

Power and  
Succession in  
Arab Monarchies



# Power and Succession in Arab Monarchies

A Reference Guide

Joseph A. Kéchichian



BOULDER  
LONDON

Published in the United States of America in 2008 by  
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.  
1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301  
www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by  
Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.  
3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2008 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data**

Kéchichian, Joseph A.

Power and succession in Arab monarchies : a reference guide / Joseph A.  
Kéchichian.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 978-1-58826-556-2 (hardcover : alk. paper)

1. Monarchy—Persian Gulf Region—Case studies. 2. Political  
stability—Persian Gulf Region—Case studies. 3. Petroleum industry and  
trade—Government policy—Persian Gulf Region—Case studies. 4. Petroleum  
industry and trade—Political aspects—Persian Gulf Region—Case studies.  
5. Persian Gulf Region—Politics and government—21st century—Case studies.

I. Title.

JQ1840.K425 2007

321'.6 dc22

2007026717

**British Cataloguing in Publication Data**

A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book  
is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America



The paper used in this publication meets the requirements  
of the American National Standard for Permanence of  
Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5 4 3 2 1

*To Haitham bin Tariq Al Sa'id,  
a genuine Sayyid*



# Contents

<i>Preface</i>	xi
<i>Acknowledgments</i>	xv
<i>A Note on Transliteration</i>	xix
1 The Challenges of Leadership in Contemporary Arab Monarchies	1
2 Islam and Monarchy	25
3 Bahrain	67
4 Kuwait	103
5 Oman	143
6 Qatar	181
7 Saudi Arabia	225
8 The United Arab Emirates	279
9 Jordan	349
10 Morocco	383
11 Arab Monarchies in the Twenty-First Century	409

**Appendixes**

1	List of Interviews Conducted	425
2	Arab Rulers and Heirs, 1 August 2007	431
3	Bahrain: Al Khalifah Rulers	433
4	Bahrain: Excerpts from the 1973 and 2002 Constitutions, and 2000 National Charter	435
5	Kuwait: Al Sabah Rulers	439
6	Kuwait: Excerpts from the 1962 Constitution	441
7	Oman: Al Sa'id Rulers	443
8	Oman: Excerpts from the 1996 Basic Law	445
9	Qatar: Al Thani Rulers	447
10	Qatar: Excerpts from the 2005 Constitution	449
11	Qatar: Jasim bin Hamad's 2003 Resignation Letter to Hamad bin Khalifah	453
12	Qatar: Hamad bin Khalifah's Reply to Jasim bin Hamad's Resignation Letter	455
13	Qatar: Jasim bin Hamad's 2003 Television Address to the People	457
14	Saudi Arabia: Al Sa'ud Rulers	459
15	Saudi Arabia: Excerpts from the 1992 Basic Law	461
16	Saudi Arabia: The 2006 Allegiance Law of Succession	463
17	United Arab Emirates: Rulers	471
18	United Arab Emirates: Excerpts from the 1996 Permanent Constitution	475
19	Jordan: Hashimite Rulers	479
20	Jordan: Article 28 of the 1952 Constitution	481
21	Jordan: Hussein's 16 January 1999 Letter to the People	485
22	Jordan: Hussein's 25 January 1999 Letter to Hassan	489
23	Jordan: Royal Decree of 25 January 1999—'Abdallah as Heir Apparent	497



24	Jordan: Hussein's 26 January 1999 Letter to 'Abdallah	499
25	Jordan: 'Abdallah's 27 January 1999 Letter to Hussein	501
26	Jordan: 'Abdallah's 28 November 2004 Letter to Hamzah	503
27	Morocco: 'Alawi Rulers	505
28	Morocco: Excerpts from the 1996 Constitution	507
 <i>Bibliography</i>		 509
<i>Index</i>		533
<i>About the Book</i>		555



# Preface

---

**C**onservative Arab Gulf monarchies—Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—are, of course, the world’s petroleum depot. In addition, along with Jordan and Morocco, they are frontline societies—not just their governments, but also an overwhelming majority of their populations—engaged in the struggle against terrorism. In fact, the eight monarchies and fourteen ruling families discussed throughout this book represent the world’s first-tier guardians of a precious commodity coveted by industrialized economies. Their power and rule are envied by friends and foes alike.

According to oil industry statistics, the world consumed more than 70 million barrels of petroleum per day (mbpd) in 2000 and was slated to reach the 120 mbpd level in 2010. The additional 50 mbpd will come, for the most part, from the Gulf region, where six Arab monarchies ruled by twelve families are nestled. The stability of the region, then, is of paramount importance to both industrialized and emerging economies.

Regional stability has been challenged on many fronts, from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the war on terror, but an important factor that hasn’t received enough attention is the question of succession. In recent years, the monarchies have successfully controlled pressures from below with limited reforms, but the unpredictability of succession struggles could produce political upheavals akin to the Iranian Revolution of 1979.

Any discussion of succession in the conservative Arab Gulf monarchies must take into account the following three points: first, that the rulers are well established within their respective societies, with clear checks and balances in place and a degree of legitimacy—limited opposition notwithstanding; second, that the idea of “ruling” over the past few decades has been closely associated with both internal and external political developments; and third, that political stability, as unsatisfactory as it may be for critics, has ensured the current elites’ hold on power.

Consequently, no long-term trends on the succession issue can be fathomed without a solid understanding of what political stability has meant for the ruling families, how it has been managed, and how it has been envisaged for the future. Short of a cataclysmic development, normal succession in each of the conservative Arab monarchies depends on the social, economic, and political stability of these countries. With the exception of Saudi Arabia, an independent country for more than seventy years, and perhaps Morocco because of its close dependence on France, Arab monarchies are very young sovereign actors in the international political arena. Jordan became independent immediately after World War II, Kuwait in 1961, and Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates in the early 1970s. Although Oman's sovereignty was exercised for several centuries, the sultanate did not enjoy autonomy before 1970, when Sultan Qaboos acceded to the throne and literally opened his country to the outside world. Their relative youth as nations means that unpredictable changes could alter political life if rulers shun genuine calls for reform.

To their credit, Arab monarchical ruling families have attempted to increase popular participation in their respective political systems, recognizing that internal stability strengthens regional security. Indeed, the absence of effective political participation could present a catalyst for potential upheavals and instability, and the demise of the Shah of Iran in 1979 reminded Arab rulers that no regime, no matter how strong, could remain in power if a population rejected its ruler's legitimacy.

Although the impact of the Iranian Revolution cannot be overemphasized, an examination of Arab monarchies' political systems indicates that authority and legitimacy were institutionalized quite differently than in Iran. In fact, ruling families consolidated power and authority over their subjects through historical tribal allegiances. Moreover, economic and social changes experienced since the discovery of petroleum accelerated demand for political participation, and the pivotal question was whether change in Arab monarchies would be gradual and peaceful or would produce instability and violence. Because political stability requires that a system or subsystem in the international arena maintain equilibrium among its members, Arab monarchies' search for stability necessitated political cooperation among themselves as well as with reliable allies. This was especially significant because the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf were at the center of international and regional conflicts that threatened both Gulf rulers and their subjects. Similarly, Jordan and Morocco stood out as key powers, in the Arab-Israeli arena and on the African continent, respectively.

Thus, how conservative regimes absorb and process change, while continuing to function normally by stressing their religious and ideological values, remain the key factors for stability during succession. In the absence of mass political participation, stability also requires that the rulers fill certain popular requirements. Among these are meeting the political and socioeconomic needs

of their populations, both indigenous and expatriate, safeguarding their citizens from external and internal sources of threat, as well as supporting basic freedoms for all. Yet, legitimacy largely rests on norms adopted in different times, and past political successes were often accomplished through the use of coercion in an isolated environment.

In the post-oil boom years, when all eight countries are endowed with small intelligentsias and when education levels are rapidly rising, political coercion is no longer effective. And in the era following 11 September 2001, political instability has brought to the forefront the need for genuine political reforms, including in monarchies. Arab monarchs are thus faced with new challenges and calls for further tolerance of peaceful internal dissension to strengthen their legitimacy, source of authority, and ultimately, harmonious successions.

—*Joseph A. Kéchichian*



# Acknowledgments

---

This book was inspired by an earlier study of mine, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, which broached a sensitive topic in a country that values tradition and privacy. I feel privileged to have had the rarest of opportunities to discuss the succession issue with so many officials in Saudi Arabia, and it was at these meetings that the idea to draft a more comprehensive volume on all Arab monarchies germinated. I simply could not have assembled the data presented here, nor written candidly about my findings, were it not for the access I had to dozens of individuals. This was truly an honor given the nature of the subject. Although I examine fourteen ruling families in eight contemporary Arab monarchies, it was not possible to personally interview every ruler.

In the course of writing this book, I visited several Arab monarchies, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Kingdom of Bahrain, the Shaykhdoms of Kuwait and Qatar, and the Kingdom of Jordan. My worn passport indicates a total of twenty-eight trips to the United Arab Emirates and fourteen journeys to the Sultanate of Oman—where I often discussed succession questions with the highest-ranking officials. The only country I could not visit was Morocco; discussions with members of the ruling family as well as members of the intelligentsia would significantly have improved my analysis of that nation. I trust that this lacuna will be remedied before long.

Dozens of individuals assisted me in this endeavor, and a partial list of those who kindly received me is provided in Appendix 1. Nevertheless, several individuals deserve special accolades. First, I wish to thank Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq Al Sa‘id, Oman’s minister of national heritage and culture. Despite his numerous responsibilities, Sayyid Haitham always found time to receive me, entertain my questions, and more important, provide detailed and honest answers. I came to cherish our long conversations, eagerly looking forward to the next. I thank his highness for his immense confidence in my work, and it is to honor that trust, which germinated after our very first meeting in 1989, that I dedicate this book to him.

Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, the deputy prime minister of the United Arab Emirates, was instrumental in opening many doors. It was through his intercessions that I met with several monarchs, shaykhs, and others. He added value to my work, and I cherish his friendship above all else. His highness knows how much he means to me, and I find no adequate words to acknowledge his kindness to my family and me.

Turki al-Faysal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, the former ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States, was equally helpful in facilitating my access to various officials in the kingdom, and I express my profound gratitude to a meticulous, perceptive, and dedicated leader.

‘Abdul Rahman bin Sa‘ud Al Thani, now the private secretary to the ruler of Qatar, deserves special mention for his consistent accessibility in what must surely be the busiest schedule any human being could keep.

The Smith Richardson Foundation found merit in my original proposal for *Succession in Saudi Arabia* and kindly funded this second research endeavor. Marin Strmecki encouraged me to apply for another grant, which was approved. His interest illustrates the serious attention that the Smith Richardson Foundation is devoting to the Gulf region, and I thank him for this unwavering support. Dale Stewart, also from the foundation, proved to be a congenial colleague, as he approved extensions to complete this work and secure its publication. Dale also coordinated the grant’s various requirements at Pepperdine University in Malibu, California.

At Pepperdine, Dean Jim Wilburn welcomed me at the School of Public Policy as a Davenport Fellow in 2003–2004 after the bulk of the book had been composed. It was a privilege to return to Pepperdine, where in 1997–1998 I had taught a class on the Gulf states to a remarkable group of students. I also thank Jon Kemp, the assistant dean and director of the Davenport Institute, for shepherding the grant at Pepperdine.

I also wish to thank several colleagues and friends who read parts of the manuscript and offered valuable suggestions. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, a past deputy director of the G. E. von Grunebaum Center for Near Eastern Studies at the University of California–Los Angeles, provided incisive comments. Her sharp review of Chapter 2, “Islam and Monarchy,” significantly improved the analysis, and I thank her for the time she devoted to reading it. Likewise, R. Hrair Dekmejian, professor of political science at the University of Southern California, helped identify various sections that needed attention. His assistance as well as friendship are sincerely appreciated.

Finally, I thank the publication team in Boulder, Colorado, starting with Lynne Rienner herself, who quickly grasped the value of the manuscript. Marilyn Groschmidt, my acquisitions editor, shepherded the first draft of the document through the usual academic hurdles, and Claire Vlcek followed up as necessary. Karen Schneider, the marketing and exhibits coordinator, provided valuable assistance in the critical follow-up phase, and Shena Redmond, the



senior project editor, attended to every detail. Last, but not least, I thank Jason Cook, a most able copyeditor, who carefully read my text, caught and corrected stylistic errors, and made useful suggestions. Publishing teams work under difficult deadlines, and this one was a pleasure to work with.



## A Note on Transliteration

---

A modified version of the Library of Congress transliteration system has been adopted throughout this book. In rendering Arabic words and names, however, I have relied on the style used by the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*. Thus, for example, Mohammed, as it is commonly rendered in English, becomes Muhammad. Whenever known, I have used the common English spellings for proper names, as well as for names of countries. Thus Zayed rather than Zayid, Qaboos rather than Qabus, and Casablanca rather than Dar al-Bayda'. Although special care has been devoted to standardizing the spellings of as many transliterated words as possible, there are—inevitably—a few inconsistencies that I trust readers will understand. For practical purposes, all diacritical marks for long vowels and velarized consonants have been eliminated, except for the hamza (') and the ayn ('). Arabic speakers will know the correct reference for transliterated words throughout the text.

Because this study deals with eight countries and fourteen ruling dynasties spread over vast geographical realms, titles and names—especially when specific actors prefer particular spellings—pose several dilemmas. First, various spellings exist for names and places, a confusion that partly stems from Ottoman and Persian customs, which were selectively applied throughout the Muslim world. While an Ottoman sovereign was known as a *padishah* (king), his Persian counterpart was a *shahanshah* (king of kings), even if both used other titles, including the shared eponym *zill-allah* (shadow of god). Persian monarchs, especially Turkish-speaking Qajar dynasty rulers, played key roles in regional affairs and, for centuries, clashed with Ottoman potentates over Arab territories. In the process, fresh nomenclatures were exported to, or imposed on, Arab sovereigns, who were burdened with new titles on top of intrinsic designations.

Today, King Muhammad VI of Morocco rules over the sharifian throne. *Sharif*, or “descendant of the Prophet,” is a valuable title for any monarch. Jor-

dan qualifies as well by virtue of the Hashimite monarchy's documented lineage to the Prophet's tribe, the Quraysh, as several Hashimite leaders carried the *sharif* title in their names. Arabian Peninsula rulers, traditionally known as shaykhs, introduced the title *emir* as they extended their authority over independent states. In Arabic, *shaykh* refers to a religious leader (or leaders), although it can also designate an elderly man. While referring to a ruler, *shaykh* roughly means "chief," whereas *emir* corresponds to "prince." In terms of title, both *shaykh* and *emir* rank below *sharif* or *malik* (king), even if contemporary protocol overlooks such designations.

Therefore, and as of this writing, the rulers of Kuwait and Qatar are emirs (princes), and their families are ruling, not royal. The sovereigns of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are kings—although 'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz prefers the title "Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques"—but the Al Khalifah and Al Sa'ud are royal. Khalifah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, as well as all of his fellow federation rulers, are shaykhs, even if the Abu Dhabi sovereign is also president of the United Arab Emirates. Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Sa'id is a sultan, though he is also referred to as "his majesty." All, however, are monarchs according to the common English definition.

I have tried throughout the text to clarify family names. When referring to the proper names of ruling families, the Arabic word *Al*, which means "family," is capitalized and precedes the name of the eponymous founder. For example, in Bahrain, an individual known as Khalifah lent his name to the family, thus the Al Khalifah. A lower case *al*- often refers to a sub-branch of the ruling family. In this instance, Sa'ud al-Faysal, is the son of the late King Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Sa'ud.

Finally, a word about the appendixes, where all titles—shaykh, emir, king, and so forth—were omitted to avoid excessive verbiage. Inevitably, these genealogical charts are not complete, given their size, paucity of data in some instances, and tendency to concentrate on rulers at the expense of junior members. Whenever possible, I incorporated data on women, but unfortunately this is limited.

# The Challenges of Leadership in Contemporary Arab Monarchies

**A**t a time when the Arab world is rising in importance and increasingly affecting international and especially Western security interests, this book provides an assessment of coming leadership changes in eight Arab countries. It analyzes succession issues in the remaining Arab Muslim monarchies.<sup>1</sup> It also examines current and projected political and military leaders' security perceptions, including future security relations with leading Western powers—especially the United States.

Among the many issues facing Arab monarchies over the next decade, none is more important than that of anticipated leadership changes, both at the top levels as well as in the lower ranks, where many served their sovereigns when the latter enjoyed full power, and tumbled when the monarch passed the torch to a successor. In fact, a major recent report concluded that “a new generation of [Arab] elites . . . will reflect significantly different formative experiences and personal and national aspirations from those of its predecessors.”<sup>2</sup> Starting in the 1990s, leadership changes were recorded in several Arab monarchies, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). More are likely to occur during the next few years, especially in the UAE, where several rulers are advanced in age, and where a younger slate of sovereigns may well usher in permanent changes.<sup>3</sup> Modifications and emendations befell key countries, including Bahrain, Kuwait, Jordan, Qatar, and the UAE, all of which may still witness renewed tensions, because the last leadership changes that occurred in each were problematic. Even Morocco is not immune, because contenders to power, while kept at a distance from authority, remain close enough to attempt a regime change. In the case of Jordan, the former heir apparent added a unique twist by letting it be known—in no uncertain terms—that he may be interested in any “Hashimite” throne. In mid-2002, the erudite Prince Hassan bin Talal participated in an anti-Saddam Hussein rally in London, to test whether his eventual return to power—albeit in Baghdad—would be feasible.<sup>4</sup> He was not the only

contestant to the second Hashimite throne, as Sharif 'Ali bin Hussein, a first cousin of the late King Faisal II, sought the highest office as well. Even before the interim government managed to organize elections and draft a constitution in 2005, Sharif 'Ali told reporters that his Iraqi Constitutional Monarchy Movement would "seek a referendum for the Iraqi people to vote on whether they want a constitutional monarchy or a republic."<sup>5</sup> In the event, the Constitutional Assembly skirted the issue, especially when a rival group emerged—Sharif Mamoul 'Abdul Rahman al-Nissan and his Hashimi Iraqi Monarchy Party.<sup>6</sup> Neither gathered enough votes to dramatically alter Iraq's nascent "democratic theocracy." Still, the fancy to reestablish an expired kingdom was still a fervent wish, at least for a few die-hard monarchists.

Since none of the eight countries under discussion in this study introduced a streamlined system of succession, the possibilities for instability were high, even if survival instincts necessitated smooth transitions. Today, Arab monarchies are ruled by either outright autocrats or strongmen, sometimes shielding themselves behind powerless parliaments, but always exercising absolute authority. Their successful knack for survival notwithstanding, internal political stability remained challenging across the board, and attitudes toward the West in general, and the United States after 11 September 2001 in particular, remained somewhat unpredictable.<sup>7</sup> Consequently, an understanding of future leadership changes in the conservative Arab monarchies, and their potential implications for leading international actors, were of utmost importance to policymaking communities in the Arab monarchies themselves as well as for all elites dealing with them.

### ■ **The Pressure of Succession**

The fact that the principle of succession within many Muslim states is under pressure is a matter of some concern to observers of Middle Eastern, African, and Asian affairs.<sup>8</sup> The principle of succession is not under attack by any one individual or group, but rather by time. Rulers are advancing in age and, indeed, the passage of time will inexorably exhaust the supply of qualified successors. In fact, it may generate a rate of turnover among rulers that could become destabilizing in and of itself. While the number of senior leaders declines, thousands of hopeful aspirants from the second and third generations wait in the wings, with no agreed criteria for choosing among them. Familywide competitions are crucial in monarchies, even if less than a few have any chance of acceding to the throne in key countries over the next decade. Astonishingly, military dictators have pursued more or less the same pattern in securing power for the next generation of leaders, as in Syria, Egypt, Yemen, Libya, and Azerbaijan.<sup>9</sup> Nevertheless, the future composition and stability of the decisionmaking elite in leading Arab monarchies are subject to dramatic change, because of complex inter-

family realignments. How will these alliances evolve? Who will come to dominate each system? What will it take to earn the support of those who are not chosen?

Undoubtedly, certain factions will better negotiate the winnowing that must take place among the second and third generations. If history is a guide, one may expect key ruling families (i.e., in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait) to present the outside world with a solution to the succession question in a manner that appears sensible and expeditious. Such moves would remove uncertainty and end opportunities for open speculation on intrafamily contentions. Nevertheless, the prospect that behind-the-scenes resolutions of the succession question may be further extended, and that solutions may not come quickly or for that matter felicitously in key countries, should be carefully assessed.

While ruling families in monarchies will probably always try to avoid allowing events to reach the scale of unseemly public disputes, differences of views among senior members are not unprecedented in Arab and Muslim history. A repeat of past questioning of the regime's ideological or doctrinal legitimacy would be particularly destabilizing.<sup>10</sup> There is a chance that the resolution of the succession issue in several Arab monarchies could turn into significant and bitter behind-the-scenes skirmishes. Players may well act early, promoting their sons to positions in which they can build the internal or external political capital needed for a credible bid for power, or attempting to broaden their relatives' base within both family and government at the expense of other officials. Any attempt by a faction of the ruling regime to build a rival power base within the religious or tribal establishment would be indicative of such behind-the-scenes struggles. Nor have past clashes for power within certain countries been without violence. In fact, several Omani, Qatari, and UAE rulers acceded to their respective commands through carefully orchestrated coups.

Today, with popular support a valuable commodity, a full-blown succession contest in any of the eight monarchies could literally polarize these conservative Muslim societies. Indeed, the prospect of stalemate, extreme rivalry, and instability within regimes would remain of concern for both regional leaders as well as their dependent Western allies. Such developments could have serious implications for major Western powers, if domestic strife should hinder a regime's efforts to meet growing internal and external challenges to its continued rule and, potentially, destabilize the regime.

### **The Influences of Religion and Tribal Behavior on Succession**

Succession issues are problematic in hereditary monarchies because of ingrained power struggles that, for better or worse, determine how the mighty rule. In Europe, where dynasties flourished, succession was once determined by a show of strength among a ruler's sons. In time, however, it reverted to primogeniture, in

which a ruler's oldest male descendant acceded to the throne.<sup>11</sup> For a variety of reasons, chiefly because of religious and tribal traditions, primogeniture has not developed among Muslim dynasties in quite the same way, because under *shari'ah* law, all sons of a man are equal and legitimate, even if they were born from illegitimate marriages. Moreover, under pre-Islamic tribal norms, while the throne could have passed from one generation to the next within a particular family, it was not necessarily passed from father to son. Rather, authority also fell to a ruler's brother, uncle, or cousin, depending on which of these oldest male relatives was seen to possess "the qualities of nobility, skill in arbitration, *hazz* or 'good fortune,' and leadership."<sup>12</sup>

The major difficulty of this tradition lies in the determination of ability, or disability, in ambiguous situations, particularly since the pool of potential heirs is expanded to include the ruler's lineal relatives (sons) and his lateral relatives (brothers), as well as other members of a ruling family. Since there are several potential rulers and no means—either observed or formal—to finally arbitrate among various claimants, the traditional Muslim political system has tended to foster succession struggles. Although the system has the advantage, at least in principle, of determining the most able ruler—that is, the succession of the fittest—in practice the struggle can be somewhat destructive and can expose a monarchy or a military dictatorship to a number of internal and external foes.<sup>13</sup>

To some extent, the inherent fragility of the succession principle in Islamic states is mitigated by the traditional prerogative of rulers to designate their successors, and even the heir to the heir apparent. This is particularly the case for strong rulers of long tenure, who have typically attempted to establish a lineal line of succession, usually to their oldest son (as in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). While this designation helps to ensure a smooth continuation, it has not prevented a struggle for succession in the face of problems and failures.

Similarly, the maintenance of a ruler's position is inherently tenuous, since the basis of *his* legitimacy depends on a continued demonstration of ability. Evidence of failure, or disability, thus weakens the ruler's position and opens opportunities for rivals to challenge him with the entirely legitimate claim that they can rule the realm better. It is for this reason that crises facing Muslim dynasties have tended to aggravate internal rivalries, to the extent that a ruler could be held accountable for causing a particular crisis, or fail to resolve it. In fact, other family or elite members, or even rival families or institutions, often challenged the most able ruler, when rule by consensus diminished. More recently, the tendency to challenge rulers on the basis of merit was somewhat mitigated by the latter's aptitude to exercise financial discretion, essentially the sharing of oil wealth—where available—with a wide-ranging array of family members.<sup>14</sup>



Historically, the lack of an institutionalized state structure also tended to complicate succession problems. Without a central state apparatus, it was more difficult for a designated heir to guarantee his succession and deter challenges, or to maintain his position once he became ruler. Similarly, there were no government positions independent of a ruler's household that the ruler could use to reward supporters and conciliate opponents. Rather, the power of a Muslim ruler stemmed from his complicated, but highly effective, personal loyalties from relatives and advisers. The absence of formal state institutions did not mean that dynastic rulers operated in a vacuum, but that despite rich tribal traditions—which ensured the survival of a particular dynasty—monarchical rulers in the Arab world assumed additional burdens after the advent of the state system.

### **The Legacy of Islamic Succession**

Whether the Prophet Muhammad ever envisaged the process for legitimate and orderly succession, the absence of a male heir ensured that there would be no dynasty for the first Islamic state.<sup>15</sup> The first four caliphs who succeeded the Prophet—Abu Bakr (632–634), 'Umar (634–644), 'Uthman (644–656), and 'Ali (656–661)—were not only related to him through marriage, but also members of the Quraysh tribe. Indeed, the first three successors were chosen by tribal acclamation, and even though the struggle did not culminate until 656 with 'Ali's rule, major differences arose almost from the beginning. 'Uthman was challenged by 'Ali and was assassinated in 656 by the latter's supporters. 'Ali himself was challenged by Mu'awiyah, the 'Umayyad governor of Syria, who demanded vengeance for the murder of 'Uthman. What unfolded in the major sectarian division in Islam, between Sunni and Shi'ah (followers of 'Ali), was a genuine struggle for legitimate authority.<sup>16</sup>

In 661, a disgruntled follower, in yet another struggle for succession, assassinated the caliph 'Ali. Mu'awiyah then founded the Sunni 'Umayyad dynasty (661–749) in Damascus, which in turn was succeeded by the Sunni 'Abbasid dynasty (750–1258) in Baghdad.<sup>17</sup> For their part, the followers of 'Ali established their own realm in Cairo in what has become known as the Fatimid dynasty (909–1171).<sup>18</sup> The 'Abbasids, who claimed descent from the Prophet's uncle of the Hashim clan within the Quraysh tribe, rose against the 'Umayyads in a classic dynastic clash. In the event, the victorious 'Abbasids slaughtered most of the 'Umayyad leadership, with the exception of 'Abdul Rahman, who managed to escape to Spain, where he founded a new 'Umayyad dynasty (755–1031). What followed was a period of relative peace and unique awakening in the Muslim realm.

In the tenth century, the 'Abbasid caliphate lost its secular power to warlords in Baghdad, and in 1258 the 'Abbasid dynasty was eradicated altogether by the Mongol invasion.<sup>19</sup> Various military powers then emerged whose leaders

were astute enough to rule in the name of Islam and, ostensibly, by applying *shari'ah* law. Over time, Sunni jurists started to interpret that rule seized by force was legitimate, provided that rulers declared their support for *shari'ah*.<sup>20</sup> Such interpretations, while expedient and perhaps even necessary, certainly hindered the development of proper succession mechanisms in the Muslim world in general and the Arab world in particular. Still, extenuating circumstances, including tribal and regional politics, played critical roles as well.

### **The Legacy of the Ottoman Empire**

For the next 600 years, succession patterns within most of the Muslim world were set by the behavior of Ottoman rulers, who, more often than not, were innovative and bloody. From the thirteenth to the sixteenth century, twelve sultans ruled the Ottoman Empire following a lineal setup, with authoritative governance passing from a ruler to his eldest son.<sup>21</sup> Despite this seemingly orderly pattern, there was no clearly defined system of primogeniture, and the strongest male offspring routinely eliminated rival siblings. Under the rule of Mahmud I (1413–1421), a “law of fratricide” was introduced, which gave the conqueror the right to execute any surviving brothers to eliminate potential uprisings.<sup>22</sup> This approach was violently followed by Muhammad III, who acceded to the throne in 1595 and, conveniently, had nineteen surviving brothers executed. His own children were executed as well, for alleged court conspiracies, leaving prospects for succession rather dim. Muhammad III died in 1603 with two minor heirs, Ahmad and Mustafa, and, fittingly, both ruled, but more as the result of a winnowing of ranks than through any merit in their intrinsic capabilities. In 1617, Sultan Ahmad instituted a new mechanism, known as the *khafes* (cage), to further isolate his own sons and nephews from the seat of authority in Constantinople.<sup>23</sup> The *khafes* were isolated courts—often spread in remote parts of the empire—serviced by deaf-mutes and sterilized concubines to further control the production of undesired offspring. If and when the services of a particular eligible “successor” were required, the sultan would fetch one, but naturally the practice weakened whatever institutions the empire could support. Moreover, isolation often resulted in nurturing mediocrity, which in time affected the quality of successors. Several sultans subjected to the *khafes* treatment in their youth suffered from personality disorders and other psychological problems that affected their putative rule.

Of course, the loss of quality did not escape shrewd rulers, and in the case of Sultan ‘Abdul Hamid (1774–1789), the suspension of the *khafes* system was deemed necessary. As his own son was not particularly promising, ‘Abdul Hamid retrieved his nephew Selim III (1789–1807), because the latter was allegedly bright. Sultan Selim III, although responsible for the organization of military institutions, proved to be less enlightened than his uncle, because once in power he reinstituted the system, ostensibly to limit palace intrigues.<sup>24</sup>

To their credit, none of the tribes on the Arabian Peninsula instituted fratricide or cage methods, although most were aware of such practices. Even if tribal traditions—steeped in family honor and the survival of the entire community—prevented behavior similar to that practiced by Ottoman sultans, succession struggles were not eliminated. Largely because of widespread poverty, the struggles for survival on the peninsula meant that intrigues and clashes were intended not only for the retention of power, but also to literally ensure that a strong leader would safeguard tribal members from harm. This was certainly the case with the Rashid dynasty, which ruled Hail in Saudi Arabia from 1835 to 1921. In the case of the Al Rashid, a series of weak leaders failed to maintain order, which plunged the dynasty into chaos. Similar changes occurred in Abu Dhabi in 1966, when Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan replaced his brother Shakhbut, with full family consent. In this instance, the violence was very limited, but the winnowing of potential challengers was largely completed by the time Zayed assumed rulership. Though vengeance fueled the successive murders, underlying weaknesses were equally important. Tribal customs, especially the contest over meager landholdings, determined the extent to which the strife evolved. Moreover, the belief that all were “equal,” even when that was not the case, prompted those who possessed military resources to challenge rulers, in search for legitimizing authority. Equally important were the influences of outside forces, especially the Ottoman and British Empires, which slowly aligned themselves with several Arabian Peninsula tribes. Importantly, the Al Rashid failed because several rulers were too narrowly concerned with internal disagreements, and because they slowly lost the ability to compromise and govern through consensus. This was a major lesson to the equally ambitious Al Sa‘ud leaders.

Thus, the monarchical legacy of earlier Middle Eastern empires—the Arab and Ottoman Empires—that was duly inherited by their twentieth-century successors, can be summarized by two main characteristics. First, monarchical principles were applied without official Islamic legitimacy. The title *malik* (king) was regarded as non-Islamic and therefore unlawful and allegedly corrupt. In fact, until the twentieth century, Islamic rulers did not even assume this title. A ruler’s emphasis was rather on fulfilling the task of a *khalifah* (the Prophet’s substitute, ruling over a community of believers, or *ummah*), claiming his right to rule according to *shari’ah*. However, throughout all of Islamic history, Muslim rulers have practiced at least two fundamental models of monarchical rule: individual-absolutist and dynastic-hereditary. A social system based on kin, ethnic, religious, and other solidarity characteristics was arrayed in hierarchical divisions. They also adopted additional monarchical facets, such as royal entourages and household trappings that created significant retinues that benefited from royal largess. The ruler wielding these prerogatives in hereditary fashion within a family or a dynasty held the helm.<sup>25</sup>

Second, without an official religious sanction, adoption and exercise of these qualities did not develop into a desired norm or into an official doctrine

of monarchical rule. Monarchical principles in the Arab and Ottoman Empires evolved more haphazardly, typical of a regime created by a forceful seizure of government following Persian, Greek, and Byzantine examples as well as local practices and arbitrary rulers' interests. To some extent, this was the legacy of empire, which left undeniable marks on nascent dynasties. In Asia and Africa, monarchical rule evolved along ethnic, kin, religious, as well as several other attributes within specifically defined tribal and hierarchical divisions. Still, few survived the political ravages of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, with the remaining ruling families galvanized by their rapid declines.

## ■ Contemporary Arab Monarchies

Eight active, quasi-absolutist monarchical regimes prevail in the Middle East today. Several others that existed until the mid-twentieth century have since collapsed. Understanding Middle Eastern monarchies—the failure of some and prevalence of others—is critical given their primacy in international affairs.

Though recent instances of succession in the Middle East—King Hussein of Jordan dramatically altering a three-decade long consensus, and President Hafiz al-Asad appointing his son Bashar in Syria—appear to have resulted in a smooth transfer of power, significant question marks linger over these regimes.<sup>26</sup> In the Persian Gulf, several of the six Arab monarchies are led by aging rulers, whereas others, while younger and more energetic, seem to have embarked on what can only be described as radical courses (see Appendix 2 for a list of current rulers and their heirs). Despite a widespread awareness of the succession problem throughout the Arab and Muslim worlds, little is actually known about the various succession scenarios that may unravel over a very short time, certainly before 2010–2015.

### The Kingdom of Bahrain

When Shaykh 'Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah died on 6 March 1999, his designated heir apparent, his son Hamad, acceded to the throne as planned. This was the fourth consecutive primogeniture succession in Bahrain, which enjoys—despite its minuscule geographical size—one of the largest ruling families in the Gulf. Still, differences between Hamad and his late father are the stuff that worries observers of the island state. Whereas 'Isa was a hands-off ruler, leaving much of the decisionmaking to his brother Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman, Hamad seems to relish his authority. Herein lies one of the key dilemmas, as Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman is still very much the prince who governs Bahrain, even if he does not rule.<sup>27</sup>

Surprising most, Hamad initiated dramatic changes in the Bahraini political scene, including a blanket pardon to Shi'ah opposition groups (Bahrain's

population is predominantly Shi'ah, whereas the Al Khalifah are Sunnis). He also encouraged the drafting of a new national charter in February 2001—with a series of long-denied political rights as well as provisions for an elected house to replace the National Assembly, which was “suspended” in 1976. The national charter, fortuitously, was submitted to a referendum. The greatest surprise of all, approval to change the shaykhdom into a *mamlakah* (monarchy) in February 2002, was also affirmed through a plebiscite. Remarkably, 98 percent of Bahrainis approved the change, and Hamad is now king. Naturally, these measures enhanced Hamad's popularity, but it does not follow that his rule will be strife-free or necessarily long.

Hamad's first decree, on 6 March 1999, was to appoint his son Salman (born in 1969) as heir apparent. The selection was in continuation of the policy of primogeniture and conformed to the 1973 constitution. Yet, Khalifah bin Salman remains prime minister, and while he himself may have little chance of becoming king, he may position one of his sons—particularly 'Ali bin Khalifah, who has served as minister of transportation for several years and is now a deputy prime minister—for the post. Periodically, a series of rumors imply that the prime minister and his sovereign may have disagreements that, naturally, necessitate denials.<sup>28</sup> Such exercises illustrate existing tensions that can be neither denied nor ignored. Should Bahrain's religious disputes rekindle, should socio-economic conditions deteriorate further, should outside interference destabilize the regime, any and all of these may and will probably place succession and even the Al Khalifah in serious jeopardy.

Finally, the ascendance of a younger generation in Bahrain may only have positive influences on neighboring Saudi Arabia, especially because the two ruling families are friends. The future interaction of these two families is analyzed in Chapter 3.

## The State of Kuwait

The Kuwaiti constitution limits the entire succession process to those descendants of Shaykh Mubarak, who ruled from 1896 to 1915. Importantly, Mubarak ensured the security of the small shaykhdom by aligning himself with the British, against the Ottoman Empire. In 1990, one of his successors did not hesitate to align his rule with the United States against Iraq. These arrangements notwithstanding, the Kuwait internal dynamic is particularly flawed because intense rivalries have produced a system that alternates power between two branches of Mubarak's descendants. These derive from the two sons of Mubarak: Jabir (r. 1915–1917) and Salim (r. 1917–1921). When succession moved to the next generation, however, Ahmad bin Jabir was chosen instead of 'Abdallah bin Salim. Consequently, and for three decades, the family was divided between the Al Jabir and the Al Salim. The Al Salim finally acquired power after 'Abdallah bin Salim acceded the throne in 1950, and kept their

branch of the family in a unique position of authority after Sabah al-Ahmad Al Salim replaced his brother in 1965. Still, the accession of Jabir al-Ahmad Al Jabir in 1978 restored the alternation back to the Al Jabir.<sup>29</sup>

In addition to this intricate balancing act between the two branches of the family, the Kuwaiti constitution requires that the ruler name his heir apparent, and seek the approval of the National Assembly. Interestingly, the assembly was in suspension when ‘Abdallah died, and consequently the selection of an heir apparent by the family was never formally approved. While it was expected that an Al Salim would be chosen, the most prominent candidate was skipped in favor of a cousin, Sa‘ad bin ‘Abdallah, the heir apparent until early 2006. Unfortunately, Sa‘ad’s legacy was controversial, and there were a number of very critical questions about his ability to rule. Many wondered whether the National Assembly would be bamboozled into overlooking his original appointment. In the event, there were few candidates in a rather weak pool, further creating significant dilemmas for Kuwait. In fact, when Sa‘ad acceded to the throne on 15 January 2006, it was amply clear that the appointment of his heir apparent, even among the younger Al Sabah generation, would not be easy. Sa‘ad ruled for nine days before he was replaced by Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah. While this quick turnover respected Kuwait’s traditional arrangement, Sabah al-Ahmad broke it, after he chose his brother Nawwaf al-Ahmad as his heir. As discussed in Chapter 4, this dramatic adaptation may well have identified the best candidate, even if few knew where this leadership stood on vital issues, especially on the critical relationship with the United States. Who were the young members of the family, in either branch, who held views that differed from those held by the current leadership?

## **The Sultanate of Oman**

When Sultan Qaboos bin Sa‘id Al Sa‘id acceded to the throne in 1970, the sultanate was “governed” but not ruled, Omanis were “guided” but not led, and the Al Sa‘id ruling family directed the dominion even if they were the most isolated individuals in the whole country. The contrast with earlier generations of proud Omanis, whose power extended across the seas, could not be more blatant. Once a contender power, Oman was reduced to a shallow entity—a reality that was clear to the young Qaboos. To his credit, the new sultan rose to the occasion and, in the span of four decades, equipped his country with the basics. Still, he did not immediately “solve” the succession problem and, as a corollary—perhaps even as a necessity—sanctioned venality that further divided Omanis. As the twentieth century closed, Qaboos reassessed and offered fresh alternatives, breaking regional standards.

Who will succeed Qaboos has been a major question, because the sultan has no heir and has failed to designate a successor. The legal question as to who may succeed him seems to be practically resolved, although interpreta-

tions vary. The 1996 Basic Law, promulgated in great fanfare, sets out a method for the ruling family to select a successor. Yet the “law” does not make clear whether the next ruler of the sultanate should come from a particular branch of the family, since Qaboos’s own line is destined to end with him. It further stipulates that, if the family council—and not the family, as it is generally assumed—is unable to agree on a successor within three days of Qaboos’s death, then they should appoint the person named in a letter left behind by the sultan.

As discussed in Chapter 5, and irrespective of the “identity” in Sultan Qaboos’s letter, several “candidates,” including Fahd bin Mahmud (deputy prime minister for cabinet affairs), Haitham bin Tariq (minister of national heritage and culture), Shihab bin Tariq (the former commander of the navy), and Asa’ad bin Tariq (the former commander of an army unit), are amply qualified to rule. These men, along with others, display legitimate credentials to lay a claim to the throne. In any case, the list of contentions that the next ruler of Oman may well face is significant, requiring utmost unity.

## **The State of Qatar**

In the aftermath of the June 1995 bloodless palace coup in Doha, when Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani overthrew his father, observers of the Gulf scene feared a domino effect throughout the region. Though Shaykh Khalifah was a workaholic who managed Qatar like a successful chief executive officer runs a major corporation, increased workloads and ennui nevertheless led him to delegate to his son. Where Khalifah succeeded was in wresting power away from different Al Thani factions, into his own palace, under his full control. In doing so, he limited internal factionalism but, inevitably, prevented the development of institutions that could routinely “manage” the country’s affairs. Hamad, a Sandhurst Royal Military Academy graduate, quickly moved to alter the system.<sup>30</sup> First, he successfully repatriated the billions whisked away by his father. Second, he placed a unique stamp on internal and regional politics. And third, he deliberately embarked on a security enhancement policy—mimicking the one instituted in Kuwait—by aligning Doha with both Tehran and Washington.

On the domestic front, Hamad authorized municipal elections, with the full participation of women. He encouraged economic liberalization, and gained membership in the World Trade Organization, for which he even hosted a summit. Irking just about everyone in the Arab and Muslim worlds, Hamad landed the failed *BBC Arabic* television setup, lock, stock, and barrel. The renamed *Al-Jazeera* (The Peninsula) has become a thorn on the side of just about every Arab government, in particular Saudi Arabia and Jordan. Similarly, on the regional front, Hamad bin Khalifah put his maverick stamp on the Gulf Cooperation Council, by actually walking out of a summit meeting. Doha took over the presidency of the Organization of the Islamic Conference from Iran—

but maintained and forged very close relations with the mullahs in Tehran—and, simultaneously, embarked on an open alliance with the United States. The newly created Al-‘Udayd Air Base became the latest launching pad for US military action throughout the Gulf region, but especially for the attack against Afghanistan in 2001 and, more important, the toppling of the Iraqi regime in 2003.

Like Hamad bin ‘Isa Al Khalifah in Bahrain, Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani chose to appoint one of his sons—in fact, his third, Jasim (born in 1978)—as heir apparent. In doing so, he broke the principle of primogeniture but confirmed descent through his offspring. In a surprise move, Jasim renounced the heir apparentship in 2004, because he allegedly did not seek power for its own sake. His younger brother, Tamim, who was born in 1980, replaced him. Few understood this dramatic shift and many wonder how long Tamim will stay in office. Will he also renounce to succeed his father? What about Shaykh Hamad’s own brothers? Will, for example, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Khalifah accept this latest arrangement? Can ‘Abdul ‘Aziz create a wedge between Hamad and a younger brother, ‘Abdallah, who was prime minister until 2007? It is important to note that a counter coup has already occurred (February 1996), that a Doha court tried most of the defendants, and that thirty-three were sentenced to life imprisonment. All of these developments, discussed in Chapter 6, indicate that the succession question in Qatar is far from settled.

## **The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia**

Inasmuch as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the key Arab monarchy—both for the central role it fulfills as the custodian of two of Islam’s holiest shrines as well as for unrivaled energy resources—the succession question preoccupies its leaders and many outsiders who must deal with them. Although ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud acceded to rulership in mid-2005, he actually assumed governance after mid-1995, when King Fahd was incapacitated by a stroke. As anticipated, ‘Abdallah acceded to the throne, and quickly appointed his half-brother Defense Minister Sultan as his heir apparent. Our understanding of how these two men interact, consult, clash, and/or agree, is vital. How successful both princes are in promoting their offspring, and how careful they may be in building multilayered alliances, are critical questions.

Saudi traditions, fine-tuned by the founder, ensured that allegiance will be bestowed to ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman’s sons. Five of his progeny have succeeded him to date—Kings Sa‘ud, Faysal, Khalid, Fahd, and ‘Abdallah—establishing an unmistakable chronological pattern. Yet, with age and various degrees of qualifications, the Al Sa‘ud stirred the succession pot in 1992 with the introduction of a Basic Law. The law stipulated that succession must observe the founder’s chronological preferences, but added two modifications: that the candidate must be properly vetted and that the pool of putative succes-



sors could be enlarged to include grandsons. Beyond such specific references, the Basic Law did not address preferred succession methods, leaving the powerful family council empowered to identify and anoint a ruler. In light of Saudi Arabia's problematic 1953 and 1964 successions, when weak institutions threatened the stability of the dynasty, caution was mandatory. In both instances, Al Sa'ud authority was preserved, largely due to the prowess of Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz. The affable and astute Faysal earned the family's gratitude but, tragically, was gunned down by a deranged nephew in 1975. His successor oversaw the country's huge financial windfalls as the oil boom of the 1970s transformed it into a modern-day El Dorado. Khalid entrusted his designated heir, Fahd, with the authority to introduce socioeconomic reforms. To his credit, a competent Fahd channeled his energy in commanding the country's growing challenges, which, by all standards, exceeded everything Saudi Arabia had witnessed until then.<sup>31</sup>

Fahd's intrinsic capabilities were defied immediately before he came to power in 1982, as oil prices collapsed, the Iranian Revolution enflamed regional passions, and Iraq invaded Iran. Health problems eventually compounded these woes, although the monarch's 1992 edicts ushered in epoch-making changes to Al Sa'ud rule. In fact, the 1992 Basic Law affirmed the current succession order, as monarchs will continue to be drawn from among the founder's sons and grandsons. Beyond specific individuals, what distinguishes various Al Sa'ud personalities are not conflicting ideologies, but distinct outlooks. For example, and while there is a unanimity regarding the family's hold on power, several tend to espouse vastly more conservative objectives. If an image of moral rectitude hovers around 'Abdallah, his more rigid half-brother, Interior Minister Nayif bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, reflects a more severe approach. Fahd, 'Abdallah, Sultan, and others all opted to form family alliances throughout the 1990s to protect their dominion and promote offspring as needed. Several emphasized the need to equip the country with competent individuals, who, not surprisingly, could only be found among their men. For some observers, an aura of righteousness and blatant maneuverings for power was pervasive. Even worse, the proliferation of genuine contenders for rulership is perceived as a genuine threat, certainly falling beyond Al Sa'ud ability to regulate.

Succession contentions were further streamlined in October 2006 when King 'Abdallah created the Hay'at al-Bay'ah (Allegiance Committee) to introduce order among the plethora of contenders. In reality, the potential list of candidates is rather short. In addition to the founder's surviving sons, especially Sultan, Nayif, Salman, and Ahmad, a handful of grandsons are also eminently qualified to accede to rulership. Among these are the sons of Fahd, 'Abdallah, and Sultan, as well as the sons of the late King Faysal. There are also several dark-horse possibilities, including Bandar bin Sultan (former ambassador to the United States) and al-Walid bin Talal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, a leading businessman

reckoned to be one of the world's wealthiest persons. Both men are charismatic but probably too controversial to assume authority.<sup>32</sup>

Under the circumstances, how will the Al Sa'ud balance emerging family alliances, and how will their current leaders tame defeated members? Will the Islamist challenge threaten the "throne," or will Riyadh's war against terrorism allow for orderly succession? As security is of paramount importance, can the Al Sa'ud risk the country's welfare by engaging in protracted succession crises, or will they quickly settle on compromise candidates to maintain internal order? These concerns are addressed in some detail in Chapter 7.

### **The Federation of the United Arab Emirates**

By the end of the UAE "trial period" in December 1976, when the first five-year temporary constitution and presidency of Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi concluded, enough transfer of power from local to federal authorities had taken place to make federation among the shaykhdoms a reality. This contrasted with the many merely nominal attempts at federalism in the Arab world. Indeed, the degree of "Emirati" integration since the mid-1970s confounded critics, because few experts believed the coastal families—who were distributed in more than one emirate and who therefore had innate commercial interests at heart—would cooperate. In the event, cooperate they did, especially on the all-important survival front. Over the years, a substantial accumulation of wealth effectively meant that most Emiratis were fairly satisfied with the overall progress of their country, and most were relatively content with their respective leaders. Still, because of substantial and growing differences in economic power, a phenomenon that dramatically accelerated in the 1990s, the trend was for more centripetal rather than centrifugal activity. Despite Zayed's consistent commitment to the federation—in effect relying on dirham diplomacy to further gel the federation—the transition in a post-Zayed period posed certain dilemmas. Too many contenders, and key contentions, ensured that the UAE, both as a federation and as a union of individual shaykhdoms, would pass through troubled transition periods.<sup>33</sup>

Among the many issues facing the UAE over the next few years, none is more important than that of anticipated leadership changes. Although a good deal was known about Zayed's immediate successor in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi (his eldest son, Khalifah, who assumed rulership in 2004), less is known about the ruler's eighteen other sons, and what they may hope to achieve. There is also a dearth of information on younger leaders in the other six federation member states and, equally important, on how several among them perceive Abu Dhabi, especially as the leadership torch passed from Zayed to Khalifah bin Zayed. As expected, the Abu Dhabi succession ran smoothly when Zayed passed away.<sup>34</sup> Still, how Abu Dhabi addressed its various inter-

nal tensions, ranging from regional security to domestic socioeconomic questions, preoccupied observers.

Zayed certainly did not want a coup d'état in Abu Dhabi and, contrary to his own declared preferences, altered the succession pattern several months before his death. He was categorical in mid-1998 when he declared that his heir apparent would make all future decisions regarding who would come after him and in what pecking order.<sup>35</sup> Yet, in a surprising move, Zayed appointed his third son, Muhammad, to the position of heir to the heir apparent in December 2003 by emiri decree.<sup>36</sup> This reality, the emergence of new alliances, may further complicate matters, for better or worse. Detractors of Khalifah bin Zayed and Sultan bin Zayed, the second son, spread rumors that the two did not get along. While neither of Zayed's eldest sons spoke publicly on the change, both accepted their father's decision. Court gossip postulated that Zayed persuaded his sons to accept this new arrangement, to safeguard the UAE and Abu Dhabi's leadership role within the federation. In other words, Zayed's decision was predicated by a belief that only Muhammad could command wily northern shaykhs eager to pounce on federal institutions at the first opportunity. If accurate, this concern highlights putative contentions from other federation members, which will surely require exceptional diplomatic skills at a time when regional tensions abound. Although few anticipate a breakup of the federation, how the Al Nahyan manage their increasingly critical ties with the other emirates deserves careful attention. In turn, how each of the UAE ruling families positions itself vis-à-vis the largest emirate is also worthy of investigation. These topics are addressed in Chapter 8.

## **The Kingdom of Jordan**

The dramatic change that the late King Hussein introduced into the Jordanian succession quagmire—by dismissing his brother Hassan in favor of his son 'Abdallah—fundamentally altered the Hashimite model. Among the many reasons for this change was Hussein's desire to meet his core constituents' needs. In fact, neither the family nor the military were ecstatic with Hassan's decisions when the latter effectively ruled Jordan while the monarch received medical treatment in the United States. Yet Hassan was appointed heir apparent by Hussein and kept in office for the better part of three decades, and was genuinely trusted by the monarch. Moreover, Hassan had amassed a respectable intellectual baggage, uncommon by Arab monarchical standards. For some, the substitution was a sly attempt by the US-born Queen Noor, the former Lisa Halaby, to position her own son as a future monarch. King 'Abdallah II did in fact appoint his half-brother, Hamzah bin Hussein, as his heir, but there is nothing to suggest that this was more than a mere expediency. In fact, on 28 November 2004, 'Abdallah II stripped Hamzah bin Hussein of his

royal title, allegedly because the young prince was poised to capture the lime-light from his ruler.

The key question for Jordan is whether ‘Abdallah II will keep an heir apparent for three decades and then act much like his own father. Although Hamzah bin Hussein is now sidelined, and unlike Hassan bin Talal, his supporters may not accept such a decision in the long run. Therefore, how Hamzah has positioned himself within the current hierarchy will certainly reveal long-term intentions. Likewise, it is fair to ask whether Prince Hassan, still nursing his wounds from the deep humiliation—which he accepted with dignity—will renew his attempt to the Iraqi Hashimite throne in case Baghdad implodes. What will the roles of Queens Noor and Rania be? All of these questions will clearly impact on Hashimite legitimacy in Jordan and are assessed in detail in Chapter 9.

### **The Kingdom of Morocco**

The succession in Morocco during 1999, much like its counterpart in Jordan, heralded the beginning of a major change in generational leadership within Arab monarchies. King Muhammad VI acceded to the throne amid great fanfare and high expectations. Although the young monarch was well groomed for the post, Moroccans anticipated dramatic changes from King Hassan II’s authoritarian rule. Would the son succeed where the father failed?

It is amply clear that Muhammad VI, like most rulers of the next generation, will have difficulties sustaining the state bequeathed by his father. Indeed, most Arab monarchies, including Morocco, are in dire economic straits, with little prospect for additional revenues that would allow their rehabilitation and progression. Morocco did not “develop the capacity to extract necessary revenues and deliver essential services, and the social and political ramifications of undertaking such reforms are dangerous, at least in the short run.”<sup>37</sup> How far Rabat retreats from its welfare largess and tries to extract additional revenues from its subjects, and how far it goes in attempting to balance between the haves and the have-nots, will surely determine Muhammad VI’s rule as king. Moreover, there is a class conflict in Morocco that needs to be addressed if the state elites are not to retrench into their own separate world. Will leading Moroccans retain their alliances with business and intellectual groups, or will they tolerate fissures among their ranks? Muhammad VI, while certainly beholden to the old elites in power, is nevertheless the representative of a new generation. He is said to empower young leaders to take the helm of Moroccan society, better equip themselves to deal with the challenges of the modern world, and reject the mentalities that kept his father at a distance from his people. Indeed, the monarch insisted that he wanted to promote “a new concept of authority,” and many Moroccans “interpreted the new king’s wish

that his subjects shake his hand, and not kiss it, as a sign of his intention to break with his father's maintenance of royal distance."<sup>38</sup>

How will Muhammad VI accomplish such objectives when he is beholden to the elites in power? Will he successfully reconcile the various competing constituencies, each tasking him for time and largess, when the country's internal needs are overwhelming? Will the young monarch manage to hold off traditional opponents within the armed forces and the security services? Will his brother, Prince Moulay Rashid, accept his authority, especially now that an heir has been produced? What will be the roles of the three very powerful princesses in Morocco, Lalla Maryam, Lalla Asmah, and Lalla Hasnah? Will they brake Muhammad VI's rule or, on the contrary, stand by their brother and monarch? These contentions and the various positions of Moroccan contenders are analyzed in Chapter 10.

## ■ Methodological Approach

Because the Muslim world is undergoing significant changes—evolving popular opinion by independent television broadcasts, the Internet, and similar technological advances—it is vital to understand how popular pressures, and globalization, influence current and future leaders. Therefore, this book identifies the new forces at work throughout the eight countries under investigation. It focuses on the key question of stability, and how leaders—both those in power as well as their potential successors—deal with domestic and foreign policy challenges.

Another major line of inquiry is the identification of existing constituencies—families and tribes—and how they impact on succession. It is claimed, for example, that the late King Hussein of Jordan anointed his son 'Abdallah, rather than his designated heir and brother, to appeal to his core constituencies in the military and tribes. Likewise, when Shaykh Rashid bin Sa'id Al Maktoum died in 1990, it was claimed that while the oldest son acceded to the Dubai rulership, a *stronger* brother was named heir apparent presumably to satisfy family and tribal interests. Can such a pattern be identified throughout the eight monarchies? What are the forces at work, and how can potential leaders deal with them?

A third line of inquiry examines the question of regime transformation. Although a younger generation of leaders will sooner or later come to power, it is critical to identify—to the extent possible—whether fundamental new foreign policy initiatives may also be introduced with new personalities. In other words, will new Arab leaders change their outlook, and how? Is it possible to anticipate such changes? What special features should we look for? Finally, it is also important to ask the following questions for all eight monarchies: How

legitimate are hereditary monarchies? How long will their legitimacy last in the face of changing societies, economies, and politics? How long can the ruling families sustain privileged positions amid economic constraints? Ultimately, what are the prospects for a transformation of Arab monarchies into constitutional monarchies, and with what degree of political participation?

These are some of the questions addressed in the chapters that follow. It is often posited that over half the people in the Muslim world today are under fifteen years of age. In fact, the proportion of younger citizens in the Arab monarchies—given their small populations and, until the mid-1970s, dire health conditions—is even greater than in nonmonarchical regimes. It naturally follows that these rapidly growing populations will produce their own requirements for rule and governance. A sufficient understanding of developing currents, especially with respect to power, is essential for analysts and policy-makers. How will leaders in the eight Arab monarchies exercise their power—entrusted to them by an increasingly aware and articulate population—and how will that impact their relations with the West in general and the United States in particular?

Our investigation begins with an appraisal of contemporary dynastic rule in the Arab Muslim realm. Chapter 2 examines scholarly interpretations of the concept of monarchy, and how it evolved over time, and assesses how Arab Muslim monarchies acceded to and fell from power, before nationalism gripped the realm in the aftermath of World War II. What were the lessons drawn by Arab dynasties that ruled Muslim societies? How did each of the surviving fourteen dynasties deal with prevailing internal challenges despite unparalleled pressures? How did these dynasties protect and preserve their power to ensure regional stability? The purpose of this essential discussion is to highlight how successful monarchies required, and strove for, religious justification. Indeed, contemporary Arab monarchies have been led by men conscious of this distinction, even if most established institutional capacities to buttress their legitimacies. In other words, a reliance on constitutions did not preclude a dependence on religious institutions. On the contrary, the two acted as balancers, perhaps an essential requirement for traditional societies.

We then turn to the eight country studies. These chapters briefly discuss how contemporary dynasties emerged before each earned its “independence” and assumed “sovereign” authority, and ascertain whether rulers or, more broadly, respective ruling dynasties, were ready for self-government.

Each case study next addresses one of the more difficult questions facing contemporary monarchies: how to resolve constitutional dilemmas while still retaining authoritarian powers. In assessing the sociopolitical continuums within the eight Arab monarchies, the case studies examine how the founding ruler maneuvered through the country’s political minefields after independence, and identify any constitutional initiatives introduced to the body politic and whether these withered the test of time or contradicted religious legiti-

macy. The analysis then proceeds to the current ruler, and how his succession withstood constitutional pressures, if any. What specific measures were introduced to support or emend existing laws? Did the monarch display differences of vision compared to his predecessor's outlook? Was the prevailing constitutional charter altered in any way to buttress interpretations of the succession mechanism? If the monarchy had no specific constitutional bearings, were there alternative initiatives, and how did these affect conservative societies? Were there individuals in the ruling families who clamored for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy? And what procedures, if any, did the ruling family adopt to ensure internal stability?

Next, the case studies canvass leading personalities within the current regimes. How do these very young sovereign actors perceive their power? Are contemporary leaders secure on their "thrones," and what kinds of adjustments have they made to further solidify their legitimacy? Each chapter examines the size and structure of the ruling family and identifies its particular dynamics. The analysis broaches seniority, any maternal lineages (and the authority that certain families derive from the "full-brother" phenomenon), descendants of the family scion as well as cadet branches, if any, and the roles played by key aristocratic clans, if relevant. The analysis concludes with the current monarch. Of particular interest are the circumstances of his own accession to the throne and any maneuvers within his family to hold on to authority. Several key questions are addressed, including whether the monarch compromised his beliefs or values after acceding to his rulership, or whether he was able to successfully emend succession shortcomings based on his own experiences. An equally critical question—how the monarch perceived succession dilemmas in his society—is raised to determine whether the monarch himself introduced institutionalization processes to avoid future pitfalls. The monarch's succession dilemma for the ruling family, and whether he has entertained alternative solutions, are also addressed.

Each case study then identifies current contenders to power, first summarizing the heir apparent and his background, as well as cataloguing key allies, then analyzing how potential contenders differ or agree on internal, regional, and international affairs. While this effort is not meant to be comprehensive, it is nevertheless an educated step in singling out potential contenders or, at the very least, individuals who may influence the next rulers.

Concluding the book, Chapter 11 assesses the current security perceptions of ruling families. Except for Saudi Arabia, which declared its independence in 1932, Arab monarchies gained their sovereignty after World War II. Jordan became independent in 1946 and Morocco achieved autonomy a decade later. Kuwait earned its dominion in 1961 and Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE only in 1971. Although Oman exercised sovereignty for several centuries, the sultanate did not enjoy autonomy before 1970, when Sultan Qaboos acceded to the throne and literally opened his country to the outside world. By and large,

these monarchies are young actors in the international arena, even if some ruling families have exercised power for decades if not centuries. Several are under pressure to transform—even reinvent—themselves, although spiraling into shaykhly democracies may be easier said than done. Though recent cosmetic changes have increased in frequency, the quest for most citizens living under contemporary Arab monarchies has been for substantive modifications. Majorities are concerned with socioeconomic issues even if the critical succession question drifts along unresolved, because awakened citizens clamor for political participation. Although Arab monarchies appear to be anachronistic entities, in reality they are not. Still, their main challenge is to maintain a balance between traditional values and the growing demands of modernization. In many cases, ruling families are the anchors that guarantee internal stability as all eight countries slowly evolve their contemporary political structures into stable political entities.

## ■ Notes

1. “Monarchies” is the preferred term to refer to the eight ruling dynastic Arab regimes defined and contrasted in this volume. Although reference is made to eight countries, in fact there are fourteen ruling families, seven of which are nestled within the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

2. Directorate of Intelligence, *The Next Generation of World Leaders: Emerging Traits and Tendencies*, OTI IA 2003-017, Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, April 2003, p. 13.

3. For a detailed look at Saudi Arabia, see Joseph A. Kéchichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, New York: Palgrave, 2001.

4. Beth Gardiner, “Ex-Iraq Officers, Groups Talk Saddam,” *Associated Press*, 13 July 2002.

5. Nirmala Hanssen, “Sharif Seeks Support for Constitutional Monarchy,” *Gulf News*, 20 December 2004, <http://gulfnews.com/articles/print2.asp?articleid=144548>.

6. Jeffrey Gettleman, “The King Is Dead (Has Been for 46 Years) but Two Iraqis Hope: Long Live the King!” *New York Times*, 28 January 2005, p. 8. See also Ashraf Khalil, “One Candidate Has a Simple Solution: Crown Him King,” *Los Angeles Times*, 27 January 2005, p. A10; and “Royal Dream: Prince Awaits Democratic Crowning by People,” *Gulf News*, 5 December 2004, p. 12.

7. J. E. Peterson, “What Makes the Gulf States Endure?” in Joseph A. Kéchichian, ed., *Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 451–460.

8. Muhammad al-Rumayhi, “Al-Nuzu‘ ila-Malakiyyah” [Longing for Monarchy], *Al-Hayat* no. 14370, 24 July 2002, p. 9. See also Sa‘ad al-Din Ibrahim, “Fiqh al-Jamlukiyyat al-‘Arabiyyah . . . Nihayat al-Isha‘at wa laysa Nihayat lil-Qalaq” [Arab Republicarchies’ Visions: End of Rumors Not Anxieties], *Al-Hayat* no. 14908, 20 January 2004, p. 9; and Thomas L. Friedman, “The Arab World Needs More Than Fathers and Sons,” *International Herald Tribune*, 15 February 1999, p. 8.



9. In Syria, for example, the ruling Ba'ath Party quickly ushered in Bashar al-Asad after his father died, if for no other reason than to ensure continuity to protect vested interests. Such an appointment was new for Damascus and, irrespective of personalities, highly unorthodox, even if the grooming process started before Hafez al-Asad died. In Egypt, Husni Mubarak positioned his son to succeed him as president, although his timing was probably somewhat off. Once Cairo concluded that the time was not right to introduce such a dramatic measure (because of potential violence by groups opposed to nepotism), Mubarak decided to run for an unprecedented fifth term, which he won without obstacles. Jamal Mubarak thus waited, although few observers doubted his eventual accession. In fact, Egypt's ruling National Democratic Party—in which Jamal served as general secretary of the Policy Committee, the third most powerful post—was expected to anoint the young Mubarak as its next candidate. In Yemen, 'Ali 'Abdallah Saleh carefully positioned his son to succeed him, even as he “modestly” maintained that he would withdraw from power sooner than his detractors fathomed. Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi simply denied that he had any succession aspirations for his son Saif al-Islam or, perhaps, even his daughter 'Ayshah. These leaders paled in comparison with the Aliyevs in Azerbaijan, who orchestrated one of the most colorful recent power grabs. See Michael Eisenstadt, “Who Rules Syria? Bashar al-Asad and the 'Alawi Barons,” *Policy Watch* no. 472, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 21 June 2000. See also Roula Khalaf and James Drummond, “Mubarak's Son Rules Out Succession,” *Financial Times*, 24 April 2001, p. 7; “Mubarak Has Waited Far Too Long to Name a Successor,” *Daily Star*, 21 November 2003, p. 5; Paul Schemm, “Egypt's Leader Stumbles; People Ask, ‘Who's Next?’” *Christian Science Monitor*, 21 November 2003, p. 9; James Drummond, “Cairo Confronts the Succession Taboo,” *Financial Times*, 8 January 2004, p. 6; “PM: Jamal Qualified to Replace Mubarak,” *Gulf News*, 18 January 2005, <http://www.gulfnews.com/articles/print2.asp?articleid=148238>; Michael Slackman, “Egypt Holds a Multiple-Choice Vote, but the Answer Is Mubarak,” *New York Times*, 8 September 2005, p. A1; “Gaddafi Denies Grooming Son,” *Gulf News*, 1 February 2005, <http://www.gulfnews.com/articles/print2.asp?articleid=146134>; Simon Henderson, “Meeting Qadhafi: Blair's Kiss of Acceptability,” *Policy Watch* no. 847, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 24 March 2004; “An Unending Succession,” *Washington Post*, 25 August 2003, p. A16; and “Ruling Party May Nominate Jamal for President,” *Gulf News*, 20 September 2006, p. 11.

10. As was the case in the early 1960s, when the so-called free princes movement rallied behind King Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz of Saudi Arabia as the fallen monarch struggled to overturn his initial deposition. See Gerald De Gaury, *Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia*, New York: Praeger, 1966, pp. 130–138; and Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*, New York: New York University Press, 1984, pp. 64–70. Similar occurrences in Bahrain and Qatar were equally revealing, as discussed in Chapters 3 and 6 respectively.

11. For a theoretical discussion of succession, see Robbins Burling, *The Passage of Power: Studies in Political Succession*, New York: Academic Press, 1974. See also Perry Anderson, *Lineages of the Absolutist State*, London: Verso, 1974; Reinhard Bendix, *Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980; Samuel Clark, *State and Status: The Rise of the State and Aristocratic Power in Western Europe*, Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1995;

Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971; Ferdowsi, *Stories from the Shahnameh*, 3 vols., translated by Dick Davis, Washington, D.C.: Mage, 1998; Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, *The Federalist Papers*, New York: New American Library, 1961 (especially nos. 4, 6, 51, 67, and 75, which identify specific shortcomings in “monarchy”); Joseph A. Kéchichian and R. Hrair Dekmejian, *The Just Prince: A Manual of Leadership*, London: Saqi Books, 2003 (includes an authoritative English translation of the *Sulwan al-Muta’ fi ‘Udwan al-Atba’* [Consolation for the Ruler During the Hostility of Subjects] by Muhammad Ibn Zafar al-Siqilli); Barrington Moore, *The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*, Boston: Beacon, 1966; Nizam al-Mulk, *The Book of Government or Rules for Kings*, translated by Hubert Darke, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978 (originally published in Arabic ca. 1110); George Rude, *Europe in the Eighteenth Century: Aristocracy and the Bourgeois Challenge*, New York: Praeger, 1973; Charles Tilly, *European Revolutions, 1492–1992*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1993; and Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, translated by A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, edited by Talcott Parsons, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947.

12. Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, p. 57. Helms’s discussion of the influence of the tribal segmentary system on political and social organization in Central Arabia (see esp. pp. 51–70) is extraordinarily analytical and informative.

13. This is best discussed in the context of the rise of the Ottoman military machine, which certainly brought order as it instituted death and destruction. See Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 18–34.

14. Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997, pp. 139–192.

15. Noel J. Coulson, *A History of Islamic Law*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1964, pp. 9–20.

16. For a thorough discussion of the caliphate from both Sunni and Shi‘ah perspectives, see Henri Laoust, *Le Califat dans la Doctrine de Ras[h]id Rida*, Paris: Librairie d’Amerique et d’Orient, 1986; and Abdulaziz Abdulhussein Sachedina, *The Just Ruler in Shi‘ite Islam: The Comprehensive Authority of the Jurist in Imamite Jurisprudence*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.

17. M. A. Shaban, *The Abbasid Revolution*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970.

18. Marius Canard, “Fatimids,” in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, new ed., vol. 2, Leiden: Brill, 1960, pp. 850–862; and D. S. Richards, “Fatimid Dynasty,” in *The Oxford Encyclopaedia of the Modern Islamic World*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1995, pp. 7–8.

19. Shaban, *The Abbasid Revolution*, pp. 155–168.

20. H. A. R. Gibb, “Al-Mawardi’s Theory of the Caliphate,” in Stanford J. Shaw and William R. Polk, eds., *Studies on the Civilization of Islam*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982, pp. 151–165.

21. Bernard Lewis, “Politics and War,” in Joseph Schacht with C. E. Bosworth, eds., *The Legacy of Islam*, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon, 1974, pp. 156–209.

22. Gary Samuel Samore, “Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953–1982),” unpublished PhD diss., Cambridge: Harvard University, December 1983, pp. 9–10.

23. Ibid., p. 10.
24. Ibid. See also Ira M. Lapidus, *A History of Islamic Societies*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 597–598.
25. Bernard Lewis, “Monarchy in the Middle East,” in Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 15–22.
26. “Winds of Change,” *Middle East* no. 293, September 1999, pp. 4–7; Roula Khalaf, “Arab Rulers with a New Agenda,” *Financial Times*, 3 February 2000, p. 15; and Russell E. Lucas, “Monarchical Authoritarianism: Survival and Political Liberalization in a Middle Eastern Regime Type,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36, no. 1, February 2004, pp. 103–119.
27. Munira Fakhro, “The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment,” in Gary G. Sick and Lawrence G. Potter, eds., *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion*, New York: St. Martin’s, 1997, pp. 167–188. See also Abdul Hadi Khalaf, “The New Amir of Bahrain: Marching Sideways,” *Civil Society* 9, no. 100, April 2000, pp. 6–13.
28. Faysal Al Shaykh, “Ra’is Wuzara’ al-Bahrayn Yunfi Wujud Khilafat Baynahuh wa Baynah al-Malak” [Bahrain Prime Minister Denies the Presence of Conflicts with the King], *Al-Watan* (Oman) 36, no. 8462, 22 September 2006, p. 8.
29. Abdul-Reda Assiri and Kamal Al-Monoufi, “Kuwait’s Political Elite: The Cabinet,” *Middle East Journal* 42, no. 1, Winter 1988, pp. 48–58. See also Jill Crystal, *Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
30. Andrew Rathmell and Kirsten Schulze, “Political Reform in the Gulf: The Case of Qatar,” *Middle Eastern Studies* 36, no. 4, October 2000, pp. 47–62.
31. For recent but thorough overviews, see Daryl Champion, *The Paradoxical Kingdom: Saudi Arabia and the Momentum of Reform*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003; Thomas W. Lippman, *Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia*, Boulder: Westview, 2004; and Pascal Menoret, *L’Énigme Saoudienne: Les Saoudiens et le Monde, 1744–2003*, Paris: Éditions La Découverte, 2003.
32. Al-Walid bin Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz is a dual citizen of Saudi Arabia and Lebanon—due to his maternal lineage—and may conceivably be appointed prime minister in Beirut. Ironically, the late Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri of Lebanon also held dual citizenship, but in his case the Sidon-born tycoon owed his Saudi passport to King Fahd’s munificence.
33. The UAE federation groups seven ruling families, which are fully analyzed in Chapter 8. Only a few general remarks are made in this introduction to situate the country within the book’s larger framework.
34. It may be worth recalling that succession in Abu Dhabi has a bloody track record. According to legend, Shaykhah Salamah bint Butti, mother of the Abu Dhabi shaykhs Shakhbut and Zayed and the other sons of Shaykh Sultan bin Zayed (r. 1922–1926), “made her sons promise not to harm each other if one of them were to be deposed by another as Ruler.” For details, see Frauke Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition*, London: Longman, 1996, pp. 27–57, 150.
35. Douglas Jehl, “Sheikh Shares His Misgivings over U.S. Policies,” *New York Times*, 31 May 1998, p. 5. For a complete copy of the interview transcript, see *Emirates News*, 1 June 1998, pp. 1, 3. The taped interview, with full translation from Arabic into

English by Zaki Nusseibeh, was broadcast on national television on 2 June 1998, and rebroadcast a few days later. The message from Zayed to one and all was that Khalifah would make whatever decisions were necessary at the appropriate time.

36. "With MBZ's Promotion, Sheikha Fatima Sons Take Centre Stage," *Gulf States Newsletter* 27, no. 724, 12 December 2003, pp. 1–2.

37. Lisa Anderson, "Political Decay in the Arab World," in Martin Kramer, *Middle East Lectures* 4, Tel Aviv: Dayan Center, December 2001, p. 9.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

## 2

---

# Islam and Monarchy

According to a leading scholar, the term *malik* (king) sometimes carries “a connotation of presumption and even of paganism” when applied to human beings in Islamic scriptures.<sup>1</sup> This interpretation dodges specific quranic references to the Kingdom of God. It is essential to note that sovereigns, especially those who wish to rule with justice—that is, those who govern without caprice and with full consultation (*shurah*)—are the ones who rightly deserve the title of monarch. To be sure, such command has not always prevailed, as Muslims preferred their own tested model, that of the caliphate. It must also be underscored that Muslims chose the caliphate because the Prophet Muhammad did not come to establish a kingdom but to reveal God’s Word. As reported by renowned Arab historian Abu Ja’far Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari, a conversation between Caliph ‘Umar and a Persian convert by the name of Salman emphasized this key distinction between authority and justice. When ‘Umar asked Salman whether he was a king or a caliph, Salman answered: “If you have taxed the lands of the Muslim one dirham, or more, or less, and applied to unlawful purposes, then you are a King not a Caliph.”<sup>2</sup> The parable, often heard in contemporary majlis discussions in Gulf societies, highlighted the difference between arbitrary rule and divine inspiration. Even if the term *malik* referred to military and political sovereignty, there was a specific understanding that religious legitimacy was still necessary, which in part explained why its use was sporadic. The term was not abandoned, but rather supplemented, over the centuries, with exalted new titles, like *sultan*, *shah*, or *khan*, to better equip Arab and Muslim sovereigns with influence and legitimacy.<sup>3</sup> In fact, the title *malik* was subjugated to the more idealized designation of *caliph*, even if it never successfully combined authority with full religious legitimacy. It was, in short, a secularized honorific that acquired additional capital as Arabs and Muslims interacted with Western monarchs. Especially relevant was the impact of the British Empire, which, for better or worse, rearranged the diplomatic terminology in usage to fit loftier objectives. British monarchs, admired for their power rather

than any religious credentials, were soon mimicked. The Hashimite Sharif Hussein of Makkah declared himself “King of the Hijaz” in 1916. He was followed by his son Faisal, “who proclaimed an Arab Kingdom in Syria in 1920 and, after the failure of that adventure, became King of Iraq in 1921.”<sup>4</sup>

In rapid succession, Egyptian and Saudi leaders assumed the title *malik*, both as a measure of authority to challenge London for independence, as well as to project to their own subjects an aura of worldly legitimacy. In Egypt, *malik* was preferred over *khedive* or *sultan*, since both of the latter were associated with rulers who lost power. ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman Al Sa‘ud became “King of the Hijaz and Sultan of Najd” in 1926, and “King of Saudi Arabia” in 1932. In Morocco, Jordan, and Libya, as in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the title *malik* was quickly adopted to proclaim independence and, equally important, to project a degree of equality among fellow Arab and Muslim rulers.

Several Arab and Muslim monarchies fell during the second half of the twentieth century: Egypt in 1953, Sudan in 1956, Iraq in 1958, Yemen in 1962, Afghanistan in 1973, and Iran in 1979. Except for Iran, which transformed itself into an “Islamic republic,” these monarchical regimes lacked religious legitimacy and were replaced with “republics” that, ironically, insisted on reverent credentials. Several decades later, opposition forces, whether secular or Islamist, battered monarchical regimes for failing to uphold Islamic law (*shari‘ah*)—among various other reasons—which increased the pressure on succeeding rulers to publicize and accentuate their pietistic legitimacy. In 1986, Al Sa‘ud monarch Fahd bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz abandoned his title of “king,” to assume that of the “Khadim al-Haramayn al-Sharifyan” (Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques).<sup>5</sup> This was partially a response to the tectonic rise of religious fundamentalism, but also because senior Al Sa‘ud family members appreciated the large gap between the haves and have-nots within their society. A necessity to rule with humility, already a Wahhabi tradition, was further reinforced by awakened Al Sa‘ud leaders who carefully assessed, above all else, how to gauge the population’s sociopolitical pulse. The trend was to rule with verve, though with an abundance of devout legitimacy.<sup>6</sup>

In the early part of the twenty-first century, fourteen Arab dynasties ruled in eight monarchies, and although each promised unparalleled endurance, internal challenges prevailed. How these dynasties protected and preserved their power was critical to regional stability. To better appraise contemporary dynastic rule in the Arab Muslim realm, this chapter examines how various Muslim scholars interpreted the concept of monarchy, and how it evolved over time.

## ■ Islamic Interpretations of Monarchy

Beyond its spiritual wealth, the Islamic revelation in Arabia, and subsequent spread throughout much of the known world, ushered in genuine political

dilemmas for indigenous leaders. For better or worse, these shaped the history of peoples from the Atlantic to the Pacific, as regimes and dynasties emerged, prospered, and fell. Conflicts, revolts, and wars all dominated long periods of human recollection, leading to both bureaucratization and militarization. Epoch-making events shaped personalities as leaders ruled with impunity. A few devised grand schemes, etching legacies into their respective societal memories, while others withdrew to humbler ends. Still others sought religious legitimacy by proposing to govern according to the Holy Scriptures and *shari'ah*. It was chiefly to satisfy such requirements that Islamic scholars developed various interpretations of power, refined the role of the community (*ummah*), planned for legitimate succession (*khilafah*), and cultivated more civilized designations and acknowledgment of political leadership (*bay'ah*). Still, by the dawn of the twentieth century, and despite gargantuan strides over a millennium, the Muslim world had reached a seminally ineffective stage, one that permitted other powers—notably Western colonial empires—to dictate terms. Under the circumstances, basic legal needs, steeped in religious interpretations, were no longer sufficient to address the slew of problems confronting Arab and Muslim rulers. The latter faced inevitable upheavals, adding pressure to reinvent government, both to ensure survival and to serve wary subjects.

Such options were difficult to implement, because Arab and Muslim sovereigns had fallen into the maelstrom of subjugated dominions. Whether due to corruption, incompetence, or both, few mustered the will to break colonial tethers extended from London, Paris, Rome, or Berlin. Rightful rule was ephemeral in the realm, prompting Muhammad 'Abduh to plead for a just despot.<sup>7</sup> A prominent Egyptian scholar, 'Abdul Rahman al-Kawakibi, argued for despotism as well, if for no other reason than to save the nation from one of the most corrupt Muslim governments ever—the Ottoman Empire—which ruled from a distance but certainly with authority.<sup>8</sup> Others chimed in, but these two pioneers shaped the political debate that dominated Arab history around the turn of the century. How regimes justified coercive and unfair dictums galvanized intellectual analysis. Increasingly, Arab masses were asked to seek and apply traditional stipulations, ranging from moral to legal concerns. Relying on traditional networks, Arab rulers aimed to satisfy popular demands, even if their mandates were limited. As independent states emerged after World War II, Arab leaders energized their considerable power into political institutions—republican as well as dynastic—that professed to serve their subjects but that, in reality, aimed first and foremost to secure acquired authority. Invariably, most professed to govern with justice, often relying on Islamic law to strengthen their legitimacy, even if few genuinely applied religious norms and interpretations. Yet by donning sacred mantles, they raised the righteousness bar higher than it had ever been. These approaches certainly complicated everyday rule as it sharpened demands for justice and, eventually, set in motion significant challenges to existing regimes reminiscent of claims made during Islam's genesis.

## Origins of the Caliphate

First in Makkah, then in Madinah, the Prophet Muhammad and his loyal companions quickly faced a dilemma of succession. There was a necessity to entrust the community, as well as its significant interests, to a leader who would guide it to loftier shores. Whatever else developed over the years regarding Islamic regimes, the theory of a caliphate was initially embedded within fundamental tribal principles. Successive sovereigns, stretching from the 'Umayyad and 'Abbasid empires to more recent dynastic regimes, all accepted the necessity to align their rules to the Prophet's ideal model.

The caliphate may well have ended with the great 'Abbasid leader Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809), “because those who followed him fell into decadence,” but full justification continued unabated.<sup>9</sup> Ibn Khaldun, for example, considered the early caliphate as a source of inspiration. In explaining its real meaning, the Tunisian philosopher posited that the institution was “a substitute for Muhammad inasmuch as it serve[d], like him, to protect the religion, and to exercise leadership of the world.”<sup>10</sup> Whether this institution was known by the name *caliphate* or by some other perfectly acceptable substitute—like *imamate* or even *sultanate*—was less important than whether leaders imposed law and order in the best interests of general welfare and society. For while religion remained a fundamental principle, what ensured—and continues to guarantee—order was not only faith per se, but tribal unity and social cohesion. This solidarity of a clan or tribe (*'asabiyyah*), as described by Ibn Khaldun, was later reinforced by military power. Under both 'Umayyad and 'Abbasid rulers—that is, until Harun al-Rashid—*'asabiyyah* and power coexisted, but the former conception faded under Ottoman sovereigns who increasingly relied on military abilities. Of course, little of the caliphate's trappings survived the Ottoman Empire, save for the exalted title. Turks and Mongols, but also Berbers and Arabs, fell back on ethnic loyalties to buttress the caliphate's symbolic features starting in the eighteenth century.

Three specific principles—faith or piety, blood ties that gelled social order, and law that guided it—stood out in this reasoning among Arabs, and deserve closer analysis. As discussed above, in the non-Ottoman Muslim realm, the ruler sought to bolster his legitimacy through either direct linkage to the Prophet's own tribe or by applying *shari'ah* dictums. A tribal ruler (*shaykh*) on the Arabian Peninsula was thus the Commander of the Faithful (*Amir al-Mu'minin*), and his legality sprang from his willingness to implement Islamic law. Even authoritarian 'Umayyad rulers (C.E. 650–700) relied on forms of piety, as the formation of Sufiani and Qahtani movements illustrated, to justify their authority.<sup>11</sup> Faith and piety remained central determinants of power in Muslim societies under the 'Abbasids (after C.E. 750), as illustrated by various interpretations that clarified ties and linkages: the *ummah* needed to establish friendly alliances (*dar al-sulh*), protect non-Muslim subjects liv-



ing in the realm (*ahl al-dhimma*), and identify those who were enemies (*dar al-harb*).

It is this important legacy that partially explains the centrality of religion in contemporary political conduct, based on the existence of a solemn link between “church” and “state,” which is enshrined in every modern Muslim constitution. Under the ‘Abbasid caliphate (750–1258), Muslim scholars developed *shari’ah*, and instituted clear guidelines for both church and state.<sup>12</sup> Religious titles further supported this propensity, if for no other reason than to consecrate political authority. Thus, Muhammad VI of Morocco today is a Commander of the Faithful, and King ‘Abdallah of Saudi Arabia is the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, an idea whose origins can be traced to Mamluk dynasties in Egypt in the thirteenth century.

Central to Ibn Khaldun’s *‘asabiyyah* is the connection between social and political, especially as it is related to blood ties. Thus, in Morocco and Jordan, ‘Alawi and Hashimite monarchs trace their origins to the Prophet himself. Today, both consider their respective dynasties part and parcel of the Prophet’s “household” (*ahl al-bayt*) and, as such, benefit from added legitimacy. Ibn Khaldun, Ahmad al-Qalqashandi, and other philosopher-historians have posited that the caliphate was distinct from monarchy, because the latter relied on force (*mulk*), even if they recognized several additional legitimizing features.

Arab dynastic control emerged in incredibly harsh tribal environments, where survival of the fittest was a foregone conclusion. To be sure, Sunni religious interpretations rejected the justification of *mulk* to legitimize power, and whereas the more egalitarian Mamluks resorted to consultation (*shurah*) principles that identified able and worthy leaders, reliance on brute force could not be neglected in toto. ‘Umar, who succeeded the Prophet Muhammad as the titular (*‘ahd*) leader of the community, was the first Arab Muslim official to undergo this transformation. His nomination established a precedent that would serve as the ideal model. Nonetheless, both ‘Umayyad and ‘Abbasid sovereigns imposed dynastic rule through a combination of principles, without neglecting precedents. That is why each contemporary Arab dynastic ruler, with the exception of the Al Sa‘id in Oman, has an heir apparent (*wali al-‘ahd*), clearly satisfying social, religious, as well as a political interests.<sup>13</sup>

*Shari’ah*, of course, remained the most important ingredient of just rule. Sovereigns and heirs needed to uphold it if they claimed to govern under His guidance. Nevertheless, over the years, various renderings were added to the basic premise, as religious leaders transformed dogma into law. More specifically, local social norms required adjustments as four schools of thought emanated in countries where Sunni adherents dominated and separate schools emerged in Shi‘ah realms. Still, the *shari’ah* persisted intact, based on revelation itself even if elaborate legal interpretations developed around new disciplines, including analogy (*qiyas*), legal consensus (*ijma’*), and exegesis (*tafsir*).

Contemporary rulers, at least in the perception of most Muslims, cannot escape *shari'ah*'s logic and must submit to it in full.<sup>14</sup> Therefore, the duty of a ruler then, as now, is to apply it, because the state cannot be separated from religion. The just commander must protect and preserve religion, which, inter alia, is based on divine will, a guarantor of social order, the expression of justice, a force to prevent evil, and the unifier of the *ummah*, despite various and equally valid scholarly interpretations that emerged within Sunni and Shi'ah theological schools. Moreover, *shari'ah* is not limited to juridical applications, but also includes various purposes (*makasid*). Such ends may well surpass all intrinsic legislative abilities and must be recognized as God's salvation. That is why command itself must conform to *shari'ah*, because of long-term divine objectives. Naturally, it follows that rule becomes legitimate when it is in full conformity, which is the genesis of politically legitimate rule (*siyasaḥ al-shari'ayyah*).

Muslim philosophers who struggled with the idea of just rule under all forms of authority concentrated on the critical role played by man in society and, secondarily, on relationships between governors and their subjects. For several authors, certainly for Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, Ibn Khaldun, Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, Abu Bakr al-Turtushi, and others, "man" covered the entire gamut of emotions and proclivities—from the evil to the saintly. Al-Ghazali, for example, asserted that man had multiple propensities, including diabolical features (*shaytaniyyah*), bestial aspects (*bahimiyyah*), cruel habits (*sab'iyyah*), and domineering ideas (*rububiyyah*).<sup>15</sup> Al-Shatibi, on the other hand, posited that man was primarily led by passion (*ahwa'*), not necessarily a positive value.<sup>16</sup> Ibn Khaldun, for his part, identified aggression (*'udwan*) and tyranny (*zulm*) as man's more determining traits.<sup>17</sup> The Spanish-born Abu Bakr Muhammad al-Turtushi compared man to sea animals—the larger ones swallow smaller fare—concluding that only the fittest survived. In short, man was by nature a self-serving creature who demanded justice without voluntarily imparting it to others (*hub al-intisaf wa 'adam al-insaf*).<sup>18</sup> These were the perceptions that shaped concepts of power and law in Islam. All were considered indispensable to tame man's passions. Power, especially in the political sense, therefore evolved through constraints and difficulties. Al-Ghazali identified such pressures as the necessary features of a compass (*shawkah*).<sup>19</sup> Ibn Khaldun recognized power's fully coercive characteristics as obstructionism (*wazi'*), hatred (*qahr*), and plunder (*ghalabah*), whereas al-Shatibi attributed most legal inhibitions as part and parcel of power.<sup>20</sup> Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah completed the circle by concluding that blunt methods, including the need to use brute force, were absolutely legitimate.

Thus, both repressive methods and the application of laws were deemed basic ingredients of power. Perhaps more relevant to the Arabian Peninsula, Ibn Taymiyyah asserted that those who deviated from the Holy Scriptures would, in the end, also face divine wrath. The medieval scholar and a sup-

porter of Hanbali readings, Ibn Taymiyyah advanced the following quranic verse to argue his case: “We have sent down iron, with its mighty strength and diverse uses for mankind, so that God may recognize those who aid Him, though unseen, and help His apostles” (Surah 57:25). It is chiefly for this reason, advanced Ibn Taymiyyah, that Islam rests on the duality of law and order.<sup>21</sup> While these rigid interpretations perturbed many, Ibn Taymiyyah and his followers intended to address how best to eradicate man’s corrupt inclinations (*fasad*). This is why *shari’ah* law is applied with such rigidity in the Hanbali school, and why crimes face severe punishment. In fact, Ibn Taymiyyah, as well as others, frowned on leniency to maintain social order.<sup>22</sup> They advocated a strict application of *shari’ah* even in the harsh conditions of Arabia and without any favoritism. A father or a ruler was called on to exercise discretion, but was never expected to hesitate in using force to uphold his mandate, even when those on the receiving end of his chastisement were close relatives.<sup>23</sup> This logic fell within a simple formulation: a ruler can only uphold justice when subjects understand and accept that divine justice is absolute and must be applied universally. It naturally followed, theoretically at least, that a just earthly ruler was divinely empowered, as he represented everything to his subjects. Although some scholars rejected this premise, the ruler secured the community, ensured prosperity, and guaranteed survival. His ability to maintain peace was at the center of the community’s overall welfare. For al-Turtushi, such a just ruler was to a society what God is to nature.<sup>24</sup>

### Codifying the Caliphate

It took close to five centuries to fully develop an exegesis of constitutional order in Islam. Well before Abu al-Hassan ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi, a renowned Shafi‘i jurisprudent (*faqih*) from Basrah, Iraq, composed his magisterial *Al-Ahkam Al-Sultaniyyah* (Principles of Rule), Muhammad Ibn Isma‘il Abu ‘Abdallah al-Djufi al-Bukhari and Abu al-Hussain al-Kushayri al-Naisaburi al-Muslim, two great chroniclers, had refined the Prophet’s sayings into various Hadiths, and authored key renderings. Five hundred years of research resulted in the *Usul al-Fiqh* (Principles of Jurisprudence), which equipped the Muslim world with political theories, certainly in Sunni schools of thought, but also in response to Shi‘ah reactions. Among various theories that emerged, the ones most relevant here are those of the imamate, or caliphate—that regulated succession—and the idea of “those who bind and loosen” (*ahl al-hall wal-‘aqd*), that is, individuals empowered to legitimize authority.

A jurisprudent as learned as al-Mawardi, whose genius was based on scholarship, provided a definition of the caliphate that encompassed the earthly with the spiritual. The Mesopotamian scholar posited that “the Caliphate guarantees the succession of the Prophet, to safeguard religion, and administer its worldly interests” (*hirasat al-din wa siyasat al-dunyah*).<sup>25</sup> His

judicious classification of power ranged from that acquired by brute force to that assumed through consensus. Furthermore, he codified actual methods of choosing a successor by devising two specific mechanisms: those that fell under dynastic succession (*'ahd*) methods, and those that were the result of elective succession (*ikhtiyar*).

These were major changes of customary tribal practices, and the distinctions between al-Mawardi's preferences and those of al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah, while evident, are worth further elaboration. For the latter two, much could be justified to preserve *shari'ah* law, regardless of consequences.<sup>26</sup> What mattered for al-Ghazali were substantive principles, chiefly to preserve the interests of the community, not whether rulership decisions served monarchs. Al-Shatibi seconded this line of analysis in his equally imposing *Al-Muwafaqah fi Usul al-Shari'ah* (The Congruence of Sources in Divine Law), by highlighting how rules and regulations needed to be rationalized with principles (*makasids*). Ibn Khaldun posited that realism was based on natural coalition (*mulk tabi'i*) dominated by passion, with political coalition (*mulk siyasi*) based on reasoning, and the caliphate, which rested on *shari'ah*. In this trilogy, the caliphate may well have presented a utopian city-state that encompassed philosophy, theology, and politics, resembling the "virtuous city" approach proposed by Abu Nasr al-Farabi, the so-called Islamic-Platonic option influenced by Greek philosophy.<sup>27</sup>

### Modernizing the Caliphate

Contemporary conceptions of power and succession started in earnest in the nineteenth century. In 1830, Egyptian historian Rafa'a Badawi Rafi' al-Tahtawi refined the concept of a republic (*jumhuriyyah*), which saw light in the early 1830s.<sup>28</sup> Rashid Rida went so far as to claim that an Islamic government was a sort of republic.<sup>29</sup> More recently, Ahmad Ibn Abu al-Dhiaf, a prominent Tunisian commentator, polished the concept into a burden of power rather than a responsibility of the caliphate. Relying on one of Ibn Khaldun's theories, Ibn Abu al-Diyaf advanced his preferences around three possibilities: (1) the need for absolute power (*mulk mutlaq*), whose shortcomings he deplored; (2) the necessity for republican power (*mulk jumhuri*) that contained merit; and, (3) the advisability for constrained power where laws—either religious or secular—strictly regulated political behavior (*mulk muqayad bi qanun*).<sup>30</sup> Ibn Khaldun's key concepts were thus skillfully applied to contemporary settings where a constitution (*dustur*), freedom (*hurriyyah*), rights (*haq*), legality (*qanun*), and republican norms (*'adl jumhuri*) flourished in full harmony with *shari'ah*. Not surprisingly, these interpretations were not universally welcomed by those who rejected—and continue to deny—this concordance. 'Ali 'Abdul Raziq, an Egyptian scholar educated at the famed Al

Azhar University in Cairo, disavowed fresh attempts to regularize reforms, on the grounds that such revisions were too confusing.<sup>31</sup> In fact, conservative theologians fear that any interpretation of the linkages between *shari'ah* and the caliphate are tantamount to abrogating their very existence, whereas reformers search for adaptable solutions to modern times.

Irrespective of such trends, which grew in the aftermath of World War I and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, the caliphate—as a system—retained intrinsic value. Although contemporary references are largely symbolic, especially as the nation-state order is now fully entrenched in Arab and Muslim political discourse, the inspiration of the caliphate continues to link contemporary institutions with the Prophet and his more perfect political vision. It has a metaphorical role in Arab political identity that, in part, explains why several rulers refer to themselves—and encourage their subjects to refer to them—as “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” or the “Commander of the Faithful.” Therefore, the Arab proclivity to preserve the theory of a caliphate, even if the concept has evolved since, is still very potent on the Arabian Peninsula as well as in Jordan and Morocco. It is powerful because authority is tainted, for it encompasses both virtues and vices and has only peripheral legal bearings. It draws from *shari'ah* but also from the wisdom of knowledge that was developed and spread by Greek, Persian, and Arab philosophers. There is no denying that the sum total of virtues devised and updated over centuries has left imprints in how Arabs and Muslims perceive their rulers and how the latter exercise authority.

All authority, but especially that exercised by Muslim monarchical regimes, is thus nestled in justice (*'adl*) or, at the very least, in a perception of justice. This notion is vital to the discourse of Muslim rule, but more so in Arab monarchical regimes, because it is the main support on which tribal societies rest. Still, Machiavellian concepts are not alien to Arab monarchies, including artifice (*hilah*), ruse (*makidah*), and falsehood (*kizb*), all of which may be used for the good of the state.<sup>32</sup> Since politics is largely based on convenience and reasoning, several Muslim political thinkers have proposed that the art of politics be based on variations of justice, and reliance on benevolence as well as force. It is within this context that consultation gains value for monarchs, because it is within their ability to dispense justice—while benefiting from collective advice—that shields them from ill will. Monarchs can restrain social vices only when they lend a careful ear and gauge the pulse of internal antagonisms. They can also apply princely values by listening to trusted advisers, encouraging scientific inquiry, and promoting political clarity among their subjects.

Monarchical subjects, on the other hand, must satisfy but a single principle: compliance to power of the just ruler. In its ultimate form, and if the application of *shari'ah* is fulfilled, obeying a just prince is tantamount to obeying

divinely inspired law. Naturally, the reverse is equally valid, as illustrated by oft-repeated references to a subject's obligations. Still, the key condition is the notion of justice or, as stated above, the appearance of justice.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, and despite repeated efforts to perpetuate the all too critical linkage with the essence of politically legitimate rule, the theoretical validation is very much under challenge. There are several delicate shifts that impact on a ruler's authority. Among these, and first, is the source of real power, especially the way it is applied. Contemporary monarchs must wonder whether their legitimacy continues to rest on the application of *shari'ah* or whether they must increasingly rely on coercive powers. Second, and especially in modern settings where information is spread at furious paces, how many genuinely welcome advice? Past Muslim rulers admired such guidance, in the genre of *Fürstenspiegel* (Mirrors for Princes), but which monarch values it today? Have rulers come to depend on themselves and their more despotic natures instead? Third, do they demand compliance with dictatorial rule, or do they eagerly seek to share the burdens of power? Fourth, do they genuinely condemn corruption—as Muhammad 'Abduh advised them to—or do they only tolerate it for expediency's sake? Fifth, do they seek prestige and fortune at the expense of hapless populations, or do they strive to empower subjects with economic independence? Sixth, and finally, do they draw on family and tribal support for strength, or do they partially count on them to validate questionable legitimacy?

These six spheres—and they are spheres of interrogation—allow several monarchs to govern even if many have demonstrated uncanny flexibility to adapt, integrate, and reform. Nevertheless, dynastic rulers have not wavered from key religious principles, including that of *'ahd*, that certainly evolved from its purely classical form into a modern version. Likewise, *shurah* and *bay'ah* principles have been carefully adapted to modernizing states, embedded in the trappings of wealth and alliances. Even *shari'ah* law, while intact, welcomed key legal additions that strengthened various interpretations (*hukm muqayad bi qanun*). It can thus be accurately stated that Arab monarchs, while authoritarian in nature, have correspondingly recognized the value of objectives that were not always compatible with desired ends. Perhaps the best example is the modernization of penal codes that grew out of common goals and basic rules of justice in several countries. Astute rulers therefore applied discretion (*ta'zir*) in utilizing Islamic codes (*hudud*) and, by doing so, catapulted their respective societies into modernizing stages. Discerning monarchs did not challenge or pretend to change *shari'ah*, as doing so would be an unacceptable, strictly forbidden form of innovation (*bid'ah*). Rather, they exercised reasoning (*ijtihad*) to earn public support, strengthen their rule, and institute ethical behavior, while remaining true to faith. By doing so, they consciously modernized, adapted, and consolidated dynastic power.

## ■ Muslim Monarchies and Power

Throughout the Arabian Peninsula, modernized caliphates ensured that power in contemporary Muslim societies rested on *shari'ah*, even if serious challenges threatened it. Yet, as the Ottoman Empire stretched its immense political will over vast territories, and as foreign powers slowly weakened the Porte, Arab dynasties confronted new risks.<sup>33</sup> These were far more ominous than anything experienced to date. In fact, European empires with long-term occupation plans deployed troops, pro-consuls, bureaucrats, and assorted other mandarins to reshape the Muslim realm into their own image. Such a multidimensional sociopolitical threat was so daunting that few anticipated its repercussions. Arab dynasties were forewarned, but few were equipped to prevent a sustained and full immersion. What transpired was appalling, for it changed the face of the modern Middle East.

### The Revival of Monarchies

For rulers accustomed to pomp and circumstance, few gatherings rivaled the inauguration of the Suez Canal in 1869. The occasion brought European royalty, including the Empress of France, the Emperor of Austria, the Crown Prince of Prussia, and others, to the “Court” of Khedive Isma‘il (r. 1863–1879) in Egypt. Isma‘il acquired his title, meaning “master,” from the Ottoman sultan in 1867 and was, for all practical purposes, a semi-independent vassal of the Porte. As achievements went, the canal was majestic, and the khedive intended to display his “royal” generosity to guests ever ready to wallow in opulence. In the event, celebrations were meant to accomplish two objectives: show Egypt’s renewed technological grandeur, and affirm the power of monarchies in the Arab world. Nevertheless, the inauguration brought unexpected changes, both for Egypt as well as for the entire region.

Although excavated by Egyptians, the Suez Canal was conceived by Ferdinand de Lesseps, a French engineer who was also responsible for the Panama Canal. For a nation that had constructed the Pyramids, the technological gap presented by the Suez artificial waterway illustrated how far behind Arab societies had fallen. To make matters worse, Cairo was made to borrow millions to finance construction that, before long, created a new type of dependence. European entrepreneurs exploited the country to reap huge financial windfalls. As if the injury was not serious enough, a Catholic bishop, Monseigneur Marie-Bernard Bauer, officiated at the inauguration. Bauer must be credited with an all-time lapse in judgment when he spoke of Christianity raising “its voice in prayer and its hands in blessing, out in the open and in front of the Crescent.”<sup>34</sup> This contemptible pronouncement was made in front of Muslim rulers in a host Muslim country. Bauer inferred that European powers

could—and probably intended to—extend protection to Christian subjects scattered throughout the Middle East. This was a rather clear example of interference in the internal affairs of dynastic rulers, even if the mighty Ottoman Empire was still functioning. Sadly, the extremist cleric could get away with uttering such incendiary remarks because European imperialism was at its peak or close to it. Both France and Russia had already intervened in Lebanon and the Balkans respectively, and London was consolidating itself in the Persian Gulf as well as in Aden, certainly to preserve access channels to India but also to compete head-on with Paris and Moscow.<sup>35</sup> Geographically, therefore, Egypt represented a strategic prize that straddled continents. Few politicians and fewer clergymen could ignore it.

Arab monarchies were thus faced with unprecedented political and military challenges. Although most accepted the need to modernize—especially with respect to economic advances that would improve their populations' standards of living—Arab regimes in the nineteenth century rejected the idealized even if rare European constitutional models. Muslim monarchies relied on a variety of legitimizing principles, including the application of *shari'ah* law, *shurah* councils where needed, and the advice of learned men (*'ulamah*) where available. Occasionally, they even welcomed Western advisers who straddled cultures, and who found solace in either or both. Muslim monarchs, as amply illustrated by various manuals of kingship (*Mirrors for Princes*), believed that prosperity, as much as decline, originated with them. Most were persuaded that rulers exercised unlimited power when they governed with justice. It must be underscored that, opposition forces notwithstanding, Arab monarchs were respected because a Muslim owed full obedience to a sultan. For acculturated believers, the latter represented the shadow of God on earth and, therefore, no rebellion against him could be tolerated save when the ruler strayed from the *shari'ah*.<sup>36</sup> Of course, several Ottoman rulers were overthrown through internal rebellions, but those were not the result of religious challenges.

Under the circumstances, most Arab and Muslim governments upheld indigenous traditions, to secure rulership and maintain internal harmony. By 1869, however, as education levels, encouraged by rulers, grew proportionately, many rulers were challenged precisely because they could no longer maintain internal peace. Ironically, this evolution occurred as major changes were under way in the Arab world, where empires clashed and repositioned their perceived power bases. Arab sultans were not recognized by their European counterparts as equals and, in those rare instances when they were, few were elevated to positions deserving of parity. Mighty monarchies in India and Indonesia had fallen under European suzerainty, and neither Khedive Isma'il nor other Arab rulers could compete on the same plane. If strong Indian and Indonesian rulers could not climb the European imperial power ladder, how could Arab monarchs pretend to do so, especially when most were already in vassal relationships with Ottoman emperors? In fact, the fate of Arab leaders



largely depended on the health of the Porte vis-à-vis prevailing European powers, even if few recognized it. When Constantinople sneezed, Arab monarchies caught cold, and at an alarming frequency. Clearly, the pressure was on to modernize, or fall by the wayside.

### **Ottoman Dynasties**

Ottoman conquests gave Constantinople its pivotal role throughout contemporary Muslim history as successive sultans enjoyed unrivaled splendor. As a Muslim ruler, the sultan was also caliph, as well as protector of the Prophet's relics held at Topkapi Palace. Equally important, Ottoman sultans ruled absolutely, because they prevented the rise of landowning ruling classes to challenge them. In theory, no one could own land and therefore no one could be truly independent, although intricate inheritance customs were practiced throughout the Muslim world. Moreover, everyone owed full and total allegiance to the sultan, who acted as God's officer on earth. Still, Ottoman sultans were responsible for fundamental changes that both supported and impeded the Osmanli dynasty over the years. Key individuals deserve attention, as particular decisions affected the empire and may well have caused its downfall.

One of the most visionary Ottoman rulers was Sultan 'Abdul Medjid I (r. 1839–1861), who sought to enhance the dynasty's image and equip it with the trappings of European courts. He moved out of Topkapi after a brand new palace, known as the Dolmabahçe, was completed on the Bosphorous. Dolmabahçe, visualized by renowned Armenian builder Krikor Balyan, introduced a European-style palace to the East. It contained 285 rooms stretching over 900 feet.<sup>37</sup> This architectural marvel was the first of many grandiose accomplishments that the reform-minded sultan would introduce following the Crimean War (1853–1856). Indeed, that conflict "clarified" in the sultan's mind much of what needed to be done, and fast. By 1826, his predecessor, Mahmoud II (r. 1808–1839), had concluded that modernizing the military, as well as establishing functioning institutions, were bare necessities. Still, the Porte's main dilemma was not in outfitting its rulers with grand palaces or by seeking—and receiving—European assistance to modernize the armed forces. Rather, the main problem was the rise of nationalism throughout the empire, given that large portions of its populations were not Turkish. In addition to Muslim Kurds, Albanians, and Arabs, the empire was inhabited by Armenians, Bulgarians, Christian Arabs, Greeks, Jews, and Serb subjects.<sup>38</sup> Abdul Medjid I knew that his dynastic dominion would, sooner or later, confront nationalist sentiments.

At first, Constantinople estimated that enough Ottoman qualities existed to override racial or religious differences among its many subjects, as it broadened its inclusive policies. In fact, leading Christian and Jewish officials served as ministers, while other high-ranking minority representatives attended to their

padishahs (kings) in other ways. Most court physicians and financial advisers, for example, were drawn from various minority communities, not only because rulers trusted them more than they trusted fellow Turks, but also because many were highly qualified in their respective disciplines. In time, fully integrated educational institutions were established in Constantinople, and these welcomed pupils from all minority groups. A unique cosmopolitan city emerged where East and West mingled freely and where meritocracy was highly valued. Exceptionally capable ministers channeled the empire's vast obligations in intelligent fashion, but by 1871—ten years into Sultan 'Abdul 'Aziz's reign—radical changes became apparent.

'Abdul 'Aziz (r. 1861–1876), who displayed a rather shy even if eccentric personality, was enamored with things European. Since he frequented royalty, with visits to Paris, London, and Vienna in 1867, he was determined to duplicate what he observed. Consequently, new palaces were constructed, each with magnificent decorations and paraphernalia. Building on his predecessors' keen interest in the military, he also pushed for additional reforms in the field, increasing expenditures. His extravagance soon spilled over into corruption as ministries were forced to make do with less. By 1875, as the "Palace" hoarded the empire's wealth to pay for the sultan's lavish lifestyle, the government formally declared bankruptcy.<sup>39</sup> This was the accidental opportunity for the empire's foes to instigate internal dissent. Russia and Austria, ever eager to restore fading glories, fomented opposition throughout the Ottoman realm. With corruption trickling down to the provinces, increasingly repressed minority communities became ideal candidates for recruitment. Most Ottoman subjects remained loyal, but a few erred in their judgment. In the capital, a group of discontented intellectuals, who would eventually come to be known as the Young Turks, demanded the adoption of a constitution.<sup>40</sup> Unlike sultans eager to emulate European grandeur, Young Turk leaders anticipated a different sort of imitation, namely an expectation that Muslim dynasties would tolerate and encourage genuine political reforms. Sultan 'Abdul 'Aziz was not too inclined to welcome such initiatives, and dismissed them with his legendary contempt. What mattered to him was the reorganization of the military, with which he could maintain order and, of course, court appearances that displayed his legendary even if illusory grandeur.

When riots erupted in Constantinople in May 1876, the empire's supreme religious official issued a religious decree authorizing Sultan 'Abdul 'Aziz's deposition, on the grounds of insanity and diversion of public revenues. The sultan abdicated on 30 May after troops and ships surrounded Dolmabahçe. Murad, a nephew and eldest male of the dynasty, succeeded 'Abdul 'Aziz. Ironically, the French-speaking Murad V may well have thought that the time was opportune to transform the entire system of government, as he favored the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. Court advisers, who attributed such ideas to mental illness, quickly dismissed his preferences. It is not possi-

ble to determine whether palace intrigues, including his predecessor's suicide and the murder of a war minister, affected Murad V's state of mind, but his genuine desire to introduce radical change cannot be dismissed.<sup>41</sup> In the event, 'Abdul 'Aziz's suicide added fuel to the fodder and, within two months, Murad V became the second sultan to be deposed. Even by Ottoman standards, this was rather unusual, as well as a bad omen.<sup>42</sup>

The third sultan to accede to the Ottoman "throne" in 1876 was 'Abdul Hamid II. Unlike Murad V, his jovial brother, 'Abdul Hamid was often pale, "with dark rings surrounding great black eyes, as the countenance of a ruler capable of good or evil, but knowing his own mind and determined to have his own way."<sup>43</sup> At first, the dour 'Abdul Hamid allowed a constitution to be proclaimed on 23 December 1876, and even encouraged a parliament to meet periodically between March 1877 and February 1878. For the wily sultan, who faced considerable foreign challenges in the Balkans, the internal diversion was necessary. Luckily for him, the British intervened against Russia, thereby allowing Constantinople to crush Balkan insurrections. Nevertheless, within two years of his accession, 'Abdul Hamid had abandoned any and all reform ideas—"by persuasion and by liberal institutions"—he may have nurtured. Unhesitatingly, he confided that "it is only by force that I can move the peoples with whose protection God has entrusted me."<sup>44</sup> The time for lip service had ended.

Entertaining and intelligent, 'Abdul Hamid II opened the doors of his Yildiz Palace to a multitude and sought advice from secular and religious figures at will. Jamal al-din al-Afghani, Abul Huda al-Sayyadi, and Muhammad Zafir were among his guests.<sup>45</sup> These and many other religious leaders buttressed the credentials of his "great Islamic empire." The sultan gave generously to Islamic causes, helped build the Hijaz railway to carry pilgrims to Makkah and Madinah in 1900, and distributed largess far afield. He even encouraged the adoption of a more rigorous academic curriculum than heretofore available, because he understood the need to equip his empire with competent, and therefore well-trained, civil servants. Still, his 1878 decision to rely on force meant that he would fall back on yet another expansion of the military, whose unending modernization looked and sounded impressive. A hands-on ruler, he supervised every detail of this expansion, ranging from the acquisition of weapons (mostly from Germany) to promotions among the officer ranks. Unlike his predecessors, he encouraged the recruitment of Turks, Kurds, and Arabs, and was so confident of his mercenaries' allegiance that he forged ahead mercilessly. In the words of one commentator, 'Abdul Hamid II, "like many Middle Eastern monarchs in this age of transition, had two personalities. He was not only an intelligent modernizer, but also a tyrant devoured by fear."<sup>46</sup>

For all his initiatives, 'Abdul Hamid II sullied his considerable reputation by repressing minority populations when that suited him, which, tragically,

culminated in the 1895 massacres of Armenian “subjects” of the Porte.<sup>47</sup> The massacres were organized, in part, to suppress a community that sought constitutional protections. Ironically, and despite his antiminority policies, ‘Abdul Hamid II entrusted his personal health to a Greek physician for thirty years, and his security to Arabs and Albanians for even longer. Neither his physician nor his guards could save him, however, because the seeds of opposition were well planted in the empire’s nucleus.

As momentous revolutions unfolded in Russia (1905) and Persia (1906), several Ottoman officers educated in the sultan’s military colleges formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP). Led by Enver and Niazi Pashas, and from their distant Macedonian garrison, in 1907 the CUP finally called for a restoration of the 1876 constitution. ‘Abdul Hamid rejected the call and, instead, attempted to rally the *‘ulamah* to back him on his set course. Shocking the sultan, Ottoman *‘ulamah* concluded that a constitution was not contrary to the *shari‘ah*, and that the ruler did not have grounds to dismiss intrinsic and peaceful supplications. Shaykh Abul Huda al-Sayyadi, the eminent Syrian cleric who “had great influence with his master,” persuaded the sultan to proclaim the restoration of the constitution and the convocation of parliament on 24 July 1908.<sup>48</sup> Notwithstanding an overall reduction in tensions, neither the sultan nor CUP officials—many of whom served in parliament—trusted each other. CUP leaders were determined to overthrow the sultan and eagerly waited for the occasion to pounce on the regime. An opportunity presented itself on 9 April 1909 when a minor mutiny in Constantinople degenerated into a well-orchestrated uprising.<sup>49</sup> On 27 April 1909 the sultan was informed by the *‘ulamah* that his services were no longer required.

Mehmed Reshad, who became Mehmed V, succeeded ‘Abdul Hamid II. Although a liberal figure sympathetic to a constitution, Mehmed V, a brother of ‘Abdul Hamid, soon fell prey to CUP machinations. His clever attempts to shift the burden of power failed as the Balkans flared. Italy invaded Tripolitana (modern Libya) in 1911, and Albania rose in revolt against the Porte in 1912. Soon, members of the “dynasty,” led by the sultan himself, adopted hostile postures toward an increasingly powerful CUP. Despite a century-long investment in the armed forces, Bulgarian, Greek, Montenegrin, and Serbian troops performed far better than Ottoman troops in every military engagement. Considerable financial assets were poured into the military, but that did not transform the nascent army into an effective instrument of power, because successive rulers bludgeoned it with systematic political purges.<sup>50</sup> By 30 May 1913, the Ottoman Empire had ceded all of its significant European territories—except for small holdings along the Sea of Marmara—to heretofore hostile enemies. The empire was well on its way toward disintegration. Even before the outbreak of World War I, Britain, France, Germany, and Russia had agreed to divide the Ottoman Empire into spheres of economic influence. These foreign policy disasters paled in comparison to the tyranny of the CUP at home, where, by early 1913,

Young Turk leaders had pushed their opponents out of office, even if their own hold on power remained unsettled.

Within the Arab Muslim world, the Porte had not lost its vast sway, however. In 1914, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman Al Sa‘ud signed a secret treaty acknowledging Ottoman suzerainty.<sup>51</sup> Others kowtowed to its lingering authority. Yet, with Talaat, Enver, and Jemal Pashas in effective power, Constantinople transformed its imperial vision. The new triumvirate championed a distinctly Turkish nationalism, perhaps to salvage the remnants of the Ottoman Empire, but certainly to assert its more indigenous attributes. None of the top leaders cared for minority populations, which were perceived as burdens rather than assets for an evolving society eager to take its place among rising powerhouses. A different kind of country was envisaged as the torch passed to a new generation of leaders. One of the great Muslim monarchies—the Ottoman Empire—was on its way to extinction, although several vassal regimes would soon confront similar destinies.

### **The Ruling Family of Egypt**

Egypt, considered a lesser province by the Ottoman Empire despite its unparalleled legacy in Muslim history, was a clone of its occupier in the early nineteenth century. The reigning dynasty, led at first by Muhammad ‘Ali, was an Ottoman invention. Muhammad ‘Ali, an Albanian, arrived in the early nineteenth century from Kavalla and, along with a substantial circle, served the Porte well.<sup>52</sup> In time, a ruling class—estimated at 20,000 members—emerged but, ironically, failed to connect with Egypt and its resourceful society. For savvy Caireneses, the khedive and his court were nothing more than “Turks,” “Albanians,” “Kurds,” or “Circassians,” appellations uttered as pejoratives rather than mere descriptions. Members of the gentry spoke Turkish or, more often, French. Seldom were they heard uttering Arabic. Paradoxically, while they kept distant from the indigenous population, Egyptian “Turks,” as they came to be known, were also ostracized in Constantinople. In fact, Ottoman rulers despised their Egyptian vassals, but felt obligated to tolerate their presence purely for political reasons.

Despite existing connections between Cairo and the Porte, Khedive Isma‘il (r. 1863–1879) was keen to increase Egyptian ties to various European powers. In addition to a substantial investment in the Suez Canal, he promoted a full revision of the country’s 1875 legal code, by appending secular regulations to specific religious laws. He promoted European-style education, the construction of a new railway system linking major cities, and dramatic changes in agriculture. In short, the khedive was determined to catapult Egypt into the European orbit, which stood as a stark rejection of the Ottoman model he presumably represented.<sup>53</sup> A cultural revolution followed, with modern theater and opera performed at high standards. In 1878, Cairo boasted publication

of twenty-seven newspapers, including nine in French, seven in Arabic (whose impact on Arab nationalism would be immeasurable in the following decades), five in Italian, three in Greek, and three in dual languages.<sup>54</sup>

In less than half a century, Cairo and Alexandria were transformed into truly cosmopolitan cities. Impressive palaces were constructed, including ‘Abdine, which, remarkably, updated classical Islamic architecture with contemporary visions. The khedive was keenly interested in Islamic arts and founded the first modern Islamic museum in Cairo in 1880. Today, the majestic ‘Abdine Palace is still used as the principal presidential residence for the Republic of Egypt, although it seldom witnesses the splendor of yore.

His European origins and vassal status notwithstanding, Khedive Isma‘il—perhaps imitating his grandfather—displayed an unusual craving for an African dominion that, with few exceptions, would build on an established core principle of Egyptian foreign policy. His reach extended beyond the Sudan to approach Somalia.

Isma‘il spent lavishly on his court and country and, naturally, his quest for an African empire was bound to be expensive.<sup>55</sup> Yet despite inherent clairvoyance, key miscalculations augmented his financial woes. Land purchases or, more often, outright confiscation, caused irreparable harm to Egypt’s peasants (*fallahin*). Unwise expenditures, foreign conquest costs, unending commitments to the Porte, exorbitant interest rates to underwrite grandiose projects, all added to Cairo’s agony. By 1872, Egypt had accumulated a huge debt, estimated at over US\$545 million (£100 million).<sup>56</sup> In response to this burden, and perhaps to quell both European interference as well as stifle potential internal discontent, in August 1878 the khedive turned to Nubar Pasha to introduce a constitutional system. Nubar, a sophisticated Armenian minister who had served three generations of the khedive’s family, was entrusted with a gargantuan mission: “to reform the administration on principles similar to those observed in the administration of the States of Europe.”<sup>57</sup>

Whatever intentions the khedive espoused, and whatever Nubar Pasha could actually do about implementing them, European creditors—led by the Rothschilds—deemed Cairo’s debt burden to be wobbly. European governments, but especially Britain, pressured ‘Abdul Hamid II to dismiss Khedive Isma‘il before the latter defaulted. On 26 June 1879, a telegram was dispatched from Yildiz to ‘Abdine, addressed to “Isma‘il Pasha, ex-Khedive of Egypt,” informing the vassal that his eldest son Tewfik was ruler. Isma‘il Pasha abdicated, eventually moving to Constantinople, where he died in 1895.

Unlike his father, Tewfik Pasha (r. 1879–1892) alleviated the tax burden on peasants, and adopted a more modest administration. Sadly, and given the financial conditions he inherited, governing Egypt was next to impossible. He was perceived to be weak, although the class warfare on display—between Turks and Arabs—was not his making. Isma‘il’s largess to the Turkish ruling class had created substantial resentment that, inevitably, boiled over. On 9

September 1881, Tewfik was challenged by 'Arabi Pasha, an army colonel who rose through the ranks. The nationalist revolt against Tewfik as well as the Turkish ruling class mobilized the palace to seek foreign assistance.

In April 1882, a humiliated Tewfik Pasha placed the interests of his dynasty ahead of any obligations to his nation. He formally requested Britain and France to assist in freeing him from the 'Arabi "nightmare."<sup>58</sup> When, on 31 May 1882, Tewfik moved to Alexandria—where the allied fleet lay—a riot broke out. What happened next was classic: an undetermined but fairly large number of residents—both indigenous as well as European—were killed. Britain landed troops on 13 July to restore order. 'Arabi Pasha repudiated Tewfik's authority and sought the Porte's assistance against the khedive. Although Egyptian *'ulamah* issued religious decrees supporting the removal of Khedive Tewfik, the sultan in Constantinople rejected 'Arabi's moves, fearing that the establishment of a republic in Egypt would significantly weaken the Ottoman Empire.<sup>59</sup> After 'Arabi was soundly defeated in Alexandria, a triumphant Tewfik returned to 'Abdine Palace in Cairo on 30 October, where an estimated 12,000 British troops paraded to salute his reign. Whether Tewfik instigated the Alexandria massacres to finally seal London's intervention is a subject of heated debate even after all these years.<sup>60</sup> What was blatantly obvious, on the other hand, was that an intrinsic nationalist call was stifled. British "liberation," to use a more contemporary epithet, turned into "occupation" and lasted until 1956. For all the good that they performed, British troops ruled as a colonial entity would, even if Tewfik Pasha affixed his official seal to all state decisions. Successive British consuls behaved in the best tradition of British imperialism, condescending of local preferences and dismissive of indigenous needs. Only pro-British Egyptian Ottoman officers were promoted to positions of consequence, appointments that inevitably planted the seeds of opposition. Against such blatant sociopolitical impediments, many Egyptians turned to religious fraternities to seek solace, which would blow back and haunt Western decisionmakers before long. Even Tewfik Pasha, perhaps to salvage his blemished honor, "renewed his links with the mosque." Such indoctrination, however, required time to blossom.<sup>61</sup> Still, Tewfik died in 1892, having espoused policies that sealed Egypt's revolutionary fate.<sup>62</sup>

Tewfik Pasha was succeeded by his eldest son, 'Abbas Hilmi (r. 1892–1914), perhaps the most gifted Egyptian monarch to reign in contemporary history. Although barely eighteen when afflicted with the responsibilities of public office, he was determined to gain real independence from Britain and quickly challenged the occupying power at its core by attempting to assert control over the armed forces. At first, the commander in chief of the army, Horatio Kitchener, welcomed the ruler's entreaties, as an obedient seconded officer would be expected to do.<sup>63</sup> Unfortunately, Lord Cromer (Evelynn Baring, 1841–1917), the immensely powerful consul in Cairo, was overseeing the relationship. Not only did he chastise Kitchener, but he also made sure that 'Abbas

Hilmi's so-called government decisions after 1893 were deemed null and void unless duly approved by British advisers. Between 1896 and 1906, the number of said advisers grew from 286 to 662, but the situation was far worse than many thought, as resentment against their interferences grew even more.<sup>64</sup> Cairo was transformed into a British playground while the Cairenese became mere spectators to developments in their own country, or servants to the British. European residents kept their distance from Egyptians, who were literally excluded from major clubs, including the posh Gezireh facility that welcomed the foreign "who's who" of the city. Few Europeans bothered to look at the local scene, much less learn the language, or consider particular needs of an increasingly hapless population. Cultural barriers were erected as the British class system oozed in and dominated the local environment. The 1904 Anglo-French *entente cordiale* further sealed Egypt's fate as Paris acknowledged this British sphere of influence. When Kitchener became consul-general in 1911, and harbored visions of grandeur to perhaps become viceroy of a putative British empire in the Middle East, neither the khedive nor anyone else at 'Abdine could think of independent Egypt. In 1914, 'Abbas Hilmi went to Constantinople to spend his summer vacation, where Young Turk operatives plotted to assassinate him and where the British deposed him.

After Khedive 'Abbas Hilmi was jettisoned by the British, his uncle Hussein Kamil (r. 1914–1917) was duly installed on the Egyptian throne, but died after a banquet at 'Abdine Palace. In turn, he was succeeded by Prince Fouad, a thoroughly Europeanized individual who gambled his family's fortune away, the last surviving son of Khedive Isma'il. Princess Shevikiar's brother was so infuriated by Fouad divorcing his sister that the hapless brother-in-law shot his monarch and left him seriously injured.<sup>65</sup> Egypt was resplendent in pomp as a deferential court life pervaded all political activities. Remarkably, Egyptian monarchs carefully orchestrated a public decorum around themselves that inspired popular respect. This phenomenon was so ingrained that the Wafd (Delegation) Party, eventually empowered to ask for independence, originated in a casual conversation between Prince Omar Toussoun and future prime minister Sa'ad Zaghloul.<sup>66</sup> As the movement grew more extremist, however, the ruler distanced himself from its instigators, although the Egyptian monarchy benefited from British political concessions made in February 1922. With the demise of the Ottoman Empire, coupled with the national movement that culminated in the 1919 revolt, London recognized the need to elevate its Egyptian vassals and proclaimed Fouad king of Egypt on 15 March 1922.

The British high commissioner was nevertheless still the ultimate decisionmaker. Unwittingly, London insisted that a constitution be adopted that, for better or worse, allowed various Egyptian politicians from playing the palace against the high commissioner. Within a year, parliamentary debates had become so heated that the constitution was quickly amended to increase the king's prerogatives. Wafd leaders, including Sa'ad Zaghloul, were literally



powerless, as the king hoarded every iota of control he could possibly fathom. Fouad became wealthy as well as strong, although the exiled 'Abbas Hilmi was still regarded as the people's favorite. After the 1929 financial crisis, which left him in ruins, the latter finally renounced any intentions to return, in exchange for a modest annual government stipend.

Having settled his 'Abbas Hilmi dilemma, King Fouad turned to Egypt's many needs, especially those related to education. Under his patronage, Cairo witnessed flourishing educational and artistic lives, hosted by newly established institutions sponsored by the ruler. These accomplishments notwithstanding, the monarch was first and foremost preoccupied with the trappings of his position, traveling throughout Europe to indulge himself. He died tragically in a Rome restaurant, choking on his meal at the age of forty-four, but comfortable in the knowledge that his son, Farouk, was in good hands.

Fouad had groomed his Oxford-educated first chamberlain, Hassanein Pasha, to look after Farouk. In contrast to his father, Farouk actually bothered to study his own native tongue and history. The mere fact that he spoke fluent Arabic dramatically enhanced his popularity among Egyptians.<sup>67</sup> Yet, much like his predecessor, Farouk was keenly aware of what monarchical power actually meant, and what was expected of him to protect acquired privileges. Over the years, he introduced a balanced approach, conceding whenever such political steps protected dynastic rule, but vociferously defending his "rights." He dismissed Wafd ministers and cabinets whenever the latter attempted to curb the king's freedoms, but championed Arabism when the League of Arab States convened in Cairo in 1945 to show where his heart lay. Indeed, the king was eager to fight Israel in 1948, after the latter declared its independence, although British advisers counseled restraint. Whether this eagerness cost him the throne is unknown, but his pro-Islamist credentials, at a time when Britain was still the dominant local actor, did not endear him to the British ambassador in Cairo or foreign office mandarins in London. Reportedly, Farouk "forged links between the palace and the Muslim Brotherhood, the powerful secret society which led the Muslim revival of the 1930s."<sup>68</sup> It may be worth recalling that the British ambassador routinely called the monarch a "boy," contemplated his deposition as early as 1937, and was prepared to replace him in February 1942.

The king's astute chamberlain devised a proper solution—for the ruler to preside over an entire Wafd cabinet led by pro-British Nahas Pasha—that saved the day. Sir Miles Lampson, the ambassador who described King Farouk as a "boy," won the day, but his poorly thought-out preferences planted the seeds of permanent opposition within the hearts and minds of Egyptian military officers. Gamal 'Abdul Nasir and his Free Officers were increasingly persuaded that the time was ripe for a coup d'état against Farouk to rid Egypt of its colonial masters. The decision to act would be accelerated by the debauchery of a court that was often more preoccupied with lavish entertainment

parties than with the growing needs of Egyptian society. Disinterested in rule, King Farouk may well have engineered his own fall, since he knew of, and encouraged, the formation of the Free Officers' plans for a coup. Ironically, the Free Officers gathered around a secret "Ring of Iron" group, created by 'Ali Maher, director of the royal cabinet. The palace, of course, was eager to prevent Egyptian military officers from gaining access to the Wafd and encouraged the king's former tutor 'Aziz 'Ali al-Masri to "inspire" them. Whether Nasir and his allies needed any inspiration is debatable, but on 26 July 1952, three days after the actual coup, 'Ali Maher handed a relieved King Farouk a letter of abdication, which the latter promptly signed. He quickly left for Italy, where he died in 1954, a lonely man, abandoned by most of his friends, and distraught in the knowledge that he could not prevent the fall of the Muhammad 'Ali dynasty. Similar outcomes would befall several North African dynasties throughout the first half of the twentieth century.

### **The Ruling Family of Tunisia**

For much of the thirteenth to sixteenth centuries, the literal absence of a universally recognized caliph caused Berber populations of North Africa to cease relying on religious figures as sources of authority. With the fall of the 'Abbasid caliphate and the rise of the Ottoman Empire, the Hafsid dynasty gained influence in Tunisia. The Hafsids adopted the unitarian ideology espoused by Ibn Tumart (who died in 1128), but abandoned it when Ottoman preferences gained practice. North Africa witnessed cultural imperialism as the Spanish inquisition and its related *reconquista* movement, which aimed to impose the power of Catholic Spain, clashed with Ottoman expansion. Equally important were European economic visions that drove several rising powers to pursue new markets. Naval clashes between Spanish, Portuguese, and Ottoman forces were fierce. In 1546, Algiers fell to the Ottomans, who moved on Tripoli in 1551. Admiral Khayr al-Din then seized Tunis from the Hafsids, but lost it to the Hapsburgs of both Spain and Austria on two separate occasions. It was only in 1574 that Ottoman forces captured Tunis and sent the last Hafsid ruler into exile to Constantinople.

Throughout the seventeenth century, Tunis was seen as a vassal state under the control of Ibrahim Pasha. His successor was Hussein bin 'Ali, who established the Husseini dynasty, which ruled until independence in the mid-twentieth century. Although Tunisia was under Ottoman tutelage, the Husseini dynasty ruled while maintaining cordial ties with the Porte. As Britain watched over its strategic interests in Egypt, France perceived similar opportunities in Tunisia. In 1869, Paris made a much noticed entry onto the local scene, when ruler Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey (r. 1859–1882) "lost his financial independence to a French-controlled commission."<sup>69</sup> A full six years would pass before order returned to Tunisian finances. Ironically, it was a Cir-

cassian slave, purchased in Constantinople, Khayr al-Din, named after the famous naval officer who routed the Hafsid several centuries earlier, who would negotiate with French authorities. To his credit, Khayr al-Din opposed loans advanced by Paris, but the debt burden, much like the one in Egypt, severely undermined Tunisia's small economy. Still, by 1860, Muhammad al-Sadiq was confident enough to issue a constitution, the first in contemporary Arab history.

Tunisia thus became a limited monarchy, with the ruler as head of state and assisted by a council to which ministers were accountable.<sup>70</sup> It was Khayr al-Din Pasha who influenced the new structure and, naturally, became its first president. He resigned from the post in 1878, however, after failing to end widespread corruption tolerated and encouraged by key ministers. In turn, he left for Constantinople as Tunisia's chances for independence waned.

Alleging outrages committed by Tunisian tribes in Algeria, and ostensibly to assist one of the most pro-French rulers, France invaded Tunisia in 1881. This was a pretext, but Muhammad al-Sadiq Bey was not in a position to object. On 12 May 1881, the titular ruler signed the Treaty of Bardo, which stated that the occupation was temporary and would end following the restoration of order. When Paris realized that this particular treaty restricted its freedom of action, French resident-minister Paul Cambon negotiated with London and Rome to end all international controls over Tunisia's finances. The time had come for a formal protectorate, and in June 1883 Muhammad al-Sadiq signed the Al-Marsa Convention, as a result of which Tunisia came to resemble Egypt, but under French occupation. The ruler and his retinue were well cared for, though by affixing his signature on these two documents, he had abdicated any and all national aspirations that many Tunisians craved.<sup>71</sup>

Tunisian rulers attempted in vain to rekindle dormant linkages with the Porte and, at least for a while, hoped to gain Ottoman interests. Muhammad al-Sadiq's various appeals for assistance in 1881 were only met with general advice to exercise prudence. 'Abdul Hamid II cared little for Tunisia, because his primary focus in North Africa was on Tripolitana and the devout Sanusi order, which represented something of a legitimizing threat to the caliph's religious credentials.<sup>72</sup> Tunisia was expendable, but Tripolitania received particular attention. In 1835, Constantinople overthrew the Qaramanli dynasty and decided to rule Tripoli directly.

After France's occupation of Tunisia, European and especially Italian economic penetration into Tripolitania increased. The Sanusi order protected trade routes, but early mistakes—fearing French military movements throughout North Africa—came to haunt its leaders in later years.<sup>73</sup> In the meantime, and by 1902, France, Britain, Germany, and Austria-Hungary had agreed to Tripolitania's annexation by Italy. Rome gradually introduced a postal service, a flour mill, and medical care facilities to endear itself with the indigenous population. As the Young Turk movement gained influence in Constantinople

in 1908, Italian officials claimed that their citizens were severely endangered by CUP activities. Italy went to war with Constantinople in 1911 and 1912, while the Sanusi order assisted with Ottoman defenses. Although Turkey's future strongman Mustafa Kemal Pasha served as an aide to Enver Pasha in the 1911–1912 war, the Porte was bogged down in the Balkans and therefore could not afford to maintain two major fronts. The Ottomans recognized Italian suzerainty over Tripolitania and withdrew in 1912. Sanusi leaders, led by Omar al-Mukhtar, continued to resist Rome and, in a clever tour de force, asserted that Enver Pasha had actually given Tripolitana its independence under Sanusi protection and authority.<sup>74</sup> A protracted war between Italy and Sanusi leaders after World War II would lead to the establishment of a Libyan monarchy, but the Porte was out of the political frame by 1912.<sup>75</sup>

### The Ruling Family of Morocco

In the absence of Ottoman diktats, the Sa'idi tribe, claiming sharifian descent and aided by powerful *'ulamah* from the Zawiyyah clan, launched a jihad in 1511 against the Portuguese garrison at Agadir. The effort to oust entrenched Portuguese forces was successful, but only by the mid-1540s. It was selfless perseverance that earned Sa'idis, under the leadership of Muhammad al-Shaykh, unparalleled legitimacy. By 1554, rival tribes in the cities of Fez and Safi had submitted to Sa'idi rule, as the capital was moved to Marrakech. Ottoman agents exacted revenge by assassinating Muhammad al-Shaykh in 1557, and the Portuguese, when Muhammad al-Shaykh's successor displayed signs of weakness, landed a vast army in Morocco to fight both Sa'idi and Ottoman forces. The "Battle of the Three Kings" or, as it is known in Arabic, *Ma'rakat al-Qasr*, saw all three rulers perish, leaving Ahmad al-Mansur Al Sa'idi substantial takings obtained from pillages and ransoms. This booty was the source of Sa'idian wealth during Ahmad's reign (r. 1578–1603).<sup>76</sup>

Ahmad Al Sa'idi devoted a portion of his wealth to create an efficient army that permitted him to conquer parts of modern Mali and Mauritania in 1591. Salt and gold mines in Western Sudan (as the area was then known) added to Sa'idi riches, and it is this conquest that accounts for recurrent modern Moroccan claims to Saharan territories. Although Ahmad is credited with establishing the foundations of modern Morocco—equipping the country with a central government—his reliance on nontaxable income literally meant reliance on trade routes beyond his control. As commodity prices fluctuated, revenues oscillated, and his mighty but expensive army decayed.

On his death, two of Ahmad's sons divided his kingdom, ruling at Fez and Marrakech respectively. Sa'idi power waned as regional authorities exercised considerably more influence. Tensions between the *Bilad al-Makhzen* (areas falling under state treasury) and *Bilad al-Siba* (areas of dissidence) dominated all Fez-Marrakech ties. It was in the seventeenth century that members of the

‘Alawi tribe triumphed over the two Sa‘idian principalities. Perhaps the greatest early ruler was Isma‘il (r. 1672–1727), a racially mixed leader who improved treasury collections and raised an army of black slaves similar to early Egyptian Fatimid armies. Isma‘il imposed taxes, but most of his subjects prospered because his policies ensured social stability, which in turn guaranteed peaceful trade. At the height of his power, he moved the capital to Meknes, although Fez, on the northern coast, remained critical as an economic hub. Unfortunately, his successors struggled to hold the country together as both Jewish and Christian merchants, often under foreign protection, flourished independently.<sup>77</sup>

In the early nineteenth century, France occupied Sufi-led Algeria, only to encounter stiff opposition. This conquest proved costly for all concerned, but particularly brutal colonialism won the day.<sup>78</sup> ‘Alawi rulers in Morocco were drawn into the conflict even if a significant effort was made to deny European consuls—and other instigators—access to the indigenous population. At first, Morocco secured British pledges to maintain a balance of power, but after General Thomas Robert Bugeaud defeated Moroccan troops at Isly, every Moroccan detected the negative value of British promises. Moulay ‘Abdul Rahman was devastated, but signed lucrative trade accords with British merchants eager to benefit from Morocco’s natural resources.<sup>79</sup>

France and Spain objected to these profitable agreements. While Paris preferred to strengthen its Algeria holdings, Madrid consolidated a presence at Ceuta, on Moroccan territory. Local tribesmen demolished Spanish fortifications at Ceuta, which naturally became the pretext necessary for an outright Spanish invasion. Muhammad (r. 1859–1873) lost enormous support in 1860 when Spanish troops occupied Tetuan. In Fez, Muhammad was financially crippled and had to borrow funds, which compromised his ability to rule independently. The European penetration of Morocco was now three-pronged. France, Spain, and Britain occupied land and dictated terms of behavior.

Unlike Tunisia, which “dared” to adopt a constitution as well as a legislative assembly between 1860 and 1864, Morocco distinguished itself by not falling under Ottoman suzerainty. Morocco’s Berber and Arab populations supported their sultan, who in turn considered his Ottoman counterpart to be an apostate. When, in 1887, Germany sought to encourage an alliance between the two rulers—to check French expansionism—ruler Moulay Hassan (r. 1873–1894) reportedly confided: “any alliance between us and Turkey is impossible,” because “the Sultan on the Bosphorus is no Sharif.”<sup>80</sup> As a descendent of the Prophet’s tribe, the Moroccan established his credentials as caliph, while denying a similar title to his Osmanli opposite. In fact, Moroccan rulers, then as now, considered themselves to be religious figures first, before assuming any political roles.

Moulay Hassan, an intelligent and industrious ruler, displayed remarkable indifference to putative Ottoman claims to the caliphate in 1873, and attempted to reverse the trend of European occupation. While an equitable taxation system

along with the introduction of a new currency ushered some order into the economy, his intention to establish a professional military did not secure minimally required tribal allegiances. Morocco's more than 600 tribes embarked on a loyalty-selling spree that facilitated outside interferences. Ironically, and while the Sultan's policies failed to secure the establishment of a modern nation-state, his model was in place when he died in 1894.

Moulay 'Abd al-'Aziz (r. 1894–1908) as well as his successor and brother, Moulay 'Abd al-Hafiz (r. 1908–1913), also fell prey to European pressures. Just like his father, 'Abd al-'Aziz was forced to accept French military intervention in Morocco, to protect the "sultan." Disputes along the Algerian-Moroccan border necessitated such a military presence that, over time, Morocco was turned into a French protectorate. Much like the 1882 British takeover of Egypt—following the Alexandria massacres—and after the 1904 Anglo-French *entente cordiale* that divided colonial holdings, a 1907 "massacre" of European merchants in Casablanca—where nine persons died—sealed the country's fate.<sup>81</sup> Moulay 'Abd al-'Aziz faced a serious rebellion that presented his brother 'Abd al-Hafiz with a golden opportunity to challenge the former in 1907. The two siblings went to war against each other as Morocco sank into chaos. France intervened with full British—and Spanish—consent to restore order. Only the kaiser expressed a desire to assist the ruler of Morocco, but French control over vast areas of territory was swift and Germany's show of force, a single gunboat in Agadir in 1911, superfluous.

A victorious France promised to protect "His Sherifian Majesty against all dangers which may threaten his person and his throne," in a 30 March 1912 treaty.<sup>82</sup> This display of great concern for the 'Abd al-Hafiz regime, as well as his personal well-being, was provided in exchange for a free hand to reshape Morocco's administrative, economic, and military capabilities. Colonial France, through powerful resident-generals, became the country's real master.

Unlike their bloody conquest of Algeria, the French actually managed to occupy Morocco mostly through clever diplomatic maneuverings, which neither 'Abd al-'Aziz nor 'Abd al-Hafiz could prevent. Still, and though terribly bruised by this occupation, the 'Alawi dynasty was intact. 'Abd al-Hafiz was quickly retired—he joined the Berber Tijaniyyah religious order in Tangier—and was succeeded by Moulay Youssef (r. 1912–1917).

A pious ruler, Moulay Youssef adopted a nonthreatening style, as Marshall Hubert Lyautey, the resident-general from 1912 through 1925, effectively governed the country.<sup>83</sup> Lyautey initiated a Berber policy for Morocco, giving village councils administrative and judicial authority, and encouraged Moulay Youssef to display his traditional religious influence. While Berbers were intentionally separated from the country's *shari'ah* courts to satisfy French objectives, the prestige of the sultan increased, because Moroccans identified themselves with the sharifian court. Lyautey, "a convinced monarchist," was persuaded that French rule could only be ensured by the support

that Moroccans extended to “the only legitimate Caliph of the Prophet.”<sup>84</sup> Still, Lyautey’s objective was French supremacy in the Arabized fertile plains of Morocco. In the event, his efforts failed as urbanization advanced and educated Muslims, mostly associated with *salafiyyah* (traditionalist) movements, formed the backbone of Morocco’s primary nationalist leadership.

On the death of Moulay Youssef in 1927, his third son was chosen to succeed him, on the grounds that he was a harmless sultan.<sup>85</sup> Muhammad, a subtle, patient, and determined leader, would bid for time while encouraging nationalist forces to organize against the occupiers. Well-placed French spies revealed the ruler’s covert support, which led to a three-year exile starting in 1953. Still, independence loomed over the horizon, because the opposition to occupation was not the function of a single leader. Rather, it was the result of well-organized mass movements that mobilized public opinion and public action at the most appropriate moment. The French would thus be forced to return Muhammad to his capital to quell a rising opposition to their long occupation. Consequently, a triumphant ruler would land in Morocco in 1955, to resume his rule as Morocco earned its independence.

### Exhaustion and Renewal of Muslim Monarchies

As World War I drew most of Europe and large parts of Asia and Africa into a maddening vortex of violence, Egypt, Morocco, Tripolitania, and Tunisia were comfortably under imperial occupations. The monarchies of the Middle East traded the Ottoman Empire for European counterparts, with one caveat. Whereas the Porte ruled in exchange for little or even less, European powers introduced new political ideas that led to the establishment of parliaments in Cairo as well as in Constantinople. Of course, limited transfers of scientific knowledge occurred as well, but modernization was expensive to say the least. Remarkably, the vast majority of Arab and Muslim monarchies adapted and, most crucially, succeeded in retaining dynastic rule.

World War I shattered whatever regional peace existed throughout the Middle East and North Africa. As alignments solidified, Enver Pasha in Constantinople, a pro-German minister, opted to side with Berlin against Moscow. Russian targets in the Balkans and the Caucasus were systematically attacked. Enver’s fateful decision, made on the mistaken assumption that Muslims loathed Allied powers far more than distant Axis hegemony, permanently damaged Ottoman interests and, in the long-term, the empire itself. Constantinople entered the war after the *‘ulamah* issued a religious decree calling for a jihad in the name of the sultan. The duly written *fatwah* summoned Muslims to rally behind the Porte but, extraordinarily, few responded. There were at least two principal reasons for this significant breach of conduct. First, few Arabs sympathized with Ottoman wishes or aspirations, because the latter’s treatment of their subjects, including fellow Muslims, was appalling. Over the

span of several centuries, Ottoman armies ruled over Arabs with an iron fist, stifling existing freedoms and, perhaps worse, exchanging the relative emancipation of the 'Abbasids with extremist policies. A second and equally important reason emerged for this open defiance. As Britain intensified its presence in the area, Arabs were intrigued by London's support to an indigenous Arab dynasty (the Hashimites), and thought the time opportune to seek alternatives.

The Hashimites, "a family whose claim to descent from the Prophet was at least as good as any other," ruled over the holy city of Makkah.<sup>86</sup> Since 1517, and despite periodic tensions, Hashimite shaykhs submitted to the Porte, although little is known about multipronged discussions between them, the Ottomans as well as the British. Nevertheless, the Hashimites accepted the sultan's largess and protection as needed, shielded the holy sites as best as possible, and cherished the opportunity to live at the Constantinople court as permitted. After 1894, when Sharif Hussein and his sons 'Ali and 'Abdallah were forcefully moved as hostages to the shores of the Bosphorous, they learned Turkish and spoke it so well that Sultan 'Abdul Hamid was quite impressed.<sup>87</sup>

Sharif Hussein was named emir of Makkah in 1908 and led an Ottoman expedition into 'Asir province (today in southern Saudi Arabia) in 1911 against the Al Sa'ud. If Sharif Hussein was enamored with his Ottoman masters and freely engaged in their biddings, his son 'Abdallah was far more sympathetic to Arab nationalist ideas. In Constantinople, a secret society known as Al-'Ahd (The Covenant) was established by the Egyptian 'Aziz 'Ali al-Masri in 1913, "consisting almost entirely of army officers, with a strong Iraqi element among them."<sup>88</sup> Al-Masri loathed Enver Pasha and sought to create a Turkish-Arab monarchy—on the Austro-Hungarian model, but that was not to be. Such brewing nationalistic predilections notwithstanding, Sharif Hussein opposed any Ottoman involvement in World War I and warned the sultan not to side with Germany. Doing so "would be either ignorance or high treason," confided Hussein, but Constantinople was not keenly interested in evaluating dissenting opinions, especially an Arab one.<sup>89</sup>

With Horatio Kitchener's assistance in Cairo, Sharif Hussein plotted a realignment that, with a little luck, would give rise to a new caliph in Makkah. Emboldened by allied successes against Ottoman forces—despite the 1915 devastation at Gallipoli—Sharif Hussein cut his ties to Constantinople. He may well have reasoned that the Young Turk government was anti-Arab and that this rare moment should not be squandered. On 16 June 1916, he launched the Arab Revolt and declared himself "King of the Arabs." For London and Paris, neither of which were ready for a king of the Arabs, he simply was "King of the Hijaz." Irrespective of designations, Hussein declared to *Al-Qibla* newspaper on 2 November 1916 that the Arabs had restored "their ancient fame and the oldest reigning house in the entire world."<sup>90</sup> Hussein's vision never materialized, however, as few Arabs rose against the Ottoman Empire.



British troops, rather than Arab forces, occupied Damascus on 1 October 1918, as Constantinople signed an armistice and withdrew its remaining regiments from Syria.<sup>91</sup>

Constantinople was broken, but strangely enough the Osmanli dynasty survived under a younger brother of Sultan Reshad, Mehmed VI (r. 1918–1922). Long known for his sympathies with London and Paris, a beholden Mehmed VI openly pursued pro-Western policies, believing that such fawning would ensure dynastic durability. After all, the ills of the war and the wrong choice made by its leaders were all attributed to the CUP. Ironically, the sultan was fully aware of CUP decisions and tacitly supported them, which highlighted intellectual dishonesty. Mehmed VI had to be content with the presence of British, French, Italian, and—adding insult to injury—Greek troops in his capital city. Allied “advisers” engaged the ruler, who reluctantly conceded most of the Arab provinces he had heretofore ruled. The sultan’s slavish attitude convinced victorious countries to dispose of the Ottoman Empire as they pleased. Italian troops occupied Antalya, and Greek forces systematically destroyed countless Turkish villages. An extermination of Muslim inhabitants around Smyrna was predicated by revenge, but the massacres were still unjustified.<sup>92</sup> Demoralized Turks paid a heavy price for previous leaders’ racist policies as the country lost its grandeur. It was within the context of this humiliation that Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a Salonica-born officer who disliked the Porte’s decision to join the Axis, settled to act.<sup>93</sup>

Mustafa Kemal owed his education and title to Ottoman military institutions. He distrusted Enver Pasha, but did not oppose the monarchy in 1918. In fact, he would only break with the Osmanli dynasty in 1924, while serving Mehmed VI faithfully in the interim.<sup>94</sup> The sultan rejected Mustafa Kemal’s fallback position—to take refuge in Anatolia—and refused to entrust him with the Ministry of War portfolio in 1918. His personal antipathies notwithstanding, Mehmed VI erred in properly judging this aspiring officer in the prime of his career, especially since he was idle, unemployed, and unpaid. Original sources clarifying his intents being absent, it is difficult to certify whether the sultan planned to distance Kemal from Constantinople or whether he merely wished him to lead an anti-Western resistance. In the event, the ruler appointed Kemal Pasha to the post of inspector-general of the armed forces in Northern Anatolia on 16 May 1919, which, at least for a while, constrained his movements. At first, Mustafa Kemal wore his sultani uniform and “claimed to be acting on [the ruler’s] orders,” but less than a month later he formally resigned his commission.<sup>95</sup>

Leading a revolt against the government—but not against the sultan—Kemal Pasha formed an alternative source of legitimacy in Ankara, where he claimed to represent nationalist interests. Faced with such insurmountable odds, the sultan initiated a reconciliation with nationalist leaders in late 1919

and early 1920, if for no other reason than to show his “patriotism.” A key meeting was held in Constantinople, where Kemal was restored to his previous army rank as his troops were once again regularly supplied with sorely needed logistical assistance. British forces, which were essentially holding the throne together, occupied the Ministry of War in March 1920, but outside the capital the sultan’s army had withered. By June 1920, the sultan was far more concerned with staying alive than with anything else. Public outrage grew and meager efforts by the heir apparent to seek a rapprochement with Mustafa Kemal yielded no results. With Soviet guidance and military support, Kemal crushed the Kurds and what was left of the exterminated Armenian population, pushed the Italians out of the city of Antalya in June 1921, and the Greeks from the rest of Anatolia by September 1922.<sup>96</sup> Massive migrations—some voluntary but most involuntary—ensued, with over 1.2 million Greek-speakers leaving the Ottoman Empire, and 400,000 Turkish-speakers returning from Greece. British politicians, including Lloyd George, may well have promised Athens a revival of the Byzantine Empire, but the time for religious dominions was coming to a close, at least in the twentieth century. Lloyd George would in turn pay a heavy political price after Britain failed to engage Mustafa Kemal’s troops at Chanak in the Dardanelles in November 1922. The decision to surrender Chanak was probably made earlier, after London opted to distance itself from the sultan. Indeed, the ruler’s calls on Britain to fight “a Macedonian of unknown origin” were tantamount to a conspiracy with a foreign power against nationalist forces.<sup>97</sup>

Unceremoniously, but in a move that was carefully staged dozens of times by British troops, the sultan left Yildiz Palace on 17 November 1922 for a battleship waiting in the Bosphorous. Thus ended direct Osmanli rule, and Mehmed VI died in San Remo, Italy, in 1926.

Given the dynasty’s popularity, however, Mustafa Kemal did not abolish it outright; instead he persuaded ‘Abdul Medjid to accept the caliphate. Within a year, serious political cleavages emerged between the two men, with Mustafa Kemal eager to stamp his own secular imprimatur on the country. On 3 March 1924, the sultan was placed on the Orient Express for Europe, followed by all remaining members of the Osmanli dynasty. Gradually, the Republic of Turkey erased the Ottoman Empire from the country’s political memory, as Mustafa Kemal transformed himself into “Atatürk” (father of the Turks). Although secular and pro-Western in outlook, Atatürk was an iron-fisted dictator who inherited what could be salvaged from his mighty predecessors. The Ottoman wonder was quickly replaced with pan-Turkism, but the ideology would only have value in those parts of the Muslim world where Turkish was spoken, or where indigenous populations could trace their ancestral origins to it. As equally valid nationalist movements emerged throughout the Muslim world, non-Turkish inhabitants were seldom eager to emulate Ankara, and in the Arab world colonial powers quickly filled the political void.

## The Hashimite Monarchy in Iraq

As the Ottoman Empire collapsed, the active Arab Revolt, led by Hashimite leaders, expected to unite a divided nation. The Hashimites were nevertheless caught between Franco-British ambitions as the latter carved the Levant to serve imperial interests. With British blessings, the French crushed Faisal bin Hussein's power base in Damascus and expelled him from Syria on 24 July 1920. Ironically, Paris relied on Arab troops, mostly drawn from Algeria and Morocco, to defeat a nascent independent Arab government. From Makkah, Sharif Hussein dispatched Faisal's elder brother, 'Abdallah, to southern Syria, to assess whether an uprising against the French might be organized. It could not, and 'Abdallah fell back to Amman, situated on the main Hijaz railway. At the time, the city was principally inhabited by Circassians—forcefully evicted from Russia and settled there by previous Ottoman governments—many of whom served loyally successive indigenous military forces.

Whether 'Abdallah anticipated Britain's next moves and whether he carefully manipulated the Franco-British rivalry in the Middle East are difficult to determine. France and Britain conveniently carved the region through their then-secret 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, with Britain receiving both banks of the Jordan River. In Amman, 'Abdallah made a nuisance of himself by openly defying London, and issued several proclamations against Paris's moves in Syria. Moreover, Winston Churchill, then colonial secretary, was keen to address troublesome Arab nationalists whose actions challenged the delicate and recently concluded *entente cordiale* between Britain and France. He traveled to Jerusalem in March and April 1921, when an agreement was reached with the Hashimite. 'Abdallah would thus become ruler of Transjordan and receive an annual stipend if he were to renounce his ambitions in Syria.

The offer was accepted as Amman became the capital of a brand-new Arab country, courtesy of the British crown, although its legitimacy was not attained. In fact, to rule Transjordan, 'Abdallah relied on Circassian guards as well as British officers on secondment to his putative army.<sup>98</sup> With very limited financial resources, the ruler lived modestly, but eventually surrounded himself with the trappings of power by building the impressive Basman Palace. Although contented with his life and severely handicapped by the Zionist movement's considerable gains in British Palestine, he never renounced his quest to become king of Syria.

French political initiatives in Beirut and Damascus eventually resulted in the creation of two republics, in 1943 and 1946 respectively. Britain appended the West Bank to Transjordan in 1948 when Israel was created, but by the same token 'Abdallah absorbed a significant Palestinian population who did not owe him allegiance. British officials may well have had second thoughts, but the die had been cast and the Palestinian quest for independence withered.<sup>99</sup> 'Abdallah was ruler of Transjordan, beholden to London, and a vassal

of the British crown. His exiled brother Faisal was itching to return and, in Churchill's revealing words, was "the best and cheapest solution" to Britain's Iraqi quagmire. Britain failed to subdue the Iraqi opposition after it occupied Baghdad in 1918. Within two years, London had a full-fledged uprising on its hands, and was eager to extricate itself from the quandary. Percy Cox, the British high commissioner stationed in Iraq, supplied London with a list of several "indigenous" names in January 1921, ostensibly to elucidate the difficult task entrusted to foreign office mandarins. Importantly, none of the suggested names were members of the Hashimite dynasty.<sup>100</sup> The futile exercise was of course irrelevant, because Faisal was Churchill's choice, and the former duly arrived in Basrah on a British battleship on 21 June 1921 to assume his functions. His reception was cold, since few Iraqis knew of him and even fewer cared for his putative governing skills. To his credit, Faisal realized that he was indebted to the British for his "throne" and, more important, indebted for the vital military assistance that kept him in power. "Apart from my personal ideals in the direction of Arab nationality," he told the high commissioner, "I am an instrument of British policy. His Majesty's Government and I are in the same boat and must sink or swim together," he stressed.<sup>101</sup> Although aware of the need to appear legitimate in public, he nevertheless stood out as a "Hijazi" among a population who loathed Arabs from the peninsula. Yet, whether he resigned himself to fate or whether he genuinely wished to lead a new nation, Faisal gradually distanced himself from the British because he correctly concluded that the British needed him to. As oil discoveries in northern Iraqi fields accelerated, London perceived Faisal as a palpable ally whose longevity on the throne was an integral part of British objectives in Iraq.<sup>102</sup> For the next twelve years, Faisal forged a relatively strong identity in his kingdom, and erased much of the pent-up ill feelings toward the Hashimites. Importantly, he accomplished this gargantuan task without neglecting his pro-British obligations. Gertrude Bell, one of the "founders" of the Kingdom of Iraq, was always there to advise as necessary.<sup>103</sup>

King Faisal died in Switzerland in 1933 while on a summer vacation. His inexperienced son Ghazi, who ruled until 1939, when he perished in an untimely car accident, succeeded him on the throne. The Harrow-educated Ghazi despised Britain and, more important, its arrogant behavior in and toward Iraq. Ghazi's views concerning British occupation, which he periodically commented on, made him quite popular among a vast majority of Iraqis. Naturally, London frowned on his maverick conduct—some of which was facilitated by carefully selected British advisers to further embarrass the monarch—and resented the king's unperturbed approach to the 1936 military coup led by Kurdish general Baqr al-Sidqi. Against his better judgment, Ghazi had earlier accepted the British-imposed Nuri al-Sa'id as foreign minister, but the latter sought refuge at the British embassy in 1936 when the coup toppled the government.<sup>104</sup> Because Nuri al-Sa'id was an unabashed Anglophile, and because

he itched to reclaim his political as well as social station, King Ghazi's accidental death raised questions about its veracity. Was there any foul play to murder the monarch? Although Iraqis by and large doubted the accident version, no definitive evidence was available at the time, and after all these years even less is available to determine what exactly happened.<sup>105</sup> Suffice it to say that London "became clearly annoyed by the rise in the intensity of the nationalism advocated by Ghazi's personal broadcasting station and, in particular, by its repeated appeals to the Kuwaitis to ditch their shaykh and rejoin Iraq."<sup>106</sup> Simultaneously, the British were astutely assessing the merits of other family members "in case any emergency might arise."<sup>107</sup> What role the queen played in her husband's accident was, and still is, a mystery. Still, it was widely known at the time that Queen 'Aliyah was alienated from her consort, and secretly plotted to have her brother, 'Abdul Illah, reign. Backed by Nuri al-Sa'id, she successfully canvassed the British to appoint 'Abdul Illah regent, given that the king's son, Faisal II, was a minor.<sup>108</sup>

London gave the queen's recommendation careful thought and accepted the proposed regency. The diplomatic hoopla was just that, given that 'Abdul Illah was a well-known British candidate. In the event, the most anglophile regent in imperial history rewarded Britain, except that few Iraqis fell for the ruse. At King Faisal's funeral in Baghdad, mourners were heard chanting: "Thou shalt answer for the blood of Ghazi, O Nuri!"<sup>109</sup> 'Abdul Illah was regent, but in fact Nuri al-Sa'id ruled Iraq, which for all practical purposes meant that the prime minister could do, and did, just as he pleased. For their part, British officials tolerated Nuri al-Sa'id, as long as their primary interests in the country—access to abundant oil resources and regional alliances consecrated through the infamous 1955 Baghdad Pact—were not endangered. Yet, neither London nor the al-Sa'id government were particularly preoccupied with Iraq's social unbalances, recurrent urban revolts, intermittent agrarian disturbances, inflated living costs, as well as the expansion of a voiceless middle class. For over a decade, various policy initiatives were proposed and adopted, including exempting the landed class from paying income taxes and encouraging the transfer of land from peasants to powerful mercantilists, all of which set the stage for the 1958 revolution. Nuri al-Sa'id's decision to sponsor and lead the 1955 Baghdad Pact may well have served British and US Cold War interests, but it surely isolated Iraq from the rest of the Arab world.<sup>110</sup>

As Arab nationalism blossomed in the Levant and in Egypt, and as the 1956 Suez War saw Britain and France joining Israel in an assault on Egypt, Nuri al-Sa'id's government was further weakened. Officers in the Iraqi army, led by the devout Major Rif'at al-Hajj Sirri, organized secret antigovernment cells. Inexperienced and somewhat careless, Sirri was quickly "caught" by the chief of staff, Lieutenant-General Rafiq 'Aref, who nevertheless failed to identify and apprehend hostile soldiers. Dissident officers, led by Brigadier 'Abdul Karim Qasim and Colonel 'Abdul Salam 'Aref, soon swelled the ranks of a

nascent nationalist movement. Clearly, these officers intended to mount a coup, in order to gain independence from the monarchy and its pro-British ruling family.

Qasim and 'Aref proved their cunning on 14 July 1958, when several battalions ostensibly deploying to Jordan rushed into Baghdad and occupied key installations (Ministry of Defense, radio stations, munitions depots, etc.). Both Nuri al-Sa'id's house and the palace were seized. Heir Apparent 'Abdul Illah lacked the will to resist as the Royal Guard surrendered. In the pandemonium that followed, the king, his designated heir, and other members of the Hashimite ruling family were summarily killed. Nuri al-Sa'id, who had escaped, disguised as a woman, was caught on 15 July and immediately executed. His body was unceremoniously dragged through Baghdad's streets and burned, not only to humiliate his extended family members but also to serve as a warning to others.<sup>111</sup> In the words of a prominent historian, the violence was not strange, because it "issue[d] from the dehumanizing conditions in which the *shatgawiyas*—the mud-hutters—of Baghdad subsisted."<sup>112</sup> Thus was Hashimite dynastic rule demolished in British-invented Iraq. Routed in Baghdad by nationalist military officers, and defeated in Makkah by the Al Sa'ud, the Hashimites fell back to Amman.

