

Dictators and Their Secret Police

COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS
AND STATE VIOLENCE



SHEENA CHESTNUT GREITENS

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How do dictators stay in power? When, and how, do they use repression to do so? *Dictators and Their Secret Police* explores the role of the coercive apparatus under authoritarian rule in Asia – how these secret organizations originated, how they operated, and how their violence affected ordinary citizens. Greitens argues that autocrats face a coercive dilemma: whether to create internal security forces designed to manage popular mobilization, or defend against a potential coup. Violence against civilians, she suggests, is a by-product of their attempt to resolve this dilemma.

Drawing on a wealth of new historical evidence, this book challenges the conventional wisdom on dictatorship: what autocrats are threatened by, how they respond, and how this affects the lives and security of the millions under their rule. It offers an unprecedented view into the use of surveillance, coercion, and violence, and sheds new light on the institutional and social foundations of authoritarian power.

Sheena Chestnut Greitens is an assistant professor of political science at the University of Missouri. She is also a non-resident senior fellow at the Center for East Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institution and an associate in research at the Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies at Harvard University. Greitens' research focuses on East Asia, security studies, and the politics of authoritarian states. Her doctoral dissertation, on which this book is based, won APSA's Walter Dean Burnham Award for the best dissertation in politics and history, as well as Harvard's Richard J. Herrnstein Prize.

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*To my parents,
Tim and Janet Chestnut*

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A note on romanization

Chinese-language names and terms have been romanized using the pinyin system. Korean-language names and terms have been romanized using the McCune-Reischauer system. Following Korean and Chinese custom, surnames precede given names unless otherwise stated.

Exceptions were made for authors who have published in English under alternate transliterations, and for names, places, and organizations with other official or standard English spellings that are more widely known and accepted (Chiang Kai-shek, Park Chung Hee, Seoul, etc.).

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PART I

THE PUZZLE AND THE ARGUMENT

I

Introduction

The use of violence by authoritarian regimes against their people has long been central to the trajectories of world politics and of human history. Historically, authoritarianism rather than democracy has been the norm, and much of citizen interaction with the state has been centered on trying to avoid abuse at the hands of those in power. Today, too, autocracies comprise a significant fraction of the world's countries.¹ These regimes govern almost 60 percent of the world's population, dominate geopolitically critical regions of Asia, the Middle East, and Africa, and lead several of the world's great powers. From the gulags of Stalinist Russia to the failed protests in China's Tiananmen Square in 1989 to the post-Arab Spring crackdowns in Egypt and Syria, repression plays a central role in our conception of dictatorship; history and literature have provided us with towering accounts of the human effects of institutionalized terror.²

The stakes of that repressive activity are high, for both regimes and their citizens. When militaries agree to repress, citizens are often killed in large numbers in public spaces, with reverberations around the globe; when coercive agents balk at participating in government crackdowns, their intransigence can topple dictators and pave the way for transitions to democracy (or to another autocracy). Where state coercion is unopposed

¹ This book uses *autocratic*, *authoritarian*, and *dictatorial* interchangeably. *Freedom in the World 2013* (Freedom House, 2013), p. 4, www.freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/FIW%202013%20Booklet_0.pdf.

² Alexander Solzhenitsyn, *The Gulag Archipelago* (New York: Harper Perennial, 2007); Gao Xingjian, *Soul Mountain* (New York: Harper Collins, 2000); Gao Xingjian, *One Man's Bible* (New York: HarperCollins, 2002); Mario Vargas Llosa, *The Feast of the Goat* (New York: Picador, 2000); Roberto Bolaño, *By Night in Chile* (New York: New Directions, 2003).

by citizens, some of the world's worst human rights abuses can come to pass, as has happened in North Korea; but where it is resisted, as has happened in Syria, the struggle can metastasize into insurgency or civil war, and can even trigger external intervention leading to interstate conflict.

The abuses committed by states against their citizens, however, are a relatively overlooked source of political violence in the world. Conceptualizing authoritarian regimes as uniformly dependent on coercion ignores a critical element of variation in their governance: the different ways in which they use violence and repression to maintain power. In some places and at some times, autocratic regimes rely on low-intensity forms of repression such as surveillance and intimidation, while at other times they turn to high-intensity violence such as mass killing. Eighteen people per year died under Brazil's military junta, while the annual death rate in Argentina under military rule was a staggering 1,280.³ Under some regimes, as in Taiwan and Chile, violence was high in the early years of the regime but dropped over time, while in other places, such as the Philippines, state violence escalated over the course of the dictatorship. The events of the Arab Spring provided observers with ample proof that the security forces of regimes faced with the common challenge of popular protest behave in very different ways, with profound consequences for outcomes including human rights, regime stability, civil conflict, and geopolitics.

This book concentrates on two key questions related to the use of coercion under autocracy. First, what determines the design of autocratic coercive institutions? Why do different autocrats design their coercive apparatus differently? Second, what effect do these institutional design choices have on patterns of repression and the use of violence against civilians?

Coercive institutions are a dictator's final defense in pursuit of political survival, but also his chief obstacle to achieving that goal. This book argues that autocrats face a coercive dilemma: whether to organize their internal security apparatus to protect against a coup, or to deal with the threat of popular unrest. Because coup-proofing calls for fragmented and socially exclusive organizations, while protecting against popular unrest demands unitary and inclusive ones, autocrats cannot simultaneously maximize their defenses against both threats. When dictators assume power, then, they must (and do) choose which threat to prioritize. That choice, in turn, has profound consequences for the citizens who

³ Alfred McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military Academy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), pp. 192–93.

live under their rule. A fragmented, exclusive coercive apparatus gives its agents social and material incentives to escalate rather than dampen violence, and also hampers agents from collecting the intelligence necessary to engage in targeted, discriminate, and pre-emptive repression. A unitary and inclusive apparatus configured to address significant mass unrest, however, has much better intelligence capacity vis-à-vis its own citizens, and creates incentives for agents to minimize the use of violence and to rely instead on alternative forms of repression, including surveillance and targeted pre-emption. Given its stronger intelligence capacity, the mass-oriented coercive apparatus is also better at detecting and responding to changes in the nature of threats than is its coup-proofed counterpart, leading to predictable patterns of institutional change that are neither entirely path dependent nor entirely in keeping with the optimization predicted by rational design. The chapters that follow trace how coercive institutional design unfolds and what its consequences are – for autocrats, for their coercive agents, and for the civilians they rule.

THE IMPORTANCE OF COERCION UNDER AUTHORITARIANISM

Despite the intuitive centrality of coercion to authoritarian political systems, we currently have a poor understanding of the dynamics of authoritarian violence. Historians, biographers, and novelists have filled library shelves with books about Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia,⁴ but political scientists have failed to ask whether the coercive dynamics at work in these two particular regimes were replicated in the scores of authoritarian

⁴ For a sample that does not even scratch the surface of this extensive literature, see Christopher Browning, *Ordinary Men: Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1992); William Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Robert Gellately, *The Gestapo and German Society: Enforcing Racial Policy 1933–45* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990); Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, *Hitler's Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust* (New York: Vintage 1997); Richard Overy, *The Dictators: Hitler's Germany and Stalin's Russia* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004); Adrian Weale, *Army of Evil: A History of the SS* (New York: NAL Caliber/Penguin, 2010); Amir Weiner and Aigi Rahi-Tamm, "Getting to Know You: The Soviet Surveillance System, 1939–57," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Winter 2012), pp. 5–45; David Shearer, *Policing Stalin's Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924–53* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009); Paul Hagenloh, *Stalin's Police: Public Order and Mass Repression in the USSR, 1926–41* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009); Paul R. Gregory, *Terror By Quota: State Security from Lenin to Stalin (An Archival Study)* (New Haven and Stanford: Yale University Press and the Hoover Institution, 2009).

regimes that have populated the world in the subsequent seven decades. Consequently, our common understanding of authoritarianism is dominated by a few cases that may well be outliers rather than representative examples of authoritarian rule. Moreover, scholars have not sought to discern underlying systematic patterns in autocratic regimes' organization and use of violence, an oversight that has been noted by Dallin and Breslauer, Tilly, and Davenport, among others.⁵

What do scholars currently know about authoritarian coercive institutions and why they differ? Comparative politics has recently experienced a resurgence of interest in the study of authoritarian politics, spanning a range of methodological approaches and theoretical perspectives.⁶ These studies have especially probed the role played by political *institutions* such as courts, parties, legislatures, and elections.⁷ Despite this focus, however,

⁵ For a partial, single-case exception, see Gregory, *Terror By Quota*; Alexander Dallin and George W. Breslauer, *Political Terror in Communist Systems* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970); Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 10 (2007), pp. 1–23; Charles Tilly, *The Politics of Collective Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁶ Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003); Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 40, No. 11 (November 2007), pp. 1279–301; Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships," *Economics & Politics*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2006), pp. 1–26; Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (June 1999), pp. 115–44; Steven Levitsky and Lucan Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: The Origins and Evolution of Hybrid Regimes in the Post-Cold War Era* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Dan Slater, "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 1 (October 2003), pp. 81–101; Dan Slater, *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Milan Svoblik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jeffrey A. Winters, *Oligarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁷ Lisa Blaydes, *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010); Jason Brownlee, *Durable Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Gandhi, *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship*; Barbara Geddes, "Why Elections and Parties in Authoritarian Regimes," paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual conference (2005); Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa, *Rule by Law: The Politics of Courts in Authoritarian Regimes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ellen Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan," *Democratization*, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2006), pp. 456–71; Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico* (New York: Cambridge

and despite the centrality of coercion in works on the development of the nation-state, the role of autocratic *coercive* institutions remains strikingly under-examined. In focusing primarily on the quasi-democratic features of non-democracies, we have risked “neglecting their defining feature: the use of coercion, and sometimes terror.”⁸ If rule by violence rather than consent is, as Milan Svoblik terms it, the “original sin” of dictatorship, then scholars are all the more remiss in overlooking these variations.

A small handful of works are single-case analyses that provide excellent information on an individual country’s coercive apparatus.⁹ They do not, however, examine variations in the design of coercive institutions or offer a systematic explanation for why countries might adopt different institutional designs. Yet, in practice, we observe widespread variations in the form of authoritarian coercive institutions. Some countries, like

University Press, 2006); Benjamin Smith, “Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule,” *World Politics*, Vol. 57, No. 3 (Spring 2005), pp. 421–51; Slater, “Iron Cage.” See also Jessica Weeks, “Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve,” *International Organization*, Vol. 62, No. 1 (2007), pp. 35–64; Edmund Malesky and Paul Schuler, “Nodding or Needling? Analyzing Delegate Responsiveness in an Authoritarian Parliament,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 3 (2010), pp. 482–502; Geddes, “What Do We Know about Democratization?”; Philip Keefer, “Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment, and Conflict,” draft paper prepared for Michelle Garfinkel and Stergios Skaperdas, eds., *Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conflict* (July 2010).

⁸ David Art, “Coercive Institutions under Authoritarian Regimes: A Research Agenda,” paper presented at the annual conference of the American Political Science Association, Seattle, Washington (September 2011), p. 2; David Art, “What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After 10 Years?” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 2012); Svoblik, *Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, Ch. 1; Christopher Andrew, “Intelligence, International Relations, and Under-Theorization,” in L.V. Scott and Peter Jackson, eds., *Understanding Intelligence in the Twenty-First Century: Journeys in the Shadows* (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 29–41.

⁹ Gregory, *Terror By Quota*; Xuezhong Guo, *China’s Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Pablo Policzer, *The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009); Joseph Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Michael Schoenhals, *Spying for the People: Mao’s Secret Agents, 1949–67* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Jonathan R. Adelman, ed., *Terror and Communist Politics: The Role of the Secret Police in Communist States* (Boulder: Westview, 1984). In a somewhat different category is Eva Bellin, “The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2, (January 2004), pp. 139–57. Bellin notes the importance of the coercive apparatus, but – as discussed in Chapter 2 – treats these institutions’ strength as proceeding from structural factors – resource endowments, either material (oil wealth) or social (patrimonialism) – that remain roughly constant in a society or in a regime across time. This argument leaves unexplained the reorganizations of internal security and the trends of repression that vary more quickly than structural factors evolve.

TABLE 1.1. *Fragmentation in authoritarian coercive institutions*

Regime	Lead agency/agencies	Coordinating authority?
Fragmented:		
Iraq	Internal: General Security Directorate/ Directorate of Military Intelligence, General Directorate of Intelligence, Special Security Organization Military: Popular Army, Republican Guard, Special Republican Guard, Saddam's Fedayeen	No
Philippines	National Intelligence and Security Authority Presidential Security Command Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines: Military Intelligence Group Philippine Constabulary: 5th Con- stabulary Security Unit, Metrocom Intelligence Services Group Dept. of National Defense: Security Unit, National Defense Intelligence Office	No
South Korea (Park)	KCIA Army Security Command Presidential Security Service Capitol Garrison Command	No
Chile (1973–77)	Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), Army, Air Force, Navy, Carabineros	No
Unitary (not fragmented):		
Chile (1977–90)	Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI)	Yes
East Germany	Ministry for State Security (Stasi)	Yes (after 1953)
Taiwan	National Security Bureau (NSB)	Yes (after 1955)
South Korea (Chun)	Defense Security Command	Yes

East Germany, create a single powerful “secret police,” while others, like Libya under Qadhafi, employ multiple overlapping and competing security forces with no clear coordinating authority over them (see Table 1.1).

Coercive institutions also vary in the number of people they employ for surveillance relative to the size of the population. Despite the Stasi's

TABLE 1.2. *Ratio of authoritarian internal security personnel to population^a*

Country	Ratio
Chad (Habre, 1982–90)	1:10,000
Soviet Union	1:5,830
Iraq (Saddam Hussein)	1:5,090
Chile (early 1970s)	1:2,600
Nazi Gestapo (c. 1940)	1:2,000
Philippines (Marcos, 1980s)	1:1,120
Republic of China (Taiwan)	1:132
East Germany (officers only)	1:166
(including informants)	1:67
North Korea	1:124
(including informants, 2012)	1:40

^a Figures calculated by the author.

fame, their level of societal penetration was highly unusual, as shown in Table 1.2.

There is, as yet, no explanation for why these kinds of institutional differences might arise. Thus, despite a burgeoning literature, theoretical significance, and acute contemporary relevance, we lack a systematic understanding of the organization of violence under authoritarianism.

This might not be especially important if these institutions did not subsequently display widespread variation in their behavior, much of which cannot be satisfactorily explained by existing studies of repression and state violence. Yet as the examples that begin this chapter show, both the strategies of repression and the levels of violence employed by authoritarian regimes differ dramatically across countries, as well as within countries across space and time. In contemporary literature, the most common explanations for higher levels of repression focus on escalating threat from the population – but as I will show in more detail in the next chapter, these explanations neglect the chief insight from civil–military relations, which is that empowering security agencies to conduct effective repression creates an equally or more serious risk to the autocrat’s political and often physical survival: the risk of a coup. Taking that threat seriously requires a fundamental rethinking of how to organize a regime’s repressive capacity.

Moreover, because these existing threat-based arguments focus largely on repression of public protest, rather than the more difficult-to-observe processes of pre-protest surveillance and violence, they also neglect the

point that a strategic autocrat will seek not simply to repress protest, but to deter or pre-empt it. Many existing studies of repression, therefore, focus only on cases where the coercive apparatus has already failed to detect, deter, or pre-empt public opposition, and thereby overlook the set of cases where pre-protest repression is successful.

There are understandable reasons for the omission of coercive institutions from our discussions of authoritarian politics. Accessing source materials on the sensitive decision-making processes of closed regimes and determining the scope and nature of violence is difficult, even in the best-documented and most-analyzed cases.¹⁰ Moreover, the belief, now largely defunct, that the world was evolving toward universal democracy may have convinced scholars that the topic had dwindling real-world relevance.¹¹ As the number of democracies increased at the end of the Cold War and civil wars multiplied, state terror likely seemed an old-fashioned and outdated concern, limited to a handful of bizarre holdouts like North Korea, whose time was surely almost up. Scholars may also have avoided examining the motivations of perpetrators of human rights violations because to do so sounds like justification – a tendency that Holocaust scholars have called the “moral sensitivity exclusion.”¹²

The result, however, is that much variation in repressive behavior and in the use of violence – cross-national, cross-temporal, sub-national, and especially outside of a protest context – remains empirically unexplained. We do not know how dictators construct the institutions of coercion, or what the consequences of these choices are, for them or for the people they rule. We do not know what drives different kinds of variation in the patterns of state violence, or why, given the costs of indiscriminate violence, regimes use it at some times, but avoid it at others. Repression in authoritarian political systems, in short, is something that is assumed far more than it is analyzed.

This oversight is fundamentally misleading. Beyond implications for state violence, omitting coercive institutions from our analysis of authoritarian politics risks overstating the contribution of other factors to outcomes ranging from regime stability and longevity to authoritarian foreign policy behavior. After all, the coercive apparatus and its willingness and ability to engage in repression have played a critical role in

¹⁰ Eric Lichtblau, “The Holocaust Just Got More Shocking,” *New York Times*, March 1, 2013.

¹¹ Thomas Carothers, “The End of the Transition Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (January 2002), pp. 5–21.

¹² Inga Clendinnen, *Reading the Holocaust* (New York: Cambridge, 1998).

determining the survival or failure of many autocratic incumbents and regimes, from the Soviet Union in 1991 to Tunisia and Egypt in 2011.¹³ The coercive apparatus is also a critical component of the “audience” to whom an autocrat is – in varying degrees – accountable for his actions, meaning that choices made during the construction of these institutions can strengthen or weaken the constraints that affect his propensity to initiate international conflict.¹⁴ Examining how autocrats create and use their coercive apparatus, therefore, will help us understand not only variations in repression itself, but also the relative importance of coercive and non-coercive factors in the longevity and behavior of the world’s dictatorships.

THE ARGUMENT AND PLAN OF THE BOOK

Coercive institutions matter. Their creation and management are among any dictator’s most urgent priorities. They fundamentally shape patterns of repression and state violence under authoritarianism, and do so in ways that defy the predictions of existing theories.

This book examines two questions in turn. First, how do autocrats design and construct their coercive apparatus? Second, what difference do coercive institutional variations make for levels of repression and violence?

Chapter 2 outlines the logic of my theory. It begins from the premise that autocrats who want to stay in power must simultaneously defend themselves from two different internal threats: threats from the population and threats from elites, especially elites in the coercive apparatus itself. In practice, most autocrats deal with a combination of these threats at any given point in time. In constructing a coercive apparatus, however, they face a fundamental *organizational* tradeoff between addressing the risk of popular overthrow or coup-proofing against rival elites.¹⁵ Coup-proofing calls for an internally fragmented and socially exclusive security force, while managing popular unrest requires a unitary apparatus with broadly embedded, socially inclusive intelligence networks.

¹³ Zoltan Barany, “The Role of the Military,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (October 2011), pp. 24–35.

¹⁴ Jessica L. Weeks, “Strongmen and Strawmen: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 106, No. 2 (May 2012), pp. 326–47.

¹⁵ Milan Svolik has termed these problems “the twin problems of dictatorship.” Svolik, *Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, p. 2.

I argue that autocrats who face this “coercive dilemma” construct their coercive institutions based on the dominant perceived threat at the time they come to power, optimizing institutional characteristics for whichever threat they perceive to be most acute. Autocrats chiefly concerned with the risk of a coup create fragmented and exclusive organizations, while autocrats most threatened by popular unrest create unitary and inclusive ones.

Institutional variations then give rise to predictably varying patterns of state violence. A more fragmented, socially exclusive security apparatus, associated with a high initial threat from elites, is likely to be more violent for two reasons. First, both fragmentation and exclusivity damage an organization’s capacity to collect and effectively analyze *intelligence*, which reduces the ability of the coercive apparatus to engage in pre-emptive, discriminate, and targeted forms of repression. Fragmentation and exclusivity also create professional and social *incentives* to engage in higher levels of violence. By contrast, autocrats who are truly concerned about popular threats use less violence rather than more and use it in more discriminate ways, because they mobilize organizations expressly designed for that purpose, with intelligence capacity and incentives that favor limiting violence rather than increasing it.

This chapter provides the first comparative account of the origins of the coercive apparatus and of why these institutions vary so much in their structure and social composition. In doing so, it shifts the focus from authoritarian regimes more generally to authoritarian *coercive institutions*: the specific set of institutions that collectively hold responsibility for internal intelligence and security. The chapter also incorporates these institutions, for the first time, into existing discussions of how autocrats seek to hold power, including the strategies that they employ with respect to managing potential opposition. It shifts our understanding of autocratic thinking about threat management from one focused on short-term reaction to protest to one focused on longer-term efforts to deter and pre-empt opposition from ever materializing. The chapter concludes by outlining a research design that tests its arguments for coercive institutional origins and institutional effects on repression against the most prominent alternatives. It proposes an empirical strategy that broadens our observational aperture on repression by including cases of pre-protest surveillance, repression, and violence.

The remainder of the book tests my two main arguments empirically. It does so by looking at several cases in East Asia, where the combination of temporal and cross-national variations in violence, along with the ability to control for alternative explanations and an unusually complete

set of sources and data, make a full test of the theory both possible and methodologically sound. Chapters 3 through 5 analyze the origins of the coercive apparatus and offer an explanation for the variations that we observe in authoritarian coercive institutional design. These chapters focus particularly on variations in two organizational characteristics, fragmentation and exclusivity, which are discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. *Fragmentation* denotes the presence of multiple organizations with overlapping missions with respect to internal security and no clear coordinating authority over them; it is a quality that is defined not only by the number of organizations within the coercive apparatus, but also by the procedures that govern their interaction. *Exclusivity*, on the other hand, denotes the degree to which the society of a particular country is included in or excluded from the workings of the coercive apparatus; it particularly examines how class, ethnic, and regional cleavages shape who participates in the work of repression and who does not. Where an elite threat is dominant, both fragmentation and exclusivity are common. Where popular threats are dominant, these attributes are much less likely to be present.

These chapters focus on the construction of the internal security apparatus in Taiwan under Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo (Chapter 3), the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos (Chapter 4), and South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan (Chapter 5). In Taiwan, a shift in Chiang Kai-shek's perception of the dominant threat – from managing elite rivals on the mainland to being principally concerned with the risk of popular revolt on Taiwan – prompted a corresponding shift in coercive institutions in the early 1950s, from organizations that were fragmented and socially exclusive to ones that were unitary, coordinated, and socially inclusive, especially of the native Taiwanese. By contrast, in 1972 in the Philippines, Marcos feared elite conspiracies that involved the military much more than he did popular unrest. He therefore fragmented his internal security apparatus across multiple organizations that he set in deliberate competition, and hired in an exclusive fashion, drawing on his own ethnic, familial, and educational networks.

In South Korea, the shadow of an existentially high external threat kept the Republic of Korea's military unified and inclusive by keeping it under U.S. operational control. The changing institutional configuration of *internal* security, however, still reflected Park and Chun's evolving threat perceptions. A combination of incidents beginning in the early 1970s, from preparations for the promulgation of the Yushin constitution

in 1972 to multiple assassination attempts (one of which missed Park Chung Hee but killed his wife), led Park to abandon the unitary and relatively inclusive coercive apparatus that he had created as a democratically elected leader. Focused increasingly on elite rivals and distrustful of the capacity of his security apparatus to ensure his safety, he built up organizational counterweights to the KCIA that increased fragmentation, and also increased exclusivity by relying more and more on natives of his own Kyöngsang province. Chun Doo Hwan, on the other hand, came to power amid severe nationwide popular unrest, including the Pusan-Masan protests and the Kwangju Uprising; his coercive apparatus was unified under the Defense Security Command and used inclusive, conscription-based units to police popular protest.

Chapters 6 through 8 examine the consequences of coercive institutional design for the levels of state violence experienced by civilians in Taiwan (Chapter 6), the Philippines (Chapter 7), and South Korea (Chapter 8). These chapters focus on two primary attributes of state violence: its *scope* and its *intensity*. Scope has to do with the breadth of violence employed, while intensity is a measure of height. Each chapter measures state violence by examining its scope at varying levels of intensity; practically speaking, it counts the numbers of people arrested, sentenced, and executed (and, in the case of the Philippines, people who “disappeared” while in custody of the security forces). Because Chapter 2 also offers predictions about the *indiscriminacy* of violence – a measure of precision – I examine variations in that characteristic at times as well. (These concepts, their operationalization, and the reasons for this choice of focus are explained in more detail in the final section of Chapter 2.)

In Chapter 6, I demonstrate that the organizational reforms instituted by Chiang Kai-shek in the early 1950s altered both the intelligence capacity and the incentives of the coercive apparatus in ways that led to lower levels of and more discriminate violence. Reducing fragmentation within the coercive apparatus dampened incentives for violence provided by inter-agency competition and improved the internal sharing of information, while the inclusion of native Taiwanese lowered incentives for out-group repression and improved the regime’s intelligence collection. The result was a dramatic drop in state violence around 1955, and its replacement with a more discriminate, surveillance-based style of repression.

Chapter 7 shows that the fragmentation of Marcos’ coercive institutions created clear material incentives for agents to compete over captures and killings, and also prevented them from sharing intelligence with each other in ways that escalated the likelihood of torture and

killing. Moreover, the exclusivity of Marcos' coercive apparatus led to decreased concern with violence that was targeted against the out-group, and left holes in domestic intelligence that predisposed coercive agents toward higher levels of and less discriminate violence.

Chapter 8 shows that coercive institutional design helps explain variations in state violence not only over time but across space in South Korea between 1972 and 1987. It argues first that the presence of an external threat and American control over the military minimized the overall presence of coup-proofing behavior in South Korea throughout the Cold War, and therefore helped to keep state violence relatively low compared to other regimes. Second, however, it demonstrates that variations in fragmentation and regional exclusivity in the non-military internal security apparatus under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan explain not only the targets and types of state violence that occurred during each autocrat's tenure, but also differences in repressive activity and uses of violence between the two. Specifically, it demonstrates that changes to the social composition of the riot police under Chun Doo Hwan – the use of conscripts to staff the riot police, who had previously been self-selecting, while regional exclusivity was maintained and even deepened at the top levels of the coercive apparatus – help to explain three key differences in state violence under Chun: first, that protests were on average policed more peacefully under Chun than under Park; second, that the repression of protest was less regionally biased; and third, that the repression of these protests was increasingly unpopular not only within South Korean society at large but within the coercive apparatus itself.

A summary of these arguments is presented in Table 1.3, which outlines the dominant perceived threat, the coercive institutional type, and the level of state violence that resulted.

These chapters empirically confirm the predictions of my theory with respect to coercive institutional design and state violence, demonstrating that coercive institutions fundamentally shape the strategies of repression used by a regime and the patterns of violence that citizens experience as a result. They demonstrate the validity of a new framework by which to think about repression and state violence under authoritarian rule.

Chapter 9 suggests that this framework can be used to illuminate the priorities and ruling tactics of a large number of leaders worldwide, both historically and in the present moment. It examines how the book's argument travels to other parts of the world, probing its plausibility with respect to coercive institutions and patterns of state violence in Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. In Chile, a deal struck by

TABLE 1.3. *Summary of cases*

Case (Years)	Threat	Fragmentation	Exclusivity	Violence
Taiwan (1945–87)	Popular	Unitary	Inclusive	Low/ decreasing
Philippines (1972–86)	Elite	Fragmented	Exclusive	High/ increasing
S. Korea (Park) (1972–79)	External- Elite	Unitary military Fragmented internal	Inclusive military Exclusive internal	Low overall Higher than Chun
S. Korea (Chun) (1980–87)	External- Popular	Unitary military Unitary internal	Inclusive military Mixed internal	Low overall Lower than Park

the junta in the mid-1970s reduced Pinochet's elite threat, leading to the consolidation of the coercive apparatus and a decline in state violence. In East Germany, the unexpected outbreak of mass unrest in 1953 made that the dominant perceived threat, spurring remarkable growth in the power and reach of the Stasi – the quintessential unitary and inclusive organization – and reducing state violence against East Germans in favor of the surveillance-based style of repression for which the Stasi has become infamous. In Iraq, Saddam Hussein's paranoia about a coup led him to create fragmented and competitive security agencies staffed exclusively by family members, which were collectively responsible for extraordinarily high levels of state violence during his rule. Together, and with reference to other cases worldwide, these regimes demonstrate the external validity of the theory and help to clarify the scope conditions of the argument. Chapter 10 then concludes by reviewing the book's main findings, outlining its contributions to several scholarly debates and its implications for policy, and discussing some possible directions for future research.

A theory of coercive institutions and state violence

Coercive institutions exist to safeguard an autocratic ruler in power. Their construction is among the most fundamental tasks he can undertake, and their performance determines his longevity in office and the manner of his exit. These institutions also matter deeply for the millions of ordinary citizens that the autocrat governs, because they affect the levels of violence experienced by those people.

This chapter outlines the logic behind the creation and operation of autocratic coercive institutions. The first half of the chapter begins by reviewing the threats that an autocrat must address to stay in power. It then identifies how different threats lead to the creation of distinct types of coercive institutions, proposing that autocrats face a “coercive dilemma” because managing the risk of a coup and managing the threat of popular unrest call for different optimal levels of fragmentation and social exclusivity: coup-proofing calls for fragmented and exclusive coercive institutions, while managing popular unrest is best accomplished using a unitary and inclusive internal security apparatus. Ultimately, autocrats negotiate this organizational tradeoff by crafting their coercive institutions to address the *dominant perceived threat* at the time they come to power.

The second half of the chapter turns from using coercive institutional design as the dependent variable to making it an independent variable that explains variations in state violence. I isolate two primary mechanisms by which coercive institutions affect levels of state violence, which I term the *intelligence pathway* and the *incentives pathway*. Fragmentation and exclusivity both provide incentives, either social or material, that predispose coercive agents toward higher levels of and less discriminate violence. Both characteristics also hamper the collection,

analysis, and transmission of intelligence that might enable more targeted, pre-emptive, and non-violent repression, thereby raising the probability of higher levels of and less discriminate violence. Through these pathways, the coercive apparatus has an independent effect on levels of state violence that cannot be accounted for by other factors.

The fact that authoritarian coercive institutions have varying intelligence capabilities also suggests a set of fairly restrictive conditions under which we should see institutional change, and suggests the likely direction of such change when it occurs. The chapter therefore outlines a set of predictions for when and how coercive institutional change should happen, and contrasts this theory of change with explanations grounded in path dependence and rational design.

This chapter proposes an original theory for the variations in the construction of an autocrat's coercive apparatus, and an original theory to explain variations in the "coercive outputs," or violence, that that apparatus produces. In both sections of the book, I contrast my theory with prominent alternative explanations, which are tested together in Chapters 3–8. For the origins of coercive institutions, the two most prominent alternatives are institutional inheritance (often intermingled with discussions of underlying social structure) and external influence. For patterns of violence, the most prominent alternative explanations include changing levels of popular threat, state or organizational capacity, and international factors (variously defined). The final section of the chapter addresses methodological questions and explains my empirical strategy, including potential causal issues and case selection criteria.

THE ORIGINS OF COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS

Autocrats who aspire to stay in power must address a range of threats. Optimizing a coercive apparatus to deal with each type of potential threat, however, would produce different coercive institutional designs for each threat. For this reason, even though autocrats commonly confront multiple threats at any one time, the process of constructing the coercive apparatus involves making fundamental organizational tradeoffs. I term this the autocrat's "coercive dilemma," and argue that autocrats resolve it by configuring their internal security apparatus to address the *dominant perceived threat* at the time they come to power. Prioritizing the threat of a coup leads to higher fragmentation and exclusivity, whereas focusing on the threat of popular uprising leads to a more unitary and socially inclusive apparatus.




FIGURE 2.1. Threat landscape for autocrats

The autocratic threat landscape

To a dictator seeking to ensure his survival, the world presents a number of potential threats, illustrated in Figure 2.1.

A dictator may face the threat of external conquest, as in the deposition of Iraq's Saddam Hussein in 2003. Internally, he could be overthrown by a mass movement, insurgency, or revolution, such as those that overturned communist regimes in Eastern Europe and autocracies in the Middle East during the Arab Spring. Or he could be overthrown or assassinated by fellow elites in a coup. (As Figure 2.1 notes, dictators can also face secessionist movements, but since these do not necessarily lead to the dictator's removal from power, I do not discuss them here.)

Many autocrats face more than one of these threats at the same time, and addressing only one threat is not a luxury that dictators have if they want to stick around for long. Existing political science literature, however, commonly treats autocrats as if they focus on only one of these problems. Classical works on totalitarian government, for example, deal primarily with the threat of mass mobilization and popular revolt,¹ as does some recent work on social movements and repression,² autocratic

¹ Dallin and Breslauer, *Political Terror*; Karl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965); Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2000).

² See, for example, Sidney Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 1988); Christian Davenport, Hank Johnston, and Carol Mueller, eds., *Repression and Mobilization* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 2005); Christian Davenport, "State Repression and Political Order"; Mark Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 31, No. 2 (June 1987), pp. 266–97;

institution-building,³ and democratic transition.⁴ An extensive literature spanning comparative politics, civil–military relations, and security studies deals with how dictators manage the coup risks posed by their own security forces.⁵ More recent work focuses on the task of elite management, examining how autocrats create and sustain the coalitions necessary to stay in power.⁶

Relatively little of this literature deals systematically with tradeoffs and their effect on internal security. Milan Svolik identifies popular management and elite power-sharing as the “twin problems of dictatorship” and explores how institutions address one or both threats, but does not directly address the issue of an organizational tradeoff.⁷ The coup-proofing literature cited above uses elite threats to explain why autocrats pursue forms of political intervention in the military that are sub-optimal for external security, particularly warfighting. Steven David’s

Will H. Moore, “Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (July 1998), pp. 851–73; Gerald Marwell and Pamela Oliver, *The Critical Mass in Collective Action: Toward a Micro-Social Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993); Pamela Oliver, “Bringing the Crowd Back In: The Non-Organizational Elements of Social Movements,” *Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change*, Vol. 14 (1989), pp. 1–30.

³ Gandhi, *Political Institutions*; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion”; Gandhi and Przeworski, “Authoritarian Institutions”; Lust-Okar, “Elections Under Authoritarianism.”

⁴ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, “A Theory of Political Transitions,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 91 (2001), pp. 938–63; Charles Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁵ Edward Luttwak, *Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook* (New York: Knopf, 1968); Eric A. Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics: Military Coups and Governments* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice, 1977); John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, “Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power,” *World Politics*, Vol. 42 (1990), pp. 151–83. On coup-proofing and military effectiveness, see Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, “Technology, Civil–Military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1996), pp. 171–212; Risa Brooks, *Political–Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Kenneth Pollack, *Arabs at War* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002); James Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East,” *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (1999), pp. 131–65; Caitlin Talmadge, *The Dictator’s Army: Battlefield Effectiveness in Authoritarian Regimes* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2015).

⁶ Milan Svolik, “Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes,” *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 477–94; Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, *The Logic of Political Survival*; Brownlee, *Durable Authoritarianism*; Brett L. Carter, “Inside Autocracy: Political Survival and The Modern Prince,” PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2014; Julia Choucair-Visozo, “Organizing Power: Elite Networks and Authoritarian Stability,” PhD dissertation, Yale University, 2016.

⁷ Svolik, *Politics of Authoritarian Rule*.

omnibalancing theory looks at how states' assessments of internal versus external threats inform alliance choices.⁸ Perhaps the work that comes closest to addressing internal tradeoffs is by Philip Roessler, who finds that ethnic exclusion in African personalist regimes can substitute coup risk for the risk of civil war.⁹ None of these works, however, address the specific question of how mixed threat environments inform coercive institutional design across multiple sub-types of authoritarian regime, or identify comprehensively and specifically what kind of organizational tradeoffs exist for autocrats who must manage multiple threats. They also do not address the consequences of threat balancing for internal security behavior, for human rights outcomes, or for the patterns of state violence and repression against ordinary citizens.

Solving the “coercive dilemma”: the purpose and problem of coercive institutions

To address the threats that he faces, an autocrat creates *coercive institutions*: the cluster of organizations collectively responsible for domestic intelligence and internal security.¹⁰ Because I am interested in explaining how autocrats assign the tasks of domestic intelligence and internal security across various institutional frameworks, I adopt a functional definition of the coercive apparatus: the term may include parts of the military, local or national police, intelligence organizations, state security agencies, and presidential or praetorian guards. I do not include other political or social institutions, such as parties or local associations, *unless* such groups have been formally and institutionally incorporated into a country's internal security architecture. Thus I include the *baojia* system in Taiwan, but not the Kabataang Barangay youth movement in the Philippines, because only the former was formally and fully embedded into the internal security system, being co-located with police offices and having formal lines of reporting to the police and martial law command

⁸ Steven R. David, “Explaining Third World Alignment,” *World Politics*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (January 1991), pp. 233–56; Taylor Fravel, *Strong Borders, Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).

⁹ Philip Roessler, “The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa,” *World Politics*, Vol. 63, No. 2 (April 2011), pp. 300–46.

¹⁰ These institutions are also referred to as the coercive apparatus, the internal security apparatus, and the internal security sector. I use these terms interchangeably. Art, “What Do We Know About Authoritarianism?”; Ronald Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States: Communal Violence and Internal Security in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990).

structure under which Taiwan was governed. For reasons outlined below, only some authoritarian regimes pursue this kind of institutionalized social incorporation.

In creating coercive institutions, dictators encounter a particular variant of a universal problem of political order, which I term the autocrat's "coercive dilemma."¹¹ That question is: who guards the guardians? How do rulers simultaneously give the security forces the capacity for violence, and prevent that capacity from being directed toward them? How do they make their "specialists in violence"¹² an asset rather than a threat?

The field of civil-military relations frames this issue largely as one of civilian or democratic control over the military. In democracies, the risk is that "the very institution created to protect the polity is given sufficient power to become a threat" to it. As Peter Feaver elaborates:

The civil-military problematique is so vexing because it involves balancing two vital and potentially conflicting societal desiderata. On the one hand, the military must be strong enough to prevail in war ... On the other hand, just as the military must protect the polity from enemies, so must it conduct its own affairs so as not to destroy or prey on the society it is intended to protect. Because the military must face enemies, it must have coercive power, the ability to force its will on others. But coercive power gives it the capability to enforce its will on the community that created it.¹³

To those who seek to ensure self-government, these dual requirements of power and self-control pose a fundamental challenge. The armed forces must be strong enough to defend the country, but their strength must not become abusive.

Autocracies face a different version of this dilemma, for two reasons. First, contemporary civil-military relations literature's conception of political control over coercive power as an internal-external tradeoff focused only on the military is misplaced; the tradeoff is as much internal as external. In fact, framing the question of control over coercive power that way is a relatively recent development. James Madison wrote in the *Federalist Papers*, "In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself."¹⁴ Madison's observation reminds us that the fundamental

¹¹ This dilemma is stylized for clarity.

¹² Tilly, *Politics of Collective Violence*.

¹³ Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," *Annual Political Science Review*, Vol. 2 (1999), p. 214.

¹⁴ The first obligation and *raison d'être* of any government is to eliminate the dangers of anarchy; the additional requirement on a democracy is that it check itself to avoid becoming

problem to be resolved is how to balance the capacity to enforce order with control over the order-enforcers, regardless of whether those actors are internally or externally oriented.

The second difference in an autocratic coercive dilemma is that the dictator, rather than the people, is both the principal overseeing coercive agents and the object to be protected from them. An autocrat seeks not to preserve society's ability to govern, but his own. He does not worry about the security services destroying democracy or the polity, but about the security services destroying *him*. Machiavelli identified this risk in the fifteenth century, warning princes of both technical incompetence and disloyal ambition in their generals. "Commanders are either skilled in warfare, or they are not," he noted, and "if they are, you cannot trust them, because they are anxious to advance their own greatness ... If, however, the commander is lacking in prowess, in the normal way he brings about your ruin."¹⁵ In fact, the threat of usurpation by fellow members of the ruling elite – typically involving the military or security forces – is the most common way for a modern autocrat to fall from power. Svobik's analysis of authoritarian leaders from 1946 to 2008 shows that 68 percent lost power through a coup d'état, compared to 11 percent by popular uprising, and only 5 percent by foreign intervention.¹⁶ When it comes to their security forces, autocrats face a fundamental "coercive dilemma" between empowerment and control.

Autocratic rule depends on organized coercive capacity. Autocrats must empower their security forces with enough coercive capacity to enforce internal order and conduct external defense. Equally important to their survival, however, they must control that capacity, to ensure that it is not turned against them. What do these control practices look like? The following section outlines them and then addresses the question of when they are most prevalent.

Addressing coup risks through institutional design

To manage the threat posed by their coercive institutions, autocrats use a range of techniques often grouped under the heading "coup-proofing." Coup-proofing techniques are designed to ensure the security forces' loyalty and limit their ability to stage a successful power grab, and they

a tyrannical Leviathan. James Madison, "Federalist No. 51," in Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay eds, *The Federalist Papers* (New York: Penguin, 1987).

¹⁵ Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (London: Penguin, 1961), p. 39.

¹⁶ Svobik, *Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, pp. 5–6.

predispose coercive institutions toward two organizational characteristics. (Because these characteristics are driven by common political imperatives, they tend to co-vary in their appearance.) First, coup-proofed security services tend to have a *high degree of fragmentation*; second, they tend to be *more socially exclusive*.

To be sure, these two characteristics are not the only means by which autocrats try to protect themselves from their own security forces, or by which they attempt to check elite threats. Comparative politics has long recognized that a coup d'état is a complex political phenomenon that includes both civilian elements and parts of the security apparatus.¹⁷ A fairly extensive literature looks at the role of political institutions in mitigating elite conflict and co-opting potential rivals, particularly civilian political elites who do not command coercive capacity.¹⁸ Fragmentation and social exclusivity are also not the only means by which an autocrat can attempt to coup-proof the security apparatus itself; he may, for example, try to ensure loyalty by providing the security forces with direct patronage or an economic stake in the regime's survival, as Hosni Mubarak did in Egypt.¹⁹

Participation of and support from the security forces, however, remain essential components of any successful coup d'état. Even if they employ other tools to manage civilians, autocrats must still mitigate the threat that comes from these forces and their potential participation in anti-regime political activity. Autocrats are unlikely to see co-optation and cronyism as sufficient insurance against coup risks. These approaches seek to minimize the risk of coercive forces' defection and disloyalty by giving them a stake and voice in the regime, but autocrats must be prepared for the fact that these mechanisms can fail. (In fact, they may actually incentivize coercive forces to seize power, to obtain more of these benefits.) Ultimately, then, an autocrat needs tools that enable him to maintain power even if

¹⁷ Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 218; Aries Arugay, "Democracy's Saviors and Spoilers: A Study of the Causal Conditions and Mechanisms Behind 'Civil Society Coups' After the Third Wave of Democratization," PhD dissertation, Georgia State University, 2014.

¹⁸ Brownlee, *Durable Authoritarianism*; Bueno de Mesquita *et al.*, *The Logic of Political Survival*; Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*; Smith, "Life of the Party"; Svobik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics"; Beatriz Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 41, No. 4–5 (April 2008), pp. 715–41.

¹⁹ Risa Brooks, *Political–Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998); Robert Springborg, "Economic Involvement of Militaries," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (August 2011), pp. 397–99.

the security forces try to take it. In that scenario, the in-group/out-group pressures created by exclusivity provide an extra line of defense against defection, while the check-and-balance process created by fragmentation is an additional hedge against power-grabbing. (Preliminary evidence corroborates the proposition that ethnic manipulation is more effective than economic patronage at ensuring the loyalty of security forces.²⁰) For this reason, I contend that the presence of a perceived high coup threat makes both fragmentation and exclusivity more likely.²¹

Coup-proofing and fragmentation

On balance, coup-proofing should *increase the degree of fragmentation* within the internal security apparatus. In autocracy, internal security is commonly assigned to multiple organizations that have overlapping or competing responsibilities and limited lines of inter-organizational communication and coordination. This divided organizational structure prevents collusion and keeps any single agency from amassing enough political power to carry out a coup. Under this definition, fragmentation's precise organizational form can vary: the organizations could be military branches (as in the Argentine junta's Army–Navy rivalry); domestic agencies like the police, paramilitary, and presidential guard (as in Iraq); or a combination of internal security forces and the military (as in North Korea). The question is whether internal security functions are assigned in overlapping ways to multiple organizations without clear lines of coordination and communication. I code fragmentation by asking two questions: first, are multiple organizations tasked with overlapping missions with respect to domestic political surveillance and policing? Second, does any organization have “coordinating authority” over the others on the autocrat's behalf? If there are multiple organizations operating in the domestic security space, but no coordinating authority among them, then the apparatus is considered fragmented. In adopting this sector-wide focus, I intentionally depart from previous studies, which have focused primarily on a single actor such as the military, and shift our analytical focus to the overall inter-organizational structure and how it is manipulated to suit an autocrat's political interests.

²⁰ Theo McLauchlin, “Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 42, No. 3 (2010), pp. 333–50; Michael Makara, “Coup-Proofing, Military Defection, and the Arab Spring,” *Democracy and Security*, Vol. 9, No. 3 (2013), pp. 334–59.

²¹ Note that this argument is probabilistic rather than deterministic.

Journalistic accounts and historical case studies of autocratic security services are rife with observations about competition and hostility between rival organizations. A multitude of scholars have chronicled “the overlapping lines of command, the confusion of jurisdictions, and the duplication of responsibilities” in the Nazi state, resulting in a situation wherein “a number of agencies competed for a larger role in the Nazi solution to the Jewish question.”²² During the reign of the Dominican Republic’s Rafael Trujillo, “high command was always diluted among several contenders.”²³ North Korea’s Kim Jong Il created intelligence and internal security services with “deliberately blurred and overlapping” lines of responsibility to ensure that none could gather enough power to stage a challenge.²⁴ Saddam Hussein created a set of Iraqi civilian and military security organizations with “overlapping and redundant functions,” designed to impede collusion and foster competition.²⁵ Indonesia’s Suharto created a divide-and-rule strategy among powerful generals, creating “multiple informal chains of command that led only to Suharto.”²⁶

Fragmentation is often reinforced by doctrines and practices that deliberately impede coordination and cooperation between forces and stoke inter-agency competition instead. In Middle Eastern non-democracies, joint commands and exercises are rare, and require presidential approval. In Saudi Arabia, for example, even relatively simple and routine activities such as assembling road convoys require authorization from multiple command channels. Information-sharing across military units is severely restricted, and authority is not delegated to ground-level commanders.²⁷ Fragmentation, then, begins with lines on an organizational chart, but extends beyond this to the daily practices of the fragmented organizations.

²² Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 316–26; Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin, 1976, rev. ed), pp. 71, 151–52; Martin Broszat, *The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich* (London: Longmans, 1981); Robert E. Conot, *Justice at Nuremberg* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983); William L. Shirer, *The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1960).

²³ Robert D. Crassweller, *Trujillo: The Life and Times of a Caribbean Dictator* (New York: Macmillan, 1966).

²⁴ Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., *The Armed Forces of North Korea* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2001), p. 7.

²⁵ U.S. Institute of Peace, “Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq,” *Special Report No. 104* (April 2003), p. 4.

²⁶ Mary P. Callahan, “Civil–Military Relations in Indonesia: Reformasi and Beyond,” *Occasional Paper No. 4* (Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, September 1999), p. 13.

²⁷ Norvell B. DeAtkine, “Why Arabs Lose Wars,” *Middle East Quarterly*, December 1999.

Coup-proofing and social exclusivity

Autocratic security services that are coup-proofed should also be more *socially exclusive*. Autocrats commonly manipulate the social composition of their security forces in ways that they believe will make those forces more loyal, and less likely to rebel or defect. While Stephen Rosen suggests that militaries which reflect the society from which they are drawn engender higher trust among democratic leaders,²⁸ in autocratic regimes the converse is true: isolated insiders are perceived to be most trustworthy, for several reasons. First, security forces composed of the same social or ethnic group as the dictator are considered more reliable because they share regime interests defined by common identity and stake in a particular societal distribution of power. Second, by not reflecting the fissures of a multiethnic society, exclusive forces are expected to operate more cohesively.²⁹ And finally, because exclusive forces lack a broad social base of power, they have a lower likelihood of defection or coup because their ability to replace the autocrat in power, or even to mount a successful challenge, is limited by the lack of broader support.

As with fragmentation, exclusivity's precise operationalization varies with a country's dominant social cleavages. The key question is: are the country's major social groups all included in the organs of intelligence and coercion? If participation in the coercive apparatus is restricted to a narrow group that shares an ethnic, tribal, regional, or familial tie with the autocrat, while those who lack such a tie are barred from participation, then the apparatus is exclusive; if individuals from across the dominant social cleavage are regularly and (roughly) proportionally included, then the apparatus is inclusive. Recall, too, that extensive membership in social or communal organizations counts as inclusion only if such organizations have been formally incorporated into the coercive architecture. For example, broad-based party membership does not create an inclusive coercive apparatus *unless* party cells have a regularized, institutionalized mechanism by which they provide information to that apparatus.

Examples abound of autocratic security forces staffed with favored ethnic groups and led by family members. In Libya, Muammar Qadhafi's son Khamis ran an elite brigade designated for regime protection, his brother-in-law Abdullah Senussi ran the intelligence services, and organizations such as the Republican Guard were predominantly drawn from

²⁸ Stephen P. Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and its Armies* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996).

²⁹ Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier* (New York: Macmillan/Free Press, 1960).

Qadhafi's own tribe.³⁰ Denis Sassou Nguesso in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) used intermarriage and other social institutions to stitch together an elite based on family and social networks.³¹ In Asia, Chiang Ching-kuo managed Taiwan's secret police for decades on his father's behalf before assuming power himself; the North Korean coercive apparatus is made up of a narrow handful of families bound to the ruling Kim family by both blood and shared partisan history.³²

Beyond family, the leadership and even the rank and file of the intelligence and security forces are often drawn from favored social or ethnic groups. After 1968, Saddam Hussein replaced the ethnically and religiously representative Iraqi National Police with the Special Security Directorate (SSD, *al-Amn al-Khas*), run by his youngest son Qusay and composed of 5,000 members of his Tikrit clan.³³ Alawite and Druze minorities make up most of the officer corps in Syria, and pro-regime Alawite militias (*shahiba*) from the Assad family stronghold of Latakia have been blamed for many of the abuses in the current conflict.³⁴ In Iran, the government has employed *basij*, volunteer forces from impoverished areas in the countryside who lack "social bonds to the city dwellers ... and are expected to be capable of violently suppressing urban, middle-class uprisings."³⁵ Chad's President Hissène Habré created a state security force (the Directorate of Documentation and Security, DDS) composed entirely of his own ethnic group, the Gorane, and purged security officials of rival ethnicities.³⁶ Samuel Doe in Liberia replaced most of the government and

³⁰ John Hamilton, "Libya Protests: the Tangled Web Keeping Gaddafi in Power," *The Telegraph*, February 23, 2011; Charles Levinson and Margaret Coker, "Inside a Flawed Spy Machine as Libya's Regime Crumbled," *The Wall Street Journal*, September 2, 2011, p. 1.

³¹ Brett L. Carter, "Unite and Rule: a Theory of Compulsory Elite Social Networks in Autocracies," paper presented to the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, New Orleans (2012).

³² Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: the Formation of North Korea, 1945–60* (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 2002).

³³ U.S. Institute of Peace, "Establishing the Rule of Law in Iraq," pp. 3–5.

³⁴ Keefer, "Why Follow the Leader?" p. 7; Christian Caryl, "Plague of Thugs," *Foreign Policy*, July 18, 2012; Bill Spindle, "Assad Draws Shock Troops from Elite Sect in Syria," *Wall Street Journal*, August 29, 2012, p. 1.

³⁵ Ali Alfoneh, cited in Caryl, "Plague of Thugs."

³⁶ Reed Brody, "Inside a Dictator's Secret Police," *Foreign Policy*, March 9, 2010, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/03/08/inside_a_dictators_secret_police; Romesh Silva, Jeff Klingner, and Scott Weikart, "State Coordinated Violence in Chad under Hissene Habré," report by Benetech's Human Rights Data Analysis Group to Human Rights Watch and the Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crimes, February 3, 2010, www.hrdag.org/about/chad.shtml.

army with members of the Krahn tribe from which he came – an estimated 4 percent of the country's population.³⁷

There are other ways of making the coercive apparatus exclusive. First, autocrats can hire mercenaries. Ottoman rulers drew their Janissaries (palace guard units) from Christian areas in the Balkans,³⁸ while Gadhafi gained notoriety before his 2011 demise for having imported foreign fighters from countries like Sudan, Chad, Mali, and Niger to counter escalating rebellion.³⁹ Second, autocrats can employ minorities from within the country who are too small in number and influence to have a hope of seizing power themselves. Stalin deliberately promoted minorities whose lack of a power base neutralized them as a threat,⁴⁰ and members of Saddam Hussein's palace staff were almost entirely Christian speakers of Assyrian and Chaldean.⁴¹ Finally, autocrats can make the security services more exclusive by simply making them smaller; if fewer people participate in the security apparatus, it by definition becomes more exclusive.

Similar to fragmentation, social exclusivity is often paired with personnel practices designed to achieve the same goals. Limiting the funding of the coercive apparatus – rather than paying coercive agents to stay loyal – keeps these forces too small to mount an effective threat and more responsive to the patronage that a ruler does deploy. Autocrats also commonly employ rotation policies designed to ensure that no individual becomes too close to a unit or region or accumulates excessive power in a single base. Haile Selassie, Saddam Hussein, and Kim Jong Il all operated systems in which they directly controlled personnel appointments and transferred commanders frequently, without warning.⁴² Latin American

³⁷ Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith, *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics* (New York: Public Affairs/Persus, 2011), p. 22.

³⁸ Patrick Kinross, *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire* (London: Perennial Press, 1977).

³⁹ Scott Baldauf, "Qaddafi's Ties to Rebel Groups Scrutinized as 'African Mercenaries' Patrol Libya," *Christian Science Monitor*, February 23, 2011.

⁴⁰ Gregory, *Terror by Quota*.

⁴¹ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party*. Similar logic may inform the use of child soldiers; young fighters are more likely to follow orders and less likely to defect. Keefer, "Why Follow the Leader?" p. 16; Berndt Beber and Christopher Blattman, "The Logic of Child Soldiering and Coercion," *International Organization*, Vol. 67, No. 1 (January 2013), pp. 65–104.

⁴² Ryszard Kapucinski, *The Emperor* (London: Penguin, 2006); Bermudez, *Armed Forces of North Korea*; Ahmed Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq: The Quest for Legitimacy and Power," *Middle East Journal*, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Winter 2003), pp. 9–41. On direct control of appointments, see Geddes, "What Do We Know about Democratization?"

TABLE 2.1. *Predicted coercive institutional configuration based on threat type*

Threat	Fragmentation	Exclusivity
External	Low (battlefield effectiveness)	Low (draft, support)
Popular	Low (coordinated operations)	Low (intelligence, support)
Elite	High (prevent collusion)	High (trusted insider)

police officers who returned from training in the U.S. during the Cold War were frequently assigned new commands to prevent them from aggrandizing power with their new skills.⁴³ Like the other techniques described above, rotation makes regularized channels of communication and participation between the population and the internal security apparatus much harder to establish.

The coercive dilemma: organizational tradeoffs of coup-proofing

If all dictators were principally concerned with coup threats, then we should see a single optimal model of coercive institutions characterized by high levels of fragmentation and social exclusivity. Empirically, however, we observe the variation described in Chapter 1. Why is this the case?

This book argues that variation occurs because not all dictators are primarily concerned with the risk of a coup. Although many are, others are more concerned with popular threats or external defense. Optimizing one's internal security apparatus to defend against a coup, however, produces precisely the opposite organizational configuration of the one that an autocrat should want if his main priority is the management of popular unrest. The optimal coercive institutional designs for each type of threat are shown in Table 2.1.

An autocrat who optimizes for coup protection is likely to create fragmented and exclusive institutions for the reasons mentioned above, while one who prioritizes popular management is likely to create institutions that are unitary and inclusive.

Most literature on the costs of coup-proofing discusses its drawbacks from the standpoint of effective external defense. Because this manuscript is less concerned with external defense, I do not engage this literature

⁴³ Thomas Lobe, "The Rise and Demise of the Office of Public Safety," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Winter 1983), p. 197.

in depth, but it is worth noting that severe external threats predispose leaders toward unitary and inclusive coercive institutions, because under these circumstances, operational effectiveness trumps political criteria in determining the organization and composition of the security forces.⁴⁴ Maximizing military effectiveness on the battlefield requires decentralized command to improve responsiveness to the changing conditions of battle, and easy channels of communication across different units so that operations can be coordinated – a unitary rather than a fragmented institutional design. Countries with a high demand for external defense are more likely to have mechanisms, such as a draft, that widen the social base of the military, while requirements for battlefield effectiveness also suggest that they will recruit soldiers and promote officers on the basis of merit rather than ethnic affiliation – both mechanisms that broaden these forces' inclusivity. Coercive institutions that are optimized for external defense, in short, are likely to be unitary and socially inclusive.

Coercive institutions that are designed to manage popular threats are also more likely to be unitary and inclusive because operational effectiveness in addressing these challenges likewise calls for a unitary structure and socially inclusive force composition. Police and military organizations that handle multi-city riot control, counterinsurgency, or other widespread forms of popular unrest must be able to engage in extended coordinated operations and communicate effectively across units, which makes fragmentation undesirable.⁴⁵ High demands for popular policing are also likely to lead to increased recruitment or even conscription, as well as recruitment and promotion based on efficacy rather than political loyalty, thereby increasing inclusivity. Finally, demands for domestic intelligence and the desire to pre-empt protest by “winning hearts and minds” should predispose these institutions toward social inclusivity, either by making sure that minority groups are included in the police force,⁴⁶ or by employing institutionalized channels of contact between

⁴⁴ For a review of military-organizational practices and their contribution to military effectiveness, see Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army*.

⁴⁵ John Crank and Robert Langworthy, “Fragmented Centralization and the Organization of the Police,” *Policing and Society*, Vol. 6 (1996), pp. 213–29; Stuart Kirby, *Effective Policing? Implementation in Theory and Practice* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2013); “Overcoming Challenges and Creating a Regional Approach to Policing in St. Louis County,” *Police Executive Research Forum*, April 30, 2015.

⁴⁶ Guy Ben-Porat, Fany Yuval, and Shlomo Mizrahi, “The Challenge of Diversity Management: Police Reform and the Arab Minority in Israel,” *Policy Science*, Vol. 45 (2012), pp. 243–63; E. Hochstedler, “Impediments to Hiring Minorities in Public Police Agencies,” *Journal of Police Science and Administration*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (1984),

the police and various social associations and groups.⁴⁷ An autocrat principally concerned with the threat of popular unrest, then, will be more likely to create unitary and socially inclusive coercive institutions.

Table 2.1 should not be interpreted to mean that there are no tradeoffs between external defense and popular policing. These tradeoffs, however, are not primarily in organizational design, but in resource allocation and training regimens. For example, external defense may call for more capital-intensive investments such as tanks or planes, while popular policing demands a higher human-capital investment and relatively less expenditure on equipment.

As a result, the largest *organizational* tradeoffs in designing the coercive apparatus are between the risk of a coup on the one hand and the threat of popular unrest on the other. Theoretically, it is impossible for an autocrat to create a coercive apparatus that is truly optimized to deal with both a popular threat and an elite one: the characteristics that make an apparatus effective against one type of threat are precisely those that make the autocrat more vulnerable to the other, and an apparatus cannot be both unitary and fragmented, exclusive and inclusive, at the same time. Mutually exclusive institutional designs mean that the dictator must bet on the most serious risk. Organizationally speaking, an autocrat must decide which threat is most acute, and choose his design accordingly.

Dominant perceived threat: the origin of coercive institutional design

Coercive institutions vary in their design because autocrats configure them based on what they *perceive to be the dominant threat* at the time they come to power. Scholars observed some time ago that external

pp. 227–40; Nick A. Theobald and Donald P. Haider-Merkel, “Race, Bureaucracy, and Symbolic Representation: Interactions between Citizens and the Police,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2009), pp. 409–26; Samuel Walker, “Racial Minority and Female Employment in Policing: The Implications of ‘Glacial’ Change,” *Crime & Delinquency*, Vol. 31, No. 4 (1985), pp. 555–72.

⁴⁷ Ian Barnes and Tania Eagle, “The Role of Community Engagement in Neighborhood Policing,” *Policing: a Journal of Policy and Practice*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (2007), pp. 161–72; Mike Brogden, “Horses for Courses and Thin Blue Lines: Community Policing in Transitional Society,” *Police Quarterly*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (2005), pp. 64–98; Sinclair Dinnen, Abby Mcleod, and Gordon Peake, “Police Building in Weak States: Australian Approaches in Papua New Guinea and the Solomon Islands,” *Civil Wars*, Vol. 8, No. 2 (June 2006), pp. 87–108; Georgia Holmer with Fulco van Deventer, “Inclusive Approaches to Community Policing and CVE,” *United States Institute of Peace Special Report No. 352* (September 2014); Mark Moore, “Problem Solving and Community Policing,” *Crime & Justice*, Vol. 15 (1992), pp. 99–158; John R. Topping, “Diversifying from Within: Community Policing and the Governance of Security in Northern Ireland,” *British Journal of Criminology*, Vol. 48 (2008), pp. 778–97.

threats at the moment of state formation lock in patterns of domestic institutions; this book demonstrates that internal threats have a similarly transformative impact.⁴⁸ Decisions about both the structure and social composition of the coercive apparatus are made based on the desire to optimize these institutions to deal with the primary threat the autocrat believes he faces. Coercive institutions that are designed to deal primarily with an elite threat will tend toward high levels of fragmentation and exclusivity, while institutions designed to deal with an internal popular threat will tend toward a unitary structure and social inclusivity.

Both *dominant* and *perceived* are important qualifications, because each marks a departure from the way that threats and autocratic responses to them have typically been treated. First, I argue that what matters in determining the nature of the coercive apparatus is the *dominant* threat. I ask, which type of internal security threat – elite or popular – is perceived to be the biggest risk to the autocrat's survival at the time he assumes power? This framework explicitly accounts for the fact that elite and popular threats commonly co-exist, and that the intensity of each type of threat may rise or fall over time. (The East Asian autocrats in this book all contended with both elite and popular challenges to their rule, and all faced popular threats that rose over time.) As the next section discusses in more detail, existing studies of repression argue that changes in the level of popular threat predict the intensity of state repression. By contrast, I argue that what matters for shaping a country's coercive apparatus, and eventually the level and kind of repression its population experiences, is which threat the autocrat initially believes to be most acute, *relative to others*. Popular threat may rise or fall, but unless it becomes more or less severe than the elite threat, the coercive apparatus will not change. (For more on predictions related to institutional change, see pp. 62–64). Chapters 3–5 demonstrate that dominant perceived threat

⁴⁸ See also Slater, *Ordering Power*; Ted Robert Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (April 1988), pp. 45–65. On external threat shaping domestic institutions, see Peter Gourevitch, "The Second Image Reversed: The International Sources of Domestic Politics," *International Organization*, Vol. 32, No. 4 (1978), pp. 881–911; Otto Hintze, "Military Organization and the Organization of the State," in Felix Gilbert, ed., *The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 178–215; Charles Tilly, *Coercion, Capital, and European States, AD 990–1992* (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992); Charles Tilly, "Reflections on the History of European State-Making," in Charles Tilly, ed., *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 3–83.

outperforms other explanations in predicting what kind of coercive apparatus a regime will adopt.

This theory is also based on *perceived* threat. Because threat perception is notoriously difficult to define falsifiably *ex ante*, and because there is usually no alternative approach available, most studies infer threats from objective indicators – levels of popular protest, balance of military forces, etc. – on the assumption that autocrats look at these same indicators to make their judgments.⁴⁹ I adopt a different approach for two reasons.

First, information problems are an endemic feature of dictatorship, and should lead us to *expect* misperception of threats by autocrats. At the mass level, authoritarian subjects routinely engage in preference falsification to avoid being targeted by the state; at the elite level, subordinates have strong incentives to provide distorted information when accurate, complete information would be displeasing to the autocrat.⁵⁰ As a result, we simply cannot expect that dictators' subjective perceptions of threat will correlate with objective reality. In fact, historical evidence suggests that we should expect precisely the opposite. Mao and Stalin both prioritized internal security when hindsight suggests that external security should have been paramount,⁵¹ while Hitler and Mussolini emphasized

⁴⁹ For examples, see Slater, *Ordering Power*; Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army*. For the classic argument that states balance against threats rather than power, see Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987).

⁵⁰ Wintrobe, *Political Economy of Dictatorship*; Timur Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsification* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Stephen P. Rosen, *War and Human Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Kevin Woods, James Lacey, and William Murray, "Saddam's Delusions: The View from the Inside," *Foreign Affairs* (May/June 2006); Simon Sebag Montefiore, *Stalin: Court of the Red Tsar* (New York: Knopf, 2004); Christopher Magee and John Doces, "Rethinking Regime Type and Growth: Lies, Dictatorship, and Statistics," *International Studies Quarterly* (2014), pp. 1–15; Jeremy Wallace, "Juking the Stats? Authoritarian Information Problems in China," *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January 2016), pp. 11–29.

⁵¹ On Stalin, see Donald Cameron Watt, "The High Command: Who Plotted Against Whom? Stalin's Purge of the Soviet High Command Revisited," *Journal of Soviet Military Studies*, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1990), pp. 46–65; David Glantz, *Stumbling Colossus: The Red Army on the Eve of World War* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998); Earl F. Ziemke, "The Soviet Armed Forces in the Interwar Period," in Allan R. Millet and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness, Vol. 2: The Interwar Period* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn., 2010), pp. 1–38. On Mao, see Ellis Joffe, "Military as a Political Actor in China," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), pp. 139–80; Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,

external threat when elite threats were high (and in Mussolini's case, fatal).⁵² In order to account for the information distortion that we now believe to be the norm under authoritarian rule, this book assesses threat perceptions subjectively, from the viewpoint of particular autocrats. Doing so also follows the precedent of recent research, which finds that leaders' personal experiences and perceptions shape their decisions more than has been previously understood, and often lead them to different conclusions than those reached by intelligence organizations that rely on objective indicators to compose their assessments.⁵³

Second, unlike past studies that had no option but to rely on objective indicators, a viable alternative approach exists for the cases analyzed here. Historical records of various types shed an unusual amount of light into these autocrats' thinking about the threats they faced. Chiang Kai-shek, Chiang Ching-kuo, Ferdinand Marcos, and Park Chung Hee all kept private diaries, portions of which have been published or made available to scholars, which offer a source of information on their thinking that is less likely than public rhetoric to be "strategic communication" aimed at deception or image management.⁵⁴ I supplement analysis of these diaries with internal threat assessments generated by the regime, threat assessments composed and shared by their American allies, public speeches and writings, other official documents, newspaper accounts, and interviews with those who knew the autocrat personally. Cumulatively, these sources allow for a reasonably accurate characterization of how each autocrat perceived the various internal threats that he faced.

2006); Andrew Scobell, "Military Coups in the People's Republic of China: Failure, Fabrication, or Fancy?" *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (1995), pp. 25–46.

⁵² MacGregor Knox, "The Italian Armed Forces 1940–43," in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., *Military Effectiveness*, Vol. 3: *The Second World War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn., 2010), pp. 126–79; MacGregor Knox, *Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), Ch. 5; Albert Seaton, *The German Army 1933–45* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985).

⁵³ Keren Yarhi-Milo, "In the Eye of the Beholder: How Leaders and Intelligence Organizations Assess the Intentions of Adversaries," *International Security*, Vol. 38, No. 1 (summer 2013), pp. 7–51; Michael Horowitz and Allan Stam, "How Prior Military Experience Influences the Future Militarized Behavior of Leaders," *International Organization*, Vol. 68, No. 3 (June 2014), pp. 527–59.

⁵⁴ Studies have shown a surprisingly high degree of correlation, however, between public speech and private rhetoric. See Jonathan Renshon, "When Public Statements Reveal Private Beliefs: Assessing Operational Code at a Distance," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2009), pp. 649–61.

Many variables combine to shape an individual autocrat's perceptions of threat. In addition to objective indicators, threat perceptions may be shaped by the country's underlying social structure; past national or personal experience with either rebellion or coup threat; regime type; and the particular path that the autocrat himself takes to power. The possibility that these variables collectively condition the likelihood that the autocrat will focus on one or the other type of internal threat does raise questions about possible endogeneity in the sources of threat perception. For example, Talmadge hypothesizes that both regime type and an autocrat's path to power should affect a regime's propensity for coup-proofing; one-party regimes that have institutions to resolve elite conflict should feel less need to coup-proof than personalist or military regimes, while leaders who assume power in a coup should worry more about coup risks.⁵⁵ Yet the cases examined here call these logics into question, as do other cases worldwide. Chapter 5 demonstrates that South Korea's two military dictators, Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, each assumed power in a coup amid conditions of widespread popular protest, but Park focused on the risk of a coup, while Chun focused on managing popular unrest. Similarly, in Latin America, Chile's military dictatorship had fragmented coercive institutions during the early years of its rule, but unitary ones later; the difference was not in regime type or in how the junta came to power, but in an informal agreement struck among the members of the junta midway through their tenure that decreased the coup threat to Pinochet. Neither regime type nor the ruler's path to power can explain these differences.

In general, I find that although a number of factors influence autocratic threat perceptions, they do so collectively and unsystematically. I can find no evidence that any one of these factors has a decisive enough effect on threat perceptions to cause methodological problems for the argument made here. Given the absence of clear endogeneity issues, I have opted to bracket this question and begin the project by taking threat perceptions as historically given to examine their effect on the coercive apparatus.⁵⁶ It would be interesting to conduct a study that dissects and weights the various sources of threat perception, but that is a separate project, beyond the scope of this book.

⁵⁵ Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army*.

⁵⁶ The approach is admittedly imperfect. It raises questions about falsifiability and the degree of confidence that readers can have in my interpretation of historical records without having read the sources themselves, and lacks generalizability to cases for which

Alternative explanations for coercive institutional origins

No existing work provides a general comparative explanation for the origins of the coercive apparatus. The broader literature on institutional origins and institutional design, however, does suggest two major alternative explanations for why we might observe variations in coercive institutional design.⁵⁷ These explanations are necessarily broadly comparative; each empirical chapter (Chapters 3–5) tests my proposed theory against appropriately country-specific variants of these alternative explanations. If there is a country-specific alternative explanation for the origins of a particular coercive apparatus, I include it in the testing process as well. Across all cases, however, I test my proposed generalizable theory of coercive institutional origin against the following generalizable alternative explanations: *institutional inheritance* and *external influence*. I show that an explanation grounded in the dominant perceived threat outperforms both of these alternatives in explaining coercive institutional design across multiple cases.

Institutional inheritance

Institutional inheritance provides an explanation for the origins of coercive institutions grounded in historical path dependence. It predicts that a particular regime's coercive apparatus will be characterized by a high degree of institutional continuity relative to that of the previous regime.⁵⁸ Path-dependent institutional dynamics have been highlighted, for example, in work on post-Soviet intelligence and security agencies, where scholars argue that the transition toward democracy has been stalled by these agencies' successful resistance to reform.⁵⁹ Mary Callahan suggests that an institutional legacy of strong British control facilitated

such sources remain unavailable. Given theoretical expectations about the systematic lack of information under authoritarianism, however, and the availability of historical source materials that could be used to account for this possibility, I believe that the course I have adopted is the least problematic of potential inferential approaches, and find in succeeding chapters that it has greater explanatory power than existing alternative explanations.

⁵⁷ "There is a vast literature on institutions, but relatively little on how institutions are created." Joseph Fewsmith, *The Logic and Limits of Political Reform in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 8; Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 103.

⁵⁸ Douglass C. North, *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 3.

⁵⁹ Julie Anderson, "Intelligence and Democracy: A Russian Case Study of Secret Police Transformation in the Post-Soviet Context," PhD dissertation, City University of New York, 2008; Stephane Lefebvre and Roger N. McDermott, "Russia and the Intelligence Services

authoritarianism in contemporary Burma;⁶⁰ Elizabeth Perry describes the continuity of militias in the People's Republic of China;⁶¹ Reo Matsuzaki attributes the divergent effectiveness of police in Taiwan and the Philippines to the different institutions bequeathed by Japanese and American state-building efforts;⁶² Stephen Cook traces the path dependence of military involvement in politics in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey; and Ronald Weitzer outlines the effects of an institutional heritage of "settler rule" in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe.⁶³

At the empirical level, institutionalist arguments about path dependence are often entwined implicitly or explicitly with arguments about *underlying social structure*. Deeper social forces are thought to first shape and then constrain institutional modifications. Eva Bellin, for example, in her discussion of coercive institutions in the Middle East, treats them as proceeding from structural factors and resource endowments – either material (oil wealth) or social (patrimonialism) – that remain roughly constant in a society or regime across time.⁶⁴ Thus both factors, taken separately or in combination, predict a high degree of coercive institutional continuity across specific changes of regime. According to these theories, the best predictor of the institutional features of a particular regime's coercive apparatus should be the coercive apparatus that preceded it.

As I show in subsequent chapters, the principal weakness of this explanation is that if an autocrat is strong enough to seize power from the previous system, he is often strong enough to engage in significant institutional revision. To the extent that institutions represent an equilibrium of power, expecting coercive institutions to be continuous across regimes would neglect the shifting dynamics of power that have made possible the ascension of a new autocrat.⁶⁵ Examples of major changes to

of Central Asia," *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2008), pp. 251–301.

⁶⁰ Mary Callahan, *Making Enemies: War and State-Building in Burma* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003).

⁶¹ Elizabeth J. Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006).

⁶² Reo Matsuzaki, "Institutions by Imposition: Colonial Lessons for Contemporary State-building," PhD dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2011.

⁶³ Stephen A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997); Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States*.

⁶⁴ Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 36, No. 2, pp. 139–57.

⁶⁵ Bernard S. Silberman, *Cages of Reason: The Rise of the Rational State in France, Japan, the United States, and Great Britain* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1993); Terry M. Moe, "Power and Political Institutions," in Ian Shapiro, Stephen Skowronek and Daniel

the coercive apparatus accompanying regime transition are as common as or more common than cases of continuity. At the time that Kim Jong Il died in December 2011, for example, experts predicted that his successor, son Kim Jong Un, would be highly constrained by his youth and inexperience in a regime dominated by his father's generation and senior military officers. Yet within three years the younger Kim had purged or replaced an estimated two-thirds of the military leadership, including all but two of the seven officials who escorted his father's hearse through the streets of Pyongyang. Institutional transformation occurs almost as frequently as simple personnel replacement. Perry finds that "institutional inversion" in the early years of the People's Republic of China transformed militias from institutions of state-breaking to institutions of state-making,⁶⁶ while Weitzer notes that similar repressive organizations inherited by regimes in Northern Ireland and Zimbabwe were constrained in the former case but fortified and further mobilized in the latter.⁶⁷ Empirically, shifts in the coercive apparatus are simply far more common than they should be if either underlying social structure or simple institutional path dependence were determinative explanations for their form.

Continuity is sometimes present across regimes, but it is neither absolute nor determinate of coercive institutional design. I find that where there is a high degree of continuity between old coercive institutions and new ones, it is because past dominant threats correlate with present ones. Where the dominant perceived threat changes with the rise of a new regime, institutions are likely to change also.

External influence

External influence is sometimes also posited as a source of institutional design. This explanation is especially important to consider because external assistance on internal security was prevalent on both sides of the Cold War. The United States began training and providing aid to foreign police forces in the 1950s, and the Kennedy administration expanded the "internal defense" program under the auspices of the Office of Public Safety (OPS). OPS' stated goal was to "deal with and eliminate the causes of dissidence and violence"; its efforts focused on local police, whom American government officials believed were "the first line of defense"

Galvin, eds., *Rethinking Political Institutions: The Art of the State* (New York: New York University Press, 2007), pp. 32–71.

⁶⁶ Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution*.

⁶⁷ Weitzer, *Transforming Settler States*.

against communist proto-insurgency.⁶⁸ From 1963 to 1974, Georgetown's International Police Academy (IPA) – a “West Point” for international police forces – provided equipment and advice to nearly eighty countries, in what one scholar characterized as a direct attempt to disseminate American models of social control.⁶⁹ Communist countries engaged in similar behavior. The Soviet KGB and the East German Stasi trained foreign police and intelligence forces across the Third World, educating African insurgents and sending advisors to Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East; North Korea trained foreign security forces as well.⁷⁰ The *presence* of external intervention in internal security, therefore, is visible and uncontested.

The actual causal effect of external actors and models on the institutions of internal security, however, is much less clear. At times, external assistance did seem to transmit norms about policing that ran counter to what objective, threat-based explanations would predict – for example, when Western models of “professionalized” policing recommended that police in Republican China be socially exclusive, despite clear drawbacks for the challenges that police in that society faced. More often, however, I find that whether external influence and models have a decisive influence on the coercive apparatus depends simply on whether an autocrat agrees with the external influencer's assessment of the threat environment. Where threat assessments are shared, external assistance is useful and influential; where threat perceptions diverge, an autocrat whose survival is at stake will be willing to contradict the wishes of external patrons. (External patrons like the United States, moreover, are often more concerned with external defense than with internal security.) As the leader of Republican China, Chiang Kai-shek agreed

⁶⁸ U.S. Department of Defense, “U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy,” September 1962, pp. 10–11; see also Jeremy Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression: Police Training and Nation Building in the American Century* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2012); Lobe, “Rise and Demise of the Office of Public Safety,” pp. 5–6.

⁶⁹ Congress eventually terminated the program as a result of mounting concern about its support for repressive regimes. Lobe, “Rise and Demise of the Office of Public Safety,” pp. 192–93; United States General Accounting Office, “Foreign Assistance: Meeting the Training Needs of the Police in New Democracies,” Report to Congressional Requesters, January 1993; United States General Accounting Office, “Foreign Aid: Police Training and Assistance,” Report to Congressional Requesters, March 1992, online at <http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat7/145909.pdf>.

⁷⁰ Lefebvre and McDermott, “Russia and Central Asia”; John O. Koehler, *Stasi: The Untold Story of the East German Police* (Boulder: Westview, 1999), p. 297; Martin Meredith, *Our Votes, Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe* (New York: Public Affairs, 2002); Bermudez, *Armed Forces of North Korea*.

with American advisors on the exclusivity of the police force because he sought to ensure police loyalty and avoid defection; once he moved to Taiwan, however, even though his dependence on the United States increased, he was willing to reject that “professionalized” model, and adopted a political commissar system in the military that was highly unpopular with American military advisors. In the Philippines, Marcos accepted American aid to build the police force when he sought to suppress crime as a democratically elected leader, but was willing to sacrifice that assistance when new political imperatives demanded a shift toward coup-proofing. An autocrat’s fundamental political interests, in short, may plausibly be expected to trump those of an external patron – and I show in subsequent chapters that they often do.

