FACTORS INFLUENCING THE OCCURRENCE OF MILITARY COUPS D'ETAT IN LATIN AMERICA

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1. *Introduction*

In the last 60 years,[1] 1907 through 1966, the twenty Latin American republics have experienced a total of 105 military coups d'etat according to our data and the definition employed in the following. The definition is rather wide and covers

> *any successful deposition of incumbent head of state, civilian or military, by the military forces, or parts of them, with, or without civilian participation.*

A social science approach would reject the idea of the coups occurring randomly, but would try to relate them to other social and political phenomena, thereby attempting some sort of explanation. This is our aim. A first step would be to look at the number of coups per country, which is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. *Number of coups per country 1907–66*[2]

Uruguay	0	Venezuela	5
Costa Rica	1	Brazil	6
Colombia	2	Chile	6
Mexico	2	Guatemala	6
Panama	2	Paraguay	7
Cuba	4	Argentina	8
Honduras	4	Haiti	8
Nicaragua	4	Peru	8
Dominican Rep.	5	Bolivia	9
El Salvador	5	Ecuador	13

Table 1 shows a marked difference between the countries, the number ranging from Ecuador's 13 coups to Uruguay's zero. This immediately suggests the first question to be discussed in the course of this article, viz. what factors account for this variation between countries? Or, more specifically, is the frequency in some way related to certain background variables describing these countries?

Another logical question would be whether there are some recurrent situations in which military coups show a particularly high frequency. One obvious situation is election periods, here taken to mean a period stretching from 6 months before to 6 months after a presidential election. There may be other characteristics of the situation, for instance economic fluctuations: we may speak about 'improvement years' and deterioration years'[3] and see which economic conditions seem particularly favourable to the occurrence of coups. These and other factors will be discussed later in this paper.

Much emphasis will be placed on the historical development: that is, we will look at the changes in relative frequencies for the values on a number of variables over the years. Table 2 gives the percentages of the 105 coups occurring in an early period, an intermediate period, and a recent period, respectively.

Table 2. *Percentage distribution of the coups in three historical periods*

1907–26:	25
1927–46–	34
1947–66:	41
SUM:	100
(N)	(105)

The two main types of variables men tioned so far may be used in a very simple



Diagram 1. *'Model' for the study of military coups d'etat*

'model' for the study of military coups, and not only to study their frequencies, but also the forms they take.[4] The 'model' is shown in Diagram 1. Departing from this simple 'model', we may say that a military coup can conveniently be described using a set of background variables, and some dimensions of the unit, i.e. the coup itself.

But these approaches presuppose that nations exist in social isolation. They do not: they influence each other, and they interact with each other. We will try to find cross-national repercussions of military coups. That is to say, we will see whether a coup in one country contributes by imitation or conspiration to triggering off coups in other countries.

So far we have presented the problems to be discussed here. At this juncture we feel it necessary to emphasize that we will not here be concerned with the historical and political significance of each single coup, which of course may differ considerably. Some coups, as for instance the coming to power of brigadier Edelmiro Farrell and subsequently the Peron group in the Argentine army, ushered in momentous changes in society at large; whereas other coups, as the Chilean ones in the summer of 1932, only reflected a general state of temporary political instability, without leaving profound marks on society.

Further, we would like to stress one basic point of view, namely as to where to place the burden of explanation. One could conceive of a military coup as an instance of militarism, and place the burden of explanation on the military itself. Two main lines of thought have this emphasis. Samuel P. Huntington views military interference in politics as a function of professionalism.[5] This thesis is heavily attacked, notably by S. E. Finer.[6] One might, however, argue that it would have had some merits if one added that the rest of society should also be 'professionalized', i.e. modernized. Further, one may argue that a main cause of hemispheric militarism is the 'underemployment' of the Latin American military, having great resources and very few 'proper' tasks, and very few wars. It turns out, however, that only Mexico has a higher military participation ratio than Norway, and only Paraguay uses a greater share of its Gross National Product on the military than does Norway.[7] Much of the explanation for military behaviour ought then to be sought in the general state of society. We may then conceive of a military coup as just another manifestation of general political instability. The two approaches do not necessarily exclude each other, but it should be clear by now that in this article we are somewhat leaning to the 'instability side'. We agree with Th. Wyckoff when he states:

> the underlying social and political conditions are more significant than the actual role of the military.[8]

2. *Background variables*

The idea that there is a relation between general background characteristics of society and specific political phenomena is certainly not new, and in the recent period substantial research has been done on the

problem. Suffice it to mention works by Seymour Martin Lipset[9] and Bruce M. Russett,[10] and more specifically concerning the 'military and society' by S. E. Finer[11] and Morris Janowitz[12] among others. But the 'explanatory distance' between socio-economic variables and specific political phenomena is a long one. As Russett puts it:

> Political life is not so simple, however. As we shall see, there is no terribly clear relationship between economic development and democracy. Nor is the relationship very strong between per capita GNP and some other explicitly political factors.[13]

This is certainly true, as Russett's own correlational coefficients also show. An effort to find out how the frequency of a political phenomenon, in casu a military coup d'etat, varies between the 'low' and the 'high' category on certain background variables is, however, ventured. In Table 3 we give the relative frequencies for the values on ten background variables, and the average number of coups per country, defined according to dominant ethnic element, as an eleventh variable. Although the whole set of background variables is presented, only a few will be given explicit analytical treatment here: the rest appears as a matter of information only.

Table 3 shows that very few of the dichotomized background variables seem to affect significantly the frequency of coups. That is, it seems to matter little whether a country is situated in the 'low' or the 'high' category. There are, however, some notable exceptions, viz. variables 1, 5, and 11. The frequency for the value 'high' on variable 1 approaches twice the frequency for value 'low'. Variable 5 shows the opposite to be the case to a slightly stronger degree, and on variable 11 the 'Indian' countries show on the average more than twice as many coups as the 'White' countries. In the following we will first give extensive treatment to variables 1 and 5.

Table 3. *Percentage distribution of Latin American coups for the 'lower' ten and the 'higher' ten countries on 10 background variables 1907–66*[14]

1.	Size	low	37
		high	63
		difference	−26
2.	Ratio biggest and second biggest city	low	50
		high	50
		difference	0
3.	Ethnic homogeneity	low	52
		high	48
		difference	4
4.	GNP	low	56
		high	44
		difference	12
5.	GNP per capita	low	66
		high	34
		difference	32
6.	Urbanization	low	52
		high	48
		difference	4
7.	Economic diversity	low	44
		high	56
		difference	−12
8.	Population	low	42
		high	58
		difference	−16
9.	Population density	low	56
		high	44
		difference	12
10.	% white population	low	53
		high	47
		difference	6
11.	Numerically dominant ethnic element. Per country	White	3.8
		Mestizo	3.8
		Negro	5.7
		Indian	8.6
		Range:	4.8

To make sure that these differences between the two values are of a more basic kind, we run variables 1 and 5 against the trichotomized historical dimension to see if the differences hold in all periods (Table 4).

Table 4. *Percentage distribution of coups in small and big countries in three historical periods*

	1907–26	1927–46	1947–66	Total
Small	42	28	42	37
Big	58	72	58	63
SUM	100	100	100	100
(N)	(26	(36)	(43)	(105)

The relative frequency of coups is greater for big countries in all periods, early, intermediate, and recent (Table 5.) The relative frequency of coups is greater for the relatively poorer countries in all periods.

Table 5. *Percentage distribution of coups in poor and rich countries in three historical periods*

	1907–26	1927–46	1947–66	Total
Poor	69	64	65	66
Rich	31	36	35	34
SUM	100	100	100	100
(N)	(26)	(36)	(43)	(105)

It seems that we have arrived at two basic findings, viz. that big size and poverty, relatively speaking, both are particularly favourable for the occurrence of military coups d'etat. At this point a lot could be said to explain these facts. We would, however, like to proceed a little further. A next step that is near at hand is to combine these two variables, 'size' and 'wealth', in a simple, three-valued additive index. Table 6 shows the average number of coups per country in the three categories in three historical periods.

Table 6. *Average no. of coups for countries having three values on the additive index, for three historical periods*

	1907–26	1927–46	1947–66	Total
Values				
0	0.4	1.0	1.2	2.6
1	1.5	1.3	2.1	4.9
2	1.8	3.6	3.2	8.6

The total column shows a monotonic increase in the average frequency of coups per country from 2.6 to 8.6. Rounded upwards, we get the nice slope 3 — 5 — 9. What is more important, we find a monotonic increase in all three periods.

The extreme values are easy to interpret. Value '0' represents the relatively *richer* and *smaller* countries, whereas the other extreme, value '2', represents the relatively *poorer* and *bigger* countries. Value '1' is of course a mixed category and consists of the 'big and rich' countries and the 'small and poor' countries. Looking at the average number of coups for these two groups separately, we actually get very small differences; the 'small and poor' countries have an average of 5.2 coups and the 'big and rich' countries an average of 4.6. The poor-rich dimension actually weighs heavier than the small-big dimension, which was already shown in the univariate distributions in Table 3.