## ■ Conclusion

Imperial powers literally imposed modernization on Muslim monarchies, which in turn adapted to guarantee dynastic survival. Turkey, Egypt, and in particular Morocco paid a heavy price for contemplating independence. More than any Arab dynasty, the Hashimites paid the ultimate price to Arab nationalism—especially in Iraq. The Al Sa'ud, for their part, restored their own dynastic rule by creating a modern kingdom.

Although most Muslim monarchs capitulated against more potent foes, they were nevertheless an impressive lot. The Ottoman 'Abdul Hamid was subtle, whereas the Persian Reza Shah was clearly driven to carve out an imperial vogue. Faisal of Iraq was astute in his multiple undertakings, while 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Sa'ud was poorly surrounded and unsatisfactorily advised, even if pure genius permitted him to unite Arabia's tribes from the mire of perpetual conflict. Personality mattered, especially when the sovereign was able to govern with a modicum of justice. More often than not, just rulers faced the wrath of foreign intrusion more successfully than counterparts who lacked internal support. In fact, the Ottoman Empire collapsed partly because of sheer British determination to carve up the Muslim world, with the sultan left dangling by his own subjects, who, astonishingly, rejected his malevolent stratagems.

To be sure, fallen monarchs regretted the fate of the Ottoman Empire—allegedly because it united Arabs—but in reality no such unification occurred.

Rather, subsequent regimes, in republics as well as monarchies, salvaged more individual political rights than generally acknowledged. Constantinople attracted Muslim elites from across the empire, but the purposes of those privileged few were simply to serve the sultan and, secondarily, to help themselves. Local needs were subordinate to the padishah's necessities, as the Porte appropriated for its own aggrandizement what was most precious. Yet monarchies survived in several Arab countries throughout the twentieth century, largely because influential sovereigns remained faithful to religion and tribal norms. As Ibn Khaldun brilliantly surmised, "royal authority implies a form of organization necessary to mankind."<sup>113</sup> Even in European-style Arab republics, presidents routinely parodied monarchs by wrapping themselves in majestic trappings. A ruler's personality, family connections, extreme security precautions, and gaggle of titles that concentrated authority in one hand were often greater than in any of the eight remaining monarchies.

Yet effective royal authority required "superiority and force," and while dynasties needed "ordained political norms" to "fully succeed in establishing the supremacy of [their] rule," Ibn Khaldun insisted that "considerations of policy or political decisions" were to be made under *shari'ah* law.<sup>114</sup> Royal authority lacking divine light was tantamount to fulfilling wordly considerations that, ultimately, would not be satisfactory. The purpose of the lawgiver was therefore to guide mankind in this world and prepare its welfare in the after-life. That was the mandate of surviving Arab monarchies.

## ■ Notes

1. Bernard Lewis, "Monarchy in the Middle East," in Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenges of Modernity*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 16. The term *malik* appears in reference to one of the keepers of hell in the Quran (Surah 43:75). See *The Koran*, translated by N. J. Dawood, London: Penguin, 1999, p. 347.

2. Abu Ja'far Muhammad bin Jarir al-Tabari, *Tarikh al-Rusul wal-Muluk* [History of Governments and Kings], vol. 1, Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1960, p. 2754.

3. Lewis, "Monarchy in the Middle East," p. 17.

4. Ibid., p. 19.

5. "Fidei Defensor," *The Economist* 301, no. 7471, 8 November 1986, p. 49.

6. The exception when a ruler changed his title to "king" was Shaykh Hamad bin 'Isa Al Khalifah, who became king in February 2002 when the Shaykhdom of Bahrain was transformed into the Kingdom of Bahrain. This change was made for political rather than legitimizing reasons, because Al Khalifah rule on the island-state, although devout, was already well anchored.

7. Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Tarikh al-Ustaz al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh* [The History of the Master Imam Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh], vol. 2, Cairo: Dar al-Manar, 1947–1948, pp. 83, 390.

8. Abderrahman al-Kawakibi, *Oeuvres Complètes*, Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahdah al-‘Arabiyyah, 1995, p. 415.

9. ‘Abdallah Ibn Muslim Ibn Qutaybah, *Al-Imamah wal-Siyasah* [Politics and the Imamate], vol. 2, Cairo: n.p., 1937, p. 222.

10. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 155.

11. Emile Tyan, *Institutions du Droit Public Musulman*, vol. 2, Paris: Sirey, 1954, p. 435. See also Fred M. Donner, “Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political History of the Islamic Empire up to the Mongol Conquest,” in John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 1–61.

12. Majid Fakhry, “Philosophy and Theology: From the Eighth Century C.E. to the Present,” in Esposito, *The Oxford History of Islam*, pp. 269–303.

13. ‘Umar had no *wali al-‘ahd*, although the companions bestowed their *bay‘ah* onto him. Mu‘awiyah bin Abi Sufyan, founder of the ‘Umayyad dynasty, who ruled from 661 to 680, was the first to identify a *wali al-‘ahd*, his son Yazid, who ruled from 680 to 683.

14. This is, of course, a subjective interpretation, for it may be argued that few rulers have submitted to *shari‘ah* in full even if one were to give most the benefit of the doubt.

15. Henri Laoust, *Politique de Ghazali*, Paris: Geuthner, 1970, p. 217.

16. Abu Ishaq al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqah fi Usul al-Shari‘ah* [The Congruence of Sources in Divine Law], vol. 1, sec. 2, Cairo: Al-Maktabah al-Tijariyyah al-Kubrah, 1975, pp. 64, 92, 102.

17. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, pp. 97, 288.

18. Abu Bakr Muhammad al-Turtushi, *Siraj al-Muluk* [The Light of Kings], London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wal-Nashr, 1990, pp. 40, 77–80.

19. Laoust, *Politique de Ghazali*, p. 250.

20. al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafaqah fi Usul al-Shari‘ah*, vol. 2, sec. 2, p. 105.

21. Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al-Siyasah al-Shar‘iyyah fi Islah al-Ra‘i wal-Ru‘iyyah* [Perspectives and Visions on Legal Political Reforms], Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-‘Arabi, 1966, p. 26.

22. Still, when punishment is meted out, Hanbali School interpretations are not always doctrinaire. While rigid in certain areas, they can be more flexible in specific instances. For example, although punishment for adultery is quite severe (death by stoning), several accusers must testify under oath (itself severely punishable if breached) that they actually observed the act.

23. Ibn Taymiyyah, *Al-Siyasah al-Shar‘iyyah fi Islah al-Ra‘i wal-Ra‘iyyah*, p. 98.

24. al-Turtushi, *Siraj al-Muluk*, pp. 47–48.

25. Abu al-Hassan ‘Ali Ibn Muhammad al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah* [Principles of Rule], translated into French by E. Sagnan, as *Les Statuts Gouvernementsaux*, Alger: Jourdan, 1915 (reprint of 1880–1881 edition), p. 5.

26. This is amply clear in al-Ghazali’s monumental *Nasihah al-Muluk* [Advice to Kings]. See Laoust, *Politique de Ghazali*, p. 115.

27. Abu Nasr al-Farabi, *Ara‘ Ahl al-Madinah al-Fadilah* [Views of the People in the Virtuous City], Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1968.

28. Al-Tahtawi, perhaps the first Egyptian in contemporary history to articulate an idea of a renewed Egyptian nation, studied in Paris for five years (1826–1831), where



he learned about, and was strongly influenced by, the French Enlightenment. See Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983, pp. 69–70. See also Rifa‘a Badawi Rafi‘ al-Tahtawi, *Takhlis al-Ibriz ila Talkhis Bariz* [The Golden Quintessence of Paris], Cairo: Fahmi, 1905, p. 197.

29. Muhammad Rashid Rida, *Al-Khilafah* [The Caliphate], Cairo: n.p., 1922–1923. See also Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, pp. 239–244.

30. Ahmad Ibn Abu al-Diyaf, *Ithaf Ahl al-Zaman bi Akhbar Muluk Tunis wa ‘Ahd al-Aman* [Presenting Contemporaries the History of the Rulers of Tunis and the Fundamental Pact], Tunis: Nashr Kitabat al-Dawlah lil-Shu‘un al-Thaqafiyyah wal-Ikhhbar, 1963, pp. 9–71. This important study was translated and annotated by L. Carl Brown in *Consult Them in the Matter: A Nineteenth-Century Islamic Argument for Constitutional Government*, Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2005.

31. First published in Cairo in 1925, and considered by a vast majority of contemporary Arab writers as the seminal work on the subject in the twentieth century, ‘Abdul Raziq’s critical study is immensely enlightening. See ‘Ali ‘Abdul Raziq, *Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm: Bahith fil-Khilafah wal-Hukmah fil-Islam* [Islam and the Principles of Governance: A Thesis on the Caliphate and Government in Islam], translated into French as Ali Abderraziq, *L’Islam et les Fondements du Pouvoir*, Paris: Éditions La Découverte/CEDEJ, 1994 (reprint of 1966 edition).

32. Joseph A. Kéchichian and R. Hrair Dekmejian, *The Just Prince: A Manual of Leadership*, London: Saqi, 2003, p. 111.

33. *Porte*, meaning “Gate,” is the term used to refer to Ottoman governments and, by implication, to rulers. From Constantinople, successive sultans—who were fluent in French—encouraged the use of the designation to signify that entrance through it could provide earthly salvation. See Carter V. Findlay, *Bureaucratic Reforms in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

34. Bauer, whose real name was Hermann Cohen, was born in 1829 in Budapest, and converted to Catholicism in Paris. He joined the Carmelite Order, but eventually left and distinguished himself as a pulpit orator. First in Vienna, where he delivered a series of addresses that were published in 1866 under the title “Le Judaïsme Comme Preuve du Christianisme,” he became father confessor to Empress Eugénie in 1867. He delivered his now infamous dedicatory address at the opening of the Suez Canal on 17 November 1869. After the downfall of the empire, Bauer exchanged the bishopric for the turf, and became a fancier of racehorses. For the text of the inaugural speech at the canal, see “Speech Given by Monsignor Bauer,” [http://www.napoleon.org/en/special\\_dossier/suez/html-content/inauguration/ceremonie/discours.html](http://www.napoleon.org/en/special_dossier/suez/html-content/inauguration/ceremonie/discours.html).

35. Britain had already weakened the Muhammad ‘Ali regime and sent it back to Egypt, and London, of course, intervened in Lebanon to “protect” Protestant communities there.

36. Ann K. S. Lambton, *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*, London: Variorum Reprints, 1980, pp. 420, 424, 433.

37. Philip Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, London: Parkway, 1988, p. 15. I have relied on Mansel’s rich bibliography throughout this chapter.

38. The Greek War of Independence started in 1822 and stood as a worrisome model for Ottoman sultans.

39. Pierre Crabitès, *Ismaïl: The Maligned Khedive*, London: Routledge, 1933, p. 197.

40. It is because many of its members spoke fluent French that the movement was known as Jeune Turquie (Young Turks), although they were led by Mustafa Fazil—brother of Egyptian khedive Isma‘il. While several motives may be attributed to Fazil’s radicalization, a major reason for his stand was his open resentment for being passed over as vassal of the Porte in Egypt. For a solid presentation, see Feroz Ahmed, *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914*, Oxford: Clarendon, 1969.

41. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 20.

42. Henry G. Elliott, *Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences*, New York: Dutton, 1922, p. 231.

43. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 21.

44. Roderic H. Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876*, New York: Gordian, 1973 [1963], p. 403.

45. How well many of these leading religious scholars were received is subject to interpretation. While ‘Abdul Hamid II listened to and valued advice, most of his guests were often “virtual prisoners of the Sultan although [they were] treated with honor.” See Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, p. 112.

46. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 23.

47. Samantha Power, *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*, New York: Perennial, 2003, pp. 1–16, esp. p. 8. For a detailed analysis of the 1895 massacres, see Frederick Greene, *Armenian Massacres, or the Sword of Mohammed*, Philadelphia: International Publishing, 1896. See also Peter Balakian, *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America’s Response*, New York: HarperCollins, 2003, pp. 53–62.

48. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 29.

49. Ahmed, *The Young Turks*, p. 28.

50. This is a key point, because much credit is generally given to the clairvoyance of Ottoman sultans in organizing and modernizing the empire’s armed forces. For an example, see Bernard Lewis, *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 18–34.

51. Jacob Goldberg, *The Foreign Policy of Sa‘udi Arabia: The Formative Years, 1902–1918*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986, p. 106.

52. For a magisterial analysis of Egypt during this period, see Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

53. Crabitès, *Ismail*, p. 154.

54. Three newspapers were in multiple languages: Turkish and Arabic, Arabic and French, and Arabic, French, and Italian. See Alexander Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians: The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878–1882*, New York: Ithaca Press, 1981, pp. 107–109.

55. John Marlowe, *Spoiling the Egyptians*, New York: St. Martin’s, 1975, pp. 119, 135.

56. F. Robert Hunter, *Egypt Under the Khedive, 1805–1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*, Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984, pp. 65, 181, 183.

57. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 43.

58. Schölch, *Egypt for the Egyptians*, pp. 163, 186.

59. Ibid., pp. 172, 311.
60. Muriel E. Chamberlain, "The Alexandria Massacres of June 1882 and the British Occupation of Egypt," *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 1, January 1977, pp. 14–39.
61. Naturally, all rulers had religious links, and most went to mosque. The point here is that several reconsidered their behavior after careful reflection to preserve intrinsic political interests.
62. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 47.
63. Philip Magnus, *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist*, London: Murray, 1958, p. 84. See also John Pollock, *Kitchener: Architect of Victory, Artisan of Peace*, New York: Carroll and Graf, 2002.
64. Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*, London: Murray, 1968, p. 139.
65. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 162.
66. Toussoun, a cousin of Prince Fouad, made the suggestion at a tea party at Ras el-Tine Palace on 9 October 1918. See Janice J. Terry, *Cornerstone of Egyptian Political Power: The Wafd, 1919–1952*, London: Third World Centre, 1982, pp. 75–76, 103.
67. For a background on Egyptian nationalism, see Afaf Lutfi al-Sayyid Marsot, *Egypt's Liberal Experiment, 1922–1936*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
68. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 169.
69. Ibid., p. 54.
70. Leon Carl Brown, *The Tunisia of Ahmed Bey, 1837–1855*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
71. For background details on Tunisian affairs, see Nicola A. Ziadeh, *Origins of Nationalism in Tunisia*, Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1962. See also the seminal work by Jacques Berque, *French North Africa: The Maghreb Between Two World Wars*, translated by J. Stewart, London: Farber and Faber, 1967.
72. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *The Sanusi of Cyrenaica*, London: Oxford University Press, 1949.
73. Kenneth Perkins, *Qaids, Captains, and Colons: French Military Administration in the Colonial Maghrib, 1844–1934*, New York: Africana, 1981.
74. For a detailed examination of al-Mukhtar's political role, see Qadri Qal'aji, *Thamaniyat min Abtal al-'Arab: Hikayat al-Ayam al-Madiyat li anba' al-Ayam al-Atiyat* [Eight Arab Heroes: Bygone Stories for Future Generations], Beirut: Sharikat al-Matba'at lil-Tawzi' wal-Nashr, 1997, pp. 53–100.
75. Arnold H. Green, *The Tunisian Ulama, 1873–1915: Social Structure and Response to Ideological Currents*, Leiden: Brill, 1978.
76. C. R. Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*, Oxford: Oneworld, 2003, pp. 83–88.
77. Ibid., pp. 97–114.
78. For an overview of the French occupation, see Charles-Robert Ageron, *Les Algériens Musulmans et la France (1871–1919)*, 2 vols., Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.
79. Pennell, *Morocco*, pp. 115–136.
80. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 58.
81. French and British negotiations granted Spain special allowances, but conveniently failed to explain its intricate nuances to the young Moroccan ruler. Unfortunately,

and because the latter was far more interested in the “pleasures” of rule than its heavy burdens, wily Europeans operated more or less freely to do as they pleased. See Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 59. See also Pennell, *Morocco*, pp. 135–136.

82. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 60.

83. The seminal work on the marshall is André Maurois, *Lyautey*, New York: Appleton, 1931, esp. pp. 214–226. See also Alan Schamm, *Lyautey in Morocco*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.

84. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 63.

85. Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 140.

86. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, p. 269.

87. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 113.

88. Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age*, p. 285. See also Hanna Batatu, *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'athists, and Free Officers*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978, p. 322.

89. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 115.

90. C. Ernest Dawn, *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973, p. 82.

91. George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, New York: Lippincott, 1939.

92. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 118.

93. Ali Kazancigil and Ergun Özbüdün, eds., *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*, Hamden, Conn.: Arehon, 1981. See also Lord Kinross, *Atatürk*, New York: Morrow, 1965.

94. Mustafa Kemal Pasha “felt close enough to the Sultan to ask for his daughter’s hand in marriage in the summer of 1918,” but the ruler, “out of concern for his daughter, knowledge of Kemal’s history of venereal disease or distrust of his ambition,” refused. See Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 119.

95. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 119. See also Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*, vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977, pp. 341–342.

96. Richard Hovannisian, ed., *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*, New York: St. Martin’s, 1992. See also Vahakn Dadrian, *The History of the Armenian Genocide*, Providence, R.I.: Berghahn, 1995.

97. Mansel, *Sultans in Splendour*, p. 122.

98. Abd Allah Ibn Hussein, *My Memoirs Completed “Al Takmilah,”* translated by W. Gibson, London: Longman, 1978, p. 73.

99. Elizabeth Monroe, *Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1971*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, esp. pp. 151–177.

100. Helmut Mejcher, *Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq, 1910–1928*, Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1976, p. 76.

101. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 324.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 325.

103. Gertrude Lowthian Bell, *The Desert and the Sown*, London: Virago, 1985 (reprint of 1907 edition). See also Rosemary O’Brien, ed., *Gertrude Bell: The Arabian Diaries, 1913–1914*, Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000.

104. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, pp. 337–338.

105. Monroe, *Britain's Moment in the Middle East*, p. 122.

106. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 343.

107. Ibid.

108. Ibid., pp. 344–345.

109. Ibid., p. 344.

110. For a thorough analysis of inter-Arab relations during this period, see Malcolm Kerr, *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970*, London: Oxford University Press, 1973.

111. For one of the best discussions on the fall of the monarchy, see Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, pp. 764–807.

112. Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*, p. 802.

113. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, p. 154.

114. Ibid., pp. 154–155.



# 3

---

## Bahrain

**T**he Al Khalifah of Bahrain traced their origins to the ‘Utub tribal confederation. The clan, which was also settled in Kuwait, migrated south to Qatar in 1766 under the leadership of Muhammad bin Khalifah. The latter successfully negotiated with Musallam tribesmen who, in turn, acquiesced to the former—along with his five sons—to settle near Zubarah, on the northwesterly shore of the Qatar promontory. In exchange for this compliance, Muhammad bin Khalifah and his sons agreed to pay the Musallam an annual levy. Zubarah prospered by local standards, especially after Basrah, heretofore the pearl trade capital of the Gulf, fell under Persian occupation in 1776. A number of Basrah residents, especially those involved in the lucrative pearl trade, migrated to Zubarah to escape Persian suzerainty and, partly, to avoid paying additional taxes.<sup>1</sup>

In 1782, ‘Utub tribesmen led by the Al Khalifah landed on the island of Bahrain, then a Persian colony. Persian tradesmen, who considered Zubarah a direct competitor to their commercial entrepôt in Bahrain, moved against the ‘Utub. Surprisingly, a Persian military attempt to expel the ‘Utub from Bahrain failed in 1783, despite significant military advantages. In fact, it was this setback that motivated successive Persian and Iranian officials to reject the Al Khalifah’s sovereignty over Bahrain for the next two centuries. The late Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi reluctantly acknowledged the Al Khalifah ruling family as Bahrain’s rulers in 1970, but only after a United Nations referendum and a devastating quid pro quo that linked Tehran’s decision over Bahrain to several “understandings” over the United Arab Emirates’ Abu Musa and Tunb Islands.<sup>2</sup>

### ■ Creation and Cohesion

The Al Khalifah moved from Zubarah to Bahrain after the Pyrrhic 1783 victory against Persia because they knew that Iran was the inevitable major regional

power destined to influence the area, and because prudence required the adoption of alternative strategies. In addition to the Persian threat, tribal differences and several clashes between the Al Sa'ud in Najd and 'Utub tribes in Kuwait persuaded the Al Khalifah to seek a more secure environment. Ahmad bin Khalifah, who would become known as Ahmad al-Fatih (Ahmad the Conqueror) assumed authority in Bahrain and strengthened his rule by creating an ideal commercial environment, certainly by regional standards. Above all else, the Al Khalifah were shrewd businessmen who nurtured various contacts, and who entered into lucrative accords with a number of regional and international actors. From Muharraq Island, facing the Manama hamlet that would eventually become the capital city, the Al Khalifah sought to defend a perceived independence from all, but especially from Persian dominion, Ottoman supremacy, Sa'udi tribal competition, and British colonialism.<sup>3</sup>

Yet the Al Khalifah, reeling from Omani incursions onto the islands in 1800 and 1802, were fearful of the latest Al Sa'ud occupation of Zubarah. Partly to offset Omani gains, and partly to protect commercial interests, they reluctantly aligned themselves with the Al Sa'ud. In 1810, Qatif, Qatar, and Bahrain all fell under direct Al Sa'ud suzerainty. 'Abdallah bin 'Ufaysan emerged as local leader, and in turn was instructed to prevent another Omani gain.<sup>4</sup> In the event, Sa'id bin Sultan leveled Zubarah and, although overstretched throughout his growing empire, installed the Al Khalifah to rule Bahrain as his vassals. Still, the latter double-crossed the Omani by realigning with the Al Sa'ud.

In the interim, the Al Khalifah confronted an entirely different reality—the overwhelming British military incursion into the region. Although London destroyed the Qawasim in Ras al-Khaimah in 1819, it could not match Sultan bin Saqr's prowess, which inevitably required more skillful diplomacy. Indeed, the 1820 imposed truce gave the British *carte blanche* to impose their will on the Lower Gulf, but the action had little impact on Bahrain.<sup>5</sup> The Al Khalifah, perennial capitalists who understood how to protect assets gained with immense difficulty, sheltered Qawasim ships and provided the latter with alternative entrepôt facilities. Yet, as Bahrain was not party to the 1820 General Treaty of Peace, Al Khalifah rulers eventually sought to adhere to it, fearful of London's regional military intentions. Salman bin Ahmad and 'Abdallah bin Ahmad Al Khalifah sought and received British "protection." It was a smooth surrender that portended to avoid what befell the Qawasim in Ras al-Khaimah.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Ruling Family**

When Salman bin Ahmad Al Khalifah died in 1825, his son Khalifah bin Salman shared rulership with his uncle, 'Abdallah bin Ahmad (see Appendix 3 for a list of Al Khalifah rulers). Khalifah co-ruled but died of natural causes in 1834. Senior family members then assumed that Khalifah's own son, Muhammad bin Khalifah, would rule jointly with his great-uncle 'Abdallah, if



for no other reason than to maintain family harmony and well-established traditions. In the event, the wily 'Abdallah, by now advanced in age, refused this succession arrangement for about six years. As palace feuding accelerated, and a steady exodus from Bahrain followed, discontent among the population spread. 'Abdallah's wrath against his great-nephew upset internal harmony with a clear division emerging within the family.<sup>7</sup>

On Salman's sudden death, 'Abdallah tried to establish himself as absolute ruler, provoking a major and bloody conflict within the family. The ensuing power struggle weakened Al Khalifah rule considerably, and the conflict was partially untangled only after 'Abdallah was deported to Zubarah in 1843 by his nephew Muhammad bin Khalifah bin Salman. The eviction was achieved with the support of the Bin 'Ali and Bu 'Aynayn tribes, whose allegiance was rapidly reversed as Shi'ah families became subject to systematic extortion.<sup>8</sup> Muhammad bin Khalifah bin Salman probably committed a major political error by subjugating Shi'ah families to ensure the tribe's putative security requirements. Simultaneously, the rapidly expanding Al Sa'ud exploited Al Khalifah internal frictions to extend their own geopolitical sphere of influence. In fact, the two branches of the Al Khalifah, one in Manama and the other near Zubarah in Qatar, fought in 1869, each supported by allies providing additional manpower as required. The devastating attack on Bahrain forced British authorities to intervene and impose a semblance of order. Both leaders were expelled and Bahrain was entrusted to the rule of 'Isa bin 'Ali, a great-nephew of Muhammad bin Khalifah who was barely twenty-one. Despite occasional attempts by the sons and grandsons of the exiled 'Abdallah to unsettle 'Isa, the shaykh ruled peacefully for fifty-four years—until 1923—when he was succeeded by his son Hamad.<sup>9</sup>

***Hamad bin 'Isa (r. 1923–1942).*** Bahrain was literally on the threshold of the oil age when 'Isa died on 9 December 1932. Barely six months had passed since oil had been discovered near Jabal al-Dukhan. The year was also memorable for the introduction of telephone and air services. Imperial Airways inaugurated its first flight to Muharraq Island, after Britain reached a deadlock with Iran that, for political rather than economic reasons, marked the transfer of the air route from Persia to the Arabian littoral.<sup>10</sup> This was a major shift, and encouraged a rapid expansion in Bahraini-British ties, especially at a time when the pearling industry had started its steady decline.

Within a single year, Bahrain exported its first barrels of petroleum, fortuitously permitting the Al Khalifah to embark on a sustained socioeconomic boom. Except for a brief Italian intervention in 1940, World War II did not particularly affect Bahrain, although the British air and naval bases on the island were used intermittently to advance allied interests.<sup>11</sup> The "shaykh," as most Bahrainis affectionately knew him, set the small emirate on the prosperity path by encouraging a sustained relationship with Britain. For him, perhaps more

than other Gulf rulers, London's umbrella was a true blessing. In fact, he perceived Britain as being a regional protective shield, as well as guarantor of internal stability. Remarkably, Hamad bin 'Isa, a ruler who labored diligently, admired the Victorian work ethic and hoped to adopt it as a genuinely positive model for Bahrain. He pursued a heavy schedule and, despite his diabetic condition, almost never slowed down. He died on 22 February 1942.<sup>12</sup>

**Salman bin Hamad (r. 1942–1961).** Much like his father, Salman bin Hamad supported Britain during the war and after, because London provided undeniable benefits to the Al Khalifah. According to one observer, the ruler revealed that his father advised him “to always trust the British,” which Salman dutifully did.<sup>13</sup> Still, repeated British maneuverings created undeniable friction, and after 1942 he reportedly operated on the principle of being “wary of the British when they tell you something for your own good.”<sup>14</sup> The shrewd ruler must have concluded that he needed British support as much as the latter relied on the shaykhdom's oil resources. With added oil revenues, the result of astute renegotiations, Salman channeled new financial resources into Bahrain's growing infrastructure needs. The country adopted the Gregorian calendar in 1947, ostensibly to coordinate with Western companies lured to the Gulf, but in reality to streamline budgetary woes. Starting in the early 1950s, Bahrain experienced a series of industrial strikes that threatened the country's economic stability. Salman bin Hamad understood that an effective response was required and proposed and adopted the Bahrain Labor Law in August 1955. Under its provisions, workers were no longer mere subjects, but endowed with rights and privileges.<sup>15</sup> The ruler detected a growing anti-British sentiment among his increasingly educated population, which prompted him to introduce the first Bahrainization steps within the bureaucracy.

Indeed, internal developments in Bahrain moved along at such a rapid pace that other Gulf rulers took notice. Several established contact to coordinate responses, especially as oil workers elsewhere on the Arabian Peninsula perceived their Bahraini counterparts as pace-setters. In 1948, the Al Sa'ud monarch 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman visited Manama, where a critical bilateral accord was signed. The two rulers stipulated that oil revenues from the Abu Safa' offshore field, falling in the yet undefined maritime border area, would be equally divided between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. By entering into this epoch-making accord, Salman bin Hamad—still under British tutelage—challenged the status quo. At the time, Gulf rulers hesitated before pretending to oppose Britain, but the Al Sa'ud offer to settle a border dispute proved too enticing to forego. This bold initiative served Salman's son and successor well. Salman instructed his successor to foster friendly ties with its natural neighbor. When he suffered a debilitating heart attack in June 1959, from which he never recovered, Salman turned to Riyadh for solace. The Al Sa'ud rose to the occasion and, when the ruler died on 2 November 1961, provided both finan-

cial and military assistance to support the new leaders. ‘Isa bin Salman acceded to the Bahraini rulership on 16 December 1961.<sup>16</sup>

## ■ Constitutional Continuum in Bahrain

Between 1961 and 1971, the lead-up to Bahrain’s proclamation of independence from Britain, the small shaykhdom experienced a noticeable socioeconomic boom. Gradually, a “middle-class” work force emerged and revolutionized the island. More cosmopolitan than all of their neighbors, Bahrainis quickly acquired necessary business wherewithal. Society was evolving at great speed, placing an onus on the Al Khalifah to keep pace.

### Isa bin Salman (r. 1961–1999)

‘Isa bin Salman rose to the occasion immediately after his accession to Bahrain’s rulership on 16 December 1961. In 1964, he established the Bahrain Currency Board to replace the Indian rupee, then in circulation. A new currency, the Bahraini dinar, was introduced in October 1965, six years before formal autonomy. ‘Isa Town, a modern city, was started in 1967 to provide free housing to a growing number of Bahraini subjects. ‘Isa also authorized the establishment of a national guard to form the embryo of the future armed forces under the command of heir apparent Hamad bin ‘Isa.<sup>17</sup> Telecommunication installations followed, transforming the island into a modern city-state, well before London transferred sovereignty to the ruling family. Perhaps pressed by the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, but certainly because of the 1968 British announcement of an imminent withdrawal from the region, Bahrain entered into political discussions with Qatar and the seven Lower Gulf shaykhdoms to weigh the feasibility of a federation. Although the experiment failed for the nine shaykhdoms, ‘Isa displayed keen political savvy, championing Bahraini interests. That, coupled with his wish to equip the country with an effective constitution, marked his thirty-seven-year rule as shaykh.

**A constitutional legacy.** Even before the development of the oil industry and the creation of limited bureaucratic entities, the Al Khalifah were pressured by both family disputes as well as external threats to alter the island’s sociopolitical makeup. The challenge to the regime “drifted to the rising new forces—the Shi‘ah, the labor force, the students, and the underground political parties.”<sup>18</sup> Yet the confrontation changed over the century, and while the quest for power and property dominated tribal affairs, popular participation and legitimacy preoccupied Bahrainis starting in the late 1950s. At the time, a series of violent clashes between Shi‘ah and Sunni Bahrainis threatened to destroy the nascent nation-building framework.<sup>19</sup>

Having witnessed these clashes and, more important, their lingering effects, 'Isa bin Salman proposed to remedy Bahrain's systemic ills. To his credit, when the British announced their imminent departure from the Persian Gulf in 1968, the ruler foresaw popular participation and the adoption of several institutional reforms as being in the best interests of his people. True to his vision, Bahrain's first governmental institutions were established on 19 January 1970, when 'Isa formed the Council of Ministers, whose purpose was to serve as a working cabinet.<sup>20</sup> Members of the council were mainly drawn from the Al Khalifah family, who helped 'Isa govern until the British withdrawal and Manama's declaration of independence on 11 August 1971. Two years after the establishment of the council, on 20 July 1972, 'Isa announced that elections would be held on 1 December 1972 to elect a constitutional assembly, which in turn would ratify a new constitution.

Approximately 27,000 male Bahrainis went to the polls on 1 December 1972 to select twenty-two deputies from a list of fifty-eight candidates. In addition to these elected officials, membership to the Constitutional Assembly was extended to all twelve cabinet officers (the Council of State) as *ex officio* members, as well as to eight prominent individuals appointed by the ruler, for a total of forty-two parliamentarians.<sup>21</sup> The Bahraini National Liberation Front (BNLF) and the Bahraini branch of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG) (later known as the Bahraini Liberation Front [BLF]) boycotted the 1972 elections. At the time, leaders representing both of these popular organizations demanded that the ruler lift the state of emergency imposed after the March 1972 riots, release from prison all those arrested, and allow Bahraini women to cast ballots in the general suffrage. Perhaps not surprisingly, 'Isa bin Salman rejected these demands and opted to seek support from another opposition group. A general pardon was issued to members of the Committee of National Union (CNU), whose leaders were exiled to Lebanon and Syria. CNU pioneers, including 'Abdul 'Aziz Shamlan—who was deported by the British to the island of St. Helena in 1967—accepted the ruler's amnesty, and participated in the electoral process. In fact, of twenty-two deputies elected in 1972, ten were CNU members, with Shamlan as the new vice speaker of the Constitutional Assembly.<sup>22</sup>

The 1972 elections revealed that ideological groupings were forming within the Constitutional Assembly that threatened to cripple the proposed task of drafting a constitution. Discernible voting blocs emerged in the assembly around the twelve government ministers and the eight appointed members who together represented wealthy Sunni as well as leading Shi'ah business interests. This progovernment bloc voted in unison, in contrast to a second faction of conservative religious leaders who perceived the constitutional debate from a fundamentalist Shi'ah perspective. A third and final bloc consisted of "liberal, pragmatic, bourgeois nationalists, which was rarely able to present a unified position."<sup>23</sup>

The Constitutional Assembly deliberated for a total of forty-five sessions, and presented the emir with a document consisting of 109 articles for ratification and promulgation. A constitution, largely modeled on its Kuwaiti counterpart, was promulgated, declaring Islam as the state religion (Article 2). It also declared a democratic system of government, with sovereignty residing with the people, the source of all power (Article 1d).<sup>24</sup> It vested the ruler (Article 33) and his ministers in the Council of State with executive powers, but also charged them with certain responsibilities, including duties toward the legislature. In turn, the National Assembly's thirty elected members would be responsible to the electorate (Articles 42–82) for the period of their tenure, four calendar years (Article 45). According to the 1973 constitution, the prime minister and his cabinet could not be dismissed through a no-confidence vote, though individual ministers could (Article 68). If the assembly failed to cooperate with the cabinet, parliamentary leaders were authorized to petition the head of state to dismiss the legislative body (Article 69). The emir could then either accept the petition or reject the proposal made by assembly leaders. Interestingly, this first assembly allowed the legislative branch to share power with the head of state, as the latter was given authority to initiate new legislation, promulgate laws already approved by parliament within thirty days, or send them back to the assembly for further debate and amendments. If, at the end of a thirty-day period, a bill had neither been returned to the legislative body nor approved, it automatically became law (Article 35). The emir, on the other hand, was entitled to adopt emergency measures independent of the legislature when the latter was not in session, subject to ratification (Article 38). A decision to dissolve the assembly required fresh elections within a period of two months (Article 65).<sup>25</sup>

Finally, the 1973 Bahrain constitution recognized that succession was hereditary, based on a primogeniture system. Article 1b declared that rule shall be “transmitted from His Highness Shaykh ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah to his eldest son and then to the eldest son of this son and so forth, generation after generation, unless, during his lifetime, the emir appoints one of his sons other than the eldest as his successor.”<sup>26</sup> Remarkably, the 1972 constitution empowered the ruling family to alter succession regulations by simple decree (Articles 1c and 104c). The principle of primogeniture was thus established in 1972 as the Al Khalifah distanced their rule from prevailing consensus-driven approaches widely accepted throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Still, acknowledging the constitutional formulation of dynastic politics did not entirely eliminate the quest for consensus, necessary because a minority Sunni family ruled over a Shi‘ah majority (see Appendix 4 for excerpts from the constitution).

**Political clashes.** Deliberations within the Constitutional Assembly quickly clarified the rules under which Bahrain's National Assembly would be elected. A year after the Constitutional Assembly had been formed, elections were held

to form a new legislative body that would be composed of thirty elected and fourteen ex officio members, all cabinet officers.<sup>27</sup>

On 7 December 1973, 112 candidates stood for election in the country's twenty wards; of those 112, 30 were elected. No candidate was allowed to run on a party ticket, implying that all 112 candidates were "independent." Two main factions quickly emerged, however: a people's alliance, including so-called leftist candidates; and a religious faction.<sup>28</sup> The People's Bloc consisted of ten members "organized [along a] party base linked to political movements outside the country." They represented working-class Bahrainis, with several leaders having actively participated in student labor strikes throughout the 1960s. With one exception, they belonged to urban families, both Shi'ah and Sunni, from Manama or Muharraq. Not surprisingly, most were high achievers, with advanced academic training. The president of the new National Assembly, Hassan Jawad Al Jishshi, a forty-nine-year-old Shi'ah, emerged from the ranks of the alliance.<sup>29</sup>

Unlike the People's Bloc, which organized over several years, albeit outside Bahrain, the Religious Bloc lacked practical organization prior to 1972. Six of the National Assembly's thirty-strong Religious Bloc won complete endorsements from various constituents. Of the six, two were attorneys, one was a journalist, one was a 'alim, and two were elementary school teachers. Interestingly, the six may have "won the election through the influence of some high religious authorities who chose not to indulge directly in politics." This tacit support by influential religious figures coincided with the attitude of the Al Khalifah family, whose senior members "refused to subject their authority to a popular vote."<sup>30</sup> Yet, while religious figures refused to subject their authority to political controversy and competition, such nuances were no longer valid in Bahrain. Religiosity became "a political issue, much more so among the Shi'ah than the Sunni, which [had] forced Shi'ah religious authorities to interfere directly in politics (the elections) through second-rank jurists, mullahs, or other religionists."<sup>31</sup> In parliament, the Religious Bloc supported labor demands, and proposed stricter rules for the sale of liquor as well as a host of customary and social issues, ranging from relations between the sexes to Islamic teachings.

These two political camps shared "legislative" powers with a large group of independent parliamentarians whose seventeen votes would swing from right to left depending on the issue. Unlike the People's Bloc or the Religious Bloc, independents lacked a reliable power base. Lacking a balancing constituency, National Assembly ranks were split, with significant minority voices emanating from the two extremist groups. The assembly plunged into chaos, with a defining moment on 28 October 1974 following major riots initiated by workers in January and June of that year. In response, the ruler sought the passage of a special "law on state security," which sanctioned the government to "arrest and imprison any citizen without investigation or trial for a term of up

to three years on suspicion of ‘opposing’ the government’s domestic or foreign policy.”<sup>32</sup> Opposition forces refused to vote on the proposed bill, despite the emir’s sustained efforts. Frustrated by the assembly’s inaction on repeated requests, ‘Isa bin Salman dissolved parliament ten months later, and suspended the constitution on 26 August 1975.<sup>33</sup> A number of prominent deputies were arrested on the grounds that the cabinet could not work with parliamentarians whose regulations contravened the “law.” Denouncing deputies for having incited riots, the interior minister declared that parliamentary life would only resume once electoral laws had been completely reformed, and existing “irregularities” removed.

A few days prior to the suspension of the constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly, the interior minister announced that thirty members of the CNU and the BLF had been arrested because they represented a grave danger to the security of Bahrain. Several other confederacies, including the Union of Bahraini Students (UBS), were asked to suspend their activities and accept Ministry of Interior guidelines if they wished to remain lawful. On 24 August 1975, the prime minister presented his resignation, only to form a new government the following day.<sup>34</sup>

While the emir’s decree stated that the constitution had been “suspended” and the National Assembly dissolved because the executive and legislative branches could no longer function as a team, opposition members concluded that foreign influences had motivated Manama to act against them. Presumably, Saudi Arabia pressured the ruler to suspend the Bahraini constitution because of hostility, from Riyadh in particular, to any parliamentary experiments on the Arabian Peninsula, especially if it tolerated leftist representation. It was equally probable that opposition demands to nationalize foreign business entities, including oil companies, banks, refineries, and insurance companies, as well as calls to end US military privileges on the island, all prompted the emir to suspend the entire democratic experiment in Bahrain. Yet another explanation was the spillover effects of the Lebanese civil war, whose sectarian features partially mimicked Bahrain’s own demographic mosaic. A more likely speculation, however, focused “on the inherent contradiction between tribally controlled governments and the system of representation” that existed throughout the Arabian Peninsula.<sup>35</sup> In fact, popular representation required a careful balance between tribally inspired governments and emerging democratic institutions, which did not always serve ruling family interests. Even if the latter traced their roots to established clans, senior Al Khalifah leaders concluded that democratization was too risky. ‘Isa bin Salman and his brother Khalifah bin Salman joined hands to oppose those who aspired to alter the shaykhdom’s sociopolitical makeup.

**Opposition to the Al Khalifah.** Whether opposition to Al Khalifah rule originated “from a very small but skillful group of fundamentalist zealots and

extremists” or from more legitimate sources, the fact that such groups flourished after 1976 was too serious a challenge to ignore.<sup>36</sup> Manama chose to confront its foes head on, amending its State Security Measures Law of 1974, and quickly thereafter the 1976 penal code as well as other laws and decrees. These measures allowed the Al Khalifah to detain alleged criminals for unlimited periods of time. In this instance, the otherwise visionary ‘Isa—perhaps under strong family pressure—failed to follow up on his original desire to wean out the overt British security presence, which seconded Manama in maintaining law and order.<sup>37</sup> On the contrary, ‘Isa approved the appointment of J. S. Bell as chief of police, and after 1965 the Al Khalifah employed Ian Stewart Henderson as a deputy officer responsible for a then-forming special police division. Over time, Henderson became head of Security and Intelligence, later renamed the Idarat Amn al-Dawlah (State Security Directorate). He further assumed additional leadership roles as head of the Public Security Directorate as well as the Criminal Investigations Directorate. To say that Henderson had too much power—controlling these three directorates—would be an understatement. To infer that the British police officer served the Al Khalifah would not. In the event, little opposition was tolerated after 1974, and even less after parliament was dissolved in 1976.

Whether inspired by the 1978–1979 Iranian Revolution or the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Bahraini Shi‘ah leaders sought to establish an Islamic republic on the island-state, which naturally displeased the Sunni ruling family. In December 1981, Manama arrested over seventy-five individuals, charged them with plotting to overthrow the regime with Iranian assistance, and tried them for crimes against the state.<sup>38</sup> In early 1982, three defendants received life sentences, fifty-nine were imprisoned for fifteen years, and ten received seven-year judgments. As a result of this trial, several Bahrainis were exiled or voluntarily opted to leave the island in search of a safe heaven. Relative calm returned to Bahrain.

The hiatus was short-lived, though, as the Gulf region became enflamed in the eight-year Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988) and, after the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a January 1991 US-led UN-sanctioned war to liberate the shaykhdom. The Kuwaiti liberation, more than any other development, galvanized many Bahrainis to press for political rights. From their exile in Ta‘if, Saudi Arabia, Kuwaiti leaders promised to restore their suspended parliament by holding elections immediately after liberation, as well as introducing genuine political reforms. Led by ‘Isa bin Salman, several Al Khalifah leaders realized that the shaykhdom’s imminent liberation would usher democratization throughout the region, including in Bahrain. Such dramatic changes preoccupied each Arab Gulf ruling family, whose leaders engaged in various informal debates at the next Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit.<sup>39</sup> Manama, in particular, was involved in a major internal deliberation, with the ruler supporting reformist calls while his brother, Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman, cautiously



weighed the consequences of fast reforms. In early 1992, Manama expressed a desire to restore suspended residency rights, and allow exiled citizens to return home.<sup>40</sup> Shaykh 'Isa pardoned several imprisoned critics, authorized the restoration of suspended subsidies for poor Bahrainis, and even welcomed a delegation that submitted a petition calling for a restoration of the constitution. While these steps indicated that the ruler was attuned to popular grievances, 'Isa backtracked—again, under family pressure—proposing instead a consultative council.<sup>41</sup> Al Khalifah critics dismissed the new majlis as a late token for inaction, at a time when senior officials were repeatedly declaring that great economic opportunities abounded, even as the country's financial malaise widened. A January 1994 confrontation at a Shi'ah mosque quickly degenerated, leading to repeated skirmishes between opposition forces and trigger-happy government personnel, who vowed to restore law and order. Several were arrested at a November 1994 sports rally on the grounds that Western women in "running attire" affronted local mores. Similar incidents were recorded during the next few years, illustrating the scope of social unrest that enveloped the shaykhdom, and destabilized the Al Khalifah.<sup>42</sup>

Even if the confrontations that gained momentum in 1994 receded over time, they nevertheless singled out Bahrain as the only GCC member state with a visible and sustained opposition, whose spillover potential was underscored by fellow Arab Gulf monarchies at every GCC summit gathering. The Bahraini challenge rested on concrete demands by the country's Shi'ah population, who called for parliamentary elections as well as a return to constitutional rule. Neither of these objectives were met in the late 1990s, as the main exile opposition group, the London-based Bahrain Freedom Movement, vainly sought a dialogue with the ruler. Reportedly, Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman objected, fearing unmanageable instability if and when the political system was modified.

### **Hamad bin 'Isa (r. 1999– )**

'Isa bin Salman died suddenly from a massive heart attack on 6 March 1999. The shocking news was revealed as US secretary of defense William Cohen was leaving the ruler's palace. The sixty-six-year-old emir, who had ruled Bahrain since 1961, was, until the death of Jordan's King Hussein on 7 February 1999, one of the longest-ruling Arab leaders (thirty-seven years on the throne).<sup>43</sup> His eldest son, Hamad, the longtime commander of the armed forces, succeeded 'Isa. Observers expected Hamad to continue Manama's uncompromising policies toward the opposition, because allegedly the new emir was a soldier who would rule with an iron fist. This rationale acquired momentum after Hamad reconfirmed his powerful uncle as prime minister with full authority over internal security. Nevertheless, Hamad surprised many when he introduced several political reforms, granted amnesty to exiled opposition figures, and ended the

despised and much feared state of emergency. Overall, his initiatives relaxed existing tensions among a wary population eager to voice its opinion and participate in nation building. As discussed below, Hamad bin 'Isa ensured the constitutional continuum and, in a sharp departure from his predecessor's rule, altered his *bay'ah* (oath) with his subjects. His calls for the adoption of a new national charter in 2000, followed by significant revisions to the 1973 constitution two years later, dramatically altered Bahraini civil society.

**The national charter.** As was customary in the region after an accession to rulership, Hamad bin 'Isa quickly amnestied several political prisoners, and eased burdensome restrictions immediately after taking over authority from his father. Still, leading opposition forces who wished to reconcile with the Al Khalifah were somewhat disappointed that Hamad did not challenge the entrenched power of his uncle, Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman. In late 1999, however, Hamad bin 'Isa embarked on a dramatic proposal to hold new parliamentary elections, reinvigorate political participation, and more important, to explicitly transform Bahrain into a "constitutional monarchy."<sup>44</sup> Although the proposed national charter (*mithaq al-watani*) contemplated that Bahrain could eventually become a kingdom—an amendment stipulated that the official name of the state could be changed "in accordance with the format decided by the Amir and his People"—no such change was proposed at the time. Simultaneously, the ruler appointed a thirty-member consultative council, which included four women, a Jew, a Christian, and a member of Bahrain's Indian community. Hamad further promised a national dialogue, recognizing the "new political era" under way.<sup>45</sup>

The national charter purported to address, first and foremost, the key opposition demand to restore parliamentary life. Interestingly, it intended a bicameral system, with a chamber elected by universal suffrage, sitting alongside an upgraded consultative council. More critically, the elected lower house would have limited powers, because major decisions now required joint passage by both institutions. To be sure, this condition fell short of opposition demands, even if the process restored an elected legislative institution.

Hamad empowered a specially appointed forty-six-member Supreme National Committee (SNC) in November 2000 to create the ideal framework for the charter, whose text would be submitted to Bahrainis in a referendum in early 2001. The committee circumvented the suspended 1973 constitution, because that document specifically called for the full participation of parliament if any emendations were to be valid. Existing constitutional requirements necessitated that the old parliament be revived if the letter of the law was to be applied, but the ruler opted to forego that mandate by supplanting it with the SNC. In the event, the SNC underwent various permutations when several members resigned, allegedly to preserve their freedom of action. At the time, objections were raised about the new draft's extraconstitutionality. Whatever its

rationale, the upgraded committee quickly concluded its given assignment and, on 18 December 2000, a duly written draft was submitted to the ruler. The national charter was subsequently published to allow for a full debate before a plebiscite. To its credit, Manama did not sell the charter as a new constitution but as a statement of principles that, in turn, envisaged parliamentary elections sitting parallel to an appointed consultative council. It specifically noted that “the implementation of some of the essential ideas included shall require constitutional amendments,” to “stipulate the name” of the state, and revise the existing constitution so that two legislative bodies—one elected, one appointed—could provide a harmonious parliamentary life.<sup>46</sup>

The charter tabled several rights, including lawful privileges for women and civil as well as human rights. It even spelled out the outline of a “constitutional monarchy” in which individual Bahrainis would be the source of sovereignty within a hereditary monarchy. Heretofore unheard-of principles, especially those pertaining to a separation of powers between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches, were also included. An entire chapter dealt with economic principles, while another promoted the critical value of the Bahraini Defense Force (BDF).

Hamad bin ‘Isa’s vision for Bahrain notwithstanding, the national charter was not equipped to enhance democratization, because it proposed considerably less than what Bahrainis enjoyed in the early 1970s. Opposition leaders insisted that nothing short of a full restoration of parliament would do, maintaining the validity of the 1973 constitution. Ironically, Manama recognized that its own national charter explicitly called for at least two amendments to the 1973 constitution, which, in a twist of fate, would necessitate two-thirds votes of parliament. Few Bahrainis, especially those in the ruling family, offered any explanation on how to address this inherent contradiction, although an emiri decree, combined with a referendum, unlocked the constitutional jam. Under the circumstances, and given that several SNC members resigned rather than accept Al Khalifah decisions on this matter, the moves did not bode well for an uneventful adoption. At the time, the charter aimed to advance Bahrain’s democratization efforts, even if few expected a rapid turnaround. Hamad was given the benefit of the doubt, and a majority agreed to test his proposal.<sup>47</sup>

***From shaykhdom to kingdom.*** On 14 February 2001, Bahrainis adopted the national charter in a referendum that recorded a high participation level (90 percent turnout and 98.4 percent approval).<sup>48</sup> Bahrain embarked on a new step toward democratization and the restoration of parliamentary life. In fact, few observers foresaw the rapid pace of change that, less than three years after Hamad bin ‘Isa Al Khalifah succeeded his father, introduced concrete political reforms to the small country. Leading opposition figures returned from exile and assumed public responsibilities with the tacit approval of the monarch. Slowly,

Hamad distanced his rule from the notorious security services under Ian Henderson, repealed offensive and largely ineffective emergency laws, and replaced them with more liberal laws that were perceived to be legitimate.<sup>49</sup>

One year after the national charter was approved, Hamad issued a decree that implemented key reforms, and called for municipal as well parliamentary elections. A decree on 14 February 2002 further declared that Bahrain was now a constitutional monarchy and the country a kingdom. Through this single royal proclamation, the State of Bahrain was transformed into the Kingdom of Bahrain, and Shaykh Hamad bin ‘Isa became King Hamad bin ‘Isa Al Khalifah.<sup>50</sup>

These dramatic changes further complicated Bahrain’s constitutional questions, first raised when the national charter was approved, and then delayed until the next elections. Although the 1973 constitution underscored Al Khalifah hereditary rule, the family’s actual legitimacy vis-à-vis the constitution was unclear. Why did Hamad opt to introduce these changes and abandon the country’s official *dawlah* (state) title? What were the advantages the Al Khalifah expected to reap from their transformation into a *mamlakah* (kingdom)?<sup>51</sup>

Until 2002, of the eight monarchical systems in the Arab world, only Morocco, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were designated as kingdoms. On the Arabian Peninsula, the Al Sa‘ud were the only ruling family who governed a monarchy, although King Fahd bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz introduced the designation of “Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques” in 1995 as his preferred title. Oman was a sultanate, and while English references to “his majesty” abound, the Omani ruler is most often addressed as “his majesty the sultan” (*sahib al-jalalah al-sultan*). Kuwait and Qatar—and, until 2002, Bahrain—were designated as “states” or “shaykhdoms,” and their rulers were known as emirs. The United Arab Emirates, on the other hand, was a federation of seven semi-independent emirates led by a president, although the head of state was also a shaykh. Given that Bahrain was one of the smallest and financially less fortunate Gulf monarchies, it is important to decipher what prompted its ruler to embark on such a breathtaking transformation.

This spectacular change did not distract attention from a long-sought democratization process that purported to provide Bahrainis participatory tools. Diaspora Arab critics of monarchical regimes underscored the newest kingdom’s minuscule size. More serious commentators saw comparative motives vis-à-vis Iran or Saudi Arabia.<sup>52</sup> Although unknown, since neither Hamad nor any other senior family member spoke on the subject, one of the most logical reasons for the change was probably the entire democratization process itself. The Al Khalifah agreed to revive the elected parliament—even if combined with an appointed body—and welcomed the restoration of the suspended constitution, on the condition that the ruling family itself would be elevated to new heights. Direct democracy would be welcome if it ensured the Al Khalifah monarchical privileges.

**Hamad's constitutional vision.** The monarch's 2002 proposals spelled out how he foresaw his vision. To begin, the new bicameral parliament, consisting of the appointed Majlis al-Shurah (Consultative Council) and an elected Majlis al-Nuwab (Council of Deputies), was dubbed the Majlis al-Watani (National Assembly). Unlike the prior consultative council, which consisted of thirty members, the 2002 version envisaged forty members, with more specific constitutionally defined powers to allow for parity with the lower house. Hamad's vision foresaw conflict between the two chambers, which propelled him to mandate joint sessions for the two councils, in order to resolve deadlocks. National Assembly decisions would thus necessitate majority vote, and the fact that the two chambers held equal numbers of representatives, a plurality in one congress along with a minuscule minority in the other, would conceivably satisfy Manama's felicitous viewpoint.<sup>53</sup>

**Municipal elections.** It was with such a potential outcome that Bahrainis elected five municipal councils, each with ten members, along with an appointed chairman. The actual elections were spread over a two-week period, with thirty members chosen on 9 May 2002, and twenty seats filled on 16 May. No major political organization boycotted the plebiscite, although many Bahrainis were wary of the much touted and amply discussed 24 October parliamentary elections, because Manama was debating a new apportionment system. Municipal elections recorded a slight majority of voters (52 percent of eligible voters) and, for the first time ever in the country's history, the full participation of women. In yet another major innovation, women stood as candidates, with 31 among 306 candidates in the first round alone. Although none won, and while several defeated candidates suspected foul play—and called for an investigation on grounds that conservative preachers had urged their flocks to boycott women candidates—the precedent had been set.<sup>54</sup> The Islamic Wifaq (Consensual) movement, led by activist 'Ali Salman (Shi'ah), won twelve seats in the first round. Two candidates affiliated with the Islamic Education Society were also elected. In an ironic twist, Manama listed the majority as independents.

Property owners in Bahrain who happened to be citizens of other Gulf Cooperation Council states (Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates) were also invited to participate in the 2002 municipal elections. While the move was interpreted as an effort to empower nonresident owners to influence local affairs, Manama saw the opportunity to undercut nonconformist tendencies among citizens. Presumably, GCC citizens residing in Bahrain tended to favor less radical changes, although most sought second residences on the island-kingdom because of its far more liberal features.

**The National Assembly.** Bahraini men and women participated on an equal footing in the 24 October 2002 plebiscite for parliament, both as voters and

elected officials. Members of the Council of Deputies would serve four years, with the king empowered to extend the legislative session for a period not exceeding two years “when necessary.” In turn, parliamentarians would choose their president and two vice presidents. A special Court of Cassation would handle electoral challenges should any emerge in the course of the actual balloting.

According to the national charter, the monarch retained the power to dissolve the Council of Deputies, but was obligated to call for a fresh suffrage within four months. The dissolved council could reconvene if the head of state abdicated his constitutional responsibilities. Yet, Article 64 of the 1973 constitution—the only existing document at the time—as amended by royal decree, added a new feature to this prerogative. After 2002, it affirmed that the king could defer elections if the Council of Ministers deemed them impossible due to “compelling circumstances.” In other words, the monarch retained an explicit authority to dissolve parliament if circumstances similar to 1975 ever presented themselves.<sup>55</sup>

Short of such extreme circumstances, the Council of Deputies would have the power to question ministers and hold confidence votes on particular civil servants, even if the parameters of public accountability were not fully established. If thirty out of forty representatives withdrew their support of a particular minister, the individual would necessarily have to resign. Still, the national charter underlined that parliament could not opt for a similar maneuver against the prime minister, allegedly because the post was occupied—and expected to remain occupied—by a senior Al Khalifah. In fact, the same individual, Khalifah bin Salman, had occupied the Bahraini prime ministership since 1971. Nevertheless, the charter recognized that a prime minister could be made accountable if thirty out of forty deputies voted that it was “not possible to cooperate with” him. The dispute would then be referred to the full National Assembly, where a vote of fifty-four out of eighty deputies (two-thirds) would result in a sanction. Only then would the injunction be placed in front of the monarch, who could either replace the prime minister or dissolve the Council of Deputies.<sup>56</sup>

***Hamad's vision of the legislature.*** Under the new charter, a unanimous vote in the National Assembly was required to pass legislation, which would then be ratified by the monarch.<sup>57</sup> For Hamad bin ‘Isa, such legislative harmony was ensured because the appointed upper house acted as the intrinsic balancer on the power of the democratically elected lower house. Moreover, the charter foresaw the possibility that the government—that is, the cabinet in the person of the prime minister—could also propose legislation. Why the cabinet would originate legislation was not clarified, although the effort appeared to equip Manama with yet another governing tool. Still, the ruler’s vision was elegant for the normal process, with both chambers working separately, before reconciling differences in joint committee. Once both chambers consolidated, the legislation would be submitted to the ruler for ratification and full imple-

mentation. When a particular bill failed to pass, it would return to the concerned chamber, for a second round of discussions and negotiations. After two cycles without a harmonious outcome, the National Assembly would convene in a joint session, under the presidency of the Consultative Council. With a simple majority of members present, a piece of legislation could then become law, even if the elected body objected. Clearly, the system favored the ruler, strengthened his particular political interpretations, and solidified his influence over the legislative branch. In other words, the charter accepted the idea of parliamentary life, but one that acknowledged the supremacy of the ruling family as specifically defined in Article 104c.<sup>58</sup> While the latter clause maintained a semblance of order to preserve individual rights, in fact it institutionalized the virtually unlimited powers of the Al Khalifah.

***Hamad's vision of the judiciary.*** The National Charter underlined the importance of an independent judiciary in its exhortation that “no authority shall prevail over the judgment of a judge.” In turn, military courts were called to exercise jurisdiction exclusively on military matters, as they were no longer able to rule over civilians without an express order for martial law. Should confusing interpretations emerge, a higher judicial council would supervise all court activities. Equally important, the new reforms established a “constitutional court,” comprising a president and six members, all appointed by the monarch. Its fiduciary role was “to watch over the constitutionality of laws and statutes.” Importantly, once appointed, its members could not be dismissed except under extreme circumstances. The cabinet and both chambers of the National Assembly were authorized to challenge the constitutionality of measures before the court, but the monarch retained additional rights in this instance as well. The king reserved the privilege of consulting with the court on the constitutionality of any laws prior to their submission to the National Assembly and/or adoption. Al Khalifah authority to consult with the judiciary illustrated how the ruling family protected Bahraini rights.<sup>59</sup>

***Hamad's vision of human rights.*** The national charter specifically recognized the primacy of *shari'ah* law as the principal source of legislation. It also pledged freedom of conscience, and guaranteed equality between men and women “in political, social, cultural and economic spheres, without breaching the provisions of Shari'ah.” Furthermore, the state pledged to safeguard the “requisite social security” system, and acknowledged that inheritance laws shall continue to abide by established religious norms. In addition to these two major endorsements, the charter recognized that every citizen was entitled to healthcare, while “ownership, capital and work” were “basic constituents of the social entity of the state and the national wealth.” Private property was duly protected, although the country’s “natural wealth and resources,” in particular oil and gas, were considered to be “State property.”<sup>60</sup>

Much like the 1973 constitution, the 2002 charter conferred Bahraini nationality, and emphasized that no national can be stripped of citizenship except in case of treason or other actions prescribed by the law. All discrimination was banned on the basis of “sex, origin, language, religion or creed,” and “freedom of conscience [was] absolute.” The state was obligated to warrant “the inviolability of worship, and the freedom to perform religious rites and hold religious parades and meetings,” albeit with the proviso that local customs were to be observed.

Like constitutions elsewhere around the world, the Bahraini national charter pledged inalienable rights, even if it portrayed itself as an improved version of the 1973 document. For some critics, the charter was nothing more than a legal way for the Al Khalifah to rule by decree, especially as its various clauses granted the ruling family refined advantages. For example, the charter asserted that Bahrain was democratic, while it neglected to underscore the inherent contradiction with the actual rule by decree. Of course, Manama insisted that there was no legal mechanism to restore the suspended 1975 parliament, which in turn resolved how parliament would add value to the 1973 constitution. This was technically correct, but the ruler’s emphasis to seek approval through a referendum, at a time of significant changes throughout the region, raised legitimacy questions. The referendum was perhaps a quest for a mandate to implement reforms without diluting the power of the ruling family. While Manama confronted a constitutional conundrum—to hold elections and revive suspended institutions before requesting amendments that would establish a new chamber that, in turn, would weaken the overall system—the facts that so much time had elapsed and so many parliamentarians had died were surely significant. To be sure, the ruler opted for a semirepresentative system, even if his method was authoritarian. He was certainly more adroit than his predecessor, as he cloaked his initiatives under the veil of a referendum and democratization. Where he did not waver from ‘Isa bin Salman’s methods was in protecting the influence of the ruling family. In fact, he probably enhanced it substantially, as opposition leaders reluctantly praised the emir for his liberalization efforts. Ironically, political changes necessitated Al Khalifah approval, which surely redefined Bahrain’s constitutional continuum.<sup>61</sup>

### ■ **Contemporary Rulers: The Al Khalifah of Bahrain**

Despite the modest size of the country, the Al Khalifah dynasty in Bahrain represents one of the largest ruling families on the Arabian Peninsula, perhaps with several thousand members. As discussed above, the clan belongs to the dominant Bani ‘Utub tribe that extended its realm from Kuwait to the Lower Gulf region. Even before its evolutionary transformation into a constitutional



monarchy in 2002, the Al Khalifah embarked on specific political reforms to further secure hereditary rule. In fact, the 1973 constitution adopted specific language regarding primogeniture, and established succession patterns (see Appendix 4 for relevant excerpts). Still, Bahrain cherished dynastic consensus, which remained a vital tool to promote family unity. That harmony was necessary because the Al Khalifah were “the only family that [came] to power by invasion and conquest”; consequently, its rule required special care. For one observer, the consequences of conquest were “often arrogant Al Khalifa attitude toward the state and its population and the polarization of Bahraini society, to a degree unmatched elsewhere in the Gulf.”<sup>62</sup> In fact, between 1994 and 1998, Bahrain witnessed a unique uprising against the regime that resulted in the death of hundreds and the arrest of thousands.<sup>63</sup>

Starting in the 1970s, the Bahrain crisis pitted the majority Shi‘ah population against the Sunni-dominated establishment. Over the course of two decades, political disputes evolved into serious economic confrontations that, naturally, preoccupied all Gulf monarchies. Bahrain faced considerable employment problems that reverberated throughout various sectors of society. It was this overall internal context, in addition to the epoch-making revolutionary changes in Shi‘ah Iran, that prompted Al Khalifah leaders to consider lasting changes. Although few changes were noticeable on the surface, Manama was preoccupied with the welfare of the ruling establishment, which motivated concrete modifications. Little of these changes was made public before 1999, largely because ‘Isa bin Salman—a “hands-off” ruler—was content to entrust them to his brother, Khalifah bin Salman. ‘Isa was satisfied with the progress his prime minister had presumably made, while insisting that his successor would be his eldest son, Hamad. The family, ‘Isa insisted, would preserve established traditions of hereditary rule, although Khalifah clearly thought that he was better qualified to rule the shaykhdom.<sup>64</sup> When Hamad bin ‘Isa thus became the emir in 1999, many predicted a short-lived reign, insisting that Khalifah bin Salman would be the strongman behind his untested nephew. It was also predicted that, over the long term, Khalifah would position his own offspring to gain power, effectively altering the succession line.

### **Hamad bin ‘Isa (r. 1999– )**

Hamad bin ‘Isa was born at Al-Rifa‘ah Palace in Bahrain on 28 January 1950.<sup>65</sup> He received a traditional primary education, studied the Quran, and excelled in poetry. An avid sportsman, he mastered swimming, horseback riding, and target shooting, which prepared him for an active military career. Before starting his secondary education at private institutions in Applegarth College in Godalming, Surrey, and Leys School in Cambridge, England, he was proclaimed heir apparent on 27 June 1964. In 1968, he graduated from Mons Officer Cadet School at Aldershot, England, and studied at the Sandhurst

Royal Military Academy. On his return to Manama in 1969, he was entrusted with the critical task of organizing the Bahraini Defense Force, the country's nascent military establishment. Hamad assumed this burden at the tender age of nineteen, as Manama prepared for the day after Britain withdrew from the Gulf, probably not fully conscious of the immense responsibilities that awaited him. At independence, Hamad was named commander in chief of the BDF and minister of defense, two key positions he held until 1999, when he became ruler. His own military training continued when, in 1972, Hamad attended the US Army Command and Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and graduated with honors. That same year he also earned a diploma in military administration from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in Washington, D.C. Two years later, in 1974, 'Isa bin Salman named Hamad deputy of the Khalifah Family Council, the conflict resolution body within the ruling family. Simultaneously, he encouraged the establishment of the Historical Documents Center, which was sheltered in his court. The commander received specialized training to become a helicopter pilot in 1978, as the BDF created the Bahraini Emiri Air Force. In 1981, he funded the establishment of the Bahrain Center for Studies and Research, which published a monthly record of the country's sociopolitical accomplishments. He was minister of defense until 1999; under his command, Bahraini military units joined an international alliance led by the United States to help drive Iraqi forces out of Kuwait in 1991. This was the only military engagement for Bahraini forces in contemporary history, although, theoretically, the kingdom is committed to the Joint Arab Command as well as the Gulf Cooperation Council alliance. Hamad is married to Shaykhah Sabikah bint Ibrahim Al Khalifah, a cousin, and has fathered seven sons and four daughters. Importantly, Hamad entrusted the command of the BDF to his son and heir, Salman bin Hamad, immediately after he designated the latter as his successor in 1999.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

Barring unforeseen circumstances, Bahraini succession patterns seemed clearly established for years to come, because the first priority had been to solidify the country's constitutional gains. What preoccupied Bahrainis when Shaykh 'Isa died was the process rather than the institution itself. For most citizens, the critical question was the role of the monarchy within Bahrain's ongoing democratization process before, and especially after, 2002.<sup>66</sup>

The accession of Hamad bin 'Isa as emir of Bahrain in 1999, in addition to a dramatically youthful image, ushered in a new and reinvigorated era in Bahraini politics. Indeed, and despite 'Isa's overall munificence and personal kindheartedness, the previous five years were characterized by increasing violence. Not unexpectedly, the 1995–1999 period recorded an antigovernment political campaign waged by predominantly Shi'ah citizens who vehemently

disagreed with government policies. Hamad quickly instituted several reforms to calm the situation. In a surprise move, he pardoned Shaykh ‘Abdul Amir Al Jamri, perhaps the most prominent opposition figure, who was first arrested in 1995, released, rearrested in January 1996, and tried only in February 1999. Furthermore, the emir realized that the espionage conviction of this famous dissident was a sham, and that the ten-year verdict was a liability rather than justice. Even the fine, US\$15 million (5.7 million Bahraini dinars), ostensibly for damages associated with the uprising, was tactless.<sup>67</sup> On 8 July 1999, the day after this shallow conviction, Shaykh Hamad issued his pardon. The Al Jamri ruling was quickly followed by sorely needed amnesty to hundreds of prisoners and dissidents, the return from exile of many of the regime’s skilled opponents, a steady introduction of greater freedom of speech in the printed media, discussions to amend the constitution, and promises to reconstitute the partially elected parliament. Between 1999 and 2002, in the lead-up to Bahrain declaring itself a monarchy, euphoric Bahrainis lived on hope, anticipating positive changes and a reinvigorated national dialogue.<sup>68</sup>

After 2002, however, the heralded liberalization was significantly curtailed, even if outside tensions contributed to the overall malaise. Key grievances were left unresolved, and the prospect of further substantial change seemed to disappear as Bahrain joined the permanent “war on terror.” Various objections consequently bubbled over into confrontation, and Manama experienced dozens of demonstrations between 2002 and 2006. Most of these were protests against the lack of accountability toward security officials, who relied on excessive force to impose law and order. Additional concerns, ranging from the unpopular US-led War on Iraq, to serious unemployment, further mobilized Bahrainis. The political situation turned sour after 2004, when Manama confronted its “political societies,” putative parties even if Bahrain rejected the epithet. Al Khalifah officials warned opposition leaders in February and March 2004 that their societies faced dissolution if they continued to call for constitutional reforms beyond the existing document. At the time, several proposals centered around petitions—ostensibly submitted to a referendum—that contemplated an empowerment of the elected parliament, demanding that it be given exclusive authority to enact future constitutional amendments.<sup>69</sup>

Manama responded by arresting more than a dozen activists belonging to the two largest societies, al-Wifaq and the National Democratic Action Society, in part to muzzle dissent but also as a warning sign to the lower house of the National Assembly. Numerous protesters were arrested, and detainees were released only after they promised to abandon all popular appeals, especially their calls for a referendum. On 25 September 2004, internal security forces arrested ‘Abdul Hadi al-Khawajah, the executive director of the fledgling Bahrain Center for Human Rights. His putative crime was a call for the resignation of Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman, allegedly because the latter had mishandled the Bahraini economy and ignored various human rights abuses.<sup>70</sup> Khawajah clearly

stepped on one of the most sensitive issues in Bahrain, the power of the prime minister, and within days saw his beloved center shut down. Not surprisingly, the monarch stood by his uncle, and declared that criticism of senior government officials would not be tolerated. The hapless al-Khawajah faced charges of sedition as well as inciting hatred against a member of the ruling family. His trial was briefly hampered by an outpouring of public support—through at least four demonstrations, each of which gathered several thousand Bahraini citizens—as well as his own hunger strike in prison. Still, the human rights activist was sentenced on 21 November 2004 to a one-year prison term, although King Hamad quickly suspended the sentence to time already served.<sup>71</sup>

If the monarch's action was a sign of disagreement with his uncle and prime minister, it was difficult to decipher. Suffice it to say that his cautious attitude toward Shaykh Khalifah was telling and, in the perception of many Bahrainis, foreboding. Widely believed to be responsible for excessive measures on the island-nation, Khalifah was not widely trusted, and in fact was viewed by the vast majority of Bahrainis—including within the ruling family—with some suspicion. After 2004, many wondered why the monarch was still overtly cautious in his decisions toward his paternal uncle, and whether the king's decision to unconditionally back his uncle illustrated a new pattern of Al Khalifah coercion. Bahrainis further speculated whether their ruler had embarked on the establishment of a monarchy only to create a permanent hierarchy with his uncle, given that all Al Khalifah family members, without exception, owed allegiance to the monarch. Could the king not do more? Would he eventually stand by his subjects rather than against them? Many wondered whether the continuing power of the late Shaykh 'Isa's powerful brother hampered sorely needed reforms for a population becoming increasingly aware of its rights and responsibilities, one that was eager to create the framework for lasting civil society. For years, Bahrain-watchers speculated about potential conflicts between the prime minister, who controlled the internal security services, and the monarch, who had essentially created the Bahraini army while heir apparent. Although Hamad's gestures since taking power, including the freeing of Shi'ah opposition leaders, suggested he was more liberal than his hard-line uncle, more recent actions implied that Hamad was restrained and overtly cautious.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Khalifah**

Hamad bin 'Isa issued his first royal order on 14 February 2002. The documents elaborated that the official name of the state would henceforth be the "Kingdom of Bahrain" and that the official title of the ruler would be the "King of Bahrain." Subsequent changes were introduced to the flag, now featuring symbols to represent the five pillars of Islam, along with a separate royal flag that carried a crown. These cosmetic changes notwithstanding, Hamad bin 'Isa was a largely unknown heir apparent who seldom ventured out into domestic,

regional, or international forums. Many Bahrainis believed that he was under the influence of the Al Sa'ud in Riyadh or, to a lesser extent, King Hussein of Jordan, with whom he entertained a particularly close friendship.<sup>72</sup> Yet, since 1999, the Bahraini monarch has embarked on bold initiatives, culminating in the creation of a bicameral legislative body. In fact, the elected house may well be rambunctious and excessively vocal, but to the ruler's immense credit it is very much a hands-on institution that shoulders its responsibilities. Regardless of internal permutations, the Bahraini parliament can no longer be ignored, a fact that has not escaped the king. Moreover, and although the prime minister remains a vocal critic of parliament, the house was empowered by the revised 2002 constitution to actually debate and act. Its members cherished their responsibilities and acted with gusto—sometimes with excessive zeal—but that too was a healthy development for the island-kingdom.

In late November 2006, opposition candidates won a whopping sixteen of the seventeen seats they contested in parliamentary elections, which translated into a 40 percent bloc within parliament's forty seats. While the al-Wifaq Shi'ah Party secured these respectable results, progovernment deputies retained full control over much of the lower house. Still, what happened was a shocker, especially since the party had never contested an election before 2006, having opted to boycott the 2002 elections after King Hamad imposed a new constitution.<sup>73</sup>

Still, Bahrainis who voted for the national charter did not deliver a blank check to the government, and although the heralded covenant included a legislative conundrum—not clarifying the legislature's oversight privileges—parliament retained its skeptical attitude. In fact, the right to introduce legislation, as well as the monarch's veto powers on measures passed by the body, were both openly debated and vigorously defended. The real challenge to the Al Khalifah in the twenty-first century is whether they will protect their rule, perhaps by tolerating a fully elected parliament, as the National Assembly of the 1970s was. The Al Khalifah and their Najdi tribal allies have enjoyed undeniable privileges through their monopoly over all political and economic power centers, yet they may have little choice but to begin sharing power in the future. Given their foresight, King Hamad and his heir can further ensure their rule, especially if they opt to empower a larger section of Bahraini society. Their survival capabilities notwithstanding, Manama requires enlightened Al Khalifah rulers to better serve country and crown.

## ■ Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Bahrain

While the Al Khalifah ruling family ensured that a major referendum on a new constitution for the Kingdom of Bahrain was well received, it did not eliminate

inconsistencies that raised questions about the democratization process. As discussed above, parliament was dominated by Islamists, both Sunni and Shi‘ah, and its deliberations concentrated on social issues rather than political affairs. Still, many Bahrainis were optimistic, although being a “reformist” in the Gulf was not a very popular option. For Rasheed al-Maraj, chairman of the Muntada Forum, a group of liberal intellectuals and businessmen, “democracy [was] not a switch [but] a process.”<sup>74</sup> This view was not a voice in the wilderness, as prominent Bahrainis, speaking individually or on behalf of legitimate organizations, challenged Manama to accept dialogue. Leaders of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, officials of the General Organization for Youth and Sports, administrators of the Al-‘Urubah Club, and other responsible intellectuals were all barred from public gatherings. Dismissed on flimsy excuses—that such clubs were cultural establishments and, consequently, barred from political activities—Bahraini activists found solace in courts that eventually recognized their intrinsic constitutional rights. Although several criminal courts relented in a few noteworthy cases, human rights reformers maintained that the country’s prime minister was directly responsible for the heavy-handed responses, and blamed him for alleged abuses.<sup>75</sup> The leader who called on Prime Minister Khalifah bin Salman to resign—on the grounds that he failed to restore conditions to redress the Bahraini economy as well as violated basic human rights—was ‘Abdul-Hadi al-Khawajah, of the Bahrain Center for Human Rights, who pleaded not-guilty to charges of sedition, defamation, and spreading false information. His trial forced Manama to organize progovernment activities, in the form of loyalty pledges to the prime minister, to overcome and reverse popular perceptions of incompetence.<sup>76</sup>

These developments supported the premise that a genuine democratic society, including respect for human rights and the rule of law, was certainly possible in Bahrain—if and when the country’s political institutions were strengthened, and allowed to make their own contributions. Many believed that it was up to the new contenders to initiate such concrete steps and salvage the nascent Bahraini democracy.

### **Salman bin Hamad**

Shortly after acceding to Bahrain’s rulership in 1999, Hamad bin ‘Isa named his eldest son, Salman, as the shaykhdom’s heir apparent. After Bahrain became a monarchy in 2002, its amended constitution specifically identified the country’s succession mechanism, declaring that kingship will henceforth be inherited by the ruler’s eldest son, unless the monarch names another son as heir during his lifetime. Through this mechanism, a level of regularity was introduced to Bahraini succession, eliminating its unpredictable features.

Salman, who speaks fluent English as well as Arabic, was sworn in as heir apparent on 9 March 1999, and was immediately promoted to the rank of gen-

eral and entrusted with command of the Bahraini Defense Force. The commander-in-chief position was his father's tested turf, and its bequest to a son raised uncomfortable questions to Bahrainis who rejected the accumulation of power in Al Khalifah hands.

Salman was born on 21 October 1969, the eldest son of Hamad and Shaykhah Sabikah bint Ibrahim, and completed both his primary and secondary education in Manama. In 1992, he earned a bachelor's degree in political science from American University in Washington, D.C. He then enrolled at Cambridge University in England, where he secured a master's degree in history and philosophy. The heir apparent was named vice chairman of the Bahrain Center for Studies and Research in 1992—founded several years earlier by his father—and became its chairman three years later. An avid environmentalist, the heir to the Bahraini throne is a devoted sportsman with a variety of interests, including equestrian life. He is married to Shaykhah Halah bint Du'ayj Al Khalifah, who is the honorary president of the Information Center for Women and Children, as well as the chairwoman of the Bahrain Society for Mental Retardation. Halah is the youngest daughter of Du'ayj bin Khalifah Al Khalifah, who was the assistant undersecretary at the Ministry of Finance and National Economy. Salman is known to have a unique and progressive vision for Bahrain's future. It is believed that he encouraged his father to embark on the genuine reforms that were first introduced in 1999 and 2000, ostensibly to distance Hamad's rule from his grandfather's *laissez-faire* approach. It was Salman's idea for his father to meet with Shi'ah leaders, welcome former exiles back into the country, and allow civil society representatives a greater say in the affairs of state.<sup>77</sup> Needless to say, none of these tasks were easily accomplished, but Salman persevered.

### **Khalifah bin Salman**

A son of the founding father, Khalifah bin Salman has held the prime ministership of Bahrain since 1971. Born on 24 November 1935, the second of three sons of Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifah, the premier pursued primary and secondary education in Bahrain and higher education in Britain. On his return from the United Kingdom in 1957, Khalifah was named president of the Education Council. In 1959, he assumed the post of acting secretary of the government. In 1960, his eldest brother, 'Isa, entrusted him with the Finance Department, and in 1966 with the chairmanship of the Administrative Council, the precabinet under British rule. After 1961, he assumed additional responsibilities, as president of the Electricity Board, chairman of the Manama Municipality (1962–1967), head of the Bahrain Monetary Council (1965), chairman of the Joint Committee for Economic and Financial Studies, head of the Administrative Council (1967–1970), as well as head of the Bahrain Monetary

Agency when it was formed in 1971. When ‘Isa bin Salman created the State Council in 1970, Khalifah graduated first to the Administrative Council, and then, after Bahrain’s independence, to the Council of Ministers. Shaykh Khalifah has headed each of these institutions, and retained the prime ministership, ever since. More important, Khalifah is chairman of the Defense Council, effectively controlling the country’s internal security apparatus. He is married to Shaykhah Hussah bint ‘Ali Al Khalifah, fourth daughter of Shaykh ‘Ali bin Hamad Al Khalifah, a brother of Salman bin Hamad (r. 1942–1961), and has fathered three sons and one daughter.

Because of his hard-line views, Khalifah is not particularly popular within the Shi‘ah community, having unleashed the internal security forces on protesters after 1994. Nevertheless, he was and remains a pivotal actor in contemporary Bahraini affairs, and his influence has never waned. It would be an error to dismiss his long-term influence on the Al Khalifah and Bahrain in general because his nephew assumed the throne after Shaykh ‘Isa died. In fact, Khalifah is probably the most influential individual in the island-state, having immense political and financial resources at his disposal and, more important, an unblemished “will to power” that he is not shy to display. He is someone who can make or break a policy, promote a point of view within the cabinet as well as society at large, and protect perceived Al Khalifah interests both internally as well as within the larger Gulf political environments.

### **‘Abdallah bin Hamad and Khalifah bin Hamad**

‘Abdallah bin Hamad was born on 30 June 1975 to King Hamad and Shaykhah Sabikah, and is close to his older brother, the heir apparent. ‘Abdallah was deputy chairman of the National Wildlife Preservation Organization and head of the Public Commission for the Protection of Marine Resources, Environment, and Wildlife. In the latter capacity, he sat on the board of the Center for Environment and Development for the Arab Region and Europe, a Cairo-based institution that aimed to build a qualified and responsible human resource base, especially in terms of water resource management. Because of his interests in contemporary Western culture, ‘Abdallah bin Hamad was also in the news after he befriended and welcomed singer Michael Jackson to Bahrain. According to various news reports, Jackson recorded for Shaykh ‘Abdallah’s label, 2 Seas Records.<sup>78</sup> Still, his primary contribution to Al Khalifah family affairs is to buttress his brother’s growing constituency, by championing Heir Apparent Salman’s preferences and remaining vigilant among younger Al Khalifah shaykhs.

Khalifah bin Hamad was born on 4 June 1977 to King Hamad and Shaykhah Sabikah, and is close to his older brother, the heir apparent. Along with his younger brother, Nasir, Khalifah stands as the heir apparent’s most critical base of support within the ruling family.



### **Nasir bin Hamad**

Nasir bin Hamad was born on 8 May 1987 to King Hamad and Shaykhah Sabikah, and is also close to his older brother, the heir apparent. In August 2006, King Hamad attended the Sovereign's Parade at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in England, to mark the graduation of Shaykh Nasir. According to news reports, Nasir, who became president of the Bahrain Royal Equestrian and Endurance Federation in 2003, "was presented with the King Hussein Medal for the best overseas cadet."<sup>79</sup> The monarch was proud of his son's accomplishments, perceiving the milestone as a paradigm for Bahraini youths; his older brother was equally pleased, as Nasir graduated with honors. Interestingly, the August 2006 Sandhurst promotion included Shaykh Majid bin Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the son of the Dubai ruler; Majid received the Shaykh Salem Sabah al-Salem Distinction Award. As classmates, Nasir and Majid may well forge a special relationship between Bahrain and Dubai, further tying the bonds of cooperation between these two ruling families.

### **Khalid bin Ahmad bin Muhammad**

Khalid bin Ahmad was born in 1960 and received his elementary education at West Riffa School, and his secondary education at the Islamic Scientific College in Amman, Jordan. He obtained a bachelor's degree in history and political sciences from St. Edward's University, Texas, in 1984. According to news reports, he volunteered in several election campaigns in the United States, including the 1980 presidential run of then-governor Jimmy Carter. In March 1985, Shaykh Khalid joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the rank of third secretary, and from August 1985 to November 1994 was stationed at the Bahraini embassy in Washington, D.C., where he was entrusted the congressional and media affairs portfolio. From 1994 to 2000, he was chief liaison officer for the deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, responsible for negotiations regarding the maritime delimitation and territorial dispute between Bahrain and Qatar. In recognition of his contribution as liaison officer during the territorial dispute between Manama and Doha, he was awarded the Bahrain Medal, second class, by King Hamad bin 'Isa in May 2001, and dispatched to London as ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the Kingdom of Bahrain to the Court of St. James. A year later, his portfolio expanded with simultaneous appointments to the Netherlands, the Republic of Ireland, the Kingdom of Norway, and the Kingdom of Sweden. On 29 September 2005, Khalid was sworn in as Bahrain's foreign minister, although the minister of information, Muhammad 'Abdul Ghaffar, who previously served as ambassador to the United States, retained his designation as minister of foreign affairs to assist him until early 2007. Khalid is married to Shaykhah Wusal bint Muhammad Al Khalifah and has two sons.

### **Muhammad bin 'Isa**

A son of 'Isa bin Salman (r. 1961–1999) and a brother of Hamad bin 'Isa (r. 1999– ), Muhammad is the late ruler's third son, and assumed command of the National Guard in 1997. He was born in Manama in 1954 and pursued a military career and rose through the ranks to become a lieutenant-general, and in 1998 was entrusted with additional military responsibilities, including an appointment as chief of staff of the Bahraini Defense Force. He is married to Shaykhah Khulud Al Khalifah, with whom he has fathered a daughter, Shaykhah Ayshah bint Muhammad.

### **Muhammad bin Mubarak**

A longtime deputy prime minister and minister for foreign affairs, Shaykh Muhammad is responsible for the design of most parameters and visions for Bahraini foreign policy, including implementation of accords and advising all three rulers after independence on regional and international affairs. Muhammad bin Mubarak was born in 1935 and for nearly thirty-five years served as foreign minister—from 1971 until 29 September 2005—before he became deputy prime minister for Ministerial Committees. He was knighted by the British Crown in 1984. He is married to Shaykhah Mawzah bint Khalifah Al Khalifah, eldest daughter of his paternal uncle, Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Al Khalifah. This elder statesman is highly respected by most members of the ruling family, as well as by leading Bahraini intellectuals.

### **Hayah bint Rashid Al Khalifah**

Shaykhah Hayah was born on 18 October 1952 in Manama and graduated from the University of Kuwait with a law degree in 1974. She was associated with the Association for the Promotion and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law (ADIF) in Lyon in 1976, and the Université de la Sorbonne in Paris, the latter of which she earned a diploma from in public law in 1977. She then attended Alexandria University in Egypt, where she earned a diploma in higher law studies in 1986, and the University of 'Ayn Shams in Egypt, where she graduated with a diploma of advanced studies (DEA) in 1988. She was a counselor at the Ministry of State for Legal Affairs between 1975 and 1979, and then went into private law practice until 1983. Shaykhah Hayah was an advocate and judicial consultant from 1984 to 1999, and a senior partner at the Hayah Rashid Al Khalifah Law Firm in 2000. Also in 2000, she was appointed ambassador to France (and concurrently to Spain, Switzerland and Belgium, the European Union, Italy, the Vatican, and Latvia after 2001). A vice president of the Bahrain Bar Society between 1991 and 1993, and a vice president of the Special Commission for the Arbitration and Resolution of Conflicts be-

tween 1995 and 1998, Shaykhah Hayah was elected president of the United Nations General Assembly in mid-2006 for its sixty-first annual session (2006–2007).

### **Potential Alliances Among the Al Khalifah**

The ruling family of Bahrain essentially has two major poles around which gravitate leading Al Khalifah members and their respective supporters. The first pole is naturally led by the monarch, Hamad bin 'Isa, and the second pole is led by the prime minister, Khalifah bin Salman. The heir apparent and commander in chief of the Bahraini Defense Force, Salman bin Hamad stands with his father, as do all of his brothers, while Shaykh Khalifah's sons stand with the prime minister, representing a clear delineation of the two alliances that exist within the family at the dawn of the twenty-first century. The bipolar system does not mean that the two alliances are so far apart that little unites them. That would indeed be a false assumption, even an error. In fact, the two groups agree on many issues, including projects that aim to improve and develop internal services, to increase the country's standard of living, and whenever possible, to alleviate excessive burdens on a hapless population that is far less fortunate compared to Gulf citizens in neighboring countries. Even on controversial questions that, presumably, mean a divergence of views between the two leading men—demonstrations, opposition to state policies, and calls for reforms—the monarch often stands by his prime minister and uncle, and has declared on several occasions that he will not tolerate criticism of senior government officials.<sup>80</sup> As discussed above, however, and when proceedings against al-Khawajah were initiated, the ruler may well have sided with his prime minister out of concern for internal stability rather than full conviction. In the midst of supporters chanting for his release after the human rights advocate was sentenced—and while Shaykh Khalifah was publicly disparaged—the monarch quickly rescinded his putative backing, and suspended the sentence to time already served. Observers attributed this stratagem to a new Machiavellian approach, but in reality the moves indicated a sharp internal division. The monarch and his alliance professed a vision for Bahrain that was distinct from the prime minister's more authoritarian preference.

Although Shaykh Khalifah is generally disliked and widely believed to have accumulated enormous wealth, the primary source of whatever opposition exists against him is directly tied to his repressive policies that thwart equality for Bahrain's majority Shi'ah population and generally assume that Bahrainis are not ready for genuine political reforms. To his credit, Khalifah bin Salman held his monarch in check, obliging the ruler to stay cautious in all of his decisions and actions vis-à-vis his uncle. Not surprisingly, the prime minister welcomed his nephew's backing on many questions, maintaining that the young king was wise to stand by him to better protect and preserve family

interests. Still, what troubled Khalifah was the monarch's readiness to entertain popular sentiments, even welcoming opposition forces into the political debate, which certainly bodes well for the future of liberalization and reform in Bahrain.

Several important women, who coalesce the alliance, further buttress Hamad's pole. These include Shaykhah Hussah bint Salman bin Ibrahim Al Khalifah, the mother of the monarch; Shaykhah Sabikah bint Ibrahim Al Khalifah, the wife of the king; and Shaykhah Halah bint Du'ayj Al Khalifah, the wife of the heir apparent. Other leading actors have now joined the alliance, including Shaykh Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifah, the minister of foreign affairs; and periodically, Shaykh 'Abdallah bin Khalid Al Khalifah, the minister of justice and Islamic affairs, who is also president of the Bahrain Red Crescent Society and honorary president of the Wisdom Home Society. Ministers and other members of the family are divided between the two alliances, with the more reform-minded siding with the monarch.

Nevertheless, for the ruler's alliance to grow and strengthen, a fundamental shift in methodology may be necessary. To date, all of the many political and social changes introduced in Bahrain have been presented as *takrims* (gifts) from the ruler to his citizens. Some Bahrainis have viewed these "gifts" as offerings to defuse volatile situations rather than advance the cause of constitutionalism. Despite years of opposition and agitation, Bahrainis have struggled to "claim real rights or achieve an actual constitutional basis of equality, or true citizenship, or even ownership of their own country."<sup>81</sup> Many have complained that the ruling family treats the country as its own property, merely tolerating the residence of the people therein. Yet, as amply demonstrated time and again, reforms introduced in Bahrain since 1999 have been the result of internal pressures, including violent confrontations with authorities. The monarch's alliance could certainly take credit for the fact that Manama and the rest of the country have avoided a return to the political chaos of the early 1970s. Nevertheless, and precisely because so much is expected from this alliance, any complacency threatens the modest gains recorded under Hamad bin 'Isa. The monarch cannot assume that his *takrims* will be sufficient to retain the supremacy of the constitution he has supported, especially when a slew of young Al Khalifahs recognize the necessity to introduce permanent and fundamental changes to Bahrain's body politic.

## ■ Notes

1. For a history of the Al Khalifah branch of the 'Utub, see Muhammad bin Khalifah al-Nabhani, *Tarikh al-Bahrain* [The History of Bahrain], Cairo: n.p., 1924. See also 'Abdallah bin Khalid Al Khalifah and 'Abdul Malik Yusuf al-Hamr, *Al-Bahrain*

'*Abr al-Tarikh* [Bahrain at the Crossroads of History], Manama: Sharikat al-'Arabiyyah lil-Wikalat wal-Tawzi', 1972; and Zahiyyah Kaddurah, *Shibh al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah: Kiyanatuhah al-Siyassiyyah* [The Arabian Peninsula: Political Origins], Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-'Arabiyyah, n.d., p. 368.

2. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972, pp. 15–27, 35–41.

3. Maurice Fougrouse, *Bahrein: Un Exemple d'Économie Post-Pétrolière au Moyen-Orient*, Paris: L'Instant Durable, 1984, p. 46.

4. Zamil Muhammad al-Rashid, *Su'udi Relations with Eastern Arabia and 'Uman (1800–1871)*, London: Luzac, 1981, pp. 31–40, 45–51.

5. Fuad I. Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, p. 26.

6. Fougrouse, *Bahrein*, p. 49.

7. Muhammad G. Rumaihi, *Bahrain: Social and Political Change Since the First World War*, London: Bowker, 1976, p. 4.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

9. Fougrouse, *Bahrein*, p. 50.

10. Mahdi Abdalla al-Tajir, *Bahrain, 1920–1945: Britain, the Shaikh, and the Administration*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 7, 14.

11. The "Allies" sunk an Italian submarine at the entrance of the Gulf in July 1940. Its crew was first taken to Bahrain before being transferred to India. On 19 October 1940, Italian planes bombed the Bahrain refinery, but missed their target. See al-Tajir, *Bahrain*, p. 248. See also Fougrouse, *Bahrein*, p. 54.

12. Andrew Wheatcroft, *The Life and Times of Shaikh Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, Ruler of Bahrain, 1942–1961*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1995, pp. 108–109.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 134.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 135.

15. Fougrouse, *Bahrein*, p. 55.

16. Wheatcroft, *The Life and Times of Shaykh Salman*, p. 212.

17. Fougrouse, *Bahrein*, p. 57.

18. Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, pp. 194–217.

19. The dispute occurred during 1953 'Ashurah celebrations commemorating the murder of Imam Hussein. For reasons that remain obscure to this day, skirmishes between Shi'ah participants and several Sunni onlookers degenerated into intertribal warfare. Sunnis attacked Shi'ah villages in retaliation, with minor clashes in several parts of the country leading to massive demonstrations and several deaths. A number of young chauvinist Bahrainis, perhaps eager to demonstrate their nationalistic zeal after visits to Beirut and Cairo, established secret "clubs" to encourage workers to stand up for their rights. In other words, skirmishes built on larger issues brewing throughout society. On the advice of his British counselors, the ruler banished Bahrainis accused of inciting workers, but without satisfying demands made by working-class citizens. Suffice it to say that the Bahraini police, reinforced by British troops, took advantage of the Shi'ah-Sunni split on a number of occasions and did not hesitate to impose law and order with severity. Consequently, several networks and political organizations were established to challenge Al Khalifah rule over the island. For further details, see Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, pp. 196–214.

20. Muhammad T. Sadik and William P. Snively, *Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects*, Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972, p. 129.

21. Emile A. Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Policy*, New York: Praeger, 1982, p. 28. See also Emile A. Nakhleh, *Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society*, Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1976, chaps. 6–7.

22. John Duke Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*, Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975, p. 50.

23. Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Policy*, p. 27.

24. Although the 1972 constitution described the government and the National Assembly as being “democratic,” no comparisons of this phenomenon are made to systems operating in Western countries.

25. For the full text of Bahrain’s 1973 constitution, see John N. Gatch Jr., “Bahrain,” in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1974.

26. Gatch, “Bahrain,” p. 2.

27. Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, p. 219.

28. Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Policy*, p. 33.

29. Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, pp. 219–220.

30. Ibid., p. 225. See also Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Policy*, p. 33.

31. Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, p. 226.

32. Abdullah Rachid, “Bahrain: Fighting for Liberation,” *World Marxist Review* 21, no. 10, October 1978, p. 85. The author of this essay was then a member of the governing committee of the BNLF.

33. Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Policy*, p. 34.

34. Fred Lawson, *Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy*, Boulder: Westview, 1989, p. 67.

35. Khuri, *Tribe and State in Bahrain*, p. 230.

36. Human Rights Watch–Middle East, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain*, New York, 1997, p. 3.

37. Interviews with a high-ranking Bahraini member of the ruling family on a nonattribution basis, Manama, 26 May 1998, 2 December 2004.

38. Anthony H. Cordesman, *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE*, Boulder: Westview, 1997, pp. 42–43.

39. Interview with Saif bin Hashil Al Maskery, then–assistant secretary-general for political affairs, Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), Muscat, 26 April 2002.

40. Human Rights Watch–Middle East, *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial*, p. 24.

41. Ibid., pp. 26–27.

42. May Seikaly, “Kuwait and Bahrain: The Appeal of Globalization and Internal Constraints,” in Joseph A. Kéchichian, ed., *Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 177–192.

43. “A Changing Gulf: Bahrain Succession, Qatari Election May Have Longer Term Impact Than Iraq War, Cohen Visit,” *The Estimate* 11, no. 6, 12 March 1999, <http://www.theestimate.com/public/031299a.html>.

44. "Bahrain: Bloodless Revolution?" *Middle East International* no. 644, 23 February 2001, p. 15.

45. Marc Pellas, "Bahreïn: Un Simulacre de Démocratie," *Le Monde Diplomatique* no. 612, March 2005, p. 10.

46. David Hirst, "Percée Démocratique à Bahreïn," *Le Monde Diplomatique* no. 566, May 2001, p. 20. See also "Amir al-Bahrayn Saya'lan Ijra'at Ta'dil al-Dustur bi-Munasabat Murur 'Am 'Ala Iqrar al-Mithaq al-Watani" [Bahrain Ruler to Announce Constitutional Changes on the First Anniversary of the National Charter Decree], *Al-Hayat* no. 14209, 12 February 2002, p. 3; and "Dossier: Bahraini Political Reform: An Elected Parliament of Sorts," *The Estimate* 12, no. 12, 29 December 2000, <http://www.theestimate.com/public/122900.html>.

47. Joe Stork, "Letter from Manama," *Middle East International* no. 670, 8 March 2002, p. 28.

48. Michael Slackman, "In a Region Stuck in Autocracy, Bahrain Has a Different Idea," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 December 2001, pp. A8–A9.

49. For background material on Ian Henderson, see Brian Whitaker, "British 'Torture Chief' Quits," *The Guardian*, 4 July 2000, p. 13. See also various clippings assembled by the Bahrain Freedom Movement at <http://www.vob.org>.

50. Sam F. Ghattas, "Bahrain Now Constitutional Monarchy," *Associated Press*, 14 February 2002. See also Latheef Faroul, "New Beginning in Bahrain," *Gulf News*, 13 February 2002, p. 6.

51. Abdulhadi Khalaf, "The New Amir of Bahrain: Marching Sideways," *Civil Society: Democratization in the Middle East* 9, no. 100, April 2000, pp. 6–13. See also "The Kingdom of Bahrain: The Constitutional Changes," *The Estimate* 14, no. 2, 22 February 2002, <http://www.theestimate.com/public/022202b.html>.

52. "No Taxation, No Representation," *The Economist* 362, no. 8265, 23 March 2002, pp. 11–13 (in the section "Time Travellers: A Survey of the Gulf").

53. "The Kingdom of Bahrain."

54. Abbas Salman, "Women Fail to Win in Landmark Bahraini Election," *Reuters*, 10 May 2002.

55. "The Kingdom of Bahrain."

56. During an April 2003 debate on two underfunded but oversubscribed pension funds controlled by the prime minister, parliamentarians were specifically warned "not to rock the boat" and to limit their intrusive questions. See Abdulhadi Khalaf, "Bahrain's Parliament: Quest for a Role," *Arab Reform Bulletin* 2, no. 5, May 2004, pp. 3–5, <http://www.ceip.org> (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace).

57. Bahrain Freedom Movement, "The Constitution Is the Foundation," 29 June 2002, <http://www.vob.org>.

58. See Gatch, "Bahrain," pp. 1–2, 30. The relevant parts of Article 1 are in app. 4 of the book containing Gatch's chapter: Blaustein and Flanz, *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*.

59. Fatiha Dazi-Héni, "Bahreïn and Koweït: La Modernisation des Dynasties Al Khalifa et Al Sabah," in Rémy Leveau et Abdellah Hammoudi, eds., *Monarchies Arabes: Transitions et Dérives Dynastiques*, Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2002, pp. 229–231.

60. State of Bahrain, *Al-Mithaq Al-Watani* [National Charter], Manama, 2002.

61. Kingdom of Bahrain, *Al-Muzakarat al-Tafsiriyyah li-Dastur Mamlakat al-Bahrain* [Narrative of the National Charter], Manama, 14 February 2002, <http://www.bahrain.gov.bh/pdfs/consdescweb.pdf>.

62. J. E. Peterson, "The Nature of Succession in the Gulf," *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 4, Autumn 2001, p. 588.

63. For a thorough analysis, see Munira A. Fakhro, "The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment," in Lawrence G. Potter and Gary Sick, eds., *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion*, New York: St. Martin's, 1997, pp. 167–189.

64. 'Ali Abahussain, *Masirat al-Khayr wal-'Ata' fil-Bahrain* [The March Toward Progress and Prosperity in Bahrain], Bahrain: n.p., 1993.

65. For complete biographical details, see "Bahrain's New Amir: Sheikh Hamad bin 'Isa Al Khalifa," *The Estimate* 11, no. 6, 12 March 1999, <http://www.theestimate.com/public/031299b.html>.

66. Slackman, "In a Region Stuck in Autocracy," p. A9.

67. Details, as well as confirmation thereof, concerning Shaykh Al Jamri are drawn from regular conversations with his son, Mansur Al Jamri, in London and Manama, between 1995 and 2006.

68. J. E. Peterson, "Bahrain's First Steps Towards Reform Under Amir Hamad," *Asian Affairs* 33, no. 2, June 2002, pp. 216–227.

69. See, for example, Mohammed Almezal, "17 Charged with Advocating Regime Change in Bahrain," *Gulf News*, 3 May 2004, <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/04/05/03/119895.html>; and "Discussion to Continue on Constitutional Amendments," *Bahrain Tribune*, 30 April 2004, <http://www.bahraintribune.com/articledetail.asp>.

70. Human Rights Watch, "Bahrain: Rights Center Closed as Crackdown Expands," 30 September 2004, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/09/30/bahrain9422.htm>.

71. "Bahrain's King Frees Jailed Rights Activist," *New York Times*, 22 November 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/22/international/middleeast/22bahrain.html>. See also "Al Khawaja Is Charged," *Gulf Daily News*, 17 October 2004, p. 1; "Bahraini Activist Faces Trial for Dissent," *Associated Press*, 16 October 2004; and Mohammed Almezal, "Bahrain Rights Activist Trial Put Off After Chaotic Scenes," *Gulf News*, 17 October 2004, p. 6.

72. King Hamad forged even closer ties with King Hussein's successor, 'Abdallah II, with whom he maintained frequent contacts.

73. Hassan Fattah, "Strong Showing for Opposition Party in Bahrain Elections," *New York Times*, 27 November 2007, p. 8. See also Mohammed Al A'ali, "Al Wefaq to Field 19 Candidates," *Gulf Daily News*, 6 October 2006, p. 1.

74. Quoted in Geraldine Bedell, "Bahrain/Democracy," *DPA* (German News Agency), 14 December 2003.

75. "Club Reopens After Compromise Reached on Early Lifting of Ban," *Gulf News*, 24 October 2004, p. 8.

76. "Loyalty Saluted," *Gulf Daily News*, 3 October 2004, p. 1. See also "Crowds Pledge Loyalty to Premier," *Gulf Daily News*, 7 October 2004, p. 1.

77. Confidential interview with a high-ranking Bahraini official, Manama, 6 December 2005.



78. Barry A. Jeckell and Lars Brandle, "Michael Jackson Sails with Two Seas," *Billboard*, 18 April 2006, [http://billboard.com/bbcom/news/article\\_display.jsp?vnu\\_content\\_id=1002345673](http://billboard.com/bbcom/news/article_display.jsp?vnu_content_id=1002345673).

79. "Nasser Is 'Best Cadet,'" *Gulf Daily News*, 12 August 2006, p. 1.

80. For a solid analysis of the relationship, see Peterson, "Bahrain's First Steps," pp. 216–225.

81. J. E. Peterson, "Bahrain and the Gulf: Wider Implications of Bahrain's Quest for Political Reform," 15 July 2004, <http://jepeterson.net/comment.html>.



# 4

---

## Kuwait

**T**he founding of the original settlement of Kuwait may have taken place between 1700 and 1710.<sup>1</sup> At that time, a general drought spread throughout the Arabian Peninsula, and drove members of the ‘Anizah confederation to Kuwait in search of water and pasture. Among badu (desert-dwelling) groups who survived the long journey from southern Arabia were the ancestors of the Al Sabah, the ruling family of Kuwait, along with the Al Khalifah, the present ruling family of Bahrain. The name *Kuwait* probably refers to a small fort (*kut*) built to guard the early community.

In the eighteenth century, the powerful Banu Khalid from the Hasah area further south dominated the entire region, even if the Al Sabah were accepted by ‘Utub confederation leaders as a ruling family. The Al Sabah earned the support of key ‘Utub tribes following a successful diplomatic mission initiated by a certain Sabah. That mission visited the Ottoman garrison in Basrah to convey Kuwaiti tribes’ peaceful intentions. This diplomatic accomplishment solidified the Al Sabah and ensured uninterrupted rule beginning in 1756.<sup>2</sup> Unlike tribal relations in the Lower Gulf, where family disputes severely limited peaceful coexistence, Al Sabah rule was secure chiefly because of early matrimonial alliances with the Banu Khalid, their only rivals of significance.

### ■ Creation and Cohesion

Internal Kuwaiti developments between 1820 and 1860 left their mark on the Al Sabah.<sup>3</sup> ‘Abdallah Al Sabah was succeeded by his son Jabir bin ‘Abdallah Al Sabah, who maintained friendly relations with the British. Kuwait literally became an Ottoman garrison town when the Hasah conflict erupted in 1838–1839. Ironically, Al Sa‘ud fighters opened a front against the Ottomans when the British regarded Kuwait as a Turkish vassal. From then on and until the late nineteenth century, British officials referred to Kuwait as attached to,

or a dependent of, the Porte.<sup>4</sup> According to John Gordon Lorimer and Jerome Antony Saldanha, two astute observers of the Persian Gulf in the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government was officially informed that London “admitted to the existence of a Turkish sovereignty along the coast from Basrah to Qatif,” as late as April 1893.<sup>5</sup> A few years later, the British government recanted and declared that, in fact, it had never admitted Ottoman “tutelage” over Kuwait.<sup>6</sup> Despite this denial, Kuwait rapidly succumbed to Ottoman influence. Indeed, the change of heart did not occur in response to numerous Al Sabah requests for assistance, but rather to circumvent Ottoman and German quests for further deployments toward, and in, the Persian Gulf.

In Kuwait itself, Mubarak Al Sabah seized power by assassinating Muhammad, Jarrah, and Yusuf Al Sabah, whom he accused of collaborating too closely with the Ottomans. The coup was carried out in the middle of a hot summer night on 17 May 1896, stunning the shaykh’s family. Senior leaders nevertheless accepted the news as a *fait accompli*. Among the citizenry, a number of merchants were jubilant that a strong leader had taken over and that Mubarak had rejected the allegiance with Ottoman forces.<sup>7</sup> Constantinople, for its part, would not tolerate this defection within its sphere of influence, and at first cajoled Mubarak by bestowing on him the title *qa’immaqam* (governor). When Mubarak rejected the designation and increased taxes levied on imports from 2 to 5 percent, including those originating in the Ottoman Empire, he prudently approached the British for protection. The rising tension between Kuwait and Constantinople necessitated the search for a powerful ally that would deter the Porte. Mubarak Al Sabah negotiated with the British political resident starting in August 1897, expressing a wish to receive protection to prevent an impending annexation by Constantinople. As in previous instances, the request was rejected on the grounds that Britain had not interfered in Gulf rulers’ domestic affairs.<sup>8</sup> Yet when London discovered that Russian envoys had discussed a concession with the Porte involving the construction of a railway from the Mediterranean to the Gulf, the political resident was rapidly instructed to settle a treaty with Mubarak.<sup>9</sup> Naturally, London aimed to prevent Constantinople from granting St. Petersburg any rights, and to muzzle the Al Sabah from ceding territorial rights to a foreign power. This new document would be modeled after the 1891 treaty signed with the rulers of Muscat, the Trucial Coast, and Bahrain, involving British annual tributes in exchange for acquiescence.<sup>10</sup>

The agreement with the Al Sabah was signed on 23 January 1899, by Malcolm John Meade, the British political resident, and Shaykh Mubarak. The latter pledged “himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power or Government at Kuwait, or at any other place within the limits of his territory, without the previous sanction of the British Government,” nor “to cede, sell, lease, mortgage or give for occupation or for

any other purpose, any portion of his territory to the Government or the subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty's Government for these purposes."<sup>11</sup>

When the Porte threatened to occupy Kuwait in 1899, the British ambassador to Constantinople warned Ottoman officials that London would defend Kuwait. Simultaneously, Britain warned its new ally Mubarak Al Sabah not to negotiate with Germany. Berlin objected to the treaty on the grounds that it would be denied the opportunity to build an extension to the Baghdad Railway.<sup>12</sup> In 1901, the Ottomans dispatched a delegation to Kuwait to claim previous privileges, as well as to show the flag. Mubarak refused to receive the delegation. Confident that the British would abide by their commitments, the ruler's position gained him further "legitimacy" in the eyes of his followers.

Cooperative schemes led London to recognize Kuwait as "an independent Government under British protection." The British also encouraged the Al Sabah to declare war against Ottoman garrisons stationed in Basrah and Umm Qasr, to delegitimize Ottoman claims on Kuwait, as well as Bahrain. More significant, the 1899 agreement was restated in 1913 when the Al Sabah agreed to consult with the political resident before granting an oil concession to a third party. In fact, the oil concession was negotiated by the British on behalf of the Kuwaiti ruler for the newly established Kuwait Oil Company, formed by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (later British Petroleum) and the Gulf Oil Corporation of the United States. On 23 December 1934, a draft agreement was finally accepted that invariably granted British firms unequivocal commercial advantages.<sup>13</sup> In addition to these agreements, Sir Percy Cox negotiated with Iraq and Saudi Arabia in 1922 and 1923, all on behalf of the Al Sabah "concerning the adjustments of the boundaries of Kuwait with neighboring countries."<sup>14</sup> Following the discovery of oil, British interests in Kuwait increased substantially and relations between the two countries improved considerably, because Kuwaiti oil redefined the shaykhdom's intrinsic value. In fact, by 1961, close to 40 percent of British oil imports originated from Kuwait and, since the shaykhdom operated within the sterling bloc, Britain had an added incentive in protecting the stability of its currency. Naturally, London asserted itself in the Gulf region, and considered its privileged ties with the Al Sabah vital to its national security objectives.

## **The Ruling Family**

Difficult Al Sabah ties with successive Iraqi potentates forged unique ruling family characteristics. Over the years, astute Al Sabah leaders developed specific internal regulations to govern the shaykhdom's foreign policies without neglecting internal needs. An elaborate hierarchy was developed, one that earned popular support and respect, with the ultimate aim of transforming Al Sabah rule into a

dynastic corporation. Remarkably, the Al Sabah family council—whose writ was to address internal schisms and challenges—emerged as the ideal institution that buttressed the corporation. The council was—and remains—entrusted to a non-contending member whose somewhat neutral position allowed rare opportunities to adjudicate impartially.

Unlike other Gulf families, the Al Sabah introduced relatively strife-free rule to Kuwait, with the exception of Mubarak Al Sabah (r. 1896–1915). The latter, also known as Mubarak the Great, murdered two brothers. His ironclad administration led successors throughout the twentieth century to follow the constitution, which specified that succession be limited to Mubarak's descendants (Article 4). For practical reasons, even for narrower survival expedients, lineage was significantly restricted to descendants of Salim and Jabir, two of Mubarak's seven sons who ruled immediately after him. Consequently, all existing succession dilemmas were traced to the constant jockeying between al-Jabir and al-Salim offspring, who alternated as rulers beginning in 1915, to the exclusion of descendants from Mubarak's remaining five sons: Sabah, Nasr, Fahd, Hamad, and 'Abdallah. Whether this elimination was permanent was unknown, although new leaders from these five branches of the family remained in contention, and may well fill a noticeable vacuum in the future. Still, the Al Sabah's knack for consensus, itself due to a relatively peaceful legacy, meant that the family approached succession matters with aplomb. Given that power was effectively centralized in Al Sabah hands, few outsiders challenged the status quo, concentrating instead on ways to increase their wealth.

Although such pressure existed, the Al Sabah handled it with legendary skill. When, in 1921, Ahmad al-Jabir arbitrarily levied new taxes, leading merchant chieftains interpreted the move "as a breach of the social contract."<sup>15</sup> The tactical breach prompted the formation of a twelve-member consultative council that stood outside Al Sabah authority paths, and Ahmad reverted course. This was an important concession, as the ruling family pledged to work in tandem with the new institution to govern Kuwait. Although this first majlis did not last, a second equally vocal effort started in 1938, this time to respond to steady propaganda emanating from Iraq. As the shaykhdom experienced severe economic lapses, the new body struggled with difficult questions, only to be stifled by the Al Sabah. Yet, as a direct consequence of heated debates in this majlis, Kuwait ushered in a relatively free press, long before any other Gulf society.<sup>16</sup>

Remarkably, the tenor of political difficulties between 1921 and 1961 allowed the Al Sabah to fine-tune their response mechanisms, as shrewd rulers developed and relied on astute compromises. While every move was taken under watchful British eyes—and, presumably, British approval—the Al Sabah developed a rare sense of nationalism for their separate identity. That perception kindled genuine sovereignty aspirations.

## The Al Sabah and Independence

On 19 June 1961, London concluded a new treaty with ‘Abdallah al-Salim Al Sabah, recognizing Kuwait as a sovereign independent state, in effect terminating the 1899 treaty. It was a rare moment in the Gulf, because a major outside power—an intruding authority—conceded local influence to indigenous rulers. The new treaty, titled “Exchange of Notes Regarding Relations Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the State of Kuwait,” pledged British military assistance to defend Kuwait against unspecified aggressors, in effect placing a burden on the latter’s proclaimed independence from London.<sup>17</sup> In fact, this assistance pledge could no longer be simply imposed on Kuwait—whose rulers successfully removed the small shaykhdom from the “British-protected Arabian Gulf states” orbit—because it created a new set of dynamics between the ruling family and a foreign power. Membership in the United Nations and the League of Arab States, as well as the institution of a limited parliamentary system, all permitted Kuwait to conduct independent domestic and foreign relations, albeit within limits. Remarkably, the shaykhdom owed its political freedom to a British presence in the Gulf throughout the early 1960s, when Kuwait experienced several threats against its territorial integrity.

On 25 June 1961, Iraqi strongman ‘Abdul-Karim Qasim revived an old claim to the shaykhdom, arguing that Kuwait was part of the Ottoman Governorate of Basrah, and declared that the 1899 treaty between London and the Al Sabah was “illegal” because it had been negotiated in secret without Constantinople’s approval.<sup>18</sup> While no Iraqi military action was initiated at the time, rumors of such activities were rife. Fearing for his rulership, ‘Abdallah al-Salim Al Sabah called on his allies for assistance. Reaction from the Arab world was overwhelmingly pro-Kuwait. Egyptian president Gamal ‘Abdul Nasir joined other leaders in expressing cordial greetings to Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia sent troops to help the shaykhdom seal its border with Iraq.<sup>19</sup> The Al Sabah further requested military support from London. On 29 June 1961, Britain ordered its aircraft carrier the *Victorious*, and other warships deployed throughout the Middle East and Africa, to sail toward Kuwait. Within two weeks, 5,000 British men were ashore, demonstrating to Qasim that his intentions would not be easily carried out. Qasim’s weakness led Baghdad to move cautiously. The Iraqi strongman declared on 8 July that his country would not use force to regain Kuwait. Still, Baghdad refused to renounce its claim, and as the crisis subsided, Britain began to withdraw deployed forces. British troops were replaced by an Arab League unit of 3,300 men drawn from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Republic, Sudan, Jordan, and Tunisia, under the command of a Saudi officer, Major-General ‘Abdallah al-‘Isa.<sup>20</sup> British forces left Kuwait on 11 October 1961, but this was not the last time that London would

stand by the Al Sabah. Still, the task of securing long-term British objectives in Kuwait was duly accomplished, as Iraqi claims on Kuwait were temporarily shelved.<sup>21</sup>

On 8 February 1963, Qasim was overthrown by a new revolutionary council headed by ‘Abd al-Salim ‘Aref, who declared that Baghdad wished to ease tensions that prevailed in its neighborly ties.<sup>22</sup> Simultaneously, Riyadh intervened to buttress its conservative ally in Kuwait, as the shaykhdom was admitted to the United Nations as its 111th member on 7 May 1963. This was accomplished only after the Soviet Union softened its position and agreed not to exercise its veto. In fact, the Soviets had vetoed Kuwait’s membership application in 1961, but relented in 1963 after Egyptian president Nasir cajoled Moscow.<sup>23</sup> No final settlement on the delimitation of borders between Kuwait and Iraq could be negotiated at the time, even though the issue was of some importance given that Iraq was interested in enlarging its only outlet on the Persian Gulf, through the Shatt al-‘Arab estuary, which is almost entirely blocked by Bubiyan and Warbah Islands. As later events would illustrate, this contention took on great significance, leading to a 1990 invasion.

## ■ Constitutional Continuum in Kuwait

On 11 November 1962, seventeen months after Kuwait gained its 19 June 1961 independence, ‘Abdallah Salim Al Sabah announced that the shaykhdom would introduce a constitution, consisting of 183 articles.<sup>24</sup> Parliamentary life was consequently introduced to the “principality.” This was the first time in the contemporary period that a Gulf ruler granted his subjects a written constitution. The document specified that the country’s sovereignty resided with the people, the source of all power (Article 6), drawing on both Arab and Western models.<sup>25</sup> Moreover, this new democratic system of government was based on a 1938 body of laws, promulgated while Kuwait was still under British dominion. Indeed, based on the 1899 treaty signed between the Al Sabah and London, Kuwait was granted full sovereignty over its domestic affairs, leading the ruler to share his powers with an assembly.<sup>26</sup> The move enhanced the country’s legitimacy, especially vis-à-vis neighboring Iraq, while preserving the shaykhdom’s social contract. For the Al Sabah, an assembly was eminently acceptable, so long as real political power remained nestled under their control. Assembly members could advise, and even work alongside, the executive branch, but Kuwaiti rule was locked into its set pattern.

Within a very short period of time, Kuwait was transformed into a welfare state, which inevitably bolstered Al Sabah legitimacy. Few could resist the state’s ability to appear generous and act munificently. Interestingly, it was individuals who were largely indebted to the ruling family who drafted the 1962 constitution, which, despite glaring anomalies—citizenship that must be



traced to 1919, familial lineage, the exclusion of women until 2005, along with various suspicious clauses—guaranteed the Al Sabah rare privileges. Confidently, successive rulers relied on family members for advice and, over time, help in governing the shaykhdom. Given the Al Sabah's large size—estimated at about 1,200 in the late 1980s—rulers tapped a gaggle of royals to serve in key posts.<sup>27</sup> Although less prominent toward the end of the twentieth century, cadet-branch family members still played important political roles before independence. For example, descendants of Jarrah and Muhammad—the murdered brothers of Mubarak the Great—returned to Kuwait in the 1950s from forced exile. 'Abdallah al-Salim (r. 1950–1965) welcomed his “cousins” to strengthen the ruling clan, but also to expand his own intrahousehold alliances. One of the most prominent members of this cadet branch is Sa'ud Nasir, Kuwaiti ambassador to the United States during the 1990–1991 Iraqi invasion, who earned his ruler's gratitude at a difficult time. His own murdered grandfather and past ruler, Muhammad (r. 1892–1896), would have applauded the performance.<sup>28</sup>

### **Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah (r. 1965–1977)**

Smooth successions were recorded after independence, especially after 'Abdallah al-Salim named his brother Sabah as heir apparent in 1962. The choice, which broke the alternation pattern between the al-Jabir and al-Salim lines, came as a total surprise. It was the exception to the unwritten rule practiced by the Al Sabah throughout the twentieth century. 'Abdallah apparently settled on Sabah because the leading contender from the al-Jabir faction, Jabir al-Ahmad, was too young. The latter's youth did not prevent him from serving as finance minister, leading many to speculate that the real reasons for rolling past his nomination lay elsewhere. In fact, Jabir al-Ahmad displayed pan-Arab tendencies that enhanced his popularity among Kuwaitis, even if they preoccupied Britain. Beholden to London for ensuring Al Sabah power, these sentiments engrossed the ruler, who settled on his full-brother to avoid a schism with the British crown.

Because Sabah was a compromise candidate, his appointment was not expected to offend, least of all Jabir al-Ahmad. Still, Sabah was amply qualified, having served as police commander and director of health. He succeeded 'Abdallah al-Salim when the ruler died in 1965. Sabah's rule was characterized by significant constitutional issues that deserve special attention, especially because the interests of the Al Sabah family were protected and promoted.

***A constitutional legacy.*** Like similar constitutions, Kuwait's stipulated that it was “an Arab country” (Article 1), that “the religion of the State is Islam, and [that] the Shari'ah Law shall be a main source of legislation” (Article 2). The constitution provided the principality with a council of ministers (Article

56), and a parliament composed of fifty deputies elected directly by universal suffrage and secret ballot (Article 80), although women did not have the right to vote.<sup>29</sup> Article 80 further stated that “ministers who [were] not elected members of the National Assembly shall be considered ex-officio members thereof,” introducing a permanent fluctuation into the assembly that, years later, would lead to serious political clashes.

Much like the Bahraini code, individual freedoms were guaranteed by the Kuwaiti constitution. Articles 7 to 26 described in some detail the types of freedom Kuwaiti citizens enjoyed. According to Article 7 “Justice, Liberty and Equality are the pillars of society,” and according to Article 8 the state was enabled to secure those pillars for all citizens.<sup>30</sup> The constitution further recognized that “education is a fundamental requisite for the progress of society, [which must be] assured and promoted by the State” (Article 13), and ensured “aid for citizens in old age, sickness or inability to work” (Article 11). Moreover, it recognized private property rights (Articles 16–19) and, like the Bahraini document, forbade the state to exile a citizen or to prevent him from entering the country (Articles 27–28). Finally, Kuwaitis enjoyed liberty of movement, freedom of choice in their place of residence and place of work, and safety in their homes, because the latter could not be entered without legal sanction. Within the limits of the law, freedom of speech was also guaranteed, and while there were no references to political parties in the constitution, the civil code provided for the right to establish peaceful associations and trade unions (Article 43).

At the time this constitution was drafted, astute senior Al Sabah leaders understood that a distribution of powers was necessary between the executive and legislative branches, precisely to preserve, protect, and promote ruling family authority (Article 51). Just like the Al Khalifah in Bahrain, the Al Sabah wrote explicit rules into their constitution to clarify the rights of succession even if no primogeniture was envisaged. Among privileges explicitly enjoyed by the ruler was the right to choose an heir, albeit following consultations with family members, but before seeking parliamentary approval. An heir and successor could be a brother, nephew, or a cousin of the ruler, and did not have to be a son. Once named, a Kuwaiti heir, by tradition—at least since 1963—was appointed prime minister. The emir was head of state.

With respect to the legislative branch, the constitution stipulated that fifty members (Article 80) were to be directly elected through universal suffrage (women were denied the right to vote until 2005). Elected for a four-year term (Article 83), parliament could be dissolved by an emiri decree, although new elections would have to be called within two months (Article 107). Because the prime minister was always a senior Al Sabah family member, the constitution protected him from a no-confidence vote (Article 102), although the National Assembly could censure individual ministers. Under such circumstances, the concerned minister would resign to preserve government unity. If

deputies were no longer able to cooperate with the cabinet, the issue would be raised with the head of state, who could either appoint a new prime minister or dissolve the assembly.

Given such intricate conditions, it was no wonder that executive-legislative ties were problematic, and led to periodic emergencies. A major constitutional crisis occurred on 6 December 1964 when a newly appointed government, composed of members of the Al Sabah and leading merchant-family members, was duly ushered in. Strangely, and lacking parliamentary support, Kuwaiti officials opted to ram the new government through. Two weeks later, twenty-eight out of the fifty deputies walked out of parliament, as the emiri decree identifying the newly appointed ministers was read. At the core of the dispute was a constitutional directive that insisted no minister could "hold any other public office or practice, even indirectly, any profession or undertake any industrial, commercial or financial business" (Article 131). Deputies were clearly in the right, but it was their vigilance that prompted the ruler to rescind previous orders and dismiss all six implicated individuals.<sup>31</sup> A fresh government was finally designated, which defused a serious constitutional crisis, although Al Sabah leaders were livid that their preferences had been suppressed.

**Political clashes.** On 29 August 1976, the constitution was suspended, and the National Assembly dissolved, by Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah. Simultaneously, the emir decreed that he would assume legislative powers jointly with the Council of Ministers, and declared that the publishing law would be amended to give the Ministry of Interior full authority to suspend any publication that received financial subsidies from foreign sources. Allegedly, these actions were deemed to be in the national interest, following heated parliamentary debates on specific internal as well as regional issues.<sup>32</sup> Why did the ruler take these drastic measures, and how were they related to the ruling family's own success?

In a radio and television broadcast on 29 August 1976, the emir charged the National Assembly with disseminating discord among the Kuwaiti population, instead of working to strengthen the principality.<sup>33</sup> He further announced that fresh electoral reforms would be submitted to a referendum within four years. Remarkably, there were no immediate threats to Kuwaiti stability at the time, even if the ruler was motivated to opt for such a preventive measure. No challenge to Al Sabah rule was imminent or, for that matter, in the offing. Indeed, despite frequent parliamentary opposition, such as the 1964 case, which had been a victory for the assembly, no one in parliament wished, or planned, to overthrow the regime. The only significant opposition to Al Sabah rule came from the Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), though it achieved little, having only nine deputies. What apparently concerned the Al Sabah were the repercussions of the 1975–1976 chapter of the Lebanese civil war, which highlighted the presence in Kuwait of a large, vocal, and influential Palestinian community.

Some Al Sabah officials simply feared that political dissension and pan-Arab debates among Kuwait's highly articulate—and effective—intelligentsia could reverberate among the stateless community. Such politicization, it was further reasoned, would affect a small vulnerable country if a neighboring state wished to exploit the situation. The emir specifically noted this salient point during his address to the nation, insisting that the country's relatively free press was being manipulated by foreign powers that presumably intended to subject Kuwait to a similar fate.<sup>34</sup> The allusion to a neighboring country, probably Iraq, was reasonable from an Al Sabah perspective, given Baghdad's claims on the shaykhdom. Therefore, it was entirely possible that the emir was referring to both Iraq as well as the specific developments in the Lebanese quagmire. Again, from a Kuwaiti ruling family viewpoint, the precedent set by Damascus—intervening in Lebanon presumably to control “radical” elements—established a model for others to emulate should similar circumstances emerge in the Gulf region. The Al Sabah feared that their own Palestinian population, including those who occupied important government positions in the shaykhdom, would be influenced by ideologically noncompatible elements. Neither Sabah al-Salim nor Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah were willing to experiment.

In fact, on 31 August 1976, Jabir al-‘Ali, then-minister of information, admonished the press and warned journalists not to get involved in intra-Arab conflicts. He boldly advised leading editors to confine their journalistic bravado to constructive criticism on domestic affairs. Kuwaiti newspapers along with those of Lebanon enjoyed, by Arab standards, undeniable freedoms. To a certain extent, they supported resistance movements, and sharply criticized “conservative” regimes for not using their wealth and prestige to assist those less fortunate. On 1 September 1976, Shaykh al-‘Ali suspended five leading periodicals that had criticized the government.<sup>35</sup> The action was probably taken to reduce rising tensions between Damascus and Kuwait over the Lebanese conflict. In any event, the suspension of the constitution and the dissolution of the National Assembly ended all representative forms of government in the Gulf.

Regional reactions to Kuwait's 1976 constitutional crisis were mixed, ranging from Syrian, Iranian, and Saudi support, to Palestinian and Iraqi opposition. President Hafez al-Assad congratulated the Al Sabah, while Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran declared to London's *Daily Telegraph* that the Kuwaiti press was “in the pay of a foreign country.” A progovernment Saudi daily in Riyadh, the *Al-Jazirah*, opined that the 29 August measures represented “the best way to lead Kuwait back on the road to democracy and to eliminate the negative results created by certain elements exploiting freedom of expression.” The Egyptian daily *Al-Akhbar* editorialized that the measures were “necessary for some time.”<sup>36</sup> Before long, and in a volatile political environment, rumors filled the airwaves and the pages of most Arab controlled media outlets. Shortly after the August decrees were delivered, the Iraqi News

Agency reported that a number of Kuwaiti army officers had been arrested and that some of them had been dismissed from their posts.<sup>37</sup> The Kuwaiti minister of cabinet affairs, 'Abdul 'Aziz Hussein, denied a report, published in the progovernment Egyptian daily *Akhbar al-Yom*, that an unsuccessful Libyan-backed coup attempt had been discovered in Kuwait.<sup>38</sup>

In November 1976, however, the Kuwaiti prime minister declared that an elaborate antisabotage detection system had finally been installed around various oil installations. A few months later, Kuwait approached British security officials for assistance, and on 24 May the Minister of Interior confirmed that former London police commissioner Robert Mark had been invited to advise the Al Sabah on appropriate antiterrorism measures.<sup>39</sup> These steps illustrated Kuwaiti apprehension and Al Sabah precautions.

### **Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah (r. 1977–2006)**

None of these precautionary measures stopped serious internal clashes that occurred in December 1977 as Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah acceded to the shaykhdom's rulership. Jabir, who had been appointed prime minister and heir apparent by Sabah in May 1966, restored the succession alternation. As minister of finance and economy, Jabir al-Ahmad was entrusted with the shaykhdom's finances, which made him keenly aware of what was possible. He established the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and directed the General Oil Affairs Office, both of which sharpened his sense of what a small state like Kuwait could accomplish in the Gulf, as well as the Arab and Muslim worlds. Kuwait adopted several aid programs under his leadership, which were further enhanced after he became ruler.<sup>40</sup> These significant accomplishments notwithstanding, his first few weeks as ruler were mired in violence, after the historic visit to Israel by Egyptian president Anwar al-Sadat (19–22 November 1977). Prompted by the Egyptian's speech to the Israeli Knesset (parliament), frequent political disturbances in Kuwait and elsewhere throughout the Arab world mobilized opposition forces. Not surprisingly, several Kuwaiti student leaders were quickly arrested, because their opposition to the Al Sabah had crossed unwritten red lines in the shaykhdom's political discourse. Although demonstrators momentarily channeled their wrath toward Sadat, Al Sabah leaders were not spared, allegedly because the latter ruled in an "undemocratic" fashion. The January 1979 fall of the Shah of Iran further increased the level of disturbances in the shaykhdom. A Kuwaiti citizen of Iranian origin, clergyman Abbas Ahmad al-Mehri, and his eighteen member family, were summarily deported on 26 September 1979, allegedly for engaging in "seditious" anti-Al Sabah political activities. According to Kuwaiti sources, al-Mehri had delivered several speeches in a mosque to "disseminate . . . division and incitement."<sup>41</sup> A few weeks later, police dispersed a demonstration in front of the US embassy in Kuwait City, organized by pro-Iranian

Shi'ahs following 'Ashurah celebrations.<sup>42</sup> On 17 January 1980, the director-general of Kuwaiti internal security forces announced that approximately 18,000 illegal immigrants had been deported over a three-month period.<sup>43</sup>

These developments further unsettled the Al Sabah, who nevertheless insisted that they were fully able to defend the country and preserve their rule. When the visiting Iranian foreign minister, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, escaped an assassination attempt on 29 April 1980, Kuwait reevaluated.<sup>44</sup> Attacks against Iranian interests increased, with two bombs exploding outside the offices of Iran Air in May 1980, and another at the Chancellery on 4 June. Anonymous reprisals against the newspaper *Al-Ra'i al-'Am* on 12 July left two persons fatally wounded and seventeen seriously injured. On 23 July 1980, Prime Minister Sa'ad 'Abdallah Al Sabah revealed that "vehicles carrying various types of arms had entered Kuwait" and that "one of them had been intercepted at the border by security forces."<sup>45</sup>

Over a very short period of time, additional disturbances occurred, as several fires were set across the city. Kuwaiti authorities suspected that their frequency could not be coincidental. After three and a half years of political tumult, during which little or no political activity of any significance transpired, the Kuwaiti government announced on 11 February 1980 that a new committee had been created to formulate, within six months, necessary amendments to the constitution. At the completion of its work in June 1980, the committee recommended that an enlarged parliament (sixty members serving for five years) be formed, and that women be granted the right to vote. Jabir Al-Ahmad Al Sabah rejected both recommendations. Instead, he pledged that parliament would be restored, no later than February 1981.<sup>46</sup>

On the eve of the shaykhdom's twentieth independence anniversary, approximately 43,000 male Kuwaitis elected 50 new parliamentarians, from among 440 candidates. While eligible voters represented 3 percent of the total population, many residents were jubilant that elections were being held at all, reinforcing their desire and interest in popular forms of government.<sup>47</sup> Pro-Al Sabah and Sunni fundamentalist groups registered marked gains among newly elected parliamentarians. Both groups defeated deputies belonging to the ANM and, "playing on anti-Iranian backlash, reduce[d] the Shiite Muslim representation from 10 to 4 seats."<sup>48</sup>

As important as these elections were, the gestational parliamentary experience of the shaykhdom never earned Al Sabah trust, especially because far too many disenfranchised Kuwaitis questioned the ruling family's dedication to the legislature. While the ruler was not opposed to the National Assembly, Al Sabah members disdained the institution, even if convenience dictated tolerance.<sup>49</sup> In the event, and while 43,000 individuals qualified to register in 1981, census figures for 1980, compiled by the Economic Commission for Western Asia, counted 120,578 male Kuwaiti citizens aged twenty and over.<sup>50</sup> Why were 80,000 eligible male Kuwaitis not active participants in the 1981

elections?<sup>51</sup> Why were 80,000 Kuwaitis willing to forego exercising this constitutional privilege? Were any of them denied participation?

As he accepted various compromises to restore parliament, the ruler acquiesced to increase the number of electoral districts (from ten to twenty-five), each of which would elect two representatives. At the time, allegations of gerrymandering abounded, especially with respect to redrawing district boundaries and sizes, all to “increase conservative bedouin representation and decrease troublesome nationalist and perhaps Shi‘ah representation.”<sup>52</sup> Election results in 1981—a massive return of the *badu*, the dismal performance of nationalists, as well as the withering of the Shi‘ah—supported these charges.

Nevertheless, the reintroduction of parliamentary life in Kuwait indicated that the *Al Sabah* were conscious that, in a sea of swirling instability, popular participation could enhance the shaykhdom’s political stability. Participation promised to limit internal subversion against a regime whose tribal allegiances clashed with democratic institutions. Although internal challenges threatened the regime, the introduction of more or less participatory institutions and practices mitigated the more serious problems, without eliminating any of them. Political change was a double-edged sword. Although it ensured stability in the long run, it clearly weakened the country in the short term, even if the ruling establishment was willing to assume that burden.

**Opposition to the *Al Sabah*.** Though Jabir al-Ahmad supported the stiff measures adopted in the wake of the 1976 constitutional crisis when he was heir apparent, in fact he affirmed that practicing “insane democracy” led individuals “lacking in scruples” to transform “freedoms into anarchy.” This was the context in which he authorized a clampdown on the press. A few years later, the ruler had pushed for the same constitutional amendments discussed above, with similarly abysmal results. Despite the progovernment parliament in place, Kuwaitis rejected many of the ruler’s political advances. Worsening economic conditions, and the government’s inability to deal with the failure of the *Suq al-Manakh* (the unofficial stock market), set the stage for serious clashes.<sup>53</sup> In response, the ruler called for new elections for 1985, hoping that the assassination attempt on his life would earn the *Al Sabah* sympathy as well as deflect attention from systemic shortcomings.

Kuwaiti nationalists made a noticeable comeback, even if the same disparity in numbers persisted, between the 1981 and 1985 elections. The *Al Sabah* made a significant effort to maneuver public opinion toward law and order issues—playing on the series of bombings that rocked the city in 1983 as well as the 1985 assassination attempt. Of the 238 candidates who sought one of the fifty seats, 31 new faces replaced traditional office holders. Fundamentalist candidates lost two of their strongest members, while progovernment deputies enjoyed a small numeric advantage. Still, the *Al Sabah* were vanquished on one score when their protégé, Speaker Yusuf al-‘Adsani, was

defeated. Shi'ah candidates increased their number from two to three.<sup>54</sup> Because of these political changes, Kuwait feared the worst. At a time when the Iran-Iraq War was entering into a decisive stage, internal security questions remained unanswered, threatening to escalate the level of anti-Kuwaiti violence. A series of hijackings and other subversive acts proved the point to anxious Kuwaiti rulers. The country drifted and, after the government resigned on 1 July 1986, the ruler suspended the National Assembly on 3 July.

Although the Suq al-Manakh crisis, and the spillover effects of the Iran-Iraq War, prompted the ruler to suspend parliament for the second time, internal Al Sabah family maneuvers played equally important roles in the suspension. Vociferous debates filled the airwaves and print media outlets as well as most public debates held in Kuwait's famed *diwaniyyahs* (informal majlis). Almost always opposed to heir apparent Sa'ad al-'Abdallah, who represented the al-Salim branch of the family, the al-Ahmads unhesitatingly called for his replacement by Sabah al-Ahmad, the ruler's brother and also foreign minister. A favorite tactic employed by al-Ahmad cronies was to launch attacks on Sa'ad's allies. Various reports highlighted how the National Assembly was used to embarrass pro-Sa'ad ministers, including 'Ali al-Khalifah al-'Adhbi Al Sabah, the minister of petroleum; Hasan 'Ali al-Ibrahim, the minister of education; and 'Isa Muhammad al-Mazidi, the minister of communications. In response, the heir apparent traveled for extended periods, or simply refused to appear in parliament to defend the government when he was physically in the country.<sup>55</sup>

The stratagem achieved its desired results for a while, but after a Kuwaiti oil installation was sabotaged on 17 June 1986—temporarily crippling the shaykhdom's oil production—the government was taken to task by parliamentarians eager to further embarrass it. Both the minister of petroleum, 'Ali al-Khalifah Al Sabah, and the minister of interior, Nawwaf al-Ahmad Al Sabah (the ruler's older brother), appeared in parliament to explain what the government was doing to protect and defend the state. The spectacles were hostile, and no matter what clarification either minister advanced, it appeared that the primary objective was to further annoy the heir apparent rather than address what ailed the country and its economy. The prime minister saw his influence dramatically curtailed within the ruling family as his protégés were systematically admonished. Against the plethora of negative publicity, he challenged the ruler to act, as the latter assailed those who "pushed freedom away" until it became "chaos." The emir also warned those who "turned nationalism into sectarianism," but the damage was already done.<sup>56</sup> Kuwait joined its conservative neighboring monarchies as the last functioning Arab Gulf parliament was suspended.

***The Al Sabah after the Iraqi invasion.*** With the 2 August 1990 Iraqi invasion and the 27 February 1991 allied liberation of Kuwait, the political crisis of the shaykhdom returned with gusto. Members of the ruling elite who called



for fundamental changes in Kuwait were in abeyance as the ruling family devised various schemes to return to power and restore the sovereignty of the shaykhdom. For the designated successor, Sa'ad al-'Abdallah, the writing was on the wall, and one may argue that the heir apparent was uniquely qualified to assess the dramatic repercussions of the latest crisis. Sa'ad was amply aware that the Iraq question, with or without the Ba'ath party, would be at the forefront of political developments in Kuwait for the foreseeable future, just as it had been during the past three decades. In fact, Sa'ad first went to Baghdad in the fall of 1977, ostensibly to discuss the border dispute between the two countries, but also to assess how Kuwait could protect itself as well as its interests while coexisting with the Ba'athist regime at arm's length. His presence in Baghdad was then, and throughout the following decade, a good omen, since Ba'ath leaders seemed to welcome his style. Under his leadership, relations between Kuwait and Baghdad improved steadily, as the heir apparent devised a border arrangement that allowed Kuwaitis to travel to Basrah and enjoy that famed city's entertainment facilities. Even then, however, Iraqis continued to insist that Kuwait cede Warbah and Bubiyan Islands. For Sa'ad, therefore, the Iraq question remained the key issue for Kuwaiti stability, but after 1990 the heir apparent was significantly weakened within the ruling family. In fact, al-Ahmad branch members never forgave Sa'ad his rapprochement efforts, arguing with perfect hindsight that he should have been much less accommodating to Saddam Hussein and his various demands. Still, it would be mendacious to maintain that Sa'ad favored an accommodation with the Iraqis, even if few choices existed before 1991. By early 2002, al-Salim officials correctly assessed the long-term repercussions of the 1991 liberation, arguing that the Iraq problem was still present after a full decade had elapsed. Yet few al-Salim leaders fathomed that their policies toward Ba'athist Iraq could change, once Sa'ad acceded to rulership. In addition to Iraq, the Al Sabah faced equally daunting internal challenges.

***Internal pressures throughout the 1990s.*** One of the key questions facing the Al Sabah after the 1991 liberation was the type and pace of political reforms that the shaykhdom could tolerate, perhaps even encourage. How the Al Sabah went about addressing this question illustrated the shaykhdom's trauma throughout the 1990s.

Several weeks after the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the Al Sabah and leading Kuwaitis gathered in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, to draft a new power-sharing compact. It was duly decided that Kuwaitis would support the Al Sabah ruling family, who in turn would reciprocate by restoring the 1962 constitution. The accord represented a significant concession for the Al Sabah, because the 1962 concordat elevated the elected parliament to new heights, giving the Kuwaiti "people" certain inalienable rights. In fact, when assemblymen freely exercised their newly acquired freedoms throughout the

1960s and early 1970s, the Al Sabah considered such behavior as a breach. Parliament was then abolished, ostensibly to put an end to such independence of action. Two decades later, the Al Sabah were back to square one, but this time their promises were made on foreign soil. Indeed, they were beholden to their Saudi hosts, US-led coalition liberators, and their dispersed but determined citizens to restore full sovereignty. There would be a heavy price to pay, although few realized how dramatic the changes would be.

Emboldened by the 1991 US-led, UN-sanctioned liberation of the shaykhdom, the Kuwaiti opposition literally trounced pro-Al Sabah loyalists and insisted that elections be held without delay. Although the ruler created a largely technocratic government in April 1991 (thirteen new ministers and only four ruling family members), opposition leaders remained steadfast. For his part, the emir was not in a hurry to fulfill his Jiddah pledges, banking on his triumphant return to a liberated country as sufficient panacea. Still, while an overwhelming majority of Kuwaitis stood by the Al Sabah as a governing elite, Jabir al-Ahmad's paternalism grew thin. What galvanized the opposition was the ruler's unconstrained penchant to act in the name of the (suspended) National Assembly. Distributing largess, including canceling all utility bills for the past year and a half, and forgiving US\$20 billion in personal debt, was all done by decree in the name of the people, whose representatives were held in abeyance. Moreover, and as the country was literally reinvented precisely to restore freedoms and liberties, the ruler's cavalier attitude was deemed unworthy of the heavy price paid by Kuwaitis who stayed behind and fought for liberation. In the end, it was US pressure—perhaps to alleviate calls that Washington fought to restore an undemocratic political system—that prompted Jabir al-Ahmad to call for elections in October 1992. A full eighteen months had elapsed since the last Iraqi soldiers had been expelled from Kuwait.<sup>57</sup>

An estimated 82,000 Kuwaitis cast ballots in the elections, ushering into office thirty-four (out of fifty) opposition and independent deputies. Parliamentarians like “the Democratic Forum’s Nibari and [Ahmad al-] Khatib, and the Sunni fundamentalist editor of the Journal *al-Mujtama’*, Isma‘il al-Shatti—all veteran anti-government agitators—signaled tension and anti-al-Sabah parliamentary activity.”<sup>58</sup> Not surprisingly, this first postliberation parliament was mired in acrimonious debates, as disputants “attempted to make members of the Al Sabah accountable for their actions and to give the Assembly a greater role in governing.”<sup>59</sup> A full-fledged constitutional crisis emerged after parliament sought to nullify emiri decrees issued between 1986 and 1992. Assembly experts advanced the notion that Article 71 of the constitution granted the people of Kuwait this privilege.<sup>60</sup> As both the tone and the substance of the debate became tempestuous, the government referred the case to the Constitutional Court, which promptly sided with the Al Sabah. Opposition forces backed down, comprehending that the ruling family could easily dissolve this new parliament, further narrowing the parameters of legitimate debate.

Nevertheless, the episode was a wake-up call, and the Al Sabah decided to better prepare for the October 1996 plebiscite. The eighth National Assembly witnessed another metamorphosis, as nineteen progovernment and fourteen Islamist candidates won, after an estimated 85,000 Kuwaiti males cast their ballots. Liberal parliamentarians could only retain seven seats, including the one held by Speaker Ahmad al-Sa'adun. Eleven independent and tribal representatives were elected as well.<sup>61</sup> Critics noted that so-called service deputies (*nuwab al-khidmah*) gave the Al Sabah breathing room, even if most parliamentarians registered healthy skepticism, particularly as changing regional circumstances required added vigilance.<sup>62</sup> The service parliamentarians lost out, while Islamist parliamentarians gained momentum. Yet both groupings alternated their critiques of the ruling family and the government it supervised. The decade closed with a *modus vivendi* as the National Assembly adapted to Al Sabah endurance, and the latter accommodated careful and, at times, vocal scrutiny.

In July 1999, and for the first time in Kuwaiti history, over 100,000 voters participated in assembly elections, as 80 percent of eligible voters cast ballots in temperatures hovering around 118°F (48°C). Pork-barrel service parliamentarians lost ground to liberal forces, as did several prominent Islamists. Gone was the docile 1996 parliament, which was replaced with a body "split more or less evenly three ways between liberals, Islamists and the government's men."<sup>63</sup> At a time when serious economic challenges abounded, and as the Al Sabah accumulated over sixty decrees waiting for ratification, a political crisis brewed. Among the more prominent decrees was the ruler's 16 May 1999 edict that allowed women the right to vote and to hold public office. Not surprisingly, Islamists opposed the command and used this issue to form a workable tribal-bloc coalition that essentially plunged "the country into a state of political excitement by challenging public secular liberties."<sup>64</sup> The National Assembly struck down the measure in November 1999, although the Al Sabah and their supporters vowed to continue their push for full political rights. A useful argument advanced by liberal leaders was the undeniable fact that Kuwaiti women had earned their rights by actively resisting the 1990 invasion, and that many had paid the ultimate price for true liberation. Moreover, it was repeatedly pointed out in parliamentary debates that Islam provided specific rights to women, and that under *shari'ah* all human beings were equal. A more pertinent assertion was the absence in the Kuwaiti constitution of any proclamation that limited every citizen's right to vote and run for office, irrespective of gender. What stood in the way of the emiri decree being implemented was a 1963 electoral law that prohibited female participation in politics. According to the Al Sabah, this provision violated the constitution itself and therefore needed a simple amendment. A significant segment of Kuwaiti society rejected this interpretation, of course, resulting in increased attacks "on video shops considered to be upholders of loose morals and non-Islamic propaganda, as

well as legal attacks on women writers and publishers accused of immoral and irreligious views,” among other incidents.<sup>65</sup> Prominent Kuwaitis, including leading women, objected to the tone and direction of the debate, but the issue surpassed a woman’s right to vote. The real question was the constitutionality of rule by decree, a recurring theme in internal Kuwaiti matters, with the Al Sabah favoring this time-tested option.

As the Islamist influence over the democratic process increased, and as liberal voices gathered momentum, the Al Sabah dissolved parliament on 4 May 2000 and called for new elections. Yet because the next plebiscite was not to be held until July 2003, the government returned to its preferred governance tool: the edict. Between May 2000 and July 2003, the palace issued landmark decrees dealing with women’s suffrage, economic liberalization, and nationality. Understandably, the National Assembly later rejected all of these proclamations as a matter of principle, before reintroducing several as parliamentary legislation. Still, in 2003 larger numbers of voters, up to 140,000 out of a citizen population of 900,000, participated even as old-style favoritism, including vote “trading”—not to say “buying”—became quite rampant.<sup>66</sup> Held after the US-led war against Iraq, this suffrage was the first without the lurking shadow of Saddam Hussein. In fact, these elections were the first to propel young Kuwaitis to think about their future as more or less orderly in a normal country, without the fear of invasion from a perennial foe that shaped every Kuwaiti decision. Surprisingly, liberal candidates lost many seats, although the Al Sabah organized effective campaigns on their behalf. The incoming assembly, which was slated to sit until late 2007, was divided among twenty-one Islamists, fourteen progovernment supporters, twelve independent elements, and a mere three liberal representatives. Once again, the enduring Al Sabah went to work, to better control the blocs that emerged. Although senior family members were preoccupied with personal health predicaments—slowing the entire political process—the ruling family set out to overhaul the country’s electoral system. Little was actually accomplished on the primary goal—to reduce the electoral constituencies from twenty-five to five—even if the assembly’s main parliamentary blocs agreed with the Al Sabah to move the process forward.<sup>67</sup> Irrespective of excited voices or added scrutiny, the Al Sabah protected their long-term interests, by ensuring that the Kuwaiti constitutional continuum recognized a central role for the ruling family to maintain internal stability.

## ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Sabah of Kuwait

Since 1756, when a Sabah was selected as a ‘Utub tribal leader near the northern trading port of Kuwait, all of the shaykhdom’s rulers have been his succes-

sors, chosen by family council. As discussed above, the definite transitional leader was Mubarak al-Kabir, or Mubarak the Great, who ruled between 1896 and 1915. His accession was neither by family council nor peaceful. Rather, Mubarak the Great—like many men with “great” in their names—gained power by killing his half-brother, who was then the legitimate ruler. As if intrafamily conflicts were not acute enough, Mubarak opted to rely on Britain—perhaps to differentiate himself from his fallen brother’s Ottoman preferences—with which he signed the 1899 agreement that granted Kuwait a “protectorate” status. London then assumed a literal control over the shaykhdom’s foreign and defense affairs.

After Mubarak’s reign, Kuwait switched from a lateral succession—a brother replacing another—to a more peaceful system of succession, although not quite a primogeniture structure. His two eldest sons, Jabir (r. 1915–1917) and Salim (r. 1917–1921) succeeded him. Salim’s successor was Jabir’s son, Ahmad (r. 1921–1950). In turn, authority reverted to ‘Abdallah bin Salim (r. 1950–1965) when Ahmad died (see Appendix 5 for a list of Al Sabah rulers). In fact, ‘Abdallah bin Salim is widely accepted as the true father of Kuwait, an observation confirmed by commentators who praised his astute maneuvers to empower the shaykhdom’s leading Al Sabah tribal chieftains, while ushering in relative prosperity and concrete political privileges to many when the country was very much under strict rules of conduct imposed by the United Kingdom.<sup>68</sup> Ever since 1915, the rotation had functioned rather well, with a single exception in 1965, when ‘Abdallah bin Salim was succeeded by his brother, Sabah al-Salim (r. 1965–1977).

## Rulers and Successors

Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, the shaykhdom’s twelfth ruler, died on 31 December 1977; as expected, senior family members gathered to choose his successor. At the time, questions were raised on the equilibrium of forces within the Kuwaiti ruling family. No one doubted that the heir apparent would succeed the ruler, especially when his predecessor designated the individual, and govern with full family backing. Moreover, as was customary, senior Al Sabah leaders deferred to the previous ruler’s preference, accepting a monarch’s right to choose the ablest individual within the ruling family. In May 1966, Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah was indeed appointed heir apparent, a decision that raised little or no opposition at the time, given that Jabir was perceived by family members as being highly competent, especially with respect to economic and administrative issues.<sup>69</sup>

Jabir al-Ahmad was a known quantity. Born in 1928, he quickly assumed several official positions in the days when the shaykhdom was under full British protection, and in a sense was “tutored” by senior Al Sabah family

members to eventually fill the heir apparent-ship. In 1949, at twenty-one, Jabir was appointed chief of police of Ahmadi district, within a decade was entrusted with reorganizing the Ministry of Finance. In 1969, he was asked to head the government for the first time; because his predecessor was ailing, he increasingly assumed actual governance responsibilities. More frequently in the public eye, Jabir al-Ahmad promoted Kuwait's cultural life, and early on espoused a vision for the unification of the Arab Gulf states. Thus, if the 1977 succession was relatively smooth because of Jabir's record, as well as the family's tendency to rally around the heir apparent, there were still rumblings through the corridors of Sif Palace.<sup>70</sup> Internal differences were apparent and, save for outside pressures, an eventual challenge to Jabir was quietly crushed after regional leaders intervened to end this perceived defiance. Saudi Arabia, in particular, pleaded that all succession matters be dealt with swiftly, illustrating how edgy Riyadh was regarding succession matters throughout the Arabian Peninsula. Chief among the difficulties in Kuwait was the established rivalry within the Al Sabah family, first between its two branches—the al-Salims and al-Jabirs—and second between various personalities competing for power and influence.

In accordance with traditions established after Mubarak the Great's death, and to avoid the Al Sabah succumbing to prevalent Arab tribal disputes, which more often than not resulted in death and mayhem after every leadership change, it was thus decided that the throne would continue to alternate between members of the two branches of the family. As stated above, the custom had been faithfully adhered to in the past, with the sole exception of 1965. Members of the al-Jabir branch of the family may well have felt betrayed by this transgression in tribal protocol, and the solution, at least for a few, would have seen two al-Jabirs succeed each other. At the time, the matter was further strained because of Jabir 'Ali al-Salim's strong personality; he was a man of immense charisma as well as potential, and as deputy prime minister espoused and articulated a rather prudent agenda that unsettled most.<sup>71</sup>

On several occasions, Jabir 'Ali al-Salim lobbied for a dissolution of the protocol allowing an individual to simultaneously hold both the heir apparent and prime minister positions, as he rejected the blatant accumulation of power. As an activist, he encouraged his supporters to take up arms and, because their numbers were limited, facilitated the immigration of members of his tribe from 'Ajman (then under Saudi control, now a member state of the United Arab Emirates) to resettle in Kuwait. Of course, to maintain his traditional influence, Jabir 'Ali al-Salim even provided the necessary weapons and ammunition to strengthen his presence. Indirectly, this show of force was meant to influence upcoming National Assembly deliberations and voting. Under the circumstances, Saudi Arabia very much opposed such dramatic changes in Kuwait, and pressured the ruler to place restrictions on Jabir 'Ali's activities. Riyadh's political wishes notwithstanding, Jabir 'Ali al-Salim, who was ten years older than Jabir al-Ahmad, was someone to reckon with in the

shaykhdom. He remained a viable candidate for succession, someone who could not be easily passed over to assume the heirship.

For Jabir al-Ahmad, the new ruler in 1977, the dilemma was twofold. First, how to contain Jabir 'Ali's ambitions without infuriating the al-Salims, and second, how to prevent the latter group from rallying around Jabir 'Ali, precisely to weaken the ruler. Clearly, there was a danger that the two branches of the family would break or distance themselves from post-Mubarak the Great traditions and, in the process, risk damaging the ruling family's long-term interests in Kuwait. In early 1978, during the forty-day mourning period that followed Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah's death, advice and suggestions poured from all quarters throughout the region. The most creative was to accept Jabir 'Ali's challenge, and decree that the ruler would introduce major reforms regarding the heir apparent and prime minister positions. Heavy nooses would thus be removed from around the ruler's neck, thereby overturning the arguments made so forcefully by Jabir 'Ali. That was not to be, however, and Jabir 'Ali was clearly passed over for the two critical positions when Sa'ad al-'Abdallah al-Salim Al Sabah was designated heir apparent. Nevertheless, the appointment restored the balance between the two branches of the family and the flamboyant Jabir 'Ali was "neutralized." The ruler could certainly be criticized, but not for his selection. After all, Sa'ad was a fellow al-Salim, which meant that the Salims could be cajoled. No al-Salim attempt to undermine the influence and popularity of the ruler would be tolerated, something that the new ruler underscored through various appointments.<sup>72</sup>

By appointing Sa'ad al-'Abdallah to the heirship, the ruler strengthened the bipolar reality of the Al Sabah family, and cleaned the slate for his authority. Moreover, the choice weakened one of Jabir al-Ahmad's most potent and effective challengers, Jabir 'Ali. Although little of the internal deliberations that transpired at the time were made public, senior family members never missed the opportunity to remind their younger brethren of the enormity of what was at stake. Younger Al Sabah officials were reminded that the interests of the family should not, and would not, be compromised, and that internal splits were never justified. Shaykh Sa'ad, who was entrusted with both Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior portfolios, quickly agreed to surrender them to preserve family harmony. Even in this instance, the equilibrium was maintained, as the Ministry of Interior was turned over to Sabah al-Ahmad, the ruler's brother (therefore an al-Jabir), and the Ministry of Defense was entrusted to Salim Sabah al-Salim, earlier a minister of works and social affairs (as well as an al-Salim). These changes meant that the ruling family reserved all of the key portfolios in early 1978, with the exception of the Ministry of Finance, which was entrusted to 'Abdul Rahman Al 'Atiki. The contrast that emerged then was between a ruling establishment that maintained all of its influences intact—stressing its traditional roots and its patriarchal approach to succession—and a Kuwait that emphasized a more technocratic model where a

majority of inhabitants were nonindigenous and politically and socially distant from the leadership.<sup>73</sup>

As soon as he acceded to the throne, Jabir al-Ahmad faced clear institutional, demographic, and political crises, which shaped the following thirteen years. How the ruler managed the shaykhdom's domestic and foreign policies during this period brought Kuwait to the reality of 1991, when the country was invaded and occupied by Iraq. In 1977, the ruler's major task was to come to terms with the repercussions of a suspended National Assembly, as well as the resulting constitutional crisis. With the 1990 Iraqi invasion, however, the ruler faced a slew of political indebtednesses. Likewise, Heir Apparent Sa'ad al-'Abdallah's legacy was equally controversial, especially since the reportedly temperamental heir irked many family members. His disdain for the National Assembly was well documented, as he regularly criticized it for objecting to his numerous policies. Whether al-Jabir neophytes encouraged some dissent within the assembly to further weaken Sa'ad is difficult to ascertain. Suffice it to say that some al-Jabir members wished to end the alternation mechanism that had been introduced decades earlier. Undoubtedly, al-Salim members saw their overall position weaken after the 1994 death of Jabir 'Ali, who was certainly positioned to succeed Jabir al-Ahmad Al Sabah.

Protocol required that once Sa'ad was ruler, Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir, a brother of the ruler and longtime deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, be next in line. Yet this was not certain, for several reasons, including the key factor that Sabah al-Ahmad was not particularly well liked within the family. Many objected to his extensive business interests. Others deplored his lack of political and diplomatic skills, which had resulted in the 1990 Iraqi invasion and the subsequent turnover of the country to Western powers. In fact, the 1990 Iraqi invasion and occupation, followed by a traumatic decade that militarized Kuwait, did not endear the Al Sabah to a vast majority of citizens. Popular opposition to the ruling family expanded as public demands for power sharing grew. Throughout the 1990s, a growing schism between a frail ruler, who suffered a stroke in September 2001, an equally debilitated heir apparent, and a foreign minister allegedly involved in interminable feuds, preoccupied the Kuwaiti intelligentsia. Observers of the boiling Kuwaiti political scene concluded that the triumvirate was weak, with several calling for an urgent need to select someone from the new, even if largely inexperienced, generation to take over Kuwait's helm.<sup>74</sup> In fact, Kuwaiti intellectuals feared that the next succession would quickly degenerate into a dangerous crisis that, left unattended, would create considerable difficulties. As leading personalities maneuvered to preserve the long-term interests of the ruling family, and to protect the shaykhdom from predators, such a crisis was precisely what occurred in early 2006. When Jabir al-Ahmad died on 15 January 2006, the Al Sabah ruling family became mired in confusion as Sa'ad al-'Abdallah was declared ruler.<sup>75</sup>



### Sa'ad al-'Abdallah Al Sabah (r. 2006)

A few hours after Jabir al-Ahmad died, Sif Palace announced that Heir Apparent Sa'ad would succeed, following a smooth transfer of power. Senior family members confided to the media that the family would make additional leadership decisions after the official mourning period.<sup>76</sup> Yet because the constitution mandated that the emir be sworn in before parliament, and because the oath of office is a somewhat complex text (see the relevant excerpts in Appendix 6), it was further revealed that the new monarch might not be able to fulfill his constitutional duty in full. An ailing Sa'ad al-'Abdallah ruled for a mere nine days as the shaykhdom averted a major dynastic crisis.

