

Democracy, Dictatorship, and Term Limits

Alexander Baturo

The University of Michigan Press
Ann Arbor

Copyright © by the University of Michigan 2014

All rights reserved

This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, including illustrations, in any form (beyond that copying permitted by Sections 107 and 108 of the U.S. Copyright Law and except by reviewers for the public press), without written permission from the publisher.

Published in the United States of America by

The University of Michigan Press

Manufactured in the United States of America

Printed on acid-free paper

2017 2016 2015 2014 4 3 2 1

A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Baturo, Alexander.

Democracy, dictatorship, and term limits / Alexander Baturo.

pages cm. — (New comparative politics)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-0-472-11931-8 (cloth : alk. paper) — ISBN 978-0-472-12023-9 (e-book)

1. Democracy—Case studies. 2. Dictatorship—Case studies. I. Title.

JC423.B2637 2014

321.8—dc23

2013033839

Page v

To Natalie, Alisa, and Philip

Page vi

List of Tables

2.1 Formal Presidential Terms in 2010

3.1 How Constitutional Amendments Are Promulgated: Summary Statistics

3.2 Institutional Constraints in Non- and Partly Democratic Regimes: Summary Statistics

3.3 Term Limits and Re-election, 1960–2009

3.4 How Terms Are Extended: Summary Statistics

3.5 Presidential *Continuismo*, 1960–2009

4.1 Occupation after Leaving Presidential Office

4.2 Remuneration in Office and Salary-to-Responsibility Ratios, Selected Presidents

4.3 Estimates of Funds Skimmed from Office, Selected Presidents

6.1 Stakes of Losing Office, Constraints and Term Limits

6.2 Stakes of Losing Office, Constraints, and Term Limits in Non-, Partly and Democratic Regimes

6.3 Institutions and International Influences

6.4 Stakes of Losing Office, Constraints and Term Limits: Alternative Model Specifications

6.5 The Cox Proportional Hazard Model of Compliance with Term Limits

6.6 Stakes of Losing Office, Constraints and Term Limits: Alternative Specification of the Dependent Variable

7.1 Individual Background and Constitutional Compliance

7.2 Individual Traits as an Omitted Variable

Page x

8.1 Survival in Office and Fate after Leaving Office

8.2 Incumbency, Liberalizing Elections and Electoral Defeats: GEE Models

8.3 Incumbency and Electoral Results: Selection Models

8.4 Economic Growth Variance and Time Horizons

8.5 Time Horizons and Capital and Social Spending

List of Figures

- 2.1 Presidential Term Limits in 1962, 1975, 1991 and 2010
- 2.2 The Emergence of a Norm of Presidential Term Limits, 1960–2010
- 2.3 Presidential Terms and Democracy, 2010
- 3.1 Party, Institutional, and Mass Constraints
- 4.1 Personal Choice over Public and Private Careers
- 6.1 Selection of Presidents for Analyses
- 6.2 Predicted Probability of Extending Tenure, 1960–2009.
- 6.3 Substantive Effects of Predictors on the Dependent Variable
- 7.1 Personal Background of Presidents, Democracy, and Development
- 7.2 Personal Background and Compliance with Term Limits

Acknowledgments

The initial idea for this book can be dated to one particular conversation with my friends almost fifteen years ago that we had back at the Central European University in Budapest. I remember us discussing careers of several post-Soviet presidents, such as Karimov, Lukashenko or Niyazov, who at that time were busy rewriting constitutions to their advantage. We tried to imagine what else could these political leaders do if they had stepped down from power, and we simply could not. We could hardly see these leaders working in private sectors, as goodwill ambassadors or running their own nonprofit foundations. In fact, no matter how we looked at it, being in office appeared to be the best and safest thing that ever happened to these individuals. Since then I have thought a lot about the motivation of rulers in transitional and developing countries, what was at stake for them and what implications their behavior had for democracy. The questions of career concerns of the national political leaders, presidential confrontations with term limits and their consequences for democratic consolidation received no systematic attention in comparative democratization literature at that time. Ultimately, this and related puzzles led me to turn to academic research for answers. Post-Soviet presidents still provide almost half of the illustrative examples used in this book — this is because of my familiarity with the region — the other half, however, hail from the rest of the world, mainly from Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa; statistical analyses center on all the world presidents. From the existing scholarship I have learnt a lot about the role of institutions, economic performance, international environment and other factors behind political regimes' stability and change. Throughout this book, references to various scholars who work in comparative democratization should also be treated as a sign of my acknowledgment and indebtedness. Without their guidance this book would not have been written.

This book would also not have been written without funding received from the Irish Research Council for the Humanities and Social Sciences, Page xiv as well as from Dublin City University's Early Career Start Award. They enabled me to gather the required data and, crucially, gave sufficient time to contemplate and finish the book. Special thanks go to my colleagues at the School of Law and Government of Dublin City University to whom all, with their patience and understanding over my frequent absences at whatever I was required to attend, as well as their encouragement and enthusiasm, I am indebted. Their subtle sense of humor is also what makes this department such a pleasant place to work.

Some of the arguments presented in this book draw on earlier conference papers presented at the Midwest Political Science Association and American Political Science Association Annual Meetings in 2005–7. I would like to thank the participants for their insightful comments and suggestions, in particular Jason Brownlee and Jennifer Gandhi. Also, an early and condensed version of the argument made in [chapter 4](#) and tested in [chapter 6](#) was published as “The Stakes of Losing Office, Term Limits and Democracy,” *British Journal of Political Science* 40(3): 635–62 (2010). I am grateful to Cambridge University Press for allowing me to reprint parts of this paper. The book manuscript was written in 2009–10; subsequently I updated it (e.g., time in office) to the end of 2011.

While researching and writing this book I received very valuable feedback from scholars and practitioners alike. I have been fortunate to interact and discuss my work with, and wish to thank, Kenneth Benoit, Sarah Birch, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randall Calvert, John Doyle, Michael Gallagher, Ronald Hill, Marc Howard, Roland Kovats, John Kubinec, Michael Marsh, Gail McElroy, Peter McCrossan, Iain McMenamin, Azra Naseem, Daudi Nyaluke, Sanja Pesek, Joanna Rohozinska, Katya Ryabiko, and Vasily Vaschanka. I am especially thankful to my friends and fellow political scientists David Doyle, Robert Elgie, Jos Elkink, Julia Gray, Slava Mikhailov and Eoin O'Malley for reading and commenting on various parts of this manuscript. I would also like to thank Michael Laver, the editor of the series; the anonymous reviewers; and Melody Herr and Andrea Olson at the University of Michigan Press. Any errors and omissions are entirely mine. Most importantly, I would like to thank my wife and daughter for understanding my absence and absent-mindedness while writing this book. My wife also proved that AutoCAD can be used not only in the interior architecture and design but also in political science, as can be seen from several illustrative figures in text. To all those mentioned herein and those I unintentionally failed to include, I am indebted.

The authority of the King in France has, in the first place, the advantage of duration over that of the President; and durability is one of the chief elements of strength nothing is either loved or feared but what is likely to endure. The President of the United States is a magistrate elected for four years. The King in France is a hereditary sovereign.

Alexis de Tocqueville (1864, 155)

Introduction: Presidential Term Limits and the New Caesarism

In the past fifty years, between 1960 and 2010, from Latin America to post-Soviet Eurasia, out of two hundred term-bounded presidents that have served their terms, more than a quarter have managed to extend their stay in office beyond constitutionally mandated periods in one way or another. Many ambitious presidents throughout the world strive to increase their power and control the executive, the legislative and judiciary branches of their nations, and to preside over enforcement agencies that make it possible to extend these leaders' remit into all corners of public and private life. Yet, if these leaders have to surrender all these powers and step down, as stipulated by presidential term limits — an institution that prescribes the maximum length of tenure that a president can serve in office — then dictators they are not, so term limits are not compatible with absolute power. Indeed, as the eminent scholar of democracy Juan Linz underscored, one of the defining characteristics of democracy is that it is government *pro tempore*, and authoritarianism is the one that is “forever” (Linz 1998, 20–21). During the 2011 Arab Spring in Egypt one of the key demands of pro-democracy protesters, eager to leave decades of one-man rule in the past, was to impose mandatory term limits on future presidents. Yet, in a never-ending cycle of history repeating itself, just as the long-standing rulers in the North Africa were departing from the scene, other national leaders — Hugo Chávez, Vladimir Putin, Daniel Ortega — were implementing personal designs in their own quests for political immortality.

Term limits have a long history, just as the numerous attempts to circumvent them do, and remain at the center of our understanding of Page 2 how many political regimes across the world function. The names of Napoleon III of France, Porfirio Díaz of Mexico, or Juan Perón of Argentina, who were elected for limited periods, became “indispensable,” then overturned limitations on the duration of their mandates, are familiar to all students of politics. In the past five decades, and especially after the collapse of the Berlin Wall, presidential term limits, alongside multiparty elections and other democratic norms, have proliferated even among less democratic regimes. Unlike elections that can be manipulated, however, tenure restrictions are more difficult to manipulate: a given ruler either steps down when term limits approach, or does not. It is not obvious whether presidents will abide by their constitutions when the time comes, and an orderly and institutionalized presidential succession remains problematic. In fact, reluctance of political leaders to leave the scene is so prevalent that it is increasingly recognized as one of the main obstacles to democratic development. Mohamed Ibrahim, a prominent philanthropist and businessman who launched dozens of developmental initiatives throughout Africa, underlined that because “the actions of the President are really crucial,” personal decisions to depart from office are paramount: therefore in 2006 he established the multi-million Ibrahim Prize in order to incentivize political leaders for good governance and compliance with term limits.¹

Many presidents attempt to rule by decree, diminish the power of parliaments or replace constitutional courts' judges with their own supporters, and they surely encounter virulent criticism and opposition. Yet, no other institutional changes provoke as much debate and opposition as meddling with term limits. Consider the failed attempt to prolong his stay in power by President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007) of Nigeria. The president's bid was backed by supporters who wanted him to complete his economic reforms as well as, allegedly, by a group of businessmen with close links to the president who benefited from rent-seeking.² The opposition to a third term was very vocal, and ranged from civil society groups and many Western governments to Obasanjo's own vice-president. Why did so many political actors, both on the elite and mass levels, oppose a third term for the president? What is the purpose of restricting voters' choice by eliminating one contender for the highest office? The opponents to a third term hailed the failed bid as a victory for Nigeria's democracy. But if checks and balances worked in Nigeria, as manifested by the successful opposition to a third term, then restricting tenure can arguably be a redundant and undemocratic instrument. Surely, should a president have decided to transgress his constitutional boundaries in the future, these checks and balances could have prevented him from doing so, or the voters Page 3 would have defeated him in elections?

Put simply, the arguments about term limits rest on the perpetual debate between the democratic tradition and that of constitutionalism. Indeed, constitutionalism is the tradition that attempts to prevent democracy's despotic inclinations and protect rights, often from a democratic majority (Dworkin 1996; Elster and Slagstad 1993). Much like minority rights that have to be protected irrespective of majority preferences, term limits insulate compulsory rotation in politics from democratic majority: office-holders must step down when term limits stipulate, irrespective of the majority's preferences. While elections subject politicians to voters' judgment at regular intervals and thus to the possibility of losing office (see Manin (1997) and Cheibub and Przeworski (1999) on electoral accountability), elections do not guarantee a rotation in office, only the prospect thereof, as individual politicians can be repeatedly re-elected. In contrast, the institution of term limits, if binding, ensures compulsory periodic rotation of office-holders irrespective of voter preferences. Many constitutions across the world choose to ensure such rotation because the perils of longer or unlimited time in office are quite serious: it can increase political barriers to entry, and the long-standing incumbents will be able to consolidate power further, lower remaining constraints, while voters and civil servants can get accustomed to particular individuals and even develop apathy to politics. Consequently, the only feasible strategies for alternation of power become nonelectoral: regime insiders' (or outsiders') coups, mass revolutions and uprisings. The office-holders are certainly aware of this and respond by making their regimes even more repressive in order to prevent irregular alternation.

If compliance with presidential term limits is so important for democratic development, what are the factors that can ensure that political leaders will honor constitutional norms, across presidential regimes? The general explanation as to why many presidents facing term limits attempt, often successfully, to scrap tenure restrictions while many more step down when constitutionally required is that democratic leaders comply with their constitutions while dictators do not. However, can the strength of democracy and of the executive constraints alone explain individual compliance with constitutional norms, across political regimes? Recent experiences of presidents bidding for additional terms illustrate that institutional checks and balances, in particular the strength of legislative opposition and an independent judiciary, as well as mass collective action potential of the citizenry, in addition to the leverage of international players over domestic politics, often do thwart the designs of ambitious leaders. For example, in Zambia, President Frederick Chiluba's (1991–2002) bid to remain in office was defeated when confronted by his own party's grass-roots members, civil society, and international donors. President Carlos Menem (1989–99) of Argentina's third bid was hindered by a resurgent Supreme Court, opposition parties and members of his own party.

In general however, even though the strength of institutional constraints certainly contributes to the explanation of presidents' behavior when the latter are confronted with term limits, such an explanation will not be complete. In many unconsolidated democratic and partly democratic regimes, the strength of democracy and the associated executive constraints themselves need to be explained. In the context of constitutional compliance with term limits, the costs and benefits of staying in office for particular presidents, their individual preferences, are likely to loom large as leaders often decide single-handedly whether to comply with norms and depart, or subvert their constitutions instead. To put it simply, if a president decides to depart, he or she will. A great number of sitting presidents in less democratic nations often choose to obey limits and to step down, such as Leopold Senghor of Senegal in 1980, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana in 2000, and Festus Mogae of Botswana in 2008, to name only a few. Arguably, these leaders faced similar, or even less significant, institutional constraints than many leaders that attempted to remain in office.

Also, among electoral regimes, whether fully democratic, partly or nondemocratic, there exists considerable variation in whether or not presidents respect term limits. On average, among presidents that are able to complete their terms that are prescribed by their constitutions at the time of entry into office, around a quarter successfully attempt to remain in office longer.³ In partly democratic regimes, two out of five leaders manage to remain in office beyond constitutional mandates. Even in regimes that are defined as fully democratic at the time of entry into office of their leaders — for instance, such as Daniel Ortega (2007–) of Nicaragua or Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) of Peru — one in ten leaders does not comply with constitutions. In addition, compliance with term limits, or whether presidential tenure is regulated in the first place, varies among more repressive regimes also. Many authoritarian rulers do face limits and they comply with constitutions. For example, López Arellano

(1963–71) of Honduras chose to honor constitutional single term and stepped down in 1971. Likewise, Brazil during military rule (1964–85) or Mexico under the *PRI* (1929–2000) chose to regulate executive turnover. Not only does there exist a variation in compliance among more and less democratic regimes alike, in addition, during the Page 5 tenure of a particular president a country can also make significant democratic progress, or regress; and compliance with, or subversion of, term limits almost always plays a significant role in this.⁴ This variation only underscores the urgent need to examine the motivation of presidents in a more general structure than simply looking at democrats versus autocrats.

What can explain whether presidents step down or extend their tenure? What are the consequences of the outcomes of presidential succession on democratic transition and consolidation? Why do some presidents in dictatorships step down without a fight? How can presidents extend their stay in power? These and other questions will be addressed here. Because presidents themselves often determine their own succession behavior, a proper understanding of the costs and benefits of staying in office of individual leaders is required. While this book describes and explains the role of term limits in democracy and dictatorship, primarily it is about factors behind political leaders' compliance with constitutional norms, about degeneration into personalism and authoritarian reversals. In other words, the subject is the onset of personalism — the breakdown of term limits — rather than development and breakdown of personalist regimes over longer time periods as in, for instance, Chehabi and Linz (1998). Geddes (1999) finds that personalist regimes usually end with the death or incapacity of their rulers. This book attempts to explain how these regimes begin. When presidents choose to comply with constitutions and step down, they signal their acquiescence that institutions are more important than men, however effective and indispensable the latter might be, and that the key political actors agree to the “rules of the game.” Why do they agree to comply with the rules of the game, however? The answer I propose stands in contrast to existing literature that emphasizes the role of institutions: a simple framework can be used to explain whether presidents the world over retain their office. That framework centers on the incentives facing an executive at the end of his or her term.

The Argument of This Book: The Costs and Benefits of Leaving Office

Similar to the most famous Roman of them all, Julius Caesar, who crossed the Rubicon and proceeded to claim the consecutive titles of consul, dictator and dictator for life, many contemporary presidents that are confronted with term limits decide to circumvent them and cross their own Rubicons in their quest of political immortality. The Page 6 referral to Caesar is not coincidental, as the study of stability and change of presidential term limits is also a study of caesarism, a historical term for the “subversion of constitutional government by an outstanding leader” (Linz 2000, 63). At its heart, the argument of this book is simple — similarly to Caesar, who was concerned for what he stood to lose before his famous crossing, contemporary Caesars will attempt to stay in office if the stakes of losing office are too high. Yet this seemingly straightforward argument is more multifaceted than it might initially appear, and it will serve as the foundation of the overall query into the nature of presidential power, the relationship between rent-seeking and political regimes, and personal survival. Presidents contemplating whether to comply with constitutional term limits or extend their stay instead have to be able to implement such an extension — hence constraints on the executive capacity matter — but they also have varying monetary and personal incentives to remain in that office — hence individual motives are also crucial.⁵ It is not sufficient to focus on how political institutions constrain or empower presidents who desire to take over political regimes. Instead, we also need to understand what is it that individual presidents can gain or lose, in or out of political office.

Monetary and personal motives to remain in office — the value of holding political office for individual presidents — depend on the income-generating capacity of that office, in contrast to potential income after leaving it, as well as on personal concerns over future immunity and status. The larger *magnitude of spoils* from the political office and the lower *probability of retaining these spoils and immunity* after exit from office increase the likelihood that a president will try to personalize his or her regime and extend tenure. The stakes of losing office for a president in a poor, corrupt country are much higher than for a president in an industrialized democracy. The former could face exile or imprisonment once they step down, while the latter can look forward to lucrative writing contracts and lecture tours. Second, the former derive their income while in office through rent-seeking while the latter, unless they were already wealthy prior to assuming office, make much more money after they

leave office. If presidents cannot enrich themselves after leaving office in various lucrative private sector endeavors, they are more likely to acquire personal wealth while in office. Leaders will also raise the bar if they commit crimes and abuses of power not necessarily related to the acquisition of wealth. These two groups of rulers, therefore, face different intertemporal payoffs whereby one group postpones the acquisition of wealth until after exit from office, and another sees political office as a source of income and Page 7 accumulates wealth while they can. Even though all leaders can be motivated by personal and financial concerns, leaders in the latter group will have *stronger* motivation to retain their office because of the larger magnitude of spoils and the lower probability of retaining these spoils and immunity.

The magnitude of available spoils depends on the size of public sector and of governmental procurement markets, as well as natural resource rents. In turn, such spoils are often transferred into foreign jurisdictions in the form of the so-called capital flight. The probability of retaining spoils and immunity depends on the likelihood that financial assets can be expropriated, as well as on whether presidents have legitimate immunity concerns and whether their immunity can be protected by their successors. Leaders become more reluctant to depart when the spoils of office are plentiful, which is often evidenced by the number of palaces they occupy, the size of the presidential budget and the offshore banking accounts, as I illustrate throughout this book. These spoils, however, are all derived from the rent-seeking activities in the economy. A recent surge of high-profile cases of the so-called *grand corruption* — illicit acquisition of wealth and money by the highest public officials, including the heads of state (The Financial Action Task Force 2011), — indicates the extent of spoils of office that can accrue to presidents. For instance, it was estimated that President Jean-Claude Duvalier (1971–86) of Haiti was able to generate and transfer overseas sums that were equivalent to 1.7–4.5 percent of Haitian GDP *for each year* during his tenure (World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 2007, 10).

There is an old research program that underlines the nexus between office-holders' motives, economic and political structures and the opportunities the latter can provide for politicians. Indeed, Max Weber in his magisterial *Economy and Society* argued that many office-holders throughout history perceived their office in purely economic terms as a private source of income — and lived “off” politics — and with time developed a property right to their offices (Weber 1978, 966). Furthermore, in *Government and Parliament in a Reconstructed Germany* he argued that capable leaders would be attracted to political careers in a democratic, good parliament, while a bad and nondemocratic legislature would appeal to bureaucrats and demagogues, and capable leaders would go to private cartels, industries and banks instead. Similarly to a Weberian politician who lives “off” politics, many contemporary presidents treat their office as the source of income, develop a property right to that office, and, when confronted with term limits, are unable to part.

Page 8

Presidents motivated by the magnitude of available spoils and concerns for immunity must also have the *capacity* to confront other political players and change their constitutions in order to stay in power. In less democratic regimes self-perpetuation in power is more frequent and, in general, easier to implement since presidents face fewer constraints. Still, the existence of powerful and autonomous institutions can thwart their leaders' attempts to remain in power even in nondemocratic regimes. In the process, rulers often have to battle over supremacy with legislatures, courts and civil society groups; they have to make sure that their own political parties support their bids. As I argue in [chapter 3](#), presidents of the world are more capable of circumventing constitutional prohibition on the number of terms when they control their own political parties, especially if they have strong personal legitimacy within their own parties as party founders. Likewise, successful extenders are able to control legislative majority and impose their preferences on the judiciary. These factors will often, but not always, make compliance with limits less likely. In order to explain such compliance therefore, we need to understand not only factors that constrain the presidents, but also what drives them to desire office so much in the first place.

Many presidents cannot simply step down from office whatever constraints and obstacles they might have. For instance, for President Miloš evi (1989–2000) of Serbia and Yugoslavia, whatever the existing constraints were — and they were often considerable during the president's tenure — a continuing pursuit of office was the only possible option, given the magnitude of rents extracted from the economy by the president's family, as well as the

criminal prosecution that became certain in 1999 following his indictment by the international tribunal. In contrast, for Presidents Masire (1980–98) and Mogae (1998–2008) of Botswana for instance, who both faced no significant constraints at the elite, mass, or international level, yet still stepped down when required, holding on to power was not paramount since the value of holding office in Botswana was much lower than in other African countries for a number of reasons, including its vibrant private sector. In retirement, Botswana's former leaders pursued business activities and occupied various international public roles not unlike the former heads of state in developed democracies in the West would have.

The relationship between political opportunities and economic motives is not straightforward. If rulers value their office highly enough, they will attempt to reduce constraints after entering into office by undermining checks and balances. As Huntington (1968, 59–71) argued, whenever political opportunities exceed economic benefits, individuals will use political power to enrich themselves: therefore rent-seeking can be driven purely by the lack of constraints rather than the financial motives in addition. It is likely that less constrained leaders will almost certainly be more corrupt. However, as my argument goes, they will be more likely to seek rents *and* they will also be more likely to subvert institutions when they command larger economies, when various rents are easily available and private sector careers do not bring comparable benefits. In the empirical sections of this book I attempt to control for the complex relationship between these factors. Compliance with constitutional norms, as other complex phenomena, is influenced by several different causal processes, including the strength of institutions and the magnitude of rents and immunity concerns. There is no doubt that institutions play an important role and constrain the executives. The proposed explanation, however, highlights a novel causal mechanism that underlines the crucial role of individual political leaders and their career concerns in authoritarian reversals.

The focus of this book is on the *extension* of presidential term limits, which can be accomplished through referenda, acts of parliament, executive decrees, decisions of supreme or constitutional courts, or the combination thereof— in contrast to presidential *re-election* that follows such a prolongation. As I argue elsewhere in this book, almost all presidents that had their term limits extended proceeded to win subsequent re-elections. Also, the predominant majority of regimes analyzed in this book are directly elected presidencies, with a small number of indirectly elected. Indeed, such rulers as President Marcos (1965–86) of the Philippines or Milošević (1989–2000) of Serbia and Yugoslavia implemented indirect elections as the core of their tenure prolongation strategies. The omission of such leaders from the case selection will arbitrarily reduce the number of important cases. Since no other chief executives face limits on their time in office, this book only examines compliance with term limits among rulers that are subject to such limits — presidents. Rent-seeking in presidential regimes is particularly dangerous for democracy because presidents are not only well placed to acquire assets but they are also more insulated from other institutions. In contrast, prime ministers who accumulate too much power and assets, because it changes the power distribution within their ruling coalitions and because the latter could easily remove such leaders, are much less dangerous for democracy (Adsera and Boix 2008, 247–57).

Drawing on original data on presidential term limits, personal background of individual presidents and their official remuneration, among other things, this study offers a systematic analysis of presidential term limits in democracy and dictatorship. The novel approach proposed here is the attempt to understand the motivation of a national political leader, the value of holding political office and, on the basis of various cross-national data, the likely factors that determine this value — and thus what rulers stand to lose — in the context of term limits. The latter render leaders' reluctance to leave office particularly observable. Thus, this book makes several contributions to the literature on comparative democratization and presidentialism, on the effects of individual political rulers, and on rent-seeking. In a narrow sense, it explains why presidential term limits break down. More ambitiously, using term limits as the observable example, this book is concerned with the motivation of a politician facing the prospect of leaving the highest political office, why so many rulers strive to remain in power, and how their career concerns influences stability and breakdown of democracy.

Democratic Consolidation, Personalization of Power, and Term Limits

Presidents differ in their powers: constitutional powers — powers of decree, veto, powers to introduce legislation

or to call referenda, powers to dissolve assembly, of an exclusive authority over specific policy domains, powers over hiring and firing, etc., as well as political and partisan — the extent of control over their own party, and that party's dominance in the legislature (Krouwel 2003; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997, 40–52; Metcalf 2000; Shugart and Carey 1992, 148–58; Van Cranenburgh 2008). Political systems with presidents at the helm can also be classified as pure presidential or semi-presidential, depending on whether governments can be removed by president only, or also by the assembly (Cheibub 2007; Duverger 1978; Elgie 2011). Presidents of the world also differ in the way their re-election is regulated by term limits, or more crucially, in whether there are term limits at all.

A number of scholars of presidentialism argue that there is nothing inherently undemocratic in having no limits on presidential tenure in a *democratic* system, provided there exist checks and balances. Indeed, if the latter work, then term limits that require the mandatory retirement are seemingly unnecessary; if they do not, then one can argue that limits should not matter. Thus, Shugart and Carey (1992, 90) point out that “presidentialism requires that the chief executive be elected by popular vote” and “there should be as few restrictions as possible on the will to be expressed in that vote.” Likewise, Cheibub (2007, 167) argues that Page 11 “term limits may be too blunt an instrument because it fundamentally interferes with the relationship between voters and presidents and preempts the possibility that elections may operate as mechanisms of accountability.” In other words, much like other institutions that regulate presidential powers and differ from one presidential regime to another, one can argue that there is nothing inherently undemocratic about the lack of term limits and that they constitute an optional institution in a democratic presidential regime.

Yet there exists a considerable body of opinion pointing out that the lack of term limits is fundamentally undemocratic and that limits are different from all other institutions. Unlike other institutions that regulate presidential powers, many, from ancient political philosophers to contemporary opponents of presidential third term bids, see term limits as an institutional demarcation line that separates democratic rulers, however powerful, from tyrants. Indeed, there is an old philosophical tradition that equates nondemocratic rule with perpetual rule and the lack of term limits, in principle, permits a permanent stay in power. Machiavelli in his *Discourses* underscores that in Rome, even the all-powerful office of dictator was not regarded as an infringement as long as it was limited to a specific period; and it was the temporary nature of this office that distinguished it from perpetual tyranny (Machiavelli 2003 [1513–19], 194; Sartori 1962; Schmitt 2007 [1928]). The names of such presidents as François Duvalier of Haiti (1957–71), Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia (1957–87) or Saparmurat Niyazov of Turkmenistan (1990–2006) — who all obtained that Holy Grail of political power, Presidency for Life — are synonymous with contemporary dictatorship.

The findings in this book underscore the fundamental importance of binding term limits for democratic consolidation. Term limits, if binding, is an important democratic safeguard. In presidential regimes, regular elections must be strengthened by the institution of term limits, along with checks and balances. Due to the additional entry barriers imposed on challengers, development of presidential “brand names,” and the fact that a civil service and a populace can grow more responsive to a long-term ruler, without tenure restrictions executives can be re-elected multiple times and become really difficult to unseat. The arguments that other institutional measures, less strict than term limits, would be able to prevent dictatorial takeover without severing the links between voters and presidents, are hard to test as it is difficult to imagine the circumstances where a president can be re-elected multiple times (more than once) without the state apparatus growing uniquely responsive to the executive branch.

The question of whether presidents will be able to overturn term Page 12 limits and “personalize” their regimes is related to the overall research program on democratic consolidation. Indeed, democracy is consolidated when “it is the only game in town” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 5), when, among other things, there is a high degree of “*institutional routinization*” in politics (ibid., 10) and when political actors comply with the existing norms and “violations of these norms are likely to be both ineffective and costly” (ibid., 5). If a general and regularized acceptance that institutions and norms are more important than political actors, however indispensable and capable the latter might be, is an important criterion for democratic consolidation, then compliance with presidential term limits goes to the heart of the problem of democratic consolidation. The question of such

compliance therefore is central for our understanding of how political actors accept the norms and how democracy can become a self-sustaining equilibrium (Przeworski 2005).

We know from the existing scholarship that political institutions, such as the type of political regime (Linz 1994), the strength of ruling parties and legislatures (Brownlee 2007a; Smith 2005), or of international factors (Levitsky and Way 2010), such as the type of neighboring regimes (Bunce and Wolchik 2009; Gleditsch and Ward 2006), foreign aid and sanctions (Marinov 2005; Wright 2009), prior democratic experience and the strength of civil society (Linz and Stepan 1996; Pop-Eleches 2007), structural factors, such as the levels of economic development and inequality (Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix and Stokes 2003; Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub and Limongi 2000), the presence of natural resources (Dunning 2008; Ross 2001), can influence stability and change of political regimes. Specifically, democracies are more likely to break down during economic crises, in less developed societies, in presidential regimes, and in countries with a history of military coups (e.g., Cheibub 2007; Przeworski et al. 2000; Svoboda 2009). We also know that presidential systems are more prone to democratic breakdown than parliamentary ones. Whether such breakdowns can be due to the intrinsic features of presidentialism (Linz 1978, 1990) or whether the relationship is spurious because of a greater likelihood of military involvement (Cheibub 2007), regime type itself does not explain why some presidents choose to launch a dictatorial takeover and others do not.

Due to an extensive body of research we also know a lot about electoral manipulation in partly and nondemocratic regimes (Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lehoucq 2003; Lindberg 2009; Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002; Magaloni 2006; Schedler 2006). In general, however, we still lack systematic knowledge of what happens when presidents confront, and how they manipulate, term limits, and what the consequences are thereof. To date, no study has been undertaken that examined presidential term limits across time and across all regime categories, especially focusing on individual presidents. There exist few studies that examine particular rulers and how they take over their regimes, such as the earlier scholarship on caudillos and the practice of the so-called *continuismo* (Fitzgibbon 1940; Morse 1954; Wolf and Hansen 1967) and analyses of presidential *autogolpes* (Cameron 1998). Such studies underline the role of economic upheaval, of international players and the strength and weakness of opposition. In the seminal study of democratic breakdown by Linz (1978) as well as a more recent one by Bermeo (2003), the scholars find that authoritarian reversals are often contingent on choices and preferences of key elite actors rather than larger institutional or structural forces. None of these studies investigated the degeneration of contemporary presidential regimes into personalism however, as well as the role of compliance with presidential term limits in this process.

In many nations that attempt to part ways with a previous non-democratic rule, the institutional environment is malleable and authoritarian reversals, often manifested or culminated in tenure prolongation, are frequent. Even though in this book I explain factors that lead toward the descent into personalism across all presidential regimes, compliance with term limits in partly democratic regimes is considered in particular detail. In such unconsolidated democracies it is more difficult to attribute regime stability to a prior democratic experience or culture, or in fact, to forecast whether these democracies will ultimately succeed. Epstein, Bates, Goldstone, O'Halloran and Kristensen (2006, 564) find that unconsolidated regimes are the most volatile, that there was "little information as to the factors that would lead partial democracies to either slide down to autocracy or to move up to full democracy" and that "the determinants of the behavior of the partial democracies elude our understanding." Such regimes usually have constitutional term limits, and it is not obvious whether their presidents will abide by the latter or not when the time comes. However, whether presidents will be able to evade limits and personalize their regimes will have serious consequences for political development of their nations. Personalization of power is not easy to account for in an empirical framework. In fact, personalization is often operationalized on the basis of observed compliance with term limits.⁶ Brooker (2000, 131) argues that the moment when ruler's power becomes permanent is a crucial stage in the genesis of personalist regime.⁷ Presidential term limits and succession behavior are especially interesting because individual presidents themselves can be often thought as the core political Page 14 institutions that glue other institutions and interests together, so that personal survival and regime stability are synonymous. In the comprehensive analyses of hybrid regimes that emphasize the role of structural explanations, Levitsky and Way (2010, 82) acknowledge that it is often difficult to explain either authoritarian

takeovers or unwillingness to repress without taking into account preferences of particular leaders.

Existing scholarship has provided important insights into the role of economic development and inequality in democratic consolidation, the role of political institutions and electoral processes in partly and nondemocratic regimes, and the executive-legislative relations and their effects on democracy. This book takes another step and explains what happens when the national political executives are confronted with the mandatory requirement to leave office, and what are the factors that influence these leaders' decisions. The proposed argument draws not only from the literature on democratic consolidation but also from the scholarship that examines the financial motives and career concerns of politicians, in and out of office (e.g., Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 2005; Eggers and Hainmueller 2009). I underline that unlike politicians in developed economies that can accumulate personal wealth after leaving office, many politicians, including presidents, in less developed economies, because of the inability to enrich themselves after leaving politics, choose to acquire wealth while in office. Well-developed literature exists on various causes of rent-seeking and corruption, including democracy and the strength of institutions (Ades and Tella 1999; Krueger 1974; La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 1999; Treisman 2000). In the influential theory of political survival, Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow (2003) examine rent-seeking as a tool that political leaders employ in order to satisfy their supporters and thus to stay in power. In this book, the argument is that office-holders that engage in rent-seeking will find it more difficult to step down, and if confronted with term limits, they will be more likely to subvert them. In contrast to the said scholarship therefore, I place rent-seeking on the right-hand side of the proposed explanation: personal corruption influences the motives of office-holders and, in turn, influences development of political regimes.

The aim of this book is twofold. First, it brings the motivation and career concerns of individual presidents to the fore and underlines that the costs and benefits of holding office have to be examined. Second, it also charts the history of, and arguments about, limited tenure from antiquity to today; provides comprehensive analyses of presidential term limits; explains how political leaders can manipulate constitutional Page 15 provisions in order to extend their stay in power and various obstacles they have to overcome; and investigates various consequences of long and short time horizons in politics.

Plan of the Book

The book develops arguments outlined in this introduction, and it consists of three informal parts. Readers that are interested in the history of term limits and how exactly presidents manipulate them should turn to chapters 2 and 3. The second, main part of the book, consists of chapters 4–7 and explains the relationship between individual career concerns, rent-seeking, political constraints, and compliance with term limits. The third, and shortest, part consists of chapter 8 that examines various effects of presidential term limits. In addition, the book is accompanied by a data appendix, available online at <http://www.press.umich.edu/p/democracy-dictatorship>.

Following the introductory chapter 1, chapter 2 charts the history of the idea behind term limits and the institution that rests on this idea, from antiquity to contemporary times. Chapter 3 addresses how exactly presidents can extend their stay in power. It highlights the difficulties in defining what constitutes departures from power, using examples of Presidents Obregón of Mexico and Putin of Russia, who all formally stepped down yet retained control over the executive. The same chapter then offers a typology and categorizes various ways that presidents of the world employ in order to prolong their stay in power. It also explains the types of constraints that will make it more likely that presidents will comply with constitutional norms. In chapter 6 these factors will be assessed alongside factors behind the value of holding office.

Chapter 4 is centered on the costs and benefits of a politician facing mandatory departure from his or her office. I highlight the differences between how public careers affect the acquisition of wealth in less and more developed nations and discuss how the magnitude of spoils from political office and the probability of immunity and retaining assets after exit can make political office more valuable. In chapter 5 I turn to three illustrative cases in order to underline that constraints can only tell part of the story behind constitutional compliance and that the motivation of a departing president matters. Building upon the discussion in previous chapters, chapter 6 empirically examines how presidents confront term limits. Results indicate that in substantive terms the most

significant predictors of constitutional compliance are Page 16 the size of public sector, protection of property rights, the fate of the previous ruler, personal control over president's own party, and democratic constraints. In the same chapter, I further disaggregate the composite measure of constraints and examine the role of political institutions and international factors in more detail.

The proposed explanation of constitutional compliance combines structuralist and actor-based factors that account for the value of holding office. However, examples abound of leaders departing from the presidency despite apparent lack of democratic tradition and tempting rent-seeking opportunities. Building on the empirical literature of leadership, in [chapter 7](#) I examine whether the desire to stay in office at whatever cost is associated with leaders' personal traits. While certain traits of leaders' background are indeed associated with leaders' propensity to subvert democracy, or not, results however are not consistent, and the proposed argument for the value of holding office, given constraints, provides a better explanation of leaders' behavior.

If presidents care so much about term limits, what are the consequences of their staying in power beyond prescribed periods? In [chapter 8](#) I examine whether presidents that desired political immortality and overturned term limits achieved their dream. In the same chapter I also examine how term limits, by enforcing executive turnover, influence the prospects of political liberalization. Finally, I also investigate whether longer horizons in office have any positive effects on the economy, as their champions claim. In summary, I find that very long horizons in office do not seem to benefit either countries at large or even the individual presidents that desire the option of continuous re-election so much.

The final, concluding chapter summarizes the most important findings and conclusions as elaborated in the preceding chapters that, taken as a whole, make a powerful argument not only for incorporating tenure restrictions into constitutional design, but also for paying careful attention to individual political leaders' career concerns, as well as the temptations of political office.

Term Limits in Historical Perspective

Presidential term limit is a restriction on the maximum length of tenure that a president can serve in office. It stipulates the length of term — four, five, six or seven years (historically there were both shorter and longer terms), and the number of consecutive or nonconsecutive terms — usually a single, two, or less often three terms — that the chief executive is permitted to serve. If there exists a restriction on the number of terms, it can be further qualified whether it applies to a consecutive re-election only or whether the latter is allowed only after some interim period — usually one, sometimes two terms. Presidential term limits clauses are incorporated in national constitutions, usually in sections on the manner of election and eligibility of presidential candidates. A single word matters. For example, as I discuss later in subsequent chapters, if “consecutive” is omitted in “a president can be re-elected for one term only,” then an individual can be re-elected consecutively, but, should the president avail of this opportunity, he or she cannot be eligible later, for nonconsecutive terms, as the omission of “consecutive” implies a life-ban. On the other hand, the omission of “once” in “an individual can be re-elected” transforms a two-term office into an unlimited presidency whereby an individual can stand for reelection an unlimited number of times. Additionally, some constitutions can erect a firewall around presidential term limits and explicitly forbid a sitting president from benefiting should the modification of tenure arrangements be made during his or her tenure, or they can exclude this particular clause from modifications altogether, whether by simple or qualified parliamentary majority, or even referenda.¹

The story of term limits dates back to ancient Greece and republican Rome where office-holders had short tenures and often faced bans on consecutive re-election or re-election in general. It resurfaces again Page 18 in several medieval and early modern city-states. The first modern national constitution that included term limits was the 1795 French Constitution that introduced a ban on subsequent re-election for its five-member executive, Directorate. In the wake of repeated presidential attempts to perpetuate themselves in power, all Latin American republics introduced presidential term limits at some stage in the 19th century, with the majority banning consecutive re-election altogether. In the rest of the world — in countries that had presidents at their helm — term limits did not exist. In the USA, formal limits were introduced only in 1951 after Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–45) disregarded a two-term tradition and won a third, then a fourth term. When sub-Saharan African nations became independent and opted for presidentialism, by and large they failed to impose presidential term limits. Likewise, virtually all presidential regimes of North Africa and Middle East did not have them. With the notable exception of Latin America, until the “third wave” of democracy began in 1974, the norm was *not* to have presidential term limits, whether in democracies or nondemocracies. By the end of the century, however, the situation reversed. With the advent of democracy in Africa and Eastern Europe virtually all new or revised constitutions included compulsory rotation in office. This chapter charts the history of term limits from antiquity to the 21st century, and how this institution appeared to have become the norm in presidentialism.

Term Limits from Antiquity to Early Modern Period

Ancient Greeks and Romans recognized that political power must be constrained not only by other institutions contemporaneously but also temporally, and that perpetual power was tantamount to tyrannical power. Thus, Cicero underlined that by “the title king our Romans universally understand every man who exercises over the people a *perpetual* and undivided domination” (*De Re Publica* [54–51 BC] Book II, XXVII, 37 [emphasis mine]). The idea of term limits is as old as democracy itself, and there is no surprise that this overview should begin with the ancient Greeks who were the first to practice term limits. Thus, the republic of Athens imposed single and two term limits for its elected officials. Aristotle in *Athenian Constitution* explained that no office “might be held more than once, either by the first occupants or by their successors” (ibid. [c. 350 BC], XXXI, 29). The only exceptions were the offices of the Council members, which might be held twice, and generals (*Strategi*), which might be held any number of times (ibid., LX, Page 19–54). The logic behind compulsory rotation of office-holders was that limited tenures were necessary to minimize the chances of usurpation of power. Equally important, as Aristotle

reasoned in *Politics*, was that in a community of equals frequent rotation of officials was intrinsic to the idea of civic virtue as “in most constitutional states the citizens rule and are ruled by turns, for the idea of a constitutional state implies that the natures of the citizens are equal, and do not differ at all” (ibid. [c. 335–332 BC], Book I, XII, 49). The very fact that term-bound rulers had to live in the shadow of their certain future return to private life ensured moderation in office and the commonality between public and private individuals.

Republican Rome also practiced term limits (Mommsen 1894). The majority of Roman magistrates, excluding censors — who had an eighteen-month term of office — were elected for a limited term of one year (Staveley 1972; Taylor 1966). The most powerful of them — consuls — were equally elected for a single one-year term.² From 180 BC there was also a rule in place that required an interval of at least ten years between tenures in the same office. This rule made second consulships uncommon, even before the latter were formally prohibited in around 152 or 151 BC (Astin 1989, 175). Re-election limits were introduced in order to prevent the return of monarchy or imposition of tyranny, and they had a very long tradition in Rome. Thus, Cicero writes that term limits were practiced as early as during interregnums, between the reigns of two kings, in monarchical Rome, that is, prior to about 509 BC. He implicitly expounds on the virtues of term limits when writing on a Roman republic tradition: “the State was not...subjected too long to the same governor, nor exposed to the fear lest some one, in consequence of the prolonged enjoyment of power, should become more unwilling to lay it aside, or more powerful if he wished to secure it permanently for himself” (ibid., *De Re Publica* [54–51 BC] Book II, XII, 32).

Roman term limits also served to moderate political competition, to prevent “preeminence so marked that it threatened to restrict opportunities for others and to distort the conventional pattern of competition for office and power” (Astin 1989, 175). In a highly competitive system that prized glory and achievement (Rosenstein 1990, 114–51; Takacs 2009, 1–16), formal restrictions on tenure were designed to enforce executive rotation and thereby to ensure political stability of the aristocratic system. Except during dire emergencies or a very small number of successful second consulships that circumvented the ten-year rule or, consequently, the ban on second term in office, term limits were in place and complied with in republican Rome.

Page 20

During the Second Punic War (218–201 BC) Rome, facing mortal danger, had to dispense with the convention and granted lengthy or repeated spells of authority, for example to Fabius Maximus, who served five nonconsecutive consulships and was, additionally, a constitutional dictator in 217 BC. Once the danger passed, in 180 BC a law was promulgated that imposed a ten-year interim period before consuls could assume another term. From 152 BC, second consulships were banned altogether. During the second century BC the almost universal compliance with tenure restrictions was punctuated by only a few isolated incidents, as “from time to time men of ambition sought to override seemingly unnecessary formal impediments which slowed their advance or denied them attractive opportunities” (Astin 1989, 190; also see Astin 1967, 36–40; Ch. 6).

Another important office — the constitutional office of a dictator — established to deal with specific emergencies and invested with wide-ranging powers — was virtually unconstrained, except for one critical distinction — initially its term was very short and lasted only until the assignment to address the specific emergency had been dealt with, and later was regulated not to exceed a six-month period after which the dictator had to step down (Schmitt 2007 [1928]). In fact, it was the temporary nature of the dictatorship that distinguished it from perpetual tyranny (Kalyvas 2007, 416). Dictators enjoyed almost unlimited, tyrannical authority — until term limits made them retire. Dictatorships were quite common in the period from 501 to 202 BC when Rome had many powerful enemies.

In his *Discourses* Machiavelli thought that prolongation of offices — especially military offices — was one of the two main factors behind the breakdown of the Roman republic. His argument that one's prolonged stay in a powerful office ultimately makes subordinate officers loyal not to that office but to a particular office-holder is similar to contemporary arguments made against a third term (see below): “when a citizen had been for long in command of an army, he won the army over and made it his partisan; so that it came in time to forget of the senate and recognize its commander alone as its head” (Machiavelli 2003, [1513–19], 474). Indeed, at the turn and early

part of the first century BC, the institution of term limits — together with the republic itself — was seriously undermined by two ambitious generals, Marius and Sulla. Both played key roles in the civil war that would lead to the collapse of the republic (Appian 1913 [c. 145–165 AD], Book I, 67–201). Gaius Marius was elected for seven consulships, thus fulfilling the alleged omen when in his youth he had found an eagle's nest with seven chicks in it (Plutarch 1920 [c. 1st century AD], 565). After being elected Page 21 for the first time on an anticorruption and antioligarchic platform, he was elected for a second time after a three-year interval, since people “considered that this would not be the first time that the law had given way before the demands of the general good” (Plutarch 1920, 493). Plutarch writes that at the end of his fifth consulship Gaius Marius was “as eager for a sixth as another would have been for his first” (ibid., 541).

Sulla went even further. After defeating his rivals in civil war, in 82 BC Sulla, after a lapse of a hundred and twenty years during which dictatorship was not revoked, declared himself dictator not, as usual, “for a fixed period, but until such time as he should firmly re-establish the city and Italy and the government generally” (Appian 1913 [c. 145–165 AD], Book I, 185). Unlike earlier dictatorships appointed for a fixed term, Sulla's term in office broke new ground as it was unrestricted by time. According to Appian in his *Civil Wars*, Romans “welcomed this pretence of an election as an image and semblance of freedom, and chose Sulla as their absolute master for as long a time as he pleased. There had been autocratic rule of the dictators before, but it was limited to short periods. But under Sulla it first became unlimited and so an absolute tyranny” (ibid., 185). Having implemented reforms that he thought would prevent future dictatorial takeover Sulla, however, resigned the following year and died shortly after.

The example of Sulla inspired many ambitious Romans at the time. The most capable and certainly most known of these, Julius Caesar, delivered the mortal blow to the republic, and not surprisingly, his tenure extensions were at the core of institutional transformation. Caesar, driven by concerns for his future immunity after the expiration of his pro-consulship in 50 BC, famously marched on Rome, and having emerged triumphant, from 48 to 44 held consecutive titles of consul and dictator, even serving without a second consul for a time (Taylor 1949). Finally, not satisfied with the ten-year term of dictator (technically, ten consecutive yearlong terms), Caesar was bestowed with the title of the Father of the Country and perpetual dictator in 44 BC. The prominent scholar of Roman institutions Theodor Mommsen underlined that *dictator perpetuus*, both in “its first ephemeral and in its second enduring tenure,” constituted unlimited prerogatives that “superseded the republican partition of powers” (Mommsen 1894, 328). The conspirators who would assassinate Caesar believed that Caesar's final tenure amendment was making him into a de facto, if not in name, king (Meier 1997, 414–86). Throughout the history of republican Rome, term limits that restricted tenure of its magistrates were in place alongside other institutions that imposed checks and balances. Page 22 As the Roman Republic died, the tradition of tenure restrictions died with it, as its checks and balances were dismantled and perpetual rule became the norm.

In Medieval and Early Modern Europe, monarchy, whether hereditary or elected, became the universal form of government, and rulers' tenure was not restricted in time. Term limits, however, reappear in the aristocratic republics of Novgorod, Pskov, Genoa and Florence. In the Novgorod Republic, which occupied the North-Eastern part of the contemporary European area of Russia and existed from 1136 to 1478, term limits emerged as its republican institutions developed. Similar to Italian city-states of the time, Novgorod was not always an aristocratic republic nor an elective monarchy but more of a hybrid, especially in the earlier period (Yanin 1962, 99). Executive power was shared between an elected duke who was in place until the end of the 13th century, and an elected *posadnik*, who became more dominant with time.³ The aristocratic dukes were elected and usually quickly dismissed by the proto-legislative *Veche*, a gathering of all citizens of the city that soon, however, became an aristocratic forum. *Posadnik* was responsible for the executive, adjudicated in court, controlled appointments and dismissals and oversaw the duke. In the 13th century, as the struggle between various oligarchic groups intensified, the tenure of *posadnik* was restricted and came to be rotated among the elites (Yanin 1962, 130–31). In the middle of the 14th century, the office of *posadnik* became a collective executive of six, elected for life, and from their ranks a chairman (*stepennoi posadnik*) was elected for a one-year term, and from the early 15th century for a six-month term (Yanin 1962, 274–305). Another oligarchic republic, Pskov, also had elected *posadniks* at its helm between the early 14th century and 1510, when Pskov was conquered by the Muscovy.

From 1528 to 1798, the doges of Genoa were elected for single two-year terms. The executive council, the *signoria*, consisted of doge and sixteen other officials, also elected for two-year terms (Epstein 1996, 315). Likewise, in Florence, power was vested in the executive council, with the head of council, *gonfaloniere*, at its helm. Members of the council were chosen by lot every two months, from a rather large pool of citizens who placed “their names into a bag or purse, and drawing them every two months” (Machiavelli 2007 [1521–25], Book II, Ch. 6, 107). The list of potential office-holders was publicly updated every 3–5 years, and the term of office was only two months.

It appears that tenure limitation is a European invention. Elsewhere in the world, even where we know that some form of collective or appointed leadership was practiced, or where contemporary scholars Page 23 hypothesize that it might have been practiced — such as in the Mayan city-states, especially in Chichen Itza (Ringle 2004), within the Aztec empire (Hodge 1996, 17–46), or early Arab city-states — there is no evidence that their office-holders were term-limited. Term limits might have been practiced in a different manner, for example the so-called *Ixiptlatli* (*ixiptla* — singular) — regarded as divinity in human form that impersonated the most powerful Aztec god Tezcatlipoca among Aztecs — served one single year term. *Ixiptlatli* were elected by priests and during the following year they were worshipped as deities and lived like kings. Their yearlong tenure was terminated when these “office-holders” were ritually sacrificed however (Duran 1977 [1574–79]).

Term Limits in Modern Constitutions

The idea of term limits resurfaces again among English and French liberal philosophers in the 17th and 18th centuries.⁴ The limits, however, were not incorporated into the first three democratic constitutions: the 1788 Constitution of the United States, the 1791 Polish-Lithuanian⁵ Commonwealth Constitution and the 1793 French Constitution. However, for the first time for a national constitution, term limits were formally introduced for a multiple executive branch in a more conservative 1795 French Constitution that stipulated the five-man executive directory, with five-year terms for each member, and three-month rotating terms for its President — “each member of the Directory shall preside over it in turn for three months only”⁶ and without immediate re-election: “none of the retiring members may be reelected until after an interval of five years” (ibid.).

In revolutionary France, Napoleon Bonaparte followed Caesar's sequence of institutional reforms to the letter by prolonging his tenure incrementally, and pioneered the use of referenda to rubber stamp them. After the fall of the Directory government in France in 1799, three consuls were vested with the executive powers for a ten-year term. One of the consuls, Napoleon Bonaparte, riding on his military success, outmaneuvered his rivals and became first the First Consul after the February 1800 referendum, then First Consul for Life confirmed in the August 1802 referendum and third the Emperor, following the May 1804 referendum — all plebiscites with larger than 99 percent margins (Thompson 2002, 141–91). Before his second referendum Napoleon argued that he could not feel assured in the continuing confidence of the people until the latter endorsed the prolongation of his ten-year consulship. He then framed the brief proposition for the French people Page 24 simply: “shall Napoleon Bonaparte be named first consul for life?” — thereby revealing his peculiar understanding of such an assurance (Baehr and Richter 2004, 226–28).

Several North American colonies practiced legislative term limits that were also debated during the Constitutional Convention in 1787 in Philadelphia. The convention delegates discussed possible limitation of presidential tenure to a single six- or seven-year term and agreed to limit presidential term to four years. Yet, for reasons that are not clear, in the end term limits were not included in the document (Petracca 1992; Price 1996). John Adams, James Madison, George Mason and Thomas Jefferson favored term limits for office-holders, yet it appears that the busy agenda at that time, combined with the expectation that checks and balances together with a voluntary regular rotation would be sufficient, motivated delegates to exclude limits (Petracca 1992). Later in the 19th century, Alexis de Tocqueville would criticize presidential re-election in America. He asserted that in salience re-elections overshadowed policy-making and that they corrupted government, as the latter would obey the chief executive and strive to achieve re-election as its primary objective (de Tocqueville 2006 [1864], 173).

The arguments about term limits, expressed by the Founding Fathers of the US Constitution, reflected those of the ancient philosophers and in turn, to a remarkable degree, anticipated those used in the contemporary third term

debates the world over. They also provide a very eloquent summary of the major historical debates about limited tenure. Thus, Alexander Hamilton in *The Federalist Papers* n. 71 1999 [1788] offered a number of valid arguments against term limits, and they are worth enumerating below. His first assertion that limits can restrict voters' choice and deprive the latter of experienced representatives, mirrors the contemporary one most often made in democratic and nondemocratic regimes alike: "What more desirable or more essential than this quality in the governors of nations? Can it be wise to put this desirable and essential quality under the ban of the Constitution...?" (ibid., 412) In addition, Hamilton also argued that limits would hinder policy continuity (ibid., 410): "To reverse and undo what has been done by a predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best proof he can give of his own capacity and desert...." He also pointed out that limits fail to create the adequate incentives to perform (ibid., 411), and, therefore, induce kleptocratic behavior (ibid., 412): "An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking forward to a time when he must at all events yield up the emoluments he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not easy to be resisted by such Page 25 a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed while it lasted, and might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory." In turn, Hamilton dismisses the arguments in favor of term limits as not very compelling. In his view, restrictions would fail to promote the independence of a ruler and instead endanger democracy (ibid., 413): "While it was conceivable that security of the people would be promoted by restricted tenure under certain circumstances, it could be just as much endangered by forcing ambitious rulers facing limits to extend their tenure via usurpation."

Alexander Hamilton's arguments that unrestricted tenures are safe for democracy since the executives will be counterbalanced by the existing checks and balances, do not entertain the possibility that long-serving presidents would be very likely to seek and expand executive power and thus undermine the very checks and balances that are supposed to keep them in check. Indeed, the major argument for term limits was and remains the one about the possibility of power usurpation. Thomas Jefferson, who was a strong supporter of tenure limitation as insurance against self-perpetuated personal rule, wrote that he "greatly dislike[d]...the abandonment in every instance of the necessity of rotation in office, and most particularly in the case of the President. If some termination to the services of the Chief Magistrate be not fixed by the Constitution or supplied by practice, his office, nominally four years, will in fact, become for life; and history shows how easily that degenerates into an inheritance."⁷

After George Washington stepped down voluntarily after his second term in 1796, a two-term rule, while not codified, became an informal rule of American politics and often inspired Latin American constitutional engineers who regarded it as a *de facto* term limit (Carey 2003, 123). Following independence of the former Spanish colonies, newly sovereign Latin American nations went through a turbulent period of instability accompanied by a remarkable proliferation of a multitude of governmental forms, including juntas, triumvirates, supreme directorships, monarchies and presidential regimes. Similar to, and often inspired by, the 1793 and 1795 French Constitutions, early post-independence multiple-executives of Spanish America were weak, with term duration of no longer than four years and without immediate re-election (Lopez-Alves 2000; Loveman 1995). For example, the 1812 Constitution of Venezuela stipulated that "the Executive constitutional power...lodged in three individuals popularly elected"... (Article 72). "The duration of their functions, shall be for four years, at the expiration of which the three individuals composing the Executive Page 26 Power, shall be replaced in the same manner they were elected" (Article 75). The short-lived experience with plural executives was followed or was accompanied by an equally short-lived — except for Brazil — experiment with monarchical and quasi-monarchical forms of rule, such as the Mexican or Haitian empires.

Following the early period of experimentation, and often inspired by the American presidential regime, Latin American nations soon began adopting the presidential form of government with a single executive at the top (Sondrol 2005, 518). In 1826 Simon Bolivar, the hero of a liberation struggle in Latin America and the president of Gran Colombia, explicitly acknowledged that "President of Bolivia shares the same powers with the American Executive, but with local restrictions.... I have brought to Bolivia the Executive of the most democratic Republic of the world" (Message to the Congress of Bolivia, 25 May 1826).⁸ Elsewhere, a variety of tenure restrictions was attempted, from two consecutive four-year terms — a very typical arrangement nowadays — to an usual single nine-year term.⁹

Constitutional engineers often debated the extent of presidential powers and the appropriate length of tenure. Simon Bolivar's evolution of his views on term limits reflects the political discourse in Latin America at that time. In his message on the Constitution of Venezuela on February 15, 1819, Bolivar acknowledged the danger of dictatorship arising from prolonged rule by a powerful president: "Nothing is more perilous than to permit one citizen to retain power for an extended period. The people become accustomed to obeying him, and he forms the habit of commanding them; herein lie the origins of usurpation and tyranny."¹⁰ Bolivar's political views continued to evolve, and soon he made a complete reversal on term limits in his speech on a draft constitution of Bolivia, where he discussed political organization in great detail. He proposed a lifelong president,¹¹ not unlike a constitutional monarch, who would also have the sole right to appoint his own successor:

The President of the Republic in our Constitution, becomes the Sun, which, fixed in its orbit, gives life to the Universe. This supreme authority must be perpetual; for in systems without hierarchy, more than in others, a fixed point is needed about which leaders and citizens, men and affairs can revolve. You give me a fixed point, one of the ancients said, and I will move the world. For Bolivia, this point is the president for life. Without it, there is no order. The (his) head has been insulated so nobody can thwart his objectives and his hands are tied so that he cannot Page 27 harm anyone (Message to the Congress of Bolivia, 25 May 1826).¹²

Like Alexander Hamilton earlier, Bolivar now believed that a lifelong president would not become a tyrant because the former was to be counterbalanced by very strong executive checks, with the real power vested in the cabinet and the legislature, and the President left in charge of enforcement and defense ministers only, "deprived of all patronage. He can appoint neither governors, nor judges, nor ecclesiastic dignitaries of any kind" (ibid.).

In the early and middle 19th century, several Latin American rulers succeeded in securing overly long or unlimited stay in office, often inspired by Napoleon and his exalted titles and ten-year terms.¹³ Over time however, a single presidential term without immediate re-election emerged as the constitutional norm in Latin America, and rather than seeking extensions in office, presidents preferred to install their own successors (Przeworski 2005, 24). Following the long rule by President Juan Manuel de Rosas of Argentina (1829–52), and drawing ideas from Jean-Jacques Rousseau and the Constitution of the United States, "the Father of the Argentine Constitution of 1853," Juan Bautista Alberdi (1810–84), advocated for a single six-year term for the Argentine President. Alberdi [1852] in his *Bases and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic*¹⁴ devoted a whole section to executive power and how to ensure that the executive does not become a dictator (ibid., 168–76). He also argued against the "indispensable man" theory, a view commonly held by the opponents of term limits (ibid., 240–41):

What will become of the Argentinean Confederation the day that it no longer needs its present President? It will be, in my opinion, like a ship that changes its captain: a change that does not prevent the ship from continuing its journey as long as there is a clear navigation chart and the new captain knows how to observe it. In the life of nations, outcomes have required special men. Nobody knows how they could have concluded the French revolutions of 1789 and 1848 without the personal intervention of Napoleon I and Napoleon III. Who knows if the Constitution of the great United States would have been a reality without the influence of Washington.... But a day arrives in which the work of such men acquires sufficient robustness to survive on its own, and then the hand of the author is no longer indispensable.

Page 28

Alberdi also warned that checks and balances were not sufficient because of incumbency advantage that any president would enjoy (ibid., 276): "To allow re-election is to extend to twelve years the presidential term. The president always has the means to secure his own re-election, and only rarely would refrain from doing so. Any re-election sows controversy, because it will be fought based upon actions taken in the first period in preparation for the effort."¹⁵ In Argentina, this rule of a single six-year term remained intact from 1853 until 1949, when President Juan Perón (1946–55, 1973–74) — the only Argentine president between 1854 and 1993 who was able to repeal the constitutional ban on immediate re-election — driven by personal ambition and by the spoils of

office,¹⁶ scrapped term limits.

In Central America and the Caribbean throughout the 1920s and 1930s, especially as the Great Depression made it easier to claim the need for the strong hand and indispensable men — and in a clear example of constitutional diffusion that was undoubtedly reinforced by domestic factors — a number of presidents overstayed their constitutional tenures, often employing the same methods to do so¹⁷ (Fitzgibbon 1940; Walter 1993, 93–94). These extensions occurred during times of economic turmoil, which presented the office-holders with unrivaled economic opportunities. Also, all of these presidents committed serious abuses of power during their first terms that made departures particularly problematic. All promulgated short-term extensions initially, whether through Constituent Assemblies or acts of parliament, then prolonged even further, typically by scrapping term limits. For example, Carías (1933–49) of Honduras was elected for a single four-year term, yet the 1936 Constituent Assembly increased the term length to six years, allowing re-election. In 1939 the legislature extended his tenure by six more years to 1946 on an ad hoc basis (Lentz 1994, 360). Similar to contemporary presidents who left office, however, and to whom I return in subsequent chapters, Carías was forced to depart by very strong international — US — pressure. However, he only did so after securing the victory of his handpicked successor.

As in other Latin American nations, Mexico experienced several attempts by its rulers to perpetuate themselves in office: in fact, the remarkable stability of Mexican presidential term limits in the 20th century rests on the preceding century of abuse.¹⁸ Porfirio Díaz (1876–80, 1884–1911) who campaigned against the violation of a no re-election principle, paradoxically turned into the biggest violator of them all: not only did he secure his own nonconsecutive re-election while serving his first and, constitutionally, only term in 1876–80 — in 1880–84 Porfirio Díaz's handpicked successor kept the office — prior to the 1888 scheduled departure he introduced a two-term amendment, followed by the elimination of term limits in 1890, and additionally lengthened his four- into six-year term in 1904 (Krauze 1998). It was not possible to unseat Porfirio Díaz in elections; nor was the president, who generated enormous spoils for himself and his coalition through extensive rent-seeking (Haber 2008; Haber, Maurer and Razo 2003), willing to stand down voluntarily. Eventually, the electoral defeat of the opposition candidate Francisco Madero to the incumbent, who was running for his 8th term, triggered the revolt that sent the president fleeing into exile. In 1917 a new constitution was enacted that unequivocally forbade re-election.¹⁹ When president Álvaro Obregón (1920–24) avoided the ban — which also included a nonconsecutive re-election — by winning a second term that he also lengthened from four to six years in 1928, he was assassinated later the same year. Shortly after, Mexican political elites established a new umbrella party, *PRI*, as a collective agreement to prevent one single individual from becoming a dictator (Hall 1981). To a large extent, the assassination of Obregón created a powerful focal point for coordination against possible re-election attempts in the future (Magaloni 2006, 8; Needler 1982, 89–93). Ever since, no president in Mexico has dared to break this rule.

The authors of presidential constitutions of North and Latin America frequently debated the relative merits of term limits yet they were rarely adopted prospectively, with hindsight. Much like the 1949 German Basic Law that no longer envisaged referenda at the federal level out of fear of repeating the experience of plebiscites under Adolf Hitler, in many nations term limits were introduced not out of some abstract principles but in reaction to a specific fear of perpetual executive that a country experienced in the past. In the United States, a constitutional amendment of 1951 was introduced to limit presidents to two terms in office only after President Franklin D. Roosevelt (1933–45) won a third, and subsequently fourth term, and thus broke an informal precedent established by George Washington in 1796. The concerns were not only about executive re-election per se, they also stemmed from the fact that the executive branch grew responsive to a particular individual, Franklin D. Roosevelt (Kallenbach 1952). Likewise, in Mexico a no-re-election rule was universally agreed upon only after president Obregón was re-elected again.

Outside of Latin America, term limits were still an exception.²⁰ The 1848 Constitution of the Second Republic in France however stipulated a single four-year term for its president. When the proposed amendment to extend his presidential term was rejected by the parliament, President Louis-Napoleon launched a coup in 1851 and like his famous uncle Page 30 earlier, first extended his tenure for a ten-year term ratified in the (January 14) 1852 constitution and, according to the November 7 amendment, Article 1, “imperial dignity was restored” later the

same year when the president turned into emperor Napoleon III (Bresler 1999, 224–54). Napoleon's inability to stand for re-election was seen as the immediate trigger for the collapse of democracy, yet whether Louis-Napoleon would have established a monarchy regardless is an interesting counterfactual. Since then, neither the Third Republic (1870–1940), nor the Fifth Republic in France (from 1958 until 2008) imposed term limits for its presidents. Likewise, neither the 1919 Weimar Constitution nor the 1919 Constitution of Finland limited their presidents; they also stipulated very long terms of seven and six years, respectively. The oldest African constitution, of Liberia in 1847, was inspired by the US Constitution and had no term limits (a single eight-year term was in effect between 1944 and 1951, however).

Presidential Term Limits in the Contemporary Period

In the 1960s, the majority of newly independent states of sub-Saharan Africa that chose presidential regimes, or changed from parliamentary to presidential form of government even in the early, relatively democratic period, had no term limits — only the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gabon, Rwanda and Togo initially had them, but not for long. Constitutions imposed terms of different length, varying from four to seven years. Subsequently, a number of rulers opted for a lifelong presidency, conveniently forgetting about the corresponding weakening of its powers as envisaged by Simon Bolivar. In a majority of the countries powerful presidents, constrained neither by political opposition to the extent of their authority nor by term limits in how long they could stay in power, kept winning election after election with improbable margins. No North African or Middle Eastern presidential regime — except for Lebanon — restricted their chief executives.

Figure 2 gives four snapshots of term limits in place: in 1962 — around the time when a number of newly independent states in Africa adopted presidential form of government; in 1975 — at the beginning of the “third wave”; in 1991 — when the majority of former socialist countries opted for presidentialism; and in 2010. In early 1960s, outside of Latin America that imposed single terms of different duration for its presidents, the predominant majority of presidential regimes had no limits: in Korea both presidents Syngman Rhee (1948–60) and Park Chung-hee (1962–79) soon eliminated a two-term limit and neither Page 31 Indonesia nor Taiwan imposed them. Only the Philippines, which had been under US sovereignty until 1946, imposed restrictions — a single six-year term under the 1935 constitution and two consecutive four-year terms after a 1940 amendment. They broke down in the early 1970s, however, when President Ferdinand Marcos (1965–86), who amassed one of the largest fortunes from political office (Johnston 1997, 68; Transparency International 2004, 13), decided to stay in office longer.

As can be seen in Figure 2, in 1975 even fewer presidents faced restrictions on their tenure. Indeed, the mid-1970s was a dark time for democracy. The only two free countries in Latin America then were Venezuela and Colombia, and Africa was home to a great number of Page 32 highly repressive dictatorships, sporting presidents for life at their helm. Like in 1962, in 1975 the majority of presidents had no restrictions on the number of terms they could serve, with the $N \times 5$ being the most popular arrangement.

In 1991 compulsory rotation is featured prominently in the majority of constitutions, however. In Africa before 1989 only a handful of nations had multiparty politics, and even then, to a very limited degree (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Yet the spread of discontent, fueled by falling living standards and the end of the Cold War that deprived the long-serving autocrats of often unconditional Soviet, and also Western, support, augured well for regime change (Bates 2008; Bratton and van de Walle 1997). One after another, African presidents had to agree to hold competitive elections. All first multiparty constitutions included clauses on term limits.

How term limits became universal is not exactly clear. Western organizations active in democracy promotion, such as the National Endowment for Democracy or the National Democratic Institute, for example, did not explicitly single out presidential term limits as one of the aims of their governance programs — many civil society organizations or political parties funded or trained by international donors, however, did promote tenure restrictions or fight against tenure prolongations. Direct pressure by donor governments to thwart third term bids came later, in the 2000s (chapter 3 of this book, also Von Doepp 2005). Likewise, the most active US NGO

involved in legal technical assistance in less developed nations, the American Bar Association Rule of Law initiative that, among other things, contributes and advises on constitution-making and law reform in its host nations, established its Africa Law Initiative in 2000 only. Thus, the initiative to restrict tenure was largely home-grown and was regarded as evident by democratic activists. Certainly, some of these nations previously had limits in their first post-independence constitutions in the past, so they simply reinserted them. There also existed a precedent for compliance with term limits in Africa, however limited. President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, who stepped down in 1985, later emphasized that term limits were absolutely necessary as presidents were not exactly Plato's philosophers who did not like political life and therefore could easily leave: "Our leaders are ordinary politicians who very much like governing...; who are even ready to bribe so that they get elected to Office, and once elected do not leave until they are forced out. It is not wise to leave them to decide when they should step down" (Nyerere 1995, 27).

Even nations with the French constitutional tradition (which did not have limits) deviated from the script and restricted the tenures of Page 33 their future rulers. In Benin, in early 1990 President Mathieu Kérékou (1972–91) was forced to convene a National Conference on a new constitution and agree to multiparty elections and presidential term limits alongside upper age limits demanded by the delegates (Allen 1992, 47–48; Heilbrunn 1993). The most prominent constitutional lawyer, Maurice Glele Ahanhanzo, who criticized the 1960 document for its absence of limits as one begetting "absolute monarchy [and] a constitutional dictatorship" (Boko 2000, 19), exerted serious influence on the work of the Commission of Constitutional Affairs during the Conference and later Constitutional Commission.

It seems that the movement to impose presidential limits in Africa was a combination of spontaneous rejection of perpetual power in every nation and a process of constitutional diffusion, whereby country after country included virtually identical articles limiting their presidents to two consecutive terms, alongside other constraints on the president. Having ousted the long-running President Bourguiba (1957–87) of Tunisia, his successor Ben Ali (1987–2011) in his first address said that "the age in which we live can no longer permit either presidency-for-life, or automatic succession as head of state, from which people are excluded" (Quoted in Kasmi (1988, 165–68). President Ben Ali had to reconsider this statement in 2002 when his own term limits approached, however.

Even long-lasting presidents that introduced new constitutions as a democratic façade only, had to oblige and include tenure limitations so as not to look too dictatorial. Thus, swept by the democratization wave, the 1991 constitution of Equatorial Guinea included a new clause that the president "shall be elected for a period of seven years, he may be re-elected once" (Article 34). The 1995 amended constitution contained identical wording, except that one crucial word — "once" — that disappeared. It probably helped that the incumbent presidents in the early nineties were not banned from standing in elections and the scheduled departures loomed long in the future — in eight, ten, twelve or fourteen years, provided they were re-elected. Perhaps inadvertently, by imposing tenure restrictions at the onset of democratization, whether genuine or not, many presidents created very powerful focal points for future societal, elite and international coordination against dictatorial takeover. Similar to the Latin American experience throughout the 19th century, an almost universal adoption of this norm in Africa has grown out of the fear of long-lasting autocrats, and was "at the heart of regime transitions in Africa, driven as they were by a mass consensus that old-guard leaders had overstayed their welcome" (Bratton and van de Walle 1997, 113).

