

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Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring

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Despite implementing coup-proofing measures designed to maintain military loyalty, Arab regimes proved vulnerable to military defection during the Arab Spring. Some Arab militaries defected amid widespread protests, and some remained loyal, while others split between these two options. This article explores civil–military relations in Egypt, Syria, and Yemen and develops a theory of military defection based on three coup-proofing strategies: building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties. Building parallel security institutions and material incentives create competition within the security apparatus that motivates military defection. However, exploiting communal ties mitigates these effects and more successfully maintains military loyalty.

Keywords: Arab Spring, Civil–Military Relations, Coup-Proofing, Military Defection

INTRODUCTION

A notable empirical puzzle has emerged from the Arab Spring: when confronted with mass uprisings and orders to repress protesters, some Arab militaries (Tunisia and Egypt) defected to the opposition, and some remained loyal to the ruling regime (Syria and Bahrain), while others split between these two options (Yemen and Libya).[1] This variation is particularly puzzling given that, for decades, Middle Eastern regimes had effectively exercised civilian control over their armed forces. By implementing a variety of "coup-proofing" strategies, these governments had long guaranteed that their militaries would remain subservient and not turn against the civilian leadership. Beyond merely explaining the absence of military coups, existing coup-proofing theories provide little reason why these strategies should not have prevented defection among Arab militaries as they confronted mass protests throughout

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2011. However, the variation in military behavior during this period suggests that not all coup-proofing strategies are created equally. Explaining this empirical puzzle thus advances our understanding of coup-proofing strategies by elucidating which measures solidify military support for a ruling regime during periods of widespread popular dissent and which ones actually make a regime vulnerable to military defections.

To explain the variation in security apparatus behavior during the Arab Spring, I develop a theory of military defection behavior amid popular uprisings based on three coup-proofing strategies: building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties. Strategies based solely on creating parallel security institutions and distributing material incentives can create divisions and competition within the security apparatus that make the military susceptible to defection when the ruling regime faces mass protests. However, coup-proofing strategies that exploit communal ties mitigate these effects and are more likely to maintain military loyalty. The lack of a communal strategy in Egypt left the regime exposed to the internal divisions that make defection likely. Syria's ruling regime, by contrast, has successfully maintained security apparatus loyalty by exploiting communal ties, while the split in Yemen's armed forces resulted from a strategy that did so only partially.

This article begins by outlining the various coup-proofing strategies that Arab regimes have adopted to keep their militaries in check and explains why military behavior during the Arab Spring is so puzzling, both empirically and theoretically. Next, I develop a typological theory of the relationship between military defection and different coup-proofing measures based on military behavior during the recent Arab uprisings. Finally, I illustrate the plausibility of this theory by presenting evidence from Egypt, Syria, and Yemen during the Arab Spring.

COUP-PROOFING AND THE ARAB SPRING PUZZLE

Scholars have demonstrated that building a strong, capable security apparatus is key for repressing internal dissent, preventing regime overthrow, and sustaining authoritarian rule.[2] By empowering their armed forces, however, authoritarian regimes run the risk that their militaries will challenge for political preeminence.[3] To protect themselves from military coups, authoritarian regimes throughout the world bolstered their rule by implementing a variety of "coup-proofing" strategies.[4] Such measures subordinate the armed forces to a country's political leadership, structuring civil–military relations in a way that reduces both their ability and willingness to challenge the political status quo. In the Middle East, coup-proofing strategies have virtually eliminated coup attempts since 1980, a remarkable feat given the region's tumultuous history of civil–military relations.[5] In fact, the relationship between Middle Eastern

regimes and their militaries has been so strong over the past few decades that, before the Arab Spring, political scientists had overwhelmingly commented on these regimes' exceptional strength and durability.[6]

Three coup-proofing measures in particular have been common throughout the world: building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties. First, regimes create parallel militaries and multiple layers of security services to insulate themselves from military interventions. Parallel militaries are autonomous from the regular armed forces and are tasked primarily with defending the ruling regime. Possessing a capacity that mirrors conventional military roles, parallel militaries prevent coups by balancing against the regular army.[7] Parallel militaries do not necessarily need to be able to defeat the regular armed forces, but their ability to resist would-be military dissidents in defense of the ruling regime discourages coup attempts by raising the costs of military intervention. Additionally, security services, police, and intelligence organizations enjoy surveillance and intelligence capacities that allow them to monitor the regular army and uncover coup plots before they occur. Such forces almost always enjoy a chain of command distinct from that of the regular military and an organizational structure that ties them directly to the political leadership.[8] Often endowed with overlapping jurisdictions and with the civilian leadership in control of how resources and responsibilities are distributed, these organizations compete with one another for privilege rather than against the regime itself.[9] While creating parallel militaries and establishing multiple layers of security services defend regimes through different mechanisms, they each represent a more general attempt to undermine security apparatus cohesion and pit different factions against each other.

Second, ruling regimes maintain security apparatus loyalty by keeping their various sectors well funded and distributing material benefits to armed forces personnel. Large defense budgets prevent coups both by keeping the army happy and by empowering parallel security institutions to perform their coup-proofing functions.[10] It comes as little surprise, therefore, that authoritarian regimes often prioritize the development of security apparatus capacity over other domestic concerns, increasing funding for the armed forces even when economic hardship forces budget cuts in other areas.[11] In addition to maintaining a large defense budget, those in power will often purchase the military's loyalty with economic incentives and patronage unavailable to the rest of the population.[12] Security apparatus personnel often have privileged access to a country's best housing, medical care, and economic opportunities. In theory, such a strategy co-opts the military and ties its fate to that of the regime. By granting economic benefits, the ruling regime attempts to give the military a stake in its continued survival, thereby discouraging any aspirations the military might have to intervene in politics against its civilian leadership.[13]

Finally, authoritarian regimes often exploit communal identities when building their armed forces and promoting officers, granting particular favor to "communities of trust" with close ties to the regime.[14] The relevant community of trust can vary based on context, with family, tribe, and sect often serving this function in the Middle East.[15] The common denominator between each of these communities, however, is their shared identity with a ruling regime, which differentiates them from the rest of society. The notion of a besieged minority group—and they are almost always minorities—in need of regime protection is the key mechanism through which the communal strategy operates. Regardless of the specific community in question, this shared identity is used as an indicator of loyalty to the regime. By advantaging communities of trust, therefore, a regime seeks to secure its armed forces' unwavering support by wedding their interests to those of the regime.[16] Over time, the identification gap between the privileged community of trust and the rest of society becomes reified as the disadvantaged majority grows to resent what it perceives to be institutional discrimination on the basis of communal ties.

