OXFORD STUDIES IN DEMOCRATIZATION

# THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE

OISÍN TANSEY

# THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE

# OXFORD STUDIES IN DEMOCRATIZATION

*Series editor*: Laurence Whitehead

. . . . . .

Oxford Studies in Democratization is a series for scholars and students of comparative politics and related disciplines. Volumes will concentrate on the comparative study of the democratization processes that accompanied the decline and termination of the Cold War. The geographical focus of the series will primarily be Latin America, the Caribbean, Southern and Eastern Europe, and relevant experiences in Africa and Asia.

OTHER BOOKS IN THE SERIES

Accountability Politics:
Power and Voice in Rural Mexico
*Jonathan A. Fox*

Regimes and Democracy in Latin America:
Theories and Methods
*Edited by Gerardo L. Munck*

Democracy and Diversity:
Political Engineering in the Asia-Pacific
*Benjamin Reilly*

Democratic Accountability in Latin America
*Edited by Scott Mainwaring and Christopher Welna*

Democratization:
Theory and Experience
*Laurence Whitehead*

The Politics of Uncertainty:
Sustaining and Subverting Electoral Authoritarianism
*Andreas Schedler*

The Politics of Accountability in Southeast Asia:
The Dominance of Moral Ideologies
*Garry Rodan and Caroline Hughes*

Segmented Representation:
Political Party Strategies in Unequal Democracies
*Juan Pablo Luna*

Europe in the New Middle East:
Opportunity or Exclusion?
*Richard Youngs*

Turkey's Difficult Journey to Democracy:
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back
*İlter Turan*

Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Autocractic Survival
*Abel Escribà-Folch and Joseph Wright*

Legislative Institutions and Lawmaking in Latin America
*Edited by Eduardo Alemán and George Tsebelis*

# The International Politics of Authoritarian Rule

OISÍN TANSEY

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS

OXFORD
UNIVERSITY PRESS
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom

Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University's objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries



First Edition published in 2016
Impression: 1



Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available

Library of Congress Control Number: 2016931576

ISBN 978–0–19–968362–8

Printed in Great Britain by
Clays Ltd, St Ives plc

# Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the support of many people. The research project from which the book emerged was funded by the European Research Council, and I am grateful to the ERC for its generosity. Colleagues at the University of Reading offered helpful comments on the early project proposal that significantly improved the initial ideas, and King's College London has provided an excellent and highly supportive environment in which to continue and complete the research. I presented many draft chapters at a range of seminars and conferences as the book developed, and I am grateful to the many colleagues who offered criticisms that both improved the ideas in the book and encouraged me to ditch the many ideas that did not make the final manuscript. Elements of the book were presented at seminars in the Universities of Aarhus, Amsterdam, Austin, Nuffield College Oxford, and at GIGA in Hamburg. The ECPR Joint Sessions workshops provided a forum in which elements of the book could be discussed with colleagues working on similar themes, and the IDCAR project based at GIGA offered further opportunities to exchange ideas and learn from scholars working on authoritarianism. I am grateful to all those who invited me to these events and included me in these networks.

I would like to thank the following for their helpful contributions: Julia Bader, André Bank, Nancy Bermeo, Sarah Birch, Jason Brownlee, Alan Cromartie, Marlies Glasius, John Gledhill, Jonathan Golub, Sara Hobolt, Amaney Jamal, Kevin Koehler, Reinoud Leenders, Jørgen Møller, Alan Renwick, Thomas Richter, Alex Schmotz, Kathryn Sikkink, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Michael Seeberg, Jakob Tolstrup, Sarah von Billerbeck, Christian von Soest, Kurt Weyland, Laurence Whitehead, Sharon Wolchik. Several of these friends and colleagues read significant parts or all of the manuscript, and I am particularly grateful to those who attended a 'book bash' in London to provide feedback on an early draft of the manuscript. I owe a great debt to John Gledhill, who has read multiple drafts from the very beginning of the project. I am also very grateful to the indefatigable Filippo Costa Buranelli for providing excellent research assistance.

I would like to thank Dominic Byatt at Oxford University Press for his encouragement from the very early stages, and also Elizabeth Stuffling, Olivia Wells, and Sarah Parker who have helped ready the manuscript for publication.

Finally, I would like to thank my family, and especially my wife Avril, who continue to provide unstinting support and encouragement.

# Table of Contents

# List of Figure

# List of Tables

# 1

# Introduction

The politics of authoritarian rule revolve, in many ways, around the challenges of gaining and maintaining the capacity to rule. For many aspiring autocrats, the challenge of gaining the capacity to rule often involves mobilizing a coalition of supporters with enough resources to overthrow a sitting government.[1] Once in power, the challenges of maintaining rule primarily involve seeing off opponents both within the governing elite and among the public—what Svolik calls the problems of authoritarian power-sharing and authoritarian control.[2] Surmounting these challenges requires not only political skill, but also essential resources such as money, weapons, and loyal followers. It also requires the willingness to engage in risky, and potentially highly costly, forms of autocratic behaviour. Aspiring and incumbent dictators must be willing to stage coups, rig elections, eliminate opponents, and repress the public. They do so in the hope that the benefits of such actions (gaining and remaining in power) outweigh the potential risks that come with potential failure, which can range from quiet and reluctant retirement to more costly outcomes such as imprisonment, exile, and even death.[3] Some rulers, such as President Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, routinely and successfully use electoral fraud to stay in power. Others, however, such as Slobodan Milošević in Serbia in 2000, have found that efforts to rig elections can backfire and lead to the sudden loss of power.[4]

The political considerations and manoeuvring involved in facing these challenges, as well as their outcomes, are often concentrated at the domestic level, within the boundaries of the state. Yet they cannot be divorced from the international environment, as external actors and forces shape the information, incentives, and capacity of domestic actors in crucial ways. There is an

[1] Jimmy D. Kandeh, *Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

[2] Milan W. Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[3] Henk E. Goemans, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza, 'Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders', *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 2 (1 March 2009): 269–83.

[4] Joshua A. Tucker, 'Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions', *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 3 (2007): 535–51.

extensive literature about the role that international factors can play in promoting and contributing to the democratization of authoritarian regimes.[5] International actors can create positive incentives for rulers to embrace democracy, offering inducements like aid, trade, and membership of international organizations.[6] International actors can also raise the costs of authoritarian behaviour, placing constraints on autocratic elites in ways that reduce their room to manoeuvre and loosen their grip on power.[7] Yet just as some international actors can try to persuade and pressure autocratic actors to refrain from engaging in autocratic behaviour, so too can international actors offer encouragement and support. Many autocrats have found that when considering their options and when engaging in autocratic behaviour, they benefit from the presence of important and often powerful international allies who provide vocal reassurance and material forms of sponsorship. Russia and China have often been singled out as key sponsors of autocratic regimes, but many countries, including democracies such as the United States and United Kingdom, routinely support non-democratic countries abroad.[8]

This book examines the ways in which international events, structures, and actors reinforce authoritarian rule at the domestic level, with a particular focus

[5] Geoffrey Pridham, 'The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice, and Interregional Comparisons', in *Building Democracy: The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*, ed. Geoffrey Pridham (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994) 7–29; Laurence Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996); Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

[6] Susan D. Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), chapter 3; Jon C. Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Milada Anna Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

[7] Gordon Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency', *Democratization* 4 (1997): 69–108; Frank Schimmelfennig and Hanno Scholtz, 'EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange', *European Union Politics* 9, no. 2 (2008): 187–215; Daniela Donno, 'Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms', *International Organization* 64 (2010): 593–625; Anna Van Der Vleuten and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann, 'Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy by Regional Organizations: Comparing EU, Mercosur and SADC', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 3 (2010): 737–58.

[8] Julia Bader, *China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies* (London: Routledge, 2015); Jakob Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013); Robert Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams* (New York: Vintage, 2009); Jason Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Matthew Willis, 'Britain in Bahrain in 2011', *The RUSI Journal* 157, no. 5 (2012): 62–71.

on the role of intentional autocratic sponsorship in the post-Cold War period. The politics of authoritarianism has been the subject of a burgeoning literature in comparative politics in the last fifteen years, but the most influential theories that have emerged have focused on domestic-level explanations for the patterns of authoritarian politics that we see.[9] The international influences on authoritarianism have gained increasing attention in recent years, but this work remains relatively fragmented and we lack a clear understanding of the different forms of international influence and the different causal mechanisms through which they operate.[10] Some of the insights from the scholarship on the international dimensions of democratization are helpful when applied to the topic of authoritarianism, but there are limitations to how much the conceptual and theoretical findings can travel when looking at authoritarian resilience rather than transitions to democracy.

The goals of this book are to take stock of what we know so far, to put some analytical order onto the disparate findings that exist, and to offer new insights into the role that international actors play in contributing to authoritarian persistence. The book opens with a wide lens, and examines the different forms of international influence (active and passive, intentional and accidental) that can shape the politics of authoritarianism at the domestic level. It identifies a series of flaws in existing work on the international sources of authoritarian rule, and presents a new typology of international influences to provide some conceptual clarity to the field. The book then narrows focus and addresses the role that active and intentional international sponsorship can play in encouraging and supporting autocratic elites at the domestic level. Building on recent research on the sources of authoritarian persistence, the analysis explores the variety of arenas in which international actors can bolster autocratic elites, as well as the manner in which international politics can shape authoritarian politics in different ways at different moments in time. The book

[9] Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*.

[10] Rachel Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013); Jakob Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"', *Democratization* 16, no. 5 (2009): 922–44; Thomas Ambrosio, 'Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research', *International Studies Perspectives* 11, no. 4 (2010): 375–92; Bader, *China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies*; Peter Burnell and Oliver Schlumberger, 'Promoting Democracy—Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes', *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 1–15; Thomas Risse and Nelli Babayan, 'Democracy Promotion and the Challenges of Illiberal Regional Powers: Introduction to the Special Issue', *Democratization* 22, no. 3 (16 April 2015): 381–99.

focuses in particular on *how* external actors bolster the position of authoritarian incumbents at the domestic level, and examines the causal mechanisms through which international efforts translate into domestic outcomes.

A central contention of this book is that these external sponsors can lower the perceived and real costs of authoritarian behaviour, and can thus help authoritarian elites overcome the central challenges of authoritarian rule. To stay in power, autocrats must manage the threats they face from members of their own regime and the general public, and must do so with the knowledge that the international environment is a far less forgiving place for authoritarian regimes than it was in the days of the Cold War and earlier. Yet the international environment is not a single entity, and there is rarely, if ever, a uniform international response to autocratic behaviour at the domestic level. How autocrats behave is thus informed by the regime's particular position in a constellation of relationships with a variety of international actors. Regime elites must take into account the balance of international pressure and support with which they are faced, and will often seek to minimize the former and maximize the latter.

In particular, the book explores how international support can contribute to some of the key pillars of autocratic strength and persistence. Scholars have shown how autocratic rulers can remain in power through a number of means, including patronage politics, political repression, and fraudulent elections.[11] Each of these strategies can in turn be facilitated (or undermined) by the supporting (or opposing) intervention of external actors. To date, however, the existing literature has largely presented the international environment as a source of opposition to these authoritarian strategies, and a source of costs to the autocrats who would consider pursuing them. Most attention has been focused on the role of pro-democratic actors and their efforts to deter or punish authoritarian behaviour. To fully understand the international politics of authoritarian rule, however, it is necessary to consider the role of the international environment as a mitigating factor that might lessen the costs of authoritarian rule. External sponsors can send informational cues and signals that reassure autocratic incumbents that they can rely on outside support, which in turn increases the chances that incumbents will pursue authoritarian practices. International sponsors can also offer assistance in ways that protect, and often enhance, the material capacity of the state and thus empower autocratic incumbents. As a result, international sponsors

[11] Beatriz Magaloni, 'The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule', *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 3 (2010): 751–65; Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, 'Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships', *Economics & Politics* 18, no. 1 (2006): 1–26; Eva Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective', *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–57.

contribute to a range of aspects of authoritarian politics, making it more likely that authoritarian incumbents will resort to authoritarian practices, contributing to the implementation of those practices, and protecting autocrats from punitive sanctions once their behaviour is exposed on the international stage. In short, rather than placing constraints on elites, international actors often provide them with the political opportunity space within which to pursue their desired policies and, in turn, extend the lifetime of their own regime.

## THE RESILIENCE OF AUTHORITARIAN RULE

Authoritarian regimes have proved highly resilient in the face of increasing international pressures for democratization. While the number of autocratic regimes declined significantly at the end of the twentieth century, the democratic surge known as the 'Third Wave' of transitions did not pave the way for a universal trend of democratization, and any optimism about the prospects for a truly global shift to democracy were undermined by two realities. Firstly, many authoritarian regimes seemed immune to the democratizing trend and resisted any pressures for political reform. Although the number of closed authoritarian regimes declined sharply after the Cold War, the continued stability of countries such as Saudi Arabia, China, and North Korea reflect the resilience of autocratic rule in many parts of the world.[12] Secondly, many of the states that initiated a process of liberalization ultimately failed to achieve genuine democratic rule, and settled into an uneasy combination of regular elections and government abuse of power.[13] Recent debates about the extent of 'democratic recession' and 'authoritarian resurgence' reflect the staying power of authoritarian forms of rule.[14] According to one count, more than half the world's population live in non-democratic regimes.[15]

This resilience of authoritarianism has important consequences for an immense number of people, as regime types differ systematically in their social

[12] Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, 'The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers', *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 97–109.

[13] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Andreas Schedler, *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006).

[14] Larry Diamond, 'Facing Up to the Democratic Recession', *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 141–55; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, 'The Myth of Democratic Recession', *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 45–58.

[15] Economist Intelligence Unit, *Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and Its Discontents* (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015).

and political implications. By definition, authoritarian regimes restrict political and civil liberties to a much greater extent than democracies, and citizens in authoritarian regimes face much greater repressive restrictions than those in democratic regimes.[16] Scholars have long observed the crucial role that repression plays in authoritarian regimes, and it is widely viewed as one of the central pillars of authoritarian durability.[17] In particular, the difference between autocracy and democracy is more stark when it comes to political liberties such as freedom of speech and assembly, which represent a greater threat to autocratic political incumbents than do 'private' liberties such as religious expression or freedom of movement.[18] Although subject to greater debate and contention, many scholars have also found a number of trends that suggest that socio-economic performance is likely to be worse in autocracies than democracies, partly as a result of systematically lower investment in public services within authoritarian regimes.[19] Authoritarian regimes are less effective in managing the damaging effects of corruption on economic growth,[20] feature lower participation rates in education,[21] and are associated with systematically lower health indicators such as child mortality and life expectancy.[22] Not all authoritarian regimes are the same, and performance

[16] Christian Davenport, *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Christian Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007): 1–23.

[17] Ronald Wintrobe, 'Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches', in *Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. C. Boix and S. Stokes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 363–94; Juan J. Linz, *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Johannes Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes', *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 13–38.

[18] Jørgen Møller and Svend-Erik Skaaning, 'Autocracies, Democracies, and the Violation of Civil Liberties', *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 82–106.

[19] George Avelino, David S. Brown, and Wendy Hunter, 'The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999', *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 625–41; Morton H. Halperin, Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein, *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace* (New York and London: Council on Foreign Relations/Psychology Press, 2005); Pippa Norris, *Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

[20] A. Cooper Drury, Jonathan Krieckhaus, and Michael Lusztig, 'Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Growth', *International Political Science Review* 27, no. 2 (2006): 121–36.

[21] Ben W. Ansell, *From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Redistributive Political Economy of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); David S. Brown, 'Reading, Writing, and Regime Type: Democracy's Impact on Primary School Enrollment', *Political Research Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (1999): 681–707.

[22] Thomas D. Zweifel and Patricio Navia, 'Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality', *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 2 (2000): 99–114; David A. Lake and Matthew A. Baum, 'The

varies systematically across different types of authoritarian regime,[23] but societies living in autocratic regimes are, overall, likely to be disadvantaged compared to those living in democratic states. Autocratic regimes have also been shown to produce systematically different outcomes at the international level, especially with regard to patterns of international war, peace, and cooperation.[24]

It is thus highly important to understand the sources of authoritarian persistence, but our knowledge remains incomplete, especially regarding the international dimensions of authoritarian rule. Debates about the resilience of authoritarianism are often infused with references, many of them quite ad hoc, to the international political environment in which authoritarian powers exist today. The end of the Cold War, the shift to an increasingly multipolar world, the legacies of the war in Iraq, and the process of globalization have all been linked in some ways to the resilience of authoritarianism in the face of democratizing pressures.[25] Yet the relationship between international politics and the resilience of authoritarian rule requires further systematic analysis if it is to be fully understood. Although there is a recent and growing literature in this area, there remains a lack of clarity about the nature and type of international influences on authoritarianism at the domestic level. In this book I address a number of important aspects of this relationship, and seek to clarify the range of international influences that exist, the distinctive features of the

Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services', *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 6 (2001): 587–621; Matthew A. Baum and David A. Lake, 'The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital', *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (2003): 333–47. For a dissenting view, see Michael Ross, 'Is Democracy Good for the Poor?', *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006): 860–74.

[23] Aurel Croissant and Stefan Wurster, 'Performance and Persistence of Autocracies in Comparison: Introducing Issues and Perspectives', *Contemporary Politics* 19, no. 1 (2013): 1–18.

[24] Bruce Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Alexandre Debs and Hein E. Goemans, 'Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War', *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 430–45; David A. Lake, 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War', *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (1 March 1992): 24–37; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002); Lisa L. Martin, *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).

[25] Thomas Carothers, 'The Backlash against Democracy Promotion', *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2006): 55–68; Quan Li and Rafael Reuveny, 'Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis', *British Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 1 (2003): 29–54; Carles Boix, 'Democracy, Development, and the International System', *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 4 (2011): 809–28; Thomas Carothers, 'Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose', *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 59–73.

contemporary international environment, and the causes and effects of the external sponsorship of authoritarianism.

One of the most important challenges in addressing these issues is a conceptual one, and involves distinguishing between different types of international influence. A range of academic literatures have identified a broad number of international-level factors that have, at one time or another, contributed to authoritarian rule at the domestic level. These include aid, trade, sanctions, intervention, globalization, shifts in polarity of the international system, and the diffusion effects that pass from autocratic regimes in one setting to another (these findings are reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2).[26] I seek to place some order on these disparate insights by distinguishing between three broad categories of international variables that can contribute to domestic authoritarian persistence. The first concerns the role of a range of *passive international influences*, which are distinguished by the lack of any intentional effort on the part of external actors to shape domestic politics. Such influences can include processes of cross-border learning and emulation that are unrelated to any external efforts to promote or support authoritarian rule, as well as the effects of economic globalization and its implications for democratic freedoms. The second and third categories both involve a key role for external actors and their intentional policies at the domestic level, but they differ regarding the nature of those intentional policies. The second category captures the *unintended international influences* that can serve to bolster autocratic incumbents, despite rather than because of the goals of the external actors. These influences include some of the perverse effects of international development aid or even democracy promotion, which can sometimes have the effect of reinforcing rather than undermining autocratic rule. The third category, however, involves *intentional autocratic sponsorship*, where external actors actively seek to support autocratic incumbents through a variety of means and for a variety of reasons. This book focuses primarily on this third category, identifying a number of different forms of intentional sponsorship and examining the mechanisms through which they

[26] Li and Reuveny, 'Economic Globalization and Democracy'; Michael McFaul, 'The Missing Variable: The "International System" as the Link between Third and Fourth Wave Models of Democratization', in *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*, ed. Michael McFaul, Valerie J. Bunce, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 3–29; Daniel Yuichi Kono and Gabriella R. Montinola, 'Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?', *Journal of Politics* 71, no. 2 (2009): 704–18; Julia Grauvogel and Christian von Soest, 'Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes', *European Journal of Political Research* 53, no. 4 (2014): 635–53; Kurt Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830–1940', *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 8 (2010): 1148–76.

contribute to authoritarian politics at the domestic level. Although pro-democratic forces have been in the ascendance since the end of the Cold War, international sponsors offer significant succour to autocratic regimes, especially in times of crisis. Not all autocratic regimes, however, receive similar levels of outside support, and variation in the extent of sponsorship thus creates distinct international environments for different regimes in different settings.

## THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT FOR AUTHORITARIANISM

The politics of authoritarianism has rarely, if ever, been entirely isolated from the international environment. Few countries are immune to outside influences, and history is replete with examples of despotic leaders whose rule was inspired, sponsored, or protected by external actors. The wave of democratic breakdown and transitions to authoritarian rule in Europe during the interwar years was prompted in part by political struggles that owed their origins to events in Russia in 1917.[27] Once Mussolini and Hitler came to power, they both inspired other autocrats within the region and provided them with material support.[28] During the Cold War, the external influence on authoritarianism continued in different forms. The expansion of Soviet control throughout Central and Eastern Europe created a system of suppressive, one-party states, while the United States pursued its side of the Cold War struggle in part by forging alliances with a wide range of reliable, yet reliably autocratic, partners.[29] Since the end of the Cold War, major powers such as Russia and China have been identified as 'model' authoritarian systems that provide fuel for foreign emulation,[30] and many incumbent autocrats have no difficulty in securing diplomatic and material support from dependable international allies. Yet the norms and practices of the post-Cold War international

[27] Nancy Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003).

[28] Arnd Bauerkämper, 'Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations between Regimes and Movements in Europe, 1922–1939', *East Central Europe* 37, no. 2–3 (2010): 214–46; Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830–1940'.

[29] Vladimir Tismaneanu, *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009); David F. Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965–1989* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

[30] Stefan A. Halper, *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century* (New York: Basic Books, 2010); Azar Gat, 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers', *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2007): 59–69.

state system are not the same as in earlier periods in history, and even though many autocratic regimes have remained resilient, the contemporary system offers a more constraining environment than was the case in previous periods.

In this book I focus in particular on post-Cold War developments, as there are a number of key features of this era that create a distinctive setting for the politics of authoritarian rule. In normative terms, after the collapse of communism and the end of the Cold War, democracy became widely seen as the only legitimate form of government in the world, to the extent that even blatantly authoritarian actors have appropriated the rhetoric of democratic rule. Whereas democracy had previously faced the competing ideologies of communism and fascism during the interwar and Cold War years, by the end of the twentieth century it had come to be seen as 'the world's most valued political system'.[31] This normative shift was accompanied by major changes in international practice, as a well-developed and expansive network of international democracy promoters emerged. A multitude of governmental and non-governmental actors began to promote democracy actively on the international stage, including major international organizations such as the European Union and smaller, issue-driven organizations and agencies dedicated solely to promoting democracy.[32] Many of these democracy promoters sought not only to assist domestic democrats who welcomed their help, but also to pressure domestic actors who were slow to embrace democracy. Democratic conditionality emerged as a major policy tool, as states and international organizations began to restrict access to benefits on the basis of democratic performance, and to punish states that failed to meet new democratic standards.[33] The spread of 'democracy clauses' among regional organizations, with automatic suspension triggered for member states engaging in autocratic behaviour, reflects the wider shift in the international context.[34]

Yet these changes have not led to a single, uniform, and inhospitable international environment for authoritarian regimes. As Levitsky and Way note, while the post-Cold War period 'raised the external cost of authoritarianism', democratic pressure was often applied selectively and weakly.[35] Furthermore,

[31] Michael McFaul, 'Democracy Promotion as a World Value', *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2004): 147–63.

[32] Peter Burnell, *Democracy Assistance: International Co-Operation for Democratization* (London: Frank Cass, 2000); Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above*.

[33] Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency'; Donno, 'Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms'; Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above*.

[34] Jacob Wobig, 'Defending Democracy with International Law: Preventing Coup Attempts with Democracy Clauses', *Democratization* 22, no. 4 (2015): 631–54.

[35] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 18–19.

many states and international organizations showed no interest in adopting these new norms and practices, and instead showed a willingness to actively support autocratic regimes and push back against the agenda of democracy-promoting actors. A wide range of countries, both democratic and authoritarian, have acted in support of autocratic regimes. Russia, for example, has been linked to support for autocratic regimes in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, offering diplomatic, economic, and security assistance to autocratic leaders such as Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus, Bashir al-Assad in Syria, and Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan.[36] China has cooperated closely with incumbents in non-democratic regimes in Cambodia, Burma, and North Korea among others, and its policies in Africa have been linked to the region's pockets of resilient authoritarianism.[37] Saudi Arabia has played a central role in resisting democratic change and pursuing a 'counter-revolution' in the Middle East in the wake of the Arab Spring.[38] Venezuela's oil-fuelled foreign policy under Hugo Chavez involved support for a number of repressive regimes, including Cuba and Syria.[39] US policy in the Middle East has long involved overt and explicit support for ruling autocrats,[40] and a number of other democracies have also found reason to defend their non-democratic allies, including the UK, France, and India.[41]

[36] Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"'; David R. Cameron and Mitchell A. Orenstein, 'Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its "Near Abroad"', *Post-Soviet Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2012): 1–44; Mark Kramer, 'Russian Policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: Recent Trends and Future Prospects', *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, no. 6 (2008): 3–19.

[37] Bader, *China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies*; Chris Alden, 'China in Africa', *Survival* 47, no. 3 (2005): 147–64; Dingding Chen and Katrin Kinzelbach, 'Democracy Promotion and China: Blocker or Bystander?', *Democratization* 22, no. 3 (16 April 2015): 400–18, doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.999322.

[38] Madawi al-Rasheed, 'Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring', *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11, no. 3 (2011): 513–26; Mehran Kamrava, 'The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution', *Orbis* 56, no. 1 (2012): 96–104.

[39] William Neuman, 'Chávez Appears to Use Venezuelan Fuel to Help Syrian Leader', *New York Times*, 22 February 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/americas/chavez-appears-to-use-venezuelan-fuel-to-help-syrias-assad.html>; Javier Corrales, 'Conflicting Goals in Venezuela's Foreign Policy', in *Venezuela's Petro-Diplomacy: Hugo Chavez's Foreign Policy*, ed. Ralph S. Clem and Anthony P. Maingot (Florida: University Press of Florida, 2011), 32–48.

[40] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*; Amaney A. Jamal, *Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at All?* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012).

[41] Angelique Chrisafis, 'Sarkozy Admits France Made Mistakes over Tunisia', *The Guardian*, 24 January 2011, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/24/nicolas-sarkozy-tunisia-protests>; Willis, 'Britain in Bahrain in 2011'; Siddharth Mallavarapu, 'Democracy Promotion circa 2010: An Indian Perspective', *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 49–61.

Thus, while the post-Cold War period is distinguished by some new democratizing pressures and constraints, not all authoritarian countries face the same international environment, and different countries are part of distinct constellations of international relationships. These differences in turn shape the extent of international sponsorship to which autocratic elites are likely to be exposed, and have implications for how we think of the 'international environment' for contemporary autocracy. While some authoritarian regimes are relatively isolated on the world stage, many others benefit from cross-border relationships with a series of reliable allies who can generally be trusted to support the regime in times of crisis. The variation in extent of outside support can be explained in part by the strategic importance of the autocratic country involved. Strategically important countries that benefit from mineral reserves, wealth, or a favourable geopolitical location will often be able to rely on international allies that seek to ensure continued close relations to satisfy their own strategic interests.[42]

Strategic and instrumental incentives, however, are insufficient to understand the range of variation in international sponsorship. Some countries sponsor autocratic incumbents abroad where they are of little real strategic interest. Rather, cross-border connections and interrelationships can foster tight bonds, and linkage politics can lead to external support even in the absence of significant strategic considerations. The politics of international linkage has been extensively studied with reference to democratic regime change, but there is much less research on the role of linkage with respect to the resilience of authoritarian rule. Levitsky and Way's influential work has highlighted the role played by linkage to Western democracy promoters such as North American and European states and international organizations. Recent scholarship has sought to shed light on the role of non-Western linkage,[43] but we still lack a full account of the mechanisms through which non-Western linkage shapes the politics of authoritarianism at the domestic level. To understand the balance of influences that linkage politics creates, it is necessary to conceive of a 'linkage spectrum' that each individual country faces. Regimes that enjoy high Western linkage but low non-Western linkage will experience a very different international environment from those with low Western linkage and high non-Western linkage.

Yet just as consideration of strategic interests is insufficient on its own, so too is consideration of only linkage politics. It is too simplistic to assume that

[42] John M. Owen and Michael Poznansky, 'When Does America Drop Dictators?', *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (2014): 1072–99.

[43] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Gwendolyn Sasse, 'Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy: The EU's Eastern Neighbourhood', *Democratization* 20, no. 4 (2012): 1–39; Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*.

**Table 1.1.** Four International Environments for Authoritarianism

| | | Autocratic Sponsorship | |
|---|---|---|---|
| **Democratic Pressure** | | High | Low |
| | High | Contested | Constraining |
| | Low | Supportive | Permissive |

Western linkage is a source of democratic pressure and that non-Western linkage is a source of autocratic support. Rather, it is necessary to understand the full combination of strategic and linkage politics at play. While linkage to the West often creates democratizing pressures, under certain conditions it can combine with strategic interests to produce the opposite effects. Jason Brownlee, for example, has highlighted the ways in which linkages between Egypt and the US have had a seriously damaging effect on the prospects for Egyptian democracy.[44]

The combination of strategic interests and linkage politics thus creates a distinct international environment for different countries in different settings (Table 1.1). Levitsky and Way highlight how low levels of linkage to the West can create a permissive international environment for authoritarianism, compared to the hostile international environment characterized by high Western linkage.[45] I argue that consideration of the full range of potential international influences requires a more wide-ranging typology, and I distinguish between four categories of international environment for authoritarian elites. The first applies to those countries where the primary international influences are pro-democratic, with limited external autocratic sponsorship, and thus where there is a *constraining* environment for authoritarianism. Autocratic elites are likely to be subject to intense democratizing pressure, and democratic conditionality is likely to be stringently implemented and acutely felt. Central Europe in the 1990s is a clear example of a constraining international environment for would-be autocratic leaders. For example, former communists who came to power in Romania and Bulgaria and undermined democracy through ethnic nationalism and restrictions on political freedoms were hampered by the economic and political leverage of the European Union.[46]

Other states, however, are subject to comparatively little pro-democratic pressure along with low autocratic sponsorship, and thus exist within a *permissive* international environment. Such states may receive little international scrutiny and criticism, either because of their particular geographical location and low

[44] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*.
[45] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.
[46] Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*, chapter 6.

levels of linkage to the West, or because their strategic importance or political power make the application of democracy-related pressure unattractive or infeasible (for example, autocratic regimes in Iran or Eritrea). Other regimes find they are situated within a *contested* international environment, and that the constraints they face from pro-democratic international actors is countered by the support and sponsorship they receive from international allies. Such countries, such as Zimbabwe under President Robert Mugabe after 2000, can become the battleground on which international actors pursue competing interests and promote competing values, often in ways that ultimately benefit the incumbent elites who are the subject of the international struggle. Finally, some countries combine low democratizing pressure with high levels of external sponsorship and thus experience a *supportive* international environment (such as that experienced by Bahrain in 2011, as it received extensive regional support for domestic repression and very little international criticism). There is thus no single or uniform international influence in authoritarian settings, and the level and effect of external support will vary from setting to setting.

## THE NATURE AND EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL SPONSORSHIP

In the recent writings on the international politics of authoritarianism, a range of labels have been used to describe the behaviour of international actors who support autocratic regimes, including black knights, negative actors, and autocracy promoters.[47] I eschew these labels, and talk instead of international autocratic sponsorship. The language of 'black knights' and 'negative actors' is normatively loaded in a way that is unhelpful for analytical usage, creating images of 'bad' international actors working at odds with 'good' democracy promoters. Even if we hold a normative preference for democracy over autocracy, it is best not to smuggle such normative preferences into our analytical constructs. The tasks of classification and explanation are best pursued with value-free labels that can be applied in all contexts, leaving the normative value of actions and their outcomes as a separate consideration. The concept of 'autocracy promotion' is value-free, but suffers from a separate problem in that it implies a conceptual relationship to the practice of

[47] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"'; Peter Burnell, 'Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?', Working Paper 96 (Madrid: Fride, March 2010); Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*.

democracy promotion. The comparison is unhelpful, because the kind of international activities and forces that have been labelled as autocracy promotion do not correspond well with the activities that are generally understood to constitute democracy promotion. International actors often support autocratic elites not because of any desire to promote autocracy as a form of rule, but for a range of strategic reasons that have more to do with securing compliant allies and achieving beneficial policy alignment across international borders (this argument is pursued in further detail in Chapter 2).

I define international autocratic sponsorship as an external actor's intentional assistance to autocratic elites to help them gain or maintain political power.[48] Sponsorship involves both a sender and a target actor. In theory, senders can include a range of international actors, including both states and non-state actors such as transnational corporations and international organizations. In this book I focus on state sponsors, and examine how state governments, both democratic and authoritarian, support authoritarian actors abroad. On the target side, recipients can include both aspiring and incumbent autocratic actors. International sponsors often seek to help autocratic elites who do not hold the reins of power, and work to support opposition actors that seek to seize power. Many coup plotters have been assisted by external forces in their efforts to overthrow sitting governments (see Chapter 6). In this book, I primarily focus on the external sponsorship of incumbent autocrats, and examine the ways in which external states help domestic incumbents retain the positions of power they already hold. Although this approach may be criticized for being excessively state-centric, focusing as it does on the sponsorship of one type of state government by another, there is a logic to this line of enquiry. Authoritarianism as a form of government only comes into existence once aspiring autocrats come to wield power. Throughout history many democratic regimes have hosted anti-democratic actors, groups, and official political parties, yet only sometimes do these actors come to seize power and introduce autocracy.[49] In order to identify the international influences on authoritarianism itself, rather than on pockets of illiberalism within democracies, it is necessary to focus on those autocratic actors who have ultimately been successful in coming to power. I thus focus on state sponsors of autocratic incumbents.

[48] This definition builds on Byman's definition of a different form of international sponsorship: Daniel Byman, *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 10.

[49] Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978); Bermeo, *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*; Giovanni Capoccia, *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005).

What effect, if any, does international sponsorship have on authoritarian persistence? I argue that the principal means through which sponsorship can strengthen the position of autocratic incumbents is by lowering the perceived and real costs of the key authoritarian practices that they use to gain and maintain power. Many of the strategies that autocratic actors use to gain and maintain power come with costs as well as benefits, and leaders thus have reason to hesitate before attempting to seize power, rig elections, or repress their opponents. Such efforts often fail, as autocratic actors overestimate their own power and support base. Even when they succeed in the short term, they can create a backlash at both the domestic and international levels that can undermine authoritarian rule over the long term.

International sponsorship can contribute to such authoritarian behaviour, and in turn to authoritarian persistence, in a number of ways. I highlight two broad sets of causal mechanisms through which international sponsors shape politics at the domestic level. The first is informational, and concerns the signals and cues that international actors send to domestic incumbents and that serve to lower the perceived costs of autocratic behaviour. The second concerns the manner in which outside sponsors can protect and enhance the capacity of domestic incumbents, enabling them to project power, face down challenges, and maintain their rule. While some of the international effects at work are similar to those that have been identified in the literature on the international dimensions of democratization, there are some important differences. Crucially, and unlike democracy enforcement measures that seek to incentivize or socialize domestic elites towards new forms of behaviour, the international sponsors of autocracy are seeking to reinforce, rather than alter, the preferences and actions of autocratic incumbents. As a result, mechanisms of conditionality and socialization are much less relevant when it comes to the international dimensions of authoritarian rule, and the informational and material channels of influences work to empower and embolden domestic elites, rather than constrain or change them.

I also distinguish between three stages in the life cycle of authoritarian behaviour to highlight the different effects that international sponsorship can have. The first stage concerns the decision to engage in authoritarian behaviour, which entails an evaluation of the potential costs and benefits that such behaviour might bring. Much of the literature on the types of authoritarian behaviour considered here—coups, fraud, repression—highlights the common benefits that such action can achieve (gaining and maintaining power, overcoming domestic threats to rule) as well as the diverse risks involved.[50] These

[50] Sabine C. Carey, 'The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression', *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (2006): 1–11; Jonathan Powell, 'Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups D'état', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 6 (2012): 1017–40.

risks can include domestic protests, which in some cases are heightened and invigorated by government efforts at repression rather than suppressed and quashed. The risks can also be international, including international condemnation and punitive action from pro-democratic states and international organizations.[51] However, when considering their course of action, autocratic elites will not only factor in these possible domestic and international costs of such action, but also the domestic and international forces that might mitigate such costs. This includes the likelihood of international sponsorship from reliable allies, who may send a range of signals to suggest that their support will be forthcoming. The prospect of international support can thus influence the cost–benefit analysis prior to any decision to engage in authoritarian behaviour.

The second stage concerns the implementation of authoritarian practices. Coups and crackdowns require personnel and weaponry to be undertaken successfully, as well as strategic intelligence. Election malpractice requires technical knowledge of the variety of ways to steal elections, ranging from simple ballot-stuffing measures to more elaborate forms of manipulation before and after the votes have been cast. International sponsorship can contribute to the strategic knowledge that autocrats have about how best to undertake these measures, and can enhance the material capacity that is needed to execute coups and coercive crackdowns effectively. External sponsorship can thus act as a supplement to domestic-level incumbent capacity, increasing the odds of successful implementation.