Page 34

Likewise, the introduction of term limits in presidential regimes throughout East Europe and the former Soviet Union was universal once democratization was under way. Also, all of them adopted five-year terms — the length probably inherited in institutional "genetic" codes from the previous period of state socialism when all elected officials served five-year terms and the economy ran on five-year plans. For the first time in the region, in the Soviet Union, the newly created office of the directly elected President of the USSR was introduced by the constitutional amendment of March 14, 1990, with Article 127(1) stipulating that "the same person cannot be President of USSR for more than two terms."²¹ All subsequent new constitutions — 1991 Russian (RSFSR), 1992 "Small" Polish, 1992 Turkmen, 1994 Belarusian, 1996 Ukrainian, for example — imposed two-term limits of

five-year terms. In the early nineties, much like in Africa, limits were introduced automatically and were not questioned.

In Russia, despite the fact that the delegates of the 1993 Constitutional Convention endorsed the creation of a very strong presidential, often called super-presidential, regime (Parrish 1998), term limits were not even debated — delegates simply referred to best international practice, especially the presidency of the United States.²² The delegates used examples of other constitutions — Finnish, Portuguese, Austrian and especially French — extensively. When the turn came of the new constitution's proposed Art. 71, which regulated presidential time in office, none of the five plenary groups questioned the necessity of limits. Instead, in the discussion of the proposed length of presidential term, the major issue was whether presidential and parliamentary elections should be separated in time and whether different term lengths should be considered (Constitutional Convention 1995–1996, Volume VI, 77). Another proposal — to make sure that the presidential electoral campaign ran the full nine months in order to correspond with the natural term of pregnancy — was rejected (*ibid.*, VI, 289).

Instead, President Boris Yeltsin, who was elected in 1991 for a five-year term under the old constitution, had his term shortened to four years rather by accident. One of the first drafts, proposed by deputy Prime Minister Sergey Shakhrai on behalf of the president, alongside increased presidential powers also stipulated two six-year consecutive terms (article 74 of the so-called Shakhrai's version). The president proposed another version, with two consecutive five-year terms (article 71, the proposed “president's” version). The convention delegates were given the draft of the proposed constitution, together with the submitted amendments, which they debated at length in several separate and plenary sessions (Constitutional Convention 1995–1996, Page 35 Volume I, 237).²³ In the end, out of five convention groups that debated separately, three groups endorsed a five-year term and two groups a four-year term. However, when the plenary session was finalizing the draft, quite unexpectedly four years were inserted in the final draft instead of five (*ibid.*, V 12, 289–92):

V.F. Shumeiko: “Why do we insist on changing from ‘five years’ to ‘four’? It is because we would like the Federal Council and President to have terms of the same length.”

Chairman: “I am only concerned that for our country, for such a huge territory, four years is way too short for a person that enters office with this kind of authority.”

E. A. Panfilova: “Yes, Sergey Mikhailovich, but it is too long for members of parliament. Under no circumstances should the term be lengthened....”

N. T. Ryabov: “We should shorten the term, there is no need extending it to five years for anyone, and five years for MPs is far too long.”

Chairman: “It is today that it is long. But if we lived in a normal economic situation, when the President had the opportunity to carry out his large-scale programs, then four years is a term too short.... All right, shall we vote? All for four years? Five years? Who supports reduction of a presidential term down to four years, please vote. In my opinion, majority. Who supports keeping five years? Four. Good. One abstained.”

Thus, a four-year term was introduced in a rather incidental manner, together with the omission of the age limit of 65 years (Yeltsin was 62 at the time of the convention). Crucially, as it would only become apparent at the end of his successor's second term, the new constitution did not explicitly prohibit nonconsecutive third (or fourth) terms either. The available records of the constitutional convention suggest that the delegates simply did not give much thought to the question of “consecutive” terms. Indeed, while in contrast to “president's” and “Shakhrai's” versions yet another version — proposed by parliament — envisaged two four-year terms and omitted “consecutive” thus ruling out the possibility of running again (article 93, the so-called parliament's version), it did not appear that the delegates seriously considered the question of eligibility after an interim term.²⁴ Given the lack of relevant precedents and political and economic crisis of the early 1990s Page 36 it is hardly surprising that the authors of the constitution had more immediate concerns in mind.

Similarly, in the debates during the 1999 Constituent Assembly in Venezuela, the question of whether the president should have term limits did not arise at all — the delegates considered it axiomatic. Instead the debate was mainly about the appropriate term length and whether a consecutive second term should be introduced. In a submission on October 18, 1999, the Commission on the Executive Branch acknowledged that “presidential re-election is without a doubt the most debated issue in the Constituent Assembly and the country at large” (*Asamblea Constituyente* records, October 18, 1999).²⁵ The Commission supported the immediate re-election clause and proposed it to the Assembly, having found that there was a broad agreement over it. Thus, Samuel Lopez, a supporter of a president, pointed out that immediate re-election will “guarantee that a project will have a long time horizon. Secondly, it will also guarantee the alternation, because re-election is immediate and for a single time. Therefore we can be sure that the new leaders can advance and that the current leader can consolidate his policy” (*Asamblea Constituyente* records, November 4, 1999).

The predominant majority of delegates also favored immediate re-election. Thus, Mario Isea criticized previous presidents and praised the fact that since they could not be re-elected, their tenures were at least short enough. He emphasized, however, that President Chávez was of course different: “In this case we have no doubt that President Chávez, with his good leadership, and this is not disputed, would never, never have behaved like these gentlemen that I have mentioned” (*ibid.*). Likewise, Pablo Medina argued that the record in Venezuela regarding re-election in the last forty years has been bad. Both presidents who were re-elected for second terms after interim periods in the past were politically unsuccessful, especially in their second terms. Rather counterintuitively, he then argued: “I believe that we have the opportunity to change it.... Immediate re-election is common in developed nations, even in Latin America. I believe that re-election with an interim ten-year period is completely different from the immediate one.”...(*ibid.*).

Among the few voices that forcefully argued against re-election was constitutional lawyer Hermann Escarra, who reminded the delegates that Venezuela had 25 revisions of the constitution in the past and almost all of them were to suit a ruler, a specific person. They denoted instances of “personalism”: “The experience of this century provides a multitude of examples of self-perpetuation in power and the truth Page 37 is that re-election is...partially responsible for political problems of Venezuela. Once [president] Carlos Andrés Pérez asked me why I did not like re-election and I told him it was because of him.... I believe that the rotation in power is fundamental for a democratic system. I know that in the end you are going to vote for re-election anyway.”...(*ibid.*). Indeed, the Constituent Assembly did endorse a second presidential term.

As it turned out, Russian presidential term limits survived intact until 2008; in Venezuela, term limits were overturned altogether ten years later in 2009 when President Hugo Chávez realized that thirteen years in power were not enough to implement his socioeconomic program. Many leaders across the world, in Latin America and the Post-Soviet region, also modified their terms at some stage during their tenure in one way or another. Likewise, African leaders, both from the older generation that self-imposed restrictions in the 1990s and those that came to power later, attempted to extend their stay in office, and many of them were successful (see [chapter 3](#)).

Page 38

[Figure 2.2](#) looks at the history of term limits by charting them alongside democracy since 1960. The broken line stands for the percentage of presidential regimes that are democratic in a given year. The number of democratic presidential regimes has grown so that close to half of all presidential regimes are democracies now. The solid black line charts those having formal limits on the number of terms. The thinnest line below documents the decline of single-term regimes as more and more single-term presidents are allowed one more term. The majority of Latin American executives can still serve only single term, but there is a momentum to allow consecutive re-election and Brazil, Bolivia, Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and the Dominican Republic permit a second term. The institutional variation in Latin America is not about the number of terms, at least up until quite recently, but about whether re-election is permitted after some interim period, or not.²⁶

Presidents of nations who “disagree” with Thomas Jefferson who argued for the necessity of term limits hail from the sub-Saharan Africa, Post Soviet area, and the Middle East and North Africa. Note that the dotted line (“de

facto” limits) deviates from the line that tracks formal limitations, which suggests that many presidents chose to extend their stay whether by introducing one more term or lengthening it without formally abolishing limits.

The divergence between formal and de facto term limits, and the increasing reluctance by chief executives to scrap limits altogether and instead employ more ingenious designs in order to remain in power, indicate that, similarly to elections, many leaders attempt to manipulate term limits in order to preserve the façade of democratic legitimacy, as discussed at length in [chapter 3](#).

The national democratic indicators almost certainly deteriorate following meddling with term limits. For example, after a successful removal of term limits in the February 2009 referendum, Freedom House downgraded Venezuelan ranking of Political Rights from four to five for 2009 (where seven is the worst score), while Nigerien Political Rights declined from three to five “due to President Mamadou Tandja's antidemocratic moves to extend his power, including the dissolution of the Constitutional Court and National Assembly and the holding of a referendum to eliminate term limits” (Freedom House 2010). While Freedom House does not include presidential term limits as one of the Political Rights criteria, the changes thereof are often reflected in the national rankings. As the Director of Research Arch Puddington explained, when assigning the scores, the research team looks “at the Page 39 context of decisions to eliminate or extend presidential terms” and addresses whether “the decision to eliminate or extend term limits has been reached democratically and has that decision been made in an obvious effort to benefit a sitting president? In most recent examples, the decision to extend term limits has been made under considerably less than democratic circumstances and the decision clearly undermines democratic standards.”²⁷

[Figure 2.3](#) illustrates the strong correlation between the strength of democracy, on the Freedom House combined index of Political Rights and Civil Liberties where one stands for more liberal countries, and limited tenure. There is a dense cluster of “unfree” countries without limits in the upper right corner, and “free” and “partly free” countries with single or two terms in the lower left corner and at the center. Page 40 There is a clear association between democracy and term limits.²⁸ The pattern is unambiguous: the longer executives are allowed to stay in office, the more repressive their regimes are.

Conclusion

We can draw several preliminary conclusions from the discussion of the idea behind term limits. First, there is an old tradition in political thought that equates perpetual rule, or the possibility of perpetual rule, with tyranny. The arguments that the possibility of perpetual rule can be checked by executive constraints abound, most notably made by Alexander Hamilton and Simon Bolivar. Such arguments, however, tend to overlook the possibility that overly long tenure could diminish checks and balances and transform presidents into monarchs. Binding term limits are supposed to hinder this transformation. While short time horizons can distort policy making, long horizons can just as easily lead to executive consolidation and dictatorial takeover. The shorter the tenure, the fewer opportunities there are for a ruler to take over a regime (Barzel 2002, 261).

Second, at the center of the debate about term limits is the trade-off between the possibility of dictatorial takeover and restriction of democratic choice: while restrictions on re-election can prevent leaders from accumulating incumbency advantage at the polls, they can also deprive people of capable leaders. Constitutional designers also seem to agree that the longer the term, the less powerful the office should be; and the more uncertain and fluid the times are, the shorter the term should be also. One can debate the advantages and disadvantages of term limits on normative grounds, yet history indicates that restrictions “in advance,” with foresight, proved to be an exception. They were almost always agreed upon and adopted on the basis of the previous negative experience with long-lasting rulers.

The historical arguments made by opponents and proponents of term limits, and later of presidential term limits, were reiterated in this chapter not only because the former are so eloquent — which they certainly are — but also because virtually all of these arguments are being used, sometimes in rephrased and less eloquent form, by our

contemporaries. As reasons for extending term limits, presidents the world over still emphasize primarily the need for policy continuity, stability, and democratic accountability.

From the broad overview in this chapter it is clear that indeed democracy and tenure limitations usually go together, and that many Page 41 rulers who enter term-limited office — whether in the ancient Roman republic or a contemporary presidential regime — comply with the term limits as they do with other rules of democracy, and step down when required. However, historical record indicates that a large number of leaders, such as Sulla, Caesar, Napoleon, Louis-Napoleon, or Porfirio Díaz — to name few discussed earlier — enter limited office yet choose to extend their tenure and take over their regimes. How different were these leaders from those who chose to comply with constitutions, from those that faced similar checks and balances? Is it possible to offer a more generalizable theory than to say that idiosyncratic ambition of individual leaders drove them to pursue political office at whatever cost? The following two chapters will explore reasons behind the phenomenon of modern Caesarism, focusing especially on the constraints on dictatorial bids ([chapter 3](#), which also explains how presidents implement changes) and on the motivation of a politician facing the prospect of leaving the highest post ([chapter 4](#)).

Appendix 2A: Presidents and Term Limits, 1960–2010

The data on presidential term limits is coded by the author from national constitutions and constitutional amendments dating from 1960 onward,²⁹ and it includes the length of a term, how many terms are allowed, whether nonconsecutive terms are permitted after some specified interim period, years when a particular tenure arrangement is in place, and miscellaneous details about tenure prolongation.³⁰ In this period, the term length varies from four to eight years, and the number of consecutive terms that are permitted are single, two, or unlimited. Almost a hundred presidents enter office under 2×5 arrangement in this period — which therefore makes it the most common arrangement in the world. Only fewer than 2 percent of presidents have more than two terms at entry into office (while keeping limits in place). Thus, rather unusually, Article 53 of the 1962 constitution of Rwanda allows four terms of four years each for its president who “may not however be reelected for more than four successive terms.” Later on, the 1973 Rwandan constitution stipulates three consecutive terms of five-year duration.³¹ The most unusual is the 1951 amendment to the Constitution of Liberia. It had previously stipulated a single eight-year term, amended from an unlimited number of two-year terms as in the 1847 constitution. From 1951 the president, after serving his first eight-year term, is allowed to serve an unlimited number of terms that are however twice shorter than his original four year term — should Page 42 the president, according to Article 3(1), have gained the majority of votes cast in a subsequent election. Also, in 1980 in Chile the head of state Pinochet adopted a rather peculiar tenure limitation whereby he was to serve a single eight-year term, which was to start however only following the scheduled 1988 referendum, thus rendering it into de facto 2×8 arrangement.

This book is concerned with the role of term limits in democracy and dictatorship. Therefore, it considers presidents in democratic, partly and nondemocratic regimes. The majority of the empirical analyses throughout the book focus on the period between 1960 and 2009, thus covering the period after independence in Africa during which a great number of new presidential regimes appeared, as well as the third wave of democratization and its aftermath. Each president that enters a term-limited office can, in principle, extend his or her tenure. The unit of analysis in the majority of estimations in subsequent chapters is the individual president, not the presidential regime as such. There could be a number of presidents during a spell of a particular regime, or there could be a single president if the country is a newly independent state. Also, if in a small number of cases, the same national leader enters office for a second, or more, terms after an interim period, his subsequent presidency is counted as a separate observation. This rule excludes instances when a president formally departs yet rules through a figurehead (see [chapter 3](#)). Below I explain the criteria for selection of individual presidents.

All national political leaders that have, or can have, term limits This book is about how presidentialism can slide into personalism and the role of term limits in this process. No other national political leaders — prime ministers, monarchs, leaders of military juntas, and general secretaries of one-party states — who may or may not be prime ministers — have term limits.³² Indeed, in constitutional terms, monarchs can rule as long as their health

allows; military juntas for as long as they can remain in control and thwart challenges; and prime ministers for as long as they enjoy the support of the legislative majority and their party keeps winning. In practice, of course, these leaders can exit office early for a number of reasons, ranging from coups to electoral defeats. For the purposes of discussion of tenure limitation, however, no national political leaders except presidents face constitutionally mandated exits from office. Indeed, in contrast to other chief executives, there is a fundamental bond between presidents and term limits (Linz 1998, 25). In the analyses of breakdown of term limits, only presidents that enter *term-limited* office are included, as I explain in greater detail in [chapter 6](#).

Page 43

All directly and indirectly elected presidents Presidential regimes differ, and many constitutions that envisage presidents with or without term limits can be defined as semipresidential, or even parliamentary, depending on the relation between president, cabinet, and the legislature. My main inquiry is about factors behind changes of term limits and authoritarian reversals. What is relevant is whether a ruler, an effective head of state, faces constitutional limits on the length of time he or she is allowed to serve, and whether this ruler chooses to comply with them. Whether presidents can dismiss the cabinet, whether they can do so alone or together with the legislature — criteria at the heart of classification based on executive-legislative balance (Lijphart 1992) — while important, are secondary to the main question. Likewise, whether presidents are directly or indirectly elected, which is important in the literature (e.g., Duverger 1978; Shugart and Carey 1992), is orthogonal to the question of compliance with term limits. The selection of only directly elected presidents would entail an arbitrary exclusion of a number of leaders that practiced an indirect election into a different office as the core of their tenure extension — for instance, Milošević of Serbia and Yugoslavia or Marcos of the Philippines (see [chapters 3 and 5](#)). Additionally, the distinction between directly and indirectly elected ruler can be less pertinent than thought (Tavits 2009); even “directly-elected” presidents can be elected indirectly, such as in Bolivia or Chile (for example, Allende in 1970). In terms of the definition based on presidential-legislative relationship, the predominant majority of regimes selected for analyses in 1960–2009 are presidential, and the rest are semipresidential.³³

All presidents in democratic, partly democratic, and non-democratic regimes Presidents in all kinds of regimes, nondemocratic and democratic alike, can have term limits. Presidents in more institutionalized nondemocratic regimes, especially those with hegemonic parties, often have binding term limits. They are within a subcategory that Jennifer Gandhi defines as “civilian dictators” (2008, 29–36) that bear the titles of “president” and are, or can be, subject to term limits. The study of presidential term limits will encompass not only democratic, but also partly and nondemocratic regimes with presidents at their helm. Presidential regimes can make significant democratic progress, or regress, during the tenure of a particular president, and the compliance with or subversion of term limits almost always plays a significant role in this. Selection on democracy/dictatorship dichotomy would be a selection on the dependent variable as many partly democratic regimes can gravitate toward democracy around the time when their leaders honor term limits thus marshaling the first democratic Page 44 electoral turnover. Thus, Freedom House upgraded and downgraded democracy rankings for Ghana during the tenure of, and after, Jerry Rawlings (1979–2000); these rankings closely reflected the introduction of, and compliance with, term limits. Clearly, excluding certain types of regimes according to their degree of democracy at a particular time will lead to omission or truncation of leaders' tenures to be examined in their entirety. Thus, while other studies of presidentialism either exclusively focus on democratic presidential regimes (Shugart and Carey 1992) or they first establish criteria for democracy and dictatorship (Cheibub 2007, 26–33) and second examine exclusively democratic regimes, this study is more inclusive and “democratic” in its selection criteria. It examines the whole range of political regimes — non-, partly and fully democratic, both together (similarly to Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Goemans 2008) and separately (see [chapter 6](#)).

Presidents are unitary actors and effective national executives A president is effective — that is, not dominated by a single ruling party or a military junta — and he cannot be dismissed by a simple legislative no-confidence vote (Riggs 1994). A president has to be a unitary actor and not part of a collective executive, for instance, of a military junta. While a number of the heads of state are called presidents — for example in Ireland or Austria — and can be subject to term limits provisions, their powers are largely ceremonial and the effective head of government is the prime minister, who is not subject to term limits. In the same manner, while the Iranian

president is the head of government and is subject to term limits, he is not the de facto head of state, and his position is more akin to that of a prime minister in a powerful presidential regime. Also, as I explain below in [chapter 3](#), figurehead presidents that are installed in office by the effective national executives for the duration are also excluded. Among nondemocratic regimes, unelected military juntas — in the words of Juan Linz, those that had not undergone “the process of civilization” (Linz 2000, 172) — monarchies, and one-party states are excluded. However, those military regimes with a unitary, effective national executive that is elected, directly or indirectly — for instance, military presidents of Brazil (1964–85) — are included.

In the period of 1960–2009 there are 498 presidents of political regimes that fulfill the above criteria.³⁴ Altogether, 163 presidents are from sub-Saharan Africa, 32 from the Middle East and North Africa, 199 from Latin America, 36 from the Newly Independent States and Eastern Europe that did not join European Union, 34 from the United States, Western Europe and nations of Central and Eastern Europe that joined EU, and 34 from Asian countries. On average, there are 4 Page 45 or 5 presidents per country in this period.

Below there is a list of political regimes in the 1960–2009 period that are included in the analyses, as defined above: Afghanistan (2003–), Algeria (1962–92, 1995–), Angola (1979–), Argentina (1958–65, 1983–), Armenia (1991–), Azerbaijan (1991–), Belarus (1994–), Benin (1960–65, 1972–), Bolivia (1960–64, 1982–), Botswana (1966–), Brazil (1956–), Burkina Faso (1960–80, 1983–), Burundi (1962–93, 1996–), Cameroun (1961–), Cape Verde (1975–), Central African Republic (1960–), Chad (1960–75, 1982–), Chile (1958–73, 1990–), Colombia (1960–), Comoros (1975, 1978–95, 1995–) Congo (1960–77, 1979–), Costa Rica (1960–), Cote d'Ivoire (1960–99, 2000–), Croatia (1990–), Dem. Rep. Congo (1960–), Djibouti (1977–), Dominican Republic (1966–), Ecuador (1960–63, 1966–76, 1979–), Egypt (1960–), El Salvador (1962–79, 1982–), Equatorial Guinea (1968–), Finland (1956–), France (1958–), Gabon (1961–), Gambia (1965–), Georgia (1991–), Ghana (1960–66, 1979–81, 93–), Guatemala (1966–81, 1986–), Guinea (1958–), Guinea-Bissau (1980–99, 2000–2003, 2004–), Haiti (1957–86, 1988–91, 1994–), Honduras (1957–62, 1965–), Indonesia (1959–), Iraq (1968–2003), Kazakhstan (1991–), Kenya (1963–), Kyrgyzstan (1991–), Lebanon (1958–), Liberia (1944–90, 1997–), Lithuania (1991–), Madagascar (1959–72, 1975–), Malawi (1964–), Mali (1960–68, 1979–), Mauritania (1960–78, 1992–), Mexico (1958–), Mongolia (1990–), Moldova (1991–2000), Mozambique (1975–), Namibia (1990–), Nicaragua (1956–79, 1984–), Niger (1960–74, 1987–99, 1999–), Nigeria (1979–83, 1999–), Panama (1960–68, 1989–), Paraguay (1954–), Peru (1956–67, 1980–), Philippines (1957–), Poland (1990–), Portugal (1976–), Romania (1990–), Russia (1991–), Rwanda (1962–94, 2000–), Sao Tome and Principe (1975–), Senegal (1960–), Sierra Leone (1968–), Somalia (1960–91), South Africa (1984–), South Korea (1961–), Sri Lanka (1978–), Sudan (1958–64, 1971–85, 1989–), Surinam (1987–90, 1991–), Syria (1961–), Taiwan (1950–), Tajikistan (1991–), Tanzania (1964–), Timor-Leste (2002–), Togo (1960–), Tunisia (1957–), Turkmenistan (1991–), Uganda (1966–79, 1980–85, 1986–), Ukraine (1991–), United States of America (1961–), Uruguay (1967–73, 1985–), Uzbekistan (1991–), Venezuela (1959–), Yemen Arab Republic (1978–), Yugoslavia (1953–80 [FPRY/SFRY] 1989–2003 [prior to Union of Serbia and Montenegro], Serbia 2004–), Zambia (1964–), Zimbabwe (1987–).

3

Continuismo in Comparison: From a Few More Years to a Presidency for Life

The previous chapter demonstrated that the majority of democratic regimes, as well as many non- and partly democratic regimes, restrict the tenures of their presidents, especially after the end of the Cold War. Many leaders throughout history, however, were able to circumvent constitutional provisions on re-election. When the scheduled time for departures looms and the most powerful politicians confront the necessity to honor their constitutions, third term debates come to dominate national political agendas. In some countries such extensions are so salient and controversial that the attempts to remain in office or the supporters thereof even receive their own labels: throughout Latin America the former are often dubbed “continuismo”; in Bolivia they are referred to as “prorroguismo”; throughout the post-Soviet region as “tretij srok” (a third term — which does not necessarily imply only a third one); in Niger the supporters were referred to as “tazartchistes” after the Hausa word “tazartche,” “prolongation”; and in Uganda it came to be known as “ekisanja.”

What is tenure extension and what is departure from power? Under certain circumstances, the answers to these seemingly simple questions are not always obvious. The first section of this chapter, *How to Define Tenure Extension*, begins with a description of difficulties in defining what constitutes departure from power, as demonstrated by the examples of Presidents Álvaro Obregón (1920–24) of Mexico, Rafael Trujillo (1930–38 and 1942–52) of the Dominican Republic and Vladimir Putin (2000–) of Russia, who all formally stepped down from the office yet retained control over the executive. However, such cases Page 48 usually prove to be the exception to the rule as the predominant majority of presidents are more unequivocal in whether they prefer to stay or go.

The strategies to extend one's rule are diverse, and some of them can be quite opaque in order to disguise prolongations in power. A tenure extension is conceptually different from an additional presidential election to follow — re-election that the incumbent presidents predominantly win, as I explain in the last section of this chapter, *Incumbency, Re-election, and Term Limits*. Such an extension may indeed usher in a new election for which the sitting president becomes eligible, but it can also lengthen the existing term, or grant a number of additional years ad hoc, or postpone elections for a considerable period of time — without holding elections. Examining relevant articles in the national constitutions and court decisions, examples of which can be found in the appendix to this book, I classify and explain ten discernable ways that the presidents of the world employ in *The Menu of Staying in Power* section — from promulgating a new constitution and simultaneously discarding time already served under the previous one, to lengthening the term, to instituting a Presidency for Life, for example. Having established how rulers attempt to remain in office, in the *Constraints on Executive Capacity* section I turn to the question of what obstacles they have to overcome and what can hinder them.

Simply put, a tenure extension is when an individual president is, for whatever reason, permitted — usually through a constitutional change but often through an act of a constitutional court or parliament, or even on an ad hoc basis — to serve longer time than was prescribed at the time of his election into office. A longer time is whenever a president is able to stay in office for at least one additional year or more than the longest constitutionally permitted time (to exclude very short-term mandates' differences due to discretionary electoral timing). In practice, presidential extensions usually imply at least one extra term or more. This definition resonates with the classical one proposed by Russell Fitzgibbon in his explanation of tenure extensions, the so-called *continuismo*, in Central America (1940): “the practice of continuing the administration in power in a Latin American country by the process of a constitutional amendment, or a provision in a new constitution, exempting the president in office...from the historic and frequent prohibition against two consecutive terms in office. The precise form of the constitutional change may vary — the general pattern is simple and uniform.”¹

How to Define Tenure Extension

As an illustration of the typical options available to a political leader that faces term limits, and of the difficulties of categorizing them, below I analyze briefly the 2008 Russian presidential succession and subsequent developments. According to the 1993 Russian Constitution, a Russian president cannot serve more than two *consecutive* four-year terms, leaving the possibility of more than two *nonconsecutive* terms, as explained earlier in [chapter 2](#). President Vladimir Putin was, therefore, required to step down in the spring of 2008 when his second and last four-year term was to expire. At the end of the last term Putin was anything but a lame duck. He presided over an impressive economic growth — Russian GDP rose from USD 200 billion in 1999 to 1,290 billion in 2007, foreign debt was settled and foreign currency reserves increased thirty-fold during his tenure, according to World Bank and IMF data. By the end of his second term in 2007, the president ruled supreme and did not face any significant challenges from the consolidated national and regional elites and enjoyed consistent popular support. Indeed, according to the opinion polls conducted in the summer of 2007, 55 percent of Russians were willing to support him in elections.² It was not surprising then that the so-called 2008 problem had been the most salient issue in politics since Putin's re-election in 2004, and was seen as decisive for the future of Russian democracy. Those who wanted to amend the constitution argued that President Putin was indispensable and he had to finish reforms he started, while others warned that a third term signaled the end of democracy.

What were the choices available to the president? The first option was certainly to honor the constitution, step down and retire from public life. The president could also step down after designating a successor in advance and making sure the latter would win. There was a precedent for that: after Boris Yeltsin stepped down three months prior to the scheduled expiration of his term, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin himself became a *de facto* president in the crucial pre-election period and consolidated his control over the executive. Having secured the election of his successor however, the president and his winning coalition could have found themselves, their assets and immunity at the former's mercy. The establishment of the strong governing party, *United Russia*, as a commitment mechanism could have probably addressed this problem yet it was not clear at the time how the party would fare on its own (Remington and Reuter 2009).

What could presidents do, if they decided to prolong their rule? The menu of choice depends on a country's constitutional and political history, but there is ample room for constitutional imagination as well. In the case of the Russian regime in 2008, its president could have simply amended the constitution and allowed an additional third term *ad hoc* — as President of Namibia Sam Nujoma (1990–2005) did in 1998 — or he could have dropped term limits altogether, as President Alexander Lukashenko (1994–) in neighboring Belarus did in 2004. The option of appointing oneself for life and abolishing elections was certainly rather archaic. Alternatively, the Russian president could have pursued a further integration with one of the former Soviet states and become the head of a new state. The president could have also reconfigured the political regime and empowered the prime ministerial office at the expense of the presidency and then become the head of cabinet.

There were still other, more ingenious designs. The president could have stepped down but in fact retained executive control and ruled by proxy. Certainly there were historical precedents for the latter, albeit in different locales. For example, in Mexico between 1917 and 1936, political power was either intermittently shared between the president at the time and the national political boss, the head of the ruling party (*jefe maximo*), or the latter ruled via proxies that occupied the presidential palace. In 1917–20 and later in 1924–28 the real power was yielded by party boss Álvaro Obregón, who himself had been the president in 1920–24, rather than by Presidents Venustiano Carranza and Plutarco Calles (Weldon 2007, 248–50). From the assassination of Obregón in 1928 until 1936, when President Lázaro Cárdenas finally became the sole ruler, a duality of power existed. Similarly, in his fascinating account of life under the regime of Rafael Trujillo (1930–61, formal terms in 1930–38 and 1942–52) in the Dominican Republic, Vargas Llosa (2000) described how the latter, in order to deflect international criticism, designated four different successors including his own brother to serve between his own terms, while himself remaining the *de facto* ruler of a country (also Crassweller 1966; De Galindez 1955). Chehabi and Linz refer to such situations whereby the *de facto* ruler “does not always occupy the position that is constitutionally the most powerful, a policy called *politique de doublure*, or ‘politics of understudy’” (ibid., 17). Such an arrangement does not always work however. Anastasio García Somoza of Nicaragua (1936–56) who had

to formally step down in 1947 under US pressure, installed the figurehead 72-year-old President Leonardo Argüello. The latter, however, turned on his master and tried to govern unaided. He was ousted only 26 days after inauguration (Lentz 1994, 589; Walter 1993). Somoza then placed another figurehead that proved more compliant, yet in 1950 decided Page 51 to return to office formally as the president. After his assassination in 1956, his sons Luiz and Anastasio took turns ruling the country (Lentz 1994, 590–91).

Vladimir Putin maintained suspense until October 2, 2007, when he announced his decision to lead the list of the party of power, *United Russia*, in the forthcoming parliamentary elections, which were promptly won by that party, gaining the legislative super-majority. Then, on December 10, 2007, he endorsed deputy Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, a close member of his circle, to become his successor. The day after the succession plan was revealed, Medvedev, in turn, invited Putin to become his prime minister following the March 2, 2008, presidential election. Also, seemingly straight from the Caesar's vocabulary, in the last two years of his second term President Putin was frequently referred to as the “national leader,” whether in presidential office or not.³ There was no surprise when President Medvedev, having won elections by a landslide, indeed appointed Putin as prime minister on May 8, 2008, the day after his own inauguration. From that moment, the configuration of Russian executive power was to resemble the earlier described situation in Mexico, with the powerful *jefe maximo* alongside the president. Yet it was not immediately clear whether Putin would remain the de facto leader with a proxy president, effectively prolonging his tenure, or if he would share political power with the latter and possibly retire after making sure his successor's hold on power was secure. While Dmitry Medvedev occupied an all-powerful presidency with extensive powers and formal authority over appointments and dismissals, at the same time his predecessor retained control over the executive in the capacity of prime minister and was also able both to impeach the president and to change the constitution, given the legislative super-majority in the Duma if needed (Baturo and Mikhaylov forthcoming).

In his first annual address to the parliament on November 5, 2008, President Medvedev unexpectedly proposed to amend the constitution and lengthen the presidential term from four to six years (and legislative from four to five), painstakingly pointing out that it would not constitute a full-fledged constitutional reform but only mere adjustments.⁴ The haste of extending future terms so early in his presidential tenure was surprising — very few presidents did so in their first year in office. With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that the newly elected president followed the designs of his predecessor. Indeed, earlier, in the summer of 2007 while reiterating his commitment to term limits — “I believe that limitation by the number of terms is justified” — President Putin remarked on the appropriate length of presidential term: “In modern Page 52 Russia, five, six or seven years are quite acceptable. I was acting prime minister before becoming president so I knew what was going on.... But if, for example, a governor is elected [president], it will take him at least two years to understand national and international problems, but by then a new election campaign will have to be launched.”⁵

In December 2008 the new constitutional amendments were quickly enacted by both houses of parliament. The new, longer term was to apply to the president elected in 2012. Since Medvedev's inauguration, political scientists, area specialists, and journalists developed a body of analysis, sometimes referred to as *tandemology*, on the question of the relative powers of the new president versus his prime minister (Sakwa 2010; Wilson 2008). Following the initial uncertainty over the distribution of power between the two leaders, after about a year into a new president's term, the situation resembled more and more the 1924–28 Mexican presidential interregnum where former President Obregón was posed to return in 1928. There, too, a four-year term was extended to six years. The new Russian president had not employed his extensive powers over hiring and firing, all the significant members of Putin's winning coalition remained in office, and the prime minister exercised the paramount influence over policy.

In terms of definition of tenure extension, there are three possibilities in this case: the first is that the president “stepped down” in 2008; the second is that he “extended” his tenure by staying in power and ruling from a different office. The third possibility is that this case could not be defined as either until Putin had returned to the presidency after the interim term, not unlike President Porfirio Díaz in 1880 in Mexico, or until he has stepped down not unlike Jiang Zemin (1989–2004) of China in 2004. Indeed, in the People's Republic of China, the effective political leader of a country usually occupies the three most powerful posts. When Jiang Zemin decided

to step down, first he vacated the post of the General Secretary of the Central Committee in November 2002, then of the Presidency of the Republic in March 2003, and finally of the Chairmanship of the Central Military Commission in September 2004. The succession took almost two years. His successor Hu Jintao stepped into these three posts incrementally after his predecessor vacated them (Duchatel and Godement 2009). Clearly, in some instances stepping down defies the binary choice.

Since the logic of social science renders private designs of individual rulers not verifiable until these are revealed, until Vladimir Putin had returned to the presidency, or amended the constitution to strengthen the office of prime minister, or stepped down eventually, it could not be known with certainty whether the former president “stepped down” Page 53 or “extended” his term in 2008. In order to avoid the Type II error, such cases should only be categorized ex post, when the ruler does the former or the latter. When Prime Minister Putin was asked whether he considered returning to presidency in 2012, he clearly indicated that “earlier, President Roosevelt was elected for four consecutive terms because it did not contradict the American Constitution. I reckon that any decision that complies with the Basic Law by definition cannot harm the national democratic process.”⁶ Indeed, in the examination of political speeches made in connection with various tenure extensions for this book, I found that about half of all the rulers that ever tackled term limits would almost certainly employ the examples of either President Franklin D. Roosevelt or presidents of France (prior to 2008), or both, to explain their continuous re-election. Indeed, this F.D.R. rule of thumb proved to be correct: on September 24, 2011, President Medvedev proposed at the *United Russia* congress that the delegates supported the candidacy of Vladimir Putin for presidency. Thus, in the autumn of 2011 it became possible to identify that Putin “extended” his tenure in 2008.

This example illustrates that sometimes even the very fact of succession can be open to interpretation. Therefore, throughout the book a leader is defined as having “extended” his or her term if the former unambiguously remains the effective national leader even after the expiration of tenure as prescribed by the text of the constitution at the time. In the predominant majority of cases the post of an effective national leader retains the title of president, but prime ministerial office can become the top one instead, if the constitutional amendments are enacted to transform presidential type into a parliamentary one. The ruler is classified as having “stepped down” if the former exited her or his office after expiration of a term. Ambiguous cases such as Russia in 2008–11 are not categorized to avoid possible errors or a subjective judgment. If the president stepped down but retained or gained another political office, such as the chairmanship of the ruling party or that of the prime minister, he or she is categorized as having “stepped down” if that leader relinquished that post later.⁷

The Menu of Staying in Power Beyond Term Limits

The practices of contemporary world presidents provide the menu of possible options for political survival beyond constitutional term limits. Presidents can also combine several changes at the same time, usually by lengthening the term while simultaneously discarding time Page 54 already served. Below I count ten discernible actions for rulers that face restrictions:

- I. Step down and retire from political life (e.g., France 2007);
- II. Designate a successor and step down, with or without occupying a significant post after departure (e.g., Ghana 2000, Namibia 2005);
- III. Promulgate a new constitution and start a new term countdown after re-election, in which case the second term becomes first all over again (e.g., Peru 2000, Kyrgyzstan 1998); alternatively, promulgate a new constitution and make amendments to the effect that the time served under the old constitution is discarded (e.g., Belarus 1996, Venezuela 1999);
- IV. Modify the length of term without changing the number of terms, usually in combination with strategy three (e.g., Congo 2002, Uzbekistan 2002);
- V. Change the constitution to allow re-election in a single-term regime (Peru 1993, Brazil 1997) or to allow one more term ad hoc (e.g., Korea 1969, Namibia 1998);

VI. Simply prolong the rule by referendum or parliamentary vote ad hoc (e.g., Turkmenistan 1994, Kazakhstan 1995);

VII. Assume a different office, with or without constitutional changes to the effect that the regime type or the division of authority within the federation, if applicable, changes. For example, it is conceivable to weaken the post of the president so that the latter becomes a mere figurehead, strengthen the prime-ministerial position and place oneself as a prime minister; or to further strengthen the strongest component of the federation at the expense of the center, or vice versa (e.g., Yugoslavia 1997, Philippines 1976);

VIII. Suspend elections for the time being (e.g., the Philippines 1972, Angola 1992);

IX. Change the constitution to eliminate term limits altogether so that an incumbent can run an unlimited number of times (e.g., Uganda 2005, Kazakhstan 2007);

X. Abolish elections, presidency for life (e.g., Equatorial Guinea 1973, Turkmenistan 1999).

When new constitutions are drafted, many articles are inserted automatically, without much thought or deliberation. Term limits almost always appear in contemporary national constitutions, either after independence or after introduction of multiparty democracy. They become very salient, however, when the time to depart looms large before the presidents. In such times, rulers perform interesting feats of constitutional engineering — their second terms become first, or their third terms become second, or a number of years served in office are erased, or extra years become necessary in order to carry out a particular policy. Presidents rewrite and reinterpret their constitutions, often imaginatively; but they also encounter opposition from other institutions, from their own parties, civil society, international donors, and allies. They persist, however, and are often successful in staying beyond their designated mandates. Below I provide details about each possible manner of tenure extension, discussing constitutional modifications that are usually required.

I and II Departure from Office with or without Designated Successor

The simplest step to take for a president that has served his or her mandate is simply to step down when required. To depart without making any arrangements is unusual, but some presidents do so. For example, President of Benin Mathieu Kérékou (1996–2006) who also previously served in 1972–91, did not designate his successor in 2006, nor did he even indicate his preference for any particular candidate (Freedom House 2010). An independent candidate, Boni Yayi, emerged as a victor after a very competitive race in a second round.

Presidents, however, can also step down after designating a successor, often making sure the latter wins, and on rare occasions they can depart and hold on to another political office, usually party chairmanship, for some time during the tenure of the next president. In practice, almost always, whether in democracies, partly democracies, or nondemocracies, the outgoing president would endorse a candidate, typically from his own party, cabinet or even family that will be able to protect the interests of the outgoing leader, if necessary. There is certainly nothing inherently undemocratic if the incumbent leader publicly endorses his preferred candidate. Departing leaders frequently do so, often campaigning on behalf of their party's candidates. In less democratic settings, a particular president — whether popular or not — can ensure the victory of his chosen successor through electoral manipulation or even violence. Often the outgoing president can be the main or even the only person to decide who is to succeed him or her. The paradigmatic case of such succession is the Mexican presidency until 2000. Castaneda (2000) describes how Mexican presidents chose their successors in a process called the *dedazo* (the finger tap): the former would pick the ruler-to-be at will so that the incumbents were the only “voters” deciding the next president from among cabinet members. The population at large was only presented with the opportunity to endorse the candidates. The presidents vigilantly guarded their right to appoint their successors and punished aspiring politicians that made public their wish to be next ruler.

Similarly, many presidents are able both to ensure the election of their chosen successors and to preserve certain influence in their party even after official departure if they choose to do so. For the purposes of this discussion, if the president publicly supports one of the candidates prior to election during campaign, and this endorsement is

reported by at least two media sources, it is deemed that there is a designated successor. Among presidents that stepped down in the 1960–2009 period after completing their single terms, after completing a second term, or by not running after the first in two-term regimes, 66 percent endorse their designated successors and 34 did not: the majority of rulers prefer the next president to be their chosen candidate. In turn, 59 percent of the endorsed candidates win. Therefore, 41 percent of these candidates lose despite the best efforts of their predecessors. In hegemonic party regimes, however, departing leaders almost always are able to guarantee the election of their chosen candidates.

Presidents often strategically resign in advance of the expiration of their mandate so that their preferred successors assume presidential office temporarily and become de facto incumbents by the time of presidential election. An advance transfer of power can only work if the constitution does not formally prohibit interim leaders from contesting presidential elections, or does not stipulate an election within a specified period of time.⁸ In practice, however, bans are often circumvented, and many nondemocratic regimes do not shy away from disregarding the succession clauses of their constitutions: following the death of President Saparmurat Niyazov (1990–2006) of Turkmenistan on December 21, 2006, a constitutional successor, the parliamentary speaker Ovezgeldy Atayev, was swiftly arrested for corruption and, instead, deputy Prime Minister and a former health minister Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov was chosen as acting president. The Turkmen elites also followed the old Soviet custom to reveal the identity of the future leader by appointing him — Berdymukhamedov — as the chairman of the committee to organize his predecessor's funeral.⁹ Shortly after the former leader was buried, the parliament voted to remove article 60 from the constitution that rendered interim leaders ineligible, and on February 11, 2007, the interim leader was formally elected as president.

Apart from the departures without and with designated successors, the third option for the outgoing president is to engineer the victory of his chosen successor, then step down as president while remaining at the helm of a political party to which the successor also belongs — thus continuing the process of succession into the reign of a new ruler. Page 57 Thus, the president and founding father of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere (1964–85), stepped down from his office in 1985, yet remained chairman of the ruling CCM party until 1990. He then transferred this authority to his successor, President Ali Hassan Mwinyi (1985–95), who was then able to combine presidential powers and the ruling party chairmanship in his second term. Even after the latter assumed the full powers of both the presidency and party chairmanship, Julius Nyerere remained at least as powerful as his successor. He influenced constitutional developments in the federation and ensured the success of yet another presidential candidate ten years after his own departure (Hartmann 1988; Nyerere 1995). A decade-long exercise of power after formal departure by Julius Nyerere is an exception, however, and the majority of former presidents either relinquish control over the party themselves or quickly lose their influence once their successors consolidate control.

There are two exceptions to the tendency of former presidents to transfer powers over their parties swiftly. The first exception, as previously discussed, is when rulers do not intend to step down and when they rule through figurehead leaders after formal departures. Second, many former presidents in Latin America face the ban on consecutive re-election, yet they are eligible after some interim period, usually one term, and continue to lead their legislative parties. A number of these rulers run for office again, most of the time unsuccessfully. Therefore, presidents who are unable to run for a consecutive re-election might be less inclined to designate strong and popular successors and instead retain the party leadership in order to mount the presidential bids at a later date.

III New Constitution during One Term and a New Term Countdown during That Term or After

For presidents that want to stay in the same office, however, a number of options are possible. A promulgation of a new constitution presents such an opportunity, for example. One can discard time already served, by either counting a new term from the moment when a new constitution came into force, or from their first re-election following the latter's adoption. Seventeen presidents extended their tenure in this manner without formally abolishing term limits, and nine among them simultaneously modified the term length. This method of staying in office became especially popular among Post-Soviet rulers. Since ruling of the Constitutional Court is usually required to declare whether second term is in fact their first, if presidents can impose their will on the judiciary,

they can almost always stay longer.

Page 58

This practice is familiar in the literature on legislative term limits, where grandfathering refers to the provision under which the current office-holders are exempt from term limits that are implemented during their tenure. Full grandfathering dictates that enacted term limits are not applicable to the current office-holders, and limited grandfathering implies that for the current office-holders previous time in office is discarded and term limits will be applicable in the future (Bender 2003, 555; Reed, Schansberg, Wilbanks and Zhu 1994). Consequently, no grandfathering refers to the provision whereby term limits can be applied retrospectively so that the time already served is included. In practice, there are numerous examples of full and limited grandfathering for presidential term limits. The difference, however, is that presidents that already enter term-limited office under one constitution often modify or introduce a new constitution, also with term limits, and still argue for a grandfathering exception in their favor.

Examples exist of full presidential grandfathering. According to the 1999 Constitution of Republic of Kazakhstan, the president is elected for a seven-year term, and can be re-elected only once. In the 2007 modified version of the constitution the term is shortened to five years, however re-election ban is declared not to apply to the incumbent president.¹⁰ The provision constitutes the full presidential grandfathering that is applied to President Nursultan Nazarbayev, elected to the 2×5 office in 1991 and in power ever since, even though term limits were never officially abolished. In practice, a grandfathering clause is rarely incorporated into revised constitutions at the time when term limits are modified. Presidents seem to discard their future heavily and only make arguments for grandfathering when the time to depart approaches. A few constitutions are more explicit, however, as I explain regarding the extension of President Menem below.

The seemingly obvious question whether a second term constitutes a second or a first term is often subject to interpretation by the Supreme or Constitutional Court, which could endorse or reject a *laissez-faire* interpretation of the constitution by the executive. In practice, the ruling always depends on the degree of judicial independence. The decisions of the Kyrgyz and Russian Constitutional Courts, both dated 1998, about the appropriate interpretation as to what constituted the “first term,” are illustrative. President of Kyrgyzstan Askar Akayev (1990–2005) was elected for the first time indirectly on October 27, 1990, and elected directly in an uncontested poll on October 12, 1991. Under the old constitution the president was to serve two consecutive terms of five years each. Following the adoption of a new Constitution in 1993, on January 30, 1994, a referendum endorsed President Akayev Page 59 to continue the exercise of this authority under the new constitution. Subsequently, on December 24, 1995, the president was re-elected for another term and proceeded to consolidate his powers, codified in the 1996 and 1998 constitutional referenda. About two years prior to the expiration of Akayev's second term, on July 13, 1998, the Constitutional Court ruled, in a typically verbose fashion that “the tenure in office of Askar Akayev,” the President of Kyrgyz SSR, which was the part of a federal state of the USSR, “likewise in the consecutive period during the independence of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan cannot be regarded as a term in office of the President of Kyrgyz Republic” and therefore “for the first time, as the President of Kyrgyz Republic, Askar Akayev was elected only in the December 24, 1995 elections” (Kyrgyz Constitutional Court, July 13, 1998 Decision).¹¹ All nine judges were nominated by the president and confirmed by parliament in the period from 1993 to 1996, for fifteen-year terms. Cleared to run again, President Akayev was re-elected for his second, yet de facto third, term, in 2000.

In Russia, the very same question was put to the Constitutional Court, which interpreted it in the opposite way. President Boris Yeltsin (1991–99) was elected in 1991 for his first term, had the constitution adopted in 1993, and was re-elected for a second term in 1996. On November 5, 1998, the legislature requested the opinion of the Constitutional Court regarding presidential terms, yet the court dismissed the case due to the obvious lack of ambiguity in interpretation of relevant articles, ruling that two terms consecutively constitute the constitutional limit that cannot be exceeded.¹² The judges also pointed out that there was no explicit grandfathering clause and that “all participants of the electoral process — voters, officials and President himself assumed that the latter was nominated, voted for and elected as a person running for a second term” (ibid.). In Russia, even though all

nineteen judges were nominated by the president, they preserved a higher degree of independence from the executive (Ahdieh 1997; Barry 2002; McFaul 2001). President Yeltsin did not interfere with the Constitutional Court and even though the latter was dissolved in 1993, the newly constituted court retained a number of judges who were quite critical of the president.¹³

IV Modification of a Length of Term

Modifying the length of a presidential term is also quite common. All in all, 25 presidents lengthened their terms, usually from five to seven years, with or without accompanying modifications to the number of terms.¹⁴ The debate about presidential terms during the adoption of Page 60 the 1999 Constitution of Venezuela provides an example that illustrates the crucial role of the agenda-setter as the term length that was tabled by presidents' supporters was the one that was adopted. President Hugo Chávez, who won the December 6, 1998, election, was inaugurated for a single five-year term in February of the following year. In order to bring sweeping socioeconomic changes promised earlier during campaign, Chávez proposed the total overhaul of the constitutional system including a new unicameral legislature and new presidential powers, among other things. The most important, and certainly most debated, was a new clause on the immediate presidential re-election and lengthening of the term to six years. Shortly after assuming power in April 1999 the leader prevailed in a referendum to convene a constitutional assembly, which was swiftly elected in July of that year. The assembly, which was dominated by the president's supporters, claimed that by acting on behalf of a popular sovereignty it could override the acts of the legislature and judiciary, and clashed repeatedly with the latter over the constitutionality of its acts (Molina 2004; Urribarri 2008). Similarly, unable to secure qualified majorities in parliaments, many Post-Soviet executives employed people's conventions of various kinds in order to override and dismiss legislatures.

On October 18, 1999, the Assembly's Commission on Executive Powers, comprising of several legal scholars, acknowledged the agreement on presidential re-election. They pointed out, however, that the term length remained a “difficult and thorny issue.”¹⁵ Some deputies repeatedly argued in all seriousness that frequent elections represented “threats to political stability and the continuity of economic development plans” (e.g., Pablo Medina, November 2). No delegate advocated for the abolishment of term limits. Many delegates, despite being supporters of Chávez, expressed their concerns over the proposed six-year term and instead proposed four- or five-year periods. Interestingly enough, everyone took it as self-evident that the incumbent was likely to be re-elected, so in their references to the length of tenure they almost always multiplied the length of a term by two to imply how long a president was likely to stay in power. The supporters of a longer term, following Hugo Chávez's own argument that national transformation would take a very long time, indicated that an extra-long period was not designed specifically for the current president: “Speeches have been given that the tenure should be as short as possible. My opinion is to the contrary. It should be a period that will allow the total reconstruction of the country, the longer the better, so as to consolidate the transformation that this country requires. The period that we have to give has to be of sufficient duration so that the change is consolidated and there will be Page 61 no possibility of going back.... I would even propose seven years with re-election, but six years with re-election is more agreeable, so that with those twelve years we expect (Applause), with the leadership of the commander Chávez, we will consolidate this revolutionary movement” (Luís Camargo, November 2).

In the end the majority was convinced that the option of a recall referendum would serve as a check on an extra-long term of six years. When it came time to vote on the length of term, the proposed term of four years by Allan Brewer Carías was instantly rejected. In the end, the five-year term was pitted against the six-year term. The former lost with 39 against 55 votes for six years.

On December 15, 1999, the new constitution that incorporated the new clause on presidential tenure was approved by a popular referendum and, in July of the following year, Hugo Chávez was elected for a first six-year term. This represents a remarkable feat of constitutional engineering whereby the president simultaneously increased the length of his term from five to six years, introduced an additional second term, and discarded time already served under the old constitution. Having survived a military coup in 2002, a recall referendum in 2004 and having won re-election in 2006, the President decided to drop term limits altogether. His proposal was narrowly defeated in a

December 2007 referendum (Corrales 2010, 35–37). Undeterred, he won a second referendum in February 2009, which finally scrapped limits.

V Constitutional Change to Allow Re-election in a Single-Term Regime or to Allow One More Term Ad Hoc

This option is most common among Latin American presidents. Stemming from its historical experience with the so-called *hombre fuerte* — the strongmen — and abuse of power, constitutions on this continent traditionally prohibited immediate re-election (e.g., Argentina) and many ban re-election altogether (e.g., Mexico). Consider Argentina, where a single six-year term, which was in place from 1854 to 1976 (punctuated by Juan Perón's second consecutive term), and then again from 1983, with the military junta in between, was seen as “convenient for the realization of the governmental program, but that could turn dangerous should the president lose popular or political support” (Serraferro 1994, 3). President Carlos Menem (1989–99) was to follow the steps of Perón and to extend his tenure by one more term. Menem's Justicialist Party enjoyed the 50 percent majority in the Chamber of Deputies and 54 percent, from 1992 — 63 percent, in the Senate (Jones 1997, 284). With a legislative majority, in the spring of 1990, Page 62 President Menem was able to reshuffle the Supreme Court by increasing the number of judges from five to nine and filling the court with his appointees (Helmke 2002, 143–47). The president did not disguise his ambition to serve a consecutive second term.¹⁶ Prior to the October 1993 parliamentary elections, Menem declared that they “have gone far in four years...[but] I need ten to consolidate the reforms we have introduced.”¹⁷ Menem, however, did not possess the required two-thirds majority in the lower chamber that was necessary for the constitutional amendment. Many in the media opposed re-election, arguing that Menem was driven by the necessity to prolong his grip on power in order to remain immune from prosecution.¹⁸

Late in 1993 his predecessor Raúl Alfonsín, whose Radical party controlled one-third of the legislative seats and who believed that Carlos Menem would not stop in his re-election bid regardless — Menem even threatened a nonbinding referendum — decided to extract concessions in exchange for a re-election. Against the opposition of his own party, the ex-president signed the so-called Olive Pact in order to establish the constitutional assembly (Jones 1997, 291; Levitsky 2003, 33). Re-election, albeit for a shorter four-year term, was approved by the elected Constituent Assembly in 1994, alongside other amendments that decreased powers of the presidency considerably (Colomer 2003, 159). Rather shrewdly, the Radicals foresaw a possible future misunderstanding and inserted in the constitution a clause whereby “the mandate of the current president at the moment of the sanctioning of the reform shall be considered as his first term” (Helmke 2002, 149). Since re-election was paramount for Menem he was willing to face more checks and balances in his second term (Jones 1997, 292). Ultimately, the latter proved to be his undoing after presidential re-election in 1995, with the legislature becoming assertive and blocking many of the initiatives, including a bid for a third term, of a weakened, and less popular president (Levitsky 2003, 34–35). After departure from office Menem was repeatedly investigated, placed under house arrest, and accused of corruption.

When an immediate re-election appeared on the agendas of other Latin American nations later, politicians and constitutional lawyers frequently referred to the example of Argentina. Everywhere, the ban on immediate re-election was so entrenched that a possible amendment to allow one more term always became the focus of any debate on a new constitution. The opposition to a second presidential term was often virulent: the attempt to amend the constitution — and introduce immediate re-election — triggered the removal of President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras (2006–9) on June 29, 2009. The removal occurred Page 63 despite the fact that in all likelihood, he would not have been able to run for a second term himself.¹⁹

Unlike additional second terms in the previously single-term presidential regimes, ad hoc third terms in two-term regimes are quite rare — presidents prefer other ways of extending their tenure. In 1998, President Sam Nujoma of Namibia (1990–2005) introduced an additional third term ad hoc, without amending the term limits' clause, but by including a third term specifically for the “first president of Namibia” (article 134). Unlike many rulers that followed short-term extensions with yet additional extensions, Sam Nujoma stepped down in 2005 in favor of his designated successor, and remained the president of the ruling *SWAPO* party until November 2007.

VI Prolongation by Referendum or Parliamentary Vote Ad Hoc

Extending one's rule for a number of years ad hoc, whether by an act of parliament or referendum, without constitutional changes, is not common. As described earlier in [chapter 2](#), several presidents in Central America and the Caribbean did just that in the 1930–40s, however. To some extent, such a method is similar to the previous strategy when rulers discard time already served and begin a new countdown; the only difference is that they do so prospectively. Presidents who do so are either so blatantly authoritarian that they do not even pretend to go through the institutional channels or they are leaders who attend to specific national emergencies that do not envisage formal changes to a presidential term, and step down when the additional period has expired.

President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, in office since 1991 (*de facto* leader since 1990), was one of the politicians that chose this manner of extending his stay. Early in 1993 the parliament adopted a new constitution, which explicitly included a no grandfathering clause.²⁰ The new parliament elected in March 1994 proved less amenable to executive control, and the majority cast a vote of no confidence in the government in May of that year. Many ambitious presidents, when confronted with checks and balances in a fluid environment of political transition and economic crisis, dismiss the intransigent legislature with or without reconvening the people's assembly to don the cloak of legitimacy, and subsequently promulgate a new constitution that would make presidents all-powerful, preferably with extending their tenure at the same time. The president of Kazakhstan did just that. Following the court ruling that the whole parliament was constituted illegally because of the electoral fraud allegations in Page 64 — a single electoral district, the president dismissed the legislature in March 1995 and ruled by fiat. In the absence of the legislature, the president arranged the election of the constituent assembly, which proposed a referendum to extend presidential tenure to December 1, 2000, “in order to preserve unity of the society and avoid deep polarization of political and social situation in the country.” On April 29, 1995, this proposal was endorsed by a referendum. President Nazarbayev pointed out that “the presidential form of government is dictated by the objective factors rather than some interests and ambitions of the current head of state. It will be necessary for our nation for a rather long time” (Nazarbayev 1995). And long time it was to be: in October 1998 yet more amendments were added to the constitution alongside the one that stipulated two consecutive seven-year terms. Finally, in 2007, term limits were abolished altogether for the first president.

Since President Nazarbayev would prove so adept at extending his tenure in 1998 and 2007 by formally amending term limits, why did he avoid doing so in 1995? By lengthening the presidential term to seven years in 1998, Kazakhstan pioneered the longest contemporary presidential term length in Central Asia. Indeed, the same length came to be adopted in the neighboring Uzbekistan later in 2002 and Tajikistan in 2003. The most likely explanation seems to be that in 1995 there were no precedents for scrapping term limits or introducing limited grandfathering — none of the post-Soviet presidents had done so yet, and neither African nor Latin American constitutional practices seemed proper. The only precedent was provided by President Saparmurat Niyazov (1990–2006) of Turkmenistan who extended his rule by referendum in 1994, just like President Nazarbayev would do in 1995.

VII Prolongation by Taking a Different Political Office

One can also remain in power longer if one can abolish the presidency altogether or leave and become prime minister, which makes the issue of term limits no longer pertinent. Indeed, even prime ministers whose democratic credentials are not questioned can serve longer tenures than presidents — Prime Minister Felipe Gonz  lez of Spain (1982–96) served four terms, same as Helmut Kohl of Germany (1982–98). Strategy VII is related to informal rule by proxy between formal nonconsecutive terms, as discussed earlier in this chapter. Consider constitutional changes during the tenure of President Ferdinand Marcos of Philippines (1965–86). As part of his prolongation strategy that included suspension of elections and elimination of term limits (see Page 65 below), the president manipulated the powers of presidential and prime-ministerial office, merging and splitting the two in turn. Thus, following the promulgation of the 1973 Constitution that allowed for an indirect presidential election an unlimited number of times, further amendments in 1976 stipulated that offices of the head of state and the head of government were to be combined into one, that of *Premier*, which would retain presidential powers as prescribed by the constitution, alongside legislative decree powers. Having legitimized the extension of his rule as incumbent president and prime minister in December 16–17, 1977, referendum (in the form of very pliable citizen

assemblies, *barangays*), which additionally, similarly to an earlier 1976 referendum, extended the martial law period, Ferdinand Marcos had assumed the office of *Premier* in 1978 and had served in that office until 1981, when direct presidential election was reintroduced, and the ruler became a directly elected president again (Nohlen, Grotz and Hartmann 2001, 208).

In practice, the transformation of a presidential regime into a parliamentary one is almost never implemented. Due to the remarkable “stickiness” of presidentialism, there are only a few nations that transformed from the former to the parliamentary type, such as Moldova in 2000, for example. It is usually the other way around: in Latin America, presidential regimes were never replaced by the parliamentary type, and in sub-Saharan Africa, where at the time of independence parliamentary constitutions outnumbered presidential four to one, nineteen out of twenty-one parliamentary regimes were replaced by presidential ones (Robinson and Torvik 2008, 2). Thus, if leaders do change their regimes, they transform them into presidential ones, and usually without term limits — as Julius Jayewardene (1977–89) of Sri Lanka in 1978 or Robert Mugabe (1980–) of Zimbabwe in 1987.

Another possibility, however, is to assume the highest executive post after one's country has modified its territorial structure, gained a new territory, or lost part of its territory. In [chapter 5](#), while discussing the value of holding office for President Slobodan Milošević (1989–2000), I explain how he moved between republican and federal offices in Serbia and Yugoslavia.

VIII Suspension of Elections

In order to avoid having to stand for election and thereby to extend one's mandate until the vote is held, the president can always declare elections postponed, usually on the basis of the state of emergency arising from Page 66 the ongoing hostilities. *Prima facie*, it seems to be a legitimate act. Indeed, if a country is at war and the electoral officials are not in a position to administer elections throughout or in parts of the country, perhaps elections should be postponed. However, examples abound of belligerent nations engaged in hostilities whether internally or externally that do hold regular elections without resorting to postponement. For example, neither Sri Lanka nor Colombia cancelled or postponed elections despite the long-lasting internal conflicts, which rendered large parts of their territories ungovernable. Similarly, Afghanistan and Iraq held elections in 2009 and 2010 in extremely difficult circumstances.

In contrast, consider President Jose Eduardo dos Santos of Angola who assumed office in 1979, was subjected to multiparty elections only once, in 1992, and postponed the vote ever since. In the first round of the multiparty presidential election in 1992, dos Santos gained 49.5 percent, short of majority which necessitated a second round. Yet, his opponent withdrew from the race and armed hostilities resumed (Ottaway 1998, 138–45). The Lusaka peace agreement of November 20, 1994, stipulated the postponement of elections until the end of hostilities. With the assassination in February 2002 of Savimbi, leader of the opposing force *UNITA*, major hostilities were effectively over (Hodges 2004, 14–18). Yet the anticipated presidential election was postponed to 2005, then to 2006, 2007, and 2009. In 2006 dos Santos argued that first “the party must encourage the government to conclude its programme of rehabilitation of primary road and rail links in 2007 so that participation by citizens in the next polls is substantial.”²¹ Alcides Sakala, one of the *UNITA*'s officials, commented: “if we have to have a perfect process then it will take longer to hold elections. One year, five years, ten years? Nobody knows” (*ibid.*).

In 2009 it was decided that an election was to be held in 2010 following the adoption of a new constitution. When the new constitution was adopted in 2010 it stipulated that the new presidential election, now indirect, would take place in 2012, with the new two five-year terms' clause (article 113) not applicable to the current power-holder (article 241). Thereby, Eduardo dos Santos managed to extend his first five-year term, which he assumed in 1992, to twenty years.

While other cases of presidential election postponement following a declaration of emergency are shorter, I include the latter as effective tenure extensions if they exceed one year.

IX Elimination of Term Limits

Elimination of term limits trumps all the above-mentioned strategies. All the others retain some kind of limitation on the length of tenure, even if national executives postpone elections, introduce one more term, lengthen it, or discard time already served. With scrapping of term limits, in principle nothing prevents them from staying in office “forever” as long as their health or mortality allows, provided they are re-elected. Even if they submit themselves to elections, in practice none of the rulers that scrapped limits on their tenure ever lost re-election.²² Until 2008, when France finally attended to its anomaly of not having presidential term limits and imposed a two-term ban, for many peer presidents France remained a convenient example of a democratic country that did not limit its executives, yet remained democratic.²³

In some sense, many observers confuse this option with a life presidency proper (see below),²⁴ yet since the latter option gets rid of re-election altogether, I treat it separately. Many rulers enter office without limits on the number of their terms in the first place, as I describe in the last section of this chapter. Yet many of those that enter single- or two-term offices manage to join this group and scrap limits — 32 managed to implement such change. Leaders that decide to scrap limits often do so in the footsteps of previous institutional changes that had already strengthened executive powers in the process of authoritarian reversal — so when the question is asked at the referendum, they already “know” the answer. Nine presidents did so following earlier, shorter extensions. Unlike other strategies pursued by presidents of the world that often disguise political survival behind dozens or hundreds of amended constitutional articles, doing away with term limits leaves no doubt about the intentions of a ruler and how long he or she intends to stay. Later in this chapter I chart the battle for elimination of term limits, using the example of President Mamadou Tandja of Niger.

X Presidency for Life

The final option to extend one's rule — to extend beyond any limits, institutionally eliminating the possibility of being replaced in principle — is to be appointed President for Life. This is the Holy Grail for rulers seeking political immortality, an office that was coined earlier as “presidential monarchy” (Apter 1965). It most resembles the position of a king but stops short of allowing the president to declare himself a king, which preserves certain legitimacy. Even such rulers realize that power should emanate from the will of the people rather than gods.

Presidents who have no limits on the number of their re-elections almost never lose elections. Nor do presidents-for-life: they do not subject themselves to elections in the first place.²⁵ However, not many of them manage to stay in office for life and, similar to the previous category, perpetual rulers usually are ousted or assassinated while in office. Out of nine Presidents for Life in the 1960–2009 period, only François Duvalier (1957–71) of Haiti, Josip Broz Tito (1953–80) of Yugoslavia and Saparmurat Niyazov (1990–2006) of Turkmenistan died of natural causes in office — the rest were deposed or assassinated.²⁶ Also, it seems that in the twenty-first century, perpetual rulers prefer to have an unlimited number of re-elections rather than life presidency. Since Idi Amin (1971–79) changed to this status in 1976, the number of presidents scrapping term limits increased, yet the only other ruler who became President for Life after Idi Amin was President Niyazov of Turkmenistan, when, three days before the millennium, on December 28, 1999, the Turkmen legislature (*Mejlis*) made the president a present, the law *On Powers of the First President of Turkmenistan Saparmurat Turkmenbashi*, that granted him a perpetual presidency. Curiously, the president himself got rid of his own life presidency when yet another new constitution was adopted in 2003 that stipulated no limits on the number of five-year terms the president could run for.

From the point of view of a powerful president in control of the executive, legislature, and the judiciary it makes no difference whether he or she has to run in regular re-elections with no chance of losing or that he or she does not have to do so at all. In fact, running in repeated elections might even be beneficial as nondemocratic elections provide clues about the state of public opinion, revealing conformity, gaining legitimacy, domestically and internationally, and adjusting the equilibrium of governing circles (Hermet, Rouquie and Rose 1978). In fact, being president for life is a handicap for the ruler who cannot project his superiority at the polls and legitimize authority at regular intervals. However, this institution presents a wonderful opportunity for the most loyal among

the elites to show their devotion by endorsing their ruler for life.

Consider President Habib Bourguiba (1957–87) of Tunisia. Following the adoption of a new constitution in 1959, Bourguiba was re-elected in 1959, 1964, 1969, and 1974 for five-year terms. The president, who was born in 1903, suffered from repeated medical problems, especially in later years (Murphy 1999, 61). Despite his health problems, however, the president was able to purge the ruling party of his enemies in Page 69 the early 1970s, and his loyal supporters engineered a coup to make Habib Bourguiba president of the party for life (Perkins 2004, 159). In the same year the national assembly, “as an exceptional case and in consideration of the eminent services,” made him President for Life in a unanimous vote. The constitution was amended accordingly in 1975. President Bourguiba, having already won multiple elections and in full control of the state, could have gone on winning re-election after 1974. But as a perpetual president he did not have to campaign at all. Instead, he became increasingly morose and prone to chaotic decisions and sudden dismissals. Even though the monarchy was abolished after independence, “in all but title Bourguiba became the *bey*, exercising his authority, working and residing in his palaces, and reveling in pageantry and rituals once reserved for Husainid rulers” (Perkins 2004, 208). In 1987 he finally fell to a palace coup launched by his prime minister, Zine Ben Ali, who reckoned that he would soon be dismissed like all previous successors (Hopwood 1992, 102–4).

The logical extension from perpetual presidency is to discard the institution of presidency and introduce monarchy, but the only president in this period under consideration who followed the steps of Napoleon Bonaparte was Jean-Bédél Bokassa of Central African Republic (1966–79). Bokassa, following his own appointment as President for Life in March 1972, became the Emperor of the Central African Empire on December 4, 1976, at an elaborate coronation ceremony in December 1977 (Lentz 1994, 152). His monarchy proved to be short-lived, however, and Bokassa was ousted in 1979. Barring Bokassa, none of almost five hundred presidents in power between 1960 and 2009 attempted to convert their presidencies into monarchies. Presidents who are strong enough to eliminate term limits can remain in power without the king's mantle and if a suitable heir is available, can even engineer hereditary succession (Brownlee 2007a).

The Manner and Timing of Tenure Changes

Altogether, 60 presidents extended tenures from limited, either two- or single-term, office; 11 entered unlimited office yet lengthened it even further or became Presidents for Life. There were 94 extensions altogether as several rulers implemented two or more constitutional amendments consecutively, usually extending their tenure by several years and then getting rid of limits altogether. Table 3.4 in the appendix to this chapter summarizes the previous discussion of various ways in which presidents can stay in office. The most popular choice is a Page 70 simple elimination of term limits, followed by a new countdown of the term that is sometimes bundled together with a new constitution, followed by an introduction of one additional term. Sometimes, as described earlier, presidents can implement the elimination of term limits together with changing the length of each term. A simple glance at democracy scores and executive constraints at the time of change indicates that most repressive rulers go for the most “princely” option of all — presidency for life; while most democratic ones introduce one additional term.

For the analyses to follow in later chapters, these options can be aggregated into the binary outcome, so that choices I–II constitute “stepping down” and III–X tenure extension (see appendix to this chapter). Alternatively, choices III to VIII in principle do not lead to perpetual rule and can be classified as “short-term” extensions and strategies that do — IX and X — as the “long-term” extensions. This menu of choice also loosely resembles the ordinal scale variable with a set of succession outcomes from stepping down without precautions to establishing a lifelong presidency with no restrictions. However, the order of strategies from V to VIII is somewhat arbitrary — can probably be placed in a different order — and hence these choices would have to be aggregated.

All of these strategies testify to the ingenuity of the constitutional designers. In order to prolong their stay in office presidents resort to referenda, parliamentary approval, executive decrees, or decisions of the courts, usually constitutional courts. Many leaders have no leeway if the constitution is explicit about the required course of action. Thus, if the constitutional revisions or amendments require a compulsory referendum, then a referendum

has to be held. However, if a referendum can only have a consultative nature, and some kind of a qualified legislative majority is required instead, then the vote on term limits has to be delegated to members of parliament.

Presidents often have certain discretion over the manner in which they have their prolongation endorsed. For example, in Algeria, article 134 of the 1996 Constitution stipulates that the constitution could be amended either by referendum or 3/4 majority of the two houses. On November 12, 2008, a joint session of two chambers approved — by 500 votes to 21 with eight abstentions — amendments to scrap a two-term limit and increase presidential powers. A referendum was not held. President Abdelaziz Bouteflika (1999–) managed to overcome the initial opposition of the military establishment to his third term, and also the unease among some of his supporters regarding the decision to go for a parliamentary vote instead of a referendum.²⁷ Indeed, in Page 71 the 2007 legislative elections turnout was very low, officially at 35 percent. Similar voter apathy could have undermined the legitimacy of the constitutional amendment. The Algerian elites probably wanted to avoid the poll, if possible, for security reasons. Clearly, rulers that enjoy parliamentary majority at times choose to avoid the unpredictability of referenda, which the opposition, excluded from the legislature, could use as a rallying point. In contrast, as I explain below, in Niger in 2009 President Mamadou Tandja faced a different situation where he did not have the required 4/5 parliamentary majority, and probably could not have even amassed a 2/3 majority in order to proceed with amendment. Instead he dismissed the parliament and legitimated his prolongation by referendum, which he found easier to exert control upon.

