change. Importantly, this document showed that the Change the Constitution group did not have a parliamentary majority needed to

pass a constitutional change. (Karimi and Ochieng 1980, 19–25; Tamarkin 1979, 24; Widner 1992, 115–116).

The attorney general, who was a Moi supporter, further issued a warning: "It is a criminal offence for any person to encompass, imagine, devise, or intend the death or deposition of the President." As a final nail in the coffin, Kenyatta himself made a statement supporting the attorney general's earlier warning, despite the fact that many members of the Change the Constitution group were from Kenyatta's own family (Tamarkin 1979, 24; Widner 1992, 166–117).[3]

Of course, the constitutional amendment was likely not the only factor that led to the ascension of Moi to the presidency. Kenyatta's influence played a role in supporting Moi's claims to the office, and the Change the Constitution group lacked the support of a majority in the parliament. However, the presence of formal succession rules acted as a critical barrier against attempts by other elites to dethrone the appointed successor. As Tamarkin (1979) effectively summarizes: "The anti-Moi group suffered a severe setback in its first attempt to assert itself. If they thought of pursuing their struggle they would have to do it against the backdrop of a grim political reality and with a debilitating constitutional constraint" (24).

A second benefit of formal succession rules is that such procedures transform conflict over succession from a single-shot game after the leader's death into a dynamic process in which elites can compete for power peacefully within the political arena. In fact, upon Kenyatta's death, as it became clear that Moi would indeed serve as the next president, former members of the Change the Constitution group all publicly proclaimed their loyalty to Moi. Mbiyu Koinange, a long-time cabinet minister who had served Kenyatta since 1964, had been a participant of the Change the Constitution group. Upon Moi's quick ascension to the presidency after Kenyatta's death, Koinange made a public loyalty pledge to Moi, stating "there is no truth whatsoever in the rumours spreading abroad that I or any other respectable politician I know of in this stable land of ours will be opposing the President" (as quoted in Karimi and Ochieng 1980, 3). Koinange actually remained a cabinet minister the first year of the Moi presidency (although he was given a less prestigious portfolio) before being removed from the cabinet the following year.

A third benefit of constitutional succession rules is that they prevent incumbents from reneging on promises made to their designated

[3] Two of the leaders of the Change the Constitution movement were Dr. Njoroge Mungai, Kenyatta's nephew and personal doctor, and Mbiyu Koinange, his brother-in-law.

successors. The 2012 transition from President Bingu wa Mutharika to his vice president Joyce Banda in Malawi illustrates this mechanism. Like Kenya, the Mawali constitution includes an amendment that states: "Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of President, the First Vice-President shall assume that office for the reminder of the term" (Section 83(3)). Though Mutharika initially promised to support Banda as his successor, he reneged on this pledge and instead began to endorse his younger brother, Peter Mutharika, as the next incumbent.[4] Upon Mutharika's death in 2012, factions supporting Peter Mutharika tried to contest Banda's ascension to the presidency. These attempts ultimately failed, as the courts and military supported the existing constitutional succession plans (Cammack 2012; Dionne and Dulani 2013).

In sum, the creation of formal constitutional succession rules promotes peaceful leadership transitions by protecting the existing regime against outside challenges, in addition to keeping the incumbent accountable to her successor. Although scholars of African politics have noted that such constitutional procedures now play an important role in regulating the transfer of power in democratizing countries in the post-Cold War era (Dionne and Dulani 2013; Posner and Young 2007), I show that these mechanisms played an important role in the transfer of power during the autocratic era as well.

> ***Hypothesis 1:*** Regimes that have a constitutional succession rule are more likely to have peaceful transfers of power.

7.3 DESIGNATING INFORMAL SUCCESSORS

Beyond formal constitutional rules, I also argue that the stable appointment of a vice president or prime minister can also promote peaceful transitions by signaling who the designated successor should be. Within the context of sub-Saharan Africa, vice presidents and prime ministers have long been understood to be the heir apparent of the president. Vice presidents and prime ministers are commonly designated as the interim president in the event of the death or incapacitation of the president. In many cases, the interim president is even allowed to serve out the rest of the former incumbent's term. As Hughes and May (1988) note, this provides an interim president with "an enormous advantage in

[4] Mutharika could not simply remove Banda as vice president because the Malawi constitution mandates that the vice president can only be removed by impeachment (Dionne and Dulani 2013).

consolidating his power. His constitutional authority places immediate patronage in his hands and this is used to reward allies and eliminate rivals" (14).

Even when the constitution does not specify the succession order, the "second-in-command" position has generally been perceived as the most likely stepping-stone to the presidency. As Table 4.1 from Chapter 4 shows, presidents are frequently former vice presidents or prime ministers.

Leon M'Ba, the first president of Gabon, for instance, appointed a loyal second-in-command, Omar Bongo, to the vice presidency as his heir apparent. "It is probably true that Bongo's own political skills served him well during the transitional period, but this does not gainsay the fact that he was M'Ba's personally selected [heir] and that he benefitted from the approval and legitimacy that such selection bestowed" (Jackson and Rosberg 1982, 72).

The implication of this argument is that succession planning does not necessarily have to take place only on paper. Appointing an heir apparent, similar to the creation of constitutional succession rules, empowers a specific elite and incentivizes the successor to preserve the existing regime. Therefore, if my argument about individual elites as focal points is correct then we should expect that the appointment of de factor successors is as useful as constitutional succession rules in promoting peaceful transitions.

Hypothesis 2: Regimes that have an appointed de facto successor are more likely to have peaceful transfers of power.

7.4 DISAGGREGATING AUTOCRATIC CONSTITUTIONS: SUCCESSION POLICIES VERSUS TERM LIMITS

Although autocratic constitutions may be an important source of regime stability, I argue that not all constitutional amendments are equally effective in constraining leaders and solving the problem of leadership succession. In fact, there is important variation within constitutions: certain types of amendments matter more and other types matter less. This argument builds on existing studies of comparative constitutions which highlight variation in which different kinds of constitutional rights are enforced (Chilton and Versteeg 2015). Chilton and Versteeg, for instance, argue that not all rights are equally effective and in an analysis of constitutions from 186 countries, they find that the right to unionize is more often upheld than freedom of expression.

While I hypothesize that the implementation of constitutional rules specifying procedures for succession play an important role in promoting

peaceful transitions, I predict that the presence of term limits do not. Existing scholarship on leadership succession procedures in modern autocracies suggest that term limits can be an important type of rule that regulates the transfer of executive power by specifying when the incumbent must leave office. Term limits specify a finite length of time in which the leader will hold office and may incentivize de facto successors to wait for the leader to voluntarily leave office, rather than trying to stage a coup prematurely.

However, term limits do not empower other elites in the same way that succession rules do because term limits do not specify who the successor will be. Returning to the example of Kenya, the constitutional amendment that was implemented under Kenyatta specified that the person in the vice-presidential role is to be the de facto successor in the event of the death of the leader. Under this particular constitutional rule, Moi and his supporters had a lot to lose in the event that this particular amendment was violated. Succession policies create certainty and establish predictability about the actors who are expected to come into office and benefit from the existing regime. Not only do such policies empower specific elites, they also incentivize these elites to protect the existing regime in order to reap the benefits of the existing succession order.

Term limits, on the other hand, do not identify a clear alternative leader that other elites can coordinate around. When term limits are violated by incumbents – which often occurs in autocracies – it is not clear who exactly is being hurt the most, unless a specific elite has been designated as a de facto successor. In sum, constitutional term limits do not help solve coordination problems as effectively as succession procedures because term limits do not identify a specific individual that elites should coordinate around.

In sum, we should not expect to see a strong effect of term limits on the promotion of peaceful leadership transitions:

> ***Hypothesis 3:*** Regimes that have term limits are not more likely to have peaceful transfers of power than those who do not.

7.5 ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONALIZATION RECONSIDERED

As Chapter 6 highlighted, a concern that arises when trying to identify the effects of institutions is that leaders who enter power especially weak choose to institutionalize; these institutions are certainly not randomly assigned to regimes. If succession planning is an endogenous decision and only weak leaders tend to implement succession policies, should we expect to see effects of these institutions on transition outcomes?

I argue that succession policies should have observable effects because they affect not only the leader but also the designated successor. When weak leaders choose to plan for succession in order to prevent other elites from preemptively staging a coup, their designated successors also benefit inadvertently from this strategic planning. As Sections 7.2 and 7.3 argued, constitutional succession rules and the appointment of a de facto successor provide certainty and clarity surrounding the chain of command. Designated successors have an incentive to protect the incumbent regime in hopes of becoming the next leader upon the death of the incumbent. Consistent with the argument in Chapter 6, when weak leaders institutionalize, we should expect to see an effect on leadership succession outcomes.

What types of leadership transition outcomes should we expect to see from regimes with strong leaders who do not institutionalize? Recall that leaders who enter power already strong do not invest in succession planning because they are not at risk of being deposed. Strong leaders therefore do not institutionalize their regimes but are able to remain in power for long periods of time. However, such regimes are unlikely to experience a peaceful leadership transition upon the death of the leader. In fact, such regimes often appear stable while the charismatic leader is still in power, but then crumble upon the death of the leader due to the lack of succession planning. Because strong leaders do not plan for succession (due to the absence of any real threats to their authority while they are in power), elites often face a coordination problem upon the leader's death. Without succession planning, it is unclear who the next incumbent should be. The resulting power vacuum often leads to a military coup as elites resort to violence in an attempt to usurp power. Figure 7.1 summarizes my argument.

The implication of this argument for the empirical section of this chapter is that we do not need to condition on initial leader strength when estimating the effect of regime institutionalization on succession outcomes. We should expect the presence of institutionalized succession



Figure 7.1 What is the effect of regime institutionalization on leadership succession?

rules to result in peaceful leadership transitions, and the absence of such rules to result in violent transition, regardless of the motivations of the leaders who created such policies.

7.6 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The remainder of this chapter presents empirical tests of my arguments about succession procedures and designated successors on leadership transitions using my dataset.