Finally, sponsorship can also play an important role in the wake of such authoritarian moments, shielding autocratic actors from the potential fallout and thus minimizing the domestic and international costs involved. Through swift recognition of election results, or of post-coup leadership claims, external actors can lend legitimacy to autocratic rulers and undercut objections from opposition parties. International sponsors can also act to block sanctions at the international level, and frustrate efforts to mobilize global support for democratic enforcement measures.[52] Even if some regional organizations or states enact sanctions, international sponsors can compensate for the losses incurred by providing funds to make up for lost revenue. External actors can thus shield autocratic incumbents from the most costly consequences of their actions. Over the course of the chapters ahead, I examine the diverse ways in which different international sponsors have contributed to each stage of these authoritarian practices in a number of settings.

[51] Donno, 'Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms'; Tucker, 'Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions'.

[52] Bryan R. Early, 'Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 4 (2011): 381–402.

## SCOPE AND METHODS

As outlined further in Chapter 2, the range of international variables that can serve to encourage and bolster authoritarian rule is broad and diverse. It includes both intentional policies of external states as well as a range of passive influences that can have the effect of strengthening autocratic rule even in the absence of actor intent. The empirical focus of this book concerns the former type of influence, and addresses the role of external sponsorship by foreign states, including both democratic and autocratic international actors. Although much of the recent literature on 'black knights' has focused on the influence of authoritarian foreign powers, supportive external sponsorship of authoritarian regimes can come from both democratic and autocratic regimes.[53]

The outcome of interest concerns the practice of authoritarian politics at the domestic level. There is a great deal of variation in the ways in which authoritarianism, and regime types more generally, have been conceptualized. Current approaches include minimal dichotomous distinctions between democratic and autocratic regimes, broader typologies with multiple categories, and projects that rest on distinguishing different regimes along a continuum.[54] In this study I begin with a dichotomous distinction between democratic and autocratic regimes based on procedural considerations. As Svolik states, 'before anything else, regimes are either democracies or dictatorships'.[55] Procedural definitions of political regimes emphasize the rules and procedures of political systems, rather than policies or their outcomes. Building on the work of Dahl, the 'procedural minimum' definition of democracy requires free and fair elections, universal suffrage, and effective guarantees of civil and political freedoms.[56] By contrast, regimes that fail to meet these core criteria fall into the autocratic camp. Yet, autocracy does not constitute a single, monolithic

[53] Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*, 9.

[54] José Antonio Cheibub, Jennifer Gandhi, and J. R. Vreeland, 'Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited', *Public Choice* 143, no. 1 (2010): 67–101; Michael Wahman, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius, 'Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective', *Contemporary Politics* 19, no. 1 (2013): 19–34; Barbara Geddes, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz, 'Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set', *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (2014): 313–31; Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 23; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

[55] Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 23.

[56] Robert A. Dahl, *Polyarchy: Participation & Opposition* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971); David Collier and Steven Levitsky, 'Democracy with Adjectives', *World Politics* 49 (1997): 430–51, 434.

residual category, and further disaggregation can facilitate more fine-grained analysis. Distinctions between the types of ruling actors and institutions across autocratic regimes enables analysis of diverse autocratic subtypes, such as monarchical, military, and single-party regimes.[57] Comparisons of levels of competitiveness across autocratic regimes help distinguish electoral or competitive forms of autocracy from closed or hegemonic regimes.[58]

In this study, I pursue a policy of disaggregation that eschews consideration of autocratic subtypes, focusing instead on the variety of 'authoritarian practices' that autocrats pursue to gain and maintain power. My aim is not to examine processes of regime transition from democracy to autocracy, or from one subtype of autocratic regime to another, but rather to examine the international influences on the practice of authoritarian politics within individual regimes. In particular, I examine the effects of international sponsorship on a subset of authoritarian behaviours that contribute to the persistence of authoritarian rule, namely election fraud, coercive crackdowns, and coups. Each type of behaviour is significant in its own right, but also in its wider contribution to the politics of authoritarianism. Pursuing this strategy of disaggregation makes it possible to tease out the ways in which different forms of sponsorship can contribute in distinct ways to different forms of authoritarian behaviour. In particular, I focus on episodes that involve challenges or threats to regime stability, and in which autocratic elites seek to protect or consolidate political rule by engaging in blatant and visible authoritarian practices. Although authoritarianism is often a form of regime type that endures over prolonged periods, it is also the case that authoritarian rule tends to be punctuated by a series of critical episodes that allow for its establishment and sustainability. Capoccia and Ziblatt's 'episode analysis' approach, which entails the disaggregation of complex processes of regime change and consolidation into distinct episodes that can be analysed in detail, facilitates the analysis of these critical moments.[59] Consequently, I employ episode analysis as a means of identifying and isolating the international dimensions of authoritarian consolidation and persistence. The episodes in question revolve around incumbent use of authoritarian practices to either

[57] Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland, 'Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited'; Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, 'Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set', 318.

[58] Andreas Schedler, 'The Menu of Manipulation', *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 36–50; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 7; Larry Diamond, 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes', *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35.

[59] Giovanni Capoccia and Daniel Ziblatt, 'The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond', *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 8–9 (2010): 931–68.

solidify newly acquired power or maintain power in the face of sudden domestic or international challenges. The main empirical chapters of the book are organized thematically, and each addresses a distinct type of authoritarian practice. Each thematic chapter also concentrates on a distinct stage of authoritarian politics, in order to facilitate a narrower analytical focus. Chapter 4 addresses the practice of election fraud, and focuses primarily on the international signals that structure political decision-making *prior* to the decision to engage in election malpractice. Chapter 5 examines key moments of authoritarian repression, and focuses primarily on the international contribution to the *implementation* of coercive crackdowns, while Chapter 6 addresses the international politics of coups and concentrates on the role that international sponsorship plays in the *aftermath* of coups, as new incumbents seek to consolidate their rule.

The thematic chapters include a number of case studies that examine the international politics of authoritarian behaviour in specific settings. The case studies facilitate the exploration of the causal mechanisms that link international sponsorship to domestic political outcomes.[60] The role of international signals and their implications for the politics of election manipulation is illustrated with examination of fraudulent behaviour in successive Zimbabwean elections in the years after 2000. The examination of the role of international sponsorship in the politics of coercive crackdowns is illustrated with evidence from events in Bahrain and Syria in 2011. Finally, the analysis of coups is illustrated with studies of the international responses to post-coup incumbents in Fiji after 2006 and Egypt after 2013.

The case studies were selected for a number of reasons. As the principal aim of the book is to examine *how* international sponsorship shapes authoritarian politics at the domestic level, each case study involves analysis of instances of robust international sponsorship of autocratic regimes. This facilitates identification of the causal mechanisms of international influence when sponsorship is taking place. The case studies, however, also include variation in the identity of the sponsors and the nature of the sponsorship in order to tease out the ways in which the causal mechanisms of influence can vary from setting to setting. The sponsors include both democratic and autocratic states, and the forms of sponsorship range from relatively mild signals of support from afar to large-scale intervention in domestic affairs. This facilitates analysis of how the mechanisms of influence can vary according to the 'supply-side', the identity and actions of the sponsors. The cases also vary in outcome, with some cases

[60] Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

offering clear examples of successful autocratic strategies leading to stable and persistent rule (e.g. post-coup politics in Fiji after 2006), while others show the limitations of international sponsorship in securing the full aims of autocratic incumbents (e.g. incumbents facing civil war in Syria after 2011 and compromise and power-sharing in Zimbabwe in 2008). Within each case study, the analysis sheds light on the reasons behind the international sponsorship that occurred, the nature of the overall international environment that domestic elites faced, the tools of sponsorship used, and the extent (and limitations) of the international contribution to authoritarian persistence.

Tolstrup has identified a number of methodological challenges to examining the role and effects of international sponsors of autocratic regimes.[61] These include the fact that much outside support is offered through covert means, and that authoritarian settings provide particular challenges of data collection. In the absence of ideal but scarce sources of evidence (e.g. frank discussions by autocratic leaders of the role that outside powers played in encouraging and/or facilitating authoritarian practices) it is necessary to infer such influences from domestic-level events and behaviour. In the empirical chapters, therefore, I do not pretend to provide a complete account of the decision-making process or inner thoughts of autocratic actors. Rather, I pursue the narrower goals of demonstrating that international factors were part of the decision-making environment, that regime elites were conscious of these international factors, and that they responded to them. Domestic responses are sometimes clear and unequivocal. Autocratic elites can express gratitude for external assistance, and have direct contact with international sponsors (for example, through diplomatic visits during times of crisis). They can also demonstrate the importance of international sponsorship through their diplomatic efforts on the international stage to gain favour from potential allies and minimize punishment from potential critics. If the international environment were unimportant, such efforts would not be necessary. In other cases, the importance of international sponsorship is less clear-cut, and must be inferred from domestic behaviour that does not explicitly reference international actors. The timing of authoritarian practices, for example, or the repeated pursuit of such practices, can be tied to international sponsorship if it can be shown that they followed international interventions by supportive sponsors. In each case study, a range of evidence is used to demonstrate that international sponsorship is more than just international noise that plays little if any role, and rather directly contributes to the politics of authoritarianism at the domestic level.

[61] Jakob Tolstrup, 'Problems in Studying the International Dimension of Authoritarianism', *APSA Comparative Democratization Newsletter* 13, no. 1 (2015): 1–11.

I draw on multiple sources for each case, including official documents, newspaper accounts, biographies, think tank reports, and the academic literature.

## OUTLINE OF THE BOOK

Chapters 2 and 3 set out the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the book in more detail, while Chapters 4–6 include the thematically guided empirical analysis. Chapter 2 offers a critical review of recent research that addresses the international influences on authoritarian politics, and challenges the idea that international sponsorship of autocratic regimes can best be understood as a form of 'autocracy promotion'. The chapter identifies a number of conceptual flaws in the scholarship on this topic, and offers a typology of international influences on authoritarianism that allows for a more fine-grained understanding of the range of relevant external forces. The chapter seeks to put some order on the existing literature by classifying recent findings with reference to the categories of the new typology.

Chapter 3 narrows the focus of the book to international sponsorship, and lays out the framework for exploring the nature and effects of external sponsorship on domestic politics. It highlights the value of disaggregating the study of authoritarian rule into examination of a number of discrete strategies for gaining and maintaining authoritarian power. It offers an overview of the motives for, and tools of, international sponsorship, and it concludes by identifying the three principal elements of authoritarian behaviour that outside actors can influence, namely the decision to engage in authoritarian behaviour, the implementation of authoritarian behaviour, and the ability of regime elites to survive international punishment in the wake of authoritarian behaviour.

The subsequent three chapters address the three thematic areas of study, and explore the empirical case studies. Chapter 4 examines the international influences on the politics of electoral manipulation, and examines the role of international signals in shaping decision-making processes in Zimbabwe in successive elections after 2000. Chapter 5 turns to the role of authoritarian repression of mass uprisings, and traces the international contributions to the implementation of coercive crackdowns in Bahrain and Syria in 2011. Chapter 6 addresses the international politics of coups, and examines how international actors contributed to post-coup authoritarian stability in Fiji and Egypt. Finally, the conclusion draws together the findings of the book and offers suggestions for future research.

# 2

# A Typology of International Forces

In the wake of the surge in the number of democracies in the world after the 1970s, scholars quickly sought to understand the roots of the widespread pattern of transitions from authoritarian rule. Early research on the politics of regime change concluded that the breakdown of authoritarian regimes was primarily a domestic rather than an international story. As the 'third wave' of democratization spread, it became a common lament to bemoan the neglect of external influences in analyses of democratic transitions, and the 1990s witnessed an increase in research into the international dimensions of democratization. Cross-border diffusion, foreign aid, international conditionality, and foreign intervention were each identified as major drivers of regime change processes in varying contexts, and it soon became almost conventional to affirm the international dimensions of democratization.[1]

A similar process of re-evaluation has recently begun in relation to the politics of authoritarianism. As the third wave of democratization petered out and scholars began to account for the resilience of authoritarianism in much of the world, initial treatments tended to focus on domestic rather than international factors. The most influential contributions sought to place the greatest explanatory weight on domestic institutions, such as political parties, legislatures, and security agencies.[2] More recently, however, scholars have sought to explore the varying international influences that can reinforce rather than loosen the grip of authoritarian incumbents on the reins of power, and a more comprehensive image of the contours of authoritarian rule has

[1] Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*; Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above*; Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, 'Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy', *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 4 (2006): 463–89; Richard Youngs, *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001); Oisín Tansey, *Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration: Democratization and International Administration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[2] For a review, see David Art, 'What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After Ten Years?', *Comparative Politics* 44 (2012): 351–73.

emerged.[3] This work challenges approaches that see political regimes as purely domestic-level phenomena that are constituted and sustained by domestic-level actors, and advocates for a fuller account of regime politics that recognizes the often integral role of international environments and actors. In doing so, it further tears at the already frayed boundaries between the subfields of international relations and comparative politics, highlighting the inadequacy of perspectives that see regime change and regime consolidation as political processes that operate only at the level of national politics.

Yet much of this literature remains relatively underdeveloped. While recent contributions have shed light on important elements of authoritarian politics that were previously underexplored, much of the scholarship is fragmented and uneven. Conceptual and theoretical clarity is often absent, and there is little agreement over the types of international influence that exist and the causal mechanisms through which they shape domestic-level authoritarian politics. Another problem is that scholars frequently talk past one another, limiting cumulative knowledge accumulation. Many of the insights about the international influences on authoritarianism come from scholars whose primary interests concern other topics, such as international aid or sanctions, and their findings are not always recognized by those whose interest lies primarily in the politics of authoritarianism itself. Consequently, there is need for a systematic and critical review of what we do and do not know about the international sources of influence on the politics of authoritarianism.

The aim of this chapter is to put some order on our current knowledge, with a particular emphasis on the manner in which we can conceptualize the range of international forces that shape authoritarianism at the domestic level in the post-Cold War period. The chapter makes three principal contributions. First, it critically engages with the emerging literature on the international dimensions of authoritarian politics and takes issue with some of the underlying assumptions that are guiding conceptual development in the field. In particular, I critique the recent literature that focuses on 'autocracy promotion', and use it as an example to illustrate the fuzzy conceptual boundaries that currently distinguish different forms of international influence on authoritarian politics. Second, I build on this critique by identifying three key questions that should be asked when trying to determine the different

[3] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*; Burnell and Schlumberger, 'Promoting Democracy—Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes'; Bader, *China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies*; Ambrosio, 'Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research'; Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*.

international forces that shape authoritarian politics at the domestic level. Using these questions, I introduce a typology of international dimensions of authoritarianism that distinguishes more clearly between multiple types of international influence. Finally, I then use this typology to take stock of the existing body of literature that addresses the international politics of authoritarianism, much of which has yet to be seen as part of a common field. This review integrates previously diverse and fragmented findings and puts into order the body of knowledge that currently exists.

## THE INTERNATIONAL TURN IN AUTHORITARIAN STUDIES

For many years, the comparative study of regime type and regime change prioritized democracy and democratization.[4] The field of 'transition studies' was for a long time defined primarily by an interest in transitions *from* authoritarianism, rather than to it, and it is only in recent years that processes of authoritarian transition and consolidation have received similar levels of attention. More recently, the scholarship on regime change that had initially focused on authoritarian breakdown and democratization began to recognize the need to conceptualize and explain the enduring patterns of authoritarianism that proved resilient even in the face of the trend towards democracy.[5] These efforts include the development of new concepts, such as different types of hybrid regime,[6] as well as new efforts to classify the different forms of contemporary authoritarianism.[7] Greater theoretical attention was also given to the ways in which democracies break down,[8] and the most vibrant area of

[4] Some classic studies include Guillermo O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); J. J. Linz and A. Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).

[5] Jason Brownlee, 'Low Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism', *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 4 (2002): 477–98.

[6] Diamond, 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes'; Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002): 51–65.

[7] Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, 'Pathways from Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007): 143–57.

[8] Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, 'Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003): 594–620.

debate concerned ways in which authoritarian regimes sustain themselves in power. Different theoretical approaches emphasized a range of facilitating factors for authoritarian endurance, ranging from deeply embedded structural features such as the presence of oil reserves,[9] to the strategic interaction of societal groups,[10] to the regime's use of political institutions such as political parties,[11] elections,[12] and legislatures.[13] This latter strand of research has been particularly influential, and the rise of a 'new institutionalism' in the study of authoritarian regimes has been one of the central features of recent research in the area.[14] This work has thus helped correct an earlier imbalance and has contributed to major advances in our understanding of authoritarianism.

Yet, much of this work also ignored or downplayed international-level variables in its explanations of authoritarian change and consolidation. This is despite the fact that the study of international politics has greatly enhanced our understanding of why democracies emerge and consolidate. There is an extensive literature that explores the international influences on democratization, and that identifies a wide range of mechanisms through which international actors and environments can contribute to democratic progress.[15] This work has addressed the varying influence of democracy assistance and training,[16] financial aid,[17] international organizations,[18] military intervention,[19] and regional diffusion

[9] Michael L. Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?', *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 325–61.

[10] Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

[11] Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*.

[12] Jennifer Gandhi and Ellen Lust-Okar, 'Elections Under Authoritarianism', *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 403–22; Ellen Lust-Okar, 'Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan', *Democratization* 13, no. 3 (2006): 456–71.

[13] Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, 'Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats', *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279–301.

[14] Andreas Schedler, 'The New Institutionalism in the Study of Authoritarian Regimes' (CIDE, Mexico, 2009).

[15] Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*; Pridham, 'The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice, and Interregional Comparisons'; Huntington, *The Third Wave*.

[16] Burnell, *Democracy Assistance: International Co-Operation for Democratization*; Thomas Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1999).

[17] Stephen Knack, 'Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?', *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 251–66; Steven E. Finkel, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson, 'The Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003', *World Politics* 59 (2007): 404–39.

[18] Youngs, *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy*; Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above*.

[19] Jeffrey Pickering and Mark Peceny, 'Forging Democracy at Gunpoint', *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2006): 539–60.

effects.[20] However, this literature on the international dimensions of regime change and regime type has had a strong democratizing bias, with an overwhelming emphasis on the ways in which international variables can promote democratic rather than authoritarian rule.

Consequently, the wider literature has contained three core assumptions that have limited our understandings of authoritarianism. Firstly, where scholars have sought to account for patterns of authoritarian transition and consolidation, they have tended to focus on national politics and have assumed that *domestic-level variables are the most significant explanatory factors*. Secondly, where scholars have sought to examine the role of international influences on regime politics, they have tended to examine the influence of *Western*, *democratic international actors*, and have usually ignored the influence of non-democratic or illiberal international actors on domestic regime politics.[21] Thirdly, and partly as a result of the second, they have also overwhelmingly assumed that the international dimension to regime politics serves *as a source of democratic politics*. Combined, these assumptions have led to a skewed understanding of the role of international influences in domestic regime politics, and have restricted theory building about the determinants of authoritarian rule and resilience.

Recently, scholars have begun to counter these flaws and develop a research agenda on the international dimensions of authoritarianism. Addressing the imbalance in the study of international politics and regime change, they have sought to demonstrate that external forces can promote and strengthen authoritarianism just as much as they can encourage democratization. The most well-developed scholarship here concerns the role of 'black knights', external actors who intervene in the domestic affairs of target countries in ways that reinforce authoritarian rule.[22] Scholars have demonstrated how countries such as Russia, China, Saudi Arabia, and the US have all pursued policies abroad that have contributed to authoritarian rule.[23] Some have

[20] Brinks and Coppedge, 'Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy'; Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward, 'Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization', *International Organization* 60, no. 4 (2006): 911–33.

[21] On the 'Western bias' in the democratization literature, see Jakob Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"', *Democratization* 16, no. 5 (2009): 922–44.

[22] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 41.

[23] Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"'; Thomas Ambrosio, 'Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls: America as a Black Knight in the Uprising in Bahrain', *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 3 (2 May 2014): 331–46, doi:10.1080/13569775.2014.911497; Bader, *China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies*; Daniel Odinius and Philipp Kuntz, 'The Limits of Authoritarian

focused in particular on the rise of authoritarian great powers (especially Russia and China), arguing that they have brought about a resurgence of ideological foreign policies driven by a belief in the superiority of autocracy over democracy.[24] Many authors have also framed these efforts in terms of international efforts at 'autocracy promotion'.[25] Elsewhere a new strand of research on authoritarian diffusion is developing, with an emphasis on the ways in which cross-border learning and emulation among autocratic leaders helps reinforce non-democratic rule.[26] Scholars have pointed to the role of autocratic cooperation,[27] as well as the importance of cross-border linkages

Solidarity: The Gulf Monarchies and Preserving Authoritarian Rule during the Arab Spring', *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (1 November 2015): 639–54; Sean Yom and Mohammad Al-Momani, 'The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability: Jordan in the Post-Cold War Era', *Arab Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (2008): 39–60; Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*; Christian von Soest, 'Democracy Prevention: The International Collaboration of Authoritarian Regimes', *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (1 November 2015): 623–38; Jakob Tolstrup, 'Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Why and How Russia Supports Authoritarian Incumbents in Post-Soviet States', *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (2015): 673–90; Risse and Babayan, 'Democracy Promotion and the Challenges of Illiberal Regional Powers'; Rachel Vanderhill and Michael E. Aleprete Jr, eds, *International Dimensions of Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from Post-Soviet States* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013); Laurence Whitehead, 'International Democracy Promotion as a Political Ideology: Upsurge and Retreat', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 20, no. 1 (2 January 2015): 10–26, doi:10.1080/13569317.2015.991510.

[24] Robert Kagan, 'The End of the End of History', *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, 23 April 2008, carnegieendowment.org/2008/04/23/end-of-end-of-history; Alexander Cooley, 'Countering Democratic Norms', *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 3 (2015): 49–63.

[25] Julia Bader, Jörn Grävingholt, and Antje Kästner, 'Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy? A Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in Regional Neighbourhoods', *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 81–100; Burnell, 'Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?'; Burnell and Schlumberger, 'Promoting Democracy—Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes'; Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Inna Melnykovska, Hedwig Plamper, and Rainer Schweickert, 'Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?', *Asia Europe Journal* 10, no. 1 (2012): 75–89; Katsiaryna Yakouchyk, 'The Good, the Bad, and the Ambitious: Democracy and Autocracy Promoters Competing in Belarus', *European Political Science Review*, advance online publication, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773914000459.

[26] Ambrosio, 'Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research'; Mark R. Beissinger, 'Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions', *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 2 (2007): 259–76; Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, 'Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the "Arab Awakening"', *Globalizations* 8, no. 5 (2011): 647–53; Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830—1940'.

[27] Michaela Mattes and Mariana Rodríguez, 'Autocracies and International Cooperation', *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 3 (1 November 2013): 527–38; Julia Bader, 'Propping up

that solidify authoritarian rule.[28] Brownlee has arguably gone the furthest in emphasizing the importance of international variables, arguing that authoritarianism itself should be viewed as an 'international phenomenon' that is co-constituted by domestic and international actors.[29] This approach, however, goes too far, and risks obscuring the variation in international influences on autocratic regimes. Not all autocratic regimes are so heavily influenced by international forces that they should be seen as international rather than domestic phenomena. Yet the range of contributions in this new literature demonstrates the crucial role that international politics can play in increasing the prospects for the emergence of authoritarian regimes, as well as shaping the day-to-day politics of authoritarianism in ways that fundamentally affect the prospects for regime stability and survival.

## CAN THE CONCEPTS TRAVEL?

Much of the new research in this area is of excellent quality, but the broader research agenda remains in the early stages of development, and further work is needed before the international dimensions of authoritarianism are understood as clearly as the international dimensions of democracy. A key barrier to progress in this area is its fragmented nature and the lack of integration. While numerous scholars refer to international influences on authoritarianism, only few engage in *debates* about these influences, and there is limited evidence of cross-referencing within the diverse scholarship that touches on the external dimensions of authoritarianism. Scholarship on 'autocracy promotion', for example, is quite distinct from scholarship on the 'aid curse', and there is little sense that they belong to a common field of research into the international sources of authoritarian politics.[30] There still remains much work to be done

Dictators? Economic Cooperation from China and Its Impact on Authoritarian Persistence in Party and Non-Party Regimes', *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (2015): 655–72; Thomas Ambrosio, 'Catching the "Shanghai Spirit": How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia', *Europe–Asia Studies* 60, no. 8 (2008): 1321–44; Gero Erdmann et al., 'International Cooperation of Authoritarian Regimes: Toward a Conceptual Framework' (GIGA Working Papers, 2013).

[28] Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*; Sasse, 'Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy'; Cameron and Orenstein, 'Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its "Near Abroad"'.

[29] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*, 4.

[30] Simeon Djankov, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol, 'The Curse of Aid', *Journal of Economic Growth* 13, no. 3 (22 July 2008): 169–94; Deborah Brautigam, 'Governance,

in identifying and conceptualizing the full range of international influence on authoritarian rule, and in examining their interrelationships.

Another important issue that has yet to receive sufficient attention is the question of whether concepts that were developed to help explain the international dimensions of democratization will be equally suitable for shedding light on the international dimensions of authoritarianism. The literature on the external politics of democratic transitions has given rise to in-depth studies of various types of international influence, including democracy promotion and assistance,[31] democratic conditionality,[32] diffusion,[33] foreign-imposed regime change,[34] and linkage and leverage.[35] Yet the potential set of international influences on authoritarianism is not a mirror image of those influences on democracy,[36] and it is not self-evident that concepts which were originally developed with democracy in mind can easily be utilized to analyse authoritarianism. The two forms of regime type do not hold the same status in the current international environment, and democracy is much more widely seen as a legitimate form of government that can justifiably be promoted abroad.[37] As a result, some concepts that help illuminate the international dimensions of democracy and democratization offer limited help in understanding the international dimensions of authoritarianism. There is little evidence, for example, that 'autocratic conditionality' exists in a way that corresponds to democratic conditionality, and there are certainly no states or international organizations that set out explicit criteria of autocratic governance that must be met in exchange for aid, trade, or membership.[38] Forms of normative

Economy, and Foreign Aid', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 27, no. 3 (1992): 3–25; Burnell and Schlumberger, 'Promoting Democracy—Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes'.

[31] Burnell, *Democracy Assistance: International Co-Operation for Democratization*; Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*.

[32] Philippe C. Schmitter, 'The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies', in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 26–58; Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency'.

[33] Brinks and Coppedge, 'Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy'.

[34] Alexander B. Downes and Jonathan Monten, 'Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization', *International Security* 37, no. 4 (2013): 90–131.

[35] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

[36] Burnell, 'Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?', 3.

[37] McFaul, 'Democracy Promotion as a World Value'.

[38] Lucan A. Way, 'The Limits of Autocracy Promotion: The Case of Russia in the "Near Abroad"', *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (2015): 691–706.

'shaming' that have been shown to pressure authoritarian elites are much less likely to exist as a form of pro-authoritarian pressure, and we should expect a much smaller role for transnational advocacy networks in bolstering authoritarian regimes.[39] Consequently, understanding the international dimensions of authoritarianism requires more than simply 'flipping the coin' of international influences on democratization and looking at how different values of previously identified international-level variables may shape authoritarian rule.

This is most clearly in evidence in the recent writings on 'autocracy promotion'. This literature is expanding quickly and has identified some clear patterns of external support for autocratic incumbents, yet it has also struggled to develop clear conceptual and theoretical contributions.[40] As Kelley has noted, 'research on black knights and autocracy promotion is still slim and mostly limited to empirical description'.[41] A key problem in this regard relates to the lack of clarity regarding the central concept of autocracy promotion itself. Not all authors who examine the role that external actors can play in supporting authoritarianism at the domestic level use the language of autocracy promotion,[42] but those who do have tended to use this concept in problematic ways. Few offer a clear definition that would help delimit precisely what counts, and does not count, as autocracy promotion, and several key contributions offer conceptualizations that are so loose that the utility of the concept begins to wash away. This is a particular problem because the term 'autocracy promotion' carries strong connotations given its similarity to the well-established idea of 'democracy promotion', and its use immediately suggests a set of activities that mirrors those of the international community's democracy promoters. However, while many states do actively support autocratic incumbents, there is little evidence that they seek to promote autocracy in the way that many international actors seek to promote democracy. Combined with the lack of conceptual clarity that characterizes much of the research on this topic, the result is a conceptual innovation that ultimately has limited analytical utility.

[39] Thomas Risse-Kappen, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[40] Tolstrup, 'Problems in Studying the International Dimension of Authoritarianism'.

[41] Judith G. Kelley, 'International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States', *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 203–20, 214.

[42] Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"'; Nicole J. Jackson, 'The Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-Liberal Democratic Forms of Political Rule: A Case Study of Russia's Influence on Central Asian Regimes', *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 101–18.

For example, Peter Burnell was an early contributor to the literature on autocracy promotion, and helped focus attention on this form of activity.[43] However, Burnell defines the concept so widely that it appears to encompass multiple distinct forms of international influence that do not all include active regime promotion. Burnell offers both an inclusive and exclusive definition of autocracy promotion. The former is defined as 'all the international forces that move [a] political regime away from democracy and towards semi or fully authoritarian rule', a definition so broad that it appears to encompass any form of international influence. The latter, exclusive, definition is focused on the agency and intentions of actors, and includes a number of external policies: direct efforts to export autocracy, direct efforts to influence domestic politics in ways that unintentionally produce movement toward authoritarianism, and processes of authoritarian diffusion. While each of these is relevant to the international dynamics that may reinforce authoritarian rather than democratic rule, only the first (autocracy export) truly relates to a conscious effort by international actors to promote a particular form of regime type abroad. The other elements of Burnell's exclusive definition of autocracy promotion, while undoubtedly relevant to the international factors that might reinforce authoritarianism, are quite distinct from the *promotion of a particular type of regime*. As a result, the concept blurs the lines between distinct forms of external influence and makes it difficult to identify what does and does not count as autocracy promotion.

Other research on the concept contains similar conceptual ambiguity. Vanderhill's recent work on the international promotion of authoritarianism offers a systematic effort to generate theory about the effects of international sponsorship of authoritarian elites, with important empirical findings. Vanderhill defines the promotion of authoritarianism as behaviour in which an external actor 'is actively supporting illiberal elites, groups, or regimes through direct assistance'.[44] Yet, it is not entirely clear if external support for illiberal elites is tantamount to the *promotion* of authoritarianism. Vanderhill acknowledges that states may have self-interested motivations, and that external powers may have economic and geopolitical goals. According to the author, 'the primary goal of their support may not be to develop authoritarian regimes, but the outcome of their support is an increase in authoritarianism in the recipient country'.[45] However, this suggests that the process under investigation may not be the *promotion* of authoritarianism but rather the *enabling* of authoritarianism as a by-product of the promotion of some other goal. Many of Vanderhill's examples, such as Russia's energy deals with Belarus,

[43] Burnell, 'Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?'
[44] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*, 9. [45] Ibid., 8.

Venezuelan economic aid to Nicaragua, and Iran's influence on Hezbollah's military strategy towards Israel, seem to constitute strategically driven support for valuable allies abroad, rather than instances of a common policy to promote authoritarianism as a form of rule.

Other recent contributions share similar ambiguities,[46] and various forms of international influence have too often been grouped together under a single, and misleading, heading. As a result, we still lack a clear conceptual framework with which to analyse the contemporary international influences on autocracy.[47] In the following section, I set out a series of considerations that allow for the development of more precise conceptual categories, and lay the foundations for a full typology of the international influences on authoritarian rule.

## A TYPOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL FORCES

Autocracy promotion constitutes one narrow form of international influence that can reinforce authoritarian rule, although the problems with the concept illustrate the need for conceptual clarity regarding the wider set of international forces that shape authoritarian politics. In this section I present a full typology of international forces that can serve to bolster autocratic endurance and survival. Each of these international forces has been shown to reinforce authoritarian rule in certain settings, but scholars have often conflated them with one another due to a lack of conceptual clarity in the field. The typology presented here helps overcome this problem by identifying clearer boundaries between distinct international influences. The typology is derived from asking three questions about the source and nature of the international influence that are related to the intentions and motivations of external actors (see Figure 2.1). By working through these questions systematically (and sequentially) it is possible to avoid some of the conceptual confusion discussed in the previous section.

The first question concerns the role of agency. Some international influences on autocracy result from the actions of external actors who seek to shape domestic politics in target countries. Yet other forms include no such central role for political actors, and result from the influence of structural features of the world or passive channels of influence. Consequently, it is important to distinguish between active and passive international forces. Yet some of the

[46] Melnykovska, Plamper, and Schweickert, 'Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?'; Yakouchyk, 'The Good, the Bad, and the Ambitious'.

[47] For a fuller critique of the concept of autocracy promotion, see Oisín Tansey, 'The Problem with Autocracy Promotion', *Democratization* 23, no. 1 (2016): 141–63.




**Figure 2.1.** Typology of International Influences on Autocracy.

recent discussions in the emerging literature on the international politics of authoritarian rule have conflated active and passive influences. For example, Burnell's 'inclusive' definition of autocracy promotion includes 'all the international forces that move [a] political regime away from democracy and towards semi or fully authoritarian rule. The deliberate actions of external actors to export democracy might be but a small part.'[48] Yet any international

[48] Burnell, 'Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?', 5.

forces that do not involve the deliberate actions of external actors should not be considered a form of promotion, which by its very definition requires such deliberate action. We must thus first make clear a distinction between active and passive international influences, before then exploring further, more fine-grained, forms of influence of either type.

The second question concerns the role of actor intentions, and helps distinguish different forms of active international influence. Not all policies that are designed to affect the internal politics of autocratic regimes are the result of intentional efforts to support autocratic incumbents. Some external actions that serve to bolster authoritarian elites may be pursued for entirely separate reasons. Yet some contributions to the literature are unclear on this point. For example, Melnykovska et al. frame Russian economic policies in Central Asia as instances of autocracy promotion, even as they explicitly state that 'Russia's focus is mostly directed at maintaining its monopoly over Central Asian energy resources' and Russia's 'central goal' is 'keeping the Central Asian states economically dependent'.[49] I argue that these are instances of misclassification, and that external policies that are designed and intended to achieve objectives unrelated to regime type should not be considered as instances of regime promotion, and must be classified under some alternative heading. It is thus important to ask what the intention of the external actor is, and in particular whether they intend to support the position of ruling autocratic incumbents. This helps us distinguish between active efforts at regime sponsorship and various forms of unintended consequence.

Establishing actor intentions empirically is not always easy, especially in settings where those seeking to assist autocratic actors abroad may have an incentive to conceal their aims. Yet there are a number of indicators that can be used to identify actor intentions.[50] Firstly, scholars can look at the statements of those international actors who are seeking to shape the domestic politics of countries abroad. While actors may sometimes wish to conceal their objectives, at times intervening countries can offer clear indications of their intentions to support and prop up autocratic regimes abroad. For example, Saudi Arabia voiced robust support for President Mubarak in Egypt as his regime became threatened by public uprisings in 2011.[51] Secondly, it is sometimes possible to infer intentions from the behaviour of external actors, and in particular the type of policies they pursue at the domestic level.

[49] Melnykovska, Plamper, and Schweickert, 'Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?', 79.

[50] James Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 163.

[51] Wall Street Journal, 'Saudi Arabia Voices Support for Mubarak', 29 January 2011.

Domestic actors often gain and maintain power by pursuing authoritarian practices such as coups, election fraud, and violent repression. When external actors assist domestic actors in the pursuit of these activities, such behaviour can clearly indicate a desire to bolster or protect autocratic actors abroad. By contrast, more general policies of economic aid or the provision of energy subsidies are less obviously indicators of an intentional policy to support autocratic actors, as they may serve to achieve other goals (such as the promotion of economic development or as leverage to extract policy concessions). For example, Russia's support for election fraud in Ukraine in 2004 is a clearer indicator of an intention to bolster autocracy than Russian energy subsidies to the country. Finally, scholars can also look at the timing of external support. If there are surges of supportive policies (such as spikes in economic aid, or in diplomatic support) that coincide with challenges to autocratic rule at the domestic level, such intensification of support can indicate an intention to protect the regime itself. For example, after General Sisi initiated a coup against President Morsi in Egypt in 2013, Saudi Arabia offered a massive aid package to Cairo.[52] Such a spike in economic aid indicated Riyadh's desire to support the new post-coup regime.

The third and final question to ask concerns the role of actor motivations, and helps distinguish different forms of active regime sponsorship. Intentions concern the purpose of the policy—what it is intended to achieve. A policy of sponsorship towards an autocratic regime, for example, is by definition intended to promote the continuation of autocratic rule. The underlying motives behind such an intention, however, may be diverse, and the goal of sponsoring autocratic regimes may be pursued for a variety of reasons: ideological or strategic, altruistic or self-interested.[53] I make a distinction between interest-driven and ideology-driven motivations, and argue these different motivations have implications for how we conceptualize distinct international influences on autocracy. To tease out the importance of this distinction, I identify three principal motivations that might drive policies intended to bolster or support autocratic regimes, two of which rest on instrumental self-interest and one of which rests on ideological commitment. I argue that only the latter motivation characterizes genuine cases of 'autocracy promotion', while the first two are better understood as instances of 'democracy resistance'.

[52] Ron Nordland, 'Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt's Regime', *New York Times*, 19 August 2013.

[53] On the differences between the intentions and motivations of external actors, see Pattison, *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect*, 154.

The first motive concerns those instances where transitions to democracy in one setting are viewed as a threat to political authority in another. Outside actors often fear that the collapse of authoritarianism abroad will have a contagion effect and unleash democratic forces at home.[54] As a result, states will have an interest in seeking to protect autocratic incumbents abroad for domestic interests, primarily in order to preserve political power.[55] The fear of contagion thus motivates autocratic regime sponsorship abroad.

