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Pathways to democratization in personalist dictatorships

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Personalist dictatorships make up an increasingly large proportion of the world's dictatorships. Moreover, they tend to be particularly resistant to democratization. Understanding the conditions that increase the likelihood of democratic transitions in personalist contexts, therefore, is critical for the study and practice of democratization in the contemporary era. This study argues that political party creation is a key factor. Though personalist dictators typically create parties to offset immediate threats to their power posed by the elite – and particularly the military – doing so encourages peaceful mass mobilization and a realignment of elite networks. These dynamics, in turn, enhance prospects of democratization. Using cross-national empirical tests that address the potential endogeneity of this relationship, we find support for the argument that personalist dictators who create their own political party are more likely to democratize than those who ally with a pre-existing party or rule without one.

Keywords: authoritarian politics; democratization; personalist dictatorship; political survival; political parties

Dictatorships are often assumed to be brutal and ruthless regimes, where power is highly concentrated in the hands of a single individual. Regimes like Iraq under Saddam Hussein and Uganda under Idi Amin fit this prototype. In these regimes, often called *personalist authoritarian regimes*, leaders have few constraints on their power and decisions remain largely at their discretion.[1] Personalist authoritarian leaders may govern with the use of a political party (like the Baathists under Hussein) or wear a military uniform (like Amin in Uganda), but neither the party nor the military exert policy influence independent of the leader.

Although scholars have taken great pains to illustrate that many dictatorships do not fit this stereotype,[2] personalist authoritarian regimes have become a more prevalent form of dictatorship since the end of the Cold War. As of 2010, 42%

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of all autocracies were personalist regimes, up from 23% in 1989.[3] Not only have personalist autocracies become a more common form of dictatorship, but they also rank among the most problematic countries for policymakers. Among dictatorships, personalist authoritarian regimes tend to be the most belligerent, have the highest poverty rates, and are the most likely to transition to a failed state.[4] Moreover, personalist authoritarian regimes are the least likely of all autocracies to democratize.[5] Given the challenges they present to the international community, encouraging democratic transitions in personalist autocracies should be among the top priorities for policymakers interested in democracy promotion in the contemporary era.

In this article we identify a key variable that makes personalist autocracies more inclined to democratize. We find that personalist dictatorships that create their own parties – either to run in an election just prior to the seizure of power or once already in office – are more likely to transition to democracy than those that ally with pre-existing parties or rule without them. In other words, party creation sets in motion a chain of events that enhances opportunities for democratization.

We identify two dynamics that link party creation with democratization. First, personalist leaders typically create political parties to offset the immediate threat to their power posed by the military.[6] The creation of these parties, however, facilitates peaceful mass mobilization. Peaceful protests (and peaceful regime transitions more generally), in turn, increase the prospects of democratization.[7] Second, the creation of a political party frequently entails a significant change in the composition of the elite who benefit from holding power, marking a break in traditional elite networks. This disruption in the old ways of doing business creates an opportunity for an eventual shift away from the status quo, also increasing the chance for democracy to emerge.

We provide cross-national empirical evidence of these pathways linking political party creation with democratization in personalist dictatorships. We find support for our argument: party creation increases the chances of transitions to democracy in personalist dictatorships. Our results are robust even to tests that take into account the potential endogeneity of this relationship.

In this article we do not focus on the reasons why dictators create parties, though we summarize that literature shortly. Rather, we focus on the implications of party creation for democratization within the context of personalist regimes. Existing research shows that the presence of political parties increases the chances of democratization in many types of dictatorship, but has no impact on democratization in personalist settings.[8] We argue that the current lack of evidence linking the presence of political parties to enhanced prospects for democratization in personalist autocracies is due to the conflation of two unique strategies: a leader's creation of a new political party versus alliance with a pre-existing one. Both strategies provide personalist regimes with the political benefits academic research has found to be associated with ruling with a political party, but party creation generates opportunities for democratization that party alliance does not.

In what follows, we first highlight the relevant literature on the role of political parties in autocracies and the motivations that autocrats may have for creating them. We then build on this body of research and outline our theoretical argument linking political party creation and democratization in personalist contexts. Next, we provide a number of statistical tests to evaluate our hypotheses. We conclude by summarizing our key findings and offering insights into their implications.

Theoretical background

Autocrats, like all politicians, are fundamentally interested in remaining in power. They possess two broad types of strategies – repression and co-optation – which they must employ selectively to ensure their continuation in office.[9] Autocrats who are overly reliant on repression risk creating widespread popular discontent that can increase the chances that small acts of defiance will snowball into destabilizing civil unrest.[10] Moreover, reliance on repression requires that leaders strengthen the security services, which creates new risks.[11] Armed with greater resources, the very groups hired to protect dictators can use their privileged status to remove them from power. Repressive strategies can raise the costs associated with challenging a leader, but they cannot reduce the desire of opponents to do so.

Most dictators, therefore, also seek to maintain political order by co-opting potential rivals and creating groups with a vested interest in the regime's survival.[12] Co-optation can occur through the distribution of monetary payoffs, but once individuals receive the payoff there is little guarantee that they will not use it to strengthen their own bases of power and seek the dictator's overthrow.[13] Moreover, this strategy is based on a constant supply of resources required to sustain such exchanges. If resources dry up, the dictator becomes vulnerable to defections of the regime elite.

Political parties offer a solution to the aforementioned commitment problems inherent to co-optation in autocracies. In Magaloni's account, political parties enable the dictator to credibly share power with potential elite opponents, neutralizing threats within the elite and prolonging the leader's tenure in office.[14] According to Boix and Svolik, parties increase the transparency of power-sharing deals between the leader and the elite by providing an institutionalized forum that allows for regular interactions and mutual monitoring between the dictator and his allies.[15] The mechanism through which political parties are strategically used in dictatorships varies across studies, but the consensus is that they enhance the survival of the autocrat: dictatorships that use political parties last longer in office than those that do not.[16]

Beyond extending autocratic survival, there is also evidence that political parties influence democratization. According to Wright and Escribà-Folch, parties can help foster democratic transitions because they protect the interests of incumbent elites, who are less likely to resist democratization if they can reasonably expect to participate in the political process after ceding power.[17] They find

that political parties in dictatorship enhance prospects of democratization, but that this relationship does not hold in personalist dictatorships because political parties in these countries tend to be weak and poorly institutionalized. As a result, Wright and Escribà-Folch conclude that parties in personalist regimes are unable to safeguard incumbent elite interests and therefore do not enhance the prospects for democratization in these settings.