The question that now poses itself is of course 'Why is it that relative poverty and big size seem so much more conducive to military coups than relative wealth and small size?' In short, we have the problem of a Bolivia vs. a Costa Rica.

In his outstanding *The Man on Horseback*,[15] S. E. Finer distinguishes between the 'opportunity' to intervene and the 'disposition' to intervene. In the following we will approach the problem from these two angles. But first some comments on the two items in the index will be given.

We usually suppose that the GNP per capita not only says something about wealth, but also 'taps' some dimensions of social structure. The hypothesis is that the less GNP per capita, the more archaic and higly stratified the social structure and less mobilized the popluation. There may be better indicators to be found, but the GNP per capita is at least one of the few existing ones and by far the most easily available. The poor countries are then assumed to present more favourable conditions for military coups, since these could be carried out over the heads of the

vast majority of the population, not being much of a challenge or peril to the 'golpistas'. One might of course have argued the opposite, that the more advanced countries, being more dynamic, and, within the Latin American universe of nations, showing a greater degree of uneven development, would have a greater potential for conflict and presumably should show a higher frequency of coups. But the crude data presented in Table 3, variable 5, do not uphold such a hypothesis. It might, however, have been corroborated by the data if we had included many other types of conflict manifestations, from regional outbursts of civilian violence to carefully executed military coups by top-ranking generals.[16] Further, it might have proven fruitful if we had made distinctions between various types of coups regarding their political implications, and, accordingly, their historical significance.

The other item is 'size'. It is more difficult to use as a basis for theorizing, but at least the argument can be made that greater size makes for higher degree of regionalism and local elite politics. S. E. Finer states that 'the regional interest can act as a motive for intervention.'[17]

Combining these two items as in the index we get the following picture of the 'poor-big nation'. This is a nation that besides having a small mobilized population and a higly elitist political life, both on the national and the regional level, shows only a small degree of national territorial integration, generally much less than in the small and rich countries. Communication between the central authority and the local ones is scarce, and even more scarce between regions; and the local elites show strong desires for far-fetched independence. A good example is the fact that São Paulo, Brazil, had its own foreign military missions between the two world wars. The local elites define the national interest in their own way and each is reluctant to accept the presidency of a man from a rival region. Cases at hand are the rivalries between São Paulo, Guanabara, Minas Gerais and Rio Grande do Sul in Brazil, a problem Brasilia is supposed to help solve, and between the 'Sierra' and the 'Costa' in Ecuador.

This absence of shared norms and the existence of regional rivalries should then in two ways induce the military or parts of it, to intervene. It may act united to break a constitutional deadlock, as in the close after-election period in Peru in 1962. It may also be that provincial garrisons might act on behalf of the province to impede presidents from other provinces to take seat, or in general to impose its will on the body politic, as in Chile in 1932, when general Pedro Vignola and the northern army garrisons put an end to the military dictatorship of general Blanche Espejo.

To account for the 'disposition to intervene', we shall make a simplified use of the concept of rank disequilibrium as it is used by Johan Galtung.[18] We have, however, no data whatsoever to ascertain in each single instance the actual motives of the military. The following appears as speculation, hopefully fruitful speculation, only. Disclosing the actual motive of the military in each case will have to be the task of somebody else.

The idea is simply that any social unit, be it a person or a nation, can suitably be described on some essential dimensions, as ranking 'high' or 'low' relative to other units at the same level of analysis. The assumption is that ranking 'high' on one dimension and 'low' on another — i.e. being rank-disequilibrated — will have some consequences for behaviour. That is, it is supposed to induce a desire to change the 'low' ranking to a high'' ranking, making for an equilibrated position, i.e. a position with equal values only. Examples are revolutionary intellectual proletarians, and, on a higher level, isolated and despised but big and potentially powerful nations which strive for

recognition and regional power, for instance China.

In the case of the big and poor nations, we may talk about a rank disequilibrium: that of being big relative to other nations in the region but at the same time being relatively poor. The country is an underachiever; it has not lived up to its bigness, so to speak. We cannot confirm empirically that such disequilibrium is perceived, nor is it strictly speaking necessary; but it is not unnatural to assume that it is felt by the military officers. These, especially in the poorer countries, belong to the more educated and the more progressively minded part of the population. Further, as Lucien Pye says

> First of all, armies are by nature rival institutions in the sense that their ultimate function is the test of one against the other. .... The soldier, however, is constantly called upon to look abroad and to compare his organization with foreign ones. He thus has a greater awareness of international standards and a greater sensitivity to weaknesses in his own society.[19]

We may then imagine some thought on the part of military men saying that the country is big and potentially rich and powerful, but still, compared to neighbouring nations, miserably poor and backward. Nasser's well-known dictum, 'If the army does not do it, who will?' seems to apply here. In short, we have here a case of units being 'high' on ascribed status, viz. size, and 'low' on achieved status, viz. wealth. This may make for change in the sense that 'ineffective' regimes are deposed by groups who feel themselves more competent and more aware of the backwardness to change the disequilibrium. While not claiming general validity for the hypothesis, we think that it applies to several instances, and it is in complete agreement with the data in Tables 3—6.

Another variable that we may suppose says something about social structure is variable 7. More specifically, we may suppose it has something to do with the degree of openness, or possibility to reach top economic positions in society. Variable 7 is an indicator of degree of economic diversity, in that it measures the percentage of the dominant export good of the total export. The hypothesis is then that countries relying almost exclusively on one export goods, have a very closed economic and political elite with few opportunities for people from non-propertied families. Merle Kling argues along such lines when he says:

> As political office provides a uniquely dynamic opportunity to acquire an economic base of power, however, sufficiently large segments of the population is prepared to take the ultimate risk, the risk of life, in a revolt, in a coup d'etat, to perpetuate a characteristic feature of Latin American politics — chronic political instability.[20]

More specifically, we may say that the military is one main channel for upward mobility, and perhaps the main channel for gaining influence for non-propertied classes in the countries with the least diversified economies. On the basis of this, we might have expected more coups in the monocultures than in the 'pluricultures'. This is not so, however, as the data in Table 3 show. 46 coups of 105, i.e. 44% of the coups only, are in the monocultures, while 56% are in the more diversified economies. Another line of reasoning would eventually have come to such a conclusion, viz. that having restricted, cohesive elites, which is expected to be more predominant in the monocultures, with a high degree of integration, makes coups more difficult to execute successfully. Cooperation from at least parts of the civilian elite often is imperative to success.

We may then look at the same problem along the historical dimension, saying that the motivation for upward social mobility has been greater in later years,

due to the effect of the mass-media and the changing recruitment base of the officers corps. This cannot be documented because of the almost complete absence of data for the social background of the Latin American military. It seems, however, natural to assume that this has been the case. The above hypothesis which was not confirmed for the whole period, is then supposed to become increasingly valid, to hold for later years rather than for earlier. Table 7 shows proportion of coups in monocultures and 'pluricultures' respectively, in three historical periods.

Table 7. *Percentage of coups in monocultures and 'pluricultures' in three periods*

	1907–26	1927–46	1947–66	Total
Mono-cultures	27	44	54	44
Pluri-cultures	73	56	46	56
SUM	100	100	100	100
(N)	(26)	(36)	(43)	(105)

The hypothesis is confirmed as the percentage of coups in the monocultures shows a monotonic increase from about 1/4 (27%) to more than a half (54%). One may of course focus on the opposite tendency and try to explain the relative decline of the share of the pluricultures. An explanation would centre around the greater complexity of the political system and the more numerous civilian elite groups acting as inhibitions to the military. In Huntington's words, 'As the political system becomes more complex, coups become more difficult.'[21]

3. *Situational variables*

So far we have been concerned with some simple background characteristics. We would like now to proceed to the discussion of what may be termed situational variables. Presidential elections are already mentioned. Table 8 shows the distribution of coups on some situational variables.

Table 8. *Situational variables describing 105 military coups, percentages*

1. Elections forthcoming (6 months prior)	yes	27
	no	68
	no information	5
2. Elections completed (6 months after)	yes	11
	no	89
	no information	0
3. Actual incumbents	civilian	69
	military	31
	no information	0
4. Public disorders	yes	61
	no	17
	no information	22

The outstanding feature of Table 8 is that as many as 38% of the coups were carried out in election years, combining variables 1 and 2. Further, 31% of the military coups were against military regimes. It should be noted, however, that not all of these regimes could with equal justification be labelled 'military'; it would be a gross mistake to conceive of for instance Peron's regime in Argentina as only, or even primarily, a military regime, since a basic source of his power was the trade unions. In general, however, we feel that it makes some sense to define regimes according the status, civilian or military, of the head of the regime, although we then in some cases blur important distinctions. Finally, as many as 61% of the coups were executed in situations with public disorders.