A second motivation that drives support for autocratic regimes concerns instrumental considerations about policy alignment. Powerful states often wish to maintain and protect authoritarian regimes abroad in order to ensure that supportive and compliant allies remain in power. Such support for autocratic regimes becomes paramount when there is a disjuncture between government policy and popular opinion, raising concerns that free and fair elections would give rise to a new government that would abandon pre-existing alliances and commitments. The support for autocracy in such cases arises not out of a fear that democratization effects might lead to instability or loss of authority at home, but rather out of strategic concerns in terms of national security and economic interests. Consequently, both democracies and autocracies are likely to share these concerns when their interests are at stake, whereas only autocratic regimes are likely to support autocracies abroad due to a fear of contagion. Brownlee has shown, for example, how US support for Egypt is rooted in the alignment of domestic and foreign policies in Cairo with those of the US.[56]

These two sets of motivations lead to policies that are best described as democracy prevention or resistance, rather than autocracy promotion. Several scholars have already sought to identify democracy resistance as a distinct form of foreign policy.[57] Yet to date the defining features of this policy have remained somewhat unclear, especially in relation to the boundaries between democracy resistance and autocracy promotion. I argue that the two sets of policies are related, but distinct. They are related in that they both rest on intentional efforts to bolster autocratic regimes abroad. They are distinct in that they are driven by different underlying motivations. I define democracy resistance as policies designed to support autocratic regimes abroad as a means to avoid the negative

[54] Mary Elise Sarotte, 'China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example', *International Security* 37 (2012): 156–82; Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830–1940'.

[55] von Soest, 'Democracy Prevention'.

[56] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*.

[57] Laurence Whitehead, 'Anti-Democracy Promotion: Four Strategies in Search of a Framework', *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 2 (2014): 1–24; Whitehead, 'International Democracy Promotion as a Political Ideology'; von Soest, 'Democracy Prevention'; Ghia Nodia, 'The Revenge of Geopolitics', *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 4 (2014): 142.

externalities that come with transitions to democracy. By contrast, autocracy promotion is defined in terms of the third motivation that can drive external actors to shore up and support autocratic elites abroad, namely an ideological commitment to authoritarianism as a form of regime type. This definition of autocracy promotion is strict, in that efforts to protect autocratic elites and regimes abroad are only considered cases of autocracy promotion if they are driven in significant part by ideological motivations *related to regime type*. I do not argue that ideological concerns must be the only motivations—most foreign policies are characterized by some mix of motivations. Rather, I argue that ideological motivations must be a major driver of the policy in question, and that there must be a clear ideological commitment to promote a particular, non-democratic regime type. It is also not sufficient for the foreign policy in question to have any ideological goals. Rather, the ideological commitment must relate to autocracy as a form of regime. For example, the foreign policies of Venezuela under Hugo Chavez were closely linked to ideological preferences for populist, left-leaning and anti-Western regimes within Latin America,[58] but these preferences primarily related to public policies rather than any overarching regime type.[59]

The resulting typology highlights the wide array of potential influences on authoritarian rule, and teases out the key lines of distinction between different categories. The typology ultimately distinguishes between three major distinct categories of international influence: passive influences, unintended active influences, and intentional active autocratic sponsorship. Much of the existing literature on black knights and autocracy promotion concerns the latter category, but has yet to acknowledge that there are subsets of intentional autocratic sponsorship.[60] The categories outlined in the typology are ideal types, and in practice autocratic incumbents may be subject to the interaction of several external influences. They nonetheless provide a useful set of concepts with which to make sense of diverse influences that have often been conflated and over-aggregated.

In the sections that follow, I conduct a stock-take of the existing literature and use the categories developed in the typology to put some order on what is currently a fragmented strand of scholarship. The purpose of the discussions is to bring these disparate findings together and highlight how the different influences on authoritarian politics relate to one another and fit together within an overarching framework.

[58] Corrales, 'Conflicting Goals in Venezuela's Foreign Policy'.

[59] John M. Owen IV, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 257.

[60] For a similar critique, and an alternative typology that focuses specifically on the role of external actors, see Tolstrup, 'Problems in Studying the International Dimension of Authoritarianism.'

## TAKING STOCK OF THE FIELD

It is only in recent years that an identifiable research agenda on the international politics of authoritarian rule has emerged, and that scholars have begun to coalesce around a set of common questions and topics in the area. Yet while this research has produced many important new findings, as discussed above it is still relatively underdeveloped in conceptual terms. Furthermore, there are many distinct pockets of research, often pre-dating the recent rise of attention to this area, that offer insights into the international influences on authoritarian politics but that have not yet been integrated into the new research field. Below, I seek to bring these diverse findings together, and put them in some order by classifying them according to the typology presented above.

### Passive Influences

The key starting point for distinguishing between different types of influence concerns the role of agency, and asks whether the influence in question is characterized by the involvement of intentional policies of external actors. This leads to a distinction between *active* and *passive* influences, where passive influences exert an effect on domestic-level politics without an integral role for the intentional efforts of international actors. These are the international influences that are independent of any foreign policy targeted at the regime in question. The literature on authoritarianism has highlighted a wide array of international effects that derive from the influence of passive external forces, and here I highlight in particular the roles of distant events, the international economy, the international state system, and patterns of international linkages.

One key international source of authoritarian resilience concerns the models and examples of authoritarian survival (or breakdown) in distant settings, which can influence autocratic leaders through the mechanism of diffusion. Early research on diffusion and regime change primarily focused on the effects of diffusion on *democratic* transition,[61] although some scholars also

[61] Huntington, *The Third Wave*; Mark J. Gasiorowski, 'Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis', *The American Political Science Review* 89, no. 4 (1995): 882–97; Laurence Whitehead, 'Three International Dimensions of Democratization', in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 3–25; Jeffrey S. Kopstein and David A. Reilly, 'Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World', *World Politics* 53, no. 1 (2000): 1–37.

suggested diffusion could reinforce authoritarian regimes.[62] More recently, scholars have sought to address the mechanism of 'authoritarian diffusion' more directly, and engage with the ways in which global, regional, and neighbour effects can reinforce authoritarian rather than democratic rule.[63] Discussion of authoritarian diffusion has centred around two key forms of passive cross-national influence that have been particularly salient in recent years, relating both to the rise of powerful authoritarian states such as Russia and China, as well as forms of authoritarian learning that take place in the wake of cross-border waves of regime contention. Firstly, the rise of authoritarian great powers has been linked to a 'power of example' effect that enhances the attractiveness of authoritarian forms of government.[64] Scholars have pointed to the various ways in which the success of authoritarian forms of rule in China and Russia in particular have acted as a model for others to emulate, even in the absence of overt encouragement. Halper, for example, has argued that China's 'capitalist authoritarian' model appeals to many developing countries, which have in turn sought to achieve their own balance of economic liberalization and political centralization. MacKinnon has argued that China's 'networked authoritarianism', involving strict control of internet traffic, has also acted as a model for other autocratic regimes, including Iran.[65] A second form of diffusion concerns the ways in which autocratic leaders can learn from events abroad in ways that enable them to deter, or crush, mobilization from below. Here, the diffusion dynamic has less to do with emulating a model of governance seen abroad, and rather concerns the ability of autocratic elites to recognize the threat posed by foreign instances

[62] Brinks and Coppedge, 'Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy', 467; Richard P. Y. Li and William R. Thompson, 'The "Coup Contagion" Hypothesis', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19, no. 1 (1975): 63–84.

[63] Ambrosio, 'Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research'; Thomas Ambrosio, 'The Rise of the "China Model" and "Beijing Consensus": Evidence of Authoritarian Diffusion?', *Contemporary Politics* 18, no. 4 (2012): 381–99; Karrie J. Koesel and Valerie J. Bunce, 'Diffusion-Proofing: Russian and Chinese Responses to Waves of Popular Mobilizations against Authoritarian Rulers', *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 3 (2013): 753–68; Vladimir Gel'man and Tomila Lankina, 'Authoritarian versus Democratic Diffusions: Explaining Institutional Choices in Russia's Local Government', *Post-Soviet Affairs* 24, no. 1 (2008): 40–62; Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber, 'Gravity Centres of Authoritarian Rule: A Conceptual Approach', *Democratization*, 2015, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1018898>.

[64] Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, 'Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy? A Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in Regional Neighbourhoods'; Kagan, *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*.

[65] Halper, *The Beijing Consensus*; Rebecca MacKinnon, 'China's "Networked Authoritarianism"', *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 2 (2011): 32–46.

**Table 2.1.** Categories of International Influence on Autocracy

| Types of Influence | Role of Actors, Intentions, Motives |
|---|---|
| **Passive** | No role for intentional external policies |
| **Active: Unintentional** | Actors involved, without intention to support the regime |
| **Active: Sponsorship** | |
| - Democracy resistance | Actors seek to avoid externalities of regime change |
| - Autocracy promotion | Actors motivated by ideological commitment to autocracy |

of pro-democratic mass mobilization (sometimes including regime overthrow) and to learn from the mistakes or successes of regime elites elsewhere. Weyland has termed this effect 'counter-diffusion', and it has contributed to the resilience of authoritarian rule in the wake of multiple waves of regime contention.[66] Beijing's brutal response to the Tiananmen Square protests in 1989 were informed in part by a fear that demonstration effects from Eastern Europe would threaten the regime in Beijing.[67] Similar dynamics shaped the responses to the so-called 'Colour Revolutions' and the Arab Spring, as incumbent elites were also able to learn from early examples of success and introduced repressive policies to minimize the prospects for protestor success in their own jurisdiction, thereby shoring up their autocratic regimes.[68] These dynamics largely took place as a result of passive external influences, involving emulation from a distance without a significant role for the active promotion of autocratic policies across borders.

Another form of passive influence concerns the nature of the balance of power within the international system and the presence or absence of global hegemonic powers. McFaul has labelled the international system the 'missing variable' in the study of regime change, and has identified the polarity of the international system as a crucial determinant of the opportunities that exist for transitions from authoritarian rule. During the Cold War in particular, the bipolar international system acted as a constraint on domestic regime politics, effectively ruling out democratic development and reinforcing authoritarian

[66] Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830–1940', 1165.

[67] Sarotte, 'China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example'.

[68] Beissinger, 'Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena'; Koesel and Bunce, 'Diffusion-Proofing'; Kurt Weyland, *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 244; Heydemann and Leenders, 'Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the "Arab Awakening"'.

forms of government in much of the world.[69] Similarly, Boix has highlighted the importance of both the number of hegemonic powers within the international system, as well their own regime type. Where democratic great powers dominate, the prospects for democracy improve considerably (such as in the context of post-Cold War US hegemony). However, where a single authoritarian great power dominates, the system creates a distinctly favourable environment for the spread of authoritarianism (e.g. Europe under the Holy Alliance after 1815). Furthermore, where great powers compete along ideological lines, both democratic and authoritarian hegemonic powers will create conditions that favour authoritarian regimes (as during the Cold War).[70] Gunitsky further contributes to these insights by focusing on 'hegemonic shocks', namely the critical moments when there is a sudden shift in the balance of power between the leading states in the international system. While some systemic shocks can contribute to the spread and consolidation of democracy (e.g. the end of the Cold War), others (such as the rise of Germany after the Great Depression, and the rise of the Soviet Union after WWII) contributed heavily to the spread of non-democratic regimes through waves of fascist or communist regime transitions.[71]

A third passive influence also derives from a largely structural feature of international politics, the channels of cross-border linkage between states. As developed by Levitsky and Way, the concept of linkage captures the ways in which regional proximity, shared histories, or socio-economic development can lead to increased economic, social, and political ties between non-democratic regimes and Western democratic states.[72] Although Levitsky and Way focused primarily on the role of 'linkage to the West' as a force for democratization, scholars have increasingly sought to explore the role that linkage can play in reinforcing authoritarian rule. Brownlee has shown how Western linkage can be beneficial for authoritarian incumbents, who often find that their ties to the US and Europe provide them with important channels of support.[73] Vanderhill places international linkages at the heart of her recent study of 'authoritarian promotion', arguing that linkages to authoritarian states can make the external promotion of authoritarianism

[69] McFaul, 'The Missing Variable: The "International System" as the Link between Third and Fourth Wave Models of Democratization'.

[70] Boix, 'Democracy, Development, and the International System'.

[71] Seva Gunitsky, 'From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century', *International Organization* 68, no. 3 (2014): 561–97.

[72] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 43.

[73] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*; Jason Brownlee and Joshua Stacher, 'Change of Leader, Continuity of System: Nascent Liberalization in Post-Mubarak Egypt', *Comparative Democratization* 9, no. 2 (2011): 1–9.

more effective.[74] Tolstrup has rightly criticized a Western bias in much of the literature on the international politics of regime change, and identified the ways in which linkages to Russia have helped autocratic elites, and harmed democratic ones, in several Eastern European states.[75] Several other studies also point to the role that international linkages to Russia can play in bolstering autocratic elites within the post-Soviet region.[76] In work co-authored with Kevin Koehler and Alexander Schmotz, I have elsewhere shown that channels of 'autocratic linkage' have important implications for the longevity of authoritarian regimes. Autocratic linkage can be conceived of in similar ways to linkage to the West, as the density of ties and cross-border flows between non-democratic countries. States with higher levels of autocratic linkages are likely to survive longer than states with comparatively lower levels (all else being equal).[77]

Finally, the structure and fluctuations of the international economy can create forces that shape autocratic rule at the domestic level in the absence of any overt external intention. The increasing liberalization and interconnectedness of the international economic system has provoked extensive debate about its implications for political order at the domestic level, and the spread of economic globalization has been linked to both the decline of democratic quality and the consolidation of authoritarian regimes.[78] Increasing global economic integration has been tied to non-democratic forms of rule due to the constraints it can place on incumbent elites and the diffusion of traditional state authority to unaccountable non-state actors.[79] The development of

[74] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*.

[75] Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*.

[76] Sasse, 'Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy'; Cameron and Orenstein, 'Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its "Near Abroad"'; Thomas Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union* (London: Ashgate Publishing, 2009); Jackson, 'The Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-Liberal Democratic Forms of Political Rule: A Case Study of Russia's Influence on Central Asian Regimes'; Anastassia Obydenkova and Alexander Libman, 'The Impact of External Factors on Regime Transition: Lessons from the Russian Regions', *Post-Soviet Affairs* 28, no. 3 (2012): 346–401.

[77] Oisín Tansey, Kevin Koehler, and Alexander Schmotz, 'Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival' (Unpublished paper, King's College London, 2015).

[78] For reviews, see Li and Reuveny, 'Economic Globalization and Democracy'; Helen V. Milner and Bumba Mukherjee, 'Democratization and Economic Globalization', *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 163–81.

[79] Susan Strange, *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006); Andrew Hurrell, 'The International Dimensions of Democratization in Latin

internet communications has been shown to reinforce authoritarian rule in certain settings.[80] Recent scholarship has also shown how shifts within specific economic markets can have mixed effects on regime stability. While economic shocks and fluctuations can undermine the stability of authoritarian regimes in some settings (e.g. the Asian financial crisis),[81] price surges in commodity markets can lead to revenue surges for incumbent autocrats that facilitate patronage politics and strengthen their position in power. These dynamics ensure that there is a strong international dimension to the manner in which the 'resource curse' operates, as international market pressures play an important role in shaping the way states can use their natural resources.[82] As Morrison observes, 'any effects natural resources have are driven initially by changes in the international environment.'[83] For example, rising oil prices in the 1970s and 1980s enabled Mexico's PRI government to redirect the surge in profits towards social spending that dampened public discontent with the regime and lessened the need for democratic reform. When international oil prices slumped in the 1990s, public discontent re-emerged and the government began to enact electoral reforms.[84] Variations in the structure and prices of the international economy thus have an important role to play in understanding patterns of authoritarian stability and resilience, even when international economic actors are not actively attempting to influence domestic politics.

America: The Case of Brazil', in *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, ed. Laurence Whitehead (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 146–74.

[80] Larry Diamond, 'Liberation Technology', *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 3 (2010): 69–83; S. Kalathil and T. C. Boas, *Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010).

[81] Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, 'The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions', *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1995): 263–83; Thomas B. Pepinsky, *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[82] Hussein Mahdavy, 'The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran', in *Studies in Economic History of the Middle East*, ed. M. A. Cook (London: Oxford University Press, 1970): 428–67; Thad Dunning, *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Ross, 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?'; Nathan Jensen and Leonard Wantchekon, 'Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa', *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 7 (2004): 816–41; Nita Rudra and Nathan M. Jensen, 'Globalization and the Politics of Natural Resources', *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (2011): 639–61.

[83] Kevin M. Morrison, 'Nontax Revenue, Social Cleavages, and Authoritarian Stability in Mexico and Kenya: "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change" Revisited', *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (2011): 724.

[84] Morrison, 'Nontax Revenue, Social Cleavages, and Authoritarian Stability in Mexico and Kenya: "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change" Revisited'.

## Active Influences: Unintended Consequences

Unlike the passive influences discussed above, active forces represent fundamentally distinct types of influences by virtue of the role of actor intention. The second question in the typology thus relates to the intention of external actors, and distinguishes those external actions that are intended to support the position of incumbent autocratic elite actors, and those that are pursued for some other objective. The former constitute efforts at autocratic sponsorship (discussed further below), while the latter entail a broad range of *unintended influences* that can reinforce the position of authoritarian elites despite the intentions of the external actors involved. I identify four types of international policy that have been shown to have such unintended or counterproductive results: democracy promotion, development aid, economic sanctions, and international peacekeeping.

The most glaring type of unintended consequence concerns the ways in which external democracy promotion efforts sometimes have the effect of reinforcing authoritarian rule. Scholars have shown that efforts to promote democracy in one setting can lead autocratic incumbents in other countries to tighten their grip on power.[85] Roessler has shown how 'donor-induced democratisation' led incumbents to privatize the agents of state coercion, increasing rather than decreasing political violence aimed at opposition parties.[86] Several authors have suggested that international election assistance and monitoring can sometimes help legitimize autocratic rulers, and also prompt incumbents to eschew electoral fraud while turning to less visible but no less effective ways of undermining democracy.[87] US and European efforts have been associated with a 'backlash against democracy promotion' that included new and significant restrictions on civil and political freedoms in countries as diverse as Russia, China, Venezuela, Egypt, and Zimbabwe.[88] Despite explicit

[85] Valerie J. Bunce and Sharon L. Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 23; Burnell, 'Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?', 5; Gordon Crawford, 'Promoting Democracy from Without—Learning from Within (Part I)', *Democratization* 10, no. 1 (2003): 88.

[86] Philip Roessler, 'Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda', *Comparative Politics* 37, no. 2 (2005): 207–27.

[87] Kelley, 'International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States', 214; Stephen Brown, 'Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in Power', *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 5 (2001): 725–39; Alberto Simpser, 'Unintended Consequences of Election Monitoring', in *Election Fraud: Detecting and Preventing Electoral Manipulation* (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008), 216–34.

[88] Carothers, 'The Backlash against Democracy Promotion'; National Endowment for Democracy, 'The Backlash against Democracy Assistance' (Washington DC: The National

intentions to support and further the cause of democracy, the policies of external actors have sometimes had the opposite effect and helped reinforce and solidify authoritarian rule.

A second form of active intervention that can lead to unintended consequences for authoritarianism concerns development aid. The relationship between international aid and political development has long been the subject of debate.[89] While many find a positive causal link between aid and democracy,[90] some have found that aid has limited effects on the prospects for democratization in authoritarian settings,[91] and many critics have sought to highlight its potentially counterproductive and unintended consequences on authoritarian stability. These arguments are not new. Milton Friedman argued during the Cold War that US foreign economic aid, while having laudable objectives, would 'almost surely retard economic development and promote the triumph of Communism'.[92] More recently, scholars have highlighted the ways in which this form of external rent can provide incumbents with discretionary spending power that can be used to engage in patronage politics, while also breaking the traditional social contract between the rulers and the ruled in which the burden of taxation is often rewarded with political participation.[93] Moss et al. argue that the 'aid curse' has many of the same dysfunctional effects as the resource curse, and undermines institutional development and democratic responsiveness.[94] Djankov et al. argue that the aid curse has an

Endowment for Democracy, 2006); Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*.

[89] Joseph Wright and Matthew Winters, 'The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid', *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 61–80.

[90] Finkel, Pérez-Liñán, and Seligson, 'The Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003'; James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, 'Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to the Developing World, 1988–2001', *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (2011): 47–69.

[91] Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*; Knack, 'Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?'.

[92] Milton Friedman, *Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1995), 2.

[93] Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, 'Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52, no. 2 (2004): 255–85; Brautigam, 'Governance, Economy, and Foreign Aid'; Todd Moss, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle, 'An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa', Working Paper 74 (Center for Global Development, 2006); Peter Burnell, 'The Domestic Political Impact of Foreign Aid: Recalibrating the Research Agenda', *The European Journal of Development Research* 16, no. 2 (2004): 396–416.

[94] Moss, Pettersson, and Van de Walle, 'An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa'.

even stronger negative effect on democracy than the resource curse, and find that the effects of aid are more damaging to the prospects of democracy than those of oil.[95] Kono and Montinola show that while foreign aid is always helpful to the survival of democratic leaders, long-term aid provision also props up autocratic leaders, who are freer to stockpile aid over time and accumulate funds for their own advantage.[96] Autocratic leaders often divert such development aid to the military, which contributes more directly to their own survival.[97] These dynamics can be seen in operation in numerous authoritarian countries, including the role that aid has played in reinforcing patrimonial rule in sub-Saharan Africa.[98] Democracy aid in the Middle East has also frequently been appropriated by government agents, often operating through government-created 'NGOs' that seek to intercept foreign revenue intended for genuine non-governmental actors.[99] Yet the relationship is not a simple one, and the identity of the donor and nature of the regime type can mediate the effects of aid transfers. Bermeo shows that the regime type of the donor makes a difference: aid from democratic donors is associated with a higher chance of democratization, while aid from autocratic donors shows a negative relationship with democratization.[100] Recipient regime type also makes a difference, and several scholars have demonstrated that the effects of foreign aid on autocracy are dependent on the nature of the autocratic regime.[101]

Thirdly, international sanctions constitute another policy tool that sometimes has unintended consequences, bolstering authoritarian rule despite the intentions of sender states. While much of the work on the effects of sanctions concerns the question of whether targeted regimes grant policy concessions in response to sanctions,[102] scholarship has increasingly addressed the

[95] Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol, 'The Curse of Aid'.

[96] Kono and Montinola, 'Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?'.

[97] Daniel Yuichi Kono and Gabriella R. Montinola, 'The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid: Development Aid and Military Spending', *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 3 (2013): 615–29.

[98] Moss, Pettersson, and Van de Walle, 'An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa'.

[99] Sheila Carapico, 'Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Arab World', *The Middle East Journal* 56, no. 3 (2002): 392.

[100] Sarah Blodgett Bermeo, 'Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent', *World Development* 39, no. 11 (November 2011): 2021–31.

[101] Agnes Cornell, 'Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?', *Democratization* 20, no. 4 (1 June 2013): 642–67; Amanda A. Licht, 'Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 1 (2010): 58–87; Joseph Wright, 'How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes', *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 3 (2009): 552–71.

[102] Gary Hufbauer et al., *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (Washington DC: Peterson Institute, 2007); Daniel W. Drezner, *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

question of whether sanctions have implications for regime rather than policy stability.[103] Although there is no clear consensus here, one robust set of findings suggests that rather than destabilizing authoritarian regimes, international sanctions have actually bolstered the position of incumbent autocrats, especially where incumbents can use sanctions as part of their own legitimation strategies and produce a 'rally-round-the-flag' effect.[104] Peksen and Drury also show that economic sanctions can lead to autocratic retrenchment for a number of reasons. Firstly, autocratic incumbents will target their reduced economic resources to support their core constituencies, thereby making the public more dependent on the regime in a time of relative scarcity. Secondly, sanctions also create incentives to utilize coercion and restrict civil liberties in order to deter any domestic challengers who might seek to take advantage of the economic constraints the regime faces. For example, threats of economic sanctions against the Chinese regime in the wake of the Tiananmen Square crackdown further hardened the regime against political reform.[105] As with foreign aid, the impact of sanctions may also depend on the type of autocratic regime. For example, Escriba-Folch and Wright find evidence that sanctions levied against personalist regimes are more likely to destabilize the regime than those levied against single-party or military regimes, which can use their greater levels of state capacity to respond to sanctions in ways that can prolong regime survival.[106]

Finally, international efforts to promote peace and stability in conflict and post-conflict settings can also inadvertently solidify the position of authoritarian rulers, as international peacemakers and peacekeepers offer solutions to conflict that involve working with, and often strengthening the position of, incumbent autocrats. Democracy promotion has increasingly become a core element of international peacebuilding efforts, and the practice of UN peacekeeping has been shown to contribute to democratic development in certain conditions.[107] However, it has also been associated with authoritarian

[103] Nikolay Marinov, 'Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?', *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 564–76; Dursun Peksen and A. Cooper Drury, 'Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy', *International Interactions* 36, no. 3 (2010): 240–64; Christian von Soest and Michael Wahman, 'Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive?', *Democratization* 22, no. 6 (2015): 957–80.

[104] Grauvogel and von Soest, 'Claims to Legitimacy Count'.

[105] Peksen and Drury, 'Coercive or Corrosive'.

[106] Abel Escriba-Folch and Joseph Wright, *Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Authoritarian Survival* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015). See also Abel Escribà-Folch, 'Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions', *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 6 (2012): 683–713; Abel Escribà-Folch, 'Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy', *International Political Science Review* 34, no. 5 (2013): 543–60.

[107] Janina Isabel Steinert and Sonja Grimm, 'Too Good to Be True? United Nations Peacebuilding and the Democratization of War-Torn States', *Conflict Management and Peace Science*

resilience in some settings, as international peacekeeping missions have sometimes had to work closely with authoritarian regimes in order to achieve their peace and security aims. Intrusive international missions in post-conflict settings can sometimes undermine democratic channels of accountability and local ownership.[108] UN peacekeepers have also sometimes sought to support peace by building local state capacity, with the result that their efforts inadvertently strengthen the position of the ruling elite (as occurred with the Kabila regime in the Democratic Republic of Congo).[109] As Gowan observes, 'the UN, having aspired to instil democracy and good governance in countries like the DRC and South Sudan, has ended up propping up unreliable and even autocratic leaders in the absence of better alternatives.'[110]

## Active Influences: Autocratic Sponsorship

The final major category of international influence concerns those instances in which external actors actively engage in domestic politics with the specific intention of supporting incumbent autocratic elites. The broad category here concerns *autocratic sponsorship*, entailing intentional international assistance to elite incumbents to help them retain their positions in power. Yet as discussed above, policies that are intended to support autocratic governments can differ in important ways. The final question thus distinguishes between two forms of international sponsorship: *autocracy promotion*, which is ideologically driven regime sponsorship, and *democracy resistance*, which is not motivated by any ideological commitment to autocracy itself, and is primarily driven by strategic and instrumental motives related to concerns about the domestic and international repercussions of regime change.

32, no. 5 (1 November 2015): 513–35; Madhav Joshi, 'Post-Civil War Democratization: Promotion of Democracy in Post-Civil War States, 1946–2005', *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (1 October 2010): 826–55; Oisín Tansey, 'The Concept and Practice of Democratic Regime-Building', *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 5 (2007): 633–46; however, see also Virginia Page Fortna, 'Peacekeeping and Democratization', in *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, ed. Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008): 39–79.

[108] Simon Chesterman, *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).

[109] Séverine Autesserre, *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 147.

[110] Richard Gowan, 'The Peacekeeping Quagmire', *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 16, no. 2, (12 August 2015): 39–46.

### *Democracy Resistance*

Both democracy resistance and autocracy promotion have been explored in the recent literature.[111] As outlined above, I argue that they are similar in that they both involve external efforts to protect non-democratic forms of governance, but they differ in their underlying motivation. Much of the activity that has been identified in the literature as autocracy promotion would be better understood as efforts at democracy resistance. Several authors have framed Russian support for autocratic practices in the post-Soviet sphere as autocracy promotion, especially with regard to policies in Ukraine and Belarus.[112] Nodia argues convincingly, however, that many of these policies are driven by the desire to resist Western forms of democracy, rather than any ideological commitment to authoritarian rule.[113] Russia's relations with its autocratic neighbours have rested in large part on a desire to further Moscow's geopolitical interests by protecting and promoting compliant allies and limiting the chances that genuine democracy might bring to power pro-Western elites who would sever close ties to Moscow.[114] As Way has observed, Moscow's policies in the 'Near Abroad' were motivated by a desire to protect pro-Russian incumbents, and its antipathy to reformist leaders such as Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine and Mikheil Saakashvili in Georgia would not have been lessened had those leaders embraced more authoritarian practices.[115] Russia's efforts to bolster autocratic regimes in its neighbourhood have also been closely associated with fear of contagion from abroad. In the wake of the Colour Revolutions in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Putin's regime in Moscow became concerned that a wave of democratic transitions in the region could lead to domestic overthrow in Russia. The result was both a concentration of political authority at home, entailing a wide range of restrictive and repressive domestic policies, as well as an increasingly assertive foreign policy, entailing cooperation with and support for regional autocrats as part of a counter-revolutionary push.[116] Much of Russia's foreign policy towards its autocratic neighbours,

[111] Nodia, 'The Revenge of Geopolitics'; von Soest, 'Democracy Prevention'; Whitehead, 'Anti-Democracy Promotion: Four Strategies in Search of a Framework'.

[112] Melnykovska, Plamper, and Schweickert, 'Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?'; Yakouchyk, 'The Good, the Bad, and the Ambitious'; Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*.

[113] Nodia, 'The Revenge of Geopolitics', 142–3.

[114] Andrei P. Tsygankov, *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity* (Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006), 119.

[115] Way, 'The Limits of Autocracy Promotion: The Case of Russia in the "Near Abroad"'.

[116] Michael McFaul and Regine A. Spector, 'External Sources and Consequences of Russia's "Sovereign Democracy"', in *New Challenges to Democratization*, ed. P. Burnell and R. Youngs (London: Routledge, 2009): 116–33; Kramer, 'Russian Policy toward the Commonwealth of

therefore, can be understood as efforts to prevent the negative externalities that would come with democratization in the region, rather than efforts to spread a Russian model of autocracy.

Another example of democracy resistance, rather than autocracy promotion, can be seen in relation to the international politics of the Arab Spring. After the outbreak of the Arab Spring several countries in the Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia, sought to offer support for nearby autocratic regimes threatened by public mass mobilization. Yet these policies were not underpinned by a desire to promote authoritarianism as a form of regime type, and rather reflected a desire to limit the threatening implications of democratization rather than a programme for a particular kind of authoritarian rule. Saudi Arabia's staunch support for the besieged monarchy in Bahrain in 2011, for example, can partly be understood in terms of its desire to avoid any successful Shia-led democratic revolution on its borders that might prompt mobilization from its own disaffected Shia minority in its eastern provinces.[117] Reflecting the fact that states can be driven by multiple motivations, Saudi policy also reflected a strategic concern for a regional balance of power among Sunnis and Shias, and ultimately between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Democratization in Bahrain would have strengthened the role of Shia Islam in the Gulf, an outcome anathema to the Saudi monarchy. As Gause has observed, Riyadh's focus was 'on checking and rolling back Iranian influence in the Arab world. That is what drives their policy, not some imagined notion of anti-revolutionary dictatorial solidarity.'[118]

## *Autocracy Promotion*

If autocracy promotion only relates to external efforts to promote authoritarianism that are driven in significant part by ideological and normative commitments, then how prevalent is the practice and how useful is the concept? Based on the strict definition that I adopt here, I argue that there is little evidence that autocracy promotion has been a significant feature of the post-Cold War world. Ideologically driven regime promotion of this kind can be most clearly seen in earlier periods of history, primarily pursued by international sponsors who are

Independent States', 5; Vitali Silitski, '"Survival of the Fittest": Domestic and International Dimensions of the Authoritarian Reaction in the Former Soviet Union Following the Colored Revolutions', *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43, no. 4 (2010): 344.

[117] Geneive Abdo, 'The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a–Sunni Divide', Saban Center Analysis Paper (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, April 2013), 15; Odinius and Kuntz, 'The Limits of Authoritarian Solidarity'.

[118] F. Gregory Gause, 'Is Saudi Arabia Really Counter-Revolutionary?', *Foreign Policy*, 9 August 2011, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/09/is-saudi-arabia-really-counter-revolutionary/>.

themselves also autocratic and who wish to promote their own type of regime. Owen identifies several periods of international history when such ideological clashes led to waves of forceful regime promotion, often including the intentional promotion of autocratic forms of rule, such as absolutist monarchy, fascism, and communism.[119] In the nineteenth century, republican and monarchical regimes sought to promote their own regime forms, with many monarchies promoting absolute-monarchical regimes abroad. During the twentieth century, the struggle was between democracy, communism, and fascism, and many of the clearest examples of ideologically driven regime promotion can be seen in the projects of fascist and communist internationalism of the interwar and early post-WWII periods in Europe.

In the wake of the Russian Revolution of October 1917, Moscow actively supported revolutionary movements abroad with a view to spreading communist rule. Communist internationalism was institutionalized in the form of the Communist International (Comintern), and there was an ideologically driven effort to spread a particular type of regime.[120] Similarly, both Mussolini and Hitler engaged in concerted efforts to promote fascism in other European countries, supporting right-wing groups diplomatically and materially. Such efforts often entailed support for right-wing opposition groups abroad, but in many cases involved direct sponsorship of ruling autocratic incumbents abroad.[121] These policies were founded on an ideological commitment to fascism as a system of government—Italian and German foreign policies sought not just to instal and protect compliant elites, but to further the cause of fascism as a political system.[122] In the wake of WWII, Stalin's Soviet Union forcefully imposed political regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. This was partly driven by strategic concerns—Stalin wished to control the territories in Eastern Europe to minimize any further threat from Germany and to gain the spoils of economic extraction from newly controlled territories.[123] But the imperial intent was also ideological in nature, and Stalin sought to create *communist regimes* rather than simply *compliant governments*. As a leading scholar of the period has observed, the Soviet takeover proceeded

[119] Owen IV, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics*.

[120] Kevin McDermott and Jeremy Agnew, *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin* (London: Macmillan, 1996).

[121] Kurt Weyland, 'Fascism's Appeal and the Autocratic Wave of the Interwar Years' (Unpublished paper, 2015).

[122] Bauerkämper, 'Transnational Fascism'; Luca de Caprariis, '"Fascism for Export"? The Rise and Eclipse of the Fasci Italiani all'Estero', *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 2 (2000): 151–83.

[123] Mark Kramer, 'Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944–1953', *Divinatio*, no. 31 (2010): 53–100.

'along the lines of a presupposed set of ideological premises', involving 'institutional and ideological transfer based on the premise of radical transformation and of cultural revolution'.[124] Stalin aimed to impose new political and social orders modelled on the Soviet regime, with ideological intent.[125]

By contrast, the recent policies that have been identified as cases of autocracy promotion appear to lack the kind of proactive motivation to advance a particular form of non-democratic rule. As outlined above, Russia's policies in the post-Soviet world, Saudi 'counter-revolutionary' policies after the Arab Spring, Chinese involvement in the developing world, and the Bolivarian foreign policy of Hugo Chavez are all better understood as some other form of policy. Consequently, while there is much evidence to suggest that many countries actively work with and support autocratic incumbents, there is much less evidence that these actions have been motivated by any normative or ideological project to further the spread of autocracy in the world.

## CONCLUSION

The study of the international dimensions of authoritarianism is not entirely new, but the scholarship that has addressed them has to date been fragmented and underdeveloped. Different forms of international influence on autocratic politics have been addressed in diverse research areas that often do not overlap, and many recent contributions have lacked conceptual and theoretical clarity. In this chapter, I have sought to put some conceptual order on the wide range of findings about the international sources of autocratic rule by offering a new typology of external influences. By distinguishing between categories according to the role of agency, intentions and motivations it becomes possible to develop a number of types (and subtypes) of external influence. The three principal categories of passive influence, unintended influences, and intentional autocratic sponsorship capture much of the key variation in the nature of external forces. By further disaggregating the sponsorship category into subtypes, it becomes possible to get a better understanding of the forms of activity that have been the focus of most recent research in this area.

[124] Tismaneanu, *Stalinism Revisited*, 3–4.

[125] Vladislav M. Zubok, *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), x, 21; Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956* (London: Penguin Books, 2012), introduction.

In particular, I have argued that it is problematic to characterize the international effects on authoritarian stability as the result of international efforts at 'autocracy promotion'. This concept has been loosely defined, and as it stands in the literature offers limited analytical utility. By considering more carefully the role of actor motivations, it becomes possible to distinguish between ideologically driven forms of autocracy promotion and more interest-based efforts at democracy resistance. Most contemporary instances of regime sponsorship are cases of the latter, rather than the former. Identifying different motivations empirically poses significant challenges of operationalization, but difficulties of measurement should not preclude the development and use of such concepts. There are many strategies that can be used to mitigate some of the challenges that exist, and some recent research on the international sponsorship of authoritarian regimes has plausibly identified motivations based on consideration of rhetoric and behaviour, as well as the correlation of particular foreign policies with regime characteristics that allow for plausible inferences. Brownlee, for example, illustrates the security motivations behind US efforts at 'democracy prevention' in Egypt through a comparison of US policy in Tunisia, which contained fewer strategic interests for Washington and received less interference as a result.[126] Similarly, Kuntz and Odinius evaluate a range of theories about Saudi Arabia's regional post-Arab Spring policies, and draw inferences about Riyadh's motivations by comparing policies across multiple cases and eliminating those that follow no pattern.[127] Through careful selection of cases and evidence, scholars can infer the existence of actor intentions and motivations even in the absence of clear statements of intent. Operationalization will always be a challenge with this topic, but not an insurmountable one.