7.6.1 Dependent Variable

The primary outcome of interest in this chapter is whether the leadership transition was peaceful, therefore the unit of analysis is leadership transition rather than leader. The main dependent variable, "peace transition," is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leadership transition is peaceful and 0 otherwise. I use the following rules to identify peaceful leadership transitions. First, I require that a leader must have an immediate successor following their departure from office. To evaluate this, I use the "start date" and "end date" variables available from the Archigos dataset (Gleditsch and Chiozza 2009). Second, I require that the method of exit for the incumbent and method of entry for the successor both be coded as "regular" by Archigos.[5] In other words, in order for the transition to be coded as peaceful, the incumbent cannot have been deposed through a coup or civil war. The successor must take office immediately following the departure of the previous incumbent, and the successor cannot come to power using military force or foreign imposition.

An example of a peaceful leadership succession is when power was transferred from Jomo Kenyatta to Daniel arap Moi in Kenya. Kenyatta died on August 22, 1978, and Moi took office that day: both are coded as regular entry in Archigos. Another example of a peaceful transition is subsequently when power was transferred from Ahmadou Ahidjo to Paul Biya in Cameroon. Ahidjo retired due to ill health on November 6, 1982

[5] Archigos breaks down leader exit into the following main categories: assassination, popular protest, removed by military, removed by other government actors, removed by rebels, removed through threat of foreign force, regular, still in office. I consider all exit codes other than assassination, regular, and still in office as an instance of "irregular" leader exit. I exclude assassination from my list of irregular leader exits because Archigos codes assassination attempts only by unsupported individuals. U.S. presidents, for instance, have been assassinated but were peacefully succeeded by their vice presidents. For leader entry, Archigos uses the following categories: foreign imposition, irregular, regular, unknown. I only consider cases coded as "regular" as peaceful entry.

and Biya took office that same day. On the other hand, from 1960 through 1970, Benin experienced six leadership changes, all of which were driven by coups. Finally, a number of incumbents were in power through the end of the dataset in 2010, and I exclude such observations from the analysis in this chapter. Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe is such an example.

7.6.2 Independent Variables

For my key explanatory variables, I use three of my regime institutionalization measures. Succession policies and term limits represent formal constitutional rules that regulate the transfer of power. The stable appointment of a vice president or prime minister represents the informal designation of a successor. However, since my desired unit of analysis is transition units, I collapse my country–year observations to cross-sectional measures of succession rules.

For succession rules, I use the "specific successor" variable from my dataset. This variable takes a value of 1 for all years in which the country had a constitutional rule specifying who would be the interim successor in the case of the departure or death of the president. Importantly, I only consider succession rules that were in place in the years leading up to the leadership transition. If, for example, a leader had succession rules at the start of her tenure, then eliminated them before existing office, then these rules would not have been in place to facilitate the transition. Therefore, the variable, "succession rules" records the number of years during the leader's tenure leading up to the transition for which constitutional succession rules were in place.

In addition to succession rules, I evaluate whether having term limits promotes peaceful transfers of power. The variable "term limits" records the number of years during the leader's tenure leading up to the transition for which the constitutional term limits were in place.

I also evaluate whether designating a de facto successor has an effect on the likelihood of peaceful transitions. To code this variable, I focus on vice president and prime minister appointments that are stable. The variable "stable VP/PM" records the number of years of the incumbent's tenure in which the vice president or prime minister is the same person as the previous year.

In addition to my main hypotheses about succession planning, I also create variables to test existing arguments surrounding hereditary succession and ruling parties. To evaluate whether power transitions between family members are more stable, I utilize the family ties ("fties") variable in Archigos, which identifies the familial relationship between leaders. The variable, "family ties" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if

the transfer of power occurs between two family members. I include blood ties and ties via marriage and do not exclude irregular transfers of power.

I also create a set of variables to test the party hypothesis. Ruling parties are thought to provide a clear mechanism for leadership succession, and this effect is likely to be stronger for more established parties. For data on ruling parties, I merge the time-series version of my dataset on transitions with the dataset on institutions from Svolik (2012). Using the party variable from Svolik, I create the variable "party years," which documents the number of years the leader had a ruling party prior to the leadership transition.[6]

7.7 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

The resulting data for this chapter includes 144 leadership transitions that occurred between 1960 and 2010 in sub-Saharan Africa. Out of these transitions, fifty-seven were peaceful and eighty-seven were not.[7] As documented in the literature on authoritarian rule, smooth leadership transitions do not occur easily; only 40 percent of the transitions in this sample were peaceful.

A number of interesting descriptive findings emerge from the data. The first striking observation is that hereditary succession in sub-Saharan Africa is surprisingly rare. Only 5 percent of power transfers (whether peaceful or not) occur between family members.[8] Out of these nine cases, four were peaceful,[9] and four were not,[10] and one leader is still in power. This finding is similar to patterns of hereditary succession in the global sample of all authoritarian regimes. Out of all autocratic leadership

[6] In order for the party to be included in this variable, I require that (1) The party must be in power up until the transition. If, for instance, a leader bans a party prior to the leadership transition, then the party could not have facilitated the transition. (2) I also require that the party be in power for at least three years. In establishing the three-year cutoff, I follow conventions in the literature (for example, see Geddes 1999), with the goal of excluding parties that were so new that they most likely did not have the capacity to play a meaningful role in the leadership transition.

[7] There were twenty-seven leaders still in power as of 2010, and I exclude these units from the analysis.

[8] It is useful to recall that I am using a broad definition of the term "family"; I include relatives who are related by marriage in addition to blood relations.

[9] For instance, in 1999, Ismail Omar Guelleh came to power as the president of Djibouti, following his uncle Hassan Gouled Aptidon who had been the first president of Djibouti from 1977 to 1999. Guelleh was the handpicked successor of Aptidon and took over when his uncle retired.

[10] For example, in 1966, Jean-Bedel Bokassa seized power from David Dacko in the Central African Republic in a military coup. Bokassa was Dacko's uncle.

transitions that occurred between 1946 and 2016, power was handed between family members less than 3 percent of the time.

Even family "dynasties" occur very infrequently. In my sample of African leaders, only 6 percent of leaders have any family ties with earlier incumbents.[11] Once again, this statistic mirrors general patterns of family dynasties found in the global sample of all autocratic leaders. Summary statistics of all variables are reported in Appendix Table 7.1.

7.8 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

To test the hypotheses presented in this chapter, I estimate a logit model predicting peaceful transitions for each leadership transition *i* in country *j*. It is represented as the following:

$$\Pr(\textit{Peaceful leadership transition}_{ij} = 1) = f(\beta X_{ij} + \gamma W_{ij} + \epsilon)$$

where X_{ij} is a vector of transition-specific variables (such as the presence succession rules) as well as leader-specific variables (such as time in office). W_{ij} is a vector of country-specific controls at the time of the transition (such as GDP per capita or population size). Standard errors are clustered at the country level for all model specifications.

Figure 7.2 presents graphs of the marginal effect of constitutional succession rules and the presence of a de facto successor on the likelihood of a peaceful transition, and Appendix Table 7.2 reports the full regression results of the logit analysis. The presence of constitutional rules specifying succession procedures are positively associated with peaceful transitions, and this effect is robust across various model specifications. The presence of a de facto successor (measured by the stability of the vice president/prime minister appointment) is also significantly associated with peaceful transitions across all model specifications, suggesting that informal institutions can play an important role in regulating power. The size of these effects is not trivial. As the number of years a leader has a constitutional successor policy increases from 0 to 35, the predicted probability of a peaceful transition jumps from .3 to almost 1. The size of the effect of a stable vice president or prime minister is similar in magnitude. The effects of term limits are much more inconsistent. For some model specifications, term limits appear to be positively associated with

[11] By family "dynasty" I am referring to leaders who have a familial connection with an earlier incumbent, but did not immediately come into office following the family member. For instance, Ian Khama, the current president of Botswana, came into office in 2008. His father, Sereste Khama, left office in 1980.



Figure 7.2 Marginal effects of having a succession policy and designated successor on likelihood of peaceful transition

peaceful transitions, but this effect is not robust to the addition to controls (see Appendix Table 7.2).

The presence of a ruling party does not appear to have a significant effect in any of the model specifications. In fact, the ruling party variable is never significant in any subsequent models or robustness checks presented in this chapter. In addition, because there are so few cases of familial transfers of power (less than 5 percent of the sample), I drop this variable from the results presented in this chapter. When included in the models, this variable is never significant.

One potential concern is that parties may be especially weak in sub-Saharan Africa, particularly during the early decades immediately following independence. To show that the absence of a party effect is not simply an artifact of weak parties in Africa, I analyze a global sample of leadership transitions from 1946 to 2008 and find that the presence of a ruling party does not increase the likelihood of a peaceful leadership transition. I also find no effect of hereditary succession on the likelihood of a peaceful transition in the global sample. Appendix Table 7.3 reports these results.

7.8.1 Robustness Checks

These findings remain consistent over a number of robustness checks. First, I rerun the analysis on a subset of the data that excludes units that do not have constitutions (in order words, only units that have constitutions for the entire period are included in this analysis). The results,

reported in Appendix Table 7.4, remain consistent. The presence of formal succession rules continues to be significantly associated with peaceful transfers of power, as well as the appointment of a stable vice president or prime minister.

Second, to ensure that my results are not purely being driven by institutions that were created after the end of the Cold War in 1990, I split the sample into two time periods. Models (1) and (2), reported in Appendix Table 7.5, include leaders who were in power during the Cold War period, from 1960 to 1990. Models (3) and (4) include leaders who were in power after the end of the Cold War, from 1991 to 2010. The presence of constitutional successor rules continues to be significant during both time periods, suggesting that these rules had an effect on transitions of power even during the most authoritarian decades.

7.9 CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the effect of institutionalization on leadership succession outcomes. I argued that the creation of constitutional succession procedures and the designation of a de facto successor (through the appointment of a stable vice president or prime minister) plays a critical role in regulating peaceful leadership turnover. Although leaders institutionalize out of self-interest, these measures inadvertently create conditions for peaceful succession. The creation of a clear line of succession provides certainty of the chain of command. Designated successors have an incentive to uphold the existing regime since preserving the status quo is the best guarantee that they will become the next incumbent.

I also argued that term limits, unlike succession rules, should not have strong effect on succession outcomes. This is because term limits do not solve the elite collective action problem by identifying a specific elite challenger. Whereas the designation of a vice president or prime minister or the designation of a line of succession in the constitution identifies specific elites as a clear alternative leader, term limits place constraints on the leader without empowering a specific elite.