In the chapters that follow, I specify the predictions of each of these alternative explanations and compare them to the predictions of my proposed theory based on dominant perceived threat. I find that although both institutional inheritance and external influence are visible in the processes leading to coercive institutional creation, neither framework provides the best explanation for the variations that we observe in coercive institutional design. I show that dominant perceived threat is a better predictor of the levels of fragmentation and exclusivity in an autocrat’s coercive apparatus, especially across multiple cases.

THE EFFECT OF COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS ON STATE VIOLENCE

How do variations in coercive institutions shape patterns of state violence? The previous section proposed that the more threat an autocrat perceives from fellow elites, especially those in the military and security forces, the more likely he will be to create coercive institutions that are fragmented, internally competitive, socially exclusive, and isolated from the population. The detrimental effect of these “coup-proofing techniques” on autocratic military performance during interstate war is well documented.⁷¹ I show below that they should impact the use of force domestically as well.

Fragmentation and exclusivity are likely to increase levels of state violence through two chief pathways, illustrated in Figure 2.2. One pathway

⁷¹ Talmadge, *The Dictator’s Army*; Hashim, “Sadam Husayn and Civil–Military Relations in Iraq”; Pollack, *Arabs at War*; Quinlivan, “Coup-Proofing”; Brooks, *Political–Military Relations*; Biddle and Zirkle, “Technology, Civil–Military Relations, and Warfare.”




FIGURE 2.2. How coercive institutions affect violence

is based on the *incentives* that these organizational characteristics provide to agents within the coercive apparatus, and another is based on how these organizational characteristics affect coercive institutions' *intelligence capacity*.

Regimes that are oriented against an elite threat – whose coercive institutions are internally fragmented and socially exclusive – are more likely to engage in higher levels of and less discriminate violence, for reasons that involve both of these mechanisms.

The intelligence pathway

Autocrats are most likely to rule civilian populations with minimal violence when their domestic intelligence and security agencies effectively collect, analyze, and communicate information on emerging popular threats. A unitary, socially inclusive coercive apparatus is more likely to produce that kind of good intelligence on popular threats, so autocrats who have this kind of coercive apparatus should be able to rule with violence that is lower in both scope and intensity, and also more discriminate.

Information plays a central role in the study of conflict. Classic texts on the causes of conflict suggest that we observe violence even when it is inefficient because of a lack of information (among other reasons).⁷² The argument that close relationships with local actors create good intelligence, and that good intelligence is necessary to sustain discriminate levels of violence, appears in studies of multiple

⁷² This framework assumes some inefficiency and cost to violence that make it undesirable from the autocrat's standpoint. Although a regime may occasionally find it useful to engage in a burst of high-intensity violence as a deterrent, this means that the regime has already failed at the low-cost strategy of deterring or pre-empting collective action short of mass violence. I assume that the costs of violence make it an inefficient long-term strategy. James Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 3 (1995), pp. 379–414.

different conflict environments: conventional military combat,⁷³ civil war,⁷⁴ counterinsurgency,⁷⁵ colonial pacification and rule,⁷⁶ and democratic “community-based policing.”⁷⁷ They share the finding that intelligence is difficult to collect, but critical to achieving the appropriately calibrated use of force.⁷⁸ Under British and French colonial government, intelligence relayed from the periphery to central administration acted as a force multiplier that “enabled colonial governments, garrison commanders, and police inspectors to deploy limited resources to maximum effect at minimum cost.”⁷⁹ The U.S. Army’s counterinsurgency field manual argues that good intelligence allows security forces to operate with more precise use of violence, “like surgeons cutting out the cancerous tissue while leaving the vital organs intact.”⁸⁰

Intelligence enables precise, selective, lower-intensity violence, against the right people and only when necessary. In the realm of domestic security, a regime with superior intelligence collection, analysis, and

⁷³ Peter Jackson, “Historical Reflections on the Use and Limits of Intelligence,” in Peter Jackson and Jennifer Siegel, eds., *Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society* (Westport: Praeger, 2005), p. 12; Michael I. Handel, *Intelligence and Military Operations* (New York: Routledge, 1996).

⁷⁴ Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Madhav Joshi, “Livelihood Coping Mechanisms, Intelligence, and Violence During the Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, Vol. 25, No. 5 (2013), pp. 820–39.

⁷⁵ David J. Clark, *The Vital Role of Intelligence in Counterinsurgency Operations* (Army War College, 2006); Michael Gallagher, “Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency: Persistent Pathologies of the Collector-Consumer Relationship,” *Small Wars Journal* (June 5, 2011); Jason Lyall, “Are Co-ethnics Better Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 104, No. 1 (February 2010), pp. 1–20; Jason Lyall, “Does Indiscriminate Violence Incite Insurgent Attacks? Evidence from Chechnya,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 53, No. 3 (June 2009), pp. 331–62; Jason Lyall and Isaiah Wilson, “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in Counterinsurgency Wars,” *International Organization*, Vol. 63, No. 1 (2009), pp. 67–106.

⁷⁶ C.A. Bayly, *Empire and Information: Intelligence Gathering and Social Communication in India 1780–1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Martin Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder After 1914* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008); Martin Thomas, “Colonial States as Intelligence States: Security Policing and the Limits of Colonial Rule in France’s Muslim Territories, 1920–40,” *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 6 (December 2005), pp. 1033–60.

⁷⁷ David Sklansky, *Democracy and the Police* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007); David Bayley, *Patterns of Policing* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1985); William Ker Muir, *Police: Streetcorner Politicians* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979).

⁷⁸ Clark, *The Vital Role of Intelligence*.

⁷⁹ Thomas, “Colonial States as Intelligence States.”

⁸⁰ U.S. Army, Army-Marine Corps Counterinsurgent Field Manual (FM 3–24), p. 41, www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf.

transmission will be able to identify the leaders of opposition activity, track their movements, and arrest them quietly before their actions escalate or become public. They will be less likely to feel compelled to engage in mass arrest and torture, less likely to execute fifty people for fear of letting one conspirator go, and less likely to be surprised by large protests that cannot be dispersed without mass public violence. Violence can therefore be narrower in scope, lower in intensity, and more capable of discriminating between true threats and casual bystanders or accidental victims. In addition to their pre-emptive capacity, coercive institutions with good intelligence should also have a cumulative deterrent effect, leading to a further drop in violence. If protestors or opposition activists learn that they are virtually guaranteed to be detected in advance and prevented from acting, they will be deterred from organizing and therefore no state response will be required – creating what Tony Judt has called “the peace of the prison yard.”⁸¹

The bottom-up expensiveness of information suggests that all incumbents, independent of regime type, confront some informational difficulties in identifying and neutralizing threats from within the population. Autocracies, however, also impose processes from the top down that make information difficult to obtain, making their information problems worse than those of democracies. Existing studies have proposed several reasons: citizens’ habit of concealing oppositional beliefs in favor of politically acceptable “public lies”;⁸² the lack of independent information that would otherwise be provided by civil society and alternative centers of power;⁸³ pressure on the autocrat to present a façade of strength to avoid challenges;⁸⁴ and the “shoot the messenger” tendency that makes autocratic subordinates reluctant to share bad news.⁸⁵ Each of these problems makes obtaining complete and accurate information difficult; for this reason, Han Fei Tzu, the Chinese legalist political philosopher who has been compared to Machiavelli, spends much of his treatise discussing ways in

⁸¹ Tony Judt, *Postwar: A History of Europe Since 1945* (New York: Penguin, 2006), p. 5.

⁸² Kuran, *Private Truths, Public Lies*.

⁸³ Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 18.

⁸⁴ Victor Shih, “The Autocratic Difference: Information Paucity,” working paper, 2010.

⁸⁵ Magee and Doces, “Rethinking Regime Type and Growth”; Rosen, *War and Human Nature*, ch. 4; Woods *et al.*, “Saddam’s Delusions.” On intelligence politicization in democracies, see Richard K. Betts, “Politicization of Intelligence: Costs and Benefits,” in Richard K. Betts and Thomas G. Mahnken, eds., *Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael Handel* (New York: Routledge, 2003), pp. 59–79; Joshua Rovner, *Fixing the Facts: National Security and the Politics of Intelligence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011).




FIGURE 2.3. The intelligence process and organizational requirements

which a (non-democratic Chinese) ruler can obtain complete and accurate information from his ministers.⁸⁶ Autocracies, in short, confront especially severe difficulties in getting good information.

The theory proposed here, however, suggests that autocracies are not all equally information-poor. In fact, the organizational dynamics of authoritarian coercive institutions help to explain why intelligence is more of a problem for some than others. The defining characteristics of elite-oriented coercive institutions – fragmentation and exclusivity – hamper two steps in the intelligence process that are critical to producing targeted and discriminate violence: (1) *collection* and (2) *analysis*, as illustrated in Figure 2.3.

The following subsections explain how exclusivity and fragmentation each negatively affect the intelligence capacity of an authoritarian regime's coercive apparatus.

Exclusivity and intelligence

Because social penetration is a critical requirement for the collection of intelligence on a country's population, each of the autocratic habits that make the coercive apparatus more exclusive also hampers the collection of accurate, detailed, and timely intelligence. As in counterinsurgency and imperial policing, authoritarian security forces face the challenge of identifying and pre-empting threats in a potentially hostile environment, and the task of discriminating between a minority of hostile actors and the majority of non-hostile civilians who pose no threat.

In these environments, shared ethnicity carries a demonstrated informational advantage.⁸⁷ Mutual social or ethnic identification provides a deep foundation of local social knowledge, an understanding

⁸⁶ Burton Watson, trans., *Han Fei Tzu: Basic Writings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), especially p. 87.

⁸⁷ Thomas, *Empires of Intelligence*; Bayly, *Empire and Information*; Jeremy Weinstein, J. Habyarimana, Macartan Humphreys, and D. Posner, "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 101, No. 4 (November 2007), pp. 709–25.

of interpersonal networks, an intuitive grasp of local norms, and a level of trust that make the population more likely to voluntarily convey sensitive information to the security forces. Jason Lyall finds that co-ethnic participation in security operations in Chechnya has led to faster identification of insurgents, higher levels of civilian participation in these operations, and greater counterinsurgency success.⁸⁸ Similarly, Janet Lewis demonstrates that the development of civil intelligence in Uganda, with broad-based ethnic participation, has improved the Ugandan government's ability to identify and pre-empt the launch of internal rebel groups, particularly in previously difficult-to-penetrate ethnically homogenous areas of the country.⁸⁹ An ethnically inclusive security force is likely to have an easier time obtaining timely and relevant intelligence, while an ethnically or tribally exclusive intelligence and security apparatus, composed only of a small segment of society, will have more difficulty.

Many of the policies that accompany high levels of exclusivity exacerbate the intelligence deficit that these forces incur. Rotation policies, for example, create further social distance between police and society. Frequently moving officers or units to different locations, which prevents them from accruing an independent power base, also prevents them from building bonds with local residents or locally recruited grunts. Local officers are often more trusted by residents with information that might be sensitive or embarrassing, and have informational advantages accruing from long experience in an area, including a network of trusted contacts, knowledge of local history and potential flashpoints, and an understanding of local customs. Rotation foregoes these advantages. It also impedes the accumulation of individual and organizational memory about a place or community, making the collection, recognition, and analysis of key pieces of information more difficult to achieve. Officials in democracies engaged in overseas state-building have observed that personnel deployed on short rotations fail to develop the needed familiarity with local governmental structures, social institutions, logistics, and language that are typically accumulated over a lifetime of living in a country, society, or community.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Lyall, "Are Co-ethnics Better Counterinsurgents?"

⁸⁹ Janet I. Lewis, "How Rebellion Begins: Insurgent Group Formation and Viability in Uganda," PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2012, especially Chapter 6 on the development of the Ugandan civil intelligence system.

⁹⁰ Rory Stewart, "What Can Afghanistan and Bosnia Teach Us About Libya?" *The Guardian*, October 7, 2011, www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/oct/08/libya-intervention-rory-stewart.

Exclusivity achieved by reducing the number of intelligence and security personnel available to patrol and collect information likewise reduces these forces' ability to obtain intelligence on popular threats. All else equal, a larger and better-resourced internal security apparatus will simply find it easier to collect that information; it may have more people out on the street, more money to pay informants, or better surveillance technology with which to wiretap its opponents. In some cases, technology can substitute for human intelligence, but few autocracies have funding for such a resource-intensive strategy, many choose to deploy these resources toward patronage instead, and technical intelligence has been shown to deliver inferior results compared to human intelligence – after all, to use technology effectively, you still have to know something about who to monitor.⁹¹ Even the East German Stasi, famed for their technical surveillance, complemented it with an extraordinary number of unofficial informants (*Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, IMs, see Chapter 9).⁹² In short, exclusivity obtained by reducing personnel and budgets is another form of exclusivity that damages intelligence.

Fragmentation and intelligence

Fragmentation within the internal security apparatus, on the other hand, predominantly damages the analytic component of a regime's intelligence capability. It restricts or blocks the vertical and horizontal flow of information among the organizations of the coercive apparatus. Fragmentation can exist in both democratic and autocratic political systems, but the theory advanced in the first half of this chapter suggests that it should be systematically more present in certain autocracies – those whose leaders perceive a high coup threat – and therefore that these systems will more often have barriers to the flow of information that make timely and complete provision of intelligence unlikely.

Having multiple organizations in any political system can lead to stovepiping, in which information flows to the top of the single agency for which the information is collected, but not to other relevant agencies that might find similar knowledge useful. As the number of agencies

⁹¹ Gallagher, "Human Intelligence in Counterinsurgency," p. 1.

⁹² Jens Gieseke, *Die hauptamtlichen Mitarbeiter der Staatssicherheit: Personalstruktur und Lebenswelt 1950–1989/90* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2000); Helmut Mueller-Enbergs, *Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums fuer Staatssicherheit - Band 3: Statistiken mit CD-ROM* (Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 2008); Jens Gieseke, *The GDR State Security: Shield and Sword of the Party* (Berlin: Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the Former German Democratic Republic, 2006).

increases, the probability that all information will be shared across all organizations decreases. Different clearance procedures and practical or technical processes for transmitting information can exacerbate the problem; for example, the U.S. Department of Defense and the Department of Veterans' Affairs have separate personnel processing systems that do not communicate with one another,⁹³ and investigators found that the lack of information-sharing between the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Central Intelligence Agency contributed to American intelligence failures prior to 9/11.⁹⁴ Competition between agencies with overlapping missions can also produce deliberate failures to share information with competitors. Poor inter-service communication immediately after the 1973 coup in Chile, for example, rendered coordination "haphazard and without established procedure" and the "consistency of reporting problematic at best," leading to a failure to collect even the most basic of information – like who the regime had executed or "disappeared."⁹⁵

Fragmentation can also damage the quality and quantity of information transmitted upwards to the autocrat. Scott Gartner writes about how the selection of "dominant indicators" by military organizations to assess their rates of success leads them to collect some kinds of information at the expense of others;⁹⁶ for reasons related to organizational mission, bureaucratic culture, and leadership style, different agencies are likely to gather, emphasize, and transmit different information upward. Having multiple or conflicting channels of reporting may be useful for managing elite threats, especially if secret police organizations are being tasked to watch each other. The cost of that fragmentation, however, is an increased likelihood of confusion or disagreement over the nature and severity of threats faced by a regime, and an increased likelihood of conflicting estimates of success or failure for any given policy option to deal with it. Coupled with the presence of incentives against providing negative feedback, fragmentation can produce an underestimation of threats – leaving them to grow until it's too late – and an overestimation of the coercive apparatus' efficacy in dealing with them. The larger and more public a problem becomes, then, the greater the probability that

⁹³ Hannah Winston, "Veterans Affairs, Defense Departments Spend Billions in Effort to Coordinate Records," *News21*, August 27, 2013, www.publicintegrity.org/2013/08/27/13253/veterans-affairs-defense-depts-spend-billions-effort-coordinate-records.

⁹⁴ Amy Zegart, *Spying Blind: The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007).

⁹⁵ Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, pp. 18, 58.

⁹⁶ Scott Gartner, *Strategic Assessment in War* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).




FIGURE 2.4. The intelligence pathway

the regime will have to use higher levels of less discriminate violence to address it.

In sum, both fragmentation and exclusivity in coercive institutions damage these institutions' intelligence capacity, as shown in Figure 2.4.

A strong intelligence capacity provides the ability to engage in selective, pre-emptive, and targeted repression. Over time, it can also create a deterrent effect, as individuals find out that opposition will be reliably detected. Absent a strong intelligence capacity, then, autocratic security forces are more likely to engage in violence that is broader in scope, higher in intensity, and less discriminate.

The incentives pathway

Coercive institutions that are fragmented and exclusive will also have incentives that predispose them toward broader and higher-intensity violence. These incentives are both social and material. They are also both positive and negative, meaning that these systems provide direct incentives *for* violence and lower sanctions *against* it.

Fragmentation and incentives for violence

Fragmentation creates incentives for violence among the organizations and agents of the internal security apparatus. It does so in two ways. First, fragmentation increases the likelihood of competition between the various agencies that make up the internal security apparatus, the most likely result of which is an escalation of violence. Second, fragmentation creates incentives that damage the provision of intelligence, also thereby increasing the probability of violence.

Fragmentation can create incentives that damage intelligence in three primary ways. First, as described in the previous section, when different agencies are incentivized to compete for power by making arrests and claiming credit for security "victories," competition becomes zero-sum,

and agencies are less likely to share information that would negate their competitive advantage against an organizational rival. Second, when competing security agencies monitor and report on each other, it takes attention away from collecting intelligence on the population, and detracts resources and manpower from that task. To the extent that fragmentation provides incentives against sharing information and for spending resources on inter-agency monitoring rather than popular policing, it hampers the creation of intelligence that could be used to make violence more discriminate. Third, fragmentation and competition can heighten obstacles to vertical transmission of information. Subordinates who are in competition against rival agencies or personnel are more likely to conceal accurate but unpopular information (the “shoot the messenger problem”), or to provide damaging misinformation on their rivals to eliminate competitors and accumulate personal or organizational power.⁹⁷ Currying favor and casting aspersions on one’s rivals distort the content and provision of intelligence assessments; competition between the police and the army in Ethiopia, for example, prevented officials from delivering information about unrest in provincial army garrisons to Haile Selassie until it had escalated into full-blown revolt, and competition between armed service branches damaged intelligence coordination in Chile during the immediate post-coup violence in 1973–74.⁹⁸ Fragmentation skews incentives, which negatively impacts intelligence and drives higher violence in the ways described in the previous section.

Fragmentation also contributes to violence in a more direct way: by creating competition in which agents are rewarded for acts of violence. It is common to measure the success of a security agency and its personnel by the number of “enemies” that it has neutralized; among the well-known international examples are the use of body counts and kill ratios to judge military performance in Vietnam, or anti-drug agencies’ use of seizure data to prove their organizational effectiveness.⁹⁹ Similar dynamics occur in policing; in 2007, for example, the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department held competitions between stations to see who could arrest the most people in a given twenty-four hour period (Operation Any Booking) and who could seize the most illegally parked vehicles (Operation Vehicle Impound). Not surprisingly, the establishment of

⁹⁷ Rosen, *War and Human Nature*; Shih, “The Autocratic Difference.”

⁹⁸ Kapucinski, *The Emperor*; Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 58.

⁹⁹ Peter Andreas and Kelly M. Greenhill, eds., *Sex, Drugs, and Body Counts: The Politics of Numbers in Global Crime and Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2010).

these metrics and the inter-station competition it created led to spikes in the number of vehicles seized and the number of suspected gang members stopped for questioning.¹⁰⁰ Broader studies of policing and violence confirm that the organizational characteristics of police departments provide professional incentives that influence arrest rates and violence.¹⁰¹

As the chapters that follow show, competition among organizations tasked with political policing often explicitly rewards agents for arresting or executing regime enemies – the more the better. Whether incentives are based on individual or organizational performance, autocratic coercive agents are incentivized to compete on the grounds of violence to advance their individual professional standing and bureaucratic interests. Under these circumstances, they are more likely to encourage fabrication of cases and the use of extreme measures, including additional violence and torture, to elicit confessions. Competition also gives intelligence and counter-intelligence organizations incentives to accuse each other of being “enemies,” increasing the possibility of intra-organizational violence and vendetta-settling. Further adding to the likelihood of violence is the fact that few of these systems assign penalties for excessive zeal in the pursuit of duty; if coercive agents are going to err, they will err on the side of violence. Fragmentation therefore provides direct individual and organizational professional incentives that predispose coercive agents toward increased violence.

Exclusivity and incentives for violence

Exclusivity creates incentives for violence by making members of the internal security apparatus into social outsiders and turning repression

¹⁰⁰ Scott Glover and Matt Lait, “For Deputies, Arrests Can Be a Contest,” *Los Angeles Times*, October 4, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/oct/04/local/me-games4>.

¹⁰¹ Allison T. Chappell, John M. McDonald, and Patrick W. Manz, “The Organizational Determinants of Police Arrest Decisions,” *Crime & Delinquency*, Vol. 52, No. 2 (April 2006), pp. 287–306; David Eitle, Stewart D’Alessio, and Lisa Stolzenberg, “The Effect of Organizational and Environmental Factors on Police Misconduct,” *Police Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (2014), pp. 103–26; David A. Klinger, “Environment and Organization: Reviving a Perspective on the Police,” *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 593 (2004), pp. 119–36; James Kai-sing Kung and Shuo Chen, “The Tragedy of the Nomenklatura: Career Incentives and Political Radicalism during China’s Great Leap Famine,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 105, No. 1 (February 2011), pp. 27–45; Lauren A. McCarthy, “Beyond Corruption: An Assessment of Russian Law Enforcement’s Fight Against Human Trafficking,” *Demokratizatsiya*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Winter 2010), pp. 5–27. For (partly) contrasting evidence, see Brad W. Smith, “Structural and Organizational Predictors of Homicide by Police,” *Policing*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2004), pp. 539–57.

into a question of violence against an out-group rather than fellow in-group members. Evidence from social psychology strongly suggests that engaging in violence against fellow human beings, a difficult task for ordinary people in ordinary circumstances, becomes easier when the objects of violence are removed from the perpetrator both physically and socially.¹⁰² One of the most abusive guards in the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment later explained that not knowing the prisoners made it easier to engage in abuse; he recounted, “if there were prisoners in there who knew me before they encountered me, then I never would have been able to pull off anything I did.”¹⁰³ In the same way, members of the security apparatus who lack regular interaction or social identification with the people they are policing are likely to perceive a lower social and psychological cost to violence against these strangers than they would if asked to be violent against friends, neighbors, and co-ethnics.

Exclusivity, therefore, does more to lessen social sanctions against state violence than to provide positive incentives to commit it. To put it another way, inclusivity provides incentives to refrain from violence that are absent from socially exclusive security forces. In both the United States and Israel, studies have found that the racial or ethnic identity of police officers affects the arrest rates of different ethnic groups and the rate of police killings; numerically sparse police forces are also more likely to engage in violent interactions with citizens.¹⁰⁴ In Ethiopia, protests are more likely to spiral into violence when multiethnic federal police confront ethnic Oromo protestors than when local, ethnic Oromo police handle protests.¹⁰⁵ Today’s Chinese Communist Party officials

¹⁰² Dave Grossman, *On Killing: The Psychological Cost of Learning to Kill in War and Society* (Boston: Back Bay Books, 1996); Barry P.C. Malloy and Dave Grossman, “Why Can’t Johnny Kill? The Psychology and Physiology of Interpersonal Combat,” in Barry P.C. Malloy, ed., *The Cutting Edge: Studies in Ancient and Medieval Combat* (Tempus Press, 2007), pp. 188–202.

¹⁰³ Romesh Ratnesar, “The Menace Within,” *Stanford*, July/August 2011.

¹⁰⁴ Smith, “Structural and Organizational Predictors”; Justin McCrary, “The Effect of Court-Ordered Hiring Quotas on the Composition and Quality of Police,” *American Economic Review*, Vol. 97, No. 1 (March 2007), pp. 318–53; Gustavo Mesch and Ilan Talmud, “The Effect of Community Characteristics on Police Performance in a Deeply Divided Society: the Case of Israel” *Sociological Focus*, Vol. 31, No. 3 (1998), pp. 233–48; Steve Wilson and Jihong Zhao, “Determining the Correlates of Police Victimization: An Analysis of Organizational Factors on Injurious Assaults,” *Journal of Criminal Justice*, Vol. 36 (2008), pp. 461–68.

¹⁰⁵ Leonardo R. Arriola, “Protesting and Policing in a Multiethnic Authoritarian State: Evidence from Ethiopia,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2013), pp. 147–68.




FIGURE 2.5. The incentives pathway

deliberately seek out people with social ties to protestors who can convince them to stand down without fighting, a phenomena that scholars have termed “relational repression.”¹⁰⁶ These cases suggest that the use of a socially exclusive coercive apparatus is likely to produce higher state violence than a more inclusive one.

In sum, both fragmentation and exclusivity create incentives for coercive institutions that predispose them toward violence, as shown in Figure 2.5.

Predictions about coercive institutions and state violence

What the above subsections suggest is that, *ceteris paribus*, authoritarian regimes with fragmented and exclusive coercive institutions should exhibit higher levels of state violence. More precisely, violence should be broader in scope, higher in intensity, less discriminate, and more heavily aimed at social “out-groups” who have been excluded from the intelligence and internal security apparatus. This logic leads to four major predictions:

- Fragmentation creates incentives for violence because it creates inter-agency competition that provides motivation to escalate rather than minimize violence.
H₁: Fragmentation leads to increased violence because it increases organizational and individual incentives for violence.
- Exclusivity creates incentives for violence because an exclusive security apparatus will be less sensitive to violence against members of the out-group, thereby lowering the costs to the in-group of engaging in violent repression.
H₂: Exclusivity leads to increased violence because it decreases social incentives against violence.

¹⁰⁶ Yanhua Deng and Kevin O’Brien, “Relational Repression: Using Social Ties to Demobilize Protestors,” *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 215 (September 2013), pp. 533–52.

- An apparatus that is exclusive is also likely to have weaker intelligence capacity, because it lacks the local social knowledge to uncover plots in advance and engage in discriminate, targeted arrests.
H₃: Exclusivity leads to increased violence because it decreases the intelligence capacity for targeted, discriminate, and pre-emptive repression.
- Coercive institutions that are fragmented will also have weaker intelligence capability, because fragmentation hampers the sharing of information and analysis.
H₄: Fragmentation leads to increased violence because it decreases the intelligence capacity for targeted, discriminate, and pre-emptive repression.

For these reasons, we should see the most intense and indiscriminate violence against civilians in regimes where these autocratic coup-proofing incentives are most acute and where fragmentation and exclusivity are highest.

Alternative explanations for violence

The argument advanced here diverges significantly from existing explanations for state violence and repression. In subsequent chapters (Chapters 6–8), I test my argument about coercive institutions and state violence against several alternative explanations, including *changing popular threat*, *state/organizational capacity*, and *international factors*. In each case study, readers will likely find one (or more) alternative explanations plausible, if not convincing. Considered cumulatively across multiple cases, however, this book’s argument outperforms all of the alternatives that are constructed in an *ex ante* falsifiable manner. (The comparative power of different explanations is addressed explicitly and discussed in more detail in Chapter 10.)

State violence as response to rising popular threat

Perhaps the most prominent argument that purports to explain patterns of state violence argues that state violence increases in response to *rising domestic challenges or threats*. Christian Davenport’s “Law of Coercive Response” argues that autocrats respond to rising threats with rising violence intended to stamp out that threat.¹⁰⁷ Along with the argument that

¹⁰⁷ Christian Davenport, ed., *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000).

democratic regimes use less repression than autocracies, this assertion is one of only two relatively uncontested findings in the literature, and several subsequent studies have corroborated this proposition.¹⁰⁸ Many of these studies adopt, implicitly or explicitly, a choice-theoretic framework in which the government chooses an optimal strategy based on protestors' behavior (or vice versa), and in which the government's goal is to optimize production of a good (usually protest cessation) at minimal cost.¹⁰⁹ The framework therefore suggests that the levels of violence that occur, whether "peaceful compromise, deterrence, or escalation to violence ... are then actually a product of the optimal choices of the government."¹¹⁰ Autocrats calculate the costs and benefits of violence, and use violence when violence is useful.

These studies pose a key challenge to the book's arguments by suggesting that coercive institutions are epiphenomenal. If autocrats optimize their coercive institutions to deal with the dominant threat, one might reasonably ask, why not simply use threats to explain patterns of violence? Are institutions doing anything other than transmitting the level of violence that their creators deem necessary and efficient?¹¹¹ This alternative explanation suggests that since threats determine both coercive institutional design and the level of violence, we should be able to predict the level of state violence without knowing anything about the

¹⁰⁸ Jennifer Earl, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy, "Protest Under Fire: Explaining the Policing of Protest," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 68 (August 2003), pp. 581–606, esp. p. 581; Ted Gurr, "The Political Origins of State Violence and Terror: a Theoretical Analysis," in Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds., *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research* (Westport: Greenwood, 1986), pp. 45–72; Steven C. Poe and C. Neal Tate, "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 88, No. 4 (1994), pp. 853–72; Paul Y. Chang and Alex S. Vitale, "Repressive Coverage in an Authoritarian Context: Threat, Weakness, and Legitimacy in South Korea's Democracy Movement," *Mobilization*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2013), pp. 19–39.

¹⁰⁹ Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation?"; Moore, "Repression and Dissent"; Vahe Lskavyan, "A Rational Choice Explanation for Stalin's 'Great Terror'," *Economics & Politics*, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2007), pp. 259–87; Francisco Herrero, "The Full Weight of the State: The Logic of Random State-Sanctioned Violence," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 43, No. 6 (2006), pp. 671–89.

¹¹⁰ Jan Henryk Pierskalla, "Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation: The Strategic Calculus of Government Repression," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 54, No. 1 (2010), pp. 117–45; see also Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, *The Dictator's Handbook*.

¹¹¹ Douglass C. North, *Structure and Change in Economic History* (New York: Norton, 1981); Douglass C. North and Barry R. Weingast, "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth Century England," *Journal of Economic History*, Vol. 59, No. 4 (December 1989), pp. 803–32; Margaret Levi, *Of Rule and Revenue* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).

coercive apparatus. The institutions of violence exist only to implement the level of violence that is efficient for their creators.

However, there are a number of reasons to expect, *ex ante*, that institutions might exert an independent effect on violence, contrary to the “Law of Coercive Response.” First, a dictator cannot personally use violence against everyone who threatens him. Staying in power requires violence at scale and at a sustained level of organization over time; in other words, it requires an institution. Second, if we assume violence has some cost – no matter how big, whether domestic or international – a smart dictator will minimize the use of costly violence whenever he has another option. In thinking about how to react to a serious challenge from below, autocrats do not face a “violence or nothing” choice about whether to repress a protest once it has erupted. Rather, if they have any cost-sensitivity, they will think more strategically over the longer-term about how to deter or pre-empt protest and other forms of collective action from coalescing in the first place.¹¹² We know that autocrats have a broader range of strategies than violence by which to address threats, and the coercive apparatus can be useful for these broader purposes. Autocrats do not just decide, therefore, whether to respond to threats with direct violence; they respond by creating institutions to administer violence for them at scale and over time, and by employing tools when possible to prevent costly violence from becoming necessary.

Third, this literature assumes that state violence is driven only by the actions of and threats from the population. A good deal of theoretical and empirical evidence now suggests that this is not an autocrat’s only, or even primary, security concern; elite threats play a major role. Taking both elite and popular threats seriously leads us to the “coercive dilemma” with which this chapter began, and to the institutional tradeoffs that flow from it. Fourth, once institutions are present, one must at least consider the possibility that they may not be perfectly optimized to threats. This may be because the dictator gets his assessment of threat wrong in the first place, for the reasons described previously, or because institutions, once created, may not perfectly serve the interests of their creators.¹¹³

¹¹² O’Brien and Stern distinguish between *ex ante* suppression (measures such as surveillance, censorship, etc.) and *ex post* repression (violent crackdowns on protest, etc.). Kevin O’Brien, ed., *Popular Protest in China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Harvard Contemporary China Series, 2008).

¹¹³ Pierson, *Politics in Time*, p. 105; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 80; George Tsebelis, *Nested Games: Rational Choice in Comparative Politics*

Institutions can become sticky; their establishment endows powerful actors with personal and organizational interests that run counter to strict optimization to threat. (How these dynamics might shape coercive institutional change is discussed in more detail in the next section.)

This book presents a different story about how autocrats view threats, especially popular threats. It proposes that an autocrat who faces thousands of angry protestors in the street has already, from his perspective, experienced a significant failure; success would have been deterring or pre-empting those people from protest in the first place. Literature that bases its arguments about threat on state response to protest alone, therefore, is examining a skewed sample: a truncated set of harder cases where the first and second lines of defense (deterrence and pre-emption, respectively) have already failed. Rather than asking, “When are regimes willing to pay the cost of intense public repression?” political scientists should be thinking about why the choice between conceding or paying the costs of repression became necessary in the first place. Coercive institutions play a key role in the emergence of that choice.

All of these factors suggest that we cannot simply assume that institutions are epiphenomenal. This is especially true since explanations grounded straightforwardly in rising popular threat leave us with a number of unresolved empirical puzzles. This book contains several, discussed in more detail in the final section of the chapter: to begin with, I find that strict and falsifiable operationalizations of popular threat – such as the number or size of protests, or the estimated size of the opposition movement – lack empirical power to explain the levels of state violence observed. Other studies have reached similar results.¹¹⁴ A further empirical puzzle results from observing the effects of repression: if violence is being used optimally, then it should be more uniformly effective. Instead, we observe that sometimes repression works, and sometimes it inflames further resistance. Studies on repression and collective action have identified nearly every possible relationship

(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990); Thomas Ertman, *Birth of the Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Early Modern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, *The Price of Wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

¹¹⁴ Kathleen A. Mahoney-Norris, “Political Repression: Threat Perception and Transnational Solidarity Groups,” in Christian Davenport, ed., *Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), pp. 71–108.

between state repression and protest: positive,¹¹⁵ negative,¹¹⁶ inverted U-shaped,¹¹⁷ mixed,¹¹⁸ and relationships that are driven by substitution effects.¹¹⁹ These variations in the effectiveness of repression make more sense if we consider that the fundamental tradeoffs involved in creating coercive institutions might sometimes lead to sub-optimal organization for popular threat management.

Organizational dynamics therefore matter in the process of repression. Coercive institutions exert powerful and independent effects that cannot be accounted for simply by the magnitude of popular threat; the patterns of violence that they create are also not simply linear responses to changes in that threat. Rather, autocrats who are most threatened by popular challenges will create organizations that are designed to counter that threat. Over time, these organizations will use less violence rather than more.

State/organizational capacity

A second set of alternative explanations for violence hinges on *state or organizational capacity*. Testing these explanations, however, immediately confronts the problem that they are indeterminate and contradictory. One might think that state and organizational (sub-state) capacity should be positively correlated, but high state capacity is generally hypothesized to lower the likelihood of violence, while high organizational capacity is thought to increase it. On the one hand, strong governments are predicted to deter protest, co-opt opposition, and make violence less necessary, while weak state institutions coupled with the expansion of democracy

¹¹⁵ Edward Muller and Karl-Dieter Opp, "Rational Choice and Rebellious Collective Action," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 80, No. 2 (1986), pp. 471–88; Jeff Goodwin, *No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements 1945–1991* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

¹¹⁶ D.A. Hibbs, *Mass Political Violence: A Cross-National Causal Analysis* (New York: John Wiley, 1973); Sam Bell, David Cingranelli, Amanda Murdie, and Alper Caglayan, "Coercion, Capacity, and Coordination: Predictors of Political Violence," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 30, No. 3 (2013), pp. 240–62.

¹¹⁷ Edward D. Muller and Erich Weede, "Cross-National Variation in Political Violence," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 34 (1990), pp. 624–51.

¹¹⁸ Karen Rasler, "Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 61, No. 1 (1996), pp. 132–52.

¹¹⁹ Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation?"; Moore, "Repression and Dissent." See also Tarrow, *Power in Movement*; Douglas McAdam, John McCarthy, and Mayer Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); Vincent Boudreau, *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

are thought to lead to increased repression (the so-called Murder in the Middle hypothesis).¹²⁰ Studies of non-state armed groups have similarly suggested that weak organizational cohesion and control lead to increased abuse of civilians.¹²¹ On the other hand, studies that examine the organizational cohesion of the security forces themselves have generally posited that cohesive organizations are more likely to engage in crackdowns when ordered to do so.¹²² Definitional issues hamper both families of argument; state capacity has been used to denote a dizzying array of functions, and in these studies, a “strong state” is often defined as one that has, or has control of, a “strong” military or police force, rendering the argument close to tautological.¹²³

The chapters that follow provide a new explanation for the origins of one specific aspect of state capacity: the capacity for coercion. They find that state capacity is not a fixed quality that polities possess or lack; it is one that regimes and leaders strengthen or weaken to serve changing political interests. Moreover, they suggest that even in the realm of coercion, state capacity is different against different types of threats, since a regime cannot simultaneously be equally “strong” vis-à-vis both a coup threat and the threat of a popular uprising. Finally, coercive institutional effectiveness depends not just on internal organizational characteristics like cohesiveness, but on the relationships *among* different organizations within the entire coercive architecture, and on the characteristics that bind (or don’t bind) these organizations to society. In the empirical chapters of this book, I test my argument about the origins and effect of coercive capacity against traditional formulations of state and organizational capacity, and find that my theory has more explanatory power.

¹²⁰ Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation”; Helen Fein, “More Murder in the Middle: Life Integrity Violations and Democracy in the World,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1995), pp. 170–91.

¹²¹ Jeremy M. Weinstein, *Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Jacob N. Shapiro, *The Terrorist’s Dilemma: Managing Violent Covert Organizations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

¹²² These studies generally bypass the important question of when crackdowns will be ordered, and refer only to state violence manifested in mass public violence, i.e. protest crackdowns. Kurt Dassel, “Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife: Domestic Sources of International Aggression,” *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (Summer 1998), pp. 107–40; Terence Lee, “Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1989 Indonesia,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 32, No. 1 (2005), pp. 80–104.

¹²³ Pierskalla, “Protest, Deterrence, and Escalation,” p. 136; Cullen Hendrix, “Measuring State Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Implications for the Study of Civil Conflict,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (2010), pp. 273–85.

International factors

A third alternative explanation posits that *international factors* decisively shape patterns of state violence. International influence is operationalized in a myriad of ways across different studies, from the presence of transnational solidarity groups, to the existence of trade agreements, to direct pressure by foreign governments or international organizations, to the density of cross-border activity. In general, more international linkage, influence, or pressure is thought to correlate with reduced violence.¹²⁴ Given that the United States had close security and economic relationships with all three of the countries examined here, country-specific alternative explanations often take on a specifically American form: American preferences are posited to explain patterns of repression. Interpretations often differ: some readers will have a general impression that American support for anti-communism gave a green light to repression, while others tend to believe that American pressure for human rights and democratization may have been responsible for decreases in violence. For this reason, Chapters 6–8 examine whether American preferences, as well as other operationalizations of international influence, can plausibly explain the patterns of violence observed.

These chapters find, however, that international factors are generally better predictors of political liberalization or of democratization than they are of state violence during the authoritarian period.¹²⁵ As American allies during the Cold War, South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines all experienced similarly timed pressure to improve their human rights records, and all democratized at around the same time. Yet their pre-democratization periods were marked by very different patterns of state violence. Moreover, as I show below, in-case evidence does not support the argument that American or international factors were decisive; state violence in Taiwan declined before the peak period

¹²⁴ Mahoney-Norris, "Political Repression"; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Peter Burnell, *Democracy Assistance: International Cooperation for Democratization* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Oona Hathaway, "Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?" *Yale Law Journal*, Vol. 111, No. 8 (2002), pp. 1935–2042; Emilie Hafner-Burton, "Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression," *International Organization*, Vol. 59 (Summer 2005), pp. 593–629; Emilie Hafner-Burton, "Right or Robust? The Sensitive Nature of Repression to Globalization," *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 42, No. 6 (2005), pp. 679–98.

¹²⁵ What I find is consistent with the observation that Western pressure has prioritized visibly democratic practices like elections over less visible liberal practices like the rule of law. Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).

of American interest in human rights, while in the Philippines, American pressure to lower visible signs of repression, combined with private support for repressive activity, actually appears to have worsened state violence by driving it underground. An explanation grounded in the coercive apparatus of the three authoritarian regimes, rather than international or American influence, best explains the variations observed in East Asia's state violence.

Other alternative explanations for violence

The above set of alternative explanations is necessarily not exhaustive. I have chosen here to outline the alternative explanations that pose the most difficult challenges for my theory, while for brevity's sake omitting others that seem less plausible. (Some of these are assessed in Chapters 6–8.) For example, scholars have proposed that *regime type* may influence levels of violence; perhaps military dictatorships, whose officials and organizations see the execution of violence as their chief mission, are likely to be more violent.¹²⁶ On the face of it, however, there seems to be little support for this theory, either in the cases analyzed here or more generally. The two military regimes in this book, in South Korea, are the least violent of the three (compared to a personalist regime in the Philippines and a single-party regime in Taiwan). Elsewhere in the world, moreover, military regimes as a category have displayed widely varying levels of repression – take, for example, the comparison between low levels of violence in Brazil and high levels of violence in Argentina that was mentioned in Chapter 1.

Others have suggested that an authoritarian *regime's life cycle* may help to explain patterns of violence. Almost all non-democracies have to engage in some violence just to seize power, so it is logical that the initial period of any authoritarian takeover is marked by purges, arrests, and violence intended to either neutralize or defeat the new regime's immediate enemies. This dynamic does appear in the cases in this book. What a life cycle explanation cannot explain, however, is the divergence in patterns of violence that follows: why one regime holds the level of violence relatively steady (South Korea), while the second experiences a dramatic drop (Taiwan) and the third a dramatic rise (the Philippines). In the final section of the chapter, I discuss the ways in which the research design adopted here helps to control for some of these alternative explanations.

¹²⁶ Barbara Geddes, Erica Frantz, and Joseph G. Wright, "Military Rule," *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 17, No. 7 (2014), pp. 147–62.

EXPLAINING COERCIVE INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE

The theory advanced in this chapter also generates predictable, empirically testable implications for when and how authoritarian coercive institutions should change. It proposes that the weaker intelligence capacity of fragmented, exclusive coercive institutions will prevent the autocrats who create them from obtaining information that should prompt a change in their threat perceptions to emphasize popular threat. Fragmented, exclusive coercive institutions are therefore less likely to become unitary and inclusive. Autocrats who establish unitary and inclusive coercive institutions, however, are comparatively more likely to experience a shift in threat perceptions from popular to elite.

This produces two primary predictions about institutional change in the coercive apparatus. First, we are more likely to observe change in unitary and inclusive coercive institutions than in fragmented and exclusive ones. Second, when institutional change occurs, it is likely to be in the direction of fragmentation and exclusivity rather than the reverse.

This framework for explaining coercive institutional change runs counter to two primary arguments in the field about the nature of institutions and institutional development. One is the rational design argument, discussed in the previous section of the chapter. This literature suggests that coercive institutions exist merely to make violence efficient for their creators, and that, therefore, they will be optimized continually to address changing threats. As Chapters 3–5 will show, we simply do not observe the rate of institutional adaptation that rational optimization would lead us to expect. Instead, we observe outcomes that are more consistent with the theory suggested above: that the differential intelligence capacities of the two types of coercive apparatus outlined here will make continual optimization unlikely, particularly in regimes designed to deal with coup threats.

The second predominant way of thinking about institutional evolution comes from the literature on path dependence, and leads us to expect a high degree of continuity in coercive institutions. (Many case studies of the authoritarian coercive apparatus in a particular country implicitly share this view, portraying the coercive apparatus as fixed, and neglecting changes to its structure and function over time.) This framework treats institutional development as even more path dependent and self-reinforcing than initial institutional creation, for two reasons.¹²⁷

¹²⁷ James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen, eds., *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); James Mahoney,

First, bureaucratic practices, traditions, habits, and standard operating procedures generate a tendency toward self-replication. Second, individuals who have the power to affect institutional development are concerned not only with efficiency, but also with preservation of “the power, prestige, privileges, and importantly, distributional advantages of the dominant elite and its allies.”¹²⁸ As a relatively powerful institution or set of institutions, the coercive apparatus is especially likely to have both the capacity and the desire to defend the institutional status quo to preserve its advantages.¹²⁹ Proponents of path dependence postulate that these factors place serious constraints on change and optimization.

This book suggests an alternate framework. Generally speaking, coercive institutions are somewhat path dependent and constrained away from constant optimization. The degree of institutional continuity, however, should not be constant across the two types of coercive apparatus, for several reasons. First, the fragmented, exclusive coercive apparatus has a much weaker intelligence capacity vis-à-vis popular threats. It is therefore unlikely to receive feedback suggesting that popular threats have eclipsed coup or elite threats, and will not adjust institutionally even if popular threats get more serious. Second, an autocrat who has created fragmented and exclusive institutions is also more likely to see agents’ rivalries as evidence of their ambition and desire for aggrandizement, heightening coup fears and creating a negative feedback loop that propels the system even further into coup-proofing. Third, coups are offense-dominant, meaning that they occur quickly and offer significant advantages to first movers, whereas insurgencies and revolutionary movements develop more slowly and provide more opportunities for the regime to respond.¹³⁰ In an environment where threats are uncertain, an especially strong signal is needed to persuade the autocrat to focus on the population if he has previously prioritized coup risks. For these reasons, coercive institutional evolution is almost always in the direction of

“Path Dependence in Historical Sociology,” *Theory and Society*, Vol. 29, No. 4 (August 2000), pp. 507–48; Pierson, *Politics in Time*; Kathleen Thelen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” *Annual Review of Political Science*, Vol. 2 (1999), pp. 369–404.

¹²⁸ Stephen A. Cook, *Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), especially pp. 5–6.

¹²⁹ Kenneth Grundy, *The Militarization of South African Politics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), p. 109.

¹³⁰ Talmadge, *The Dictator’s Army*.

fragmentation and exclusivity. Only a major shock – such as sudden and surprising nationwide popular unrest – is likely to provide a sufficiently clear and forceful signal to convince the autocrat that popular unrest has replaced elite conspiracy as the dominant threat. Coup-proofed systems are therefore much more likely to be institutionally “stuck.”

In mass-oriented systems that are unitary and inclusive, on the other hand, we should observe institutional evolution more often. The most common kind of evolution should be deterioration toward fragmentation and exclusivity. Autocrats who have been in power for some time tend to develop fears of elite rivals and plots to dethrone them whether or not such beliefs are grounded in reality; the longer an autocrat is in power, the more likely it is that he will develop this fear at some point. If deterioration toward the elite orientation does occur, it can create one of the otherwise rare cases in which fragmentation and exclusivity do not co-vary. Patrick McEachern suggests, for example, that North Korea under Kim Il Sung fit a classic totalitarian model in which the party-state achieved high penetration and low fragmentation, but that his son and successor Kim Jong Il ruled in a “post-totalitarian” system that maintained high penetration but grew increasingly fragmented by the coup-proofing management tactics that the younger Kim employed toward his security ministries and military.¹³¹ Thus, regardless of where coercive institutions start, it is easier to move toward (or remain in) a fragmented and exclusive state than it is to get away from it.

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND APPROACH

The empirical backbone of this book is a set of historical case studies on authoritarian coercive institutions and state violence in three East Asian countries during the Cold War: Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. In this final section of the chapter, I explain how I measure state violence and why comparative historical case studies are the best empirical strategy for testing my argument. I then outline the scope of the study and possible universe of cases, discuss the logic of case selection, and explain how I use these cases to test my argument against the major alternative explanations.

¹³¹ Other North Korea experts would take issue with this characterization, pointing to high levels of exclusivity at the top levels of the regime, including the coercive apparatus. Patrick McEachern, *Inside the Red Box: North Korea's Post-Totalitarian Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010).

Measuring state violence

This book offers an explanation for the patterns of state violence under authoritarianism. Scholars have examined a number of different attributes of state violence,¹³² but I focus on two in particular: the *scope* of violence, and its *intensity*. I concentrate on these two dimensions because they display clear-cut variation across time and space, and because they seem the most essential qualities, without reference to which one cannot plausibly seek to understand why violence was generated and how it was employed.

I define the *scope* of violence as the breadth of violence employed: simply the number of people against whom the state uses force. I define *intensity* as the level of force used; extrajudicial killings are a higher-intensity form of violence than arrest, while imprisonment and torture fall in between. Each chapter measures state violence by examining its scope at several different levels of intensity. I examine the number of people arrested, the number charged or sentenced for political crimes, and the number executed.¹³³ In the case of the Philippines, I also consider the number of people who disappeared in the custody of the security forces or who were “salvaged” – not simply killed, but mutilated and their bodies left in a public place. Torture statistics are less systematically available, but I refer to them where they exist.

The theory proposed in this chapter also has implications for a third attribute of state violence – *indiscriminacy*. I conceptualize indiscriminacy as a measure of precision, and define it by asking whether the regime uses force against the people it intends, while avoiding the use of force against those it is not targeting. Scope and indiscriminacy are distinct conceptually, but in practice are highly correlated: an indiscriminate campaign will, for example, by relying on group arrests rather than individual targeting, lead to more people being subjected to violence and thereby produce violence that is broader in scope. Each chapter also examines a range of qualitative, less systematic evidence about the context and

¹³² Donna Della Porta, “Social Movements and the State: Thoughts on the Policing of Protest,” in Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, and Mayer N. Zald, eds., *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and cultural framings* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 66.

¹³³ Data on the scope of violence becomes more accurate as intensity increases. In most regimes, temporarily detaining someone does not consistently generate a documentary record, but the processes leading to long-term imprisonment or execution leave a paper trail. Our confidence in measurement should therefore be lowest for low-intensity metrics like arrests, and highest for high-intensity metrics like executions.

nature of state violence – the legal framework around repression and violence, the timing of repressive activity, the targets of repression, its level of transparency, etc. – in order to make use of the widest possible set of empirical implications generated by my theory and alternative explanations. The use of a standard set of metrics for state violence improves upon the approach taken in many single-country case studies – which often describe autocratic behavior as “repressive” without a clear standard of measurement or a sense of cross-case comparability – but also remains sensitive to political context and within-case forms of variation.

I adopt a qualitative approach because the major quantitative datasets on repression do not provide a satisfactory test of my argument. The Political Terror Scale goes back only to 1976, while the CIRI Human Rights dataset begins in 1981 – a timeframe that censors the data on state violence in ways that could produce misleading conclusions.¹³⁴ Beginning one’s analysis of Taiwan’s authoritarianism at 1976, for example, produces very different conclusions than an analysis beginning in 1945, and omits the major shift in state violence that occurred around 1955. Existing quantitative datasets also sometimes combine violent forms of repression with non-violent ones (such as restrictions of civil liberties like free speech and assembly), making it difficult to distinguish scope from intensity and the use of force from other forms of repression.¹³⁵ Finally, the historical evidence uncovered during fieldwork raises serious questions about the accuracy of the sources used to compile these cross-national quantitative datasets. The statistics commonly used in Western scholarship on the number of executions during Taiwan’s White Terror, for example, appear

¹³⁴ Reed M. Wood and Mark Gibney, “The Political Terror Scale: A Re-Introduction and a Comparison to CIRI,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, Vol. 32 (2010), pp. 367–400; David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, “Measuring the Level, Pattern, and Sequence of Government Respect for Physical Integrity Rights,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 43, No. 2 (1999), pp. 407–18.

¹³⁵ The Polity IV database suffers from a similar problem: violent repression is used to code the degree of authoritarianism or democracy, making it difficult to assess the causal effect of one on the other. Davenport, “State Repression and Political Order,” p. 7; Wintrobe, *Political Economy of Dictatorship*, p. 46; Dimitriy Gershenson and Herschel I. Grossman, “Co-option and Repression in the Soviet Union,” *Economics and Politics*, Vol. 13, No. 1 (2001), pp. 31–47; Philip G. Roessler, “Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda,” *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 37, No. 2 (2005), pp. 207–27; Joshua Stacher, *Adaptable Autocrats: Regime Power in Egypt and Syria* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), p. 4. On Polity, see James Raymond Vreeland, “The Effect of Political Regime on Civil War: Unpacking Anocracy,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2008), pp. 401–25; Gerardo L. Munck and Jay Verkuilen, “Conceptualizing And Measuring Democracy: Evaluating Alternative Indices,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 1 (2002), pp. 5–34.

to be off by an order of magnitude (see discussion in Chapter 6). Each chapter in the second section of the book (Chapters 6–8) provides more detail on how data on state violence were collected and coded, and the strengths and weaknesses of the approach adopted.

Qualitative analysis, by contrast, offers several advantages. First, it provides maximal leverage for an argument that is as much about causal processes and causal mechanisms as it is about causal effects.¹³⁶ Second, because some variables must be operationalized differently in different cases (for example, exclusivity is defined by ethnicity in Taiwan but regional identity in Korea), qualitative analysis minimizes the risk of measurement error while retaining conceptual rigor and coherence. A qualitative approach tests my argument using the widest possible range of empirical implications – an important consideration given relative data paucity – and explicitly assesses the strength of my argument relative to alternatives by using the Bayesian logic of process tracing.¹³⁷ Although a cross-national quantitative approach focused on causal effect might be too handicapped by missing data, qualitative data are sufficiently available to allow for a researcher to make rigorous arguments about causal process. For these reasons, the empirical strategy adopted here focuses on fine-grained analysis of a few central case studies.

Scope, case selection, and sources

This book purports to explain patterns of state violence under authoritarianism since 1945. The empirical core of the book analyzes anti-communist regimes in East Asia, while the penultimate chapter, Chapter 9, explores whether the argument extends to other authoritarian regimes. (I argue that it does, with one exception discussed in more depth in the Conclusion.) The cases examined in Chapters 3 through 8 include single-party, military, and personalist regimes, demonstrating that the logic works across different regime types; Chapter 9 shows that the argument has geographic and temporal reach as well. Following precedents set by previous work on authoritarian politics, I exclude regimes

¹³⁶ Henry Brady and David Collier, *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2004).

¹³⁷ Andrew Bennett, “Process Tracing: A Bayesian Approach,” in Janet Box-Steffensmeier, Henry Brady, and David Collier, eds., *Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 702–21.

that are experiencing foreign occupation, a collapse of state authority, or civil war, since the absence of political authority under these conditions should lead to fundamentally different theoretical expectations about the nature of violence.¹³⁸

In limiting the scope of the project to authoritarian governments, I do not intend to suggest that autocracies are the only regimes to use force against their citizens. All states threaten or use force to maintain order, and coercive power is not limited to non-democracies.¹³⁹ In fact, I expect that many of the organizational dynamics outlined above will contribute to violence in democratic political systems as well as authoritarian ones. However, the theory proposed in this chapter also suggests that these two political systems should exhibit systematically different overall patterns of state violence. Because autocrats face a systematically different internal threat environment than democratically elected leaders do, they should more often engage in the institutional manipulations and create the organizational pathologies that lead to high levels of violence. The examples of Park and Marcos, who governed differently as autocrats than they did as democratically elected leaders, provide some empirical support for this proposition and corroborate the work of scholars who have previously reached similar conclusions.¹⁴⁰

How then should one select cases for comparison? Ideally, the chosen cases should display both cross-national and within-case variation, but hold system-level attributes relatively constant (to examine cross-national variation) and have enough longevity to hold some national-level factors constant (to examine variations within a country over time). The cases should also maximize the availability of data on key variables – autocratic threat perceptions, the characteristics of coercive institutions, and the patterns of state violence – to enable a test of both the hypothesized

¹³⁸ Svolik, *Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, pp. 24–25; Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*; Kristine Eck and Lisa Hultman, “One-Sided Violence Against Civilians in War: Insights from New Fatality Data,” *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 2 (2007), pp. 233–46.

¹³⁹ Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Della Porta, “Social Movements and the State”; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy, “Protest Under Fire”; Sklansky, *Democracy and the Police*; Patrick Rafail, Sarah A. Soule, and John D. McCarthy, “Describing and Accounting for Trends in U.S. Protest Policing, 1960–95,” *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 56, No. 4 (2012), pp. 736–65.

¹⁴⁰ Tilly, *Politics of Collective Violence*, pp. 231–32; Christian Davenport, “The Promise of Democratic Pacification: An Empirical Assessment,” *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 48, No. 3 (2004), pp. 539–60; Christian Davenport, *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

correlations and the processes underpinning a topic about which systematic and reliable data are seldom available.

Taken together, these factors argue strongly for situating the manuscript in a single region. Four cases from East Asia, therefore, form the empirical backbone of this book: Taiwan under martial law (Chapters 3 and 6), the Philippines under Marcos after 1972 (Chapters 4 and 7), South Korea under Park Chung Hee after 1972, and South Korea under Chun Doo Hwan (Chapters 5 and 8). As a region, East Asia offers particular theoretical and practical advantages. Although Eastern European communism, Latin American military rule, Middle Eastern petro-states, and African personalist dictatorships have become templates for our understanding of non-democratic politics, Asian authoritarianism remains relatively understudied.¹⁴¹ The presence of more than one case in the region adds cross-national variation to the sub-national and longitudinal variation present in each case, and helps to address – though does not entirely resolve – questions about external validity.¹⁴² Moreover, the cases display what Slater and Ziblatt refer to as “typological representativeness,” particularly in terms of the temporal trends that they represent: violence drops in Taiwan, rises in the Philippines, and remains relatively steady over time in South Korea.¹⁴³

This case selection also partially controls for some important factors that might explain variations in state violence. All four cases have roughly parallel international influences, in that they were allied with the United States under the Cold War’s bipolar international structure, enabling a relatively clean comparison of American influence; American leaders supported a strong anti-communist stance in all four regimes and tolerated the emergence of authoritarian government in each case. All four regimes are characterized by a strong anti-communist ideology. All face increasing popular mobilization and threat over time, especially in the form of democratic movements that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. The regimes in Taiwan and South Korea are both considered to have strong state and organizational capacity, while the Philippines is weaker. The most general formulations of prominent alternative explanations for violence, then, predict very little difference in the patterns of state violence. Yet these cases display cross-national, temporal, and – in

¹⁴¹ For an important exception focused on Southeast Asia, see Slater, *Ordering Power*.

¹⁴² Evan S. Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy for Comparative Research,” *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 99 (2005), pp. 435–52.

¹⁴³ Dan Slater and Daniel Ziblatt, “The Enduring Indispensability of the Controlled Comparison,” *Comparative Political Studies*, Vol. 46, No. 10 (2013), pp. 1301–27.

the Korean cases – sub-national spatial variations in violence that these factors simply cannot explain. Where an alternative explanation is most plausible in one case, it fails in others. For example, factors like institutional inheritance or social structure that might be responsible for differences between Taiwan and the Philippines cannot explain why two autocrats in South Korea responded to similar national conditions with different institutional structures and patterns of violence; empirical endogeneity might explain decreasing violence over time in Taiwan, but cannot explain its rise in the Philippines or the relatively narrow fluctuations that occur in repressive violence in South Korea. The empirical chapters provide more specific tests of the alternative explanations to be doubly sure that they are not generating the outcomes of interest here. In sum, combining the ability to control for the most plausible alternative explanations with representative cross-national and within-case variation in outcomes provides the broadest possible range of observable implications for hypothesis testing, minimizes the risk of selection bias, and offers a better test of external validity than would be generated by a single case.¹⁴⁴

Focusing on Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines has practical advantages as well. The threat perceptions of dictators and the operations of authoritarian secret police are topics upon which data are typically highly restricted, making research difficult. However, these four cases – unusually – have sufficient data for process tracing. Democratization in the late 1980s has resulted in the recent release of documents from the authoritarian period, including from the coercive apparatus itself, at a level of detail and specificity sufficient to enable a comparative research project.¹⁴⁵ These rich documentary data allow me to assess whether the hypothesized mechanisms actually connect independent and dependent variables as proposed: whether threat affects the shape of coercive institutions through the perceptions of the autocrat, and whether institutions

¹⁴⁴ Slater and Ziblatt, “Enduring Indispensability”; Timothy McKeown, “Case Studies and the Limits of the Quantitative Approach,” in Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., *Rethinking Social Inquiry: Diverse Tools, Shared Standards* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), pp. 158–67; Lieberman, “Nested Analysis as a Mixed-Method Strategy.”

¹⁴⁵ The common assumption that these organizations do not keep records is simply incorrect. The data are secret and sometimes flawed, but they appear to exist in far more cases than is commonly assumed. For research that reached similar conclusions, see Brody, “Inside a Dictator’s Secret Police”; Martha K. Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros, and Philip G. Zimbardo, *Violence Workers: Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), p. 74.

drive state violence through the two specific mechanisms of agent incentives and intelligence capacity.

The chapters that follow draw on a wealth of previously untapped primary source materials, including several autocrats' private diaries and new documents from inside the intelligence and security agencies. Two additional sets of sources enable me to triangulate perspectives, fill gaps, and verify the accuracy of documentary accounts obtained during fieldwork: American archival records, generated by the three countries' close security relationships with the United States; and a pool of interviewees in each country who were removed enough from their countries' authoritarian periods and transitional justice processes to be comfortable speaking candidly, but who were still living and available for interviews. A full list of the collections consulted during research for this book may be found in the Appendix. In sum, the cases examined here offer a rare and valuable type and volume of micro-empirical data on the logic, organization, and implementation of authoritarian state violence, within a theoretically justified comparative framework.

PART II

THE ORIGINS OF COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS

Organizing coercion in Taiwan

The termination of martial law in Taiwan on July 15, 1987 marked the end of a record: after thirty-eight years, the world's longest unbroken stretch of martial law was lifted on the island. Taiwan had been a Japanese colony for the first half of the twentieth century, and had come under the administration of the Republic of China's Nationalist (or Kuomintang, KMT, 國民黨) government in 1945, in accordance with an agreement made at the Cairo Conference of 1943.¹ Soon after the Japanese surrender, fighting on the Chinese mainland began again, between Nationalist forces and those of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1949, the collapsed Nationalist government retreated to Taiwan. There, the KMT, led by Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo, presided until 1987 over a period of authoritarian rule known in Taiwan as the martial law era (*jiéyán shíqī*, 戒嚴時期).²

This chapter examines how Chiang Kai-shek and the KMT constructed the coercive institutions that implemented their four-decade rule, and why Chiang chose to organize these institutions as he did. In particular, it scrutinizes how and why Taiwan's coercive apparatus underwent profound organizational reforms in the early 1950s that shifted it from a fragmented and exclusive model of internal security to one that was unitary and inclusive. As Chapter 6 will show, these organizational reforms

¹ Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.–Taiwan Relations Since 1942* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2004), Ch. 2.

² In Taiwan, “martial law era” refers to a formal period of history. “White Terror” (*baise kongbu*, 白色恐怖) is a more politically charged term, and more varied in its use: sometimes referring to state violence throughout the martial law period, and sometimes only to particularly high levels of violence in the late 1940s and 1950s.

had profound consequences for state violence in Taiwan, but their origins have, thus far, remained unexplained. If some kind of path-dependent argument were at work, then Taiwan's coercive apparatus should have mirrored one of two inherited institutional legacies: either that of Japanese colonial policing, or that of the internal security apparatus used by Chiang and the KMT on the mainland. If external influence were at work, one would expect to see police and military structures preferred by, or modeled on, those of the United States. Neither of these factors, however, turns out to be determinate.

Instead, this chapter demonstrates that Taiwan's coercive apparatus during the martial law period, and in particular the changes to that apparatus that occurred in the early 1950s, emerged directly from the threat perceptions of Chiang Kai-shek. The first section of the chapter illustrates that prior to 1949, Chiang's primary concern was about how to govern Republican (mainland) China, where the dominant threat that he perceived came from disloyal elite rivals and regionally based warlords. To manage these actors, Chiang created fragmented and socially exclusive intelligence, security, and policing agencies, and in 1945 he simply and unreflectively transposed them onto Taiwan. The second half of the chapter traces changes in Chiang's thinking about threats after 1949, and links these to changes in Taiwan's coercive institutions. It shows that after losing control of the mainland, Chiang's perception of the dominant threat changed: he and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, began to concentrate much more on governing Taiwan itself, where they faced the primary threat of popular unrest. This shift in the dominant perceived threat prompted a wholesale reorganization of the coercive apparatus into one oriented toward popular management and social control. As a result of these reforms, Taiwan's coercive institutions became unitary and socially inclusive: an arrangement that lasted from the mid-1950s until the end of the martial law era.

ELITE THREATS ON THE MAINLAND AND TAIWAN'S EARLY COERCIVE APPARATUS

Chiang Kai-shek's original coercive apparatus was geared toward the dominant threat during the early years of his rule – the elite factionalism of warlord-era China and the Nanjing decade. Although Chiang came to power atop a country that was far from cohesive, he further exacerbated the fragmentation and social exclusivity of his coercive apparatus in order to maneuver around elite rivals, many of whom commanded

their own forces. Particularly notable in terms of fragmentation was the division and rivalry between the Military Bureau of Investigation and Statistics and the Central Bureau of Investigation and Statistics. Chiang also adhered to concepts of police professionalism that led to socially exclusive, isolated police forces: a model that was internationally acclaimed, but which also minimized the risk that regionally based elites and warlords would capture or corrupt security forces that were supposed to be loyal to the center.

In applying this model of internal security to Taiwan, Chiang chose not to use the system that had already been established and institutionalized on the island under the Japanese, which was unitary and socially inclusive. He opted instead to dismantle that system and graft onto Taiwan the fragmented and exclusive coercive institutions that governed the mainland. He did so even though these institutions were a poor match for the internal security conditions in Taiwan itself (and arguably a poor match for internal security in China itself after 1937, once the Chinese Communist Party had established its wartime bases). As the second half of the chapter will show, the Japanese legacy eventually became influential on Taiwan, but Chiang did not recognize the potential utility of that legacy until his perception of threats shifted.

How did Chiang Kai-shek perceive the dominant threat that he faced prior to 1949? Descriptions written during the Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) and Chinese Civil War (1927–49) portray him as a typical strongman in a weakly institutionalized polity: preoccupied with elite politics, playing rival factions and factional leaders against one another to secure his own precarious position, and failing in the process to build the social and institutional base that might have ensured popular support, or at least compliance.³ He prioritized internal power struggles over external defense, famously referring to the Japanese as a disease of the skin, but the Communists as a disease of the heart.⁴ Even internally, however, he was preoccupied – at least initially – by the challenge

³ Hung-mao Tien, *Government and Politics in Kuomintang China, 1927–37* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972); Joel Migdal, *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capability in the Third World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988); Terry Bodenhorn, ed., *Defining Modernity: Guomindang Rhetorics of a New China, 1929–70* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 2002); Julia C. Strauss, *Strong Institutions in Weak Polities: State Building in Republican China, 1927–40* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998).

⁴ John King Fairbank and Albert Feuerwerker, *The Cambridge History of China Vol. 13, Part 2: Republican China, 1912–1949* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 148.

of outmaneuvering his elite rivals more than he was concerned about growing popular support for the Communists. Historian Lloyd Eastman writes:

Like an emperor of the Ch'ing dynasty, politics for [Chiang] was a matter of competition among elites. To maximize his power, therefore, he manipulated and combined the support of one group of elites against rival elites ... He never comprehended – as Mao Tse-tung did – that it was possible to generate new sources of power by mobilizing support from outside the elite structure.⁵

Thomas Gold adds that Chiang “preferred to keep his minions divided and competing with each other in order to strengthen his personal power rather than forge a strong unified force.”⁶

Chiang was particularly suspicious of the generals and warlords under his command. He claimed they exaggerated their successes and could not be trusted, once complaining to American General Joseph Stilwell:

I have to lie awake nights thinking what fool things my commanders may do. Then I write and tell them not to do these things. But they are so dumb, they will do a lot of foolishness unless you anticipate them. That is the secret of handling them – you must imagine everything that they can do that would be wrong, and warn them against it.⁷

Chiang's distrust was not entirely unwarranted. The unwillingness of rival Nationalist military units to obey central orders on the battlefield led on more than one occasion to the near-complete elimination of entire units in combat. Moreover, during the 1936 Xi'an Incident (*Xi'an Shibian*, 西安事變), Chiang was kidnapped by two of the senior generals ostensibly under his command and forced to agree to a united front with the Communists. General Claire Chennault, who led the American Volunteer Group “Flying Tigers” and advised the Nationalist Air Force in the late 1930s and early 1940s, was sympathetic to Chiang's difficulties in finding competent subordinates. He noted, however, that Chiang's response was to engage in a strategy of “playing one [subordinate] off against the other ... every now and then lopping off a few heads as a warning that there was a limit to his patience.”⁸

⁵ Lloyd E. Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction: Nationalist China in War and Revolution, 1937–49* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp. 10, 218.

⁶ Thomas B. Gold, “The Waning of the Kuomintang State on Taiwan,” in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Susan Young, eds., *State Capacity in East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 85.

⁷ Joseph W. Stilwell, *The Stilwell Papers* (New York: W. Sloane Associates, 1948).

⁸ Claire Lee Chennault, *Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault* (New York: G. P. Putnam's, 1949), p. 77.

Fostering fragmentation

Fragmentation of power among multiple subordinates and fostering of inter-agency competition were key tactics that Chiang Kai-shek used to manage his internal security subordinates.⁹ In the 1930s, he established two competing intelligence and security organizations: the Kuomintang's Central Bureau for Intelligence and Statistics (CBIS, *Zhongtong*, 中統), and the Military Bureau for Intelligence and Statistics (MBIS, *Juntong*, 軍統) under the Nationalist Government's Military Affairs Committee.¹⁰ Headed by Xu Enzeng and Dai Li, respectively, these two organizations had ostensibly separate responsibilities, but in practice overlapped and competed bitterly for power throughout the Sino-Japanese War and Chinese Civil War.¹¹ CBIS was affiliated with the Central Club ("CC") clique: the faction based around brothers Chen Guofu and Chen Li-fu, whose uncle Chen Qimei had been an early mentor to Chiang Kai-shek. The Chen brothers, however, became political rivals to Chiang's son Chiang Ching-kuo, and Chen Li-fu's memoirs acknowledge the friction that existed between CBIS and other agencies as a result.¹² In

⁹ Wang Yuting, "The Establishment and Experience of China's Information Statistics System," in Xu Enzeng, *A Detailed Account of the Central Bureau and Military Bureau* (Taipei: Biographical Publishing House, 1992) / 王禹廷, "中國調統機構之創始及其經過," 徐恩曾等著, <細說中統軍統>, (臺北市: 傳記文學出版社, 1992), pp. 7–20.

¹⁰ Li Shijie, *Study of the Investigative Bureau* (Taipei: Li Ao Publishing House, 1995), especially pp. 109–18 / 李世傑, 調局研究, (台北市: 李敖出版社, 1995); Chen Tsui-lien, "Secret Agent Rule and White Terror Atmosphere during Taiwan's Martial Law Period," in *Martial Law Era: White Terror and Transitional Justice – Collected Writings* (Taipei: Wu Sanyun Taiwan Historical Materials Foundation/Taiwan Historical Studies Association Publishing House, 2009), pp. 43–70 / 陳翠蓮, "台灣戒嚴時期的特務統治與白色恐怖氛圍," in 戒嚴時期白色恐怖與轉型正義論文集 (台北: 吳三運臺灣史料基金會, 臺灣歷史學會出版, 2009), pp. 43–70; Guo Xuyin, ed. *History of the Kuomintang's Factional Struggles* (Taipei: Guiguan Tushu, 1993, 2 vols.) / 郭緒印, 主編。〈國民黨派系鬥爭史〉 (臺北市: 桂冠圖書, 1993).

¹¹ Chen, Tsui-lien, "Intelligence Agencies' Internal Competition Giving Rise to White Terror Political Cases," in *Martial Law Era: White Terror and Transitional Justice – Collected Writings* (Taipei: Wu Sanyun Taiwan Historical Materials Foundation/Taiwan Historical Studies Association Publishing House, 2009) / 陳翠蓮, "情治機關內部鬥爭所引起白色恐怖政治案件," <戒嚴時期白色恐怖與轉型正義論文集> (台北: 吳三運臺灣史料基金會, 臺灣歷史學會出版, 2009), pp. 253–66; Xu Enzeng, *A Detailed Account of the Central Bureau and Military Bureau* (Taipei: Biographical Publishing House, 1992) / 徐恩曾等著, <細說中統軍統>, (臺北市: 傳記文學出版社, 1992); Frederic Wakeman, *Spymaster: Dai Li and the Chinese Secret Service* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Guo, *History of the Kuomintang's Factional Struggles*, p. 613.

¹² Chen Li-fu, *The Storm Clouds Clear Over China: the Memoir of Ch'en Li-fu, 1900–1992* (Stanford: Hoover Press, 1994); Guo, *History of the Kuomintang's Factional Struggles*, p. 613; Chen, "Secret Agent Rule."

both intelligence and military organizations, Chiang actively restricted information-sharing across units and removed field officers' latitude to make independent decisions, interfering in field operations down to the regimental level.¹³

This fragmentation within the military and intelligence apparatus was matched in policing, where Chiang undercut and counterbalanced the Public Security Bureau (PSB), which he perceived as ineffective and untrustworthy, with a competing military police organization created in 1931.¹⁴ Horizontal communication among police agencies and transmission of information among them was restricted, ostensibly to limit damage from Communist infiltration but also to limit the risk of collusion. This stovepiping of information extended down even within a nominally unitary organization like the PSB itself. Individual offices relied on a stovepiped flow of case documents, and bureau chiefs operated fiefdoms that exercised exclusive control over personnel and resources, with little if any lateral coordination.¹⁵

The relationship between city and national authorities was also lacking, and fragmentation was ubiquitous there as well. Duplication of responsibilities led to competitive overlap between agencies assigned to police the same space and execute the same missions. In 1934–35, for example, the encroachment of MBIS agents on the territory of local PSBs, police academies, and police units in Shanghai led to active resistance from the deputy brigade commander and regular detectives. At least four different groups responsible for Shanghai's public security – the original PSB "locals"; Beijing-imported officers and the Beijing-led paramilitary Peace Preservation Corps (保安隊/保安團, *baoundui/baoantuan*); Chiang's expanding military police; and military intelligence represented by MBIS agents – all jockeyed for control, creating friction and competition.¹⁶ Although a newly created commission attempted vertical integration in the mid-1930s, seeking to bring local militia under the Ministry of the Interior and to strengthen new police forces directed and trained by the center, the expectation that provincial and local budgets would continue

¹³ Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction*, pp. 130–71.

¹⁴ A rising focus on anti-communism as the primary police mission (under Chiang's *annei rangwai* policy – first subjugate the internal enemy, then expel the external) also resulted in the police force's gradual militarization.

¹⁵ Frederic Wakeman, Jr., *Policing Shanghai 1927–1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 51, 54–55, 179, 193.

¹⁶ Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 211, 249, 251; Elizabeth J. Perry, *Shanghai on Strike: The Politics of Chinese Labor* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993).

to support these forces caused the officials paying for them to oppose central control. The process was never completed, and authority over each local police station remained divided between local magistrates and the provincial government.¹⁷ At times like the Kiangnan Incident of November 1927 – in which the Public Security Bureau intercepted a shipment of opium entering Shanghai under Garrison Command guard, and each organization subsequently accused the other of involvement in the trade while claiming their own prerogative of enforcement – the dysfunction of multiple agencies competing for control over the same turf reached almost comical levels.¹⁸

Embracing social exclusivity

The Kuomintang coercive apparatus in mainland China was also deliberately designed to be socially exclusive. In 1928, the Nationalist government began to create a modern national police system for China. They drew on international models to do so: Japanese academies trained officers, German advisors consulted on structure and deployment, and municipal leaders modeled organization and training after American police departments.¹⁹ These attempts at police professionalization resulted in a force that was exclusive of Chinese society rather than inclusive of it – a characteristic that had the twin benefits of winning international approval for Chiang and preventing police commanders from developing a local base from which they could operate independent of central support.

Exclusivity was a product of multiple factors. The first was numerical; in 1929, Shanghai had a ratio of one uniformed officer for every 425 inhabitants of the Chinese-administered section; in 1935, the ratio was around 1:300 – a shortfall by China's own standards.²⁰ More important, however, was who made up the police force: the KMT simply believed that outsiders were better policemen. Throughout the 1927–37 period, southern officials actively recruited policemen from

¹⁷ Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 244–47.

¹⁸ Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 129–31.

¹⁹ William C. Kirby, *Germany and Republican China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), pp. 55–56; Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, p. 245.

²⁰ In Beijing, the goal in the late nineteen-teens was to have twelve police per thousand residents, or a ratio of one officer per eighty-five or so residents. David Strand, *Rickshaw Beijing: City People and Politics in the 1920s* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), p. 72.

the north, on the grounds that they had superior physical attributes for policing, that they would be better able to man the new Japanese police-box system of law enforcement, and that their “linguistic incompetence” in the Shanghai dialect made them less susceptible to corruption. After 1927, only 18 percent of the Shanghai PSB’s agents were local, and the police chiefs came from Guangdong and Hainan. Social differences between police and ordinary citizens were accentuated by police uniforms, which were cut in the distinctly military style of the Japanese *gendarmérie*; not until 1930 did officials even propose differentiating police and military uniforms. (Detectives wore plainclothes attire, symbolizing that they were “immersed in, similar to, and contaminated by ordinary Shanghai society.”) As a result, the police were a group apart, “more like an army of occupation than a domestically recruited constabulary.”²¹

In the 1930s, Nationalist officials became aware of the intelligence handicap that came from excluding locals. They lamented that physically imposing northern patrolmen might be good for deterring crime on the beat, but that their inability to understand the Shanghai dialect made them “unfit for assignments at rallies, during demonstration, or around railroad stations, where travelers’ stray conversations would provide clues about the enemy’s political conspiracies.”²² Although efforts to ease out locally embedded experts declined temporarily, the trend was short-lived; there was no fundamental rethinking of the ideal social composition of a police force. Shanghai continued to import outsiders as policemen: 500 from Beijing in 1932, and more in 1934.²³ The drive to set Nationalist policemen as a profession apart despite the obvious intelligence handicap this created emphasizes the priority placed on ensuring loyalty and deterring police defection, rather than empowering agents to leverage social embeddedness to gain information necessary for effective popular policing.

The Nationalist model of professional policing also eschewed informal mechanisms of societal inclusion and penetration. The most obvious of these, the centuries-old *baojia* (保甲) system of communal responsibility, was incompletely and only belatedly implemented on the mainland.²⁴ In 1931, while fighting the Communists in Jiangxi, Chiang

²¹ Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 49–50, 54, 75, 165–66, 229, 231.

²² Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, p. 137.

²³ Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 49–50, 137, 207, 230.

²⁴ According to Han Fei, “Lord Shang taught Duke Hsiao [r. 361–338 b.c.] of Ch’in how to organize the people into groups of five and ten families that would spy on each other and be corporately responsible for crimes committed by their members.” Burton Watson, trans., *Han Fei Tsu: Basic Writings* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 82; Ching-chih Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire,” in Ramon

Kai-shek issued the “Rules for Organizing Households into Pao-Chia in Bandit-Suppression Areas,” which were implemented in forty-three counties that year. Although the guidelines were expanded by decree to all provinces in 1934, they were in practice adopted unevenly, especially under the stresses of social disorder and natural disaster; by 1937, only sixteen of China’s thirty-five provinces had fully implemented them.²⁵ Moreover, because Chiang and the KMT leaders around him perceived local self-government as a threat to central control rather than a tool of it, they employed the *baojia* system mostly as a mechanism to push unpopular central directives (most notably conscription) downward, rather than as a collaborative system of local self-government that could transmit valuable information upward. For fear of local collusion and disloyalty, KMT authorities also separated the *baojia*’s administrative role from the policing system that was supposed to enforce social control.²⁶ Only under the extreme pressure and partial collapse of wartime did Nationalist officials allow the organization of locally recruited militias.²⁷ Consistent reluctance to rely on locally organized forces for fear that these forces would usurp central power reinforced the social exclusivity and isolation of KMT policing.

Transferring mainland models to Taiwan

At the end of the Second World War in the Pacific, the Nationalist government of the Republic of China replaced Japan as the governing authority over the island of Taiwan. After retrocession – the official end of Japanese rule in Taiwan, in October 1945 – the island was administered as a re-acquired and relatively unimportant Chinese province while the Nationalist government negotiated with and then engaged in civil war against Communist forces on the mainland. During this period of reoccupation and conflict, the KMT simply transplanted its organs of

H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 218; Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980); Elizabeth J. Perry, *Rebels and Revolutionaries in North China, 1945–1945* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1980).

²⁵ Caroline Hui-yu Tsai, “One Kind of Control: The *Hoko* System in Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945,” PhD dissertation, Columbia University, 1990, p. 559.

²⁶ Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction*, pp. 147; Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 85–86; Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” p. 574.

²⁷ Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 277–91; Elizabeth J. Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution: Worker Militias, Citizenship, and the Modern Chinese State* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), ch. 3.

government to Taiwan, including the intelligence and coercive agencies. Rather than maintaining the colonial security system that had achieved both internal cohesion and societal penetration, Chiang imported a coercive apparatus that on the mainland had accomplished neither. Instead, as described above, this apparatus, which governed Taiwan from 1945 until around 1950, was both fragmented and exclusive.

Fragmentation in Taiwan's post-1945 coercive apparatus was pronounced. Initially, this was due to the relative inattention of the Nationalist government to conditions on the ground, and the unthinking duplication or extension of the KMT's intrinsically fragmented governance across the Strait to the island. Taiwan – China's "newest, smallest, and least populous province" was simply "not a major issue in war-weakened China."²⁸ The factional rivalries that suffused the KMT's various internal security agencies were transported to the island as officials jockeyed to claim power in territory not previously controlled by any clique.²⁹ The appointment of Chen Yi as provincial governor, for example, marked a victory for the so-called Political Science/Political Study Clique over the C-C clique run by the brothers Chen.³⁰ After 1949, the fragmentation of the coercive apparatus on Taiwan worsened further, as security officials and organizations intended for the whole of the Republic of China crowded into a single province. In late 1949, Chen Cheng, Peng Mengji, and Sun Liren were all competing for command over Taiwan's defense, and the individual service commanders refused to relinquish control over their forces.³¹ According to reports obtained from police authorities and transmitted by the American consulate in Taipei, as many as thirteen different security organizations operated in each city.³²

The Nationalists' coercive apparatus on Taiwan was also exclusive. Over the course of their first year governing Taiwan, the KMT managed

²⁸ Steven E. Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence: The Taiwanese Encounter Nationalist China, 1945–1950* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 53.

²⁹ David Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949–50: From Abandonment to Salvation* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2014), p. 59.

³⁰ Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, p. 54; Chen Mingtong, "Paixi Zhengzhi yu Chen Yi Zhi Tai Lun," [Discussion of Political Factions and Chen Yi's Governing of Taiwan] in Lai Tse-han, ed., *Taiwan Guangfu Chuqi Lishi* [The History of Immediate Postwar Taiwan] (Taipei: Zhongyang Yanjiuyuan Zhongshan Renwen Shehui Kexue Yanjiusuo, 1993) / 賴澤涵主編, 臺灣光復初期歷 (臺北市: 中央研究院中山人文社會科學研究所, 1993), pp. 223–301.

³¹ Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, pp. 170–71.

³² U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, April 27, 1950; July 20, 1950; July 26, 1950; November 1, 1950. In the April 27 cable, see statement in particular by Sun Li-jen about Kaohsiung.

to destroy the capillary system by which its Japanese predecessors had penetrated local Taiwanese communities.³³ As a result, from 1945–1949, Chiang's regime lacked the ability to administer Taiwan's society, thanks to three factors that collectively created an exclusive coercive apparatus: overall manpower shortages, exclusion of native Taiwanese, and an organizational structure that lacked mechanisms to collect intelligence on society.

First, in terms of manpower, Taiwan suffered from a sudden, acute shortage of security personnel to monitor and police the population, especially as the KMT drained capable men from the island to fight in the civil war. The total number of soldiers and police decreased from 48,000 to 11,000, and many of the police that remained were of poor quality. By February 1947, the month of the infamous 2-28 Incident (an outbreak of island-wide unrest suppressed forcibly by the KMT, discussed in more detail in Chapter 6), "troop transfers ... [had] reduced the total police-troop presence to 6 percent of the Japanese level."³⁴ Simple math made the KMT's internal security apparatus far more exclusive than it had been months prior.

Second, KMT authorities did not include native Taiwanese in the work of public security. The dominant cleavage on Taiwan was "the fissure between the majority group of native Taiwanese – or descendants of earlier mainland immigrants – who comprise[d] about 85 percent of the population, and the mainland Chinese."³⁵ The demands of elite politics – particularly the need to provide patronage for politically consequential Mainlanders – contributed directly to social exclusivity. Between 1945 and 1949, the majority Taiwanese were systematically excluded from policing and internal security. In October 1945, 5,600 of the 13,000-strong police force (43 percent) were Formosan, as were 46,955 of the 84,559 civil service positions (55 percent). The KMT, however, shrank the civil service to half its previous size, and replaced many Formosans with inexperienced

³³ Caroline Hui-yu Tsai, "Notes on Hoko Secretaryship in Taiwan under Japanese Rule, 1911–45," *Taiwan Historical Research*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1994) / 蔡慧玉, "日治時代台灣保甲書記初探," *台灣史研究*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (June 1994), pp. 5–24. See also Cheng Tzu, "The Takeover and Re-establishment of the Postwar Administrative System in Taiwan," *Shilian Zazhi*, Vol. 19 (1991) / 史聯雜誌; Lin Te-lung, "Guofu jiantai jianhou shehui kongzhi zhi lizheng" [The Process of Social Control Before and After the Retreat of the National Government to Taiwan], *Taiwan Shiliao Yanjiu*, Vol. 3 (February 1994), pp. 114–19.

³⁴ Lai Tse-han, Ramon H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991), pp. 7, 148.

³⁵ Chalmers Johnson, *The Taiwan Experience* (New York: Praeger, 1981).

but politically connected Mainlanders. As American observer George Kerr describes policing during the post-handover period:

[Governor] Chen Yi did not promote experienced Formosans and recruit others for “freshman” jobs. Thousands of newcomers were placed on the rolls, inexperienced relatives and friends of mainland Chinese already established in the Administration. Many policemen could speak neither Japanese [then the official *lingua franca*] nor the local Chinese dialects ... When all the police jobs vacated by the Japanese had been filled, the Government began to discharge Formosans to make room for more newcomers.³⁶

An estimated 36,000 Taiwanese civil servants lost their jobs, and the remaining individuals were paid less than Mainlanders in equivalent positions. By 1946, only 9,951 of 44,451 government positions were occupied by Taiwanese: 22 percent, compared to 55 percent a year earlier.³⁷

Finally, in organizational terms, the KMT disregarded and dismantled the *baojia* system of communal organization that had been utilized effectively by Japanese authorities and that might have compensated for numerical and social shortcomings. Taiwanese police officers and patrolmen who had experience working closely with *baojia* heads were fired, and changes in police location severed the previous near-symbiotic relationship that had existed between the police and the local *hoko* heads.³⁸ These measures made the KMT's early coercive apparatus highly exclusive in addition to its fragmentation.

SHIFTING THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND COERCIVE INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS

The changed fortunes of the Kuomintang in the late 1940s and early 1950s prompted a profound rethinking of Chiang Kai-shek's priorities and his beliefs about the dominant perceived threat. As Taiwan became a larger fraction of the KMT's remaining territory, it increased in importance, and popular unrest there was increasingly seen as the chief challenge. In 1947, February's island-wide unrest during the 2-28 Incident (described in Chapter 6) was followed quickly by the Communist approach to Changchun in northeastern China in March. KMT forces suffered successive setbacks in the civil war throughout the mainland,

³⁶ George H. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed* (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1965), p. 190.

³⁷ Note that the local elections in 1946 did lead to increased Taiwanese participation in local (rather than provincial or central) government. Matsuzaki, “Institutions Through Imposition,” p. 206; Lai *et al.*, *Tragic Beginning*, pp. 63–67.

³⁸ U.S. State Department, Taipei to Washington, January 28, 1947.

losing control of territory steadily in the process. Their disastrous defeat at Huaihai in late 1948 heightened fears of potential insurgency in the remaining KMT-controlled areas, including Taiwan, and made the task of consolidating control on the island seem more urgent and important.³⁹ By autumn 1949, when the KMT relocated to Taiwan, American analysts at both the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency were predicting the fall of the island – formerly a backwater, but now the sole remaining bastion of Nationalist power and the last territorial foothold from which Chiang could make any claim to be the leader of China.⁴⁰ The situation was desperate; political scientist Wu Yu-Shan summarizes the KMT's situation when it retreated to Taiwan as “surrounded by an alienated population, overwhelmed by an external security threat, and abandoned by its most important ally.”⁴¹

Although no type of threat seemed trivial to Chiang at this point, defusing the internal security threat from the alienated Taiwanese population on the island from which he clung to power quickly became the overriding priority.⁴² The Communist military across the Strait represented a non-trivial external threat but, at least temporarily, it was not an existential one; since the CCP lacked the forces to actually mount a successful invasion and the Nationalists had the economic and military resources to defend themselves, “the internal threat to Taipei remained as great, if not greater, than the threat of external invasion.”⁴³ External threats especially appeared less pressing after the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, and again during the Taiwan Straits crises, when the United States made its support for the defense of Taiwan and Chiang's regime increasingly clear. (Indeed, despite the discouragement of American officials and some of his own aides, Chiang was confident enough that he believed for years in his ability not just to defend Taiwan but to someday stage a return to the mainland.)

³⁹ Denny Roy, *Taiwan: a Political History* (Cornell: Ithaca University Press, 2003), p. 69; Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, p. 50.

⁴⁰ The American government was unwilling at that point to intervene to save the KMT from what it perceived as the regime's own ineptitude; the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 reversed this preference. For a detailed account of U.S. policy during this period, see Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*; see also Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–58* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

⁴¹ Wu Yu-Shan, *Comparative Economic Transformations: Mainland China, Hungary, the Soviet Union, and Taiwan* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), p. 140.

⁴² Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the Struggle for Modern China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

⁴³ Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, p. 2.

American assessments that the island would fall were based not on the strengths of the Communist military, but on the *internal* weaknesses of KMT governance on Taiwan and the regime's inability to handle the likelihood of serious popular unrest.⁴⁴ One report specifically stated that the chief problem on Taiwan had thus far been "the transfer of the ills and malpractices that have characterized the KMT in China," and argued that, therefore, the U.S. needed to avoid creating any sense of false security for Chiang. Accordingly, in October 1949, the U.S. government issued a *démarche* warning Chiang and the KMT to "pull itself together and work for common salvation with the Formosans." Consul General Macdonald warned Chiang, in person, that the American government was not willing to have its money wasted by Nationalist incompetence and misgovernance, and, critically, indicated that future assistance was contingent on the KMT's ability to reform and repair its relationship with the people of Taiwan.⁴⁵ Taiwan's external security, therefore, depended on its ability to manage domestic security and popular threats competently. In 1949–50, therefore, it became clear to Chiang and those around him that his political survival depended on his ability to reform governance on Taiwan and that the risk of popular unrest had become the dominant perceived threat.

Internal elite or coup threats also diminished in the early 1950s, as the process of transferring the KMT to the island gradually sidelined Chiang's former rivals. Although rumors of coup plots circulated until 1949, this threat declined thereafter, as politically powerful figures either left Taiwan or died.⁴⁶ Li Tsungjen (Li Zongren), Acting President in 1949 and early 1950, and former Taiwan Governor (1949–53) K. C. Wu (Wu Guozhen), both critics of Chiang, moved to the United States.⁴⁷ The powerful C-C clique lost influence when Chen Li-fu moved to the United States in 1949 and Chen Guofu died in 1951. That left General Sun Li-jen (Sun Liren), commander in chief of the armed forces, who

⁴⁴ U.S. State Department, Taipei to Washington, July 12, 18, and 21, 1950. American diplomats judged that British concerns about Communist infiltration were "without merit" and that popular unrest was due to KMT misbehavior rather than externally backed subversion.

⁴⁵ U.S. National Security Council, NSC Memorandum 37/8, October 6, 1949; U.S. State Department, "Policy Memorandum on Formosa," December 23, 1949; Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, pp. 116, 187.

⁴⁶ Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, p. 193; Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949–50* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), p. 181.

⁴⁷ "China: Return of the Gimo," *Time Magazine*, March 13, 1950; K. C. Wu, "Your Money is Building a Police State in Taiwan," *Look*, June 29, 1954.

opposed Chiang's reorganization of the security services (particularly the introduction of commissars into the military), and who was popular with American military and political officials; Sun was moved to an honorary position in 1954, and confined to house arrest after being falsely accused of plotting a coup with the CIA in 1955.⁴⁸

By 1955, no elites remained who could truly challenge Chiang for power. The removal of the threat of a coup or elite replacement, combined with the reduction in external threats and the warning that American assistance was contingent on domestic political reform, enabled and in fact *compelled* Chiang to concentrate on managing the threat of popular unrest. This shift in the dominant perceived threat prompted Chiang to rethink his approach to internal security, and to identify several specific flaws that he believed had contributed to his defeat on the mainland. The ones most closely related to managing the population were the organizational dilapidation of the party; inability to gather intelligence from society; counter-intelligence and infiltration problems; and a politically unreliable military.

First, in contrast to the optimistic assessments of party strength that had existed in the 1920s, Chiang identified the party-organizational weakness of the KMT as fatal. In January 1949, he observed, "The biggest reason for our defeat was that we never have been able to establish a new, solid, organizational system ... we have lost the basic means to rebuild and save our country. This is why we have been defeated."⁴⁹ Chiang recognized that factionalism and internal fragmentation had damaged the KMT's organizational capacity, and believed that this threat had, if anything, increased since the KMT's transfer to Taiwan; he became determined to reorganize to eliminate this weakness.⁵⁰

Second, Chiang concluded that the KMT's intelligence apparatus had lacked the ability to generate and use knowledge drawn from Chinese (and now Taiwanese) society. Post-1949 analyses done by the Nationalist

⁴⁸ Peter R. Moody, *Opposition and Dissent in Contemporary Taiwan* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1977).

⁴⁹ Hoover Institution Archives, KMT Central Reform Committee Archive (CRCA), 6.4-2, reel 1, Chiang Kai-shek's introduction to the Resolution on the Reforming of our Party, July 18, 1950; Ramon H. Myers and Lin Hsiao-ting, "Breaking With the Past: the Kuomintang Central Reform Committee on Taiwan, 1950-52," Hoover Institution On War, Revolution, and Peace, December 2007, p. 2; Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution*, p. 106.

⁵⁰ Gold, "The Waning of the Kuomintang State," p. 94; Myers and Lin, pp. 3-4; Bruce J. Dickson, "Lessons of Defeat: The Reorganization of the Kuomintang on Taiwan, 1950-52," *China Quarterly*, Vol. 133 (March 1993), pp. 56-84.

military drew particular attention to the weaknesses of their intelligence system relative to that of their CCP adversaries: KMT intelligence reports were formal, bureaucratized, and unhelpful for understanding the local population and countering insurgency. This presented a clear contrast with Communist intelligence, which the KMT belatedly recognized had drawn on a network throughout the population to supply intelligence and generate an edge in civil conflict.⁵¹

Chiang also identified counter-infiltration and counter-intelligence as an area of KMT vulnerability. Fragmentation and compartmentalization of the intelligence apparatus during the Civil War, he concluded, had not stopped the Communists from gaining advance notice of Nationalist plans, but had restricted the Nationalists from coordinating their own operations effectively, which had actually facilitated CCP infiltration.⁵² Infiltration was still perceived as a risk when the KMT moved to Taiwan; Chiang believed (and some reports corroborated) that Communist spies had infiltrated the flotilla of two million refugees who accompanied him. Because of this, registration was required for all arrivals on the island from 1948 onward, and police carefully inspected the identity cards of arriving visitors and refugees.⁵³

The risk of Communist infiltration was part of a larger problem for Chiang Kai-shek in 1949: the political unreliability of the military. The Nationalist military had had whole divisions defect en masse, and the dislocations of war meant that there was simply no way to adequately verify the claims to past loyalty of arriving soldiers and officials. As a result, these forces were perceived as an even greater security risk than the native Taiwanese, who had been subject to intensive Japanese anti-communist surveillance for some time. Moreover, although the flight to Taiwan had weeded out many top leaders who opposed Chiang (by offering them the option of remaining on the mainland or departing for the United States), factionalism within the military remained.⁵⁴ Chiang Ching-kuo, in particular, concluded that the lack of a political commissar system within the Republic of China's military had been an organizational and intelligence handicap; the absence of political reporting and inadequate surveillance of officers had prevented Chiang Kai-shek

⁵¹ Author's interview with a high-ranking member of the ROC military, Taipei, November 2010.

⁵² Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction*, pp. 169–70.

⁵³ Joseph Heinlein, "Political Warfare: the Chinese Nationalist Model," PhD dissertation, American University, 1974, pp. 503–04; Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*.

⁵⁴ Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, pp. 170–71.

from discovering disloyalty and punishing false reporting, and fragmentation had been an ineffective solution to the problem.⁵⁵

Chiang Kai-shek's response to this evolution in the dominant perceived threat was twofold. First, the KMT declared martial law and created a legal framework that, while referred to as "temporary," would in fact govern their internal security operations for the subsequent four decades. Second, he engaged in extensive organizational reforms of Taiwan's coercive institutions, shifting them from a fragmented, socially exclusive cluster of organizations to a unitary, cohesive, inclusive, and socially embedded apparatus.

Constructing the framework, 1948–49

The legal framework of KMT authoritarian governance was composed of two primary, interlocking pieces: the Temporary Provisions, and Martial Law. The Nationalist government promulgated the Temporary Provisions Effective During the Period of Communist Rebellion (*Dongyuan Kanluan Shiqi Linshi Tiaokuan*, 動員戡亂時期臨時條款) on the Chinese mainland in late spring of 1948.⁵⁶ The four articles of the Temporary Provisions suspended much of the 1946 Republic of China constitution. Amended in March 1960, February–March 1966, and March 1972, these extra-constitutional arrangements also "suspended the re-election of the three national representative bodies – the National Assembly, the Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan – extended the tenure of their incumbent members for life, and deferred the election of provincial and municipal heads indefinitely," vitiating electoral procedure at the national level.⁵⁷ The Temporary Provisions also heightened the emergency powers given to the President, waiving his two-term limit (and that of the Vice President), and empowering him "to make changes in the organization and personnel of the central government."⁵⁸ Most

⁵⁵ Eastman, *Seeds of Destruction*, p. 210.

⁵⁶ National Government Gazette No. 3129 and Presidential Office Gazettes No. 482, No. 1104, No. 1723, No. 1733, and No. 2394, reprinted in Chu Chung-Sheng, ed., *From Governor-General's Office to the President's Office: The Presidents* (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2009), pp. 48–53.

⁵⁷ Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, "Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan: State-building, Regime Transformation, and the Construction of National Identity," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 165 (2001), p. 114.

⁵⁸ Tien Hung-mao, *The Great Transition: Political and Social Change in the Republic of China* (Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1989), pp. 108–12; Tay-sheng Wang and I-Hsun Sandy Chou, "The Emergence of Modern Constitutional Culture in Taiwan," *National Taiwan University Law Review*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (March 2010), p. 17.

broadly, Article 1 allowed the President and Executive Yuan “to take emergency measures to avert an imminent danger to the security of the state or of the people” without being subject to the procedural restrictions that normally existed, thereby conferring “practically unlimited authority” on the president.⁵⁹ Records from the Presidential Office show that, despite Executive Yuan’s constitutionally given status as the highest administrative organ of the state, under martial law it reported directly to Chiang’s office, rendering Taiwan’s separation of powers even more limited in practice.⁶⁰

The second component of the KMT’s authoritarian legal framework was martial law. On May 19, 1949, Chen Cheng, then Chairman of the Taiwan Provincial Government and head of Taiwan Garrison Command, declared martial law on Taiwan.⁶¹ It was to last for thirty-eight years and fifty-six days: until July 15, 1987. Under martial law, political offenses were tried in military courts according to military tribunal law. Article 8 also specified ten categories of *criminal* offenses for which civilians could be tried in military tribunals, rather than the constitutionally mandated civilian courts.⁶² The heads of the tribunals had to approve any and all decisions made by the court; for the appellate court, the head was the ROC President (Chiang Kai-shek) himself. The Council of Grand Justices, the only body in Taiwan with the hypothetical power of judicial review, was composed mostly of Mainlander party members, and functioned to “legitimize rather than supervise government action.”⁶³ As with the Temporary Provisions, the substantive effect of martial law was an expansion of presidential authority, and a concentration of power in the person of President Chiang.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ These procedural restrictions were outlined in Articles 39 and 43. Hung-mao, *The Great Transition*, pp. 108–12.

⁶⁰ Wang and Chou, “The Emergence of Modern Constitutional Culture in Taiwan,” pp. 15–16; Wang Tay-sheng, *Jurisprudence with Historical Thinking: Combination of Taiwanese Social History of Law and Legal Reasoning* / 王泰升, <具有歷史思維的法學：結合臺灣法律社會史法律論證> (臺北市：王泰升出版，2010).

⁶¹ U.S. State Department, Taipei to Washington, May 19, 1949; Chu, *From Governor-General’s Office to the President’s Office*, pp. 27–37; Tien, *The Great Transition*, pp. 110.

⁶² Wang, *Jurisprudence with Historical Thinking*.

⁶³ Wang and Chou, “The Emergence of Modern Constitutional Culture,” pp. 22, 26.

⁶⁴ Wang, *Jurisprudence with Historical Thinking*; U.S. Department of State, “Graphic Summary of the Formosa Situation,” Office of Intelligence and Research, Report No. 5320, August 21, 1950.

Organizational reform: 1950–52 and after

The Temporary Provisions and martial law required an infrastructure to administer them: police, military, intelligence, and courts. Constructing that institutional infrastructure was the second major task of the KMT in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Chiang's status in the party, military, and government – by June 1950, he was Director-General (*Zongcai*, 總裁) of the Kuomintang, President of the Republic of China, and Commander in Chief of the ROC military – made these organizational reforms relatively easy to implement once they had been decided.

Internal security was the chief priority of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo upon their arrival in Taiwan in summer 1949 – so much so that plans to reform the intelligence and internal security apparatus actually preceded the party reform effort that accounts of this period traditionally emphasize. Ching-kuo, who had spent much time talking to his father about their plans and policies over the course of the preceding months, was both the principal driver and the primary beneficiary of these reforms, which simultaneously strengthened the coercive apparatus and brought it under his control.⁶⁵ He had spent a decade in the Soviet Union and witnessed firsthand the political persecution that accompanied the Stalinist purges of the 1930s; his instructor in strategy in Leningrad had been Marshal Tukashevsky, a high-ranking general executed in the purges.⁶⁶ He was described as “strong-willed, decisive, and effective ... [with a] man-of-the-masses approach ... [and] the outward geniality suited to his rotund appearance.”⁶⁷ Although Ching-kuo's eventual legacy would be to set Taiwan on a course toward liberal democracy, his initial task was to assume authority over the island's coercive apparatus and figure out how to reorganize its “overlapping, often incompetent, faction-based spy organs.”⁶⁸ Hard-working, organized, and administratively capable – unlike many dictators, Ching-kuo had an unusual tolerance for paperwork – he assumed directorship of a number of important internal security roles in swift succession in 1949

⁶⁵ Jay Taylor, *The Generalissimo's Son: Chiang Ching-Kuo and the Revolutions in China and Taiwan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).

⁶⁶ Tillman Durdin, “Chiang Ching-Kuo and Taiwan: a profile,” *Orbis*, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Winter 1975), p. 1027.

⁶⁷ Durdin, “Chiang Ching-kuo,” p. 1024.

⁶⁸ Gold, “The Waning of the Kuomintang State,” p. 54; Taylor, *Generalissimo*; Shih Ming, *Four Hundred Years of the History of the Taiwanese People* (San Jose: Paradise Culture Associates, 1980) / 史明 著, 台灣人四百年史 (San Jose: Paradise Culture Associates, 1980), pp. 875–78.

and 1950. These included becoming head of the Ministry of Defense's General Political Warfare Department (GPWD), a member of the Central Reform Committee and Central Standing Committee, and leader of the China Youth Anti-Communist National Salvation Corps.

Chiang Ching-kuo's reforms focused on three major elements of internal security organization: eliminating fragmentation within the intelligence and internal security bureaucracies; improving political control over the military; and increasing the social embeddedness and domestic intelligence capacity of Taiwan's coercive institutions. These three sets of reforms, in combination, led to the creation of a unitary and socially inclusive coercive apparatus by the mid-1950s.

Reducing fragmentation

The first major task of reforms was to reduce fragmentation within the coercive apparatus. Within weeks of arriving in Taiwan, in July 1949, Chiang Kai-shek gathered a group of trusted young aides in Kaohsiung: Chiang Ching-kuo, Tang Zong, Zheng Jiemin, Mao Renfeng, Ye Xiufeng, Zhang Zhen, Mao Lin, Tao Yishan, Peng Mengji, and Wei Daming. On August 15, they formed a Political Action Committee (政治行動委員, PAC), led by Chiang Ching-kuo under the auspices of the "President's Office" directed by Tang Zong.⁶⁹ The PAC's express purpose was to unify and streamline intelligence organizations to improve their dismal performance. By December 1949, the PAC had about 100 personnel detailed to it, with plans underway to select another fifty.⁷⁰ From its second year in operation, the committee also began to register all personnel in the coercive apparatus. This meant that, "for the first time in KMT China, one organization now knew the names of every military or civilian secret agent in the government, military, and party."⁷¹

When Chiang Kai-shek was reinstated to the presidency in March 1950, the President's Office was broken up and incorporated into the formal Office of the President and KMT party headquarters, and the

⁶⁹ Taylor, *Generalissimo*, p. 412; Chen, "Secret Agent Rule," p. 47; Sun Jiaqi, *The Secrets Behind Chiang Ching-kuo's Establishment of Taiwan's Intelligence Services* (Hong Kong: Ri Li Publishers, 1961) / 孫家麒, < 蔣經國建立特務系統密辛 > (香港: 日力, 1961), p. 22.

⁷⁰ Yu Jishi, "Abstract and Original of Tan Zong's 38th year [1949] year-end Political Action Committee report to Chiang Kai-shek," *President Chiang Kaishek Case Files, Special Case Files*, Vol. 010, No. 4, Academia Historica.

⁷¹ Taylor, *Generalissimo*, p. 423; Peter Chen-main Wang, "A Bastion Created, A Regime Reformed, An Economy Reengineered, 1949-1970," in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *Taiwan: A New History* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007), p. 323.

Political Action Committee was transformed into the Confidential Office Data Group of the Office of the President. Tang Zong moved over to head party intelligence work under the Sixth Division of the KMT's Central Reform Committee, and Chiang Ching-kuo took over the Confidential Office Data Group.⁷² According to Chen Tsui-lien, by 1953, the Confidential Office Data Group either exercised a formal supervisory role or had "guidance and coordination" authority over nearly all of the government's security agencies.⁷³

Chiang Ching-kuo also restructured, eliminated, and merged the array of overlapping agencies that had crowded onto the island of Taiwan. After reducing the total number of organizations, he reassigned responsibilities among those that remained, in order to minimize institutional conflict.⁷⁴ He became the Deputy Secretary-General of a new National Defense Council in 1952 and, under NDC auspices, the National Security Bureau (NSB, *Guojia Anquanbu*, 國家安全部) was established in 1955. The National Security Bureau was "a new super-spy organ charged with coordinating and overseeing security work throughout the party, army, state, and society."⁷⁵ Though Zhou Zhirou was named formal director, Vice-Director Chiang Ching-kuo was unquestionably the figure in charge.⁷⁶

The NSB took charge of coordinating the activities of all police, security, and intelligence agencies. Because it coordinated not only government but also party intelligence work, it held even broader jurisdiction than that of its predecessor, the Confidential Office Data Group.⁷⁷ The agencies that it oversaw included the various organs of the Kuomintang, the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan Garrison Command, military intelligence, and local police forces.⁷⁸ Among the NSB's new and augmented responsibilities

⁷² Jiang Nan, *Biography of Chiang Ching-kuo* (Taipei: Li Ao Publishing House, 1995) / 江南著, 蔣經國傳 (台北市: 李敖出版社, 1995), p. 245; Sun, *Secrets Behind Chiang Ching-kuo's Establishment of Taiwan's Intelligence Services*, p. 22; Gao Minghui, *Intelligence Archives: an Old Investigator's Story* (Taipei: Shangzhou Wenhua Press, 1995), pp. 267–70 / 高明輝, 情治檔案: 一個老調「員」的自述 (臺北市, 商周文化發行, 1995), p. 134.

⁷³ Chen, "Secret Agent Rule."

⁷⁴ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, August 3, August 7, and September 6, 1950.

⁷⁵ Thomas B. Gold, *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1986), p. 54.

⁷⁶ Chen, "Secret Agent Rule"; Hsu Rei-Hao, "How Did the Authorities Deal With the Lei Chen Case?" *Academia Historica* (in Chinese), n.d.

⁷⁷ Chen, "Secret Agent Rule."

⁷⁸ National Security Bureau, "History of NSB," www.nsb.gov.tw/En/En_index01.html; "History of the National Defense Council," President Chiang Ching-kuo Case

were: synchronizing each agency's policies; approving the allocation and use of their funding; reviewing their investigation data and reports; planning staff training and research; and monitoring all agencies' record-keeping and human resources practices.⁷⁹

The NSB therefore sat at the top of a centralized, internally coordinated coercive apparatus. At the top, internal security policy was set by the President and NSB, while implementation was directed and overseen by Taiwan's Garrison Command (TGC). At the local level, four regional garrison commanders directed "Party, Government, and Military Joint Warfare Meetings," which were attended by all KMT party chairmen in the region, leaders of local legislative and government offices, county and city police chiefs, leaders of military and military police units, investigative personnel, and officials in charge of telecommunications monitoring. The reports that were compiled from these meetings were routinely forwarded to Garrison Command Headquarters for review.⁸⁰ Civilian law enforcement remained under party and political control; when Governor K. C. Wu sought to strengthen the rule of law by giving "civilian law enforcement officials exclusive jurisdiction to make arrests for non-military crimes," Chiang Ching-kuo blocked him, keeping arrest authority and power concentrated in the hands of his politically trusted "secret police."⁸¹

Particularly significant was the fact that this consolidation dampened the fragmentation and decades-long rivalry between MBIS and CBIS. From 1949–1956, both agencies changed names and places in the organizational structure several times, but eventually CBIS became the Ministry of Justice's Bureau of Investigation (調查局, *Diaochajju*, led by Li Yuanpu; often abbreviated MJIB in English), while the Military Bureau became the Ministry of National Defense's Intelligence Bureau (*Qingbaoju*, led by Mao Renfeng).⁸² The two organizations' portfolios of work were much more clearly divided than in the past, as the Investigative Bureau concentrated on domestic intelligence work in Taiwan, and the Intelligence Bureau directed its operations toward

Files, Academia Historica Archives. See also Chen, "Intelligence Agencies' Internal Competition."

⁷⁹ These responsibilities are outlined in a December 1954 document available in the President Chiang Ching-kuo case files, Vol. 43, Academia Historica Archives.

⁸⁰ Chen Shou-shan, *Taiwan's First Commander in Chief: Oral History of Chen Shoushan* (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002) / 陳守山, <台灣首位上將總司令: 陳守山口述歷史> (台北: 國史館, 2002).

⁸¹ Wu's account of this was published in the U.S. Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, pp. 480–86.

⁸² Chen, "Intelligence Agencies' Internal Competition."

mainland China and other external areas. Ching-kuo further attempted to water down the old MBIS–CBIS rivalry by transferring personnel across the two departments, under a slogan that roughly translates to “improving communication between bureau personnel.”⁸³

Controlling the military

Having been appointed the head of the General Political Warfare Department (GPWD) in 1950, Chiang Ching-kuo pursued reforms that would more cohesively and effectively integrate the military into the internal security apparatus he was constructing.⁸⁴ His efforts consisted of two major steps. First, he reshuffled the military internally to break down factions and limit the potential for conspiracy. Second, he established a system of surveillance and political control that thoroughly penetrated the ROC military and incorporated it into the unitary overall structure of the KMT’s coercive apparatus. Combined with the absence of elite rivals in the military after 1955, these efforts increased Chiang’s confidence that the military had been neutralized as a potential coup threat.

Chiang began by reshuffling military units and reassigning or removing potentially troublesome personnel.⁸⁵ He ordered the retirement of several hundred generals on the grounds of incompetence, and dispersed their subordinates into other units.⁸⁶ He then established a “rotation system of military command” for officers; designed to limit regional and factional divisions, it prohibited any officer from serving in a single post for longer than two years.⁸⁷ Cheng Tun-jen credits this system with eliminating “military paternalism based on personal and regional ties”; it also prevented officers from building a power base among their men and limited their ability to engage in operational collusion with each other.⁸⁸ To further undercut the lingering effects of regionally based factionalism, Chiang Ching-kuo recruited native Taiwanese, augmenting the number of military personnel and making sure that these men were dispersed across the military, as he and Chiang Kai-shek insisted in 1951 that there

⁸³ Li, *Study of the Investigative Bureau*, p. 134.

⁸⁴ Cheng Hsiao-shih, *Party–Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990).

⁸⁵ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, June 29, 1951.

⁸⁶ Taylor, *Generalissimo*, p. 423; Chiang Kai-shek Diaries, Hoover Institution Archives, Box 48, Folders 2–3, entries from January 26, February 2–3, and February 20, 1950.

⁸⁷ Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan,” p. 114.

⁸⁸ Cheng Tun-jen, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1989), pp. 497.

would be “no purely Formosan units.”⁸⁹ As a result of these recruitment and personnel practices, and of the measures taken to improve inclusivity elsewhere in the coercive apparatus, rotational policies did not damage inclusivity as much as they often did in other regimes; instead, the addition of these soldiers prevented officers from coalescing in regional blocs behind a potential rival to Chiang and actually improved the overall inclusivity of the military.

The second step was to establish a Leninist-style commissar program to educate and supervise the military. Political officers were assigned to all units at and below the regimental unit. By 1957, there were 17,000 political staff within the Republic of China military: one for every thirty-five members of the armed forces.⁹⁰ Political officers, along with other intelligence agents, were educated at a training center in Shihpai that was created and supervised by Chiang Ching-kuo in his capacity as the GPWD head.⁹¹ Once embedded, they operated their own chains of reporting and command upward through party channels. Ching-kuo used this system to keep a close eye on military officers – at the beginning, particularly those who he thought might become rivals to or conspirators against his father, such as Chen Cheng and Sun Liren.

American military observers reported that this system was widely unpopular, since officers and men saw it as deliberately designed to tighten Chiang Ching-kuo's control. Disapproving reports from the early 1950s repeated the following (unconfirmed) story about initiation rites forced on soldiers by political officers:

Pledges of loyalty to Generalissimo required of all members military and police forces take form of drop of blood from each person of group into glass of water from which each member of group then sips, plus verbal pledge and in some cases written.⁹²

While the story may be apocryphal, the Shanghai Green Gang (青幫) – which Chiang Kai-shek participated in and used against Shanghai's striking workers in 1927 – as well as the Triads and other secret society brotherhoods did traditionally celebrate blood-sharing rites (typically mixing blood with wine rather than water).⁹³ The refusal to allow purely

⁸⁹ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, July 28, 1951.

⁹⁰ Heinlein, “Political Warfare.”

⁹¹ Gao, *Intelligence Archives*; Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”

⁹² U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, August 7, 1950.

⁹³ C. Martin Wilbur, *The Nationalist Revolution in China, 1923–28* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 104; Rana Mitter, *A Bitter Revolution: China's Struggle with the Modern World* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), p. 145; Brian Martin, *The*

Taiwanese (Formosan) units was also unpopular with the Taiwanese themselves, though this policy was less objectionable to the Mainlanders in the ROC military and was judged by the Chiangs to be worth the dissatisfaction it engendered.

The purpose of the political warfare system within the military also evolved over time to emphasize effective popular control. Monte Bullard writes, "the principal difference in Taiwan's approach to warfare ... was to elevate the role of allegiance warfare – the political and social struggle for the hearts and minds of the people."⁹⁴ Cartoon lessons given to the ROC Army post-reform are particularly revealing of this emphasis. In addition to lessons on the personal grooming and dress standards required of a soldier, Lesson 1 centered on the theme, "I am Chinese," while Lesson 33 instructed, "Soldiers love the people and the people help soldiers. Soldiers and people are one."⁹⁵ The core idea in these reforms of the content of political warfare was clearly to bridge social differences between civilians and soldiers, integrate native Taiwanese, and create a new and unified identity under the KMT.

Increasing inclusivity and social penetration

Finally, reforms to the coercive apparatus were designed to reverse its social isolation, make it more inclusive, and embed it into every corner of society. To do this, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo recruited native Taiwanese into the party and government, including the police and the military; established party organizations to monitor workplaces, schools, and other parts of society; reactivated the *baojia* system and linked it to the organizations that worked on internal security; and developed an extensive network of informants. Particularly notable was the way in which they explicitly connected political institutions (like party networks) and social institutions (such as the *baojia*) to make them an extension of the domestic intelligence and internal security apparatus. While political parties and social associations exist under a range of authoritarian regimes, their close and institutionalized incorporation into the coercive apparatus is, in fact, relatively unusual, and so I treat their social and organizational role during martial law in some depth here.

Shanghai Green Gang: Politics and Organized Crime, 1919–37 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996); Perry, *Shanghai on Strike*.

⁹⁴ Monte R. Bullard, *The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan's Development* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 170.

⁹⁵ Reprinted in Bullard, *The Soldier and the Citizen*, Appendix 4, pp. 183–92.

TABLE 3.1. *Levels of Taiwanese representation in the ROC military*^a

Rank	1960s	1970s	1980s
General	1.3%	7.4%	15.8%
Colonel, Lieutenant Colonel, Major	9.6%	18.8%	32.6%
Lowest three ranks	52.8%	68.4%	78.7%

^a Wu Nai-teh, "Convergence or Polarization? Ethnic Political Support in the Post-Liberalization State," in Chen Chung-min, Chuang Ying-chang, and Huang Shu-min, eds., *Ethnicity in Taiwan: Social, Historical, and Cultural Perspectives* (Taipei: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica, 1994), pp. 156–57; Chu and Lin, "Political Developments," pp. 118–19; Tien Hung-mao, "Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development," and Huang Teh-fu, "Elections and the Evolution of the Kuomintang," in Tien Hung-mao, ed., *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave* (Armonk and London: M. E. Sharpe, 1996), pp. 3–26, 105–36.

Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo recognized early that exclusion and under-representation of native Taiwanese were problematic from an intelligence and security standpoint. As early as January 1949, Chiang had cabled Provincial Governor Chen Cheng to instruct him to hire more native Taiwanese, and "indigenization" increased as Chiang Ching-kuo gained authority.⁹⁶ The Republic of China military, entirely a Mainlander force in 1945, expanded its recruitment and accelerated promotions for Taiwanese. Practically, however, the time required for military advancement made this a slow mechanism of inclusion, especially at top levels (see Table 3.1).

These efforts were also limited by Chiang Kai-shek's fear of defection and forbidding of purely Taiwanese units, which limited retention of native Taiwanese past the mandatory period of military service.⁹⁷ By the 1980s, though Taiwanese populated the overall ROC military in levels roughly proportional to population (80 percent), they remained under-represented at the top levels. They were also under-represented in the police: around 12 percent of the top officers and one-third of city or county police station chiefs.⁹⁸

As a result, it was clear that other mechanisms were needed to complement formal membership in the military and security apparatus. Here, party and local administrative reform became especially useful. Having identified party weakness as a major cause of the KMT's defeat, Chiang

⁹⁶ Chu, *From Governor-General's Office to the President's Office*, p. 14.

⁹⁷ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, July 28, 1951.

⁹⁸ Wu, "Convergence or Polarization," p. 156; Douglas Mendel, *The Politics of Formosan Nationalism* (Berkeley: UC Press, 1970), p. 100.

led an intensive effort between August 1950 and October 1952, known as the Reform (*Gaizao*, 改造) Period, to analyze past KMT failures and develop plans for reform.⁹⁹ (As noted earlier, these efforts followed from and built on reforms to the coercive apparatus, rather than preceding and structuring them.) A group of younger, well-educated, trusted cadres, including Chiang Ching-kuo, made up the Central Reform Committee (CRC), which temporarily replaced the Central Executive Committee and the Central Supervisory Committee in party leadership. Over the course of two years and more than 400 working meetings, the CRC drafted and implemented extensive reforms, including the establishment of party branches throughout society, re-registration of party members, and purges or re-education of remaining cadres. As in the military, the CRC marginalized factions by assigning their leaders to honorary but powerless positions.¹⁰⁰ It coupled implementation of martial law with a land reform program designed to deflect popular discontent, and promoted electoral participation at the local level, using elections to pressure party cadres to keep up the pace of reform and continue to recruit new supporters.¹⁰¹ Chiang openly stated that the threat of electoral punishment was necessary to force cadres to jettison “old conceits,” internalize new attitudes, and consolidate the party’s broadening social base. By the time the Central Executive Committee resumed power in 1952, the Nationalist party had regained political force, combining “strong leadership, concrete structure, tight discipline, high morale, common faith in shared doctrine, greater efficiency, and less corruption.”¹⁰²

Paralleling military recruitment efforts, the Party’s re-registration campaign focused on native Taiwanese. The KMT increased its membership from 50,000 members who crossed the Straits in 1949 to over 280,000 by the Seventh Party Congress in October 1952. Over half were Taiwanese.¹⁰³ At least 30,000 work teams – the lowest level of party

⁹⁹ Myers and Lin, “Breaking With the Past.”

¹⁰⁰ Li Yunhan, *Historical Narrative of the Kuomintang* (Taipei: Kuomintang Central Committee Party Historical Commission Publishers/Modern China Publishing House, 1994, 5 vols.) / 李雲漢著, <中國國民黨史述> (北市: 中國國民黨中央委員會黨史委員會出版: 近代中國出版社發行, 1994), Vol. 4, pp. 74–80; Dickson, “Lessons of Defeat,” p. 67.

¹⁰¹ Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*.

¹⁰² Myers and Lin, “Breaking With the Past,” p. 22; Wang, *Jurisprudence With Historical Thinking*, p. 322.

¹⁰³ CRCA, 6.4-2, reel 5, Annual Report of the Central Reform Committee for fiscal year 1951 (Taipei, August 1951), p. 4, Hoover Institution Archives; Wu Nai-teh, “The Politics of a Regime Patronage System: Mobilization and Control Within an Authoritarian




FIGURE 3.1. Taiwan intelligence agencies' social monitoring and reporting network

Source: Adapted and translated by the author from Chen, "Secret Agent Rule," p. 60.

organization, with nine or more members – spanned Taiwan's geographical, occupational, and societal spectra, with augmentary cells in workplaces and organizations. The Anti-Communist Youth Corps, for example, established in 1952 and headed by Chiang Ching-kuo, was the only intercollegiate organization allowed by law; it was designed to entertain, monitor, and recruit students, especially Taiwanese.¹⁰⁴ Eventually, by 1980, almost 20 percent of the population were KMT members – a higher than average level of inclusion for a Leninist party – and more than 67 percent were native Taiwanese.¹⁰⁵

In combination, these organizations created complementary, overlapping, and coordinated layers of surveillance. (See Figure 3.1.) Each part of society fell under the view of multiple organs and organizations, but rather than being stovepiped or compartmentalized, intelligence and reporting on societal targets was shared across the coercive apparatus in a coordinated fashion. Reporting flowed upward through multiple inter-related channels to both the KMT and Taiwan Garrison

Regime," PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1987, p. 66; Wang, "A Bastion Created," p. 322; Cheng, "Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan."

¹⁰⁴ Wang, "A Bastion Created," p. 323; Kuo, "Origins of State-Local Relations in Taiwan," p. 46.

¹⁰⁵ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, p. 312; Jorgen Dormes, "State Capacity in an Asian Democracy: The Example of Taiwan," in Kjeld Erik Brodsgaard and Susan Young, eds., *State Capacity in East Asia* (Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 116.

Command, whose information and activities were coordinated by the National Security Bureau and the President's Office.

The clear purpose of this reform process, and of the structure that emerged from it, was to more effectively monitor and investigate Taiwan society. In order to accomplish this – and unlike other authoritarian parties, including Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath party in Iraq (see Chapter 9) – party intelligence was clearly linked into and placed at the service of the broader coercive structure. The Sixth Division of the KMT Central Committee, which was responsible for intelligence-gathering and prevention, coordinated the party's intelligence work. Members were instructed to carry out social investigation (社會調查, *shehui diaocha*) at least once a month, and to act as “the eyes and ears” of the party. The reports that they provided included lists of local notables, statistical information, analyses of social trends, and evidence of illegal and communist-sympathizing activity – information that was then used to identify targets for more intensive, formal surveillance.¹⁰⁶ Public service stations, set up by the KMT in 1953–54 in every town and village, gathered and reported statistics on local organizations, agencies, schools, religions, factions, gangs, criminals, influential citizens, and leaders.¹⁰⁷

These tasks and the eventual destination of the information they generated were not secret. Douglas Mendel, a critical American observer teaching in Taiwan during martial law, described students' explanations of the regime's internal security system: “its use of secret police, political commissars, youth corps, labor indoctrination, and dogmatic slogans. KMT party spies appear to infest every local government office, private organization, school campus, and community organization.” He also recounted warnings by a local official not to trust even low-level native bureaucrats, because they “would sell their own brothers to the security police.”¹⁰⁸ It was clear to all in Taiwan's society, as well as to foreign visitors, that party offices and organs were part and parcel of the regime's extensive domestic intelligence and security network.

To reinforce the security apparatus' penetration of society, the regime also drew on a Japanese legacy it had initially neglected. Chiang

¹⁰⁶ Myers and Lin, “Breaking With the Past,” p. 12; CRCA 6.4-2, reel 4, minutes of 168th CRC meeting, July 9, 1951, Hoover Institution Archives; *Gaizao*, no. 19 (June 1951), p. 65; *Gaizao*, no. 47–48 (August 1952), pp. 42–43.

¹⁰⁷ Chen, “Secret Agent Rule,” p. 59; Gong Yijun, *Foreign Regime and Native Society: The Formation of the Kuomintang's Post-Reform Social Base (1950–69)* (Taipei County, Banqiao: Daoxiang Publishing House, 1998) / 龔宜君著, <外來政權與本土社會: 改造後國民黨政權社會基礎的形成 (1950–69)> (台北縣板橋市: 稻江出版社, 1998), pp. 46–49.

¹⁰⁸ Mendel, *Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, pp. 94, 100.

Ching-kuo was close to officers who had studied in Japan (more than to those who had studied in the United States) and, beginning in late 1949, much of the ROC's military training was done by the White Group, composed of retired Japanese military officers and directed by Peng Mengji, who himself had studied in Japan.¹⁰⁹ Early Japanese colonial security had been no less fragmented and socially isolated than the initial efforts of the KMT, but by 1945 Japan had bequeathed to Taiwan's new rulers a strong, internally coordinated policing system that was heavily enmeshed in and inclusive of local society.¹¹⁰ The island's 1,000 civil police stations each had four or five police officers, overseeing up to five household groups (*hoko*).¹¹¹ Native Taiwanese had comprised 20–30 percent of the police force after 1901, and those who were Japanese had received language training. Typically, each Formosan officer partnered with two Japanese policemen, and concentrated on investigative work, where knowledge of local conditions was especially advantageous.¹¹² Policemen during the colonial period were expected to attain a “quality of omniscience” and “minute and detailed knowledge of a multitudinous state of affairs” within their jurisdiction, including:

[S]upervision of publications; supervision of all public meetings and private organizations (the detection of any group or society that might endanger the existing form of government or the system of private property is chief purpose);

¹⁰⁹ Report, Office of the Chief, Army Section, Military Assistance and Advisory Group, September 17, 1951; Ambassador Karl Rankin, “Mutual Security Policy Monthly General Report,” November 1951; December 20, 1951.

¹¹⁰ Tsai, “One Kind of Control”; Hui-yu Caroline Tsai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building: An Institutional Approach to Colonial Development* (Abingdon and New York: Routledge, 2009); Reo Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition: Colonial Lessons for Contemporary State-building,” PhD dissertation, MIT, 2011; Harry J. Lamley, “Taiwan Under Japanese Rule, 1895–1945: The Vicissitudes of Colonialism,” in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *Taiwan: A New History* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2007, expanded ed.), pp. 201–60; Yosaburo Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa* (London: Longmans, 1907; reprinted by Taipei: SMC Publishing, 1996); James W. Davidson, *The Island of Formosa Past and Present* (London and New York: Macmillan, 1907); Edward I-te Chen, “The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives,” in Ramon H. Myers and Mark R. Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895–1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press: 1984).

¹¹¹ Tsai, “One Kind of Control”; Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems” p. 215.

¹¹² Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 181; Chengtian Kuo, “The Origins of State–Local Relations in Taiwan: A New Institutional Perspective,” *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 6 (November/December 1999), p. 36; Edward I-te Chen, “Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control,” *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, No. 30 (1970), pp. 126–58; Chen, “Police and Community Control Systems,” p. 215; Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, p. 150.

supervision of religion; control of situation in case of accident, flood, earthquake (fire departments and auxiliaries such as youth groups are under police control); and maintenance of public morals (contact with schools and social-educational bodies to insure “correct thinking” on political and economic questions).¹¹³

Bicycles were forbidden and training manuals specified how fast policemen should walk to allow time for proper observation (“on foot at a speed of about 60 steps a minute”). They collected reports from everyone: taxi drivers, rail and bus workers, prostitutes, waitresses, managers of hotels and boarding houses, and *hoko* leaders.¹¹⁴ Photographs, household details, and personal information on every surrendered rebel were filed in police stations to help identify potential troublemakers.¹¹⁵ The system centralized control under the Governor-General, but “intelligence transmitted freely from one part to another, and the relations between the rural officers and the central government resemble[d] those existing between the hands and the brain.”¹¹⁶

To supplement the police, the Japanese had also strengthened the *hoko* system – their name for the *baojia* – and placed it under police authority.¹¹⁷ Ten households comprised one *ko*, and ten *ko* formed a *ho*; in practice, *hoko* units varied between 50 and 300 households.¹¹⁸ Nominally a form of communitarian self-government, *hoko* leaders were supervised directly by the police; their offices were co-located with and their meetings held inside police stations.¹¹⁹ Colonial administrators were enthusiastic about drawing on Taiwan’s “organic politics” of communal obligation and kinship to enhance self-rule in ways that were compatible with Japanese control, encouraging Taiwanese within a *hoko* unit to report on each other and collectively fining villages for social unrest or failure to report insurgent activity.¹²⁰ By 1905, more than 5 percent

¹¹³ George H. Kerr, “Shu (Province) and Cho (District) Police System,” MG-8, Lecture 28, George H. Kerr papers, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Box 3, Folder 8 (3.8); “Administration – Police system (Japanese period),” n.d. (Accession No. xx381-8M.38).

¹¹⁴ Kerr, “Shu (Province) and Cho (District) Police System,” pp. 14–16.

¹¹⁵ Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 187.

¹¹⁶ Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, p. 148; Kerr, “Shu (Province) and Cho (District) Police System,” p. 3; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, p. 58.

¹¹⁷ Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan,” pp. 102–29.

¹¹⁸ Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 191.

¹¹⁹ Tsai, “One Kind of Control,” pp. 87–102, 150–52; Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 198–99.

¹²⁰ Goto Shimpei, “The Administration of Formosa,” in Okuma Shigeno-bu, ed., *Fifty Years of New Japan* (London: Smith, Elder & Co., 1909), pp. 536–37; Tsai, “One Kind of Control”; Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 194–95.

of Taiwan's civilian population (58,000 people) held a position of leadership in the *hoko* or its associated militia system; by 1945, the ratio of security personnel (including *hoko* leaders) to ordinary citizens was 1:47.¹²¹ The *hoko*'s deep social penetration made it "extremely difficult" for strangers to travel unnoticed, since not only the travel but also who had reported it became a matter of record.¹²² Visitors remarked on the effectiveness of the system in "preventing offences, detecting crime, collecting taxes, and even assisting greatly in putting down the brigands,"¹²³ and contemporary historians credit this thorough integration of police and *hoko* as the "key factor" that enabled Japan to exercise effective control over Taiwan's population.¹²⁴ Matsuzaki terms this process the "hybridization" of Japanese colonial and native Taiwanese institutions; contemporary observer George Kerr referred to the system less charitably as a "community straitjacket."¹²⁵ By 1945, Taiwan's policing apparatus was a unitary, inclusive internal security system that had replaced "repressive mechanisms" with "information superiority."¹²⁶

From 1945 to 1949, Nationalist authorities had allowed that system to lapse, and had fired many of the individuals who worked in it. After 1949, however, the system was recalled to action and put into the service of the KMT. Chiang reactivated the *hoko/baojia* and subsumed it into the monitoring network operated by the party and local government, so that it was once again closely linked to the gathering of domestic intelligence and the deployment of coercive power.¹²⁷ The *bao* and *jia* were merged into local governments; *jia* become *lin* of 6–15 families, and *bao* became *li* of 150–300 families. The secretaries of the *bao* and *jia* (保甲書記, *baojia shuji*), who had assisted the local heads of the system during the Japanese colonial era, became employees of local government.¹²⁸

As under the Japanese, the *baojia* system under the KMT was coupled with a clear system of mutual monitoring and collective responsibility.

¹²¹ Tsai, "One Kind of Control"; Lamley, "Taiwan Under Japanese Rule," p. 215; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, pp. 57–58.

¹²² Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, pp. 60–61.

¹²³ Takekoshi, *Japanese Rule in Formosa*, p. 151.

¹²⁴ Ching-chih Chen, "The Japanese Adaptation of the Pao-Chia System in Taiwan, 1895–1945," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (February 1975), pp. 402–03.

¹²⁵ Tsai, "One Kind of Control"; Tsai, *Taiwan in Japan's Empire Building*; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, p. 58.

¹²⁶ Chu and Lin, "Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan," p. 111.

¹²⁷ Kuo, "Origins of State-Local Relations in Taiwan," p. 45.

¹²⁸ Kuo, "Origins of State-Local Relations in Taiwan," p. 37; Hui-yu Caroline Tsai, "Notes on Hoko Secretaryship."

Regulations established in June 1950 required individuals and families within a unit to provide information on each other to the authorities. According to Article 5 of the regulations, each person had to “associate” with at least two other people, and if it was discovered that the individual in question was a spy, his two associates as well as his supervisor would be held responsible, with a penalty of jail time ranging from one to seven years on the charge of failing to report a spy.¹²⁹ Sanctions could also be issued to the entire neighborhood, unit, or organization. In general, local neighborhood leaders (the old *baojia* heads) were seen by the authorities as responsible for maintaining a spy-free area.¹³⁰ The integration of these social institutions into the coercive apparatus contributed significantly to its inclusivity.

Finally, beyond the formal organizations of the coercive apparatus, the party, and the organized social support provided by the *baojia* system lay a large and inclusive network of informers used to monitor potentially subversive activity within society. One 1964 estimate concluded that “Ching-kuo had 50,000 regular policing agents in the many organizations under his control ... the number of paid informants active on Formosa might be ten times that figure.”¹³¹ No specific information has come to light to corroborate this particular claim, but according to the former Vice Minister of the Investigative Bureau, his organization alone in 1979 had 2,000 investigators, each responsible for thirty to forty informants (*xianmin*, 線民) assigned to a particular community or organization. This totals 80,000 *xianmin* for a population of 17.5 million (10.6 million adults) – a ratio of one informant for every 219 citizens, or 1:132 if one excludes children.¹³² This ratio is only for informants run by the Investigative Bureau; it does not include those working for other agencies; information provided by KMT offices located in schools, large companies, and civic associations; or the information that came through the *baojia* system.¹³³ Even if one counts only informants employed by the Investigative Bureau, this ratio suggests

¹²⁹ Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”

¹³⁰ Gao, *Intelligence Archives*, pp. 160–68.

¹³¹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, pp. 395, 495 fn. 3; Tillman Durdin, “Taiwan and the Nationalist Government,” unpublished ms. prepared for the Council on Foreign Relations symposium on The United States and China in World Affairs, 1964, cited by Mark Mancall, ed., *Formosa Today* (New York: Praeger, 1964), p. 36; Roy, *Taiwan*, p. 91; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, p. 312. Douglas Mendel estimates 30,000. Mendel, *Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, p. 119.

¹³² Gao, *Intelligence Archives*; Li, *Study of the Investigative Bureau*.

¹³³ Gold, *State and Society in the Taiwan Miracle*, p. 60.

a level of societal penetration historically matched by very few secret police organizations – among them those of contemporary North Korea and the East German Stasi. Perhaps unsurprisingly, a popular expression during the martial law era was that “everyone has a police headquarters in their hearts.”¹³⁴

With so many different sources of information flowing in from throughout Taiwan’s society, the regime developed a sophisticated internal information management system to process, organize, and communicate its intelligence. Locally, police stations “regulate[d] inter-personal relations not just by enforcing laws, but by relying on detailed household records to understand how people were connected and who should be contacted were some incident to occur.”¹³⁵ At the central level, the National Security Bureau established a Data Center, in keeping with its charge to provide the data necessary to set, manage, and coordinate internal security policy. By 1967, the Data Center held nearly 140,000 case files on dissidents, suspected spies, Taiwan independence activists, and other persons of concern: 26,000 individual case files, some of which dated back to 1950, plus another 110,000 files or pieces of data from the Office of the President and the various intelligence sources.¹³⁶ Intelligence agencies kept additional files, nicknamed AB files since A files held basic data, and B files held secret information.¹³⁷

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Prominent alternative explanations do not satisfactorily explain the origins and design of Taiwan’s coercive apparatus. These explanations fail to explain the ultimate outcome, and are particularly weak in explicating the process by which the coercive institutions were developed – namely, the reforms made to the intelligence and internal security apparatus in the early 1950s.

¹³⁴ Huang Fusan, *Documentary Compilation of Political Cases in Taiwan during the Martial Law Period, 1950s-1970s* (Nantou: Taiwan Provincial Documentary Commission, 2001) / 黃富三, 台灣地區戒嚴時代政治案件, 五〇-七〇年代文獻記錄: 美麗島事件 (南投: 台灣省文獻會, 2001), p. 11; Lu Fang-shang et al., *Oral Histories of Taipei-Area Political Cases During Martial Law* (Taipei: Academia Sinica, Institute of Modern History Oral History Series, 1999, 3 vols.) / 呂芳上等訪問, 丘慧君紀錄, <戒嚴時期臺北地區政治案件口述歷史> (台北市: 中央研究院近代史研究所 口述歷史叢書, 1999, 3 冊).

¹³⁵ Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 208.

¹³⁶ “History of the National Defense Council,” in *President Chiang Ching-kuo Case Files/Loyalty and Diligence Case Files*, Vol. 43 (Taipei: 1967), Academia Historica.

¹³⁷ Chen, “Secret Agent Rule.”

Arguments about *institutional path dependence* draw our attention to two models that one could plausibly argue the KMT “inherited,” upon which they could have based their internal security apparatus. These two models are the Japanese colonial model of policing and internal security, and the model used by the KMT to police the mainland. A path-dependent argument suggests that Taiwan’s coercive apparatus under martial law should have exhibited a high degree of continuity with one or the other of these legacies, or both. The first problem with this argument, however, is that it is indeterminate in its prediction, because Taiwan had two possible and opposite institutional legacies to work from: one unitary and inclusive, and one fragmented and exclusive. While the chapter shows that both legacies mattered at different times and in different ways, theories of path dependence make no clear prediction about which should dominate.

More importantly, the simple historical presence of these two models cannot explain which outcome would ultimately dominate, in what aspects of internal security, at what time, by what process, and why. In fact, each of the two models predominated at one time, but not the other. The KMT did draw on the Japanese legacy to achieve the task of popular management, but not as a result of any direct continuity or because it was inevitable; this institutional inheritance was essentially irrelevant from 1945–1949 because it did not serve the political interests of the leadership. Likewise, the regime first employed a set of institutions “inherited” from mainland China, but proved willing and able to depart from this legacy when it became clear that the security situation required it. Institutional inheritance provided Chiang with certain institutional and social resources, but these did not become determinative constraints on his coercive institutional design. Given a choice of inherited institutions, he selectively employed the ones that were useful at a particular time to meet the dominant threat that he perceived to his power.

International influence also clearly informs Taiwan’s coercive institutional design at multiple points in its development. The chapter demonstrates the presence of American, Japanese, and German influence on KMT policing strategies in mainland China, and of Japanese and Soviet influence on post-1949 policing in Taiwan. Again, however, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo chose which influences and legacies to respond to based on their perceptions of their political interests. Given the close relationship between the United States and the Nationalist regime during this period, we should expect American influence to be most prominent in Taiwan’s organization and management of internal security. For exactly this reason, the American *démarche* that made U.S. support for the KMT

dependent on reformed governance of Taiwan clearly motivated Chiang to act.¹³⁸ The specific reforms that he undertook, however, ran counter to both American models and American preferences; he eschewed these in favor of a system of political commissars and youth league organizations that his American allies and American-aligned opponents criticized for their similarity to Nazi and Communist structures. If external influence on coercive institutional design were decisive, we would expect to see an internal security apparatus after 1950 that reflected either American models or American preferences; we see neither.

Rather than directly influencing the structure and social composition of Taiwan's coercive institutions, American actions were most influential in shaping the threat perceptions of Chiang Kai-shek. By telling Chiang in autumn 1949 that assistance on external security depended on effective reforms to Taiwan's domestic security and governance, and by signaling support for the Nationalists at the beginning of the Korean War, the United States reinforced the message that Chiang's survival depended on effective management of popular threats, above all else. By providing a refuge for some of Chiang's chief political opponents and rivals, the U.S. lowered his perception of coup risk and elite threat as well. This left Chiang relatively free to concentrate on the need to manage popular threats – and ironically, to buck U.S. influence in designing a coercive apparatus that was optimized to do so.

CONCLUSION

The design of Taiwan's coercive institutions clearly reflects shifting perceptions of the dominant threat on the part of Chiang Kai-shek and his son Chiang Ching-kuo. The internal security apparatus initially used to govern Taiwan after retrocession in 1945 was organized to manage the elite threats faced by Chiang Kai-shek on the mainland. It was therefore fragmented and socially exclusive. In 1949, however, dramatic shifts to Chiang's security environment altered his perceptions of the dominant political threat he faced. These changes included not just the loss of the mainland, but a recent history of widespread popular unrest on the island of Taiwan itself, combined with temporary confidence vis-à-vis the external threat environment, a drop in elite threats due to the physical removal of most of Chiang's plausible rivals from the island, and an American ultimatum that made continued external security dependent on

¹³⁸ Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma*, pp. 192–93.

effective popular threat management. Taken together, these factors convinced Chiang that his most urgent priority was managing the threat of popular unrest on Taiwan, and consolidating control over the island and its inhabitants. As a result of this changed perception of the dominant threat, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo completely overhauled Taiwan's coercive institutions. They altered the structure of the coercive apparatus to make it unitary, and altered its social composition to make it more inclusive, especially in intelligence-gathering, both through formal recruitment and by leveraging institutionalized linkages between coercive agencies and social institutions. This shift in Chiang's threat perceptions from a focus on rival elites to a focus on popular unrest explains not only the timing and nature of reforms to the internal security apparatus, but the prioritization accorded to these reforms and the process by which they were carried out.

Organizing coercion in the Philippines

A Spanish colony since the mid-1500s, the Philippine Islands became an American colony after a period of warfare at the turn of the twentieth century, and achieved Commonwealth status and limited domestic autonomy in 1935. The archipelago saw brutal fighting after its occupation by Japan in 1941; granted independence in 1946, it was then governed by a series of democratically elected presidents. From the mid-1940s to the mid-1950s, the government sought to suppress a rebellion by the Communist Hukbalahap insurgency. The sixth president, Ferdinand Marcos, was elected in 1965 and re-elected in 1969. Unable to run for a third term, Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, and remained in office until deposed by a combination of military coup-defection and mass uprising – the so-called People's Power revolution – in 1986.

This chapter examines the origins of Marcos' internal security apparatus, particularly the coercive institutions that operated from the declaration of martial law in September 1972 to his fall from power in 1986. Like Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, Marcos had the opportunity to reorganize the Philippines' coercive apparatus and did so. However, Marcos chose the opposite kind of coercive institutional design to that of Chiang: one that was fragmented and socially exclusive. This chapter examines why. It shows that fragmentation and exclusivity were not dictated either by external American influence or by the social factors and institutions that Marcos inherited. If either American assistance or preferences were decisive, the Philippines should have emphasized unitary internal security forces, especially police, to handle the popular threat of communist subversion. If institutional inheritance were determinative, then the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) should have remained socially inclusive,

and Marcos would not have been able to pursue unitary internal security institutions as a democratically elected leader but then create fragmented ones as he moved toward dictatorial rule.

For a complete explanation of why Marcos chose to pursue fragmentation and exclusivity in the coercive apparatus after 1972, then, we must look to his own perceptions of threat. This chapter shows that Marcos created this apparatus primarily to deal with the threat of a coup by the military and security forces, which he feared would pave the way for one of the other elite families in the Philippines to replace him as President. The first section of this chapter reviews the institutions that existed prior to 1972, demonstrating that neither fragmentation nor social exclusivity was foreordained. The second section of the chapter traces Marcos' evolving threat perceptions; it demonstrates that despite public rhetoric about popular threats, evidence from internal assessments and Marcos' own diaries suggests that he found these threats negligible relative to the threats posed by his security forces and their potential supporters within elite Philippine families. As a result, he created fragmented and exclusive coercive institutions, a process that is outlined in the third section of the chapter.

INDETERMINATE INSTITUTIONAL INHERITANCE: PRE-1972 INTERNAL SECURITY IN THE PHILIPPINES

The pre-1972 institutional history of the Philippines' coercive apparatus makes apparent these forces' malleability, emphasizing that they were not always fragmented and socially exclusive. While Spanish security forces were exclusive, American colonial forces deliberately sought inclusivity and emphasized intelligence-gathering. Fragmentation was high under colonial rule, but decreased during Marcos' time as a democratically elected leader. These shifts clearly demonstrate that although there exist underlying continuities in Philippine state-society relations, the specific design of the country's coercive apparatus has been far more flexible, varying with the particular interests of the archipelago's political leadership. The fragmentation and exclusivity of Marcos' post-1972 coercive apparatus, therefore, cannot be wholly attributed to path dependence or institutional inheritance.

Both Spanish and American authorities ruled the archipelago through a fragmented array of security organizations: the military, the paramilitary Guardia Civil (GC), and municipal police forces. In the early centuries of Spanish rule, security was left to municipal forces, organized

militia-style and called *cuadrilleros*.¹ In 1868, however, desire for additional control over the countryside, combined with the rising influence of the Spanish Army in Spain itself, led to the creation of the Guardia Civil, a paramilitary police designed to suppress warlords and bandits (*ladrones*) and ensure social order. The GC operated separately from the Spanish military, and municipal forces were expressly forbidden from interfering in their operations, creating a lack of coordination between the three organizations.² It was also exclusive; only Spaniards could serve as commissioned officers, and authorities “deliberately recruited its members not from their own locality, but from the areas of their traditional enemies.”³ As a result, the GC was known for its violence, and was much resented by Filipinos.⁴

After 1902, American colonial authorities retained this fragmented, tripartite structure. A desire to fashion Philippine democracy in America’s image, which included a normative emphasis on decentralization and local autonomy, led officials to perpetuate the fragmented Spanish legacy.⁵ As the U.S. Army “pacified” various areas, officials turned village-level *cuerpos de cuadrilleros* into municipal police, over which the Army retained nominal oversight but little control.⁶ Colonial authorities also sanctioned “rural police”: private forces that guarded roads from highwaymen (and, sometimes, haciendas from angry peasants). Under command of the local *presidente*, these police essentially became private security for rural notables.⁷ Colonial authorities also transformed the Guardia Civil into the Philippine Constabulary (PC), which Secretary of the Interior and Philippine Commission member Dean Worcester described as “A body of armed men with military organization, recruited from among the people

¹ Greg Bankoff, “Big Fish in Small Ponds: The Exercise of Power in a Nineteenth-Century Philippine Municipality,” *Modern Asian Studies*, Vol. 26, No. 4 (1992), pp. 684–87.

² Theodore Grossman, “The Guardia Civil and Its Influence on Philippine Society,” *Archiviana* (December 1972), pp. 3–7; McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 15.

³ Grossman, “The Guardia Civil,” pp. 4–6; George Yarrington Coats, “The Philippine Constabulary 1901–1917,” PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 1968, p. 15; Reo Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 215.

⁴ Bankoff, “Big Fish,” p. 700; Grossman, “The Guardia Civil,” p. 6; Coats, “Philippine Constabulary,” p. 15.

⁵ Stanley Karnow, *In Our Image: America’s Empire in the Philippines* (New York: Random House, 1989).

⁶ Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 212.

⁷ Alfred W. McCoy, *Policing America’s Empire: The United States, The Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2009), pp. 349–56; Emanuel Agrava Baja, *The Philippine Police System and its Problems* (Manila: Pobre Press, 1933), pp. 532–40; David R. Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines 1840–1940* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1976), pp. 249–51.

of the islands, officered in part by Americans and in part by Filipinos and employed primarily for police duty in connection with the establishment and maintenance of public order.”⁸ Critically, American administrators opted not to incorporate local forces into the national structure of the PC, despite repeated complaints from on-the-ground experts that the duplication of forces and lack of coordination was “a great waste.”⁹ The quasi-militaristic PC was also in competition with the Army, particularly the Army’s Philippine Scouts; the Army tried to block funding and equipment for PC forces while funding the Scouts lavishly.¹⁰

American colonial authorities did, however, make the coercive apparatus more inclusive. Under the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations’ push for civilianization, and especially after the First World War pulled American officers away from the archipelago, indigenization (“Filipinization”) became a key priority. Modeled after British India, Dutch Java, and American Puerto Rico, each province was to have “150 men ... selected from the natives thereof.”¹¹ By 1933, only 3 percent of Constabulary officers were American, and they were trained at a domestic academy rather than attending West Point.¹² Most importantly, each province furnished its own men, assigned *within* their home province – thereby reversing the Spanish system of assignment. The Philippine Commission explicitly reasoned that the risk of corruption and defection would be offset by intelligence advantages, noting that these men’s “familiarity with local dialects, geography, and political conditions was seen as an important asset in combating outlaws and insurgents” and suggesting that ex-revolutionaries were best placed to know “the locations of safehouses and the meeting places of outlaws.”¹³ In-group policing was also seen as a way to reduce the brutality for which the Guardia Civil and the American occupation had been criticized, and which the Philippine Scouts had used against other ethnic groups.¹⁴

⁸ Coats, “Philippine Constabulary,” p. 6.

⁹ Quote from Harry Bandholtz in Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 169, 211, 224, 235–36; Greg Bankoff, *Crime, Society and the State in Nineteenth Century Philippines* (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1996), pp. 134–37; Baja, *Philippine Police System*, pp. 37–44, 87–98, 182–83; Margarita Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” in Margarita Cojuangco, ed., *Konstable: The Story of the Philippine Constabulary 1901–1991* (Manila: ABoCan, 1991), pp. 1–22; Coats, “Philippine Constabulary.”

¹⁰ Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” pp. 14, 18; Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 209, 215.

¹¹ Taft’s instructions to Root, quoted in Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” pp. 8, 12–13.

¹² Baja, *Philippine Police System*, p. 70; McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 17–18.

¹³ Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” p. 12.

¹⁴ Cojuangco, “Islands in Turmoil,” p. 12; Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 217.

An inclusive manpower system was also complemented by archipelago-wide intelligence networks, a priority of Constabulary chief Brigadier General Henry Allen. For example, Metropolitan Manila's police received state-of-the-art intelligence equipment and training, which they used to amass an alphabetized file card index of 200,000 Filipinos: 70 percent of the city's population.¹⁵ Allen's informant network, and the intelligence system in which it was embedded, was credited with forestalling several insurrections during the relatively quiescent period after 1911.¹⁶ Moreover, even though budget constraints continued to hamper police operations, the PC's treatment of civilians improved so much that the Commission began to worry instead that it would become too popular.¹⁷ American colonial rule, therefore, largely reversed the Spanish legacy of exclusivity.

The post-1935, pre-Marcos period of Philippine democracy further highlights malleability rather than path dependence in Philippine security institutions. Strong executive powers granted to the President with the establishment of the Commonwealth in 1935 – including power to declare martial law and suspend habeas corpus – aided this process.¹⁸ After 1935, President Quezon sought to use the PC as the basis for a new national army; 8,700 PC members were transferred to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), inaugurated just before independence on July 4, 1946.¹⁹ The AFP was intended to represent and act for all of Philippine society, rather than operating at the piecemeal behest of local politicians. To foster national unity, counter the entrenchment of local interests, and persuade the public that kinship ties would not corrupt officials, Quezon established a rotation policy that forbade “the retention of Constabulary officers in the same province for too long a time, especially when they have relatives in that province.”²⁰

¹⁵ Coats, “Philippine Constabulary,” p. 9; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 28.

¹⁶ W. Cameron Forbes, *The Philippine Islands*, Vol. I (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1928), pp. 220–21; Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 218; Sturtevant, *Popular Uprisings in the Philippines*.

¹⁷ In Manila in 1934, the police–citizen ratio was 1:407, but the national average was 1:1,525. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 357; Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” pp. 221, 229.

¹⁸ David Wurfel, *Philippine Politics: Development and Decay* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), pp. 76–77.

¹⁹ Suzanne G. Carpenter, “Toward the Development of Philippine National Security Capabilities, 1920–40: With Special Reference to the Commonwealth Period,” PhD dissertation, New York University, 1976, pp. 123–24, 139–43, 174–75, 211–12; *New York Times*, November 20, 1934; November 25, 1934; May 30, 1936; June 20, 1936; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 363–64.

²⁰ “Dictation by the President,” Malacañang Palace, January 16, 1936, Manuel Quezon Papers, Series 7, Box 62, File: Constabulary, Philippine National Library.

For the same reasons, he opted not to draw the officer corps only from Reserve Officers' Training Corps (ROTC) graduates at elite universities, but to expand recruiting to the lower and middle classes, who could join the officer class by attending the Philippine Military Academy (PMA). By centering the military on the PMA rather than ROTC, Quezon sought to create a nationally representative and inclusive military.²¹ He also pursued the creation of a national police force, but the effort was blocked by legislators, and the PC was pulled back into a domestic security role until the Second World War placed the entire Philippine military, including the PC, under American command.²²

Both the domestic security environment and the structure of the Philippine coercive apparatus remained unstable in the years immediately following the Second World War. A number of factors – the demobilization of the Army, the discrediting of collaborationist police forces, and the rise of domestic insurgent groups and private security forces – combined to shatter the public monopoly on coercive power. The PC was removed from the AFP in 1947, and put back under it in 1950, maintaining the archipelago's fragmented domestic security architecture. An array of overlapping police forces supplemented their wages through racketeering, and the Huk rebellion escalated in the provinces.²³ The result was “de facto warlordism” based on what observers cynically termed the “trinity” of Philippine politics: guns, goons, and gold.²⁴

²¹ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*.

²² At this point the PC became known as the Military Police Command (MPC). Joseph R. Hayden, *The Philippines: A Study in National Development* (New York: Macmillan, 1942), pp. 294, 741–42; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 364–66; Baja, *Philippine Police System*, Vol. 2, pp. 72–74.

²³ Cicero C. Campos, “The Role of Police in the Philippines: A Case Study from the Third World,” PhD dissertation, Michigan State University, 1983, pp. 184, 210; Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, pp. 377–79; Fidel V. Ramos, “New Perspectives in the Fight Against Crime,” *Diamond Jubilee Issue of the Philippine Constabulary*, 1976, pp. 40–41; *Manila Times*, December 11, 1965; *Manila Times*, December 17, 1965; John Sidel, “The Philippines: the Language of Legitimation,” in Muthia Alagappa, ed., *Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), p. 147; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 375–86; Frank E. Walton *et al.*, *Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement* (Washington, DC: USAID, 1966); Frank Walton, *A Survey of the Manila Police Department* (Washington, DC: USAID, 1964); Frank Walton *et al.*, *Survey of Law Enforcement: Customs Enforcement* (Washington, DC: USAID, 1966).