In the chapters that follow, the focus of the book narrows to address active forms of autocratic sponsorship, and largely leaves consideration of passive influences and unintended consequences behind. In the next chapter I move from consideration of conceptual questions regarding regime sponsorship to address causal questions. The chapter addresses both the sources of international autocratic sponsorship (why is there variation of sponsorship across cases?) as well as the effects of sponsorship (how does it influence authoritarian politics in practice?). The chapter establishes the analytical framework on which the subsequent empirical chapters are based.

[126] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*, 167.
[127] Odinius and Kuntz, 'The Limits of Authoritarian Solidarity'.

# 3

# International Sponsorship and Authoritarian Practices

The previous chapter identified the wide array of international forces that can bolster and reinforce authoritarian rule, ranging from distant and passive influences to the highly intrusive activities of external actors at the domestic level. Having placed some order on these different forms of international influence, this chapter focuses in particular on the role of external sponsors, and examines the ways in which these actors work to protect, shield, bolster, and strengthen authoritarian regimes.

The chapter makes a number of contributions to the existing body of literature on autocratic sponsorship. Firstly, the chapter identifies the key outcome of interest that drives the remainder of this study, namely the 'authoritarian practices' that autocratic incumbents use to gain and maintain power. Authoritarian practices are the non-democratic strategies that autocrats use to secure their rule, and once in power, to fend off challenges and ensure regime survival. Conceptualizing the outcome of interest in terms of authoritarian practices rather than levels of democracy/autocracy or periods of regime change facilitates fine-grained analysis of the international effects on those key periods when incumbent elites assert themselves against domestic opponents. I also introduce the idea of a 'life-cycle' of authoritarian practices, and distinguish between three key stages at which international actors can have distinct effects. This life-cycle is comprised of three stages—the moments *before*, *during*, and *after* authoritarian practices are pursued—and helps illuminate the ways in which the actions of autocratic sponsors vary over time in relation both to the nature of sponsorship itself (e.g. the choice of tools of sponsorship) and the effects of sponsorship on domestic politics.

The central contributions of the chapter concern the types of effects that international sponsorship can have and the mechanisms through which they are transmitted from the international to the domestic level. External actors support autocratic regimes using a number of tools that influence domestic politics through a number of different mechanisms. In the discussions ahead, I highlight the ways in which external autocratic sponsorship shapes the politics of authoritarian rule, mediates the effects of international democratic

enforcement measures, and often contributes to authoritarian regime survival. We already know from existing research that autocratic elites frequently weigh the potential costs and benefits of their authoritarian practices (such as repression or electoral fraud) in order to ensure the gains are worth the potential backlash. Violations of democratic norms frequently come with a high cost, and incumbent elites can be faced with mass protests at the domestic level and costly sanctions in the international sphere.[1] Yet the presence of reliable international allies has a number of important effects.

Firstly, the existence of such allies, and their record of prior support for the regime, can lead incumbents to lower their projections of the international costs of authoritarian practices, and can thus increase the likelihood that such practices are pursued. In the *before* stage of the life-cycle, that is, when domestic elites are considering engaging in autocratic practices, I argue that autocrats that anticipate international support are more likely to risk undertaking potentially costly steps to secure their position in power. Secondly, once autocratic practices have begun, external actors can contribute in distinct ways to the *during* stage, when authoritarian practices are being actively pursued. International sponsors can contribute directly to the implementation of authoritarian practices, providing strategic and material assistance to domestic elites engaged in authoritarian behaviour and tilting the domestic balance of power towards incumbent autocrats. Finally, *after* the practices have concluded, for example after a coercive crackdown has been completed, international sponsors can seek to protect the regime in various ways. The presence and visible support of external sponsors can reduce the likelihood that authoritarian behaviour will be effectively sanctioned by pro-democratic international actors. International sponsors can limit the extent of punitive measures taken by international opponents by sending clear signals of their support, and by engaging actively in international diplomacy to protect the regime. Furthermore, even if punitive efforts are attempted, incumbent autocrats frequently benefit from the direct and material support of their allies as they seek to navigate the backlash and survive both domestic and international pressure. Foreign states can provide direct material assistance (including economic and military support) to the regime in ways that offset the costs of external enforcement. In so doing, they can contribute to authoritarian regime survival in times of regime instability and crisis.

Two key causal mechanisms are at work in these dynamics. The first concerns the role of signalling and information, which work to shape the

[1] Tucker, 'Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions'; Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*, chapter 3.

incentive structure facing incumbent autocratic elites. The existing literature on international support for autocratic regimes has tended to focus on the material forms of external sponsorship, and largely ignored the role of international cues and signals. Yet the signals sent by reliable international allies (both in the past and in the present) can embolden incumbent autocratic elites and lower their inhibitions toward autocratic behaviour. Information about international channels of support can thus serve to fuel authoritarian practices. The second mechanism concerns the material impact of international sponsorship, which can shape the balance of power between the incumbents and both their domestic and international opponents. Recent research has highlighted the importance of incumbent capacity for authoritarian endurance, but has yet to fully appreciate the extent to which such capacity is often underwritten by international actors.[2] Outside sponsorship can be instrumental in providing incumbents with the capacity to co-opt potential domestic opponents, to withstand the pressure of international sanctions, and to forcefully repress the threat that comes from mass mobilization and public protests.

## AUTHORITARIAN PRACTICES

The focus of this book concerns the effects of international sponsorship on authoritarian practices and their aftermath. Much of the existing literature on authoritarian politics seeks to explain issues of transition (when and why do some regimes become authoritarian, while others do not) and consolidation (why do some authoritarian regimes last longer than others).[3] I share these interests, but rather than seek to address the international dimensions of transitions to or consolidation of authoritarian rule in general, I disaggregate the concept of authoritarianism and use a common framework to demonstrate the ways in which international influences can shape the constitutive elements of authoritarianism in different ways.

In particular, I focus on different forms of 'authoritarian practice', or the forms of behaviour that autocratic actors pursue to obtain and maintain political power. Would-be and ruling autocrats can pursue multiple strategies to secure political authority, including coups, elite co-optation, repression,

[2] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

[3] Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*; Christian Göbel, 'Authoritarian Consolidation', *European Political Science* 10 (2010): 176–90; Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*; Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

electoral fraud, and legitimacy-seeking practices such as propaganda and politicized education policies.[4] I focus in particular on three of these forms of authoritarian practice: coups, repression, and electoral misconduct.[5] Each of these practices is closely associated with authoritarian rule. Coups are by definition authoritarian practices, as they violate the defining feature of democratic rule, namely that political authorities are selected through free and fair elections. Repression and electoral misconduct, on the other hand, can both be found in democratic regimes. Democracies regularly repress their citizens, although in different ways (and usually less violently) than autocracies.[6] Democratic states are also not immune to electoral malpractice, and several democracies have experienced election-related political scandals.[7] But political repression and electoral misconduct are most closely associated with authoritarianism and, unlike in democracies, are often central practices in shaping the survival prospects of the ruling elite. Repression has been identified as a central pillar of authoritarian stability,[8] and electoral malpractice is a central characteristic of competitive authoritarian regimes that fall short of the minimal definitions of democracy.[9]

Coups, repression, and electoral misconduct thus represent a core set of practices that capture some of the central dynamics of authoritarian rule. Unlike some other forms of authoritarian practice, such as elite co-optation and propaganda, they also tend to involve short-term and intensive bursts of political activity, rather than long-running policies over time. There is a trade-off involved in the event-based analysis of such moments of high-visibility practices. On the one hand, analysis of such critical moments facilitates the form of 'episode analysis' discussed in the Introduction, and helps starkly illuminate the causal mechanisms that tie international sponsorship to authoritarian rule.[10] By focusing on these highly visible short-term surges

[4] Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability'; Wintrobe, 'Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches'; Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*; Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*; Lisa Wedeen, *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015).

[5] For a similar approach, see Susan Hyde and Carew Boulding, 'Political Terror, Election Fraud, and Foreign Aid: When Do Donors Withdraw Aid to Promote Democracy?' (Paper presented at annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 2008).

[6] Davenport, *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*.

[7] Fabrice Lehoucq, 'Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences', *Annual Review of Political Science* 6 (2003): 233–56.

[8] Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability'; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 'Elections Under Authoritarianism'.

[9] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

[10] Capoccia and Ziblatt, 'The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies'.

and spikes of authoritarian behaviour, it becomes possible to see highly visible instances of autocratic sponsorship, and identify the causal mechanisms that link international sponsorship to domestic authoritarian politics. On the other hand, an event-based focus also precludes the study of long-term and continuous forms of external sponsorship, such as sustained diplomatic or financial sponsorship over years or even decades. Such forms of sponsorship may also have crucial effects on domestic politics, and may bolster autocratic elites so much that they feel no need to resort to more extreme autocratic practices such as coercive crackdowns or electoral malpractice. One indicator of successful international sponsorship may thus be the very absence of highly visible surges in authoritarian behaviour such as those that are the focus of this study. I do not claim to overcome this trade-off, and the focus here on key events and spikes of authoritarian practice means that some forms of long-term international sponsorship receive little attention. This study is thus a partial rather than complete treatment of the politics of international sponsorship, and captures only a portion of the full canvas.

Nonetheless, the disaggregation of authoritarianism and the exploration of constitutive authoritarian practices allows for a focused analysis of the impact of international influences on a specific set of political processes and events.[11] In turn, it facilitates more fine-grained theory building, as the strategy of disaggregation enables the construction of causal explanations one step at a time, rather than through attempts at theorizing about a complex macro-political process as a whole.[12] Several decisions, processes, and events combine to create and maintain authoritarian regimes, and some may operate independently of others. Developing a full understanding of the international politics of authoritarianism thus involves examining these distinct, but often interrelated, practices.

Such an approach also improves on some recent studies on the relationship between international politics and authoritarianism that have examined alternative outcomes. Tolstrup, for example, provides an excellent account of how actors such as Russia can contribute to authoritarian politics, but frames his dependent variable in terms of 'democratic performance'.[13] However, while

[11] For a similar argument regarding democratization, see Daniela Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms: International Actors and the Politics of Electoral Misconduct* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 8.

[12] Barbara Geddes, *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 43.

[13] Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*, 24–6; See also Jackson, 'The Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-Liberal Democratic Forms of Political Rule: A Case Study of Russia's Influence on Central Asian Regimes'.

understanding the ways in which external actors might undermine democracy is important, a proper understanding of the ties between international politics and authoritarianism requires analysing *authoritarian* outcomes, and not just variation in levels of democracy or democratic performance. For example, framing Russian influences in Belarus in terms of changes in democratic performance is problematic when the Belarusian regime bears little resemblance to a democracy. Similarly, Vanderhill offers a compelling framework with which to understand the role of international actors that support autocratic elites, but frames her dependent variable primarily in terms of 'regime change'.[14] Yet, specifying regime change as the dependent variable risks overlooking those international influences that contribute to authoritarian politics in ways that fall short of regime change, or that have their effects in relatively stable authoritarian settings where the regime does not vary over time. Indeed, many of Vanderhill's examples involve international influences on domestic politics that fall short of regime change. Consequently, I argue that focusing on authoritarian practices offers a more suitable approach to capture the international influences on the politics of authoritarian rule.

I also focus on forms of international sponsorship directed at autocratic incumbents. Some forms of sponsorship target autocratic actors who oppose the ruling government, and seek to overthrow the existing government or regime.[15] I focus primarily, however, on the international policies targeted at ruling autocratic incumbents, and the ways in which they enable rulers to maintain the power they have already obtained (in the case of coup-leaders, power that they have obtained very recently). Doing so enables a targeted focus on the politics of governance and survival in authoritarian regimes, rather than on the politics of authoritarian opposition that can exist within democratic regimes.

This chapter addresses a range of issues relating to the politics of international sponsorship and its effects. As examined in Chapter 2, scholars have increasingly sought to examine the work and effects of so-called black knights and autocratic sponsors.[16] I seek to build on this work by setting out a comprehensive framework for understanding the range of tools that international sponsors use and the effects of these efforts on the politics of

[14] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*, 11. [15] Ibid., chapter 3.

[16] Burnell and Schlumberger, 'Promoting Democracy—Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes'; Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*; Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*; Bader, Grävingholt, and Kästner, 'Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy? A Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in Regional Neighbourhoods'.

authoritarian practices. In the next section, I first examine some of the factors that determine whether external actors have an interest (whether strategic or normative) in offering sponsorship to autocratic regimes.

## THE SOURCES OF AUTOCRATIC SPONSORSHIP

Autocratic sponsorship is common but not universal, and there is considerable variation in the extent to which it is pursued across the world. Not all countries that have the capacity to support autocrats abroad do so, and some autocratic countries receive extensive sponsorship, while others receive very little. Chapter 2 highlighted some of the diverse motivations that drive autocratic sponsorship, including interest-based and ideological motivations. But where do these interests and motivations come from? What explains the variation in international efforts at autocratic sponsorship? I identify three principal sources of the strategic and ideological motivations that drive autocratic sponsorship (see Table 3.1).

Firstly, a common source of interest-based motivation for autocratic sponsorship derives from the internal characteristics of the target state in question. An abundance of valuable natural resources, or the presence of a strong economy, can prompt outside interests to develop, as these countries can act as important sources of wealth or security. Outside actors may sponsor incumbent autocrats in order to gain access to and exploit these resources and markets.[17]

A second source of the (primarily interest-based) motivations of foreign powers is rooted in regional or global patterns of political competition, and has little to do with inner dynamics within target states. Countries with little wealth, few resources, and limited diplomatic influence of their own can nonetheless become important pawns in political struggles among great

**Table 3.1.** Sources of Sponsorship Motivation

| | |
|---|---|
| **Characteristics of target country** | Natural resources, size of economy |
| **Balance of power** | Nature of regional or international polarity; existence of rival power |
| **Linkage politics** | Extent and direction of economic, political, diplomatic ties |

[17] Bader, *China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies*, 6.

powers.[18] In some of these cases, target states are important only insofar as they serve a wider geopolitical purpose, and there is little other than the direction of their foreign policy alignment that concerns external powers. Patterns of regional or global polarity can thus shape the propensity of international actors to sponsor autocratic regimes abroad.[19]

A third factor that can give rise to both interest-based and ideological motivations is the role of international linkages. As mentioned in Chapter 2, international linkages include the economic, diplomatic, and political ties between countries that can result from geographic proximity and historical connections such as colonialism and geopolitical alliances. In some cases, interests clearly drive the development of linkages, such as with the rise of US linkages to states in the Middle East during the Cold War. Yet linkage is not reducible to interests, and it can have an independent effect over time, producing new and compelling interests and obligations. Rather like the debate within comparative politics over the role of political institutions, linkages can be viewed either from a functionalist perspective (as a by-product of the calculated decisions of rational actors) or from a path-dependent perspective (as a force that, once created, exerts an independent causal effect).[20] A functionalist approach to understanding linkage would struggle to capture the nature and weight of these cross-national ties. International linkages can produce bonds and ties that outlast the original motivation for their creation. Linkages developed for one reason (colonial exploitation, or balance-of-power manoeuvring) can evolve over time and gain a significance that is unrelated to the original intentions. Such significance may include a new set of strategic interests, as linkages produce profitable new ties and relationships, or it may include symbolic or normative concerns, as strategic alliances develop deeper bonds and give rise to a sense of mutual obligation.

Not all forms of international linkage are the same, and the extent of external sponsorship received by any individual regime will depend on the array of international relationships they enjoy. Sponsorship is thus in many ways a function of the 'linkage spectrum' that each individual country faces, where the linkage spectrum constitutes the mix of linkage relationships with diverse international actors. The most influential work on linkage, by Levitsky

[18] Alexander Cooley, *Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012).

[19] Boix, 'Democracy, Development, and the International System'; McFaul, 'The Missing Variable: The "International System" as the Link between Third and Fourth Wave Models of Democratization'; Owen and Poznansky, 'When Does America Drop Dictators?'.

[20] Paul Pierson, *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).

and Way, suggests that linkage to the West increases the prospects of experiencing international democratizing pressures.[21] Yet sometimes Western linkage can give rise to autocratic sponsorship rather than democratic pressure,[22] and other forms of non-Western linkage (especially autocratic forms of linkage) can also increase the prospects for autocratic sponsorship.[23] In research carried out with Alexander Schmotz and Kevin Koehler, we have shown that there are important differences between democratic and autocratic linkages.[24] Cross-border linkages between autocratic states have a systematic effect on regime longevity, and are associated with the prolonged survival of authoritarian regimes. We argue that this pattern is explained in part by the role that autocratic linkage plays in increasing the prospects for external sponsorship of autocratic incumbents. In particular, foreign autocracies have a particular reason to fear regime transitions in autocratic countries with which they have extensive cross-border ties. Scholarship on diffusion has shown how models of regime contention can spread quickly from one setting to another, especially if there are close political and societal networks between countries. The spark of democratic revolution travels more easily between densely connected countries.[25] External authoritarian actors will thus have a strong incentive to prevent democratization in a highly linked partner country in order to protect the status quo in their own. By contrast, democracies have no equivalent fear and concern.

Aside from an instrumental fear of contagion, linkage politics can also create long-standing international ties and bonds that create normative motivations to support autocratic incumbents. For example, much of the external support for long-standing autocratic leaders such as Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe and Fidel Castro in Cuba has been attributed to their symbolic status as independence fighters and revolutionary leaders among states with which they share linkages due to common membership of networks of post-colonial, developing, and/or non-aligned states.[26] International linkages can thus act as an important source of the interests and

[21] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

[22] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*, 6.

[23] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*; Cameron and Orenstein, 'Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its "Near Abroad"'; Sasse, 'Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy'.

[24] Tansey, Koehler, and Schmotz, 'Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival'.

[25] Bunce and Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*, 300.

[26] Van Der Vleuten and Hoffmann, 'Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy by Regional Organizations', 753; Daniel P. Erikson and Paul Wander, 'Raul Castro and Cuba's Global Diplomacy', *Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy* 18 (2008): 390–401.

motivations that lead to supportive policies towards authoritarian regimes. In the following section, I address the different tools of support that international sponsors can use in the quest to bolster the position of their favoured autocratic incumbents.

## THE TOOLS OF AUTOCRATIC SPONSORSHIP

International actors use a variety of tools to support authoritarian regimes. At times, these tools can be difficult to disentangle from standard and generic forms of international relations, such as long-standing trade and security ties. These relationships are often based on mutual economic or security interests that are unrelated to an effort by one party to support and stabilize the other. Yet frequently these relationships are based precisely on an effort by one state to bolster autocratic rulers and regimes abroad. Classifying foreign policies as tools of international sponsorship can in part be achieved with reference to the political rhetoric surrounding the policies; often, they are accompanied by explicit statements that make clear that one state is seeking to support another's government. In other cases, the political nature of these policies can be inferred from their timing and nature. International sponsorship by one state of another is rarely constant over time, but fluctuates according to political developments in either country and often spikes during and after the pursuit of authoritarian policies at the domestic level. After the 2013 coup in Egypt, for example, Saudi Arabia immediately offered a new multi-billion dollar financial package of support to Cairo that sent a clear signal of support to the new regime, and was coupled with glowing rhetorical praise for the new authorities.[27]

A number of scholars have sought to identify the range of tools and strategies that external actors can use to support authoritarian actors abroad.[28] I build on these studies, which point to a very wide variety of foreign policy tools, and concentrate on four broad categories of international support for autocratic regimes, covering both material and non-material policies. First, I distinguish between two forms of material support, before addressing the non-material forms of sponsorship that outside countries can offer.

[27] Nordland, 'Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt's Regime'.

[28] Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"', 928; Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*, 12; Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*, 19.

## Material Sponsorship: Financial

Material assistance comes in a wide variety of forms, but it is helpful to distinguish between two forms of external material sponsorship that correspond to two of the central pillars of authoritarian rule—outside economic patronage and foreign security support. Economic assistance is a major source of material support for authoritarian regimes, and can provide incumbents with the financial means with which to ensure domestic political stability through patronage-based policies at the domestic level.[29] Recipients of international sponsorship are often lacking in their own sources of economic development, such as natural resource reserves or a vibrant middle class, and foreign economic assistance thus often constitutes a critical form of external support. As discussed in Chapter 2, some forms of economic assistance, such as development aid, can reinforce authoritarian rule because of their *unintended* consequences. Yet, economic assistance is often provided precisely in order to support particular autocratic elites, and to bolster their positions in power.

In recent decades, economic assistance has increasingly become contingent on political performance, and political conditionality has become a major factor in aid allocation. Many regimes lower or suspend their economic assistance when recipient regimes engage in egregious authoritarian practices.[30] Yet studies of international aid also show that economic assistance is often given despite the absence of democratic practices, and many autocratic governments receive high levels of economic aid from foreign powers.[31] Furthermore, aid allocation by 'new donors', that is, non-Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member states who are comparatively new to aid delivery, is even more blind to regime type; new donor aid allocation is not affected by consideration of civil or political rights.[32] Often such economic aid is provided not simply for the purposes of

[29] Leonardo R. Arriola, 'Patronage and Political Stability in Africa', *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 10 (2009): 1339–62; Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'.

[30] Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency'; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 'EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange'; Diane Ethier, 'Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives', *Democratization* 10 (2003): 99–120.

[31] Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?', *Journal of Economic Growth* 5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63.

[32] Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele, 'Are "New" Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between Non-DAC and DAC Donor Countries', *World Development* 39, no. 11 (2011): 1950–68, 1961.

development assistance, but for highly political reasons designed to support autocratic incumbents and maintain autocratic rule.

During the Cold War, both superpowers provided extensive economic aid to client states abroad, often in large quantities over prolonged periods of time. The Soviet Union provided extensive economic assistance to its satellite states in Eastern Europe and to non-democratic countries in the developing world, provided they proved loyal to Moscow.[33] Similarly, US economic assistance during the Cold War targeted many autocratic regimes. In the 1950s, the US pursued the Eisenhower Doctrine, which involved economic aid to non-democratic Middle Eastern countries that were deemed at risk to the twin threats of the spread of communism and the rise of pan-Arab, anti-Western nationalism.[34] In 1957, the US began to assist King Hussein's non-democratic government in Jordan, gaining the monarchy's foreign policy allegiance in exchange for prolonged economic and military assistance ($55 million from 1957–67).[35] Egypt became a recipient of extensive US economic aid once its foreign policies were realigned with those of the US after the Camp David Accords were agreed in 1978.

In the contemporary Middle East, the US remains a major economic sponsor of several autocratic regimes, underwriting autocratic incumbents that are willing to align their policies with American national interests. This aid does not simply constitute 'regular' development assistance, but is driven by political motivations that include a significant interest in resisting democratic change that might lead to shifts in regional foreign policy.[36] Several Middle East states are also major providers of economic assistance to other regional autocracies. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE are the major donor countries in the region, and provide extensive material support to a range of other Arab authoritarian states, especially those with compatible foreign policy interests.[37] As with US aid, such economic sponsorship is often highly political and involves direct sponsorship of autocratic leaders. Saudi Arabia's

[33] Roger E. Kanet, 'Four Decades of Soviet Economic Assistance: Superpower Economic Competition in the Developing World', ACDIS Occasional Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, July 2010, <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/27702>.

[34] Raymond Hinnebusch, *The International Politics of the Middle East* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 25.

[35] Anne Mariel Peters and Pete W. Moore, 'Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44, no. 3 (2009): 256–85.

[36] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*, 2; Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'.

[37] Espen Villanger, 'Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives', *Forum for Development Studies* 34, no. 2 (2007): 223–56.

aid package to Egypt in the wake of the 2013 coup that ousted President Mohamed Morsi was highly political, reflecting support for the new authorities rather than a purely needs-based assessment of Egypt's economic needs.[38]

Similar dynamics are at work in other regions also, and there are a variety of resource-rich countries that are willing to use their wealth to sponsor autocratic regimes abroad. Venezuela, for example, has supported a variety of non-democratic regimes abroad, and in 2014, Russia gave Cuba an economic lifeline by forgiving $30 billion in debt and expanding economic relations, reducing fears that economic decline might threaten the stability of the regime in Havana.[39] These policies of support tend to reflect anti-Western and anti-hegemonic foreign policy priorities, rather than ideological commitments to authoritarianism itself.[40]

## Material Sponsorship: Security

A second form of material support concerns the forms of security assistance that foreign patrons can provide autocratic regimes. Economic assistance can add to the coffers of the state, while military assistance can increase the capacity of the security forces. There are several forms of military assistance that external powers can provide. In order to be effective, domestic security forces require troops and weapons to project power within the territory.[41] External actors can provide both by offering access to weapons exports, donating weaponry, and deploying troops strategically in order to support the recipient state. Recent research has highlighted a variety of ways in which military and security support can facilitate and encourage repressive practices.[42] In some instances, this form of support has involved long-term

[38] Nordland, 'Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt's Regime'.

[39] Anthea McCarthy-Jones, *Origins of Radical Policy-Making: An Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Fifth Republic of Venezuela* (Canberra: University of Canberra, 2010); Jay Ulfelder, 'Russia Throws Cuba a Lifeline', *Dart-Throwing Chimp*, accessed 13 November 2014, <http://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2014/07/17/russia-throws-cuba-a-lifeline/>.

[40] Steffen Hertog, 'Petro-Populist States in the International System' (Unpublished paper, 2014).

[41] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 56.

[42] Dursun Peksen, 'Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?', *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 3 (2012): 558–71; Shannon Lindsey Blanton, 'Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries', *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (1999): 233–44; Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*, 20.

patterns of regular military assistance, while in others it entails short-term and unusual bursts of security assistance in times of regime crisis.

John Owen has shown how great powers have used military force to impose regime institutions in foreign states throughout history, often with the result of reinforcing non-democratic forms of rule.[43] US support for right-wing dictatorships during the Cold War regularly took the form of military assistance and support.[44] After the Cold War, major powers continue to support authoritarian regimes with military assistance. The US has continued to offer long-term military assistance to a number of key autocratic allies, especially in the Middle East. Egypt remains one of the largest beneficiaries of US assistance, and by far the largest share of US aid that Egypt receives is comprised of military assistance.[45] Pakistan was also a major beneficiary of US military assistance under the dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf,[46] and Jordan has also received extensive US military assistance both during and after the Cold War. Fluctuations in US security support to Jordan have correlated closely with the extent of autocratic control exercised by the Jordanian ruling elite.[47]

During the Arab Spring, some long-term security relationships were supplemented with a surge of external support during moments of regime crisis. Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia each provided material support to beleaguered incumbents, involving spikes of security assistance in response to the threat posed to regime incumbents by mass mobilization. Building on pre-existing patterns of long-term military assistance, Russia and Iran sent weapons and, in the case of Tehran, troops and military advisors in order to bolster the Assad regime. Saudi Arabia and the United States both sought to prevent the collapse of the monarchy in Bahrain, but Riyadh spearheaded a large military intervention under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council in order to shore up the regime (see Chapter 5). Russia and the US have also provided extensive military assistance to a number of autocratic regimes in Central Asia, bolstering their security apparatuses in ways that have facilitated domestic repression.[48]

[43] Owen IV, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics*.

[44] Schmitz, *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965–1989*.

[45] Jeremy M. Sharp, 'Egypt: Background and US Relations', US Congressional Research Service (5 June 2014), 14–16.

[46] Ashley J. Tellis, 'U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation', *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (1 December 2004): 97–116; C. Christine Fair, 'The US–Pakistan Relations after a Decade of the War on Terror', *Contemporary South Asia* 20, no. 2 (1 June 2012): 243–53.

[47] Yom and Al-Momani, 'The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability: Jordan in the Post-Cold War Era'.

[48] Dimitry Gorenburg, 'Why Russia Supports Repressive Regimes in Syria and the Middle East', *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 198*, 2012, iv, 87.

## International Diplomacy

Aside from material assistance that involves the direct transfer of money, weapons, or troops, international sponsors can also seek to bolster the position of their favoured autocratic incumbents through diplomatic support and protection. Either working bilaterally with the target state, or working through regional or international organizations, autocratic sponsors can use diplomatic strategies to assist their allies and protect their power. These efforts often seek to counter the diplomatic pressure and 'shaming' that autocratic regimes frequently receive from Western and democratic powers. Such normative pressure and condemnation is often targeted at autocratic regimes due to their breaches of democratic norms and human rights. Diplomatic sponsorship, on the other hand, is designed to reassure and protect incumbents, rather than to pressurize or compel.

There are a wide variety of diplomatic moves that states can take in order to achieve these aims. The recognition of new governments is usually a straightforward element of international diplomacy, but in certain cases it represents a starkly political and highly contested act. Some governments are denied recognition due to a perceived lack of effective control within the state, whereas others are denied recognition due to the political nature of the government itself, including both the manner in which it came to power and the political ideology it seeks to advance.[49] In some rare cases where new rulers have obtained power through non-constitutional or non-democratic means, such as the overthrow of the elected government of President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti in 1991, there has been international consensus on the refusal to recognize new rulers.[50] Similarly, after the overthrow of the government in the Central African Republic in 2013, regional leaders refused to recognize the new leaders as the legitimate government and insisted on a new transitional body that would prepare for elections.[51]

In most cases where universal recognition is not forthcoming, however, the new autocrats are not entirely isolated, and while some states may refuse to

[49] Sean D. Murphy, 'Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments', *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (1999): 545–81; Stephen D. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 15.

[50] Ken Gude, 'Case Studies in Collective Response', in *Protecting Democracy: International Responses*, ed. Morton H. Halperin and Mirna Galic (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005), 63–100, 64.

[51] Madjiasra Nako, 'Regional Leaders Refuse to Recognize Central African Republic Coup Leader', Reuters, 3 April 2013, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/03/us-centralafrica-rebels-summit-idUSBRE93216M20130403>.

offer recognition, others offer their vocal support. After flawed elections in Zimbabwe in 2002 and 2008, the US refused to recognize the results but many regional leaders offered recognition and support (see Chapter 4). During the Arab Spring several Western governments withdrew recognition from the Syrian regime due to its repressive practices, yet the Assad government retained recognition and support from several key allies, including Russia, China, and Iran.[52] After a coup in Honduras in 2009, regional leaders criticized the US for recognizing the legitimacy of elections held by the coup leaders, rather than demanding the return of the ousted president.[53] Such acts of recognition can not only frustrate the efforts of international democracy promoters who may wish to isolate the incumbents, but can also enhance the legitimacy of the incumbents in the eyes of the domestic population, strengthening their position vis-à-vis the domestic opposition forces.

Another form of diplomatic support that can bolster the position of autocratic elites is the offer of a state visit from an important ally. New autocratic leaders who find their position contested domestically and internationally can help solidify their rule and send a signal of authority if they are invited to the capital of a powerful state in their capacity as political leader, or, alternatively, if they receive a state visit from a powerful foreign leader. The regime of Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus has been the subject of extensive international condemnation and sanction for successive breaches of democratic rules and norms, and especially for the widespread use of electoral malpractice.[54] Yet Lukashenko has benefited from robust diplomatic support from important allies. Putin has visited the country regularly, including in the wake of highly fraudulent elections in 2006 that were condemned by Western states and international organizations, and Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad undertook a state visit the following year.[55] China has hosted controversial leaders in symbolically important state visits, including Zimbabwe's President Mugabe and Uzbekistan's President Kariminov, who was hosted just two weeks after his regime engaged in a brutal crackdown on protesters in Andijan in May 2005.[56]

[52] Ian Black, 'Syrian Opposition Takes Arab League Seat', *The Guardian*, accessed 6 May 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/26/syrian-opposition-appeals-nato-support>.

[53] Ginger Thompson, 'Region Finds U.S. Lacking on Honduras', *New York Times*, 28 November 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/world/americas/28honduras.html>.

[54] Vitali Silitski, 'Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus', *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 4 (2005): 83–97.

[55] 'Iran's President Visits Belarus', Associated Press, 21 May 2007.

[56] Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, 'China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?', *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2008): 38–56; Julia Bader, 'China,

Such state visits are often accompanied by forceful vocal support for incumbent autocrats, and foreign leaders regularly speak out in defence of their authoritarian allies. Such support can be particularly important in the wake of visible and controversial authoritarian practices, when regimes are under intense pressure from domestic critics and certain quarters of the international community. After the violent crackdown in Andijan in 2005, the Uzbek regime received vocal endorsement from the Chinese authorities. As well as the state visit mentioned above, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman stated that China 'firmly support[ed] the crackdown on the three forces of separatism, terrorism and extremism by the Uzbekistan government'.[57] In the immediate aftermath of Egypt's brutal crackdown on supporters of ousted president Morsi in August 2013, Saudi Arabia coupled its economic assistance with robust rhetorical support. King Abdullah took to state television to proclaim that 'the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, its people and government stood and stands by today with its brothers in Egypt against terrorism'.[58]

## Strategic Advice

A final tool of autocratic sponsorship involves offers of advice on strategy and tactics to authoritarian elites in an effort to assist them to stay in power. As Vanderhill notes, an important influence on aspiring or incumbent elites is the ability of outside actors to influence elite strategies, and to encourage political actors to engage in illiberal or autocratic practices.[59] Such influences can be both active and passive. Forms of cross-border diffusion of ideas and strategies can take place in the absence of actor intention, and there is ample evidence that autocratic elites have pursued new strategies of political control based on processes of learning and emulation. Strategies of effective (or ineffective) political control in one setting are replicated (or actively avoided) in another in order to increase the prospects of regime survival.[60] I focus here on active

Autocratic Patron? An Empirical Investigation of China as a Factor in Autocratic Survival', *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (1 July 2014): 23–33.

[57] C. J. Chivers, 'China Backs Uzbek, Splitting With US on Crackdown', *New York Times*, 25 May 2005, <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/25/world/europe/china-backs-uzbek-splitting-with-us-on-crackdown.html>.

[58] 'Saudi King Backs Egypt's Military', *Al-Jazeera*, 17 August 2013, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381615196784361.html>.

[59] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*, 13.

[60] Heydemann and Leenders, 'Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the "Arab Awakening"'; Weyland, *Making Waves*; Koesel and Bunce, 'Diffusion-

forms of influence, in which external political actors intentionally and actively seek to advise autocratic elites on their strategies of political control.

Russia, for example, provided strategic advice to the Yanukovych campaign during the contested presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004. President Putin had a strong interest in a Yanukovych victory, which would continue Ukraine's close relationship and foreign policy alignment with Moscow. Yet Yanukovych was not a widely popular politician in Ukraine, and Moscow sought to ensure he would win at the polls, whether the votes were in his favour or not. Putin is said to have met directly with Yanukovych to offer strategic advice on how to ensure victory, including by replacing local electoral officials with loyal followers. Moscow also deployed a number of Russian political strategists to Kiev to 'export' the methods used by the Putin regime in its own fraudulent elections to the Yanukovych campaign.[61] These strategies included artificially raising reported turnout and vote share, in part through ballot stuffing and in part through the production of vote summaries without regard to the actual votes cast.[62] The second round of the 2004 presidential election was accordingly deeply flawed, leading to mass public protests and a court-ordered re-run.

China's support for the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe has also involved a strategic element. Zimbabwe's Look East policy, involving a diplomatic pivot towards Beijing, was initiated after increasing condemnation and isolation from the West in the early 2000s.[63] The policy has resulted in Chinese material and economic assistance to Zimbabwe, and also the presence of military trainers.[64] Mugabe himself has suggested that China's support for Zimbabwe has included a strategic dimension relating to the ability of the security services to assert political control against domestic political opponents. Speaking in 2006, Mugabe stated, 'we want to remind those who might harbour any plans of turning against the government: Be warned, we have armed men and women who can pull the trigger . . . the defence forces have benefited from the

Proofing'; Sarotte, 'China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example'.

[61] Mikhail G. Myagkov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dimitri Shakin, *The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 142. See also Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*, 47; Nikolai Petrov and Andrei Ryabov, 'Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution', in *Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough*, ed. Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), 145–64.

[62] Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin, *The Forensics of Election Fraud*, chapters 3 and 4.

[63] Jeremy R. Youde, 'Why Look East? Zimbabwean Foreign Policy and China', *Africa Today* 53, no. 3 (2007): 3–19.

[64] Southern Africa Report Profile, 'Zimbabwe Security Forces', July 2011.

government's Look East policy through which they have not only acquired new equipment but also learned new military strategies'.[65] Russian and US military assistance to Central Asian states (mentioned above) also entails strategic advice and training that widens the repertoire of security tactics that regime incumbents can use against domestic challengers. While security-related threats in the region, including Islamic terrorism, have prompted foreign training in new counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism strategies, these new strategic and tactical abilities have sometimes been put to use to deal with non-security, political challenges, including those posed by civilian protests against the regime.[66]

The choice of which tool of sponsorship to use depends on a number of factors. The economic and military strength of the international sponsors affects their ability to employ each of the tools of sponsorship discussed above. Only wealthy states can offer the significant and meaningful level of financial support of the kind that Saudi Arabia offered to Egypt in 2013, and only militarily well-developed states can offer the kind of security assistance that many authoritarian states rely on to bolster their own domestic coercive capacity. The characteristics of the sponsors thus systematically shape the available array of sponsorship strategies. The choice of sponsorship tool will also be shaped by the authoritarian practice that external actors wish to support. While external military assistance may help those domestic actors who wish to engage in repression or conduct a coup, it is unlikely to be appropriate for efforts at electoral fraud. Finally, the form of sponsorship is also likely to vary across the 'life-cycle' of an authoritarian practice, that is, across the periods of time that distinguish the *before*, *during*, and *after* stages of authoritarian practices. This distinction is crucial for understanding the different mechanisms through which international sponsors shape the politics of authoritarianism at different points in time, and is explored more extensively below.