Often, when a new constitution is promulgated and the ruler makes an argument about constitutional grandfathering, the matter is almost always decided by the constitutional court, as it was in Kyrgyzstan in 1998. In turn, the prolongation by decree is practiced by rulers who extend their rule temporarily via a state of emergency or by the most dictatorial presidents who do not bother with the democratic procedure at all. We can compare selected measures of executive strength across four categories — separated on the basis of whether presidents promulgated changes by referendum, parliament, decree or a court decision — in order to see whether more authoritarian rulers prefer any particular manner of legitimation.²⁸ The most common measure is to have a parliament approve the extension, followed by a referendum, with the extension by decree a distant third. There are no significant differences across the four categories however, which suggests that presidents usually know the answer before they ask the question: on average, overwhelming majorities of 87 percent approve extensions whether in referenda or parliaments. Rulers that sign on their extensions themselves, by decree, are the most authoritarian. Those who resort to parliaments and courts are somewhat more constrained by other institutions.

Also, the majority of presidents prefer to bundle their own tenure extensions with other constitutional amendments. Often, new constitutions that transform the very nature of executive-legislative relations are introduced at the same time. For example, two years prior to the expiration of President Ben Ali's (1987–2011) last term in office in Tunisia, a 2002 amendment modified 39 out of 78 articles and ushered in various provisions for human rights; the creation of a second legislative chamber; more powers to the Constitutional council; and legislative oversights, and included the following rather peculiar wording: “while Page 72 reaffirming our commitment to...abrogation of life presidency and automatic succession, being so much convinced that the will of the people could not be firmly established otherwise, and while insisting on the importance of maintaining the limit required in respect of the age of eligibility for the presidency of the Republic, we will apply ourselves to seeking effective means to consecrate pluralism at the forthcoming presidential elections.”²⁹ Somewhat counterintuitively, the abrogation of term limits — this is what the president referred to — was meant to enhance pluralism. This bundling of tenure prolongation with other provisions allows presidents to claim that the amendments are not aimed at a specific person but would benefit the nation as a whole.

Another frequent strategy employed by presidents is to include similar benefits to members of their winning coalition. When a 2007 referendum in Venezuela rejected constitutional revisions of 65 articles, including presidential term limits, President Hugo Chávez proposed a much slimmer package in another referendum with a crucial amendment Page 73 that would “increase the political rights of the people and to allow any citizen in elected office to be nominated as a candidate for the same office, for the period of time according to the constitution, his or her possible re-election depending exclusively on popular vote”³⁰ — in other words, the

abolishment of term limits for governors, mayors, regional and national legislators, and, incidentally, the president. This time the amendments were approved after Hugo Chávez won the referendum in 2009, perhaps because other officials tried harder on their own behalf and that of the president.

Finally, at what stage in their tenure do presidents extend their rule? Out of 60 presidents that entered term-limited office, only to extend it later, 32 did so in the first term and 28 in the second. Among the former, 17 entered single-term office so they had no choice between a first and a second term. Twenty did so in their last year. The distribution of timing is somewhat bimodal — half of all the rulers extend in the last quarter of their tenure, and above one-third do so in the first quarter.³¹ In general, by and large, the presidents prefer extending at the end of their tenure. Perhaps rulers need time to establish incumbency advantage, taking the executive, legislature, and the judiciary branches under their control; it is also possible that they do not plan to extend their tenure at the beginning of their term. A glance at those rulers who extend in the first two years of their tenure indicate that it is not the strongest presidents who want to lengthen their horizon early, but rather those who do not have much time: many are those that enter single-term offices, such as Evo Morales (2006–) of Bolivia, for instance.

Constraints on the Executive Capacity to Stay in Office

In the introductory chapter I briefly reviewed the literature on regime stability and change. We know a lot about factors that make it more likely that democracies will consolidate. They include various economic, geographic and international determinants, the type and strength of institutions, as well as more contingent factors (e.g., Boix and Stokes 2003; Bunce and Wolchik 2009; Levitsky and Way 2010; Linz 1994; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Marinov 2005; Przeworski et al. 2000; Svoboda 2008). How do the experiences of presidents bidding for third terms, as discussed earlier in this chapter, agree with the related explanations for democratic consolidation and breakdown? What are the obstacles that the presidents have to overcome?

The major hurdle for any president contemplating extending terms, Page 74 whether in a more or less democratic regime, is his own immediate coalition (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003). In a nondemocratic regime the assent of a relevant autonomous institution, a political party, or, in other cases, the military, usually is the only obstacle that the president has to face. As I explain below, the strength of individual presidents vis-à-vis their own parties is often predicated on whether the former are party founders and, therefore, whether presidents have personal strength and legitimacy within their own parties. In more democratic settings, in addition, a formal assent at the elite level, whether via a legislative majority, or a super-majority, vote, or via the court ruling, or both, is required. As I explained in the previous section of this chapter, whether the act of *continuismo* has to be legitimated by a legislature, judiciary, a referendum, or the combination thereof often depends on the manner of extension, but the presidents can also manipulate the requirements and choose the institutional venue they have control over. Thus, unable to secure a legislative majority, Ortega (2007–) of Nicaragua relied on the Supreme Court to legitimate his second term instead. In contrast, Wade (2000–) of Senegal, who controlled an overwhelming majority of legislative seats after the opposition parties boycotted the 2007 elections, disregarded the constitutional clause (article 27) that the term limits can only be amended through referendum, and had the legislature approve the extension instead. Third, even if presidents are able to secure the support of their own party, as well as of the legislature and the courts, their success often depends on more contingent factors, such as the capacity of opposition parties and civil society to mobilize their supporters for street protests, which in turn can make promulgation by referendum or subsequent re-election difficult. Figure 3.1 illustrates schematically the main obstacles that an ambitious executive has to overcome. If a ruler's closest coalition, his own party, withholds assent to its president's designs, it is usually the end of the road for a president, and the latter will have to comply with a constitution. If, however, assent is granted, then the president has to assemble a legislative majority, or supermajority, and to obtain a favorable ruling by the relevant court. Constraints at the elite level, checks and balances provided by the judiciary, legislature, and members of president's own executive cabinet will determine how easy or difficult it is to stay in power. If formal assent is not forthcoming, the president will either comply, or a constitutional crisis will ensue with an uncertain outcome. Finally, provided political elites have legitimated tenure extension, the latter has to be implemented in practice, often through a referendum, and re-election will follow.

The ruler's success can be determined by more contingent factors, such as a president's own popularity or the strength of street mobilization launched by civil society groups and opposition parties. Indeed, constraints on the executive capacity are not always imposed by political institutions alone, they could also be mounted by collective action of the citizenry or even by relevant international actors, as demonstrated by the interaction between the US and some Caribbean presidents in the 1930s and the 1940s, for example (see [chapter 2](#)). In general, existing executive constraints, buttressed by a strong and consolidated party system, an independent judiciary and rigid constitution, alongside mass-level constraints, such as the collective action potential of the citizenry, as well as international constraints — should international players have leverage over domestic politics of a particular country — are factors that can hinder presidential ambitions.

Page 76

As an illustrative example of various obstacles that many presidents have to overcome in order to extend their stay in office, consider a relatively democratic regime of Niger in 2009, where a number of constraining factors on the executive capacity of President Mamadou Tandja (1999–2010) were present.³² The Nigerien president wanted to stay in office in a rather competitive partly democratic regime, clashed with different political actors in the process, and, despite the odds, prevailed in his quest. It is certainly unknown at what stage of his second term President Tandja made the decision to stay longer. However, less than two years prior to the scheduled departure of Tandja, one of the key members of the president's party, Hama Amadou, who was seen as the likely presidential successor in the 2009 elections, and who earlier served as prime minister (1995–96, 2000–2007) before losing the vote of confidence, was stripped of his parliamentary immunity and arrested on corruption charges, which in turn triggered unrest within the ruling *MNSD (Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement)* party.

The president's designs came into the open when at the end of 2008 the pro-presidential supporters launched demonstrations endorsing a three-year extension of the mandates of elected officials, including the president. The opponents were equally numerous. Unlike many other sub-Saharan presidents who extended their terms throughout the 2000s and usually enjoyed the support of the political elite, in Niger many governmental supporters in different branches of government, including the former president Mahamane Ousmane (1993–96) and the government ally *CDS (Convention Democratique et Sociale)* party, opposed the idea. Also, there were serious safeguards against dictatorial takeover in the Nigerien constitution: amendment required a 4/5 majority in the parliament in order to pass; short of that, it required 3/4 support for it to be put to a referendum (article 135). On top of that, article 136 explicitly firewalled the term limits clause from future amendments be it through parliament or by referendum.

In May 2009 the president publicly surrendered to the will of the people and indicated that the referendum on term limits would be held soon. To avoid the ban on tenure amendments, the constitutional revision was described as the introduction of a new, sixth republic, not as a modification of the existing constitution. On May 25, 2009, the Constitutional Court ruled that the proposed referendum would be unconstitutional as the president could not submit revisions of article 36 to the referendum. The government coalition partner, the *CDS* party, which controlled almost 20 percent of legislative seats, also declared its opposition to the plan. Other presidents who were similarly confronted Page 77 by a strong opposition within the legislature, their own party, or the civil society surrendered their bids and stepped down. For instance, President Bakili Muluzi (1994–2004) of Malawi was confronted by his own party in the legislature, while Frederick Chiluba (1991–2002) of Zambia was confronted by his party's grass-roots members. In the latter two cases, civil society also played a very active role (Baker 2002). Alberto Fujimori's (1990–2000) bid to stay for a third term in Peru was thwarted by the unprecedented campaign of demonstrations and civil disobedience. In Venezuela, Hugo Chávez's (1999–) first bid in 2007 failed because of civil society mobilization against it and the apparent unwillingness of officials to commit fraud.

Likewise, Presidents Menem of Argentina and Uribe of Colombia complied with their courts' rulings on the unconstitutionality of their third terms, and stepped down. President Menem's (1989–99) third bid was thwarted by a resurgent Supreme Court, opposition parties, and members of his own party, whose “upward mobility

opportunities” were threatened (Corrales 2002, 215–16). The judges of the Supreme Court, dependent on the executive, initially wavered but in the end defected from the president calculating that there was no public support for it and the president was likely to lose anyway (Corrales 2002, 216–20; Helmke 2002, 148–49). In Colombia, the constitutional court, despite the overwhelming support in the legislature, and the surveys indicating that the majority supported a third term for President Álvaro Uribe (2002–10), ruled seven to two against holding a referendum that would table a third term for public approval.³³ In Niger, however, the day after the court's ruling the president dissolved the parliament, raising the stakes higher.³⁴

In early June, the president approved a constitutional package to include, alongside the abolishment of term limits, transformation into a full presidential republic, introduction of a second chamber, and a three-year extension of presidential tenure into 2012. On June 12, however, the Constitutional Court struck down the presidential decree on the referendum as unconstitutional, and the Electoral Commission ruled that it would not be able to oversee the referendum under such circumstances. The Council of the Republic, which convenes in times of emergency, also challenged the president. Perhaps even more ominous for the leader was the fact that his own party was split over the issue, with the supporters of prospective successor Amadou leaving to form a new party.

Yet the president did not back down. Instead, assuming emergency powers, he issued a decree that both the August 4 referendum and August 20 legislative elections would take place regardless.³⁵ When Page 78 the boundaries of executive discretion are questioned, as they were in Niger, only judicial review could establish the constitutionality of the presidential decrees (Carey 1998, 14). The court, to its credit, did repeatedly rule against the executive. Clearly, what President Tandja carried out over the summer of 2009 was the so-called *autogolpe*, familiar to students of presidentialism.³⁶ Following the script to the letter, the president dismissed the Constitutional Court and reappointed a new one with his own supporters, which swiftly outlawed the general national strike against the referendum. In the end, the referendum went ahead, and the opposition chose to boycott it. The official results released shortly after indicated that 92.5 percent supported the new constitution. The legislative elections were rescheduled for October 20, and the opposition decided to boycott again. The governing party with its allies won an overwhelming majority.

The Nigerien battle for presidential extension is unusual in several respects. First of all, Niger has been considered rather successful in its democratization throughout the 2000s, as indicated by its rather high Freedom House rankings — higher than its neighbors Nigeria, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Libya, and Chad — only Benin and Mali had higher scores. Second, its semipresidential regime imposed serious constraints on the president and empowered other governmental branches that proved to be able to stand up to the executive during crises. These institutional obstacles — from the legislature, courts, and his own party — were equally, or more, serious as those encountered by presidents who were deterred in their attempts and stepped down. Likewise, the president met serious opposition on the street embodied in the numerous rallies against the constitutional change; the international donors, including France, vehemently opposed the president's design as well. Yet the leader persisted and prevailed. The loyalty of the interior ministry and security services proved crucial at the time. So was his timing in dismissing the legislature. Yet his own personal drive to remain in power at whatever cost was paramount.³⁷

What does the experience of President Tandja, as well as of other presidents battling for tenure extensions, tell us about the relevant constraints? A president's personal control of his own party, control over legislature and judiciary, as well as the ability to withstand or neutralize street protests, are important factors that can prevent the personalization of presidential regime. However, institutional constraints alone cannot always explain whether the president backs down or persists, as the case of President Tandja illustrates above.

As discussed earlier, some dictatorships also regulate executive tenure. Like their democratic peers, leaders of such regimes are often Page 79 constrained in their capacity to act at will. The degree of autonomy of other institutions from the ruler, especially the presence of a hegemonic ruling party (Gandhi 2008; Magaloni 2006), whether other actors choose to oppose the president when the latter takes over the regime (Svolik 2009), the role of powerful international players (Fitzgibbon 1940), or even such idiosyncratic factors as the existence of an important precedent, often rooted in a prior elite pact, or as preferences of a particular president, often explain

whether leaders in these regimes step down when required, or not.

Many nondemocratic regimes with hegemonic parties are capable of imposing limits on their presidents. Earlier I discussed the case of the Mexican ruling party, *PRI*, which has enforced presidential term limits throughout its rule. There are however numerous examples of regimes with strong hegemonic parties that do not impose limits on their presidents. It is therefore very likely that the relationship between presidents and their own political parties is crucial. In the explanation of dynastic succession in dictatorships, Brownlee (2007b) argues that in regimes with rulers predating their own parties, thereby possessing independent sources of authority and legitimacy, leaders are able to dictate the terms of their own succession. Thus, we need to take into account not only the strength of the executive party, but also, and equally important, the strength of an individual president vis-à-vis that party. In more democratic regimes the acquiescence of the president's party is equally important, as the example of President Menem above illustrates. It is therefore necessary to assess the power that a president can exert on his or her own party. Thus, as an indicator for the likelihood of a president's party agreement to a tenure extension, whether in a more or less democratic regime, we could investigate whether a president is a party founder and therefore is likely to have strong personal legitimacy in, and be able to control, his own party.

Additionally, personal preferences of a particular leader as an explanation for the lack of regime personalization presents a rather idiosyncratic explanation; however, it does not necessarily makes it less true. For instance, the first president of a military regime in Brazil, which featured five presidents and lasted from 1964 to 1985, Castelo Branco, who was deeply committed to the principles of constitutionalism and saw military intervention merely as a short-term solution, ruled out his own re-election and repeatedly refused prolonging his tenure, underlining that he was not “cut out to be a dictator” (quoted in Skidmore 1988, 40).³⁸ As a result of his precedent, all three of his successors that served full terms complied with a single-term limit and Page 80 departed in an orderly fashion.

Table 3.2 shows some important institutional differences between presidents that step down from office and those that extend their terms, in less democratic regimes. In the empirical chapter 6 I explain how rulers are defined as “stepped down” or “extended,” here I only highlight that the presidents that honor their constitutions and step down typically operate in a somewhat more institutionally constrained environment: their constitutions are more rigid (there is a lower number of prior constitutional changes that occur before a president's time in office), they face more effective legislatures and more independent judiciary, they experience a higher number of demonstrations, strikes Page 81 and other mass *events* during their tenures, and they are more likely to rule alongside hegemonic parties. There are almost three times fewer party founders among these leaders, in contrast to those that manage to extend their stay in power. However, these two groups are similar in terms of durability of their regimes, the average age of main political parties, and the size of legislative majorities. In chapter 6 I examine whether these institutional differences can explain constitutional compliance, controlling for other factors.

International environment matters as well. Presidential tenure extensions tend to cluster spatially and temporarily among countries experiencing similar economic and political circumstances, whether the virtually universal “continuismo” (Fitzgibbon 1940) in Central America and the Caribbean in the 1920–30s; the parade of the Presidencies for Life in Africa in 1960–70s; the adoption of second terms in Latin America in 1990–2000s; or the elimination of limits in 2000s in Africa and Post-Soviet Eurasia. Indeed, there is some evidence that presidents choose particular extension strategies on the basis of cues provided by other rulers nearby. The record of successful, or unsuccessful, tenure prolongation among presidents in the same “reference group” creates windows of opportunity. If a term change has never been done before in the region, it could be more difficult to implement. In their analysis of regime change, Levitsky and Way (2010) argue that linkage to the West, and the leverage that Western countries might have in particular region, are central for understanding whether international influence will be an effective tool of political change (Levitsky and Way 2010, 43–44). It is therefore not surprising that instances of tenure extensions are more frequent in Post-Soviet Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa, where presidents are less constrained by either USA or EU as regional hegemons, than in Latin America or Central and Eastern Europe, for instance. Therefore, similarly to institutional factors, in chapter 6 I assess the influence of various international factors in a comparative framework.

Presidential term limits are extended not only in partly or non-democratic regimes, but also in regimes that can be defined as fully democratic. While it is hardly appropriate to explain personal bids to perpetuate oneself in office as part of the democratic process, there is however a limited number of cases where presidents enter term-limited office, typically for a single term, later on extend their stay for another term or for a few years in order to tackle some kind of emergency, and step down. Such rulers are arguably in a different category from those who scrap term limits altogether. For example, Presidents Fernando Cardoso (1995–2003) of Brazil and Émile Lahoud (1998–2007) of Lebanon extended their stays — by one additional, shorter term in the case of Cardoso and by three extra years in case of the latter — and stepped down when required. If we treat “democratic” extenders separately from the others, then theories of endogenous institutions in democratic societies will be more appropriate (e.g., Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi 2004), in particular examining the role of veto players (e.g., Tsebelis 2002), presidential powers (e.g., Metcalf 2000), executive-legislative relations (e.g., Cheibub 2007), executive-legislative and party relations (e.g., Samuels and Shugart 2010), or constitutional design (Shugart and Carey 1992). There exist studies that look at the origins of term limits or implications of term limits in more democratic settings (Carey 1997; Colomer 2003, 152–59; Lopez 2003; Serrafiero 1997; Shugart and Carey 1992, 76–93).

However, many presidents enter offices in democracy and — similarly to those that subsequently step down as described above — extend by an additional term. Then these leaders desire more, and attempt — sometimes successfully — at extending further, as the examples of Carlos Menem (1989–99) and Hugo Chávez (1999–) demonstrate. It is certainly possible to omit the likes of Cardoso altogether, or to reclassify them as the ones departing (instead of extending). However, to create a separate, more “democratic” category of extenders would be a rather ad hoc enterprise; some of these leaders are also still in office at the time of this writing. Therefore, in the majority of analyses to follow, *all* instances of *continuismo* are studied together.³⁹

Incumbency, Re-election, and Term Limits

With term limits extended or overturned, presidents can submit themselves for additional, or often an unlimited number of, times to consecutive re-elections. But do these leaders always avail of this opportunity and what is the rate of their success? In this section I examine presidential re-election. Altogether, there are 498 presidents who entered office in the period between 1960 and the end of 2009, including interim presidents and those still in power on December 31, 2009. Leaders are divided into three groups according to the number of terms they are allowed to serve at the time of their entry into office: a single consecutive term, two consecutive terms, and an unlimited number of terms.⁴⁰ A total of 196 presidents entered office with a single term permitted, whether nonconsecutive re-election was allowed or not; 174 entered office with two consecutive terms, and 128 without limits.⁴¹ In the first category, 131 presidents completed their single and only term, Page 83 Page 84 and 69 did not or have not yet done so — if they were still in power on December 31, 2009, or exited early for whatever reason. Eighteen single-term presidents extended their tenure in one way or another. Out of 203 presidents who served in an office with a possibility of an immediate re-election in a two-term office, 130 (101 + 29) completed their first term and 72 did not. Out of these 130, 101 altogether were re-elected for a second term, 12 did not run for re-election — such as Martti Ahtisaari (1994–2000) of Finland — and 18 lost the contest.⁴² Forty-two prolonged their rule. Among those 72 rulers who had not completed their first terms, 30 were still in power (and thus could still get re-elected or extend their tenure, or step down after 2009), and 42 either died in office prior to the expiration of their first term, served as interim presidents for one to two years, or were deposed. Many political leaders who failed to serve their first terms are Latin American presidents who were prevented from completing their tenures (Perez-Linan 2007). For example, during the financial crisis in the early 2000s Argentina had four presidents within the space of only three years.

If we exclude presidents who were still in power on December 31, 2009, along with those who served as interim rulers, died in office, were deposed, and also those who either lost their first re-election or did not run for it while in two-term offices, we find that out of 209 term-bounded presidents who reached term limits in 1960–2009, 149 leaders, 71 percent, obeyed term limits and stepped down when required, and 60 leaders, 29 percent, extended their terms. Indeed, this constitutes the sample in the majority of statistical analyses throughout this book. Additionally, including those 30 rulers in the two-term offices that lost their first re-election or did not run for it,

we can conclude that altogether 62 percent stepped down because of term limits, 8 percent because they lost re-election, 5 percent because they chose not to run even though they could have, and 25 percent extended their terms.

Finally, of those who entered unrestricted, multiple-term presidential office, half did not survive beyond the end of their first term as the majority were deposed in coups or assassinated, and the other half stayed for more than one term. Among these more successful presidents, 28 remained in power for at least three terms, and 15 rulers stayed in office for even more terms.

Even though this examination included both democratic presidents and their less, sometimes much less or not at all, democratic peers as well as all the presidents who came to power in the post–Cold War period, by and large the conclusion still resonates with the conclusion of the earlier study regarding the re-election of democratic presidents Page 85 between 1950 and 1990 (Cheibub and Przeworski 1999, 234–37). They find that democratic presidents predominantly step down because they comply with term limits, not because they lose elections.⁴³ Here the odds of re-election in two-term presidential regimes are 5 to 1 (101 to 18), or 3.5 to 1 (101 to 30) if we add presidents who did not run for re-election on the assumption that they anticipated defeat and would have lost had they run. In other words, there is an 77 percent chance of getting re-elected, should a leader present himself or herself for re-election — a very significant incumbency advantage.

The fact that many presidents are willing to confront often considerable opposition, and frequently take personal risks in pursuit of their political immortality, implies that they believe in their future re-election prospects. Out of 71 presidents (including 11 that entered unlimited office yet lengthened it even further, as explained earlier) who extended their tenure in one way or another in 1960–2009, all but a very few — Hipólito Mejía (2000–2004) of the Dominican Republic who lost re-election in 2004 and Slobodan Milošević (1989–2000) of Yugoslavia who also lost the first round but only stepped down when forced to do so by mass street mobilization — proceeded to win the immediate re-election that followed constitutional changes.⁴⁴ In [chapter 8](#), I examine the survival in office and the subsequent fate of presidents that overturned tenure restrictions.

Conclusion

This chapter maps possible options that are available to a president seeking term extension, depending on his or her degree of control over government, particular constitutional history, structure of the state, and his or her own personal preferences. Aside from describing various tenure changes that presidents routinely employ, I also highlight the difficulties that might arise in defining what it means to step down.

The comparative examination of various cases of tenure extensions does not lead us to the identification of a particular factor as a necessary and sufficient condition behind presidents' constitutional compliance. Usually, a combination of various factors plays a role, and these factors vary from one case to another. In general, however, the presidents are more capable of circumventing constitutional prohibition on the number of terms when they control their own political parties, when they face fewer checks and balances at the elite level, particularly when they control a legislative majority and the judiciary. Also, mass collective action and international pressure can influence the capability Page 86 of presidents to remain in power. In [chapter 6](#), which compares the behavior of presidents in a *large-n* framework, we can gauge however what factors, on average, are the most robust predictors of constitutional compliance.

As I find and discuss in this chapter, as well as earlier in [chapter 2](#), presidents that attempt to remain in office longer, whether they are constrained by other political institutions or not, almost always have a lot at stake, whether in terms of personal wealth accumulated while in office, or personal immunity, or both. In the next chapter therefore I turn to the personal costs and benefits of leaving office in order to explain the phenomenon of *continuismo* from the perspective of an incumbent president.

Appendix 3A: Continuismo in 1960–2009

4

The Costs and Benefits of Leaving Presidential Office

What explains the success of modern Caesars — incumbent presidents? In the previous chapter I explored major obstacles for executives contemplating tenure extensions. The strength of a president vis-à-vis his or her own party, legislature and judiciary, the extent of mass collective action, as well as the role of international players, are the key factors that can prevent self-perpetuation in power. In this chapter however I turn not to what restraints presidents — the strength of democracy, institutional checks and balances and other factors — but to what drives them, motivates them to take over their regimes and extend their terms: monetary and personal motives to remain in power, the value of holding office. In [chapter 5](#) I turn to three illustrative cases in order to underline how the costs and benefits of holding office explain the behavior of several presidents when the latter were confronted with term limits. In turn, [chapter 6](#) presents a series of empirical analyses that examine the value of holding office and constitutional compliance.

The following example illustrates the intuition behind the argument. In April 2003 Boston University African Presidential Archives and Research Centre held the first-ever roundtable of former African presidents. Six ex-presidents altogether — Soglo of Benin, Masire of Botswana, Rawlings of Ghana, Mwinyi of Tanzania, Ramgoolam of Mauritius and Kaunda of Zambia — attended the gathering.¹ This roundtable became possible only in 2003 because, to put it bluntly, there had not been enough former African presidents around to man a roundtable in the past. The presidents had either still been in power, had died during their time in office, or had hidden in exile. Almost half of those who exited from power in Africa in the preceding period Page 92 died or went into prison or exile within one year of their departure from power. In contrast, at the time of the 2003 meeting, their host country, the United States, had five former presidents alive and active in public life. This one country alone could field half the number of former heads of state as the whole continent of Africa. It seems that one of the fathers of the US Constitution, Alexander Hamilton, who worried whether it would bring any good to have “half a dozen men who had had credit enough to be raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering among the people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they were destined never more to possess” (1999 [1788], 412), was proved wrong, at least with regard to his own country.

The argument that I advance is simple: politicians will try not to part from office not only because they can, but also because they stand something to lose. Earlier in the introduction I used the example of President Milošević to underline that political leaders often attempt to remain in power because of valid concerns over their personal security and over retaining wealth should they have to depart from office. Likewise, there are presidents that choose to step down even when they face similar or even less significant institutional constraints, than those leaders that attempt to remain in office. What goes on in the head of a president who faces the prospect of stepping down? What is at stake? If presidents desire re-election to the extent that they are willing to overturn constitutional clauses pertaining to term limits, what are their rewards of political office, financial or otherwise? Can these rewards, once accumulated, be consumed after leaving office, and can similar rewards be obtained in the private sector? More importantly can different structures of rewards, given existing constraints, explain whether rulers comply with constitutions, or not? These are not trivial questions and, if addressed, will permit us to understand better what it is that makes political actors comply with democratic rules, or not.

The argument takes into account the costs and benefits of staying in power in different polities, for individual presidents; a simple framework can be used to explain whether presidents the world over retain their office.² Throughout I differentiate between political constraints and personal, mainly monetary, motives, in order to explain whether presidents will be able to, or want to, remain in office. Studies exist that distinguish between motives and constraints of political actors (e.g., Decalo 1990). Thus, Brooker (2000) in his study of the genesis of nondemocratic regimes, and building on earlier work by Finer (1976), differentiates between motives, on one hand, and means and opportunity, on the other. For the ease of discussion throughout this Page 93 book, factors that are expected to influence monetary rewards in and out of office, as well as factors that can protect or hinder

personal immunity of the incumbent presidents, even if such factors can also influence constraints on the executive capacity, are presumed to influence incentives.³

Building on career concerns literature, in the section below, *Rewards in Public and Private Careers*, I emphasize the importance of monetary rewards for the office-holders. The value of holding political office can depend on the relative size and importance of public and private sectors in the economy, as well as the opportunities to acquire personal wealth either in the private sector, after retirement from office, or in the public sector, while in office. In the *Career and Fate after Leaving Office* section I illustrate the argument with the data on varying occupations of former presidents after leaving office, in different polities. As I demonstrate in another section to follow, *Presidential Remuneration*, salaries of political leaders do not explain all the rewards that these leaders can extract from office. Instead, in *The Spoils and the Value of Political Office*, I turn to the size of public sector, procurement markets, and various rents since it is the structure of the domestic economy and rent-seeking opportunities that can tempt the presidents to stay in power. Leaders that extract rents or commit abuses while in office will also have concerns about their own immunity, which is an additional factor that increases the value of holding office, as I explain in *The Probability of Retaining Immunity and Assets after Leaving Office* section.

Rewards in Public and Private Careers, and Motives to Remain in Office

Recently, new literature emerged examining the rewards, especially monetary rewards, of political office in both theoretical and empirical frameworks. The value of political office can be correlated with monetary returns to that office (Lopez 2003, 36) or the ability to springboard individuals to more important office (Reed et al. 1994, 82–86). Since the presidency is the highest political post in the land, it will be unable to position individuals for a higher post — except perhaps the leaders of EU democracies — but it could, or not, springboard them onto a lucrative private career.⁴ Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005) analyze congressional careers taking into account future private and public career opportunities. They find that congressional experience can increase wages after leaving office. Similarly, Querubin and Snyder (2008) Page 94 and Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) compare the post-office wealth of winning and losing candidates for the US Congress and UK Parliament, respectively, and find that holding a political seat significantly increases total personal wealth. Thus, Eggers and Hainmueller (2009) estimate that British Conservative MPs die almost twice as wealthy as their less successful peers, controlling for personal characteristics (ibid., 514). Drawing on this literature, I examine the costs and benefits of staying in office for individual presidents, across different presidential regimes.

The scholarship on monetary rewards indicates that successful politicians in democratic societies postpone their personal wealth acquisition until after leaving political office, and that they increase their wealth after that office, not while they are in it (e.g., Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 2005; Vaubel, Klingen and Muller 2011). The net increase occurs because of the connections they make in office or because the time served in that office signals their superior ability to private employers who will pay the premium (Mattozzi and Merlo 2007). Assuming that the decision to step down or run for re-election depends on the present payoffs and career prospects after leaving office (see Diermeier, Keane and Merlo 2005, 348), is it plausible to expect that politicians in poor nonconsolidated democracies, partly democratic regimes, or even regimes defined as nondemocratic, can expect payoffs similar to their democratic peers after leaving office? A few examples below illustrate that it is very unlikely.

Consider, for example, president Bill Clinton (1993–2001) of the United States who stepped down in early 2001. Soon after his departure, the publishing company Alfred A. Knopf paid an advance of USD 10 million for his book, and many institutions were willing to spring USD 250,000 or more for a lecture.⁵ In his first year alone after leaving office, the former president gave 59 speeches and made USD 9.2 million. Indeed, after departure from office with an estimated personal debt of USD 12 million, Clinton generated more than USD 30 million from speeches between 2001 and 2005, excluding the income he designated for charities. In 2006 the former president joked: “I never had a nickel to my name until I got out of the White House, and now I'm a millionaire, the most favored person for the Washington Republicans.”⁶ This American leader is certainly not an exception. Many democratic exleaders profit from lectures, book deals, consulting, and membership on corporate boards after leaving office. President Lech Wałęsa (1990–95) of Poland, under whose presidency Poland became a democracy,

later established the Lech Wałęsa Institute Foundation, became honorary doctor of dozens of universities, and attended hundreds of honorary meetings and conferences throughout the world. Similarly to Bill Page 95 Clinton, the fee for *each* public appearance by Lech Wałęsa rivaled his annual salary as the president.⁷

The post-tenure fate of such presidents leaves little else to be desired. Some former presidents could end up in exile, or worse, however. President Askar Akayev (1990–2005) of Kyrgyzstan, who lost power after a series of street protests in 2005, stepped down peacefully and had to leave the country. He quietly settled in Russia. The prospects of his successor Kurmanbek Bakiyev (2005–10), who lost power after a sudden implosion of mass mobilization in the spring of 2010 and also had to leave his country for exile, however, were more uncertain, as his departure was accompanied by a significant number of casualties among protestors. Bakiyev had a lot to lose as his immediate family, especially his son Maxim Bakiyev as head of the Kyrgyzstan's Central Agency for Development and Investments, allegedly accumulated wealth in excess of USD 1 billion.⁸ President Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) of Peru left for exile in Japan after being ousted in 2000. He had the misfortune of returning to Latin America where he was arrested in Chile in 2005. Fujimori was eventually found guilty and sentenced to 25 years in prison after four trials in Peru in 2009.⁹ The estimates of spoils skimmed from office by the Peruvian president and his closest circle during a ten-year tenure varied between USD 600 million and USD 2 billion.¹⁰ These leaders, except Bakiyev who was at the very beginning of his second term (but already proposed wide-ranging constitutional changes), extended their terms but had to step down and face the consequences. Many a ruler in the developing world, who has to decide whether to remain in office, faces a life that can be nasty, brutish and short outside of office.

The above-mentioned examples illustrate that, first, the stakes of losing office for a president in a poor, corrupt country are much higher than for a president in an industrialized democracy. The former could face exile or imprisonment once they step down, while the latter can look forward to lucrative writing contracts and lecture tours. Second, the former derive their income while in office through rent-seeking, while the latter, unless they are independently wealthy already, make much more money after they leave office. Third, precisely because of rampant rent-seeking during tenure, the former decrease their chances of a quiet life after retirement and thereby increase the stakes of losing office. Leaders also raise the stakes if they commit crimes and abuses of power not necessarily related to the acquisition of wealth. Two groups of rulers face different intertemporal payoffs. One group sees political office as a source of income and accumulates wealth while in office. These leaders anticipate staying in office for a long time and therefore Page 96 can discard the future. Should their tenures prove to be shorter than anticipated, they can hope to consume the acquired wealth in exile. Either way, they expect to improve their economic welfare directly out of political office.

Another group — in consolidated and wealthy democracies — postpones the acquisition of wealth until after exit from office, and these leaders can do so for several reasons. First, presidents in more democratic societies can be more public spirited, which is difficult to test however. Second, existing norms and conventions that are checked by institutions ensure that “democrats” behave in office as democrats and “dictators” as dictators. Third, their relative official salary can be high enough to moderate the temptation and make waiting worthwhile. Finally, particular structures of political economy that render rent-seeking more or less likely can also play a role. Certainly, these possibilities are not mutually exclusive. Whether democracy serves as a selection mechanism, or whether it constrains selfish political actors better (first and second reasons), these possibilities can be accounted for in an empirical framework by “controlling” for democracy. In a section on remuneration that follows I examine the third reason — whether official salary can incentivize political leaders — but it is the last conjecture regarding the influence of rent-seeking and the structure of economy on politicians' motives that I examine in more detail throughout this chapter.

The argument that I advance is that politicians will try not to part from office not only because they can, but also because they stand something to lose. Undoubtedly, politicians value office for its intrinsic benefits. The office-seeking motivation, whereby politicians care about winning elections as their central goal, is one of the most axiomatic assumptions in the rational choice literature, and political science in general (Black 1958; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Downs 1957; Wintrobe 1998). Mancur Olson argued that the assumption of self-interest is much more realistic than any other of comparative simplicity and impartiality. Riker (1962) assumed that re-

election was the central goal, yet provided a politician was re-elected, the latter would also want to maximize control over policy. Many scholars however assume that politicians are primarily driven by policy (Alesina 1988; Calvert 1985; Wittman 1977), while other scholars explicitly allow for both policy- and office-seeking candidates in the same modeling framework (e.g., Callander 2008).

However, it is not unreasonable to allow the possibility that political actors seek office for a variety of reasons. As Diermeier, Keane and Merlo (2005, 347) point out, “reelection may be better understood as Page 97 an (intermediate) objective to realize other goals, like monetary income, the perks of a powerful public office, or the desire to implement certain policies.” Politicians certainly desire it for intrinsic benefits or seeking status or acknowledgment. They can also seek office in order to carry out specific policies either because of their own ideology or in order to deliver to their winning coalition or donors. They can seek it for monetary reasons, either in the present, while in office, or in the future. They can also seek office because of what might happen to them out of office. Certainly, not all of the implications of these motives can be tested directly in the empirical framework.¹¹

Indeed, there is no obvious research strategy to test whether political actors primarily desire office for intrinsic benefits, or because they like power, or out of civic duty. If leaders stay in office because they like power, the argument becomes tautological and cannot be tested. Additionally, greater executive authority can be a reward in itself, so that the degree of constraints can be seen not only as a check on the executive, but as a motive in itself. Indeed, de Tocqueville highlighted that the nature of political temptations and ambitions vary in different polities: “It is clear that the greater the privileges of the executive authority are, the greater is the temptation; the more the ambition of the candidates is excited, the more warmly are their interests espoused by a throng of partisans who hope to share the power when their patron has won the prize” (ibid., 1864 [2006], 161). For ease of discussion however, I assume that the *intrinsic value* of office cannot be estimated and instead emphasize the *financial value* of office.

Arguably, some rulers can come into office in order to implement a particular policy, and they will attempt to remain in power longer if this is necessary to achieve their goals. For example, it is quite plausible that Hugo Chávez (1999–) of Venezuela strove to achieve power in order to improve the lot of the poor. However, no leader ever justified tenure extension by a personal motive, but to continue the program of reforms, policies that he or she alone was able to implement. President Chávez, who extended his mandate several times, repeatedly argued that he needed more time, perhaps till 2021 to complete his transformation of the country into twenty-first-century socialism.¹² It is also never leaders' decisions, but the people's: “One cannot ignore the call by the people, because the people are the ones who make the final decision” (Sam Nujoma of Namibia).¹³ It is not obvious how to observe empirically whether or not presidents do value policies and step down if they achieve their goals. It is more plausible that, following the argument by Riker (1962), that presidents care about policy, provided they are re-elected.

Page 98

Indeed, while policy seeking could be an alternative explanation, it cannot be tested in the chosen framework: no policy is arguably ever complete, and therefore it can be constantly improved. Tullock (1987) argued that policies are adopted “largely in terms of their effect on the dictators' careers rather than in terms of their intrinsic desirability” (ibid., 46). Still, there seem to be more left- than right-wing presidents among those that extend their terms: 35 percent of left-wing presidents extend their terms (e.g., Daniel Ortega (2007–) of Nicaragua), while 11 percent of right-wing do so (e.g., Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) of Peru).¹⁴ However, among those defined as in the center or those that fit neither left, center, or right ideology — 41 percent extended terms (e.g., Nursultan Nazarbayev (1991–) of Kazakhstan). In other words, while a higher percentage of left-wing presidents prolong their tenure than that of right-wing ones, I am reluctant to attribute causality to this factor as *the majority* of those that extend the terms — 55 percent — are neither left nor right.

Instead, examination of monetary rewards in and out of office, as well as of immunity concerns, is more promising, and I turn to it in more detail in the remainder of this chapter. Depending on existing institutions and

the structure of the economy, which in turn determine financial rewards in different occupations and economic sectors, political actors will have different opportunities for enrichment in and out of office, and, therefore, different incentives to enter, and hold, political office. For instance, an anticonstitutional coup is twenty times more likely in a poor country: lower income renders stakes of losing office higher (Londregan and Poole 1990). Also, consider the following examples from democratic politics. As Wolfinger and Heifetz (1965) point out, in the past Southern politicians valued careers in the US Congress more highly than the Northerners did because, first, the less industrially developed South provided fewer alternate careers to ambitious men, and second, in the South politics was a more highly valued activity — in contrast to the North where politics served as a social elevator for the lower classes. In other words, the value of holding office can depend on socioeconomic conditions. Likewise, Meserve, Pemstein and Bernhard (2009) explain that whether members of the European Parliament (EP) will remain in that institution or will aspire instead to other positions is conditional on different opportunities that are present in domestic politics. In other words, some actors will want to remain in the EP more than other actors because of different future expected benefits. All of these politicians face very similar constraints of staying in office as MEPs, however they face different post-MEP fates: in a sense, they respond to incentives similarly but have different desires of staying on in that office because of the costs and benefits of having domestic careers versus MEPs. This argument is not dissimilar to the one in this chapter: some presidents will be more reluctant to part from office because of their career concerns, not only because of the constraints they face.

Similarly to an earlier argument by Weber (1978) on how political leaders can treat their office as the source of income, Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991) explain how choices over careers by ambitious individuals in either private or public sectors (allocation of talent) are driven by prevalent rent-seeking or productive activity in national economies: in some polities ambitious individuals choose to pursue careers in the state sector because the “government sector, with the attendant ability to solicit bribes and dispose of tax revenue for the benefit of one's family and friends, was the principal career for the able people in society” (Baumol (1989), cited in *ibid.*, 505). Indeed, while in developed nations the average rate of governmental pay is about twice the average GDP per capita, in developing countries it is at least four times as high (Heller and Tait 1983, 45), and in some countries much higher, for instance, in Francophone African nations it is 7–11 times (Schiavo-Campo, de Tommaso and Mukherjee 1997, 9).

One observable implication of the higher value of political careers in poorer and rent-seeking societies, in contrast to alternative private careers, is provided by the survey data. When asked a hypothetical question to choose, if they could, between working in private business or in government or a state-owned enterprise,¹⁵ as Figure 4.1 indicates, about a half of all respondents in wealthy democracies with vibrant private sectors, such as Great Britain or Germany, opted for private careers. In contrast, the predominant majority of respondents in former socialist countries such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan or Belarus would rather work for governments. Certainly, not all developing countries have “pro-public sector” strong majorities, e.g., Romania apparently does not, and not all wealthy democracies have “pro-private” majorities, e.g., Italy — but overall it appears that private-sector jobs are seen as more desirable in more developed economies.

In summary, we can certainly assume the same selfish motives for all office-holders, and given that the latter all desire to remain in power, the researcher only has to identify the existing constraints. If all presidents are canonical Downsian office-seekers and desire unlimited re-election, then in democracies they are more constrained, less so in partly democracies, and very little in nondemocracies. The degree of constraints imposed will explain whether this desire will be realized, and the role of motivation should either be taken as given or discarded. The assumption that all politicians across the world only seek office is a powerful assumption, but an assumption nonetheless. Likewise, the assumption that some politicians have stronger motives to stay in power, because of higher financial rewards that their office brings and because such rewards are not available elsewhere, is equally an assumption. While neither the assumption of intrinsic value of office, nor that of public-spiritedness, nor of policy-seeking can be tested directly, we can however find observable implications for monetary benefits in and out of office, as well as for immunity concerns, and therefore test whether the perks of office and the fear of retribution once out of office can provide a novel explanation for individual compliance with norms. One can also argue that because all politicians desire financial and personal security, their

motives remain the same, and the existing structural and political factors determine different *opportunities* to acquire wealth and security.¹⁶ However, while all leaders can be driven by motives of financial and personal security, leaders that acquired wealth while in office or have reasons to fear for personal immunity will have *stronger* motives to hold on to that office, in contrast to leaders that plan to acquire wealth and have nothing to fear after leaving office. Whether we assert that it is economic factors that determine the opportunities for financial advancement in and out of office while selfish motives remain the same, or that it is different opportunities for enrichment, together with personal concerns for immunity, that influence the value of holding office, and that, therefore, render motives for staying in office stronger, the explanation should attempt to operationalize personal costs and benefits of individual presidents.

Political office will be more valuable if it can provide better opportunities for enrichment and status than private sector careers. If this is the case, we should observe that in more democratic and more developed countries former presidents are more active and pursue various careers in retirement after leaving office, in contrast to ex-presidents in less democratic and less developed countries.

Career and Fate after Leaving Office

If political rulers are more reluctant to leave their posts because of the differences between how public careers are related to the acquisition of wealth in less and more developed nations, and because other professional opportunities are scarce in poorer nations, then an examination of political leaders' fate after presidency, as well as their post-office occupation, can provide some indication as to whether presidents in poorer nations are much worse off in retirement than they are in office. According to the Archigos dataset (Goemans and Chiozza 2009), as calculated by the author, in the 1960–2004 period 268 ex-rulers — 24 percent of all leaders, whether presidents, prime ministers, kings, or other national leaders — went into exile, were imprisoned or died within one year after leaving office. In Africa, 106, or 52 percent of rulers, suffered similarly after 1960. Likewise, in the Middle East, excluding Turkey and Israel, the same fate awaited 18 leaders, or 53 percent. In Page 102 the same period in Latin America, 64 presidents, or 25 percent had irregular fate, and 279, or 37 percent did in the whole 1875–2004 period. It is no surprise that the sub-Saharan Africa, together with the Middle East and North Africa, also witnessed the highest proportion of rulers extending their rule or having unlimited tenure. In Europe and North America only 13 leaders, or 4 percent suffered a bad fate after 1960. Thus, former leaders are indeed worse off in developing countries.

We now turn to presidents, and only those that served in office and stepped down at some stage in the period between 1960 and 2009. This excludes those still in power at the end of 2009 and those who died or were assassinated while in office. The discussion is based on the original dataset on the background of political leaders that additionally includes some data about their life after office, and to which I will return in [chapter 7](#) in more detail. Discarding the most immediate period after leaving office when leaders almost always take some time off, we can examine what they are *primarily* involved in during the first three years following departure. I divide their post tenure occupation into four broad categories: 1) predominantly retirement, 2) political career, 3) international career, 4) business career.

First, *private citizen/retirement* is chosen if the leader retires from public life altogether or chooses other pursuits unrelated to politics, or a noncorporate career, such as becoming a university academic — as Ricardo Lagos (2000–2006) of Chile did for instance; or becomes a public speaker or public intellectual as Alexander Kwasniewski (1995–2005) of Poland; or if he or she participates in, or more often, heads a nongovernmental organization or a nonprofit foundation as Óscar Arias (1986–90, 2006–2010) of Costa Rica and Bill Clinton (1993–2001) of the USA did. Many former presidents can also resume their earlier careers after leaving the presidency. For example, after his exit from office, president of Mexico Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), whose time in office culminated in 2000 in the first-ever transfer of presidency to another party, returned to his professorship in economics in the US. This category also includes exile, whether voluntary or not — which is tantamount to retirement.

The second category is when he or she assumes some *public office* that is subordinate to the national political leader such as the post of an ambassador, as Virgilio Barco Vargas (1986–90) of Colombia, or continues a political career such as that of a party leader, or a senator or member of lower chamber, as Raúl Alfonsín (1983–89) of Argentina. Many constitutions stipulate that former presidents are granted senatorships for life and those that take these posts are also coded in this category.

Page 103

Third, a leader is deemed to have chosen an *international career* — a third category — if the former assumes a post in any international or intergovernmental organization, such as César Gaviria (1990–94) of Colombia who became the Secretary General of the OAS after his departure, or Alpha Oumar Konare (1992–2002) of Mali who assumed the chairmanship of the Commission of the African Union.

Finally, the fourth category is when the ex president returns to or begins a *predominantly business career*, including the membership of corporate boards, such as Roberto Chiari (1960–64) of Panama or José Ascona del Hoyo (1986–90) of Honduras.

Clearly, these categories are not mutually exclusive. If a former ruler presides over his or her own nonprofit foundation or even retires from public life altogether, nothing precludes this individual from a corporate board membership that can be very lucrative. If the biographic sources indicate that former presidents pursue several activities after leaving office, I tried to ascertain whether they predominantly engaged in one or the other.¹⁷ Certainly, older individuals could also be more likely to retire; in this case it is leaders' age that determines their occupation after leaving office rather than political institutions or the economy. However, as can be seen from the average age for each category in brackets (first column of [Table 4.1](#)), age does not seem to be factor at all: all categories do not deviate much from the average age of retirement of around 60 years old.

All in all, 54 percent of former presidents retire or assume predominantly private profiles after presidency. Among leaders that are assigned to this category many are active in their private endeavors even if the latter are not for profit, while equally many simply retire and there is no record of them pursuing any kind of occupation. It is likely, therefore, that further disaggregating the first category into full retirement and a private/predominantly nonprofit career would reveal starker differences between different groups of former presidents. Indeed, 12 percent of all former leaders (one-fifth of all retirees) appear to be active in their retirement as academics, pundits or heads of their own foundations.

In turn, 33 percent occupy some kind of political post that is subordinate to the next president, 8 percent pursue an international career, and only 6 percent choose a predominantly business career. The last column of [Table 4.1](#) excludes presidents that were ousted or served as interim leaders: as can be seen, those with more “regular” tenures are more active after retirement from office.

Page 104 Page 105

However, it is the difference between leaders in more and less democratic, and between more and less developed nations, that is interesting. When we compare career choices in different kinds of polities, some differences are discernible even if not stark. Former presidents in more democratic and more developed nations — nations with per capita incomes (in constant 2005 USD) above the median world income per capita in the year of departure from office and above — are more likely to pursue an active role after presidency, as evidenced in all categories. There is also a higher number of former presidents still in politics, pursuing international careers and in “active retirements” in more developed and more democratic nations than in their less developed and less democratic counterparts. Among former leaders that step down in less democratic nations only 6 percent are active “retirees,” that is, predominantly public speakers, academics or heads of foundations. In contrast, 16 percent are engaged in these types of activities in the more democratic polities, and the differences between leaders in wealthier and poorer nations are equally noticeable. There are also small discernible differences between two groups of leaders in terms of the likelihood of their pursuing more lucrative occupations — a fourth category. The percentages of

individuals that the sources reported as engaged in business are quite small however to reach strong conclusions.¹⁸ As the bottom row indicates, differences between what leaders do after stepping down in more and less developed nations are statistically significant, which supports the argument that former leaders are indeed more likely to pursue other careers not only in more democratic, but also in more developed countries.

Presidential Remuneration

Can official salary and perks explain the value of holding office? Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991, 521) argue that the single most important determinant of the allocation of talent is the compensation contract. However, Besley (2004) points out that politics usually lacks high-powered incentive schemes. Such “contracts” can certainly encompass both formal and informal compensation, however. We can examine whether presidents in more developed nations are also better compensated for their efforts in office, whether relative to their peers or to some national benchmark income level.

Singapore officially has the top paid politicians in the world: in 2009 the incomes of its president and prime minister exceeded USD 2 million each. The president of the USA makes USD 400,000 annually, Page 106 and apparently the least paid is President John Kufuor (2001–9) of Ghana with USD 3,000 per annum.¹⁹ For illustrative purposes, thirty presidents who were either still in power in 2010 or left not much earlier are compared. By and large, presidents of the wealthier nations make more in absolute terms than their peers of the poorer ones. However, some leaders of less developed nations have unexpectedly large compensation relative to national incomes, as indicated by the ratio of salary to the average income in a country: the compensation for President Laurent Gbagbo (2000–2011) of Cote d'Ivoire is 200 times the average income, Mwai Kibaki (2002–) of Kenya's is 194 times, followed by Arnoldo Alemán (1997–2002) of Nicaragua whose compensation is 109 times the national average income. The American president's official wage, the largest paid in this group, is very modest indeed in relative terms as his income is only 9.3 times larger than that of an average American citizen. In the private sector, a chief executive's pay primarily depends on the level of responsibility, the size and budget of their companies. We can gauge whether official public salary similarly reflects the level of responsibility by calculating the ratio of salary to public spending and to the total population, where the lower ratio figures stand for lower compensation relative to responsibility, and vice versa.²⁰ The pattern is very similar: consolidated democracies pay less in relative terms than unconsolidated, partly or nondemocratic regimes: again, Alemán, Gbagbo, Kibaki but also Saakashvili are vastly overpaid relative to the size of the states, while Teodoro Obiang Nguema (1979–) of Equatorial Guinea or Sam Nujoma (1990–2005) of Namibia are overpaid relative to their population.

It appears that leaders of wealthy consolidated democracies who, as would be indicated by the various perception of corruption indices, by and large abstain from rent-seeking, earn more in absolute terms. However, relative to average incomes or the magnitude of responsibilities, they make less than their peers in the less developed economies. Comparison with the average income in a country might be the wrong kind of benchmark, however, should political leaders, for the sake of national prestige, have to have compensation comparable with their peers from other countries, irrespective of the size of their economies. It is also not necessarily the case that leaders of small nations have fewer governing responsibilities than those of larger ones. Perhaps a more appropriate benchmark is the compensation of the captains of industry rather than the average income. If we compare the median CEO compensation, it becomes immediately clear that it trumps official public salaries: USD 2,250,000 in the USA, USD 735,000 in France, USD 961,000 in Mexico, USD 526,000 in Venezuela, USD 372,000 in South Page 107 Page 108 Africa or USD 44,000 in the Philippines.²¹ For developed economies, it is clear that, first, executives in the private sector make much more than public national leaders, perhaps with the exception of Singapore. Second, upon retirement these political leaders can easily reach similar or higher levels of income once they join the private sector and exploit their status as former presidents. Thus, while the data about the differences in official incomes while in office and expected income after office for presidents is patchy, it is however illustrative and indicates that after departure these leaders can be at least as well off financially as when they were in office.

It is also clear, however, that the official remuneration does not exactly account for all the rewards of political

office, including housing, travel, transportation, separate expense accounts, paid holidays, security, and more. For example, Heller and Tait (1983) point out numerous difficulties in cross-national comparisons of either governmental employment figures or, especially, governmental payment rates. Likewise, Hood, Lee and Peters (2003) in their comparative analysis of political rewards in several Asian and Pacific Rim nations, use the analogy of icebergs to describe political compensation, where basic official salary represents the visible part over the water, the size of which varies from nation to nation (ibid., 4). Indeed, the official compensation of such presidents as Niyazov of Turkmenistan (1990–2006) of only USD 10,800 per annum and Frederick Chiluba (1991–2002) of Zambia of only USD 10,000 a year clearly does not tell the whole story as these rulers and their small winning coalitions controlled all aspects of economic activity in their respective countries. In case of tailoring alone, it is extremely puzzling how the Zambian president was able to rival the infamous collection of Imelda Marcos with his 349 shirts, 206 jackets and suits, 72 pairs of shoes, and other items — all from one tailor whom he paid USD 1,029,400, which exceeded his annual salary by 100 times.²²

The Spoils and the Value of Political Office

Presidents of more developed and democratic nations are more likely to pursue active careers in retirement, and their compensation in private sectors is likely to be much higher than in their previous governmental jobs. However, while comparisons of presidential salary with the expected income after leaving office are valid for consolidated democracies, official salary cannot serve as a valid indicator of the financial value of holding political office elsewhere. If leaders contemplate what they stand to lose should they step down from office, presidential salary is Page 109 an unlikely cause of term limits' avoidance.

How can one operationalize the temptations of power? The status and lifestyle of a president in office is often difficult to match should the latter become a private citizen. Consider, for instance, official spoils of office in Ukraine, to which I return in more detail in [chapter 5](#). The presidential affairs department of the presidential administration,²³ in charge of the president's accommodation and daily routine, provides lavish, king-like services to the incumbent leader. While in 2000 the president's official remuneration was only about USD 5,600 per annum, or six times above the average salary in the country, the overall expenses for the head of state were very significant, estimated around 0.05 percent of national GDP, and there were fourteen official residencies that the president could avail himself of, all refurbished to the highest standards²⁴ — not a small number, even comparing with a very generous accommodation of the president of France with his five residencies.²⁵ The Ukrainian president's spoils of office are not unusual as his peer rulers enjoy similar, if not better, perks and benefits.²⁶ The presidential affairs department with dozens of various properties and industries in its management and an annual revenue of more than USD 153 million resembles more a medieval king's own royal domain than a mere administrative department responsible for a national executive.²⁷

However, political leaders that can direct state funds to improve their own living accommodations and official expenses can also do more and misappropriate, or acquire, funds unofficially, for their own private purposes. There are no reliable cross-national indicators that show exactly how much political leaders are able to skim from their national economies. Indeed, a great many leaders prefer foreign bank accounts, because “foreign bankers...can be depended on to hold the money and keep the investments a secret.... The exact size of the funds the dictator has will not be known” (Tullock 1987, 51). Sporadic evidence, ranging from unsubstantiated media reports to more reliable court decisions with factual findings, about personal fortunes of various political leaders, however, indicate that the income generated from the highest office could be in magnitudes of billions of dollars or more, especially in poorer nations (Transparency International 2004, 13).

Studies exist that attempted to gauge the overall magnitude of corruption, globally: the estimates range from conservative USD 20–40 billion of assets owned by leaders of developing nations and that are transferred overseas, to USD 1–1.6 trillion annually from the overall money laundering worldwide that include not only corrupt but also criminal activities.²⁸ Combining the data collected by Transparency International (2004), The Financial Action Task Force (2011), and Page 110 calculations from various media sources,²⁹ [Table 4.3](#) illustrates the estimated extent of spoils for selected twenty former presidents from different regions in the world. The figures are staggering, with some presidents reportedly skimming billions of dollars during their often long

tenures. In comparison with Indonesian President Suharto's (1967–98) USD 15 to 35 billion or Saparmurat Niyazov (1990–2006) of Turkmenistan's estimated account of more than USD 3 billion, Carlos Menem's (1989–99) alleged USD 10 million or Didier Ratsiraka (1975–93, 1997–2002) of Madagascar's USD 8 million seem almost trivial.

What are the factors that lead to a higher likelihood of rent-seeking by politicians? If we put the degree of executive constraints aside for the moment, the decision to skim the spoils should depend on the size of potential rents and the expected future private income. In Page 111 polities with large public sectors potential spoils will be much larger than in polities with vibrant private sectors, all things being equal. Thus, I turn to the structure of political economy that influences the probability of rent-seeking as the major explanation of the financial value of holding office.

Lacking the direct data on rewards of political office, instead we could employ indirect measures that are likely to be correlated with the unobserved magnitude of spoils, such as the level of economic development, the size of public sector and governmental procurement markets, the extent of capital flight, and natural resource rents. Valid cross-national data are available for all of these indicators, therefore they can be employed to gauge the magnitude of possible spoils, and to them I turn in the empirical chapter. Below I briefly discuss how these factors are related to the value of holding office.

In general, the poorer the country is, the more likely its rulers are to skim off from the state. Political office can provide economic enrichment, “the fountain of privilege,” that is not available out of office in less developed economies (Bates 2001). Many politicians in poor countries pursue a rational strategy of enriching themselves while in office, as they realize that opportunities out of office are scarce. Indeed, “in poor countries the marginal value of money is higher than in wealthy countries.... A governmental job that offers the possibility of extralegal income supplements would be especially attractive” (Sandholtz and Koetzle 2000, 36–37). Spoils are generated when politicians are able to engage in corruption and capture rents from the economy, and rents are created when the state restricts the market.³⁰ In general, in many poorer nations the lines between public and private sectors can be quite blurred (Linz 2000 [1975], 153).

In a widely cited theory of rulers' political survival, Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) argue that in more authoritarian regimes political leaders, whose survival in office depends on a smaller number of supporters, will be able to remain in office as long as they provide rent-seeking opportunities to these supporters. The sources of rents range from natural resources and foreign aid during the Cold War to a difference between overall taxation and expenditure, which in turn is defined as kleptocracy. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) further hypothesize that the size of kleptocracy will be associated with both deficit spending — “funding their discretionary pet projects, or rewarding cronies with lucrative government contracts, deficit spending allows leaders to skim off resources” (ibid., 162) — and surplus spending, when funds are misappropriated from future revenues. Kleptocracy — the absolute value of the difference between taxation and spending — Page 112 is found to be more significant in smaller coalition (more authoritarian) regimes. Similarly, in Olson (1991) autocrats can increase taxes and collect the residuum for their own consumption. Unfortunately, as the authors point out, the tax data are available predominantly for developed nations only (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 142–43). We also know however that fiscal collection is very low across the developing world, and taxes never cover expenditure needs (e.g., Tanzi and Zee 2000). It is also lower in autocracies than democracies (Cheibub 1998, 365). For instance, in Africa the average taxation is only 7 percent of GDP (Auriol and Warlters 2005, 626), which is much lower than the average expenditures levels. Thus, in less developed nations the size of kleptocracy, if estimated as the difference between tax and spending, because of a very small fiscal base, will be higher than in developed ones regardless.

Instead, I turn to the overall size of public sector, procurement markets, various rents and capital flight in order to gauge the extent of spoils that can accrue to the ruler. Whether the leader engages in bribe taking, embezzles, or makes policy to advance his or her own wealth, the magnitude of possible spoils will be largely determined by the opportunities present in the public sector of the economy. Some scholars employ the size of the public sector, such as the proportion of GDP that is spent on all governmental salaries and wages, as regressors or regressands of

corruption (such as in La Porta et al. (1999)). However, all things being equal, larger public sectors will certainly generate wider opportunities for rent-seeking and thus automatically reflect perceptions of corruption, so a researcher will be better off using one or the other rather than both in the same framework. In the empirical chapter I assume that the size of public sector, especially in poorer and less democratic nations, will be correlated with the magnitude of rent-seeking, and thus it will account for the spoils accruing to the top politicians, including presidents. In general, the ruler collects private rents and benefits from increases in taxes and regulation, and from higher spending (Rose-Ackerman and Coolidge 1997). For instance, during his time in office, Anastasio Somoza García (1936–56) of Nicaragua, who both extended his terms repeatedly and ruled by proxy, acquired a personal fortune as the size of public sector grew considerably and he asserted personal control over public enterprises and railroads (Walter 1993, 84–89). Indeed, at the time of his death in 1956, Somoza had reportedly amassed a fortune of USD 60 million, and his family became the largest landowner in the country (Rouquie 1995, 261).

The public sector could not only increase opportunities for rent-seeking, Page 113 it could also increase the stakes of leaving office because it would entail relinquishing control over such an economy. Throughout Africa, for instance, large public sectors afforded numerous patronage and rent-seeking possibilities (Van de Walle 2001, 144). We also know that on average, in contrast to the developed nations, developing countries feature a more significant presence of public enterprises in the economy (Heller and Tait 1983, 45). With a large public sector, public careers become more important for advancement than private ones, and this could additionally affect the incentives of rulers. Indeed, a ruler will not be able to find a career in the private sector with sufficient rewards similar to his or her peers in developed economies with robust private sectors. Dominant public sectors will also reduce the expectations of future compensation in the private sector that could otherwise moderate a ruler's behavior in office.

If access to the state is important for economic success, rulers will be concerned whether they will continue to be well-off after their exit from office. Many anecdotes relate how presidents who amassed enormous control over their economies through the growth of the public sectors have then become reluctant to leave office.³¹ The growth of the public sector under Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, for example, has been explosive (Penford-Becerra 2007; Weisbrot and Sandoval 2008). In Belarus, where the president extended his tenure in 2004, the state controlled 80 percent of the economy (Way 2008). Also, as I illustrate below in [chapter 5](#), an unreformed public sector of Yugoslavia provided enormous riches to the president and his inner circle.

While we can only assume that a sizable part of the spoils generated by rent-seeking will be consumed by the political leader himself or herself, it is a very plausible assumption. In less democratic polities the rent-seeking is usually controlled by centralized networks leading all the way to the top, in contrast to democracies, however poor, where corruption is more diffused (McLeod 2005; Rock 2003). Corruption of the heads of state is typically referred to as *the grand corruption* — “in which those at the political, decision-making levels of government use their office to enrich themselves, their families, and their associates” (The Financial Action Task Force 2011, 7), and, as can be seen from [Table 4.3](#), it is more serious in poorer nations. Presidents, because of their elevated position and ability to propose or influence policies, are able to control state budgets and create extra-budgetary funds, state-run companies, and parastatals; they also have access to public funds, “to create structures to siphon money from government coffers” (The Financial Action Task Force 2011, 9). Rents can be captured by both the office-holders and those outside the state who are connected Page 114 to them — businessmen that became less “entrepreneurial” and more “bureaucratic” (Easterbrook 1957, 574–75, quoted in Lane 1979, 62). However, whether they are captured by politicians directly or by private individuals who pass along the share to office-holders that make it happen, rents will accrue to politicians if the state restricts economic activity in one way or another.

In the top-down lines of command of a presidential regime decisions such as privatizing or nationalizing core industries in the economy will be often made by a president himself or herself.³² Indeed, examples abound of how politicians, and chief executives most of all, benefit from the nationalization of private enterprises (Colazingari and Rose-Ackerman 113; Kurer 1993; Peirce 2005; Wedeman 1997). Likewise, if accompanied by rigged tenders, “corruption in privatization process in some countries is analogous to corruption in large-scale public procurements” (Rose-Ackerman 2004, 71). Arikan (2008, 724–25) finds that more privatization leads to an

increase in corruption not only in the former socialist countries that experienced large higher levels of privatization but in other regions as well. Rose-Ackerman (1999, 36–37) lists numerous cases when heads of state directly benefited from corrupt privatization deals.

During tenures of many presidents that later extended them further, whole sectors of national economies were privatized. For example, during President Carlos Menem's (1989–99) of Argentina time in office, privatization generated a staggering USD 44.6 billion, which constituted 10 percent of total GDP.³³ Likewise, during the tenure of another president that extended his stay in office, Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan (1991–), the state obtained USD 9.4 billion (16 percent of GDP) in total, which included proceeds from the sale of energy giant *Aktyubinskneft*, for USD 4.3 billion.³⁴ The amount of privatization proceeds, however, is not a very exact measure, as greater amounts could reflect that state officials extracted the fair price from the tenders, and lower amounts would reflect larger kickbacks rather than more spoils. While privatization per se does not entail rents, when combined with fluid institutions and weak economies, a certain percentage from total proceeds will almost certainly end up in the private accounts of politicians.

Likewise, a recent study of corruption in the public sector by the World Bank identified governmental procurement as the area that is one of the most vulnerable to corruption and that can provide plenty of temptations for political actors (Campos and Pradhan 2007). Indeed, decisions to contract services to private firms are often influenced by the political connections of the office-holders (Coviello and Gagliarducci Page 115 2010; Goldman, Rocholl and So 2010). Corrupt practices typically include artificial demand for often unnecessary goods and services, unfair tenders awarded to friendly companies or even companies affiliated or owned by politicians themselves, and various post-tender irregularities (Audet 2002; Ferraz and Finan 2011; Ware, Moss, Campos and Noone 2007). Therefore, larger procurement markets should increase the magnitude of rents available to the ruler. For instance, in Venezuela under Chávez, governmental contracts are routinely awarded without any bidding whatsoever (Corrales 2010, 46).

Also, corruption of public officials is frequently correlated with the magnitude of capital flight — unaccounted financial outflows. For 2008 alone, such outflows are estimated in the range between USD 1.26 trillion and 1.44 trillion for the developing nations (Kar and Curcio 2011). At least half of these outflows are generated from corruption; and a number of cases emerged about heads of state transferring very significant amounts abroad (Perdriel-Vaissiere 2012).

The structure of governmental revenue could also provide evidence about possible spoils from office. The connection between the dependence of public budgets on natural resources and a high level of corruption is well researched in the literature (e.g., Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz 2007; Treisman 2000). For example, in Angola, where the president was a champion of postponing elections (see [chapter 3](#)), it is estimated that in 2000–2001 alone oil rent averaged more than 3.6 billion dollars a year, and a significant part of this rent was transferred, legally or illegally, to the ruling elite or the so-called oil nomenclatura (Hodges 2004, 202).

In summary, the national economy consists of private and public sectors, and the larger the latter, the greater the rent-seeking opportunities. There is plenty of sporadic evidence that leaders become more reluctant to depart when the spoils of office are plentiful, ranging from the number of palaces they can occupy, the size of presidential budget and the offshore banking accounts. These spoils, however, are all derived from the rent-seeking activities in the economy. The extent of rent-seeking will be correlated with the size of public sector and of the governmental procurement markets, but rents can also be collected from natural resource extraction. While in office, the president consumes his or her official salary and perks and decides whether or not to supplement them with additional, corrupt rents. A leader is more likely to engage in rent-seeking when such a leader faces lower constraints, but also if there is no expectation of a private career after leaving office — which is influenced by the strength of the private sector that will create monetary rewards to a former leader. In the empirical chapter I Page 116 also employ an indicator to control for corruption and probability of retaining assets, as I explain below.

The Probability of Retaining Immunity and Assets after Leaving Office

Like all individuals, politicians contemplate their future. They consider whether they would be able to live as high-status a life as they had become used to during their tenures, if they would retain their wealth and immunity, or whether they would instead end up in prison, exile, or worse. It is also very likely that such contemplation will affect their succession behavior. Indeed, the manner in which they or their close relatives and associates acquired assets will influence the security of these assets and leaders' immunity. Apart from the *magnitude* of the value of office, the *probability* of leading a comparably high-status life after leaving office and retaining wealth and immunity will also factor in. In countries with insecure property rights and the absence of the rule of law, the prospect of redistribution of assets after every elite rotation is very strong indeed.

How do we know that presidents worry about their post-tenure fate and that this influences their succession behavior? Certainly, they never express any doubts in interviews taken before or after leaving office. It is, however, very likely that political leaders evaluate their future prospects and decide on their succession on the basis of the stakes of losing office and the constraints they face. Ultimately, however, as in any observational study, the fundamental problem of causal inference renders unequivocal attribution of causality difficult since we only observe the fate of rulers that step down and do not observe the counterfactual — the post-tenure fate of rulers that extended and stayed in office. Indeed, as I discuss survival in office in more detail in [chapter 8](#), the presidents that extend their terms do not usually step down, they are ousted in coups, assassinated, or die in office.

One can, however, infer concerns over post-tenure fate from the observed fate of those presidents who failed in their attempts to remain in power.³⁵ Out of thirteen that clearly attempted to remain in office, four presidents experienced prosecution or exile after leaving; five more were either protected by their successors or retained considerable control after departure through parties so that the alternative remains unknown; and another four appeared not to have grounds for concern. While the number is rather small, we can, however, infer that the presidents who cling to power might indeed have legitimate concerns over their fate; others, too, probably have similar concerns but could retain their wealth and status through their influence over, or deals with, their designated successors and political parties. In [chapter 5](#) I examine in more detail how personal concerns for immunity might have influenced the behavior of several presidents.

How can one account for the probability of immunity and retaining wealth? Certainly, we can gauge the existence of legitimate immunity concerns of an individual president indirectly if there are reports in the media during or after that ruler's term in office, or if there are legal proceedings instituted against him or her for acts committed while in office, such as for alleged corruption, embezzlement and various human rights violations, or if the ruler gained entry into office in nonconstitutional manner. In the empirical chapter I construct such an indicator from the available reports in the media. However, the lack of negative information regarding particular individuals might not always mean that the latter are not corrupt, and allegations are often caused by the negative campaigning of opposing parties, with or without legitimate grounds. Instead, we can also employ more unequivocal and observable criteria for personal immunity concerns.

There is a number of potential factors that could influence life after the presidency.³⁶ Some of these factors are correlated with the overall degree of democracy, such as the rule of law and security of property rights; others are very difficult to assess, such as the back-room deals between outgoing leaders and their successors. I will focus instead on cues found in the fate of the previous ruler, on the extent of rights' abuses during the leader's tenure and on the presence of a hegemonic party.