Our study is deeply grounded in this body of research, but departs in one important respect: we argue that not all political parties in personalist dictatorships are the same. Party origins matter for a regime's long-term political trajectory. We posit that those regimes that create a new political party (for example, the Dominican Republic under Rafael Trujillo) set in motion opportunities for democratization that do not exist in regimes that rule without a party (for example, Kyrgyzstan under Askar Akayev), or ally with a pre-existing party (for example, Republic of Congo under Denis Sassou Nguesso).

Why do autocrats create political parties? According to existing research, dictators create parties to neutralize the existential threat posed by individuals inside their regime, particularly within the military.[18] Militaries have access to weapons and comprise individuals who know how to use them, making the risk of a military coup omnipresent in the minds of most dictators. The threat posed to leaders by regime insiders is well founded: coups have historically been the most dominant form of autocratic ouster.[19] However, members of the military are far less likely to stage a coup if they perceive that the public would oppose their intervention. Coup conspirators carefully evaluate their chances of success and should only attempt a coup when the expected rewards of doing so and the chance of victory are high enough to offset the potentially serious consequences of a failed effort.[20] Dictators can therefore deter coups if they can signal to the military that they have popular support that can be easily mobilized.

The creation of a political party serves this purpose.[21] Parties generate a support base for leaders that they can mobilize to deter would-be coup plotters. This "coup-proofing" effect of political parties is borne out in the data: dictatorships that create parties experience fewer coups than those that pursue alternative strategies.[22] Political parties reduce the incidence of coups because they create a network of supporters a leader can mobilize should he face a challenge from the military or other elite. Parties are made up of individuals with vested interests in the survival of the regime and who are connected to each other via established lines of communication and interaction. Even when party structures are weak, which is nearly always the case in personalist regimes, the mere presence of the network facilitates the mobilization of a movement in support of an embattled leader.[23] Moreover, party militants often play the role of "brokers" who, in addition to disseminating tactical information such as the time and location of events, or transportation or other resources, can enforce the participation of those party members who have claimed party benefits but are less actively involved in its core network.

To summarize, existing research emphasizes that dictators create political parties to counterbalance regime elites. In the section that follows, we analyse the political consequences of this choice.

Argument

In this section we detail a theory of how political party creation creates opportunities for democratization in personalist dictatorships. Though the mechanisms we identify may also occur in other types of autocracies, party creation is a less common strategy outside of personalist dictatorships: half (50%) of all personalist regimes created parties, while only 18% of military regimes and 8% of party regimes did the same (we discuss measurement of party strategy in detail in the section that follows).[24] Exploring why personalist autocracies are more inclined to create political parties lies outside of the scope of this study. It is possible, however, that other types of dictatorships create parties less frequently because they possess alternative institutions they can rely on to maintain control or that the presence of alternative institutional counterweights to a leader's power limits his ability to do so.

We argue that party creation sets in motion two key dynamics that enhance the prospects of democratization. First, the creation of a political party establishes an institutional structure that facilitates peaceful mass mobilization. Second, party creation changes the composition of the regime elite, which disrupts preexisting patronage networks in ways that make change possible. Together, these dynamics work to create greater opportunities for democratization than would exist otherwise. We discuss each mechanism in greater detail below.

Party creation and the facilitation of peaceful mass mobilization

The creation of a political party enables a leader to counterbalance the threat to their power posed by elites and the military. Political parties, however, have the longer-term consequence of facilitating mass mobilization, increasing the regime's vulnerability to being ousted by protests. Savvy authoritarian leaders are doubtlessly aware of the mobilizing impact of political parties, but these leaders are likely to calculate that the distant threat from mobilization is preferable to the more immediate risk of coups emanating from inside their regime (Roessler 2011).

All political parties, whether created or co-opted, are likely to serve a mobilizing function. In fact, the risk of protest in personalist regimes in any given year is about 20% – regardless of the party strategy adopted by the dictator.[25] However, we argue that party creation is unique in that it enhances the prospects that any such protests that do occur remain relatively peaceful. This is important because peaceful protests substantially increase the prospects of transitions to democracy.[26] Peaceful protests tend to be inclusive of broad and cross-cutting segments of society, making it hard for any one group to impose its preferred outcome at the time of transition. Violent protests, by contrast, tend to make transitions to a

new autocracy more likely as the group that successfully ousts the leader is often able to dominate the transition.[27]

Party creation fosters peaceful (as opposed to violent) mass mobilization because leaders who create parties are less dependent on the coercive apparatus to protect their power than are leaders who do not use a political party or co-opt a pre-existing one. Party creators have the least need to rely on repressive strategies to counterbalance their militaries and regime elite and therefore dedicate fewer resources to developing the capacity or elevating the political status of their security units.[28] Leaders who rule absent a support party, for example, lack any institutional counterweight to the military or mechanism to co-opt elite support and therefore must invest in the capacity of paramilitary forces staffed by loyalists to monitor the activities of the military and other regime elites.[29] Uganda's Idi Amin illustrates this. Amin seized power in 1971 in a coup ousting Milton Obote and ruled until his own ouster in 1979 without the support of a political party. Shortly after seizing power, Amin purged elements of the military assumed to be loyal to Obote, replaced them with his allies, and created paramilitary groups to counterbalance the military.[30]

Similarly, leaders who ally with a pre-existing party inherit parties that are likely to have superior organizational capacity and are staffed by individuals with unproven loyalties to the new leader relative to a party a dictator creates. Leaders that ally with a pre-existing party, therefore, must also prioritize the development of coercive units to a greater extent than party-creating leaders in order to monitor the activities of party elites who they view as rivals. In Iraq, for example, Saddam Hussein joined the Baath party, which seized power in 1968, long before his assent to power. Once Saddam formally assumed the leadership in 1979, he set out to neutralize several of his competitors within the party, executing 21 high-ranking party members who had objected to his takeover in the first two weeks of his presidency. This initial bloodbath set the rules of the game for years to come and highlights the dynamics at play in regimes in which leaders co-opt pre-existing parties.[31]

A leader's proliferation of or greater investment in the security services to enhance their capacity to counterbalance the military and other regime elite increases the chances that a leader will use violence to confront any challenges to the regime, including protests.[32] Moreover, the security services will be more likely to execute orders to use violence in personalist settings where leaders often maintain direct control over paramilitary forces or staff them with family or close allies.