In addition to preventing coups, the strategies discussed above should also protect authoritarian regimes from military defection during popular uprisings such as those witnessed during the Arab Spring. As Taylor notes, " . . . the notion of a coup is really shorthand for a range of military behaviors, both active and passive, that can lead to a change in the executive leadership of the state."[17] Indeed, although scholars usually discuss coup-proofing with reference to coups in the classic sense, in practice it is unlikely that any authoritarian ruler that coup-proofs his regime does not also intend to insulate himself from the myriad ways in which the armed forces can challenge a civilian leadership.[18] More than merely preventing coups, therefore, coup-proofing strategies are intended to bind the security apparatus to the ruling regime to such an extent that the two become mutually dependent on one another.[19]

Given the above discussion, military behavior during the Arab Spring presents a puzzling variation: the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries defected in their entirety when faced with mass protests; those in Syria and Bahrain continue to protect the ruling regime; and the armed forces in Yemen and Libya split between protection and defection. Empirically, this variation is puzzling given that each regime had implemented a variety of coup-proofing measures designed to maintain military loyalty; theoretically, the military defection that occurred in four countries during the Arab Spring defies what scholars have come to expect from coup-proof regimes. Military behavior during the Arab Spring thus suggests that not all coup-proofing strategies are equally effective at maintaining civilian control over a regime's security apparatus. Rather, it is clear that coup-proofing strategies that successfully maintain military loyalty during periods of stability do not necessarily do so when regimes face popular threats to their rule.

This puzzle highlights a theoretical blind spot in existing civil–military relations research: while scholars have demonstrated that coup-proofing is an effective way to maintain military loyalty, they have said much less about how these strategies might actually make authoritarian regimes vulnerable when they face popular threats to their rule. The literature on this topic, moreover, has focused on how coup-proofing affects military effectiveness in interstate war,[20] giving little attention to how such strategies might impact a regime's ability to use its security apparatus to quell domestic challenges. The Arab Spring can help fill this gap by providing scholars with an opportunity to explore how different coup-proofing strategies affect military behavior when called upon to repress popular dissent.

Addressing this puzzle also speaks to more general debates on the durability of authoritarianism. Scholars agree that a robust security apparatus that can repress popular dissent is key for maintaining authoritarian rule and that ruling regimes become vulnerable when their armed forces are either unable or unwilling to offer their protection.[21] However, as David Art notes, research on authoritarian durability has yet to move much beyond this insight and has said little about how ruling regimes build strong, loyal coercive institutions or when such efforts are likely to fail.[22] This research generally understands security apparatus "robustness" as a function of its size or budget; however, the Arab Spring demonstrates that our ability to gauge the strength of a security apparatus—and thus the durability of authoritarian regimes—requires greater attention to the effectiveness of the variety of strategies that regimes use to guarantee security apparatus loyalty. Examining how different coup-proofing strategies affect military behavior during periods of widespread popular dissent can thus improve our understanding of when authoritarian leaders can count on continued security apparatus support and when these rulers are vulnerable to regime change.

RESEARCH DESIGN

This article develops a theory about the relationship between coup-proofing strategies and military defection behavior amid popular uprisings against authoritarian rule. It establishes the plausibility of the theory by providing case evidence from the Arab Spring through a combination of typological theorizing and process-tracing that sheds light on understanding military defection during the recent uprisings. The theory is based on evidence gathered through a "diverse" case selection strategy, in which the cases under study achieve maximum variance on the dependent variable (defection, continued loyalty, security apparatus split).[23] This strategy is ideal for theory development, as it selects cases in a way that highlights the empirical puzzle in need of explanation. By using these cases to establish the theory's plausibility, the article lays the

groundwork for future research that can test and potentially amend the theory based on additional case evidence.

The explanatory typology presented within articulates how different coup-proofing strategies (the independent variable) should affect the military's decision to protect the ruling regime amid mass protests or defect to the opposition (the dependent variable). The analysis then illustrates these dynamics empirically using process tracing to explore one case from each type. Rather than relying on correlation and statistical probability, process-tracing unpacks the causal chain through which a hypothesized independent variable affects a given outcome.[24] It does so by providing evidence of the causal mechanisms articulated by a given theory. Researchers establish confidence in conclusions based on process-tracing when the data gathered for a case study create a complete, unbroken narrative of the steps linking the independent and dependent variables. These two methods are appropriate for achieving this article's theory development goals. In this respect, typological theorizing defines the expected interaction between different coup-proofing strategies, popular uprisings, and military defection behavior, while process-tracing confirms the theory's plausibility by bridging the gap between theory and empirics.

COUP-PROOFING AND MILITARY DEFECTION: A TYPOLOGY

This section presents a theory of military defection behavior based on three coup-proofing strategies: building parallel security institutions, distributing material incentives, and exploiting communal ties.[25] It is limited in scope to cases in which authoritarian rulers order their security apparatuses to repress popular challenges to their rule. I define defection as the armed forces' unwillingness to fulfill these orders.[26] This minimal definition includes instances in which the armed forces simply refuse to fire on demonstrators, as well as cases in which they take power for themselves or fight alongside an armed opposition to the regime. The refusal to defend the regime is the theoretically relevant link between each of these examples. It indicates that a regime no longer enjoys the armed forces' loyalty and, consequently, that the coup-proofing strategies designed to maintain this loyalty have failed.

The theory assumes that all militaries and security personnel seek to protect their corporate interests and will be motivated to defect from the ruling regime when these interests are violated. Eric Nordlinger identifies four interests that can motivate such behavior: budgetary support, autonomy, the absence of functional rivals, and institutional survival.[27] Of these, institutional survival is the most fundamental, representing an "existential interest" that must be guaranteed before a military can pursue its other corporate interests.[28] Although it is difficult to discern the relative importance of these interests,

this theory asserts only that institutional survival will be the armed forces' top priority.

Given these assumptions, the combination of two coup-proofing strategies—building parallel security institutions and distributing material incentives—risks creating rivalry within the security apparatus that has historically motivated military defection from authoritarian regimes.[29] These "divide and rule" strategies create multiple, autonomous institutions that compete over finite budget resources and contend with one another over access to regime patronage. They thus weaken the armed forces' overall cohesion and, as in any competition, create what Terence Lee terms "winners" and "losers" within the security apparatus.[30] Those who benefit least from the status quo will be the least wedded to the ruling regime. If given the opportunity, these "losers" will thus be the most willing to break with the regime in an attempt to achieve a more favorable position vis-à-vis their rivals within the security apparatus.

However, whereas divide-and-rule coup-proofing strategies and intra-security apparatus competition are common across countries, defections and other political interventions by the armed forces are not.[31] Regardless of the grievances that "losers" within the security apparatus might hold, turning against the ruling regime is a risky venture. Personnel that conspire against the regime likely face harsh retribution should their plot fail, which is likely given that rival parallel military and intelligence organizations are built to snuff out and prevent this kind of behavior. Despite structuring the security apparatus in a way that might motivate some factions to defect, therefore, overt dissent is unlikely to occur without a significant reduction in the risk involved.[32]

Despite being an effective way for an authoritarian regime to maintain control of the security apparatus, divide-and-rule strategies becomes far less effective when a regime faces popular uprisings against its rule. Such events signal that the regime's grip on society is breaking and that its legitimacy has been undermined. Popular uprisings similarly indicate that constituencies exist within society that can provide protection for those in the armed forces who break ranks, thus lowering the costs of defection. Behavior that was risky under normal conditions thus becomes possible during periods of widespread unrest. Grasping this opportunity, those within the armed forces that have been neglected by the status quo will defect in the hopes that regime change and a new government will better provide for the interests that Nordlinger identifies. As Lee notes, initial defections may then create a cascade of defection within the armed forces, as even those factions most loyal to the regime come to believe that they must defect to preserve their privileged status and avoid being on the losing side of the uprising when the dust settles.[33]

However, even when combined with popular mobilization against a regime, competition within the security apparatus does not make defection inevitable.