Sa'ad was born in 1930 as the eldest son of 'Abdallah al-Salim Al Sabah (r. 1950–1964). His mother, Jamilah, was of African origin, accounting for his darker complexion. After primary and religious education in Kuwait, he attended Hendon Police Academy in Britain, returning in 1954 to work for his uncle Sabah al-Salim (future ruler), who headed the nascent constabulary force under formation in the shaykhdom. When the police and public security departments were combined in 1959, he assumed the critical deputy commander role under 'Abdallah bin Mubarak Al Sabah. At independence in 1961, Sa'ad became chief of police and public security, followed a year later by yet another promotion. As minister of interior, his responsibilities expanded considerably, only to double in 1964 when he also assumed the Ministry of Defense portfolio. This was a significant concentration of power, unique in Kuwaiti annals. When Jabir al-Ahmad became ruler in 1977, he appointed Sa'ad as his heir apparent, who was further entrusted with the premiership.<sup>77</sup> Through this alternating appointment, the Al Sabah ensured that power would pass once again to the al-Salim side of the family. Sa'ad's reputation as a gregarious and outgoing official earned him an undeniable following, especially when compared with his more austere cousin and ruler. Still, his public support was always rather limited, because for years he led a notorious police force that ensured security at any price. Over the years, Sa'ad also voiced his suspicion of parliamentary life, opinions that, in one of the most open Gulf societies, did not endear him to the shaykhdom's articulate population. As age and illnesses took their toll, Sa'ad lost some of his penchant for confrontation, preferring long overseas visits rather than prying in Kuwaiti internal affairs. Because of serious medical problems, however, Shaykh Sa'ad's short rule was destined to fail, even if the actual change bordered on the tragic.<sup>78</sup>

Although impossible to ascertain, Sa'ad suffered from Alzheimer's or a similarly debilitating disease, which essentially meant that it was difficult for him to speak, at least for any length of time. Whether some Al Sabah family members goaded leading parliamentarians to dangle the constitution in front of Sa'ad so as to corner him into an impossibly embarrassing situation, or whether members of the National Assembly identified this debilitating condition as a

unique opportunity to meddle in family politics, the succession process in January 2006 turned into a rare political spectacle. In fact, the National Assembly embarked on a course of action that intended to depose a monarch, and nearly succeeded.

### **Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah (r. 2006– )**

On 24 January 2006, Sabah al-Ahmad acceded to the Kuwaiti rulership, swore allegiance to the constitution, and appointed his brother Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah, the minister of interior in the previous government, as heir apparent. The emir also appointed his nephew Shaykh Nasir Muhammad al-Ahmad Al Sabah, minister of Emiri Diwan (Royal Court) affairs, as prime minister. Simultaneously, the critical position of minister of Emiri Diwan affairs—the gatekeeper to the ruler—was entrusted to Sabah al-Ahmad's son, Nasir al-Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah. Nasir had earlier been an adviser to Heir Apparent Sa'ad al-'Abdallah, not only to assist his uncle but also to keep his own father informed. These appointments reinforced the Al Sabah hold on several positions in the government, including the prime ministership, the deputy prime ministership, and the Ministries of Interior (Jabir Mubarak al-Hamad Al Sabah), Foreign Affairs (Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah), and Defense (Jabir Mubarak al-Hamad Al Sabah). Kuwaiti law stipulates that the Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Defense Ministry portfolios are always beholden to ruling Al Sabah family members. In the latest cabinet, however, and in addition to the above seats, Al Sabah candidates held the Ministries of Energy and Oil ('Ali al-Jarrah Al Sabah), Health (Ahmad 'Abdallah al-Ahmad Al Sabah), and Social Affairs and Labor (Sabah al-Khalid al-Hamad Al Sabah), as well as the governorship of the central bank (Salim 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Sabah).

Because Jabir al-Ahmad was somewhat shy, his brother, Sabah al-Ahmad, was often the more visible representative of the clan. A staunch supporter of the National Assembly, the new ruler conducted Kuwaiti foreign policy for the better part of four decades, certainly in his capacity as foreign minister beginning in 1963, but also as official negotiator. In fact, if 'Abdallah bin Salim (r. 1950–1965) is considered the true father of contemporary Kuwait, and his son Sa'ad al-'Abdallah (r. 2006) the liberator after the 1990 Iraqi invasion, then Sabah al-Ahmad must be deemed the visionary who untangled the shaykhdom's alliances within the Gulf region as well as with Kuwait's powerful foreign patrons.

Sabah al-Ahmad was born in 1929. His political career started with a membership in the Supreme Council (1955–1962), as well as the directorship of the shaykhdom's Department of Press and Publications (1955–1959). In 1959, he was appointed president of the Department of Printing, Publishing, and Social Affairs, a post he held until 1961. Between 1962 and 1963, he was

minister of public information, guidance, and social affairs, and headed Kuwait's delegation to seek admission to the United Nations, an entrance that was indirectly blocked by Iraq for two years. Between 1963 and 1991, he held the key minister of foreign affairs post, making him one of the longest-serving foreign ministers in the world. In addition to these duties, Sabah al-Ahmad assumed various other responsibilities, including minister of information (1982–1985 and 1971–1975), acting minister of finance and oil (1965–1967), minister of interior (1978), and deputy prime minister (1978–1991 and 1992–1998). From 1998 to 2003 he was first deputy prime minister, and from 2003 to 2006 he was prime minister.<sup>79</sup> Although in his seventies and the recipient of a heart pacemaker, which was fitted in 1999, Sabah al-Ahmad is in good health and expected to rule for several years. Sabah al-Ahmad is married to Shaykhah Fatuwah bint Salman Al Sabah, eldest daughter of Salman bin Hamud Al Sabah and Shaykhah Hussa bint Mubarak Al Sabah. The emir and his spouse have three sons and a daughter.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

Immediately after acceding to power, Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah named both an heir apparent and a prime minister from his own al-Jabir branch of the family, which sidelined the al-Salims. In fact, on 24 January 2006, the al-Jabir branch held all three senior positions in Kuwait: emir, heir apparent, and prime minister. The most prominent al-Salim figure, Shaykh Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, was reconfirmed as foreign minister, and made a deputy prime minister, even if, under long-standing protocol, he would have been elevated to either heirship or premiership. In addition to the former ruler, Shaykh Sa'ad, the foreign minister and the commander of the National Guard, Salim al-'Ali, are currently the highest-ranking al-Salims in the Kuwaiti government.

In the frantic days that followed Sa'ad's accession, and because of the new ruler's health conditions, Al Sabah leaders discussed either shortening the oath of allegiance or allowing him to take an abridged version, with no agreement on how to proceed.<sup>80</sup> As the actual oath or a specially designed version to fit the ruler's dire health needs were discussed, Al Sabah family members engaged in behind-the-scenes bargaining, which mesmerized and frightened Kuwaitis. But the oath issue was a smokescreen, because the real disagreement was over the heirship, as no clear candidate emerged for the next in line. It was then that a major coup de force was introduced to the discussions, as Sabah al-Ahmad—who was the shaykhdom's de facto leader for several years—took matters into his own hands. Following intensive negotiations with the al-Salims, who determinedly resisted an abdication of Sa'ad, Sabah al-Ahmad dangled the National Assembly threat in front of the family council.<sup>81</sup> The Al Sabah would either accept the assembly's move to depose the emir, on the grounds that he could not carry out his constitutional duties, or end debate on succession. The powerful

prime minister underlined the urgency of the matter on 24 January 2006 as assembly members anxiously debated the emir's abdication. When word reached Sif Palace that the assembly had scheduled a vote to press on with abdication proceedings, al-Salim holdouts relented and the message reached the National Assembly just as the clerk started his roll call. There is an ongoing debate in Kuwait regarding the actual timing of the vote. Pro-National Assembly experts insist that the elected body formally removed the emir before his official abdication reached the clerk. Others maintain that the actual message was "prevented" from being delivered so as not to interrupt initiated proceedings. Those who favored and argued for the first option insisted that Kuwait experienced a moment of constitutional monarchy. Perhaps, but Sabah al-Ahmad, who was duly sworn in as the new emir, ended all speculation by insisting on existing protocol vis-à-vis the National Assembly.<sup>82</sup>

Throughout the first week of February 2006, there was intense speculation concerning the identity of the new heir apparent, as Sabah al-Ahmad consulted various family members. On 7 February 2006, the emir named his brother, Nawwaf al-Ahmad, as the new heir, and his nephew, Nasir al-Muhammad al-Ahmad, as the prime minister. Neither appointment was particularly popular, but the shortage of figures in the al-Salim line with suitable government experience and talent, with the obvious exception of Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim, may have contributed to this decision. In any event, the emir surrounded himself with close family members, perhaps to placate more serious challenges ahead. Politically sophisticated Kuwaitis wondered whether the shaykhdom could afford to rely on an "amiable" figure as heir, especially because Nawwaf had little experience in regional and international affairs. Others lamented the sorry state into which the Al Sabah plunged the country, especially when Saudi Arabia and Dubai—perennial competitors—experienced far smoother successions between 2004 and 2006. Many wonder whether the Al Sabah will rally behind their new leaders and cement the established patterns, or whether they will experience a similar shock before long.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Sabah**

It remains to be seen how al-Salim leaders will react to these new appointments and patterns beyond their initial allegiance oaths. Will Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim, for example, the only senior al-Salim in the current government, reconcile with the fact that the al-Jabir line is now dominant throughout the country as well as the government? Will he and other al-Salims accept that al-Jabir rulers led Kuwait through Ahmad al-Jabir (r. 1921–1950), Jabir al-Ahmad (r. 1977–2006), and Sabah al-Ahmad (r. 2006– )? Because the family rotation was only missed once in the twentieth century, when two Salims held the post in succession in the period 1950–1977, one could easily conclude that the current pattern is in fact a repeat of that permutation, to balance out the

model. Still, what was disquieting in 2007 was the absence of senior al-Salims in key posts. Naturally, it may also be possible to speculate that the rotation model may be outdated altogether, and that the Kuwaiti ruling family adopted a new formula that stressed alternative attributes. Regardless, the dilemma that faced the Al Sabah was not the ability to rotate as necessary, but whether senior leaders have the foresight as well as the will to introduce a smoother succession mechanism that could force or prevent a future National Assembly intervention. Current and potential Al Sabah leaders also have to consider a move into a full constitutional process, to alter or update existing protocols. Under those circumstances, a primogeniture system may be introduced, to ensure an intervention-free succession pattern.

### ■ **Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Kuwait**

The dissolution of the Kuwaiti parliament and the call for new elections on 3 July 2004 enlivened Kuwaiti politics, although the campaign that followed was dominated by a single item: the ruler's decision to give voting and other political rights to Kuwaiti women. This long-cherished move was criticized in several Islamist circles, leading to counter criticisms from liberals that diverted attention from what ailed Kuwaiti political discussions—the domination of the government by the ruling family. Although parliament was abolished on a peripheral issue (a controversy over misprints in the Quran), Kuwait's historical quarrel between successive cabinets and parliaments hovered around the rights of elected officials to question, investigate, and reprimand officials—including those who happen to be members of the ruling Al Sabah family. Since these invariably included the ministers of foreign affairs, defense, interior, finance, and oil, parliamentary investigations of almost any major issue entailed questioning an Al Sabah, which unsurprisingly was not a favorite exercise. It was therefore particularly interesting that the ruling family shifted any and all discussions to a wholly different subject—political rights for women—while portraying their hereditary rule as more liberal than the motives of the elected parliament. It was a brilliant illustration of Arab Gulf ruling family skills that pretended to address core issues of interest to their Western interlocutors. Remarkably, it was in this critical environment that an extraordinary statement was uttered, by a leading member of the Al Sabah.

In late November 2004, Salim al-ʿAli, head of the al-Salim branch of the Al Sabah and fourth in the hierarchy, called for fresh political reforms. The head of the Kuwaiti National Guard declared to the daily *Al-Siyassah*: “We as a family have an urgent need to stand united more than ever,” presumably because the Al Sabah were not. Salim further maintained that the Al Sabah “political leadership, represented by the emir and the crown prince, was healthy

and active,” although everyone “realized their leadership during the invasion of Kuwait when they moved the whole world to liberate the country and return it to its people who renewed their loyalty and love to their leaders” took a heavy toll on both men.<sup>83</sup> Still, the mere fact that these comments were made illustrated a rare anxiety in light of the two leading officials’ overall poor health.

As the declaration was made in a *diwaniyyah*, the traditional Kuwaiti cultural institution that allowed a regular gathering of men—usually in a tent or a separate room of the main house—to debate current concerns, Salim al-‘Ali “hope[d] that in the coming days after Ramadan this communication and unity will continue and differences and disputes will be forgotten . . . especially among members of the ruling family who represent the legitimacy of the country with a popular mandate for the last three centuries.” Indeed, Salim wished to unite “the ruling family and bring it back to its top shape to form a steady tent with strong stakes to provide shelter to all its citizens,” because not everyone was “under one roof.”<sup>84</sup>

At the time these statements were made, Kuwaitis expected key changes heralding a new era, with Prime Minister Sabah al-Ahmad becoming heir apparent to replace the ailing seventy-four-year-old Sa‘ad ‘Abdallah al-Salim. But no changes were announced, and the call was simply shelved. Within a year, however, Kuwait experienced significant changes, with a full-fledged succession crisis that ended in mid-January 2006. To universal surprise and shock, the new ruler, Sabah al-Ahmad, appointed his half-brother as his heir, thereby opening a new chapter in Kuwaiti succession affairs. It was a bold initiative not necessarily approved by all Al Sabah family members. Nevertheless, by raising this most sensitive issue, Salim al-‘Ali opened a new chapter in intrafamily debates regarding succession, one that pitted two existing branches against each other, but that also, and increasingly, included a sharp generational split. Who will lead this fresh debate, and which direction it may well take, are still difficult questions to answer, although several innovative individuals are certain to frame the debate and guide the Al Sabah in the twenty-first century. Regardless of the overall direction, Kuwaiti politics are destined to be problematic for at least one generation.

### **Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir**

Nawwaf al-Ahmad was born in 1937, and is a half-brother of the current ruler, the son of Ahmad al-Jabir Al Sabah (r. 1921–1950). He was nominated to the position of heir apparent on 7 February 2006, against established traditions that recognized an alternate system between the sovereign and his heir hailing from the al-Salim and al-Jabir branches. Nawwaf was governor of Hawalli from 1962 to 1978, and then minister of interior from 19 March 1978 to 26 January 1988, after which he was designated minister of defense. He returned

to the Ministry of Interior in June 1992 and occupied that most sensitive portfolio until 13 July 2003, when he also assumed the deputy premiership. On 16 October 2003, he was entrusted with the post of first deputy prime minister, a burden he shouldered until early 2006. Few observers anticipated this appointment, not only because it retained the succession in the al-Jabir branch of the family, but also because Nawwaf was not considered an eminent senior prince. When he eventually succeeds Sabah al-Ahmad, he will become the third son of Ahmad al-Jabir to rule Kuwait, after his brothers Jabir (1977–2006) and Sabah (2006– ).

Nawwaf received his primary and secondary education in Kuwait before becoming governor in 1962. In the wake of the 1990 Iraqi invasion and the 1991 liberation of Kuwait, Nawwaf, who was then minister of defense, was moved to the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor. At the time, this was seen as a demotion from his earlier posts at Interior and Defense, where he was more of a caretaker than an innovator. Yet in 1994 he returned to prominence by assuming the post of deputy commander of the National Guard, with the rank of minister. A second promotion was bestowed on him in July 2003, when he was named deputy prime minister and minister of interior. At the time, few observers foresaw the steady rise under way, assuming that the 1990 debacle at the Ministry of Defense eliminated him as a contender to power. Still, during his various tenures at the Ministry of Interior, Nawwaf worked hard to create a strong Department of Legal Affairs along with an effective Department of Mayoral Affairs. Both of these accomplishments endeared him to important constituencies, who came to perceive him in a new light. Interestingly, Nawwaf established similar departments—Legal Affairs and Private Contracts Affairs—at the Ministry of Defense, although these were meant to address local concerns rather than influence defense policies.

The amiable and accessible Nawwaf is an avid horseman. He is married to Sharifah bint Sulayman al-Jasim and has four sons and a daughter.

### **Nasir al-Muhammad al-Ahmad**

A nephew of the new ruler, the new prime minister of Kuwait, Shaykh Nasir was born in 1940 and received his primary and elementary education at Mubarakiyah School in Kuwait. He earned a general certificate of education in the United Kingdom as well as a higher diploma in French language studies. In 1964, Nasir obtained a bachelor's degree in political science and economics from the Université de Geneve in Switzerland. Among the top leaders of the shaykhdom, Nasir was probably the only individual with near native command of Arabic, French, English, and Persian.

Before assuming the premiership, Nasir was a diplomat who served as a third secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, starting in August 1964, when he first embarked on his professional career. In October 1964, he was

posted to the Permanent Mission of Kuwait at the United Nations in New York, and then to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in June 1965. In December 1965, his career saw two rapid changes: first as the minister extraordinary and plenipotentiary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and then as the permanent representative of Kuwait to the European Office of the United Nations in Geneva. In fact, he inaugurated the first office of the Kuwait Permanent Mission in Geneva in 1966, and became the first consul-general of Kuwait to the Swiss Confederation in the same year. In October 1968, Nasir was promoted once again, to ambassador to Iran. Between 1975 and 1979, he served as dean of the Diplomatic Corps in Iran, the youngest ever to hold that position at the time. He was recalled in May 1979 and became undersecretary at the Ministry of Information until 1985, and then minister of information until 1988. Nasir was minister of social affairs and labor from 1988 to 1990, and then minister of foreign affairs from 1990 to 1991. On 16 November 2005, he was appointed by an emiri decree to the high-profile position of minister for Diwan (Royal Court) affairs, a post in which he served the late ruler until becoming prime minister on 24 January 2006. He married Shaykhah Scheherazade bint Hamud Al Sabah, the younger daughter of Hamud bin Jabir Al Sabah, but later divorced. He has two sons, Sabah bin Nasir and Ahmad bin Nasir.

Over the years, Nasir received several distinctions and decorations, including the First Persian Imperial Order Decoration from the Shah of Iran; a decoration from then-mayor of Paris Jacques Chirac; the First Degree National Decoration of the Republic of Argentina from Carlos Menem; the Highest Decoration *Ordre du Grand Officier de l'Ordre National Du Lion* of the Republic of Senegal from Abdou Diouf; a Certificate of Excellence from the Organization of the Islamic Conference; as well as the Greater Order of Finland from Marti Ahtisaari. Interestingly, his was the first Kuwaiti voice from the shaykhdom to be heard on radio during the Iraqi invasion, maintaining: "This is Kuwait." His brother, Fahd, was the most senior Al Sabah killed during the Iraqi invasion in 1990.

### **Salim al-Sabah al-Salim**

The minister of defense and deputy prime minister, Salim al-Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah was a first cousin of the heir apparent in the Salim line. Born on 18 June 1937, and educated at Sharqiyyah School as well as Shuwaykh Secondary School in Kuwait, Salim is the son of Sabah al-Salim (r. 1965–1977). He studied law at Gray's Inn and took courses at Oxford, and in 1962 joined the nascent Kuwaiti Foreign Service. He headed the Political Department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 1964, served as ambassador to Britain from 1965 to 1970, and served as ambassador to the United States and Canada from 1970 to 1975. For the next three years, Salim served as minister of social affairs and labor, and from 1978 to 1987 as minister of defense. He then became



interior minister and served in that post through the 1990–1991 War for Kuwait before becoming, once again, defense minister.<sup>85</sup> His wife, Shaykhah Badriyyah, is a member of the Sabah family, and they have several children.

### **Salim al-‘Ali bin Salim**

Salim al-‘Ali Al Sabah is the chief of the National Guard of Kuwait and the oldest member of the Al Sabah family. He was born in 1926 and adopted by his uncle, Fahd, who raised him as his own son. Salim was president of the Department of Public Works from 1959 to 1962, minister of public works from 1962 to 1964, head of the Kuwait Municipality from 1960 to 1963, and head of the Supreme Defense Council (1963 to 1990). In 1967, he assumed the leadership of the National Guard, a key portfolio that ensured the protection of the ruling family.

He married three women: Shaykhah Munirah bint Sabah, Shaykhah Badriyyah, and Shaykhah ‘Anud bint Ahmad, the latter the widow of Muhammad bin Salman and eighth daughter of Ahmad bin Jabir (r. 1921–1950). His six sons and eight daughters have all played key roles in family affairs, notably ‘Ali bin Salim, who was minister of communications and finance from 1998 to 1999. Shaykh Salim is well known for his efforts to unite the family and discourage bitterness between the two major branches. Currently second in the family’s hierarchy, Salim commands great respect and, while not a direct contender to power, is well situated to act as a senior family counselor. He is married to the current ruler’s sister, ‘Anud, who is also the ruler’s only full sibling.

### **Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim**

Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah was born in 1955, and is the son of the late ruler Shaykh Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah. He was the only al-Salim to hold a cabinet post in 2006. His elder brother is Salim Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah, former defense and interior minister. Muhammad holds a doctorate in economics from Harvard University. He was a professor at Kuwait University from 1979 to 1985, and then worked at the prestigious Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research from 1987 to 1988. In 1993, he was appointed ambassador to the United States, a post he retained until he became a minister of foreign affairs on 14 February 2001. On 11 February 2005, Muhammad became deputy prime minister, still also retaining his position as minister of foreign affairs.

### **Mubarak ‘Abdallah al-Ahmad**

This elder and respected member of the family was born in 1932, the son of Ahmad bin Jabir (r. 1921–1950), and served for several years as the president of the Department of Posts, Telephones, and Telecommunications. He was

minister of posts, telephones, and telecommunications from 1962 to 1963, and minister of guidance and information from 1963 to 1964. He is married to Shaykhah Zakiyyah bint ‘Abdallah Al Sabah, daughter of ‘Abdallah bin Jabir, a former president of the Department of Education and Courts. Their six sons and three daughters occupy important governmental positions, notably Jabir bin Mubarak (director of air transport at the Department of Civil Aviation) and Talal bin Mubarak (chairman of the Council of Airline Representatives).

### **Jabir ‘Abdallah al-Jabir**

Jabir was born in 1930 and educated in Egypt and Britain. He assumed the post of deputy to his father, the influential ‘Abdallah bin Jabir Al Sabah, who was Kuwait’s chief magistrate for several years. Jabir served as governor of Ahmadi from 1962 to 1985, and as governor of Kuwait City from 1985 to 1991. He is married to Shaykhah Najibah bint ‘Abdallah as well as Hudah, a daughter of ‘Abdul Wahhab al-Naqib, and has two sons and three daughters.

### **Jabir al-Mubarak al-Hamad**

Jabir al-Mubarak, born in 1942, was assistant director for administration and finance in the Emiri Diwan (1971–1979), governor of Hawalli (1979–1985), and governor of Ahmadi (1985–1986), as well as minister of social affairs and labor (1986), before accepting his current triple appointment: first deputy prime minister, minister of defense, and minister of interior—the highest concentration of power in the hands of a single individual entrusted with the survival of the Al Sabah ruling family. Jabir is married to Shaykhah Shaykhah bint Sabah, the second daughter of Sabah bin Nasir, and has six sons and a daughter.

### **Ahmad bin Fahd al-Ahmad al-Jabir**

The son of Fahad al-Ahmad Al Sabah (1943–1990), Ahmad bin Fahd was born on 12 August 1961 and educated at Kuwait University, where he earned a bachelor’s degree. Following graduation from the Kuwait Military Academy, he joined the Kuwaiti army and attained the rank of major. Ahmad fought in the 1990–1991 War for Kuwait, in which his father was killed defending Dasman Palace from invading Iraqi troops. Ahmad was appointed minister of energy in 2005. Perhaps attuned to intrafamily disputes, Ahmad maneuvered to position himself in the line of succession, suspecting that Sabah al-Ahmad would become ruler following a potential resignation or a parliamentary recall of Shaykh Sa‘ad. Ahmad has been a member of several organizations, including the International Olympic Committee; the Kuwait Handball, Football, Shooting, and Rowing Federations; the Kuwait Olympic Committee; and the

Olympic Council for Asia. He is married to his first cousin, Shaykhah Shaykhah bint Misha'al, and has five children.

### **Nasir bin Sabah al-Ahmad**

Nasir bin Sabah was born in 1948 and educated at St. George's School in Jerusalem. He was minister of foreign affairs from 1990 to 1991, and assumed the key post of minister of Emiri Diwan affairs in 2006. Simultaneously, Nasir retained the chairmanship of United Fisheries, and the directorships of Gulf International, Lonrho, and several other companies. He is married to Shaykhah Hussah bint Sabah Al Sabah, fourth daughter of Sabah bin Salim Al Sabah, a former ruler of Kuwait. They have four children (the grandchildren of the current ruler), notably 'Abdallah bin Nasir (director of Kuwait Investment Projects and director of United Gulf Bank) and Sabah bin Nasir (also director of Kuwait Investment Projects).

### **Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah**

Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah was born in Kuwait City on 3 October 1944. Well known in the West because he served as ambassador to London and then to the United States during the 1990 War for Kuwait, Sa'ud served as minister of information until 2004, when he resigned under pressure from parliament. He was rewarded with the even more influential Ministry of Petroleum portfolio, although he failed to retain this position in the 2006 government, ostensibly due to his controversial positions. Still, because Sa'ud is a descendant of a brother of Mubarak the Great, not of one of the two main lines of the present family, his contention to power is peripheral, even if he plays a critical balancing role within family affairs. His primary role within the family is to act as a diversionary target for nonfamily members who intend to criticize the Al Sabah without launching an open offensive against it.

### **Potential Alliances Among the Al Sabah**

Among Arab Gulf ruling families, the Al Sabah have proved to be surprisingly resilient, as best illustrated by two recent 2006 successions. Still, these successions revealed "the growing dependence of at least one regional dynastic monarchy on popular forces, social and economic elites, and jointly shaped understandings of the national interest."<sup>86</sup> As discussed above, the Kuwaiti parliamentary intervention was a positive initiative toward democratization, even if the primary aim was to avoid an open succession imbroglio. Consequently, Kuwait faced the prospects of a constitutional monarchy sooner than many other Arab monarchies, and it was in that light that new alliances between members of the Al Sabah emerged.

Despite his incapacity, the pool from which Shaykh Sa'ad could have drawn his heir—after he briefly acceded to power—was limited. The fact that so few young Al Sabah shaykhs had the credentials and the will to power became clearer during Sabah al-Ahmad's rule. Although a candidate to manage the family's affairs and rule the country was found, the advancing age of the family's inner circle posed certain risks. Still, what mattered for the United States and other leading Western powers with fundamental interests in the shaykhdom's stability was the Al Sabah's open pro-US, and pro-Western, posture. After 16 February 1991, the latter notion was almost etched in stone, periodic surprises notwithstanding.

Among the many ironies of current Kuwaiti family affairs is the glaring fact that no son of the top three men has held a senior government post. The late Shaykh Jabir may have fathered between thirty and a hundred sons and daughters, but none attained prominent posts, nor were any groomed for political careers before 2006. Salim al-Jabir, born in 1947, perhaps the most promising son, spent most of his life overseas, having earned a doctorate from the Sorbonne in Paris and served as an ambassador to the United Nations in Geneva as well as in Malaysia and Oman. Shaykh Sa'ad's son Fahd, born in 1960, expressed no interest nor displayed any aptitude for politics. Like their father, Shaykh Sabah's sons Nasir and Hamad were heavily involved in a business conglomerate. Nasir was not chosen as heir in 2006, although he may well be a potential aspirant to rulership because of his demonstrated interests, his last appointment as an adviser to then-heir apparent Sa'ad al-'Abdallah, and equally important, significant marital ties. In fact, Nasir bin Sabah is married to Hussah bint Sabah, the daughter of Sabah al-Salim, who ruled Kuwait between 1965 and 1977. It remains to be seen whether Nasir bin Sabah will eventually be able to do the necessary work to succeed—with or without his wife's assistance—or whether he would rather spend his time collecting art-work and engaging in philanthropic activities.

Consequently, the current heir, Nawwaf al-Ahmad, and the current prime minister, Nasir al-Muhammad, were obligated to form new alliances with several other members of the Al Sabah accredited to the cabinet. In 2007, and not counting the ruler, the Kuwaiti cabinet had a total of seven Al Sabah family members. The most renowned of these is Jabir Mubarak al-Hamad Al Sabah, who was the minister of information in 1990, but was brought back from semi-retirement in February 2001 as minister of defense, and who now holds two critical portfolios (interior and defense). Another prominent officer is Ahmad al-'Abdallah al-Ahmad, a banker and former minister of finance, who is now minister of health. His father, Fahd, was one of the few Al Sabahs killed in 1990, when he resisted occupation. Importantly, Ahmad al-Fahd made headlines in 1996 when he declared his intention to be the first Al Sabah to run for elections in the National Assembly. Although he failed to win a seat in the incoming parliament, the daring initiative earned him widespread praise, partic-

ularly among Kuwait's independent-minded and highly awakened population, who perceived the National Assembly as a viable alternative to hereditary rule. While supportive of the new triumvirate, these men are only loosely connected to Kuwait's current leaders. As they patiently observe how Shaykhs Nawwaf and Nasir mark their tenures and, equally important, determine what kind of alliances they themselves will establish, their commitments could shift should Kuwait face a new crisis.

## ■ Notes

1. For a discussion of Kuwait's history and foreign relations, see 'Abdul 'Aziz al-Rashid, *Tarikh al-Kuwait* [The History of Kuwait], Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1962.

2. H. V. F. Winstone and Zahra Freeth, *Kuwait: Prospect and Reality*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1972, p. 62.

3. Al-Rashid discusses this period in generalities. Surprisingly, very few European visitors stopped in Kuwait during this time. One such individual was Sir Brydges of the East India Company, who reported that the Al Sabah "kept no armed forces but levied a duty of two per cent on imports." See al-Rashid, *Tarikh al-Kuwait*, pp. 103–112; and Winstone and Freeth, *Kuwait*, p. 64.

4. Husain M. Albaharna, *The Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal and Political Status and Their International Problems*, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1975, p. 41.

5. J. G. Lorimer, comp., *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, vol. 1, 1915, vol. 2, 1908, Farnborough, Hants, UK: Gregg International, 1970 (reprint of 1915 edition), pp. 1016–1017. See also J. A. Saldanha, *A Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral of the Persian Gulf and Hasa and Katif Affairs*, Calcutta: India Records Office, Political and Secret Department, 1904, as cited in Albaharna, *The Arabian Gulf States*, p. 41.

6. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, pp. 1017–1019.

7. For a discussion of Mubarak's colorful rule, see al-Rashid, *Tarikh al-Kuwait*, pp. 113–128.

8. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, pp. 1021–1022.

9. The Russian attempt to construct a railway with a terminus in the Gulf must be understood in terms of Tsarist Russia's quest for a warm-water port in the "outland" of the empire. See Howard M. Hensel, "Soviet Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1968–1975," PhD diss., University of Virginia, 1976, esp. pp. 1–59.

10. For additional details, see Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 91–142.

11. For the full text of the treaty, see Albaharna, *The Arabian Gulf States*, pp. 375–376.

12. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, pp. 1025–1026.

13. Negotiations that led to the first Kuwaiti oil concession are quite elaborate and beyond the scope of the present discussion. For a full description and analysis, see Winstone and Freeth, *Kuwait*, pp. 122–163.

14. Albaharna, *The Arabian Gulf States*, pp. 45, 250–258.

15. Uzi Rabi, “The Kuwaiti Royal Family in the Postliberation Period: Reinstitutionalizing the ‘First Among Equals’ System in Kuwait,” in Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenge of Modernity*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 153.

16. Salem al-Jabir al-Sabah, *Les Emirats du Golfe: Histoire d'un Peuple*, Paris: Fayard, 1980, pp. 181–184.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 40.

18. For a discussion of Iraq’s claim to Kuwait, see Edith Penrose and E. F. Penrose, *Iraq: International Relations and National Development*, London: Ernest Benn, 1978, pp. 274–276.

19. Winstone and Freeth, *Kuwait*, p. 215.

20. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Republic each provided 1,200 troops to the force; Sudan provided 400, Jordan 300, and Tunisia 200. In December 1961 the republic contingent was withdrawn following political disagreements with Saudi Arabia over the fate of the Yemens, and in July 1962 a new Saudi commander, Major-General ‘Abdallah al-Mutlaq, took over. The force was officially dissolved in February 1963. For further details, see Robert W. MacDonald, *The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965, pp. 234–240.

21. British objectives could be separated on two levels: long-range policy (to secure Kuwaiti oil supplies) and immediate policy (minimum presence to assist an ally from potential aggression). For details of the British military intervention, see Charles W. Koburger Jr., “The Kuwait Confrontation of 1961,” *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 100, no. 1, January 1974, pp. 42–49.

22. Penrose and Penrose, *Iraq*, pp. 282–288.

23. Albaharna, *The Arabian Gulf States*, p. 251.

24. Much of the information in this section is based on Yahyah al-Jamal, *Al-Nizam al-Dusturi fil Kuwayt: Ma’a Muqadimah fi Dirasat al-Mabadi’ al-Dusturiyyah al-‘Amah* [Constitutional System in Kuwait: With an Introduction to General Constitutional Law], Kuwait: University of Kuwait Press, 1970–1971.

25. For the full text of the Kuwaiti constitution, see Eric B. Blaustein, “Kuwait,” in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, December 1971.

26. al-Jamal, *Al-Nizam al-Dusturi fil Kuwayt*, pp. 128–134. See also al-Sabah, *Les Emirats du Golfe*, pp. 182–184.

27. Uzi Rabi quotes Alan Rush, *Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwait’s Ruling Family, 1752–1987*, London: Ithaca Press, 1987, p. 1, to advance a much higher figure (12,000), although this is probably a typographical error, since Rush claims “twelve hundred.” See Rabi, “The Kuwaiti Royal Family,” p. 151. In her updated study, Rosemarie Said Zahlan advances the figure of “over one thousand.” See Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 96.

28. Jill Crystal, *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State*, Boulder: Westview, 1992, p. 94.

29. The decision to grant women the right to vote was passed in May 2005.

30. This article highlighted the underlying tribal endowment of the Kuwaiti constitution. Like similar documents throughout Arab monarchies, societal interests dom-

inated or overrode individual interests, which almost always granted immense powers to ruling families.

31. J. E. Peterson, *The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation*, New York: Praeger, 1988, p. 38.

32. For a discussion of these developments, see al-Sabah, *Les Emirats du Golfe*, pp. 180–197. For an evaluation of the 1961–1976 legislative experiment, see Abdo Baaklini, “Legislatures in the Gulf Area: The Experience of Kuwait, 1961–1976,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14, no. 3, August 1982, pp. 359–379.

33. “Amir Announces Rule by Decree,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service—Middle East and Africa* (hereafter *FBIS-MEA*) 76-169, 30 August 1976, p. C2.

34. Peterson, *The Arab Gulf States*, pp. 39–41.

35. The five periodicals included the following: the daily *Al-Watan*, suspended for a single month because it “published, without authorization, a supplement in which the 29 August measures were criticized”; the weekly *Al-Tali’a*, mouthpiece of the Movement of Democratic Progressives (former ANM), suspended for three months for similar reasons; the weekly *Al-Hadaf*, suspended for three months for having criticized the suspension of the first two periodicals; the weekly *Al-Risalah* (pro-Iraqi), suspended for three months for breaking “the law on the press”; and *Al-Ra’id* (mouthpiece of the powerful Teachers Union), suspended for three months for criticizing the 29 August measures. Four other dailies—*Al-Anba’*, *Al-Ra’i al-‘Am*, *Al-Siyassah*, and *Al-Qabas*—published normally, although the latter’s weekly supplement was suspended for two months.

36. Kuwait-Politics, “The Suspension of the Constitution,” part 2, “The New Government and Reactions,” *FMA Arab World File, I-K25* no. 579, 27 October 1976, p. 2.

37. “Large-Scale Arrests of Military Personnel Reported,” *FBIS-MEA* 76-176, 9 September 1976, p. C1.

38. “Interview with Shaykh ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Hussein, Minister of State for Cabinet Affairs,” *Kuwait Times*, 12 September 1976, p. 1.

39. The report was first published in the London *Daily Mail* of 9 May 1977. The minister’s confirmation came on 24 May 1977. See Kuwait-Politics, “Internal Problems,” part 1, “From November 1968 to August 1980,” *FMA Arab World File, I-K25* no. 1701, 1 October 1980, p. 2.

40. Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*, pp. 96–97.

41. “Iranian Clergyman Deported for Preaching ‘Sedition,’” *FBIS-MEA* 79-189, 27 September 1979, p. C2.

42. “Army Units Disperse Iranian Crowds Around US Embassy,” *FBIS-MEA* 79-232, 30 November 1979, p. C1.

43. “*Al-Hadaf* Reports Security Official’s Remarks on Deportations,” *FBIS-MEA* 80-012, 17 January 1980, p. C4.

44. “Gotbzadeh Escapes Assassination Attempt,” *FBIS-MEA* 80-084, 29 April 1980, p. C1.

45. “Explosions Partially Destroy Kuwaiti Offices of Iran Air,” *FBIS-MEA* 80-104, 28 May 1980, p. C2. See also “Bomb Explodes at Iranian Embassy in Kuwait, 4 June,” *FBIS-MEA* 80-110, 5 June 1980, p. C2; and “Paper Resumes Publication After Bombing of Offices,” *FBIS-MEA* 80-137, 15 July 1980, p. C2.

46. “Chronology: Kuwait,” *Middle East Journal* 35, no. 1, Winter 1981, p. 53.

47. Jonathan C. Randall, “In Mood of Self-Congratulation, Kuwait Elects Moderate Parliament,” *Washington Post*, 25 February 1981, p. A21.

48. Ibid.

49. Peterson, *The Arab Gulf States*, p. 41.

50. United Nations, *Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the Economic Commission for Western Asia*, no. 3, Beirut: ECWA, May 1982, p. 83.

51. André Bourgey, "Kuwait," in Paul Bonnenfant, ed., *La Péninsule Arabique d'Aujourd'hui*, vol. 2, Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1982, pp. 417–452.

52. Peterson, *The Arab Gulf States*, p. 41.

53. S. M. Al-Sabah, *Kuwait: Anatomy of a Crisis Economy*, London: Eastlords, 1984, pp. 6–12.

54. Peterson, *The Arab Gulf States*, pp. 42–43.

55. Ibid., pp. 49–51.

56. "Text of Amir's Address to the Nation," *Al-Watan*, 4 July 1986, pp. 1, 3.

57. Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*, pp. 54–55.

58. Rabi, "The Kuwaiti Royal Family," p. 161.

59. Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*, p. 55.

60. Article 71 of the constitution recognized the ruler's right to issue decrees when parliament was dissolved, but further stated: "If it is dissolved, or its legislative term has expired, such decrees shall be referred to the next Assembly at its first sitting. If they are not thus referred they shall retrospectively cease to have the force of law, without the necessity of any decision to that effect." See Blaustein, "Kuwait," p. 16.

61. The 1996 National Assembly, with sixteen progovernment/tribal representatives, eight pro-Islamist/tribal representatives, six Salafis, eight Islamic Constitutional Movement (ICM) deputies, two National Islamic Coalition (NIC) assemblymen, four liberals, and six various independents, ushered in a major revamping. See the extensive coverage in "Elections Bring in a More Pro-Government Assembly," *Kuwait Country Report* no. 4-1996, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996, pp. 10–14.

62. Shafeeq Ghabra, "Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait, 1993," *Middle East Policy* 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 102–119.

63. "A Bolder Kuwait," *The Economist* 352, no. 8127, 10 July 1999, p. 39.

64. May Seikaly, "Kuwait and Bahrain: The Appeal of Globalization and Internal Constraints," in Joseph A. Kéchichian, ed., *Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 177–192, esp. p. 185.

65. Ibid.

66. "Vote-Buying in Kuwait: Making Cheats Accountable," *The Economist* 368, no. 8331, 5 July 2003, p. 41.

67. In 2003, the assembly's main blocs were the Islamic Constitutional Movement, the Salafi Movement, the National Democratic Movement, the Kuwait Democratic Forum, and the Shi'ah National Islamic Alliance.

68. Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima, *The Modern History of Kuwait*, London: Luzac, 1983. See also Rush, *Al-Sabah*; and Jill Crystal, "Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah," in Bernard Reich, ed., *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa*, New York: Greenwood, 1990, pp. 8–14.

69. al-Jamal, *Al-Nizam al-Dusturi fil Kuwait*.

70. Confirmed by Shaykh Nasir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah, the minister of Emiri Diwan affairs, in an interview in Kuwait City, 18 October 2000.



71. Laurent Chabry, "La Succession au Koweït: Continuité Assurée," *Maghreb-Machrek* no. 80, January–March 1978, p. 5.
72. Ibid., pp. 4–5.
73. Bourgey, "Kuwait," pp. 440–444.
74. Peterson, "The Nature of Succession in the Gulf," *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 584–587.
75. "Smooth Constitutional Transition of Power," *Al-Qabas*, 16 January 2006, <http://www.alqabas.com.kw/index.php?browsedate=2006-01-16&imagefield3.x=12&imagefield3.y=23>. See also "The Kuwait Succession Crisis and the New Leadership," *The Estimate* 18, no. 3, 27 February 2006, <http://www.theestimate.com/public/022706.html>.
76. Diana Elias, "Sheik Jaber, Emir of Kuwait, Dies at 79," *ABC News International*, 15 January 2006, <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wirestory?id=1507345>.
77. For background information, see his biographical entry at [http://www.embassyofkuwait.ca/kwt/history/sheikh\\_saad.htm](http://www.embassyofkuwait.ca/kwt/history/sheikh_saad.htm).
78. Fatiha Dazi-Héni, *Monarchies et Sociétés d'Arabie: Le Temps des Confrontations*, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2006, pp. 271–279.
79. For a biographical entry, see "Profile: Sheikh Sabah al-Sabah," *BBC News*, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle\\_east/4645048.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4645048.stm).
80. Abdullah F. Ansary, "The Succession Process in Kuwait: A Brief Overview of the Recent Crisis from a Legal Perspective," *World Law Bulletin* no. 1, January 2006, pp. 64–74 (a publication of the Law Library of Congress).
81. Hassan M. Fattah, "Kuwait Moves to Strip Power from Ill Emir," *New York Times*, 22 January 2006, p. A4.
82. "Two Parallel Lines: Activating Article 3 and Opening the Door for Settlement," *Al-Qabas*, 23 January 2006, [http://www.alqabas.com.kw/news\\_details.php?cat=1&id=141413](http://www.alqabas.com.kw/news_details.php?cat=1&id=141413). See also "The National Assembly Unanimously Removed Sheikh Saad from Office," *Al-Jazeera.net*, 24 January 2006, <http://www.aljazeera.net/nr/exeres/e8d3e03c-7c14-4cda-8d4a-833da62c7d3b.htm>.
83. Nirmala Janssen, "Salem Urges Ruling Family to Push Reforms," *Gulf News*, 21 November 2004, p. 8.
84. Ibid.
85. He died at the age of 69 on 8 October 2007. See "Former Kuwaiti Defence Minister and Senior Royal Passes Away," *Arab News*, 9 October 2007, p. 1.
86. Mary Ann Tétreault, "Three Emirs and a Tale of Two Transitions," *Middle East Report*, 10 February 2006, <http://www.merip.org/mero/mero021006.html>.



# 5

---

## Oman

**T**he sultanate's tribal composition, the checkered narrative of the imamate, and "the struggle between Omanis and foreigners for control of her coastal provinces" defined the contemporary history of Oman.<sup>1</sup> Over the years, the sultanate's various policies were driven by those propositions, and no matter who ruled, norms of constancy and continuity galvanized the nation into action. It was nevertheless the Al Sa'id who shouldered great responsibilities as a unifying institution and, in the process, shaped the country's outlook.<sup>2</sup> Other Omani ruling families exercised authority at various times, but few managed to bring order to the sultanate's rich tribal mosaic. That the Al Sa'id inspired most to shelve age-old differences and accept unification was no small accomplishment.

### ■ Creation and Cohesion

Faysal bin Turki was the first Al Bu Sa'id ruler to ascend his throne peacefully, in 1888. To be sure, the young man had to prove himself and, unlike his father (who had nurtured special relationships with tribal leaders), wanted "to be the monarch of a united Oman truly independent of foreign tutelage."<sup>3</sup> Faysal was especially sensitive to excessive British influence, and to indicate his strong displeasure he sacked his pro-London minister Sa'id bin Muhammad.

Faysal's enthusiasm ran against archconservative tribal elements. In 1895, the predicament reached a turning point when the tribes of the interior had found sufficient common cause for another major attack on Muscat. Led by Shaykh Saleh bin 'Ali al-Harthy of the Sharqiyyah, tribal forces gained the upper hand and captured the city. Because of his anti-British tone, the sultan's colonial "friends" refused to provide military assistance, which fortunately prompted the ruler to turn toward the Ghaffiris. Opposition forces had neglected the powerful Ghaffiris, who were more than happy to fight for their sultan.

Faysal's reliance on the age-old Omani method of overcoming enemies—borrowing money from merchants to buy off rebels—proved effective. His forces reoccupied Muscat on 10 March 1895, even if differences between the sultan and tribal leaders arose again a few years later. Faced with a financial crisis, the ruler did not move to reconstruct his regime. Rather, he granted Paris a coaling-station concession, which further irritated the British. The latter eventually gained the upper hand, but at the time they enthusiastically supported tribal efforts to revive the imamate. When the Hinawis and Ghaffiris joined together, it was natural that a new imam would be elected—Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi was elevated to the post. But the 1913 election did not result in a permanent union. Sultan Faysal died later in 1913, and ironically his son Taymur received the loyalty oath (*bay'ah*) from a number of leading tribal chieftains in the interior, including 'Isa, the head of the Hinawi faction who elected Imam al-Kharusi.

The Taymur-'Isa honeymoon was short-lived. Imam Salim and Shaykh 'Isa reunited once again to execute their long-heralded assault on the capital, in January 1915. They were not able to make a breakthrough, and although the imam, the shaykh, and several tribal masters managed at very short notice to mobilize more than 3,000 men to fight the well-trained sultan's force of 700 men, the adventure turned into a debacle.<sup>4</sup> With British assistance, the sultan was able to repel the attack, but was still unable to impose his will on tribal leaders. Similarly, the powerful men who ruled in the interior were unable to spread their power on the coast. What emerged was not novel, but served British interests well: the sultan ruled Muscat and the imam controlled the interior. After a long succession of halfhearted negotiations between the sultanate and the imamate, again under British tutelage, a clear line was drawn between the two.<sup>5</sup> That tutelage came from Lord Hardinge, the viceroy in India, who visited Muscat in February 1915 to offer the services of the British political agent as a mediator. The sultan accepted the offer, while the imam interpreted this decision as a sign of weakness. Imamate leaders banked on a sultani capitulation and consequently delayed acceptance. Moreover, many wondered how impartial a British officer would be as a mediator, given the February 1895 skirmishes. These reservations notwithstanding, contact was established in April 1915, followed by talks between Shaykh 'Isa and the British political agent, the former representing the imam and the latter the sultan.

Negotiations stretched over a five-year period and produced few results. The imam rejected a British military presence, although he did not object to a political relationship. Tribal leaders also charged the sultan with sedition. Allegedly, he did not conform to their version of 'Ibadhi practice, as they demanded the British not support him in matters contrary to religious truth. From a strict 'Ibadhi point of view, the British "permitted the forbidden, such as the import and sale of wine and tobacco, but forbade the permitted, such as the trade in slaves and arms." The imam's supporters objected to British claims that com-

mand of the sea was exclusive, insisting that it should be open to all. Moreover, they alluded that ordinary people were suffering from monetary fluctuations that affected the price of consumable products. Of course, these conditions developed over many decades, but the dislocations associated with World War I heightened the distress. In the end, the tribal leadership was willing to compromise and accept the sultan as ruler if he accepted some of their proposals. Heading their demands was the imam's exclusive right to administer "the country according to religious law either personally or through a representative in Muscat."<sup>6</sup>

Sayyid Taymur bin Faysal rejected these demands when he became convinced that the imam was not serious. For their part, the British realized that a successful reorganization of the regime required additional resources. When, in July 1920, Imam Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi was assassinated by a disgruntled al-Wahibah tribesman, a climate "conducive to reaching an agreement" was created.<sup>7</sup> The election of the new imam was held immediately, with Shaykh Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Khalili winning the tribal vote of confidence. Al-Khalili, who was a member of the Hinawi Banu Ruwahah, a confidant of 'Isa bin Salih, and a grandson of Sa'id bin Khalfan al-Khalili, impressed all with his competence and sense of justice. A genuine effort was made in 1921 when law courts were revamped to represent the 'Ibadhi version of *shari'ah* in Muscat. This, and a new British appeal to the imam (to revive peace negotiations), suggested that positive steps were about to be introduced to the troubled political landscape. The austere Imam Salim, however, rejected the overture. Consequently, and in search of a compromise solution to end the factional strife, "the Sultan's government increased penal taxes on Imamate-produced commodities up to almost 50 percent of the value of some classes of goods."<sup>8</sup>

With Al-Khalili in office as imam, the atmosphere became more conducive for reaching a durable peace agreement between him and the sultan, as a shift to a more conciliatory posture emerged. Negotiations resumed, and on 25 September 1920 a treaty was signed at Seeb. Vague in several respects, the treaty ensured that all parties would coexist in peace even if the "exact nature of the Sultan's rights of sovereignty in Oman [was] not detailed nor [was] the Imam specifically granted independence." Specifically, "nothing was said concerning the right of the Imam to carry on relations with foreign powers."<sup>9</sup> By and large, however, tribal leaders regarded the treaty's vagueness as being useful, because the pact recognized two distinct regions in Oman, governed by two different regimes.

Undeniably, and for the next three decades, the country enjoyed relative peace and stability. The sultan ruled the coast from Muscat, whereas the imam ruled the interior from Nizwah. Two powerful rulers dominated the nation and worked and cooperated closely, publicly, whenever needed, in a *modus vivendi* that satisfied both sides. The sultan retained charge of all external matters, corresponded with foreign governments, and adjudicated at the Muscat

appellate court. In short, Muscat and the interior cooperated harmoniously on common interests. During the Saudi invasion of the Buraimi Oasis in 1952, for example, the imam responded favorably to Muscat's request for a contingent of tribesmen from the interior. In turn, the sultan acknowledged the right of the imam to administer the interior by appointing governors (*walis*), judges (*qadis*), tax collectors, and other tribal officials, as needed.<sup>10</sup>

Regrettably, the balance of power between Sa'id bin Taymur and Muhammad bin 'Abdallah al-Khalili ended when the imam died in May 1954. Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur, on a quest for additional financial resources to meet the country's severe economic crisis, sent his troops to occupy Nizwah in December 1955. Oil exploration, which had gripped the Arabian Peninsula since the early 1930s, when the Standard Oil Company of California was granted its first exploration concession, galvanized the sultan's attention. Sayyid Sa'id's father had granted a concession in 1925 to the D'Arcy Exploration Company to look for oil, gas, and other minerals, though the company did not find anything of commercial value and the concession lapsed three years later. Short on resources and mired in internal challenges, Taymur bin Faysal abdicated in favor of his son in 1932, and moved to India. Sayyid Sa'id realized that the prime reason for the erosion of Omani independence was its chronic insolvency and consequent dependence on financial support from outside powers, especially Britain. Sa'id developed a rare talent for husbanding his scarce financial resources. Above all else, Sayyid Sa'id was eager to become economically independent, which naturally led him to seek new oil explorers. In 1937, a concession was awarded to the Iraq Petroleum Company Group, which was subsequently transferred to Petroleum Development Oman (and Dhuffar) Limited.<sup>11</sup> What prevented a full development, however, was the lack of properly delineated borders between Oman, the United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. As a result, a race between oil specialists and diplomats started in the mid-1930s, to find (and eventually produce) oil before it was legally determined in which territory the fields were located. The sultan did not consult the imam before granting his concessions, knowing full well that the exploration would be carried out in areas that were under the imam's jurisdiction. Muscat calculated that the imam's death would come sooner than oil would be discovered, further illustrating the intrigues of the time. Not surprisingly, the imam and his supporters sought and received advice from Saudi forces, which were still deployed in the Buraimi Oasis. An ambitious leadership in Riyadh welcomed the election of Shaykh Ghalib bin 'Ali bin Hilal al-Hinai as imam and, soon after his election, encouraged him to proclaim "independence." The new ruler annulled the oil concessions granted by the sultan in 1937, supported by three dignitaries of the interior, Shaykh Sulayman bin Himyar, Shaykh Saleh bin 'Isa, and the imam's brother, Shaykh Talib, all of whom stood as political opponents to Sayyid Sa'id bin Taymur.

What happened next was classic: although the imam abdicated, his brother refused to accept Sayyid Sa'īd bin Taymur as sultan and appealed to Saudi Arabia for military assistance. Shaykh Talib banked on the Saudi desire to settle the Buraimi dispute in their favor and anticipated suzerainty over the rest of Oman in exchange for his political support. Riyadh, for its part, came through and provided him the resources needed to establish the Oman Liberation Army. Talib launched his "liberation" in 1957, only to meet the sultan's British-trained and -equipped armed forces in several decisive battles. Sayyid Sa'īd "lost sight of his earlier objective, to make Oman independent," but circumstances required that he welcome Britain's Royal Air Force and Special Air Service to help him keep the country united.<sup>12</sup> London wrestled several concessions from the dependent sultan, including a lease agreement of Masirah Island for the Royal Air Force, thereby establishing a significant foothold on the strategic Arabian Peninsula. Having defeated the rebels, Sayyid Sa'īd moved to Salalah, from which he ruled in a most disinterested fashion. His neglect of the country galvanized homegrown opposition efforts, and by 1965 a full fledged rebellion was under way in Dhuffar. The recluse ruler grew tired of his responsibilities and, save for spurts of enthusiasm to defeat rebel forces, left his country's governance to British officers serving him on secondment. The throne was occupied even if its authority was unrecognizable.

### The Ruling Family

The Muscat-Zanzibar empire collapsed in 1964, although the Sa'īd dynasty maintained its significant power base on both continents even as traditional skirmishes between Nizwah and Muscat continued in earnest. Taymur bin Sultan asserted his temporal rights, including control of Oman's foreign and defense policies, both of which satisfied Britain. For London, the arrangement was particularly useful, as it promoted British regional interests. In fact, not only were British officials eager to work with Oman, but they also demonstrated a blatant preference to deal with Taymur bin Sultan's son, Sa'īd bin Taymur. According to reliable sources, the latter demonstrated an astuteness that inevitably tilted the balance of power. Taymur bin Sultan was gently persuaded to abdicate in 1932 in favor of his son (see Appendix 7 for a list of Al Sa'īd rulers).<sup>13</sup>

Sa'īd's rule extended over a quarter of a century. From 1932 to 1970, he lived in Salalah, the capital city of Dhuffar province. His early education concentrated on traditional religious studies as well as extensive literary Arabic review in Iraq. On his return from Baghdad, his father entrusted him to the British representative in Oman, who sent the young man to India to receive "modern European education in English, which he learned to speak fluently."<sup>14</sup> Sa'īd proved to be a vigilant administrator who loathed his father's

accumulated debt to foreign creditors. When the Omani treasury came under his full control, the sultan introduced a systematic reduction in all spending, bordering on a severe austerity program that displeased most. The only exceptions were expenditures related to defense, which over time became an obsession. Largely under the tutelage of key British advisers, Sa'id financed the creation of a small army, which he hoped to deploy inland to extend his rule over tribal territories his father had lost. Though some of his methods were particularly harsh, the ruler earned the confidence of many Omanis, who genuinely feared his military campaigns. Peaceful relations were restored between the sultan and tribal chiefs after the Seeb Treaty, but the peace lasted only until 1954, when Imam Al-Khalili died. Contenders to Al-Khalili's powerful position elected Ghalib bin 'Ali Al-Hinai, whom Sa'id suspected to be pro-Saudi. In terms of tribal relations, the allegiance of an elected imam to a foreign family was critical and, as far as Sa'id was concerned, not in the best interests of Oman. At the time, a dispute over the Buraimi Oasis, which was jointly administered by Oman and Abu Dhabi, pitted Oman and Saudi Arabia against one another. Imam Ghalib's close association with Riyadh embittered his relations with Sa'id, who suspected that Saudi Arabia had cultivated Ghalib to overthrow him.<sup>15</sup> Assisted by the British, Sultan Sa'id defeated Ghalib and his forces, and Nizwah fell. Ghalib opted for self-exile to Dammam, Saudi Arabia.

While the Buraimi Oasis never came under total Omani rule, it was between 1958 and 1970 that Sultan Sa'id lost prestige among influential tribal leaders there, who reluctantly continued to pay tribute to Muscat. The sultan insisted that all oil exploration come under his full control. This was strongly challenged after Al-Khalili died, because tribal chieftains were eager to retain local authority. Moreover, Ghalib bin 'Ali's cooperation with the Saudis, from whom he and his supporters received military and economic assistance, further encouraged tribal heads to reject Muscati ultimatums. After 1958, Sa'id reacted harshly against "rebellious" tribes, as the reliance on force embittered clans eager to reap financial rewards. Daily protests prompted the sultan to leave for Salalah in the hope that distance would reduce northern demands. In hindsight, the move was a tactical error, because no self-respecting tribal leader would disburse tribute while the recipient was away. In response, Sa'id turned his British-trained army against those who defected, as well as those who may have contemplated doing so. Naturally, what followed was an open rebellion. In 1965, a conflict with ideological and class tendencies transformed the countryside. Shortly thereafter, the rebellion turned "into a war of liberation against imperialism and foreign influence."<sup>16</sup> There is little dispute that Sultan Sa'id was obsessed with defense matters, and it may be accurate to state that his views were reinforced with the rise of so-called radical movements throughout the Middle East. Egyptian president Gamal 'Abdul Nasir's call for the creation of a pan-Arab movement prompted Sa'id to literally isolate Oman



from all Arab political affairs. Haunted by potential upheavals, and unwilling to distribute more equitably newly acquired oil wealth, the sultan lost sight of potential internal uprisings against his rule.<sup>17</sup> Provincial masters who objected to sultani interference in their internal affairs were enticed to join ranks with rebellious groups in exile. Clearly, while the tribal chiefs shared religious and moral norms with Sayyid Sa'id, lack of political and economic reforms inspired them to sympathize with irate Omanis ready for change.<sup>18</sup> All requests made to the sultan since his accession to the throne had been automatically rejected. Consequently, from the mid-1950s onward, young Omanis emigrated. Indeed, emigration forced many to cross the treacherous Rub al-Khali desert, or trust their lives to professional smugglers using illegal ports. A number of Omanis joined progressive or nationalist groups on their arrival in Cairo or Beirut, which were hubs of Arab nationalist movements at the time.<sup>19</sup> But most Omanis emigrated to the Gulf region, particularly Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi.

### Opposition to Sa'id bin Taymur

In Kuwait, Omani refugees “organized a nationalist society called *al-Jam'iyyah al-Khayriyyah* [The Fraternal Society], whose members were drawn mainly from Dhuffar,” and whose objectives transcended charitable functions.<sup>20</sup> Indeed, a primary objective was to rely on pan-Arab organizations—for moral as well as financial support—to liberate Oman from a ruler they identified as “despotic.”<sup>21</sup> Inspired by developments in South Yemen, where National Yemeni Liberation Front guerrillas waged a victorious war against British forces, Dhuffari refugees created the Dhuffar Liberation Front (DLF) on 9 June 1965.<sup>22</sup> The DLF was an umbrella organization, the result of a merger between the Fraternal Society (which had begun organizing opposition activities against the sultan in 1962), the Dhuffari Soldiers' Organization, and the local branch of the Arab Nationalist Movement. Interestingly, the Dhuffari Soldiers' Organization recruited a number of troops serving in the sultan's army, from Saudi Arabia as well as from several Gulf shaykhdoms.<sup>23</sup>

The DLF's primary objective was to seek secession of Dhuffar province from Oman. In pan-Arab circles, however, the DLF was perceived as a vanguard group capable of genuine revolution activities throughout the Gulf region.<sup>24</sup> From its inception, therefore, the front followed two major and different political courses: to support activities that would “liberate” Dhuffar—where, if successful, the DLF planned to establish an independent government—and second, to participate in the larger pan-Arab anticolonial struggle. Revolutionary leaders agreed that an armed revolt should be launched against Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur, and in 1965 the DLF was formally recognized by the Arab League, which disgorged Egyptian, Iraqi, and Saudi financial aid. At the time, Oman

was not a member of the League, and both Cairo and Baghdad opposed London. For its part, Riyadh harbored an historical enmity with Sa'id bin Taymur, especially over the Buraimi conflict. Saudi Arabia withdrew its support from the DLF in 1966, however, following the establishment of a close relationship between the DLF and the National Liberation Front in South Yemen. In 1968, the DLF also lost the support of traditional Omani tribal leaders when it declared that its outlook extended beyond Dhuffari nationalism and that it would follow a Marxist ideology.<sup>25</sup>

At the September 1968 Hamrin congress, the left wing of the DLF registered a clear victory, after Marxism-Leninism was adopted as the group's ideology.<sup>26</sup> The name of the organization was changed to the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), and Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghassani emerged as its new leader, favoring "democratic centralism" that was antimonarchical. The Popular Liberation Army was established around the Leninist model of commissars guiding recruits with ideological training. New socioeconomic reforms were announced for liberated regions of Dhuffar, even as ideological changes created serious disagreements among top PFLOAG echelons, themselves following radical Arab leaders.<sup>27</sup> Several PFLOAG leaders, including Yusuf 'Alawi, who would eventually become minister of state for foreign affairs, shifted their allegiance.

Between 1970 and 1974, the Dhuffar rebellion intensified, as the newly established government in Muscat came under severe strains. Initial military setbacks were significant and surprising. In February 1971, rebel forces occupied Salalah. Omani and Baluchi troops, under Pakistani, Jordanian, and British commands, failed to dislodge rebel forces from the Salalah stronghold. The sultan quickly introduced an amnesty program, even if few Dhuffaris chose the option at first. The PFLOAG held its third congress at Ihlish (near Rakhyut, the capital of the so-called liberated Oman) and pledged to extricate the entire Gulf from British occupation. Fresh Soviet and Chinese assistance in 1972 and 1973, as well as successive victories of rebel forces, persuaded the sultan to call on Amman and Tehran for military relief.<sup>28</sup>

Jordanian and Iranian interventions led to several decisive battles. Iranian reinforcements proved essential, as the Salalah-Thumrait road was reopened and rebel forces were dislodged from Rakhyut by January 1975. These significant defeats led the PFLOAG to implode, which led to the establishment of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) under Muhammad Ahmad al-Ghassani. Between 1974 and 1975, the PFLO engaged Omani as well as Iranian military forces in several battles, but lost decisively in October 1975 when Omani and Iranian air and naval forces attacked the Sarfit area. The rebellion was crushed and Sultan Qaboos, to his credit, introduced major socioeconomic reforms that benefited local populations. In contrast to his father, Qaboos bin Sa'id assumed full responsibility for the country's many needs, serving hapless inhabitants long ignored by their rulers.

## ■ Constitutional Continuum in Oman

On his British advisers' recommendation, Sa'id bin Taymur planned every aspect of his son's life, allowing Qaboos—who was born on 18 November 1940—to study in England. The young prince was a reserved individual and it was clear that environmental and cultural changes left their marks on his disposition. In 1960, Qaboos entered Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, where he received infantry training, after which he joined a British regiment in the Federal Republic of Germany. Remarkably, his academic training was duly supplemented with practical experience, as Qaboos served in several units. During his British and German sojourns, Qaboos was impressed by both modernizing societies, and admired the civic institutions he witnessed firsthand. After he completed his tour of duty, the young man embarked on a world tour, which acquainted him with various countries and cultures. He returned to Salalah in 1966 expecting an official position to serve crown and nation. Sa'id bin Taymur opposed such a task for his son, who was then placed under virtual house arrest. Distraught, the young Sayyid devoted a great deal of time to studying 'Ibadhi religious and legal texts, but soon found himself with "nothing to do but to recline on the sofa and meditate." Qaboos described this period to Majid Khadduri in these terms: "I began to reflect on my present condition and contemplated on what might happen to the country in consequence to my father's policy."<sup>29</sup>

### **Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Sa'id (r. 1970– )**

On 23 July 1970, Qaboos bin Sa'id instigated a palace coup against his father with the assistance of his uncle and future father-in-law, Tariq bin Taymur. The coup d'état succeeded because the Omani army's chief intelligence officer in Dhuffar, Brigadier John Graham, and the military (later defense) secretary and supreme commander of the army in Muscat, Colonel Hugh Oldman, insisted that Sa'id surrender. In hindsight, it was probably too difficult for the young prince to carry out the stratagem alone, and the support extended by these and other officers was undoubtedly approved at the highest levels in London. Britain simply concluded that the fate of the monarchy in Oman—a clear strategic asset—was at stake. In fact, Sa'id bin Taymur, while compliant with all British directives, stood against change. The time was ripe to entrust the throne to a modernizing figure as Qaboos sought to repair some of the perceived sociopolitical damage inflicted by his father on the sultanate. The Omani population extended a warm welcome when the young monarch first set foot in his own capital city on 30 July 1970.<sup>30</sup>

**To rule and to govern.** Perhaps the greatest challenge facing the young sultan was the stark absence of any formal political institutions in the country

when he started his reign.<sup>31</sup> Few individuals, apart from the sultan, exercised any authority. While the ruler enjoyed absolute power, administrative authority was delegated to forty-one governors (*walis*), and judicial authority was administered by religious judges (*qadis*) who commanded according to *shari'ah* law. In fact, the relationship between political and religious authorities in Oman had been firmly established ever since the eighth century, when a majority of the population embraced 'Ibadiism and "defiantly held fast to their faith and their political independence."<sup>32</sup>

Proclaiming his intentions to modernize the country and abolish unnecessary governmental restrictions imposed by his father, Qaboos called on his uncle Tariq bin Taymur, then in exile, to become prime minister on 9 August 1970. The sultanate's first government was soon established; several ministries were created, portfolios were assigned to prominent individuals, and a national strategy was devised. The sultan retained for himself the key posts of internal security, defense, finance, and oil affairs. Although few Omanis objected, many concluded that the privatization of cabinet positions, and the secretive way in which the ruler conducted foreign and defense affairs, were superfluous. Eventually, differences arose between the head of state and his prime minister.<sup>33</sup> Tariq bin Taymur favored the creation of a parliament to draw up a constitution for the sultanate, and wished to reduce the extensive and still-growing British hegemony over the country. In a controversial move, on 1 January 1972, Qaboos announced that his prime minister had resigned while Sayyid Tariq was on a private visit to Europe. The office was then attached to the Office of the Sultan, further enlarging the burden of governance. Simultaneously, the cabinet was reorganized into eight ministries (Interior and Justice; Foreign Affairs; Health; Education and Culture; Economy; Defense and Communication; Labor and Agriculture; and Finance), while the sultan still headed the key Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Finance Ministries.<sup>34</sup> Between 21 January 1973 and 14 December 1979, the Omani cabinet was reshuffled eleven times as ministerial departments grew from eight to twenty-three. Several specialized institutions were also set up during this period. The National Defense Council (11 March 1973) acted as a consultative branch to the sultan. The Interim Planning Council (7 March 1972), which was chaired by Thuwayni bin Shihab, created the country's first development projects (this body was replaced in September 1972 with the Supreme Council for Economic Planning and Development—later the Ministry of Development). Finally, the Central Bank of Oman was established in December 1974, under the governorship of Tariq bin Taymur.<sup>35</sup>

Despite these changes, Oman lacked a written constitution, nor were any political parties allowed. Qaboos was persuaded that an effective parliamentary system could not thrive until Omanis had matured politically to exercise their freedom of speech freely but responsibly. According to the ruler, "a parliament whose members we will choose can be created; we can create a phony

parliament to give the impression of a semblance of democracy in our country. All this is possible, but does it correspond to the aim for which a parliament is supposed to exist? We need more time to reach this stage.”<sup>36</sup> There was truth in this statement, given Oman’s high illiteracy levels (65–70 percent). By the late 1980s, however, social development and rapid modernization had increased the demand for legislation dealing with such issues as labor regulations, banking, investment, and exploration of natural resources. As economic activity picked up in the sultanate, the burdensome task of drafting legislation by decree took its toll on the ruler and his Council of Ministers. Inasmuch as the arbitrary decisionmaking process created some resentment among merchants and members of the small intelligentsia, Muscat opted for added participatory steps, in part to alleviate some of the political burdens that overwhelmed it.

Several government officials proposed to enlarge popular participation through the Council on Agriculture, Fisheries, and Industry (CAFI). Until that time, the purpose of the twelve-member appointed council had been to encourage citizen participation in identifying priorities pertaining to basic subsistence. CAFI meetings led a number of participants to speculate on potential economic and political developments. Because multilevel conversations were encouraged, “democracy” and how it could be applied to Oman were routine topics of discussion as well. Therefore, when Sultan Qaboos issued a series of royal decrees on 18 November 1981 to abolish CAFI and establish the State Consultative Council (SCC) in its place, the wheels of change were turned yet another revolution.<sup>37</sup>

Speaking at the SCC inaugural session, the ruler defined the council as a “continuation of [his] policy aimed at achieving a greater scope for citizens to participate in the efforts of the government to implement its economic and social projects.” He further posited that “the task of formulating opinion and advice” on the country’s economic and social development would pass through the new body.<sup>38</sup> Despite these laudatory goals, the forty-four delegates (of whom seventeen were designated as government representatives and twenty-eight as representatives of the people) could only advise the ruler, since the council was not a parliament and therefore did not have any legislative powers.<sup>39</sup> It was clear that the SCC was not intended to diminish the sultan’s authority, and interestingly, while nine “cabinet officers” sat on the SCC, the minister of petroleum and mineral resources did not. Presumably, this was a critical portfolio, whose deliberations could not be shared, even at a state-sponsored forum. Furthermore, while the SCC may have had a semblance of balanced representation from its inception with respect to regional, ethnic, religious, and educational representation, none of the original forty-four members were from among the “university-educated Omanis who [had] completed the major part of their schooling since the beginning of the ‘new era’ in 1970.”<sup>40</sup>

Few Omanis were aware of what the SCC was supposed to be and do, particularly since the government failed to explain the council's functions, and because each delegate represented "all" of Oman rather than a region. This may be understandable, given the sultanate's complex tribal relations and the difficulty of classifying each delegate's own "constituency." Furthermore, in the absence of an official census, proportional representation remained an impractical option in the early 1980s. Thus, the lack of communication between Omanis further hampered potential progress within the SCC. In hindsight, and because of its limited scope, the SCC was not meant to be a permanent fixture on the political scene. Rather, it was another bloc in the critical institution-building process, so essential to a state that lacked so much. Whether Qaboos fathomed a complete set of institutions at this early stage was far less important than his willingness to pursue policies that gradually introduced them. In short, and this much is certain, his early oversights alerted him to adopt more fail-proof steps to build institutions for and by Omanis. Qaboos also realized that the sultanate's long-term interests could only be preserved through an evolutionary approach that recognized both its strengths and weaknesses. Accordingly, he adopted policies aimed at gradual change, both at the international level as well as at domestic levels. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Muscat endeavored to provide basic services, increase literacy rates, and encourage foreign investments. Because Oman was an autocracy, however, critics of the regime voiced their opposition to Qaboos's perceived heavy-handedness in setting the tone of whatever debate took place in the sultanate. Qaboos was painfully aware of such needs and, in part because he felt that Oman's literacy rate had reached a high enough level, embarked on one of the most important political reformulations in the history of the country—establishing a full-fledged consultative council.

***The Consultative Council.*** "With the setting up of this council, a new era and a new experiment start in Oman," declared Qaboos, as he inaugurated the Majlis al-Shurah (Consultative Council) on 21 December 1991.<sup>41</sup> Unprecedented in scope and substance, the ruler called on Omanis to assume nation building burdens. The council, he declared, intended to bridge the gap between citizen and government. It was, in comparative terms, a concordance. In many respects, the 21 December announcement was the fulfillment of the sultan's earlier pledge to establish a reinvigorated institution in which all provinces (*wilayats*) would be represented.<sup>42</sup> Qaboos drew broad outlines for the kind of majlis he envisaged, calling on the government to submit to the peoples' will and be responsible to its representatives. The council, he declared, will be a "step on the road of participation which will serve the aspirations and ambitions of the citizens throughout Oman."<sup>43</sup> Made at the height of the 1990 crisis in the Persian Gulf when Oman—under United Nations mandate—was poised for war against Iraq, the pledge raised many sensitive eyebrows throughout the region. In time, however, others emulated its forward-looking directions. Still, for Oman, the establish-

ment of the majlis was nothing short of a giant step forward, one that was part of a long-established plan to move the country forward on the road to full political participation. To be sure, Qaboos's frank assessment may well have been dictated by events in the area. Nevertheless, his policies were building on the legacy of the 1980s.

Qaboos appointed 'Abdallah bin 'Ali Al Qatabi speaker of the new council. Al Qatabi, a former Interior Ministry undersecretary and the SCC's last president, held foresightful views as well. The Consultative Council would be different from the SCC, and the speaker was ready to shoulder new responsibilities.

Al Qatabi closed the first Consultative Council session by saying that its establishment was a "curtain raiser for a new era of joint national action," hinting that further political reforms were likely before the completion of the council's first three-year term.<sup>44</sup> Others were equally confident that permanent changes were imminent. The deputy prime minister for legal affairs, Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmud Al Sa'id, remarked that more was expected from the majlis and that it "was only coincidental that there were no women members [in this first Majlis]."<sup>45</sup> This was a clear indication that Oman was not just experimenting with participatory government, but that it was also taking appropriate measures to stay well ahead of changing circumstances. Women would be called on to assume their rightful roles in society, not for superficial reasons but because it was in the best interests of Oman. In fact, the sultan himself took the country's pulse on this issue, in the course of his annual tours of the sultanate.

In informal settings, he heard firsthand his people's grievances, complaints, and suggestions, which, according to informed sources, often belied the picture painted by close advisers regarding the state of affairs in the country.<sup>46</sup> When a grievance had merit, the sultan almost always summoned the responsible minister or officer and instructed him to deal with the matter immediately. It was the sum total of such interactions that probably persuaded Qaboos to call on his people to take a more active part in the decisionmaking process.

Unlike the SCC, which was a purely advisory body, the Consultative Council called on its members to assume "responsibilities." In fact, the council's bylaws were quite specific and, at least by Omani standards, nothing short of revolutionary. Article 78 of the decree that established the council, for example, specifically stated that members could question cabinet officers, a privilege that was rapidly exercised.<sup>47</sup>

Unabashedly, Muscat highlighted the sultanate's deep-rooted traditions, and opted to proceed at a pace compatible with Oman's verve. The ruler called on members to "review," "propose," "opine," and otherwise "participate" in raising public awareness of issues of public policy, without practicing "zealotry." Even if entirely new to the experiment, majlis members grappled with their "right" to question ministers, assess state programs, formulate legislation, and help devise development plans. At first, majlis members were

chosen by a two-phase electoral-appointive system that aimed at “striking the required nation-wide representational balance.”<sup>48</sup> As three candidates were selected by notables in each province, the sultan appointed one to serve a three-year term. Membership was raised to eighty for the second term, in 1994, as constituencies of 30,000 or more individuals received two seats, in keeping with the 1993 census.<sup>49</sup>

Over the years, the Consultative Council underwent major emendations, most notably in 1997, 2000, and 2003 (new elections were also scheduled for late 2007). On 16 October 1997, approximately 51,000 notables cast secret ballots for 736 candidates, which included 27 women. For the first time in Omani history, women were allowed to run for office in all of the country’s 59 provinces, and not just in the capital region. To be sure, the 736 nominees emerged from a certain “social standing,” and were vetted by the Ministry of Interior. Nevertheless, a noticeable change was introduced, as a far more eclectic group came forward. Simply having so many eager Omanis in the process was a significant departure from past practices. Likewise, the same method was repeated in the election of the fourth Consultative Council, on 14 September 2000, with even more important modifications. The Millennial Council saw the total number of Omanis empowered to vote raised to 114,934, a third of whom were women. Another critical change occurred with the requirement that prospective electors register with provincial governors rather than tribal leaders, as was done in previous elections. A total of 561 candidates ran for office in 2000, including 21 women. The sultan declared winners those candidates who obtained the largest number of votes for the 83-member majlis (up from 82 as another governorate crossed the 30,000-population threshold). This was therefore the first direct plebiscite to be decided by the ballot box. Last, in October 2003, Oman held its first universal franchise polling, with an estimated 822,000 citizens aged twenty-one and older (out of a total population of 1,960,000) eligible to cast a ballot.<sup>50</sup> In the event, and despite a sustained media campaign to promote participation, approximately 262,000—including 100,000 women—registered, of whom less than 200,000 actually voted. The total number of candidates stood at 506—including 15 women—of whom 83 were elected. Two women members were among them, both from the capital area, highlighting the country’s acute conservatism.<sup>51</sup> One of the victorious female candidates declared that the poor showing was “because the awareness and thinking among the people with regard to women as their leaders [was] quite poor.”<sup>52</sup> Were these results the consequences of a fast-paced introduction of democratization, or were Omanis more realistic than generally given credit?

Inasmuch as the universal suffrage enterprise was unique in the Gulf region, Sultan Qaboos’s initiatives were not short of revolutionary. As a case in point, when the ruler further decreed that women could become members of the Consultative Council, candidates came forward to compete in what remained a



largely paternalistic environment. This was an unprecedented move for the whole of the Arabian Peninsula, including Kuwait, certainly the most politically emancipated country in the area. Undoubtedly, the active participation of women in responsible positions illustrated the sultan's wish to see working women gaining trust and respect among the population. In his own words:

We call upon Omani women everywhere, in the villages and the cities, in both urban and Badu communities, in the hills and mountains, to roll up their sleeves and contribute to the process of economic and social development. . . . We have great faith in the educated young Omani women to work devotedly to assist their sisters in their local communities to develop their skills and abilities, both practically and intellectually, in order to contribute to our Omani Renaissance which demands the utilization of our entire national genius, for the realization of our country's glory and prosperity. We call upon Omani women to shoulder this vital role in the community and we are confident that they will respond to this call.<sup>53</sup>

Nevertheless, women candidates did not fare well in Consultative Council elections, because religious and social norms required a slower pace. Equally important, the overall performance of the 2003 plebiscite probably reflected a widespread frustration with the role of the majlis itself. For one observer, the institution had "no powers at all," not only because significant constraints were placed on campaigning, but also because it lacked intrinsic powers to remove a cabinet officer or block unpopular legislation.<sup>54</sup> Another source concluded that "young, urban, educated Omanis" desired "greater democracy, and in particular . . . the empowerment of the body to legislate on matters of national concern."<sup>55</sup> Given the institution's current limited powers, it may indeed be impossible to expect national debates to emerge from the ranks, although one cannot denigrate the important constituency work under way. This point was reiterated by two legislators, who pled for understanding if the pace for action in Oman did not match the pace seen elsewhere in the Gulf or, for that matter, throughout the world. The president of the Consultative Council, Shaykh 'Abdallah bin 'Ali Al Qatabi, reiterated the need to build popular trust in the institution and perceived numerous functions undertaken by members toward the electorate as building blocks of that long-term objective.<sup>56</sup> A leading member was keen to equally highlight her constituents' needs and the role she could play in fulfilling as many of them as possible.<sup>57</sup> Even if bread and butter questions dominated indigenous concerns, the sultanate was on a path of constant expansion of popular participation in government, in part to help defuse internal governmental disputes.

**The Council of State.** When Sultan Qaboos first appointed forty members to the new Majlis al-Dawlah (Council of State) in 2000, most considered the majlis a valuable addition, even if its commission was still not fully developed.

The new majlis—intended as an upper body to the Consultative Council—was to enjoy a rare debating mandate to help Omanis deliberate controversial issues facing society at large. Unlike the lower body, which welcomed cabinet officers to openly provide an “accounting” of their various activities, the Council of State was supposed to articulate a “sense of Oman.” Not only was the Council of State supposed to advise the government on matters of public policy, but it also was supposed to act as its conscience.

The most recent Council of State, appointed in October 2006, consists of fifty-seven members—seventeen more than the one designated in 2000, and including nine women. Under the leadership of Shaykh Yahyah bin Mahfouz Al Mantheri as president, council members serve for three years. Members are generally former government ministers and senior officials as well as key tribal dignitaries with significant expertise and public service.<sup>58</sup> Whether the sultan intended to constitute an elite coterie of individuals to strengthen national unity is unknown. Still, the Council of State functions as a consultative forum rather than a representational system, which certainly strengthens the hypothesis that it acts as a nationalist body.

Why did Sultan Qaboos opt for this move when the Consultative Council was still not settled in? Among the many answers, the most likely is that Qaboos sought to limit the cabinet’s rampant “independence.” Of course, ministers would always be more than happy to serve their ruler, but the latter found it convenient to look the other way when so many were engaged in activities that could only be described as perverted. While alive, the former deputy prime minister of economic affairs was well known for controlling key business franchises, ranging from luxury cars to housing projects. His multimillion-dollar purchases of rare Western and Islamic art pieces were widely publicized as well. Omanis pointed with consternation to the multimillion-dollar villas overlooking the capital, each owned by a minister attempting to outdo his neighbor. According to several Council of State members, ongoing in-camera debates were intended to highlight such excesses, and called on leading members in society to conform to higher norms.<sup>59</sup> Of course, ministers agreed on strategy when necessary, but they also competed and disagreed on tactics. If the ruler failed to publicly chastise those who abused their privileges, he nevertheless expected a system of accountability to slowly emerge in the upper body.

Equally important concerns hovered around major policy differences among senior decisionmakers and how those were expected to be addressed in public. For example, the minister of state for foreign affairs, Yusuf Al ‘Alawi bin ‘Abdallah, led the strategy archetype, insisting that the sultanate’s interests required a coordinated position with Saudi Arabia with respect to the two countries’ policies toward Yemen.<sup>60</sup> ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Rowas, for years minister of information and now adviser to the sultan on cultural affairs, on the other hand, contended that the sultanate’s long-term interests necessitated a semi-

independent policy from all parties to better articulate a purely indigenous preference.<sup>61</sup> Likewise, whereas the minister of economy, Ahmad ‘Abdulnabi Al Macki, argued that competing with Dubai was ill advised, Dhuffari business leaders wholeheartedly supported the creation of massive port facilities in Salalah to contest the northern emirate’s shipping monopoly. It is of course impossible to determine which arguments won the day, but suffice it to say that Omanis were privately “discussing” these issues and reproached Sultan Qaboos for tolerating such matters. Many wondered whether the Council of State would rise to the occasion and articulate the “sense of Oman” that ruler and public alike craved. It was not inconceivable that, over time, secrecy would wane and more open forums would tackle issues of concern to the population. Although few expected the process to be fast-paced, Muscat had permanently embarked on genuine reforms that distinguished themselves by being gradual both in nature as well as in substance. Omanis debated procedure, with a vast majority eagerly awaiting concrete results, while various interest groups lobbied the ruler for time.

A key future consideration for the Council of State will be corruption and its corrosive repercussions on society at large. In the past, the ruler may well have preferred to overlook various pleas to address this topic, perhaps to preserve his government’s cohesiveness. Still, profiteering could be overlooked when the economy was booming, but not during difficult periods. It may indeed be argued that the reason why past excesses were overlooked was to maintain the unity of the state itself. When senior government officials competed, the end result was a degradation of trust in the entire system, generating a monopoly of interests in the hands of a few.<sup>62</sup> Nevertheless, for Omanis, this was not necessarily a welcome approach, even if many could not object. Bewildered citizens wondered why Sultan Qaboos tolerated divisions, especially when many knew that his nationalism, as well as motives, were as intact as theirs. Without expecting any action, one legislator called for a new renaissance (*nahda jadidah*), calling on the sultan to pull a coup d’état against his own administration to stifle those who abused his tolerance and goodwill.<sup>63</sup>

To date, the ruler’s bold institutionalization programs have generated little interest among the wider population, because many Omanis perceive the two councils as largely powerless institutions, although few object to the process. Paradoxically, their rejection of the councils is probably due to the undeniable fact that a majority of Omanis trust the sultan far more than they trust any council members or cabinet officers. Irrespective of personal affinities, however, Qaboos is painstakingly aware that the sultanate has fully embarked on the democratization path. It has taken less than three decades for this tribal society to achieve universal suffrage, resulting in many more contenders to power than expected. If the ruler’s gargantuan personality has stifled the imagination of some Omanis, young and old, they believe that time will surely alter

their outlook, and demand that they too step up to take responsibility. In sharp contrast to 1970, the level of political participation in the sultanate today is considerable, even if Muscat does not pretend to be a Western-style democracy.<sup>64</sup> Neither is it a third world dictatorship with few rights and privileges. In fact, in 2007, according to an Economist Intelligence Unit study, Oman ranks twenty-second (and first in the Middle East) on the Global Peace Index, which clearly illustrates how Omanis themselves are slowly rising on the contenders' ladder.<sup>65</sup>

***An evolving role for women.*** As stated above, Qaboos bin Sa'id called on Omani women "to roll up their sleeves and contribute to the process of economic and social development"; not surprisingly, many answered his call enthusiastically. In what endured as a deeply conservative and patriarchal society, this call was nothing short of revolutionary, capable of threatening gender harmony. To their credit, Omanis rose to the occasion, ushered in a series of genuine reforms—that protected women's rights, granted them full equality, and banned all forms of discrimination—and welcomed women as partners in nation building. Among conservative Arab Gulf monarchies, the progress made by the Omani woman was unique, indeed. Yet, constituting 49.5 percent of the population, women were vital to the survival of the country as a healthy and wealthy society.

Even before the 1996 Basic Law recognized their legal rights, Omani women participated in public affairs, formed various associations, occupied public offices, excelled in education, and most important, earned substantial income and preserved property.<sup>66</sup> Over the years the ruler appointed several women to high-ranking positions, and after 2003 Omani women were elected to the Consultative Council. In 2005, three women served in the cabinet (as ministers of higher education, tourism, and social development), one was president of the Public Authority for Craft Industries, one assisted as an undersecretary, while another was installed as an ambassador. Omani officials customarily highlighted that under a universal suffrage system, all citizens age twenty-one and over, including women, voted. Moreover, they could run for office if they were at least thirty, and two were indeed elected during the 2003 balloting. It was not always that way. In fact, women first entered the Majlis al-Shurah in 1994, when their participation was confined to the Muscat governorate, before being extended to the entire country in 1997. Sultan Qaboos appointed nine women to the fifty-seven-member Council of State in 2005.<sup>67</sup>

These appointments and elections were remarkable, to say the least. Yet Omani women also worked as police and security officers since 1972, and in 2004, for the first time in any Gulf state, women entered the General Prosecution Office. Increasingly educated Omani women began to excel in the health sector. The Ministry of Health reported that, in 2000, 54 percent of all physi-

cians working for its various facilities throughout the country were female, along with 48 percent of all dentists. According to the latest census figures, in 2005, women represented 85 percent of nurses, nursing assistants, and technicians.<sup>68</sup> Likewise, Omani women represented 56 percent of all teaching faculty in government schools, and 71 percent of all teachers of the wider system. Even more impressive were those individuals who periodically emerged with truly epoch-making work habits. In 2004, Farah Yahyah Al Numani became the sultanate's first female firefighter, breaking down a universal stereotype that women were not strong enough to perform such tasks.<sup>69</sup> It was interesting to note that while women represented close to 33 percent of civil servants in 2000, they occupied 18 percent of the private sector work force, a percentage slated for expansion in the years ahead. It would indeed be facile to overlook steady gains made by women as contributing members of society because of the country's conservative nature. Yet such an assessment would simply be incorrect, not only because of rapid changes on the ground but also because Omanis—both male and female—are distinctively at ease sharing their work environment, even if much more improvement is probably required.

**The Basic Law.** The Sultanate of Oman experimented with various aspects of democratization after 1970, even if its most visible accomplishments to date have been those associated with the Council of State.<sup>70</sup> In November 1996, Qaboos bin Sa'id announced his intention to introduce a Basic Law that promised to revolutionize the country and set a significant precedent for the region.<sup>71</sup> This written "constitution" provided a bill of rights, guaranteed freedom of the press, encouraged religious tolerance, insisted on an equality of race and gender, and appointed an independent judiciary—emulating a supreme court scheme—that would interpret the Basic Law and act as its guardian.<sup>72</sup>

This unprecedented initiative augured well for Oman. Over time, the sultan, or perhaps his successor, will probably emerge as the first constitutional monarch on the Arabian Peninsula. Nevertheless, the pace of reform remains slow and, in specific instances, tied to internal crises. Critics of the Omani approach claim that the 1996 initiatives were taken only after the 1994 attempted coup d'état that shook the regime.<sup>73</sup>

With specific reference to succession, the Basic Law stipulates a particular method for the ruling family to select a successor, but does not make clear whether the next ruler of the sultanate should come from a particular branch of the Al Sa'id family. It further stipulates that, if the family council—and not the family, as it is generally assumed—is unable to agree on a successor within three days of the ruler's death, then the Defense Council should appoint the person named in a letter left behind by Sultan Qaboos. By further institutionalizing the succession process, Qaboos sought to curb whatever opposition lingered, especially opposition that targeted the ruling family.

## ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Sa'id of Oman

When Qaboos acceded to the throne, Oman was not the vast empire that once comprised the sultanate itself, the future states of the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, parts of the Iranian and Pakistani coasts, and Zanzibar and the East African littoral. The empire eroded in large measure because of outside interference and poor management. Three successive rulers, Faysal, Taymur, and Sa'id, made few friends among their Arab and Muslim brethren, and only relied on Britain (and to a lesser extent on India) to guide Oman. Qaboos bin Sa'id, the leader who was called on to end the sultanate's self-imposed isolation, faced the urgent task of salvaging Al Sa'id rule while reinvigorating the nation.

### **Qaboos bin Sa'id al Sa'id (r. 1970– )**

To his credit, Sultan Qaboos quickly realized that his popularity was the result of the new openness policy, not necessarily ingrained adulation, and that he needed to prove himself rapidly in the eyes of his subjects. Rather than shy away from his father's legacy, he distanced himself publicly from Sa'id bin Taymur by declaring: "In the past, I had marked with mounting concern and intense dissatisfaction the inability of my father to control affairs. Now my family and my armed forces have shown their allegiance to me. The old Sultan has left the country and I promise that the first thing I shall dedicate myself to will be the speedy establishment of a modern government."<sup>74</sup> The young ruler then flew to Muscat, where he committed himself to change by stating: "Oh people, I shall work with dispatch to make your life happier and your future better. Every one of you must help in this task."<sup>75</sup> He appointed his uncle Sayyid Tariq bin Taymur prime minister, removed from power key figures associated with the old regime, dismissed Major Leslie Chauncy (then British consul-general) for "incompetence," declared slaves and prisoners free, supported the inauguration of an independent weekly newspaper, the *Al-Watan*, and authorized the establishment of two radio stations, one in Muscat and one in Salalah. He also amnestied Omanis in exile for plotting against Sayyid Sa'id, appealed to them to return and contribute to a reinvigorated society, and pledged to invest in an Omanization program that would take over from "guests" serving Muscat.<sup>76</sup>

Within months, Qaboos changed the name of the country to the "Sultanate of Oman" (from "Muscat and Oman," which illustrated divisions throughout the land), adopted a new flag, and devoted a great deal of attention to the Dhufar war. He realized that the need for vision was essential. For without vision—shared with the majority of Omanis—it would simply be impossible to forge national unity.

Qaboos bin Sa'id was born in Salalah in the southern Dhuffar region of Oman on 18 November 1940. He is the only son of the late ruler Sa'id bin Taymur, and the eighth in the direct line of the Al Bu Sa'idi dynasty. In turn, the dynasty was founded in 1744 by Ahmad bin Sa'id, a leader of some ability who unified the country, after civil war tore it apart. Qaboos spent his youth in Salalah, where he was educated in Islamic studies. At the age of sixteen, he was sent to a private educational establishment in England, and in 1960 he entered the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy as an officer cadet. After graduating from Sandhurst, he joined a British infantry battalion on operational duty in Germany for one year, and held a staff appointment with the British army. After his military service, Qaboos studied local government in England, and went on a world tour before returning home. The next six years were spent in Salalah under house arrest studying Islam and the history of his country and people. The British eventually forced his father to abdicate, and Qaboos acceded to the throne on 23 July 1970. He arrived in Muscat a few days later—seeing his own capital for the first time in his life—to begin the task of rebuilding Oman. On 9 August 1970, Qaboos delivered the first of several speeches setting out his vision for the people and the country, a vision that was probably honed in Salalah during a dark chapter in his life.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

Three and a half decades after Sultan Qaboos assumed power, the way he acceded to the throne remains a sensitive subject. There was, to be sure, widespread disenchantment with Sa'id bin Taymur's rule, as well as his ability to control rebel action in Dhuffar. Qaboos became the center of opposition within the ruling family and, with the assistance of several influential members of the household, plotted to overthrow his father.<sup>77</sup> The coup was carefully prepared with the assistance of several individuals, including Burayk bin Hamud al-Ghaffiri, the son of the Dhuffar governor; Hamad bin Hamud Al Bu Sa'id, Sultan Sa'id bin Taymur's secretary; Brigadier Timothy Landon, a former Sandhurst classmate who was seconded to the army as an intelligence officer; and key Petroleum Development Oman officials. Senior British officials in the Gulf, including the consul-general in Muscat, David C. Crawford, and the political resident in the Persian Gulf, Geoffrey Arthur, knew of these discussions and lent their sympathetic support. Other British officials, especially the sultan's military secretary, Brigadier Pat Waterfield, opposed it. Waterfield was reassigned by London in January 1970, thus eliminating a major political obstacle. He was replaced by Colonel Hugh Oldman, who ensured that there would be some continuity in government. In May 1970, Qaboos received his uncle's endorsement, and in June 1970, when the opportunity arose (a rebel attack on the city of Izki), he authorized his supporters to take action.

On the night of 23 July 1970, Burayk bin Hamud confronted Sa'id bin Taymur, who accidentally shot himself in the foot before agreeing to leave the palace. He was forced to sign his abdication in favor of his only son and then flown by the Royal Air Force to Bahrain, where his wounds were tended.<sup>78</sup> Gulf Air whisked him to London, where he received additional care before taking up residence at the Dorchester Hotel.<sup>79</sup> Understandably, Qaboos was bitter toward his father and in an early interview stated that his father "knew five languages, but he wasn't cultured. Knowledge is one thing and culture is something else. He adopted a policy and would not agree to give it up, because he believed that his policy was the best one. He was headstrong and bigoted. He didn't believe in change. His thinking went back to an age which is not this present age. So he had to fall from power, and this is what happened."<sup>80</sup>

Qaboos was thirty years old when he first set eyes on Muscat, a capital out of reach for so many decades. He quickly took action, summoning the manager of the Muscat branch of the British Bank of the Middle East, as well as the director of Petroleum Development Oman and the defense secretary to brief him on the state of the country. What these officials told Qaboos was the truth: Oman was financially sound even if developmentally in dire straits. Despite the challenges, the young ruler heartened the enthusiastic crowds gathered to welcome him, promising them a prosperous future. What was remarkable was the genuine expression of support that many displayed toward the new ruler when so few individuals actually knew him or had seen him before. Expectations were high among the population, but government officials had no idea what would or should happen next in the sultanate. Coup leaders had not planned for the day after.

Despite this uncertainty, the time was right for a radical change in internal Omani affairs. Muscat was falling behind in the socioeconomic transformation under way in the Persian Gulf, and fear that the sultanate's self-imposed retrenchment might ruin its chances for success was running high. Moreover, Oman's modest oil revenues after 1964 were not devoted to sorely needed development requirements. Tension in Dhuffar also meant that the sultanate's entanglement in the south was draining its meager resources, and that Sa'id bin Taymur was not capable of defeating the rebels who challenged his authority. The British were also concerned with the old sultan's archconservatism and intransigence in opening up the sultanate to outside investments. London announced its plans for withdrawal in 1968, but did not want to leave behind a dark spot. It was, in a strange way, a British responsibility to bring the conflict to an end.

Oman scarcely had any modern political institutions when Qaboos reached Muscat. In fact, it had no government per se. Few individuals, apart from the sultan, had any authority. No one else was equipped to make routine decisions about the most mundane issues affecting the sultanate. Qaboos, after the tragedy



of his lonely childhood, and the “unhappiness of his years at Sandhurst where the British habit of ragging had not done a great deal for his self-confidence,” spent several difficult years in Salalah. Few visitors ever saw him there, because his father “carefully (but not carefully enough)” screened his guests. Qaboos was inexperienced when he took the throne, and was ill prepared to take a firm lead and impose his authority. As he knew few Omanis, he was surrounded by British advisers, “alternatively fawning and patronizing,” on whom he depended for the truth. The young ruler knew that he “could make no positive policy decision without their support, and indeed, without their strength to ensure its implementation.” What he lacked were Omani friends and contacts in Muscat and among the tribes of the Batinah Coast. His army, that is, his British-led army, “controlled communications throughout the country, and through Cable and Wireless Limited, between Oman and the outside world.” One astute commentator concluded that “he had escaped from one situation where he had no power into another. Little wonder that he was not immediately able to take command of the situation.”<sup>81</sup> Without experience, and lacking the means to achieve independence from his British advisers, Qaboos set out to tackle the sultanate’s myriad problems on several fronts. He entrusted the establishment of a new government to his uncle and, having drawn one fundamental lesson from his father’s legacy, sought to gain economic independence for Oman. Because the ruler understood that he needed to prove himself, he addressed the problems of his government head-on and tackled the Dhufar rebellion without reservation. Determined to bring this festering problem to an end, he vowed to settle the conflict at whatever cost, even with British assistance if need be. Qaboos was determined not to shy away from difficult tasks even though he lacked the experience and was somewhat isolated in his own country. The young ruler believed in his abilities to introduce change and, above all, trusted his subjects to assume their fair share of responsibilities.

To say that a political vacuum followed the coup is an understatement. An interim advisory council, chaired by a retired British colonel—the defense secretary—informed the sultan of its ongoing activities, but only in name were these men “advisers.” In reality, they ruled, especially as the sultan was still in the process of determining what was expected from him as a reigning monarch.

While Qaboos enjoyed absolute power in 1970, administrative authority was delegated to the sultanate’s forty-one governors, and judicial authority was administered by religious judges who ruled according to *shari’ah* law. In fact, the relationship between political and religious authorities in Oman had been firmly established since the eighth century, when a majority of Omanis embraced ‘Ibadiism and “defiantly held fast to their faith and their political independence.”<sup>82</sup> The difference now rested in Muscat’s willingness to let religious scholars judge according to tested interpretations without political involve-

ment. Along with other decisions, this measure illustrated the growing confidence of the young ruler. The “throne” became authoritative under Qaboos, who could devote attention to the more complex task of building a “state.”

Proclaiming his intentions to modernize the country and to abolish unnecessary governmental restrictions imposed by his father, Qaboos called on his uncle Tariq bin Taymur to preside over the first modern cabinet in August 1970. Sayyid Tariq, a younger brother of the deposed Sa'id bin Taymur, had been educated in Germany and was married to a German woman (his own mother was a Christian Circassian). He was well versed in the business world, and his command of Arabic, Turkish, English, and German, as well as his keen awareness of developments in the Gulf region—the result of his extensive business representations—made him an ideal candidate for the newly created post. This critical appointment illustrated Qaboos's options. To be sure, the ruler was aware that Oman had very limited political capacity. Tariq bin Taymur was an exception, and although a *bon vivant* (his Beirut society life was well known), his savvy was a desperately needed commodity in Muscat. Well informed and intelligent, Tariq was a natural ally of his nephew as they both lamented Sultan Sa'id's regressions and lack of trust in the Omani population to lead a developed life. Unlike his brother, Tariq was liked and respected in Oman as well as among the large Omani exiled community throughout the Middle East, both of which made him a natural leader. For these reasons, members of the British planning committee advised the ruler to bring in his uncle in part to neutralize his enormous potential power. Perhaps this was a reason for the appointment, but a more logical explanation centered around Qaboos's desire to benefit from his uncle's experiences in the affairs of the world.<sup>83</sup>

Both men realized that Oman's internal needs could not be satisfactorily met while the country remained isolated. Qaboos charged Tariq with the immense task of securing diplomatic recognition around the world even if regional disputes prevented accelerated resolutions, and in doing so preserved monarchic rule in the sultanate. The prime minister supported his ruler and worked in earnest to elevate the country's stature.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Sa'id**

Today, a vast majority of Omanis know—both in fact as well as in deeds—that Qaboos rules with aplomb. Middle-aged Omanis remained impressed and grateful even as the regime's zeal, especially in the 1990s, began to take its toll. Deeply ingrained traditions were slowly eroding under modernizing influences.<sup>84</sup> A majority of Omanis—but not Omanis between the ages of 15 and 30, whose different expectations were certainly higher—were satisfied in the knowledge that their ruler was reliable and that he placed the interests of the state above his own. As time went on, however, many began to wonder whether Qaboos's successor would be capable enough and wise enough to rule

with the same degree of interest and competence. Others, within both the elite as well as the population at large, were keen to speculate on a potential successor, knowing full well that Sultan Qaboos did not have an heir.<sup>85</sup>

The legal question as to who may succeed Qaboos seems to be practically resolved, although interpretations vary. Promulgated in great fanfare, the 1996 Basic Law sets out a method for the ruling family to select a successor, but does not make clear whether the next ruler of the sultanate should come from a particular branch of the family.<sup>86</sup> As mentioned previously, it further stipulates that, if the family council—and not the family, as it is generally assumed—is unable to agree on a successor within three days of the ruler's death, then the Defense Council should appoint the person named in a letter left behind by Sultan Qaboos.<sup>87</sup> According to one source, that letter remains in the custody of General 'Ali bin Majid Al Ma'amari, the minister of palace affairs and a long-time confidant of Sultan Qaboos who is believed to possess "sufficient political muscle to sort out disputes that might arise."<sup>88</sup> General Al Ma'amari, overlooked by various observers of the sultanate, may indeed be in the possession of this celebrated letter, but in reality no one really knows. Moreover, his intrinsic capabilities to sort out internal family disputes, if any, are probably overestimated. In fact, he may not be privy to such presumed deliberations, if and when any confabulations are to be held after the death of the sultan. Moreover, it may be important to note that the overall influence of any single individual had diminished in recent years, as several legitimizing institutions have emerged and as various contestants have diligently maneuvered to enhance their overall access to the ruler. Still, knowledgeable Omanis assert that there are three copies of the famous letter—the third being in London—further illustrating how many checks and balances exist within the family.

Irrespective of the "identity" in Sultan Qaboos's letter, and according to well-informed observers of the sultanate, the "candidate" who will most likely succeed him remains one of the following: Fahd bin Mahmud, now deputy prime minister for cabinet affairs; Haitham bin Tariq, now minister of heritage and culture; Shihab bin Tariq, now adviser to the sultan (commander of the Royal Navy until February 2004); and Asa'ad bin Tariq, now representative of the sultan (previously commander of the Sultan's Armored Regiment [an army unit] and later secretary-general of the Higher Committee for Conferences).<sup>89</sup> The three bin Tariq brothers are the sons of Sayyid Tariq bin Taymur, the sultan's late uncle and first prime minister. Sayyid Fahd, another cousin of the sultan, effectively fulfilled the sultanate's day-to-day affairs, presiding over its premier political institution, the Council of Ministers. Fahd has represented the country in most international forums, led Omani delegations to League of Arab States and Gulf Cooperation Council summits, and received most visiting dignitaries. Given these myriad responsibilities, he is very much attuned to the diplomatic pulse of the country, a position that provides rare insights. Along with Sayyid Fahd, the bin Tariq offspring are capable individuals, even

if all four lack the vital maternal link that Sultan Qaboos possesses with key Dhuffari tribes through his late mother, Miyzun bint Ahmad Al Ma'ashani. All four are highly educated, converse in several languages (including near native fluency in English), and are heartily able to lead Oman, should one of them accede to the throne.

Although Qaboos acceded to the throne without broad Al Sa'id support, the sultan quickly entrusted sensitive posts to relatives to enlarge his immediate support base, unlike his father—who presided over a powerless four-man government council. Moreover, and once again unlike his father, Qaboos was confident and trusting. Both of these qualities facilitated his rule, but also led to regrettable oversights.<sup>90</sup> To be sure, Qaboos retained the titular titles of prime minister, minister of defense, minister of foreign affairs, minister of finance, and chairman of the central bank, but without administering any of the respective bodies. He delegated most of the day-to-day operating of these departments to trusted aides and Al Sa'id Sayyids. In contrast to his predecessor, who relied on two relatives to assist him—Ahmad bin Ibrahim bin Qays and Shihab bin Faysal bin Turki—and who exiled several of his brothers, including Sayyids Tariq and Fahr, Qaboos adopted a different strategy. Perhaps his own virtual house arrest in Salalah on his return from Britain and military service in Germany influenced his decision, but the fact is that he drastically changed tactics.

Without neglecting key British expertise, the ruler gradually promoted Al Sa'id family members—as well as genealogically close Al Bu Sa'id family members—to positions of authority. As stated above, his uncle Sayyid Tariq served as prime minister; another uncle, Sayyid Fahr, assumed most of the sultanate's Ministry of Defense responsibilities; Sayyid Thuwayni bin Shihab, a cousin and son of the former governor of Muscat, was personal representative; and Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmud, yet another cousin, assisted Qaboos in various functions, including, at present, the post of deputy prime minister of cabinet affairs. Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq, who occupied the number two post at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for several years, was appointed minister of heritage and culture in 2001, whereas his two brothers now assist the sultan on specific tasks and are within his innermost circle. And, importantly, the 2007 cabinet includes several Al Bu Sa'id members, led by 'Ali bin Hamud as minister of the Emiri Diwan (Royal Court), Sa'ud bin Ibrahim bin Sa'ud as minister of interior, Rawyah bint Sa'ud as minister of higher education, and Badr bin Sa'ud bin Harib as minister of defense.

## ■ **Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Oman**

When Qaboos bin Sa'id acceded to the throne, he faced myriad challenges, but nevertheless committed himself to rebuilding the Omani nation-state. At the

dawn of the twenty-first century, who are the potential contenders to power in Oman, and what are the emerging centers of authority in the sultanate? How do Omani officials interact to better solve the many contentions that preoccupy them?

Given the gaggle of ruling family members, it is somewhat disingenuous to assert that Sultan Qaboos retains all power himself. While it may be accurate to assert that among potential successors few hold "high office," ostensibly because only such prestige allows for the expression of political views, in reality leading Al Sa'id officials shoulder various responsibilities as well as the burden of power. In a long and insightful interview, Sayyid Fahd reiterated that consultations between the ruler and his cabinet are much closer than generally assumed, and that the sultan is not, as sometimes inferred, a hands-off leader. On the contrary, he confirmed that Sultan Qaboos follows various dossiers with care, delegating specific tasks to the cabinet as a whole.<sup>91</sup>

Still, critics point out that Sultan Qaboos rules with an iron-fist and, to illustrate their claim, assert that the sultan once summarily demoted one of his closest relatives: Asa'ad bin Tariq lost his army post in 1999 for complicated and mostly unknown reasons, as his successor was elevated to the post of commander of the army. This led to the speculation of a royal cuff, but Asa'ad assumed several significant roles after that date. While it is true that he was relegated to a ceremonial role at first, he gradually came to shoulder serious responsibilities within the Gulf Cooperation Council. In February 2002, he was appointed "representative," a position that was previously held by Sayyid Thuwayni bin Shihab Al Sa'id and that carried considerable clout. With an ailing Sayyid Thuwayni largely incapacitated, Qaboos entrusted critical duties to his charismatic cousin, who was not perceived as being too brazen.<sup>92</sup> Whether outsiders wished to create a wedge between cousins is difficult to determine, although that possibility cannot be dismissed given the precedent that existed between Qaboos and his paternal uncle (and father of Sayyid Asa'ad), Sayyid Tariq bin Taymur. In 2001, Asa'ad marked the sultan's thirty-first accession anniversary by praising his cousin "for accelerating Oman's economic development, and commended the armed forces for maintaining domestic stability and security from external threat."<sup>93</sup> The statement lacked luster, but was nevertheless carried by the official news agency, further confirming that Asa'ad's candidacy to the highest post was not ruled out despite the previous military demotion. Perhaps because of the public awkwardness that befell Asa'ad, both of his brothers, Shihab and Haitham, were especially cautious, more so than putative successors would usually be.

This last point is important and deserves elaboration. The fact that little media exposure or publicity existed on leading members of the ruling family is remarkable. This was not a major handicap, since few Omanis knew of Sultan Qaboos when he was heir to the throne—although that was more than four decades ago—and, sadly, the ruler took his first step into his own capital only

a few days after he became head of state. In 2007, few Al Sa'id family members are in the same situation, but the popularity of leading contenders is not universal.

Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmud and the three first cousins of the sultan are typically mooted as candidates, because few other members of the ruling family have commendable qualifications to rule the sultanate. Some lack the immediate family credentials; others carry sociopolitical handicaps that most likely rule them out as contenders. It may also be argued that several senior Omani officials, and other potential members of the Ruling Family Council, may very well want to preserve their future positions within the sultanate by rallying behind the deputy prime minister, or behind a bin Tariq. From their perspectives, these four men—especially if that is the wish of Sultan Qaboos—would be preferable to those who might well fail in ensuring the unity of the sultanate. It is this rationale that underlies the oft-mentioned contention that the council will quickly open Qaboos's letter and settle on the chosen candidate. Why quibble when Qaboos's successor may have difficulty being accepted by certain tribal leaders, for example? Why add to the list of contentions that the next ruler may face and, in the process, hinder the family welfare? Why support disunity when so much is at stake, including challenges from certain quarters within the religious establishment and the business community?

Sultan Qaboos has repeatedly declared that he will not publicly name a successor. In turn, Omanis have speculated that the ruler does not wish to give his putative successor room to strengthen his constituency and, in the process, hinder his painstaking institutionalization efforts to equip the sultanate with credible and transparent state mechanisms. As an individual eager to strengthen the sultanate's many organizations, however, it is more likely that the sultan prefers to see these mechanisms grow, to trust his own creations to show effective results at the right time. That no heir apparent is formally designated may well mean that Qaboos trusts the Al Sa'id to reach a felicitous decision in a sensible fashion and, equally important, that Omanis will feel comfortable enough to accept such a "choice" to ensure stable continuity.

### **Fahd bin Mahmud**

Fahd bin Mahmud Al Sa'id, the fourth son of Mahmud bin Muhammad Al Sa'id (1898–1947), a past governor of Muttrah (1935–1937) and of Burkah (1940–1943), and great-grandson of Turki bin Sa'id, sultan of Muscat and Oman (r. 1871–1888), was born in 1944. He received his primary education at Sa'idhiyyah School in Muscat, before traveling to Bahrain for his secondary schooling. Fahd then lived in Egypt, where he earned a diploma from Cairo University, and another from the Academy of Arts while living in The Hague. In 1971, Fahd became the first director of foreign affairs. He was minister of state from 1971 to 1972, minister of information and culture from 1972 to

1980, and deputy prime minister of legal affairs in 1980. Since 1994, Fahd has been deputy prime minister of cabinet affairs, effectively the number two post in Oman.

### **Asa'ad bin Tariq**

Sayyid Asa'ad, the third son of Tariq bin Taymur Al Sa'id, was born in Muscat on 20 June 1954. In 1996, he married Sayyidah Shawanah bint Nasir (Umm Talal), daughter of Sayyid Nasir bin Hamud Al Sa'id Rathabiyyah, with whom he fathered a son. In 1978, Asa'ad married a daughter of Sayyid Badr bin Sa'id. His son Sayyid Taymur bin Asa'ad married a daughter of Shaykh Mustahil al-Ma'ashani, a distant cousin of Qaboos bin Sa'id.

Asa'ad served in the Royal Oman Army and moved up the ranks to assume command of the popular Sultan's Armored Regiment—organizing parallel regular services—between 1986 and 1993. In 1993, he was appointed secretary-general of the Higher Committee for Conferences. Since 2002—especially after Sayyid Thuwayni became incapacitated—Asa'ad has served Sultan Qaboos as a personal representative.

### **Haitham bin Tariq**

Sayyid Haitham, the fourth son of Tariq bin Taymur Al Sa'id and Sayyidah Shawanah (Umm Qays), Tariq bin Taymur's second spouse, was born in Muscat on 13 October 1954. He served as an undersecretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs starting in 1986, eventually moving up the bureaucracy to attain his current posting, in 1996, as secretary-general of the ministry, in effect holding the number two post in foreign affairs. He was appointed minister of heritage of culture in 2002, after Sayyid Faysal bin 'Ali Al Sa'id resigned from his office for health reasons.

### **Shihab bin Tariq**

Sayyid Shihab, the fifth son of Tariq bin Taymur Al Sa'id and Sayyidah Shawanah (Umm Qays), Tariq bin Taymur's second spouse, was born in Muscat on 5 March 1956. He served in the Royal Navy, where he rose through the ranks over a period of several years. He was appointed commander of the Royal Navy in 1990, but retired in 2004, when he was designated an adviser to Sultan Qaboos.

### **Potential Alliances Among the Al Sa'id**

In addition to the above-named individuals, other leading Al Sa'id personalities include Sayyidah Umaymah bint Sa'id Al Sa'id, an older half-sister of Qaboos

bin Sa'id who was born at Al-Husn Palace in Salalah in 1934; Sayyid Thuwayni bin Shihab Al Sa'id, a personal representative of the sultan whose poor health has left him largely incapacitated; Sayyid Talal bin Tariq Al Sa'id, born in Muscat on 27 July 1947 to Shawanah Umm Talal, and married to Tahirah, of Turkish origin; Sayyid Qays bin Tariq Al Sa'id, born in Muscat on 20 January 1952, a son of Shawanah Umm Qays; Sayyid Adham bin Tariq Al Sa'id, born in Muscat in 1959, a son of Shawanah Umm Qays; Sayyid Faris bin Tariq Al Sa'id, born in Muscat in 1961, another son of Shawanah Umm Qays; Sayyidah Amal bint Tariq Al Sa'id, born in Muscat on 18 November 1950, a daughter of Shawanah Umm Qays; Sayyidah Nawwal bint Tariq Al Sa'id, born in Muscat on 20 November 1951, a daughter of Shawanah Umm Talal; Sayyid 'Ali bin Hamoud Al Busa'idi, the minister of Diwan of the Royal Court; Sayyid Badr bin Sa'ud Bin Harab Al Busa'idi, the minister responsible for defense affairs; and Sayyid Sa'ud bin Ibrahim Al Busa'idi, the minister of interior.

Another important individual is Sayyid Shabib bin Taymur Al Sa'id, who was born in Bombay, India, on 22 August 1943 and educated at the Grammar School in Karachi, Pakistan. Sayyid Shabib attended Princeton College as well as the Aero and Auto Engineering College in Chelsea, London. While in Britain, he also enrolled at the Queen Elizabeth College at Oxford, and served as a certified accountant with Hugil, Tingle, and Comber, in London, from 1968 to 1970. He was acting director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and assistant to the prime minister from 1970 to 1971, before assuming the responsibilities of chargé d'affaires in London, from 1971 to 1972, and Washington, D.C., from 1972 to 1973. From 1973 to 1975 he served as ambassador to Pakistan, and from 1975 to 1980 he represented Oman in Morocco. He was minister of state and personal envoy of the sultan from 1981 to 1983, assistant to the chairman of the Council for the Conservation of Environment and Protection Against Pollution from 1984 to 1986, minister of environment from 1983 to 1990, and minister of water resources from 1986 to 1989. In 1984, Sayyid Shabib was chairman of Tawoos LIC and subsidiary companies, and president of the Oman Equestrian Federation. In 1976, he married Aman Al Sa'id, born Gerda Verena, from Switzerland, with whom he has fathered two sons and a daughter. Although retired from official duties, he remains a distinguished counselor.

All of these men and women have played critical roles in various alliances in contemporary Omani affairs. Nevertheless, tribal proximity and the development of unique alliances have necessitated all the attributes of tolerance that Omanis can muster, as found in the 'Ibadhi interpretations of Islam that were adopted by many tribes in the interior, where people forged strong links to the land. A close association between the ruling family and members of the religious establishment has fostered the kind of cooperation that prevents serious clashes. After the 2005 challenge to the state's authority, which illustrated the existence of indigenous opposition forces, Muscat reacted calmly, rejecting martial law and declaration of a state of emergency after several arrests were



made. If the threat had been ominous, Muscat would not have hesitated to tackle this challenge. Neither internal security nor the political order were threatened, although additional troops were deployed in the interior. Still, and critically, Sultan Qaboos remained at Al-Shumukh Palace, in the Nizwah area, for several months in early 2005. In fact, the ruler was eager to start his annual meet-the-people tour, and did not consent to a cancellation that was ostensibly advised as a security precaution. Given the sultanate's well-established imamate traditions, and in light of Muscat's three-decade-long institutionalization initiatives, what was one to make of religious contenders to power, and were they party to emerging alliances?

It was clear that 'Ibadhi leaders, from the grand mufti to local shaykhs, were fully meshed in the nation-building fabric of Omani society. Without eliminating the possibility of a revival, it may be possible to contemplate the creation of an imamate monarchy headed by an Al Sa'id. Such a system may allow the head of state to dispense political justice while retaining the title of religious leader. In 'Ibadhi custom, this Omani monarch would be backed by legitimate judicial fixtures, cementing harmony at the highest levels of the state. Although not all Omanis would accept this alternative, the possibility cannot be ruled out, given Qaboos's record for innovation. Such an outcome would probably receive popular endorsement, because it would introduce fundamental reforms within the sultanate's narrative. Sunni and Shi'ah Omanis would likely support such an endeavor as well, because most would benefit from the added stability.

## ■ Notes

1. J. C. Wilkinson, "The Origins of the Omani State," in Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1972, p. 67.

2. This section draws on Joseph A. Kéchichian, *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*, MR 680-RC, Santa Monica: RAND, December 1995, pp. 17–36.

3. Robert G. Landen, *Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 365.

4. Ibid., p. 396.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid., p. 398.

7. Ibid., p. 403.

8. Many factors contributed to the successful conclusion of the Treaty of Seeb between the Sultan and the Imam. Pressures put by the Sultan on the Imam did not produce contemplated results. Moreover, the assassination of Imam Salim bin Rashid al-Kharusi shocked his successors. Finally, Imam al-Khalili won the hearts of many tribal leaders because of his moderate personality. See Landen, Ibid., p. 404.

9. Landen, *Oman Since 1856*, p. 404.

10. Dale F. Eickelman, "From Theocracy to Monarchy: Authority and Legitimacy in Inner Oman, 1935–1957," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 1, February 1985, pp. 6–9.

11. Francis Hughes, "Oil in Oman: A Short Historical Note," in Brian Pridham, ed., *Oman: Economic, Social, and Strategic Developments*, London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 168–176.

12. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman*, 1st ed., London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, p. 112.

13. Liesl Graz, *The Omanis: Sentinels of the Gulf*, London: Longman, 1982, p. 15.

14. Majid Khadduri, *Arab Personalities in Politics*, Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1981, p. 250.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 258.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 261. For a full discussion of the civil war, see F. A. Clements, *Oman: The Reborn Land*, London: Longman, 1980, pp. 40–48. Another unique interpretation worthy of attention is available in Fred Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans*, London: Penguin, 1974, pp. 101–130. A great deal has been written on the Dhuffar rebellion in recent years, examining the roots of the conflict and its developments. For a chronological sampling of useful discussions, see R. P. Owen, "Rebellion in Dhofar: A Threat to Western Interests in the Gulf," *World Today* 29, no. 6, June 1973, pp. 226–272; P. Rondot, "Le Sultanat d'Oman Devant la Rebellion du Dhofar," *Maghreb-Machrek* 70, October–December 1975, pp. 38–46; J. B. Kelly, "Hadramaut, Oman, Dhufar: The Experience of Revolution," *Middle Eastern Studies* 12, no. 5, May 1976, pp. 213–230; Fred Halliday, "Imperialism's Last Stand?" *New Statesmen* 91, nos. 6–7, 2 January 1976; J. E. Peterson, "Britain and the Oman War: An Arabian Entanglement," *Asian Affairs* 63, no. 3, October 1976, pp. 285–298; J. E. Peterson, "Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation in the Arabian Peninsula: The Rebellion in Dhufar," *World Affairs* 139, no. 4, 1977, pp. 278–295; and Howard M. Hensel, "Soviet Policy Towards the Rebellion in Dhofar," *Asian Affairs* 13, no. 2, June 1982, pp. 183–207.

18. A recent study posits that Sa'id was not negligent and, in fact, should be considered the (silent) father of the "New Oman." See Uzi Rabi, *The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman Under Sa'id bin Taymur, 1932–1970*, Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2006.

19. Khadduri, *Arab Personalities in Politics*, p. 263.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 263–264.

21. Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans*, pp. 274–298.

22. *Ibid.*, pp. 153–262. For a full discussion of the organization and the many changes within it, see 'Abdallah al-Nafisi, *Tathmin al-Sira' fi Dhuffar* [Evaluation of the Struggle in Dhuffar], Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1975.

23. Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans*, pp. 314–318.

24. Khadduri, *Arab Personalities in Politics*, p. 265.

25. Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans*, pp. 361–365.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 366.

27. The PFLOAG came under the strong influence of South Yemen's revolutionary movement as well as Soviet and Maoist influences around the late 1960s. The Democratic Front for the Liberation Front of Palestine, under Nayif Hawatimah, exercised

a certain degree of influence on al-Ghassani as well. This interference may have prompted several Dhuffari nationalists to defect from the main group, and accept a pardon offered by Sultan Qaboos. See, al-Nafisi, *Tathmin al-Sira' fi Dhuffar*, pp. 52–54.

28. Halliday, *Arabia Without Sultans*, pp. 331–340, 353.

29. Khadduri, *Arab Personalities in Politics*, p. 271.

30. Although Sa'id bin Taymur was—and still is—widely criticized for his perceived neglect of internal Omani affairs, some of this reticence to move very cautiously was ingrained in his frugal policies. His chief preoccupation was the sultanate's financial indebtedness, which according to the ruler's understanding would grow worse, perhaps even into a heavy burden beyond the country's capabilities. See J. E. Peterson, *Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State*, London: Croom Helm, 1978, pp. 143–144. See also "The Word of Sultan Said bin Taimour," in John Beasant, *Oman: The True-Life Drama and Intrigue of an Arab State*, Edinburgh: Mainstream Publishing, 2002, pp. 209–214.

31. Kéchichian, *Oman and the World*, pp. 47–54.

32. Nabil M. Kaylani, "Politics and Religion in 'Uman: A Historical Overview," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10, no. 4, November 1979, pp. 567–579.

33. It must be emphasized that difficulties that existed between the two men were not based on suspicion. Envious advisers to the ruler placed Tariq bin Taymur in front of faits accomplis with the most technical decisions, including such items as water development projects around Muttrah and the country's demographic blueprint (which was tabulated in a record six weeks' time without necessary statistical precautions), for immediate attention. Inasmuch as Tariq bin Taymur could not possibly handle the deluge of responsibilities placed at his doorstep, it was relatively easy for outsiders to poison the relationship between uncle and nephew.

34. Clements, *Oman*, pp. 65–75.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 75–90.

36. Attia Adel Moneim Attia, "Oman," in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1974, p. 3.

37. Dale F. Eickelman, "Kings and People: Oman's State Consultative Council," *Middle East Journal* 38, no. 1, Winter 1984, pp. 51–71. Qaboos appointed all members under the presidency of Khalfan Nasir Al Wahaybi and, on 28 October 1983, the SCC presidency was turned over to Hamud 'Abdallah Al Harthi, an Omani of East African origin educated at Baghdad University.

38. Eickelman, "Kings and People," p. 56.

39. On 28 October 1983, the SCC membership was increased to fifty-four. Fifteen of the original members remained in office, while thirty new members were added to the roster. See Eickelman, "Kings and People," p. 71.

40. Of the original 44 SCC delegates, 18 were from the interior, representing tribal leaders; 18 were from the capital, Muscat, and from the coastal plains (Batinah); and 8 represented the Musandam Peninsula as well as former East African colonies. The religious breakdown was as follows: 24 'Ibadhis (55 percent), 13 Sunnis (29 percent), and 7 Shi'ahs (16 percent). SCC members' educational levels were: 17 traditional basic (39 percent), 5 traditional advanced (11.5 percent), 6 primary modern (13.5 percent), 6 intermediate (13.5 percent), 4 secondary (9 percent), and 6 university (13.5 percent). See Eickelman, "Kings and People," pp. 60–61, 63.

41. "Nas al-Khitab al-Sami li-Hadrat Sahib al-Jalalat al-Sultan Qaboos bin Said al-Muazam Bimunasabat Iftitah al-Fitrat al-Oula li-Majlis al-Shurah" [Text of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos' Inaugural Address to the First Session of the Majlis al-Shurah], in *Al-Wathaiq al-Khasat bi-Majlis al-Shurah, al-Fatrat al-Oula* [Private Documents of the Majlis al-Shurah, First Session], Muscat: Majlis al-Shurah, 21 December 1991, p. 1.

42. The Sultan made this pledge in November 1990. See "Speech of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said on the occasion of the 20th National Day, 18 November 1990," in *The Speeches of H.M. Sultan Qaboos bin Said, Sultan of Oman, 1970–1990*, Muscat: Ministry of Information, 1991, pp. 215–216; see also "Oman Planning Democratic Step, Will Form Consultative Assembly," *The Los Angeles Times*, 19 November 1990, p. A14.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

44. Interview with Speaker 'Abdallah bin 'Ali Al Qatabi at Majlis Headquarters in Seeb, 13 October 1993.

45. Interview with His Highness Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmud Al Sa'id, Deputy Prime Minister for Legal Affairs, Muscat, 14 October 1992.

46. Although recent tours became highly structured affairs with carefully vetted participation (ostensibly for security reasons), Qaboos's early national journeys were quite genuine, as most allowed him to hear what his ministers were too embarrassed to report.

47. *Al-Wathaiq*, p. 48.

48. *Oman: Political Development and the Majlis Ash-Shura*, Washington, D.C.: Independent Republican Institute, July 1999, pp. 17–18.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 23. For details, see Abdullah Juma al-Haj, "The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council," *Middle East Journal* 50, no. 4, Autumn 1996, pp. 559–571.

50. "Omanis Show Little Interest in Majlis Elections," *Oman Country Report* no. 4-2003, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 2003, pp. 12–13. See also Sultanate of Oman, *Intikhabat Majlis al-Shurah: Al-Fatrat al-Khamisat, 2003* [Elections for the Majlis al-Shurah: The Fifth Session, 2003], Muscat: Ministry of Interior, October 2003.

51. Majlis al-Shurah, *Tashkil Majlis al-Shurah wa-Ajhzatuhah al-Ra'isiyyah fi-Fatratihah al-Khamisat (October 2003–September 2007)* [Composition of the Majlis al-Shurah and Its Principal Organs During the Fifth Term (October 2003–September 2007)], Seeb: Sultanate of Oman, n.d.

52. "Omanis Show Little Interest," p. 13.

53. "Royal Address by HM Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said," opening ceremonies, second term of the Majlis al-Shurah, 26 December 1994.

54. Michael Herb, "Parliaments in the Gulf Monarchies Are a Long Way from Democracy," *Daily Star* (Lebanon), 4 December 2004, p. 10.

55. "The Limited Powers of the Majlis Frustrate Many," *Oman Country Report* no. 4-2003, p. 13.

56. Interview with Shaykh 'Abdallah bin 'Ali Al Qatabi, president, Majlis al-Shurah, Seeb, 5 March 2005.

57. Interview with Rahilah bint 'Amir bin Sultan Al Riyami, member, Majlis al-Shurah, Seeb, 8 March 2005.

58. "New Members Are Named to State Council," *Oman Country Report* no. 4-2003, p. 14.

59. Confidential interviews with three Majlis al-Dawlah members, Muscat, 7–8 March 2005.

60. Interview with Yusuf Al 'Alawi bin 'Abdallah, minister responsible for foreign affairs, Shati' al-Qurm, 30 November 2004.

61. Interview with 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Rowas, cultural adviser to the sultan, Ruwi, 29 November 2004.

62. For a variation of this theme, see "Oman: Where's Our Sultan?" *The Economist* 344, no. 8029, 9 August 1997, pp. 38–40.

63. Confidential interview with an Omani legislator, Muscat, 28 November 2004.

64. Jeremy Jones and Nicholas Ridout, "Democratic Development in Oman," *Middle East Journal* 59, no. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 376–392.

65. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Global Peace Index*, Cammeray, Australia, 2007, <http://www.visionofhumanity.com>.

66. For fascinating details on the progress as well as the challenges facing women in the sultanate, see Sultanate of Oman, *Human Development Report in the Sultanate of Oman, First Report 2003*, Muscat: Ministry of National Economy, 2003, pp. 145–181.

67. Sultanate of Oman, *Omani Women Contribution to Modern Development of the State Institutions: Facts and Figures*, Seeb: Majlis al-Shurah, May 2004.

68. For additional details as well as primary health indicators, see Sultanate of Oman, *Human Development Report*, pp. 115–127.

69. Hanan Janab, "Farah Extinguishes a Male Bastion," *Tribune of Oman*, 6 December 2004, p. 21.

70. Joseph A. Kéchichian, "Oman: A Council for the People," *Arabian Trends* no. 19, April 1999, pp. 24–27.

71. *Al Nizam al-Asasi lil-Dawlat* [The Basic Statute of the State], Muscat: Diwan of Royal Court, 1996.

72. Nikolaus A. Siegfried, "Legislation and Legitimation in Oman: The Basic Law," *Islamic Law and Society* 7, no. 2, 2000, pp. 359–397.

73. Beasant, *Oman*, pp. 14–21. See also Mark N. Katz, "Assessing the Political Stability of Oman," *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal* 8, no. 3, September 2004, <http://meria.idc.ac.il>.

74. Sultanate of Oman, *Oman: A Modern State*, Muscat: Ministry of Information, 1988, p. 7.

75. Quoted in Mohammed Ali Masoud Al-Hinai, "The Dynamics of Omani Foreign Policy: Omani-Gulf Relations (1971–1985)," unpublished PhD diss., University of Kent at Canterbury, 1991, p. 58.

76. In addition to these major decisions, Qaboos quickly removed petty restrictions that annoyed the overwhelming majority of people living in Muscat and Muttrah. The Muscat curfew, according to which the city gates were closed each day three hours after sunset, coupled with the requirement to carry a hurricane lamp, as well as the customs post at Ruwi, which collected duties on goods moving from the interior to the capital, were two such examples. Ironically, these ill-conceived methods harmed Sa'id's policy of unification, as they enlarged the gulf separating different regions of the country. For

further details on Sultan Sa'id's rule, see Peterson, *Oman in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 52–59.

77. The future ruler's confinement was excessively harsh, even if it allowed Qaboos to study Islamic law. Eager to contribute in whatever capacity his father saw most appropriate, Qaboos asked senior members of the ruling family to intercede with Sa'id bin Taymur, to no avail. This refusal embittered the young prince, "and by 1970 the Heir Apparent had reached the conclusion that Sa'id should be overthrown." Despite his forced isolation, it must be emphasized that Qaboos knew of dramatic changes occurring elsewhere in the world, especially within the Arab arena, and was keenly aware of nationalist sentiments in his own country. News of developments in Dhuffar reached him regularly through a network of indigenous and British visitors. See Peterson, *Oman in the Twentieth Century*, pp. 201–202.

78. There is still confusion about what actually happened that night. Sa'id bin Taymur claimed that a Sultan's Armed Forces officer shot him. When British officers at the airport realized that he had not signed the Arabic copy of his abdication document, Sa'id was brought back to the palace, and then returned to the awaiting Royal Air Force plane. See Riyadh Najib al-Rayyis, *Sira' al-Wahat wa-al-Naft: Humum al-Khalij al-'Arabi Bayna, 1968–1971* [The Struggle of Oases and Oil: Troubles of the Arabian Gulf, 1968–1971], Beirut: Al-Nahar al-Khidmat al-Sihafiyah, 1973, pp. 228–229.

79. Sa'id bin Taymur would stay at the Dorchester until his death on 19 October 1972. Reconciliation plans between him and his son did not materialize in time for a reunion. It is unknown, however, whether private communications were exchanged through third parties.

80. *Al-Watan* (Muscat), 6 April 1971, as cited in John Townsend, *Oman: The Making of a Modern State*, London: Croom Helm, 1977, pp. 78–79 n. 1.

81. Townsend, *Oman*, p. 78.

82. Kaylani, "Politics and Religion in 'Uman," pp. 567–579.

83. Joseph A. Kéchichian, "The Throne in the Sultanate of Oman," in Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenges of Modernity*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 187–211.

84. For critiques of the sultan's modernization initiatives, see Ian Skeet, *Oman: Politics and Development*, New York: St. Martin's, 1992. See also Beasant, *Oman*.

85. In March 1976, Sultan Qaboos married Nawwal bint Tariq Al Sa'id, his cousin, but the marriage did not last. A formal divorce followed and the princess remarried in 2005. Earlier, the sultan may have married a daughter of an Al Harthy tribal leader from the Sharqiyyah region, and it may be this betrothal that was not dissolved, although these speculations cannot be confirmed.

86. Article 6 of the Basic Law specifically declares that "the Ruling Family Council shall within three days of the throne falling vacant, determine the successor to the throne." It further states that "if the Ruling Family Council does not agree on the choice of the successor to the throne, the Defense Council shall confirm the appointment of the person designated by the Sultan in his letter to the Ruling Family Council." See Sultanate of Oman, *The Basic Statute of the State*, Muscat: Diwan of Royal Court, 1996, p. 3 (Appendix 8 reproduces the relevant sections).

87. A few words about the ruling family, the "Ruling Family Council," and the "Defense Council": The Omani ruling family, certainly by the standards of the Saudi or even the Kuwaiti ruling families, is rather small. Various estimates place the total

male members of the Al Sa'id at around fifty, including several under-age "Sayyids." The Ruling Family Council, on the other hand, is a far more restricted entity, perhaps composed of fewer than eight individuals, although no outsider can truly determine the correct figure. In addition to the sultan, the Defense Council comprises the head of the supreme commander's office, the minister of palace affairs (both positions currently held by Lieutenant-General 'Ali bin Majid Al Ma'amari), the inspector general of police and customs (Lieutenant-General Malik bin Sulayman Al Ma'amari), the chief of staff of the Sultan's Armed Forces (Lieutenant-General Ahmad bin Harith Al Nabhani), the commander of the Royal Army (Major-General Sa'id bin Nasir bin Sulayman Al Salmi), the commander of the Royal Air Force (Air Vice Marshal Yahyah bin Rashid Al Juma'ah), the commander of the Royal Guard (Major-General Khalifah bin 'Abdallah bin Sa'id Al Junaybi), the commander of the Royal Navy (Rear-Admiral Salim bin 'Abdallah Al 'Alawi), as well as the head of the Internal Security Service (Lieutenant-General 'Abdallah bin Salih bin Khalfan Al Habsi). The Defense Council acquired critical "executive" functions in recent years, including the duty to settle any potential succession crises, but its more pertinent role is to preserve the sultanate's safety and defense, thus acting as a form of "national security council" to Sultan Qaboos. It is important to note that Sayyid Shihab bin Tariq Al Sa'id, now an adviser to Sultan Qaboos, was vice admiral and head of the Royal Navy until February 2004.

88. "Political Change Will Be Slow—and the Succession Is Unlikely to Be Resolved," *Oman Country Report* no. 3-1999, p. 6.

89. "Domestic Politics," *Oman Country Report* no. 1-2001, p. 7.

90. Dale F. Eickelman and M. G. Dennison, "Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services: Clash of Cultures?" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 7, no. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 1–28, esp. pp. 10–12.

91. Interview with Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmud Al Sa'id, deputy prime minister of cabinet affairs, Muscat, 28 November 2004. It is also known that the sultan maintains a rich correspondence with senior Al Sa'id family members, in the form of handwritten notes on blue parchment, which further illustrates his keen interest in various issues. Confidential interview with a high-ranking Omani official, Muscat, 30 November 2004. This section draws on Joseph A. Kéchichian, *Political Participation and Stability in the Sultanate of Oman*, 2nd ed., Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006, pp. 15–24.

92. "Contenders for Succession Appointed to New Posts," *Oman Country Report* 2002, pp. 12–13.

93. "Sayyid Assad Comments on the Sultan's Rule," *Oman Country Report* no. 3-2001, p. 13.





# 6

---

## Qatar

A “protected state” of the Lower Gulf, Qatar enjoyed semi-independent rulerships under indigenous shaykhs who were generally chosen by agreement and consent in the name of senior members of leading tribal families. The long journey to statehood was nevertheless harrowing, as the shaykhdom experienced unmistakable adversities. Various leaders helped shape that history and, in the process, consolidated Al Thani legitimacy and authority over Qatar.

### ■ Creation and Cohesion

Although little is known of Qatar before the 1700s, its modern history may be traced to early 1730, when ‘Utub tribesmen settled in Kuwait, Zubarah, and Bahrain.<sup>1</sup> Around 1730, members of the Ma‘adhid tribe, an ‘Utub subtribe to which the Al Thani belonged, arrived from the Najd, in the heart of the peninsula, to dwell on the promontory. At first, they settled in the northwest, an area predominantly inhabited by pearl divers. Competition with the Musallam—who collected *zakat* alms on behalf of the Banu Khalid, a major Hasah conglomerate clan—resulted in serious friction even as the latter enjoyed supremacy in what is today the northeast of Saudi Arabia. Partly due to the clash between the Banu Khalid and the Al Thani, the ‘Utub left Qatar for Kuwait, where they continued to excel in the emerging pearl trade.<sup>2</sup>

On Bahrain, where the Al Khalifah had settled since 1766, clashes spread between them and the Jalahimahs, another ‘Utub tribe that helped the former conquer the islands. Jalahimah lords were eager to share power, but the Al Khalifah adamantly refused, assuming, perhaps, that “victory” against the Persians was only theirs.<sup>3</sup>

Dejected, a prominent Jalahimah member, Rahmah bin Jabir—who loathed the Al Khalifah and who would align himself with anyone against his

implacable foes—left the island for Qatar. Rahmah and his followers settled at Khawr Hassan, north of Zubarah, from which they conspired against the Al Khalifah for the next fifty years. At first, Rahmah aligned himself with the Al Sa'ud, who in turn were forging close ties with the Qawasim in Ras al-Khaimah. In 1787 and 1788, Al Sa'ud forces, under the command of Sulayman bin Ufaysan, had launched several incursions toward Zubarah. Rahmah bin Jabir, with Qawasim maritime assistance, successfully badgered vessels that belonged to the Al Sabah and the Al Khalifah, and even those that flew the Persian flag, all operating near the promontory. A Persian assault in 1809 against Khawr Hassan ended in total defeat.<sup>4</sup>

Parenthetically, Rahmah's 1809 success in gaining control over Zubarah was only accomplished because of the ambitious Al Sa'ud, who by then were eager to gain full control over the coastline. It was, in fact, a foregone conclusion that the Al Sa'ud would continue their march, especially after they conquered Qatif and Hasah from the Banu Khalid. The year 1809 was also memorable for the Al Sa'ud, who captured Buraimi further south, which stood as a gate to Oman and the Arabian Sea.<sup>5</sup> As soon as the Al Khalifah realigned themselves to the Al Sa'ud in 1813, Rahmah bin Jabir, eager to take any position that was anti-Al Khalifah, emerged as an Omani supporter. In 1816, he organized yet another attack against Bahrain, which, not unexpectedly, failed. Having overplayed his hand by crossing his erstwhile Al Sa'ud allies, Rahmah could no longer seek refuge in Dammam. He first escaped to Khawr Hassan, but soon reached Bushire on the Persian coast. From there, he rekindled his piratical activities against the Al Khalifah, this time piggybacking on Qawasim largess.<sup>6</sup>

Rahmah bin Jabir returned to Dammam in 1818 after the Al Sa'ud lost the city to Ottoman forces. In fact, four years after Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz died in 1814, the Al Sa'ud discovered that their heretofore strong influence was significantly weakened throughout the region. Immersed in intrafamily squabbles, they lost Dir'iyah in 1818, followed by various villages throughout the vast peninsula. Rahmah was eventually forced to accept British supremacy and, in 1824, reluctantly adopted a peaceful approach with the Al Khalifah. The agreement would not last. In 1826, he died in combat against his foes, without an adult heir capable of assuming the leadership mantle.<sup>7</sup>

Qatar's fate was not even raised as a separate question when the British forced Lower Gulf rulers to sign the 1820 General Treaty of Peace, because both they and the Al Khalifah had assumed that the promontory was part of Bahrain. When the *Vestal*, a British East India Company ship, destroyed Doha in 1821—allegedly for harboring anti-British pirates—few noted its inhabitants' objections, and fewer lodged any indignation. Buhur bin Jubran, of the Al Bu 'Aynayn tribe, was the local chief at the time, but he did not have the clout of Rahmah bin Jabir. Qatar was left without a champion to defend its

rights and, consequently, stayed nestled for the next fifty years within Bahrain's political cocoon.<sup>8</sup>

### The Ruling Family

With Faysal bin Turki's death in 1865, and the opening of the Suez Canal in 1866, the second Saudi monarchy embarked on a slippery slope. The Al Sa'ud turned inward while the Ottomans occupied key cities in both Hijaz and 'Asir provinces. In 1871, the Porte subdued the Hasah hamlet in Eastern province, threatening both Bahrain and Qatar, which lay less than fifty miles away.<sup>9</sup>

A few months after Hasah fell under Ottoman rule, Jasim bin Muhammad Al Thani agreed to fly the Ottoman flag and pay tribute to Constantinople. To be sure, this was a pragmatic decision, even if Jasim's father, Muhammad bin Thani, counseled against it. For the young prince—who was barely forty at the time—the collapse of Al Sa'ud rule exposed Qatar to potential Al Khalifah attacks. Arguably, his memory of the 1867 violence was fresh on his mind, something he did not wish to see reoccur. In fact, over a period of close to forty years, Jasim would masterfully balance the Ottomans against the British, hoping to safeguard emerging Qatari interests. Naturally, Britain rejected any Ottoman claims to the promontory, but refused to strike at Constantinople's rising influence in the Gulf in order to maintain a semblance of an equilibrium within the festering European continent.<sup>10</sup> At about the same time, a rift emerged between the government of India in Delhi—which wished to transform the Persian Gulf into a “British Lake”—and the foreign office, which wanted to nurture a shaky balance of power. London was not willing to accept *de jure* rule by the Porte, but acknowledged a *de facto* control over Qatar.<sup>11</sup>

In 1876, Jasim bin Muhammad Al Thani was named *qa'immaqam* (district governor) for Qatar, a territory that fell under the administrative jurisdiction of Ottoman Basrah. The Porte elevated him to the position of *wali* (governor) of Doha in 1879. These titles, coupled with those assigned him by the British, strengthened the Qatari hand. When the Al Khalifah renewed claims to Zubarah, for example, Jasim was so incensed that a British-Ottoman confrontation loomed over the horizon. In 1895, after a serious military defeat over the Zubarah hamlets, the British political resident formally asked the Al Khalifah to stop interfering in “internal” Qatari affairs, a call that was heeded until 1937. Through his apt maneuverings, and even after a loss, Jasim was able to wrestle the idea of sovereignty over Zubarah, a declaration that was voluntarily accepted by Al Khalifah rulers after 1871 (see Appendix 9 for a list of Al Thani rulers). With Zubarah increasingly perceived as an expensive proposition by Bahrainis, and with the British fearing a spillover of this local confrontation into an alleged entente with the Ottomans, Jasim bin Muhammad Al Thani was well placed to protect and promote Qatari interests. He did,

and, remarkably, stood up to various Ottoman demands. An emboldened Jasim reprimanded the Porte after Abu Dhabi laid claim to Khawr al-'Udayd, even as Constantinople disapproved of his maverick positions. In time, Jasim's self-declared autonomy led the Porte to confront him.<sup>12</sup>

Constantinople instructed the governor of Basrah to visit Doha in 1893 and muzzle their *qa'immaqam*. Jasim sought refuge in nearby Wajbah and refused to meet with the vainglorious emissary. The Ottoman *wali* lost patience, imprisoned the district governor's brother 'Ali, set siege to Doha, and moved toward the Wajbah hamlet. Against some odds, including superior Ottoman armies, Jasim and his tribal levies put up stiff resistance. Dejected from Wajbah, the Ottomans returned to, and sequestered themselves in, Doha. A shrewd Jasim went on the offensive and actually cut off the small city's water supplies. Defeated, the Ottoman *wali* fled to Hasah, even if his foe's victory was not entirely surprising.<sup>13</sup> What was epoch-making, however, was an Ottoman acknowledgment that the Al Thani were in fact legitimate heirs to power in Qatar. Jasim bin Muhammad gained legendary authority and, even in retirement—having passed rulership to his brother and sons—retained a preponderant and respected voice. Not only did Jasim place Qatar on the road to independence, but in a sense he was conscious of the need to equip various hamlets and towns with the wherewithal of "statehood." Toward that end, semihardened roads were laid out to facilitate travel between cities, schools were launched, and largess—although limited—was steadily institutionalized in the hands of his family members throughout the promontory. Clearly, his "markers" were the first signs of an emerging political entity, even though independence would not come for a few more decades.

When 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman Al Sa'ud, a grandson of Faysal bin Turki, took back Riyadh in 1902, Jasim bin Muhammad in Doha sought an immediate "entente" with the Saudis. He perceived the Al Sa'ud as potential allies and quickly converted to the more conservative Unitarian creed (Wahhabiyyah), nestled in Hanbali Sunnism. This was a dramatic reversal, because members of the Al Thani tribes were somewhat settled and lived contented under Maliki Sunni laws and traditions. While the religious transformation brought his tribe into spiritual proximity with the Wahhabis—at the time certainly a source of contention because of legal differences—Jasim was adamant and sealed his alliance by paying Riyadh an annual tribute. Remarkably, and while he was aware that his adhesion and subsequent allegiance to the Al Sa'ud would upset the Ottomans, Jasim correctly calculated that the power of the Porte was waning, and that new forces were emerging on the Arabian Peninsula. Moreover, and from the Saudi perspective, his association with the Al Sa'ud portended a warning to the Al Nahyan in Abu Dhabi—perennial Wahhabi opponents—whose enmity Jasim nurtured over the Khawr al-'Udayd dispute.<sup>14</sup>

Almost two decades after the Ottoman defeat in Qatar, three significant regional developments influenced contemporary Qatari affairs and, perhaps inevitably, ushered in new leadership capabilities. First, when the Ottomans lost the key Hasah oasis to the Al Sa'ud in May 1913, the latter's credibility, as well as leadership credentials, soared throughout the Gulf. Second, and barely two months later, 'Abdallah bin Jasim succeeded his father, closing a critical period in Qatari court politics (1905–1913). The Al Thani masterfully played the Ottomans against the British and, in the process, forged a new Qatari identity. Yet in these endeavors, the British—who devised clever stratagems of their own to solidify a growing hold on the Gulf region—nudged them into action. Thus the third key development of the year was the adoption of an Anglo-Turkish convention that acknowledged Ottoman renunciation of all and any rights to Qatar.<sup>15</sup> Consequently, and due to British foresight, Qatar emerged as a relatively independent entity because Bahraini attempts to re-assert control over the promontory were legally rejected.<sup>16</sup> This was a brilliant British move that, undeniably, illustrated how London actually interfered in the internal affairs of Gulf States while pretending to look after the interests of key ruling families. By mid-1913, Qatar was firmly nestled in both the Saudi as well as the British political sphere of influence.<sup>17</sup>

This experience with regional and world powers further set the precedent for Qatari acumen throughout the twentieth century, as Doha nurtured a balance-of-power etiquette between Riyadh and global hegemons. By the turn of the twentieth century, the British had been replaced by Americans in protecting the Al Thani from putative foes, including those in Riyadh. Jasim bin Muhammad and 'Abdallah bin Jasim set solid leadership precedents for future successors. Although Jasim was motivated and perhaps persuaded to accept these conditions because of his intrinsic business interests—to sustain his pearl harvesting—he also knew how to plan. Commercial arrangements notwithstanding, he and his successors learned and applied the many lessons of balance of power, as Doha promoted perceived advantages in a neighborhood lined with stronger forces.

If 'Abdallah bin Jasim learned how to manage his evolving ties with the Al Sa'ud as well as those he nurtured with London, he nevertheless was wary of both. The British feared the rising influence of the Al Sa'ud throughout the area, and warned them not to interfere with the shaykhdoms of the Lower Gulf. Riyadh pledged to do just that, but only in 1915, a full year after World War I spewed its global devastation. In Qatar, and as early as 1914, 'Abdallah bin Jasim sided with London, foreseeing an Allied victory. Within a year, distraught Ottoman troops abandoned their Doha garrison, leaving behind 3 cannons, 500 shells, and more than 100,000 rounds of ammunition. Shortly after this withdrawal, London proposed to seal its friendship with the Al Thani through a new treaty, even if 'Abdallah was eminently cautious.<sup>18</sup>

Pretending not to be interested in politics, he feared that the British resident would pit one member of the family against another, having accurately assessed internal tensions. ‘Abdallah’s twelve brothers were certainly ambitious, as were his cousins—Ahmad bin Muhammad’s sons—all of whom ached to succeed him. ‘Abdallah tamed his own sons, but clan feuds delayed any accord. Several of ‘Abdallah’s brothers insisted that the Al Thani were simply replacing the Ottomans with the British, whereas ‘Abdallah was far more concerned with specific restrictions that any agreement with London would inevitably place on him. In particular, he was taken aback by a clause in the proposed treaty that allowed British subjects to settle in Doha. Still, his reservations notwithstanding, he was cajoled to sign a comprehensive agreement with the persuasive political resident, Percy Cox.

The 3 November 1916 treaty with Qatar was analogous to the 1892 accords harmonized with various Gulf shaykhdoms, in that it reinforced the “protectorate” recognition that prevailed elsewhere, since the Qatari ruler was expressly forbidden to cede, sell, lease, or mortgage any part of his territory without specific British approval. Likewise, Doha could not conduct any diplomatic relations with foreign powers without British consent. In exchange for this stewardship, London would significantly expend its presence on the promontory, facilitate life to its subjects who wished to live and work in Qatar, install a wireless post in the city, and monitor all maritime traffic, including slave and arms movements, both of which were specifically banned in the agreement.<sup>19</sup>

Unlike various 1892 treaties with Gulf shaykhdoms that limited British protective interventions to seaborne attacks, ‘Abdallah bin Jasim managed to insert a key clause (Article 11) into the 1916 treaty that stipulated something quite novel. In an uncharacteristic move, the British government pledged to “undertake to grant [him] good offices, should [he] or [his] subjects be assailed by land within the territories of Qatar.”<sup>20</sup> This commitment to intervene in potential land conflicts was a significant concession, although naturally still subject to interpretation. Nevertheless, by signing the 1916 treaty, ‘Abdallah bin Jasim Al Thani was finally affirmed as the ruler of Qatar and, in 1919, was even named “Companion of the Most Eminent Order of the Indian Empire,” a minor but valuable decoration.<sup>21</sup>

Despite the honorific, neither Delhi nor London were particularly eager to recognize independent Qatar. Rather, what was required of the Al Thani was to “rule” in peace, refrain from engaging in or encouraging piratical activities, and ensure maritime harmony. This was indeed the case until 1930, when the search for petroleum gained momentum. On several occasions, ‘Abdallah inquired whether the British would support him if one of his brothers attempted a coup, or whether the Al Thani would receive material assistance in case of an Al Sa‘ud land incursion. Arthur Prescott Trevor, political resident in Doha at the time, startled him by declaring that all the British would offer the Al Thani was

diplomatic backing—referring to the term “good offices” in the duly signed 1916 treaty.<sup>22</sup> With respect to interfamily disputes, Trevor was instructed to underscore that no support to any party would be forthcoming, because London pursued a noninterference policy. Ironically, Trevor refused to loan ‘Abdallah a modest amount when the latter revealed that he probably would not be able to repay his debts due to severe income problems. Trevor was able, however, to secure a gift of two obsolete canons—with blank cartridges—to restore harmony in Doha. This was the full extent of the 1916 treaty protection ‘Abdallah secured, modest in content and irrelevant in substance.<sup>23</sup>

The shrewd Qatari would not admit defeat and, on the pretext of settling a few business contracts, went to Bahrain to meet the British political agent. On the grounds that Doha was threatened by the Al Sa‘ud, ‘Abdallah bin Jasim sought British support in his planned assault on coastal villages, where dissident tribal leaders refused to pay him tribute. He informed the political agent that he planned to launch a maritime offensive—clearly banned by the 1916 treaty—with British assent. He further exhorted the British to recognize his son as heir, if for no other reason than to enhance his legitimacy. The British India government advised its agent that, in case of Saudi aggression, Qatar would receive diplomatic protection but no military assistance. Paradoxically, ‘Abdallah bin Jasim’s maritime actions against Qatari villages would indeed be tolerated, on account that these were purely internal matters falling outside British purview. Needless to say, these interpretations did not endear London to an increasingly worried ‘Abdallah.<sup>24</sup>

When in 1932 the British sought to build an airstrip for Royal Air Force aircraft flying from Britain to India—especially if they were forced to make emergency landings—‘Abdallah demurred, further damaging ties with furious colonial officials.<sup>25</sup> Undiplomatic language was used, with the resident threatening to hold ‘Abdallah personally responsible for the welfare of any unfortunate aviator compelled to crash-land on the promontory. It was a perfect illustration of the contempt several British representatives held toward Gulf ruling families, when few foresaw the day oil would transform enslaved and vilified tribal leaders into wealthy and cherished “allies.” Successive Western leaders, to paraphrase future British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, would opt “to do business” with Gulf rulers, even if their motives were not always altruistic.

Wishing to ensure that British companies received oil concessions in the Lower Gulf, London activated specific clauses in its bilateral treaties with local rulers. In the case of Qatar, Article 5 of the 1916 treaty, which denied the right to grant a concession without British approval, was exercised. Frank Holmes sought a Qatari concession from ‘Abdallah bin Jasim as early as 1922, but the British political agent in Bahrain persuaded the ruler to reject the New Zealander’s venture. A disappointed ‘Abdallah demurred and, under duress, granted an option to the D’Arcy Exploration Company, itself a subsidiary of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. As fully documented, the Anglo-Persian Oil

Company coordinated with its Iraq Petroleum Company partners, to create Petroleum Concessions (Qatar) Limited, which in turn was a mirror image of Iraq Petroleum Company, except for the fact that it had no Iraqi representative on its board.<sup>26</sup>

Whether 'Abdallah bin Jasim appreciated the impact that Petroleum Concessions Limited would eventually have on Qatar is unknown. He was nevertheless unaware of the promontory's petroleum and gas holdings, given poor exploration yields between 1922 and 1934. Yet, and while he agreed to renew the D'Arcy concession in 1934, news of discoveries elsewhere around the Arabian Peninsula piqued his interest. In particular, the Qatari heard of the 1932 discoveries made by the Standard Oil Company of California in nearby Bahrain, which also excited various British officials. News of Standard Oil's financial generosity rapidly percolated into Doha, further animating 'Abdallah's imagination, as the latter sought to emend the D'Arcy concession. 'Abdallah was quick to detect a significant difference in approach. Whereas Standard Oil representatives and, before them Holmes, fostered close ties with the Al Khalifah, the Iraq Petroleum Company as well as delegates from its numerous affiliates tended to be less generous with the Al Thani and other ruling families. News of Standard Oil's largess meant that miserly Iraq Petroleum Company employees would be hard-pressed to win additional favors, but the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, given British political preponderance, managed to lock a very lucrative oil deal with 'Abdallah bin Jasim.

Negotiations, though they eventually led to an accord, were not easy to conduct, as 'Abdallah bin Jasim drove a tough bargain. By the mid-1930s, the Qatari was cognizant of various British demands: jurisdiction of foreigners living on the promontory as well as the three dormant articles of the 1916 treaty (to allow British subjects the right to live in Qatar, to accept a British agent in Doha, and to establish a British post and telegraph office). Hovering over these key subjects was the Royal Air Force requirement for overflights and rescue missions. Realizing that 'Abdallah may well have entered into secret negotiations with the Al Sa'ud, the British political resident opted to enforce Article 5 of the 1916 treaty, insisting that the only acceptable concession would have to go to a partly British company.<sup>27</sup> Simultaneously, and to seal an accord, the resident was authorized to offer the protection 'Abdallah bin Jasim first sought in 1921.

Although predisposed to sign an accord with the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 'Abdallah stalled for time, hoping for more favorable terms. More important, an India Office memorandum raised a troubling question, namely that the 1916 treaty was "personal" to 'Abdallah and "not binding to his heirs and successors."<sup>28</sup> Britain would have little choice but to renegotiate with 'Abdallah's successor, after the latter's rule. London opted to press for the oil concession, while recognizing the need to address the succession issue and, privately,



preparing to accept Hamad bin ‘Abdallah as heir. There was, however, a catch: Hamad would have to accept the 1916 treaty.<sup>29</sup>

For ‘Abdallah bin Jasim, the concession was a political matter rather than a purely commercial venture, because he was not sure of holdings. Equally important, he had no possible idea of potential financial gains that awaited the Al Thani ruling family. Consequently, he bargained for political rewards, including a clearer definition of Qatar’s borders and a British commitment to stand by his family. These were more important than any remittances, even if remittances would have helped him retire considerable debts. Faced with such reticence, London prepared a proper concession agreement that literally gave ‘Abdallah most of what he had been asking for since 1921. Before finally signing the accord on 17 May 1935, several letters were duly exchanged between ‘Abdallah and Fowles, including a British government commitment to protect Qatar. The protection against “serious and unprovoked attacks from outside Qatar” was made conditional to signing the oil concession.<sup>30</sup> Unprecedented, the pledge allowed the Al Thani to look after all internal matters, while relying on the British—through the Royal Air Force, which now received its long coveted access to certain facilities—to look after external affairs. With this offer, London secured suitable landing rights, wireless telegraphy, permission for personnel to establish a presence, and last but not least, permission to establish an embryonic intelligence-gathering organization in Doha.

‘Abdallah bin Jasim’s oft-repeated request to the British to recognize Hamad as heir was also addressed in a separate letter, committing London to stand by the Al Thani, who were perceived as useful allies to settle disputes that might arise with respect to foreign subjects living in Qatar. A solid quid pro quo was duly created whereby ‘Abdallah granted a seventy-five-year oil concession in exchange for his legitimacy and the stability of a fledgling “state.” The Anglo-Persian Oil Company’s exclusive rights to produce, transport, refine, and market petroleum, natural gas, and other byproducts were specifically defined on a map of Qatar (probably the first of its kind in Al Thani hands). Remarkably, the concession’s financial terms were quite modest. Petroleum Development (Qatar) Limited, with Hamad bin ‘Abdallah as one of two local representatives, discovered oil in October 1939 near Zakrit, but large-scale production did not start until 1949. Although several additional oil companies would in time participate in Qatari production, ‘Abdallah bin Jasim exercised his business shrewdness to secure a political realm. Negotiating with so little, he ensured his successors’ legitimacy—especially for the wary and equally shrewd British—at a time when regional ties, with Bahrain and Saudi Arabia in particular, added to the area’s instability. At every turn, he would insist on granting his sons additional negotiating powers, perhaps understanding that the British usually respected those sitting across the table who could deliver.

Much like his father and grandfather, ‘Abdallah bin Jasim earned the status of statesman, adding value to what was one of the most isolated territories on the Arabian Peninsula. He was reluctant to assume power—especially as the number of contenders within the family grew—but his astute handling of negotiations over the 1916 treaty and the equally important discussions concerning oil concessions strengthened his resolve and enhanced his leadership capabilities. ‘Abdallah defended Qatar’s interests in the Zubarah and Hawar disputes, which stretched over decades, but with age and infirmity taking their toll he progressively transferred various responsibilities to his second son, Hamad. By 1944, Hamad was *de facto* ruler, having access to his father’s official seal.<sup>31</sup> Astonishingly, Hamad’s rule recorded a sharp decline in family insecurities, although certain members of the Al Thani family complained that they were not benefiting from oil revenues.

The Al Thani were divided, “with ‘Abdallah and his sons on one side, and some of ‘Abdallah’s brothers, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz and Salman in particular, as well as several cousins, the sons of Ahmad, on the other.”<sup>32</sup> Perhaps for the first time in recorded Qatari history, and directly as a result of perceived financial imbalances, some family members opted to leave Doha. A few settled in Saudi Arabia while others sought their fortunes elsewhere around the Gulf. Still others opted to stay put, accepting to live in penury, while they remained loyal to ‘Abdallah. The latter was indeed secure in the knowledge that his popularity would win the day if any challenger attempted to oust him from power. World War II halted oil operations and imposed significant hardships on an already hapless population living on meager foodstuffs. The comparative affluence of Bahrainis attracted a number of Qataris to the island, further reducing the overall number of residents on the promontory.

Ironically, Hamad’s *de facto* rule ebbed, given his many ailments—including diabetes—which in turn required his semi-retired father’s services. Well in his eighties, ‘Abdallah bin Jasim was still alert, and outlived his son Hamad, who died in 1948. Given that Hamad’s son was too young to rule, senior Al Thani members settled on ‘Ali bin ‘Abdallah to succeed the family scion, as Qatar was about to enter a new era.