Paramilitary organizations are often the groups that dictatorships first turn to in response to instances of domestic unrest.[33] In Libya, for example, Muammar Gaddafi initially created the Arab Socialist Union of Libya after he assumed power, but dissolved the party in 1977 and ruled without a support party thereafter. He relied heavily on paramilitary security units as his first line of defence rather than the regular military, given that the latter had attempted to remove him from power four times.[34] When protests against Qaddafi's rule emerged in 2011, for

example, Qaddafi sent out the paramilitary units, which fired indiscriminately against civilian protestors.[35] Whereas traditional militaries may be hesitant to use force against fellow citizens in the face of protests,[36] paramilitary forces tend to perceive greater loyalty to the regime given that they often directly owe their positions to the incumbent and are therefore more likely to carry out orders to use violence.

Basic summary statistics provide support for the hypothesis that personalist leaders who create parties are less likely to rely on the security services and more inclined to experience peaceful protests than leaders who do not create a party. We find that 38% of personalist dictatorships that create parties maintain paramilitary forces compared to 54% of those that do not.[37] In addition, while all personalist regimes have a 20% risk of a protest in a given year (as mentioned earlier), 18% of all protests remain nonviolent in those that create a party. In contrast, in regimes that repress parties or ally with a pre-existing one, only 5% of protests are nonviolent. Put differently, party creators experience higher rates of nonviolent protest than dictators who do not create parties. When dictators ally with pre-existing parties or rule without them, the risk of a nonviolent protest in any given year is about 1%. When dictators create their own parties, the rate triples to 3%. The empirical record is therefore consistent with the first mechanism we propose.

Party creation and the disruption of traditional elite networks

The creation of a political party can also increase democratization prospects in personalist dictatorships because it dismantles pre-existing elite networks, opening the door for new political paths to be pursued. Leaders who create political parties are often interested in making a break from the status quo and tend to staff and recruit party members from very different segments of the population than the previous regime. In Peru, for example, Alberto Fujimori was a self-professed anti-establishment candidate when he ran for office in 1992. He created a new party, Cambio 90, to signal his distance from the traditional political establishment and develop a wider system of alliances that bypassed pre-existing parties, which had been largely discredited in the years prior to the election.[38] Fujimori staffed the party with personal acquaintances from his business and academic circles.[39] Through the creation of Cambio 90, Fujimori was able to orchestrate a grass-roots support group opposed to the persistence of political domination by the entrenched political elite.

Similarly, in Georgia, Eduard Sheverdnadze created the Union of Citizens of Georgia in the mid-1990s. He used the party to actively recruit young, reform-minded members into the political establishment, including Mikheil Saakashvili. Saakashvili was unwilling to adopt the conciliatory approach of some of his colleagues, however, and became impatient with the slow pace of reform. This rift between the group of young reformers and the more conservative elements of the political establishment played a decisive role in bringing about democratic

change in Georgia in 2003.[40] Though party creation does not guarantee the incorporation of new elites more receptive to democratization than the individuals they replaced, at a minimum it generates this opportunity.

We recognize that the overall concept of elite rotation is not unique to party creating regimes. All personalist leaders tend to rotate government officials to prevent any one person from establishing a base of support that could be used to challenge the dictator and to ensure that individuals deemed disloyal or unreliable are excluded from the inner circle.[41] What is different in regimes that create new political parties is the composition of the elite turnover. Dictators who do not use a support party or ally with a pre-existing one typically recycle the same players or draw elites from the same segments of society. Dictators who create parties, by contrast, often recruit from a new pool, shifting the composition of individuals who benefit from the perks of office in ways that disrupt the traditional methods of doing business.

It is difficult to test this mechanism directly, but we contend that an examination of the durability of the democracies that succeed personalist dictatorships that created parties provides an indirect test of this pathway. More specifically, the extent of disruption within the patronage and elite system caused by party creation should make it more difficult for the regime elite to relapse into their old habits post-transition. In addition, because these new individuals incorporated into the system should have less experience as part of the elite, they should cling less tightly to past patterns of behaviour and be more open-minded in the face of reforms. In other words, reversions to new autocracy following the democratization experiment should be less likely in these contexts. Our argument, therefore, implies that party creators pave the way for longer-lasting experiences with democracy than personalist dictators who pursue other strategies.

Basic summary statistics are consistent with this assertion. Looking at the average duration of the democracy that followed experiences of personalist dictatorships (using the data sources discussed in the following section), we find that party creators experience longer-lasting democracies than do personalist dictators who ally with parties or repress them. Among the personalist dictatorships that have collapsed and democratized, the median duration of the subsequent democracy is seven years when no support party was used, four years when a pre-existing party was used, and 13 years when a new party was created. These are substantively large differences that correspond with the second mechanism outlined here.

Taken together the two mechanisms that we propose yield the following hypothesis: *Personalist authoritarian regimes that create political parties will be more likely to democratize than those that co-opt pre-existing parties or do not use a support party.*

Testing the argument

To test our central hypothesis, we use the Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (GWF) data set on authoritarian regimes.[42] The data set codes the entry and exit dates of

authoritarian regimes from 1946 through 2010, the type of regime in power, whether regimes transitioned to democracy or new dictatorship, and a variety of other features of authoritarian regimes. We restrict our sample to those classified as "personalist", which GWF define as "autocracies in which discretion over policy and personnel are concentrated in the hands of one man, military or civilian".[43] There are 100 unique personalist dictatorships in our sample.

We also use the GWF data set to capture whether personalist dictatorships created support parties. The data set includes a *party history* variable, which classifies for each autocratic country-year whether there is a regime support party and, if so, when it formed and who leads it. We use this information to create our key independent variable, *party creation*, which is coded "1" if a support party was created at the time of the seizure of power for the purposes of running in an election or at any point afterwards and "0" otherwise. The data indicate that half (50%) of personalist regimes created a party at some point during their tenures, with the rest either relying on a pre-existing party for support (25%) or using no support party (25%). A list of the dictatorships in the sample and their party strategy is provided in the Appendix.