Rather, the effect of intra-security apparatus competition on defection behavior depends on how the armed forces have been structured relative to a country's salient communal cleavages. Communal coup-proofing tactics raise the costs of defection by pitting the regime's community of trust against those communal groups that have been marginalized. Resentment against the privileged communal group is often pervasive among those communities that find themselves politically and economically disadvantaged.[34] These feelings of injustice are exacerbated when the communally recruited armed forces have historically committed crimes and repression against society.[35] Collectively, these factors create and sustain negative stereotypes about security apparatus personnel, reinforcing the identification gap between the armed forces and society.

Far from providing allies for potential defectors, therefore, popular uprisings and the prospect of regime change threaten communally recruited security apparatus personnel. A new regime would likely perceive such forces to be disloyal and hostile, perceptions that often result in purges, "ethnic reshuffling," and "wholesale ethnic turnover" in the security apparatus.[36] Therefore, rather than being institutionalized as part of the state, the security apparatus's existence is based on communal ties with the existing regime. Threats to the ruling regime thus represent a threat to the security apparatus itself, turning the regime's community of trust into a besieged minority whose very institutional survival depends on thwarting challenges to the regime's rule. Communal strategies thus encourage security apparatus personnel recruited on this basis to repress popular uprisings against a regime, as their most basic corporate interest—institutional survival—depends on the regime's continued dominance.

This theory organizes communal coup-proofing strategies into three general types: a-communal, communal, and partial-communal. What distinguishes these strategies is the extent to which they exploit communal ties that exist within society. While intra-security apparatus competition motivates defection in all three, defection is plausible only when not obstructed by a communal strategy that ties security apparatus personnel to the regime.

A-Communal

A-communal coup-proofing strategies are those in which no communal group is privileged when staffing the security apparatus. Instead, the armed forces' demographic composition resembles that of society more generally. This coup-proofing strategy type is the least likely to prevent defection amid popular uprisings, as the competition created by the proliferation of parallel security institutions and control over material incentives can operate unabated. Unlike coup-proofing strategies with a communal component, a-communal security apparatuses are not wedded to the status quo by fear of reprisal from communal rivals. The absence of a communal dimension insulates the armed forces

from changes in the civilian leadership and reduces the risk that security apparatus personnel will be purged as a result of regime change. Under these circumstances, the armed forces' institutional survival is ensured despite the presence of popular dissent against the political regime. Defection from the ruling regime thus becomes a plausible option for pursuing other corporate interests, as there is no reason to believe that the armed forces would not survive a political transition.

Communal

A *communal* strategy is the most effective way to prevent military defections. In pursuing this strategy, ruling regimes recruit most, if not all, security apparatus personnel from loyal communities of trust in an effort to achieve homogenization between political and military elites.[37] Security apparatuses that fall into this category are characterized by the fact that communities of trust staff the overwhelming majority of the officer corps and other key positions, as well as a disproportionate percentage of career officers and the rank and file. Personnel recruited on this basis will be threatened by widespread dissent against the regime and the potential for political change that this creates, as there is little chance that communally recruited military personnel will survive a power transfer. The communal strategy thus creates a sense of being a besieged minority among security apparatus personnel, binding them to the ruling regime for protection. Although competition within the security apparatus might exist, it should take a backseat to concerns over institutional survival. For this reason, coup-proofing based on a communal strategy makes defection unlikely and, *ceteris paribus*, should result in one-sided repression of popular uprisings against authoritarian rule.

Partial-Communal

Finally, a *partial-communal* coup-proofing strategy is one in which only a portion of the security apparatus is recruited based on communal ties. Unlike the communal strategy, many within the officer corps—as well as within the rank and file—share no communal ties with the regime. This leaves a significant portion of the armed forces without any special ties to the political leadership and, consequently, without any particular stake in the regime's survival. Partial-communal strategies thus create competing attitudes toward regime change, with those personnel recruited on a communal basis remaining invested in the regime's continued rule and those without communal ties to the regime being more likely to pursue changes to the status quo. For this latter group, defection is therefore a plausible solution with which to rectify marginalization or threats to institutional interests. Given their involvement in the armed forces, moreover, defecting military personnel have the arms and training with which to challenge those in power. All else being equal,



Figure 1: Military defection as a function of coup-proofing.

partial-communal strategies are thus likely to result in armed conflict and civil war, with well-armed defectors confronting hardliners in the security apparatus whose institutional survival is tied to the regime. Fig. 1 illustrates the explanatory typology presented in this section.

It is important to note that the three general coup-proofing strategies described above are best understood as ideal types. This is particularly relevant for the communal strategy, which, as Quinlivan points out, is difficult to implement to perfection given that communities of trust are often small. Although these categories are useful for theory-building, in practice the boundaries between security apparatuses that fall into these three types are not rigid. However, the general lesson remains: security apparatus personnel recruited on a communal basis are far less likely to turn against a ruling regime amid popular uprisings than those who are not.

ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNTS OF CIVIL–MILITARY RELATIONS DURING THE ARAB SPRING

It is worth considering how the explanation for military behavior offered above compares to other accounts of the Arab Spring. Previous research has generally explained military behavior during the Arab Spring by emphasizing the military's degree of institutionalization or cultural affinity with those calling for regime change.[38] For example, given their shared nationality with their country's citizens, the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries refused to repress popular protests in their respective countries, as doing so would have meant turning their guns on their neighbors and fellow countrymen and tarnishing the military's reputation. By contrast, the lack of such an affinity made sustained repression possible in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Libya. Moreover, the institutionalized nature of the Egyptian and Tunisian security apparatuses insulated them against regime change, whereas militaries in other Arab countries that

experienced mass uprisings were inspired to defend the status quo given that their institutional integrity was more closely tied to the ruling regime.