We have not been able to obtain the total number of presidential elections. We assume, however, that elections have been held on the average every 6th year. Presidential periods usually are 6 years, and the long periods of dictatorships without any elections whatsoever and periods of intense instability with a rapid succession of elections should more or less balance each other. If the coups had no relation to elections, we would expect to find them evenly distributed over the years without concentration in election

years. That is, that we should expect 1/6 of the coups, or 17% approximately, to take place in what we have called 'election time', which covers a period of one year. Actually the percentage is more than twice this figure, 38%. And even if the estimate for the number of elections is too low, it certainly is not so high as 38% of the years, for that would mean presidential elections more frequent than every three years for all countries in all periods.

Why then this concentration in election years? One may conceive of elections as genuine causes of coups or only as the events that triggered them off, the implication being that the coups would have been executed whether elections were being held or not, but were timed for the election year for specific reasons. It may be viewed as a cause when the new regime coming to power through a coup is only a caretaker regime which purports and really turns out only to superwise the election or secure the orderly transfer of power in the face of threatening disturbances and conspiring groups. A good example is the preemptive coup of Marshal Henrique Teixeira Lott in Brazil in November 1955. The coup was evidently carried out to secure the transfer of power to president-elect Juscelino Kubitschek.

Much more important, however, is the motive of preventing the coming to power of groups inimical to the military. It may take the form of a pre-emptive pre-election coup as in Guatemala in March 1963, where the candidacy of former radical president Juan José Arévalo was deemed threatening to military interests. Or it may take place after the election, an example being the army coup in Peru in July 1962, where the old enemy of the military, Victor Raúl Haya de la Torre, came out with the greatest vote, without having the required more than 33% of the votes. In this case the military pretended to break a constitutional deadlock, and managed to get rid of a candidate with a long-lasting antagonism towards the military. As Edwin Lieuwen says:

> ... military leaders in Peru imposed a veto on the democratic processes because the military disapproved of the outcome of elections.[22]

More generally he states:

> Elections, either just completed or scheduled for the near future, triggered off the coups. ... The military acted primarily to prevent the coming to power of civilian groups they considered inimical to the military.[23]

As Table 8 shows, elections 'scheduled for the near future' have been the more frequent cause; more frequent than elections 'just completed'.

Diagram 1 showed the 'relation' between background variables and situational variables. One such relationship that deserves to be explored is that between election time and a background variable. One may suspect that the concentration of coups in election times is not equal for all types of countries. Elections, however fraudulent or manipulated they may be, are a democratic device embodied in the constitutions. One may then focus on the problem of legitimacy and hypothesize that legitimacy is more difficult to obtain when a greater share of the population is mobilized, and where there is a greater attentive public. It is of course difficult to measure this dimension of mobilization and the size of the 'public'. We have used the urban/rural dichotomy to 'tap' the dimension, the hypothesis being that it is more difficult to obtain legitimacy in the more urban countries, and consequently more difficult to bring a coup to a successful conclusion than in the 'rural' countries: hence there should be fewer coups in election periods in urban countries. Table 9 shows the distribution.

The percentage differences confirm the hypothesis. In urban countries only 30% of the coups have been in election time,

Table 9. *Coups in election and non-election time for 'urban' and 'rural' countries*

	Rural	Urban	Difference
Election time	45	30	15
Not election time	47	68	−21
No information	7	2	5
SUM	99	100	−1
(N)	(55)	(50)	(105)

whereas the percentage for rural countries is 45%.

We may argue in favour of the same hypothesis in another way, focussing not on legitimacy but on the risks involved in the execution of a coup when a relatively great share of the public is mobilized. The hypothesis would then be that it is more perilous for the 'golpistas' to carry out a coup in the more urbanized countries than in the rural countries, because in the latter countries very few people are concerned with what goes on in the body politic.

It was shown above, Table 8, that 31% of the military coups were directed against regimes headed by military men. This gives another clue to some of the motives behind the depositions. A cause that immediately suggests itself is the phenomenon of internal disunity and rivalry in the military itself. First, there is the obvious motive of serious political disagreement between officers, conservatives, and radicals. The implications of such a disagreement are stated by Samuel P. Huntington:

> ... coups tend to follow a dialectical process resembling the swings in the political pendulum in a constitutional democracy. Radical reform coups are followed in a few years by conservative reform coups.[24]

There may be other causes, for instance what we may term 'general conflicts' within the military.[25] Suffice it here to mention the colonels' revolt against general Medina Angarita in Venezuela in 1945 and the conflict between progressive colonel Caamaño and reactionary generals Wessin y Wessin and Imbert in the Dominican Republic in 1965. An instance of such a conflict is described by Edwin Lieuwen with reference to the coup in Guatemala in 1963:

> However, the Army had many grievances against (general) Ydígoras. The President was a military man of pre-World War vintage, whereas the rest of the Army leadership had won its spurs in the 1944 revolution against the dicatorship of general Jorge Úbico ...[26]

Variable 4 in Table 8 is hardly amenable to further analysis, since as many as 22% of the coups fall in the 'no information' category. The fact remains, however, that almost 2/3 of all coups took place in times with public disorders. Such disorders may influence the military in two ways to intervene. The military may have a real desire to re-establish public order without further motives; or the disturbances may serve as a pretext to intervene when the real motives were considered to be far from convincing, to ensure at least some adherence from other power groups in society or the public at large, making the coup more difficult to execute.

It is often argued that the occurrence of military coups is not unrelated to economic fluctuations. John J. Johnson states:

> Economic deterioration, if it is severe enough, will tend to invite military intervention that will have popular approval.[27]

If this is correct, we would assume that the number of coups should show fluctuations over the years for the whole continent, as economic conjunctures are supposed to affect most countries at the same time. Most Latin American countries rely heavily on one or a few products for their incomes and are particularly vulnerable to economic fluctuations. Table 10 shows the fluctuations of the coup frequencies for three year intervals.

Table 10. *Number of coups per three years intervals for twenty countries 1907–66*

	No.		No.
1907–09	4	1937–39	3
1910–12	6	1940–42	0
1913–15	4	1943–45	9
1916–18	1	1946–48	9
1919–21	5	1949–51	5
1922–24	2	1952–54	6
1925–27	4	1955–57	8
1928–30	7	1958–60	2
1931–33	9	1961–63	10
1934–36	6	1964–66	5
		Total	105

The Table shows three 'peaks', 1928–33, the immediate post-War period, and the recent period, more specifically 1961–63. The first period covers the great world economic depression, and the last period is a period with constantly declining prices on raw commodities on the world market and a rapid inflation. The immediate post-War peak may best be explained by saying that the high number of coups represents the fall of otherwise 'ripe' regimes which were frozen in power during the War, and which fell with great rapidity as the War came to an end. It should also be noted that the lowest frequencies are found during the two world wars, neither of which touched Latin America directly except by creating a great demand for Latin American exports and hence an economic boom.

Some good arguments can be given for a relationship between economic conditions and political instability, the main one being that depression (and inflation) bring to the fore conflicts that in better times might have been 'bought off' with a certain relative economic surplus, making contending parties temporarily more satisfied. Further, depression, bringing about unemployment, may cause general social unrest, and this will activate the military to intervene. First they may step in to 'restore public order'. Then, in a situation where social conflict is intense, the military, or part of it, may side with one of the factions. Most important, however, is the fact that during many crises wide sectors within the military feel disappointed with the efforts of incumbent governments to relieve the plight of their countries, and may consider themselves to be in a better position to do something about it. In short, there seem to be many reasons why the military should show a greater propensity to intervene in times of depression than in 'normal' times.

Proceeding a little further from Table 10, we shall look at the relation between coups in 'deterioration' years and in 'improvement' years. We have obtained data for two different periods, 1922–38 and 1951–63. In the first period we have looked at the whole continent and defined 'deterioration' year and 'improvement' year as the rise or fall in the value of world export in relation to the preceeding year.[28] This may not be entirely satisfactory, but it was the only data we were able to obtain. Table 11 shows the frequency of coups for deterioration years and improvement years, respectively.

Table 11. *Coups in improvement years and deterioration years 1928–38. The whole continent.*

	No. of years	No. of coups	Coups per year
Deterioration years	7	18	2.6
Improvement years	10	13	1.3
Ratio deterioration/improvement years			2/1.

The Table shows that the frequency of coups in deterioration years on the average was twice the frequency for improvement years, 2.6 vs. 1.3.

For the recent period, the terms 'deterioration' and 'improvement' have been defined as to whether the per capita GNP showed a rise or a fall in relation to the preceeding year, for each country.[29] Table 12 shows the frequencies.