**‘Ali bin ‘Abdallah (r. 1949–1960).** ‘Ali lacked his father’s leadership qualities. He clearly was a compromise choice when he succeeded ‘Abdallah bin Jasim in 1949 after the latter abdicated due to old age. In a complicated arrangement, ‘Ali pledged to allow his late brother Hamad’s son to succeed him, once the young man reached adulthood. ‘Ali ruled Qatar for eleven years, a period that mixed tragedy with several lucky happenings.<sup>33</sup> And although ‘Abdallah bin Jasim sought the construction of a small medical facility in Doha in 1943, it was ‘Ali bin ‘Abdallah who saw to it that social services were provided. The few schools that existed, which had been forced to shut down in 1938 because of lacking resources, were reopened. In 1955, a modest edu-

cation department was created, led by a group of *'ulamah*. Over a very short period of time, the department grew in importance, its budget jumping from US\$400,000 in 1955 to US\$6 million in 1964.<sup>34</sup>

Still, while Shaykh 'Ali had the foresight to equip Qatar with a much needed social infrastructure, his own peculiarities—considering all revenues to be his personal treasury—did not endear him to his followers. In the early 1950s, Qatar earned an estimated US\$50 million from oil exports, of which US\$12 million was allocated to 'Ali's private purse. But due to his legendary summer visits to Switzerland and Lebanon, along with his moody expenditures, he soon became indebted.<sup>35</sup> Although a *bon vivant*, 'Ali displayed an overall stabilizing character because he wanted as many Qataris as possible to prosper from the country's oil income, all the more so given that Qatar was not independent and, as such, fell under direct British control, with political residents monitoring and deciding most issues. 'Ali may well have sensed that change had set in throughout the region—an assessment that became clearer during his numerous travels—and supported the movement to accelerate its pace. Although his extravagance offended some, 'Ali was a rather religious individual, eager to promote Qatari interests.<sup>36</sup> His critics derided his consultations with Saudi religious counselors, which over time took their toll on his ability to rule. He was forced to abdicate in favor of his own son Ahmad in 1960, thereby reneging on his 1949 pledge to allow Hamad bin 'Abdallah's son from succeeding him. This was a significant breach, further highlighting ruling family differences that, inevitably, would surface and spread dissent. Ahmad bin 'Ali would be burdened with the final phase of Qatari political emancipation before independence.

**Ahmad bin 'Ali (r. 1960–1972).** Ahmad was poorly equipped to steer Qatar at a time when momentous developments were under way in the Persian Gulf. It was under his reign that London decided to withdraw from the Gulf, terminate its long-standing security relationships with the shaykhdoms, and grant them independence. The Arab world was embroiled in epoch-making changes too. A few years earlier, revolutionary forces had overthrown monarchies in Egypt and Iraq, and destabilized Jordan and Lebanon. Kuwait experienced the threat of an Iraqi invasion in 1961—which required troops from Britain and, eventually, the League of Arab States—before gaining autonomy. Yemen fell into a protracted civil war in the early 1960s that, over several years, dragged Saudi Arabia and Egypt into a vicious politico-military vortex that endangered regional security. Nationalist and revolutionary movements sprouted throughout the Arabian Peninsula between 1960 and 1970, mobilizing Arab public opinion from Bahrain to Oman and, in the case of the latter, setting the stage for an openly anti-British rebellion in Dhuffar in 1965. Finally, Iran renewed its latent claims to Bahrain in 1968.<sup>37</sup>

It was within this unenviable environment that 'Ali bin 'Abdallah abdicated, but none of these events unsettled the Al Thani as much as the British

government's decision to terminate its defense commitments east of Suez by the end of 1971. Still, the 1960s were critical for Qatar, as Ahmad bin 'Ali was given a family oath of allegiance while simultaneously Khalifah bin Hamad, Hamad bin 'Abdallah's son, was appointed heir apparent as well as vice ruler.

With Ahmad as ruler, the influence of Qatari *'ulamah*—who had started to stamp their influence on fledgling educational institutions—declined, in contrast to past performances. Simultaneously, the pace of reforms accelerated. In 1961, an official journal was created for the “state,” in which shaykhly edicts were published as law of the land. Ahmad bin 'Ali was determined to equip his entourage with functional, even performing, structures that would serve Qataris more efficiently.<sup>38</sup> For example, in 1962, Ahmad issued a law that organized his administration. According to its first article, the powers of the vice ruler were defined as agreed to by both the ruler and the Majlis al-Shurah (Consultative Council). In addition, the Ministries of Finance and Education were specifically designated, with clearly labeled responsibilities. Naturally, Ahmad bin 'Ali envisioned that the Ministry of Finance would need to be entrusted to one of his closest aides, and appointed his vice ruler and heir apparent, Khalifah bin Hamad, to the post, giving him a free hand to invest Qatar's wealth as he saw fit. Khalifah accelerated the establishment of various departments—agriculture, social affairs, public works, and others—which over time evolved into full-fledged ministries. A legal affairs department, which eventually evolved into the Ministry of Justice, was created in 1962. Khalifah shouldered these responsibilities with aplomb, as if he were a prime minister.<sup>39</sup> Yet despite these modernizing initiatives, Ahmad bin 'Ali continued to collect all revenues on a more or less personal capacity. When demonstrations and work stoppage efforts were staged in 1963, the Al Thani agreed to revisit the mechanisms through which oil revenues were distributed. A more equitable arrangement was devised, though the family remained in charge.

The Al Thani formally adopted what has come to be known as the “quarter rule.” According to this formula, a quarter of all revenues would flow straight to the ruler's private purse, a second quarter would be distributed among senior family members, a third quarter would cover the interests of remaining Al Thani family members, and the fourth quarter would be allocated to the public treasury.<sup>40</sup> To be sure, the equability of this formulation was not in line with Western commercial norms, but by local traditions it introduced a new way of doing business. Regardless, the accommodation bought Ahmad bin 'Ali some peace and tranquillity, although by 1963 even that would not be enough. Work stoppages that paralyzed exports, and therefore directly affected revenues, persuaded the ruler to take proactive steps.

In early 1964, the ruler issued a law that formally established the long-promised Consultative Council. A small step by modern standards, it nevertheless allowed the family to encourage participation in the decisionmaking

process, even if the exercise was confined to a restricted group. At the time, the majlis was composed of fifteen members—all chosen and appointed by the ruler—whose primary task was advisory. Both ruler and vice ruler presided over the majlis, which by its very composition was steeped in Qatari traditions. Each and every tribe, whether represented on the Consultative Council or not, bestowed an oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*) to the ruler. Those that refused an oath were not welcome to stay and, more often than not, were ordered to leave the promontory. This was the case with the Mahandah tribe in Al-Khawr and Dhakhirah, whose estimated 6,000 members sought and received refuge in Kuwait.<sup>41</sup> The Mahandah withdrew their *bay'ah* from Ahmad bin 'Ali after Nasir Al Misnad, a member of the tribe, was allegedly imprisoned under false pretenses.<sup>42</sup>

Serious sociopolitical mutations were under way as the 1971 British withdrawal date approached, imperiling the Qatari body politic. Yet most of the changes that occurred in the 1960s resulted more from external pressures than from Al Thani leaders' desire for political reforms, although several leaders genuinely worked toward the creation of a cohesive political entity. Substantive sociopolitical reforms would have to wait for full independence in 1971, when the Al Thani faced gargantuan nation-building tasks that, much like in neighboring nascent states, imposed their own set of conditions. The Al Thani rose to the occasion, even if the responsibility was overwhelming.

## ■ Constitutional Continuum in Qatar

The Al Thani, like other Gulf ruling families, frowned on the 16 January 1968 British decision to withdraw from east of Suez by the end of 1971, even if the eventual pullback was clearly anticipated by all concerned. Most were petrified that the security vacuum would encourage Iran, Saudi Arabia, and perhaps the United States and the Soviet Union to fill it. At the time, numerous contentions lay unresolved, including Al Khalifah rule in Bahrain (given Iran's claims to the archipelago), ownership of the Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands for Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah respectively, as well as border disputes between Qatar and each of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Abu Dhabi.<sup>43</sup>

Gulf ruling families scrambled in February 1968 to unite nine shaykhdoms (Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, 'Ajman, Umm al-Qiwayn, Ras al-Khaimah, and Fujairah). At a Dubai summit the same month, a Qatari proposal—to create a federation of Arab emirates under a ruling council—was duly accepted. This proposed union contrived to fill the vacuum that the British allegedly would leave behind, but few rulers appreciated the enormity of the tasks: how to foster federalism when clear disparities existed among the nine and, once formalized, how to govern a federation.<sup>44</sup>

### **The Road to Independence: 1968–1971**

From a Qatari perspective, several divergences emerged that, not surprisingly, weakened Doha's resolve toward federation. Which Gulf city would become the capital of the federation? Would all government ministries be located in this capital, or would they be dispersed throughout the Lower Gulf? Would the shaykhdoms draft a federal constitution—certainly a novelty for the region—and who would outline it? Would there be a constitutional convention? Ultimately, how would decisions on foreign policy, defense, citizenship, finance, and internal affairs be reached and implemented?

As these questions were being debated, two blocs emerged among the nine, each grouping led by the more powerful shaykhdoms: Qatar caucused alongside Dubai, and Bahrain sided with Abu Dhabi. The two coalitions, between four principal members, drew on established Gulf ruling family alliances. For example, the Qatari ruler, Ahmad bin 'Ali Al Thani, supported the Bahrain–Abu Dhabi faction because he believed that its planks were most likely to be seconded by Britain. Heir Apparent Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, on the other hand, perceived the Qatar–Dubai formula as better suited because it had tacit Saudi support. What the two camps offered merits clarification, especially to highlight innate family interferences in regional political gains.<sup>45</sup>

Remarkably, and despite a full understanding of his emirate's potential, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan understood that Bahrain stood above the other eight. It had the largest population and, more important, enjoyed a full gaggle of indigenous capabilities, ranging from business experience to functional infrastructure. Zayed accepted that Manama's quest for a leadership role could be beneficial, even if he was aware that the Al Khalifah's primary "interest in the federation was to protect [Bahrain] from the persistent Iranian claims."<sup>46</sup> Qatar, of course, rejected this interpretation, positing that its intermediary location offered undeniable balancing advantages—not tilting the Lower Gulf shaykhdoms upward. Doha further reminded its neighbors that a peaceful resolution of Qatari–Saudi border problems was a harbinger of successful diplomacy for the federation. In this quest for leadership, Dubai, a natural ally because of past cooperative efforts, endorsed Qatar. Contacts between the two increased after the 1930s, and have continued unabated ever since. Commercial ties were considerably strengthened after Ahmad bin 'Ali married a daughter of Rashid bin Sa'id, the ruler of Dubai. Finally, Dubai was not inclined to back Bahrain because the latter pushed for a strong anti-Iranian stand. Not only was Rashid bin Sa'id wary of his significant Iranian population, but he also accepted Tehran's leading regional role as a *fait accompli*. Abu Dhabi, for its part, retained a healthy skepticism as far as repeated Qatari assurances over putative Saudi border accords were concerned. In large measure, the Al Nahyan were simply concerned with Riyadh's long-standing claims to the Buraimi Oasis, and how to manage this troublesome question

with or without Qatari or “union” backing. Zayed would ultimately turn the tone and pace of these deliberations to his advantage, but after giving the federation of the nine a final chance.<sup>47</sup>

The last meeting of the nine rulers occurred in October 1969 in Abu Dhabi. Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan was elected president, and Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, the Qatari heir apparent, was elected prime minister.<sup>48</sup> Agreements on substantive matters could not be reached, including the necessity to draft and adopt a federal constitution, create appropriate legislative bodies, and settle on adequate defense expenditures. When the British political agent in Abu Dhabi addressed the meeting and expressed his government’s support for a federation of the nine, the blatant interference was too disruptive and a plain example of barging in on shaykhly affairs. The rulers of Ras al-Khaimah and Qatar walked out as the federation withered away. By walking out of the meeting, Ahmad bin ‘Ali unwittingly strengthened his nephew’s hand. Yet, was it his intention to stand by his heir apparent, or was this a coordinated step? Whatever the two men’s motives, the end result enhanced Khalifah bin Hamad’s hand, as the designated prime minister’s call for a federationwide constitution gathered momentum. In early 1970, after Iran relented and accepted a United Nations referendum, Bahrain declared its independence. When the federation convention balked and Bahrain and Qatar essentially bolted out, Doha—perhaps encouraged by UN activities in Manama—embarked on its boldest experiment to date. On 2 April 1970, Qatar announced the adoption of a provisional constitution, certainly one of the first in the Lower Gulf.<sup>49</sup>

Ahmad bin ‘Ali Al Thani decreed that Qatar would henceforth adopt a seventy-six-article provisional constitution (*Al-Nizam al-Asasi al-Mu‘aqat lil-Hukum fi Qatar*), and transmitted the government’s powers to Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani by appointing him prime minister and deputy ruler.<sup>50</sup> This British-sponsored move was instigated to ensure Qatar’s political survival and to help rulers in the Lower Gulf form a federation. According to the explanatory memorandum that accompanied the provisional constitution, there would be a transitional period, “while a complete permanent constitution would be formulated in the light of the experience gained during the transitional stage.” If the Al Thani had relied on unwritten codes that previously governed their relationships with other tribes on the promontory, the provisional constitution purported to formalize those ties in a more structured framework. In fact, the idea of a constitution was specifically entertained as an instrument of independence, as well as a legitimizing tool for Al Thani rule. References to “sovereignty” and “statehood,” including a readiness to defend the territory, stood in sharp contrast to the 1916 treaty, which had bound ‘Abdallah bin Jasim from any notion to relinquish or cede land without British approval.<sup>51</sup>

Drafted by Hasan Kamil, an Egyptian legal adviser who participated in federation discussions, the document referred to Qatar as being a part of the United Arab Emirates. Yet the provisional constitution singled out Doha, identifying the

role of the ruling family vis-à-vis the “state,” settled on a “national anthem,” described a separate flag, and more critically, defined citizenship (Article 4). Clearly, the Al Thani were in the process of declaring independence under their full authority. According to the provisional constitution, the head of state was inevitably to be drawn from the Al Thani ruling family, which probably came as a surprise to putative federation partners. In fact, the head of state’s functions and responsibilities were outlined in some detail. On 31 May 1977, five years after Khalifah assumed rulership, an amendment was approved by decree. It specifically recognized his son Hamad bin Khalifah as heir apparent. The critical succession matter was left to a family council empowered to settle differences, if any (Article 22), even as it foresaw the need for a special law to regulate the provisions for succession issues.<sup>52</sup>

Because the Qatari constitution did not address primogeniture—a stark absence given detailed attention to questions far less central to the family and its leaders—Article 22 specified neither who were the notables that would confront succession decisions, nor how they would do so. Rather the document assumed that Qatari tradition, mostly oral, would carry the day, and that the family would reach whatever decisions might be required in relative harmony. This may well have been the case in 1970 and 1971, but was soon tested when Khalifah bin Hamad forced the family’s hand.

In his capacity as heir apparent and prime minister, Khalifah bin Hamad ushered in a full-fledged government immediately after independence. It was to comprise ten posts: finance; petroleum; education and culture; interior; justice; industry and agriculture; communications; transport; electricity; and water. The ruler amended Article 33 of the provisional constitution on 24 May 1970 to authorize establishment of an economy and commerce ministry.<sup>53</sup> An advisory council whose primary task was to recommend specific initiatives (Article 43) would assist the ruler and his heir apparent. The council was to be composed of twenty elected members—through an undefined process—as well as the full membership of the cabinet. If necessary, the ruler could also appoint three additional representatives, but his influence stood to be much greater, because Article 45 granted the ruler the right to choose twenty additional members, from a roster of forty presumed elected officials. As Qatar was divided into ten electoral districts, the provisional constitution foresaw four elected representatives from each precinct, further muddying the political scene through a public winnowing of prominent tribal members.<sup>54</sup>

The provisional constitution presented “an internal inconsistency” in that it allocated the head of state specific prerogatives that could easily be challenged. “His person shall be accorded inviolability and it shall be a duty to respect him” (Article 20), stated the political document.<sup>55</sup> Yet the oath of allegiance given a ruler by Qataris, and the expectation that he would govern by consensus under *shari’ah* law, etched their loyalty toward a sovereign. As the explanatory memorandum of the constitution made clear, *shari’ah* “imposes a



duty on those who take part in the consensus formalities and, through them, on the whole nation, to pledge their loyalty and absolute obedience to the Ruler in the fear of God.”<sup>56</sup> For one renowned commentator, “this ‘obedience’ contradicts not only the ‘respect’ [Article 20] mentioned in the constitution itself, but also the spirit of the constitution between the government and the people.”<sup>57</sup> Of course, while the ruler was empowered to ratify and promulgate laws (Article 23), he could also amend, add, delete, and revise as “necessary in the public interest” (Article 74).<sup>58</sup> The confusion that was therefore ingrained in this epoch-making document was the blurring of authority between the ruler and the state. In Ahmad bin ‘Ali’s mind, the distinction was largely academic, for he was both ruler and head of state. Complications would arise with his successors, who could not assume such a convenient representation when faced with multiple challenges.

Parenthetically, but importantly, the first Qatari constitution addressed the need to organize a separate judiciary. It was “to be determined by law in accordance with the terms of the provisional constitution” (Article 73), while retaining its independence. It purported to deny any party from interfering in the administration of justice (Article 72), considered all to be innocent until proven guilty (Article 11), and upheld nondiscrimination of sex, race, and creed (Article 9). In light of more recent legislation in this area, the provisional constitution’s prescient outlook stands out, albeit with hindsight.<sup>59</sup>

For Ahmad bin ‘Ali, ruler and statesman, legitimacy derived from his judicious application of *shari’ah* to protect Qatari families and tribes. The emerging state pledged to serve society in all fields, provided for the people’s welfare, embarked on joint actions with friends, and defended them against foes. Toward that end, Heir Apparent Khalifah bin Hamad broadcast a television announcement on 3 September 1971 that Qatar had terminated its old treaty obligations with Britain and that it was replacing them with a new Anglo-Qatari “treaty of friendship and cooperation.” Ironically, the ceremony was not widely seen, since few Qataris then owned a television, although key tribal leaders rushed to the palace to join in the celebrations. Ahmad bin ‘Ali was vacationing overseas at the time, and was not particularly inclined to return home for the country’s independence ceremonies. This was Doha’s declaration, achieved peacefully, even if only a haphazard consequence of British withdrawal from the Gulf.

Independence did not alter the supremacy of the ruler. On the contrary, it reinforced his command substantially, codifying Al Thani authority and delineating subservient political structures.<sup>60</sup> The constitution skirted fundamental issues, including any references to a potential tenure in office, thereby confirming established rulership traditions. Qatar would remain a shaykhdom governed by tribal rules, even if cocooned within a legal framework. A new patriarchal approach was developed to guarantee the ruler’s command, but in the absence of protective clauses the stage was set for unexpected jolts. Succession

by consensus and the fiduciary responsibility toward tribesmen who pledged their allegiance meant that a ruler would have to perform or, at the very least, appear to be performing, in the interests of the people.

### **Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani (r. 1972–1995)**

Backed by senior Al Thani family members, Khalifah bin Hamad waited until 22 February 1972 to overthrow his ruler. His “accession” was guided by several developments, including an oft-expressed desire by the ruler to secure the post of heir to his own son. In the event, Khalifah took advantage of Ahmad bin ‘Ali’s hunting trip to Iran to alter the Qatari political scene. He received significant backing from Saudi Arabia, whose troops were rushed to the “border,” in case Ahmad bin ‘Ali contemplated any retaliatory measures.<sup>61</sup> The coup d’état was well prepared and unfolded as planned, and few Qataris objected, because Ahmad bin ‘Ali, two years into his rule as an independent potentate, had failed to fulfill most Qatari aspirations. The many demands of his position proved daunting, and his reluctance to tackle them head on drew Al Thani ire. For example, he did not see the urgency of establishing an advisory council, even if the requirement was specifically spelled out in the constitution. The latter document remained provisional throughout his tenure, though far more egregious faults were identified against him. Ahmad bin ‘Ali opted to enjoy an extravagant lifestyle, benefiting from a quarter of Doha’s growing oil income, which unsurprisingly contributed to a general malaise among Qataris. Moreover, the ruler’s preferences for travel, and spending considerable time out of the country, enlarged the gap that separated him from his tribesmen. His aloof attitude toward foreign affairs, illustrated by a significant absence of a cabinet post in the first government entrusted with this most august task, meant that Ahmad bin ‘Ali was bound to let others reach key decisions for him. Acting on these and other facts, Al Thani leaders welcomed Khalifah bin Hamad’s overtures to replace the ruler. Ironically, “the deposition of Ahmad was in implicit accordance with the constitution,” because his actions were perceived to have hindered the interests of the country.<sup>62</sup>

Once the 1972 “corrective movement” (*al-haraka al-tash‘iyyah*) replaced the prevailing British-imposed agreement with an amended provisional constitution, Khalifah bin Hamad wasted no time to alter the country’s political scene.<sup>63</sup> On 1 May 1972, he convened an advisory council of appointed representatives—there was little time to conduct any elections—and on 16 December 1975, he prolonged its term from three years (as specified in the constitution) to six. The 1975 emiri decree further extended membership, from twenty to thirty individuals. Male Al Thani family members, estimated to total about 500 at the time, were entrusted with additional responsibilities.

Although Doha brimmed with confidence, it was necessary to line up to the constitution’s historical outlook, certainly bold by regional standards.

Khalifah increased most public and military salaries by 20 percent, canceled outstanding housing loans, and reduced the ruler's personal "salary." Perhaps wishing to set a precedent, he promised to limit his own take to US\$250,000 each year, to cover his basic needs, although some family members objected because the sum was too small to cover palace expenses.<sup>64</sup> Still, this was a substantial reduction from Ahmad bin 'Ali's known annual expenditures, and even if the ruler could theoretically draw from the treasury as much as he wanted, the public pronouncement introduced a rare sign of transparency. Khalifah bin Hamad understood, perhaps better than his predecessor, that the country's newly acquired instruments of power legitimized the Al Thani while transforming the shaykhdom into a state. To their credit, the Al Thani distinguished themselves by defining their putative roles vis-à-vis Qatar. Doha's constitutional claims, which it aspired to consolidate as "a proper basis for the establishment of true democracy" (Article 5), were bold and, perhaps, a harbinger of some Al Thani leaders' long-term visions.<sup>65</sup> As discussed above, the duality of power—in the role of an absolute ruler to act on behalf of the common good—may well have been a sign of weakness, but the desire to pursue democratic aspirations was also a sign of the unique path available to those who wished to pursue it. This quest may well have been inspired by the limited opposition to the Al Thani, but on the other hand Doha was fully cognizant that its stated preferences would lift the barrier separating rulers from ordinary Qatari citizens.

Because of a relatively tiny population (less than 70,000 citizens in 1984), and abundant wealth equitably distributed after 1972, Qatar experienced no internal political unrest outside the Al Thani ruling family feuds throughout the 1960s and 1970s. Consequently, the amended provisional constitution served the nascent state rather well, even though the Advisory Council's role remained limited to debating and advising the ruler. Though Khalifah bin Hamad modified his council's statute to increase its membership and extend its term, members were largely chosen from among the notables and the Al Thani. While the ruler enjoyed limited choices—given the paucity of qualified individuals within Qatari society—his selections illustrated an unhealthy condition.<sup>66</sup> By stacking the Council with acolytes, the ruler ensured that it would be devoid of any significant authority. Government officials overlooked critical issues, and no debates were permitted on important items. What eluded the council were not just healthy debates on what ailed the country, but the opportunities to govern with full transparency. Rather than hash out differences, if any, the ruler informed the council of his preferred policies.<sup>67</sup> Naturally, he expected each and every member to stand by his decisions without voicing reservations. Indeed, Khalifah bin Hamad treated his constitutionally mandated council as little more than a tribal gathering, devised along specific paternalistic lines. It was not surprising, therefore, that this ancestrally constituted power structure, much like those in operation elsewhere throughout the Arabian Peninsula, contained embedded

contradictions with proclaimed constitutional goals. How to resolve such tensions foretold the degree of necessary political changes within Qatari society.

### **Developments Before the 1995 Coup**

On 31 May 1977, Khalifah bin Hamad appointed his eldest son, Major-General Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani (a Sandhurst Royal Military Academy graduate and commander in chief of the Qatari armed forces) as heir apparent and minister of defense. Hamad bin Khalifah's decision to remain commander in chief was a guarantee that the military backed him and, equally important, ensured a source of support in case of opposition to his eventual succession. In fact, the appointment settled a long-standing dispute over the identity of the heir, as two brothers of the ruler, Suhaym bin Hamad, the minister of foreign affairs, and 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Hamad, the minister of finance and oil, hoped to inherit the post. Suhaym, in particular, demonstrated his discontent with the ruler's decision by repeated absences from his official duties. Although the emir tolerated his brother's proclivities, he was nevertheless irritated as Suhaym tightened his connections with Saudi Arabia, perhaps to seek the latter's support in case of a power struggle in Doha. It was, in part, to prevent such an outcome that Khalifah bin Hamad appointed his son to the heirship. Importantly, the young major-general received the full backing of the army chief of staff, Hamad al-Atiyyah, who not only hailed from one of the most influential Qatari families, but also was Hamad's maternal uncle. In the event, Suhaym agreed to the appointment, on condition that he serve as prime minister.<sup>68</sup> Ahmad bin 'Ali, another contender, died in Britain in November 1977.

Ruler and prime minister settled on a *modus vivendi*, as a new publication law was promulgated on 8 October 1979 that prohibited criticism of the sovereign and all references to internal affairs likely to cause sedition, or likely to compromise or disturb religious sensitivities.<sup>69</sup> On 3 September 1981, Qatar celebrated its tenth independence anniversary, with Khalifah bin Hamad secure on the throne. For a well-situated official, the decade witnessed "Qatar [as having] taken giant, wide and unprecedented steps in firmly establishing the foundations of its national and social independence."<sup>70</sup> By September 1983, however, several Gulf sources revealed that Qatari authorities had uncovered an Iranian- or Libyan-inspired plot to assassinate Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders preparing to assemble for their annual summit meeting in Doha. Over seventy individuals, including several Qatari army and air force officers, were evidently arrested. It was also reported that "some of the detainees were . . . relatives of the ruling family," leading to speculation that the plot was not foreign-inspired after all, even if the spillover effects of the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the 1980 Iran-Iraq War were strongly felt throughout the region. Bahraini experts alleged that the plan "was part of a family vendetta . . . pursued by those who had lost in the 1972 power struggle and in

the subsequent disputes over the succession [issue].”<sup>71</sup> Official denials aside, Doha witnessed tight security for several months preceding the summit and, after a short period of time, publicized “confessions” exposing Libyan connivance. It ordered the Libyan chargé d’affaires to leave Doha, although Qatar did not break diplomatic relations with Tripoli.<sup>72</sup> The plot may well have been foreign-inspired, rather than embodying internal characteristics, but Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani was embarrassed nevertheless. He vowed to address key challenges with more determination, even if that required a confrontation with inconsolable family members, especially the ruler’s younger brother, Suhaym.

Khalifah bin Hamad mourned his brother’s untimely death on 21 August 1985. The foreign minister, who was only fifty-two, left a substantial void in family affairs, having first supported Hamad’s 1972 seizure of power. Although Suhaym experienced a series of disappointments, including the 1977 decision not to entrust him with the heir apparent-ship, what upset him most was Khalifah bin Hamad’s neglect to assign him the promised premiership. Suhaym remained foreign minister until his death, dejected and bitter, even eager to plot a palace coup. According to Gulf sources, he “apparently gathered a group of supporters from the northern area of the Shaykhdom and built up large quantities of weapons” for such a purpose. Reportedly, “after Suhaym’s death, his sons attacked and fired upon the Qatari Minister of Information, ‘Isa Ghanim al-Kuwari, whom they viewed as responsible for their father’s death.”<sup>73</sup> The veracity of this reportage aside, Doha arrested several of Suhaym’s supporters, confiscated large caches of weapons, and delayed the announcement of his replacement. ‘Isa Ghanim al-Kuwari may well have escaped an assassination attempt in May 1986—though he denied it—and Nasir bin Hamad Al Thani, another brother of the ruler, was admitted to a London hospital suffering from a gunshot wound.<sup>74</sup> How the ruler’s brother received his potentially mortal wounds was never revealed, even as Doha denied any and all speculations of serious palace disputes.

An equally troubling development was the mysterious case of Qatari Stinger missiles. When Qatar acquired twelve of these US-made shoulder-held missiles from mujahidin fighters in Afghanistan—that were first “observed” during a March 1988 military parade in Doha—it was feared that Qatari authorities could not ensure that the missiles would not fall into unfriendly hands. Senior members of the ruling family received US presidential envoy Vernon Walters and US assistant secretary of state Richard W. Murphy to discuss the matter. Khalifah bin Hamad did not budge and Washington “responded by placing a hold on future military and economic cooperation with Qatar.”<sup>75</sup> This was an untenable situation for the heir apparent, who vehemently disagreed with his ruler and father. From Hamad bin Khalifah’s perspective the Stingers were not worth the trouble they generated. He was particularly distraught at a vicious characterization of Qatar as “a speck of a little country” by a leading US congressman.<sup>76</sup> The acquisition, ostensibly to create

an equilibrium with Bahrain—which had acquired a few Stingers from the United States—was deemed as being inconsequential in terms of military needs. Hamad bin Khalifah opposed his father's decision to bypass proper channels and spoke about the "error" with senior advisers.<sup>77</sup>

Qatar revised its decisionmaking apparatus in 1989, when a full-fledged cabinet reshuffle was ushered in. On 18 July, a decree announced the changes, which included an increase in cabinet posts from eleven to fifteen (eight of which were held by Al Thani family members), restoring several long-vacant posts, and creating new ones. Only Shaykhs Hamad bin Khalifah (heir apparent and minister of defense) and 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Khalifah (minister of finance and petroleum) retained their portfolios. Although most appointees were young technocrats, the large number of Al Thanis in the government indicated the ruler's preferences, and that Doha was still very much a family enterprise. Khalifah consolidated his power base further by appointing his sons to key posts. In addition to the heir apparent and defense minister, his second son, 'Abdul 'Aziz, retained the finance and petroleum portfolio. His third son, 'Abdallah, was entrusted the critical Interior Ministry, which assumed new security responsibilities as developments throughout the Persian Gulf region deteriorated. Muhammad, his fourth son, was appointed undersecretary at the Finance and Petroleum Ministry.<sup>78</sup>

Of course, the individual who gained most was the heir apparent, who was reconfirmed in his position while retaining both his minister of defense and commander in chief of the Qatari armed forces assignments. Yet Hamad bin Khalifah astutely promoted several of his advisers to further consolidate his political footing within the family. Hamad's principal assistant, 'Abdallah bin Khalifah al-'Atiyyah, filled the foreign affairs portfolio, which, bizarrely, had been left vacant since 1978 because of intrafamily disputes. In May 1989, Hamad's influence was augmented further when he was appointed chairman of the newly created Supreme Planning Council (SPC). Independently staffed and budgeted, the SPC was created by the heir apparent, who wished to firmly grip the country's economic affairs in his hands. In this endeavor, he was assisted by Hamad bin Jasim bin Hamad Al Thani, who was entrusted with the vacant economy and trade portfolio. The two Hamads, who would embark on a sustained alliance, drafted several development plans for Qatar, monitored their implementation, and proposed legislation that facilitated a complete government reorganization. Although initial industrial ventures were all related to the North Dome gas field, the SPC embarked on far-reaching projects that planned to reinvent the Qatari economy, and promoted genuine entrepreneurship. Both of these key appointments implied more harmonious ties between the ruler and his heir apparent, but they also illustrated how Hamad bin Khalifah was directing the country. Observers of internal Qatari affairs noticed that the heir was slowly but surely differentiating himself from his ruler, sharply

disagreeing on critical concerns, and preparing for the day when he would assume full authority.<sup>79</sup>

Hamad bin Khalifah, like all senior Gulf officials, was shocked by the 1 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, but grateful for having dramatically altered Qatar's military ties with key Western powers, including the United States. Khalifah bin Hamad, the ruler, spoke for all Qatari when he stressed the need to "establish a more effective security system . . . to confront challenges in the post-crisis period."<sup>80</sup> The Iraqi invasion, he underlined, had "upset all the realities and standards which we had taken for granted regarding the basics of inter-Arab relations, the concept of Gulf security, and Arab security."<sup>81</sup> For months after the invasion and occupation, Qatari officials emphasized the illegality of Baghdad's actions, accusing Saddam Hussein of treachery, and enhancing cooperation with United Nations-backed forces assembling on the Arabian Peninsula in preparation for war. A military campaign against a fellow Arab state was no longer taboo, even if several efforts were undertaken to find a political solution. In Qatar, as elsewhere throughout the Gulf, pragmatic leaders appreciated the inevitability of war. Hamad bin Khalifah, as defense minister, was fully prepared to assume his share of the burden. Confident that Gulf states would weather the crisis successfully, Doha anticipated an Iraqi defeat in Kuwait, with a full liberation of the shaykhdom. This confidence was not widely shared, as Foreign Minister 'Abdallah bin Khalifah al-'Atiyyah resigned in May 1990, ostensibly because he was denied greater freedoms to manage his ministry. In reality, a family dispute arose over how best to address the Iraqi invasion, with the heir embarking on a more assertive anti-Iraqi stance.

In the period after the liberation of Kuwait, Al Thani attention refocused on internal and regional challenges, including a troubling confrontation with Bahrain over the Hawar Islands and the Fasht al-Dibal coral reefs. Khalifah bin Hamad celebrated his tenure by inaugurating the first phase of the North Dome gas project but, almost simultaneously, was handed a popular petition calling for openness and accountability. Increasingly, young Qataris sought a less paternalistic regime, one that would factor in their growing demands for privileges taken for granted by the ruling family.

When fifty-four prominent Qataris petitioned Khalifah bin Hamad in 1991, calling for the inauguration of a legislative rather than a designated body, Doha was confronted with a major challenge. The petition expressed worry and disappointment over what the signatories perceived as the abuse of power in Qatar, especially with respect to the economy, which allegedly benefited the wealthy.<sup>82</sup> Moreover, the petition identified the lack of freedom of speech, along with the dire conditions of the shaykhdom's health system. It also urged the creation of a legislative body that would ensure effective popular participation, an appeal that, irrespective of how potent the approach may

have been, could not be dismissed because it reflected an authentic mood among Qatari elites. What was sought was a more egalitarian institution that would significantly alter existing paternalistic methods, especially in the context of the 1990–1991 Gulf crisis, which shook Gulf monarchies at the core. To be sure, the petition phenomenon was not unique to Qatar, as similar efforts were under way elsewhere throughout the GCC states. Khalifah bin Hamad, nevertheless, was not ready to usher in such reforms, fearful that more liberal preferences would not alleviate the burden of rule but rather threaten the Al Thani.

Although it is difficult to identify the exact time that Heir Apparent Hamad bin Khalifah decided to mount a coup d'état against his father, the latter's rejection of a petition signed by fifty-four of Qatar's leading officials in 1992 probably crystallized nascent perceptions for change. The ruler may have found the petitioners' call for the establishment of a legislative assembly, as well as sorely needed economic and education reforms, as overbearing, but Hamad understood how minimal and necessary these steps were. According to reliable sources, father and son discussed the matter, clashing over the pace that the younger Al Thani wished to follow. To his credit, the ruler agreed to entrust day-to-day governance responsibilities to his heir, perhaps to test his son's capabilities and gauge his strength to deal with various internal constituencies. As prime minister, Hamad was already well on his way to adopting policies that, at times, contradicted his father's more cautious preferences. In particular, the heir apparent concluded that internal political reforms were necessary, including holding elections at the local and state levels. With respect to foreign policy initiatives, Hamad rapidly normalized relations with Iran as well as Iraq, established initial economic contacts with Israel, and distanced Qatar from Saudi Arabia to lessen the latter's influence on the promontory.

### **Hamad bin Khalifah (r. 1995– )**

Because of its rather large size, the Al Thani family inevitably experienced factionalism, pitting brothers and cousins against each other. It was precisely to avoid a repeat of such schisms that Khalifah bin Hamad successfully introduced constitutional changes—authorizing him to make necessary personnel changes at will—and appointed his eldest son heir apparent and minister of defense in May 1977. Still, the way he went about this change was revealing, and in hindsight was an abject lesson to his heir and successor.

Though Khalifah bin Hamad gradually relegated much of the day-to-day governing authority to his scion, his unfulfilled promises to his brothers introduced a level of unnecessary mistrust within the family. Hamad bin Khalifah, who acquiesced to his father's coup against Ahmad bin 'Ali, could not be oblivious to promises made to his paternal uncles Khalid and Suhaym. In fact, the three brothers, Khalifah, Khalid, and Suhaym, along with Hamad bin Khalifah,



had a specific understanding on the division of labor after the 1972 coup d'état. Khalid and Suhaym would support the revolt against Ahmad only if, in exchange, the new ruler would appoint Suhaym prime minister as well as heir. Remarkably, with Hamad bin Khalifah's knowledge, Suhaym was appointed minister of foreign affairs. Five years after attaining rulership, Khalifah selected his own son Hamad as heir, in lieu of his brothers. Once again, Suhaym accepted this *fait accompli* and gave his oath of allegiance, on the condition that he would become prime minister. According to reliable sources, Suhaym was infuriated when his wish was not fulfilled, and started courting Saudi endorsements to help organize a counter coup against his brother.<sup>83</sup>

Equally troubling to the young heir, Hamad was amply aware that he was not his father's first choice as successor, in 1977. The preferred candidate was his brother 'Abdul 'Aziz. Therefore, he knew that his own selection was made to partially appease Suhaym and, perhaps indirectly, distance Riyadh from any contemplated political designs on its Unitarian neighbor. Irrespective of these perceptions, family disagreements remained on Hamad's mind, as he himself faced difficult choices over the course of several years. Throughout the mid-1980s, the Sandhurst-educated officer assumed new responsibilities, gaining both insight and expertise in stately affairs. Yet by following "in the footsteps of his own predecessor, [and] seemingly unaware of the lessons of history," Khalifah bin Hamad slowly became "ruler in name only," whereas his son transformed himself into "the effective Amir."<sup>84</sup> Few Gulf observers were surprised when, on 27 June 1995, Hamad seized power while his father was overseas.

Hamad bin Khalifah rapidly initiated several reforms to the Qatari political system. In 1999, municipal elections were held, in which both men and women voted and ran for office, and in 2002 a constitutional commission produced an updated draft constitution that called for the creation of a partially elected legislative body. The new constitution guaranteed Qatari citizens the right to vote. It also enshrined individual rights, including freedom of expression, assembly, and religion. In fact, the draft was overwhelmingly approved by public referendum in April 2003, even if the country experienced an undeniable clash between reformists and more conservative elements.

***Hamad bin Khalifah's vision for Qatar.*** To his credit, Hamad bin Khalifah introduced several epoch-making changes to the Qatari body politic that stood in stark contrast to established traditions. Hamad's most critical change was the amendment to the constitution regarding succession. Indeed, by boldly addressing this sensitive subject, he alleviated one of the principle causes of internal strife in Qatar. Moreover, he successfully separated the functions of ruler and prime minister in the second cabinet of his reign. He announced and encouraged municipal elections—the first in over thirty-five years—and motivated women to run for office and vote. Perhaps his most controversial initiatives came in forging a radical new foreign policy that centered around a rapprochement with

the United States as well as a controversial opening with Israel, which maintained a trade office in Doha. On vital internal matters, and throughout his tenure, Hamad sought to extend Al Thani influence over the entire Qatari society. In less than two decades, a gradual rise in prominence of the nuclear family was accomplished, far more pronounced than any previous similar initiatives. Consequently, new relationships between the ruling family and Qataris emerged, fostering a new sociopolitical pact. At its core was a new political understanding that Al Thani rule could indeed prosper, as long as all Qataris shared in the country's bounty. The pact further recognized that political participation could no longer be sequestered, but should be practiced by all citizens acting in their own long-term interests in the rapidly changing environment.

**A new constitution.** On 29 April 2003, Qataris went to the polls to vote on a referendum to approve the adoption of a new constitution that promised to rewrite the shaykhdom's history. Although the voting date had been scheduled several months earlier, the referendum was coincidentally held a day after US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld publicly announced the transfer of US military assets from Sultan air base, near Al Kharj in Saudi Arabia, to Al-'Udayd near Doha.<sup>85</sup> Irrespective of any coincidence that highlighted the rise of a nascent alternative relationship on the Arabian Peninsula, the Qatari initiative, under juridical evaluation and fine-tuning since 1998, was in fact part of Hamad bin Khalifah's long-term political reform agenda. Indeed, the new document intended to replace the 1972 amended constitution because, the ruler concluded, the latter no longer served Qatar's needs. As he heralded transparency, especially by welcoming the immensely popular and highly atypical *Al-Jazeera* television network to Doha and, equally important, by abolishing his Ministry of Information in November 1996, Hamad lit the fires of internal civic innovations. Consequently, Arab political debate, including conservative Arab Gulf discourses, changed permanently.

Hamad first spoke of the need for a new constitution in March 1999, when the ruler ushered in municipal elections through universal suffrage, and allowed women to vote as well as run for office. At the time, he posited that a committee of experts would prepare a formal draft text, which would be revised as needed before being submitted to a referendum. Moreover, the ruler further declared that such a constitution would pave the way for full parliamentary elections, to be held after 2005. Remarkably, and unlike the Bahraini and Kuwaiti doggedness, each and every Qatari initiative was undertaken in the quasi-absence of credible popular demands for change. In fact, Qatari democracy hailed from the top rather than the bottom, and was highly preventive. To be sure, Hamad was keenly aware of regional trends, anticipating inevitable clashes between those who held on to old vestiges of power and politicized as well as media-savvy generations of young Gulf citizens. Furthermore, and as an astute observer of the international arena, Hamad assessed the

overall Western push for democratization as a key plank that would dominate most world forums. Why wait for the Damocles sword to fall on the Al Thani before adopting steps that could remove that drastic possibility? Coupled with Doha's penchant for dialogue with Israel, Al Thani domestic reforms would surely enhance internal stability, as well as endear Qatar to Washington, even if they ostracized the regime from Saudi Arabia and other conservative Arab monarchies.

Although these steps were both daring and comprehensive, the new constitution, like its predecessor, recognized that *shari'ah* law was the "principal source of legislation" (Article 1).<sup>86</sup> Furthermore, it addressed the shaykhdom's succession issue head-on, by specifically dictating terms. Article 8 instituted a hereditary alternation among the ruler's male children or, absent such offspring, through designated male descendants from a cadet branch duly appointed by the ruler (see Appendix 10 for excerpts from the constitution).

The fundamental difference between this document and its 1972 predecessor was the role of the Consultative Council. Importantly, the Qatari council was empowered with legislative powers after 2003, as thirty of its forty-five members were slated for universal suffrage, with four-year terms. The remaining fifteen members were to be nominated by the ruler (Article 77). Significantly, all council members were to enjoy parliamentary immunity (Article 113), itself a first in the Gulf Cooperation Council area.

Various other details are worthy of attention. Qatari "parliamentarians," along with the ruler, were empowered to offer specific amendments to the constitution if two-thirds of all members approved such a revision. This was a novel step, and although the ruler preserved his veto powers on any amendment, the operation granted Qataris additional rights. Although no changes would be allowed in two specific areas—to curtail the right to free speech as well as alter succession clauses—the entitlement was breathtaking nevertheless. The 2005 constitution further guaranteed privacy (Article 37), the presumption of innocence (Article 39), freedom of expression as well as the press (Articles 47 and 48), and the right of assembly and association (Articles 44 and 45), banned the expulsion of citizens (Article 38), and secured asylum (Article 58).

One of the more interesting issues addressed by Qatar in this innovative document was freedom of religion. In a country where the majority practiced the conservative Sunni Unitarian (Wahhabi) creed of Islam, the idea of constitutional guarantees for freedom of religion (Article 50) was both novel and revolutionary. The law, which ensured the independence of the judiciary (Article 131), looked after individuals without neglecting societal needs. Indeed, the new Qatari constitution ensured that the Al Thani retained undeniable privileges, while placing the country on the path of effective and long-lasting reforms. It was formally adopted on 9 June 2005, although anticipated elections for the thirty open Consultative Council seats were delayed.

## ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Thani of Qatar

By the early 1990s, the Al Thani ruling family consisted of three main branches: the Bani Hamad, headed by Khalifah bin Hamad; the Bani 'Ali, headed by Ahmad bin 'Ali; and the Bani Khalid, headed by Nasir bin Khalid (who served as minister of economy and commerce in 1984 and for several years thereafter). Reliable sources estimated total clan membership at around 20,000 individuals, although this could not be independently confirmed because so little was actually known about family affairs. Hamad bin Khalifah's heirs, of course, were certainly considered first among peers.

### **Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani (r. 1995– )**

With the 27 June 1995 coup against his father, Hamad bin Khalifah ushered into Qatari succession affairs a jump to the younger generation of leaders. To be sure, Hamad was the shaykhdom's *de facto* ruler in every sense of the word and, since at least 1992, controlled every sector of government except for the ministry of finance. Because his father, Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani, preferred to live for extended periods of time in his French chateau on the famed Côte d'Azur, day-to-day state activities fell on the heir. Still, the younger prince was unable to introduce meaningful changes, particularly since the father pulled Doha's purse-strings as he saw fit. To say that a level of discontent arose within the Al Thani would be an understatement, even if most deferred to the ruler out of respect and protocol. It was not surprising, therefore, that the son would ease his father out of power, backed by leading ruling family members equally distraught at the political calamities that befell the small country. Whether due to his forward-looking agenda, his generosity, or his genuine belief that future generations deserved better support from their rulers, Heir Apparent Hamad was immensely more popular than his father. The heir's spouse, Shaykhah Mawzah bint Nasir Al Misnad, was equally engaging. Her desire to equip Qatar with first-rate educational institutions was already present even before the coup that brought her husband to power.<sup>87</sup>

Hamad bin Khalifah was born in Doha in 1952, and was educated at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy. In 1971, he earned a commission as a lieutenant-colonel, and joined the nascent Qatari armed forces as the commander of its First Mobile Regiment. He was regularly promoted in his military career, first to major-general in 1972, then to commander in chief in 1972, a post he retained until 1995. In addition to these duties, he became minister of defense in 1977, and prime minister a year later. When he was appointed heir apparent on 30 May 1977, few doubted his intrinsic abilities to manage Qatari affairs with self-confidence. In fact, over the years, Hamad served in various capacities, earning him praise as a leader who practiced what he envisioned. From 1979 to 1991 he was the chairman of the Higher Council for

Youth Welfare, and from 1989 to 1995 he was chairman of the Higher Planning Council. He first married Shaykhah Mariam bint Hamad Al Thani, a daughter of his first cousin, Hamad bin Muhammad Al Thani. Then, in 1977, he married Shaykhah Mawzah bint Nasir Al Misnad, who earned a bachelor's degree in sociology from the University of Qatar in 1986. In 1995, the ruler's second wife established the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development. Three years later, she assumed the presidency of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs, and in 2002 shouldered the vice chairmanship of the Supreme Educational Council. An active first lady, Shaykhah Mawzah was appointed special envoy for basic and higher education for the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization in 2002, and received an honorary doctorate in humane letters from Virginia Commonwealth University in 2003.<sup>88</sup>

A man of immense enthusiasm for positive change, Hamad bin Khalifah perceived the slow pace of regional transformations as an impediment to Qatar's own development. He distanced his policies from Doha's traditional Arab allies in the Gulf region, and anticipated the winds of change by forging new alliances with the United States, while maintaining correct ties with Iran. Even if the period after 1995 was especially troubling for the sovereign, he continued to emphasize internal reforms as the ideal method to address changing relationships between citizens and ruling families. It was that truism that allowed Qataris to justify, as well as accept, the coup d'état.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

The Hamad coup d'état was in the making for several years, as two major cabinet shuffles realigned internal family alliances in 1989 and 1992. At the time, Hamad carefully reorganized the government by allocating key posts to his allies. Four Al Thani shaykhs—Khalid bin Hamad bin 'Abdallah, Muhammad bin Hamad bin 'Abdallah, Faysal bin Thani bin Jasim, and Jasim bin Muhammad bin Jasim—lost their portfolios in 1989, and of those four, three were key Khalifah supporters who had backed his revolt against a cousin in 1972. In replacement of these four ousted Al Thanis, five shaykhs allied with Hamad received influential appointments, including the heir's brother 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Khalifah at the Ministry of Finance and Petroleum. Reportedly, Hamad and 'Abdul 'Aziz disagreed on tactics, with the latter often siding with their father against the heir. Knowledgeable analysts assumed that Hamad appointed another brother, Muhammad bin Khalifah, as undersecretary at the Ministry of Finance, essentially to keep on eye on 'Abdul 'Aziz, who, for very complex reasons, maintained a certain distance from the ruler.<sup>89</sup> Yet another sibling, 'Abdallah bin Khalifah, was entrusted with the Ministry of Interior portfolio, while a distant cousin and a former chief of police, Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir Al Thani, was elevated to the Ministry of Economy and Trade. The 1989 reshuffle included

Hamad bin Suhaym—as minister of information and culture—further illustrating the length to which Hamad bin Khalifah was willing to go to forge new coalitions, even if the sovereign was seriously contemplating abolishing that ministry at the time.

A short three years later, Heir Apparent Hamad bin Khalifah further consolidated his alliance when four rotations were made to the government. ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Khalifah was dismissed from the Ministry of Finance and Petroleum, and left Qatar to reside permanently in France. The ministry itself was abolished, and replaced by two new bodies, the Ministry of Energy and Industry and the Ministry of Finance, Economy, and Trade. While the designs were meant to streamline policies, in reality the new classification presented Heir Apparent Hamad two new opportunities to appoint trusted allies to the cabinet. Muhammad bin Khalifah, previously undersecretary, was entrusted with the Ministry of Finance, and ‘Abdallah bin Hamad Al ‘Atiyyah, a director at the Ministry of Interior, was elevated to the Ministry of Energy and Industry. Three other prominent Al Thanis joined the cabinet in 1992: Fahad bin Hamad (the heir’s son), as minister of municipal affairs and agriculture; Hamad bin ‘Abdallah bin Khalifah (the heir’s nephew), as minister of state for defense affairs and deputy commander in chief of the armed forces; and ‘Abdallah bin Khalid, as minister of endowments and Islamic affairs. Equally important, Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir Al Thani was moved from the Ministry of Economy and Trade to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which allowed the latter post to be restored to an Al Thani, as well as a unique bond to be forged with the heir that outlasted the 1995 putsch.<sup>90</sup>

These tangible gains notwithstanding, Khalifah bin Hamad, who ruled with rare acuity for his perceived pecuniary rights, controlled the purse. More often than not, such attention paralyzed smooth government operations, with workers and companies refusing to conduct new business before arrears were settled. Hamad grew restless, as his decisions were constantly placed in abeyance. Internal family tensions grew over mundane and inconsequential matters that clearly needed to be resolved. Even after all these years, it is difficult to know what finally broke the remaining family harmony, but the ruler’s insistence to bring back his son ‘Abdul ‘Aziz—and the heir apparent’s hesitancy to acquiesce—probably played a major role. On 27 June 1995, Hamad sent word to his vacationing father (who was in Cannes, France) that his twenty-three-year rule had come to an end, and that he was taking over. Al Thani family members, led by ‘Abdallah and Muhammad bin Khalifah—the new ruler’s brothers—were asked to swear their oath of allegiance to Hamad, and most did so voluntarily. A few shaykhs were noticeably absent, indicating a minor schism, but the putsch hardly raised an eyebrow among the vast majority of Qataris. The episode was reminiscent of the 1972 revolt, when Khalifah moved similarly, an event still fresh in most Al Thani minds.

Within two weeks, a new cabinet was announced, with no less than thirteen Al Thanis in government positions. Ironically, and although the deposed ruler was safely out of the country, Hamad bin Khalifah confronted his father's shadow. Doha reluctantly but quickly confirmed that the dethroned sovereign controlled a substantial portion of the country's foreign reserves—estimated at about US\$3 billion—which in turn created liquidity problems for his successor. Equally irritating was the very public attention that Khalifah bin Hamad received throughout the Gulf region. In fact, “conspicuously high-profile welcome[s] befitting a head of state” were accorded the fallen monarch in Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).<sup>91</sup> At every stop, Khalifah reiterated his refusal to relinquish power, and telegraphed his intentions to return. Except for the Omani ruler, conservative Gulf rulers displayed their displeasure with the maverick young Qatari, whose cavalier 1995 decision in Doha contravened local tribal norms. By granting a deposed ruler warm attention, several GCC rulers expressed displeasure with Hamad bin Khalifah, who nevertheless did not hesitate to buck the regional trends. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE were not ready for a nonconformist decisionmaker among them, which in part explained their reception of Khalifah.

This succession, consequently, was of an entirely different variety, introducing new variables into family harmony. Even if the vast majority of Al Thanis stood by Hamad, the new ruler anticipated opposition, given that he had deposed his father. Some clan members also disapproved of Hamad's disciplined, no-nonsense approach, and unleashed their wrath in a countercoup attempt in February 1996. Its ostensible purpose was to restore Khalifah bin Hamad to the throne, but few in fact believed that the small force assembled for the occasion—an estimated 3,000 badu recruited as a mercenary army—could accomplish the task. The regime, with relatively sophisticated intelligence capabilities, managed to learn plot details and mobilized the regular army to counterattack. An estimated hundred armed men were quickly arrested, and Qatari officials sought to apprehend Hamad bin Jasim bin Hamad Al Thani (not to be confused with the current foreign minister, whose full name is Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir Al Thani). A member of the ruling family and former minister of the economy as well as former chief of police, Hamad bin Jasim bin Hamad Al Thani allegedly organized the rebellion. According to informed sources, he apparently acted on behalf of the former ruler, who was “waiting on the Saudi side of the border with Qatar to see if the coup succeeded or not.”<sup>92</sup> Several diplomatic sources hinted that the coup plotter may have received assistance from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE, although this could not be verified. In the event, the former ruler sought and received residence in Abu Dhabi, where he enjoyed full hospitality for several months after the botched operation. Tensions remained high between Doha and various GCC capitals, exacerbated by the Qatari ruler's hasty decision to storm out

of a GCC summit in Muscat in December 1995. Whether policy disputes pitted Doha against one or more of its allies, or whether the Qatari ruler's behavior (overthrowing his father) irked more senior attendees, the damage was visible. Still, Doha asserted that Hamad's Muscat pullulation was an objection to the appointment of a Saudi, Jamil al-Hujeilan, as secretary-general of the GCC, not as a tiff against any particular leader. In fact, personality clashes were the root cause of the overall dissatisfaction, as Hamad bin Khalifah lost his patience with overindulgent GCC officials toward his father.

On the domestic front, Hamad moved quickly, changing the succession clause in the constitution. Whereas Article 22 had specifically stated that "rulership of the State is hereditary in the [Al Thani] family," Hamad issued a decree that declared succession would go "from the father to one of his sons."<sup>93</sup> In October 1996, he appointed his third son, Jasim (Shaykhah Mawzah's eldest), as heir. At the same time, Hamad bestowed the premiership on his younger brother 'Abdallah, methodically spreading dynastic authority over several individuals. Simultaneously, he launched a lawsuit against his father, to recover financial assets controlled by his predecessor. Whatever else may have been on his agenda, Hamad was determined to strengthen his command over the country, knowing that he possessed the Al Thani family's loyalty oath. Secure in this knowledge, a special Doha criminal court convened in late 1998 to hear the case of the failed counter coup. Affable Qatari foreign minister Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir Al Thani declared that the ruler wanted "justice and democracy in the state of Qatar," and added that his presence in "court prove[d] in theory and practice this attitude," as 121 individuals went on trial. Witness statements disclosed significant personal details on several Al Thani family members, which prompted the attorney general to limit public attendance. Hamad bin Jasim testified against the former ruler, after Judge Mas'ud al-'Amari requested a formal affirmation, ostensibly because the foreign minister had accused Khalifah bin Hamad of organizing the counter coup targeting his son. It was a good illustration of washing dirty laundry in public, but confirmed the ruler's desire, as never before, to rule with more transparency.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Thani**

On 16 October 2002, Arabicnews.com, an Internet site that offered consistently thorough coverage of domestic affairs in Arab states, cited rumors out of Egypt and the Gulf region that Qatari authorities had apprehended "scores" of high-ranking army officers four days earlier. The report claimed that US military personnel stationed on the promontory assisted in the crackdown, establishing roadblocks and, in plain clothes, participating in various arrests. An undetermined number of Pakistani and Yemeni soldiers serving in the Qatari army were arrested.<sup>94</sup> Reliable sources in Doha confirmed that these men were engaged in a fresh coup plot against Hamad bin Khalifah. Whatever motives



that alleged coup plotters may have harbored, this latest revelation highlighted the close and growing military alliance between Qatar and the United States. Qataris observed the sprouting bases at Al-‘Udayd and Al-Salmiyyah, near Doha, and questioned how their leaders justified the US presence. Of course, Doha defended the presence as a necessary balancer vis-à-vis Iran and Saudi Arabia, but no matter its geopolitical motives, the ruler was under strong internal pressure to distance Qatar from the nascent alliance. In the event, a news blackout shrouded the 2002 coup attempt, even if senior Al Thani leaders knew that the conspirators hailed from within the military and, perhaps, included members of the ruling family. For Hamad bin Khalifah, the implications were clear: first, supporters of the previous ruler were still scheming, and second, Doha’s deteriorating ties with Riyadh—chiefly because of the Qatari penchant for more liberal social reforms—probably prompted key Saudi officials to assist the deposed ruler and his putative allies. Still, and while no evidence surfaced to make the link, Hamad bin Khalifah faced a fresh conundrum. According to a close counselor of the young ruler, a decision was then made to seek a full and public reconciliation between father and son, to end these perpetual schisms.<sup>95</sup>

The opportunity for a public reunion between the ruler and his father occurred when the deposed emir flew back to Doha—with full honors granted at the airport by Al Thani family members—on 14 October 2004, to attend the funeral of his wife Shaykhah Mawzah bint ‘Ali bin Sa‘ud bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Thani. This was Khalifah bin Hamad’s first visit to Qatar since the 1995 palace coup, and a new title was quickly created, “Emir al-Ab” (the Emir-Father).<sup>96</sup> A befitting title for a “returnee” under the best of circumstances, but even better for an individual who was expected to remain in the country after funeral services, the designation stuck, and has followed the deposed ruler ever since. Beyond the courtesy of the moment, as Shaykhah Mawzah bint ‘Ali was not the mother of the sitting ruler, the public reconciliation ended what was truly an acrimonious situation. In fact, the two men met earlier in Europe to settle lingering financial disputes, with Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad agreeing to return the vast bulk of monetary instruments under his control. Nevertheless, the concern went beyond the settlement of a multibillion-dollar financial dispute, as it sought to remove all blemishes associated with the May 2001 appellate court death sentences of several Al Thani members. By publicly reconciling, the father finally abandoned his remaining claims to authority and, equally important, accepted his son as the legitimate ruler of Qatar. With this display of mutual forgiveness and support, both rulers permanently eliminated the threat of yet another coup from indigenous Qatari affairs.

Since then, Hamad bin Khalifah has sought to defuse internal family rivalries by adopting transparent liberalization efforts, which certainly stand out throughout the region. Several elections for municipality councils, in which women voted and stood as candidates, and the adoption of a written constitution,

were the most visible features. The ruler further decreed that future successions would be limited to the sons of the ruling emir (see Appendix 10), perhaps to end anticipated rivalries among various branches of the Al Thani. In fact, the decree meant that Hamad's brother, Shaykh 'Abdallah, the current prime minister, was no longer a contender to power, even if he retained immense political and financial influence. Hamad surprised many when he named his third son, Shaykh Jasim bin Hamad, as his heir when the latter was only eighteen. Jasim, the eldest son of Shaykhah Mawzah bint Nasir al-Misnad, was appointed over the ruler's two older sons and fulfilled his duties until a surprise resignation a few years later. As discussed in some detail below, on 5 August 2003, the emir called on his fourth son, Tamim, to fill the heirship position. With this latest change, Al Thani family members continued to hold absolute power in Qatar and, having demonstrated a rare knack for transparency, ensured longevity. In fact, it may be accurate to conclude that Al Thani rulers were burdened with genuine governance responsibilities, which necessitated internal harmony.

### ■ **Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Qatar**

Following a Ruling Family Council meeting on 5 August 2003, Hamad bin Khalifah informed the world that Jasim bin Hamad Al Thani had requested and received permission to step down from his post as heir apparent. Jasim, barely twenty-five when he tendered his resignation, is the ruler's third son (see Appendix 11 for the full letter). He further announced that Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani would replace his brother. Assembled family members and dignitaries, led by Khalid bin Hamad Al Thani, Prime Minister 'Abdallah bin Khalifah Al Thani, and Deputy Premier Muhammad bin Khalifah Al Thani, all pledged their allegiance to the new heir apparent.

In a letter to the ruler, Jasim stated the reasons behind his decision to step down, declaring that he had agreed to take over the responsibility of heir apparent in 1996 "in view of the most critical and sensitive circumstances that surfaced following the aborted attempt to destabilize and undermine security and stability in the country." He further declared that his father's intention to undergo surgery overseas played a role in his decision, reminding his interlocutor that he never sought the office even if he was willing and able to carry out his responsibilities and "serve [the] country." Shaykh Jasim expressed full confidence that Shaykh Tamim "would take over the entrusted task as Heir Apparent with competence and efficiency."

A visibly moved Hamad bin Khalifah thanked his son for efforts exerted while in office as heir apparent. Although snide remarks abounded on the televised performance that illustrated a government functioning on *Al-Jazeera's* model, the ruler declared that his son was chosen for the post in 1996 because

of distinguished leadership traits—competence, sincerity, goodness—and praised him for serving Qatar and its people. Hamad further revealed that repeated attempts to persuade the young man to reconsider were to naught, but that he would regretfully accept the decision because the outgoing heir was instrumental in grooming his successor (see Appendix 12 for the full text of Hamad's reply to his son). Even if the mystery surrounding the change remained, the Al Thani torch thus passed to Tamim bin Hamad, with Jasim relegated to a king-maker's role. Interestingly, and innovatively, Jasim went on state television to address Qataris and explain his decisions (see Appendix 13 for the text of the television address).

### **Tamim bin Hamad**

Tamim was born on 3 June 1980 in Doha and is the fourth son of the ruler and Shaykhah Mawzah bint Nasir Al Misnad. He received his early education at Sherborne (Dorset) in Britain, and graduated from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in 1998, after which he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Qatari army. For several years Tamim was president of the Qatari Olympic Committee, and in December 2006 chaired the Doha Asian Games. He was appointed heir apparent on 5 August 2003, and pledged to pursue his father's policies. Both men cultivated relations with the United States, which maintained several significant military facilities on the promontory. In 2002, Washington began transferring many military facilities from Saudi Arabia to Qatar, and Doha served as a critical command center for the 2003 US-led invasion of Iraq. Tamim is married to Shaykhah Jawharah bint Hamad Al Thani, daughter of Hamad bin Suhaym Al Thani, a former minister of state without portfolio. For all practical purposes, Tamim is the leading contender to power, as well as the primary leader of a nascent alliance concentrated around the ruler's sons.

### **Jasim bin Hamad**

The former heir apparent (1996–2003) was born on 25 August 1978, and is the eldest son of the ruler and Shaykhah Mawzah bint Nasir Al Misnad. Like his younger brother, Jasim also graduated from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Qatari army, in 1996. Appointed heir apparent in October 1996, he renounced his rights in favor of his younger brother, Tamim, on 5 August 2003. His resignation notwithstanding, Jasim retains a great deal of influence, and is his brother's main political supporter within the Al Thani family. At present, Jasim is chairman of the Higher Committee on Coordination and Pursuance, a post he first accepted in 1999. He is married to Shaykhah Buthaynah bint Ahmad Al Thani, daughter of Ahmad bin 'Ali Al Thani.

**'Abdallah bin Khalifah**

Born in 1959, 'Abdallah bin Khalifah bin Hamad bin 'Abdallah bin Jasim graduated from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in 1976, after which he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Qatari army. He was promoted to the rank of lieutenant colonel and deputy commander in chief of the Qatari armed forces in 1989, and chaired the Qatar Olympic Committee from 1979 to 1989. From 1989 to 2001 he was minister of interior, and from 1995 to 1996 served as deputy prime minister. From 1996 to 2007, 'Abdallah was prime minister. He is currently an adviser to the emir.

**Muhammad bin Khalifah**

Muhammad bin Khalifah bin Hamad bin 'Abdallah bin Jasim was born in 1965, and received his early education at the Tariq bin Ziyad and Al Yarmuk schools in Doha, before attending George Washington University in the United States. Muhammad was undersecretary of finance and petroleum from 1989 to 1992, minister of finance and trade from 1992 to 1998, and minister of economy from 1996 to 1998. Since 1998, he has been entrusted with the key post of deputy prime minister, and oversees day-to-day governmental activities.

**'Abdul 'Aziz bin Khalifah**

Born in 1948, 'Abdul 'Aziz earned a master's degree from Northern Indiana University in the United States. Upon his return to Qatar, in 1972, he became a deputy minister of finance and petroleum, and retained this post until 1992. He has been an active representative of Qatar within the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, and served as chairman of the organization from 1976 to 1977. In 1972, he was promoted to the presidency of the Qatar Monetary Agency, while also holding the chairmanship of the National Petroleum Company.

**Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir**

Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir Al Thani was born in 1959 and became acting minister of electricity and water in 1982. Over the years, he held various posts, including president of the Central Municipal Council, chairman of the Qatar Electricity and Water Company, and director of the Ruler's Special Projects Office. He was also a member of the Qatar General Petroleum company as well as the Higher Planning Council and director of the Office of the Minister for Municipal Affairs and Agriculture (1982–1989). In 1989, he became minister of municipal affairs and agriculture, a position he retained until 1992. Simultaneously, starting in 1990, Shaykh Hamad was minister of electricity and

water. Since 1992 he has also served as minister of foreign affairs, and in 1996 he joined the Supreme Defense Council as a full member. He has served on the Permanent Constitution Committee since 1999, and on both the Ruling Family Council and the Supreme Council for the Investment of Reserves, the latter of which looks after the country's long-term interests, since 2000. In 2003 he became first deputy prime minister, and in 2007, he was elevated to the premiership.

### **Mawzah bint Nasir Al Misnad**

Shaykhah Mawzah bint Nasir al-Misnad is the ruler's second spouse. She received a bachelor's degree in sociology from the Qatar Public University in 1986, and an honorary doctorate in humane letters from Virginia Commonwealth University in 2003. In 1995, she became chairwoman of the Qatar Foundation for Education, Science, and Community Development, which seeks to alter the social face of the shaykhdom. Mawzah is also president of the Supreme Council for Family Affairs, since 1998; vice chairwoman of the Supreme Education Council, since 2002; and a special envoy for basic and higher education for the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, since 2003.

### **Mayassah bint Hamad**

Mayassah bint Hamad is a daughter of the ruler and Shaykhah Mawzah. She was educated at the Qatar Academy in Doha, and earned a bachelor's degree in 2005 from Duke University in Durham, North Carolina. An active member of the ruling family, the young princess has joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is chairwoman of the Reach Out to Asia Appeal Fund, which was established after the devastating Pakistan earthquake in 2005. Mayassah is also head of the Council of Trustees of the Qatar Museums Authority. In December 2006, she was appointed an honorary patron of the International Telecommunications Union, which aims to bring basic communication to a billion disenfranchised people by 2015.<sup>97</sup> Mayassah married Jasim bin 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Thani in early 2007.

### **'Abdul Rahman bin Sa'ud**

Shaykh 'Abdul Rahman was born on 20 February 1963 and joined the Qatari foreign service in 1984. He served in Washington from 1984 to 1992, and then became ambassador to the United States from 1992 to 1997. In 1997, he became director of the Political Department of the Emiri Diwan, a policy position he retained for five years. From 2001 to 2003 he was undersecretary of the Emiri Protocol division, and from 2003 to 2005 he was private secretary

to the ruler. In 2005, he became chief of the Emiri Diwan and thus a key insider in Qatari political affairs. Shaykh ‘Abdul Rahman is married to a cousin, Shaykhah Tamadir Al Thani.

### **Potential Alliances Among the Al Thani**

Because past rivalries within the Al Thani ruling family culminated in a coup immediately after independence, the precedent of a schism existed, even if the current ruler may well have established new mechanisms to avoid future rebellions. In 1972, Shaykh Khalifah bin Hamad Al Thani deposed his cousin Ahmad bin ‘Ali, and while senior family members agreed to the change, several were concerned with the monarch’s methods—including his wresting of ministerial portfolios from collateral branches of the fractious Al Thanis and his refusal to delegate authority.

After the ruler was deposed by his son in a bloodless palace coup in 1995, the new monarch, Hamad bin Khalifah, embarked on his own unique democratization path. Hamad’s many reforms included appointing a woman to a ministerial post, holding regular municipal elections after 1999, and even establishing a national parliament following a favorable national referendum in 2003, as well as adopting a new constitution. Yet his most important innovation was the 1996 announcement that Shaykh Jasim would be his successor, further illustrating his conservative preferences. No Al Thani would relinquish power and full control over the country. Yet by appointing Jasim as heir apparent in 1996, Shaykh Hamad broke with the principle of primogeniture, although he confirmed descent through his offspring. In fact, a clean primogeniture mechanism should have seen the ruler’s eldest son, Mish‘al, then assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, designated heir apparent. Instead, the position was entrusted to Jasim “apparently because of his better education and perceived leadership qualities,” as the younger man had just graduated from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy.<sup>98</sup> Hamad further skipped over his second son, Muhammad, allegedly “because of his religious conservatism and lack of interest in government.”<sup>99</sup> As discussed above, fresh constitutional changes after 1995 essentially limited succession to the ruler’s chosen son and, importantly, specifically provided for the removal of an heir apparent if he failed to perform to the monarch’s satisfaction. These decisions raised specific questions for the future of succession in Qatar, including the formation of alliances within the family and, equally important, of the potential roles of Shaykh Hamad’s sons.

If the eldest son of a ruler is not necessarily chosen to succeed his father, does this mean that succession by primogeniture in Qatari politics is no longer an automatic process? In other words, while a ruler can opt to appoint anyone among his offspring to succeed him, what guarantees will the institutional mechanism provide to ensure that those passed over accept such a decision

without fracas? Because of specific clauses, will the next succession be in fact constitutional, especially if any other member of the family were to contest the choice? According to Article 8 of the 2005 constitution, “rule shall be inherited by the son named as Heir Apparent by the Amir,” which may be open to interpretation and which may lead to internal schisms if any other member of the ruling family were to contest it (see Appendix 10 for relevant sections of the constitution). How will this specific call eliminate a possible struggle for power between competing sons of a ruler? Where does it place the sons of the former ruler, Khalifah bin Hamad, or any other Al Thani aspiring for power? Indeed, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Khalifah, the former monarch’s second son, was summarily dismissed from the 1992 cabinet reshuffle under then–prime minister Hamad bin Khalifah. At the time, a dejected ‘Abdul ‘Aziz took up residence abroad, but returned to Doha a few years later. The experienced ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, who served as finance minister after 1972, may not have helped his cause by pursuing nongovernmental activities, but age and maturity certainly tamed his youthful passions. Moreover, the “father” irked Hamad in 1995 when Khalifah bin Hamad insisted that ‘Abdul ‘Aziz return home and assume a position of responsibility. Irrespective of what actually occurred between siblings and their father, suffice it to say that Hamad and ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Khalifah were rivals then, and remain so still.

On the other hand, an alliance exists between Hamad and his younger brother ‘Abdallah (Khalifah bin Hamad’s third son), who was appointed prime minister by his brother in 1995. Critically, ‘Abdallah retained his interior minister portfolio, to better control domestic activities in Doha, which essentially means looking after Al Thani interests. Khalifah bin Hamad’s fourth son, Muhammad, who was minister of finance at the time of the 1995 coup, initially appeared to join his father in exile, but soon returned to Doha to take up a position as deputy prime minister before he was asked to retire.<sup>100</sup>

It is also important to consider one of the key impacts of the 1996 countercoup after Doha decided to place those accused of involvement on trial. In 2000, and after lengthy trials that witnessed the washing of much Al Thani dirty linen in public, thirty-three defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment. Doha then concluded that the “coup” had involved an attempt to capture a tank at a border post by badu retainers of the former ruler, backed by former minister of economy and trade (and chief of police) Hamad bin Jasim bin Hamad. The trial illustrated that some Al Thani family members were willing and ready to take up arms against a ruler, and while this threat was dealt with swiftly and efficiently, the possibility existed that others might not necessarily agree with the current leadership. The case indicated the presence of several factions, grouped around at least three alliances: the ruler and his sons, supported by several of his half-brothers and distant cousins; dejected offspring of the former ruler; and other Al Thani officials aspiring for leadership. Importantly, the 2005 constitution, anticipating putative dilemmas associated with

hereditary rule, proposed to issue new “provisions of the rule of the State and accession,” although those provisions have yet to be made public as of late 2007.

## ■ Notes

1. Ahmad Mustafa Abu Hakima, *History of Eastern Arabia, 1750–1800: The Rise and Development of Bahrain and Kuwait*, Beirut: Khayat, 1965. See also Muhammad Sharif al-Shaybani, *Imarat Qatar al-‘Arabiyyah bayn al-Madi wal-Hadir* [Qatar: An Arab Emirate Between Past and Present], Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafah, 1962; Mahmud Bahjat Sinan, *Tarikh Qatar al-‘Am* [A General History of Qatar], Baghdad: Maktabat al-Ma‘arif, 1966; and Ahmad Zakariyyah al-Shalaq, *Fusul min Tarikh Qatar al-Siyasi* [Episodes from Qatari Political History], Doha: Matabi‘ al-Dawhah al-Hadithah al-Mahdudah, 1999, pp. 1–60.

2. Zahiyyah Kaddurah, *Shibh al-Jazirah al-‘Arabiyyah: Kiyanutuhah al-Siyasiyyah* [The Political Origins of the Arabian Peninsula], Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-‘Arabiyyah, n.d., pp. 368–369.

3. Anie Montigny-Kozłowska, “Histoire et Changements Sociaux au Qatar,” in Paul Bonnenfant, ed., *La Péninsule Arabique d’Aujourd’hui*, vol. 2, Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1982, pp. 475–522, esp. pp. 477–478.

4. For a masterful analysis, see Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, London: Croom Helm, 1979, p. 30.

5. *The Buraimi Memorials 1955: The Territorial Dispute Concerning Buraimi, Liwa, and Khor al-‘Udayd—The Memorials Submitted to Arbitration by the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom*, vol. 1, London: Archive Editions, 1987, pp. 127–130.

6. Jean-Louis Joulié, *A Connaître le Qatar*, Paris: Édifra, Édition Française pour le Monde Arabe, 1994, pp. 57–60.

7. Ahmad Mustafa Abu-Hakima, *The Modern History of Kuwait, 1750–1965*, London: Luzac, 1983, pp. 60–61.

8. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 33.

9. Frederick F. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1997, pp. 29–33.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 69–74.

11. Briton C. Busch, *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894–1914*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967, p. 57.

12. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf*, pp. 34–69.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 85–90.

14. Sinan, *Tarikh Qatar al-‘Am*, pp. 93–95.

15. Anscombe, *The Ottoman Gulf*, pp. 162–166.

16. According to Article 11 of the convention, “the Imperial Ottoman Government having renounced all its claims concerning the peninsula of Qatar, it is understood between the two Governments that the said peninsula will be, as in the past, governed by Shaykh Jasim Ibn [Muhammad Ibn] Thani and by his successors. His Britannic Majesty’s Government declares that it will not permit the Shaykh of Bahrain to inter-



ferre in the internal affairs of Qatar, to infringe the autonomy of that country, or to annex it." See John C. Wilkinson, *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert*, London: Tauris, 1991, pp. 62–63.

17. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 55.

18. Mustafa Murad al-Dabbagh, *Qatar: Madihah wa Hadaruhah* [Qatar: Past and Present], Beirut: n.p., 1961, p. 187.

19. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, pp. 59–61 (the 1916 treaty is reproduced on pp. 144–147). See also Wilkinson, *Arabia's Frontiers*, pp. 131–133, 205–206.

20. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 146.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

22. Albaharna, *The Arabian Gulf States*, pp. 38–39.

23. Yousof Ibrahim al-Abdulla, *A Study of Qatari-British Relations, 1914–1945*, Doha: Orient Publishing and Translation, 1981, pp. 32–47.

24. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 64.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 65. See also al-Abdulla, *A Study of Qatari-British Relations*, pp. 36–40.

26. Wilkinson, *Arabia's Frontiers*, pp. 172–173.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 173.

28. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 74.

29. Joulié, *A Connaissance le Qatar*, pp. 90–91.

30. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 76. See also al-Abdulla, *A Study of Qatari-British Relations*, pp. 74–77.

31. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 95.

32. *Ibid.*

33. al-Shalaq, *Fusul min Tarikh Qatar al-Siyasi*, pp. 109–111.

34. Joulié, *A Connaissance le Qatar*, p. 105.

35. According to one report, he had a million-dollar mansion built in Lebanon. On a whim, he once offered King 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman Al Sa'ud sixteen luxury cars, equipped with gold-plated door handles. See Joulié, *A Connaissance le Qatar*, p. 106. See also Kaddurah, *Shibh al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah*, pp. 392–393.

36. al-Shalaq, *Fusul min Tarikh Qatar al-Siyasi*, p. 110.

37. Rouhollah K. Ramazani, *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972, pp. 45–56.

38. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 102.

39. al-Shalaq, *Fusul min Tarikh Qatar al-Siyasi*, pp. 111–116.

40. Montigny-Kozłowska, "Histoire et Changements Sociaux au Qatar," pp. 494–495. See also Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 112.

41. Joulié, *A Connaissance le Qatar*, p. 109.

42. Ali Khalifah Kuwari, "Oil Revenues in the Gulf Emirates," in Howard Bowen-Jones, ed., *Patterns of Allocation and Impact on Economic Development*, Epping, UK: Bowker, 1978.

43. Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1970, pp. 256–267. See also John Duke Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*, Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975, pp. 219–226.

44. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman*, London: Unwin Hyman, 1989, pp. 19–31.

45. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 105.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
47. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States*, London: Macmillan, 1978, pp. 190–198.
48. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 105.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 107.
50. Herbert J. Liebesny, "Qatar," in A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, July 1973. See pp. 12–15 for the "Explanatory Memorandum Regarding Some of the Articles of the Provisional Constitution of Qatar."
51. Article 1 of the provisional constitution declared that Qatar was an independent sovereign Arab state, even though the emirate would not declare its independence from Britain until 1 September 1971, and that "its religion is Islam and Islamic religious law shall be the fundamental source of its legislation." See Liebesny, "Qatar," p. 2.
52. Liebesny, "Qatar," p. 4.
53. *Ibid.*, p. 23.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 8. See also Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 109.
55. Liebesny, "Qatar," p. 4.
56. "Explanatory Memorandum Regarding Some of the Articles of the Provisional Constitution of Qatar," in Liebesny, "Qatar," p. 13. See also Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 109.
57. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 109.
58. Liebesny, "Qatar," pp. 5, 11.
59. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 110.
60. Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*, p. 103.
61. Joulidé, *A Connaître le Qatar*, pp. 121–122.
62. Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, p. 112.
63. The amended provisional constitution of 19 April 1972 was published in the official government journal, *Al-Jaridah al-Rasmiyyah* no. 5, 22 April 1972, as cited in Husain al-Baharna, *The Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal and Political Status and Their International Problems*, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1978, p. xl.
64. Joulidé, *A Connaître le Qatar*, p. 122.
65. Liebesny, "Qatar," p. 2.
66. Montigny-Kozłowska, "Histoire et Changements Sociaux au Qatar," pp. 475–522.
67. The council's twelfth ordinary annual meeting, for example, opened on 17 December 1983 and was allegedly concerned with foreign policy (the Iran-Iraq War, Palestine, etc.), as well as economic questions. However, there were no debates on these presumably important subjects. For the text of his opening address, see "Khali-fah bin Hamad Al Thani Address to the Council," *Al-Jazirah* (Riyadh) no. 4098, 18 December 1983, p. 26.
68. Colin Legum, ed., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 1, 1976–1977, New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978, pp. 354–355.
69. *Ibid.*, vol. 4, 1979–1980, 1981, p. 423.
70. *Ibid.*, vol. 6, 1981–1982, 1984, p. 519.
71. *Ibid.*, vol. 7, 1982–1983, 1985, p. 496. See also Said Zahlan, *The Creation of Qatar*, pp. 134–141.

72. Legum, *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 8, 1983–1984, 1986, p. 417.
73. Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, eds., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 9, 1984–1985, Boulder: Westview, 1987, p. 416.
74. Ibid., vol. 10, 1986, 1987, p. 317.
75. Ami Ayalon and Haim Shaked, eds., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 12, 1988, Boulder: Westview, 1989, p. 459.
76. The congressman, Tom Lantos (D-Calif.), questioned Peter Burleigh, then–deputy assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern and South Asian affairs, on the Qatari response to Washington’s request to return the “illegally” acquired missiles. See House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 2nd sess., *Proposed Arms Sales to Kuwait*, hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, and Europe and the Middle East, Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 7 July 1988, p. 38.
77. Confidential interview with a senior adviser to Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah, Doha, 28 January 2006.
78. Ayalon and Shaked, *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 13, 1989, 1990, pp. 567–568.
79. Confidential interview with a senior adviser to Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah, Doha, 28 January 2006.
80. Quoted in Ayalon and Shaked, *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 14, 1990, 1991, p. 584.
81. Ibid.
82. The December 1991 petition was reproduced in “Qatar Cracks Down on Democracy Advocates,” *Arabia Monitor* 1, no. 4, May–June 1992, p. 3.
83. Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 116.
84. Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States*, p. 104.
85. Michael R. Gordon and Eric Schmitt, “U.S. Will Move Air Operations to Qatar Base,” *New York Times*, 28 April 2003, p. A1.
86. State of Qatar, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Constitution,” <http://english.mofa.gov.qa/details.cfm?id=80>.
87. The proposition that Qatar should pursue education excellence is not a recent phenomenon. See Carla Power, “Qatar: Hillary Clinton Stand Back,” *Newsweek*, 10 November 2003, pp. 30–31.
88. Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah married his third wife in 1989. He was betrothed to Shaykhah Nurah bint Khalid Al Thani, daughter of Khalid bin Hamad Al Thani, a former minister of interior. The ruler’s three wives have given him eleven sons and six daughters: Misha’al and Fahad, sons of Mariam; Jasim, Tamim, Jawa’an, Muhammad, Khalifah, and Mayassah, Hussah, and Hind, sons and daughters of Mawzah; as well as Khalid, ‘Abdallah, Thani, and Qa’aqah, Lulwa’ah, Mariam, and ‘Anud, sons and daughters of Nurah.
89. Herb, *All in the Family*, p. 118.
90. Uzi Rabi, “Qatar,” in Ayalon and Shaked, *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 13, 1989, 1990, pp. 567–571; and Uzi Rabi, “Qatar,” in Ayalon and Shaked, *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 16, 1992, 1993, pp. 658–667.

91. "The Emir's Father Vows to Return," *Qatar Country Report* no. 1-1996, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1996, p. 24.
92. "A Coup Attempt Is Foiled," *Qatar Country Report* no. 1-1996, p. 23.
93. Liebesny, "Qatar," p. 4. See also Herb, *All in the Family*, p. 126.
94. Although actual numbers are unknown, foreign nationals are estimated to make up over half of the Qatari military, which is not particularly surprising in the region. Several other countries rely on outside help due to the paucity of indigenous manpower, tribal customs, and overall trust concerns.
95. Interview with Shaykh 'Abdul Rahman bin Sa'ud Al Thani, private secretary to the ruler, Doha, 31 January 2006.
96. "Deposed Emir Returns to Qatar for Wife's Funeral," *Daily Star* (Beirut), 15 October 2004, p. 1.
97. "Sheikha Mayassa Appointed Honorary Patron of ITU," *Gulf Times*, 11 December 2006, p. 2.
98. J. E. Peterson, "The Nature of Succession in the Gulf," *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 591 n. 21.
99. Ibid.
100. 'Abdallah and Muhammad bin Khalifah are full-brothers whose mother also raised Hamad bin Khalifah after the death of the latter's mother.

# 7

---

## Saudi Arabia

**M**odern Saudi Arabia is largely the creation of the ruling Al Sa‘ud family.<sup>1</sup> While ruling family politics in the kingdom share many characteristics with other hereditary monarchies, it is unique in a number of aspects. The family’s sheer size and complexity, in terms of both its internal structure and composition and its connections to Saudi society, make the Saudi political system markedly different from other past and present monarchies.<sup>2</sup> In addition, family politics have developed in the context of vast wealth and profound transformations that have altered the face of Saudi Arabia, perhaps permanently. Thus the analysis here emphasizes the interplay between politics and policy on the one hand, and the balance between cohesive and disintegrative forces within the family on the other. These implications for Saudi behavior have a direct bearing on Saudi power and succession.

### ■ Creation and Cohesion

Indeed, to assess the legacy of King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman—certainly the leading Al Sa‘ud figure in the twentieth century, who branded the country into his image—and to better understand the many changes that have occurred within the ruling family, a careful look at King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz is necessary. ‘Abdul ‘Aziz’s progeny institutionalized the kingdom’s political features, ranging from governance to succession, and despite serious challenges managed to preserve the dynasty’s authority. Five of his sons succeeded him to power. In less than a century, these successors further legitimized the founder’s—as well as their own—power bases, adding value to both crown and country, against some odds. Even if ‘Abdul ‘Aziz’s successors were relatively ensured of their positions, all had to distinguish themselves and come to terms with the many limitations that the complex Al Sa‘ud entity represented.

## The Ruling Family

Long before ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman reconquered Riyadh and unified central Arabia, the pattern of succession and intrafamily politics determined, to a large extent, his preferences and behavior. The problems inherent in the Saudi pattern of succession and maintenance were evident to the future monarch as he contemplated the history of the first (1744–1818) and second (1822–1891) Saudi kingdoms.<sup>3</sup> ‘Abdul ‘Aziz realized that different branches of the family struggled to fill vacuums in the line of succession when foreign powers interfered and disrupted the relative tranquillity within the peninsula.<sup>4</sup> Even without external influences, the balance of power among rivals for the throne frequently broke into open warfare, because self-preservation required family leaders to protect and provide for their members. Out of a total of fourteen successions between 1744 and 1891, only three were uncontested. The eleven contested successions included assassination, civil war, and in a few cases, bloodless revolution (see Appendix 14 for a list of Al Sa‘ud rulers).

Beginning from exile in Kuwait in 1902, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz captured Riyadh and expelled the Al Rashid. Over the next three decades, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz defeated a host of enemies—including the Ottoman Turks, rival Arabian families, rebellious tribes, and even rival princes from the Al Sa‘ud family—to establish the present Saudi Arabian kingdom in 1932. What ‘Abdul ‘Aziz concluded was that constant challenges to the dominant branch within the family substantially weakened the ruler, and that rivalries from collateral branches, although limited, were equally harmful. There were too many claimants to power to sustain. Moreover, the founder of the third state realized that lineal challenges were detrimental to the survival of the family, and partly to address this problem he reinforced an existing mechanism to support his own heir apparent: the oath of loyalty (*bay‘ah*). Faithful to the 1744 alliance between the Al Sa‘ud and Al Shaykh, the *bay‘ah* was bestowed to his designated heir by the Ahl al-‘Aqd wal-Hall (“those who bind and loosen,” composed of senior family members and religious notables), who ensured a modicum of stability. Much like the first Saudi state, which had been achieved through a combination of religious fervor and tribal ethos, Arabia would be reconquered by ‘Abdul ‘Aziz using the same methods. The alliance with the *‘ulamah*, neglected when expediency gave way to principles, was restored in full. Only by adhering to such values, reasoned ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, could the Al Sa‘ud transcend intertribal feuding. Although personal authority and demonstrated prowess were helpful, internal unity was absolutely necessary to successfully challenge outside foes. Finally, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz also noted that both states that had preceded his own failed to create basic institutions that assumed the burden of governance and, in a real sense, fashioned a buffer between the population and the leadership on one level, and among leaders on another. He set out to address all of these concerns systematically,

even before 1932, to ensure that his own successors did not engage in fraternal struggles.

Ruling family politics under the founder's five successors shaped contemporary Saudi Affairs. Each ruler marked his reign with significant sociopolitical and economic steps that ensured long-term family harmony, even if undeniable internal squabbles threatened it.

***King Sa'ud (r. 1953–1964).*** Sa'ud's rule was marked by a sharp division of power between the king and the heir apparent that escalated into a bitter feud over political and policy differences.<sup>5</sup> In the prolonged struggle that ensued, the balance between Sa'ud and Faysal shifted back and forth several times, as the ruling family split along innovative alignments. The contest was finally resolved in Faysal's favor, nearly at the point of bloodshed, and Saudi domestic and foreign policy suffered from confusion and reversals because the ruling family was not united.

Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz succeeded his father in 1953 during a smooth transfer of power. Prince Faysal became heir apparent, and during the following few years the founder's eldest sons shared both power and responsibility. With some exceptions, Sa'ud strengthened his power base within the family, while Faysal concentrated his efforts in the Council of Ministers. Although the nascent monarchy was fully engaged in state-building efforts, the pattern of appointments indicated internal schisms. For example, Faysal's supporters included his son, 'Abdallah (minister of interior), and his half-brothers, Fahd (education) and Sultan (communications), while Sa'ud installed his sons as commander of both the National and Royal Guards, chief of the Emiri Diwan, minister of defense, and governor of Riyadh. Whatever arrangements existed broke down under the strain of two developments. Internally, the kingdom's finances deteriorated amid charges of corruption and extravagance.<sup>6</sup> Externally, the rise of Gamal 'Abdul Nasir in Egypt—on a wave of Arab socialist ideology—confronted the conservative Saudi establishment with an unprecedented foreign threat.<sup>7</sup> In early 1958, the monarch's capricious fiscal policies, coupled with his impulsive foreign adventures, resulted in a head-on family collision.<sup>8</sup>

Senior members of the ruling family were both concerned and embarrassed at Sa'ud's tendency to appoint his inexperienced young sons to major governmental positions, rather than older and more seasoned uncles and nephews. Many feared that such appointments signaled that Sa'ud was planning to transfer succession to his offspring. Such concerns, coupled with their observations of Sa'ud's lavish spending habits, increased overall dissatisfaction, to the point that senior family members urged Sa'ud to relinquish power to Faysal. On 24 March 1958, and under much duress, Sa'ud issued a royal decree transferring executive powers to Faysal. The heir apparent turned the distressing financial

situation around, although reductions in family expenditures infuriated Sa‘ud. Gradually, the monarch usurped Faysal’s privileges, which limited Prime Minister Faysal’s authority. An equally devastating decision was the king’s opposition to his heir apparent’s regular appointments within the Council of Ministers, especially after Faysal gained personal control over the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior, Commerce, and Finance.<sup>9</sup>

The very success of Faysal’s efforts—to meet the financial and foreign policy crises facing Saudi Arabia—created opportunities for Sa‘ud to reclaim full power. For example, because strict financial restrictions were necessary to restore Saudi fiscal standing, Sa‘ud relied on tribal and commercial circles (the two groups who paid dearly), promising fundamental changes. It was typical that most would support him against Faysal. The heir apparent’s concentration of power also created a faction of disgruntled younger princes who advocated constitutional reforms. Sa‘ud endorsed the “free princes,” not because he believed in their advocacy, but because they posed as natural allies against the power and authority of his brother. By late 1960, Sa‘ud had engineered a complete reversal in concert with the free princes, as Faysal and his supporters were swept from the Council of Ministers. The monarch appointed himself prime minister and replaced several cabinet officials with several of his sons. Key supporters, including Princes Talal, ‘Abdul Muhsin, and Fawwaz bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, were brought in as well.<sup>10</sup> Faysal and his Council of Ministers tendered their resignations.

Family politics then entered an extraordinarily complex period, with three sets of main competitors: King Sa‘ud and his sons (the “little kings”), the free princes, and Heir Apparent Faysal and his supporters. Yet because Sa‘ud was conservative at heart, tensions quickly developed between him and Prince Talal, especially over the latter’s calls for constitutional reforms.<sup>11</sup> The growing influence of Sa‘ud’s sons, as well as the division of power between members of the family and the Council of Ministers, amplified the overall anxiety. Sensing an opportunity to further weaken Prince Faysal, Sa‘ud played Talal against the heir apparent. In September 1961, he managed to remove the most troublesome of the free princes, including Talal, yet denied Faysal and his supporters any positions in government. By fragmenting the free princes and frustrating Faysal, Sa‘ud was strengthening the power of his sons—especially Minister of Defense Muhammad, who was being discussed as a possible successor.

At the height of his power, however, Sa‘ud’s health deteriorated, and in December 1961 the monarch flew to the United States for medical care. This marked the beginning of Faysal’s return to power.<sup>12</sup> About the same time, civil war broke out in Yemen, and Egyptian forces arrived to support revolutionary elements there against Saudi-supported royalists. Steeped in international politics, Faysal perceived the inherent advantages of the Egyptian intervention to secure and strengthen his authority. With Sa‘ud indecisive, Faysal seized the



crisis to assume full executive powers and, in a foresightful move, appointed a new ministerial council composed of loyal princes. These included confirmed allies such as Fahd (interior) and Sultan (defense), but also a key new ally, Prince Khalid, as deputy prime minister. Given Khalid's ties to the critical Jiluwi tribe, his alliance with Faysal severely undercut Sa'ud's traditional power base. In 1963, Faysal appointed 'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz as commander of the National Guard (in place of Sa'ud's son Sa'ad), and Salman bin 'Abdul 'Aziz as governor of Riyadh (in place of Sa'ud's son Badr).<sup>13</sup>

Armed with emergency powers, Faysal fortified his position by implementing a number of foreign and domestic policies (including a ten-point reform program) to meet the Yemen crisis.<sup>14</sup> Sa'ud, however, made one last effort to recover his powers. In January 1964, the monarch met with Egyptian president Nasir to discuss the Yemen situation, and arranged for the return of the free princes to Saudi Arabia to prepare yet another comeback. By doing so, however, he brought the ideological struggle that had boiled within family circles for almost half a decade to a head, when he ordered that all his executive powers be restored. To achieve this aim, Sa'ud appealed to the *'ulamah* for a decision on 13 March 1964. In response, and at the end of his patience, Faysal mounted a palace coup by inviting the leading religious figures and princes to convene in Riyadh and consider a formal settlement of the persistent feud.<sup>15</sup>

Faysal's victory was sealed by a series of proclamations from the *'ulamah* and the Council of Ministers following the 25 March meeting at Prince Muhammad bin 'Abdul 'Aziz's palace. On 26 March, a delegation composed of religious leaders—including Muhammad bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh, 'Abdul Malik bin Ibrahim Al Shaykh, 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Baz, and Muhammad bin Harakan—confronted King Sa'ud at his Nasiriyyah palace. Four specific demands were made: (1) attach the Royal Guard to the armed forces, (2) attach the monarch's personal guard (the Khuwiyyah) to the Ministry of Interior, (3) abolish the Royal Diwan, and (4) reduce royal expenses "to reasonable amounts and investment of saved funds in development projects."<sup>16</sup> Sa'ud rejected these demands and immediately mobilized the Royal Guard around the palace. What followed was a classic coup d'état, because Defense Minister Sultan and National Guard commander 'Abdallah had surrounded both the palace as well as the Royal Guard with their respective forces. Sa'ud was perhaps expecting support from his traditional tribal allies, but none was forthcoming. Faysal struck first, as the Royal Guard pledged its allegiance to the heir apparent. Sa'ud still refused to abdicate. On 2 November 1964, the Council of Ministers, under Deputy Prime Minister Khalid bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, "asked the Kingdom's *'Ulamah* to examine the 28 October 1964 letter from the ruling family—deposing King Sa'ud and proclaiming Faysal monarch—from a canonical point of view, and to issue a suitable fatwa [religious decree]."<sup>17</sup> An edict confirming the latter was issued on the same day, and made

public—along with the Council of Ministers' decision as well as King Faysal's first royal decree—on 2 November 1964. Faysal immediately became king, and Sa'ud, along with some of his sons, went into exile.

**King Faysal (r. 1964–1975).** Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz was not destined to succeed his father or to play a pivotal role in the kingdom's history.<sup>18</sup> His unique political capabilities, however, and early exposure to international affairs, eventually led the Al Sa'ud to entrust him with the throne. The future king was tutored in Islamic law by his maternal grandfather, a descendant of Shaykh Muhammad bin 'Abdul Wahhab. At thirteen, 'Abdul 'Aziz chose Faysal to represent him in London, to discuss the border dispute between Najd and Hijaz, which was then ruled by the Hashimites. Accompanied by Ahmad Al Thunayan, who spoke French and Turkish, Faysal and his entourage arrived in London wearing traditional Arabian dress. While the assemblage caught considerable public attention, and though the border negotiations could not be resolved, Faysal and Al Thunayan met Lord Curzon and other high-ranking British officials to discuss future ties.<sup>19</sup>

At sixteen, Faysal led a military expedition into 'Asir province, which was then in contention between Najd and Hijaz. The territory was conquered and incorporated into the growing Al Sa'ud realm in 1930. This victory—as Faysal displayed genuine military skills—led the ruler to name his second son viceroy of the Hijaz and the kingdom's first minister of foreign affairs, a post he held until his assassination in 1975. Throughout the years, Faysal proved to be an astute diplomat, as his numerous travels throughout the world allowed him to champion Arab causes.<sup>20</sup> When 'Abdul 'Aziz died in 1953, his eldest son, Sa'ud, was chosen as his successor. Faysal was named heir apparent but quickly assumed the prime ministership to restore financial order. On 22 March 1958, a royal decree was issued giving Faysal full powers to govern the kingdom, with Sa'ud virtually renouncing his cherished prerogatives as sovereign.

Nevertheless, as austerity programs created a malaise within the upper classes of Saudi society, Faysal was sharply criticized and forced to resign in 1960. The king reassumed his full authority to rule and govern. As discussed above, a series of internal disputes led to a formal declaration announcing that Sa'ud was unfit to rule. Faysal became king of Saudi Arabia on 2 November 1964, and quickly introduced social reforms and restructured the economic basis of the country.<sup>21</sup> Gradually, the new monarch adopted a more nationalistic approach, particularly after the October 1973 war, although in his pro-US attitude he did not waver. The decision to impose an oil embargo on Washington and Amsterdam, more than any other decisions he made during his long career, led a number of world dignitaries to reconsider ties with Saudi Arabia. The king displayed immense moderation in world affairs and opposed radicalism, even if he remained steadfast on core beliefs. His successors faced far

greater challenges, especially from modernizing domestic sources, but Faysal anchored the kingdom as a legitimate and stable power.

**King Khalid (r. 1975–1982).** Khalid bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz was proclaimed king of Saudi Arabia on 25 March 1975. He immediately appointed his younger brother, Fahd, as heir apparent, and ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, commander of the National Guard, as second deputy prime minister.

While relations between the kingdom and the world in general improved considerably during the late 1970s, internal matters threatened the stability that was so painstakingly established throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The 1979 occupation of Makkah’s Holy Mosque froze the government for several weeks as the Al Sa‘ud fathomed a response.<sup>22</sup> Coming on the heels of the Iranian Revolution, the shock of a homegrown opposition force that challenged Al Sa‘ud core legitimacy led to a reexamination of tolerated frivolities and extravagant habits. Abrupt changes were introduced that purported to end corruption and enhance accountability. With King Khalid suffering from poor health, Heir Apparent Fahd bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz assumed a larger role, and succeeded his half-brother when the former died in 1982. ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz was designated heir apparent, maintaining the family balance within the ruling establishment.

## ■ Constitutional Continuum in Saudi Arabia

Although the first Saudi monarchs weathered various crises, the gravest challenges that confronted the Al Sa‘ud pertained to constitutional markers, because the founder considered the Holy Scriptures as a valid “constitution.” As later developments illustrated, the ruling family anchored its legitimacy on various permutations of this dictum especially as it motivated and protected contenders to power.

Having successfully extended his rule throughout most of Arabia, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman Al Sa‘ud took the title “King of the Hijaz” and announced, on 31 August 1926, the adoption of a constitution. The latter stipulated that the kingdom was a monarchical constitutional Islamic state whose capital would be Makkah.<sup>23</sup> This document placed no limits on the monarch’s authority, except to confine his rule to compatibility with *shari‘ah*. In addition, the 1926 constitution introduced the concept of succession in calling for the appointment of an heir apparent who would assist the ruler, and who would seek the cooperation of as many administrators as necessary to direct the affairs of the kingdom. Finally, this first modern constitution called for the establishment of a consultative council, which would meet once a week and debate pertinent questions on the agenda prepared by the heir.<sup>24</sup> This was the first

attempt to institutionalize consultation in contemporary Saudi Arabia, even though the practice was widespread among Arabia's tribal communities. Though this constitution was never fully implemented, it served as a basis for future permutations.

On 18 September 1932, the name of the country was changed to "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," and while a new heir apparent was named as successor, the country was essentially ruled by decree until 1953, as the Council of Ministers executed the ruler's domestic and foreign policies. Originally, there were two ministries: Finance and Foreign Affairs. In 1944, the Ministry of Defense was duly established. With additional revenues generated through the sale of petroleum, Saudi Arabia earned US\$160 million in 1953, leading 'Abdul 'Aziz to expand various government functions.<sup>25</sup>

### **The Council of Ministers**

Approximately one month prior to his death, 'Abdul 'Aziz promulgated a decree establishing a new ministerial council, as Heir Apparent Sa'ud was named prime minister. Still, the council did not convene its first session until 7 March 1954 in Riyadh, after the founder had died. One of the new ruler's first decrees, issued on 26 March 1954, defined the statutes of the council, which was expected to supervise the implementation of domestic and foreign policy, approve budgets, authorize the foreign minister to sign treaties and international agreements, and grant oil concessions as necessary. Significantly, the monarch, who was also the prime minister, presided over council meetings, even if he could not vote. This was a technical matter of little importance, since all council decisions were subject to the ruler's approval.<sup>26</sup> The 26 March decree further provided for the establishment of a secretariat-general, an audit office, a grievances post, and a group of technical experts attached to the council.<sup>27</sup> These new positions formed the cabinet of the Council of Ministers, and were part of Prince Faysal's effort to delegate administrative powers to qualified individuals. Parenthetically, King Sa'ud, in his capacity as prime minister, presided over only the first council meeting. Faysal chaired all succeeding meetings after he became prime minister.

With respect to internal reforms, and largely at the insistence of senior family members, Sa'ud issued another critical decree on 23 March 1958, to give Faysal full authority over foreign affairs, internal policy, and finance. When this authorization was deemed insufficient to resolve the political crisis that mired the Al Sa'ud, Sa'ud promulgated yet another decree, on 11 May 1958, to expand the prerogatives of the Council of Ministers. That initiative transformed the council "from a purely advisory [institution] into a formal policy-making body with both executive and legislative powers under Faysal."<sup>28</sup> Although the king retained a veto power, the council was in effect given legislative and executive privileges, which established the framework for future constitutional

changes. While the 11 May 1958 decree was not a formal constitution, its fifty paragraphs could indeed be classified as constitutional articles.<sup>29</sup>

According to the decree, each cabinet officer would be responsible to the prime minister, who would in turn be responsible to the king (Article 8). The Council of Ministers would “draw up the policy of the State [in] internal and external, financial and economic, educational and defense, and in all public affairs” and “supervise its execution” (Article 18). In addition, all government commitments regarding public spending would have to conform to the provisions of the budget authorized by the cabinet (Article 34), and no extra spending would be permitted without the council’s authorization (Article 36). All government requests would be submitted to the ruler for approval, who would have thirty days to approve or reject them. Only after following this procedure could the prime minister act independently and inform the cabinet of his decisions (Article 23).

Many differences separated Sa‘ud and Faysal, and political developments related to the appropriation of authority within the Council of Ministers enlarged the gap that existed between the two brothers. Poor management of the kingdom’s limited resources threatened the country with bankruptcy, which compelled senior princes to trust the administration of the state to the more capable Faysal, who in turn instituted strict spending limits. Faysal introduced severe austerity measures that were unpopular among Sa‘ud’s supporters. The latter pressured the monarch to force his brother’s resignation on 19 December 1960. Two days later, Sa‘ud formed his own cabinet comprising six “liberal” princes, including Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz and ‘Abdallah Tariqi, the latter of whom was director-general of the Department of Petroleum and Mineral Resources.<sup>30</sup>

Influenced by Egyptian president Nasir’s calls for a pan-Arab movement, the new team in Riyadh began working on a constitutional project that pretended to create a national assembly for Saudi Arabia. The zeal of liberal princes was not new, and in fact may have started in 1958 with the transfer of all executive powers to Faysal. At the time, Tariqi claimed exultantly: “we in Saudi Arabia have just taken a step forward to a constitution. Eventually this country will become a constitutional monarchy.”<sup>31</sup> The young technocrat, who proved himself a staunch nationalist during negotiations with oil companies and other founding members of the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries, ignited the flame of political participation. Yet it was Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz who provided detailed constitutional proposals that led Sa‘ud to break his ties with “progressive” ministers and entrust, once again, the premiership and Foreign Ministry to Faysal, on 15 March 1962.

Relations between the two brothers worsened over the Yemen conflict. Sa‘ud favored a military intervention on behalf of Imam Badr, but Faysal considered the Saudi army too weak to confront the Egyptian military. Within his own camp, Faysal was criticized for not showing firmness toward Washington,

which had adopted an ambiguous attitude toward Nasir's Yemeni policies while extending lukewarm support to Riyadh. Deteriorating relations between Sa'ud and Faysal led the latter to call on the Council of Ministers and the *'ulamah* to hear his grievances. On 30 March 1964, the struggle for power ended, with the clerics introducing a bizarre solution. They declared that Sa'ud was "unable to carry out the affairs of the state" because of his "state of health" and "current circumstances," but would remain king and still have "the right to respect and reverence." The *'ulamah* further stated that Faysal would "carry out all the internal and external affairs of the King, without referring back to the King in this regard."<sup>32</sup> On 1 April, Khalid bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, the deputy prime minister, notified senior ministers of the decision and asked them to approve it by signing the *fatwah*. Sa'ud would reign but no longer govern.

Such a situation could not continue without creating unnecessary disputes within the royal family, especially since several members disapproved of Faysal's brilliant internal diplomatic maneuvers. Others concluded that the heir apparent was not empowered to exercise full authority as long as the monarch reigned. Not surprisingly, what transpired throughout the following months was managed chaos, as the country's—as well as the family's—interests were severely affected by top-level disagreements. By early November 1964, Faysal was ready to end the discord that had ensued, and summoned the Council of Ministers and the *'ulamah* to make a final decision. A verdict was brokered to depose Sa'ud and to proclaim Faysal king.<sup>33</sup> Consequently, the statutes of the Council of Ministers were duly revised on 18 November 1964, allowing the monarch to resume direct control of the council's presidency—a provision that has remained applicable ever since. In fact, the council was the only effective political institution in Saudi Arabia, although a draft constitution first drawn up in 1960—which called for the establishment of an independent national assembly—lingered.

While the kingdom was ruled under *shari'ah* law, the country's religious administration did not neglect the rise of a semi-independent judiciary. In full accord with *shari'ah*, three separate legal institutions emerged over the years: (1) the Mahakim Al-Umm (Magistrate Courts), led by judges who ruled on minor misdemeanors and small claims; (2) the Mahakim Al-Shari'ah Al-Kubrah (High Courts of Shari'ah), whose jurisdiction extended to all matters not covered by the lower courts; and (3) the Mahkamat Al-Isti'naf (Court of Appeals), which acted as an arbitrator of decisions reached by the lower courts.<sup>34</sup>

On 25 March 1975, King Faysal was assassinated by his nephew Faysal bin Musa'id bin 'Abdul 'Aziz. Within a few hours, Saudi Arabia's ruling family named Khalid to succeed his brother and proclaimed him monarch. In turn, Khalid appointed Fahd his heir, and increased Fahd's powers by naming him both first deputy prime minister as well as interior minister—the latter a position he had held since 1962.<sup>35</sup> This reshuffling of the cabinet restored the bal-

ance within the ruling family, with Fahd representing the powerful Sudayri clan.

Faysal's assassination was described as an isolated act perpetrated by a "deranged" young man. Yet serious interclan disagreements existed within the Al Sa'ud that elucidated the perpetrator's hidden rationale. In particular, three significant circumstances related to family affairs and to interclan disputes that were relevant. First, Faysal bin Musa'id belonged, through his mother, to the Al Rashid clan, which was defeated at the beginning of the century by 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman. Al Rashid family members raised the young prince after the founder divorced his mother. Second, the assassin's brother, Khalid, was a sympathizer of the Muslim Brotherhood, which "advocated the preservation of Islamic traditions and which had lost some of its influence during Faysal's reign." Third, the murderer "had planned to marry one of King Sa'ud's daughters and was close to the ousted princes" in the early 1960s.

These questions may well have been debated during Faysal bin Musa'id's short trial, although details were never published, and no Al Sa'ud family members entertained queries. While internal family conflicts received little publicity in Saudi Arabia, one cannot conclude that such disputes did not occur. That is not to suggest, however, that such conflicts were rampant. Rather, specific developments, over the years, have left distinct marks on political life in the kingdom.

Perhaps the gravest event of all occurred in 1979 with the attempted takeover of Makkah's Holy Mosque. The ordeal in Islam's holiest city created significant tension in the kingdom and led Khalid to widen his rule by providing a channel for dissent.<sup>36</sup> It was clear, nevertheless, that without the assistance of religious authorities, the Saudi government would not have been able to isolate and defeat the rebellion.<sup>37</sup> The occupation of the Makkah mosque revealed that there was organized opposition to the Al Sa'ud. This was particularly embarrassing because the attack occurred in a sacred city, revered by Muslims and entrusted to the Saudi ruling family. By early 1980, several steps had been taken to ensure the security of the holy places, as lackadaisical officials were demoted from office. Significant additional changes occurred within the ruling family, noticeably altering the balance of power. King Khalid's position was reinforced at the expense of both Prince Fahd and Prince 'Abdallah. Another victor was the kingdom's chief mufti, whose political value added to his already substantial religious authority. It was Shaykh bin Baz who "legitimized" the government's military actions after he issued an unambiguous *fatwah* that permitted the use of deadly force within the holy Haram.<sup>38</sup>

The most significant political change, however, was Heir Apparent Fahd's 1980 pronouncement that the kingdom needed to develop new institutional structures. Fahd proposed the formation of a new fifty- to seventy-member consultative council to deliberate approval of a "charter" for the government

that would supplement the Quran as the kingdom's constitution.<sup>39</sup> For several reasons, including disturbances in Eastern province involving the Shi'ah minority population (perhaps influenced by Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran), these pronouncements were not formally implemented. On several occasions in 1982 and 1983, King Fahd announced that a consultative council would be formed, and that a basic charter would be promulgated.<sup>40</sup> Such proclamations, calling for a modernization of royal institutions, were not new and had already been made on several previous occasions by Faysal and other members of the Al Sa'ud. Yet what was missing was the urgency to act, certainly prompted by internal and regional developments. Change would come to the kingdom, but slowly, and family debates on the all too important succession question would not always be incident-free.

### **Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Sa'ud (r. 1982–2005)**

Because Khalid bin 'Abdul 'Aziz died after a prolonged illness, his death did not come as a surprise, and elaborate succession arrangements were already in place.<sup>41</sup> Within minutes of the death, an official court statement declared that "Royal family members, led by Prince Muhammad bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, have pledged allegiance to Heir Apparent Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz as King of the country."<sup>42</sup> The same statement further declared that Fahd had nominated 'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz as heir apparent, a decision that was wholeheartedly accepted by the majority "to maintain the Saudi principle of collective leadership."<sup>43</sup> For his part, the perceptive 'Abdallah declared that while the monarch's death was a huge tragedy, the Al Sa'ud were consoled in knowing "that God has compensated [Saudi Arabia] well in His Majesty the great King Fahd." He further called on all Saudis to "unite [their] efforts and grow together, government and people, behind my lord, His Majesty King Fahd."<sup>44</sup> Before the end of the day, a slight cabinet shuffle was also announced, with Defense Minister Sultan appointed as second deputy prime minister. His place in the ruling hierarchy as heir to the heir apparent was thus secured, at least in 1982.

Not only was the transfer of power smooth—strongly suggesting that a family agreement had been reached days if not months ahead of time—but neither 'Abdallah nor Sultan relinquished their traditional power bases. The heir apparent retained full control over the National Guard, and Defense Minister Sultan was in full charge of the regular armed forces, even if all three senior figures displayed remarkable unity. Whether this unity was genuine or the result of convenience following several years of regional and international crises is difficult to determine. True to Al Sa'ud traditions, it was not unusual for all members of the extended family to unite in times of crisis, but what could be accomplished in the presence of a unifier was quite different during the absence of such a figure.



For the balance of the 1980s, Fahd and 'Abdallah shared governing responsibilities, the former concentrating on international concerns and the latter on regional, especially Arab, affairs. To a certain degree, this pattern of specialization reinforced underlying differences in orientation, with Fahd and 'Abdallah viewing foreign policy issues from the differing perspectives of their different capabilities. As a result, Fahd was labeled "pro-American" and 'Abdallah "pro-Arab."<sup>45</sup> In reality, these labels were greatly exaggerated, because 'Abdallah was never "anti-American" and Fahd was seldom "anti-Arab." Both agreed with the vast majority of the Al Sa'ud family on the strategic necessity of good relations with major powers, including the United States and key Arab states like Egypt and Syria. Moreover, this conviction did not mean that periodic disagreements did not exist, as in the aftermath of the Camp David Accords, when then-heir apparent Fahd argued for milder sanctions against Egypt while Prince 'Abdallah was inclined to support the Arab consensus against Cairo. At other times, both Fahd and 'Abdallah agreed, as in 1987, for example, when Riyadh requested that Washington recall Ambassador Hume Horan after a rather ugly incident that had infuriated both men.<sup>46</sup>

The division of labor, at least for most of the 1980s and 1990s, was not always fluid, however. At times, differences on domestic issues appeared to be more pronounced than any alleged variations on foreign concerns. Both Fahd and 'Abdallah agreed on maintaining the dominance of the ruling family in internal affairs, but their perspectives on how this could be achieved differed. These variances, in turn, were directly related to their corresponding political bases. With close ties to key tribes and conservative religious leaders, 'Abdallah favored a more cautious pace of economic development, arguing that overtly rapid development posed a threat to Saudi values and stability. While it was unlikely that he wished to turn back the clock, modernization presented a major challenge to the kingdom, especially after oil prices collapsed in the mid-1980s. Reduced income immediately translated into a weakening of his traditional base, as the recruiting process in the National Guard shrank. By contrast, Fahd favored a more "progressive" approach, seeking a rapid rate of development and implementation of social reforms. As minister of education in the 1950s, for example, Fahd had pushed for the education of women. Both as heir apparent and as monarch, he also favored the adoption of ambitious development strategies. In this perspective, he was joined by his full-brothers Sultan and Nayif, who reportedly believed that failure to provide material benefits to their constituency presented the greatest threat to internal stability. Naturally, additional expenditures for military and internal security operations translated into strengthened power bases for both.

These permutations notwithstanding, the superlative source of disagreement between Fahd and 'Abdallah throughout the 1980s centered on the question of political reforms. King Fahd repeatedly pushed for the rapid adoption

of a Basic Law as well as the establishment of the long delayed Consultative Council.<sup>47</sup> ‘Abdallah, on the other hand, made no public allusions to either before 1990. Of course, promises of basic political reforms were almost always associated with internal events that rocked the stability of the ruling family, including the epoch-making 1979 Makkah mosque takeover. From Fahd’s perspectives, these pronouncements could well have been designed to appease internal opposition. Nonetheless, the monarch’s endorsement of such reforms appealed to loyalties of various disenfranchised groups, while ‘Abdallah’s lukewarm position alienated others. Yet one of the most serious obstacles to the establishment of a Basic Law in the 1980s was the proposed solution to the succession issue.<sup>48</sup>

Another point of disagreement between Fahd and ‘Abdallah in the 1980s concerned the overall organization of Saudi Arabia’s defense and security establishment. Aside from a variety of police, frontier, and internal security forces, and as is widely known, the Saudi defense and security establishment is divided into two separate and distinct forces, the regular armed forces and the National Guard. King Fahd and Prince Sultan made a number of efforts to undercut Prince ‘Abdallah’s institutional base, with proposals either to merge the two forces under army command, or to restrict the National Guard to light weapons, which would reduce it to a police force rather than the paramilitary organization it really was. For his part, Defense Minister Sultan frequently advocated the establishment of a national conscription program, which in reality would deprive ‘Abdallah of badu recruits for the National Guard. Throughout the 1980s, ‘Abdallah resisted these efforts, and the advance in his political standing in the 1990s corresponded with new plans to increase the size and strength of the National Guard. While the division between the National Guard and the Royal Saudi Army implied different perspectives on the threats facing Saudi security and stability, the Royal Saudi Army was better equipped to handle external threats to Saudi Arabia, while the National Guard was more suited to meeting internal challenges. Thus, Defense Minister Sultan’s institutional interests implied an emphasis on external attacks, while ‘Abdallah was more inclined to stress internal dangers, including the danger of a military coup. These differences further corresponded to foreign policy preferences, since, on balance, key Western powers, led by the United States, offered greater protection against external attacks, while cordial relations with the Arab world were more essential for internal tranquillity. Both of these variables took on concrete form in the aftermath of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the ensuing 1991 war to liberate the shaykhdom.

Following the War for Kuwait, the Al Sa‘ud ruling family became sensitive to both domestic and international pressures, and called for liberalizing reforms. For the first time in decades, dynastic succession in Saudi Arabia turned into a topic of discussion and analysis, due in large part to the vast influx of foreigners into the country. The world’s media focused on the cultural

and ideological peculiarities of a closed society, encouraging Saudi traditionalists and more liberal elements alike to voice their opinions. Although Fahd often spoke of reforms throughout the 1980s—even funding the construction of a building to house a consultative body (which remained empty for years)—no changes were introduced before 1992. Against a new trend of open challenges, however, the monarch hinted that he was ready to nominate sixty leading citizens to a consultative council, though even this minor pledge was delayed. In this endeavor, Fahd was supported by his heir apparent, who, true to Al Sa‘ud traditions, rallied behind his monarch to ward off opposition.

**The 1992 edict.** On 1 March 1992, Fahd bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz addressed his subjects on television and issued several key documents, including the Basic Law of Government, the statutes governing the newly created Consultative Council, and the Law of the Provinces.<sup>49</sup> This was, by any measure, a momentous step forward, because an institutionalization process was clearly established. Even if the monarch’s decision was propelled by the rising tide of internal opposition, as well as the repercussions of the War for Kuwait, significant and permanent changes were under way. The Consultative Council was established and engaged in useful discussions, and in one of Fahd’s last decisions was expanded from 120 to 150 members, further indicating its growing popularity among Saudi elites.<sup>50</sup>

The Basic Law of Government was divided into nine main sections, dealing with the general principles of the state, the law of government, the values of Saudi society, the country’s economic principles, the various rights and duties of citizens, the authority of the state, financial affairs, auditing authorities, and general provisions. It was the second section of the Basic Law “that was of greatest interest and proved to be a bombshell both within and outside the Al Saud.”<sup>51</sup> In fact, just two subsections of the second chapter contained the most controversial, and undefined, lines (see Appendix 15). Article 5 stated that “rulers of the country shall be from amongst the sons of the founder, King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman Al Sa‘ud, and their descendants,” and that “the most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him).”<sup>52</sup> The last line, imposing a qualification—“the most upright”—was telling. One interpretation was that seniority was no longer the primary qualification for succession and that other considerations, including being “upright,” strengthened a candidate’s eligibility. Another interpretation alluded to the fact that all direct descendants of the founder—that is, grandsons as well as sons—were now eligible to rule the kingdom. Just as enigmatic, Article 5 further stated that “the King shall choose the Heir Apparent and relieve him by a Royal Decree.”<sup>53</sup> This last line threatened the entire balance of power that existed in the kingdom, foreshadowing the authority of Heir Apparent ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz.

Fahd's bold decree—which was law—that a Saudi monarch could name and remove his heir apparent, and that the latter would not automatically succeed, established several new criteria for succession. First, the 1992 edict granted a ruler the prerogative to choose and withdraw approval of an heir apparent, as an entirely legal proposition. Second, it further acknowledged that the more than sixty grandsons of 'Abdul 'Aziz were now legitimate claimants to the throne. By declaring that successors could be chosen from the most suitable of 'Abdul 'Aziz's progeny, Fahd implied that 'Abdallah was not necessarily the presumed heir to the throne. Finally, the decision to include grandsons in the process proved that some senior members were indeed committed to the younger generation. This was the turning point in the current succession issue, for the decree clearly broke away from Al Sa'ud time-tested and tribally favored traditions.

At the time that these edicts were under preparation and about to be announced, 'Abdallah "was said to have been 'outraged,' that his position . . . was defined as being at the whim of King Fahd, rather than as his right as the next in line."<sup>54</sup> Even if 'Abdallah was advanced in age, he was in good health and certainly considered himself to be eminently qualified for the post. The monarch, ever so aware of such nuances, and mindful of internal family political sensitivities, issued another decree on 1 March 1992, confirming Heir Apparent 'Abdallah's command of the National Guard.<sup>55</sup> Defense Minister Sultan, for his part, apparently was equally concerned. After several years as second deputy prime minister, and presumed heir to the heir apparent, Sultan would now have to lobby much harder within the family to step up the succession ladder. Moreover, he would—at least theoretically—face stiff competition from some of his younger brothers, sons, and nephews. Indeed, after 1992 nothing prevented the ruling family from settling on a younger son or grandson of 'Abdul 'Aziz, to provide both continuity and change. Given that the succession line was not agreed to, and while it moved from brother to brother through the sons of the founder, the 1992 edict further ensured that fundamental political changes were indeed acceptable.<sup>56</sup>

As fate would dictate, Fahd, debilitated by disease, entrusted the Al Sa'ud as well as the kingdom's public custodianship to Heir Apparent 'Abdallah in 1995. Within a few years, Saudi Arabia would confront unprecedented threats to the country's institutional framework. Yet despite the gravity of these exceptions, the Al Sa'ud husbanded their succession needs with utmost care. The dawn of the twenty-first century ushered in other threats, but the ruling family endured, although 'Abdallah was willing and ready to catapult the kingdom into a higher orbit.

**National dialogue.** The 2003 US war on Iraq sent shock waves throughout the Gulf region, but especially into Saudi Arabia because of the kingdom's

custodianship of the two holy mosques, in Makkah and Madinah. Riyadh remained exquisitely conscious of its responsibilities to the Muslim world, but especially toward its Sunni adherents. Yet the desire for political reforms did not necessarily spread through the ultraconservative ruling family. Rather, public discourse took on a new dimension—in the form of the petition—which redefined how Saudis accessed authority. A slew of rather sophisticated supplications, addressed to the monarch and the heir apparent, became both frequent and public. Since early 2003, prominent Saudi reformers, led by ‘Abdallah al-Hamed, argued that the best way to counter the spread of Muslim extremist thoughts was to transform the kingdom into a constitutional monarchy.<sup>57</sup> Al-Hamed, along with Matruk al-Faleh and Ali al-Dumayni and thirteen other activists, were promptly arrested in March 2004, although only the three named individuals were still in custody by mid-2005, when a new monarch addressed their fate.<sup>58</sup> Remarkably, Saudi reformists adopted pacific steps, bordering on the reverential, toward the ruling family. Although their demands were nothing short of spectacular—challenging the ruler’s absolute power—‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz deemed it necessary to meet with leading petition signatories, and authorized well-thought-out dialogues as a partial rejoinder.

In December 2003, in June 2004, and again in September 2004, several rounds of national dialogue were held to discuss, at times with unabashed frankness, sensitive questions. Saudis from all walks of life debated religious differences, education concerns, some of the causes leading to extremism, gender matters, and municipal elections.<sup>59</sup>

The 13–15 June 2004 national dialogue on women, held in Madinah—the city that first took in the Prophet Muhammad as a political refugee—was perhaps one of the most electrifying of such gatherings in Saudi memory. When the monarch was urged to “assign a body to study a public-transport system for women to facilitate mobility,” most dismissed the exercise for its futility. Although this tame request failed to resolve a fundamental contention—to allow women the right to drive—the mere fact that it was made at all was correctly interpreted by beady-eyed observers as a remarkable feat. Beyond arcane social norms, nineteen fresh recommendations on ways to improve women’s lives in the kingdom were prepared for the ruler by dialogue participants.<sup>60</sup>

Because Saudi women were still not allowed to mingle about freely uncovered, organizers limited their demands for what could be realistically accomplished. Remarkably, and although Saudi women were not permitted to drive, sail a boat, or fly a plane, none of the country’s existing regulations prevented Hanadi Hindi, who had trained for her pilot’s license in Jordan, from signing a contract with billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz in January 2005. Hindi joined the businessman’s roster of private pilots, thereby directly challenging the country’s ultraconservative clerics.<sup>61</sup> This was a singular step for an energetic woman, but a giant leap for Saudi society.

Likewise, dialogue participants debated divorce laws and the supersensitive question of child custody. Al Sa'ud leaders purposefully aimed to introduce real reforms in this area of *shari'ah* law after one of the kingdom's most popular television personalities, Rania al-Baz, gained immense sympathy for her tragic case. Al-Baz, who was severely beaten by her husband, and against family counsel, invited photographers into her hospital room to record her injuries. She spoke out in public and filed for divorce, in which she asked for her children's custody. She was granted a quick annulment and, surprisingly, won custody of her children, even if, under Islamic law, fathers routinely received custodianship after juveniles reached the age of seven. She also formed a support group to publicize abuse cases in the kingdom.<sup>62</sup>

To be sure, this was a *cause célèbre*, but several national dialogue recommendations concerning women, once enacted, necessitated fresh perspectives. Al Sa'ud reformists understood that the creation of special courts to adjudicate similar cases, along with the establishment of additional women-only courts, ruffled feathers. Naturally, all judges would still be religious men in an interim period—presumably until such time when women magistrates would be trained to assume such burdens—but the Al Sa'ud signaled that they expected establishment figures entrusted with interpreting the law to become “more aware” of women as human beings.

Still, skeptical voices wondered whether this dialogue would expand to eventually empower the kingdom's healthy and expanding female student body population, estimated at 55 percent of all university attendees with a life expectancy of seventy years in 2004, to assume unusual burdens of responsibility. In 2005, Saudi women made up 6 percent of the work force, but for the first time in history the epoch-making dialogue allowed taboo social subjects to be aired more or less openly.

Although a fifth of Algeria's supreme court judges were women, and a respectable number of judicial posts in North Africa and the Levant were held by women, the Saudi religious establishment was not about to follow suit without bargaining one of its vestiges for additional power elsewhere. Women in other Gulf states worked as diplomats and ministers, served in the armed forces, and filled various business posts. In late February 2005, Prince Sa'ud al-Faysal revealed that the Saudi Foreign Ministry was about to hire its first class of women diplomats, illustrating how far real reforms had reached and how fast, even if painstakingly slow, they were being implemented.<sup>63</sup>

It may be worth noting that the first four national dialogues touched on critical internal questions that certainly deserved the attention of senior Al Sa'ud leaders. Little was said about the kingdom's equally crucial ties with the rest of the Muslim world as well as the world at large. In April 2005, the Riyadh-based King 'Abdul 'Aziz National Dialogue Center announced that the fifth dialogue, to be held in December 2005 in Abhah, would cover a broader theme: “Our Re-

lations with Others: A Collective National Vision for Dealing with World Cultures.”<sup>64</sup> Even if overtly ambitious, the effort was certainly remarkable, given that Saudi Arabia has had its share of difficult ties with many Muslim as well as Western societies. The discussions ranged from diversity within and without Saudi Arabia, to the role of women and the Saudi view of foreigners, issues considered taboo a few years ago. The fact that Saudis were looking at themselves and their relations with the rest of the world was certainly fresh and healthy. Moreover, by confronting the challenges inherent in this process, perhaps even by discussing them in a calm and informed manner, participants and all watchers—this was the first dialogue broadcast on television—found it easier to make necessary adjustments. Critics objected that “the concept for ‘Us and Others’ [was] completely false, [since] modern travel and communications have shrunk the globe.”<sup>65</sup> Yet others recognized that “Islam unite[d] Saudis with the hundreds of millions of Muslims throughout the world,” but that much more could be done to promote cultural exchanges. Saudis concluded that recognition of differences did not threaten social harmony, that ingrained and largely negative attitudes toward expatriate workers necessitated complete reappraisals, and that civility actually enriched the existing diversity. At the conclusion of the gathering, King ‘Abdallah embraced several participants as he received their recommendations, pledging to devote appropriate resources to implement them.<sup>66</sup> It was a cathartic experience that highlighted the level of awareness at the very top of the kingdom’s hierarchy.

**Municipal elections.** National dialogues set the tone for fundamental changes facing Saudi Arabia. The concrete and natural next step was the introduction of electoral processes, which were unhurriedly laid out starting in Riyadh on 10 February 2005, followed by Eastern province as well as several southern provinces in early March. These municipal elections concluded following plebiscites in the west and north in April. Remarkably, but not surprisingly, the relatively well attended elections (75 percent turnout for registered voters in Riyadh) proved far more popular than anticipated. Nevertheless, conservative, proclerical candidates won most seats, illustrating the intricacies of democratization.<sup>67</sup> Although half of the 178 municipal posts would eventually be appointed by government minions, a significant precedent was established when ordinary Saudis flocked to polling stations, leading Saudi observers to foresee Consultative Council universal suffrage elections before long. Irrespective of future initiatives, Al Sa‘ud leaders responded to public demands by accepting the idea of political participation, even if the process was not entirely transparent.<sup>68</sup>

In fact, Riyadh managed a series of contradictory initiatives throughout 2004, which highlighted confusion in devising political, economic, and social reforms. For example, it authorized key dialogues, yet jailed a group of

reformists in March 2004 without addressing any of their grievances. Strangely, reformists—not dissidents—called for the establishment of a constitutional monarchy that, at its very core, supported Al Sa‘ud authority.<sup>69</sup> Whether the balancing act was necessary to maintain public order is debatable, although Riyadh was certainly emboldened by numerous arrests of jihadist elements. In a lucid message, the cabinet issued a September 2004 ban on all state employees, including academics (given that all universities fell under state regulations), from questioning policies enunciated by the Al Sa‘ud. Reforms would certainly be introduced, but only on a carefully laid-out timetable, free of what certain officials perceived as foreign interferences in internal Saudi affairs.

**A new monarch in 2005.** Fahd bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz died on 1 August 2005 at the age of eighty-four after a long illness. He was immediately succeeded by his brother ‘Abdallah, who in turn appointed the second deputy prime minister, Sultan, as his designated heir. As expected, the fifth Al Sa‘ud succession since the country’s formal founding in 1932 was ensured, even if critics opined that “this tribal way of succession [was] no way to run a modern country, let alone one with the largest known reserves of oil.”<sup>70</sup> Within hours, senior Al Sa‘ud leaders, followed by thousands of Saudis, pledged their oath of allegiance to ‘Abdallah and Sultan. This *bay‘ah* was not a foregone conclusion, as many anticipated potential problems between the two most senior princes in the kingdom. But the oath was nevertheless duly delivered, probably because of the former ruler’s 1992 edict, as well as ‘Abdallah’s demonstrated skills during his regency after 1995. ‘Abdallah became king on 1 August 2005, but in reality had been ruler since a debilitating stroke incapacitated the former monarch in 1995.

A week after acceding to the throne, he issued a blank pardon to ‘Abdallah al-Hamed, Matruk al-Faleh, and ‘Ali al-Dumayni, who earlier had been sentenced to jail terms.<sup>71</sup> The three men had been tried for seeking the establishment of a constitutional monarchy and had been condemned to jail by a court that found them guilty of “stirring up sedition and disobeying the ruler.” Yet, by issuing blanket pardons, ‘Abdallah reflected both magnanimity as well as a strength of character. The decision was as clear an expression of leadership as could be mustered, especially after withholding his innermost sentiments for over a decade. A reformist ‘Abdallah could not do as he pleased when he was heir apparent. As an absolute monarch, however, he was no longer constrained by Article 5 of the Basic Law, which limited the heir apparent to “duties delegated to him by the King.”<sup>72</sup> ‘Abdallah could now do as he pleased. He even received al-Dumayni and al-Faleh to accept their *bay‘ah* and, perhaps, convey the notion that not all intellectual dissent was harmful to the Al Sa‘ud.<sup>73</sup> By acting the way he did, and as quickly as he did, he further set



the tone for his preferences. The king was on the march to further strengthen Saudi society.

## ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Sa'ud of Saudi Arabia

The ruling Al Sa'ud family is notable for its sheer size, diverse composition, and complex internal structure.<sup>74</sup> Because these features directly influence the political dynamics of the family, it is useful to examine them in some detail, to better understand how family dynamics influence carefully devised succession mechanisms.

The exact size of the Al Sa'ud family is not known to any outsider, although educated estimates range between 5,000 and 8,000 adults.<sup>75</sup> A more practical breakdown is to consider three politically relevant groupings from which all current and future leaders will probably emerge: (1) descendants of 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman, (2) descendants of 'Abdul 'Aziz's brothers, and (3) cadet branches of the Al Sa'ud dynasty. These three groupings must, in turn, be broken down into several subgroupings to better identify rising leaders. Whether the founder had a clear idea of what his succession would look like, or what patterns a particular transmission should follow, is unknown. Suffice it to say that challenges from several cousins (also known as the Sa'ud Al-Kabir line) as well as from the 'Arafat and Jiluwi branches of the family, surely influenced the founder's preferences.<sup>76</sup> If anything, 'Abdul 'Aziz was determined to avoid the disputes that had dominated the family for 200 years, weakened it, and allowed outside powers to interfere in the country's internal affairs.

'Abdul 'Aziz ruled as monarch for twenty-one years (1932–1953), though his rule was carefully balanced with a reinvigorated alliance with members of the Al Shaykh clan.<sup>77</sup> Moreover, and because his campaign to unify the many tribes on the Arabian Peninsula required it, the founder married a large number of women from important tribes, who gave him his thirty-six known sons.

The sons of 'Abdul 'Aziz form the core of the ruling family. His five successors to date—Sa'ud (1953–1964), Faysal (1964–1975), Khalid (1975–1982), Fahd (1982–2005), and 'Abdallah (2005–present)—along with the rest of his surviving sons, occupied the most important political positions in the country. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that 'Abdul 'Aziz's sons either formed a unified bloc in the past or can claim to have established such an “institution” since 1953. Few Saudis ever made such claims, even if this was a favorite Western observation. Apart from each individual's personal attributes, which may be issue-driven within family politics, several topics determined the direction many followed. These ranged from ideological preferences to business interests, and

helped form the pattern of whatever factions emerged over the years. Nevertheless, for Arab Gulf ruling families, but especially for the Al Sa‘ud, seniority, maternal descent, and the availability of full-brothers enhanced one’s standing within the exclusive grouping, which by and large remained a valid illustration of family cohesiveness and the establishment of subgroupings. These characteristics were deeply ingrained in time-tested tribal rules that certainly evolved, even if they retained permanence.

### **Seniority, Maternal Lineage, and Full-Brother Characteristics**

As a first criterion, seniority emerged as a key political requirement for succession. To date, the five monarchs since ‘Abdul ‘Aziz have come from among the oldest sons. Prince Muhammad voluntarily stepped aside in 1975 in favor of his younger brother Khalid, and both Prince Nasir and Prince Sa‘ad were passed over by the family council that decreed Fahd monarch in 1982. To some extent, this pattern may be explained by both traditional and practical factors. While the Saudi system of succession is not based on primogeniture, seniority denotes a respected claim to political primacy. Indeed, any political system based on bloodlines provides for elder heirs to have a special relationship with their father. In practical terms as well, elder sons are more likely to get the first taste of power and responsibility, especially in a tribal setting like Saudi Arabia, where several young princes fought alongside the founder in physically unifying the country. Both Sa‘ud and Faysal, for example, led armies in the conquests and subsequently served as first viceroys of Najd and the Hijaz, respectively.<sup>78</sup> Several other sons received their first opportunities to lead after the seniority succession pattern was set in motion. Given this fundamental characteristic, younger sons of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, once they matured, challenged the positions of their older brothers. This was demonstrated during the period of struggle between Sa‘ud and Faysal, when policy differences accelerated their feud. At the time, a group of “middle sons,” known as the free princes, supported Sa‘ud against Faysal when the heir apparent represented the more established—and older—generation, whereas the monarch garnered the support of the younger ones.<sup>79</sup>

While seniority was an important characteristic of succession, it was but one of several features that determined family politics. Although seniority helped, it did not—and probably will not—guarantee political prominence. As stated above, Princes Muhammad, Nasir, and Sa‘ad were passed over in the line of succession for various reasons, some that are probably impossible to decipher. What role family elders played in anointing an heir apparent, and how they exercised their persuasive skills to encourage three senior princes to renounce their claims—on the basis of seniority—are undocumented. Suffice

it to say that family political alliances were influenced by several factors, aside from seniority, including maternal lineage and the availability of full-brothers.

As important as seniority, the social standing of mothers and their tribal connections often determined the prominence of individual princes. In general terms, sons with mothers from prominent families, such as the Jiluwi or Sudayri, or from important tribes, such as the Shammar, displayed stronger political credentials. Moreover, the influence of maternal lineage must be examined along with the seniority factor, because 'Abdul 'Aziz's early marriages were of greater political significance. Given the fact that 'Abdul 'Aziz produced thirty-six sons, maternal lineage shaped political and social alliances.<sup>80</sup> King 'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz is known to have strong ties to tribal elements in Najd province because his mother, Fahdah, was from the Shammar tribe. Equally key was the undeniable fact that the Shammar contributed significant numbers of soldiers to 'Abdallah's political base in the kingdom—the tribal levies that constituted the National Guard.<sup>81</sup> King Khalid's mother, Jawharah, was of the Jiluwi family, while King Fahd's mother, Hassah, was a Sudayri. Both families shared a long history of association with the Al Sa'ud and played prominent roles in Saudi politics. On such a basis, one is able to infer that Khalid and Fahd represented different factions, and called on members of the prominent Jiluwi and Sudayri families for support when needed. Perhaps the best example of the maternal seniority linkage could be associated with the late King Faysal, whose mother, Tarfah, was from the Al Shaykh family. Indeed, Faysal benefited from this lineage because the Saudi religious establishment supported him against Sa'ud (whose mother, Wadhbah, was from the small Bani Khalid tribe) in 1964.

Although there was an element of truth in the argument that maternal descent and seniority were complementary and useful, the complexity of the family structure did not allow for a simple confluence. The Jiluwi, Sudayri, and several other subfamilies intermarried with the Sa'uds, as well as with each other. Khalid's maternal grandmother was of the Sudayri family, for example, even if his mother was born into the Bani Khalid. For their part, the Jiluwis and the Sudayris, like the Sa'uds, have so many internal divisions that it may be misleading to conclude that they represent unified "groups." As a case in point, and aside from the late King Fahd and his six full-brothers, there were two additional sets of Abdul Aziz's sons born of two other Sudayri women, who seldom supported King Fahd.<sup>82</sup> Today, it is impossible to draw clear lines for blood-tie connections, even if the exercise may shed some light on family intricacies.

Perhaps the major factor in family alliances has been the role of full-brother divisions. Although neither Sa'ud nor Faysal had full-brothers, the characteristic has gained prominence in recent years, as Fahd and his full-brothers formed a distinctive political association that merits careful analysis.

The seven sons of the Hassah bint Ahmad Al Sudayri, led by the late King Fahd, formed a formidable alliance within the Al Sa'ud dynasty. In 2007, this subclan is led by Heir Apparent Sultan, who is also minister of defense, and includes 'Abdul Rahman, who reportedly handles family finances; Nayif (minister of the interior); Turki, another leading businessman;<sup>83</sup> Salman (governor of Riyadh); and Ahmad (deputy minister of interior). Whether by luck or by design, the political fortunes of the "Sudayri Six" or, as they are now known, the "Al Sultan," have been closely linked. For example, as minister of defense, Sultan welcomed—perhaps even encouraged—his younger brother Turki to be appointed as his deputy in July 1969. Similarly, when King Fahd was minister of interior (1963–1975), he promoted Nayif as his deputy (June 1970). Not surprisingly, when Nayif became minister of interior in 1975, the youngest of the full-brothers, Ahmad, was advanced to the deputy post.

Although it may be a mistake to think of the Sudayri Six as a cohesive unit—because internal factions have emerged in recent years—the sheer presence of these senior princes in positions of authority add considerable weight to their overall power. More important, several sons of the six surviving full-brothers joined the alliance on specific issues, thus forming a power nexus second to none. King Khalid and his older full-brother, Prince Muhammad, were united on virtually all political and policy issues. Similarly, King Fahd and Prince Sultan seemed to have a long-standing political partnership that extended back to the late 1950s, when both supported Heir Apparent Faysal against King Sa'ud. Under Faysal, Fahd and Sultan were also partners in various family skirmishes that, for better or worse, sealed their alliance.<sup>84</sup> Fahd and Sultan cooperated together, starting during Khalid's rule, to further limit the influence of other senior princes, especially that of then-heir apparent 'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz.<sup>85</sup> It may therefore be logical to assume that the "partnership" of full-brothers is a leading factor in Saudi succession.

This phenomenon is not exclusive to the Sudayri Six, as the fortunes of Princes Mansur, Mish'al, and Mit'ab—sons of Shahidah (an Armenian woman who was a favorite of 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman)—provide another interesting example of linkage between maternal lineage and seniority. When Prince Mansur, the first Saudi minister of defense, died in 1951, he was replaced by his younger full-brother Mish'al, who had been his deputy. In turn, the youngest of the brothers, Mit'ab, was then appointed to the deputy position. Both Mish'al and Mit'ab were ousted from office under Sa'ud, but they were returned to power in 1963 by King Faysal, who entrusted them with the key governorship and deputy governorship, respectively, of Makkah. Interestingly, both left office in 1971, for reasons that were not entirely clear. Mit'ab was finally appointed minister of public works and housing in October 1975.<sup>86</sup>

These examples notwithstanding, the association of full-brothers is by no means an inviolable rule, as the case of Princes Talal and Nawwaf illustrate. Talal and Nawwaf were born to Munaiyir, another Armenian concubine who

became a favorite wife. Surprisingly, the two brothers became bitter enemies during Sa'ud's reign, even to the point of contesting their inheritances.<sup>87</sup>

### **Grandsons of 'Abdul 'Aziz**

If the sons of 'Abdul 'Aziz still constitute the active political core of the ruling family, it is their sons—the grandsons of 'Abdul 'Aziz—who constitute the emerging political leadership in Saudi Arabia during the first decade of the twenty-first century. While the exact size of this group is not known, it may include an estimated 300 males and an equal number of females. A number of these princes have been entrusted with important administrative positions in the state bureaucracy as well as the armed forces.

Because of their relative advantages, especially in terms of education and exposure to Western ideas, several “grandsons” may well be identified as a distinct faction within the family. Still, this rising group—with distinct political interests—is not a homogeneous entity either. In fact, the grandsons, much like their fathers, are divided into several factions. Connections between fathers and sons, against other fathers and sons, seem to be present as well. In certain instances too, there are links between some of 'Abdul 'Aziz's sons and some of his grandsons. Nevertheless, the political fortunes of many of the grandsons are heavily influenced by the successes or failures of their fathers, thus keeping the founder's traditions alive. Just as 'Abdul 'Aziz passed power on to his sons, rather than his to equally qualified nephews, this pattern among grandsons persists because all significant changes have been introduced by royal decree. There are several examples of this trend, most notably the divergent fortunes of the sons of Sa'ud and Faysal, as well as those of Fahd.

When Sa'ud was monarch, he appointed some of his estimated fifty-three sons to a number of prominent positions, including posts in the Ministry of Defense (Fahd and Muhammad), commander of the National Guard (Sa'ad), commander of the Royal Guard (Bandar and Mansur), governor of Riyadh (Badr), governor of Makkah ('Abdallah), and several other posts.<sup>88</sup> The influence of these sons, then known as the “little kings,” became so prevalent that Sa'ud's brothers feared he intended to establish a lineal line of succession, and this accounted, in part, for the support Heir Apparent Faysal received against the monarch in the early 1960s.<sup>89</sup> In turn, when Sa'ud was deposed in 1964, his sons were quickly distanced from power. In despair, several followed their father into exile, and although most were rehabilitated, none of them was any longer a contender to the highest position. Likewise, the three sons of King Faysal (Sa'ud, Turki, and Khalid) were quickly promoted after 1964, and continue to play significant roles in contemporary Saudi affairs. By contrast, King Fahd's sons, including the young 'Abdul 'Aziz, have emerged as the rising stars of the next generation, although the latest changes in 2006 could witness unrest at this level too.

Still, and unlike the sons of Sa'ud and Fahd—who rose to prominence at the expense of their uncles—Faysal's sons tended to start at more junior positions and work their way up the ranks. Prince Sa'ud, for example, spent five years as deputy director of Petromin, was deputy minister of petroleum and mineral resources, and served as executive director of the Supreme Petroleum Council before becoming foreign minister on his father's death in 1975.<sup>90</sup> Prince Turki studied in the United States as well as in Britain, and spent five years as deputy director of the Directorate General of Royal Intelligence before moving to the director post. In 1979, he commanded the Saudi forces at Makkah, to help defuse the Holy Mosque takeover, and in January 2003 was appointed ambassador to the United Kingdom.<sup>91</sup> In late July 2005, Turki was appointed ambassador to the United States, in part to mend the seriously eroded ties between the Al Sa'ud and Washington in the post-11 September 2001 environment, but he resigned in late 2006.<sup>92</sup> It was rumored at the time that Turki was horrified by his predecessor's entreaties at the highest levels of the US government, without his knowledge. Turki returned to Riyadh and the directorship of the King Faysal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, to await new opportunities and challenges.

As these two examples illustrate, bureaucratic stints have tended to give several princes greater administrative experience and, significantly, the distance necessary to rise above petty family disputes. These work experiences have further allowed many to observe intricate internal developments and, perhaps, appreciate the necessity to form alliances, because the relative success of a father does not always ensure prominence for his progeny. As a case in point, the three sons of Khalid did not play any discernible roles while their father was monarch, and most relinquished any claims after his death in 1982. By contrast, Fahd's six sons assumed identifiable and very public positions when their father acceded to the throne. The eldest, Faysal, was the director-general of youth welfare starting in 1971, and a director-general at the Ministry of Planning starting in 1977. Faysal bin Fahd, who held the rank of minister of state after 1977, was also a private "emissary to Iraq." He died of a heart attack in 1999. His younger brother Khalid, a prominent businessman, replaced him as head of youth welfare, a significant and visible post that earned Fahd and his progeny undeniable popularity and legitimacy. Another son, Muhammad bin Fahd, was entrusted with the critical Eastern province governorship in 1985 (replacing a key Jiluwi ally). Sa'ud bin Fahd, who was elevated to minister rank in September 1997, has occupied the deputy headship of External Intelligence since 1985. Sultan bin Fahd, a career army officer, was also elevated to minister rank in November 1997. 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Fahd, allegedly the late monarch's favorite son, was carefully groomed as well. He "represented" his father at most public ceremonies and, in 1999, was elevated to minister rank. All of these men retained their posts after 2005, when a new king acceded to rulership.

These examples depict that paternal success is important because it guarantees a visible platform and instant notoriety. Other cases abound throughout the ruling family. The sons of 'Abdallah and Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz are perfect illustrations. Two of King 'Abdallah's six sons—Mit'ab and Turki—served in the National Guard, and two of Prince Sultan's seven sons—Khaled and Bandar—were once attached to their father's ministry. Although 'Abdallah's children were not in the army or the air force, Sultan's sons were also absent from the ranks of the National Guard. At least in these two cases, the grandsons reflected and reinforced divisions that emerged in the earlier generation.<sup>93</sup>

Seniority, maternal lineage, and full-brother status that applied to the sons also pertain to the grandsons of the founder, even if no single factor is decisive. As examples, the sons of King Faysal, who were once considered among the most important of the third generation, clarify these contentions. Faysal's eldest son, 'Abdallah bin Faysal (1921–2007), started his political career in 1945 when he disputed his uncle Mansur's appointment as acting viceroy of the Hijaz, and actually assumed the office a year later.<sup>94</sup> From 1951 to 1959, 'Abdallah served as minister of interior, but in the early 1960s he retired to pursue extensive business interests. His public career amply depicted the extent to which there was a generational overlap between the sons and grandsons of 'Abdul 'Aziz. Born in 1924, 'Abdallah was older than the majority of 'Abdul 'Aziz's sons, and even older than one of 'Abdul 'Aziz's brothers. Similarly, many of 'Abdul 'Aziz's great-grandsons were older than his grandsons, and consequently the pool of potentially active princes contained elements of four generations who were of roughly similar ages. This pattern tended to blur generational distinctions and complicated the entire seniority characteristic.

As for maternal lineage, all of Faysal's sons received a solid start because their mothers came from the established Sudayri or Jiluwi families. And even the full-brother characteristic played a part among Faysal's sons. In order of age, Muhammad, Sa'ud, 'Abdul Rahman, Bandar, and Turki are full-brothers, sons of Iffat bint Ahmad Al Thunayan. Given the critical role that the Thunayan played—as an important cadet branch of the Al Sa'ud family—and given that Queen Iffat was the monarch's favored wife, this characteristic became important.<sup>95</sup> Remarkably, Faysal's other three sons, 'Abdallah (from Sultanah bint Ahmad Al Sudayri), as well as Khalid and Sa'ad (from Hayah bint Turki bin 'Abdallah Al Jiluwi), were always close to their half-brothers, thus forming a formidable political nexus within the Al Sa'ud.

When this single line was multiplied by the progeny of all thirty-six sons of 'Abdul 'Aziz, it became amply evident that the direct descendants constituted a prolific and powerful group. They included approximately 300 princes—36 sons and an estimated 260 grandsons and great-grandsons—as well as a similar number of princesses.<sup>96</sup> Their absolute size was more than matched by the concentration of power within the group as a whole, especially

when compared with other units in the ruling family and with clusters of power within the rapidly evolving Saudi society. Within the primary nexus of power, however, there was no even distribution. Personal attributes, seniority, paternal and maternal lineage, and full-brother subgroups all helped create an internal hierarchy of power that was simultaneously complex and fluid. These same characteristics tended to divide descendants of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz into dozens of factions that cut within and across generations. If this were not complicated enough, at least two other broad groupings within the ruling family—the descendants of the founder’s brothers and several key cadet branches—held significance because of their intrinsic capabilities to form or influence political alliances.<sup>97</sup> It was the sum total of concerns uttered by these personalities that preoccupied successive Saudi rulers, who remained steadfastly sensitive to their various needs.

### **‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud (r. 2005– )**

As illustrated above, succession—with minor exceptions—has passed to the sons of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz in order of seniority since the death of the dynasty’s founder. Understanding the interrelationships and precedence is therefore critical to identifying how the pattern has changed or may yet evolve. In a break with long-standing tradition, the ruling family published an explicit order of succession in 1992 and, in addition to addressing existing “understandings” regarding the identity of the heir apparent, a royal decree that explicitly stated that ‘Abdallah was first in line for the throne.<sup>98</sup> It was a foregone conclusion that ‘Abdallah would become king, even if many found fault with his skills, speech patterns, and politically incorrect behavior.

Until mid-2005, Heir Apparent ‘Abdallah maintained a rather cool attitude toward Western powers in general, and the United States in particular. This outlook underwent considerable change once the prince saw Washington make good on its promise to support the monarchy by intervening successfully after Baghdad’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait. As critical as this updated perception was, ‘Abdallah drew his principle legitimacy from elaborate connections to leading tribal communities, as well as by virtue of his leadership of the kingdom’s internal security force—the National Guard. The guard shouldered the burden of protecting the ruling family, was principally raised from tribal levies, and, as a unique instrument by which to maintain tribal loyalty to the ruling family, strengthened ‘Abdallah’s claim to succession, even if no challenges were actually made in 2005.

Still, and despite the fact that ‘Abdallah controlled the National Guard, he was relatively weak, given his overall position within the family, since he did not enjoy the gaggle of full princely brothers that other Saudi leaders possessed. Perhaps because of his lack of broad family ties, his three sons whose positions were known remained employed exclusively within the National



Guard fief, which meant ‘Abdallah lacked a strong network of supporters within the broader government bureaucracy—an asset that other princes managed to fashion by placing their sons and relatives widely throughout the government. Since his accession, King ‘Abdallah has chosen not to alter this internal balance, even as he has made other critical choices affecting family harmony. In fact, his most important decision to date has been the conscious vacancy of a second deputy prime minister, the traditional post from which to designate an heir to the heir apparent. To be sure, the monarch may be mulling over his various options, or he may have opted to defer that choice to his successor. Still, this nonchoice has fueled speculation that the ruler feels uncomfortable tackling such a gargantuan topic, further illustrating existing family cleavages. In fact, ‘Abdallah’s genealogical ties within the ruling house are so weak that his ability to place trusted men within the government remains limited. Because the monarch did not introduce any fundamental changes to the succession line as he assumed the throne, ‘Abdallah signaled that profound changes necessitated certain clashes with powerful princes, something he was not willing to do. In the end, the monarch preferred to ensure internal stability, rather than risk chaos for immediate rewards. He quickly designated his brother Prince Sultan as heir apparent, and was unlikely to force a change to eventually replace his heir with another Al Sa‘ud, even if his predecessor’s 1992 edict was available to alter fundamental changes to the succession line. Although ‘Abdallah will probably not force or even contemplate a dismissal of Sultan, such a possibility cannot be theoretically excluded. ‘Abdallah is not keen to propel his offspring to the forefront, or enter into specific new alliances to encourage internal family divisions. Moreover, it may be safe to assume that his own preferences, if any, aim to rearrange the succession process around a more radical choice. Indeed, senior ‘Abdallah advisers have contemplated a galvanized family decision to transform the kingdom into a constitutional monarchy, a choice that requires full assent by most senior officials.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud, eleventh son of the founder, succeeded his brother Fahd as ruler on 1 August 2005, at the age of eighty-two. Heir apparent for twenty-three years, ‘Abdallah was regent after Fahd had a stroke in 1995, and effectively ruled the kingdom after his brother was left physically incapacitated. While Fahd was fondly remembered as a reformer—his later-life conservatism overshadowed his gargantuan appetite for the high life in his youth—the late monarch heightened intrinsic radicalism when he invited Western powers to defend Saudi Arabia from Saddam Hussein in 1990. Whether the presence of so many “infidels” saved the Al Sa‘ud from an imminent Iraqi invasion is debatable, even if one of its spillover effects—the mobilization of distraught youths against the regime—is not. ‘Abdallah thus inherited from his

brother a significant burden, one that threatened the establishment, including the ruling Al Sa'ud family.

Sultan became the new leader of the Sudayri faction after Fahd's demise, and was automatically elevated to the position of deputy prime minister. Past rivalries between the monarch and his heir, largely professed by outsiders with questionable knowledge of intrafamily schisms, created a rift that enlarged the distance separating them.<sup>99</sup> Still, with Sultan now firmly ensured succession—health permitting—and continued influence given advancements to his sons Khaled (deputy defense minister) and Bandar (head of the National Security Council), the relationship between the two senior Al Sa'uds will be less stormy.<sup>100</sup>

'Abdallah was somewhat fortunate during his first year in power because he assumed rulership during a period when the government's treasury was relatively healthy and growing steadily. With new and contemplated massive investments in the oil sector, Riyadh considered its unemployment and poverty problems—priorities identified by the new monarch in his inaugural address—as containable threats to long-term internal stability, even if the economy needed to create several million new jobs over the next two decades. He was also fortunate that the Saudi public turned against terrorists spreading havoc throughout the kingdom. With several hundred individuals killed in Saudi Arabia since 2003, Saudis relied on the state to enforce the country's stringent antiterrorism laws, rallying behind the Al Sa'ud even if the latter's methods were drastic and overbearing. Whatever arguments liberal reformers advanced, those paled in comparison with conservative pressure to impose law and order. An unabashed and indomitable 'Abdallah successfully pushed establishment clergymen against the wall, forcing thousands into re-education camps, cajoling others to tone down inflammatory rhetoric, and setting clear examples for acceptable behavior.<sup>101</sup>

This last issue was particularly irritating to many self-centered clergymen who had near divine mandates to impose a particular interpretation of Muslim dogma. True to his long-standing preference to incorporate a far more tolerant religious environment, 'Abdallah did not mince his words, nor did he limit his actions against Unitarian (Wahhabi) clergymen. An estimated 1,000 were summarily fired on 11 June 2003, and many more were made to recant deviant teachings.<sup>102</sup> This was followed by several meetings with Shi'ah clergymen, many of whom pledged their oaths of allegiance in public. In August 2005, Hassan al-Saffar, the putative leader of the Saudi Shi'ah community since the late 1970s, met the new monarch in Jiddah, where he committed his loyalty to the Saudi nation. This was followed in mid-September by a rare meeting with five Isma'ili leaders from Najran, who underlined the king's pledge to seek "prayer and advice" from Saudis, and to instill within them "the principles of justice and equality among [all] without distinguishing between them." Natu-

rally, this rapprochement with Muslims, considered heretical by Unitarian leaders, irked sensibilities.<sup>103</sup>

In fact, of all the strategic challenges to ‘Abdallah, the potential clash between Sunnis and Shi‘ahs loomed as the most dangerous. This was not a confrontation the monarch sought, but he needed to thread around it with utmost care now that the process was initiated. Unlike his brother and predecessor King Faysal, ‘Abdallah did not enjoy a religious *ijazah* (a license to discuss religious matters with theologians) to mount a serious credibility challenge to extremists, but needed to persuade powerful clergymen to allow serious social reforms. If the establishment will let him, he may well become the greatest king in contemporary Saudi history, but if they oppose him, he may join Khalid and Sa‘ud as uninspiring monarchs. ‘Abdallah enjoyed an ace in the hole—his somewhat exemplary private life—but he still needed to extend the accountability bit to the clergymen themselves and further rally the public, especially young Saudis, to back him. In other words, the ruler needed to compete with Osama bin Laden—the most popular Saudi inside the kingdom—in order to capture the hearts and minds of many have-nots. How ‘Abdallah successfully rehabilitated the clergy, persuaded them not to back Saudi jihadists—who will surely survive Afghanistan as well as Iraq before they return home with the aim of overthrowing the establishment—and how he cajoled them to welcome reforms in their educational fiefdoms, all jeopardized his potential success.

These challenges notwithstanding, and in the short year after he succeeded to full authority, ‘Abdallah accelerated the transformation process. Nowhere was this more evident than in the kingdom’s education system, which underwent a top-to-bottom reappraisal of textbooks. Bigoted clerics who thrived on intolerant prose saw their work purged, with new far more broadminded texts replacing xenophobic ones. The ruler further widened the scope of representative government by empowering, albeit on a limited basis, the Consultative Council to debate heretofore sensitive topics like the budget. ‘Abdallah welcomed a discussion of the country’s finances, especially concerning the ruling family itself, and sowed a culture of tolerance by holding several national dialogues on important subjects. He also pardoned prominent dissidents and decreed that the kingdom’s National Day—23 September—would heretofore become a public holiday. The momentous decision introduced a whiff of nationalism into a tribal society that had prevented young Saudis from developing a sense of pride in the land.<sup>104</sup>

Perhaps his most critical decision after acceding to power was a blanket ban on kissing his hand.<sup>105</sup> A favored activity of Fahd—and other princes—‘Abdallah frowned on this subservient as well as mechanical activity as nothing more than a demeaning step. It remains to be seen whether this moribund, un-Islamic, and un-badu custom can ever be revived, although any successor may well have to deal with the precedent.