In only one instance (Libya 1969–2011) did a regime create a support party after the seizure of power, but dissolve it afterwards. In all other cases, once regimes created a support party, the party remained intact for the duration of the regime. In three instances, regimes seized power using the support of a pre-existing party, dissolved or repressed that party, and then created a new support party later (Democratic Republic of Congo 1997–, Kazakhstan 1991–, and Tajikistan 1991–). In the rest of the sample, regimes either came to power without a support party and then created one afterwards, or created the party at the time of (or just prior to) the seizure.

Figure 1 offers information on the timing of party creation in personalist regimes. It shows that most personalist dictatorships that create parties do so early in the regime's tenure. In fact, about a quarter (26%) of party creators establish their new support groups just prior to or immediately following the seizure of power. As each year passes, party creation becomes increasingly less likely, and after about a decade in power, it is extremely rare.

To measure our key dependent variable, *democratic transition*, we use the GWF data. This variable is coded "1" if a transition to democracy occurred and "0" otherwise. Of the 100 personalist regimes in the sample, 23% were still in power as of 2010, 26% transitioned to democracy, and 51% transitioned to new dictatorship.

The raw data provide support for our argument. When we disaggregate regimes based on the three approaches to political parties (creating a party, allying with a traditional party, or ruling without one), we find that 38% of personalist dictatorships that created parties transitioned to democracy upon collapse, compared to 32% of those that relied on pre-existing parties and 29% of those that ruled without them.[44] Party creation is associated with higher rates of democratization than other strategies.



Figure 1. The timing of party creation in personalist dictatorships.

The data also indicate that *how* personalist dictatorships transition to democracy differs in ways that are consistent with our argument. Using information from GWF classifying the manner through which dictatorships exit power, we find that personalist dictatorships that create parties are more likely to democratize via mass uprisings or internal pressures than are dictatorships that pursue other strategies: 64% of regimes with created parties democratized as a result of mass uprising or internal pressure, compared to 50% of those that allied with a pre-existing party and 50% of those that ruled without one. Moreover, democratization in party creating regimes tended to be peaceful. About two-thirds of personalist dictatorships with created parties experienced nonviolent democratic transitions, compared to half of those with inherited parties and one-third of those with no party. These statistics are consistent with our proposed mechanisms: party creation increases the chance of democratization by generating opportunities for peaceful protests and internal demands for reform.

The data also indicate that personalist regimes that create political parties last in office longer than those that do not. Personalist dictatorships that create parties last in office an average of 13 years, regimes that ally with pre-existing parties last an average of 11 years, and regimes that rule without parties only last an average of five years. The staying power of personalist regimes is also consistent with our proposed mechanisms. First, personalist regimes that create political parties are better able to neutralize the threat posed by the military and are less likely to experience coups early in their tenures, as previous research has shown. Second, we suggested that party creating leaders often seek to staff new parties with individuals not previously associated with the political establishment. These individuals are likely to

be highly indebted, increasing the extent of elite loyalty, and therefore the durability of these systems.

Given the power-prolonging effect of party creation, however, it is possible that the longevity of the regime is driving democratization prospects, rather than party creation itself. In other words, regimes that last longer in power may have other latent features that make them amenable to democratization, independent of party creation. Table 1 examines this possibility. It shows the average duration of personalist regimes, by transition type and party strategy. It illustrates that party creation is associated with longer-lasting regimes, regardless of whether democratization occurs. Those personalist dictatorships that democratize last about five years longer when a party is created than when one is not, while those that transition to new dictatorship last about four years longer when a party is created than when one is not. This implies that party creation is driving the longer duration of regimes, not latent propensity for democratization. This is in line with existing arguments in the literature about the survival benefits of support parties in dictatorships.

We next examine the effect of *party creation* on *democratic transition* while taking into account other potentially confounding factors. We begin with a simple model (Model 1 in Table 2) that estimates this relationship using logistic regression and a handful of control variables: economic *growth* rates (averaged over the four-year period prior), *GDP per capita* (logged), and *regional democracy* (lagged, measured using combined Polity scores, which range from -10 to 10 such that higher scores indicate higher levels of democracy).[45] We also include three polynomial transformations of leader duration in our specification to deal with duration dependence, as suggested by Carter and Signorino,[46] and use robust standard errors (clustered on country). The results of this simple model are consistent with our argument: the coefficient of *party creation* is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.06$) indicating that party creation increases the likelihood of democratization.

Model 2 in Table 2 uses the same specification, but includes additional control variables. The first is whether the country is a *Western ally*, which we measure using a dummy variable indicating whether the regime has an alliance with either the United States, the United Kingdom, or France.[47] The idea is that regimes with close relationships with the West may be both more likely to adopt pseudo-democratic institutions like parties and more likely to democratize due to these relationships.[48] The second control variable is the *age of the leader*, as

Table 1. Average personalist dictatorship duration, by transition type and party strategy (number of observations in parentheses).

	Party created	No party created
Regime democratized	14 (14)	9 (12)
Regime transitioned to new dictatorship	12 (23)	8 (28)

Table 2. The effect of party creation on democratization in personalist dictatorship.

	Logit	Logit	IV-2SLS	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	
	Dem. transition	*Dem. transition*	1st stage *Party creation*	2nd stage *Dem. transition*
Party creation	0.88* (0.47)	1.12* (0.63)		0.07** (0.03)
Growth (lagged)	0.01 (0.03)	0.04 (0.04)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
GDP/capita (logged)	0.08 (0.41)	−0.02 (0.62)	0.01 (0.10)	−0.00 (0.01)
Regional democracy (lagged)	0.09 (0.08)	−0.20* (0.12)	0.01 (0.02)	−0.00* (0.00)
Western ally		0.68 (1.14)	0.01 (0.14)	0.03* (0.01)
Age of leader		0.08** (0.03)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Conflict (lagged)		0.65 (0.47)	0.01 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)
Cold war		−1.90*** (0.69)	0.06 (0.08)	−0.04** (0.02)
Junior military leader			0.35** (0.16)	
Regional party creation (lagged)			0.53*** (0.18)	
No. of observations	771	568		567
No. of regimes	68	60		60
No. of countries	46	42		42
Regional dummies	No	Yes		Yes
Standard errors	Clustered (country)	Clustered (country)		Clustered (country)

Note: Leader duration polynomials, regional dummies (where relevant), and constant excluded to conserve space.
*$p < 0.10$.
**$p < 0.05$.
***$p < 0.01$.

measured by the Archigos data set.[49] Younger leaders are believed to be more likely to create parties;[50] yet, they may also be more likely to be reform-minded, increasing the chances that they will push for political institutions like parties that pave the way for democracy. The third control variable is whether a state is engaged in *conflict* (either external or internal, lagged one year), to capture the fact that political instability might simultaneously drive regimes to create a support party while also increasing the likelihood they will democratize.[51] We also include a dummy variable measuring the *Cold War*, because dictatorships may have been less likely to both use support parties and democratize during that era. Finally, to ensure regional differences are not driving our results, we include dummy variables for region. The results support our expectations: the coefficient of *party creation* is positive and statistically significant ($p = 0.07$).

