

# Countering Coups: Leadership Succession Rules in Dictatorships

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## Abstract

Paradoxically, many dictators agree to institutionalized succession rules even though these rules could regulate their removal from office. This study shows that succession rules, like other pseudo-democratic institutions in authoritarian regimes, provide survival benefits for dictators. Specifically, they protect dictators from coup attempts because they reduce elites' incentives to try to grab power preemptively via forceful means. By assuaging the ambition of some elites who have more to gain with patience than with plotting, institutionalized succession rules hamper coordination efforts among coup plotters, which ultimately reduce a leader's risk of confronting coups. Based on a variety of statistical models, including instrumental variables regression that addresses potential endogeneity between succession rules and coup attempts, the empirical evidence supports the authors' hypothesis that institutions governing leadership succession reduce the likelihood that dictators confront coups. This study clarifies one of the ways in which institutions in dictatorships help autocratic leaders survive.

## Keywords

institutionalized authoritarianism, succession rules, autocratic survival, coup d'état, dictators

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## Introduction

Dictators' enigmatic inclusion of institutions that may constrain them has led to burgeoning interest in the institutionalization of authoritarian regimes (Pepinsky, 2014). Many political scientists have argued that dictators willingly adopt institutions traditionally associated with democratic regimes, such as elections and legislatures, because they suit leaders' strategic interests.<sup>1</sup> They can build authoritarian leaders' international and popular legitimacy (Calingaert, 2006; Hyde, 2011), generate and provide essential information on support for and opposition to the leader (Blaydes, 2010; Geddes, 2006; Malesky & Schuler, 2010), and offer a venue for other elites—who could be potential rivals—to influence policy and earn material benefits (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Malesky & Schuler, 2010). Scholars contend that many such institutions result from bargains between autocrats and members of their inner circle (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003; Geddes, 2003; Svobik, 2009).<sup>2</sup> In authoritarian regimes, where interpersonal trust may run in short supply, formalizing such bargains by adopting institutions that construct power-sharing arrangements or limit leaders' power boosts the credibility of each party's commitment to uphold the agreement (Boix & Svobik, 2013; Magaloni, 2008). However, the incorporation of power-sharing institutions exposes autocratic leaders and their regimes to some risk (Cox, 2009; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Howard & Roessler, 2006), such as defeat at the polls. The literature on authoritarian institutions suggests that authoritarian leaders and elites accept them because their expected benefits for survival outweigh their perceived risks.

Previous studies of institutionalized authoritarianism have focused on autocratic regimes' use of prominent institutions, including semi-autonomous legislatures, elections, and political parties (e.g., Blaydes, 2008, 2010; Boix & Svobik, 2013; Cox, 2009; Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Geddes, 2006, 2008; Lust-Okar, 2006; Magaloni, 2006, 2008; Malesky & Schuler, 2010; Schedler, 2002, 2006). Other authors have expanded upon these studies, demonstrating more nuanced distinctions that improve autocratic durability, such as constitutions codifying the power distribution (Albertus & Menaldo, 2012) and parliamentary rather than presidential arrangements that favor cooperation when selecting leaders (Roberts, 2015). Following this line of research, in this study we identify an oft-overlooked institutional tool that increases the survival of autocratic leaders and extends autocratic regime longevity: institutionalized leadership succession procedures.

Leadership succession, the process of transitioning from one leader to another, may occur according to well-defined, established guidelines, or it may take place *ad hoc* upon the unexpected or forced departure of a leader (Clapham, 1988; Govea & Holm, 1998). The former scenario represents a

regime that has institutionalized the process of leadership transition by accepting or adopting *leadership succession rules*.<sup>3</sup> We define leadership succession rules as clearly specified procedures that govern the transition from one leader to another. Such rules may define *if*, *when*, and/or *how* a transition in leadership will occur. For example, succession rules may mandate when a change in leadership might take place (e.g., upon death or departure of a leader, set by term limits, or indicated by a pre-determined election schedule), establish provisions for the removal of a leader, or stipulate procedures for how the regime should determine the leader's successor. Regimes design and adopt institutionalized succession rules to bolster the legitimacy of the leader and regime and to define the process of replacing the executive, which can destabilize regimes if left unregulated.<sup>4</sup>

While we often associate succession procedures with democratic rule or hereditary monarchies, most dictatorships, regardless of regime type, eventually feature them. Despite the prevalence of institutions outlining succession procedures in dictatorships, previous research offers minimal insight into what motivates leaders and members of their regimes to incorporate them and what effect, if any, institutionalized succession rules have on political outcomes.

As with other autocratic institutions, the institutionalization of leadership succession implies that the leader and a segment of the elites who form the dictator's inner circle have struck a bargain; both parties support the institutionalization of succession procedures because each party has something to gain from doing so. Prior studies, primarily of monarchies, inform our understanding of why regime elites would agree to implement succession rules. As scholars first identified in their analyses of dynastic monarchies in Europe (Rousseau, 1762/2010), elites support succession rules because they help the regime withstand the turbulence of leadership transitions, improving the prospect for the *regime's* survival.<sup>5</sup> Upon a leader's departure, institutionalized succession rules can reduce costly and potentially destabilizing infighting that may occur amid a power vacuum by offering regime elites guidelines for how to fill the leadership post. Such rules serve elite interests by creating a stable path to power for some member(s) of the elite and protecting regime survival principally by excluding outsiders from contention for the leadership post (Brownlee, 2007; Herb, 1999; Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014).

The insurance for regime survival that succession rules provide accounts for elites' support of their inclusion; however, understanding dictators' acceptance of rules that stipulate ways in which leaders can be sanctioned and removed from power is less intuitive (Herz, 1952). We argue that autocratic leaders support the institutionalization of succession rules because such procedures reduce elites' incentives to try to grab power preemptively via forceful means. Because succession rules offer a less risky pathway to power than attempting a coup, they assuage the ambition of some elites who have more

to gain with patience than with plotting. Institutionalized succession rules, therefore, hamper efforts to coordinate sufficient support among members of the inner circle to plot a successful coup d'état, which ultimately reduces a leader's risk of confronting coups. While some elites—perhaps those with a lower chance to become the future leader—might be better off if a coup attempt were to succeed, the high degree of uncertainty of the outcome and the extraordinary costs that would be borne by participants if the challenge were to fail should minimize the number of willing participants in a coup plot.