I analyzed all postindependence leadership transitions within sub-Saharan Africa and provided empirical evidence for these arguments. Altogether, Chapters 6 and 7 show that institutionalization does indeed have stabilizing effects on key leader and regime outcomes.

Appendix

Appendix Table 7.1 *Summary statistics*

Variable	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Peaceful transition	106	.386	.489	0	1
Succession rules	106	2.79	5.08	0	24
Stable VP/PM	106	3.73	5.23	0	35
Term limits	106	1.95	3.88	0	22
Constitution	106	6.84	7.87	0	41
Family ties	106	2043	.205	0	1
Party years	106	4.37	4.37	0	27
GDP per capita	101	1.29	1.61	.160	11.1
Oil production	101	.250	1.13	0	11.8
Population	101	8.71	1.17	6.16	11.6
Ethnic fractionalization	101	.664	.240	.035	.925
Years in power	106	8.50	8.20	1	41

Appendix Table 7.2 *Does succession planning increase the likelihood of peaceful leadership transitions?*

DV: peaceful transition	(1)	(2)	(3)
Stable VP/PM	0.257**	0.267**	0.245*
	(0.086)	(0.103)	(0.117)
Successor rules	0.159**	0.159**	0.149*
	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.059)
Term limits	0.123*	0.123*	0.100
	(0.055)	(0.058)	(0.070)
Constitution	–0.093	–0.100	–0.145
	(0.115)	(0.125)	(0.141)
Ruling party		0.042	0.030
		(0.091)	(0.088)
GDP per capita			0.906*
			(0.423)
Oil production			–0.060
			(0.502)
Population			0.319
			(0.225)
Ethnic fractionalization			0.423
			(1.264)

(continued)

Appendix Table 7.2 *(continued)*

DV: peaceful transition	(1)	(2)	(3)
Cold War			–0.911
			(0.623)
British			–0.103
			(0.763)
French			–0.388
			(0.821)
Years in power	0.005	–0.007	0.066
	(0.092)	(0.099)	(0.108)
Constant	–1.842***	–1.806**	–5.518*
	(0.556)	(0.570)	(2.502)
Observations	106	106	101
Pseudo R-squared	0.286	0.289	0.400

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05

Appendix Table 7.3 *Global sample*

DV: Peaceful transitions	(1)	(2)	(3)
Family ties	0.778	0.824	1.811
	(0.560)	(0.535)	(0.969)
Ruling party	0.008	0.011	–0.027
	(0.020)	(0.020)	(0.044)
Constant	–2.936***	–3.130***	–3.147**
	(0.720)	(0.675)	(1.183)
Observations	456	456	347
Pseudo R-squared	0.0613	0.0946	0.148
Country FE	No	No	Yes
Region controls	No	Yes	No

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05
This sample includes all leadership transitions that have occurred in all dictatorships in the world (as defined by Cheibub, Gandhi and Vreeland 2010). The family ties variable was retrieved from the Archigos dataset and the ruling party variable was retrieved from Svolik (2012).

Appendix Table 7.4 *Robustness check: only units with constitutions*

DV: peaceful transition	(1)	(2)
Successor rules	0.177**	0.175*
	(0.066)	(0.075)
Stable VP/PM	0.251**	0.199*
	(0.095)	(0.093)
Term limits	0.098	0.114
	(0.057)	(0.077)
Ruling party		0.005
		(0.072)
GDP per capita		1.189*
		(0.560)
Oil production		–0.386
		(0.437)
Population		0.276
		(0.227)
Ethnic fractionalization		0.382
		(1.981)
Years in power	–0.078	
	(0.061)	
Constant	–1.846*	–6.620*
	(0.839)	(2.599)
Observations	65	62
Pseudo R-squared	0.303	0.436

Note: Units without constitutions for the entire period are excluded from this analysis.
Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
*** $p < 0.001$, ** $p < 0.01$, * $p < 0.05$

Appendix Table 7.5 *Robustness check: time trends*

	Cold War		post-Cold War	
DV: peaceful transition	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Successor rules	0.112	0.148*	0.165	0.189**
	(0.076)	(0.071)	(0.085)	(0.068)
Stable VP/PM	0.215*	0.215	0.297	0.257
	(0.101)	(0.164)	(0.191)	(0.176)
Term limits	0.073	0.016	0.136	0.407
	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.100)	(0.323)
Constitution	–0.116	–0.241	–0.097	–0.144
	(0.160)	(0.155)	(0.214)	(0.262)
Ruling party		0.012		0.177
		(0.106)		(0.130)
GDP per capita		0.564		1.224
		(0.326)		(1.121)
Oil production		0.304		1.209
		(0.400)		(1.208)
Population		0.990		0.320
		(0.667)		(0.408)
Ethnic fractionalization		–0.085		–0.547
		(1.890)		(1.499)
British		1.549		–2.020
		(1.649)		(1.334)
French		–0.095		–0.710
		(1.420)		(1.472)
Years in power	0.036	0.193	–0.021	0.091
	(0.130)	(0.150)	(0.149)	(0.203)
Constant	–0.895	–11.523	–2.328**	–6.863
	(0.612)	(6.619)	(0.762)	(3.813)
Observations	47	44	59	57
Pseudo R–squared	0.158	0.339	0.323	0.505

Robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses
*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

6

What Are the Consequences of Institutionalization on Autocratic Stability?

This book has so far been primarily been concerned with explaining the emergence of institutionalized autocratic rule. We now return to the first central puzzle presented at the very onset of Chapter 1: What explains differences in authoritarian regime stability? Why is it that some dictatorships are subject to constant coup attempts and regime change, while others withstand multiple peaceful leadership transitions and remain stable over long periods of time?

The next two chapters will examine the effects of institutionalization on regime durability. Do institutionalized regimes actually perform better on a number of key outcomes, such as leader longevity, the prevention of coups, and the promotion of peaceful leadership succession? This chapter will focus on estimating the effects of regime institutionalization on key *leader* outcomes: the length of leader tenure and susceptibility to coups attempts. The next chapter will focus on estimating the effects of institutionalization on key *regime* outcomes: leadership succession and regime survival.

This chapter will show that leaders who institutionalize their regimes tend to remain in office for longer periods of time and face fewer coup attempts. The next chapter will demonstrate that institutionalized regimes are significantly more likely to undergo peaceful leadership transitions. Together these two chapters demonstrate that executive constraints are not simply empty parchment rules. Institutionalization does indeed have consequences for regime stability.

However, estimating the effects of endogenously created institutions is not as straightforward as it may seem. In determining the effects of institutions, these chapters will take into consideration the subject of the first half of this book – the fact that leaders choose whether to institutionalize based on underlying threats to their rule. Since constitutional rules and cabinet appointments are not randomly assigned across regimes, we must consider the types of leaders who choose to create these institutions when examining whether such rules have an independent effect on regime durability.

Existing work on the empirical determinants of regime stability has largely ignored the empirical challenge of estimating the effect of endogenous institutions, even though much of the scholarship does indeed acknowledge theoretically that dictators choose whether or not to allow for institutional constraints. This chapter argues that to determine whether institutions play a stabilizing role, we cannot simply regress regime outcomes on levels of institutionalization.

Recall that the formal model in Chapter 2 demonstrated how leaders who enter office already strong can remain in power without institutionalizing the regime. Such leaders will therefore be associated with stable regimes and no institutionalization. Weak leaders, on the other hand, must institutionalize in order to maintain their hold on office. Therefore, if we focus on the subset of leaders who enter power weak, we should observe a positive effect of institutionalization on regime stability. Yet, without taking into account leader type, simply regressing regime outcomes on institutionalization would result in biased estimates because strong leaders do not need to institutionalize to stay in power.

In this chapter I demonstrate that when we condition on initial leader strength, institutionalization does indeed have a stabilizing effect for weak leaders but little or no effect for strong leaders. This approach helps to make sense of the existing divergent empirical findings on the question of whether institutions promote regime stability. It heeds Pepinsky's (2014) call to deal with the "nagging problem" facing the literature on authoritarian institutions: If "institutions under authoritarian rule are vulnerable to manipulation because political actors believe that institutional manipulation can shape political outcomes in their favor, then it is also true that factors that explain the origins of (and changes in) [these institutions] also directly affect those political outcomes" (631).

6.1 ARE CONSTITUTIONAL RULES ACTUALLY FOLLOWED IN DICTATORSHIPS?

Before we discuss the effects of institutionalization on regime outcomes, it is important to first address an important descriptive question: once established, are constitutional rules followed in dictatorships? If we are to believe that formal rules promote regime stability, then we should observe leaders and elites actually following the letter of the law. To answer this question, I focus on the constitutional rules in my dataset: leadership succession procedures and term limits. I find that constitutional leadership succession procedures are generally adhered to in my sample, while term limits are violated much more frequently.

To examine whether constitutional leadership succession rules were followed, I identified all instances of peaceful leader exit, whether by death or voluntarily retirement. For all instances of peaceful leader exit, I then identify whether a constitutional succession rule existed at the time of leader exit. The procedure results in thirty-four cases that allow us to observe whether the succession policy was followed at the time of leader exit. Cases of leader departure but no succession rule were excluded because the question of whether succession rules would have been followed is unobserved in such instances. Cases of violent leader deposal were also excluded because coups result in new regimes rather than the continuation of the existing regime via succession. I also exclude cases of democratization after the death of the leader: in these instances the next leader was elected via elections, rendering the succession policy irrelevant.

For the majority of the observations, leadership succession occurs according to constitutional rules. Out of thirty-four observations, 79 percent consist of peaceful leadership transitions where the constitutional policy was followed exactly – in particular, the designated successor became the interim president following the death or departure of the leader. In 21 percent of these cases, a peaceful leadership transition did occur, but the interim president was not the designated successor who was specified in the constitution. Summary statistics are listed in Table 6.1.

To determine whether term limits were followed, I identified all leaders who had term limits in the constitution and remained in power long enough to observe whether they would adhere to those limits. This resulted in forty-five observable cases. Out of these forty-five cases, leaders adhered to term limits 29 percent of the time. To summarize, while constitutional leadership succession policies were indeed followed in most observable cases, leaders seem to violate term limits much more frequently. The next chapter will provide a theory of why term limits seem to be easier to violate compared to constitutional succession policies.