²⁴ Matsuzaki, “Institutions by Imposition,” p. 209; Cesar P. Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces of the Filipino People* (Quezon City: New Day, 2000), pp. 363–68; George Malcolm, *The First Malayan Republic: The Story of the Philippines* (Boston, 1951), pp. 382–83; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 379–83; Alfred McCoy, ed., *An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines* (Madison: University of

The pressure imposed by popular threat, however, did eventually force the AFP to become a more inclusive, intelligence-oriented institution. The definitive internal security challenge of the late 1940s and 1950s was peasant rebellion in central Luzon by the Communist Party and its 15,000 Hukbalahap (Huk) guerillas.²⁵ Initially criticized for brutality and ineffectiveness, the AFP (under Defense Secretary and eventual President Ramon Magsaysay) slowly transformed into an organization designed for guerilla war.²⁶ It relied heavily on military intelligence at the battalion combat team level to facilitate collection of “important and timely information.”²⁷ The AFP staged elaborate psychological warfare campaigns to persuade the population of the dangers of Communist subversion, and attempted to address the social and economic sources of discontent through measures such as land reform (never fully implemented).²⁸ Magsaysay also established a reward system for information on top Communist leaders. It had two key features: money was given to informants for information, rather than capture or killing, and the AFP received recognition and sometimes promotions, but not money, for performance.²⁹ The information accumulated by this intelligence program culminated in the capture of multiple high-level targets in the first half of the 1950s, and led U.S. officials to use the Philippines as a model for combating communist insurgency worldwide.³⁰ This, then, was the internal security framework that Marcos inherited: oriented toward popular threat, still somewhat fragmented but with increasingly clear lines of organizational responsibility, socially inclusive, and attuned to the need for good intelligence to manage the threat of popular unrest.

Wisconsin, 2009); John T. Sidel, *Capital, Coercion, and Crime: Bossism in the Philippines* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999).

²⁵ Benedict J. Kerkvliet, *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines* (Berkeley: University of California, 1977).

²⁶ John G. Jameson, Jr., *The Philippine Constabulary as a Counterinsurgency Force 1948–54* (Carlisle Barracks: Army War College, 1971), pp. 18–19; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 373–77; Raymond Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator: the Marcoses and the Making of American Policy* (New York: Vintage, 1988), pp. 35–36.

²⁷ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 405, 412–14.

²⁸ Magsaysay passed the Land Reform Act in 1955, but because of opposition from local elites it was never effectively implemented. Edward Lansdale, *In the Midst of Wars: An American's Mission to Southeast Asia* (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), pp. 72–73; Campos, “Role of Police,” pp. 181–82.

²⁹ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 408.

³⁰ National Security Council, Action Memorandum 182, “U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy,” August 24, 1962/September 1962.

MARCOS' CHANGING THREAT PERCEPTIONS

As President, Ferdinand Marcos initially focused on popular threats and criminal violence – appropriate since his electoral platform in 1965 placed a strong emphasis on improving law and order throughout the Philippines. As a democratically elected leader whose constituency would hold him accountable for promising to restore popular order and decrease criminal violence, Marcos pursued a set of reforms designed to do exactly that.³¹ He increased centralization, improved the internal coordination of the internal security forces, and expanded the inclusiveness and reach of the Philippines' coercive apparatus. After his unprecedented re-election in 1969, however, he began to think about how to ensure a third term in office, which he accomplished by declaring martial law in September 1972. From that time until his overthrow in 1986, he perceived an increasing threat from the military, which he feared would partner with rival political elites to remove him from office.

Throughout his presidency – democratic and autocratic – Marcos had no real external threat to contend with. The United States considered the Philippines strategically critical, and its security guarantees and security assistance freed Marcos – and his coercive apparatus – to concentrate on internal security.³² The Military Base Agreement concluded in March 1947 established the American military at Clark Air Field and Subic Bay Naval Station – the largest overseas U.S. military bases in the world during the Cold War.³³ A Military Assistance Agreement signed the same month furnished defense equipment and supplies, while the U.S. Military Advisory Group based at Fort Bonifacio in Manila provided training and advice. From 1946 to 1971, the United States sent Manila a total of \$704 million in military equipment and training.³⁴ After the outbreak of the Korean War, the U.S. and the Philippines also negotiated a Mutual

³¹ Marcos' ability to implement reforms was probably aided by the fact that for his first thirteen months in office, he served as both President and Defense Minister.

³² Ricardo T. Jose, "The Philippines During the Cold War: Searching for Security Guarantees and Appropriate Foreign Policies, 1946–1986," in Malcolm Murfett, ed., *Cold War Southeast Asia* (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2012), pp. 50–80.

³³ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 370; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 375.

³⁴ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 370. The full texts of these agreements can be found in the *Philippine Treaty Series*, Vols. 1–3 (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Law Center, 1968). See also Nick Cullather, *Illusions of Influence: The Political Economy of US–Philippine Relations, 1942–90* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), pp. 79–80; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 376; Stephen Shalom, *The United State and the Philippines: A Study of Neocolonialism* (Philadelphia, 1981), pp. 63–66, 109–10.

Defense Treaty (MDT), which was signed on August 30, 1951 (pre-dating the MDT with Japan by just over a week). The Philippines also participated in SEATO.³⁵

Marcos the democrat: threat perceptions and internal security pre-1972

As an elected leader, Marcos' biggest threat to staying in office was that he would be voted out by a population disillusioned with his failure to keep electoral promises, including those that had to do with public security. As a result, the early years of his presidency focused on improving performance in popular policing, which led to an expanded, more inclusive, and internally coordinated internal security system.

During his first two terms, Marcos sought to centralize police power and improve its coordination through the executive branch. He established inter-agency coordination centers such as the Anti-Smuggling Action Center; the President's Agency for the Reform of Government Operations; and the Peace and Order Coordinating Council.³⁶ The Police Act of 1966 (Republic Act No. 4864) established the National Police Commission (Napolcom), charged with implementing the provisions of police reform and coordinating among various police agencies.³⁷ In Metro Manila, the Metropolitan Police (Metropol) were set up to coordinate forces across the area's four cities and nine municipalities plus Metropolitan Command (Metrocom, a PC force specifically for the capital).³⁸ Metrocom came to dwarf the municipal force, which had 2,800 policemen (a ratio of 1:3,000 citizens) and a total of fourteen working police cars in a city of 8,000 vehicles.³⁹ By 1971, Metrocom had an integrated communications network and fingerprint system spanning four provinces, 113 municipalities, and six million people in a forty-mile radius centered on

³⁵ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 374. The signatories were the Philippines, the U.S., the U.K., France, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, and Pakistan.

³⁶ Donald L. Berlin, "Prelude to Martial Law: An Examination of Pre-1972 Philippine Civil-Military Relations," PhD dissertation, University of South Carolina, 1982, pp. 186-87.

³⁷ Campos, "Role of Police," pp. 211-12.

³⁸ Calvin B. Cowles, "East Asia Mission Director Conference," Office of Public Safety, USAID, October 21, 1968. See also Walton, *Survey of Philippine Law Enforcement*, pp. 84-85; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 387.

³⁹ USAID/OPS, "Monthly Report," March 12, 1969; OPS, "Internal Security Program - FY 71," August 13, 1969.

Manila.⁴⁰ In addition to providing concrete evidence of Marcos' commitment to improving public security, the centralization and coordination process had an added political benefit: it pulled authority over coercive power away from local elites and legislators, some of whom were Marcos' political opponents and rivals.

The size and inclusivity of the armed forces increased as well, and intra-military fragmentation decreased. This process was impelled partly by the continued exigencies of popular threat. An upsurge in insurgency in the south during the mid-1960s led to the creation of a new defense concept and the establishment of a unified command that was supposed to improve coordination within the armed forces.⁴¹ The size of the AFP increased from 45,000 to 55,000 in 1971, and to 63,000 by 1972. Much of that increase occurred in the Philippine Constabulary, which bore the brunt of insurgent attacks in Mindanao.⁴²

External influence – in the form of American preferences and American assistance – also aligned with Marcos' initial focus on popular threat management. Many of Marcos' public security projects, including Metrocom, received millions of dollars of U.S. assistance through USAID'S Office of Public Security, which had expanded rapidly under President John F. Kennedy. The United States saw this assistance not just as capacity-building for law enforcement, but as a tool for addressing internal security threats, especially communist subversion. They identified the Philippines as a country at risk, and extended aid packages explicitly as "preventative medicine" to identify and pre-empt "early the symptoms of an incipient subversive situation."⁴³ At the price of \$5 million from 1969 to 1973, this assistance to the Philippines was relatively cheap compared to the funding provided to Vietnam (\$94 million), Thailand (\$70–80 million), and Indonesia (\$10 million). These

⁴⁰ USAID/OPS, "Monthly Report," March 12, 1969; May 9, 1969; October 10, 1969; February 12, 1971; USAID, *USAID Assistance to the Philippines 1946–69* (Manila, 1969), p. 15.

⁴¹ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 425.

⁴² McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 29; Campos, "Role of Police," p. 190.

⁴³ NSC/Department of State, "Policy Research Study: Internal Warfare and the Security of the Underdeveloped States," Box 332, November 20, 1961; Robert W. Komer to George McBundy and Maxwell Taylor, "Cutbacks in Police Programs Overseas," National Security Council, Folder: Counter-insurgency Police Programs, Box 332, May 5, 1962. See also Thomas David Lobe, "U.S. Police Assistance for the Third World," PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1975; Thomas Lobe, "The Rise and Demise of the Office of Public Safety," *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 9 (1983), pp. 187–213; Jeremy Kuzmarov, "Modernizing Repression: Police Training, Political Violence, and Nation-Building in the 'American Century,'" *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (April 2009), pp. 191–221.

funds, however, provided the bulk of training received by Philippine policemen.⁴⁴ External influence and Marcos' political interests, therefore, worked together during the early period of his presidency to foster the coordination and inclusivity necessary for effective popular policing.

Marcos the autocrat: a change in threat perceptions

As Marcos prepared to declare martial law, however, his perceptions of threat clearly shifted to focus more on rival elites and the military. Because the Philippines – unlike Taiwan and South Korea – had never experienced land reform, and because the central state had never completely disarmed local militias, Philippine politics had since independence been dominated by an interlocking upper crust of families in the provinces whose hold on “the mutually reinforcing aspects of coercive and material power” made them a force to be reckoned with.⁴⁵ As a democratically elected leader, Marcos had been accountable primarily to the threat of popular removal. By achieving re-election, however, he had already done what no other Philippine president had achieved; his second term disrupted what Benedict Anderson describes as a norm of rotation of the presidential office among “competing provincial dynasties.”⁴⁶ His desire to hold onto power for an unheralded and unconstitutional third term upended that balance further, as did his musings about passing power to his wife Imelda afterward so that he could finish executing his political agenda. As he contemplated a third term, then, he became increasingly concerned about the risk of a coup carried out by his security forces, either on their own behalf or to pave the way for another family to accede to the presidency.

Although Marcos publicly blamed the Communist insurgency and domestic unrest for making martial law necessary, historical evidence clearly shows that popular threats were not his dominant perceived threat.

⁴⁴ Campos, “Role of Police,” p. 210; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 387; Kuzmarov, “Modernizing Repression,” p. 201. See also USAID/OPS “Monthly Report,” June 9, 1971; USAID/OPS “Philippines Report,” August 15, 1973; USAID/OPS, “U.S. Public Safety Assistance in the Country of the Philippines: Fact Sheet,” September 10, 1973; House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies' Appropriations for 1975 (Washington, DC: 93rd Congress, 2nd session, 1974), p. 285.

⁴⁵ Jeffrey A. Winters, *Oligarchy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp. 193–207; see also National Security Council, Memorandum 84/2, November 9, 1950, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1950*, Vol. 6: *East Asia and the Pacific* (Washington, DC, 1976), pp. 1515–20; Andrew Grajdanzev, *Modern Korea* (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1994), esp. Ch. 10; Slater, *Ordering Power*.

⁴⁶ Benedict Anderson, “Cacique Democracy in the Philippines: Origins and Dreams,” *New Left Review*, Vol. 50 (2008), pp. 27–59.

Instead, they were a pretext to remain in office past his constitutionally mandated term. Once he had decided to do so, his primary fear was of an elite-backed military coup. To offset this threat, Marcos established a coercive apparatus that was fragmented, competitive, and socially exclusive. He divided power between different parts of the security apparatus, and shifted the numbers, ethnic composition, and deployment patterns of his security force in ways that made them more exclusive and socially isolated.

Marcos' public rhetoric, which stressed domestic unrest as the cause of martial law, seems to have been a justification manufactured to explain the declaration. From March to August 1972, a set of twenty bombings racked Manila, including an explosion on August 21 outside Plaza Miranda's Quiapo Church during a 10,000-person rally organized by ex-Senator Benigno Aquino's Liberal Party, then the strongest opposition to Marcos and the Nacionalistas.⁴⁷ The final trigger was a September 22 assassination attempt on Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile; Marcos ordered martial law into effect at midnight, and the military moved swiftly to arrest potential opponents, including Aquino. However, evidence later surfaced (though it was never completely confirmed) that the regime had orchestrated both the bombings and the assassination attempt.⁴⁸ The man who reportedly organized the bombings, General Ramon Cannu, was a "countersubversion specialist" and chief of Marcos' Physical Protection Brigade in the Presidential Security Unit (PSU); he was promoted to Brigadier General on September 19, two days before the imposition of martial law.⁴⁹ According to sworn affidavits and interviews with American and Philippine military officials, the bombings were financed by "private corporations controlled by persons connected with President Ferdinand Marcos," and carried out by squads of highly trusted Constabulary officers called Monkees.⁵⁰ Enrile later admitted that

⁴⁷ Bonner, *Waltzing With a Dictator*, pp. 126–27.

⁴⁸ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 491; Bonner, *Waltzing With a Dictator*, pp. 101, 127–28; Efren N. Padilla, "Faked or Staged: The Impression Management of Juan Ponce Enrile," *GMA Network*, October 19, 2012; "True or False: Was 1972 Enrile Ambush Staged?" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, October 8, 2012.

⁴⁹ *New York Times*, February 23, 1986; Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, pp. 125, 468; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 395–96, 616, esp. fn. 120.

⁵⁰ The Monkees originated in 1969 as armed gangs in the service of local politician-landlords in central Luzon; the Huk units they fought were nicknamed the Beatles. Jose Fronda Santos, Jr., [a former Monkee and military intelligence officer], sworn affidavit submitted to the U.S. House Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs, February 13, 1984 and March 22, 1984.

the bombing had been planned, which was why he rode that day in a security vehicle behind his usual car (he later retracted this statement).⁵¹ Marcos' published writings also suggest that he decided on martial law on September 17, prior to the attack on Enrile.⁵²

In the fifteen pages of Proclamation 1081, which declared martial law, Marcos laid primary blame (eighteen of twenty-two "whereas" clauses) on a rising threat from the communist New People's Army (NPA). He claimed that these forces had at least 8,000 active guerillas, 10,000 active support cadres, and 100,000 sympathizers.⁵³ No one shared this alarmist estimate of NPA strength, which was openly mocked in leading political cartoons of the time.⁵⁴ The State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research concluded that the number of guerillas plus support cadres totaled 9,000 – half Marcos' estimate – while a RAND Corporation report for the U.S. Army placed it even lower: 1,000 guerillas and 5,000–6,000 part-time militia members. Moreover, the reports concluded, the NPA's "military operations were at a low level and confined to remote areas, while it concentrated on recruitment and organization-building"; the NPA's history records only 350 men with modern rifles.⁵⁵

These American assessments were shared with Marcos and the officials within his coercive apparatus, who by all accounts appeared to agree with their judgment. Liberal senators as well as those from Marcos' Nacionalista party reported at the time that the threat was minimal. In summer 1971, PC General Eduardo Garcia told the press, "Insurgency and subversion are not serious problems of the government now," a claim echoed privately by both Army chief General Rafael Iletto and Chief of Staff General Manuel Yan.⁵⁶ Even more striking were the entries written in Marcos' diary during this period. He recorded in 1970 that he intended to allow the Communists to gather strength "but no such strength that

⁵¹ Juan Ponce Enrile, *Juan Ponce Enrile: A Memoir* (Manila: ABS-CBN, 2012); "True or False: Was 1972 Enrile Ambush Faked?" *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, October 8, 2012.

⁵² Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Introduction to the Politics of Transition* (Manila: Marcos Foundation, 1978), p. 26.

⁵³ "Proclamation 1081," *Official Gazette*, September 24, 1972.

⁵⁴ William C. Rempel, *Delusions of a Dictator: The Mind of Marcos as Revealed in his Secret Diaries* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1993), p. 115; Alfredo R. Roces and Irene Roces, *Medals and Shoes: Political Cartoons of the Times of Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos* (Pasig: Anvil Publishing, 1992).

⁵⁵ State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Philippine Communists Under Martial Law," Secret (declassified), December 11, 1973; Robert E. Klitgaard, *Martial Law in the Philippines* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1972); Eduardo Lachica, *HUK: Philippine Agrarian Society in Revolt* (Manila: Solidaridad, 1971).

⁵⁶ Rempel, *Delusions*, pp. 115, 121–22.

we cannot overcome them"; in January 1971, he asserted that the Huks, NPA, students, etc. "do not now constitute a serious threat"; in February 1971, he described the Communists as "weak and disorganized"; and in summer 1971, he asserted that the Communists would "not mount a rebellion" while he remained in office.⁵⁷ In short, neither objective nor subjective evidence suggests that Marcos declared martial law or reorganized his coercive apparatus because of the perceived severity of the popular threat.

Instead, Marcos was increasingly focused on elite threats. He attributed popular opposition, and even the growth of the NPA itself, to the backing of rival elite families and the Aquino-led Liberal Party. Jeffrey Winters has observed that in Marcos' mind, Aquino symbolized oligarchic resistance to Marcos' continued rule, since he was "a direct challenge as a contender for the presidency" and "the favorite to win the 1973 presidential election."⁵⁸ In his diary, Marcos referred to Aquino as "a congenital liar ... a Huk coddler ... the most dangerous man" in the country, who "makes my blood boil." He also wrote, "It seems clear now that the demonstrations and riots are engineered by the Liberal Party ... We must unmask these would-be anarchists hiding behind children." He concluded, "These are dangerous men. Small boys with power. Not only for our own good, but for the good of the country, they must never be entrusted with power."⁵⁹ They were among the first targeted for arrest when Marcos declared martial law.

Marcos believed that these families might be collaborating with parts of the military and the security apparatus to mastermind a coup. He recorded "feelings" that the Liberal Party was planning to launch a coup, that Aquino was orchestrating Huk sabotage operations, and that a group of retired military officers was targeting him for assassination. Marcos saw elite-backed conspiracies everywhere, writing that Senator Jose Diokno wanted him dead and that the Lopez family intended to assassinate him or remove him from office and then punish him "by imprisonment or worse"; diary entries in 1972 record at least three coup or assassination plots that he believed were orchestrated by the Lopez family.⁶⁰ It was these threats, he wrote, that drove him to the "refuge of anti-communism and anti-Americanism" (which he reported saddened

⁵⁷ Rempel, *Delusions*, pp. 107, 122, 141.

⁵⁸ Winters, *Oligarchy*, p. 204.

⁵⁹ Rempel, *Delusions*, pp. 51–52, 128.

⁶⁰ In addition to descriptions in Rempel, *Delusions*, see the diary entry from April 17, 1972, www.quezon.ph/2007/09/22/from-the-diaries-of-ferdinand-e-marcos/.

him). Even after his conversion to a crusading anti-communist, he linked it implicitly to oligarchic rule, writing that “Communism ostensibly seeks to eradicate the ruling or influential oligarchies. But it succeeds only in replacing them with a worse group – the ruling or influential cliques and elites who actually rule without the approval or consent of the people.”⁶¹ Oligarchy, he said, was the primary threat to Philippine democracy – ironic given that planning was underway for Marcos to rule without popular consent.

The Philippine military, however, became the target of Marcos’ greatest concern and sense of threat. He told reporters in June 1972 that it was his greatest fear, saying, “what I feared most ... was that the armed forces may be pushed to the wall and for their own individual survival they might take over the country.”⁶² He suspected that the United States might back an attempt by the military to remove him from office, “setting me up like a Ngo Dinh Diem for liquidation as an oppressive tyrant by an armed forces supported coup d’état.”⁶³ Marcos saw potential for a coup even in places that did not really have the power to execute one – such as a presidential advisory office that he himself had founded.⁶⁴ As a result, he concluded that he needed to both satisfy and manage the military to survive in office.⁶⁵ “Marcos was not stupid,” one interviewee observed. “He knew that to declare martial law he needed as broad a support from the military as possible ... so he cultivated broad support, but gave the most sensitive work to the people he trusted most.”⁶⁶

The balance of historical evidence, then, suggests that Marcos’ public emphasis on insurgency and popular threats was a red herring. By seizing power through martial law, he knew that he would no longer be dependent on popular legitimacy to rule, and would instead be dependent on the armed forces.⁶⁷ As a result, by the early 1970s, the dominant threat that Marcos perceived was clearly that of a coup backed by his elite rivals and

⁶¹ Rempel, *Delusions*, pp. 51–52.

⁶² Rempel, *Delusions*, p. 161.

⁶³ Rempel, *Delusions*, p. 128; see diary entry from October 9, 1971, p. 144.

⁶⁴ Interview with a former general and former advisor to Marcos, Metro Manila, September 2012.

⁶⁵ Interview with a former member of the coercive apparatus, Metro Manila, September 2012.

⁶⁶ Interview with Professor Felipe Miranda, Quezon City, September 2012.

⁶⁷ On Marcos’ relationship with the military, see Carolina Galicia Hernandez, “The Extent of Civilian Control of the Military in the Philippines, 1946–76,” PhD dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1979.

implemented by his own military and security forces. The coercive apparatus that he created reflected this dominant perceived threat.

MARCOS' COERCIVE APPARATUS:
FRAGMENTED AND EXCLUSIVE

The coercive apparatus that Marcos used to govern from the declaration of martial law in 1972 until his fall from power in February 1986 was both fragmented and socially exclusive. Many of the organizational and personnel reforms that increased fragmentation and exclusivity actually began prior to September 1972, which is consistent with what one might expect if Marcos' threat perceptions began to shift – as they seem to have – in *anticipation* of seizing non-democratic power rather than after doing so. The trend toward fragmentation and exclusivity within the coercive apparatus, however, became increasingly pronounced after 1972.

The martial law framework

Marcos' reforms to the coercive apparatus, and many of his actions vis-à-vis internal security, were enabled by unusually broad presidential powers granted to Philippine presidents in case of emergency. In declaring martial law, Proclamation 1081 invoked Article VII of the Constitution, which allowed the president to suspend habeas corpus and place the Philippines under martial law.⁶⁸ The constitution also authorized the president to issue whatever executive decrees he deemed necessary whenever he judged there was a sufficiently severe threat to the country. Accordingly, Marcos first ordered that anyone detained for violating public order be “kept under detention until otherwise ordered released by me.”⁶⁹ Executive decrees enabled the first wave of detentions, and Marcos continued to use them liberally throughout the martial law period, publishing over a thousand and issuing others that remained secret.⁷⁰ During the 1972–86 period, the Philippines also had Arrest, Search and Seizure Orders (ASSOs) or Presidential Commitment Orders (PCOs), which allowed the military to make arrests without warrants, confine suspects in “safe houses,” and

⁶⁸ Ferdinand Marcos, *Martial Law and New Society in the Philippines* (Manila, 1977), p. 1832; Ferdinand E. Marcos, *Revolution from the Center: How the Philippines is Using Martial Law to Build a New Society* (Manila: Raya Books, 1978).

⁶⁹ Marcos, *Martial Law and New Society*, pp. 1878–79.

⁷⁰ U.S. Department of State, Manila to Washington, September 16, 1980; August 20, 1981; May 18, 1983.

conduct unlimited “tactical interrogations.”⁷¹ The suspension of habeas corpus removed the military’s anti-dissident activities from judicial oversight, granting legal backing and de facto immunity to units engaged in any activity that Marcos deemed anti-subversive. Marcos also used these powers to accelerate reforms within the Philippines’ coercive institutions, making them more and more socially exclusive and fragmented.

Social composition: an exclusive coercive apparatus

Marcos deliberately designed a set of coercive institutions that were socially exclusive and isolated from the wider Philippine population. He relied on a small number of trusted in-group members – Ilocanos, former classmates, and extended family – to populate the internal security apparatus. The coercive apparatus was also less inclusive because – in contrast to what he had done as an elected president – Marcos reduced the number of military and police personnel patrolling the population, assigning them instead to presidential security or simply redistributing the resources that would have been theirs toward elite patronage projects.

Even prior to 1972, Marcos had moved to make the top levels of the security apparatus more exclusive. In preparation for martial law, on the grounds of cleaning up corruption, he removed one-third of provincial commanders and forced fourteen of twenty-five AFP general officers into retirement. In their place, he began to construct “a hierarchy bound to him by strong personal ties: old classmates from the [University of the Philippines] cadet corps, blood relatives, and fellow Ilocanos, the northern Luzon ethnic group known for being clannish.”⁷² He recalled a number of Ilocano generals from retirement to active duty, including General Ernesto Mata, who became Chief of Staff, and General Segundo Velasco, chief of the Philippine Constabulary.⁷³

In the months prior to September 1972, Marcos made sure that loyalists occupied the operational positions critical for seizing and maintaining power, rotating commanders until he was satisfied with the

⁷¹ Amnesty International, *Philippines: Unlawful Killings by Military and Paramilitary Forces* (New York: Amnesty, 1988), pp. 5–6; Amnesty International, *Report-1981*, pp. 1–12, 22–23; Satur C. Ocampo, “Leaving the Pain Behind,” *PST Quarterly*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (July–September 1996), pp. 13–14.

⁷² McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 28.

⁷³ Republic of the Philippines, *Final Report of the Fact-Finding Commission (Pursuant to RA No. 6832)* (Manila: Bookmark, October 1990), p. 42.

loyalty of the individuals in each position. In January 1972, he promoted two commanders who had made clear their belief that the armed forces' role was to protect democracy rather than to protect Marcos as the President: General Rafael ("Rocky") Iletto became the AFP's deputy chief of staff, and General Manuel Yan became the ambassador to Indonesia. These promotions removed both men from operational control over troops. To command key positions around Metro Manila, Marcos named two loyalists: Brigadier General Tomas Diaz as the head of the PC First Zone, and Colonel Alfredo Montoya as the head of Metrocom.⁷⁴ They, along with ten others named publicly by Marcos two years later, became known as the "twelve apostles" or the "Rolex 12," in memory of the reward with which he supposedly expressed his appreciation.⁷⁵ A list of the Rolex 12 and their ties to Marcos can be found in Table 4.1.

After declaring martial law, Marcos relied almost exclusively on family and fellow Ilocanos to carry out the tasks of internal security. One Philippine scholar explained, "Politics is about people you can implicitly trust. Here that means relatives, school or fraternity members, and people of the same ethnic group or language."⁷⁶ Historian Teodoro Agoncillo explains clan and regional loyalties by saying, "the Filipino believes that a candidate from his province or region, no matter how repugnant, is better than one who comes from another region."⁷⁷ From his first political campaign in 1949, Marcos had played on ethnic loyalties, shouting to crowds in Ilocos Norte, "Elect me a Congressman now, and I pledge you an Ilocano President in twenty years."⁷⁸ (The appeal worked, and he reached the presidency in sixteen.) Once he was President, Marcos' preference for placing Ilocanos in leadership positions for internal security

⁷⁴ Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, pp. 482–83.

⁷⁵ In July, Marcos reportedly discussed plans for martial law with a group nicknamed the Seven Wise Men: Marcos, Enrile, Ver, Diaz, Montoya, Gatan, and Cojuangco. This group did not include the major service commanders, meaning that planning relied only on units that reported directly to Marcos. Alex Bello Brillantes, *Dictatorship and Martial Law: Philippine Authoritarianism in 1972* (Quezon City: Great Books, 1987), p. 44; Government of the Republic of the Philippines, *Official Gazette*, Vol. 70, No. 37 (September 16, 1974), p. 7748-F. See also Bonner, *Waltzing With a Dictator*, pp. 3, 468; Karnow, *In Our Image*, p. 359; Hernandez, "The Extent of Civilian Control."

⁷⁶ Interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011.

⁷⁷ Teodoro Agoncillo, *A Short History of the Philippines* (New American Library, 1969), p. 13.

⁷⁸ Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, p. 9.

TABLE 4.1. *The “Rolex 12” in the Philippines*

Name	Title (in <i>Official Gazette</i>)	Notes
Juan Ponce Enrile	Secretary of National Defense	Principal architect of martial law
Gen. Romeo Espino	AFP Chief of Staff	Marcos’ college classmate; ROTC graduate
Maj. Gen. Rafael Zagala	Chief, Philippine Army	ROTC graduate
Maj. Gen. Fidel Ramos	Chief, Philippine Constabulary	Marcos’ cousin; West Point graduate
Maj. Gen. Jose Rancudo	Chief, Philippine Air Force	ROTC graduate
Adm. Hilario Ruiz	Chief, Philippine Navy	ROTC graduate
Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver	Head, Presidential Security Group	Marcos’ cousin; ROTC graduate
Col. Ignacio Paz	Chief of Intelligence Services of the AFP	-
Brig. Gen. Tomas Diaz	Joint General Staff	-
Col. Alfredo Montoya	Commander, First PC Zone	Vice-Chief of PC. Ilocano
Col. Romeo Gatan	Commander, PC-METROCOM	-
	Provincial PC	PC Commander
	Commander of Rizal, Special Projects Officer	in Tarlac (Aquino’s district)
Col. Eduardo Cojuangco	“Recalled to active duty in the Armed Forces for Special Projects”	Only civilian other than Enrile; Corazon Aquino’s cousin

was such public knowledge that it featured in political cartoons, as in Figure 4.1.

As the cartoon suggests, Ilocanos were particularly over-represented when it came to key positions that had coercive power. The head of Marcos’ Presidential Security Command (PSC), Fabian Ver, was an Ilocano and a cousin, as was Philippine Constabulary chief Fidel Ramos. Ver himself relied on family and ethnic loyalties to staff the PSC, appointing his son Irwin as the PSC chief of staff, his son Wyrlo as the head of its anti-aircraft unit, and his son Rector as commander of the




FIGURE 4.1. Political cartoon: Ilocano “goon rule”

Source: *Philippines Graphic*, June 10, 1970, reprinted in Roces and Roces, *Medals and Shoes*, p. 46.

President's close-in security.⁷⁹ He also opened a camp in Ilocos Norte to train Ilocanos for the PSC staff.⁸⁰ Defense Minister Enrile was also an Ilocano.⁸¹ Marcos' Ilocano preference permeated the military to such an extent that congressional leaders complained, and passed legislation forcing the military to engage in more proportional recruitment.⁸²

School and military ties were important to the construction of Marcos' coercive institutions as well, and were a form of exclusivity whose loyalty-inducing, coup-proofing value was clear. Both Ver and Ramos

⁷⁹ Republic of the Philippines, *Final Report*, p. 42; Richard J. Kessler, *Rebellion and Repression in the Philippines* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), p. 119.

⁸⁰ Ferdinand Marcos, “Presidential Security Command: An Elite Unit of the AFP,” in *Self-Reliance in Freedom: Contemporary Speeches and Writings on Philippine Defense and National Growth* (Manila: Philippine Educational Promotion, 1977), pp. 71–75; Arturo C. Aruiza, *Ferdinand E. Marcos: Malacañang to Makiki* (Quezon City: AC Aruiza Enterprises, 1991), pp. 42–43; Angela Stuart Santiago, *Duet for EDSA* (Manila: Foundation for Worldwide People Power, 1995); Republic of the Philippines, *Report of the Fact-Finding Commission*, p. 46; McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 226–28.

⁸¹ Bonner, *Waltzing With a Dictator*, p. 14.

⁸² Rempel, *Delusions*, p. 135.

had served in Major Marcos' anti-Japanese guerilla unit (the exact history of which is much debated): Ver as a third lieutenant and Ramos as a staff sergeant.⁸³ More importantly, however, Marcos preferred to hire graduates of the ROTC programs at the nation's elite civilian universities, rather than those who had been trained at the PMA. He himself had risen through the ROTC system as a member of the University of the Philippines' (UP) Vanguard fraternity, and was suspicious of the tight class bonds formed at the PMA. Once he became President, he feared that the strong lateral networks that existed among PMA graduates could facilitate conspiracy and make a coup easier to plan. (PMA cadets, by Marcos' time, had become a relatively exclusive group; many were children or siblings of graduates, such that an insular group of elite families came to dominate the military.⁸⁴) Relying on ROTC appointees, then, helped Marcos mitigate the coup risk posed by PMA graduates.

Throughout the first decade of martial law, Marcos preferentially appointed ROTC graduates as major service commanders, over the more numerous PMA candidates (see Table 4.1.) These commanders included General Rafael Zagala for the Army; General Jose Rancudo for the Air Force; and Admiral Hilario Ruiz for the Navy.⁸⁵ Fabian Ver, the head of Marcos' Presidential Security Command, was also a graduate of the University of the Philippines' ROTC program. When AFP Chief of Staff Espino retired in 1981, Marcos selected Ver, who lacked the combat experience that had hardened most of the AFP, as the AFP's new Chief of Staff. Just as Ver promoted family members – his son Irwin (PMA class of 1970) was promoted to colonel ahead of more senior graduates – he also preferentially chose subordinates from the ROTC's Vanguard fraternity, including Army General Josephus Ramas; Navy Admiral Brillante Ochoco; General Roland Pattagulan in the infantry; Colonel Pedro Balbanero in the military police; and General Artemio Tadiar as Marine commandant.⁸⁶

⁸³ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 227.

⁸⁴ Felipe B. Miranda, *The Politicization of the Military* (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1992); McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 5–6; Republic of the Philippines, *Report of the Fact-Finding Commission*, Ch. 2.

⁸⁵ Harold W. Maynard, "A Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions in Indonesia and the Philippines," PhD dissertation, American University, 1976, pp. 489–92; Rigoberto Tiglao, "The Consolidation of the Dictatorship," in Aurora Javate de Dios *et al.*, eds., *Dictatorship and Revolution: The Roots of People's Power* (Manila, Conspectus, 1988), pp. 50–51, 404.

⁸⁶ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 227; Aruiza, *Malacañang to Makiki*, pp. 41–43, 66.

The parts of the coercive apparatus that were ostensibly dedicated to popular policing also became more exclusive. The primary reason for this was that the regime's allocation decisions prioritized elite and military patronage. In 1971, the ratio of military to population (55,000 troops, 0.1 percent of the population) was the lowest in Asia, and approximately 33,000 police were spread across 1,673 jurisdictions with minimal cross-unit communication ability.⁸⁷ In the first four years of martial law, Marcos increased the size of the military from 62,000 to 113,000 and oversaw a 500 percent increase in the AFP's budget (in part thanks to American military aid); he also raised the police presence to 84,000, a ratio of 1:492, by 1975.⁸⁸ These efforts were intended to satisfy the military so that they would not challenge Marcos for power or seek to replace him; most of the budget increase went to ensuring senior military leaders' political loyalty, rather than toward improving intelligence or fighting competence.⁸⁹ Officers' salaries increased 150 percent the week after martial law, and generals who had passed retirement age were retained – and well compensated – to ensure that senior positions remained in loyal hands. By 1984, over half of the Philippines' generals had exceeded the mandated retirement age.⁹⁰ These allocations, however, turned out to be temporary and directed only at higher levels. More importantly, they came at the expense of the police, who were already so divided and weak that they could not plausibly pose a coup threat to Marcos. By the 1980s, the ratio of police to population had plummeted to 1:1,120 and funding for police work had decreased, even as serious crime continued to rise.⁹¹

Deployment patterns further contributed to the exclusivity and isolation of the coercive apparatus. Despite the fact that crime and insurgency not only brought Marcos to office but supposedly forced him to remain there after 1972, internal security personnel were allocated to presidential security rather than counterinsurgency or foot patrols. By 1985, fully one-third of the AFP's combat forces were assigned to presidential security duties.⁹² Renewed enforcement of the personnel rotation policy, which had lapsed, transferred PC commanders to new locations after

⁸⁷ Campos, "Role of Police," p. 206.

⁸⁸ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 29, 193, 205.

⁸⁹ Interview with a former member of the coercive apparatus, Metro Manila, September 2012; see also Felipe B. Miranda and Ruben F. Ciron, "Development and the Military in the Philippines: Military Perceptions in a Time of Continuing Crisis," SWS Working Paper, August 1987.

⁹⁰ Bonner, *Waltzing With a Dictator*, p. 364.

⁹¹ McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 400.

⁹² McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 227.

each three-year tour, hampering their ability to get to know a particular area.⁹³ These factors combined to make Marcos' post-1972 coercive apparatus socially exclusive.

Organizational structure: a fragmented coercive apparatus

As with social exclusivity, fragmentation began to increase prior to the declaration of martial law, and became especially pronounced afterward. In the late 1960s, the first reports surfaced that Marcos had begun to create special security units that answered to him rather than to the military hierarchy; these forces were reportedly used in Operation Merdeka in 1968 and to coerce votes in the 1969 elections.⁹⁴ After declaring martial law, Marcos further fragmented the formal coercive apparatus. He created four central, rival organizations that each held overlapping responsibility for internal security, and placed them in competition with each other. He also fostered rivalry between two different blocs that comprised the security apparatus: PMA graduates on the one hand, and graduates of the nation's ROTC programs on the other.

To make fragmentation serve the political purpose of protecting Marcos, each of the fragmented units first had to answer to him. Marcos' initial step after declaring martial law, then, was to make the police responsive to the presidency rather than to local politicians. Immediately after declaring martial law in 1972, the government began to disarm private militias under the control of rural elites, and to confiscate firearms: a total of 145 private security forces had been disarmed and almost 600,000 firearms confiscated by December 1972.⁹⁵ In 1975, Marcos implemented reforms intended to pull additional police power away from politically powerful families in provincial offices, something that previous presidents had been prevented from doing by these families' influence in the now-weakened Philippine legislature. In August of that year, Presidential Decree No. 765 created the Integrated National Police (INP) under a joint command structure with the Philippine Constabulary, in which the PC assumed administrative and operational control over local police forces, and the Constabulary chief became

⁹³ Campos, "Role of Police," p. 205.

⁹⁴ Berlin, *Prelude to Martial Law*, pp. 200–01; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 390–91; *Philippines Free Press*, April 6, 1968, p. 68.

⁹⁵ The Constabulary also launched a crackdown on the narcotics trade that many of these militias had profited from. McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 400; Bonner, *Waltzing with a Dictator*, p. 121.

Director-General of the INP.⁹⁶ The PC zone commanders (and in Manila, the head of Metrocom) became the zone directors and director of the Metropolitan Police, and the four PC zones that had divided the country were realigned into thirteen regional commands mirroring the structure of the government and military.⁹⁷ Formal integration of 42,000 PC members and the INP's 65,000 policemen was completed in January 1976.⁹⁸

As this happened, however, the PC itself became one of several competing internal security agencies, which fragmented the coercive apparatus. The initiation of this process in the early 1970s was directly linked to Marcos' perception of a growing threat from the military. In December 1970, Marcos was en route to Baguio when he received word that Lieutenant Victor Corpus had raided the PMA armory with ten Huk insurgents, and that the group was thought to be waiting to ambush him on the road. The event precipitated a reorganization within the military and coercive apparatus to create counterbalancing internal security forces. On January 4, 1971, Marcos ordered the creation of a Special War Center, an Internal Security Agency, and a psychological warfare branch under Juan Ponce Enrile. He simultaneously increased Fabian Ver's authority and authorized him to create and train a new "special team," and promoted Fidel Ramos to head the Second PC Zone.⁹⁹ This was the first step in the fragmentation that would dominate the coercive apparatus throughout the 1972–86 period.

After declaring martial law, Marcos divided authority and power over internal security among four main commanders: AFP Chief of Staff General Romeo Espino (until 1981); General Fabian Ver at the Presidential Security Command and National Intelligence and Security Agency (and AFP Chief of Staff after 1981); Secretary of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile; and chief of the Philippine Constabulary General Fidel Ramos. At the outset of martial law, Secretary of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile, a civilian protégé of Marcos and the primary drafter of Proclamation 1081, was the second most powerful man in the Philippines. Enrile established the National Defense Intelligence Office (NDIO) and used his Security Unit to track and hunt down subversives. As Chief of Staff of the

⁹⁶ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, pp. 498–99.

⁹⁷ Campos, "Role of Police," p. 218.

⁹⁸ Rod B. Gutang, *Pulisya: The Inside Story of the Demilitarization of Law Enforcement in the Philippines* (Quezon City: Daraga, 1991), pp. 35–37; McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, p. 399.

⁹⁹ Rempel, *Delusions*, p. 103; for an excerpt, see www.quezon.ph/2007/09/22/from-the-diaries-of-ferdinand-e-marcos/.

AFP Marcos named his college classmate General Romeo Espino, who served until 1981 (a ten-year retention, unusually long by normal standards). Espino collected intelligence and pursued suspected communists through the Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (ISAFP) and the Military Intelligence Group (MIG).¹⁰⁰ Marcos placed his cousin Fabian Ver in charge of the National Intelligence and Security Agency (NISA) and the Presidential Security Command (PSC), which transformed from a marginal detachment when Ver was a captain to a 1,000-strong force headed by now-General Ver in 1972. After martial law began, the PSC's power expanded still further, to 7,000 men armed with helicopters, ships, and tanks. Finally, another Marcos cousin, PC chief General Fidel Ramos, controlled the Fifth Constabulary Security Unit (CSU) and Metrocom's Intelligence and Security Group (MISG, commanded by Colonel Rolando Abadilla). Each of these four men headed an internal security organization that ran its own intelligence operations, anti-subversion units, and interrogation facilities, and Marcos fostered competition among them in ways that Chapter 7 describes in detail.

Marcos also fostered social divisions within the military that reinforced fragmentation, and the rivalry between ROTC graduates and PMA cadets eventually had the effect of sorting personnel from the two blocs into consistent patterns of affiliation with particular internal security agencies. By creating two factions within the military and using Ver's ROTC faction as a counterbalance against the PMA graduates, Marcos fractured what had been a nationally integrated and inclusive institution. At the top of the system, rivalry existed between Ver and Imelda Marcos on one hand and Ramos and Enrile on the other, intensifying as Ver accumulated power.¹⁰¹ A series of reforms between 1975 and 1985 strengthened Ver, as Marcos' bodyguard and consigliere, against what Marcos regarded as his primary coup risk: the formal military structures led by Ramos and Enrile. In 1978, Marcos removed Enrile from the chain of command, making him the first Secretary of National Defense in three decades without operational control over troop movements. In 1981, after Ver took over as AFP Chief of Staff, he created Regional Unified Commands (RUCs) that superseded the Constabulary's regional commands, and maneuvered his own people into these positions; only one of twelve RUC commanders was loyal to Ramos, then the head of the PC. In August 1983, Marcos moved control over the INP – Ramos'

¹⁰⁰ McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 403–05.

¹⁰¹ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 226–28.

remaining operational units – to Ver's headquarters, and centralized the budget so that none of the service commanders, Ramos included, retained financial control.¹⁰²

Ver also blocked promotions recommended by Ramos, who, though he had attended West Point and therefore lacked a PMA class network, had become well liked among the Constabulary for his extensive field visits over the course of fourteen years in office. Because of this, competition between the top leaders extended to the ranks below, in the form of the divide between PMA graduates and "integreees," which is what graduates of university reservist/ROTC programs were called.¹⁰³ Class differences and perceived differences in combat experience exacerbated the intra-apparatus split. Most ROTC cadets were members of the elite, university-educated stratum and were placed on the political fast track, whereas most PMA cadets came from the lower-middle class and received assignments to combat positions fighting the insurgency in the south.¹⁰⁴ There was widespread resentment of the ROTC appointees based on the perception that they, like Ver, received political sinecures in Manila, where they enriched themselves at the expense of PMA graduates who were sent to fight the insurgency in Mindanao.¹⁰⁵ By the mid-1980s, reservists served throughout the most politically influential positions, but 44 percent of the command positions were still occupied by PMA graduates.¹⁰⁶

These changes were ostensibly intended to use Ver to defend Marcos against Enrile and Ramos. Their cumulative effect, however, was to irreversibly alienate both men, as well as the military networks that they commanded.¹⁰⁷ In response to Ver's Ilocano monopoly and ROTC reservist preference, Defense Secretary Enrile began to actively balance by recruiting Ilongo officers from the western Visayas to staff his own security units and by increasing his advocacy for PMA graduates. By late 1981, he had begun to construct a special 300-person security force under Colonel Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan. In 1983, Ramos formed his own "PC Special Action Force," which began sharing smuggled weapons and

¹⁰² Cecilio T. Arillo, *Breakaway: The Inside Story of the Four Day Revolution in the Philippines, February 22–25, 1986* (Mandaluyong: CTA and Associates, 1986), p. 142.

¹⁰³ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 576.

¹⁰⁴ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 8–9.

¹⁰⁵ The MNLF had coalesced in Mindanao in 1973.

¹⁰⁶ Ronald G. Bauer, "Military Profession Socialization in a Developing Country," PhD dissertation, University of Michigan, 1973, p. 27; Maynard, "Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions," p. 423.

¹⁰⁷ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 229.

engaging in joint training exercises with Honasan's forces. These groups would become the basis of the Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) whose mutiny, led by Ramos and Enrile, eventually triggered Marcos' fall.¹⁰⁸ Fragmentation in Marcos' post-1972 coercive apparatus, then, ran along organizational lines, and was reinforced by his manipulation of various social, ethnic, and military-educational cleavages.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Alternative explanations do not perform well in predicting the structure and composition of the security apparatus under Marcos. Neither institutional path dependence nor external influence provides a satisfactory explanation for the origins of Marcos' fragmented and exclusive coercive apparatus after 1972.

First, an explanation that relies on *institutional inheritance* or *path dependence* has difficulty explaining the high degree of institutional malleability, rather than continuity, that characterized the development of the Philippine coercive apparatus. Although fragmentation characterized Philippine internal security institutions throughout Spanish and American colonial rule, the social composition of that apparatus fluctuated. Spanish forces were exclusive, while American ones were inclusive. Marcos himself inherited an apparatus that, given the dual recruitment streams of the AFP, could have remained a broadly inclusive national force, but he chose instead to make the post-1972 coercive apparatus socially exclusive along kinship, ethnic, and educational lines. He also chose to foster fragmentation by reversing the policies that he had pursued as a democratic leader, and by reinforcing organizational divisions through the manipulation of competition between rival social blocs. Marcos' determination to reorganize the coercive apparatus was well documented at the time, in ways that suggest that path dependence and inherited social and institutional constraints exerted fairly minimal constraints on his behavior (see Figure 4.2). The instability of Philippine military and security structures throughout the twentieth century, as well as Marcos' ability to pursue significant organizational reforms as his political interests evolved, suggest that institutional inheritance or path dependence are not determinate

¹⁰⁸ Santiago, *Duet for EDSA*, p. 11; McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 231–32; *Kudeta! The Challenge to Philippine Democracy* (Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1990).



FIGURE 4.2. Political cartoon: Marcos and reorganization of the coercive apparatus
 Source: *Philippines Graphic*, December 1, 1965, reprinted in Roces and Roces, *Medals and Shoes*, p. 30.

explanations for the design of Philippine coercive institutions from 1972 to 1986.

Explanations rooted in *external influence* are also unsatisfactory. American policymakers wanted Marcos – like his predecessors – to focus on combating the threat of Communist subversion, and provided internal security assistance and aid to enable him to do so. As Marcos' political priorities diverged from those of the United States in the late 1960s, however, American influence on internal security waned, and the U.S. eventually terminated an aid program that it deemed a failure (thanks largely to Marcos' meddling). As with Taiwan, the United States had the greatest influence on coercive institutional design by affecting Marcos' threat perceptions, in that the American assumption of responsibility for external defense freed post-1945 Philippine presidents to focus on internal threats. Unlike Chiang Kai-shek on Taiwan, however, and unlike the presidents who preceded him, Marcos chose not to focus on popular threats, though he paid lip service to them. Instead, he prioritized the risk of a coup from his own military and security forces, and their backers in the Philippines' family-based oligarchic system.

CONCLUSION

The structural fragmentation and exclusive social composition of the coercive apparatus under Ferdinand Marcos between 1972 and 1986 can be attributed to Marcos' fear of elite threats after he declared martial law. Like Chiang Kai-shek, Marcos was relatively unconstrained in his ability to remake the coercive apparatus once he had assumed autocratic power, and he significantly redesigned the Philippines' institutions of coercion to suit his political priorities. Unlike Chiang, however, Marcos' principal fear was of the threat created by an alignment between his security forces and his major political rivals. To address the threat of a coup, he created coercive institutions that were fragmented and exclusive. The nature of the elite threat perceived by Marcos explains not only the specific lines along which he fragmented the coercive apparatus and excluded certain parts of Philippine society from it, but the specific timing of the processes that generated these characteristics and the sequence in which they were carried out.

Organizing coercion in South Korea

The Korean peninsula, a Japanese colony from 1910 to 1945, was effectively partitioned into Soviet and American zones of control at the end of the Second World War. Elections in the South in 1948, followed by the Korean War (1950–53), solidified this division. About a year after the 1960 April Revolution (or Movement) ended the presidency of the unpopular Syngman Rhee, a bloodless coup d'état by Park Chung Hee in May 1961 established a military government in South Korea, which ruled until the 1963 elections put Park into the presidency. After a surprisingly close third-term re-election in 1971, Park declared martial law and assumed dictatorial power through the Yushin Constitution (유신) in autumn 1972. In October 1979, he was assassinated by the director of the KCIA, and power passed to General Chun Doo Hwan. Chun held the presidency until 1987, when power transferred to former General Roh Tae Woo, who kept his pre-election promise to democratize the country.

This chapter examines how Presidents Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan created and managed their coercive apparatus.¹ Comparing two South Korean cases provides an opportunity to assess how two different autocrats' threat perceptions shaped their coercive institutional choices for ruling the same country, and helps to examine the role of alternative explanations. If either external influence or path dependence was the best explanation for coercive institutional design, then we should observe

¹ As with Marcos, I focus particularly on the coercive apparatus during the authoritarian period of Park's rule, from 1972 to 1979. Under Syngman Rhee, the Republic of Korea had a Polity IV rating of –3 and –4 (anocracy). Although Korea scholars commonly refer to him as authoritarian, because of that and because cases involving civil war are outside the scope of the project (see Ch. 2), I do not treat his presidency as a separate case.

very little difference between the coercive institutions of Park and Chun. Instead, the variation in their coercive institutional designs is striking. Consistent with previous chapters, this variation is best explained by the different threat perceptions of the two leaders.

The second section of this chapter illustrates that, unlike Taiwan, which organized itself to deal with popular unrest, or the Philippines, which was oriented toward elite threats, South Korea was first and foremost organized to deal with the external threat coming from North Korea. That threat prompted an unusually high degree of external (American) involvement in South Korea's coercive apparatus, including the retention of U.S. command authority over the Republic of Korea (ROK) military even under armistice conditions. The presence of an external threat and unusually high external influence limited the extent to which either autocrat was able to engage in coup-proofing fragmentation within the military, and imposed a national service requirement in which every South Korean male served in the military. The ROK *military*, therefore, displayed low levels of fragmentation and high levels of inclusivity.

Outside the military, however, the degree of fragmentation and exclusivity in the internal security apparatus varied depending on each autocrat's perceptions of the relative importance of elite versus popular threats. As a democratically elected leader, Park Chung Hee initially prioritized the threat of popular protest, creating a coercive apparatus that was unitary under the leadership of the KCIA and broadly inclusive with respect to domestic intelligence.² Increasing fears of elite rivals, however, along with growing distrust of his security forces, led Park later to create an apparatus that fragmented power across the KCIA, Army Security Command, and Presidential Security Service. Chun Doo Hwan, on the other hand, who came to power amid severe popular unrest, governed in a unitary fashion through the Defense Security Command.

Park and Chun's threat perceptions also led them to adopt different approaches to exclusivity, which this chapter analyzes using an original dataset on internal security elites in South Korea from 1961 to 1987.³ After 1972, Park – who clearly regarded Chŏlla and its leaders as a source of elite

² Park originally seized power in a coup d'état in 1961, an intervention that he and the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR) justified on the grounds of the chaos and widespread popular unrest that characterized South Korea's Second Republic.

³ This dataset includes the heads of the KCIA, Presidential Security Service, Capitol Garrison Command, Army Security Command/Defense Security Command, and National Police Agency, as well as the Army Chief of Staff and the Chief Prosecutor. Drawing on biographies from *JoongAng Ilbo* (중앙일보) and supplemental sources, each individual was coded for province of origin, military education, and family ties, among other factors.

threat – exhibited increased regional favoritism throughout the coercive apparatus, including officials from his home region of Kyöngsang while excluding those from Chölla. Chun, however, responded to the urgent need to manage popular protest by creating a coercive apparatus that was puzzlingly mixed in terms of exclusivity: exclusive at the top levels, but conscript-based and broadly inclusive at the ground level. The effects of these unusual “mixed” dynamics are explored in more depth in Chapter 8.

EXTERNAL THREAT AND INSTITUTIONAL INHERITANCE: SOUTH KOREA UNDER SYNGMAN RHEE

The presence of a high external threat from North Korea strongly shaped the structure and social composition of the South Korean military. The United States maintained operational control over the ROK’s armed forces, thereby limiting the degree to which South Korean presidents could engage in coup-proofing. The military, therefore, displayed low levels of fragmentation and exclusivity. Wherever his powers were unchecked by American control, however, President Syngman Rhee promoted internal competition and social exclusivity. As a result, Park inherited a fragmented and exclusive apparatus – but did not keep it. As in the Philippines, the history of South Korea’s pre-1972 coercive apparatus suggests that these institutions are not determined by either underlying social structure or simple path dependence. It also demonstrates that the type and degree of external influence on internal security depends on the presence of external threat, and does not necessarily constrain decisions about non-military parts of the coercive apparatus.

Combating external threat: a unitary, inclusive military

From 1948 to 1960, under American guidance and assistance, the Republic of Korea’s military became a strong, unitary, and professional institution capable of repelling the threat posed by the communist North. The unusually high nature of this external threat – nearly leading to the elimination of the Republic of Korea in autumn 1950 – led to an unusually high degree of external involvement and influence. Not only did American troops remain stationed in South Korea, but the United States also retained peacetime operational control over the ROK military, limiting the ability of any Korean autocrat to coup-proof these forces in any way that would detract from their capability to fight a second potential Korean War. It also imposed a requirement that all South Korean men serve in the military, making it broadly inclusive at the ground level.

During the period of trusteeship and military occupation by the United States (1945–48), as well as afterward, the primary focus of American assistance was to strengthen the military to counter the external threat posed by communism and the North Korean regime. Historian Gregg Brazinsky explains, “Between 1946 and 1960, the United States transformed the military of the ROK from a small disorganized constabulary into the most dominant institution in South Korean society.”⁴ The military exceeded any other Korean political organization in terms of its size, group cohesion, institutionalization, and mobilization capacity; over the course of two decades, it became a capable, highly professional force with regard to its mission of external defense.⁵

The Korean War produced a dramatic expansion in the size and resources of the ROK military, largely due to American assistance. In 1945, approximately 50,000 Koreans had served in the Japanese military; most were conscripts or enlistees, but several hundred had served as officers – including Park Chung Hee and his KCIA-chief turned assassin, Kim Jae-gyu – and these personnel became the foundation of the ROK military.⁶ During the war, Rhee obtained assistance by convincing the United States that it needed to either send more troops or provide more assistance to stave off an ROK collapse.⁷ By the time the armistice was signed, the strength of the Army had increased from 100,000 to almost

⁴ Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), pp. 71–74; Bonnie B.C. Oh, ed., *Korea Under the American Military Government, 1945–48* (Westport: Praeger, 2002); Allan Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945–50: A House Burning* (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 2005), pp. 78–80; Se-jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1971), pp. 38–39; Allan Millett, “Captain James Hausman and the Formation of the Korean Army 1945–50,” *Armed Forces & Society*, Vol. 23 (September 1997), pp. 503–40.

⁵ Jinsok Jun, “South Korea: Consolidating Democratic Civilian Control,” in Muthiah Alagappa, *Coercion and Governance: the declining political role of the military in Asia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001), p. 123.

⁶ The U.S.-established military academy drew its first classes from those who had served under the Japanese or in the Kwangbok Army, a group of Korean nationalists that had fought with Chinese forces against the Japanese. High attrition by the Kwangbok Army group, however, led to a majority of the officer pool being men who had served under the Japanese. In addition to Park and Kim, this included the officers in charge of all six divisions with which the ROK Army was inaugurated in 1948. Don Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History* (New York: Basic Books, 2001), p. 31.

⁷ Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 72; Stephen Jin-Woo Kim, *Master of Manipulation: Syngman Rhee and the Seoul–Washington Alliance, 1953–60* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2001). For a view of this relationship from the standpoint of a conservative Korean and Rhee supporter, see Henry Chung, *Korea and the United States Through War and Peace, 1943–60* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2000).

half a million. Under the 1953–54 negotiations surrounding the Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States agreed to provide assistance for a military of up to 720,000 men and, for the rest of Rhee's tenure, American aid totaled around \$300 million a year: as much as 87 percent of the ROK defense budget.⁸ The United States also provided extensive advising, pairing American advisors with ROK counterparts in an attempt to replicate American structures and practices, helping with the creation of a Korean Military Academy modeled on West Point and command/staff colleges that were similarly parallel, and training over 7,000 ROK Army officers from 1950–1957 alone – including Park Chung Hee, who went to Fort Sill's artillery school in 1954.⁹

American officials, however, were concerned that Rhee's views on how to handle the North Korean threat did not align with theirs, and worried that he might order an attack across the De-Militarized Zone (DMZ) without their approval. As a result, they took pains to limit his authority over the military, both formally through operational control and informally by maintaining good ties with military leaders. The State Department observed in 1955 that “the present leaders of the Army are friendly to us and it is our belief that they will not act against our interests even under orders from Rhee.”¹⁰ From July 1950 onward, operational control of the ROK military remained under United Nations Command, and therefore under American military authority.

The coercive apparatus under Syngman Rhee: fragmented and exclusive

Outside the U.S.-controlled military, however, the coercive apparatus that Rhee created was fragmented and exclusive. Under American trusteeship, Rhee – an Ivy League graduate and long-time exile born in Haeju, in what is now North Korea – became the “uncontested leader of the right.”¹¹ He

⁸ “Acting Secretary of State to Embassy in Korea,” September 11, 1954, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–54*, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 1875–82; Yong-pyo Hong, *State Security and Regime Security: President Syngman Rhee and the Insecurity Dilemma in South Korea 1953–60* (New York: Macmillan/St. Martin's, 2000), pp. 71–79.

⁹ Kenneth W. Meyers, “KMAG's Wartime Experiences: 11 July 1951 to 27 July 1953,” RG338, Box 85; Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, pp. 84–96.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of State, Walter Robertson to Herbert Hoover, Jr., November 9, 1955, *Foreign Relations of the United States of America, 1955–57*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 180–81; “General Approach to and Possible Active Steps to Meet the Korean Internal Political Crisis,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–54*, Vol. 15, pp. 336.

¹¹ Young Ick Lew and Sangchul Cha, eds., *The Syngman Rhee Presidential Papers: A Catalogue* (Seoul: Yonsei University Press, 2005).

had been away from the Korean peninsula so long that he lacked local social ties, something that American officials expected to be an advantage in overcoming factionalism and uniting Koreans from different blocs.¹² Instead, it meant that Rhee was primarily concerned with securing power against various political rivals. To do that, he appointed high-level officials based on loyalty rather than competence, and played rival factions and organizations off each other. The result was a fragmented and exclusive coercive apparatus.

The social composition of Rhee's coercive apparatus, including the Korean National Police (KNP), was anti-communist, rightist, collaborationist, and personally loyal. Rhee excluded both anti-Japanese nationalists who had fought in China and the indigenous leftist movement represented by the Korean People's Republic.¹³ Although he accepted American aid to build up a police force and military "suitable for maintaining internal order under conditions of political strife," he contravened American pressure for inclusivity by purging the military of suspected communist sympathizers, including approximately 10 percent of an 80,000-man force after a mutiny in October 1948.¹⁴ Rhee also excluded anti-communists who were not personally loyal to him,

¹² Gregory Henderson, *Korea: The Politics of the Vortex* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968), p. 152; Robert T. Oliver, *Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the Myth* (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1954); Richard Allen, *Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait* (Rutland: Tuttle, 1960).

¹³ In 1946, more than 80 percent of police officials, including police intelligence, had worked for the Japanese, including many with a reputation for brutality; Rhee retained these personnel. Author's interview, Seoul, March 2011; Jun, "South Korea," p. 123; Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 4; Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, pp. 43–48; Gi-Wook Shin and Michael Robinson, eds., *Colonial Modernity in Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999); Carter J. Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New: A History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), pp. 327–29; Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History* (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), p. 173; Henderson, *Korea*, p. 143; Kim Dong-Choon, "The Long Road toward Truth and Reconciliation: Unwavering Attempts to Achieve Justice in South Korea," *Critical Asian Studies*, Vol 42. No. 4 (December 2010), p. 534.

¹⁴ Military units ordered to sail to Cheju to participate in anti-communist suppression activities mutinied. Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, pp. 25, 75. For the quote on American views of the purpose of the police, see "Brief History of U.S. Military Assistance to the Republic of Korea," WHCF, Box 25, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library; U.S. State Department, "Memorandum concerning United States Political Objectives in Korea," December 1, 1950. See also Chung-in Moon and Sang-young Rhyu, "Overdeveloped State and the Political Economy of Development in the 1950s: A Reinterpretation," *Asian Perspective*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1999), pp. 179–203; David Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 101.

purging conservative rivals who had worked for the American occupation or who served in the Korean Democratic Party. To staff his coercive apparatus, he preferred officials who had come from North Korea, who were anti-communist but lacked a geographic power base that might be a platform from which to challenge him for leadership.¹⁵ Additionally, Rhee personally controlled both national- and provincial-level appointments, and used rotation liberally. Six months after he took office, half of his ministers had been replaced; by March 1949, the State Department reported that not a single one of his ministers or vice ministers had held a significant position during the American occupation.¹⁶ He replaced cabinet ministers with astonishing frequency – over ten a year for twelve years – thereby “depriv[ing] the administrative agencies of stability and consistency” while preventing “the consolidation of groups, bonds, personal powers, and vested interests in any province, ministry, or board.”¹⁷ Exclusivity, then, was one of Rhee’s primary tools in dealing with potential elite threats to his power.

Rhee also fostered fragmentation within the coercive apparatus whenever possible, creating rival units with parallel, overlapping responsibilities and exploiting factional rivalries. He built up a military police unit headed by Lieutenant General Wŏn Yong-dŏk – the Joint Military Provost Marshal or Joint Provost Marshal Command (JMPM/JPMC) – which was outside Army jurisdiction and answerable only to the Defense Minister and to Rhee. He played this unit off the Special Task Command (특무대, *T’ungmudae*), later Counter-Intelligence Corps (방첩대, *Pangch’ŏptae*), headed by Major General Kim Ch’ang-nyong.¹⁸ Fragmentation also existed between the executive-controlled KNP and a separate police force established by the National Assembly, called the Special Police, which existed in open rivalry with the KNP and sometimes attempted to arrest and try its leaders.¹⁹ Somewhat like Marcos, Rhee

¹⁵ Ironically, Rhee was also to use the experiences of the northern Koreans to demonstrate their trust, while using that of the Chinese Koreans to call their loyalty into question. Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 76; Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, p. 56.

¹⁶ U.S. State Department, “The Composition of the Present Korean Government,” March, 24, 1949, 895.01-3-2449; see Henderson, *Korea*, p. 239; Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 17; Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution*, p. 20.

¹⁷ Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution*, p. 21; Henderson, *Korea*, pp. 214, 239–40; Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 17; U.S. State Department, “Intimate Report on Rhee Syngman,” February 9, 1958.

¹⁸ Jun, “South Korea,” p. 136; Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, pp. 72–73.

¹⁹ Henderson, *Korea*, pp. 256–57, 165–66.

used rotation to balance rival regionally based factions within the coercive apparatus: a Northwest, P'yŏngan-based faction was headed by the Paek (백) brothers from the Japanese Kwantung army and later by Chang Do-yŏng (patrons of Park Chung Hee, despite his southeastern origins); a Northeast, Hamgyŏng-based faction led by former Japanese officer Chŏng Il-gwŏn and Yi Yong-mun; and a middle-southern faction led by Yi Hyŏng-gŭn.²⁰ Other rivalries existed between those who had trained at the Japanese Military Academy and those trained at the Fengtian and Xinjing Officers' Schools.²¹ Under Rhee, therefore, "the façade of top-down control masked a fractured regime that frequently splintered into competing clusters of power," as he fostered competition between subordinates in different factions and organizations.²² As it had in the Philippines, this interference created an intra-military divide between officers who were politically favored by patronage and promotion and those who were excluded on political rather than performance-based grounds.²³ The coercive apparatus that Park inherited at the end of Rhee's tenure, therefore, was fragmented and socially exclusive.

PARK'S CHANGING THREAT PERCEPTIONS AND COERCIVE APPARATUS PRE-1972

After his election in 1963, Park initially focused on managing popular protest and unrest. Perhaps even more than Marcos, Park pursued centralization and internal coordination in the internal security apparatus, creating a KCIA with unitary powers of coordination over the rest of the coercive agencies and establishing broadly inclusive intelligence networks. He also promoted policies within the coercive apparatus and military designed to break down factionalism and avoid social divisions. After re-election in 1967, however, he began to contemplate a third term,

²⁰ Yong-sup Han, "The May 16th Military Coup," in Kim Byung-kook and Ezra Vogel, eds., *The Park Chung Hee Era: The Transformation of South Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011), p. 39; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, pp. 201–02, 212, 247, 261; Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, pp. 57–58; Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 99.

²¹ Yong-sup Han, "The May 16th Military Coup," pp. 37–40.

²² Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 341.

²³ In September 1960, sixteen officers, including 1961 coup architect Kim Jong-p'il, demanded that the Army's Chief of Staff remove senior commanders tainted by politicization and corruption. They were arrested for insubordination; no action against the senior officers was taken. Jun, "South Korea," p. 125; Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 99; Uk Heo and Terence Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980* (Cambridge: Cambridge, 2010), p. 21.

which eventually led to the promulgation of the Yushin constitution and autocratic rule in September 1972. As Park prepared to shift from democratic to autocratic rule, his threat perceptions changed, focusing first on political rivals who could block his path to a third term, and then on the coercive agencies responsible for keeping him alive and in power. Park's distrust of his coercive apparatus appears to have increased dramatically after two close escapes from assassination: the 1968 Blue House raid, and the 1974 assassination attempt that missed him but killed his wife. As a result of these changing threat perceptions, over the course of the 1970s, the nature of Park's coercive apparatus evolved. He increasingly relied on internal security officials from Kyöngsang, rendering his coercive apparatus more exclusive, and increased fragmentation within the coercive apparatus by balancing power among the KCIA, the Presidential Security Service, and the Army Security Command.

Park the democrat: threat perceptions and internal security pre-1972

During the 1960s, Park's primary domestic security concern was with popular unrest, especially after the 1963 elections cemented his accountability to popular rule. Elite threat was relatively low, as purges in the regime's first year had removed all but six of the original thirty-two members of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction (SCNR), including Park's two major potential rivals: Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Chang Do-yöng (SCNR chairman) and coup co-architect Kim Dong-ha.²⁴ Popular threats, however, were non-trivial: there were severe protests in 1964–65 over the Korea–Japan normalization talks, resulting in the declaration of martial law in June 1964, a Media Ethics Committee Law in August 1964, the passing of a Garrison Decree in August 1965, and a crackdown by the Army.²⁵ During this period, as a leader facing the risk of electoral removal, Park created a coercive apparatus that was unitary under the KCIA. Moreover, the internal security apparatus was – compared to the Yushin period – relatively inclusive, though still marked by the absence of officials from Chölla province.

During this period, the central change made by Park Chung Hee to the structure of the internal security apparatus was the establishment of the KCIA in June 1961. The KCIA's coordinating authority over the

²⁴ Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, pp. x, 111.

²⁵ Victor D. Cha, "Bridging the Gap: The Strategic Context of the 1965 Korea-Japan Normalization Treaty," *Korean Studies*, Vol. 20 (1996), pp. 123–60.

coercive apparatus made it a unitary system quite different from the fragmented one employed by Rhee. Though named after the American CIA, it combined domestic and external spy functions in ways that made it organizationally closer to the Soviet KGB. The KCIA was divided into three major branches: one focused on foreign intelligence and operations, one handling domestic intelligence and operations, and the third aimed at North Korea, which fell into neither the domestic nor the foreign category.²⁶ The KCIA assumed a supervisory role, unifying and streamlining internal security operations under its aegis. Article 1 of the KCIA's founding decree (Law No. 619) spelled out its purpose and intended authority:

The [Korean] Central Intelligence Agency was created directly under the Supreme Council of National Reconstruction in order to supervise and coordinate both international and domestic intelligence activities and criminal investigation by all government intelligence agencies, including that of the military.²⁷

The official history of the National Intelligence Service (the organizational descendant of the KCIA) explicitly notes that a primary goal of establishing the KCIA was “to enhance efficiency in security investigations by decreasing the waste of effort from engaging in unnecessary competition or executing redundant tasks.”²⁸ Article 3 gave the KCIA the right to set up domestic branches, and Article 7 authorized it to receive “support and assistance from all state institutions when necessary for work.”²⁹ Additional regulations in December 1963 confirmed its powers of control and coordination, and by the mid-1960s, the KCIA had assumed “coordinating power” or “coordinating authority” over the entire internal security apparatus, unifying intelligence and anti-dissident investigations and operations under a single authority.³⁰

With respect to internal security, this power meant that the KCIA possessed the authority to appear at a local police station and demand to see

²⁶ Author's interviews with three former KCIA officials, Seoul, March 2011.

²⁷ Quoted in Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, p. 111; Hyung-a Kim, “State-Building: The Military Junta's Path to Modernity Through Administrative Reforms,” in Kim and Vogel, eds., *The Park Chung Hee Era*, p. 91.

²⁸ Republic of Korea, National Intelligence Service, *Communication with the Past, Self-Reflection into the Future*, Vol. 6, *Schools and Espionage* [*Kwagōwa Taehwa Mirae'ŭi Sōngch'al*] (Seoul: National Intelligence Service, 2007), p. 433/대한민국 국정원, 과거와 대화 미래의 성찰 (서울: 국정원, 2007).

²⁹ This included hiding the KCIA budget in those of other agencies for reasons of national security. Byung-Kook Kim, “The Labyrinth of Solitude: Park and the Exercise of Presidential Power,” in Kim and Vogel, eds., *The Park Chung Hee Era*, pp. 143–44.

³⁰ National Intelligence Service, *Communication with the Past*, pp. 245–52, 431–36, 662–65.

the records of any individual, and to issue commands and actively manage the operations of other police, intelligence, and security agencies.³¹ The KCIA also directed the activities of the Prosecutor's Office, which under Korean law managed police investigations and whose approval was required for warrants related to arrest and search/seizure.³² By law, any agency that initiated an investigation had to notify the KCIA of its action, and prosecutors had to notify the KCIA of which charges they decided to press and each sentence handed down.³³ The KCIA could and sometimes did override the decisions of other parts of the security apparatus; for example, when prosecutor Koo Sang-jin (구상진, Ku Sang-jin) sought to suspend the arraignment of two university students that the KCIA wanted to charge with treason, the KCIA overruled him and Koo resigned.³⁴ KCIA agents boasted to activists of their authority, telling one that it was "the top policy-making body of the government."³⁵ The KCIA, in short, was the nerve center of a unitary and powerful coercive apparatus: "a smooth-functioning agency, with swift communications up and down its lines, and sideways with the National Police, the Army Security Command, district and local governmental offices, and many other agencies."³⁶

Park also took pains to minimize rivalry, division, and competition within the coercive apparatus, including the military. He saw internal division as destructive to Korean government; his speeches railed against factionalism and warned of the "agony and humiliation" that it had previously produced.³⁷ In notable contrast to Marcos, Park tried to smooth over

³¹ Author's interview with a police officer in the pre-democratic era; interview with an author of the official history of the National Intelligence Service, who was allowed to view KCIA files; interviews with three individuals arrested and tortured by the ROK coercive apparatus; Seoul, Korea, March 2011. See also Kim Rahn, "Call Mounting to Deprive Ex-Torturer of Pastorship," *Korea Times*, January 12, 2012.

³² Author's interviews with Korean police officials, Seoul, Korea, January 2012; Kim Young-Chul, "The Effective System of Criminal Investigation and Prosecution in Korea," *UNAFEI Annual Report for 2001 and Resource Material Series* No. 60 (February 2003), pp. 77–93; Lee Jung-Soo, "The Characteristics of the Korean Prosecution System and the Prosecutor's Direct Investigation," *Annual Report of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders* (UNAFEI) (Japan, 1997), pp. 83–102.

³³ National Intelligence Service, *Communication with the Past*, pp. 431, 434.

³⁴ National Intelligence Service, *Communication with the Past*, pp. 435.

³⁵ Sukjo Kim, "The Politics of Transition: South Korea After Park," unpublished manuscript prepared for East Asian Legal Studies, Harvard Law School, March 1980, p. 7.

³⁶ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 365.

³⁷ "The October Reforms are a Great Save the Nation Movement, Succeeding the March 1 Spirit," speech on March 1, 1973, *Major Speeches by President Park Chung Hee, Republic of Korea* (Seoul: Samhwa Publishing Company, 1974), p. 189. See also pp. 126–27, 137–38.

differences between officers produced at the Korean Military Academy, by university ROTC programs, and by Officer Candidate Schools. He de-emphasized these groups' differences, deliberately spread KMA graduates across posts to mix with other groups, and consciously chose not to turn social differences into factions that would try to balance against or compete with each other.³⁸ Promotions based on merit rather than factional alignment further reduced fragmentation and internal competition.

What of the social inclusivity or exclusivity of Park's pre-1972 coercive apparatus? During the 1961–63 period, Park replaced many of the rightist KNP personnel that had made Syngman Rhee so unpopular, and after 1963 he stabilized the bureaucracy and decreased personnel rotation, offering government ministers longer tenures and placing them in consecutive appointments.³⁹ During his democratically elected tenure, moreover, Park relied on a broader range of military ties and more inclusive military network than historians sometimes credit, appointing important personnel from his class, but also from the KMA Third, Fifth, and Eighth Classes, as well as others who had had operational control over forces needed to take power in 1961. By reaching out to a broad range of military elites, Park “put himself at the center of the coalition” that governed after the 1961 coup.⁴⁰ Soldiers were also encouraged to focus only on professional military responsibilities – the external defense of South Korea against the North – and to stay out of politics until retirement (at which time opportunities

³⁸ This had the benefit of making it harder for them to coalesce as a bloc within any single organization, as Ver's Ilocano integreees had done in the PSC. Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, p. 160; Samuel Berger to Dean Rusk, December 15, 1961, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961–63*, Vol. 22, p. 543; Samuel Berger to Dean Rusk, July 25, 1961, NSF Box 128, John F. Kennedy Presidential Library.

³⁹ From 1963–1972, 50.4 percent of those at the vice-ministerial level or above under Park stayed in office for two years or more (versus Rhee's 10–11 months); from 1972–1979 that share increased to 60.9 percent. Of 162 men at that level in 1963–72, thirty-seven men held such posts twice, and thirty-five did so three times or more. After 1972, twenty-two of ninety-one served twice and twenty-four served three times or more. Only two cabinet positions (Ministers of Agriculture and Home Affairs) had longer average tenures under Rhee than under Park. Kim, “Labyrinth of Solitude,” p. 155; for a competing interpretation, see Kang, *Crony Capitalism*, pp. 67; see also Henderson, *Korea*, pp. 239, 430, esp. fn. 81 and 84; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, pp. 354–46; Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, pp. 116–17.

⁴⁰ Analysis of KMA classes drawn from author's dataset. Park, who was in command of a logistical headquarters in Seoul during the initial coup planning, did not have operational control over the necessary forces. David Kang likewise concludes that Park selectively, rather than blindly, employed people from his own military networks. Han, “The May 16th Coup,” pp. 40–41, 44; Kang, *Crony Capitalism*.

in business and political life abounded). Park made it clear that excessive collaboration between military officers and national assemblymen could derail an officer's career.⁴¹

Historians generally remark on Park's regional favoritism toward his home province of Kyöngsang, and his economic neglect of the rival region of Chölla.⁴² Based on this literature, one might also expect an exclusive coercive apparatus biased in favor of Kyöngsang.⁴³ Instead, the exclusivity of Park's coercive apparatus is limited, consistent with the view of him as a leader focused primarily on external defense and popular management, and one who saw internal factionalism as detrimental to performance.⁴⁴ Park exhibited a clear awareness of the risk of regionally based factions, warning his security officials not to get too close to people from their own region.⁴⁵

⁴¹ Paul Hutchcroft, "Reflections on a Reverse Image: South Korea Under Park Chung Hee and the Philippines Under Ferdinand Marcos," in Kim and Vogel, eds., *The Park Chung Hee Era*, pp. 452–71; see also Kim, "The Armed Forces," in the same volume, pp. 168–99; Chang-hun Oh, "A Study of the Dynamics of an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of the 'Yushin' System Under Park Chung Hee, 1972–79," PhD dissertation, Ohio State University, 1991, p. 123.

⁴² Kim, "Labyrinth of Solitude," pp. 143, 150; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 326; Kang, *Crony Capitalism*; Choong Soon Kim, *The Culture of Korean Industry: An Ethnography of Poongsan Corporation* (Tucson: University of Arizona, 1992), pp. 42–43; Park Kie-duck, "Fading Reformism in New Democracies: A Comparison of Regime Consolidation in Korea and the Philippines," PhD dissertation, University of Chicago, 1993, pp. 140–41; Sallie Yea, "Cultural Politics of Place in Kwangju City and South Chölla Province," in Shin Gi-Wook, and Kyung Moon Hwang, eds., *Contentious Kwangju: The May 18th Uprising in Korea's Past and Present* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 118; Sallie Yea, "Regionalism and Political-Economic Differentiation in Korean Development: Power Maintenance and the State as a Hegemonic Bloc," *Korea Journal*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1994), pp. 5–29; Sallie Yea, "Maps of the Imaginary, Geographies of Dissent: The Marginalization of South Chölla Province," PhD dissertation, Monash University, 1999.

⁴³ Regionalism has been an enduring social cleavage in Korea, with origins extending back to the Three Kingdoms period (seventh century); regionally based factions have been a hallmark of Korean politics since the Chosön dynasty. Jun, "South Korea," p. 124; James Palais, *Confucian Statecraft and Korean Institutions: Yu Hyongwon and the Late Choson Dynasty* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996); Sallie Yea, "Cultural Politics of Place," pp. 112–17; Gi-Wook Shin, *Peasant Protest and Social Change in Colonial Korea* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996).

⁴⁴ It is worth noting that Park relied on members of the northwest faction to execute the 1961 coup, and he did not come from an elite Kyöngsang family. He might therefore not have been able to rely on regional networks in the way that a cursory reading of regional politics might predict. Author's interview with a Korean historian, Seoul, January 2012; Han, "The May 16th Coup," p. 39.