## THE EFFECTS OF AUTOCRATIC SPONSORSHIP

Once external actors pursue policies of external sponsorship, how do they bolster autocratic rule at the domestic level? Given the diversity of tools that

[65] Quoted in Ian Taylor, 'Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights', *African Affairs* 107, no. 426 (2008): 63–87, 76.

[66] Gorenburg, 'Why Russia Supports Repressive Regimes in Syria and the Middle East', 47, 88.

international sponsors can use to support their favoured autocratic allies abroad, it follows that these international policies will have a range of different effects. Not all efforts at international sponsorship achieve their aims, and some autocrats have struggled to rule or been ousted from power despite international patronage. Russian advocacy was insufficient to have Viktor Yanukovych elected in 2004, or to preserve him in power in 2014 in the wake of the Maidan protests. Saudi Arabia was a staunch supporter of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, but was unable to prevent his ousting from office in 2011. Yet while international autocratic sponsorship is no guarantee of autocratic survival, it can nonetheless have important consequences that shape developments at both the domestic and international levels. Through a variety of means, international actors can contribute to authoritarian rule by lowering the real and perceived costs of autocratic practices and by assisting autocratic elites in overcoming the challenges of autocratic rule. It is possible to identify three broad categories of domestic-level effects that follow from this kind of external sponsorship and that can contribute to three different dimensions of authoritarian rule. Each of these effects corresponds to a different stage (before, during, and after) of the pursuit of authoritarian practices:

1) increasing the likelihood of authoritarian practices
2) contributing to implementation of authoritarian practices
3) shielding elites from international enforcement measures in the wake of authoritarian practices.

Tracing the ways in which external sponsorship influences these authoritarian practices involves locating the causal mechanisms linking international actions with domestic outcomes. I endorse the view, advanced most compellingly by Peter Hedström and his colleagues, that causal accounts should identify causal mechanisms that operate through the individual level, so that causal arguments entail some account of political actors and their role in determining the political outcome of interest.[67] Regime change and regime consolidation do not take place independently of the political actors (masses or elites) who ultimately govern and are governed through that regime. As Michael

[67] Peter Hedström, 'Studying Mechanisms to Strengthen Causal Inferences in Quantitative Research', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, ed. Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry M. Brady, and David Collier, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 319–35; Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, 'Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay', *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, ed. Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1–31. For an opposing view, see Tulia G. Falleti and Julia F. Lynch, 'Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis', *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 9 (2009): 1143–66.

McFaul has said, 'inert, invisible structures do not make democracies or dictatorships. People do.'[68] It is thus essential to provide an account that identifies at least one step of the causal chain at the individual level so that the role of political actors and their actions is accounted for. External autocratic sponsors can shape domestic outcomes only by working with and through domestic actors.[69]

There is an extensive literature on the international dimensions of democratization that has sought to identify the mechanisms through which international forces shape domestic actors. Yet I argue that just as the *concepts* associated with democracy promotion cannot easily be applied to autocratic sponsorship, so too are there obstacles to applying the causal mechanisms that have been associated with the international dimensions of democratization. Most of the existing theoretical literature that explores how international actors can shape domestic regime outcomes focuses on the role of Western international actors and the effects of their efforts to promote democratic norms and behaviour through a range of strategies. Often these studies distinguish between conditionality-based approaches, which use material incentives to alter the behaviour of domestic elites, and normative or diplomatic engagement that rests on shaming, normative pressure, or persuasion to induce change.[70] If these efforts work, it is because domestic actors have *changed* in some way, either by reluctantly complying with international demands or, in some cases, becoming socialized into the normative framework that the international actors are promoting.

By contrast, the mechanisms through which external autocratic sponsorship operates are different. International sponsors are not seeking to induce *altered* behaviour at the domestic level, but rather are seeking to help domestic elites carry out the policies that they are already committed to. It thus involves a different set of international influences, based on a different set of causal

[68] Michael McFaul, 'The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World', *World Politics* 54 (2002): 212–44, 213.

[69] Michael McFaul, 'Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution', *International Security* 32 (2007): 45–83, 47.

[70] Frank Schimmelfennig, 'International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment', *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (2000): 109–39; Frank Schimmelfennig, 'Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe', *International Organization* 59 (2005): 827–60; Judith G. Kelley, *Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010); James Hughes, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon, 'Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-National Government', *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, no. 3 (2004): 523–51; Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above*; Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*.

mechanisms. External actors do not seek to alter the preferences of domestic actors, and coerce or persuade them to change. Rather, external sponsors of autocratic incumbents seek to encourage, empower, and protect domestic actors. Consequently, efforts to apply models of conditionality or socialization to cases of external autocratic sponsorship may not capture the key differences between pro-democratic and pro-authoritarian international influences.[71]

Although there are multiple tools of autocratic sponsorship, I argue that there are two broad categories of mechanisms of international influence, relating to informational and material effects. Information is central to political decision-making and affects the beliefs and strategies of a wide range of political actors. Citizens within democracies often cast their votes based in large part on the information they have available to them.[72] Politicians introduce policies, and cast their legislative votes, on the basis of the information they have at a given point in time.[73] States choose to cooperate or engage in conflict as a result of the information available.[74] Information is thus critical for understanding various political outcomes, but it is also often absent. Citizen voters, would-be protestors, democratic legislators, and ruling dictators all struggle with the challenge of imperfect information, and must estimate and calculate the likely consequences of their actions without full certainty. As a result, political actors often rely on cues and signals provided by other actors that provide partial information about their positions and intentions, and the likely consequences of distinct courses of action.[75] Often the source of such cues and signals is the international environment, where international actors make statements and pursue policies that provide information that is relevant for domestic-level citizens and politicians. In the context of authoritarian rule, such signals can sometimes provide information about the level of international disapproval and condemnation that exists.[76] Yet they can also reassure autocratic elites about the

[71] Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*, 31–2.

[72] Sara Binzer Hobolt, *Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).

[73] Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, 'The Reach of Political Economy', in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, ed. Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 3–25, 11.

[74] James D. Fearon, 'Rationalist Explanations for War', *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414; Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005).

[75] Weyland, *Making Waves*.

[76] Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

appropriateness of their behaviour, as well as about the types of international sponsorship that they may expect if they engage in authoritarian practices.

The second set of mechanisms of international influence concern the material effects that external actors and their policies can have. Material effects shape the position of political actors by enhancing, or lowering, their material capacity in terms of resources, such as their access to money, weapons, troops, or territory. Incumbent capacity is a key pillar of authoritarian stability and has important domestic and international sources.[77] International sanctions may reduce or restrict material power, whereas foreign economic or military assistance increases it. When international sponsors offer material support to autocratic actors, it contributes to their capacity to seize and maintain power. Such external policies may also send important informational signals, and thus certain forms of international behaviour may simultaneously have both informational and material effects. The following sections further explore how these mechanisms of influence operate at different stages of the life-cycle of authoritarian practices: before, during, and after.

## Increasing the Likelihood of Authoritarian Practices

Why do certain political actors seize power in violation of the constitution, repress their people, and steal elections (if they hold them at all)? From a rationalist perspective, the answer to this question is relatively straightforward. Political actors are rational, self-interested beings who strive for political power. Their methods for obtaining power are primarily a function of the calculations they make about the costs and benefits of the different strategies that are available to them based on the resources to which they have access. Many influential contributions to the literature on authoritarianism generally, and the scholarship on coups, repression, and election malpractice more specifically, rest on a core assumption that autocratic behaviour is pursued when the benefits of doing so (access to power or the protection of it) outweigh the costs (some combination of domestic and international censure).[78]

Yet while rationalist approaches capture a crucial element of political decision-making in authoritarian settings, they fail to capture some of the

[77] Lucan A. Way, 'Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine', *World Politics* 57 (2005): 231–61.

[78] Wintrobe, 'Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches'; Powell, 'Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups D'état', 1019; Carey, 'The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression', 4; Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*, 33.

normative rather than strategic thinking in which political actors often engage. Politics operates not only according to a logic of consequences, but also according to a logic of appropriateness, whereby actor behaviour is governed not just by a consideration of the possible costs and benefits that might result, but also from a sense of what is appropriate at a particular time in a given environment.[79] Prevailing national and international norms create certain standards of behaviour, and policies that would breach those standards may be less desirable even if they may bring about material benefits. The literature on human rights violations, for example, has highlighted an important role for transnational advocacy networks that shame repressive governments and establish them as part of an 'out-group' that is distinct from the norm-abiding 'in-group'. While some governments respond to international criticism for purely strategic reasons, others are troubled by the normative criticisms and are persuaded to alter their behaviour.[80] As a result, many authors wisely advise some integration between rationalist and more normative or constructivist approaches that emphasize the role of norms, values, and persuasion.[81] Here I identify how both sets of dynamics can influence the decision of aspiring or incumbent autocrats to engage in authoritarian practices.

As briefly discussed above, several scholars have identified the ways in which international pressure and conditionality can alter the incentives for domestic actors. International institutions have long been identified as powerful agents at the domestic level, who can use positive and negative conditionality to prompt changes in behaviour among domestic elites.[82] By creating international costs for certain policies and benefits for others, international actors can shape the incentive structure facing domestic elites and

[79] James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders', *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 943–69.

[80] Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink, 'The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction', in *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, ed. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 1–38, 15.

[81] Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*, 29; Judith G. Kelley, *Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 99; James Fearon and Alexander Wendt, 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View', in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (London: SAGE, 2002), 52–72.

[82] Kelley, *Ethnic Politics in Europe*; Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, 'Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–79; Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above*; Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*.

influence their behaviour. By raising the costs of norm-violating behaviour, international actors can induce compliance with international demands. Yet, international autocratic sponsors can counteract these influences, and undercut the incentive structure that international democracy promoters seek to establish.

In particular, international information effects can increase the likelihood of authoritarian practices. The rhetoric and policies of supportive international allies can send important signals and cues that lower the anticipated costs associated with authoritarian practices. The domestic and international costs associated with authoritarian practices can be extensive. Domestic costs include the threats that come from both rival elites and the wider public. Failed coup attempts can result in exile, imprisonment, or death.[83] Stealing elections may secure political power in the short term, but can also lead to mass public protests that are capable of deposing even seemingly strong dictators from power, such as Slobodan Milošević in Serbia in 2000.[84] International costs can also be highly punitive, especially in the post-Cold War world when the rise of international democracy promotion introduced a range of 'democracy-contingent benefits' that could be won or lost depending on domestic democratic performance.[85] Elites who fail to meet international democratic standards risk a punitive international response that would entail costly sanctions, isolate them diplomatically, and put their rule at risk.

The actions of supportive international allies, however, can provide crucial information to allay some of the fears that elites may have about the potential costly implications of authoritarian practices. External actors can send clear signals that, when the time comes, they will support rather than criticize, and defend rather than enforce.[86] Such signals can be overt and explicit, including rhetorical statements that sometimes encourage repressive policies and clearly indicate support will be forthcoming. In the days before the violent crackdown on protesters in Andijan in 2005, Russian government officials sent several signals to the Uzbek government that it felt that action needed to be taken and that it could 'aid' the Uzbek government in its efforts.[87] Prior to the brutal

[83] Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, 'Introducing Archigos'.

[84] Tucker, 'Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions'.

[85] Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*, chapter 3.

[86] Kathryn Sikkink, *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007).

[87] 'Russia's Putin Concerned Uzbek Uprising Could Threaten Stability in Central Asia', Associated Press International, 14 May 2005; 'Russian Foreign Minister Says Uzbek Situation Stabilizing, Politicians Express Concern', Associated Press International, 13 May 2005.

crackdown in Bahrain in 2011, Saudi Arabia is said to have encouraged authorities in Manama to respond with force.[88]

Prior policies of external actors can also send signals that indicate their likely future policies. Past practice can be an indicator of future policy, and some states have long histories of supporting autocratic regimes. Individual rulers may have direct experience of receiving assistance and support in the past from international allies, and may feel they can rely on the same allies again in the future. Such rulers may also be aware of regional patterns of international criticism and support. Incumbent elites in Africa, for example, are well aware of the record of limited democratic enforcement by regional states and the African Union, and will tailor their policies accordingly. As discussed further in Chapter 4, President Mugabe in Zimbabwe received robust regional support over a series of flawed and violent elections, and was able to rely on the protection of loyal international allies even at the peak of international criticism of his regime. Russia has been a reliable supporter of a number of autocratic regimes in Central Asia, despite a pattern of flawed elections and Western condemnation.[89] Regular support of this kind over time can send clear signals that future actions will receive a similar response, and thus lower the anticipated international costs of certain forms of behaviour. Elites can be confident that international punishment will not be universal, and support is likely to be forthcoming from some quarters.

It is important to note, however, that such international signals can often be misread, often with dire consequences. Understanding the intention of other actors on the international stage is notoriously difficult, and states often err in their reading of current intentions and likely future behaviour.[90] Autocratic leaders regularly miscalculate the likelihood of critical events, such as election results,[91] levels of public support and loyalty,[92] the animosity of foreign states,[93] and the patience of previously supportive international allies.[94] Consequently, while international signals may increase the likelihood of authoritarian practices being pursued, domestic elites may be surprised by the consequences of those actions.

[88] ICG, 'Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform', 28 July 2011, 3; Abdo, 'The New Sectarianism', 16.

[89] Kramer, 'Russian Policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States'.

[90] Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).

[91] Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*, 125.

[92] Kandeh, *Coups from Below*, 167.

[93] Erica Frantz and Natasha Ezrow, '"Yes Men" and the Likelihood of Foreign Policy Mistakes Across Dictatorships', paper presented at the *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Toronto, 2009.

[94] Risse and Sikkink, 'The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices', 28.

## Contributing to the Implementation of Authoritarian Practices

As well as indicating support for particular regimes in ways that lower the perceived costs of authoritarian practices, external actors can also assist elites in carrying out those practices. In these cases, international allies insert themselves intrusively in domestic politics and make a direct contribution to national-level policies. International actors can assume positions of authority at the domestic level and become key players in directing and carrying out authoritarian practices. In the most extreme cases, international actors can come to 'co-constitute' the authoritarian regime.[95]

Not all of the tools of sponsorship discussed above will be helpful in directly contributing to the implementation of authoritarian practices. While diplomatic sponsorship may encourage authoritarian practices, and protect and bolster autocratic leaders in the wake of such events, it is unlikely to contribute directly to the implementation of authoritarian policies at the domestic level. Similarly, the nature of the external contribution will also depend on the nature of the authoritarian practice in question. Different authoritarian policies require different sets of skills and capacities. Coercive crackdowns, for example, would benefit from external security assistance in ways that electoral fraud would not. Different tools of sponsorship will thus be more or less helpful to different authoritarian practices.

The strategic advice that international sponsors provide can help domestic elites to implement a number of authoritarian practices, such as election fraud or the complex repression of mass mobilization movements. Advice from experienced foreign allies can provide strategic capacity to a regime with which it can better project authority and control the political environment. Material assistance from foreign states can also make repressive policies more feasible. States vary considerably in the capacity of their coercive institutions, and it follows that not all states have the ability to repress challenges from below in the same way.[96] External allies can provide regime elites with material transfers of personnel and weapons that can significantly swell the size and capacity of the domestic security forces. In doing so, they increase the opportunities that incumbent elites have to fight and defeat domestic challenges. While our understandings of anti-government mobilization have been enhanced through an understanding of

[95] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*, 4.
[96] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 56.

the opportunity structures that shape the behaviour of social movements,[97] it is also essential to understand the opportunity structures that shape the actions of incumbent elites. In times of crisis, external supporters can considerably, and materially, enhance the opportunities for effective repression in non-democratic settings. During the Cold War, popular revolts in Hungary and Czechoslovakia were crushed in part due to the intervention of Soviet troops. After winning independence from Britain in 1980, Zimbabwe's new leader Robert Mugabe repressed his erstwhile allies in the revolutionary movement through the use of a military unit trained and supplied by North Korea, the Fifth Brigade.[98] During the more recent Arab Spring, Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia have each provided material support to beleaguered incumbents. International material support of this kind acts as a 'supplement' to existing state capacity, providing government actors with greater (albeit temporary) coercive capacity in ways that alter the balance of power between incumbents and opposition groups and facilitate regime survival.

Finally, international support for repressive practices can contribute to their successful implementation by sending clear signals to both regime insiders and the opposition. One of the risks that regime elites face when ordering repressive crackdowns is that their security services will refuse to follow orders. Foreign backing can send a signal about the strength of the regime and shore up the loyalty of domestic security forces in ways that limit defections and ensure that a cohesive coercive apparatus operates at the state's disposal.[99] Similarly, foreign contributions to domestic repression can send a clear signal to opposition movements, forcing them to recalibrate their assessments of the domestic balance of power. Potential regime opponents, including individual citizens who are considering joining mass protests, consider the costs and benefits of declaring their opposition.[100] Foreign

[97] Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978); Doug McAdam, 'On the International Origins of Domestic Political Opportunities', in *Social Movements and American Political Institutions*, ed. Anne N. Costain and Andrew S. McFarland, (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998), 251–67.

[98] Knox Chitiyo and Martin Rupiya, 'Tracking Zimbabwe's Political History: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980–2005', in *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*, ed. Martin Rupiya (Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2005), 331–63.

[99] Sharon Erickson Nepstad, 'Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria', *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 337–49.

[100] Timur Kuran, 'Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989', *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (1991): 7–48.

sponsorship of domestic repression can thus deter members of the public from initiating or continuing visible protests as it becomes clearer that the state has robust external support and will be harder to defeat. In so doing, it alters the domestic balance of power in favour of the incumbents and contributes to the successful implementation of coercive repression (discussed further in Chapter 5).

## Shielding Autocrats from International Enforcement in the Wake of Authoritarian Practices

The final set of effects concerns the manner in which external support can help autocratic regimes survive moments of crisis by shielding them from the kind of international punitive action that often follows authoritarian practices. Coups, election fraud, and repression are often highly visible, and are frequently followed by democratic enforcement efforts by Western international actors. Democratic enforcement is highly uneven, but has been shown to exact significant costs on autocratic elites where it has been pursued.[101]

Yet our knowledge of the international responses to autocratic behaviour is skewed by an imbalance of attention toward pro-democratic international actors. Several major studies that focus on the international politics of norm-violating behaviour focus primarily on Western enforcers that seek to punish autocratic behaviour, rather than on those actors that seek to defend or support it.[102] Donno's recent analysis of patterns of democracy enforcement is a case in point.[103] Donno's study of international democratic enforcement in the wake of electoral misconduct explores many of the political dynamics that are the subject of this book, including the nature and consequences of authoritarian practices, the international reaction to those practices, and the effects of those international reactions. I depart from Donno's approach, however, in viewing the 'international audience' that responds to domestic behaviour as a complex and multifaceted one that includes both international enforcers *and* international defenders. Regimes that engage in authoritarian practices and openly breach democratic norms do not face only international censure and condemnation. In

[101] Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*; Morton H. Halperin and Mirna Galic, *Protecting Democracy: International Responses* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005); Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*.

[102] Kelley, *Ethnic Politics in Europe*; Halperin and Galic, *Protecting Democracy*; Pevehouse, *Democracy from Above*; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*. Although Levitsky and Way address the role of 'Black Knights', it remains a secondary concern of their analysis.

[103] Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*, 21.

reality, regimes that engage in even highly visible, large-scale, and violent authoritarian practices are frequently defended on the international stage by supportive, and often powerful, allies. Recent research on the role of so-called black knights has considerably enhanced our understanding of the competing international influences in more detail,[104] but we still lack a full understanding of the variety of ways in which international sponsors can shield domestic incumbents from international enforcement efforts.

I distinguish between three different mechanisms through which international sponsors can undercut the effects of international enforcers. One contribution that robust external support of this kind can make is to *limit the incentives* for international democratic enforcement. International democracy promoters often seek to employ negative conditionality against norm-violating regimes, withdrawing aid or introducing sanctions against regimes that breach democratic standards and engage in authoritarian practices. Yet such efforts are highly inconsistent, and enforcement efforts vary from case to case. Such variation has been explained in significant part due to the distribution of political power and interests in the international community; international democracy promoters are less likely to enforce democratic norms and standards against regimes that are powerful or geo-strategically important.[105] In some cases, democratic 'enforcers' almost resemble autocratic sponsors themselves, neglecting to implement their own enforcement rules and offering little or only lax punishment. Information about the nature and extent of the norm violation also has implications for the likelihood and extent of enforcement.[106] Reports from human rights activists, election monitors, and other civil society organizations often reveal important facts about government abuses, and pressure foreign governments to intervene in some way. However, another informational factor that can determine the extent of democratic enforcement efforts concerns the manner in which the visible international backing of the target regime also provides crucial information, often in ways that can lower the prospects for external enforcement.

In some instances, Western leaders have been open and frank about the ways in which foreign sponsors of autocratic regimes have influenced their decisions against pursuing particular punitive measures. For example, regional

[104] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*; Early, 'Unmasking the Black Knights'.

[105] Renee De Nevers, 'Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement', *International Studies Review* 9, no. 1 (2007): 53–80.

[106] Risse and Sikkink, 'The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices', 20, 22; Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*, 27.

support for Robert Mugabe influenced the enforcement policies of Western states towards Zimbabwe. In his memoirs, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair states that he would have 'loved to' intervene to depose Mugabe from power in Africa, but that regional patterns of international sponsorship reduced the incentive to attempt it:

> . . . in [Mugabe's] case, and for reasons I never quite understood, the surrounding African nations maintained a lingering support for him and would have opposed any action strenuously.[107]

Secondly, once international actors do decide to pursue democratic enforcement measures, international sponsors can also take direct measures to *limit the extent* of international enforcement by actively seeking to block efforts within international institutions. The influence of sponsors here is not one of deterrence (reducing the incentives of other international actors to attempt enforcement) but is rather one of obstruction (blocking and frustrating attempts at enforcement once they have been initiated). International sponsors can argue against international enforcement in global and regional international organizations, and can wield their institutional power to prevent coordinated sanctions. Efforts within regional organizations to enforce democratic norms in the wake of breaches have regularly been frustrated by the role of veto-wielding states, especially but not exclusively authoritarian states, that oppose punitive action against norm-violating regimes.[108]

Thirdly, international sponsors can also *blunt the effects* of the enforcement measures that are pursued, compensating in both material and ideational ways for the costs imposed on states by external enforcers. In material terms, sponsors can offer to offset the economic losses suffered through sanctions by matching lost funds. Such efforts protect the economic capacity of the regime, and can enable autocratic elites to continue to pursue policies of economic patronage and co-optation that facilitate regime persistence but rely on external sources of finance. As discussed further in Chapter 6, Chinese financial assistance to Fiji rose sharply in the wake of that country's 2006 coup, and served to offset the costs of international sanctions from critical Western powers.

In diplomatic terms, international sponsorship can also undercut the normative effects of democratic enforcement. Risse and Sikkink's influential work

[107] Tony Blair, *A Journey: My Political Life* (London: Hutchinson, 2010), 229.

[108] Barry S. Levitt, 'A Desultory Defense of Democracy: OAS Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter', *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 3 (2006): 93–123; Thomas Legler and Thomas Kwasi Tieku, 'What Difference Can a Path Make? Regional Democracy Promotion Regimes in the Americas and Africa', *Democratization* 17, no. 3 (2010): 465–91.

on international human rights norms and the efforts of transnational advocacy networks highlights the role that normative pressure can play at the domestic level. The international human rights regime can seek to enforce international norms through shaming strategies in ways that construct 'in-groups' of norm-abiding states and 'out-groups' of norm-violating states. While some repressive regimes may be immune to such efforts, others feel offended and concerned about their legitimacy, and this normative pressure persuades them to alter their behaviour.[109] Yet it is also the case that international sponsors can reduce this normative pressure by providing regime incumbents with an alternative 'in-group' of which they can feel a part. By offering vocal and enthusiastic diplomatic support, and by confirming their role as supporting allies (often involving the use of the language of 'friendship'), external sponsors can lessen the sense of isolation that Western normative pressure may entail, and provide an alternative source of legitimacy and group belonging. Authoritarian elites often seek to use international sanctions for their own purposes, framing the international punishment in ways that contribute to their standing and legitimacy.[110] External sponsors can reinforce this effort, and thus strengthen incumbents' domestic position in the eyes of their domestic audience. In so doing, they can undercut international democratizing pressures and shield incumbents during times of scrutiny. They can also send important signals that may be factored in at a later date, when domestic elites are considering engaging in authoritarian practices in the future. The three categories of effects identified here should thus be seen as closely related international influences. Individual international policies may have multiple effects on more than one authoritarian practice and across more than one stage of authoritarian practice.

## CONCLUSION

It is difficult to make blanket statements about the effects of international sponsorship on authoritarian rule. Different international actors (democratic and non-democratic, Western and non-Western) regularly pursue a wide range of policies (material and non-material) that are intended to support a diverse set of autocratic incumbents. Rather than advance a single theory of

[109] Risse and Sikkink, 'The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices', 15, 26.

[110] Grauvogel and von Soest, 'Claims to Legitimacy Count'.

the international politics of authoritarianism, in this chapter I have sought to provide an analytical framework that can guide research on the various moving parts that collectively constitute this broad topic. I have eschewed analysis of authoritarianism as a single outcome of interests, and sought to pursue a policy of disaggregation. By breaking down the treatment of authoritarian rule into a set of authoritarian practices, it becomes more feasible to evaluate the nature of the impact of international sponsorship at the domestic level.

Not all authoritarian regimes receive the same level of international sponsorship, and this chapter has sought to address the different sources of sponsorship motivations. While a focus on strategic imperatives can shed considerable light on the determinants of why some countries support autocrats in one setting but not another, a purely strategic account of international sponsorship of autocratic actors is insufficient. The variation in motivations for sponsorship are also structured by the patterns of international linkage that exist between autocratic states and the international community. Linkage patterns have systematic effects on the prospects of authoritarian survival, and I have argued here that one central reason for this causal relationship is the fact that the bonds of linkages can generate interests and concerns about the government and regime type of foreign countries. In particular, autocratic linkage has systematically different effects on the likelihood of sponsorship than democratic linkage. While both types of linkage may create incentives for outside sponsorship, autocratic linkage is unique in that it generates a fear of contagion among autocratic regimes that generates incentives for democracy resistance efforts abroad.

The chapter also outlined the range of tools that international sponsors can use to shape domestic politics, including both material and non-material forms of support. I argue that these strategies of support affect domestic politics through two broad sets of causal mechanisms, one related to the role of information and the other to the role of material capacity building. International actors can send domestic autocratic elites important signals about the likely consequences of their actions, but can also provide them with forms of economic and security capacity that enhance their ability to remain in power. Finally, and departing from some recent scholarship that has explored similar channels of influence, I make a distinction between three different stages in the time frame of autocratic practices. In exploring how international sponsors can shape the politics of autocratic rule before, during, and after the decision to engage in authoritarian practices, I further demonstrate the variety of ways in which international actors can encourage and bolster autocracy at the domestic level. In the chapters that follow, I explore how these dynamics operate with respect to three major authoritarian practices: coups, coercive

**Table 3.2.** Overview of Empirical Case Studies by Topic and Time Frame

| | | Authoritarian Practice | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | Fraud | Repression | Coups |
| **Stage of Life-cycle** | Before | Chapter 4: Zimbabwe 2000–08 | | |
| | During | | Chapter 5: Bahrain and Syria 2011 | |
| | After | | | Chapter 6: Fiji 2006 and Egypt 2013 |

crackdowns, and electoral manipulation. In each thematic chapter, I focus on one particular stage in the time frame, and present a series of case studies related to each particular stage. This facilitates closer examination of the causal mechanisms through which international sponsorship operates. Table 3.2 outlines the approach taken in the chapters to come.

# 4

# The International Politics of Electoral Manipulation

One of the major trends of the post-Cold War period has been the increasing use of electoral politics within authoritarian regimes. Many authoritarian regimes now adopt the institutional features of democracy, especially regular elections, while controlling the political landscape in ways that preclude the exercise of genuine democratic governance.[1] Elections in these regimes are often little more than sham procedures, and are manipulated by incumbents to ensure they do not enable opposition success. Such efforts are not always successful, and elections within authoritarian settings sometimes act as catalysts for democratic transitions, but this is despite rather than because of incumbent intentions.[2] Consequently, in the wide array of authoritarian regimes that hold elections in the contemporary world, election fraud and manipulation constitute one of the principal authoritarian practices pursued by incumbent elites.

To date, however, the international politics of election malpractice has been seriously underexplored, and the prevailing emphasis on the domestic determinants of electoral misconduct has led to an underappreciation of the international factors that frequently contribute to decisions to manipulate elections. Aside from some recent exceptions,[3] scholars have tended to downplay the international influences on election fraud. Conventional wisdom on the determinants of election malpractice suggests that incumbent elites seek to manipulate elections when a credible opposition threat emerges, and when the domestic political and socio-economic context provides the opportunity to

[1] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Yonatan L. Morse, 'The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism', *World Politics* 64 (2012): 161–98.

[2] Marc Morjé Howard and Philip G. Roessler, 'Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes', *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2006): 365–81; Jason Brownlee, 'Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions', *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2009): 515–32.

[3] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Tolstrup, 'Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes'.

manage the electoral process in ways that facilitate government victory.[4] To the extent that international factors have been incorporated into theoretical accounts of electoral misconduct, it is generally with the assumption that they add to the perceived costs of misconduct due to the risk of international sanctions. Yet, incumbent elites rarely face a unified international community that acts in a coordinated way. International reactions to electoral malpractice are characterized by their diversity rather than their coherence, and while Western states and international organizations often condemn or punish perpetrators of electoral malpractice, they are often countered by other international actors that are more inclined to defend and protect the governments in question. Leaders in Belarus and Ukraine, for example, have blatantly manipulated elections safe in the knowledge that any Western condemnation and punishment would be offset by robust Russian support.[5]

In this chapter I examine the ways in which international autocratic sponsors can lower the perceived costs of electoral fraud. I focus in particular on the role of information and signals that international actors can send to domestic incumbents *before* they engage in election malpractice. Contested or supportive international environments can provide incumbent elites with a mix of signals about the likely consequences of their authoritarian behaviour. While some international signals suggest that electoral malpractice will incur international costs, others can indicate that such costs can be mitigated or lowered by the likely support of reliable international sponsors.

I identify three international informational effects that can affect the calculus of incumbent elites who consider malpractice as one of their electoral options. The first international effect concerns signals sent by supportive international election monitoring groups. There is significant variation in international election monitoring practices, and many monitoring groups exhibit biases in favour of the governments whose elections they are monitoring. Incumbent elites can thus be confident that the costs associated with critical international monitoring reports can be reduced if they invite observer groups who have shown through previous behaviour that they are likely to be lenient and supportive. The second international effect concerns the (often unintentional) signal that is sent to incumbents if international efforts at punishment and sanctions are limited or absent. Although many states and international organizations promise robust sanctions against those

[4] Lehoucq, 'Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences'; Daniel Ziblatt, 'Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany', *American Political Science Review* 103 (2009): 1–21; Sarah Birch, *Electoral Malpractice* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011).

[5] Myagkov, Ordeshook, and Shakin, *The Forensics of Election Fraud*.

who engage in electoral manipulation, international enforcement is rarely universal, and target countries often benefit from the fact that supportive allies refuse to take part and even seek to frustrate and undermine the sanctions effort. Finally, incumbent actors can also act in the knowledge that manipulation may be met not only with international opprobrium from certain, especially Western, quarters of the international community, but also with high-level diplomatic support from dependable international sponsors, who may use state visits and international forums to advocate publicly on behalf of beleaguered allies. Consequently, when considering whether to engage in manipulation or whether to allow for free and fair elections, incumbents consider not only the likely costs of their behaviour but also the ways in which supportive international allies might mitigate those costs in the event that misconduct is detected and exposed.

Not every state, however, is exposed to the same set of international signals, and patterns of international linkages will shape the likely international response in the event that election misconduct is detected and exposed. Consequently, I also show how linkage politics can shape the international informational environment, and demonstrate how a diverse linkage spectrum can lead to a combination of critical and supportive signals. Countries that enjoy such a diverse spectrum can thus avoid being entirely isolated as part of a pariah 'out-group', and can find instead that their relative isolation is compensated for by membership of a competing 'in-group' that includes influential international sponsors.

I illustrate these dynamics through an examination of electoral misconduct in Zimbabwe from 2000–08. During this period the regime of President Robert Mugabe faced a high level of international scrutiny and opprobrium, linked in large part to a series of controversial policies including land seizures, electoral fraud, and political repression. Yet Mugabe did not face universal condemnation, and experienced instead a contested international environment that included loyal sponsors as well as vocal critics. Many international actors, including states and international organizations from the region and beyond it, used a range of tools to send clear signals of support to the regime. As a result, Mugabe's repeated resort to practices of electoral manipulation must be understood not only in terms of the domestic politics within Zimbabwe, but also of the diverse and contested international informational environment in which the regime operated.

The chapter examines these dynamics over three parts. The first part reviews the literature on electoral manipulation and highlights the general marginalization of international politics in theoretical accounts of electoral misconduct. The second part sets out the three international informational effects in greater detail, highlighting the manner in which they may mitigate the perceived costs of electoral manipulation. The final section explores the international

dimensions of electoral manipulation in the case of Zimbabwe, where the Mugabe regime benefited from the support of international sponsors who lowered rather than raised the perceived costs of authoritarian behaviour.

## THE POLITICS OF ELECTORAL MANIPULATION

The politics of electoral malpractice has received increasing attention in recent years, in part due to the spread of elections across the world since the end of the Cold War and their increasing use in authoritarian contexts.[6] The new international environment created considerable incentives within authoritarian regimes to hold elections in order to qualify for economic assistance that Western states and international organizations increasingly made conditional on political reform.[7] Authoritarian governments began to introduce elections but also to manipulate them in ways that ensured incumbent survival—nearly all authoritarian regimes now hold regular elections. While many of these elections were genuinely competitive, the game was rigged in enough ways to preclude genuine democratic competition.[8] In other contexts, elections were little more than political theatre, with little real political competition permitted against incumbent candidates.[9] The increasing role for elections in authoritarian settings increases the importance of understanding the determinants of electoral manipulation. However, despite the theoretical richness and sophistication of this research agenda, it remains somewhat limited by its concentration on domestic-level politics, and its marginalization of external influences that shape the politics of electoral manipulation.

Election manipulation includes not just fraudulent efforts to rig the ballot results, but also a wider array of activities designed to tilt the election outcome, including vote buying, tampering with voter registration rolls, and intimidating voters.[10] The most influential explanations for why electoral manipulation

[6] Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 'Elections Under Authoritarianism'.

[7] Susan D. Hyde, 'International Dimensions of Elections', in *The Dynamics of Democratization: Dictatorship, Development, and Diffusion*, ed. Nathan J. Brown (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011), 266–82.

[8] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

[9] Diamond distinguishes here between competitive and hegemonic electoral authoritarian regimes: Larry Jay Diamond, 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes', *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35.

[10] In this article I use the terms manipulation, misconduct, and malpractice interchangeably. See Alberto Simpser, *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications* (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), chapter 2.

takes place have tended to focus on national politics, and have identified a range of influences on both the motivation and opportunities for electoral malpractice. Lehoucq's review of the literature on electoral fraud highlights the key role that political competitiveness plays in creating motivation for misconduct. The more competitive the political environment, and the stronger the opposition challenge, the more likely it is that incumbents will resort to fraud to stay in power.[11] Simpser, however, identifies an alternative motivation for electoral manipulation by showing that it often takes place even when victory is almost assured, as incumbent elites send a message to opposition forces about the scale of their power and the futility of opposition mobilization.[12]

The motivations for manipulation, however, are not always matched by the opportunity, which often varies according to the prevailing political institutions within a given regime.[13] Fortin-Rittberger for example, suggests that electoral fraud is more feasible when state capacity is weak rather than strong, while Birch argues that electoral system design shapes incumbents' abilities, and thus incentives, to resort to electoral malpractice.[14] Ziblatt also points to the importance of underlying structural inequalities, and argues that electoral fraud is sometimes encouraged by inequalities of social power that provide entrenched interests with the opportunities to subvert the democratic process.[15]

Even if the motive and opportunity exist, however, incumbents must also assess the potential costs that might accompany the potential benefits. Governments must balance any expected electoral gains with consideration of both the chance that their actions will be uncovered and the consequent damage that they may suffer, and in this area at least, scholars have acknowledged the role of international politics. One set of potential costs is domestic, and concerns the loss of legitimacy that regime incumbents can suffer if they

[11] Lehoucq, 'Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences'.

[12] Simpser, *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*.

[13] Fabrice E. Lehoucq and Ivan Molina, *Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Emilie M. Hafner-Burton, Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski, 'When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?', *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2013): 1–31.

[14] Jessica Fortin-Rittberger, 'The Role of Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity in Explaining Different Types of Electoral Fraud', *Democratization* 21, no. 1 (2014): 95–117; Sarah Birch, 'Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct', *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (2007): 1533–56.