To estimate whether the size of this effect is substantively meaningful, we use the Clarify programme.[52] Assuming a personalist dictatorship is an ally of the West, in the post-Cold War era, and in Sub-Saharan Africa, and holding all other control variables at their means, party creation increases the predicted probability of democratization from 6% to 13%. This is a sizable effect, and one that we interpret to be substantively significant.

It is possible, however, that the relationship between *party creation* and *democratic transition* is endogenous. Party creation may be more likely precisely in those environments that are already the most amenable to democratization. In other words, the propensity for democratization may influence the decision to create parties, rather than vice versa. This is not a small issue given that, according to some scholars, inattention to endogeneity plagues most cross-national large-N research in the literature on authoritarian institutions calling into question many of the causal relationships proposed.[53] To deal with this concern, we use an instrumental variables (IV) approach. The IV approach entails estimating the potentially endogenous variable (*party creation*), using at least one exogenous variable that is correlated with it but not with the dependent variable (*democratic transition*).[54] For the IV analysis here, we use the instrumental variables two-stage least squares method (IV-2SLS), which is usually the preferred method even in instances in which the endogenous variable is dichotomous.[55]

Though the underlying idea is simple, a critical component of the IV method is the selection of a good instrument.[56] The assessment of whether an instrument is "good" comes down to whether it is *theoretically* plausible that the instrumented variable affects the endogenous variable but does not directly affect the outcome of interest.

We use two instruments. The first is whether the leader of the regime is a junior officer in the military. Using the GWF data set, we create a variable, *junior military leader*, that is a "1" when the leader of the dictatorship is a member of the military with the rank of colonel (if that is not the highest rank), major, or below. This variable is a "0" if the leader is a member of the military with the rank of general or colonel (if that is the highest rank), or a civilian.

We chose this instrument because leaders who are junior officers in the military should be more likely to create parties than other types of leaders. Geddes argues that when civilians seize power, they are often already members of a pre-existing party, which typically serves as the regime's launching organization.[57] Because they already maintain a party to support them, there is little need to create one to counterbalance the military. When members of the military seize power, by contrast, they must contend with the very real threat that co-conspirators within the military will unseat them later on. For leaders who are higher up in the military, maintaining the support of the rest of the military corps is easier to secure, given the hierarchical nature of most militaries and the emphasis on chain of command. For leaders of lower rank, however, the military's support is far from guaranteed. The very fact that the leadership position is filled by a junior officer signals a breach of the military's established hierarchy. Leaders who are junior officers, therefore, should be more likely to create a support party to counterbalance the threat of the military than leaders who are either military elites or civilians.

Though leadership by a junior officer should increase the likelihood of party creation in personalist dictatorships, we see little reason why it would also directly affect the chance of democratization.[58] For example, research has shown that military regimes are more prone to democratization than other types of dictatorship, but the underlying arguments to support this finding assume a professionalized and unified military. This is far from the case when junior officers hold the leadership position. Leadership by a junior officer is a sign that the military's traditional hierarchy has been ruptured and that it is a factionalized force. We should therefore not expect the same incentives for democratization to be relevant here. If anything, personalist dictatorships that are ruled by junior military officers might be expected to be less likely to democratize, given that they probably came to power through force rather than through electoral processes, and democratic norms of behaviour may either seem foreign or unimportant. In sum, we argue that a *junior military leader* increases the chances of party creation, but does not affect the likelihood of democratization, apart from its direct effect on party creation.

The second instrument we use is *regional party creation*, which is the proportion of personalist dictatorships in the region (excluding the regime in question) that created a party (lagged).[59] The use of this instrument follows the approach of Bernhard et al., who argue that institutional choices are often the product of diffusion, such that countries are more likely to adopt specific institutions if their neighbours also feature them.[60] This means that where a high proportion of personalist dictatorships in the region have opted to create a party, other personalist dictatorships should be likely to follow suit. At the same time, we can think of little reason why *regional party creation* would increase a personalist dictatorship's likelihood of democratization, except via its effect on a regime's decision to create a party.

In addition to the selection of "good" instruments, it is also critical that the instruments be "strong", meaning that they are relevant predictors of the endogenous variable.[61] Whereas classifying instruments as "good" requires a persuasive theory, classifying them as "strong" can be done with statistical tests. Specifically,

with a single endogenous regressor, when the F-statistic of the excluded instruments in the first-stage equation is at least 10 and the partial R^2 is at least 0.10, the instruments are often considered strong.[62] In our model, the F-statistic (45.6) and partial R^2 (0.14) exceed both of these benchmarks, signalling that our instruments are adequate predictors of *party creation.* In addition, the Sargan test of the exclusion restriction ($p = 0.96$) suggests that our chosen instruments are valid.

We note that in IV estimation, each control variable that is included in the second-stage equation (predicting *democratic transition*) must be included in the first-stage equation (predicting *party creation*), which must also include at least one instrument excluded from the second-stage equation. For this reason, our second-stage equation includes all of the control variables used in Model 2, while our first-stage equation includes these variables in addition to the instruments, *junior military leader* and *regional party creation*.

Model 3 in Table 2 shows the results of IV-2SLS estimation, using standard errors clustered on country. The results provide strong support for our argument: *party creation* increases the chance of democratization, and the effect is statistically significant at traditional levels ($p = 0.04$). In the Appendix, we offer the results of a battery of robustness tests – using alternate standard errors, fixed effects, different ways of capturing party creation, and more – that confirm this finding.