⁴⁵ For an example involving General/Prime Minister Chöng Il-gwön, see Kim, "Labyrinth of Solitude," p. 152.

TABLE 5.1. *Regional origins of government vs. internal security officials under Park, pre-1972^a*

Province	% population	% high officials	% internal security officials
Chŏlla	23.8	13.2	0
Seoul/Kyŏnggi	20.8	14.1	12.5
Kangwŏn/Cheju	7.7	7.7	2.5
Ch'ungch'ŏng	15.6	13.9	22.5
Kyŏngsang	32.1	30.1	37.5
North Korea	0.0	21.0	7.5
Missing	0.0	0.0	17.5

^a Statistics on internal security officials calculated by author. Statistics on population from 1960 census. Statistics on high officials taken from Joo Seung-man, "Reflection on and Resolution of the Fundamental Cause of Regional-Based Voting," (Seoul: Yonsei University, 2003), p. 47. / 주승만, "지역주의 선거 근본원인에 대한 성찰과 해결방안" (2003), 서울, 연세대학교, 페이지 47.

Table 5.1 shows the regional backgrounds of high-ranking internal security officials compared to government officials and the South Korean population in general from 1963–1972. Chŏlla is clearly under-represented in high-ranking government positions overall, and excluded entirely from positions of responsibility in internal security. Kyŏngsang is over-represented in internal security only slightly (5 percent), and under-represented in high-level government positions compared to the overall population. Perhaps most surprising are the number of officials from North Korea (generally and in internal security), and the over-representation of Ch'ungch'ŏng, the regional home of coup architect and KCIA creator Kim Jong-pil, in internal security: 22.5 percent of senior appointments relative to 15.6 percent of the population. Regional exclusivity in the 1963–72 period, therefore, is present, but not especially pronounced.

Moreover, with respect to domestic intelligence, Park actively expanded the inclusivity of the coercive apparatus. By 1964, the KCIA had 370,000 employees: one for every fifty-four Korean citizens.⁴⁶ The KCIA monitored dissidents overseas, sent informants to campuses, and set up branch offices in each province and major city. One college professor recalled reporting weekly to seven intelligence agencies, including several in the KCIA (in addition to district police, government offices,

⁴⁶ Alexander Joungwon Kim, *Divided Korea: The Politics of Development 1945–1972* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975), p. 234; Kim, "The Armed Forces," p. 91.

and military intelligence).⁴⁷ A source of career mobility for thousands of ambitious officers and citizens, the KCIA sponsored entrants into other ministries, thereby monitoring and influencing their policies.⁴⁸ The agency's information control and censorship policies allowed its personnel to collect information on potential opposition while preventing its public dissemination.⁴⁹ Koreans who lived through that period recall the KCIA as omnipresent, permeating "every nook and cranny of society"⁵⁰ with a reach from "students and churches to labor and the military."⁵¹

Park's regime also pursued forms of popular mobilization and civil society organization that provided some additional information. These included the National Student Defense Corps (학도호국단, *Hakto Hoguktan*) and the New Village Movement (새마을운동, *Saemaül Undong*), which promoted rural development.⁵² Kim Jong-pil also organized the Democratic Republican Party (DRP, 민주공화당, *Minju Konghwadang*) with an eye toward establishing a strong party like Taiwan's Kuomintang; though the DRP won a legislative majority in November 1963, it never achieved the Kuomintang's level of party discipline or membership. In contrast to Taiwan, however, these organizations were not formally linked to the coercive apparatus, which limited their effect on inclusivity.

Park the autocrat: changing threat perceptions

As Park prepared to run for a third term in 1971 and then to establish autocratic rule in 1972, his threat perceptions clearly shifted.⁵³ External threats remained high with the advent of the Nixon doctrine, Nixon's visit to China, superpower détente, and the withdrawal of a full division of American troops from Korea (decreasing troop strength from 62,000 to 42,000); in response, Park initiated a nuclear weapons program and negotiated a joint declaration with Pyongyang in July 1972. With respect

⁴⁷ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 366.

⁴⁸ Henderson, *Korea*, p. 434, fn. 115.

⁴⁹ Kim Jin-a, "Kim Dae Jung, 8-15 Declaration HOLD <Namsan Park>" *Issue Reporting: Don't Trust the Journalism in this Country - Reporting Guidelines under Yushin Regime* (Media Oneul, 1996), pp. 101-04. / 김진아, "김대중 8.15 선언 HOLD <남산 박> 문제제기. 이 나라의 언론을 믿지 마라 - 유신시대의 보도지침 (미디어 오늘, 1996), 페이지 101-04.

⁵⁰ Kim, "Politics of Transition," p. 2.

⁵¹ Jun, "South Korea," p. 138.

⁵² Kim, "Politics of Transition," p. 14.

⁵³ Hyug Baeg Im, "The Origins of the Yushin Regime: Machiavelli Unveiled," in Kim and Vogel, eds., *The Park Chung Hee Era*, p. 242; Joo-hong Kim, "The Armed Forces," in the same volume, pp. 185-88; Oh, "A Study of the Dynamics," Ch. 3.

to internal security, however, Park became less concerned with popular unrest and more with the elite politics that were his obstacle to remaining in power. Even though intense protests accompanied his third presidential campaign, these issues assumed a secondary importance relative to managing political rivals and his own security forces. Two major factors appear to have contributed to the evolution in his thinking about the dominant perceived threat: growing concern about opposition from politicians who were obstacles to Park's assumption of lifetime tenure, and rising distrust of the coercive apparatus, particularly of its ability to protect Park after attempts on his life in 1968 and 1974. These shifting threat perceptions resulted in a coercive apparatus that became, over time, increasingly fragmented and exclusive.

As Park prepared to obtain a third presidential term, elite rivals became increasingly important in his thinking. Infighting erupted among the lieutenants and protégés in the DRP who thought they might be able to replace Park, as a number of younger politicians vied to become his successor. Among them were Kim Jong-pil, then "first among equals in the political leadership of the DRP," and Kim Sŏng-gon, leader of the Gang of Four and the DRP's main fundraiser. In 1969, Park used pressure from the KCIA and the Gang of Four to pressure Kim Jong-pil into supporting a constitutional amendment for Park's third term, thereby removing much of Kim's power as the assumed successor to Park. When Kim Sŏng-gon then tried to challenge Park in October 1971 by joining the opposition in a vote of no confidence in Home Minister O Ch'i-sŏng, Park had the Gang of Four purged (and tortured by the KCIA).⁵⁴ Other elites who fell rapidly from grace during this period included Capitol Garrison Commander Yun P'il-yong, caretaker of the nascent Hanahoe (하나회) faction (see below), who was tried for subversion in April 1973; former KCIA Director Kim Hyŏng-uk, who went into exile in the United States in early 1973 and who later testified in Congress about KCIA operations in the United States; and Yi Hu-rak, who stepped down as KCIA Director in December of that year.⁵⁵ Park appears to have been particularly disturbed by Kim Hyŏng-uk's "defection," writing that he could tolerate Kim's lack of personal loyalty but not his abandonment and treason against his Korean fatherland (조국, *choguk*).⁵⁶ Rather than replacing

⁵⁴ Oh, "A Study of the Dynamics," pp. 124-25; Chŏng Jae-gyŏng, ed., *The Annals of Park Chung Hee [Pak Chong-hui Silgi]* (Seoul: Chimmundang, 1994), October 2-3, 1971, p. 364 / 정재경, 鄭在景編著, 朴正熙實記 (서울특별시: 集文堂, 1994), p. 364.

⁵⁵ Kim, "The Armed Forces"; Im, "Origins of the Yushin Regime," pp. 238-42.

⁵⁶ Chŏng, *Annals of Park Chung Hee*, June 7, 1977, pp. 566-67.

these prominent lieutenants who had been his agents during his democratic tenure, Park increasingly took over direct management of politically sensitive issues, including internal security: a management style that exacerbated inter-agency competition during the Yushin period.⁵⁷

In the run-up to the 1971 election, Park's concern about elite rivals also focused increasingly on Chŏlla. Aware that economic inequality had been a source of discontent, he appealed to voters in Kwangju to avoid voting based on regional ties. In early April, he promised to invest tens of billions of won in Chŏlla, cautioning, "Regionalism is a social disease which can destroy our country. It is unfortunate that ... some people instigate regionalism between Yŏngnam (Kyŏngsang Province) and Honam (Chŏlla Province). I hope you [Chŏlla people] vote without regionalism."⁵⁸ Five days later, his victory over Chŏlla-based challenger Kim Dae Jung was a narrower-than-usual margin (53 percent of the vote to Kim's 45 percent).⁵⁹ In May, while campaigning for candidates for the National Assembly, he told voters in North Chŏlla that he interpreted the election results as a "candid warning" of voter discontent in that region.⁶⁰ Park perceived Kim Dae Jung's popularity as a "personal defeat" and threat.⁶¹ The presidential race intensified Park's concern over dissent in Chŏlla, and especially the threat to his leadership posed by Chŏlla-based politicians.

The other threat that Park increasingly feared was that of an assassination attempt by North Korea, and the inability of his coercive apparatus, particularly the KCIA, to protect him. In January 1968, commandos from the North Korean People's Army staged an infiltration raid to assassinate Park, and got within a kilometer of Blue House before being apprehended.⁶² The incident shocked Park, and shortly afterward he began practicing with a rifle and a pistol on a range at Blue House, asking First Lady Yuk Yŏng-su as he did so, "My shooting is good enough for any emergency, isn't it?"⁶³ After the incident, Park's criticism of the North in his private writings intensified, and became more personal; his diary increasingly associated the cause of national security with his own

⁵⁷ Kim, "Labyrinth of Solitude," pp. 164–65.

⁵⁸ Chŏng, *Annals of Park Chung Hee*, April 22, 1971, p. 352.

⁵⁹ Uk Heo and H. Stockton, "Elections and Parties in South Korea Before and After Transition to Democracy," *Party Politics*, Vol. 11 (2005), pp. 675–89.

⁶⁰ Chŏng, *Annals of Park Chung Hee*, May 11, 1971, p. 354.

⁶¹ Sohn Hak-kyu, *Authoritarianism and Opposition in South Korea* (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 32.

⁶² Narushige Michishita, *North Korea's Military-Diplomatic Campaigns, 1966–2008* (London: Routledge, 2010).

⁶³ Chŏng, *Annals of Park Chung Hee*, February 11, 1968, pp. 253–54.

personal safety. Following the raid, he created the Homeland Reserve Forces (향토예비군, *Hyangt'o Yebigun*) and new squadrons of Combat Police (전투경찰, *Chōnt'u Kyōngch'al*) to conduct counter-espionage and counter-infiltration missions. In contrast to later riot police units, the Combat Police were self-selecting; men conscripted for military service opted to join.⁶⁴ Park's worries about infiltration and assassination only increased after August 1974, when Japanese-born pro-DPRK activist Mun Se-gwang killed Yuk Yōng-su during an attempt on Park's life. According to his confidants and diary entries, his wife's assassination changed Park's worldview; he became more fatigued, melancholy, and withdrawn, and less trustful of subordinates – a second factor that contributed to his adoption of direct management and fragmentation in the coercive apparatus in the 1970s.⁶⁵ The outbreak of the 1976 “Koreagate” scandal in Washington, DC, in which former KCIA officers testified to the Park regime's attempts at bribery, further damaged Park's trust in the KCIA and caused him to look for other institutional mechanisms for self-protection, including augmenting the power of the Presidential Security Service.⁶⁶

The sections that follow show that Park's post-1972 coercive apparatus had important differences from its pre-1972 predecessor, in terms of both structure and social composition. Internal security therefore appears to be an exception to the recent claim that the 1972 promulgation of Yushin formalized rather than established his “imperial presidency.”⁶⁷ Because Park's distrust of his own security forces was much higher in the post-1972 period, his coercive apparatus was more fragmented, with power struggles emerging between the KCIA, the Presidential Security Service (PSS), and the Army Security Command (ASC). Regional favoritism within the coercive apparatus also deepened during the Yushin period. These shifts confirm that the design of an autocrat's coercive apparatus

⁶⁴ Park originally drew the Combat Police from existing police squadrons in 1967. These units were often posted to remote locations along the DMZ, but by 1973, they had taken over counter-infiltration from the police. Interviews with three members of the Korea National Police Agency, Seoul, Korea, January 2012; Kim Sōng-su *et al.*, *History of National Police in Korea [Hanguk Gyōngch'alsa]* (Seoul: Police Mutual Aid Association, 2010) / 김성수 외 7명, *한국경찰사* (서울: 경찰공제회, 2010).

⁶⁵ Kim, “Labyrinth of Solitude,” pp. 164–65.

⁶⁶ Paul Y. Chang, *Protest Dialectics: State Repression and South Korea's Democracy Movement 1970–79* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015); Kim, “The Armed Forces,” p. 195.

⁶⁷ Kim and Vogel, eds., *The Park Chung Hee Era*, pp. 29–30; Oh, “A Study of the Dynamics,” p. 118. For a dissenting view that reaches conclusions similar to the ones presented here, see Jorge Domínguez, “The Perfect Dictatorship?” in Kim and Vogel, eds., *The Park Chung Hee Era*, pp. 573–602.

depends less on underlying continuities in social structure or on stable inherited institutions, and more on the malleable and changing political interests that he perceives as he maneuvers to stay in power.

PARK'S COERCIVE APPARATUS AFTER 1972: INCREASING FRAGMENTATION AND EXCLUSIVITY

The coercive apparatus that Park used to govern from autumn 1972 until his assassination in 1979 was characterized by increased fragmentation and exclusivity. As with Marcos, some of these trends actually began prior to 1972, since Park's threat perceptions began to shift in anticipation of the declaration of Yushin. Both institutional characteristics, however, became increasingly pronounced after 1972, leading to what Jorge Domínguez refers to as a deterioration of Park's rule during the 1970s.⁶⁸ Both fragmentation and exclusivity emerged as a result of Park's preoccupation with elite threats and the need to directly manage his own internal security agencies.

Yushin and the framework of repression

According to testimony from his former chief of staff, Kim Jǒng-nyŏm, Park Chung Hee began planning for Yushin in April 1971, as he ran for his third presidential term, under the auspices of the "Good Harvest Project" (풍년 사업, *P'ungnyŏn Saŏp*). He emerged from the election cycle with a DRP majority in the legislature and firm control over the party. When the opposition continued its protests after the election, Park responded by quashing student protests at Korea University and issuing a Garrison Decree (위수령, *Wisuryŏng*) in October that stationed troops on eight different university campuses in Seoul.⁶⁹ In December, he declared a state of emergency and enacted a Special Law on National Security, which provided him a wide range of emergency powers, including the ability to prohibit demonstrations and restrict freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and collective action by workers.⁷⁰ In October 1972, he declared martial law (계엄령, *kyeŏmnyŏng*), dissolving the National Assembly, closing colleges and universities, and banning political parties.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Domínguez, "The Perfect Dictatorship?" pp. 573–602.

⁶⁹ Chǒng, *Annals of Park Chung Hee*, October 15, 1971, p. 365.

⁷⁰ Im, "Origins of the Yushin Regime," p. 247.

⁷¹ For Park's justification, see Park Chung Hee, *Major Speeches* (Seoul: Samhwa, 1973), pp. 24–26.

Finally, in a “self-coup,” Park promulgated the Yushin constitution (South Korea’s Fourth Republic), which allowed him to appoint and fire the prime minister and cabinet, appoint Supreme Court justices and one-third of the National Assembly, suspend civil liberties, and rule by emergency decree.⁷² The Yushin constitution also abolished direct presidential elections, switching to indirect election by a body whose membership Park now controlled in a system that lacked term limits, thereby ensuring that he could remain in office for life.⁷³ Throughout the Yushin period, a key characteristic of Park’s governance was the use of Emergency Measures (긴급조치, *kingŭp choch’i*) to suppress and manage popular dissent.⁷⁴ A list of Emergency Measures is shown in Table 5.2.

The infamous EM #9, passed in 1975, made criticism of the regime a violation of national security laws, and remained in effect until Park’s death.⁷⁵ In addition to Emergency Measures, the regime employed “political control laws” (정치규제법, *chŏngch’i kyujepŏp*), the most famous of which were the 1948 National Security Law (NSL) and the 1961 Anti-Communist Law (ACL). The two laws overlapped in many respects, and were used to target communists, North Korea sympathizers, and sometimes simply political dissidents. Other political control laws used against dissidents included the Social Safety Law, Law on Public Gatherings and Demonstrations, Law on Purification of Political Activities, Special Law on Crimes under Emergency Situations, and Special Law on the Protection of the State.⁷⁶

Increasing fragmentation

Under Yushin, the KCIA’s monopoly on power weakened, and fragmentation increased. Two rival organizations – the Army Security Command (ASC) and the Presidential Security Service (PSS) – emerged to challenge its coordinating power and overarching authority. A secondary source of

⁷² Eugene Kim, “Korea at the Crossroads: The Birth of the Fourth Republic,” *Pacific Affairs*, Vol. 46 (Summer 1973), pp. 218–31.

⁷³ Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, p. 23; Kim, “Korea at the Crossroads.”

⁷⁴ In 2013, South Korea’s constitutional court ruled unanimously that three of the measures (EMs #1, 2, and 9) were unconstitutional. Chang, *Protest Dialectics*; Sohn, *Authoritarianism and Opposition*; Choe Sang-hun, “Court Says South Korean Dictator, Father of Current President, Violated Constitution,” *New York Times*, March 21, 2013.

⁷⁵ Oh, “A Study of the Dynamics,” pp. 227–28; Zbigniew Brzezinski, “Memorandum for the President: Emergency Measure 9,” White House, August 10, 1978.

⁷⁶ Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, ch. 2; Seo Joong-Seok, *Contemporary History of South Korea: 60 Years* (Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2007), p. 135.

TABLE 5.2. *Garrison and Emergency Decrees in South Korea under Yushin^a*

Decree number	Date	Purpose
Garrison Decree	Oct. 15, 1971	Reaction to student protests against military training. Soldiers deployed to major universities; 2,000 arrested.
Martial Law	Oct. 17, 1972	Martial law declared. National Assembly dissolved.
EM #1 EM #2	Jan. 8, 1974	Disallowed criticism of Yushin. Forbade anti-government petitions. Created General Emergency Court Martial system (moved anti-government cases from civil to military court).
EM #3	Jan. 14, 1974	Eased tax burden of low-income earners to stabilize economy.
EM #4	Apr. 3, 1974	Criminalized student political organizing. Targeted National Democratic Youth-Student League (민청학련, <i>Minch'ŏnghangnyŏn</i>).
EM #5	Aug. 23, 1974	Annulled EM #1 and EM#4.
EM #6	Dec. 31, 1974	Annulled EM #3.
EM #7	Apr. 8, 1975	Closed Korea University (because of student activism).
EM #8	May 13, 1975	Annulled EM #7.
EM #9	May 13, 1975	Made criticism of government illegal. Allowed imprisonment without due process.
Garrison Decree	Oct. 20, 1979	Reaction to protests in Pusan, Masan, and Ch'angwŏn.

^a Based on Shin Gi-Wook, Paul Chang, Jung-eun Lee, and Sookyung Kim, *South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970–1993): Stanford Korea Democracy Project Report* (Stanford: Korea Democracy Project, 2009), pp. 88–90.

fragmentation lay in the factional competition that developed between now-Prime Minister Kim Jong-pil and the KMA Eighth Class on the one hand, and a newly emerging faction called Hanahoe (“unity”) on the other, which was established by Chun Doo Hwan and members of the Eleventh KMA Class from Kyŏngsang region to act as a counterweight to Kim Jong-pil.⁷⁷

⁷⁷ As in the 1961 coup, this was a split between senior military officers and junior ones. After his disgrace in 1969, Kim Jong-pil had been “kicked upstairs” to the largely ceremonial office of prime minister.

Park's strengthening of the Army Security Command was the first measure that increased fragmentation. In 1968, the year of the Blue House raid, he transformed a military organization called the Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) into the ASC, headed by Kim Jae-gyu (the eventual KCIA director), and then by Kang Ch'ang-sŏng.⁷⁸ The ASC became one of three internal security organizations, along with the PSS and the KCIA, that held overlapping responsibilities and whose directors not only each met one-on-one with Park – without even his chief of staff present – and reported to him directly, but also had the ability to contact him at any time.⁷⁹ By 1973, the ASC under Kang Ch'ang-sŏng had developed a clear rivalry with the Capital Garrison Command (CGC), a military unit with authority over Seoul, run by Commander Yun P'il-yong.⁸⁰ Yun had gained importance as an official whom Park relied on to cultivate relationships with Hanahoe, but Park began to suspect Yun's ambitions after Yun reportedly made the mistake of discussing who might take over the presidency after Park with then-KCIA director Lee Hu-rak at a drinking party. That year, Park used the ASC to investigate a supposed coup plot led by Yun within the CGC, an investigation that resulted in the sentencing of ten generals for corruption, the imprisonment of Yun, and the resignation of over 200 officers. (Yun and several other officers were cleared of wrongdoing by the South Korean courts in retrials in 2009 and 2012.⁸¹) The incident further strengthened the power of the ASC, but heightened fragmentation and lack of coordination among the major internal security organizations, as it became clear that Park's distrust was leading him to use agencies against each other.

The power of the Army Security Command, which rose throughout the 1970s, also placed it in competition with the KCIA, at whose expense it accumulated power. After the advent of Yushin, the KCIA lost the power to monitor the military; that responsibility was transferred to the ASC and removed from KCIA oversight. This was the first sign that the KCIA's coordinating authority, which had previously unified the coercive apparatus, was breaking down. After that, Park also began to use the KCIA as a scapegoat. Directors Kim Jong-p'il, Kim Hyŏng-uk, and Lee Hu-rak all became targets of public blame and discontent; Lee Hu-rak, for example,

⁷⁸ Jun, "South Korea," p. 136.

⁷⁹ Kim, "Labyrinth of Power," p. 147.

⁸⁰ Jun, "South Korea," p. 507.

⁸¹ Hwang Chun-hwa, "Former Defense Official's Name Clear Years After His Death," *Hankyoreh*, February 23, 2012, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/520463.html.

was forced to resign after his role in the Yun P'il-yong scandal came to light.⁸² Military men who had been serving in the KCIA were forced to retire or go back to active duty, creating further division between organizations that had previously been unified and coordinated informally by overlapping personnel.⁸³ In 1977, Park further strengthened the ASC by merging the various armed services' counter-intelligence units into it. The merger created a new Defense Security Command (DSC, 국군 보안 사령부, *Kukgun Poan Saryŏngbu*), whose head reported directly to Park, rather than to the Minister of Defense or the Army's Chief of Staff.⁸⁴ In March 1979, Hanahoe founder Chun Doo Hwan was appointed head of DSC.

Finally, a significant expansion of power on the part of the PSS contributed to the increasing fragmentation of internal security, and rivalry with the KCIA in particular.⁸⁵ The KCIA's successive failures in handling the 1968 Blue House infiltration raid, the 1974 assassination attempt, and the 1976 Koreagate scandal led Park to rely less on the KCIA and more on the PSS for personal protection and regime security. Rivalry between the KCIA and the PSS emerged in the early 1970s, when the PSS was run by Pak Chong-gyu, and the KCIA by Lee Hu-rak, but intensified after Ch'a Ji-ch'öl was appointed to head the PSS in August 1974 after the death of First Lady Yuk.⁸⁶ Ch'a, Park's former bodyguard and a retired army lieutenant, was described as "a short squat man without a visible neck, known for his ability to kill a man with his bare hands."⁸⁷ His role in presidential security and his effect on the coercive apparatus were similar to that of Ver in the Philippines: powerful, antagonistic, and disruptive. Ch'a created new offices within the PSS and recruited elite KMA graduates to fill them, expanded important presidential security guard units, and appropriated equipment and troops from other internal security units to increase the firepower under PSS authority. He also obtained a presidential decree that gave the PSS command over

⁸² Kim, "Labyrinth of Solitude," p. 144.

⁸³ Jun, "South Korea," p. 138.

⁸⁴ Jun, "South Korea," p. 136.

⁸⁵ The Presidential Security Service began as the Presidential Security Police (경무대경찰, *Kyŏngmudae Kyŏngch'al*) in 1949, and was renamed the Blue House Presidential Police upon Park's accession in 1961. In 1963, it legally became the Presidential Security Service (대통령경호실, *Taet'ongnyŏng Kyŏnghosil*). See history on the PSS website, "History of the PSS," www.pss.go.kr/pssEng/introduce/historyOfPSS.jsp, and www.pss.go.kr/pssEng/majorActivities/historyOfActivities.jsp.

⁸⁶ Kim, "Politics of Transition," p. 7.

⁸⁷ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 374.

TABLE 5.3. *Regional origins of government vs. internal security officials under Park, post-1972^a*

Province	% population	% high officials	% internal security officials
Chŏlla	23.8	13.2	4.0
Seoul/Kyŏnggi	20.8	14.1	12.0
Kangwŏn/Cheju	7.7	7.7	4.0
Ch'ungch'ŏng	15.6	13.9	12.0
Kyŏngsang	32.1	30.1	44.0
North Korea	0.0	21.0	4.0
Missing	0.0	0.0	20.0

^a Statistics on internal security officials calculated by author. Statistics on population from 1960 census. Statistics on high officials taken from Joo, "Reflection," p. 47.

Capitol Garrison Command in the case of an emergency. Finally, he began to distribute bonuses in Park's name to win favors inside the military, and started to interfere with the military's promotion of officers and its personnel policies.⁸⁸ These activities created fragmentation and friction between the PSS and the military, as well as between the PSS and KCIA.

Increasing exclusivity after 1972

From 1972 to 1979, the exclusivity of Park's coercive apparatus deepened. Reliance on officials from Kyŏngsang increased, as seen in Table 5.3. Over-representation of Kyŏngsang officials in high-level internal security positions increased: men from Kyŏngsang filled 44 percent of these positions, compared to 32 percent of the population. Reliance on officials from Ch'ungch'ŏng, the home of Kim Jong-pil, decreased after Yushin (and Kim's transfer to the largely ceremonial office of prime minister), so that the region was slightly under-represented during this period. (Interestingly, even as Ch'ungch'ŏng's representation decreased, Kim's Eighth KMA Class became more dominant relative to other KMA classes, comprising nearly a third of Park's high-level internal security appointments from 1972–1979.⁸⁹) Most striking – despite Park's acknowledgment of regional tensions in Chŏlla in the 1971 election – is the continued, near-total exclusion of officials from Chŏlla, which held around a quarter

⁸⁸ Kim, "The Armed Forces," p. 194.

⁸⁹ Statistics calculated by the author.

of the Republic of Korea's population (23.8 percent). In Park's entire eighteen-year tenure, only one official from Chŏlla is known to have held a high-level position related to internal security: Chang Il-hun, who headed the National Police for a mere seven months from May 1975 to January 1976.

These changes to the internal security apparatus, however, were organizationally isolated from the military in order to preserve its combat effectiveness vis-à-vis the external threat from North Korea. Scholars have previously noted Park's distinction between military positions with external versus internal responsibilities, and the different promotion criteria and chains of command used for each:

[Park] divided military positions into two levels: one consisted of command structure positions, including the army chief of staff and the joint chief of staff; the other consisted of intelligence/security positions such as commander of the Defense Security Command and commander of the Capital Defense Command. He then had the defense security commander report directly to him rather than to the minister of defense or the army chief of staff.⁹⁰

Joo-hong Kim reaches a similar conclusion about Park's military: that "praetorian guards" were promoted for loyalty in intelligence units, but professional soldiers were promoted on merit through the field army, with little overlap between the two career paths.⁹¹ According to the dataset used here, this pattern is even clearer when the backgrounds of all internal security officials – not just military ones – are included in the analysis. Regional favoritism was more pronounced in non-military positions related to internal security, as well as for officials who rose to their positions outside the military. For example, all of the country's Chief Prosecutors (responsible for prosecuting political crimes) came from either Kyŏngsang or Ch'ungch'ŏng. Conversely, the internal security positions that were military positions, or that were held by people from military backgrounds, displayed less regional exclusivity. By distinguishing between these types of positions, Park shifted the social composition of the coercive apparatus in political positions related to regime security, but did so without compromising the military's external efficacy. This relatively unusual system protected him internally while keeping the majority of the ROK military focused on external security.

⁹⁰ Jun, "South Korea," p. 136.

⁹¹ Kim, "The Armed Forces," p. 170.

COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS UNDER
CHUN DOO HWAN

After Park's assassination in October 1979, Major General Chun Doo Hwan, then the head of Defense Security Command, was appointed to lead the investigation into Park's murder.⁹² In mid-December, Chun, who had long supported Park and who had risen through a series of politically important positions in the coercive apparatus – positions in the SCNR, the KCIA, and the Army Chief of Staff's office; deputy directorship of the PSS; and leadership of Capital Security Command (where he led the 1968 effort to apprehend the North Korean commandos that launched the Blue House raid) – seized power in a coup in mid-December.⁹³

Over the next nine months, Chun assumed uncontested power. In December, the regime merged the National Security Law with the Anti-Communist Law. In April 1980, Chun assumed leadership of the KCIA as well as the DSC, and purged and reshuffled internal security personnel. In May, Acting President Choi declared martial law, which suspended civilian rule and placed Chun in formal command of the entire country. Chun dissolved the National Assembly, banned political activities and labor strikes, closed universities, and arrested opposition leaders.⁹⁴ When these actions inflamed popular resistance, particularly in Kwangju in Chŏlla, Chun ordered the military to suppress the demonstrations: a violent crackdown sometimes called "Korea's Tiananmen" (see Chapter 8). In August, after promoting himself to four-star general, Chun resigned to run for the presidency. The government tightened control over labor unions and passed a Basic Media Act that, in addition to closing periodicals and firing journalists, required newspapers to feature Chun's photo every day.⁹⁵ In late August, Chun, using the indirect system, was elected President; after amending the constitution to limit himself to one seven-year term, he was re-elected in February 1981. As the end of his presidency neared in 1987, however, protests intensified, and broad segments of society coalesced their opposition into a "grand democratic alliance."⁹⁶ The United States and the ROK

⁹² Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, pp. 118–21; Sunhyuk Kim, "State and Civil Society in South Korea's Democratic Consolidation," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 37, No. 12 (December 1997), p. 1138; Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, p. 29.

⁹³ William J. Gleysteen, Jr., *Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis* (Washington: Brookings, 1999); Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 117.

⁹⁴ Eckert et al., *Korea Old and New*, p. 374.

⁹⁵ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 380; Shin et al., *South Korea's Democracy Movement*, pp. 44, 31.

⁹⁶ Sunhyuk Kim, *Politics of Democratization in Korea* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000); Hagen Koo, *Korean Workers: The Culture and Politics of Class Formation*

military pressed Chun not to respond violently, and in 1987 Chun's designated successor, Roh Tae Woo, announced that South Korea would hold democratic elections in 1988.⁹⁷

Throughout his presidency, Chun's coercive apparatus was unitary under the Defense Security Command. On the question of exclusivity, however, Chun's coercive apparatus is puzzlingly mixed. Pressure to manage popular unrest did lead him, as Chapter 2's theory would predict, to establish a large number of new riot police units, and to staff them (unlike the Combat Police under Park) with randomly assigned conscripts, thereby rendering these forces socially inclusive and representative of Korean society. The top levels of Chun's internal security apparatus, however, were even more heavily drawn from Kyöngsang than Park's had been; many were members of his Hanahoe faction. Thus, the case of South Korea under Chun illustrates the tendency for high external and popular threats to contribute to a less fragmented and more inclusive coercive apparatus. It also raises interesting questions about "mixed" organizational choices – the consequences of which for repressive behavior will be explored in Chapter 8.

Chun's threat perceptions

With respect to internal security, Chun's dominant perceived threat appears to have been popular rather than elite. (Alone among the autocrats in this book, Chun remains alive; no private papers have yet been released or memoirs published that clearly and fully reveal his private perceptions.) Severe popular protests in Pusan and Masan triggered the assassination that eventually put Chun in power, and he was immediately confronted with a crisis of popular unrest in Kwangju, in which popular organizations actually succeeded in temporarily seizing power over the city from police and security forces. Chun also worried about the risk of assassination, but appears to have thought it most likely that the assassin would be a disgruntled member of the population. He confided to U.S. President Ronald Reagan that the demise of

(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2001); Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2007); Paul Y. Chang, "Unintended Consequences of Repression: Alliance Formation in South Korea's Democracy Movement (1970–1979)," *Social Forces*, Vol. 87, No. 2 (2008), pp. 651–77.

⁹⁷ James Cotton, ed., *Korea Under Roh Tae-Woo* (Canberra: Australia National University, 1993); Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. x; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 388; John Wickham, *Korea on the Brink: A Memoir of Political Intrigue and Military Crisis* (Washington: Brassey's, 2000).

Rhee and Park had convinced the Korean people that “that a change of presidents is possible only through violence ... a very dangerous way of thinking,” and explained his decision to seek only a single seven-year term as one that he hoped would prolong his life. He also quizzed the U.S. Secret Service on their security arrangements for ex-presidents, and assigned that responsibility to the PSS in 1981 – meaning that he became the first president to take advantage of post-presidential protection when he stepped down in 1988.⁹⁸ Chun, therefore, appears to have been far more concerned about popular dissatisfaction than any other threat to his power.

This was partly because Chun had eliminated elite threats before he formally assumed power. His major potential rival at the time of the coup was Army Chief of Staff and martial law commander General Chŏng Sŭng-hwa, who had been rumored, prior to the coup, to be thinking about sending Chun to the backwater East Coast Security Command. In his capacity as an investigator of Park’s murder, Chun arrested Chŏng and accused him of conspiring to murder Park, a move that placed Chun in charge of the military chain of command.⁹⁹ Chŏng’s subsequent removal and sentencing nullified him as a potential threat to Chun, and cleared the way for the declaration of martial law to formally place power in Chun’s hands. From December 1979 to April 1980, Chun also purged and reshuffled personnel that he thought might be loyal to Chŏng, and appointed his own people instead, including General Roh Tae Woo, a KMA classmate and Ninth Division commander who had assisted Chun in the coup and who became head of CGC.¹⁰⁰ The May 1980 arrest of the “three Kims” – Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong-pil – removed potential electoral rivals as well. Finally, after a major financial scandal in May 1982, Chun replaced several party officials and half his twenty-two-person cabinet; a twelfth cabinet member (Yu Hak-sŏng, head of the Agency for National Security Planning, formerly the KCIA) was replaced the following month.¹⁰¹ As a result, there were few if any elite rivals, inside the coercive apparatus or beyond it, who could plausibly challenge Chun.

⁹⁸ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 163; “History of PSS.”

⁹⁹ Chŏng was exonerated in 1997.

¹⁰⁰ Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, p. 30.

¹⁰¹ Henry Scott-Stokes, “Seoul Pressing Shake-Up After Scandal,” *New York Times*, June 3, 1982, p. A3; Milt Freudenheim and Barbara Slavin, “Billion-Dollar Housecleaning,” *New York Times*, June 6, 1982.

Structure: a unitary coercive apparatus

Under Chun, the Defense Security Command became the coordinating organization for a unitary coercive apparatus in South Korea. After the KCIA director assassinated Park Chung Hee, Chun stripped the KCIA of its remaining authority over other internal security agencies. He then personally assumed leadership of the KCIA while retaining his role as head of the DSC, uniting civilian and military intelligence and security agencies that had been at loggerheads for much of the Yushin period. His purges and personnel reshuffling also removed most of the personnel who had been involved in the factional and organizational rivalries that had characterized the coercive apparatus in the 1970s. Subsequently, through presidential orders and legislation, he redefined and limited the KCIA's role to one of collecting and processing intelligence, and renamed it the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP, 국가안전기획부, *Kukka Anjŏn Kihoekpu*).¹⁰² The coercive apparatus under Chun was therefore unitary and low in fragmentation throughout his tenure.

Social composition: inclusive frontline forces but exclusive elites

The popular unrest amid which Chun assumed power led him to expand the inclusivity of the coercive apparatus both numerically and socially, increasing the size of the riot police to handle public protests and using conscripts that made the frontlines of these forces broadly representative. At the top levels of the internal security apparatus, however, Chun's coercive apparatus was at best mixed. Chŏlla was included more than it had been previously, but still not proportionally to its percentage of the overall Korean population; at the same time, reliance on Kyŏngsang officials increased, reaching an even greater fraction of internal security elites than under Yushin.

Chun expanded the overall size of the coercive apparatus to deal with the threat of popular protest. In December 1980, just after his takeover, the Combat Police (CP) were assigned an auxiliary mission of protecting peace and public order. Shortly after, however, a new amendment to the law on the "compulsory duty police service system" was added, which divided the CP into two different types.¹⁰³ The first, the combat police

¹⁰² Shin *et al.*, *South Korea's Democracy Movement*, p. 94.

¹⁰³ In English, the term Combat Police has sometimes been used (incorrectly) to refer to both. Kim *et al.*, *History of National Police*; Kim Doosung, *Military Service System in South Korea* (Seoul: Jacil Press, 2002); Jung Joosung, Wonyoung Jung, and Seokki

for counter-espionage (Combat Police), were assigned to the Ministry of National Defense, and were to be selected at basic military training.¹⁰⁴ The second group was the combat police for public order, also known as the Auxiliary or Riot Police (의경, *Ŭigyŏng*). The Riot Police were originally supposed to be recruited by the National Police Agency but, because there was a surplus of men who needed to do their compulsory military service, the government began simply assigning these conscripts to Riot Police units and dispatching them to protests instead. (In late November 1980, U.S. President-elect Reagan exclaimed to outgoing President Jimmy Carter, “Mr. President, I’d like to have the power that Korean presidents have to draft dissenters.”¹⁰⁵) Riot Police conscripts, therefore, were generally randomly assigned to their units. Interviewees who had been through the system recounted, however, that an individual assigned to the Riot Police could sometimes find a way to get sent to a unit in or near his home district, further decreasing the social distance between these units and the population and making the units even more inclusive with respect to local populations.¹⁰⁶ This new system of assignment took effect nationally in late 1982, and by the mid-1980s the number of riot police had reached 54,100: 45.8 percent of the total strength of the KNP.¹⁰⁷

At the top levels, the composition of the internal security apparatus was more skewed (see Table 5.4). On one hand, officials from Chŏlla were no longer entirely excluded, though the region was still under-represented, at 9 percent of high-level internal security appointments compared to 16 percent of the population. On the other hand, individuals from Kyŏngsang disproportionately dominated the internal security apparatus, holding nearly two-thirds of the top internal security positions during the 1980s despite being less than a third of the population.

A far higher proportion of individuals from the Kyŏngsang region served in high-level internal security positions (62.8 percent) than served

Ahn, *Directions of Military Service Policy in South Korea* (Seoul: Institute for Defense Analysis, n.d.).

¹⁰⁴ Interview with Dr. Ahn Seokki, Seoul, Korea, January 2012; Kim, *Military Service System*; Jung *et al.*, *Directions of Military Service Policy*; Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, “Military Service System in South Korea” and “The Military Service Law Lays Out Rules Regarding Military Service Responsibilities,” (Seoul, KIDA, n.d.).

¹⁰⁵ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 138.

¹⁰⁶ Interviews with Korean National Police officials, Seoul, Korea, January 2012.

¹⁰⁷ Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, June 1990), p. 322. During an interview with Korean National Police officials, however, the number given for Riot Police in the mid-1980s was 150,000.

TABLE 5.4. *Regional origins of government vs. internal security officials under Chun^a*

Province	% population	% high officials	% internal security officials
Chölla	16.2	14.1	9.3
Seoul/Kyönggi	35.5	24.6	7.0
Kangwön/Cheju	6.0	4.7	4.7
Ch'ungch'öng	11.7	13.2	7.0
Kyöngsang	30.5	33.0	62.8
North Korea	0.0	7.9	9.3

^a Kyöngsang's population increased in the 1960s and 1970s as economic growth stimulated by Park's preferential policies brought people to the region. Statistics on internal security officials calculated by the author. Statistics on population from 1980 census, Korean Statistical Information Service, http://kosis.kr/eng/database/database_001000.jsp?listid=Z. Statistics on ministers and high-level officials from Joo, "Reflection," p. 47.

in government in general at either the ministerial level (41.2 percent) or as high-ranking officials (33 percent). Some of this can be explained by the fact that Chun drew most of his internal security appointees from the military, whose promotion patterns exhibited stronger path dependence than civilian appointments. (In other words, it was relatively easy to replace a provincial governor or vice minister with one from a different region. However, if few officers from Chölla had been promoted up through the ranks under Park, Chun's choices for high-level internal security appointments would simply be more limited.) In fact, except for Chief Prosecutors and Directors of the Korean National Police, every individual who held a high-level internal security position came from the military; all but two had attended the KMA, though they came from a wide variety of classes (not just Chun's Eleventh), and very few were drawn from the same classes (the KMA Fifth and Eighth) that had been most prominent under Park.¹⁰⁸ Chun's reliance on Kyöngsang also reflects the strong influence of the Hanahoe clique, which he had headed and which remained influential after he assumed power. The

¹⁰⁸ Chief Prosecutors had legal degrees; police chiefs came from the Korea National Police Academy. Of three members of the KMA Fifth and Eighth Classes who were brought over from Park's tenure, two were replaced right after December 1979 and all three were gone by 1981. Oberdorfer's claim that the transition from Park to Chun was a "generational battle within the military" thus seems overstated, but it does seem like a generational handover. Chun also made fewer military appointments to civilian office than Park had. Retired officers comprised 16 percent of National Assemblymen under Park but 9 percent under Chun, 28 percent of the cabinet under Park but 21 percent under Chun. Jun, "South Korea," p. 129; Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 118.

faction was composed of so many individuals from Taegu and Kyöngsang that one of its nicknames was “TK.”¹⁰⁹

Chun appears to have been relatively unsuccessful in utilizing societal institutions to supplement formal intelligence-gathering efforts vis-à-vis the domestic population. In the early 1980s, he briefly attempted and then abandoned a method of intelligence-gathering and infiltration known as “afforestation” (녹화사업, *Nokhwasajŏp*). Under this policy, Defense Security Command created a list of young men suspected of politically problematic views or the potential for anti-government activity. The military then planned to draft these individuals for military service, indoctrinate them, and send them back to spy on students and anti-regime activists. At one point in the 1980s, over 1,000 dissenters were on their watch-list. The program was, however, short-lived; after the suspicious deaths of several students undergoing military training caused public furor, *Nokhwasajŏp* was abolished in 1984.¹¹⁰

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Alternative explanations do not convincingly explain the origins of coercive institutions in South Korea under military rule, particularly the variations in coercive institutional design that are observed across two different Korean autocrats.

As in the Philippines, explanations grounded in *institutional inheritance* and *path dependence* or underlying social structure are at odds with the malleability of South Korea's coercive institutions. The Japanese colonial experience in Korea left the peninsula with a legacy of strong, centralized, and militarized, but not particularly inclusive, police organization.¹¹¹ Yet

¹⁰⁹ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 380; Yea, “Cultural Politics of Place,” p. 117.

¹¹⁰ Han Hong-ku (Han Hong-gu), “Is ‘*Nokhwasajŏp*’ Forgivable?” [한홍구, “‘녹화사업’을 용서할 수 있는가?】, *Hankyoreh* 21, October 1, 2002, p. 77; Kim Jung Ho, “*Nokhwasajŏp* Was Directed by Chun,” *Hankook Ilbo*, October 12, 2002, p. 23; Lee Sae Young (I Sae-yöng), “Compulsory Conscription ‘*Nokhwasajŏp*’: Evidence that Former President Chun Ordered It” [이세영, “의문사위” 녹화사업 전두환씨가 지시], *Daehan Maeil*, October 12, 2002, p. 1; Lee Sae Young, “The Process and Issues of *Nokhwasajŏp*,” [이세영, “녹화사업 진행과정, 문제점/강제징집 운동권 출신 256명 사상교육통해 프락치등 활용”], *Daehan Maeil*, October 12, 2002, p. 22.

¹¹¹ On deep historical precedents, see Jun, “South Korea,” pp. 121–42; Hagen Koo, ed., *State and Society in Contemporary Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell, 1993), especially Jang-jip Choi, “Political Cleavages in South Korea,” pp. 13–50; Han Sung-joo, *The Failure of Democracy in South Korea* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), pp. 2–5; Henderson, p. 265. On Japanese colonial policing, see Eric W. Esselstrom, “Gai Kei: The Japanese Consular Police in Northeast Asia, 1880–1945,” PhD dissertation, University

this chapter clearly demonstrates that subsequent regimes displayed variations in both fragmentation and exclusivity that depart from this historical precedent. Park inherited a fragmented and exclusive coercive apparatus from Syngman Rhee, created a unitary and inclusive security apparatus as a democratically elected president, and then reversed his preferences as an autocrat to fragment the coercive apparatus and make it regionally exclusive. Chun Doo Hwan, on the other hand, reverted to a unitary security apparatus, but one led by a completely different organization – while creating a coercive apparatus that was exclusive at the top but inclusive at the ground level, different yet again from the choices made by Park. The fact that fragmentation and inclusivity fluctuated as much as they did over the course of these two cases suggests that the attributes of South Korea's autocratic coercive institutions were determined by something more variable and fluid than institutional inheritance, path dependence, or Korea's underlying social structure.

External influence, on the other hand, did exert a clear effect on the shape of South Korea's coercive apparatus. American influence, and specifically an alliance with the United States that kept operational control over much of the ROK military in American hands, limited the extent to which either Park or Chun could engage in coup-proofing measures that would compromise the military's combat effectiveness. American influence, however, was predicated on the presence of external threat; without an existentially high external threat from North Korea, it is hard to see how the South Korean military could have been so atypically insulated from autocratic manipulation. (To my knowledge, there is no other case, even among American alliances, where operational control of an autocrat's military remained in the hands of an outside country.) Moreover, American influence and preferences cannot explain variations in the structure and social composition of the non-military parts of the coercive

of California-Santa Barbara, 2004; Akira Iriye, *Pacific Estrangement: Japanese and American Expansion, 1897-1911* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972); Lee Ki-baik and Edward Wagner with Edward Schultz, trans., *A New History of Korea* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984); Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*; Ching-chih Chen, "Police and Community Control Systems in the Empire," in Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie, eds., *The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), pp. 213-39; Edward I-te Chen, "The Attempt to Integrate the Empire: Legal Perspectives," in Myers and Peattie, *The Japanese Colonial Empire*, pp. 248-50; Edward I-te Chen, "Japanese Colonialism in Korea and Formosa: A Comparison of the Systems of Political Control," *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies*, No. 30 (1970), pp. 126-58; Mark Caprio, *Japanese Assimilation Policies in Colonial Korea, 1910-1945* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2009); Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, p. 7.

apparatus, since that influence was present for both the Park and Chun regimes but their coercive institutional designs differed. Moreover, it cannot explain cross-national variation between the Korean cases and others; for example, the United States had alliances and helped to shape the police forces of both the Philippines and South Korea, but American influence in the Philippines led to a decentralized and fragmented police apparatus, while leading to a centralized and unitary one in South Korea. External influence, while clearly present and important, was far from decisive in shaping South Korea's coercive apparatus.¹¹² With external security under the management of the United States, South Korean autocrats were left to make decisions about the coercive apparatus based primarily on the kind of internal threat that they believed they faced.

CONCLUSION

Both Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan shaped their coercive institutions in ways that reflected their judgments about the threat environment they faced. Both operated under constraints imposed by an existentially high external threat, which precipitated an unusually high level of American involvement in and control over the military, which was generally unitary, inclusive, professional, and highly effective. Bracketing the military, however, we see that institutional variations in internal security are consistent with the predictions made in Chapter 2. As Park Chung Hee moved toward establishing autocratic rather than democratic rule, he, like Marcos, began increasingly to focus on elite rivals who could either block him from achieving that goal or remove him from power once he had done so. Accordingly, he began to fragment his internal security apparatus to keep power balanced among different organizations, and to more exclusively appoint internal security officials from his home region, Kyöngsang. Chun's dominant perceived threat, on the other

¹¹² One observer suggests that competition with North Korea may have caused the North's organizational practices to influence those of the South; he writes that the KCIA combined "Communist techniques" with "anti-Communist motivations." Changes over time in the role of the KCIA, however, suggest that even North Korean influence on organizational design was not determinative at all points. "Institutional borrowing" may have occurred, as happened between the Nationalists and Communists in China, but there is limited evidence to support this proposition, and the institutions in North and South were hardly mirrors of each other. Henderson, *Korea*, p. 447, fn. 35; on China, see Perry, *Patrolling the Revolution*, p. 109; William C. Kirby, "The Chinese Party-State under Dictatorship and Democracy on the Mainland and on Taiwan," in William C. Kirby, ed., *Realms of Freedom in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 113-38.

hand, was popular dissatisfaction and unrest, and he shifted his coercive apparatus – though not entirely – in the direction of unitary and inclusive coercive institutions. The fact that both autocrats were able to reshape the coercive apparatus in different ways to deal with the threats they perceived to be dominant when they assumed power indicates that institutional inheritance is not an explanation for coercive institutional design, while the fact that they both did so under the constraints imposed by American operational control similarly suggests that external influence is not decisive. By contrast, an explanation grounded in the dominant perceived threat explains not only why Park and Chun each created such different coercive institutions, but also the timing of their decisions to do so and the specific content of the reforms that they made.

PART III

COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS AND STATE VIOLENCE

Coercive institutions and repression in Taiwan

The design of Taiwan's coercive institutions had a profound effect on the patterns of violence that the island experienced during martial law. In particular, the reforms made to the coercive apparatus in the early 1950s, described in Chapter 3, help explain why Taiwan experienced a drop in state violence in the years that followed. Before that, during the late 1940s and early 1950s, the exclusivity of the KMT's coercive institutions isolated coercive agents from Taiwan's society. Social exclusivity had two major effects: first, the security forces had a more difficult time identifying and dealing with popular threats without resort to public, indiscriminate violence, and second, exclusivity created out-group resentment between the Mainlander and native Taiwanese populations that incentivized worse violence. Fragmentation of the coercive apparatus also fostered violence – against civilians as well as between rival security organizations – by hampering the flow of intelligence on popular policing and by providing incentives for inter-agency competition. As a result, state violence was relatively high during the period from 1945 to 1955.

Following the reforms that were documented in Chapter 3, however, the coercive apparatus became unitary and socially inclusive. This new organizational design provided fewer social and material incentives for coercive agents to engage in violence. Because social inclusivity provided better access to information on Taiwan's society, and because reductions in fragmentation improved internal coordination, the coercive apparatus' intelligence capacity also improved. These changes enabled coercive agents to rely on surveillance and pre-emptive, discriminate repression rather than public, reactive, and indiscriminate violence. As a result, state

violence declined around the time that these reforms were completed, in 1955, and remained low for the rest of the martial law period.

The first section of this chapter describes the drop in state violence that occurred in Taiwan in the mid-1950s, with an emphasis on several key aspects of that violence that are either omitted from or inaccurately depicted by existing studies. The second section illustrates how exclusivity and fragmentation worked through the intelligence and incentives pathways to contribute to higher levels of violence in the late 1940s and early 1950s, while the third section analyzes how inclusivity and a unitary coercive structure altered incentives and intelligence capabilities in ways that decreased violence after 1955. The penultimate section of the chapter discusses possible alternative explanations for violence, arguing that coercive institutional design outperforms explanations grounded in the level of popular threat, state capacity, and international influence, along with several other rival hypotheses. Variations in coercive institutional design also shed light on specific features of state violence in Taiwan that these alternative explanations cannot, including the identity of the people targeted at various times for violence at the hands of the state.

EXPLAINING THE DROP IN STATE VIOLENCE

Taiwan experienced a significant drop in the level of state violence around 1955. Violence declined in both scope and intensity: the number of people arrested, sentenced, and executed for political crimes all decreased, as shown in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.¹

These figures demonstrate that state violence in Taiwan has a striking temporal variation that is overlooked in existing studies of the martial law era. Around 1955, both the scope and intensity of state violence in Taiwan dropped precipitously, according to available data on arrests, sentencings, and executions. First, although comprehensive annual data

¹ These data were provided by the Foundation for Compensation for Improper Trials during the Martial Law Era (Compensation Foundation, 財團法人戒嚴時期不當叛亂匪諜審判案件補償基金會), which based its estimates on archival research done by Foundation staff, and which posted the data publicly on its website until it finished payments and ceased operation in 2014. The dossiers it used have been transferred to the Ministry of Culture and are gradually being made publicly available. Following Foundation precedent, Figures 6.1 and 6.2 omit casualties from the 1947 2-28 Incident. See “US\$600m paid to victims of Taiwan’s White Terror,” *WantChinaTimes*, May 14, 2013, www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=20130514000003&cid=1101; Ministry of Culture, Republic of China (Taiwan), “First Lot of White Terror Dossiers Made Public,” December 10, 2014, <https://english.moc.gov.tw/article/index.php?sn=2417>.




FIGURE 6.1. Individuals sentenced for political crimes in Taiwan (annual average)




FIGURE 6.2. Annual number of executions for political crimes in Taiwan

on arrests is not available, reports suggest that these were highly concentrated in the early years of martial law: compare the regime's own reported 23,000 people arrested in January–August 1950 with the 1,345 arrested in January–October 1964 – the latter figure around 5 percent of the number of arrests that had taken place in a similar period fourteen years earlier.² Figure 6.1 shows that about 75 percent of court sentences in political cases had also been issued by 1960, meaning that three-quarters of the cases occurred in the first one-third of the martial law period. Finally, as shown in Figure 6.2, the number of executions dropped; over time, an individual became less likely to be sentenced to death. After Chiang Kai-shek's death in 1975, almost all of the prisoners waiting for death

² U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, November 1, 1950.

sentences had their terms commuted to life imprisonment.³ The above statistics do not include the casualties from the February 28, 1947 incident, which are estimated to be between 6,000 and 10,000, but if those numbers are added to the totals, the decline in state violence becomes even more pronounced.⁴ Temporal variation is overlooked in most of the existing English-language literature on Taiwan's experiences under martial law, but there is little doubt that over time, the regime on Taiwan became markedly less violent.

The assumption that state violence was constant is linked to a second mischaracterization that pervades Western scholarship: inflated claims of the probable death toll. Most literature on the White Terror and KMT authoritarianism cites Douglas Mendel's claim that 90,000 people were arrested in Taiwan between 1949 and 1955, and that over half of these were executed (an estimated 45,000 deaths).⁵ Mendel's figure, however, comes from an anonymous source whose estimates were based on observations from inside a cell in one of Taiwan's dozen or so political prisons; it relies on internally inconsistent calculations and assumes a constant level of violence across all prisons across all years of martial law.⁶ There is simply no good reason for this estimate to have achieved the authoritative status it currently holds in English-language literature, and good reason to believe it is inaccurate.

Although Taiwan has not convened a full, formal transitional justice process, investigations drawing on extensive official documentation from the coercive apparatus itself have attempted to estimate the numbers who died, and have arrived at far lower totals.⁷ The government-funded Compensation Foundation, the source of the data in Figures 6.1 and 6.2, examined around 10,000 dossiers from the martial law era and documented 786 executions (statistics that they caution should be treated as

³ "Taiwan Reducing Prisoners' Terms: Clemency Will Cover Many Held on Political Charges," *New York Times*, June 1, 1975, p. 11.

⁴ Casualty reports on the incident typically combine the numbers of dead and wounded, making the death toll difficult to determine. Lai *et al.*, *Tragic Beginning*, pp. 158–60.

⁵ Mendel, *Politics of Formosan Nationalism*, p. 120. This figure is cited in Sylvia Li-Chun Lin, *Representing Atrocity in Taiwan: The 2/28 Incident and White Terror in Fiction and Film* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), p. 12; Tien Hung-mao, "Taiwan in Transition: Prospects for Socio-political Change," *The China Quarterly*, No. 64 (December 1975), p. 629; Roy, *Taiwan*, p. 90.

⁶ Mendel cites Anonymous, "A Report on Formosan Political Prisoners," *Formosan Readers Association Report*, 1 (November 1966), p. 11, reprinted as "Tyranny in Free Formosa," *The Progressive* (December 1967).

⁷ Wu Nai-teh, "Transition without Justice, or Justice without History: Transitional Justice in Taiwan," *Taiwan Journal of Democracy*, Vol. 1, No. 1 (July 2005), pp. 77–102.

the lower bound of any estimate, rather than a reflection of the full scope of human rights violations during this period).⁸ A report by former political prisoner and opposition Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) legislator Hsieh Cong-min (謝聰敏), in collaboration with the Ministry of Justice (which oversaw much domestic surveillance work during martial law), estimated that the regime investigated (a step prior to arrest) 29,000 political cases involving 140,000 people, and that these cases resulted in 3,000–4,000 executions.⁹ Finally, an official investigation into the martial law era, mandated by the DPP after it assumed power and led by former political prisoner Vice President Annette Lu (呂秀蓮), arrived at a figure of 10,000 trials and 2,000–3,000 executions.¹⁰ These statistics suggest that Taiwan's political violence was broader in scope in the earlier period, but less intense in the later periods, than Western scholarship has previously understood.

One final aspect of state violence that has been overlooked in existing accounts is relevant for identifying the mechanisms that produced repression in Taiwan: the identity of those targeted. The White Terror is often conceptualized as a quasi-imperial enterprise in which Mainlander arrivistes crushed native Taiwanese resistance.¹¹ Examining the home province of the individuals targeted for political offenses during the martial law period, however, suggests that at least one-third were Mainlanders, who comprised only 15 percent of the population. In the early years of KMT rule on Taiwan, Mainlanders were actually more likely to be arrested than native Taiwanese and, once arrested, could expect to receive harsher

⁸ For example, individuals or family members entitled to compensation might no longer be alive or in Taiwan, or might simply have chosen not to file a claim. Author's interview, staff member at the Compensation Foundation, Taipei, January 2013; Loa Lok-sin, "Former Premier's Praise of Martial Law Draws Fire," *Taipei Times*, November 1, 2011.

⁹ State violence in Taiwan can be quantified at three different points: arrest, trial/sentencing, and execution. Because records become more extensive as an individual proceeds through the process, confidence in the estimates increases with the intensity of violence. Many people were arrested and let go without much documentation, but execution created an extensive paper trail. Author's conversation with Hsieh Cong-min (謝聰敏), Taipei, December 2010; Wei Tingchao, *Report on Human Rights in Taiwan, 1949–1995* (Taipei: Wenyangdang Chubanshe, 1997) / 魏廷朝, <台灣人權報告書 一九四九–一九九五> (臺北市: 文英堂出版社, 1997); Hsieh Tsung-min, "From a Taiwan Prison," *New York Times*, April 24, 1972.

¹⁰ Tai-lin Huang, "White Terror Exhibit Reveals Part of Truth," *Taipei Times*, May 20, 2005; Tien, "Taiwan in Transition," p. 629; Amber Parcher, "Remembering the White Terror," *Foreign Policy*, October 12, 2012.

¹¹ On popular representations of the White Terror, see Lin, *Representing Atrocity in Taiwan*, especially Ch. 1; Stephen Kosack, *The Education of Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 133; Roy, *Taiwan*, pp. 77–78.

sentences.¹² As the sections that follow show, many of these individuals were members of the Nationalist government, military, and intelligence agencies, who became casualties of purges and inter-agency feuds.¹³ Although Chiang's purges and the White Terror are often regarded as separate phenomena, this chapter demonstrates that the two phenomena – violence against native Taiwanese and violence within the Mainlander KMT population itself – cannot be regarded separately. Both were consequences of the KMT's coercive institutional design, and of the incentives and intelligence weaknesses created by that system.

HIGH VIOLENCE AND WHITE TERROR, 1945–55

The high level of state violence between 1945 and 1955 in Taiwan is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that the crowds who greeted the 30,000 Nationalist troops arriving in Taipei in late 1945 were initially enthusiastic about rejoining China; Taiwan was not a province that had to be forcibly reconquered. It was, however, simply an afterthought compared to KMT concerns about the mainland, a fact that led to sub-optimal treatment of the island across a range of outcomes: the use of military rather than civilian rule; contempt for the administrative competence instilled in native Taiwanese by Japanese colonialism; extraction of resources from Taiwan to support the fight on the mainland; soldiers living off (and looting) local communities; appropriation of enterprises and property transferred from the Japanese to native Taiwanese before retrocession; and inattention and misgovernment that led to deterioration of the public health system and the outbreak of diseases. KMT mismanagement and predation turned the island's initial enthusiasm to disillusionment, and tensions increased.

The high level of state violence of this decade is largely attributable to the fragmented and exclusive coercive apparatus used for policing and internal security, which – as Chapter 3 showed – was transplanted from the mainland with little thought about whether it was appropriate for conditions on Taiwan. An apparatus designed to protect Chiang

¹² Data provided to the author by the Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation (台灣民間「相與和解促進會」, www.taiwantrc.org; author's interview, Compensation Foundation, Taipei, January 2013; J. Bruce Jacobs, "Taiwan and South Korea: Comparing East Asia's Two 'Third-Wave' Democracies," *Issues & Studies*, Vol. 43, No. 4 (December 2007), p. 36.

¹³ Author's interview with a retired admiral, Republic of China Navy, Taipei, November 2010.

from elite rivals performed unsurprisingly poorly when confronted with the distinct task of policing the population of an unfamiliar island. The exclusivity of Taiwan's coercive institutions – both numerically and in their Mainlander-dominated social composition – hampered the police in obtaining information and communicating with a population they perceived as potentially hostile, while also making it easier to justify predation and abuse against the Taiwanese out-group. This contributed to violence during the 2-28 Incident and in the years afterward. Throughout this period, fragmentation provided multiple agencies with incentives to make arrests and gain organizational or factional advantages by controlling operations in Taiwan, and contributed to violent feuding, accusations, and counter-accusations among the various security agencies themselves. The result was increased violence both against the citizens of the island and among the Mainlander population itself. Taiwan's coercive institutional design, in short, gave its coercive agents both social and material incentives for violence, and weakened the intelligence capacity of the system, thereby eliminating alternatives to high and indiscriminate violence.

Exclusivity and violence

The exclusivity of the Nationalist coercive apparatus had two major effects that contributed to violence. First, it vitiated the regime's intelligence capacity. Numerically, socially, and organizationally, the Nationalist government's decisions about policing denied them the capacity to effectively know and administer the society over which they had assumed power. Second, this exclusivity warped the incentives of coercive agents by removing the social sanctions that might otherwise have created a check against excessive violence.

Exclusivity isolated the police from society and made it much harder for them to get information. Numerical cuts to the police and public security forces made it a much smaller and more exclusive segment of the population. As mentioned in Chapter 3, by 1947 the police and security presence on Taiwan was at a mere 6 percent of pre-war levels,¹⁴ spreading public security forces too thin and making the “quality of omniscience” achieved by the constant physical presence of Japanese-era police an artifact of the past. Governor Chen Yi used the inaugural issue of *Taiwan Police* to proclaim (somewhat paradoxically) that, “From now on

¹⁴ Lai *et al.*, *Tragic Beginning*, pp. 7, 148.

in Taiwan, although our policies will be completely different from those of the Japanese, the things that the police had to do should continue to be done as before.”¹⁵ The reality, however, was that with 94 percent of the island’s previous police force absent, the same level of patrolling and information-gathering simply could not be sustained.

Changes in the social composition of the island’s domestic security forces contributed to their exclusivity, and to intelligence problems as well. The replacement of trained native Taiwanese with unqualified and unfamiliar Mainlanders – throughout the civil service, but especially among the police – exacerbated the difficulties posed by manpower shortages. The new KMT-appointed policemen spoke neither Japanese nor any of the local dialects in use on the island.¹⁶ Moreover, despite wielding language competency as a symbol of Chinese-ness, they themselves “could not speak understandable Mandarin – they brought with them the plethora of China’s regional dialects.”¹⁷ Communication with the local population was poor to non-existent.

The Nationalist coercive apparatus also failed to employ the informal mechanisms that had supplied the formal Japanese policing system with a steady stream of detailed intelligence. Thanks largely to the Nationalist distrust of local self-government – which had little to do with Taiwan and more to do with assumptions about its disadvantages on the mainland – the *hoko* system that had organized Taiwan’s households and linked their (self-)administration to the deployment of police power was severed at the local level, as police stations were relocated and the former administrators of the system fired. When its remnants were used, the *hoko* was employed only as an enforcement mechanism for unpopular orders – as it had been used on the mainland – rather than as a tool to build relationships between the regime and the population and obtain information on their conditions and mood.¹⁸ The Taiwan People’s Political Council convocation in late 1946 acknowledged the need to build an “information network” among the population, implicitly acknowledging the lack of one; it more specifically noted that the lack of language skills among policemen and the breakdown of the *baojia/hoko* system were leading to administrative inefficiency, misunderstanding, and conflict between

¹⁵ Joseph Charles Wicentowski, “Policing Health in Modern Taiwan, 1895–1949,” PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2007, pp. 164–65.

¹⁶ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, January 28, 1947; Lai *et al.*, *A Tragic Beginning*, pp. 59–68; Roy, *Taiwan*, p. 62; Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, pp. 190, 193.

¹⁷ Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, p. 69.

¹⁸ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, pp. 108–09.

the regime and the population of Taiwan.¹⁹ Though KMT authorities thought that they were keeping much of the Japanese colonial police structure, they failed to maintain the very features of the system that had led the Japanese to adopt it in the first place: its unitary character and its ability to create ties with the local population.

The poor quality of Nationalist intelligence was evident in the behavior of its coercive apparatus on Taiwan. The most prominent and egregious example of the failure of early KMT internal security policies was the 2-28 Incident (二二八事件), in which the KMT's crackdown on island-wide anti-government unrest – provoked by authorities forcibly confiscating cigarettes from a woman illegally selling them on the street – resulted in the deaths of an estimated 6,000–10,000 people, mostly native Taiwanese.²⁰ The Nationalist government claimed that 2-28 was caused by a trifecta of Communist instigation, Japanese training, and misplaced Formosan ambition, but outside assessments, as well as analysis from some of the KMT's own officials, suggested that the primary cause of the resentment lay in the KMT's behavior. In particular, they concluded, fault lay in the KMT's inability to gather and internalize intelligence on the ways in which its own policies were generating popular dissatisfaction.²¹ Bad intelligence on Taiwan therefore led to a failure to pre-empt popular dissatisfaction until it had exploded in streets and town centers across the island.

The lack of understanding of local dialects and customs on the part of the KMT's coercive agents also worsened their use of violence during suppression of the protests. Under conditions of extreme information paucity and social hostility between the two groups, peaceable actions were often misinterpreted and language barriers prevented the security

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, December 4, 1946; January 28, 1947.

²⁰ For the most comprehensive, if contested, history of the incident, see Lai *et al.*, *A Tragic Beginning*. For an eyewitness account, see Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*. For an overview of Chinese-language literature, see Lung-chih Chang, "A Tragic Beginning Remembered: Reflections on the Dual History of the February 28 Incident in Post-Martial Law Taiwan," paper presented at European Association of Taiwan Studies Annual Conference, Stockholm University, Sweden (April 2007). In Chinese, see Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History Editorial Board, *2-28 Incident Special Volume: Oral Histories* (Taipei: Academia Sinica Institute of Modern History, 1993) / 中央研究院近代史研究所, 編輯委員會編, <二二八事件專號: 口述歷史> (臺北市: 中央研究院近代史研究所, 1993); Chen Tsui-lien, *Factional Conflict and Power Politics: 2-28 Victims Facing Tragedy* (Taipei: Shibao, 1995) / 陳翠蓮, 派系鬥爭與權謀政治: 二二八悲劇的另一面相 (臺北市: 時報文化, 1995).

²¹ Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949–50*; U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, July 12, 18, and 20, 1950.

forces from resolving tense situations short of violence. One army colonel sent to the island with Mainlander forces after 2-28, for example, recounted how these social and linguistic barriers mattered:

Some young and middle-aged Taiwanese did not understand these wartime regulations or did not understand Mandarin. Our soldiers also did not understand the Minnan dialect ... [W]hen our troops questioned the Taiwanese, they simply did not understand, and continued walking. Our troops then had no recourse but to shoot.²²

The pattern of poor intelligence contributing to violence extended beyond this single incident to characterize the 1945–49 period more generally. In response to social unrest, and without the intelligence capacity to separate ringleaders and organizers from less committed protestors, the police engaged in mass arrests and house-to-house searches of entire areas, often arresting or roughing up people without any idea of their identity or whether they posed an actual threat to the KMT.²³ In one notable example, Mainlander military police mistakenly arrested a National Assemblyman, Lin Lianzong, while he was at the home of a friend; they had no idea who he was until he provided them with a business card. The incident, and the pattern of which it was a part, illustrates that the KMT's lack of information on Taiwan society produced what one historian has called an “unnerving element of chance” in whether a particular individual would be targeted for violence at the hands of the KMT's coercive apparatus – the very definition of indiscriminate repression.²⁴

Exclusivity and the social differences between Mainlanders and Taiwanese also contributed to violence by incentivizing arbitrary and confiscatory behavior on the part of the regime's internal security agents. Even as the Nationalists did away with the Japanese system's informational advantages, they retained practices from the mainland such as the use of arbitrary police judgments and fines to augment police budgets – an incentive structure that made wealthier Taiwanese easy targets for predation.²⁵ Nationalist soldiers also brought with them a different set of social habits and expectations about their relationship with society.

²² Lai et al., *Tragic Beginning*, p. 157; account by Wang Kang in Mei Cunren, ed., *The Real Truth of 2-28* (Mintai (Fujian-Taiwan) News Service/unpublished, n.d.) / 梅村仁編, <二二八真相> (閩台通訊社, n.d.), pp. 329–30.

²³ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, August 22, 1947; November 14, 1947; September 14, 1948.

²⁴ Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, p. 82.

²⁵ Tay-sheng Wang, *Legal Reform in Taiwan Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1895–1945: The Reception of Western Law* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), pp. 181–82.

Accustomed to “living off” local communities, and encouraged to do so by a regime that lacked the resources to adequately compensate them, they engaged in foraging and unorganized resource confiscation that Taiwan’s outraged local residents perceived as thuggish extraction. At one point, military police had removed nearly all of the bicycles on the island – bicycles that Japanese-trained policemen had not been permitted to ride because it would create too much social distance between them and the citizens they policed.²⁶ KMT soldiers who had suffered during years of fighting the Japanese resented Taiwanese compliance with Japanese rule, and saw no problem with confiscating property from alleged collaborators who were overdue in paying their “fair share” of war’s costs, further heightening resentment against the Taiwanese “out-group.”²⁷

Multiple sources corroborate that social exclusivity contributed to excessive violence on the part of the regime’s coercive apparatus. Among the most critical requirements in the “Thirty-Two Demands” presented to Governor Chen Yi by the 2-28 Settlement Committee – a committee formed by local elites to restore order after the incident escalated and before forces arrived from the mainland to crack down – was the stipulation that police leadership posts should be filled with Taiwanese rather than Mainlanders, and that native Taiwanese should be protected from political (rather than criminal) detention by the regime’s security forces.²⁸ Under the slogan “Let Taiwanese rule Taiwan,” the Settlement Committee specifically stipulated that the top police officials should be islanders, not Mainlanders.²⁹ A report by U.S. General Albert Wedemeyer, who visited the island after the incident to report on the political situation, reached similar conclusions, emphasizing the role that social incompetence on the part of the Nationalist troops had played in fostering 2-28 and in making the government’s response more brutal than was necessary.³⁰ Finally, a report on the incident by then-Minister of National Defense Bai Chongxi accepted the idea that social differences had exacerbated violence; it

²⁶ Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, p. 67.

²⁷ On this dynamic within the KMT more generally, see Suzanne Pepper, *Civil War in China: The Political Struggle, 1945–49* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

²⁸ Settlement Committee, “Thirty-Two Demands,” presented to Governor Chen Yi, Taipei, March 7, 1947; translations of these demands are included in Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, and Lai *et al.*, *Tragic Beginning*.

²⁹ Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, p. 79.

³⁰ “Reports on the situation in Formosa (Taiwan), particularly respecting Formosan dissatisfaction with administrative policies of the Chinese government,” U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States: The Far East: China* (1947), pp. 423–80.

recommended to Chiang that more Taiwanese be recruited into the government and public security apparatus, and that the two social groups be treated more even-handedly by these organizations. Governor Chen Yi similarly acknowledged the flaws in the KMT's handling of the *baojia* when he attempted to revive the system in the aftermath of 2-28. His order read:

The household head must guarantee a survey and exposure of any traitors in the neighborhood association and in the unit to which the household belongs ... When a traitor is found in that household or within that neighborhood association, it will be the responsibility of the household head and the neighborhood association head to report to the officials of the township or the district police, who will investigate this matter. At such time, the chief official organs or the household and neighboring association head will share equally the responsibility for that crime [harboring traitors] and will be dealt with according to the law.³¹

This effort, though it mandated that the household heads assume responsibility for the presence of “traitors” in their districts, still did not create the kind of organizational relationship with the police, or any other part of the coercive apparatus, that had existed previously and had made the system effective.

As a result, the 1948–50 period of consolidation was violent. A series of cables from American officials on Taiwan noted that indiscriminate violence by the police and Garrison Command Headquarters continued throughout 1947 and 1948: tens of thousands of people were arrested, many of them in large-scale roundups.³² Violence on this scale continued with the full-scale arrival of the KMT in 1949. Under Chiang Ching-kuo's leadership, the U.S. State Department reported, 10,000 people were interrogated that year by the security apparatus, and more than 1,000 reportedly executed.³³ (Systematic data for the period prior to 1949 does not exist, but according to a later statement by Chiang Ching-kuo's deputy, Wang Sheng, approximately 15 percent of those arrested during this period were executed – an extraordinarily high proportion.³⁴) A series of more than twenty cables transmitted to Washington by U.S. Consul General Robert Strong and his staff in 1950 itemizes meeting after meeting with citizens and government officials on Taiwan testifying to heightened

³¹ Lai *et al.*, *Tragic Beginning*, p. 154.

³² U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, August 22, 1947; November 14, 1947; September 14, 1948.

³³ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, p. 368.

³⁴ Taylor, *Generalissimo*, p. 477.

repression.³⁵ One summary report, sent from the U.S. State Department's post in Taipei to Washington on August 19, 1950, read:

During recent Executive Yuan meeting Premier admitted that in 1949 some 15,000 persons were arrested by secret police for political reasons, and in 1950 alone total so far is 23,000. He admitted there may have been other arrests of which he ignorant [sic]. Also could not state how many of those arrested had been released or executed. Thus in past 19 months about 1 of every 200 persons arrested on political grounds.³⁶

A subsequent political report written during the period from June 25 to October 10 of 1950 repeated these arrest numbers: 15,000 in 1949 and 23,000 for the "first eight months of 1950." The violence was not just high; it was indiscriminate, sweeping up large numbers of innocent bystanders in the quest to find opponents of the regime. To the security apparatus, "it was worth it if there was one conspirator or unsatisfied element (*buman fenzi*) among the one hundred, one thousand, or even ten thousand grabbed."³⁷

Taiwan's leaders were relatively open and unapologetic about this behavior. The otherwise liberal, pro-American politician K. C. Wu insisted to his American interlocutors that the KMT needed to be severe with "Communist instigators ... whose many plots and tricks could easily defeat the law if we showed too much leniency toward them."³⁸ In March 1951, General Tang Zong, director of one of the internal security agencies, told the new American consul and his staff that the problem of Communist subversion was coming under control. He acknowledged that complaints had surfaced about lengthy delays and long detentions before political trials, as well as the use of torture to force confessions. However, he chided the Americans that to "to do away with such methods in this area of the world was perhaps too much to expect, especially in such critical times."³⁹ It was the response of a regime that lacked the information to form an alternative strategy.

³⁵ U.S. State Department, Taipei to Washington, all 1950: January 6; February 9, 11, 21; March 1, 10, 21; April 8, 25; May 3, 5, 19; June 2, 10, 21; July 8, 15, 21, 24; August 3; November 18.

³⁶ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, August 19, 1950.

³⁷ Phillips, *Between Assimilation and Independence*, p. 99.

³⁸ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, August 3, 1950.

³⁹ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, March 26, 1950. The role of General Tang Zong (referred to in cables as Tang Tsung) is also mentioned in the cable of January 6, 1950.

Fragmentation and violence

Fragmentation in the internal security sector also fed violence during the years from 1945 to the early 1950s. Different police and intelligence agencies with overlapping missions all operated in the same, reduced space, forcing them to compete to justify their existence and prove their worth.

Taiwan's domestic intelligence and security agencies sought to prove their worth by coming up with lists of "enemies" and then liquidating them. American General Wedemeyer's after-action report on the 2-28 Incident, during which these kinds of lists were employed, laid blame for the unrest squarely on Nationalist forces, citing their tendency toward internal feuding rather than efficacy in popular policing as a contributing factor in alienating local Taiwanese.⁴⁰ Not surprisingly, during the incident, the 2-28 Settlement Committee included in its demands the requirement that some of the independent police forces then in operation on the island should be disbanded to reduce competition between units, and that the soldiers of Garrison Command should not be allowed to compete with police in making non-military arrests.⁴¹

Financial pressures on police funding after 1945 heightened incentives for abuse and excess, as the prospect of monetary gain reinforced the urgency of bureaucratic turf battles. Police, like other government agencies under Nationalist rule, were not fully funded, leading to shortfalls in salaries as well as departments' operating budgets.⁴² Administrative laws and regulations in Republican China, which were applied in Taiwan after retrocession, allowed police to prosecute and sentence offenders on the spot. The sentences could include either short jail terms or fines for misdemeanors – giving the police an opportunity to augment their department budgets.⁴³ Budget shortfalls, Nationalist regulations, and the pressure imposed by inter-agency competition gave police forces added incentives for excessive enforcement, and sometimes for outright extortion.

Factional and organizational rivalries also played a major role in stoking excessive violence during the suppression of the 2-28 Incident.⁴⁴ The officials responsible for commanding the Mainlander suppression

⁴⁰ "Reports on the situation in Formosa (Taiwan)."

⁴¹ Settlement Committee, "Thirty-Two Demands," presented to Governor Chen Yi, Taipei, March 7, 1947; translations of these demands are included in Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, and Lai *et al.*, *Tragic Beginning*.

⁴² Strand, *Rickshaw Beijing*, pp. 80, 95–96.

⁴³ Wakeman, *Policing Shanghai*, pp. 91–92.