Indeed, as described in the previous section, both cultural affinity and institutionalization played a role in explaining military behavior during the Arab Spring; however, these factors provide an inadequate account of motivations to protect the ruling regime or defect to the opposition and confront a number of empirical anomalies. In Egypt, for example, cultural affinity cannot explain why the same military that was unwilling to repress the popular uprising against Hosni Mubarak behaved quite differently after the former president's ouster. While serving as the country's transitional government, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has sanctioned crackdowns against those who disapprove of the military's role in Egypt's transitional government, resulting in hundreds of casualties during Egypt's period of military rule. Similarly, there is no reason why arguments that emphasize cultural affinity should apply to both the Egyptian and Tunisian militaries but not to each country's internal security services. However, as presidents Mubarak and Ben Ali attempted to maintain their grip on power, internal security service personnel in each country did, in fact, repress mass demonstrations in defense of the ruling regime. Moreover, Egypt's military government invited widespread popular backlash as many accused it of hijacking the country's post-Mubarak political trajectory. As will be discussed in the next section, Egypt's military has used its influence over the reform process to ensure its interests and insulate itself from civilian control rather than advancing the goals of the country's popular protest movement. These examples should not suggest that individual members of the Egyptian and Tunisian security apparatuses—particularly the rank and file tasked with maintaining control over the protests—did not feel an affinity with protesters or did not hesitate when fulfilling their orders. However, they do indicate that the military's behavior in each case has been guided less by a cultural affinity with the general population than by a desire to strengthen its position in the post-transition political order.

Arguments that emphasize the military's degree of institutionalization similarly fail to provide a complete account of military behavior during the Arab Spring. Empirically, such an explanation cannot explain why large segments of the Yemeni and Libyan security apparatuses defected amid mass uprisings, despite the fact that both displayed low degrees of institutionalization. Additionally, they cannot explain why the internal security services in both Egypt and Tunisia, which enjoyed a high degree of institutionalization, initially defended the ruling regime in each country. Theoretically, moreover, arguments that focus on degree of institutionalization do not provide a mechanism that accounts for the military's motivation to defect or remain loyal. In Egypt and Tunisia, the high degree of institutionalization suggests only that each military *could* defect, but it is less clear about why different branches of the security apparatus would choose this option over

remaining loyal to the ruling regime.[39] Thus, although this article suggests that a lack of institutionalization—as observed by communal ties between the security apparatus and the ruling regime—provides a powerful explanation for why the armed forces might fear defecting, accounts that rely solely on this variable cannot explain why branches of the security apparatus that enjoy greater institutionalization will actually be compelled to defect. As the next section illustrates, introducing intra-security apparatus competition to existing explanations of military behavior during the Arab Spring helps explain the motivation to defect and thus provides a more complete account of the variation in defection patterns across the region.

COMMUNAL STRATEGIES AND DEFECTION DURING THE ARAB SPRING

This section consists of three parts. The first part illustrates how coup-proofing strategies in Egypt motivated the military to defect from the ruling regime. Those that follow focus on Syria and Yemen in an attempt to explain why the armed forces have remained loyal to the regime (Syria) or split between continued loyalty and defection (Yemen).

Egypt: A-Communal Strategy and Regime Defection

Motivated both by its own domestic grievances as well as by Tunisia's successful uprising against Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, tens of thousands of Egyptian protesters began calling for an end to Hosni Mubarak's rule in January 2011. The president initially relied on his internal security services to repress the demonstrations; however, when the size of the protests overwhelmed security personnel, Mubarak ordered the military to intervene on his behalf and repress those calling for regime change. The military refused to fire on those who had gathered, and without its protection, the president had no choice but to relinquish power.

Prior to Mubarak's ouster, coup-proofing strategies in Egypt had centered on two measures: building parallel security institutions and distributing patronage and material incentives. During his rule, Hosni Mubarak staffed an array of security units tasked with defense and surveillance responsibilities. In early 2011, Egypt's Ministry of the Interior employed approximately 1.4 million people, a number that includes police, informants, and a variety of armed security forces.[40] The largest among these are the Central Security Forces (CSF), a unit roughly equal in size to the regular army and primarily responsible for quelling domestic opposition and checking the military's power. Beyond the CSF, Egypt's State Security Investigations (SSI) is a secret police force responsible for domestic security, while the General Intelligence Services (GIS) monitors both the Ministry of the Interior and the regular army. With

their overlapping mandates and jurisdictions, these organizations have historically competed with one another for influence rather than turning against the ruling regime.[41]

Additionally, Egypt's security apparatus has benefited historically from extensive economic and political privileges. Throughout the twentieth century, the military enjoyed access to the best salaries, housing, and health care in the country, and its control over a variety of profitable private-sector industries allowed it to ensure its economic fortunes even further. Its empire included control over manufacturing, service provision, and tourism industries, making the military Egypt's premier economic institution. Some sources even report that the military accounts for up to 40 percent of Egypt's economy.[42] It has also benefited from substantial foreign rents, as well as from a domestic budget that remains "off the books."[43]

Evidence suggests that the combination of these two coup-proofing strategies motivated military defection by encouraging intra-security apparatus competition. While the military had long enjoyed economic privilege, its fortunes had declined steadily since the 1990s as Egypt's principal security and political concerns shifted from foreign to domestic threats. In response to this change, Hosni Mubarak increasingly relied on—and funded—his internal security services at the army's expense. In relative terms, the military's budget had declined compared to that of the Ministry of Interior, a trend that the military resented.[44] This rift between the military and internal security services illustrates the distinct institutional agendas that exist within the Egyptian security apparatus, a distinction that scholars often take for granted.[45] Additionally, the military felt threatened by the increasing "civilianization" of Egyptian politics. Since the 1970s, the Egyptian military has become used to "ruling without governing": while avoiding the day-to-day responsibility of running the country, the military has always been the final arbiter in Egyptian politics.[46] Yet until 2011 its position had come under attack by Mubarak's growing rapport with civilian factions within his National Democratic Party (NDP). In particular, the military had felt threatened by the idea that Mubarak's son, Gamal, might succeed his father as president. It saw Gamal Mubarak's ties to the NDP's younger business elite as a threat to its economic privileges, a point exacerbated by the fact that he would be the first Egyptian president without a military background. Especially given the military's interest in protecting the economic and political privileges that it had long enjoyed, its changing fortunes vis-à-vis other branches of the security apparatus provided reason to break with the president and position itself to maximize these interests in the post-Mubarak political order.

Unlike the cases discussed below, the effects of intra-security apparatus competition in Egypt were not mitigated by a communal coup-proofing strategy. This does not mean that communal divisions are nonexistent in Egypt. Coptic Christians constitute about 10 percent of the population, and

tribal and regional divisions are also present. Despite these social divisions, Egypt remains relatively homogenous, with Mubarak's regime reflecting the country's predominantly Sunni Muslim composition. Conscription guarantees that the armed forces draw on a broad social base rather than recruiting exclusively from a particular community. Indeed, with about 12 percent of Egyptian males entering the military every year, most families have at least one member enlisted at some point.[47] Rather than being a beleaguered minority distinct from the masses that rose up against Mubarak's rule, therefore, Egypt's armed forces are representative of the general population, placing them squarely in the a-communal coup-proofing category described in this article.

Without communal ties to the ruling regime, Egypt's armed forces were free to defect once the country's uprising began. Evidence from Egypt's post-Mubarak transition suggests, moreover, that this defection was motivated more by the army's concern over its declining position relative to the Ministry of the Interior than by a concern over its reputation among Egyptians or its rapport with the population. Indeed, advancing the goals of the popular protest movement took a back seat to the military's concerns over its corporate interests during this period. For example, rather than supporting popular calls for democracy, the SCAF, while serving as Egypt's transitional military government, hijacked the constitutional reform process to guard its economic interests and insulate itself from civilian oversight. In what a number of observers cynically referred to as a soft coup and a return to Mubarak-era authoritarianism, the SCAF granted itself control over the budget and legislative processes, exclusive power over military affairs, and final say over the content of Egypt's new constitution.