This study sheds light on the logic behind the institutionalization of succession rules across all types of dictatorships, a subject largely absent from current scholarship on authoritarian politics. In addition, by linking the use of these rules in dictatorships to a lower incidence of coup attempts, our research contributes to the literature on coups d'état that generally has disregarded how specific institutions affect the risk of coup onset.<sup>6</sup>

In the first section of this article, we discuss existing research devoted to succession rules in dictatorships. Next, we present our theoretical argument regarding the benefits for autocratic survival conferred by the institutionalization of succession rules, specifically outlining how such rules help dictators counter coup attempts. Subsequently, we empirically test our argument using statistical analyses. We conclude by highlighting some implications of our findings.

## **Succession Rules in Dictatorships**

The uncertainty and internal conflict generated by leadership transitions can destabilize even long-standing dictatorships (Herz, 1952). LaPorte (1969) describes the ordeal authoritarian regimes experience during the transfer of power from one leader to the next, and the potential instability these transitions generate:

[E]ven in political systems where the procedures surrounding succession are institutionalized and tested, [succession] is a complex, highly sensitive, and often traumatic experience. Where procedures have not been routinized, tested, and modified by experience, and where the personal charisma of the departing leader was a factor of immense importance for maintaining the system, the survival of the system as a whole, let alone individual political institutions, processes, and policies, often appears precarious. (p. 843)

The inability of regimes to guarantee seamless transfers of power exposes elites, as well as ordinary citizens, to potential fallout from violent and unregulated transitions (Clapham, 1988).

Believing that rules could ease this unsettling process, centuries ago monarchies created succession rules to reduce infighting over the rightful successor during transitional periods. Monarchic regimes primarily adopted primogeniture to dictate succession procedures, typically establishing leaders' firstborn (often male) child as the designated successor. In 18th-century Europe, Rousseau (1762/2010) explained that

(t)hrones have been made hereditary within certain families, and an order of succession has been established to forestall dispute when a king dies. The risk of having children, monsters, or imbeciles for rulers has been deemed preferable to the conflicts involved in choosing a good king. (p. 63)

Members of ruling families accepted succession rules, even with their preclusion of most family members from the leadership post, because the rules lowered the risk of regime collapse, which ultimately could have excluded all family members from power and terminated their access to the regime's spoils (Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). For example, Brownlee (2007) explains,

Even members of the royal family not tapped as heir apparent were invested in the regime's survival because they held top cabinet posts including the prime ministership, the ministry of defense, the ministry of foreign affairs, and the ministry of the interior. Thus ensconced, when succession neared, they would band together rather than polarize and risk an internecine feud. (p. 606)

The bulk of the literature on succession rules in contemporary dictatorships further emphasizes these points, focusing on the use of hereditary succession in monarchies and other regimes (Brownlee, 2007; Herb, 1999; Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014; Menaldo, 2012).

Beyond heredity, dictatorships also institutionalize succession by incorporating rules in party platforms or constitutions (Ginsburg & Simpser, 2014; Herz, 1952).<sup>7</sup> The logic that underlies elites' support of heredity to determine succession likewise holds for elites' backing of other institutionalized mechanisms of succession. In reality, approaches that favor merit or competition rather than genealogy could appeal to a broader segment of elites because such alternatives might create the possibility for any member of the elite to assume the leadership post himself or at least allow more people to influence who would become the next leader. Succession rules offer elites who are best positioned to become leader a less risky pathway to power, giving them the largest stake in maintaining the status quo regime. These elites and their close allies likely would resist a coup attempt, limiting the number of potential recruits available to the architect(s) of a coup plot.

Succession rules—regardless of the form in which they appear—convey political legitimacy and offer guidelines for how politics should progress if

the leader unexpectedly leaves office. As Iqbal and Zorn (2008) show, regimes that feature succession rules compared with those that do not better withstand the turmoil that arises in the wake of a leader's assassination. Succession procedures not only can reduce uncertainty about who would rule after the leader's departure, but also boost regime survival and provide regime elites with some insurance that under a subsequent leader they will continue to enjoy the perks of membership in the inner circle.

The experience of the Chilean military dictatorship (1973-1989) illustrates the above point. The leaders of the 1973 coup that overthrew then-president Salvador Allende originally intended to govern Chile collegially (Geddes, 1999). In the regime's early years, however, General Augusto Pinochet consolidated power in his position at the helm, using his control over military promotion and retirement to force out generals who presented potential threats to his leadership (Epstein, 1984; Remmer, 1979). The regime had no succession rules in place from its inception until Pinochet and the Government Junta drafted a constitution in 1980 that granted Pinochet a subsequent 8-year term and stipulated that the members of the Junta would select a candidate unanimously to stand in a plebiscite for another 8-year term. Barros (2002) describes the 1980 constitution as a compromise among members of the Junta:

[T]hough the armed forces from the outset vowed to restore "chilenidad, justice, and the institutional order [which were] torn asunder by the crisis," this pledge remained peripheral and abstract until conflicts over the consequences of military rule itself forced the Junta to define a common position on regime succession. In fact, much of the internal tension that emerged during 1977-78 arose precisely because the Junta had not established any procedure for resolving differences over the duration of the regime and the nature of a new constitution. (p. 180)

In sum, the existing literature asserts that elites support the institutionalization of succession rules because they buffer the regime from the destabilizing effects of leadership transitions, helping to prolong the regime. The evidence supports these expectations: Authoritarian regimes with succession rules last twice as long, on average, compared with those that lack them.<sup>8</sup>

### *Why Dictators Agree to Succession Rules*


Elites' rationale for supporting the institutionalization of succession rules that favor the regime's persistence follows a clear logic of utility maximization; elites want assurances that a leader's departure will not jeopardize their continued access to the benefits they receive under the current leader. Leaders'

willingness to accept institutionalized succession rules that could facilitate their removal under certain circumstances, in contrast, presents an enigma.<sup>9</sup> These rules define the conditions under which the leadership post can be vacated and may define procedures for deposing the leader. The institutionalization of succession rules generates the risk—even if small—that such procedures might be used to remove the leader (Herz, 1952). In the Chilean case, for example, although the junta members eventually sanctioned the candidacy of Pinochet, the constitutionally designed succession procedures did not mandate his selection.<sup>10</sup> Even where succession rules do not provide a means for removing the leader, but rather simply stipulate the process for selecting the leader's replacement, they still may increase a leader's vulnerability. The existence of such rules could jeopardize the principle allegiance to the leader of members of his inner circle by empowering elites assigned the task of guiding the transition process, who could leverage their influential position to curry personal support among other members of the inner circle.