Leaders that have certain concerns for their future and who contemplate departure from power might need to be able to make a binding contract with their successors in order to avoid the redistribution of their assets and to ensure their immunity. Hereditary monarchy seems to be able to solve the succession problem, and it is not surprising that some incumbent presidents prepare their offspring for the highest post for life after they depart (Brownlee 2007b; Kurrild Klitgaard 2000; Tullock 1987). The reliable confirmation of a deal that guarantees immunity from prosecution for a leader leaving office, or a constitutional provision to that effect, will serve as the direct indicator of the probability of immunity. Almost always, there is some legislative or constitutional provision regarding former presidents in all presidential regimes, such as the 1963 Presidential Transition Act in the USA. Some constitutions do incorporate a clause stipulating that the president is immune from prosecution during and after his term in office, and some Page 118 could even extend to the president's immediate family.³⁷ Likewise,

there exist reports from multiple sources about less formal guarantees such as alleged deals struck between outgoing presidents and their successors, as in the case of outgoing presidents Mathieu Kérékou (1972–91) of Benin in 1991 and Yeltsin (1991–99) of Russia in 2000.

Alternatively, former presidents could also secure immunity through the political post they assume after presidency. For example, President Arnoldo Alemán (1997–2002) of Nicaragua assumed the post of the speaker of parliament from 2002 after his departure from the presidency, and was thereby protected from potential prosecution. However, constitutional immunity clauses that are introduced with ease under an outgoing president can be revoked with the same ease when his or her successor assumes power. Likewise, deals struck can be revisited and immunity that comes with another office can be revoked, as was done in the case of former president Alemán. Indeed, in a related discussion of contracting during regime transitions, Barbara Geddes points out that the basic problem facing exiting dictatorships is that agreements they make during transitions are usually unenforceable once the transition is complete (Geddes 1999, 137). Besides, the often unofficial and covert nature of immunity deals makes them hard to operationalize in an empirical study.

Strong hegemonic party regimes, however, can ensure that the designated presidential successor wins, as described in the previous chapter, while simultaneously protecting the interests of the outgoing leader who might otherwise find himself at the whim of the all-powerful successor. The stakes of losing office will be reduced if the president can be assured that his or her immunity and assets will be secure after departure. In fact, in such a system, the outgoing leader might secure a position of influence even after leaving the presidency, as suggested by examples of several outgoing presidents in Botswana (Good and Taylor 2006), Tanzania (Hodd 1988) and Mexico (Magaloni 2006). For example, all the former presidents of Mexico — which has been governed by the hegemonic party until 2000 — even if some live abroad, enjoy status and immunity and are guaranteed a considerable life-long state pension that has never been revoked.³⁸ Thus, the existence of strong hegemonic parties could ease the costs of stepping down for the outgoing leaders and protect their immunity after exit (Magaloni 2006; Smith 2005).

While specific constitutional immunity clauses, deals with successors and strong ruling parties could increase the probability of retaining assets and status, it is also plausible to assume that immunity will depend on the magnitude of abuses committed during leader's tenure. Page 119 If a ruler committed human rights violations during his or her tenure, future immunity may be far less likely (Hasson 2002). If there are no major abuses under the president's command, or if these abuses cannot be attributed to the ruler but to other executive officers acting on their own, the probability of immunity should not be affected and presidents will find it easier to step down. Examples abound, however, of many presidents who cling to power out of the fear of personal retribution in political afterlife. Since 1990, 67 former heads of state were criminally charged, some of whom were imprisoned, for crimes committed while in office (Lutz 2009). For example, the former president of Chad Hissène Habré (1982–90), who for years fought extradition requests from his exile in Senegal, was sentenced to death in absentia in 2008 by a Chad court for an estimated 40,000 politically motivated murders and 200,000 charges of torture committed during his tenure.³⁹

It is also very plausible that a ruler will receive cues about his or her likely post-tenure fate from the experience of his predecessor. If a country has an established tradition of honoring past presidents, the current president's costs of stepping down should be reduced. It is equally likely that a ruler will monitor the experience of other ex-rulers. It is not clear, however, whether an irregular fate of other rulers will strengthen a president's resolve to remain in power or force him to moderate his behavior in office, thus serving as a deterrent.⁴⁰ For example, the international arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court for President Omar al-Bashir of Sudan in 2009 certainly took away the prospect of immunity for the leader and thus ensured he would have to stay in office at all costs. The warrant could certainly deter other leaders that have not committed abuses yet, and will have an opposite effect on those who did. The fate of the previous ruler in the same office, especially given that oftentimes it is the current president who could be held responsible for the former's fate, should influence calculations of personal immunity.

Discussion and Conclusion

In this chapter, instead of giving priority to factors that restrict executive power, I propose an explanation that centers on the motivation of an individual president and focuses on the trade-off between enrichment in public and private sectors from the point of view of a politician. The income-generating capacity of political office in polities where rent-seeking is prevalent, as well as concerns over future immunity, entice many presidents to remain in power beyond the mandated period. Page 120 Rent-seeking during tenure also decreases probability of immunity after office. The ruler will attempt to stay in office if the expectation of wealth acquisition as a private citizen is low and the probability of immunity, as well as of retaining wealth, is equally low. In turn, the payoff of a private citizen again depends on the expectation of a private career — which is influenced by the strength of the private sector that will create monetary rewards to a former leader — and the probability of future immunity as a citizen. The value of political office therefore is a combination of the magnitude of the income-generating potential of this office and the *probability of retaining assets and immunity* after exit. The key parameters that should influence decisions to remain in office are the size of public sector that determines the rent-seeking opportunities and, correspondingly, the importance, or lack thereof, of private careers, and, second, executive constraints that determine how difficult it is to remain in office.

Indeed, presidents motivated by the value of their office must also have the *capacity* to confront other political players and change their constitutions in order to stay in power. In the previous chapter I discussed several factors that proved to be important in thwarting presidents' attempts to remain in office. A president's control over his or her own party, the strength of legislature and judiciary, mass and international constraints will be included to account for the main obstacles on the executive capacity. In general, the overall strength of democracy will be a powerful factor. Indeed, rulers in stronger democratic systems will be more constrained, less so in partly democratic systems. However, democratic presidents should be deterred from pursuing political immortality not only because of democratic norms and practices that constrain, but also because they do not have to stay in office in order to become wealthy and influential: these presidents cannot, and do not have to, prolong their time in power. Thus the relationship between the value of office and constraints becomes self-enforcing. In contrast, leaders that enter office with insignificant constraints and economies that favor rent-seeking behavior will be tempted to enrich themselves not only because they are powerful but also because private careers will never bring comparable wealth, status and prestige. Third, when the value of holding office is high either because of rent-seeking or because of prior behavior in office that renders immunity problematic, and when existing constraints are also considerable, the leader will find it difficult to stay in power. He or she will, however, be motivated to attempt it.

The Stakes of Losing Office in Comparison

When a president in a mature democracy with a developed economy complies with a constitution and steps down when required, we can put forward two related explanations for such behavior. If we assume that all politicians are pure office-seekers and only institutional constraints hinder their political ambitions, we will attribute constitutional compliance to the existing checks and balances alone. However, if we allow for the possibility that motivations of political actors are more complex, the behavior of presidents can also be explained if we turn to how these leaders perceive the value of their office and career prospects after departures. Either way, in wealthy democracies most of the time we do not observe any other succession outcomes bar unambiguous departure. Therefore, the strength of checks and balances, and, equally, a possibility of enrichment after leaving office as a private citizen, offer possible explanations for presidents' behavior. Likewise, in regimes where political leaders face a high value of holding office and low constraints, presidential term limits will often be absent in the first place. Should these restrictions be present, they will often be easily overturned by powerful executives. Such cases are also less illuminating if we attempt to attribute causality unequivocally and trace the causal mechanisms behind constitutional compliance. In fact, given the inherent heterogeneity of causal relationships, especially behind the phenomenon of democratic consolidation, various empirical models that can demonstrate the validity of institutional, or actor-based, or structuralist explanations, are equally possible, as enumerated in the introductory chapter.

In order to examine the validity of the proposed argument and to find implications for how the value of holding office influences Page 122 constitutional compliance, I turn to three illustrative cases below. Each of these cases demonstrates, in the language of causal inference, the existence of causal tendencies that show how tenure extensions and “personalization,” or lack thereof, are brought about (Hedstrom 2005, 108). Throughout this chapter I underline that the existing executive constraints — while important — alone cannot provide a complete explanation of presidents' behavior, and that leaders' personal motives to remain in office matter at least as much as the existing checks and balances. Admittedly, institutional, international and societal constraints are easier to observe than personal costs and benefits of individual leaders. We cannot know with absolute certainty how political actors perceive the value of their offices. We can however infer this value from reported estimates of the spoils of office, interviews of political actors, indictments, and implemented institutional changes that can be interpreted as driven by leaders' concerns for personal immunity and wealth.

The case of President Milošević (1989–2000) of Serbia and Yugoslavia is the clearest example of how prohibitively high costs of leaving office make the pursuit of that office the only possible option for an incumbent leader. Given the magnitude of rents extracted from the economy by the president's family, as well as the concerns over criminal prosecution that prior to 1999 had been quite likely, and, following the indictment by the ICTY Tribunal in 1999 — became certain, — irrespective of various constraints on the president's capacity to act at will, from his own point of view Milošević had no choice but to extend his time in office, which he did successfully in 1997 and attempted to, unsuccessfully, in 2000.

In contrast, another president, Leonid Kuchma (1994–2004) of Ukraine, in 2004 attempted to secure the election of his chosen successor, albeit unsuccessfully, and in the process triggered the momentous events which came to be known as the Orange revolution. This case presents several questions in light of the proposed theory. If, as I argued earlier in [chapter 4](#), presidents with valid reasons to worry about their personal immunity are more likely to attempt to remain in office, then why did this leader, who had valid personal concerns, decide to step down? Also, given the existence of such concerns and the fact that his succession plan failed, why the former president was not prosecuted after departure? In some sense, Ukrainian presidential succession of 2004 is a critical case study to examine whether, despite the president's departure and his immunity intact in private life, it is still possible to demonstrate observable implications of the personal costs and benefits Page 123 of an individual president. I draw attention to the complex strategy that the outgoing president implemented during his second term, the major

part of which, the constitutional reform that was agreed upon in the midst of an electoral crisis, was not a spontaneous event but the result, and the last stage, of a complex game of political survival that had been under way for several years. As I explain below, a close examination of the president's behavior, revealed in his interviews and a series of legislative initiatives to extend one's stay in office and to ensure immunity, as well as his actions during the 2004 election, demonstrates the presence of personal concerns that are consistent with the proposed theory of costs and benefits of leaving office.

Third, I turn to Botswana that is often lauded as a successful case of economic development and political stability (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003; Leith 2005; Samatar 1999). The fact that the majority of political elites, including Botswana's presidents, came from the wealthy cattle-owning class and had personal stakes in the development of property rights and private sector after independence, made the value of holding office in Botswana much lower than it was in other African countries. Likewise, the dominant role that the ruling *BDP* party enjoyed despite subjecting itself to repeated multiparty competitive elections ensured that the incumbent presidents were confident in the success of their chosen successors and their own future. The case of President Masire that stepped down in 1998, and of President Mogae that did in 2008, with both being able to rely on their party and facing no significant constraints at the elite-, mass-, or international level, simply underlines the fact that sometimes presidents *do not have to* remain in power, irrespective of the degree of constraints on their behavior.

While more reliable indicators and reports about the value of holding office are often available for sitting presidents, in this chapter I only focus on presidents that departed from office at the time of this writing in order to examine their fate after leaving the presidential palace. Three selected cases can be seen to represent three different “types” of presidents: first, those that face intermediate levels of constraints and very high value of holding office and, therefore, are almost certain to attempt to remain in office (Miloš evi); second, those that face both high constraints and high value and, therefore, it is more difficult to predict whether these leaders are able to remain in office, or not (Kuchma); and third, leaders that face low-to-intermediate constraints and low value of holding on to office and that in all likelihood will step down when required (Mogae). Subsequent statistical analyses in Page 124 [chapter 6](#) support the logic behind selection.¹

President Miloš evi (1989–2000) of Serbia and Yugoslavia

Slobodan Miloš evi , the president of Serbia (1989–97) and then of Yugoslavia (1997–2000), a former official of the Yugoslav League of Communists, came to power in the turbulent period of the late 1980s. Scholarship exists that examined both his political biography and politics in the 1990s in sufficient detail (e.g., Cohen 2002; Djukic 1994; Thomson 1999). Below I draw from this literature to highlight how the president's concerns over losing office became the paramount issue that to a large extent determined politics in Serbia at that time. In early 1987 Miloš evi , who by then headed the Central Committee of the Serbian Communist party, embraced Serbian nationalism as a vehicle for advancement, and later that same year ousted his more moderate rivals and emerged supreme in the party (Cohen 2002, 106–18). With the old order collapsing, in late 1989 Miloš evi was popularly elected as the president of the Socialist Republic of Serbia, and, with the adoption of the new Serbian constitution in 1990, as the president of the Republic of Serbia — the largest republic of the then rapidly disintegrating Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). In December 1990 the president of Serbia was elected for his first five-year term. Article 86 of the constitution unequivocally stated that “the same person may be elected for President of the Republic two times only.”

Even though formally Serbia was a part of the federal state, SFRY, as president of the largest of the two remaining republics, Serbia, Miloš evi remained the effective leader over what was left of the federation also. After the latter's dissolution a new, Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) was constituted of Serbia and a much smaller Montenegro in 1992. FRY's new constitution “attempted to reconcile two competing claims for sovereignty, one claimed by the federal units (republics), the other by the federal state,” yet due to the elite alignment of interests, the lack of clarity over jurisdiction of the federal center and the republics was not a problem (Lukic 2005, 58). The president of the FRY was elected by the bicameral Federal Assembly, and Miloš evi 's party and its allies dominated both federal houses, which gave the Serbian president the power to control and dismiss the federal president.

The president's personal and unchallenged control over his political party was crucial for his own political survival and subsequent tenure Page 125 extensions. When the communist party was dissolved, on its basis Milošević founded a new party, Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), which was to become the country's main political force in the 1990s. In his biography of Milošević, Cohen (2002, 174) refers to the analysis of a Serbian academic, Vladimir Goati, who argued that Milošević's ability to control his party stemmed from the fact that prior to the party's establishment in 1990, Milošević, the party founder, "had already gathered broad support for his personal leadership."²

How constrained was President Milošević by other institutional actors or the civil society? Milošević's regime was clearly not a democracy, akin to many neighboring countries in the Central and East European region that all aspired to join the European Union. At the same time, in contrast to the majority of East European and Central Asian autocrats that quickly consolidated their authority and ruled unchallenged, during his tenure Milošević's control over the state and society was limited, and he and his party often struggled at the polls and had to resort to buying votes and co-opting the opposition (Silitsky 2005). Throughout the 1990s, Serbian politics featured competitive, even if rigged, elections, opposition parties were often present in the legislature, and there were also vibrant civil society and the independent media (Thomson 1999). Even the Serbian Orthodox church, traditionally dependent on the state, was capable of taking autonomous positions on occasion.³ Likewise, despite significant purges in the early 1990s, the army remained semi-autonomous from Milošević, and the latter could never completely trust the officers (Thomson 1999, 307–8).

While the governing party, SPS, was quite popular in 1990, its support was already in decline only two years later. Later on, in November 1996 SPS was defeated in a number of key municipalities, including the capital city. The government attempted to annul the results of these elections yet the strength of protests in 1996–97 that followed was unprecedented and brought the regime to a near collapse. Milošević's regime, however, became somewhat more repressive late in the 1990s, after the purge of moderates from the ranks of the regime and the tightening of restrictions on civil liberties in 1998–99.⁴

Nor was the president immune from challenges and defections from within his own ranks throughout his time in office. When the new federation, FRY, was established in 1992, the new federal authorities that were chosen in 1992 proved less compliant than Milošević had foreseen. Contrary to Milošević's preferences, on the grounds of the foundation of a new state, FRY, the new federal executive pledged to hold early elections, including those for the Serbian presidency, before the end of 1992. After a brief battle over the constitutionality of Page 126 holding an election only two years into his first five-year term, in the end Milošević chose to set the election date for December 1992 (Cohen 2002, 212). In contrast to his first presidential election in December 1990 when Milošević easily defeated the other candidates, in December 1992 he faced a serious challenge and only won after a tight contest with a credible opponent, Prime Minister of FRY Panić. This unexpected threat from the federal authorities led Milošević to ensure that only the most compliant actors would occupy these crucial posts in the future. Likewise, since 1992 Milošević stood in direct elections only once, in 2000 (Thomson 1999, 130–35).

In 1997 his second and final term as the president of Serbia was about to expire. The very ambiguity of the relationship between the federation and its largest republic, Serbia, provided Milošević with a possibility to prolong his tenure without formally amending the constitution. In chapter 3 earlier I discussed various strategies that presidents employ in order to remain in office. The option chosen by President Milošević falls under Strategy VII — "offices' swap." Such possibility can present itself after one's country has modified its territorial structure, gained a new territory or lost part of its territory. Such a change often necessitates a revision of the constitution, which in turn could trigger a new election for a *different* presidential office. First, however, similarly to his post-Soviet peers, Milošević argued that the second term for which he was elected in 1992 should have been construed as his first because of the "objective circumstances" — the dissolution of the state. Thus, in April 1997 one of Milošević's supporters, law professor Ratko Marković, pointed out that the president should be eligible for another term since his first lasted only two years and was terminated in 1992 when early elections were called. However, this proposal was never acted upon, either because the ruler still wanted to preserve his reputation and an easier solution — federal office — was available instead, or because of the considerable mobilization of political opposition displayed in street rallies earlier and whose wrath a possible third term could have provoked, or both

(Thomson 1999, 337).

Instead, Milošević orchestrated his own indirect election as the president of the FRY for a single four-year term on July 15, 1997. Lukic (2005) points out that with Milošević becoming the president of FRY, political power shifted from the Serbian presidency, now assumed by the interim president Dragan Tomić, and later by Milan Milutinović — both loyal lieutenants — to the federal presidency. Notably, Milošević made no constitutional amendments or institutional changes to empower the federal presidency, he simply utilized relevant articles Page 127 of the FRY constitution in his favor — in a highly deinstitutionalized polity the main institution that mattered was Milošević himself. In advance of his takeover of a federal presidency, in the spring of 1997 Milošević reappointed key figures from his republican cabinet to the federal level, especially those with enforcement portfolios, and relied on previously dormant article 136, which gave the Yugoslav president powers over hiring and firing in the army, in order to maintain control over enforcement ministries (Lukic 2005, 60–61).

Thus, for the first time, in 1997 Milošević extended his mandate into 2001, but he had much more ambitious designs. Once the president even lashed out in anger at his own supporter: “what concern is it of yours how long I rule? I will rule as long as I want to” (Quoted in Stevanovic 2004, 179). As I demonstrate below, an exit from office was becoming increasingly dangerous to the president as his tenure progressed, both because of the manner of wealth acquisition of his family and because of his own personal immunity concerns in nonfinancial matters.

Soon after Milošević's taking office, a narrow coalition coalesced around him composed of high-ranking party officials, directors of public and para-state enterprises, and bankers. These individuals were able to derive enormous wealth for themselves from the unreformed state-dominated economy (Miljukovic and Hoare 2007, 195). The majority of the largest companies were state-owned; and as late as in 1998 only 37 percent of the economy was still in the private sector (Miljukovic and Hoare 2007, 196). The rents were collected from import monopolies, through fiscal manipulations, embezzlement, and various currency and black market exchange premium operations. A large and unreformed public sector permitted members of the inner circle that controlled state enterprises and banks to build personal fortunes. Indeed, through a process of stalled privatization and renationalization, or limited privatization rigged in favor of close supporters or even themselves, ruling party elites were able to “convert their political power into economic control, property, and personal wealth” (Cohen 2002, 177).

Milošević and his immediate coalition were apparently able to build personal fortunes while in office. An investigative report by a US publication revealed that the closest members of Milošević's inner circle — the so-called ministers-managers that headed the most important state companies — routinely syphoned off the proceeds from these companies to their own private accounts.⁵ The regime cronies had access to the restricted information on “currency devaluation, extremely favorable credits, and hard-to-get import licenses.” Many of these individuals were also connected “with smaller ‘private’ firms through which state capital leaks into private hands.”⁶ For instance, Page 128 Dragan Tomić, the parliamentary speaker, was also the director of *Jugopetrol*, the state oil and gas monopoly. All reports about corruption in Serbia at that time indicate that fuel-smuggling was a multi-million dollar business throughout the 1990s, so whoever was in charge of fuel imports' monopoly could also make riches trading scarce gas on a black market. Likewise, Deputy Prime Minister Slobodan Radulović directed a grocery chain on the side.⁷ In turn, Milošević's secret services oversaw illegal street money exchange throughout the country, and public officials and close businessmen had access to these currency operations.⁸

Corruption was rampant. For instance, in 1996 the sale of half of the state-run Serbia telecoms company was agreed upon with the foreign buyers for DM 1.6 billion, however even the cabinet ministers were unable to see the contract of sale. In the end, some of the proceeds were simply directed to pay for public salaries and pensions, while considerable amounts were channeled to the private bank accounts the world over and never seen again (Miljukovic and Hoare 2007, 210–11).

Milošević's family was personally involved in the very lucrative cigarette smuggling business during the war, facilitated by the secret service and customs, profiting on the order of dozens, if not hundreds, of millions of US dollars.⁹ The president's son, Marko Milošević, reportedly had links with the criminal gangs, as well as various

interests in duty-free shops, discos, stores, gyms, and internet companies.¹⁰

President Milošević himself was apparently very well off, as indicated by the number of properties he and his family held in the most desirable locations.¹¹ Miljukovic and Hoare (2007, 196) point out that the basis of Milošević's survival was his personal control over financial resources, which was only possible in a system not governed by “genuine private ownership of property.” Indeed, various cronies that capitalized on their political connections reportedly came to refer to the president as “the Boss”: the estimates suggest that Milošević's family accumulated a fortune of around USD 1.1 billion (Stevanovic 2004, 89). Under the president's direct order, a branch of *Beogradaska Bank* was established in Southern Cyprus to facilitate money transfers out of Yugoslavia. According to various estimates, at least USD 1.2 billion and perhaps as much as USD 12 billion moved through Southern Cyprus in the 1992–2000 period. Other jurisdictions, including Switzerland, Russia and Lebanon, were also used to launder the money. While some of these funds were channelled to buy weapons and materials in avoidance of UN sanctions, a lot disappeared into private accounts and cannot be traced back.¹²

Clearly, the president and his closest coalition had a lot to lose Page 129 financially should their champion have had to depart from office. Given the size of the public sector in the country, alternative private careers with comparable monetary rewards for the president and other politicians were not easily available. Even more ominous for the president was the fact that he was almost certainly guaranteed criminal prosecution in the future, if not for corruption and abuse of office, then for his involvement in wars in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Kosovo. Indeed, as early as 1996, prior to his 1997 tenure extension, it was reported in the media that the UN War Crimes Tribunal began gathering evidence against Milošević (Cohen 2002, 249). The extent of his involvement, and his exact responsibilities for the crimes committed against civilians in the 1990s, given the protracted proceedings by the tribunal in 2001–6 (see below) will probably be never known. However, the level of coordination between the federal army, which was formally under Milošević's command, the Bosnian Serbs' forces, as well as various paramilitary units, was considerable, especially in the early 1990s.

In the street rally in 2000, the president's main rival, Koštunica, pointed out that the incumbent president was the key problem for the country and that only after his departure were profound changes possible: “Slobodan Milošević does not want to step down. He is the Sun King, the King who said: ‘après moi le déluge.’ Today our state is being destroyed and flooded and is sinking under him” (quoted in Cohen 2002, 434). Milošević was urged to step down repeatedly. Thus, as early as 1992, federal Prime Minister Panić urged the president to leave for exile and promised “comfortable positions and income” (quoted in Cohen 2002, 211). In 1999, however, the prospect of criminal prosecution, should the president ever have lost office, became certain when on May 27, 1999, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) indicted Milošević for war crimes and crimes against humanity.¹³ The majority of Serbian politicians that opposed the regime were dismayed at this development, believing that the negotiated exit from office for Milošević was no longer possible as any immunity guarantees would not be credible. For instance, the former army chief of staff remarked at the time: “the international community made a big contribution here by not leaving them a way out. They publicly proclaimed Milošević and four others war criminals. If there are changes here they will have to face the music. The prospect of this frightens them” (quoted in Cohen 2002, 417).

Indeed, following the indictment and the NATO bombing campaign in 1999, Milošević was left little to lose, and his regime descended into a serious degree of lawlessness (Ramet 2002, 343–44). In late 1999–2000 Page 130 a series of high-profile assassinations, disappearances, and assassination attempts on cabinet ministers, party leaders and crime lords swept the country (Ramet 2002, 344). Whether the killings were carried out on the order of the president, his lieutenants, or other actors is not entirely clear given the opaque relationship between paramilitary groups, criminals and politicians in Serbia at that time. However, it is not implausible that the president and his inner circle decided to burn the bridges. For instance, the former Serbian leader Ivan Stambolić disappeared in August 2000 and his body was only discovered after the fall of Milošević. While the reasons for his assassination were not revealed, it is quite likely that, because Stambolić was the head of one of the key banks in the 1990s, he knew too much about financial dealings of the regime insiders (Miljukovic and Hoare 2007, 219).

Early in 2000 new threats to the president's future immunity might also have come from another corner: after

president of Croatia Franco Tudjman's death in December 1999 and the subsequent victory of the opposition at the polls in that country, rumors emerged that the late president had taped all the meetings with his Serbian counterpart in the early 1990s when they reportedly made secret deals about the division of Bosnia, and that these tapes were available (Stevanovic 2004, 177–78).

Since the 1992 FRY constitution stipulated a single four-year term, the president would have had to step down in 2001, barring changes. Facing a certain prison cell or worse, in 2000 the president could make only one choice, to attempt to remain in office no matter what. Caring less about the appearances of legality than he did in 1997 when a third term was sidestepped, in 2000 Milošević was more decisive. He chose not to transfer back to the republican level and instead opted to extend his tenure at the FRY level. In 2000 the president could still rely on his party, legislative majority support, and compliant courts. The decision was legitimated on July 6, 2000, when the federal parliament approved a constitutional amendment to replace articles 97 and 98 that would now allow a direct presidential election for a four-year term, renewable once. Also, even though President Milošević could have had a new election in 2001, he decided to hold elections in September 24, 2000, and, remarkably, lost — with dire personal consequences.¹⁴

The reasons behind the Serbian revolution — as the post-election protests came to be known — in 2000 and how the opposition overcame the challenges are discussed elsewhere (e.g., Thompson and Kuntz 2004). Even after his abysmal electoral performance the president could have turned the tables in his favor. Despite the opposition candidate Koštunica's clear lead in the polls, the electoral commission announcedPage 131 that the latter failed to obtain the majority. It was not immediately clear whether a new run-off would be called, or results would be annulled altogether. Also, Milošević could have still transferred back to the Serbian presidency (Cohen 2002, 442). At it turned out, all these designs were moot in the face of determined street rallies and elite defections. Following the blatantly biased October 4 Court's ruling that annulled the election and declared a new election to be held sometime before the end of the president's mandate in 2001, on October 5 government buildings were suddenly stormed while the army and police stood back and the regime simply imploded. The following day Milošević had to acknowledge defeat.

In the sweeping political changes after his exit from power, any designs for a possible political afterlife proved futile for Milošević. In spring 2001 the former leader was arrested in Belgrade and charged with abuse of office and embezzlement by the national court. In late June 2001, however, hoping to placate international donors, Serbian authorities finally had Milošević extradited to the international court and placed under the jurisdiction of ICTY. Likewise, Milošević's son Marko and wife Mira Marković, who left Serbia in 2000 and 2003, respectively, were later charged with abuse of office and smuggling, among other things. Both were granted asylum in Russia in 2008, however.

On February 12, 2002, a trial of Milošević began in the Hague. Milošević was charged on the basis of individual criminal responsibility and superior criminal responsibility and accused of participating in a joint criminal enterprise and war crimes, crimes against humanity, breaches of the Geneva Convention and even genocide.¹⁵ The former president elected to represent himself and virulently denied any wrongdoing. The proceedings were frequently interrupted because of his declining health, however, and on March 11, 2006, the former president had passed away in prison before the completion of proceedings.

The case of President Milošević's struggle to remain in office underlines a very simple fact: whatever the degree of opposition that he encountered throughout his tenure, which was not insignificant considering very serious threats to his authority in 1992 and in 1996–97, and the fact that Milošević was one of only three presidents in the 1960–2009 period that ever lost election following tenure change, sometime after 1996 the only alternative for him was to remain in office in order to avoid certain prosecution. The fact that he was the party founder of his own party permitted Milošević to rely on its legislative support throughout his rule, even when his popularity at the polls plummeted. The president, his family and his close inner Page 132 circle obtained considerable monetary rewards from holding, and access to, political office. Fearing for his personal assets and immunity, the president chose to remain in power as long as possible and thereby stalled the democratic development of his nation.

President Kuchma (1994–2004) of Ukraine

When President Kuchma (1994–2004) was re-elected in 1999 for his second and last term in office, the countdown to the 2004 departure from power began.¹⁶ What was at stake? As I discuss below, the value of holding office for the president of Ukraine, due to a very high probability of redistribution and prosecution after his scheduled departure, was rather high for him to dismiss the idea of extension out of hand. Given the extensive and rather opaque privatization of public enterprises that in all likelihood benefited the president, his closest associates and his relatives, and considering the widely disseminated allegations of corruption and politically motivated disappearances in which the president was personally implicated, both the magnitude of the value of holding political office and the probability of immunity and redistribution were very plausible factors affecting this leader's reluctance to step down.

Similarly to Miloš evi , Kuchma was personally, alongside his closest associates, implicated in bribe taking, money laundering and political assassinations during his second term. The so-called Kuchmagate scandal that broke in 2000-2001 and that implicated the sitting president in various crimes was well covered by international media at the time and later.¹⁷ The scandal provoked mass demonstrations, and President Kuchma's ratings sank to the bottom. Unlike Miloš evi , however, the second president of Ukraine did not burn all his bridges behind him, as I explain below.

Given the seriousness of the accusations against the president that followed the Kuchmagate, and the possible expropriation of his and his closest allies' assets, to step down without taking any precautions to secure his future immunity would have been an extremely risky strategy. As the post-electoral re-privatization campaign launched in 2005 by the new government of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko showed, such concerns were not unfounded. Likewise, the new probes into unsolved criminal cases that implicated top officials, including the president himself, were launched almost immediately once President Kuchma stepped down in 2005.¹⁸ Therefore, almost certainly, the president had to take into account his probable fate after leaving office.

Page 133

Ukrainian economy suffered from a high degree of political interference and corruption, at levels similar to, or perhaps worse than, its neighbors.¹⁹ During the president's tenure a series of questionable privatization schemes had been implemented in which several businessmen with access to the state became very wealthy.²⁰ As Darden (2008, 48) describes, the “Kuchmagate” tapes indicated that a sizable part of the rents generated by corrupt officials went directly to accounts held by the president and other high officials. One of the most notorious examples that illustrates the magnitude of spoils available to the politically connected was the late privatization of a highly profitable Ukrainian metal giant, *Krivorozhstal*, on June 14, 2004. The tender was awarded to a business group with close links to the president, for a sum of USD 804 million, that was only slightly above the initial asking price of USD 717 million.²¹ Following President Kuchma's departure, the results of the privatization were annulled. On October 24, 2005, *Krivorozhstal* was sold to the international conglomerate Mittal Steel for a record amount of USD 4.79 billion, which was 20 percent higher than all the income that Ukrainian authorities gained in the entire privatization period.²² This was also six times the amount received by the state for the same enterprise in 2004.

While the extent of rents skimmed from the economy by politicians and oligarchs connected with the president cannot be adequately estimated, it is arguably comparable to the magnitude of rents collected in the most corrupt regimes. Kar and Curcio (2011, 40–41) estimate that the amount of illicit financial outflows from Ukraine was USD 9.2 billion per year in the 2000-2008 period — a capital flight of approximately 11 percent of annual GDP, with 12.6 billion for 2004 alone. To place it in perspective, roughly USD 50 billion of annual capital flight in Russia, which is the second worst offender in terms of the total magnitude of outflows, accounts for 8 percent of its GDP. It is hardly possible to pinpoint or to even provide interval estimates of the precise amount of such spoils. Even if the president himself did not benefit directly, his closest coalition and relatives certainly did. For example, in early 2008 the daughter of by then former president Kuchma, Olena Franchuk, was reported to have acquired the most expensive property in London ever, valued at the staggering sum of USD 160 million.²³ The magnitude of spoils and the extent of political rents associated with the opaque public finances and widespread privatization

that were all likely to accrue to the top politicians including the president, as well as various allegations about the president's involvement in corruption, disappearances and assassinations that rendered his immunity and status in private life very difficult, all point out that the stakes of losing Page 134 office were extremely high.

It is hard to assess whether the experience of fellow rulers provided any cues for the president; there were not many ex presidents in the region in the first place. The fate of a previous Ukrainian ruler, first President Kravchuk (1991–94) who lost the election in 1994 and since then kept a low profile as a parliamentarian, was favorable, however. In fact, in 2010, while discussing the fate of Kyrgyzstan's President Bakiyev (2005–10) who was ousted and forced into exile earlier that year, Leonid Kravchuk pointed to the example of Ukraine, which had had three ex-presidents by then, and alluded to the ability of former presidents to walk the streets unmolested as a *prima facie* indicator of democracy.²⁴ More ominous for the second Ukrainian president, and probably a better cue about his own fate as perceived at the time, was the fate of the former prime minister Lazarenko who generated considerable wealth in the 1990s and was later indicted in the USA for corruption.²⁵

If the stakes of losing office were probably very high, what could have prevented the ruler from staying in office? As argued earlier in [chapter 3](#), presidents that attempt to perpetuate themselves in power should be able to have the acquiescence of their own party, they also have to secure agreement from the legislature and courts, and they must be able to implement change in referendum or win elections to follow. As it happened, President Kuchma faced serious obstacles on several counts.

The 1996 constitution established a strong presidency empowered with a legislative veto authority, executive decree powers and various prerogatives over appointments and dismissals, including over the prime minister (D'Anieri 2003; Herron 2002; Protsyk and Wilson 2003). However, in contrast to the majority of the post-Soviet regimes, Ukraine featured a much less unified political elite. The opposing actors often controlled different branches of government, and the president repeatedly clashed with the parliament and his prime ministers. The legislature, however fragmented, was often capable of defending its prerogatives, and the judiciary was willing, albeit not very often, to rule against the president (Brown and Wise 2004). Second, early privatization of numerous and potentially lucrative public industries triggered the emergence of a number of distinct business interests that were sometimes loosely affiliated with several oligarchic clans, and which in turn underpinned political competition. These clans and groups sought representation in the executive and legislature in order to ensure further rents and economic opportunities in a self-enforcing spiral (Wilson 2006). Thus, elite support was never guaranteed for the Page 135 president's political initiatives.

Also, in contrast with other post-Soviet regimes where presidential elections rarely featured a second round since the mid-1990s, Ukrainian elections have always had a second round, indicating a serious degree of contestation. Indeed, in 1999 President Kuchma was re-elected only in a second round with 56.25 percent cast against 37.8 cast for his challenger. Also, the Ukrainian president faced a rather strong parliament and vibrant political opposition, especially at the end of his second term. Indeed, after the 2002 Parliamentary elections, the pro-presidential block, *For a United Ukraine*, obtained only 101 seats out of total 450. Two right-of-center opposition blocks, *Our Ukraine (Nasha Ukraina, or NU)* with 101 seats, headed by the former prime minister Victor Yushchenko, and Yulia Tymoshenko Block (*BYT*) with 19 seats, dominated on the right. The communists (*KPU*) with 59 seats, and the socialists (*SPU*), fiercely opposed to the president, with 20 seats, represented the left. The center was ill-defined and elusive (Hale 2010; Protsyk and Wilson 2003; Wilson 1999). Still, many nominally independent MPs supported the president, providing him with the overall legislative majority.

In the context of Ukrainian politics, what could the president do in order to protect his personal and financial security? Any possible ambitions of running for a third term were probably ruined by the combination of Kuchmagate and his declining popularity, but they were not entirely off the table. Indeed, on December 25, 2003, the Constitutional Court ruled that president's second term could also be construed as his first.²⁶ However, the ruling was never acted upon, and in all likelihood its purpose was only to intimidate parliamentarians into voting for constitutional reform, to which we will turn shortly.

The Ukrainian economy was also dependent on European markets, and many among the elite aspired to eventual

EU membership, thus potentially increasing international leverage over domestic politics. Ukraine's reliance on foreign aid from the United States and the EU,²⁷ as well as the imperative of various business groups to gain legitimacy of their capital in the West, rendered the possibility of extending the president's term highly uncertain. Indeed, in 2004, exports of goods and services were on the magnitude of 61 percent of GDP, or USD 28.5 billion, with the EU as the Ukrainian largest trade partner. In 2005, after the elections, Leonid Kuchma elaborated why he did not entertain the possibility of running for the third term: "I decided for myself from the very beginning: a third term was not an option. I am a realist. I did not want to make Ukraine into pariah state in the democratic world."²⁸

Page 136

One possibility for the president was to find a strong and loyal successor who would be capable of defeating a challenger that was sure to emerge and of guaranteeing immunity for the president's various misdeeds in office. However, if a president lacks confidence in his successor, from a personal point of view he or she will be better off trying to prolong the stay in power or finding a way to make a binding contract with the successor to guarantee immunity in the political afterlife. Ukraine in 2004 did not have a ruling hegemonic party that could have protected the president's interests or enabled him to exert influence after departure. Instead, the pro-presidential parties of the center were affiliated with various business interests and were extremely fragmented (Protsyk and Wilson 2003).

Another possibility was to launch a constitutional reform and to have the parliament elect the president, as Miloš evi had in 1997, thus rendering personal unpopularity irrelevant given majority support in the parliament, or to weaken the future president, whoever it was to be, and transfer the bulk of executive powers into the hands of the prime minister. President Kuchma could have become prime minister himself or, having secured a weaker presidency, could have orchestrated politics from behind the scenes.

The constitutional reform that President Kuchma initiated in 2002 can only be understood in the context of presidential succession and the ruler's concerns over his future. The process of this reform also allowed the president a certain flexibility in trying several succession strategies. In August 2002, President Kuchma outlined his vision of Ukraine as a parliamentary-presidential republic. The first version of reform,²⁹ if implemented, would have introduced a much stronger prime minister and legislature.³⁰ Another bill to have the parliament elect the president, proposed under the auspices of the same constitutional reform by a member of a pro-presidential majority, was quashed on the grounds that it contravened the clauses on the separation of powers.³¹ If the proposed reform had been successful, the president could have become a prime minister and thus remained in power, albeit in a different capacity;³² or, at least, he could have weakened his successor making contracting and affinity with him less important; if the latter strategy were to become unsuccessful, the fourth possibility was to designate a successor and make sure the latter won. Indeed, President Kuchma tried all four possibilities in the period between 2002 and the end of 2004.³³

In order to carry out constitutional changes, the president had to assemble a majority in the parliament that would approve the bill. The pro-presidential coalition commanded a majority, so passing it in the Page 137 first reading proved to be easy. Second, a constitutional proposal had to withstand the scrutiny of the Constitutional court, which it did. In the subsequent session it had to be endorsed by a supermajority of 2/3 of the MPs, 300 out of 450. Assembling a supermajority proved to be very difficult due to the considerable numbers of opposing deputies both on the political left and right, as explained earlier. However, it was not seen as impossible either, as the proposed increase in the powers of the parliament could have swayed many MPs.

If the president wanted to have his bill passed, he had to co-opt the opposition on the left (*KPU* and *SPU* with 79 seats), or to co-opt more numerous opposition forces on the center-right (*NU* and *BYT* with 120 seats). Since the leader of center-right, Yushchenko, was the top-running candidate for the forthcoming 2004 elections, for them the support for reform was tantamount to weakening the presidency that their champion was expected to win. Instead, the pro-presidential majority, including independent MPs, assembled along with the *KPU* and *SPU* factions that traded their agreement to the amendment in exchange for a fully proportional electoral system. On

April 8, 2004, the parliament held a crucial vote.³⁴ To the surprise of many observers, the bill failed, as only 294 MPs, six short of the required 300 majority, endorsed it.³⁵

After a crucial vote on April 8, 2004, and with chances for a positive result rapidly diminishing, President Kuchma had no choice but to endorse his successor, Prime Minister Yanukovych, for the presidency. He did so on April 14. If the outgoing president wanted to make sure his handpicked successor was able to defeat a very popular challenger, a mere endorsement was hardly enough: his successor had to be able to manipulate elections if necessary and to suppress likely protests. The outgoing president could have transferred the command of police and security forces to his prime minister prior to the election, however, becoming a lame duck himself. Instead President Kuchma decided to retain command over the executive to the very last day in office. After the election he explained: “I am disappointed that the reform was agreed upon so late. If it had been approved in the first attempt, the events that unfolded would never have happened.... I don't know what they mean [by accusing Kuchma of betraying his successor]. It seems what they mean is that I did not transfer my authority to Yanukovych prior to elections. There were people who suggested I should do so.”³⁶

It appears that the outgoing president — either because of a lack of confidence in the ability of his designated successor to defeat a popular challenger or in his successor's ability to guarantee his own interests and that of his closest allies — preferred the constitutional reform Page 138 irrespective of who was to succeed him. Also, as some reports suggested at the time, from a perspective of a future private citizen, soon-to-be former President Kuchma, as well as those Ukrainian oligarchs whose business interests did not necessarily coincide with those of the Donetsk group behind the prime minister and successor designate, Yanukovych as president would have been no less a risk than Yushchenko himself.³⁷ Instead, President Kuchma did not transfer his executive authority to the chosen successor, did not retire in advance and, to some extent, contributed to a situation of parity between the two candidates; he chose to retain control over the executive for as long as possible in order to be able to negotiate with the strongest candidate at the latest possible date.

The electoral campaign itself has been held in a highly charged atmosphere (OSCE 2004), and culminated in an inconclusive first round on October 31, 2004, followed by a second on November 21, when the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) declared preliminary tallies that showed Yanukovych to be the apparent winner, ahead by 3 percent. Supporters of Yushchenko immediately occupied Kyiv's Main Square to demand a recount, yet very shortly the CEC declared Yanukovych the official winner. At this stage, hundreds of thousands of Yushchenko's supporters commanded the streets and were on the brink of storming government buildings. On November 25, 2004, the Supreme Court however agreed to delay certification of the results. The situation remained uncertain as the president's closest advisers allegedly called on him to suppress the demonstrations using brute force.³⁸

However, President Kuchma opted not to suppress the protests and to press for constitutional change yet again. A note on the likely motivation of Kuchma to promote constitutional amendments in the heat of a crisis is necessary. Indeed, one might think that it would be easier for the president to negotiate immunity with a strong president, whether Yanukovych or Yushchenko, since a stronger president would be better positioned to guarantee a former president's immunity than a weaker one. There are several plausible explanations as to why the president pushed for the constitutional reform instead. With no law on perpetual presidential immunity, Kuchma was vulnerable under any circumstances, with or without reform. Besides, as far as the major oligarchs were concerned, reform could have somewhat protected their interests in a post-Kuchma world. It would also have been easier to negotiate with dispersed rather than concentrated powers. Perceiving that Yanukovych was losing, Kuchma could have also hoped to weaken a future presidency, expecting the new government to be in disarray in the following months up to the parliamentary elections in 2006.³⁹

Page 139

Also, while the majority of oligarchs supported the candidacy of Yanukovych, many supported his opponent, and some supported both. Thus, Ihor Kolomoyski from Dnepropetrovsk backed Yushchenko, while Rinat Akhmetov, the wealthiest Ukrainian businessman from Donetsk, bankrolled the campaign of Yanukovych, while his co-owner of the *Krivorozhstal*, Pinchuk, hedged his bets. While these sponsors certainly had their preferred candidates,

because of oligarchs' reputational concerns and the inability of either of these candidates to guarantee property rights after the elections, they were not interested in victory at any cost. In the event of a stalemate they would rather renegotiate a contract that would divide or weaken the executive, whoever it might be. Polish mediators recalled that during the crisis, Kuchma and his officials as well as the major oligarchs, Pinchuk and Akhmetov, first suggested sharing the executive authority. The idea of a legislative vote to be held both on constitutional amendments and on electoral reform was also proposed by an official connected with the Donetsk business group.⁴⁰

It is conceivable that the incumbent president did not order a crackdown because he was losing control over the security forces and perceived that his order would not be obeyed.⁴¹ However, President Kuchma also clearly saw the personal consequences of a violent crackdown: "As a result of a violent crackdown blood would have spilt for sure. Under no circumstances I could accept that. Every drop of blood would have tainted only one person — the acting President."⁴² The US State Department made clear that President Kuchma would be personally responsible and that those who caused bloodshed would be prosecuted, their assets abroad would be seized, and they would be sought as criminals.⁴³ Both the US Secretary of State Powell and President George W. Bush made several calls to President Kuchma, linking his post-tenure fate with his conduct during elections.

During a round table meeting on December 1, the outgoing president and the two candidates signed a declaration in which they discussed the possibility of voting on a package bill that included both constitutional reform and amendments to electoral laws to prevent electoral fraud. The leader of the pro-democratic opposition could only win under the revised electoral rules guaranteeing a transparent process, which in turn could only be possible with his faction's support for constitutional reform. He had to, therefore, agree to the amendments. On December 8, 2004, a 402-majority approved the so-called package bill that endorsed constitutional reform that would weaken the future president.⁴⁴ On December 26, 2004, Yushchenko indeed obtained a 52 percent majority in that third round, an 8 percent margin of victory over his opponent. Page 140 Kuchma preserved his reputation and the balance between competing oligarchic groups, and increased the chances of post-tenure immunity.⁴⁵ After elections, the former president calmly contemplated his situation: "I can look straight into my people's eyes because I can give an account of everything I did. It is absolutely absurd for me to be afraid of any legal action. Of course, I cannot exclude that some attempts will be made, but I look upon it philosophically."⁴⁶

In retrospect, it is clear that the president, unable either to step down, come what may, or to remain for a third term, pursued a combination of strategies in between these two options. The president relied on a constitutional reform to transform Ukraine into a parliamentary-presidential republic. This reform allowed him certain flexibility in pursuing several institutional options in turn. The deputies affiliated with the president proposed to elect the president by parliament, yet failed (VII). Then, the president attempted to synchronize the elections and thereby postpone his succession (VIII), or to become a powerful prime minister should reform be enacted (VII). Having failed to implement that as well, he still relied on this reform to weaken the next president and lower the stakes of succession (VII and II). Finally, he designated his successor (II) but did not ensure the latter's election. The president was unable to rely on a strong political party to guarantee his status after departure because the so-called pro-presidential majority parties first and foremost represented the often conflicting interests of various regional and business groups. There was also considerable uncertainty over the ability of his successor to win and to guarantee the former president's interests and those of his winning coalition. Overall, the president pursued a very interesting strategy of attempting to extend his power, or at least to step down with his immunity and wealth intact, by incrementally implementing several options between 2002 and the very end of 2004. The escalating reputational costs arising from the continuing support of his successor forced him to choose an institutionally weaker challenger instead. The president however was able to steer the succession crisis according to his preferences and to engineer the binding contract between his competing successors via a constitutional reform.

Whether a deal on immunity had been made with the outgoing president or not was not revealed in the aftermath of the 2004 election. The former ruler argued that "the insinuations about some sort of agreement with Victor Andreevich Yushchenko in order to ensure the latter's victory was nonsense. We were both politicians, and we had always had a serious political relationship. What actually happened was exactly what everyone observed."⁴⁷ There is widespread acknowledgment, Page 141 however, that the president did receive guarantees of personal

immunity by Yushchenko in the presence of international mediators, and that the new president personally instructed the prosecutor-general not to indict the former ruler.⁴⁸ After his stepping down from power, Kuchma retired from public life and focused on running his own foundation, the “Leonid Kuchma Presidential Foundation Ukraine.” Also, all the major oligarchic groups that emerged during President Kuchma's reign remained intact. After the brief attempt by Prime Minister Tymoshenko in the first half of 2005 to reverse earlier privatization, there was no redistribution of private oligarchs on any significant scale.

Presidents Masire (1980–98) and Mogae (1998–2008) of Botswana

In contrast to the abysmal economic performance and frequent experiences with long-standing presidents that routinely subvert constitutions and attempt to rule for life throughout Africa (e.g., Van de Walle 2001), Botswana's stellar economic growth and political stability, as well as its unusual practice of presidents departing from office in an orderly manner, present a case that attracted considerable scholarly attention (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003; Leith 2005; Samatar 1999). In a widely cited paper about the exceptionalism of Botswana, Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson (2003, 84) trace the country's economic prosperity and stability — uncommon in Africa — to its robust institutions. Their argument is that institutional stability depends on the strength and inclusiveness of precolonial tribal institutions, in turn facilitated by low penetration of British colonialism in Botswana, by its ethnic homogeneity, by the fact that economic and tribal elites, such as “cattle owners and chiefs, were politically powerful,” and by “important and far-sighted decisions” made by political leaders, such as Presidents Khama and Masire. Consequently, according to this explanation, these conditions influenced the preferences of political leaders that chose to protect the institutions of private property. Poteete (2009) qualifies this argument and points out that similar preindependence institutions were present in other colonies, that ethnic peace was not a given in Botswana since important cleavages existed there, and instead underlines the role of coalition-building between politicians and farmers. Other scholars are more critical of Botswana's democratic accomplishments (e.g., Good 1992) and its economic performance (e.g., Auty 2001).

My aim is not to revisit the literature on Botswana's exceptionalism Page 142 but simply to underline the possible reasons that render this country's presidents' departures from office easy, in contrast to other regimes. The existing checks and balances simply cannot adequately explain leaders' behavior in Botswana, as I point out below. Because of its robust system of property rights protection and strong private sector, as well as the fact that the majority of political elites are also wealthy cattle owners, seeking rents while in office was never that paramount for economic advancement in Botswana as it was in other African countries. Also, while the ruling party, *BDP*, has remained in power since independence in 1966, its leaders never had to resort to repression and human rights abuses that would have made their immunity problematic after departure from office. The strong cohesiveness of the political elite, cemented by the presence of the hegemonic party, *BDP*, ensured the possibility of smooth leaders' transitions, and for departing presidents, the very low stakes of losing office.

At independence, livestock was the key economic sector in Botswana; members of the political elite by and large consisted of tribal chiefs and other important cattle owners (Samatar 1999, 13). Thus, political actors were comparably wealthy and had a personal stake in preserving private property. The founding father of Botswana, Seretse Khama, enjoyed traditional legitimacy as the chief of the largest tribe (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003); he was also the largest cattle owner in the country (Parsons, Henderson and Tlou 1995, 188; Samatar 1999, 7, 51). In fact, the majority of the ruling class hailed from the private sector as large or medium cattle-owners (Samatar 1999, 69–70). After independence, the transfer of tribal land into private ownership, facilitated by the land board, was managed fairly and efficiently. It is therefore not surprising that cattle owners and political actors, including the president, had common interests in creating stable institutions and protecting the competitiveness of the beef industry. For instance, the majority of commissioners in the state-run Botswana Meat Commission that was in charge of the beef exports were cattle owners, and even politicians and civil servants, — members of the same commission — owned herds (Samatar 1999, 114–17).

Arguably, in Botswana the access to political office was important not because it could bring financial rewards, but because it could assist in managing of what political actors already had. Leaders also led a comparably frugal life in office. Thus, in the biography of Seretse Khama, William Henderson quotes the president who on meeting

his peer African presidents, noted that “although he was a capitalist, he was the only member of the front line team to come to a meeting in a hired rather than private plane.”⁴⁹ Even though Botswana was not able to avoid corruption fully, with some politicians profiting from rigged procurement practices (Good and Taylor 2006, 55), it was however able to set up relatively strong institutions to tackle it, such as the directorate on corruption and economic crime, the public procurement and asset disposal board, as well as the office of ombudsman, and no reports or allegations of grand corruption involving its presidents ever surfaced. Indeed, the control of corruption in Botswana is widely applauded.⁵⁰ Kar and Curcio (2011, 40–41) estimate that the amount of illicit financial outflows from Botswana was only USD 0.3 billion per year in 2000–2008 — approximately 3.5 percent of annual GDP. In contrast, Nigeria lost 14.5 billion per year, or 14 percent of its annual GDP in the same period. The system-level intolerance of corruption can also be traced back to personal influence and preferences of the first President Seretse Khama (Parsons, Henderson and Tlou 1995). The fact that Botswana did not succumb to resource curse a decade after independence when significant revenues from diamond industry found their way into the state coffers is equally unusual. While reasons for the efficient management of diamond rents are plenty (see, e.g., Auty 2001), the fact that the *BDP* coalition could prevail in free elections repeatedly also ensured that political actors had long horizons and could avoid the temptations of spending these proceeds quickly.

In addition, the political elite was very cohesive and very small, and had similar upbringing with a considerable number receiving education in the West (Sebudubudu and Molutsi 2009). Likewise, the incumbent presidents and their prospective successors had considerable affinity with each other. Altogether, Botswana has had four presidents since 1996. The founding father, Seretse Khama (1966–80), did not have limits on his tenure and died in office. His successor, Quett Masire (1980–98), was a co-founder of the ruling party, *BDP*. Prior to assuming the presidential office, Masire also served as vice-president and, as the architect of economic growth, held the key portfolio of finance and planning. In 1998 President Masire honored the recently imposed term limits and stepped down.⁵¹ After Masire resigned in March 1998, his vice-president, Festus Mogae, temporarily assumed office, only to be formally elected for presidency in October 1999. In turn, as president, Festus Mogae (1998–2008) himself granted the same period of a year and a half to his own successor, Ian Khama. In his last speech to the *BPD* party congress, Mogae underlined, “There can be no doubt that our succession plan is a distinctive hallmark of our political stability. Elsewhere, in times of leadership transition, there would be murmurs, or even tremors which could result in confusion and chaos. We must be grateful that we do not even have a ripple of disquiet as we change the guard.”⁵²

Thus, since 2008 Botswana has had two former leaders out of office, and these individuals pursued a combination of business activities and international public roles since leaving their office, which is not unlike the former heads of state in mature democracies in the West would have. Quett Masire, who after leaving office managed his cattle farms, reportedly often referred to himself as “a farmer on loan to politics” (quoted in Poteete 2009, 557). After departure from office he remained very active as an international statesman, serving on various mediating and peacekeeping initiatives, for instance as a chair of the Organization of African Unity panel investigating Rwanda genocide, or leading several election observation missions. He also established Sir Ketumile Masire Foundation in 2007. Similarly to his predecessor, Mogae also turned to various international initiatives, for instance, serving as Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General on Climate Change. Additionally, the status of former leaders in Botswana is institutionalized and maintained to the high standard. Indeed, the Office of the President, which has twelve divisions, formally includes the Office of the former Presidents I & II.⁵³

Certainly, the orderly succession in office and the active role played by former presidents in retirement is facilitated by a strong ruling hegemonic party.⁵⁴ Throughout its rule, the *BDP* coalition was able not only to accommodate tribal chiefs and a small Western-educated elite, but also to ensure traditional rural structures of loyalty (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003). Even though the conduct of elections has been generally fair and the opposition was able to compete without hindrance, the vote shares for *BDP* have remained very high until the late 1980s and only declined with the fall of apartheid in South Africa.

Botswana, despite being a full democracy (Freedom House 2009), and even though it went through two leadership transitions, has not experienced power turnover from one party to another. Indeed, Przeworski et al. (2000, 23) underline that we cannot know whether elites conduct free elections only because they are confident of victory

and whether *BDP* would step down if it loses. The president of Botswana has very extensive powers, and the occupants of this office in the past routinely implemented constitutional amendments that enhanced their powers, such as the indirect presidential election in 1972 or automatic succession of the vice-president in 1998 (Good and Taylor 2006, 53). Despite the declining support at the polls, the ruling party however has maintained the legislative supermajority throughout its history. Clearly, the existing political constraints are not the reason that presidents of Botswana leave office. If the leaders of this country wanted to, they Page 145 most likely would have been able to prolong their stay in power, and neither the ruling party, nor the legislature, nor the judiciary would have opposed them. They simply do not have to remain in that office as the stakes of losing it are quite low.

Conclusion

Using these three illustrative cases, I draw attention to the fact that the existing executive constraints often can provide only part of the explanation of presidents' behavior, and that leaders' personal motives to remain in office can matter at least as much as the institutional constraints on their executive capacity. Similarly to the scholarship that examines how structural economic conditions determine what political elites stand to lose as a group in the event of democratization (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000), I emphasize various personal and structural factors that increased, or limited, what was at stake for presidents of Serbia, Ukraine and Botswana. Based on the estimates of the spoils of office, recollections of political actors, indictments, institutional changes that can be interpreted as driven by leaders' concerns for their immunity, and assets, we can conclude that some leaders simply have no other option but to remain in office no matter what, while other leaders do not have to do that and they find it easier to depart instead. Presidents Miloš evi and Kuchma were clearly motivated by concerns for immunity, and the Ukrainian president even acknowledged it himself in several published interviews. Of the leaders discussed in this chapter, the president of Serbia had the strongest motivation to remain in office at whatever cost, followed by the president of Ukraine, then by the presidents of Botswana. Clearly, we cannot get inside the mind of a sitting president and understand what it is that is at stake when that president has to leave the palace. Still, we can gauge the existence of personal concerns from observed factors, such as the structure of the economy, the extent of corruption and capital flight, the size of the public sector and the human rights abuses.

6

Endogenous Term Limits: Statistical Analyses

In this chapter I bring together the previous discussion of the major obstacles that the presidents have to overcome when they desire political immortality ([chapter 3](#)) and of the value of political office ([chapter 4](#)). The previous chapter explored how the costs and benefits of holding office influenced presidents' behavior in three cases. Here I turn to empirical estimations and attempt to map the costs and benefits of holding office to the observable outcomes of presidents extending their tenure or stepping down. I take several approaches to statistical analyses in this chapter. Following detailed discussion of the operationalization of dependent and independent variables, I estimate how the stakes of losing office increase the probability of attempts to prolong one's stay in power. I examine whether a higher value of holding office manifested in larger size of *Public sector*, of *Government procurement markets* and of *Natural resource rents*, as well as a lower probability of retaining the spoils and immunity after expected exit from office (bad *Previous ruler's fate*, low values of *Contract-intensive money* and the existence of personal *Immunity concerns*), for a given level of constraints, among which I distinguish elite-level constraints, collective action constraints, and international pressure, can explain whether leaders are more likely to take over their regimes and prolong their tenure. Next I turn to separate analyses of the effects of spoils and immunity concerns in democratic and partly democratic regimes, in partly democratic regimes only, and in nondemocratic regimes, in order to gauge whether the logic of costs and benefits of holding office holds in different political regimes.

Results are supportive of the expectations and indicate that in substantive terms the most significant predictors are the size of public sector, protection of property rights, the fate of the previous ruler, [Page 147](#) personal control over president's own party, and democratic constraints. The results are robust to different model specifications, including instrumental-variable probit regression, different measurements of the magnitude of spoils and of immunity, and a different specification of dependent variable. For ease of discussion, the majority of the complementary analyses that gauge the robustness of results are reported in the appendix to this chapter; the variables are described in detail in an online appendix to this book.

In the final section, building on the preceding discussion of various institutional and international constraints in [chapter 3](#), I additionally disaggregate the composite measure of constraints and examine which institutional factors are the most important in deterring the sitting presidents. Results indicate that presidents that manage to extend their stay in office usually face a compliant judiciary, a weaker legislative opposition and a larger number of effective legislative parties, which suggests that these leaders rule in a more institutionally malleable regime. Likewise, leaders are responsive to their international environment, and I find that presidents facing lower linkages with the West, fewer democratic neighbors in the same region, and those that have witnessed numerous examples of successful tenure extensions by their peers, again, in the same region, are more likely to subvert constitutions.

Extending and Stepping Down: The Dependent Variable

In [chapter 3](#) earlier I explained the possible ways that presidents turn to in order to remain in power. In the empirical analyses I simplify the choice of available strategies to two: to extend tenure by whatever means or step down, and construct a binary dependent variable. There are two potential challenges to such a specification. First, it is possible that a small number of presidents that extended for one additional term only were driven by different considerations than their more dictatorial peers, as argued previously. If this is the case the model can be misspecified, and two separate models or the model with multiple outcomes would be more suitable. I address this possibility in the section on robustness in the appendix to this chapter by distinguishing between short-term — those retaining formal limits — and long-term — those that can be extended for unlimited periods — prolongation.

Second, the binary-outcome variable will not distinguish between cases where presidents stepped down without a fight and when they fought to extend their terms and failed. But how can we define an attempt? Observable cases such as the surprising defeat of Hugo Chávez of Venezuela at the 2007 referendum, or the protracted battle for a third term by Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria in 2006, can be easily defined as failed attempts. However, more ambiguous cases such as the discreet backdoor court ruling on Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma's second term as his first, or the initial maneuverings by presidents that probe reaction to possible third-term bids yet subsequently abandon them, are more difficult to identify. It is also conceivable that presidents attempt to cajole their subordinates behind closed doors, but fail. Any specification of the attempt is prone to exclude relevant cases; because of the arbitrariness of classifying attempts, it is easier to group the failed and deterred presidents into one group. However, in the section on robustness, I relax this assumption and examine several attempts as well.

A ruler is coded as having “extended” tenure if he or she modified the length of tenure that was prescribed at entry into office in any manner as described in strategies III–X, [chapter 3](#), and “stepped down” otherwise. To avoid possible errors, I exclude all cases that cannot be interpreted as “staying in” or “leaving” office, as also explained in [Page 149](#) that chapter earlier. The sample includes all presidents that entered office *with* term limits or introduced them during tenure in presidential regimes as defined earlier, *completed* their terms and stepped down, or extended their terms even if they did not step down, in the period between 1960 and 2009. If they entered prior to 1960, I extend coverage to include all years in power. In a few cases where rulers entered unlimited office and subsequently introduced term limits, I count their tenures from the time of this modification. In cases where leaders modified their terms more than once, I include tenure up to the last, most significant extension. The selection therefore excludes those in power that still have a chance to extend their tenure and those that were ousted from office, died, or did not complete their terms for whatever reason and hence could not extend terms even if they wanted to. This is a conservative selection as it can conceivably exclude those that tried to extend their tenure but were ousted. There are 209 presidents altogether in the 1960–2009 period, whether they extended their terms or stepped down; 60 presidents extended their terms — 32 of them extended for “long” periods — and 149 did not.

The Explanatory Variables

The Value of Holding Political Office

As argued in [chapter 4](#), the value of holding political office can be seen as a combination of the *magnitude* of the income-generating potential of this office and the *probability of retaining assets and immunity* after exit. Greater stakes of losing office, for a given level of constraints, *the executive capacity*, increase the probability of tenure extensions. Below I explain the choice of empirical indicators for the value of holding office. The comparative data on the amount of spoils is not reliable due to the high secrecy surrounding leaders' personal assets and the sensitive nature of the information. If and when such data become available, it is usually only after political leaders have left office, and provides a rough estimate only. Instead, I rely on several indirect measures that are likely to be correlated with the magnitude of spoils that can be skimmed from political office. In [chapter 4](#) I discussed that the higher value of rents extracted from the state could be due to government activity in the economy and a large public sector, which in turn will increase the value of holding office. Many scholars conclude that corruption, the misuse of public office for private gain, is affected by the size of the state, the total public interference in economy, measured as the ratio of governmental budget to GDP (e.g., LaPalombara 1994; Sandholtz and Page 150 Koetzle 2000). Likewise, La Porta et al. (1999, 242) find correlation between corruption and the size of total governmental transfers and subsidies. If presidents cannot enrich themselves after leaving office in various lucrative private sector endeavors, they will value holding on to office more. Therefore, the size of *Public sector* accounts for a larger magnitude of possible rents and is also negatively related to the possibility of personal enrichment after leaving office.

On average, presidents that manage to circumvent constitutional restrictions on their terms command larger state sectors relative to GDP, they allocate larger proportions of total spending on public salaries, they command a

larger number of public sector workers, and many of these presidents experience, at least at some stage during their tenure, large black market premiums on foreign exchange.¹ In the majority of model specifications, I include the size of *Public sector*, estimated as the ratio of governmental spending to GDP.² Larger size of public sector should therefore increase the likelihood of unconstitutional tenure extensions.

Second, as an indicator for corruption and the probability of retaining assets after leaving office, I employ a relatively novel indicator, *Contract-intensive money*, proposed by Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson (1996), which is a proportion of money that is being held in the banking sector. It is measured as $(\text{Money and quasi-money (M2)} - \text{money outside banks (M1)})/\text{M2}$. Higher proportion of money held by citizens in the banking sector reflects their confidence that their assets will not be confiscated, and vice versa. This measure therefore will capture the extent of property rights protection in the country (Ahlquist and Prakash 2008; Clague, Keefer, Knack and Olson 1999); unlike other available indicators of the rule of law or corruption it has extensive coverage and does not rely on the perceptions of experts or businessmen.³

Apart from the size of *Public sector*, in order to control for the magnitude of potential rents from the economy, I employ several additional indicators. *Governmental procurement* — the purchases of goods and services by governments — renders such governments into major economic players, particularly in the developing world (Audet 2002). Governmental procurement is also the area that is one of the most vulnerable to corruption (Campos and Pradhan 2007; Ware et al. 2007). Therefore, larger procurement markets, all things being equal, should be associated with a larger magnitude of spoils and, therefore, should lead to tenure extensions. The size of total governmental procurement is very difficult to estimate, however, due to the lack of standard methodology and missing data, especially in less developed Page 151 countries (Audet 2002). In the online data appendix I explain in detail how two indicators for the size of procurement markets are calculated.⁴

Similarly, the size of *Natural resource rents* in general, and of *Oil rents* additionally, will also increase the spoils of office. The literature on corruption and resource rents is very extensive and documents various negative effects of rents on, among other things, governance and democracy (e.g., Humphreys, Sachs and Stiglitz 2007; Treisman 2000). Additionally, in auxiliary model specifications reported in the robustness appendix to this chapter, I include proceeds from privatization, in absolute figures, and the extent of capital flight, in relation to the total GDP. Indeed, privatization is often accompanied by corruption in many developing nations (e.g., Arikan 2008; Rose-Ackerman 2004). Likewise, *Capital flight* — estimated illicit financial outflows — in the current framework will capture the magnitude of spoils that are being repatriated by corrupt officials (Le and Meenakshi 2006). This variable will also control for political risks associated with perpetuation in power and therefore can account for private capital leaving risky jurisdictions (Lensink, Hermes and Murinde 2000).

Additionally, I include the standard measure of economic development, *Income* (GDP per capita in constant 2000 USD, log). Indeed, rulers are less likely to relinquish power in poor settings because their utility is concave in income; as income increases, the gap between the likely well-being of electoral losers under democracy and nondemocracy becomes larger (and vice versa) (Przeworski 2005). This indicator is also one of the standard control variables in any study of regime change and stability, and, therefore, will account for the overall level of economic development and country's traits.

Earlier I distinguished between the *magnitude* of the value of office and the *probability* of retaining wealth and immunity. *Contract-intensive money*, as explained above, that accounts for corruption and the rule of law, should also relate to the probability of retaining wealth after leaving office. Indeed, if private individuals trust the banking system to keep their assets secure from expropriation, then higher values on the *Contract-intensive money* indicator should also lower the stakes of losing office for incumbent leaders and therefore lead to a higher probability of compliance with constitutions.

Lacking reliable data on instances of immunity deals I turn to the general indicator for the ease of contracting between the outgoing incumbents and their successors: the presence of a hegemonic party that often predates a ruler's time in office. The criteria are based on Magaloni (2006, 32–42). The presence of such a party could ease the costs of stepping down and guarantee post-tenure immunity and the Page 152 retention of wealth. Also, as

discussed previously, if former leaders are treated with respect and enjoy high status in retirement, it should provide heuristics to the leaders that follow and lower the psychological costs of stepping down, and vice versa. In [chapter 4](#) I discussed how the record of former rulers can plausibly influence the calculations of sitting presidents. I construct a dummy variable, *Past ruler's fate*, denoting whether the previous ruler's post-tenure fate after exit from office was “regular” or not.

I additionally construct an indicator for presidents' personal *immunity concerns*. This indicator captures the existence of legitimate immunity concerns for acts committed while in office by presidents, such as the alleged corruption, or embezzlement, or nonconstitutional entry into office, and various human rights violations. Certainly, this indicator is rather “soft” and is based largely on the available reports in the media rather than more unequivocal and observable criteria that other remaining predictors are based on. Indeed, the absence of news on corrupt dealings that a particular president was implicated in can be caused by various factors that are not necessarily indicative of the “clean hands” of a politician. Likewise, the presence of serious allegations could also be due to negative political campaigning of ruler's opponents. For these reasons, this variable is only included in supplementary model specifications.

In summary, I employ several indirect measures that are expected to account for the magnitude of the value of office: a larger size of public sector and governmental procurement markets, more natural resource and oil rents, more privatization proceeds, illicit financial outflows, and lower incomes will induce corruption and more opportunities to skim off the economy. In turn, concerns over property rights and retaining wealth in the future, more serious human rights abuses committed under a leader's watch, and the absence of a hegemonic party and less than envious fate of the previous ruler will decrease the probability of retaining status and immunity after office.

Variables Measuring Constraints on the Executive Capacity

A standard indicator for the overall democracy, *Polity2* (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011), is chosen to account for the overall elite-level checks and balances and the strength of democratic norms. When assessing Polity measurements of democracy, Gleditsch and Ward (1997) find that the overall scores by and large depend on one indicator — the degree of decisional constraints on the executive, so that “this variable virtually determines the democracy and autocracy score values” Page 153 (ibid., 380) and “the recruitment and participation dimensions are...empirically extraneous despite their centrality in democratic theory” (ibid., 361). Thus, executive constraints are related to democracy very strongly. Even though *Polity2* is somewhat endogenous to term limits, as Category 3 on the measure of executive constraints, *XCONST* (Polity IV) includes “the executive fails to change some constitutional restrictions, such as prohibitions on succeeding himself, or extending his term” (ibid., 69),⁵ because its values are fixed at entry, as I explain below in the section on model specification, and only presidents that already have term limits at entry into office are selected for empirical analyses, it does not present a problem of endogeneity.

Second, as an indicator of president's personal control over, and legitimacy within, his or her political party, as discussed in [chapter 3](#), I record whether a president predates that party: whether he or she is a founder, or one of the main founders, of a political party he or she belongs to. Presidents that belong to political parties that predate them rather than the other way around, or those that are nonpartisan, are not coded as party founders.

Nations with stronger civil societies will be able to mobilize against presidents who seek to extend their mandates. Civil society, however, is a multifaceted concept and is difficult to measure; most researchers employ some indirect proxy for the strength of civil society. It is quite plausible to assume, however, that its strength will be captured by the collective action potential as well as by democracy scores in general. As an indicator of mass-level constraints, therefore, I employ *Events*: the sum of assassinations, strikes, riots and antigovernmental demonstrations (Banks 2009). I expect this variable to track the collective action capacity of the opposition, as well as whether the leader remains in control of the situation. The variable is measured as the total number of the above-mentioned events during each ruler's tenure. International pressure can also play a role. In Malawi, with almost half of the national budget dependent on donor support, the decision by the IMF to withdraw aid, which

was reciprocated by the European bilateral donors, seriously weakened President Muluzi's bid to stay in office. In contrast, in Uganda, except for the withdrawal of British grants to aid public finances and repeated admonishments by the international community,⁶ neither bilateral nor other donors exerted much influence, leading to a successful third term amendment by President Museveni (1986–) in 2005 (Tangri 2006, 194–95). As a proxy for international leverage I use *Foreign aid*, the percentage of foreign aid to GDP.