Since succession rules are generally followed but term limits are frequently ignored, I exclude term limits from my analysis of the effects of constitutional rules on regime stability for the remainder of this chapter.

Table 6.1 *Summary statistics*

Policy	Observable cases	Rule followed	As percent
Succession rules	34	27	79%
Term limits	45	13	29%

6.2 EMPIRICAL DISAGREEMENT: DO INSTITUTIONS PROMOTE REGIME STABILITY?

Despite the general consensus that institutionalized forms of dictatorship tend to be more stable, the empirical record of the relationship between institutions and regime stability has been surprisingly mixed. In a seminal study, Geddes (1999a) finds that single-party regimes remain in power for longer periods of time compared to personalist regimes. Military regimes, which tend to have weak or no civilian institutions, are less durable compared with personalist regimes. This study catalyzed the idea that institutionalized forms of authoritarianism tend to be most durable. Geddes' empirical analysis was replicated by Brownlee (2007), who found similar effects. Since then, many scholars have made the theoretical argument that institutions, such as parties and legislatures, can prolong the lifespan of authoritarian regimes (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2018; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Magaloni 2008; Svolik 2009).

However, a number of subsequent studies have since challenged this initial finding. Smith (2005), for instance, shows that the significant effect of single-party regimes is driven primarily by two outliers: Mexico and the Soviet Union. He replicates Geddes' original analysis, producing similar results, but then demonstrates that when the two longest-living regimes are dropped from the analysis, single-party regimes are no longer significantly more durable compared with personalist regimes.

A small number of studies have also pointed out that autocratic leaders endogenously respond to threats with "appropriate" degrees of institutionalization, therefore we should not expect to see a relationship between institutions and stability. Gandhi (2008), for instance, finds that leaders with ruling parties do not tend to survive in office longer compared with those without parties, "suggesting that most authoritarian incumbents are able to perceive with some accuracy the threats germinating within society and to respond with the appropriate degree of institutionalization" (176–177). According to this study, leaders institutionalize optimally, and therefore there should be no observable effect between institutions and stability.

Boix and Svolik (2013) also present a study in which institutional choice is endogenous. They argue that power-sharing institutions, such as parties or legislatures, can be established only when backed by a credible threat of elite rebellion. However, despite the fact that their theory endogenizes the creation of institutions, two observable implications of their study are that regimes with institutions should be longer lived and experience fewer coups. Using data on the existence of parties and legislatures in autocracies, they find empirical support for their arguments.

To sum up, the existing literature on the relationship between autocratic institutions and regime stability has produced a confusing array of theoretical predictions and empirical findings. Two questions remain unresolved. First, should we expect, theoretically, to see an effect of endogenously created institutions on autocratic regime stability? Second, what does the data show us empirically?

6.3 PROBLEMS WITH EXISTING APPROACHES

How do we make sense of these contrasting theories and divergent empirical findings? I argue that there are two possible reasons why existing empirical studies of the relationship between autocratic institutions and regime durability may be biased: (1) measurement problems and (2) theoretical problems.

First, existing empirical findings may be subject to a number of measurement problems due to the difficulties of obtaining fine-grained data that accurately reflects the quality of authoritarian institutions. As Chapter 4 demonstrated, the data on autocratic regime types (Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014) has a number of inconsistencies when compared with this book's dataset on executive constraints. In particular, many single-party regimes, which are supposed to be the most institutionalized type of autocracy, appear to lack many dimensions of formal and informal constraints on presidential power. Many regimes that are coded as military and personalist, which are supposed to be less institutionalized, do actually appear to have many executive constraints in place.

On the other hand, empirical studies (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008) that use the existence of institutions – such as the presence of a single, multiple, or no political parties – may also be subject to measurement problems, due to the fact that such data often does not capture detailed information about the quality of the institutions. Therefore it is unclear whether the lack of an effect of the presence of institutions on regime durability is due to a true lack of an effect or whether the null findings are due to measures that do not capture institutional quality.

Beyond measurement problems, I also argue that existing empirical studies on the relationship between autocratic institutions and regime durability are also subject to biased theoretical modeling. In particular, while many existing studies acknowledge the fact that leaders choose to create or allow institutions in order to promote regime stability, this endogenous institutional choice is not taken into account when estimating the effect of institutions on outcomes, such as regime stability or longevity. As Pepinsky (2014) notes, "factors that explain the origins of (and changes in) [institutions] directly affect those political outcomes" (631).

I argue that we need to differentiate between initially strong and initially weak leaders when considering the effects of institutionalization on regime durability, since these different types of leaders make different institutional decisions. Since leaders choose to institutionalize based on existing threats to their rule, the creation of executive constraints should only help initially weak leaders stay in power longer than they otherwise would have. Initially strong leaders who have already consolidated power by the time they take office do not need to rely on power-sharing institutions to remain in office. Their rule is secure with or without regime institutionalization. We therefore should generally not observe a relationship between party institutionalization and regime durability for strong leaders.[1]

For leaders who are weak, however, building an institutionalized regime should promote regime stability. Leaders who are highly vulnerable to being deposed by their fellow elites require institutional mechanisms in order to make credible commitments to share power and resources. Institutionalized regimes should therefore lengthen the time horizons of initially vulnerable leaders. Initially strong leaders, on the other hand, have no incentive to institutionalize their regimes to begin with. Figure 6.1 summarizes my argument.

Figure 6.1 illustrates why simply regressing institutionalization on regime stability would produce biased estimates of the effect of institutions on stability. For initially weak leaders, those who institutionalize should experience more stable regimes. For initially strong leaders, however, there should be little or no effect of institutionalization on regime durability because strong leaders should be able to remain in power regardless of whether they institutionalize. A regression model



Figure 6.1 What is the effect of institutionalization on regime stability?

[1] It is important to note that it is possible for strong leaders to institutionalize, even though this would be out-of-equilibrium behavior according to the model. I would expect institutionalized regimes, even if the leader was initially strong, to be more stable due to the fact that the creation of constitutional rules and cabinet appointments creates mechanisms for credible power-sharing and patronage distribution.

that regresses institutionalization on regime stability without taking into account differential effects based on leader type will likely result in either a diminished effect of institutionalization or a null effect, both of which would be inaccurate.

***Hypothesis 1*:** Institutionalization has a positive effect on regime stability, conditional on leader weakness.

6.4 ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF ENDOGENOUS INSTITUTIONALIZATION

How should we estimate the effects of institutionalization on regime stability without ignoring the origins of these institutions? One approach is to incorporate an interaction term between regime institutionalization and leader strength which will account for differential effects of institutionalization based on whether the leader was initially strong or weak.

6.4.1 Data

The outcome variable of interest in this chapter is autocratic stability, particularly with respect to leader outcomes.[2] Leader stability will be measured via two dependent variables: the length of a leader's tenure and the number of coup attempts a leader faces during her tenure. "Years in power" is a variable that counts the number of years a leader remained in power. "Coup attempts" records the percent of the number of office years for which a leader faced coup attempts. This variable is presented as a percent, rather than a count of the number of coup attempts a leader faced in order to take into account the fact that various leaders remained in office for different lengths of time.

There are two primary independent variables of interest: leader strength and regime institutionalization. Leader strength will be proxied using two measurement strategies from Chapter 5: founders versus successors and coup leaders versus noncoup leaders. "Founder" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader was the first leader of the country after independence and 0 otherwise. As Chapter 5 argued, founding leaders tended to enjoy special legitimacy and mass support, and this was especially true for these leaders who rose to power in the immediate aftermath of independence. Founding presidents can therefore be interpreted as stronger leaders compared with subsequent presidents. "Coup

[2] The next chapter will examine the effect of institutionalization on leadership succession and regime survival.

leader" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader came to power through a coup d'etat and 0 otherwise. As Chapter 5 argued, leaders who successfully take power through a coup demonstrate that they have control over the coercive apparatus that allowed them to launch a successful coup in the first place. Since one of the most precarious challenges to any civilian leader is the threat of military takeover, when the leader is the head of the military this threat is diminished. Coup leaders can therefore be interpreted as strong leaders, compared with leaders who did not come to power via a coup.[3]

The second primary independent variable of interest is level of regime institutionalization. I use my indicators of regime institutionalization, measured separately. For this chapter, I use the percent of years for which the leader had a succession policy in place ("successor"), stable VP/PM appointment ("VP/PM same"), and stable defense appointment ("Defense same").[4] Each of these measures take a value from 0 to 1, with high values indicating a higher level of regime institutionalization.

6.4.2 *Summary Statistics*

Before turning to the empirical strategy, I first present summary statistics of the leader outcome variables: length of leader tenure and frequency of coup attempts. The average leader in my sample was in power for 8.48 years, with the shortest tenure being one year and the longest tenure being forty-one years. Appendix Table 6.1 presents summary statistics of this variable. On average, founding leaders remain in power for 13 years, while subsequent leaders remain in power for 7.4 years. The average coup leader remains in office for 8.2 years and the average noncoup leader remains in power for 8.6 years. This finding runs contrary to existing scholarship portraying coup leaders as especially weak or susceptible to falling into coup traps, yet is

[3] The reader may recall that in Chapter 5 I presented a third strategy for measuring leader strength by looking at the subset of founding leaders, and comparing strong nationalist leaders against those who were close allies of the colonial state. Since this strategy requires looking within the subset of independence regimes, the number of observations available for this strategy are much more limited. I therefore exclude this strategy from the empirical tests in this chapter.

[4] Since the strict and weak version of the successor rule are highly correlated, I exclude the "strict successor" variable from the analysis in this chapter. Since "VP/PM appoint" and "VP/PM same" as well as "defense appoint" and "defense same" are also highly correlated, I also exclude the "VP/PM appoint" and "defense appoint" variables from the analysis in this chapter. Since term limits were generally not implemented until after the 1990s and are not frequently adhered to, I exclude it from the analysis in this chapter.

consistent with my argument that leaders endogenously institutionalize based on threat perceptions.

Turning to the other dependent variable, the average leader faces a (successful or unsuccessful) coup attempt for 19 percent of the years she is in power. Appendix Table 6.2 presents summary statistics of this variable. In other words, if a leader were in power for ten years, she would face a coup attempt in roughly two of the ten years.