The prevalence of formalized succession procedures across a variety of authoritarian regime types suggests that leaders and their elite supporters all favor their adoption. We contend that leaders' inclination to endorse succession procedures stems from their desire for self-preservation, because institutionalizing leadership succession reduces the likelihood that leaders will confront coups.

We use Roessler's (2011) definition of a coup as the "sudden and illegal removal of the incumbent using force or the threat of force" (p. 307), which members of the military almost always carry out (Jackman, 1976; Luttwak, 1979). Dictators worry about facing coups not only because a successful coup could end their careers, but also due to the high likelihood that they would suffer negative repercussions subsequent to their forced removal. Authoritarian leaders who fall to coups face death, imprisonment, or exile 73% of the time compared with only 29% of leaders who depart office via other means.<sup>11</sup> Therefore, institutionalized succession rules, which reduce the probability of attempted coups, decrease the likelihood that leaders will suffer the negative fates associated with successful leadership coups.

To provide further insight into leaders' motivations, we illustrate trends in the manner in which autocrats exit office. Using data from Svobik (2012) that code the entry and exit years of authoritarian leaders and leaders' manner of entry to and exit from power, along with data compiled by Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz (henceforth GWF) (2014) that identify the start and end dates of 280 authoritarian regimes from 1946 to 2010, we break down the typical modes of exit for authoritarian leaders (see Figure 1).<sup>12</sup> More dictators leave office as the result of coups d'état—about one third of all exits—than due to any other type of departure.



**Figure 1.** Authoritarian leaders' types of exit.

Previous studies have shown that the fear of succumbing to “bad fates,” such as imprisonment, exile, or death, motivates leaders to rely on repression (Escribà-Folch, 2013) and take drastic measures—including waging war—to avoid such fates (Debs & Goemans, 2010). To deter coup attempts, dictators employ a range of strategies and tactics including improving their surveillance capabilities and distributing perks to members of the military.<sup>13</sup> We contend that dictators support institutionalizing succession procedures because it offers a relatively low-cost addition to their coup-proofing arsenal.

Institutionalized succession rules embody a bargain between leaders and elites; elites agree to honor the leader's tenure in return for a share of the spoils and the exclusion of outsiders during any subsequent transfer of power. Institutionalized succession rules convey the challenges (and risks) potential plotters would face were they to try to recruit co-conspirators. Elites who are well-positioned to become the next leader, as well as their close allies, have a vested interest in stymying coup plots by other members of the leader's coterie of supporters. Alternatively, should these well-positioned elites—who may be anxious to assume power—initiate the plot, other members of the inner circle might seize the opportunity to reposition themselves favorably within the regime by exposing the plot to the leader in hopes of garnering his favor. In the presence of succession rules, some portion of the elite has more invested in preserving the status quo than in overturning it. Absent institutionalized succession rules, which improve some elites' chances to assume power peacefully, a larger portion of the inner circle might be willing to risk the status quo by joining the conspirators. By raising the stakes for some



elites, succession rules therefore should reduce the odds that a dictator will experience a coup attempt.

Coup plots are risky endeavors for those who plan and implement them. Their outcomes are unpredictable. Even successful coups provide uncertain benefits for most participants. Should a coup attempt fail or a coup plot be revealed, those responsible for the plot and their collaborators likely would pay a high price for their ambition, such as long prison sentences, mandated exile, or even death sentences. For example, following a failed coup attempt against Gambian president Yahya Jammeh in 2014, he issued this forewarning: "Anybody who plans to attack this country, be ready, because you are going to die."<sup>14</sup>

Launching a coup requires coordination among collaborators. Coup conspirators have few concrete benefits to offer elites reticent to join them; their promises of future perks are cheap talk because enforcing pre-coup power-sharing agreements can be difficult *ex post*. Thus, ringleaders who try to recruit support for a coup attempt must convey to other regime actors that the plot has a very high probability of succeeding, while also trying to prevent potential snitches from catching wind of the plot (Singh, 2014). As Machiavelli aptly described,

it was astonishing that any overthrow of a prince ever occurred because of necessity, the conspiracy was risky and there was a safe alternative, which was to betray the conspiracy to the prince. The prince would then naturally reward highly the person who had betrayed the conspiracy and take care of those members of the conspiracy that had not informed.<sup>15</sup> (Machiavelli in Tullock, 1987, p. 26)

Conspirators' efforts to assemble a broad coalition of support, which could increase the odds of a coup's success once initiated, inherently amplify the risk of the plot's premature revelation; as conspirators enlist more collaborators, the number of potential whistleblowers increases.

Though successful coups do not require full military participation, they cannot succeed without a reliable threat of force. Therefore, plotters must secure the cooperation of at least some members of the armed forces; however potential recruits from the military likely will resist joining conspirators if they anticipate that other members of the armed forces actively will oppose the plot (Singh, 2014). Recognizing that the military's participation substantially boosts the probability that a coup attempt succeeds, dictators characteristically co-opt part of the military to impede intra-military collusion (Geddes, 2003).

To summarize, we contend that the accord between leaders and their elite inner circle, actualized in the institutionalization of succession rules, impedes coup plotters' efforts to attract co-conspirators by giving more elites a real stake in maintaining the status quo.<sup>16</sup> We therefore anticipate that the

institutionalization of succession rules decreases the likelihood that regime elites will attempt coups. We assert that leaders agree to institutionalized succession rules, despite their potential risks, because such risks pose a lower cost than do the negative consequences leaders might suffer if overthrown via a coup d'état.

We derive the following hypothesis from our argument:

**Hypothesis:** In autocratic regimes with institutionalized succession rules leaders face fewer coup attempts than in autocratic regimes where these rules do not exist.

In the following section, we provide empirical evidence to support our argument. Using statistical analyses of data on dictatorships from 1946 through 2010,<sup>17</sup> we examine the validity of our hypothesis.