⁴⁴ Chen, *Factional Conflict and Power Politics*.

forces gave orders about where to go and how to act that were based on factional guidance and interest; they failed to cooperate with rival units, and attempted instead to outbid them in forcible suppression of the native Taiwanese population, rather than implementing a coordinated strategy to quiet the protests with minimal violence. A lack of coordination, and sometimes open competition, between arriving forces and the organizations and personnel that were already operating on Taiwan further contributed to civilian casualties.⁴⁵ For example, Chen documents the competition between the Military Police's Fourth Regiment and the forces under Taiwan Garrison Command in suppressing the protests in the northeastern port city of Keelung, and suggests that one reason behind the overall violence of the suppression was that intelligence agents from other factions, who resented Chen Yi's appointment as governor, inflated their descriptions of unrest in order to undermine Nanjing's confidence in Chen Yi's leadership – a clear example of fragmentation and competition damaging intelligence in ways that lead to higher levels of violence.⁴⁶

Fragmentation persisted through the initiation of reforms in 1950, and for several years afterward while the organizational map was gradually redrawn. American observers complained to Washington that because factionalism and competition ran rampant, “abuses of the regular police system were felt in every town and village across the island.”⁴⁷ According to reports obtained from the police authorities and transmitted by the American consulate in Taipei to Washington in 1950, as many as thirteen different security organizations operated in Kaohsiung and other cities.⁴⁸ Each agency or office “administered its own affairs without coordination and at times competed for power with others,” further damaging the KMT's intelligence on the population and inflating the number of people arrested unnecessarily.⁴⁹

Bureaucratic and individual professional incentives also continued to push coercive agents toward higher violence in the early 1950s, as the KMT allowed informants and arresting officers to take home a share

⁴⁵ Chu and Lin, “Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan,” p. 112.

⁴⁶ For an English-language summary of her analysis, see Chen Tsui-lien, *2-28 Massacre: Research Report on Responsibility* (Taipei: 2-28 Memorial Foundation, n.d.), especially Ch. 3, www.228.org.tw/ResponsibilityReport/eng/07.htm.

⁴⁷ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, December 3, 1946. See also Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, p. 193; Chen, *Factional Conflict and Power Politics*.

⁴⁸ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, April 27, 1950; July 20 and 26, 1950; November 1, 1950. In the April cable, see statement in particular by Sun Li-jen about Kaohsiung.

⁴⁹ Kerr, *Formosa Betrayed*, p. 193; Wang, “A Bastion Created,” p. 323.

of the confiscated property of those accused as spies and traitors. In June 1950, the regime established the Regulations for the Inspection and Elimination of Spies During the Period of Rebellion, which offered financial rewards to those who reported a spy; according to Article 14, informants were given 30 percent of a convicted spy's confiscated property, while 35 percent was allocated as a reward or payment to those who prosecuted the investigation and case. (The government treasury took the remainder.) According to members of the Investigative Bureau, these regulations incentivized false and unjust accusations, leading the island's various intelligence agencies to compete over performance levels both by exaggerating the capabilities of the enemy spies they hunted and by inflating the numbers they had caught.⁵⁰ The number of people arrested was explicitly considered a measure of organizational and individual effectiveness; guidance given to the ROC Army in 1951 stated, "Whoever captures the most Communist spies and kills the most cadres is a hero."⁵¹ In order to impress their superiors and to claim rewards such as confiscated property, then, intelligence personnel fabricated cases, accused people falsely, and exaggerated the size and significance of their cases. Among these manufactured cases were the Hui-an Case (which implicated 130 people); the Nanjing Teacher Training School case (20 people); the Zhongzheng University case (30 people); the Ye Jiaban case (20 people), and the Watchmaker's Case (40 people).⁵² Inter-agency competition caused by organizational fragmentation led the security agencies to target exaggerated numbers of ordinary citizens for investigation and state violence.

Importantly, however, fragmentation and competition also led these agencies to accuse and target *one another*. Many of the individuals targeted in these cases were members of intelligence and security agencies originally under the authority of potential rivals to Chiang Kai-shek, who were purged on the grounds that they were party to a communist or other conspiracy, demonstrating the direct connection between elite infighting, fragmentation, and violence. In early 1950, the GPWD under Chiang Ching-kuo began to purge and execute officers suspected of communist sympathies, including the Vice Minister of National Defense, the Chief

⁵⁰ Li Shijie, *Study of the Investigative Bureau* (Taipei: Li Ao publishing house, 1995), pp. 115–18, 195–200 / 李世傑, <調查局研究> (台北市: 李敖出版社, 1995).

⁵¹ Bullard, *The Soldier and the Citizen*, p. 190.

⁵² Li, *Study of the Investigative Bureau*, pp. 115–18, 195–200; Wei, *Report on Human Rights in Taiwan*, p. 52.

of Military Conscription, the Chief of Army Supply Services, and the Commander of the 70th Division.⁵³ Spy rings were discovered in June and July 1951, and campaigns to root out additional conspiracies continued for the next several years.⁵⁴ The last and most important of these purges was that of Army commander-in-chief General Sun Li-jen (Sun Liren), an American-educated officer who had close ties to the United States and who opposed Chiang's plans to insert Soviet-style commissars in the Republic of China military. The purge extended beyond Sun himself; a State Department cable from March 1950 notes the arrest of thirty-six generals in the Nationalist military for alleged connections with Sun.⁵⁵ Sun was removed from operational command in 1954 and assigned an honorary role within the military; in 1955, he was accused of plotting a coup with the CIA, court-martialed, and placed under house arrest in Taichung, where he remained until his exoneration in the late 1980s, shortly after Chiang Ching-kuo's death.⁵⁶ From 1950–1954, Chiang Ching-kuo claimed to have broken up an average of thirteen “Communist conspiracies” per month: a total of 550 cases in all, each of which resulted in the purge and punishment of multiple individuals.⁵⁷ The resulting purges led to a spike in violence within the coercive apparatus itself, a process of inter-agency bloodletting that one account refers to as a campaign of “indiscriminate ferocity.”⁵⁸

One of the overlooked consequences of this dynamic of internal competition is the extent to which Mainlander insiders as well as native Taiwanese became targets of state violence during the period commonly referred to as the White Terror.⁵⁹ Much of the state violence illustrated by Figures 6.1 and 6.2 was concentrated among the Nationalists' own

⁵³ *New York Times*, June 12, 1950.

⁵⁴ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, June 29, July 5, and July 6, 1951.

⁵⁵ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, March 7, 1950.

⁵⁶ In 2014, the Control Yuan found that the confession used to charge Sun had been coerced under torture. Lee Hsin-fang and Jason Pan, “Control Yuan Clears General of 1955 Charges,” *Taipei Times*, July 19, 2014; Tucker, *Patterns in the Dust*; John W. Garver, *The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American Cold War Strategy in Asia* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1997).

⁵⁷ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, June 29, July 5, and July 6, 1951.

⁵⁸ Heinlein, *Political Warfare*, p. 510.

⁵⁹ “White Terror” often carries the implication that it was directed against native Taiwanese. In seeking a full explanation of Taiwan's violence, however, it is important to note that state violence *within* the coercive apparatus occurred in parallel, and had some of the same underlying causes. Author's interviews with two senior retired officers of the Republic of China Navy, Taipei, October and November 2010; Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation.

officials, police, intelligence, and military personnel; American officials writing at the time noted the inward turn to the island's repressive operations. Focusing on incentives and intelligence as key mechanisms linking organizational characteristics to violence helps explain why this violence was inwardly directed, something that other theories of repression struggle to explain: fighting between fragmented rival organizations created incentives to accuse one's organizational rivals of disloyalty as well as to outbid them in the execution of violence. Moreover, on the informational front, as described in Chapter 3, the Mainlander population that arrived with Chiang in 1949 presented a particularly difficult and dangerous counter-intelligence and counter-infiltration problem.⁶⁰ Lacking the intelligence capacity to separate real from imagined threats, and believing that the exigencies of the situation left no margin for error, the KMT made any suspicious activity grounds for violence – especially if the accused could plausibly pose a coup or infiltration threat. Scholars' current focus on the 2-28 Incident as the principal manifestation of state violence in Taiwan, therefore, has obscured a broader pattern that characterized the early period of KMT rule and that generated much of the state violence observed: the disproportionately high rate at which Mainlanders became targets of their own coercive apparatus during this period. The KMT's particular coercive institutional design, and the intelligence shortcomings and organizational incentives that it generated, help to explain this otherwise puzzling finding.

REPRESSION AFTER REFORM

In late 1949 and early 1950, Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo began the process of coercive institutional reform described in Chapter 3. Over a period of several years, they transformed the KMT's coercive apparatus from one that was fragmented and exclusive to one that was unitary and inclusive. From the outside, these developments did not necessarily seem positive; American observers, for example, saw them as measures being taken to construct a strong police state. When Consul General Strong departed in August 1950, he warned that Taiwan was descending into "a reign of terror, more silken than in other countries or in other times, but nevertheless in progress."⁶¹ Paradoxically, however, the creation of this powerful new coercive infrastructure resulted in a long-term

⁶⁰ Heinlein, *Political Warfare*, pp. 503–04.

⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, September 6, 1950.

drop in state violence. A decrease in fragmentation lowered incentives for false and exaggerated accusations against civilians, and reduced – though did not entirely eliminate – the incentives for violence created by rivalries between different parts of the internal security apparatus. This new unitary structure also allowed the KMT to capitalize on the improved intelligence coming from its more socially inclusive intelligence agencies and their networks. Institutional reforms, therefore, permitted the KMT to rely on surveillance and targeted, lower-level repression instead of indiscriminate violence. By 1955, as the post-reform system came fully into operation, the higher violence that had marked the previous period of KMT rule had virtually vanished in favor of a more deliberate, precise, and discriminate style of repression.

Reducing incentives for violence

The first effect of the reforms made to the KMT's coercive apparatus was to alter the incentives facing its coercive agents. As early as August 1950, the leadership issued a new ruling to raise the evidentiary and procedural standards for making arrests, after which the American consulate noted that some of Taiwan's internal security agencies had ceased making arrests "without warrants and at least a semblance of evidence." The consulate further observed that the rate of arrests had begun to decline significantly by October, and that executions had now become "not particularly numerous" compared to their previous frequency.⁶² In November 1953, the KMT's Sixth Division, responsible for intelligence, complained that the high rewards offered under the Regulations for the Inspection and Elimination of Spies During the Period of Rebellion were leading to entrapment, collusion among agents to forge documentation, and a culture of laxity toward the problem of false accusations. The regulations were subsequently revised so that all of the confiscated property and money went to the Treasury, which then was responsible for paying a smaller, non-proportional reward to informers and helpers on the case.⁶³ These policy changes limited the direct material benefits that had previously incentivized violence within the coercive apparatus, and indicated to coercive agents that arrests should be pursued more cautiously and with more concern for the accuracy of the charges being

⁶² The executions were also publicly announced "in nearly all cases." U.S. Department of State, Taipei to Washington, November 1, 1950.

⁶³ Chen, "Secret Agent Rule," p. 66.

brought – creating an organizational climate more conducive to limited and discriminate violence.

A second change in the incentive structure facing Taiwan's coercive agents was more directly linked to decreased fragmentation. Consolidation among the security agencies reduced and eventually eliminated several organizational rivalries that had contributed to violence, especially the decades-long rivalry between MBIS and CBIS. Many of the cadres involved in planning the reforms of the coercive apparatus – namely, members of the Political Action Committee and then the Confidential Data Group of the Office of the President – came from the Whampoa military academy and the Zhejiang school, both affiliated with MBIS, and in the early days of reform, in 1949, Tang Zong identified the lack of CBIS members as participants in the reform process as a potential obstacle to reform.⁶⁴ The removal of CBIS' elite backers, however – the CC clique led by the Chen brothers – made consolidation and dampening this rivalry easier than one might otherwise have expected. As the CC clique faded from politics, its members were forced to integrate into the new structure and to cooperate with their former rivals, especially after Chiang Ching-kuo exchanged personnel among agencies under the slogan of “improving communication between bureau personnel.”⁶⁵ In 1964, Shen Zhiyue, a former MBIS officer, became Director of the Ministry of Justice's Investigative Bureau, formerly CBIS. He was MJIB's longest-serving director (in office 1964–78), and no CBIS person was ever again appointed to the directorship of MJIB.⁶⁶ This consolidation gradually eliminated previously existing inter-agency competition.

The diminishment of fragmentation and inter-agency competition did not entirely eradicate state violence. It did, however, have a limiting effect on that violence, which was subsequently confined to a narrow and specific set of cases – ones where the factors highlighted by this argument were still present as the exception rather than the rule of the system. The cases of post-reform violence that remained were consistent with two main predictions of the theory outlined in Chapter 2: these cases resulted from accusations among competing members of the security apparatus, and they were targeted at individuals in “outsider” social groups.

Factionalism and regional difference were the two primary predictors of post-reform violence within the coercive apparatus. When

⁶⁴ Tang Zong, Political Action Committee, “Year-end Report to Chiang Kai-shek,” President Chiang Kai-shek Case Files (1949), Academia Historica.

⁶⁵ Li, *Study of the Investigative Bureau*, p. 134.

⁶⁶ Li, *Study of the Investigative Bureau*, p. 134.

Shen Zhiyue arrived in the Investigative Bureau, he aggressively investigated and prosecuted a subset of his new employees, typically those who had been members of the Central Bureau (CBIS) and who hailed from Fujian. Chen Tsui-lien documents a set of interconnected cases that implicated at least sixty individuals within the Investigative Bureau, including First Division Vice-Director Li Shijie, former Third Division Director Jiang Hairong, Fourth Division Director Fan Ziwen, his wife and Training Council Assistant Director Man Suyu, Assistant Director Shi Yuwei, Section Chief Zhu Weiru, Sixth Division Assistant Director Yu Zhenbang, First Division Assistant Director Deng Qichang, and Sixth Division Vice-Director Chen Zhengmin.⁶⁷ Many of the CBIS members who were investigated or punished were Fujianese who had been among the earliest Mainlander arrivals to Taiwan. Jiang Hairong, from Fuzhou in Fujian, had appointed numerous officials from his hometown, including Sixth Division Vice-Director Chen Zhengmin, Fourth Division Section Chief Huang Xiang, and the Third Division's Dai Guangwu, as well as Fujianese First Division Vice-Director Li Shijie, who himself subsequently promoted numerous other Fujianese. This group became known as the "Fujian Gang." When the Investigative Bureau was targeted by Shen, its Fujianese officials were among the most prominent targets: in fact, individuals from Fujian had the second-largest number of cases processed by Garrison Command's military tribunals of any province in China, following only native Taiwanese. Only the intervention of a senior NSB official – Yan Lingfeng, himself from Fujian – halted the attacks.⁶⁸ Shen also used his position within the Investigative Bureau to target officials from a rival faction that remained behind in the Intelligence Bureau (the clique around Ye Xiangzhi); more than 130 individuals from that Bureau were arrested as well.⁶⁹ These cases demonstrate both the potential for factionalism and regionalism to drive violence, and the capacity of a unitary structure – in this case, the coordinating authority of the NSB – to mitigate internal competition and limit the escalation of violence.

⁶⁷ Because the competition no longer fell along organizational lines, Chen calls this a shift from "struggles between factions" to "struggles between personnel." Chen, "Intelligence Agencies' Internal Competition."

⁶⁸ Li, *Study of the Investigative Bureau*; Li Shijie, *Nine Years in a Martial Law Detention Center* (Taipei: Li Ao Publishing House, 1990, 2 vols) / 李世傑, <軍法看守所九年> (台北市: 李敖出版社, 1990), Vol. 1 pp. 18–20 and Vol. 2, pp. 420–21, 589–90; Xie Congmin, *Discussing Jingmei Martial Law Detention Center* (Taipei: Qianwei, 2007) / 謝聰敏, <談景美軍法看守所> (台北市: 前衛, 2007), pp. 171–72.

⁶⁹ Li Shijie's memoir provides an overview: Li, *Study of the Investigative Bureau*.

Thus the KMT's institutional reforms to the coercive apparatus limited internal competition and thereby constrained one of the major sources of violence that existed in the pre-reform period. The reforms, however, did not eliminate violence entirely – where fragmentation, social difference, and organizational rivalry remained, they continued because of state violence.

Improving intelligence: the substitute for violence

In the 1960s, American officials conducted a six-part review, numbering hundreds of pages, of the internal threats facing Taiwan and the factors that could affect its domestic security. The fourth part of the report, on methods of political control and internal security, noted that Taiwan's domestic intelligence and security apparatus had been successful in neutralizing any hint of movement toward armed opposition. It noted that the regime had shifted from "harsh and arbitrary measures" to "preventative measures designed to discourage dissidence before it actually breaks out," and that the regime "would much prefer to prevent demonstrations before they occur, to avoid any political incident that can be avoided, to apply pressure for compliance rather than take punitive action." One of the six sections complained about the methods by which Taiwan's authorities had achieved this competence, describing their approach as one of "saturation to the point of inefficiency."⁷⁰ When the United States assessed which of its allies needed assistance with internal security to offset risks of subversion and instability, the recommendation on Taiwan was consistently "No assistance necessary."⁷¹

These assessments reflect the effect of the reformed coercive apparatus on internal security operations after 1955. The reforms made to the coercive apparatus dramatically improved the quality and quantity of intelligence available to the KMT on Taiwan's society, so much so that intelligence became a virtual substitute for violence. What replaced the previous high-intensity, indiscriminate violence was a more targeted, selective, preventative, and bureaucratic approach to repression. Not only did the number of people arrested decline sharply, but a survey of cases suggests that the average size of the arrest incidents changed as

⁷⁰ U.S. Department of State, "Political Stability and Internal Security on Taiwan: Part IV, Methods Used to Maintain Stability," April 26, 1968.

⁷¹ U.S. Department of State, "Police Assistance Program," Taipei to Washington, August 21, 1962; U.S. Department of State, "Country Internal Defense Plan – Taiwan," Taipei to Washington, September 13, 1962.

well: individual arrests took the place of mass or group arrests. Meeting notes from the Presidential Office and Taiwan Garrison Command – including in the Lei Chen case described in some detail below – reveal that as the regime grew more confident of its ability to uncover and pre-empt threats before they coalesced into action, it adopted a less lethal approach to dissidence. Instead of facing firing squads, political criminals were incarcerated in a set of newly constructed prisons, including places like the infamous Green Island – Taiwan’s Alcatraz, thirty miles off the island’s southeastern coast.⁷²

It is difficult to explain the cause of an absence, and easier to illustrate what replaced it. For this reason, the best way to illustrate how the KMT’s new coercive apparatus caused a drop in violence is to illustrate the process of surveillance and targeted repression that was employed in its place. Based on the various lines of surveillance and reporting available to them, frontline investigators prepared dossiers, often numbering hundreds to thousands of pages, summarizing the intelligence that had been collected on a particular individual’s case.⁷³ Garrison Command’s Martial Law Section then prepared a draft-sentencing document that outlined the charges, provided an overview of the evidence, discussed the severity of the offenses, and proposed possible sentences; it then forwarded this document to the Martial Law Bureau of the Ministry of National Defense. This Bureau in turn reviewed the documents and sent its findings and recommendations to the Office of the President. There, files were personally approved or revised by Chiang Kai-shek, whose seal appears on nearly every sentencing document and is often accompanied by handwritten revisions to the sentence recommended.⁷⁴ A death sentence required, among other things, Chiang’s personal seal of approval, marked in red on the pages, as well as before-death and after-death photographs to document that the sentence had been correctly carried out; in some cases, Chiang’s notes provided guidance on how the sentences should be adjusted from the recommendation

⁷² Author’s visit to Green Island, December 2010: 2009 8 [“A Day on Green Island: Visual Record of the Green Island Human Rights Memorial Park/Oral History Documenting Former Prisoners and White Terror History”], directed by Ang Liang Bang, produced by National Taitung Living Arts Center, August 2009. / 洪隆邦導演, “綠島的一天: 台灣白色恐怖受難者與綠島人口述影像紀錄,” (國立台東生活美學館, 年, 月).

⁷³ Selected cases are available in Academia Historica volumes titled “Documentary Collection on Political Incidents.” 戰後臺灣政治案件 (臺北縣新店市: 國史館; 臺北市: 文建會, 2008). Each case is 1–2 volumes of 450–600 pages each.

⁷⁴ A photograph of a verdict, as well as an annotated copy downloadable in Word, are available from Ministry of Culture, “First Lot of White Terror Dossiers.”

submitted.⁷⁵ If an execution was ordered, it usually took place by firing squad on a racetrack in southern Taipei. In contrast to the late 1940s, where individuals arrested by various secret police agencies sometimes simply disappeared, extrajudicial disappearances after 1955 were basically unheard of; the names of those executed by the regime were publicly posted at Taipei Main Station.⁷⁶

As noted above, however, relatively few people were executed by the post-reform coercive apparatus. Instead, offenders were arrested, processed through Garrison Command's military tribunal system, and kept in confinement in one of the island's various prisons until their sentence expired. Upon the prisoner's release, his or her name and data were forwarded to the district police headquarters and placed on an NSB list of individuals who required special observation. Released political prisoners were then subject to regular interrogations and reporting requirements, typically on a weekly basis (and sometimes more often). Two neighbors also had to sign each individual's release paperwork, vouching for him or her and agreeing to submit regular reports on his or her activities to local security officials (see Figure 6.3). The former Vice-Director of the Investigative Bureau, Gao Minghui, estimates that this watch-list contained approximately 15,000 people in 1969–70.⁷⁷

The example of Lei Chen, a pro-democracy figure who helped found and run the *Free China* periodical and who was arrested in 1960, is instructive.⁷⁸ Lei Chen founded *Free China* in 1949 with initial support from a KMT seeking to differentiate itself from the Chinese Communist Party, but a series of more critical articles in the mid-to-late 1950s began to arouse the enmity of Nationalist authorities. By 1958, Garrison

⁷⁵ This procedural emphasis, coupled with a lack of empirical reports of extrajudicial violence after the first year or two of martial law, also suggests that the security apparatus documented the majority of the cases that it handled. Lee Chen-hsiang *et al.*, eds., *The Road to Freedom: Taiwan's Postwar Human Rights Movement* (Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy and Haiwang Printing Company, 2004), pp. 94–95; Wei, *Report on Human Rights in Taiwan*.

⁷⁶ Author's interviews with three former political prisoners, Taipei, November and December 2010.

⁷⁷ Gao, *Intelligence Archives*, p. 227.

⁷⁸ The following section draws on archival materials from the Ministry of National Defense and the diary of Taiwan Garrison commander Huang Chieh, contained in the Academia Historica Archives. Shih-hung Chen, ed., *Documentary Collection on the Lei Chen Case: the Selected Archives of the Ministry of Defense* (Taipei: Academia Historica, 2002) / 陳世宏 編輯, <雷震案史料彙編: 國防部檔案選輯> (臺北市新店市: 國史館 / 臺北縣板橋市: 三民總經銷, 2002); Hsu, "How Did the Authorities Deal with the Lei Chen Case?"

Command had begun investigating *Free China*, highlighting it as a major object of investigation in the Second Division's annual report, issued in November 1958. In January 1959, the periodical published a reader's letter titled "Why the Military Should Consider Themselves Dogs," prompting an investigation on the grounds of having revealed military secrets. (The case was eventually settled.) That same month, according to the office diary of the Taiwan Garrison Commander Huang Chieh, Chiang Kai-shek grew angry after Lei's name came up at a meeting of security officials. After complaining about his "bad influence" and the disrespect that proved "his illegal connection with the Communists," Chiang ordered that several security organs – including the GPWD and Garrison Command – figure out how to deal with the case such that the publication of content violating national policy would not be allowed to continue.⁷⁹ Extensive surveillance followed; among the files are photographs of security agents sitting outside the *Free China* offices, watching and reporting on Lei's activities.⁸⁰

After articles appeared in *Free China* in 1960 that criticized Chiang's consecutive terms as President, and as reports indicated that Lei Chen was apparently participating in conversations about the development of an opposition party, surveillance increased. From May to September, Garrison Vice Commander Li Libai, General Bao Lie, and representatives from at least seven other intelligence agencies gathered to make "regular and speedy reports" on the movement and activities of Lei Chen and others involved in the nascent opposition party movement.⁸¹ By June 1960, Garrison Command's Political Department, Security Department, and Military Law Department had prepared plans for "Project Rainfield (雨田專案, *Yutian Zhuan'an*)" to arrest Lei Chen; these plans indicated what he would be charged with and called on the Security Department to swiftly collect the evidence required for prosecution.

For the next two months, members of the KMT Sixth Division, General Political Department, Investigation Bureau, Garrison Command, and National Security Bureau met as a working group to further develop their

⁷⁹ U.S. Ambassador Drumright sent a fairly well-informed cable hypothesizing about Chiang's personal involvement to the Department of State. U.S. Department of State, *FRUS* 1958–60, Vol. 19, p. 725. See also Zhang You-hua, "Operation Rain-field: Arrested With or Without Forming a New Party?" July 30, 1998 / 張友驊, 〈雨田專案: 組不組黨都「一名情治將領對雷震案的日記」〉, 《自立早報》, 一九八九年七月三〇日~三十一日四版。

⁸⁰ See, for example, photos in Lee, *The Road to Freedom*, p. 98.

⁸¹ Huang Chieh's *Office Diary*, Academia Historica Archives; Chen, *Documentary Collection*.

plans, with occasional input from Taiwan Police Headquarters and the Military Police. Chiang Kai-shek's orders were transmitted to the working group by the Secretary-General of the Office of the President, or by KMT General Secretary Tang Zong. In mid-August, Chiang met personally with Garrison Commander Huang Chieh to inquire about the plans and issue instructions on the general timing of the operation. His questions and instructions were specific, down to which jail Lei Chen would be taken to, and which military judge had been selected for his tribunal. No detail was left unexamined.

In early September 1960, Chiang reviewed a "Project Rainfield Action Plan" and ordered Garrison Command to execute the operation on September 4. That day, the Garrison Commander received multiple phonecalls from Chiang Kai-shek, who wanted personally to confirm that the arrest had gone according to plan and to check on the development of the case. Afterward, Huang Chieh sent regular reports to his superiors on how the case and interrogation were progressing. When Chiang read the confession of one of the men arrested with Lei Chen, Liu Ziyang, he told Huang Chieh that it lacked punch, and ordered him to ask several additional, specific questions in order that certain materials could be added. He also ordered the authorities to treat this as a spying case, rather than something to do with the development of an opposition party.

Lei Chen's trial took place on October 3, 1960. Chiang had given guidance on how to prepare the sentencing document, and in a meeting in the Office of the President on October 8 he reviewed the three options that had been submitted to him outlining the pros and cons of each course of action. He then directed the length, wording, and appeal process of Lei Chen's sentence, as well as the deregistering and dissolution of *Free China*. The Chief of the Appellate Military Court also guaranteed to Chiang and the other officials at the meeting that Lei's appeal would be rejected.⁸² After the verdict was announced, various security departments sent regular reports to Chiang on domestic and international reactions to Lei's imprisonment, which they had been monitoring since before his arrest.⁸³ Lei Chen's appeal, filed on New Year's Eve 1960, was rejected as planned on January 11, 1961, and he

⁸² "Assembly Discussing Lei Chen at the Presidential Office," October 8, 1960, in Chen, *Documentary Collection*, pp. 331–32.

⁸³ *Huang Chieh's Office Diary*, Academia Historica Archives. For corroboration that this kind of monitoring happened in other cases, see Linda Gail Arrigo and Lynn Miles, eds., *A Borrowed Voice: Taiwan Human Rights Through International Networks, 1960–1980* (Taiwan: Social Empowerment Alliance and Hanyao Color Printing Co., Ltd., May 2008).




FIGURE 6.3. Surveillance documentation for Lei Chen

Source: Provided with permission by the National Archives Administration in Taipei. Also reprinted in Lee, *The Road To Freedom*, pp. 97–98.

served out his ten-year prison sentence. Figure 6.3 shows the cover page of Lei Chen's release file, and a document bearing the signature of two guarantors who, upon his release, agreed to be responsible for his obedience and report his activities monthly.

What is important about Lei Chen's case is the entire system of intelligence and coercion that made it possible: an impressive capacity for surveillance; a coordinated, unitary process of top-level deliberation about how to investigate and handle political opposition; and the confidence that targeted surveillance and imprisonment would be sufficient to achieve the regime's ends vis-à-vis popular opposition. Researchers at Taiwan's Academia Historica have called the Lei Chen case a classic example of the KMT's top-down "capacity of organizational control and mobilization" and bottom-up "capacity of information collection and feedback"⁸⁴ – capacities that the system developed as a direct result of the organizational reforms conducted in the early 1950s. While the system was not perfect – former political prisoner and Vice President Annette Lu's memoir records that during her imprisonment, the Mainlander prison guards did not speak Taiwanese, and tried (unsuccessfully) to force her to speak with family visitors in Mandarin⁸⁵ – it represented

⁸⁴ Hsu, "How Did the Authorities Deal with the Lei Chen Case?"; Ketty W. Chen, "Disciplining Taiwan: The Kuomintang's Methods of Control during the White Terror Era (1947–1987)," *Taiwan International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Winter 2008), pp. 185–210.

⁸⁵ Annette Lu, *My Fight for a New Taiwan: One Woman's Journey from Prison to Power* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2014).

a dramatic improvement over what had previously existed. By 1960, the smooth internal coordination of the KMT's coercive apparatus was complemented by the information-gathering advantages provided by increased social inclusiveness. This system was then brought to bear on Lei Chen and other dissidents.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Alternative explanations do not satisfactorily explain the patterns of state violence that occurred in Taiwan during the martial law period. These include high levels of popular threat, state/organizational capacity, international factors, regime life cycle, and empirical endogeneity.

High levels of *popular threat* are, indeed, fundamental to the story of the coercive apparatus and state violence in Taiwan, but not in the way that existing explanations predict. This explanation suggests that violence should have been high in the early years of KMT rule, which is correct. However, this explanation also suggests that state violence should have risen in the late 1970s and 1980s, as social movements grew stronger, levels of popular protest mounted, and anti-regime mobilization increased – eventually to such an extent that the regime conceded power in 1987.⁸⁶ Chu Yun-han, for example, demonstrates that protest rose nearly exponentially in the 1980s.⁸⁷ Yet contrary to the theory's predictions, state violence did not rise. Instead, the regime's use of violence stayed flat: there was not a noticeable increase in arrests or sentencings for political offenses, and not a single person was executed on political charges after 1976. Explanations grounded in objective levels of popular threat cannot explain this divergence between the rise in popular protest and the lack of state violence.

What does explain this outcome is how the initially high levels of popular threat persuaded Chiang to reform the KMT's coercive apparatus in order to concentrate on the long-term management of popular threats. (As Slater and Wong have shown, the regime did not lose the capacity to repress in the 1970s and 1980s; it made a strategic decision that it was more likely to maintain political power if it separated political power from authoritarian

⁸⁶ See Gold, "Waning of the Kuomintang State," p. 103; Zhang Maogui, *Shehui Yundong yu Zhengzhi Zhuanhua* [Social Movements and Political Change] (Taipei: Yeqiang Publishing House, 1989) / 張茂桂, 社會運動與政治轉化 (台北市: 業強出版社, 1989).

⁸⁷ Chu Yun-han, "Social Protests and Political Democratization," in Murray A. Rubinstein, ed., *The Other Taiwan: 1945 to the Present* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 100.

rule.⁸⁸) Focusing on how threat informed coercive institutional design can also explain several aspects of state violence that a straightforward correlation between threat and violence cannot.

First, it helps explain why coercive organizational reform was such a high priority for Chiang Kai-shek in the late 1940s and early 1950s. Chiang responded to existentially high popular threat not simply by ordering violence against the population – in fact, by 1950, he realized that much of this violence was undesirable – but by concentrating his own attention, and that of his most trusted advisors and officials, on coercive institutional reform, and reform specifically designed to achieve particular capabilities like surveillance and pre-emptive action. This emphasis on developing the capacity for intelligence and prevention of collective action is simply overlooked by bargaining models that focus on response to threat rather than pre-emption of it, suggesting that these models mischaracterize the long-term drivers of repression. While Chiang's response to one moment of crisis (the unrest of 2-28) was indeed a choice between imposing a crackdown or not, that choice is wholly unrepresentative – and indeed, fundamentally at odds with – the broader strategy pursued by the regime in the years afterward. The Taiwan case, therefore, illustrates the value of broadening our analysis of repression and state violence beyond crisis cases of mobilization and crackdown.

A focus on the internal dynamics of the coercive apparatus also helps explain why at certain times Mainlanders rather than native Taiwanese were disproportionately targeted for violence. Since Mainlanders were not typically the ones protesting Nationalist rule, and they were part of the in-group, this outcome only makes sense in light of the institutional fragmentation and competition within the Mainlander-dominated security apparatus, which led different parts of that apparatus to target each other for violence.

Explanations rooted in *state capacity* or *organizational cohesion* are also unsatisfactory. The Taiwan case demonstrates that a more cohesive set of institutions and a strong state used less violence rather than more. As noted in Chapter 2, this finding confirms the predictions of around half of those who study organizational cohesion, but contradicts the other half. Perhaps more importantly, this chapter confirms that state capacity is not a fixed quality, but one that can be altered by leaders to serve their political interests. To say that increased state capacity explains

⁸⁸ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Dan Slater and Joseph Wong, "The Strength to Concede: Ruling Parties and Democratization in Developmental Asia," *Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September 2013), pp. 717–33.

the drop in violence in Taiwan after 1955 is perhaps true, but seems to misattribute true causal power: that Chiang found it necessary to strengthen the regime's coercive capacity vis-à-vis the population after 1950 to ensure his survival in office, when he had previously found it advantageous to do precisely the opposite. An explanation based on state capacity also fails to explain why violence did not rise again in the face of supposed "waning" of overall state capacity in the latter two decades of martial law. This chapter's arguments, by contrast, suggest that this outcome should be unsurprising: the lack of violence is attributable to the specific type of coercive capacity developed by the KMT, which was relatively constant after 1955 and which was directed at deterring and pre-empting violence rather than employing it.⁸⁹ What these chapters explain, then, is what state capacity looks like when it comes to the state's most basic task – coercion of the population – and what happens when leaders do and do not seek to maximize it.

International explanations, especially those that focus on American influence, are also poor predictors. These explanations generally suggest that American permissiveness toward violence in combating the communist threat early in the Cold War explains why violence was high, and American pressure to improve human rights in the later decades explains why violence was lower then. The problem with this explanation is that historical evidence does not support this interpretation of American preferences or their communication to the KMT leadership; in fact, changes in American preferences do not correlate with the temporal pattern of state violence. If American preferences with respect to the level of repression were decisive, then repression should have been *lowest* in the late 1940s under the disapproving presence of Consul General Robert Strong, and it should have risen under his more permissive successor, Karl Rankin, who served from 1950 to 1957 and who "did not share Strong's view that KMT repression was undermining the government."⁹⁰ After that, American pressure to improve human rights on Taiwan did not really pick up again until the 1970s. Instead, violence dropped under Rankin – precisely the opposite of what this theory should predict. This is not to say that a desire for international legitimacy and a good relationship with the United States did not affect Taipei's decision-making in the 1970s, as many scholars suggest.⁹¹ Legitimacy concerns, however,

⁸⁹ Gold, "The Waning of the Kuomintang State."

⁹⁰ Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, p. 56.

⁹¹ Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Lawrence Whitehead, "Taiwan's Democratization: A Critical Test for the International Dimension Perspective," *Taiwan*

appear to have had their most substantial influence on overall political liberalization – rather than specifically on state violence, which was uncorrelated with liberalization because it had already dropped two decades earlier. In short, American influence mattered, especially in 1949–50, but not in the straightforward way that is often argued: it mattered because it influenced Chiang Kai-shek's threat perceptions, and through them his coercive apparatus – and it is these institutions, rather than American preferences, that can explain the timing and nature of the drop in state violence.

An explanation centered on *regime life cycle* is plausible, but within-case evidence renders it ultimately unconvincing. This argument predicts that violence should have been high at the beginning of the regime, when the KMT was first establishing power and needed to eliminate enemies. The trend – initial high levels of violence followed by a drop – does correlate with the most basic prediction of the theory. This explanation makes less sense, however, given that by all accounts the KMT inherited an orderly and peaceful island in 1945, inhabited by Taiwanese who were optimistic about their return to Chinese rule. The KMT's coming to power in Taiwan was not a violent seizure of power from opponents who had to be forcibly eliminated or conquest of a population that had to be violently subdued, and in fact the initial transition was relatively smooth. The fact that serious and threatening popular unrest only emerged in *response* to KMT predation and misgovernance calls the life cycle explanation into serious question. Perhaps even more importantly, violence correlates very differently with regime life cycle in other cases in the book, something that will be discussed in more detail in the Conclusion.

A final possible explanation is that the drop in violence could be the result of an *empirical endogeneity effect*. In other words, perhaps high levels of violence at the beginning of the regime simply deterred opposition activity from then on, creating the violence-not-needed condition that Judt calls “the calm of the prison yard.” Three factors suggest that this explanation is unlikely, or at least incomplete. First, we continue to observe opposition activity in Taiwan *after* the period of high levels of

Journal of Democracy, Vol. 3, No. 2 (December 2007), pp. 11–32; see also Cheng Tun-jen, “Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan,” *World Politics*, Vol. 41, No. 4 (1989), pp. 471–99; John F. Copper, *Taiwan's Mid-1990s Elections: Taking the Final Step to Democracy* (Westport: Praeger, 1998); Bruce Dickson, *Democratization in China and Taiwan: The Adaptability of Leninist Parties* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997); Shelley Rigger, “Machine Politics and Protracted Transition in Taiwan,” *Democratization*, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2000), pp. 135–52.

violence, as the Lei Chen case and especially the opposition movements that emerged in the 1970s attest to. This suggests that deterrence was, at most, only partly successful. Second, we also observe a pattern of state response to opposition that suggests *pre-emptive rather than deterrent* effects: identification of opposition activity in earlier stages and a focus on individual rather than mass or group arrests. Third, and similar to explanations based on state capacity, to argue that the regime was able to deter and thereby lower the need for violence may be (partly) true, but that claim somewhat misses the point of the argument made here, which focuses on why and how the regime was able to make that possible. The case of Taiwan suggests that the varying capacity of the coercive apparatus creates a deterrent effect in some cases, but not others. Deterrence only works if behavior is observable and punishment is credible; an apparatus that lacks the intelligence to consistently identify and punish plotters will not deter them effectively. Taiwan achieved the construction of this kind of apparatus – but as we will see, not every regime does. The important question is how that deterrent coercive capacity is created and sustained. Therefore, although empirical endogeneity cannot be entirely ruled out in the Taiwan case, the presence of ongoing opposition handled with pre-emptive methods suggests that it is at best an incomplete explanation for what we observe and, moreover, that its presence does not answer the fundamental puzzle, which is why it occurs in some cases but not others.

CONCLUSION

What explains the drop in state violence in Taiwan in the mid-1950s? This chapter argues that the drop in violence can most convincingly be attributed to the extensive reforms of the coercive apparatus that began in late 1949. Replacing a fragmented and exclusive set of coercive institutions with ones that were unitary and inclusive produced a decline in state violence that lasted for the rest of the martial law period. Taiwan's coercive institutions changed from a fragmented collection of "outsider" internal security agencies engaged in chaotic, extrajudicial, and intense violence against society, to a unitary system of internal security that had deep roots into Taiwan's population and depended on targeted surveillance to administer atomized, bureaucratized, and judicially sanctioned repression. Coercive institutional reforms made it possible for the KMT to rely on targeted, selective, and more discriminate violence in the years from 1955 until martial law was lifted in 1987.

Coercive institutions and repression in the Philippines

As in Taiwan, Marcos' reforms of the coercive apparatus had a profound effect on the patterns of state violence that the Philippines experienced. As Chapter 4 documented, Marcos restructured the Philippines' coercive institutions in order to protect himself from elite threats, especially as he moved toward the declaration of martial law in 1972. In order to defend against a coup, he fragmented his coercive apparatus and made it socially exclusive along educational, ethnic, and familial lines. These decisions resulted in increased state violence against the population. The fragmented, internally competitive relationship that Marcos fostered among the coercive agencies, combined with the Philippines' bounty and rewards system, created clear material incentives to escalate violence, and hampered the intelligence-sharing and coordinative capacity of the internal security apparatus. Exclusivity hampered the collection of intelligence on popular threats, and lowered social incentives for coercive agents to refrain from violence against the out-groups who composed the majority of the Philippine population. By weakening the Philippines' intelligence capacity and skewing incentives toward violence rather than restraint, both fragmentation and social exclusivity contributed to the escalation of violence against civilians over the course of the Marcos dictatorship.

The first section of this chapter describes the trend of rising state violence in the Philippines during Marcos' autocratic rule. The second section outlines the pathways by which coercive institutional design affected violence in the Philippines; it argues, successively, that exclusivity hampered intelligence in ways that increased violence, that exclusivity warped incentives in ways that increased violence, that fragmentation




FIGURE 7.1. Annual number of political arrests in the Philippines

hampered intelligence in ways that increased violence, and that fragmentation warped incentives in ways that produced higher levels of violence. The penultimate section of the chapter reviews alternative explanations for the rise in state violence in the Philippines and shows that coercive institutional design is a more powerful explanation for the patterns of violence observed than plausible alternatives like international influence, state capacity, or rising popular threat.

EXPLAINING THE RISE IN STATE VIOLENCE

State violence in the Philippines rose steadily from the time Marcos declared martial law until he was deposed in February 1986. Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show the trend of increasing state violence in the Philippines over the period from 1975 or 1977 (the earliest years for which these data are available) until 1986, as measured by the number of politically motivated arrests, disappearances, and extrajudicial killings by the security forces.¹

These figures demonstrate that, like Taiwan, the Philippines exhibits dramatic and unexplained temporal variations in state violence, but in

¹ Data provided to the author by the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, December 2011. For qualitative and case study reporting on violence against civilians, see Lawyers' Committee for Human Rights, *Salvaging Democracy: Human Rights in the Philippines* (New York: December 1985); Commission of the Churches on International Affairs/World Council of Churches, *Philippines: Testimonies on Human Rights Violations* (Geneva, 1986); Bishop Francisco F. Claver, *The Stones Will Cry Out: Grassroots Pastorals* (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1978); Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, *Political Prisoners of Our Time* (Quezon City, 1989); Kessler, *Rebellion and Repression*.




FIGURE 7.2. Annual number of disappearances and extrajudicial killings in the Philippines

the opposite direction: state violence in the Philippines increased steadily over time.

The statistics above were collected by organizations affiliated with the Catholic Church, whose uniquely broad geographic reach, local social penetration, and semi-protected status under martial law allowed its personnel to conduct surveys and write reports throughout the archipelago.² Other sources have reached similar conclusions about the overall scope of state violence; historian Alfred McCoy reaches a figure of 3,257 deaths, and the class-action suit that found Marcos guilty in U.S. federal court included approximately 9,540 claimants.³ In the absence of the full release of archival materials from this period, these figures are the most comprehensive available⁴, but they are likely to underestimate the

² Task Force Detainees of the Philippines (TFDP) was organized in 1974 by the Association of Major Religious Superiors of the Philippines (AMRSP). Robert L. Youngblood, *Marcos Against the Church: Economic Development and Political Repression in the Philippines* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990); Mark R. Thompson, *The Anti-Marcos Struggle: Personalistic Rule and Democratic Transition in the Philippines* (Quezon City: New Day, 1996); Patricio N. Abinales and Donna J. Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

³ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 192, 328; District Court of Hawaii, *Cesar Hilao et al. v. The Estate of Ferdinand Marcos* (1986).

⁴ The Intelligence Services of the AFP (ISAFP) has agreed to declassify some martial-law era documents, but interviews in Manila indicated that the documents may be being sanitized (and some destroyed) before they are transferred out of ISAFP custody. Jefferson Plantilla, "Elusive Promise: Transitional Justice in the Philippines," *Human Rights Dialogue*, Vol. 1, No. 8 (Spring 1997), www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/archive/dialogue/1_08/articles/553.html; T.J. Burgonio, "Military Declassifies Marcos-Era Documents,"

scope of violence in several specific ways. First, because the Church had a weaker presence in Muslim Mindanao, these data likely under-report state violence there. Second, the class-action suit represents individuals (or family members of individuals) who were willing and knowledgeable enough to participate in the legal process; reluctance to file or inability to document abuses may lead this number to be lower than the actual number of victims.⁵ Finally, because state violence in the Philippines was conducted by multiple agencies and appears to have been less tightly regulated by legal and bureaucratic structures, the majority of killings by the security forces were extrajudicial and do not appear to have been carefully documented – a contrast with Taiwan, despite Marcos' lawyerly claims to "constitutional authoritarianism." What we know at present about the process of state violence in the Philippines suggests that the true number of deaths and disappearances attributable to Marcos' coercive apparatus may never be fully ascertained.⁶

The statistics in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 also omit a large number of arrests from the first years of martial law, before data collection efforts were organized. Official statements from the Marcos government suggest that state violence during these years was broad in scope but low in intensity – high numbers of arrests and temporary detentions, but relatively few killings. The first person arrested after the declaration of martial law, at midnight sharp during a meeting at the Manila Hilton, was Benigno Aquino; by 4am, scores of Philippine politicians, journalists, and other prominent figures had been taken into custody.⁷ Amnesty International estimated that the total number of detainees in the weeks after the declaration reached 30,000;⁸ the government itself estimated

Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 10, 2011, <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/108867/military-declassifies-marcos-era-documents>; author's interviews, Metro Manila, November 2011.

⁵ In 2013, the government established a Human Rights Victims Claims Board to provide reparations to victims under Marcos' regime, chaired by former Philippine Constabulary/National Police General Lina Sarmiento. One month into the six-month application period, only 300 claims had been filed. Walter I. Balane, "SELDA wants recognition of 9,539 ML victims," *MindaNews*, June 3, 2014, www.mindanews.com/top-stories/2014/06/03/selda-wants-public-recognition-of-9539-ml-victims/.

⁶ Though these deaths were perpetrated by identifiable (usually uniformed) members of the coercive apparatus, they occurred without any formal legal process. At least 735 people simply disappeared. TFDP data provided to author; also cited in McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*.

⁷ Juan L. Mercado, "Price Tag," *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, June 17, 2014, <http://opinion.inquirer.net/75682/price-tag>.

⁸ Amnesty International, *Report of an Amnesty International Mission to the Republic of the Philippines*, 22 November–5 December 1975 (New York, 1975).

at one point that 60,000 people had been arrested in the first few years of martial law. Many were released a few months to a year later; in February 1977, five years into martial law, somewhere between 1,500 and 4,000 political detainees remained in prison. The regime's statements about the numbers of people in prison were inconsistent; Marcos claimed in a national radio address in December 1974 that 5,234 people were under detention as a result of martial law, but in June 1977 in a speech to the Foreign Correspondents Club, he denied that the Philippines had any political prisoners at all.⁹ The initial martial law crackdown – broad, urban, and focused on neutralizing Marcos' elite opposition in the media and political realms – immediately called into question his assertion that martial law was motivated by the threat coming from the NPA, whose sympathizers were rurally based and (even by the government's own estimates) far smaller in number than the number of people that Marcos had arrested.

As it escalated, state violence also evolved, taking progressively more brutal form. Torture, not common prior to martial law, became widespread. All of the detainees interviewed by the author experienced what ISAFP documents euphemistically refer to as “the physical extraction of information.”¹⁰ SELDA, an association of former political prisoners, estimated that 35,000 political prisoners had suffered “some form of torture” during their confinement.¹¹ Many of the later political killings in the Philippines were also “salvagings” – a Filipino-English term denoting the disposal of a mutilated corpse in a field, along a roadside, or in another publicly visible location.¹² According to Amnesty International, 1,956 of 2,540 documented deaths were “salvagings” (77 percent).¹³ The number of salvagings also grew over time: from 3 in 1975 to 538 in 1984.¹⁴

⁹ The government claimed that 1,500 were “subversives” and that 2,500 were criminal offenders; Marcos' speech listed 1,165 political detainees and 4,069 criminal offenders. David Briscoe, “Martial Law May Be Lifted, but Marcos Remains Secure,” *Associated Press*, December 25, 1980; International Commission of Jurists, *The Decline of Democracy in the Philippines* (Geneva, Switzerland: August 1977); Jesus Castila *et al.*, “State of Political Detainees: The Philippine Setting,” *Philippine Law Journal*, Vol. 54, No. 4 (1979), pp. 497–549.

¹⁰ “Institution of Safehouses,” Agent's Report, Top Secret, ISAFP files, January 2, 1973.

¹¹ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 205.

¹² *Philippine Daily Inquirer*, June 29, 1996.

¹³ Amnesty International, *Report on the Philippines – 1981* (New York, 1981), p. 7.

¹⁴ Data provided by the Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, email communication, December 2011.

COERCIVE INSTITUTIONS AND STATE VIOLENCE

Marcos' coercive institutional design fostered state violence. Social exclusivity and structural fragmentation in the agencies tasked with political policing decimated the intelligence capacity that might have enabled the regime to maintain control with more judicious and pre-emptive forms of repression. Incentives for violence were provided both by a system of material rewards for executing violence in an environment of inter-agency competition, and by the lack of social inhibitors on violence facilitated by the coercive agencies' exclusivity.

Exclusivity, intelligence, and violence

Social exclusivity within the coercive apparatus contributed to a weak intelligence capacity vis-à-vis Philippine society. The lack of intelligence, in turn, led to indiscriminate and higher violence executed by coercive institutions that were "flying blind." Exclusivity hampered intelligence and exacerbated violence in several ways.

First, Marcos' reduction of the size of and resources allocated to the security apparatus limited these forces' ability to gather information on potential opposition within Philippine society. Because of poor financing, coercive agents on the ground lacked effective cross-unit communications and surveillance ability, and had limited training and capacity to engage in analysis of the information that did exist. In the mid-1970s, estimates by police officials placed the AFP's "armament capability [at] only 60%, mobility 4%, communications capability 8%," and – most critically – "investigative capacity 4%" of their target levels.¹⁵ In 1984, after the fiscal crisis restricted government budgets, surveillance agents in Manila were allowed no more than 5 liters of gasoline a day in which to cover the sprawling, traffic-clogged metropolis – so even if the services had cars, they sometimes lacked fuel to continue patrolling. Foot patrols were discarded.¹⁶ Partly because of resource shortages, the photographs that agents used to identify wanted dissidents were restricted in circulation to a single province, making positive identification of suspects in custody difficult.¹⁷ Despite references in the ISAFP files to "American

¹⁵ Campos, "Role of Police," p. 211.

¹⁶ Cicero C. Campos, "The Police Professional: Catalyst for Change," *Criminal Justice*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (May–August 1986), pp. 32–33.

¹⁷ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 205; Hernandez, "Extent of Civilian Control," p. 216; Viberto Selochan, "Professionalization and Politicization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines," PhD dissertation, Australian National University, 1990, pp. 57, 68, 216.

friends” having provided “advance [sic] equipment and gadgets for surveillance,” the most sophisticated technology in evidence from archival sources is a camera. Intelligence agents collected photographs, many of which were simply taken at public events such as rallies or protests or when detainees entered custody, and pasted them in paper books in which they made handwritten annotations of varying levels of accuracy and detail.¹⁸ Record-keeping in general was spotty and unsystematic; the official police journal noted in mid-1985 that one of the “chief defects” of the Philippine police was its inability to make effective use of a records system.¹⁹

Second, the coercive apparatus’ exclusivity in terms of social composition presented additional intelligence handicaps. Because of who they were, AFP intelligence operatives had difficulty infiltrating groups that they suspected of radical or subversive activity. A 1974 memo titled “Recruitment of Agents,” which discusses lessons shared between the United States and ISAFP, is candid about the difficulty of recruiting effective infiltrators. According to the report, neither subversives who had surrendered nor detainees who had been coerced into signing a collaboration agreement had been able to serve as effective infiltrators. The former were too suspicious to their comrades, and most of the latter broke their bargains with ISAFP to go back underground (though the report did note that the few who remained loyal had provided valuable information on “organizations and personalities” of interest). Faced with this difficulty, ISAFP attempted to plant agents among activists, using relatives of members of the security apparatus. These efforts, too, faltered because these agents’ family backgrounds and social ties made them immediate objects of suspicion.²⁰

The Philippines’ domestic intelligence capacity consistently suffered because of the limited social strata from which it drew infiltrators and assets, and because its agents lacked awareness of how social differences might hamper their intelligence collection efforts. Agent instructions did not encourage infiltrators to mingle with the population to obtain better information. On the contrary, one 1975 report described social

¹⁸ “Recruitment of Agents,” Agent’s Report, ISAFP files, June 1, 1974; author’s examination of several hundred surveillance photographs contained in the ISAFP files.

¹⁹ Teodulo C. Natividad, “The Intellectual Dimension of Police Professionalization,” *Criminal Justice*, Vol. 5, No. 2 (May–August 1985), p. 4.

²⁰ “Recruitment of Agents.”

distance between intelligence assets and villagers as official policy, writing, "Our people are advised to maintain distance between themselves and the village people" for fear that local women might be employed as spies.²¹ Some of ISAFP's agents had to be extricated because they had been exposed due to their own lack of understanding of the social networks and cultural landscape in which they were operating. Individuals sent to infiltrate stronghold areas of the New People's Army, for example, were exposed because of their recurrent socialization and drinking with the government-backed Civilian Home Defense Forces. ISAFP reported that they were unable "to blend well with the residents of the poor barrios. They prefer fraternizing with the well-off farmers."²²

Finally, intelligence was weak because the regime appears not to have made much use of informal organizations or channels outside the coercive apparatus that could have broadened their inclusivity and served as supplementary sources of information. For example, in April 1975, Presidential Decree 684 created the Kabataang Barangay (KB) youth movement. Modeled on the Chinese Red Guards – Marcos was an admirer of Mao – Kabataang Barangay was led by Marcos' nineteen-year-old daughter Imee, and provided for organization of KB units in the country's 42,000 *barangay* (the Philippines' smallest administrative unit).²³ However, local KB chairs participated only in the *barangay* council, which lacked an institutionalized, close working relationship with either the police or the Constabulary, limiting the extent to which the organization could serve as a conduit of information on the district. The government also did not make intelligence use of the reservists and paramilitaries that it employed as cheaper substitutes for full-time AFP personnel. Although Home Defense activities were organized from 1970 onward, and were used increasingly in the 1980s to help counter the insurgency, the AFP seems to have used them more as an inexpensive personnel management tool than a channel for gathering intelligence.²⁴ They were badly trained and poorly supervised; hundreds of reports filed by SELDA document the Civilian Home Defense Forces' responsibility for extrajudicial killings and salvagings, especially in Mindanao.²⁵

²¹ "On Hamletting," Agent's Report, Confidential, ISAFP files, February 4, 1975.

²² "Asset Planting and Infiltration," ISAFP files, December 20, 197X [date cut off document]; "Assets and Informants," ISAFP files, Agent's Report, Top Secret, December 22, 1976.

²³ William F. Buckley, Jr., "Manila (II): Imelda Dominates Manila, but What Does She See in Chairman?" *Star News*, November 27, 1977.

²⁴ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, pp. 430, 565.

²⁵ Kessler, *Rebellion and Repression*, pp. 120–21.

Not until the mid-1980s, when Marcos' rule was almost at its end, does one see a serious discussion of the informational advantages of community participation in policing, or an attempt to set up an intelligence network to offset the one operated by dissidents.²⁶ Deliberate relationships between social institutions and intelligence agencies of the kind that characterized Taiwan were simply absent in the Philippines.

As a result of the lack of intelligence gained through infiltration and surveillance, the coercive apparatus tried to obtain information forcibly through capture and torture. In theory, the AFP could rely on three major sources of information: pre-arrest surveillance and informant work; analysis of documents captured from the NPA and other dissidents during arrest raids; and information obtained through interrogation and torture in detention centers.²⁷ Surveillance and informant work, which were the frontlines of internal security in Taiwan, would have been the least violent of these methods, but for reasons described above the intelligence services were unsuccessful in using them. Moreover, where surveillance existed, it seems to have been conceived of as something done for intimidation, deterrence, and coercion, rather than for information-gathering. When asked about surveillance during the martial law period, interviewees consistently interpreted the question to be about the visible presence of armed forces. One, teaching at the time at the University of the Philippines (UP), recounted students he did not recognize, in plain clothes but with a military haircut and demeanor, arriving to sit at the back of his classes.²⁸ Another commented, "it was not so much espionage, but a demonstration of their capacity to surveil you ... The whole idea was to show the capacity of the government to monitor. It was really to intimidate you more than to gather information."²⁹

Torture, on the other hand, was commonly used after 1972 in an attempt to generate information and obtain evidence.³⁰ In 1975, Amnesty International noted with outrage that "star chamber methods have

²⁶ Reynaldo J.D. Cuaderno, "Community Involvement in Crime Prevention," *Criminal Justice*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Second Quarter 1984), pp. 40–50, and Vol. 4, Nos. 3–4 (Third and Fourth Quarter, 1984), pp. 31–47; Campos, "The Police Professional," p. 32.

²⁷ Interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011; interview with former detainee Romeo Candazo, Quezon City, November 2011.

²⁸ Interview with a UP professor during the time of martial law, Quezon City, November 2011.

²⁹ Interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011.

³⁰ Torture does not appear to have been used prior to the declaration of martial law, though prisoner abuse in ordinary police custody had been a problem.

been used on a wide scale to literally torture evidence into existence.”³¹ Most often, this “physical extraction of information” was done at rented “safehouses,” managed by ISAFP and institutionalized upon advice from American advisors, who based their guidance on the United States’ experiences in Vietnam and Central America, and taught Filipino forces American terminology.³² Because of time pressure to extract information – agents were advised to get information before someone realized a detainee had been taken and arrived at a military camp to ask his whereabouts – safehouse interrogations quickly turned violent. Multiple accounts suggest that if a prisoner did not provide information quickly, interrogators escalated violence until he or she did.³³ This is described in an account of a 1982 detention and interrogation by one of the regime’s most infamous torturers, Lieutenant Rodolfo Aguinaldo of the Fifth CSU:

Aguinaldo grew frustrated when strangulation, beating, and electrocution failed to extract information from a twenty-five-year-old male prisoner named Marco Palo. “Sonofabitch,” the lieutenant shouted at his subordinates, “Make him undress completely and electrocute his balls!”³⁴

Aguinaldo’s comrade, Lieutenant Vic Batac, later suggested publicly that torture arose from “individual initiatives to get information in a short time.”³⁵ One medical survey of political prisoners found that 85 percent had been tortured; other surveys showed similar ratios, and human rights group SELDA placed the number of people tortured under Marcos at 35,000.³⁶ According to ISAFP’s own assessment, however, torture contributed little information of quality: “Forced confessions while they yield some information are generally not reliable and generate adverse publicity.”³⁷

³¹ Amnesty International, *Report – 1975*, pp. 13, 57, 72–73, 85.

³² Soviet and Chinese agents did not use the term “safehouse.” “Institution of Safehouses”; “On Clark Briefing,” Agent’s Report, Top Secret, ISAFP files, November 12, 1974. On Soviet and Chinese practices, see Michael Schoenhals, *Spying for the People: Mao’s Secret Agents, 1949–67* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), p. 182.

³³ Interviews with five former detainees, Quezon City, November 2011 and September 2012.

³⁴ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 214.

³⁵ *The Daily Cardinal*, October 17, 1986; *The Capital Times* (Madison, Wisconsin), October 17, 1986.

³⁶ *New York Times*, November 10, 1986; Amnesty International, *Report – 1981*, pp. 2–8; McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 205; Amnesty International, *The Philippines: The Killing Goes On* (New York: Amnesty, 1992), p. 14.

³⁷ “Asset Planting and Infiltration.”

The reliance of the Philippine intelligence services on arrest and torture to generate information is clear from the differences between the files of dissidents who had not been captured and tortured and the files of those who had. The files of the former are short, and contain little detail compared to the files of the latter group. Perhaps the simplest illustration of this is a summary of the contents of two files: one of a captured activist (Person A), and one of a wanted man who remained at large (Person B).³⁸ The file of Person A lists four aliases, the man's height, the fact that he sometimes wears eyeglasses (and photos with and without eyewear), his date and place of birth, citizenship, marital status and wife's name, parents' names, educational background (major and year of graduation), last known address, and a list of seven previous positions held in the CPP/NPA and other leftist organizations. A "note" reads: "Apprehended by elements of the 5th CSU, Camp Crame, QC on 6th April 1973 at Salinas, San Dionisio, Paranaque, while he was about to get some of his clothes in their safehouse in Salinas."³⁹ Contrast this to the file of Person B, wanted for violations of Section 4 of RA 1700 (involvement in subversive activity), who remained at large. His file contains only a photo, his citizenship (Filipino), a list of six possible aliases and two suspected positions, and a last known address of "Bulan, Soraogon [sic]" – the second-largest city in Sorsogon province in southern Luzon. The rest of the fields are blank.⁴⁰

The treatment of detainees after they were released from detention further confirms the coercive apparatus' weak capacity for surveillance and societal monitoring. Former detainees in the Philippines spoke about being under "house detention" or, in some cases, "city arrest," in which they were released from imprisonment at Camp Crame or Fort Bonifacio, but for a period of several years afterward had to appear once a month at the gates to report their activities and certify their presence in Manila; in some cases, an officer at the military facility would sign a report card.⁴¹ In contrast to Taiwan, however, the reports appear to have been less frequent and less detailed, and only the detainee him/herself was required to appear, with no cross-checking, corroboration, or elaboration on their

³⁸ Names redacted to protect privacy. While I use these two files for purposes of illustration, I viewed approximately twenty files. The pattern was consistent.

³⁹ ISAFP Surveillance File, "Person A," SECRET, n.d. Anonymized for privacy protection.

⁴⁰ ISAFP Surveillance File, "Person B," SECRET, n.d. Anonymized for privacy protection.

⁴¹ Interview with Professor Randy David, Quezon City, November 2011; interview with Professor Amado (Bong) Mendoza, Quezon City, November 2011; interview with a former detainee, Metro Manila, November 2012.

activities. One copy of instructions given to detainees upon their “conditional release” from confinement simply instructed them not to leave Greater Manila without authorization, and not to talk to foreign or domestic media.⁴²

Exclusivity, incentives, and violence

Exclusivity also created social incentives that shaped the pattern of violence. The people who worked inside the coercive apparatus, particularly military officers, came from inter-related social networks defined by kinship, ethnicity, and school ties, forming tight bonds that lasted for decades. General Galileo Kintanar, former head of ISAFP, recounted, “The people I worked with in the 1960s and 1970s – even today, I still take care of and help their kids.”⁴³ The military’s interrogation teams fit this pattern: they were cohesive, stable in membership, competitive with rival units, and distinctive in their work styles. Aguinaldo worked routinely with Lieutenant Billy Bibit (who had graduated from the same PMA class, 1972) and Lieutenant Vic Batac (one class ahead).⁴⁴ At MISG’s interrogation facilities, Colonel Rolando Abadilla worked regularly with Roberto Ortega and Panfilo Lacson;⁴⁵ Lacson’s work in MISG from the time he graduated PMA until Marcos’ downfall in 1986, including a stint as Abadilla’s deputy commander, placed him on “a fast track to national police power” – which he achieved when he served as Director-General of the National Police Administration from 1999 to 2001.⁴⁶

The contribution of these social ties to the demise of the Marcos regime is relatively well known. When Ramos and Enrile staged their February 1986 coup, members of the coup forces called on kinship and school connections to prevent fellow officers from crushing the revolt at Camp Crame. These relationships caused a chain reaction of defection

⁴² Mercado, “Price Tag.”

⁴³ Interview with General Galileo Kintanar, Metro Manila, September 2012.

⁴⁴ Proof of Claim Forms for Torture Victims in the SELDA collection, Filipiniana Multimedia Collection, University of the Philippines Main Library: Domingo Luneta (November 22, 1993); Marcelio M. Talam, Jr. (November 4, 1992); Ma. Paz Castronuevo Talam (November 2, 1992); Eliseo C. Tellez, Jr. (December 8, 1992); Oliver G. Teves (July 13, 1993).

⁴⁵ Proof of Claim Forms for Torture Victims in the SELDA collection, Filipiniana Multimedia Collection, University of the Philippines Main Library: Romeo I. Chan (March 11, 1993) and Damaso de la Cruz (October 27, 1992).

⁴⁶ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 206–17, 406.

across the military: commander after commander refused to attack the troops around Enrile and Ramos, and then joined their side. In one of the critical moments, Marine commandant General Tadiar was ordered to attack Camp Crame, outside which thousands of Filipinos had gathered in answer to the Archbishop's radio call to "protect our friends, the soldiers":

"Ram through," Ramos ordered, "Ram through the crowds, regardless of the casualties." But in front of Tadiar were thousands kneeling in the path of his tanks, nuns in white habits reciting the rosary, children in his firing line. His uncle's voice pleaded with him over the radio to turn back. His bishop's voice came next, saying, "We're all Filipinos." His former PMA superintendent, General Manuel Flores, urged him not to kill "classmates and fellow alumni." Three military wives pushed their way through the Marines and lunged forward, gripping Tadiar's arm. "Temy," said Aida Ciron, the wife of Enrile's aide Ruben Ciron (PMA '68), "you also have a wife and children, please don't do it." Another, Vangie Durian, cried out "Temy, you know me – we were neighbors in Navy Village." Referring to her husband, Commander Jesus Durian (PMA '60), Tadiar asked "Is Jess there?" Yes, she replied, her husband was inside the camp with the rebels.⁴⁷

Tadiar withdrew, and the tide of combat power swung decisively in favor of Ramos and Enrile, who were negotiating with opposition leaders for a provisional government headed by Benigno Aquino's widow, Corazon. By the next evening, Ramos estimated that "60% of the troops in the field had either declared their support or promised to refuse orders" to fire. Later that night, without any Philippine aircraft remaining under his command, Marcos and his contingent – including twenty-six members of the Ver clan – left Malacañang, the presidential palace, in American helicopters, bound for Hawaii.⁴⁸

Less well documented, but equally apparent, is that these same social ties – close familial, ethnic, educational, and social relationships with those in the coercive apparatus – had sheltered individuals within those networks from state violence for years prior to 1986. Professor Amado Mendoza, for example, recalled being stopped in the countryside when he was out past curfew during martial law. Mendoza was the son of two government engineers, and his mother was particularly well known in that area; when the police recognized him, one called to another, "Oh, it's the son of Engineer [Trinidad Mallonga] Mendoza, he can go." Arrested in September 1973, Mendoza went through a series of detention centers where he was tortured, including the custody of

⁴⁷ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 249.

⁴⁸ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, pp. 242–55.

the Metropolitan Police Investigative Service (the investigative unit of Metrocom), the Fifth CSU, and eventually the Ipil Rehabilitation Center, a low-security detention center at Fort Bonifacio. At one point, his older brother, an officer at the National Police Commission, saw him and tried to intervene, but the younger Mendoza, who had been arrested under a cover name, denied being related. At the Fifth CSU office in Camp Crame, Mendoza underwent intensive interrogation and torture until the commanding officer, Colonel Aure, recognized him, and realized that Mendoza's uncle, General Reynaldo Mendoza, had been Aure's commanding officer in ISAFP. "You're Rey's nephew," Aure said, and from then on, Mendoza recounted, "I noticed a reduction in pressure." Later, he discovered that the guards had consulted his uncle, who asked that he be detained at the minimum security prison at Fort Bonifacio (rather than the maximum security prison in the same fort) so that he would be treated somewhat better, and not thrown in with the true hardliners.⁴⁹

The idea that social or blood ties to the coercive apparatus could protect someone from violence is obvious and familiar enough to Filipinos that it has become a cultural reference. It is the key determinant of the outcome in a novel about the Marcos years, Gina Apostol's *The Gun Dealer's Daughter*, and was a theme of political cartoons at the time (see Figure 7.3).⁵⁰ One former political prisoner recalled receiving a phone call in 1975 from a classmate who was a niece of the chief of naval intelligence. "I heard from my uncle that they're all looking for you. All of the units are trying to find you," she told him. "But if you surrender to him, his unit guarantees not to torture you. The other units will not guarantee that."⁵¹ This kind of offer of protection could only have been extended via the educational and kinship ties shared between this individual and the coercive apparatus, but these ties were not equally available to all Philippine citizens. Another former detainee, Alex Magno,

⁴⁹ Interview with Professor Amado (Bong) Mendoza, Quezon City, November 2011; see also Amado Mendoza, "September 21, 2012: Parts I and II," and "September 17, 1973," <http://bongmendoza.wordpress.com/2012/09/22/september-21-2012-part-i/>; <http://bongmendoza.wordpress.com/2012/09/22/september-21-2012-part-ii/>; <http://bongmendoza.wordpress.com/2012/09/17/september-17-1983/>; and <http://bongmendoza.wordpress.com/2010/05/21/the-political-rehabilitation-of-the-marcoses/>.

⁵⁰ Gina Apostol, *The Gun Dealer's Daughter* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2012).

⁵¹ Interview with Dr. Joel Rocamora, Quezon City, November 2011. The story was corroborated in an independently arranged interview with the interviewee's former classmate, Chairwoman of the Human Rights Commission Etta Rosales, Quezon City, November 2011.



FIGURE 7.3. Political cartoon: protecting the children of “big shots”

Source: Ely Santiago, *Philippines Graphic*, January 22, 1969.

spent almost four months imprisoned at Fort Bonifacio; he heard one day that a famous general – a distant relative who shared his last name – would be visiting the camp. He recounted, “So I watched out the window just above the ground, at the top of my cell, and when I saw the shiny pair of boots passing, I yelled ‘Tito Joe! Tito Joe! [Uncle Joe! Uncle Joe!]

The general asked them who it was, and they told him, ‘Oh, just some fellow named Magno.’ About two weeks later, I was released.”⁵² A third former detainee explained that he was captured by a unit under the Philippine Constabulary and tortured for a night in tactical interrogation. In the morning, the facility’s phone rang. When the officer who had been interrogating him hung up, he said, “Why didn’t you tell us you were a friend of General Ramos? He would like to have breakfast, and is on his way. Please forget what has happened here, we

⁵² Interview with Dr. Alex Magno, Quezon City, November 2011.

are just doing our job.” The captured detainee did not know Ramos, but decided to wait for Ramos’ arrival. He subsequently discovered that Ramos’ mother and his own mother-in-law were good friends, and that his wife had known Ramos as a small girl. Release of a prisoner required the signature of a senior officer, so the detainee was signed out under Ramos’ name to house arrest in Ramos’ personal custody – custody that was then deputized to his mother-in-law, Ramos’ neighbor.⁵³ Time and again, social ties to members of the coercive apparatus helped to protect individuals from state violence. Where these ties were absent, individuals were subject to more extended and harsher violence at the hands of the coercive apparatus.

Police reports from the time suggest that patterns of violence being shaped by social ties were standard, rather than an exception. This is observable from the experience of ordinary police forces, who, in contrast to the anti-dissident forces that did political policing, were not socially exclusive and typically operated in their home regions. According to a study published in National Police Command (Napolcom)’s official journal, *Criminal Justice*, two-thirds of prisoner escapes between 1973 and 1979 occurred because guards who were on friendly terms with prisoners let them out of their cells, even out of the prisons entirely – for example, to run errands for the guards, or for conjugal home visits, which were regularly allowed to prominent citizens as well as ones who had befriended or bribed the police. The study specifically reported that these incidents were most common when police forces were managed by local officials, rather than under the centralized and distant supervision of officials in Manila. As a result, the police began to attempt to enforce central control more strictly, gradually increasing the social distance between those ordering violence and Filipino society.⁵⁴ No follow-up data was collected by Napolcom, but the trend of decreased local control and increased social distance correlates with the trend of rising violence by local forces.

The effect of social exclusivity helps explain an additional facet of state violence: its spatial distribution. Though systematic, detailed information on the locations of state violence is not available, reporting by human rights groups suggested consistently that abuses were worse in the provinces and more rural areas. In response to a 1976 Amnesty International report on

⁵³ Interview with a former detainee, Quezon City, November 2011.

⁵⁴ Reynaldo J.D. Cuaderno, “The Patterns of Police Misbehavior in the Philippines, Part 2” *Criminal Justice*, Vol. 3, No. 2 (Second Quarter 1983), p. 45; Cuaderno, “The Patterns of Police Misbehavior, Part 3”; Natividad, “The Intellectual Dimension,” p. 8.

torture, the American embassy in Manila cabled its own assessment to Washington. They concluded that the reports were “essentially balanced and accurate,” and observed that Amnesty’s conclusions might have been even more negative had the investigators traveled outside of Luzon, since “reports of torture, etc. become more common the farther one gets from Manila.”⁵⁵ This is what one would expect if social exclusivity was a key driver of state violence: the small in-group that made up the coercive apparatus was centered on Manila, and activists who stayed in rural areas often lacked the social ties and pedigree that protected more privileged student activists in the capital.

Fragmentation, intelligence, and violence

Fragmentation contributed to poor intelligence on the part of the Philippine coercive apparatus by limiting information-sharing across the various units engaged in anti-dissident operations. Inter-agency competition, combined with resource shortages, limited the sharing of photographs used to identify wanted dissidents, hampering intelligence operations if dissidents simply moved from one area to another.⁵⁶ One interviewee recounted undergoing a nonsensical interrogation by a unit in search of dissident activity on the UP campus. “They had terrible intelligence,” he said, “It was partly interference by politicians ... Each service had its own intelligence, including the police, and they competed with each other. Nobody talked to anyone else.”⁵⁷ Another former detainee recounted that the PC unit that arrested him did not understand that the communist movement had split between the old Communist Party (Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas, PKP) and a new Maoist faction set up in December 1968 by Jose Maria Sison (the CPP and its armed wing, the NPA).⁵⁸ ISAFP had written memos on the split as it was occurring in late 1967, but that information was not transmitted to the PC units responsible for capture operations or tactical interrogation.⁵⁹ The PC unit, believing that the man belonged to the NPA, tortured him for a night, all the

⁵⁵ Amnesty International, *Report-1976*; U.S. Department of State, Manila to Washington, September 4, 1976.

⁵⁶ McCoy, *Closer Than Brothers*, p. 205; Hernandez, “Extent of Civilian Control,” p. 216; Selochan, *Professionalization and Politicization*.

⁵⁷ Interview with Joel Rocamora, Quezon City, November 2011.

⁵⁸ International Crisis Group, “The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines: Tactics and Talks,” Asia Report No. 202 (February 2011), pp. 3–9.

⁵⁹ “Reported Split within the PKP,” Case Evaluation, Confidential, ISAFP files, November 30–December 25, 1967.

while pressuring him to answer questions that could only be answered by someone from the other wing.⁶⁰

The impact of fragmentation and bad intelligence on operational effectiveness becomes clear when one considers the very different outcomes that occurred during one of the few incidents in which competing services – ISAFP, MIG-15, MIG-4, MISG, and the Naval Intelligence Service Group – were forced to collaborate: Task Force Makabansa. The Task Force achieved some notable tactical successes in February 1982.⁶¹ The operation's success was due partly to the fact that it was one of the only times that the coercive apparatus was able to assemble enough information to act pre-emptively rather than reacting to developments that had already unfolded; it conducted “pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist [CT] underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila.”⁶² In general, however, cross-unit cooperation was rare, as was pre-emptive or preventative intelligence. Years later, high-ranking Philippine intelligence officials still discussed intelligence as reactive. One, while emphasizing that “the best way to neutralize a threat to a country's stability is the use of intelligence, which is the acquisition of correct information that gives a basis for action,” still spoke of the development of intelligence as a response to the emergence of the CPP, rather than information collected in anticipation of dissident action.⁶³ Fragmentation contributed to this weak intelligence, which then contributed to violence in the ways described above.

Fragmentation, incentives, and violence

Finally, fragmentation within the coercive apparatus fueled inter-agency competition that led to heightened state violence. In 1984, the Philippines' official police journal bemoaned the negative effects of fragmentation and

⁶⁰ Interview with a former detainee, Quezon City, November 2011.

⁶¹ The operation was a tactical success but a strategic failure, since it prompted the *Aberca v. Ver* civil suit against some of the Marcos regime's most notorious torturers.

⁶² Colonel Fidel C. Singson, “Presidential Order of Arrest and Detention Against Felix Manuel Y. Macaraeg and Twenty-Six (26) Others,” Annex 1, *Rogelio Aberca et al, Plaintiffs v. Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver et al, Defendants*, Civil Case No 37487, Regional Trial Court, Branch 1, Quezon City, February 27, 1982.

⁶³ Interview with a former high-ranking intelligence official, Metro Manila, September 2012. For background on how officials viewed the role of intelligence in Philippine domestic security operations, see Galileo Kintanar, *Lost in Time: The Communist Party of the Philippines* (Quezon City: Truth and Justice Foundation, 1999, 2 vols); Galileo C. Kintanar, “A Counterinsurgency Approach in the Philippine Setting,” PhD dissertation, Polytechnic University of the Philippines, 1990.

competition between law enforcement agencies in recent years, wherein “jealousies precluded cooperation among them, and accomplishments were oriented not so much on the desire to serve the public as in the desire to outdo one another. The duplication of their functions further aggravated the problem.”⁶⁴ Competition between rival units was so well known that it was mentioned offhandedly in numerous interviews with former detainees. Recall the story mentioned above, in which an interviewee had been informed that multiple units were racing to find and capture him, and that one was willing to promise to protect him from torture in exchange for winning the inter-agency race. Another detainee explained that he was captured by one of the units under part of the Philippine Constabulary (CIS, under C₃) rather than the other (CSU, under C₂). Because the two units were rivals, one decided to arrest him as soon as they received a tip on his whereabouts, rather than passing the information on to the other unit. The other unit, however, had his file and the information on why he was wanted for capture, so he was tortured for a night in tactical interrogation while the investigators asked questions that he could not answer.⁶⁵ In this particular incident, fragmentation created both incentives for state violence and incentives not to share information that then made that violence more intense.

Inter-agency outbidding over violence was acute in part because rival organizations were competing for material and professional rewards. At high levels, Marcos rewarded those close to him with access to coveted sectors of the economy, public praise, and lavish gifts.⁶⁶ Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, for example, established extensive holdings in coconut and lumber, two of the Philippines’ most important industries; other insiders amassed extensive financial holdings in overseas bank accounts.⁶⁷ At the lower levels, the Philippines’ coercive institutions operated a bounty

⁶⁴ Eugenio A. Ocampo, Jr., “The Future of the Philippine Constabulary/Integrated National Police,” *Criminal Justice*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Second Quarter 1984), p. 24.

⁶⁵ The Criminal Investigative Service, one of two strike forces of the Operations division (C₃) of the Philippine Constabulary, had a competitive rivalry with CSU, the strike force of C₂, the intelligence division. Interview with a former detainee, Quezon City, November 2011.

⁶⁶ Miranda and Ciron, “Development and the Military.”