There are significant differences in the percentage of years for which strong leaders face coups, relative to weak leaders. Founders face coup attempts for about 5 percent of the years they are in power, compared with subsequent leaders who face coup attempts for about 22 percent of the years they are in power. Coup leaders face coup attempts about 35 percent of the of the years they are in power, compared with noncoup leaders who face coup attempts for about 11 percent of the years they are in power.

It is important to remind the reader that the analysis conducted in this chapter does not focus on these baseline differences in the length of leader tenure or vulnerability to coups. Instead, what we are interested in is whether institutionalization affects these outcomes within the subgroup of weak leaders.

6.4.3 Empirical Strategy

Let Y represent the outcome of interest – leader tenure and percent of years with coup attempts. Let x_1 represent a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the leader was initially strong, and 0 otherwise. Let x_2 represent the degree of institutionalization, which is measured as the percent of years for which a particular dimension of institutionalization was in place during a leader's tenure. x_2 takes a value between 0 and 1, and higher values indicate more institutionalized regimes. Let W represent a vector of control variables, including mean GDP per capita, oil production, population size, and ethnic fractionalization. ε represents the error term. Since the outcome variables and leader strength variable of interest are cross-sectional, our unit of analysis will be the leader.

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 x_1 + \beta_2 x_2 + \beta_3 x_1 x_2 + W + \varepsilon$$

Recall that the hypothesis we're interested in testing is that institutionalization has a positive effect on regime stability, conditional on leader weakness. This means that we should observe better regime outcomes for weak leaders but no relationship between institutionalization and regime outcomes for strong leaders.

How should we interpret the regression coefficients? We break down our analysis into two sets of cases: those with a strong leader and those

with a weak leader. For x_1=0, the subset of weak leaders (recall that x_1 is a dummy variable representing leader strength or weakness), the equation reduces to the following:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_2 x_2 + \varepsilon$$

I hypothesize that when the leader is weak, institutionalization should have a positive and significant effect on leader outcomes. Since x_2 denotes levels of regime institutionalization, we should expect β_2 to be significantly different than zero.[5]

For x_1=1, the subset of strong leaders, the equation reduces to the following:

$$Y = \alpha + \beta_1 + (\beta_2 + \beta_3)x_2 + \varepsilon$$

I hypothesize that when the leader is strong, there should be no effect of institutionalization on leader stability. Since x_2 denotes levels of regime institutionalization, then the coefficients $(\beta_2 + \beta_3)$ should not be significantly different from 0.

To summarize, if my theory is correct, then we should expect β_2 to be significantly different from 0 and $(\beta_2 + \beta_3)$ not to be significantly different from 0.

6.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

I use two different proxies of leader strength to condition the differential effects of institutionalization on length of leader tenure and vulnerability to coups: (1) founding leaders versus subsequent leaders and (2) coup leaders versus noncoup leaders. I will present results using both of these strategies separately.

6.5.1 *What Is the Effect of Institutionalization on the Length of Leader Tenure?*

As hypothesized in Section 6.3, we should expect institutionalization to lengthen the time in office of initially *weak* leaders but have no effect on the tenure of initially strong leaders. Therefore we should expect $\beta_2 > 0$ and $(\beta_2 + \beta_3)$ to not be significantly different from 0. To estimate these

[5] Whether β_2 should be greater than or less than 0 depends on the outcome we are examining. A lower number of coup attempts denotes a more stable regime, so for that analysis, we should expect $\beta_2 < 0$. Longer leader tenure denotes a more stable regime, so for that analysis, we should expect $\beta_2 > 0$.



Figure 6.2 What is the effect of institutionalization on leader tenure (founders)?
Note: 90 percent confidence intervals reported. Proxy for leader strength is founders versus subsequent leaders. The dependent variable is the number of years for which a leader was in power. Our hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between institutionalization and leader tenure for weak leaders.

effects, we include an indicator of leader strength and an interaction term between leader strength and institutionalization.

First I use founding leaders as a proxy for initially strong leaders. The results of these regressions are illustrated in Figure 6.2, and the full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 6.3. When weak leaders (nonfounders) institutionalize, they tend to remain in office for longer periods, and this result is statistically significant for all three dimensions of institutionalization: succession procedures, having a stable VP/PM, and having a stable defense minister.[6]

The results also show little or no effect of institutionalization on leader tenure for strong leaders (founders).[7] Designating a stable VP/PM and defense minister does not appear to have a statistically significant effect on leader tenure. Having a constitutional succession policy does have a statistically significant effect of lengthening leaders' time in office, even when the leader is initially strong. This could be due to some measurement

[6] Recall that ($ß_2$) is the relevant coefficient for weak leaders. These rows are highlighted in Appendix Table 6.3.

[7] Recall that the effect of institutionalization for strong leaders is denoted by $ß_2 + ß_3$. This row is highlighted in Appendix Table 6.3.



Figure 6.3 What is the effect of institutionalization on leader tenure (coup leaders)?
Note: 90 percent confidence intervals reported. Proxy for leader strength is coup leaders versus noncoup leaders. The dependent variable is the number of years for which a leader was in power. Our hypothesis predicts a positive relationship between institutionalization and leader tenure for weak leaders.

error for the leader strength variable. It could be the case that founding leaders does not serve as a perfect proxy for initial leader strength. On other hand, it is also possible that having a leadership succession policy in place does indeed lengthen the tenure of all leaders, even those who enter office initially strong. Chapter 7 provides an extensive discussion of leadership succession.

I also analyze the relationship between institutionalization and leader tenure using coup leaders as a proxy for initially strong leaders. The results are illustrated in Figure 6.3 and the full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 6.4. Once again, I find that when initially weak leaders (noncoup leaders) institutionalize, they tend to remain in office for longer periods of time, and this finding is statistically significant along cabinet stability dimensions.

For initially strong leaders (coup leaders), institutionalization – particularly the stable appointment of VP/PMs and the creation of succession policies – does appear to have effects on leader tenure. It is possible that coup leaders, while having consolidated authority over the coercive apparatus of the regime, have vulnerability along other nonmilitary dimensions, and therefore benefit from the stabilizing effect of institutionalization along such dimensions. Coup leaders who institutionalize along civilian dimensions may

experience more stable rule, even if they took power having already consolidated power along coercive dimensions.

6.5.2 What Is the Effect of Institutionalization on the Frequency of Coup Attempts?

Does institutionalization prevent coup attempts? First I use founding presidents as a proxy for strong leaders. The results from these regressions are illustrated in Figure 6.4, and the full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 6.5. Initially weak leaders (non-founding presidents) who institutionalize are less likely to face coup attempts, and the results are statistically significant across all dimensions of institutionalization. There does not appear to be an effect of institutionalization on coup threats for initially strong leaders (founding presidents) and this is true for all dimensions of institutionalization.

Finally, I also analyze the effect of institutionalization on coup attempts using postcoup leaders as a proxy for strong leaders. The results are illustrated in Figure 6.5, and the full regression results are reported in Appendix Table 6.6. Initially weak leaders (noncoup leaders) who institutionalize are significantly less likely to face coup attempts, and this is true for all



Figure 6.4 What is the effect of institutionalization on the frequency of coup attempts? Note: 90 percent confidence intervals reported. Proxy for leader strength is founders versus subsequence leaders. The dependent variable is the percentage of years for which a leader faces a coup attempt. Our hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between institutionalization and coup attempts for weak leaders.



Figure 6.5 What is the effect of institutionalization on coup vulnerability?
Note: 90 percent confidence intervals reported. Proxy for leader strength is coup leaders versus noncoup leaders. The dependent variable is the percentage of years for which a leader faces a coup attempt. Our hypothesis predicts a negative relationship between institutionalization and coup attempts for weak leaders.

dimensions of institutionalization. There does not appear to be a significant effect of regime institutionalization on coup threats for initially strong leaders (coup leaders). The one exception to this general finding is that initially strong leaders who have constitutional leadership succession procedures appear to be significantly less likely to face coup attempts. This may be due to the fact that, as discussed previously, while coup leaders enter power having already consolidated coercive authority, they may be more vulnerable along other civilian dimensions. Therefore implementing succession policies may lessen coup risk, even for leaders who took power via a coup.

6.6 CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the effect of institutionalization on autocratic stability, particularly the length of leader tenure and frequency of coup threats. I argued that in estimating the effect of institutionalization on these outcomes we need to take into account the fact that initially strong and initially weak leaders make different institutionalization decisions, depending on threats to their rule. Weak leaders institutionalize in order to alleviate threats to their rule, and therefore we should expect to see an effect of institutionalization on stability for initially weak leaders. Initially strong leaders are able to remain in power whether they institutionalize or not, so

we should expect to see little or no effect of institutionalization on stability for strong leaders. Using founding presidents and postcoup leaders as my proxies for leader strength, I demonstrate that these patterns are indeed born out in the data. The next chapter will consider the effect of institutionalization on leadership succession.

Appendix

Appendix Table 6.1 *Summary statistics: length of leader tenure*

DV: length of leader tenure	Mean	SE	N
Whole sample	8.483	8.224	207
Measure of leader strength: founder vs subsequent leaders			
Founder (strong leader)	13.000	1.320	40
Nonfounder (weak leader)	7.401	0.606	167
Measure of leader strength: coup leader vs noncoup leaders			
Coup leader (strong leader)	8.214	1.061	70
Noncoup leader (weak leader)	8.620	.674	137

Note: Dependent variable is a count variable of the number of years the leader was in power.

Appendix Table 6.2 *Summary statistics: frequency of coups*

DV: length of leader tenure	Mean	SE	N
Whole sample	.190	.301	206
Measure of leader strength: founder vs subsequent leaders			
Founder (strong leader)	.051	.013	40
Nonfounder (weak leader)	.223	.025	166
Measure of leader strength: coup leader vs noncoup leaders			
Coup leader (strong leader)	.349	.043	69
Noncoup leader (weak leader)	.109	.019	137

Note: Dependent variable is the percentage of years in which a leader faced a coup attempt while in power.