## Methods and Analyses

To test our argument, we use the sample of dictatorships identified by GWF (2014).<sup>18</sup> We operationalize institutionalized succession to capture the institutionalization of either formal or broadly accepted informal rules that address leadership transitions regardless of whether a regime observes such rules in practice at times of transition. We also do not distinguish among the types of rules in place, which may stipulate impeachment procedures or may simply describe the process to be followed in the event of the leader's death. Although particular rules might amplify their effect in deterring coup attempts, our central argument rests on whether elites and the leader have agreed, in principle, to establish or maintain any type of succession procedures, which we contend should deter coup attempts and bolster the status quo.

To determine whether dictatorships have succession rules, we build on the work of Iqbal and Zorn (2008), who use the Polity IV Project's executive regulation variable (*xrreg*), which examines whether "there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected. Regulation refers to the extent to which a polity has institutionalized procedures for transferring executive power" (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014, p. 20).<sup>19</sup> Polity considers that regimes are *unregulated* if no procedures exist for transferring power (e.g., the Chilean dictatorship prior to 1980), *designational* if chief executives are chosen from within the political elite without formal competition (e.g., the Chilean dictatorship after 1980 or the Brazilian military regime from 1964 to 1985, which held presidential elections that were neither free nor fair), or *regulated* if chief executives are determined through hereditary succession (e.g., the Saudi Arabian monarchy) or fully competitive elections. According to Polity's coding of the nature of executive transitions, the *xrreg* variable


takes values of one, two, or three, respectively, for *unregulated*, *designational*, or *regulated* executive selection. In our sample of autocratic regimes, 13% of country-years are *unregulated*, 69% are *designational*, and 18% are *regulated*, nearly all of which are monarchies (because dictatorial rule precludes the possibility of truly competitive elections—the other form of regulated transition).<sup>20</sup>

We consider regimes as having institutionalized succession rules if Polity classified them as either *designational* or *regulated*, whereas those classified by Polity as *unregulated* we denote as lacking such procedures. We create a variable, **institutionalized succession**,<sup>21</sup> in which we assign country-years a score of one if the *xrreg* variable equals two or three, and zero if *xrreg* equals one. Regimes receiving a one on our succession measure generally feature either a constitution or party platform defining rules governing succession or an established mechanism for guiding hereditary succession; those that receive a zero usually have declared martial law, a state of emergency, or suspended a pre-existing constitution.

The data indicate that dictatorships commonly feature succession rules: 87% of autocratic country-years in the sample feature succession rules. We also note some variation in the frequency with which succession rules exist across authoritarian regime types (as specified in the GWF, 2014, data set). While around 97% and 99% of country-years for single-party and monarchic regimes, respectively, feature formalized rules of succession, 77% and 59% of country-years in personalist and military dictatorships, respectively, include them.<sup>22</sup> Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of country-years with leadership succession rules in place, given the duration of the regime, across each regime type.

Even though most authoritarian country-years feature succession rules, many regimes do not incorporate them immediately. Figure 2 indicates that the prevalence of institutionalized succession rules increases the longer regimes remain in power. More than one third (37%) of all dictatorships govern their first year in power without rules in place, but by the time regimes collapse, this number decreases to less than 20%.<sup>23</sup> Only six regimes in our sample abandoned institutionalized rules of succession that were previously in place.<sup>24</sup>

To evaluate our hypothesis, we look at the impact of **institutionalized succession** on **attempted coups**, which we measure using data from Powell and Thyne (2011). Powell and Thyne code a country-year one if one or more coup attempts occurred in a given country during a given year, and zero otherwise. Figure 3, which plots both of these variables over time, shows that when a higher proportion of dictatorships has succession rules in place, the rate of coup attempts declines, as was the case during much of the 1940s and 1950s and in the years following the Cold War. In contrast, during the 1960s to 1980s, when a lower proportion of dictatorships incorporated succession rules, a higher percentage of dictators experienced coup attempts.




**Figure 2.** Proportion of regimes with succession rules given number of years in power, by regime type.

We next estimate the relationship between succession rules and coup attempts taking into account a number of control variables derived from a well-established body of literature that could potentially confound the relationship between the two variables. Looking to previous studies that show the adoption of parties and legislatures can increase survival rates of dictators (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007), we include as controls Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010) measures of **parties** and **legislature**, both of which we lag by 1 year. The former takes on a value of one if regimes have at least one political party and a value of zero otherwise, while the latter takes on a value of one if regimes have a legislature and a value of zero otherwise.

Next, we include a measure of **ethnic fractionalization** (Fearon & Laitin, 2003) because prior studies have shown that ethnically fragmented societies tend to suffer more political instability than do countries with ethnically homogeneous populations (Jackman, 1978).

Public support for leaders of democracies and autocracies alike improves with good socioeconomic performance and deteriorates when socioeconomic conditions decline (Stein, 2013; Weyland, 1998). It follows that when leaders preside during bad economic times, they are more susceptible to threats to their rule, including coup attempts. To capture the impact of economic conditions on the leader's susceptibility to coup attempts, we control for **GDP/capita** (logged) and economic **growth** (Gleditsch, 2002), each of which we lag by 1 year.



**Figure 3.** Succession rules and coup attempts in dictatorships.

We also control for **leader age** (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009) because older leaders may be more likely to have established support networks that could lower their risk of facing coup attempts. In addition, because most regimes tend to adopt rather than abolish succession procedures over time, older leaders more likely govern with succession rules in place by virtue of the likelihood that they have held power longer than their younger counterparts.

During the Cold War, the two superpowers intervened in the domestic politics of countries in their respective “spheres of influence,” changing the political dynamics within countries. We include a dummy variable for the **Cold War** given prior evidence that the number of coups increased during that period (Marinov & Goemans, 2014; Posner & Young, 2007).

Previous research suggests that the composition of the armed forces influences the likelihood such forces will attempt a coup (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2011; Powell, 2012). On the one hand, cohesive military forces could facilitate coordination and improve the chances of implementing successful coups, which should increase the frequency of coup attempts. On the other hand, because a successful coup rarely requires the complicity of all armed government organizations, where more military agencies exist, coup plotters could elicit the support of a group or groups that have weaker allegiances to the leader while containing the coup plot within allied military organizations. We therefore control for the number of ground-capable combat organizations, measured by the **effective number of military organizations** (Pilster & Böhmelt, 2011).