I emphasize the importance of elite-level constraints, mass collective action and international constraints. *Polity at entry* is the main indicator not only for elite-level checks and balances, but also for the level of liberty, democracy in the system. Because it is an aggregate measure, however, it is rather blunt. In the attempt to keep the original model specification parsimonious and because of a relatively small number of observations, I am wary of including too many additional controls to measure other aspects of institutional constraints other than the aggregate, elite-level indicator. Besides, the main thrust of the theory is about how the stakes of losing office influence endogenous term limits, controlling for constraints. However, in the last section of this chapter that examines institutional factors in more detail, I additionally include the strength of opposition parties in the legislature, independence of judiciary, party fragmentation, and other institutional factors. Likewise, additional factors of Western influence are also tested for in the last section.

Estimating Endogenous Term Limits

Below I employ a series of probit regression models for the 1960–2009 period, with one president being a single observation. Because of the limited availability of certain variables, the number of observations varies depending on model specification. While it is also possible to fit models with leader-years as observations, whether binary time-series cross-section or survival models, the primary question of concern is *whether* presidents step down or extend their tenure, not *when* they do so. For comparison, the auxiliary Cox hazard model is included in the appendix to this chapter. Besides, several predictors are time-invariant, which would make panel data methods less illuminating. Each model is estimated with the robust standard errors. In addition, instrumental variables probit regression is fitted alongside the regular probit model to account for the possibility of omitted factors.

Elite, mass and international-level constraints could reduce the capacity of an individual ruler to extend his or her terms. However, if rulers value their office highly enough, they will attempt to reduce constraints after entering into office by undermining checks and balances, by rewriting constitutions, or by dismissing judges. If constraints are reduced, a subsequent tenure extension could be seen as one of the last pages of the “dictator's script.” In Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) rent-seeking is a product of political institutions: all leaders desire re-election, however institutions that constrain them, or not, will determine if the former will be more likely to promote public policies or engage in rent-seeking, depending on how such activities help them to remain in office. Certainly, lack of constraints is a temptation by itself, and less constrained leaders almost certainly will be more corrupt. However, as my argument goes, leaders will be more likely to seek rents when the latter are available, private sector careers do not bring comparable benefits, *and* they will be more likely to subvert institutions at the same time. Thus, in order to tackle potential endogeneity in the estimations, I fix the value of constraints on the executive at the time of *entry* into office, so that any subsequent changes in constraints that are affected by the value of office will be captured by the dependent variable — tenure extensions.

All independent variables included in the models are calculated as average values of these variables during leaders' time in office before constitutional departure or before extension. Exceptions are *Polity at entry* with values fixed at entry, the sum of *Events* during ruler's tenure, and binary indicators such as a *Previous ruler's fate* or *Hegemonic party*. There is also a number of additional variables in the robustness section that are calculated as averages unless otherwise stated. For observations of leaders who pursued two or more successful extensions, the variable values are averaged prior to a more significant extension.

The argument developed earlier suggests that rulers across the world are driven by costs of benefits of staying in office: a simple framework should be able to explain compliance with norms in non-, partly, and democratic regimes. Below I turn to the empirical models that examine behavior of presidents in all regime types. Still, it is possible that the explanation can be improved if we examine constitutional compliance separately, in different

regime types. Indeed, it is conceivable that in more democratic regimes president-party politics or presidential-judiciary relations could shed light on the nature of institutional, elite-level constraints on presidents seeking continuity in power, while in nondemocratic regimes prior institutionalization of these regimes could be important. Therefore, I also examine the value of holding office in different regime types, separately. There are certain limitations to this approach, however, since, as discussed earlier, rulers that entered in democratic regimes might end up in partly or even nondemocratic ones, and vice versa, so restricting samples on the basis of political regimes at the time of entry into office will not always define regime types at the time of extension. It is however preferable to selection based on *Polity2* at the time of extension, since the latter strategy would introduce additional complications of endogeneity.

Page 156

The Stakes of Losing Office, Constraints and Term Limits

To account for constraints, all fitted models include *Polity at entry* that controls for the initial entry-level checks and balances that presidents had to deal with, the international constraints — primarily foreign aid or the alternative indicators of international leverage, in separate estimations — in order to measure how much a ruler can be constrained by his or her international obligations and donors, and third, an indicator of a collective action potential — events during tenure, as described earlier. Additionally, each model includes an indicator whether president was a founder, or one of the principal founders, of his or her own party.

Likewise, each model also includes indicators that should control for the probability of retaining assets and immunity — *Past ruler's fate*, *Hegemonic party* and *Contract-intensive money*. *Income per capita* will account for the overall level of economic modernization and therefore is featured in every specification. Most important, variables for the magnitude of possible spoils from political office — the size of *Public sector*, the size of *Governmental procurement markets*, and *Natural resource rents* — are also included. The latter two variables are included in separate specifications from those that feature *Public sector*.

Model 1 in the first column of [Table 6.1](#) is the main model specification and will provide the benchmark to compare other models with. The results of this model indicate that the stakes of losing political office do influence rulers' decisions to remain in power: a larger size of *Public sector* increases the likelihood of personalization, similarly to the effects of a lower level of trust in the banking sector, *Contract-intensive money*, while the fate of the previous ruler also seems to provide an important cue for a president reluctant to leave. The coefficients on all of these three predictors have the expected sign of direction of their effects, and they are statistically significant, albeit *Contract-intensive money* is at the 0.1 level of statistical significance.

As expected, more democratic *Polity at entry* makes it much less possible that presidents will be able to remain in power beyond their mandates. The presence of a *Hegemonic party*, as theorized, seems to decrease the likelihood of extending terms, but we cannot be confident enough due to large standard errors. Indeed, while a strong party can guarantee immunity after exit from office, it can also empower the executive for a constitutional change. Many presidents in such Page 157 regimes do step down voluntarily, as did all the Mexican presidents or Gouled Aptidon (1977–99) of Djibouti, to name a few, yet others prolong their rule, as did Alfredo Stroessner (1954–89) of Paraguay or William Tubman (1944–71) of Liberia, for example.

The indicator of mass collective action, *Events*, while it has the correct, negative sign of its effects on its coefficient, is not statistically significant. Likewise, foreign donors do not seem to be able to deter rulers from taking over their regimes, on average. *Party founder*, however, makes it more likely that leaders will be able to co-opt legislatures and ensure constitutional changes. This variable's coefficient has consistently statistically significant effects irrespective of model specification.

Columns 2 and 3 of [Table 6.1](#) report results obtained following simpler model specifications: one that includes only spoils and immunity indicators, alongside income per capita (2), and another one that only includes constraints, again, alongside income per capita (3). As can be seen, both “spoils and immunity only” and

“constraints only” separate models remain valid, with indicators that are statistically significant in the main model 1 retaining their significance in separate model specifications. Crucially for the argument of this book, the breakdown of term limits is driven not only by constraints, but also by motives, as revealed by results reported in column 2.

As argued earlier, a larger size of governmental procurement markets and more natural resource rents should be associated with a higher magnitude of available spoils in public office. To test for this, instead of the *Public sector* size, which is strongly collinear with these variables and therefore is not included in the same model, model 4 includes the size of *Procurement markets*, alongside the same predictors as in model 1. Indeed, the coefficient on the new indicator is positive and statistically significant, and other predictors retain the same direction of effects and statistical significance. Because of the extremely high degree of missingness of procurement indicator, however, almost three-fourths of observations are dropped. As a possible remedy, I re-estimate the same model specification via multiple imputation (Honaker, King and Blackwell 2011). Because of the high degree of missingness on the variable of interest, 20 datasets are imputed. While the size of *Procurement markets* seems to be associated with a higher likelihood of staying in power, its coefficient is not statistically significant after multiple imputation (column 5), in contrast with results reported in column 4. Therefore, unless better coverage of government procurement, Page 158 especially for developing nations, becomes available, we cannot reject the possibility that the size of such markets and democratic breakdown are unrelated. Still, results are suggestive, as indicated by model 4, which is based on nonimputed data. Likewise, model 6 is fitted following the same specification as the main model, but it includes the size of available *Natural resource rents* instead of *Public sector* size. As can be seen, such rents are strongly associated with the higher probability of ruler's extending tenure.

Both the main model reported in the first column, as well as auxiliary models in columns 2 to 6, include a number of predictors that can account for the motives behind rulers' decisions to stay in office, as well as constraints on their ability to do so. However, the majority of predictors, such as countries' *Income* or the presence of *Hegemonic party*, for instance, account for structural economic conditions or the presence of institutions that not only individual presidents but all other political actors are equally “exposed” to. Indeed, the rents from natural resource extraction will be available not only to the top executive but also to the majority of his ruling coalition. While this does not undermine the argument about the stakes of losing office, it is however incumbent to demonstrate that rulers themselves, as individuals, are driven by the logic of the value of office and constraints. Each model specification already includes two indicators that are plausibly tied to individual rulers' own motives and their personal strength: *Previous ruler's fate* and president's control over his own party, *Party founder*. Both indicators are statistically significant predictors irrespective of the model specification.

In addition, I include another variable, *Immunity concerns*, a very “personalized” indicator that accounts for whether there are any grounds for concerns about personal immunity should the ruler decide to step down. This variable therefore is uniquely tied to an individual president, in contrast to structural or institutional factors. Because this variable is based on the available reports in the media rather than more unequivocal and observable criteria, I chose not to include this measure in all model specifications and only employ it in model 7, [Table 6.1](#) in lieu of other variables for immunity.

Page 159 Page 160 Page 161

Results of model 7 do suggest that rulers with alleged criminal dealings or other grounds for possible prosecution are more likely to attend to their immunity concerns in the safest manner — stay in office. Even though this indicator is likely to capture a lot of “noise,” the assignment of presidents into those with immunity concerns and those without is rather conservative.⁷ Despite a considerable number of presidents that are unlikely ever to be prosecuted, yet are categorized in this manner and that, however, stepped down, *Immunity concerns* proves to be a statistically significant predictor, which, I believe, provides additional support to the argument advanced in this book that personal immunity concerns matter.

Omitted Factors and IV Estimation How confident can we be that there is indeed a causal relationship between

the spoils of office, immunity concerns and the breakdown of term limits? Admittedly, probit regression is not the most sophisticated model in the arsenal of comparative politics. Also, due to the nonexperimental nature of a research design the possibility of endogeneity can never be fully dismissed (e.g., Carey, Niemi and Powell 2000). Below I discuss some of the concerns regarding causal relationships in the chosen empirical framework.

As explained earlier, the value of democracy indicator is fixed at the levels for the first year in office. If presidents value their office highly enough, they will attempt to reduce constraints after entering into office by undermining checks and balances. After such a record of manipulation, tenure extension would be yet another step toward dictatorial control. Therefore, subsequent changes in democracy can be affected by the same reluctance to step down as the one that drives subversion of term limits. Since the level of constraints is fixed at entry, a possible two-stage procedure whereby one would estimate constraints on other covariates, and then estimate the effects of first-stage residuals on the probability of tenure change, will not be necessary. Indeed, all institutional changes that might have preceded tenure changes will be captured by the dependent variable and not by entry constraints. In addition to fixing democracy at entry, all independent variables are lagged, which effectively deals with the potential problem of endogeneity, since Y and X are not occurring contemporaneously. Other researchers used lagged levels of democracy to predict admittedly related indicators of media freedom (Egorov, Guriev and Sonin 2010), human rights (Greenhill 2010; Hafner-Burton 2005) and liberalized electoral outcomes (Howard and Roessler 2006).

Thus, reverse causality does not appear as a problem. The omitted variable bias, however, represents a more serious possibility of model misspecification. Indeed, while the structure of domestic economy — the size of public sector — can tempt the presidents to stay on, it is also possible that state spending is driven by other predictors, not necessarily those that are included in the model.⁸ If the valid instruments for the size of public sector are available, however, we can turn to the instrumental variable regression. As argued in the comparative political economic literature, governmental ideology often drives the size of public sector, with left parties preferring higher levels of spending (e.g., Franzese 2002). Thus, one can hypothesize that left-leaning presidents will be more likely to increase spending. Earlier in [chapter 4](#) I pointed out that there was no strong evidence to suggest that it was ideology of incumbent presidents that drove subversion of term limits, even though there were more left- than right-wing presidents experiencing it. However, if ideology can “cause” higher governmental spending, then the relationship between public sector and staying in power is more complex than posited earlier. Indeed, if ideology exerts its effects on the probability of tenure change indirectly via its shared variability with the size of public sector, one faces the possibility of an omitted variable bias. Likewise, former socialist countries are likely to inherit larger public sectors after the collapse of the socialist block. If socialist legacy is the true cause of a breakdown of democracy, then it is the former that exerts its influence via public sector size. Finally, governments might reduce spending when economies contract. To address this possibility, we can also include the average rate of economic growth during leader's tenure as another instrument for the size of public sector.

Instrumental-variables probit is an appropriate model specification when the dependent variable is binary; results are reported in the last column of [Table 6.1](#). As explained above, *Public sector* is instrumented by *Left party* of the president, *Ex-socialist* legacy and *Average economic growth*. *Public sector* remains statistically significant in this model specification. The choice of a more complex model does not appear to improve on the explanation, however.⁹ All coefficients retain the same direction of effects as in the ordinary probit model. The standard errors are only slightly increased by 5 to 10 percent, suggesting some loss of precision. More important, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that *Public sector* is exogenous in the current model specification (probability of 0.23).

Another possible issue with the main model specification is the degree of correlation between predictors. Indeed, all models include *Democracy at entry*, as well as the number of *Events* that gauge the collective action potential and also the degree of street violence. Likewise, [Page 163](#) while *Hegemonic party* is common in many partly and nondemocratic regimes, it is not present in fully democratic ones by definition. In turn, *Events* could capture permissiveness of a political system regarding the freedom of assembly. Thus, both of these measures can be expected to share some variability with democracy. The standard post estimations tests on model specification and multicollinearity do not reveal serious grounds for concern however.¹⁰

Model Fit and Substantive Significance of Predictors In terms of forecasting and reliability, model 1 in [Table 6.1](#) indicates that 85 percent of observations are predicted correctly. In order to see the predictive power of the empirical model as well as its limitations, [Figure 6.2](#) visualizes the predicted probability of tenure extension for each president, between zero and one, with an arbitrary line at 0.5 to differentiate between presidents predicted as more likely to stay in office (above 0.5) and those predicted to step down (below 0.5). In addition, point estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals are marked in either gray — to delineate those presidents that in fact extended limits, and in black — for rulers that departed. All those in gray above the 0.5 line and those in black below the line are therefore predicted correctly, as they indeed did what the probit regression suggested they would do. The results are very intuitive: the model predicts a number of African and Post-Soviet rulers to stay in office, and they indeed oblige us and do just that. A number of US, Taiwanese, Korean and democratic Latin American presidents have very low probability of not complying with their constitutions, and they, of course, do step down. Interestingly enough, the probability that leaders of Botswana would subvert constitutions and stay in office is on a par with American presidents, which validates [chapter 5](#)'s discussion about the incentives of power elite in that country.

[Figure 6.2](#) certainly underlines some limitations of the model as well. Indeed, not all presidents predicted to remain in office do so, and not all those expected to depart do. Among those predicted to remain in power are Luiz Somoza of Nicaragua, Medici of Brazil, Rawlings of Ghana and four more, such as Nyerere of Tanzania and another Brazilian military president, Geisel.¹¹ These errors in prediction however can be attributed to factors that are difficult to account for in a statistical model. Indeed, elsewhere in the book I discuss the idiosyncrasies of Nyerere and Rawlings that both ultimately chose to depart themselves. Likewise, a prior precedent, such as in the case of Brazilian military presidents who were all expected to follow suit after President Castelo Branco (1964–67), is another important factor that is difficult to operationalize. Luiz Somoza (1956–63) of Nicaragua who formally stepped down from his office in 1963 yet continued to remain the effective head of state behind the proxy president Rene Schick Gutiérrez (1963–66), while being only a senator, in all likelihood would have returned to the presidency similarly to what his predecessor and successor in office, father and brother Somozas, did, yet was prevented by his own mortality. Looking closer, therefore, these errors in predictions probably cannot be avoided.

A number of predictions that marked presidents to depart, while in actuality the latter did the opposite and extended terms, warrant more attention, however. Excluding predictions with confidence intervals crossing the 0.5 line, fifteen rulers are predicted incorrectly. Evidently, given the value of political office and relatively high degree of constraints at entry into office, the model predicts that these leaders — such as Chávez of Venezuela, Putin of Russia or Wade of Senegal — should have stepped down. While it is tempting to go through the list and search for possible explanations in each case, suffice it to say that the majority of these presidents are Latin American rulers that entered single terms and introduced one more term, with a number of them still being in office at the end of 2009. Earlier I already discussed that certain short-term extensions, such as by Sarney of Brazil, arguably are not extensions at all and have to be redefined as departures instead. The resulting poor fit therefore could indicate that these observations should be dropped or indeed reclassified. It would however introduce an element of arbitrariness in coding of what is extension and what is not. I revisit the specification of the dependent variable and the question of tenure extensions in Latin America in the last section and in the appendix to this chapter. Likewise, in [chapter 7](#) I investigate whether individual traits and background of leaders can possibly improve on the explanation and account for the “outlier” presidents, those that step down when rent-seeking and constraints suggest they would stay, and vice versa.

In summary, the empirical model is able to predict how the predominant majority of leaders behave. I believe that [Figure 6.2](#) underlines the validity of the argument across all political regimes, whether democratic, partly, or nondemocratic ones.

In order to grasp the substantive impact of the regressors on the outcome probability, we can compute the first differences and simulate predicted values using a standard package to interpret substantive significance, Clarify (King, Tomz and Wittenberg 2000). Holding other variables at their means, when predictors change their values from the minimum to the maximum, then the larger size of *Public sector*, bad *Previous ruler's fate* and the fact

that a president is *Party founder* Page 166 increase the probability of staying in office by 52, 26 and 38 percent, respectively, as can be seen from Figure 6.3. When the size of *Public sector* increases from very low to very high levels — for instance, from the level of Colombia or the United States to that of Angola or Chad — all things being equal, the probability of tenure change goes up by more than 50 percent. At the same time, having a president who entered office in the strongest democratic regime (+10 on *Polity2* scale), instead of autocracy (−9, which is the lowest score in the sample), will render extension extremely unlikely (but not impossible), decreasing its probability by 65 percent. These four predictors enumerated above are all statistically significant at the 0.05 level. Finally, an increase in trust in the banking system, *Contract-intensive money*, which decreases the probability by 29 percent, is only significant at the 0.1 level. We cannot be confident about other predictors as their upper or lower bounds cross the zero line; in other words, we lack confidence whether they have positive or negative impact on the probability. In the subsequent Page 167 section, I discuss predicted changes among more democratic presidents only, also plotted on the same graph.

The Type of Political Regime, the Value of Office, and Term Limits

Certainly, the causal relationship between independent variables might be more complex than posited in the theory. Thus, the level of economic development is related to the degree of democracy, as well as the strength of civil society, and in turn democracy could influence economic development: we know that wealthy nations are also more democratic (e.g., Lipset 1959; Przeworski et al. 2000). If there are clusters of nondemocratic leaders presiding over state-dominated and often corrupt economies, on the one hand, and of democratic leaders in economies with vibrant private sectors and the rule of law, on the other, then results reported in the previous section can indeed be driven by such exemplary “good” and “bad” cases.

The predominant majority of presidential regimes included in the sample is at the low to low-middle income levels, and many are non- or partly democratic, or unconsolidated democracies with the median number of years of uninterrupted democratic rule of only five years prior to entry into office of leaders. Additional inclusion of “deep” determinants, such as the latitude, colonial heritage or the proportion of Protestants in a country, as, for instance, in the seminal paper by Acemoglu, Robinson and Johnson (2001), in order to isolate the effects of regimes and institutions, will not improve understanding of the relationship between the value of holding office for the individual presidents and stability of term limits. In addition, such explanatory variables as *Public sector*, *Contract-intensive money* or *Proceeds from privatization* (in robustness section) are not necessarily determined by the overall economic development. Instead, throughout this chapter I include *Democracy at entry* and *Income* to control for the overall levels of liberty and of economic modernization and focus on more specific economic, institutional and even personal aspects that can bring about democratic breakdown. While larger structural conditions do influence the calculations of individual leaders, these conditions alone cannot explain fully whether presidents would comply with constitutions.

The size of *Public sector* does not covary with political regimes that are included in the analyses. Indeed, the average level of public spending is 17 percent in democracies, and it is 19 percent in partly and nondemocracies. This difference is not statistically significant, with a two-sample *t*-test for unequal variances indicating a *t*-ratio of 1.6 and the probability of only 0.11 that democracies and nondemocracies would Page 168 have different public sector size. Indeed, democracies can have very different levels of spending and different varieties of capitalism; likewise, nondemocracies, depending on the elite preferences for redistribution, could be defined as right- or left-wing dictatorships; they can be equally repressive yet vary in the extent of their involvement in the economy (Boix 2003).

The value of holding office influences the executives in all regime types, whether in non-, partly democratic, and perhaps even in democratic ones. Such presidents as, for instance, Lukashenko of Belarus, Chávez of Venezuela or Fujimori of Peru all entered office in regimes categorized as democratic at that time (above +6 on *Polity2* scale), yet extended their terms as their regime takeovers progressed successfully: neither economic development nor democratic constraints at the time of entry can explain how leaders behave when term limits approach.

In order to demonstrate that empirical results are not spurious, that is, that they are not driven by such “good” or “bad” clusters of regimes only and instead the theory is applicable across the board, here I focus on the specific types of political regimes. First, I select presidents that enter offices in partly democratic and fully democratic regimes, thus excluding leaders that enter in nondemocracies.¹² Second, I only examine presidents that enter office in regimes that are defined as partly democratic, therefore excluding full autocratic and full democratic regimes. As argued earlier in the book, it is very difficult to predict political trajectories of regimes that are neither consolidated democracies nor consolidated autocracies — partly, or semidemocratic (e.g., Epstein et al. 2006). If the analysis is driven by “good” and “bad” cases, then a model estimated on the sample that includes only cases in the middle will produce weak, or different, results. Third, I estimate on a sample of leaders that enter office in nondemocratic regimes only.¹³

Each model features the same predictors as the original model 1, Table 6.1. Models 1, 4–5 and 8 in Table 6.2 follow model specification 1 from Table 6.1. Results are very similar to the main model. For rulers that enter partly or democratic regimes only (column 1), the size of *Public sector*, *Previous ruler's fate* and *Democratic constraints* at entry all remain statistically significant predictors. For partly democratic regimes separately, however (column 4), only *Contract-intensive money*, *Previous ruler's fate*, and *Polity at entry* are significant. The sample of partly democratic regimes is reduced, however. As a test of sensitivity, partly democratic regimes can be defined alternatively following the criteria in Epstein et al. (2006) rather than in Polity IV guidelines. Column 5 reports results estimated from a sample defined as in Epstein et al. (2006) and indicates that *Public sector* and *Previous ruler's fate* are statistically significant predictors.

Likewise, similarly to the main model that accounts for all regime types, results obtained from a smaller sample of more repressive regimes (column 8) indicate that *Public sector*, *Contract-intensive money*, *Previous ruler's fate* and *Party founder* matter. Earlier in chapter 3 I argued that the elite agreements and past precedents often explained constitutional compliance in nondemocratic regimes. Unfortunately, there is no obvious strategy to account for the precedents in the past. Indeed, one can always infer the existence of a precedent when the presidents are observed leaving office. As argued elsewhere in this book, the degree of institutionalization of political regime that predates ruler's tenure might be an important factor that explains whether presidents will be able to establish personal dictatorship. The existence of a *Hegemonic party* — that is already included to control for the ease of contracting between presidents and their successors — also signifies the presence of a strong political organization that can be autonomous from the president and therefore provides one of the indicators of regime institutionalization (Gandhi 2008, 183). Additionally, I include an indicator of regime durability. As in other model specifications, however, *Hegemonic party* is not statistically significant, but *Durability* is: more institutionalized nondemocratic regimes are less likely to experience changes in term limits. The *durability* of more democratic regimes (column 1) does not appear to be relevant, however.

We can also replicate the instrumental-variable model following the same specification as reported earlier. As can be seen in columns 2, 6 and 9, Table 6.2, results are broadly comparable to those obtained from a larger sample in Table 6.1. As earlier, these models do not significantly improve on the explanation that is offered in simpler models. Finally, and again similarly to the model specification in the main section, we fit three auxiliary models that include personal *Immunity concerns* as an additional predictor. Results are indicative: presidents with alleged concerns for immunity are more likely to extend terms, and it appears to be the case in all kinds of regimes (columns 3, 7 and 10).

In order to demonstrate that results are not skewed by the presence of the most repressive regimes, we can examine predicted changes after fitting a model that excludes presidents in nondemocratic regimes. Results are displayed in Figure 6.3 alongside those discussed earlier. When the size of *Public sector* increases from its minimum to its maximum, the likelihood of extension goes up by more than half, by 51 percent. Similarly, when a president is a founder of his own party, the probability goes up by 29 percent, and it decreases by 43 percent Page 170 when a ruler enters more limited office in a democracy (at *Polity2* of +10) instead of in a partly democratic regime with the *Polity2* score of −4. The effects of all of these variables are statistically significant. Likewise, both irregular fate of the previous ruler and a lower trust in the banking sector have effects, but only at the 0.1 level.

The examination of hybrid regimes, as well as of nondemocratic regimes, separately, severely reduces the number

of observations, and in the majority of the estimations that follow I return to the full sample. Besides, in all model specifications both *Public sector* and *Polity at entry* remain simultaneously statistically significant, which testifies to the strength of these predictors even when controlling for other potentially overlapping conditions. If they were collinear or interactive, this would make itself known by a *lack* of statistical significance of individual independent variables. However, the main reason behind the inclusion of all rulers is that during an individual president's time in office, depending on the actions of that president and exogenous circumstances, regime type can also change. The framework that gauges the costs and benefits of staying in office should be applicable to leaders in all political regimes.

Constraints on the President in More Detail: Institutions and International Influences

Results of statistical analyses that are reported above provide strong evidence that rulers across the world are driven by the costs and benefits of staying in office. *Polity at entry*, which proved to be significant in all model specifications, is the main indicator for the elite-level checks and balances. However, it is possible that additional models that account for president-party politics or presidential-judiciary relations could shed more light on the nature of institutional, elite-level constraints on presidents seeking continuity in power. In this section therefore I turn to the explanations that are either complementary to the theory advanced in this book or that offer alternative views. First, I examine institutional determinants of constitutional compliance in more detail and parcel out which institutions are important in preventing dictatorial takeover. Second, I examine additional international factors as well. Finally, I turn to Latin America since it is the most democratic region in the developing world and it is conceivable that its presidents can be influenced by other factors as well.

Political Institutions as Constraints As [chapter 3](#) illustrated, many presidents had to overcome a number of obstacles in order to [Page 171](#) stay in power longer. At the elite, institutional level, presidents are often challenged by their legislatures, judiciary, cabinet ministers, and even their own parties. Instead of the overall democratic constraints, I employ another indicator for elite-level checks, *Political constraints*, which is based on the number of independent veto points over policy outcomes and the distribution of preferences of the actors in the executive, lower and upper legislative chambers (Henisz 2002). While this variable was developed to predict the feasibility of policy change, the same factors that constrain the executives to implement policies should also constrain their freedom to modify constitutions. Second, I employ years of uninterrupted democratic rule prior to entry into office as a control for the institutionalization of democracy, based on *Durable* variable (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2011), excluding years when *Polity2* score is lower than +6.

Third, more specific institutional indicators are included. We know from the previous section that a president who is also a *Party founder* finds it easier to remain in office. It is also possible that strong political parties, whether parties in the opposition, governing coalition partners, or even parties of the president, can offer a serious opposition to the executive attempts to stay in power. For example, it was indeed the concerted effort by the opposition parties, the president's own party, together with the judiciary, that finally put a brake on President Carlos Menem (1989–99) of Argentina's attempt to run for a third term in 1997 (Corrales 2002, 215–16). Likewise, the National Executive Committee of the governing Movement for Multiparty Democracy (*MMD*) was instrumental in thwarting President Frederick Chiluba (1991–2002) of Zambia's attempt to stay beyond his second term in 2001 (Von Doepp 2005). To control for the strength and institutionalization of party system, I employ *Party Fractionalization Index*, based on a formula proposed by Rae (1968). This indicator should also control for the strength and cohesiveness of the legislature. A more fragmented legislature should enable a particular president to cajole, pork trade or even bribe members from other parties. Additionally, I examine whether a direct measure of legislative constraints — percentage of seats controlled by the opposition (Beck et al. 2001), matters. In turn, *Judicial independence* measures whether a country's judiciary is independent and not subject to interference by the government and/or parties. Indeed, a determined position of the judiciary played crucial roles in thwarting attempts to stay for a third term by Menem of Argentina or Uribe of Colombia.

Different polities vary considerably in terms of robustness and independence of political-legal institutions, and the strength of their [Page 172](#) constitutions. For example, in Latin America, institutional strength is greater in Chile, Uruguay, and Costa Rica than in Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru. As it happens, presidents have not

attempted to remain in power in the former countries, at least as of the end of 2010, as they did in the latter countries. As an additional control of regime institutionalization, I include the number of major constitutional changes in a country prior to departure or extension, for each president. The expectation is that higher constitutional flexibility makes it easier to change constitutions again. However, since this indicator is correlated with the history of statehood, the frequency of changes is counted from 1950 only.

In order to examine whether more refined indicators for institutional constraints improve on the explanation, I fit three model specifications, [Table 6.3](#): first, for all regimes (column 1), second, excluding presidents that enter nondemocratic regimes (column 2), and finally, as explained below, for Latin American presidents only (column 5). Similar to the previous model specifications, the unit of observation is a particular president. The values of explanatory variables are taken for the period prior to extension or departure from office, and details are available from the online data appendix. *Entry constraints* has the expected sign of effects on its coefficient but it is not significant. In all of these model specifications, the strength of judiciary, *Judicial independence*, and the strength of legislative opposition are statistically significant factors that deter or thwart executive attempts to stay in power, thus supporting observations made in [chapter 3](#).

Institutions and International Influences in Latin America As argued earlier, some Latin American presidents that extend from a single and only term might be different and could be treated as a separate group. Indeed, Latin America is the most democratic region in developing world in the 1990s and 2000s, in the decade when many extensions were made there, and the changes in presidential term limits, for example, by Menem of Argentina or Cardoso of Brazil can arguably be driven not by the same logic as those implemented by political leaders in Africa or the Newly Independent States. Therefore, it is conceivable that in case of Latin American executives, their strength vis-à-vis their parties (Carey 1997; Serrafiero 1997), for instance, will be more relevant than it is elsewhere. While neither statistical evidence nor existing country narratives indicate that Latin American leaders are intrinsically better politicians driven by different considerations, I can additionally test for the institutional determinants of tenure extensions in Latin America, separately.

If we turn to the fifth column of [Table 6.3](#) that reports the results of Page 173 model specification based on the sample of Latin American presidents, *Prior constitutional changes* become significant, albeit at the 0.1 level, and the direction of effects on its coefficient is correct: more changes in the past make it easier to change a constitution one more time. Indeed, as reported previously in [chapter 2](#), one of the opponents of constitutional changes in Venezuela underlined the frequency of prior constitutional changes in that country and how it always benefited the sitting presidents. Other than that, the same institutional factors Page 174 that prove to be significant in models 1 and 2 also feature in the explanation of tenure changes in Latin America: a stronger legislative opposition and an independent judiciary apparently hinder executive designs. Indeed, when the independence of judiciary goes from “not independent” to “generally independent,” that is, for example, from the levels of Venezuela during Chávez's tenure or Nicaragua during Ortega's second presidency to those of Chile or Uruguay in 2009, the probability that a president is able to extend his mandate decreases by 42 percent.¹⁴ Additionally, presidents that face a more fragmented party system find it easier to implement change. These results provide evidence that those Latin American executives that manage to extend their stay in office in whatever manner do operate in a more fluid, institutionally malleable environment than their peers that comply with their constitutions.

International Influences Additionally, we can examine international influences in more detail. Model 3 in [Table 6.3](#) follows a simple model specification that accounts for regional demonstration effects (e.g., Gleditsch and Ward 2006), and the fourth examines international — Western — linkages. In addition to economic development and democracy at entry into office as controls, model 3 includes the percentage of term-limited presidents in the region in a year prior to extension or departure from office, for each given leader. Likewise, it also includes a number of tenure extensions in the region in the last five years prior to each extension, for each ruler. Results suggest that democratic neighborhood matters: all things being equal, when the percentage of term-limited presidents in the same region goes up from 25 to 50 percent, the probability that a given president would extend his mandate decreases by 17 percent, and if the percentage goes from 25 to 75 percent, it decreases by 32 percent. A successful demonstration by peer rulers that were able to change constitutions has the opposite effect: when the

number of presidents that are able to extend their mandates in the same region increases from none to three, and from none to nine (the highest number) in the previous five years, the likelihood that a given president would follow suit increases by 8 and 28 percent, respectively. Results of this model clearly resonate with what I discussed in chapters 2 and 3: presidents do receive cues about the possible courses of action from their peers in their geographic neighborhood. Clearly, many undergo similar transformations, and they are primarily influenced by the costs and benefits determined by domestic factors. However, a little encouragement from peer leaders as a potential heuristic cannot be discarded also.

Model 4 additionally includes two indicators for Western leverage Page 175 and linkages, following the argument in Levitsky and Way (2010). To control for Western leverage, I simply include a binary indicator that equals one if a president is in either Central and Eastern Europe or in Latin America. Indeed, in the case of Eastern Europe there was a very strong leverage of EU membership, while in the case of Latin America the United States possessed “uncontested and complete hegemony” (Smith 1996, 6–7, cited in Levitsky and Way 2010, 131). Likewise, there exist factors that increase linkages to the West, including various economic, governmental and social linkages. To account for these linkages, I employ trade with the West as percentage of GDP. Results suggest that Western influences do matter: the likelihood of tenure extensions in a region of high Western leverage are lower than elsewhere. Higher volumes of trade with the West decrease the probability, however, this coefficient is not statistically significant.

In the last model specification in column 5 that examines Latin American rulers separately, in addition to institutional predictors I also include two international factors. While regional demonstration does not prove to be significant, the level of trade does. Because of its geo-strategic interests in the region, instead of trade with the West I calculate and include trade with the USA in order to account for Western linkages in Latin America: the effects are strong and statistically significant.¹⁵

Conclusion

Statistical results provide strong support for the importance of the value of holding office: higher magnitude of spoils, especially manifested in larger *Public sectors* and more corruption (*Contract-intensive money*, as well as the lower probability of retaining the spoils and immunity after exit from office (*Past ruler's fate* and *Immunity concerns*), for a given level of constraints — especially those arising from the elite-level checks and balances (*Polity an entry*) — increase the chances of tenure extension. It also appears that presidents that are able to command their own political parties, *Party founders*, are more likely to be successful if they want to, or have to, stay in office. These results hold under alternative model specification, different operationalization of the main explanatory variables, alternative specification of the dependent variable, and further controls for the omitted variable, as I explain in more detail in the robustness appendix to this chapter. A further disaggregation of executive constraints indicates that presidents that manage to extend their stay in office face weaker judiciary and Page 176 legislative opposition, as well as a larger number of effective legislative parties — which additionally suggests that such leaders rule in a more institutionally malleable environment. Likewise, structuralist international factors, or more specifically, the degree of influence and linkages with Western countries, are also important. Because of the limited size of the sample, however, I was unable to incorporate the institutional and international explanation fully in the main section.

There are certain limits to the validity and interpretability of the statistical results. All indicators for the magnitude of the value of office are indirect: it is unknowable how much, whether in relative or absolute terms, the national political leaders are able to skim off their economies. However, we know that they do so, often on the magnitude of billions of US dollars, and we know that the amount of rents is likely to be correlated with the size of the public sector, public procurement and resource rents.

The proposed explanation complements the existing theories of regime change by suggesting a novel mechanism that highlights the crucial role of individual political leaders and their career concerns that are in turn often determined by how these rulers respond to rent-seeking opportunities while in office. By endogenizing term limits we can test the determinants of observable reluctance and willingness to step down. This explanation certainly

does not reject that it is the strength of institutions that also influences presidential behavior. On the contrary, the strength of democracy is a crucial parameter that determines the capacity of presidents to affect constitutional change and, therefore, to stay in power at will. However, monetary rewards in and out of office have to be taken into account also.

Appendix 6A: Robustness Checks

To examine whether results remain robust under different specifications and assumptions, below I employ additional explanatory variables and also test how the value of office, given constraints, influences the probability of extending tenure under different model specifications.

Alternative Specification of Explanatory Variables

Earlier, I examined the relationship between the value of office and regime type, separately in more and less democratic regimes. Results remained very similar irrespective of specification. In order to test whether the relationship between the value of office and designs to remain in office is conditional on the degree of democracy, I fit an interaction model, column 1 of Table 6.4. I interact *Public sector* with *Polity at entry*, which however is inverted so that both have the same direction of effects. However, the interaction term is not statistically significant. This finding indicates, using the jargon of statistics, that *Public sector* size has a similar slope across different regime types.¹⁶

In order to understand what makes some leaders more reluctant to leave office, I have put forward a necessarily simple framework conditioned by the costs of stepping down and constraints imposed on the executive. But other potential explanations for leaders' behavior exist — some testable and some not. A leader's popularity provides another possible reason as to why some rulers step down. Certainly, the observed popularity rating will be correlated with the measure of constraints on the executive. Instead, I include average economic growth during the last three years prior to departure. Indeed, governmental legitimacy is often linked to economic performance (Przeworski et al. 2000). It is not unreasonable to assume that, all things being equal, leaders whose economies grow are more popular than those whose economies stagnate (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 302–9). As can be seen from column 2, Table 6.4, while all predictors retain their statistical significance and direction of effects, *Economic growth* is not statistically significant. Apparently, leaders that preside over poor growth want to stay in office just as much as those that are able to steer their economies better.

Additional Indicators for Spoils of Office I primarily used the size of *Public sector* as a proxy for available spoils and for the importance of political office vis-à-vis private sector jobs. In addition to this indicator, *Natural resource rents* and *Procurement markets* were also used. Below I test whether four alternative indicators for spoils of office improve on the explanation. Columns 3 to 6 in Table 6.4 include, respectively, the total amount of *Privatization proceeds* during leader's tenure (model 3), average annual *Capital flight*, percent of GDP (model 4), *Oil rents*, percent of GDP (model 5), and an alternative indicator of the size of *Procurement markets* (model 6). Details about construction of these variables are available in the data appendix online. As can be seen, by and large results remain robust to the alternative specifications of the explanatory variables as the majority of other predictors retain the direction of their effects and statistical significance. *Privatization proceeds* are statistically significant. Because this variable's coverage extends back to 1988 only, however, the estimation sample is reduced considerably. Similarly, the number of observations is reduced in models 4 and 6; both *Capital flight* and the second indicator for *Procurement markets* have the expected direction of effects but they are not statistically significant. Finally, model 5 suggests that similarly Page 178 to the overall *Natural resource rents*, *Oil rents* lead to the higher likelihood of subversion of term limits.

Additional Indicators for Immunity Concerns Instead of *Previous ruler's fate* and *Hegemonic party* that accounted for personal immunity concerns in the main model specification, I include *Nonconstitutional entry*, *Abuses* and an alternative indicator for *Hegemonic party* in models 7 to 9, Table 6.4. The indicator of *Hegemonic party* employed throughout chapter 6 is based on the criteria of both the strength (governing party controls at least 65 percent of seats) and longevity (must be in office for more than 20 years) (Magaloni 2006, 32–42). However, in

the predominant majority of model specifications, this indicator did not prove to be significant. As a test of sensitivity, instead I include another measure that is based on the strength only, where it is recorded as one in cases of ruling “party controlling an absolute majority in the primary legislative chamber,” irrespective of the number of years in power (Reuter and Gandhi 2011, 87, 94–95). The alternative specification increases the percentage of rulers coexisting alongside hegemonic parties from 10 percent (the original indicator) to 25 percent. As can be seen from column 7, however, the new specification of *Hegemonic party* does not alter the results.

If presidents fear for their immunity because of certain deeds they committed while in office, then the fact of a violation of constitutional norms during entry into office, perhaps by taking over in a military coup, will diminish the possibility of immunity should they relinquish that office. Twelve percent of presidents enter their offices in a nonconstitutional manner, even though they legitimated their rule through elections at some later stage. As can be seen from column 8, even though the direction of effects is expected, the coefficient of this variable is not statistically significant.

As an indirect indicator of the probability of immunity, I measure the extent of human rights violations, *Human rights abuses* (Cingranelli and Richards 2010), taking the lowest value during a leader's time in office as the measure of various deeds the ruler could be held responsible for (the lower value stands for no respect for rights). The coefficient for *Human rights abuses* has the expected sign — more abuses during tenure makes it less likely that the ruler will step down when the time comes, yet it is not statistically significant. Because the coverage of abuses extends back to 1981 only, many observations are dropped.

To control for the possibility that the allegations of corruption against certain presidents are lacking because of a mere unavailability of relevant data and not because these leaders failed to commit abuses, I exclude all presidents that exit office prior to 1990. The assumption is that all things being equal, there should be more available materials Page 179 on actors that are still in office or that departed relatively recently, after 1990. Column 10 reports the results of this model specification: *Immunity concerns* still feature in the explanation of tenure extensions, albeit at the 0.1 level of statistical significance, and other predictors retain the direction of their effects and statistical significance.

The Cox Proportional Hazards Model

As an additional sensitivity test, I specify several Cox proportional hazards models, with leader-years as units of observations. As argued earlier, primary interest is *whether* presidents decide to honor constitutions by departing from office, or not, not *when* they do so. As a result, the values of the majority of predictors are averaged in the probit model specification. We can, however, compare the results from the main section with those obtained from the duration models. Each president is assumed to be at risk of experiencing tenure extension. Thus, reported coefficients denote “hazard,” so that positive coefficient on a particular variable stands for increased hazard of extension that this predictor brings about.

The first three models reported in Table 6.5 follow specifications in the main section and include predictors that account for the spoils of office, immunity concerns, and constraints. Models 1 and 2 are estimated on the whole sample; Model 3 excludes presidents in nondemocratic regimes. The difference between models 1 and 2 is that the second, in addition to the time-invariant *Polity at entry*, also includes this variable that is measured annually. Results are very similar to those estimated with the assistance of probit model: the size of *Public sector*, *Party founder* and *Previous ruler's fate* all increase the hazard of extending terms, and they are statistically significant. *Polity* that is fixed at entry is not a significant predictor, however a time-variant indicator of *Polity* is. Also, the duration model indicates that the less aid a country receives before potential presidential succession, the more likely a ruler is to extend his rule. It is possible that there is some loss in information when we average the values of *Foreign aid* per tenure. However, other predictors have similar effects to those reported in the main section. Model 4 follows specification that accounts for institutional factors: *Party fractionalization* matters, *Judicial independence* decreases hazard but it is not significant, and *Prior constitutional changes* make it easier to change once again. Finally, model 5 accounts for international influences: as in the main section, democratic neighborhood decreases hazard of experiencing extensions while a successful demonstration by other presidents in

the same region increases it.

Page 180 Page 181 Page 182 Page 183 Page 184

Alternative Specification of the Dependent Variables

The number of possible ways to perpetuate oneself in power can be quite large, as [chapter 3](#) demonstrated. However, the specified dependent variable reduced this diversity into one binary outcome. To address the argument that a different model is necessary to deal with the presidents who extended their single terms into additional second terms as opposed to those who, for example, were made presidents for life, or whose failed attempts should be accounted for, I compare the results estimated with alternative specifications of the outcome variable, and more restricted samples.

Excluding More Democratic Leaders The first column of [Table 6.6](#) reports the results of the model estimated without American, West European, and those Central and East European presidents whose nations joined the EU. The second model additionally excludes democracies at *Polity 2* level of +10, which stands for the highest attainable level of democracy in the dataset. Indeed, no president that entered office in a regime at this score has ever extended his or her terms yet, with the score of +9 — for instance, of Nicaragua in 2007 when Daniel Ortega entered office again — being the highest one at entry, following which a ruler managed to do so. The logic behind this exclusion is to observe whether results alter after excluding rulers that serve in countries with the most robust democratic cultures. As can be seen from the first two columns, however, results hardly change. The third column is based on a model that excludes presidents that extended their terms yet decided to step down, and political regimes at the time of their departures were defined as democratic. Again, as we see, even though in all likelihood such presidents as Cardoso or Sarnay of Brazil should not have been coded as “extenders,” even after they are excluded, results remain robust and by and large do not change. Additionally, the fourth column is based on a model that excludes democracies at entry, defined as those above +6 on *Polity2* scale. Again, results are very similar to the main model.

Directly Elected Presidents Only The overall sample includes all national political executives that are confronted by term limits. These executives include directly and even indirectly elected presidents. As a test for the possibility that the model is misspecified because it includes indirectly elected leaders, however, column 5 is based on a model that only includes directly elected ones. The percentage of indirectly elected presidents is lower than 10 percent in the sample, and after exclusion of such rulers results remain very similar to the main model, which indicates that the logic of this book is applicable [Page 185](#) to assembly-elected presidents as well.

Unsuccessful Attempts Earlier I discussed the difficulties of identifying what constitutes an attempt to stay in power and what does not. Models in columns 6 to 8 of [Table 6.6](#) are based on model specifications with alternative dependent variables. The sixth column is based on a model that, together with 60 presidents that extend their tenure successfully, additionally re-classifies thirteen identifiable failed attempts at “tenure extensions,” 73 rulers altogether. If a ruler's desire to remain in power is driven by the income-generating potential of political office and his or her immunity concerns, the ruler will try to remain in power despite the constraints he or she might face. The results could be interpreted as indicating that failed leaders are driven by similarly high stakes of losing office as their more successful peers, yet they lose their bids, perhaps because of the higher levels of constraints, or the idiosyncrasies of political battles. *Public sector* size is only borderline significant, while the effects of the rest of the predictors are comparable to the original model.

Short- and Long-Term Extensions Next I compare short-term and long-term extenders. Those presidents who pursued Strategies IX and X are recoded as long-term extenders. These strategies are designed to allow unlimited time in office. Likewise, those who pursued Strategies III to VIII *more than once* are also coded as long-term extenders. Indeed, President Rakhmonov of Tajikistan never abolished term limits, but several times he began a new countdown of his terms with every new constitution or amendment. Short-term extenders are those who have pursued Strategies III to VIII only once, even if they tried and failed with further strategies later on. There are 32 long-term extenders and 28 of those that prolonged their stay for shorter periods.

If we assume that short-term extenders are driven by determinants that are different from those for their more dictatorial peers, that is, provided that Cardoso, Menem, Morales or Fujimori introduced second terms as part of normal institutional change in a democracy, as opposed to authoritarian self-coups where rulers eliminate limits altogether, then when we reclassify short-term extenders as 0s and retain long-term extenders as 1s on the dependent variable, we should observe similar, if not stronger, effects than we do in the main model specification. Also, if the latter is true, then short-term extenders face similar stakes to those rulers who never tried to remain in power and stepped down. And likewise, should we drop long-term extenders from the estimation and predict only short-term extensions on the basis of the same original model, the significance should diminish or even disappear, if the latter indeed were not driven by the value of office Page 186 but policy only.

As it turns out, nothing can be further from the truth: the coefficients on the major explanatory variables lose their significance or become borderline significant once we reclassify short-term extenders as 0s in model 7, and by and large results remain robust even after we exclude long-term extenders in model 8. *Democratic constraints*, *Contract-intensive money* and the *Fate of the previous ruler* remain significant predictors of the long-term change even after we reclassified 28 short-term changes as 0s, while *Hegemonic party* becomes statistically significant in predicting departures from office among short-term changes only. These results suggest that the main model is specified correctly and that short-term and long-term extenders have similar utility functions. While a small number of presidents, such as Cardoso of Brazil (1995–2003), do stand out from other extenders, I am wary of excluding them on an ad hoc basis. Also, the record of many short-term extenders, such as Menem (1989–99), indicates that many do seek still further stay in power.

Personal Background of Presidents and Constitutional Compliance

Presidents are more likely to attempt to remain in office beyond their constitutional mandate if they face insignificant political constraints, as discussed earlier in [chapter 3](#). They are also more likely to extend their terms if personal costs of departing from office are too high, as discussed in [chapter 4](#). These explanations are not mutually exclusive, and they were tested extensively in the previous chapter. Either way, the strength of institutional constraints and the value of holding office are the main factors behind constitutional compliance.

Ultimately, however, sitting presidents themselves decide whether to honor constitutions and step down, or not. Indeed, the counterfactual in which a former political dissident and democratic activist, such as Václav Havel, overturns term limits — whatever the hypothetical value of holding office or executive constraints — is absurd to even entertain. Therefore, apart from economic opportunities, the costs and benefits of holding office and institutional constraints, there is something about individual leaders themselves, their preferences and background, that suggests another look at the determinants of constitutional compliance. In the empirical [chapter 6](#) several variables measuring *personal* capacity or *personal* motives of the president — such as the fate of the previous ruler, president's control of his own party and personal concerns for immunity — proved to be statistically significant predictors in the majority of analyses. Therefore, in this chapter I turn to the individual background of incumbent presidents as a possible complementary explanation of their behavior.

Examples abound of leaders departing from office despite an apparent lack of democratic tradition and tempting rent-seeking opportunities. For example, Senegalese President Leopold Senghor (1960–80), who appears to be the first modern African ruler that decided to step down voluntarily, did so not because of political pressure, health reasons or because he lost an election, but of his own volition. Senghor, who earlier introduced multiparty politics and a certain degree of media freedom, considered himself a democrat. In 1984 he was elected as a member of the French Academy, the highest honor France can award to men of merit (Meredith 2006, 270–71). Likewise, President Joaquim Chissano (1986–2005) of Mozambique in 2007 was awarded a multimillion-dollar Mo Ibrahim Prize for good governance, largely because of his unusual decision to step down from the presidency, in contrast to many of his peers.¹ While in office, he rationalized his decision to depart by criticizing others who clung to power no matter what, citing as an example President for Life Hastings Banda (1966–94) of Malawi: “the speeches were always the same. He wasn't changing anything. As a result he died surrounded by enemies. Who were Banda's friends when he died? Nobody! They had all distanced themselves from him. That's not what I want.”²

Presidents making choices in a fluid institutional environment can influence national democratic development and create precedents, expected norms of behavior to be followed by their successors. Consider President Julius Nyerere (1964–85) of Tanzania, presiding over a hegemonic party regime and one of the least developed African nations, who always thought of himself as the educator. In 1985 Nyerere established a precedent for his followers by voluntarily relinquishing power. The leader continued to influence politics even after his departure from the presidency. When invited in 1992 to discuss the idea of an additional term for his successor, the former leader was “astonished at this gathering to learn that the question of the President's tenure was still a subject of discussion,” and pointed out that “If he [the president] says two terms are insufficient that wants to serve three, the next President will say three terms are not enough and will ask for four, and so on until we create a Ngwazi (Life President) in Tanzania” (Nyerere 1995, 26–28). Likewise, earlier I referred to the personal decision of President Castelo Branco (1964–67) of Brazil to honor a single-term limit, which created the powerful precedent for his successors. In contrast, in a not too dissimilar military regime in Chile, which had been governed in a collegial manner until 1978 (Barros 2002), General Pinochet forsake rotation in power and instead established a personalist regime of his own by dismissing rival officers and prolonging his tenure by eight more years in 1980. To a large extent, therefore, regime institutionalization and personalization, respectively, were influenced by personal preferences of these two rulers.

Thus, it is certainly possible that apart from the existing constraints Page 189 and the costs of leaving office, leaders' own personal convictions matter in the explanation of constitutional compliance. Still, even if such convictions of individual presidents do matter, and we can indeed refer to numerous examples and testimonies to this effect, it is however not obvious whether leaders' personal effects can be shown to matter in the empirical framework. If every time a president steps down while rent-seeking opportunities are ripe and constraints are insignificant we infer that he or she must have had democratic preferences, and, in turn, every time a ruler takes over his regime we therefore infer his dictatorial predispositions, the argument becomes circular. It is also not immediately clear whether leaders' personal characteristics that influence decisions to honor constitutions, if such characteristics exist, can be identified, observed, and compared systematically, or whether these traits are fundamentally unobservable or idiosyncratic.

In the section below I discuss a number of problems in the empirical studies of leadership, such as whether leaders' personal effects can be separated from those of offices they occupy and from various contingent factors, as well as whether leaders' traits that are relevant to the outcome under study can be observed. For the purposes of research design in this chapter, to infer causality between individual presidents' preferences for democracy and their decisions to honor constitutions, these preferences have to be identified a priori, and they have to be correlated with the observable factors of professional, educational or any other personal background, and the effects of leaders have to be isolated from the overall effects of political regimes these leaders serve in. Indeed, the existing structural or institutional conditions can “favor” certain types of rulers, so that presidents with particular background characteristics are more likely to be selected for office in particular polities.

Can Personal Background of Presidents Explain Whether They Comply with Constitutions?

Recently a new, data-driven approach emerged among political scientists and economists concerned with the effects of individual political leaders on democracy, development, and conflict. The findings seem to suggest that under certain circumstances, identities and preferences of particular leaders matter and that this can be shown in the empirical framework (e.g., Iqbal and Zorn 2008; Jones and Olken 2009). Typically, scholars that attempt to attribute causality to leaders and their personal attributes use either, first, an experimental (e.g., Humphreys, Page 190 Masters and Sandhu 2006) or a quasi-experimental design (e.g., Jones and Olken 2005, 2009), or, second, they estimate the effects of individual background traits in a typical multivariate regression framework that is similar to typical cross-national analyses (e.g., Bienen and de Walle 1991; Dreher, Lein, Lamla and Somogyi 2009). In the case of quasi-experimental design the strategy is to select some treatment, such as natural deaths or assassinations, that would permit a researcher to compare effects with particular incumbent leaders being present or absent. Thus, Jones and Olken (2009) find that successful attempts on autocrats increase the probability of democratic transition, which suggests that since the results of assassination attempts can be seen as a random process, “individual autocrats appear to be cornerstones of national institutions” (ibid., 26). This ingenious research design can permit researchers to conclude whether leaders “matter,” however we still do not know what exactly about them, what particular individual traits, if any, matter. In case of a second approach (e.g., Dreher et al. 2009), researchers identify various individual traits that are hypothesized to matter for particular outcomes, and then they estimate the effects of these traits, controlling for other covariates, in a *large-n* statistical model.

Unfortunately, the problem of selection bias and conflation of leaders' effects with other predictors, among other things, cannot be avoided. For instance, in a recent investigation of the effects of leaders on economic growth, Easterly (2011) argues that the identification of leaders' effects is problematic even in the case of quasi-experimental design, let alone the regression framework. There are numerous difficulties in studying the effects of leadership and of even defining the concept itself (Bass and Stogdill 1990, 11). Leaders' effects can be impossible to identify, and they can be conflated with other factors such as the overall effects of political regimes in which leaders serve or with the present constraints and opportunities that leaders, whatever their background, exploit. Researchers themselves can also experience cognitive biases making wrong attribution of causality to incumbent political actors simply because the latter occupy political offices at the time of events, even though these political leaders have no sway over the course of these events (e.g., Patty and Weber 2007). It is therefore not surprising that various studies that attempt to attribute various complex outcomes such as economic development,

democratization, or foreign policy — factors that can be driven by a multitude of causes and actors — to particular leaders, encounter various obstacles in the identification of leaders' effects.

How can the examination of an individual constitutional compliance Page 191 fare in the presence of such serious difficulties of research design? Admittedly, while a number of problems remain regardless, other issues will be of less concern. Indeed, while tenure extensions are certainly the collective endeavors of leaders acting together with their parties and supporters, all of whom stand to lose should their leaders depart, such prolongation is an act however that uniquely benefits, and is driven by, one individual — the incumbent president. While we can debate whether a particular economic policy should be attributable to the president, finance minister or, more plausibly, a number of actors, at the end of the day it is the president alone who decides whether to honor the constitution. In fact, if the individual traits of national political leaders are to be tested as a possible causal factor behind political or economic developments, compliance with term limits presents a much better venue for testing individual effects than more complex “venues,” such as national economic performance. Indeed, one of the problems that scholars of leadership encounter is that they have to demonstrate that leaders are able to translate their preferences into policies — in other words, to prove that leaders, not other actors, not institutions, not larger structural factors, are “causes” behind the outcomes of interest. For instance, as an example of difficulties in attribution of causality to leaders, Canes-Wrone (2006), in order to trace particular policies to individual presidents rather than the office itself or to other factors or actors, had to examine various historical evidence in order to demonstrate that the presidents have prior beliefs about appropriate policies. In presidential regimes, however, if the national leader decides to depart, he or she will. Certainly, presidents across the world claim that their additional terms are not their decisions and that they have to surrender to the will of the people. But who can seriously believe such claims?

Whatever degree of constraints or temptations of office exist, some rulers, because of their personal convictions or preferences, will not hold on to office, and depart from it. The example of Roman dictator Sulla, who occupied the office sometime in 82–81 BC and was able to obtain absolute power without limitations for life, but chose to step down less than two years into his office, remains almost unique to this day. It is an example that completely refutes the proposed theory in this book, and we can only consider his actions in wonder, as did the ancient historian Appian (1913 [c. 145–165 AD], Book I, 193):

The next year the people, in order to pay court to Sulla, chose him consul again, but he refused the office . . . , and voluntarily laid down the supreme power, although nobody Page 192 interfered with him. This act seems wonderful to me — that Sulla should have been the first, and till then the only one, to abdicate such vast power without compulsion, not to sons . . . , but to the very people over whom he had tyrannized. Almost incredible is it that after incurring so many dangers in forcing his way to this power he should have laid it down of his own free will after he had acquired it. Paradoxical beyond anything is the fact that he was afraid of nothing, although more than 100,000 young men had perished in this war, and he had destroyed of his enemies 90 senators, 15 consulars, and 2,600 knights, including the banished.

This example also suggests that even if rulers' individual preferences can clearly offer an explanation of leaders' behavior, these preferences can also be potentially very idiosyncratic. This, however, can be tested for in a typical *large-n* statistical framework. If certain leaders' traits are associated systematically with decisions to step down, or not, and the problem of selection, to which I turn below, is addressed, then idiosyncratic cases, such as the one above of the perpetual dictator Sulla who however surrendered his office, can be regarded as outliers.

Above I posited that the effects of individual presidents can be isolated from other factors because tenure changes obviously benefit the incumbent leaders and are driven by them. This is only partly correct, however. Indeed, while we can plausibly attribute extensions to particular leaders, these leaders' effects still have to be identified and isolated from other factors. Assuming that leaders' preferences can be explained by observable traits of their personal background (e.g., education) that can be identified prior to leaders' decisions to step down, presidents that share particular traits can still be more likely to govern in particular regimes. We know, for instance, that military regimes are governed by serving or former military officers, or that there are more former lawyers among leaders

in wealthy democracies. We also know that democracies seem to attract more educated leaders (e.g., Besley and Reynal-Querol 2011). Indeed, individuals with traits conforming to the norms of existing political regimes are usually selected for leadership (e.g., Sullivan, Walsh, Shamir, Barnum and Gibson 1993). We also know from the citizen-candidate literature that official wages and other rewards often influence the type of candidates attracted to office (e.g., Besley and Coate 1997; Caselli and Morelli 2004; Osborne and Slivinski 1996). For instance, Besley (2004) finds that higher pay is expected to result in worse candidates, as monetary incentives crowd out intrinsic public service motivations. Similarly, particular structural conditions that influence monetary rewards in and out of office, such as the size of public sector, also can attract political leaders with particular traits.

In summary, even if certain traits of individual background are associated with leaders who comply with their constitutions, the effects of these traits still have to be separated from the effects of political regimes and of economic structures that might “select” individuals with these traits into office. If this is the case, individual attributes only matter indirectly, and the overall structural factors will be more important. In the empirical section below, I turn to possible remedies to control for such selection. In the section that follows, I discuss a number of traits of personal background that can conceivably account for individual preferences toward democracy, or lack thereof.

Individual Background Traits and Democratic Preferences

To infer the relationship between leaders' traits and constitutional compliance we need to assume, first, that individual background can influence political preferences — a relationship that is often supported by findings in political psychology studies. There is a well-developed electoral behavior literature that finds how individual background influences voting and political preferences (e.g., Greenstein 1965; Lipset and Rokkan 1967); studies on political socialization examine how political beliefs are developed during childhood; we know that age and education can influence xenophobia and political attitudes (e.g., Boehnkje, Hagen and Hefler 1998). Thus, there are reasons to believe that personal background and political preferences are related. Moreover, such preferences have to be relatively intransigent for us to be able to infer their effects on individual behavior in office. Indeed, even if individual background does influence political preferences, leaders can simply react strategically to the present opportunities whatever their “true” preferences are. We know, for instance, that actors often primarily consider regime performance and personal benefits, and this in turn determines their political beliefs and behavior in the short term (Hooghe 2001). If leaders act strategically irrespective of their personal traits and beliefs, and their preferences are highly transient, then the null hypothesis is that individual traits simply do not matter. In order to see whether such a hypothesis can be rejected, however, we can examine whether leaders that share particular background traits are more likely to comply with constitutions, or not.

Page 194

If individual background traits and political preferences are systematically related, for us to be able to gauge the effects of these traits the latter have to be observable, such as a particular type of education rather than a personality type. It is entirely possible that *relevant* traits cannot be operationalized because they are not observable. For instance, Bienen and de Walle (1991), in their explanation of leaders' political survival, alongside country-level variables also employ leaders' traits as potential predictors. The authors explain the observed decline in the hazard of losing office over time on the basis of structural factors, yet acknowledge, however, that such decline can also be attributed to the simple fact that less capable leaders are losing office sooner than capable ones, and thus the models fail to include unobserved leadership skills. Indeed, scholars of political psychology have long investigated the effects of personality or leadership style on various political outcomes and found that leaders' psychology mattered (e.g., Hermann and Kegley 1995). Indeed, a deep but perhaps idiosyncratic examination of what makes individual dictators become dictators, and democrats democrats, would involve inferences drawn from the field of psychology and the examination of personalities. The systematic comparative data on psychological profiles of presidents are not available, however, even if case studies exist (e.g., Loewenberg 1986).

Instead, I have to make several assumptions for an empirical study of leaders' effects to be feasible. First, I assume

that the relevant traits of personal background are observable and can be identified, that such traits influence preferences for democracy and that, in turn, such preferences are relatively intransigent to allow for systematic analysis, and finally, that the effects of such traits can be separated from other factors (the problem of selection, as explained above). Provided that these assumptions are not unreasonable, what are the possible personal traits that can be associated with individual presidents' "democratic type" and their decisions to honor constitutions?

Studies exist that attempted to map differences in individual background to the observable outcomes. For instance, in the study of policy influence of various prime ministers, Jones (1985) finds it very hard to hypothesize how previous background of prime ministers could affect their behavior in office systematically. Other scholars, however, find that individual traits of political leaders matter, especially in non-democratic countries, such as in the explanation of conflict initiation (e.g., Hermann and Kegley 1995). There is also a literature in political economy that examines how professional and educational background of political leaders can influence policy outcomes. For instance, Heinemann, Page 195 Mohl and Osterloh (2009) and Heinemann and Janeba (2007) investigate how education and socioeconomic characteristics affect preferences for particular policies of members of German and European parliaments. Similarly, Dreher et al. (2009) in the study of heads of state find that former entrepreneurs and scientists are more likely to promote economic reforms. There do not appear to be any systematic studies that examine the effects of personal background of national leaders on democratic consolidation and breakdown however.

There exist studies that examine the effects of individual characteristics, especially education, on beliefs, in particular, socioeconomic beliefs (Blendon, Benson, Brodie, Morin, Altman, Gitterman, Brossard and James 1997). One can further hypothesize that better educational attainment will influence whether a political leader will be more likely to promote democratic norms. In the so-called democratic elitism argument, scholars advance the view that political elites are often more democratic than the public at large — because of their superior education and economic status, among other things (Converse 1964). At the same time, in the former authoritarian regimes prior democratic learning is absent, and therefore university education can have the opposite effect and also indoctrinate (e.g., Klingemann 1966).

Many educational exchange programs that are being administered by Western governmental or nongovernmental agencies, such as the TACIS by the European Union, the Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program by the USA or the German Academic Exchange Program (DAAD) that often target young scholars and professionals from developing nations, are predicated on the idea that upon return these individuals would promote democracy, rule of law and market economy. Thus, Future Leaders Exchange, administered on behalf of the US State Department, assumes that the experience of everyday life in a democratic society will "promote democratic values and institutions" at home (US Department of State 2004, 1). Many of the alumni of such programs do end up in positions of power and are able to influence their countries' development, such as the Muskie program alumni president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili (2004–) or former prime minister and president Václav Klaus (2003–) of the Czech Republic. While there are no studies that examine whether Western-educated national political leaders are more likely to promote democracy, there is some evidence on another level that the number of Western-educated individuals resident in a country is associated with positive democratic effects. Thus, Spilimbergo (2009) finds that the number of students educated in democracies increases the likelihood of democracy in students' countries; Page 196 likewise, Atkinson (2010) finds that the number of the US-educated civilian and military students affects compliance with human rights in their home countries, with both authors emphasizing socialization in Western democracy and the likelihood of exchange students attaining high-status jobs at home as the causal mechanism.

Thus, I can put forward the following hypotheses: first, past university education in Western Europe or the US by a political leader from a country other than US or Western Europe influences this individual's democratic beliefs and therefore the likelihood of constitutional compliance. Second, a higher educational attainment could also influence whether a president complies with the constitution. Certainly, the records of some rulers, such as Alberto Fujimori (1990–2000) of Peru and Robert Mugabe (1980–) of Zimbabwe, who both hold advanced university degrees and honorary doctorates, suggest that education does not necessarily instill democratic norms, but we need to examine this variability in a full sample.

Also, it is conceivable that the type of education will affect a ruler's predisposition to comply with the constitution. Similar to studies that traced prior degree in economics to certain economic outcomes, such as in Kogut and Macpherson (2008) who find that the presence of a number of the US — and especially Chicago school-trained — economists in a country affects the likelihood of privatization, we can test whether a university law degree is likely to increase compliance with constitutions. Former lawyers, because of the professional habituation of legal norms and procedures, could be less inclined to break constitutional norms while in office. Likewise, in line with the argument advanced in [chapter 4](#), leaders with business or entrepreneurial careers prior to assuming office should find it easier to step down and return to private careers. Therefore, a prior business career will make compliance more likely.

Other factors could also be relevant. Whether a particular president is the first post-independence leader should make it easier for him or her to claim indispensability and thus remain in power beyond the constitutional mandate. First post-independence leaders also enter office without a history of compliance with constitutions and democratic tradition. They also lack the precedent of former presidents residing in private life. These factors should make it more difficult for “Fathers of the Nation” to leave their office.

The length of time an individual had to work and socialize in a political system to achieve the highest office should also render such a leader into a stakeholder of the system: such a leader will be less likely to subvert it. The insider's status could be manifested [Page 197](#) in the number of years the current president is involved in politics by occupying some formal post as a cabinet minister or a governor, so that the longer one spends climbing “the greasy pole,” the less likely she or he will be to break the constitution. Likewise, whether an individual belongs to a prominent political dynasty — when a particular leader has direct relatives that occupied the presidency in the past — should also indicate the insider's status. Similar to the argument that presidentialism is more likely to elect outsiders (which renders, among other things, presidentialism more dangerous), as in Linz (1994, 171–73), insiders will be more likely to work through existing procedures, in contrast to outsiders who will value existing institutions less and, therefore, will be more willing to subvert them.³ Also, outsiders with “disadvantaged” backgrounds that render their success in private life unlikely will value holding on to political office more highly than leaders with more established backgrounds. A number of leaders that arguably can be thought as political outsiders — for instance, Chávez, Fujimori, Lukashenko, Putin — once in office, disregarded constitutional norms and decided to stay on. Likewise, leaders that are military officers or have military backgrounds will probably be less likely to work through the established constitutional channels and might be more prone to decisive action including changing the constitution at will.

This leads to the next hypothesis: the insider status of the ruler, manifested in prior experience in formal politics or in being a member of a prominent family, will make constitutional compliance more likely. Meanwhile, an outsider status, manifested in a lack of political experience or a military background could render such compliance less likely.

Age is another potential factor, but the direction of its effects is less clear. For example, after winning three consequent elections and being able to run for a fourth one in 1999, 83-year-old president Hassan Gouled Aptidon (1977–99) of Djibouti stepped down and let his nephew become the new president instead. Indeed, older presidents might have less stamina to withstand the stress of political life, and depart from office. Younger presidents, should they step down, can hardly find a more powerful job to suit their ambitions than the supreme post in a country, so it is possible that they are more likely to remain in office. At the same time, older presidents could also be more skillful, or other actors could anticipate their additional stay in office to be shorter than that of younger presidents because of their age and could, therefore, be less likely to oppose them, preferring to wait it out instead.

Finally, following Cederman and Girardin (2007) and Fearon, Kasara [Page 198](#) and Laitin (2007) who examine whether or not the fact of the head of state belonging to a minority ethnic group increases the risks of civil war, I can also examine whether a ruler's ethnic minority status influences his or her reluctance to leave political office. If the minority group wins election in a polarized society, future election and leader's succession could usher in a different ethnic group that would make the exclusion from office permanent, making it even more compelling for a leader and his or her ruling group to stay in power (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2003). The last hypothesis

is thus: the smaller the size of the ethnic group of a ruler, the more likely the leader will be to subvert institutions.

Differences in Personal Background between Presidents

As discussed previously, even if certain background traits of leaders are associated with constitutional compliance by the latter, leaders that share such traits can be “selected” for leadership because more democratic and wealthy countries tend to attract leaders with such traits into office. In this case, the effects of leaders themselves, manifested in their personal traits, and of political regimes they serve in, will be difficult to distinguish. However, do leaders that enter presidential offices in more and less democratic regimes and more and less developed economies vary systematically in terms of their personal background? In order to answer this and subsequent questions, I rely on the original data that categorize traits of personal background of national political leaders. All variables except *previous times in office*, *age* (from Goemans and Chiozza 2009) and *ruler's ethnic group* (Fearon, Kasara and Laitin 2007) are collected by the author as part of a larger project that covers all national political leaders in the 1960–2010 period (Baturu 2012); I explain all of these variables in more detail in the data appendix online. The indicators of the individual background characteristics vary in their reliability. For instance, prior political post, education or military status are reliable because generally such facts are reported by the majority of bibliographic sources and are not subject to interpretation. Other measures such as years in politics, prior business career or prior imprisonment are less reliable because they are not always, or not fully, reported and therefore should be treated with caution.