[15] Ziblatt, 'Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany'.

are found to be engaging in misconduct, which may undermine existing support for the regime and may harm the incumbents' chances in any future elections.[16] Public exposure of manipulation can also lead to widespread public protests, which can undermine incumbents' ability to govern without the use of coercion and, in certain circumstances, as illustrated by the fall of Milošević in Serbia, can threaten their very position in power.[17]

Another set of potential costs is international, and concerns the risk that international actors will punish governments who are seen to manipulate their own elections. Hyde has demonstrated, for example, that a range of 'democracy-contingent benefits' can be put at risk if manipulation is uncovered by international election observers.[18] Birch frames some of the costs associated with international exposure in terms of a loss of international rather than domestic legitimacy. As many states rely on their ties with the rest of the international community to obtain the resources necessary for regime survival, loss of legitimacy in the eyes of the international community can represent a major threat, as the international sanctions that follow may undermine the economic capacity of the authorities.[19] Similarly, Donno identifies a range of mechanisms through which international actors can enforce democratic norms in the wake of electoral misconduct, and argues that such international enforcement can raise the costs of, and thus deter, manipulation.[20] Numerous states, including Zimbabwe, Haiti, and Ethiopia, have been faced with punitive international sanctions after engaging in electoral misconduct.

Yet as illuminating as these insights are, they focus primarily on the influence of mostly Western and pro-democratic international actors. There is another side to the international influences on the politics of electoral manipulation that has yet to be fully explored or understood, involving mostly non-Western actors who often seek to support rather than punish autocratic elites. Recently, some scholars have sought to shed light on some of these practices. Vanderhill has highlighted the ways in which external actors can contribute to electoral manipulation abroad, and Tolstrup has identified a number of mechanisms through which external 'black knights' can help autocratic incumbents successfully win and survive elections.[21] I seek to

[16] Birch, *Electoral Malpractice*.

[17] Tucker, 'Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions'; Susan Hyde and Nikolay Marinov, 'Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation' International Organization 68, no. 2 (2014): 329–59.

[18] Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*, chapter 4.

[19] Birch, *Electoral Malpractice*.

[20] Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*.

[21] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Tolstrup, 'Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes'.

complement this line of research by focusing on the type of international behaviour that can lower the perceived costs of electoral manipulation for incumbent actors and make it more, rather than less, likely to take place. The central focus is thus on the first stage in the life-cycle of the authoritarian practice of electoral manipulation (the decision to pursue the practice), rather than on the practical implementation of malpractice or the post-election fallout.

## THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF ELECTORAL MANIPULATION

The role of information is crucial in understanding the politics of electoral manipulation. It shapes both the incentives of incumbent and opposition actors, and also affects the way in which the wider public will respond to electoral outcomes.[22] More generally, information is central in shaping the ways in which, and the extent to which, political actors can learn from developments abroad.[23] Yet the context of electoral competition is one in which these actors are subject to a wide range of information signals, and the literature on electoral manipulation has yet to fully appreciate the diversity of information sources and their potentially contrasting effects. To date, the literature has tended to view international politics as a source of information about the *costs* of electoral manipulation, and scholars have emphasized the role of Western states and international election observers as actors that create disincentives for manipulative behaviour. Donno, for example, discusses an 'international audience' for electoral misconduct that is presented as a pro-democratic audience with a preference for higher election quality and a willingness to push for democratic reform.[24] Similarly, Birch's important insights on the role of international legitimacy and electoral manipulation are limited by a tendency to view international actors as democratic actors who will sanction their trade and aid partners if electoral manipulation is detected.[25]

[22] Hyde and Marinov, 'Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation'; Simpser, *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*.

[23] Nancy Bermeo, 'Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship', *Comparative Politics* 24 (1992): 273–91; Heydemann and Leenders, 'Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the "Arab Awakening"'.

[24] Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*, chapter 2.

[25] Birch, *Electoral Malpractice*.

Yet numerous states and international organizations have a track record of supporting authoritarian regimes abroad in the wake of electoral misconduct, and consequently there are a range of international signals that incumbents can receive that suggest the international costs of electoral malpractice may be limited or mitigated by international support from other quarters. Here, I identify three international informational effects that can suggest to incumbent elites that the potential costs of electoral manipulation may be mitigated by other factors.

## Lenient International Observers

The first international signal concerns the detection of manipulation itself, and the likelihood that international actors will expose any electoral malpractice that takes place. The rise of the international election monitoring regime has had a significant effect on the elite calculus regarding electoral manipulation, and has been shown to act as a disincentive to elites considering electoral malpractice.[26] Similarly, the presence of observers makes public protests more likely, thus increasing pressure on incumbents to avoid malpractice. As Hyde and Marinov state, 'in a counterfactual world without observers, fewer governments would be motivated to hold clean elections'.[27]

Yet while international observers can clearly provide information that creates disincentives for manipulation, it is also the case that not all observer groups act in the same way or provide similar reports on individual elections. Kelley identifies a 'shadow market' of consistently lenient monitoring groups that routinely offer positive assessments of elections that are criticized as flawed by other, often more reputable, organizations.[28] The shadow market exists to meet the needs of governments who would prefer to cheat while excluding outside observers, but who recognize that doing so would incur excessive costs. The alternative they have found is to invite supportive monitors (often representing allied countries or local regional organizations with non-democratic members) who are more likely to endorse flawed elections and refrain from direct criticism. The lenient reports from such friendly monitors can divide the community of international organizations and

[26] Kelley, *Monitoring Democracy*; Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*; Nahomi Ichino and Matthias Schündeln, 'Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana', *Journal of Politics* 74 (2012): 292–307.

[27] Hyde and Marinov, 'Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation'.

[28] Kelley, *Monitoring Democracy*.

provide a diversity of findings from which incumbents can 'forum shop' and emphasize the most favourable, thus complicating the notion that the presence of observer groups automatically creates costs for incumbents.[29] Supportive observer groups can send clear signals over multiple election cycles that they will reliably legitimize flawed elections, and can thus have the effect of reducing the anticipated costs of electoral manipulation.

Many of the most lenient monitors operate in the non-Western world or have large numbers of non-Western states as members, including the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Commonwealth, and the African Union (AU). These groups frequently send signals that they are unlikely to expose or condemn electoral manipulation, and governments can thus rely on their presence as a counterweight to potential criticism from other groups. States can thus lower the expected costs of electoral malpractice by inviting groups that they are confident will provide supportive findings.

## Partial and Contested Enforcement

The second international informational effect concerns the variation in punishment or sanctions that follows breaches of democratic norms and procedures. In those circumstances when election observers detect electoral malpractice and publicize it widely, the subsequent response of the international community can send signals to political elites who might consider manipulating elections in the future. Would-be manipulators can thus examine past episodes in which international authorities have uncovered manipulation in order to gain information as to the likely international reaction.

Donno's research has highlighted the ways in which democratic enforcement following flawed elections can lead to intense democratizing pressure through mechanisms of conditionality, mediation, and shaming.[30] Yet such international pressure is rarely applied in unison by all countries, and there are significant variations in international practice in the wake of flawed elections. The issue here is not only one of inconsistent or impartial democratic enforcement. It is well known that democracy-promoting countries and international organizations frequently fail to enforce their own conditions, often in deference to the strategic importance of the country in breach.[31]

[29] Ibid. [30] Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*.

[31] Crawford, 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency'; Carothers, *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*; Thomas Carothers, *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).

Rather, it is also the case that many states are resistant to the very idea of democratic conditionality and are politically opposed to international sanctions for the purposes of punishing perpetrators of electoral misconduct and other breaches of democratic procedure. Democratic conditionality is often highly contested, and powerful international actors often actively resist and block international sanctions efforts. European Union sanctions against Belarus were intensified following deeply flawed presidential elections in 2006, but Russia provided continued support in subsequent years and openly declared its intention to counter the effects of Western sanctions.[32] As discussed further below, efforts to enact United Nations sanctions against Zimbabwe after the deeply flawed 2008 presidential elections were blocked by Russia and China.

Often, these debates about sanctions are highly public and visible, and autocratic leaders can thus learn from international reactions to past regime abuses either at home or in the wider region. Future behaviour can never be entirely predicted from past behaviour, but international actors can provide clear cues as to their likely response to electoral manipulation in a given country through their previous record of enforcement or support. Governing elites may therefore estimate that the expected costs associated with electoral manipulation will be bearable if the international signals they receive suggest that external sanctions may only be applied by certain quarters of the international community and may be opposed and resisted with robust countermeasures by supportive allies.

## High-Level Diplomatic Support

The third international informational effect that can influence incumbent elites concerns the extent of active diplomatic support they expect to receive even if election misconduct is uncovered. Aside from simply eschewing international sanctions against governments accused of electoral misconduct, international actors often provide robust, high-level diplomatic support to embattled incumbents. This type of active, and often long-term, support can in turn reassure incumbent elites that they will be able to escape the worst effects of Western pressure and punishment and thus provide incentives for continued electoral malpractice in the future.

[32] 'Putin Attacks EU Sanctions on Belarus Visit', Reuters, 31 May 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/31/us-russia-putin-belarus-idUSBRE84U1J220120531>.

Supportive allies can provide several forms of diplomatic support that can send such signals. Prior to election campaigns, external actors can offer open support to incumbent elites, for example through public statements or official visits. More directly, international allies may also encourage manipulative behaviour and provide strategic advice on how to engage in specific forms of electoral malpractice. If election misconduct is exposed, supportive allies can protect embattled elites by offering swift recognition of the election results, making public statements of support, and openly criticizing those actors (usually Western, democratic states and international organizations) who question the quality of the election. Such robust support in the wake of flawed elections can send a clear signal that when it comes to the next election cycle, similar levels of support may be forthcoming. Vladimir Putin, for example, offered President Lukashenko of Belarus open support after the flawed and controversial 2010 presidential elections, in a predictable echo of the swift recognition of the disputed 2006 election results.[33] Prior to Ukraine's controversial 2004 elections, Russia provided funds to enable the Viktor Yanukovych campaign to engage in election-related bribery, and offered high-level strategic advisors to manage the electoral manipulation. The depth of Russian investment in a Yanukovych victory meant that Putin's support in the event of Western criticism and public protests against the handling of the elections was unsurprising and predictable.[34]

Many regimes are thus in a position to know that even should their non-democratic behaviour be exposed, any international criticism they receive may be matched, or outweighed, with staunch international support from close allies. The particular set of international signals, however, is likely to vary from context to context. Some countries will receive signals of support due to their geo-strategic importance. Major military powers, resource-rich states, and strategically important allies are often given a 'green light' to engage in non-democratic behaviour even by self-proclaimed democracy promoters.[35] Yet countries that lack such strategic importance can also receive favourable signals from outside actors depending on their external linkage relationships. While Levitsky and Way have shown that linkage to the West can lead to democratizing pressure, the presence of non-Western (and especially autocratic) linkage can lead to the presence of countervailing international influences. Governments in states with strong non-Western linkage will be

[33] Tolstrup, 'Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes'.

[34] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*. Andrew Wilson, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005); Taras Kuzio, 'Russian Policy toward Ukraine during Elections', *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 13, no. 4 (1 October 2005): 491–517.

[35] Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*; Carothers, *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*.

more likely to expect that any electoral malpractice they engage in will be actively defended by non-Western allies, and that democratic enforcement from other quarters will be weakened as a result. It is important to note that the argument here is not deterministic; I do not argue that non-Western linkage *guarantees* external support, and that all non-Western actors will respond in an identical way. Just as not all Western states and international organizations promote democracy in equal measure, and may sometimes sponsor authoritarianism instead,[36] so too do non-Western states vary in their policies towards autocratic states. Rather, echoing Levitsky and Way's arguments about linkage to the West,[37] I argue that channels of non-Western linkage alter the *likelihood* that non-Western governments will support a particular regime once allegations of electoral abuses are made. Support will not be automatic, but it is more likely to be forthcoming if incumbent elites have strong ties to non-Western partners. Furthermore, such linkage ties are not entirely static,[38] and incumbent elites can also act in strategic ways that enhance linkage ties to non-Western partners, and thus further increase the probabilities of obtaining external support. Although linkage is often tied to deeply embedded structural factors that are hard or impossible to change, such as geography or history, it is also the case that elites can seek to foster greater linkage to outside actors through foreign policy changes, such as opening previously closed markets and engaging in diplomatic flattery. Such actions allow governments to strengthen links with those they view as reliable, or potential, sources of support.

The remainder of this chapter explores these dynamics in the case of Zimbabwe, a country that has received remarkably high levels of international attention for its electoral behaviour, but also remarkably varied forms of international response. For the regime of Robert Mugabe, the international environment has been not only a source of punishment and opprobrium, but also one of robust international sponsorship.

## THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF ELECTORAL MANIPULATION IN ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwe achieved independence in 1980, and the following two decades were notable for the dominance of Robert Mugabe's political party, the

[36] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*.

[37] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 45.

[38] Jakob Tolstrup, 'When Can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Gatekeeper Elites', *Democratization* 20, no. 4 (2013): 716–42.

Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF), and the ease with which it overcame the opposition movements it faced. Elections were at times competitive, but ZANU–PF also used violence and manipulation in order to maintain its dominance over weak or divided opposition parties.[39] The political situation began to change in the late 1990s with the rise of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by former trade union leader Morgan Tsvangirai. The MDC emerged out of an increasingly mobilized opposition movement that was disillusioned with political corruption, economic decay, and enduring ZANU–PF dominance.[40] It quickly grew into a powerful force in Zimbabwean politics, shaking the political landscape by spearheading a successful campaign to reject a government-proposed referendum on constitutional reform in February 2000. The government's response included a range of authoritarian practices. ZANU–PF co-opted and empowered veterans' groups from the pre-1980 independence struggle, and unleashed a destabilizing campaign of land seizures perpetrated largely against white farmers.[41] It launched a targeted campaign of state-sponsored violence against the MDC, deploying a range of repressive tactics and striving to create 'no-go areas' for opposition groups.[42] Over subsequent years, the regime also engaged in successive rounds of election manipulation, peaking with the highly violent and controversial presidential elections of 2008. Given the prevalence of election-related violence in Zimbabwe, it is sometimes difficult to separate out the authoritarian practices of election fraud and violent repression.[43] Here, I focus in particular on the regime's use of non-violent electoral malpractice to maintain its rule, although the arguments have relevance for the regime's pursuit of election-related violent repression also.

[39] Sara Rich Dorman, '"Make Sure They Count Nicely This Time": The Politics of Elections and Election Observing in Zimbabwe', *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 43, no. 2 (2005): 155–77; Norma Kriger, 'ZANU (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and Coercion', *African Affairs* 104, no. 414 (2005): 1–34.

[40] Brian Raftopoulos and Ian Phimister, 'Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion', *Historical Materialism* 12, no. 4 (2004): 355–82; Adrienne LeBas, *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

[41] A key provision of the constitution that was rejected at the polls would have allowed the government to appropriate land without compensation. On the importance of both land reform and the role of war veterans groups in Zimbabwean politics, see Raftopoulos and Phimister, 'Zimbabwe Now'.

[42] Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, 'The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980–2010', Development Leadership Programme Research Paper 9 (2011): 24.

[43] Hafner-Burton, Hyde, and Jablonski, 'When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?'; Ursula E. Daxecker, 'The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-Election Violence in Africa', *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (2012): 503–16.

The post-2000 pattern of electoral misconduct certainly fits existing theories that emphasize the role of opposition threat in explaining incumbent decisions to manipulate elections. The Mugabe regime faced a radically altered domestic environment, and the incentives for misconduct became more urgent: without it, ZANU–PF faced the real prospect of losing power. Yet once the land seizure campaign of 2000 was initiated, and after early evidence of electoral misconduct was exposed, Zimbabwe also faced a dramatic rise in Western international scrutiny, and the costs of further electoral malpractice rose accordingly. Western media interest in Zimbabwean politics increased sharply,[44] international actors began to criticize the Mugabe regime more strenuously, and its spectrum of international support began to narrow.[45]

What explains the sustained pattern of election misconduct after 2000 even when the costs of misconduct had risen so steeply? To understand the repeated resort to electoral manipulation in Zimbabwe after 2000, I argue that it is necessary to go beyond consideration of increased incentives for manipulation (the rise of the MDC) and the increased costs of such manipulation (domestic protests and international sanctions). It is also necessary to take into account the international signals that communicated to the Mugabe regime that the costs of manipulation could be offset by strong external support. I do not argue that this is purely an international story. The policies of ZANU–PF during this period were not solely determined by international pressures, and in crucial ways reflected a long-standing determination to retain the power it had gained at independence in 1980. Partly reflecting its origins as a revolutionary independence movement, the ZANU–PF leadership felt entitled to rule Zimbabwe and since independence in 1980 had consistently sought to de-legitimize and eliminate its rivals.[46] Consequently, it was willing to engage in extreme measures when challenged by the MDC.[47]

[44] Western media interest in Zimbabwe spiked considerably in 2000 with the rise of the MDC, violent land seizures, and hotly contested elections. According to its online archive, the *New York Times* published only eleven articles mentioning Robert Mugabe in 1996, the year of presidential elections, rising to twenty-five articles in 1999 and fifty-eight in 2000. Similarly, according to the UK *Guardian*'s archive the newspaper's coverage rose more than fourfold in one year, from seventy-four stories mentioning Mugabe in 1999 to 358 in 2000.

[45] On Zimbabwe's increasing international isolation, see ICG, 'Zimbabwe In Crisis: Finding A Way Forward', 13 July 2001, 20. US condemnation of Zimbabwe started in earnest in 2000: see US Department of State, 'U.S. Relations With Zimbabwe: Fact Sheet', 15 February 2013, <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5479.htm>. On the debate over why the international position changed so much at this time in particular, see Dorman, '"Make Sure They Count Nicely This Time"'.

[46] Michael Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014); Kriger, 'ZANU (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980–2000'.

[47] Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*, 73.

Yet after 2000, Zimbabwe became the focus of intense international scrutiny, and it is difficult to separate the internal power politics from the external cross-currents. As I show below, the international environment that the Zimbabwean regime faced was one that was not simply a source of bad news and potential costs. Rather, Zimbabwe's location within Africa and its diverse network of international linkages ensured it received a mix of international signals, including some which would have lowered the anticipated costs of manipulation. To adapt Donno's concept, Zimbabwe's 'international audience' was a diverse one that included both pro-democratic critics and pro-Mugabe supporters. The response of pro-Mugabe supporters to early instances of electoral misconduct sent clear signals that any subsequent misconduct would be met not only with further criticism and punishment, but also with further advocacy and protection.

The diversity of international responses did not reflect a simple divide between Western critics and African supporters, or between democratic opponents and autocratic allies. Zimbabwe often received criticism from its African neighbours, including authoritarian ones.[48] Furthermore, such regional criticism increased over time, and peaked after the brutally violent 2008 presidential election campaign, when many states within the region openly condemned Mugabe's actions. Nonetheless, even when Mugabe's electoral malpractice was at it worst and most violent, his regime retained the support of a core set of key, non-Western allies, both within Africa and internationally. Mugabe actively courted such support, and expressed gratitude for it. Linkage to non-Western states was thus no panacea, but it facilitated close ties with key supportive allies during a period in which the regime was under intense and increasing scrutiny and pressure. In the sections that follow, I outline Zimbabwe's place within the international community, highlighting in particular its diverse linkage spectrum, before identifying the international informational effects that shaped the calculus of electoral misconduct within the regime.

## Zimbabwe's International Environment

Despite the rise of international scrutiny and criticism of the Mugabe regime after 2000, Zimbabwe's position in the international community limited Mugabe's vulnerability to outside pressure. In their study of competitive authoritarian regimes, Levitsky and Way suggest that Zimbabwe was subject

[48] Dorman, '"Make Sure They Count Nicely This Time"'.

to high levels of Western leverage and lacked 'black knight' support.[49] Yet this analysis is flawed, as it underappreciates the extent to which Zimbabwe has been protected from the West by international sponsors. Although it lacks economic or military power, and is not a strategically important actor on the international stage, the reality is that Zimbabwe has strong channels of non-Western linkage, with ties to states and international organizations that have a limited track record of robustly promoting democracy or punishing non-democratic behaviour. It has also benefited from extensive support from a range of regional and international powers that have consciously and forcefully defended Zimbabwe in the face of Western democratizing pressures and punitive sanctions.

This is partly due to Zimbabwe's location within Africa, a region which has a notoriously uneven track record on promoting or enforcing democratic norms and practices. African international organizations are much less likely to enforce democratic provisions than their European or Latin American counterparts, and are more likely to act in response to coups than in response to electoral misconduct.[50] While the AU has suspended several member states in the wake of political coups, including Togo in 2005, Guinea in 2008, and Egypt in 2013,[51] it has tended to be much more lenient in response to election irregularities, and has refrained from enacting sanctions in the wake of numerous flawed elections and other forms of democratic backsliding.[52]

It is within this context that Zimbabwe has developed a complex set of international, and mostly non-Western, linkages. Its most significant economic partner is South Africa, which has tended to be only a cautious advocate of democracy and human rights abroad.[53] Diplomatically, Zimbabwe has actively sought to expand its non-Western linkages.[54] Since the early 2000s, Mugabe has pursued a 'Look East' policy that seeks to reject relations

[49] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, 238.

[50] Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*.

[51] Eki Yemisi Omorogbe, 'A Club of Incumbents: The African Union and Coups d'Etat', *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 44 (2011): 123–54.

[52] Konstantinos Magliveras, 'The Sanctioning System of the African Union: Part Success, Part Failure?' (Paper presented at an Expert Roundtable on 'The African Union: The First Ten Years', Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2011); Paul D. Williams, 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture', *African Affairs* 106, no. 423 (2007): 253–79, 274.

[53] Thomas Carothers and Richard Youngs, *Looking for Help: Will Rising Democracies Become International Democracy Supporters?* (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011).

[54] On the role elites can play in shaping linkage politics, see Tolstrup, 'When Can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Gatekeeper Elites'.

with the West and to build relations with states in the Middle East and Asia, especially China.[55] Zimbabwe's relationship with China has been developing rapidly, and in 2012 it ranked as Zimbabwe's second-largest trading partner after South Africa.[56] Mugabe has framed the diplomatic eastward shift in terms that emphasize the rising strength of Asian states, as well as a shared colonial history and a common identity as Third World nations. Commenting in 2004, Mugabe suggested the East 'sees things the same way we see them, thinks as we do, dreams as ourselves, so they are our greatest friends'.[57]

For their part, Zimbabwe's international sponsors have had a number of motives for supporting the Mugabe regime. Within Africa, states have offered robust support to Mugabe for both self-interested and normative reasons. Libya under Muammar Gadhafi provided extensive diplomatic and material support to Zimbabwe, including loans for oil purchases, multimillion-dollar campaign donations, and security training.[58] Such support was significantly underwritten by economic interest, as Libya negotiated access to Zimbabwe's markets, significant shares in its state-run companies, and ownership of valuable farm land that had been seized in the land reform campaign.[59] Mugabe also received loyal support from a range of other countries in the region, including Angola, Mozambique, and South Africa. For regional authoritarian states, the motives related in part to limiting contagion, and to bolstering a fellow autocrat against a tide of popular mobilization. Democracy resistance was an important factor behind the actions of a number of autocratic sponsors. Yet support for Zimbabwe cannot be divorced from the standing and position of Mugabe himself, and reflected more than just self-interested concerns. Mugabe's personal history as the leader of a successful independence movement, combined with his carefully cultivated reputation as a champion of African resistance to Western powers, contributed greatly to his status among both democratic and authoritarian neighbours.[60] South African President Thabo Mbeki was a staunch supporter during this period, and his policy reflected the mix of motives at play within Africa. Without any reason

[55] Percyslage Chigora and Taderera Hebert Chisi, 'The Eight Years of Interaction: Lessons from Zimbabwe's "Look East" Policy and the Future of African Countries and Asia-Pacific Region,' *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 10, no. 4 (2009): 92–8.

[56] European Union, 'Zimbabwe: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World', 2013.

[57] Cited in Youde, 'Why Look East?', 13.

[58] 'Zimbabwe in 360 Million Dollar Fuel Deal with Libya', Agence France-Presse, 20 July 2001.

[59] 'Libya: Gaddafi Pledges US$900,000 to Mugabe Re-Election Campaign', *Africa News*, 20 July 2001; 'Zimbabwe; Mugabe Hires Libyan Guards', *Africa News*, 23 August 2001; 'Mugabe Pawns Nation's Assets in Deal with Libya', *The Times (London)*, 23 February 2002.

[60] Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulos, 'Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism', *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 101 (2004): 385–400; Youde, 'Why Look East?'.

to fear a process of democratization in Zimbabwe, the loyal sponsorship of South Africa's democratic president is best seen as a reflection of a combination of economic interests (access to Zimbabwe's markets), normative affinity (in response to Mugabe's calls for anti-imperialist solidarity), and power politics (South Africa's desire to maintain a position as a leading diplomatic power in the wide region).[61] Outside Africa, Zimbabwe also received support from some powerful actors, including China and Russia. China's involvement, like that of many other sponsors, reflected both economic interests related to market access, as well as diplomatic and normative interests in building alliances with states that resist Western norms and interests.[62]

Zimbabwe's regional location and network of international linkages thus offered a very specific international context, which in turn provided a very specific, and highly contested, informational environment. Not all of the international signals that were received after 2000 in Zimbabwe were directed from the pro-democratic West, and any understanding of the politics of electoral misconduct in the country must incorporate not only the role of Western pressure, but also the salience of regional dynamics and enduring non-Western support networks. Ultimately, many of Zimbabwe's non-Western partners became vocal critics, but crucially, all of its enduring supporters were non-Western states or international organizations. Non-Western linkage thus should not be seen as a factor that guarantees external support, but rather one that must be taken into account to understand the channels of support that emerge and endure.

The following sections illustrate how the three types of international signal described above were present in Zimbabwe, and identify the ways in which the regime responded to each one. There are significant methodological challenges to measuring the impact of these international signals on the political decision-making processes of a small group of regime elites. The difficulties of doing so relate not only to the largely unobservable nature of the political decision-making involved (i.e. the cognitive processes taking place in the minds of a select group of elite actors), but also the nature of the behaviour being considered, which involves non-democratic and often illegal acts that elites are unlikely to discuss openly. Direct observations or frank confessions are thus both difficult to obtain. Consequently, the aim here is not to

[61] Phimister and Raftopoulos, 'Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism'.

[62] Taylor, 'Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights'; Emma Mawdsley, 'China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power', *Geography Compass* 1, no. 3 (2007): 405–21; Johan Lagerkvist, 'Chinese Eyes on Africa: Authoritarian Flexibility versus Democratic Governance', *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 2 (2009): 119–34.

demonstrate their precise impact on the thinking of regime leaders, but rather to show that international factors were part of the decision-making environment, that regime elites were conscious of these international factors, and that the behaviour of regime elites was shaped in part by consideration of a complex mix of international signals that suggested that electoral misconduct would be met with external support as well as external costs. In particular, the analysis below rests on three types of evidence to support the arguments advanced above. Firstly, it includes evidence that shows that international actors do indeed seek to influence the nature of electoral competition, including multiple statements and policies of a wide range of international actors who concerned themselves with national elections in Zimbabwe. These statements and policies not only include those designed to deter or punish misconduct, but also those that appear designed to downplay or defend it. Secondly, the domestic-level importance of these international efforts can be established in part from the extent to which national-level actors refer to the international sphere in the context of electoral competition and misconduct. Statements from national-level elites that address international actors and international policies help demonstrate that the context for decision-making is not an entirely domestic one, and statements that emphasize international allies over international accusers help demonstrate that national elites are aware not only of the likely international costs of fraud but also of the channels of likely international support. Finally, the behaviour of national elites on the international stage, or in relation to international actors such as regional organizations and monitoring groups, can also be examined to establish the extent of international influences. Changes in behaviour regarding the invitation of electoral monitors, for example, can highlight the ways in which national elites can learn to use international actors strategically to shape the cost–benefit dynamics of electoral misconduct. With respect to each international signal discussed below, the Mugabe regime responded in words and deeds, and the process of electoral manipulation was thus situated in a context in which international actors shaped and guided domestic behaviour.

## Lenient Observers

One important international informational effect on the dynamics of electoral politics in Zimbabwe emerged from the activities of international election monitors, and especially the pattern of lenient reporting from supportive African observer missions. Election monitoring in Africa expanded considerably in the 1990s, but the practice quickly earned a reputation for producing

inconsistent, biased, or superficial reports.[63] It was within this context that the Mugabe regime faced increased international scrutiny in 2000, and the regime showed itself to be well aware of the vagaries of the international election observation regime, as well as how to take advantage of them.

Mugabe was unable to remove all critical voices, including critical African voices, but with the knowledge that some observer groups were likely to be much more lenient than others, his regime sought to politicize the observation process in ways that reinforced the favourable findings of supportive observers while undermining the findings of more critical sources. The regime's engagement in the politics of election observation suggests two key conclusions: firstly, the history of lenient election observation in Africa provided critical information to the regime that suggested international observation represented not only potential costs, but also potential benefits; and secondly, that the regime used this knowledge to devise a highly strategic game of interaction with international observers designed to minimize the costs of its electoral malpractice. At the height of electoral malpractice in 2008, Mugabe was unable to prevent widespread and nearly universal international condemnation, but for much of the period after 2000 the regime benefited from a core of supportive monitors within the region.

For the 2000 legislative elections, the role of election observers became highly controversial before the poll had taken place. Prior to the election, Mugabe launched what Susan Hyde calls a 'comprehensive campaign to manipulate foreign observers', revoking the visas of two prominent US non-governmental organization (NGO) observer groups and altering rules in ways designed to determine the nationality profile of those observers that were admitted.[64] ZANU–PF won a slim majority of legislative seats when the results were announced, but the MDC immediately questioned the validity of the outcome. Zimbabwean human rights NGO the Amani Trust documented 5,048 human rights violations between the announcement of the constitutional referendum result and the June 2000 elections, with 86 per cent of the incidents resulting from actions by members or supporters of ZANU–PF.[65] The UN High

[63] Douglas G. Anglin, 'International Election Monitoring: The African Experience', *African Affairs* 97, no. 389 (1 October 1998): 471–95; Gisela Geisler, 'Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do with It? Vagaries of Election Observations and Democratic Standards', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31 (1993): 613–37; Brown, 'Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in Power'.

[64] The visas were revoked for both the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute, and all UK observers were banned. See Hyde, *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma*, 172.

[65] Denis Venter, 'Zimbabwe before and after the June 2000 Elections: An Assessment', EISA, 10 June 2005, <https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2000election1.htm>.

Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, also argued that the levels of violence and intimidation undermined the validity of the elections.[66]

Some international observers supported this view, but others passed supportive verdicts. The EU was the most critical and declared that the elections were not free and fair.[67] The Commonwealth also highlighted problems during the campaign period, and to a lesser extent on polling day, and sought to strike a balance in its findings. It concluded that on the one hand, 'incidents of violence and threats impaired the freedom of choice of the electorate', but also emphasized its view that 'democracy in Zimbabwe has taken a major step forward'.[68] Other observer groups, however, offered only mild criticism and broadly endorsed the election results. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) mission acknowledged the role of intimidation and a flawed voter registration process, but concluded that 'the Zimbabwean people have successfully exercised their franchise'.[69] The regional South African Development Community (SADC) also combined some acknowledgement of pre-election violence with a strong endorsement of the poll, concluding that 'the results are legitimate and reflect the will of the people'.[70] Despite blatant electoral manipulation, the Mugabe regime thus received open support from regional organizations, sending a clear signal that future electoral malpractice would not be met with universal condemnation.

The pattern was indeed repeated within two years. The 2002 presidential elections marked an increase in regional condemnation of electoral politics in Zimbabwe after the results showed that Mugabe had defeated Tsvangirai, 56 per cent to 42 per cent, but Mugabe nonetheless retained key supportive allies. Once again, the MDC alleged that the vote had been manipulated, while the ZANU–PF government declared them free and fair. Once again, the regime sought to strategically manipulate the international observer presence, and appeared to take advantage of the disagreements among observer groups. In advance of the poll, the EU pulled its observers out of the country after the head of its observer mission, Pierre Schori, was expelled from Zimbabwe and the government blocked the accreditation of observers from European countries that had criticized the 2000 elections.[71] European leaders were united in their

[66] Cited in Liisa Laakso, 'The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000', *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 3 (2002): 437–64, 453.

[67] Laakso, 'The Politics of International Election Observation'.

[68] Commonwealth Observer Group, 'The Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe 24–25 June 2000: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group', 2000.

[69] Organisation for African Unity, 'Zimbabwe 2000: OAU Interim Statement', July 2000.

[70] SADC, 'Zimbabwe 2000: SADC–ECF Observer Mission Report', June 2000.

[71] Eric Bjornlund, *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy* (Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004), 202.

condemnation of the election after polling day, the US refused to recognize the results,[72] and the Commonwealth issued a highly critical report.[73] Importantly, there was one significant break with the regional pattern, and the SADC Parliamentary Forum was also highly critical of the elections, citing a broad range of irregularities and concluding that the elections violated almost all of its own norms and standards for electoral conduct.[74]

However, several regional observer missions found the elections to be largely legitimate and acceptable. The OAU report found the elections were 'transparent, credible, free and fair', while South Africa, Kenya, Namibia, and Tanzania also produced positive assessments.[75] While the South African observer missions noted that pre-election 'campaigning was characterised by polarisation, tension and incidents of violence and intimidation', it suggested these problems remained at a minimal level and concluded that 'the outcome of the 2002 Zimbabwe Presidential elections should be considered legitimate'.[76]

In the wake of the elections, the regime sought to capitalize on the divergence of findings and develop a narrative that the reports of supportive African monitors were the only valid ones. The government's Information Minister, Jonathan Moyo, criticized the Commonwealth report on the grounds that it was 'totally out of step not only with how elections were run but also with what other more important African observers had to say'.[77] Mugabe also sought to emphasize the role of positive African observer reports, suggesting that they provided the only 'genuine' reports.[78]

In the wake of increased criticism from international observers in 2002, the regime blocked all Western observers from elections in 2005, 2008, and 2013.[79] Furthermore, despite signing up to SADC's new 'Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections' in 2004, the regime sought to

[72] Bruce Baker, 'When to Call Black White: Zimbabwe's Electoral Reports', *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 6 (1 December 2002): 1145–58.

[73] Commonwealth Observer Group, 'Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group: Zimbabwe Presidential Elections 9–11 March 2002', 2002.

[74] SADC, 'SADC Parliamentary Forum: Statement on the Zimbabwe Elections', 13 March 2002.

[75] Bjornlund, *Beyond Free and Fair*, 202.

[76] South African Observer Mission, 'Interim Statement by the South African Observer Mission on the Zimbabwean Presidential Elections of 9 and 10 March 2002', 2002.

[77] Peter Fray and Ed O'Loughlin, 'Zimbabwe an International Pariah', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 March 2002, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/03/21/21zimlead.htm> (emphasis added).

[78] Ankomah Baffour, 'Mugabe: "No Remote Control Ever Again"', *New African*, May 2002.

[79] Susan D. Hyde and Nikolay Marinov, 'Which Elections Can Be Lost?', *Political Analysis* 20, no. 2 (2012): 191–210.

work around them and continued to engage in various forms of electoral manipulation.[80] While the 2005 elections were largely uneventful, the 2008 legislative and presidential elections represented the peak of election-related misconduct and crisis in Zimbabwe. Prior to the elections, the regime once again sought to politicize the observation process, justifying the banning of Western observers by alleging that they wished to overthrow the government.[81] Preliminary reports from international observers largely found the legislative elections to be free and fair, and results that showed a breakthrough majority victory for the MDC were released and quickly confirmed. However, the results of the first round of the presidential elections were delayed for thirty-three days, during which time the security situation in the country deteriorated significantly. When the results were finally released, they showed Tsvangirai leading by 47 per cent to Mugabe's 43 per cent in a result that necessitated a second-round run-off. The figures ran counter to parallel vote tabulation results that had been produced by NGO groups and the MDC based on individual polling station results. Parallel tabulations from one local NGO, the Independent Results Centre, as well as the MDC, showed that Tsvangirai had been elected as the outright winner with just over 50 per cent, while tabulations from the Zimbabwe Election Support Network NGO showed Tsvangirai receiving just over 49 per cent but with an absolute majority within the margin of error.[82]

The government responded to the official results with an escalating campaign of violence and intimidation against opposition targets, including domestic election observers. As the campaign intensified, Tsvangirai withdrew from the race and boycotted the election. For the first time, the Mugabe regime faced near universal condemnation from election observers, with even a key organ of the African Union (the Pan-African Parliament) issuing a damning report concluding that the run-off election was not free, fair, or credible.[83] Despite having been criticized by Morgan Tsvangirai earlier in 2008 for its initially mild response to election irregularities, SADC was also highly critical in the wake of the second-round violence, declaring that the election outcome did not reflect the will of the

[80] Norma Kriger, 'Zimbabwe's Parliamentary Election of 2005: The Myth of New Electoral Laws', *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34, no. 2 (2008): 359–78.

[81] 'Zimbabwe Bans Western Observers', *BBC*, 7 March 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7283061.stm>.

[82] EISA, 'Zimbabwe: 2008 Post-Election—Parallel Vote Tabulations', 16 April 2008, <https://eisa.org.za/wep/zim2008postb.htm>.

[83] Pan-African Parliament, 'Report Of The Pan-African Parliament Election Observer Mission: Presidential Run-Off Election And House Of Assembly By-Elections, Republic Of Zimbabwe', 27 June 2008.

people.[84] Yet, although the widespread condemnation marked a significant shift in attitudes within the region, it did not lead to punitive action (discussed further below) and regional neighbours ultimately sought to resolve the crisis by mediating a power-sharing agreement between ZANU and the MDC.