Previously scholars have suggested that the susceptibility of leaders and regimes to failure does not follow a linear pattern with respect to their time in

power. Following Carter and Signorino's (2010) suggestion, to account for this duration dependence, we include polynomials of **time since attempted coup**. In the Appendix, we provide basic summary statistics for all of the variables included in this study (for the observations included in the sample in Model 3 of Table 1). We estimate all of our models with robust standard errors clustered by regime case, unless otherwise noted.

In Table 1 given the dichotomous nature of our dependent variable, we first present a basic probit estimation of the relationship between institutionalized succession and attempted coups for authoritarian regimes from 1946 through 2010 including only the duration polynomials in the specification (Model 1). Some of the control variables we include in subsequent models limit the size of our sample, primarily by restricting the time frame to 1970 through 2010. Model 2 mimics Model 1, but uses the sample of observations from Model 3—our core model—that includes control variables. Model 2 demonstrates that our basic result holds absent controls in the abridged sample. In Model 3, we estimate the relationship including the aforementioned control variables. Including the same set of independent variables, in the subsequent two models we use different estimation methods in place of probit. In Models 4 and 5, respectively, we use ordinary least squares linear regression and a Cox proportional hazard model (duration polynomials would be inappropriate in a hazard model, so we exclude them from the latter model). In each of these specifications, the coefficient of institutionalized succession remains negative and statistically significant at conventional levels.

To evaluate whether underlying features of authoritarian regime types are driving the relationship between succession rules and coup attempts, in Model 6 in Table 1 we use the same specification as our core model, but include dummy variables for dictatorship type (**monarchies**, **personalist regimes**, and **single-party regimes** with **military dictatorships** the excluded category) as measured by GWF (2014). The results conform to our expectations; succession rules protect leaders against coup attempts above and beyond other characteristics endogenous to regime type. In Model 6, the coefficient of institutionalized succession remains negative and is of similar magnitude to the core model, though it falls just shy of statistical significance ( $p = 0.103$ ). We conclude that the negative relationship between succession rules and coup attempts unlikely occurs by chance.

In Model 7 in Table 1 we explore whether different types of succession rules affect attempted coups differently. To do so, we estimate our core model but disaggregate the two components of our measure of succession, including dummy variables for **designated** versus **regulated succession**, according to the Polity *xrreg* measure. The coefficients of designated and regulated succession have similar magnitudes to one another with  $p$  values equal to 0.030 and 0.138, respectively.

Table 1. Institutionalized Succession and Coup Attempts in Dictatorships.

	Probit	Probit	Probit	Ordinary Least Squares	Cox Prop. Hazard	Probit	Probit
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Institutionalized succession	-0.189* (0.088)	-0.342** (0.117)	-0.270* (0.122)	-0.052* (0.023)	-1.290*** (0.362)	-0.201 (0.123)	
Designated succession							-0.276* (0.127)
Regulated succession							-0.237 (0.159)
Parties <sub>t-1</sub>			0.143 (0.133)	0.011 (0.017)	0.025 (0.304)	0.185 (0.135)	0.147 (0.132)
Legislature <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.204† (0.109)	-0.025† (0.014)	-0.769** (0.228)	-0.147 (0.116)	-0.203† (0.109)
Ethnic fractionalization			0.205 (0.172)	0.026 (0.017)	0.466 (0.466)	0.206 (0.177)	0.207 (0.171)
Real GDP/capita <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.133** (0.052)	-0.008† (0.004)	-0.601*** (0.155)	-0.126* (0.053)	-0.135* (0.053)
Growth <sub>t-1</sub>			-0.960† (0.553)	-0.030 (0.030)	-1.853 (1.165)	-0.966† (0.551)	-0.954† (0.554)
(Annual change in GDP/capita)			-0.003 (0.005)	-0.0003 (0.0004)	-0.027* (0.013)	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)
Leader's age			0.214† (0.111)	0.021* (0.010)	0.604* (0.284)	0.252* (0.116)	0.213† (0.110)
Cold War			0.095 (0.080)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.064 (0.238)	0.073 (0.086)	0.096 (0.081)
Effective number of military organizations						-0.127 (0.213)	
Monarchies						-0.046 (0.136)	
Personalist regimes						-0.365* (0.151)	
Single-party regimes						-0.259 (0.493)	-0.192 (0.494)
Constant	-0.844*** (0.085)	-0.839*** (0.121)	-0.196 (0.496)	0.211*** (0.047)		2489 (0.181)	2489 (0.181)
Observations	4122	2489	181	2489	2367	181	181
Regimes	258	181	181	181	173	181	181
Wald $\chi^2$	113.43***	68.39***	112.06***	8.95***		118.42***	111.87***
F-statistic							
Likelihood ratio test ( $\theta=0$ )					114.12***		-0.192

Robust standard errors clustered by regime. \*\*\*  $p \leq 0.001$ , \*\*  $p \leq 0.01$ , \*  $p \leq 0.05$ , †  $p \leq 0.10$ .  
“Years since coup attempt” polynomials included but coefficients not reported. Sample in Model 2 corresponds with sample in Model 3.

Next, we take into account the possibility that the relationship between succession rules and coup attempts may be endogenous. Overlooking issues of endogeneity has plagued many cross-national, large-*N* studies that examine the relationship between authoritarian institutions, such as succession rules, and autocratic survival (Pepinsky, 2014). Precisely in those environments in which leaders already have a strong hold on power and, hence, a low likelihood of facing coup attempts, leaders might be better able to adopt or safeguard succession rules to buoy their rule. In other words, the adoption of succession rules may occur more frequently where leaders rule from positions of strength and where elites less likely would attempt to overthrow them.<sup>25</sup> We therefore run a second set of models using an instrumental variable (IV) approach to address endogeneity.

In instrumental variable regression, we first estimate the endogenous variable (Institutionalized succession), including at least one exogenous variable that correlates with the endogenous variable but not with the dependent variable (Attempted coup) (Angrist & Krueger, 2001; Angrist & Pischke, 2009; Gujarati, 1995; Sovey & Green, 2011). The success of IV estimations depends on the selection of good instruments (Sovey & Green, 2011); a “good” instrument must affect the endogenous variable in a *theoretically* plausible manner but not directly affect the outcome of interest. We use an indicator for whether a regime took power at independence as an instrument to predict institutionalized succession. We measure our instrument, **post-independence**, by comparing countries’ independence dates with regime start dates, as indicated in GWF (2014). We chose this instrument because regimes that came to power following independence more likely have succession rules in place from the onset (97% of post-independence dictatorships in our sample feature succession rules in their first year in office, compared with 53% of the remaining dictatorships).