Appendix Table 6.3 *What is the effect of institutionalization on leader tenure (leader strength proxy: founder versus successor)?*

DV: number of years leader is in power	(1)	(2)	(3)
Founder	7.388***	4.781**	4.886**
	(2.323)	(2.013)	(2.263)
VP/PM same ($ß_2$)	4.999***		
	(1.571)		
Founder*VP/PM same ($ß_3$)	–4.000		
	(4.252)		
Successor ($ß_2$)		2.770*	
		(1.474)	
Founder*successor ($ß_3$)		2.525	
		(3.265)	
Defense same ($ß_2$)			4.620**
			(1.945)
Founder*defense same ($ß_3$)			1.631
			(4.345)
GDP per capita	–0.227	–0.242	–0.008
	(0.358)	(0.406)	(0.348)
Oil production	1.658***	1.870***	1.493***
	(0.508)	(0.567)	(0.468)
Population	0.287	0.500	0.086
	(0.651)	(0.744)	(0.698)
Ethnic fractionalization	–0.343	–1.181	–0.491
	(1.751)	(1.931)	(1.904)
Constant	3.027	2.207	5.093
	(5.570)	(6.494)	(5.839)
$ß_2 + ß_3$	0.999	5.295*	6.251
	(3.860)	(2.924)	(4.171)
Observations	194	194	194
R-squared	0.153	0.155	0.155

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country. The effect of institutionalization for weak leaders is denoted by ($ß_2$). The effect of institutionalization for strong leaders is denoted by ($ß_2 + ß_3$). P-value and standard errors of ($ß_2 + ß_3$) calculated using Stata's "lincom" function. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 6.4 *What is the effect of institutionalization on leader tenure (leader strength proxy: coup leaders versus noncoup leaders)?*

DV: years in power	(1)	(2)	(3)
Coup leader	−0.169	−0.189	0.875
	(1.830)	(1.413)	(1.646)
VP/PM same ($ß_2$)	3.808*		
	(2.227)		
Founder*VP/PM same ($ß_3$)	3.402		
	(4.470)		
Successor ($ß_2$)		2.700	
		(1.884)	
Founder*successor ($ß_3$)		3.726	
		(2.883)	
Defense same ($ß_2$)			6.197**
			(2.650)
Founder*defense same ($ß_3$)			−0.714
			(4.445)
GDP per capita	−0.119	−0.120	0.087
	(0.356)	(0.412)	(0.346)
Oil production	1.452***	1.648***	1.259**
	(0.535)	(0.595)	(0.503)
Population	−0.038	0.251	−0.308
	(0.686)	(0.762)	(0.716)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.553	0.122	0.298
	(2.369)	(2.468)	(2.413)
Constant	6.504	4.311	8.213
	(5.735)	(6.504)	(5.888)
$ß_2 + ß_3$	7.21*	6.426**	5.483
	(3.924)	(2.565)	(3.623)
Observations	194	194	194
R-squared	0.078	0.082	0.092

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country. The effect of institutionalization for weak leaders is denoted by ($ß_2$). The effect of institutionalization for strong leaders is denoted by ($ß_2 + ß_3$). P-value and standard errors of ($ß_2 + ß_3$) calculated using Stata's "lincom" function. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

Appendix Table 6.5 *What is the effect of institutionalization on coup vulnerability (leader strength proxy: founder versus successors)?*

DV: coup attempts	(1)	(2)	(3)
Founder	–0.222***	–0.227***	–0.201***
	(0.045)	(0.058)	(0.058)
VP/PM same ($ß_2$)	–0.235***		
	(0.065)		
Founder*VP/PM same ($ß_3$)	0.263***		
	(0.065)		
Successor ($ß_2$)		–0.155***	
		(0.051)	
Founder*successor ($ß_3$)		0.200***	
		(0.067)	
Defense same ($ß_2$)			–0.232**
			(0.098)
Founder*defense same ($ß_3$)			0.261**
			(0.121)
GDP per capita	–0.017*	–0.019**	–0.029***
	(0.009)	(0.009)	(0.006)
Oil production	0.006	–0.002	0.017
	(0.011)	(0.014)	(0.012)
Population	–0.019	–0.038**	–0.016
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.015)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.103	0.144**	0.107**
	(0.068)	(0.061)	(0.051)
Years in power	–0.011***	–0.011***	–0.011***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Constant	0.511***	0.641***	0.477***
	(0.148)	(0.146)	(0.123)
$ß_2 + ß_3$	0.028	0.045	0.029
	(.048)	(.052)	(.070)
Observations	193	193	193
R-squared	0.243	0.234	0.239

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country. The effect of institutionalization for weak leaders is denoted by ($ß_2$). The effect of institutionalization for strong leaders is denoted by ($ß_2 + ß_3$). P-value and standard errors of ($ß_2 + ß_3$) calculated using Stata's "lincom" function. *** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.10$

Appendix Table 6.6 *What is the effect of institutionalization on coup vulnerability (leader strength proxy: coup leaders versus noncoup leaders)?*

DV: coup attempts	(1)	(2)	(3)
Coup leader	0.039	0.100*	0.053
	(0.038)	(0.059)	(0.059)
VP/PM same ($ß_2$)	−0.096**		
	(0.039)		
Founder*VP/PM same ($ß_3$)	0.158*		
	(0.082)		
Successor ($ß_2$)		−0.071	
		(0.049)	
Founder*successor ($ß_3$)		−0.079	
		(0.073)	
Defense same ($ß_2$)			−0.108**
			(0.050)
Founder*defense same ($ß_3$)			0.134
			(0.085)
GDP per capita	−0.002	−0.004	−0.008
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Oil production	0.011	0.004	0.013
	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Population	−0.010	−0.023*	−0.014
	(0.013)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.061	0.061	0.061
	(0.062)	(0.055)	(0.059)
Years in power	−0.008***	−0.007***	−0.008***
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Constant	0.266**	0.361**	0.297**
	(0.128)	(0.134)	(0.124)
$ß_2 + ß_3$	.062	− .149***	.025
	(.072)	(.053)	(.071)
Observations	101	101	101
R-squared	0.265	0.303	0.276

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country. The effect of institutionalization for weak leaders is denoted by ($ß_2$). The effect of institutionalization for strong leaders is denoted by ($ß_2 + ß_3$). P-value and standard errors of ($ß_2 + ß_3$) calculated using Stata's "lincom" function. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.10

8

Conclusion

8.1 TAKING STOCK: AUTHORITARIAN INSTITUTIONS RECONSIDERED

This book is motivated by the question of how executive power becomes institutionalized in authoritarian regimes. Under what conditions does the leader at the apex of power delegate authority to other elites, and why would such a leader want to do so? The book opened with a quote from Samuel Huntington's famous volume, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968). In that study, he examined the fundamental question of how political systems become institutionalized. Though Huntington did not make distinctions between regime types in his study, since then political scientists have established the very important observation that the institutional makeup of dictatorships does indeed vary across time and space. Dictatorships, like democracies, differ greatly in the extent to which they are institutionalized. This book explains how institutionalized forms of dictatorship emerge.

Why is this topic so important? Although the field of comparative authoritarianism has bourgeoned in the last twenty years, two major challenges remain.

First, the existing literature has largely been focused on studying the presence of nominally democratic institutions, such as parties, legislatures, and elections. Scholars have developed a number of theories explaining why autocratic leaders would voluntarily adopt institutions such as parties and legislatures (Boix and Svolik 2013; Gandhi 2008; Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Svolik 2012). These studies highlight the important idea that leaders choose to embrace nominally democratic institutions because doing so helps to strengthen their rule. Whereas political scientists and observers used to find it puzzling that dictatorships would adopt institutions that resemble those found in democracies, these studies emphasized the important idea that one-man rule was ultimately

destabilizing and that autocrats were willing to trade unconstrained power for more stable rule.

Yet, simply *having* institutions, such as parties or legislatures, does not necessarily constrain dictators. This is easily demonstrated by the fact that autocracies with ruling parties and legislatures are incredibly common in the post-Second World War era. From 1946 to 2008, autocratic leaders maintained a ruling party 87 percent of the time, and a legislature 85 percent of the time. These percentages have approached 100 percent since the end of the Cold War. Despite the prevalence of these institutions, scholars agree that the vast majority of dictatorships are not highly institutionalized or stable. During the same period, almost half of all leadership transitions that occurred in dictatorships were violent and coups were the most common way in which leaders were deposed. In fact, the appearance of democratic-like institutions, such as ruling parties, often obscures the true lack of constraints on the leader.

To sum up, although leaders do make strategic decisions regarding the adoption of autocratic institutions, the mere presence of nominally democratic institutions cannot explain why some regimes persist while others fall. Ruling parties, legislatures, or elections can often project and amplify autocratic power, rather than constrain it, and this is true especially when the institutions are weak. This book contends that the existing focus on nominally democratic institutions – many of which are quite weak – has diverted our focus of real and binding constraints on autocratic power. I argue that rather than studying regime institutions, scholars should focus on studying regime institutionalization.

Second, existing scholarship has largely focused on explaining the effects of institutions on regime stability, rather than the origins of constrained dictatorship. In fact, this omission has been noted by scholars (Magaloni 2006; 2008; Reuter 2017) but remains extremely understudied. If constrained forms of dictatorship do indeed have important stabilizing and regime maintenance properties, then why don't all autocratic leaders adopt such constraints? How do institutionalized forms of dictatorship emerge in the first place?

In addition to being an important scholarly omission, the origins of these constraints affect our understanding of the effects of regime institutionalization. As Pepinsky (2014) notes, no contemporary scholar of authoritarian regimes believes that these institutions are randomly assigned yet few studies have taken into account the endogenous adoption of institutions when theorizing and estimating the effects of such institutions. Leaders base decisions to institutionalize precisely on the presence or absence of underlying regime threats, and these strategic decisions affect the relationship between institutionalization and resulting regime

stability. Studies that examine the effects of autocratic institutions must also necessarily consider the origins of these institutions.

There is one exception to the general lack of studies focusing on the origins of autocratic institutions: a number of studies do examine the emergence of institutionalized ruling parties or dominant-party regimes (Brownlee 2007; Gehlbach and Keefer 2011; Levitsky and Way 2012; Reuter 2017; Slater 2010; Smith 2005).[1] However, the vast majority of ruling parties in autocracies are simply not strong or institutionalized, and most dictatorships are not true party-based regimes (Meng 2019). The vast majority of ruling parties fail to survive past the death or departure of the founding leader, suggesting that these organizations lack the institutional infrastructure to rule beyond the influence of a particular leader. Such regimes may have the façade of appearing as a party-based regime while under the tutelage of a charismatic leader but quickly crumble upon the death of the leader. Studies focusing on regimes with exceptionally strong ruling parties, such as the CCP in China, Communist Party of the Soviet Union, or PRI in Mexico, are likely explaining cases that resemble outliers rather than the modal dictatorship. In other words, previous studies lacked generalizable theories and empirical studies of how constrained forms of authoritarian rule emerge.