As can be seen from [Figure 7.1](#), personal background does vary among leaders that enter office in more and less democratic regimes, and among those in more and less developed nations.⁴ For ease of comparison with other indicators that are reported as percentages of Page 199 leaders with particular traits that are encountered in each respective group, *years in politics*, *ruler's ethnic group* size and two age indicators are reported as average values for each group of leaders. Additionally, the category that reports the percentage of leaders with a college degree is inverted and instead displays percentage with *No college degree*. Categories in [Figure 7.1](#) are additionally sorted by differences in personal traits between leaders that enter democratic and nondemocratic office (first graph on the left), and by differences between leaders that enter office in more or less developed nations (second graph on the right). Thus, categories at the top of both graphs are those that are more likely to be shared by leaders who enter less democratic and less developed countries, respectively, while personal traits found at the bottom of each graph are more likely to be encountered among leaders of more democratic and more developed nations. The sample of leaders is chosen in the same manner as in the previous chapter.

Former and current military officers, first post-independence leaders, former prime ministers or vice-presidents, and former finance, foreign, or defense ministers (*Important cabinet post*) are more likely to assume office in a non- and partly democratic regime. In contrast, better educated leaders, those with law degrees and Western education, are more likely to enter office in democratic regimes. Additionally, some leaders in democratic regimes were imprisoned, typically by a previous dictatorship, and they are also more likely to have business careers prior to politics.

Similarly, as revealed in the second graph on the right, there are more military officers and “outsiders” in less developed nations than in wealthy ones (28 and 16 versus 14 and 7 percent, respectively), and there are more lawyers and university-educated leaders in more developed nations. Likewise, leaders of more democratic and more developed nations also seem to have more years of prior experience in formal politics — 14 and 13 years respectively versus 9 years in less democratic and less developed nations, on average.

These differences indicate that we cannot discard the possibility that leaders with certain traits are more likely to serve in particular regimes, for instance, lawyers in democracies, and first post-independence leaders in less developed economies. Even if certain traits of personal background are indeed systematically associated with constitutional compliance, we might not be able to tell whether these traits do explain individual behavior in office or simply whether they reflect larger institutional context. However, in the statistical analyses to follow, I attempt to address the problem of selection.

We can also examine whether particular background traits are associated with instances of constitutional compliance, and see whether differences between leaders that step down or extend their stay reflect the differences between leaders that enter office in different contexts, as compared above. As explained in the previous section, the expectation is that a leader's prior socialization in a mature democracy, such as being educated in the United States or Western Europe, whether he or she belongs to a prominent political family, has better education, whether a ruler has prior business career that he or she can return to, and possibly, university law degree, are hypothesized to be associated with stronger democratic preferences and respect for rules and norms, as well as lower costs of return to private life, which in turn should ease the decision to depart from office. In contrast, other factors, such as being a former or current military officer, strong personal legitimacy arising, for example, from being first post-independence leader, as well as the status of political outsider, can be associated with either lack of democratic preferences, lack of personal stake in the existing political system, or the existence of an autonomous personal power base — factors that can render personal bids for power easier.

What are the differences in personal background between leaders that comply with their constitutions and those that do not? In contrast to the differences between leaders that enter offices in different regimes and in different economies that I examined earlier, [Figure 7.2](#) compares personal traits of presidents that step down or extend their terms. As can be seen, leaders with a third-level education, Western education (received by non-Western leaders) and lawyers are more likely to step down. From an earlier comparison we already know, however, that former lawyers and university-educated leaders are more likely to serve in more democratic and more developed nations, so perhaps differences observed in [Figure 7.2](#) are spurious. In many countries a law degree is correlated with wealth and a higher social class, so that an education in law does not necessarily imply that it instills a higher respect for constitutional norms but can simply capture a higher social status of its holder and the likelihood that the latter has a stake in the existing political system. Interestingly enough, a prior full-time entrepreneurial career is also relevant for predicting whether the ruler would comply with the rules of the game and step down — often resuming his or her business upon return to private life. Likewise, 18 percent of leaders that comply with constitutions are members of political dynasties, while only 7 percent of those that extend their terms have political family connections.

Page 202

While a Western degree is common among leaders that enter office in more democratic regimes, it is equally common among leaders that enter office in less developed economies, as we know from [Figure 7.1](#). Thus, it is not entirely clear whether the potential effects of this personal trait on constitutional compliance will reflect democratic convictions of a president or whether these effects can be separated from other factors. Many future leaders, however, receive their degree in the United States or Western Europe early in their careers, during formative years, and the effects of political and personal socialization that occur during their studies can persist for years to come. For instance, in 1988 Benazir Bhutto (1988–90, 1993–96) of Pakistan admitted that her student life
Page 203 was the best period of her life and acknowledged that her four years at Harvard gave her “determination to see freedom in my own country, to see rule of law, to see democratic institutions.”⁵

Forty percent of “extenders” are current or former military officers as opposed to only 11 percent among those that depart from office. However, military officers are more common among leaders of less developed and less democratic nations, so perhaps this difference is due merely to the institutional environment rather than leaders themselves. There are also exceptions to the rule: for example, Jerry Rawlings (1981–2000) of Ghana, a leader with a military background that first entered office via military coup, later introduced multiparty elections and term limits and stepped down when required by constitution. Also, first post-independence leaders are more likely to stay longer. Indeed, twelve out of fourteen “national fathers” extended the terms. This could be because these presidents are perceived as indispensable in settings without a precedent of executive turnover, or that they are more popular, or authoritarian, or all of the above. Also, it appears that first post-independence leaders are not able to observe former leaders in retirement simply because there are none yet — a fact that also resonates with the proposed theory of the value of holding office. Likewise, 18 percent of leaders that manage to extend their terms can be regarded as political outsiders, in contrast to only 7 percent of such leaders among those that comply with their constitutions. The fact that there are fewer outsiders among the group of leaders that step down when

required could also indicate that there are stronger and more established party systems in these nations, where a career within a party is a necessary stepping-stone to the highest executive post.

Similarly to Fearon, Kasara and Laitin (2007) that fail to find the effects of a ruler's ethnic minority status on the onset of a civil war, minority status does not seem to affect a leader's predisposition to subvert institutions. Neither age nor cabinet background has much sway over compliance with constitutions. Also, differences between two groups of leaders in terms of their prior experience in formal politics are quite small. Additionally, only six leaders in the sample received their education, wholly or in part, in the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact countries (excluding those that themselves are from these nations), with some of such leaders, as José Eduardo dos Santos (1979–) of Angola, for example, remaining in office far too long, while others — Michelle Bachelet (2006–10) of Chile — becoming respected democratic leaders instead. The number of Soviet-educated leaders is quite small to infer anything of significance.

Page 204

Estimating Personal Background Effects

In order to test whether personal traits explain compliance with term limits in a regression framework, first I fit a very simple probit model specification. Results are displayed in [Table 7.1](#). Because of a high degree of collinearity between several personal background variables and a limited number of observations, I can only include a limited number of indicators of personal traits. In order not to exceed the ratio of predictors to the number of observations as in the previous chapter, seven indicators of personal traits are included: four from the top and three from the bottom of [Figure 7.2](#), alongside two control variables. The number of selected background variables — seven — is arbitrary, however these indicators of personal background reflect the strongest differences between presidents as can be seen from the descriptive statistics. If these seven indicators do not prove to be statistically significant in an inferential model, it is unlikely that inclusion of additional traits would deliver different results. Because *University education* is highly collinear with *Western education* and *Law degree* — indeed, the former can explain the latter perfectly — I only include education received in Western Europe or Northern America, alongside a legal degree, and exclude *College education* or the inverted *No college degree*.

Model 1 — the “bare bones” model — includes seven indicators of personal traits, and it is estimated using the whole sample of presidents in all political regimes, as described in [chapter 6](#). As can be seen, first post-independence leaders, those with military backgrounds, as well as those that are either political outsiders or those that occupied a second-in-command post prior to their presidency are all more likely to extend their terms, while leaders that received their education in the West and former businessmen are more likely to comply with constitutions. The coefficient on *Law degree* has the expected direction of effects: these leaders are more likely to comply with constitutions, but the coefficient is not statistically significant.

Most of the predictors lose their statistical significance, however, once we control for democracy at entry and economic development, also at entry (model 2). The exceptions are *Father of the nation*, *Political outsider*, and *Western education* that retain their statistical significance. Additionally, model 3 is specified with the same predictors, yet it excludes leaders that enter nondemocratic regimes. Similarly, only political outsiders and first post-independence leaders appear to be associated with instances of constitutional breakdown in more democratic regimes.

Page 205 Page 206

Selection The descriptive statistics displayed earlier in [Figures 7.1](#) and [7.2](#) indicate that certain differences between leaders entering offices in different regimes do exist; some of these differences reflect those between leaders that step down when required and that attempt to stay in office. Unfortunately, to fit an appropriate model that will account for a possible selection bias is rather difficult as the number of observations is limited. We cannot increase the number of observations as the sample includes the whole “population” of relevant leaders, as explained earlier in [chapter 6](#). Rather than specifying a series of selection equations for each background trait that

can be caused — “selected” — by political and economic predictors, I chose to control for selection of two variables only, *Western education* and *Political outsider*. Also, in the case of another variable that proved to be significant earlier, only two out of fourteen *Fathers of the nation* departed from office, making controlling for selection uninformative.

Two simple model specifications will account, first, for possible unobserved reasons behind Western education of individual presidents, and, second, for possible institutional or economic reasons behind the emergence of political outsiders. Even if Western-educated rulers are found to be more likely to comply with constitutions, a Western degree might not be indicative of individual democratic preferences that are instilled during prior socialization in Western democracy, but simply reflect the fact that a country a particular leader hails from has stronger links with the West in the first place (Levitsky and Way 2010), of which Western education of its president is one of the observable implications. If this is the case, we can attempt to parcel out the effects of Western education from such hidden factors. The selection model will gauge by how much the propensity to remain in office and to have Western education in the first place are linked.

Similarly, the fact that the president is a political outsider does not always reflect his or her personal maverick qualities but can simply indicate the breakdown of national party systems, or economic crises that delegitimated traditional parties, and that rendered the emergence of outsiders possible in the first place (Doyle 2011).

Specifically, in order to account for these possibilities, the probit model with selection is specified (Van de Ven and Pragg 1981). First this model estimates the likelihood of individual leaders obtaining a Western degree (column 4, [Table 7.1](#)), and then, second, uses that likelihood as a control variable to estimate the probability of leaders complying with constitutions. For the model to be identified, the selection equation should have a variable or variables that are not included in the second-stage equation that predicts constitutional compliance. A region of *Western influence* and *Western trade* (see [chapter 6](#)) are two plausible Page 207 factors that can account for whether a president of a country that trades with the West and that is located in the Western sphere of influence is likely to receive a Western education. Admittedly, such a selection model is not the most efficient as neither *Western influence* nor *Western trade* can be regarded as strong instruments (Heckman 1979).⁶

Likewise, another model (column 5) is fitted that first predicts the likelihood of an outsider emerging as president in a given country, based on the strength of democracy at entry into office, the average age of political parties at the time of entry into office — to account for party system strength — and *Economic growth per capita* — to account for the possibility that dire economic situation attracts outsiders — and, second, the likelihood of such an outsider complying with the constitution, in the second-stage equation.

Results reported in the fourth column of [Table 7.1](#) indicate that the underlying factors, such as the Western linkages and leverage (*influence* and *trade*), as well as the poor levels of national economic development, do influence the probability that leaders of these countries will be Western-educated in the first place. Likewise, the last column displays the results of another selection model. It appears that a stronger party system (*Average age of parties*) can indeed hinder the emergence of political outsiders, while economic factors do not seem to play a role.

The likelihood ratio test fitted on the first — *Western education* — model suggests that the correlation between errors is not statistically significant — it has a probability value of only 0.36 — which makes it possible that the two equations are independent and that there is no need for selection specification. In contrast, the same test following the second model — *Outsider* — is statistically significant, which suggests that outsiders are indeed more likely to emerge in more fluid institutional environments, and therefore selection has to be accounted for. The correlation between two equations (an inverse tangent of ρ),⁷ further suggests that individual traits are indeed to a large extent driven by the underlying national factors that make the emergence of leaders with these traits more likely.

Above I tested whether personal traits can explain constitutional compliance. The effects of these variables diminish once we control for the level of economic development and for democratic constraints. Likewise, once we account for the possibility of selection bias, the effects of *Western education* and *Political outsider* on

constitutional compliance weaken somewhat. Still, in the case of *Western education* results suggest that the leader's degree can be unrelated to the country's links to the West, which in turn indicate that results reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 7.1 are not spurious (however, the statistical significance is at the 0.1 level only). Second, the effects of *Political outsider* hold after controlling for selection.

Individual Traits as an Omitted Variable As yet another test, we can respecify the main model of the value of political office, as employed earlier in chapter 6, and include additional predictors of personal background that are, potentially, relevant omitted factors. Column 1 of Table 7.2 replicates the original core model from chapter 6 for ease of comparison. In columns 2, 3, and 4 I include additional predictors — *Western education* (2), *Father of the nation* (3) and *Political outsider* (4) — that proved to be significant in the majority of model specifications in Table 7.1. As can be seen, however, while *Western education* is borderline significant, and it, together with *Father of the nation* have the correct direction of effects, only *Political outsider* proves to be statistically significant in the main model specification alongside other predictors. Other predictors that prove to be significant in column 1 remain so.

As a final test of individual traits' effects, I fit a heterogeneous probit model to account for the possibility of heteroscedasticity of errors. Because the sample includes all kinds of individual presidents, ranging from uneducated military officers to former academics, from leaders with no political experience to those with four decades in various offices behind them, those educated in Soviet party schools and Ivy League colleges, if personal background has an impact on individual preferences for democracy, statistical inference could suffer from incorrect standard errors or even outright bias because of possible heteroscedasticity.

As in the analyses above, I only select several variables that revealed strong differences between leaders in descriptive comparisons: *Western education*, *Business career*, *(Ex-) military officer*, and *Father of the nation*. Using these four indicators as plausible factors behind unobserved variability of political leaders, I fit a heteroscedastic probit model, part of larger family of models known as location-scale models (McCullagh and Nelder 1989) and heterogeneous choice models (Alvarez and Brehm 1995; Keele and Park 2004), that estimates the variance of the error term as a function of a predictor or predictors.⁸ The likelihood-ratio test is employed to compare estimation by heteroscedastic probit and regular, homoscedastic probit, as can be seen at the bottom of the last column. The test indicates that heteroscedastic probit does offer some statistically significant improvement on the main model. However, main predictors that are statistically significant in the main model — *Public sector*, *Previous ruler's fate*, *Party's founder*, *Polity at entry* — remain so, and direction of effects is correct. It appears, therefore, that while personal characteristics of incumbent presidents to some extent do contribute to the explanation of leaders' behavior, they however do not alter the results of the main model specification.

Discussion and Conclusion

After extensive testing this chapter concludes with a negative finding. Even though there is evidence that certain traits of leaders' background are systematically related to how these leaders behave in office, by and large it is difficult to infer that the observable traits of presidents' personal background are robust predictors of whether these leaders comply with their constitutions, or not. Leaders' personal traits, such as *Father of the nation*, and *Political outsider*, also reflect the overall conditions under which particular presidents with these traits of personal background operate. Indeed, first post-independence leaders will find it easier to stay in power because of the lack of democratic practices in a newly independent country. Likewise, political outsiders are able to gain office because party structures are weak, which makes it simultaneously possible for such presidents to launch the executive takeovers. Admittedly, there is some evidence that personal traits — *Western education* and *Political outsider* — should not be discounted. However, the explanation that is based on costs and benefits stands and provides stronger support for leaders' behavior.

It is possible that personal preferences toward democracy or dictatorship, if they exist, are psychological, such as the type of a personality, and that these latent traits are not necessarily correlated with observable personal

characteristics, such as the type of education or a prior career. Indeed, research on intolerance — a trait that is likely to influence personal preferences toward dictatorship — indicates that the former is associated with psychological rigidity, as in work by Stenner (2005) on the personality trait of authoritarianism. In this case, even if leaders' individual traits matter, we cannot measure and compare these traits: they still remain in the residual in statistical analyses. We do not know however whether valid indicators for the unobserved traits, such as personal psychological profiles for instance, if they were available, would have been able to explain individual compliance with constitutions, or not.

In this chapter I attempted to avoid an ad hoc explanation and only focused on a number of personal characteristics that can be identified a priori. Given the plethora of various indicators of personal background that are included, it is unlikely that alternative *observable* traits of personal background would have been able to explain leaders' behavior Page 211 better. The negative finding does not deny the possibility that many leaders do behave in a public-spirited manner even when political and economic structures make it tempting for them to remain in office. On average, however, whatever their personal background, leaders tend to respond to political constraints and to monetary rewards in and out of office.

It is possible that the majority of leaders, if not all, are potential dictators (Milgram 1963) and that they realize this potential if they go through a certain socialization process, or if the circumstances are right. In this case, neither background characteristics nor psychological predispositions really matter, and a dictator only “has to be a person who is deeply concerned with rising in power; he has to be intelligent; he has to be ambitious. He does not have to be a profound scholar of economics” (Tullock 1987, 56). In other words, whatever the differences in individual background are, the majority of leaders will be influenced by the costs and benefits of staying in office, which in turn are largely determined by the exogenous political and economic factors.

Effects of Presidential Term Limits

The main inquiry of this book is how the value of holding presidential office contributes to authoritarian reversals. If the presidents are not restricted from running for consecutive re-election, they, as demonstrated in [chapter 3](#), predominantly win. Does the lack of term limits make political leaders into contemporary kings re-elected forever, however, until they die in office or until they step down in old age at a time of their own choosing? In the first section of this chapter I examine whether presidents who desired political immortality and overturned term limits achieved their dream, in other words, their survival in office and their fate, once they extended their tenure.

How does compliance with term limits relate to democracy? First, the honoring of constitutional rules and practices by chief political executives contributes to the habituation of political elites to democratic norms, further regime institutionalization and therefore, to democratic consolidation. Second, the withdrawal of a long-standing incumbent from an electoral contest as necessitated by term limits often ushers in additional uncertainty and elite infighting that could lead to the defeat of the departing leader's chosen successors, and trigger democratic breakthroughs as a result. The Ukrainian presidential elections of 2004, as described in [chapter 5](#), proved that the process of presidential succession could be a highly uncertain business for the outgoing incumbent and his designated successor, and that the latter could lose, ushering in further political liberalization. Therefore, I investigate whether term limits — by automatically removing long-standing incumbents and replacing them with chosen successors as candidates representing incumbent parties — have any sway over whether regime candidates lose elections and, more important, whether this executive turnover increases the likelihood of political liberalization.

The type of a tenure institution, the number of terms and the length of each term influence the time horizons of rulers and their policy-making. In the final section of this chapter I turn to economic effects of term limits. Comparing economic growth variance under leaders with shorter and longer horizons, I however cannot find strong support for the Olsonian (1993) argument that leaders with longer horizons — the so-called stationary bandits — are better economic planners: the latter are associated with variances of economic growth rate similar to their term-limited peers, in equally nondemocratic regimes. Additionally, I investigate whether governmental capital spending, as well as spending on education, healthcare, social security and welfare, differ between political regimes headed by leaders who are term-bounded and those who can be re-elected multiple times, and also between presidents in their last terms and otherwise.

Survival in Office, Fate after Office, and Term Limits

What determines how long a particular ruler can stay in office? Scholarship exists that examines the determinants of survival in office, comparing between democracies and nondemocracies, or between different kinds of dictatorships (e.g., Bienen and de Walle 1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi 2008; Geddes 1999; Goemans and Chiozza 2004). Geddes (1999) finds that single-party regimes survive the longest while military regimes have the shortest duration in power, and that personalist regimes, which in terms of their duration fall somewhere in between the first two categories, are relatively immune to economic crises and other shocks but are especially vulnerable to death or incapacity of their rulers. Similarly, Gandhi (2008) finds that leaders of military regimes serve shorter tenures than the heads of other types of dictatorship. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) focus on institutions that select the leader: rulers whose survival depends on large coalitions, such as in democracies, can only stay for shorter periods. Those in smaller coalitions have to provide private goods to their coalitions, and as long as these rulers continue doing so, they stay in office.

The main concern in this section is about the relationship between term limits and time served in office, so I turn

to this specific aspect instead. In an overview of the literature on legislative term limits, Lopez (2003) points out that “term limits will unambiguously reduce average tenure, as long as the constraint is ‘binding’” (ibid., 30). How binding can this constraint be? While Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) dismiss the possibility that term limits have any effects on survival as Page 214 they are unenforceable (ibid., 313–14), they also argue that whenever they are enforceable, “term limits undermine incumbency advantage by restricting the length of time for which a leader can credibly promise private benefits to their coalition” (ibid., 314). Indeed, presidents have to make a credible commitment that they will be able to continue rewarding their supporters in the future. Long horizons, determined by the absence of limits on the number of terms, signal this credible commitment. In contrast, term-bounded presidents have shorter horizons and cannot promise long-term access to the state and private goods to their coalition. Term restrictions limit the period of time in which a ruler can provide and hence lower his incumbency advantage over challengers.

The ability of a president to present him- or herself for re-election, and consequently to win, stems from the absence of term limits that allows this very continuing re-election, as well as from a higher degree of authoritarianism. Therefore, it is difficult to separate the influence of these two factors on the president's survival in office in the empirical framework. Because of these difficulties, I do not model the exogenous effects of term limits on political survival. Indeed, as I demonstrate throughout this book, presidential term limits are endogenous, and their effects can be contaminated by various factors. There are also no theoretical reasons to expect that in more or less democratic regimes, presidents' propensity to remain in power with or without term limits will be driven by factors different from those discussed in the above-mentioned literature. Instead, henceforth I simply examine whether or not presidents who overturned limits gained the political immortality they sought and, if they failed, the manner in which they lost office.

Excluding those still in power on December 31, 2009, on average presidents who enter office without limits stay in power for 10.7 years (standard deviation of 8.6) in contrast to those who enter term-limited office, comply with this norm, and on average stay in office for 4.1 (2.6) years. Indeed, since these rulers obey term limits and step down when required, their length in office must be shorter by definition. The prescribed length of time is usually shorter than the actual time served, but individual tenures are still correlated with term limits as prescribed at entry. Presidents who successfully extend their tenure are able to remain in office on average for 12.9 (7) years, which is almost 4 years longer in comparison with those who did not have to confront limits at all. Presidents in more democratic regimes — those with *Polity2* scores of six and above — stay in power for 5.3 (4.3) years in contrast to less democratic rulers who survive for 8.3 (7.3) years. These results are certainly consistent with the literature: Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, Page 215 294–302) report the average of 8.06 years for small-coalition systems and 5.23 years for large-coalition (more democratic) systems. How long can the presidents stay in office following changes? Excluding those still in power, nine presidents altogether fail before the end of their second year following extension. Indeed, some rulers fall short of achieving political immortality as they lose office, or life, only a few weeks after successful extension. For example, Ahmed Abdallah (1978–89) of Comoros, following his victory at the November 5, 1989, referendum that extended his term, survived for only three weeks. He was assassinated on November 26 of that same year (Lentz 1994, 189). Likewise, and more recently, as described in [chapter 3](#), President Mamadou Tandja (1999–2010) of Niger was overthrown a few months after constitutional change. Clearly, these leaders would have been better off if they had stepped down instead. The majority of successful extenders, however, stay in office for much longer than a few additional weeks or even years. Excluding rulers that were still in power on Page 216 December 31, 2009, twelve presidents survived for longer than ten additional years after change and twenty-five managed to do so for periods between two and ten years, thus seemingly indicating that they achieved their goals.

How many of them came to resemble successful monarchs so that they either died in office or retired at a time of their choosing? The number of presidents that extended their terms and left office prior to December 31, 2009, does not seem to be large enough for inference even though it comprises the whole population of extenders after 1960. Still, only three of these presidents lost their office through elections, such as the manner in which Miloš evi lost his office. even if we count forced departures after elections. This figure underscores the fact that long-standing incumbents are almost impossible to unseat by electoral means.

Eight rulers died in office of natural causes, including Presidents for Life François Duvalier (1957–1971) of Haiti, Josip Broz Tito (1953–80) of Yugoslavia and Saparmurat Niyazov (1990–2006) of Turkmenistan. Seven stepped down when their short-term extensions came to an end or retired at a time of their choosing, often ensuring the victory of their hand-picked successors, as discussed in more detail in chapters 3 and 4. For instance, President Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone (1971–85), who reportedly amassed a personal fortune of USD 500 million, was eighty years old when, in the middle of a severe economic crisis, he decided to step down ensuring the election of his hand-picked successor, Joseph Momoh. He died less than two and a half years later in 1988 following an illness (Lentz 1994, 680; Meredith 2006, 562). The majority, however, met less than agreeable fates: five were assassinated in office, and eighteen were ousted to be later imprisoned, forced into exile, or met their deaths shortly after. In other words, the majority failed in their quest for political immortality: only 45 percent died or retired peacefully, while 55 percent were killed, ousted or forced to resign. When we additionally examine presidents who entered unlimited office and thus did not have to confront term limits at all, we find that these rulers met a very similar fate to that of the extenders: 50 percent were assassinated or ousted from office, 21 percent died of natural causes, and only 29 percent stepped down peacefully into retirement.

It appears that since presidents without limits are very difficult to unseat and can be re-elected forever, the only feasible strategies for the alternation of power become nonelectoral: regime insiders' coups, mass revolutions and uprisings. Rulers realize this and respond by making their regimes even more repressive in order to prevent this alternation, thus many become more authoritarian the longer they stay in power Page 217 (Bunce 1981). Wintrobe (1998, 20–25) elaborates on the so-called dictator's dilemma: the more power a dictator has, the more dangerous it becomes for him to remain in office, as his subjects become reluctant to reveal their true preferences, depriving the dictator of adequate information about the true state of the world. Consequently, the dictator's response is to make his regime even more repressive. Indeed, if we compare the levels of democracy prior to and following tenure changes — among presidents that prolonged their stay in office — on average the scores turn out to be worse in the years following tenure extensions.¹

The logic of a presidency without term limits is similar: because rulers are increasingly difficult to unseat by electoral means, they can only be unseated in an irregular manner. Cox (2009), who explained the role of elections in nondemocratic regimes, argued that these elections are tolerated to reduce the threat of leaders' violent removal from office via a coup d'état or a revolution. He found that violent removals are less frequent in election years. However, as the evidence of presidential departures indicate above, regular or electoral departures of presidents who do not face term limits are relatively rare: whether they subject themselves to elections or not, the predominant majority still lose office in an irregular manner. If potential challengers realize that incumbent leaders are unseatable, they will be more likely to attempt gaining office via nonconstitutional means instead (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). In turn, rulers will understand this danger and respond by making their regimes more authoritarian in order to remain in power. Additionally, no ruler is immune from the inevitable decline in popularity over time. In order to prevail in re-elections, unpopular presidents will have to resort to various nefarious tricks instead.

Unconstrained presidents also become more repressive because they do not face the prospect of a return to private life. Indeed, many leaders “would have chosen to govern with more restraint had they known that they might someday be forced from political office and shorn of the protection it afforded” (Bates 2008, 26–27). Rulers who face limits, and therefore have shorter time horizons, cannot discount their future heavily. As described in chapter 2, ancient Greeks realized that the future return to a private life ensured moderation in office and hence subjected office-holders to a compulsory rotation. Those rulers who do not face limits, and have the prospect of self-perpetuating rule, can discard the prospects of future punishment and they are not constrained in certain types of behavior — such as human rights abuses or imprisonment of their political rivals — that enable them to survive in office irrespective of their performance. Hence the relationship Page 218 between term limits and democracy becomes self-enforcing.

The conclusion is that while some of the leaders do manage to stay in office till they die of old age or retire at a time of their choosing, the majority meet a less enviable fate: they are assassinated or ousted. Also, while the elimination of term limits further strengthens the electoral advantage of an incumbent president, it only makes it

more likely that the ruler loses power via nonelectoral means instead. The paradox of unlimited tenure is that in many ways it brings more personal dangers than limited tenure, while term limits enhance the personal *physical* survival of political leaders even as they hinder *political* survival. Yet leaders seeking political immortality are still willing to take these risks, perhaps considering themselves more fit to follow the footsteps of successful presidents for life, or perhaps because they simply cannot fathom life outside the palace.

Presidential Succession, Term Limits, and Democratization

In previous chapters I investigated various factors that made incumbent presidents remain incumbents. What difference does this holding on to office make for their countries, for democratic development? In [chapter 3](#) I examined the odds of re-election among presidents of the world and found that they enjoy a very serious incumbency advantage in all kinds of regimes: when they present themselves to the electorate, they are much more likely to win than to lose. In this section I turn to the electoral consequences of incumbency. Does it make any difference whether a long-standing incumbent presents him- or herself for reelection, or whether regime elites designate someone else instead as a successor?

The empirical literature that investigates incumbency advantage in democratic societies finds that in the absence of term limits, incumbents are difficult to unseat, and the incumbency advantage grows with time. This could reflect the spending power of the incumbents, voters' familiarity, or the poor quality of challengers that are aware of the advantage and self-select to run in “open” constituencies only (Alford and Brady 1988; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1990; Gelman and King 1990). The findings about incumbency effects in developing countries are less conclusive. Thus, Howard and Roessler (2006) find strong effects of incumbency on the so-called liberalizing elections (elections that trigger political liberalization), while Reuter and Gandhi (2011), for instance, do not find that incumbency increases elite defections — that in turn often bring about regime breakdown — during elections. Both Page 219 studies, however, employ both presidential and legislative elections; the latter study only focuses on hegemonic party regimes. Below, in order to re-examine the effects of incumbency, I turn to presidential elections only, in all kinds of partly and nondemocratic regimes, excluding democracies.

Incumbency, Electoral Performance and Liberalizing Elections

After nearly two decades in office, on January 7, 2001, President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana stepped down, passing power to the pro-democratic opposition candidate. Earlier Rawlings' vice-president and successor designate John Atta Mills had lost the second round of the December 2000 presidential election despite the support of the ruling party, the military, the media, and the outgoing president himself. One of the most important elements of this contest was that the charismatic incumbent Rawlings, who had won two elections in the past, did not run due to term limits (Gyimah-Boadi 2001, 107). Indeed, in the 2000 elections, “a great wave of excitement swept the country with President Rawlings no longer on the ballot chapter, and the scent of change in the air.”² The hopes of the Ghanaian electorate were not unfounded, as Rawlings's successor indeed lost. Following the election, Ghana's Freedom House ranking was changed from Partly Free to Free. While it is certainly not possible to re-run the 2000 election where President Rawlings does not comply with term limits and runs for re-election, we can however compare elections in which designated successors run instead of incumbent presidents, controlling for the overall strength of regime and structural factors.

In the analyses to follow, incumbents are defined as those presidents who have been in office for at least one year or longer prior to election. Successors are presidential candidates from the same party as presidents, close relatives, or all those designated as successors and/or campaigned for by the departing presidents. Elections in which the incumbent president does not run and I do not find it possible to ascertain a designated successor — for example, the 2006 presidential elections in Benin — are excluded. Elections where leaders fail to designate successors, or where there were no successors if elections swiftly followed coups, are equally excluded.

The dataset includes 116 presidential elections held in partly or nondemocratic regimes in the period between 1990 and 2006, excluding foundational elections, where long-standing incumbents are usually absent (see the data appendix online for details). Elections held in countries that receive a Freedom House index of political rights of

two Page 220 or lower are excluded, since indeed liberal democracies do not need to democratize, or at least not as much as less democratic regimes. Some of the elections occur in the same country twice or even three times. Several noncompetitive plebiscite elections, as in Syria, or in Egypt prior to 2005, where the chances for democratic breakthrough are minuscule, are also included. I exclude such elections in the least democratic regimes as part of the sensitivity analyses below, however.

Presidential term limits can be shown to influence political liberalization only if we can demonstrate, first, that incumbent presidents do not run for re-election because they comply with term limits — controlling for the strength of the regime and the opposition, or other factors — and not because leaders are ousted or die in office. A second condition is to examine whether, all things being equal, long-standing incumbents are more likely to win elections than their designated successors who can equally represent the same regimes or parties of power. In other words: does one type of regime representative — incumbent leader — perform better at elections than another type — designated successor? The fact that regime candidates lose elections and surrender office by itself is an important characteristic of democratization: consider the two-election rule as one of four criteria for democracy in the influential study by Przeworski et al. (2000, 23–28). However, if we can demonstrate that the replacement of a more experienced elite representative during election is likely to lead to political liberalization — a third condition — it will give additional support for the importance of term limits.

Are the absences of incumbent leaders mainly due to death or incapacitation rather than to term limits? Among selected electoral contests after 1990, 26 elections do not feature long-standing incumbent presidents. Seventy-seven percent of elections that are conducted without incumbents do not have them because the presidents comply with term limits, step down, and designate successors from the ranks of their winning coalitions, which appears to provide support for the first condition that leaders are not absent because they die or get too infirm. However, while term limits do seem to account for the majority of incumbent absences, this fact alone does not tell us whether these rulers choose to honor term limits because of institutional weakness, the stakes of losing office, or their own preferences, or whether they would have prevailed had they run for re-election. Thus, in order to satisfy the second condition and to demonstrate incumbency effects on democratic change, we need to isolate these effects from other, possibly confounding factors. If we can show that in similarly strong (or weak) regimes long-standing incumbents still perform better than Page 221 their hand-picked successors, all things being equal, it will provide additional support that this institution is important.

How different are elections with incumbents and successors, on average? The Freedom House civil liberties index in a two-year period before an “incumbent” election is 4.9, and before a “successor” election it is lower (which implies better on this scale) at 4, where higher values represent a less open environment. The differences are not that stark, however, to indicate a qualitatively different electoral environment. Also, while 35 percent of “incumbent” elections in the analyses to follow were conducted following tenure changes or under no limits, 32 percent were contests in which incumbent leaders stood for their second terms. Such elections are not that dissimilar to “successor” elections, with the corresponding Civil Liberties score of 4.4, only 0.4 points higher (worse) than in elections with successors.

What are the causal mechanisms behind incumbency? Incumbency can have direct and indirect — through its relationship with other factors — effects on electoral outcomes. The absence of a long-standing ruler can compound uncertainty and increase the probability of electoral turnover through the following process. First, leaders are at their weakest in the initial period in office (Bienen and de Walle 1991; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003), when they still have to prove their strength, neutralize challengers, accumulate resources for their coalitions, and gain experience in office. Designated successors usually are unable to place their own loyalists in all the key governmental offices prior to the departures of their predecessors. As discussed in [chapter 5](#), in Ukraine in 2004 the governmental candidate Yanukovych was unable to order a crackdown on protesters because the outgoing president retained control over the executive to the day of his departure.

Likewise, ambitious individuals from the regime ranks who are unwilling to challenge the incumbent president will be more likely to try their luck against a less experienced and weaker leader, more vulnerable than a longer-serving ruler (Howard and Roessler 2006). For instance, when Kenyan President Daniel arap Moi (1978–2002)

decided not to participate in the 2002 elections and to comply with limits, he designated his cabinet minister Uhuru Kenyatta as successor. The absence of the incumbent made other incumbent party officials less motivated to spend large amounts of money on the electoral campaign, and it also led to splits within the governing party, *KANU*, between those who wanted to choose their own presidential candidate and those standing by the incumbent's choice (Howard and Roessler 2006; Throup 2003). Similarly, leadership turnover could also reduce certainty over future immunity for electoral officials who are routinely employed to Page 222 commit electoral violations; the absence of a familiar incumbent ruler could act as a disincentive and prevent officials from stuffing the ballot boxes: successors will gain lower vote-shares as a result.

Additionally, in many rent-seeking economies, the various rewards and access to rents depend on access to a particular leader (Bates 2001). If certain elite groups are not confident in their continuing access to rents under the new president, or are unsure of a new ruler's ability to provide rents, they will be likely to designate an alternative candidate instead, or even to place bets on several likely winners, as many did in the 2004 succession in Ukraine. In turn, elite splits will compound electoral uncertainty and increase the chances for the regime's defeat.

The lack of incumbents at elections also reduces barriers to entry and increases competition because the capital that long-serving rulers had previously invested in their “brand name” — in providing public and private rents to the electorate and to regime insiders, campaigning in elections — will be equally lacking. Indeed, as Lott (1986) argues, albeit in the context of democratic elections, such a brand name cannot be simply transferred to, and empower, the designated successor. As Simpser (2005) points out, many nondemocratic regimes repeatedly invest in large margins of victory for the incumbent candidates at elections to create apathy and discourage opposition supporters from voting. Such inflated margins also create the halo of invincibility for the particular individuals (Hermet, Rouquie and Rose 1978) — something that the newly appointed leaders yet have to create and cultivate. Therefore, the process of succession could affect the chances for democratic change by breaking the apathy of a population through the novelty effects of new candidates, as described by an observer of the Ghanaian politics mentioned earlier in this chapter.

There are good reasons to think that strategies of the opposition actors depend on other parameters, and one of the most important of them is the absence of an incumbent. Huntington (1991, 120–21) argues that the absence of a leader due to his or her incapacity or death not only can precipitate elite splits, but it can also ease collective action problems within the opposition. Similarly to democratic societies where better-quality candidates will not run against incumbents and only present themselves when the latter are absent (Gelman and King 1990), elections with successors can draw stronger candidates into opposition ranks. In the 1990–2006 period in elections where hand-picked successors represented the incumbent parties, opposition parties managed to unite into electoral coalitions in 54 percent of such elections, often defeating the regime candidates. In contrast, such coalitions Page 223 were present only in 28 percent of the elections where long-standing incumbents were in the running. Furthermore, even if we exclude elections in more repressive regimes — those with the *Polity2* score of below –6 — the opposition unites only in 31 percent of these “incumbent” elections. It does therefore seem that opposition parties, whether in a more or less democratic environment, are more likely to present a united front when the incumbent is absent.

Even more indirectly, by stepping down the president chooses not to undermine the constitutional process and norms, as he or she would have done by extending term limits. This compliance will also contribute to the overall liberalization, to *routinization* of norms (Linz and Stepan 1996, 5).

In relation to the framework developed in earlier chapters, it is also conceivable that it is incentive-compatible for the departing ruler to leave public office for a private life in a more democratic setting where his or her interests as a private citizen will not be at the mercy of the all-powerful ruler-to-be. In such cases, should the president decide to step down — as President Leopold Senghor of Senegal in 1980 or President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania in 1985 did — the outgoing leader himself could ease the political restrictions in advance, as part of his succession.

In summary, executive turnover at the top can increase the likelihood of electoral change because designated successors are likely to be weaker and less able to command obedience from elites and election officials than

longer-serving incumbents, because prior investment into larger margins of victory and the image of invincibility can be lost and therefore citizens will be politically more active, because elites splits are likely during succession, and because opposition will also be more likely to unite before elections. While the absence of an incumbent can be a potential “cause” of political liberalization, as well as being the manifestation of overall democratization, it is the multifaceted process of presidential succession that can “cause” democratic change. In this sense, it is not the mechanical effect of the executive turnover that matters — whether an incumbent president is replaced by another regime candidate — but rather the *process* of presidential succession that cannot be separated fully from the overall degree of political permissiveness and that has psychological effects on the perceptions of regime elites, opposition parties, and voters. Still, while many of these factors will indeed have psychological effects, these factors will also have certain implications that can be observed and therefore operationalized, Page 224 as discussed below.

Incumbency Effects: Research Design

What is the possible identification of incumbency effects? Admittedly, these effects can be conflated with other factors. One possible strategy is to employ an experimental (e.g., Humphreys, Masters and Sandbu 2006) or a quasi-experimental design (e.g., Jones and Olken 2005, 2009), which treats leaders' deaths or assassinations as a random process, as explained in [chapter 7](#). Only five leaders died or were assassinated prior to elections among those selected for this analysis, however. Also, because it is the process of succession and not the mechanical absence of a leader — due to a sudden death, for example — that increases the probability of regime defeat, the examination of exogenous leaders' absences in a quasi-experimental framework is not suitable.

Instead, I rely on two modeling strategies. First, I assume that the effects of incumbency can be isolated from other predictors provided a number of relevant variables that explain regime defeats at elections are included. If an incumbency indicator remains significant after inclusion of potentially confounding predictors, it provides *prima facie* evidence for its importance. Second, a selection model will account for the possibility that incumbency is not an exogenous factor, that is, independent from other factors. Indeed, the absence of incumbents could merely be the manifestation of overall regime liberalization. Incumbents could also be so unpopular that they anticipate defeat and choose not to run, or they are too old or infirm to run. In other words, behind a formal fact of executive turnover there is a related and important query: why incumbent leaders do not stand for re-election in the first place.

Why would this process of succession necessarily lead to liberalization, or even democratic transition? The incumbents or their designated successors, as representatives of the status quo regime, run against the opposition that, in turn, challenges this status quo. Most of the time, and especially after the end of the Cold War, this challenge came from groups espousing democratic values rather than socialist, nationalist or pro-independence creeds as in earlier periods (McFaul 2002; Przeworski in Munck 2007).³ To gauge whether incumbents are less likely to lose than their hand-picked successors, and whether liberalizing elections are more likely in the absence of incumbent presidents, I use three dependent variables. First, I estimate if the regime candidate, whether the incumbent president or his or her designated successor, loses the election. Second, I estimate whether the election leads to a liberalizing Page 225 outcome. Following Howard and Roessler (2006), a liberalizing election is classified as such if there is an increase in the country's Freedom House score by one point and an increase of its *Polity2* score by three points, both in the election year. While a liberalizing election does not necessarily usher in a consolidated democracy (see Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009), it often triggers political liberalization and more competitive future elections. Third, I estimate whether incumbents or their successors obtain more votes in the first and only round.

Howard and Roessler (2006) predicted the effects of opposition unity on the likelihood of a liberalizing election in 50 presidential and parliamentary elections, controlling for a number of domestic political and economic and international factors. Building on their model, I equally include *Opposition unity*, the average number of antigovernmental demonstrations in the year prior to and of the election; *Opposition mobilization*; international and global factors such as *Foreign Aid* per capita; *Civil Rights* as the regime's average Freedom House civil liberties score for the two years prior to election; and *Prior Liberalization*: whether regime experienced changes

on the democracy score five years prior to election. To the existing 35 observations of presidential regimes in their model, I include 82 more observations that cover additional elections and countries throughout the 1990–2006 period. The hypothesis is that all of the predictors above — apart from economic *Growth* — should increase chances of regime candidates' electoral defeat and liberalizing outcome, as these variables account for the permissiveness of regimes, strength of the opposition, or Western linkages. In contrast, if economic growth is high, regime insiders will be able to buy votes by increasing salaries or providing other benefits, while poor economic performance can discredit a regime's electoral promises and rally the opposition (Reuter and Gandhi 2011, 89–91).

I also include a number of additional parameters that should contribute to the likelihood of regime defeat and a liberalizing election. Magaloni (2006, 231–33) stipulates that when presidential elections take place concurrently with legislative elections, stakes can be lower for incumbent elites because they can lose presidential office but still retain legislative seats, whether majority or not, and thereby protect their interests. To control for the possibility that regime insiders will be less reluctant to surrender presidential office if they obtain some legislative seats and thereby can influence policy regardless, or because they will campaign less hard for their presidential candidate when they run for the legislature themselves, a dummy variable for the *Concurrent legislative election* is included. Also, as theorized earlier, the presence of a *Hegemonic party* could mitigate the effects of the absence of an incumbent and thus render the distinction between the latter and his or her designated successor less relevant and ensure the continuation of policies and careers of regime elites despite the uncertainty of executive turnover.

Also, the opposition's efforts to mobilize and win elections in one country were often triggered and mobilized by successful efforts in other countries; opposition activists traveled and shared their methods and practices, international donor programs were designed according to the successfully implemented ones, etc. (Bunce and Wolchik 2009; Carothers 2003; McFaul 2005). To account for the effects of neighboring regimes, I include the proportion of democracies in the region in a particular year.⁴ Also, numerous studies on the political effects of resource curse highlighted the influence of resource rents on regime stability and change (e.g., Dunning 2008; Karl 1997; Ross 2001). To control for the possibility that regimes reliant on oil and other commodity exports are more capable of repressing and co-opting societal groups, I additionally include an indicator whether a country is a fuel or primary-commodity exporter.

Thus, the model includes a number of economic and political factors that should control for the possibility that presidents tend to step down and designate successors in more open, democratic regimes, and a liberalizing election is not influenced by the absence of an incumbent, but by the overall openness. The main hypothesis is that incumbents are less likely to be defeated than their designated successors, which in turn reduces the probability of a liberalizing election.

Predicting Regime Defeats and Liberalizing Elections

Presidential elections take place at different times and frequency across countries, and as the existing literature indicates, GEE models can make efficient use of such an unbalanced data structure and unequal spacing between observations (Baker and Greene 2011; Zorn 2001). Models 1 to 6 are specified as GEE for logistic regression, with an exchangeable correlation structure where a binary dependent variable denotes liberalizing election (LE), Electoral Defeat (ED), or not. The unit of observation is a presidential election; all models are estimated with robust standard errors. Models 3 and 4 exclude elections in more repressive regimes — those with the *Polity2* score of below –6.

The presence of an incumbent is a statistically significant predictor of both the liberalizing election and the electoral defeat — at the 0.05 levels of statistical significance, and it retains its significance even if the most authoritarian elections are excluded (models 1–4). As Page 227 expected, the *Coalition of the opposition* influences the outcome of the election, especially electoral defeats, where this predictor is statistically significant. Likewise, the level of *Mobilization*, regime's stronger reliance on resource rents, and more *Foreign aid* holds sway over elections. The strongest statistical significance in this particular model specification is shown by the

coefficient on the variable that controls for the overall level of permissiveness of the political system, *Civil Rights*. The higher score on the *Civil Rights* index stands for more repressive regimes, so the negative sign of the coefficient is expected. The presence of *Concurrent legislative election* does increase the likelihood of a liberalizing election, but it has no impact on whether the regime is defeated or not. Also, the presence of a *Hegemonic party* makes the regime's electoral victory more certain but has less of an impact on the likelihood of a liberalizing election. The inclusion of this battery of controls does not, however, render the incumbency effects insignificant.

Regime candidates can be defeated in liberalizing elections for a number of reasons: poor economic performance, lack of rents derived from natural resources, prior experience with democracy or the ongoing political liberalization. Such defeats can also be triggered by actor-centered factors, such as the ability of the opposition to unite behind one single candidate or the absence of an incumbent president. Results of models 1 to 4, however, do not warrant prioritizing one factor over another. In substantive terms, all of the explanatory variables have somewhat comparable effects on the probability of a liberalizing election as well as on regime defeat. Holding all independent variables at their means and changing the values of interval variables by one standard deviation and of the binary variables — by one — I calculate the first differences to assess the influence of changes in parameters of interest on the probability of liberalizing election and defeat (Tomz, Wittenberg and King 2003).⁵ The predicted probabilities are as follows: the presence of an incumbent decreases the probability of liberalizing election by 12 percent (and of defeat by 27 percent), the lack of opposition unity — by 12 percent (by 13 percent), concurrent legislative election — by 14 percent (5 percent), mobilization — by 9 percent (4 percent), civil rights — by 5 percent (7 percent) and oil and other commodity exports — by 12 percent (7 percent).

If the absence of an incumbent is simply the function of the overall regime strength, so that presidents comply with term limits and step down because of it — then excluding the factor of *Incumbency* from the model specification should not affect the results and the latter should be similar to the original model. As can be seen in the fifth column, however, the only two variables that retain significance are Page 228 Page 229 *Opposition Mobilization* and *Civil Rights*. *Opposition Coalition* loses its statistical significance. Indeed, it is possible that the opposition candidates will agree to unite under the single candidate only if the prospects of victory are realistic: when the opposing regime is weak, when there is a political opening, when the incumbent president is absent. Also, if the election is a double-ballot and, should the regime candidate fail to obtain the majority in the first round, the opposition will have to unite behind one candidate for the second round because of electoral rules, not because it formed a strategic alliance that “caused” regime defeat. In this regard, opposition coalition is endogenous to incumbent performance in the first round. It is very likely that if regime candidates fail to win a first round, they would fail to win the second, as their failure mobilizes their opposition and signals their weakness. For example, in February 2000 election Abdou Diouf (1981–2000) of Senegal was unable to garner the majority of votes required to prevent a run-off election. The opposition united for a second round only after Diouf failed to win in the first, and the president was defeated in the second round (Ottaway 2003, 101).

Another possible specification is a model that will exclude sudden departures of leaders due to death or assassination in office. There are five absences of incumbent presidents due to these factors in the selected sample. Model specification in the sixth column excludes such elections. Thereby we can separate the effects of exogenous absences of presidents — when they die in office — from potentially endogenous ones — when they are absent because they complied with term limits. As can be seen from the sixth column, results are not affected by a different specification. Certainly, it would be more illuminating to do the opposite and include only “exogenous” absences of incumbents, without concerns for the effects of other predictors on decisions of political leaders to step down. Unfortunately for the purposes of a model specification, but fortunately for the leaders themselves, only five presidents died prior to elections in the selected sample.

Selection into Incumbency As discussed earlier, the absence of an incumbent president, resulting from the latter's compliance with term limits, can be partly endogenous and correlated with other variables that account for the overall regime repressiveness or liberalization, prior to election. Presidents that decide to run for continuous re-election might self-select into incumbency, and the presence of incumbents or their successors will not be random.

In the GEE model specifications above, the assumption was that the incumbency had an effect on the electoral outcome that was independent of other predictors. How can we parcel out these effects? Even if the valid instrument is available Page 230 Page 231 that has an effect on the incumbency but not on the electoral outcome, the instrumental-variable approach still assumes that the coefficients on other predictors, such as *Civil rights* or *Opposition Mobilization*, are the same for both incumbents and successors alike. If, however, the presence or absence of long-standing incumbents can influence both the electoral outcome and the overall regime strength, coefficients on other predictors in the model will vary depending on the incumbency status, and therefore the selection model will be more appropriate.

Indeed, rulers operating in a more constrained, democratic environment will be more likely to depart from office and to lose elections if they are permitted to run. Presidents that depart from office can be seen as “selecting” themselves as they might be less capable of victory at the polls. Therefore, because incumbency can be influenced by other factors, we can specify a selection model to estimate whether the absence of incumbents and election outcomes are linked. For robust identification, the Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979) with exclusion restriction is chosen. Because of the restricted number of observations, in order to improve efficiency in the second stage I employ an OLS regression to predict vote shares, instead of the binary outcome, defeat or liberalizing outcome. Indeed, if the binary-outcome models are capable of predicting whether regime candidates win or lose, the continuous-outcome model with a similar specification should also predict votes cast for the regime candidates: incumbents and their successors. Results of lower than 50 percent usually imply that these candidates lose, except in the first-past-the-post electoral systems, or that they have to compete in a risky second round.

All regressors from model 1, Table 8.2, except *Concurrent Legislative Election*, are included in the second-stage model that predicts vote shares, Table 8.3. Additionally, I include *Electoral Violations* and votes cast for the executive in the previous election. Reported violations indicate that vote margins are probably inflated. Votes cast in the past election are included for two reasons: to control for the typical executive vote in a country as an additional control, and also because office-holders often coordinate election returns on the basis of their past performances so as not to look weaker than before.⁶ Because larger shares of votes cast for regime candidates will translate into a lower probability of regime defeat, the coefficient signs will be opposite to those in the GEE models. As can be seen from the first column in Table 8.3 that reports results of an OLS regression, incumbent leaders do increase the vote share cast for the incumbent regime. Both types of regime candidates also obtain lower vote shares when there is more respect for *Civil Rights*, and higher shares in the previous election are Page 232 associated with higher shares in the future.

In order to implement selection specification with restriction, an exogenous regressor that influences the probability of selection (of the incumbent to remain in office), but that does not influence the election outcome directly, has to be included. I use age of incumbent leader at the time of election as a variable that should influence personal decision to stay or depart, and that should not influence election outcome. For instance, in Djibouti, 82-year-old President Gouled (1977–99) stepped down in favor of his nephew, Ismail Gulleh, who promptly became the new ruler. The hegemonic *People's Rally for Progress* party ensured a smooth succession. While president's considerable age could be seen as the factor behind retirement and hence, incumbent's absence, it had no direct impact on subsequent election. On average, leaders that present themselves for re-election are 59.4 years old and those that step down are eight years older — 67.5.⁷ In addition, selection equation includes all the variables from earlier GEE model specifications. Model 2 (columns 2 and 3) is estimated on all elections and model 3 excludes more repressive regimes, for robustness (last two columns).

Results indicate that it is indeed possible that there is some selection bias: the values of -0.67 and -0.7 of the term are significant. At the same time, the likelihood-ratio tests with p -values of 0.16 and 0.17 in models 2 and 3, respectively, do not warrant the rejection of null hypothesis that two equations — one that predicts incumbency and another that predicts vote shares — are independent. Still, as can be seen, in two selection equations not only *Civil rights* and *Regional democracies*, but also an additional *Incumbent's age* have significant power to explain incumbent turnover (columns 3 and 5). The estimated effects of incumbency on vote shares obtained after simple

OLS model are not that different from those obtained after a two-stage selection model, however: when incumbent is replaced by another regime candidate there is an expected reduction of 8.5 percent of votes as estimated from the former model, and of 9.9 percent from the latter.⁸

In summary, it does seem that incumbent leaders are more likely to prevail than their designated successors, whether the former are confronted with a united coalition or not, whether they enjoy the support of the hegemonic party or not, whether they operate in a more permissive environment or not, and whether they have resources at their disposal or not. Surprising defeats of long-standing presidents, such as Slobodan Milošević in 2000, only underscore the difficulties of unseating such rulers. Such outcomes only occur in 11 percent of all presidential elections selected for analyses — most elections are safe Page 233 for the incumbent elites. However, such surprising elections occur in 35 percent of elections with designated successors as candidates. As examined in previous chapters, decisions to step down or present oneself for re-election by overturning term limits are somewhat endogenous to the various political, economic, institutional and even personal factors. Controlling for factors that are likely to be correlated with the presidents' decisions gives some credence to the results presented here. It does seem that incumbency is a negative factor in forestalling democratic change.

Economic Effects of Term Limits

Scholars of comparative political economy stipulate that longer horizons in office affect horizons in policy decision-making (e.g., Franzese 2002). Indeed, presidents bound by a single four-year term with no prospect of re-election will probably implement different policies from those serving two terms of five years each with a high probability of re-election. Presidential term limits could determine political time horizons of governments and, in turn, have significant economic consequences. Existing scholarship on time horizons in politics use composite indicators thereof: for example, Cheibub (1998, 360) constructs a time discount variable as the hazard rate determined by length of a leader's time in office, the rate of economic growth, and the rate of past executive turnover; Gandhi and Przeworski (2006) use the number of prior leaders' changes and coups in each regime spell. As presidential term limits stipulate mandatory retirements and because of a significant re-election advantage of the incumbent office-holders, we can employ term limits as an alternative institutional indicator of time horizons. The exogenous effects of term limits were extensively studied in the literature on legislative behavior, especially in the American Congress (e.g., Alford and Brady 1988; Besley and Case 1995; Carey 1998; Carey, Niemi and Powell 2000; List and Sturm 2006). However, only Johnson and Crain (2004) examined the effects of presidential term limits, albeit in democratic nations only.

Economic Growth Variance and Term Limits

Limited time in office induced by term limits can lead to the so-called rage of *vouloir conclure*, haste and ambitiousness of policy formulations (Hirschman 1965, 313–16, quoted in Linz 1998, 22). There exist studies that find links between particular policies and the time politicians spend in office. Roubini and Sachs (1989) indicate that larger deficits are more Page 234 likely in countries characterized by a short average governmental tenure, which is also a sign of its inability to achieve and maintain political consensus. The length of tenure also determines the length of the political economic cycle (e.g., Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997): for example, in Mexico big capital projects are bedeviled by the “sexenio mentality,” the rush to get things done during the six-year presidential term. This is caused by the politicization of many governmental activities, which encourages six-year, but not long-term, planning.⁹ Olson (1993, 2000) argues that if a government is insecure, or for any other reason has a short time horizon, it no longer has an incentive to encourage the investment that will increase the national output in the long run (Olson 2000, 25–58). In contrast, rapid executive turnover makes it difficult to implement policies for structural change (Bienen and de Walle 1991).

From the literature on political regimes and economic growth we know that on average, nondemocracies exhibit higher variance in economic growth rates than democracies (e.g., Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson and Thaicharoen 2003; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Przeworski and Limongi 1997; Przeworski et al. 2000). The widely accepted explanation for the difference is that among dictatorships there are more economic disasters, as well as economic miracles, than under democracies that exhibit lower variance, which in turn, “is an attractive feature of a

polity that makes it ripe for high rates of investments and savings, which encourages higher growth in the future” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 161). There is a disagreement, however, whether instances of high growth under dictatorships should be attributable to institutions that constrain leaders (Besley and Kudamatsu 2009; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003; Gandhi 2008), to the attributes of individual leaders themselves (Jones and Olken 2005; Weede 1996) or to the exogenous shocks and inherent countries' traits (Przeworski et al. 2000). Whether economic performance of dictatorships can be explained by these factors or not, we can, however, compare whether longer time horizons in dictatorships are associated with lower variance of economic growth, in comparison with regimes that impose term limits on their own rulers. In essence, I conduct a simple test of the Olsonian argument whether stationary bandits are indeed better at managing their economies.

In a recent paper, Easterly (2011) examines variance of economic growth in democracies and autocracies and rejects the argument that high economic growth in some autocracies can be due either to their institutional parameters or to the identities of incumbent autocrats. Page 235 Instead, he finds that the variance of economic growth under autocracies is attributable to the growth differences *within* leaders' terms, rather than to differences between countries, similarly to Przeworski et al. (2000, 176) who also find very significant differences over time for the same regimes, even among autocracies that were deemed successful at particular times in history. In other words, it is likely that even autocrats that are regarded as successful at particular times are likely to experience low economic growth if they stay long in office. Following a similar research design as in Easterly (2011), below I examine whether longer time horizons are associated with lower variance of growth rates. With this goal in mind, I specify several fixed effects regression models that predict economic growth rates per capita in unbalanced panels of countries, 1960–2008. Each model includes year dummies to account for factors that might be common to all countries, such as commodity booms, oil prices, financial crises, and the like.

The first four models are estimated with countries' fixed effects, and the null hypothesis of zero country effects can be rejected in each case. The variance of country effects on growth among democratic and nondemocratic countries (those with *Polity2* of +6 and above, and otherwise) is quite similar (second row of Table 8.4, first two columns). However, nondemocratic regimes have a higher annual within-country variation than democracies (third row, first two columns). In turn, columns 3 and 4 display results from another model specification that excludes democratic regimes and compares growth variance in non-democratic regimes only: namely, between those that impose executive turnover (term-limited) and those that do not. It appears that non-democratic regimes that do not impose restrictions on their rulers, in contrast to those that do so, have lower variance (3.12 versus 6.06), and the variance within-countries is also lower in this group, albeit only just (6.34 versus 7.27).

Since term limits restrict the horizons of individual leaders, however, it is more informative to compare the growth variance between leaders in different regimes and between leaders with different time horizons, as well as within leaders' terms, that is, during their time in office, rather than between countries. The following four model specifications (columns 5–8) are estimated with leaders' fixed effects. As earlier, the null hypothesis of zero leaders' effects can be rejected in each model. The variation of economic growth per capita is lower for democratic leaders, and variation within leaders' terms is also lower in a democratic system (second and third rows of columns 5 and 6).

Page 236 Page 237

If we turn to nondemocratic leaders only and compare term-limited with unrestricted presidents (columns 7 and 8), leaders' effects appear to be lower for leaders with long time horizons than for “roving bandits” (4.15 versus 9.33). This difference could also be interpreted to indicate that “good” and “bad” autocrats — those with higher and lower growth rates — that the literature (e.g., Jones and Olken 2005; Weede 1996) argues about, tend to serve shorter tenures, hence higher variance of 9.33 in this category. However, most important, there are no significant differences *within* leaders' terms when we compare presidents with longer and shorter horizons in the third row (6.5 versus 6.25). In fact, this is the main result in this section: the absence of differences between two groups of leaders in equally nondemocratic regimes suggests that presidents with long horizons are not able to provide steadier economic performance than their peers that serve shorter tenures.¹⁰ This finding leads us to the tentative conclusion that the evidence to support the Olsonian argument about possible benefits of longer time horizons is

lacking. Below I examine more specific economic policies that the term limits could have effects upon instead. Even if nondemocratic leaders with shorter and longer horizons in office have equally high variance of growth rates, different economic policies could still be behind this volatility.

Capital and Social Spending and Term Limits

Do presidents with unlimited or longer mandates pursue different economic policies? The relationship between legislative term limits and public spending, despite a significant volume of research, seems to be unclear (e.g., Aka, Reed, Schansberg and Zhu 1996; Reed et al. 1994). What is the expectation regarding presidential limits, however? Virtually all presidents who extended their time in office claimed that their term was too short to carry out and complete necessary reforms, and that they needed more time. Certainly, as discussed earlier, an absence of term limits can insulate political leaders and enable them to pursue certain policies they might not pursue otherwise — policies where effects are not immediately apparent. Equally, binding term limits can also insulate those leaders who will not be re-elected no matter how hard they please their electorate, and therefore permit implementation of unpopular decisions.

In more democratic settings, as many scholars assume, a re-election possibility provides incentives to pursue certain policies that reflect well on the incumbents' reputations (Rogoff 1990). Besley and Case (1995) investigate whether US state governors pursue different fiscal policies depending on their re-election status, and find that taxes and spending are lower in the first than in the second, “lame-duck,” term. Similarly, Johnson and Crain (2004) find that single-term governments spend more than two-term or unlimited ones, and that two-term presidents are associated with more fiscal volatility.

Fiscal policy, which is often employed in the studies of democratic political business cycles (e.g., Alesina, Roubini and Cohen 1997), is not so pertinent in the less developed nations that collect insignificant amounts of revenue in personal taxes, in comparison with spending and social transfers that could have more impact on electoral results. More governmental spending does not necessarily have to displease voters in poorer economies, in contrast to the American electorate. What kind of public spending might be influenced by the time horizons of a chief executive? Spending on education, health care, and social benefits will certainly have an impact on the long-term economic performance of nations and increase human capital (Barro 1999). At the same time, however, such expenditures can also bring immediate rewards to the politicians and ease their re-election prospects.

Governmental capital spending, on the other hand, while exerting similar positive effects on long-term economic growth (Sala-i Martin 1997), will not necessarily fill the pockets of an average citizen, directed as it is toward the acquisition of fixed capital assets that would benefit long-term national prospects. Indeed, De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) find that public capital spending is politically easier to cut than other spending categories. Below, I employ spending on education, health care, and welfare as a measure of governmental spending with immediate political effects, and public capital spending as an indicator of governmental investment with less immediate, longer-term effects.

Presidents with longer tenures will be more insulated from electoral pressures, in contrast to the leaders who face more immediate exits from office and who may not “feel particularly interested in putting effort in policy reforms, especially if they require ‘time to build’” (Aghion, Alesina and Trebbi 2004, 602). Unlimited rulers, however, could be more likely to allocate more on long-term capital projects, and still be in office to reap the rewards when these projects are completed. For example, for President Anastasio Somoza (1936–56) of Nicaragua, who had no effective limits on his tenure after 1939, public capital investment became the most important budgetary expenditure, especially in the 1940s when it rose to 45 percent in certain years. In contrast, his spending on education, health care, labor and agriculture rarely exceeded 10 percent (Walter 1993, 86–87). The benefits arising from capital projects usually are not revealed in the short run, and myopic, time-constrained governments will be less likely to increase capital spending (De Haan, Sturm and Sikken 1996).

Additionally, we can examine whether “lame-duck” presidents spend more or less than those that can still be re-elected. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 313–19) argue that as the end of their legal term approaches, leaders know that they will be removed regardless of their policy performance, and this fact undermines their incentive to

perform. As mentioned earlier in this section, Besley and Case (1995) find that state taxes and spending are higher in the second terms when office-holders feel less pressure to please the voters. Other studies find no significant changes in representatives' last term in office (e.g., Lott and Bronars 1993).

In summary, the expectation is that term-limited presidents will invest less in capital projects than those with longer horizons. However, it is not certain whether social spending should be higher under the former or the latter. Certainly, spending on education, health care or social welfare is expected to be higher under more democratic regimes (e.g., Stasavage 2005), but I remain agnostic as to the effects of term limits on governmental outlays in these areas in general. We can also expect that presidents that can be re-elected — those in their first out of two terms — should allocate more to social expenditure, in contrast to presidents that can not be re-elected.

Data and Model Specification

Public finance data exhibit a high degree of autocorrelation and any model specification has to take into account that the current observations will be dependent on their past values. Existing studies in comparative political economy employ various methods to estimate panel data. One possibility is to specify a model that includes the lagged dependent variable to capture the cumulative effects of past values of regressors on the dependent variable. However, the inclusion of the former does not necessarily guarantee that the relationship between variables will not be spurious. In his study of the determinants of public spending, Franzese (2002) used the so-called pseudo error-correction model that allowed estimation of both contemporaneous and long-term effects of the included regressors; the model specified the dependent variable as the difference between the current and lagged levels and included the lagged dependent variable, alongside other regressors that were both lagged and differenced, on the right-hand side (De Boef and Keele 2008). Thus, to gauge the effects of presidential term limits on governmental spending decisions, first I employ autoregressive distributed lagged OLS regression with fixed effects that includes lagged dependent and independent variables as predictors and, second, the pseudo error-correction model with fixed effects, that in addition to the lagged predictors also includes differenced ones.

To see whether governments with long horizons in power and more insulated rulers will be more likely to invest in projects that do not always give immediate returns, I examine governmental capital spending levels. Combined expenditure on education, health care, and social security and welfare (social protection in the IMF GFS current version) constitutes the measure of social spending. Both variables are calculated as proportions to total spending to gauge governmental priorities, and details are available in the data appendix online. On average, in the 1972–2008 period countries included in analyses spend 20 percent of the total expenditure on capital investment programs, and they spend 37 percent on education, health care, social benefits and welfare. Presidents who are not constrained by term limits allocate on average 25 percent to capital spending and 31 percent to social spending in contrast to those facing limits who allocate 17 percent and 42 percent, respectively. To investigate whether these differences are statistically significant, however, I turn to the various factors that are likely to influence governmental spending, in a dynamic setting.

Existing studies that examine the determinants of public expenditure in particular areas usually employ predictors that account for the available resources, economic and societal demands or the ease of policy-making. De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) find that in advanced democracies public capital investment is reduced when governments face deficits and public debts, when private investment is low, and when governments face short time horizons. The authors employ governmental turnover as the proxy for the latter. Sturm (2001), who investigates the determinants of public investment decline in less-developed nations, employs a battery of variables including budget deficits, economic growth, degree of urbanization, debt, trade openness, private investment, civil liberties, governmental ideology, and political instability, and finds that economic determinants trump political and institutional ones in the explanation of this decline.

Every fitted model includes the lagged dependent variable: either aggregated social or capital spending. The indicator for term limits assumes the value of one for years when presidential term limits in effect are in place, and zero otherwise. The presidential first term assumes the value of one for years under the first term in the two-term presidency, and zero for second terms and for single and only terms — under single-term presidents.

To control for the effects of political cycles, I include a dummy for presidential election year. Governments are more likely to increase social spending, but not necessarily capital spending, in an election year. Also, to control for regime effects, a standard *Polity2* measure is included.

Following De Haan, Sturm and Sikken (1996) and Sturm (2001), in order to account for the demand for more infrastructure in less developed and agrarian economies, I include the degree of urbanization as the proportion of total population living in urban areas: the more urbanized the nation is, the less demand there is for capital spending. Likewise, the growing population will increase pressure for more public infrastructure and hence cause larger capital spending. Similarly, lower levels of income per capita will also capture higher demand for hospitals, roads, schools and the like. Also, a high governmental deficit often leads to austerity measures and could trigger cuts in governmental spending in all areas. Also, the measure of trade openness is used to gauge whether governments are likely to invest in better infrastructure in order to appeal to international investors. Greater trade openness could also make governments increase their social spending to compensate for possible unemployment brought by increased competition from abroad (Rodrik 1998). In a similar manner, a great proportion of dependent population should increase social spending by their governments. More elderly people will increase demand for health care and welfare benefits (Rudra 2002), and more young will demand better provision of education (Stasavage 2005). All independent variables are lagged by one year.

Due to a high degree of missingness of many potential predictors, especially for the less developed nations, I forsake a larger number of variables that could also have contributed to the explanation.

Page 242 Page 243 Page 244 Page 245

Predicting Capital and Social Spending

Results indicate that even though the presence of term limits is associated with lower capital spending — with the correct sign of the direction of effects on the coefficient — it is not statistically significant to warrant a firm conclusion that presidents facing longer time horizons are more insulated and spend more on projects that yield medium- to long-term effects. However, once we exclude democratic regimes, it appears that leaders in partly and nondemocratic regimes that are not subject to binding term limits do allocate more to capital projects than their peers in other nondemocratic, yet limited, offices. This result can be seen from columns 3 and 4 of [Table 8.5](#). In the ECM model the coefficient on the differenced variable for limits is not statistically significant, which probably indicates that there is no evidence for long-term effects of this variable. As can also be seen, more open nations with growing populations have to invest more. There is also evidence that nations with budget surpluses spend more.

If we turn to aggregate spending on education, health care and welfare benefits, again, term-limited presidents turn out to spend less on social outlays, but the results are not statistically significant. As expected, presidents that can be re-elected — in their first terms — allocate more on social outlays (last two columns), but again, results are not statistically significant. Also, governmental finances being in good shape (budget surpluses) are associated with higher spending. More trade openness that exposes societies to increased international competition reduces spending on education, health care and social benefits, and, counterintuitively, a higher proportion of the young in the total population decreases social spending. The negative sign of the latter's effects can probably be attributed to the high correlation between low income per capita and the high proportion of population aged below fifteen years.

In summary, longer time horizons in office associated with the absence of term limits in all presidential regimes influence neither public capital spending nor social spending. The only apparent effect of longer time horizons in office is revealed in comparisons between term-limited and unlimited rulers in non- and partly democratic regimes only: presidents that can be continuously re-elected spend more on capital projects. Also, this finding probably indicates that in nondemocratic regimes where presidents can remain in office for a long time it is easier, perhaps more “efficient,” to skim funds from the large, elephantine projects that require significant amounts of capital spending (also see Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, 162), and therefore we observe higher Page 246 volumes of such spending among regimes headed by presidents with unrestricted tenures.

Conclusion

Presidential term limits have certain economic and political consequences. If they did not have, presidents would not strive to extend them with such tenacity. Term limits' most obvious effect is on the average time in office that presidents can serve because regular elections do not provide sufficient brakes on executive tenure, but binding term limits do. The longer the national executives are in power, the higher grow the barriers to entry they impose whether through more executive control over other branches of government and dismantling of democratic institutions, or through indirect effects on voters and civil servants who get accustomed to particular individuals and even develop apathy to politics.

Many more presidents step down because they comply with term limits rather than because they lose re-election. The identity of a governmental candidate — whether a long-standing incumbent or a hand-picked successor — matters. When incumbent presidents are absent, their designated successors are more likely to lose elections. Since 1990, partly and nondemocratic regimes are predominantly challenged by the pro-democratic opposition rather than by the pro-Soviet, nationalist, fascist, or other antisystem forces, or opposing oligarchic parties of the earlier periods. As a result, governmental defeat at elections often leads to further political liberalization. The evidence suggests that despite shared variability with other determinants, longer-serving incumbent presidents almost always perform better at elections than their designated successors.