In a number of countries, organized groups waged independence movements against colonial powers. These groups often functioned like political parties, having well-established internal hierarchies and rules (Geddes, 2006). Following independence, citizens of newly established regimes frequently elected the leaders of the former independence movements in reasonably free and fair elections. With support from party members (the former independence movement in most instances), the new leaders subsequently restricted competition through tactics such as banning, harassing, or otherwise constraining opposition activities. Because these independence movements commonly had an organizational structure prior to taking control of government, they often had succession rules in place at the time they assumed power (defined in a constitution or party platform). We therefore expect post-independence regimes to positively correlate with institutionalized succession. Despite the substantial popular support many leaders of independence



movements enjoy, their elite supporters still may jockey for favored positions within the regime leading to intra-elite conflict. We believe that beyond their greater propensity to have inherited succession procedures, the first leaders of post-independence regimes should not bare significantly lower levels of risk of facing attempted coups than leaders of other authoritarian regimes.

Not only should scholars select theoretically appropriate instruments, but they also should ensure they use instruments that are neither “weak” nor poor predictors of the endogenous variable (Sovey & Green, 2011). An  $F$  test assesses the strength of the instrument: An  $F$ -statistic for the excluded instrument in the first-stage equation of less than 10 indicates a weak instrument (Sovey & Green, 2011; Staiger & Stock, 1997; Stock & Watson, 2007). In our core IV model (Model 9 in Table 2), the  $F$ -statistic (16.02) surpasses this benchmark, indicating that we have selected an adequate instrument.

In Table 2, we begin by estimating a barebones model (Model 8) without control variables to ensure that their inclusion has not influenced our results (Dunning, 2012). In line with prior research on instrumental variable models that recommends using linear estimation methods even with dichotomous endogenous dependent variables (Angrist & Krueger, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002), we use instrumental variable two-stage least squares (IV-2SLS). In Model 9, we estimate this relationship using the same set of control variables that we used in the one-stage models. Consistent with the rules for IV estimation, we include these variables in both our second-stage equation predicting attempted coup and in the first-stage equation predicting institutionalized succession, in which we add the aforementioned instrument (post-independence regimes). To ensure that the estimation choice does not determine our findings, in Model 10 we estimate this same relationship but use an instrumental variables probit model. The results of these three models provide strong support for our argument: The coefficients of institutionalized succession are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. These results indicate that the use of succession rules in dictatorships reduces the *likelihood that leaders will experience coup attempts*, supporting our central hypothesis.

We offer tests that explore other implications of our argument and provide additional robustness checks in the Online Appendix, though we summarize those findings here. In Model A1 (in Table A1), we explore whether institutionalized succession rules also reduce the chance of **successful coups**, as measured by Powell and Thyne (2011). We estimate the same specification as in Model 9, but substitute this measure as the dependent variable.<sup>26</sup> It is possible, for example, that succession rules lower the incidence of successful coups because incentives elite insiders face raise the probability of last-minute whistleblowing, allowing the regime sufficient time to mobilize support to stymie the coup while in progress. According to these results, leaders governing with institutionalized succession rules tend to succumb to coups less frequently than leaders without them, a statistically significant finding.

**Table 2.** Institutionalized Succession and Coup Attempts in Dictatorships, Accounting for Endogeneity.

	IV two-stage least squares		IV two-stage least squares		IV probit	
	(8)		(9)		(10)	
	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 1	Stage 2
Institutionalized succession		-0.265*** (0.054)		-0.227* (0.092)		-2.463*** (0.623)
Post-independence regime	0.179*** (0.024)		0.114*** (0.028)		0.114*** (0.028)	
Parties <sub>t-1</sub>			0.104* (0.049)	0.027 (0.022)	0.104* (0.049)	0.338* (0.170)
Legislature <sub>t-1</sub>			0.109** (0.038)	-0.005 (0.018)	0.109** (0.037)	0.111 (0.155)
Ethnic fractionalization			-0.040 (0.061)	0.028 (0.021)	-0.040 (0.061)	0.138 (0.191)
GDP/capita <sub>t-1</sub>			0.020 (0.015)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.020 (0.014)	-0.034 (0.069)
Growth <sub>t-1</sub> (annual change in GDP/capita)			-0.022 (0.024)	-0.036 (0.033)	-0.022 (0.024)	-0.859† (0.443)
Leader's age			0.002* (0.001)	0.0001 (0.0005)	0.002* (0.001)	0.004 (0.005)
Cold War			-0.020 (0.029)	0.016 (0.013)	-0.020 (0.028)	0.124 (0.132)
Effective number of military organizations			0.043* (0.021)	0.013 (0.009)	0.043* (0.021)	0.151* (0.076)
Constant	0.815*** (0.025)	0.292*** (0.051)	0.164 (0.169)	0.218*** (0.055)	0.164 (0.169)	0.012 (0.552)
Observations	4,122		2,489		2,489	
Regimes	258		181		181	
F	51.59***		16.02***		N/A	

Robust standard errors clustered by regime. "Years since coup attempt" polynomials included (except in Model 8) but coefficients not reported. IV = instrumental variable.

†p ≤ 0.10. \*p ≤ 0.05. \*\*p ≤ 0.01. \*\*\*p ≤ 0.001.

Next, in Table A2 we evaluate how succession rules influence other types of leader failure, distinguishing leaders who exit due to **coups**, **civilian revolts**, via **non-violent exits**, or **other leader failures**, as measured by Svulik (2012). Model A2 employs multinomial logit that includes the categorical variable, **types of leader failure**, as the dependent variable. Including institutionalized succession rules and leader duration polynomials, measured by Svulik (2012), we simultaneously evaluate the effect of succession rules on the risk of coups as well as on the above types of leadership failure, with **no leader failure** as the base outcome for comparison. We find that

institutionalized succession rules decrease the chance of all leader exits, but the effect is only statistically significant when predicting the chance of leader failure via coup.