The wrinkle of the succession dilemma facing the Al Sa'ud is twofold. First, King 'Abdallah and Heir Apparent Sultan retain all of their previous portfolios, which complicates matters. Many Saudis wonder why a ruler still needs to head the National Guard and why an heir apparent still needs to remain defense minister. Others wonder whether these fiefdoms are ultimate refuges for weak leaders. The second quandary concerns the monarch's calculated delays to name a second deputy prime minister—traditionally the heir to the heir apparent. Under normal circumstances, the monarch would have settled on a deputy prime minister if for no other reason than to provide a modicum of stability. Yet because the post may well be contested between Interior Minister Nayif bin 'Abdul 'Aziz and Riyadh governor Salman bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, the monarch has postponed whatever decision he wishes to decree. 'Abdallah and Nayif are not the best of allies, and it may be that the monarch has purposefully left the position vacant to signal his discomfort at the prospect of power passing to the interior minister after Sultan. In fact, inclined to steer the kingdom carefully rather than allow wild policy swings, 'Abdallah perceives Nayif as a moody, somewhat abrasive individual, capable of tempestuous decisions that could ultimately harm the Al Sa'ud. He quickly stripped Nayif of national security responsibilities when Bandar bin Sultan, the former ambassador to Washington, was appointed head of the newly created National Security Council. This was a clear indication that the monarch had contemplated the long-term stability of the ruling family, and the institutionalization of decisionmaking within it. Future monarchs were thus to rely on professional advice before reaching critical judgments, and distance themselves from intrigue and capriciousness, objections that 'Abdallah and his allies harbored. The monarch consolidated his hold by designating several allies to critical positions, including Muqrin bin 'Abdul 'Aziz as head of intelligence and Turki al-Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz as ambassador to the United States until late 2006.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Sa'ud**

Senior members of the Al Sa'ud recognize that they have a succession problem. As recently as mid-2005, Prince Talal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, a brother of King 'Abdallah, called on Riyadh to “start with political reform, that is introducing a new basic stature (of government), or what is known in the West as a constitution.” Talal emphasized that the proposed constitution would be tantamount to “a social covenant between ruler and ruled, compatible with known constants in Saudi Arabia in terms of religion and genuine traditions.”<sup>106</sup> Six years earlier Talal had cautioned that the Al Sa'ud ought to “find a smooth way to pass the monarchy to the next generation, or face a power struggle after the era of old royals passes.”<sup>107</sup> Prince Talal, who was the leader of the “free princes” movement—which called for democratic changes in the early 1960s—drew the ire of senior Al Sa'ud family members in the late 1950s and early 1960s,

and may do so again. To be sure, he was rehabilitated after several years in exile and, equally important, after pledging his undivided loyalty to the family. Yet in 1962, future king ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz responded to the democratization call made by the maverick prince as follows:

Talal alleges that there is no constitution in Saudi Arabia which safeguards democratic freedoms. But Talal knows full well that Saudi Arabia has a constitution inspired by God and not drawn up by man. I do not believe there is any Arab who believes that the Koran contains a single loophole which would permit an injustice to be done. All laws and regulations in Saudi Arabia are inspired by the Koran and Saudi Arabia is proud to have such a constitution. . . . Talal talked at length about democracy. He knows that if there is any truly democratic system in the world, it is the one now existing in Saudi Arabia.<sup>108</sup>

In his more recent calls, Talal has seen the need to further modernize the kingdom, “including giving women more rights to work and allowing them to drive, . . . limit[ing] Riyadh’s substantial military spending, and pass[ing] power to the next generation because,” he has further clarified, “our problems are with the grandsons,” who will presumably require a new mechanism to ensure smooth successions.<sup>109</sup>

Although King ‘Abdallah has not publicly responded to Talal’s latest comments about modernization, social restructuring, and succession, these critical questions—certainly the most urgent and obvious facing the kingdom—are well known to him. As Talal noted in June 1999, the ruling family faces certain inevitable challenges, to modernize and come to terms with the difficult succession question. Still, his frankness amply illustrates the dilemma for ‘Abdallah—as well as his successors—wanting to maintain Saudi Arabia’s traditions while engaging in a full-scale modernization program. ‘Abdallah is amply aware of the delicate relationship between the kingdom’s sustained development and various political reforms. How up-and-coming Al Sa‘ud leaders position themselves, and how their decisions affect Western security interests, matters to political and economic leaders everywhere. How the Al Sa‘ud define and shape their “will to power” (the determinants to prevail against all odds) further affect long-term relationships between Saudi Arabia and a slew of Western, Eastern, as well as Muslim countries.<sup>110</sup>

## ■ **Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Saudi Arabia**

In October 2006, ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz decreed that a commission of princes will vote on the eligibility of future generations of kings and heirs, to better formalize the succession process.<sup>111</sup> Although the contemplated system

is not to come into effect until the current heir apparent—Sultan bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz—accedes to rulership, the mere fact that a formal commission has been envisioned for the process is telling. It is King ‘Abdallah’s first major decision regarding succession and it speaks volumes.

With this new commission, the Hay’at al-Bay‘ah (Allegiance Commission), ‘Abdallah has underscored the necessity to pledge allegiance to the Al Sa‘ud, as the name clearly implies. Although this new mechanism had inspired observers to conclude that this is vintage ‘Abdallah—seeking allegiance—in reality it represents nothing more than a new succession law.<sup>112</sup> In fact, confusion arose, because the 1992 law pledged allegiance to something or someone, whereas the new law introduces his long-anticipated reforms to the kingdom’s succession mechanism. With twenty-five articles defining its purposes, the “Allegiance Law of Succession” replaces the informal family gathering that selected and approved successors, though secret deliberations were not excluded (see Appendix 16 for the text of the law). The Allegiance Commission, whose size has not been announced, is to be chaired by the oldest surviving son of the founder and include sons and grandsons of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman. This development is an innovation because the commission now includes members of the second generation. Not surprisingly, the commission has been called to follow strict regulations contained in the Basic Law, which the new decree has amended.<sup>113</sup>

Under the previous system, the monarch enjoyed a full prerogative to name and dismiss his heir apparent, although such decisions were almost always debated within the inner family circle. In the new structure, members of the Allegiance Commission will have a say in the appointment of an heir, even when recommended (or suggested) by the monarch. If members reject the nominated heir, an alternative vote for one of three leaders designated by the ruler may be considered. According to initial reports, the appointment of the new heir has been placed within a strict timetable—within thirty days of the accession of a new monarch—even if few have anticipated lengthy deliberations given the secret nature of all decisionmaking mechanisms.<sup>114</sup>

‘Abdallah also foresaw the need for a transitory ruling council in case neither the monarch nor his heir are fit to rule. Under such conditions, this council, to be composed of five members of the Allegiance Commission, would assume responsibility for state affairs for a maximum period of one week. This idea is amply relevant given the advanced ages of the current leadership and the potential for disagreements within the Al Sa‘ud. Importantly, the transitory council would not enjoy prerogatives affecting state institutions, such as dissolving the government or the country’s self-styled parliament (the Consultative Council), nor would it be allowed to amend the Basic Law or any “laws that [are] linked to the rule.” In other words, ‘Abdallah has ensured that no one outside the family will be able to recommend non-Al Sa‘ud members for succession. In fact, by institutionalizing the process, he has etched in stone what

is also largely guaranteed, that only sons and grandsons of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz can rule Saudi Arabia. This is not just a turning point for Riyadh. Equally revelatory, it has placed ‘Abdallah’s cachet on succession matters by strengthening the ruling family.

### **Sultan bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz**

Heir Apparent Sultan bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, born in 1924, enjoys strong family ties because he shares a mother, Hussah bint Ahmad Al Sudayri, with six other full princes. Much has been made of the influence of the surviving “Sudayri Six” within the Al Sa‘ud. Sultan’s own sons are also well positioned within the government to act as proponents of his eventual candidacy for the highest office in the land. Until recently, the elder son, Khaled, was well known to Westerners as the Saudi army commander of the Arab coalition forces that successfully participated in Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm.<sup>115</sup> In fact, Prince Khaled’s success generated so much political capital and commercial opportunity for him that he saw fit to resign his army commission prematurely, an event that was likely influenced by the king and the opprobrium of other princes concerned with Khaled’s growing power.<sup>116</sup> Yet on 17 January 2001—coincidentally, the tenth anniversary of the War for Kuwait—a royal decree appointed Khaled assistant to the minister of defense and aviation (with the rank of minister), further indicating that senior family members may well have realized his value to the Al Sa‘ud. His return to a sensitive post further solidified his father’s position within the family by strengthening that emerging alliance. In turn, Khaled enhanced his own credentials by assuming this new responsibility and, being a notch closer to the throne, was given yet another opportunity to solidify his political reputation.<sup>117</sup>

Sultan’s second son—Prince Bandar—was better known in the West than Prince Khaled, largely because his post as Saudi Arabia’s ambassador to the United States created numerous public occasions to speak in Washington—and elsewhere—in the name of the Al Sa‘ud. Bandar bin Sultan, who was reportedly close to the late King Fahd, implemented the kingdom’s deliberate political and military strategy of codependency with the United States, designed to ensure that Washington has a continuing stake in supporting the ruling family in power. The success of this policy is an integral part of Saudi security initiatives. For this reason, any political capital that Bandar built because of his close ties with Western, especially US, political and business elites, was as much a credit to his own and his father’s political standing within the ruling family as it was a bonus to the country’s long-term security. Indeed, given the Sudayri command of this liaison post to a key ally, it was difficult for then-heir apparent ‘Abdallah to make his voice heard in Washington independent of Sudayri mediation. In mid-2005, however, Bandar resigned his post, and was replaced by Turki bin Faysal. Bandar’s long-term prospects were

still undefined within Saudi Arabia's National Security Council, which he led, but these may become clearer now that he is the son of the heir to the throne.

Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz thus enjoyed a strong base of power within the government thanks to the superior positioning of his sons and relatives. He also benefits from a strong base of support within the ruling family because of his connections to his extended Sudayri family. Still, it would be a mistake to assume that Sultan can automatically rely on the support of monolithic ranks of the Sudayris within the ruling family in his bid to influence policy. King 'Abdallah is not only the senior member of the Al Sa'ud, but also the one individual who can designate other Sudayris to critical posts. King 'Abdallah may well continue his patronage of Sudayri loyalties by reappointing Sudayris like Muhammad bin Turki—who is entrusted with the governorship of Bahah province—to this post. Earlier, Turki Al Sudayri and Fahd bin Khalid Al Sudayri controlled the key southern provinces of 'Asir and Najran. This whole area of the kingdom was wrested from Yemen as recently as the early 1930s. It was the scene of extended border skirmishes financed by Egypt in the 1950s, and is a likely future source of discord between the kingdom and unified Yemen.<sup>118</sup>

With the 20 October 2006 "Allegiance Law of Succession," Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz saw his succession chances markedly improve, although undeniable risks remained. As the latest permutation indicates, a full application will occur after Sultan accedes to the throne. Yet the decree foresees the possibility that an incapacitated monarch might come to power, a probability that is clearly unacceptable to Riyadh after its experience with the late King Fahd's incapacity. Consequently, the new law allows for the king to be medically evaluated if deemed incapable of carrying out his duties. If it is determined that the monarch is temporarily unable to exercise his full powers, then the rulership will be temporarily transferred to the heir apparent until the king recovers. Moreover, if the king's disability is deemed permanent, the heir apparent will take over the rulership. Further still, if both the king and the heir apparent are deemed incapable of exercising their powers for health reasons, a transitory ruling council will assume full responsibility for administration of state affairs until the monarch or his heir recovers.<sup>119</sup> In other words, 'Abdallah has signaled that the Al Sa'ud can no longer afford a repeat of the mid-1990s to mid-2000s experience, a period of serious indecision due to illness.

### **Salman bin 'Abdul 'Aziz**

By establishing permanent institutions, the king's edicts have enhanced the country's political stability. The Al Sa'ud are further secure in the knowledge that succession has been legitimized, even if the identity of the putative successor remains murky. At the time of Fahd's accession to the throne, "the designation of 'Abdallah and then Sultan reflected a balance of family factions and a continuing adherence to principles of seniority," although the order re-



mained vulnerable to the untimely death of one of the successors or an escalation of family rivalries.<sup>120</sup> No matter how unpalatable Fahd's 1992 decisions were—since he was not known for bold political moves—at the very least they guaranteed Al Sa'ud rule.<sup>121</sup> He was also confident that the family contained several leading candidates who could maneuver through difficult times. The leading candidate acceptable to all major princes is Salman bin 'Abdul 'Aziz.

Salman, usually mentioned as the arbitrator between Fahd and 'Abdallah, combines modernizing and traditional qualities. As the governor of Riyadh, he is attuned to the country's critical tribal constituents—and their various needs—and is also surrounded by a slew of young and well-qualified technocrats, mostly recruited from King Sa'ud University. Were he to be elevated, however, a dozen older princes would be passed over, and that clearly would be an unprecedented move. Even if a majority of 'Abdul 'Aziz's surviving sons did not have strong claims to the throne, seniority remains a key determinant. Yet, and irrespective of how the majority feels, four princes could pose credible claims to priority: 'Abdul Muhsin, Badr, Mit'ab, and Nayif. The first two were once part of the so-called "free princes" movement, but they were rehabilitated and, in all fairness, have reestablished their credentials. Both are closely tied to King 'Abdallah. Mit'ab's political career has been somewhat erratic, but his loyalty cannot be questioned. Nayif, for his part, clearly emerged as a powerful minister of interior, though, unlike Salman, there have been various hints of friction between Nayif and 'Abdallah that did not abate after the latter became monarch.<sup>122</sup>

Prince Salman's potential nomination and elevation would not be without its drawbacks. Were he to succeed Sultan, for example, certain family members could be concerned that the "al-Sultan" would be "establishing a lateral line of succession among themselves and, in the process, violating the tradition of interspersing half-brothers in between full-brothers."<sup>123</sup> On the other hand, if King 'Abdallah and Heir Apparent Sultan were to agree on a single candidate—Salman—then it would be doubtful that the objections of bypassed brothers or ambitious nephews would carry much weight, especially since the ruling princes would inevitably seek to console the disappointed. Moreover, whenever top officials were united in the past, their ability to apportion power among themselves, deputize responsibility to junior princes, and reconcile policy differences avoided disruptions. Salman's elevation could indeed avoid such disruptions, but even his putative candidacy is subject to the two sections of Article 5 of the Basic Law and, in the aftermath of the "Allegiance Law of Succession," subject to an even wider consensus. King Fahd maintained the delicate family balance for almost a decade, but ill health forced a transfer of power to 'Abdallah—before the latter was named regent in 1999—which essentially meant that momentous decisions were postponed.

As discussed above, King 'Abdallah did not name an heir to the heir apparent, although such a designation could now be anticipated under the

deliberations of the “Allegiance Law of Succession.” It would be difficult to imagine that Prince Sultan would object to a streamlined mechanism, especially as age and added governance burdens necessitated a smoother transition. The near certainty that the kingdom’s leadership will now remain in the hands of the founder’s sons, or a member of the next generation (grandsons of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz), has actually improved Salman’s intrinsic abilities to become an heir to the heir and eventually king of Saudi Arabia.

### **Nayif bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz**

Born in Ta’if in 1933 or 1934, Prince Nayif bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud received basic religious education at the palace, and held several government positions starting with a brief stint as governor of Riyadh from 1953 to 1954. He was appointed deputy minister of interior in 1954 by King Sa‘ud bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, and became minister of internal affairs in 1970. Five years later, he was entrusted the Interior Ministry portfolio in full, a post he preserved in 2007. Over the years, and because of his sensitive position, Nayif developed a rare reputation for being the most assertive Al Sa‘ud. To his credit, he fulfilled his mandate with gusto, winning universal scorn for implementing an iron-fist policy to preserve and protect family interests. So-called liberals and alleged conservatives criticized him in unison, maintaining that he relied on the sword more than the law, and that his methods backfired as the kingdom experienced a steady stream of opposition forces. Like other senior Al Sa‘uds, Nayif balanced his preferences, ostensibly to better gauge what would be tolerated.

In 2006, he curbed the powers of the Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, denying the *muttawai‘in* (religious police) the right to arrest suspects without the presence of police officers.<sup>124</sup> This was certainly a difficult decision, but in line with King ‘Abdallah’s sharp directives to abandon un-Islamic, disruptive, and questionable behavior on the part of law enforcement personnel. Nayif, who was not necessarily on the best of terms with his monarch, applied his ruler’s wishes both because he was a committed family player and, equally important, because he was the target of sustained denigration. In the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States, Nayif sustained a vilification barrage from sources that identified with the fifteen Saudis involved in the attacks, allegedly for tolerating their movements within and outside of the kingdom.<sup>125</sup>

As part of the original “Sudayri Seven,” Nayif was one of the most powerful members of the ruling family, technically third in line to the Saudi rulership. His essential role at the Ministry of Interior, to oversee public security, direct coast guard forces, direct civil defense units, coordinate fire departments, instruct border police, supervise special security and investigative functions, including criminal inquiries, and administer the clergy within the kingdom, concentrated immense powers in his hands. By virtue of these re-

sponsibilities, he is a major power-broker in internal family affairs, and cannot be dismissed for obtuse views. On the contrary, his opinion carries weight within various groups, including more moderate forces that would wish to see him on their side in any deliberation. Likewise, conservative voices will also rally to him, believing that he would represent their opinions best.

### **Ahmad bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz**

Prince Ahmad was born in 1940 to the founder and Hussah bint Ahmad al-Sudayri, and is therefore the youngest member of the subclan. He earned a bachelor’s degree in the United States and entered into business with his older brother ‘Abdul Rahman until he was appointed deputy governor of Makkah in 1971. In 1975, he was transferred to the Ministry of Interior, where he has served as deputy to his brother Nayif ever since.

Because of his proven performance in this sensitive position, including negotiating with Afghani and Pakistan authorities over the fate of Osama bin Laden in those two countries, Ahmad is a very strong candidate for succession to the kingdom’s highest office. Though he remains in the shadows of his brother, he may also have been instructed by Heir Apparent Sultan to look after Nayif as the latter manages the ministry. His low-key preferences and competence are legendary throughout the country, and many have pointed to him as the model Al Sa‘ud official.

### **Sa‘ud bin Faysal**

A son of King Faysal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, Sa‘ud was educated at Princeton University in the United States. On his return to the kingdom, he was appointed to various posts within the Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources. A particularly bright individual, he was designated minister of foreign affairs in 1975, after his father was assassinated, “to co-opt the best-known member of the next generation as a reinforcement against any attempt to change the order of succession.”<sup>126</sup> Over the years, Prince Sa‘ud articulated the kingdom’s foreign policies with savvy—especially in the volatile Arab rejectionist arena—without abdicating its independent direction. Close to King ‘Abdallah, and impeccably credentialed, Sa‘ud bin Faysal remains one of the critical members of the Al Sa‘ud, even if poor health restricts his full potential.

### **Turki bin Faysal**

Prince Turki was born in 1945 in Makkah, Saudi Arabia, and first attended the Ta’if elementary and intermediate schools. In 1963, he graduated from Lawrenceville School in New Jersey, and subsequently pursued an undergraduate degree at Georgetown University in Washington, D.C. He was appointed an

adviser to the Royal Court in 1973. From 1977 to 2001, he served as director-general of the General Intelligence Directorate, where he slowly became the main gatekeeper of the kingdom's innermost secrets. It was in that position that Turki oversaw all intelligence matters affecting Saudi Arabia and, in that capacity, protected the Al Sa'ud from their foes—both internal and external. Appointed to his intelligence post by King Khalid bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, Turki was entrusted with several critical portfolios, including the problematic Yemen and Afghanistan questions, which naturally remained priorities for Riyadh. His deputy, Sa'ud bin Fahd, was an equally hardworking individual, but whose presence under Turki guaranteed King Fahd a unique overview of all intelligence matters affecting Saudi Arabia. Together, Turki and Sa'ud bin Fahd kept the senior Al Sa'ud leadership fully apprised of intelligence matters, and acted as key liaisons with Western counterparts, especially the CIA, MI6, and the DGSE (Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure, as the French service is known). Inasmuch as intelligence duties tended to be clandestine, Prince Turki's time-tested capabilities, and unique role within the ruling family, guaranteed him a privileged position.

Yet his furtive efforts to meet and negotiate with Taliban officials as well as authorized personnel in the Directorate for Inter-Services Intelligence—the Pakistani body that developed very close associations with Afghani leaders over the fate of his renegade countryman Osama bin Laden—derailed his mandate.<sup>127</sup> The dismissal was rough—after twenty-four years on the job—but ironically he was entrusted with even more demanding responsibilities when the late King Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz appointed him to the Court of St. James, as ambassador to London (while he simultaneously held the nonresident ambassadorship to the Republic of Ireland). In July 2005, he was assigned an even greater challenge, becoming ambassador to the United States. He abruptly left that post in early December 2006, without revealing the reason for the resignation, but probably because he learned that his predecessor was relying on back-channel contacts with senior US government officials.

Faithful to his late father's legacy, this power-broker assumed additional duties at the King Faysal Foundation, where he is currently chairman of the King Faysal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, a top-notch institution in the Saudi capital.

### **Mit'ab bin Abdallah**

The oldest son of King 'Abdallah, born in 1943, Mit'ab occupies a vital position in the kingdom as deputy commander of the National Guard. Although the mission of the National Guard is limited—protection of the family—in reality it is the guard that maintains the tribal balance of Saudi Arabia. It recruits soldiers from trusted tribes throughout the country, thus strengthening the overall position of the Al Sa'ud to rule with zeal.

Mit'ab is well liked by tribal leaders and, more important, by recruits who benefit from his largess. In less than fifty years, the guard has transformed a segment of the Saudi population from destitute tribal elements into well-off, well-armed, and well-trained recruits. Unlike the regular armed forces—in which a number of coup attempts were hatched (1955, 1957–1959, 1969, and 1977)—the guard never experienced an uprising. The last recorded revolt occurred in 1929, when 'Abdul 'Aziz crushed the Ikhwan, the force that preceded the guard. Mit'ab, who is very close to his father and who was specifically instructed to distance himself from excessive commercial activities, is thus destined to lead the guard after his father relinquishes that portfolio. Indeed, the value of the guard will significantly expand under a future King Sultan, when it may well have redefined duties.

### **Khaled bin Sultan**

The oldest son of Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, Khaled was born in 1949, entered the military, and eventually graduated from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy. He holds a master's degree from Auburn University in the United States. As a major-general and the most senior uniformed member of the Al Sa'ud, he was appointed commander of the Air Defense Forces (a separate service in Saudi Arabia) in May 1986, and later promoted to lieutenant-general. After the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, he was named commander of all Arab and Muslim forces in Saudi Arabia, which gave him enormous public exposure and power. It was speculated that this, along with his concentration on extensive business interests—as well as a supposed demand to the king to be appointed chief of the General Staff—led to his dismissal in September 1991.<sup>128</sup> Understanding the need to protect his position, Khaled bought *Al-Hayat* newspaper—a tested platform—from the Mroueh family in Lebanon, to solidify his, as well as his father's, prospects.<sup>129</sup> In 1995, Prince Khaled authored a major thesis on his background and role in the War for Kuwait, revealing his determination to seek power.<sup>130</sup> This was the first time since Prince Talal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, who wrote *A Letter to the Citizen*, a call to Saudis from his Cairenese exile, that a senior member of the Al Sa'ud affixed his name to a comprehensive and somewhat critical study.

Given his military background and impeccable credentials as a nationalist, as well as his popular views on a slew of issues, this rising star—despite his premature resignation from the service—retains credible chances for future service.

### **Muhammad bin Fahd**

One of the late king's favorite sons, and certainly the most visible of his brothers, Muhammad bin Fahd, born in 1950, is—in addition to his important

political duties as governor of the oil-rich Eastern province—heavily involved in various business enterprises. He is a partner in the huge Al-Bilad Trading Company—a conglomerate involved in importing and construction. Another of his companies managed the US\$10 billion contract awarded to Bell Canada and Philips of Holland to upgrade the kingdom’s telephone system.<sup>131</sup> Irrespective of whatever financial transactions he may be involved in, his father entrusted him with the most difficult governorship in the kingdom, probably to assess his intrinsic capabilities. More important, and according to seasoned diplomatic observers of the ruling family, the late monarch confided that Muhammad had to prove himself to other senior Al Sa‘ud family members, arguing that his son’s leadership potential could be demonstrated only in the critical Eastern province. Having managed the province’s various religious and ethnic problems rather well, Muhammad enhanced his succession chances immeasurably, although he now serves his “uncle” rather than a father. Irrespective of such subtleties, Muhammad bin Fahd led his late father’s subclan, and was heavily involved in Sudayri affairs to better promote his interests and exercise influence.

### **Al-Walid bin Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz**

Al-Walid was born in 1957 to Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz and Mona al-Solh, a daughter of Lebanon’s first postindependence prime minister, Riad al-Solh. Prince Talal emerged as the leader of the liberal “free princes” in the 1950s, and what followed, including years in exile, left a mark on the young Al-Walid. After his parents divorced, the young man spent most of his childhood in Lebanon before returning to Saudi Arabia in 1968, to attend military school. Because his father was no longer close to the line of succession, al-Walid experienced relative deprivation—especially when contrasted with his many cousins—which clearly inspired his desire to excel. In 1976, al-Walid moved to San Francisco to attend Menlo College, where he studied business and distinguished himself as an ambitious, straight-A student. According to Carlos U. Lopez, a former academic adviser, the young man “was the hardest worker [he had] ever seen.”<sup>132</sup>

Al-Walid returned to Saudi Arabia in early 1980 with a bachelor’s degree in business (with honors), “anxious to take part in the massive, oil-driven economic boom sweeping through his country.”<sup>133</sup> He inaugurated his own company, Al-Mamlakah (The Kingdom), which quickly delved into various construction projects. The risk-taker soon invested in joint venture companies and earned significant revenues, which were immediately plowed into Riyadh real estate holdings. Unsatisfied with his accumulated professional knowledge, al-Walid returned to the United States in the mid-1980s to pursue a master’s degree at Syracuse University. As aptly described in a *Business Week* profile, “for a property owner with a sharp eye, Saudi Arabia’s poorly managed banks

were a ripe target [for al-Walid].” The ambitious entrepreneur accelerated his pace and, in 1986, “announced he had secretly amassed a controlling stake in the loss-making United Saudi Commercial Bank,” not a particularly successful financial institution at the time.<sup>134</sup> This was the first time that the Saudi establishment witnessed a hostile takeover of a well-known company. Within a few years, the Saudi entrepreneur had purchased substantial shares in Chase Manhattan, Manufacturers Hanover, and Chemical Bank, as well as a 5 percent stake through common stock purchases of the then-ailing Citicorp (increased to 14 percent with Federal Reserve Board approval in 1991).<sup>135</sup> Within five years, his investments climbed to US\$7.6 billion, which in turn allowed him to pursue other ventures, including the acquisition of a 24 percent stake in the Eurodisney theme park outside Paris, a 50 percent stake in New York’s Plaza Hotel, a 10 percent stake of London’s Canary Wharf, a 5 percent stake in Apple Computers, along with significant holdings in Compaq, Kodak, Ebay, Priceline.com, Amazon.com, and Worldcom.

These purchases drew severe criticism and questions about his strategies and putative backers. Suggestions that the prince was acting “as a front for a larger consortium of senior-level Saudi princes anxious to acquire a hefty stake in the American economy” surfaced from time to time, although these rumors were never substantiated. A 1999 report in *The Economist* concluded that he had “not earned enough from his investments” to pay for his massive stock purchases in the 1990s and may “have [had] a valuable and unrevealed source of income.”<sup>136</sup>

Irrespective of his financial activities, the prince’s verve for savvy political views, the result of his parental heritage, is remarkable. Echoing earlier statements by his father, Prince Talal, he has spoken openly about the need for governmental reforms, and has perhaps even offered alternative options. Al-Walid privately supported his father’s calls for an updated mechanism for succession in April 1998 in favor of the founder’s grandsons. By 2001, he had begun to publicly advocate his father’s views, calling for the introduction of elections to the Consultative Council.<sup>137</sup>

### Potential Alliances Among the Al Sa’ud

In addition to several grandsons mentioned earlier, including Khaled and Bandar bin Sultan, as well as Muhammad and ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Fahd, a number of important young princes are making significant advances into the Saudi decisionmaking process. To this short list above must be added ‘Abdul ‘Aziz and Sultan bin Salman, Mit‘ab bin Abdallah, and Fahad bin ‘Abdallah bin Sa’ud al-Kabir. Potentially, the latter four are allies of King ‘Abdallah, who over the years has established important links with each. Other prominent figures dominate the political scene, but most of those in the second generation are reflections of their fathers’ fortunes within the family.<sup>138</sup>

Naturally, the new “Allegiance Law of Succession” has established the need for a far smoother mechanism that alters existing family alliances. According to Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, the most gregarious Al Sa‘ud royal, recent internal research indicates that their family had 5,114 members in 2006, including “women and children, and there could be either an increase or decrease of 10 per cent in the figures.”<sup>139</sup> Assuming these figures to be accurate, designating the most righteous from among them will be an elaborate process, and Talal has called “for real political reforms in the region.” The Saudi has foreseen a role for Muslim political movements “that believe in democracy,” but insist that “they adhere to the laws of the land and the constitution of the country.”<sup>140</sup> In other words, Talal has contemplated a wider participatory framework for the kingdom, based on strong alliances within and outside the family. This is precisely what King ‘Abdallah has envisaged, albeit in a more institutionalized structure, supported by his many allies within the large ruling family.

## ■ Notes

1. This summary section draws on Joseph A. Kéchichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, New York: Palgrave, 2001, esp. pp. 1–65.

2. For a good discussion of the Al Sa‘ud ruling family, see David Holden and Richard Johns, *The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World*, New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981. See also Thomas W. Lippman, *Inside the Mirage: America’s Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia*, Boulder: Westview, 2004; and As‘ad AbuKhalil, *The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power*, New York: Steven Stories, 2004.

3. David Howarth, *The Desert King: The Life of Ibn Saud*, London: Quartet, 1965, 1980, pp. 42–52.

4. H. St. John B. Philby, *Sa‘udi Arabia*, London: Ernest Benn, 1955, pp. 265–291. See also Joseph Kostiner, *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From Chieftancy to Monarchical State*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, pp. 10, 185–188.

5. King Sa‘ud’s controversial rule cannot be adequately analyzed here because so much of what actually occurred is either unknown or anecdotal. No reliable Saudi sources exist and most Western data are inadequate. This section aims to highlight key developments that emerged from this rule, focusing on succession, to better draw patterns. For a detailed assessment of Sa‘ud’s rule, see Gary Samuel Samore, “Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953–1982),” PhD diss., Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1983, pp. 74–229. See also Alexei Vassiliev, *The History of Saudi Arabia*, London: Saqi, 1998, pp. 354–368. For an updated assessment of Faysal’s overall rule, see Joseph A. Kéchichian, *Faysal: Saudi Arabia’s King for All Seasons*, Gainesville: University Press of Florida, forthcoming 2008.

6. Dissatisfaction grew over wasteful expenditures, the lack of development of public projects and educational institutions, as well as the low wages for the growing



labor force. See Helen Lackner, *A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia*, London: Ithaca Press, 1978, pp. 57–68.

7. William Powell, *Saudi Arabia and Its Royal Family*, Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, 1982, pp. 230–232.

8. Sarah Yizraeli, *The Remaking of Saudi Arabia: The Struggle Between King Sa‘ud and Crown Prince Faysal, 1953–1962*, Tel Aviv, Israel: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997, pp. 63–64.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 204.

11. Talal, thus becoming the first member of the Al Sa‘ud family to write a public exposé, later felt that Sa‘ud was misrepresenting the country and its people and, eventually, fled to Cairo along with several air force officers. See Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz [Al Sa‘ud], *Risalah ilal-Muwatin* [A Letter to the Citizen], Cairo(?): n.p., 1962(?).

12. Although several Al Sa‘ud family members urged Faysal to take control of the government and the country, the heir apparent at first declined, citing a promise he had made to his father to support Sa‘ud. Instead of just taking over, Faysal became prime minister, named Khalid deputy prime minister, and formed a new government. He took command of the armed forces and quickly restored their loyalty and morale. This step proved to be a turning point, as later developments proved. See Gerald de Gaury, *Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia*, New York: Praeger, 1966, pp. 93–94.

13. Gerald de Gaury, *Faisal*, p. 100.

14. For the full text of the ten-point program, see *ibid.*, pp. 147–151.

15. Importantly, Faysal himself flew to Jiddah to let the ‘*ulamah* and the senior princes reach an independent decision. See Samore, “Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia,” p. 185.

16. Samore, “Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia,” pp. 186–187.

17. *Ibid.*, pp. 194–195.

18. For a discussion on King Faysal’s political thinking, see Majid Khadduri, *Arab Contemporaries: The Role of Personalities in Politics*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973, pp. 88–105.

19. de Gaury, *Faisal*, pp. 22–31.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 57–70.

21. Khadduri, *Arab Contemporaries*, pp. 98–99. See also Benoist-Mechin, *Fayçal, Roi d’Arabie: L’Homme, le Souverain, sa Place dans le Monde, 1906–1975*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1975.

22. Joseph A. Kéchichian, “The Role of the ‘Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia,” *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, no. 1, February 1986, p. 53–71; and Joseph A. Kéchichian, “Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi’s ‘Letters’ to the Saudi People,” *Muslim World* 70, no. 1, January 1990, pp. 1–16.

23. Muhammad ‘Ali al-Jawwad Muhammad, *Al-Tatawwur al-Tashri‘i fil-Mamlakah al-‘Arabiyyah al-Sa‘udiyyah* [Legislative Development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia], Alexandria, Egypt: Munsha‘at al-Ma‘arif, 1977, pp. 39–42. For the text of the 1926 constitution, see Helen Miller Davis, *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East*, Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1947, pp. 248–258.

24. For a discussion of the first nine meetings of the Majlis al-Shurah, see Fuad Hamza, *Al-Bilad al-'Arabiyyah al-Sa'udiyyah* [The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia], 2nd ed., Cairo: Maktabat al-Nasr al-Hadithat, 1968, pp. 98–111.

25. For a history of the ministries and the growth of their functions, see Hamza, *Al-Bilad al-'Arabiyyah al-Sa'udiyyah*, pp. 157–178 (Finance), pp. 113–156 (Foreign Affairs), and pp. 248–260 (Defense). See also Hisham B. Sharabi, *Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century*, Princeton: D. Van Nostran, 1962, p. 231.

26. Gaafar 'Abdul Salam 'Ali, *Al-Nizam al-Idari al-Sa'udi* [The Administrative Law in Saudi Arabia], Cairo: Al-Salfiyat, 1977, pp. 24–31.

27. The audit office was headed by a controller-general appointed by the king and directly responsible to him. His extensive powers included a right to lodge complaints against officials and dignitaries. The office was not filled until June 1957, when Sa'ud trusted it to his uncle Prince Musa'id bin 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman Al Sa'ud (whose son assassinated King Faysal in 1975), who was simultaneously head of the grievances office. Arguably, since the audit office was supposed to monitor state funds, and since the king was its largest spender, the authority of the audit office was sharply limited so as not to reveal the monarch's extravagant spending habits.

28. Abdulmunim Shakir, "Saudi Arabia," in A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, March 1976, p. 5.

29. For the text of Royal Decree no. 380, dated 11 May 1958, and translated by H. St. John B. Philby, see *Middle East Journal* 12, no. 3, Summer 1958, pp. 320–323.

30. Holden and Johns, *The House of Saud*, pp. 198–222.

31. *Ibid.*, p. 210.

32. "Document: Transfer of Powers from HM King Sa'ud to HRH Amir Faysal," *Middle East Journal* 18, no. 3, Summer 1964, pp. 351–354. The *fatwah* issued by the 'ulamah was signed by twelve leading clerics; in turn, the religious decree was ratified by sixty-eight senior Al Sa'ud family members.

33. de Gaury, *Faisal*, pp. 130–140. Faysal's own views on the engineered coup are reproduced from his first interview to the Beirut newspaper *Al-Hayat* in *ibid.*, pp. 136–138.

34. Shakir, "Saudi Arabia," pp. 10–11.

35. Holden and Johns, *The House of Saud*, pp. 379–383.

36. Steven Rattner, "Saudis Widen Rule After Mosque Raid," *New York Times*, 17 February 1980, p. 33. See also, James Dorsey, "After Mecca, Saudi Rulers Provide a Channel for Dissent," *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 March 1980, p. 7.

37. Kéchichian, "The Role of the 'Ulama," pp. 53–71.

38. The reputation of the Saudi military establishment diminished somewhat after the Makkah incident. First, the National Guard (headed by 'Abdallah) failed to rapidly put down the takeover, and second, the Royal Saudi Army (under the authority of Fahd) took a long time to defeat the rebels. Both of these military institutions required the assistance of Jordanian and French officers to overcome the 1979 Makkah siege.

39. Rattner, "Saudis Widen Rule After Mosque Raid," p. 33.

40. John M. Goshko, "Saudi King Seen Seeking Wider Base," *Washington Post*, 20 December 1982, p. A1. See also David B. Ottaway, "Saudi King Seeks Islamic Law Review," *Washington Post*, 16 June 1983, p. A1; and David B. Ottaway, "New Saudi Monarch Wields Slack Reins," *Washington Post*, 31 May 1983, p. A1.

41. Kéchichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, pp. 57–61.
42. “Fahd Proclaimed King,” *Foreign Broadcast Information Service–Middle East and Africa* (hereafter *FBIS-MEA*) 82-114, 14 June 1982, p. C1.
43. Steven Rattner, “Khalid Is Dead; Fahd Succeeds in Saudi Arabia,” *New York Times*, 14 June 1982, p. A1.
44. For the text of Heir Apparent ‘Abdallah’s speech, see *FBIS-MEA* 82-115, 15 June 1982, pp. C2–C3. As discussed below, the choice of “my lord” when referring to a monarch was repugnant to ‘Abdallah, who nevertheless uttered these words because his *bay’ah* required it.
45. Peter W. Wilson and Douglas F. Graham, *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*, Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1994, pp. 102–106.
46. Peter Wilson and Douglas Graham report that staffers at the US embassy in Riyadh told them that the recall was likely tied to Horan’s meeting with the king concerning the Saudi purchase of Chinese missiles. “When Horan protested, Fahd reportedly told him that every country had a right to defend itself. Later in the conversation, Fahd asked for American assurances that Israel would not attack its rockets. Horan infuriated the King by then repeating Fahd’s own words that every country including Israel had a right to defend itself.” See Graham and Wilson, *Saudi Arabia*, pp. 106, 137 n. 43.
47. R. Hrair Dekmejian, “Saudi Arabia’s Consultative Council,” *Middle East Journal* 52, no. 2, Spring 1998, pp. 204–218.
48. As later developments would confirm, delays in drafting a Basic Law for the kingdom indeed centered on this key question. See the interview with Prince Talal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz in “Change Is Inevitable in Saudi Arabia,” *Al-Quds al-‘Arabi*, 16 April 1998, reproduced in *Mideast Mirror*, 17 April 1998.
49. Kéchichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, pp. 71–73.
50. P. K. Abdul Ghafour, “Shoura Council Strength Increased to 150,” *Arab News*, 12 April 2005, p. 1.
51. Simon Henderson, *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995, p. 21.
52. *Basic Law of Government* (1992), art. 5, sec. b. See Appendix 15 in this volume for the relevant sections.
53. *Ibid.*, art. 5, sec. c. See Appendix 15.
54. Henderson, *After King Fahd*, p. 22.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 22 n. 2.
56. Of twenty successions in Al Sa‘ud reigns to date, a monarch’s rule has gone to a son seven times, and to a cousin four times. The total for brother-to-brother successions stands at nine.
57. Joseph A. Kéchichian, “Testing the Saudi ‘Will to Power’: Challenges Confronting Prince Abdallah,” *Middle East Policy* 10, no. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 100–115.
58. “Saudi Arabia: The Limits of Reform,” *The Economist* 370, no. 6368, p. 47.
59. F. Gregory Gause III, “The FP Memo: How to Save Saudi Arabia,” *Foreign Policy* no. 144, September–October 2004, pp. 66–70.
60. “Special Report: Arab Women—Out of the Shadows, Into the World,” *The Economist* 371, no. 8380, 19 June 2004, pp. 26–28.
61. “Riyadh Professor Objects to Woman Pilot,” *Arab News*, 3 July 2005, p. 1.
62. Lubna Hussain, “This Is Not a Saudi Soap Opera,” *Arab News*, 1 July 2005, p. 8. See also Rania al-Baz, *Défigurée: Quand un Crime Passionnel Devient Affaire*

*d'État*, Paris: Michal Lafont, 2005 (published in English as *Disfigured: When a Crime of Passion Becomes an Affair of State*, Oxford: OneWorld, 2007).

63. Khaled Almaeena, "Foreign Ministry to Appoint Women for First Time: Saud," *Arab News*, 24 February 2005, <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter/2005/saudi-relations-interest-02-24.html>.

64. Judy Al-Bakr, "Preparations in Full Swing for 5th National Forum for Dialogue," *Arab News*, 25 April 2005, p. 3.

65. "Editorial: Dialogue Forum," *Arab News*, 17 December 2005, p. 6.

66. Ebtihal Mubarak, "Dialogue Participants Meet King, Review Results," *Arab News*, 18 December 2005, p. 1.

67. Salah Nasrawi, "Islamists Make Strong Showing in Saudi Election," *The Independent*, 24 April 2005. See also Brian Whitaker, "Clerics' Choices Clean Up in Saudi Election," *The Guardian*, 25 April 2005.

68. Neil MacFarquhar, "Saudi Reformers: Seeking Rights, Paying a Price," *New York Times*, 9 June 2005, pp. A1, A8. See also Neil MacFarquhar, "Some Saudi Candidates Claim Election Violations," *New York Times*, 14 February 2005, p. A6; and M. Ghazanfar Ali Khan, "Government Intensifies Efforts to Constitute Municipal Councils," *Arab News*, 11 August 2005, p. 1.

69. Joseph A. Kéchichian, "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC," *Middle East Policy* 11, no. 4, Winter 2004, pp. 37–57, esp. pp. 46–49.

70. "Saudis Need Better Successions," *Christian Science Monitor*, 4 August 2005, p. 8. For details on the late king's life, see Douglas Martin, "Saudi Arabia's King Fahd Dies; Abdullah Named New Leader," *New York Times*, 1 August 2005; and Thomas W. Lippman, "King Fahd, Man of Maddening Contradictions," *Washington Post*, 1 August 2005.

71. "Reformists' Trial Set to Resume Today," *Arab News*, 2 April 2005, p. 1. See also "3 Saudi Reform Advocates Sentenced," *Los Angeles Times*, 16 May 2005, p. A5.

72. *Basic Law of Government* (1992), art. 5, sec. d. See Appendix 15 in this volume.

73. "Abdullah Receives Al-Damini [Dumayni], Al-Faleh," *Arab News*, 14 August 2005, p. 1.

74. Kéchichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, pp. 23–35.

75. 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman fathered at least thirty-six sons and perhaps an equal number of daughters. He accomplished this feat with twenty-two known wives, although he was always married to four at any given time, even if several stood out as his "favorites." Given cultural and religious sensitivities regarding wives, and in the absence of a Saudi source clarifying this subject, the most authoritative genealogical reference book is by a former British military attaché in the kingdom: see Brian Lees, *A Handbook of the Al Sa'ud Family of Saudi Arabia*, London: Royal Genealogies, 1980. An equally useful scholarly source, with emendations and clarifications, is Alexander Bligh, *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*, New York: New York University Press, 1984.

76. The Sa'ud al-Kabir, 'Arayf, and Jiluwi succession bids around the turn of the century were soundly rejected by 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman, through battle, marital connections, and/or co-option. When his cousins, the sons of Sa'ud, opposed him—and were responsible for a serious uprising among the 'Ajman and Hazazinah

tribes in 1908—‘Abdul ‘Aziz harnessed the power of his Ikhwan troops to end the revolt. In one episode, he gathered nineteen of the captured leaders together at the town of Laylah and conducted an impressive public execution. After eighteen had fallen under the sword, the victor pardoned the nineteenth and “bade him to go free and tell what he had seen of the just vengeance of Ibn Saud.” This example of stern justice immensely expanded ‘Abdul ‘Aziz’s prestige with the tribesmen, who increasingly supported him. See Harold C. Armstrong, *Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud—An Intimate Study of a King*, London: Barker, 1934, p. 97. By relying on force, the founder established “impeccable credentials,” even if his violent actions crystallized family rivalries. For further details on this issue, see Samore, “Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia,” pp. 36–47.

77. Howarth, *The Desert King*. See also Muhammad Jalal Kishk, *Al-Saudiyyun wal-Hal al-Islami* [The Saudis and the Islamic Solution], Jiddah: Saudi Publishing and Distribution House, 1982, esp. pp. 19–55.

78. Sa‘ud and Faysal were appointed viceroys of Najd and Hijaz, respectively, in 1926. They held these posts until 1933, when Sa‘ud was designated heir apparent and Faysal was elevated to the presidency of the Hijaz Council of Deputies.

79. The so-called free princes included Talal, Badr, Nawwaf, Majid, and Fawwaz. In addition, both Bandar and ‘Abdul Muhsin would join in, although their support was lukewarm. See Yizraeli, *The Remaking of Saudi Arabia*, pp. 32–33, 85–96; and Samore, “Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia,” pp. 139–154.

80. Benoist-Mechin, *Le Loup et le Leopard: Ibn-Seoud ou la Naissance d’un Royaume*, Paris: Albin Michel, 1955, pp. 467–485.

81. Madawi Al Rasheed, *Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty*, London: Tauris, 1991. See also A. Al Uthaymin, *Nashat Imarat al Rashid* [Accomplishments of the Al Rashid Emirate], Riyadh: n.p., 1981; Christine Moss Helms, *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Saudi Arabia*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 127–150; and John S. Habib, *Ibn Sa‘ud’s Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa‘udi Kingdom, 1910–1930*, Leiden: Brill, 1978, pp. 63–78.

82. These were Sa‘ad, Musa‘id, and ‘Abdul Muhsin, born to Jawharah bint Sa‘ad Al Sudayri; and Badr, ‘Abdul Illah, and ‘Abdul Majid, born to Haiyah bint Sa‘ad Al Sudayri.

83. Turki was appointed deputy minister of defense in 1969, but resigned in May 1979 after a marital scandal.

84. Another example of the reinforcement of the Fahd-Sultan alliance was the policy of arms purchases from Western sources, especially the United States, although the evidence to confirm this inference is anecdotal.

85. Abbas R. Kelidar, “The Problem of Succession in Saudi Arabia,” *Asian Affairs* 9, no. 1, February 1978, pp. 23–30.

86. Yizraeli, *The Remaking of Saudi Arabia*, pp. 63–64.

87. Powell, *Saudi Arabia and Its Royal Family*, pp. 240–245.

88. For a more complete list of nominees, see Philby, *Sa‘udi Arabia*, pp. 298–358; and Yizraeli, *The Remaking of Saudi Arabia*, pp. 75–82.

89. Yizraeli, *The Remaking of Saudi Arabia*, pp. 56–60.

90. Mordechai Abir, *Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration*, Boulder: Westview, 1988, pp. 135–139.

91. Holden and Johns, *The House of Saud*, pp. 507, 512–513, 523. Turki bin Faysal resigned from his position as head of the Directorate-General of Royal Intelligence on 31 August 2001 and was appointed ambassador by royal decree on 18 January 2003. See “Prince Turki Named Envoy to UK,” *Arab News*, 20 January 2003, p. 1.

92. “Prince Turki’s Résumé,” *New York Times*, 31 July 2005, p. 11 (sec. 4).

93. The prominent role of ‘Abdul ‘Aziz’s grandsons in the various armed forces of Saudi Arabia was striking. In addition to some of the sons of Faysal, Fahd, ‘Abdallah, and Sultan, other grandsons serving in the armed forces included two sons of Nasir (air force officer Turki, army officer Muhammad) and two sons of Salman (army officer Ahmad and air force officer Sultan). Ahmad died while undergoing surgery and Sultan, the astronaut, retired to head the nascent tourism portfolio. Many others were unidentified, especially if they took their military careers more seriously than their family politics. Still, all “grandson” military officers represented a substantial power investment for their respective fathers, even if it was difficult to draw clear lines between their alliances.

94. de Gaury, *Faisal*, p. 32. An account of the episode is also contained in a cable from J. Rives Childs, US minister in Jiddah, titled “Rivalry Between Saudi Arabian Princes,” 29 October 1946, in Ibrahim Rashid, ed., *Documents in the History of Saudi Arabia*, vol. 5, Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980, p. 47.

95. Some members of the fourth generation (the great-grandsons) are also present as officers in the army and in high administrative posts. For example, Sa‘ud bin ‘Abdallah bin Faysal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz is an army officer, and Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah bin Faysal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz is undersecretary of state at the Ministry of Education. The total size of this group is not clear, but it is certain to grow larger and to increasingly play a more active political role in the future. Ghassan Salamé, *Al-Siyasah al-Kharijiyyah al-Sa‘udiyyah Munzu ‘Am 1945: Dirasah fil-‘Ilaqat al-Dawliyyah* [The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia Since 1945: A Study in International Relations], Beirut: Muassasat al-Rihani lil-Tiba‘at wal-Nashr, 1980, pp. 45–50.

96. Kéchichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, pp. 175–184 (apps. 6–7). How many princesses survive is of course unknown.

97. Kéchichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, pp. 31–35.

98. The 1982 choice of a non-Sudayri, ‘Abdallah, was reported to have been a compromise born of a desire to limit the power faction of the Sudayris within the ruling family. This compromise decision was reaffirmed in 1992. See Youssef M. Ibrahim, “Saudi King Issues Decrees to Revise Governing System,” *New York Times*, 2 March 1992, p. 1.

99. “Saudi Arabia: New King, Same Dreadful Job,” *The Economist* 376, no. 8438, 6 August 2005, p. 35. See also “Saudi Arabia: More of the Same Won’t Do,” *The Economist* 376, no. 8438, 6 August 2005, pp. 10–11.

100. “Prince Salman Seems Most Likely to Succeed,” *Oxford Analytica*, daily brief, 17 November 2005.

101. Max Rodenbeck, “A Long Walk: A Survey of Saudi Arabia,” *The Economist* 378, no. 8459, 7 January 2006, pp. 1–12.

102. Alain Gresh, “Amorce de Changements, Pression des Conservateurs: Kaléidoscope Saoudien,” *Le Monde Diplomatique* 53, no. 623, February 2006, pp. 8–9. See also “Saudi Arabia: Talk of Reform,” *Middle East International* no. 704, 11 July 2003, pp. 18–19.

103. Fatiha Dazi-Héni, "La Crise de Légitimités du Régime Saoudien," in Dazi-Héni, *Monarchies et Sociétés d'Arabie*, pp. 85–124.

104. Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia, *Political and Economic Reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*, Washington, D.C., May 2006. See also Khaled Almaeena, "Let Every Voice Within Our Midst Be Heard," *Arab News*, 23 September 2005, p. 1; and Mariam Al Hakeem, "Saudi Arabia Marks National Day Today," *Gulf News*, 23 September 2005, p. 6.

105. According to news reports, on 9 August 2005 the king declared to a gathering of princes, officials, and citizens who were at Al-Salam Palace to congratulate him on his accession that "kissing hands is something alien to our values and ethics, and is refused by free and honest people. It also leads to bowing, which violates God's law as the faithful bow only to the one and only God [and] I hereby declare my total rejection of this matter, and I ask everyone not to kiss the hand of anyone except their parents as a mark of devotion." On 18 August, the monarch banned citizens from addressing him as "my lord," stressing that God is the only Lord whom Saudis acknowledged. See Female First News, "Saudi Arabia's King Bans Kissing Hand of Royal Family," 16 September 2005, [http://www.femalefirst.co.uk/royal\\_family/royal+news+saudi+arabia+s+king+bans+kissing+hand+of+royal+family-9267.html](http://www.femalefirst.co.uk/royal_family/royal+news+saudi+arabia+s+king+bans+kissing+hand+of+royal+family-9267.html).

106. "Prince Talal Calls for Reforms in Arab World," *Times of Oman*, 27 August 2005, p. 1. See also "Prince Talal Calls for Reform and a Saudi Constitution," *Daily Star* (Lebanon), 29 August 2005, p. 1.

107. Salah Nasrawi, "Saudi Prince Urges Changes," *Associated Press*, 6 June 1999.

108. Prince Abdallah's remarks were first published on 18 August 1962, in *Al-Safa* and *Al-Hayat*, two leading Beirut dailies. See de Gaury, *Faisal*, pp. 107–108.

109. "Prince Talal Calls for Reform and a Saudi Constitution," *Daily Star* (Lebanon), 29 August 2005, p. 1.

110. Stanley Reed, "A Princely Power Struggle Could Shake the House of Saud," *Business Week*, 25 December 1995, p. 56. See also Kathy Evans, "Saudi Arabia: Shifting Sands at the House of Saud," *Middle East Magazine* no. 253, February 1996, pp. 6–9; Joseph A. Kéchichian, "Saudi Arabia's Will to Power," *Middle East Policy* 7, no. 2, February 2000, pp. 47–60; and Kéchichian, "Testing the Saudi 'Will to Power,'" pp. 100–115.

111. This section updates my previous assessment of several Saudi personalities. See Kéchichian, *Succession in Saudi Arabia*, pp. 75–80.

112. "Al-Malik Yaqur al-Nizam al-Asasi li-Hay'at al-Bi'at . . . wa-Yu'ainu al-Tuwayjari Aminan 'Aman' [The King Issues Basic Laws for the Allegiance Institution and Appoints Al-Tuwayjiri as Secretary-General], *Al Jazirah* no. 12441, 21 October 2006, p. 1. Though the literal translation for *Hay'at al-Bay'ah* is indeed "Allegiance Commission," my own transliteration identifies the decree as "Allegiance Law of Succession."

113. As this book went to press, Riyadh issued Royal Decree Number 90 (27/8/1412—8 October 2007) with the Commission's bylaws. Composed of eighteen articles, which were published in the daily, these regulations clarified membership (all surviving sons of the founder and, if deceased, a single grandson representing the family subbranch), along with several steps to select an heir within ten days of the death of a monarch. See "Khadim al-Haramayn 'Yatamidu 'al-Laihat al-Tanfiziyyah li-Nizam Hay'at al-Bay'ah' [Custodian of Holy Mosques Relies on Bylaws to Allegiance Law of

Succession], *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat*, 9 October 2007, at <http://www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=3&article=440516&Issue=10542>.

114. "Saudi Arabia Sets Up Panel to Formalize Succession," *Reuters*, 20 October 2006.

115. Khaled bin Sultan [Al Sa'ud] with Patrick Seale, *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*, New York: HarperCollins, 1995.

116. "Prince Khaled's Departure Is Unexplained," *Saudi Arabia Country Report* no. 4-1991, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1991, p. 12.

117. "Saudi Names Gulf War Prince Deputy Defence Minister," *Reuters*, 18 January 2001.

118. F. Gregory Gause III, *Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990, pp. 150–162.

119. P. K. Abdul Ghafour and Saeed Al-Abyad, "New Law to Streamline Succession," *Arab News*, 21 October 2006, <http://arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=84257&d=21&m=10&y=2006>.

120. Samore, "Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia," p. 483.

121. Of course, the process was completed in 1993 when the monarch appointed members of the Majlis al-Shurah and, in a fundamental departure from past practices, limited the tenure of most cabinet officers to four-year terms—a decision that was periodically "updated" to allow senior Al Sa'ud members to retain critical portfolios.

122. Samore, "Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia," p. 486. See also Brian Lees, "The Al Saud Family and the Future of Saudi Arabia," *Asian Affairs* 37, no. 1, March 2006, pp. 36–49.

123. Samore, "Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia," p. 486.

124. Mahmoud Ahmad, "Prince Naif Curbs Power of Virtue Commission," *Arab News*, 25 May, 2006, <http://www.arabnews.com/?page=1&section=0&article=82705&d=25&m=5&y=2006>.

125. Michael Scott Doran, "The Saudi Paradox," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1, January–February 2004, pp. 35–51.

126. Bligh, *From Prince to King*, p. 90.

127. Arnaud de Borchgrave, "Saudis' James Bond and George Smiley," *Washington Times*, 29 July 2005, <http://www.washtimes.com/functions/print.php?storyid=20050728-081358-7342r>. See also "Profile: Prince Turki al-Faisal," *BBC NEWS*, 20 July 2005, [http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/ft/-/2/hi/middle\\_east/4700589.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/ft/-/2/hi/middle_east/4700589.stm).

128. Opposition forces in Britain maintain that his dismissal was the result of an unauthorized speech—declaring the doubling of the size of the Saudi armed forces—allegedly delivered without the king's approval.

129. *Al-Hayat* was a Lebanese newspaper whose credibility and diligence as protector of freedom of speech cost its owner, Kamel Mroueh, his life in Beirut in 1966. Khaled first rented the name *Al-Hayat*, but soon bought it after realizing it could be a useful tool. He turned the newspaper, a symbol of freedom of the press and democracy, into his personal podium. Along with *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, another London-based Saudi-owned daily, *Al-Hayat* covers the Middle East from the kingdom's perspective. Other newspapers, magazines, and television networks complement the Al Sa'ud media portfolio.

130. Al Sa'ud with Seale, *Desert Warrior*.

131. According to Said Aburish, "In May 1981, Muhammad obtained his father's approval and claimed a share of Petromin Oil on the pretext of selling it to a Japanese



company by the name of Petromonde. On the surface, this looked like a straightforward commission transaction similar to what members of the Al Sa'ud do every day and which was meant to produce a huge, one-off profit—like those that Muhammad got from many of the commercial deals in which he had been involved. In reality, the purchaser did not exist and a close investigation by *The Wall Street Journal* revealed that Petromonde was part of Al-Bilad, an international corporation owned by none other than Prince Muhammad himself. His Highness was not content with the commission; he also wanted to control the resale of the oil to make more money, and it was estimated that his income from the deal amounted to \$11 million a month for over a year." See Said Aburish, *The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud*, London: Bloomsbury, 1994, p. 298.

132. John Rossant, "The Prince," *Business Week*, 25 September 1995, <http://www.businessweek.com/archives/1995/b34431.arc.htm>.

133. Gary C. Gambill and Ziad K. Abdelnour, "Dossier: Prince Al-Walid bin Talal," *Middle East Intelligence Bulletin* 4, no. 9, September 2002, [http://www.meib.org/articles/0209\\_med1.htm](http://www.meib.org/articles/0209_med1.htm).

134. Rossant, "The Prince."

135. This controversial transaction is discussed in Dan Briody, *The Iron Triangle: Inside the Secret World of the Carlyle Group*, New York: Wiley, 2003, pp. 51–59.

136. "Al Waleed's Kingdom: The Mystery of the World's Second-Richest Businessman," *The Economist* 350, no. 8108, 27 February 1999, pp. 67–70.

137. Gerhard Spörl and Bernhard Zand, "Interview with Saudi Arabia's Prince Waleed Bin Talal: 'We Too Are Victims of Terrorism,'" *Der Spiegel*, reproduced in Saudi-US Relations Information Service, 31 January 2005, <http://www.saudi-us-relations.org/newsletter2005/saudi-relations-interest-01-31.html>.

138. These ten individuals were chosen for two specific reasons: all were encouraged by their powerful fathers to assume leadership responsibilities, and all were ambitious enough to accept the challenges ahead. In addition to these ten, the following individuals are also rising stars, although not necessarily in the top list: Faysal bin Bandar (governor of Qasim), Turki bin Nasir (Royal Saudi Air Force general), Fahd bin Sultan (governor of Tabuk), Faysal bin Muhammad Al Sa'ud al-Kabir (Royal Saudi Air Force general), Sa'ud bin Fahd (General Intelligence Directorate); Fahd bin Salman (deputy governor of Eastern province), Turki bin Sultan (Ministry of Information), Khaled bin Faysal (governor of Makkah), Mansur bin Bandar (commander of Jiddah Air Base), and Sa'ud bin Nayif (vice governor of Riyadh). One must also add to this list 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Salman (deputy minister of petroleum), who is the fourth son of the charismatic governor of Riyadh and, in that capacity, a critical leader with his hands on the kingdom's primary source of income. 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Salman is popular and surrounds himself with a retinue of supporters who benefit from his largess and, naturally, support him—and his father—in other forums. He was appointed to the newly created post of undersecretary of petroleum affairs in July 1996. Previously, the prince had served as an adviser in the ministry, where he often was at loggerheads with the previous oil minister, Hisham Nazer.

139. Mariam Al Hakeem, "Prince Talal Bin Abdul Aziz, Saudi Royal Family Member: Tackling Region's Myriad Ills," *Gulf News*, 11 November 2006, [http://gulfnews.com/region/saudi\\_arabia/10081685.html](http://gulfnews.com/region/saudi_arabia/10081685.html).

140. Ibid.



## 8

---

# The United Arab Emirates

**A**lthough the seven emirates that form the United Arab Emirates (UAE) boast rich historical backgrounds, little of their past glories survived into the first half of the twentieth century. The destruction of the once dominant Qawasim tribes by British forces in 1819, and the forced sedentarization of the remaining clans after that date, essentially meant that the entire coast would be “subjugated” until the early 1970s. Remarkably, no Emirati leader reneged his authority—perceived or otherwise—to successive British political residents, even if reality required them to cooperate with London.

To be sure, the 1971 federation experiment in the Lower Gulf Coast performed well for a variety of reasons, including Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan’s unique consolidating attributes, ranging from foresight to generosity. As it is frankly acknowledged by senior UAE officials, including the president, unification was not an easy task.<sup>1</sup> On the contrary, few anticipated the UAE experiment in unity to last a few years, much less celebrate a silver jubilee and embark on its fourth decade of existence with remarkable accomplishments to its credit. Still, and despite the many difficulties associated with the idea of federation—as well as the myriad practical issues in creating a state—Zayed was fortunate to deal with fellow rulers who were legitimate in their own right. An entire generation of men, led by six talented and politically savvy rulers, accepted Zayed’s mantle. In turn, these seven men operated within specific tribal confines, which defined Emirati sociopolitical life. Indeed, their calculated actions changed the face of the country from a neglected realm into a modern society.<sup>2</sup>

Over a relatively short period of time, different tribal traditions were amalgamated, against considerable odds. Furthermore, the harmony between a tribal way of life and many religious requirements, was a clear test of Emirati endurance, as poorly educated and often isolated inhabitants faced the challenges of a rapidly encroaching world. Throughout the centuries, Emirati tribes competed for power, often at great cost, before finally settling into a sustained pattern of peaceful cohabitation.<sup>3</sup>

## ■ Creation and Cohesion

The Qawasim and the Banu Yas, along with the Na‘im and the Manasir, among others, all submitted to the overwhelming British imperial presence in the Lower Gulf Coast. Emirati tribes were under the influence of three major foreign powers—the Portuguese, the Ottomans, and the British—long before they joined into a federal alliance.<sup>4</sup> In the Gulf region, the Portuguese—who ruled over vast expanses of Asia, ranging from Macao to Goa—settled on the island of Hormuz (Iran) as well as on Bahrain and the Omani coast. In fact, the two main forts in Muscat are still referred to as the “Portuguese forts.” With the waning of its military might, however, Lisbon ceded all of its power in the Gulf region to London, which, starting at the beginning of the nineteenth century, opted to protect its significant interests in India. As discussed above, Britain entered the Gulf because the seafaring inhabitants of the coastal communities, specially the Qawasim, represented a credible challenge to British might on the high seas. In other words, Britain was in the Gulf not because it wanted to liberate and democratize, but to protect its own intrinsic interests.<sup>5</sup>

At the time, the Gulf emirates were rather strong and presented, from a British imperial point of view, a genuine threat. Indeed, the reputation of Lower Gulf entities as capable sea-faring powers was widespread, leading London to label the area as a “Pirate Coast” even if, objectively, the British were the intruders. The East India Company organized several major naval expeditions against the Qawasim and, having deployed overwhelming military power, subjugated the entire coast through a series of treaties and agreements starting in 1820. After that date, East India Company ships were safe and, in exchange, London recognized the legitimacy of several tribal leaders to rule in specific areas, and the need to defend the Lower Gulf, from both sea-borne and—importantly—land attacks. It was only after the 1820 agreements that the British reference to the “Pirate Coast” changed to the “Trucial Coast,” a name that was still in use in 1971. Of course, the treaty that defined Britain’s obligations toward the Arab Gulf shaykhdoms was the 1853 Maritime Treaty, to which Fujairah was assimilated on 19 March 1952. Yet, and this much was certain, London did not allow the lack of a formal treaty to define how it exercised its influence between 1820 and 1853.<sup>6</sup>

Senior British political figures and historians recognized that the “centre of the British political authority and influence was, until 1946, at the Persian port of Bushire, which was also the seat of a British Consulate-General for south-western Persia.”<sup>7</sup> In other words, the Lower Gulf Coast did not rank high enough on the political pedestal of the empire to warrant direct contact, but necessarily enjoyed a privileged relationship through the East India Company. Ostensibly, such an arrangement allowed tribal leaders in the Lower Gulf to conduct their internal affairs freely, while dealing with the paramount power—and through it, the rest of the world—via a political resident.

Although tribal leaders in the Trucial Coast were bound to these accords with the British in the aftermath of the Qawasim defeat, they nevertheless were also cognizant that the Ottoman Empire had extended its influence all the way down to Basrah in Iraq, as well as Hijaz on the western side of the Arabian Peninsula, and down to Aden in Yemen. If the British-Ottoman competition for power retained a European dimension to its myriad machinations for the inhabitants of the peninsula—later to be further complicated with a German intervention—an equally important feature was the inhabitants' desire to rely on London to protect them from the Porte.

After World War II, when the Gulf region was still relatively isolated, Shakhbut bin Sultan appointed his brother Zayed as his representative in Al Ain. Between 1946 and 1966, Zayed seized every chance to learn about his subjects, fellow Gulf Arabs and peoples from all walks of life.<sup>8</sup> He validated the confidence placed in him as a doer. In the context of the time—that is, before oil income was significant enough to make a difference—how Zayed dealt with problems illustrated his intrinsic capabilities. These were not easy years, but Zayed was keen to bring development to Al Ain. He borrowed money and mortgaged his shaykhdom's potential wealth, cajoled relatives to give up their rights to limited water resources, cleared out the ancient *falaj* (water canal) system so that more water became available for basic needs as well as agriculture, and, in a foresightful step, supported the construction of a water pipeline from Al Ain to Abu Dhabi. The emirate was no longer dismembered, and travel from the oasis to the coast was greatly enhanced. Although lack of funds hampered the establishment of schools in the 1950s, Zayed hired teachers when possible, and paid them whenever he could. His charm and the knowledge that an experiment was under way lured many. Among the children who benefited from such investments were several of his sons, including Khalifah bin Zayed, the future Abu Dhabi heir apparent, deputy supreme commander of the UAE Armed Forces, and ruler after Zayed died in 2004; Sultan bin Zayed, the deputy prime minister; Tahnun bin Muhammad, the ruler's representative in Al Ain; and Surur bin Muhammad, chamberlain of the Presidential Court.<sup>9</sup> Funds were limited, but the vision was infinite.

Oil was discovered in Abu Dhabi in 1958, and the first commercial field entered production in 1962. New revenues meant that development projects would soon follow, and Zayed was eager to set a fast pace even if the ruler, Shakhbut, was far more cautious. Given the dizzying pace of change elsewhere in the region, and the pressure for progress by Emiratis eager to remove the shackles of poverty, it was not long before Zayed was propelled to seek—and receive—Abu Dhabi leaders' support to lead the emirate as ruler.

Facilitating the development of human resources, erecting proper infrastructure throughout the emirate, and adopting an environmental approach were not the only developments pursued by the ruler in the 1960s. Remarkably, Zayed committed himself to cooperating with his tribal neighbors, because he

realized that advances in Abu Dhabi necessitated cooperation with adjoining, if less fortunate, tribes. One early step was to meet with the then-ruler of Dubai, Rashid bin Sa'id Al Maktoum, to resolve a long-standing border dispute between the two emirates.<sup>10</sup> Agreements were also signed with Oman and Qatar, and Abu Dhabi quickly stepped up to the plate to assume full funding for the Trucial States Development Council, which was first proposed by hesitant British authorities.<sup>11</sup> By assuming the mantle of financial leadership, Zayed illustrated that he was willing to share Abu Dhabi's good fortune with his neighbors.

When, in early 1968, the British announced their intention to leave the Gulf after 150 years of total control, Zayed seized the opportunity to shape the future political course of the Lower Gulf. He successfully persuaded Rashid bin Sa'id to join him in a federation of all nine emirates (Abu Dhabi, 'Ajman, Bahrain, Dubai, Fujairah, Ras al-Khaimah, Sharjah, Qatar, and Umm al-Qiwayn). When Bahrain and Qatar opted to seek full independence, Zayed redoubled his efforts to set up the federation with the remaining seven. Following a series of accords, he succeeded in helping to establish the United Arab Emirates in December 1971.

By Zayed's own account, negotiations that led to the creation of the UAE were taxing, both politically and financially.<sup>12</sup> Still, the newly elected president of the nascent federation concluded that only unity would ensure the survival of the smaller shaykhdoms, and that much would need to be asked of those that possessed the most. Indeed, because of this basic judgment, he never flinched from his responsibilities toward the federation. Despite numerous problems since 1971, Zayed almost always felt that his own responsibilities were far greater than all of the others' combined.

## **The Transformation of Tribes into a Nation**

Despite their isolation from the rest of the Arab world—the dual legacy of both Ottoman and British imperialism—the emirates of the Lower Gulf were agitated by “the” condition of the 1950s and 1960s: Arab nationalism. After a century and a half of neglect, Arab nationalism appealed to rulers and populations alike, including in the conservative Gulf region. In fact, Arab nationalism meant to restore the dignity and power of what were once powerful tribal societies, promising to eliminate poverty and misery. Although the seven emirates were not “revolutionary” in any sense of the word, by the mid-1960s several rulers were fully aware of developments in Egypt, Iraq, Syria, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The allure aside, savvy rulers appreciated differences between the wheat and the chaff and, rather than opt for revolution, embarked on a unique evolutionary process. When London announced its intent to withdraw from east of Suez by 1971, the emirates scrambled to fill the security vacuum left behind. Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan

and his fellow rulers were intent to assume their fair share of responsibilities, even if the immediate preference—given all that was lacking—was to persuade London to change its mind and “stay for a little while longer.” When this effort failed to produce the desired results, the British departed, and the UAE was duly created. Wary rulers were finally persuaded to follow Zayed’s admonitions. In doing so, they transformed their tribal nations into a modern state, with both challenges and opportunities (see Appendix 17 for a list of UAE rulers).

## ■ **Constitutional Continuum in the United Arab Emirates**

Between 1968 and 1970, a significant effort was initiated by several rulers in the Lower Gulf to unite the nine small shaykhdoms into a federation.<sup>13</sup> On 24 October 1970, at the last meeting of the Federal Council held in Abu Dhabi, the failure of the nascent federation was appropriately confirmed. Differences on the “citing of the capital,” “representation of the Union Council in the Permanent Constitution,” “the method of voting in the Supreme Council of Rulers,” and other provisions, including the critical proportional representation based on each emirate’s population, led the delegations to seek outside mediation.<sup>14</sup> Kuwait and Saudi Arabia attempted to persuade wary rulers to seek a viable alternative, with little success. Iranian claims on Bahrain, Abu Musa, and the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands forced the Bahraini and Qatari ruling families to quickly normalize relations with Tehran, which at the time opposed the intended federation of nine before a complete resolution of various sovereignty matters over the disputed islands. Added to these regional transactions, the Bahraini intelligentsia implied that they were not ready to “be integrated with a society which still had some way to go to reach Bahrain’s sophistication.”<sup>15</sup> Qatari and Bahraini rulers finally informed their would-be partners that they would not join the proposed federation, and declared their independence on 24 August and 1 September 1971, respectively. These two defections facilitated the process of unification of the other shaykhdoms, because both ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah and Ahmad bin ‘Ali Al Thani insisted on preferential treatment in the envisaged federation.

## **Constitutional Formation of the Emirates**

On 10 July 1971, the seven rulers of the Trucial Coast met in Dubai and initiated a week-long debate, at the end of which a communiqué was accordingly issued announcing the formation of a union between six emirates.<sup>16</sup> Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qassimi, the ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, could not compromise on the issue of representation in the Union Council, which caused him to withhold

approval. Despite traditional quarrels between the ruling families of the Lower Gulf—often instigated by the considerable disparities of natural wealth as well as British, Saudi, Iranian, and Kuwaiti intrigues—the UAE came into being when six rulers adopted a provisional constitution. This body of laws was considered a federal agreement in which each ruler was allocated specific powers. Since this was the first such agreement of its kind for the region, and given that individual rulers did not enjoy previous experience in joint governance, there were no precedents to discuss. It was, to put it mildly, a haphazard affair. Still, the union constitution survived a number of alterations, especially after its first five-year transitional period expired.

Judiciously balanced, the union constitution aimed to accommodate each ruling family's desire for autonomy, while upholding Abu Dhabi's wish to amalgamate the "Trucial States" under its leadership. This objective created a paradoxical situation, because each sovereign operated according to traditional prerogatives. In the process, they willingly or involuntarily bypassed the emerging UAE state machinery, which included, among other bodies, the Supreme Council of Rulers, the Council of Ministers, the Union National Council, and the Union Judiciary. What further complicated matters was the constitutional recognition that each shaykhdom retained residual authority over internal affairs (Article 3).<sup>17</sup> Authority over foreign and defense policies as well as policies affecting the entire federation, on the other hand, were the prerogatives of the federal government (Article 2), which was "guided" by the Supreme Council of Rulers, in which each shaykhdom technically enjoyed equality (see Appendix 18 for relevant excerpts from the constitution).

**Supreme Council of Rulers.** In this governing body of the UAE (Article 46), the seven members retained overall power and no measures could be adopted without the agreement of five of its members, including the necessary Abu Dhabi and Dubai votes. Although each emirate exercised a single vote, those cast by Abu Dhabi and Dubai carried additional value and were in fact used to veto particular items. No substantive matters concerning the UAE's "general policies, the ratification of international treaties, agreements, and draft laws, the appointment of a prime minister, a declaration of war, the imposition of martial law" (Article 47) and the like could thus be adopted without the Abu Dhabi and Dubai ballots (Article 49).<sup>18</sup> According to Articles 51–54, the Supreme Council of Rulers was to elect a president as well as a vice president, who in turn would be responsible to the other rulers. The sovereign of the largest emirate, Abu Dhabi, traditionally occupied the presidency, and the sovereign of Dubai typically occupied the vice presidency, although no specific references were spelled out in the text. Nevertheless, the pattern became a tradition because of the personalities of the country's first president, Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, from Abu Dhabi, and first vice president, Rashid bin Muhammad Al Maktoum, from Dubai. It is critical to appreciate the context in



which such leading personalities played their roles in tribal politicking. Whether tacit relationships between leading power brokers might perpetuate indefinitely was anyone's guess.

**Council of Ministers.** According to the UAE constitution, a federal government with executive powers and responsibilities to the Supreme Council of Rulers was to be formed, drawing officers from all seven emirates (Articles 55–56). Article 60 catalogued in ten points all the responsibilities of the government, underlining its considerable legislative capacity and powers. Consequently, the federal government would draft all federal laws, which would then be submitted to the Federal National Council for debate, the latter of which would then present the laws to the president. Initially, the prerogatives of the federal government remained vague, because of the rulers' preferences for a loose union. More accurately perhaps, the first few federal governments lacked the expertise to coordinate seven policies to unite them into a single position. Yet by 1976, after the unification of several separate military institutions into a federal army, and the creation of a higher finance committee responsible for preparing a joint budget, the government's prerogatives were further clarified by the Supreme Council of Rulers. The most dramatic effect of this change was manifested in January 1977, when a previously established distribution of portfolios between the seven shaykhdoms was eliminated and priority was extended to staffing the Council of Ministers (cabinet) with qualified individuals.<sup>19</sup> From its outset in December 1971 until 1979, Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum, the heir apparent of Dubai, headed the federal government. The 1 July 1979 governmental crisis led to a change, with the office reverting to his father, Rashid, thereby preserving the post for an official from Dubai.

**Federal National Council.** The powers ascribed to the Federal National Council indicated that it was "neither the exclusive nor the most prominent legislative authority in the state but, in reality, [had] a predominantly consultative character."<sup>20</sup> With a two-year mandate, the council's forty members (Article 72) were distributed according to a carefully balanced roster: Abu Dhabi and Dubai had eight seats each, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah had six seats each, and 'Ajman, Umm al-Qiwain, and Fujairah had four seats each (Article 68). Interestingly, the selection method of Federal National Council members was left up to each emirate, although the rulers appointed every member between 1971 and 2006. Nevertheless, an interpretation of Article 69 suggested that potential popular elections held by individual emirates to select council delegates would not be contrary to the language of the constitution, as new regulations in late 2006 implied.<sup>21</sup> Significantly, however, while the council debated federal laws on behalf of the government, it did not cast ballots on any of them (Article 92).

**Union Judiciary.** Finally, the constitution stipulated that a union judicial system would be created, including establishment of a supreme court and a first instance court (Article 95). According to the constitution, the UAE Supreme Court may have no more than five members, who are appointed by the president of the Supreme Council of Rulers after consultations with other rulers. Naturally, jurists must be competent to adjudicate various issues, including disputes between emirates, constitutional legality of union laws, interpretation of the provisions of the constitution, crimes affecting the federation, and conflicts of jurisdiction between union juridical authorities and local juridical authorities (Article 99).<sup>22</sup> Remarkably, the First Instance Court's competence was defined to include civil, commercial, and administrative disputes, as well as personal status actions (Article 102), but this was the exception rather than the rule. Adoption of a federal judiciary system, which included a hierarchy culminating in a supreme court with extensive authority of interstate intervention, illustrated the rulers' desire to entrust the UAE to an institutional custodian, even if its implementation was not guaranteed. In fact, the main objective was to ensure "that the Constitution was adhered to," itself a novel idea because the historical evidence pointed to outside mediation to resolve disputes.<sup>23</sup> While the effectiveness of a supreme court remained proportional to the powers wrested in the body, the principle of an independent judicial system in what was basically a tribal society was quite remarkable. Nevertheless, to date, the UAE Supreme Court has not petitioned to hear interfederation disputes. Until such time, the court's institutional effectiveness remains bound to the judgments of Supreme Council of Rulers members or, in their absence, individual federation bureaucracies.

### **Zayed's Constitutional Vision**

Despite the elaborate constitutional stipulations described above, serious differences existed within the Supreme Council of Rulers, perhaps with the exception of issues related to the federation's foreign policies. Consequently, UAE political institutions evolved helter-skelter, hampered by unending power struggles among rulers.

As president of the UAE, Zayed bin Sultan sought to strengthen federal institutions and won the support of rulers in Sharjah, Umm al-Qiwain, Fujairah, and 'Ajman. His preferences were often rejected by Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah. Regrettably, serious political differences between Abu Dhabi and Dubai in 1976 and 1979—chiefly over centralization—threatened the very existence of the UAE as a federation. In August 1976, five years after the creation of the country, Zayed announced that he intended to step down from the presidency at the end of his mandate, on 2 December 1976. Arguing that his accomplishments had been negligible—when merely holding the shaykhdoms together was an unprecedented phenomenon—Zayed identified lack of progress in unifying armies

and coordinating petroleum policies as his major shortcomings.<sup>24</sup> He further lamented his alleged ineptitude to implement stated constitutional prerogatives, which in hindsight instilled fear in the hearts of all concerned.

With respect to the army, no unification was possible, despite the 12 May 1975 decision by the Supreme Council of Rulers to restrict air, land, and naval deployments to federal forces. Individual shaykhdoms could only retain guards to protect ruling families. Other than Abu Dhabi—whose forces formed the nucleus of the federal military—Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qassimi, the ruler of Sharjah, was the emirate that complied with this directive. Dubai and Ras al-Khaimah retained local armies, even though all seven emirates released some of their forces to buttress emerging federal military institutions.<sup>25</sup>

With respect to petroleum resources, there was a total lack of coordination that resulted in the construction of duplicate projects, often draining scarce resources. The Supreme Council of Rulers' limited efforts to resolve disputes and attempts to reconcile competing policies failed to produce tangible results. In fact, the issue of federal ownership of the country's oil resources was never addressed. Consequently, the UAE Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral Resources acted exclusively on behalf of Abu Dhabi, while Dubai, Sharjah, and to a lesser extent Ras al-Khaimah maintained autonomous policies.

Despite these irritants, Zayed was persuaded to reverse his resignation intention following internal as well as regional advocacy. Theoretically, some of his demands were to be implemented, in exchange for which the president would agree to an enlarged number of ministers from Dubai in the new cabinet. It was tough bargaining, but a noticeable synchronization occurred, particularly in the country's immigration, communications, federal budget, and security policies. In substance, however, these unification measures remained theoretical, and led to a new round of disagreements by 1978.

Early in 1978, Zayed embarked on the long-sought unification of the army by naming his son, Khalifah bin Zayed, as commander in chief of the UAE Armed Forces. Dubai immediately withdrew its token forces from federal units, asserting that Zayed was overextending his presidential prerogatives, which set off a new round of internal polemics.<sup>26</sup> Simultaneously, the border dispute between Dubai and Sharjah flared once again, as Federal National Council debates on new immigration laws neglected to produce a sorely needed consensus. Rumors of secession filled the air, although they may have been manifestations of tension rather than genuine plans. With revolutionary developments in Tehran and the increased perception of the threat emanating from Iran, Dubai relented, accepting to tone down its maverick policies. On 23 February 1979, the Council of Ministers issued a statement indicating that the country would remain united in the face of regional dangers. Once again, foreign policy concerns forced the rulers to place internal differences aside. As the opportunity was ripe, Zayed, ever the Emirati nationalist, expediently proposed a bold ten-point program to reinforce federal institutions. This was a

rare opening and worthy of political risk, as the program intended to create working mechanisms to resolve border disputes, unify armed forces, and coordinate petroleum and other economic affairs. Unfortunately, Zayed's proposals in the Supreme Council of Rulers were rejected by Dubai, whose leader was quickly confronted by large profederation demonstrations organized by Abu Dhabi, Ras al-Khaimah, and some Dubai residents. Shaykh Rashid rejected all pleas and threatened to secede from the federation if the marches were not called off. Facing a worsening situation, Zayed called on Kuwait to mediate on behalf of the Arab Gulf states, whose efforts led to the formation of a new government on 10 July 1979. A new balance of power was struck between the seven rulers, and some progress was made toward unity, but the episode left its scars.

Policy differences between Zayed bin Sultan and Rashid bin Maktoum negatively affected the constitutional continuum of the UAE. While both men offered arguments that contained merit, their failure to honestly address major issues significantly delayed the union's progress. For example, the UAE military establishment, drawing on personnel from several countries, remained severely challenged. This problematic fact undoubtedly resulted in questionable command and control reliability. Cognizant of potential consequences for the union's security, Zayed advocated a gradual dismemberment of state forces, and their replacement by a large union operation as a legitimizing element. By the end of 1981, however, the UAE military and budget questions remained unresolved. On 29 October 1981, the provisional constitution was extended for a further five-year period, with Zayed and Rashid reelected to the top two positions.<sup>27</sup> Like other Gulf states, the UAE turned its attention to falling oil prices and regional security throughout 1982 and 1983. Few Emirati leaders concentrated on domestic political affairs. The ominous nature of these larger and perhaps more significant issues convinced UAE rulers to temporarily postpone sorely needed political reforms that could accommodate popular participation, but few perceived constitutional urgency.

UAE leaders faced five enigmas: (1) serious religious legitimizing factors, (2) evolving ruling family authority and the absolute nature of their power, (3) growing intelligentsia expectations, (4) dwindling tribal prestige with unforeseen social consequences, and (5) developing gaps among generations.<sup>28</sup> Zayed foresaw many of these problems and attempted to address them. Toward that end, he never called for a dissolution of the UAE Federal National Council, even if critics raised doubts about his unwillingness to empower the council with real legislative powers.

Still, Zayed was keenly aware of the need to establish the foundations of "constitutionality" within a federal system that would draw strength from the union's tribal origins. For him, this was the ultimate legitimizing force for UAE ruling families. The move toward constitutionality of Gulf monarchies was further reinforced by existing political rules that remained hereditary. A

ruler's accession to office was a matter left to senior family members, whose decisions were final and not subject to public ratification. Yet all family members were expected to pledge their loyalty to the new ruler, once that individual was chosen. All seven UAE member states had designated "apparent heirs," who were expected to succeed their rulers while upholding the UAE interim constitution. It was only after UAE rulers felt secure in their own separate shaykhdoms that they even considered the necessity to amend the body of laws into a permanent document. It took Zayed six elections to finally persuade his fellow rulers to acquiesce. On 2 December 1996, the UAE Supreme Council of Rulers amended the constitution, eliminating the word "temporary." It also accepted that Abu Dhabi would in fact become "the capital of the federation."

### **Contemporary Rulers and Next-Generation Leaders in the United Arab Emirates**

If imperial rivalries scarred the Lower Gulf, the social, economic, and political integration of a few meager institutions after 1971 stood out as a remarkable feat for small and rather isolated tribes. Indeed, this integration occurred because several tribal leaders displayed flexibility that, within a very short period of time, translated into "a distinct form of [a] federal system."<sup>29</sup> What preoccupied Emirati rulers in the 1960s "was the harmonizing and coordinating of their politics—including foreign trade, industry and agriculture, and social activities—in the face of changing circumstances."<sup>30</sup> Indeed, what concerned these survivor-rulers was the necessity to invent political will, to integrate ferociously independent shaykhdoms into a nation-state. Leading families were faced with the necessity to shelve narrow interests and address the task of developing conditions that could contribute to the nascent federation.

Naturally, the tribes mattered, and ruling families within each emirate mattered even more. How conservative tribal leaders compromised was perhaps the most important requirement for the men who embarked on such an adventure. Most drew succor from their rich traditions and articulated evolving views, with a firm grounding in age-tested norms. To accomplish ambitious federation goals, Emirati tribal leaders did not redefine themselves, but sought to emulate their illustrious ancestors' survival skills.

By 1971, six tribes were considered dominant in the Lower Gulf: the Bani Yas, the Manasir, the Dhawahir, the 'Awamir, the Na'im, and the Qawasim. Most were further divided into subtribal groups whose leaders could, would, and did shift alliances as necessary. Although the Bani Yas included several branches, they were led by the Al Bu Falah and the Al Bu Falasah, who in turn conceived two ruling families—the Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi and the Al Maktoum of Dubai. Like fellow ruling families elsewhere in the UAE, the Al

Nahyan and the Al Maktoum brokered peace between sub-branches whenever rivalries surfaced. They also buried the hatchet to join forces in the creation of a federal system. Still, who led the ruling families, and how they interacted with each other, deserves attention. First, because the federal system could not always remain subservient to family vagaries, and second, because individuals evolved and had to accept the idea of a single leader to govern.

It is critical to note that the actual power of UAE ruling families was far greater than any tribal rivalries or the necessary compromises most voluntarily adhered to. In fact, the structure of leading ruling families provides specific clues as to how the seven emirates agreed to unite and share power.<sup>31</sup>

### ■ **Contemporary Rulers: The Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi**

The Al Nahyan traced their origins to the Liwah Oasis in the southern part of the emirate. By the mid-1760s, migrating members of the Bani Yas—a land-faring tribe from the interior—had discovered a water-well on the island of Abu Dhabi, some 500 miles away, where several families settled as early as 1761. This was the initial colony that, in time, would grow into and become the capital of the UAE federation.<sup>32</sup> Other Bani Yas families, including Al Nahyan progeny, settled in Al Ain near the Buraimi Oasis, where several forts were built next to farms and agricultural dwellings. Over a period of a few decades, this triangle comprising the Liwah Oasis, Abu Dhabi, and Al Ain provided a unique source of strength to the Al Nahyan, who in turn identified with the area's intrinsic tribal traditions. In fact, the dizzying development of the preceding few decades aside, what stood out in Abu Dhabi was the patrimonial affinity of the native population, which inevitably was reflected in the emirate's, and to a certain extent in the union's, outlook in all sociopolitical matters. Immensely proud of their proclivity to the land, the Al Nahyan remained faithful to their customs and traditions, best exemplified by leading shaykhs whose jet-setting habits were carefully choreographed to reflect badu conventions.

### **Size and Structure**

In 1820, the Bani Yas tribes signed the all-important General Treaty of Peace with the British government, seemingly ending intertribal warfare and piracy in the Gulf. Unfortunately, the treaty failed to live up to expectations, as periodic clashes arose among various rulers and their tribesmen. Eventually, the influence as well as interference of Sharjah's powerful Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi reverberated in Abu Dhabi—until the rise of Zayed bin Khalifah (r. 1855–1909).

Zayed bin Khalifah, who ruled for fifty-four years, and who would ultimately become known as Zayed the Great, cemented Al Nahyan legitimacy in Abu Dhabi and restored a balance of power among the Bani Yas. His extraordinary legacy proved to be far-reaching, and stood as a model for his grandson and namesake, Zayed bin Sultan (r. 1966–2004). The circumstances under which Zayed bin Khalifah came to power were ordinary, save for the astute chieftain's desire to exercise power in an uncharacteristic way.

Zayed acceded to authority when his first cousin Sa'id bin Tahnun lost a battle of tribal "will" over a murder case. His ill-advised action, slaying the alleged murderer in question, drew the ire of the population, forcing him to escape to Sharjah.<sup>33</sup> Plotting revenge, Sa'id bin Tahnun returned a year later, sacking Abu Dhabi and inflicting significant damage to the town's meager tribal possessions. Zayed, who was in the Dhaffrah hamlet visiting tribal constituencies, returned with a party of *badu*. A battle ensued during which Sa'id was killed, thereby restoring a semblance of justice. Simultaneously, the British imposed a hefty fine (an estimated 25,000 Maria Teresa dollars, the currency in use at the time, which was 75 percent silver) on the ruler of Sharjah, allegedly because of the complicity of some of his subjects in Sa'id's earlier raid. Zayed regained full control of the town, but soon faced other internal challenges.

One of the more interesting was the decision by leading Al Qubaysi family members to move from Abu Dhabi and settle in the remote creek of Al-'Udayd (today on the border with Qatar). The Qubaysi argument rested on the premise that Zayed's full control did not allow for equanimity in sharing whatever wealth or opportunities existed or came about. For his part, Zayed perceived the need to reign in various tribal members, ostensibly to unify and strengthen Bani Yas "families." According to a contemporary observer, "no Shaykh of Qatar [had] so much as laid claim" to Al-'Udayd in 1871, when the Al Qubaysi sought refuge there.<sup>34</sup> What troubled Zayed was the Qubaysi assertion that they formed an independent "commonwealth" within the Bani Yas. Moreover, the Abu Dhabian noted that the colonists had identified the borders of this new entity, stretching from the Al-'Udayd creek to Wakrah farther inside Qatar and, "in the other direction as far as the island of Yas, . . . includ[ing] Dalmah and other adjacent islands formerly considered to belong to Abu Dhabi."<sup>35</sup> Further complicating matters, the Al Qubaysi threatened to seek protection from the Ottomans—who had just occupied Qatar—if the British refused to support them.

Operating under the restrictions of the 1853 Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, Zayed could not possibly launch an attack on Al-'Udayd without British approval. His first request to initiate a land assault was met with indifference, because intratribal matters fell outside London's purview. Zayed displayed patience for two years, during which the Qubaysi settlement grew in strength. In 1873, Zayed sought British approval to send a maritime force to reoccupy Al-'Udayd, but London refused to acquiesce. For several years there-

after, the Qubaysis prospered, paying tribute to their Ottoman lords. Repeated piratical acts—which were unanswered by successive British residents—further emboldened the Qubaysis. By 1877, illegal activities had grown in frequency and repeated reconciliation efforts between the Al Nahyan and the Al Qubaysi had come to naught. London finally authorized one of its war vessels to execute a “search and arrest” mission in and around the creek, but when the warship arrived at Al-‘Udayd, the search party landed on a deserted spot. The settlers had fled to Doha, in Qatar, having “first dismantl[ed] their houses and fill[ed] up the wells.”<sup>36</sup> Remarkably, and in an uncharacteristic fashion for the time, Zayed did not abandon his flock. In January 1880, he offered to welcome the Al Qubaysi back into Abu Dhabi, which the latter accepted. Given the acrimony that pervaded tribal relations, Zayed demonstrated patience and forgiveness as the Al Qubaysi resumed their allegiance to their leader. Date palms and other Qubaysi properties were restored or returned to members who responded to Zayed’s appeal.

This episode, which is often recalled with fondness when discussing Zayed the Great, stood out in a region where disputes were often settled violently.<sup>37</sup> It illustrated the leader’s visionary outlook, emphasizing the need for internal unity, as well as the obligation to heed calls for forgiveness when so much was at stake.

Zayed the Great did not always rely on peaceful instruments to achieve his objectives. In fact, after the expulsion of the Wahhabi contingent from Buraimi in 1869, he succeeded in several critical military offensives to gain full control over the entire area. Starting in 1875, major raids against the Na‘im, and their allies the Manasir, altered the tribal makeup that existed in the hinterland. Manasir and Mazari‘ forces threatened to gain control of Buraimi from the Bani Qitab, which brought the sovereign of Dubai—a Bani Qitab—into the quarrel. Given Zayed’s influence in the region, his protagonists sought assurances that the town would not be occupied, which fortunately was spared.

In 1887, members of the Dhawahir tribe in Buraimi objected to Zayed’s growing authority and aligned themselves with the Sultan of Oman, Sayyid Turki bin Sa‘id. The month-long battle that ensued was a significant victory for Zayed, who returned triumphant.<sup>38</sup> Several Dhawahir shaykhs were imprisoned, which ultimately set the stage for revenge in 1891. Trusting his rugged force—certainly by contemporary standards—Zayed gushed victorious from this confrontation as well. Against this display of power, Na‘im subtribes, including the Al Bu Khurayban, along with the Bani Qitab and Bani Ka‘ab (formerly dependent on the Qawasim), all aligned themselves with the Al Nahyan. It was only a matter of time, therefore, before Zayed would formally annex the oasis to his dominion, thus sealing the triangle comprising the Liwah Oasis, Abu Dhabi, and Al Ain.

Secure in his domain, Zayed the Great and his son Khalifah embarked on an acquisition spree to establish new population hamlets. The “markers” that



sprang up would serve his grandson well, and the latter, deeply conscious of how beneficial such steps were for his grandfather, adopted semi-identical measures to further legitimize Al Nahyan rule. The end effects of such steps proved to be so powerful that even the British political resident could not help but report that Zayed's "influence was much stronger than that of the Sultan of Muscat throughout the Dhahirah district of Oman."<sup>39</sup> To his credit, Zayed maintained cordial ties with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, and entrusted two of his sons, Khalifah and Sultan, in 1904, to visit Muscat. Both were received with utmost courtesy and were richly rewarded before taking leave. For several years afterward, the Sultan of Muscat and Oman agreed to pay an annual tribute to Zayed, ostensibly to ensure the stability of the Buraimi region, but in reality acknowledging Zayed the Great's preeminence.

Zayed bin Khalifah died on 19 May 1909 and was succeeded by his second son, Tahnun bin Zayed (r. 1909–1912), a "confirmed invalid, having practically lost the use of his lower limbs from some form of paralysis."<sup>40</sup> This succession ushered in an unfortunate pattern of violence among four of Zayed's sons, each of whom ruled for short periods of time and died coarsely while in office. Tahnun bin Zayed ruled for two years and died in October 1912. He was succeeded by his brother Hamdan (r. 1912–1922), who, as a firm ruler, understood the necessity to acquire arms (against British wishes) and defend his holdings against the rising Al Sa'ud family, who contemporaneously launched a successful conquest of Hasah. Hamdan was murdered by his full-brother Sultan, assisted by another brother, Saqr, apparently because the former was an oppressive sovereign. Accepted by members of the family, Sultan (r. 1922–1926) was also extended British recognition, as soon as he committed himself to honoring existing treaties. On 4 August 1926, his brother Saqr, whom he had invited to dinner, assassinated Sultan.<sup>41</sup> According to British sources, "the reason given for the murder was that from the time of his accession the Shaykh gave no subsistence allowance to his brothers or sisters."<sup>42</sup> Sultan's sons, Shakhbut and Haza', escaped and took refuge with the Na'im shaykh in Buraimi, and were later reunited with their uncle Khalifah. The latter then sent the young men to Sharjah, in December 1927. With the help of a Baluchi servant, and several Manasir supporters, Khalifah's men murdered Saqr on 1 January 1928. Although Khalifah would have assumed ruling authority under the circumstances, family elders and British officials counseled him not to seek power. Wisely, the oldest son of Zayed the Great summoned Shakhbut and Haza' from Sharjah, and handed over full rulership to Sultan's eldest son. Shakhbut was recognized ruler of Abu Dhabi by British authorities on 24 April 1928.<sup>43</sup> With him, succession passed "to a new generation and into the hands of the Bani Sultan branch of the family where it has remained ever since."<sup>44</sup>

The pattern of succession in Abu Dhabi could only be described as one embedded in assassination. To end the practice, Sultan bin Zayed's widow,

Shaykhah Salamah, “made her sons promise not to harm each other if one of them were to be deposed by another as Ruler.”<sup>45</sup> Shakhbut, Haza‘, Khalid, and Zayed accepted their mother’s admonition in 1928 and the practice, at least in Abu Dhabi, ceased. Shakhbut’s tenure as ruler of Abu Dhabi, particularly on the all-important succession front, would be relatively free of terminal assaults. Nevertheless, the 1928 decision—to hand over rulership to the Sultan branch of the family—meant that Shakhbut and his successor would need to handle the Khalifah branch with discriminating care. Indeed, Muhammad bin Khalifah, although advanced in age and incapacitated, raised six sons, all of whom played and continue to play critical roles in Abu Dhabi’s political and economic development. All were potential claimants to rulership, though their numerical advantage in the early 1960s has now been eclipsed by Zayed bin Sultan’s progeny.

Shakhbut’s relations with Britain proved to be very difficult.<sup>46</sup> Yet even if London pretended that it did not interfere in tribal affairs, it certainly shepherded the ruler’s ties with his brother and eventual successor, Zayed bin Sultan. To be sure, Shakhbut was miserly with leading tribesmen, which invariably damaged Al Bu Falah prestige. Reportedly, he was “cavalier and uncivil in his treatment of visiting tribesmen,” denying them largess. His attitude toward the Manasir, for example, may have been “responsible for the drift [of the latter] towards the Saudis.” Worse yet, his “refusal to pay the Manasir a share of his concession money, for his failure to protect them in the war with Dubai in 1946–47 and his refusal to allow them to take their revenge,” all contributed to his poor reputation.<sup>47</sup> Whether this criticism was entirely legitimate is subject to debate, although most Abu Dhabians concede that Shakhbut lacked in foresight.

### **Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (r. 1966–2004)**

Shakhbut bin Sultan abdicated on 6 August 1966, in favor of his younger brother, who was in a hurry to make things happen. The new ruler assumed a frenetic schedule, pushing as hard as he could to motivate his own dazed population and invite foreign experts to lend a hand, while strengthening and protecting the young emirate. Within days of assuming the rulership of Abu Dhabi, Zayed introduced a formal government structure, with departments empowered to tackle specific tasks. Priorities were set to erect basic housing facilities, schools, and heretofore almost nonexistent health services, and to construct a port, an airport, roads, and a bridge to link Abu Dhabi to the mainland. Throughout his many endeavors on behalf of the emirate, and because he was well aware of the sacrifices that his subjects endured, Zayed was quite conscious of the need to improve the overall quality of life. Even if accelerated development was favored, the ruler was mindful of the barren landscape, which naturally meant special attention would be devoted to the environment.

Zayed, who loved the Al Ain oasis, poured considerable financial resources into the planting of trees throughout the emirate—estimated at over 200 million during the past few decades—which rapidly transformed the city. After 1971, and on a progressive schedule, the rest of the UAE received similar attention.<sup>48</sup> In fact, Zayed, and no one else, was the man who dreamed of, and transformed the desert into, a confined but growing garden.<sup>49</sup>

“We accomplish nothing of substance without great men,” declared Charles de Gaulle, but Zayed bin Sultan dreamed that his proud and time-tested tribesmen could indeed achieve greatness and, seizing the opportunity brought by oil resources, propelled them forward to build a nation-state.<sup>50</sup> In less than three decades, he turned his dreams into reality, setting goals so high that few believed he could accomplish much at all. The dreamer-ruler rose to the many challenges and cherished the role of doer. For generations, Arab leaders promised, whereas Zayed delivered.<sup>51</sup>

Zayed, the fourth son of Sultan bin Zayed bin Khalifah, a younger brother of the then-ruler of Abu Dhabi, Tahnun, was born in 1919 in the oasis city of Al Ain. He was named after his illustrious grandfather and matured in a relatively cohesive environment. Still, Zayed was not born into wealth, and prospects were rather limited. Abu Dhabi was off the beaten path of international affairs—under full British administration. Successive rulers were concerned with the literal survival of their subjects, maintaining the integrity of grazing lands, and checking off competing tribal ambitions.

The eager and often impatient Zayed grew into manhood in Al Ain and the surrounding desert. This exposure to the harsh conditions of the environment allowed him to develop a keen sense of belonging, not just to hunt with falcons, but also to strengthen his identity. Early on, the future ruler learned to appreciate this tangible feature of his many dreams for statehood and nation building. With limited opportunities for education, the devout young man developed the convictions, principles, and skills that propelled him into a leadership position by learning the Holy Quran.

Although a period of internal political stability existed under Shakhbut—much of which imposed by the British—the young Zayed witnessed age-old tribal conflicts throughout the region. He observed the effects such struggles had upon the land and the people, and concluded that a wiser approach was required to mediate, conciliate, and end family discord. In a harsh environment like the Gulf, Zayed determined that the contest for survival would remain the most important challenge of all, and realized that, in turn, internal as well as regional struggles would not end until the environment that had created them changed as well. Stressing his devotion to faith, culture, and tradition, the young Zayed set out to reinvent his society. Although Al Ain felt little of the turmoil affecting the rest of the world in the 1930s, the collapse of the pearl market after Japanese scientists invented the cultured gem awakened the people of the Lower Gulf. Near bankruptcy and desperately dependent on foreign

assistance, the Al Nahyan welcomed early prospecting teams looking for oil deposits. Given his solid knowledge of the landscape, Zayed guided several visiting teams and, although barely twenty years old, the future leader quickly understood the consequences of such discoveries. By 1946, Zayed was well known throughout Trucial Oman as a savvy tribal leader, with foresight and wisdom beyond his years. Wilfred Thesiger, the legendary explorer of inner Arabia, noted in his book *Arabian Sands* that the badu admired Zayed for his unmistakable qualities. For the adventurer, Zayed “had a strong, intelligent face, with steady, observant eyes, and his manner was quiet but masterful.”<sup>52</sup> The globetrotter further described how the badu perceived their leader and “liked him for his friendliness, . . . respected his force of character, his shrewdness, and his physical strength.” According to Thesiger, the admiring badu maintained that Zayed was “a Bedouin, and knows about camels, can ride like one of us, can shoot, and knows how to fight.”<sup>53</sup>

Admittedly, many liked him as well for his accessibility, friendly disposition, and informal preferences—all qualities that remained with the ruler until his death in 2004. Although additional responsibilities and age reduced accessibility in the late 1990s, Emiratis respected Zayed because his character was exemplary, his discernment celebrated, and his cogency unwavering. As discussed above, Zayed transformed the various tribes of the emirates into a nation, and while the experiment was still a work in progress, his dreams were largely conceptualized and applied in full. It would not be an exaggeration to state that leaders like Zayed were not common, especially in an environment beholden to strong passions, where loyalties endured centuries. Zayed’s substantial legacy became the burden on the broad shoulders of his successor, whose own contributions were unfairly compared with what the father achieved.

### **Khalifah bin Zayed Al Nahyan (r. 2004– )**

There was no bloodbath after Shaykh Zayed died on 2 November 2004, near the age of ninety, and Khalifah bin Zayed succeeded his father as ruler of Abu Dhabi and became president of the UAE the following day. Well liked in the UAE and among other UAE ruling families, Khalifah was foreordained to assume rulership, even if caution and modesty prevented him from defining particular interests.<sup>54</sup>

Born in Al Ain in 1948, Khalifah received primary and religious education at the local level, after which he was appointed as the ruler’s representative in the Eastern Region of Abu Dhabi. On 18 September 1966, approximately a month after his father became ruler, the young shaykh was entrusted the headship of the local Courts Department. He was designated heir apparent on 1 February 1969, and commander of the Abu Dhabi Department of Defense the next day. It was this force that was transformed into the nucleus of the

UAE Armed Forces after independence. Serving as heir apparent, Khalifah was entrusted with domestic political affairs, and steered clear of foreign policy questions. After the establishment of the federation in December 1971, Khalifah was appointed deputy prime minister, and in May 1976 he assumed the post of deputy commander of the UAE Armed Forces. Although these critical posts exposed him to various federal responsibilities, Khalifah earned his authority as the Abu Dhabi heir. His two most significant appointments were as chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council and chairman of the Supreme Petroleum Council, both of which empowered him beyond anyone's imagination and allowed Khalifah to distinguish himself by looking after local constituents. Unfortunately, endless speculation about his lacking abilities complicated matters throughout the years, leading a faction to voluntarily assume governance burdens even if the heir was not consulted. The concern hovered around the mistaken assumption that once Khalifah became ruler, his brothers Muhammad, Hamdan, Hazza', and 'Abdallah bin Zayed would shepherd as best as possible his as well as the UAE's decisions, especially on security issues and foreign policy.<sup>55</sup> This outcome was comparable to the case of the late King Khalid bin 'Abdul 'Aziz in Saudi Arabia, whose decisions between 1975 and 1982 were influenced by Princes Fahd and Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz. Clearly, such an outcome threatened to complicate the decisionmaking process in Abu Dhabi and create a shadow government with competing sources of power. Although certain local actors stood to benefit from such an outcome, outsiders who were to deal with the UAE would have found it extremely difficult to conduct "foreign affairs." Speculations proved to be wrong, however, as Abu Dhabi marshaled the wherewithal to usher in a stable and relatively effective leadership.

Thus, and as expected, Khalifah bin Zayed acceded to both the Abu Dhabi rulership and the UAE presidency, which he has shepherded with style ever since. A staunchly pro-Western modernizer, Khalifah retained his low-key approach, aware that no one could possibly top the thirty-three-year reign of his predecessor. In April 2005, however, he "ordered a 25% pay increase for all federal government employees—a populist and deliberately high-profile move . . . designed to underline his commitment to promoting the interests of UAE nationals." Importantly, while the ruler's priority was the tiny national population (less than 10 percent of the country, estimated 4.5 million inhabitants), the same salary boost applied to expatriate workers, even if the latter's increase was pegged at 15 percent.<sup>56</sup> The UAE faced a growing labor problem starting in 2005, but the issue was particularly irksome in Dubai, where a massive construction boom created a wedge between ferociously competitive construction companies that hired cheap Asian laborers from India, Pakistan, and China. Still, Khalifah authorized federal legislation to improve working conditions, and to treat the country's temporary "guests" with the dignity befitting those who transformed the desert into a modern country.<sup>57</sup>

Khalifah was also eager to align the UAE with fellow Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Oman and Qatar in particular), which were speedily introducing electoral changes to their constituents. On 1 December 2005, Khalifah announced that half the members of the Federal National Council, the closest body the country has to a parliament, would be indirectly elected as early as November 2006. According to the decree, the leaders of the seven emirates would appoint half the council's members, while twenty legislators would be elected through local councils.<sup>58</sup> All would still serve in an advisory capacity, and while the move appeared modest, it was a constitutional reorganization nevertheless. True to Zayed's legacy, Khalifah took yet another modest initiative, relying on tested incremental steps that functioned best in tribal societies.

Despite known health problems, the relatively young Khalifah bin Zayed is expected to rule for several years, not as an innovator but as a caretaker. That is his true character: in awe of his father, but humble in the knowledge that his best efforts can only emulate his illustrious predecessor. Khalifah is thus destined to navigate the UAE—and especially Abu Dhabi—to safer harbors in an area prone to crises and looming dangers.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

For the UAE president, the “jockeying” for power that was in full swing among several Zayed sons throughout the 1990s left a bittersweet aftertaste, for Khalifah loathed such infighting. Even if his participation was tangential, as Khalifah attempted to stay above the fray, the competition created a new set of alliances, not all of which were restricted to the Al Nahyan family, and which did not disappear after December 2004. Several stretched over a wider spectrum, including links with the Maktoums in Dubai, as well as other UAE ruling families. In the absence of a streamlined system, and given ongoing internal developments in the UAE, future instability remained a distinct possibility. What made matters worse was that few outsiders knew what actually transpired in early 2004, when Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan appointed his third son, Muhammad, as deputy to the heir apparent amid wild speculation.<sup>59</sup> In fact, the winnowing started in the mid-1990s, leading to speculation that the decision to alter Al Nahyan succession patterns started much earlier than generally assumed. An effective campaign was conducted to pre-position certain candidates for victory and, as a corollary, to impugn others' capabilities. Carefully crafted public relations “articles” were periodically placed in Arab and Western newspapers, often leaked by one of the protagonists to boost weak credentials.

For example, an alarming essay published in the London-based Arabic monthly *Ad-Diplomasi News Report* in 1997 presented a *fait accompli*—that Shaykh Zayed considered appointing Muhammad bin Zayed as his successor—although, at the time, few found any merit in its contents.<sup>60</sup> This “campaign”

continued unabated after 1997, most notably in the Economist Intelligence Unit's closely read *Country Report on the United Arab Emirates*, which presented as fact events that may or may not have occurred. At first, the report opined that Zayed's poor health necessitated that the "simmering rivalry between the president's 19 sons" be addressed. According to the influential publication, Zayed was

successful in ending the rivalry between Khalifah, his heir and the Abu Dhabi crown prince, and the "Bani Fatma," the sons of his favorite wife, Fatma bin[t] Mubarak al-Qudera. Shaykh Khalifah and Muhammad bin Zayed, the eldest of the Bani Fatma and Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces, [were] increasingly working as a team in facing up to the task of economic reform, which has been made all the more urgent by plunging oil prices over the past year. However, there [was] still a clear element of mistrust between the two camps, with Shaykh Muhammad's more traditional aides reluctant to move forward on economic reforms.<sup>61</sup>

The report concluded that this rapprochement disappointed Sultan bin Zayed, the deputy prime minister, who felt "sidelined by the détente between Shaykh Khalifah and the Bani Fatma." It insisted, nevertheless, that Shaykh Sultan was "widely rumored to be unhappy with the rather meaningless title of Abu Dhabi deputy ruler he [was] expected to inherit when his father die[d]," without explaining how or whether the deputy prime minister expressed such sentiments—in public or private.<sup>62</sup> In fact, no one really knew whether Zayed attempted to settle the succession issue as such at the time, or whether Sultan was offered the consolation prize of deputy ruler of Abu Dhabi. Still, the Economist Intelligence Unit persisted and, in its last issue for 1999, posited that an actual agreement was signed in Geneva in September of that year. According to this latest version, the agreement confirmed Khalifah as heir apparent in Abu Dhabi—and, in a comic diversion, as president of the federation—with "the increasingly powerful Chief-of-Staff of the Armed Forces, Shaykh Muhammad," as heir apparent.<sup>63</sup> The London-based source added that Sultan bin Zayed "thus lost any chance of attaining power, and will have to content himself with the position of deputy ruler of Abu Dhabi, although he will continue to have a role as the federation's Deputy Prime Minister."<sup>64</sup> According to the source, Al Maktoum leaders "were later called to Geneva and informed of the new line of succession" and, apparently, "they readily agreed to support Shaykh Khalifah's candidacy as the Federation's next President when Shaykh Zayed pass[ed] away."<sup>65</sup>

### Succession Dilemma for the Al Nahyan

When Shaykh Khalifah became ruler and president in 2004, his brother Sultan was not elevated to the deputy ruler's post, but lingered in the largely secondary office of deputy prime minister. Sultan bin Zayed retained some value to

Khalifah, although he was permanently sidelined by Zayed's actions. It was unclear whether this choice was made by Zayed alone, or following consultations with other Al Nahyan family members or, for that matter, with other tribal leaders throughout the UAE. Moreover, no one knew whether Khalifah was consulted on this issue, and whether he consented. Muhammad bin Zayed, on the other hand, was confirmed as Abu Dhabi's heir apparent. As the eldest son of Shaykhah Fatimah, Muhammad was amply supported by several of his full-brothers, including Haza' as head of intelligence, 'Abdallah as foreign minister (following a stint as information minister), Hamdan as deputy prime minister, and Mansur as minister of palace affairs. Shaykh Khalifah was well served by his half-brothers, who swore their allegiance to serve sovereign and state, even if his own sons, Sultan and Muhammad, were increasingly capable and ready to assume power if the ruler decided to institute a primogeniture system in Abu Dhabi.

How Khalifah conceives his own eventual succession is still a largely unanswered concern. One option would be to leave the current lineup as it is and allow his heir to succeed him. Under this scenario, Muhammad bin Zayed, as sovereign of Abu Dhabi, would then choose to appoint either of his full-brothers or his eldest son to succeed him. A second scenario would see Khalifah emulate the Bahraini and Qatari models, in favor of either of his sons in a straightforward primogeniture system. Such an option would be difficult to conceive in Abu Dhabi—because of the gaggle of actors involved—although a precedent for similar dramatic change exists in Jordan, where the late King Hussein dismissed Hassan bin Talal and replaced him with his son 'Abdallah bin Hussein (see Chapter 9). Whether such a spectacular alteration will ever be ushered in is less important than the mere possibility that it can, which contributes to succession uncertainties inherent in nonprimogeniture systems.

### ■ **Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Abu Dhabi**

Among the many issues that Abu Dhabi has faced during the past few years, none is more important than that of anticipated leadership changes. As the leadership torch passed from Zayed to Heir Apparent Khalifah bin Zayed, few observers anticipated that that succession would resemble earlier, more problematic ones. As it was destined for Shakhbut bin Dhiyab to play a considerable role in the events of the nineteenth century—when he congregated several tribes in the Bani Yas confederation—it was also destined for one of his grandsons to play a preeminent role in the twentieth century, when Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan successfully unified the Trucial States on the coast of Oman into a federation. Zayed removed his own brother from power to accelerate the modernization of the emirate. He was nevertheless confident that the legiti-



macy of the Bani Yas was sealed. His heir to rulership, Khalifah, thus carries a huge mantle—to preserve and promote what was accomplished.<sup>66</sup> Khalifah is certainly capable to lead, even though several of his brothers are available to assist him in his rulership.

### **Muhammad bin Zayed**

As the designated heir apparent of Abu Dhabi, Muhammad bin Zayed was next in line for the rulership of the emirate, as well as the presidency of the country. In addition Muhammad was also the deputy supreme commander of the UAE Armed Forces and frequently met with heads of states on trips abroad to fulfill various diplomatic duties. Muhammad served as a special adviser to the president of the UAE and assumed the chairmanship of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council—which is responsible for the development and planning of Abu Dhabi—after his older brother became ruler. His other duties have included membership in the Supreme Petroleum Council, a body empowered to make policy decisions for all oil-related matters, as well as responsibilities in various charities and sporting associations.

Muhammad, who was born in 1968, is a graduate of Sandhurst Royal Military Academy. He is a capable individual with intrinsic political savvy and considerable organizational skills. He has also been involved in several business activities.<sup>67</sup> What genuinely concerned local observers was that Muhammad bin Zayed, with the support of his brothers Hamdan, Hazza', and 'Abdallah in particular, would overwhelm Khalifah bin Zayed after the latter acceded to rulership. Muhammad, one official maintained, was well equipped on this front. As chairman of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ECSSR), he could call on outside experts for guidance. The logic here was that Muhammad could argue that his strategic assessments were backed by sound results conducted by independent researchers using scientific tools. Still, the truancy of the center was that most of its studies lacked critical independent assessments by world-class researchers with established credentials. Without denying its potential, the ECSSR was ill equipped to produce highly analytical studies to best serve its masters. Nevertheless, the ECSSR deserves careful observation and analysis, especially with respect to its role within the UAE Ministry of Defense.<sup>68</sup> In any case, Muhammad bin Zayed enjoys a gaggle of brotherly support (six full-brothers) and, equally important, the presence of an extremely influential mother, the late Shaykh Zayed's favorite wife, whose support for her son has been immeasurable and vital.<sup>69</sup>

### **Sultan bin Zayed**

Zayed's second son, Sultan, born in 1953, provided a semblance of order in the post-Zayed era, although he was out of the power loop. A deputy prime

minister since November 1990, Sultan displayed characteristics reminiscent of Zayed, was well liked within Abu Dhabi (especially among the critical tribal leaders), and was respected by other UAE ruling family members.<sup>70</sup> And no one denied that Sultan stood out among his brothers in one crucial area: his lack of business ties. Indeed, few UAE leaders could boast the same level of integrity and, equally important, the same level of transparency. Several shaykhs were active in myriad commercial enterprises while discharging important governmental responsibilities, which inevitably encouraged a high degree of corruption. These behaviors upset Zayed, who made frequent references to transparency and integrity in his numerous public statements, but, as old age set in, little attention was devoted to the matter.

Over the years, Sultan carried out special assignments on behalf of the state, including his 1995 participation at the fiftieth anniversary of the United Nations in New York. Sultan graduated from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in 1972 and served in the armed forces of both Abu Dhabi (1973–1978) and the UAE (1978–1982). After a distinguished military career that spanned a decade, he was appointed general commander of the armed forces (1978–1982). For many years, and in addition to his various federal positions, Sultan was chairman of the Abu Dhabi Public Works Department, responsible for infrastructure, as well as vice chairman of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council, the highest governing body of the emirate. Before the 2004–2005 shifts, he also served on the Supreme Petroleum Council and was chairman of the executive committee of the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, although his services in both were terminated by Khalifah bin Zayed.

Sultan was also known to have taken the initiative to improve US officials' perceptions of the UAE, even if his views tended to be rather independent.<sup>71</sup> For example, he was instrumental in arranging Zayed's support of a major project at the New York–based Council on Foreign Relations (estimated at US\$3 million), and for introducing a leading delegation of US officials—Zbigniew Brzezinski (national security adviser to President Jimmy Carter), Brent Scowcroft (national security adviser to Presidents Gerald Ford and George H. W. Bush), and Richard W. Murphy (assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs to President Ronald Reagan)—to his father and other senior UAE officials. Sultan ensured that this meeting highlighted his pragmatic views and identified long-term interests, especially the establishment of working contacts with US statesmen and “institutions.” His particular interest in foreign affairs was well known, especially in the Arab world, where he enjoyed very strong contacts. Indeed Sultan's acquaintances stretched from Morocco to Oman and beyond.

Before 2004 and his older brother Khalifah's accession, Sultan bin Zayed did not want to be just deputy ruler of Abu Dhabi. Clearly, he wanted to be the heir apparent, perhaps with an understanding that over time his nephew Sultan bin Khalifah would replace him. But Zayed chose Muhammad, even if

Sultan bin Zayed once believed that he “may have no choice but to become heir apparent.”<sup>72</sup> Whether the two men reached an “understanding” is unknown, although the announcement made in Zayed’s name rendered it moot. Khalifah believed that Sultan could rule and improve the quality of life for his subjects, as the latter spoke of transforming UAE laws to protect individual rights. In short, Sultan displayed a strong grasp of what made the average Emirati tick and, in the tradition of his father, relied on ample generosity to provide for his brethren.

### **Sultan bin Khalifah**

If Sultan bin Zayed displays certain weaknesses, he also has some strengths, including a quiet relationship with his nephew, Sultan bin Khalifah. The two men like and see each other at least once every few weeks. Given that there is a twenty-year age gap between them (similar to the Khalifah and Muhammad bin Zayed age gap), the relationship is not based on friendship but raw political interests. Both men need each other and both know it. Moreover, the two men had a unique rapport with the late Shaykh Zayed, who liked Sultan bin Zayed like the “apple of his eye” and Sultan bin Khalifah as his eldest grandson. In 1999, the two men further strengthened their nascent alliance when Muhammad bin Khalifah, Sultan’s younger brother, married Shaykh Sultan bin Zayed’s daughter.

It must be further emphasized that Sultan bin Khalifah looked to Sultan bin Zayed as the one individual who could—and probably would—be inclined to step aside should his father opt to change the succession pattern in Abu Dhabi. Although Sultan bin Khalifah does not currently hold a prominent political post—he was the heir apparent’s office president for a few years before his services were terminated in 2005—he nevertheless has access to his father’s substantial financial chest (the so-called Khalifah Fund). Moreover, he looks after his father’s—and his—private investments, estimated at about US\$10 billion. In fact, he is one of the very few members of the Al Nahyan family with access to such large sums of money, which in any tribal—as well as nontribal—situation is an undeniable plus. Money buys loyalty. Still, there has been a conscientious effort to remake Sultan bin Khalifah’s public image (that of a potential successor), and Sultan bin Zayed was not entirely unhappy with this development until the 2004 changes. It remains to be seen whether Khalifah bin Zayed will eventually call on his eldest son to succeed him, even if the mere suggestion is genuinely risky for the ruler, as well as his sons.

### **Muhammad bin Khalifah**

The second son of Shaykh Khalifah bin Zayed, Muhammad was entrusted with the leadership of the critical Abu Dhabi Financial Department. A member

of the Abu Dhabi Executive Council since 2005, Muhammad is married to Sultan bin Zayed's daughter, and seems to be the rising star of Emirati politics. His greatest strength is an uncanny ability to stay clear of controversy in an environment that thrives on gossip and innuendo. Unlike his older brother Sultan, Muhammad is an introvert, even if highly modernized.

### **Hamdan bin Zayed**

By virtue of his association with Heir Apparent Muhammad bin Zayed, Hamdan (born in 1963) is a key Abu Dhabi official, especially since he was elevated to the post of deputy prime minister in 2003. Of course, Hamdan held the largely ceremonial role of minister of foreign affairs after 1990, and embarked on various missions, notably to Iran and the United States, which elevated his stature as Hamdan steered through stormy political seas. An energetic individual with true jet-set interests, Hamdan led the UAE Red Crescent Society, and chaired the board of trustees of Abu Dhabi University. Like other Abu Dhabi shaykhs, he was heavily invested in various business conglomerates, including the chairmanship of the hugely subscribed Dolphin Energy Limited, which worked to link gas pipelines from Qatar to Oman via the UAE.

Hamdan attended various White House receptions, including a high-level Iftar dinner with President George W. Bush in October 2003.<sup>73</sup> Still, his alleged hunting trip with Osama bin Laden preoccupied US officials, and provoked angry exchanges in both Abu Dhabi and Washington.<sup>74</sup> Hamdan passed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs perch to his younger brother 'Abdallah in 2005, but remains a key player in internal Al Nahyan affairs.

### **Haza' bin Zayed**

After heading Emirati intelligence services for many years, Haza' was appointed national security adviser to Shaykh Khalifah bin Zayed in 2006, even if the position was ill defined and largely secretive.<sup>75</sup> A leading member of the Bani Fatimah, Haza' supported his older brother Muhammad, substantially enhanced his credentials by maintaining close associations with various regional intelligence services, and acted as a liaison with high-ranking counterparts. He was particularly close to the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence, which helped establish its Emirati complement in the early 1970s, and which continued to provide it with expertise. This was especially valuable given the UAE's demographic composition, with millions of residents hailing from the Indian subcontinent, bringing specific language skills that were not available to Emiratis. Ever pragmatic, Abu Dhabi leaders persuaded their brethren to foster such associations, to protect and preserve intrinsic interests against specific

threats emanating from key Muslim countries. It must also be emphasized that Haza' was seconded by a slew of Arab, Muslim, and Western advisers who were keenly aware that the human mosaic represented in the UAE necessitated very close attention to detail and regular surveillance. With significant Western military deployments throughout the country, and the presence of a large expatriate community, intelligence duties in Abu Dhabi are truly daunting, but especially so for very young institutions that struggle to hold on to established hospitality norms while preserving security.

### **Mansur bin Zayed**

The late Zayed bin Sultan's primary gatekeeper, Mansur attended presidential affairs and controlled access to the ailing former leader. For years, Mansur served his father faithfully, accompanying him on most of his visits overseas and, after repeated medical interventions, literally nursing the founder. This unique opportunity endeared him to the rest of the family because the burden was heavy. In fact, the young Mansur probably spent more time with Zayed after 1995 than any of his siblings.

On 2 May 2004, Mansur bin Zayed Al Nahyan, minister of presidential affairs, married a daughter of Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum of Dubai. President Khalifah bin Zayed held a luncheon in his honor at Jumeirah City, attended by a large number of dignitaries, including members of the UAE Supreme Council and Rulers and their heirs, deputy rulers, ministers, and senior officials. Among them were Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifah of Bahrain, Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani of Qatar, Mit'ab bin 'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, Khalid bin Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, Asa'ad bin Tariq Al Sa'id, and Andrew, the Duke of York. This generous display notwithstanding, Mansur is not the indispensable aid to his current ruler that he was to his late father.

### **'Abdallah bin Zayed**

The former UAE minister of information, 'Abdallah became foreign minister in 2005, thereby assuming a key position in the new government. A full-brother of Muhammad bin Zayed, the US-educated 'Abdallah implemented largely pro-Western policies, even if the UAE's primary interests were safely nestled in the Arab and Muslim worlds. To his credit, 'Abdallah worked hard to bridge the growing gap between the West in general and the United States in particular on the one hand, and the Arab and Muslim worlds on the other, by offering to carry the tolerance mantle inherited from his father. Undeniably, 'Abdallah is one of the most promising young Emirati leaders, with a concrete understanding of how best to promote the interests of the federation on the Arabian Peninsula and beyond.

### Potential Alliances Among the Al Nahyan

Although Shaykh Khalifah bin Zayed rules in Abu Dhabi, his short tenure in office has not been entirely strife-free, because the Al Nahyan are divided. To be sure, Zayed bin Sultan entrusted his nineteen sons with commensurate responsibilities, even if the Bani Fatimah appeared to have a hold on key posts. Led by Muhammad, the Bani Fatimah were indeed a powerful subgroup, but their power base was their mother. After Shaykh Zayed's death, Shaykhah Fatimah was relegated to near obscurity, modest social involvements notwithstanding. There were twelve other sons of Zayed who were outside this subgroup and, despite some efforts to woo a select few, the majority were not thrilled with the monopoly of power that emerged. First, Shaykhs Khalifah and Sultan, as the only two sons of Zayed without other full-brothers, formed a distinct subgroup. They were the oldest, carried responsibilities that placed them in close contact with key tribal leaders, and were called on to maintain the balance of power both within the family as well as with the other ruling families of the UAE.

Second, the Bani Fatimah, composed of Shaykhs Muhammad, Hamdan, Haza', Sa'id, Mansur, Nasir, and 'Abdallah (all full-brothers), controlled key military, information, intelligence, and foreign policy portfolios. Yet despite these substantial responsibilities, the seven were in an overall secondary level of power, because Khalifah and Sultan outranked them. Any Bani Fatimah accession to power in the future would thus require either the co-option of one—or both—of the two eldest sons (as well as Sultan and Muhammad bin Khalifah), or a physical removal of the four men from their current posts. Although the Bani Fatimah are the primary movers and shakers of contemporary Abu Dhabi affairs, they are somewhat distant from power, especially the power of the purse. While Zayed was alive, only Khalifah could spend large sums without the approval of the UAE president, a situation that did not change after 2004.

Third, the remaining ten sons, 'Isa, Nahyan, Saif, Falah, Tahnun, Hamed, Ahmad, 'Umar, Khalid, and Dhiyab, were also split, some supporting Khalifah and Sultan, and others standing by the Bani Fatimah. Yet the support that any one of these may extend to the Bani Fatimah or to their two eldest half-brothers was heavily mortgaged, and should be weighed accordingly. Except for Saif, who took his military career seriously, the others were not trailblazers. All of them realized that they would never assume effective power. Consequently, they were more than willing to play swing roles, ostensibly to tilt the balance of power one way or the other. Several of these shaykhs were bon vivants, happy jet-setters who relished luxury. Remarkably, few were in tune with key tribal leaders in Abu Dhabi, and had little or no contact with shaykhs in the northern emirates.

Although the fractionalization described above applied to men only, the key ingredient here was the roles that their respective wives (as applicable)

played, and how several interacted with Shaykhah Fatimah. For example, it was widely known that Fatimah did not socialize with the wives of either Shaykh Khalifah or Shaykh Sultan before 2004, a situation that has not changed since the latest succession. Yet, it was also known—Abu Dhabi remained a small town and the rumor mills were in full gear most of the year—that Fatimah surrounded herself with a coterie of key women, in what must be a unique women's club in the UAE, where admission was surely by invitation.<sup>76</sup> The end result of this fractionalization was that most of Zayed's sons were in fluid coalitions. One cannot deny that some coalitions could strengthen over time, especially if a military coup upsets the balance of power, but one should not overestimate them either.

### ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Maktoum of Dubai

If Rashid bin Sa'id Al Maktoum defined Dubai in modern times—he ruled for twenty years as regent to his father before acceding peacefully to rulership in 1958—the individuals who set the first “precious” stones on the shaykhdom were his parents. Sa'id bin Maktoum (r. 1912–1958) and his wife, Hussah bint al-Murr (or Hussah Umm Rashid), together developed a real commercial and political power base. This pioneering couple “managed” the land, “administered” shipping to and from Dubai's famous Creek, and, after the discovery of oil, “regulated” concessions with various companies.<sup>77</sup> In time, additional accords—ranging from air transport to various utility facilities—were entered into, all culminating in substantial earned income. Moreover, both were keenly aware of intrafamily skirmishes—between the two main branches, the Bani Rashid and Bani Suhayl—and how to limit, even eliminate, opposition to Sa'id bin Maktoum. Whether this awareness was due to Sa'id's 1 November 1934 clash with two particularly unruly cousins is difficult to substantiate.<sup>78</sup> In the event, and after considerable mediation by British political agents, Sa'id saw his hand forced as preparations were under way for his son's wedding. Pouncing on the opportunity, Sa'id maneuvered the large badu presence, representing the bride's family, to gain full control over the city.<sup>79</sup> Several opponents were killed and, over time, the defeated branch of the family retrenched into commercial affairs. Power was secured in the hands of Sa'id bin Maktoum until 1958, and in those of Rashid bin Sa'id between 1958 and 1990.

To his credit, and like his parents, Rashid bin Sa'id Al Maktoum displayed a sophisticated acumen for rule as well as “the intricacies of foreign trade and international finance.”<sup>80</sup> He stood as a dreamer-builder and, throughout the 1960s, well before the idea of federation was taken seriously in the Lower Gulf, guided his three sons, Maktoum, Hamdan, and Muhammad, to transform Dubai into a modern trade oasis.<sup>81</sup> He welcomed Indian and Iranian tradesmen and entered into gigantic building schemes. He facilitated when that was

needed, and staunchly held on to his gains at every turn. He welcomed diversity, but only if it protected and promoted his interests. He encouraged privileged relations with Britain to further strengthen his family's position in the Lower Gulf and, after 1971, fostered even closer commercial ties with London. While it may be facile to label him a "merchant-ruler," he was nevertheless a visionary who was plainly aware of his contribution to the Al Maktoum first, and to regional interests second.<sup>82</sup>

After 1971, Rashid bin Sa'id worked with diligence on behalf of his emirate, and positioned his three sons in key posts. Maktoum, who was entrusted the all-important "Lands Department" of the shaykhdom, succeeded him as ruler of Dubai in 1990 and, like his father, was elected by the UAE Supreme Council of Rulers as vice president of the UAE that same year.<sup>83</sup> Hamdan bin Rashid was appointed deputy ruler of Dubai and UAE minister of finance (after a stint as deputy prime minister). Muhammad bin Rashid became heir apparent of Dubai and UAE minister of defense. All three would play key roles starting in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The death of Rashid bin Sa'id Al Maktoum on 8 October 1990 opened the doors that would usher the UAE into a new age. This is not to say, of course, that the late shaykh was an insurmountable obstacle to change. Rather, that specific internal impediment existed, which limited what could be accomplished on a countrywide basis. Rashid was one of the UAE's most prominent leaders, and played a major part in building the federation in 1971. He was therefore reluctant to experiment, especially since federation extracted such a heavy price from individual member states. His mandate after independence was to nurture those gains and shepherd incremental progress attained over two decades.<sup>84</sup> Inevitably, his death accelerated the pace of internal changes, as leading shaykhs were appointed and reappointed to key cabinet, military, and federal positions. Beginning in 1990, several challenges to the country's unity and its economic welfare became apparent, subdued by Shaykh Zayed's continued willingness to remain optimistic and to spend lavishly on one and all until 2004. Yet this was the crux of the matter, because fundamental contentions facing the UAE could not be handled with dirham diplomacy alone, a reality that confronted the Khalifah government after December 2004.

### **Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum (r. 1990–2006)**

Under the astute Rashid, and in less than two decades, Dubai was transformed into an ambitious, relatively independent entity. Rashid succeeded in building his shaykhdom into a warehouse center, with industry, a vibrant banking sector, aviation facilities, a working harbor, and modern communications. Dubai became the Hong Kong of the Gulf region and, in the 1980s, broke away from the UAE fold—during the Iran-Iraq War—when it opted to execute its carefully thought-out plans. It did not reject the 1979 Iranian Revolution, but



helped Tehran in its 1980–1988 war against Baghdad by encouraging a vibrant reexport business after an embargo was imposed on Iran.<sup>85</sup>

Still, what preoccupied Dubai was the struggle for power between Shaykh Rashid's four sons: Maktoum, then UAE deputy prime minister; Hamdan, minister of finance and industry; Muhammad, minister of defense; and Ahmad, general manager of civil aviation. In time, Muhammad emerged as the most prominent, displaying leadership qualities and a distinguished personality. He was able to achieve his prominence by encouraging and supporting many local and foreign activities, and differed from his brothers by the fact that he spoke up on more than one occasion against the practices of "the other fellow Arab in Abu Dhabi."<sup>86</sup> He spearheaded, for example, the border dispute with Sharjah and, at one point, even demanded that Sharjah and Ras Al-Khaimah fold into Dubai. On several occasions, Dubai troops and the Dubai air force were mobilized to occupy Sharjah, and had it not been for the mediation of his British advisers, massacres would not have been averted. In short, the influential Shaykh Muhammad stood out early on, overshadowing his three brothers with aplomb. The man who guarded the emirate's interests in this volatile political environment was the more serene Maktoum. It was his burden to maintain Dubai on its progressive path—set so ably by his immensely capable parents—while managing his more ambitious brother. Maktoum applied his father's conciliatory methods, forged close associations with the Al Nahyan, and adopted true *laissez-faire* economic policies in his own realm that literally transformed Dubai into a marketable international entity.

Born in Shindaghah, Dubai, in 1943, Maktoum bin Rashid became the first prime minister of the UAE on 9 December 1971, when the country gained independence. He served in that post until 25 April 1979, when he was replaced by his father, Rashid bin Sa'id, as the emirates went through one of their most difficult postfederation periods. A decade later, after his father died on 7 October 1990, Maktoum was entrusted the premiership once again, and served both Dubai and the UAE until his death on 4 January 2006.<sup>87</sup> On 3 January 1995, he appointed his younger brother Muhammad heir apparent, entrusting him the day-to-day affairs of Dubai.

Maktoum enjoyed significant popularity because he tolerated private innovation. In repeated interviews over the years, he stressed the need for a sound vision that was free from government interference. His ultimate goal was to make sure that Dubai was prepared for the postoil era. In fact, success for Dubai often meant sharp disagreements with fellow Emiratis, but Maktoum was a master cajoler. When in 2003 Abu Dhabi established its own separate airline, Etihad, Maktoum did not react to the decree that identified the company as the UAE's official flag-carrier. Zayed may well have issued the decree, but Maktoum was too shrewd to take issue with his president. For him, Emirates Airlines was already flying with the UAE flag painted on the tail of its aircraft, and he was satisfied with its reputation. Let others struggle with the

undeniable fact that two national airlines in the federation left the impression of potential conflict. He was comfortable with impressive results in Dubai.

It would be a mistake to conclude that federation matters were secondary preoccupations. Though Maktoum preferred to delve most of his time and passion—and substantial resources—to his thoroughbreds,<sup>88</sup> he took his responsibilities seriously and presided over UAE cabinet sessions on a regular basis. He also represented the UAE at regional as well as international conferences, representing Shaykh Zayed as the president's health deteriorated. Maktoum briefly served as acting president of the UAE on 2–3 November 2004, following the death of Zayed bin Sultan, until Khalifah bin Zayed was proclaimed and installed as president.

### **Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum (r. 2006– )**

Maktoum bin Rashid died on the morning of 4 January 2006 from a heart attack at the Palazzo Versace Hotel, on the Gold Coast of Australia. He was immediately succeeded by his brother Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum as ruler of Dubai, and shortly thereafter as vice president and prime minister of the United Arab Emirates. The challenge that faced the energetic and photogenic Muhammad was to maintain the policies of the past few decades. As was amply demonstrated in the spring of 2006, aggressive Dubai investments throughout the region and the rest of the world drew the ire of foreign regulators, who objected to the pace and content of the emirate's progress.<sup>89</sup> Many questioned whether the Dubai boom was really a bubble waiting to burst. Others wondered how much of the money pouring into Dubai was laundered. Still others questioned the free-flowing banking system that couldn't always stop the transfer of funds to alleged terrorist organizations. Was Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid aware that a parallel transfer system operated out of Dubai and, as alleged, was he aware that Islamic extremists were operating out of the emirate?<sup>90</sup> Such questions dogged the new sovereign as he settled into his new rule. It was too early to conclude that Muhammad would not successfully address putative challenges, even if he confronted stiff competition. How he maneuvered economic and political concerns—in that order, as set by his parents and brother—would certainly mark his tenure.

Muhammad bin Rashid was born in 1949 and privately tutored in Arabic and Islamic studies in Dubai. In 1955 he attended Al Ahmadiyyah School, and four years later he graduated to Al Sha'ab School. After a two-year stint at Dubai Secondary School, he enrolled at Bell School of Languages in Cambridge, England, in 1966. He is married to Shaykhah Hind bint Maktoum bin Juma' Al Maktoum, and to Princess Hayah bint Al Hussein, the latter a daughter of Hussein of Jordan (and half-sister of Jordan's current king, 'Abdallah II). Shaykh Muhammad has sixteen children—seven sons and nine daughters.

## **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

The key factor in the UAE succession equation was Dubai's ruling Al Maktoum family, in particular the increasingly powerful Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum. Muhammad pretended to share a very close bond with the late Shaykh Zayed—which bode well for the future stability of the federation—although most Abu Dhabi shaykhs did not trust him. In his capacity as UAE defense minister, Muhammad worked closely with Muhammad bin Zayed, especially after Dubai—for financial reasons—opted to fold its separate military units into the federation's unified forces a few years ago. But it is still unclear what stance he may take in the event of a power struggle within the Al Nahyan family.<sup>91</sup> It remains to be seen whether Shaykh Muhammad will be satisfied with the premiership of the UAE federation, or whether he may become a potential presidential contender in 2009 (or later), when a new election for president will be held by the Supreme Council of Rulers.<sup>92</sup>

## **Succession Dilemma for the Al Maktoum**

The December 2009 selection will be the first without Zayed's shadow, when Khalifah bin Zayed's own record will be scrutinized, and when other potential candidacies may well volunteer for service. Whether Muhammad bin Zayed will accept that Dubai or any other emirate challenge the Al Nahyan at this level is a fundamental question, although chances are excellent that he will reject any emendation to the unwritten rule that the presidency is Abu Dhabi's province. If a coup—any coup—were to take place, Muhammad bin Zayed would want to lead it, and it is doubtful that the Abu Dhabi heir would ever contemplate sharing power with anyone, especially someone as ambitious as Muhammad bin Rashid, though the latter faces two obstacles. First, the capital of the UAE is Abu Dhabi, and it seems inconceivable that the vice president and minister of defense would want to leave his beloved emirate. Equally important, and for all the publicity in the world, one cannot but recall his fierce past.<sup>93</sup> Under the circumstances, at least Sharjah, if not Abu Dhabi, would veto his election as president.

Closer to home, Muhammad bin Rashid is poised to make his most critical decision, the appointment of an heir. It is not clear whether he will pass the torch to his brother Hamdan or opt for a primogeniture system. Naturally, such a choice would likely upset Hamdan bin Rashid, but also the late Shaykh Maktoum's own sons.<sup>94</sup> Who among younger Al Maktoums is capable to fill Shaykh Muhammad's shoes is still unclear. Although the concern is not urgent, the uncertainty associated with such a vacancy rattles family nerves, even if few anticipate a power struggle. Al Maktoum family members are too preoccupied with the implementation of various long-term projects to worry

about who will lead the emirate. It was in part to address such anxieties that Muhammad considered the appointment of one of his sons to allow for a smoother transition. Muhammad nominated his son Hamdan to the chairmanship of the Dubai Executive Council in September 2006, perhaps to help the young man carefully learn the risks associated with rulership, although no decisions about the heirship had been announced by mid-2007.<sup>95</sup>

### ■ **Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Dubai**

It is generally assumed that Muhammad bin Rashid is an effective leader with rare foresight. He is certainly those things, but only within the narrow confines of Dubai, a situation that will probably not change in the foreseeable future. It does not translate that the Al Nahyan will accept him—or anyone else who is not from Abu Dhabi—to assume real power in the federal context. Dubai, as the largest Indian city outside of the subcontinent, is a world unto itself and has little to do with Abu Dhabi or the Arab world, save for frequent conferences that address theoretical concerns. It is not an exaggeration to underscore the social and cultural gaps that exist between the two and, consequently, between the Al Nahyan and the Al Maktoum. Yet one should not underestimate the influence of Muhammad bin Rashid on the country, especially now that the formidable ruler of Dubai has acceded to full authority. In fact, Muhammad bin Rashid is an ambitious individual who is well positioned to bid for the UAE presidency in 2009.

Unlike the more subdued Al Nahyan, the Dubai ruler is a public relations genius, thanks in large part to his British consultants. To his credit alone, however, he has ventured into controversial arenas, as in a televised one-man show in late 1999 during which he “discussed” democracy and freedom. Whether these efforts were theatrical in nature is unknown, but they were (and remain) unpopular in Abu Dhabi, because few considered them commendable in a hugely tribal environment. This was the crux of the matter for the UAE: how to reconcile modernization with tribal norms, especially in Dubai, where few bothered to anchor change on intrinsic social strengths. Ironically, the contrast was greatest among young Dubai contenders, who shared little with the previous generation due to their lifestyle of plenty.

### **Hamdan bin Rashid**

Shaykh Hamdan bin Rashid, born 25 December 1942, was deputy ruler of Dubai and minister of finance in the federal government. Older than his ruler and brother, he effectively lost power to the far more ambitious Muhammad in the late 1980s, when the then-heir apparent sidelined his sibling. Hamdan ac-

cepted his fate, but may yet play a key role in Dubai affairs, should Muhammad no longer rule. Indeed, because Muhammad's own sons are relatively young, Hamdan's proven ability to lead and years of experience may certainly propel him into a brokerage role. Ironically, and largely due to his *laissez-faire* approach, Hamdan bin Rashid is highly regarded elsewhere in the UAE.

### **Hamdan bin Muhammad bin Rashid**

Born in 1982, Hamdan bin Muhammad studied at Rashid Private School for Boys, and graduated from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in 2001. A son of the ruler, Hamdan was appointed head of the Dubai Executive Council in September 2006. The decree that authorized the honorific announced that all departments and concerned parties of Dubai were called upon to implement it to better serve the country and its supreme interests. Interestingly, Hamdan was quickly seconded by an able hand to help him steer this major institution when Muhammad 'Abdallah Al Gargawih was named chairman of the Executive Office, which coordinated with the Executive Council. The decree further designated Ahmad Bin Bayat as secretary-general of Executive Council, while Nabeel Al Yousuf was designated director of the Executive Office.<sup>96</sup>

Hamdan's appointment was praised by leading shaykhs, even if the young man's relative inexperience meant that his immediate future was uncertain.<sup>97</sup> Sultan bin Muhammad bin Sultan Al Qasimi, heir apparent and deputy ruler of Sharjah, and chairman of the Sharjah Executive Council, sent Hamdan a cable of congratulation to wish him success in his new post. It was telling that a fellow Emirati recognized the youth's readiness to take on added responsibilities.

### **Potential Alliances Among the Al Maktoum**

Now that Muhammad bin Rashid has assumed power, he will need the support and cooperation of Muhammad bin Zayed if his rule as UAE vice president is to have any meaning beyond the honorific. Although both men have a nascent relationship, one may wonder whether the defense minister is using the chief of staff, or whether the latter is humoring his military boss to neutralize the former. Again, and irrespective of motives, it is truly difficult to envisage Muhammad bin Zayed granting his distant Dubai cousin such powers, which could only come at his own expense. Likewise, a putative Muhammad bin Rashid UAE presidency in 2009 would face much uncertainty, with his only rival, and still heir apparent of Abu Dhabi, retaining access to the country's firepower.

Remarkably, Muhammad bin Rashid may well have concluded that he did not need to establish close ties with Khalifah and Sultan bin Zayed (not to mention some of the other sons). This was certainly the case when Zayed bin Sultan was alive, but no longer. In fact, one of the more interesting developments

after 2004 was the nascent rapprochement between Khalifah bin Zayed and Muhammad bin Rashid, further enhanced in January 2006 when Muhammad replaced his brother as ruler of Dubai. Both men are now rulers, and are jointly burdened with maintaining the balance of power between Abu Dhabi and Dubai within the UAE. Moreover, both are straddled with serious internal, regional, and international responsibilities, which require coordination if UAE interests are to advance. Finally, both leaders are amply aware that other rulers, some senior in age as well as experience, defer to them, but only for the sake of the country's overall welfare. In other words, Khalifah bin Sultan and Muhammad bin Rashid are inclined to collaborate for a variety of reasons, even if these are mostly unnatural to their respective personal and social histories.

Interestingly, the two men shared a common aversion to internal politics, especially with respect to Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. If Muhammad bin Rashid neglected the younger shaykhs in the northern emirates, he was not alone in this activity, as most Abu Dhabi shaykhs followed suit. Although Shaykhs Sultan bin Muhammad (Sharjah) and Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi (Ras al-Khaimah) played key roles as rulers, even they were not as prominent in terms of alliance formation compared to the Abu Dhabi–Dubai axis. With a few exceptions, perhaps Shaykhs Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi in Fujairah and Khaled bin Saqr in Ras al-Khaimah, most exercised little or no influence outside their respective emirate. Any conversation in Fujairah or Ras al-Khaimah was bound to reveal how frustrated some of these younger men were, but most could do little more than vent their frustration. It would be the wise and foresightful Abu Dhabian or Dubaian leader who undertook to tap into this vast unharvested field.

## ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Qasimi of Sharjah

The individual who marked the Qawasim and emerged as one of the most important rulers in the Gulf was Sultan bin Saqr (r. 1803–1866). Until the end of his life, he was interchangeably referred to as “Shaykh of Sharjah” and “Shaykh of Ras al-Khaimah,” as both principalities, along with several other portions of the Persian Gulf, submitted to his authority.<sup>98</sup> Universally feared and mistrusted by the British, Sultan bin Saqr was capable of making deals with friend and foe alike, and survived Saudi as well as British plots against him.<sup>99</sup>

Sultan bin Saqr, his sons, and several brothers ruled over Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah through a series of rebellions instigated by one against another. Often, opposition rose against a lawful “ruler” when inhabitants rejected his authority because the ruler failed to support his brethren, or refused to reduce the tax on pearl divers after a poor harvest. At other times, blood feuds arose, spreading panic among a hapless population. On one such occasion in 1854, Sultan sought the British political resident's consent to coerce those who had

rebelled against his authority in the town of Hamriyah, situated between 'Ajman and Umm al-Qiwayn. In the event, the British counseled against a maritime assault on the town, for fear that a localized feud would spill over into neighboring emirates. When Sultan was away in Lingeh, on the Persian coast, the affair was entrusted to a Saudi representative who, not surprisingly, introduced a Wahhabi garrison into the area. On his return, Sultan was mired in an unwanted battle that resulted in dozens of casualties and, worse, forced the ruler to seek British intercession to end it. The British resident, Captain Arnold B. Kemball, mediated.<sup>100</sup> Beyond the immediate local consequences, pitting opposing tribal leaders against each other, the Hamriyah episode significantly enhanced the British resident's ability to interfere in tribal affairs.

Shaykh Sultan bin Saqr died in 1866 at the age of eighty. His sons Khalid in Sharjah and Ibrahim in Ras al-Khaimah succeeded him.<sup>101</sup> In May 1867, however, Khalid bin Sultan launched an assault on Ras al-Khaimah, expelled his brother Ibrahim, and reincorporated the town and its dependencies under full Sharjah control. In turn, Khalid died in April 1868 from wounds sustained in combat with the ruler of Abu Dhabi.<sup>102</sup>

From the late 1880s to the early 1950s, several individuals, who almost always remained under British tutelage, ruled the emirate. In May 1951, however, a leader who held sharply critical views of the British acceded to power. Saqr bin Sultan (r. 1951–1965) was something of an anomaly for the period and the area. His British “handlers” tolerated neither the rise nor the application of ideas espoused by the maverick chieftain. His bold suggestion that the League of Arab States establish an office in Sharjah was anathema to British officers, who derided any Arab nationalist efforts. While such a suggestion amounted to a forbidden step—that no tribal leader in the Gulf would conduct “foreign policy” without British approval—this was nevertheless an example of interference, because Saqr bin Sultan did not call for a change in either outlook or direction. On the contrary, he affirmed the reality that the Gulf region was slowly integrating into the larger Arab world, and that nothing prevented their eventual linkage. Simultaneously, Saqr bin Sultan, considered a rising star with significant potential at that time, proved difficult in negotiations over the Kalbah region. From a British point of view, the time was therefore ripe to make a “correction,” to orchestrate the ruler's eventual ouster.

Starting in early 1965, British representatives suggested to Saqr bin Sultan's brothers, as well to several other close relatives of the Bani Sultan line of the ruling family, that their ruler should be replaced. According to one observer, “Saqr's brothers are said to have been agreeable, but only on condition that he be assassinated.”<sup>103</sup> Fearing a backlash to their machination, the British rejected this prerequisite and, instead, sought another successor from among other branches of the family. They eventually settled on Khalid bin Muhammad (r. 1965–1972), “who at the time was running a successful paint store in Dubai.”<sup>104</sup> In the event, Khalid received the necessary support, including from

the paramount British resident, and acceded to power. A dejected Saqr went into exile to Cairo, where for seven years he plotted a return. For several critics, Khalid's seven-year rule was uncharacteristic, lacking imagination. Yet, albeit much later than some uncharitable critics maintained, Khalid realized that Sharjah's treaty relationship with Britain was not proving as beneficial as he was led to believe. When it came to protecting Sharjah's sovereignty over Abu Musa Island, for example, London was not eager to resist Iranian violations as the treaty governing the territory implied. What this episode illustrated to Khalid and other members of the Al Qasimi ruling family was that the once powerful Qawasim had become subservient to the British. Under the circumstances, Khalid preferred to turn inward, trusted fellow rulers in the Lower Gulf, and compromised for the good of the contemplated federation. In other words, and while British officials may well have behaved "correctly" (at least from their perspective) with tribal leaders in Sharjah, their undeniable neglect of key issues persuaded a few that the time was approaching for independence. By dismissing legitimate local concerns, British officials, preoccupied with more pressing questions at home, contributed to the formation of the UAE, even if several of its leaders, including the Al Qasimi in Sharjah, favored an orderly transition.

### **The 1972 Coup**

In late January 1972, Khalid bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, ruler of Sharjah since 1965, was assassinated. Because this successful coup, led by the ousted Shaykh Saqr, occurred in the nascent federation, and perhaps to alleviate fears of internal problems, the UAE rapidly extended recognition to the new ruler, Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi. Unfortunately, the assembled elders of the ruling family had not elected Sultan bin Muhammad, the brother of the slain ruler, as his successor when Abu Dhabi extended this vital recognition. The murdered sovereign and his deputy ruler were "viewed by many as accomplice[s] . . . in the unpopular agreement between Sharjah and Iran over Abu Musa Island."<sup>105</sup> Saqr was arrested and placed under house arrest in Abu Dhabi, where the Supreme Council of Rulers refused to hear his case.

The investigation conducted after his arrest revealed that Saqr was counting on Sharjah's anti-Iranian sentiments. Indeed, many believed that the accord between Sharjah and Tehran, to share oil revenues from offshore fields near Abu Musa, was not equitable. According to one observer, Saqr, once in power, "intended to abrogate the agreement."<sup>106</sup> The coup nevertheless presented the UAE Supreme Council of Rulers with a genuine political hurdle, for the country's constitution specifically stated that a ruler tried and found guilty by a federal court of justice would receive the death penalty. Clearly, that was out of the question for conservative rulers wary of setting such a legal precedent, and so early in the federation's life.



Tragically, one of Sultan bin Saqr's successors—who was critical of British activities in the Gulf region throughout the 1950s and 1960s—set in motion a series of events that ushered into the political life of Sharjah a certain degree of instability. Sultan bin Muhammad, Shaykh Khalid's younger brother, benefited from two significant assets that neither of his predecessors could command. First, under his rule, Sharjah became an oil producer, with significant financial windfalls. Second, he was the only ruler to have earned a university education and was therefore attuned to foreign and Western political developments before the Gulf region gained statehood responsibilities.<sup>107</sup> Still, and while both of these assets propelled him into a position of authority and respect, circumventing an Al Qasimi family council to actually select a ruler proved shortsighted. For Sultan bin Muhammad's vision for Sharjah, realized since with aplomb, turned the emirate into a center of learning, but under Abu Dhabi's largess. Sultan served as the UAE's first minister of education and, equally important, endeared himself with Zayed bin Sultan, who respected the former's expertise and interest in agriculture. Zayed the visionary saw in Sultan an educated and competent individual who shared his ideas in turning the UAE into a functioning political entity, a vibrant society, and a responsible Arab and Muslim country.

Given the Qawasim background, and given Shaykh Sultan's full realization that Sharjah interests were best served within a strong union, it was not surprising that the Sharjah–Abu Dhabi relationship grew stronger between 1972 and 1978, until tragedy struck again.

### **Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi (r. 1972– )**

Shaykh Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi was born in 1939. He became ruler following the assassination of his brother Khalid bin Muhammad Al Qasimi (r. 1965–1972), who was killed in an unsuccessful coup to restore his cousin Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi (r. 1951–1965) to power. Sultan earned a reputation for progressive thinking and for several enthusiastic endeavors that transformed Sharjah into a cultural oasis. He earned a doctorate from the University of Exeter in England in 1985, published various studies concentrating on the Gulf region,<sup>108</sup> and embarked on what can only be described as a cultural philanthropic voyage to establish learning centers around the world. He also oversaw a significant construction boom in Sharjah that concentrated on museums, art institutes, as well as several world-class universities, including the celebrated American University of Sharjah, which was fashioned on its sister institution in Beirut, Lebanon.

For some in the UAE, including supporters who perceived his strengths as a potential UAE federal leader, Sultan bin Muhammad was too extravagant. Few doubted that the numerous construction projects in the emirate cost a fortune, and while Sharjah earned modest revenues from oil and gas sales starting

in the early 1980s, its production was somewhat limited, especially when compared with gigantic returns in Abu Dhabi. After assuming power, Sultan amassed a substantial debt, estimated at close to US\$1 billion in the late 1980s.<sup>109</sup> Naturally, this created discontent among several members of the ruling family, and may well have precipitated the coup attempt that rocked the peaceful town in June 1987. While Sultan was out of the country, his elder brother, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Qasimi, issued a statement through a local news agency that the ruler had abdicated. At the time, rumors of alleged mismanagement, coupled with the erudite man’s academic pursuits—he was known to scrounge through major European libraries for hours on end—sealed his fate.<sup>110</sup> Despite initial Abu Dhabi support for the pretender, who was expected to tighten his belt and be less dependent on the Al Nahyan, the coup failed after the Al Maktoum rejected it. The palace uprising forced the Supreme Council of Rulers to meet and deliberate the matter. It was a show of force between Rashid bin Sa‘id and Zayed bin Sultan, and the council ruled that Sultan bin Muhammad was the sole legitimate sovereign. He was thus allowed to resume his duties. Zayed conceded, but insisted that ‘Abdul ‘Aziz retain a seat on the council as the new heir apparent of Sharjah. Vindicated but also chastened by his president, Sultan bin Muhammad initiated administrative and financial reforms, even if he summarily removed his heir apparent in February 1990.

When ‘Abdul ‘Aziz was removed from his post, he revoked any rights to succeed Sultan, and was quickly exiled to Abu Dhabi and points farther west. Zayed demurred, for it was the right of a sovereign to designate his successor, but the episode left a huge scar in the relationship between the two men.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

No matter how unpalatable, the 1987 palace coup attempt was a rude awakening to the Al Nahyan, who were eager to introduce a semblance of order among the northern Emirati ruling families. In Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, Abu Dhabi saw both a highly educated individual as well as a potential rival to the presidency of the federation. Al Qasimi ruling family members were not especially wealthy, but they were not destitute either. Oil and gas revenues allowed them to invest in both Sharjah and the unofficial Kuwaiti stock market. Yet when the Suq al-Manakh—as the exchange was unofficially known—collapsed in 1982, the Al Qasimi lost substantial sums that were never recovered.<sup>111</sup> Many found solace in Zayed bin Sultan’s unsurpassed financial generosity. Still, while Sultan bin Muhammad was certainly grateful, he was equally adamant in his own perceptions. As a learned man with both theoretical as well as practical experience, he concluded that Sharjah, and he in particular, deserved additional rights and responsibilities. From his perspective, the UAE federation was better served if and when all member states shared those tasks, rather than acquiesce to the pre-1971 entente between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Absent such po-

litical allocations, Sultan bin Muhammad saw little merit in kowtowing to every whimsical order that emanated from the capital.

Sharjah weathered serious internal challenges in 1972 and 1987, although its leaders were not particularly satisfied with their neighbors' interference. Even if the Al Qasimi were beholden to the Al Maktoum in 1987, they loathed the precedent-setting outcome, and swore to never place their ruling family in a similar situation.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Qasimi**

In 1990, Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi appointed as heir apparent Ahmad bin Sultan, a younger brother of the former ruler Saqr bin Sultan, in an effort to heal the rift between the two branches of the family. Many believed that this was a temporary selection as the ruler groomed his own son Muhammad for the post. Tragedy struck in April 1999 when the twenty-four-year-old Muhammad bin Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi was found dead in his father's mansion—Wych Cross Place—near Forest Row in East Grinstead, near London.<sup>112</sup> After the forty-day mourning period, the ruler designated a cousin, the competent Sultan bin Muhammad bin Sultan, who was also the brother of his beloved wife Jawahir, to assume the heirship after May 1999.<sup>113</sup>

It is too early to know whether Shaykh Sultan will switch the Sharjah heirship to one of his younger sons, or accept the permanence of the affable Sultan bin Muhammad bin Sultan. The latter is certainly capable of looking after the emirate's interests and, equally important, has raised few objections in Abu Dhabi. This heir apparent is seasoned in intrafederation politics, knows his strengths and weaknesses, and has done nothing to solicit any opprobrium from the south. Moreover, Sultan bin Muhammad is also well placed to keep in check other Al Qasimi rivals, many of whom believe that the sovereign should emerge from within their own branches. Such a highly unpredictable situation is likely to become more pronounced as the ruler grows older.

### **■ Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Sharjah**

The Al Qasimi family of Sharjah is the larger of the two ruling houses. Under the leadership of Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, who enthusiastically supported a strong federal government while maintaining a cachet for each emirate, gigantic construction projects were initiated that contemplated transforming Sharjah into an education capital for the entire region. These projects, including the establishment of the American University of Sharjah, required substantial financial resources, and Sultan amassed significant debt, which unsurprisingly created discontent within the ruling family and may well have

precipitated the June 1987 coup. Although Sharjah benefited from some oil income, as well as generous assistance from Abu Dhabi, especially when Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan was president of the UAE, Sharjah's economy required careful management. Sultan accepted the terms imposed in 1987 that guaranteed his return to power—when he initiated administrative and financial reforms—but did not endear himself with Abu Dhabi when, in February 1990, he removed his brother from the post of heir apparent. A designated son to the position was killed under suspicious conditions in England, which necessitated a reappraisal of potential successors, if for no other reason than to maintain internal stability.

### **Sultan bin Muhammad bin Sultan**

The natural candidate for the heirship, Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi is a cousin of the ruler, as well as the first lady's brother. The affable heir was named deputy ruler and heir apparent of Sharjah in May 1999 after the tragic death of Muhammad bin Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi. A quiet and somewhat shy leader, Sultan filled various positions for his ruler, including the chairmanships of the Sharjah Executive Council, the Sharjah Financial Control Department, the Sharjah Electricity and Water Authority, as well as the National Bank of Sharjah. Sultan has become indispensable in attending to the emirate's various internal needs, and is among the most effective local officials in the UAE. His strength, however, lies in a contented approach. He prefers to stay out of the limelight—not an easy proposition in the overtly media-conscious UAE—to better meet Sharjah's needs. While the ruler has several young sons who may one day claim the right to succeed their father, Sultan bin Muhammad is that rare tested Sharjahan who can fulfill the task of ruler should he accede to full authority.

### **Lubnah bint Khalid**

A surprising recent development in contemporary Emirati history was the memorable appointment of Shaykhah Lubnah bint Khalid bin Sultan Al Qasimi as the first woman cabinet minister. In November 2004, Khalifah bin Zayed Al Nahyan appointed Lubnah, a niece of Sultan bin Muhammad, as the minister of economy and planning, a particularly important position in a country that is a major oil producer, and that relies so heavily on foreign investments. There is little doubt that Lubnah now towers as one of the UAE's most influential women.

Lubnah started her career in the 1970s, working her way up the ranks after she earned a bachelor's degree in computer sciences from California State University at Chico. She returned home in 1981 and took a post as a programmer for the Indian software firm Datamation, working as the sole woman on a

team of mostly Indian programmers—at a time when few women ventured into the field. Two years later she moved to the Dubai Ports Authority, where she rose through the ranks as an information technology manager and developed a documentation system that helped reduce the time needed for paperwork, from one hour per ship to approximately ten minutes. This early success encouraged her to consider the private sector, which she entered in the early 1990s by developing an online marketplace that supported purchase orders for companies in Dubai's free-trade zones. Her business-to-business auction site, *Tejari*, became a trademark and continues to prosper. In preparation to attend the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for a PhD in economics, she earned an executive MBA from the American University of Sharjah in 2000, but postponed her appointment in Boston when she accepted her ministerial portfolio.