⁶⁷ Belinda Aquino, “The Transnational Dynamics of the Marcos Plunder,” paper published by UP-Diliman, National College of Public Administration and Governance, January 1999; Belinda Aquino, *The Politics of Plunder: The Philippines Under Marcos* (Quezon City: Great Books, 1987); Paul D. Hutchcroft, *Booty Capitalism: The Politics of Banking in the Philippines* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998); David Kang, *Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

system to reward those who captured or killed suspected subversives.⁶⁸ Rewards for meeting these professional standards were significant, and clearly outlined to coercive agents. The 1985 issue of the official police journal, for example, listed numerous medals that Marcos awarded to top performers, complete with photographs and detailed descriptions of how an officer could earn each one.⁶⁹ Monetary rewards and promotions were also dependent on the capture or killing of dissidents – and did not generally distinguish between those two outcomes. CPP student-leader Edgar Jopson (Edjop), for example, was worth P180,000 – a considerable sum by the standards of the day – and the promise of a promotion to Major Nelson Estares, the head of the Constabulary Security Unit that eventually took Edjop; the reward was paid and the promotion given even though Edjop was killed rather than captured in the operation. The price on the head of the suspected chairman of the CPP Central Committee was P125,000; Rafael Baylosis, CPP Secretary-General, brought P200,000; and three other members of the CPP had a reward value of P100,000 or P125,000.⁷⁰ When the PC's Rodolfo Aguinaldo apprehended NPA leader Jose Maria Sison, he earned a promotion to captain and command of his own “anti-subversion” unit, equipped with more sophisticated weaponry than usual and a pool of fast cars.⁷¹

The Philippines' official police journal explicitly observed in 1982 that internal security agencies' performance against subversive activity was measured in terms of body counts, rather than information obtained or the overall safety of a particular area under the police's jurisdiction. An article listed out these metrics: “The accomplishment of the PC/INP consists of body counts and quantities, namely: number arrested, numbers killed in encounters and raids, volume and amount of confiscated contraband.”⁷² ISAFP appeared to regard the rewards it provided as an unfortunate but necessary part of the incentive structure; former ISAFP

⁶⁸ Interview with former detainee and congressman Romeo Candazo, Quezon City, September 2012; interview with a human rights lawyer during the martial law period, Quezon City, September 2012.

⁶⁹ Agustin V. Mateo, “The New INP Awards: A Step to Professionalization,” *Criminal Justice*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (January–April 1985), pp. 40–44.

⁷⁰ Benjamin Pimentel, *Rebolusyon! A Generation of Struggle in the Philippines* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1991), p. 315.

⁷¹ Pobre, *History of the Armed Forces*, p. 506; Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, *Pumpiglas: Political Detention and Military Atrocities in the Philippines 1981–82* (Quezon City: TFDP/AMRSP, 1980), pp. 106–07.

⁷² Eugenio A. Ocampo, Jr., “Understanding Crime Statistics,” *Criminal Justice*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (Third Quarter 1982), p. 44.

chief General Kintanar reflected, “Unfortunately, this is what motivates people – some by patriotism, others by material factors.”⁷³ Official writings from the time corroborate that the leaders of the coercive apparatus were aware of the downsides of this incentivization system, but accepted the costs as unavoidable. In the early 1980s, the police journal noted that “as long as police promotions are based more on arrests made than on ability to improve police–community relations ... it is not likely that citizen misconduct against citizens will be controlled.” It also noted police reluctance to spend time on small cases or community-relations activities that did not produce arrests, because it was big cases and arrests or “kinetic operations” that would “earn [the agents] extra income.”⁷⁴ In contrast to the system operated by Magsaysay in the 1950s, which rewarded the provision of accurate intelligence, Marcos established a system that used acts of violence as the chief measures of professional success in internal security, both individually and organizationally. Whether the targets of that violence had actually done anything to deserve their treatment was irrelevant to the metrics and provision of the rewards.

Finally, fragmentation within the internal security apparatus was reinforced by social divisions among rival organizations that exacerbated their incentives for violence. Tight bonds among stable interrogation teams strengthened their in-group identity and heightened their sense of rivalry toward other units.⁷⁵ Tensions were particularly acute between the internal security units staffed by PMA graduates and those staffed by Ver’s “integrees,” as the ROTC graduates were called. The fact that promotions were based on a combination of performance metrics and social ties helped consolidate the divisions among rival units even further; in 1975, one AFP colonel described the academy–reservist rivalry as “our own silent war.”⁷⁶ Professional and social incentives to compete were therefore fostered by institutional fragmentation, and skewed the behavior of the coercive apparatus toward violence rather than restraint.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Alternative explanations fare poorly in explaining the patterns of state violence observed under Marcos. For example, the simple temporal pattern

⁷³ Interview with General Galileo Kintanar, Metro Manila, September 2012.

⁷⁴ Campos, “The Police Professional,” p. 32.

⁷⁵ Amnesty International, *Report on Developments in the Philippines 1976* (New York, 1976); U.S. Department of State, Manila to Washington, September 4, 1976.

⁷⁶ Maynard, “Comparison of Military Elite Role Perceptions,” p. 491.

of violence turns an explanation based on an authoritarian regime's *life cycle* on its head, since that explanation predicts high levels of violence at the start of a regime and lower levels of violence afterward. Although the regime arrested and imprisoned numerous people in the early weeks and months of martial law, it released them quickly, and killed far more people later in its tenure. As it is usually conceptualized, this explanation simply does not correlate with the observed pattern of violence.

With respect to *state capacity* or *organizational cohesion*, the case of the Philippines under Marcos suggests (like Taiwan) that a weaker or less cohesive coercive apparatus uses higher levels of violence. This conclusion parallels to those of recent studies on armed group violence, but contradicts many studies of state repression, which generally find a positive relationship between cohesion and the willingness and ability to repress. The underlying mechanisms driving violence in this chapter, however, are different from those typically identified in studies of armed group violence; they are derived from relationships among different organizations rather than a single group's cohesion or lack thereof. Also similar to the Taiwan case, this chapter shows that it is coercive capacity rather than state capacity that matters for patterns of violence – and that this capacity is not a fixed quality constraining autocrats, but a variable one that they can manipulate based on their perceived threats and interests. These political interests, rather than state or organizational capacity, explain why Marcos deliberately fragmented the coercive apparatus and made it exclusive after 1972, when he had previously pursued opposite policies. Since Marcos manipulated coercive capacity in different directions at different times to suit his interests, state capacity is not an independent variable that can, by itself, explain the observed.

International or American influences seem to have had a mostly cosmetic effect on the escalation of state violence in the Philippines. Western pressure from groups like Amnesty International, the Catholic Church, and the Carter administration did force Marcos to formally restore the trappings of democracy midway through his tenure. He emptied the prisons, reducing the number of political prisoners from 6,000 in May 1975 to 563 two years later; announced disciplinary actions against abusive soldiers; and renamed the notorious Fifth CSU (which became Regional Security Unit 4, RSU-4).⁷⁷ Proclamation 2045 in January 1981, before Reagan's inauguration and Pope John Paul II's visit, lifted martial law. State violence, however, did not drop when martial law was lifted; the

⁷⁷ Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, *Report* (Manila, 1980), pp. 103–07.



FIGURE 7.4. Political cartoon: the “lifting” of martial law

Source: Corky Trinidad, *Honolulu Star-Bulletin*, January 1981, reprinted in Roces and Roces, *Medals and Shoes*, p. 81.

number of political killings and disappearances continued to rise each year (see Figure 7.4).

Proclamation 2045 continued the suspension of habeas corpus in subversion cases, and retained decrees passed under martial law allowing the coercive apparatus broad powers and de facto immunity.⁷⁸ Promises to court-martial abusive soldiers were a sham: the officers charged later returned to work.⁷⁹ The State Department concluded that Marcos had lifted martial law mostly to improve his image overseas, and that he felt free to do so because the powers he needed were already “adequately institutionalized in one form or another – economic, military, police, media, and of course, political control.”⁸⁰ They wrote, “Marcos can have the best of both worlds – he rids himself of the onus of martial law while retaining the broad powers he now holds.”⁸¹ As Figures 7.1 and 7.2

⁷⁸ U.S. Department of State, Manila to Washington, September 16, 1980; August 20, 1981; May 18, 1983.

⁷⁹ McCoy, *Policing America's Empire*, pp. 405–06; Amnesty International, *Report – 1981*, pp. 86–87.

⁸⁰ U.S. Department of State, Manila to Washington, December 26, 1980.

⁸¹ U.S. Department of State, Manila to Washington, September 16, 1980.

showed, the Philippines experienced its worst state violence *after* martial law was lifted.

The American government also sent mixed signals to Marcos about its preferences vis-à-vis repression. The United States provided the Philippines with both military aid and covert advice on internal security; ISAFP documents indicate that in the mid-1970s, American advisors instructed the Philippines' coercive institutions on the use of safehouses for anti-subversion operations.⁸² These advisors made clear that they were under pressure to have their allies improve the *appearance* of human rights performance – a distinction not lost on ISAFP, which recorded dutifully in briefing notes that “The US government is being pressured by some international organizations to advise its allies not to be perceived as tyrants or violators of citizens’ rights,” and which took from this the lesson that safehouses (rather than formal military facilities) should be used for forcible interrogations, and that care should be taken to conceal these from public view.⁸³ The generous interpretation of external pressure by the United States and others is that it informed processes of visible political liberalization that were uncorrelated with true levels of repression and state violence; the cynical interpretation is that this pressure actually contributed to violence by shifting the regime from semi-institutionalized visible repression by the AFP toward unrestrained violence conducted underground by less accountable organizations. Most likely, international and American pressure did play a role in lifting martial law, but this was a cosmetic change of little import to the patterns of state violence, because the institutions that organized and implemented that violence had acquired their fundamental character a decade earlier.

Rising popular threat is a potentially plausible alternative explanation, but struggles to explain a number of pieces of within-case evidence. First, proponents of a threat-based argument in the Philippines generally attribute increased violence by the coercive apparatus in the 1980s to swelling popular mobilization after the assassination of Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino in late 1983 (which, they suggest, culminated in the “People Power” or EDSA revolution that swept Marcos from power). As the statistics in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 show, however, the use of violence by the

⁸² “Institution of Safehouses”; Walden Bello and Severina Rivera, eds., *The Logistics of Repression: The Role of US Assistance in Consolidation the Martial Law Regime in the Philippines* (Washington: Friends of the Filipino People, 1977); Kuzmarov, *Modernizing Repression*.

⁸³ “Institution of Safehouses”; “On Clark Briefing.”

state – especially disappearances and killings – had already been climbing for several years by that time. Higher levels of mobilization after Ninoy’s assassination, therefore, can explain the last three years of the rise in violence, but not its first decade. Second, the severity of popular threat – both objectively and in Marcos’ mind – is far from clear. Although the strength of the NPA did grow over time – from several hundred estimated fighters in 1972 to around 8,000 in 1984, and in excess of 100,000 supporters (loosely defined) by the mid-1980s – Chapter 4 demonstrated that this growth was partially attributable to *leniency* on the part of Marcos, who did not consider the NPA a real threat and was confident enough to actually allow the NPA to increase in strength. And despite the importance of People Power, popular protest did not succeed on its own in toppling Marcos – that required a coup attempt and significant military defection, both of which were affected by Marcos’ choices about coercive institutional design. Finally, the timing of the growth in popular mobilization, coupled with within-case evidence from interviews and activist testimonies, suggests that the indiscriminacy of Marcos’ coercive apparatus may have been the *cause* of growing opposition from the population, not an effect of it. “If I have to go through three-and-a-half months of jail for doing nothing wrong,” one former detainee commented wryly, “I decided that next time I might as well do something to deserve it.”⁸⁴ Rather than increased mobilization provoking higher levels of state violence in the Philippines, evidence suggests that the reverse occurred: higher levels of less discriminate violence appear to have catalyzed an increase in anti-regime mobilization.

The final alternative explanation is that of an *empirical endogeneity effect*, or a feedback loop between repression, opposition, and further repression. Perhaps the Marcos regime (in contrast to the KMT in Taiwan) did not use *enough* violence at the beginning to deter its opponents, so opposition mounted and then more repression became necessary. Given the Marcos’ regime *laissez-faire* approach to the NPA, it is possible that this is the case. This does, however, raise several questions. First, were the 60,000 people imprisoned in the first flush of martial law truly an inadequate deterrent? Relatively low levels of opposition activity in the early years of martial law suggest that the regime did achieve deterrent power, which is at odds with this proposed explanation. Second, if the inadequacy of Marcos’ early “restraint” encouraged mobilization, then why did the coercive apparatus’ subsequent escalation of violence not have a

⁸⁴ Interview with a former detainee, Quezon City, November 2011.

deterrent effect later on, once it became clear that the regime was willing and able to kill to preserve power? As noted in the previous chapter, I suspect that the answer lies in the *indiscriminacy* of the violence meted out. Violence against the wrong people suggests that, in fact, punishment for opposition activity is uncertain; it actually weakens deterrent capacity and encourages people to mobilize. This brings us back to the important role that coercive institutional design plays in achieving the level of precision in violence necessary to send deterrent signals. The endogeneity of state violence, therefore, appears to rest at least partially on the design of coercive institutions. Without examining coercive institutional design, we cannot understand why violence rises or falls, against whom it is likely to be employed, and with what effects or probability of success.

CONCLUSION

The design of Marcos' coercive institutions best explains the escalation of state violence during his autocratic tenure. Designed to offset the threats that he perceived from elite rivals and his own military, Marcos' internal security institutions were fragmented and socially exclusive. Fragmentation encouraged these agencies to outbid each other in the execution of violence to reap professional rewards, and discouraged them from sharing information that might have improved their intelligence capacity and enabled them to engage in more discriminate, pre-emptive repression. The social exclusivity of the coercive apparatus reinforced the dynamics of inter-agency competition, hampered the collection of intelligence on dissident activity (especially in rural areas), and lowered the inhibitions of coercive agents against violence directed at the social "out-group" that comprised broader Philippine society. Incentives therefore fostered excessive state violence, while intelligence problems eliminated any alternative. When tasked to deal with an ostensible popular threat – as all dictatorships must, and as Marcos claimed he was particularly impelled to do – the coercive apparatus was unable to deal with the population without resorting to brutality, violence, and intimidation. The design of Marcos' coercive institutions therefore not only sheds light on the rising levels of state violence against ordinary Filipinos from 1972 to 1986, but also helps explain who among the population was targeted by that violence, in what locations, and why that violence over time took on an increasingly brutal form.

Coercive institutions and repression in South Korea

The differences in the coercive apparatus under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan, described in Chapter 5, shaped the patterns of state violence that Korean society experienced during their different periods of rule. The structure and social composition of the coercive apparatus in these two cases help us understand both the within-country temporal trends in levels of state violence, which were the main focus of the chapters on state violence in Taiwan and the Philippines (Chapters 6 and 7), and how the Korean cases compare cross-nationally, to the cases in the previous two chapters. Moreover, coercive institutional design can also shed light on sub-national variations in the execution of state violence, including cross-unit variations in state violence executed by different parts of the coercive apparatus and regional variations in the distribution of protest repression.

To a much greater degree than either Taiwan or the Philippines, the presence of an external threat in South Korea limited the degree of coup-proofing present in the coercive apparatus, particularly the externally focused military. By cross-national comparative standards, therefore, state violence in South Korea was relatively low. The non-military parts of the internal security apparatus, however, had important differences under Park, compared to Chun, that help to explain why violence in the two regimes took on a somewhat different character. Park's more fragmented and regionally exclusive regime engaged in intra-apparatus violence as organizations attempted to counterbalance and investigate each other, resulting in the arrest and sentencing of a number of internal security personnel. It also engaged in disproportionately high repressive violence against protests in Chŏlla, compared to the rest of the country,

culminating in the Kwangju incident of May 1980. Chun Doo Hwan, on the other hand, had a unitary internal security apparatus but one that was divided in terms of exclusivity: somewhat more inclusive of Chölla at the top levels but entirely inclusive and representative in terms of its ground-level policing of protest. The difference in the social composition of Chun's riot police units helps explain several findings that are otherwise surprising and counterintuitive to scholars of Korea's authoritarian history: that in fact Chun seems to have been less violent on average in his non-protest repression than Park, that his repression of popular protest was usually less violent and less regionally biased, and that, despite these considerations, his use of repression ended up being far more reviled.

The first section of the chapter outlines the temporal and regional trends in state violence under Park and Chun, and explains how the characterization of repression presented here differs in important ways from extant scholarship. The second section focuses on the mechanisms that drove state violence under Park Chung Hee, including the violent suppression of the Kwangju Uprising – which it argues should be considered the by-product of Park's coercive institutional design, even though it formally took place during Chun's first months in office. The third section focuses on explaining patterns of state violence under Chun Doo Hwan. The penultimate section compares alternative explanations for state violence in Korea, concluding that the nature of the coercive apparatus is a more powerful explanation of the timing, location, and type of state violence under authoritarianism in South Korea than the commonly proposed alternatives.

CHARACTERIZING STATE VIOLENCE IN SOUTH KOREA

Characterizing the patterns of state violence in South Korea under Park Chung Hee (1972–79) and Chun Doo Hwan (1980–87) is more complicated than in Taiwan or the Philippines, since there is both temporal and sub-national spatial variation to the state violence observed. The following section outlines both kinds of variation.

Cross-national and temporal trends in state violence in South Korea

Despite the reputation of Korea's military dictatorships for brutality and repressiveness, South Korea executed comparatively few people for anti-regime activity under either Park Chung Hee or Chun Doo Hwan: so few that it does not make sense to chart executions or killings in graph

form as was done in the chapters on Taiwan and the Philippines. The crackdown on the Kwangju Uprising of May 1980 is the cause of the largest number of deaths by far, with estimates ranging from several hundred to as many as 2,000 killed.¹ As with the 2-28 Incident in Taiwan, the Kwangju Uprising in Korea has strongly shaped popular and academic intuitions about the nature of repression under authoritarianism. Like 2-28, however, Kwangju is also an exception in many ways to the overall pattern of state violence during South Korea's authoritarian period.

Outside of this incident, the relatively low number of people killed under South Korea's military dictatorships is signaled by the fact that writings on this period typically discuss particular cases or individuals who died: worker Chŏn T'ae-il and student Kim Sang-jin, who committed suicide to protest working conditions in 1970 (pre-Yushin) and Park's authoritarianism in 1975, respectively; the death sentence given to Chŏlla poet Kim Chi-ha for his poem "Five Bandits," later commuted to life imprisonment and then reduced to ten months;² and the eight men executed in the People's Revolutionary Party case in April 1975. In mid-1974, the *New York Times* reported that ninety-one people had been convicted of subversion charges, and fourteen sentenced to death, but a number of those sentences were subsequently converted to time in prison.³ In South Korea between 1981 and 1987, thirteen people were given death sentences under the NSL and twenty-eight were sentenced to life imprisonment: less than two executions per year.⁴ Another fifty-four individuals died during "re-education," bringing the average number of deaths to 9–10 per year.⁵ By contrast, during the high violence period on Taiwan, an average of 150 people a year were executed on political charges;

¹ Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*.

² Kim was re-arrested for writing another dissident poem in 1975 and remained in jail until 1980. See Sarah Kim, "Dissident Poet Cleared of Charges After 39 Years," *JoongAng Ilbo*, January 5, 2013.

³ Fox Butterfield, *New York Times*, July 19, 1974.

⁴ Park Won Soon (Pak Wŏn-sun), *Review of the National Security Law, Vol. 2: Historical Uses of the National Security Law [Kukka Poanbŏp Yŏngu]* (Seoul: Yŏksa Pip'yŏngsa, 1992), pp. 31, 36–37/박원순, 국가보안법연구 (서울: 역사비평사, 1992); Namhee Lee, *The Making of Minjung: Democracy and the Politics of Representation in South Korea* (Ithaca: Cornell, 2007), p. 82; Republic of Korea, National Intelligence Service, *Communication with the Past, Self-Reflection into the Future, Vol. 6, Schools and Espionage [Kwagŏwa Taehwa Mirae'ŭi Sŏngch'al]* (Seoul: National Intelligence Service, 2007), p. 433 / 대한민국 국정원, 과거와 대화 미래의 성찰 (서울: 국정원, 2007).

⁵ Lee suggests that 350 more people died "as a result of re-education," which would bring the average to 65 per year. Lee, *Making of Minjung*, pp. 46–47; cites Samch'ŏng Kyoyuktae In'gwon Undong Yŏnhap, *White Paper on the Reeducation Corps to Purify the Three Vices [Samch'ŏng Kyoyuktae Paeksŏ]* (Seoul: Hanaro, 2003, 2 vols.) / 삼청교육대 인권운동연합, 삼청교육대백서 (서울: 하나로, 2003).

during the high violence period in the Philippines, the combined annual number of extrajudicial killings and disappearances was around 550. These estimates make clear that – as lawyer Kim Sukjo acknowledged in an otherwise critical account of life under South Korea’s military rule – “political murder and ‘disappearances’ did not become staples of life under the Yushin regime as they have in other regimes of kindred spirit.”⁶

Figure 8.1 shows the number of people arrested (검거, kǒmgǒ/檢舉) and indicted (기소, kiso/起訴) each year for violations of the National Security Law and the Anti-Communist Law – the major political control laws used to target dissidents between 1972 and 1986. With the exception of 1979, 100 percent of the people arrested were subsequently indicted under Park’s tenure. This reflects the legal process used to charge dissidents and communist sympathizers in Korea, in which someone could be taken into custody but not formally “arrested” until the prosecutor confirmed the charges against them. The KCIA’s oversight over the prosecutor’s office essentially ensured that arrests would be successfully converted into indictments.⁷

During South Korea’s military-authoritarian period, state violence as measured by indictments (mid-level intensity) did not display either the obvious drop that characterized Taiwan or the obvious rise that characterized the Philippines. Instead, it remained at a relatively constant level. Under Park Chung Hee, indictments averaged around 405 people per year: 101 per year under the NSL and 304 per year under the ACL. Under Chun Doo Hwan, arrests averaged around 221 per year and the average number of indictments per year was approximately 190.⁸ (Separate reporting in an official history of the National Intelligence Service suggests that Chun similarly convicted fewer South Korean residents of espionage; there were a total of 136 cases between 1972 and 1979, but only 66 from 1980 to 1987.⁹) This oscillation of state violence within

⁶ Kim, “Politics of Transition: South Korea After Park,” p. 23.

⁷ Small gaps emerged between arrest and indictment under Chun. Lee Jung-soo, “The Characteristics of the Korean Prosecution System and the Prosecutor’s Direct Investigation,” *Annual Report of the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders* (Japan: UNAFEI, 1997); Lee Jung-soo, *The Relationship of the Prosecution with the Police and Investigative Responsibility*, report for the United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders (Japan: UNAFEI, 1997); Kim, “Effective System.”

⁸ Paul Chang reaches similar conclusions about the period 1970–1979: 1,229 NSL violations (average 123 per year) and 3,082 ACL violations (308 per year), for an overall average of 431 per year. Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, ch. 2.

⁹ National Intelligence Service, *Communication with the Past*, Vol. 6, pp. 263–69.




FIGURE 8.1. Individuals indicted for political crimes in South Korea, 1972–86

Source: The figure shows a combination of NSL and ACL indictments from 1972–1979, and NSL indictments after the two statutes were combined in 1980. Park, *Review of the National Security Law*, pp. 31, 37; National Human Rights Committee, *Situation of Human Rights from the Application of the National Security Law* (2003), pp. 24, 30, 70 / 국가인권위원회, 국가 보안법 적용상에서 나타난 인권 실태 (2003).

a relatively low but consistent band may well be attributable to the constant presence of a high external threat and the institutional stability that it induced in the largest part of the coercive apparatus: the ROK military.

There are, however, several important areas in which these data are incomplete. First, at the lower levels of intensity, large numbers of protestors and activists under both Park and Chun experienced something that we might normally think of as “arrest,” but which was not given that term in the legal parlance of the time. In South Korea, an individual could be taken into custody and held at a police station for several days before the prosecutor decided charges and an “arrest” and “indictment” were formally recorded. The statistics in Figure 8.1 do not capture the individuals who experienced that kind of *de facto* short-term arrest, many of whom were also tortured (or “knocked about,” as one interviewee phrased it) during this temporary confinement.

Second, the above data do not capture some individuals imprisoned under Chun Doo Hwan, because statistics from this period count some political arrests and indictments as regular criminal violations. For example, the social purification campaign (삼청교육대, *Samch’ŏng Kyoyuktae*) mounted by the Chun regime in 1980–81 led to the warrantless arrest of 60,755 people, of whom 3,252 were remanded to military court, 39,742 were sent to Samch’ŏng Re-education Camp in Kangwŏn province, and 17,761 were dismissed after short-term education or physical labor.¹⁰ The

¹⁰ “South Korean Junta Punished Civilians With Military Camp in Early 1980s: Report,”

campaign was justified as a crackdown against criminals and gangsters, rather than against political activists, but investigations later found that around 40 percent of those detained at Samch'ŏng had no previous criminal record, suggesting that allegations of gangsterism were sometimes cover for targeting dissidents. The organizers of the Kwangju protests, for example, were reportedly included, which is why, in official statistics, 1980 is a low year for NSL indictments.¹¹ The Samch'ŏng case represents a broader strategy employed by the Chun regime, in which protestors and dissidents were charged under general criminal laws (such as laws against disrupting traffic or interfering with police investigation) whenever possible, to avoid invoking the more controversial NSL and ACL framework.¹² The most common law used to target dissidents under Chun was the Act Concerning Assembly and Demonstration, which prohibited gatherings that undermined public order and safety.¹³ Because of this conflation of political and criminal charges, clarification of the scope of state violence at the middle level of intensity (indictment or imprisonment), beyond Figure 8.1's tally of NSL and ACL violations, does not appear to be possible.

Based on what *is* known about the data generation and measurement process, however, we can safely conclude the following. First, the data recorded at the time and used here understate the scope of low-intensity violence, as measured by arrests, throughout Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan's regimes. This, however, is an issue that also appears in the Taiwan and Philippines data used in previous chapters. Throughout the manuscript, estimates of the scope of state violence are simply less precise at the lower bounds of intensity, and cross-case comparison becomes more reliable at higher levels of intensity of state violence. Second, confidence in

Hankyoreh/Yonhap, November 11, 2006, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/171123.html; Lee, *Making of Minjung*, pp. 46–47; Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, pp. 35, 46; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 379; George Ogle, *South Korea: Dissent Within the Economic Miracle* (Atlantic Highlands: Zed Books, 1990), p. 55; Samch'ŏng Kyoyuktae, *White Paper on the Reeducation Corps to Purify the Three Vices*.

¹¹ Lee, *Making of Minjung*, pp. 46–47; Samch'ŏng Kyoyuktae, *White Paper on the Reeducation Corps to Purify the Three Vices*.

¹² Interviews with two former activists who had experience with these laws, Seoul, May 2014.

¹³ There were 6,701 pre-arrest investigations into violations of this Act under Chun, but the results in terms of indictment numbers, and the percentage of these that were political rather than criminal in nature, is unknown. Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, *South Korea: A Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress, June 1990), pp. 308–10.

estimates of high-intensity state violence, measured by executions or other wrongful deaths, is much higher. Data reliability is only a potential problem for cross-case comparability in the third and final category: middle-intensity violence, measured by indictments and imprisonments. Figure 8.1 understates the scope of this level of violence at the beginning of Chun's tenure by excluding Samch'ŏng, and probably understates it to a smaller degree throughout his tenure.

Spatial variations in state violence

The theory advanced in Chapter 2 suggests that variations in the regional exclusivity of Korea's coercive apparatus should produce variations in the level of state violence, and that that violence should be disproportionately targeted against excluded populations. In the South Korean cases, this means that a Kyŏngsang-heavy coercive apparatus that excludes people from Chŏlla should be more likely to use violence against Chŏlla, and less likely to use violence against the population in Kyŏngsang. In terms of *protest policing*, we should also expect to see a clear difference in regional patterns of violence under Park compared to Chun. Unlike under Park, protest policing under Chun was carried out by conscript-based, inclusive riot police units, some of whose personnel were assigned to their home regions. We should therefore expect protest policing under Chun to be less violent on average, as well as less regionally biased. This expectation runs counter to the general assumption in studies of Korean democratization that Chun was particularly repressive against Chŏlla – a claim often accepted *prima facie* on the basis of the Kwangju example and consistent with typical threat-based arguments about repression.

Figure 8.2 shows regional variations in violent regime response to protest: the percentage of protests that produced a violent response by the coercive apparatus, out of the total number of protest events that occurred.¹⁴ It is calculated from an original dataset on protest

¹⁴ The dataset codes two types of repression: violent if it involves an act of physical force by the state, and non-violent if it does not. Non-violent repressive responses therefore include censorship, restriction of civil liberties, imposition of curfew, etc. Figure 8.2 illustrates the likelihood of *violent* response, conditional on a protest occurring; the same pattern holds, though not as strongly, for the likelihood of repressive response that is either violent or non-violent. In a separate study using the same primary sources, Chang and Vitale code "repressive coverage," which measures the percentage of protests at which the police or coercive apparatus simply showed up. They find that repressive coverage ranged from ~25 percent in 1972 to a maximum of ~52 percent in 1978: in




FIGURE 8.2. Probability of violent state response to protest, by region

and repression events in South Korea during the 1970s and 1980s that was developed from sourcebooks compiled by the Korea Democracy Foundation.¹⁵

other words, that even at its most repressive, the coercive apparatus only appeared at around half of protest events – a finding that is logically consistent with Figure 8.2. Paul Y. Chang and Alex S. Vitale, “Repressive Coverage in an Authoritarian Context: Threat, Weakness, and Legitimacy in South Korea’s Democracy Movement,” *Mobilization*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (2013), pp. 489–511.

¹⁵ Korea Democracy Foundation [KDF], *KDF Sourcebook on Events [Minjuhua Undong Kwallyŏn Sagŏn Sajŏn]* (Seoul: KDF, 2004) / 민주화운동기념사업회 연구소, 민주화운동 관련 사건 사전 (서울: KDF, 2004); KDF, *Chronology of Korean Democratization Movement [Hanguk Minjuhua Undongsa Yŏnp’yo]* (Seoul: KDF, 2006) / 민주화운동기념사업회 연구소, 한국민주화운동사 연표 (서울: KDF, 2006); KDF, *History of Korea’s Democratization Movement [Hanguk Minjuhua Undongsa]* (Seoul: 2008–2010, 3 vols.) / 민주화운동기념사업회 한국민주주의 연구소, 한국민주화운동사 (서울: KDF, 2008–2010, 3 vols.); Gaudim et Spes Pastoral Institute, *Torch in the Dark: Witness Reports of the Democratization Movement in 1970s and 1980s [Ambŭksogŭi Hwaetpul: Ch’ilp’alsip Nyŏndae Minjuhua Undongŭi Chŭngŏn]* (Seoul, 1996–2001, 8 vols.) / 기쁨과 희망 사목연구원, 암흑속의 횃불: 7,80년대 민주화 운동의 증언 (서울, 1996–2001). The Stanford Korea Democracy Project has used the same data sources to create a separate dataset, not yet publicly available. For information, see Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, Appendices 1–2.

Conditional on a protest occurring, Chun was less likely to respond violently than Park, across all regions – a finding that, while consistent with the indictment statistics above, is at odds with popular perception of the two dictators. Also conditional on the occurrence of a protest, Park was disproportionately more likely to respond to protest with violence against rival region Chŏlla (37 percent probability of violent repression) than he was if a protest occurred in either his home region of Kyŏngsang or the rest of the country (around 25–26 percent probability). Chun, on the other hand, was actually slightly *less* likely to respond repressively to protests occurring in Chŏlla (4 percent probability) as compared to those that occurred in Kyŏngsang (9 percent) or the rest of the country (13 percent).

A note on state violence under Syngman Rhee

As noted in Chapter 5, the semi-autocratic rule of President Syngman Rhee is outside the scope of this book. It is worth noting, however, that the patterns of state violence under Rhee's tenure – while undoubtedly confounded by high levels of civil conflict – occur in ways and as a result of mechanisms consistent with the theory in Chapter 2. Syngman Rhee's fragmented and exclusive coercive apparatus limited intelligence in ways that led policymakers to overestimate threats and escalate violence, and fostered violent competition between security agencies.

Violence under Rhee was generally high, indiscriminate, and carried out by special units that were most subject to Rhee's manipulations. The indiscriminacy of violence is suggested by the fact that in December 1949 almost 90,000 people were arrested on political grounds, but over a third of them were later released. The number of people in prison for political charges around that time reached 30,000.¹⁶ South Korean forces were accused of "white terror" killings of civilians suspected as communists or sympathizers, including an estimated 30,000 on Cheju island alone in 1948–49; during the Korean War, the KNP was so heavy-handed in supposed Communist areas that U.S. commanders recommended that its forces not be allowed to operate north of the DMZ.¹⁷

¹⁶ Central Intelligence Agency, "Review of the World Situation," December 16, 1948, Box 205, NSC File, PSF, Truman Library, Independence, MO; Central Intelligence Agency, "Communist Capabilities in South Korea," February 21, 1949, Box 257, Truman Library; U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, December 12, 1947; U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, December 12, 1949. See also Henderson, *Korea*, p. 163; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 282.

¹⁷ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 281; Suh Hee-kyung, "Atrocities Before and During the Korean War: Mass Civilian Killings by South Korean and U.S. Forces," *Critical Asian*

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Korea later estimated that at least 100,000 civilians were killed in one summer; many of them were members of the 300,000-strong National Guidance League (국민보도연맹, *Kungmin Podo Yŏnmaeng*), an organization that had been set up the previous year to rehabilitate leftists.¹⁸

Both exclusivity and fragmentation contributed to violence under Syngman Rhee's tenure. The social distance between the Japanese-trained, rightist police and ordinary civilians contributed to distrust, fear, and military-like siege conditions; police boxes were fortified like military outposts and barricaded from interaction with civilians.¹⁹ As a result, intelligence was poor; the KNP struggled to distinguish between civilians and combatants or subversives. A visiting correspondent described violence during wartime as "the blotting out of villages where the enemy *may* be hiding, the shooting and shelling of refugees who *may* include North Koreans ... or who *may* be screening an enemy march up on our positions."²⁰ At an elite level, moreover, reliance on an exclusive group decreased the quality of intelligence available to Rhee; his wife and his aide "strictly controlled and limited the matters brought to Rhee's attention, removing those which might excite or disturb him."²¹ Opposition leaders noted that Rhee lacked full awareness of the problems his regime faced and how its policies were implemented; American reports described him as "isolated from the uncontrolled outside information needed for effective leadership," and subject to the information presented by subordinates whose views were skewed by parochial and personal interest.²² Exclusivity therefore made Rhee susceptible to threat inflation and unaware of excessive repression carried out by his own forces – as when he

Studies, Vol. 42, No. 4 (2010), pp. 553–88; Kim Dong-choon, "The Long Road Toward Truth and Reconciliation," p. 531; Sheila Miyoshi Jager, *Brothers at War: The Unending Conflict in Korea* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2014), pp. 52–53; Allan R. Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945–50*, p. 303; James Hausman, "Notecards for a Speech on the Early Days of the Korean Constabulary," Hausman Papers, Yenching Library, Harvard University.

¹⁸ Kim Dong-choon, *War and Society [Chŏnjaenggwa Sahoe]* (Seoul: Tolpaegae, 2000) / 김동춘, *전쟁과 사회* (서울: 돌베개, 2000); 2007 *Report on Excavations* (Seoul, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2007).

¹⁹ U.S. Department of State, "Report of Vice Consuls John Rozier and Donald MacDonald," Seoul to Washington, March 17, 1949.

²⁰ *Time*, August 21, 1950.

²¹ Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, p. 125.

²² Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, p. 125; U.S. State Department, "Democrats Look to 1960," December 1, 1958; U.S. State Department, "The Republic of Korea: Present Situation and Outlook," February 6, 1958.

complained (incorrectly) that the opposition had been infiltrated by communists and did not realize that his security forces had locked legislators in a basement to secure passage of a much-criticized National Security Law amendment.²³

Fragmentation and the use of competing security forces similarly contributed to state violence under Rhee. The National Assembly responded to the fact that the KNP became known in the 1950s as “the political tool of the president” responsible for unjust and indiscriminate repression by establishing its own police force (the Special Police), which engaged in “institutional warfare” with the KNP in 1948–49; at one point, this feuding resulted in Rhee’s using the KNP to jail not only members of the Special Police, but 7 percent of the National Assembly.²⁴ In summer 1952, facing the threat of impeachment, Rhee declared martial law, arrested some forty-five legislators, and tried Army Chief of Staff General Yi Chong’an – who refused to divert combat divisions from the war to support Rhee’s actions – and seven other military officers for “Communist conspiracy.”²⁵ Beyond this executive-legislature fragmentation, both the JPMC under Lieutenant General Wŏn Yong-dŏk (원용덕) and the CIC under Major General Kim Ch’ang-nyong (김창룡) were routinely used to intimidate, arrest, and eliminate political opponents. Rivalry between the two organizations escalated violence between these forces as well; after Kim was assassinated in January 1956, one of the first people arrested on suspicion of the murder was the commander of General Wŏn’s unit.²⁶

²³ U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, all 1959: January 14 and 19, February 3, March 6, May 3 and 8; Dowling’s report on December 27, 1958, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–60*, Vol. 18, pp. 523–35. See also Park, *The National Security Law*; Hong, *State Security and Regime Security*, pp. 126–27; Han, *Failure of Democracy in South Korea*, p. 45; Park Chi-Young, *Political Opposition in Korea 1945–60* (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1980), pp. 153–75.

²⁴ Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, p. 20; Henderson, *Korea*, pp. 165–66, 173, 256–57; Kim Cheel-sung (Kim Ch’ilsŏng), “Study on the Decentralization of Korea National Police System,” (in Korean with title/abstract in English) [“Hanguk Kyŏngch’alŭi Pungwŏnhwa’e Taehan Yŏngu”], PhD dissertation, Kyungnam University, 2008 / 김철성, 韓國警察의 分權化에 관한 研究, 경남대학교 박사학위논문, 2008.

²⁵ Apparently, Yi offered to oust Rhee in a coup, and American officials seriously considered his offer. Henderson, *Korea*, p. 167; Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 29; “Lightner to Office of Northeast Asian Affairs,” June 5, 1952, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–54*, Vol. 15, pp. 305–08.

²⁶ U.S. State Department, “Report on the Counter-Subversive Capacity of the Republic of Korea,” *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–57*, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 74–75; see also Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, pp. 72–74; U.S. State Department, “Situation and Short-Term Prospects of the Republic of Korea,” November 21, 1957.

Rhee's case, therefore, provides suggestive (though not conclusive) evidence that the arguments of this book apply to semi-autocratic regimes as well as those that are fully authoritarian.

STATE VIOLENCE UNDER PARK CHUNG HEE

An examination of state violence under Park Chung Hee shows a pattern of repression consistent with the arguments made in Chapter 2. Generally speaking, Park Chung Hee's autocratic rule (1972–79) was fairly targeted and specific in its use of violence against the population.²⁷ Rough handling of protest was common, as were short-term arrests, but more intense forms of violence like long-term imprisonment were reserved for several hundred individuals at any given point in time, usually the leaders of student or Christian movements or opposition politicians. Institutional fragmentation produced violence within the security apparatus, as different organizations competed against and attacked each other to show their credibility and importance to Park's security, while the deepening regional exclusivity of the coercive apparatus led to higher repression of protests in the Chŏlla region, culminating in the crackdown in Kwangju in 1980.

Under the Yushin regime, the declaration of a particular Emergency Measure was usually accompanied by a mass arrest, the scale of which ranged from a dozen or so individuals to just over one thousand for EM#4 in 1974. Table 8.1 summarizes the arrest, sentencing, and imprisonment patterns that surrounded various Emergency Measures.

In April 1974, Park's regime declared Emergency Measure #4, which made student political organizing illegal, and launched a crackdown against student activism, particularly targeting the National Democratic Youth-Student League (민청학련, Minch'ŏnghangnyŏn). Over 1,000

²⁷ Because of its short duration, I do not examine the 1961–63 period of military rule, which was characterized by a high number of arrests, purges, and trials. In mid-May 1961, the junta closed the National Assembly and several papers; banned political activity; instituted a curfew; and purged or mandated the retirement of thousands of members of the civil service and military. It subsequently arrested over 2,000 politicians and, by March 1962, had banned over 4,300 from engaging in political activity, though many were cleared to participate again by February 1963. Nearly 14,000 people were arrested as "hooligans," and military courts handled increasing numbers of criminal cases: 10,080 in 1960; 22,195 in 1961; 35,044 in 1962. Henderson, *Korea*, pp. 183–84; Stephen Bradner, "The Student Movement in the Korean Election Crisis of 1960," MA thesis, Harvard University, 1963; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, pp. 347–51; Jang-jip Choi, *Labor and the Authoritarian State* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1990); Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*.

TABLE 8.1. *State violence linked to Emergency Decrees in South Korea^a*

Decree	Date	Accompanying state violence
Garrison EM #1-2	Oct. 1971 Jan. 1974	~2,000 arrested ~6 opposition leaders detained 20+ more accompanied by police or under house arrest ^b
EM #4	Apr. 1974	1,024 students taken into custody 253 sent to Emergency Martial Court; 180 convicted/sentenced, most to 3-20 years ^c
	Apr. 1975	People's Revolutionary Party case (8 executed)
	Jul. 1977	14-50 political prisoners have sentences suspended Estimated 100+ remain in jail ^d
EM #7	Apr. 1975	~200 students arrested/tortured ^e
EM #9	May 1975	18 ("Myöngdong 18") imprisoned; 15 sentenced to 3-5 years solitary confinement; 3 receive suspended sentences
	Dec. 1977	"Myöngdong 18" sentences (except Kim Dae Jung) suspended ^f
Other	Apr. 1977	45 dissidents arrested; 18 released shortly after ^g
	Nov.-Dec. 1977	31 students arrested for demonstrating ^h

^a Shin *et al.*, *Korea's Democracy Movement*, pp. 88-90; Oh, "A Study of the Dynamics," pp. 227-28; Zbigniew Brzezinski, "Memorandum for the President: Emergency Measure 9," White House, August 10, 1978.

^b Fox Butterfield, *New York Times*, January 13, 1974.

^c Yi Chaeyo (I Jae-o), *History of Korean Student Movement 1945-79* [*Hanguk Haksaeung Undongsä 1945-79*] (Seoul: Parak Puksu, 2011), pp. 274-75 / 이재오, 한국학생운동사 (서울: 파라북스, 2011); Richard Halloran, *New York Times*, April 4, 1974; Fox Butterfield, *New York Times*, August 9, 1974; *New York Times*, August 14, 1974; November 12, 1974.

^d "Seoul Frees 14 Dissidents in Move Seen Easing Tight Political Rule," *Washington Post*, July 18, 1977.

^e John Saar, "S. Korea Framed Espionage Case, Park's Critics Charge," *Washington Post*, June 30, 1977.

^f Fay Willey, "Rights and Wrongs," *Newsweek*, June 20, 1977, p. 61; *Associated Press*, December 31, 1977.

^g *Associated Press*, July 18, 1977.

^h *Associated Press*, December 7, 1977.

students were temporarily detained; five prominent Koreans, including the Catholic bishop and former President Yun Posun (윤보선), were eventually also arrested for supporting the student movement.²⁸ The crackdown lasted until late August, when the Park regime finished its trials and repealed EMs #1 and #4; by that time, around 200 people had been sentenced to prison terms ranging from 3 to 20 years. Although the trials earned the regime international criticism – in July 1974, Amnesty International testified to Congress that an estimated 1,100 political prisoners were being held in South Korea for political crimes including subversion – the regime's response was simply to expedite the trials it deemed necessary, so that it could publicly repeal the law as soon as the targeted individuals had been sentenced.²⁹ In 1976, a group of eighteen Christian and opposition leaders (the Myöngdong 18) were arrested under EM #9; most were sentenced to three to five years' imprisonment.³⁰ The government's process in arresting and charging these individuals, and its response to international pressure, suggests that it had a fairly discriminate process by which it targeted the dissidents it considered a true threat.

These targets tended to be a small percentage of protestors. Most of those actually arrested, imprisoned, and charged were leaders of opposition movements, rather than the rank-and-file, and many of their sentences were reduced in the late 1970s under a staged amnesty program.³¹ In student protests, a fairly typical pattern was for several hundred protestors to confront several hundred policemen, for 12–25 students to subsequently be arrested, and for a smaller number still, if any, to actually be charged.³² In 1977, the regime also began an amnesty program for the release of political prisoners. After an initial release of 47 political prisoners in 1977, the Justice Ministry announced in 1978 that over 5,000 people in total, including Kim Dae Jung and 106 other dissidents, would be released. Opposition and media estimates of the remaining number of political prisoners varied between 100 and 300 individuals;

²⁸ Yi Chaeyo (I Jae-o), *History of Korean Student Movement 1945–79* [*Hanguk Haksaeung Undongsa 1945–79*] (Seoul: Para Puksu, 2011), pp. 274–75 / 이재오, *한국학생운동사* (서울: 파라북스, 2011); Richard Halloran, *New York Times*, April 4, 1974; Fox Butterfield, *New York Times*, August 9, 1974; *New York Times*, August 14, 1974; November 12, 1974.

²⁹ Bernard Gwertzman, *New York Times*, July 31, 1974.

³⁰ Fay Willey, "Rights and Wrongs: Dissenters as Outlaws," *Newsweek*, June 20, 1977, p. 61.

³¹ Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, esp. Ch. 3.

³² See reports by the Associated Press on student protests at Seoul National University and Korea University, May 8, 1978; September 13, 1978; September 14, 1978.

Kim claimed at the time of President Carter's visit in 1979 that he could provide a list of 338 political prisoners who remained in jail and an additional 45 who were under house arrest.³³ To gain release, most had to sign a statement of repentance and agree not to engage in continued activism or criticism of the regime. Their sentences were generally suspended, rather than commuted, meaning that violation of these terms would subject them to the risk of re-arrest.

Fragmentation and violence

Fragmentation and inter-agency competition contributed to state violence during Park Chung Hee's Yushin regime. Most often, however, the violence that resulted from fragmentation was internal to the coercive apparatus, directed at one agency by members of another.

This dynamic occurred both in the brief period of military rule from 1961 to 1963 and again during the 1970s. First, during the 1961–63 period, the process by which the KCIA established its initial dominance over other internal security and intelligence agencies was remarkably similar to that of Taiwan, in terms of both process and effects on the patterns of violence. The struggle for inter-agency superiority created a short period of intra-apparatus violence followed by a post-consolidation decrease. State Department officials reported of this period that the main danger was “internal factional struggle for a control too tightly exercised by the KCIA.”³⁴ Among the KCIA's first tasks was a loyalty review of all major political and government figures, after which it reported that 1,863 of the 41,000 people screened were found to have committed some offense. The KCIA claimed to have uncovered at least thirteen “anti-revolutionary” cases between June 1961 and May 1963, and around 17,000 members of the civil service and military were retired or purged.³⁵

As in Taiwan, two of the most notable early cases of inter-agency competition and counter-accusation eliminated potential rivals to Park and Kim Jong-pil. The first casualty of this struggle was Lieutenant General Chang Do-yŏng (장도영), the original chairman of the SCNR, who, with forty-five “co-conspirators,” was implicated in an alleged

³³ *Associated Press*, December 31, 1977; William Chapman, “S. Korea to Free Key Dissidents in Broad Amnesty,” *Washington Post*, December 23, 1978, A1; Edith Lederer, *Associated Press*, June 26, 1979.

³⁴ Henderson, *Korea*, p. 185.

³⁵ Henderson, *Korea*, pp. 183–84.

plot to assassinate Park, and arrested on July 3, 1961.³⁶ The second case was that of Major General Kim Dong-ha (김동하), who had helped plan the 5-16 coup with Park Chung Hee and Kim Jong-pil. Kim Dong-ha's attempt to remove Kim Jong-pil from leadership of the Democratic Republican Party culminated in his own court martial and Kim Jong-pil's resignation to take a multi-month trip overseas. As these senior officials' networks were investigated over the course of 1960-63, additional senior military officers were purged or retired, and the "penalties for those dropped became decidedly more extreme; imprisonment and even torture were visited on many who were dropped from high posts."³⁷ The purges led to a short-term spike in NSL indictments in 1961-63.³⁸ Thereafter, however, the number of indictments decreased as internal competition for power diminished and the KCIA's coordinating authority took effect.

Second, as Park's distrust of elites mounted during the 1970s, his attention focused increasingly on monitoring his own military-security apparatus. Unlike Rhee, who had used a "fire alarm" strategy of controlling his agents, Park – a former intelligence official – used a "police patrol" strategy of routine information-gathering, holding monthly meetings and visiting various sites and units to dispense "on-the-spot guidance."³⁹ When he died, officials found that Park's private safe was full of meticulous, handwritten notes on various officials, organized and indexed according to his own particular scheme, which had been used to monitor the loyalty and activities of officials throughout his regime.⁴⁰ To obtain this information, agencies within the coercive apparatus were increasingly tasked with monitoring other agencies that had similar or overlapping internal security duties. The Army Security Command, whose director reported to Park in writing on a daily basis, was ostensibly the main agency in charge of monitoring the loyalty of the military, but in practice several security and intelligence agencies tracked

³⁶ Henderson hypothesizes that members of the Fifth KMA Class who had participated in the coup became nervous about the ascendance of Kim Jong-pil's Eighth KMA Class in post-coup Korea and approached Chang to convey their concerns; Chang paid a steep price for listening. Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, p. x; Henderson, *Korea*, p. 267.

³⁷ Henderson, *Korea*, p. 239; Kim, *Politics of Military Revolution*, p. x.

³⁸ Park, *Review of the National Security Law*, p. 31.

³⁹ Kang, *Crony Capitalism*, pp. 72-73; Matthew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, "Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 28 (1984), pp. 165-79.

⁴⁰ Park's former chief of staff Kim Chung Yum, cited in Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, pp. 32, 35.

relationships among both active and retired officers to detect and prevent coalescence of an opposition bloc.⁴¹

These overlapping responsibilities created professional incentives for agencies to find each other guilty of some wrongdoing or disloyalty, especially as Park began to use agencies to engage in competition and violence against each other in ways that he had previously avoided and even publicly cautioned against. To do so, he employed the “political” units of the coercive apparatus, tasked with internal security rather than external defense, which lay outside the U.S.-dominated Combined Forces Command and “hence were available for Park’s mobilization without consultation with the United States.”⁴² Unsurprisingly, the rivalries described in Chapter 5 resulted in intra-apparatus purges and violence. In early 1973, KCIA Director Lee Hu-rak – best known to Americans for brokering the 1972 agreement between North and South Korea, and for the KCIA’s 1973 kidnapping of Kim Dae Jung – accused Capitol Garrison Command’s Yun P’il-yong of leading a coup plot among Hanahoe faction members. Park appointed Kang Ch’ang-sŏng, head of the rival Army Security Command, to conduct the investigation into Yun and the CGC.⁴³ Yun and nine other officers were sentenced for corruption as a result of the ASC’s investigation, and he and three additional generals received maximum sentences of fifteen years in prison. In total, 200 officers were forced to resign and received some kind of punishment.⁴⁴

Historical evidence also suggests that officials in the KCIA saw rivalry with other agencies as a motivating factor in the 1974–75 People’s Revolutionary Party (PRP, 인혁당, *Inhyŏktang*) case, which produced eight of the executions conducted during the Yushin period.⁴⁵ The case, which grew from the mass arrest of students following the declaration of EM #4, resulted in the arrest of senior leaders in the democracy movement in July 1974 and, in April 1975, culminated in the sentencing of fifteen individuals to fifteen years in jail and the execution of an additional eight men. Much of the evidence presented at trial was based on confessions extracted under torture. Two high-level KCIA figures

⁴¹ Oh, “A Study of the Dynamics,” p. 121; Jun, “South Korea,” p. 128.

⁴² Kim, “The Armed Forces,” pp. 183–84.

⁴³ Kim, “The Politics of Transition,” p. 6; Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*; Aidan Foster-Carter, “Hitting Below the Belt: Pyongyang Spills the Beans on Secret Summit Talks,” July 8, 2011, <http://38north.org/2011/07/aidanfc070811/>.

⁴⁴ Kim, “The Armed Forces,” pp. 183–84; Jun, “South Korea,” pp. 137, 507.

⁴⁵ Chang, *Protest Dialectics*, Ch. 3; Jim Stentzel, *More Than Witnesses: How A Small Group of Missionaries Aided Korea’s Democratic Revolution* (Seoul: Korea Democracy Foundation, 2006).

responsible for the investigation and prosecution of the PRP case were Sin Jik-su (신직수) and Yi Yong-t'aek (이용택), each of whom had been involved in a failed attempt to prosecute an earlier PRP case in 1964. At that time, officials from the Prosecutor's Office and from the Ministry of Welfare and Security (공안부, *Konganbu*) threatened to resign en masse to protest the KCIA's attempts to pressure them into an indictment for which they believed there to be no evidence. Sin and Yi, it is suggested, saw the 1974–75 PRP case as a chance to revenge themselves against the colleagues elsewhere in the coercive apparatus who had blocked them. In 2002, a Seoul court formally determined that the case had been fabricated, and exonerated the eight executed men; in 2007, the government was ordered to pay around US\$65 million in compensation to their families.⁴⁶

The growing sense of rivalry among Park's security agencies, and particularly between the KCIA and the PSS in the latter half of the 1970s, contributed not only to purges and violence within the coercive apparatus, but also to the incident that cost Park his own life. Chapter 5 documented that by the mid-1970s, after the assassination attempt on Park that killed Yuk Yŏng-su and the Koreagate scandal that shook his relationship with the United States, the duties of the KCIA began increasingly to overlap with – and its authority to be threatened by – the growing power of the Presidential Security Service under Ch'a Ji-ch'ŏl. On October 26, 1979, KCIA Director Kim Jae-gyu assassinated both Park and PSS Director Ch'a over dinner at a KCIA facility on the Blue House grounds. The shooting followed the "YH Company" labor dispute of August 1979 and an internal disagreement over how to handle the protests that followed in Pusan and Masan.⁴⁷ Ch'a Ji-ch'ŏl, who came from Seoul, favored a hardline response to the Pu-Ma struggle. He is said to have suggested, "It wasn't a big deal to kill a few million in Cambodia. This is only 100,000 or 200,000; let's mow them down with tanks."⁴⁸ Park was apparently leaning toward violent suppression as well. Kim, who (like Park) came from the Kyŏngsang region where the protests were occurring, opposed

⁴⁶ The base award was US\$25 million, but interest payments, accrued since the time of execution, led to the total figure of ~US\$65 million. "Families of Eight Wrongfully Executed Political Prisoners Awarded Compensation," *Hankyoreh*, August 22, 2007, http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/230608.html.

⁴⁷ When South Kyŏngsang opposition leader Kim Young Sam declared his support for the workers in the struggle, Park expelled him from the National Assembly, triggering protests in Pusan and Masan as well as foreign and domestic criticism. Shin Gi-Wook, "Introduction," in Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, p. xiii.

⁴⁸ Chang, *Protest Dialectics*; see also www.sisaon.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=7700.

a crackdown and favored a more moderate response. Reportedly, when it became clear that Park was inclined toward Ch'a's hardline stance, Kim exclaimed, "How can you do politics with a worm like that by your side?" and shot both men.⁴⁹ Internal competition and violence, which had led to attacks on and the fall of key members of the security apparatus already, escalated at the end to include Ch'a Ji-ch'öl and Park himself – as well as Kim Jae-gyu, who was executed in May 1980 with five other co-conspirators.

Kwangju: the consequence of regional exclusivity

In May 1980, during the transition between the Park and Chun regimes, South Korea experienced widespread popular protest, particularly in the Chölla region and its capital city, Kwangju. Like the 2-28 Incident in Taiwan, the Kwangju Uprising and its suppression, which observers have called "Korea's Tiananmen," have become the subject of extensive popular commemoration, strongly shaping the memory of state violence in South Korea and largely defining Chun Doo Hwan's legacy.⁵⁰ Reinterpreting Kwangju in light of the arguments advanced in this book, however, suggests that the violence of the crackdown was significantly intensified by the regional exclusivity in the coercive apparatus that had accumulated under Park Chung Hee.

Popular protests mounted after Chun Doo Hwan took over as KCIA Director in April 1980. On May 17, the declaration of martial law placed Chun in control. He closed schools, banned political activities including labor strikes, dissolved the National Assembly, and arrested thousands of activists – among them Kim Dae Jung, Chölla's

⁴⁹ Brazinsky, *Nation-Building in South Korea*, p. 232.

⁵⁰ There is a National Commemoration Day, a foundation, a research institute, three different monument sites, multiple novels and films, at least one TV miniseries, and two multi-volume source collections. Yea, "Cultural Politics of Place," p. 123; Don Baker, "Victims and Heroes: Competing Visions of May 18th," in Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, pp. 87–107. Korean-language multi-volume source collections include Center for Research on Contemporary Korean History (Hanguk Hyöndaesa Saryo Yönguso), *A Comprehensive Collection of Historical Documents on the May People's Uprising [Kwangju Owöl Minjung Hangaeng Saryo Chönjip]* (Seoul: P'ulbit, 1990) / 한국현대사 자료연구소, 광주 오월 민중항쟁 사료전집, (서울: 풀빛, 1990). Other references translate this as Korean Modern Historical Materials Research Institute, *Complete Collection of the Historical Record of the Kwangju May People's Uprising*. See also City of Kwangju, *General Collection of Documents of the Kwangju Democratization Movement [5-18 Minjuhwa Undong Charyo Ch'ongsö]* (Kwangju: Saryo P'yönh'an Wiwönhoe, 1997) / 광주시, 민주화운동자료총서 (광주: 5-18 사료편찬위원회, 1997).

most prominent political leader and one of Chun's principal political opponents.⁵¹ American observers attributed the intensity of protest in Chŏlla, particularly Kwangju, to the Park regime's discrimination against the region and its attempt to make Kim Dae Jung a scapegoat for the unrest. Ambassador William Gleysteen reported, "Having their hero singled out by the military as the troublemaker tapped into a deep pool of resentment in Chŏlla, where people felt they had been treated as second-class citizens if not outcasts by the rival region of Kyŏngsang and the leadership in Seoul."⁵² As Figure 8.2 showed, public protests in Chŏlla had been subject to higher rates of violent repression throughout the Yushin period.

When a student protest on May 18, 1980, at Chŏnnam National University was violently suppressed, the people of Kwangju ejected soldiers and police from the city, setting up "Citizens Committees" to maintain order in their place.⁵³ Gleysteen called what was happening in Kwangju "a massive insurrection," adding, "[it is] out of control and poses an alarming situation for the ROK military."⁵⁴ On May 27, approximately 20,000 soldiers entered the city and forcibly subdued the uprising. In late May, South Korea's Martial Law Command announced that 170 people had died (144 civilians, 26 soldiers/policemen), and that an additional 380 had been wounded (127 civilians, 109 soldiers, and 144 policemen). Most contemporary estimates, however, place the total closer to 500 dead and 3,000 wounded, most of them on the civilian side.⁵⁵

Like the Uprising's origins, its suppression can be seen through a regional lens. In 1980, both Koreans and international observers believed that the troops used in suppression operations came from Chŏlla's rival region of Kyŏngsang. The paratroopers sent to Kwangju were under the command of Lieutenant General (eventual Army Chief of Staff) Chŏng Ho-yong (정호용), who came from Taegu in Kyŏngsang, and who had graduated with Chun in the KMA's Eleventh Class. His soldiers were under Special Warfare Command, part of Chun's power base; they had reportedly been told that the uprising was the work of North Korean

⁵¹ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 127; Eckert *et al.*, *Korea Old and New*, p. 374.

⁵² Quoted in Shin, "Introduction," in Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*.

⁵³ Also called the Citizens' Army, (시민군, *Simingun*). C. Kim, "Days and Nights on the Street," in Henry Scott-Stokes and Lee Jai-Eui, eds., *The Kwangju Uprising: Eyewitness Press Accounts of Korea's Tiananmen* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2000), pp. 8–9; Jong-chul Ahn, "The Citizens' Army During the Kwangju Uprising," in Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, p. 13.

⁵⁴ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 128.

⁵⁵ Shin, "Introduction," in Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, p. xvii.

instigators.⁵⁶ Accounts by Western missionaries who were working in Kwangju at that time report that suppression units spoke in a Kyöngsang accent about killing “no-good Chölla rascals.”⁵⁷ The American embassy, too, accepted a regional interpretation of the violence, reporting rumors that “Special Forces employed in Kwangju are from the area’s traditional rival Kyöngsang.”⁵⁸ They added that police and military severity occurred not only because of “the spirit of the challenge, but possibly because that was how they felt they should treat Chölla people.”⁵⁹

The regime’s response to the Kwangju crisis confirms that it saw regional factors strongly at work – and specifically, that it believed that regional exclusivity in the coercive apparatus contributed to higher violence. A U.S. Defense Department report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that Chun’s regime was specifically identifying Chölla-born officers within the ROK military and ordering them to Kwangju to do riot control, even at the cost of removing them from the frontlines of the De-Militarized Zone. The rationale, the report indicated, was “that these officers will have more success in quelling the demonstrations that [sic] others due to their provincial ties, knowledge and accents.” The report also commented that these orders were “meeting with some limited resistance but were for the most part being grudgingly obeyed.”⁶⁰ Officers from Chölla, the authorities believed, would have the local intelligence and the social incentives to calm the situation without the excessive violence that the Kyöngsang troops had employed.

In the medium-term aftermath of the crisis, as well, the Korean military and the Chun regime attempted to increase the inclusion of leaders of Chölla origin in the coercive apparatus so as not to let regionalism damage military cohesion. The regime feared that these officers’ loyalties might

⁵⁶ Though most elites now see the crackdown as unnecessary, some senior ROK military officials still argue that failing to crack down would have allowed North Korea to take advantage of the disorder. Author’s interview with a retired ROK general, Seoul, March 2011; Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, pp. 30–31; Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, p. 76; Department of Defense Intelligence Report, “ROK Special Warfare Command Locations and Key Personnel,” February 27, 1980; Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “ROKG Shifts SF Units,” May 8, 1980.

⁵⁷ Underwood, “An American Missionary’s View,” in Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, p. 28.

⁵⁸ U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, “Korea Sitrep,” May 20, 1980.

⁵⁹ Mobs in Kwangju apparently attacked Kyöngsang-owned industrial facilities in retaliation. U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, “Kwangju Riot and Future Political Stability,” May 21, 1980; U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, “Korea Sitrep,” May 21, 1980.

⁶⁰ Department of Defense, Report by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 21, 1980.

have become conflicted, or that they would now fear discrimination, and so military leaders made a conscious effort to reassure officers from the area.⁶¹ Major General So Jun-yŏl, a “respected Kwangju man,” was promoted and placed in command of the ROK Army Training Command, and a South Chŏlla native became the new provincial governor.⁶² By the mid-1980s, officers from Chŏlla had been appointed to head the Agency for National Security Planning (the KCIA’s successor), the Presidential Security Service, the Capital Defense Command, and the Defense Security Command. (No disciplinary action against the Kyŏngsang paratrooper unit, however, seems to have been taken – most likely, the embassy noted, because its commanding general was part of Chun’s “first echelon core group members.”⁶³) In September, Kim Dae Jung was sentenced to death for plotting the uprising; among the men arguing most forcefully – if ultimately unsuccessfully – for Kim’s execution was Chŏng Ho-yong, the Taegu commander of the Kwangju suppression forces.⁶⁴ Not surprisingly, the incident worsened regional tensions in South Korea, both in terms of popular sentiment and within the military.⁶⁵

STATE VIOLENCE UNDER CHUN DOO HWAN

While Park Chung Hee remains Korea’s most popular president, Chun Doo Hwan is widely reviled for being repressive and corrupt.⁶⁶ Historians have, thus far, expended much less ink on Chun’s tenure than Park’s – in part, one South Korean academic suggested, because no-one is willing

⁶¹ Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “The ROK Army in Perspective,” May 29, 1980; Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “ROKG Shifts SF Units,” May 8, 1980.

⁶² The KNP Director and provincial police chief were also replaced. U.S. Department of State, Seoul to Washington, “Korea Sitrep,” May 23, 1980.

⁶³ Department of Defense, “ROKG Kwangju Follow-Up,” June 20, 1980.

⁶⁴ Kim’s death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment in exchange for Chun’s state visit to the Reagan White House. Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 135; Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, p. 36.

⁶⁵ Declassified intelligence report, “Republic of Korea/Relocation of Two Special Warfare Command Brigades,” June 24, 1982.

⁶⁶ In 1988, Chun apologized and agreed to return nearly \$17 million in illicitly obtained assets. In 1995, he was tried for treason, repression, bribery, and corruption; in 1996 the court ordered him to pay \$283 million and sentenced him to death. The sentence was commuted to life imprisonment, and Chun was later pardoned, by President Kim Dae Jung. Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, pp. 35, 46; Terence Roehrig, *The Prosecution of Former Military Leaders in Newly Democratic Nations: The Cases of Argentina, Greece, and South Korea* (Jefferson: McFarland, 2002), Ch. 6–7; Shin *et al.*, *South Korea’s Democracy Movement*, p. 56.

to explore the logic behind decisions that so many Koreans find unconscionable. Chun's relaxation of some of South Korea's restrictions on civil liberties (such as lifting the curfew) in a "decompression phase" (유화국면, *yuhwa kungmyŏn*) after 1984 did not prevent his rule from being perceived as more heavy-handed, both domestically and by foreign audiences. (In June 1987, for example, he appeared on the cover of *Time* magazine above images of flames and riot police, with the headline "Korea's Crisis.") This perception, however, is at odds with both the data on National Security Law indictments under Chun (Figure 8.1) and his regime's response to popular protest (Figure 8.2). Both of these measurements depict Chun as *less* inclined toward repressive state violence and less regionally biased in applying that violence than Park Chung Hee.

What explains this divergence between popular perceptions and available data? First, the conflation of political and ordinary criminal charges may mean that the data omit some arrests and indictments (though probably not deaths). This, however, leaves unresolved the question of why Chun appears to have been less violent by two additional metrics that do not have the same measurement issues: the prosecution of cases of espionage by South Korean citizens, and the probability of a violent regime response to popular protest.

Second, the early violence of Chun's tenure, including Kwangju and the Samch'ŏng Kyoyuktae campaign, may have been so extreme that it overwhelmed in popular memory the "average" statistics that this chapter uses to analyze his rule. In interviews, several South Korean academics expressed the sentiment that regardless of what happened during the rest of his eight-year term, Kwangju alone was enough to justify stating, without qualification, that Chun's regime was the most repressive and regionally biased.⁶⁷ Chun's regime, however, is an example of the claim made at the beginning of this book: that regimes we think of as monolithically repressive in fact display wide variations in their use of violence. The question that this chapter focuses on is *why* that is the case – why Chun's regime was more violent in the beginning but less violent later.

The book's arguments suggest two possibilities for this temporal variation. First, the regional exclusivity of the coercive apparatus, which intensified under Park, likely contributed to the violence of the Kwangju (Ch'ŏlla) suppression in May 1980; the riot police that Chun established were not in operation at that time, leaving more exclusive forces in charge of the suppression. Second, the high level of violence of the

⁶⁷ Interviews with three South Korean academics, Seoul, May 2014.

Samch'ŏng Kyoyuktae campaign in 1980–81 was exacerbated by competition between coercive agencies, unlike in the later periods of Chun's rule; police stations were given quotas of gangsters to arrest, and competition to fill them resulted in the arrest of innocent people.⁶⁸ Not long after these events, however, Chun's reforms took effect, and the coercive apparatus became unitary and inclusive. The timing of these variations explains why state violence was present under Chun at some times and in some particular forms, but not others.

Third, repression under Chun was also much more *visible*. Chun employed his coercive apparatus largely for intimidation rather than intelligence-gathering – much like some of the descriptions of surveillance under Marcos – with little regard for the costs of public violence. Bruce Cumings describes the Riot Police as “Darth Vader-like figures,” wearing “helmets, tight screens over the face, leather scabbard protecting the back of their neck, padded clothing, thick elbow, knee, and shin guards, heavy combat boots, and long metal shield in the left hand and riot batons in the right.”⁶⁹ The regime also became famous for its use of “white skull” (백골, *paekkol*) strikebreakers: padded and shielded troops who arrived on motorcycles to break up labor strikes and thrash striking workers.⁷⁰ The tear gas used in South Korea became known among international activists and reporters as the worst in use worldwide.⁷¹ A similar emphasis on force without apparent attention to cost marked Kim Dae Jung's return from exile in 1985; when Kim arrived at the airport, escorted by an American delegation that included two congressmen, the KCIA attacked the group, knocked some of them to the floor, and took Kim and his wife away to house arrest.⁷²

Fourth, the inclusive nature of the coercive apparatus made violence more visible and affecting even as it became less frequent. Using conscripts in the policing of popular protest, especially conscripts who were from, and had strong social ties to, a particular area, made citizens in these areas more aware of who was being required to police them, and made the repression of protest more apparent and less popular within

⁶⁸ Lee, *Making of Minjung*, p. 47.

⁶⁹ Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 381.

⁷⁰ Chun sought tighter control over labor from early in his regime. One-third of political prisoners arrested under NSL violations in the early 1980s were workers. Shin *et al.*, *South Korea's Democracy Movement*, p. x; Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 379.

⁷¹ Maria Ressa, “Draw the Line,” commencement address, Far Eastern University, Manila, April 18, 2012.

⁷² Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun*, p. 381; photo of incident in Kim Dae Jung Presidential Library, Seoul.

Korean society. At the same time, inclusivity raised the social cost to coercive agents of engaging in repression, as conscript-based police were more reluctant to use force against friends, family, neighbors, and fellow students. One police officer recounted the following story from his time as the head of a conscript-based riot police unit – a standard assignment for police university graduates and new officers – that had been sent to a farmers' protest:

My lieutenant came to me and said, "You need to go talk to this guy, his father is one of the protestors." I went to the front of the line, and there was a young man, just out of military training, and it was true, he could see the face of his father, and his father's friends in the crowd. I told him, "Get out of line, go back to the barracks. You don't need to be here today." I could see him clenching his shield, and I could see that he had tears on his face under his helmet. But he said, "Sir, I cannot leave my post, I cannot leave my unit." He thought it would be a dishonor. But then how could he go against his own father, and the friends of his father? It affected everyone in the unit. Not just that day, but for a long time.⁷³

Several interviewees recounted stories of university graduates who went to complete their mandatory military service, only to be assigned to a riot police unit and sent back to campus to man the other side of the protest line, aiming tear gas at their friends and classmates.⁷⁴ The trope is so common in Korea that it formed the storyline of the movie *Peppermint Candy* (박하사탕, *Pakha Sat'ang*), in which the protagonist transforms from student to military conscript in Kwangju to police torturer.⁷⁵ The inclusivity of the riot police after 1980 reduced the frequency of protest repression by raising its social cost.

It is unclear from available historical records whether Chun's regime understood whether or how the change in riot police composition would alter the incentives facing coercive agents, or whether the change was purely accidental. Regardless, both the riot police and the military – which remained a generally inclusive national force – became less willing to perform an internal security role, especially as society became more vocally critical. Forcing young Koreans to do the regime's dirty work of repressing fellow citizens was seen as a perversion of the patriotic purpose of national military service.⁷⁶ It imposed heavy social costs by pitting students against

⁷³ Interview with a police officer during the 1980s, Seoul, March 2011.

⁷⁴ Author's interviews, Seoul, March 2011 and January 2012.

⁷⁵ For an English-language plot synopsis, see www.yaentertainment.com/catalog/pc.html.

⁷⁶ Kim Dae Jung, among others, warned publicly that trying to justify repression using the threat from the North would undermine the cause of anti-communism. Interview with a former police official, Seoul, March 2011; interview with a democracy activist, Seoul, May 2014.

their friends and sons against their parents. Former policemen and activists alike asserted that because of this dynamic, the coercive apparatus became increasingly unwilling to actually inflict violence. American military reports after Kwangju indicated that soldiers “were growing weary of the internal security role that SF was assigned,” and that officers “ready to break heads” at Pusan and Masan in October 1979 had, by the time of a coal miners’ protest in April 1980, begun to believe that the protestors were right. The ROK military, the report warned, expressed no enthusiasm at the future prospect of quelling student protests.⁷⁷ As a result, democracy protests evolved into a scripted performance: students arrived, they chanted and drummed, and eventually the police fired some tear gas and everyone dispersed, with minimal violence and no arrests. Sometimes protest organizers even coordinated with police in advance to minimize the chances of anyone getting hurt.⁷⁸ The performativity of protest during the Korean democracy movement evolved as a way of coping with the tensions that protest and repression under a highly inclusive coercive apparatus had engendered within Korean society.⁷⁹

As a result, state violence dropped, as measured by both indictments (Figure 8.1) and protest policing (Figure 8.2). Figure 8.2 also shows that after Kwangju, Chölla was no longer singled out for disproportionate repression of its protests. The very factors that caused a decrease in state violence, however – coercive institutional design and, specifically, the inclusivity of the coercive apparatus – heightened tensions within the coercive apparatus over whether they should engage in any repression at all. South Korea under Chun, therefore, illustrates the argument that high levels of popular threat push autocrats toward unitary and socially inclusive coercive institutions, which have strong social incentives to refrain from engaging in violence against their own people.

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS

Alternative explanations have a limited ability to explain the patterns of state violence in South Korea under Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo

⁷⁷ Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, “ROKG Shifts SF Units,” May 8, 1980.

⁷⁸ Interview with a democracy activist, Seoul, March 2011; interview with a reporter in Korea during the democracy movement, Seoul, January 2012.

⁷⁹ Drums, though technically protected by national heritage preservation laws, were so much associated with protest that finding a drum in a student’s backpack was used as evidence of intent to protest. Katherine Lee, “The Drumming of Dissent during South Korea’s Democratization Movement,” paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies Annual Conference, Toronto (March 2012).

Hwan. These include levels of popular threat, American and international pressure, state/organizational capacity, regime life cycle, and empirical endogeneity.

Rising popular threat has difficulty explaining both the timing and location of state violence. A study by Stanford University's Korea Democracy Project found that although there were fewer protest events in the 1980s, this was only because the democracy movement itself had consolidated, and "the number of participants in protest events does not differ significantly in the 1970s and 1980s" until the final spike of protest in 1987 that produced democratic transition. Moreover, protestors were increasingly likely to use "disruptive" tactics in the 1980s.⁸⁰ Based on the level of popular threat, then, we might expect state violence to be higher in the 1980s. Yet the coercive apparatus in the 1980s was not more violent toward civilians than it had been in the 1970s. Even acknowledging the small rise in indictments in the latter half of the 1980s, fewer individuals were indicted during the 1980s in South Korea than in the 1970s. There was also less state violence during the 1980s as measured by other criteria, such as protest repression and the prosecution of South Koreans for espionage (in single digits by the second half of the 1980s). In South Korea as in other cases, objective measures of popular threat simply do not strongly or consistently correlate with state violence under either Park or Chun.

Moreover, as in the Philippines, increased protest participation *post-dates* rather precedes the period of the highest levels of state violence in South Korea, suggesting that popular mobilization does not cause violent repression, but results from it. Kim Dae Jung warned in the mid-1970s that state repression and violence were having this effect, saying, "Mao Tse-tung has said that guerillas are the fish that swim in the sea of the People ... If the current situation [of repressiveness under Park] continues, the sea will soon be ready for the fish."⁸¹ The fact that Chölla was particularly mobilized in the 1980s – after being disproportionately targeted for repression under Park, but during a period when it was *not* being disproportionately targeted by violence under Chun – provides further support for this hypothesis. Similarly, Paul Chang's careful study of the democratization movement shows that violent suppression of the student movement in the 1970s catalyzed lateral

⁸⁰ Shin *et al.*, *South Korea's Democracy Movement*, pp. 10–12.

⁸¹ "Dance of the Dominoes: South Korea's Park Holds the Line," *Newsweek*, June 2, 1975, p. 31.

cooperation between different segments of society, such as Christian activism and labor organizers, that eventually coalesced into the alliance of the 1980s that forced Chun and Roh to democratize.⁸² Evidence from the two Korea cases, therefore, suggests that (a) higher popular threat did not cause increased state violence, but that (b) higher levels of repression sparked increased mobilization.

Regime life cycle predicts that both Park and Chun should have engaged in high levels of violence at the time they seized power, in order to eliminate opposition, and used less violence after that. In Chun's case, there is some evidence to support this hypothesis: after the high levels of violence of 1980–81, indictments are low from 1980–1984, though they rise slightly again in the latter half of Chun's tenure. A regime life cycle explanation, however, doesn't correlate with patterns of state violence observed under Park, since violence is not observably higher at the start of the regime in 1972 than it was in later years.

Explanations grounded in *empirical endogeneity* suggest that either high levels of state violence or a strict "repressive environment" (including non-violent forms of repression like tight restrictions on civil liberties) should deter protest and opposition activity, making subsequent state violence less necessary. Chang suggests, for example, that mass arrests in 1971 and 1974 temporarily demobilized the student movement. If this is true, however, then demobilization should also decrease the threat to the regime and lead to a subsequent drop in state violence. However, this is not what happened under Park; instead, the year of Park's regime with the lowest level of protest (1976) has one of the highest numbers of indictments. Under Park, therefore, state violence simply was not correlated with protest levels in the way these theories predict. Under Chun, an explanation based on empirical endogeneity suggests that the high levels of violence of 1980–81 should deter later protest or oppositional activity, making state violence unnecessary. There is a temporary drop in protest activity in the early 1980s, but opposition leaders continue to organize, and protest rises again (eventually exponentially) in the second half of the decade. This raises doubt about whether repression actually quelled protest in the way this theory suggests. The evidence on this alternative explanation is mixed, but not wholly convincing either way.

Explanations grounded in *state capacity* or *organizational cohesion* confront the same issues of indeterminacy raised in previous chapters.

⁸² Chang, *Protest Dialectics*.

With respect to organizational cohesion, this chapter's findings are consistent with previous ones: Park's more fragmented coercive apparatus engaged in higher levels of violence than the unitary apparatus employed by Chun, although highly cohesive individual units conducted the largest (atypical) episode of violence that occurred in South Korea under either president – the Kwangju suppression. Overall state capacity is generally considered to be strong in South Korea in both decades, so it provides little explanatory leverage for patterns of violence that display more variation. The chapter also appears to be consistent with previous chapters in demonstrating that coercive capacity is not a fixed and one-dimensional explanatory factor, but an intervening variable employed by autocrats to pursue certain political interests. These interests, rather than capacity more generally, explain why two different autocrats used the same underlying resources to create distinct organizational structures whose “coercive outputs” vis-à-vis the Korean population were very different.