The Table shows that the frequency of coups in improvement years is 60% of the frequency in deterioration years. Even though many of the changes are extremely

Table 12. *Coups in improvement years and deterioration years 1951–63. Per country*

	No. of years*	No. of coups	Coups per year
Deterioration years	74	11	0.15
Improvement years	168	15	0.09
Ratio deterioration/improvement years			15/9.

* We were unable to obtain data in twelve cases (country/year).

small, we feel that we have confirmed the general hypothesis that deterioration invites intervention.

4. *Cross-national repercussions of military coups*

The idea of cross-national repercussions of military coups, i.e. the idea that a coup in one country may contribute to the triggering off of coups in other countries in the region, has been stated by Samuel P. Huntington:

> A successful coup or insurrection by one party or group in one country inspires similar parties or groups in other countries to similar action. The conditions breeding insurrection or coup d'etat must be present in these other countries, while the action of the 'pace-setting' country indicates that the time may well be ripe.[30]

There seems to be some reasons to adhere to such an hypothesis. In his *History of Modern Brazil*,[31] Jose Maria Bello describes the profound impact of the Argentine coup of September 1930 on the insurrectionists in Rio Grance do Sul, and the importance it had in 'hardening' the decision of Getulio Vargas to take action against the regime of Washington Luis. A glance at the distribution over time of all Brazilian and Argentine coups in this century would suggest that the instance of 1930 was not an isolated one. Table 13 gives the temporal distribution of the military coups.

Another instance which seemingly confirms Huntington's hypothesis is the coincidence of the coups in Guatemala and El Salvador on the 19th and 21st of October 1944. The underlying conditions had strong similarities, both countries being of the monoculture variant, and both having been ruled by reactionary old dictators since 1931.

Table 13. *Temporal distribution of military coups in Argentina and Brazil 1907–66*

1930	September	Argentina
	October	Brazil
1943	June	Argentina
	June	Argentina
1944	March	Argentina
1945	October	Brazil
1954	August	Brazil
1955	September	Argentina
1955	November	Brazil
1955	November	Argentina
1961	August	Brazil
1962	March	Argentina
1964	April	Brazil
1966	June	Argentina

There are at least two ways of approaching this problem of a cross-national effect. One could look at the fluctuations in time of the coup frequencies, and the existence of 'peaks' may at least warrant a hypothesis that such clusters of coups could not have happened without any relations whatsoever between the countries. Another explanation is, however, just as reasonable: an underlying factor affecting all the countries at the same time, for instance economic fluctuations. This we have already shown to be the case, Tables 11 and 12. But this does of course not exclude the possibility outlined above; and after all, such a curve will not be taken to serve as anything more than a basis for speculations of the existence of cross-national effects. Examples of such fluctuations in the frequencies of military coups are given earlier, Table 10.

Another way of approaching the problem of 'coupling' between nations would be to focus on what may be termed a 'neighbour effect'. The 'neighbour' concept is here used in a strictly geographical sense of having common borders. The hypothesis is then that if there exists some kind of coupling between nations it should

at least operate between neighbours and to a greater extent than between non-neighbours.

We should mention at once that to arrive at a confirmation that coupling between nations in fact exists, and, more specifically, that a neighbour effect is operating, we would have to make a thorough historical investigation of each single case to see whether a coup in another country in fact had entered the 'decision calculus' of the country in question. That is not what we are in a position to do here. We will start in the other direction, and try to give a statistical demonstration of the existence of such a coupling, leaving the more time-consuming work to the historians.

To study the neighbour effect, one could depart from a coup in one country and look for the percentage of neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries with coups respectively, within, say, a two-year period, after the coup of departure, doing so for all coups successively. The unit in question is then *country, neighbouring or non-neighbouring, within two years after coup in one country*, and the variable, or attribute, is whether or not a coup was registered in that country in that period. Such a procedure is followed in Table 14.

Table 14. *Percentage of neighbouring and non-neighbouring countries with coup after coup in one country*

	Neighbour	Not neighbour	Difference
Coup	18	15	3
Not coup	82	85	−3
SUM	100	100	0
(N)	(281)	(1005)	(1286)

* Excluding as *independent* units Uruguay, that has no coups, and Cuba, that has no neighbours.

The conclusion reads that of neighbouring countries to a country with coup, 18% had coups themselves within a two-year period, whereas for non-neighbouring countries the percentage was slightly lower, 15%. The percentage difference, 3%, is too low to warrant an affirmative conclusion. That is, the figures do not allow us to assume the existence of a neighbour effect. But let us see whether the effect is more pronounced among some *types* of neighbours.

Per Olav Reinton conceives of two basic types of interaction: influence and dominance.[32] 'Influence' refers to relations between equals, 'equals' taken to mean a certain similarity in level of socio-economic development. 'Dominance' refers to relations between unequals, in the sense that the big and powerful countries export many more events and institutions to small neighbours than they import. A further distinction is to divide 'influence' into two types, 'responsiveness' and 'competitiveness'.[33] We shall not probe deeper into this last distinction, but only say that the relation between Brazil and Argentina may be considered an instance of 'competitiveness', whereas the relation between El Salvador and Guatemala may be considered an instance of 'responsiveness'.

To see whether 'influence' or 'dominance' can be said to have been the most important coupling factor in the Latin American universe of nations as regards military coups, we will look at the neighbour effect between equals and unequals.

To operationalize the concepts of 'equal' and 'unequal', we will use the Center-Periphery Index developed by Galtung, Mora y Araujo, and Schwartzman,[34] and have 'topdog' and 'underdog' to refer to the notions of 'center (countries)' and 'periphery (countries)' respectively. This index measures two dimensions particularly relevant for this study, socio-economic development and regional power. As has been shown by Galtung,[35] interaction is primarily between topdogs in a system, what we may call 'influence' in this context, and, we may add, 'dominance' is by topdog over underdog.

Two underdogs may be similar, but generally we hypothesize that interaction, or here, coupling between underdogs, is negligible, even when they are neighbours. We have then the four possible combinations of neighbouring countries as shown in Table 15.

Table 15. *Combination of neighbouring countries*

TT	TU
UT	UU

For three combinations the hypothesis should be evident, first TT, then TU, and then UU. The category UT does not seem very meaningful in this context, and we have no hypothesis outside the obvious one that very little can be argued in favour of the existence of an influence relation from the underdog to the topdog nation.

For the first combination, TT, the hypothesis would be that a neighbour effect should operate. Table 16 shows the extent to which this is true.

Table 16. *Coupling between topdog neighbours*

	Neighbour	Not neighbour	Difference
Coup	20	7	13
Not coup	80	93	−13
SUM	100	100	0
(N)	(94)	(185)	(279)

The percentage difference, 13, is high enough to warrant a conclusion in the affirmative: that a neighbour effect is operating. We may say that there is an influence relation as regards the occurrence of military coups between neighbouring countries, provided they are topdogs.

For the UU combination, we have two ways of arguing. We might hypothesize a neighbour effect because of similarity. As we said, however, 'interaction' is generally scarce between underdogs, and we accordingly, expect no coupling.

Table 17. *Coupling between underdog neighbours*

	Neighbour	Not neighbour	Difference
Coup	17	19	−2
Not coup	83	81	2
SUM	100	100	0
(N)	(63)	(342)	(405)

The percentage differences in Table 17 are negligible, and we may conclude that the hypothesis is confirmed: no neighbour effect is found.

The relation between unequals is shown in Table 18.[36]

Table 18. *Coupling between unequals, TU and UT*

	Neighbour	Not neighbour	Difference
Coup	17	14	3
Not coup	83	86	−3
SUM	100	100	0
(N)	(124)	(478)	(602)

The Table gives no evidence of the existence of a neighbour effect.

The results presented in Tables 16—18 may be summarized in a Table showing the percentage differences for the various combinations, Table 19.

Table 19. *Percentage difference for three combinations of countries*

	Difference neighbour — not neighbour
TT	13
TU UT	3
UU	−2

A general conclusion then reads that a neighbour effect operates between topdog neighbours, but not otherwise. That is to say that to the extent we have cross-national repercussions of military coups in one country, these seem to be of the 'influence' kind as they are between topdogs and not the 'domination' kind: at least this follow from the above. Or, to use

another term, we have instances of imitation.

5. *Conclusion*

We have shown some contexts in which the occurrence of military coups d'état can be discussed. More specifically, we have demonstrated that some socio-economic characteristics of countries seem particularly conducive to the occurrence of military coups, notably size and poverty. It has further been demonstrated that the coups often concentrated around election times and in periods with a deteriorating economy. Finally we have shown that coups in many instances were not without consequences for other countries, in that they contributed to triggering off coups in neighbouring countries.