Furthermore, by emphasizing the regime stabilizing effects of institutions, existing studies have adopted a primarily functionalist approach to explaining the existence of parties and legislatures. Yet if we examine the historical record, it becomes quickly apparent that many ruling parties are not strategically created, but instead inherited by leaders. Virtually all leaders who come into power in newly postcolonial states do so with already existing pro-independence parties. Even coup leaders often ally with party elites and inherit already existing regime parties after taking office. In other words, parties and legislatures often exist not because incumbents strategically created them but because they already existed. By contrast, this book argues that the real strategic decision incumbents make is not whether to create these institutions, but whether to institutionalize their regime.

This book makes five broad claims that address shortcomings in the existing literature on comparative authoritarianism.

1. Regime institutionalization rather than the adoption of nominally democratic institutions drives authoritarian stability.

[1] Yet these studies still do not link the emergence of strong ruling parties to regime outcomes and instead focus primarily on explaining the origins of party-based regimes.

2. In contrast to the prominence of "big men" theories of rule, African dictatorships vary in their levels of institutionalization over space and time. Beginning in the 1990s, institutionalization has allowed incumbents to solidify their hold on power.
3. Institutions provide credible commitments only when they change the underlying distribution of power between actors. In authoritarian regimes this can be done by providing elites with access to the state.
4. Autocratic leaders make decisions to institutionalize based largely on the conditions under which they first come into power. These institutional decisions lock in and shape the rest of their rule.
5. We must take into account the endogenous adoption of these constraints when evaluating the effects of institutionalization on regime outcomes.

For the rest of this chapter, I will discuss each of these claims in more detail and summarize the empirical and theoretical contributions of these key findings. I will then conclude by considering the implications of my argument for future studies of institutional design and democratic backsliding.

8.2 Empirical Contribution: Reexamining Regime Institutionalization

The first set of contributions of this book are empirical. I highlight the importance of examining regime institutionalization as a distinct concept rather than simply focusing on the presence of nominally democratic institutions. Highly institutionalized regimes have explicit constraints on presidential power, and I introduce a new dataset measuring institutionalization by looking at constitutions and presidential cabinets. My measures demonstrate that existing variables of authoritarian institutions serve as poor proxies for regime institutionalization. The data also reveals a number of important findings for African politics, namely that institutions in Africa are not uniformly weak and that the regional trend toward institutionalization in the 1990s was an effort to reinforce authoritarian rule rather than usher in true democracy.

8.2.1 Measuring Autocratic Regime Institutionalization

Although autocratic regime institutionalization is a variable which scholars often reference, it has not been carefully defined or operationalized. Developing high quality indicators of authoritarian institutions poses a number of challenges, as dictatorships are often closed off or limit access

to accurate information. As a result, scholars are limited to a small number of large-N datasets that rely either on subjective expert coding or on overly broad measures of the existence of institutions.

In this book I present a new cross-sectional time-series dataset measuring autocratic regime institutionalization across all countries within sub-Saharan Africa from 1960 to 2010. Using historical records of state constitutions and presidential cabinets, I created seven indicators of regime institutionalization:

1. whether the constitution had a leadership succession policy;
2. whether the constitution had a leadership succession policy that designated a specific successor;
3. whether the constitution included term limits;
4. whether a vice president or prime minister was appointed to the presidential cabinet;
5. whether the person in the vice president or prime minister post was the same as the year before;
6. whether a defense minister was appointed in the presidential cabinet;
7. whether the person in the defense post was the same as the year before.

A clear advantage of this dataset is that it is objectively coded in a way that can be easily verified and replicated. Rather than hand-coding cases according to subjective criteria, the data was constructed around indicators that do not rely on the researcher to make subjective decisions when coding the variables. Each variable takes the form of a dummy variable, and simply asks whether a specific rule exists in the constitution or whether a specific position is filled within the cabinet.

An additional advantage is that the data is disaggregated and time-variant. Rather than collapsing multiple dimensions of institutionalization into a single regime category, the data is presented as separate indicators, therefore allowing the researcher to determine which dimension of institutionalization is most relevant to the research question at hand. Moreover, yearly measures allow us to observe not only differences across countries but also changes in levels of institutionalization over time. Finally, this approach of measuring regime institutionalization using data on constitutions and presidential cabinets is not unique to sub-Saharan Africa and can be replicated in other regions of the world.

A comparison between my measures of institutionalization in Africa against existing datasets reveals that simply having parties and legislatures does not necessarily mean that explicit constraints on executive power exist. Many regimes that have been coded as dominant-party regime types are actually not very institutionalized,

and expert-coded Polity and V-Dem scores display inconsistencies when compared to my disaggregated indicators of regime institutionalization. In sum, existing variables of autocratic institutions are poor indicators of regime institutionalization because they often do not reflect the extent to which the leader is actually constrained.

8.2.2 Regime Institutionalization in African Autocracies

This study also makes a number of important contributions to scholarship on African politics. It focuses explicitly on strategies of autocratic rule in sub-Saharan Africa, separating it from most existing studies that examine governance, development, conflict, and democratization in Africa. Furthermore, as a result of the proliferation of field, lab, and survey experiments in the region, much of the existing literature retains a strong focus on local-level politics. By contrast, this book presents theory and empirics on elite politics in sub-Saharan Africa.

I show that autocratic regimes in Africa vary substantially in their levels of institutionalization both across countries and over time. Autocratic regimes in Botswana, Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania, for instance, were highly institutionalized. Autocracies in countries such as Benin, Mali, Malawi, and Niger exhibited low levels of institutionalization. Whereas some leaders implemented few constraints on their authority while they were in power, other leaders created constitutional rules and delegated important cabinet positions to elites.

These empirical patterns establish an important finding: the image of African dictatorships as uniformly weak and uninstitutionalized is a false narrative. By providing empirical measures of autocratic regime institutionalization in sub-Saharan Africa, this book challenges a number of conventional wisdoms that prevail in the study of African politics. Scholars have historically argued that African dictatorships were ruled by "big men" who relied primarily on patronage-based strategies rather than institutions to remain in power. These studies generally disregarded constitutional rules and institutions in African autocracies as meaningless or window dressing. In contrast with these dominant perspectives, I demonstrate that there is rich variation in the extent to which dictatorships in Africa are institutionalized. While some autocrats, such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire or Modibo Keita of Mali, were indeed strongman dictators who ruled largely without constraints, other leaders, such as Ahmadou Ahidjo of Cameroon or Seretse Khama of Botswana created institutionalized mechanisms of power sharing that limited their despotic power. This book shows that some African autocrats do indeed rule through institutions that regulate and depersonalize

power, and this is true even during the most authoritarian decades prior to the end of the Cold War. Institutions are not uniformly weak in sub-Saharan Africa.

The data also highlights that patterns of institutionalization change over time. There is a clear difference between the modal African autocracy before and after the end of the Cold War. In the decades from the 1960s through the 1980s, weak leaders were compelled to institutionalize their regimes during the independence era. As a result, about half of African autocracies during this time established institutionalized power-sharing mechanisms through cabinet ministerial appointments and roughly a quarter created constitutional succession procedures. Following the end of the Cold War from the 1990s through the present, most African autocrats were forced to institutionalize their regimes and we see a sharp increase in the creation of constitutional rules and stable cabinet appointments.

Moreover, this book provides an alternative perspective on democratization in Africa. I contend that trends toward institutionalization in the 1990s were an attempt by incumbents to recalibrate the political system in order to entrench authoritarian stability, rather than genuine movement towards political liberalization. Despite the introduction of multiparty elections across most African nations following the end of the Cold War, democratic consolidation remains stubbornly out of reach in most countries within the region. This book demonstrates how regime institutionalization allowed incumbents and elites to strike credible and lasting bargains of joint rule, even as external conditions changed. Rather than ushering in real citizen-led democracies, the institutionalization of African regimes in the 1990s introduced more durable rule-based forms of authoritarian rule.

8.3 THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTION: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF REGIME INSTITUTIONALIZATION

The second key contribution of this book is theoretical. I examine the causes and contributions of regime institutionalization. I provide a specific mechanism of how institutions can provide credible commitment power, rather than assuming that de jure rules on paper will be binding. Importantly, this book considers how the strategic origins of institutionalization shape the effects of such rules. The consequences of institutions are intimately related to where these institutions came from. Rather than considering the origins and effects of regime institutionalization in isolation, this book provides a unifying account of the creation and consequences of institutionalized dictatorship.

8.3 Theoretical Contribution

8.3.1 Sources of Credible Commitment Power in Autocracies

This book tackles the question of how certain types of institutions can credibly constrain autocratic leaders. After all, as Svolik (2012) highlights, one of the defining features of an authoritarian regime is the lack of an independent authority with the power to enforce agreements amongst actors. Furthermore, in dictatorships violence is always available as an outside option. How then, do institutions become binding and self-reinforcing? After all, a dictator who can create an institution can also disassemble it as well.

I argue that institutions matter, not when they establish de jure rules, but when they affect de facto political power. Institutions credibly constrain leaders only when they change the underlying distribution of power between the incumbent and elites. Within the context of this book, the establishment of executive constraints empowers elites by providing them with access to the state. When leaders delegate key cabinet positions, such as the vice presidency or minister of defense position, that particular elite is given access to the power and resources that are associated with that ministry. He then can then reward his own constituency, therefore consolidating his own base of support. Furthermore, elites that are assigned to key positions within the cabinet, such as the vice president or prime minister, then become focal points for other elites. This is particularly true when the appointee is designated in the constitution as the legal successor to the presidency. The designated successor is identified as a potential challenger to the incumbent if she were to renege on promises to distribute rent. To sum up, institutions that empower and identify specific challengers help to solve elite collective action problems, and this mechanism provides the key source of commitment power in autocracies. Institutionalization limits despotic power by creating conditions that actually threaten the leader.