Presidential elections in 2013 returned to a more familiar pattern, where international observers offered a mix of findings, both critical and complementary, along largely Western and non-Western lines.[85] As with earlier elections, both domestic and international factors shaped the regime's approach to election practice in 2013. Domestically, the need for malpractice had declined, as economic improvements and a decline in support for the MDC (which was criticized in some quarters for its involvement in the power-sharing government) had strengthened ZANU–PF's position in the polls. Internationally, the backlash against the violence and malpractice of 2008 had raised the international costs of any repeat performance in 2013.[86] Electoral manipulation was thus more subtle in the 2013 elections, without the use of systematic manipulation and brute force that had been the case in earlier campaigns.[87]

In sum, Zimbabwe benefited from the presence of a core of reliably supportive election monitoring across a series of election cycles. The international reaction to the 2000 elections reinforced the prevailing regional trend for lenient election monitoring, and suggested that Mugabe would be able to rely on supportive allies in the future. The events of 2002 bore this out, as the regime was once again protected and supported in the wake of problematic elections. Possibly overestimating the stability of this international support, Mugabe against resorted to malpractice in 2008, leading some previously reliable allies to turn against the regime. Yet prior to each election, the international context was one which Mugabe had good reason believe would be a source not just of political costs, but also of pro-active support. Furthermore, by trying to manipulate the field of election observers, the regime clearly indicated how important the regime considered the international politics of elections to be. By seeking to exclude international observers, it suggested a concerted effort to

[84] Fanuel Jongwe, 'Mugabe Begins New Term as Criticism of One-Man Election Mounts', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 June 2008, <http://news.smh.com.au/world/mugabe-begins-new-term-as-criticism-of-oneman-election-mounts-20080630-2yy9.html>.

[85] Adrienne LeBas, 'A New Twilight in Zimbabwe? The Perils of Power Sharing', *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 2 (2014): 52–66.

[86] Bratton, *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*, 178; Blessing-Miles Tendi, 'Why Robert Mugabe Scored a Landslide Victory in Zimbabwean Elections', *The Guardian*, 5 August 2013, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf>.

[87] Merete Bech Seeberg, *The Power to Control: How State Capacity and Economic Control Condition the Effect of Authoritarian Elections on Regime Stability* (PhD thesis, Aarhus University, 2015).

manage the international response in ways favourable to the regime, as well as a process of learning from one election to the next.

## Partial and Contested Enforcement

Several of the dynamics that shape the politics of election observation in Zimbabwe also shape the politics of international sanctions and democratic enforcement. From 2000 onwards, regional and other non-Western states and international organizations were reluctant to join forces with Western actors to pursue a united approach, and Zimbabwe never faced universal sanctions. Although some African neighbours grew increasingly impatient with Zimbabwe and urged punitive action, Zimbabwe's staunch allies in the region ensured that neither SADC nor the AU could be used as vehicles to seriously punish the regime.[88] As a result, the Mugabe regime was sent clear signals that international enforcement would either be almost entirely absent, or at worst, partial and divided.

Prior to the 2000 parliamentary elections, Mugabe and other regime elites would have been fully aware of the partial and uneven record of sanctions enforcement across the region. Despite widely held concerns about electoral irregularities in Zimbabwe during the 1980s and 1990s, the regime was not subject to any democratic enforcement measures by regional organizations.[89] The AU's predecessor, the Organisation of African Unity, had only just begun to adopt a democratic agenda and had little experience of democratic enforcement, and several regimes in Africa had held highly flawed elections without any significant regional sanction.[90] In the run-up to the 2000 elections, elite actors could thus balance the fact that they were operating under increased international scrutiny with the knowledge that supportive regional actors appeared highly unlikely to take punitive action and were more likely to actively resist Western sanctions.

[88] 'Africa's Shame', *The Economist*, 3 July 2008, <http://www.economist.com/node/11670822>.

[89] The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions dataset shows only two incidents of sanctions between 1980 and 2000, neither of which were related to governance issues: T. Clifton Morgan, Navin Bapat, and Valentin Krustev, 'The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971–2000', *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 1 (2009): 92–110. For details, see 'U.S. Makes Sharp Cut In Its Aid to Zimbabwe', *New York Times*, 20 December 1983, <http://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/20/world/around-the-world-us-makes-sharp-cut-in-its-aid-to-zimbabwe.html>; 'U.S. Halts Aid For Zimbabwe', *New York Times*, 13 July 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/13/weekinreview/the-world-us-halts-aid-for-zimbabwe.html>.

[90] Magliveras, 'The Sanctioning System of the African Union: Part Success, Part Failure?'.

The aftermath of the 2000 parliamentary elections confirmed this pattern, and sent a clear signal that Zimbabwe would be spared the kind of democratic enforcement measures experienced by states in Europe and Latin America, as allegations of widespread manipulation were dismissed by regional actors and punitive measures were mostly noticeable by their absence. The 2002 elections did prompt significant and costly Western sanctions, including asset bans, travel freezes, and suspension from the Commonwealth and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The pre-election context of intimidation and violence, combined with Mugabe's strategic manipulation of the election observation process, prompted the EU and US to impose sanctions before the election had even taken place.[91] Somewhat surprisingly, in the wake of the flawed elections, the Commonwealth suspended Zimbabwe for a year, and later extended the suspension indefinitely (a move that prompted Zimbabwe to leave the organization entirely in 2003, and which it blamed on Canada and Australia rather than the Commonwealth's African members). However, the African Union declined to enact any punitive measures, and in 2004 its Heads of State group refused to consider a damning report into human rights violations and authoritarian practices in Zimbabwe that had been prepared by the AU's own bureaucratic offices.[92]

Prior to the 2008 elections, therefore, the regime had good reason to believe that international sanctions would be limited in scope. There was little prior evidence to suggest that Mugabe would be subjected to the level of intense pressure that was placed on his government after the 2008 manipulation and election-related violence, when Mugabe was ultimately, and reluctantly, pushed into a power-sharing government with the MDC. Arguably, Mugabe miscalculated the prospects for international costs in 2008 by misreading the international environment based on earlier international signals. The international response to the manipulation in 2000 and 2002 suggested that the international costs would be selectively rather than universally applied, and Mugabe proceeded to engage in widespread and blatant manipulation and election-related violence in 2008. It was only after this malpractice was initiated, and its scope and extent became clear, that the international community took its most forceful action against the regime, sending a new signal about the shifting limits of international enforcement. Yet, even while the regime came under unprecedented pressure, with SADC and the African Union voicing stern criticisms regarding the 2008 elections, the regional

[91] Jan Grebe, 'And They Are Still Targeting: Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions against Zimbabwe', *Africa Spectrum* 45, no. 1 (2010): 3–29.

[92] Legler and Tieku, 'What Difference Can a Path Make?', 476; Phimister and Raftopoulos, 'Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism', 397.

powers refrained from imposing sanctions or suspending Zimbabwe's membership.[93] Although countries such as Zambia, Botswana, and Kenya were vocal in their support for sanctions against the regime, Zimbabwe's allies such as South Africa, Angola, and Mozambique blocked any serious punitive measures within both SADC and the AU.[94] Western efforts to gain UN Security Council approval for universal sanctions were also blocked by several of Zimbabwe's key supporters.[95]

As with the election observer reports, the Mugabe regime also sought to take advantage of the international divergence on sanctions, and to politicize the issue in ways that would galvanize domestic and international support and blunt the effects of the democratic enforcement to which it was exposed. By framing Western sanctions as a form of colonial oppression, and by appealing to anti-imperialist and pan-African ideals, Mugabe actively sought to cultivate solidarity within Africa and the developing world more broadly.[96] In doing so, the regime sought to turn potential international costs (Western sanctions) into potential international benefits (increased non-Western solidarity and support). The results were often successful, and Zimbabwe's international allies not only refrained from imposing sanctions, but also frequently and robustly came to its defence. The next section examines this final type of international influence, in which international actors made direct, high-level diplomatic efforts to support and protect the Mugabe regime.

## High-Level Diplomatic Support

Incumbent elites accused of authoritarian behaviour frequently find that they are not only subject to vocal international condemnation and punitive sanctions, but are also beneficiaries of protective and defensive behaviour from reliable external sponsors. Such efforts can include the swift recognition of election results that may be disputed by opposition groups and other international actors, rhetorical statements in support of election winners, official state visits in the wake of disputed elections, and vocal condemnation of

[93] Simon Badza, 'Zimbabwe's 2008 Harmonized Elections: Regional and International Reaction', in *Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe's 2008 Elections*, ed. Eldred V. Masunungure (Harare: Weaver Press and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2008), 149–75.

[94] 'Africa's Shame'; 'Rebuff to Mugabe Is Watershed for African Union', Reuters, 3 July 2008, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/03/uk-zimbabwe-crisis-au-idUKL027452620080703>.

[95] Badza, 'Zimbabwe's 2008 Harmonized Elections'.

[96] Phimister and Raftopoulos, 'Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism'.

opposition groups or critical international actors.[97] Zimbabwe experienced all of these forms of support during its episodes of disputed elections after 2000. In the face of a surge of Western scrutiny and criticism, the Mugabe regime benefited from the robust support and defence of African states and international organizations, as well as non-Western international actors beyond Africa. Importantly, Mugabe and his domestic allies would have had good reason to expect this would be the case. Mugabe had considerable stature in the region and in the developing world more broadly, and events in the 1990s had clearly shown the ways in which popular African leaders frequently received considerable international support even in the wake of major violations of democratic practices.[98]

Three types of evidence support the view that these forms of external support played a role in political decision-making within Zimbabwe. Firstly, and most simply, there is ample evidence that Mugabe received considerable, vocal, high-level support in the wake of flawed elections. Secondly, the Mugabe regime was not just a passive recipient of this support, but also actively lobbied for it. Thirdly, Mugabe himself, as well as other regime insiders, made several public expressions of gratitude for external support, suggesting that the outside help was significant in the eyes of domestic actors.

Even prior to the controversial 2000 elections, Zimbabwe was the subject of intense international criticism for its fast-track land reform campaign. In the wake of the elections, Zimbabwe received further international criticism directed at the conduct of the pre-election campaign and the administration of the election itself. Yet Zimbabwe also immediately received swift and robust support from staunch regional allies. The major regional organization SADC not only provided a positive election observer report, but at the Heads of State level it quickly defended Robert Mugabe personally, declaring the parliamentary elections free and fair and criticizing Western states for threatening to impose sanctions.[99] Mugabe was also supported by several individual African states, including Namibia, Nigeria, and its long-standing trading partner and staunch ally, South Africa. Under the leadership of Thabo Mbeki, South Africa not only showed reluctance to criticize Zimbabwe or to lend its support to international efforts at enforcement, but also consistently and publicly

[97] Tolstrup, 'Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes'.

[98] Ibrahima Kane, 'The Implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance', *African Security Studies* 17, no. 4 (2008): 43–63.

[99] 'Summit Backs Zimbabwe over Land', *BBC*, 8 August 2000, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/870444.stm>; 'Why the Region Rallies to Mugabe', *Business Day (South Africa)*, 10 August 2000.

defended Mugabe himself.[100] Although the 2000 elections were marred by widespread violence and government intimidation of opposition actors and voters, after the results were released Mbeki declared Zimbabwe a 'democratic country', and the African National Congress (ANC) party issued a glowing statement in support of Mugabe, congratulating him on his victory and criticizing those who would seek to 'derail the noble course of democracy' in Zimbabwe.[101] One of the key lessons of the 2000 elections, therefore, was that the Mugabe regime could count on international support even in the wake of violent misconduct. The international signals were loud and clear.

These signals were sent again after the 2002 presidential elections, as Mugabe was supported by several key states, with messages of congratulations from Kenya and China, among others.[102] South Africa offered mixed messages but voiced no overt criticism. This time Mbeki was personally cautious, and offered little direct praise for or criticism of Mugabe, but his deputy (and future South African president) Jacob Zuma sent a clear signal of support by travelling to Zimbabwe the day after the election and declaring the result legitimate, free, and fair.[103] While Mbeki was part of the Commonwealth troika of Heads of State that ultimately decided on Zimbabwe's suspension from the organization, he was notably quiet during the announcement and reports suggest he was a reluctant participant in the decision.[104] Thus, even as international enforcement measures began to bite, Mugabe was still receiving high-level support from reliable allies.

Similar dynamics were also present before the controversial elections in 2008. The year before the elections, SADC and AU leaders threatened to boycott a planned European Union–Africa summit to be held in Lisbon unless Mugabe was allowed to attend; Portugal reluctantly lifted the travel ban,

[100] Merle Lipton, 'Understanding South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Perplexing Case of Zimbabwe', *South African Journal of International Affairs* 16, no. 3 (2009): 331–46; Victoria Graham, 'How Firm the Handshake? South Africa's Use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006', *African Security Studies* 15, no. 4 (2006): 113–27; Phimister and Raftopoulos, 'Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism'.

[101] 'Zimbabwean Opposition Leader Encourages Support from South Africa', Associated Press, 28 July 2000; 'South Africa's ANC Issues Statement on Election Result', *BBC*, 27 June 2000.

[102] Rachel L. Swarns, 'An Election, Yes. But Free and Fair?', *New York Times*, 17 March 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/17/weekinreview/the-world-an-election-yes-but-free-and-fair.html?src=pm>; 'Zimbabwe's Tainted Election: Verdicts from around the World', Agence France-Presse, 16 March 2002.

[103] Anton La Guardia, 'South African Deputy Hails Mugabe "Victory"', *The Telegraph*, 15 March 2002, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/1387887/South-African-deputy-hails-Mugabe-victory.html>.

[104] Baker, 'When to Call Black White', 1150–1.

Mugabe attended, and Britain stayed away.[105] One year before another round of presidential elections, Mugabe was once again receiving high-level signals of support, indicating (perhaps erroneously) that Zimbabwe's allies were as reliable as ever. The regime's decision-making in relation to the blatant and violent election malpractice in 2008 was thus informed by a long and continuous pattern of robust regional sponsorship. As the *New York Times* editorialized in the wake of the surge in election-related violence, 'Mugabe has bet on the indifference of his neighbors and the rest of the world. So far, shamefully, he has been right.'[106] If anything, however, it was not indifference he bet on, but outright support.

Once the 2008 elections took place, regional support for Zimbabwe did become fractured, but it did not entirely disappear. Despite the blatant and violent nature of the election misconduct, several of Mugabe's neighbours swiftly recognized the result as legitimate, including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Gambia, Tanzania, Libya, Lesotho, and Gabon.[107] South Africa's President Mbeki provided public support to Mugabe in April 2008, holding hands with him in public and declaring that there was 'no crisis' even as election-related violence began to spread.[108] The MDC repeatedly criticized Mbeki for what it perceived to be biased behaviour towards Mugabe at a time when the South African leader was the SADC-nominated mediator between the government and opposition, and the MDC also criticized the African Union and SADC for their silence.[109] Both the AU and SADC, while deeply involved in seeking to mediate a solution to the crisis, refrained from sanctioning Mugabe and offered him critical recognition in the post-election period as the legitimate Zimbabwean Head of State. Both organizations invited Mugabe to their summit meetings in the autumn of 2008, and Badza has

[105] Ian Traynor, 'Mugabe Invited to Lisbon Summit despite Ban', *The Guardian*, 2 July 2007, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/02/zimbabwe.eu>; Charles Mangwiro, 'SADC Nations Want Mugabe at EU Summit', *The Mail and Guardian*, 16 August 2013, <http://mg.co.za/article/2007-09-24-sadc-nations-want-mugabe-at-eu-summit/>.

[106] Celia W. Dugger, 'Zimbabwean Opposition Leaders Held by Police', *New York Times*, 5 June 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/world/africa/05zimbabwe.html>.

[107] Michelle Faul, 'Dissent over Mugabe Cracks African Unity', *USA Today*, 13 July 2008, <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-07-13-1812490162_x.htm>; 'Legitimacy Crisis Haunts Mugabe', *Zimbabwe Independent*, 16 August 2013, <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2008/07/11/legitimacy-crisis-haunts-mugabe/>.

[108] 'Mbeki Urges Patience on Zimbabwe', *BBC*, 12 April 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7343907.stm>.

[109] Celia W. Dugger, 'Accounts of Violence Spread in Zimbabwe', *New York Times*, 9 April 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/world/africa/09zimbabwe.html>.

argued that by doing so, they 'tacitly endorsed the presidential election run-off and its outcome as credible and legitimate'.[110]

Some measure of the impact of this kind of international support can be seen in the response of the Mugabe regime. Through successive election periods, Mugabe and others within the regime have acknowledged the importance of external support and expressed gratitude to international actors that have defended the regime. In 2000, Mugabe and members of his government actively discussed their efforts to lobby other African nations for support in the face of Western pressure. Zimbabwe's Foreign Minister, Stan Mudenge, spoke openly of lobbying member states of SADC and the OAU in order to gain regional support to counter potential US sanctions.[111]

More directly, numerous statements by Mugabe and regime insiders demonstrate awareness of international diplomatic support and its importance. In his inauguration speech in the wake of the 2002 elections, and shortly after the US and EU had imposed sanctions, Mugabe framed the win as a 'victory over colonialism' and was vocal in his gratitude to his international supporters:

> I want to thank our brotherly African and non-African countries for their full solidarity and enduring support…we will continue to need your support in the future as imperialist manoeuvres against Zimbabwe persist.[112]

Similarly, the government-controlled *Herald* newspaper boasted of the support given to the regime by SADC, the AU, and a list of African countries that included Tanzania, Namibia, Nigeria, and South Africa.[113] In the wake of the more controversial 2008 elections, Mugabe appeared before the newly elected parliament in August and expressed his gratitude to supportive international allies:

> We are deeply indebted to SADC, the African Union, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, our allies in the United Nations Security Council, and other progressive peoples of the world, for their invaluable support and solidarity with us.[114]

Mugabe also appeared at the UN General Assembly a month later and talked of 'deriving solace' from the support of countries in the UN Security Council who had blocked sanctions against the regime.[115]

Over several years, therefore, Mugabe and his colleagues not only received extensive international support in the wake of blatant and controversial

[110] Badza, 'Zimbabwe's 2008 Harmonized Elections', 155.
[111] 'Zimbabwe Fights US Sanctions', *Africa News*, 4 August 2000.
[112] Robert Mugabe, 'Speech at 22nd Independence Anniversary', 18 April 2002.
[113] Quoted in Phimister and Raftopoulos, 'Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism', 387.
[114] Robert Mugabe, 'Speech to Zimbabwe's 7th Parliament', 26 August 2008.
[115] Robert Mugabe, 'Speech at 63rd Session of UN General Assembly', 25 September 2008.

electoral misconduct, but also acknowledged that support, at times sought it out, and expressed gratitude for it. A full understanding of post-MDC electoral politics in Zimbabwe thus requires not just an understanding of the rise of the MDC itself, and the incentives it created for electoral manipulation, but also the international context of the time. The regime received consistent signals from Western actors about the high costs of malpractice, including punitive and damaging sanctions. Yet these signals were often matched by signals from non-Western actors about the likelihood of supportive observer reports, limited sanctions, and diplomatic support and protection at the highest level. Mugabe could thus approach each election campaign with considerable confidence that the costs associated with Western condemnation and sanctions would be offset by robust, sustained, and often high-level international support from Zimbabwe's non-Western allies. The limit of that support was exposed in 2008, as much of the international community that was usually supportive, or at least accepting, of Mugabe lost patience. But decisions made in 2000, 2002, and 2008 were made in a context where international politics offered mixed signals about the costs of election malpractice, and provided clear indications that Zimbabwe would find strong support in the international community even in the wake serious election misconduct.

## CONCLUSION

Election malpractice is one of the key pillars of incumbent authority in the vast majority of authoritarian regimes. Existing treatments of electoral misconduct identify numerous possible motivations for manipulation, and highlight a wide range of factors that might influence incumbent decisions about electoral misconduct. To date, however, such treatments have tended either to marginalize international politics, or to treat the international sphere as a source only of potential risks and costs. This chapter has demonstrated that while incumbents may indeed face extensive international costs in their pursuit of electoral malpractice, they may also receive a range of signals to suggest those costs will be bearable. The actions of supportive international allies can send important signals to incumbent elites that even if their malpractice is exposed, they will not face universal condemnation and will, in some quarters at least, receive vocal, high-level diplomatic support. Such signals of support, however, are not received the same way in all settings. Linkage politics matters. Elite actors operating in countries that have high levels of linkage to the West are likely to receive few international signals to suggest that they will receive international support should their efforts to fix elections in their favour be found out. In

contrast, would-be election manipulators who operate in states with high levels of non-Western linkage are likely to receive a very different set of signals, and are much more likely to be reassured that the costs of international exposure may be made bearable by international support. Non-Western linkages do not guarantee external support, but they create more opportunities for it to exist.

The experience of Zimbabwe highlights these dynamics in stark detail. With a diverse and largely non-Western linkage spectrum, the Mugabe regime was in a position to gain critical information over successive election episodes that widespread electoral manipulation, even when associated with violent repression, would be met in some international quarters with international support and defence rather than condemnation and sanction. Electoral manipulation in Zimbabwe was not cost-free, and the Mugabe regime was subject to more democratic enforcement measures than many others in Africa. However, it was robustly defended by many states and key international organizations within Africa, and major international powers outside Africa used their position to veto punitive actions against it.

Efforts to understand electoral manipulation in Zimbabwe, therefore, as well as electoral manipulation more generally, must take into account the international sources of support and succour for autocratic regimes as well as the possible international condemnation and punishment they may face. Authoritarian elites can read signals provided by others in the international community. These signals may suggest that manipulative behaviour will incur costly punishments, but may also highlight the ways in which the international sphere can provide a conducive environment for electoral manipulation. International cues from election monitors, from democratic enforcers, and from authoritarian defenders can all provide critical information to incumbent elites. Incumbent elites can use such cues to inform their decision-making about electoral malpractice, and they can engage in strategic behaviour both domestically and internationally to strengthen their linkages to their more supportive international partners. To understand the politics of electoral manipulation, and of authoritarian politics more generally, it is thus essential to examine the sphere of international politics, and the possible influences it may have on the politics of authoritarian rule. Autocratic leaders pursue manipulation based in part on calculations regarding the costs and benefits of such actions, and it is necessary to take into account not only the domestic balance between costs and benefits, but the international balance as well.

# 5

# Underwriting Repression: The International Politics of Coercive Crackdowns

When authoritarian rulers face well-organized uprisings from below, one of the tools they often use to ensure their survival is violent repression from above. When challenged, incumbents seek to mobilize the coercive apparatus of the state and use violence to quell dissent and eliminate threats.[1] In some cases, repression can work extremely well, suppressing domestic dissent and solidifying incumbent rule. In others, repression can prove insufficient to meet the challenge at hand, and incumbent leaders fall in the wake of redoubled efforts on the part of the public opposition.[2] To date, much of the literature that has addressed the threat posed by mass uprisings and the divergent regime outcomes that follow has focused primarily on the domestic sources of regime strength in the face of mass mobilization. In particular, it has pointed to the cohesion and unity of the security services in times of crisis, identifying the 'will to repress' as a crucial determinant of the outcome of mass uprisings.[3] Scholars have also identified the capacity of state institutions as crucial factors, with strong states demonstrating a greater prospect of surviving domestic challenges than weak states with fragile institutions. By contrast, the international contribution to regime responses to mass uprisings has been relatively underappreciated. Scholars have identified a number of ways in which international forces can contribute to domestic-level repressive practices, but there is limited research that looks at such

[1] Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*; Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

[2] Escribà-Folch, 'Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy'.

[3] Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'; Eva Bellin, 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring', *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–49; Jean Lachapelle, Lucan A. Way, and Steven Levitsky, 'Crisis, Coercion, and Authoritarian Durability: Explaining Diverging Responses to Anti-Regime Protest in Egypt and Iran' (Paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 2012).

influences in times of acute crisis, when the political regime itself is facing an existential threat.[4]

In this chapter, I examine the contribution that international sponsors can make to repressive capacity in times of regime crisis. External international sponsorship is not sufficient on its own to secure autocratic survival, and a number of regimes have collapsed despite the diplomatic and material assistance of supportive allies (for example, the Yanukovych regime in Ukraine collapsed in 2014 despite enjoying Russian support). Yet international actors can add important strength to authoritarian regimes in ways that enhance their prospects for survival. Once coercive crackdowns begin, a political regime is fighting for its life. External actors (both democratic and authoritarian) can play a critical role in shaping the outcome of this fight through their support for incumbent elites. Non-material forms of support can contribute to the decision to use repression, as well as the cohesion and unity of the regime once repression has begun. In this chapter, I focus in particular on the ways in which material forms of support, such as arms transfers and the deployment of foreign troops, can enhance a regime's coercive capacity and thus increase its chances of suppressing domestic protests. Much of the existing research on the role of coercive capacity has focused on its domestic sources, along with some insights into the ways in which long-term external aid can contribute to state capacity over time. In this chapter, I illustrate the ways in which international sponsors can provide short-term surges of external material support when regimes face domestic crises. International material support of this kind can act as a 'supplement' to existing state capacity, providing government actors with greater (albeit temporary) coercive capacity in ways that alter the balance of power between incumbents and opposition groups and facilitate regime survival in the face of domestic uprisings.

The chapter proceeds in four sections. The first section briefly reviews the literature on mass uprisings and coercive crackdowns, identifying the factors that have been shown to influence the outcome of such moments of regime crisis. The second section examines the mechanisms through which international forces can shape various elements of the politics of coercive crackdowns. The third section narrows down to focus on the international influences on the coercive capacity of the state. The fourth section examines how international influences have affected two cases from the Arab Spring, where incumbent elites in Bahrain and Syria repressed domestic protests with

[4] Roessler, 'Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda'; Blanton, 'Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression?'; Peksen, 'Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?'; Nepstad, 'Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria'.

extensive international assistance. The regime in Bahrain faced a largely supportive international environment in its efforts to crack down on domestic protests in 2011, and received robust diplomatic and material assistance, particularly from its Gulf neighbours. The Assad regime in Syria faced a more contested international environment, including extensive international condemnation, but efforts to isolate and punish the regime were countered by intense sponsorship from supportive allies. Although both countries experienced divergent trajectories in the wake of their initial use of repression, regime persistence in each case was facilitated by the patronage and assistance of external actors.

## REPRESSION AND AUTHORITARIANISM

Repression is found in all forms of political regime, but large-scale and violent repression is more common to authoritarian forms of rule.[5] Scholars have long observed the crucial role that repression plays in contributing to the persistence of authoritarian regimes, and it is widely viewed as one of the central pillars of authoritarian durability.[6] Authoritarian rulers exclude most of the population from involvement in decision-making, and deny people the opportunity for expression and political participation in ways that are conducive to dissent. As they often lack means of influence other than coercion, these dynamics frequently prompt authoritarian states to respond to domestic discontent with repressive policies.[7] In what Svolik describes as 'the problem of political control', the use of force to ensure order and compliance becomes a necessary tool of governance in authoritarian settings.[8] Such challenges of political control become particularly acute in times of mass uprisings, when broad sectors of the population join protests that seek to remove the existing regime.[9] Incumbents have a number of options for responding to such uprisings, including negotiations and policy concessions. However, when regime leaders view mass protests as representing a fundamental threat to

[5] Davenport, *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*.

[6] Wintrobe, 'Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches'; Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability'.

[7] Davenport, *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*.

[8] Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*.

[9] Beissinger, 'Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena'; Dawn Brancati, 'Pocketbook Protests: Explaining the Emergence of Pro-Democracy Protests Worldwide', *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 11 (2014): 1503–30.

their rule, they often resort to violent repression to crush the opposition movement. Violence is not always a hallmark of repression, but is characteristic of repression in times of mass uprisings. History is replete with examples of autocratic elites resorting to force in order to ensure political survival in the face of mass mobilization from below, such as the repressive crackdowns in China in 1989, Burma in 2007, and Iran in 2009.

Scholars have identified a range of factors that can determine the outcome of such moments of regime crisis. For some, the outcome rests with the size and nature of the popular uprising. Popular mobilization against authoritarian rule constitutes a serious collective action problem, and a number of scholars have pointed to the role of information and signalling in prompting individuals to join public protests. Unless individuals know that there will be strength in numbers, and that they will be participating in a broad-based protest, they will be reluctant to take a stand.[10] It is where this kind of broad-based public participation is achieved, where a 'revolutionary threshold' is met, that protest movements can be successful in bringing about the collapse of the regime.[11]

For others, the divergent trajectories of crisis moments are better explained by the nature of the regime's response, rather than the nature and size of the opposition. In particular, a number of scholars have emphasized the coercive capacity of the state.[12] This refers in part to the institutional strength of the state's security agencies, which determines the ability of the regime to respond forcefully to domestic challenges. Low-capacity regimes are much more likely to struggle to quash dissent compared to high-capacity regimes. As Lachapelle, Levitsky, and Way observe, 'where security forces are severely under-sized, poorly-trained and equipped, and under-paid (e.g. Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Madagascar, and Haiti in the 2000s), high intensity coercion is virtually impossible to carry out'.[13]

In addition to institutional capacity, numerous scholars have identified the role of regime cohesion, and the crucial role of the 'will to repress' among

[10] Kuran, 'Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989'; James DeNardo, *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014); Susanne Lohmann, 'The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91', *World Politics* 47, no. 1 (1994): 42–101.

[11] Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004); Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, 'Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict', *International Security* 33, no. 1 (2008): 7–44.

[12] Lachapelle, Way, and Levitsky, 'Crisis, Coercion, and Authoritarian Durability'; Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'.

[13] Lachapelle, Way, and Levitsky, 'Crisis, Coercion, and Authoritarian Durability'.

regime elites.[14] If autocratic incumbents are to survive in power by crushing domestic uprisings, they must maintain a united front and command the loyalty of the security services. Yet the challenging conditions created by public protests often produce precisely the conditions that fray the ties of regime unity and create the circumstances for indiscipline and desertion. In many cases, autocratic rulers have fallen not because the masses overwhelmed and defeated the state's agents of security, but because the state's agents of security chose not to defend the rulers. Accordingly, the willingness of the armed forces to fight for the regime constitutes one of the most significant determinants of regime crises.[15] Several factors have been identified to explain the propensity of regime elites to defect or not, including the organizational structure of the armed forces, the extent to which the loyalty of the security services is based on material incentives (especially financial) or group-based and communal ties of loyalty, and the extent of divisions and tensions within the security sector.[16] The outcome of these major crisis moments thus rests in large part on an interplay of opposition and incumbent actors, and their beliefs, preferences, and resources. Yet international actors also play an important role, often in ways that reinforce incumbent authority.

## THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF COERCIVE CRACKDOWNS

Recent research has shown how international factors can play a crucial role in the onset and cross-border spread of popular uprisings, particularly through

[14] Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'.

[15] Diana E. H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa* (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'; Bellin, 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring'.

[16] Theodore McLauchlin, 'Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion', *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 3 (2010): 333–50; Lachapelle, Way, and Levitsky, 'Crisis, Coercion, and Authoritarian Durability'; Dan Slater, 'Revolutions, Crackdowns, and Quiescence: Communal Elites and Democratic Mobilization in Southeast Asia', *American Journal of Sociology* 115, no. 1 (2009): 203–54; Terence Lee, 'The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia', *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 640–69.

processes of activist-driven diffusion.[17] Once such uprisings begin, however, international forces can also contribute to incumbent efforts to overcome these domestic challenges, and can influence many of the domestic-level factors discussed above. Here, I identify six different mechanisms through which international actors can shape the politics of coercive crackdowns in ways that favour autocratic incumbents. Not all international forces work in favour of autocratic elites, and the wider literature on repression suggests ways in which international actors (both state and non-state) can constrain incumbents who seek to crack down on domestic challengers.[18] Yet international actors can provide both material and non-material forms of support to incumbent elites in ways that can serve to tip the balance of power significantly in favour of incumbents vis-à-vis the opposition forces.

The six mechanisms can be divided into two broad categories, with the first category concerning the international effects on autocratic incumbents, and the second category concerning the international effects on the popular opposition movements. The first mechanism of influence on incumbent autocrats is primarily informational, and concerns the signals that external powers can send to autocratic elites before any decision to use repression has been made. It is important to distinguish here between the intentional and unintentional international signals that can influence the decision to use repressive behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 2, events in foreign settings may have passive effects, whereby incumbent elites learn from the trajectories of mass uprisings abroad and tailor their repressive strategies at home accordingly. Such processes involve passive forms of learning and diffusion, without any intentional effort or policy of external actors.[19] By contrast, the active efforts at autocratic sponsorship that are the focus here entail intentional efforts to send signals to incumbent elites that repression will be tolerated and even actively supported. Such signals are sent prior to the onset of

[17] Beissinger, 'Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena'; Bunce and Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*; Weyland, *Making Waves*.

[18] Keck and Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders*; Jason Brownlee, '… And yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 3 (2002): 35–63; Matthew Krain, 'J'accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?', *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 3 (2012): 574–89; Emilie M. Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui, 'Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises', *American Journal of Sociology* 110, no. 5 (2005): 1373–411.

[19] Weyland, 'The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830–1940'; Sarotte, 'China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example'; Heydemann and Leenders, 'Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the "Arab Awakening"'.

repression, and can lower the perceived costs of repression among autocratic elites. They essentially give a 'green light' for repressive behaviour, and thus make coercive crackdowns more likely to take place.[20]

External sponsors can also provide support to incumbent elites once the repression has begun. The second mechanism thus relates to the ways in which external actors can offer vocal diplomatic support for the repressive crackdown, and can thus contribute to the 'will to repress' discussed above. Some of the sources of the will to repress are deeply rooted in domestic politics, and are unlikely to be subject to international influences during the crisis itself. For example, the nature of the regime's origin and the ethnic make-up of the armed forces have been linked to the strength of unity within the regime,[21] and no outside power can change history or demographics in ways that tighten these bonds of loyalty. Yet elite unity and the loyalty of the armed forces often rests on perceptions of the strength of the regime, and external signals of support can provide vital information at a crucial moment about the presence of robust international backing. Foreign sponsors can thus reassure those who may otherwise consider defecting, and act as a source of confidence within the regime at a time when panic often leads to chaos and collapse.[22]

Thirdly, external actors can also contribute more directly to the state's capacity to repress. Strong states have a greater institutional capacity to put down mass uprisings than weak states with small and poorly equipped armed forces. International backers can materially strengthen the state's capacity in times of crisis by offering troops, weapons, and equipment. In doing so, they provide a supplement to the regime's coercive capacity, altering the material balance of power between the regime and the masses. Such action effectively raises the revolutionary threshold discussed above, as the enhanced strength of the state creates a bigger challenge for the opposition to overcome.

A fourth mechanism of international influence that strengthens, or at least protects, the position of regime incumbents concerns the role that external actors can play in shielding the regime from international punishment. Large-scale coercive crackdowns are highly visible forms of political repression, and often reverberate internationally. The rise of the international human rights regime means that major crackdowns are often met with widespread

[20] Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*.

[21] Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, 'The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes', *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 5–17; McLauchlin, 'Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion'.

[22] Nepstad, 'Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria'.

condemnation and international punitive actions, including sanctions.[23] Yet supportive external actors can seek to frustrate such efforts, both by offering an alternative narrative that presents the crackdown as justified and proportionate, and also by blocking potentially costly international sanctions and protecting the regime's coercive capacity. External supporters can thus shield the regime from international challengers while also strengthening it in material terms.

The final two mechanisms relate to the ways in which external actors can support the position of incumbents by undermining the will and capacity of the masses to pose a threat to the regime. Regarding the will to challenge the regime, external actors can contribute to the deterrent effects of repression by sending a clear signal about the strength of the regime. Just as external support can send a signal of strength to regime insiders and reduce potential defections, so too can it send a signal of strength to regime opponents and suppress confidence that public mobilization will achieve its aims. As mobilization in mass uprisings requires members of the public to believe that the potential benefits of protesting (bringing down the regime) are likely to be greater than the potential costs (e.g. being arrested, beaten, or killed), then any international signal that enhances the perceived strength of the regime is likely to suppress popular mobilization. Regarding the capacity to challenge, external actors can act to undermine the opposition by directly targeting their members and assets. Foreign forces can be directly involved in clashes with public protestors and can seek to undermine their position in both material and non-material ways. This can involve rhetorical strategies of condemnation against opposition actors, as well as efforts to cut off resources or detain protestors. Regional sponsors of Uzbekistan, for example, helped directly target public opposition members in the wake of the 2005 Andijan crackdown; Kazakhstan arrested a human rights activist that fled to Kazakh territory on the request of the Uzbek authorities, while Kyrgyzstan was heavily criticized by the UN for returning four protestors to Uzbekistan after they had sought refuge in the wake of the crackdown.[24]

It is beyond the scope of this study to examine each of these mechanisms in detail. In the remainder of this chapter I focus in particular on the mechanisms through which external actors can provide a supplement to the state's coercive

[23] Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and Sikkink, *The Power of Human Rights*; James C. Franklin, 'Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America', *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (2008): 187–211; Emilie Hafner-Burton, *Making Human Rights a Reality* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013).

[24] 'Uzbek Witness to May Massacre Arrested in Kazakhstan', Agence France-Presse, 5 July 2005; 'UNHCR: Kyrgyz Authorities Send Back 4 Uzbek Asylum Seekers', Associated Press Worldstream, 10 June 2005.

capacity in times of crisis (the third mechanism discussed above), and explore the different ways in which state capacity can be enhanced from abroad.