Can we find some implications for the near future from what is presented here? We might venture the hypothesis that poverty will be more and more of a problem in the years to come and contribute significantly to the polarizing of the Latin American societies between those accepting and those rejecting the existing social order. In such a situation, recourse to violence will be the only way to change governments and bring about change. We may say that in the absence of shared norms, military coups can be conceived of as a functional equivalent to elections.

Nothing seems to indicate a significant reversal of the economic conditions in Latin America, or more specifically the prices on raw commodities in the world market. This, we recall, was said to have a relation to the frequency of coup d'etats. International communication will be better and the cross-national repercussions of a coup in one country may be supposed to be even more important in influencing the military in other countries.

In short, we see no signs that the overall increase in the coup frequency in this century should be reversed.

NOTES

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[1] 60 years is partly an arbitrary choice. We wanted, however, to stretch the period as far back as possible.

[2] The coups are listed for Appendix I.

[3] The terms are borrowed from Martin C. Needler. See his 'Political Development and Military Intervention in Latin America.' *American Political Science Review*. Vol. LX. No. 3, September 1966, p. 617.

[4] For the forms of the coups, see my 'Some Attributes of the Latin American Military Coup' in *Proceedings of the Second IPRA General Conference* (forthcoming) and *Patterns of Military Intervention* (forthcoming ms. of the International Peace Research Institute.)

[5] Samuel P. Huntington: *The Soldier and the State*. chapters 1–4. pp. 7–97. (The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass. 1964.)

[6] S. E. Finer: *The Man on Horseback*. (Pall Mall Press. London 1962) pp. 24–25.

[7] The data were found in Russett and Alker, Deutsch, Lasswell: *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. (New Haven and London. Yale University Press. 1964.)

[8] Th. Wyckoff: 'The Role of the Military in Contemporary Latin American Politics', *Western Political Quarterly*. Vol. XII. September 1960, pp. 745–66.

[9] S. M. Lipset: 'Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy', *American Political Science Review*. Vol. LIII, March 1959, pp. 69–105.

[10] Bruce M. Russett: *Trends in World Politics*. (The Macmillan Company. New York 1965.)

[11] S. E. Finer: *The Man on Horseback*. Supra.

[12] Morris Janowitz: *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations*. (Chicago and London. The University of Chicago Press. 1964).

[13] Bruce M. Russett. op. cit. p. 126.

[14] The rank orders for all countries on these variables are presented in Appendix 2.

[15] P. 23.

[16] Egil Fossum. op. cit.

[17] S. E. Finer. op. cit. p. 43.

[18] Johan Galtung: 'A Structural Theory of Aggression'. *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. I. No. 2, pp. 95–119.

[19] Lucien W. Pye: 'Armies in the Process of Political Modernization', John J. Johnson (ed.) *The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries*. (Princeton N. J. Princeton University Press 1962.) pp. 78–79.

[20] Merle Kling: 'Towards a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America', John H. Kautsky (ed): *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*. (New York, London 1962. John Wiley and Sons. Inc.) p. 137.

[21] Samuel P. Huntington: 'Patterns of Violence in World Politics', Samuel P. Huntington (ed.) *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*. (New York 1962. The Free Press of Glencoe. Inc.) p. 38.

[22] Edwin Lieuwen: *Generals vs. Presidents — Neo-militarism in Latin America*. (New York 1964) p. 5.

[23] Edwin Lieuwen. op. cit. p. 107.

[24] Huntington: *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*. p. 33.

[25] See my 'Some Aspects of the Latin American Military Coup.' Supra.

[26] Edwin Lieuwen. op. cit. p. 37.

[27] John J. Johnson: *The Military and Society in Latin America*. (Stanford, California. Stanford University Press. 1964) p. 260.

[28] The data were found in W. S. Woytinsky and E. S. Woytinsky: *World Commerce and Governments. Trends and Outlook*.' (New York 1955. The Twentieth Century Fund.) Table 14. column 1. p. 39.

[29] The data were found in *America Latina; Producto Real Per Capita (dólares de 1960)*. Table for internal use CEPAL. Santiago de Chile.

[30] Huntington: *Changing Patterns of Military Politics*. p. 45.

[31] José Maria Bello: *A History of Modern Brazil 1889–1964*. (Stanford 1966). pp. 270–.

[32] Per Olav Reinton: 'International Structure and International Integration', *Journal of Peace Research*, No. 4. 1967.

[33] Per Olav Reinton. op. cit.

[34] Johan Galtung, Manuel Mora y Araujo, Simon Schwartzman: 'El Sistema Latinoamericano de Naciones: un Análisis Estructural', *América Latina*. Ano 9. No. 1. Janeiro-Março de 1966. Rio de Janeiro. Brazil, pp. 59–94. For the rank order of countries see Appendix II.

[35] Johan Galtung: 'East-West Interaction Patterns', *Journal of Peace Research*. Vol. III. No. 2. 1966, pp. 146–177.

[36] We split the 'unequals' category and found slight percentage differences going in the opposite direction of what was expected. An 'effect' was indicated from 'U' to 'T' and no 'effect' was found from 'T' to 'U'.

APPENDIX I

Military Coups in Latin America 1907–66. A complete list with sources.

The following abbreviations are used in the list:

Books:

'Historia': *Historia de America y de los pueblos Americanos*. Dirigidd por Antonio Ballesteros y Beretta. Salvat Editores, S. A. Barcelona — Buenos Aires 1948.

'America': *Historia de America*. Direccion General Ricardo Levene. Buenos Aires 1941 & 43.

'Parker': Franklin D. Parker: *The Central American Republics*. Oxford University Press. London 1964.

'Wilgus': A. Curtis Wilgus: *The Development of Hispanic America*. 6th Edition. N.Y. 1955. Reinhart & Co., Inc.

'Herring': Hubert Herring: *A History of Latin America*. A. Knopf. N.Y. 1957.

'Munro': Dana G. Munro: *The Latin American Republics. A History*. 3rd edition. N.Y. 1960. Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc.
'Stokes': W. S. Stokes: *Latin American Politics*. N.Y. 1959.
'Breve Historia': Oscar E. Reyes: *Breve Historia General del Ecuador*. Quito 1949.
'Bernstein': Harry Bernstein: *Modern and Contemporary Latin America*. N.Y. 1952. J. B. Lippincott Co.

Newspapers:
JB: Journal do Brasil. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.
CM: Correiro da Manha. Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.

As general reference books were used: *Encyclopedia Britannica*. Various editions. *The Statesman's Yearbook*. Various editions. *Almanaque Mundial*. Edited by Eduardo Cardenas. Mexico City 1965 and 1966.

1.	Paraguay	2. 7.08	Harris G. Warren: *Paraguay*. (University of Oklahoma Press 1949.) pp. 266–267 and p. 358. Efraím Cardozo: *Breve Historia del Paraguay*. (Buenos Aires 1965.) pp. 119–121.
2.	Haití	.12.08	*Wilgus* p. 605. *Munro* p. 469.
3.	Venezuela	19.12.08	*Wilgus* p. 523. *Munro* p. 319. G. Moran: *A History of Venezuela*. (London 1964. G. Allen and Unwin.) pp. 188–189.
4.	Nicaragua	10.10.09	*Americá*, Vol. XI. p. 327.
5.	Paraguay	17. 2.11	*Cardozo* (supra) p. 120.
6.	Ecuador	18. 2.11	*Breve Historia*, pp. 522–524.
7.	Ecuador	11. 8.11	Oscar E. Reyes: *Los Ultmos Siete Años*. Vol I. (Quito 1933). p. 47. *Breve Historia* pp. 521–522. *Wilgus* p. 496. *Munro* p. 287. *Herring* p. 506.
8.	Haití	. 8.11	*Munro* p. 469.
9.	Dominican Rep.	20.11.11	*Wilgus* p. 614. *Herring* p. 428. *Munro* p. 487. Leland H. Jenks: 'The Dominican Republic' in *Studies in Hispanic American Affairs*. Vol. II. Curtis Wilgus (ed.) (Washington D.C. 1934.) pp. 114–115.
10.	Ecuador	28. 1.12	*Breve Historia*. pp. 524–26.
11.	Perú	4. 2.13	*Historia* p. 570. *América*. Vol. X p. 209. *Herring* p. 517. *Wilgus* p. 456. *Munro* p. 261.
12.	Mexico	18. 2.13	*Bernstein* pp. 116–118. *Herring* pp. 355–56.
13.	Haití	8. 2.14	*Munro* p. 469. *Wilgus* p. 605. *Herring* p. 419.
14.	Haití	4. 3.15	*Munro* p. 469. *Wilgus* p. 605. *Herring* p. 419.
15.	Costa Rica	27. 1.17	*América* Vol. XI p. 351. *Wilgus* p. 567. *Parker* p. 262. *Munro* p. 425.
16.	Honduras	. .19	*América* Vol. XI pp. 303–305.
17.	Perú	4. 7.19	*Historia* p. 630. *Herring* p. 517. *Wilgus* p. 456. *Munro* p. 262. Liisa North: *Civil-Military Relations in Argentina, Chile, and Peru*. (Univ. of California. Berkeley 1966.) p. 78.
18.	Mexico	21. 5.20	*Bernstein* pp. 123–24. *Herring* pp. 362–363.
19.	Bolivia	12. 7.20	*Historia* p. 607. *Munro* p. 274. *Wilgus* p. 483.
20.	Guatemala	6.12.21	*Parker* p. 96. *Wilgus* p. 536. *Munro* pp. 425–426.
21.	Honduras	1. 2.24	*América* Vol. XI. pp. 304–307.
22.	Chile	5. 9.24	*Bernstein* pp. 528–530. *Herring* pp. 559–560.
23.	Chile	23. 1.25	*Bernstein* pp. 530–531. *Herring* pp. 560.
24.	Ecuador	9. 7.25	*Breve Historia* pp. 532–537. *Los ultimos siete años* (supra no. 7) p. 60. *Munro* p. 288. *Wilgus* p. 496.
25.	Chile	1.10.25	*Bernstein* p. 531. *Herring* pp. 560–61.
26.	Nicaragua	.10.25	Wilgus (ed). *Studies in Hispanic American Affairs*. Vol. II. (supra nr. 9) pp. 295–298.
27.	Dominican Rep.	25. 2.30	Wilgus (ed) *Studies in Hispanic American Affairs*. Vol. II. (supra). pp. 114–115.
28.	Bolivia	25. 6.30	*Wilgus* p. 483. *Munro* p. 275. *América* Vol. X. p. 118.
29.	Perú	24. 8.30	*Herring* p. 518. *Wilgus* p. 457. *Munro* p. 262.
30.	Perú	28. 8.30	*Historia* p. 645. Else as the preceeding coup.