These actions invited popular backlash against the military among Egyptians, suggesting that the SCAF had few misgivings about tarnishing its reputation if doing so meant securing its corporate interests. Mass demonstrations and dissent, tolerated by the military when directed against Hosni Mubarak, were brutally repressed when directed at the armed forces. Violence against protests, military trials for civilians, and the curtailment of civil liberties were common under military rule throughout 2011, prompting Amnesty International to dismiss the military's claim to represent Egyptians as mere rhetoric.[48] Although Mubarak's successor, Mohammad Morsi, tried to rein in the military's political power grab, the general argument remains: the pursuit of corporate interests motivated military defection in Egypt; mass demonstrations against Mubarak's rule made defection possible.

Syria: Communal Strategy and Regime Protection

Coup-proofing strategies in Syria resemble those implemented in Egypt in a number of respects. In addition to its regular army, Syria boasts an extensive

security apparatus that includes its Republican Guard and a variety of intelligence branches. Additionally, while officers do not enjoy the same economic opportunities as they do in Egypt, security apparatus personnel often benefit from generous defense expenditures and opportunities for personal financial gain. Under Hafez Al-Assad, for example, Syrian officers exploited their positions for personal economic gain, often through smuggling drugs and consumer goods between Syria and Lebanon.[49] This practice continues today among some officers, but in a more limited fashion due to the current president's campaign against corruption.

The Syrian regime's inability—or unwillingness—to distribute material benefits equally across the security apparatus has fostered resentment among many armed forces personnel. Relative to the various internal security services, the regular military remains weak, underfunded, and politically marginalized. In terms of economic influence, moreover, the military's status and opportunities for personal gain diminished rapidly after Hafez Al-Assad's death in 2000, a product of his son's preference to lean on the Republican Guard and intelligence services as the regime's primary means of maintaining security. This gap is made worse by the fact that many officers believe that the president's recent anti-corruption campaign has unfairly and disproportionately targeted the army. While Bashar Al-Assad has thus used material incentives to maintain loyalty among security apparatus personnel, this strategy has created both winners and losers among the armed forces. It comes as little surprise, therefore, that many within the security apparatus have expressed frustration with the ruling regime and a willingness to defect to the opposition. Enlisted personnel complain about corruption and greed among officers and the security services, and they increasingly view the president as out of touch with their grievances. One report describes the army as "hollowed out" and "demoralized," noting that a vast majority of officers sympathize with the popular uprising against the ruling regime.[50]

Despite divisions within the armed forces and the motivation to defect from the ruling regime, the security apparatus has largely remained cohesive and loyal throughout Syria's popular uprising. Its willingness to repress civilians has resulted in approximately 100,000 deaths and has allowed Assad to maintain his grip on power. The regime's reliance on a communal coup-proofing strategy explains why the security apparatus has not defected. In contrast with Egypt, the president ensures loyalty by staffing his security apparatus overwhelmingly with members of Syria's Alawite community. Despite constituting only about 10 percent of Syria's population, Alawites make up approximately 90 percent of the officer corps and 70 percent of career soldiers, while the elite Republican Guard, Fourth Armored Division, and intelligence services are almost exclusively Alawite.[51] The size of Syria's Alawite community makes it difficult for the regime to implement a communal coup-proofing strategy perfectly, and many of the army's conscripted personnel are, in fact, Sunni.[52]

However, by placing Alawites in leadership and key logistical support positions, the regime has minimized Sunni influence over the security apparatus and ensured Alawite dominance.

Though many in the military feel that their corporate interests have been violated, Assad's communal coup-proofing strategy has maintained security apparatus loyalty by increasing the costs of defection and guaranteeing that the armed forces' most basic corporate interest—institutional survival—depends on its defense of the status quo. According to one report, "the regime in effect took the Alawite minority hostage, linking its fate to its own."[53] It has done so by perpetuating the notion that retribution against Syria's Alawite community would be severe if the government falls. Assad has gone to great lengths to frame the opposition as a threat to the Alawite population, going so far as unleashing "thugs" in ethnically diverse areas to stoke fears of sectarian violence and spreading rumors of Sunni attacks against Alawite communities.[54] Such a narrative is not entirely fabricated, however. Sectarianism has long been salient in Syria, as anti-Alawite prejudices among Sunnis have historically resulted in persecution and repression. As sides in this conflict have mobilized along sectarian lines, many Alawites believe that their livelihoods and personal safety would come under attack without the ruling regime's protection. Thus, although many Alawites do not support Assad, they are compelled to ally with him for fear of the alternatives.

Perhaps no institution has a greater stake in the ruling regime's survival than Syria's security apparatus. Rather than being "part of the people," many Syrians consider the Alawite-dominated security apparatus to be directly implicated in perpetuating an unjust and repressive political system. It bears direct responsibility for some of the bloodiest episodes in Syrian history, including the 1982 massacre in Hama in which armed forces killed tens of thousands of Sunni civilians. During the present crisis, moreover, the military and security services have been responsible for thousands of deaths, while forces loyal to Assad have also committed torture against detainees, sexual crimes, and violence deliberately targeting women and children. This behavior has created deep societal resentment against the security apparatus. By affirming negative anti-Alawite stereotypes, it has reified the identification gap between the largely Alawite armed forces and the predominantly Sunni society.[55] As a consequence of engaging in repressive behavior, therefore, there exists a fear among the armed forces that purges and retribution would be severe should Assad's regime fall.[56] Given these circumstances, assuring its institutional survival thus requires the security apparatus to defend the current regime against the opposition.

Syria's protracted civil war might, at first glance, seem to present a challenge to the theory discussed in this article. Indeed, this outcome seems more like the predicted result of the partial-communal strategy in which a large portion of the security apparatus defects and fights alongside the

opposition. However, these defections merely illustrate the difficulty of implementing communal strategies perfectly. Syrian defectors who have joined the Free Syrian Army (FSA) have come almost entirely from the military's Sunni rank and file, a group that, unlike Alawite personnel, is not bound to Assad's rule through communal ties. Despite the media attention that the FSA has received, the scale of defections should not be overstated. Many of the estimated 50,000 members are believed to be civilians rather than military defectors, especially when compared to the approximately 400,000 active personnel staffing Syria's security apparatus (including 220,000 army personnel and 110,000 in the paramilitary forces); even the most generous estimates of FSA strength do not suggest that defections have occurred beyond more than a small segment of the armed forces.[57] Although the security apparatus has thus suffered from some "fraying at the edges," it largely remains loyal to Assad's regime.[58]

Moreover, Syria's protracted civil war—rather than simply one-sided repression—is the product of a variety of factors beyond military defection. External support for Assad's regime (from Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah), external support for the opposition (from Saudi Arabia and Qatar), foreign fighters, and the large numbers of civilian militias have all played a role in this conflict. Although the theory makes predictions, *ceteris paribus*, about how different coup-proofing strategies might affect armed outcomes, certainly many factors affect a conflict's trajectory. Continued security apparatus loyalty thus might not save Assad's regime in the end, but it has allowed him to hold onto power far longer than he would have otherwise.