If succession rules primarily function as bargains intended to persuade members of the elite to wait their turn rather than seek the leader's overthrow, then we would expect succession rules to reduce the chance of coups that entail leadership changes more so than coups that result in regime change.<sup>27</sup> In the two models we report in Table A5, we test the implication that institutionalized succession rules influence the type of coup levied. To do so, we estimate the same model as in our core IV model, but use **leadership shuffle coups** (Model A3) and **regime change coups** (Model A4) as our dependent variables.<sup>28</sup> Our results validate our expectation. Succession rules exert a negative impact on both types of coups, but the coefficient is larger and statistically significant when estimating the chance of a coup that simply shuffles the leadership.

In the remaining models, we return to our core IV model (Model 9) that uses coup attempts as the dependent variable. When the Cold War ended, countries altered their strategies and objectives with regard to allocating foreign aid. Many Western democracies used foreign aid to promote democracy. Therefore, in a post-Cold War global environment, the allocation of foreign aid potentially factors in not only to regime elites' decision whether or not to stage coups (Marinov & Goemans, 2014), but also the regime's decision to adopt or maintain pseudo-democratic institutions like succession rules. In Model A5 in Table A4, we therefore include a control for **foreign aid/capita** and the interaction between **foreign aid/capita** and the **Cold War** along with our core independent variables. Institutionalized succession rules continue to have a statistically significant negative effect on coup attempts. Our results do not support the alternative argument that foreign aid and changes in foreign aid allocation at the end of the Cold War account for our previous findings, particularly in the instrumental variables model (given that many countries achieved independence during the Cold War).

In Table A5, Model A6 demonstrates that our key result proves robust to the inclusion of region dummy variables. Also in Table A5 (Models A7-A10) we report our core IV model, but exclude from the sample each category of regime type, one at a time, to ensure that no single type of regime drives our results. The coefficient of institutionalized succession remains negative and statistically significant in each instance.

The evidence we present strongly supports implications of our argument that leaders adopt institutionalized succession procedures to prolong their survival by reducing their risk of confronting a coup.<sup>29</sup> Institutionalized succession rules reduce the likelihood that autocrats who govern with them will face an attempted coup, benefiting both regime and leader longevity.

## Implications and Conclusion

In recent years, scholars increasingly have studied the curious phenomenon of authoritarian regimes adopting democratic-like institutions. Though these studies have emerged only in the past decade or so, dictatorships have incorporated such institutions for some time. The 71-year reign of the Institutionalized Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico, which had succession rules in place throughout most of the regime's duration, epitomizes the prolonging effect that succession rules can provide the leader and the regime, earning the pre-2000 Mexican regime the designation of the "Perfect Dictatorship."<sup>30</sup> Scholars have suggested many possible motivations for why authoritarian regimes might adopt institutions such as political parties and elections, such as their informative role, the credibility they lend to authoritarian leaders' future commitments to elites, the legitimacy they bestow on the regime in the eyes of foreign democratic allies or donors, and their importance as an alternative venue for dissent to inhibit potentially destabilizing contentious behavior. Our research builds on and adds to this literature.

Although, at first, it may appear paradoxical that authoritarian leaders would accept rules that could limit their reign, they do so because the rules strengthen their durability. Succession rules raise the cost of coordination among would-be coup plotters and increase the probability of the pre-emptive revelation of such plots. Authoritarian leaders therefore accept or incorporate succession rules precisely because these rules bolster dictators' tenure by countering coup attempts.

We view as troubling the fact that succession rules help sustain dictator's time in power. The increasing pressure that external democratic powers place on authoritarian leaders to democratize may increase dictators' incentives to *appear* democratic leading them to adopt succession rules along with other pseudo-democratic institutions that likely prolong their reign, such as political parties and legislatures. Countries or international organizations that condition foreign aid on the adoption of superficially democratic institutions actually may be strengthening the status quo.

Though pseudo-democratic institutions in dictatorships impede the rise of new democracies—which we see as a negative by-product—they nevertheless can improve the quality of life for citizens subjected to authoritarian rule (Miller, 2015). As a number of previous studies have shown (e.g., Dionne, 2011; Wright, 2008), leaders who foresee themselves in office for some time are more likely to invest in the country's infrastructure and economy. For example, prior research indicates that leaders with longer time horizons improve foreign aid effectiveness (Wright, 2008) and spend more to combat the AIDS epidemic in some African countries (Dionne, 2011).

We imagine this relationship extends to other policy areas and creates other positive externalities. For example, leaders with longer time horizons

may invest in physical infrastructure such as roads, provide fresh water supplies for remote communities, or develop childhood immunization programs. In addition leaders protected by succession rules may feel less threatened by the risk of citizens' access to the Internet and social media and therefore may build more cell towers and improve broadband networks, which can augment human capital (e.g., grow the economy, improve education) and help expand personal liberties among the population. Future research could reveal whether well-established pseudo-democratic institutions, including institutionalized succession rules, in fact encourage leaders to promote policies that produce positive social outcomes, and, if so, whether leaders and regimes ultimately pay for increasing social and human capital.

## Appendix

### Summary Statistics.

Variable	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Minimum	Maximum	Source
Institutionalized succession	0.88	0.32	0	1	Polity IV (2010)
Attempted coup	0.04	0.21	0	1	Powell and Thyne (2011)
Time since attempted coup	17.69	13.98	0	60	Powell and Thyne (2011)
Post-independence	0.32	0.46	0	1	Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014)
Parties <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	0.85	0.35	0	1	Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010)
Legislature <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	0.75	0.42	0	1	Cheibub et al. (2010)
Ethnic fractionalization	0.45	0.29	0.001	0.92	Fearon and Laitin (2003)
GDP/capita <sub><i>t-1</i></sub> (logged)	7.91	1.05	5.51	12.97	Gleditsch (2002)
Growth <sub><i>t-1</i></sub>	0.01	0.16	-0.66	6.43	Gleditsch (2002)
Leader age	58.79	11.94	24	93	Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009)
Cold War	0.57	0.49	0	1	Coded by authors
Effective number of military organizations	1.72	0.63	1	4.57	Pilster and Böhmelt (2011)
Monarchy	0.09	0.29	0	1	Geddes et al. (2014)
Personalist regime	0.26	0.44	0	1	Geddes et al. (2014)
Single-party regime	0.49	0.50	0	1	Geddes et al. (2014)
Military dictatorship	0.13	0.33	0	1	Geddes et al. (2014)
Successful coup	0.02	0.15	0	1	Powell and Thyne (2011)
Leader duration	11.74	9.40	0	46	Svolik (2012)
Foreign aid/capita <sub><i>t-1</i></sub> (4-year average, logged)	40.95	60.36	-6.32	929.44	World Bank's World Development Indicators
Leader shuffle coup	0.01	0.09	0	1	Powell and Thyne (2011); Geddes et al. (2014)
Regime change coup	0.01	0.12	0	1	Powell and Thyne (2011); Geddes et al. (2014)

## Authors' Note

Both authors contributed equally to the research, and we take equal responsibility for any errors that remain.