Because of her credentials, Lubnah has accepted several engagements, including seats on the following boards: the Dubai Chamber of Commerce and Industry; the Dubai University College; the Electronic–Total Quality Management College in Dubai; the American Graduate School of International Management (Thunderbird) in Phoenix, Arizona; Zayed University; and the Dubai Autism Center. In the past few years, she also received several prominent awards, including the Dubai Quality Group Award for Support to Leadership, Quality, and Change (2000), the ITP Best Personal Achievement Award (2000), Datamatix IT Woman of the Year Award (2001), the Business.com Personal Contribution Award (2001), the Datamatix Outstanding Contribution Award (2002), and the Commonwealth of Kentucky Honorary Title—Kentucky Colonel (2003).

### **Tariq bin Faysal**

Shaykh Tariq is chairman of the Sharjah Economic Development Department, and heads the Sharjah Charity Association as well as the Sharjah Commerce and Tourism Development Authority. In addition to these duties, he is involved in several private businesses, including, as director, the Buhayrah National Insurance Company and the UAE Securities and Commodities Authority.

### **Other Influential Sharjahans**

Several other Sharjah citizens play and will continue to play critical roles in the development of the emirate and influence federal policies. Among these are 'Abdallah bin Salim, chairman of the Sharjah Emiri Diwan; Ahmad bin Khalfan bin Khalifah Al Suwaydi, chairman of the Sharjah Consultative Council after 2004; and Ayshah bint Muhammad, director of the Sharjah Education Affairs Department. Among Al Qasimi family members, the following hold positions of responsibility: Jawahir bint Muhammad Al Qasimi is chairwoman of the Sharjah Family Supreme Council; Jamilah bint Muhammad Al Qasimi

is deputy chairman of the Sharjah Family Supreme Council; Bdur bint Sultan Al Qasimi is president of the Development and Planning Department at the Sharjah Family Supreme Council; Khalid bin ‘Abdallah bin Sultan is chairman of the Sharjah Customs Department; Muhammad bin Sa‘ud is chairman of the Sharjah Administrative Control Department; Jamil bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz is chairman of the Sharjah Islamic Affairs and Endowments Department; Ahmad bin Sultan is chairman of the Sharjah Petroleum and Mineral Affairs Department; and Muhammad bin Sa‘ud bin Sultan is chairman of Sharjah Finance Department. Finally, ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad Al Qasimi is chairman of the Sharjah Municipality.

### **Potential Alliances Among the Al Qasimi**

Because the ruler’s surviving sons are relatively young, the current nexus of power revolves around Heir Apparent Sultan, primarily in either the business world or the education environment. Several Sharjahans serve in the federal government, notably Shaykhah Lubnah bint Khalid Al Qasimi, particularly as ambassadors in the foreign service. These individuals present a serious commitment to the UAE as a federal entity and, in the aftermath of the 1972 and 1987 internal crises, Sharjah may well have shed its penchant for excessive self-flagellation. Still, the Al Qasimi serenity in Sharjah may be due to the personalities of the two senior officials, rather than misgivings about putative intrigues. As long as Sharjah’s overall missions—to transform the emirate into a high-quality education hub and to defend significant political rights at the federal level—remain intact, the Al Qasimi will strengthen internal positions to present a unified posture. Such is the legacy of Sultan bin Muhammad, which will be duplicated by his heir for the foreseeable future with full Al Qasimi backing.

### ■ **Contemporary Rulers: The Al Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah**

Although related to the Qawasim of Sharjah, the Ras al-Khaimah branch is numerically smaller, and rules by virtue of its successful brokerage role between other tribes that inhabit the emirate.<sup>114</sup> London formally recognized the separate identity of Ras al-Khaimah when Sultan bin Salim (r. 1919–1948) accepted British treaty obligations on 20 July 1921. Yet internal family disputes necessitated the appointment of a new ruler in Ras al-Khaimah as well as a new regent in Kalbah.<sup>115</sup> This is yet another blatant case of interference in the internal affairs of the Lower Gulf. In the event, the 1921–1948 period was mired in rivalries between the two branches of the family, until Saqr bin Muhammad Al

Qasimi seized power. The longest-ruling sovereign in contemporary Arab history gained power because of a disagreement between his father, Muhammad bin Salim, and his uncle, Sultan bin Salim. It was a classic palace coup that filled the Ras al-Khaimah plateau with fear of future disturbances.

### **Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi (r. 1948– )**

Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, a mercurial personality and astute sovereign since 1948, never missed an opportunity to propel Al Qasimi interests.<sup>116</sup> Of course, Ras al-Khaimah was mired in political intrigue even before this choice was made, because two sides of the family vied for power—meager as their authority was at the time. In the case of Saqr, the dispute was over the distribution of “annual fees and monthly payments for petroleum exploration rights” among members of the ruling family.<sup>117</sup> Saqr’s father, who acceded to the rulership in 1919, only to see it pass to his brother in 1921, insisted that Sultan bin Salim (r. 1921–1948) was not distributing revenues equitably. Taking advantage of the ruler’s brief absence from the emirate in 1948, his nephew, Saqr bin Muhammad, seized the fort in the capital. He then orchestrated an effective campaign within the ruling family, thereby receiving the necessary oaths of allegiance, and courted and received British recognition.

Whether London was duped in this recognition or whether it saw merit in the choice is controversial even today. Suffice it to say that Saqr’s reputation was one of unmitigated independence that, in diplomatic parlance, translated in stubborn resistance to British demands. Consequently, Saqr was never a “trusted” ally. According to one observer, “during the negotiations to establish the [UAE], he is perhaps best remembered for angrily walking out of the meeting of the nine Lower Gulf Rulers in October 1970 over alleged British interference in the discussion.”<sup>118</sup> At the time, it took a full year for negotiations to resume, and to partly remedy the damage caused by this walkout. Saqr’s equally critical rejection was over the proposal put forth by London to settle the islands dispute with Iran over the Greater and Lesser Tunbs. In fact, part of his refusal to join the UAE in 1971 was pinned on Saqr bin Muhammad’s hope that oil exploration would allow for a more equitable distribution of power, if not parity, with Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Naturally, the more important reason was for Ras al-Khaimah to assert itself, but its ruler came under severe pressure when Saqr’s own tribesmen called on him not to deny them a new and respectable identity.

Interestingly, Saqr’s political interpretations stood out from the more conservative variety espoused by fellow Gulf rulers. Throughout the 1960s, for example, he championed liberal Arab nationalism—going so far as to support the establishment of a League of Arab States office in nearby Sharjah—only to face the ire of British officials. He retaliated by holding out in terms of the

necessary compromises over the creation of the UAE, and resented London's imprimatur over the Abu Dhabi–Dubai alliance that stood at its center. How much of this was showmanship is hard to tell. Suffice it to say that Saqr did not hesitate to send members of the Trucial Oman Scouts in December 1964 to urge pro-Egyptian, and therefore anti-British, demonstrations. Nevertheless, his uncanny ability to irritate fellow rulers proved legendary and, within the UAE federation since 1971, his unconstrained positions gained both ire and concern. For example, Saqr has played the Saudi Arabia alliance game rather well, accepting financial support—ostensibly to improve local infrastructure—but also displaying a level of independence from Abu Dhabi. Whether this preference is based on a legitimate fear—that the stronger federation members will dominate the country's political setup in perpetuity—or articulated to gain in federation windfalls, is also difficult to gauge. Yet like their cousins in Sharjah, the Ras al-Khaimah Qasimis long for the day when the Qawasim—once an imperial power that fought the mighty British—will once again regain their regional influence. Saqr bin Muhammad and his sons as well as their brethren in Sharjah insist, even if most Westerners label the Qawasim as mere “pirates,” that their ancestors were not just a tribe, but a legitimate maritime power. They often recall and remind interlocutors that Ahmad bin Majid, Vasco de Gama's chief navigator in the Indian Ocean, was one of them.<sup>119</sup>

Saqr's heir apparent and deputy ruler was Khaled bin Saqr until mid-2003, when the US-educated official—who is at ease in both Eastern as well as Western settings—was replaced by his brother Sa'ud. Khaled, an intelligent official, gained the support of several uncles both in the UAE and living abroad, the latter after they were expelled from the emirate in the mid-1960s with British assistance. Most acquiesced, accepted Khaled as the eventual ruler, and hoped to return home at the right time. In fact, this recognition stood in contrast to their rejection of Saqr's authority when the elderly ruler ushered in a dramatic change.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession: The 14 June 2003 Coup**

Because of his advanced age, starting in 1999 Saqr entrusted the actual day-to-day management of Ras al-Khaimah to his heir apparent, Khaled. Devoid of primary energy sources, the relatively impoverished emirate nevertheless offered strategic value—abutting the Musandam Peninsula on the hugely critical Straits of Hormuz—and therefore required a steady hand at the helm. Given his experience and proven record, Khaled was indeed such an individual, capable of protecting Ras al-Khaimah's primary interests—to recover the occupied Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands from Iran and, at the very least, ensure that this question remained on the UAE's permanent foreign policy agenda.<sup>120</sup>



There were no hints that the heir apparent was not fulfilling his ruler's wishes precisely as the latter ordered when, on 14 June 2003, and after a short visit to Abu Dhabi to meet with Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayan, Saqr issued a decree demoting his heir. Khaled would hence become deputy ruler, whereas the Ras al-Khaimah heirship—and de facto rulership—would go to Sa'ud bin Saqr, one of the younger of his seven sons.

Surprisingly, the announcement provoked a brief crisis after Khaled resisted, implying that his octogenarian father was probably not in the fullest possession of his faculties. Khaled would not accept that Shaykh Saqr would dismiss an heir who had served faithfully for almost forty years, describing his father's decision to replace him as "unsound."<sup>121</sup> In the event, thousands of his supporters marched on the ruler's palace to demand a full retraction. When police units failed to disperse the throngs, clashes ensued, leading to the deployment of armored personnel from Abu Dhabi. Against this show of force, Khaled called on his men to desist, and left for Oman to seek mediation from Sultan Qaboos.<sup>122</sup> Although he returned to Ras al-Khaimah a few days later in a last effort to return to power, Khaled was no longer a contender, as he had lived in the sultanate for the better part of the preceding few years.

Sa'ud bin Saqr, the new heir apparent, quickly confided that the succession change was approved by Shaykh Zayed and occurred in coordination with UAE federal officials.<sup>123</sup> Zayed may well have given his imprimatur to Saqr's wishes, but refused to speculate one way or the other, even if local traditions permitted any ruler to name his own successor. Still, there can be little doubt that Abu Dhabi supported the move, primarily to buttress its own rising power within the federation.

Why was Khaled ousted and how did this dramatic change enhance Ras al-Khaimah's long-term interests within the UAE? A variety of reasons may have prompted the ruler to act the way he did, even if some are rather implausible. It was first speculated that Sa'ud, the ruler's fourth son, wanted to develop the emirate further, and that this was the primary reason why Saqr orchestrated the change. Sa'ud was already Ras al-Khaimah's most prominent business leader before assuming his new post, and although Saqr may well have wanted to satisfy his young son's ambitious development plans, in reality the new heir's desires to diversify the economy were not entirely different from Khaled's outlook.<sup>124</sup> This rationale is thus too facile to merit serious attention. Another controversial cause may well have been Shaykh Khaled's wife, Shaykhah Fawqiyyah, "a well-known playwright [and] founder of an organization for women which has sought to assist in solving women's problems [by] campaigning for women's rights."<sup>125</sup> Ultraconservative Emiratis may well have demanded that Khaled muzzle his wife, but that too is pure speculation. Shaykhah Fawqiyyah's courageous and outspoken positions did not help, although a "confrontation" may well have occurred on the subject between father and

son.<sup>126</sup> In fact, Khaled's own straightforward advocacy, to introduce sorely needed political improvements, including his calls to allow UAE citizens to elect the Federal National Council, were even more important. If Shaykh Zayed, or any of his sons in Abu Dhabi, objected to Khaled's maverick ideas, these thoughts were more relevant than what his spouse may have wished to bring about.

To be sure, Khaled was not the only UAE official speculating about elections, or even contemplating that women should also have the right to vote if and when such elections were organized. Even Sa'ud bin Saqr advocated more liberal approaches, although his initial preferences centered on laissez-faire economic policies. Rather, Saqr objected to Khaled's perceived liberal penchant, to encourage genuine reform and accelerate women's rights by openly declaring them even if his "comments were made in the context of U.S. statements regarding the need for political reform and democratisation in the region following a change of regime in Iraq."<sup>127</sup> The fact that the US-educated Khaled was surrounded by several articulate and fascinating university professors advising the then-heir to push for change did not endear him to the tradition-bound ruler, even if Ras al-Khaimah and Khaled were consummately pro-American.<sup>128</sup> Critics pointed to his open and at times severe opprobrium of US policies in the Middle East, especially in Iraq, but Khaled's nationalist credentials were never challenged by any worthy antagonist. His opposition to the US intervention in Iraq was widely shared among most high-ranking UAE officials—as well as the overwhelming majority of the public—but few revealed their true feelings in public.

Equally important was Khaled's obsession with the recovery of the lost islands. Although this quest was Saqr's lifelong objective too, Abu Dhabi reluctantly sought to reduce the rhetoric level that the question generated as the federal government forged closer ties with Iran.<sup>129</sup> Without abandoning his country's claims to the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands, Zayed distanced the UAE from a potential crisis with unforeseen consequences. Naturally, Khaled bin Saqr and Sultan bin Muhammad, in Sharjah, remained adamant that this question continue to occupy the core of any UAE foreign policy plank. In both cases, frequent and at times poignant demands irritated the overtly cautious and patient Al Nahyan. Along these lines, and finally, is also the possibility that Zayed reacted to strong US complaints about Khaled, especially after the former Ras al-Khaimah heir apparent led an antiwar demonstration in 2003. Thus, while the conservative Saqr may have objected to his daughter-in-law's activism or preferred Sa'ud's economic vision, the most likely reason to orchestrate the palace coup was outside pressure. Specific demands made by Abu Dhabi to curtail Khaled's exuberance about the islands question, as well as Arab *shahamah* (decency), required that fellow leaders prevent any embarrassment to each other. Saqr certainly did not wish anyone, especially US officials,

to complain to Zayed that the Ras al-Khaimah heir apparent was leading an anti-American demonstration in the UAE or was expressing anti-American views in public.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Qasimi**

Among succession crises in the UAE, the 2003 palace coup was of the self-inflicted variety, which diminished Al Qasimi authority within the federation. Even traditional rulers, who exercised their prerogatives with gusto, were now subservient to more powerful internal as well as international powers. When Saqr bin Muhammad acquiesced to pressure to oust Khaled and replace him with Sa'ud, the durable sovereign illustrated the winds of change, and how the northern emirates were slowly folding under Abu Dhabi's wings. The fundamental dilemma facing Ras al-Khaimah was to uphold a semblance of independence within the federation, lest its "seat" on the Council of Rulers be relegated to a meaningless stature. Indeed, a post-Saqr Ras al-Khaimah will certainly flourish, but less so within UAE affairs. It was certainly possible to foresee a Khaled attempt to return to power, even if its likelihood was marginal at best. A wiser Khaled understood the permanence of his outlook and diversified his interests to better focus on his family life. Today, the burden is on Sa'ud, certainly an energized young heir who has launched various schemes to empower Ras al-Khaimah in all directions. New educational and industrial projects have flourished, but all of these efforts have failed to alter the reality that the Al Qasimi literally stay in the shadows of power. Sa'ud plans to compete with Dubai in commercial venues, with Sharjah in the establishment of educational alliances, and with Abu Dhabi in political circles. How he proposes to surmount these contests is anyone's guess. His is an existential dilemma, not necessarily for his own rule, but certainly to retain a semblance of value to the Al Qasimi in Ras al-Khaimah. In fact, Sa'ud is burdened with succeeding one of the longest-reigning rulers in Arab and Muslim history, one who left a larger-than-life impression with an even larger legacy to surpass.

### **■ Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Ras al-Khaimah**

The Al Qasimi branch of Ras al-Khaimah drew its past strength from a major maritime power during the eighteenth century. As discussed earlier, the Al Qasimi controlled much of the trade that passed through the Persian Gulf area, which led to various regional and international conflicts. The Qawasim opposed Oman and eventually the British Empire, which was actively consolidating its colonial presence in Southeast Asia. In 1819, London destroyed the

Qawasim stronghold in Ras al-Khaimah, which may well have instituted a permanent dislike of occupation. Survivors of these bloody battles retrenched in the emirate.

The Al Qasimi family of Ras al-Khaimah is much smaller than the branch in Sharjah, and developed a reputation for producing Arab nationalists even if circumstances required that they compromise often. For example, Saqr rejected British attempts to resolve Iranian claims to the Greater and Lesser Tunb Islands, long before Tehran occupied them militarily. After that, Al Qasimi claims to these islands (the two Tunbs for Ras al-Khaimah and Abu Musa for Sharjah) presented an intractable foreign policy dilemma for the UAE. Still, neither ruler hesitated to insist on various historical claims, even if they embarrassed Abu Dhabi. Ras al-Khaimah, in particular, pretended that its two tiny and largely barren islands enhanced its own political value within the UAE. Although sovereignty was a matter of principle, so were the realities of confrontation. How Shaykh Saqr argued his sovereignty claims was as important as his contentions. It must be emphasized that his passion regarding this issue was widely shared throughout Ras al-Khaimah, especially by his long-time heir, Shaykh Khaled bin Saqr. The US-educated Khaled was a consummate Arab nationalist who persuasively argued, especially within the UAE federal machinery, that the islands question was existential for the Qawasim.

It is important to assess the 2003 coup d'état against Khaled within this particular framework. In fact, it now seems certain that Abu Dhabi persuaded Shaykh Saqr to accelerate the change and replace the heir in favor of his younger brother, Sa'ud bin Saqr, precisely to reduce regional and nationalist tensions. In the event, the abrupt change did not involve a constitutional process, as it merely centered on a simple announcement in the name of the ruler. The change was arbitrary, entirely political in nature, intent, and substance as befit a highly tribal society enmeshed in age-old traditions that never questioned the ultimate authority of the ruler to do as he pleased. A dejected Khaled eventually accepted his fate, passing the torch to his brother, but aware that few Al Qasimi decisions were now made in Ras al-Khaimah. This was the ultimate fate of what once was a leading community in the Lower Gulf region.

### **Sa'ud bin Saqr**

Sa'ud was educated in the United States and earned a bachelor's degree from Michigan State University in 1979. He became heir apparent of Ras al-Khaimah in 2003. Among his many positions, Sa'ud is chairman of the Public Works and Service Department, the Antiques and Museum Department, the Center for Studies and Documentation, and the Ras al-Khaimah Municipality, and president of the Ras al-Khaimah Emiri Diwan. As a prominent business

leader, Sa'ud is also chairman of Julphar, RAK Ceramic, and the Ras al-Khaimah National Insurance Company, and a board member of the United Arab Bank.

### **Khaled bin Saqr**

After Khaled surrendered his heirship to his brother, he accepted the largely honorary position of deputy ruler of Ras al-Khaimah, while devoting more time to his various business concerns. These included a board membership at the United Arab Bank, and the chairmanship of both the Ras al-Khaimah Gas Organization as well as RAKBANK.

### **Other Influential Ras al-Khaimah Officials**

In addition to Sa'ud and Khaled, the following leading officials play important roles in Ras al-Khaimah, and may be expected to support the heir apparent as he consolidates his power base: Faysal bin Saqr, chairman of the General Accounts Department as well as the Ras al-Khaimah Free Zone; 'Umar bin Saqr, deputy chairman of RAKBANK and chairman of the Financial Control Department; Talib bin Saqr, director-general of the Police Department; Faysal bin Humayd, director of the Emiri Diwan; Walid bin Khaled bin Saqr, who holds a federal post at the Ministry of National Economy; and Salim bin Sultan bin Saqr, chairman of the Civil Aviation Department.

### **Potential Alliances Among the Al Qasimi**

After the dramatic changes ushered in 2003, the Ras al-Khaimah Al Qasimis were divided into two alliances, centered on Shaykhs Sa'ud and Khaled. Although a potential conflict may emerge between the two groups if the young and energetic Sa'ud were to be somewhat incapacitated, the Khaled alliance will not force the succession issue in the near term, because it literally lost the pivotal Abu Dhabi support. While Shaykh Zayed was alive, Khaled was valued as a genuine contributor to Arab nationalism, a far less attractive proposition since November 2004. In fact, Khaled confided that he drew succor from his frequent encounters with Zayed, a man who invariably placed the interests of the UAE in their proper Arab perspective. He stressed that all of his nationalist efforts were in tune with Zayed's wishes and that he cleared his positions with the president before embarking on what appeared to be controversial public pronouncements.<sup>130</sup> Naturally, priorities shifted in Abu Dhabi several years before Zayed died, but it was a largely hidden truth that the ailing ruler was no longer capable of offering comments on detailed internal UAE affairs. Indeed, Khaled was the first casualty of this epochal change, but true to his character,

he accepted his fate with dignity. The critical alliance in 2007 is the one led by Sa'ud, which will dominate the emirate's political as well as business decisions.

### ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Na'aimi of 'Ajman

Because of its proximity to Sharjah, and like several of his neighbors, in 1820 the tribal leader in 'Ajman lodged an official complaint with London against acts of aggression attributed to Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi.<sup>131</sup> Rashid bin Humayd Al Na'aimi vowed never to submit to Al Qasimi authority, even if his son was married to the daughter of Sultan bin Saqr, and even if he sought to gain British recognition of his rulership. This was sealed by his successors in the 1853 Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, which aimed to build parallel alliances between the various ruling families in the Lower Gulf with Britain. Between 1873 and 1900, 'Ajman was ruled by intrigue, which culminated in the assassination of Humayd bin Rashid on 8 July 1900 by his uncle and successor, 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Humayd, ostensibly because the ruler failed to provide promised allowances.<sup>132</sup> As was customary, British officials pressed the new ruler to accept and obey treaty obligations that the predecessor had entered into, without noticing the pattern that political murder set in motion. 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Humayd ruled for a decade before he too was murdered, on 16 February 1910, to be succeeded by his son Humayd, a most interesting character. As was customary, British residents annually (or more often if circumstances warranted it) distributed gifts to shaykhs and rulers to further seal existing bonds. The gifts were modest by modern standards—gold watches and chains, binoculars, clothes, or weapons. In 1910 and 1911, Shaykh Humayd publicly refused to accept these gifts, perhaps realizing their insignificance. Here was a leader who perceived how enduring yet unbalanced the Lower Gulf rulers' relationships were with the great power, and how miserly British political residents could be. British officials, however, would not stand for such "arrogance" and, in this instance, made the poor shaykh apologize—as well as accept the gifts—and promise to behave differently in the future.<sup>133</sup> Rashid bin Humayd succeeded his father on 20 April 1928 at the age of twenty-five, and ruled unopposed by the British India government, especially since he promised to abide by all existing treaty obligations. He bore the scars of battle, and projected a unique style, combining humor with courage.<sup>134</sup> His long reign ended on 6 September 1981, when his son succeeded him.

As a cursory look at 'Ajman's past illustrates, it is geographically fragmented because of constant feuds that resulted in dispersed tribal elements recognizing competing leaders as their sovereigns. Rashid bin Humayd's claims that the villages of Masfut and Manamah, lying on the border with Oman but within the emirate of Sharjah, were his, did not facilitate matters. Although he collected *zakat* (alms offerings) from inhabitants of those vil-

lages,<sup>135</sup> one of his sons, ‘Ali, supported a lavish lifestyle by liberally issuing travel documents. This was not welcome news to the ruler, who took counter-measures to end this breach of diplomatic behavior, but the damage was done.<sup>136</sup>

### **Humayd bin Rashid Al Na‘aimi (r. 1981– )**

The Na‘aimi ruling family, probably the smallest in the Lower Gulf in terms of actual numbers, fell victim to the vagaries of Gulf tribal life. Its members were dispersed in Ras al-Khaimah as well as in Buraimi and Al Ain (and in Oman), which undoubtedly burdened Ahmad bin Rashid bin Humayd Al Na‘aimi. Moreover, and perhaps because of the shaykhdom’s proximity to Dubai, ‘Ajman leaders adopted neighborly policies to ingratiate themselves with the Maktoums. This preference created the impression that the Al Na‘aimi were not always grateful to Zayed’s unwavering support. This may well have been due to Ahmad’s sense of pride—not wishing to be financially dependent and kowtow to every Abu Dhabi directive—but it may also have been an attempt to uphold traditions, perhaps in emulation of the legendary Humayd bin Rashid, who refused British advances. More likely, it was due to tribal survival instincts, nestled between more powerful and wealthier leaders in Sharjah, Dubai, and Abu Dhabi.

Humayd bin Rashid was born in 1931 and received his primary education in ‘Ajman. At independence in 1971, he became active in the affairs of state, and represented his father as deputy ruler in various councils as he slowly sidelined his older brother ‘Ali bin Rashid. He succeeded his father as emir in 1981, and eagerly undertook to transform the small fishing village into a vibrant commercial center. While ‘Ajman welcomed foreign investments, its proximity to Dubai predetermined all of its decisions, especially during the emirate’s slow transformation into a relatively affordable bedroom community to thousands toiling next door.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

As anticipated, Humayd bin Rashid succeeded his father in 1981, and ingratiated himself with neighboring ruling families. This approach stood in contrast to past tribal behavior in the area, because British political residents managed all such contacts. Humayd embarked on a true fact-finding mission to meet his neighbors, acquaint himself with distant cousins, and address common concerns. Indeed, such a vision was necessary to better resolve lingering border disputes, which festered under British rule, and continued after 1971. Humayd was somewhat responsible for freeing local sovereigns from preconceived notions, including severe prejudices, the absence of which allowed them to exchange views and options. This was a clever move, for ‘Ajman—like Umm

al-Qiwain and Fujairah—was too marginalized to affect federal policies. It was also an improved way to gain respectability in the UAE federation.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Na'aimi**

Because 'Ajman was tribally homogeneous, with the native population primarily drawn from the Al Bu Khayraban section of the Al Na'aimi, there were few challenges from within. The previous ruler, Rashid bin Humayd Al Na'aimi, enjoyed a very long rule (r. 1928–1981), and his successor has been in power for over two decades. It is worth recalling that while the Al Na'aimi succession has been particularly bloody, no assassinations have occurred during the past century, itself a record for this northern clan.<sup>137</sup> Just like his father, Humayd bin Rashid displayed exceptional physical courage, an impressive stature, and, according to his interlocutors, an engaging personality. Yet unlike his predecessor, Humayd did not simply rely on the small size of his fiefdom to play Abu Dhabi against Dubai. Rather, he sought to add value to tiny 'Ajman by reconciling with his neighbors. He quickly appointed his son 'Ammar as heir apparent, following a family conclave. During the past two decades, there have been no lasting challenges to the succession lineup, and none are likely in the foreseeable future. What preoccupies the Al Na'aimi ruling family is the meteoric financial progress recorded throughout the UAE, which has created two major dilemmas. First, the emirate and the ruling family must be aligned in an effective way if its current and future alliances are to harvest significant benefits from whatever largess follows the creation of wealth. Second, the emirate must retain enough of its independence not to become irrelevant in UAE political life. Both of these issues affect long-term family security and require the utmost husbanding of economic and political resources.

### **■ Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in 'Ajman**

One of the smallest UAE federation members, 'Ajman is entrusted to the heir apparent and chairman of the 'Ajman Executive Council, 'Ammar bin Humayd. He is seconded in running the emirate's affairs by Majid bin Sa'id, chamberlain of the Ruler's Court and a board member of the Executive Council. In turn, these two men can count on the assistance of 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Humayd, chairman of the Information Department; and Ahmad bin Humayd, chairman of the Economic Department and the Petroleum and Mineral Resource Department, head of the Free Zone Authority, and a board member of the Executive Council.



## **Potential Alliances Among the Al Na‘aimi**

There are no known alliances among the Al Na‘aimi of ‘Ajman other than supporters of the heir apparent. In fact, Shaykh ‘Ammar bin Humayd is expected to succeed his father and remain a tangential player in UAE affairs. To their credit, however, and aware of their neighboring emirates’ potential, the Al Na‘aimi have agreed to play such a secondary role so that their subjects can benefit from the financial windfalls that accrue through federation membership. Managing such understanding within a traditional tribal setup, especially when fellow rulers tend to be far more resourceful, requires patience, tolerance, and compliance. The Al Na‘aimi and their fellow rulers in both Umm al-Qiwain and Fujairah have mastered the skills that permit the smaller ruling families to benefit from the largess bestowed upon them.

### **■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Mu‘allah of Umm al-Qiwain**

With Abu Dhabi as its lone parallel, Umm al-Qiwain enjoys a geographical continuity that, more than other characteristics, facilitates Al Mu‘allah rule. Remarkably, the ruling family—who belongs to the Al ‘Ali tribe—has enjoyed a palpable and more or less unchallenged degree of longevity ever since the rule of ‘Ali bin ‘Abdallah in 1844. Whatever internal disputes existed were due to Al Qasimi domination of the Lower Gulf and how successive British political agents positioned ruling families against them.<sup>138</sup> A major dispute arose, however, when Rashid bin Ahmad was imprisoned by Zayed bin Khalifah of Abu Dhabi in 1907.

Typically, the dispute emerged from periodic adjustments over the position of a tribe vis-à-vis another, all to ensure that putative treacherous acts would be avoided. Lack of trust fueled Zayed bin Khalifah’s fears of advancing claims and counterclaims over meager property (mostly grazing animals), which prompted him to place the young ruler of Umm al-Qiwain under house arrest. Whether any of these fears were justified is difficult to substantiate, but the fact that Zayed eventually accepted the British political agent’s mediation indicates that they were not. A compact was negotiated in February 1907 between Rashid bin Ahmad and the rulers of Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, and ‘Ajman, whereby such petty disputes would no longer be blown out of proportion.<sup>139</sup>

Shaykh Rashid’s personality clashes were not limited to his contacts with neighbors. Between 1912 and 1917, he was also entangled with his half-brother, Nasir bin Ahmad, over inheritance conditions. His son ‘Abdallah succeeded him in August 1922, but ruled for only about a year before he was killed by one of his slaves, ostensibly over a trivial matter but in reality as an

act of treachery by one of his cousins. Hamad bin Ibrahim assumed power in a classic coup and attempted to make peace with his uncle Sa'id bin Ahmad, who was then living in Ras al-Khaimah. His own rule came to a violent end on 13 February 1929, when servants of his blind uncle 'Abdul Rahman killed him. Ahmad bin Rashid, the brother of the ruler who was murdered by Hamad bin Ibrahim, was named successor.<sup>140</sup>

Barely eighteen when he assumed the burdens of power, Ahmad accepted British treaties and ruled peacefully until 1981. He was a recluse during the latter part of his life and turned over most federal responsibilities to his son Rashid, who in turn acceded to rulership on 22 February 1981. Under both of these men, the authority of the Al Mu'allah family has remained unchallenged for almost a century.

### **Rashid bin Ahmad Al Mu'allah (r. 1981– )**

The smallest UAE federation member state was also the poorest, although its ruling family experienced wealth in earlier times. For the Al Mu'allah, survival meant total acquiescence to Abu Dhabi, and Shaykh Rashid bin Ahmad was eager to oblige, although this was a recent phenomenon. Like his late father, who was a recluse with little interest in state affairs, Rashid banked on the tribal homogeneity of Umm al-Qiwain to isolate and protect his tribesmen from the vagaries of regional tensions. In exchange for his loyalty and acquiescence, he was amply rewarded, which essentially meant near-total dependence on, and subservience to, Abu Dhabi.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

There was no opposition to Shaykh Rashid's 1981 accession and acceptance of the Al Mu'allah loyalty oath. Federal officials periodically visited Umm al-Qiwain to inquire about local needs, and the ruler judiciously paid his respect to Shaykh Zayed several times each year. Zayed was not miserly toward the smaller federation members, including Umm al-Qiwain, because they retained constitutional value, but also because the Abu Dhabian genuinely believed that his bounty was worth spreading across all of his immediate neighbors. As a tribal leader first and foremost, Zayed understood that Rashid bin Ahmad, like similarly situated rulers in the northern emirates, depended on him to share wealth with fellow Emiratis. Toward that end, he provided Umm al-Qiwain with the resources and requested the Al Mu'allah to be generous with their subjects.

When Rashid appointed his son Sa'ud as heir apparent, he sought and received Abu Dhabi's blessings, which stood in direct contrast with earlier periods when northern Emiratis refused to cooperate with southern neighbors. In some way, the evolving relationship between Umm al-Qiwain and Abu Dhabi

reflected the consequences of dramatic changes throughout the UAE, which divided the country between haves and have-nots.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Mu'allah**

Like the Al Na'aimi in 'Ajman, the Al Mu'allah are tribally homogeneous, with the native population firmly supporting its rulers. There have been no challenges from within to Rashid bin Ahmad's rule since his 1981 accession to power. His son Sa'ud is expected to succeed him. What ails Umm al-Qiwain are its limited resources, and the Al Mu'allah are certainly preoccupied with the consequences of current and prospective alliances within the federation.

### **■ Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Umm al-Qiwain**

Except for Abu Dhabi, Umm al-Qiwain is the only UAE member that enjoys geographical continuity and, remarkably, an established longevity for the Al Mu'allah ruling family. Long subject to Qawasim attacks, the Al Mu'allah managed to survive, even if they were frequently conquered by intruders.

The current heir apparent is Sa'ud bin Rashid, ably assisted by Ibrahim bin Ahmad, director of the ruler's office, and by Maktoum bin Rashid, director of the heir apparent's office. In addition to these men, the following individuals play critical roles in the small emirate: 'Abdallah bin Rashid, deputy ruler and head of both the Police Department as well as General Security Forces; Khalid bin Rashid bin Ahmad, president of the Emiri Court and chairman of the Port of Umm al-Qiwain; Muhammad bin Rashid, commander of the National Guard and chairman of the Antiques and Museums Department; 'Ali bin Rashid, head of the Lands and Property Department; and 'Abdallah bin Ahmad, chairman of the Ahmad Bin Rashid Port Authority as well as head of the Umm al-Qiwain Municipality.

### **Potential Alliances Among the Al Mu'allah**

There are no known alliances among the Al Mu'allah of Umm al-Qiwain other than supporters of the heir apparent. Sa'ud bin Rashid is expected to succeed his father and, like his counterpart in 'Ajman, to remain a tangential player in UAE affairs. Like the Al Na'aimi in 'Ajman, the rulers of Umm al-Qiwain have correctly surmised that they benefit far more from their more powerful neighbors, even if their respective emirates may well have been transformed into affordable bedroom communities for Dubai. In fact, the merit of such understandings are not mundane but deeply rooted in tribal recognition that the relatively weaker parties must welcome the benevolence of stronger elements,

especially if junior participants add value to the federation by enhancing the system's overall legitimacy.

### ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Al Sharqi of Fujairah

The Al Sharqi gained full sovereignty over the emirate from the Al Qasimi (Sharjah) on 23 March 1952, although the initial break occurred around 1866, after Sultan bin Saqr, the legendary Qasimi leader who marked the chronicle of the Lower Gulf, died. Since then, successive leaders have shaped the ruling family's history just as they have delineated its geographic features. Consequently, the emirate came into existence, but as a fragmented entity, which unsurprisingly complicated its actual administration. Today, Fujairah has two separate enclaves, as well as three village dependencies, and has a Westerly outlook because of its physical location on the Sea of Oman. These enclaves and dispersed villages are the result of wars between Al Qasimi and Al Sa'id (Oman) rulers who competed for power in the area and enlarged their numerous quarrels by dragging other tribes along.<sup>141</sup> What preoccupied Qasimi rulers, as well as influential British political agents, were the various maritime conditions that facilitated—or prevented—free navigation for their ships. The divide-and-rule approach persisted, but not because Fujairah was devoid of either leadership or tangible assets.

Starting in 1902, London preferred to retain Fujairah under Sharjah's rule, while acknowledging Hamad bin 'Abdallah as the "Headman of Fujairah."<sup>142</sup> By 1916, the British felt bold enough to caution the ruler of Umm al-Qiwayn not to "interfere" in Sharjah's internal affairs, by welcoming the "Headman of Fujairah" to reconciliation talks.<sup>143</sup> In fact, these and similar interferences contributed to the fragmentation of Fujairah, until the rule of Muhammad bin Hamad Al Sharqi (r. 1938–1975), who, more than any other recent Al Sharqi ruler, marked the history of the shaykhdom.

Because the British never recognized Oman's claim to Fujairah, Muhammad bin Hamad's persistence paid off in 1952, when London sought to further its commercial position in the Lower Gulf. Reacting to Muhammad's offer to grant oil concessions, and having long accepted Al Qasimi divisions in Sharjah, Ras al-Khaimah, and Kalbah, London extended recognition to further its maritime posture. Naturally, the ruler accepted the panoply of British conditions, ranging from the General Treaty of 1820 to the crucial Treaty of Peace in Perpetuity of 1853. At the time, both rulers in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah voiced their objections, but these were simply ignored.<sup>144</sup> Mistrust and competition kept Muhammad bin Hamad at odds with the rulers of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, which on several occasions resulted in armed conflict. They also forcefully brought in British political agents to defuse tensions.

### **Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi (r. 1974– )**

Muhammad's son, Hamad bin Muhammad, was born in 1948, and is one of the better-educated of the seven UAE rulers. He acceded to rulership in late 1974, and has ruled Fujairah—located entirely on the Gulf of Oman—with dexterity. Although Hamad inherited the plethora of problems in the Fujairah portfolio—Dibbah (one of the dependencies), for example, is nominally under Al Sharqi rule, but its inhabitants continue to recognize the authority of Sharjah and, more important, the Sultanate of Oman—he has not been able to convert this intrinsic advantage to any substantial gains for the shaykhdom. Fujairah continues to be dependent on Abu Dhabi's financial largess and has been slow in developing its commercial ventures, save for its recently enlarged deep-water port. The advantage that such a facility provides Fujairah, as it falls outside the strategic and vulnerable Straits of Hormuz, is only beginning to be properly assessed.

Shaykh Hamad's primary strength lies in the fact that he rules over a population that is predominantly Al Sharqi; consequently, there is little or no internal opposition to his rule.<sup>145</sup> Noticeably, and more recently, the versatile ruler, who projects a strong personality, has seen his emirate's strategic location enhance its value. In fact, the Fujairah port and airport have been extensively used by Western powers to service military deployments in the Sea of Oman, as well as in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, Hamad bin Muhammad has been entrusted with additional federal responsibilities, including frequently representing the president of the UAE at international conferences.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

For several years after independence, Shaykh Hamad bin Muhammad served as the UAE's minister of agriculture and marine resources, before succeeding his father as ruler in 1974. The Al Sharqi, one of the largest UAE tribal entities, and certainly the most important on the Gulf of Oman, supported his designation. United for decades, the family successfully freed itself from Qasimi domination, standing behind Muhammad first and Hamad second. Both men carefully regained control over various enclaves and brought them under Al Sharqi control. In fact, Al Sharqi rulers displayed genuine capabilities as they addressed their fiefdom's relative remoteness. Hamad resolved many of his complicated tasks—due to the emirate's distance from centers of commerce and politics—by encouraging his subjects to fully immerse in federal activities. It was remarkable that a large number of federal employees, including those in the military, hailed from Fujairah. Whatever shortcomings existed in family affairs were quickly set aside as the ruler channeled the right people into appropriate positions elsewhere in the federation.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Al Sharqi**

Hamad bin Muhammad relies on his brother Salih as his putative heir, although one of his sons may be expected to succeed him. Because of past breakups with the Qawasim, there are undeniable family rivalries, but these are largely the product of traditional competition with neighboring clans eager to regain control over certain dependencies. How intrafederation border disputes can be eventually addressed remains unclear. This was a subject that Zayed bin Sultan placed in perpetual abeyance through his dirham diplomacy, and the preferred, as well as time-tested, solution may still be applied for several more years. Eventually, however, how the various ruling families settle their internal territorial disputes is certainly relevant to family harmony and succession. Although Shaykh Hamad displays a sharp intellect and a stately demeanor, the main dilemma for the Al Sharqi is their status within the Council of Rulers, especially in the balance of power between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. As a committed federalist, Hamad must ensure that Fujairah's loyalty is reciprocated, which primarily means firm economic assistance as well as due diligence to family stability. Both are mortgaged in the personality of the ruler, who conceives of his emirate's future in broad union terms. Whether his successor or other family members share this vision is unclear, even if few Fujairans contemplate secession from the federation or realignment on the Sultanate of Oman. Suffice it to say that strong allegiances to Al Sa'id rulers are common throughout Fujairah, a phenomenon that is on display to visitors who contemplate Omani flags in the emirate flying over Al Sharqi dwellings.

### **■ Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Fujairah**

A middle power within the UAE, Fujairah's unique geographical position—sitting astray of the Straits of Hormuz—bestows immense strategic value to the entire federation. Indeed, it allows the UAE to bypass the straits, should it be necessary to access the Sea of Oman and the Indian Ocean. By virtue of this capability, as well as Fujairah's particular relations with Oman, its successive rulers have carefully bankrolled their valuable real estate for political influence.

Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi has ruled Fujairah since 1974 and there is no designated heir apparent. Still, several leading officials assist the ruler, including his brother Salih bin Muhammad. Shaykh Salih holds key chairmanship portfolios simultaneously: the Port, the National Bank of Fujairah, the Al Fujairah National Insurance Company, and the Fujairah Department of Industry and Commerce. By virtue of these various positions, Salih is responsible for the bulk of the economy and is therefore the second most influential man after the ruler.

Other contenders to power, albeit in supporting roles, include Muhammad bin Sa'id al-Dhinhani, president of the Emiri Diwan; 'Ali Mustafa Muhammad, manager of the Finance Department; Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Salami, president of the General Civil Aviation Authority; and Saif bin Hamad bin Saif, chairman of the Free Zone Authority.

### Potential Alliances Among the Al Sharqi

The most important alliance in Fujairah is that between the ruler and his brother. This bond is strong and may withstand traditional primogeniture succession, although one of the ruler's young sons may eventually accede to the rulership. Irrespective of such an outlook, the next ruler of Fujairah will need Salih bin Muhammad's full backing, given the latter's immense internal powers. Simply stated, few Al Sharqi family members could flourish independently, and few would want to. In fact, the limited but growing financial resources of the emirate—the result of an upgraded port and a significant boost in tourism—have dramatically improved financial conditions for all. Long neglected because of their relative isolation at the footsteps of the Jabal al-Akhdar, the Al Sharqi have entered a new era of genuine prosperity.

### ■ Notes

1. Interview with Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, president of the UAE, Abu Dhabi, 15 March 1998. The late president clarified, in this long conversation, the many tribulations that senior members of the federation endured as they learned to place aside centuries of mistrust.

2. Frauke Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition*, 2nd ed., London: Longman, 1996. See also Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States*, London: Macmillan, 1978. These two volumes are still the best English-language studies on the early development of UAE leaders. For a key indigenous perspective, see Fatma Al-Sayegh, *Al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttahidat: Min al-Qabilat ilal-Dawlat* [The United Arab Emirates: From Tribalism to Statehood], Dubai: Markaz al-Khalij lil-Kutub, 1997.

3. Naturally, peaceful cohabitation was imposed by the British Empire, but several Emirati tribal leaders, who were manipulated into submission, were also peace-makers. See Malcolm Yapp, "British Policy in the Persian Gulf," in Alvin J. Cottrell, ed., *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, pp. 70–100.

4. For a thorough analysis of the Portuguese presence in the Gulf area, see Faleh Handhal, *Al-'Arab wal-Burtughal fil-Tarikh, 93 to 1134 H, 771 to 1720 AD: Akhtar min Alf Sanat min al-Ahdath baynal-Ummatayn* [Arabs and Portugal Through History, 93 to 1134 H, 711 to 1720 AD: Proceedings Lasting More Than One Thousand Years Between

the Two Nations], Abu Dhabi: Cultural Foundation, 1997. The Ottoman influence is described in some detail in J. G. Lorimer, comp., *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*, vol. 1, 1915, vol. 2, 1908, Farnborough, Hants, UK: Gregg International, 1970 (reprint of 1915 edition), pp. 730, 748–749, 1179–1620. For a thorough discussion of the British imperial presence, see Donald Hawley, *The Trucial States*, London: Allen and Unwin, 1970; and Penelope Tuson, *The Record of the British Residency and Agencies in the Persian Gulf*, London: India Office Records and Library, 1979.

5. Sultan Muhammad Al-Qasimi, *The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf*, London: Croom Helm, 1986, pp. 24–28.

6. This was one of the earlier treaties in the Lower Gulf, as Britain's obligations toward Kuwait, for example, were not formalized until the 3 November 1916 letter from the political resident to Shaykh Mubarak. Likewise, Bahrain did not "enjoy" such protection until the May 1861 "friendly convention," nor did Qatar until the 1916 General Treaty. Relations with Muscat were of a different order given the Omani character. See John C. Wilkinson, *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert*, London: Tauris, 1991, pp. 27–57; and Joseph A. Kéchichian, *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*, MR 680-RC, Santa Monica: RAND, December 1995, pp. 123–134.

7. Bernard Burrows, *Footnotes in the Sand: The Gulf in Transition, 1953–1958*, Salisbury, Wiltshire, UK: Michael Russell, 1990, p. 11.

8. For a compilation of these encounters, see Muhammad Khalil al-Saksak and Shams al-Din al-Da'ifih, *Al-Qiyadat* [Leadership], Abu Dhabi: Diwan of the President, 1981.

9. For a firsthand account of these changes, see Mohammed Al-Fahim, *From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi*, London: London Centre for Arab Studies, 1995.

10. For a glimpse at the Rashid-Zayed relationship, see the amply illustrated *Al-Shaykh Rashid bin Sa'id Al Maktoum*, Abu Dhabi: Zayed Centre for Coordination and Follow-up, September 2001.

11. For a British view of how the Trucial States Development Council originated, see "Cabinet, Defence, and Overseas Policy Committee," in Anita L. P. Burdett, *Records of the Emirates, 1961–1965*, year 1965, Farnham Common, Slough, UK: Archive Editions, 1997, pp. 312–322.

12. Interview with Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, president of the UAE, Abu Dhabi, 15 March 1998. The president recognized that his fellow rulers were exceptionally astute during the negotiating process and, after independence, in promoting pet concerns.

13. Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, pp. 341–362; the key documents of these discussions are included in Wahid Ra'fat, "Dirasat wa Wathaiq Hawlah Ittihad al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah fil-Khalij" [Studies and Documents of the Federation of Arab Emirates in the Gulf], *Egyptian Journal of International Law*, Special Issue no. 26, 1971.

14. Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, p. 357.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 361.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 362.

17. Specifically, the text read: "Member Emirates shall exercise sovereignty over their own territories and territorial waters in all matters which are not within the juris-



diction of the Union as assigned in this Constitution.” See *Constitution of the United Arab Emirates*, Abu Dhabi: Federal National Council, 1997, p. 6.

18. *Constitution of the United Arab Emirates*, pp. 14–16. See also Ali Mohammed Khalifa, *The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation*, Boulder: Westview, 1979, p. 43.

19. In 1973, the federal government’s portfolios were distributed as follows: Abu Dhabi, 12; Dubai, 5; Ras al-Khaimah, 4; Sharjah, 3; ‘Ajman, 1; and Umm al-Qiwain, 2. On January 3, 1977, the distribution changed to: Abu Dhabi, 8; Dubai, 5; Ras al-Khaimah, 4; Sharjah, 3; and ‘Ajman, Fujairah, and Umm al-Qiwain, 1 each. See *Constitution of the United Arab Emirates*, pp. 19–23.

20. The Federal National Council was originally known as the Union National Council (Al-Majlis al-Watani al-Ittihadî); common English usage today is “Federal National Council.” See Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, p. 482 n. 134, p. 377. See also *Constitution of the United Arab Emirates*, pp. 24–31.

21. Abdul Hamid Ahmad, “Stage Set for Country’s First FNC Elections,” *Gulf News*, 15 September 2006, <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/09/14/10067399.html>.

22. The constitution lists these prerogatives without specifying what are the relationships, if any, between union and local courts. See *Constitution of the United Arab Emirates*, pp. 31–37.

23. Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, p. 378.

24. *Ibid.*, pp. 388–389.

25. Khalifa, *The United Arab Emirates*, pp. 122–125.

26. Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, pp. 393–395.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 401.

28. For further analysis, see Emile A. Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Foreign Policy*, New York: Praeger, 1982, pp. 21–40.

29. Enver M. Khoury, *The United Arab Emirates: Its Political System and Politics*, Hyattsville, Md.: Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1980. This section draws on Khoury’s important albeit little-known study on the role of Emirati ruling families in the historical formation of the federation.

30. Khoury, *The United Arab Emirates*, p. 13.

31. What follows are brief sketches of the seven ruling families of the UAE, as well as leading personalities. Of particular interest here are the various dynamics between officials to better answer questions of influence. What were the mechanisms that helped respective families interact, and what roles did the families play in the Lower Gulf? What influences did individual leaders exercise in the formation of the UAE, and what, if any, were the succession initiatives that drove leading personalities to action?

32. S. Hennell and A. B. Kemball, “Historical Sketch of the Bani Yas Tribe, 1761–1853,” *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government* no. 27 (New Series), 1856, pp. 461–496.

33. “Shaykh Zaid bin Khalifah, from 1855,” in Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. 1, pp. 768–772.

34. *Ibid.*, p. 769.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*, p. 770.

37. Zayed the Great occupies an important place in Abu Dhabi's oral traditions, with various historical developments that directly pertain to the family's survival attributed to him. Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Abu Dhabi, 12 December 1999. An oil painting depicting Zayed the Great prominently adorned Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan's primary majlis in 1999.

38. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. 1, p. 771.

39. India Office Records, "Cox to the Government of India, 18 June 1904," IOR:R/15/1/266, in Alan de Lacy Rush, ed., *Ruling Families of Arabia: United Arab Emirates*, vol. 1, Farnham Common, Slough, UK: Archive Editions, 1991, pp. 86–87.

40. "Administration Report of the Trucial Coast of Oman for the Year 1909," IOR:R/15/1/710, in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, p. 92.

41. "Death of Shaykh Sultan bin Zaid and Accession of Shaykh Saqr, August 1926," IOR:R/15/1/265, in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, pp. 137–139.

42. "Accession of Shaykhs Tahnun, Hamdan, Sultan and Saqr b. Zaid and Shakhbut b. Sultan, 1909–1928," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, p. 96.

43. "Accession of Shaykh Shakhbut b. Sultan, January 1928," IOR:R/15/1/265, in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, pp. 157–161.

44. John Duke Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*, Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975, pp. 129–130.

45. Heard-Bey, *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates*, pp. 27–57, 150. See also Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*, p. 130.

46. Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, p. 165.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

48. Given the scarcity of water, trees throughout the country were fed through underground pipes that distributed desalinated water harvested from the sea. This engineering feat was expensive, but fit with the country's massive reforestation program. See "UAE Pushes the Desert Back," *Gulf News*, 30 March 2003, p. 1.

49. Amazingly, he funded the creation of a zoo near Al Ain in 1967, when the emirate was barely self-sufficient; a few years later, he conceived a natural plant and animal reserve on Sir Bani Yas Island, a unique phenomenon in the region. See Peter J. Vine and Ibrahim Al Abed, eds., *Natural Emirates: Wildlife and Environment of the United Arab Emirates*, London: Trident, 1996, esp. pp. 58–69.

50. Charles de Gaulle, *Le Fil de l'Épée*, Paris: Plon, 1971 (reprint of 1932 edition), p. 201. My translation of: "On ne fait rien de grand, sans de grands hommes."

51. The secondary literature on Zayed bin Sultan is voluminous. See, for example, Khalid bin Muhammad Al Qasimi and 'Abdul Rahman Yusuf bin Harib, *Za'id: Al-Qa'id wa Nida' al-Watan* [Zayed: The Leader and the Call of a Nation], Sharjah: Dar al-Thaqafah al-'Arabiyyah, 1991; and Whajihah Abu Zikri, *Za'id 'an Qarib* [Zayed from Up-Close], Cairo: Akhbar al-Yawm, 1991.

52. Wilfred Thesiger, *Arabian Sands*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980 (reprint of 1959 edition), p. 268.

53. *Ibid.*, pp. 268–269.

54. For a rare recent interview, see Joseph A. Kéchichian, "The United Arab Emirates: Strength Building on Strength," *Arabies Trends* no. 15, December 1998, pp. 25–33.

55. Under one scenario, advisers close to Shaykh Zayed, including Ahmad Khalifah Al Suwaydi and the late Hamoodah bin 'Ali, were slated to see their influence di-

minish substantially after Khalifah took over, because Muhammad bin Zayed would want to limit their access to the new ruler. Hamoodah bin 'Ali died in 2001 and Ahmad Khalifah Al Suwaydi withdrew from public life, although his relationship with Muhammad bin Zayed improved following intermarriage.

56. "Sheikh Khalifa Awards UAE Nationals a 25% Pay Rise," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 2-2005, London: Economist Intelligence Unit, May 2005, p. 13.

57. "UAE Faces Pressure over Workers' Rights," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 3-2005, pp. 14–15.

58. "Khalifa Issues Decree on FNC Elections," *Gulf News*, 12 August 2006, p. 1.

59. "Sheikh Mohammed Appointed Deputy Crown Prince," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 1-2004, p. 12.

60. "Abu Zaby Tatba'u Al-Numuzaj al-Khaliji fi Intiqal al-Hukm" [Abu Dhabi Follows the Gulf Model for Succession], *Ad-Diplomasi News Report* no. 14, June 1997, pp. 5–7. What may or may not have transpired within close family circles cannot be verified. Indeed, it is difficult to understand the myriad complications in the UAE without appropriate discussions with high-ranking officials, and this essay indicated to offer such access—without any substantive evidence. Why was this necessary? Since much of what transpired in Abu Dhabi occurred behind close doors, which in turn fueled the engines of speculation, few outsiders would have had any concrete knowledge of high-level decisions.

61. "Shaykh Zayed's Health Will Cause Concern—and Uncertainty over Future Internal Realignments Will Persist," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 2-1999, p. 6.

62. Ibid. To its credit, the Economist Intelligence Unit recognized that "even though he lack[ed] the support of any major lobby within the Emirate, thanks to his popularity among the desert tribes [Sultan bin Zayed] could be a useful ally to Shaykh Khalifah if the Bani Fatma [were] to show signs of restlessness."

63. "The Abu Dhabi Succession Agreement Will Improve Stability," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 4-1999, p. 6.

64. "The Al-Nahyan Sign a Succession Pact," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 4-1999, pp. 11–12.

65. Ibid., p. 12.

66. Kéchichian, "The United Arab Emirates," pp. 26–33.

67. Along with several other shaykhs, of course, both within the ruling families and outside them. Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayed's substantial real estate holdings on the Abu Dhabi Corniche, including the imposing Hilton Bainunah facility, were well known to local observers. For further details, see Fatiha Dazi-Héni, *Monarchies et Sociétés d'Arabie: Le Temps des Confrontations*, Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2006, pp. 155, 169.

68. Because the UAE minister of defense, Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid—now ruler of Dubai—seldom visited his own ministry, one should ask whether the chief of staff of the armed forces was in fact the de facto minister in Abu Dhabi and/or was using the ECSSR as a shadow national defense research institution. Although the two cousins got along well, the subtleties of Abu-Dhabi–Dubai politics, and the relationship of convenience, should not be neglected.

69. The key question regarding Shaykhah Fatimah was whether her influence would remain constant now that Shaykh Zayed had died. Abu Dhabi under Khalifah

became a far more reserved place, with less emphasis on personalities than at any other time in recent memory.

70. Before the 2004 shake-up that eliminated Sultan from the heirship, frequent attempts were made to discredit him—including rumors that he was an alcoholic and a womanizer. There was no evidence to support these rumors, but his opponents did not miss an opportunity to add to their long list of well-crafted “public relations” missives. In mid- to late 1999, a series of “opinion” pieces were published in *Al-Ittihad*, the semi-official newspaper for Abu Dhabi (published under the auspices of the Ministry of Information). The five essays (in the author’s possession), penned by a fictitious “Sarah Al-Jarwan,” were titled “A Message to” and addressed—in the body of the text—to “My Lord Sultan.” Sarah, a woman married to an army officer, “loved” Sultan and could no longer hold her feelings back. It was discovered that “Sarah” was in fact a security officer attached to Shaykhah Fatimah’s palace detail. Sultan was made aware of the stories, and when Sarah contacted the director of the deputy prime minister’s office to set up a meeting, she was flatly told that she should seek love elsewhere. This was not a trivial matter, but only one among many such activities. To further sully his reputation, the London-based newspaper *Al-Quds al-‘Arabi* portrayed Sultan as an incompetent administrator, an individual who held long, four-hour cabinet meetings without reaching a single decision. See “Al-Imarat Tashhadu Halat Min al-Ghalian Wa Ra’is al-Wuzarat Yataghayabu li-Ashur Fil-Kharij,” *Al-Quds al-‘Arabi*, 14 February 2000, p. 2.

71. Sultan bin Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, “Gulf Security: The View from Abu Dhabi,” in Joseph A. Kéchichian, ed., *A Century in Thirty Years: Shaykh Zayed and the United Arab Emirates*, Washington, D.C.: Middle East Policy Council, 2000, pp. 273–280.

72. Interview with Shaykh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan, deputy prime minister, Abu Dhabi, 19 February 2000.

73. White House, “Remarks by the President at Iftaar [*sic*] with Ambassadors and Muslim Leaders,” 28 October 2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031028-9.html>.

74. Although difficult to substantiate, ostensibly the United States lost a clear opportunity to kill bin Laden on 8 February 1999, in the desert south of Kandahar, Afghanistan. According to relatively solid sources, “satellite imagery revealed the presence of a military aircraft belonging to the U.A.E.” Richard Clarke, for his part, revealed to the 9/11 Commission that during a one-on-one meeting with Shaykh Muhammad bin Zayed, then-chief of staff of the UAE Armed Forces, the latter “vehemently denied rumors that high-level U.A.E. officials were in Afghanistan” hunting with bin Laden. For Alan Parrot, “an Arabist and falconry expert who became close to Shaykh Muhammad’s father,” Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan, “there was never any question that bin Laden was present at the luxury hunting camp in southern Afghanistan along with top U.A.E. officials. Osama bin Laden’s hunting partner was none other than Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed, the foreign minister of the United Arab Emirates, and a full-brother of the shaykh who signed the F-16 deal,” Parrot revealed. See Kenneth R. Timmerman, “Did the U.S. Save Osama bin Laden?” *NewsMax.com*, 12 April 2006, <http://www.globalsecurity.org>. See also Steven Strasser, ed., *The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission*, New York: PublicAffairs, 2004, pp. 108–109.

75. “Ta’yin Haza’ bin Zayid Mustasharan lil-Amna al-Watani” [Haza’ bin Zayed Designated National Council Advisor], *Saudi Press Agency*, 21 October 2006.

76. The known members of this salon included Shaykhah Fatimah's own daughters and daughters-in-law, and the wives of Shaykh Tahnun and especially Shaykh Falah. In this respect, Shaykhah Fatimah was not particularly thrilled with the Moroccan-born Shaykhah Bushrah of Dubai (a wife of the former ruler Maktoum bin Rashid), who regularly appeared on television and had her photograph published in local newspapers and magazines. That, at least in proper Abu Dhabi circles, was considered to be a faux pas.

77. Said Zahlan, *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates*, pp. 52–54.

78. "Relations with Members of the Family: Unrest at Dubai, 1934–1935," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 321–335.

79. "Ruling Family of Al-Maktoum: Dubai," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 373–378.

80. Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*, p. 155.

81. For a colorful portrait of Rashid bin Sa'id and his many accomplishments, see Noor Ali Rashid, *Dubai: Life and Times*, Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 1997.

82. Muhammad Sa'id al-Hilli, *Rashid: Ra'id al-Nahdat* [Rashid: Leader of the Renaissance], Dubai: Dar al-Gurair lil-tiba'at wal-Nashr, 1991(?).

83. Muhammad Sa'id al-Hilli, *Majmu'at Tasrihat wa Ahadith Sahib al-Sumu al-Shaykh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum: Fikr wa Riyadat* [Statements and Sayings of His Highness Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum: Thought and Leadership], Dubai: Dar al-Gurair lil-tiba'at wal-Nashr, n.d.

84. For a good recent insight into the Al Maktoum and Dubai phenomenon, see Easa Saleh Al-Gurg, *The Wells of Memory: An Autobiography*, London: John Murray, 1998.

85. Dubai's ties with Iran pose something of a dilemma to the UAE because of the Iranian occupation of the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands. Yet, as has been amply demonstrated in the past few decades, Dubai never allowed political differences to stand in the way of sound business opportunities. Shaykh Rashid and his successors chose to turn a blind eye to the occupation of the islands, to the ire of the late ruler of Sharjah (as well as his successors), Shaykh Khalid bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, who paid with his life for his positions.

86. He became much more careful in the mid-1990s, but folks in Abu Dhabi nourished a long memory. Few forgot Muhammad bin Rashid's earlier vitriolic statements and threats against those who stood in his way.

87. Hassan Fattah, "Maktoum, Modernizing Dubai Emir, 62, Dies," *New York Times*, 5 January 2006, p. A13.

88. Gerald Butt, "Obituary: Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al-Maktoum," *The Independent*, 5 January 2006, <http://news.independent.co.uk/people/obituaries/article336537.ece>.

89. For a good discussion of the Dubai Ports Authority's acquisition of a British company with US holdings, and the virulent opposition that the purchase engendered, see Edward M. Graham, James Andrew Lewis, Don N. De Marino, and William A. Reinsch, "How Can the U.S. Reopen for Business to the Arab World?" *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 71–89. See also "America's Ports and Dubai: Trouble on the Waterfront," *The Economist* 378, no. 8466, 25 February 2006, pp. 33–34.

90. Dazi-Héni, *Monarchies et Sociétés d'Arabie*, pp. 158–161.

91. Shaykh Muhammad is a public relations genius. He is on the front page of every newspaper published in Dubai on a daily basis, inaugurating a conference or presiding

over one activity or another. Although he spends a good deal of time outside the country, he is well advised by a slew of handlers, mostly British. Despite Muhammad's ambition and desire to become president of the UAE (hence his past rapprochement with Shaykh Zayed, his model and "father"), President Khalifah bin Zayed may have alternative ideas for his own successor.

92. "Death of Dubai's Ruler Unlikely to Herald Policy Change," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 1-2006, pp. 13–14.

93. An oft-forgotten incident—but well remembered in Abu Dhabi—happened in 1972 when Shaykh Muhammad bin Rashid, then eighteen years old, commandeered a helicopter to fly over the household of a fellow shaykh in neighboring Sharjah, where he proceeded on a flyby machine-gunning spree, killing at random.

94. "Sheikh Mohammed Has Not Named a New Crown Prince," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 1-2006, p. 14.

95. "Hamdan Is Head of Dubai Executive Council," *Gulf News*, 9 September 2006, <http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/06/09/09/10066170.html>.

96. "Al Gergawi Named Executive Office Chairman," *Gulf News*, 10 September 2006, [http://archive.gulfnews.com/nation/news\\_in\\_brief/10066590.html](http://archive.gulfnews.com/nation/news_in_brief/10066590.html).

97. "Sultan Wishes Hamdan Success in New Post," *Gulf News*, 9 September 2006, <http://archive.gulfnews.com/nation/government/10066381.html>.

98. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. 1, p. 756.

99. Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 2, pp. 87–322.

100. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. 1, pp. 757–758.

101. "Death of Shaykh Sultan b. Saqr of Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah, 1866," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 2, p. 89.

102. Lorimer, *Gazetteer*, vol. 1, p. 759.

103. Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*, p. 176.

104. *Ibid.*

105. *Ibid.*, p. 121 n. 20.

106. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

107. Sultan first graduated with an engineering degree from the College of Agriculture at the University of Cairo.

108. Al-Qasimi, *The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf*. Although this volume is well known, Shaykh Sultan published several other monographs, mostly in Arabic. See, for example, *Al-'Ilaqat al-'Umaniyat-al-Faransiyyat, 1715–1905* [Relations Between Oman and France, 1715–1905], Dubai: Al Ghurair, 1993 [also available in French as *Les Relations Entre Oman et la France (1715–1905)*, Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1995]; *Yawmiyyat David Seton fil-Khalij, 1800–1809* [David Seton's Journeys in the Gulf, 1800–1809], Sharjah: Al-Khalij, 1994; *Al-Ihtilal al-Britani li-'Adan* [British Occupation of Aden], Dubai: Al Ghurair, 1992; and *John Malcolm and the British Commercial Base in the Gulf, 1800*, Dubai: Al Ghurair, 1994.

109. J. E. Peterson, "The Nature of Succession in the Gulf," *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 580–601, esp. p. 596.

110. Rosemarie Said Zahlan, *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman*, Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 1998, p. 118.

111. This is obviously an extremely sensitive topic, but was confirmed by several members of the ruling family on condition of anonymity.

112. British media alleged that the young man overdosed on cocaine. See, for example, "Mystery Death of Sheikh, Aged 24," *The Argus*, 8 April 1999, <http://archive.theargus.co.uk/1999/4/8/198180.html>.

113. Given the similarity in the names of both ruler and heir, it was important to add the grandfather's name in this instance.

114. "Family Relations, 1927," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 2, pp. 369–381.

115. "Deposition of Sultan bin Salim and Accession of Shaykh Saqr b. Muhammad of Sharjah, 1948," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 2, pp. 395–404.

116. For an interesting discussion of Shaykh Saqr and Ras al-Khaimah, see Muhammad Sa'id al-Hilli, *Majmu'at Ahadith wa Tasrihat Sahib al-Sumu al-Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi* [Sayings and Statements of His Highness Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi], Dubai: Dar al-Gurair lil-tiba'at wal-Nashr, n.d.

117. Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*, pp. 193–195.

118. *Ibid.*, p. 194.

119. This point was reiterated in several interviews in both Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah.

120. Interview with then-heir apparent Shaykh Khaled bin Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi, Ras al-Khaimah, 16 December 1997.

121. Richard Myddleton, "RAK Heir Change Prompts Meeting," *Seven Days* (Dubai), 20 June 2003, pp. 1, 5.

122. Shafiq Al-Asadi, "Mubadarat 'Umaniyyah li-Taswi'at al-Khilaf fi Ras al-Khaimah" [Oman Intervention to Compromise on the Ras al-Khaimah Dispute], *Al-Hayat* no. 14707, 30 June 2003, p. 2.

123. "RAK Ruler Receives Well-Wishers," *Gulf News*, 16 June 2003, p. 2.

124. "Fragility of Succession Rights Highlighted," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 3-2003, p. 14.

125. "UAE: The Ras al-Khaimah Succession Crisis," *The Estimate*, 4 July 2003, p. 1. See also Susan Bisset, "Emirates Prince Ousted in Women's Rights Row," *Daily Telegraph*, 15 June 2003, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2003/06/15/wcoup15.xml>.

126. Simon Henderson, "Succession Politics in the Conservative Arab Gulf States: The Weekend's Events in Ras al-Khaimah," *Policywatch* no. 769, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 17 June 2003.

127. "Ras al-Khaimah Calls for Elections," *United Arab Emirates Country Report* no. 2-2003, p. 15.

128. Few remembered that Saqr dispatched Khaled to Washington in 1971 to determine whether the Richard Nixon administration might be interested in turning Ras al-Khaimah into a US military base in exchange for full diplomatic recognition as an "independent state." While the United States declined Saqr's invitation, he and his heir were both sincere, because they believed in US power. See Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*, p. 203 n. 1.

129. Khaled supported the research of, and wrote an important foreword (pp. 7–10) to, Ahmad Jalal Al-Tadmuri, *Al-Juzur al-'Arabiyyah al-Thalath: Dirasah Watha'iqiyyah* [The Three Arab Islands: A Documented Study], Ras al-Khaimah: Matba'at Ra's al-Khaymah al-Wataniyyah, 1990.

130. Interview with Shaykh Khaled bin Saqr Al Qasimi, Ras al-Khaimah, 16 December 1997.

131. "Historical Sketch, 1820–1853," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 463–470.

132. "Murder of Shaykh Humayd bin Rashid, 8 July 1900," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 481–487.

133. "Relations with the British, 1911–1912: Shaykh Humayd's Refusal to Accept Presents," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 529–534.

134. Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*, p. 207.

135. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

136. "Travels; State and Family Matters, 1920–1958," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 547–550.

137. Said Zahlan, *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates*, pp. 34–54.

138. "Historical Sketch of the Tribe of Umm al-Qaiwain, 1844–1853," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 553–670.

139. "Imprisonment of Rashid bin Ahmad by Shaykh Zaid b. Khalifah of Abu Dhabi, 1907," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 571–594.

140. For further details, see Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 1, pp. 663–697.

141. "Fujairah's Relations with Sharjah and Dibba," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 2, pp. 557–562.

142. Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 2, 582–583.

143. *Ibid.*, p. 587.

144. See the exchange of letters between Shaykh Muhammad and several British officials in "Muhammad bin Hamad, 1938–1975: Recognition by British Government as an Independent Ruler, 1952," in Rush, *Ruling Families of Arabia*, vol. 2, pp. 599–617.

145. In addition to the Al Sharqi, the Shihuh, who live either in Ras al-Khaimah or on the Musandam Peninsula (Oman), are the only other significant tribe in Fujairah. See Anthony, *Arab States of the Lower Gulf*, pp. 206–215.



# 9

---

## Jordan

In the aftermath of World War I, France and Britain—both healthy and maturing democracies—redrew the geographical map of the Middle East, notably through the infamous 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement. What was truly remarkable was the propensity to favor Arab monarchies even if these creations were contemplated within a European nation-state framework. Yet, and without exception, all Arab monarchies drew legitimacy from their pre-colonial Islamic credentials. Several acquired republican forms of government, including parliaments, over a very short period of time. In fact, when key Arab monarchies collapsed between 1950 and 1970, the propinquity to accept alien systems of government led to the speculation that surviving regimes would soon follow suit. Allegedly, the most prominent monarchy “slated” for failure was the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

Contemporary Jordanian affairs are interwoven with specific Hashimite dynasty developments in the Middle East. Banu Hashem descendants of the Quraysh tribe, into which the Prophet Muhammad was born, founded the modern state in 1921, courtesy of the British crown. The Sharifian Hashimites in Amman are indeed direct descendants of the Prophet through his daughter Fatimah and her husband ‘Ali bin Abi Talib, the Prophet’s paternal first cousin and the fourth caliph of Islam.<sup>1</sup> From 967 to 1201, various Sharifian families ruled over the Hijaz region in modern Saudi Arabia. In fact, King Hussein bin Talal’s branch of the Hashimite family ruled Makkah from 1201 until 1925, although they submitted to the Ottoman sultan in 1517. It is through this lineage that Amman claims direct descentance from the Prophet. Moreover, the Jordanian ruling family justifiably points to a regional presence dating over 1,000 years, and almost 2,000 years of recorded presence in Makkah itself. While the Sykes-Picot Agreement, as well as subsequent revisionist assessments, marginalized both of these contentions, they nevertheless remained ingrained in Arab history. Still, what prompted the creation of a new monarchy in Amman

was the British desire to support the Hashimites and, equally important, to buttress several individuals who pledged their allegiances to London.

## ■ Creation and Cohesion

Transjordan was a destitute rural environment, consisting of small towns and villages, large deserts, and practically no water resources. It was this stark reality that persuaded successive Hashimite leaders to accept British largess, if for no other reason than to ensure a minimum standard of living to a hapless population. An alliance with Britain was consequently a matter of survival. An equally persuasive argument for the monarchy—to survive and eventually succeed—was its leaders' decision to welcome Arab nationalists who were being slowly expelled from neighboring Syria. Although the decision to extend a welcome mat was attributed to King 'Abdallah bin Hussein ('Abdallah I) around the turn of the nineteenth century, it was his father who set the stage, both for the creation of the state as well as for the nascent alliance with Britain. For 'Abdallah I, Amman would become an open city where Arab dissidents could mingle with the Hashimites. Through this action, the ruler enhanced his legitimacy within Arab ranks, and even strengthened his position vis-à-vis powerful Western interlocutors, although neither would serve his successors well (see Appendix 19 for a list of Hashimite rulers).

## The Ruling Family

Several key Hashimite leaders played vital roles in regional affairs before and after the creation of Jordan.

**Sharif Hussein bin 'Ali (r. 1853–1925).** The “Emir of Makkah and King of the Arabs,” Sharif Hussein bin 'Ali was the last Sharifian Hashimite who ruled over Islam's holy cities in the Hijaz in unbroken succession from 1201 to 1925. His active participation in the Arab Revolt liberated Arab lands from the Ottoman grip in 1916.<sup>2</sup> While his primary objective was to gain control over Arabia, he was goaded into a far larger vision to establish a single independent and unified Arab state, stretching from Aleppo in Syria to Aden in Yemen. Although his quest for an *ummah* (community of believers) failed, his descendants instituted a relatively tolerant society in Jordan, upholding Islamic ideals as well as ensuring full protection and inclusion of various ethnic and religious minorities.

Seriously mistaken, Hussein bin 'Ali actually believed that he had won a British promise of an independent and united Arab state, even if he concluded that an alliance with Britain was a beneficial step. Not only was he shocked that the allies partitioned the Middle East, he was also awakened to British regional ruses, which necessitated a full pacification of Hashimite aspirations.

London fashioned several political entities in the Middle East and, in Iraq as well as Transjordan, entrusted power to strong central authorities that promoted British political goals. Sharif Hussein fought bravely, but the vainglorious British, along with their French allies, carved the region into alien forms resembling European nation-states. Jordan, Palestine, Iraq, the Hijaz, and most of the littoral shaykhdoms of the Persian Gulf fell under British tutelage. Syria and Lebanon folded under French protection. Beaten and dejected, Hussein and his sons 'Abdallah and Faysal sought to salvage what was left of the Hashimite monarchy. Two other sons, 'Ali and Zayd, were given minor posts. 'Abdallah assumed the throne of Transjordan, while Faysal agreed to rule Syria and later Iraq. The Emirate of Transjordan was thus founded on 11 April 1921, and became the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan on formal independence from Britain in 1946.<sup>3</sup>

**'Abdallah bin Hussein (r. 1921–1951).** For thirty years, 'Abdallah presided over what was an agonizingly slow process to forge a viable political entity within the area's cherished tribal traditions. At first, land surveys were undertaken to determine a potential basis for tax collection, before a proper bureaucracy could be established. Most of 'Abdallah's administrators hailed from neighboring Palestine, which was then a mandate territory, with Englishmen filling top posts. This overt reliance on Palestinians and Britons did not sit well with the area's tribal leaders, many of whom anticipated leadership roles for themselves, while others contemplated high government posts for offspring and relatives. It was in large measure to contain this growing opposition that the Hashimite sought and received public support from among Sunni tribes in Ma'an, a nationalist stronghold, to enhance his legitimacy.

To be sure, 'Abdallah was qualified to rule Transjordan and filled his role rather well, especially as his pro-British stance permitted London to deploy scarce resources elsewhere. Likewise, British leaders were eager to buttress both 'Abdallah and Faysal, if for no other reason than to restore their battered credibility after the Hussein bin 'Ali debacle. Of course 'Abdallah shared undeniable interests with Britain mostly to strengthen his power base. Yet Anglo-Hashimite ties were also marked with mutual suspicions, because of legendary manipulation that, for better or worse, preceded most British contacts. What 'Abdallah finally secured was much less than what could have been achieved, but much more than what Britain was willing to concede. Against some odds, the ruler painstakingly developed key institutions, including the country's 1928 Organic Law, which planted the seeds for a full-fledged constitution. Elections for the first twenty-one-member Legislative Council were held in 1929, implementing rudimentary democratic norms, if not legitimacy, at a time when Arab nationalism became a driving force.<sup>4</sup> Simultaneously, 'Abdallah negotiated several treaties with Britain, ostensibly to enhance his—as well as the young country's—stature, but in reality to protect Amman from future

predatory practices. The young monarch was keenly aware that such initiatives were necessary to promote a separate identity and, eventually, to position Transjordan for full independence, even if he struggled for most of his rule to husband scarce political resources. These negotiations culminated with a comprehensive treaty on 22 March 1946 that formally ended British mandate. Transjordan gained full independence and changed its name to the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.<sup>5</sup>

It was under ‘Abdallah that the Hashimites confronted a direct linkage with the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinian question, which arose from the establishment of the State of Israel on 15 May 1948 after a bitter first war. ‘Abdallah’s “Arab Legion” defended Jerusalem and the “West Bank” in 1948, but lost territory to the stronger Jewish military underground. At first, and hoping to avoid an entanglement, the Hashimite negotiated in secret with Jewish leader Golda Meyerson (later Prime Minister Golda Meir), in search of a compromise. Yet Arab League pressures compelled him to commit his legion to the battlefield. Arab Legion troops won a few battles and successfully defended the Old City of Jerusalem by putting up a stiff resistance that, for a time, proved impenetrable. Nevertheless, the war ended with several armistice agreements signed at the Rhodes Conference, although Jordan opted to conclude a separate bilateral truce with Israel on 3 April 1949.<sup>6</sup>

This accord confirmed ‘Abdallah’s interests, which were limited to incorporating Palestinian lands under his rule, rather than supporting the establishment of a separate and independent Palestinian state. After Jordan and Israel reached their armistice agreement, only Egyptian-controlled Gaza could aspire for independence, but only if given the opportunity. No such chance materialized. By 1950, ‘Abdallah was forging ahead with the incorporation of the West Bank, territory that was theoretically designated by the United Nations for a Palestinian state. Defending (East) Jerusalem and gaining control over the West Bank effectively meant that ‘Abdallah had won a diplomatic—perhaps even a limited military—victory, but only within Arab ranks. Baghdad, Cairo, and Damascus lay in shambles.<sup>7</sup> To be sure, ‘Abdallah did not enjoy the fruits of his political ambition, especially after the Hashimite monarchy was burdened with Palestine and the fate of its hapless inhabitants. Whether he accomplished much for the latter was debatable, but he certainly secured his throne, content that he could accomplish parity with his sibling in Baghdad. Yet, and unlike Faysal in Iraq—who never truly enjoyed popularity—‘Abdallah presided over a relatively harmonious society, which was significant. The country that he created was not just an expanse of desert lying beyond the heartland of the Levant or of Arabia, but incorporated the West Bank and Jerusalem, certainly worthy political assets for any Muslim ruler. His putative victory and considerable accomplishments notwithstanding, ‘Abdallah’s successes proved ephemeral and quickly crumbled when he was brutally gunned down.

On 20 July 1951, ‘Abdallah went to Jerusalem for his regular Friday prayers, with his young grandson Hussein at his side. A lone gunman assassinated the monarch on the steps of Al-Aqsah Mosque, the third holiest shrine in Islam. Fortuitously, Hussein survived when a stray bullet lodged in a medal his grandfather had recently awarded him, but the event left a profound mark on the young ruler. In his memoirs, Hussein recalled how, three days before that fateful day in Jerusalem, his grandfather had turned to him and said: “I hope you realize, my son, that one day you will have to assume responsibility. I look to you to do your very best to see that my work is not lost. I look to you to continue it in the service of our people.”<sup>8</sup> ‘Abdullah was succeeded by Talal, his eldest son, who could only rule for a short period of time due to a severe mental illness.

***Talal bin ‘Abdallah (r. 1951–1952).*** Talal bin ‘Abdallah acceded to the Hashimite throne after his father was assassinated on 20 July 1951, even if he was not his father’s first choice for the post.<sup>9</sup> His reign was short-lived, and he abdicated on 11 August 1952 for health reasons. In fact, the monarch suffered from delusions—perhaps even schizophrenia—which for understandable reasons presented an insurmountable political dilemma, especially as he refused proper treatment.<sup>10</sup> Talal, who attended Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in Britain and who was interested in politics, was not entirely idle. His spouse, Queen Zayn al-Sharaf bint Jamil, was determined to succeed and proved quite effective, especially in the care she displayed in raising her three sons, Hussein, Muhammad, and Hassan. During a short tenure, Talal initiated and supported the revision of the British-inspired and dictated 1946 constitution, which since January 1952 has stood the test of time. This was his major legacy and, in the words of one observer, “Talal was wedded to the notion of reigning as a constitutional monarch, an idea that most likely grew as much out of his driving need to be what Abdullah was not as it did out of his liberal inclination.”<sup>11</sup> It was under his rule that the monarchy accepted collective responsibility before a parliament that is still in effect today.

Talal may well have been ill, but his refusal to accept proper treatment accelerated his eventual forced abdication. Then–prime minister Tawfiq Abul Huda, a onetime ally and ultimate insider, convened parliament to vote a deposition of the monarch on the grounds of insanity as duly permitted in the 1952 constitution. Yet two primary reasons moved the premier to act: first, internal military rumblings, and second, the successful coup that overthrew the monarchy in Egypt. Burdened by epoch-making developments, and from his European perch, Talal was glad to abdicate, knowing that his wife would ensure ruling family stability. Their eldest son, Hussein, was healthy enough to assume the mantle of power on 11 August 1952, even if he would need a regent for another year. A man of action rather than intellect, Hussein asserted himself by

demonstrating substance as an heir apparent, even if regional events would eventually transform him as well as his monarchy.

**Hussein bin Talal (r. 1952–1999).** Hussein was born in Amman on 14 November 1935, the eldest of four children to Talal bin ‘Abdallah and Zayn al-Sharaf bint Jamil. His two brothers, Muhammad and Hassan, and sister Basmah, all served with him in various capacities. Queen Zayn, who exercised undeniable influence on her children, died on 26 April 1994. A popular figure admired for her charisma, her generosity, and above all, her penetrating political mind, guided her offspring. Sadly, her death marked the end of an era in contemporary Jordanian affairs, given that the late queen probably shaped contemporary monarchical affairs in Jordan like no other.

After completing his elementary education in Amman, Hussein attended Victoria College in Alexandria, Egypt, and Harrow School in England. He later received his military education at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, which equipped him with the wherewithal to defend his throne amid a sea of turmoil.

Beyond his preoccupation with regional affairs, which earned him the “PLK” (plucky little king) acronym from perplexed Western officials and admiring journalists, Hussein bin Talal was for many Jordanians the father of the modern state.<sup>12</sup> He served at a critical time, despite significant internal and regional uncertainties. In fact, his rule witnessed a period of domestic strife and extensive international turmoil, as well as several major wars with Israel. Yet, through most of these tragic developments, Hussein demonstrated a knack for survival that augured well for his kingdom. Above all else, Hussein’s genuine biculturalism, which allowed him to feel at ease in the West as much as in the East, helped forge a climate of openness and tolerance. His rule, at least partially, ushered in a period of relative tranquillity, even if significant challenges preoccupied him far more than any Hashimite anticipated. When he died after a long illness on 7 February 1999, Hussein was the longest-serving head of state throughout the world, having been in power for forty-seven years. Much like his grandfather, Hussein bin Talal understood why world powers valued the Middle East, and was eager to pursue policies that would—or so he hoped—subdue any and all of their aspirations for direct or indirect control over the area.

Hussein bin Talal inherited, neither by choice nor design, a gargantuan portfolio that encompassed the Palestinian question and the Arab-Israeli conflict after 1948.<sup>13</sup> Saddled with Transjordan’s debt to Britain—for creating it in the first place and husbanding a semidependent regime through the complex Arab political arena for decades—was enough to drive a mental wedge between monarch and his subjects. Undoubtedly, the young ruler was predisposed to excel, especially given his energy, intrinsic capabilities, and appetite for power. Yet Hussein had witnessed his grandfather’s assassination, and had

survived several attempts on his own life immediately after acceding to the throne, and these experiences colored the way he ruled as a Hashimite. Above all else, he became astutely aware that his kingdom was a multiethnic society in which the majority of the population was and remained Palestinian. Inasmuch as his five-decade reign witnessed negative internal and regional developments, it was a rare accomplishment that he managed to preserve throne and country, burdened as he was with an existential dilemma. To defend his regime and his subjects as a Hashimite monarch, while remaining true to core Arab causes, including the Palestinian quest for sovereignty, was no small accomplishment. In fact, when compared to his father, Talal, who was destined to shepherd his kingdom through a generational crisis, Hussein's priorities as well as intrinsic capabilities were far greater.

Hussein's lifelong political nemesis, Egyptian president Gamal 'Abdul Nasir, towered over the Arab world throughout the 1960s. To save his throne, the Jordanian oscillated between pro- and anti-Nasir periods, but could never shake the Egyptian's shadow. For one observer, "he was not always a good judge of character," and relied far too much on cronies eager to please.<sup>14</sup> For another, "Hussein survived because his most dangerous adversary . . . lacked the singleness of purpose in wishing his destruction."<sup>15</sup> Yet he survived, because Hussein seldom hesitated to destroy foes, comforted in the knowledge that Britain and the United States would rush to his assistance as soon as his rule wavered. Even his colossal errors with the Palestinians between 1967 and 1970 withered on the Arab political vine as he tackled perceived radicalism within his own society. At times, he displayed emotions seldom witnessed among conservative Arab monarchs; though he missed opportunities, Hussein always managed to survive crises that befell him.

At the 1974 Rabat Summit, Hussein saw the Palestinian mantle stripped from his shoulders, after the League of Arab States supported the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. This rebuff was soon followed by the fallout of the Camp David Accords, which further isolated Jordan in Western eyes. Consequently, Hussein opted to align with Saddam Hussein's rejectionist front, a decision that earned him Western contempt. To be sure, the new couple was odd, but that was less pertinent than the primary consequence of this fragile alliance: a gradual economic rapprochement with Baghdad that slowly drew Amman into the Iraqi orbit. Along with Egypt and North Yemen, Iraq and Jordan created the Arab Cooperation Council in February 1989, which pretended to align "the indebted with the underdeveloped with the war-damaged."<sup>16</sup> The Arab Cooperation Council challenged the Gulf Cooperation Council, but in the end diminished the Jordanian monarchy's worth among fellow Arab monarchs. Ironically, Hussein's cataclysmic 1990 choice to back Ba'athist Iraq against a fellow monarchic dynasty, the Al Sabah in the Shaykhdom of Kuwait, sealed the personal fate of the "plucky little king" throughout conservative circles. No longer were fellow Arab rulers

willing to dole out generous support to a dependent Jordan. The Western, especially US, wrath would be even more devastating.

By all accounts, Hussein was a complex character who struggled throughout his reign to promote and provide for his multiethnic subjects, without much success. After the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, when Jordan lost Jerusalem and the West Bank, he supported United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. The infamous UN proclamation, which called on Israel to withdraw to the 1967 borders in exchange for peace, dogged Amman because Jordan could never regain physical control over the occupied Palestinian territories, as Israel refused to implement the Security Council's directives.<sup>17</sup> Even if Hussein played a pivotal role in convening the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, ostensibly to allow Palestinians to negotiate as part of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian "umbrella" delegation, the damage was done.<sup>18</sup> His vigorous efforts to peacefully execute an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, and the restoration of the Al Sabah to rulership, were for naught. Hussein's pursuit of genuine Arab reconciliation and calls for international humanitarian aid to relieve the suffering of Iraqis from sanctions and associated repercussions collapsed as well. Washington marginalized Hussein for breaking a significant imperative of international affairs—it does not pay to side with the weak—and, when the hurried Bill Clinton administration came in, exerted heavy pressure to secure Jordanian concessions. It may be fair to assert that the United States imposed its considerable will on King Hussein—to obtain a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel in 1994—if for no other reason than to allow Amman the opportunity to redeem itself in US eyes. Still, King Hussein's relationships with the West in general and the United States in particular suffered, despite his astute understanding of the West.<sup>19</sup> Such insights stood as poor substitutes for raw power politics, and Hussein bin Talal simply overreached.

Although Hussein's commitment to democracy, civil liberties, and human rights helped pave the way in making Jordan a model state for the region, serious problems remained. Perhaps the gravest question was that of his succession, which was far better planned than many realized at the time.

Several years after his accession to the throne, King Hussein introduced an amendment to the Jordanian constitution to allow his brother Hassan, rather than 'Abdallah (his only son at the time) to succeed him. The logic behind this emendation was twofold: first, to equip the brilliant Hassan with the wherewithal to rule, through a king-in-training program, and second, to satisfy family harmony. The decision to pass the torch to Hassan was probably made jointly by the ruler and his trusted mother, although few know. Hassan served his king and brother until 1998, when he was summarily dismissed. Unlike his more determined ruler, Hassan was the brainy-type who believed in compromises and the gentility of rule. Whatever progress was achieved in Jordan on a slew of issues considered tough by many, ranging from respect for human rights to the drive toward democratization, owed much to Hassan's slow and



painstaking efforts. In 1990, Hussein appointed Hassan to lead a royal commission, representing the entire spectrum of Jordanian political thought, to draft a national charter that, along with the Jordanian constitution, would serve to guide democratic institutionalization and political pluralism. Amman authorized parliamentary elections in 1989, 1993, and 1997, which were internationally monitored and relatively free, even if the government of Jordan regretted the dramatic liberalization process that was ushered in as a result. The monarchy matured under Hussein bin Talal and, though the Hashimites were safe, his succession burst into a full-fledged predicament.

## ■ Constitutional Continuum in Jordan

Hussein bin Talal ruled Jordan with aplomb, especially because Western leaders concluded that “their” plucky little king defended perceived interests well and could therefore be trusted. Under British protection, Hussein managed to retain and build on his influence, although ultranationalist Arabs in neighboring countries as well as inside Jordan derided him as a British stooge. Over the years, English officers, led by John Glubb—who became known as Glubb Pasha—ran a mixed military that was built on the foundations of the Arab Legion. It was a loyal force, both to the Hashimites as well as to their foreign masters.

Demeaning nicknames notwithstanding, Hussein defended his dynasty well, even if regional developments threatened the kingdom. Throughout the 1950s, the ruler became fully aware of his constitutional responsibilities, although he ruled as a full autocrat. Hussein overhauled his regime by stressing loyal *badu* tribes, increasingly exclusive East Bank Jordanian elements.<sup>20</sup> Relying on these elites permitted the energetic monarch to suppress opponents—perhaps best illustrated by the 1957 coup attempt as well as the tragic assault on Palestinians in 1970—even as he realized that the indispensable bulwark of his legitimacy was the military. Consequently, starting in the mid-1950s, Hussein emphasized his attachment to the army.<sup>21</sup> The latter received additional funding, modern equipment, and advanced training. Foreign advisers lent a hand, as updated supplies arrived from both Western and some communist countries, all to better support the government. Remarkably, Hussein managed to transform his military, whose undistorted duty was to protect him and the Hashimites.<sup>22</sup>

## Constitutional Changes

To the monarch’s credit, the image of the Jordanian military evolved as he successfully managed a shift in perception. While he was still the most pro-Western Arab potentate, Hussein bin Talal was no longer exclusively seen as a British

tool, although the Jordanian military's overall capabilities for effective defenses against Syria and Israel were marginal at best. On the domestic front, however, His Majesty's Army proved indispensable, especially in 1989 when serious riots challenged Amman. Fulfilling International Monetary Fund directives to eliminate subsidies on foodstuffs, Jordan faced the wrath of destitute citizens in traditionally royalist towns like Ma'an, Kerak, and Tafilah.<sup>23</sup> Naturally, the army intervened, but the use of force and high casualties accomplished little. This uprising was different from the major 1970 international crisis after Palestinian forces attempted to muzzle power away from the monarch. Because those who rioted in the heartland in 1989 were badu Jordanians, the insurrection authenticated the monarchy's shaky foundations. Hussein could not simply rely on brute force to regain the upper hand as he had in September 1970, and consequently opted to liberalize his political philosophy. An astute student of history, the ruler was also keen not to let this episode degenerate into political chaos as Amman plunged into a crisis reminiscent of 1957 when a series of assassination attempts outraged Hussein bin Talal. The Jordanian political map was redesigned, electoral districts were reapportioned (favoring Ma'an, Kerak, and Tafilah), and parliamentary elections were properly organized.<sup>24</sup>

Shortly thereafter, the monarch convened a national conference to draft a new covenant among the ruling elites. The consultation proved effective, because opposition forces acknowledged the king's preeminence while the ruler vowed to respect Jordan's evolving political pluralism.<sup>25</sup> Reinvigorated political institutions gained confidence as the king embarked on a daring endeavor within carefully defined parameters. He would tolerate genuine dissent, but demanded total allegiance in return. Remarkably, this new covenant proved effective for most of the 1990s, especially after Jordanians experienced concrete economic benefits that lifted the population's living standard. In fact, the experiment amounted to a form of representation, with limited taxation. Yet because opposition forces rejected the 1994 Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty, the positive effects of the 1990 covenant quickly eroded.<sup>26</sup>

At first, Hussein ignored criticisms of his Machiavellian approach, but after several groups led by the main Islamic party boycotted the 1997 parliamentary elections, the entire reinvigoration of parliamentary life lost much of its luster.<sup>27</sup> Hussein died before significant changes were reintroduced into existing local alliances and, to date, King 'Abdallah II has moved hesitatingly and with extreme caution on this front. In the new ruler's perception, the Jordanian monarchy was a model of a stable institution, even if its enduring features were placed in abeyance.

Since the Hashimite hold on Transjordan and Jordan was haphazard in their early days, the formal institutionalizing process was slow, but not for lack of opportunities. Amman moved meticulously, appointing few Hashimites to key government posts, and seldom tinkered with the British-dictated constitution that grew out of the 1928 Organic Law. After the country gained its for-

mal independence in May 1946, the constitution was transformed when the Legislative Council adopted a new draft on 28 November 1947. This document was first published in the kingdom's official journal on 1 February 1947, even if the council delayed its ceremonial vote. After King 'Abdallah was assassinated in 1951, and as the actual number of male Hashimite progeny was extremely limited, it fell on Talal and Hussein to seriously think about amending the constitution. Talal recommended a few reforms, and a new draft was adopted on 1 January 1952. Hussein, for his part, wished to reassert the right of the Jordanian branch of the family. He further hoped that a crisis with the Iraqi portion could be avoided. In fact, Iraqi regent 'Abdul Illah attempted to sway family arrangements after Talal's death. 'Abdul Illah fancied himself as playing a distinguishing role in Hashimite affairs, even if that role intruded into the realm of his cousin, who unsurprisingly resented the former's offers.<sup>28</sup> Consequently, and though Hussein upheld the 1 January 1952 constitution, he nevertheless secured a key amendment to clarify Jordan's distinctiveness. In 1965, Article 28 was amended to empower the ruler to make needed changes to primogeniture, given that patrimony was the preferred succession mechanism specified in the document. Article 28 was unusually detailed and provided a unique description of who actually could succeed a monarch should the incumbent have no sons, or brothers, or uncles, or other male relatives (see Appendix 20 for the relevant excerpts).<sup>29</sup>

### Parliamentary Life

The 1989 economic crisis pushed Hussein bin Talal into action. It was no longer sufficient to simply rely on the military to restore order. The king turned to his suspended parliament, an institution he had carefully avoided reviving since 1956, not only to push for democratization, but also to buttress his throne.

In November 1989, full parliamentary elections were held in Jordan, following a very gradual liberalization of political institutions. Jordan's bicameral legislature, composed of a popularly elected eighty-member Council of Deputies (Majlis al-Nuwab) and an appointed forty-member Senate (Majlis al-'Ayan), aimed to restore the monarch's tainted legitimacy. All 650 candidates to the council were technically "independent," but the most organized opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood, scored something of a political triumph. The banned party ran a list of 26 candidates (out of the 650 independents) and, remarkably, managed to elect 22. Another 12 Islamist representatives were chosen by voters for a total of 34 (out of 80) parliamentarians.<sup>30</sup> Added to other nationalist candidates, the 1989 parliament boasted 44 opposition members, which was a stunning victory. The monarch took note even if he initially refused to acknowledge this upsetting shift. He first appointed a veteran conservative and promonarchist politician, Mudar Badran, to the premiership.

While few Jordanians expected the ruler to distance himself from such insiders, many were actually hoping to see their views reflected more equitably, at least to interject a semblance of change. Badran, a former head of intelligence services, sought to include four Muslim Brotherhood legislators in his cabinet, but members of the Muslim Brotherhood refused. Still, the astute prime minister quickly set free several political prisoners, loosened government restrictions on the media, lifted martial law, and returned an undetermined number of confiscated passports to Jordanian dissidents.<sup>31</sup>

This trend for genuine reforms was abruptly interrupted by the 1 August 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the crises that followed. As a key regional actor, Hussein bin Talal was deeply involved in the protracted negotiations that followed, including critical mediation efforts to avoid hostilities. It would be facile to conclude that Amman sided with Baghdad, but Hussein was literally caught between two intractable positions. First, Jordan was financially dependent on Iraq for generous oil subsidies, as well as crucial remittances. Second, Amman desperately sought to accommodate its traditional obligations toward a fellow monarchy, as well as absorb the estimated half million Jordanian and Palestinian workers and their dependents trekking from Kuwait. Therefore, what preoccupied Hussein foremost was the overall financial burden, which further strained the Jordanian economy. The king was trapped, especially after the United States and Britain perceived Amman as a conspirator, although Hussein's legitimacy at home reached its zenith.

Ever the astute survivor and opportunist, the Hashimite monarch proposed the adoption of an updated national charter, which carefully regulated the government's ongoing liberalization policies. Even opposition leaders jumped on the monarch's bandwagon, hailing the charter as a victory for democracy or, more accurately, for democratization. The crown welcomed this pluralism as well as competition, but only within the confines of an accepted Hashimite realm. In effect, the 1992 charter sealed the monarchy's legal character, ensured that loyalty toward it was no longer questioned, and propelled Amman to tackle domestic reforms from a position of relative strength.<sup>32</sup> With this epoch-making accomplishment, Hussein bin Talal displayed renewed flexibility as he tolerated various Islamist appointments to sensitive posts, including the Ministry of Education and the speakership of the Council of Deputies. To be sure, and while Hussein weighed the consequences of the 1990 Kuwait invasion on Jordan, it was amply clear that the 1989 elections set the stage for the political shifts that he introduced. Henceforth, Hashimite rule embraced open political activities and limited debates, both of which were first tested in 1993 when Amman held new parliamentary elections.

As a consequence of the War for Kuwait and the follow-up Madrid peace conference in which Amman participated, the Jordanian monarch accepted significant internal political reforms, including the legalization of over twenty parties.<sup>33</sup> Exactly 534 candidates competed for the 80 Council of Deputies

seats in 1993, and while turnout increased from 41 percent (1989) to 47 percent, over half of eligible voters boycotted the plebiscite. Still, history was made when, for the first time in Jordanian history, a woman, Toujan al-Faysal, was duly elected, who represented the important Circassian community and secured one of Amman's reserved third-district seats. The Muslim Brotherhood, which was represented by the Islamic Action Front party, lost six seats (down to sixteen from twenty-two). Likewise, independent Islamists dropped 50 percent of their previous representations, down from twelve to six. This substantial reversal was a backlash to legislative proposals that restricted social freedoms and that were largely rejected by more awakened constituents. Nevertheless, the overall 1993 Islamist defeat was more likely the result of clever alterations of electoral laws, including the introduction of one-person, one-vote provisions, as well as carefully planned shifts in electoral districts that swapped familiar public coteries. Such refinements effectively meant that urbanized areas, predominantly inhabited by mobilized Palestinian-Jordanians, were far less likely to be accurately represented. More traditional rural areas, principally populated by badu Jordanians and far more pro-Hashimite than their city counterparts, were consequently favored. Naturally, a genuine political crisis emerged in parliament, with the Islamic Action Front losing much of its anticipated legitimacy.

These significant gains notwithstanding, the 1993 Islamist loss did not automatically favor the so-called right, because too many parties competed for too few votes. Candidates who emerged victorious in 1993 were the true independents who had distanced themselves from both left and right. Of course, the crown fared well too, as it underscored the necessity for strong leadership, capable of steering the ship of state on stormy seas. In fact, Hussein was caught off guard by the 1993 Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization, which prompted Amman to seek its own separate treaty with the Jewish state. Parliament ratified the 1994 treaty on a comfortable margin of fifty-five to twenty-three, even if opposition leaders quickly blocked several normalization measures. The monarch sought to soften this blow in the Council of Deputies when he appointed 'Abdul Karim al-Kabariti, a young liberal-centrist reformer, who in turn vowed to curb corruption. Prime Minister al-Kabariti was precisely the type of leader Jordanians craved, but Amman saw to it that his initiatives were properly vetted by more reliable intelligence figures. Although martial law was lifted and a semblance of freedom descended on Jordan with legalized parties, few of the latter buttressed effective alliances to present unified stands. Wallowing in contradictory preferences, Jordanian parties stumbled from one policy to the next, anticipating little, and delivering even less to disenfranchised constituents.

By November 1997, when Jordan held its last elections before King Hussein died, Amman was once again operating under strict press laws and fewer rights. Ten parties, including the Islamic Action Front and most pan-Arab nationalist

groups, boycotted the scheduled November plebiscite. Most objected to the normalization pace with Israel but, far more important, all rejected various “temporary laws” that were favored by Amman. Remarkably, Hussein was confident, as he simply overlooked a decade of opposition calls, ensured that his legitimacy was not challenged (courtesy of the national charter), and made certain that his crackdown on the press would not be particularly disconcerting. He even ignored pleas for more measured conduct.<sup>34</sup>

The 1997 plebiscite became known as the “boycotted elections” after leading figures abstained from tainted associations with the Hashimite monarchy. Hussein bin Talal, like US president John F. Kennedy, forgave his enemies but never forgot their names. None of those who stood up to the “plucky little king” were appointed to the Senate, but this was, perhaps, one of the first political errors of an increasingly ailing ruler. The thirteenth parliament saw political centrists, proregime conservative figures, and tribal candidates—for a total of seventy-five (out of eighty) independent nominees—fill vacant seats.<sup>35</sup> Toujan al-Faysal lost her perch, as did most nationalist and Islamist contestants, when a gloomy disillusionment descended over Amman. Sadly, the reforms of the previous decade slowly withered away, and both government as well as opposition figures blamed each other for the overall loss of popular confidence. Ironically, it was this shattered parliament that ratified ‘Abdallah bin Hussein as the next Hashimite ruler of Jordan, on 8 February 1999.

### **From Hussein to ‘Abdallah**

Despite his “plucky little king” nickname, Hussein bin Talal saw his relationship with the West in general, and the United States in particular, suffer in the aftermath of his 1990 decisions. Previous understandings, including avowedly pro-Western positions that earned him nothing more than scorn at home throughout the 1960s and 1970s, were cavalierly brushed aside. In the words of US president George H. W. Bush, King Hussein “was blasting us in speeches and through the press, turning Jordanian public opinion against the United States.” A hastily arranged meeting on 16 August 1990 was, at least for the US president, a “disappointment.”<sup>36</sup> Differences aside, Amman joined the post-War for Kuwait bandwagon and, in 1994, signed a separate peace treaty with Israel under US tutelage. For Hussein knew, in the depth of his intellect, that his pro-Western leanings were nonnegotiable. Even on a personal level, his attachments to Western culture were clearly expressed through two marriages, first to a British citizen (Antoinette Gardiner, later Princess Muna), and then to a US citizen (Lisa Halaby, later Queen Noor al-Hussein). Hussein bin Talal was a deeply pro-Western Arab who discreetly nurtured various relationships with major Western leaders. In fact, intrafamily differences that existed among Hashimite leaders were principally due to this penchant.

As noted above, Article 28 of the Jordanian constitution specified that the heirship was allocated to the monarch's eldest son, unless the king chose one of his brothers. Indeed, Hussein's firstborn, 'Abdallah bin Hussein, was considered as heir from 1962 until 1965, when Hassan bin Talal was formally chosen as second in command.<sup>37</sup> At the time, the monarch was in fear for his throne after several assassination attempts on his life, and chose to entrust the crown to an adult. Hassan bin Talal served his ruler for thirty-four years with utmost loyalty. Normal sibling rivalries aside, he was exceedingly capable, supported his brother under all circumstances, and served Jordan commendably. In fact, Hussein perceived his younger brother as a superb understudy, and frequently referred to Hassan as "qurrat 'ayni" or "the joy of his eye."<sup>38</sup> More important, and for over three decades, Hussein relied on his brother to shoulder immense responsibilities as the latter served his master, confident that his assiduous preparation for the position would be best for the kingdom.

Starting in 1998, when his illness necessitated long absences from the country, Hussein routinely entrusted the crown to his heir, who ruled as a regent. Within a short year, however, court gossip and speculation filled the air with innuendo about the regent and his wife, the Pakistani-born Princess Sarvath. Allegedly, Sarvath harbored specific ambitions for her eldest son, Prince Rashid, to assume the throne after Hassan. The king, for his part, supposedly contemplated changing the succession lineup, to have one of his sons named as heir on Hassan's succession. At the time, it was widely believed that Hussein wished to see the succession arrangement return to his own family line after Hassan, preferably with Prince Hamzah as heir. Such a preference, it was further presumed, was due to the fact that the monarch could not be certain that Hassan, once ruler, would not alter a Hussein designee, thereby denying the king's wishes. According to Queen Noor, Hussein was inclined "to modify [the existing mechanism] for the next generation after Hassan by the creation, perhaps, of a family council" that would settle on the most qualified individual.<sup>39</sup> An increasingly ailing Hussein forcefully moved to quell all speculations, even if wisdom dictated that he uphold the trust placed in his regent.

On 25 January 1999, six days after a jubilant return to Amman from the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, Hussein bin Talal wrote a formal letter to his brother, informing Hassan of his removal as heir to the Hashimite crown (see Appendix 22 for the full letter).<sup>40</sup> The long missive contained harsh criticisms, using intemperate language that denounced "climbers" in Hassan's entourage who allegedly sought to "destroy Jordan." Though the king first praised Hassan for handling his responsibilities over such a long period of time "with diligence, enthusiasm, and resolve that knows no fatigue or failure," the praise quickly turned to reproach. Perhaps to soften his calculated blow, Hussein noted that he had designated Hassan in 1965 because the king's son was too young. There were no references to the assassination attempts that literally jeopardized Hashimite rule and that compelled Hussein to amend the constitution. Moreover,

the monarch revealed that he decided “to abdicate the throne in [Hassan’s] favor” after his first cancer surgery in 1992. Still, the very next sentence declared that his “small family was offended by slandering and falsehoods,” which was blamed on “rivalry among those who pretend to be faithful to you.” The ruler then warned Hassan against “climbers” who scaled “onto the branch to ruin the relation between brothers and between father and son,” insisting that this was “the objective of every declared or hidden enemy.” Hussein further intimated dark motives for those who planned to “instigate infighting in the ranks of the leadership . . . and they find in my being alive an impediment to all their designs.” In fact, this carefully worded sentence implied that unidentified individuals, perhaps among Hassan’s supporters, wished him personally ill and may have wanted him dead to accede to full power.

Although the letter then praised Hassan for the role he played in the peace process with Israel, it quickly returned to recriminations, with Hussein proposing formation of a family council. Such a council was meant “to ensure the unity of the Hashimite Family so that when the time [comes] for you to choose your successor, the family [will] have a great role in naming the most suitable successor.” In other words, Hussein explicitly identified the family, not a future King Hassan, to participate in the decision on a successor—normally the prerogative of a monarch. Hussein further claimed that Hassan disagreed with this judgment, wishing to accomplish such an outcome after he took the helm.

The king then addressed criticism of his son Hamzah, the eldest son by Noor, at the time widely rumored to be a favorite candidate for succession. Hamzah, stated Hussein bin Talal, was “envied since childhood because he was close to me” and desired “to know the details of the history of his family.” He praised his son’s “integrity and magnanimity as he stayed beside [him]” when the monarch was ailing, obliquely criticizing his brother for not visiting him in Minnesota. A more lavish acclamation was reserved to Queen Noor, who was customarily unpopular because of her US birth, with the king insisting that she was a full “Jordanian, who belongs to this country with every fiber of her being,” a “mother who devotes all her efforts to her family,” and a woman who brought him happiness as she “hid her tears behind smiles.”

If the first part of the letter was overtly sentimental, certainly understandable given the monarch’s state of health and probable state of mind, Hussein dramatically shifted in tone as he broached the succession subject. “I have intervened from my sickbed to prevent meddling in the affairs of the Arab Army,” he declared, a “meddling [that] seemed to be meant to settle scores, and included retiring efficient officers.” He identified the dismissed army chief of staff, Field Marshal ‘Abdul Hafiz al-Ka‘abnah, who was accused of corruption because of a stately house built with questionable funds. The king asserted that he “paid for the house,” having “collected the money in installments over [the] years until it was built modestly,” a dwelling that was “com-



mensurate with his rank and position.” He also criticized the transfer of “efficient ambassadors without reason except the reason of age,” and maintained that this was why he “returned to the homeland: to rectify matters as soon as possible and to assume my duties toward future generations.”

This rebuke of Hassan and of decisions made by the regent was brutal, since the chief complaint insinuated that the heir to the Hashimite throne had meddled in affairs that went beyond his competence or privilege. Military and diplomatic portfolios were not, according to this logic, part of the regent’s writ or, at the very least, should not have preoccupied the ruler’s “Qurrat ‘Ayni” at this time. The letter concluded on a positive note, as Hussein welcomed his regent’s willingness to abide by whatever decision the monarch reached, and informed his brother that he was returning to the “original Constitutional rule,” which designated Prince ‘Abdallah as heir apparent.

True to his nature, Hassan bin Talal stepped aside as the king was rushed back to the Mayo Clinic on 26 January 1999 to undergo additional chemotherapy treatments for his metastasized cancer. His health deteriorated sharply over the following few days, and Queen Noor decided that they would return to Amman to await “god’s will.”<sup>41</sup> The monarch’s Lockheed L1011 Tristar returned to Queen ‘Alia International Airport on 5 February 1999 as Jordanians held a vigil for their dying ruler.<sup>42</sup> On 9 February, Hussein bin Talal died and ‘Abdallah bin Hussein acceded to the Hashimite throne.

Even if King Hussein felt an innate need to restore a cautiously laid-out succession mechanism, the putative loss of confidence in Hassan appeared disingenuous. Given his letter’s timing, tone, and meandering style, the sudden dismissal was most likely affected by the monarch’s illness. Many wondered whether the ruler, certainly not a political novice, had been pushed to this decision. Why not allow Hassan, a tested leader with enough intellect and finesse to serve Jordan very well, to make the appropriate choices? Why strip the long-term heir of his tribal and public dignity? Why impose a heavy-handed decree, especially when Hassan’s own son, Rashid, was too young and too apolitical to deny Hamzah a legitimate role? Was the decision to support Hamzah solely the king’s, or was he influenced by Queen Noor? While in the United States, had Hussein been advised against a Hassan rulership by non-Jordanian officials? Why dismiss Hassan while shuttling back and forth between Amman and Rochester, Minnesota? Finally, why tinker with Article 28 of the constitution, thereby setting a precedent for future crises? None of these questions were easily answered as Jordan entered a genuine mourning period. For all his shortcomings, Hussein bin Talal was popular among a wide spectrum of the population, especially after 1990, when Amman opted to favor Arab interests slightly above other concerns. His loss left a noticeable void, although his successor was certainly an able leader equipped with a legitimizing national charter.

## ■ Contemporary Rulers: The Hashimites of Jordan

The abrupt dismissal of Heir Apparent Hassan bin Talal shocked all of Jordan. Earlier, King Hussein had ended speculation that his frequent travels to the United States for medical treatment were no cause for such concerns, declaring to a popular media outlet that any speculation that he might change the succession line was “out of line” and “nonsensical.”<sup>43</sup> Observers of the kingdom were therefore stunned by a seemingly precipitate nature of the decision to replace Hassan with ‘Abdallah bin Hussein. Most read the ruler’s 16 January 1999 letter to Jordanians as the first salvo of what was about to befall the ruling family (see Appendix 21 for the full letter). Hussein, or close family members, prepared Jordanians for his imminent death as physicians alerted the family to the advanced nature of his cancer recurrence. The monarch returned to Amman on 19 January 1999 to what could only be described as a euphoric welcome in the middle of a rare cold downpour.<sup>44</sup>

In his 16 January 1999 letter to the nation, the Hashimite embarked on a historical overview of his major accomplishments, reminding everyone of a 1952 vow to look after their interests as best as he could. Yet Hussein also knew that his return to Jordan was to reorder the succession line, as he “hinted” to a CNN reporter.<sup>45</sup> Needless to say, the interview panicked all members of the ruling family, but it would be naive to conclude that the monarch was thinking out loud. Rather, this was probably a soft landing for the inevitable meeting between Hussein and Hassan, which occurred on 21 January 1999. According to Queen Noor, no one save for the two brothers were privy to what transpired between them, although she “felt great sympathy for Hassan because the succession had turned into such high theater in Amman.”<sup>46</sup> Irrespective of any frank brotherly discussions, seasoned watchers of the royal family were truly astonished at the monarch’s rebuke. As mentioned above, on 25 January 1999, Hussein sent his brother a long letter that informed the heir apparent of his dismissal while simultaneously appointing his eldest son, ‘Abdallah, as replacement (see Appendixes 22–26 for integral texts). It is important to note that the decision to make the change was reached before 24 January, and that both Hassan and ‘Abdallah were summoned to the palace to be formally told of the switch as the monarch weighed his constitutional responsibilities.

Because Hussein amended the constitution in 1965 and appointed Hassan to be his heir, the reverse shift from brother to son—as customarily bestowed in the 1952 document—was certainly sound. What was intriguing was the identity of the son who would succeed him. As Hussein fathered five sons from three of his four wives, observers speculated that the monarch would actually name one of his younger sons, more specifically Hamzah, widely rumored to be his favorite. In her poignant memoirs, Queen Noor conveys that the ruler wished “Hamzah to finish what [he] was not able to do in terms of schooling,” and that she did not pressure her husband to name Hamzah, although these rumors upset

them both.<sup>47</sup> While she fully supported the decision to appoint ‘Abdallah, Hussein and Noor understood that naming a younger son to the heirship required a constitutional amendment. Indeed, the charter specified that the eldest was first in line for the throne, and while such an emendation was not too difficult to secure, time was pressing. After Hussein spoke with his eldest, ‘Abdallah met with Queen Noor and confided that “he had assumed that after Hassan his father’s choice would be Hamzah.” During this tête-à-tête, on either 23 or 24 January 1999, ‘Abdallah allegedly confessed that he “had been willing to support that choice,” and that he “had never expected to assume the monarchy.” ‘Abdallah reportedly told Queen Noor that he would “honor [his] father’s wishes,” and that his own “plan was to assume his responsibilities for twenty years and then hand over to Hamzah.” A pleased Noor in turn bestowed her blessings, “fully support[ing]” her husband’s choice.<sup>48</sup>

Jordanians did not have time to digest these momentous changes at the top of the ruling family when the king returned to the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, for yet another bone marrow transplant. This was the monarch’s last trip, as the next few days would confirm the incurability of his advanced cancer. Within a matter of hours after his appointment as heir, ‘Abdallah was sworn in as regent and, for the first time in his life, assumed the burdens of power. Though Jordanians were “startled by the speed and manner in which Hassan was replaced after more than three decades as Heir Apparent, and the open criticism the king gave of his handling of the job,” most kept their views to themselves.<sup>49</sup> Hussein bin Talal never recovered.

### **‘Abdallah bin Hussein (r. 1999– )**

Few Jordanians were surprised by the stoic composure of the erudite former heir apparent Hassan bin Talal. The sacrificed leader stood by his young and largely inexperienced nephew as ‘Abdallah ascended to the throne. It was a rare moment of dignity in the annals of Arab succession; decisions were respected for their own sake and no particular individual absconded any privileges. ‘Abdallah was fortunate to have an uncle like Hassan, even if they were not particularly close. This learned man, a graduate in Oriental studies from Oxford University and a tireless public servant for thirty-three years, lived through a month-long thorough humiliation. ‘Abdallah’s first task as ruler, therefore, was to underline his uncle’s nobility, because he grasped how that might reflect on him. Fittingly, the monarch concluded that to doubt his uncle’s loyalty, or to impugn ulterior motives for decisions made when Hassan was regent, would literally mean that the Hashimite ruling family was tainted. Such a conclusion was both unthinkable and dangerous, and ‘Abdallah quickly appreciated the necessity to close this painful chapter in contemporary Jordanian history. A seasoned military officer who cherished fidelity as much as any politician, the new monarch recognized that his father and uncle

were quite different in temperament and style. By his own supposed admission to Queen Noor, he also contemplated that Hussein might someday wish to see one of his own sons succeed to the throne, even if he thought that he would not be that offspring. But ‘Abdallah exhibited due respect, and the two men received world leaders who gathered for Hussein’s funeral.

‘Abdallah bin Hussein was born in 1962 and pursued a military career. ‘Abdallah spent much of his education and early career outside Jordan, and mastered the English language although private Arabic tutoring was also available.<sup>50</sup> He received his primary education in Islamic studies at home before attending St. Edmund’s Preparatory School in Surrey, England, and the Deerfield Academy in Massachusetts in the United States. After high school, ‘Abdallah enrolled at Oxford University and Georgetown University, in Washington, D.C., and then returned to Britain and the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy. On his graduation from the academy, he was commissioned a second lieutenant in 1981 and served a tour of duty with British forces in Germany, before accepting a promotion to captain in the Jordanian “Arab Army.” Over the years, he honed his military training with specialized instruction, including a “company commander’s” course at the US Army Armor School in Fort Knox, Kentucky, an “all arms tactics” course at the British School of Infantry, and a course at the Command and Staff College in Camberley, England.

In 1984, he became commander of the kingdom’s Ninety-first Armored Brigade, and from 1986 to 1987 was attached as instructor to the Royal Jordanian Air Force Helicopter Anti-Tank Wing, after which he transferred to the Seventeenth Tank Battalion. In 1988 he was promoted to the rank of major in the Second Royal Guard Brigade, and in 1989 became its second in command. Throughout the 1990s, ‘Abdallah received various commands and promotions, including lieutenant-colonel of the Second Armored Car Regiment from 1991 to 1993, colonel and deputy commander of Jordan’s Special Forces from 1993 to 1994, brigadier-general and commander of the Special Forces from 1994 to 1997, and commander of Special Operations from 1997 to 1998.

He was entrusted with the heirship less than two weeks before his accession to the throne, coincidentally six days before his thirty-seventh birthday. On 7 February 1999, he became field marshal of the Jordanian “Arab Army,” as well as marshal of the Royal Jordanian Air Force. ‘Abdallah shares many of his father’s more adventuresome hobbies, including flying and scuba diving (he is a qualified military pilot and frogman as well), and auto racing. He also collects antique weapons.

‘Abdallah is married to Rania al-‘Abdallah, a Kuwaiti-born daughter of Faysal Sidki Al Yassin from a leading Palestinian family hailing from the West Bank town of Tulkarm. They have two sons, Hussein (born 28 June 1994) and Hashim (born 30 January 2005), and two daughters, Iman (born 27 September 1996) and Salmah (born 26 September 2000). His English-born mother, Antoinette Avril Gardiner, was the late King Hussein’s second wife, and took the

title of Princess Muna. Although the Jordanian constitution provided for the heir to be a monarch's eldest son, the nationality of the princess was perceived as an impediment in a traditional Muslim society. The tense period of the early 1960s throughout the Middle East, but especially in Jordan, further complicated matters. Repeated assassination attempts on Hussein were averted in the nick of time.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

As promised to his father, 'Abdallah named Hamzah bin Hussein, then eighteen, heir to the Hashimite throne on 7 February 1999 a few hours after his father died. For the late ruler, Hamzah was "the delight of [his] eye," and Hussein may well have wished to see him succeed were it not for the pesky constitutional requirement. An accomplished athlete, the young prince graduated from the Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in 1999 (as a commissioned officer in the Jordanian "Arab Army"), and served a tour of duty in the joint Jordanian-Emirati unit in the former Yugoslavia.

In November 2004, barely five years after his own accession to the throne and the appointment of Hamzah as his heir apparent, 'Abdallah II of Jordan stripped his half-brother of the heralded title. On the surface, the reason advanced for the change was that office requirements were restricting the young prince's movements, although others concluded that the monarch "feared being upstaged."<sup>51</sup> Few doubted that 'Abdallah was seriously concerned with his sibling, especially after the latter's three-year stay in the United States. Borrowing a page from his father's preferred method, 'Abdallah addressed Hamzah in a television message about his decision to relieve him of his responsibility as crown prince to allow him "more freedom of movement." No replacement was announced, although the monarch declared that the title itself would be temporarily shelved. By leaving the post vacant, 'Abdallah ensured that his own son, Hussein bin 'Abdallah, would eventually inherit the throne in full compliance with the Jordanian constitution. There was a significant problem with 'Abdallah's choice—the role of a regency should he die before his son came of age. Remarkably, few members of the family knew about the secret decision, as most learned the news along with the rest of Jordan. The fear that Hamzah would assemble a loyal following was probably justified by the precedent paradigm, as Hassan bin Talal successfully assembled the kingdom's most brilliant minds around him. To be sure, 'Abdallah did not wish to witness a similar situation emerge under his rule, especially as he had lived through the clash that surfaced after his own father confronted his uncle's followers. Everyone's loyalty was supposed to be channeled to the throne as 'Abdallah signaled to one and all that there could be no competing inner circles around anyone save the king. Finally, the ruler's secret decision was also part of his distancing from his father. "I am not my father," he told me in an interview, indicating that he would

reach independent decisions even if those upset the establishment.<sup>52</sup> His decision to strip Hamzah of his title strengthens the argument that the choice was made for him by his father before the latter died, and that, in fulfilling his ruler's wish, he is now responsible for the family's ultimate interests. Moreover, because a monarch's most intimate, and perhaps most significant, decision is the choice of a successor, it was quite clear that 'Abdallah wished to exercise it without any interference from anyone.

Hamzah acquiesced to his sovereign's decision and, though he may over time become the focus of dissent, chances are excellent that he will remain loyal to the family as he grows in stature and gains experience. His departure from the heirship was the third major sacking that 'Abdallah steered, following the dismissal of his father's chief of staff and the sacking of King Hussein's head of intelligence. Over a very short period of time, the young monarch asserted his rights and, in the traditions of a disciplined military leader, commanded the family to uphold crown and country.

### **Succession Dilemma for the Hashimites**

Rumors associated with past Hashimite successions created an unhealthy environment in Jordanian palace life. In 1998, ugly and entirely fabricated insinuations were associated with Princess Sarvath, the spouse of Prince Hassan bin Talal, and her alleged decorating skills. A wicked and deeply hurtful "arrivisme" allegation was attributed to the entire family of the regent. Allegedly, Princess Sarvath set out to redecorate her husband's office as if King Hussein were already dead, and prepared her husband—perhaps even herself—to assume new privileges. In fact, Hassan was severely criticized for behaving like a monarch, by none other than King Hussein in his public rebuke through his hastily composed letter. Yet, and for all of his alleged misbehavior, the undeniable fact was that Hassan had served his ruler for over three decades, not only because he was chosen but also because his brother trusted him to look after Hashimite interests. It was that element that disappeared in early 1999, and the same phenomenon is likely to recur in a future scenario between King 'Abdallah II and an heir who is not his son.

Today, the Jordanian monarchy is blessed with several young men who regularly substitute for the ruler each time he travels out of the country: Faysal, the monarch's only full-brother; 'Ali, a son of Hussein bin Talal and Queen 'Alia; and of course, Hamzah and Hashim, sons of Hussein and Queen Noor. The relationships between these brothers, along with their interactions with King 'Abdallah, may well determine the harmony of the family. 'Abdallah's eldest son, Hussein bin 'Abdallah, was born in 1994 and will become an adult in 2012 when he reaches the age of eighteen (and thus fulfills Article 28 of the constitution). Of course, nothing prevents the monarch from designating his son as heir, along with a regency council created to look after family

interests as well as Jordan, should he become incapacitated before his son is eligible for office. How and whether ‘Abdallah will ever reach such a decision, knowing that a precedent for such an arrangement exists and is permitted by the constitution, will probably define family harmony for the next decade and a half in Amman.

## ■ **Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Jordan**

When King Hussein abruptly replaced his longtime heir apparent with his eldest son, Jordan entered a period of uncertainty, as little continuity emerged. To his credit, the young monarch was a quick study, as initial diplomatic gaffes were seldom repeated after the first few months on the throne. ‘Abdallah embarked on a variety of reforms, but assembling a new team to help him rule was his most crucial priority. Irrespective of his preferences, and largely to remain true to his dying father’s last wishes, he accepted the change of heir, albeit reluctantly. ‘Abdallah knew that he, and Jordan, needed Hassan more than ever. It was difficult to verify, but a high-ranking Jordanian official confided that ‘Abdallah did not ignore his uncle during the first few months after he acceded the throne.<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, the monarch accepted Hamzah as his second in command as he planned various moves carefully. Ruling as monarch was one thing, consolidating power and, more important, earning legitimacy, were entirely different.

Little of what transpired in these early months was made public, but it was not a coincidence that ‘Abdallah insisted his heir continue his education, mostly in the United States.<sup>54</sup> He encouraged Hamzah to meet his responsibilities as best he could, but stressed how much Jordan needed highly educated leaders. Whether ‘Abdallah contemplated a quick reversal of his first decision, and when, are unclear. Suffice it to say that a matter-of-fact decision was handed down on 28 November 2004, when ‘Abdallah stripped his half-brother Hamzah of the title of heir apparent.<sup>55</sup> Although speculation was rife that ‘Abdallah would eventually relieve Hamzah of his title, few expected it to happen so soon. The announcement on Jordanian television surprised many, including the heir apparent, as ‘Abdallah maintained that he wished to “free” Hamzah “from the constraints of the position of heir apparent in order to give [him] the freedom to work and undertake any mission or responsibility . . . alongside all . . . brothers, the sons of King Hussein, and other members of the Hashimite family.” ‘Abdallah further told his younger brother, and the rest of the monarchy, that the position of heir apparent was an “honorary one that [did] not entail any authority or any responsibility.” He elaborated that that the title may have “restrained” Hamzah’s freedom and “hindered [‘Abdallah from] entrusting [the heir] with certain responsibilities that [he was] fully qualified to undertake.”

Ironically, he did not specify what these responsibilities were, or what he envisioned for Hamzah (see Appendix 26).

The Jordanian monarch refrained from naming a successor, declaring that he would give it his “sincere attention” within his constitutional duties, but it was clear that ‘Abdallah intended to leave the post vacant for a few years. In fact, it will come as no surprise if he names his ten-year-old son, Hussein, as heir to the throne in accordance with the Jordanian constitution, even if the child’s age would necessitate the simultaneous establishment of a regency council. Indeed, a regent to the young Hussein would probably be named soon, perhaps in the person of Faysal bin Hussein, who is entrusted with rule during the king’s frequent absences from the country. An alternative to that post could be ‘Ali bin Hussein, as the latter is very close to ‘Abdallah, although no one really knows.

Hamzah responded to the king’s television announcement on 29 November 2004, pledging full obedience to his ruler, and promising to stand by the king as a “faithful soldier and a devoted supporter” who will implement all of his wishes. He publicly vowed to “always live up to [‘Abdallah’s] expectations and confidence in [him] as a Hashemite Muslim.”<sup>56</sup> On 4 December 2004, Queen Noor issued her own statement, which ignored the monarch’s decision, but which underscored that her son would continue to serve Jordan as Hussein bin Talal wished.<sup>57</sup> There was no mention of the warm exchange between Queen Noor and ‘Abdallah during the last few hours before Hussein died. It is clear that a schism has emerged in Amman, with the monarch strengthening his position by relying on several members of the ruling family, including his spouse and full-brother.

### **Rania al-‘Abdallah**

There is little doubt that the younger daughter of Faysal Sidki Al Yassin is now the second most influential individual in Jordan. A full partner of the monarch, Queen Rania adds substantial value to his rule, projecting both essence and style. More important, and because of her Palestinian roots, the queen genuinely represents the overwhelming majority of the Jordanian population, similar to her predecessor, the late Queen ‘Alia (1948–1977). She is active both at home as well as overseas, seems to relish her contacts with ordinary Jordanian—perhaps due to her family ties throughout the Israeli-occupied territories—and equally important, projects a modernizing image in world forums.

Rania was born in Kuwait City on 31 August 1970 to a Palestinian family then settled in the Gulf shaykhdom. She was educated at the New English School in Kuwait, and then attended the American University of Cairo. She married ‘Abdallah bin Hussein, who at that time was a career officer in the military, on 10 June 1993 in Amman. Before becoming queen, she was the president of the Jordan River Foundation, and was active in several social or-



ganizations, including the Jordan Society for Organ Donation as well as the Blood Disease Society. She was awarded the Order of Hussein bin 'Ali on 6 September 1999 by her husband and, over the years, has accumulated several other honorifics. She and the monarch have two sons, Hussein and Hashim, and two daughters, Iman and Salmah.

### **Faysal bin Hussein**

Born on 11 October 1963, Faysal received his elementary education at the Islamic College in Amman, before pursuing secondary schooling at St. Edmund's Preparatory School in Surrey in the United Kingdom. Like his brother 'Abdallah, he then attended Deerfield Academy in Deerfield, Massachusetts, as well as St. Alban's in Washington, D.C. In 1971 he completed his secondary education in Massachusetts and Washington, D.C., and in 1981 he enrolled at Brown University in Rhode Island. He was awarded a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering in 1985 while simultaneously training to become a pilot. Faysal earned his wings in 1982, and returned to Britain in 1985 to attend the Royal Air Force Cranwell Military Academy. He then assumed various military appointments, including lieutenant in the Seventeenth Squadron Operational Conversion Unit of the Royal Jordanian Air Force from 1988 to 1989, instructor in the same unit in 1989, staff officer at the Directorate of Air Operations from 1990 to 1993, commander of the Sixth Squadron from 1995 to 1996, and operations officer of the Air Lift Wing from 1996 to 1998. He was promoted to brigadier-general on 11 January 1998, after which he went to the London Business School to pursue a master's degree in management. Faysal pursued his military career as assistant chief of operations and air defense from 1999 to 2001, and was elevated to major-general on 10 January 2001. On 20 September 2004, King 'Abdallah II issued a royal decree that appointed Faysal, who holds the rank of major-general, assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for air force and information technology affairs. In addition to his many duties, the prince is chairman of the board of trustees for the King 'Abdallah Award for Government Performance and Transparency, chairman of the board of trustees of Muta University, and chairman of the Higher Supervision and Guidance Committee of the Special Operation Forces Exhibition. He is also the president of several clubs, including the Royal Gliding Club, the Golf Club, as well as the Royal Automobile Club of Jordan.

Faysal is married to Princess 'Aliah, the daughter of the late businessman Tawfiq al-Tabbah, who founded Royal Jordanian Air Lines. The couple have four children, 'Ayyah, 'Umar, and twins Sarah and Ayshah.

Prince Faysal is the only full-brother of King 'Abdallah II (both born to Princess Muna al-Hussein, born Antoinette Avril Gardiner). As such, he must be considered to have a particularly close relationship with the monarch. In fact, Faysal is routinely deputized as regent whenever 'Abdallah is out of the

country. Faysal and ‘Abdallah are equally close to their twin full sisters, ‘Ayshah and Zayn.

### **Hamzah bin Hussein**

Major Hamzah bin Hussein was born in Amman on 29 March 1980. The eldest son of Queen Noor, Hamzah was first educated at the Harrow School, in Middlesex, before enrolling at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy. He graduated on 1 December 1999 and was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Jordanian “Arab Army.” Over the years, he has received several promotions, including first lieutenant on 1 December 2000 and captain on 1 June 2001. From June to September 2001 he served with the joint Jordanian-Emirati contingent as a United Nations peacekeeper in Bosnia. From 2001 to 2004, he was attached to the army’s Fortieth Royal Armored Brigade, and on 29 November 2004 was promoted to major. An active member of the ruling family, Hamzah is chairman of the Trustees Council of the Royal Automobile Museum, the Royal Aerosports Club, and the Al-Bayt Foundation for Islamic Thought (since 1999), as well as honorary president of the Jordanian Basketball Federation. He is married to Princess Noor, the third daughter of Prince ‘Asim Abu Bakr, a grandson of King ‘Abdallah I (r. 1921–1951).

As discussed above, Hamzah was designated heir apparent on 7 February 1999, a position he retained until he was summarily dismissed by King ‘Abdallah on 28 November 2004. Although a loyal member of the ruling family, he is a potential contender to the Hashimite throne, and may actually lead an alliance to reclaim his late father’s wish.

### **Hashim bin Hussein**

Hashim bin Hussein was born in Amman on 10 June 1981. He is the second son of Queen Noor, and was first educated at the Fay School in Boston, Massachusetts. He then studied at the Meret School in Washington, D.C., and then at Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, from which he graduated in 2000. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Jordanian “Arab Army” on 14 August 2000. He is married to Fahdah bint Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Salman Abu Niyyan, a well-known Saudi business leader.

### **‘Ali bin Hussein**

Lieutenant-Colonel ‘Ali bin Hussein was born in Amman on 23 December 1975. He is the only son of the late Queen ‘Alia, who was killed in a helicopter accident in 1977, and has a full sister, Hayah. Ostensibly the most educated member of the family, ‘Ali attended the Papplewick Preparatory School in

Ascot, the Islamic Scientific College in Amman, the Deerfield Academy in Massachusetts, Sandhurst Royal Military Academy in Britain, Princeton University in New Jersey, and Columbia University in New York. He was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Jordanian “Arab Army” Special Forces on 9 December 1994, and became commander of the King’s Special Security Forces in 2001. He is married to Rym Brahimi, the daughter of former Algerian minister of foreign affairs Lakhdar Brahimi. Rym was educated at the Université de Paris, and Columbia University in New York. She worked for several media outlets, including the BBC French Service, UPI, Dubai TV, and Bloomberg TV, and since 1998 has been a news correspondent for CNN.

‘Ali was appointed deputy heir apparent on 8 June 1978, and is an honorary president of the Al-Jil Al-Jadid Club (to promote Circassian culture in Jordan), the Jordan Football Association, the Prince ‘Ali Club for the Deaf and Mute, and the Royal Jordanian Paratroopers Club.

### **Hassan bin Talal**

Hassan bin Talal was born in Amman on 20 March 1947 and served Jordan as heir apparent to the Hashimite crown from 1 April 1965 to 25 January 1999. This thirty-four-year legacy speaks volumes, although his most valuable contribution to Jordan has been his unwavering thirst for religious coexistence, best reflected in interfaith efforts in the Middle East as well as throughout the world. He supported and promoted religious dialogue among civilizations long before these were fashionable, and through his tireless initiatives has promoted a positive image of Jordan.

Hassan was educated at the International Community School in Amman as well as at Summerfield in Harrow and Christ Church in Oxford, from the latter of which he earned both a bachelor’s and a master’s degree. Although not a career military officer, Hassan held an honorary general’s title in the Jordanian “Arab Army,” along with numerous other honorifics. He has founded numerous organizations, including the Royal Scientific Society of Jordan (1970), the Jordanian Housing Bank (1973), the Al-Bayt Foundation (1980), the Arab Thought Forum (1981), the Higher Council for Science and Technology (1987), and the Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies (1994). A truly hands-on heir, Hassan has chaired various critical associations and groups, including successive national development boards for the 1973–1975, 1976–1980, 1981–1985, and 1986–1990 five-year plans, the World Intellectual Property Organization Policy Advisory Commission from 1999 to 2002, the Independent Commission for International Humanitarian Issues in 1999, the World Conference on Religion and Peace in 1999, and the Club of Rome in 1999.

Hassan is a published author, not a particularly common feature of Arab royalty, and has written or edited seventeen critical volumes, among them A

*Study on Jerusalem; Palestinian Self Determination: A Study of the West Bank and Gaza Strip; Search for Peace: The Politics of the Middle Ground in the Arab East; Christianity in the Arab World; and To Be a Muslim: Islam, Peace, and Democracy.* His scholarly efforts have earned him additional recognition, including honorary degrees from the Universities of Durham (1990), Birmingham (1999), Ulster (1996), Moscow (1997), and Bilkent (1999).

Hassan is married to Sarvath Ikramullah, the youngest daughter of Muhammad Ikramullah and Shaista Akhtar Banu Begum (Shaista Ikramullah). Princess Sarvath was vilified in the late 1990s for, allegedly, preparing to become queen prematurely—even before the king of Jordan died and her husband acceded to the throne. In fact, Sarvath hailed from a family of highly respected diplomats who served the people of Pakistan long before their daughter married royalty. Muhammad Ikramullah was a foreign minister of Pakistan as well as ambassador to France, Portugal, Britain, the United Kingdom, and Canada. Shaista Akhtar Banu Begum was a Pakistani delegate to the United Nations as well as ambassador to Morocco. Princess Sarvath has served Jordan well in the years since she married into the Hashimite monarchy, including as a patron of the Young Muslim Women's Association, the Malath Foundation, the Jordanian Phenylketonuria Association, and the Jordanian Osteoporosis Prevention Society; and as an honorary president of the Arab Society for Learning Difficulties and the Jordanian Red Crescent Organization.

Hassan and Sarvath have a son, Rashid, and three daughters, Rahmah, Sumayyah, and Badiyyah.

### **Noor al-Hussein**

Queen Noor al-Hussein was born in Washington, D.C., on 23 August 1951. She is the daughter of Najib Elias Halaby, a former chairman and president of Pan American Airways, and Doris Franklin Elvin Carlquist, of Alexandria, Minnesota. Noor, born Elisabeth (Lisa) Halaby, was educated at the Concord Academy in Massachusetts and earned a bachelor's degree from Princeton University. She moved to Amman in 1977 to become director of planning and design for Royal Jordanian Airlines. She is founder of the Royal Endowment for Culture and Education (1984) and the Noor al-Hussein Foundation (1985), as well as the chairwoman of several other charitable organizations, including the King Hussein Foundation (1999). She bore two sons to the late King Hussein, Hamzah and Hashim, as well as three daughters, Iman, Rayyah, and 'Abir. In her book *A Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life*, Noor tells her fascinating story, revealing a unique relationship with her stepson and future monarch. Noor is a formidable orator and adds concrete value to the Jordanian cause. She will likely play a valuable role in the future of the kingdom as her sons and daughters mature.

## Potential Alliances Among the Hashimites

King ‘Abdallah’s powerful alliance, comprising Queen Rania, full-brother Faysal, and half-brother ‘Ali, is the Amman power nexus to be reckoned with. The group is supported by the military and it is even common to see the elegant Rania in military uniform when she performs assorted duties throughout the country. An equally valuable alliance, comprising Hamzah, Hashim, and their mother, Queen Noor, will play an undeniable political role in the future, albeit very much weakened by the death of King Hussein. Their advances will largely depend on unparalleled performance and unforeseen opportunities that may arise in the volatile region. Prince Hassan bin Talal, of course, along with other senior members of the family, will act as swing voices, although all will remain loyal to their current monarch. What may well determine the directions of these alliances are the roles of the military, intelligence services, and several statesmen who have occasionally expressed their unabashed views.

‘Abdallah’s backbone is of course the army. This will not change, as the armed forces have a vested interest in the survival and prosperity of the Hashimite monarchy. The army literally saved the throne in 1970 when the Palestinian uprising, known as “Black September,” threatened the very existence of the state. Unlike his father, who graduated from Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, the young monarch actually served as an officer. ‘Abdallah was the commander of the Jordanian Special Forces when his father appointed him heir twelve days before he died. Because of his years in the military, ‘Abdallah enjoys true confidence from his fellow officers, having established genuine camaraderie with many. It may be safe to argue that the monarch knows his men well. Yet because of his professionalism, it is hard to fathom a situation akin to King Hussein’s vile accusations against his brother—allegedly for plotting against the army. In the late king’s own words: “I have intervened from my sickbed to prevent meddling in the affairs of the Arab Army. This meddling seemed to be meant to settle scores, and included retiring efficient officers known for their allegiance and whose history and bright records are beyond reproach” (see Appendix 22). Whether true or not, Hussein was particularly concerned with the fate of the then-chief of staff Field Marshal ‘Abdul Hafiz al-Ka‘abnah, which is difficult to duplicate. Although ‘Abdallah retained al-Ka‘abnah, on 21 February 1999, barely two weeks after acceding to the throne, he “retired or moved much of the rest of the General Staff.”<sup>58</sup> No matter how unpalatable Hassan’s alleged interventions seemed at the time, ‘Abdallah quickly signaled that the Jordanian “Arab Army” was his, and that he was prepared to redirect it to his liking. He increased contacts with military officers, and empowered his brothers to improve their own links with staff executives as well as lower-ranking personnel throughout the country. In the years since 1999, ‘Abdallah has strengthened his associations with military

units, visited them more frequently than Hussein ever did, rewarded many, and gained unflinching loyalties in return. He knew that this was his primary source of power, and that he could never neglect it.

Next to the military, 'Abdallah relied on the Mukhabarat al-'Ammah (General Intelligence Department [GID]), which has been close to the throne throughout the history of the kingdom. In 1999, the new monarch knew the head of the GID well, and got along with Samih Badr al-Din al-Butaykhi during his tenure as commander of Special Forces. Yet in this instance too, 'Abdallah replaced his father's man with one of his own, naming Muhammad Dhahabi director-general. GID responsibilities increased dramatically after 11 September 2001, albeit with controversial accusations that the Jordanians were performing rendition services for the United States, but in general it was a rather efficient security establishment. 'Abdallah relied on the GID to closely monitor myriad internal as well as external sources of threat, and the GID, in turn, served its master well.

Finally, it is important to underscore the roles that several elder statesmen have played in supporting nascent Jordanian alliances. Because of past roles in the army and security forces, what future tasks will these military advisers and security personnel perform? In fact, Royal Court officials with years of service to both the late King Hussein as well as King 'Abdallah understand the vagaries of the Jordanian throne better than most insiders and must therefore be factored into any assessment. Though a clear generational change is under way, with younger men and women taking the helms of state, their desire to serve 'Abdallah, the Hashimites, and Jordan should not be discounted.

## ■ Notes

1. The Bani Hashem traced their origins to the Arab chieftain Quraysh, a descendant of the Prophet Isma'il, himself the son of the Prophet Abraham (Ibrahim). Quraysh first came to Makkah during the second century of the common era. The first generation of Quraysh to rule the city came six generations later, when Qusay bin Kilab ascended to the leadership of Makkah in the year C.E. 480. "Hashem" was Qusay's grandson, who was the great-grandfather of the Prophet Muhammad. In turn, 'Ali and Fatimah had two sons, Hassan and Hussein. The former's direct descendants are known as *sharifs* (nobles), while the latter's descendants are called *sayyids* (lords). The royal family of Jordan, the Hashimites, are descended through the sharifian branch of lineage. See Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan*, London: Tauris, 1993, pp. 50–72.

2. The Arab Revolt is discussed in a classic study worthy of close attention: George Antonius, *The Arab Awakening*, New York: Lippincott, 1939.

3. Philip Robins, *A History of Jordan*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004, pp. 3–34.

4. *Ibid.*, pp. 36–40.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 56–58.

6. Ibid., pp. 60–70. For a magisterial examination of the first Arab-Israeli war and its impact on the Jordanian monarchy, see Avi Shlaim, *The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine, 1921–1951*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

7. Esmond Wright, “‘Abdallah’s Jordan: 1947–1951,” *Middle East Journal* 5, no. 4, Autumn 1951, pp. 439–462.

8. Hussein [bin Talal] of Jordan, *Uneasy Lies the Head: The Autobiography of His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*, New York: Bernard Geis, 1962, p. 6.

9. In 1941, with British coaching, ‘Abdallah adopted a succession law that allowed him to exclude Talal. The decree specified that successors could be ‘Abdallah’s nearest male relatives. It also provided for the potential exclusion of a candidate if he was deemed unsuitable. Such a finding could be announced in a simple royal proclamation. See Robins, *A History of Jordan*, pp. 75, 213 n. 27.

10. Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 81.

11. Robert B. Satloff, *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 43.

12. Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 88.

13. For additional details on Jordan’s roles in Arab-Israeli conflicts, see Asher Susser, *Jordan: Case Study of a Pivotal State*, Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000. See also Asher Susser, “The Jordanian Monarchy: The Hashemite Success Story,” in Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenges of Modernity*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 87–115; and Curtis R. Ryan, *Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.

14. Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 88.

15. Uriel Dann, *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 169.

16. Robins, *A History of Jordan*, p. 176.

17. There was never any “urgency” to implement Resolution 242, since it was conveniently adopted under Chapter 6 of the UN Charter. Unlike resolutions adopted under Chapter VII, which imposed specific obligations to fulfill the council’s mandate, Chapter VI decrees were deemed too sensitive for any pressing actions.

18. For a firsthand assessment of the US view of King Hussein, see George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, New York: Knopf, 1998, pp. 339–340, 348–349, 358–359.

19. It would be safe to conclude that the source of Hussein’s knowledge of the West was two-pronged: exposure to several institutions of higher learning, as well as the result of marriages to a British citizen, Antoinette Gardiner (Princess Muna), and an American, Lisa Halaby (Queen Noor al-Hussein).

20. Robins, *A History of Jordan*, pp. 79–104. See also Clinton Bailey, “Cabinet Formation in Jordan,” in Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank*, New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977, pp. 102–113.

21. Robins, *A History of Jordan*, pp. 99–102.

22. Peter Gubser, *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*, Boulder: Westview, 1983, pp. 27–29.

23. Rex Brynen, "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 1, March 1992, pp. 69–97.

24. Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center, *Intikhabat 1989: Haqa'iq Wa Arqam; Silsilat Mujtama' al-Madani wal-Hayat al-Siyasiyyah al-Urduniyyah* [1989 Elections: Facts and Figures; Political Activities in Jordanian Civil Society], Amman, 1993.

25. *Al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urduni* [The Jordanian National Charter], Amman: Mudiriyyah al-Mutabi' al-'Askariyyah, 1990, pp. 25–34. An English version of the charter is available at [http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/chart\\_ch1.html](http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/chart_ch1.html).

26. Susser, *Jordan*, pp. 74–77.

27. Robins, *A History of Jordan*, pp. 190–193.

28. Michael Herb, *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 230.

29. Article 28 of the constitution reads as follows: "The Throne of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is hereditary to the dynasty of King 'Abdallah bin Al-Hussein in a direct line through his male heirs." The article is reproduced in full in Appendix 20. The full text of the Jordanian constitution may be found at [http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution\\_jo.html](http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html).

30. Glenn E. Robinson, "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan," *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 3, Summer 1997, pp. 373–387. See also Marion Boulby, *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945–1993*, Lanham: University Press of America, 1999.

31. Lamis Andoni, "Jordan: Badran's Skillful Game," *Middle East International* no. 365, 15 December 1989, p. 8.

32. Ryan, *Jordan in Transition*, p. 24.

33. Husayn Abu Ruman, ed., *'Aqd al-Dimuqratiyyah fil-Urdun, 1989–1999* [A Decade of Democracy in Jordan, 1989–1999], Amman: Markaz al-Urdun al-Jadid lil-Dirasat, 2001.

34. Human Rights Watch, *Clamping Down on Critics: Human Rights Violations in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections*, New York, 1997.

35. Ryan, *Jordan in Transition*, pp. 34–38.

36. Bush and Scowcroft, *A World Transformed*, pp. 348–349.

37. A photograph of Hussein with his infant 'Abdallah is reproduced in the monarch's memoirs. Pointedly, it carries the following caption: "My son and heir." See Hussein bin Talal, *Uneasy Lies the Head*, opposite p. 57.

38. Hussein used the "Qurraat 'Ayni" sobriquet frequently, including in reference to Prince Hamzah. See Yasir Abu Halalah, "'Abdallah Wali Ahd lam Yathbitu Dasturiyyan wa Hamzah 'Qurat 'Ayn' Walidihi" [Abdallah Is Heir Apparent but Not Constitutionally Confirmed and Hamzah Is the Joy of His Father's Eye], *Al-Hayat* no. 13103, 21 January 1999, p. 4.

39. Queen Noor, *Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life*, New York: Hyperion, 2003, p. 359.

40. Douglas Jehl, "Disbelief in Jordan As Hussein Pushes Brother Aside," *New York Times*, 25 January 1999, pp. 1, 6.

41. Noor, *Leap of Faith*, pp. 429–431.

42. William A. Orme Jr., "Jordanians Stand Vigil As Hussein Clings to Life," *New York Times*, 6 February 1999, p. A6.



43. Randa Habib, "King Dismisses Speculations over Succession as 'Nonsensical,'" *Jordan Times*, 12 August 1998, p. 1.

44. Noor, *Leap of Faith*, pp. 423–424.

45. It is not clear whether the CNN interview with Christiane Amanpour on 20 January 1999 was entirely innocent, since she was kind enough to ask the "succession" question twice to elicit what turned out to be the precursor to the change that occurred a few days later. The relevant sections were as follows:

*Amanpour*: There's been a great deal of speculation about your successor. Is there any reason for that? Are you going to change the current plan where Crown Prince Hassan, your brother, is designated as your successor?

*King Hussein*: Prince Hassan has done an awful lot of good during the years that he has spent by my side. Personally I chose to again demonstrate that it is not a question of personal objective or of greed or anything else. I felt it is an important time that there was no substitute but to find a member of the family close by to take over. My brother, Mohammed, concurred at the time. And it was I who did bring about and canvass for the alternative in our Constitution that enables a brother to take over at times. But that didn't mean at all that it was the end of the story, and I think a Crown Prince has to work in the background to a very large extent. I gave him maybe more than he would normally have because he has to be the reserve—but when he gets too involved sometimes he gets the same kind of criticism that I do or maybe worse or otherwise.

So there are all these factors that we have to think about now and not in terms of Prince Hassan, this is not the sole focus of my attention at this stage, but what can we do to give Jordanians the assurance that the future is secure, that it's built on love and cooperation and understanding and not intimidation, and that it is a country that is going to continue to leave an impression on this part of the world.

*Amanpour*: So, sir, is that a yes or a no? Are you going to change the line of succession?

*King Hussein*: I'm not prepared to say anything, so please don't commit me to anything whatsoever because I really haven't come up with anything—I have only thoughts and ideas, and I've always had to take the final decisions and, although this has been contested at times, it's my responsibility and I will come to it in an appropriate time.

See "Excerpts from CNN Live Interview," *Jordan Times*, 20 January 1999, p. 1.

46. Noor, *Leap of Faith*, p. 425.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 426.

48. *Ibid.* It is noteworthy that the sentence "I told Abdullah that it was important to me that he know that I fully supported his father's choice and had complete confidence in him" is repeated in her text. This may well be a typographical error, but is perhaps foretelling of a wish that the queen knew in her heart could not be guaranteed.

49. "Jordan's Stunning Change: The Shift in Hashemite Succession," *The Estimate* 11, no. 3, 29 January 1999, <http://www.theestimate.com/public/012999.html>.

50. His US prep-school experience was so endearing that a decision was made to replicate it in Amman. See Nick Paumgarten, "Deerfield in the Desert," *New Yorker*, 4 September 2006, pp. 102–112.

51. Nicolas Pelham, "King of Jordan 'Feared Being Upstaged,'" *Financial Times*, 30 November 2004, p. 4.

52. Interview with 'Abdallah bin Hussein, Amman, 5 November 2003.

53. Confidential interview with a high-ranking Hashimite ruling family member, Amman, 6 November 2003.

54. Sana Abdallah, "Jordan Royal Manoeuvres," *Middle East International* no. 740, 17 December 2004, p. 23.

55. "Jordan's King Annuls Half-Brother's Title," *New York Times*, 29 November 2004, p. A13. See also Rana Sabbagh-Gargour, "Hamzeh's Demotion Clears Way for King Abdullah's Son to Inherit Crown," *Daily Star* (Beirut), 30 November 2004, p. 7.

56. "Jordanian Prince Concedes Crown Stripped," *Associated Press*, 29 November 2004. See also "Jordan's Ex-Crown Prince Vows to Obey King's Wish," *Daily Star* (Beirut), 1 December 2004, p. 7.

57. "Noor Speaks: Hamza 'Will Continue to Serve Jordan,'" *Gulf News*, 5 December 2004, p. 4.

58. "'Abdullah's Jordan: Assessing the First Two Months,'" *The Estimate* 11, no. 8, 9 April 1999, <http://theestimate.com/public/040999.html>.

# 10

---

## Morocco

**A**lthough Morocco fell to colonial rule, the foreign power did not radically alter the country's sociocultural or political structures, at least not in an outright fashion. Unlike Algeria, for example, Morocco was not to become an integral part of France. Yet throughout the years, Paris fine-tuned existing civil society institutions in this North African monarchy. It relied on a centralized administrative structure set up to support traditionalist notables to control the country. Remarkably, this approach saved successive French governments a bundle, and somewhat limited their involvement in internal affairs. Still, Paris could not ensure a permanent solution for peaceful coexistence.

### ■ Creation and Cohesion

Because French officials tolerated selected indigenous initiatives, Islam never became the ultimate refuge and source of cultural resistance to colonization in Morocco, as was the case in Algeria. Over time, Algeria won independence after what can only be described as a brutal war, with significant casualties that marred both societies for several generations. Nationalist Moroccan as well as Tunisian leaders successfully negotiated their fates with France. In doing so, they preserved most of their historical legacies, which undeniably helped both societies build on relatively distinguished political foundations. Morocco, in particular, digested its precolonial history far better than its neighbors, channeling authoritarian regimentation to secure political rule even if the ultimate price was high. Successive ruling elites handled repression rather well, relying on the military to preserve the throne—and, by association, the state. More important, Moroccan rulers ensured their sovereignty by utilizing this august instrument of power judiciously. 'Alawi rulers did not shy from eliminating putative challengers, but did so with better tact than most North African ruling families.

## The Ruling Family

What distinguished the Moroccan ruling family from most other Arab monarchies was the degree of continuity that it retained in conducting the monarchy's indigenous affairs. Morocco had a long tradition of centralized state control, and was the only Maghrebin state to escape full Ottoman rule.

It became a French-Spanish colony in 1912, but astute colonial authorities refrained from introducing radical changes to the country's sociocultural and political frameworks. Moreover, while traditional structures were preserved, a relatively effective centralized administrative system was created, supported by conservative personalities. Even under occupation, the 'Alawi dynasty remained legitimate because it skillfully aligned itself with both the powerful nationalist Istiqlal (Independence) Party, as well as an emerging independence movement.<sup>1</sup> Once autonomy was achieved in 1956, however, the monarchy crushed the Istiqlal to preserve the throne. The monarch then conceived a system that interlocked political and religious domains within a constitutional order that was fully beholden to the monarchy. All legislative, executive, and judiciary functions reverted to the total discretion of the monarch, whose core legitimacy drew on both Islam as well as Morocco's historical origins.<sup>2</sup>

It was because of this resourceful arrangement that no viable opposition emerged in Morocco. This is not to say that no revolutionary or ultraconservative forces ever arose in Morocco. Indeed, both legal as well as underground opposition groups, including Islamist groups, appeared from time to time. Yet none of them earned widespread popular support, with the exception of the latter part of the twentieth century. Regrettably, the political establishment was drawn from among those elites approved by the monarchy, which naturally created a large gap into which many Moroccans fell. Such disparities notwithstanding, the individual who coalesced the Moroccan monarchy in the twentieth century was King Muhammad V, through his masterful maneuvering between foreign and domestic foes to buttress 'Alawi interests. Although his successor would, in turn, remake the face of the monarchy, Muhammad V's difficult decisions and clever policies, as well as timely actions, ensured success.

**Muhammad V (r. 1957–1961).** Muhammad, who was born in 1910, succeeded his father, Moulay Youssef, as Sultan in 1927, and distinguished himself as a devout nationalist. Before World War II, he straddled the reigns of power, alternatively supporting France and plotting against the occupier with ardent nationalist elements. Not surprisingly, his loyalty toward Paris was lukewarm at best, and as a result, in 1953, the French opted to depose and exile him to Madagascar, from which he was flown to southern France. Faced with growing unrest throughout their Moroccan colony, however, French authori-

ties assiduously concluded that the exiled monarch was their best bet to restore a semblance of order, and negotiated his return to power in 1955.

From his exile on the Côte d'Azur, Muhammad sealed a truly nationalist accord with Paris: he would only return to rule, albeit under French tutelage, if Morocco would quickly earn its independence. Mired in the Algerian debacle, France accepted these sharifian conditions, and flew Muhammad into Casablanca on 16 November 1955. This victory weakened the monarch's old rivals and most capitulated. His aide de camp and potential competitor, Muhammad Oufkir, was the only contestant of any significance with political aspirations of his own. Although Oufkir would eventually play a critical role in Moroccan history, the mild antagonism between him and his ruler from 1956 to 1961 would come to "symbolize the split between the royalist and the civilian aspects of Moroccan nationalism."<sup>3</sup> Nevertheless, in 1955, Oufkir abided by his *bay'ah* (loyalty oath) and welcomed the monarch with open arms at a time when all political leaders rallied behind the triumphant sultan. When Morocco became an independent state on 11 February 1956, even the secular Istiqlal Party became monarchist, though the adulation would not last.

The nascent monarchy soon faced severe economic problems as wealthy landowners sought to hold on to capitalized agriculture. The monarch obliged them, sensing a looming opportunity to divide putative opponents. But Istiqlal leaders could do precious little about land reforms, since they were not even in control of the first government. Party leaders were trapped, supporting the constitutional monarchy but also beholden to the masses. The popular monarch, on the other hand, enjoyed full support and could therefore pick what suited him and the monarchy best from among a gaggle of backers. In a "claims" debate, nationalists argued that Moroccan tradition required the ruler to submit to the sovereignty of the *ummah*, "which had the right, indeed the duty, to remove Sultans who could not, or did not, ensure that justice prevailed."<sup>4</sup> This recurring theme came as a warning as nationalist parties attempted—in vain—to limit the power of the palace. Parliament served the ruler first and would not be permitted to mobilize public opinion through an independent legislative agenda. As if by reaction, successive rulers would seek to limit whatever power parliaments possessed or thought they enjoyed. But Muhammad V was not about to second-guess capable Moroccans into yielding power throughout the burgeoning bureaucracy, including the military and security institutions. He would see to it that state institutions followed his lead. Herein lay a rare chance for the Istiqlal, whose leaders realized that an infiltration into, and eventual domination of, the country's political structures could provide them with real power. Party leaders championed the adoption of various projects, while calling for minority voices to be heard.

The palace was not impressed. In 1958, when a rebellion started in the Rif, the mountainous region along the Mediterranean coast, it was Heir Apparent

Hassan who was entrusted with resolving the crisis. Hassan led army troops to crush the Rif rebellion, which in turn undermined the Istiqlal. One could not uphold law and order while calling for severe restraints on its applications. The ruler seized the moment, playing one party against another, and the Istiqlal splintered. Where the monarch miscalculated, however, was in his assessment of the rising influence of Arab nationalism, which was then spreading from Cairo onward throughout the Arab world. With his father's full consent, Hassan slowly donned the cloak of Arab nationalism, ostensibly to limit whatever damage such sentiments bred among North Africans. He negotiated the closure of US military bases in 1959—from which Casablanca was earning hefty revenues—although US troops were not fully withdrawn from Morocco until 1962. Hassan further welcomed Washington's financial assistance after the terrible 1960 earthquake in Agadir, while advocating transparency and accountability. His father was so impressed with these performances, ranging from the Rif submission to directing relief efforts in 1960, that the ruler sacked the government and appointed Hassan as deputy premier and defense minister. Muhammad V retained the premiership as the monarchy's powers ascended. Even if the move strengthened his hand, it was a palace coup d'état nevertheless, as the cabinet changes occurred a day before scheduled local council elections. The ambiguity with which Muhammad V ruled proved to be legendary, and a lesson in governance for his son. When the monarch died in February 1961, after minor health complications, Hassan II acceded to the throne aware of his father's tact and prudence. Morocco had a constitution, a parliament, and political parties, but in reality all were under palace control.<sup>5</sup> The only avenue left outside the ruling family's full control was the religious community.

In Morocco, the government sought to subordinate the religious institutions to its power, albeit in a unique manner. To be sure, the integration of the *'ulamah* into state institutions was easier than in most Arab states, because the latter shared the same ideological culture as the regime. After confining it to strictly cultural and religious affairs—its usual functions for decades—the monarchy allowed the *'ulamah* to be organized hierarchically in order to facilitate a more effective response to counter arguments made by radical Islamist intellectuals. To its credit, the monarchy under Muhammad V reinforced and recreated the Muslim associative networks, while different forms of popular Islam were allowed to prosper, largely to confront radicalism. Moroccan leaders did not attempt to erase the religious factor from the political arena, as was the case in both Tunisia and Algeria. In addition, Rabat based its appeal on popular culture, especially by upholding its religious values, rather than emulate comprehensive Western programs that were difficult to integrate in this traditional plutocracy. The government reorganized the religious sector after 1984—through such means as control of mosque construction, standardization of Friday sermons to exclude radical Islamist imams, and the closing of

mosques outside of the hours of prayer—but in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Rabat upheld coexistence.<sup>6</sup>

Morocco needed the religious establishment to strengthen its authoritarian rule and did not shy away from fostering its growth as needed. At times the regime encouraged Islamic groups against other rivals while at other times it repressed them. Simultaneously, it encouraged and funded the establishment of its own moderate Islamic groupings, hoping to guide whatever debates might arise within the religious community. It could do this because Morocco possessed a long-standing tradition that permitted some political and religious pluralism. Therefore, radical religious views would be allowed, but Muhammad V would see to it that they were constrained. Still, Rabat perceived radical religious views as too much of a threat to permit the existence of a legal Islamist party before 1961, when Hassan II became king.<sup>7</sup>

## ■ Constitutional Continuum in Morocco

After Hassan II acceded to the Moroccan throne in 1961, he confronted a series of problems, including mild but growing opposition among Islamist forces. Although the latter's influence reached a peak following the 1984 riots, the rise occurred because of deep economic and political straits, fueled by legendary neglect in Rabat.<sup>8</sup> At first, the emergence of Islamist elements in the educational and cultural sectors was encouraged by the regime, which intended to pit them against a more established challenge from the left. As an unintended consequence, however, Islamism spread from social organizations into the state's security institutions, including the army, police, and customs officers. Even the trade union federation, a traditional stronghold of the government, recorded an increasing Islamist presence. What Islamist leaders planned was nothing short of a total remake of the relatively liberalized Moroccan society. From 1975 to 1986, the leadership and organization of Islamist groups improved steadily, as a gradualist strategy was adopted to gain power.