Yemen: Partial-Communal Coup-Proofing and a Security Apparatus Split

Like Egypt and Syria, former president Ali Abdullah Saleh maintained control over his security apparatus by creating parallel security institutions and purchasing the armed forces' acquiescence with material benefits. The institutional rivals to Yemen's regular military include tribal reserves, paramilitary units such as the Central Security Organization (CSO), and the Political Security Organization (PSO), an intelligence agency with a reputation for brutality.[59] The strongest and most influential among these was the elite Republican Guard, a military unit that served as the foundation of the regime's security. While Saleh utilized extensive patronage networks to consolidate his regime, perhaps no institutions benefited more from this arrangement than those that constituted the security apparatus. For example, defense spending under Saleh accounted for approximately 25 to 40 percent of government spending, indicating the extent to which the president prioritized maintaining his armed forces over other domestic concerns.[60] Additionally, employment in the security apparatus was one of the best job opportunities available, and

many Yemenis enlisted to obtain a respectable income and support their families. In fact, as many as 60,000 people held more than one military position, suggesting the considerable role that the security apparatus played in co-opting Yemen's population.[61]

As in Syria, communal ties played a key role in Saleh's coup-proofing strategy. Rather than religious sects, however, Yemen's main communal divisions are tribes, whose laws, customs, and autonomy allow them to act as "states within a state."[62] For many Yemenis, loyalty to the tribe trumps that given to the state. Relations between these tribes are often tense, as competition over scarce resources and access to patronage pit rival clans against one another. Given Yemeni tribes' extensive involvement in the security apparatus, Saleh's ability to maintain his armed forces' loyalty depended on his ability to co-opt the tribal and political elites that control them. Additionally, President Saleh's dependence on his close family members injected an additional communal dimension into Yemeni politics. By entrusting key political and military positions to loyal kin, Saleh for decades consolidated his power and insulated himself against potential threats.

However, unlike Syria, where a single communal group dominates the armed forces, Yemen's security apparatus mapped directly onto the communal divisions that defined society. As Khaled Fattah argues, "political and economic competition among . . . [communal] elites is instantly reflected inside the military, which mirrors tribal coalitions and elite struggle, not state power."[63] On the one hand is the regular army, consisting primarily of tribesmen from the Hashid tribal confederation and under the control of its leader, Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar. Also important is the army's first armored division, whose commander, Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, controlled over half of the military and was among the most powerful men in Yemen during President Saleh's rule.[64] Neither of these men enjoyed direct communal ties with the president. On the other hand, the elite Republican Guard, paramilitary units, and intelligence services were each controlled by the president's sons and nephews. The direct kinship ties with the president have allowed him to maintain loyalty of these key branches of the security apparatus, even during political crises.

This strategy has backfired, however, as President Saleh's increasing reliance on his close kin has alienated other sectors of the security apparatus. Sheikh al-Ahmar and his family, for instance, felt that Saleh's decision to privilege a core group of relatives has threatened the family fortune and sapped their constituents—including the military—of valuable resources. Perhaps most crucial was the feud between Saleh, his sons and nephews, and General Ali Mohsen. Long believed to be next in line for Yemen's presidency, Ali Mohsen was reportedly furious when, in the late 1990s, it seemed as though President Saleh was grooming his son, Ahmed, for the position.[65] This political battle, along with Ali Mohsen's belief that the prominence of Saleh's sons and

nephews had undermined the wealth that he had accrued for himself, created a well-known rift between the general and the president's family.

Once popular protests began calling for regime overthrow, Yemen's security apparatus split according to the communal rivalries in which it was embedded. Defections from the Yemeni military began on March 18, 2011, when regime supporters fired on opposition protests in Sana'a. Motivated by their declining position relative to the president's close relatives and lacking communal ties with the ruling regime, Ali Mohsen and Sheikh al-Ahmar broke with Saleh's regime and effectively positioned themselves to take advantage of a potential power redistribution once Saleh steps down.[66] By contrast, Saleh's close relatives—as well as the Republican Guard, special forces, and intelligence units that they commanded—remained loyal to the president until he formally ceded power to his successor, Abd al-Rab Mansur Hadi, in February 2012. Each side maintained control over the armed forces under its command, pitting armed defectors against Saleh loyalists. Sustained fighting in and around the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, throughout 2011 illustrated the potential danger associated with the partial-communal strategy.

As developments following Yemen's political transition have confirmed, these units had every reason to fear for their institutional survival in a post-Saleh political system. Given that Saleh's relatives were widely viewed as an extension of the former president himself, Hadi's government has attempted to establish civilian control over the security apparatus by purging the Republican Guard and security services of potentially dissident, pro-Saleh elements. Ahmed Ali Saleh (Republican Guard), Yahya Saleh (Central Security Forces), Tareq Saleh (Third Brigade), and Ammar Saleh (National Security Bureau) were among the first security apparatus leaders that Hadi targeted, as their continued loyalty to Ali Abdullah Saleh threatened to undermine Yemen's political transition. The fact that Ahmed Ali Saleh and the Republican Guard have resisted such efforts with force further illustrates the threat that communally selected members of the security apparatus perceive from regime change.

Yemen exhibits important similarities to the cases discussed above. Like Egypt, divisions and competition within the security apparatus have motivated defection among the Yemeni armed forces. However, unlike in Egypt, the survival of the entire security apparatus was not guaranteed in the event of regime change: while disenchanted military personnel had everything to gain from regime change, the fate of those officers with close family connections to President Saleh was tied to the regime's continued rule. This latter point similarly highlights the difference between military behavior in Yemen versus that in Syria. Each of these regimes has manipulated communal ties when staffing their armed forces. However, whereas Al-Assad's regime has concentrated control of the security apparatus within a single religious sect, such

a compositional strategy had been only partially adopted in Yemen, where key position within the security apparatus are distributed across multiple competing communal groups with varying degrees of loyalty to the ruling regime. Defections essentially split the most important factions of the security apparatus in half, creating a situation in which the opposition calling for regime change was well armed and capable of challenging military hardliners defending the status quo.

MILITARY DEFECTION BEHAVIOR ELSEWHERE DURING THE ARAB SPRING

Although the theory outlined in this article is based on evidence from Egypt, Syria, and Yemen, it also provides a plausible explanation for other Arab Spring cases. The same attempts at coup-proofing through building parallel security organizations and distributing material incentives created varying degrees of intra-security apparatus competition in Tunisia, Bahrain, and Libya. However, in each case, the defection behavior that occurred was the result of the communal strategy that the ruling regime had employed. As in Egypt, Tunisia's security apparatus lacked any communal ties to the ruling regime. When called upon to repress demonstrations against president Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali's rule, the military, which had long been marginalized relative to the country's intelligence agencies, refused to intervene on the president's behalf. Lacking communal ties with the regime, Tunisia's armed forces defected in their entirety, essentially ending Ben Ali's tenure as president.