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## Notes

1. See Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) for a review of the literature on institutionalized authoritarian regimes.
2. A dictator's inner circle refers to the individuals whose support the dictator must maintain to hold power. The exact number of elites required to keep the dictator in power varies from regime to regime (Frantz & Ezrow, 2011). Depending on the type of authoritarian regime, members of the leader's inner circle may include the armed forces, relatives, close advisors, leaders of ethnic or religious groups, and other prominent individuals (Geddes, 2003).
3. When we reference the *institutionalization* of succession rules or *institutionalizing* succession rules, we refer to the regime's acceptance of pre-existing regulations—either formal or broadly accepted informal rules—that the regime inherits when it assumes control, or to regulations that the regime establishes after taking power that delineate succession procedures.
4. The existence of such rules does not guarantee that these procedures necessarily will steer the transition process upon a leader's departure.
5. Autocratic leaders are distinct from autocratic regimes. The latter refer to the set of rules for choosing leaders and policies (Geddes, Wright, & Frantz [GWF], 2014). Nearly half of all authoritarian regimes experience at least one leadership change during the regime's duration.
6. See Belkin and Schofer (2003) and Powell (2012) for reviews of the coup literature. Also, note exceptions, such as Gary Cox's widely cited research paper, "Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975-2004," in which he

- argues that autocrats accept the risk of electoral loss precisely to avoid violent exits from office, such as revolutions or military coups.
7. Regimes that use hereditary succession also may have constitutions in place that formally establish these procedures.
  8. Regimes with succession rules average 16 years in office, whereas those without succession rules average 8 years in office. Differences in the longevity of regimes with succession rules versus those without persist even when we disaggregate regimes based on authoritarian regime type.
  9. In line with prior authors (e.g., Frantz & Ezrow, 2011), we assume that autocratic leaders have veto power and could block elite attempts to establish succession procedures or maintain inherited rules that the leader does not support.
  10. Pinochet ultimately lost the plebiscite held on October 5, 1988, and, having lost the support of key members of the junta, accepted the results. Pinochet's term and the military regime itself ended on March 11, 1990, when a democratically elected civilian assumed the Chilean presidency. Although the military regime institutionalized rules that led to its own demise, these rules enabled former members of the regime to maintain their military posts and granted the military substantial influence in the subsequent democratic regime.
  11. We calculate these percentages using the Archigos data set (Goemans, Gleditsch, & Chiozza, 2009), including the update released on March 1, 2016.
  12. Here, "regular" exits (Goemans et al., 2009) include when leaders depart as the result of enforced term limits, resignations, lost elections, or as the result of consensus decisions by regime actors, such as members of a politburo or military junta.
  13. See Powell (2012) for a review of the literature on coup-proofing.
  14. "Dozens Arrested and Weapons Cache Found After Failed Gambia Coup," Agence France-Presse, January 2, 2015. Available at <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jan/02/dozens-arrested-and-weapons-cache-found-after-failed-gambiacoup> (accessed March 19, 2015).
  15. Gordon Tullock (1987) notes that the favorable treatment informants receive creates a perverse incentive to denounce plots whether or not they really exist, making it difficult for the dictator to learn the truth.
  16. The regulated nature of leadership succession procedures can bestow legitimacy on autocratic leaders and their regimes, potentially increasing the likelihood that international actors will condemn perpetrators of coup plots.
  17. When we control for confounding factors or alternative hypotheses, some available indicators limit the time period to 1970 to 2010.
  18. See "Autocratic Regimes Code Book," available at <http://sites.psu.edu/dictators/wp-content/uploads/sites/12570/2016/05/GWF-Codebook.pdf>
  19. As Iqbal and Zorn (2008) note, the Polity *xrreg* coding, which we use to measure **succession**, reflects "the institutional arrangements in place in each country in each year of [the] data rather than any actual transitions that year" (p. 298), indicating its conceptual and empirical exogeneity to actual incidences of leadership transfers.
  20. We recognize that the variable imperfectly captures what we intend to measure. For example, the variable, as measured, may not always capture if a regime

- revises the rules for succession, so long as they maintain succession procedures.
21. Because the Polity data are coded based on the regime in power as of December 31 of each calendar year, we adjusted them so that they align with the GWF data that code the regime in power as of January 1 of each calendar year. See "Dataset Users' Manual," Polity IV Project, <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/p4manualv2015.pdf> (accessed June 6, 2016).
  22. See the GWF (2014) codebook, "Autocratic Regimes Code Book," for more on authoritarian regime-type classifications.
  23. In our original sample of 280 regimes, 223 regimes ended (20% of which remained unregulated upon the regime's collapse); the remainder still were in power as of 2010, the final year in the GWF (2014) data set.
  24. These regimes include Guatemala (1970-1985), Nigeria (1983-1993), Libya (1969-2011), Thailand (1957-1973, twice), and Cambodia (1979- ). We list regime years in parentheses.
  25. Conversely, leaders might try to institutionalize succession rules where they sense their coup risk is high.
  26. The same factors that affect the chance of a coup attempt do not necessarily influence the chance of a coup's success once initiated (Powell, 2012).
  27. See Aksoy, Carter, and Wright (2015) for a discussion of the difference between coups that simply change the leadership and those that lead to regime change.
  28. Comparing the Powell and Thyne (2011) coup data with Svolik's (2012) data on leader failure and the GWF (2014) data that indicate regime failure, we coded **leadership shuffle coups** and **regime change coups**.
  29. As an indicator that succession rules increase *leader* survival by lowering coup vulnerability, we also ran our core models substituting **leader failure**, as measured by Svolik (2012), in place of **attempted coup** as the dependent variable. We find that institutionalized succession rules reduce the likelihood that leaders fail, a statistically significant finding. Readers may request these results from the authors.
  30. The Peruvian novelist and politician Mario Vargas Llosa used this term to describe the political regime that governed Mexico from 1929 through 2000 (Lawson, 2002, p. 13).

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