Also, a test of economic effects of term limits revealed that the absence of term limits does not decrease volatility in economic growth over longer tenures: countries with presidents at their helm with longer horizons in office do not exhibit lower growth variance. Second, term limits do not appear to influence capital or social spending overall; presidents who face prospects of re-election do not seem to spend more than in their second terms, or than single-term presidents. The only effect, however, is that among nondemocratic rulers those that can stay in office longer tend to allocate more on capital projects, but it can also be due to the fact that it is easier to seek rents from large projects.

I only examined the effects of term limits on public spending. There Page 247 is no reason why other potential outcomes cannot be examined further. For example, when in February 2010 the Colombian Supreme Court ruled against a third term for President Álvaro Uribe (2002–10), who was widely regarded as a business-friendly executive, the response from international markets was rather muted. In contrast, when the Russian outgoing president announced his successor in December 2007, the stock market rallied to celebrate the end of uncertainty that had surrounded succession. And when in November 2008 the newly elected President Medvedev announced extension of the next president's term from four to six years, raising doubts about his presidency, the market reaction was negative. Clearly, depending on how international investors perceive the incumbent ruler, markets will react differently to the announcements of tenure extensions, and one can certainly examine financial data to gauge how markets perceive the various events around presidential succession and the degree of uncertainty. Other potential effects of presidential term limits can also be examined, such as on other areas of public spending, international conflict, or campaign finance.

Conclusion: Presidentialism, Democracy, and Term Limits

In the preceding chapters, I have developed a leader-centric explanation for the process of democratic breakdown and personalization in presidential regimes that occurs when political leaders decide to overturn term limits. From the 1990s onward, the main focus in comparative democratization literature has been on democratic consolidation (Diamond 1999; Huntington 1991, 208–316; Linz and Stepan 1996; Svobik 2009). Due to a proliferation of clearly undemocratic regimes that conduct elections and display other attributes of democratic politics, a number of scholars, however, turned to the analyses of electoral authoritarian, partly democratic regimes, as a separate subtype (e.g., Brownlee 2007a; Levitsky and Way 2010; Schedler 2006). Likewise, there is a certain revival of studies of nondemocratic regimes. We know a lot about how non- and partly democratic regimes function and what makes them stable, the role of elections in these regimes (e.g., Gandhi and Lust-Okar 2009; Lehoucq 2003; Lust-Okar 2006), legislatures (e.g., Gandhi 2008; Wright 2008) and political parties (e.g., Magaloni 2006; Smith 2005). Likewise, we know a lot about presidentialism and executive-legislative relations (e.g., Cheibub 2007; Elgie 2011; Linz 1994; Shugart and Carey 1992). Still, the comparative examination of mechanisms under which presidentialism can slide into personal dictatorship, and the question of compliance with presidential term limits and how it all can impact on democratic consolidation, is lacking. No adequate theories exist in the literature that answer under what conditions individual political leaders will comply with their constitutions. This book fills the gap. It charts the relationship between presidential term limits, political ambition and temptations of Page 249 the highest office, and democracy.

Because the incentives to stay in office are largely determined by the structural conditions of the economy, the explanation that I advanced complements the accepted macro-economic explanations for stability and change of political regimes (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2006; Boix and Stokes 2003; Epstein et al. 2006; Przeworski et al. 2000) by proposing a novel mechanism that highlights the crucial role of individual political leaders and their career concerns. These concerns are in turn often determined by how leaders respond to rent-seeking opportunities while in office. Similarly, Adsera and Boix (2008) find that structural economic factors drive the incentives of political actors to deviate from or comply with democratic norms. Presidents have sufficient powers to launch dictatorial takeovers and to behave as rent-seekers (Adsera and Boix 2008, 247–57). Similarly to the scholarship that examines how economic conditions can determine what elites stand to lose as a group in the event of democratization, the argument of this book emphasizes various personal and structural factors that limit what is at stake for individual presidents.

This book draws attention to the necessity for comparative democratization scholarship to examine what individual political leaders stand to lose and their career concerns, especially in nations where institutions remain malleable and personalism is strong. In deinstitutionalized or weakly institutionalized regimes, presidential term limits are at the core of politics because, if they are binding, they envisage the mandatory retirement of the very individuals who guarantee property rights and intricate balances within the elite winning coalitions. In this study I used various kinds of empirical evidence to probe the relationship between term limits, democracy, and dictatorship, and between the value of holding office and democracy. The results of my inquiry have been discussed at length throughout this book. Below I summarize the most important findings and conclusions as elaborated in the preceding chapters, as well as suggestions for further research. Following that, I will turn to normative and policy implications.

Summary of Findings and Conclusions

In the beginning of this book I set the scene for further inquiries: I charted the history of term limits from antiquity to our day and discussed various normative arguments frequently made for or against limited tenure. Whether these arguments were made in Ancient Rome or in contemporary sub-Saharan Africa, they are essentially the same. Page 250 There exists a very old philosophical tradition that equates perpetual rule with dictatorial rule,

so that term limits represent an institutional demarcation line that separates democratic rulers, however powerful, from tyrants. The historical evidence indicates that whenever democratic or, earlier, competitive oligarchic systems appear, they are often accompanied by term limits. Democracy is strongly correlated with term limits irrespective of the indicator selected.

Having described various presidential term limits, I turned to how political leaders extended them. The constitutional imagination behind presidential tenure extension justifies a separate chapter on its own. Political leaders do so in a variety of ways — from one humble additional year to becoming a de facto king with a presidency for life. The latter arrangement, however, lost its popularity in the last twenty years. After 1991 many aspiring autocrats prefer the manipulation of term limits instead of unlimited or Life presidencies. Similar to electoral manipulation where incumbents rarely lose, many presidents are able to extend their tenure ad hoc while retaining formal constitutional term limits. In summary:

1. Between 1960 and 2009, out of all presidents who enter limited office and complete their mandated tenures, more than a quarter prolong their stay. In general, the rough estimates indicate that throughout history close to a quarter of leaders that are able to complete their terms choose to extend their time in office. Tenure extensions occur in variety of ways. In short, about half of these leaders obtain unlimited time in power, and the other half, temporary, via an additional term, or discarding time already served.
2. Presidents prefer to bundle tenure extensions with other constitutional amendments, extend tenures of other office-holders simultaneously, and to incorporate these changes in the new or revised constitutions.

Instead of repeating various constitutional changes that presidents of the world routinely choose in order to stay in office, below I briefly explain “the dictator's play book” and summarize what usually works from the point of view of a modern Caesar.

If you are an aspiring autocrat desiring a longer or unlimited stay in office, a lot depends on the strength of executive constraints at entry into office. If you are fortunate enough to inherit a very strong presidency with insignificant checks and balances, perhaps from your direct relative, and if you are able to overcome various challenges from the elite ranks, it does not really matter whether you extend your Page 251 tenure early in your first term, or later during your second term, if you have two. It might be important, however, to signal to your winning coalition that their stream of spoils will not disappear in eight or ten years when you approach constitutional term limits, so that they will not expect you to step down in favor of another ruler. It is preferable not to wait to the last moment when the inevitable uncertainty sets in and the elite ranks potentially split between several bidding successors.

However, if you are democratically elected in a partly democratic or even democratic regime, it is dangerous to wait till the last year without having consolidated your executive authority earlier. First of all, rally your supporters from the ranks of your own party and cabinet ministers and make sure they all remain in line. Ensure, especially, that the ministers for defense, security services and police chiefs are personally loyal to you; if they are not, replace them. Sometime early in your tenure, while your popularity is still considerable, convert the popularity into something more lasting, and attempt to modify the existing constitution, especially limiting the powers of the legislature. Do not forget to modify the composition of a constitutional court if at all possible. If the legislature and judiciary oppose modification of the constitution, launch a paraconstitutional initiative (consult Carey 1998, 14) by convening a constitutional assembly whose authority without a doubt supersedes ordinary legislature, and arrange a binding referendum to approve a new constitution.

If you are not prepared to abolish term limits — in fact there are certain reputational costs in that if the international community has some sway over your nation's affairs — constitutional change will also give you an opportunity to later claim that your second term was your first so that, at the very least, you will be able to serve one additional term. Make sure, however, that the modified constitution does not include a no-grandfathering clause so that you can indeed claim that additional term later. Additionally, make sure the new constitution does not firewall presidential term limits. If it does contain such a firewall provision, a simple constitutional reform will

not be enough. You will then have to introduce a brand new constitution that your legal office could claim is exempt from that inconvenient clause. You can always discard time already served under the old constitution and begin a new countdown after a referendum that approves the new basic law of the land.

Do not forget to initiate various political reforms often and to frequently change the electoral system. For instance, keep modifying — increasing and decreasing — the number of members in the parliament until the whole political regime becomes deinstitutionalized and the Page 252 only political institution that matters is you. Make sure that you have many plans to improve the lot of the poor and the long-term prospects of the national economy, plans that cannot be implemented or finished during your too short constitutional tenure; and ensure that more time would be needed to finish all the good reforms that you started. People should know that the absence of term limits enhances democracy as it gives them more choice and makes their president accountable — why would anyone want to take that choice away from them? Make sure that no credible challengers emerge so that you, the president, remain indispensable. When term limits are modified formally, bundle them with other provisions to enhance democracy so that this clause does not look like it is introduced for a specific person but represents just a tiny part of broader package of reforms. Better yet, simultaneously extend terms for other officials, governors and MPs, who will all then try harder on your behalf and their own. When the time comes for abolishing term limits — do not introduce a Presidency for Life, it is considered to be in rather bad taste these days — make sure that the only possible answer to your question whether you can stay in power a little longer will be “Yes” only.

If you are successful in your endeavors and implement all of the recommendations above, there is a good chance that you would indeed stay in power longer. Be aware, however, that very soon you will not be able to know what your supporters really think and whether citizens still love you, and before long, you will probably fall victim to a coup or an assassination, just like the majority of your predecessors. In retrospect, you should have stepped down when required and pursued philosophy as a private citizen instead.

This Machiavellian playbook is certainly not the product of my imagination but accounts the successful dictatorial takeovers of presidential regimes by individual leaders across the world. Remarkably, despite very different institutional parameters and varied constitutional history and political cultures, presidents perused a very similar menu of strategies to take over their regimes, and even followed a very similar timing of particular institutional changes, whether in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America or Eastern Europe. In the final section of this chapter I turn to possible policy implications and how democracy partisans can thwart the designs of ambitious presidents.

When I examined first and only re-elections in two-term presidential regimes, the incumbency advantage seems overwhelming: the predominant majority of political leaders who present themselves for re-election win — whether in democratic, partly democratic, or nondemocratic Page 253 regimes. Certainly, the first re-election rate does not necessarily imply that there will be a similar advantage should these presidents present themselves for a second, or more, re-election. With the possible exception of Franklin D. Roosevelt's (1933–45) second and third re-elections, presidential re-elections after the first one, throughout the world, are typically conducted under more repressive regimes than the ones under which the first re-elections were held. This makes it extremely difficult to separate the incumbency advantage from the overall institutional parameters in order to gauge re-election rates in general. However, virtually all unlimited presidents keep winning re-elections, and they lose office in a nonelectoral manner instead. In summary:

3. When sitting presidents present themselves for re-election, the odds of winning elections are about four to one in their favor on average.
4. The majority of leaders who either extend their stay in power or have no term limits from the very beginning are either killed in office or ousted. Only a minority of such leaders are able to die in office of natural causes or retire peacefully.

The likelihood that presidents would be driven to remain in office is largely determined by the value of holding office. This value depends on the magnitude of spoils accrued from it as well as the probability of immunity,

acquiring wealth and status after leaving office. Chapters 4 to 6 touch upon several aspects of this problem. Basically, presidents in poor and corrupt countries often see political office as a source of income and accumulate wealth while in office, perhaps anticipating that their tenure will last long, or discarding the future, or planning to consume the acquired wealth in exile. As a result, their immunity will be endangered if they step down in the future. Nor will they be able to enjoy private employment if they choose, because there are no well-developed private sectors. In contrast, leaders in wealthier countries postpone the acquisition of wealth until after exit from office, when they expect to earn in the multiples of their income in office. In summary:

5. Former leaders in more developed and more democratic countries are more likely to pursue other careers, whether in nonprofit, political, international or business sectors, than their peers in less developed or less democratic countries. Also, presidents in wealthy democracies officially earn more in absolute terms. However, relative to average incomes or the magnitude of responsibilities, they make less than their peers in the less developed economies.

6. Successful tenure extensions are associated with a higher magnitude of the spoils of office — especially manifested in larger size of public sector and poorer protection of property rights — and with the Page 254 lower probability of retaining immunity after expected exit from office, for a given level of constraints — especially those arising from elite-level checks and balances. This argument is supported by extensive statistical analyses.

Certainly, even though leaders face different opportunities to acquire personal wealth and retain personal and financial security, they are also affected by various constraints imposed on their discretion, which in turn will depend on the strength of the legislature and the party system, the collective action potential of the citizenry, and, often, international leverage. In summary:

7. Presidents who are able to extend their stay usually have personal control over the president's own party, a larger number of effective legislative parties, a weaker legislative opposition, and judiciary that is not independent from governmental interference. Additionally, presidents with lower linkages with the West, fewer democratic neighbors in the same region, and those that have witnessed numerous examples of successful tenure extensions by their peers, again, in the same region, are more likely to subvert constitutions.

It does not appear that personal background of political leaders is a strong predictor of their succession behavior. I have certainly not discovered some kind of a red flag indicator, such as individual preferences for particular pets or vegetarianism for instance, that indicates an underlying propensity to become dictators. I also did not find any indicators that will be unambiguously correlated with the quality of politicians, their public-spiritedness. All background characteristics that have shared variability with decisions to comply with constitutions are also plausible indicators for the likelihood of the individual being an “insider,” a member of the economic or political elite, with a vested interest in regime stability. In summary:

8. While certain details of leaders' background, such as their military background, being the father of the newly independent nation, the status of political outsider or a Western university degree are associated with leaders' propensity to subvert democracy, or not, the effects of personal background are inconsistent and diminish once we account for selection effects. Whatever their background is, by and large leaders respond to the existing constraints and monetary rewards in and out of office.

Finally, I gauged whether presidential term limits, if binding, have discernible political or economic effects. Compliance with term limits is important because it habituates political elites to democratic norms, and it further institutionalizes not yet consolidated democracies. It is also important because the identity of a governmental candidate — whether Page 255 a long-standing incumbent or a hand-picked successor — also matters: designated successors are more likely to lose elections than incumbents, even controlling for the overall electoral environment; and because they tend to lose elections to pro-democratic candidates, it increases the likelihood of political liberalization. My findings suggest that defeats at the so-called stunning elections are driven not only by the opposition's mobilization but also by the absence of an incumbent, which reduces the costs of collective

action. Presidential term limits also matter for public finances, but not in the same sense as meant by the presidents who claim they have to finish long-term economic transformations. In summary:

9. Incumbent presidents who served in office for at least a year prior to election are less likely to lose the election than their designated successors, controlling for the overall electoral environment; democratic liberalization occurs more often when incumbents step down.

10. I do not find support for the Olsonian (1993) argument that leaders with longer horizons — the so-called stationary bandits — are better economic planners, as the variance of economic growth under term-limited and unlimited presidents is very similar.

11. Term limits do not influence public spending decisions overall. Instead, they appear to matter in nondemocratic regimes only as unlimited presidents tend to allocate more on capital expenditure, but not on education, health care, social security and welfare.

Future Research

Certainly, this book is far from being the last word on the effects of individual political leaders and their career concerns on democratic consolidation. Equally, it is not a definitive account of presidential term limits and all possible effects thereof. In an effort to build a generalizable theory of presidential succession and the costs and benefits of leaving office, I abstracted from many details as well as other potentially important parameters. Further research can improve our understanding of rulers' career concerns and their effects on political development on several fronts. First, the question of why many rulers are reluctant to leave office and what they do to perpetuate themselves in power is very broad and could lead to the inclusion of more cases and phenomena beyond succession strategies and outcomes in term-bound presidencies. Admittedly, there is a certain tension between the fact that the book is about presidential term limits, yet I propose a general theory that is centered on spoils generated from the economy. Indeed, concerns for immunity, protection of assets, and temptations Page 256 over the spoils of office are the factors that should influence all leaders: presidents, prime ministers, “national leaders,” even monarchs. Because term limits and behavior during succession permit us to observe the value of stepping down, I focused only on leaders that were mandated to depart. Thus, one possible avenue for future research is to explore the costs and benefits of holding office in different types of regimes that do not feature mandated term limits. Similarly, provided the data is available, future scholarship can investigate the breakdown of presidential democracies and their degeneration into personalism, extending the analyses earlier in time, prior to 1960.

Second, and more important, future scholarship can turn to different, more direct indicators of the value of holding office across different regimes. There are numerous difficulties in the operationalization of temptations of power. Lacking numerical data on the financial reward of political office, I turned to indirect measures that were likely to be correlated with the unobserved magnitude of spoils. It is certainly unknowable how much, whether in relative or absolute terms, the national political leaders are able to skim off their economies. Likewise, short of unusual cases when former presidents are obliged to report their private wealth and income because, for instance, their spouse is running for public office, as former US president Bill Clinton had to do after leaving the presidency, we cannot assert by how much former presidents are able to enrich themselves in private sectors after departures. Therefore, the second direction future research can turn to in more detail is to address what exactly political leaders stand to lose and to gain in and out of office. Specifically, scholars can attempt to find proxies for the likely individual income prior to assuming office and after departing from office, turning to the data on corporate board membership or other business affiliations of former heads of state, or probate values at the time of death. Similarly, detailed data on the perks of office across the world, including the overall expenditure on the office of the head of state outlaid in the national budgets, the number of official residencies, and details on immunity guarantees provided, can be generated.

The study of term limits and changes thereof provides another interesting venue for research centered on time horizons. Earlier I referred to the example of President Hugo Chávez, who was elected for a single five-year term,

yet, dreaming of political immortality, extended his tenure from the initial five to thirteen years, and having indicated that his project would not be finished until 2021, eliminated tenure restrictions. Clearly, some rulers update their time horizons as their tenure progresses. The current models that discuss time horizons Page 257 and their impact parameterize these horizons retrospectively, such as the time served in office or as the life spans of political parties, and do not account for the fact that these horizons can lengthen or shorten. We can examine, particularly in the formal framework, whether presidents discount their future differently depending on how far they have progressed along constitutional tenure and, therefore, whether they pursue different policies.

Normative and Policy Implications

The broad implication of this book is that democracy practitioners should focus their attention not only on free and fair elections, but also on executive tenure restrictions and the observance thereof, as well as rulers' personal career concerns. Most existing studies employ adverse changes in democratic scores and rankings to define a democratic breakdown, but the breakdown of presidential term limits can serve as an additional and direct indicator of authoritarian reversal. Przeworski et al. (2000, 23–29) define democracy as a regime where both executive and legislature are elected and there is more than one party; they also propose the so-called alternation rule whereby in addition to the first three criteria, incumbents have to lose an election and step down, at least once. The last criterion can only be applied ex post, after an incumbent steps down, so that we can be certain that elections and opposition were not tolerated only as long as the incumbent was capable of winning elections. The predominant majority of partly and nondemocratic regimes, especially during the third wave of democratization, permit political opposition, elections to be held regularly, and formally democratic institutions to be incorporated into their constitutions. However, incumbent elites learnt how to manipulate and hide behind a democratic façade (e.g., Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002; Schedler 2006). Other undemocratic practices such as ballot stuffing, dependence of the judiciary on the executive and control of the media can all be open to interpretation and to allegations of Western bias. By contrast, de facto term limits are easy to monitor and interpret: the incumbent president either steps down when initially stipulated term limits approach, or does not. In a sense, similar to the alternation rule, compliance with term limits is an alternation rule for presidential regimes of today — it is irreversible and allows us to observe the true type of an incumbent political leader.

Many scholars have warned that presidential term limits can impede accountability and prevent good incumbents from re-election (Cheibub Page 258 2007, 166–68; Linz 1994; Shugart and Carey 1992, 90). However, the majority of political leaders these scholars examined were prevented only from immediate re-election after serving a single term in office. Certainly, nothing indicates that an additional, second term for a single-term president is inherently undemocratic. Single-term presidential regimes can safely move to a two-term arrangement, provided that only one, second term is added, and that there exists a broad elite and public consensus that a second term is final no matter how indispensable a sitting president becomes. In principle, one immediate re-election will allow the leader to make longer, more informed decisions because of longer time horizons and the possibility for policy correction mid-course. It is equally possible, however, that presidents will shirk from taking unpopular although necessary measures during their first terms in order to be re-elected. Also, about half of those who extended their rule from a single-term to a two-term regime realized that it was not enough and sought more terms.

While a second consecutive term in a previously single-term presidency is conceivable, there certainly should not be more than two terms, consecutive or not.¹ Perhaps the wisdom of crowds should apply to nations as well in that the best arrangement is the one that is the most widespread in the world today: an institution of a five-year term with the possibility of one immediate, and final, re-election. Additionally the Bolivarian dictum, that the longer the tenure the weaker the presidential authority should be, is also advisable for constitutional engineers. Nations considering the introduction of an additional second term for their single-term presidents should take note of Argentina's experience under President Menem who in 1993 had a single six-year term replaced for a 2×4 arrangement — thereby shortening one term even as it allowed an additional one while, at the same time, limiting the constitutional authority of the president. When Menem later attempted to run for a third term, being weaker, he failed.

In this regard, what can be done to thwart personalization of power? Earlier I elaborated on typical strategies

employed by presidents who desire political immortality. Opponents should be aware of these strategies and be able to mobilize against them. Certainly, from the very beginning, the “behind the veil of ignorance” moment, constitutional amendments to circumvent term limits have to be made as difficult as possible. Nations adopting new constitutions or modifying old ones will be well advised to firewall presidential term limits. If a constitution is amended or modified, an explicit clause in the concluding or transitory provisions that exclude the sitting president from claiming his or her second term to be his or her first, has to be inserted. In Page 259 general, constitutional amendments should be made rather difficult to implement: while it could ossify political institutions, it could also make dictatorial takeovers more difficult. As numerous examples of successful extensions demonstrate, however, all constitutional obstacles — firewalls, parliamentary supermajorities, negative rulings by constitutional courts, nonbinding referenda — can be overcome by determined presidents who command the executive branches and enforcement agencies. Certainly, and it goes to the nature of checks and balances in unconsolidated democracies, parliaments should have some control over enforcement agencies — possibly to the detriment of the separation of powers, if legislatures should have any potential to withstand against dictatorial takeovers. Institutional design, however, is not enough to truly understand the practical limits of democratic theory. We must explicitly account for the individual-level incentives of leaders to retain power. This book not only deepens our understanding of the workings of presidential regimes but also offers a cautionary note on the limits of constitutions and regime design. If the stakes are high, an unconstrained president in any variety of political regime will likely do his best to overstay his welcome.

Presidents of the world care about their careers, and they certainly care about their wealth and status. A proper understanding of rulers' career concerns could lead donor governments and democracy practitioners to re-examine what is at stake for a typical ruler in a less developed country, and which institutions and elite pacts could ease ex post contracting in order to ensure transition to, and consolidation of, democracy. Possible measures could include credible pledges of immunity guaranteed by third parties, perhaps to the detriment of the so-called torturer's problem (Huntington 1991, 211–31), provided that rulers did not commit gross violations of human rights while in office. Certainly, legislation guaranteeing the future of former rulers, their assets and their families should be considered along the lines of the US 1958 Former Presidents Act. The international community should avoid isolating rulers of developing and transitional countries who enter presidential office and who, depending on choices they make, could become democrats or dictators and thus steer their nations' trajectories. Instead, donor governments should encourage these rulers to socialize into the global political and economic organizations so that they will value their international standing and reputation.

Beyond that, donor governments and international organizations that engage in international development assistance programs should recognize that there is a long and established tradition of tenure restrictions going back to the very origins of democracy, and acknowledge Page 260 term limits as the norm. Term limits are not one of the institutional features that democracies can experiment with and adopt or ignore depending on local circumstances, such as the choice over unicameral or bicameral legislatures or Central Bank independence. Instead, presidential term limits are one of the most fundamental and inalienable institutions of a presidential democracy, and if a presidential regime abandons them, it can no longer be deemed a democracy. There is a strong bond between term limits and *democratic* presidentialism that is not present in, for instance, parliamentarism. As Juan Linz argued, in contrast to prime ministers that are not restricted by term limits, people favor presidential term limits for psychological reasons: because parliamentary leaders survive as long as they are supported by their parties or coalitions that can disintegrate or replace a leader at any time, it produces a “psychological feeling that no one is assured a prior stay in power for a fixed time” (ibid., 1998, 25). There are signs that international indicators of democracy caught on to this. In the second half of the 2000s, for example, it became routine for Freedom House to implicitly downgrade national rankings after tenure extensions, but the practice has not yet been incorporated into their methodology.

The idea of term limits is as old as the idea of democracy itself: whenever limits are breached, democracy breaks down. The ancients knew that regular elections and checks and balances needed to be strengthened by a compulsory rotation of office-holders. Binding term limits did not only prevent the possibility of a dictatorial takeover, which is the main reason for the adoption of the former nowadays; nor were they imposed only to

increase electoral competitiveness since the former also lowered barriers to entry into politics. A deeper reason for imposing term limits was that they guaranteed that private citizens and public officials were equal because the former could easily become the latter, and vice versa. More important, they also made it clear to politicians that they would have to leave their elevated stations for the robes of a regular citizen, and this certainty of a future return ensured moderation — one of the highest virtues held by the ancient Greeks — while serving in office.

Term limits are designed to hinder the transformation of presidents into monarchs. More than 200 years ago, Alexander Hamilton argued that the absence of term limits is safe for democracy (*The Federalist Papers No. 71 and 72*), 2004 [1788]). Thomas Jefferson, on the contrary, emphasized the dangers of long tenures that lead to dictatorship. As discussed with the assistance of a great number of empirical examples and cross-national statistical research that I employed in this book, in this debate Thomas Jefferson appears to have been proven right.

Appendix: Continuismo and Constitutions

III: “New Countdown”

1993 Constitution of Kyrgyzstan Article 43(1): The President of the Kyrgyz Republic shall be elected for a term of five years. Article 43(2): The same person cannot be elected President for more than two consecutive terms.

July 13, 1998, Decision of the Kyrgyz Constitution Court on the eligibility of the President to participate in 2000 elections.

Member of Parliament A. K. Madumarov argued that a first term of President Askar Akayev should be counted from 1990 to 1995, and a second term should be counted from 1995. Considering the existing disagreement about the application of Article 43(2) of the Constitution of the Kyrgyz Republic that prohibits the same individual from seeking more than two consecutive terms, the Constitutional Court shall rule on the eligibility of the President of Kyrgyz Republic Askar Akayev to participate in the 2000 presidential elections.

The office of the President of the Kyrgyz Soviet Socialist Republic was established...on October 24, 1990,... The first President of Kyrgyz SSR was elected for five years by the Supreme Soviet in a secret ballot,...the same person cannot seek the office of the President of Kyrgyz SSR more than two consecutive terms.... Subsequently, ...the Supreme Soviet, after Declaration of the State Sovereignty of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, on the same day...assigned the elections of the President of the independent Republic of Kyrgyzstan to be held on October 12, 1991, and...nominated Askar Akayev for the Presidency.... Askar Akayev...was elected as the President of Republic of Kyrgyzstan. The Constitutional Court deems the October 12, 1991...voting [vybory] that followed the Declaration of the State Sovereignty..., and the subsequent election [izbranie] of Askar Akayev as the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, to be a procedure brought about by the objective circumstances and that was carried out in order to ensure legitimacy and authority of the President of the independent state — Republic of Kyrgyzstan.

On May 5, 1993, the Supreme Soviet voted for the first Constitution of the independent Republic.... Considering that the authority of the first President...was derived from the 1978 Constitution of Kyrgyz SSR, a referendum was held on January 30, 1994, on the subject as to whether “People of Kyrgyzstan affirm that the President of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan, universally elected on October 12, 1991, for five years, is the President of Kyrgyz Republic and has the authority according to the Constitution of Kyrgyz Republic.”...The May 5, 1993 Constitution introduced new principles of organization of state and governmental bodies, and accordingly modified the magnitude and remit of authority of the President, and thereby ushered in the necessity for further legitimation of the new powers of the President during the duration of the term for which he had been elected under the 1978 Constitution..., — which [the process of legitimation] in practice was ensured in the January 30, 1994 referendum. The Constitutional Court...concludes that the term of service of Askar Akayev, based on the 1978 Constitution of Kyrgyz SSR as the President of the union republic Kyrgyzstan, which had been a part of a federal state of the USSR, in the consecutive period of independence of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan cannot be regarded as a term of service of the President of Kyrgyz Republic as stipulated by Article 43 of the Constitution of Kyrgyz Republic. The Constitutional Court decides that...for the first time as the President of Kyrgyz Republic Askar Akayev was elected only in the December 24, 1995 elections. Based on this argument,...according to Articles 43 and 45, the first term of presidential mandate to carry out the authority according to the May 5, 1993 Constitution...is counted from that moment, upon expiration of which [first term] the President of Kyrgyz Republic shall have the right to be eligible for election...in 2000. Based on the abovementioned argument..., The Constitutional Court...Decided:

1. Upon completion of the first term of his mandate, the President of the Kyrgyz Republic Askar Akayev, according to Article 43(2) of the Constitution of Kyrgyz Republic, shall be eligible to run for the Presidency in the forthcoming 2000 elections....

IV: “Term Length”

1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation Article 81 (1): The President of the Russian Federation shall be elected for a term of four years by the citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of Page 263 general, equal and direct vote by secret ballot. (4) No person shall hold the office of President of the Russian Federation for more than two consecutive terms.

Law of the Russian Federation on Constitutional Amendment *On Changing the Term of Office of the President of Russian Federation and the State Duma, N6-FKZ (December 30, 2008)* Article 1 (1): Article 81 (1) shall be read as follows: “The President of the Russian Federation shall be elected for a term of six years by the citizens of the Russian Federation on the basis of general, equal and direct vote by secret ballot.”...Article 2:...The present Law...applies in regard to the President...that is elected after [the Law] has come into force.

V: Additional Term

1979 Constitution of Peru Article 205: The presidential mandate is five years. Re-election is allowed only after one presidential term has expired.

1993 Constitution of Peru Article 112: The presidential term is five years. The President may be re-elected immediately for another term. After at least one other term has expired, the former President may be a candidate for office again, subject to the same conditions.

VI: More Time Ad Hoc

1993 Constitution of Kazakhstan Article 76: The President of the Republic of Kazakhstan shall be elected for a term of five years.... A person may not be President more than two terms in succession.

March 25, 1995 referendum: “Do you agree to prolong the mandate of President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Nazarbayev, elected by all the people on December 1, 1991, until December 2000?”

VII: “Offices' Swap”

1990 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia Article 86: The President of the Republic shall be elected in direct election and by secret ballot. The term of office of the President of the Republic shall be five years. The same person may be elected for President of the Republic two times only. Article 89: At the proposal of the Government containing justified grounds, the President of the Republic may decide that the Page 264 National Assembly be dissolved. With the dissolution of the National Assembly the Government's mandate shall also be terminated. Article 83: The President of the Republic shall: 1) propose to the National Assembly a candidate for the post of prime minister after hearing the opinion of the representative of the majority in the National Assembly; 2) propose to the National Assembly the candidates for the president and the justices of the Constitutional Court; 3) promulgate the laws by ordinance;...5) command the Armed Forces in peacetime and in war...; 6) if the National Assembly is not in a position to meet and after obtaining an opinion from the prime minister, establish the fact of existence of an immediate danger of war or proclaim the state of war; 7) at his own initiative or at the proposal of the Government during a state of war or immediate danger of war, pass the enactments relating to questions falling within the competence of the National Assembly....

1992 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Article 2: The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia shall be composed of the Republic of Serbia and the Republic of Montenegro. Article 6:...A member republic shall be sovereign in matters which under the present Constitution are not reserved to the jurisdiction of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.... Article 97: The President of the Republic shall be elected by the Federal Assembly for a four-year term of office, by secret ballot. The same individual may not be reelected President of the Republic for a second term.... The Federal Assembly shall determine the immunity of the President of the Republic. The President of the Republic may only be dismissed if the Federal Assembly ascertains that he has violated the Constitution. Article 136: The President of the Republic shall appoint, promote and dismiss from service officers

of the Army of Yugoslavia stipulated by federal law;....

VIII: Suspension of Elections

Proclamation No. 1081, September 21, 1972, Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines...I, Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and Page 265 decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.... In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of the Philippines to be affixed.

IX: No Limits

1999 Constitution of Niger Article 36: The President of the Republic shall be elected for five (5) years by direct, universal, free, equal and secret suffrage. He shall be reeligible only once. Article 136:...The republican form of the State, the principles of the separation of State and religion, the multipartisme and the provisions of articles 36 and 141 of the present Constitution cannot be subject to revision.

2009 Constitution of Niger Article 39: The President of the Republic shall be elected by direct, universal, free, equal and secret suffrage for the term of five (5) years. He shall be re-eligible. Article 154: The incumbent President of the Republic remains in office until the presidential election that will take place in December 2012.... Article 152: The republican form of the State, the *multipartisme*, the principle of the separation of the State and religion, and articles 154 and 159 cannot be subject to revision.

X: “For Life”

1959 Constitution of Tunisia Article 40: The President of the Republic shall be elected for five years, by direct universal suffrage, freely and by secret ballot, by the electors, as specified in article no. 20. The President of the Republic cannot renew his term of office more than three times consecutively. *Note: Constitutional law no. 75-13 of March 19, 1975, amending articles 40 and 51, enacted following the unanimous assembly vote to make president for life on March 18.*

1976 Constitution of Tunisia Article 39: The President of the Republic is elected for five years by universal, free, direct and secret suffrage.... The President of the Republic is re-eligible. As an exceptional case and in consideration of the eminent services rendered by the Supreme Commander (*Combattant supreme*) Habib Bourguiba to the Tunisian people, whom he liberated from the yoke of colonialism and which he made into a united Nation and an independent, modern State, enjoying the plentitude of its sovereignty, the National Assembly proclaims President Habib Bourguiba the President of the Republic for life.

Page 266

X Continued: “Into Monarchy”

1976 Constitution of Central African Empire Article 1: Marshall Jean-Bédél Bokassa is proclaimed the First Emperor by the extraordinary Congress of *MECAN*. He will take the name of Emperor Jean-Bédél Bokassa I. Article 2: The national sovereignty is incarnated in the person of the Emperor, who exercises it directly by means of plebiscite and indirectly through governmental institutions.

- [About](#)
- [Blog](#)
- [Partner With Us](#)
- [About](#)
- [Blog](#)
- [Partner With Us](#)
- [Feedback](#)
- [Contact](#)
- [Contribute](#)
- [Accessibility](#)
- [Preservation](#)
- [Terms of Service](#)
- [Login](#)

menu

500 - We're sorry, but something went wrong

If you are the application owner check the logs for more information.

Fulcrum is a publishing platform that helps publishers present the full richness of their authors' research outputs in a durable, discoverable, accessible, and flexible form. For more information about the platform, please subscribe to our [newsletter](#), follow us on [Twitter](#), or send an e-mail to fulcrum-info@umich.edu.

- [About](#)
- [Blog](#)
- [Partner With Us](#)
- [Feedback](#)
- [Contact](#)
- [Contribute](#)
-

References

- Acemoglu, Daron and James Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Acemoglu, Daron, James Robinson and Simon Johnson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91:1369–1401.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James Robinson. 2003. Botswana: An African Success Story. In *In Search of Prosperity: Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth*, ed. Dani Rodrik. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press pp. 80–199.
- Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James Robinson and Yunyong Thaicharoen. 2003. "Institutional Causes, Macroeconomic Symptoms: Volatility, Crises and Growth." *Journal of Monetary Economics* 50:49–123.
- Ades, Alberto and Rafael Di Tella. 1999. "Rents, Competition and Corruption." *The American Economic Review* 8(4):982–93.
- Adsera, Alicia and Carles Boix. 2008. Constitutions and Democratic Breakdowns. In *Controlling Governments: Voters, Institutions, and Accountability*, ed. Jose Maria Maravall and Ignacio Sanchez-Cuenca. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 247–302.
- Aghion, Philippe, Alberto Alesina and Francesco Trebbi. 2004. "Endogenous Political Institutions." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 119(2):565–611.
- Ahdieh, Robert. 1997. *Russia's Constitutional Revolution: Legal Consciousness and the Transition to Democracy, 1985–1996*. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Ahlquist, John and Aseem Prakash. 2008. "The Influence of Foreign Direct Investment on Contracting Confidence in Developing Countries." *Regulation and Governance* 2:316–39.
- Aka, Arsene, Robert Reed, Eric Schansberg and Zhen Zhu. 1996. "Is Page 294 There a Culture of Spending in Congress?" *Economics and Politics* 8:191–212.
- Alberdi, Juan Bautista. 1914. *Bases and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic*. [in Spanish: *Bases: Y Puntos de Partida Para la Organizacion Politica de la Republica Argentina*] Buenos-Aires: Hispanic American Center for Economic Research (Reprint of 1914 edition).
- Alesina, Alberto. 1988. "Credibility and Policy Convergence in a Two-Party System with Rational Voters." *American Economic Review* 78(4):796–805.
- Alesina, Alberto, Nuriel Roubini and Gerald Cohen. 1997. *Political Cycles and the Macroeconomy: Theory and Evidence*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Alford, John and Henry Brady. 1988. "Partisan and Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1986." Center for the Study of Institutions and Values. Rice University. Mimeo.
- Allen, Chris. 1992. "Restructuring an Authoritarian State: 'Democratic Renewal' in Benin." *Review of African Political Economy* 54:42–58.
- Alvarez, Michael and John Brehm. 1995. "American Ambivalence Towards Abortion Policy: Development of a Heteroskedastic Probit Model of Competing Values." *American Journal of Political Science* 39:1055–82.
- Appian. 1913. *Roman History, Vol. III, The Civil Wars, Books*. [ca. 145–165 AD] Boston: Harvard University

Press.

Apter, David. 1965. *The Politics of Modernization*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Arikan, Gulsun. 2008. "How Privatizations Affect the Level of Perceived Corruption." *Public Finance Review* 36:706–27.

Aristotle. 2004. *Athenian Constitution*. [ca. 350 BC] Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing.

Astin, Alan. 1967. *Scipio Aemilianus*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Astin, Martin. 1989. Roman Government and Politics, 200–134 BC. In *Cambridge Ancient History: Rome and the Mediterranean to 133 B.C. (Vol. VIII)*, ed. Martin Astin, F. W. Walbank and M. W. Frederiksen. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press pp. 163–96.

Atkinson, Carol. 2010. "Does Soft Power Matter? A Comparative Analysis of Student Exchange Programs 1980–2006." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 6(1):1–22.

Attorney General of Zambia v. Meer Care & Desai & Ors. 2007. Attorney General of Zambia for and on behalf of the Republic of Zambia v. Meer Care & Desai & Ors. Court Opinion Case No: HC04C03129 Page 295 Royal Courts of Justice.

Audet, Denis. 2002. "Government Procurement: A Synthesis Report." *OECD Journal on Budgeting* 2(3):149–94.

Auriol, Emmanuelle and Michel Warlters. 2005. "Taxation Base in Developing Countries." *Journal of Public Economics* 89:625–46.

Auty, R. M. 2001. "The Political State and the Management of Mineral Rents in Capital-Surplus Economies: Botswana and Saudi Arabia." *Resources Policy* 27(2):77–86.

Baehr, P. R. and Melvin Richter. 2004. *Dictatorship in History and Theory: Bonapartism, Caesarism, and Totalitarianism*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Baker, Andy and Kenneth Greene. 2011. "The Latin American Left's Mandate: Free Market Policies and Issue Voting in New Democracies." *World Politics* 63(1):43–77.

Baker, Bruce. 2002. "Outstaying One's Welcome: The Presidential Third-Term Debate in Africa." *Contemporary Politics* 8:285–301.

Banks, Arthur. 2009. "Cross-National Time-Series Data Archive, 1815–2007." Binghamton, NY: Arthur S. Banks, CD-ROMs.

Barro, Robert. 1999. "Human Capital and Growth in Cross-Country Regressions." *Swedish Economic Policy Review* 6(2):237–77.

Barros, Robert. 2002. *Constitutionalism and Dictatorship: Pinochet, the Junta, and the 1980 Constitution*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Barry, Donald. 2002. *Russian Politics: The Post-Soviet Phase*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing, Inc.

Barzel, Yoram. 2002. *A Theory of the State: Economic Rights, Legal Rights, and the Scope of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bass, B. M. and R. M. Stogdill. 1990. *Handbook of Leadership: Theory, Research, and Managerial Applications*. New York: The Free Press.

Bates, Robert. 2001. *Prosperity and Violence: The Political Economy of Development*. New York: W. W. Norton.

Bates, Robert. 2008. *When Things Fell Apart: State Failure in Late-Century Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Baturo, Alexander. 2010. "The Stakes of Losing Office, Term Limits and Democracy." *British Journal of Political Science* 40(3):635–62.

Baturo, Alexander. 2012. "Cursus Honorum: Personal Background and Career Before and After Time in Office of the Heads of State Dataset, 1960–2010." Dataset, Version 1.1.

Baturo, Alexander and Slava Mikhaylov. forthcoming. "Reading the Tea Leaves: Medvedev's Presidency Through The Political Rhetoric of Federal and Sub-national Actors." *Europe-Asia Studies*.

Page 296

Baumol, William. 1989. "Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive." *Journal of Political Economy* 98:893–921.

Beaulieu, Emily and Susan Hyde. 2009. "In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts." *Comparative Political Studies* 42:392–415.

Beck, Thorsten, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer and Patrick Walsh. 2001. "New Tools in Comparative Political Economy: The Database of Political Institutions." *World Bank Economic Review* 15:165–76.

Bender, Bruce. 2003. Term Limits 2. In *The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Volume 2*, ed. Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider. New York: Springer pp. 882–85.

Bermeo, Nancy. 2003. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Besley, Timothy. 2004. "Paying Politicians: Theory and Evidence." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 2(2–3):193–215.

Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. 1995. "Does Electoral Accountability Affect Economic Policy Choices? Evidence from Gubernatorial Term Limits." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 110(3):769–98.

Besley, Timothy and Martha Reynal-Querol. 2011. "Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?" *American Political Science Review* 105(3):552–66.

Besley, Timothy and Masa Kudamatsu. 2009. Making Autocracy Work. In *Institutions and Economic Performance*, ed. Elhanan Helpman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press pp. 452–510.

Besley, Timothy and Stephen Coate. 1997. "An Economic Model of Representative Democracy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 112:85–114.

Bienen, Henry and Nicolas Van de Walle. 1991. *Of Time and Power: Leadership Duration in the Modern World*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Black, Duncan. 1958. *The Theory of Committees and Elections*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Blendon, Robert, John Benson, Mollyann Brodie, Richard Morin, Drew Altman, Daniel Gitterman, Mario Brossard and Matt James. 1997. "Bridging the Gap between the Public's and Economists' Views of the Economy." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 11(3):105–18.

- Boehnkje, Klaus, John Hagen and Gerd Heffler. 1998. "On the Development of Xenophobia in Germany: The Adolescent Years." *Journal of Social Issues* 54:585–602.
- Bogaards, Matthijs. 2010. "Measures of Democratization: From Degree Page 297 to Type to War." *Political Research Quarterly* 63:475–88.
- Boix, Carles. 2003. *Democracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Boix, Carles and Susan Stokes. 2003. "Endogenous Democratization." *World Politics* 55(4):517–49.
- Boko, Sylvain. 2000. "Government Policy, Ethnicity and Development in Benin." Wake Forest University. Mimeo.
- Bratton, Michael and Nicolas van de Walle. 1997. *Democratic Experiments in Africa*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bresler, Fenton. 1999. *Napoleon III: A Life*. London: HarperCollins.
- Brooker, David. 2004. "How They Leave: A Comparison of How the First Presidents of the Soviet Successor States Leave Office." *Journal of Communist and Studies and Transition Politics* 20(4):61–78.
- Brooker, Paul. 2000. *Non-democratic Regimes*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Brown, Trevor and Charles Wise. 2004. "Constitutional Courts and Legislative-Executive Relations: The Case of Ukraine." *Political Science Quarterly* 119(1):143–69.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2007a. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2007b. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies." *World Politics* 59:595–628.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce and Alastair Smith. 2009. "Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(2):167–97.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph Siverson and James Morrow. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1981. *Do New Leaders Make a Difference: Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Bunce, Valerie and Sharon Wolchik. 2009. A Regional Tradition: The Diffusion of Democratic Change under Communism and Postcommunism. In *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*, ed. Valerie Bunce, Michael McFaul and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 30–56.
- Cain, Bruce, John Ferejohn and Morris Fiorina. 1990. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Callander, Stephen. 2008. "Political Motivations." *Review of Economic Studies* 75:671–97.
- Calvert, R. L. 1985. "Robustness of the Multi-dimensional Voting Page 298 Model: Candidate Motivations, Uncertainty and Convergence." *American Journal of Political Science* 29(1):69–95.
- Cameron, Maxwell. 1998. "Self-Coups: Peru, Guatemala, and Russia." *Journal of Democracy* 9(1):125–39.
- Campos, Edgardo and Sanjay Pradhan. 2007. *The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level*. World Bank, Washington DC: World Bank Publications.

- Canes-Wrone, Brandice. 2006. *Who Leads Whom? Presidents, Policy, and the Public*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Carey, John. 1997. Strong Candidates for a Limited Office. In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 199–224.
- Carey, John. 1998. *Term Limits and Legislative Representation*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Carey, John. 2003. “Policy Issues: The Reelection Debate in Latin America.” *Latin American Politics and Society* 45(1):119–33.
- Carey, John, Richard Niemi and Lynda Powell. 2000. *Term Limits in the State Legislatures*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Carothers, Thomas. 2003. “Why Dictators Aren't Dominoes.” *Foreign Policy* (July/August): 59–60.
- Caselli, Francesco and Massimo Morelli. 2004. “Bad Politicians.” *Journal of Public Economics* 88(3–4):759–82.
- Castaneda, Jorge. 2000. *Perpetuating Power: How Mexican Presidents Were Chosen*. New York: The New York Press.
- Cederman, Lars-Erik and Luc Girardin. 2007. “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies.” *American Political Science Review* 101:173–85.
- Chehabi, Houchang and Juan Linz. 1998. *Sultanistic Regimes*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Cheibub, Jose. 1998. “Political Regimes and the Extractive Capacity of Governments: Taxation in Democracies and Dictatorships.” *World Politics* 50(3):349–76.
- Cheibub, Jose. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Cheibub, Jose and Adam Przeworski. 1999. Accountability for Economic Outcomes. In *Democracy, Accountability and Representation*, ed. Adam Przeworski, Susan Stokes and Bernard Manin. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 221–51.
- Cicero, Marcus Tullius. 2009. *Republic and the Laws*. [54–51 BC] [Digireads.com](http://www.digireads.com) Publishing.
- Cingranelli, David and David Richards. 2010. “The Cingranelli-Richards Page 299 (CIRI) Human Rights Dataset.” Available from www.humanrightsdata.org.
- Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson. 1996. “Property and Contract Rights in Autocracies and Democracies.” *Journal of Economic Growth* 1:243–76.
- Clague, Christopher, Philip Keefer, Stephen Knack and Mancur Olson. 1999. “Contract-Intensive Money.” *Journal of Economic Growth* 4:185–211.
- Cohen, Lenard. 2002. *Serpent in the Bosom: The Rise and Fall of Slobodan Milošević*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Colazingari, Silvia and Susan Rose-Ackerman. 113. “Corruption in a Paternalistic Democracy: Lessons from Italy for Latin America.” *Political Science Quarterly* 3:447–70.
- Colomer, Josep. 2003. *Political Institutions: Democracy and Social Choice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Constitutional Convention. 1995–1996. *Constitutional Convention: Stenograms, Materials, Documents*. April 29 –

November 10, 1993. Volumes 1–10. [in Russian: *Konstitucionnoe Sobranie: Stenogrammy, Materialy, Dokumenty. 29 Aprelya–10 Noyabrya 1993 g. Toma 1–10*] Moscow: Yuridicheskaja Literatura of the Administration of President of Russian Federation.

Converse, Philip. 1964. The Nature of Mass Beliefs Systems in Mass Publics. In *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David Apter. London: Free Press pp. 207–27.

Corrales, Javier. 2002. *Presidents without Parties: The Politics of Economic Reform in Argentina and Venezuela in the 1990s*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press.

Corrales, Javier. 2010. The Repeating Revolution: Chavez's New Politics and Old Economics. In *Leftist Governments in Latin America: Successes and Shortcomings*, ed. Kurt Weyland, Raul Madrid and Wendy Hunter. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 28–56.

Coviello, Decio and Stefano Gagliarducci. 2010. “Tenure in Office and Public Procurement.” Mimeo.

Cox, Gary. 2009. “Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975–2000.” Mimeo.

Crassweller, Robert. 1966. *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator*. New York: The Macmillan Co.

D'Anieri, Paul. 2003. “Leonid Kuchma and the Personalization of the Ukrainian Presidency.” *Problems of Post-Communism* 50(5):58–65.

Darden, Keith. 2008. “The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution.” *Politics and Society* 36(1):35–60.

Page 300

De Boef, Susanna and Luke Keele. 2008. “Taking Time Seriously.” *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1):184–200.

De Galindez, Jesus. 1955. “Un Reportaje Sobre Santo Domingo.” *Guadernos Americanos* 80:37–56.

De Haan, Jakob, Jan Sturm and Bernd Sikken. 1996. “Government Capital Formation: Explaining the Decline.” *Review of World Economics* 132(1):55–74.

de Tocqueville, Alexis. 2006. *Democracy in America, Volume 1*. [1864] Harvard University: Sever and Francis.

Decalo, Samuel. 1990. *Coups and Army Rule in Africa: Motivations and Constraints*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Diamond, Larry. 1999. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Diermeier, Daniel, Michael Keane and Antonio Merlo. 2005. “A Political Economy Model of Congressional Careers.” *American Economic Review* 95(1):347–73.

Djukic, Slavoljub. 1994. *Between Glory and Anathema: Political Biography of Slobodan Milošević*. [In Serbian: *Izmedju Slave i Anateme: Politi ka Biografija Slobodana Milošević* d Belgrade: Filip Višnjić .

Djukic, Slavoljub. 2001. *Milosevic and Markovic: A Lust for Power*. Montreal; Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Downs, Anthony. 1957. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.

Doyle, David. 2011. “Explaining Contemporary Populism in Latin America.” *Comparative Political Studies*

Dreher, Axel, Sarah Lein, Michael Lamla and Frank Somogyi. 2009. “The Impact of Politicians' Profession and Education on Reforms.” *Journal of Comparative Economics* 37(1):169–93.

Duchatel, Mathieu and Francois Godement. 2009. “China's Politics under Hu Jintao.” *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs* 3:3–11.

Dunning, Thad. 2008. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Duran, Fray Diego. 1977. *Book of the Gods and Rites and the Ancient Calendar*. [1574–79] Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Durlauf, Steven, Paul Johnson and Jonathan Temple. 2005. Growth Econometrics. In *Handbook of Economic Growth*, ed. Philippe Aghion and Steven Durlauf. Vol. 1. Elsevier pp. 555–677.

Duverger, Maurice. 1978. *Echec au Roi*. Paris: Albin Michel.

Dworkin, Ronald. 1996. *Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Easterbrook, William. 1957. “Long-Period Comparative Study: Some Page 301 Historical Cases.” *The Journal of Economic History* 17:574–75.

Easterly, William. 2011. “Benevolent Autocrats.” Mimeo.

Eggers, Andrew and Jens Hainmueller. 2009. “MPs for Sale? Returns to Office in Postwar British Politics.” *American Political Science Review* 103(4):513–33.

Egorov, Georgy, Sergei Guriev and Konstantin Sonin. 2010. “Why Resource-Poor Dictators Allow Freer Media: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data.” *American Political Science Review* 103(4):645–68.

Elgie, Robert. 2011. *Semi-Presidentialism: Sub-Types and Democratic Performance*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elster, Jon and Rune Slagstad. 1993. *Constitutionalism and Democracy*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Epstein, David, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Sharyn O'Halloran and Ida Kristensen. 2006. “Democratic Transitions.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50(3):551–69.

Epstein, Steven. 1996. *Genoa and the Genoese, 958–1528*. Chapel Hill, NC, and London: University of North Carolina Press.

Fearon, James, Kimuli Kasara and David Laitin. 2007. “Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset.” *American Political Science Review* 101(1):187–93.

Ferraz, Claudio and Frederico Finan. 2011. “Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments.” *American Economic Review* 101:1274–1311.

Finer, S. E. 1976. *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

Fitzgibbon, Russell. 1940. “Continuismo in Central America and the Caribbean.” *The Inter-American Quarterly* 2:56–74.

- Franzese, Robert. 2002. *Macroeconomic Policies of Developed Democracies*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Freedom House. 2010. Freedom in the World. The Annual Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties. Annual report (various years).
- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2008. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2006. "Cooperation, Cooptation and Rebellion under Dictatorship." *Economics and Politics* 18(1):1–26.
- Gandhi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. "Elections under Authoritarianism." *Annual Review of Political Science* 12:403–22.
- Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2:115–44.
- Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1990. "Estimating Incumbency Advantage without Bias." *American Journal of Political Science* Page 302 34(4):1142–64.
- Gleditsch, Kristian and Michael Ward. 1997. "Double Take: A Reexamination of Democracy and Autocracy in Modern Polities." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41:361–82.
- Gleditsch, Kristian and Michael Ward. 2006. "Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization." *International Organization* 60:911–33.
- Global Witness. 2006. It's a Gas. Funny Business in the Turkmen-Ukraine Gas Trade. Report Global Witness.
- Goemans, Hein. 2008. "Which Way Out? The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53(6):771–94.
- Goemans, Hein and Giacomo Chiozza. 2004. "International Conflict and the Tenure of Leaders: Is War Still Ex Post Inefficient?" *American Journal of Political Science* 48(3):604–19.
- Goemans, Hein, Kristian Gleditsch and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace Research* 46:269–83.
- Goldman, Eitan, Jorg Rocholl and Jongil So. 2010. "Political Connections and the Allocation of Procurement Contracts." Mimeo.
- Good, Kenneth. 1992. "Interpreting the Exceptionality of Botswana." *Journal of Modern African Studies* 30(1):69–95.
- Good, Kenneth and Ian Taylor. 2006. Unpacking the "Model": Presidential Succession in Botswana. In *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics*, ed. Henning Melber and Roger Southall. Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute: HSRC Press pp. 51–72.
- Greenhill, Brian. 2010. "The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 54(1):127–45.
- Greenstein, Fred. 1965. *Children and Politics*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Gyimah-Boadi, Emmanuel. 2001. "A Peaceful Turnover in Ghana." *Journal of Democracy* 12(2):103–17.
- Haber, Stephen. 2008. Political Institutions and Financial Development: Evidence from the Political Economy of

Bank Regulation in Mexico and the United States. In *Political Institutions and Financial Development*, ed. Stephen Haber, Douglass North and Barry Weingast. Stanford: Stanford University Press pp. 10–59.

Haber, Steven, Noel Maurer and Armando Razo. 2003. “When the Law Doesn't Matter: The Rise and Fall of the Mexican Oil Industry.” *The Journal of Economic History* 63(1):1–31.

Page 303

Hadenius, Axel and Jan Teorell. 2007. “Pathways from Authoritarianism.” *Journal of Democracy* 18(1):143–57.

Hafner-Burton, Emily. 2005. “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Governmental Repression.” *International Organization* 59:593–629.

Hale, Henry. 2010. Russia's Political Parties and Their Substitutes. In *Developments in Russian Politics* 7, ed. Stephen White. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hall, Linda. 1981. *Alvaro Obregon: Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911–1920*. College Station: Texas A&M University Press.

Hamill, Hugh. 1995. *Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.

Hamilton, Alexander. 1999. *The Federalist Papers*. [1788] Charleston, SC: Forgotten Books.

Hamilton, Neil. 1995. *Founders of Modern Nations: A Bibliographical Dictionary*. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-Clio.

Harrington, James. 2007. *The Commonwealth of Oceana*. [1656]. Charleston, SC: BiblioBazaar.

Hartmann, Christof. 1988. Nyerere and the State. In *Tanzania After Nyerere*, ed. Michael Hodd. London: Pinter.

Hasson, Adam. 2002. “Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity on Trial: Noriega, Pinochet and Miloš evi — Trends in Political Accountability and Transnational Criminal Law.” *British Columbia International and Comparative Law Review* 125:125–58.

Hay Group. 2005. A Pay Comparison for Senior Politicians and Civil Servants in Eight European Countries. Executive report. Hay Group.

Hay Group. 2009. Global Management Pay Report: The Impact on Pay When Talent Is Scarce. Executive report. Hay Group.

Heckman, James. 1979. “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error.” *Econometrica* 47:153–61.

Hedstrom, Peter. 2005. *Dissecting the Social: On the Principles of Analytical Sociology*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Heilbrunn, John. 1993. “Social Origins of National Conferences in Benin and Togo.” *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31:277–86.

Heinemann, Friedrich and Eckhard Janeba. 2007. “The Globalization of Tax Policy: What German Politicians Believe.” ZEW Discussion Paper No. 07-057, Mannheim.

Heinemann, Friedrich, Philipp Mohl and Steffen Osterloh. 2009. “Who's Afraid of an EU Tax and Why? — Revenue System Preferences in the European Parliament.” *The Review of International Organizations* 4(1):73–99.

Page 304

Heller, Peter and Alan Tait. 1983. “Government Employment and Pay: Some International Comparisons.”

Helmke, Gretchen. 2002. Enduring Uncertainty: Court-Executive Relations in Argentina during the 1990s and Beyond. In *The Politics of Institutional Weakness: Argentine Democracy*, ed. Steven Levitsky and Maria Victoria Murillo. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania University Press pp. 139–64.

Henderson, William. 1990. “Seretse Khama: A Personal Appreciation.” *African Affairs* 89:27–56.

Henisz, Witold. 2002. “The Institutional Environment for Infrastructure Investment.” *Industrial and Corporate Change* 11(2):334–63.

Hermann, Margaret and Charles Kegley. 1995. “Democracy and International Peace: Perspectives from Political Psychology.” *International Studies Quarterly* 39(4):511–33.

Hermassi, Elbaki. 1972. *Leadership and National Development in Africa: A Comparative Study*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hermet, Guy, Alain Rouquie and Richard Rose. 1978. *Election Without Choice*. New York: John Wiley.

Herron, Eric. 2002. “Causes and Consequences of Fluid Faction Membership in Ukraine.” *Europe-Asia Studies* 54(4):625–40.

Hirschman, Albert. 1965. *Journeys Toward Progress: Studies of Economic Policy-Making in Latin America*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Hodd, Michael. 1988. *Tanzania After Nyerere*. London: Pinter.

Hodge, Mary. 1996. Political Organization of the Central Province. In *Aztec Imperial Strategies*, ed. Francis Berdan, Richard Blanton, Elizabeth Hill Boone, Mary Hodge, Michael Smith and Emily Umberger. Washington, DC: Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection pp. 17–46.

Hodges, Tony. 2004. *Angola: Anatomy of Oil State*. Norway: Fridtjof Nansen Institute.

Honaker, James, Gary King and Matthew Blackwell. 2011. “Amelia II: A Program for Missing Data.” Available at <http://gking.harvard.edu/amelia/>.

Hood, Christopher, Grace Lee and Guy Peters. 2003. *Reward for High Public Office: Asian and Pacific Rim States*. London: Routledge.

Hooghe, Liesbet. 2001. *The European Commission and the Integration of Europe*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Hopwood, Derek. 1992. *Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia: The Tragedy of Longevity*. London: Macmillan.

Howard, Marc and Philip Roessler. 2006. “Liberalizing Electoral Page 305 Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” *American Journal of Political Science* 50:365–81.

Humphreys, Macartan, Jeffrey Sachs and Joseph Stiglitz. 2007. *Escaping the Resource Curse*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Humphreys, Macartan, William Masters and Martin Sandbu. 2006. “The Role of Leaders in Democratic Deliberations Results from a Field Experiment in Sao Tome and Principe.” *World Politics* 58(4):583–622.

Huntington, Samuel. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Huntington, Samuel. 1991. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman: University

of Oklahoma Press.

Iqbal, Zaryab and Christopher Zorn. 2008. "The Political Consequences of Assassination." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 20:1–16.

Johnson, Joseph and Mark Crain. 2004. "Effects of Term Limits on Fiscal Performance: Evidence from Democratic Nations." *Public Choice* 119:73–90.

Johnston, Michael. 1997. Public Officials, Private Interests, and Sustainable Democracy: When Politics and Corruption Meet. In *Corruption and the Global Economy*, ed. Kimberly Ann Elliott. Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics pp. 61–82.

Jones, Benjamin and Benjamin Olken. 2005. "Do Leaders Matter? National Leadership and Growth since World War II." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 120(3):835–64.

Jones, Benjamin and Benjamin Olken. 2009. "Hit or Miss? The Effect of Assassinations on Institutions and War." *American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics* 1(2):55–87.

Jones, G. W. 1985. The Prime Minister's Power. In *The British Prime Minister*, ed. Anthony King. London: Macmillan pp. 195–220.

Jones, Mark. 1997. Evaluating Argentina's Presidential Democracy: 1983–1995. In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Shugart. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 259–99.

Kalandadze, Katya and Mitchell Orenstein. 2009. "Electoral Protests and Democratization beyond the Color Revolutions." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(11):1403–25.

Kallenbach, Joseph. 1952. "Constitutional Limitations on Reeligibility of National and State Chief Executives." *American Political Science Review* 46(1):438–54.

Kalyvas, Andreas. 2007. "The Tyranny of Dictatorship: When the Greek Tyrant Met the Roman Dictator." *Political Theory* 35(4):412–42.

Page 306

Kar, Dev and Karly Curcio. 2011. "Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2000–2009: Update with a Focus on Asia." *Global Financial Integrity*.

Karl, Terry. 1997. *The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-states*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Kasmi, Mohamed. 1988. *Le 7 Novembre ou le Miracle Tunisien*. Tunis: Societe Tunisiene de Diffusion.

Kaufmann, Daniel, Aart Kraay and Pablo Zoido-Lobaton. 1999. "Aggregating Governance Indicators." Policy Research Working Paper Series 2195.

Keele, Luke and David Park. 2004. "Difficult Choices: An Evaluation of Heterogeneous Choice Models." Prepared for the 2004 Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, Sept. 2–5.

Kees van Donge, Jan. 2008. "The Plundering of Zambian Resources by Frederick Chiluba and His Friends: A Case Study of the Interaction between National Politics and the International Drive Towards Good Governance." *African Affairs* 108(430):69–90.

Kikeri, Sunita and Matthew Perault. 2010. "Privatization Trends: A Sharp Decline but No Widespread Reversals in 2008." *Viewpoint: Public Policy for the Private Sector* 322:1–4.

- King, Gary, Michael Tomz and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. "Making the Most of Statistical Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2):347–61.
- Kirk-Greene, Anthony. 1991. "His Eternity, His Eccentricity or His Exemplarity? A Further Contribution to the Study of the African Head of State." *African Affairs* 90(359):163–87.
- Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. 1966. "Keine Saeulen der Demokratie: Ueber die Haltung der Gebildeten zur NPD." *Akut* 19(29-30):6–9.
- Kogut, Bruce and J. Muir Macpherson. 2008. The Decision to Privatize: Economists and the Construction of Ideas and Policies. In *The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy*, ed. Beth Simmons and Frank Dobbins. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 104–40.
- Krauze, Enrique. 1998. *Mexico: Biography of Power*. New York: Harper Perennial.
- Krouwel, Andre. 2003. "Measuring Presidentialism and Parliamentarism: An Application to Central and East European Countries." *Acta Politica* 38:333–64.
- Krueger, Anne. 1974. "The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society." *American Economic Review* 64:291–303.
- Kurer, Oscar. 1993. "Clientelism, Corruption, and the Allocation of Resources." *Public Choice* 77(2):259–73.
- Page 307
- Kurrild Klitgaard, Peter. 2000. "The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession." *Public Choice* 103:63–84.
- Kutafin, O. E. 2003. *Applied and Academic Commentaries on the Articles of the Constitution of Russian Federation Made by the Legal Scholars' Group Chaired by Rector of the Moscow State Law Academy Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences O.E. Kutafin*. [In Russian: *Postatejnyj Nauchnoprakticheskij Kommentarij k Konstitucii Rossijskoj Federacii Kollektiva Uchenykh-Pravovedov pod Rukovodstvom Rektora MGYuA, Akademika RAN O. E. Kutafina*] Moscow: Bibliotekha Rossiyskoy Gazety (Kodeksy Rossiyskoy Federacii).
- Kuzio, Taras. 2005. "Ukraine's Orange Revolution: the Opposition's Road to Success." *Journal of Democracy* 16(2):117–30.
- Kuzio, Taras. 2008. "Oligarchs Wield Power in Ukrainian Politics." *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 5(125).
- Kwadwo Konadu-Agyemang, Martin, Kwamina Panford and Kwamina Panford. 2006. *Africa's Development in the Twenty First Century*. Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing.
- La Porta, Rafael, Florencio de Silanes, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1999. "The Quality of Government." *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization* 15:222–79.
- Lambsdorff, Johann. 1995. "The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 1995 Framework Document." Available from www.transparency.org.
- Lane, Frederic Chapin. 1979. *Profits From Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence-Controlling Enterprises*. New York: State University of New York Press.
- LaPalombara, Joseph. 1994. "Structural and Institutional Aspects of Corruption." *Social Research* 61:325–50.
- Le, Quan and Rishi Meenakshi. 2006. "Corruption and Capital Flight: An Empirical Assessment." *International Economic Journal* 20:534–40.

Lehoucq, Fabrice. 2003. "Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences." *Annual Review of Political Science* 6:233–56.

Leith, Clark. 2005. *Why Botswana Prospered*. Montreal; Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press.

Lensink, Robert, Niels Hermes and Victor Murinde. 2000. "Capital Flight and Political Risk." *Journal of International Money and Finance* 19:73–92.

Lentz, Harris. 1994. *Heads of States and Governments: A Worldwide Encyclopedia of Over 2,300 Leaders, 1945 through 1992*. London: McFarland.

Page 308

Levitsky, Steven. 2003. *Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan Way. 2010. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lijphart, Arend. 1992. *Parliamentary Versus Presidential Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Lindberg, Staffan. 2009. *Democratization by Election: A New Mode of Transition*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, Juan. 1978. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Reequilibration*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Linz, Juan. 1990. "The Perils of Presidentialism." *Journal of Democracy* 1(1):51–69.

Linz, Juan. 1994. Presidential or Parliamentary Democracy: Does It Make a Difference? In *The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America*, ed. Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press pp. 3–87.

Linz, Juan. 1998. "Democracy's Time Constraints." *International Political Science Review* 19(1):19–37.

Linz, Juan. 2000. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. [1975] London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan. 1996. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Lipset, Seymour. 1959. "Some Social Prerequisites for Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53:69–105.

Lipset, Seymour and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments*. New York: Free Press.

List, John and Daniel Sturm. 2006. "How Elections Matter: Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 121(4):1249–81.

Locke, John. 2004. *Second Treatise of Government*. [1690] Barnes and Noble Publishing.

Loewenberg, Peter. 1986. "Nixon, Hitler, and Power: An Ego Psychological Study." *Psychoanalytic Inquiry* 6(1):27–48.

Londregan, John and Keith Poole. 1990. "Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of the Executive Power." *World Politics* 42(2):151–83.

Lopez-Alves, Fernando. 2000. *State Formation and Democracy in Latin America, 1810–1900*. Durham: Duke

University Press.

Lopez, Edward. 2003. "Term Limits: Causes and Consequences." *Public Page* 309 *Choice* 114(1–2):1–56.

Lott, John. 1986. "Brand Names and Barriers to Entry in Political Markets." *Public Choice* 51:87–92.

Lott, John and Stephen Bronars. 1993. "Time Series Evidence on Shirking in the U.S. House of Representatives." *Public Choice* 76:125–49.

Loveman, Brian. 1995. *The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes of Exception in Spanish America*. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.

Lukic, Reneo. 2005. From the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. In *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society under Miloš evi and After*, ed. Sabrina Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic. Seattle: University of Washington Press pp. 55–94.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 2006. "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan." *Democratization* 13(3):456–71.

Lust-Okar, Ellen and Amaney Ahmad Jamal. 2002. "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation." *Comparative Political Studies* 35:337–67.

Lutz, Ellen. 2009. *Prosecuting Heads of State*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. 2003. *The Discourses*. [1513–19] London: Penguin Books.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. 2007. *History of Florence and of the Affairs of Italy from the Earliest Times to the Death of Lorenzo the Magnificent*. [1521–25] Pennsylvania State University, Electronic Classics Series.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2006. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott and Matthew Shugart. 1997. *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Mainwaring, Scott and Timothy Scully. 1995. *Building Democratic Institutions: Party Systems in Latin America*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Manin, Bernard. 1997. *The Principles of Representative Government*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Marinov, Nikolay. 2005. "Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?" *American Journal of Political Science* 49(3):564–76.

Marshall, Monty and Keith Jagers. 2009. *Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2007, Dataset Users' Manual, Polity IV Project*. University of Maryland, College Park, MD.

Marshall, Monty, Keith Jagers and Ted Robert Gurr. 2011. *Political Page 310 Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010, Dataset Users' Manual, Polity IV Project*. University of Maryland, College Park, MD.

Mattozzi, Andrea and Antonio Merlo. 2007. "Political Careers Or Career Politicians?" National Bureau of Economic Research Paper, Cambridge, MA.

McCullagh, Peter and John Nelder. 1989. *Generalized Linear Models*. 2nd ed. New York: Chapman and Hall.

McFaul, Michael. 2001. *Russia's Unfinished Revolution: Political Change from Gorbachev to Putin*. Ithaca:

- McFaul, Michael. 2002. "The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World." *World Politics* 54:212–44.
- McFaul, Michael. 2005. "Transitions from Postcommunism." *Journal of Democracy* 16(3):5–19.
- McLeod, Ross. 2005. "The Struggle to Regain Effective Government under Democracy in Indonesia." *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies* 41(3):367–86.
- Meier, Christian. 1997. *Caesar: A Biography*. New York: Basic Books.
- Melber, Henning and Roger Southall. 2006. *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics*. Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute: HSRC Press.
- Meredith, Martin. 2006. *The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence*. London: Free Press.
- Meserve, Stephen, Daniel Pemstein and William Bernhard. 2009. "Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament." *Journal of Politics* 71(3):1015–32.
- Metcalf, Lee Kendall. 2000. "Measuring Presidential Power." *Comparative Political Studies* 33(5):660–85.
- Milgram, Stanley. 1963. "Behavioral Study of Obedience." *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology* 67:371–78.
- Miljukovic, Maja and Marko Attila Hoare. 2007. Crime and Economy under Milošević and His Successors. In *Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milošević and After*, ed. Sabrina Ramet and Vjeran Pavlakovic. Seattle: University of Washington Press pp. 192–226.
- Molina, Jose Enrique. 2004. The Unraveling of Venezuela's Party System: From Party Rule to Personalistic Politics and Deinstitutionalization. In *The Unraveling of the Representative Democracy in Venezuela*, ed. Jennifer McCoy and David Myers. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press pp. 152–80.
- Mommsen, Theodor. 1894. *The History of Rome*. Vol. V. London: Page 311 Richard Bentley and Son, Publishers in Ordinary to Her Majesty the Queen.
- Morse, Richard. 1954. "Toward a Theory of Spanish American Government." *Journal of the History of Ideas* 15:71–93.
- Mueller, Denis. 2003. *Public Choice III*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Munck, Gerardo. 2007. Capitalism, Democracy and Science: Interview with Adam Przeworski. In *Passion, Craft and Method in Comparative Politics*, ed. Gerardo Munck and Richard Snyder. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press pp. 456–503.
- Murphy, Emma. 1999. *Economic and Political Change in Tunisia*. London: Macmillan.
- Murphy, Kevin, Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. 1991. "The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 106(2):503–30.
- Myagkov, Mikhail, Peter Ordeshook and Dmitrii Shakin. 2010. *The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Nazarbayev, Nursultan. 1995. "Report at the II Assembly of the Peoples of Kazakhstan [In Russian: Doklad na II asamblee Narodov Kazahstana]." *Politika* 2.