31. Argentina	6. 9.30	*Bernstein* p. 274. *Stokes* p. 313. *Historia Argentina Contemporanea 1862–1930.* 2nd ed. (Buenos Aires 1965). pp. 364–375.
32. Brazil	24.10.30	José Maria Bello: *A History of Modern Brazil 1889–1964.* (Stanford 1966) pp. 270–278. Nelson Werneck Sodré: *Historia Militar do Brasil.* (Rio de Janeiro 1965. Editora Civilização Brasileira.) pp. 224–251.
33. Guatemala	16.12.30	*Parker* p. 97. *Wilgus* p. 536. *Munro* p. 430.
34. Perú	28. 2.31	*História* pp. 647–49. *Wilgus* 518–519. *Munro* p. 262.
35. Perú	1. 3.31	*História* pp. 647–649.
36. Ecuador	24. 8.31	*Breve Historia* pp. 546–547.
37. El Salvador	4.12.31	*Munro* p. 430. *Wilgus* pp. 560–561. *Parker* pp. 151–152. Martin C. Needler: *Political Systems of Latin America.* (New Jersey 1964. Van Nostrand Co.) p. 57.
38. Chile	4. 6.32	*História* p. 624. *Bernstein* pp. 542–43. *Herring* p. 562. *Wilgus* pp. 381–382.
39. Chile	13. 9.32	*Bernstein* pp. 542–44. *Herring* p. 562. *Wilgus* pp. 381–382. The newspaper *El Mercurio* (Valparaíso) 12.–15. September 1932.
40. Chile	2.10.32	*Bernstein* pp. 543–44. *Herring* p. 562. *Wilgus* pp. 381–382. *El Mercurio* 1.–3. October 1932.
41. Cuba	12. 8.33	*América* Vol. XI p. 453. *Wilgus* p. 588. *Munro* p. 451. *Herring* p. 408.
42. Cuba	5. 9.33	*Wilgus* p. 589. *Munro* p. 452. *Herring* p. 408.
43. Cuba	15. 1.34	As preceeding coup.
44. Bolivia	28.11.34	*Wilgus* p. 484. *Munro* p. 276.
45. Ecuador	20. 8.35	*Wilgus* 498. *Munro* 289.
46. Paraguay	17. 2.36	*Wilgus* p. 472. *Munro* p. 222. *Cardozo* (supra no. 1) p. 146. *História* Vol. 21. pp. 372–373. Manuel J. Cibils: *Anarquia y Revolucion en el Paraguay.* (Buenos Aires 1957.) p. 47.
47. Bolivia	17. 5.36	*Wilgus* p. 484. *Munro* p. 276.
48. Nicaragua	6. 6.36	*Munro* p. 431. *Wilgus* pp. 553–54. *Parker* pp. 227–28.
49. Bolivia	13. 7.37	*Wilgus* pp. 484–85. *Munro* 276.
50. Paraguay	13. 8.37	*Historia* Vol. XXI. pp. 375. *Wilgus* 473. *Munro* 222.
51. Ecuador	22.10.37	*Breve Historia* p. 561. *Munro* p. 289. *Wilgus* p. 499.
52. Argentina	4. 6.43	*Stokes* pp. 313–14. J. Aramburu: *Historia Argentina* Vol. II 8th Ed. (Buenos Aires 1960) pp. 407–10. A. P. Whitaker: *Argentina* (New Jersey. Prentice-Hall Inc. 1964). pp. 103–104 and pp. 107–108.
53. Argentina	5. 6.43	As preceeding coup, except Stokes.
54. Bolivia	20.12.43	*Stokes* p. 324. *Herring* p. 531.
55. Argentine	9. 3.44	*Whitaker* (supra no. 52) p. 109. *Stokes* pp. 320–321.
56. Ecuador	28. 5.44	*Breve Historia* p. 576. *Stokes* 317. *Herring* p. 508.
57. Guatemala	19.10.44	*Parker* p. 97. J. D. Martz: *Central America.* (North Carolina 1959. Chapel Hill) p. 82.
58. El Salvador	21.10.44	*Parker* p. 152. *Martz* (see preceeding coup). p. 82. *Needler* (supra no. 37) p. 58.
59. Brazil	29.10.45	*Sodré* (supra no. 32) pp. 286–289. *Bello* (supra no. 32) pp. 306–309. *Herring* pp. 727–29.
60. Venezuela	18.11.45	*Herring* p. 469. *Stokes* p. 316. *CM* 17.–20.11.1945.
61. Haiti	11. 1.46	*Herring* p. 422. *CM* 10–13.1.46.
62. Bolivia	22. 7.46	*Herring* pp. 531–532. *CM* 21–24.7.46.
63. Nicaragua	. .47	Harold Davis: *Government and politics in Latin America.* (New York 1958.)
64. Ecuador	25. 8.47	*Stokes* p. 321. *CM* 24–26.8.47.
65. Ecuador	3. 9.47	*Breve História* pp. 589–91. Georg Blanksten: *Ecuador: Constitutions and Caudillos.* (New York 1964. Russel & Russell.) pp. 55–56.