The evidence, therefore, supports our contention that personalist dictatorships that create political parties have a higher likelihood of democratization than those that rely on other strategies. This relationship holds when we take into account a variety of potentially confounding factors, as well as when we use estimation strategies that address possible endogeneity. The effect of party creation on democratization in personalist dictatorships is substantively large and (as we show in the Appendix) statistically significant in a number of empirical settings.

Conclusion

Freedom House reported in 2015 that political and civil liberties worldwide have declined for nine consecutive years.[63] This decline has coincided with a rise in the prevalence of personalist autocracies, which are among the most repressive types of dictatorship,[64] and are the least likely of all authoritarian regimes to democratize.[65] The surge in this particularly resistant form of dictatorship in the post-Cold War era underscores the future challenge of arresting the further decline in democratic principles worldwide.

This study is the first (to our knowledge) to offer insights into the process of democratization specifically within personalist autocracies. We identify a key factor that increases the prospects of democratic transitions: party creation. We find that when personalist regimes create new political parties, they become more likely to democratize than when they ally with a pre-existing party or rule without one. Moreover, once these regimes democratize, their experience with democracy is longer lasting than when other party strategies are pursued.

Our findings suggest that focusing limited resources available for democracy promotion on those countries in which personalist regimes have created a political party could be a particularly effective approach to democratization. According to the GWF data, there are 11 party-creating personalist regimes currently in power (at the time of writing). These countries include Venezuela, Togo, and Azerbaijan. As we note, the effect of party creation on democratization is not immediate as political parties also serve to prolong the tenures of personalist regimes. However, not only are these regimes more likely to democratize than other types of personalist systems, but the creation of a political party leads to longer experiences with democracy following the collapse of the dictatorship. Such an extended experience with democracy enhances the prospects that democratic processes and principles become more fully entrenched, ultimately setting these countries up for greater success with more permanent and lasting democratic systems.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Notes

1. Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles.*
2. See Ezrow and Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships*, for a review of this literature.
3. Data used for these statistics are discussed in the empirical section.
4. See Ezrow and Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships*, for a review of this literature.
5. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions." See Escribà-Folch, "Accountable for What?" for a discussion of the mechanism underlying this relationship.
6. Geddes, "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?"; Geddes, "Party Creation as an Authoritarian Survival Strategy."
7. Celestino and Gleditsch, "Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose?"
8. Wright and Escribà-Folch, "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival."
9. Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship.*
10. Lichbach, "Deterrence or Escalation?"; Moore, "Repression and Dissent."
11. Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship.*
12. Frantz and Kendall-Taylor, "A Dictator's Toolkit."

13. Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule."
14. Ibid.
15. Boix and Svolik, "The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government."
16. Blaydes, "Authoritarian Elections and Elite Management"; Gandhi and Przeworski, "Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships"; Geddes, "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?"; Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy.*
17. Wright and Escribà-Folch, "Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival."
18. Geddes, "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?"; Geddes, "Party Creation as an Authoritarian Survival Strategy."
19. Svolik, "Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes."
20. Powell, "Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups d'état."
21. Research has shown that elections in autocracies also serve to reduce the incidence of coups. Cox, "Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession," finds that elections in authoritarian settings help regularize politics by reducing the incidence of "irregular" regime change, including coups.
22. Geddes, "Why Parties and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes?"; Geddes, "Party Creation as an Authoritarian Survival Strategy."
23. McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, *Dynamics of Contention.* Weak parties lack the capacity to check the leader's power, regulate leadership turnover, and weigh in on policy choices. Such parties facilitate mass mobilization, as all parties do. As an indicator of the weakness of parties in personalist dictatorships, using time-varying data from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown" (discussed in the empirical section), we find that only two personalist dictatorships since World War II have ever – at *any* point while in power – had a political party whose top leadership posts were selected independently of the leader. These regimes are Georgia (1992–2003) and Guinea-Bissau (1980–1999). Even in these cases, the military functioned as a rival institution to the party, with the leader serving as a puppeteer overseeing both.
24. Party creation is not a guarantee for democratization in personalist dictatorships given that about half of these regimes create parties but only around a third of all personalist dictatorships transition to democracy. That being said, it does set in motion regime dynamics that create democracy enhancing opportunities. This typology is based on Geddes', *Paradigms and Sand Castles*, categorization of regimes as military, party, or personalist. See Ezrow and Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships*, for a discussion of other typologies of dictatorship.
25. Protest data come from the NAVCO (Non-Violent and Violent Campaigns and Outcomes) data set. Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*. The data measuring dictatorships are explained in the empirical section.
26. Celestino and Gleditsch, "Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose?"; Chenoweth and Stephan, "Why Civil Resistance Works"; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works*.
27. Celestino and Gleditsch, "Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose?"
28. One could argue that a leader's creation of a political party to counterbalance the military could create an opportunity for a leader to further sideline the military by creating new parallel security units. However, we argue that a leader's resources available for co-optation and repression are finite (see Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*). A leader who chooses to incur the costs associated with party creation – ranging from getting the organization up and running to reaching out and establishing viable networks of supporters – will be less likely to allocate the same level of resources on the security apparatus as a leader who did not have to incur these costs either because he inherited a party or does not have one.
29. Belkin and Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk."