By contrast, Bahrain and Libya fall into the communal and partial-communal types described in this article, respectively. In Bahrain, Sunni Muslims constitute only a quarter of the population but approximately 95 percent of the security apparatus. To implement its communal strategy more completely, the regime has recruited and nationalized Sunni personnel from abroad. Calls from Bahrain's marginalized Shia majority to overthrow the ruling regime have threatened the Sunni-dominated security apparatus, thus resulting in the regime's brutal crackdown of the protest movement. In Libya, moreover, Muammar Qaddafi staffed the most security apparatus positions with close family members and tribal supporters. However, the security apparatus similarly included personnel from eastern Libyan clans that have long been in rivalry over economic benefits, political favors, and positions within the regime. When Libya's uprising began, these eastern clans defected in their entirety, pitting them against communal hardliners with every interest in defending the ruling regime.

As the Arab Spring continues to unfold, the theory can also be useful for considering potential defection behavior in countries whose political situations remain tense. While never approaching the scale of popular mobilization

elsewhere in the region, demonstrations in countries such as Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Algeria indicate that political tensions in the region are not limited to a handful of locations. If dissent in these countries was to escalate, reaction from their respective security apparatuses would likely be mixed. In Morocco, the February 20 opposition movement has largely dissipated after the monarchy implemented a number of political reforms. However, the security apparatus lacks communal ties to King Muhammad VI's regime, suggesting that its loyalty would not be assured should the protest movement regain traction and achieve the levels seen elsewhere. By contrast, Saudi Arabia's Sunni-dominated security apparatus would likely not tolerate widespread dissent, which thus far has been concentrated in the country's eastern, Shia-majority regions. The fact that the armed forces have thus far repressed the Shia-led demonstrations—along with Saudi Arabia's intervention in Bahrain against that country's Shia uprising—gives a hint of what might occur if demonstrations were to escalate along this communal divide.

Nowhere has the political situation been tenser than in Jordan, a country that, after two years of popular protests in response to fuel price hikes and unsatisfactory political reform, has earned a reputation for being constantly "on the brink."[67] Although the country's protests have not matched the scale of those elsewhere in the region, the theory predicts that the armed forces would remain loyal to the Hashemite monarchy if such an uprising were to occur. Jordan's security apparatus consists mainly of East Bank Jordanians, which form the backbone of King Abdullah II's regime. The protest movement, by contrast, consists largely—though not exclusively—of Jordanians of Palestinian descent. This communal divide has been politically salient for decades, even serving as the main fault line during Jordan's civil war in 1970. Thus, although Jordan's armed forces have not been called upon to defend the monarchy, this theory predicts that they would be willing to do so should the country's protest movement escalate.

CONCLUSION

This article makes two contributions. First, it explores how military behavior during the Arab Spring informs broader civil–military relations theories, an endeavor that has received little attention since the Arab uprisings began. Studying the effect that different coup-proofing strategies have on regimes' ability to maintain military support amid popular challenges to their rule advances our understanding of civil–military relations in authoritarian regimes and authoritarian durability and breakdown, more generally. Second, the article develops a parsimonious theory that explains military behavior during the Arab Spring. In doing so, it reveals that, although coup-proofing has long subordinated Arab militaries to civilian control, such strategies are not necessarily equally effective.

Future research can build on this article in a number of ways. First, given the article's emphasis on theory development, testing the theory on additional cases is necessary for understanding and potentially refining its scope. While the brief discussion of Tunisia, Bahrain, and Libya illustrates the theory's plausibility beyond the three main cases under review, additional research is needed to explore the generalizability of the mechanisms articulated throughout the article. Seemingly anomalous or "deviant" cases, such as Algeria, in which the military repressed demonstrations in October 1988 despite an apparent lack of communal ties to Chadli Bendjedid's regime, can help clarify the conditions in which the combination of intra-security apparatus and communal strategies operate as described. Additionally, future research should further test the proposition that intra-security apparatus competition motivates defection amid popular uprisings. While evidence from this article supports this claim, selecting cases so that this variable—not just the degree of communal ties—varies across multiple cases will allow scholars to explore more explicitly this part of the theory.

NOTES

1. I use the term *military* in reference to a country's regular army, whereas the term *security services* encompasses special forces, parallel militaries, police, and intelligence personnel. I use *security apparatus* and *armed forces* to refer to all of these branches collectively.

2. Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization," *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 151–169; Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–157; Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

3. The tension between maintaining a capable yet subordinate coercive apparatus is what Feaver terms the *civil-military problematique*, in Peter D. Feaver, "The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control," *Armed Forces & Society* 23, no. 2 (1996): 149–178.

4. Daniel Byman and Jennifer Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea," *International Security* 35, no. 1 (2010): 44–74; Steven A. Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007); James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 131–165; Sabastiano Rwengabo, "Regime Stability in Post-1986 Uganda: Counting the Benefits of Coup-Proofing," *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 3 (2013): 531–559.

5. Eliezer Be'eri, "The Waning of the Military Coup in Arab Politics," *Middle Eastern Studies* 18, no. 1 (1982): 69–81. Be'eri documents 55 coup attempts across the Middle East from 1949 to 1980, half of which were successful: Syria (16 attempts), Iraq (9), Sudan (9), Yemen (7), Egypt (3), Lebanon (2), Algeria (2), Morocco (2), Mauritania (2), Libya (1), Jordan (1), and South Yemen (1).

6. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Jason Brownlee, " . . . And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 3 (2002): 35–63; Marsha Pripstein Posusney and Michelle Penner Angrist, *Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Regimes and Resistance* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005).

7. Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Coup Risk, Counterbalancing, and International Conflict," *Security Studies* 14, no. 1 (2005): 140–177; Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East."

8. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," 141.

9. Ibid., 148–149.

10. Some scholars argue that reducing military capacity by decreasing defense spending is the most effective way to undermine coups. For a useful review of this argument, see Justin Clardie, "The Impact of Military Spending on the Likelihood of Democratic Transition Failure: Testing Two Competing Theories," *Armed Forces & Society* 37, no. 1 (2011): 163–179.

11. In an attempt to keep their armed forces happy, for example, defense expenditures among Middle Eastern and North African regimes are nearly double the global average.

12. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Byman and Lind, "Pyongyang's Survival Strategy: Tools of Authoritarian Control in North Korea"; Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*; Mehran Kamrava, "Military Professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East," *Political Science Quarterly* 115, no. 1 (2000): 67–92.

13. In Gulf states, oil rents are sufficient to sustain the government's patronage networks (see Steffen Hertog, "Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States: The Price of Coup-Proofing," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 3 (2011): 400–402). In countries without significant oil wealth, ruling regimes have financed their militaries through a combination of foreign aid and a commitment to "pay the military first" (see Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," 148).

14. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East." See also Risa Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper 324* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Cynthia Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1980).