Finally, *international or American influence* is not a strong predictor of state violence, for several reasons. First, American officials during the Cold War were often criticized for allowing repression when it was conducted in the name of anti-communism; the United States was criticized both for adopting a policy of “dis-association” from Park's declaration of Yushin in 1972, and for valuing stability on the peninsula above the human costs of the Kwangju crackdown.⁸³ Based on this representation, one might expect state violence in South Korea, where the communist threat was acute, to be high – yet South Korea displays the lowest levels of state violence of the three countries examined in this book. Based on rhetoric, one might also expect that the American government would have been more permissive of anti-communist repression under President Reagan (1980s) than under President Carter (1970s); for example, President Reagan invited Chun for a state visit in February 1981 in a move that deliberately sought to dampen human rights criticisms of America's

⁸³ There is an extensive debate over the complicity of the United States in releasing or transferring the military units used in the Kwangju crackdown, which I do not revisit here. American policies were generally reactive rather than proactive; officials urged restraint, and intervened to save Kim Dae Jung from execution, but also supported the “restoration of order” against the “Kwangju mob.” Heo and Roehrig, *South Korea Since 1980*, p. 34; Oh, *Korean Politics*, p. 80; Gleysteen, *Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence*, pp. 127–43; Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea*, p. 235; “U.S. Government Statement on the Events in Kwangju, Republic of Korea, in May 1980,” USIS Press Office, U.S. Embassy, Seoul, Korea, June 19, 1989, p. 17; Wickham, *Korea on the Brink*.

anti-communist allies⁸⁴ – but levels of state violence in South Korea were lower during the Reagan presidency than they were during previous administrations.

Second, even when American pressure not to repress existed, it is unclear how much this mattered. In 1974, for example, when American and international officials and activists criticized EM #4 and the political trials that resulted from it, the regime's response was to accelerate the sentencing of individuals so that it could lift the EM, rather than canceling the trials outright. More generally, although American military support was a potential bargaining chip for the improvement of human rights, as were the potential trade losses and sanctions costs created by increased linkage with the American-led international economy, policymakers seldom attempted to leverage these factors to reduce state violence.⁸⁵ American influence appears greatest in three specific cases: when officials intervened to save Kim Dae Jung's life after the KCIA kidnapped him in 1973, when they intervened again to block his post-Kwangju death sentence in 1980, and finally in a 1987 diplomatic note that urged Chun to avoid military suppression of pro-democracy protests.⁸⁶ In the third instance, Chun was aware of the potential for domestic and international backlash, and Reagan's letter reinforced his concern; the true impact of American advocacy, however, is unclear, because Chun also faced active opposition to repression from within his own military (communicated by his designated successor, Roh Tae Woo), which he feared might catalyze another coup by disaffected junior officers.⁸⁷ It is therefore not clear whether it was American influence or these internal considerations that tipped the balance and halted the pending crackdown. As in the Philippines, American influence appears to have had the greatest impact by shaping Korean autocrats' perceptions of threat. Beyond that, it mattered more for restoring civil liberties and the formal proceedings of democracy, and for improving the treatment of individual dissidents who had personal ties to the West, than it mattered in shaping the patterns of state violence that ordinary Koreans experienced.

⁸⁴ Robert Wampler, ed., "Seeing Human Rights in the 'Proper Manner': The Reagan–Chun Summit of February 1981," National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book, No. 306 (February 2010), <http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB306/>.

⁸⁵ Eckert *et al.*, *Korea Old and New*, pp. 361–62; C.I. Eugene Kim, "The Military in the Politics of South Korea: Creating Political Order," in Morris Janowitz and Jacques VanDoorn, eds., *On Military Intervention* (Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971), pp. 361–86.

⁸⁶ Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*, p. 169.

⁸⁷ Shin and Hwang, *Contentious Kwangju*, pp. 76–77; Oberdorfer, *The Two Koreas*.

CONCLUSION

The patterns of state violence that occurred in South Korea under Park Chung Hee's Yushin regime (1972–79) and under Chun Doo Hwan (1980–87) can be explained largely by the coercive institutions that the two autocrats established. The high level of external threat to South Korea throughout both autocrats' tenure significantly limited coup-proofing and kept state violence relatively low in cross-national comparative perspective. Coercive institutional design also helps to explain differences in state violence between the two autocrats. Park's coercive apparatus was moderately fragmented and socially exclusive, creating inter-agency infighting that contributed to state violence – as well as regime instability – and leading to violent repression that was disproportionately directed at the excluded region of Chŏlla. State violence was lower and more evenly distributed across the regions of South Korea under Chun Doo Hwan, whose unitary and (mostly) inclusive coercive apparatus resisted the popular repression that it was tasked to engage in. The inclusive social composition of Chun's frontline coercive units explains not only the lower level of violence under Chun and its relatively equal spatial distribution, but also why the violence that did occur was so detested, and why it is still so bitterly remembered today.

PART IV

EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Extending the argument: coercion outside East Asia

Examining other cases from around the world suggests that the arguments advanced in this book travel to a wide range of authoritarian regimes. The cases in previous chapters included a single-party regime (Taiwan), two military regimes (South Korea), and a personalist dictatorship (the Philippines). The shadow cases that follow below cover an equally wide cross-section of regime types, and span multiple regions of the world: Latin America, Eastern Europe, and the Middle East. The cases have been selected on the basis of data availability and to test the generalizability of the book's arguments across regime type and geographic location; they should be considered a plausibility probe of the theory's external validity. Each of the three cases that follow demonstrates patterns of coercive institutional construction and state violence that are consistent with the arguments advanced in Chapter 2.

Where the dominant perceived threat is one of a coup, autocrats create fragmented and socially exclusive coercive institutions, as Saddam Hussein in Iraq did. These internal security agencies have social and professional incentives to engage in violence against the population, and lack the intelligence capacity to use discriminate and pre-emptive repressive alternatives. State violence is therefore high. Where the dominant perceived threat is one of mass unrest rather than elite overthrow, however, as it was in East Germany in the mid-1950s and Chile by the late 1970s, the coercive apparatus becomes unitary and more inclusive, and the use of violent repression decreases. These cases reveal strong correlations between the dominant perceived threat, coercive institutional type, and patterns of state violence that are consistent with the arguments made in earlier chapters of this book.




FIGURE 9.1. Decreasing state violence in Chile under Pinochet (1973–90)

Source: Data shown measure killings and disappearances; the same pattern holds for arrests. *Report of the Chilean National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation*, English edition (Washington: United States Institute of Peace, 2002), pp. 1124–25. This graph originally appeared in Policzer, *The Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 89.

CHILE UNDER PINOCHET

After Salvador Allende was overthrown in a coup d'état on September 11, 1973, Chile was ruled by a military government headed by Army General Augusto Pinochet, who was proclaimed President in 1974. The junta is infamous for its use of high levels of state violence during the first years of its rule, but experienced a dramatic decrease in state violence between 1973 and 1977. Over 1,800 people were killed in 1973, but after 1977, the number of deaths hovered around 100 per year. The number of people arrested and imprisoned similarly decreased. This drop is depicted in Figure 9.1.

Consistent with the arguments made in this book, this decrease in state violence is associated with the consolidation of the coercive apparatus, in a process similar to that which took place in Taiwan: from a fragmented apparatus marked by poor inter-service coordination and high internal competition to one that was unitary and inclusive in its intelligence operations. Consolidation actually proceeded in two stages: first, the creation of the Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (DINA), which operated from 1973 to 1977, and second, the establishment of the Central Nacional de Informaciones (CNI) in 1977. Moreover, coercive institutional reform

appears to have been prompted by a change in the dominant perceived threat from elite to popular. The 1977 creation of the CNI emerged from a deal in which the junta members agreed to make Pinochet president for life, thereby removing his fears of a coup and elite threat. Changes in the dominant threat therefore motivated coercive institutional reform, and institutional reforms produced a drop in state violence.

Although we do not have access to records of Pinochet's thinking about the nature of the threats he faced, available evidence suggests that the creation of a unitary coercive apparatus was linked to a shift in the dominant threat from elite to popular. At the time of the coup, Pinochet's position atop the junta was far from secure. The Army that he headed was the largest service branch, making him the top military official in the country, but Pinochet had only recently assumed his position as the Army's commander in chief, and was a relative latecomer to the coup plot – by some accounts coming on board a mere two days beforehand.¹ Inside the Army, his major rivals included Generals Lutz and Bonilla. Moreover, the junta intended to share power equally among its four members: Admiral Jose Toribio Merino (Navy); General Gustavo Leigh (Air Force); General Cesar Mendoza (Carabineros); and General Augusto Pinochet (Army).² Although Pinochet was declared the “supreme commander of the nation” in late 1973 and President a year later, these positions were, by tacit understanding, not to be permanent. As Pinochet sought to keep the presidency from rotating out of his hands to junta members from the other services, he was opposed in that effort by Air Force General Leigh.³ Analysts of the period therefore share the view that Pinochet “had less to worry about from political enemies than from opponents and rivals within the armed forces.”⁴

As a result of the junta's structure and balancing of power among different members, control of coercion was fragmented, producing competition and compartmentalized, flawed intelligence that led to violence. Each military service retained near-complete operational autonomy and had its own intelligence service: SIM (Army), SIN (Navy), SIFA (Air Force) and SICAR (Carabineros), in addition to the police forces of the

¹ Patricia Verdugo, *Caso Arellano: Los Zarpazos del Puma* (Santiago: CESOC Ediciones ChileAmerica, 1989), p. 16.

² Comision Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacion, *Informe de la Comision Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliacion* (Santiago, Chile: La Nacion, 1991), p. 47.

³ Hugh O'Shaughnessy, *Pinochet: The Politics of Torture* (New York: NYU Press, 2000), pp. 70–71, 114.

⁴ O'Shaughnessy, *Pinochet*, pp. 65, 113–15.

Ministry of the Interior.⁵ During the first year after the coup, “all four branches of the armed forces practiced all aspects of coercion,” including anti-dissident operations and summary executions, without any clear division of responsibility.⁶ The services interacted in a way that was “haphazard and without established procedure,” and there was no central clearinghouse for disappearances and executions. “Competition among junta members and their respective branches” contributed to a lack of information-sharing and coordination, as well as outright competition over work.⁷ These dynamics meant that the coercive apparatus and its leaders had little information on who or even how many they were arresting, interrogating, or even killing. According to one report on institutional fragmentation, it was common for someone “to be detained, interrogated, and released by one police service and immediately thereafter stopped again by another police service.”⁸ The flawed intelligence of the regime was not helped by its exclusivity, which was largely a numerical issue. The DINA reportedly employed 4,000 agents in a country of over 10 million citizens, a ratio of 1:2,634.⁹

High levels of violence were the natural result. Over 3,000 deaths occurred under the junta’s seventeen-year rule, but over half of these took place in the first few months (late 1972 and early 1973), along with one-third of the detentions and somewhere between 25 and 60 percent of torture incidents.¹⁰ According to Chile’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the junta’s victims during this early, pre-reform period came from all political affiliations and backgrounds: a range of individuals far broader than those targeted during the later years of the regime.¹¹ Many of the detentions and killings used public facilities such as sports stadiums, and were therefore well known to Chileans.

Institutional consolidation occurred in two stages, each accompanied by a drop in state violence. The first stage began with the creation of the

⁵ Mark Ensalaco, *Chile under Pinochet* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000), pp. 55–56.

⁶ Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 72.

⁷ Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 58.

⁸ Samuel J. Valenzuela and Arturo Valenzuela, *Military Rule in Chile: Dictatorship and Opposition* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), p. 131.

⁹ DINA also employed informants, but their number remains unknown. Ensalaco, *Chile under Pinochet*, p. 57.

¹⁰ Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 47.

¹¹ Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación, *Informe de la Comisión Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliación*; Elías Padilla Ballesteros, *La Memoria Y El Olvido: Detenidos Desaparecidos en Chile* (Santiago: Ediciones Orígenes, 1995), pp. 45–66.

DINA as a centralized intelligence agency under the National Detainees Service (SENDET) in June 1974, based on junta members' recognition that they needed better intelligence and operational coordination.¹² The DINA drew personnel from all service branches, reported directly to Pinochet, had broad authority to coordinate the intelligence activities of the various service branches, and could, by law, obtain any "report or information" from any government agency. Unlike the military services, however, which had operated openly, the DINA most commonly operated in plainclothes and unmarked cars, rounding up people and holding them in secret locations where they were tortured and eventually disappeared.¹³ The DINA gradually took over more and more of the regime's coercive operations. Junta members, however, remained fearful of a Gestapo-like organization outside their control, and insisted on maintaining autonomous offices in the armed services – particularly in the Carabineros and General Leigh's Comando Conjunto in the Chilean Air Force. These offices maintained separate intelligence files, including on each other, and refused to share information. As a result, fragmentation remained; the DINA "failed to monopolize repression" and inter-agency rivalries, especially those between the DINA, Carabineros, and Air Force, continued to produce violence.¹⁴

The second institutional reform of the coercive apparatus under Pinochet occurred in August 1977, when the junta replaced the DINA with the CNI. There is strong reason to believe that Pinochet's dominant perceived threat shifted from elite to popular at the time the CNI was created. Generals Lutz and Bonilla had both died – Lutz of blood poisoning and Bonilla in a helicopter crash – and General Leigh was ousted from the junta in July 1978, leaving no clear elite rival to threaten Pinochet's presidency.¹⁵ Around the time of the CNI's creation – and by some accounts, in explicit exchange for agreeing to it – Pinochet received a guarantee, written into the 1980 Constitution, of his permanent role as President. In exchange, he agreed that the CNI would operate under the jurisdiction of the Defense and Interior Ministries, rather than answering

¹² The unit was originally established in 1973 as an army intelligence unit under Col. Manuel Contreras, who lobbied the junta to make it a central agency. Christopher W. Mullins and Dawn L. Rothe, *State Crime: Current Perspectives* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2011), p. 164.

¹³ Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, pp. 69, 86.

¹⁴ Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 98.

¹⁵ Leigh was reportedly ousted on suspicion of supporting an Air Force coup plot. O'Shaughnessy, *Pinochet*, pp. 70–71, 114.

directly to him. Thus, “in exchange for giving up permanent personal rule, Pinochet obtained a more secure position within a more clearly articulated institutional framework.”¹⁶ Popular threats were also increasing at that time; the leftist Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR) and other resistance groups were beginning to prepare for armed struggle in the late 1970s.¹⁷ In combination, these factors shifted the dominant threat to Pinochet from elite to popular, and freed the CNI to take on the form it needed to deal with popular unrest more effectively. Remaining fragmentation across the branches of the armed forces was removed in the reform process, and the new coercive apparatus expanded rapidly, employing around 10,000 employees and 20,000–30,000 informants across a much more distributed network of bases than the DINA had used.¹⁸

The CNI’s assumption of coordinating power resulted in a unitary and more inclusive coercive apparatus, and produced a second drop in violence against civilians in 1977–78. Its activities were subject to tighter legal restrictions but, more fundamentally, the organization pursued a different repressive strategy: one that focused less on the extermination of opposition and more on containment, surveillance, and monitoring of particular groups.¹⁹ In addition to using lower aggregate levels of violence, therefore, the CNI was also more discriminate and precise in how it targeted that violence, policing a narrower set of groups within the population “that posed a direct and dire threat to Chile’s national security.”²⁰ As Figure 9.1 demonstrated, the result was a drop in state violence.

Alternative explanations are unconvincing in explaining these developments, compared to the theory advanced in this book. With respect to institutional origins, neither path dependence nor external influence appear to have been particularly consequential in shaping Chile’s coercive institutions; the former cannot explain why reforms occurred, and there is little evidence that external models or influence affected the junta’s

¹⁶ The old DINA head, Col. Manuel Contreras, headed the CNI for less than a year, falling from power in April 1978. Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 127.

¹⁷ Mullins and Rothe, *State Crime*, pp. 165–66.

¹⁸ Karen Remmer, *Military Rule in Latin America* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), p. 129; Peter Kornbluh, *The Pinochet File: A Declassified Dossier on Atrocity and Accountability* (New York: New Press, 2003), esp. pp. 164–99; Simon Collier and William F. Sater, *A History of Chile 1808–1994* (New York: Cambridge, 1996), p. 360.

¹⁹ Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura, *Informe de la Comisión Nacional sobre Prisión Política y Tortura* (Santiago, Chile, 2004); Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 102. On conservative and military concerns about excessive violence by the DINA, see Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 109.

²⁰ Policzer, *Rise and Fall of Repression in Chile*, p. 72.

calculations regarding coercive institutional structure and composition. With respect to the drop in state violence, an explanation that relies on rising popular threat suggests that violence should have been low at first but then should have risen in the late 1970s with the organization of popular resistance, which is the opposite of the trend that we observe. An explanation grounded in empirical endogeneity falters because it cannot explain why such resistance emerged then at all, when it should have been deterred by early high levels of violence. On international factors, the United States tacitly supported and funded rather than restrained the junta's repressive activities.²¹ As in previous chapters, state and organizational capacity appear to be malleable intervening factors, rather than fixed causal ones. A life cycle explanation is superficially plausible, but gives us little purchase on within-case evidence or the targets of state violence over time in the way that an explanation rooted in coercive institutional design can.

Instead, consistent with the arguments made in Chapter 2, a brief examination of the Chilean case reveals that when the elite threat to Pinochet was high, fragmentation and exclusivity characterized the coercive apparatus, creating organizational incentives and dysfunctional intelligence processes that led to higher levels of state violence. When the elite threat to Pinochet decreased and popular opposition became the dominant threat, the regime established a unitary, inclusive organization focused on intelligence-gathering and surveillance. The result of these coercive institutional reforms was a drop in violence against ordinary Chileans.

EAST GERMANY: THE STASI

The East German Ministry for State Security (MfS or *Ministerium für Staatsicherheit*, nicknamed Stasi) is one of the world's most famous secret police organizations: the archetypal unitary, inclusive organization with capillary penetration of every corner of society. But the Stasi did not take on its legendary form immediately after its creation. In fact, the original East German coercive apparatus was not really unitary in its structure, nor was it especially inclusive in its social composition. Under Soviet military rule, the Stasi was a relatively small political police unit of 4,000 employees, not unlike the counterpart organizations being formed

²¹ U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, "CIA Activities in Chile," September 19, 2000, George Washington University National Security Archive, <http://web.archive.org/web/20061129065150/www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/news/20000919/01-01.htm>.

in other Eastern European countries, and was not particularly focused on the threat of mass unrest.²² Events in 1953, however, dramatically revised the regime's threat perceptions, triggering coercive institutional reforms that altered the repressive strategy of the Stasi and shaped its pattern of coercive outputs, substituting pervasive surveillance for high levels of state violence.

In June 1953, popular protest emerged as an unexpected threat to the East German regime (GDR). In the early 1950s, living standards had deteriorated, collectivization produced food shortages, and remilitarization and suppression of criticism resulted in mounting dissatisfaction. In mid-June, a workers' demonstration against production quotas exploded to encompass more than 400 cities across East Germany, drawing in protestors from a broad cross-section of East German society, and triggering calls not just for labor reform, but for fundamental political change and the downfall of Communism. The protests were the first outbreak of open, forceful resistance within the Eastern European bloc: violent, sweepingly inclusive, and long-lasting. According to party and government documents from that summer, these events shocked the East German leaders of the Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, SED), and posed what they believed was an existential threat to their leadership. They also produced fear in Moscow, tangled in a struggle to replace the recently deceased Stalin, leading Soviet authorities to declare martial law, send in Red Army tanks, and fire on protestors to quell the riots.²³

This unrest led to organizational reforms of the coercive apparatus: a restructuring and expansion of the Stasi into the organization that achieved lasting historical and cultural fame. At the time, the Stasi's failure to see and forestall the 1953 unrest was considered a major security failure by the East German leadership. As historian Jens Gieseke notes, the Stasi "had not fulfilled its most important function: recognizing

²² The Stasi's predecessor – the K5 units under the German Administration for Internal Affairs – was primarily an auxiliary organ of the Soviet Ministry of State Security (NKGB and MGB). From May 1949 to February 1950, the Ministry for State Security itself was separated and formed; after vetting by Soviet intelligence officers – former Gestapo or SS men were not allowed to serve – only about 10 percent of the original K5 employees transferred to the Stasi. By 1958, the USSR had around thirty-two liaison officers in the Stasi. Jens Gieseke, *The GDR State Security: Shield and Sword of the Party* (Berlin: Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic, 2006), pp. 13, 31.

²³ "Conclusions from Reports of the SED District Leadership, 8 August 1953," Document No. 87, in Christian F. Ostermann, ed., *Uprising in East Germany, 1953: The Cold War, the German Question, and the First Major Upheaval Behind the Iron Curtain* (Washington, DC: National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 50, 2001).

harbingers and initial signs of uprising and nipping them in the bud.”²⁴ The party leadership’s first move was to replace Wilhelm Zaisser as Minister of State Security in July 1953. Partly in response to an American food assistance program initiated in early July, East German authorities also began providing food and consumer goods – shoes, butter, coffee, eggs – at an increased rate, particularly targeting the areas most acutely afflicted by popular unrest.²⁵ Institutionally, however, the major consequence of the 1953 unrest was change to the organization and operation of the Stasi itself, increasing the power and size of the organization. In August 1953, the Stasi began providing daily reports on internal conditions to the East German Politburo, cementing its central and authoritative role in domestic security. The organization was restructured along military lines, with 15 field offices and over 200 substations (*Kriesdienststellen*) established internally.²⁶ The police, Army, and Red Army created coordinated national plans for wide-scale repression; the police also established and armed local militias. Armed, motorized police reserves were created in major cities. Fragmentation and overlapping responsibility with other organizations were strictly forbidden; divisions of labor with the border police and intelligence operations of the National People’s Army were clearly delineated to avoid unhealthy internal rivalries.

East Germany’s coercive apparatus also became inclusive, particularly in the areas of surveillance and domestic intelligence. By 1973, over 53,000 people worked for the Stasi and, by 1989, the rolls stood at 102,000: a total of 274,000 employees between 1950 and 1989.²⁷ Even more impressive was the degree of societal penetration achieved by the organized use of regular informants (*Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter*, or IMs). Each Stasi officer supervised approximately thirty informants, and held around fifty-five meetings with IMs each month. After 1989, investigations into the Stasi’s operations suggested that at least 175,000 individuals had acted as IMs: 2.5 percent of the population between the ages of eighteen and sixty.²⁸ Approximately 10 percent of IMs either began or ended their assistance to the Stasi in any given year, and the Stasi

²⁴ Gieseke, *GDR State Security*, p. 23.

²⁵ Henry Thomson, “Of Sticks and Carrots: Repression and Food Policy as a Cause and Consequence of Mass Unrest in East Germany,” paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, IL (August 2013).

²⁶ Gieseke, *GDR State Security*, p. 14.

²⁷ Koehler, *Stasi*, pp. 141–42. Gieseke finds a slightly different total – 91,015 by autumn 1989 – but notes that this was “proportionally far outdoing the state security services of the other socialist states. For every 1000 GDR citizens there were approximately 5.5 MfS personnel.” Gieseke, *GDR State Security*, p. 7.

²⁸ Koehler, *Stasi*, pp. 141–42.

suffered from perennial criticism that it recruited too many party members and not enough informants from “hostile-negative” circles,” creating consistent pressure on the organization to expand its pool to those that the regime regarded as most threatening.²⁹ Technical intelligence collection complemented human sources: approximately 2,000–3,000 personnel were tasked with eavesdropping on 100,000 tapped phone lines, and mail was regularly intercepted and censored.³⁰ Body smell samples from dissidents were retained in case they were needed to track these individuals in the future.³¹ Particularly interesting for the arguments made in this book is the finding that the sub-national distribution of Stasi personnel and the development of their intensive, inclusive surveillance networks correlated directly with the intensity of popular unrest in 1953. The level of unrest experienced by a district in 1953 is a strong predictor of the density of surveillance (number of Stasi informants/employees per capita) that district was likely to have almost three decades later, in 1980.³² Both temporally and sub-nationally, severe popular threat correlated with the establishment of a unitary, inclusive, surveillance-oriented coercive apparatus.

As in Taiwan, the incentives given to Stasi officers inclined them toward the development of social omniscience and targeted, non-violent repression. District and substation-level officers were assigned quotas for recruiting informants, rather than for arrests or executions.³³ Their salaries, at 1,900 marks per month, were double the national average and also included access to a privileged set of recreational facilities and stores; job security was high.³⁴ The Stasi was also directed to focus narrowly on the business of uncovering and neutralizing enemy activities, and chided when its repressive activity seemed insufficiently discriminate. One 1962 party document, for example, criticized the organization for getting “involved in the areas of competence and responsibility of other State and economic organs,” for becoming distracted from its main task, and for conducting investigations on a “very large” group of citizens who did not pose a true threat to regime security.³⁵

²⁹ Gieseke, *GDR State Security*, p. 54.

³⁰ Koehler, *Stasi*, pp. 9, 143.

³¹ Gieseke, *GDR State Security*, p. 8.

³² Thomson, “Of Sticks and Carrots.”

³³ Koehler, *Stasi*, p. 143.

³⁴ Employees commonly worked for the Stasi for life; most were male party members. Koehler, *Stasi*, p. 147.

³⁵ Unsigned document from Ulbricht’s office, 1962, reprinted in Gieseke, *GDR State Security*, p. 34.

Internal coordination and inclusivity were deliberately cultivated by the regime in order to make the Stasi an effective tool in managing popular unrest. The Stasi itself judged its domestic intelligence operations to be successful. By the time of the Prague Spring in 1968, MfS officers could report that despite the presence of 2,100 protests and 500 investigative proceedings for propaganda distribution, "There was no serious discord or unrest nor were there any occurrences, involving larger population groups, which could have expanded into political actions against the GDR."³⁶

As in Taiwan and Chile, this consolidation of the coercive apparatus in East Germany led to a drop in state violence. Government investigators found, for example, that more than 100,000 people died in Soviet military internment camps established after the Second World War.³⁷ After that East Germany used the death penalty sparingly, and only in secret; though complete records have not been found, government investigators estimated after the Cold War ended that perhaps 300 people had been executed on both political and regular criminal charges.³⁸ The majority of the estimated 280,000 prison sentences given to individuals between 1945 and 1989 occurred in the first few years. The number of "proceedings" (investigations involving temporary detention) conducted by the Stasi's Main Department IX dropped from an average of 3,200 per year in the 1950s to 1,700 per year in the 1970s.³⁹ Amnesties in 1972 and 1979 released 20,000–25,000 people, and a final amnesty in 1987 released an estimated 2,000 remaining in confinement.⁴⁰ Torture was used from the 1940s to the 1960s, but employed less frequently thereafter.

What about alternative explanations for East Germany's coercive institutional design and the drop in violence? With respect to institutional origins, although the Soviet Union supported East Germany's attempts to quell popular unrest, Moscow – enmeshed in its own internal crises – had little influence on the longer-term process of coercive institutional reform that followed, a process that caused the GDR to *depart* from its original externally influenced institutional inheritance. Neither international influence nor path dependence was therefore determinative in shaping the East German coercive apparatus, especially relative to the dominant perceived threat faced by the regime. With respect to state

³⁶ Quoted in Gieseke, *GDR State Security*, p. 39.

³⁷ "100,000 Died in East Germany for Political Acts," *Reuters*, October 27, 1991.

³⁸ Koehler, *Stasi*, p. 18.

³⁹ Gieseke, *GDR State Security*, p. 80.

⁴⁰ "E. Germany Sets Amnesty, Abolishes Death Penalty," *Associated Press*, July 18, 1987.

violence, alternative hypotheses do not seem inaccurate as much as simply unsatisfying in terms of what constitutes an explanation. The three most plausible alternatives have to do with regime life cycle, empirical endogeneity, and levels of popular threat, each of which predicts early high levels of violence and a drop in violence afterward. What these explanations omit, however, are the underlying political factors and calculations that seem to have driven this process: why popular protest became the dominant threat after 1953, but not before; how exactly the regime was able to construct an apparatus that could subsequently deter unrest or pre-empt it from emerging; and why the regime did not respond to rising popular unrest toward the end of its rule with an increase in the use of state violence.

An explanation based on the dominant perceived threat and coercive institutional design not only explains this same basic temporal trend in state violence, but also sheds light on the temporal and sub-national processes of institutional creation that were associated with it, and the effect that coercive institutional reform had on the long-term management of popular threat. Wide-scale popular protest in East Germany during the regime's formative years posed an existential threat that fundamentally shaped the nature of the coercive apparatus for the duration of the regime. After the unrest of 1953, the Stasi became a powerful, unitary, and inclusive organization focused on intelligence-gathering and surveillance in order to detect and forestall organized collective action. Rather than crushing protestors in the street as it had in 1953, it sought to know their opinions and plans so well that it could prevent them from beginning to protest at all.

IRAQ UNDER SADDAM HUSSEIN

Iraq under Saddam Hussein, by contrast, is the quintessential coup-proofed regime. Predominately worried about elite threats from the military, Hussein relied on fragmentation and exclusivity to protect himself from his own coercive apparatus. His internal security agencies had social and professional incentives to engage in violence against excluded out-groups, as well as intelligence handicaps that fostered indiscriminate violence. As a result, his regime was violent, both internally and toward the civilian population.

There is little question that Saddam Hussein was primarily concerned with elite or insider threats to his power, especially from the military. The first Bath regime in Iraq had been toppled by the military,

surviving only from February to November 1963 and creating a strong drive not to make the same mistake a second time. Saddam himself had come to de facto power via the coup of 1968 (as Vice President under General Hassan al-Bakr, he was Iraq's ruler in practical terms for much of the 1970s) and then assumed power formally through a coup-purge of the Ba'th party leadership in 1979. In general, Iraq's history was one of coup and assassination attempts rather than popular uprising; the regime faced coup threats in 1970, 1971, and 1973, and at least four more attempts in 1988–90.⁴¹ Moreover, throughout the 1970s, the Ba'thist movement itself was divided between military and civilian wings. Saddam, who had risen through the party rather than the military, remained deeply suspicious of the military as an institution, as well as of the loyalty of its senior commanders.⁴² Evidence from within the Ba'th party suggests that once he was in power, warnings of the futility of a coup were frequent, and promised reprisals brutal. He sometimes announced that he knew when an individual would betray him before that individual did.⁴³

This is not to say that either external or popular threats were absent – Saddam fought wars against Iran in the 1980s and a U.S.-led international coalition in 1991, and faced an intermittent threat of regional uprising in Kurdistan. These threats, however, appeared to be less acute than elite threats, particularly during the formative period of Saddam's rule. In the 1970s, and immediately after his assumption of the formal presidency in July 1979, popular threats were arguably low: the Kurdish insurgency that had begun in 1973 was regionally limited; the Iraqi Communist Party, the only organization with cross-cleavage national mobilization potential, had been essentially decimated by the mid-to-late 1970s; and popular uprising had never yet toppled an Iraqi leader. With respect to external threats, records show that although Saddam was concerned with the effect that the Iranian Revolution would have on Iraqi politics, he believed that war with Iran would be short and simple – similar to his belief that the United States

⁴¹ Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil–Military Relations in Iraq," p. 20.

⁴² Central Intelligence Agency, "Iraq: A Political Report," August 3, 1973, www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/89801/DOC_0000854676.pdf. See also Choucair-Vizoso, "Organizing Power"; Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, *Revolutionary Iraq: 1968–73, The Political Report Adopted by the Eighth Regional Congress of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party* (Baghdad: Al-Thawrah Publications, 1974).

⁴³ Kevin M. Woods with Michael R. Pease, Mark E. Stout, Williamson Murray, and James G. Lacey, *Iraqi Perspectives Project: A View of Operation Iraqi Freedom from Saddam's Senior Leadership* (Washington, DC: Institute for Defense Analysis), p. 7.

would not attack Iraq in 2003.⁴⁴ When external and domestic threats spiked, as they did during the Iraqi military's disastrous performance in the Iran–Iraq War, and after the 1990–91 Gulf War and the uprising in the south, some reorganization of the military and security services took place that deviated them away from the default, coup-proofed model.⁴⁵ These reforms, however, were isolated to parts of the apparatus that could not challenge Saddam for power over Iraq itself, and were short-lived; after 1991, attempts at intra-apparatus coordination broke down quickly, and Saddam reduced the size of the more inclusive regular army while maintaining the smaller, more socially exclusive units that he had tasked with regime security.⁴⁶

Saddam Hussein consistently relied on fragmentation as one of his principal tools to control the military and the security apparatus after he assumed power.⁴⁷ To counterbalance the General Security Directorate (GSD) and the Directorate of Military Intelligence, he created a parallel force, which became known as the General Directorate of Intelligence (GDI) in the early 1970s; in 1984, he followed that with an additional organization, the Special Security Organization (SSO), which became the most powerful and well-known security agency by the end of his time in power. The responsibilities of the GSD, GDI, and SSO all overlapped; the only office in Iraq that had access to full information at any time or on any issue was the Office of the President himself. The military was similarly fragmented, divided into multiple organizations: the Regular Army, the party-based Popular Army, the Republican Guard, the Special Republican Guard, and

⁴⁴ Woods *et al.*, "Saddam's Delusions"; Woods *et al.*, *Iraqi Perspectives Project*; see also Kanan Makiya, *Republic of Fear: The Politics of Modern Iraq* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998).

⁴⁵ Caitlin Talmadge, "The Puzzle of Personalist Performance: Iraqi Battlefield Effectiveness in the Iran–Iraq War," *Security Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 2 (2013), pp. 180–221.

⁴⁶ Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil–Military Relations in Iraq," p. 20.

⁴⁷ This section summarizes information drawn from Choucair-Vizoso, "Organizing Power"; Talmadge, *The Dictator's Army*; Joseph Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party: Inside an Authoritarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil–Military Relations"; Sean Boyne, "Inside Iraq's Security Network – Parts One and Two," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 9, Nos. 7–8 (July and August 1997), pp. 312–16, 365–67; Ibrahim al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," *MERIA*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (September 2002), www.rubincenter.org/2002/09/al-marashi-2002-09-01/; Mustafa Alani, "Saddam's Support Structure," in Sean McKnight, Neal Patrick, and Francis Toase, eds., *Gulf Security: Opportunities and Challenges for the New Generation* (London: RUSI, 2001), pp. 42–46; Faleh A. Jabar, *The Iraqi Army and Anti-Army: Some Reflections on the Role of the Military*, Adelphi Paper No. 354 (London: IISS, 2003).

Saddam's Fedayeen (Martyrs). As with the GDI, the Popular Army was established as a Baghdad-based Ba'thist parallel to the Regular Army in the early 1970s, while Saddam's Fedayeen were established in 1994 alongside other militias that were supposed to serve the purpose of protecting him from domestic threat.⁴⁸ The commanders of these various organizations reported directly (and only) to Saddam; the chain of command for both the Popular Army and the Republican Guard completely bypassed the regular Iraqi armed forces and the Ministry of National Defense. One regime insider later recounted of these militias and special forces, "the army had no control of them. Their instructions came only from the president's office and not from normal military channels."⁴⁹ Finally, and importantly for the process of intelligence collection and usage in domestic security, there was significant fragmentation between the military and security forces on the one hand, and the Ba'th party apparatus on the other. Saddam appeared to see the party largely as a coup-proofing device, explaining to one journalist, "with party methods, there is no chance for anyone who disagrees with us to jump on a couple of tanks and overthrow the government."⁵⁰

The coercive apparatus was also generally socially exclusive – meaning that the forces tasked with internal security were small in size, exclusively Ba'thist, staffed by members of Saddam's tribe hailing from the Tikrit area, and led by his family members.⁵¹ Saddam's son Uday ran Saddam's Fedayeen, and his younger son, Qusay, ran the SSO after the 1991 Gulf War and became the head of the Republican Guard in 2001 – despite limited military knowledge and experience (a brief frontline stint in 1984). A close friend from the party became GDI Director, and Saddam's half-brothers worked in the security apparatus as well. By 2000, Mustafa Alani noted, key positions such as the head of palace or presidential security were always

⁴⁸ Woods *et al.*, "Saddam's Delusions."

⁴⁹ Woods *et al.*, "Saddam's Delusions."

⁵⁰ David Hirst, "Terror from Tikrit," *The Guardian*, November 26, 1971, p. 15; cited in Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq," p. 18.

⁵¹ It is true that the officer corps was largely Sunni – as was Saddam – but geographic and tribal rather than religious cleavages appear to have been dominant in Iraq under Saddam. Intelligence files typically described an individual not as "Sunni" or "Shia," but simply by "Ethnicity," meaning Arab or non-Arab. Choucair-Vizoso, "Organizing Power"; Ibrahim Al-Marashi and Sammy Salama, *Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History* (New York: Routledge, 2008), pp. 114–16; Anthony Cordesman and Abraham Wagner, *The Lessons of Modern War, Vol. II: The Iran-Iraq War* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1990), p. 426.

under the direct command of an immediate family member (a group that, including in-laws and half-brothers, numbered around fifteen).⁵²

Beyond that, Saddam relied on tribal affiliations and extended kinship relations to staff the leadership of his coercive apparatus. Critical positions within his security services and Republican Guard command were filled by “around 300–400 members of Saddam’s extended family (the Tikriti clan, or certain sections of it).”⁵³ All members of the security services were required to be party members, and the percentage of soldiers who belonged to the party was higher than that of the average population as well.⁵⁴ Although some other tribes were included in the coercive apparatus initially, suspected coup plots in the early 1990s increased the rate at which these groups – including the Juburi, Dulaymi, and Ubaydi – were marginalized or excluded.⁵⁵ Competence was at best a tertiary criteria for inclusion, behind blood connection and inability to pose a threat to Saddam; former Iraqi officials later commented of General Barzan, commander of the Special Republican Guard, that, “He was Saddam’s cousin, but he had two other important qualities which made him the best man for the job ... First, he was not intelligent enough to represent a threat to the regime, and second, he was not brave enough to participate in anyone else’s plots.”⁵⁶ Further increasing the exclusivity of the coercive apparatus and contributing to coup-proofing was the frequency of rotation of military officers and officials in the coercive apparatus.⁵⁷

The Ba’th party itself represents a possible challenge to the coding of Iraq as a socially exclusive coercive apparatus, especially since it engaged in domestic intelligence-gathering and surveillance. Party inclusion increased from a reported 1.6 million in 1986 to 3.9 million in 2002, a growth rate that far outpaced the increase in the overall Iraqi population.⁵⁸ This number, however, includes a large outer ring of non-member “sympathizers”; party members seem to have comprised no more than 4 percent of the total population (around 2 million in 2003).⁵⁹ Hussein himself

⁵² Alani, “Saddam’s Support Structure.”

⁵³ Alani, “Saddam’s Support Structure”; Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party*, pp. 105–06.

⁵⁴ Choucair-Vizoso, “Organizing Power.”

⁵⁵ Hashim, “Saddam Husayn and Civil–Military Relations in Iraq,” p. 32.

⁵⁶ Woods *et al.*, “Saddam’s Delusions.”

⁵⁷ Hashim, “Saddam Husayn and Civil–Military Relations in Iraq,” p. 19.

⁵⁸ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party*, pp. 51–53. There were also some things that the party did well in terms of intelligence collection, such as rewarding the recruitment of additional party members or informants, rather than only rewarding arrests (though these were rewarded professionally and financially as well).

⁵⁹ Michael Slackman, “Baath Party is Bedrock of Hussein’s Power Base,” *Los Angeles Times*, April 5, 2003.

appears to have been of two minds on party recruitment and inclusiveness, boasting (erroneously) in 1983 that the 10 percent of the population that he identified as Ba'thists exceeded the percentage of party members in the USSR or Yugoslavia, but also simultaneously calling for reductions in party membership.⁶⁰ Most importantly for this book's purposes, however, the party apparatus was deliberately separated from the coercive agencies and blocked from sharing with them the information that it collected. Both the comparatively small size of party penetration in Iraq (especially relative to other party regimes) and the lack of institutionalized connection between the party and the coercive apparatus means that the coercive apparatus itself can safely be considered socially exclusive.

As a result of coercive institutional fragmentation, the quality of intelligence in Iraq was sub-optimal. For the most part, intelligence personnel in different organizations did not communicate with one another, and internal security agencies often not did know what other agencies whose responsibilities overlapped with their own were doing. They collected duplicate information, sometimes by the design of the Presidential Office and sometimes unintentionally, and at times wrote to Saddam to ask about actions undertaken by other agencies without their knowledge. Fragmentation between the Ba'th party and other parts of the coercive apparatus particularly hampered intelligence, given the prominence of the party in domestic intelligence-gathering. In 1989, Saddam Hussein ordered that only the Party Secretariat should hold information that the party had collected. The internal security agencies therefore could not ask lower party branches for information; every request had to go up to the agency's Directorate, be passed to either the Party Secretariat or the Presidential Office, and then go back down to the relevant party office to await an answer that went back through the same channels. At least two agencies complained that this stovepiped organizational procedure prevented cooperation and made it harder for them to protect regime security.⁶¹ Saddam also provided clear disincentives for the coercive apparatus to provide him with negative reports – punishing and even executing subordinates – to the extent that his own son Qusay hid negative findings about the regime's security readiness and performance from him.⁶²

⁶⁰ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, pp. 52–53.

⁶¹ Choucair-Vizoso, "Organizing Power"; see also *Hizb al-Ba'th al-'Arabi al-'Ishtiraki Records, 1968–2003* [Ba'th Arab Socialist Party Regional Command Collection (BRCC)], Boxfiles dataset, Hoover Institution Archives, collection description online at <http://pdf.oac.cdlib.org/pdf/hoover/2009C50.pdf>.

⁶² Woods *et al.*, "Saddam's Delusions."

At one point, Saddam told the Iraqi intelligence agencies not to give him their analysis of the United States, because analysis was “his specialty” – making most of his decisions based on his own instincts and a process of introspection conducted in near-complete isolation.

The social exclusivity of the regime also contributed to domestic intelligence problems, particularly in the areas that were excluded from the coercive apparatus. Collection was often haphazard, communication across the intelligence apparatus was inefficient, and a number of blind spots existed. On more than one occasion, party memos noted the difficulty of identifying the leaders of tribes, especially those outside of central Iraq that had been excluded from the regime and from the intelligence and coercive apparatus.⁶³ Saddam’s regime particularly struggled to establish intelligence networks in the Kurdish areas. Despite offering additional incentives for the recruitment of locals, and even for party members from other areas of Iraq who might agree to work in Kurdish areas, the regime had problems finding enough people to participate, especially Kurdish speakers.⁶⁴

This lack of intelligence and the incentives provided to a fragmented and internally competitive security apparatus both stoked higher violence and repression. Where intelligence was poor, higher levels of less discriminate violence resulted; in one case, the security forces knew only that a university student named Sabah was suspected of dissident activity, so they arrested and killed all thirty-nine individuals they could find who fit that description.⁶⁵ As Sassoon describes it, “terrorizing the population had a random quality to it,” rather than one guided by informed knowledge of who was actually engaged in anti-regime activity.⁶⁶ Kurdish areas were treated particularly harshly; Iraqi records show that in a single town in northern Iraq, arrest warrants were issued for over 100 people in the space of less than a week.⁶⁷ Party branches and coercive agencies were also under continual and competitive pressure to report and neutralize anti-regime (and especially anti-Saddam) activity. They were required to regularly report the number of arrests made, arms captured, and assets confiscated from those who were opponents of the regime; good performers were provided with financial rewards, medals, and promotions.⁶⁸

⁶³ Choucair-Vizoso, “Organizing Power.”

⁶⁴ Choucair-Vizoso, “Organizing Power.”

⁶⁵ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party*, p. 197.

⁶⁶ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party*, p. 197.

⁶⁷ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party*, p. 217.

⁶⁸ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein’s Ba’th Party*, pp. 88–89; Choucair-Vizoso, “Organizing Power.”

Although party branches were also incentivized based on recruitment numbers and intelligence provided, the competitive pressure to produce arrests, combined with the relative importance accorded to arrest statistics in the reporting scale used to assess organizational success, led to inflated violence and further intelligence problems. One examination of local reporting showed that most of the information provided on who was engaging in criticism or oppositional activity was unsubstantiated.⁶⁹

Unsurprisingly, Saddam Hussein's regime is known for its violence and brutality. Complete statistics on "coercive outputs" during Saddam's tenure have not been tallied, but there is little question that state violence in Iraq under Saddam Hussein was comparatively high – including violence both within the coercive apparatus and against the population at large. In multiple cases across years, some of them fabricated, Saddam used one security agency to purge and punish, often execute, members of another agency: over 2,000 officers in 1968–69, almost 30 in 1970, an unknown number in 1978, at least 66 in the initial power transition of 1979, over 50 in 1989, 135 in 1992, at least 10–12 in 1995–96, over 300 in another coup plot in 1996, at least 24 in 1999, etc.⁷⁰ Violence against Iraq's civilian population was also high: Human Rights Watch estimated in 2003 that a total of 290,000 civilians had disappeared or were executed during Saddam Hussein's reign: an average of well over 12,000 per year.⁷¹ Much of that violence was indiscriminate, occurring in mass killings and prison "cleansings." The fact that state violence appears to have been

⁶⁹ Sassoon, *Saddam Hussein's Ba'th Party*, p. 89.

⁷⁰ Hashim, "Saddam Husayn and Civil-Military Relations in Iraq."

⁷¹ This estimate includes the following: "more than 100,000 Kurds killed during the 1987–88 Anfal campaign and lead-up to it; between 50,000 and 70,000 Shi'a arrested in the 1980s and held indefinitely without charge, who remain unaccounted for today; an estimated 8,000 males of the Barzani clan removed from resettlement camps in Iraqi Kurdistan in 1983; 10,000 or more males separated from Feyli Kurdish families deported to Iran in the 1980s; an estimated 50,000 opposition activists, including Communists and other leftists, Kurds and other minorities, and out-of-favor Ba'thists, arrested and "disappeared" in the 1980s and 1990s; some 30,000 Iraqi Shi'a men rounded up after the abortive March 1991 uprising and not heard from since; hundreds of Shi'a clerics and their students arrested and "disappeared" after 1991; several thousand marsh Arabs who disappeared after being taken into custody during military operations in the southern marshlands; and those executed in detention – in some years several thousand – in so-called 'prison cleansing' campaigns." Quote from Human Rights Watch, *Iraq: State of the Evidence* (November 2004), footnote 47, www.hrw.org/node/11910/section/5. See also Human Rights Watch, *Justice for Iraq: A Human Rights Watch Policy Paper*, December 2002; Human Rights Watch, "Iraq: The Mass Graves of Al Mahawil," Vol. 15, No. 5 (May 2003); Human Rights Watch, "Iraq: The Death Penalty, Executions, and Prison Cleansing," March 2003, www.hrw.org/legacy/background/mena/iraq031103.htm.

particularly high against Iraqi Kurds, who were social outsiders and an intelligence blind spot for Saddam's regime, is consistent with the theory outlined in this book.⁷²

Alternative explanations provide a relatively weak level of insight into both the construction of Saddam's coercive apparatus and his use of it to engage in state violence. Institutional inheritance is a weak predictor of Saddam's coercive institutional type; he modified the institutions that he inherited when he came to power, and continued to do so throughout his tenure. In terms of external influence, although he reportedly modeled his civil-military relations practices on those of Stalin, this was a choice rather than an imposed decision, since he amply demonstrated the ability to modify any template or existing framework to suit his changing needs. With respect to patterns of state violence, international influence seems to have had little impact, except to heighten fears of coup plots backed by external powers – meaning that it simply contributed to his existing perception that elite threats were dominant. State capacity was, as in other cases, a quality that was manipulated by Saddam to serve the interests of regime and personal survival, and not something that had an independent impact on coercive outputs. Explanations based on regime life cycle and empirical endogeneity do not appear to correlate with what we know about patterns of violence; there was indeed a high level of violence at the beginning of Saddam's tenure (whether counted informally to be 1968 or formally as 1979), but that did not enable lower levels of violence later. Perhaps the most difficult explanation to rule out is correlation with popular threat, since the targets and timing of episodes of high levels of violence do correlate with heightened popular threat (especially if one includes regional resistance in Kurdish areas). Explanations grounded in popular threat, however, do not explain the large amount of violence that existed within the coercive apparatus as a result of inter-agency competition and fragmentation, or why the regime did not seriously consider reforming its coercive apparatus to gain better intelligence on the nature of these threats. The strength of an explanation focused on dominant perceived threat and coercive institutional design, therefore, is that it can explain the widest possible set of empirical implications of the regime's behavior.

⁷² Violence against the Kurds was so clear and so high that Human Rights Watch has argued that the 1998 Anfal campaign, for example, constituted genocide. Human Rights Watch, *Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against The Kurds* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).

Although Saddam Hussein faced significant threats from external actors as well as regional rebellion, the dominant threat that he perceived was an elite one from his own military and coercive apparatus. He therefore created internal security institutions that were fragmented and exclusive. These organizations suffered from flawed intelligence both externally and domestically as a result, and had strong professional incentives to engage in violence. These dynamics help explain the brutality and high levels of state violence that pervaded Saddam Hussein's dictatorship.

CONCLUSION

The cases above suggest that the arguments of this book apply to authoritarian regimes of various types in regions of the world beyond East Asia. The dynamics identified in Chapter 2 are consistently correlated with predicted outcomes in terms of both coercive institutional design and patterns of state violence – both in and outside East Asia, and across military, single-party, and personalist regime types. Saddam Hussein, who principally feared a coup, created a fragmented and socially exclusive coercive apparatus that engaged in high levels of state violence. The party leadership in East Germany and Pinochet in Chile, however, both came to perceive their dominant threat as one of popular unrest, and reformed their coercive institutions to be unitary and inclusive as a result, producing decreases in state violence when they did so. Together, these cases provide evidence that the arguments advanced in this book are generalizable beyond East Asia, illuminating the origins of coercive institutions and their influence on state violence under authoritarianism worldwide.

Conclusion

This book has developed the first rigorous, comparative, and empirically documented theory of the origins and operation of authoritarian coercive institutions. Coercion is central to theories of the state and to our intuitive understanding of dictatorship, yet political scientists have largely overlooked the variation that exists across the institutions that manage domestic surveillance, repression, and violence. The strategies of repression and patterns of violence that these regimes employ also differ in ways not fully explainable by existing theories. Simply put, authoritarian coercive institutions are not all alike, and neither is the violence that they produce. Today, when political developments in non-democratic regimes shape the fate of billions of individuals and shift the contours of global politics, it is important to understand why. This concluding chapter briefly reviews the main findings of the book, draws out the implications of the work for scholarship and policy, and identifies questions raised by the findings that suggest directions for future research.

MAIN FINDINGS

The first half of this book examined the origins of coercive institutions, and explored the reasons for variations in their structure and social composition. It posited that autocrats face a “coercive dilemma”: a fundamental tradeoff between optimizing their internal security apparatus to deal with a popular threat, or coup-proofing it to defend against elite rivals. Coup-proofing against elite threats typically creates an internally fragmented security force, drawn from narrow and exclusive segments of society. Managing popular unrest, on the other hand, calls for a unitary,

non-fragmented apparatus with broadly embedded, socially inclusive intelligence networks. Chapters 3, 4, and 5 demonstrated that autocrats construct coercive institutions based on whichever threat they perceive to be dominant at the time they come to power. Institutional inheritance and external influence are not immaterial, but they are rarely, if ever, decisive when it comes to coercive institutional design – not surprising since the fate of the autocrat himself rests on the performance of these institutions.

The second half of the book examined the effect of variations in coercive institutional structure and social composition on patterns of state violence. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 demonstrated that different coercive organizational characteristics give rise to predictable variations in state violence. A more fragmented, socially exclusive internal security apparatus – the configuration associated with a high initial threat from elites – is likely to be more violent, both because it has stronger social and professional incentives to engage in violence and because it lacks the intelligence capacity to engage in discriminate, pre-emptive, and more limited forms of repression. The unitary and inclusive nature of mass-oriented coercive institutions, on the other hand, provides them with material and social incentives to minimize violence and strengthens the intelligence capacity required for targeted, discriminate, and pre-emptive policing.

Chapter 3 showed that, prior to 1949, Chiang Kai-shek's coercive apparatus was oriented toward protecting him from the elite rivals he faced on the mainland. As a result, it was fragmented and excluded native Taiwanese, and state violence on Taiwan was high. The move to Taiwan in 1949 caused Chiang to re-evaluate his threat environment, however, and he became convinced that staying in power required him first and foremost to deal with the threat of popular unrest. In the early 1950s, he instituted a series of reforms of the coercive apparatus, reducing fragmentation and increasing the number of Taiwanese involved in intelligence provision. Chapter 6 showed that these reforms altered the incentives of Taiwan's coercive agents to restrain their use of violence and improved their capacity for domestic surveillance and pre-emption. As a result, state violence dropped in the mid-1950s and remained low thereafter.

By contrast, Chapter 4 demonstrated that Ferdinand Marcos was motivated primarily by the threat of insider removal posed by his own security forces and the elite families that have traditionally dominated Philippine politics. To protect himself, Marcos fostered fragmentation among several different internal security agencies and decreased the inclusivity of his coercive apparatus by reducing the number of police and preferentially

hiring people from his own ethnic Ilocano and clan networks. Chapter 7 traced the ways in which these organizational characteristics provided Marcos' coercive agents both social and material incentives toward higher violence. It also documented the extent to which organizational design handicapped the intelligence that might have enabled the coercive agencies to deal with the Philippine population using methods other than indiscriminate brutality. Because of these dynamics, state violence against civilians rose steadily from the time Marcos declared martial law in 1972 until he was ousted in 1986.

In South Korea, the subject of Chapters 5 and 8, the presence of an existential external threat gave operational control of the Republic of Korea military to the United States, and limited South Korean autocrats' ability to manipulate the military itself. This made the military unitary and inclusive, and kept state violence in South Korea comparatively low in cross-national perspective. Outside of the military, however, the degree of coup-proofing that Park Chung Hee and Chun Doo Hwan engaged in correlated with each autocrat's beliefs about the dominant threat, and shaped the patterns of state violence experienced under the tenure of each president. As a democratically elected leader, Park Chung Hee began with a more inclusive and less fragmented security apparatus, but his shift toward autocratic rule was associated with an increasing emphasis on elite threats. As Park relied more and more on a trusted network of military-educated Kyöngsang men and on rivalry between different security agencies to assure himself of power, his coercive apparatus became increasingly fragmented and regionally exclusive. This explains the relatively higher level of state violence under Park, the intra-apparatus nature of some of the arrests and punishments, and the fact that that violence was disproportionately targeted at Kyöngsang's rival region, Chölla – including the Kwangju crackdown of 1980. By contrast, Park's successor Chun Doo Hwan faced a major popular uprising in his first months in power and feared assassination as a result of popular resentment; accordingly, he reduced fragmentation and made the riot police more inclusive. These measures reduced state violence and made it less regionally biased, and also made the coercive apparatus increasingly resistant to the repressive work that it was asked to do.

In all three countries, under all four autocrats, a perception of elite threats as dominant correlated with fragmentation and social exclusivity in the coercive apparatus. These organizational characteristics created incentives and intelligence handicaps that led to less discriminate

TABLE 10.1. *Explanatory success of theory vs. alternatives: coercive institutional origins*

Case	Dominant perceived threat	Path dependence	External influence
Taiwan	Yes	No (indeterminate)	No
Philippines	Yes	No (reverses)	No
S. Korea (Park)	Yes	No (reverses)	No/partial
S. Korea (Chun)	Yes	No (reverses)	No/partial

and higher levels of state violence. The perception that mass or popular threats were most critical, on the other hand, correlated with a unitary and inclusive security apparatus that possessed better intelligence on the population and incentives to avoid acting violently against it.

This project is the first comparative study of the origins, design, and operations of authoritarian coercive institutions. Throughout the book, the theory presented in Chapter 2 was compared to the most prominent and likely alternative explanations. In each chapter on the origins of the coercive apparatus, my theory about the origins of coercive institutions was tested against two prominent alternative explanations for institutional origin: path dependence and external influence. The results of these tests are summarized in Table 10.1

Path dependence is generally unpersuasive because every autocrat analyzed here was able to redesign the coercive institutions that he inherited. External influence exerted some effect on the design of the coercive apparatus in the two South Korean cases, but did not explain institutional variation in the non-military coercive apparatus. In the cases of Taiwan and the Philippines, external factors had the greatest influence indirectly, by influencing autocratic perceptions of the dominant threat, rather than having a direct effect on the design of the coercive apparatus. Explanations based on the dominant perceived threat outperformed the alternative explanations in every case, and provide a particularly convincing cumulative explanation when compared to alternatives across all four cases.

To test the explanatory power of my theory for patterns of state violence, I examined its performance relative to a number of alternatives. These alternatives included rising popular threat, state and organizational capacity, international influence, regime life cycle, and empirical endogeneity. The relative performance of these explanations is summarized in Table 10.2.

TABLE 10.2. *Explanatory success of theory vs. alternatives: patterns of state violence*

Case	Coercive institutions	International influence	State/org. capacity	Rising threat	Life cycle	Empirical endogeneity
Taiwan	Yes	No	No	No	Partial	Partial
Philippines	Yes	No	No	Partial	No	Partial
S.Korea (Park)	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
S.Korea (Chun)	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	Partial

Across the cases examined here, *international influence* tended to have an effect on overall political liberalization, but was not strongly correlated with patterns of state violence against civilians. *State and organizational capacity* provided little explanatory leverage, largely because they did not act as fixed causal variables but were epiphenomenal attributes manipulated by the autocrat in specific ways that depended on his perception of dominant threat. Levels of *popular threat* offered a plausible explanation for rising violence in the Philippines, but throughout the cases (including that one), the use of violence by the state – particularly indiscriminate violence – actually more often preceded and caused mobilization and opposition rather resulted from it. *Regime life cycle* applied at best to two of the four cases, and, given the peaceful nature of Taiwan's retrocession, offered a fully convincing explanation for only one (Chun Doo Hwan in South Korea).

An explanation grounded in *empirical endogeneity* – the idea that state violence at one particular time changes the ability of people to engage in opposition, and therefore raises or lowers the need for subsequent violence – is perhaps the hardest explanation to rule out, as it provides some insight into several of the cases examined here. However, this is in part because endogeneity of violence seems to be linked to, and perhaps the product of, coercive institutional development. In each case, at different points in time, one could argue that the autocrat was using violence to try to deter future opposition activity. The question, then, is why some efforts at deterrence and coercion succeed while others fail. The chapters in this book suggest that the answer lies at least partly in the coercive institutions that are constructed by the autocrats. The development of a coercive capacity based on surveillance and pre-emption – rather than continued indiscriminate violence used in an attempt at popular deterrence – is more likely to achieve the end of suppressing opposition than other institutional configurations because of the certainty of

detection and punishment that this kind of system can provide. Lower levels of state violence later in these cases is evidence that the regime has developed an effective coercive capacity geared toward managing popular threat, and the chapters in this book explain the process by which that outcome is achieved.

The theory proposed here has more explanatory power than the alternatives in predicting patterns of state violence across country, space, and time. It is particularly strong when one considers its power to explain the timing and targets of violence and the processes that drive particular incidents, as well as when its performance is evaluated cumulatively across multiple cases. For almost every case, either in this book or outside it, readers will be able to identify at least one plausible alternative explanation. One cannot, however, convincingly argue that any single explanation, if constructed in an *ex ante* falsifiable manner, is capable of explaining multiple types of variation across multiple cases better than the theory based on the characteristics of authoritarian coercive institutions proposed here.

CONTRIBUTIONS TO SCHOLARSHIP AND POLICY

This book has sought to advance our knowledge of authoritarianism, repression, and political violence, particularly in East Asia. Substantively speaking, it draws on new historical data on the processes and decisions that led to the creation of coercive institutions in Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea during the Cold War. The data also show how these authoritarian regimes' coercive institutions influenced violence, illustrating two key linking mechanisms: one grounded in the intelligence capacity of these institutions, and another related to the incentives for or against violence that these institutions provided to coercive agents. Much of the documentary and interview evidence brought to bear in these chapters has not appeared before in English-language scholarship, and fills a gap in our knowledge of the political history of these countries.

Theoretically, the book presents a novel argument about authoritarian coercive institutions and their importance for state violence. Drawing on insights from the fields of civil-military relations and security studies, it outlines the autocratic coercive dilemma and proposes an explanation for the origins of the coercive apparatus, explaining why an autocrat is likely to select a particular organizational structure and pattern of social composition over other alternative institutional frameworks. This book's explanation addresses a gap in the recent literature on authoritarianism and authoritarian political institutions, which has yet to comparatively

analyze the institutions that govern and regulate violence on behalf of the autocrat. In proposing an answer to this question, the book rejects common assumptions that dictators see threats objectively, as well as the idea that their institutions are either inherited and path dependent or continuously and rationally optimized to address changing threats. Rather, it adopts a framework based on the systematic presence of informational problems under dictatorship that offers new and clear predictions about the conditions and timing under which these institutions are most likely to be formed and re-formed.

Second, the book presents an original argument about how and why coercive institutional design matters for state violence: by shaping the incentives and intelligence capacity of the organizations that carry it out. It expands our aperture on state violence to include forms of violence that occur outside a protest context and that have therefore been difficult to observe and analyze, and predicts when and where we are likely to see a rise in state violence against civilians, as well as what mechanisms are likely to drive these outcomes. This information is likely to be useful to both scholars and policymakers who are interested in predicting outcomes such as human rights violations, political instability, and the trajectory of conflicts that may precipitate a demand for American or international intervention.

The argument advanced in this book challenges much of the existing theoretical work on the determinants of repression, which suggests that autocrats respond to increasing threats with increasing violence. I agree with scholars who make these arguments that autocrats are driven to use violence by a sense of threat, but disagree about the process by which autocratic leaders' threats and insecurities are translated into political violence. Dictators are more sophisticated than the current literature suggests. Rather than simply cracking down on protestors after their numbers have multiplied, autocrats think more strategically, focus more on institutional creation, adopt a longer timeframe, and seek more deterrent and pre-emptive capabilities than we often give them credit for – thereby producing a very different relationship between threat and violence than the one that dominates our present thinking. Paradoxically, and in contrast to the existing threat-based explanations of repression, the project demonstrates that autocrats who are truly concerned about popular threats use less violence rather than more, and do so because they mobilize organizations that they have designed expressly for that purpose. In these organizations, intelligence becomes a substitute and a guiding hand for violence; citizens relinquish their

privacy, but less often their lives. Thus, this manuscript depicts a fundamentally different understanding of repression and why it varies – a phenomenon that is central to authoritarian rule, and yet poorly understood and theorized.

The book also re-interprets existing theoretical concepts by applying them to new areas of research in contentious politics, repression, and conflict. It shows that social and ethnic cleavages, commonly discussed in the literature on civil war, are also commonly and predictably manipulated as part of a coherent strategy for institution-building (or the lack of it) under authoritarian rule. It identifies conditions under which an autocrat is likely either to exclude parts of society based on those cleavages, or to opt for a broader base of participation. It also challenges existing scholarship to broaden the meaning of “inclusion” beyond participation in the normatively positive attributes of political life, to include participation as well in the more morally fraught processes of surveillance and violence involving one’s fellow citizens. Accounts from people who have lived under authoritarianism suggest that this dynamic matters to the people who live under dictatorship – that in these systems, it is not simply the scale of violence, but the opportunity that some regimes provide for ordinary people to participate in the work of repression against their friends, neighbors, and even family members that makes the distorted social fabric of life under authoritarianism so disturbing.

Finally, the book provides detailed empirical evidence on the role of intelligence in determining the scope and intensity of state violence. In existing studies, information is empirically difficult to observe, and is often presumed to be uniformly desirable since the lack of it leads to costly conflict. These chapters suggest that the priority placed on information and the precise type of information desired vary systematically with the political interests of the autocrat. Knowing which autocrats face perceived elite threats that will lead them to handicap their domestic intelligence organizations should help identify cases in which information gaps or asymmetries render a country prone to particular types of internal conflict.

The project’s findings also have implications for policy. American foreign policymakers devote an enormous amount of time and attention to training and “capacity-building” for overseas security forces; human rights advocates press authoritarian governments to improve their treatment of particular dissidents; constructivists recommend policies designed to diffuse human rights norms worldwide. This project suggests

that interventions at the level of policy are not likely to be especially fruitful investments unless they are accompanied by interventions to shape institutional structure – tasks that are often less appealing or interesting to policymakers, and that are also often very difficult. Indeed, this book helps identify several of the reasons why institutional reform is so challenging. The fundamental interests and personal, often idiosyncratic, perceptions of autocratic leaders drive the creation and management of these institutions, making them all the more difficult to alter from outside. Moreover, in many cases, the feasible policies available to the United States or the international community may not be morally acceptable; one can hardly imagine foreign assistance that encourages dictators to consolidate their forces into a single powerful secret police with the capacity for intensive surveillance, even if that kind of reform would lead to a drop in violence. Good policy, however, is policy that works, and a realistic sense of limitations can help to focus efforts and resources where they are likely to make the biggest difference. It will do little good to spend millions of dollars training foreign policemen who will be fired eight months later because they are not trusted by the country's political leaders, or who will only be retained and promoted if their body counts are sufficiently high. Even if the cases where the United States and the international community can plausibly press for institutional reform are less numerous, it is important to realize that those changes are the ones most likely to create systematic improvement in the treatment of citizens and to alleviate human suffering at the hands of the government.

REMAINING QUESTIONS AND DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

This book has sought to develop a rigorous, comparative, and empirically substantiated understanding of the origins of authoritarian coercive institutions and their coercive outputs. Its arguments and the evidence presented to support them inevitably have limitations, and much more research could be done to extend and augment the book's findings. These fall into four basic categories: further testing the generalizability and scope of the book's argument; theorizing the origins of autocratic threat perceptions; leveraging the book's framework to clarify the relationship between repression and mobilization; and unpacking whether and how different coercive institutional structures might influence the foreign policy behavior of autocrats.

Generalizability and scope

First, although Chapter 9 provided readers with reason to believe that the book's arguments travel to a broad set of authoritarian regimes, this framework could be applied to and tested on other cases through a large-*n* analysis. The research design employed here deliberately focused on understanding causal mechanisms at a fine-grained level of detail within a relatively small number of cases, and prioritized historical accuracy and theoretical development at the expense of testing for full generalizability. Generalizing the theory will require detailed knowledge of many cases that can only be accumulated through a significant expenditure of time and resources, and that may encounter fundamental limitations posed by the closed nature of authoritarian regimes' inner processes. It will be difficult, for example, to use this theory to make falsifiable predictions about how a particular autocrat will construct coercive institutions unless we are able to obtain a fairly good understanding of how he perceives the threats around him – information that may be difficult to find for the full universe of dictators since 1945. Operationalization will also present a challenge for cross-national testing. For example, because the criteria by which exclusivity is defined depends on countries' different social cleavages, coding it accurately will require deep knowledge not only of a particular polity's social dynamics, but of how major cleavages are translated, or not, into the various coercive agencies. Finally, research on state violence under authoritarianism must take on the grim and difficult task of tallying the dead; the examples in this book have illustrated that estimates of the scope and level of violence made from outside a closed regime have often proved to be inaccurate once the dictator falls and archives are opened. Cross-national data collection and testing, therefore, is a promising if challenging avenue for future research.

Related to the question of generalizability, the theory's scope conditions could be further refined. In particular, it would be useful to explore the puzzling finding that in a specific handful of regimes, the arguments made in this book appear to be a smaller part of the causal story on violence than they are elsewhere: regimes that are both revolutionary and communist, such as China and North Korea.¹ The book's arguments do shed some light on the construction of the coercive apparatus in these cases; both Mao and Kim Il Sung turned to full-scale efforts

¹ As we saw in Chapter 9, the book's arguments apply to the non-revolutionary communist case of East Germany.

at popular control only after having eliminated elite rivals: Mao after the Long March and Kim Il Sung after the purges of the 1950s.² In China, this effort produced a Ministry of Public Security (MPS) that was – under normal conditions – attuned to the costs of excessive violence and reliant on fine-grained intelligence generated by deliberately inclusive forces to create alternative methods of social control.³ In North Korea, however, Kim Jong Il faced a much more serious threat from senior military and security elites than his father did, and consistently used both institutional fragmentation (across the newly created State Security Department, Ministry of Public Security, and Military Security Command) and social exclusivity (defined by membership in a handful of elite revolutionary families) throughout his time in power to manage his coercive apparatus.⁴ These outcomes are consistent with the theory of coercive institutional origins proposed by this book.

The book's arguments also explain some of the texture and rhythm of everyday repression under revolutionary communism. In China, good intelligence generally led to more discriminate repression by public security offices, but at specific times, organizational incentives for violence fanned its expansive and indiscriminate use by coercive agents – as when Mao tasked the MPS to kill 0.1 percent of the population during the counter-revolutionary campaigns of the 1950s.⁵ In cases of particularly high levels of state violence, like the Cultural Revolution, scholars have

² For a fuller discussion of this history, see Sheena Chestnut Greitens, "Coercive Institutions and State Violence Under Authoritarianism," PhD dissertation, Harvard University, 2013.

³ Michael Schoenhals, *Spying for the People: Mao's Secret Agents, 1949–67* (Cambridge University Press, 2013).

⁴ Andrei Lankov, *From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945–60* (New Brunswick: Rutgers, 2002); Andrei Lankov, *North of the DMZ: Essays on Daily Life in North Korea* (Jefferson, NC: MacFarland, 2007), pp. 170–71; Andrei Lankov, "The Repressive System and Political Control in North Korea," online article enlarged and reworked in English from a chapter printed in *Severnaia Koreia: vchera i segodnia* [North Korea: Yesterday and Today] (Moscow: Vostochnaia Literatura, 1995), p. 12; Ken Gause, *Coercion, Control, Surveillance, and Punishment: An Examination of the North Korean Police State* (Washington, DC: Committee on Human Rights in North Korea, 2012); Kongdan Oh and Ralph Hassig, *North Korea Through the Looking Glass* (Washington: Brookings, 2000), pp. 115, 138; Joseph Bermudez, *Shield of the Great Leader: The Armed Forces of North Korea* (St Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 2001), pp. 177–78.

⁵ Guo Xuezhi, *China's Security State: Philosophy, Evolution, and Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 66–67; Li Changyu, "Mao's Killing Quotas," *China Rights Forum*, No. 4 (2005), pp. 41–44; Yang Kuisong, "Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 193 (March 2008), pp. 102–21.

found that elite conflict and coup fears;⁶ fragmentation and organizational or factional conflict;⁷ and social cleavages⁸ all acted as contributing factors to violence and as variables that shaped the specific forms that violence took. Yet there is no question that the book's arguments fall short in explaining why these systems produced some of the highest levels of violence thought to have existed under any political system, as well as some of human history's most extreme human suffering. No systematic historical data exists on the number of people subjected to state violence under these two regimes, but they appear to have been two of the most destructive and violent political systems ever to exist – true outliers in their use of violence against their own citizens.⁹ Little in the theory proposed here can explain why this was the outcome.

Extreme cases are likely to have extreme causes, and so it is perhaps unsurprising that a theory aimed at explaining the everyday rhythms of repression falls short when it comes to these outliers. Indeed, for these cases of revolutionary communism, it is not so much that the arguments that drive this book are absent, or that their presence does not produce state violence. Rather, it is that they explain a smaller fraction of the much higher total amount of state violence that takes place. Most

⁶ See speech by Lin Biao in Roderick MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao's Last Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 38. Mao also paid particular attention to the CIA-backed coup against Iraq in February 1963; see Schoenhals, *Spying for the People*, p. 79.

⁷ Andrew G. Walder, *Fractured Rebellion: The Beijing Red Guard Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009); Lynn T. White III, *Policies of Chaos: The Organizational Causes of Violence in China's Cultural Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press).

⁸ There is also some evidence against the book's arguments: pre-existing factional divisions did not always determine participation in or victimization by state violence, and rural violence, at least, appears to have fallen along lineage or other "communal" group lines, rather than along the boundaries of class-caste that the CCP had so carefully constructed. Yang Su, *Collective Killings in Rural China during the Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).

⁹ Mao's China is thought to have killed almost 75 million people from 1949–1987, although this includes an estimated 35 million deaths during the Great Leap Forward, some of which came from resisting regime policies, but many of which came from simple starvation and extreme policy failure. One calculation places the political death toll in North Korea somewhere between 700,000 and 3.5 million; human rights advocates estimate that 200,000 North Koreans – around 1 percent of the population – are presently confined to political prison camps where they are starved, overworked, and treated brutally. R.J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1994); R.J. Rummel, *China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1991); R.J. Rummel, *Statistics of Democide* (Rutgers: Transaction Publishers, 1998); David Hawk, *The Hidden Gulag* (Washington, DC: Committee on Human Rights in North Korea, 2nd edn., 2012).

of the high violence in China and North Korea appears to have been driven by the fact that these regimes adopted much more ambitious goals than mere autocratic survival – usually involving the fundamental transformation of society through revolution – and a correspondingly higher willingness to use violence to achieve their ends.¹⁰ Revolutionary motivations therefore seem to have endowed these autocrats with an unusually high tolerance for violence, while communist organization provided an unusual capacity to carry it out. Further research could examine how the organization and use of coercion in these regimes differs from other cases of authoritarian government, and what the precise characteristics of revolutionary communism are – ideology, a transformational agenda, Leninist organization, the experience of seizing power by revolution – that seem to make these systems so uniquely violent.

Theorizing the origins of threat perception

As explained in Chapter 2, this manuscript by necessity takes autocratic threat perception as historically given. A further step in research, however, could explore and systematically theorize how various factors shape the relative threat perceptions of autocrats. Although an autocrat's path to power did not systematically correlate with coercive institutional type in the cases examined here, the apparent exceptionalism of revolutionary regimes raises the prospect that – at least in some subset of cases – how a regime comes to power could influence its later perceptions of threat and propensity toward certain types of coercive institutions. Moreover, if the organizational tradeoff posited under my theory exists for all authoritarian regimes, then these regimes should have been most vulnerable to an elite or coup threat. Yet this does not seem to have been the case; revolutionary communist regimes historically (with a few possible exceptions) do not experience coups d'état. Does this mean that the actual or perceived risk of a coup is lower in these regimes? If so, why? Conversely, one might well ask why the regimes that seem obsessed with coup-proofing so often fail to successfully accomplish it. What determines whether or not an autocrat's coup-proofing strategies will be successful? Other questions about the origins of threat perceptions emerge from cases of succession and generational turnover within

¹⁰ Julia C. Strauss, "Communist Revolution and Political Terror," in S.A. Smith, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 355–70.

autocracies: how does succession affect a regime's threat perceptions? In short, much more research could be done to understand and theorize the origins of threat perceptions under dictatorship.

Unpacking autocratic foreign policy

A better understanding of the coercive institutions of dictatorship may also help explain their foreign policy behavior. The coercive apparatus is a key part of the "audience" that is thought to condition the propensity of authoritarian regimes to become involved in international conflict: the set of actors that can implement *ex post* punishment against leaders who adopt risky or unpopular foreign policies.¹¹ Rather than using regime type as a measure of the identity and preferences of the domestic audience, this book suggests that we should look more closely at precise attributes of the coercive apparatus to understand when and how they might conceivably decide to remove an autocrat from office (and how an autocrat might seek to counter that possibility).

Beyond the logic of audience costs, a better understanding of the coercive apparatus may help illuminate authoritarian foreign policy in cases where the boundaries between internal and external security are permeable, and where institutions and assets are sometimes deployed to address both challenges. (In China, for example, the People's Liberation Army is organized into domestically based regions, while domestic law enforcement assets have been employed in maritime territorial disputes with other countries.) Existing scholarship on the domestic role of the military, in Asia and more broadly, has not yet been complemented by analysis of domestic security organizations' operations abroad – an area that is ripe for future investigation.

Clarifying the effects of repression on mobilization

A final set of questions that bears further investigation emerges from debate over the effects of repression. As explained at the beginning of this book, political science has typically modeled violent repression as a linear and efficient response to increases in threat. Although repression is sometimes effective in quelling dissent, it can also backfire and trigger

¹¹ Weeks, "Strongmen and Strawmen"; Jessica L.P. Weeks, *Dictators at War and Peace* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014).

more radical protest – an outcome that should be unlikely if repression is actually being efficiently calibrated.

The framework advanced here, however, may help to explain and predict when repression is likely to serve the ends of an autocrat, and when it will be counterproductive to them. If repression is indiscriminate, then it is uncorrelated with the actual behavior of individuals, and the probability of being repressed is essentially random. This leaves individuals no reason not to engage in subversive activity: since the probability of repression does not depend on one's actual behavior, one might as well act, even if there is only a small chance that subversive activity will result in a change of regime. Preliminary data gathered during this project suggests that dissidents faced with the prospect of blindly indiscriminate violence adopted exactly this line of thinking, thereby catalyzing both individual and collective action against the dictatorship. Moreover, if these same dissidents are from parts of society that have been excluded from regime intelligence networks, they are more likely to be able to mobilize, organize, and cooperate without being detected, leading to a greater chance of success. Thus, if regimes with certain coercive institutional designs are more likely to engage in indiscriminate violence, and if it is *indiscriminate* violence that catalyzes opposition – especially opposition that can organize undetected – then understanding the creation and operation of coercive institutions may also provide new insight into the social and institutional factors that underpin authoritarian power and durability.

CONCLUSION

The preceding pages have sought to systematically unpack the motivations and mechanisms that drive the use of violence under dictatorship. By focusing on the organizations and individuals who carry out that violence, this book has argued, we can better understand the use of repression and the role that it plays in an autocrat's pursuit of political survival. It offers a first step toward understanding these leaders' thinking and behavior and the consequences of their choices about coercion and violence – for the authoritarian regimes themselves, for countries that deal with them, and for the millions of people who live under their rule.

Appendix

A note on sources

Materials for this book were drawn from the following libraries, archives, and collections:

United States

Harvard University Libraries (Harvard Yenching Library, Fung Library, University Archives)
National Archives and Records Administration (College Park, MD)
National Security Archives, George Washington University (Washington, DC)
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library (Boston, MA)
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library (Independence, MO)
Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University (Stanford, CA)
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University (Princeton, NJ)

Taiwan

Academia Sinica (various libraries and collections)
Institute of Modern History Archives, Academia Sinica
National Central Library
National Taiwan University Library
Academia Historica Archives
Kuomintang Party History Archives
National Archives Administration
Compensation Foundation
Taiwan Association for Truth and Reconciliation

China

National Library
Foreign Ministry Archives

South Korea

Seoul National University Library
National Assembly Library
Kim Dae Jung Presidential Library and Archives, Yonsei University
Woon Am Institute/Rhee Syngman Library, Yonsei University
Korea Democracy Foundation Library and Archives

Philippines

University of the Philippines (various libraries and University Archives)
Lopez Museum and Library
National Library of the Philippines
Intelligence Services of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Commission on Human Rights
Task Force Detainees of the Philippines, Museum of Courage and
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