30. Kobusingye, *The Correct Line?*
31. Bengio, "How does Saddam Hold On."
32. Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East."
33. Mitchell, Carey, and Butler, "The Impact of Pro-Government Militias on Human Rights Violations"; Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, "States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence."
34. Barany, *The Soldier and the Changing State*, 30.
35. Finn, "Experts Say Gaddafi Relying on Paramilitary Forces."
36. Tucker, "Enough!"
37. We measure this using data from the Pro-Government Militias Database (PGMD), which identifies the presence of pro-government militias that are not part of the regular security forces. Carey, Mitchell, and Lowe, "States, the Security Sector, and the Monopoly of Violence."
38. Cameron, "Political and Economic Origins of Regime Change in Peru," 38.
39. Corrales, *Presidents Without Parties.*
40. Nodia and Scholtbach, *The Political Landscape of Georgia*, 18.
41. Ezrow and Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships.*
42. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown."
43. Ibid., 319. Hadenius and Teorell, "Pathways from Authoritarianism," argue that personalism is not a regime category, but rather a continuous trait. Ideally, we would like to use a continuous measure of personalism, as well, to assess whether increasing levels alter the relationship between party creation and democratization in dictatorships. Though such a measure does not publicly exist yet, Geddes, Honaker, and Wright, *Measuring What You Can't See*, have proposed a method for doing so that could eventually be used in research on these themes.
44. The statistical model offered in Model 9 in the Appendix compares personalist dictatorships that created parties with those that allied with a pre-existing one. The coefficient of *party creation* is positive and statistically significant in this sub-sample, indicating that the large difference between the democratization rates of party creators and those leaders who rule without a support party is not driving the results.
45. Data for these measures come from the World Bank's World Development Indicators and the Polity IV Project. We group countries into the five regions represented in the sample: Asia, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa.
46. Carter and Signorino, "Back to the Future."
47. Data for this measure come the Correlates of War project.
48. Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism.*
49. Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, "Introducing Archigos,"
50. Geddes, "Party Creation as an Authoritarian Survival Strategy."
51. Data come from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO).
52. King, Tomz, and Wittenberg, "Making the Most of Statistical Analysis."
53. Pepinsky, "The Institutional Turn in Comparative Authoritarianism."
54. Angrist and Krueger, "Instrumental Variables and the Search for Identification"; Angrist and Pischke, *Mostly Harmless Econometrics*; Sovey and Green, "Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science"; Gujarati, *Basic Econometrics*.
55. Angrist and Krueger, "Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science"; Wooldridge, *Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data*.
56. Sovey and Green, "Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science."
57. Geddes, "Party Creation as an Authoritarian Survival Strategy."
58. We acknowledge that there may be country-specific unobserved factors that affect whether junior versus senior officers are able to seize power, which in turn affect

democratization prospects. We account for this possibility by using fixed effects in Models 7 and 8 offered in the Appendix.

59. We thank a reviewer for this suggestion.
60. Bernhard et al., "Party Strength and Economic Growth."
61. Sovey and Green, "Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science."
62. Shea, "Instrument Relevance in Multivariate Linear Models"; Staiger and Stock, "Instrumental Variables Regression with Weak Instruments"; Sovey and Green, "Instrumental Variables Estimation in Political Science."
63. See Freedom House: http://www. freedomhouse.org.
64. Davenport, "State Repression and the Tyrannical Peace."
65. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Autocratic Breakdown."

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Appendix

Sample of personalist dictatorships and party strategies

Table A1. Lists the personalist dictatorships in our sample and their party strategy. Where more than one party strategy was used, the strategies are listed chronologically.

Regime	Strategy	Regime	Strategy
Afghanistan 73–78	Create	Costa Rica 48–49	No support party
Afghanistan 09–14	No support party	Cuba 52–59	No support party
Argentina 51–55	Create	Dominican Rep 30–62	Create
Armenia 94–98	Ally	Dominican Rep 66–78	Create

(*Continued*)

Table A1. Continued.

Regime	Strategy	Regime	Strategy
Armenia 98–NA	No support party	Ecuador 44–47	No support party
Azerbaijan 91–92	No support party	Ecuador 70–72	No support party
Azerbaijan 93–NA	Create	Gambia 94–NA	Create
Bangladesh 75–82	Create	Georgia 91–92	No support party
Bangladesh 82–90	Create	Georgia 92–03	Create
Belarus 94–NA	No support party	Ghana 81–00	Create
Benin 60–63	Create	Guatemala 54–58	Create
Benin 63–65	Create	Guatemala 58–63	Ally
Benin 72–90	Create	Guinea 84–08	Create
Bolivia 64–69	Create	Guinea 08–10	No support party
Burkina Faso 60–66	Ally	Guinea Bissau 80–99	Ally
Burkina Faso 66–80	No support party	Guinea Bissau 02–03	Ally
Burkina Faso 82–87	No support party	Haiti 41–46	No support party
Burkina Faso 87–14	Create	Haiti 50–56	No support party
Cambodia 70–75	Create	Haiti 57–86	Create
Cameroon 83–NA	Ally	Haiti 99–04	Create
Cen African Rep 60–65	Ally	Indonesia 49–66	No support party
Cen African Rep 66–79	Ally	Iraq 58–63	No support party
Cen African Rep 79–81	Create	Iraq 63–68	Create
Cen African Rep 03–NA	Create	Iraq 79–03	Ally
Chad 82–90	Create	Ivory Coast 99–00	No support party
Chad 90–NA	Ally	Ivory Coast 00–11	Ally
Congo/Brz 60–63	Ally	Kazakhstan 91–NA	Ally, create
Congo/Brz 97–NA	Ally	Korea South 48–60	Create
Congo/Zaire 60–97	Create	Kyrgyzstan 91–05	No support party
Congo/Zaire 97–NA	Ally, create	Kyrgyzstan 05–10	Create
Laos 59–60	Ally	Togo 60–63	Ally
Laos 60–62	No support party	Togo 63–NA	Create
Liberia 80–90	Create	Uganda 66–71	Ally
Liberia 97–03	Ally	Uganda 71–79	No support party
Libya 69–11	Create, no support party	Uganda 80–85	Ally
Madagascar 75–93	Create	Uganda 86–NA	Ally
Madagascar 09–13	No support party	Venezuela 05–NA	Create
Malawi 64–94	Ally	Vietnam South 54–63	Create

(*Continued*)

Table A1. Continued.

Regime	Strategy	Regime	Strategy
Mali 68–91	Create	Yemen 67–74	No support party
Mauritania 60–78	Create	Yemen 78–NA	Create
Mauritania 78–05	Create		
Mauritania 08–NA	Create		
Nicaragua 36–79	Ally		
Niger 96–99	Create		
Pakistan 75–77	Ally		
Panama 49–51	Ally		
Panama 53–55	Create		
Paraguay 39–48	No support party		
Peru 92–00	Create		
Philippines 72–86	Create		
Portugal 26–74	Create		
Russia 93–NA	Create		
Sierra Leone 97–98	No support party		
Somalia 69–91	Create		
Spain 39–76	Ally		
Sudan 69–85	Create		
Sudan 89–NA	Ally		
Syria 57–58	No support party		
Tajikistan 91–NA	Ally, create		
Thailand 44–47	Create		

Robustness tests

In Table A2 we offer a variety of robustness tests to further evaluate the relationship between *party creation* and *democratic transition*. First, we estimate Model 3 (from Table 2) using alternative methods of computing the standard errors. Model 4 uses robust standard errors, Model 5 uses jack-knifed standard errors, and Model 6 uses nonparametric bootstrapped standard errors (with 500 replications). We do not include the results from the first-stage equation of these models because they are virtually the same as those offered in Table 2 from Model 3. In each instance, the standard errors increase slightly, but the effect of *party creation* on democratization remains statistically significant ($p < 0.10$).