15. It is important to note that communal coup-proofing strategies do not automatically result from the presence of communal divisions within society. For a regime to implement a communal strategy, a particular group or groups must be privileged within the security apparatus.

16. Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper 324*.

17. Brian D. Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 6.

18. Aurel Croissant et al., "Beyond the Fallacy of Coup-ism: Conceptualizing Civilian Control of the Military in Emerging Democracies," *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (2010): 950–975.

19. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," 143.

20. Stephen Biddle and Stephen Long, "Democracy and Military Effectiveness: A Deeper Look," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 48, no. 4 (2004): 525–546; Ulrich Pilster and Tobias Bohmelt, "Coup-Proofing and Military Effectiveness in Interstate Wars, 1967–99," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 28, no. 4 (2011): 331–350.

21. Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective"; Albertus and Menaldo, "Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization."

22. David Art, "What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After Ten Years?" *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 3 (2012): 351–373.

23. Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly* 61, no. 2 (2008): 300–301.

24. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005); Andrew Bennett and Colin Elman, "Qualitative Research: Recent Developments in Case Study Methods," *Annual Review of Political Science* 9 (2006): 455–476.

25. This article provides a theory of military defection behavior, not regime change. While scholars have long argued that the military's loyalty is necessary for preventing regime change in authoritarian systems (see Paul D'Anieri, "Explaining the Success and Failure of Post-Communist Revolutions," *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 39, no. 3 (2006): 331–350; Mark N. Katz, "Democratic Revolutions: Why Some Succeed, Why Others Fail," *World Affairs* 166, no. 3 (2004): 163–170; Terence Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 640–669; Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*), this factor is not sufficient, as regime overthrow can result from any number of factors.

26. This definition is consistent with that used in recent research on this topic. See, for example, Terence Lee, "The Military's Corporate Interests: The Main Reason for Intervention in Indonesia and the Philippines?," *Armed Forces & Society* 34, no. 3 (2008): 491–502; David Pion-Berlin and Harold Trinkunas, "Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America," *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 4 (2010): 395–411.

27. Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), 66–68.

28. Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*, 16.

29. Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia"; Michael McFaul, "Transitions from Postcommunism," *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 3 (2005): 5–19; William R. Thompson, "Organizational Cohesion and Military Coup Outcomes," *Comparative Political Studies* 9, no. 3 (1976): 255–276; Ekkart Zimmerman, *Political Violence, Crises, and Revolutions: Theories and Research* (Cambridge, MA: Schenkman Publishing, 1983).

30. Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," 645.

31. Lee, "The Military's Corporate Interests: The Main Reason for Intervention in Indonesia and the Philippines?"; Taylor, *Politics and the Russian Army: Civil-Military Relations, 1689–2000*, 16.

32. For this reason, understanding defection requires knowledge of both structural and proximate causes. See Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003): 594–620.

33. Lee, "The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia," 646–647.

34. Theodore McLauchlin, "Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion," *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 3 (2010): 333–350.

35. Pion-Berlin and Trinkunas, "Civilian Praetorianism and Military Shirking During Constitutional Crises in Latin America."

36. Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 528–529. Horowitz refers to communal strategies based on ethnicity, but his logic similarly applies to other communal groups.

37. Ibid., 534.

38. Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–149; Philippe Droz-Vincent, "Authoritarianism, Revolutions, Armies and Arab Regime Transitions," *The International Spectator* 46, no. 2 (2011): 5–21; Derek Lutterbeck, "Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil-Military Relations," *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 1 (2013): 28–52.

39. These arguments typically accompany those that posit that cultural affinity and a concern over the military's reputation motivate defection, though these arguments are similarly problematic for the reasons discussed above and described in greater detail in the following section.

40. Yezid Sayigh, "Agencies of Coercion: Armies and Internal Security Forces," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 3 (2011): 403.

41. Muhammad Abdul Aziz and Youssef Hussein, "The President, the Son, and the Military: The Question of Succession in Egypt," *Arab Studies Journal* 9/10, no. 1/2 (2001/2002): 80–82.

42. Tarek Masoud, "The Road to (and From) Liberation Square," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 3 (2011): 25.

43. Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accommodation?," 285–286.

44. Zoltan Barany, "The Role of the Military," *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 4 (2011): 28.

45. Abdul Aziz and Hussein, "The President, the Son, and the Military: The Question of Succession in Egypt," 86.

46. Cook, *Ruling but Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey*.

47. International Crisis Group, *Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (I): Egypt Victorious?* (Middle East/North Africa Report No. 101, 2011), 16; Stephen Gotowicki, "The Military in Egyptian Society," in Phebe Marr, ed., *Egypt at the Crossroads: Domestic Stability and Regional Role* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1999), 107–108; Harb, "The Egyptian Military in Politics: Disengagement or Accomodation?," 285.

48. Amnesty International, *Broken Promises: Egypt's Military Rulers Erode Human Rights*, 2011.

49. Brooks, *Political–Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes, Adelphi Paper 324*, 26.

50. International Crisis Group, *Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People's Slow-Motion Revolution* (Middle East/North Africa Report No. 108, 2011), 27.

51. Eyal Zisser, "The Syrian Army on the Domestic and External Fronts," in *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy* (Abington: Routledge, 2002), 119.

52. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," 135–137.

53. International Crisis Group, *Uncharted Water: Thinking Through Syria's Dynamics* (Middle East Briefing No. 31, 2011), 2.

54. Salwa Ismail, "The Syrian Uprising: Imagining and Performing the Nation," *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11, no. 3 (2011): 543.

55. International Crisis Group, *Uncharted Water: Thinking Through Syria's Dynamics*.

56. Joshua Landis, "The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime Is Likely to Survive to 2013," *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 1 (2012): 74.

57. "Middle East and North Africa," *The Military Balance* 111, no. 1 (2011): 330.

58. Bassam Haddad, "Syria's Stalemate: The Limits of Regime Resistance," *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 1 (2012): 87.

59. Sarah Phillips, *Yemen's Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective: Patronage and Pluralized Authoritarianism* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 68–69.

60. Although official government statistics under Saleh place Yemen's defense budget at around 20 percent of government spending, these figures are notoriously unreliable and likely underestimate spending on the security apparatus to a considerable degree. See ibid., 68–70.

61. Ibid., 70–71.

62. Ibid., 97.

63. Khaled Fattah, "Yemen: A Social Intifada in a Republic of Sheikhs," *Middle East Policy* 18, no. 3 (2011): 82.

64. Though not a military officer, Sadiq al-Ahmar's political position as leader of Yemen's most powerful tribal alliance gives him much control over tribal militiamen. Sadiq al-Ahmar and Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar are not related.

65. Sarah Phillips, "Who Tried to Kill Ali Abdullah Saleh?," 13 June 2011, *ForeignPolicy.com*, (accessed March 4, 2013).

66. International Crisis Group, *Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (II): Yemen Between Reform and Revolution* (Middle East/North Africa Report No. 102, 2011), 11.

67. Project on Middle East Political Science, *Jordan, Forever on the Brink*. POMEPS Briefings 11, 9 May 2012.