8.3.2 The Origins of Institutionalized Dictatorship

This book examines how institutionalized forms of dictatorship emerge. I argue that autocratic leaders make decisions to institutionalize at the start of their tenure based largely on the conditions under which they come into power. Since regime institutionalization places binding constraints on leaders, autocrats do not institutionalize unless they must. Leaders who enter power weak and vulnerable to being deposed are most likely to place constraints on their own authority. Because temporary offers of patronage are insufficient to buy quiescence from exceptionally strong elites, weak leaders remain in power by delegating authority to

elites. Providing elites with access to the state shifts the distribution of power away from the autocrat in favor of her appointees, providing them with an institutional mechanism to guarantee their access to future rents. Leaders who enter power extremely strong and having already consolidated power have no incentives to create institutionalized mechanism for rent distribution because they do not face credible threats to their rule. Initially weak autocrats therefore adopt institutional constraints under duress. They trade absolute power for regime stability.

This theory presents an interesting twist of fate. Initially strong leaders are not incentivized to invest in mechanisms of joint rule because they are able to remain in power without making institutional commitments to other elites. Yet, this strategy of one-man rule is ultimately destabilizing and does not last beyond the founding leader. On the other hand, initially weak leaders must pursue the strategy of empowering other elites in order to buy their support. These self-interested actions generate power-sharing institutions, which can last beyond the tenure of that particular leader. Durable authoritarianism emerges out of initial leader weakness.

My theory also stresses the path dependent nature of regime institutionalization. Because violence is an ever-present option in autocracies, incumbents necessarily worry about being deposed from the day that they enter office. The initial distribution of power between the incumbent and her elites shape her decision about the types of institutions to set up at the very start of her rule. However, as institutionalization empowers other elites, it becomes self-reinforcing and difficult to remove. Even if the incumbent becomes stronger in later periods, she remains constrained by the very rules she implemented at the start of her tenure.

This argument attempts to address critiques of the authoritarian institutions literature as being overly functionalist. Although in my account, leaders are indeed making strategic decisions to institutionalize or not, these decisions have a "lock-in" effect and are not easily disposable. Leaders cannot construct and disassemble institutions on a whim. Whether a leader is especially vulnerable to being deposed at the start of her tenure is historically determined by the way in which she obtained power. This initial distribution of power affects her decision to institutionalize, which in turn has long-lasting consequences on the institutional makeup of the regime.

8.3.3 Reassessing the Effects of Institutionalization on Autocratic Durability

After providing a theory of the endogenous emergence of executive constraints, the book reexamines the relationship between institutionalization and autocratic durability. Do institutionalized regimes actually

perform better on outcomes such as the length of leader tenure, vulnerability to coup attempts, and leadership succession? By contrast to most previous accounts, this book considers the fact that rules are strategically adopted by autocrats when determining the effects of these institutions on regime outcomes.

Building on the theory developed in the first half of the book, I argue that we should observe differential effects of institutionalization on autocratic durability for initially strong versus initially weak leaders. Since leaders who enter office already strong do not need to rely on power-sharing institutions to remain in power, we should observe little or no effect of institutionalization on durability for strong leaders. Their rule is secure with or without institutions. For leaders who enter office weak, however, institutionalization should have an effect on autocratic durability because it provides a credible mechanism for long-term rent distribution to elites. In sum, institutionalization does have an effect on regime outcomes, such as leader tenure or vulnerability to coups, but primarily for weak leaders.

These findings make an important contribution to a large body of existing scholarship focusing on estimating the effects of autocratic institutions on regime durability. Despite the general consensus that institutionalized forms of dictatorship tend to be the most stable, the empirical record of the relationship between institutions and regime stability has been very mixed. While some studies (such as Boix and Svolik 2013; Brownlee 2007; and Geddes 1999a) have found a significant effect of institutions on regime durability, other studies (such as Gandhi 2008; and Smith 2005) have found no systematic relationship.

This book provides two reasons why existing studies have produced divergent empirical findings. First, the existing findings may be subject to a number of measurement problems due to the difficulties of obtaining fine-grained data that accurately reflects the extent to which the leader is constrained. As the book demonstrated in Chapter 4, simply having institutions such as parties and legislatures is not a strong predictor of credible executive constraints, and many regimes that have been coded as party-based are actually not very institutionalized. Second, existing studies are also subject to biased theoretical modeling. This book argues that different types of leaders make different institutional decisions when they come into power. These strategic decisions are based on underlying threat perceptions. Leaders who enter office strong do not institutionalize because they do not need to do so in order to remain in power. A regression model that regresses institutionalization on regime stability without taking into account differential effects based on leader type will likely result in either a diminished effect or null effect of institutionalization on autocratic stability, both of which would be inaccurate.

Finally, I also show that highly institutionalized regimes are more likely to survive peaceful leadership transitions. However, the book notes that peaceful transitions of power are an unintended consequence of strategic institutionalization by leaders. Incumbents create constitutional rules designating the succession order and appoint elites to high-ranking positions within the presidential cabinet not necessarily out of concern for the stability of regime after they die. Instead, they make these institutional decisions to stabilize their own rule and prevent elites from preemptively trying to depose them. Yet these self-interested actions empower the designated successor, who has every incentive to remain loyal to the current regime in the hope of being the next incumbent.

The findings from these two chapters produce two distinct types of autocratic regimes. The first is that of the institutionalized dictatorship. Such regimes may appear initially weak due to the absence of a charismatic and influential figurehead. Yet, durable institutions emerge out of autocratic weakness. Since initially weak leaders cannot rely on personalist strategies of rule to stay in power, such leaders must necessarily delegate authority to other elites. These institutional arrangements become self-reinforcing over time and joint rule allows the regime to survive past the tenure of a single leader.

The second is that of the strongman dictatorship. This leader enters office having already consolidated power and is often a charismatic "founding father" figure. Strongman leaders do not need to institutionalize their regimes in order to maintain support from other elites because they do not face any viable elite challengers of equal status. However, due to the lack of succession planning and absence of institutionalized rules and organizational structure that can operate independently of the ruler, these regimes fall apart upon the death of the strongman leader.

Yet it is important to note that personalist dictators can often remain in power for very long periods of time and in fact often die in office. Dictators such as Francisco Franco who ruled Spain from 1939 until his death in 1975 or Mobutu Sese Seko who ruled Zaire from 1965 to 1997, remained in power for decades. Because leaders endogenously respond to threats, regime institutionalization and the length of leader tenure are not strongly correlated. However, this mode of personalist rule generally cannot be passed on beyond the tenure of one leader. While strongman dictatorships appear stable while the incumbent is still alive, such regimes do not survive leadership transitions. As a result, institutionalized regimes do indeed survive longer than uninstitutionalized regimes by solving the leadership succession problem. The longest surviving autocracies, such as those in China, Tanzania, and Mexico under the PRI, reflect this pattern.

8.4 LOOKING AHEAD: IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, DEMOCRATIZATION, AND DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

This chapter concludes by considering the implications of autocratic regime institutionalization for future studies of institutional design, democratization, and democratic backsliding. One of the themes of this book is that institutional change is path dependent. Since effective constraints are those that bind, the institutional decisions that leaders make early on in their tenure often shape the rest of their rule. Another important implication of this study is that the initial period of a leader's tenure often constitutes a critical juncture. How a leader enters office determine the power dynamics within the regime coalition, and the relative strength of the incumbent versus elites shapes the institutional arrangements that emerge at the start of the regime. Founding leaders tend to be dangerously personalist. Even though the strategy of strongman rule may be sustainable through the lifespan of the first leader, such systems frequently crumble when the leader dies, revealing underlying institutional weaknesses within the regime. On this front, scholars and practitioners should pay close attention to first leadership transitions, which often expose the extent to which the regime can operate independently of any particular leader.

This book also has important implications for theories of democratization. I demonstrate that autocratic leaders can often appear democratic by introducing nominally democratic institutions, such as parties, legislatures, and elections. Yet these incumbents and their elites retain political power through institutionalized arrangements. This suggests that researchers and policymakers may be misinterpreting highly institutionalized autocracies for countries undergoing democratic transitions, when in fact, real access to power remains out of reach for ordinary citizens. Future research should pay greater attention to the quality of democratic institutions in transitioning countries rather than simply observing the presence or absence of these institutions.

In fact, even the introduction of multiparty elections does not necessarily result in democratic consolidation. As recent scholarship on elections in sub-Saharan Africa has demonstrated, incumbents routinely exploit access to state resources to coopt opposition parties and politicians (Arriola, DeVaro, and Meng 2018, Bleck and van de Walle 2018). Importantly, these strategies can occur even in the absence of fraud or explicit rule breaking. Leaders can exploit free and fair elections to amplify their own incumbency advantages. Electoral competition may not necessarily become institutionalized even when formal electoral

institutions are in place (Posner and Young 2007). These themes suggest that future scholarship on democratic transitions and consolidation should pay more attention to the conditions under which the introduction of multiparty elections actually produce electoral turnover.

Finally, this book also provides insights that address growing concerns about democratic backsliding. Democratic backsliding, also referred to as democratic erosion, broadly describes the process of "state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy" (Bermeo 2016, 5). It is a topic that has gained increasing attention but has received little scholarly research in political science thus far. Scholars are now in the early stages of conceptualizing and measuring democratic backsliding in addition to understanding the causes and consequences of it.

On this topic, this book offers two important perspectives. First, any regime – whether democratic or authoritarian – can have institutions that constrain executive power. Therefore, the debilitation or elimination of political institutions is not and should not be limited to the study of democracies. Institutionalized forms of dictatorship can backslide as well. This has been demonstrated by the removal of constitutional term limits by President Xi Jinping of China in 2018 and President Paul Biya of Cameroon in 2008. Scholars should therefore pursue the study of *de*-institutionalization across all regime types, without restricting analysis of institutional erosion to democracies.

Second, this book demonstrates that institutional constraints are most effective when they empower specific political actors who can check the authority of the president. Not all constitutional rules have the same sticking power, and certain types of institutions may be easier to remove or weaken than others. As Chapter 7 argued, term limits are easier to ignore or remove compared with constitutional succession procedures because term limits do not empower particular elite challengers. Therefore when an incumbent violates term limits, elites have a more difficult time overcoming coordination problems required to sanction the incumbent because it is not clear who exactly is losing out the most. Future research can consider this mechanism of elite empowerment when trying to understand the conditions under which leaders can weaken or remove institutional constraints on their power. Constitutional rules matter, not because they exist on paper, but only when they reshape political power.

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