- Needler, Martin. 1982. *Mexican Politics: The Containment of Conflict*. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press.
- Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz and Christof Hartmann. 2001. *Elections in Asia and the Pacific: A Data Handbook: South East Asia, East Asia, and the Pacific*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich and Bernhard Thibaut. 1999. *Elections in Africa: A Data Handbook*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nyerere, Julius. 1995. *Our Leadership and the Destiny of Tanzania*. Harare: Jongwe Printing and Publishing.
- Oberdorfer, Don. 2001. *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History*. New York: Basic Books.
- Olson, Mancur. 1991. Autocracy, Democracy, and Prosperity. In *Strategy and Choice*, ed. Richard Zeckhauser. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
- Olson, Mancur. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy and Development." *American Political Science Review* 90(4):715–735.
- Olson, Mancur. 2000. *Power and Prosperity: Outgrowing Communist and Capitalist Dictatorships*. New York: Basic Books.
- Osborne, Martin and Al Slivinski. 1996. "A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 111(1):65–96.
- Page 312
- OSCE. 2004. *Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions: Presidential Election, Ukraine. 31 October 2004*. Warsaw: OSCE.
- Ottaway, Marina. 1998. Angola's Failed Elections. In *Postconflict Elections, Democratization, and International Assistance*, ed. Krishna Kumar. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers pp. 133–53.
- Ottaway, Marina. 2003. *Democracy Challenged: The Rise of Semi-authoritarianism*. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
- Parrish, Scott. 1998. Presidential Decree Authority in Russia, 1991–95. In *Executive Decree Authority*, ed. John Carey and Matthew Shugart. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press pp. 62–104.
- Parsons, Neil, Willie Henderson and Thomas Tlou. 1995. *Seretse Khama, 1921–1980*. Gabarone: Macmillan and Boleswa.
- Patty, John and Roberto Weber. 2007. "Letting the Good Times Roll: A Theory of Voter Inference and Experimental Evidence." *Public Choice* 130:293–310.
- Peirce, William. 2005. Privatization, Nationalization, and Aspects of Transition. In *Handbook of Public Finance*, ed. Jurgen Backhaus and Richard E. Wagner. New York: Springer pp. 301–22.
- Penford-Becerra, Michael. 2007. "Clientelism and Social Funds: Evidence from Chavez's Misiones." *Latin American Politics and Society* 49:63–84.
- Perdriel-Vaissiere, Maud. 2012. The Accumulation of Unexplained Wealth by Public Officials: Making the Offence of Illicit Enrichment Enforceable. Report. U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center.
- Perez-Linan, Anibal. 2007. *Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Perkins, Kenneth. 2004. *A History of Modern Tunisia*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2004. "Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes." *American Economic Review* 94(1):25–45.
- Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 2005. *The Economic Effects of Constitutions*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Petracca, Mark. 1992. Rotation in Office: The History of an Idea. In *Limiting Legislative Terms*, ed. Benjamin Gerald and Michael J. Malbin. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press pp. 19–51.
- Pinto, Brian. 1989. "Black Market Premia, Exchange Rate Unification, and Inflation in Sub-Saharan Africa." *World Bank Economic Review* 3(3):321–38.
- Plutarch. 1920. *Lives, Volume IX*. [ca. 1st century AD]. Boston: Page 313 Harvard University Press.
- Pop-Eleches, Grigore. 2007. "Historical Legacies and Post-Communist Regime Change." *Journal of Politics* 69(4):908–26.
- Poteete, Amy. 2009. "Is Development Path Dependent or Political? A Reinterpretation of Mineral-Dependent Development in Botswana." *Journal of Developmental Studies* 45(4):544–71.
- Price, Polly. 1996. "Term Limits on Original Intent?: An Essay on Legal Debate and Historical Understanding." *Virginia Law Review* 82:493–533.
- Protsyk, Oleh and Andrew Wilson. 2003. "Centre Politics in Russia and Ukraine: Patronage, Power, and Virtuality." *Party Politics* 9(6):703–27.
- Przeworski, Adam. 2005. "Democracy as an Equilibrium." *Public Choice* 123:253–73.
- Przeworski, Adam and Fernando Limongi. 1997. "Modernization: Theories and Facts." *World Politics* 49:155–84.
- Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Cheibub and Fernando Limongi. 2000. *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950–1990*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Querubin, Pablo and James Snyder. 2008. "The Returns to U.S. Congressional Seats in the mid-19th Century." Mimeo.
- Rae, Douglas. 1968. "A Note on the Fractionalization of Some European Party Systems." *Comparative Political Studies* 1:413–18.
- Ramet, Sabrina. 2002. *Balkan Babel: The Disintegration of Yugoslavia from the Death of Tito to the Fall of Miloš evi*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Reed, Robert, Eric Schansberg, James Wilbanks and Zhen Zhu. 1994. "The Relationship between Congressional Spending and Tenure with an Application to Term Limits." *Public Choice* 94(1):85–104.
- Remington, Thomas and John Reuter. 2009. "Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia." *Comparative Political Studies* 42:501–26.
- Reuter, Ora and Jennifer Gandhi. 2011. "Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties." *British Journal of Political Science* 41:83–110.
- Riggs, Fred. 1994. Conceptual Homogenization of a Heterogeneous Field: Presidentialism in Comparative Perspective. In *Comparing Nations: Concepts, Strategies, Substance*, ed. Mattei Dogan and Ali Kazancigil. Oxford, UK: Blackwell pp. 72–152.

Riker, William. 1962. *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Page 314

Ringle, William. 2004. "On the Political Organization of Chichen Itza." *Ancient Mesoamerica* 15:167–218.

Robinson, James and Ragnar Torvik. 2008. "Endogenous Presidentialism." Mimeo.

Rock, David. 1985. *Argentina, 1516–1982: From Spanish Colonization to the Falklands War*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Rock, Michael. 2003. "The Politics of Development Policy-Making in New Order Indonesia." Working Paper 632, Ann Arbor: William Davidson Institute, University of Michigan.

Rodrik, Dani. 1998. "Why Do Open Economies Have Bigger Governments?" *Journal of Political Economy* 106(5):997–1032.

Rogoff, Kenneth. 1990. "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles." *American Economic Review* 80(1):21–36.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 1999. *Corruption and Government: Causes, Consequences, and Reform*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan. 2004. Corruption. In *The Encyclopedia of Public Choice, Volume 2*, ed. Charles Rowley and Friedrich Schneider. New York: Springer pp. 67–76.

Rose-Ackerman, Susan and Jacqueline Coolidge. 1997. "High-level Rent-seeking and Corruption in African Regimes: Theory and Cases." *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series* 1780.

Rosenstein, Nathan. 1990. *Imperatores Victi: Military Defeat and Aristocratic Competition in the Middle and Late Republic*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Ross, Michael. 2001. "Does Oil Hinder Democracy?" *World Politics* 53(3):325–61.

Roubini, Nuriel and Jeffrey Sachs. 1989. "Political and Economic Determinants of Budget Deficits in the Industrial Democracies." *European Economic Review* 33:903–38.

Rouquie, Alain. 1995. Dynasty: Nicaraguan Style. In *Caudillos: Dictators in Spanish America*, ed. Hugh Hamill. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press pp. 257–69.

Rozenzweig, Mark and Kenneth Wolpin. 2000. "Natural 'Natural Experiments' in Economics." *Journal of Economic Literature* 38:827–74.

Rudra, Nita. 2002. "Globalization and the Decline of the Welfare State in Less-Developed Countries." *International Organization* 56(2):411–45.

Sakwa, Richard. 2010. *The Crisis of Russian Democracy: The Dual State, Factionalism and the Medvedev Succession*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Page 315

Sala-i Martin, Xavier. 1997. "I Just Ran Two Million Regressions." *American Economic Review* 87(2):178–83.

Samatar, Abdi Ismail. 1999. *An African Miracle: State and Class Leadership and Colonial Legacy in Botswana Development*. Portsmouth: Heinemann Press.

Samuels, David and Matthew Shugart. 2010. *Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the Separation of*

Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sandholtz, Wayne and William Koetzle. 2000. "Accounting for Corruption: Economic Structure, Democracy, and Trade." *International Studies Quarterly* 44(1):31–50.

Sartori, Giovanni. 1962. *Democratic Theory*. Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press.

Schedler, Andreas. 2006. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. London: Lynne Rienner.

Schiavo-Campo, Salvatore, Giulio de Tommaso and Amitabha Mukherjee. 1997. "Government Employment and Pay: A Global and Regional Perspective." Policy Research Working Paper No. 1771. The World Bank.

Schmitt, Carl. 2007. *Constitutional Theory*. [1928] Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Sebudubudu, David and Patrick Molutsi. 2009. "Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in the Development of Botswana." Development Leadership Program Research Paper 02.

Serrafero, Mario. 1997. *Reelección y Sucesion Presidencial*. Buenos Aires: Editorial de Belgrano.

Serrafero, Mario. 1994. "Liderazgo y Reelección Presidencial en la Argentina." *Desarrollo Económico* 33(132):565–86.

Shugart, Matthew and John Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Silitsky, Vitali. 2005. "The Long Road from Tyranny: Post-Communist Authoritarianism and Struggle for Democracy in Serbia and Belarus." Unpublished manuscript.

Simpser, Alberto. 2005. *Making Votes Not Count: Strategic Incentives for Electoral Corruption*. PhD dissertation, Stanford University.

Skidmore, Thomas. 1988. *The Politics of Military Rule in Brazil, 1964–85*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Smith, Benjamin. 2005. "Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single Party Ruler." *World Politics* 57:421–51.

Page 316

Smith, Peter. 1996. *Talons of the Eagle: Dynamics of U.S.-Latin American Relations*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Sondrol, Paul. 2005. "The Presidentialist Tradition in Latin America." *International Journal of Public Administration* 28:517–30.

Spilimbergo, Antonio. 2009. "Democracy and Foreign Education." *American Economic Review* 99(1):528–43.

Squires, Ekaterina and Svetlana Ferdinand. 2002. *Hansa and Novgorod: Linguistic Aspects of Historic Contacts*. [In Russian: *Ganza i Novgorod: Lingvisticheskie Aspekty Istoricheskikh Kontaktov*] Moscow: Indrik.

Stasavage, David. 2005. "Democracy and Education Spending in Africa." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2):343–58.

Staveley, E. S. 1972. *Greek and Roman Voting and Elections*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Stein, Charles. 1943. *The Third-Term Tradition: Its Rise and Collapse in American Politics*. Westport, CT:

Greenwood Press.

Stenner, Karen. 2005. *The Authoritarian Dynamic*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Stevanovic, Vidoslav. 2004. *Milosevic: the People's Tyrant*. London: I. B. Taurus.

Sturm, Jan-Egbert. 2001. "Determinants of Public Capital Spending in Less-Developed Countries." Groningen University. Mimeo.

Sullivan, John, Pat Walsh, Michal Shamir, David Barnum and James Gibson. 1993. "Why Politicians Are More Tolerant: Selective Recruitment and Socialization among Political Elites in Britain, Israel, New Zealand and the United States." *British Journal of Political Science* 23:51–76.

Svolik, Milan. 2008. "Authoritarian Reversals and Democratic Consolidation." *American Political Science Review* 102(2):153–68.

Svolik, Milan. 2009. "Power-sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Political Science Review* 53(2):477–94.

Takacs, Sarolta. 2009. *The Construction of Authority in Ancient Rome and Byzantium: The Rhetoric of Empire*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Tangri, Roger. 2006. Politics and Presidential Term Limits in Uganda. In *Legacies of Power: Leadership Change and Former Presidents in African Politics*, ed. Henning Melber and Roger Southall. Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute: HSRC Press pp. 175–196.

Tanzi, Vito and Howell Zee. 2000. Tax Policy for Emerging Markets — Developing Countries. Technical report IMF Working Paper No. 00/35.

Page 317

Tavits, Margit. 2009. *Presidents with Prime Ministers: Do Direct Elections Matter?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Taylor, L. R. 1949. *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Taylor, Lily. 1966. *Roman Voting Assemblies from the Hannibalic War to the Dictatorship of Caesar*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

The Financial Action Task Force. 2011. Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption. Technical report FATF/OECD.

The Financial Action Task Force. 2012. International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations. Technical report OECD/FATF.

Thompson, J. M. 2002. *Napoleon Bonaparte*. [1952] Stroud, UK: Sutton Publishing.

Thompson, Mark and Philipp Kuntz. 2004. "Stolen Elections: The Case of the Serbian October." *Journal of Democracy* 15(4):159–72.

Thomson, Robert. 1999. *Serbia under Miloš evi : Politics in the 1990s*. London: Hurst.

Throup, David. 2003. "The Kenya General Election: December 27, 2002." CSIS: Africa Notes 14. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg and Gary King. 2003. "CLARIFY : Software for Interpreting and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 2.1." Stanford University, University of Wisconsin, and Harvard University.

- Transparency International. 2004. Global Corruption Report 2004. Technical report London: Pluto Press.
- Treisman, Daniel. 2000. "The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study." *Journal of Public Economics* 76(3):399–457.
- Tsebelis, George. 2002. *Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Tullock, Gordon. 1987. *Autocracy*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Urribarri, Raul. 2008. Venezuela, Turning Further Left? In *Leftovers: Tales of the Latin American Left*, ed. Jorge Castaneda and Marco Morales. London: Routledge pp. 174–92.
- US Department of State. 2004. The Future Leaders Exchange Programme (FLEX) What Is FLEX? Technical report US Department of State, American Councils for International Education.
- Van Cranenburgh, Oda. 2008. "Big Men Rule: Presidential Power, Regime Type and Democracy in 30 African Countries." *Democratization* Page 318 15(5):952–73.
- Van de Ven, W. P. M. M. and B. M. S. Van Pragg. 1981. "The Demand for Deductibles in Private Health Insurance: A Probit Model with Sample Selection." *Journal of Econometrics* 17:229–52.
- Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979–1999*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Vargas Llosa, Mario. 2000. *The Feast of the Goat*. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
- Vaubel, Roland, Bernhard Klingen and David Muller. 2011. "There Is Life after the Commission: An Empirical Analysis of Private Interest Representation by Former EU-Commissioners, 1981–2009." *The Review of International Organizations* 7(1):1–22.
- Von Doepp, Peter. 2005. "Party Cohesion and Fractionalization in New African Democracies: Lessons from Struggles over Third-Term Amendments." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 40:65–87.
- Walter, Knut. 1993. *The Regime of Anastasio Somoza, 1936–1956*. Chapel Hill, NC, and London: University of North Carolina Press.
- Ware, Glenn, Shaun Moss, Edgardo Campos and Gregory Noone. 2007. Corruption in Public Procurement: a Perennial Challenge. In *The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level*, ed. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan. World Bank, Washington, DC: World Bank Publications pp. 295–334.
- Wasserman, Mark. 2000. *Everyday Life and Politics in Nineteenth Century Mexico: Men, Women, and War*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.
- Way, Lucan. 2008. "The Real Causes of the Color Revolutions." *Journal of Democracy* 19:55–69.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society*. [1918] Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Wedeman, Andrew. 1997. "Looters, Rent-Scrapers, and Dividend-Collectors: Corruption and Growth in Zaire, South Korea, and the Philippines." *The Journal of Developing Areas* 31(4):457–78.
- Weede, Erich. 1996. "Political Regime Type and Variation in Economic Growth Rates." *Constitutional Political Economy* 7(3):167–76.
- Weisbrot, Mark and Luis Sandoval. 2008. "Update: The Venezuelan Economy in the Chavez Years." Center for Economic and Policy Research Working Paper. Available from www.cepr.net.
- Weldon, Jeffrey. 2007. The Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico. In *Presidentialism and Democracy*

in Latin America, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Mathew Shugart. Cambridge; New York: Page 319 Cambridge University Press.

Wilson, Andrew. 2006. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Wilson, Andrew. 2008. "Meeting Medvedev: The Politics of the Putin Succession." European Council on Foreign Relations Policy Brief 28, February 2008.

Wilson, Andrew and Sarah Birch. 1999. "Voting Stability, Political Gridlock: Ukraine's 1998 Parliamentary Elections." *Europe-Asia Studies* 51(6):1039–68.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 1998. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wittman, Donald. 1977. "Candidates with Policy Preferences: A Dynamic Model." *Journal of Economic Theory* 14(1):180–89.

Wolf, Eric and Edward Hansen. 1967. "Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 9:168–79.

Wolfinger, Raymond E. and Joan Heifetz. 1965. "Safe Seats, Seniority, and Power in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 59(2):337–49.

World Bank and United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 2007. "Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative: Challenges, Opportunities, and Action Plan." Washington, DC: World Bank.

Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2):322–43.

Wright, Joseph. 2009. "How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(3):552–71.

Yanin, Valentin. 1962. *Novgorod Posadniks*. [In Russian: *Novgorodskie Posadniki*] Moscow: Moscow University Press.

Zhang, Jun and Yuan Gao. 2008. "Term Limits and Rotation of Chinese Governors: Do They Matter to Economic Growth?" *Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy* 13(3):274–97.

Zorn, Christopher. 2001. "Generalized Estimating Equation Models for Correlated Data: A Review with Applications." *American Journal of Political Science* 45:470–90.

Index

Abdallah, Ahmed (Comoros), [215](#)

Abuses indicator, [178](#). *See also* human rights abuses

Acemoglu, Daron, [141](#), [167](#)

Adams, John, [24](#)

Adsera, Alicia, [113](#), [249](#)

Africa: dictatorships, [31–32](#); fate of former rulers, [101](#), [102](#); roundtable of former presidents, [91–92](#); salaries in government, [99](#); taxation, [112](#); term limits, [30](#), [33](#). *See also* sub-Saharan Africa

age of rulers, [197](#), [199](#), [202](#), [232](#). *See also* background traits

Ahtisaari, Martti (Finland), [84](#)

Akayev, Askar (Kyrgyzstan), [58–59](#), [95](#), [261–62](#)

Akhmetov, Rinat (businessman, Ukraine), [139](#)

al-Bashir, Omar (Sudan), [119](#)

Alberdi, Juan Bautista, [27–28](#)

Alemán, Arnoldo (Nicaragua), [106](#), [118](#)

Alfonsín, Raúl (Argentina), [62](#), [102](#)

Algeria, [70–71](#)

Alternative Specification of the Dependent Variable, [183](#), [184–86](#). *See also* Dependent Variable, Extending and Stepping Down

Amadou, Hama (Niger), [76](#)

Amin, Idi (Uganda), [68](#)

ancient Greece, [18–20](#), [217](#). *See also* rotation in office

Angola, [66](#), [115](#)

antigovernmental demonstrations, [78–81](#), [125](#), [131](#), [132](#), [138](#), [225](#). *See also* civil society; constraints; *Events* indicator

Appian (historian), [21](#), [191–92](#)

Arab Spring, [1](#)

Arellano, López (Honduras), [139](#)

Argentina, [27](#), [61–62](#), [77](#), [84](#)

Argüello, Leonardo (Nicaragua), [50–51](#)

Arias, Óscar, [102](#)

Arikan, Gulsun, [114](#)

Aristotle, [18–19](#)

Ascona del Hoyo, José (Honduras), [103](#)

assassinations, [130](#), [216](#). *See also* death in office; departures; *Events* indicator

assets, [28](#), [109–12](#), [149](#). *See also* spoils of office; value of office; wealth acquisition

Athenian Constitution (Aristotle), [18–19](#)

Atkinson, Carol, [196](#)

Austria, [44](#)

authoritarian regimes. *See* nondemocratic regimes

autocracies. *See* nondemocratic regimes

autogolpe (self-coup), [13](#), [78](#), [185](#), [251](#). *See also* coups

Aztec empire, [23](#)

Bachelet, Michelle (Chile), [203](#)

background traits, [190–211](#), [205](#), [254](#); individual preferences, [191–92](#). *See also* constitutional compliance; leaders

Bakiyev, Kurmanbek (Kyrgyzstan), [95](#)

Banda, Hastings (Malawi), [188](#), [274n25](#)

Barco Vargas, Virgilio (Columbia), [102](#)

barriers to entry, [222](#). *See also* incumbency advantage

Bases and Points of Departure for the Political Organization of the Argentine Republic (Alberdi), [27–28](#)

Bates, Robert, [13](#)

Page 322

BDP party (Botswana), [123](#), [142](#), [144](#). *See also* hegemonic party

Belarus, [34](#), [50](#), [113](#), [168](#)

Ben Ali, Zine (Tunisia), [33](#), [71](#)

Benin, [33](#), [55](#)

Berdymukhamedov, Gurbanguly (Turkmenistan), [56](#)

Besley, Timothy, [105](#), [238](#), [239](#)

Bhutto, Benazir (Pakistan), [202–3](#)

Bienen, Henry, [194](#)

binding term limits, [11–12](#), [245](#). *See also* term limits

black market exchange premium, [287n1](#)

Boix, Carles, [249](#)

Bokassa, Jean-Bédél (Central African Republic), [69](#), [266](#)

Bolivar, Simon (Venezuela), [26–27](#), [30](#), [40](#), [258](#)

Botswana, [8](#), [123](#), [141–45](#)

Bourguiba, Habib (Tunisia), [33](#), [68–69](#), [265](#)

Bouteflika, Abdelaziz (Algeria), [70–71](#)

Branco, Castelo (Brazil), [79](#), [163](#), [188](#)

brand names, presidents as, [11](#), [222](#). *See also* incumbency advantage

Brazil, [79](#), [81–82](#), [163](#)

Brooker, Paul, [92](#)

Brownlee, Jason, [69](#), [79](#), [248](#)

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, [14](#), [111](#), [154](#), [213–14](#), [214–15](#), [239](#)

Bush, George W. (USA), [287n7](#)

business careers, former presidents occupation after office, [93–96](#), [103](#), [144](#), [279n18](#); prior to assuming office, [196](#), [201](#). *See also* background traits

Caesar, Julius (Roman general), [5–6](#), [21](#)

Calles, Plutarco (Mexico), [50](#)

capital flight, and value of office: [115](#); Botswana, [143](#), Serbia; [128](#); Ukraine, [133](#); indicator of, [151](#), [177–78](#)

Cárdenas, Lázaro (Mexico), [50](#)

Cardoso, Fernando (Brazil), [81–82](#)

careers: after office, [94–95](#), [101–5](#), [104](#), [144](#), [253](#); before office, [196](#), [201](#); public and private careers, [99–100](#). *See also* Occupation after Leaving Presidential Office; retirement

Carey, John, [10](#), [78](#), [82](#), [172](#), [233](#)

Carí as Andino, Tiburcio (Honduras), [28](#)

Caribbean and Central America, [28](#)

Carranza, Venustiano (Mexico), [50](#)

Carrera, José (Guatemala), [275n26](#)

Case, Anne, [238](#), [239](#)

Castaneda, Jorge, [55](#)

CCM party (Tanzania), [57](#). *See also* hegemonic party regimes

Cederman, Lars-Erik, [197](#)

Central African Empire, [69](#), [266](#)

Central African Republic, [69](#)

CEO compensation, [106–8](#). *See also* private sector

ceremonial presidents, [44](#). *See also* place-holders

Chávez, Hugo (Venezuela), [1](#); 2007 referendum, [72–73](#), [77](#), [148](#); 2009 referendum, [73](#); election, [82](#); motives for tenure extension, [97](#); public sector, [113](#); term limits debate, [36](#), [60–61](#)

checks and balances. *See* constraints

Chehabi, Houchang, [5](#), [50](#)

Cheibub, Jose, [10–11](#), [233](#)

Chiari, Roberto, [103](#)

Chile, [42](#)

Chiluba, Frederick (Zambia), [4](#), [77](#), [108](#), [171](#)

China: rotation in office, [52](#), [271n32](#)

Chissano, Joaquim (Mozambique), [188](#)

Cicero, [18](#), [19](#)

Civil Rights index, [225](#), [227](#). *See also* Freedom House

civil society, [153](#), [167](#). *See also* antigovernmental demonstrations; constraints; mass-level constraints

Civil Wars (Appian), [21](#), [191–92](#)

Clague, Christopher, [150](#)

Clinton, Bill (USA), [94–95](#), [102](#)

Cohen, Lenard, [125](#)

collective action. *See* antigovernmental demonstrations; constraints; *Events* indicator

Colombia, [31](#), [66](#), [77](#), [247](#)

compensation contracts. *See* remuneration

Congo, [30](#)

consolidated democracies: motivation of office-holders in, [6–10](#), [93–96](#), [101–5](#), [259](#); value of private careers, [99–100](#); remuneration of office-holders in, [105–7](#); term limits in, [38–40](#), [81–82](#); sample selection, [43–44](#)

constitutional amendments. *See* tenure extensions

Page 323

constitutional assemblies, [24](#), [28](#), [33–37](#); [60–61](#), [62](#), [64](#)

constitutional compliance, [9](#), [163](#), [189–210](#), [205](#), [223](#), [248–49](#), [254](#); as an indicator of democracy, [134](#), [257–60](#). *See also* background traits; stepping down; term limits; value of office

Constitutional Courts. *See* courts

constitutionalism, [3](#), [257–60](#)

constitutions: Algeria, [70–71](#); Argentina, [27](#); Central African Empire, [266](#); Equatorial Guinea, [33](#); Finland, [30](#); France, [23](#), [25](#), [29–30](#), [33](#); Francophone countries, [271n31](#); Kazakhstan, [58](#), [263](#); Korea, [268n1](#); Kyrgyzstan, [261–62](#); Liberia, [30](#), [292n1](#); Mexico, [269n9](#), [270n18](#); new, [57–59](#), [71](#); Niger, [265](#); Peru, [263](#); Philippines, [64–65](#), [264–65](#); Russia, [262–63](#); Serbia, [263–64](#); Tunisia, [265](#); USSR, [34](#); Weimar Republic, [30](#); Yugoslavia, [130](#), [264](#)

constraints: Botswana, [134–35](#); elite, [74](#), [154](#); on executive capacity, [8–9](#), [27](#), [73–82](#), [152–54](#), [254](#); and incumbency advantage, [28](#); indicators of: [152–54](#), [170–75](#); international, [153–54](#), [174–75](#); political institutions as, [74](#), [170–74](#); Serbia, [125–26](#); and term limits, [154–55](#), [161](#); and value of office, [8–9](#); Ukraine, [134–35](#)

continuismo, [13](#), [47–90](#), [86–90](#)

Contract-intensive money indicator, [150](#), [151](#), [156](#), [159–60](#), [166](#). *See also* property rights

corruption: Botswana, [143](#); causes, [14](#); global estimates, [109–10](#); of heads of state, [7](#), [113–14](#); measures of, [149–51](#); and privatization, [114](#), [151](#); in public sector, [114–15](#); Serbia, [127–28](#); Ukraine, [132–33](#). *See also* enrichment; rent-seeking; skimming

costs and benefits of holding office. *See* value of office

coups: elections reducing threat of, [217](#); frequency in poor countries, [98](#); Louis-Napoleon, [29–30](#); military: [12](#), [61](#), [178](#), [203](#); Tunisia, [69](#); Venezuela, [61](#); unlimited tenure and, [3](#), [217](#). *See also* *autogolpe* (self-coup)

courts: Argentina, [62](#), [77](#); Colombia, [77](#), [247](#); Kyrgyzstan, [74](#), [261–62](#); Nicaragua, [74](#); Niger, [78](#); Russia, [58–59](#), [74](#). *See also* constraints; judiciary; prosecutions

Cox, Gary, [217](#)

Crain, Mark, [233](#), [238](#)

criminal prosecutions. *See* prosecutions; immunity; immunity concerns

Curcio, Karly, [143](#)

Darden, Keith, [133](#)

death in office, [68](#), [216](#). *See also* assassinations; departures from office

dedazo (finger tap), [55–56](#). *See also* designated successors

de facto term limits, [37–38](#), [45](#), [57–59](#), [63–66](#), [250](#), [257](#). *See also* formal term limits; term limits

De Haan, Jakob, [238](#), [240](#), [241](#)

democracies: breakdown, [12](#), [257](#); economic growth variance, [234–37](#); education, [195–96](#); indicators of, [152–53](#); institutionalization, [171](#); sample selection, [43–44](#), [167–70](#); selection of leaders, [190–93](#), [198–203](#); preferences for, [189](#), [210](#); and presidential tenures, [10–11](#); tenure extensions in, [4](#), [82](#), [167–70](#); retirement careers, [105–8](#), [117](#); wealth acquisition, [94](#). *See also* consolidated democracies; democratic consolidation; developed nations

democracy indicators, [38–39](#), [161–62](#), [173](#). *See also* Freedom House index; *Polity2*

democratic consolidation: literature on, [11–12](#), [73](#), [248](#); term limits, [11–12](#), [14](#). *See also* democracies

democratic elitism argument, [195](#)

democratic preferences, [193–94](#). *See also* background traits

demonstration effects: democratic neighborhood, [232](#); effects of elections, [226](#); constitutional diffusion: [28](#), [33](#), [62](#), [64](#), [81](#), [174](#), [179](#), [285n32](#)

departures from office, [91–105](#), [149](#), [163–65](#), [215–16](#), [229](#), [267n3](#). *See also* assassinations; death in office; stepping down

Dependent Variable: Extending and Stepping Down, [147–49](#). *See also* Alternative Specification of the Dependent Variable

designated successors, [54](#), [55–57](#), [220](#), [221](#), [222–54](#), [232–33](#). *See also* succession

Page 324

developed nations: retirement careers, [105–8](#); leaders' personal background, [199](#), [200](#). *See also* democracies; economic development

Dí az, Porficio (Mexico), [2](#), [28–29](#), [52](#)

dictator's dilemma, [216–17](#)

dictatorships. *See* nondemocratic regimes

dictator's play book, [250–52](#)

dictators (Roman office), [11](#), [20–21](#)

Diermeier, Daniel, [93](#), [96–97](#)

Diouf, Abdou (Senegal), [229](#)

directly elected presidents, [43](#), [184–85](#). *See also* sample selection

Discourses (Machiavelli), [11](#), [20](#)

Dominican Republic, [50](#), [85](#)

donor governments, [32](#), [153](#), [259](#). *See also* constraints; foreign aid; international constraints

dos Santos, Jos Eduardo (Angola), [66](#), [203](#)

Dreher, Axel, [195](#)

durability indicator, [159–60](#), [169](#). *See also* democracy indicators

Duvalier, Francois (Haiti), [68](#), [216](#)

Duvalier, Jean-Claude (Haiti), [7](#)

dynastic succession, [79](#). *See also* succession

Easterly, William, [190](#), [234](#), [235](#)

economic development, levels of: [12–14](#), [167](#), [168](#), [207](#); and leaders' selection, [198–200](#); and political regimes, literature on, [249](#); rulers' careers, [101–5](#). *See also* developed nations; less developed nations

economic effects: of term limits, [233–46](#), [254–55](#). *See also* time horizons

economic growth, [162](#), [177](#), [207](#), [233–38](#)

Economic Growth Variance, and Time Horizons, [236](#)

economic policies, basis for seeking re-elections, [24](#), [36](#), [97](#), [237–38](#). *See also* ideology; time horizons

Economy and Society (Weber), [7](#)

Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship Program (US), [195](#)

education, of rulers, [192](#), [195–96](#), [203–7](#), [245](#). *See also* background traits; Soviet education; Western education

educational exchange programs, [195](#)

effective national executives, [44](#). *See also* sample selection

Eggers, Andrew, [94](#)

elections: abolition, [54](#); Botswana, [144](#); forced departures after, [216](#); incumbency advantage, [218](#); incumbent absences, [221–23](#), [231](#); incumbent leaders, [231–33](#); losing, [151](#), [216](#); manipulating, [12–13](#); margins of victory, [291n6](#); nondemocratic regimes, [4](#), [217](#); run-off, [229](#); Serbia, [130–31](#), [216](#); suspension, [54](#), [65–66](#), [264–65](#); and term limits, [9](#), [82–85](#); Ukraine, [135](#). *See also* incumbency advantage; liberalizing elections; presidential elections; rotation in office

electoral behavior literature, [193](#)

elite constraints. *See* constraints

elite defections, [218–19](#), [221–22](#). *See also* liberalizing elections

enrichment, [109](#), [111](#), [150](#). *See also* corruption; rent-seeking opportunities; skimming; value of office

entry constraints. *See* constraints

Epstein, David, [13](#)

Equatorial Guinea, [33](#)

Escarra, Hermann, [36–37](#)

ethnic minority status: of a ruler, [203](#). *See also* background traits

European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), [278n15](#)

European Parliament (EP), career concerns in, [98–99](#)

European Union, [81](#), [125](#), [175](#), [273n7](#)

Events indicator, [153](#), [155](#), [157](#), [159–60](#), [162](#). *See also* antigovernmental demonstrations

executive capacity. *See* constraints

executive turnover, [212](#), [223](#). *See also* rotation in office

exile, [95](#), [101](#), [116](#), [216](#). *See also* former presidents; post-tenure fate

families, immunity for, [118](#), [132](#). *See also* immunity; value of office

Fate after Leaving Office, [215](#). *See also* post-tenure fate

Father of the nation, [206](#), [210](#), [281n37](#). *See also* background traits

Fearon, James, [197–98](#), [203](#)

Federalist Papers (Hamilton), [24–25](#)

Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), [124–25](#), [130](#). *See also* Serbia; Yugoslavia

Page 325

Financial Action Task Force, The, [109](#), [281n32](#)

financial outflows. *See* capital flight

Finer, S. E., [92](#)

finger tap (*dedazo*), [55–56](#)

Finland, [30](#)

first terms, rate of completion, [84](#)

Fitzgibbon, Russell, [48](#)

Florence, [22](#)

For a United Ukraine block (Ukraine), [135](#)

forced departures, [216](#). *See also* departures

foreign aid, [111](#), [153](#), [159–60](#), [179](#), [225](#). *See also* constraints; donor governments; international constraints

formal term limits, [37–38](#), [45–46](#). *See also de facto* term limits; term limits

former presidents: Botswana, [144](#); careers, [94–95](#), [102–5](#), [104](#), [253](#); earnings, [256](#); post-tenure fate, [116–19](#), [215](#); roundtable meeting of, [91–92](#); Ukraine, [134](#). *See also* exile; immunity; retirement

Former Presidents Act 1958 (US), [259](#)

France, [23](#), [25](#), [29–30](#), [53](#), [67](#)

Francia, José (Paraguay), [269n13](#), [275n26](#)

Francophone countries, [115](#), [271n31](#)

Franzese, Robert, [239](#)

Freedom House index: Ghana, [43–44](#), [219](#), [267n4](#); elections with incumbents running, [221](#); Niger, [78](#); tenure extensions, [260](#); Venezuela, [38–39](#). *See also* *Civil Rights* index

Fujimori, Alberto (Peru), [4](#), [77](#), [95](#), [196](#)

Funds Skimmed from Office, [110](#)

Future Leaders Exchange (US), [195](#)

future research, [255–57](#)

Gabon, [30](#)

Gandhi, Jennifer, [43](#), [213](#), [218](#), [233](#)

Gaviria, César, [103](#)

Gbagbo, Laurent (Cote d'Ivoire), [106](#)

Geddes, Barbara, [5](#), [118](#), [213](#)

Geisel, Ernesto (Brazil), [163](#)

Genoa Republic, [22](#)

German Academic Exchange Program (DAAD), [195](#)

Ghana, [44](#), [105–6](#), [219](#)

Girardin, Luc, [197](#)

Gleditsch, Kristian, [152–53](#)

Glele Ahanhanzo, Maurice, [33](#)

Goati, Vladimir, [125](#)

Goldstone, Jack, [13](#)

González, Felipe, [64](#)

Gouled Aptidon, Hassan (Djibouti), [157](#), [197](#), [232](#)

governmental pay. *See* remuneration

governmental procurement markets. *See* procurement markets

governmental spending. *See* public sector

Government and Parliament in a Reconstructed Germany (Weber), [7](#)

grand corruption, [7](#), [113](#). *See also* corruption

grandfathering, [58](#), [71](#), [251](#). *See also* tenure extensions

Great Depression, [28](#)

Gulleh, Ismail (Djibouti), [232](#)

Gurr, Ted Robert, [152–53](#), [155](#)

Habré, Hissène (Chad), [119](#)

Hainmueller, Jens, [94](#)

Haiti, [68](#)

Hamilton, Alexander, [24–25](#), [38–40](#), [92](#), [260](#)

Harrington, James, [268n4](#)

Hegemonic party: and assets and immunity retention, [118](#), [277n3](#); Botswana, [142](#), [144](#); Djibouti, [232](#); and liberalizing elections, [225–27](#); Losing Office, Constraints and Term Limits models, [159–60](#), [180](#); Mexico, [29](#); operationalization, [151–52](#), [155](#), [178](#); and presidential succession, [56](#), [118](#), [255–57](#); regimes, [78–81](#); regime institutionalization, [169](#); rulers as party founders, [79](#); Tanzania, [188](#). *See also* ruling parties

Heifetz, Joan, [98](#)

Heinemann, Friedrich, [194–95](#)

Heller, Peter, [108](#)

hereditary monarchy. *See* monarchies

Hoare, Marko Attila, [128](#)

Honduras, [28](#), [62](#)

Hood, Christopher, [108](#)

Howard, Marc, [218](#), [224–25](#)

Hu Jintao (China), [52](#)

human rights abuses, [119](#), [178](#). *See also* immunity

Huntington, Samuel, [8–9](#), [222](#)

hybrid regimes. *See* partly democratic regimes

Page 326

Ibrahim, Mohamed (philanthropist and businessman), [2](#)

Ibrahim Prize, [2](#), [188](#)

ideology, of presidents, [98](#), [162](#)

Iliescu, Ion (Romania), [273n7](#)

immunity, [8](#); after office, [116–19](#), [120](#), [149](#); constitution clauses, [118](#); guarantees of, [151–52](#), [156–57](#), [259](#); Leonid Kuchma (Ukraine), [140–41](#); Nursultan Nazarbayev (Kazakhstan), [281n37](#). *See also* former presidents; *Immunity concerns* indicator; post-tenure fate; prosecutions

Immunity concerns indicator, [152](#), [158](#), [159–60](#), [161](#), [178](#)

income-generating potential. *See* value of office

incumbency advantage, [82–85](#), [218](#), [224–26](#), [231–33](#), [252–53](#). *See also* barriers to entry; brand names

Incumbency and Electoral Results: Selection Models, [230](#)

Incumbency, Liberalizing Elections and Electoral Defeats: GEE Models, [228](#)

incumbent absences, at elections, [220](#), [221–23](#), [224](#), [227–29](#). *See also* designated successors; liberalizing elections

indirectly elected presidents, [43](#), [184–85](#). *See also* sample selection

Individual Background and Constitutional Compliance, [205](#)

individual traits. *See* background traits

Individual Traits as an Omitted Variable, [209](#)

insider status, of rulers, [197](#). *See also* background traits; outsider status

Institutional Constraints. *See* constraints

institutional indicators. *See* constraints

instrumental-variables probit model, [162](#), [288n9](#)

interim leaders, [56](#). *See also* sample selection

international constraints, [153–54](#). *See also* donor governments; foreign aid

International Criminal Court (ICC), [119](#)

International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), [122](#), [129](#), [131](#). *See also* courts

international influences. *See* demonstration effects; foreign aid; Western influence

International Social Survey Programme 2005: Work Orientation III (ISSP), [278n15](#)

Jagers, Keith, [152–53](#), [155](#)

Janeba, Eckhard, [195](#)

Jayewardene, Julius (Sri Lanka), [65](#)

jefe maximo (chairman of a ruling party), [50](#), [51](#). *See also* PRI party (Mexico)

Jefferson, Thomas (USA), [24](#), [25](#), [38](#), [260](#)

Jiang Zemin (China), [52](#)

Johnson, Joseph, [233](#), [238](#)

Johnson, Simon, [141](#), [167](#)

Jones, Benjamin, [190](#)

Jones, G. W., [194](#)

judiciary: control over, [78](#); executive constraints, [74–75](#); independence, [58](#), [171](#), [173](#); nomination of judges, [59](#), [62](#), [78](#); Kyrgyzstan, [58–59](#), [261–62](#); Russia, [58–59](#). *See also* constraints; courts; prosecutions

Jugopetrol (company), [128](#)

Justicialist party (Argentina), [61–62](#)

KANU party (Kenya), [221–22](#)

Kar, Dev, [143](#)

Kasara, Kimuli, [197–98](#), [203](#)

Kaunda, Kenneth (Zambia), [91](#)

Kazakhstan, [58](#), [63–64](#), [263](#), [281n37](#), [291n6](#)

Keane, Michael, [93](#), [96–97](#)

Keefer, Philip, [150](#)

Kenya, [221](#)

Kenyatta, Uhuru (Kenya), [221](#)

Kérékou, Mathieu (Benin), [33](#), [55](#), [118](#)

Khama, Ian (Botswana), [143](#)

Khama, Seretse (Botswana), [141](#), [143](#)

Kibaki, Mwai (Kenya), [106](#)

Klaus, Vaáclav (Czech Republic), [195](#)

kleptocracy, [111–12](#)

Knack, Stephen, [150](#)

Kogut, Bruce, [196](#)

Kohl, Helmut (Germany), [64](#)

Kolomoyski, Ihor (Ukraine), [139](#)

Konaré, Alpha Oumar (Mali), [103](#)

Korea, [30–31](#), [268n1](#)

Koš tunica, Vojislav (Serbia), [129](#), [130–31](#)

Kravchuk, Leonid (Ukraine), [134](#)

Kristensen, Ida, [13](#)

Page 327

Krivorozhstal (company), [133](#), [139](#)

Kuchma, Leonid (Ukraine), [122](#), [132–41](#), [148](#)

Kufuor, John (Ghana), [106](#)

Kwasniewski, Alexander (Poland), [102](#)

Kyrgyzstan, [58–59](#), [71](#), [95](#), [261–62](#)

Lagos, Ricardo, [102](#)

Lahoud, Émile (Lebanon), [81–82](#)

Laitin, David, [197–98](#), [203](#)

“lame-duck” presidents, [239](#)

La Porta, Rafael, [150](#)

Latin America: regime strength, [172–74](#); predictions of rulers leaving office, [165](#); choice of presidential government, [26–27](#); presidential terms, [25](#), [27](#); re-elections, [61–63](#); rulers' fate after leaving office, [102](#)

lawyers, [192](#), [196](#), [201](#). *See also* background traits

Lazarenko, Pavlo (Ukraine), [134](#)

leaders: literature on leaders' effects, [194–95](#); as political insiders, [196–97](#); setting precedents for constitutional compliance, [29](#), [32](#), [79](#), [163](#), [188](#); time horizons, [213](#). *See also* background traits

Lebanon, [81–82](#)

Lee, Grace, [108](#)

legislative term limits, relationship with public spending, [237](#)

length of term, modification of, [59–61](#)

Leonid Kuchma Presidential Foundation Ukraine, [141](#)

less developed nations, [101](#), [105–6](#), [111–12](#), [198–99](#), [200](#), [202–3](#), [238](#)

Levitsky, Steven, [14](#), [81](#), [175](#)

liberalizing elections, [218](#), [224–26](#), [227](#). *See also* elections

Liberia, [30](#), [41–42](#), [292n1](#)

Life in Transition Survey II (EBRD and World Bank), [278n15](#)

life presidents, [27](#), [30](#), [67–69](#), [73](#), [102](#), [188](#), [216](#), [265](#). *See also* no term limits; perpetual rule; tyrants

Linz, Juan, [1](#), [5](#), [50](#), [197](#), [260](#)

Llosa, Vargas (Dominican Republic), [50](#)

Locke, John, [268n4](#)

long-term capital projects, [238](#)

long-term extensions, [70](#), [185–86](#)

Lopez, Edward, [213](#)

Lopez, Francisco (Paraguay), [269n13](#)

losing office, constraints and term limits models, [156–67](#), [159–60](#), [180–81](#), [183](#), [184–86](#)

Lott, John, [222](#)

Lukashenko, Alexander (Belarus), [50](#), [168](#)

Lukic, Reneo, [126](#)

Machiavelli, Niccolò, [11](#), [20](#), [252](#)

Macpherson, J. Muir, [196](#)

Madero, Francisco, [29](#)

Madison, James, [24](#)

Magaloni, Beatriz, [151](#), [225](#), [291n6](#)

Malawi, [77](#), [153](#)

Marcos, Ferdinand (Philippines), [9](#), [31](#), [64–65](#), [264–65](#)

Marcos, Imelda, [108](#)

margins of victory, [222](#), [291n6](#)

Marius, Gaius (Roman general), [20–21](#)

Markovi , Ratko, [126](#)

Marshall, Monty, [152–53](#), [155](#)

Masire, Quett (Botswana), [8](#), [91](#), [123](#), [141–45](#)

Mason, George, [24](#)

mass collective action. *See Events* indicator

mass-level constraints, [74–75](#), [153](#), [154](#). *See also* antigovernmental demonstrations; constraints; *Events* indicator

Mbeki, Thabo (South Africa), [287n7](#)

McFaul, Michael, [291n3](#)

Medici, Emí lio Garrastazu (Brazil), [163](#)

Medieval Europe, monarchies, [22](#)

Medvedev, Dmitry (Russia), [51](#), [53](#), [247](#)

Mejí a, Hipólito (Dominican Republic), [85](#)

Menem, Carlos (Argentina): corruption, [110](#); extending terms, [82](#); opposition to third term, [4](#), [77](#), [171](#), [258](#); proceeds of privatization, [114](#); second term, [61–62](#)

Merlo, Antonio, [93](#), [96–97](#)

Meserve, Stephen, [98](#)

Mexico: 1824 constitution, [269n9](#), [270n18](#); choosing successors, [55–56](#); immunity, [118](#); political power, [50](#); time horizons, [234](#); term limits, [28–29](#), [79](#). *See also* *dedazo*; hegemonic party; *PRI* party (Mexico)

Middle East, [30](#), [38](#), [44](#), [101–2](#)

military coups. *See* departures from office

Page 328

military officers, [201](#), [203](#). *See also* background traits

military regimes, [42](#), [79](#), [192](#), [213](#)

Miljukovic, Maja, [128](#)

Mills, John Atta (Ghana), [219](#)

Miloš evi , Marko (Serbia),[128](#), [131](#)

Miloš evi , Mira (Serbia),[131](#)

Miloš evi , Slobodan (Serbia, Yugoslavia),[8](#), [9](#), [85](#), [122](#), [124–32](#), [130](#)

Milutinovi , Milan (Serbia), [126](#)

Mogae, Festus (Botswana), [4](#), [8](#), [123](#), [141–45](#)

Mohl, Philipp, [195](#)

Moi, Daniel arap (Kenya), [221](#)

Moldova, [65](#), [285n32](#)

Momoh, Joseph (Sierra Leone), [216](#)

monarchies, [22](#), [42](#), [69](#), [117](#), [216](#), [266](#)

monetary rewards. *See* value of office

Morales, Evo (Bolivia), [73](#)

Moroz, Alexander (Ukraine), [283n17](#)

Morrow, James, [14](#)

motivation: of office-holders, [6–10](#), [93–96](#), [99–100](#), [101–5](#), [259](#); political careers, choice over, [98](#), [99](#). *See also* careers; office-seeking motivation; value of office

Mouvement National pour la Société du Développement(MNSD, Niger), [76](#)

Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD, Zambia), [171](#)

Mugabe, Robert (Zimbabwe), [65](#), [196](#)

Muluzi, Bakili (Malawi), [77](#), [153](#)

Murphy, Kevin, [99](#), [105](#)

Museveni, Yoweri (Uganda), [153](#)

Mwinyi, Ali Hassan (Tanzania), [57](#), [91](#)

Namibia, [50](#), [63](#), [273n8](#)

Napoleon Bonaparte (France), [23–24](#)

Napoleon III (France), [2](#), [29–30](#)

nationalizations, [114](#), [127](#)

natural resource rents, [7](#), [111](#), [115](#), [157](#); indicator of: [151](#), [156](#), [158](#), [177–78](#)

Nazarbayev, Nursultan (Kazakhstan), [58](#), [63–64](#), [114](#), [274n23](#), [281n37](#)

neighboring regimes, effect of elections. *See* demonstration effects

new term countdown, [57–59](#), [261–62](#). *See also* tenure extensions

Nicaragua, [50–51](#), [74](#), [238–39](#)

Niger, [38](#), [71](#), [76](#), [77–78](#), [265](#)

Nigeria, [2](#), [110](#), [143](#)

Niyazov, Saparmurat (Turkmenistan), [56](#), [64](#), [68](#), [108](#), [110](#), [216](#)

Nonconstitutional entry, [178](#), [217](#)

nondemocratic regimes: constitutional compliance in, [4](#), [169](#); constraints, [74–75](#), [78–79](#); dictator's personal preferences, [79](#), [188](#); dictator's dilemma, [216–17](#); dynastic succession, [79](#); economic growth variance in, [234–35](#); economic policy, [245–46](#); financial rewards, [94](#); leaders' background traits, [210](#), [211](#); liberalizing elections, [226–29](#); presidential remuneration, [106](#); role of elections, [217](#); sample selection, [43–44](#); skimming funds, [245–46](#); succession problem, [116–19](#); survival and fate, [214–16](#); term limits, [11](#), [20](#), [38–40](#), [250](#)

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), [32](#), [102–3](#). *See also* careers; post-tenure fate

North America, fate of former rulers, [102](#)

North Africa, [1](#), [18](#), [30](#), [38](#), [44](#), [102](#). *See also* Africa; sub-Saharan Africa

no term limits, [29–30](#), [253](#). *See also* life presidents

Novgorod Republic (medieval Russia), [22](#)

Nujoma, Sam (Namibia), [50](#), [63](#), [106](#)

Nyerere, Julius (Tanzania), [32](#), [57](#), [163](#), [188](#)

Obasanjo, Olusegun (Nigeria), [2](#), [148](#)

Obiang Nguema, Teodoro (Equatorial Guinea), [106](#)

Obregón, Álvaro (Mexico), [29](#), [50](#), [52](#)

Occupation after Leaving Presidential Office, [101–5](#), [104](#). *See also* careers; post-tenure fate

Oceania (Harrington), [268n4](#)

office-seeking motivation, [96](#). *See also* motivation: of office-holders

“offices' swap,” [54](#), [125](#), [263–64](#)

O'Halloran, Sharyn, [13](#)

Olive Pact (Argentina), [62](#)

Olken, Benjamin, [190](#)

Olson, Mancur, [96](#), [112](#), [150](#), [213](#), [234](#), [255](#)

opposition, and constraints: [153](#), [222](#), [224](#), [229](#); mobilization, [225](#); unity, [225](#). *See also* constraints

Orange revolution (Ukraine), [122](#)

Page 329

Ortega, Daniel (Nicaragua), [1](#), [4](#), [74](#)

Osterloh, Steffen, [195](#)

Our Ukraine block (*Nasha Ukraina* (NU) Ukraine), [135](#)

Ousmane, Mahamane (Niger), [76](#)

outsider status, of a leader: [197](#), [199–201](#), [203](#), [289n3](#); factors behind the emergence of, [206](#); indicator of: [200](#), [202](#), [204](#), [205](#), [209](#), [210](#), [290n7](#). *See also* background traits

Pani , Milan (Yugoslavia), [129](#)

Park Chung-hee (Korea), [30–31](#)

parliamentarism, voters' perceptions of, [260](#)

parliamentary majorities, [71](#). *See also* constraints

parliamentary regimes, [43](#), [65](#), [272n33](#). *See also* sample selection

parliamentary ratification, [28](#), [63–64](#), [69–72](#), [77](#). *See also* tenure extension

partly democratic regimes: constitutional compliance, [4](#), [13–14](#); institutional constraints, [80](#); leaders' background traits, [204–10](#); liberalizing elections, [226–29](#); Niger, [75–78](#); operationalization, [168](#), [289n13](#); sample selection, [43–44](#), separate estimations, [167–70](#); Serbia, [282n4](#); term limits, [39–40](#); Ukraine, [135](#)

Party founder: control over ruling party, [78–79](#), [157](#), [158](#), [159–60](#), [169](#); Serbia, [124–25](#)

pay. *See* remuneration

Pemstein, Daniel, [98](#)

People's Rally for Progress (Djibouti), [232](#)

Perón, Juan (Argentina), [2](#), [28](#), [61–62](#)

perpetual rule, [40](#), [68–69](#). *See also* life presidents; President for Life; tyrants

Personal Background: and Compliance with Term Limits, [201](#), [202](#); of Presidents, Democracy, and Development, [199](#), [200](#)

personal background effects, [204–10](#). *See also* background traits

personal fortunes, [107](#), [109](#). *See also* value of office

personalist regimes, [5](#), [13](#), [188](#), [213](#)

personalization of power, [5](#), [42](#), [258–59](#)

Peru, [77](#), [263](#)

Peters, Guy, [108](#)

Philadelphia (Convention, US), [24](#)

Philippines, [31](#), [64–65](#), [264–65](#)

Pinchuk, Victor (businessman, Ukraine), [139](#)

Pinochet, Augusto (Chile), [42](#), [188](#)

place-holders, [28–29](#), [44](#), [50](#). *See also* ceremonial presidents; Medvedev, Dmitry; *politique de doublure*

plural executives, [25–26](#), [44](#). *See also* sample selection

Poland, [23](#), [34](#)

Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth Constitution (1791), [23](#)

Political constraints indicator, [171](#)

political dynasties, [197](#). *See also* background traits; insider status

political immortality, [1](#), [5–6](#), [85](#), [214–15](#), [256–57](#). *See also* life presidents

political institutions. *See* constraints

political leaders. *See* leaders

political liberalization, [212](#), [220](#), [223](#)

Political outsider. *See* outsider status

political parties. *See* hegemonic party; ruling parties

political posts, assumed after presidency, [102](#), [118](#). *See also* careers; post-tenure fate

political rewards, [105–8](#). *See also* remuneration

Political Rights Index, [38–39](#). *See also* Freedom House index

political survival. *See* survival in office

Politics (Aristotle), [18–19](#)

politique de doublure (“politics of understudy”), [50](#). *See also* place-holders

Polity2, indicator for democracy, [152–53](#), [155](#); at entry: [154](#), [155](#), [156](#), [159–60](#), [173](#). *See also* democracy indicators

popularity, of presidents, [75](#), [177](#); President Kuchma, [132](#); President Milošević, [126](#), [283n14](#)

posadnik (viceroy), [22](#)

post-independence constitutions: Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, [34](#); Latin America: [26–27](#); sub-Saharan African, [30](#). *See also* constitutions

post-independence leaders. *See* *father of the nation*

post-tenure fate, [94–95](#), [116–19](#), [152](#), [213–16](#). *See also* careers; immunity; Occupation after Leaving Presidential Office; previous ruler's fate; retirement

Poteete, Amy, [141](#)

Page 330

Predicted Probability, results, [163–65](#), [164](#)

Premier: Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines) as, [65](#). *See also* prime ministers; “offices' swap”

President for Life, [67–69](#), [188](#), [216](#), [265](#). *See also* life presidents; perpetual rule; tyrants

Presidential *Continuismo*, [87–90](#)

presidential elections, [43](#), [125–26](#), [219–20](#). *See also* elections

presidentialism, [10–11](#), [12](#), [18](#), [42](#), [65](#), [167](#), [197](#), [248](#)

presidential powers, [10](#), [43](#), [134](#). *See also* constraints

presidential re-elections. *See* re-election

presidential regimes. *See* presidentialism; sample selection

presidential term limits. *See* term limits

Presidential Terms (2010), [46](#)

Presidential Terms and Democracy, [39](#)

Presidential Transition Act 1963 (USA), [117–18](#)

presidents: powers versus prime ministers, [52](#); provision after retirement, [117–18](#); selection of, [148](#); strategic resignations, [56](#). *See also* presidentialism; re-election; sample selection

Previous ruler's fate, indicator: [155](#), [156](#), [158](#), [159–60](#), [166](#); Botswana: [144](#); Serbia: [130](#); Ukraine: [134](#)

prime ministers, [44](#), [52](#), [64](#), [65](#), [194](#), [260](#). *See also* “offices' swap”; *Premier*

PRI party (Mexico), [29](#), [79](#). *See also* hegemonic party

private sector, remuneration in: [106–8](#), [107](#); Botswana: [142](#); Serbia, [127](#). *See also* business careers; value of office

privatization, and value of office: [114](#), [127](#), [133](#), [134](#), [151](#); indicator: [177–78](#)

procurement markets, [7](#), [150–51](#), [156–58](#), [177–78](#)

prolongation strategies, [9](#), [53–70](#). *See also* tenure extensions

property rights, [7](#), [142](#). *See also* *Contract-intensive money*

“prorrogismo,” [47](#)

prosecutions, [8](#), [116](#), [117–18](#), [119](#), [122](#), [131](#), [287n7](#). *See also* immunity; post-tenure fate

protests, [78](#), [225](#). *See also* antigovernmental demonstrations; *Events* indicator

Przeworski, Adam, [144](#), [220](#), [233](#), [235](#), [257](#), [291n3](#),

Pskov Republic (medieval Russia), [22](#)

public sector, and value of office: [7](#), [112–13](#), [114–15](#), [150](#), [162](#); indicator: [156](#), [157–58](#), [162](#), [166](#), [167–68](#), [177](#); determinants of, [162](#); different regime types, [167–68](#), [176–77](#), [289n16](#); and governmental ideology, [162](#); ratio of salary to, [106](#). *See also* value of office

Puddington, Arch, [38–39](#)

Putin, Vladimir (Russia), [1](#), [49–53](#)

Querubin, Pablo, [93–94](#)

Radical party (Argentina), [62](#)

Radulovi , Slobodan (Serbia), [128](#)

Rae, Douglas, [171](#)

Ramgoolam, Seewoosagur (Mauritius), [91](#)

Ratsiraka, Didier (Madagascar), [110](#)

Rawlings, Jerry (Ghana), [4](#), [44](#), [91](#), [163](#), [203](#), [219](#)

re-election: age of leaders, [232](#); criticism of, [24](#); and economic policies, [237–38](#); Latin America, [26–29](#), [38](#); losing, [85](#); modifying bans, [58](#); rate of and term limits, [82–85](#); Republican Rome, [19](#); survival in office, [214–15](#); single-term regimes, [29](#), [61](#); term limits, [8](#), [82–85](#)

referendums: amending constitutions, [70–72](#); Kazakhstan, [263](#); Napoleon, [23](#); Niger, [78](#); prolongation by, [54](#), [63–64](#); Venezuela, [73](#)

regime candidates, [220](#), [224](#), [227](#). *See also* designated successors; succession

remuneration, [99](#), [105–9](#); Botswana, [286n53](#); former presidents, [94–95](#), [286n53](#), [256](#); Ukraine, [109](#). *See also* value of office

rent-seeking opportunities: causes, [14](#); and constraints, [8–9](#), [154–55](#); and immunity, [120](#); and the political economy, [110–16](#); poorer countries, [95](#), [99](#); rulers providing, [222](#); Serbia, [127](#); Ukraine, [133](#). *See also* corruption;

enrichment; skimming; value of office

Republican Rome, [18–22](#). *See also* rotation in office

republics, aristocratic, [22](#)

Page 331

reputation, and constitutional compliance, [278n11](#)

researchers, cognitive biases, [190](#)

retirement: developing countries, [95–96](#); developed economies, [108](#); and international careers, [105](#). *See also* careers; former presidents; post-tenure fate

retribution, [101](#), [119](#). *See also* immunity; prosecutions; post-tenure fate

Reuter, Ora, [218](#)

rewards of office, [108–12](#), [192–93](#). *See also* remuneration; value of office

Rhee, Syngman (Korea), [30](#)

Riker, William, [96](#), [97](#)

Robinson, James, [141](#), [167](#)

Roessler, Phillip, [218](#), [224–25](#)

Romania, [273n7](#)

Roosevelt, Franklin D. (USA), [18](#), [29](#), [53](#), [253](#)

Rosas, Juan Manuel de (Argentina), [27](#)

Rose-Ackerman, Susan, [114](#)

rotation in office, [3](#), [18–20](#), [32](#), [52](#), [217](#), [271n32](#). *See also* ancient Greece; elections; Republican Rome

Roubini, Nuriel, [233](#)

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, [27](#)

ruling parties: control of, [56–57](#), [79](#), [153](#), [254](#); guarantee immunity, [156–57](#); *jefe maximo* (Mexico), [50](#), [51](#); regime institutionalization, [169](#). *See also* *Hegemonic party*; party founder

Russia, [34–36](#), [49–53](#), [58–59](#), [133](#), [262–63](#)

Rwanda, [30](#), [41](#)

Saakashvili, Mikheil (Georgia), [106](#), [195](#)

Sachs, Jeffrey, [233](#)

Sakala, Alcides (UNITA), [66](#)

Salary-to-Responsibility Ratios, [107](#). *See also* remuneration

sample selection, [41–45](#), [147–49](#)

Savimbi, Jonas (Angola), [66](#)

Schick Gutiérrez, René (Nicaragua), [165](#)

Second Punic War (218–201 BC), [20](#)

security motives, [101](#). *See also* immunity; prosecutions; value of office

selection problem, [206–8](#), [229–32](#)

self-coup (*autogolpe*), [13](#), [78](#), [185](#), [251](#). *See also* coups

semi-presidential regimes, [10](#), [43](#), [45](#)

senatorships, life appointments, [102](#). *See also* post-tenure fate, careers

Senegal, [74](#), [187–88](#)

Senghor, Leopold (Senegal), [4](#), [187–88](#)

Serbia, [122](#), [124–32](#), [263–64](#). *See also* Yugoslavia

Shahrai, Sergey (Russia), [34–35](#)

Shleifer, Andrei, [99](#), [105](#)

short-term extensions, [70](#), [165](#), [185–86](#), [216](#). *See also* tenure extensions

Shugart, Matthew, [10](#)

Sikken, Bernd, [238](#), [240](#), [241](#)

Simpser, Alberto, [222](#), [291n6](#)

Singapore, [105–6](#)

single-term presidents, [61–63](#), [79](#), [84](#), [257–58](#)

Siverson, Randolph, [14](#)

skimming, [95](#), [109–10](#), [245–46](#). *See also* corruption; enrichment; rent-seeking; value of office

Smith, Alastair, [14](#)

Snyder, James, [93–94](#)

socialist countries, [162](#). *See also* public sector; Soviet Union

Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), [124](#). *See also* Yugoslavia

Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), [125](#)

social spending, [237–39](#), [241](#), [245–46](#). *See also* time horizons

social status, [116](#), [201](#). *See also* careers; value of office

Soglo, Nicéphore (Benin), [91](#)

Somoza Debayle, Anastasio (Nicaragua), [51](#)

Somoza García, Anastasio (Nicaragua), [50–51](#), [112](#), [238](#)

Somoza, Luiz (Nicaragua), [51](#), [163–65](#)

Soviet education, of leaders, [203](#)

Soviet Union, [34](#), [81](#). *See also* socialist countries

speeches, earnings from, [94–95](#)

Spilimbergo, Antonio, [195](#)

spoils of office: indicators, [157](#), [177–78](#); as reason to remain in office, [6–8](#); and tenure extensions, [253–54](#); unobserved magnitude, [111](#), [256](#). *See also* value of office

Sri Lanka, [65](#), [66](#)

Stambolić, Ivan (Serbia), [130](#)

stepping down: age of, [232](#); constraints on, [8](#); definition, [53](#); dependent variable, [147–49](#); as tenure extension, [52](#); term limits, [81–82](#), [214](#); voluntarily, [187–89](#), [191–92](#). *See also* constitutional Page 332 compliance; departures; leaving office

Stevens, Siaka (Sierra Leone), [216](#)

Stroessner, Alfredo (Paraguay), [157](#)

Sturm, Jan-Egbert, [238](#), [240](#), [241](#)

sub-Saharan Africa: post-independence constitutions, [65](#); presidential regimes, [30](#); term extensions, [13](#), [76](#), [81](#), [102](#); term limits, [18](#), [38](#). *See also* Africa; North Africa

Substantive Effects, of Predictors, [166](#)

succession, [5](#), [55–57](#), [218–33](#); Botswana, [123](#), [142](#), [143–44](#); succession clauses, [56](#); Tanzania, [223](#); Ukraine, [122–23](#), [136](#), [137–38](#), [139–40](#). *See also* designated successors

Sudan, [119](#)

Suharto (Indonesia), [110](#)

Sulla (Roman general), [20](#), [21](#), [191](#)

supporters, rewarding, [111](#), [214](#)

survival in office, [14](#), [53–54](#), [111](#), [194](#), [213–18](#), [215](#)

suspension of elections, [54](#), [65–66](#), [264–65](#). *See also* elections

TACIS (EU), [195](#)

Tait, Alan, [108](#)

Tajikistan, [64](#)

Tandja, Mamadou (Niger), [38](#), [71](#), [76](#), [77–78](#), [215](#)

Tanzania, [32](#), [57](#)

taxation: as a source of rent-seeking, [111–12](#). *See also* Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce

tenure extensions, basis for, [250](#); as collective endeavors, [191](#); definition of, [9](#), [48](#), [54](#); legitimization, [73–74](#); long-term, [70](#), [185–86](#); operationalization of, [148–49](#); short-term, [70](#), [165](#), [185–86](#), [216](#); stepping down after, [81–82](#); strategies for, [47–90](#); timing of, [69–73](#); unsuccessful, [185](#)

tenure limitation. *See* term limits

term-limited presidents: capital projects, [239](#); social spending, [245](#). *See also* time horizons

term limits, [17](#), [33](#); in 1962, 1975, 1991 and 2010, [30](#), [31](#); *de facto*, [37–38](#), [45](#), [57–59](#), [63–66](#), [250](#), [257](#); economic effects, [233–47](#), [254–55](#); elimination, [54](#), [64](#), [67](#), [68](#), [73](#); emergence of a norm, [37](#), [38](#), [259–60](#); formal, [37–38](#), [45](#); modifying length, [9](#), [51–54](#), [57–60](#); and re-elections, [83](#); and regime electoral defeats, [220–23](#); and time served in office, [213](#). *See also* binding term limits; constitutional compliance; tenure extensions

third terms: court rulings against, [246](#); and donor governments, [32](#); opposition to, [2](#), [4](#), [11](#), [77](#); and two-term regimes, [63](#). *See also* tenure extensions

time horizons: capital and social spending, [240–42](#), [242–44](#), [255](#); economic growth variance, [233–37](#), [255](#); longer, [16](#), [143](#), [213–14](#), [233](#), [240–46](#); and political immortality, [256–57](#); shorter, [214](#), [217](#). *See also* capital spending; economic effects; economic policies

Timoshenko, Yulia (Ukraine), [132](#)

Tito, Josip Broz (Yugoslavia), [68](#), [216](#)

Tocqueville, Alexis de, [24](#), [97](#)

Togo, [30](#)

Tomić, Dragan (Serbia), [126](#), [128](#)

trade, with the West: [175](#); with the USA, [175](#), [289n15](#); Ukraine, [135](#)

Transparency International Corruption Perception Index, [109](#), [287n3](#)

Trujillo, Rafael (Dominican Republic), [50](#)

Tubman, William (Liberia), [157](#), [292n1](#)

Tudjman, Franco (Croatia), [130](#)

Tunisia, [68–69](#), [71–72](#), [265](#)

Turkmenistan, [34](#), [56](#), [64](#), [68](#)

two-term presidencies, [25](#), [30–31](#), [34](#), [63](#), [252–53](#). *See also* term limits

tyrants, [27](#), [40](#). *See also* life presidents; nondemocratic regimes; perpetual rule; President for Life

Uganda, [153](#)

UK Parliament, post-office career, [94](#)

Ukraine, [34](#), [109](#), [122–23](#), [132–41](#), [221](#)

UNITA (Angola), [66](#)

unitary actors, presidents as, [44](#)

United Russia party (Russia), [49](#), [51](#)

unobserved magnitude of spoils, [111](#), [256](#). *See also* spoils of office; value of office

Uribe, Álvaro (Columbia), [77](#), [247](#)

USA: 1788 Constitution, [23](#); approaches to Leonid Kuchma, [139](#); Congress, [94](#), Page 333 [98](#); constitutional amendments, [29](#); college degrees, [202](#); international influence of, [81](#); remuneration, [105–6](#); state governors, [238](#); term limits, [24](#); two-term rule, [18](#), [25](#)

USSR, [34](#), [81](#). *See also* socialist countries; Soviet Union

Uzbekistan, [64](#)

value of office, [91–120](#); Botswana, [142–44](#); and capital flight, [115](#); and economic opportunities, [99–101](#); estimates of personal fortunes, [109–10](#); Explanatory Variables, [149–54](#); probability of retaining immunity and assets, [6–7](#), [116–19](#); and privatization, [114](#); and procurement, [114–15](#); and public sector, [112–13](#); regime type, [176–77](#); Serbia, [127–30](#); value-generating potential, [6–7](#), [93–94](#), [120](#), [149–52](#); Ukraine, [132–34](#). *See also* constitutional compliance; motivation; spoils of office

van de Walle, Nicolas, [194](#)

Venezuela: 1812 Constitution, [25–27](#); 1819 Constitution, [269n9](#); 1999 Constituent Assembly, [36–37](#), [60–61](#); 2007 referendum, [72–73](#), [77](#); constitutional changes, [173–74](#); government procurement, [115](#); Political Rights Index, [38](#); public sector, [113](#)

viceroi (*posadnik*), [22](#)

Vishny, Robert, [99](#), [105](#)

Wade, Abdoulaye (Senegal), [74](#)

Wał sa, Lech (Poland), [94–95](#)

war, suspending elections, [66](#)

war crimes, [129](#). *See also* Miloš evi , Slobodan

Ward, Michael, [152–53](#)

Washington, George (USA), [25](#), [29](#)

Way, Lucan, [14](#), [81](#), [175](#)

wealth acquisition, [94–96](#), [101](#), [112](#). *See also* personal fortunes

Weber, Max, [7](#), [99](#)

Weimar Republic, [30](#)

Western education, [195–96](#), [201–2](#), [204](#), [206](#), [207](#). *See also* background traits

Western influence, [81](#), [173](#), [206–7](#). *See also* trade; Western leverage

Western leverage, [175](#), [207](#)

Western trade. *See also* trade; Western influence; Western leverage

Wintrobe, Ronald, [216–17](#)

Wolfinger, Raymond, E., [98](#)

World Bank, [114](#), [278n15](#)

Yanukovych, Viktor (Ukraine), [137–39](#), [221](#). *See also* designated successors

Yayi, Boni (Benin), [55](#)

Yeltsin, Boris (Russia), [34–35](#), [59](#), [118](#)

Yugoslavia, [122](#), [124–32](#), [264](#). *See also* Serbia

Yulia Timoshenko Block (BYT), [135](#)

Yushchenko, Victor (Ukraine), [135](#), [138](#), [140–41](#)

Zambia, [4](#), [77](#)

Zedillo, Ernesto (Mexico), [102](#)

Zelaya, Manuel (Honduras), [62](#)

Zimbabwe, [65](#), [105](#)