We next evaluate this relationship taking into account fixed effects. Doing so enables a within-regime comparison of the effect of party creation on democratization over time, while conditioning out all of the differences between personalist dictatorships (such as colonial history, how the regime seized power, and so forth). In Model 7, we use an IV-2SLS model with regime-case and year fixed effects. To enable estimation with the full sample, we include just three control variables (*growth, GDP/capita*, and *regional democracy*) in the specification. The effect of *party creation* on *democratic transition* is positive and statistically significant, indicating that the creation of a political party makes personalist dictatorships more likely to democratize over time. In Model 8, we estimate a non-linear model using IV-probit and include regime-case and year means for the explanatory variables. This approach keeps the full sample of observations (unlike a conditional logit), while also modelling the binary nature of the dependent variable (unlike IV-2SLS). Because it conditions the variables of interest on regime and year effects, the coefficients have a similar interpretation as a fixed effects model (see Wright, Frantz, and Geddes, "Oil and Autocratic Regime

Survival," for a similar approach). Again, the coefficient of *party creation* is positive and statistically significant at conventional levels.

We next evaluate the impact of *party creation* on democratization using the same specification as in Model 3, but excluding observations that lack a support party from the sample. This enables us to isolate how party creation compares with alliance with a pre-existing party in altering democracy prospects. The results are offered in Model 9. The coefficient of *party creation* remains positive and statistically significant, indicating that creating a party makes personalist dictatorships more likely to democratize than simply allying with a pre-existing party.

In Model 10, we explore whether *party creation* also increases the chances of transitions to new dictatorship. This is important to evaluate because, if true, it would imply that party creation increases the likelihood of all regime transitions, not just democratization. This would call into question our key argument, which emphasizes that party creation creates opportunities for democratic transitions, specifically. Here, we use *autocratic transition* as the dependent variable, as measured by GWF, which captures when dictatorships collapse and are succeeded by new dictatorships. The results indicate that *party creation* bears little impact on the likelihood of transitions to new dictatorship.

It is possible that the democratization gains are being driven by party creators that created parties at the time of the seizure for the purpose of running in elections. Such regimes might be more prone to democratization than other party creators given that their origins involved an electoral process. To examine this possibility, we compiled a new variable *post-seizure party creation*, which is coded a "1" if a party was created at any point following the first year of the seizure of power and a "0" otherwise. Model 11 shows the results. The coefficient of *post-seizure party creation* is positive and statistically significant. This indicates that party creation increases the chance of democratization even when it occurs a year or more following the seizure of power.

Finally, as an alternate specification, we use a one-stage logit model with random effects using a slightly different independent variable, *number of years with a created party*, which captures how long the regime has featured a created party (see Wright and Escribà-Folch, "Authoritarian Institutions," for a similar application). This approach enables us to examine the relationship between party creation and democracy, while taking into account differences in the number of years the created party has existed. This is important because *party creation* may exhibit a different impact on *democratic transition* based on whether the created party has always been a feature of the regime or has just been around for a slice of its time in power. Model 12 shows the results of this test. We find support for our argument here as well. The coefficient of *number of years with a created party* is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that the longer the regime has governed with a created party, the more likely it is that it will transition to democracy.

Table A2. Robustness tests.

	IV-2SLS (4) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	IV-2SLS (5) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	IV-2SLS (6) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	IV-2SLS w/ case & regime fixed effects (7) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*
Party creation	0.08* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)	0.20* (0.11)
Growth (lagged)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00* (0.00)
GDP/capita (logged)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	−0.00 (0.01)	0.12*** (0.03)
Regional democracy (lagged)	−0.00* (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Western ally	0.03 (0.01)	0.03 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	
Age of leader	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	
Conflict (lagged)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	
Cold war	−0.04** (0.04)	−0.04** (0.02)	−0.04** (0.02)	
No. of observations	567	567	567	770
No. of regimes	60	60	60	68
No. of countries	42	42	42	46
Regional dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Standard errors	Robust	Jack-knifed	Boot-strapped	Clustered (country)

	IV-probit w/ averaged fixed effects (8) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	IV-2SLS (excluding no party) (9) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	IV-2SLS (10) 2nd stage *Aut. transition*	IV-2SLS (11) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	Logit w/ random effects (12) *Dem. transition*
Party creation	3.81***	0.04* (0.02)	−0.07 (0.04)		
Post-seizure party creation				0.07** (0.04)	
Number of years w/ created party					0.09* (0.05)
Growth (lagged)	−0.06** (0.02)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01 (0.04)

(*Continued*)

Table A2. Continued.

	IV-probit w/ averaged fixed effects (8) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	IV-2SLS (excluding no party) (9) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	IV-2SLS (10) 2nd stage *Aut. transition*	IV-2SLS (11) 2nd stage *Dem. transition*	Logit w/ random effects (12) *Dem. transition*
GDP/capita (logged)	1.87*** (0.59)	0.00 (0.01)	−0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.35)
Regional democracy (lagged)	0.10 (0.07)	−0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)	0.14 (0.10)
Western ally		0.04** (0.01)	0.02 (0.03)	0.02* (0.01)	
Age of leader		0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	
Conflict (lagged)		0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	
Cold war		−0.04* (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	−0.04** (0.02)	
No. of observations	770	445	567	567	771
No. of regimes	68	51	60	60	68
No. of countries	46	36	42	42	46
Regional dummies	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Standard errors	Clustered (country)	Clustered (country)	Clustered (country)	Clustered (country)	Regular

Notes: Leader duration polynomials, regional dummies (where relevant), constant, and fixed effects (Model 8) excluded to conserve space. $^{*}p < 0.10$, $^{**}p < 0.05$, $^{***}p < 0.01$.