The first Moroccan Islamist movement, the *Harakat al-Shabibah al-Islamiyyah* (Movement of the Islamic Youth), was created in 1969. Its founder, Education Inspector 'Abdul Karim Muti', was influenced by the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. Muti' preached a moderate stance and was rewarded with a full legalization in 1972, even if only as a social and cultural association. That privilege allowed the group to recruit and indoctrinate freely within the boundaries of religious proselytizing at various mosques throughout the country. Yet, as the movement grew in strength, Rabat applied a measure of repression, which provoked a government-desired division. In 1977, the *Harakat* reemerged as the *Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah* (Islamic Community) and the *Ursat al-Jama'ah* (Family Community), two rival organizations competing for public attention. To avoid

Hassan II's repression, 'Abdul Illah Benkirane, an educator who led the Jama'ah al-Islamiyyah, adopted a truly moderate strategy while distancing the group from leftist pressures. In fact, the movement quickly changed its name to *Islah wa-Tajdid* (Reform and Renewal), to dissipate any suspicions among conservative as well as secular streams that dominated the establishment. *Islah* leaders recognized the legitimacy of the monarch, acclaimed democracy and the principles of human rights, and disassociated themselves from secularist assemblies that propelled Morocco on a heavy Westernization curve. *Islah* leaders were so confident of their initiatives that they created a progovernment section, which quickly transformed itself into the Justice and Development Party.

To be sure, the strategy pursued by Rabat divided and somewhat weakened the Islamist milieu, as it isolated the more radical *Ursat al-Jama'ah*. Yet *Ursat* leaders were not totally incompetent, and they too adopted a new name in 1987, metamorphosing the party into *Al-'Adl wal-Ihsan* (Justice and Charity). Chaotic developments in Algeria, where atrocities perpetrated at the beginning of the civil war crippled that society, threatened to spill over into Morocco. An anxious Rabat conveniently relied on the Algeria pretext to frighten all sectors of society, successfully neutralized any and all demands for freedom and democratization, and denied Moroccan Islamists power. Hassan II was certainly not ready to allow Islamist leaders to attain power, but equally important, the latter were in no position to make demands. The Algerian model was an ugly reminder of poor results, when faulty and hasty choices threatened law and order.

### **Constitutional Reforms**

Morocco remained a relatively poor country under Hassan II, though it enjoyed a parliamentary revival when the legislative body was transformed into a bicameral body. Rabat encouraged the formation of legal political parties, but without sharing, as befit an absolute monarch, any aspect of the decisionmaking process. Still, constitutional reforms proved difficult, as the monarch cherished his intrinsic abilities to manipulate various political constituencies. In fact, the first moves for genuine reforms occurred after the palace coup d'état that brought Hassan II to power as prime minister in 1960.

A few days after his assent to the premiership, Hassan II oversaw the country's first-ever local council elections. *Istiqlal*, the muzzled progovernment independence party, won 40 percent of available seats, while the Union National des Forces Populaires, the opposition group, led by Mehdi Ben Barka, netted 25 percent. Since the latter was an offshoot of *Istiqlal*, and given that Rabat seldom trusted its putative allies, the combined presence in the 1960 parliament illustrated how strong nationalist parties actually were. Still, the mere fact that a division existed among them allowed the government to benefit from the fragmentation. Muhammad V was satisfied that cosmetic reforms



altered little as he husbanded his slowly degrading power. There would be no elected parliament under his rule, and when the ruler died in February 1961, it fell to his young son to oversee a new constitutional draft that anticipated power sharing with a duly elected legislative branch.

Few observers were optimistic that Hassan II could rule Morocco over any length of time. The young monarch was not known for any political aptitude, as he preferred European jet-set playgrounds to the harsh environment of his country. Hassan II dutifully declared that he planned to pursue his father's policies, while in reality he fathomed a complete break with the past. Nevertheless, because he lacked the popularity enjoyed by his father, the young monarch quickly concluded that he needed to earn his legitimacy. From his relatively stable military base—perhaps the only section of society where he was truly admired—Hassan II donned a religious cloak, assiduously stressing his 'Alawi traditions. His regular Friday mosque attendances earned him a significant following, as did his keeping of annual Ramadan customs.

The 18 November 1962 constitution specifically identified the form of government in Morocco as a monarchy, under 'Alawi rule, with the king empowered to act as both monarch as well as "Commander of the Faithful." A multiparty parliamentary system was also implemented, which benefited the monarch because multiplicity ensured political fragmentation. Nevertheless, the democratization process engaged Moroccans, who overwhelmingly approved the constitution in December 1962, even as opposition parties opted to boycott the referendum. The king thoroughly enjoyed playing the "democracy" game as supporters gathered under the *Front pour la Defense des Institutions Constitutionnelles*, a progovernment grouping that bid for Rabat, and won a slight majority, in the 1963 parliamentary elections.

Perhaps unsurprisingly, demonstrations against blatant manipulation turned violent, particularly in March 1964. Muhammad Oufkir, head of internal security at the time, deployed a wide dragnet. 'Abdul Rahman Youssouffi, Muhammad Basri (known as the "Faqih"), and Mehdi Ben Barka were either arrested or exiled. Hassan II rewarded Oufkir by appointing him minister of interior, and in June 1965 the monarch opted to prorogue parliament to rule by decree. Ironically, Oufkir's harsh treatment of students and demonstrating peasants etched his image for millions who, a few years hence, were called to distance themselves from the "traitor." In fact, few shed any tears when Oufkir was ousted in 1971, especially because he had honed repression into an art form. Between 1965 and 1971, shantytowns grew around most cities, and Moroccans barely survived. Rabat subsidized basic staples to avoid starvation, and generous US aid kept the restless population in check.

To be sure, economic stagnation developed over several years, and Hassan II was aware of severe political risks involved in such endeavors. At one point in 1965, he extended an offer to Mehdi Ben Barka to return home and join the monarch in governing the country, but the latter never did, instead disappearing

in Paris on 29 October 1965. Rogue elements within the Moroccan government, probably under the direct control of Interior Minister Oufkir, were most likely responsible for the disappearance.<sup>9</sup> That a prominent member of the Moroccan opposition had simply disappeared in the French capital necessitated some complicity with local actors, although no formal ties were ever established. Still, in a 1967 trial, two French officers were convicted for their putative roles in the kidnapping. The presiding magistrate ruled, however, that the main guilty party was Muhammad Oufkir. Several witnesses asserted that Ben Barka had been tortured and murdered by Oufkir himself. Georges Figon, a witness with a criminal background, testified that Oufkir had personally stabbed Ben Barka to death. 'Ali Bourequat, a dissident and former Tazmamart prisoner of conscience, claimed that a fellow prisoner in Rabat revealed how he and several colleagues, led by Colonel Oufkir and Ahmad Dlimi, had murdered Ben Barka in Paris on the orders of King Hassan II. Allegedly, French authorities knew of the plot, and opted to allow Moroccans to settle their disputes.<sup>10</sup>

Oufkir perceived Ben Barka as a threat to the regime, but it was unclear to what extent, if any, the interior minister followed directives issued by the ruler. In any event, Rabat balanced its multipronged policies with a new openness as parliament reconvened in 1970. An amended constitution mandated partial elections for two-thirds of available seats, which drew the ire of the opposition. Patronage certainly permitted Hassan II to exert power, but only because Oufkir kept the masses down.<sup>11</sup> Whether by design or utter neglect, this overemphasis on security directly translated into an economic morass as the state dwindled away its scarce resources. As a further diversion from what ailed society, the king revived the dormant Spanish Sahara dispute, ostensibly to bank on raw nationalism and to strengthen his legitimacy. Under normal circumstances, an appeal to popular nationalism should have mobilized disenfranchised elements, but not in this instance. In fact, a simmering crisis limited any contemplated maneuvers, as strikes and demonstrations increased in frequency and intensity. On 10 July 1971, over a thousand military cadets stormed the palace at Skhirat, where international personalities were gathered to celebrate the monarch's birthday. Hassan II survived the coup attempt—though 28 guests were killed and 158 rebel soldiers perished when loyal forces launched a counterattack—but he quickly authorized Oufkir, who may have instigated the coup, to purge the army. Ten high-ranking officers were later executed for their alleged involvements in the assassination plot. Within a year, on 16 August 1972, the king's plane—a bulky Boeing 727—was attacked in flight by Royal Moroccan Air Force F-5 jets, although Hassan II miraculously survived once again. His *barakah* (good fortune) held, but Oufkir was dead the next day. It is unclear whether the interior minister committed suicide or whether the monarch shot him, but the entire Oufkir family paid a heavy price for transgressions that their father may or may not have committed.<sup>12</sup>

Driss Basri, who applied extreme security measures to reestablish order, replaced Oufkir as both he and his ruler contemplated additional survival steps. For the balance of his reign, however, Hassan II was preoccupied with the Spanish Sahara question and simply failed to address intrinsic domestic concerns. The constitutional experiment that he favored at the beginning of his rule withered on the political vine with no concrete results that empowered proud Moroccans eager to support their monarch while protecting and preserving their basic rights.<sup>13</sup>

### Parliamentary Revisions

For four decades, Rabat fielded a working parliament with genuine multiparty competition, but little legislative powers. If the monarch successfully played elites against each other in the 1960 and 1963 elections to buttress his legitimacy, throughout the 1990s Hassan II empowered the institution, ostensibly to channel dialogue with specific opposition parties. His successor adopted similar schemes, in recognition of the body's hidden values, as well as its potential for internal harmony. Before 1996, when the constitution was amended to provide for a bicameral legislature, parliamentary seats were allocated to specific districts. Moreover, specific public organizations like unions and local municipality councils could also field candidates for voting, which permitted the government to pit urbanized—and therefore more sophisticated voters—against rural and more supportive populations. After 1996, the *Majlis al-Nuwab* (Council of Deputies) comprised 325 members, elected by direct popular vote for five-year terms. The *Majlis al-Istishari* (Consultative Council) acted as a senate and encompassed 270 members elected by municipalities, syndicates, and similar institutions that retained Hassan II's communal representation. While counselors served nine-year terms, a third of the council was up for reelection every three years, allowing for a statistically significant turnover.<sup>14</sup>

Before Hassan II died, elections for the Council of Deputies and the Consultative Council were held in November and December 1997, respectively. Reportedly, these elections were widely characterized as a stalemate, as three main blocs fielded sure-bet candidates. A total of 102 seats went to the *Kutla*, or Democratic bloc, whose members had been in the opposition in previous parliaments. Another 100 deputies represented the outgoing government, and 97 parliamentarians emerged from the *Wasat*, or centrist alignment. The Socialist Union of Popular Forces, a longtime left-wing opposition party, won the most seats of any single party, 57, and parties backed by the Berber population were also successful, with a total of some 91 seats spread among various blocs. A few Islamists entered parliament for the first time under the aegis of a legal political party. The major loser of the 1997 plebiscite was the long-standing

nationalist party, Istiqlal, which barely managed to hold on to 32 seats. Zealous party members claimed that vote fraud, electoral gerrymandering, and assorted other shenanigans were responsible for this defeat.<sup>15</sup>

Hassan II quickly appointed ‘Abdul Rahman Yousseouffi, head of the Socialist Party, as prime minister, signaling a new openness. This candidacy certainly was not the monarch’s first choice, but was made to quell internal tensions. Yousseouffi, a determined and vocal opposition leader, was imprisoned in the 1960s, allegedly sentenced to death in absentia in 1971 (but pardoned by the ruler in 1980), and exiled to France from 1965 to 1980. Surprisingly, he returned to Morocco after François Mitterrand, the Socialist president of France, goaded Rabat to change its ways. Hassan II pardoned Yousseouffi, probably to placate the powerful even if enigmatic Mitterrand, but also because he concluded that Yousseouffi would balance the powerful interior minister, Driss Basri. In fact, while Hassan II trusted Basri to the utmost, he was fully aware of dramatic internal changes and of the unpopularity of his interior minister. Giddy Moroccans actually perceived Yousseouffi’s rise as a clear sign of concern by a ruler who finally hinted that a move toward a more genuine constitutional monarchy was possible. Whether Hassan II intended to curtail absolute powers from his successor—perhaps building on the Spanish model—is unknown, but the clash between Rabat and the power of elected bodies could not be neglected. The ruling ‘Alawi family was not ready to share power and, as long as it counted on loyal security services, weighed the need for a balance with any elected parliament.

### **The Reign of Hassan II (r. 1961–1999)**

Much like their ancestors, contemporary Moroccan kings claimed the title “Commander of the Faithful,” traditionally the title of Muslim caliphs (see Appendix 27 for a list of ‘Alawi rulers). Hassan II made a particular effort to portray himself as a charismatic religious figure, drawing on the customary North African veneration for holy men.<sup>16</sup> Although a highly Europeanized individual with near-native command of the French language, the monarch’s official portrait often showed him in the conventional Moroccan gear, or dressed as a pilgrim in Makkah, in part to earn legitimacy and solidify the mythology that he was the “King of the Poor.”<sup>17</sup> Still, for all his piety, the ruler and his entourage allegedly owned “about a fifth of the country’s land, and Morocco’s rich phosphate mines [were] a royal monopoly as well.”<sup>18</sup> Undoubtedly, the monarch enjoyed absolute power, and ruled with aplomb for over forty years. Nevertheless, his greatest accomplishment was to usher in a system of government that allowed his successor to rule a monarchy that was no longer contested as it enjoyed dynastic, religious, and nationalist backing.

Toward the end of his reign, and in the aftermath of tragic internal events that mired his otherwise popular rule, Hassan II appreciated the pace of change

in Morocco.<sup>19</sup> Perhaps for altruistic reasons but certainly to buttress the institution of monarchy, in 1990 he authorized the creation of a consultative council whose primary objective was to defend human rights. This magnanimous effort was followed in 1994 and 1995 with several royal pardons, including a partial rehabilitation of Ben Barka. Ironically, a prominent Rabat boulevard was named for the late opposition leader in November 1995 and, within a year, several Oufkir family members were allowed to leave the country. Whether the monarch wished to express remorse for the excessively brutal treatment that key Oufkir offspring were subjected to is unknown. What is certain, on the other hand, were the efforts made by Hassan II to redeem his policies throughout the 1990s. A special effort was thus made to modernize the monarchy while keeping the opposition in check. It must be emphasized that the king's *barakah* served him well in this instance too, as Moroccans rallied behind the ruler, most fearing a spillover of the violence that rocked and destabilized neighboring Algeria starting in 1992. Indeed, the ruler was so confident of his demarches that he accepted International Monetary Fund conditions to reform the Moroccan economy starting in 1996, and in 1997 accepted the results of parliamentary elections that ushered in opposition leaders. Even his tested and well-established divide-and-rule tactics were undertaken with added confidence, especially after an upper chamber was added to the legislative process. Thus Hassan II ended his reign in relative harmony, confident that his successor would not face the dynastic challenges that he and his predecessors had confronted.

### From Hassan II to Muhammad VI

If Moroccans were afraid of King Hassan II, as an oft-repeated colloquialism emphasized, after 1999 the saying translated into a collective “fear for the King.”<sup>20</sup> Muhammad VI—or “M6” as he is affectionately known by young Moroccans—pursued policies that mimicked those devised by his astute father, even if his approach tended to be far more reserved. While the arrival of a new sovereign almost always created a window of opportunity to introduce sociopolitical reforms, M6 quickly confronted a marked resurgence of official activism in the social domain. This effort intended to compete with the Islamists on their own territory and included an attempt to revitalize moderate and progovernment forces active in the country's mosques. The campaign culminated when Shaykh ‘Abd al-Salam Yasin—a cleric with significant following—was sentenced to house arrest in 2000 and banned from preaching. To his credit, M6 did not authorize further sanctions, since an increasing factional conflict within the religious movement threatened to provoke motivated groups into action. By acting cautiously, the monarch weakened the Islamist scene, although this may well be a temporary result.

Like his predecessor, Muhammad VI welcomed the results of the 2002 parliamentary elections, and vowed to work with duly elected representatives. In

the 27 September 2002 plebiscite, the main party in the outgoing coalition, the Socialist Union of Popular Forces, won 50 of the 325 seats, and its main coalition partner, the conservative Istiqlal Party, tallied 48 portfolios. The moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party more than doubled its representatives, to 42, whereas the National Rally of Independents won 41 seats, the Popular Movement took 27, the National Popular Movement tallied 18, the Constitutional Union won 16, and fifteen other parties were represented with several parliamentarians. According to final results certified by then-interior minister Driss Jettou, two new political parties were recognized by the government—the Moroccan Liberal Party (PLM) and the Alliance of Liberties—which aimed to involve youth and women in political action. The Alliance of Liberties won 4 seats in the Chamber of Deputies. Justice and Charity, said to be the largest Islamist group, was banned and thus could not field any candidates.<sup>21</sup>

Although the Islamist party made strong gains in the 2002 elections, Moroccan parties were organized in blocs, which permitted Rabat a time-tested free hand in governance. The four major blocs consisted first of a left-wing coalition that comprised the Socialist Union of Popular Forces; the Party for Progress and Socialism, formerly the Communist Party; the Leftist Unified Socialist Party, formerly the Organization Pour l'Action Démocratique et Populaire (OADP); and the Socialist Democratic Party. The center-right block comprised the Istiqlal Party and the Justice and Development Party. The Berberist bloc comprised the Popular Movement, the National Popular Movement, and the Social Democratic Movement. Finally, the conservative bloc comprised the National Rally of Independents and the Constitutional Union.

After the election results were published, Driss Jettou was named prime minister, as the government indicated that the Socialist Union of Popular Forces—with the support of six allies in the outgoing ruling coalition—had gathered more than half the 325 seats. However, the 2002 elections further marked a significant success for the Islamist Party, which was first formed and recognized in 1997. Whether more radical Islamists toned down their politics to become a legal party and win key seats in parliament, or whether their programs were more effective in the eyes of heavily urbanized and poor Moroccans, was one of the underlying problems facing the government. But irrespective of particular agendas, Morocco had held relatively free elections, released of the customary interferences that had colored past plebiscites. This first general election under King Muhammad VI attracted a 52 percent turnout, even if the country's constitutional setup effectively meant that parliament retained limited powers. Hassan II was fond of saying that he served Moroccans without being their slave. His son, Muhammad VI, wished to emulate his father and believed that he was on an even greater mission—to fulfill his own *bay'ah* to his people. By ensuring that constitutional requirements were duly fulfilled, M6 started his reign with both predictability as well as accountability.

## ■ Contemporary Rulers: The 'Alawis of Morocco

Article 20 of the 1996 revised constitution specifically stated that the monarchy shall be "hereditary and handed down, from father to son, to descendants in direct male line and by order of primogeniture among the offspring of His Majesty King Hassan II" (see Appendix 28 for full relevant excerpts). As a constitutional monarchy, therefore, Rabat operated under strict rules, even if the charter never intended to limit the king's vast powers. Both Hassan II and his successor shared with their father and grandfather, respectively, a strong mandate to rule Morocco. Unlike Muhammad V and Hassan II, however, Muhammad VI faced modernizing challenges. Because Morocco enjoyed a political system with genuine democratic trappings, including a multiparty system as well as an established parliament, the king exercised total power. Still, while the young monarch transformed key institutions after his accession, no one challenged his authority.

To be sure, some accountability preceded the 1999 succession, as Hassan II released a steady stream of political prisoners, endowed the legislative body with an upper house, and even cohabited with an opposition prime minister. Most of these changes were not of the cosmetic variety, as the country enjoyed a relative period of stability. Hassan II became attentive to Morocco and its growing needs, especially in the all too critical economic sphere, but the financial system continued to suffer. Like many developing countries, extremes of wealth and poverty were not uncommon, even if this one was perched on the footsteps of the wealthy European continent. The late monarch withstood legitimate criticisms, pointing to concrete gains and new projects, even if the ultimate price was always very high.<sup>22</sup>

Morocco recorded solid progress, but not in terms of its human rights record, as allegations of political abuse surfaced on a regular basis.<sup>23</sup> These handicaps, coupled with dormant labor hostility as well as active religious movements that articulated nonconformist views, preoccupied the monarch and his advisers. It was within such an environment that Muhammad VI positioned his throne as he planned the future of 'Alawi rule on his watch.

As discussed above, the 'Alawi dynasty took power in the seventeenth century and, like earlier sovereigns, claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad through the line of 'Ali and the Prophet's daughter Fatimah. Such a descent morphed the dynasty into a sharifian lineage, the most powerful legitimacy tool available, which in turn enabled every monarch to survive colonialism and occupation. Even at the height of French hegemony, which conveniently legalized Morocco as a protectorate under the 1912 Treaty of Fez, the 'Alawis never conceded their authority. Nothing was relinquished, not even under a brutal administrative division, itself legalized by the 1912 Treaty of Madrid with the Spanish government. Under French rule from Rabat and a

Spanish protectorate from Tetouan in the north of the country, successive sultans sought to enhance their influence through various representatives. Remarkably, and at all times, the monarch's sovereignty was recognized. French colonial figures deposed Sultan Muhammad V when they accurately concluded that the ruling dynasty was actually encouraging nationalism. In 1953, Paris tackled repeated calls for independence with the appointment of an aging relative of Muhammad V, Sidi Muhammad bin 'Arafah, as ruler. Remarkably, this pathetic move was eventually rescinded, as the lawful sultan was restored in late 1955. Sultan Muhammad V took the title of king as he led Morocco to independence from France in early 1956.<sup>24</sup> The 'Alawi dynasty thus endured for four centuries, with leading family members active in the country's business and cultural lives.

Under Hassan II, detailed information about the ruling family was scarce or very closely held. He was born at the Dar al-Makhzin in Rabat on 9 July 1929, and educated at the Royal College and Institute of Law, where he earned a degree in 1951. A year later, the young attorney received a diploma in civil law from the Université de Bordeaux in France. The future monarch was certainly ably coached, and entrusted with immense responsibilities over a very short period of time. He was appointed heir to the 'Alawi throne in 1931 and served for several years in various French military units when Morocco was a French protectorate. Exiled to Madagascar with his father from 1953 to 1956, Hassan II shouldered several military as well as civilian duties immediately after independence. He was commander in chief of the Royal Army from 1956 to 1961, vice president of the Council of Ministers from 1957 to 1961, minister of defense from 1960 to 1961, and prime minister from 1961 to 1964 and from 1965 to 1967. He succeeded his father on 16 February 1961 and was enthroned on 3 March 1961.

Hassan II married Lalla Fatimah, a daughter of Qaid Ould Hassan Al Muharak, from the Za'yan tribe, in 1961, and Lalla Latifah, a cousin of Lalla Fatimah and niece of Qaid Ould Hassan Al Muharak, a few months later. The latter betrothal was not publicly identified until the birth of the first child in 1962. Moroccans believed that the late monarch maintained one or two additional wives, including a French wife or perhaps a mistress, but this is unknown. Importantly, only his offspring with Lalla Latifah are considered part of the royal line, including Muhammad VI and Moulay Rashid.<sup>25</sup> Hassan II and Lalla Latifah were also the parents of three daughters, Maryam, Asmah, and Hasnah. Hassan II died in Rabat on 23 July 1999.

### **Muhammad VI (r. 1999– )**

Unlike his gregarious father, Muhammad VI is a private person, an almost self-effacing figure. The contrast between his father's flamboyant assertiveness and his own low-key preferences could not be more blatant, although relative youth



may certainly account for his demeanor. Power and perhaps responsibilities compel extraordinary transformations, and it is entirely possible that Muhammad VI will develop some extroversion over time. Nevertheless, and no matter how fast his character adjusts to the state of affairs, the monarch inherited a country undergoing dramatic alterations that required his urgent attention.

Morocco is one of the poorest Arab countries, and while undeniable progress has been recorded in recent years, it ranks below average in terms of key economic indicators.<sup>26</sup> In fact, there is plenty of wealth in the country, but much of it is in the hands of a restricted elite, with perhaps a fifth of the country's land under the control of the ruling family.<sup>27</sup> Morocco is of course a major phosphate exporter, although this is a state monopoly as well. Irrespective of political differences with opposition parties—Rabat enjoys a bicameral parliament and a plethora of political factions—the primary source of discontent is not the monarchy's political monopoly, but the serious economic imbalances that divide society. In fact, few Moroccans object that major decisions are nestled in the hands of the monarch, though many complain that their livelihoods should not be curtailed by such maneuverings. Most acknowledge that certain human rights violations take place, that real difficulties prevent the implementation of United Nations resolutions over the Western Sahara dispute, and that the country's overall democratization process is rather slow. Yet above it all, Moroccans insist that their priority is the country's dire economic situation, which requires added vigilance and pragmatic solutions that will foster employment and the creation of wealth.<sup>28</sup> This was the mantle that awaited the new monarch, immense tasks that were not unknown, but whose parameters probably surprised the relatively isolated ruler.

Muhammad VI was born in Rabat on 21 August 1963, and received religious education at the Royal Palace, starting in 1967. Two years later, the young prince was initiated into a modern curriculum, from which he graduated in 1981. In 1985, Sidi Muhammad received a bachelor's degree in law from the Université Muhammad V in Rabat, where he wrote a treatise on the Arab-African Union and Morocco's position in international affairs. Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission in Brussels at that time, took Sidi Muhammad under his wing in November 1988 for advanced governance training in Belgium. On 29 October 1993, he received a law degree from the Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis, in France, where he wrote a thesis on relations between the European Economic Community and the Maghreb. To add gravitas to his résumé, and to further empower the heir, Hassan II appointed his son a division general in the Moroccan army on 12 July 1994. Remarkably, and within a week of his accession to the throne on 23 July 1999, the largely unknown Muhammad VI announced a full break with his predecessor.

On 30 July 1999, Muhammad VI declared that Morocco would amnesty 46,000 prisoners, and the next day released 8,000. This unique decision, by no means a onetime affair, as the young monarch supported the establishment of

a truth commission, earned him rave and immediate political support. It illustrated a new orientation, and while most observers anticipated that the monarch would follow his father's foreign policy preferences, Muhammad VI hinted that he planned to accelerate the liberalization of Moroccan society. In fact, the 7 January 2004 Equity and Reconciliation Commission, in perhaps the single most important decision of his reign to that date, was mandated to investigate "forced disappearances and arbitrary detentions carried out between 1956 and 1999, to prepare a report containing specific as well as general information concerning these violations, and to recommend forms of compensation and reparation for the victims, including measures of rehabilitation and social, medical, and psychological assistance."<sup>29</sup> Irrespective of its eventual disposition, as many doubted its efficacy, the mere fact that such a commission was established, and carried out serious investigations into at least 20,000 cases, spoke volumes. The decision to push ahead with vigor was a clean break with policies practiced by Hassan II. It also highlighted how confident Muhammad VI was in his abilities to tackle major political and economic concerns.

### **Assessment of Most Recent Succession**

Because he was the designated heir, and because the 1996 Moroccan constitution specifically addressed succession passing to Hassan II's eldest son, Muhammad VI was destined to rule. His accession was also orderly because of an entente between the late monarch's offspring. In fact, Muhammad and Rashid maintained relatively smooth ties solidly supported by their three sisters. Rashid was named heir apparent until Moulay Hassan bin Muhammad was born in 2003, although the monarch's brother is second in line and the most likely regent should it become necessary.

Most Moroccans were pleased that the succession mechanism operated well, and while few knew or imagined the living standard of the ruling family, most were shocked to learn of its extravagance. In January 2005, and for the first time in any Arab monarchy, a French-language Moroccan weekly published a cover story discussing royal finances.<sup>30</sup> The investigation revealed that King Muhammad VI ran up a daily bill that surpassed US\$1 million, whereas an estimated 6 million Moroccans—a fifth of the population—survived on less than US\$5 per day. It was documented that the palace disbursed US\$8.8 million a month on staff wages, US\$180,000 on car repairs, and almost US\$100,000 on animal feed, according to a breakdown of the budget. Additional details of the lavish outlays illustrated that the monarchy cost Moroccan taxpayers US\$353 million a year, significantly more than the British ruling family, for example.<sup>31</sup>

*Tel Quel*, which compiled the figures cited in its lengthy report from official records, broke a national taboo in publishing them. The Moroccan

monarch benefited more from his taxpayers than any other royal family or head of state in Europe, as significant sums were allocated to various needs: over US\$1 million for electricity and water, US\$900,000 for telephones, and US\$800,000 for fuel for the many automobiles in the car park—each year. The monthly palace clothing bill was estimated at US\$200,000, while stationery alone topped US\$110,000.

Although Arab Gulf rulers were probably worth much more, the Moroccan ruling family's private wealth was estimated at US\$4–5 billion by the US financial magazine *Forbes*, as cited in *Tel Quel*. When these revelations were published, an embarrassed Moulay Hisham, a cousin of the monarch, called for an overhaul of the ruling system. "Reforming the monarchy is the only way to ensure it endures" over the long haul. "The monarchy has to either dissociate itself from the old caliphal system or evolve from it," said the prince from exile in the United States, positing with antimonarchists that the institution was not "sacred." For the prince, "democracy and sacredness are not compatible. That's the whole problem with the Moroccan political system and a question which affects us all."<sup>32</sup>

With these financial details in print, it was difficult for Muhammad VI to maintain that he was the "King of the Poor," after his earlier promises to reform the economy. While a monthly "salary" of approximately US\$47,000 was not particularly excessive by international business standards, Moroccans considered the total sum paid monthly to other members of the family—approximately US\$200,000—as profligate. It was yet another sign of the growing gap between the ruling establishment and a majority of Moroccans who were financially strapped.

### Succession Dilemma for the 'Alawis

Muhammad VI officially married on 12 October 2001, although a secret matrimonial ceremony may have been performed on 22 July 1999, the eve of Hassan II's death, since Moroccan law did not allow an unmarried monarch. Princess Lalla, born Salamah Bennani, was a twenty-four-year-old computer engineer in 2002. An heir, Moulay Hassan bin Muhammad, was born on 8 May 2003.

With this birth, the succession dilemma diminished, although Prince Moulay Rashid, a lawyer by training, a colonel in the Royal Navy in 1994, and a brigadier-general since 2000, is still a contender should a calamity befall the ruler. In addition to Rashid, the late King Hassan II had three influential daughters, Lalla Mariam—who is married to Fuad bin 'Abdul Latif Filali, a son of former prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and cooperation 'Abdul Latif Filali—Lalla Asmah, and Lalla Hasnah. Hassan II's five children have six offspring of their own, though a designated heir is now duly recognized. Moulay Idris and Lalla Sukhaynah Filali to Maryam, Moulay Yazid and

Lalla Nuhaïlah Bushantuf to Asmah, and Lalla ‘Umaymah and Lalla ‘Ulayyah Binharbit to Hasnah. In any future allocation of power within the ruling family, these principal members must be accommodated, if for no other reason than to maintain family unity.

In addition to these individuals, there are other members who may wish to express particular views or attempt to influence policy, including family affairs. Among the more prominent are the offspring of the late King Muhammad V, led by the powerful Lalla Ayshah, the honorary president of the Union Nationale des Femmes Marocaines and former ambassador to Italy and Greece (1969–1973) as well as the United Kingdom (1965–1969); the other offspring are Lalla Fatimah Zuhrah; Lalla Malikah, president of the Morocco Red Crescent; Moulay ‘Abdallah; Lalla Nuzhah; and Lalla Aminah. While these princes and princesses, as well as several of their children, are critical to any family alliances, how some of them buttressed the offspring of the late Hassan II is of greater value. Little is known of their relationships, but in a largely traditional society where family values are prized above all else, coalitions between uncles/aunts and nephews/nieces cannot be ignored. In fact, alignments with other members of the ruling ‘Alawi clan will likely be further enlarged to incorporate the offspring of—and perhaps the brothers and sisters of—Sultan Muhammad bin ‘Arafah and Sultan Yusuf, even if they are not considered as legitimate successors. It is critical to consider the extended members of the family who may influence policies, directly or indirectly, in any future succession in Rabat.

### ■ **Next-Generation Leaders: Contenders to Power in Morocco**

Because independence did not usher in internal stability, Morocco struggled with the establishment of a constitutional monarchy, which could have dramatically altered the kingdom’s body politic. The late King Muhammad V as well as his successor, King Hassan II, both opted to rule with unlimited powers. Firm control over the government, the bureaucracy, and the military essentially meant that Rabat would rely on a coterie of men and women to implement edicts issued by the ruler. In fact, despite the existence of a written constitution, the last two rulers before Muhammad VI were hesitant to share power. Both assumed the burdens of various offices, including prime minister and minister of defense. These decisions were not reached because Morocco lacked the men and women to competently fulfill whatever missions were entrusted them, but because the monarchs feared for their own security. Neither fully trusted anyone outside a very small coterie of supporters, often kept on an attractive power leash. Indeed, Hassan II was even harsher than his father, perhaps because he endured several attempted military coups and numerous

assassination attempts. Whether internal security was his only concern or not, Hassan II proved a master political juggler, quickly focusing on peripheral issues like Morocco's annexation of the former Spanish Sahara, and the war against the Polisario guerrillas that grew out of his obstinacy. Still, Hassan II looked after 'Alawi interests well, survived many challenges, and reigned over a relatively contented family for thirty-eight years before he died in 1999. His greatest contribution to 'Alawi family affairs was the systematic elimination of most political opponents, which contradicted his claim that Morocco was a beacon of peace and that he encouraged tolerance in social, religious, and cultural areas. To be sure, Morocco stood out in North Africa for being far more tolerant than its neighbors, but that was little consolation to those who suffered or paid the ultimate price of contradicting the "Commander of the Faithful." It was for this reason, as discussed above, that a great deal of hope was placed by many Moroccans on putative liberalization proposals attributed to Hassan II's young son and successor, Muhammad VI. But family politics proved intractable, with repeated attention to classic cronyism. 'Alawi affairs were still the ultimate priority as Muhammad VI learned how to best divide and rule. He was most ably supported in this task by immediate family members, including his wife, brother, and sisters.

### **Lalla Salamah**

Lalla Salamah, born Salamah Bennani, married Muhammad VI on 12 October 2001 in Rabat. The princess was born in 1978 in the eastern city of Fez, the daughter of Hajj 'Abdul Hamid and Naimah Bennani. Her father was a teacher in Fez and imparted the love of learning to the young woman.

She was educated at several public schools, including the Lycée Hassan II, Lycée Moulay Youssef, and L'École Nationale Supérieure d'Informatique et d'Analyse de Systèmes in Rabat. Between 1999 and 2002, before her marriage to Muhammad VI was finalized, she worked with Omnium Nord Africain, a major conglomerate corporation involved in agro business, mineral extractions, distribution of goods and equipment, and various financial activities. Lalla Salamah gave birth to Heir Apparent Moulay Hassan in Rabat on 8 May 2003. The Royal Palace announced in early November 2006 that the heir would have a sibling, and Princess Lalla Khadijah was born in Rabat on 28 February 2007. Naturally, Lalla Salamah has been her husband's most loyal supporter, and has forged a nascent nexus of power within the renewed 'Alawi family.

### **Moulay Hassan**

Prince Hassan was born on 8 May 2003 and was immediately designated heir apparent. Although he is years from power, it is widely expected that Moulay

Hassan bin Muhammad will rule Morocco, most probably under the Hassan III moniker.

### **Moulay Rashid**

The monarch's younger brother, Moulay Rashid, was born in Rabat on 20 June 1970 to King Hassan II and Lalla Latifah. He was educated at the Royal College and the Université Mohammed V in Rabat, from which he earned a diploma in general studies in 1991 as well as a diploma in comparative law in 1993, respectively. He then attended the famed Académie de Bordeaux in France, where he received a law degree in 1996. Interestingly, Moulay Rashid opted to pursue a military career, and was commissioned a colonel-major in the Royal Moroccan Navy in 1994. In 2000, he was promoted to the rank of major-general.

When their father passed away, King Muhammad VI appointed his brother Rashid his heir apparent, on 23 July 1999. Rashid held this position until 8 May 2003, when his nephew Moulay Hassan replaced him. Naturally, because Moulay Hassan was young, Rashid continued to be the vital link of the 'Alawi family, as a regent whenever needed (and a ruler should it become necessary). A loyal supporter of his brother and monarch, Rashid was far more interested in his naval career than pure politics, a rare quality among Arab royalty. In addition to his military duties, Rashid presided over the Moroccan National Scouting Federation (after 1997), the Royal Moroccan Golf Association, the Moroccan Hunting and Shooting Federation, the Marrakesh International Film Festival Foundation, and the United Nations Children's Commission. He was also the honorary president of the Royal Moroccan Yachting Federation, the Royal Moroccan Skiing and Mountaineering Federation, the Moroccan Environmental Protection Association, the Moroccan–Far East Association, the Spanish Social Service Association, the Maghreb Association for Research and the Fight Against AIDS, and the Moroccan Association of Law Students in France.

### **Lalla Maryam**

The oldest daughter of the late King Hassan II and Lalla Latifah, Maryam was born in Rome, Italy, on 26 August 1962. She was educated at the Royal College and the Université Mohammed V in Rabat. A vital personality, Lalla Maryam is a staunch supporter of her brother, and stood in for his consort before the monarch married in 2002.

Among her many titles, Lalla Maryam is president of the Royal Armed Forces Social Services and Social Work Associations, the Moroccan Women's Association for the Support of the United Nations Children's Fund, the Na-

tional Observatory for the Rights of Children, the Hassan II Foundation for Moroccans Resident Overseas, and the National Union of Moroccan Women. She has also served as a goodwill ambassador for the United Nations Scientific, Educational, and Cultural Organization. She married Fuad Filali, president of Omnium Nord-Africain and son of former prime minister and minister for foreign affairs 'Abdul Latif Filali, but later divorced. They have one son, Idris Filali, and one daughter, Lalla Suukhaynah Filali.

### **Lalla Asmah**

Lalla Asmah was born in Rabat on 29 September 1965 to King Hassan II and Lalla Latifah. Like her brothers and sisters, she was educated at the Royal College, after which she became president of her own Lalla Asmah Foundation as well as the Society for the Protection of Animals and Nature. She is married to Khalid Bushantuf (son of Hajj Balyut Bushantuf), who is administrator and director-general of the Société d'Exploitation de la Verrerie au Maroc. They have a son, Moulay Yazid Bushantuf, and a daughter, Lalla Nuhaylah Bushantuf.

### **Lalla Hasnah**

Lalla Hasnah was born in Rabat on 19 November 1967 to King Hassan II and Lalla Latifah. She was educated at the Royal College, and became honorary president of the National League of Female Civil and Semi-Civil Servants, the Moroccan Association for the Aid of Sick Children, the Moroccan SOS Children's Village, the Al-Ihsane Association, and the Moroccan Anti Pyopathy Association, as well as president of the Muhammad VI Foundation for Environmental Protection and the Moroccan Archaeology and Patronomy Association.

Lalla Hasnah is married to Khalid Binharbit, a physician. They have two daughters, Lalla 'Umaymah Binharbit and Lalla 'Ulayyah Binharbit.

### **Potential Alliances Among the 'Alawis**

Muhammad VI is the new face of power in Morocco and is supported in his quest by immediate family members who are beholden to the monarch for their welfare. Since assuming the throne in 1999, Muhammad VI has pursued his self-appointed mission with diligence, if for no other reason than to convince Moroccans that his late father's iron-fisted policies are a thing of the past. In fact, the ruler aims to persuade one and all of his intent to lead Morocco to true democracy. Toward that end, in 2001 he recognized the Berber language, native to perhaps a third of Moroccans, and in 2003 he passed a new family law "hailed as the most pro-women law in the Arab world."<sup>33</sup> Indeed, early on,

Muhammad VI promised something akin to a mild revolution, and by all accounts he has delivered.<sup>34</sup>

Although Morocco may well have eliminated traditional taboos, including through its reinvigorated free press, which now broaches difficult issues, many of these activities are primarily meant to strengthen the ruling family. The “jewel in the new king’s effort has been the Equity and Reconciliation Commission,” which delved into human rights abuses “committed against activists from Western Sahara, assorted leftist parties and Berber groups, among others.”<sup>35</sup> Tangible gains have been recorded, but the march toward democracy has stumbled because Rabat prefers to deal with what is *masmuh* (allowed). In other words, Muhammad VI has envisaged a kind of democratization process to be delivered by royal decree. Under normal circumstances, the country’s political evolution would have necessitated amending the constitution, perhaps eventually stripping the monarchy of its sweeping powers, but neither Muhammad VI nor any other member of the ruling establishment was ready and willing for such an eventuality.<sup>36</sup> Against a plethora of criticisms, Rabat seized on the anti-Islamist feelings that emerged after the 2003 Casablanca bombings, to push a set of draconian antiterrorism bills. Before long, a few thousand suspects had been arrested, which quickly changed the subject. Even Nadia Yassin, the daughter of Shaykh ‘Abdul Salam Yassin—the leader of the banned Charity and Justice Party—rejected the creation of a *fatwah* committee, because she correctly argued that terrorism was a political challenge not a religious burden. She called on her fellow Moroccans to assume their responsibilities, while others called on the government to tackle serious socioeconomic grievances rather than latch on to gimmicks that hid its true intentions. Remarkably, and despite serious setbacks, many still anticipate that Muhammad VI will strengthen the existing bond between ordinary citizens and the ‘Alawis rather than continuing to manipulate public opinion to address internal disputes.

## ■ Notes

1. For an examination of internal Moroccan affairs under colonial rule, see C. R. Pennell, *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*, Oxford: OneWorld, 2003, pp. 138–162.

2. Article 1 of the Moroccan constitution defined the country as a “constitutional, democratic, and social Monarchy.” Articles 19–35 outlined the monarch’s privileges. Article 23, in particular, asserted the sacred character of the monarchy [“The King’s person is inviolable and Sacred”]. See *The Constitution of Morocco* (1992), <http://www.oefre.unibe.ch/law/icl/mo00t.html>.

3. Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 161.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 164.



5. Rémy Leveau, "Maroc: Les Trois Âges de la Monarchie Moderne," in Rémy Leveau and Abdellah Hammoudi, *Monarchies Arabes: Transitions et Dérives Dynamiques*, Paris: La Documentation Française, 2002, pp. 197–203, esp. p. 198.

6. Mohamed Tozy, "Le Prince, le Clerc et l'État: La Restructuration du Champ Religieux au Maroc," in Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard, eds., *Intellectuels et Militants de l'Islam Contemporain*, Paris: Seuil, 1990, pp. 72–87.

7. M. Aziz Enhaili, "Pluralisme et Islamisme: Le Cas du Maroc," in Marie-Hélène Parizeau and Souheil Kash, eds., *Pluralism, Modernity, and the Arab World*, Quebec: PUL-Bruylant-Delta, 2001, pp. 159–178.

8. Abdellatif Moutadayene, "Economic Crises and Democratization in Morocco," *Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 70–82.

9. On Ben Barka's disappearance, see Frédéric Ploquin and Jacques Derogy, *Ils Ont Tué Ben Barka*, Paris: Fayard, 1999. See also Bernard Violet, *L'Affaire Ben Barka*, Paris: Le Seuil, 1995; and Zakya Daoud and Monjib Maâti, *Ben Barka: Une Vie, une Mort*, Paris: Michalon, 2000. The Ben Barka dossier is still open after all these years. Conflicting reports impugn Oufkir, although the latter's execution on 16 August 1972 led to further speculation. Highly emotional, this sad chapter in contemporary Moroccan history still awaits independent analysis. For a unique family perspective written by the late general's son, see Raouf Oufkir, *Les Invités: Vingt Ans dans les Prisons du Roi*, Paris: Flammarion, 2003.

10. Ali-Auguste Bourequat, *In the Moroccan King's Secret Garden*, London: Morris, 1988.

11. Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 169.

12. Oufkir, *Les Invités*, pp. 205–241. See also Malika Oufkir and Michèle Fitoussi, *La Prisonnière*, Paris: Bernard Grasset, 1999.

13. Pennell, *Morocco*, pp. 170–171.

14. Julien Lariège, "Elections Municipales: Les Enseignements d'un Scrutin," *Les Cahiers de l'Orient* no. 74, Spring 2004, pp. 61–72.

15. "Opposition Narrowly Wins Power in Morocco," *BBC News*, 15 November 1997, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/31322.stm>.

16. Pennell, *Morocco*, p. 167.

17. Abdellah Hammoudi, "Éléments d'Anthropologie des Monarchies à Partir de l'Exemple Marocain," in Leveau and Hammoudi, *Monarchies Arabes*, pp. 45–57.

18. "The Morocco of Muhammad VI," *The Estimate* 11, no. 16, 30 July 1999, p. 1.

19. Morocco experienced mass demonstrations and street violence in January 1984—developing out of earlier protests over school and university fee increases—in connection to official proposals to raise the price of basic commodities, including food. Proposals for further increases in prices followed the recommendations of the International Monetary Fund to stabilize the economy, involving, among other measures, the withdrawal of subsidies on basic goods. As social unrest spread through the towns of the barren and relatively impoverished north of the country, and broke out even in some of the larger cities of the Moroccan "heartlands," it was countered by heavy concentrations of state security forces; press reports suggested that at least 100 were killed and many more injured or arrested. The official explanations for the troubles emphasized the role of "agitators" of various kinds; nevertheless, Hassan II recognized the root cause of the dis-

turbances and appeared on television in the evening of January 22 to announce that there would be no further increases in the price of basic goods. See David Seddon, "Riot and Rebellion: Political Responses to Economic Crisis in North Africa, Tunisia, Morocco and Sudan," October 1986, <http://www.eco.utexas.edu/faculty/cleaver/357lseddon.pdf>.

20. Séverine Labat, "La Monarchie Marocaine à la Croisée des Chemins," *Les Cahiers de l'Orient* no. 74, Spring 2004, p. 7.

21. "Socialists Set to Win Morocco Poll," *BBC News*, 30 September 2002. See also *PoliticsNationwide.com*, "Encyclopedia of the Nation—Africa: Morocco—Political Parties," <http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/africa/morocco-political-parties.html>.

22. See the various articles published as a special issue devoted to Morocco in "Le Maroc: La Monarchie à l'Épreuve de la Succession," *Les Cahiers de l'Orient* no. 74, Spring 2004, pp. 3–159.

23. For the most recent discussion on these allegations, see Human Rights Watch, "Morocco," in *Human Rights World Report 2005*, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/morocc12228.htm>. See also Amnesty International, "Visit of Amnesty International's Secretary General to Morocco: Time to Act," 29 June 1998, <http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde290061998>.

24. For a superb discussion of this period, see Abdallah Laroui, *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretative Essay*, translated by Ralph Mannheim, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.

25. Moroccan princes always carry the title *moulay*, or "master," with the sole exception of those named Muhammad. Since the only "Master Muhammad" is the Prophet, princes named Muhammad are addressed as *sidi*, or "my lord." Princesses are given the title *lalla*.

26. For an authoritative discussion of this issue, see United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development, *Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*, New York: UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2002.

27. "The Morocco of Muhammad VI," *The Estimate* 11, no. 16, 30 July 1999, <http://www.theestimate.com/public/073099.html>.

28. For a brief sketch on human rights issues, see "Country Summary: Morocco," *Human Rights Watch*, January 2006, [http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/morocc12228\\_txt.htm](http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/01/18/morocc12228_txt.htm).

29. "Morocco's Truth Commission: Honoring Past Victims During an Uncertain Present," *Human Rights Watch* 17, no. 11, November 2005, <http://hrw.org/reports/2005/morocco1105>.

30. Khalid Tritki, "Enquête: Le Salaire du Roi," *Tel Quel* nos. 156–157, 7 January 2005, [http://www.telquel-online.com/156/couverture\\_156\\_1.shtml](http://www.telquel-online.com/156/couverture_156_1.shtml).

31. By way of comparison, Queen Elizabeth's annual budget is frozen at US\$15 million per year until 2010, while Spain's royal family spends US\$10 million. The Belgian monarchy is a little less expensive, since total expenditures are less than US\$10 million per year, although European royals dispose additional sums from accumulated wealth in private holdings. See Kim Willsher, "Moroccans Pay £144m a Year for Monarch," *Daily Telegraph*, 23 January 2005, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2005/01/23/wmoroc23.xml>.

32. Willsher, "Moroccans Pay."

33. Charles Levinson, "Letter from Rabat," *Middle East International* no. 758, 16 September 2005, p. 32.

34. Roula Khalaf, "Morocco's New King Turns the Page on a Dark Past," *Financial Times*, 11 November 1999, p. 16.

35. Levinson, "Letter from Rabat."

36. Aboubakr Jamal, "Morocco Still Shoots the Messenger," *Daily Star*, 6 January 2005, p. 7.



## Arab Monarchies in the Twenty-First Century

**A**ny discussion of succession in the conservative Arab monarchies must recognize that the rulers are well established within their respective societies, with tested checks and balances in place, along with an undeniable degree of legitimacy—limited opposition notwithstanding. Moreover, as the discussion throughout this volume amply demonstrates, “monarchical rule” is—and has been—closely associated with internal as well as external political developments for several decades. Finally, whatever political stability exists, and as unsatisfactory as that may have been at times, ensures current elites’ hold on power. Consequently, no long-term trends on the succession issue can be identified without a solid understanding of what political stability and power mean in the context of monarchical affairs, how they are managed, and how they may be expected to evolve in the future. Short of major cataclysmic developments, therefore, normal succession in each of the conservative Arab monarchies depends on the social, economic, and political stability of these countries. Yet, and except for Saudi Arabia, an independent country for close to seventy-five years, Arab monarchies are relatively young sovereign actors in the international political arena. Jordan declared its independence in 1946, Morocco gained sovereignty in 1956, followed by Kuwait in 1961, and Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in the early 1970s. Although Oman’s dominion was exercised for several centuries, the sultanate did not enjoy autonomy before 1970, when Sultan Qaboos acceded to the throne and literally opened his country to the outside world. Therefore, these countries’ overall youth means that unpredictable changes could alter political life, if rulers were to shun genuine calls for reform or become displaced through violence.

Over the past two decades, several Arab rulers have attempted to enlarge popular participation in their political systems, recognizing that internal stability strengthens regional security. Indeed, the absence of effective political participation presents a catalyst for potential upheavals and instability, and the demise of the Shah of Iran in 1979 reminded Arab Gulf rulers that no regime, no

matter how strong, can remain in power if a population rejected its monarch's legitimacy. The Iranian Revolution clearly illustrated to Arab monarchs how a new regime could come to power in an Islamic state where political disenchantment was rampant.

While the impact of the Iranian Revolution cannot be overemphasized, an examination of Arab monarchies' political systems indicates that authority and legitimacy are institutionalized quite differently than in Iran. In the Arab Gulf states, as in Jordan and Morocco, ruling families consolidated power and authority over their subjects, through historical tribal allegiances. Moreover, in the Gulf region, economic and social changes experienced since the discovery of petroleum, and the rapid pace of modernization that followed, have accelerated the demand for political participation, and the "pivotal question is whether change in Arab Gulf societies will be gradual and peaceful, or if it will produce instability and violence."<sup>1</sup> To date, the changes that have occurred in seven of the eight countries analyzed in this volume have been relatively peaceful. In Jordan, however, many changes that have been introduced are factors of the ongoing Arab-Israeli conflict, and the negative repercussions of the latter on subjects and rulers alike. In fact, that conflict and the resultant Palestine question have defined part of the social contracts between rulers and their citizens. Even in Morocco, located at a distance from the core arena, what befell Palestinians colored many policies pursued by Hassan II. The sharifian monarch went to great length to identify with the central principles that drove Arab politics, mediating between Arabs and Israelis whenever possible, and aligning Rabat to positions of the League of Arab States when necessary. In short, Arab monarchs adopted appealing policies, entertained reforms, and tolerated limited dissent, to buttress regime stability.

Yet because political stability required that a system or subsystem in the international arena maintain equilibrium among its members, Arab monarchies searched for stability through various alliances. Although the Gulf monarchies were united within the Gulf Cooperation Council, each member country, along with Jordan and Morocco, squarely aligned itself with key Western powers. Council states further cooperated with each other and, at different times, extended a welcome mat to Amman and Rabat. Naturally, there were exceptions to this point, especially after Jordan was shunned in the aftermath of its pro-Iraqi policies following the 1990 invasion and occupation of Kuwait, but overall it may be accurate to state that Arab rulers placed significant emphasis on monarchical interests. An isolated Jordan was eventually rehabilitated and reintegrated in the narrow circle that divided regimes along alliance lines. Without any exception, Arab monarchies were nationalist, with very strong pro-Western preferences. Such partiality was necessary because Arab monarchies were at the center of international and regional conflicts that threatened rulers and subjects alike. Therefore, how these conservative regimes absorbed and processed political reforms, while continuing to func-

tion normally by stressing their religious and ideological values, remained the key “stability” and “succession” questions. Indeed, the absence of mass political participation—periodic elections notwithstanding—meant that stability in these countries required rulers to meet certain popular prerequisites. Among these were meeting the political and socioeconomic needs of their populations, both indigenous and expatriate, safeguarding their citizens from external and internal sources of threat, as well as supporting basic freedoms for all. Yet legitimacy largely rested on norms adopted in different times, when few rulers entertained dissent. Most secured authority through coercion in relatively isolated environments. In the post-oil boom era, when all six Arab Gulf states were endowed with small intelligentsias and when education levels were rapidly rising, political coercion was no longer effective. Neither was coercion an effective tool in Jordan—especially after 1970 and the bloody Black September clashes—or in Morocco. Ordinary Moroccans voted with their feet by emigrating en masse to western Europe, where Rabat’s shortcomings received widespread coverage. Starting in early 1991, after the liberation of Kuwait, political stability brought to the forefront the need for genuine political reforms. Therefore, rulers were faced with new challenges calling for further tolerance of peaceful internal dissension to strengthen their legitimacy, source of authority, and ultimately, harmonious succession.

## ■ An Assessment of Monarchical Succession

There are no unified rules of primogeniture in Arab monarchies, which in essence is the root cause for most succession crises. At one point or another, in every Arab monarchy, immediate family members who have sought power have fiercely contested the position of ruler. Consequently, every ruler has had to placate other family members for fear that any one of them would challenge him for full authority. For this reason, every ruler has been obligated to govern with a modicum of justice, because, more often than not, unjust rule is a good reason to challenge the incumbent. Still, just rule is only one of the two key requirements for authority, the other being rule by consensus. To placate challengers, rulers perfected Muslim society’s consensus features by creating consultative councils. Rulers who sought, attained, and implemented decisions reached by tribal or family consensus were ensured political stability. In essence, they introduced *baduqratiyyah*, a form of badu representation that was far more democratic than many assumed, and that stood out from many Arab regimes that exercised authority with near dictatorial paternalisms. In the Arab monarchies, those who opted to bypass established criteria were opposed, usually by fellow ruling family members, not because they thirsted for power, but to maintain internal harmony. It is thus critical to distinguish between the power of a monarch—often paternal in nature and requiring full obedience—and consensus. The ruler

remained supreme and often guided debates. He extended the courtesy of “listening” to the majority before reaching a decision. He also expected his followers to stand with him after various points were aired. Once cloture was reached on a salient point, his decision transformed itself into the consensus decision, and it was the astute ruler who knew how to manage various views concurrently. Moreover, the shrewd ruler was careful not to shun those with varying views, and opted instead to extend his protection in times of need. It was the type of magnanimity that was altruistic.

### **Power and Religion in Contemporary Arab Monarchies**

As discussed throughout this volume, and while rulership principles appear to have been applied without religious legitimacy—because “the title *malik* (king) [is] regarded as non-Islamic and therefore unlawful and corrupt”—it does not follow that the fourteen ruling families in the eight remaining Arab monarchies today lack in legitimacy.<sup>2</sup> The Muslim world struggled with various forms of authority and, in those instances when monarchic rule prevailed, absolutist or dynastic systems flourished. Yet even authoritarian rulers, especially in the Ottoman Empire, abided by *shari‘ah* law, because doing otherwise was too much of a strain on internal stability. In those instances when strong leaders opted for iron-fisted policies to gain power, remain in office, and ensure succession to their progeny, administrative and military costs skyrocketed and, more often than not, brought them on the brink of bankruptcy. Inevitably, clashes with organized opposition forces resulted in dramatic changes and, at least on the Arabian Peninsula, rulers fell back on kith and kin to buttress tribal solidarity (*‘asabiyyah*) and introduced forms of hierarchical or dynastic succession. Over the centuries, hereditary preferences, along with “court” trappings, led to the formation of family dynasties. Moreover, and despite the absence of official religious sanctions, Moroccan, Jordanian, Omani, and Saudi rulers sought and received religious imprimaturs from indigenous clergy. ‘Alawi and Hashimite rulers in Rabat and Amman claimed descentance directly from the Prophet; Omanis hailed from an active Khariji movement that supported highly tolerant ‘Ibadhi traditions; and Sa‘udis forged their legitimacy through a binding alliance between the Al Sa‘ud and the Al Shaykh that guaranteed the application of strong Hanbali interpretations in Riyadh.

Muslim monarchies may well have suffered a “legitimacy deficit,” but only when viewed through the Ottoman prism. As the Porte strengthened its power base, especially after urbanization necessitated the development of sophisticated administrative institutions, absolutist control was a foregone conclusion. With autarchic hegemony, Ottoman rulers invested and deployed more or less efficient military units to serve crown and empire, in that order. Yet outside Ottoman dominion, in what were pejoratively known as deserts or nomadic regions, tribes and tribal confederations flourished. More pristine in



practice and outlook, local shaykhs provided a modicum of law and order, certainly harsh but egalitarian and more transparent than their urban counterparts. Whether by necessity or enlightenment, Arabian Peninsula rulers relied on *shari'ah* and, more often than not, on the counsel of religious leaders (*'ulamah*) as well as experienced family elders. In fact, for one observer, rulership gained legitimacy when embedded within *shari'ah*.<sup>3</sup> In those circumstances, a purely Arab legacy emerged, in sharp contrast to Ottoman alternatives.

Ottoman successes were, to be sure, the result of militarization that relied on slave-soldiers and soldier-bureaucrats. The Porte relied on such trusted underlings to create a beholden elite that owed its very existence—as well as material privileges—to its full and total subordination to clairvoyant masters. Mimicking Western powers, Ottoman officials engaged in a full-fledged arms race that ostensibly “modernized” the empire, and bureaucratization and militarization allowed the Ottoman Empire to rule with impunity for several hundred years.<sup>4</sup> Elsewhere, but especially on the Arabian Peninsula, Ibn Khaldun’s group solidarity provided a more enduring model for power. For the Tunisian jurist and scholar, the ideal source of power hinged on family, clan, or tribe.<sup>5</sup> Arab tribal leaders, of course, followed Ibn Khaldun’s methodology. Before the twentieth century, few transformed their kin-based *'asabiyyah* into bureaucratic norms. Under the circumstances, they may well have failed to graduate into modernization but, remarkably, neither relative isolation nor their desolate socioeconomic conditions denied them legitimacy. Largely relying on faith—even blind faith—and against some odds, most prevailed.

Along the way, and unlike the tactics of successive Ottoman rulers, social control of the tribe was sustained by both religious as well as tribal values. Survival within harsh environments subjugated negotiations to open debates among tribal leaders. Deal-making, even with shadowy figures, was far more egalitarian than in urban settings where powerful groups sought and received largess.<sup>6</sup> This is not to say that favoritism or shadowy behavior did not exist on the Arabian Peninsula, but rather that indigenous conditions required tribal shaykhs to govern with care and transparency, both to survive and, equally important, to uphold local traditions. Therefore, while shaykhs relied on brute force to secure rulership, many quickly legitimized their authority by shrouding their claims to power in *shari'ah*. Their primary source of strength was family members, whose material needs were secured with relative impartiality, given the scarcity of resources. In those instances when transparency and impartiality waned, uprisings against unjust rulers were common, often with devastating consequences for all concerned. It was precisely to avoid such outcomes that certain tribal rulers adopted flexible approaches, often with positive results, that guaranteed clan survival even if a particular family lost power in the process.<sup>7</sup> Moreover, and especially in the second half of the twentieth century, when oil revenues allowed rulers to splurge on themselves and their subjects, Gulf monarchs were burdened with the added requirement of

performance. Although tribal members tolerated limited paternalism when resources were scarce, most demanded that sovereigns discharge their duties far better, especially after the oil boom filled heretofore empty coffers. Whatever laws and regulations were proposed would be acceptable as long as those ushering changes could justify their actions to advance the general welfare. Not only were monarchs expected to rule by chastising, regulating, and restraining themselves from alienating key factions, but they were also expected to distribute wealth.<sup>8</sup> In other words, Arabian Peninsula rulers were expected to continue their age-tested paternalism, solidify tribal diversity, *and* earn legitimacy. As discussed in this volume, and except for 'Alawi and Hashimite sovereigns, Arab ruling families did not claim divine permission to lead, although all combined tribal legitimacy with performance. In fact, theirs was a highly practical form of legitimacy, for it balanced words with deeds.

The preference for more authentic renditions may partially explain the longevity of key Arab—especially Gulf—monarchies. Indeed, if several Muslim monarchies disappeared in the twentieth century (Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Iran in particular), it was partially due to their leaders' desire to emulate newly introduced Western models rather than evolve along more indigenous paradigms. From Cairo to Baghdad, ruling dynasties competed with the rising merchant classes, ignored an increasingly educated population, and aligned themselves with colonial masters who persuaded them to alter basic socioeconomic patterns. Not surprisingly, few survived these tectonic changes, whereas the relatively poorer and isolated Arabian dynasties cringed on rapid development and questionable policies with friend and foe alike. Even after the oil boom of the 1970s, especially in the case of the Lower Gulf dynasties, economic development was introduced on a highly graduated scale, as family alliances were renegotiated from relatively stronger positions. To be sure, British and US decisionmakers were amply aware of the Arabian Peninsula's potential energy resources, and while London and Washington encouraged rapid modernization, few Gulf leaders jumped on this bandwagon. Wealth earned Gulf dynasties extended courtesies that were denied most throughout the Muslim world, but nimble rulers, above all else understanding the need for internal checks and balances, deemed such rapid financial gains problematic. Most were determined to introduce change at a deliberately slow pace.

### **Constitutional Predicament in Arab Monarchies**

Arab monarchies further addressed the conundrum of their succession dilemmas through vast constitutional reforms. As discussed throughout this volume, in several countries, the ruling family embarked on substantial alterations, which presented positive and bright outlooks.

To be sure, politics and political reforms were key to life in the eight remaining Arab monarchies, and while emerging institutions gained value, every-

thing in these countries was personality driven. Ruling families dominated the scene, and important business leaders deferred to those who held authority. Who ruled was critical. Who succeeded was even more significant, even when strict constitutional requirements were met. Nevertheless, all surviving ruling families were aware of intrinsic values embedded within their constitutions, especially for increasingly educated masses who accepted royalty but preferred them to be nestled within clearly defined parameters. In other words, the challenge that confronted Arab rulers was an inevitable progression toward constitutional monarchies, and how comfortable next-generation leaders were with such an evolution. This was perhaps the most serious dilemma for future monarchs, caught between staunch traditions and modernizing influences. How they tackled this basic progression of their rules into constitutional monarchism probably determined their respective destinies as monarchs.

### ■ Succession Dilemmas for Current Rulers

Conservative Arab monarchies experienced significant social upheavals throughout the twentieth century and may again during the twenty-first. At least four main sources of instability—or stability, depending how the eight governments responded to internal upheavals and regional convulsions—can be identified as trends to understand and monitor. First, the level of disenchantment with a ruling family, and how the latter perceived its role within society. Second, the demands made by the intelligentsia, and how these differed from ruling family perceptions. Third, the pressures imposed by an increasingly professional military, and how each monarchy appraised its military. Fourth, and finally, the competition for power between religious extremists and monarchists, and how the rest of the citizenry understood this quest. Social upheavals were not intrinsic to monarchies in the Arab World. Rather, that the oil boom of the 1970s disrupted the nature of personal and family relationships, introduced consumerism, subordinated the Islamic principle of egalitarianism to more formal authority structures, and created an economic dependency on the government throughout the Arabian Peninsula and beyond.<sup>9</sup> Although discounted as a serious variable by those inclined to perceive monarchies as being intrinsically illegitimate, the oil boom phenomenon nevertheless, throughout the world, tore at the fabric of the most traditional societies, where values were measured and implemented by entirely different social yardsticks. Ironically, most citizens living in Arab Gulf monarchies—fewer in Jordan and Morocco—perceived the turbulent decade of the 1980s as a reprieve from the chaos of the 1970s. Many Saudis, for example, compared the 1970s to an age of ignorance (*jahiliyyah*), and the 1980s to a recovery from it. Kuwaitis and Bahrainis yearned for a return to the more traditional values one could find in religion, society, and family, even if the more evident signs of

modernization were readily espoused. Thus, seemingly contradictory forces in the UAE or Oman, as throughout the Arabian Peninsula, coexisted, and consequently the debate was over the level of comfort that these powerful forces—traditions and modernization—imposed on society. Moreover, and although the exploitation of oil produced undeniable economic benefits for a majority of the Arab Gulf populations—and through generous remittances at least in Jordan—a level of disorientation was also apparent, because these conservative societies were thrown into a very complex international arena of politics, economics, and finance without adequate preparation.<sup>10</sup> Given the speed with which “modernizing” factors were introduced, some of the social changes were clearly instigated by the government. Others were unforeseen. At least eight pivotal factors may be identified that redefined how ruling families exercised their powers:

1. A transformation of each monarchy’s economy, which altered relationships between heretofore dependent “clients” on the state. Gradually, professional institutions, often coached by outside forces, replaced paternalistic ties that shaped social ties.
2. The rapid creation of bureaucracies that allowed for the introduction of new functions, including among a nascent educated elite.
3. The introduction of provisions for extensive and mostly free social services, which resulted in a new form of dependence. This factor was particularly valid in oil-rich monarchies where ordinary citizens maintained high economic expectations, especially since many harbored views that oil wealth belonged to them and no one else.
4. The adoption of all-inclusive development programs whose primary purpose was to streamline the many needs to be implemented over a very short period of time. Although all eight Arab monarchies experienced significant growing pains as far as their developmental programs were concerned, all ruling families realized that their benefits outweighed the short-term chaos that such massive transformations produced.
5. An urgent emphasis on education to develop manpower needs, especially in demographically challenged Arab monarchies. With the exception of Morocco, none of the eight Arab monarchies enjoyed a surplus of twenty- to thirty-five-year-old males who could engage in unskilled employment. Saudi Arabia eventually gained a boom in this age category, but the search for more “dignified” skilled positions forced the state to welcome laborers from Southeast Asia. Still, all of the ruling families understood that this significant foreign presence among a largely unproductive work force was a double-edged sword that, in turn, propelled them to emphasize long-term education programs to fill existing voids.

6. The massive influx of millions of expatriate workers to fill domestic manpower shortfalls. Needless to say, these laborers introduced major changes, ranging from the adoption of effective labor laws (defending the rights of the underprivileged) to controls on the amount of spice consumed (because many hailed from regions of the world where such consumption tended to be much higher than in the Arab monarchies).
7. A dramatic shift toward urbanization that witnessed booming construction projects, which generated new and often problematic consequences. To meet housing shortages, for example, high-rise complexes were quickly built before most authorities realized that few locals found such accommodation acceptable. It was difficult for roaming badu tribes to adapt to sedentary lives.
8. Considerable defense needs for what were still very vulnerable countries, requiring important reapportionments of budgetary allocations. Lacking a technological edge, most Arab monarchies resorted to mercenary troops to bolster their defense requirements, which further added to the manpower problem identified above.<sup>11</sup>

The effects of these dramatic social changes on Arab monarchies over the past four decades have been quite apparent, in such areas as sedentarization of the badu as well as partial detribalization, development of national political cultures, the rise of more nuclear families, changing relations between sexes, cultural erosion because of exposure to alien values and norms, evolution of class structure and a greater social stratification, changing outlooks of younger generations whose expectations differ sharply from those espoused by their parents, and adoption of more aggressive policies at the regional level.<sup>12</sup> Inasmuch as these factors and their effects have changed Arab monarchical societies, future trends may thus be identified with respect to ruling families, the intelligentsia, competing religious groups, and the military.

### **Evolution of Internal Structures**

Although all schemes of social stratification in Arab monarchies blurred the lines between social, economic, and political elites and groups, the social status enjoyed by badu tribes, for example, was often accompanied by poverty and marginal political power. Similarly, the *'ulamah* enjoyed considerable political influence but little economic standing. Still, the ruling families remained at the top in their respective countries, because they were the only elites into which members were born. Because of their high social positions, ruling families experienced unprecedented enhancements of their clout, with little opposition on their rights to govern. Many members exploited their standing by allocating for themselves a portion of the state income, involving themselves—often illegally—in the country's vast commercial enterprises,

and used their spending powers to exercise direct influence on the state. Yet even within these groups of high-standing elites, there was bitterness. Younger, more educated princes were demanding greater participation in running internal and foreign affairs. Westernized elites in search of an effective voice were increasingly dissatisfied with the established consensus-reaching approaches designed and supported by their elders. Of course, it was quite possible that senior family members were tuned in to these subtle changes. They also knew that they could experience serious upheavals within their own ranks if they met most of these demands. If, on the other hand, monarchical regimes succeeded in satisfying the genuine needs of younger princes without jeopardizing the established cohesion at the senior levels, then chances were good that the disenchantment within ruling families could be limited.

Below the ruling families, members of the intelligentsia owed their status to a mixture of social, economic, and political criteria. They chiefly derived power from an ability to prevent the ruling families from raising certain issues that they perceived to be threatening to their status. Traditional senior *'ulamah*, princes, and shaykhs, whose diminishing influence was unacceptable because their presence was still crucial for legitimacy purposes, continued to drive each monarchy's social debates. The cluster of intelligentsia and merchant classes, or "modernizing" elites, formed vocal political groups as well, even if they typically did not come from truly elite social origins. They formed amorphous middle classes and largely resented radical views espoused by religious extremists as well as the slow progress that the monarchs were making in introducing sociopolitical reforms. Both groups wanted rulers to introduce political, social, and economic reforms, insisting all along that they were influencing each ruler's agenda. It was revealing, for example, that close to 500 conservative judges, professors, and religious scholars, in late April 1991, sent an open letter to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia "demanding" that he accelerate the implementation of often promised political changes.<sup>13</sup> Coming on the heels of the December 1990 petition to the king by a group of forty-three businessmen and more liberal professors, the coincidence was too evident.<sup>14</sup> Both groups called on Fahd to establish the promised consultative council, among other reforms. Similar petitions have been presented to most Arab monarchs during the past few decades, further illustrating the debate bubbling beneath the social surface throughout these societies.

Of course, since most of these efforts called on the monarchs to muzzle one group or another, ruling family leaders welcomed them as new tools that allowed for closer governance. Fine-tuning existing social balances necessitated shrewd management, which was certainly within their capabilities, and that certainly empowered monarchs to fill indispensable roles. In fact, these periodic convulsions allowed otherwise secularized monarchs to demonstrate to more doctrinaire religious leaders that they were not the sole "guardians" of the people.

If religious officials wished to embarrass governments by insisting that everyone submit to their perspectives, the monarchs were delighted to remind some that alternatives existed. One significant subgroup in this category, which was not easily manipulated, was the extremist religious component, which was already disgruntled with monarchs' overtures and demanded that rulers return to pristine Islamic values. It was indeed possible to goad senior religious authorities to manipulate some of the younger—more difficult—clerics, but the experiments, as a double-edged sword, sometimes backfired. In fact, there is some evidence that clashes between the *'ulamah* of younger and older generations, for example, and the latter's privileged ties with ruling family members, were no longer viewed with the same passive mood as in the past.<sup>15</sup> We also know of young Islamists who considered their elders a useless bunch of rascals needing to be thrown out of office.<sup>16</sup> How ruling families reconciled with this growing phenomenon inside religious establishments, and how they struggled to maintain pristine values while adapting to changing circumstances, were inclinations worth watching.

Finally, the other subcategory of changing social structures in all eight monarchies was the military. Increasingly larger and more professional institutions, Arab monarchies fielded militaries that were performance-oriented and placed institutional interests ahead of narrow political interests serving selected groups. Although "national guard" missions—essentially to protect ruling families—stood in stark contrast with the regular armed forces, few Arab monarchies could afford the distinctions. All militaries were, and increasingly would be, identified with the respective state. In time, the armed forces could indeed become elite groups to be reckoned with, even if ruling family members held them closely and would probably not let go so easily.

### **Directions of Future Change**

The capabilities of Arab monarchies to deal with many of these problems tended to break down along the conservative-liberal parameters. The record of the past suggests that ruling family members were obviously much better on the conservative dimensions than the liberal ones, but even here the chief error was to try and please everyone. Those who shied away from criticisms by portraying themselves as the champions of religious values, without fulfilling promised participatory reforms, tended to be mired in controversies and clashes. The monarchs who committed themselves to the proposition that reforms were beneficial, and who prepared the terrain for gradual change, tended to be perceived in a better light. In short, they were more successful, although several understood that political reforms permanently altered the present controls enjoyed over their respective states. It was primarily for this reason that many preferred a slow pace.

Yet it was entirely possible, even likely, that the liberalization process in Arab monarchies threatened to destabilize regimes in the short and medium terms. Still, whenever ruling families recognized that their legitimacies were jeopardized, they quickly adapted to preserve and protect themselves. If consultation were needed, discussions would be encouraged; if elected parliaments would preserve a country's basic tenets, then such institutions would be established to strengthen stability. If social issues, including workers', women's, and human rights questions, as well as other sensitive areas, arose—presumably taxing a particular ruling family's abilities to govern effectively a traditional society—then appropriate measures would be taken to address them as quickly as possible. If internal succession crises emerged, because particular offspring contemplated greater roles, then suitable resolutions were also adopted. Naturally, the major danger that such preferences crafted was the desire to accommodate every constituency, which could usher in violent disturbances. Moreover, whenever the ruling families embarked on the accommodation bandwagon, there were almost always strings attached. Each "monarch" would want to get something out of his newly found accommodating mood and would insist, for example, that senior members of the ruling family "promise" (with the binding features that such a promise entailed in traditional societies) that one of his sons would someday succeed. In fact, the succession question in Arab monarchies remained one of the most important topics, even if it was the least-discussed in public. There was a consensus within each ruling family that designated heirs would succeed a monarch, but several recent examples illustrated how quickly and easily the succession order would change. At a time when primogeniture was encouraged, no viable alternative candidates could emerge with ease to tip an existing scheme, without a strong consensus within the ruling family. Such outcomes were accelerated when outside forces, especially among the conservative religious groups, prodded some ruling family members into action, even though these reforms or changes were both dangerous and preventable.

Arab ruling families are far from static entities and during the past several decades have endured successive challenges to their authorities. As the record amply illustrates, however, succession issues are of concern chiefly for a restricted number of individuals. Yet over the years, the number of surviving male princes has risen dramatically, because of better healthcare and increased marriages. In the eight monarchies under study here, the number of male ruling family princes in the fourteen families now exceeds 20,000. Still, only fourteen can be rulers at any given time, and it is becoming increasingly evident that younger, more educated princes are less than satisfied with the lack of opportunities to climb the succession ladder. Even if they are ideally positioned, so many traditional pressures exist that prominent officials are less likely to be chosen over compromise candidates. The latter's strengths, often



exhibited by maintaining close family ties, overshadow the vast expertise that some others may have and exhibit. In fact, in all fourteen families, ideally suited successors have been sidelined. Highly qualified candidates among younger princes have emerged to lead as necessary. Many have welcomed institutional prerogatives to buttress their rules, even if such trends mean internal conflicts with far more traditional supporters. Remarkably, however, a majority of politically disenfranchised princes have been co-opted, while others have challenged the traditionalist approach. There is a clear and astonishing pattern of pragmatism throughout the Arab monarchies, despite serious challenges, that reveals itself whenever the need arises. The preferences of the ruling families hover around their interests (*maslahah*), a concept that suits them well and reinforces both their power bases and their legitimacies.

## ■ Notes

1. Emile A. Nakhleh, *The Persian Gulf and American Policy*, New York: Praeger, 1982, p. 22.
2. Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenges of Modernity*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, p. 1.
3. Albert Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997, esp. chaps. 1–2.
4. Cornell Fleischer, “Royal Authority, Dynastic Cyclism, and ‘Ibn Khaldunism’ in Sixteenth Century Ottoman Letters,” *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 18, nos. 3–4, July–October 1983, pp. 198–220.
5. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967, esp. chaps. 2–3.
6. Karen Barkey, *Bandits and Bureaucrats: The Ottoman Route to State Centralization*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994.
7. Peter Lienhardt, “The Authority of Shaykhs in the Gulf: An Essay in Nineteenth Century History,” in R. B. Serjeant and R. L. Bidwell, eds., *Arabian Studies*, vol. 2, London: Hurst, 1975, pp. 61–75.
8. Alan Richards and John Waterbury, *A Political Economy of the Middle East*, Boulder: Westview, 1996, pp. 297–298.
9. Levon Melikian, “Arab Socio-Political Impact on Gulf Life-Styles,” in B. R. Pridham, ed., *The Arab Gulf and the Arab World*, London: Croom Helm, 1988, p. 115.
10. Levon Melikian, “Gulf Reactions to Western Cultural Pressures,” in B. R. Pridham, ed., *The Arab Gulf and the West*, London: Croom Helm, 1985, p. 205.
11. J. E. Peterson, “Social Change in the Arab Gulf States and Political Implications,” in J. E. Peterson, ed., *Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States*, Washington, D.C.: Defense Academic Research Support Program and the Middle East Institute, 1988, p. 48.
12. Ibid.
13. “Memorandum Presented to King Fahd of Saudi Arabia by Religious Scholars, Judges and University Professors” (in Arabic), n.p., n.d, 2 pages (in author’s possession).

14. "A Memorandum to the King," n.p., n.d., 4 pages (in author's possession).
15. "Open Letter to His Excellency Shaykh 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Abdallah bin Baz" (in Arabic), *Al-Jazeera Al-Arabia* no. 2, February 1991, pp. 29–30.
16. Muhammad Hassan Al-Musa, *Al-Harakat al-Islamiyyah wa Ajhizat Mukhabarat* [The Islamic Movement and Intelligence Services], London: Al-Safa, 1988.

# Appendixes



# Appendix 1

## List of Interviews Conducted

Although I wrote this volume between 2001 and mid-2007, my research into succession matters on the Arabian Peninsula started in the mid-1990s, when I conceived and penned *Succession in Saudi Arabia*. Over the years, I was privileged to interview leading personalities, some of whom are listed below. After 2001, I called on officials throughout the region, including in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on four separate times, the Kingdom of Bahrain thrice, the Shaykhdoms of Kuwait and Qatar twice each, and the Kingdom of Jordan once. I also made an additional twenty-eight trips to the United Arab Emirates and fourteen journeys to the Sultanate of Oman, although not all of my visits to the latter two were directly related to this project. At every stop, I discussed succession questions with high-ranking ruling family members, academics, journalists, and business leaders. The partial list below identifies several of the individuals who kindly entertained my questions on a slew of domestic, regional, and world political issues. I am immensely grateful for their frank responses, which enriched my investigations and added value to this volume.

### ■ Bahrain

Shaykh ‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah  
Ruler of Bahrain (1961–1999)  
25 May 1998 (Manama)

Shaykh Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifah  
Heir Apparent (1999– )  
5 December 2004 (Manama), 4 December 2005 (Manama)

Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin Khalid Al Khalifah  
Adviser to the Ruler  
25 May 1998 (Manama)

Shaykh Khalid bin Ahmad Al Khalifah  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
5 December 2006 (Manama)

Muhammad ‘Abdul Ghaffar  
Minister of Foreign Affairs (now also Minister of Information)  
3 November 2003 (Manama)

## ■ **Jordan**

‘Abdallah bin Hussein  
King of Jordan  
5 November 2003 (Amman)

Faysal Al Fayez  
Prime Minister  
6 November 2003 (Amman)

## ■ **Kuwait**

Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim Al Sabah  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
10 September 2003 (Kuwait City)

Jabir Mubarak al-Hamad Al Sabah  
Minister of Defense  
18 October 2000 (Kuwait City)

Nasir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah  
Minister of Emiri Diwan Affairs  
18 October 2000 (Kuwait City)

## ■ **Oman**

Qaboos bin Sa‘id  
Sultan of Oman  
18 January 1993 (Seeb)

Sayyid Fahd bin Mahmoud Al Sa‘id  
Deputy Prime Minister of Cabinet Affairs

14 October 1992, 25 September 1993, 12 November 2001,  
28 November 2004 (Muscat)

Shaykh Ahmad bin Hamad Al Khalili  
Grand Mufti of Oman  
6 March 2005 (Muscat)

Sayyid Haitham bin Tariq Al Sa'id  
Minister of Heritage and Culture  
23 February 2000 (Al Ain, UAE), 30 November 2004,  
7 March 2005 (Muscat)

Yusuf 'Alawi bin 'Abdallah  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
30 November 2004 (Muscat)

Ahmad bin 'Abdulnabi Al Macki  
Minister of National Economy and Chairman of the Financial Affairs  
and Energy Resources Council  
27 November 2004 (Muscat)

'Abdul 'Aziz Al-Rowas  
Cultural Adviser to the Sultan  
29 November 2004, 8 December 2004 (Muscat)

Hamad bin Muhammad Al Rashdi  
Minister of Information  
13 November 2001, 27 November 2004, 6 December 2004 (Muscat)

Maqbool bin 'Ali bin Sultan  
Minister of Commerce and Industry  
29 November 2004 (Muscat)

Mohammed bin Hamad bin Saif Al Rumhi  
Minister of Oil and Gas  
30 November 2004 (Muscat)

Rajihah bint 'Abdulamir bin 'Ali  
Minister of Tourism  
29 November 2004 (Muscat)

Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin ‘Ali Al Qatabi  
President of the Consultative Council  
13 October 1993, 5 March 2005 (Seeb)

Rahilah bint ‘Amir bin Sultan Al-Riyami  
Member of the Consultative Council  
8 March 2005 (Seeb)

Saif bin Hashil Al Maskary  
Member of the Council of State  
10 March 2003 (Abu Dhabi), 1 December 2004 (Muscat)

## ■ **Qatar**

Shaykh Hamad bin Jasim Al Thani  
First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs  
30 April 2004 (Los Angeles), 29 January 2006 (Doha)

‘Abdallah bin Khalid Al Thani  
Minister of Interior  
30 January 2006 (Doha)

Hamad bin ‘Abdallah bin Muhammad Al Thani  
Minister of State  
31 January 2006 (Doha)

‘Abdul Rahman bin Sa‘ud Al Thani  
Private Secretary to the Ruler  
1 May 2002 (Doha), 31 January 2006 (Doha)

## ■ **Saudi Arabia**

Turki bin Faysal bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz Al Sa‘ud  
Ambassador to the United States and Chairman of the King Faisal Center  
for Research and Islamic Studies  
2 May 2003 (London), 20 December 2004 (Riyadh), 22 April 2005 (London)

Sa‘ud al-Sati  
Counselor to the Ambassador to the United States  
22 April 2005 (London), 30 November 2005 (London)



Hassan Yassin  
Adviser to the Foreign Minister  
12 October 2004 (Los Angeles)

‘Abdallah Ibrahim El-Kuwaiz,  
Ambassador to Bahrain  
2 November 2003 (Manama)

## ■ United Arab Emirates

Shaykh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan  
President of the UAE (1971–2004) and Ruler of Abu Dhabi  
(1966–2004)  
4 November 1997, 15 March 1998, 26 May 1998 (Abu Dhabi)

Shaykh Khalifah bin Zayed Al Nahyan  
President of the UAE (2004– ) and Ruler of Abu Dhabi (2004– )  
11 November 1998, 7 November 2004 (Abu Dhabi)

Shaykh Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi  
Ruler of Sharjah  
8 October 1997 (Sharjah)

Shaykh Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi  
Ruler of Fujairah  
16 June 1997, 14 October 1997 (Fujairah)

Shaykh Sultan bin Zayed Al Nahyan  
Deputy Prime Minister  
29 May 1998, 19 February 2000, 5 April 2000, 20 January 2001,  
3 April 2001, 26 October 2001, 7 October 2002, 6 November 2002,  
22 April 2003, 11 May 2003, 6 September 2003, 7 November 2004  
(Abu Dhabi)

Shaykh ‘Abdallah bin Zayed Al Nahyan  
Minister of Information (and Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2006)  
10 March 1998, 27 May 1998 (Abu Dhabi)

Shaykh Hamdan bin Zayed Al Nahyan  
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
10 November 1997 (Abu Dhabi)

Shaykh Sultan bin Khalifah bin Zayed Al Nahyan  
Chairman of the Court of the Heir Apparent  
17 March 1998 (Abu Dhabi)

Shaykh Ahmad bin Sultan Al Qasimi  
Deputy Ruler of Sharjah  
17 June 1997 (Sharjah), October 1997 (Sharjah)

Shaykh Khalid bin Saqr Al Qasimi  
Heir Apparent of Ras al-Khaimah (until 2003)  
16 December 1997 (Ras al-Khaimah)

## Appendix 2

Arab Rulers and Heirs,  
1 August 2007

Country	Ruler	Ruler's Birth	Ruler's Accession	Heir	Heir's Birth	Heir's Designation
Bahrain	Hamad bin 'Isa Al Khalifah	1950	1999	Salman bin Hamad	1969	1999
Jordan	'Abdallah bin Hussein	1962	1999	—	—	—
Kuwait	Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah	1929	2006	Nasir al-Ahmad Al Sabah	1940	2006
Morocco	Muhammad VI 'Alawi	1963	1999	Hassan bin Muhammad	2003	2003
Oman	Qaboos bin Sa'id Al Sa'id	1940	1970	—	—	—
Qatar	Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani	1950	1995	Tamim bin Hamad	1979	2003
Saudi Arabia	'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz Al Sa'ud	1921	2005	Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	1923	2005
United Arab Emirates						
Abu Dhabi	Khalifah bin Zayed Al Nahyan	1948	2004	Muhammad bin Zayed	1960	2004
'Ajman	Humayd bin Rashid Al Na'aimi	1930	1981	'Ammar bin Humaïd	1956?	1993
Dubai	Muhammad bin Rashid Al Maktoum	1948	2006	Rashid bin Muhammad	1985	2006
Fujairah	Hamad bin Muhammad Al Sharqi	1948	1974	Saif bin Hamad	1983?	1998?
Ras al-Khaimah	Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi	1920	1948	Sa'ud bin Saqr	1956	2003
Sharjah	Sultan bin Muhammad Al Qasimi	1942	1972	Sultan bin Muhammad	1960	1999
Umm al-Qiwain	Rashid bin Ahmad Al Mu'allah	1930	1981	Sa'ud bin Rashid	1952	1981

## Appendix 3

### Bahrain: Al Khalifah Rulers

Ahmad bin Khalifah	1783–1794
Salman bin Ahmad	1794–1821
‘Abdallah bin Ahmad	1821–1842
Muhammad bin Khalifah	1842–1867
‘Ali bin Khalifah	1867–1869
Muhammad bin ‘Abdallah	1869
‘Isa bin ‘Ali	1869–1932
Hamad bin ‘Isa	1932–1942
Salman bin Hamad	1942–1961
‘Isa bin Salman	1961–1999
Hamad bin ‘Isa	1999–



## Appendix 4

### Bahrain: Excerpts from the 1973 and 2002 Constitutions, and 2000 National Charter

#### ■ **Constitution of 1973**

##### **Article 1**

- (b) The rule of Bahrain shall be hereditary, the succession to which shall be transmitted from His Highness Shaykh 'Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah to his eldest son and then to the eldest son of this eldest son and so forth, generation after generation, unless during his lifetime, the Emir appoints one of his sons other than the eldest as his successor, in accordance with the provisions of the Decree of Succession provided for in the next clause.
- (c) All rules of succession shall be regulated by a special Emiri decree which shall be of a constitutional nature and thus shall not be amended except in accordance with Article 104 of this Constitution.

##### **Article 104**

- (c) Under no circumstances shall the principle of the hereditary rule of Bahrain, the principle of liberty and equality set forth in this Constitution, as well as Article 2 thereof, be proposed for amendment.

#### ■ **Constitution of 2002**

##### **Article 1**

- 2. The regime of the Kingdom of Bahrain is that of a hereditary constitutional monarchy, which has been handed down by the late Shaykh

‘Isa bin Salman Al Khalifah to his eldest son Shaykh Hamad bin ‘Isa Al Khalifah, the King. Thenceforward it will pass to his eldest son, one generation after another, unless the King in his lifetime appoints a son other than his eldest son as successor, in accordance with the provisions of the Decree on inheritance stated in the following clause.

3. All provisions governing inheritance are regulated by a special Royal Decree that will have a constitutional character, and which can only be amended under the provisions of Article 120 of the Constitution.

## **Article 120**

3. It is not permissible to propose an amendment to Article 2 of this Constitution, and it is not permissible under any circumstances to propose the amendment of the constitutional monarchy and the principle of inherited rule in Bahrain, as well as the bicameral system and the principles of freedom and equality established in this Constitution.
4. The powers of the King stated in this Constitution may not be proposed for amendment in an interval during which another person is acting for him.

## ■ **National Charter of 2000**

### **Chapter 2: Government System**

#### ***First—The Emir***

Government system of Bahrain shall be a constitutional monarchy as may be prescribed by the constitution and the Emiri Decree on succession. The Emir is the head of state. His person is inviolable. He is the Supreme Commander of Armed Forces, the symbol of national stability, and the fulcrum of government system of the state of Bahrain. The Emir exercises his powers through ministers who are accountable to him. He appoints to, and relieves from, premiership and ministerial posts within his powers as prescribed by the constitution.

#### ***Second—Constitutional Form of the State***

In view of the stability enjoyed, progress achieved, strides made, and challenges surmounted by Bahrain by the Grace of God Almighty, and in view of the fact that it has assumed its full-fledged role as a state both in terms of international relations and sovereign institutions based on equality of all citizens, common good, and national unity, it is deemed proper that Bahrain



should join democratic constitutional monarchies with a view to meeting peoples' aspirations to further progress.

*Sources:* N. Gatch Jr., "Bahrain," in Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*, Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1974, pp. 2–16; Bahrain, State of, *Al-Mithaq Al-Watani* [National Charter], Manama: 2002; and Bahrain, State of, *Constitution of the State of Bahrain* at <http://confinder.richmond.edu/admin/docs/Bahrain.pdf>.



## Appendix 5

### Kuwait: Al Sabah Rulers

Sabah bin Jabir	1756–1762
‘Abdallah Al Sabah	1762–1812
Jabir al-‘Abdallah	1812–1859
Sabah al-Jabir	1859–1866
‘Abdallah al-Sabah al-Jabir	1866–1892
Muhammad al-Sabah al-Jabir	1892–1896
Mubarak al-Sabah al-Jabir	1896–1915
Jabir al-Mubarak	1915–1917
Salim al-Mubarak	1917–1921
Ahmad al-Jabir	1921–1950
‘Abdallah al-Salim	1950–1965
Sabah al-Salim	1965–1977
Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir	1977–2006
Sa‘ad al-‘Abdallah al-Salim	2006
Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir	2006–



## Appendix 6

### Kuwait: Excerpts from the 1962 Constitution

#### **Article 4**

Kuwait is a hereditary Emirate, the succession to which shall be in the descendants of the late Mubarak Al Sabah.

The Heir Apparent shall be designated within one year, at the latest, from the date of accession of the Emir.

His designation shall be effected by an Emiri Order upon the nomination of the Emir and the approval of the National Assembly which shall be signified by a majority vote of its members in a special sitting.

In case no designation is achieved in accordance with the foregoing procedure, the Emir shall nominate at least three of the descendants of the late Mubarak Al Sabah of whom the National Assembly shall pledge allegiance to one as Heir Apparent.

The Heir Apparent shall have attained his majority, be of sound mind and a legitimate son of Muslim parents.

A special law promulgated within one year from the date of coming into force of this Constitution shall lay down the other rules of succession in the Emirate. The said law shall be of a constitutional nature and therefore shall be capable of amendment only by the procedure prescribed for amendment of the Constitution.

#### **Article 59**

The Law referred to in Article 4 of this Constitution shall specify the conditions under which the Emir shall exercise his constitutional powers.

### **Article 60**

Before assuming his powers the Emir shall take the following oath at a special sitting of the National Assembly:

I swear by Almighty God to respect the Constitution and the laws of the State, to defend the liberties, interests, and properties of the people, and to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the Country.

### **Article 61**

In the event of his absence outside the Country and the inability of the Heir Apparent to act as Deputy for him, the Emir shall appoint, by an Emiri Order, a Deputy who shall exercise his powers during his absence. The said Emiri Order may include a specified arrangement for the exercise of the said powers on behalf of the Emir, or a limitation of their scope.

### **Article 62**

The Emir's Deputy shall satisfy the qualifications laid down in Article 82 of this Constitution. If he is a Minister or a member of the National Assembly he shall not take part in the ministerial functions or in the work of the Assembly during the period he is acting as Deputy for the Emir.

### **Article 63**

Before assuming his powers the Emir's Deputy shall, at a special sitting of the National Assembly, take the oath mentioned in Article 60 of this Constitution with the following phrase added thereto: "and be loyal to the Emir."

In case the National Assembly is not in session, the Oath shall be taken before the Emir.

*Source:* Kuwait, State of, *Constitution of the State of Kuwait* at <http://www.kuwait-info.com/sidepages/cont.asp>.

## Appendix 7

### Oman: Al Sa'id Rulers

#### ■ Rulers of Zanzibar

Majid bin Sa'id	1856–1870
Barghash bin Sa'id	1870–1888
Khalifah bin Sa'id	1888–1890
'Ali bin Sa'id	1890–1893
Hamad bin Thuwayni	1893–1896
Hamud bin Muhammad	1896–1902
'Ali bin Hamad	1902–1911
Khalifah bin Harib	1911–1960
'Abdallah bin Khalifah	1960–1963
Jamshid bin 'Abdallah	1963–1964

#### ■ Rulers of "Muscat and Oman" as well as Zanzibar

Ahmad bin Sa'id	1744–1783
Sa'id bin Ahmad	1783–1784
Hamad bin Sa'id	1784–1792
Sultan bin Ahmad	1792–1804
Badr bin Sayf	1804–1807
Said bin Sultan	1807–1856

#### ■ Rulers of "Muscat and Oman"

Thuwayni bin Sa'id	1856–1866
Salim bin Thuwayni	1866–1868

‘Azzan bin Qays	1868–1871
Turki bin Sa‘id	1871–1888
Faysal bin Turki	1888–1913
Taymur bin Faysal	1913–1932
Sa‘id bin Taymur	1932–1970

■    **Ruler of Oman**

Qaboos bin Sa‘id	1970–
------------------	-------



## Appendix 8

### Oman: Excerpts from the 1996 Basic Law

#### **Article 5**

The system of government is an hereditary Sultanate in which succession passes to a male descendant of Sayyid Turki bin Sa'id bin Sultan. It is a condition that the male who is chosen to rule should be an adult Muslim of sound mind and a legitimate son of Omani Muslim parents.

#### **Article 6**

Within three days of the position of Sultan becoming vacant, the Ruling Family Council shall determine upon who will succeed to the Throne.

If the Ruling Family Council does not agree upon a successor, the Defense Council shall confirm the appointment of the person designated by the Sultan in his letter to the Family Council.

#### **Article 7**

Before exercising his powers the Sultan shall swear the following oath at a joint session of the Oman and Defense Councils:

I swear by Almighty God to respect the Basic Law of the State and the Laws, to fully protect the interests and freedoms of the citizens, and to preserve the independence of the country and its territorial integrity.

*Source:* Oman, Sultanate of, *Al Nizam al-Asasi lil-Dawlat* [The Basic Statute of the State], Muscat, Diwan of Royal Court, 1996.



## Appendix 9

### Qatar: Al Thani Rulers

Muhammad bin Thani	1871–1876
Jasim bin Muhammad	1876–1913
‘Abdallah bin Jasim	1913–1949
‘Ali bin ‘Abdallah	1949–1960
Ahmad bin ‘Ali	1960–1972
Khalifah bin Hamad	1972–1995
Hamad bin Khalifah	1995–



## Appendix 10

### Qatar: Excerpts from the 2005 Constitution

#### **Article 8**

The rule of the State is hereditary in the family of Al Thani and in the line of the male descendants of Hamad bin Khalifah bin Hamad bin ‘Abdallah bin Jasim. The rule shall be inherited by the son named as Heir Apparent by the Emir. In the case that there is no such son, the prerogatives of rule shall pass to the member of the family named by the Emir as Heir Apparent. In this case, his male descendants shall inherit the rule. The provisions of the rule of the State and accession shall be determined by a special law that shall be issued within a year commencing as from the date of coming into force of this Constitution. This law shall have the power of the Constitution.

#### **Article 9**

The Emir shall, by an Emiri Order, appoint an Heir Apparent after consultation with the members of the Ruling Family and the people of wisdom [*Ahal-hal wal-‘Akd*] in the State. The Heir Apparent must be a Muslim of a Qatari Muslim Mother.

#### **Article 10**

The Heir Apparent, on his appointment, shall take the following oath:

I swear by Almighty God to respect *shari’ah* law, the Constitution and the law, maintain the independence of the State and safeguard its territorial integrity, defend the freedom and interests of its people, and be loyal to the State and the Emir.

### **Article 11**

The Heir Apparent shall assume the powers and discharge the functions of the Emir on his behalf during his absence outside the country, or in the event of temporary compelling circumstances.

### **Article 12**

The Emir may, by an Emiri Order, confer upon the Heir Apparent the exercise of some of his powers and the discharge of some of his functions. The Heir Apparent shall preside over the sessions of the Council of Ministers whenever he is in attendance.

### **Article 13**

Without prejudice to the provisions of the two preceding articles, and where it is not possible to delegate powers to the Heir Apparent, the Emir may, by an Emiri Order, designate a deputy from the Ruling Family to discharge some of his powers and functions; and where the person who has been so designated holds a post or performs a function in any institution, the same person shall cease to discharge the duties of that post or function during his deputation of the Emir; and the Deputy Emir shall, as soon as he is so designated, take, before the Emir, the same oath as taken by the Heir Apparent.

### **Article 14**

There shall be established a Council by an Emiri Resolution named “The Council of the Ruling Family.” The Emir shall appoint the Members of such Council from among the members of the Ruling Family.

### **Article 15**

The Council of the Ruling Family shall determine the vacancy of the position of the Emir in the event of his demise or when he becomes totally incapacitated to discharge his functions. Following this, the Council of Ministers and Consultative Council shall after a secret joint session announce the vacancy and declare the Heir Apparent as the Emir of the State.

### **Article 16**

Where the Heir Apparent, at the time he is named Emir of the State, is less than eighteen years of age according to the Gregorian calendar, the reins of Government shall be conferred upon a Regency Council to be appointed by the

Council of the Ruling Family. The Regency Council shall be composed of a Chairman and not less than three or more than five Members; and the Chairman and the majority of Members shall be from amongst the Ruling Family.

### **Article 17**

The financial emoluments of the Emir as well as the funds allocated for gifts and assistance shall be determined by a resolution issued annually by the Emir.

### **Article 74**

The Emir shall take the following oath prior to the discharge of his functions in a special session convened by Consultative Council:

I swear by Almighty God to respect *shari'ah* law, the Constitution and the law, protect the independence of the State, safeguard its territorial integrity, and defend the freedom and interests of its people.

*Source:* Qatar, State of, *Constitution of the State of Qatar* at <http://www.qatarembassy.net/constitution.asp>.

*Note:* A draft of the constitution was presented to the ruler in 2002 and submitted to a public referendum on 9 April 2003. According to Article 141 of the permanent constitution, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani issued a final version on 8 June 2004, with an effective implementation date of 8 June 2005.





## Appendix 11

### **Qatar: Jasim bin Hamad's 2003 Resignation Letter to Hamad bin Khalifah**

Your Highness, Shaykh Hamad bin Khalifah Al Thani, the Emir of Qatar, I have the honor to approach you with this letter with all of my profound love, reverence and loyalty to Your Highness.

Your Highness,

With profound appreciation to Your Highness, to the ruling family and to the Qatari people, I highly appreciate my appointment as Heir Apparent. As you know, I accepted this responsibility at your express wish, in view of critical and sensitive circumstances that surfaced following the aborted attempt to destabilize and undermine the security and stability of the country. Moreover, I was aware of Your Highness's intention to undergo surgery abroad, which, thank God, was successful. I became heir apparent with the understanding that the burden would not be perpetual although, as you very well know, I never hesitated to serve my country under your leadership.

God knows—as my religion instructs and my conscience dictates—that I spared no effort in performing my duties and in following your advice that the State of Qatar and its people rank, first because they are a trust to be handed down through generations. As it has been since the grand founder the late Shaykh Jasim bin Muhammad Al Thani. I have been guided throughout this period by your fatherly instructions, which have been my greatest support after God the Almighty.

Committed to this trust, I asked you to accept my wish to step down from the post of Heir Apparent. This was the decision I took with the belief and firm conviction but you reasoned that I should rather continue my duties until you determined the right time to step down, when the individual who would succeed me was fully prepared.

I have the pleasure, Your Highness, to assure you that since you allowed me the honor to assist you in identifying my successor, that my brother Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, is amply qualified for the post. Your decision to

assign me the task of preparing him for various duties associated with the post was sound. During the past two years, my brother Tamim contributed with extreme dedication and self-denial, as he performed all of the tasks entrusted to him, in addition to his civil and military duties.

I am fully confident that he will assume the entrusted task as Heir Apparent with competence and efficiency, and would be a great support to Your Highness in the process you are leading. In the case of his appointment, I will continue to support him at all times.

In view of this, Your Highness might consider it the right time for me to step down from the post of Heir Apparent.

Looking forward to obtaining your consent for my request, I assure you that I will continue to be, as I have, loyal to Your Highness and to the homeland, sparing no efforts to serve it and contribute to the nation-building process, under your wise leadership.

*Source:* Facsimile received from Doha, Qatar (in author's possession).

## Appendix 12

### **Qatar: Hamad bin Khalifah's Reply to Jasim bin Hamad's Resignation Letter**

I have received with great emotion your honorable letter dated [3 June 2003], in which you expressed your desire to step down from the post of Heir Apparent and which you fulfilled with care and the attention it deserves.

At first, Your Highness dear son, I wish to emphasize that your selection to assume the post of Heir Apparent was due to your distinguished traits of competence, sincerity and goodness. Moreover, the earnest concern you demonstrated for the country, and the progress it recorded under your leadership, as well as your desire to enhance the interests of the country, as God is witness, are all duly noted. Your dedication to your responsibilities solidified my positive opinion of your character. You have always been sincere and honest and earnestly concerned about Qatar, its people, and the future of its generations, and for these, I thank you.

Your Highness, dear son, with pride and complete respect for your views, and despite repeated attempts to convince you to reconsider, I regretfully accept your decision even though it causes me pain and sadness.

As you know, I have consulted with the ruling family and influential leaders in the country, regarding your request to step down from the post of Heir Apparent as well as appoint your brother [His Highness] Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani as Heir. Like you, we perceive your brother's competence, goodness, and sincerity, and give you credit for grooming him during the past two years for a mission he was expected to assume in accordance with our agreement in this regard.

And, Your Highness dear son, it gives me pleasure to proudly state for the record, that you have been and shall continue to be a source of support and assistance as you shouldered my vested trust as you performed competently, sincerely and diligently.

On this occasion, I have but to extend to Your Highness, in my name and on behalf of the ruling family as well as the people of Qatar, due gratitude and

respect for the great effort you have exerted in building the country, ensuring its progress, and enhancing its importance.

I am confident you shall contribute to this march for it is a trust vested in us in which sincere leaders like you consider their national duty to serve the highest goals of the land.

*Source:* Facsimile received from Doha, Qatar (in author's possession).

## Appendix 13

### **Qatar: Jasim bin Hamad's 2003 Television Address to the People**

Springing from respect, the honor which I harbor for you, in the spirit of frankness and transparency, and out of respect due for the confidence and honor you conferred upon me, I wish to inform you of the reasons and the background of my decision to step down from the post of Heir Apparent.

Brothers. The post of Heir Apparent was never one I sought to discharge nor a goal I cherished to accomplish, despite my belief that national service is a duty which we should carry out with all our capabilities, without any shortcoming as long as we live.

This has been my belief since [His Highness (HH)] the Emir delegated to me this responsibility, which I accepted under the prevailing critical circumstances as I made clear in my letter to HH the Emir, for there was no other way but to accept and bear that responsibility upon my shoulders.

God knows that I carried out my duties as well as I could, in accordance with dictates of my religion and conscience and out of respect for the trust HH the Emir, the ruling family and the people of Qatar bestowed on me.

Now, after the reasons which dictated my acceptance of the post of Heir Apparent have disappeared, I have seen it was opportune to make known to HH the Emir my desire to step down. This decision is based on his frank and transparent teachings and because the post was not what I sought in the first place.

Out of respect and consideration for my wishes, HH the Emir saw fit that I shoulder this responsibility until a suitable time, when the post of Heir Apparent could be shifted to another, whom HH the Emir chose.

Once again, HH the Emir honored me, for he showed me his confidence by allowing me to groom and prepare my successor, if I insisted on my decision. The choice has been made that the office be handed to my friend and brother HH Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, given his great competence and his attributes of goodness and propriety.

After two years of continuous preparation, and at the directives of our father, HH the Emir, the time is now suitable for HH the Emir to accommodate my request and transfer the role to HH Shaykh Tamim in view of the experience he acquired and his practical accomplishments in civilian and military fields.

Honorable brothers,

I have taken this decision of my free will and I know that it will seem strange and unusual under prevailing concepts, but I see it a natural matter in light of the values my master and father HH the Emir has taught us. This fits into the system which HH the Emir drew up for the establishment of a modern state in which the exercise of authority becomes a form of national service and is not an end in itself.

As you have known me, so I shall remain, forever in service of my master HH the Emir and devoted to serving this dear country, as well as my countrymen with diligence and sincerity.

I wish to extend my sincere congratulations to my brother Shaykh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani on being appointed Heir Apparent. I wish him success and that he shall always do what is right and proper.

I wish to emphasize that I shall always support and back him in all fields.

*Source:* Facsimile received from Doha, Qatar (in author's possession).

## Appendix 14

### Saudi Arabia: Al Sa'ud Rulers

Sa'ud bin Muhammad bin Muqrin	?–1747
Muhammad bin Sa'ud	1747–1765
'Abdul 'Aziz bin Muhammad	1765–1803
Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	1803–1814
'Abdallah bin Sa'ud	1814–1821
Mish'ari bin Sa'ud	1820–1821
Turki bin 'Abdallah bin Muhammad	1821–1834
Faysal bin Turki	1834–1837
Khalid bin Sa'ud	1837–1841
Faysal bin Turki	1843–1865
'Abdallah bin Faysal	1865–1871
Sa'ud bin Faysal	1871
'Abdallah bin Faysal	1871–1873
Sa'ud bin Faysal	1873–1875
'Abdul Rahman bin Faysal	1875–1876
'Abdallah bin Faysal	1876–1889
'Abdul Rahman bin Faysal	1889–1902
'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman	1902–1953
Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	1953–1964
Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	1964–1975
Khalid bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	1975–1982
Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	1982–2005
'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	2005–





## Appendix 15

### Saudi Arabia: Excerpts from the 1992 Basic Law

#### Article 5

- (a) Monarchy is the system of rule in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- (b) Rulers of the country shall be from among the sons of the founder, King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud, and their descendants. The most upright among them shall receive allegiance according to the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet (Peace be upon Him).
- (c) The King shall choose the Heir Apparent and relieve him by a Royal Decree.
- (d) The Heir Apparent shall devote himself exclusively to his duties as Heir Apparent and shall perform any other duties delegated to him by the King.
- (e) Upon the death of the King, the Heir Apparent shall assume all Royal powers until a pledge of allegiance [*bay‘ah*] is given.

#### Article 6

In support of the Holy Quran and the Sunnah of His Messenger (Peace be upon Him), citizens shall give the pledge of allegiance to the King, professing loyalty in times of hardship as well as ease.

*Source:* Saudi Arabia, Kingdom of, *The Basic System of Governance* at <http://www.mofa.gov.sa/Detail.asp?InNewsItemID=35297>.



## Appendix 16

### Saudi Arabia: The 2006 Allegiance Law of Succession

*Note:* The Allegiance Commission was created by decree in Makkah on 20 October 2006, and empowered with regulations that emended the 1992 Basic Law (see Appendix 15) as well as the 1 March 1992 decree that allowed a monarch to dismiss his heir apparent.

#### **Article 1**

An Allegiance Commission is created by royal order, comprised of:

1. The sons of the founder King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud.
2. The grandsons of the founder King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud, whose fathers are deceased or incapacitated—as determined by a medical report—or are otherwise unwilling to assume the throne, if they are proven to be eligible and capable.
3. Two members appointed by the King, one of his own sons and one of the heir apparent’s, if they are proven to be eligible and capable.

If any of the above relinquishes their post as part of the Allegiance Commission, the King will appoint a substitute, in accordance with Sections 2 and 3 of this Article.

#### **Article 2**

The Allegiance Commission shall exercise its duties in accordance with this Law, as well as with the Basic Law of Governance.

### **Article 3**

The Allegiance Commission will abide by the teachings of the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him), preserve the state, protect the Royal Family's unity, secure its cooperation, prevent its division, as well as promote national unity and the interests of the people.

### **Article 4**

The Allegiance Commission will be based in Riyadh and will hold its meetings at the Royal Court. It may convene at any of the Royal Court's locations within the Kingdom, or any setting specified by the King, subject to the monarch's consent.

### **Article 5**

Before assuming their duties, Commission members as well as the Secretary-General, will swear the following oath before the monarch:

I swear by God Almighty to be loyal to my religion, monarch, and country, not to divulge any of the country's secrets, to preserve its interests and laws, to protect the Royal Family's unity and support, to safeguard the country's national unity, and to perform my duties truthfully, honestly, reliably, and justly.

### **Article 6**

When the King dies, the Commission will pledge allegiance to the heir apparent, in accordance with this Law, as well as the Basic Law of Governance.

### **Article 7**

- A. Following consultations with members of the Commission, the King will choose one, or two, or three candidates for the position of Heir Apparent. He will present his nominees to the Commission, which will be required to unanimously designate one as Heir Apparent. In the event the Commission rejects all nominees, it will be called upon to name a suitable heir apparent.
- B. The King may ask the Commission to nominate a suitable Heir Apparent at any time. In the event that the King rejects the Commission's nominee, the Commission will vote to choose between the King's contender and its own, in accordance with Sections A and B

of this Article. The nominee who secures a majority of votes will be named Heir Apparent.

### **Article 8**

A potential Heir Apparent nominee should satisfy the conditions set forth in Section B of Article 5 in the Basic Law of Governance.

### **Article 9**

An Heir Apparent must be designated according to Article 7 within a period of thirty days after a King accedes to the throne.

### **Article 10**

The Commission will set up a five-member Transitory Ruling Council, which will temporarily assume governance responsibilities for all State affairs as provided for in this Law. The Transitory Ruling Council will not have the right to amend the Basic Law of Governance, this Law, the Council of Ministers Law, the Consultative Council Law, the Law of the Provinces, the National Security Council Law, or any other laws linked to governance. It will not have the right to dissolve or reshuffle either the Cabinet or the Consultative Council. During the replacement period, the Transitory Ruling Council should maintain national unity, in addition to protecting the country's foreign and domestic interests.

### **Article 11**

In the event the Commission is persuaded that the King is incapacitated for medical reasons, it will request a report on his health conditions from a medical committee, in accordance with this Law. If the report determines that the King is temporarily unable to exercise his full powers, the Commission will certify this finding, and transfer governance authority to the Heir Apparent until a full recovery.

When the King issues a formal written notice to the Chairman of the Commission that he has recovered and is ready to resume his full authority, the Commission will seek a confirmation of the recuperation from the medical committee, in an updated report to be made available within twenty-four hours.

If the medical report determines that the King is capable to exercise his powers, the Commission will certify this finding, and the King will resume his rule.

If, however, the medical report concludes that the King is unable to exercise his powers on a permanent basis, the Commission will further certify that

finding, and invite the Heir Apparent to accede the throne after receiving pledges of allegiance. These procedures must be carried out in accordance with this Law and with the Basic Law of Governance within twenty-four hours.

## **Article 12**

If the Commission determines that both the King and his Heir Apparent can no longer exercise their powers due to health reasons, the Commission will call on its medical committee to prepare a report on their health conditions. If the medical report resolves that neither can resume their rule, even temporarily, the Commission will empower the Transitory Ruling Council to assume governance responsibilities, and oversee the interests of the people until either the King or the Heir Apparent recovers.

After a written notice from either the King or the Heir Apparent is sent to the Commission stating that they have recovered from illness, and after the Commission is persuaded, it will request a health report from the aforementioned medical committee within twenty-four hours. If the report determines that either the King or the Heir Apparent is capable of exercising his powers then the Commission will certify that finding, and the individual in question will resume exercising his powers.

If, however, the report confirms that either the King or the Heir Apparent are medically unfit to rule, or are permanently incapacitated, the Commission will certify this finding, and call on the Transitory Ruling Council to assume governance responsibilities for a period not to exceed seven days. The Commission will, during this time, select a suitable candidate from among the sons and grandsons of the founding King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud. It will call on him to take over as King in accordance with this Law and the Basic Law of Governance.

## **Article 13**

If the King and the Heir Apparent die simultaneously, the Commission will select within a period not to exceed seven days, a suitable candidate for governance from among the sons or grandsons of King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud. It will call for a pledge of allegiance to the new King in accordance with this Law and the Basic Law of Governance. The Transitory Ruling Council will assume governance responsibilities until the new King ascends the throne.

## **Article 14**

The medical committee will be comprised of:

1. The medical representative for the Royal Clinics.
2. The medical director of the King Faysal Specialist Hospital.
3. Three medical college deans selected by the Allegiance Commission.

The medical committee is empowered to issue the aforementioned medical reports in this Law and to consult physicians it deems appropriate.

### **Article 15**

The eldest son of the founding King ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin ‘Abdul Rahman al-Faysal Al Sa‘ud will chair the Commission with the second eldest acting as his deputy. In case neither is available, the eldest grandson will chair its gatherings.

### **Article 16**

All Commission meetings will be held in camera with the King’s approval. Commission members, the Secretary-General, and a rapporteur will only attend meetings. With the King’s approval, the Commission may invite individuals to provide explanations or inform attendees, but those individuals will not have the right to vote.

### **Article 17**

The Chairman of the Commission will call meetings in accordance with Articles 6, 11, 12, and 13 of this Law.

### **Article 18**

All members should attend Commission gatherings and should not leave before the conclusion of any meeting without the permission of the chairman. If a member is unable to attend an assembly, he should inform the chairman as such, in writing.

### **Article 19**

The Chairman begins and ends all assemblies, moderates the debates, invites members to speak, determines the agenda, terminates discussions, and introduces resolutions for vote. A new item may be added to an agenda with the approval of ten members.

**Article 20**

Meetings will be considered valid when a quorum of two-thirds of the members is present, including the Chairman or his representative.

In accordance with Article 7, the Commission will approve its decisions with the consent of a majority of members present. In the event of a tie, the side on which the Chairman of the Commission has voted, prevails. In emergency situations in which the quorum has not been met, meetings may be held with half of the members present, and decisions may be reached with the approval of two-thirds of those present.

**Article 21**

For each assembly, there should be a record that indicates the time and location of the meeting, the name of its Chairman, the names of members present, along with the names of those who are absent and the reasons for their absence, if any, the name of the Secretary-General, a summary of all discussions, the number of yea and nay votes, the result of said votes, and the full text of all decisions.

The record should further indicate whether the gathering was postponed or adjourned, and if so, the time when this took place. Moreover, the record should include anything that the Chairman deems necessary, and its minutes should be signed by the Chairman, present members, as well as the Secretary-General.

**Article 22**

Commission votes will be cast by secret ballot in accordance with a model to be prepared for this purpose.

**Article 23**

Commission members may only review the agenda and all pertinent documents at the location in which the assembly is convened, and will not be permitted to remove any documents from the meeting hall.

**Article 24**

The King appoints a Secretary-General, who will assume the responsibility of inviting Commission members, supervising the process of preparing minutes and decisions, and announcing the results of its meetings as instructed by the Chairman. With the King's approval, the Secretary-General may seek assistance



as he deems necessary. The King will also appoint a deputy to the Secretary-General to preside during the Secretary-General's absence.

## **Article 25**

A Royal Decree will amend the provisions of this Law after the approval of the Allegiance Commission.

*Source:* Translated from the Arabic version as published in *Al-Madinah* no. 15886, 21 October 2006, <http://www.almadinapress.com/print.aspx?articleid=183874>.



## Appendix 17

### United Arab Emirates: Rulers

#### ■ Al Nahyan Rulers of Abu Dhabi

Dhiyab bin 'Isa	?–1793
Shakhbut bin Dhiyab	1793–1816
Muhammad bin Shakhbut	1816–1818
Tahnun bin Shakhbut	1818–1833
Khalifah bin Shakhbut	1833–1845
Sa'id bin Tahnun bin Shakhbut	1845–1855
Zayed bin Khalifah	1855–1909
Tahnun bin Muhammad	1909–1912
Hamdan bin Muhammad	1912–1922
Shakhbut bin Sultan	1928–1966
Zayed bin Sultan	1966–2004
Khalifah bin Zayed	2004–

#### ■ Al Na'aimi Rulers of 'Ajman

Humayd bin Rashid bin Humayd	1838–1841
'Abdul 'Aziz bin Rashid bin Humayd	1841–1848
Humayd bin Rashid bin Humayd	1848–1872
Humayd bin Rashid	1891–1900
'Abdul 'Aziz bin Humayd	1900–1908
Humayd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	1908–1928
Rashid bin Humayd	1928–1981
Humayd bin Rashid	1981–

### ■ **Al Maktoum Rulers of Dubai**

Maktoum bin Butti bin Suhayl	1833–1852
Sa'id bin Butti	1852–1859
Hashar bin Maktoum	1859–1886
Rashid bin Maktoum	1886–1894
Maktoum bin Hashar	1894–1906
Suhayl bin Maktoum	1906–1912
Sa'id bin Maktoum	1912–1958
Rashid bin Sa'id	1958–1990
Maktoum bin Rashid	1990–2006
Muhammad bin Rashid	2006–

### ■ **Al Sharqi Rulers of Fujairah**

Muhammad bin Hamad bin 'Abdallah	1952–1972
Hamad bin Muhammad	1972–

### ■ **Al Qasimi Rulers of Ras al-Khaimah**

Sultan bin Saqr	1803–1866
Salim bin Sultan	1868–1883
Khalid bin Saqr	1900–1908
Muhammad bin Salim	1919–1921
Sultan bin Salim	1921–1948
Saqr bin Muhammad	1948–

### ■ **Al Qasimi Rulers of Sharjah**

Sultan bin Saqr	1803–1866
Khalid bin Sultan	1866–1868
Salim bin Sultan	1868–1883
Saqr bin Khalid	1883–1914
Khalid bin Ahmad bin Sultan	1914–1924
Sultan bin Saqr	1924–1951
Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr	1951–1965
Khalid bin Muhammad	1965–1972
Sultan bin Muhammad	1972–

■ **Al Mu'allah Rulers of Umm al-Qiwain**

'Abdallah bin Rashid	1820–1854
'Ali bin 'Abdallah	1854–1873
Ahmad bin 'Abdallah	1873–1904
Rashid bin Ahmad bin 'Abdallah	1904–1922
Hamad bin Ibrahim bin Ahmad	1923–1929
Ahmad bin Rashid bin Ahmad	1929–1981
Rashid bin Ahmad bin Rashid	1981–

■ **Presidents of the United Arab Emirates**

Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan	1971–2004
Khalifah bin Zayed Al Nahyan	2004–



## Appendix 18

### United Arab Emirates: Excerpts from the 1996 Permanent Constitution

#### **Article 45**

The Union authorities shall consist of:

1. The Supreme Council of the Union.
2. The President of the Union and his Deputy.
3. The Council of Ministers of the Union.
4. The National Assembly of the Union.
5. The Judiciary of the Union.

#### **Article 46**

The Supreme Council of the Union shall be the highest authority in the Union. It shall consist of the Rulers of all the Emirates composing the Union, or of those deputized for the Rulers in their Emirates in the event of their absence or if they have been excused from attending. Each Emirate shall have a single vote in the deliberations of the Council.

#### **Article 47**

The Supreme Council of the Union shall exercise the following matters:

1. Formulation of general policy in all matters invested in the Union by this Constitution and consideration of all matters which lead to the achievement of the goals of the Union and the common interest of the member Emirates.
2. Sanction of various Union laws before their promulgation, including the Laws of the Annual General Budget and the Final Accounts.

3. Sanction of decrees relating to matters which by virtue of the provisions of this Constitution are subject to the ratification or agreement of the Supreme Council. Such sanction shall take place before the promulgation of these decrees by the President of the Union.
4. Ratification of treaties and international agreements. Such ratification shall be accomplished by decree.
5. Approval of the appointment of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union, acceptance of his resignation, and his removal from office upon a proposal from the President of the Union.
6. Approval of the appointment of the President and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union, acceptance of their resignations and their dismissal in the circumstances stipulated by this Constitution. Such acts shall be accomplished by decrees.
7. Supreme Control over the affairs of the Union in general.
8. Any other relevant matters stipulated in this Constitution or in the Union laws.

#### **Article 49**

Decisions of the Supreme Council on substantive matters shall be by a majority of five of its members provided that this majority includes the votes of the Emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. The minority shall be bound by the view of the said majority. But decisions of the Council on procedural matters shall be by a majority vote. Such matters shall be defined in the bylaws of the Council.

#### **Article 51**

The Supreme Council of the Union shall elect from among its members a President and a Vice President of the Union. The Vice President of the Union shall exercise all the powers of the President in the event of his absence for any reason.

#### **Article 52**

The term of office of the President and the Vice President shall be five Gregorian years. They are eligible for reelection to the same offices. Each of them shall, on assuming office, take the following oath before the Supreme Council:

I swear by Almighty God that I will be faithful to the United Arab Emirates; that I will respect its Constitution and its laws; that I will protect the interests of the people of the Union; that I will discharge my duties faithfully and loyally; and that I will safeguard the independence of the Union and its territorial integrity.



### **Article 53**

Upon vacancy of the office of the President or his Deputy for death or resignation, or because either one of them ceases to be Ruler in his Emirate for any reason, the Supreme Council shall be called into session within one month of that date to elect a successor to the vacant office for the period stipulated in Article 52 of this Constitution. In the event that the two offices of the President of the Supreme Council and his Deputy become vacant simultaneously, the Council shall be immediately called into session by any one of its members or by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union, to elect a new President and Vice President to fill the two vacant offices.

### **Article 54**

The President of the Union shall assume the following powers:

1. Presiding the Supreme Council and directing its discussions.
2. Presiding the Supreme Council into session, and terminating its sessions according to the rules of procedure upon which the Council shall decide its bylaws. It is obligatory for him to convene the Council for sessions, whenever one of its members so requested.
3. Calling the Supreme Council and the Council of Ministers into joint session whenever necessity demands.
4. Signing Union laws, decrees, and decisions which the Supreme Council has sanctioned and promulgating them.
5. Appointing the Prime Minister, accepting his resignation, and relieving him of office with the consent of the Supreme Council. He shall also appoint the Deputy Prime Minister and the Ministers and shall receive their resignations and relieve them of office in accordance with a proposal from the Prime Minister of the Union.
6. Appointing the diplomatic representatives of the Union to foreign states and other senior Union officials both civil and military (with the exception of the President and Judges of the Supreme Court of the Union) and accepting their resignations and dismissing them with the consent of the Council of Ministers of the Union. Such appointments, acceptance of resignations, and dismissals shall be accomplished by decrees and in accordance with Union laws.
7. Signing of letters of credence of diplomatic representatives of the Union to foreign states and organizations and accepting the credentials of diplomatic and consular representatives of foreign states to the Union and receiving their letters of credence. He shall similarly sign documents of appointment and credence of representatives.

8. Supervising the implementation of Union laws, decrees, and decisions through the Council of Ministers of the Union and the competent Ministers.
9. Representing the Union internally, vis-à-vis other states and in all international relations.
10. Exercising the right of pardon and commutation of sentences and approving capital sentences according to the provisions of this Constitution and Union laws.
11. Conferring decorations and medals of honor, both civil and military, in accordance with the laws relating to such decorations and medals.
12. Any other power vested in him by the Supreme Council or vested in him in conformity with this Constitution or Union laws.

### **Article 116**

The Emirates shall exercise all powers not assigned to the Union by this Constitution. The Emirates shall all participate in the establishment of the Union and shall benefit from its existence, services, and protection.

### **Article 117**

The exercise of rule in each Emirate shall aim in particular at the maintenance of security and order within its territories, the provision of public utilities for its inhabitants, and the raising of social and economic standards.

*Source:* <http://www.helplinelaw.com/law/uae/constitution/constitution05.php>.

## Appendix 19

### Jordan: Hashimite Rulers

#### ■ Rulers of the Hijaz

Hussein bin ‘Ali	1916–1924
‘Ali bin Hussein	1924–1925

#### ■ Rulers of Iraq

Faysal bin Hussein bin ‘Ali	1921–1933
‘Abdul Illah, Regent	1933
Ghazi bin Faysal bin Hussein	1933–1939
Faysal bin Ghazi	1939–1958

#### ■ Rulers of Transjordan

‘Abdallah bin Hussein	1921–1946
-----------------------	-----------

#### ■ Rulers of Jordan

‘Abdallah bin Hussein	1946–1951
Talal bin ‘Abdallah	1951–1952
Hussein bin Talal	1952–1999
‘Abdallah II bin Hussein	1999–



## Appendix 20

### Jordan: Article 28 of the 1952 Constitution

#### **Article 28**

The Throne of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan is hereditary to the dynasty of King ‘Abdallah bin Al-Hussein in a direct line through his male heirs as provided hereinafter:

- (a) The Royal title shall pass from the holder of the Throne to his eldest son, and to the eldest son of that son and in linear succession by a similar process thereafter. Should the eldest son die before the Throne devolves upon him, his eldest son shall inherit the Throne, despite the existence of brothers to the deceased son. The King may, however, select one of his brothers as heir apparent. In this event, title to the Throne shall pass to him from the holder of the Throne. [This section was amended in the *Official Gazette* no. 1831, of 1 April 1965.]
- (b) Should the person entitled to the Throne die without a male heir, the Throne shall pass to his eldest brother. In the event that the holder of the Throne has no brothers, the Throne shall pass to the eldest son of his eldest brother. Should his eldest brother have no son, the Throne shall pass to the eldest son of his other brothers according to their seniority in age.
- (c) In the absence of any brothers or nephews, the Throne shall pass to the uncles and their descendants, according to the order prescribed in paragraph (b) above.
- (d) Should the last King die without any heir in the manner prescribed above, the Throne shall devolve upon the person whom the National Assembly shall select from among the descendants of the founder of the Arab Revolt, the late King Hussein bin ‘Ali.
- (e) No person shall ascend the Throne unless he is a Muslim, mentally sound and born by a legitimate wife and of Muslim parents.

- (f) No person shall ascend the Throne who has been excluded from succession by a Royal Decree on the ground of unsuitability. Such exclusion shall not of itself include the descendants of such person. The Royal Decree of exclusion shall be countersigned by the Prime Minister and by four Ministers, at least two of whom shall be the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Justice.
- (g) The King attains his majority upon the completion of his eighteenth year according to the lunar calendar. If the Throne devolves upon a person who is below this age, the powers of the King shall be exercised by a Regent or Council of Regents, who shall have been appointed by a Royal Decree by the reigning King. If the King dies without making such nomination, the Council of Ministers shall appoint the Regent or Council of Regents.
- (h) Should the King become unable to exercise his powers on account of illness, his powers shall be exercised by a Vice Regent or Council of Vice Regents. The Vice Regent or Council of Vice Regents shall be appointed by Royal Decree. Should the King be unable to make such appointment, such shall be made by the Council of Ministers.
- (i) Should the King wish to leave the country, he shall, before his departure and by a Royal Decree, appoint a Vice Regent or a Council of Vice Regents to exercise his powers during his absence. The Vice Regent or Council of Vice Regents shall observe any conditions which may be prescribed in the Royal Decree. If the absence of the King is extended to more than four months and the National Assembly is not in session, the Assembly shall be summoned immediately to consider the matter.
- (j) Before the Regent or Vice Regent or any member of the Council of Regents or of the Council of Vice Regents assumes his office he shall take an oath, as prescribed in Article 29 hereof, before the Council of Ministers.
- (k) In the event of the death of the Regent or Vice Regent or member of the Council of Regents or of the Council of Vice Regents, or should he become incapable of performing his duties, the Council of Ministers shall appoint a suitable person to replace him.
- (l) A Regent or Vice Regent or member of the Council of Regents or of the Council of Vice Regents shall not be less than thirty years according to the lunar calendar. However, any male relative of the King who has completed his eighteenth year of age according to the lunar calendar may be appointed to any such office.
- (m) In the event of the King being incapacitated by any mental illness, the Council of Ministers, on confirmation of his illness, shall immediately convene the National Assembly. Should the illness be definitely confirmed, the National Assembly shall by resolution depose the

King, whereupon title to the Throne shall devolve upon the person entitled thereto after him according to the provisions of this Constitution. If the Chamber of Deputies stands dissolved at the time or if its term had expired and no new Chamber had been elected, the former Chamber of Deputies shall be convened for the purpose.

*Source:* [http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution\\_jo.html](http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/constitution_jo.html).





## Appendix 21

---

### Jordan: Hussein's 16 January 1999 Letter to the People

IN THE NAME OF GOD, THE COMPASSIONATE, THE MERCIFUL AND MAY GOD'S PRAYERS AND BLESSINGS BE UPON HIS ARAB, HASHIMITE, FAITHFUL PROPHET, AND UPON THE PROPHET'S HOUSEHOLD AND DISCIPLES.

Dear brother Jordanians,

May God's peace and blessings be upon you, and furthermore,

The happiest and most blessed moments are those that unite me with you to convey to you my best greetings, and to greet you as a brother who yearns for his brothers and his clan after his long absence, and after his longing for his country has reached a peak. You are the best of families, and the best of tribes, the noble men and women of our beloved Jordan. You are the best companions on our journey, the honest and faithful men, who are not swayed by events, and whose determination is not diminished by difficulties or challenges. You are the men who have never known any loyalty save to the soil of Jordan, nor any allegiance save to its message and banner. I have known you over the long years, in course of which we have built Jordan together, with our faith, determination, and endeavor. By the grace of God, we have overcome all obstacles, difficulties, and challenges. We have been at the forefront of our nation, defending its causes and its future. For this, we had to endure more than mountains could bear. I attest that you have always been the most faithful to your pledge, the purest in your conscience, the noblest in your intentions, the most constant in your determination, the greatest in your sacrifices, and the most enduring in the face of hardships, perils, and challenges. May God reward you bounteously and grant you faith to consolidate your faith.

And furthermore, my beloved brothers, we thank God as befits His majesty, omnipotence, and boundless mercy. We thank Him in adversity, through our acceptance of His judgment and our faith in his magnanimity, and we thank him in prosperity for having granted me recovery, as well as his countless other blessings.

My brothers, my family, my clan,

I was keen, since I left our homeland to start my treatment, to maintain contact with you, and to inform you in honesty of the most minute details of my health condition, and the progress of the treatment. This has always been my attitude toward you. The pioneer does not lie to his people, nor does he conceal from them that which he believes they need to know; for life and death are in the hand of God, and when the time comes, none shall delay it nor advance it even by an hour. Our prayers, and our hope is to gain the acceptance of the Almighty, and to be among those who meet Him in His mercy.

In spite of the length of the treatment, and its difficulty, and the effects of this type of treatment, such as physical and emotional pains and exhaustion, I have been careful to maintain two aspects of the sense of duty: The first was the faith in God's justice with which every Hashimite, descending from the house of the Prophet, and honored by Islam, faces hardships with courage, endurance, and tranquillity springing from his faith in God's mercy and acceptance of God's judgment. I thank the Almighty God for filling my heart with tranquillity and contentment, and for giving me the courage, determination, endurance, and tranquillity. My heart was never faint, my conscience did not know impatience nor solitude, nor did my determination and hope waver. Instead, my spirit was fortified by readings from the Quran, which I did at night and during the day, and which suffused my heart with contentment and lit my conscience with hope.

The second was my concern to keep abreast with your news, and to remain apprised continuously of the affairs of the nation in all their details, through the information provided for me by my dear brother and deputy, His Royal Highness Prince Hassan, who spared no effort, and who gave generously, for which he has our thanks and appreciation, and through my meetings with high officials. This was in fulfillment of my pledge to you since the first moment when God honored me with the prime responsibility in our beloved Jordan. I committed myself willingly to devote every moment of my life to serving you and to realizing the hopes and ambitions for which we have all devoted our lives, to complete the march started by our fathers and grandfathers, when they marched behind Hussein bin 'Ali, and took their place under the banner of the [Great Arab] Revolt, and later, when they sought the leadership of the founding grandfather, the martyr 'Abdallah bin Hussein. These are the noble hopes and ambitions for which they have offered legions of martyrs and made great sacrifices.

I recall 14 November 1952, when I addressed to you a message from here in London. I said to you: "Trust that I shall always be with you in my spirit and my mind, that my heart yearns to meet with you, that I constantly think of your good, that I am eager to serve you, that I shall strive to achieve your prosperity, and that I pledge to you before God to stay always in touch with you, to listen to your wishes, and to work to realize them as much as I can." I have

fulfilled this pledge. Neither the distance, nor the illness, have stood between us. You and our beloved Jordan have been in my heart and in my conscience. I feel your pulse and the warmth of your sincere feelings, and I share with you every moment of happiness or anxiety.

Your sincere prayers that sprang from hearts full of faith and love, asking the Almighty God to bless me with recovery and health, and your constant inquiries after my condition, your eagerness for my return to you, and all the noble and pure sentiments that you expressed, in all spontaneity, truth, and faithfulness, have reached me. They encouraged me and they gave me strength, determination, hope, assurance, peace, and confidence regarding the future. Your noble and loyal sentiments will fill me with appreciation, thankfulness, and pride for as long as I live.

Now that I have recovered fully, by the grace of God, it will be merely the batting of an eyelid before I am again in your midst, so that we can resume the work to build our nation, with the initiative, resolve, determination, and strength that you have always known in your brother Hussein. Thank God, my determination is the same, the resolve that has never wavered is still as you have always known it. We should, soon, make a comprehensive review of our nation's progress and address all issues and challenges that occupy our minds or handicap our blessed progress.

I have learned, brothers, that you are preparing to celebrate my return to the homeland, and that you will come out to welcome me, as you did years ago when I returned from my first trip for treatment, to embody the strongest, deepest, and noblest bond between a leader and his people, as you flock from all the towns and villages of Jordan, from its countryside and desert, to Amman, our proud capital city that is Arab in its face, voice, and conscience, as it receives your brother Hussein, and as its mountains and hills echo your cheers, songs, and noble nationalist chants.

I wish to request of you, my dear brothers and family, that we should avoid firing gunshots as an expression of our happiness, so as to avoid robbing anyone among us, or any Jordanian family of his or their pleasure, with a stray bullet that may hit someone. I know that you miss me, and that you have waited a long time for this reunion. God knows how much I miss you, and how happy I am to be with you again. But let us express our joy in a civilized way free from any action that may cause even the slightest harm, or mar the happiness of any member of our great Jordanian family. That would be unacceptable, and incompatible with our values and breeding. I am full of hope that this request will meet your acceptance and approval.

Furthermore, dear brothers,

I would like to address my thanks and appreciation to each and every one among you, the sons of the great and united family of Hussein, of all backgrounds and origins, in your cities, countryside, and desert, for your feelings

of love and loyalty that are without equal in the world. I salute you and I shake your hand one by one, the soldier at his outpost, the worker in his factory, the farmer in his field, the civil servant in his department, the student in his school or university, and the elderly, the mothers, and children in their homes. I say to all of you, may God reward you bounteously for me and for the nation.

As for the brothers and friends, the leaders, presidents, and princes of friendly and brotherly countries, and the officials and citizens from all parts of the world who have hurried to comfort themselves regarding my condition, and to inquire after my health, or who expressed wishes and prayers for my recovery, I give them all my thanks and appreciation, and I ask God to reward them for me.

My dear brothers,

I salute you, and I thank you once again, and I congratulate you on the arrival of Eid Al-Fitr, may God make it one of prosperity for us all, and for all the Arab and Islamic nations. I ask the Almighty God to bless and keep you, and to guide our footsteps to the path of righteousness. Our tryst is tomorrow, and tomorrow is close to those that await it. Many happy returns of the Eid to you all and to Jordan.

May God's peace and blessings be with you.

*Source:* <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/new.html>.

## Appendix 22

### Jordan: Hussein's 25 January 1999 Letter to Hassan

My Dear Brother,  
Your Royal Highness Prince Hassan,  
May God protect you,

I am sending you Arab Hashimite greetings with affection and appreciation. More than thirty years ago, I entrusted you with the position of crown prince, and you have accomplished the task entrusted to you with diligence, enthusiasm, and resolve that knows no fatigue or failure. You have been a brother and a supporter standing by my side in difficult times shouldering with me a great deal of responsibilities on the domestic and sometimes external fronts.

When I entrusted you with this mission, it was my response to your desire and it was my appreciation of your capabilities. I was satisfied because what good we aim to achieve with God's blessing is for Jordan and for all its people and their future generations.

I entrusted you with the post of Crown Prince and I was, with the will of God, responsible for that decision at the time, at a time when the eldest son of the King had not reached the age defined by the Constitution to allow him to assume responsibility in case the King had died by the will of God.

At that time, a dark atmosphere was affecting the whole nation because dangers, rumors, and speculation were rife concerning the imminent end of Jordan, a country with a mission, principles and morals, and a true affiliation to the nation.

At the time, we were forced to introduce an amendment to Article 28 of the Constitution so that a brother of the King could assume the post of the Crown Prince. I chose you for the post with the blessings and approval of my brother, His Royal Highness Prince Mohammad. You have been privileged to hold that post despite the fact that your brother Mohammad was older than you. My dear brother Mohammad displayed understanding and altruism.

At the time my decision concerning succession to the throne was not subject to any personal or emotional considerations but rather was a national one.

It was a decision stemming from my feeling of responsibility and the need to place the national interests and the country's stability and survival above all considerations and interests. My objective was to perform my duty toward my people and nation, to seek God's blessing and peace of mind, and to achieve stability and reassure all Jordanians about the future. This requires cohesion and national unity by God's grace after going through all kinds of experiences and ordeals.

We have sought to be transparent in all our affairs and we were keen on modernization and reforms in all matters that lead to progress and success and in an atmosphere of democracy.

It was during my first trip abroad for medical treatment when cancerous cells were discovered in my left ureter, which was removed in addition to my left kidney. The suffering I felt at the time was a reason for my deep insight into the past and the present, as I was carrying the Holy Quran when I moved from one therapy session to another. God's words served as my spiritual and mental nourishment. I had reached a point when I concluded that the long trip had exhausted me physically and I felt my agility was not like before and that there were boundaries which, if crossed, would take their toll on my resistance.

I was left with my mind and memory intact, thank God, and I was looking forward to doing whatever I could toward serving the nation and its future and the coming generations until the last breath of my life.

To achieve that, I returned home deciding to abdicate the throne in your favor despite the differences between us at times. My small family was offended by slandering and falsehoods, and I refer here to my wife and children. When I heard this, most of the time I attributed it to the tendency toward rivalry among those who pretend to be faithful to you and who attribute to you anything good in whatever you do. I have failed over the years in my advice to you and our family to stop asking the media to focus on persons instead of focusing on content and on those who we should celebrate, such as graduates and creative people.

We have overlooked all these matters because when I returned, I was accorded a great reception by my Jordanian family on that eternal day, which left an indelible impression on me. The Jordanian family has overwhelmed me with its noble feelings that strengthened my resolve and determination to do the impossible to help Jordan achieve peace, following in the footsteps of Egypt and after our Palestinian brothers assumed their responsibilities toward achieving that goal, because this is a right which they exercise with their own will. We support their cause and the Palestinian leadership with all our might.

The commencement of the peace process came at a time when Jordan was under siege and the doors were closed. It came at a time when it was believed that the country had come to a standstill.

Through the peace process, we secured the restoration of occupied Jordanian territory and we found the solution for the water problem and our full

share of water was returned to us. We are still searching and cooperating with all parties to secure the needs of the nation and its future generations, and we continue our efforts toward developing our agriculture and industry. We are trying to achieve peace and we are exploiting all our influence to support our Palestinian brothers, helping them regain their rights on their land and establish their own state on their national soil. We are trying to achieve the objective of all people seeking a just peace in this region. We stand strongly against any tendency toward destruction and death and against the use of weapons of mass destruction. We demand that the whole world stand united against any party seeking destruction or backing terrorism, wherever they might be.

After a thorough examination, it is clear to me that the situation has become extremely dangerous and is a source of constant concern to the world in view of the capability and ease of developing weapons and the access to expertise to make those weapons and use them. Perhaps biological weapons are the most dangerous of all, because they reintroduce to the world certain diseases that have already become extinct, like smallpox. Production of vaccines against the disease has stopped, and the effects of these vaccines end after a time if not used. In addition, there are doubts revolving around the effect of any remaining quantities of the vaccine. The most dangerous aspect of this disease is that its symptoms do not appear immediately, and the carrier of the disease can easily transmit it to those with whom he has contact.

In the present time of fast communication, such disease can move with an amazing speed around the world, ending the lives of all people without discrimination.

In addition, the world is witnessing material greed, which can cause great damage to the earth's environment unless sound measures are taken. It has to be pointed out that cancer is an outcome of that situation. For example, skin cancer has been proven to be a result of holes in the ozone layer. No doubt other forms of cancer result from environmental pollution in the atmosphere, in addition to smoking. What is more dangerous is that such an atmosphere leads toward drastic changes in the world, like changes in the climate and in rainfall. Such an atmosphere also can cause devastating floods and is behind fires that destroy tropical forests and pollute the waters of rivers, lakes, and seas.

Returning to the peace process, I appreciate what you have done to make it succeed, and I should admit it was not an easy job. You have helped me in selecting competitive Jordanians who are loyal to their country and capable of working and defending its rights under all conditions. For that I am grateful and I appreciate what you have done.

Some people may question the reason behind keeping certain officials in their positions. My answer is they are the elite of this nation and they have risen to the occasion with the courage and true affiliation to the country and great affection toward serving their homeland, whether civilian or military personalities, technicians, or experts.

After my first trip abroad for treatment we entered the peace process and we exerted all efforts toward making it a success. We embarked on this mission armed with our strong belief in God, our belief that we are all the descendants of Abraham, and our belief in the futility of wars and tragedies that befall people.

We were oriented toward construction and doing good, and we have always sought to persuade the world that peace cannot be achieved without justice and that the world should deal with the Arabs on an equal footing so that the inhabitants of this region can protect their interests. We have called on the world to start a serious and objective dialogue in order to lay down the new principles for actual cooperation, free of selfishness and free of the desire to place petty interests above major ones. We welcome anyone who is committed to contributing to a law governing bilateral or collective dealings among the people of the world to join us. Those who go astray must be held accountable for their actions, because the world should not be monopolized by groups seeking to tamper with the fate of mankind at will.

As for our Hashimite situation, I remember I spoke about that at a big meeting for officers and officials at the conference hall at Al Hussein Medical City. I stressed the formation of a family council to take care of those who are worthy of belonging to the family of the Prophet Mohammed, peace be upon him, and the house of the Prophet.

I have lived through many experiences and I noticed at an early age how some climbers climb onto the branch to ruin the relation between brothers and between father and son, and I swore to myself that this would not happen here in my lifetime. But surely, this has become the objective of every declared or hidden enemy, and all of those have used all means at their disposal to weaken confidence between leadership and people, but they have not succeeded.

Their plan at this stage, together with those who want to destroy Jordan, was to instigate infighting in the ranks of the leadership after they failed to dismantle the base, and they find in my being alive an impediment to all their designs, forgetting that Al Hussein has lived only to gain the blessings of God, to have a clear conscience, and to achieve the best for all his people, regardless of their origins, who cooperate in holding the banner high and carrying the message of Jordan with their heads held high, not bowing except before God.

Until that time, I was determined to hand the first responsibility to you, but after you, I envisioned a role for the family council in which to ensure the unity of the Hashimite Family so that when the time came for you to choose your successor, the family would have a great role in naming the most suitable successor, in accordance with the benevolent traditions of Islam.

The most important traits to which young men should aspire are mutual respect, frankness, the fortitude to reject malice, and a quest for knowledge, starting with the honor of serving in the Jordan Armed Forces, the Arab Army,



to be a model for young people and to earn the honor that they deserve for their abilities and capabilities.

I envisioned that the council would include all Hashimite Jordanians, including yourself, Prince Raad bin Zayd bin Hussein, Prince Zayd bin Shaker, and Prince 'Ali bin Nayif, and that all of them would rise to the level expected of them, believing in the importance of their duty and under the threat of punishment for departing from the rules and from a consensus that would achieve the objective and light the right path for future generations and show respect for the country's laws and love for all people, without any injustice or malice. I aspired that the Hashimites would deal with all people as they would wish people to deal with them, removed from envy or greed, refraining from mobilizing people against people's own interests, without dividing them into followers of this or that and destroying the edifice of Jordanian society in a way that would fulfill the interest of the country's enemies.

We differed over [the council] because your opinion was that it should be achieved only when you were at the helm. I placed between your two hands a few papers that I wrote myself. I did not show them to anyone. They consisted of the main tenets of my proposal, and when I received your comments on them, the response did not reflect the spirit of my proposal, nor did they meet the needs of the times.

We have differed, and we still do, over the succession, and who would succeed you. You were completely opposed to this until the time you would have assumed the Throne and decided who would have been your successor.

All the princes and princesses are my children and the grandchildren are mine too. You and your sister were the closest to me within the family. Your sons and daughters are like my own children: 'Abdallah, Faysal, 'Ali, Hamzah, and Hashim.

Hamzah, may God give him long life, has been envied since childhood because he was close to me, and because he wanted to know all matters large and small, and all details of the history of his family. He wanted to know about the struggle of his brothers and of his countrymen. I have been touched by his devotion to his country and by his integrity and magnanimity as he stayed beside me, not moving unless I forced him from time to time to carry out some duty on occasions that did not exceed the fingers on one hand. That is how Hamzah bin Al Hussein spent his holiday, between his studies at Harrow and his admission to the military academy at Sandhurst, after my insistence. I order him now, as his father and leader, to continue his studies there without any interruption until he finishes, by God's grace.

As for his brothers and sisters, they have both visited me, leaving behind them on many occasions their families and children for extended periods of time. These visits pleased me, but at the same time made me worry about those who they left behind. Of my family, at the forefront was my brother Muhammad and

my sister Basmah, who visited me and donated marrow that matches my own. You also volunteered to donate marrow except that yours did not match mine.

As for Noor, she brought happiness to me and cared for me during my illness, with the utmost loving affection. She, the Jordanian, who belongs to this country with every fiber of her being, holds her head high in the defense and service of this country's interest. She is the mother who devotes all her efforts to her family. We have grown together in soul and mind, and she has had to endure a great deal of hardship to ensure that I was being attended to. And she, like me, also endured much anxiety and many shocks, but always placed her faith in God and hid her tears behind smiles. She also has not escaped the attempts of criticism. Why not? [Because there are] climbers who want to reach for the summit, and when the fever was getting high some people thought it was their chance.

I have intervened from my sickbed to prevent meddling in the affairs of the Arab Army. This meddling seemed to be meant to settle scores, and included retiring efficient officers known for their allegiance and whose history and bright records are beyond reproach. At the forefront were the Field Marshal and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who was envied because of a house. I am the one who paid for the house. I have collected the money in installments over years until it was built modestly. Its costs in no way approach the estimates made by many. That was because of his loyalty and his integrity and because we wanted to give him something commensurate with his rank and position, especially [because] he receives his counterparts from all over the world.

Some people are asking, did others receive the same care? The answer is yes. From the meek to the mighty, wherever it was possible to do so.

Perhaps it was wrong at times, but the support of those who deserve it is one of my greatest responsibilities, and [I do] not do it for personal gain. Excelling students and needy patients benefited.

And then, there is another question: Where is all this coming from? The answer is, I have raised [funds] for my country and my people to ensure their progress and to ensure that they lead dignified lives, through continuous development. All [those funds] went to the objective of national self-reliance and to the treasury.

On the personal level, that was God-given; the result of many brothers in Arab and Muslim nations who were very magnanimous toward me, knowing my situation and sufferings over the years. They have helped me pay my debts and helped me also to spend on those who serve their country. I thank them and I am grateful to them for their magnanimity.

All of this has given me many sleepless nights while I was on my sickbed, on top of my personal suffering. What made me sleepless for the first time in my life is that I was asking myself, why is there insistence on change in the Army since we know the need for reform and development and the Chairman

and myself were busy all the time providing our army with all available experience, local and international. I have used my authority as Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces to stop any action that would have led to the fragmentation and politicization of the Army. We have ensured that service in the Army would achieve all our ambitions in its continuous development on the strongest basis as a shield for the country and as our pride.

The same applies to the transfer of efficient ambassadors without reason except the reason of age, although those ambassadors represent the king, the state, and the country. That's why I returned to the homeland: to rectify matters as soon as possible and to assume my duties toward future generations.

I have found that after all these years—during which circumstances and conditions have changed both in our region and at the national level—by God's grace, we have achieved a high level of credibility, confidence, and international recognition, all of which call on us to continue the tireless and sincere work to provide the chance for young people to serve their country and enrich our march with new vision and new experience. All of this requires us to take great care of our affairs and look at the future with objectivity and farsightedness.

I have received your letter in which you place the matter of succession between my hands and in which you express your readiness to hear my decision concerning that matter. I thank you for that.

I have found that to take a decision, I must refer to the original Constitutional rule, where I find that all conditions that originally dictated the exception have passed, and that, therefore, His Royal Highness Prince 'Abdallah would, in such a case, immediately assume all duties and responsibilities as the Crown Prince of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan.

I thank you, Your Royal Highness, my dear brother, and express my deepest appreciation to you for all the sincere efforts that you have exerted during the past three decades. I thank you for all your achievements in the fields of development, education, intellectual discourse, science, and environmental affairs through your overseeing of many programs at our national institutions. I value in you the spirit of true and genuine brotherhood toward myself, expressed in your generous letter, which I also feel toward you. This reflects what should ever be the case within our Hashimite Family and which should always be a pillar of the Hashimite Family of love and affection, a family which embodies a feeling of responsibility and understanding towards new developments and circumstances of a new era and regards these developments with a great deal of awareness and the ability to deal with them objectivity and with selflessness.

I am sure that you are receiving this decision of mine with self-content, and with the spirit of a member of the one united Hashimite team. I am sure that you will be relieved of all the psychological and familial pressures. Jordan and the world at large will be your world, in which there are so many

issues in many fields that need your knowledge, expertise, and deep intellect, and concerns worthy of your tireless efforts and that, by God's grace, will be supported by us. You will always stay close to me as a brother, an intellectual, and a man of principle.

May God bless you,  
Al Hussein

*Source:* <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/99-jan25.html>.

## Appendix 23

### Jordan: Royal Decree of 25 January 1999— 'Abdallah as Heir Apparent

We, King Hussein I of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan, acting under Paragraph A of Article 28 of the Constitution, issue our Royal Decree appointing our eldest son, His Royal Highness Prince 'Abdallah bin Hussein, as Crown Prince. He shall be vested with all rights and privileges pertaining to this decree.

*Source:* <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/new.html>.



## Appendix 24

---

### Jordan: Hussein's 26 January 1999 Letter to 'Abdallah

His Royal Highness Crown Prince 'Abdallah bin Hussein, may God watch over him:

I extend to you a Hashimite Arab greeting, full of love, confidence, and pride in you as a Hashimite knight, a soldier for the homeland, my heir, and the person who our great Jordanian family of all origins pins great hopes on.

I have bestowed upon you the position of crown prince of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan with a clear conscience. I am very confident and reassured that you are fit to bear this great responsibility. I have known you—my son, whom I raised with my own hands—to love your country, enjoy a great sense of belonging to it, work diligently and selflessly for its sake without showing off. I know you to be determined, strong-willed, objective, balanced, and to work upon the guidelines of the honorable and noble Hashimite principles based on the love and fear of God, as well as the love of the people and humbling oneself to their will, being eager to serve them, treating them with fairness, respecting their elderly, showing mercy on their youth, and forgiving the guilty when possible. These principles are also based on magnanimity, firmness when a decision is reached, and placing the interests of the country and nation above all other interests and considerations.

I am very optimistic about your future. You were my student and you know that beloved Jordan has inherited the principles of the Great Arab Revolt and its great message and that it is an inseparable part of the Arab nation. You know that the Jordanian people must remain, as always, at the forefront of their nation in defending the nation's causes and the future of their generations. These great people have sacrificed much for the sake of these honorable principles and have borne for their sake burdens that mountains cannot bear and would crumble under.

The lofty men and glorious women of our one Jordanian family, from all origins, have never failed to do their duties. They have never let down their leadership and nation. They have always been the faithful comrades of the

march who are affiliated with their homeland and nation, and who are capable of facing difficulties and challenges with relentless resolution and generous and noble spirits. Their leadership should commit itself to working for their present and future and to achieving their comprehensive development so that they can lead an honorable life, that their rights, which are guaranteed by the Constitution, can be safeguarded, and that their heads remain high and do not bow but to God or to kiss the soil of the dear homeland.

On the level of your Hashimite family, every one of them has done all he could. They have suffered and endured with their people and tribe, the big Jordanian family, what is beyond their endurance. I am certain that you will be, as you have always been, one of them, respect and love them and do your best to unite them, close their ranks, spread love, amity, and mercy among them, consult them after me, and appreciate everyone's favor and safeguard everyone's right.

While reiterating my full confidence in you and in your ability to assume all these responsibilities with extreme honesty, sincerity, devotion, and self-denial in accordance with the principles of soldiership on which you were raised and were distinguished in its field; and all my support for you as much as I can, I beseech Almighty God to preserve you, to take care of you, to help you, to guide your steps on the right path, and to grant you success in serving dear Jordan. May God guide our steps on the good path of success.

May God's peace and blessing be upon you,  
Your loving father

*Source:* <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/new.html>.



## Appendix 25

### Jordan: 'Abdallah's 27 January 1999 Letter to Hussein

Your Hashimite Royal Majesty King Hussein, may God protect him:  
Peace and God's mercy be upon you.

With great pride and appreciation I received your noble letter in which you gave me your sublime instructions after you entrusted me with the post of crown prince of the Hashimite Kingdom of Jordan and gave me your confidence, which is the most valuable thing in my life. This is one of your numerous glorious deeds to me, to the Hashimite family, and to the dear homeland, whose structure you strengthened with your pure hands, continuous struggle, and wisdom, which was attested to by those near and afar, your vision of the future, and your relentless courage and determination while leading the march of your faithful people and overcoming with them all the challenges and difficulties the region, including Jordan, has passed through over the past decades.

In spite of all these challenges, you realized great national achievements that drew the appreciation and respect of the whole world to this homeland whether in terms of all-out progress, the entrenchment of internal security and stability, or in terms of the work for entrenching the pillars of peace in this region, whose peoples suffered much as a result of wars and conflicts. These achievements are also manifested in opening the horizons for our democratic march and entrenching its foundations as a demonstration of the values of freedom and respect for human rights in which we believe, and I had the honor of learning in your school, benefiting from your wide experience and your inspiring and unique leadership, and taking an example from your great history, Hashimite tolerant nature, and noble traits on which we have been raised and which were deeply entrenched in our souls and consciences. Hence, you—may God protect you—added the legitimacy of achievement and construction to the historical and religious legitimacy, which your leadership enjoys.

At your great school, Sir, I learned that the united greater Jordanian family from all origins and roots is our family and clan, that they are Hussein's fellow companions, that they are the children and grandchildren of the pioneers

who joined hands with the revolutionary leader Al-Hussein bin ‘Ali and later rallied behind the founder grandfather, ‘Abdallah bin al-Hussein. You have been the leader, teacher, father, brother, and friend of the members of this family, devoting every minute of your life to serving them, building their future, protecting their dignity and rights, and realizing their hopes and aspirations that are derived from the mission and principles of the Great Arab Revolt.

As for the Hashimite family, I am but one of its members and they are my kinfolk. I am proud to be one of them. I will endeavor to make the spirit of love, amity, compassion, altruism, and Hashimite morality the basis of relations among them. The aim which I will continue to work for will be the sincere, serious work that benefits the people, placing the homeland’s interests above all other considerations.

I am, Sir, one of your sincere soldiers. You have placed your trust in me, something which I greatly cherish. God is my witness, I will do my utmost and, with your esteemed directives enunciated in your kind letter addressed to me, will continue the blessed and productive march that you have drawn up to serve the homeland and the people and realize the Jordanian people’s hopes and aspirations for development, prosperity, and a secure, decent life, and for maintaining the cohesion of our domestic front as well as our national unity which we are proud of.

I pray to God Almighty to protect you, grant you good health, and keep you for beloved Jordan and for the Arab and Islamic nations. I also pray to God to support me and grant me success in being worthy of your trust and in working in accordance with God’s desire and in the interest of the people and the homeland.

May God’s blessings and peace be upon you,  
‘Abdallah bin Hussein, Regent and Crown Prince

*Source:* <http://www.kinghussein.gov.jo/new.html>.

## Appendix 26

### Jordan: 'Abdallah's 28 November 2004 Letter to Hamzah

Your Royal Highness,  
My Dear Brother Prince Hamzah bin Hussein,  
May God keep you,

I am pleased to extend to you my very best greetings and most sincere wishes for continued health, happiness, and success, and to express my deepest affection and highest esteem to you as a brother, a Hashimite Prince and a sincere Jordanian soldier, keen to selflessly perform the call of duty. I have known these traits in you since you started your journey giving to our beloved country. I chose you personally five years ago from among all my brothers, including those who are older than you, to be heir apparent and to be my support whenever necessary. I have been eager since I came to the throne of our beloved Jordan to reflect the true meaning of the position of heir apparent as it is stated in the Constitution. This position is an honorary one that does not entail any authority or any responsibility.

Our beloved father King Hussein, may God rest His Soul, had reaffirmed to us before he passed away the importance of adhering to the honorary concept of the position of heir and we have abided by that throughout the past five years. Your holding this symbolic position has restrained your freedom and hindered our trusting you with certain responsibilities that you are fully qualified to undertake.

And because the country needs the efforts of each and every one of us to work with utmost energy and capability especially during these difficult circumstances which the region and our beloved Jordan are going through, I have decided to free you from the constraints of the position of heir apparent in order to give you the freedom to work and undertake any mission or responsibility I entrust you with, alongside with all our brothers, the sons of Hussein, and other members of the Hashimite family. I trust that you will be a great help and support to me and to your brothers in the service of our beloved country and our great Jordanian family.

As for the position of heir apparent, I will continue, guided by the Constitution and the good of our beloved Jordan and our noble Hashimite message, to give it my sincere attention.

I ask God to keep you and save you and give you success in the service of our dear country.

Your Brother,

‘Abdallah bin Hussein

*Source:* [http://www.kingabdullah.jo/main2.php?page\\_id=464&lang\\_hmka1=1](http://www.kingabdullah.jo/main2.php?page_id=464&lang_hmka1=1).