66.	Paraguay	3. 6.48	Manuel Cibils: *Anarquia y Revolucion en el Paraguay.* (Buenos Aires 1957). pp. 65–68. *CM* 2–7.6.48.
67.	Perú	29.10.48	*Herring* p. 520. *CM* 27–30.10.48.
68.	Venezuela	24.11.48	*Herring* pp. 469–70. *CM* 23–26.11.48.
69.	El Salvador	14.12.48	*Parker* p. 152. *CM* 14–16.12.48.
70.	Paraguay	31. 1.49	*CM* 30.1.–2.2.49.
71.	Panamá	24.11.49	*CM* 23–27.11.49.
72.	Haití	10. 5.50	*CM* 9–13.5.50.
73.	Panamá	10. 5.51	*CM* 8–13.5.51.
74.	Bolivia	16. 5.51	*Herring* p. 532. *CM* 16–19.5.51.
75.	Cuba	10. 3.52	*Herring* pp. 409–10. *CM* 10–12.3.52. *Needler* p. 190 (supra no. 37).
76.	Venezuela	3.12.52	*Herring* pp. 470–71. *CM* 2–6.12.52.
77.	Colombia	13. 6.53	John D. Martz: *Colombia: A Contemporary Political Survey.* (Chapel Hill N.C. 1962.) pp. 162–169.
78.	Paraguay	5. 5.54	*CM* 5–10.5.54.
79.	Guatemala	29. 6.54	*Parker* pp. 102–105. *CM* 25–30.6.54.
80.	Brazil	24. 8.54	*Sodré* (supra no. 32) pp. 350–356. *Bello* (supra no. 32) pp. 320–322. *Herring* p. 733. *Stokes* p. 118.
81.	Argentina	19. 9.55	*Whitaker* (supra no. 52) pp. 135–152. *Arambu* (supra no. 52) pp. 451–458.
82.	Brazil	11.11.55	*Sodré* (supra no. 32) pp. 361–366. *Bello* (supra no. 32) pp. 331–333.
83.	Argentina	13.11.55	*Aramburu* (supra no. 52) p. 461. G. Pendle: *Argentina.* (London 1963. Oxford University Press.) p. 142. *Stokes* p. 320.
84.	Honduras	21.10.46	*Parker* pp. 191–192. *CM* 21–22.10.56.
85.	Haití	12.12.56	*CM* 6–14.12.56. Prof. Jean Casimir. Port-au-Prince. Haití/p.t. Rio de Janeiro. *Oral communication.*
86.	Colombia	10. 5.57.	*Martz* (supra no. 77.) pp. 233–242.
87.	Haití	14. 6.57	*Stokes* p. 126.
88.	Guatemala	24.10.57	*Parker* pp. 105–107. *CM* 24–25.10.57.
89.	Venezuela	23. 1.58	*JB* 22–26.1.58.
90.	El Salvador	25.10.60	*JB* 26–28.10.60.
91.	El Salvador	25. 1.61	*JB* 25–30.1.61.
92.	Brazil	25. 8.61	*Bello* (supra no. 32) 342–346. *Sodré* (supra no. 32) 369–374. Hélio Jaguaribe: 'A Renúncia do Presidente Quadros e a Crise Politica Brasileira'. *Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais.* (Vol 1. No. 1. Noviembre 1961.) pp. 272–311.
93.	Ecuador	8.11.61	*JB* 6–12.11.61.
94.	Ecuador	8.11.61	*JB* 6–12.11.61.
95.	Argentina	29. 3.62	Edwin Lieuwen: *Generales contra Presidentes en America Latina.* (Buenos Aires 1966. Ediciones Siglo Veinte). pp. 17–19.
96.	Perú	18. 7.62	*JB* 17–20.7.62.
97.	Guatemala	31. 3.63	*JB.* 1–3.4.63. *Lieuwen* (supra no. 95) p. 61.
98.	Ecuador	11. 7.63	*JB* 10–14.7.63.
99.	Dominican Rep.	25. 9.63	*JB.* 22–28.9.63.
100.	Honduras	4.10.63	*JB* 2–8.10.63.
101.	Brazil	1. 4.64	*Bello* (supra no. 32) pp. 348–352. *Sodré* (supra no. 32) pp. 389–397.
102.	Bolivia	4.11.64	*JB* 2–8.11.64.
103.	Dominican Rep.	24. 4.65	*JB* 23–30.4.65.
104.	Dominican Rep.	28. 4.65	*JB* 23.4–30.4.65.
105.	Argentina	28. 6.66	*JB* 29–30.6.66. *CM* 29–30.6.66.

APPENDIX II

Rank ordering of the twenty republics on the background variables 1907–66.

Assuming that the relative ranks of the countries in most cases does not change much over time, we have taken one cross-section in time to represent the whole period, or, where there were available data, one cross-section within selected periods to represent the period.

Variable 1: size of country in 1,000 square kilometres, rounded upwards. 1907–66.

Low		
1	El Salvador	21
2	Haití	28
3	Dominican Rep.	49
4	Costa Rica	51
5	Panama	75
6	Guatemala	109
7	Honduras	112
8	Cuba	115
9	Nicaragua	148
10	Uruguay	187
High		
11	Ecuador	271
12	Paraguay*	407
13	Chile	742
14	Venezuela	912
15	Bolivia	1,099
16	Colombia	1,138
17	Perú	1,285
18	Mexico	1,967
19	Argentina	2,777
20	Brazil	8,512

* Paraguay increased in size as a result of the Chaco War with Bolivia, but the increase did not affect its rank.

Source: *Latein Amerika — Wirtschaft und Kultur.* (Lateinamerikanisches Institut der Hochschule St. Gallen. Zürich 1964.) Tabellen: Dr. A. Hartmann. P. 168.

Variable 2: ratio largest and second largest city (the single figure expressing how many times larger the largest city.)

	1907–26		*1927–46*		*1947–66*	
	Low		*Low*		*Low*	
1	Ecuador	1.1	Ecuador	1.2	Brazil	1.2
2	El Salvador	1.4	El Salvador	1.2	Ecuador	1.4
3	Nicaragua	1.7	Honduras	1.3	Colombia	2.0
4	Colombia	1.7	Nicaragua	1.4	Honduras	2.8
5	Venezuela*	1.8	Brazil	1.5	Venezuela	3.1
6	Chile	1.8	Venezuela*	1.8	El Salvador	3.2
7	Dominican Rep.	1.8	Dominican Rep.	2.0	Bolivia	4.0
8	Honduras	2.0	Colombia	2.3	Dominican Rep.	4.4
9	Panamá	2.1	Panamá	2.5	Panamá	5.6
10	Brazil	2.5	Paraguay	2.7	Nicaragua	5.8
	High		*High*		*High*	
11	Guatemala	3.0	Bolivia	3.0	Mexico	6.1
12	Bolivia	3.2	Chile	3.6	Haití	6.2
13	Haití	3.3	Cuba	4.0	Cuba	6.4
14	Paraguay	3.5	Costa Rica	4.0	Chile	8.0
15	Perú	3.6	Argentina	4.4	Perú	8.1
16	Mexico	4.0	Guatemala	4.4	Guatemala	8.4
17	Cuba	4.0	Perú	4.5	Argentina	8.9
18	Costa Rica	4.0	Mexico	5.5	Paraguay	10.0
19	Argentina	6.7	Haití	9.5	Costa Rica	16.0
20	Uruguay	18.8	Uruguay	21.7	Uruguay	18.0

Source: The figures are calculated on the basis of data found in *The Statesman's Yearbook 1914*, 1937, for the first two periods. For the last period we used *Almanaque Mundial.* Dirección: Eduardo Cardenas. (Editora Moderna, Inc. Mexico D.F. Mexico 1965.)

* For the two first periods we used the 1926 figures.

Variable 3: Ethnic homogeneity as measured by the modal percentage.

1907–66

Low

1	Brazil	39	(white)
2	Honduras	45	(mestizo)
3	Costa Rica	48	(white)
4	Cuba	49	(negro)
5	Perú	49	(indian)
6	Panamá	50	(mestizo)
7	El Salvador	52	(mestizo)
8	Bolivia	57	(indian)
9	Ecuador	58	(indian)
10	Colombia	59	(mestizo)

High

11	Mexico	61	(mestizo)
12	Paraguay	65	(indian)
13	Chile	66	(mestizo)
14	Guatemala	67	(indian)
15	Venezuela	68	(mestizo)
16	Nicaragua	77	(mestizo)
17	Dominican Rep.	81	(negro)
18	Argentina	89	(white)
19	Uruguay	90	(white)
20	Haití	100	(negro)

Source: Donald D. Brand: 'The present Indian population of Latin America.' in *Some Educational and Anthropological Aspects of Latin America.* (Austin, Texas 1948. Institute of Latin American Studies. University of Texas.) p. 51.

Variable 4: Gross Domestic Product. 1950. (In million dollars 1960.)

1907–66

Low

1	Nicaragua	188
2	Costa Rica	238
3	Paraguay	252
4	El Salvador	267
5	Honduras	281
6	Haití	332
7	Panamá	333
8	Bolivia	460
9	Guatemala	502
10	Ecuador	534

High

11	Dominican Rep.	569
12	Perú	1.369
13	Uruguay	1.458
14	Chile	2.609
15	Cuba*	—
16	Venezuela	3.602
17	Colombia	4.118
18	Mexico	6.232
19	Brazil	9.716
20	Argentina	12.230

* Cuba does not appear in the original list, but is given the place before Chile as it has in Bruce Russett & al. *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators.* (Yale University Press. New Haven and London 1964).

Source: Mimeo CEPAL. Santiago de Chile 1966.

Variable 5: GNP per capita 1950 in dollars (1960).

1907–66

Low

1	Haití	77.6
2	Dominican Rep.	156.2
3	Bolivia	159.0
4	Paraguay	163.4
5	Perú	178.1
6	Nicaragua	184.9
7	El Salvador	187.4
8	Honduras	188.2
9	Brazil	202.5
10	Ecuador	221.3

High

11	Guatemala	245.0
12	Colombia	271.8
13	Mexico	338.2
14	Panamá	345.6
15	Costa Rica	392.9
16	Venezuela	482.7
17	Chile	575.1
18	Cuba*	—
19	Argentina	623.7
20	Uruguay	661.5

Notes and sources as for variable 4.

Variable 6: Urbanization. Percentage of the population in cities over 25.000 inh. (Cuba over 20.000.)

1907–36		*1937–66*	
Low		*Low*	
1 Dominican Rep.	3.4	Haití	5
2 Perú	4.1	Honduras	7
3 Honduras	4.8	Dominican Rep.	11
4 Haití	5.2	Guatemala	11
5 Bolivia	6.6	El Salvador	13
6 Venezuela	6.9	Perú	14
7 Costa Rica	8.2	Paraguay	15
8 Guatemala	8.3	Nicaragua	15
9 Colombia	8.6	Ecuador	18
10 Mexico	9.2	Costa Rica	18
High		*High*	
11 Panama	9.8	Bolivia	20
12 El Salvador	11.5	Brazil	20
13 Brazil	12.4	Panama	22
14 Ecuador	13.3	Colombia	22
15 Paraguay	14.7	Mexico	24
16 Nicaragua	16.1	Venezuela	31
17 Chile	26.9	Cuba	37
18 Cuba	27.8	Chile	43
19 Uruguay	30.1	Argentina	48
20 Argentina	31.3	Uruguay	50

Sources: *For the first period,* the percentages are computed on the basis of the following sources:

for Cuba: Ph. M. Hauser: *La Urbanización en América Latina.* (Paris 1962. UNESCO) p. 102.

for Nicaragua, Haití, El Salvador, Guatemala, Ecuador, Perú, Paraguay and Uruguay: *The Statesman's Yearbook* 1914.

for the remaining countries: J. Dorselaer y A. Gregory: *La Urbanización en América Latina.* Tómo I. América Latina; Estúdios Sociológicos 2. (Madrid 1962.) pp. 174–183.

For the second period: Gino Germani: *Politica y Sociedad en una Epoca de Transición.* (Buenos Aires 196–. Ed. Paidos) p. 169.

Variable 7: Economic diversity. Dominant export goods in percent of total export.

1907–45			*1946–66*		
Low			*Low*		
1 Bolivia	90	Tin	Venezuela	92	Crude oil
2 Uruguay	85	Cattle Ind.	Colombia	78	Coffee
3 El Salvador	80	Coffee	Cuba	77	Cane sugar
4 Honduras	79	Bananas	Guatemala	73	Coffee
5 Guatemala	78	Coffee	El Salvador	73	Coffee
6 Cuba	75	Sugar	Panamá	71	Bananas
7 Venezuela	75	Petrol	Chile	67	Copper
8 Costa Rica	67	Coffee	Bolivia	65	Tin
9 Dominican Rep.	66	Sugar	Haití	63	Coffee
10 Colombia	64	Coffee	Argentina	62	Meat

High			*High*		
11 Haití	62	Coffee	Brazil	58	Coffee
12 Nicaragua	54	Coffee	Ecuador	57	Bananas
13 Argentina	52	Grain	Uruguay	55	Wool
14 Brazil	46	Coffee	Honduras	52	Bananas
15 Panamá	45	Bananas	Costa Rica	51	Coffee
16 Perú	38	Petrol	Dominican Rep.	48	Cane sugar
17 Chile	38	Copper	Nicaragua	45	Cotton
18 Paraguay	36	Cotton seeds	Perú	25	Cotton
19 Mexico	21	Silver	Mexico	25	Cotton
20 Ecuador	21	Cocoa	Paraguay	22	Meat

Sources: for the first period the data were found in *The Statesman's Yearbook* 1937. (For Brazil, Mexico, and Paraguay, 1939.)

for the second period: *CED. Cooperation for Progress in Latin America. Economic Survey of Latin America.* (New York 1961). p. 27.

for Paraguay: *Latein Amerika.* (See variable 1) p. 174.

Variable 8: Total population. (mill. inhab.)

1907–26		*1927–46*		*1947–66*	
Low		*Low*		*Low*	
1 Panamá	0.4	Panamá	0.6	Panamá	1.1
2 Costa Rica	0.4	Costa Rica	0.6	Costa Rica	1.3
3 Nicaragua	0.6	Nicaragua	0.7	Nicaragua	1.5
4 Honduras	0.6	Honduras	1.0	Paraguay	1.9
5 Paraguay	0.7	Paraguay	1.0	Honduras	2.0
6 Dominican Rep.	0.7	Dominican Rep.	1.5	El Salvador	2.8
7 Uruguay	1.2	El Salvador	1.5	Uruguay	2.9
8 El Salvador	1.2	Uruguay	2.0	Dominican Rep.	3.2
9 Ecuador	1.5	Guatemala	2.0	Bolivia	3.5
10 Guatemala	2.0	Ecuador	2.2	Guatemala	4.0
High		*High*		*High*	
11 Haití	2.0	Bolivia	2.5	Haití	4.3
12 Cuba	2.2	Haití	2.5	Ecuador	4.6
13 Bolivia	2.3	Venezuela	3.3	Cuba	6.9
14 Venezuela	2.7	Cuba	4.2	Venezuela	7.8
15 Chile	3.4	Chile	4.7	Chile	8.0
16 Perú	4.5	Perú	6.3	Perú	10.6
17 Colombia	5.4	Colombia	8.2	Colombia	15.0
18 Argentina	7.2	Argentina	13.0	Argentina	21.4
19 Mexico	15.1	Mexico	18.1	Mexico	37.2
20 Brazil	22.0	Brazil	37.2	Brazil	75.3

Sources: first and second period: J. P. Cole: *Latin America; An Economic and Social Geography.* (London 1965. Butterworths.) P. 11.

last period: *Latein Amerika.* (See variable 1.) p. 168.

Variable 9: population per sq. km. Whole numbers only.

1907–26		*1927–46*		*1947–66*	
Low		*Low*		*Low*	
1 Bolivia	2	Bolivia	2	Bolivia	3
2 Venezuela	3	Paraguay	3	Paraguay	5
3 Brazil	3	Venezuela	4	Perú	8
4 Argentina	3	Brazil	4	Argentina	8
5 Paraguay	3	Argentina	5	Brazil	9
6 Nicaragua	4	Perú	5	Venezuela	9
7 Perú	4	Nicaragua	5	Nicaragua	10
8 Colombia	5	Chile	6	Chile	11
9 Chile	5	Colombia	7	Colombia	13
10 Honduras	5	Panamá	8	Panamá	15
High		*High*		*High*	
11 Panamá	5	Ecuador	8	Uruguay	16
12 Uruguay	6	Honduras	9	Ecuador	17
13 Ecuador	6	Mexico	9	Honduras	18
14 Mexico	6	Uruguay	10	Mexico	19
15 Costa Rica	8	Costa Rica	12	Costa Rica	26
16 Dominican Rep.	14	Guatemala	18	Guatemala	37
17 Guatemala	18	Dominican Rep.	30	Cuba	60
18 Cuba	19	Cuba	36	Domingo	66
19 El Salvador	57	El Salvador	71	El Salvador	131
20 Haití	70	Haití	89	Haití	155

Computed on the basis of the figures for variables 1 and 8., for the first two periods. For the last period, the data are taken from *Latein Amerika* p. 168 (see variable 1).

Variable 10: Percentage white population. 1935.

1907–66	
Low	
1 Haití	0
2 Guatemala	3
3 Paraguay	5
4 Dominican Rep.	5
5 Ecuador	7
6 El Salvador	8
7 Panamá	8
8 Mexico	9
9 Honduras	10
10 Nicaragua	10
High	
11 Venezuela	12
12 Bolivia	12
13 Perú	13
14 Colombia	20
15 Chile	25
16 Cuba	30
17 Brazil	39
18 Costa Rica	48
19 Argentina	89
20 Uruguay	90

Source: see variable 3.

Variable 11: Countries defined according to biggest ethnic group.

Mestizo
Nicaragua
Venezuela
Chile
Mexico
Colombia
El Salvador
Panamá
Honduras

Indian
Guatemala
Paraguay
Ecuador
Bolivia
Perú

White
Uruguay
Argentina
Costa Rica
Brazil

Negro
Haití
Dominican Republic
Cuba

Source: see variable 3.

Center-Periphery Index. Rank order.

Center	*Periphery*
Argentina	Panamá
Chile	Ecuador
Cuba	Bolivia
Venezuela	Paraguay
Brazil	Dominican Republic
Uruguay	El Salvador
Colombia	Guatemala
Mexico	Nicaragua
Costa Rica	Haití
Perú	Honduras

SUMMARY

This article studies military coups d'etat in Latin America. Data are presented on 18 variables for 105 'golpes militares' in the last 60 years. By means of comparative analysis between different types of countries, a number of hypotheses about the relationship between the occurrence of military coups and socio-political context, positions in the Latin American community of nations, and political instability is tested.

Краткое содержание.

В настоящей статье рассматриваются военные перевороты в странах Латинской Америки. Представлены данные о восемнадцати переменных величинах по ста пяти военным переворотам, происшедшим за последние шестьдесят лет. С помощью сравнительного анализа различных типов стран проверен ряд гипотез о связи военных переворотов с социо-политическим контекстом в какой-либо стране, положением, занимаемым данной страной в латино-американском сообществе, и с политической неустойчивостью той или иной страны.