## Appendix 27

---

### Morocco: 'Alawi Rulers

Muhammad al-Rashid bin Sharif (Muhammad I)	1635–1664
Abul 'Abbas Ahmad Al Harrani	1664–1672
Ismail al-Rashid bin Sharif	1672–1727
Abul 'Abbas Ahmad al-Dhahabi	1727–1728
'Abdul Malik	1728
Abul Abbas Ahmad al-Dhahabi	1728–1729
'Abdallah bin Abul 'Abbas (first rule)	1729–1735
'Ali bin Abul 'Abbas	1735–1736
'Abdallah bin Abul 'Abbas (second rule)	1736
Muhammad bin 'Abdallah (Muhammad II)	1736–1738
Al-Mostadi	1738–1740
'Abdallah bin Abul 'Abbas (third rule)	1740–1745
Zayn al-'Abidayn	1745
'Abdallah bin Abul 'Abbas (fourth rule)	1745–1757
Muhammad bin 'Abdallah (Muhammad III)	1757–1790
Yazid bin Muhammad	1790–1792
Sulayman bin Yazid	1792–1822
'Abdul Rahman bin Sulayman	1822–1859
Muhammad bin 'Abdul Rahman (Muhammad IV)	1859–1873
Hassan bin Muhammad (Hassan I)	1873–1894
'Abdul 'Aziz bin Hassan	1894–1908
'Abdul Hafith bin 'Abdul 'Aziz	1908–1912
Yusuf bin 'Abdul Hafith	1912–1927
Muhammad bin Yusuf (Muhammad V)	1927–1961
Hassan bin Muhammad (Hassan II)	1961–1999
Muhammad bin Hassan (Muhammad VI)	1999–



## Appendix 28

### Morocco: Excerpts from the 1996 Constitution

#### **Article 19**

The King, “Amir Al-Mu’minin” [Commander of the Faithful], shall be the Supreme Representative of the Nation and the Symbol of the unity thereof. He shall be the guarantor of the perpetuation and the continuity of the State. As Defender of the Faith, He shall ensure the respect for the Constitution. He shall be the Protector of the rights and liberties of the citizens, social groups, and organizations. The King shall be the guarantor of the independence of the Nation and the territorial integrity of the Kingdom within all its rightful boundaries.

#### **Article 20**

The Moroccan Crown and the constitutional rights thereof shall be hereditary and handed down, from father to son, to descendants in direct male line and by order of primogeniture among the offspring of His Majesty King Hassan II, unless the King should, during his lifetime, designate a successor among his sons apart from the eldest one. In case of failing descendants in direct male line, the right of succession to the Throne shall, under the same conditions, be invested in the closest male in the collateral consanguinity.

#### **Article 21**

The King shall be considered minor until he turns sixteen. During the King’s phase of minority, a Regency Council shall assume the powers of the constitutional rights of the Crown, with the exception of those pertaining to the revision of the Constitution. The Regency Council shall serve as an advisory board to the King until he turns twenty. The Regency Council shall be presided over by the First President of the Supreme Court. It shall include, in addition to its Chairman, the President of the Council of Deputies, the President of the

Consultative Council, the Chairman of the Rabat and the Council of Scholars, and ten dignitaries appointed with the King's own accord. Rules of procedure of the Regency Council shall be governed by an organic law.

### **Article 23**

The person of the King shall be sacred and inviolable.

*Source:* Morocco, Kingdom of, *Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco* at <http://www.al-bab.com/maroc/gov/con96.htm>.



# Bibliography

- Abuhussain, 'Ali. *Masirat al-Khayr wal-'Ata' fil-Bahrayn* [The March Toward Progress and Prosperity in Bahrain]. Bahrain: n.p., 1993.
- Abdallah, Sana. "Jordan Royal Manoeuvres." *Middle East International* no. 740, 17 December 2004, p. 23.
- al-Abdulla, Yousof Ibrahim. *A Study of Qatari-British Relations, 1914–1945*. Doha: Orient Publishing and Translation, 1981.
- Abdullah, M. Morsy. "The First Saudi Dynasty and Oman, 1795–1818." *Proceedings of the Fourth Seminar for Arabian Studies*, 1970, pp. 34–40.
- Abir, Mordechai. *Oil Power and Politics: Conflict in Arabia, the Red Sea, and the Gulf*. London: Cass, 1974.
- . *Saudi Arabia in the Oil Era: Regime and Elites; Conflict and Collaboration*. Boulder: Westview, 1988.
- Abu Hakima, Ahmad Mustafa. *History of Eastern Arabia, 1750–1800: The Rise and Development of Bahrain and Kuwait*. Beirut: Khayat, 1965.
- . *The Modern History of Kuwait*. London: Luzac, 1983.
- AbuKhalil, As'ad. *The Battle for Saudi Arabia: Royalty, Fundamentalism, and Global Power*. New York: Steven Stories, 2004.
- Aburish, Said. *The Rise, Corruption, and Coming Fall of the House of Saud*. London: Bloomsbury, 1994.
- "Abu Zaby Tatba'u Al-Numuzaj al-Khaliji fi Intiqal al-Hukm" [Abu Dhabi Follows the Gulf Model for Succession]. *Ad-Diplomasi News Report* no. 14, June 1997, pp. 5–7.
- Ageron, Charles-Robert. *Les Algériens Musulmans et la France (1871–1919)*. 2 vols. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968.
- Agha, Hassan. *Qadayah al-Khalij al-Arabi* [The Problems of the Arabian Gulf]. Beirut: Al-Muassasat al-Arabiyyat lil-Dirasat wal-Nashr, 1982.
- Ahmed, Feroz. *The Young Turks: The Committee of Union and Progress in Turkish Politics, 1908–1914*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1969.
- 'Ali, Gaafar 'Abdul Salam. *Al-Nizam al-Idari al-Su'udi* [The Administrative Law in Saudi Arabia]. Cairo: Al-Salfiyat, 1977.

- al-Alkim, Hassan Hamdan. *The Foreign Policy of the United Arab Emirates*. London: Saqi, 1989.
- Allen, Calvin H., Jr. *Oman: The Modernization of the Sultanate*. Boulder: Westview, 1987.
- . "Sayyids, Shets, and Sultans: Politics and Trade in Masqat Under the Al Bu Said, 1785–1914." PhD diss. Seattle: University of Washington, 1978.
- Andoni, Lamis. "Jordan: Badran's Skillful Game." *Middle East International* no. 365, 15 December 1989, p. 8.
- Ansary, Abdullah F. "The Succession Process in Kuwait: A Brief Overview of the Recent Crisis from a Legal Perspective." *World Law Bulletin* no. 1, January 2006, pp. 64–74.
- Ansombe, Frederick F. *The Ottoman Gulf: The Creation of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.
- Anthony, John Duke. *Arab States of the Lower Gulf: People, Politics, Petroleum*. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1975.
- Antonius, George. *The Arab Awakening*. New York: Lippincott, 1939.
- Armstrong, Harold C. *Lord of Arabia: Ibn Saud—An Intimate Study of a King*. London: Barker, 1934.
- Attia, Adel Moneim. "Oman." In Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1974, pp. 1–18.
- Ayalon, Ami, and Haim Shaked, eds. *Middle East Contemporary Survey*. Vols., 12–14, 1988–1990. Boulder: Westview, 1989–1991.
- al-Azzad, Salah. *Al-Tayyarat al-Siyassiyah fi al-Khalij al-Arabi* [Political Currents in the Arabian Gulf]. Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglu al-Misriyyah, 1974.
- Baaklini, Abdo. "Legislatures in the Gulf Area: The Experience of Kuwait, 1961–1976." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 14, no. 3, August 1982, pp. 359–379.
- Badger, G. P., ed. and trans. *The History of the Imams and Seyyids of Uman, by Salil-Ibn Razik, from 661–1856*. London: Hakluyt Society, 1871.
- al-Baharna, Husain. *The Arabian Gulf States: Their Legal and Political Status and Their International Problems*. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1978.
- . *The Legal Status of the Arabian Gulf States*. Oxford: Manchester University Press, 1968.
- Bahrain, Kingdom of. *Al-Muzakarat al-Tafsiriyyah li-Dastur Mamlakat al-Bahrain* [Narrative of the National Charter]. Manama, 14 February 2002.
- Bahrain, State of. *Al-Mithaq Al-Watani* [National Charter]. Manama, 2002.
- "Bahrain: Bloodless Revolution?" *Middle East International* no. 644, 23 February 2001, p. 15.
- Bailey, Clinton. "Cabinet Formation in Jordan." In Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank*. New York: American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977, pp. 102–113.
- Balakian, Peter. *The Burning Tigris: The Armenian Genocide and America's Response*. New York: HarperCollins, 2003.
- Batatu, Hanna. *The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq's Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba'athists, and Free Officers*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978.

- al-Baz, Rania. *Défigurée: Quand un Crime Passionnel Devient Affaire d'État*. Paris: Michal Lafont, 2005 (published in English as *Disfigured: When a Crime of Passion Becomes an Affair of State*. Oxford: OneWorld, 2007).
- Beasant, John. *Oman: The True-Life Drama and Intrigue of an Arab State*. Edinburgh: Mainstream, 2002.
- Beckingham, C. F. "Bu Said." In *Encyclopedia of Islam*, 2nd ed., Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960–, pp. 128–123.
- . "The Reign of Ahmad Ibn Said, Imam of Oman." *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 28, no. 3, 1941, pp. 257–260.
- Bell, Gertrude Lowthian. *The Desert and the Sown*. London: Virago, 1985 (reprint of 1907 edition).
- Belling, Willard A. *King Faisal and the Modernisation of Saudi Arabia*. London: Croom Helm, 1980.
- Benoist-Mechin. *Fayçal, Roi d'Arabie: L'Homme, le Souverain, sa Place dans le Monde, 1906–1975*. Paris: Albin Michel, 1975.
- . *Le Loup et le Leopard: Ibn-Seoud ou la Naissance d'un Royaume*. Paris: Albin Michel, 1955.
- Berque, Jacques. *French North Africa: The Maghreb Between Two World Wars*, 2nd ed. Translated by J. Stewart. London: Farber and Faber, 1967.
- Blaustein, Eric B. "Kuwait." In Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1971, pp. 1–22.
- Bligh, Alexander. *From Prince to King: Royal Succession in the House of Saud in the Twentieth Century*. New York: New York University Press, 1984.
- Bonnenfant, Paul, ed. *La Péninsule Arabique d'Aujourd'hui*. 2 vols. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1982.
- Boulby, Marion. *The Muslim Brotherhood and the Kings of Jordan, 1945–1993*. Lanham: University Press of America, 1999.
- Bourequat, Ali-Auguste. *In the Moroccan King's Secret Garden*. London: Morris, 1988.
- Bourgey, André. "Kuwait." In Paul Bonnenfant, ed., *La Péninsule Arabique d'Aujourd'hui*. Vol. 2. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1982, pp. 417–452.
- Bowman, Larry W., and Ian Clark, eds. *The Indian Ocean in Global Politics*. Boulder: Westview, 1981.
- Briody, Dan. *The Iron Triangle: Inside the Secret World of the Carlyle Group*. New York: Wiley, 2003.
- Brown, L. Carl. *Consult Them in the Matter: A Nineteenth-Century Islamic Argument for Constitutional Government*. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2005.
- . *The Tunisia of Ahmed Bey, 1837–1855*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974.
- Brynen, Rex. "Economic Crisis and Post-Rentier Democratization in the Arab World: The Case of Jordan." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 1, March 1992, pp. 69–97.
- Bulloch, John. *The Persian Gulf Unveiled*. New York: Congdon and Weed, 1984.
- The Buraimi Memorials, 1955: The Territorial Dispute Concerning Buraimi, Liwa, and Khor al-'Udayd—The Memorials Submitted to Arbitration by the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom*. London: Archive Editions, 1987.

- Burdett, Anita L. P. *Records of the Emirates, 1961–1965*. Year 1965. Farnham Common, Slough, UK: Archive Editions, 1997.
- Burrows, Bernard. *Footnotes in the Sand: The Gulf in Transition, 1953–1958*. Salisbury, Wiltshire, UK: Michael Russell, 1990.
- Busch, Briton Cooper. *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1894–1914*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967.
- . *Britain, India, and the Arabs, 1914–1921*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971.
- Bush, George, and Brent Scowcroft. *A World Transformed*. New York: Knopf, 1998.
- Chabry, Laurent. “La Succession au Koweït: Continuité Assurée.” *Maghreb-Machrek* no. 80, January–March 1978, pp. 4–15.
- Chamberlain, Muriel E. “The Alexandria Massacres of June 1882 and the British Occupation of Egypt.” *Middle Eastern Studies* 13, no. 1, January 1977, pp. 14–39.
- Clements, Frank A. *Oman: The Reborn Land*. London: Longman, 1980.
- Cole, Donald Powell. *Nomads of the Nomads: The Al Murrah Bedouin of the Empty Quarter*. Chicago: Aldine, 1975.
- Constitution of the United Arab Emirates*. Abu Dhabi: Federal National Council, 1997.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. *Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the UAE*. Boulder: Westview, 1997.
- Cottrell, Alvin J., ed. *The Persian Gulf: A General Survey*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980.
- le Cour Grandmaison, Colette. “Le Sultanat d’Oman.” In Paul Bonnenfant, ed., *La Péninsule Arabique d’Aujourd’hui*, vol. 2. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1982, pp. 261–414.
- Crabittès, Pierre. *Ismaïl: The Maligned Khedive*. London: Routledge, 1933.
- Crystal, Jill. “Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah.” In Bernard Reich, ed., *Political Leaders of the Contemporary Middle East and North Africa*. New York: Greenwood, 1990, pp. 8–14.
- . *Kuwait: The Transformation of an Oil State*. Boulder: Westview, 1992.
- al-Dabbagh, Mustafa Murad. *Qatar: Madihah wa Hadaruhah* [Qatar: Past and Present]. Beirut: Dar al-Tali‘ah, 1961.
- Dadrian, Vahagn. *The History of the Armenian Genocide*. Providence, R.I.: Berghahn, 1995.
- Dann, Uriel. *King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989.
- Daoud, Zakya, and Monjib Maâti. *Ben Barka: Une Vie, une Mort*. Paris: Michalon, 2000.
- Davis, Helen Miller. *Constitutions, Electoral Laws, Treaties of States in the Near and Middle East*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1947.
- Davison, Roderic H. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 1856–1876*. New York: Gordian, 1973 [reprint of 1963 edition].
- Dawn, C. Ernest. *From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism*. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973.
- Dazi-Héni, Fatiha. “Bahrein et Koweït: La Modernisation des Dynasties Al Khalifa et Al Sabah.” In Rémy Leveau et Abdellah Hammoudi, eds., *Monarchies Arabes: Transitions et Dérives Dynastiques*. Paris: Institut Français des Relations Internationales, 2002, pp. 229–231.

- . *Monarchies et Sociétés d'Arabie: Le Temps des Confrontations*. Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 2006.
- Dekmejian, R. Hrair. "Saudi Arabia's Consultative Council." *Middle East Journal* 52, no. 2, Spring 1998, pp. 204–218.
- Dickey, Christopher. *Expats: Travels in Arabia, from Tripoli to Teheran*. New York: Atlantic Monthly, 1990.
- Dickson, Harold Richard Patrick. *The Arab of the Desert*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1951.
- al-Diyaf, Ahmad Ibn Abu. *Ithaf Ahl al-Zaman bi Akhbar Muluk Tunis wa 'Ahd al-Aman* [Presenting Contemporaries the History of the Rulers of Tunis and the Fundamental Pact]. Tunis: Nashr Kitabat al-Dawlah lil-Shu'un al-Thaqafiyyah wal-Ikhbar, 1963.
- Donner, Fred M. "Muhammad and the Caliphate: Political History of the Islamic Empire Up to the Mongol Conquest." In John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 1–61.
- Doran, Michael Scott. "The Saudi Paradox." *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 1, January–February 2004, pp. 35–51.
- Dowdy, William L., and Russell B. Trood, eds. *The Indian Ocean: Perspectives on a Strategic Arena*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985.
- Eickelman, Christine. *Women and Community in Oman*. New York: New York University Press, 1984.
- Eickelman, Dale F. "Changing Perceptions of State Authority: Morocco, Egypt, and Oman." In Ghassan Salamé, ed., *The Foundations of the Arab State*. London: Croom Helm, 1987, pp. 177–204.
- . "From Theocracy to Monarchy: Authority and Legitimacy in Inner Oman, 1935–1957." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 17, no. 1, February 1985, pp. 3–24.
- . "Intelligence in an Arab Gulf State." In Roy Godson, ed., *Comparing Foreign Intelligence: The U.S., the U.S.S.R., the U.K., and the Third World*. Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988, pp. 89–114.
- . "Kings and People: Oman's State Consultative Council." *Middle East Journal* 38, no. 1, Winter 1984, pp. 61–71.
- . "National Identity and Religious Discourse in Contemporary Oman." *International Journal of Islamic and Arab Studies* 6, no. 1, 1989, pp. 1–20.
- . "Oman's Next Generation: Challenges and Prospects." In H. Richard Sindelar III and J. E. Peterson, eds., *Cross-Currents in the Gulf*. London: Routledge, 1987, pp. 157–180.
- . "Religious Knowledge in Inner Oman." *Journal of Oman Studies* 6, no. 1, 1983, pp. 163–172.
- . "Religious Tradition, Economic Domination, and Political Legitimacy." *Revue de l'Occident Musulman et de la Méditerranée* 29, no. 1, 1980, pp. 17–30.
- Eickelman, Dale F., and M. G. Dennison. "Arabizing the Omani Intelligence Services: Clash of Cultures?" *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence* 7, no. 1, Spring 1992, pp. 1–28.
- Eilts, Herman Frederick. *A Friendship Two Centuries Old: The United States and the Sultanate of Oman*. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1990.

- . *United States and Oman: A Sesquicentennial Commemoration*. Washington, D.C.: US Information Service, 1983.
- Elliott, Henry G. *Some Revolutions and Other Diplomatic Experiences*. New York: Dutton, 1922.
- Enhaili, M. Aziz. "Pluralisme et Islamisme: Le Cas du Maroc." In Marie-Hélène Parizeau and Souheil Kash, eds., *Pluralism, Modernity, and the Arab World*. Quebec: PUL-Bruylant-Delta, 2001, pp. 159–178.
- Evans, Kathy. "Saudi Arabia: Shifting Sands at the House of Saud." *Middle East Magazine* no. 253, February 1996, pp. 6–9.
- Al-Fahim, Mohammed. *From Rags to Riches: A Story of Abu Dhabi*. London: London Centre for Arab Studies, 1995.
- Fakhro, Munira A. "The Uprising in Bahrain: An Assessment." In Lawrence G. Potter and Gary Sick, eds., *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion*. New York: St. Martin's, 1997, pp. 167–189.
- Fakhry, Majid. "Philosophy and Theology: From the Eighth Century C.E. to the Present." In John L. Esposito, ed., *The Oxford History of Islam*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 269–303.
- al-Farabi, Abu Nasr. *Ara' Ahl al-Madinah al-Fadilah* [Views of the People in the Virtuous City]. Beirut: Dar al-Mashreq, 1968.
- Farid, Abdel Majid. *Oil and Security in the Arabian Gulf*. New York: St. Martin's, 1981.
- Findlay, Carter V. *Bureaucratic Reforms in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789–1922*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Fougerouse, Maurice. *Bahrein: Un Exemple d'Économie Post-Pétrolière au Moyen-Orient*. Paris: L'Instant Durable, 1984.
- Fusul Min Tarikh al-'Arabiyyah Al-Sa'udiyyah* [Chapters from the History of Saudi Arabia]. Beirut(?): Dar al-Fada' lil-Tibayat wal-Nashr wal-Tawzi', 1988.
- Gatch, N., Jr. "Bahrain." In Albert P. Blaustein and Gisbert H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, 1974, pp. 2–16.
- de Gaulle, Charles. *Le Fil de l'Épée*. Paris: Plon, 1971 (reprint of 1932 edition).
- . *Mémoires de Guerre: L'Appel (1940–1942)*. Paris: Plon, 1954.
- de Gaury, Gerald. *Faisal: King of Saudi Arabia*. New York: Praeger, 1966.
- Gause, F. Gregory, III. "The FP Memo: How to Save Saudi Arabia." *Foreign Policy* no. 144, September–October 2004, pp. 66–70.
- . *Oil Monarchies: Domestic and Security Challenges in the Arab Gulf States*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1994.
- . *Saudi-Yemeni Relations: Domestic Structures and Foreign Influence*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
- Ghabra, Shafeeq. "Democratization in a Middle Eastern State: Kuwait, 1993." *Middle East Policy* 3, no. 1, 1994, pp. 102–119.
- Gibb, H. A. R., and J. J. Kramers. "Ibadiya." In *Shorter Encyclopedia of Islam*. Leiden: Brill, 1961, pp. 143–145.
- Gold, Dore. "Oman." In Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, eds., *Middle East Contemporary Survey*, vol. 10 (1986). Boulder: Westview, 1988, pp. 312–316.
- Goldberg, Jacob. *The Foreign Policy of Sa'udi Arabia: The Formative Years, 1902–1918*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986.

- Al-Gosaibi, Ghazi A. *The Gulf Crisis: An Attempt to Understand*. London: Kegan Paul International, 1993.
- Graham, Edward M., James Andrew Lewis, Don N. de Marino, and William A. Reinsch. "How Can the U.S. Reopen for Business to the Arab World?" *Middle East Policy* 13, no. 2, Summer 2006, pp. 71–89.
- Graves, Philip. *The Life of Sir Percy Cox*. London: Hutchinson, 1941.
- Graz, Liesl. *Le Golfe des Turbulences*. Paris: L'Harmattan, 1990.
- . *Les Omanis: Nouveaux Gardiens du Golfe*. Paris: Albin Michel, 1981.
- . *The Omanis: Sentinels of the Gulf*. London: Longman, 1982.
- Green, Arnold H. *The Tunisian Ulama, 1873–1915: Social Structure and Response to Ideological Currents*. Leiden: Brill, 1978.
- Greene, Frederick. *Armenian Massacres, or The Sword of Mohammed*. Philadelphia: International Publishing, 1896.
- Gresh, Alain. "Amorce de Changements, Pression des Conservateurs: Kaléidoscope Saoudien." *Le Monde Diplomatique* 53, no. 623, February 2006, pp. 8–9.
- Gubser, Peter. *Jordan: Crossroads of Middle Eastern Events*. Boulder: Westview, 1983.
- Al-Gurg, Easa Saleh. *The Wells of Memory: An Autobiography*. London: John Murray, 1988.
- Habib, John S. *Ibn Sa'ud's Warriors of Islam: The Ikhwan of Najd and Their Role in the Creation of the Sa'udi Kingdom, 1910–1930*. Leiden: Brill, 1978.
- al-Haj, Abdullah Juma. "The Politics of Participation in the Gulf Cooperation Council States: The Omani Consultative Council." *Middle East Journal* 50, no. 4, Autumn 1996, pp. 559–571.
- Halliday, Fred. *Arabia Without Sultans*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974.
- Hammoudi, Abdellah. "Éléments d'Anthropologie des Monarchies à Partir de l'Exemple Marocain." In Rémy Leveau and Abdellah Hammoudi, *Monarchies Arabes: Transitions et Dérives Dynastiques*. Paris: La Documentation Française, 2002, pp. 45–57.
- Hammoudi, Hady H. *Al-Fiqr al-Siyasi al-'Umani* [Omani Political Thought]. London: Riad el-Rayyes, 1993.
- Hamzah, Fuad. *Al-Bilad al-'Arabiyyah al-Sa'udiyyah* [The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia]. 2nd ed. Cairo: Maktabat al-Nasr al-Hadithat, 1968.
- Handhal, Faleh. *Al-Arab wal-Burtughal fil-Tarikh, 93 to 1134 H, 771 to 1720 AD: Akhtar min Alf Sanat min al-Ahdath baynal-Ummatayn* [Arabs and Portugal Through History, 93 to 1134 H, 711 to 1720 AD: Proceedings Lasting More Than One Thousand Years Between the Two Nations]. Abu Dhabi: Cultural Foundation, 1997.
- Hawley, Donald. *Oman and Its Renaissance*. London: Stacey International, 1990.
- . *The Trucial States*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1970.
- Health, M. L. "Stability in the Arabian Peninsula." *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution* 105, no. 618, May 1960, pp. 174–185.
- Heard-Bey, Frauke. *From Trucial States to United Arab Emirates: A Society in Transition*. 2nd ed. London: Longman, 1996.
- . "The Gulf States and Oman in Transition." *Asian Affairs* 59, no. 1, February 1972, pp. 14–22.
- . "Social Changes in the Gulf States and Oman." *Asian Affairs* 59, no. 3, October 1972, pp. 309–316.

- Helms, Christine Moss. *The Cohesion of Saudi Arabia: Evolution of Political Identity*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981, pp. 182–186.
- Henderson, Simon. *After King Fahd: Succession in Saudi Arabia*. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1995.
- Hennell, S., and A. B. Kemball, “Historical Sketch of the Bani Yas Tribe, 1761–1853.” *Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government* no. 27 (New Series), 1856, pp. 461–496.
- Herb, Michael. *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1999.
- al-Hilli, Muhammad Sa‘id. *Majmu‘at Ahadith wa Tasrihat Sahib al-Sumu al-Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi* [Sayings and Statements of His Highness Shaykh Saqr bin Muhammad Al Qasimi]. Dubai: Dar al-Gurair lil-tiba‘at wal-Nashr, n.d.
- . *Majmu‘at Tasrihat wa Ahadith Sahib al-Sumu al-Shaykh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum: Fikr wa Riyadat* [Statements and Sayings of His Highness Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum: Thought and Leadership]. Dubai: Dar al-Gurair lil-tiba‘at wal-Nashr, n.d.
- . *Rashid: Ra‘id al-Nahdat* [Rashid: Leader of the Renaissance]. Dubai: Dar al-Gurair lil-tiba‘at wal-Nashr, 1991(?).
- Holden, David, and Richard Johns. *Farewell to Arabia*. London: Faber and Faber, 1966.
- . *The House of Saud: The Rise and Rule of the Most Powerful Dynasty in the Arab World*. New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1981.
- Hopwood, Derek. *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1972.
- Hourani, Albert. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798–1939*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- . *A History of the Arab Peoples*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991.
- Hovannisian, Richard, ed. *The Armenian Genocide: History, Politics, Ethics*. New York: St. Martin’s, 1992.
- Howarth, David. *The Desert King: The Life of Ibn Saud*. London: Quartet, 1980.
- Human Rights Watch. *Clamping Down on Critics: Human Rights Violations in Advance of the Parliamentary Elections*. New York, 1997.
- Human Rights Watch–Middle East. *Routine Abuse, Routine Denial: Civil Rights and the Political Crisis in Bahrain*. New York, 1997.
- Hunter, F. Robert. *Egypt Under the Khedive, 1805–1879: From Household Government to Modern Bureaucracy*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1984.
- Hussein, Abd Allah Ibn. *My Memoirs Completed “Al Takmilah.”* Translated by W. Gibson. London: Longman, 1978.
- Hussein [bin Talal] of Jordan. *Uneasy Lies the Head: The Autobiography of His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*. New York: Bernard Geis, 1962.
- Innes, Neil McLeod. *Minister in Oman: A Personal Narrative*. London: Oleander, 1987.
- al-Jamal, Yahyah. *Al-Nizam al-Dusturi fil Kuwayt: Ma’a Muqadimah fi Dirasat al-Mabadi’ al-Dusturiyyah al-‘Amah* [Constitutional System in Kuwait: With an Introduction to General Constitutional Law]. Kuwait City: University of Kuwait Press, 1970–1971.



- Jones, Jeremy, and Nicholas Ridout. "Democratic Development in Oman." *Middle East Journal* 59, no. 3, Summer 2005, pp. 376–392.
- Joulié, Jean-Louis. *A Connaître le Qatar*. Paris: Édifra, Édition Française pour le Monde Arabe, 1994.
- Joyce, Ann. "Interview with Sultan Qaboos bin Said Al Said." *Middle East Policy* 3, no. 4, April 1995, pp. 1–6.
- al-Kabbani, Saif bin Ali bin Sultan. "Al-Nizam al-Siyasi li-Sultanat 'Uman" [The Political System of the Sultanate of Oman]. Thesis. Rabat: Université Muhammad V, Faculty of Law, 1987.
- Kaddurah, Zahiyyah. *Shibh al-Jazirah al-'Arabiyyah: Kiyanatuhah al-Siyassiyyah* [The Arabian Peninsula: Political Origins]. Beirut: Dar al-Nahdah al-'Arabiyyah, n.d.
- Katz, Mark N. "Assessing the Political Stability of Oman." *Middle East Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal* 8, no. 3, September 2004, at <http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue3/jv8n3a1.html>.
- . *Russia and Arabia: Soviet Foreign Policy Toward the Arabian Peninsula*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.
- al-Kawakibi, Abderrahman. *Oeuvres Complètes*. Beirut: Markaz Dirasat al-Wahdah al-'Arabiyyah, 1995.
- Kaylani, Nabil M. "Politics and Religion in 'Uman: A Historical Overview." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 10, no. 4, November 1979, pp. 567–579.
- Kazancigil, Ali, and Ergun Özbüdü, eds. *Atatürk: Founder of a Modern State*. Hamden, Conn.: Arehon, 1981.
- Kéchichian, Joseph A. "The Beguiling Gulf Cooperation Council." *Third World Quarterly* 10, no. 2, April 1988, pp. 1052–1058.
- . "Democratization in Gulf Monarchies: A New Challenge to the GCC." *Middle East Policy* 11, no. 4, Winter 2004, pp. 37–57.
- . *Faysal: Saudi Arabia's King for All Seasons*. Gainesville: University of Florida Press, forthcoming 2008.
- . "The GCC and the West." *American-Arab Affairs* no. 29, Summer 1989, pp. 20–31.
- . "The Gulf Cooperation Council: Containing the Iranian Revolution." *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies* 13, nos. 1–2, Fall–Winter 1989, pp. 146–165.
- . "The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Security." *Third World Quarterly* 7, no. 4, October 1985, pp. 853–881.
- . "The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Security in the Persian Gulf." PhD diss. Charlottesville: University of Virginia, 1985.
- . "The Gulf Cooperation Council and the Gulf War." In Christopher C. Joyner, ed., *The Persian Gulf War: Lessons for Strategy, Law, and Diplomacy*. New York: Greenwood, 1990, pp. 91–110.
- . "Iraq and the Arab World." *Conflict* 11, no. 1, January–March 1991, pp. 1–15.
- . "Islamic Revivalism and Change in Saudi Arabia: Juhayman Al-Utaybi's 'Letters' to the Saudi People." *Muslim World* 70, no. 1, January 1990, pp. 1–16.
- . "National Security." In Helen Chapin Metz, ed., *Iraq: A Country Study*. Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 1990, pp. 213–256.

- . "Oman: A Council for the People." *Arabies Trends* no. 19, April 1999, pp. 24–27.
- . "Oman and the World." *American-Arab Affairs* no. 35, Winter 1990–91, pp. 135–150.
- . *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*. MR 680-RC. Santa Monica: RAND, December 1995.
- . "The Polarization of the Arab World: The Emergence of a New Regional Order." *Middle East Insight* 7, no. 5, 1991, pp. 20–23.
- . *Political Dynamics and Security in the Arabian Peninsula Through the 1990s*. MR-167-AF/A. Santa Monica: RAND, 1993.
- . *Political Participation and Stability in the Sultanate of Oman*. 2nd ed. Dubai: Gulf Research Center, 2006.
- . "Political Reforms in Kuwait and the GCC States." *Middle East Insight* 8, no. 2, September–October 1991, pp. 40–43.
- . "The Role of the 'Ulama in the Politics of an Islamic State: The Case of Saudi Arabia." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18, no. 1, February 1986, pp. 53–71.
- . "Saudi Arabia's Will to Power." *Middle East Policy* 7, no. 2, February 2000, pp. 47–60.
- . *Security Efforts in the Arab World: A Brief Examination of Four Regional Organizations*. N-3570-USDP. Santa Monica: RAND, 1994.
- . *Succession in Saudi Arabia*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.
- . "Testing the Saudi 'Will to Power': Challenges Confronting Prince Abdallah." *Middle East Policy* 10, no. 4, Winter 2003, pp. 100–115.
- . "The Throne in the Sultanate of Oman." In Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenges of Modernity*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 187–211.
- . "The United Arab Emirates: Strength Building on Strength." *Arabies Trends* no. 15, December 1998, pp. 25–33.
- . "Whither Gulf Security?" *U.S.-Iran Review* 1, no. 8, November 1993, pp. 6–7.
- Kéchichian, Joseph A., and R. Hrair Dekmejian. *The Just Prince: A Manual of Leadership*. London: Saqi, 2003.
- Kéchichian, Joseph A., et al. *Future Gulf Dynamics and U.S. Security*. DB-106-AF/A. Santa Monica: RAND, 1994.
- Kelidar, Abbas R. "The Problem of Succession in Saudi Arabia." *Asian Affairs* 9, no. 1, February 1978, pp. 23–30.
- Kelly, J. B. *Arabia, the Gulf, and the West: A Critical View of the Arabs and Their Oil Policy*. New York: Basic, 1980.
- . *Britain and the Persian Gulf, 1795–1880*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1968.
- . "The Buraimi Oasis Dispute." *International Affairs* 32, no. 3, July 1956, pp. 318–326.
- . *Eastern Arabian Frontiers*. London: Faber and Faber, 1964.
- . "The Future in Arabia." *International Affairs* 42, no. 4, October 1996, pp. 619–640.
- . "Hadramaut, Oman, Dhufar: The Experience of Revolution." *Middle Eastern Studies* 12, no. 5, May 1976, pp. 213–230.

- . "A Prevalence of Furies: Tribes, Politics, and Religion in Oman and Trucial Oman." In Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1972, pp. 107–141.
- . "Sovereignty and Jurisdiction in Eastern Arabia." *International Affairs* 34, no. 1, 1958, pp. 16–24.
- . "Sultanate and Imamate in Oman." *Chatham House Memoranda*. London: Royal Institute for International Affairs, 1959.
- Kerr, Malcolm. *The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd al-Nasir and His Rivals, 1958–1970*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.
- Khadduri, Majid. *Arab Personalities in Politics*. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1981.
- Khalaf, Abdulhadi. "The New Amir of Bahrain: Marching Sideways." *Civil Society: Democratization in the Middle East* 9, no. 100, April 2000, pp. 6–13.
- Ibn Khaldun. *The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Khalifa, Ali Mohammed. *The United Arab Emirates: Unity in Fragmentation*. Boulder: Westview, 1979.
- Al Khalifah, 'Abdallah bin Khalid, and 'Abdul Malik Yusuf al-Hamr. *Al-Bahrain 'Abr al-Tarikh* [Bahrain at the Crossroads of History]. Manama, Bahrain: Sharikat al-'Arabiyyah lil-Wikalat wal-Tawzi', 1972.
- al-Khalily, Ahmed bin Hamed [Grand Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman]. "The Spread of Ibadhism in Northern Africa." Muscat(?): n.p., 1993(?).
- Khoury, Enver M. *The United Arab Emirates: Its Political System and Politics*. Hyattsville, Md.: Institute of Middle Eastern and North African Affairs, 1980.
- Khuri, Fuad I. *Tribe and State in Bahrain: The Transformation of Social and Political Authority in an Arab State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980.
- Kinross, Lord. *Atatürk*. New York: Morrow, 1965.
- Kishk, Muhammad Jalal. *Al-Saudiyyun wal-Hal al-Islami* [The Saudis and the Islamic Solution]. Jeddah: Saudi Publishing and Distribution House, 1982.
- Koburger, Charles W., Jr. "The Kuwait Confrontation of 1961." *United States Naval Institute Proceedings* 100, no. 1, January 1974, pp. 42–49.
- Korany, Bahgat, and Ali E. Hillal Dessouki. *The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change*. 2nd ed. Boulder: Westview, 1991.
- Kostiner, Joseph. *The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From Chieftancy to Monarchical State*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- Kumar, Ravinder. *India and the Persian Gulf Region, 1858–1907: A Study in British Imperial Policy*. Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1965.
- Kupchan, Charles A. *The Persian Gulf and the West: The Dilemmas of Security*. Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1987.
- Labat, Séverine. "La Monarchie Marocaine à la Croisée des Chemins." In *Les Cahiers de l'Orient* no. 74, Spring 2004, p. 7–34.
- Lackner, Helen. *A House Built on Sand: A Political Economy of Saudi Arabia*. London: Ithaca Press, 1978.
- Lage, Olivier de, and Gerard Grzybek. *Le Jeu des Six Familles*. Paris: Autrement, 1985.
- Lambton, Ann K. S. *Theory and Practice in Medieval Persian Government*. London: Variorum Reprints, 1980.

- Landen, Robert G. *Oman Since 1856: Disruptive Modernization in a Traditional Arab Society*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967.
- Laoust, Henri. *Politique de Ghazali*, Paris: Geuthner, 1970.
- Lariège, Julien. "Elections Municipales: Les Enseignements d'un Scrutin." *Les Cahiers de l'Orient* no. 74, Spring 2004, pp. 61–72.
- Laroui, Abdallah. *The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretative Essay*. Translated by Ralph Mannheim. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1977.
- Lawson, Fred H. *Bahrain: The Modernization of Autocracy*. Boulder: Westview, 1989.
- Lees, Brian. "The Al Saud Family and the Future of Saudi Arabia." *Asian Affairs* 37, no. 1, March 2006, pp. 36–49.
- . *A Handbook of the Al Sa'ud Family of Saudi Arabia*. London: Royal Genealogies, 1980.
- Legum, Colin, ed. *Middle East Contemporary Survey*. Vols. 1–8, 1975–1982. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978–1986.
- Leveau, Rémy. "Maroc: Les Trois Âges de la Monarchie Moderne." In Rémy Leveau and Abdellah Hammoudi, *Monarchies Arabes: Transitions et Dérives Dynastiques*. Paris: La Documentation Française, 2002, pp. 197–203.
- Lewicki, Tadeusz. "Al-Ibadiyya." *Encyclopedia of Islam*. 2nd ed., vol. 3. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1960–, pp. 648–660.
- . "Les Subdivisions de l'Ibadiyya." *Studia Islamica* 9, 1958, pp. 71–82.
- Lewis, Bernard. "Monarchy in the Middle East." In Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenges of Modernity*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 15–22.
- . *What Went Wrong: Western Impact and Middle Eastern Response*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Liebesny, Herbert. "Administration and Legal Development in Arabia: The Persian Gulf Principalities." *Middle East Journal* 10, no. 1, 1956, pp. 33–42.
- . "International Relations of Arabia: The Dependent Areas." *Middle East Journal* 3, no. 3, 1947, pp. 148–168.
- . "Qatar." In A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, July 1973, pp. 1–16.
- Lippman, Thomas W. *Inside the Mirage: America's Fragile Partnership with Saudi Arabia*. Boulder: Westview, 2004.
- Litwak, Robert. *Security in the Persian Gulf: Sources of Inter-State Conflict*. Montclair, N.J.: Allanhead and Osmun, 1981.
- Long, David E. *The Persian Gulf: An Introduction to Its People, Politics, and Economics*. Boulder: Westview, 1978.
- Looney, Robert E. *Manpower Policies and Development in the Persian Gulf Region*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994.
- Lorimer, J. G., comp. *Gazetteer of the Persian Gulf, Oman, and Central Arabia*. Vol. 1, 1915. Vol. 2, 1908. Farnborough, Hants, UK: Gregg International, 1970 (reprint of 1915 edition).
- al-Maamiry, Ahmed Hamoud. 'Awdat al-Tarikh: Sultanat 'Uman [The Return of History: The Sultanate of Oman]. New Delhi(?): n.p., 1980.
- . *Oman and Ibadhism*. New Delhi: Lancers, 1989.
- . *Omani Sultans in Zanzibar (1832–1964)*. New Delhi: Lancers, 1988.

- . *Whither Oman?* New Delhi: Lancers, 1986.
- MacDonald, Robert W. *The League of Arab States: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965.
- Magnus, Philip. *Kitchener: Portrait of an Imperialist*. London: Murray, 1958.
- al-Majid, Majid. *Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khaliji: Azmat al-Siyasat wal-Shar'iyat* [The Gulf Cooperation Council: Political and Social Issues]. London: Ta-Ha, 1986.
- Mansel, Philip. *Sultans in Splendour*. London: Parkway, 1988.
- Marlowe, John. *Spoiling the Egyptians*. New York: St. Martin's, 1975.
- "Le Maroc: La Monarchie à l'Épreuve de la Succession." *Les Cahiers de l'Orient* no. 74, Spring 2004, pp. 3–159.
- Martin, Lenore G. *The Unstable Gulf: Threats From Within*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1984.
- Maurois, André. *Lyautey*. New York: Appleton, 1931.
- al-Mawardi, Abu al-Hassan 'Ali Ibn Muhammad. *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah* [Principles of Rule]. Translated into French by E. Sagnan, as *Les Statuts Gouvernementaux*. Alger: Jourdan, 1915 (reprint of 1880–1881 edition).
- Mejcher, Helmut. *Imperial Quest for Oil: Iraq, 1910–1928*. Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1976.
- Miles, Samuel Barrett. *The Countries and Tribes of the Persian Gulf*. 2nd ed. London: Cass, 1966.
- Al-Mithaq al-Watani al-Urduni* [The Jordanian National Covenant]. Amman: Mudiriyyah al-Mutabi' al-'Askariyyah, 1990.
- Monroe, Elizabeth. *Britain's Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1971*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981.
- Montigny-Kozłowska, Anie. "Histoire et Changements Sociaux au Qatar." In Paul Bonnenfant, ed., *La Péninsule Arabique d'Aujourd'hui*, vol. 2. Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1982, pp. 475–522.
- Morris, James H. *Sultan in Oman: Venture into the Middle East*. London: Arrow, 1986 (reprint of 1957 edition).
- Moutadayene, Abdellatif. "Economic Crises and Democratization in Morocco." *Journal of North African Studies* 6, no. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 70–82.
- Muhammad, 'Ali al-Jawwad. *Al-Tatawwur al-Tashri'i fil-Mamlakah al-'Arabiyyah al-Su'udiyyah* [Legislative Development in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia]. Alexandria, Egypt: Munsha'at al-Ma'arif, 1977.
- al-Nabhani, Muhammad bin Khalifah. *Tarikh al-Bahrain* [The History of Bahrain]. Cairo: n.p., 1924.
- al-Nafisi, Abdallah Fahd. *Majlis al-Ta'awun al-Khaliji: Al-Itar al-Siyasi wal-Istratiji* [The Gulf Cooperation Council: Political and Strategic Prospects]. London: Ta-Ha, 1982.
- . *Tathmin al-Sira' fi Dhuffar* [Evaluation of the Struggle in Dhuffar]. Beirut: Dar al-Tali'ah, 1975.
- Al Nahyan, Sultan bin Zayed bin Sultan. "Gulf Security: The View from Abu Dhabi." In Joseph A. Kéchichian, ed., *A Century in Thirty Years: Shaykh Zayed and the United Arab Emirates*. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Policy Council, 2000, pp. 273–280.
- Nakhleh, Emile A. *Arab-American Relations in the Persian Gulf*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975.

- . *Bahrain: Political Development in a Modernizing Society*. Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1976.
- . *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Policies, Problems, and Prospects*. New York: Praeger, 1986.
- . *The Persian Gulf and American Foreign Policy*. New York: Praeger, 1982.
- Nawful, Sayyid. *Al-‘Awdah al-Siyasiyyah li-Imarat al-Khalij al-‘Arabi wa-Janub al-Jazirah* [Political Conditions in the Emirates of the Arabian Gulf and South Arabia]. 3rd ed. Cairo: Jami‘at al-Duwal al-‘Arabiyyah, Ma‘had al-Buhuth wal-Dirasat al-‘Arabiyyah, 1966–1967.
- Nooneman, Gerd. *Iraq, the Gulf States, and the War: A Changing Relationship, 1980–1986 and Beyond*. London: Ithaca Press, 1986.
- Noor, Queen. *Leap of Faith: Memoirs of an Unexpected Life*. New York: Hyperion, 2003.
- O’Brien, Rosemary, ed. *Gertrude Bell: The Arabian Diaries, 1913–1914*. Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 2000.
- Oman, Sultanate of. *Human Development Report in the Sultanate of Oman First Report, 2003*. Muscat: Ministry of National Economy, 2003.
- . *Intikhabat Majlis al-Shurah: Al-Fatrat al-Khamisat, 2003* [Elections for the Majlis al-Shurah: The Fifth Session, 2003]. Muscat: Ministry of the Interior, October 2003.
- . *Al Nizam al-Asasi lil-Dawlat* [The Basic Statute of the State]. Muscat: Diwan of Royal Court, 1996.
- . *Omani Women Contribution to Modern Development of the State Institutions: Facts and Figures*. Seeb: Majlis al-Shurah, May 2004.
- . *The Royal Speeches of His Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin Said, 1970–2005*. Muscat: Ministry of Information, 2005.
- . *Tashkil Majlis al-Shurah wa-Ajhizatuhah al-Ra’isiyyah fi-Fatratihah al-Khamisat* [Composition of the Majlis al-Shurah and Its Principal Organs During the Fifth Term (October 2003–September 2007)]. Seeb, n.d.
- . *Al-Wathaiq al-Khasat bi-Majlis al-Shurah, al-Fatrat al-Oula* [Private Documents of the Majlis al-Shurah, First Session]. Muscat: Majlis al-Shurah, 21 December 1991.
- Osborne, Christine. *The Gulf States and Oman*. London: Croom Helm, 1977.
- Oufkir, Malika, and Michèle Fitoussi. *La Prisonnière*. Paris: Grasset, 1999.
- Oufkir, Raouf. *Les Invités: Vingt Ans dans les Prisons du Roi*. Paris: Flammarion, 2003.
- Owen, R. P. “Rebellion in Dhofar: A Threat to Western Interests in the Gulf.” *World Today* 29, no. 6, June 1973, pp. 226–272.
- Page, Stephen. *The USSR and Arabia: The Development of Soviet Policies and Attitudes Towards the Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, 1955–1970*. London: Central Asian Research Centre, 1971.
- Paumgarten, Nick. “Deerfield in the Desert.” *New Yorker*, 4 September 2006, pp. 102–112.
- Peck, Malcolm C. *The United Arab Emirates: A Venture in Unity*. Boulder: Westview, 1986.
- Pelly, Lewis. “Remarks on the Tribes, Trade, and Resources Around the Shore Line of the Persian Gulf.” *Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society* 17, 1863, pp. 32–112.

- Pennell, C. R. *Morocco: From Empire to Independence*. Oxford: Oneworld, 2003.
- Penrose, Edith, and E. F. Penrose. *Iraq: International Relations and National Development*. London: Ernest Benn, 1978.
- Perkins, Kenneth. *Qaids, Captains, and Colons: French Military Administration in the Colonial Maghrib, 1844–1934*. New York: Africana, 1981.
- Peterson, Erik R. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Unity in a Dynamic Region*. Boulder: Westview, 1988.
- Peterson, J. E. "American Policy in the Gulf and the Sultanate of Oman." *American-Arab Affairs* no. 8, Spring 1984, pp. 117–130.
- . *The Arab Gulf States: Steps Toward Political Participation*. New York: Praeger, 1988.
- . "Bahrain's First Steps Towards Reform Under Amir Hamad." *Asian Affairs* 33, no. 2, June 2002, pp. 216–227.
- . "Britain and the Oman War: An Arabian Entanglement." *Asian Affairs* 63, no. 3, October 1976, pp. 285–298.
- . "Guerrilla Warfare and Ideological Confrontation: The Rebellion in Dhufar." *World Affairs* 139, no. 4, 1977, pp. 278–295.
- . "Legitimacy and Political Change in Yemen and Oman." *Orbis* 27, no. 4, Winter 1984, pp. 971–998.
- . "The Nature of Succession in the Gulf." *Middle East Journal* 55, no. 4, Autumn 2001, pp. 580–601.
- . *Oman in the Twentieth Century: Political Foundations of an Emerging State*. London: Croom Helm, 1978.
- . *The Politics of Middle Eastern Oil*. Washington, D.C.: Middle East Institute, 1983.
- . "The Revival of the Ibadi Imamate in Oman and the Threat to Muscat, 1913–1920." *Arabian Studies* 3, 1976, pp. 165–188.
- . *Security in the Arabian Peninsula and Gulf States, 1973–1984*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1985.
- . "Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia." *Middle East Journal* 31, no. 3, 1977, pp. 297–312.
- Philby, H. St. John B. "Rub Al Khali." *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 19, no. 4, 1932, pp. 569–584.
- . *Sa'udi Arabia*. London: Ernest Benn, 1955.
- Phillips, Wendell. *Oman: A History*. Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1971 (reprint of 1967 edition).
- . *Unknown Oman*. London: Longman, 1966.
- Ploquin, Frédéric, and Jacques Derogy. *Ils Ont Tué Ben Barka*. Paris: Fayard, 1999.
- Pollock, John. *Kitchener: Architect of Victory, Artisan of Peace*. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2002.
- Porter, J. D., ed. *Oman and the Persian Gulf, 1835–1949*. Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1982.
- Potter, Lawrence G., and Gary Sick, eds. *The Persian Gulf at the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion*. New York: St. Martin's, 1997.
- Powell, William. *Saudi Arabia and Its Royal Family*. Secaucus, N.J.: Lyle Stuart, 1982.
- Power, Samantha. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide*. New York: Perennial, 2003.

- Pridham, B. R., ed. *Oman: Economic, Social, and Strategic Developments*. London: Croom Helm, 1987.
- Qalaji, Qadri. *Al-Khalij al-Arabi* [The Arabian Gulf]. Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Arabi, 1965.
- . *Thamaniyat min Abtal al-'Arab: Hikkayat al-Ayam al-Madiyat li anba' al-Ayam al-Atiyat* [Eight Arab Heroes: Bygone Stories for Future Generations]. Beirut: Sharikat al-Matba'at lil-Tawzi' wal-Nashr, 1997.
- Qasim, Jamal Zakariyyah. *Dawlat Bu Said fi 'Uman wa-Sharq Ifriqiyah, 1741–1861*. [The Bu Said State in Oman and East Africa, 1741–1861]. Cairo: Maktabat al-Qahirah al-Hadithah, 1968.
- . *Dirasah li-Tarikh al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah (1840–1914)* [A Study in the History of the Arabian Emirates (1840–1914)]. 2nd ed. Kuwait: Dar al-Buhuth al-'Ilmiyyah, 1974.
- . *Al-Khalij al-'Arabi: Dirasah li-Tarikh al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah, 1914–1945* [The Arabian Gulf: A Study in the History of the Arabian Emirates, 1914–1945]. Cairo: Dar al Fikr al-'Arabi, 1973.
- . *Al-Khalij al-'Arabi: Dirasaj li Tarikhihi al-Mu'asir, 1945–1971* [The Arabian Gulf: A Study in Its Modern History, 1945–1971]. Cairo: Jami'at al-Duwal al-'Arabiyyah, Ma'had al-Buhuth wal-Dirasat al-'Arabiyyah, 1974.
- , ed. *Mukhtarat min Wathaiq al-Khalij al-'Arabi* [Selections from Documents on the Arabian Gulf]. Kuwait: Jami'at al-Kuwayt, 1972.
- Al Qasimi, Khalid bin Muhammad, and 'Abdul Rahman Yusuf bin Harib. *Za'id: Al-Qa'id wa Nida' al-Watan* [Zayed: The Leader and the Call of a Nation]. Sharjah: Dar al-Thaqafah al-'Arabiyyah, 1991.
- Al-Qasimi, Sultan Muhammad. *Al-Ihtilal al-Britani li-'Adan* [British Occupation of Aden]. Dubai: Al Ghurair, 1992.
- . *Al-'Ilaqat al-'Umaniyyah-al-Faransiyyah, 1715–1905* [Relations Between Oman and France, 1715–1905]. Dubai: Al Ghurair, 1993 [also available in French as *Les Relations Entre Oman et la France (1715–1905)*, Paris: Éditions L'Harmattan, 1995].
- . *John Malcolm and the British Commercial Base in the Gulf, 1800*, Dubai: Al Ghurair, 1994.
- . *The Myth of Arab Piracy in the Gulf*. London: Croom Helm, 1986.
- . *Yawmiyyat David Seton fil-Khalij, 1800–1809* [David Seton's Journeys in the Gulf, 1800–1809]. Sharjah: Al-Khalij, 1994.
- Ibn Qutaybah, 'Abdallah Ibn Muslim. *Al-Imamah wal-Siyasah* [Politics and the Imamate]. Vol. 2. Cairo: n.p., 1937.
- Rabi, Uzi. *The Emergence of States in a Tribal Society: Oman Under Sa'id bin Taymur, 1932–1970*. Brighton: Sussex Academic, 2006.
- . "The Kuwaiti Royal Family in the Postliberation Period: Reinstitutionalizing the 'First Among Equals' System in Kuwait." In Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenges of Modernity*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 151–165.
- Rabinovich, Itamar, and Haim Shaked, eds. *Middle East Contemporary Survey*. Vols. 9–10, 1984–1986. Boulder: Westview, 1987.
- Rachid, Abdullah. "Bahrain: Fighting for Liberation." *World Marxist Review* 21, no. 10, October 1978, pp. 78–88.



- Ra'fat, Wahid. "Dirasat wa Wathaiq Hawlah Ittihad al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah fil-Khalij" [Studies and Documents of the Federation of Arab Emirates in the Gulf]. *Egyptian Journal of International Law*, Special Issue no. 26, 1971.
- Ramazani, R. K. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Record and Analysis*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1988.
- . *The Persian Gulf: Iran's Role*. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1972.
- . *Revolutionary Iran: Challenge and Response in the Middle East*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988.
- Al Rasheed, Madawi. *Politics in an Arabian Oasis: The Rashidi Tribal Dynasty*. London: Tauris, 1991.
- al-Rashid, 'Abdul 'Aziz. *Tarikh al-Kuwait* [The History of Kuwait]. Beirut: Dar Maktabat al-Hayat, 1962.
- Rashid, Ibrahim, ed. *Documents in the History of Saudi Arabia*. Salisbury, N.C.: Documentary Publications, 1980.
- Rashid, Noor Ali. *Dubai: Life and Times*. Dubai: Motivate Publishing, 1997.
- al-Rashid, Zamil Muhammad. *Su'udi Relations with Eastern Arabia and 'Uman (1800–1871)*. London: Luzac, 1981.
- al-Rayyis, Riyad Najib. *Sira al-Wahat wa-al-Naft: Humum al-Khalij al-Arabi Bayna, 1968–1971* [The Struggle of Oases and Oil: Troubles of the Arabian Gulf, 1968–1971]. Beirut: Al-Nahar, al-Khidmat al-Sihafiya, 1973.
- Raziq, 'Ali 'Abdul. *Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm: Bahith fil-Khilafah wal-Hukmah fil-Islam* [Islam and the Principles of Governance: A Thesis on the Caliphate and Government in Islam]. Translated into French by Ali Abderraziq as *L'Islam et les Fondements du Pouvoir*. Paris: Éditions La Découverte/CEDEJ, 1994 (reprint of 1966 edition).
- Reed, Stanley. "A Princely Power Struggle Could Shake the House of Saud." *Business Week*, 25 December 1995, p. 56.
- Rida, Adil. *Uman wal-Khalij: Qadayah wa Munaqashat* [Oman and the Gulf: Problems and Disputes]. Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1969.
- Rida, Muhammad Rashid. *Al-Khilafah* [The Caliphate]. Cairo: n.p., 1922–1923.
- . *Tarikh al-Ustaz al-Imam al-Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh* [The History of the Master Imam Shaykh Muhammad 'Abduh]. Cairo: Dar al-Manar, 1947–1948.
- Robins, Philip. *A History of Jordan*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
- Robinson, Glenn E. "Can Islamists Be Democrats? The Case of Jordan." *Middle East Journal* 51, no. 3, Summer 1997, pp. 373–387.
- Rondot, Pierre. "Le Sultanat d'Oman Devant la Rebellion du Dhofar." *Maghreb-Machrek* 70, October–December 1975, pp. 38–46.
- Ruete, Emily. *Memoires d'une Princesse Arabe*. Paris: Karthala, 1991.
- . *Memoirs of an Arabian Princess: An Autobiography*. New York: Doubleday, 1997.
- Rumaihi, Muhammad Ghanim. *Bahrain: Social and Political Change Since the First World War*. London: Bowker, 1976.
- . *Beyond Oil: Unity and Development in the Gulf*. London: Al-Saqi, 1986.
- . *Al-Bitrul wa-al-Taghayyur al-Ijtima'i fi al-Khalij al-'Arabi* [Petroleum and Social Change in the Arabian Gulf]. Cairo: Jami'at al-Duwal al-'Arabiyyah, Ma'had al-Buhuth wal-Dirasat al-'Arabiyyah, 1975.

- Ruman, Husayn Abu, ed. *'Aqd al-Dimuqratiyyah fil-Urdun, 1989–1999* [A Decade of Democracy in Jordan, 1989–1999]. Amman: Markaz al-Urdun al-Jadid lil-Dirasat, 2001.
- Rush, Alan. *Al-Sabah: History and Genealogy of Kuwait's Ruling Family, 1752–1987*. London: Ithaca Press, 1987.
- Rush, Alan de Lacy, ed. *Ruling Families of Arabia: United Arab Emirates*. Vol. 1. Farnham Common, Slough, UK: Archive Editions, 1991.
- Ruzayq, Hamid bin Muhammad bin, ed. *Al-Fath al-Mubin fi Sirat al-Sada Al Bu Sa'idiyyun* [Chapters in the History of Al Bu Sa'id Lords]. Cairo: 'Abd al-Munim Amir and Muhammad Mursi, 1977.
- Ryan, Curtis R. *Jordan in Transition: From Hussein to Abdullah*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002.
- Al-Sabah, S. M. *Kuwait: Anatomy of a Crisis Economy*. London: Eastlords, 1984.
- al-Sabah, Salem al-Jabir. *Les Emirats du Golfe: Histoire d'un Peuple*. Paris: Fayard, 1980.
- Sadik, Muhammad T., and William P. Snively. *Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates: Colonial Past, Present Problems, and Future Prospects*. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1972.
- al-Sa'id, Nasir. *Tarikh Al Sa'ud* [History of the Al Sa'ud]. 2 vols. Beirut: Al-Ittihad, 1985.
- Said-Ruete, Rudolph. "The Al-Bu-Said Dynasty in Arabia and East Africa." *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 16, no. 4, 1929, pp. 417–432.
- . "Dates and References of the History of the Al Bu Said Dynasty (1741–1856)." *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 18, no. 3, 1931, pp. 233–255.
- . *Said bin Sultan (1791–1856), Ruler of Oman and Zanzibar: His Place in the History of Arabia and East Africa*. London: Alexander-Ouseley, 1929.
- Said Zahlan, Rosemarie. *The Creation of Qatar*. London: Croom Helm, 1979.
- . *The Making of the Modern Gulf States: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman*. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989.
- . *The Origins of the United Arab Emirates: A Political and Social History of the Trucial States*. London: Macmillan, 1978.
- al-Saksak, Muhammad Khalil, and Shams al-Din al-Da'ifih. *Al-Qiyadat* [Leadership]. Abu Dhabi: Diwan of the President, 1981.
- Salamé, Ghassan. *Al-Siyasah al-Kharijiyyah al-Sa'udiyyah Munzu 'Am 1945: Dirasah fil-'Ilaqat al-Dawliyyah* [The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia Since 1945: A Study in International Relations]. Beirut: Muassasat al-Rihani lil-Tiba'at wal-Nashr, 1980.
- Saldanha, J. A. *A Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral of the Persian Gulf and Hasa and Katif Affairs*. Calcutta: India Records Office, Political and Secret Department, 1904.
- Salem, Elie A. *Political Theory and Institutions of the Khawarij*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956.
- Salibi, Kamal. *The Modern History of Jordan*. London: Tauris, 1993.
- al-Salimi, Abd Allah bin Humayd. *Tuhfat al-Ayan bi-Sirat Ahl Uman* [Gems of the Notables in the History of the People of Oman]. 5th ed. Kuwait: Dar al-Talia, 1974.

- al-Salimi, Muhammad bin Abd Allah. *Nahdat al-Ayan bi-Hurriyat 'Uman* [Renaissance of the Notables in the Freedom of Oman]. Cairo: Dar al-Kitab al-'Arabi, 1380/1961.
- al-Salimi, Muhammad bin Abd Allah, and Naji Assaf. *'Uman: Tarikh Yatakallam* [Oman: History Speaks]. Damascus: Al-Matba'a al-'Umumiyyah, 1963.
- al-Samman, Zaki, and Muhammad Khayr Husriyah. *Uman: Ard al-Butulat wa-Maqburat al-Ghaza* [Oman: Land of Bravery and Grave of Agression]. 2nd ed. Damascus: Maktab Silsilat al-Buhuth al-Arabiyyat li-al-Sahafa wa-al-Nashr wa-al-I'lan, 1964.
- Samore, Gary Samuel. "Royal Family Politics in Saudi Arabia (1953–1982)." PhD diss. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1983.
- Sandwick, John A., ed. *The Gulf Cooperation Council: Moderation and Stability in an Interdependent World*. Boulder: Westview, 1987.
- Satloff, Robert B. *From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- [Al Sa'ud], Khaled bin Sultan with Patrick Seale. *Desert Warrior: A Personal View of the Gulf War by the Joint Forces Commander*. New York: HarperCollins, 1995.
- [Al Sa'ud], Talal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz. *Risalah ilal-Muwatin* [A Letter to the Citizen]. Cairo(?): n.p., 1962(?).
- Saudi Arabia, Royal Embassy of. *Political and Economic Reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia*. Washington, D.C., May 2006.
- "Saudi Arabia: Talk of Reform." *Middle East International* no. 704, 11 July 2003, pp. 18–19.
- Al-Sayegh, Fatma. *Al-Imarat al-'Arabiyyah al-Muttahidat: Min al-Qabilat ilal-Dawlat* [The United Arab Emirates: From Tribalism to Statehood]. Dubai: Markaz al-Khalij lil-Kutub, 1997.
- al-Sayyid Marsot, Afaf Lutfi. *Egypt and Cromer: A Study in Anglo-Egyptian Relations*. London: John Murray, 1968.
- . *Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
- . *Egypt's Liberal Experiment, 1922–1936*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.
- Schamm, Alan. *Lyautey in Morocco*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970.
- Schölch, Alexander. *Egypt for the Egyptians: The Socio-Political Crisis in Egypt, 1878–1882*. New York: Ithaca Press, 1981.
- Seikaly, May. "Kuwait and Bahrain: The Appeal of Globalization and Internal Constraints." In Joseph A. Kéchichian, ed., *Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States*. New York: Palgrave, 2001, pp. 177–192.
- al-Sha'fi, Muhammad Sa'id. "Al-'Ilaqat al-Sa'udiyyah al-'Umaniyyah, 1800–1818" [Omani-Saudi Relations, 1800–1818]. *Majallat Kulliyat al-Adab li-Jami'at al-Riyad* [Journal of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Riyadh] 1, 1970, pp. 206–229.
- Shakir, Abdulmunim. "Saudi Arabia." In A. P. Blaustein and G. H. Flanz, eds., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World*. Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana, March 1976, pp. 1–15.
- al-Shalaq, Ahmad Zakariyyah. *Fusul min Tarikh Qatar al-Siyasi* [Episodes from Qatari Political History]. Doha: Matabi' al-Dawhah al-Hadithah al-Mahdudah, 1999.

- Shams, Jalal. "Al-Fikr al-Idari al-Mu'asir al-Ishtishari li-Dawlat 'Uman." [The Modern Administrative Idea in the State Consultative Council in Oman]. *Al-Idari* 4, no. 1, January 1982, pp. 15–27 (pt. 1); 4, no. 4, April 1982, pp. 15–27 (pt. 2); 4, no. 9, September 1982, pp. 40–48 (pt. 3).
- Sharabi, Hisham B. *Governments and Politics of the Middle East in the Twentieth Century*. Princeton: D. Van Nostran, 1962.
- Al-Sharouni, Yaqub. *Sa'id Al-Kabir* [Said the Great]. No. 129-91. Muscat: Ministry of Information, 1991.
- al-Shatibi, Abu Ishaq. *Al-Muwafaqah fi Usul al-Shari'ah* [The Congruence of Sources in Divine Law]. Vol. 1, sec. 2. Cairo: Al-Maktabah al-Tijariyyah al-Kubrah, 1975.
- Shaw, Stanford J., and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey*. Vol. 2, *Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
- al-Shaybani, Muhammad Sharif. *Imarat Qatar al-'Arabiyyah bayn al-Madi wal-Hadir* [Qatar: An Arab Emirate Between Past and Present]. Beirut: Dar al-Thaqafah, 1962.
- Al-Shaykh Rashid bin Sa'id Al Maktoum*. Abu Dhabi: Zayed Centre for Coordination and Follow-up, September 2001.
- Shlaim, Avi. *The Politics of Partition: King Abdullah, the Zionists, and Palestine, 1921–1951*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Siegfried, Nikolaus A. "Legislation and Legitimation in Oman: The Basic Law." *Islamic Law and Society* 7, no. 2, 2000, pp. 359–397.
- Sinan, Mahmud Bahjat. *Tarikh Qatar al-'Am* [A General History of Qatar]. Baghdad: Maktabat al-Ma'arif, 1966.
- al-Siyabi, Salim bin Hamud. *Isaf al-Ayan fi Insab Ahl 'Uman* [The Assistance of the Notables in the Origins of the People of Oman]. Damascus: Al-Maktab al-Islami, n.d.
- Skeet, Ian. *Muscat and Oman: The End of Era*. London: Faber and Faber, 1974.
- . *Oman: Politics and Development*. New York: St. Martin's, 1992.
- Stork, Joe. "Letter from Manama." *Middle East International* no. 670, 8 March 2002, p. 28.
- Strasser, Steven, ed. *The 9/11 Investigations: Staff Reports of the 9/11 Commission*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2004.
- Susser, Asher. *Jordan: Case Study of a Pivotal State*. Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000.
- . "The Jordanian Monarchy: The Hashemite Success Story." In Joseph Kostiner, ed., *Middle East Monarchies: The Challenges of Modernity*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000, pp. 87–115.
- al-Tabari, Abu Ja'far Muhammad bin Jarir. *Tarikh al-Rusul wal-Muluk* [History of Governments and Kings]. Vol. 1. Cairo: Dar al-Ma'arif, 1960.
- Al-Tadmuri, Ahmad Jalal. *Al-Juzur al-'Arabiyyah al-Thalath: Dirasah Watha'iqiyah* [The Three Arab Islands: A Documented Study]. Ras al-Khaimah: Madba'at Ra's al-Khaymah al-Wataniyyah, 1990.
- al-Tahtawi, Rifa'a Badawi Rafi'. *Takhlis al-Ibriz ila Talkhis Bariz* [The Golden Quintessence of Paris]. Cairo: Fahmi, 1905.
- al-Tajir, Mahdi Abdalla. *Bahrain, 1920–1945: Britain, the Shaikh, and the Administration*. London: Croom Helm, 1987.

- Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqī al-Dīn. *Al-Siyasah al-Sharʿiyyah fī Islah al-Raʿi wal-Ruʿiyyah* [Perspectives and Visions on Legal Political Reforms]. Beirut: Dar al-Kitāb al-ʿArabi, 1966.
- Terry, Janice J. *Cornerstone of Egyptian Political Power: The Wafd, 1919–1952*. London: Third World Centre, 1982.
- Thesiger, Wilfred P. “Across the Empty Quarter.” *Geographical Journal* 111, nos. 1–3, 1948, pp. 1–21.
- . *Arabian Sands*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980 (reprint of 1959 edition).
- . “The Badu of Southern Arabia.” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 37, no. 1, 1950, pp. 53–61.
- . “Desert Borderlands of Oman.” *Geographical Journal* 116, nos. 4–6, 1950, pp. 137–171.
- . *Desert Marsh and Mountain: The World of a Nomad*. London: Collins, 1979.
- . “A Further Journey Across the Empty Quarter.” *Geographical Journal* 113, nos. 1–5, 1949, pp. 21–46.
- . “A New Journey in Southern Arabia.” *Geographical Journal* 108, nos. 4–6, 1946, pp. 129–145.
- Thomas, Bertram S. *Alarms and Excursions in Arabia*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1931.
- . “Among Some Unknown Tribes of South Arabia.” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 59, nos. 1–2, 1929, pp. 97–111.
- . “Anthropological Observations in South Arabia.” *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 62, nos. 1–2, 1932, pp. 83–103.
- . “Arab Rule Under the Al Bu Saʿid Dynasty of Oman.” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 24, 1938, pp. 27–53.
- . *Arabia Felix: Across the Empty Quarter of Arabia*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1932.
- . “Four Strange Tongues from South Arabia: The Hadara Group.” *Proceedings of the British Academy* 23, 1937, pp. 239–331.
- . “The Musandam Peninsula and Its People the Shihuh.” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 16, no. 1, 1929, pp. 71–86.
- . “The South-Eastern Borderlands of Rub al-Khali.” *Geographical Journal* 73, no. 3, 1929, pp. 193–215.
- . “Ubar: The Atlantis of the Sands of Rub al-Khali.” *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society* 20, no. 2, 1933, pp. 259–265.
- Townsend, John. *Oman: The Making of a Modern State*. London: Croom Helm, 1977.
- Tozy, Mohamed. “Le prince, le Clerc et l’État: La Restructuration du Champ Religieux au Maroc.” In Gilles Kepel and Yann Richard, eds., *Intellectuels et Militants de l’Islam Contemporain*. Paris: Seuil, 1990, pp. 72–87.
- Tritki, Khalid. “Enquête: Le Salaire du Roi.” *Tel Quel* nos. 156–157, 7 January 2005.
- al-Turtushi, Abu Bakr Muhammad. *Siraj al-Muluk* [The Light of Kings]. London: Riyad al-Rayyis lil-Kutub wal-Nashr, 1990.
- Tuson, Penelope. *The Record of the British Residency and Agencies in the Persian Gulf*. London: India Office Records and Library, 1979.
- Twinam, Joseph Wright. “Reflections on Gulf Cooperation, with Focus on Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman.” *American-Arab Affairs* no. 18, Fall 1986, pp. 14–35.
- Tyan, Emile. *Institutions du Droit Public Musulman*. Vol. 2. Paris: Sirey, 1954.

- United Nations. *Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets for Countries of the Economic Commission for Western Asia*. No. 3. Beirut: ECWA, May 1982.
- United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development. *Arab Human Development Report 2002: Creating Opportunities for Future Generations*. New York: UNDP Regional Bureau for Arab States, 2002.
- Al-Urdun al-Jadid Research Center. *Intikhabat 1989: Haqa'iq wa Arqam; Silsilat Mu-jtama' al-Madani wal-Hayat al-Siyasiyyah al-Urduniyyah* [1989 Elections: Facts and Figures; Political Activities in Jordanian Civil Society]. Amman, 1993.
- Al Uthaymin, A. *Nashat Imarat al Rashid* [Accomplishments of the Al Rashid Emirate]. Riyadh: n.p., 1981.
- Vassiliev, Alexei. *The History of Saudi Arabia*. London: Saqi, 1998.
- Vine, Peter J., and Ibrahim Al Abed, eds. *Natural Emirates: Wildlife and Environment of the United Arab Emirates*. London: Trident, 1996.
- Violet, Bernard. *L'Affaire Ben Barka*. Paris: Le Seuil, 1995.
- Wheatcroft, Andrew. *The Life and Times of Shaykh Salman bin Hamad Al-Khalifa, Ruler of Bahrain, 1942–1961*. London: Kegan Paul International, 1995.
- Wilkinson, John C. "Arab-Persian Land Relationships in Late Sasanid Oman." *Proceedings of the Sixth Seminar for Arabian Studies*, 1972, pp. 40–51.
- . *Arabia's Frontiers: The Story of Britain's Boundary Drawing in the Desert*. London: Tauris, 1991.
- . "Bayasirah and Bayadi." *Arabian Studies* 1, 1974, pp. 75–85.
- . "Bio-Bibliographical Background to the Crisis Period in the Ibadi Imamate of Oman (End of 9th to End of 14th Century)." *Arabian Studies* 3, 1976, pp. 137–164.
- . "The Ibadi Imama." *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 39, no. 3, 1976, pp. 535–551.
- . *The Imamate Tradition of Oman*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- . "The Julanda of Oman." *Journal of Oman Studies* 1, 1975, pp. 97–108.
- . "The Oman Question: The Background to the Political Geography of South-East Arabia." *Geographical Journal* 137, no. 3, September 1971, pp. 361–371.
- . "The Origins of the Omani State." In Derek Hopwood, ed., *The Arabian Peninsula: Society and Politics*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1972, pp. 67–88.
- Wilson, Sir Arnold T. *The Persian Gulf: An Historical Sketch from the Earliest Times to the Beginning of the Twentieth Century*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928.
- Wilson, Peter W., and Douglas F. Graham. *Saudi Arabia: The Coming Storm*. Armonk, N.Y.: Sharpe, 1994.
- Winder, R. Bayly. *Saudi Arabia in the Nineteenth Century*. London: Macmillan, 1965.
- Winstone, H. V. F., and Zahra Freeth. *Kuwait: Prospect and Reality*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1972.
- Wright, Esmond. "'Abdallah's Jordan: 1947–1951.'" *Middle East Journal* 5, no. 4, Autumn 1951, pp. 439–462.
- al-Wusami, Khaled Nasir. *'Uman bayna al-Istiqlal wal-Ihtilal: Dirasah fil-Tarikh al-'Umani al-Hadith wal Ilaqatuhah al-Iqlimiyyah wal-Dawliyyah fil-fatrat ma Bayna 1789–1904* [Oman Between Independence and Occupation: Omani History in Modern Times and Its State Relations Between 1789 and 1904]. Kuwait: Muas-sasat al-Shari' al-'Arabi, 1983.

- Yapp, Malcolm. "British Policy in the Persian Gulf." In Alvin J. Cottrell, ed., *The Persian Gulf States: A General Survey*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980, pp. 70–100.
- Yizraeli, Sarah. *The Remaking of Saudi Arabia: The Struggle Between King Sa'ud and Crown Prince Faysal, 1953–1962*. Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997.
- Ziadeh, Nicola A. *Origins of Nationalism in Tunisia*. Beirut: American University of Beirut Press, 1962.
- Abu Zikri, Whajihah. *Za'id 'an Qarib* [Zayed from Up-Close]. Cairo: Akhbar al-Yawm, 1991.





# Index

---

- ‘Abbasid caliphate, 28, 29, 46, 52
- ‘Abbasid dynasty (750–1258), 5
- ‘Abdallah II of Jordan. *See* Al Hashimi, ‘Abdallah bin Hussein
- ‘Abdallah, King. *See* Al Sa‘ud, ‘Abdallah bin ‘Abdul ‘Aziz
- ‘Abdine Palace, 42, 43, 44
- ‘Abduh, Muhammad, 27, 34
- ‘Abdul ‘Aziz, Jamil bin, 322
- ‘Abdul ‘Aziz (Sultan, r. 1861–1876), 38–39
- ‘Abdul Ghaffar, Muhammad, 93
- ‘Abdul Hamid (Sultan, r. 1774–1789), 6, 39
- Abdul Hamid II, 42, 47, 52
- ‘Abdul Illah (Iraq), 57–58
- Abdul Medjid I (r. 1839–1861), 37, 54
- ‘Abdul Wahhab, Muhammad bin, 230
- Abi Talib, ‘Ali bin, 349
- Abu Bakr (Caliph 632–634), 5
- Abu Dhabi, 149, 184, 290; and Public Works Department, 302; and succession in, 293; and Supreme Petroleum Council, 297, 301, 302
- Abu Dhabi Executive Council, 297, 301, 302, 30
- Abu Dhabi Financial Department, 303
- Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development, 302
- Abu Dhabi University, 304
- Abu Musa Island (UAE), 67, 193
- Abul Huda, Tawfiq, 353
- al-‘Adsani, Yusuf, 115
- al-Afghani, Jamal al-din, 39
- Agadir, 48, 50, 386
- ‘ahd (titular successor), 29, 32, 34
- Al-‘Ahd* [The Covenant] society, 52
- ahl al-Bayt (the Prophet’s household), 29
- ahl al-dhimma (people of the realm), 29
- ahl al-hall wal-‘aqd* (those who bind and loosen), 31, 226
- Ahtisaari, Marti, 132
- Al Ain, 290, 295, 296, 331
- ‘Ajman, 122, 315
- ‘Ajman Economic Department, 332
- ‘Ajman Executive Council, 332
- ‘Ajman Information Department, 332
- ‘Ajman Free Zone, 332
- ‘Ajman Petroleum & Mineral Resource Department, 332
- Al-‘Amri, Mas‘ud, 212
- ‘Alawi (Morocco), 29, 49, 50, 383, 392; and assessment of most recent succession, 398–399; and Isma‘il (r. 1672–1727), 49; and potential alliances among, 403–404; and royal finances, 398; and rulers (list), 505; from Hassan II to Muhammad VI, 393–394
- ‘Alawi, Hassan II (1961–1999): and barakah, 390, 393; and Ben Barka assassination, 390; and Commander of the Faithful, 392; and reign of, 392–393; and religiosity, 389; and Skirat Palace, 390; and Spanish Sahara dispute, 390–391
- ‘Alawi, Lalla Aminah bint Muhammad, 400
- ‘Alawi, Lalla Asmah, 17, 396, 401, 403
- ‘Alawi, Lalla Ayshah bint Muhammad, 400
- ‘Alawi, Lalla Fatimah Zuhrah, 400
- ‘Alawi, Lalla Hasnah, 17, 396, 403

- 'Alawi, Lalla Khadijah bint Muhammad bin Hassan, 401  
 'Alawi, Lalla Latifah bint Qaid Ould Hassan, 402  
 'Alawi, Lalla Malikah bint Muhammad, 400  
 'Alawi, Lalla Maryam, 17, 396, 402  
 'Alawi, Lalla Nuhaylah Bushantuf, 400, 403  
 'Alawi, Lalla Nuzhah bint Muhammad, 400  
 'Alawi, Lalla Salamah Bennani, 17, 399, 401  
 'Alawi, Lalla 'Ulayyah Binharbit, 400, 403  
 'Alawi, Lalla 'Umaymah Binharbit, 400, 403  
 'Alawi, Lalla Sukhaynah Filali, 399, 403  
 'Alawi, Moulay 'Abdallah bin Muhammad, 400  
 'Alawi, Moulay Hassan bin Muhammad, 398, 399, 401–402  
 'Alawi, Moulay Hisham, 398  
 'Alawi, Moulay Idris Filali, 399, 403  
 'Alawi, Moulay Rashid, 17, 398, 402  
 'Alawi, Moulay Yazid Bushantuf, 399, 403  
 'Alawi, Muhammad V (r. 1957–1961), 384–387, 393; and exile, 384–385; and Muslim societies, 386; and nationalism, 384  
 'Alawi, Muhammad VI (1999– ), 16–17, 29, 398, 402; and rule of, 396–398  
 'Alawi, Yusuf bin 'Abdallah (Oman), 150, 158  
 Al Azhar University (Cairo), 32–33  
 Albania, Albanians, 37, 40  
 Al Bu Falah, 294  
 Algeria, 283  
 'Ali, Hamoodah bin, 342 n. 55  
 'Ali (Caliph, 656–661), 5  
 'Ali, Hussein bin, 46  
 'Ali, Rashid 84  
 'alim (religious scholar) (singular). *See* 'Ulamah  
 'Aliyah, Queen of Iraq, 57  
 Al-Jazeera (television network in Qatar), 11, 206  
 Alliance of Liberties (ADL), 394  
 American University of Cairo, 372  
 American University of Sharjah, 317, 319, 321  
 Amman, 55  
 Analogy (qiyas), 29  
 Andrew, Duke of York, 305  
 Anglo-French Declaration (1862)  
 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (British Petroleum), 105  
 Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), 187  
 Anglo-Turkish Convention (1914), 185  
 'Anizah confederation, 103  
 Applegarth College (Godalming, Surrey), 85  
 Al-Aqsah (Mosque), 353  
 Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), 355  
 'Arabi Pasha, 43  
 Arab League. *See* League of Arab States  
 Arab monarchies: and the Kingdom of Bahrain, 67–101; and the State of Kuwait, 103–141; and the Sultanate of Oman, 143–179; and the State of Qatar, 181–224; and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 225–277; and the Federation of the United Arab Emirates, 279–348; and the Kingdom of Jordan, 349–382; and the Kingdom of Morocco, 383–422  
 Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM), 111, 114, 149  
 Arab Revolt, 52  
 Arab rulers and heirs (list), 431–432  
 Arabs, 37  
 Arab Thought Forum, 375  
 'Arafah, Sidi Muhammad bin, 396  
 'Arafah, Sultan Muhammad bin 400  
 'Aref, 'Abdul Salam, 57–58, 108  
 Armenians, 37, 54; and 1895 massacres of, 40  
 Arthur, Geoffrey, 163  
 'Asabiyyah (solidarity of clan), 28–29, 413  
 'Ashurah, 114  
 Asir Province, 52, 183, 230, 260  
 Assad, Hafiz, 112  
 Association for the Promotion and Enforcement of International Humanitarian Law, 94  
 Atatürk (father of the Turks), 54  
 Al 'Atiki, 'Abdul Rahman, 123  
 Al-'Atiyyah, Hamad, 200  
 Al-'Atiyyah, 'Abdallah bin Khalifah, 202–203  
 Al-'Atiyyah, 'Abdallah bin Muhammad, 210  
 Auburn University, 265  
 Ba'ath Party (Iraq), 117  
 Badr, Imam (Yemen), 233  
 Badran, Mudar, 359, 360  
*baduqratiyyah*, 411  
 Baghdad Pact, 57

- Bahrain, Kingdom of, 8–9, 68, 76, 105, 149, 162, 170, 181, 188, 190, 194; and 1981 coup attempt, 76; and Abu Safa' offshore oil field, 70; and assessment of most recent succession, 86–88; and Bahrainization, 70; and creation and cohesion, 67–71; and Criminal Investigations Directorate (CID), 76; and Committee of National Union, 72; and constitutional continuum, 71–84, 110; and constitutional debates, 73–75; and constitutional legacy, 71–73, 435–437; and consultative council (majlis al-shurah), 81; and council of deputies, 81–82; and declaration of independence (11 August 1971), 72; and dinar, 71; and elections 72, 74, 80, 89; and GCC citizens vote in, 81; and Ian Stewart Henderson, 76, 80, 99 n. 49; and Iran, 69, 80, 85; and Islamic Education Society, 81; and Islamic rule, 76; and Islamic Wifaq movement, 81; and Jabal al-Dhukhan, 69; and Labor Law, 70; and Lebanese civil war, 75; and municipal elections (2002), 81–82; and Muntada Forum, 90; and national assembly, 81–82, 83, 89; and National charter, 78–79, 82; and the National Democratic Action Society, 87; and nationality and citizenship, 84; and political reforms, 77–79; and Public Security Directorate, 76; and rulers (list), 433; and ruling family, 68–71; and Shi'ah opposition to Al Khalifah, 8–9, 85; and State Security Measures Law of 1974, 76, 76; and succession, 73; and US military privileges in, 75; and al-Wifaq Party, 87, 89; from Shaykhdom to Kingdom, 9, 79–80
- Bahrain Center for Human Rights, 87, 90
- Bahrain Center for Studies and Research, 86, 91
- Bahrain Currency Board, 71
- Bahrain Defense Forces, 79, 86, 91, 94
- Bahrain Emiri Air Force, 86
- Bahrain Freedom Movement (BFM), 77, 99 n. 49
- Bahrain General Organization for Youth and Sports (GOYS), 90
- Bahrain Historical Documents Center, 86
- Bahrain Liberation Front (BLF), 72, 75
- Bahrain Monetary Agency, 91–92
- Bahraini National Liberation Front (BNLF), 72
- Balkans, 48
- Balyan, Krikor, 37
- Bani Ka'ab (tribe), 292
- Bani Qitab (tribe), 292
- Bani Yas (tribe), 290–291, 300–301, 342 n. 49
- Bardo, Treaty of (1881), 47
- Barka, Ben, 388, 389, 390, 393
- Basman Palace, 55
- Basrah, 56, 67, 104, 105, 107, 117
- Basri, Driss, 391, 392
- Basri, Muhammad ("Faqih"), 389
- "Battle of the Three Kings" (*Ma'rakat al-Qasr*), 48
- Bauer, Marie-Bernard (Monseigneur), 35, 36, 61 n. 34,
- bay'ah* (oath of loyalty), 27, 34, 78, 144, 193, 226, 244, 385, 394
- Bayat, Ahmad bin, 313
- Al-Bayt Foundation, 375
- Baz, Shaykh bin, 235
- Al-Baz, Rania, 242
- BBC Arabic, 11
- Bell, Gertrude, 56
- Bell, J. S., 76
- Benkirane, 'Abdul Illah 388
- Berber, 46
- Berber language, 403
- Al-Bilad Trading Company, 266
- Bourequat, 'Ali, 390
- Brahimi, Lakhdar, 375
- British Bank of the Middle East, 164
- British Empire, 25, 36, 39, 43
- British School of Infantry, 368
- Brown University (Rhode Island), 373
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 302
- Bubiyan Island (Kuwait), 108, 117
- Bugeaud, Thomas Robert, 49
- al-Bukhari, Muhammad Ibn Isma'il Abu 'Abdallah al-Djufi, 31
- Al Bu Khurayban (tribe), 292, 332
- Bulgaria, Bulgarians, 37, 40
- Al Bu Sa'id, 'Ali bin Hamoud, 172
- Al Bu Sa'id, Ali bin Hamud, 168
- Al Bu Sa'id, Badr bin Sa'ud bin Harib, 168, 171
- Al Bu Sa'id, Hamad bin Hamud, 163
- Al Bu Sa'id, Rawyah bint Sa'ud, 168
- Al Bu Sa'id, Sa'ud bin Ibrahim bin Sa'ud, 168, 171
- Buraimi, Buraymi (Oasis), 182, 194, 290, 331,
- Burleigh, Peter, 223 n. 76
- Bush, George H.W., 362

- Bush, George W., 304  
 Bushrah, Shaykhah (Dubai), 345 n. 76  
 al-Butaykhi, Samih Badr al-Din, 378
- Cable and Wireless Limited, 165  
 California State University at Chico, 320  
 Caliph, 25  
 Caliphate: and codifying the, 31–32; and modernizing it, 32–34; and monarchy, 28–30; and origins of, 28–31  
 Cambon, Paul, 47  
 Camp David Accords, 355  
 Carlquist, Doris Franklin Elvin, 376  
 Carter, Jimmy, 93  
 Ceuta (on Moroccan territory), 49  
 Circassians, 55  
 Chanak in the Dardanelles, 54  
 Chase Manhattan Bank, 267  
 Chauncy, Leslie, 162  
 Chemical Bank, 267  
 Chirac, Jacques, 132  
 Christ Church (Oxford), 375  
 Churchill, Winston, 55, 56  
 Citicorp, 267  
 Clinton, Bill, 356  
 Cohen, William, 77  
 Columbia University, 375  
 Command and Staff College (Camberley, England), 368  
 “Commander of the Faithful,” 28, 33, 392  
 Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), 40, 48, 53  
 Community (Ummah), 27  
 Concord Academy (Massachusetts), 376  
 Consensus (ijma’), 29  
 Constitution: and Bahrain (2000 national charter), 436–437; and Bahrain (excerpts from the 1973, 2002 documents), 435–436; and Jordan (Article 28 of the 1958 Document), 481–483; and Kuwait (excerpts from the 1962 Document), 441–442; and Morocco (excerpts from 1996 Document), 507–508; and Oman (excerpts from the 1996 Basic Law), 445; and Qatar (excerpts from the 2005 Document), 449–451; and Saudi Arabia (excerpts from the 1992 basic law), 461; and Saudi Arabia (2006 Allegiance Law of Succession), 463–469; and United Arab Emirates (excerpts from 1996 Document), 475–478  
 Constitutional predicament in Arab Monarchies, 414–415  
 Constitutional Union (UC), 394  
 Contemporary Arab monarchies, 412–414  
 Contemporary rulers, 1–2; and ‘Alawis of Morocco, 395–400; and Hashimites of Jordan, 366–371; and Al Khalifah of Bahrain, 84–89; and list of heirs, 431–432; and Al Maktoum of Dubai, 307–312; and Al Mu‘allah of Umm al-Qiwain, 333–335; and Al Na‘aimi of ‘Ajman, 330–332; and Al Nahyan of Abu Dhabi, 290–300; and Al Qasimi of Sharjah, 314–319; and Al Qasimi of Ras al-Khaimah, 322–327; and Al Sabah of Kuwait, 120–129; and Al Sa‘id of Oman, 162–168; and Al Sa‘ud of Saudi Arabia, 245–257; and Al Sharqi of Fujairah, 336–338; and Al Thani of Qatar, 208–214  
 Cooperation Council of the Arab States of the Gulf. *See* Gulf Cooperation Council  
 Council on Foreign Relations, 302  
 Council on Agriculture, Fisheries and Industry (CAFI), 153  
 Cox, Percy 56, 105, 186  
 Cranwell Military Academy (Royal Air Force), 373  
 Crawford, David C, 163  
 Cromer, Lord (Evelynn Baring, 1841–1917), 43  
 Curzon, George, Lord, 230  
 Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, 26, 29, 33
- Dalmah (UAE), 291  
 Dammam (Saudi Arabia), 148  
 Dar al-Harb (Land of the Other), 29  
 D’Arcy Exploration Company, 146, 187, 188  
 Deerfield Academy (Massachusetts), 368, 373, 375  
 Delors, Jacques, 397  
 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, 174  
 Dhaffrah (hamlet), 291  
 Dhahabi, Muhammad, 378  
 Dhawahir (tribe), 292  
 al-Dhi’af, Ahmad Ibn Abu, 32  
 al-Dhinhani, Muhammad bin Sa‘id, 339  
 Dhuffar, 147, 151, 191 *passim*  
 Dhuffar Liberation Front (DLF), 149  
 Dhuffari Soldiers’ Organization, 149  
 Dibbah, 337  
 Diouf, Abdou, 132  
 Dir‘iyyah (Sa‘udi Arabia), 182

- Dlimi, Ahmed, 390  
*Dolmabahçe* Palace, 37, 38  
 Dolphin Energy Limited, 304  
 Dubai, 194, 294; and conflict with Ras al-Khaimah, 308; and conflict with Sharjah, 308; and modernization, 312; as Indian city, 312  
 Dubai Executive Council, 312, 313  
 Dubai Ports Authority, 321  
 Duke University, 217  
 al-Dumayni, 'Ali, 241, 244
- Economic Commission for Western Asia, 114  
 Egypt: and 1956 Suez War, 57; and ruling family, 41–46  
 Emirates Airlines, 309  
 Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 301  
*Entente Cordiale* (1904 Anglo-French), 44, 50, 55  
 Enver Pasha, 40, 41, 48, 51, 52, 53  
 Equity and Reconciliation Commission (Truth Commission), 398, 404  
 Etihad Airlines, 309  
 European Commission, 397  
 Exegesis (tafsir), 29,
- Fahd, King. *See* Al Sa'ud, Fahd bin Abdul Aziz  
 Al-Faleh, Matruk, 241, 244  
 Family Community (Ursat al-Jama'ah), 387  
 al-Farabi, Abu Nasr, 32  
 Farouk (Egypt), 44–45, 46  
 Fasht al-Dibal, 203  
 Fatimah (the Prophet's daughter), 349, 395  
 Fatimid dynasty (909–1171), 5, 49  
 Fatwah (religious decree) 51, 234–235, 270 n. 32  
 Faysal II, 57, 58  
 Faysal, King. *See* Al Sa'ud, Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz  
 Faysal, Tariq bin (UAE), 321  
 Al-Faysal, Toujan, 361, 362  
 Fay School (Boston), 374  
 Fez, 48, 49  
 Figon, Georges, 390  
 Filali, 'Abdul Latif, 399, 403  
 Filali, Fuad bin 'Abdul Latif 399, 403  
 France, 46, 57; and 1916–Sykes Picot Agreement, 349; in Tunisia, 47–48  
 “Free Officers” (Egypt), 45
- Front pour la Defense des Institutions Constitutionnelles (Morocco), 389  
 Fujairah (UAE), 332, 333  
 Fujairah Finance Department, 339  
 Fujairah Free Zone Authority, 339  
 Fujairah General Civil Aviation Authority, 339  
*fürstenspiegel* (mirror for princes), 34
- Gallipoli, 52  
 Gama, Vasco de, 324  
 Gardiner, Antoinette (Princess Muna), 362, 368–369  
 Al Gargawih, Muhammad 'Abdallah, 313  
 de Gaulle, Charles, 295  
 Gaza Strip (Palestine), 352  
 General Intelligence Department (Jordan), 378  
 George, Lloyd, 54  
 Georgetown University, 368  
 George Washington University, 216  
 Germany, 50;  
 Gezireh Club (Cairo), 44  
 al-Ghaffiri, Burayk bin Hamud, 163  
 al-Ghazali, Abu Hamid, 30, 32  
 Ghazi (Iraq, r. 1933–1939), 56, 57  
 Ghotbzadeh, Sadegh, 114  
 Glubb, John, 357  
 Graham, John, 151  
 Greece, Greeks, 37, 40  
 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 11, 76, 86, 167, 200, 204, 207, 355; and displeasure with Qatar coup, 211; and Hamad bin Khalifah storming out, 211–212  
 Gulf Oil Corporation, 105
- Hafsid dynasty, 46  
 Halaby, Lisa (Queen Noor al-Hussein), 362  
 Halaby, Najib Elias 376  
 Al-Hamed, 'Abdallah, 241, 244  
 Hanbali (doctrine), 31  
 Harakan, Muhammad bin, 229  
 Hardinge C., Lord (viceroy in India), 144  
 Hariri, Rafiq, 23 n. 32,  
 Harrow School, 354, 374, 375  
 al-Harthi, Saleh bin 'Ali, 143  
 Hasah Province (Sa'udi Arabia), 103, 182, 183, 184, 185, 293  
 Hashim (Banu) clan, 349  
 Hashemi Iraqi Monarchy Party, 2  
 Al Hashimi, 'Abdallah bin Hussein ['Abdallah II] (1999– ), 15–16, 17, 52, 300, 351, 356, 363, 366; and letter to

- Hamzah, 503–504; and letter to Hussein, 501–502; and meeting with Noor, 366; and mother, 362; and rule of, 367–369; and rulers (list), 479; as heir apparent, 365; and view of rulership, 367, 371
- Al Hashimi, ‘Abdallah bin Hussein [‘Abdallah I] (r. 1921–1951), 350, 351
- Al Hashimi, ‘Abdul Illah, 359
- Al Hashimi, ‘Abir bint Hussein, 376
- Al Hashimi, ‘Ali bin Hussein, 1, 52, 370, 374–375
- Al Hashimi, ‘Alia (1948–1977), 370, 374
- Al Hashimi, ‘Aliah bint Tawfiq al-Tabbah, 373
- Al Hashimi, ‘Ayyah bint Faysal bin Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, ‘Ayshah bin Faysal bin Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, ‘Ayshah bint Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, Badiyyah bint Hassan, 376
- Al Hashimi, Fahdah bint Muhammad bin Ibrahim bin Salman Abu Niyyan, 374
- Al Hashimi, Faisal II (King of Iraq), 2, 26
- Al Hashimi, Faysal bin Hussein, 55, 351, 370, 372
- Al Hashimi, Hamzah bin Hussein, 15–16, 363, 364, 365, 366, 370, 374, 376; as heir apparent, 369; as (former) heir apparent, 369
- Al Hashimi, Hashim bin ‘Abdallah bin Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, Hashim bin Hussein, 370, 374, 376
- Al Hashimi, Hassan bin Talal, 1, 15–16, 300, 354, 363, 366, 367, 370, 375–376; and awards from universities, 376; and National Charter Royal Commission, 357; as regent, 363
- Al Hashimi, Hayah bint Al Hussein, 310
- Al Hashimi, Hussein bin ‘Abdallah bin Hussein, 370, 373
- Al Hashimi, Hussein bin ‘Ali (r. 1853–1925), 26, 52, 350–351
- Al Hashimi, Hussein bin Talal (r. 1935–1999), 14–16, 17, 300, 310, 349, 353, 354–357; and ‘Abdallah as heir apparent, 497; and illnesses, 363–365; and letter to ‘Abdallah, 499–500; and letter to Hassan, 489–496; and letter to Jordanians, 485–488; and meeting with Hassan, 366; and Nasir, 355; and 16 January 1999 letter, 485–488; and views of succession (CNN interview with Christiane Amanpour), 381
- Al Hashimi, Iman bint ‘Abdallah bin Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, Iman bint Hussein, 376
- Al Hashimi, Noor bint ‘Asim Abu Bakr, 374
- Al Hashimi, Noor al-Hussein (Lisa Halaby), 15–16, 362, 363–364, 365, 372, 376
- Al Hashimi, Muhammad bin Talal, 353, 354
- Al Hashimi, Muna (Antoinette Gardiner), 362, 368–369
- Al Hashimi, Rahmah bint Hassan, 376
- Al Hashimi, Rashid bin Hassan bin Talal, 365, 376
- Al Hashimi, Rania al-‘Abdallah, 15, 368, 372–373
- Al Hashimi, Rayyah bint Hussein, 376
- Al Hashimi, Rym bint Lakhdar Brahimi, 375
- Al Hashimi, Salmah bint ‘Abdallah bin Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, Sarah bint Faysal bin Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, Sarvath Ikramullah, 363, 370, 376
- Al Hashimi, Sumayyah bint Hassan, 376
- Al Hashimi, ‘Umar bin Faysal bin Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, Talal bin ‘Abdallah (r. 1951–1952), 353–354
- Al Hashimi, Zayd bin Hussein, 351
- Al Hashimi, Zayn bint Hussein, 373
- Al Hashimi, Zayn al-Sharaf bint Jamil, 353, 354
- Hashimite (Jordan), 29, 52, 230
- Hashimite (Monarchy in Iraq), 15, 53–58
- Hassan II, King of Morocco. *See* ‘Alawi, Hassan bin Muhammad.
- Hassanein Pasha, 45
- Hawar islands disputes, 190
- Henderson, Ian Stewart, 76, 80, 99 n. 49
- Higher Council for Science & Technology, 375
- Hijaz Province, 55, 183, 230, 246, 349, 350–351
- Hijaz railway, 39
- Hilmi, ‘Abbas (r. 1892–1914), 43–44, 45
- Himyar, Sulayman bin, 146
- al-Hinai, Ghalib bin ‘Ali bin Hilal, 146, 148
- Al-Hinai, Talib bin ‘Ali bin Hilal

- Hindi, Hanadi, 241  
 Holmes, Frank, 187  
 Horan, Hume, 237  
 Hormuz, Straits, 324  
 Al-Hujailan, Jamil, 212  
 Hussein, 'Abdul 'Aziz (Kuwait), 113  
 Hussein, Saddam, 117, 120, 203, 355  
 Husseini dynasty, 46  
 Hussein of Jordan. *See* Al Hashimi,  
   Hussein bin Talal
- 'Ibadhi, 'Ibadhism, 144, 151, 152, 165,  
   172–173  
 Ibn Khaldun, 28, 30, 32, 59, 413  
 Ibn Taymiyyah, Taqi al-Din, 30–31, 32  
 Ibn Tumart (d. 1128), 46  
 al-Ibrahim, Hasan 'Ali, 116  
 Ibrahim Pasha, 46  
 Ihlish (in "liberated" Oman), 150  
*Ijazah* (license), 255  
 Ikramullah, Muhammad, 376  
 Imamate, 'Ibadhi, 28  
 Imperial Airways, 69  
 India, 162  
 Industrial College of the Armed Forces, 86  
 Innovation (*bid'ah*), 34  
 Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan), 304  
 International Community School (Amman),  
   375  
 Iran, 69, 80, 85, 193  
 Iranian claims on Abu Musa and Tunb  
   Islands, 328  
 Iranian Revolution, 200;  
 Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), 76, 200;  
 Iraqi Constitutional Monarchy Movement  
   (ICMM), 2  
 Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC), 146, 188  
 al-'Isa, 'Abdallah (Saudi Officer), 107  
 'Isa, Saleh bin, 146  
 Islamic Action Front (Jordan), 361  
 Islamic codes (*hudud*), 34  
 Islamic College (Amman), 373  
 Islamic Community (Morocco), 387, 388  
 Islamist Justice and Development Party,  
   388, 394  
 Islamic museum in Cairo (1880), 42  
 Islamic Scientific College (Amman), 375  
 Islamic tribal norms, (pre-), 4  
 Israel, 45, 57  
 Istiqlal Party (Morocco), 384, 385, 386,  
   388, 392, 394  
 Italy invaded Tripolitana (modern Libya,  
   1911), 40; and economic penetration  
   into Tripolitania, 47
- Izki, 163
- Jabal al-Akhdar (Oman), 339  
 Jackson, Michael, 92  
 Jahiliyyah (ignorance), 415  
 Al Jamri, Shaykh 'Abdul Amir, 87  
 Jemal Pasha, 41  
 Jerusalem, 352  
 Jettou, Driss 394  
 Jews, 37  
 Jiddah, 117, 118  
 Jiluwi, Hayah bint Turki bin 'Abdallah,  
   251  
 Al Jishshi, Hassan Jawad, 74  
 Jordan, 15–16, 55, 107, 191, 241, 300,  
   349–382; and 1916–Sykes Picot  
   Agreement, 349; and 1928 Organic Law,  
   351, 358; and 1946 Constitution, 353,  
   356; and 1970 (September) clashes, 358;  
   and 1974 Rabat LAS Summit, 355; and  
   1992 National Charter, 360; and 1993  
   Oslo Accords between Israel and the  
   PLO, 361; and 1994 peace treaty with  
   Israel, 358; and alliance with Britain,  
   350; and Arab Cooperation Council  
   (ACC), 355; and Arab dissidents, 350;  
   and Arab-Israeli conflict, 352–354; and  
   Arab nationalism, 351; and Article 28 of  
   Constitution, 362, 365; and assessment  
   of most recent succession, 369–370; and  
   (end of) British mandate, 352; and  
   Camp David Accords, 355; and  
   constitutional continuum, 357–366; and  
   constitutional legacy, 357–359; and  
   constitutional reforms, 359; and council  
   of deputies, 359–360; and creation and  
   cohesion, 350–357; and elections, 361;  
   and family council, 363–364; and  
   International Monetary Fund (IMF),  
   358; and Israel, 352, 354, 356, 358; and  
   Kuwait, 355–356; and Madrid Peace  
   Conference (1991), 356; and the Majlis  
   al 'Ayan, 359; and military, 357–358;  
   and Nasir of Egypt, 355; and opposition,  
   377; and Palestine Liberation  
   Organization, 355; and Palestinian  
   population, 355; and parliamentary life,  
   357, 359–362; and PLK (plucky little  
   king), 354, 357, 362; and political  
   clashes; and potential alliances among,  
   377–378; and Rhodes Conference, 352;  
   and role of military, 377–378; and the  
   ruling family, 350–357; and Syria, 358;  
   and United Nations Resolution 242,

- 356; from Hussein to 'Abdallah, 362–366
- Jordan Blood Disease Society, 373
- Jordanian Housing Bank, 375
- Jordan River Foundation, 372
- Jordan Society for Organ Donation, 373
- Justice and Charity (Morocco), 388, 394
- al-Ka'abnah, 'Abdul Hafiz, 364, 377
- Al-Kabariti, 'Abdul Karim, 361
- Kaiser, 50
- Kalbah, 322, 336
- Kamil, Hasan (Egyptian jurist), 195
- Kamil, Hussein (r. 1914–1917), 44
- Al-Kawakibi, 'Abdul Rahman, 27
- Kemball, Arnold B., 315
- Kerak (Jordan), 358
- Khafes (cage—mechanism in Ottoman succession), 6
- Khatib, Ahmad al, 118
- Al Khalifah (Bahrain), 68, 69, 71, 74, 78, 80, 83, 96, 103, 110, 181–182, 183, 188, 193; and family council, 86; and opposition to, 75–77; and potential alliances among, 95–96; and rulers, 69
- Al Khalifah, 'Abdallah bin Hamad, 68, 92
- Al Khalifah, 'Abdallah bin Khalid, 96
- Al Khalifah, Ahmad al-Fatih (Ahmad the Conqueror), 68
- Al Khalifah, 'Ali bin Hamad, 92
- Al Khalifah, 'Ali bin Khalifah, 9
- Al Khalifah, 'Ayshah bint Muhammad, 94
- Al Khalifah, Halah bint Du'ayj, 91, 96
- Al Khalifah, Hamad bin 'Isa (1923–1942), 69–70
- Al Khalifah, Hamad bin 'Isa bin Salman (r. 1999– ), 59, 71, 77–84, 85–86; and constitutional vision, 81; and Supreme National Committee, 78; and vision of the judiciary, 83; and vision of the legislative, 82–83; and vision of human rights, 83–84
- Al Khalifah, Hayah bint Rashid, 94–95
- Al Khalifah, Hussah bint 'Ali, 92
- Al Khalifah, Hussah bint Salman bin Ibrahim, 96
- Al Khalifah, 'Isa bin 'Ali, 69
- Al Khalifah, 'Isa bin Salman (r. 1961–1999), 8, 71–77
- Al Khalifah, Khalid bin Ahmad bin Muhammad, 93, 96
- Al Khalifah, Khalifah bin Hamad, 92, 94
- Al Khalifah, Khalifah bin Salman, 8, 9, 68, 76–77, 82, 90, 91–92; and hold on parliamentary debates, 82, 99 n. 56
- Al Khalifah, Khulud, 93
- Al Khalifah, Mawzah bint Khalifah, 94
- Al Khalifah, Muhammad bin 'Isa, 94
- Al Khalifah, Muhammad bin Khalifah, 67, 68–69
- Al Khalifah, Muhammad bin Mubarak, 94
- Al Khalifah, Nasir bin Hamad, 93
- Al Khalifah, Sabikah bint Ibrahim, 86, 91, 92, 93, 96
- Al Khalifah, Salman bin Ahmad, 68
- Al Khalifah, Salman bin Hamad (1942–1961), 70–71
- Al Khalifah, Salman bin Hamad bin 'Isa, 9, 86, 90–91, 92, 305
- Al Khalifah, Wusal bint Muhammad, 93
- Khalifah Fund, 303
- al-Khalili, Muhammad bin 'Abdallah, 145, 146, 148
- al-Khalili, Sa'id bin Khalfan, 145
- Khan, 25
- al-Kharusi, Salim bin Rashid, 144, 145
- Al-Kharj (Saudi Arabia), 206
- Al Khawajah, 'Abdul Hadi, 87–88, 90, 95
- Khawr al-Dhakhirah, 193
- Khawr al-'Udayd, 184, 291–292
- Khayr al-Din, 46, 47
- Khedibe Ismai'il (r. 1863–1879), 3–36, 41, 42,
- Khedive, 26, 41, 42
- King Hussein Foundation, 376
- King Sa'ud University, 260
- Kitchener, Horatio, 43, 44, 52
- Kurds, 37
- Kuwait, 9–10, 80, 149, 181; and Banu Khalid, 103; and constitution, 108–109, 117; and constitutional continuum, 108–120; and Constitutional Court, 118; and constitutional crisis (1976), 110–113; and constitutional legacy, 109–111; and creation and cohesion, 103–108; and Democratic Forum, 118; and *Diwaniyyahs* (informal majlis), 116, 130; and elections, 115–116, 118–119, 129; and internal pressures throughout the 1990s, 117–120; and Iraqi claims to, 108–109; and Lebanese civil war, 111–112; and opposition to Al Sabah, 115–116; and Palestinians, 112; and parliament (National Assembly), 111–115, 116, 118, 120, 122, 125–127;



- and political clashes, 111–113; and prisoners/missing persons in 1991 War; and relations with Britain, 104–105; and relations with Iraq, 107–108, 138 n. 20; and rulers (list), 439; and *Suq al-Manakh*, 115–116; and treaty with Britain (1899), 104–105
- Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED), 113
- Kuwait Institute for Scientific Research, 133
- Kuwait Oil Company, 105
- Kuwait University, 133
- Al-Kuwari, 'Isa Ghanim, 201
- Laden, Osama bin, 255, 263–264
- Lai, Chou En
- Lampson, Miles, 45
- Landon, Timothy, 163
- Lantos, Tom, 223 n. 76
- League of Arab States, 45, 149, 167, 191, 315, 355
- Lebanon, 111, 191, 351
- Leftist Unified Socialist Party (PGSU), 394
- de Lesseps, Ferdinand, 35
- Leys School (Cambridge, England), 85
- Libya, 201
- Lingeh (Iran), 315
- Liwah (Oasis), 290
- London Business School, 373
- Lopez, Carlos U, 266
- Lorimer, John Gordon, 104
- Lower Gulf Shaykhdoms, 71; and 1820 General Treaty of Peace, 182
- Lyautey, Hubert, 50, 51
- Al Ma'amari, 'Ali bin Majid, 167
- Ma'an (Jordan), 251, 358
- Al Ma'ashani, Miyzun bint Ahmad, 168
- Al Macki, Ahmad 'Abdulnabi, 159
- Madinah, 28, 39, 240
- Mahandah tribe (Qatar), 193
- Maher, 'Ali, 46
- Mahmoud II (r. 1808–1839), 37
- Mahmud I (Sultan, 1413–1421), 6
- Majid, Ahmad bin, 324
- Majlis al-Dawlah (Oman), 157–160
- Majlis al-Shurah (Oman), 154–157
- al-Makhzin, Dar, 396
- Makkah, 28, 39, 52, 55, 58, 241, 248, 263; and 1979 mosque takeover, 235, 238, 250
- Al Maktoum, 298, 307–314, 318, 331; and assessment of most recent succession, 311; and Bani Rashid, 307; and Bani Suhayl, 307; and conflict with Sharjah, 308; and potential alliances among, 313–314
- Al Maktoum, Ahmad bin Rashid, 308
- Al Maktoum, Hamdan bin Muhammad bin Rashid, 312, 313
- Al Maktoum, Hamdan bin Rashid, 307, 308, 312–313
- Al Maktoum, Majid bin Muhammad bin Rashid, 93
- Al Maktoum, Maktoum bin Rashid (r. 1990–2006), 307, 308–310; and death in Australia, 310
- Al Maktoum, Muhammad bin Rashid al Maktoum (r. 2006– ), 305, 307, 308; and ambitions, 313–314; and rivalry with Muhammad bin Zayed, 311; and wives of, 310
- Al Maktoum, Rashid bin Sa'id (r. 1958–1990), 17, 194, 307, 308, 309
- Al Maktoum, Sa'id bin Maktoum (r. 1912–1958), 307
- Al Maktoum, Shaykhah Hind bint Maktoum bin Juma', 310
- Malik (King), 7, 25–26
- Al-Mamlakah (The Kingdom Company), 266
- Mamluk dynasties, 29
- Manasir (tribe), 292, 293–294
- Al Mantheri, Yahyah bin Mahfouz, 158
- Manufacturers Hanover Bank, 267
- Al-Maraj, Rasheed, 90
- Mark, Robert, 113
- Marrakech, 48
- al-Marsa Convention, 47
- Masirah Island, 147
- al-Masri, 'Aziz 'Ali, 46, 52
- al-Mawardi, Abu al-Hassan 'Ali Ibn Muhammad, 31, 32
- Mayo Clinic (Rochester, Minnesota), 367
- Mazari' (tribe), 292
- al-Mazidi, 'Isa Muhammad, 116
- Meade, Malcom John, 104
- Mehmed V (Mehmed Reshad), 40
- Mehmed VI (r. 1918–1922), 53, 54
- al-Mehri, Abbas Ahmad, 113
- Meir, Golda (Meyerson), 352
- Meknes, 49
- Menem, Carlos, 132
- Menlo College, 266

- Meret School (Washington DC), 374  
 Michigan State University, 328  
 Mishari bin Abdul Rahman (1831–1834)  
 Al Misnad, Nasir, 193  
 Mitterrand, François, 392  
 Monarchy, monarchies, 191, 409–422; and  
   Egypt, 191; and Iraq, 191; and Islamic  
   interpretations of, 26–28; and power,  
   35–58; and revival, 35–37  
 Mons Officer Cadet School (Aldershot,  
   England), 85  
 Montenegro, Montegrans, 40  
 Moulay ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (r. 1894–1908), 50  
 Moulay ‘Abd al-Hafiz (r. 1908–1913), 50  
 Moulay ‘Abdul Rahman, 49  
 Moulay Hassan (r. 1873–1894), 49  
 Morocco, 16–17, 383–422; and 18  
   November 1962 Constitution, 389; and  
   1912 Treaty of Fez, 395; and 1912  
   Treaty of Madrid, 395; and 1996 revised  
   constitution, 395; and Arab nationalism,  
   386; and Bilad al-Makhzen (state  
   treasury), 48; and Bilad al-Siba (areas of  
   dissidence), 48; and claims to Saharan  
   territories, 48; and Commander of the  
   Faithful, 392; and constitutional  
   continuum, 387–394; and constitutional  
   monarchy, 392; and constitutional  
   reforms, 388–391; and consultative  
   council, 391, 393; and council of  
   deputies, 391; and creation and cohesion,  
   383–387; and elections, 391, 394; and  
   Muhammad Al-Shaykh, 48; and  
   Ottoman rule, 384; and parliamentary  
   revisions, 391–392; and phosphate  
   exporter, 397; and Polisario, 401; and  
   political parties, 384, 391, 394; and the  
   ruling family, 384–387; and Sa‘idi tribe,  
   48; and Spanish protectorate at Tetouan,  
   396; and US military bases in, 386; and  
   Western Sahara dispute, 397; and  
   Zawiyyah clan, 48  
 Moroccan Liberal Party (PLM), 394  
 Movement of the Islamic Youth (Morocco),  
   387  
 Al Mu‘allah, 333–336; and assessment of  
   most recent succession, 334–335; and  
   potential alliances among, 335–336  
 Al Mu‘allah, ‘Abdallah bin Ahmad, 335  
 Al Mu‘allah, ‘Abdallah bin Rashid, 335  
 Al Mu‘allah, ‘Abdul Rahman, 334  
 Al Mu‘allah, Ahmad bin Rashid, 334  
 Al Mu‘allah, ‘Ali bin ‘Abdallah, 333  
 Al Mu‘allah, ‘Ali bin Rashid, 335  
 Al Mu‘allah, Hamad bin Ibrahim, 334  
 Al Mu‘allah, Ibrahim bin Ahmad, 335  
 Al Mu‘allah, Khalid bin Rashid bin  
   Ahmad, 335  
 Al Mu‘allah, Maktoum bin Rashid, 335  
 Al Mu‘allah, Muhammad bin Rashid, 335  
 Al Mu‘allah, Rashid bin Ahmad (1981– ),  
   333, 334  
 Al Mu‘allah, Sa‘id bin Ahmad, 334  
 Al Mu‘allah, Sa‘ud bin Rashid, 335  
 Mu‘awiyah (‘Umayyad governor of Syria),  
   5, 60  
 Mud-hutters (*shatgawiyyas*) of Baghdad,  
   58  
 Muhammad (The Prophet), 28  
 Muhammad (Morocco, r. 1859–1873), 49  
 Muhammad III (Sultan, 1595–1603), 6  
 Muhammad ‘Ali (viceroy of Egypt), 41, 46  
 Muhammad, ‘Ali Mustafa, 339  
 Muharraq Island (Bahrain), 68, 69  
 Al Muharak, Qaid Ould Hassan, 402  
 al-Mukhtar, Omar, 48  
 Murad V, 38–39  
 Murphy, Richard W., 201, 302  
 Al-Murr, Hussah bint (Dubai), 307  
 Musandam Peninsula, 324  
 Musallam (tribe), 67, 181  
 Muscat, 145, 147  
 al-Muslim, Abu al-Hussain al-Kushayri al-  
   Naisaburi, 31  
 Muslim Brotherhood, 45, 235, 359, 361,  
   387  
 Muslim monarchies, and exhaustion and  
   renewal of, 51–54  
 Mustafa (Sultan, 1603–1617)  
 Mustafa Kemal Pasha, 48, 53, 54  
 Mutawwa (“morals” security forces in  
   Sa‘udi Arabia), 262  
 Muti‘, ‘Abdul Karim, 387  
 Muwahiddun (Wahhabis), 254  
 Al Na‘aimi, and assessment of most recent  
   succession, 331–332; and potential  
   alliances among, 333  
 Al Na‘aimi, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Ahmad, 332  
 Al Na‘aimi, ‘Abdul ‘Aziz bin Humayd, (r.  
   1910), 330  
 Al Na‘aimi, Ahmad bin Humayd, 332  
 Al Na‘aimi, ‘Ali bin Rashid, 331  
 Al Na‘aimi, ‘Ammar bin Humayd,  
   332–333  
 Al Na‘aimi, Humayd bin Rashid (r.  
   1910–1928), 330; and refusal to accept  
   British gifts, 330

- Al Na'a'imi, Humayd bin Rashid bin Humayd (1981– ), 330
- Al Na'a'imi, Rashid bin Humayd (r. 1928–1981), 330, 331
- Al Na'a'imi, Humayd bin Rashid, (r. 1981– ), 330–331
- Nahas Pasha, 45
- Al Nahyan, 184, 292, 296, 309, 311, 318; and assessment of most recent succession, 298–299; and Bahraini model for succession, 300; and Bani Fatimah, 306; and Jordanian model for succession, 300; and potential alliances among, 306–307; and Qatari model for succession, 300; and size and structure, 290–294; and succession dilemma, 299–300
- Al Nahyan, 'Abdallah bin Zayed bin Sultan, 297, 300, 305
- Al Nahyan, Ahmad bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Dhiyab bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Falah bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Hamdan bin Zayed bin Khalifah (r. 1912–1922), 293
- Al Nahyan, Hamdan bin Zayed bin Sultan, 297, 300, 304; and Osama bin Laden, 304, 344 n. 74
- Al Nahyan, Hamed bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Haza' bin Shakhbut, 293, 294
- Al Nahyan, Haza' bin Zayed bin Sultan, 297, 300, 304–305
- Al Nahyan, 'Isa bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Khalid bin Shakhbut, 293, 294
- Al Nahyan, Khalid bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Khalifah bin Zayed al Nahyan (2004– ), 14–15, 296–298, 310, 320; and intra-federation contenders, 313–314; and rule after 2004, 296; as heir apparent, 297
- Al Nahyan, Mansur bin Zayed bin Sultan, 300, 305
- Al Nahyan, Muhammad bin Khalifah bin Sultan, 294, 300, 303–304
- Al Nahyan, Muhammad bin Zayed bin Sultan, 297, 300–301; and appointment as heir apparent, 298; and role of mother, 300; and struggle for power, 300
- Al Nahyan, Nahyan bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Sa'id bin Tahnun, 291
- Al Nahyan, Saif bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Salamah bint Butti, 23 n. 34, 294
- Al Nahyan, Saqr bin Zayed bin Khalifah, 293
- Al Nahyan, Shakhbut bin Sultan, 7, 293, 294–295
- Al Nahyan, Sultan bin Khalifah bin Zayed, 300, 302–303
- Al Nahyan, Sultan bin Zayed bin Khalifah (r. 1922–1926), 293, 295, 301–303
- Al Nahyan, Sultan bin Zayed bin Sultan, 15, 299
- Al Nahyan, Tahnun bin Zayed (r. 1909–1912), 293
- Al Nahyan, Tahnun bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, 'Umar bin Zayed bin Sultan, 306
- Al Nahyan, Zayed bin Khalifah (r. 1855–1909), 290–291, 293, 333
- Al Nahyan, Zayed bin Sultan, 7, 14, 194, 195, 291, 294–296, 308, 310, 317, 334, 33; and 14 June 2003 Ras al-Khaimah Coup, 324–327; and constitutional vision, 286–289; and dirham diplomacy, 14, 338; and federation discussions, 194; and intra-Union disputes, 286–287; and “markers” in Abu Dhabi, 292–293; and planting trees, 295; and succession patterns, 15
- Na'im (tribe), 292, 293
- Najd Province (of central Arabia) , 230, 246
- Najran Province, 254, 260
- al-Naqib, 'Abdul Wahhab, 134
- al-Naqib, Hudah, 134
- Nasir, Gamal 'Abdul, 45, 107, 108, 148, 227, 355
- Nasiriyyah Palace, 229
- National Popular Movement (MNP), 394
- National Rally of Independents, 394
- Next generation leaders: and contenders to power in Abu Dhabi, 300–307; and contenders to power in 'Ajman, 332–333; and contenders to power in Bahrain, 89–96; and contenders for power in Dubai, 312–314; and contenders to power in Fujairah, 338–339; and contenders to power in Jordan, 371–378; and contenders to power in Kuwait, 129–135; and

- contenders to power in Morocco, 400–404; and contenders to power in Oman, 168–173; and contenders to power in Qatar, 214–220; and contenders to power in Ras al-Khaimah, 327–330; and contenders to power in Saudi Arabia, 257–268; and contenders to power in Sharjah, 319–322; and contenders to power in Umm al-Qiwayn, 335–336
- Niazi Pasha, 40
- al-Nissan, Mamoul ‘Abdul Rahman, 2
- Nizwah (Oman), 145, 146, 147, 148, 173
- Noor al-Hussein Foundation, 376
- Nubar Pasha, 42
- Al Numani, Farah Yahyah, 161
- Nusseibeh, Zaki, 24
- Oldman, Hugh, 151, 163
- Oman, Sultanate of, 10–11, 80, 143–179, 327, 331, 337; and 1996 Basic Law, 11; and the basic law, 161, 167; and Batinah Coast, 165; and border agreement with Sa‘udi Arabia 146; and border dispute with UAE, 146; and Buraimi Oasis, 146; and Central Bank of Oman, 152; and creation and cohesion, 143–150; and constitutional continuum, 151–162; and Defense Council, 161; and Dhuffar Conflict, 149–150, 165, 174 n. 17; and Dhuffar Liberation Front (DLF), 149; and elections to Majlis al-Shurah, 156; and family council, 161; and General Prosecution Office, 160; and Ghaffiri tribes, 163; and Hamrin congress (1968), 150; and Hinawi tribes, 145, 146; and *‘Ibadiyah*, 144, 145; and Imamate, 144; and Interim Planning Council, 152; and Iranian assistance, 150; and the *al-Jam‘iyyah al-Khayriyyah* (The Fraternal Society), 149; and Jordanian assistance, 150; and the Majlis al-Dawlah, 157–160; and the Majlis al-Shurah, 154–157, 158–159, 160; and national defense council, 152; and the National Yemeni Liberation Front, 149, 150; and Oman Liberation Army, 147; and Royal Air Force (RAF), 147; and ruling family council, 147–149, 170; and Seeb Treaty, 148; and al-Shumukh Palace, 173; and Special Air Service (SAS), 147; and State Consultative Council (SCC), 152; and Supreme Council for Economic Planning and Development, 152; and the United Kingdom, 147; and women, 160–161
- Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), 11
- Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 216, 233
- Ottoman Empire, 27, 35–37, 46, 51, 58; and Kuwait, 9, 103–105; and legacy, 6–8; and North Africa, 46–54; and opposition to Al Sa‘ud; and Osmanli dynasties, 37–41, 53, 54; and *qa‘immaqam* (Governor), 104, 183–184; and Qatar, 183–184; and succession patterns, 37–41
- Oufkir, Muhammad, 385, 389, 390, 393
- Oxford University, 367, 368
- Pahlavi, Shah Muhammad Reza, 25, 67, 112, 113, 132
- Palestine, Palestinians, 55, 351, 354
- Palestine Liberation Organization, 355
- Panama Canal, 35
- Papplewick Preparatory School (Ascot), 374–375
- Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS), 394
- Persian Empire, 67
- Petroleum Concessions (Qatar) Limited, 188, 189
- Petroleum Development (Oman) Ltd (PDO), 146, 163, 164
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), 72, 150
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), 150
- Popular Liberation Army, 150
- Popular Movement (MP), 394
- Power, 32; and absolute power (*mulk mutlaq*), 32; and republican power (*mulk jumhuri*), 32; and regulated political behavior (*mulk muqayad bi qanun*), 32, 34
- Power and religion in Contemporary Arab Monarchies, 412–414
- Primogeniture, 85, 196, 218, 300, 311, 339, 359, 395, 420; in Arab dynasties, 3–5; in Bahrain, 9; in Kuwait, 110, 121, 129; in Ottoman Empire, 6; in Qatar, 12
- Princeton University, 375, 376
- Public Authority for Craft Industries, 160
- Qaboos, Sultan. *See* Al Sa‘id, Qaboos bin Sa‘id

- Qahtani Movement, 28  
 al-Qalqashandi, Ahmad, 29  
 Qaramanli dynasty, 47  
 Qasim, 'Abdul Karim, 57–58, 107, 108  
 Al Qasimi (Sharjah), 314–322; and the 1972 coup d'état, 316–317; and assessment of most recent succession, 318–319; and potential alliances among, 322  
 Al Qasimi, (Ras al-Khaimah), 322–327; and 14 June 2003 coup, 324–327; and assessment of most recent succession, 324–327; and potential alliances among, 329–330  
 Al Qasimi, 'Abdallah Bin Muhammad, 322  
 Al Qasimi, 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Muhammad, 318  
 Al Qasimi, Ahmad bin Sultan, 319  
 Al Qasimi, 'Ayshah bint Muhammad, 321  
 Al Qasimi, Bdur Bint Sultan, 322  
 Al Qasimi, Fawqiyyah, 325  
 Al Qasimi, Faysal bin Humayd, 329  
 Al Qasimi, Faysal bin Saqr bin Muhammad, 329  
 Al Qasimi, Ibrahim bin Sultan, 315  
 Al Qasimi, Jamilah Bint Muhammad, 322  
 Al Qasimi, Jawahir bint Muhammad bin Sultan, 319, 321  
 Al Qasimi, Khalid bin Muhammad (r. 1965–1972), 315, 316, 317  
 Al Qasimi, Khalid bin Sultan, 315  
 Al Qasimi, Khaled bin Saqr, 324; and 14 June 2003 Coup, 324–327; and Abu Musa and Tunb Islands occupations, 326; and parliamentary advocacy, 326; and relations with Dubai, 314; and United States, 326, 327, 347 n. 128  
 Al Qasimi, Lubnah bint Khalid bin Sultan, 320–321, 322  
 Al Qasimi, Muhammad bin Salim, 323  
 Al Qasimi, Muhammad bin Sultan bin Muhammad (1976–1999), 319, 320  
 Al Qasimi, Salim bin Sultan bin Saqr bin Muhammad, 329  
 Al Qasimi, Sa'ud bin Saqr, 324, 328–329; and 14 June 2003 Coup, 324–327  
 Al Qasimi, Saqr bin Muhammad (1948– ), 322–323, 323–324; and Arab nationalism, 323; and League of Arab States, 323; and relations with Dubai, 314; and Saudi Arabia, 324  
 Al Qasimi, Saqr bin Sultan (r. 1951–1965), 315; and opposition to Britain, 315  
 Al Qasimi, Sultan bin Muhammad (r. 1972– ), 316–318, 322; and Dubai, 314, 318; and support from Abu Dhabi, 318  
 Al Qasimi, Sultan bin Muhammad bin Sultan (heir apparent), 313, 319, 320  
 Al Qasimi, Sultan bin Salim (r. 1919–1948), 322, 323  
 Al Qasimi, Sultan bin Saqr (r. 1803–1866), 68, 290, 314, 330, 336,  
 Al Qasimi, Talib bin Saqr bin Muhammad, 329  
 Al Qasimi, 'Umar bin Saqr bin Muhammad, 329  
 Al Qasimi, Walid bin Khaled bin Saqr bin Muhammad, 329  
 Al-Qatabi, 'Abdallah bin 'Ali, 155, 156  
 Qatar, 68, 71, 80, 149, 181–224; and 1971 Anglo-Qatari treaty, 197; and 1972 “corrective movement,” 198; and 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, 203; and 1995 coup, 211; and Bahrain, 189, 203; and border disputes, 193, 203; and Buhur bin Jubran Al Bu 'Aynayn, 182; and cabinet shuffle, 202; and censorship, 203; and constitution, 197, 207, 212, 217; and consultative council, 192, 207; and countercoup, 211, 219; and democratization, 207; and finances, 211; and freedom of religion, 207; and *al-Jazeera* television, 206; and ministry of information, 206; and municipal elections, 205, 213; and North Dome gas field, 202; and oil income, 198; and Pakistani soldiers in army, 212; and palace disputes, 201; and provisional constitution, 195–196; and “quarter rule” (for oil income), 192; and relations with federation of nine, 193–195; and relations with Iran, 209; and relations with Israel, 206–207; and relations with Ottoman Empire, 184; and relations with Saudi Arabia, 189–191, 194, 207; and relations with United States, 203, 206–207, 209; and “Stinger” missiles, 201; and Supreme Defense Council, 217; and succession, 205, 207, 211–212; and Zakrit, 189  
 Qatar Electricity and Water Company, 216  
 Qatar Foundation for Education, Science and Community Development, 209, 217  
 Qatar Monetary Agency, 216  
 Qatar Museum Authority, 217  
 Qatar National Petroleum Company, 216  
 Qatif (and Shi'ahs in), 68, 104, 182

- Qawasim, 68, 182. *See also* Al Qasimi.  
*Al-Qibla* newspaper, 52  
 Al Qubaysi, 291–292  
 Al-Quderah, Fatimah bint Mubarak, 299,  
 300, 304, 306, 344 n. 70  
 Queen ‘Alia International Airport, 365  
 Quraysh (tribe), 5, 349  
 “Qurrat ‘ayni” (joy of his eye), 363, 365,  
 380 n. 38
- Ras al-Khaimah, 68, 182, 193, 195, 331,  
 334, 336; and 14 June 2003 Coup,  
 324–327; and Center for Studies and  
 Documentation, 328  
 Ras al-Khaimah Civil Aviation  
 Department, 329  
 Ras al-Khaimah Emiri Diwan, 329  
 Ras al-Khaimah Financial Control  
 Department, 329  
 Ras al-Khaimah Free Zone, 329  
 Ras al-Khaimah General Accounts  
 Department, 329  
 Rashid, ‘Abdallah bin ‘Ali bin  
 (1835–1847)  
 Al-Rashid, Harun (r. 786–809), 28  
 Al Rashid dynasty (Saudi Arabia), 7  
 Raziq, ‘Ali ‘Abdul, 32  
 Reasoning (*ijtihad*), 34  
 Reform and Renewal (Morocco), 388  
 Rida, Rashid, 32  
 Rif (Morocco), 385  
 Riyadh bombing (1995)  
 Rothschilds, 42  
 Al-Rowas, ‘Abdulaziz bin Mohammed,  
 158  
 Royal Air Force (British), 164  
 Royal Endowment for Culture &  
 Education, 376  
 Royal Institute for Inter-Faith Studies, 375  
 Royal Jordanian Airlines (ALIA), 376  
 Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 85, 93  
 Royal Scientific Society of Jordan, 375  
 Rub al-Khali (Empty Quarter), 149  
 Ruling families of: Egypt, 41–46;  
 Morocco, 48–51; Tunisia, 46–48  
 Rumsfeld, Donald, 206
- Al Sabah (Kuwait), 103, 120, 182; after the  
 Iraqi invasion, 116–117; and 2 August  
 1990 Iraqi invasion, 116; and  
 assessment of most recent succession,  
 127–128; and family council, 106; and  
 family feuds, 124; and independence,  
 107–108; and opposition to, 115–116;  
 and potential alliances among, 135–136;  
 and rulers (list), 439; and rulers and  
 successors, 121–124; and the ruling  
 family, 105–106, 116; and Saudi  
 succession preferences, 121
- Al Sabah, ‘Abdallah bin Mubarak, 103,  
 125  
 Al Sabah, ‘Abdallah bin Nasir, 135  
 Al Sabah, ‘Abdallah bin Salim (r.  
 1950–1965), 9, 107, 108–109, 121, 125,  
 126  
 Al Sabah, Ahmad ‘Abdallah al-Ahmad,  
 126  
 Al Sabah, Ahmad bin Fahd al-Ahmad al-  
 Jabir, 134–135  
 Al Sabah, Ahmad bin Jabir (r. 1921–1950),  
 9, 106, 121, 128, 133  
 Al Sabah, Ahmad bin Nasir, 132  
 Al Sabah, ‘Ali al-Jarrah, 126  
 Al Sabah, ‘Ali al-Khalifah al-‘Adhbi, 116  
 Al Sabah, ‘Anud bint Ahmad, 133  
 Al Sabah, Badriyyah, 133  
 Al Sabah, Fahad al-Ahmad (1943–1990),  
 134  
 Al Sabah, Hamud bin Jabir, 132  
 Al Sabah, Hussah bint Sabah, 135  
 Al Sabah, Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir (r.  
 1977–2006), 10, 109, 113–120,  
 121–123, 128; and accession to rule,  
 113, 122  
 Al Sabah, Jabir al-‘Ali, 112, 122–123  
 Al Sabah, Jabir bin ‘Abdallah al-Jabir (r.  
 1915–1917), 9, 103, 121, 134  
 Al Sabah, Jabir bin Mubarak, 106, 126,  
 134  
 Al Sabah, Jabir bin Mubarak al-Hamad,  
 126, 134  
 Al Sabah, Mubarak ‘Abdallah al-Ahmad (r.  
 1896–1915), 9, 104–106, 121, 133–134  
 Al Sabah, Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim (r.  
 1892–1896), 109  
 Al Sabah, Muhammad al-Sabah al-Salim  
 (foreign minister), 127–128, 133  
 Al Sabah, Munirah bint Sabah, 133  
 Al Sabah, Najibah bint ‘Abdallah, 134  
 Al Sabah, Nasir al-Muhammad al-Ahmad,  
 126, 128, 131–132  
 Al Sabah, Nasir bin Sabah al-Ahmad, 126,  
 135  
 Al Sabah, Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Jabir, 10,  
 116, 126, 128, 130–131  
 Al Sabah, Sa‘ad al-‘Abdallah al Sabah  
 (2006), 10, 116, 123–124, 126; and  
 Hendon Police Academy (Britain), 125;

- and illnesses, 125–126; and Iraq, 117;  
and reign of, 125–126
- Al Sabah, Sabah al-Ahmad (2006– ), 10,  
116, 123, 126–127, 128
- Al Sabah, Sabah al-Khalid al-Hamad, 126
- Al Sabah, Sabah al-Salim al-Ahmad (r.  
1965–1977), 10, 109–113, 121
- Al Sabah, Sabah bin Nasir, 132, 135
- Al Sabah, Salim ‘Abul ‘Aziz, 126
- Al Sabah, Salim al-‘Ali bin Salim (r.  
1917–1921), 9, 121, 127, 129
- Al Sabah, Salim al-‘Ali bin Salim, 129,  
133
- Al Sabah, Salim al-Sabah al-Salim, 123,  
132–133
- Al Sabah, Salim bin Mubarak, 106
- Al Sabah, Sa‘ud Nasir al-Sabah, 135
- Al Sabah, Scheherazade bint Hamud, 132
- Al Sabah, Sharifah bint Sulayman al-Jasim,  
131
- Al Sabah, Shaykhah bint Mishal, 135
- Al Sabah, Shaykhah bint Sabah, 134
- Al Sabah, Talal bin Mubarak, 134
- Al Sabah, Zakiyyah bint ‘Abdallah, 134
- al-Sa‘adun, Ahmad, 119
- Sadat, Anwar, 113
- al-Sadiq Bey, Muhammad, (r. 1859–1882),  
46, 47
- al-Saffar, Hassan, 254
- Al Sa‘id, 143, 168, 336; and alliances  
among, 171–173; and rulers (list),  
443–444
- Al Sa‘id, Adham bin Tariq, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Ahmad bin Ibrahim bin Qays,  
168
- Al Sa‘id, Ahmad bin Sa‘id, 163
- Al Sa‘id, Aman, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Asa‘ad bin Tariq, 11, 167, 171,  
305
- Al Sa‘id, Fahd bin Mahmud, 11, 155, 167,  
170–171
- Al Sa‘id, Fahr bin Taymur, 168
- Al Sa‘id, Faris bin Tariq, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Faysal bin ‘Ali, 171
- Al Sa‘id, Faysal bin Turki, 143, 162
- Al Sa‘id, Haitham bin Tariq, 11, 167, 171
- Sa‘id, Majid bin (‘Ajman), 332
- Al Sa‘id, Nasir bin Hamud Al Sa‘id  
Rathabiyyah, 171
- Al Sa‘id, Nawwal bint Tariq, 178 n. 85
- al-Sa‘id, Nuri, 56, 57–58
- Al Sa‘id, Qaboos bin Sa‘id (r. 1970– ),  
150, 151–162, 162–163; and 14 June  
2003 Ras al-Khaimah Coup, 324–327;  
and assessment of most recent  
succession, 163–166; and British  
advisers, 164–165; and constitution,  
161; and mother, 168; and national  
unity, 162; and role of women in  
society, 160–161; and rule of, 151–154;  
and Tariq bin Taymur, 166; and United  
Kingdom, 164
- Al Sa‘id, Qays bin Tariq, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Sa‘id bin Muhammad, 143
- Al Sa‘id, Sa‘id bin Sultan, 68
- Al Sa‘id, Sa‘id bin Taymur, 146, 147–149,  
151, 162–163, 175 n. 30; and opposition  
to, 149–150; and vision of, 148–149
- Al Sa‘id, Sayyidah Amal bint Tariq, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Sayyidah Nawwal bint Tariq, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Sayyidah Shawanah bint Nasir,  
171
- Al Sa‘id, Sayyidah Umaymah bint Sa‘id,  
171
- Al Sa‘id, Shabib bin Taymur, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Shihab bin Faysal bin Turki, 168
- Al Sa‘id, Shihab bin Tariq, 11, 167, 171
- Al Sa‘id, Talal bin Tariq, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Tariq bin Taymur, 151, 152, 167,  
168, 169; and constitution, 152–153;  
and first government, 162
- Al Sa‘id, Taymur bin Asa‘ad, 171
- Al Sa‘id, Taymur bin Faysal, 144, 145, 162
- Al Sa‘id, Thuwayni bin Shihab, 152, 168,  
169, 172
- Al Sa‘id, Turki bin Sa‘id, 170, 292
- Al Sa‘idi, Ahmad al-Mansur (r.  
1578–1603), 48
- Saif, Saif bin Hamad bin, 339
- St. Alban’s (Washington, DC), 373
- St. Edmund’s Preparatory School (Surrey,  
England), 368, 373
- St. Helena Island, 72
- Salafiyyah* movements, 51
- Salalah (Oman), 147, 159, 168
- al-Salami, Muhammad ‘Abdallah, 339
- Saldanha, Jerome Antony, 104
- Salih, ‘Isa bin, 145
- Salim, ‘Abdallah bin, 321
- Salman, ‘Ali, 81
- Salman, Prince. *See* Al Sa‘ud, Salman bin  
‘Abdul ‘Aziz
- Sandhurst Royal Military Academy, 11,  
151, 163, 200, 208, 215, 216, 218, 265,  
301, 302, 313, 353, 354,  
368, 369, 374, 377
- Sanusi Order, 47
- shahamah* (decency), 326

- Shamlan, 'Abdul 'Aziz, 72  
 al-Shatibi, Abu Ishaq, 30, 32  
 Shatt al-'Arab estuary, 108  
 Al Sa'ud, 225–277, 293; and 1744 alliance with Al Shaykh, 226; and 1964 Pace Coup, 232–236; and 1979 mosque takeover, 231, 238; and 1992 Basic Law, 12–13, 239–240; and 1992 Edict, 239–240; and Allegiance Commission, 13, 258; and Al Rashid clan, 235; and 'Aryf branch, 245; and assessment of most recent succession, 253–256; and constitutional monarchy, 241, 244; and council of ministers, 232–236; and creation and cohesion, 225–231; and dynastic succession, 238–239; and family rivalries, 227; and “free princes,” 228, 246, 256; and “full brothers,” 247; and generational cross-currents, 246–249; and grandsons of founder, 249–252; and heir apparent, 240; and Jiluwi branch influence in Eastern Province, 229, 245, 247, 251; and King of the hijaz, 52, 231; and municipal elections, 243–244; and national dialogue, 240–243; and pattern of succession, 226; and petitions to, 241; and potential alliances among, 267–268; and princes who were passed over succession, 246; and role of mothers in succession, 247; and rulers (list), 439; and seniority in, 246–249; and Sudayri branch, 247, 251  
 Al Sa'ud, 'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz (r. 2005– ), 12, 229, 252–257; and accession, 244–245, 253; and bay'ah to King Fahd, 236, 271 n. 44; and custodian of the holy mosques, 29; and disagreements with Fahd, 237; and dislike of “My Lord” epithet for mortals, 271 n. 44, 275 n. 105; and family challenges, 237; and kissing of hand, 255, 275 n. 105; and religious authorities, 254; and response to Talal bin Abdul Aziz, 256–257; and views of governance, 237; and views of military, 238  
 Al Sa'ud, 'Abdallah bin Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 251  
 Al Sa'ud, 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman (r. 1932–1954), 12, 26, 41, 58, 70, 184; and Armenian wives of, 248; and lineal line of succession, 239; and National Dialogue Center, 242  
 Al Sa'ud, 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 249, 250  
 Al Sa'ud, 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Salman bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 267  
 Al Sa'ud, 'Abdul Muhsin bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 228, 261  
 Al Sa'ud, Ahmad bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 13, 263  
 Al Sa'ud, Badr bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 261  
 Al Sa'ud, Bandar bin Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 13, 251, 254; and National Security Council advisor, 256  
 Al Sa'ud, Fahd bin 'Abdallah bin Sa'ud Al Kabir, 267  
 Al Sa'ud, Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz (r. 1982–2005), 12–13, 26, 229, 236–245, 297; and address to the Nation on the New Laws (1992) ; and death, 244; and disagreements with 'Abdallah, 237; and family loyalties and family politics, 237; and rule of, 236; and Shi'ahs, 250  
 Al Sa'ud, Fahd bin Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 249  
 Al Sa'ud, Fawwaz bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 228  
 Al Sa'ud, Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz (r. 1964–1975), 12–13, 230–231; and assassination, 234–235; and Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 250; and Egyptian intervention in Yemen, 228–229; and foreign (first) minister, 230; and oil embargo (1973–1974), 230; and viceroy of Hijaz, 230  
 Al Sa'ud, Faysal bin Musa'id bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 234–235  
 Al Sa'ud, Khaled bin Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 251, 254, 265, 305  
 Al Sa'ud, Khalid bin 'Abdul 'Aziz (r. 1975–1982), 12–13, 229, 297  
 Al Sa'ud, Khaled bin Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 249  
 Al Sa'ud, Mansur bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 248  
 Al Sa'ud, Mansur bin Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 249  
 Al Sa'ud, Mish'al bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 248  
 Al Sa'ud, Mit'ab bin 'Abdallah bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 264–265, 267, 305  
 Al Sa'ud, Mit'ab bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 248, 261  
 Al Sa'ud, Muhammad bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 229, 236, 246  
 Al Sa'ud, Muhammad bin Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 228, 248, 322  
 Al Sa'ud, Muhammad bin Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 265–266



- Al Sa'ud, Muhammad bin Turki bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 260
- Al Sa'ud, Muqrin bin 'Abdul Aziz, 256
- Al Sa'ud, Musa'id bin 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman, 270 n. 27
- Al Sa'ud, Nawwaf bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 248
- Al Sa'ud, Nayif bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 12, 256, 261, 262–263
- Al Sa'ud, Sa'ad bin Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 249
- Al Sa'ud, Salman bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 12, 260–262; appointed Governor of Riyadh, 229; and potential succession, 256
- Al Sa'ud, Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz bin 'Abdul Rahman (r. 1953–1964), 12, 227–230; and deposed as ruler in 1964, 227–228
- Al Sa'ud, Sa'ud bin 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Muhammad (1803–1814), 182
- Al Sa'ud, Sa'ud bin Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 250
- Al Sa'ud, Sa'ud bin Faysal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 242, 249–250, 263
- Al Sa'ud, Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz (Defense Minister), 12, 229, 259–260
- Al Sa'ud, Sultan bin Fahd bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 250
- Al Sa'ud, Talal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 228, 248, 265, 266, 297; and views of succession, 228–229, 233, 256, 268
- Al Sa'ud, Turki bin Faysal 'bin Abdul 'Aziz, 249, 263; and ambassador, 256, 259; and foreign intelligences services, 264; and King Faysal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 264; and Osama bin Laden, 264; as director general of intelligence, 264
- Al Sa'ud, al-Walid bin Talal bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 13–14, 23 n.32, 241, 266–267; and commercial purchases, 267; and purchases in banks, 267; and views on consultative council, 267
- Sa'ud Al-Kabir (family), 245
- Saudi Arabia, 69, 70, 103, 182, 183, 186, 188, 225–277; and 2006 Allegiance Law of Succession), 463–469; and ahl al-'Aqd wal-Hall, 226; and Allegiance Commission, 13, 258; and child custody laws, 242; and clashes between Sunnis and Shi'ahs, 255; and Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice, 262; and constitutional continuum, 231–245; and constitutional monarchy, 253; and Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, 26; and Directorate General of Royal Intelligence, 250; and divorce laws, 242; and dynastic succession, 238; and education system, 255; and financial assistance to Iraq before 1990 ; and first kingdom (1744–1818), 226; and foreign ministry, 242; and Ikhwan, 265, 273 n. 76; and influence on Bahrain, 75; and institutional structures, 235; and Khuwiyah (personal guards), 229; and King Faysal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 250; and the Majlis al Shurah, 231, 233, 235; and Makkah Mosque takeover, 231; and military, 238, 265; and National Dialogues, 241, 255; and National Guard, 227, 252, 264; and National Security Council, 256, 260; and poverty, 254; and religious authorities, 254; and ruling family, 226–231; and scriptures as constitution, 231; and second deputy prime ministerships, 253; and second kingdom (1822–1891), 226; and Shia opposition in the Eastern Province, 236, 254; and Supreme Petroleum Council, 250; and textbooks, 255; and unemployment, 254; and Unitarian (Wahhabism), 254
- al-Sayyadi, Abul Huda, 39, 40
- Scowcroft, Brent, 302
- Selim III (Sultan 1789–1807), 6
- Serbia, Serbs, 37, 40
- Sharjah, 193, 291, 336; and conflict with Dubai, 308; and sovereignty over Abu Musa Island, 316
- Sharjah Administrative Control Department, 322
- Sharjah Charity Association, 320
- Sharjah Commerce and Tourism Development Authority, 320
- Sharjah Consultative Council, 321
- Sharjah Customs Department, 322
- Sharjah Economic Development Department, 321
- Sharjah Education Affairs Department, 321
- Sharjah Electricity and Water Authority, 320
- Sharjah Emiri Diwan, 321
- Sharjah Executive Council, 320
- Sharjah Family Supreme Council, 321, 322
- Sharjah Financial Control Department, 320, 322

- Sharjah Islamic Affairs & Endowments Department, 322
- Sharjah Municipality, 322
- Sharjah Petroleum & Mineral Affairs Department, 322
- Shari'ah* (Islamic) law, 4, 6, 7, 27–28, 29, 30, 3, 32, 34, 36, 40, 50, 59, 60, 83, 109, 119, 145, 152, 165, 196–197, 207, 231, 234, 337, 413passim
- Al Sharqi: and assessment of most recent succession, 337; and potential alliances among, 339
- Al Sharqi, Hamad bin 'Abdallah, 336
- Al Sharqi, Hamad bin Muhammad (1974–), 337; and relations with Dubai, 314
- Al Sharqi, Muhammad bin Hamad (1938–1964), 336
- Al Sharqi, Salih bin Muhammad, 338
- al-Shatti, Isma'il, 118
- Al Shaykh, 'Abdul Malik bin Ibrahim, 229
- Al Shaykh, Muhammad bin Ibrahim, 229
- Al Shaykh, Tarfah, 247
- Shi'ah, 5, 29, 31, 69
- Shurah (consultation), 25, 29, 34, 36
- al-Sidqi, Baqr, 56
- Sirri, Rif'at al-Hajj, 57
- Social Democratic Movement (MDS), 394
- Socialist Democratic Party, 394
- Al-Solh, Mona, 266
- Al-Solh, Riad, 266
- Soviet Union. *See* USSR
- Standard Oil Company of California, 146, 188
- Straits of Hormuz, 337
- Succession (khilafah), 27; and 2006 Allegiance Law in Saudi Arabia 463–469; and 'Alawis, 399–400; and assessment in Bahrain 86–88; and assessment of monarchical succession, 411–415; as choice (ikhtiyar), 32; and dilemmas for current rulers, 415–417; and direction of future change, 419–421; and evolution of internal structures, 417–419; and Hashimites, 370–371; and influences of religion and tribal behavior, 3–5; and Al Khalifah, 88–89; and legacy of Islam, 5–6; and Al Mu'allah, 335; and Al Maktoum, 311–312; and Al Na'a'imi, 332; and Al Nahyan, 299–300; and pressures of, 2–3; and principle in Muslim states, 4; and Al Qasimi (Ras al-Khaimah), 327; and Al Qasimi (Sharjah), 312; and Al Sabah, 128–129; and Al Sa'id, 166–168; and Al Sa'ud, 256–257; and Al Sharqi, 338; and Al Thani, 212–214
- Sudan, 107
- Al Sudayri, 248
- Al Sudayri, Ahmad bin Muhammad (1869–1936)
- Al Sudayri, Fahd bin Khalid, 260
- Al Sudayri, Hayah bint Sa'ad, 247
- Al Sudayri, Hussah bint Ahmad, 248, 259, 263
- Al Sudayri, Jawharah bint Sa'ad, 247
- Al Sudayri, Mudhih bint Ahmad, 247
- Al Sudayri, Muhammad bin Turki
- Al Sudayri, Sultanah bint Ahmad, 251
- Al Sudayri, Turki, 260
- Suez Canal (1869), 35, 41
- Sufiani Movement, 28
- Sultan, 25–26
- Sultan, Ahmad bin, 322
- Sultan, Khalid bin 'Abdallah bin, 322
- Sultan, Muhammad bin Sa'ud bin, 322
- Sultan, Prince. *See* Al Sa'ud, Sultan bin 'Abdul 'Aziz
- Sultan Air Base (Saudi Arabia), 206
- Sultanate, 28
- Sultan Yusuf, 400
- Summerfield School, 375
- Suq al-Manakh* (unofficial stock market in Kuwait), 115–116, 318
- Al Suwaydi, Ahmad bin Khalfan bin Khalifah, 321
- Al Suwaydi, Ahmad Khalifah, 342 n. 55
- Sykes-Picot Agreement, 55, 349
- Syracuse University, 266
- Syria, 351
- al-Tabari, Abu Ja'far Muhammad bin Jarir, 25
- al-Tabbah, 'Aliah bint Tawfiq, 373
- al-Tabbah, Tawfiq, 373
- Tafilah (Jordan), 358
- al-Tahtawi, Rafa'a Badawi Rafi', 32, 60–61, n. 28
- Taif (Saudi Arabia), 76
- Talaat Pasha, 41
- Tariqi, 'Abdallah, 233
- Tawfiq Abul Huda, 353
- Tazmamart prison (Morocco), 390
- Tetuan, 49
- Tewfik Pasha (r. 1879–1892), 42–43
- Al Thani (Qatar), 181–224; and 1913 Anglo-Turkish convention, 185; and 1916 Anglo-Qatari Treaty, 186–187,

- 189; and Advisory Council, 199; and Al Khalifah (Bahrain), 181–182; and Anglo-Qatari Treaty, 186; and assessment of most recent succession, 209–212; and Bahraini, 182, 187; and British Empire, 186, 188–189; and clan membership, 208; and constitutional continuum, 193–207; and conversion to Wahabiyyah, 184; and coup attempts, 212–213; and creation and cohesion, 181–193; and developments before the 1995 coup d'état, 200–204; and family disputes, 204–205; and Federation of Nine, 193; and Gulf Federation, 194–195; and new constitution in 2003, 206–207; and number of family members, 198; and palace expenses, 199; and population in 1984, 199; and potential alliances among, 218–220; and the road to independence (1968–1971), 194–198; and rulers (list), 447; and the ruling family, 183–190, 217; and share of oil wealth, 192; and Supreme Council for Family Affairs, 209; and Supreme Planning Council, 202
- Al Thani, 'Abdallah bin Jasim, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189
- Al Thani, 'Abdallah bin Khalid, 210
- Al Thani, 'Abdallah bin Khalifah, 12, 214, 216
- Al Thani, 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Hamad, 200
- Al Thani, 'Abdul 'Aziz bin Khalifah, 12, 216, 219, 202–205, 209
- Al Thani, 'Abdul Rahman bin Sa'ud, 217–218
- Al Thani, Ahmad bin 'Ali (1960–1972), 191–194, 198, 204, 208
- Al Thani, Ahmad bin Muhammad, 186
- Al Thani, 'Ali bin 'Abdallah (1949–1960), 190–191
- Al Thani, Buthaynah bint Ahmad, 215
- Al Thani, Fahad bin Hamad bin Khalifah, 210
- Al Thani, Hamad bin 'Abdallah bin Khalifah, 189, 210
- Al Thani, Hamad bin Jasim bin Hamad, 202, 211
- Al Thani, Hamad bin Jasim bin Jabir, 209–210, 216–217
- Al Thani, Hamad bin Khalifah (r. 1995– ), 11–12, 196, 202, 204–209; and coup d'état, 204; and military career, 208–209; and reply to Jasim bin Hamad, 455–456; and succession changes, 205; and vision for Qatar, 205–206; and wives, 209, 223 n. 88
- Al Thani, Hamad bin Muhammad, 208
- Al Thani, Hamad bin Suhaym, 215
- Al Thani, Jasim bin 'Abdul 'Aziz, 217
- Al Thani, Jasim bin Hamad, 12, 214–215; and resignation, 214, 453–454; and television address, 457–458
- Al Thani, Jasim bin Muhammad, 183, 184, 185, 209
- Al Thani, Jawharah bint Hamad, 215
- Al Thani, Khalid bin Hamad, 209, 214
- Al Thani, Khalifah bin Hamad (r. 1972–1995), 11, 194–197, 198–200, 205, 208, 213
- Al Thani, Mariam bint Hamad, 208
- Al Thani, Mawzah bint Nasir al Misnad, 208, 213–214, 215, 217
- Al Thani, Mayassah bint Hamad, 217
- Al Thani, Muhammad bin Hamad, 209
- Al Thani, Muhammad bin Khalifah, 210, 214, 216
- Al Thani, Muhammad bin Thani, 183
- Al Thani, Nasir bin Hamad, 201
- Al Thani, Nasir bin Khalid, 208
- Al Thani, Nurah bint Khalid, 223 n.88
- Al Thani, Rahmah bin Habir, 181–182
- Al Thani, Suhaym bin Hamad, 200–201, 204–205
- Al Thani, Tamadir, 218
- Al Thani, Tamim bin Hamad, 214–215, 305
- Thatcher, Margaret, 187
- Thesiger, Wilfred, 296
- Al Thunayan, Ahmad 230
- Al Thunayan, Iffat bint Ahmad (wife of King Faysal), 251
- Tijaniyyah Berber Religious Order, 50
- Topkapi Palace, 37
- Toussoun, Prince Omar (Egypt), 44
- Trevor, Arthur Prescott, 186
- Tribes on the Arabian Peninsula, 7
- Tropolitana, 47
- Tulkarm (West Bank, Palestine), 368
- Tunb Islands (UAE), 67, 193, 324
- Tunisia, 107
- Turkish-Greek atrocities, 53–54
- Turkish nationalism, 41
- al-Turtushi, Abu Bakr, 30, 31
- Al-'Udayd, 146, 162, 195, 213
- Al-'Udayd Air Base (Qatar), 12, 206
- 'Ufaysan, 'Abdallah bin, 68
- 'Ufaysan, Sulayman bin, 182

- 'Ulamah (religious scholars), 36, 40, 43, 48, 51, 191, 192, 226, 229, 234, 386, 417, 418, 419  
 'Umar (Caliph 634–644), 5, 29  
 'Umayyad caliphate, 28, 29  
 'Umayyad dynasty in Damascus (661–749) 5  
 Ummah, 30, 385  
 Umm al-Qiwain, 315, 332, 333–336; and Ahmad Bin Rashid Port Authority, 335; and al-'Ali Tribe, 333; and, Amiri Court, 335; and Antiques and Museums Department, 335; and General Security Forces Department, 335; and Lands and Property Department, 335; and National Guard, 335; and Port of Umm Al Qiwain, 335  
 Umm Qasr, 105  
 Union of Bahraini Students (UBS), 75  
 Union National des Forces Populaires (Morocco), 388  
 United Arab Emirates (UAE), 14–15, 122, 279–348; and 1820 General Treaty, 336; and 1853 Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, 291, 330, 336; and 14 June 2003 (Ras al-Khaimah) Coup, 324–327; and Abu Musa Island occupation, 316, 323; and Asian laborers, 297; and Buraimi dispute with Saudis, 292–293; and China, 297; and constitutional continuum, 283–289; and constitutional formation of the Emirates, 283–286; and constitutional reorganization, 298; and council of ministers, 285; and creation and cohesion, 280–283; and Dibbah, 337; and elections, 298; and Federal National Council (FNC), 285, 298; and federation discussions, 323; and foreign tradesmen in, 307; and GCC alliance, 298; and India, 297, 307; and intra-Union disputes, 286–287; and Iran, 323; and Iranian claims on Abu Musa and Tunb Islands, 328; and Iranian population in, 194, 307; and island of Yas, 291; and Al Maktoum rulers of Dubai (list), 472; and Al Mu'allah rulers of Umm al-Qiwain (list), 473; and Al Nahyan rulers of Abu Dhabi (list), 471; and Al Na'aimi rulers of 'Ajman (list), 471; and Pakistan, 297, 304; and Pakistani intelligence services, 304; and pipelines to Oman and Qatar (Dolphin Project), 304; and presidents of the UAE (list), 473; and Al Qasimi rulers of Ras al-Khaimah (list), 472; and Al Qasimi rulers of Sharjah (list), 472; and Red Crescent Society, 304; and regional contentions, 308–309; and rulers of, 471–473; and the ruling families, 289–339; and Securities and Commodities Authority, 321; and shahamah (decency), 326; and Al Sharqi rulers of Fujairah (list), 472; and Supreme Council of Rulers, 284–285, 308, 311, 316, 318, 327, 338; and tribes of, 282–283, 292; and Tunb Islands, 324; and Union Judiciary, 286; and Wahhabi garrisons in, 315; and Zayed's constitutional vision, 286–289  
 United Kingdom, 69, 162; and 1820 General Treaty of Peace, 182, 290, 336; and 1853 Treaty of Maritime Peace in Perpetuity, 291, 330, 336; and 1916–Sykes Picot Agreement, 349; and decision to withdraw from Persian Gulf, 164, 192, 193; and Empire, 327; and Royal Air Force, 187–188  
 United Nations, 302  
 United Nations Resolution 242, 356  
 United Saudi Commercial Bank, 267  
 United States, 193; and Army Command and Staff College, 86; and "Twin Pillar" policy, 355–356  
 US Army Armor School (Fort Knox, Kentucky), 368  
 Université de Bordeaux, 396, 402  
 Université Muhammad V, 397, 402  
 Université de Nice-Sophia Antipolis (France), 397  
 Université de Paris, 375  
 University of Exeter, 317  
 Al-'Urubah Club, 90  
*Usul al-Fiqh* (Principles of Jurisprudence), 31  
 USSR: and Gulf region, 193  
 'Uthman, Caliph (644–656), 5  
 'Utub, 67, 68, 84, 103, 120, 181  
 Victoria College (Alexandria, Egypt,) 354  
 Virginia Commonwealth University, 217  
 Wafd [Delegation] Party (Egypt), 44, 45  
 Wajbah (Qatar), 184  
 Wakrah (UAE), 291  
*wali al-'ahd* (heir apparent), 29  
 Walters, Vernon, 201  
 Warbah (Island), 108, 118  
 Waterfield, Pat, 163

West Bank (Palestine), 352  
World Trade Organization, 11

Yasin, ‘Abdul-Salam, 393, 404  
Al Yasin, Faysal Sidki, 368, 372  
Yassin, Nadia, 404  
*Yıldız* Palace, 39, 42, 54

Young Turks, 38, 47, 52  
Al Yousuf, Nabeel, 313  
Youssouffi, ‘Abdul Rahman, 389, 392

Zafir, Muhammad, 39  
Zaghloul, Sa‘ad, 44  
Zubarah, 67, 68, 69, 181–182, 183, 190



## About the Book

---

**A**s Arab leaders play an increasingly important role on the world stage, they also face new and complex challenges at home—challenges that could affect both regional and regime stability. *Power and Succession in Arab Monarchies* provides an essential compendium of information regarding the politically charged issue of succession in Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Based on scarce source material and a wide range of inside information, this exhaustive reference traces the rise of each ruling family, outlines key constitutional developments, provides details on current rulers and their approaches to succession, and discusses potential contenders to power. The appendixes supply a chronological list of rulers for each monarchy, as well as the text of decrees, private letters, and constitutional provisions related to succession.

**Joseph A. Kéchichian** is the chief executive officer of Kéchichian & Associates, which specializes in analyzing the domestic and regional concerns of Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Yemen; and editor of the *Journal of the Society for Armenian Studies*.

Kéchichian's recent publications include *Faysal: Saudi Arabia's King for All Seasons*; *Political Participation and Stability in the Sultanate of Oman*; *The Just Prince: A Manual of Leadership* (coauthor, with R. Hrair Dekmejian); *Iran, Iraq, and the Arab Gulf States* (editor); *Succession in Saudi Arabia*; *A Century in Thirty Years: Shaykh Zayed and the United Arab Emirates* (editor); and *Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy*.