## SUPPLEMENTING COERCIVE CAPACITY

State capacity has gained increasing prominence in the social sciences in recent years and has been used to account for a diverse range of political outcomes, including protest mobilization, revolution, economic development, and both civil and international conflict.[25] More recently, it has been cited as a central factor that can determine the persistence and survival of authoritarian regimes. Levels of state capacity affect the extent to which the regime can effectively repress domestic challenges, and thus shapes the opportunity structures of opposition groups as well as the prospects for overall regime persistence.[26] Yet the international dimensions of state capacity remain poorly understood. Many authors point to significant domestic-level determinants of state capacity, including the origins of the political regime, historical experiences of economic development, patterns of class relationships, and divergent experiences of contentious politics among societal groupings.[27] However, state capacity is not a purely domestic-level attribute. In some cases, state capacity is in part, or in its entirety, dependent on external sources of support, while in others, levels of state capacity can change rapidly as a result of international intervention.

The international dimensions of state capacity can involve both long-term, structural influences and short-term, proximate influences. The former help shape the development of a state's coercive capacity over time, and relate to the ways in which domestic-level elites craft the institutions of the state partly

[25] Jonathan K. Hanson and Rachel Sigman, 'Measuring State Capacity: Assessing and Testing the Options' (Unpublished paper, 21 March 2013); Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol, *Bringing the State Back in* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

[26] Sidney G. Tarrow, *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Michael Albertus and Victor Menaldo, 'Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization', *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 151–69.

[27] Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968); Dan Slater, *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Levitsky and Way, 'The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes'.

in response to international forces. The development of the modern state, for example, has been attributed in part to the manner in which external threats and international war have required the establishment of robust and centralized armed forces under the control of a political elite.[28] More direct international influences include long-term patterns of security assistance. A number of contributions have highlighted the manner in which foreign economic aid can enhance the capacity of the state over long periods of time, and the repressive 'security states' of the Arab world in particular have been enhanced by long-term Western funding.[29] International actors can also contribute to repressive capacity through direct intervention. Peksen shows that international military intervention can have a direct result on repression, arguing that international interveners can enhance the state's coercive capacity in ways that shift the military balance of power in favour of the government.[30] Yet although he identifies an important causal mechanism, Peksen's study identifies a broad trend using a global dataset of human rights violations that does not capture the particular dynamics at play in crisis moments of mass uprisings and emergency coercive crackdowns.

By contrast, I focus here in particular on the more short-term surges of external material assistance that take place in times of crisis. In these circumstances, it is possible for states to experience a boost of coercive capacity as a result of the supportive policies of powerful allies. When regime elites are threatened by mass mobilization from below, their capacity for survival hinges to a great extent on the capacity of the state to suppress opposition forces. Examining these crisis periods thus enables a close assessment of the importance of coercive capacity and its precise role in facilitating repressive practices. I follow Levitsky and Way's definition of the state's coercive capacities by focusing on the nature of the internal security sector infrastructure, namely the 'army and police forces, presidential guards, gendarmes and riot police, secret police and other specialised internal security units, and the domestic intelligence apparatus, as well as paramilitary organisations such as death

[28] Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore, 'The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power since 1800', *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25, no. 1 (1990): 73–108.

[29] Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'; Nancy Bermeo, 'Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security', in *New Challenges to Democratization*, ed. Peter Burnell and Richard Youngs (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 73–92; Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"'; Jason Brownlee, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds, *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 45–50.

[30] Peksen, 'Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?'.

squads, militias and armed "youth wings"'.[31] Levitsky and Way identify the scope of the state's coercive capacity as resting primarily on the size, effectiveness, funding, and equipment of these many agencies. When scope is high, state agencies are large, well funded, and well equipped, and capable of penetrating society, regulating behaviour, and quashing dissent from below. When scope is low, the security sector lacks a physical presence and struggles to maintain order in the territory, and lacks the equipment and manpower to conduct basic operations even when deployed.[32]

State security institutions therefore clearly need personnel, weapons, and equipment, and frequently they obtain these material forces from outside their own borders. International sponsors can enhance this coercive capacity in two key ways during times of crisis. The first concerns large-scale external military intervention across state borders. Generally, the state's security apparatus is staffed by national citizens who have been recruited to the various security agencies of the state. They are soldiers, police officers, presidential guards, intelligence officers, militia members, and so on. The more of these personnel the state has at its disposal, the greater its coercive capacity.[33] In some crisis situations, however, outside states intervene militarily in support of the state, and domestic security personnel are augmented with foreign fighters.[34] This form of supportive intervention can facilitate increased levels of repression as incumbent elites effectively benefit from a supplement to the state's own coercive capacity.[35] The foreign personnel may not remain for a prolonged duration, but for as long as they are tasked with supporting the survival of the regime they contribute to its capacity to suppress challenges and remain in power.

Aside from the cross-border provision of foreign fighters to domestic soil, the second principal type of international sponsorship that enhances the strength of the state concerns the cross-border movement of the physical hardware that provides security services with much of their coercive capacity. No matter how numerous, or how well trained, or how loyal a state's security personnel are, they will ultimately only be able to project real repressive power if they possess the modern equipment and weapons that allow them to use authoritative physical force. For many states, however, this physical coercive capacity must be purchased from abroad through the international arms trade. Several scholars have noted how the arms trade can enhance the capacity of states to engage in repressive practices. Blanton has shown, for example, that arms imports by developing countries are linked to higher levels of

[31] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*, pp. 58–9. [32] Ibid., p. 58.
[33] Ibid. [34] Owen IV, *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics*.
[35] Peksen, 'Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?'.

repression,[36] while de Soysa et al. find that higher imports of small arms increase levels of state terror against citizens.[37] Yet, in times of crisis weapons procurement can become highly politicized and access to security hardware cannot be taken for granted. Repressive regimes often must rely on key allies who are willing to withstand international pressures and defy or block international sanctions in order to provide material support to known human rights violators.[38] International sponsors thus frequently become central to a state's capacity to use force over prolonged periods in the face of sustained domestic challenges. In the following section, I examine how some of these dynamics played out in the Arab Spring, as several incumbent elites met domestic challenges with extensive support from international sponsors.

## COERCIVE CRACKDOWNS AND THE ARAB SPRING

International influences pervade the politics of the Arab Spring. The international diffusion of ideas has been repeatedly invoked as an explanation for the rapid spread of public protests in late 2010 and early 2011.[39] A complete account of the resulting upheavals is difficult to compile without reference to the reactions of major international powers such as the US and Russia, as well as the role of regional international organizations such as the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). International diplomacy of various kinds played a central role in shaping political outcomes on the ground.[40] Finally, the divergent trajectories of political uprisings across the region have also been influenced by material sponsorship, and the Arab Spring provides several examples of the ways in which outside actors can underwrite authoritarian capacity through security assistance from abroad.

[36] Blanton, 'Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression?'.

[37] Indra de Soysa, Thomas Jackson, and Christin M. Ormhaug, 'Tools of the Torturer? Small Arms Imports and Repression of Human Rights, 1992–2004', *International Journal of Human Rights* 14, no. 3 (2010): 378–93.

[38] Early, 'Unmasking the Black Knights'.

[39] Heydemann and Leenders, 'Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the "Arab Awakening"'; Stephen M. Saideman, 'When Conflict Spreads: Arab Spring and the Limits of Diffusion', *International Interactions* 38, no. 5 (2012): 713–22; Kurt Weyland, 'The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?', *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 4 (2012): 917–34.

[40] Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2012).

The following sections trace the international dimensions of coercive crackdowns in two cases of regime crisis during the Arab Spring: Bahrain and Syria. Both of these cases experienced extensive and intrusive international sponsorship once mass protests broke out. The high levels of international sponsorship in each case provide an opportunity to identify the causal mechanisms at work that link international-level actions to domestic-level outcomes.[41] The goal in studying these instances of high-level sponsorship is not to generalize to all cases of authoritarian crackdown, or to suggest that international sponsorship is a necessary condition for regime survival in times of regime crisis, but rather to identify the mechanisms through which international sponsorship can reinforce repressive capacity and regime persistence when it is present.

## GCC Intervention in Bahrain

The case of Bahrain provides a strong illustration of the processes by which international actors can enhance a state's coercive apparatus through a surge of material assistance. Bahrain faced a largely supportive international environment when it sought to face down mass democratic protests in early 2011. Bahrain enjoyed a diverse linkage spectrum, with ties to both Western democracies and regional autocracies that in large part reflected its strategic importance in the region. Several of its international allies, both within and beyond the region, had strategic interests in Bahrain, and had strong motives to offer sponsorship and maintain the status quo. In addition to the diplomatic and economic assistance that many other autocrats in the region received, the Bahraini regime also benefited from direct military intervention from its nearest neighbours. The intervention had a material impact on Bahrain's coercive capacity, supplementing its domestic forces and freeing up Bahrain's own troops to engage in the crackdown. As a result, Bahrain's ruling elites were in a stronger position to crush the protests and solidify their position.

The popular protests of the Arab Spring that began in Tunisia in late 2010 spread quickly to Bahrain, and by February 2011 the ruling regime was facing large-scale popular demonstrations. Bahrain already had a long history of political and sectarian tension between Sunni rulers and Shia masses, and the 2011 unrest had deep structural roots.[42] The Shia community had faced

[41] George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*.

[42] Frederic Wehrey, 'Bahrain's Decade of Discontent', *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 116–26.

systematic discrimination and political exclusion, and nursed grievances from earlier broken promises of political reform. Shortly after coming to power in 1999, Emir Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa promised political reform and a referendum was held in February 2001 to introduce a new National Action Charter designed to liberalize the political sphere. However, the Charter was never implemented and instead a new constitution was unilaterally announced that introduced monarchy to Bahrain and reduced the power of the parliament relative to the King. The episode was critical in shaping the structures of political grievance within Bahrain, as it undermined trust in the regime and sowed the seeds of the discontent among the Shia majority that fuelled the protests in 2011.[43] It was in this context that demonstrations broke out across Bahrain on 14 February, focused in particular on the Pearl Roundabout in the capital, Manama. Early police repression and protestor fatalities prompted public anger and increased mobilization, and the demonstrations swelled over the following weeks. Bahrain's official parliamentary opposition group al-Wefaq lent its support to the protests along with several other opposition groups and Shia religious leaders.[44]

In response to the growing instability, the King appointed his son, the Crown Prince, to oversee a process of dialogue that might lead to a settlement. On 12 March the Crown Prince issued seven principles according to which national dialogue could take place, including the need to empower representative institutions, address government corruption, and reduce sectarian tensions.[45] However, by this point the opposition had splintered along moderate and radical lines, and initial calls for political reform had been replaced in some quarters by demands for the end of the regime itself and the introduction of a republic.[46] The following day, the Crown Prince's proposals were rejected by the opposition, a development that was seized on by the hardliners within the regime. In the midst of diplomatic impasse and a rapidly deteriorating security environment, the King requested international military assistance from the GCC. The stated rationale for the request was that outside assistance was needed to deal with the deteriorating security situation, the threat to individuals and private property, and the obstruction of key state services

[43] ICG, 'Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt', 6 April 2011; Wehrey, 'Bahrain's Decade of Discontent'.

[44] Mahmoud Cherif Bassiouni et al., 'Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry', 2011, chapter V.

[45] Ibid., para 459; Freedom House, 'Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Bahrain', 2012.

[46] Abdo, 'The New Sectarianism'; Roel Meijer and Maarten Danckaert, 'Bahrain: The Dynamics of a Conflict', in *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat*, ed. William Zartman (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015).

and facilities by the expanding demonstrations.[47] The GCC quickly intervened, ultimately deploying over 5,000 troops to the small country. In the days and weeks that followed, Bahrain escalated a campaign of forceful repression in the context of large-scale international intervention, bringing the mass protests to a swift end.

### *The International Dimensions of Bahrain's Coercive Capacity*

The capacity of the Bahraini regime to respond to the public protests was significantly shaped by international factors. Bahrain had several powerful and influential international allies due to its strategic and political importance, and the regime benefited not only from a long history of external support, but also from a sharp surge of external sponsorship once the 2011 uprising began. Even the powerful Western and democratic countries with which Bahrain had linkages had interests in maintaining the status quo.

Bahrain's importance within the region is disproportionate to its small size, and its international partners had a number of motivations for providing external support. For the United States, Bahrain represents a crucial strategic interest due to the US naval presence that dates to 1948. The US Fifth Fleet is stationed in Bahrain, as are a number of major naval command posts that coordinate much of the US Navy's operations in the region.[48] Any change in regime could threaten the future of the US naval presence, and the US thus had a key interest in maintaining its long-standing relationship with the existing incumbents. For Bahrain's neighbouring allies, its importance rests in significant part on the stability provided by the ruling Sunni monarchy. Saudi Arabia's interests in Bahrain reflect its own status as a regional power and its long-standing rivalry with Iran, and as a result its motivations in preserving the status quo in Bahrain were primarily strategic rather than ideological.[49] A central pillar of Saudi foreign policy has been to limit Iranian influence in the Gulf, and it viewed the potential emergence of a new and possibly radical Shia government in Bahrain as a direct threat to that objective. Riyadh also wished to avoid any spillover effects into its own territory, where it feared democratization in Bahrain might inspire democratic mobilization among its own Shia population located in its Eastern Province.[50] Saudi

[47] Bassiouni et al., 'Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry', para 490.

[48] Kenneth Katzman, 'Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy' (Congressional Research Service, August 2015).

[49] Frederic Wehrey, 'Saudi Arabia's Anxious Autocrats', *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 2 (2015): 71–85.

[50] Simon Mabon, 'The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian–Saudi Rivalry', *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 2 (2012): 84–97; Kamrava, 'The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution'.

Arabia's approach thus represented a case of democracy resistance rather than autocracy promotion, as it sought to prevent the negative externalities of a democratic transition rather than advance a particular ideological cause.

These outside sponsors have used a range of tools to support the Bahraini regime, including stable and long-standing channels of external diplomatic and material assistance. Saudi Arabia has been Bahrain's largest trading partner, averaging 42 per cent of Bahraini trade during the 2000s, and has underwritten the Bahraini economy over many years.[51] The US has also been a reliable patron, providing just under $200 million in military financing to Bahrain from 2003–11.[52] As the new threat to the regime emerged in 2011, these forms of long-standing support to the state were complemented with a surge of engagement and sponsorship. In early March 2011, Gulf neighbours agreed to give $10 billion each to both Oman and Bahrain in the hope of shoring up regime elites.[53] Once diplomatic efforts flagged in Bahrain in mid-March, however, Saudi Arabia actively sought to bolster the hardliners within the Bahraini regime, encouraging a repressive response and urging the Bahraini state to take action against the protestors rather than grant concessions that would lead to regime change.[54] Iran, which has had long-standing links with Shia opposition forces in Bahrain, had mounted a media campaign at home and across the region to support the uprisings and criticize the regime, and victory for the opposition would give Tehran a foothold in the Gulf.[55] Saudi Arabia thus combined diplomatic and economic assistance with a surge of military support, and spearheaded a major military intervention to support the crackdown. For its part, the US offered only a muted response, with little direct criticism of the regime, tacitly accepting the kind of violent repression that it condemned more severely elsewhere in the region.[56]

Saudi Arabia did not intervene in Bahrain unilaterally, however, and the military contribution to the coercive crackdown was carried out under

[51] Tansey, Koehler, and Schmotz, 'Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival'; Robin Mills, 'Pioneering Bahrain Finds Itself Reliant on Saudi Largesse', *The National*, 2 May 2012; Jane Kinninmont, 'Bahrain's Economic Challenges', *Middle East Eye*, accessed 23 October 2015, <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-bahrains-economic-challenges-1463229931>.

[52] Katzman, 'Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy'.

[53] Tarek El-Tablawy, 'GCC Pledges $20 Billion in Aid for Oman, Bahrain', *Washington Post*, 10 March 2011, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/10/AR2011031003629.html>.

[54] Abdo, 'The New Sectarianism', 16; Marc Lynch, *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East* (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), 137.

[55] Abdo, 'The New Sectarianism', 15.

[56] Ambrosio, 'Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls: America as a Black Knight in the Uprising in Bahrain'.

the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The GCC is a regional political and economic organization based in part on a collective defence agreement backed by a standing military force, known as the Peninsula Shield Force. The GCC had rarely engaged in military operations, however, and its Bahrain intervention represented a significant shift in activities. As one Middle East specialist observed shortly after the intervention, 'instead of defending the state from foreign aggression (as the military pact specifies), the GCC force is protecting a monarch from a domestic uprising—the first time the forces have been deployed this way'.[57] The intervention reflected the GCC member states' vital interests in securing the survival of the Gulf monarchies, and their willingness to use coercive means to suppress and deter challenges emanating from the Arab Spring.[58]

The foreign military intervention contributed directly to the Bahraini regime's repressive campaign, especially by enhancing its coercive capacity. The Bahraini state institutions demonstrated a robust will to repress—the security services backed the regime without any significant defections.[59] Since independence in 1971, Bahrain's security forces have been dominated by the ruling al Khalifa family, which installed family members in leadership positions throughout the state, ensuring regime loyalty.[60] Furthermore, concerned about the implications of recruiting from the majority Shia population, the royal family sought to ensure the loyalty of the military by selective and discriminatory recruitment practices, ensuring that the ranks of the armed forces are filled with members of the Sunni community. This has been facilitated not only through selective recruitment within Bahrain, but also through the recruitment and naturalization of foreign Sunni fighters from neighbouring countries, leaving the Bahraini security forces unusually internationalized. The regime has recruited Sunni troops from Jordan, Pakistan, and Syria among others, and has frequently offered foreign recruits access to Bahraini citizenship.[61]

Nonetheless, the country's small size and the organizational structure of the security forces limited its overall coercive capacity. As with other states in

[57] Kristin Diwan, 'The Dire Consequences of Saudi Intervention in Bahrain,' 21 March 2011, <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/21/the-dire-consequences-of-the-saudi-intervention-in-bahrain/>.

[58] Silvia Colombo, 'The GCC and the Arab Spring: A Tale of Double Standards', *International Spectator* 47, no. 4 (2012): 110–26.

[59] Zoltan Barany, 'The Role of the Military', *Journal of Democracy* 22 (2011): 24–35.

[60] Derek Lutterbeck, 'Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations', *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 1 (2013): 28–52.

[61] Laurence Louër, 'Sectarianism and Coup-Proofing Strategies in Bahrain', *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 245–60.

the region, Bahrain's leadership has sought to guard against the threat from the military itself by disaggregating control over the armed forces into separate units. This encouragement of rival security forces reduces the risk of military-backed coups against the regime, while also allowing different members of the royal family to oversee their own branches of the security apparatus.[62] However, this had the consequence of reducing the capacity of the armed forces by limiting the scope for cooperation and facilitating the development of armed units that have little function other than to provide a role of authority for members of the royal family. Bahrain experienced precisely this form of fragmentation, and the coherence of its security forces have been limited by multiple (and sometimes competing) agencies, as well as a general tension between hardline and reformist camps within the security sector.[63] Outside intervention could thus compensate for some of the weaknesses (real and perceived) within the domestic security services.

On the evening of 14 March, GCC troops began to arrive in Bahrain, led by units from the Saudi Arabian Royal Guard that crossed the causeway linking the two countries in tanks and other armoured vehicles.[64] The following day, the King declared a State of National Safety for three months and the security forces initiated a coercive campaign to clear the demonstrators from the streets. A period of sustained repression followed in which opposition activists were rounded up and detained, hundreds of Bahrainis lost their jobs, medical staff were put on trial, and many students were suspended or had their funding revoked. According to the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI) Report, set up under the chairmanship of international lawyer Cherif Bassiouni after the crackdown had ended, thirty-five people were killed during the events in Bahrain from February to April 2011, and the security forces operated in a culture of impunity where due process was disregarded and detainees were routinely subjected to physical and psychological mistreatment.[65] The crackdown thus entailed a multifaceted process of repression utilizing multiple security agencies in the shadow of extensive and highly visible international military intervention.

The international military intervention played a significant, though contested, role in the repressive crackdown. Scholars have pointed to many domestic sources of authoritarian survival in the Gulf monarchies, including

[62] Steffen Hertog, 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States: The Price of Coup-Proofing', *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 3 (2011): 400–2.

[63] Louër, 'Sectarianism and Coup-Proofing Strategies in Bahrain'.

[64] Bassiouni et al., 'Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry', para 501.

[65] Ibid.

oil rents and the stabilizing effects of hereditary succession.[66] In times of crisis, however, short-term and direct international sponsorship can also play a critical role. In total, approximately 5,000 troops from the GCC's Peninsula Shield Force were deployed in Bahrain, including land and naval combat units, as well as command and control personnel. Troops from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar were deployed to the island state, and Kuwaiti ships established a naval blockade.[67] Accounts vary widely about the precise involvement of the GCC troops in the crackdown. Local and international media reported that troops from the Peninsula Shield Force had fired on demonstrators, and opposition figures alleged that GCC troops were directly involved in violence against protestors.[68] The Bahrain Center for Human Rights, an independent civil society organization, offered eyewitness accounts that suggested GCC troops took a direct role in the repression.[69] In contrast to these claims, the government asserted that the GCC troops were used purely to protect vital assets within the state and were not deployed in any internal security operations.[70] The Commander of the Peninsula Shield Force, Major General Mutlaq Bin Salem al-Azima, commented that the purpose of the intervention was to 'secure Bahrain's vital and strategically important military infrastructure from any foreign interference' and denied it had harmed any Bahraini citizens.[71] This position received support from the BICI report, which found no evidence of GCC participation or involvement in any human rights abuses.[72]

The precise contribution of the GCC troops to the government crackdown is thus disputed, although the findings of the credible BICI report lend significant weight to the contention they played no *direct* role in the repression. Nonetheless, the intervention was a significant one that at the very least enhanced the coercive capacity of the Bahraini state in ways that facilitated the

[66] André Bank, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik, 'Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East: A Configurational Comparison, 1945–2012', *Democratization* 22, no. 1 (2015): 179–200; Jason Brownlee, 'Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies', *World Politics* 59, no. 4 (2007): 595–628.

[67] Bassiouni et al., 'Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry', para 1580.

[68] 'Bahrain Opposition Figure Decries "Devastating" Crackdown', *CNN*, 17 March 2011, <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/17/bahrain.protests/>; 'Peninsula Shield Force to Sue News Channels', *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 10 February 2011.

[69] M. Younes, 'Saudi Troops Quietly Pull out of Bahrain after Crackdown on Anti-Government Protests', *The Observers*, 7 January 2011.

[70] 'A Talk with Peninsula Shield Force Commander Mutlaq Bin Salem Al-Azima', *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 28 March 2011.

[71] Ibid.

[72] Bassiouni et al., 'Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry', chapter IX.

repression. Although it appears the GCC troops did not engage directly in coercive operations against the demonstrators, their presence did have implications for the capacity of the national security forces to implement the crackdown. It cannot easily be dismissed only as unnecessary 'overkill'.[73] In particular, the BICI report highlighted a central contribution the GCC deployment made to the Bahraini state's capacity for repression through its support for the Bahraini Defence Forces (BDF). According to the report, the GCC units 'were based in BDF facilities that had been vacated by BDF units deployed in the field'.[74] The external intervention, in other words, allowed the Bahraini regime to strengthen its coercive capacity relative to the opposition in the capital city by freeing up soldiers that would otherwise be needed in other strategic locations. The GCC forces provided the 'essential backbone' of the crackdown, as they enabled the BDF to engage with the demonstrators.[75] In doing so, the intervention effectively bolstered the security apparatus of the state by, temporarily at least, swelling the size of the security forces at the regime's disposal.

The intervention thus facilitated the surge of coercive repression that occurred in mid-March 2011. While the regime had been accused of repressive behaviour in the weeks before the GCC troops were deployed, it was only after their arrival that the crackdown escalated considerably and reached its height.[76] This enhancement of the state's capacity to repress in turn enhanced its capacity to survive in power. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) observed in April 2011, the military intervention left the ruling elite holding most of the cards and made it 'far harder to topple the regime or press it toward genuine reform'.[77] The regime was 'emboldened',[78] and it suppressed the protests accordingly. The impact of the crackdown was swift and comprehensive. Demonstrators were forcefully removed from the Pearl Roundabout, opposition protest leaders and demonstrators were arrested in large numbers, and signs of further protest gatherings on the streets were swiftly broken up. Within days of the GCC intervention and the initiation of the final crackdown, the uprising had essentially been crushed.

[73] Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, *The Arab Spring*, 86.

[74] Bassiouni et al., 'Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry', para 1580.

[75] Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, 'Bahrain's Uprising: Regional Dimensions and International Consequences', *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–12.

[76] ICG, 'Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform', 4.

[77] ICG, 'Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III)', 21.

[78] ICG, 'Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform', 13.

In sum, the repressive crackdown in Bahrain in 2011 was underwritten by external actors. Foreign troops flowed into the country under the GCC banner and swelled the size of the security forces available to the Bahraini regime. This in turn enabled Bahraini forces to be re-deployed from locations around the country to target the mass demonstrations where they were taking place. By allowing the government to take forces away from the locations where GCC troops were deployed, the intervention had an indirect, but significant, effect. GCC troops may not have participated directly in the crackdown, but they enhanced the capacity of the Bahraini leadership to crush the protests and survive in power.

## International Sponsorship and Violent Repression in Assad's Syria

By one measure, the coercive crackdown initiated by Bashar al-Assad in March 2011 in Syria failed comprehensively. Rather than suppressing and eliminating the popular protests that had emerged in the town of Deraa, the repression fuelled a backlash and led to the escalation of public mobilization.[79] On another measure, however, the violent response of the regime proved effective in ensuring the survival of the regime itself. Although the country descended into civil war and the government lost control of significant territory, the violent crackdown initiated in early 2011 kept the Assad regime in power long after many had predicted its demise.[80] External sponsorship from Syria's international allies was instrumental in ensuring this outcome, as the coercive capacity of the Syrian state was robustly bolstered with outside strategic and material assistance.

The Syrian state has always had a large security apparatus, but it has varied over time in its levels of strength and cohesion. Immediately after independence in 1946, there was little or no civilian control over the military, coups were the norm, and professionalism in the security sector was marked by its absence.[81] After Hafez al-Assad took power in 1970, he set out to restore

[79] Reinoud Leenders and Steven Heydemann, 'Popular Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and Threat, and the Social Networks of the Early Risers', *Mediterranean Politics* 17, no. 2 (2012): 139–59.

[80] Lee Matthew, 'US: Assad's Syria a "Dead Man Walking"', *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 December 2011; Joel Greenberg, 'Israeli Officials Say Syria's Assad Is Doomed', *Washington Post*, 14 December 2011, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israeli-officials-say-assad-is-doomed/2011/12/14/gIQAYBuEuO_story.html>.

[81] Kenneth Michael Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991* (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 457; Raymond Hinnebusch, *Syria: Revolution from Above* (London: Routledge, 2002), 29.

civilian control over the armed forces and facilitate greater cohesion through the use of familial and ethnic-based policies that favoured family and members of the Alawite community.[82] However, after the end of the Cold War and loss of Soviet support, the regime struggled to finance the army and train its forces to use the sophisticated and maintenance-heavy equipment it had.[83] The security sector was also largely equipped to deal with foreign rather than domestic threats, especially potential war with Israel, and was poorly equipped and trained for the kind of internal and decentralized forms of resistance presented by the Arab uprisings.[84]

It was in this context that the regime faced popular protests in early 2011, and as a result it relied to a considerable extent on external allies to assist its efforts to eliminate the domestic challenge. As Steven Heydemann has argued, the Assad regime responded to the uprising with 'a process of authoritarian restructuring', in which the regime was compelled to 'reconfigure its social base, tighten its dependency on global authoritarian networks, adapt its modes of economic governance, and restructure its military and security apparatus'.[85] Some of these strategies were intertwined, and the increased reliance on international authoritarian networks helped inform the restructuring of its military and security apparatus. From the very beginning of the crackdown, the Assad regime was operating with the support of key allies, and the crackdown was facilitated in significant part by the cooperation of authoritarian partners.

External sponsors had a number of largely strategic motivations for supporting the Assad regime, and there is little evidence that their support rested on a normative desire to protect or promote authoritarianism more generally. Syria's linkage spectrum skewed towards non-democratic international partners, many of whom had incentives to protect the status quo in Damascus. Russia had extensive military ties to Syria that gave it a valued political base in the Middle East (especially through the naval port of Tartus), and the two countries enjoyed a robust arms trade relationship and a common foreign policy outlook centred on state sovereignty. More broadly, Putin also had geostrategic and domestic concerns that drove Russian support for Assad. Russia

[82] Eyal Zisser, 'The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and the External Fronts', *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal* 5, no. 1 (2001): 1–12.

[83] Barry M. Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney, *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 2002), 20.

[84] Steven Heydemann, 'Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 59–73, 62; C. J. Chivers, 'As Conflict Continues in Syria, Assad's Arms Face Strain', *New York Times*, 2 August 2012.

[85] Heydemann, 'Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism', 60.

viewed any fall of the Assad regime as a threat to the geopolitical balance in the Middle East towards the West, and a threat to its own role as a strategic actor in the region.[86] Moscow also had concerns about the domestic repercussions of Assad's overthrow—regime change (or even state collapse) in Syria would be a threat to regime (and state) stability at home.[87] Iran was also one of Syria's staunchest international supporters, and its policies reflected its close strategic alliance with Syria dating to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. In particular, Assad's continued rule served Iranian regional interests in limiting Western and Sunni regional power, and Tehran thus feared the rise to power of a Sunni (and possibly pro-Western) regime in Damascus.[88] As with Bahrain, Syria's external sponsors were less interested in promoting autocracy for ideological purposes than they were in preventing the regional fallout that would come with a change of regime.[89]

This external support was not universal, however, and Syria faced a highly contested international environment. The US, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar were all key critics of the Assad government and each sought to sponsor their favoured (and often competing) opposition groups. As a result, the political struggle in Syria quickly became highly internationalized, a dynamic that only accelerated as the initial uprising became militarized and the clashes between the regime and a non-violent resistance evolved into a long-running civil war. This transformation of political conflict occurred in no small part due to the use of violence by Assad in the face of the early anti-regime protests. The initial mass street protests in various regions in Syria were diffuse, uncoordinated, and non-violent.[90] As the protests spread, the Assad regime initially pursued non-violent strategies, including offering political concessions (such as the formation of a new government and the release of political prisoners) as well as deploying a narrative designed to discredit the protests (labelling them as Western-backed extremists).[91] But as protests continued it

[86] Roy Allison, 'Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis', *International Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2013): 795–823; Bülent Aras and Richard Falk, 'Authoritarian "Geopolitics" of Survival in the Arab Spring', *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (2015): 322–36.

[87] Fiona Hill, 'The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad', *Foreign Affairs*, 25 March 2013; Samuel Charap, 'Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention', *Survival* 55, no. 1 (2013): 35–41.

[88] Jubin M. Goodarzi, 'Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment', *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 4, no. 2 (2013): 31–54; Jubin M. Goodarzi, *Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East* (London: IB Tauris, 2009).

[89] Erik Mohns and André Bank, 'Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?', *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 3 (2012): 25–35, 29.

[90] Leenders and Heydemann, 'Popular Mobilization in Syria'.

[91] Emile Hokayem, *Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013), 51–6.

quickly resorted to the use of violent repression, deploying the security forces against the protestors and encouraging the use of violence by pro-regime militias. Although the violence did not crush the protests as in Bahrain (the regime's ideal outcome), in many ways the subsequent descent into violence suited the regime's interests more than the continuation and spread of non-violent protests. By provoking the militarization of the opposition, reflected in the emergence of the Free Syrian Army, the government was more able to justify the use of large-scale force and pursue a military course of action.[92] As Leenders observed, 'the military standoff that ensued . . . seems to contain much less prospect for regime change than the peaceful and popularly driven protests that challenged the regime in the first few months of the uprising'.[93]

In this altered environment, external powers vied to influence the outcome. Syria's fragmented and often competing opposition groups obtained numerous sponsors of their own who wished to see the overthrow of the Assad regime. The US supported early incarnations of the political opposition movement such as the Syrian National Council, as well as offering funds, training, and arms to more moderate elements of the armed opposition (with limited success). Arab states also sought to further their interests by supporting and arming opposition groups, with Saudi Arabia and Qatar leading regional efforts (while also disagreeing on which groups to support).[94] Combined with Western efforts to place sanctions on Syria, these moves ensured that at least some of the international environment placed a constraining influence on the Assad government. However, from the beginning of the uprising, Syria's international allies offered robust diplomatic support to Assad, and opprobrium from some quarters was accompanied by acclamation from others. Russia and Iran, in particular, supported the regime diplomatically and materially, helping to undercut the efforts of Assad's international opponents and offering much needed financial and military support at the domestic level.

Syria's allies provided Assad with robust diplomatic support in the wake of the uprising, endorsing the regime's narrative claiming that the uprising was a foreign plot against the regime.[95] In October 2011, Russia, along with China, wielded its veto at the UN Security Council to block international sanctions

[92] Ibid., 57.

[93] Reinoud Leenders, 'How the Syrian Regime Outsmarted Its Enemies', *Current History* 112, no. 758 (2013): 331–7, 332.

[94] Roula Khalaf and Abigail Fielding-Smith, 'How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution', *Financial Times*, 17 May 2013; 'Saudi–Qatar Rivalry Divides Syrian Opposition', Reuters, 15 January 2014.

[95] Mohns and Bank, 'Syrian Revolt Fallout'.

against Syria.[96] More importantly, Assad's international allies supplemented diplomatic support and cover with direct material support to the regime, bolstering the capacity of its security apparatus and enhancing its ability to resist the opposition threat and defend itself from forceful overthrow.

Syria's coercive capacity was enhanced as a result of both strategic and material tools of international sponsorship. This external support began in the early stages of the non-violent uprising, and continued and strengthened as the crisis evolved into a protracted civil war. The shifting nature of the political struggle in Syria makes it more difficult to make general statements about the international dimensions of the coercive crackdown. Unlike in Bahrain, where the initial crackdown essentially put an end to the threat to the regime and quelled the mass protests, in Syria the crackdown evolved into a long-running campaign against an armed opposition. Nonetheless, while the strategies of the opposition changed from non-violent to violent resistance, the logic of the regime's actions, and those of its international sponsors, remained largely the same, and focused on the goal of regime survival. The international contribution to authoritarian stability in Syria thus rested on both a contribution to the initial crackdown against mass protests, and continuing support (driven by largely unaltered imperatives) for Assad as the struggle became violent.

From the very early stages of the uprising, Syria's strategic response was informed by Iranian advice and guidance, in particular through the foreign arm of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, known as the Quds Force. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard was formed in the wake of the 1979 revolution to protect the Supreme Leader from a military coup, and the Quds Force was developed to advance Iranian interests abroad.[97] Led by Major General Qassem Suleimani, it has been involved in supporting militant groups throughout the Middle East, especially Hezbollah in Lebanon, with the goal of furthering Shia Islam and undermining US and Israeli interests in the region.[98] The Quds Force played a significant role in providing strategic advice to the Assad regime in the wake of the uprising, and assisted Syrian forces in monitoring opposition groups and coordinating attacks on opposition targets. Suleimani and other leading Iranian figures provided top-level support to the Syrian army, including advice and training designed to strengthen Syrian

[96] 'Russia and China Veto UN Resolution against Syrian Regime', Associated Press, 5 October 2011.

[97] Anthony H. Cordesman, *Iran's Developing Military Capabilities* (Washington DC: CSIS, 2005).

[98] Dexter Filkins, 'The Shadow Commander', *The New Yorker*, 30 September 2013, <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander>.

capacity to suppress the uprising.[99] As early as May 2011, within two months of the onset of the demonstrations, the US government sanctioned Suleimani and the Quds Force Operations and Training Commander, Mohsen Chizari, for their role in the repression. The sanctions order described the Quds Force as 'the conduit for Iranian material support' to Syria, and implicated it in 'human rights abuses and repression of the Syrian people'.[100]

While part of this strategic influence entailed an emphasis on forceful repression of the initial protests, similar to Iran's violent crackdown on popular protests in the wake of its 2009 elections, Iran also assisted in the restructuring of the coercive apparatus of the Syrian state itself. After the 1979 revolution, Iran developed a fragmented security structure that included the conventional army, the Republican Guard, and also a powerful militia organization loyal to the Supreme Leader, the Basij. The Basij militia played a central role in Iran's 2009 post-election crackdown, and after 2011 Iran assisted Syria in adopting this model and enhancing its own pre-existing militia forces. Pro-regime criminal gangs known as the *shabiha* had existed in Syria for some time, but were soon structured into more organized paramilitary forces modelled on the Basij. Brought together as the National Defence Force (NDF), the paramilitary force was not just inspired by Iran, but was actively coordinated with Iranian oversight and many NDF combat forces were sent for training in Iran.[101] Cross-border cooperation and material assistance thus facilitated structural changes to the coercive apparatus of the Syrian state that increased its capacity to contain the popular opposition and maintain regime survival.[102]

To complement this strategic input, the capacity of the Syrian regime was also enhanced by the direct involvement of foreign military and paramilitary fighters from both Iran and Lebanon. This contribution helped compensate for the regime's inability to utilize all units of its armed forces due to fears that only the Alawite-dominated units were reliable and loyal.[103] In addition to providing strategic advice and training, Iran's Republican Guard deployed troops and officers. In August 2012, forty-eight Iranian nationals understood

[99] Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, 'Iranian Strategy in Syria' (Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War, May 2013), 10.

[100] US Treasury, 'Administration Takes Additional Steps to Hold the Government of Syria Accountable for Violent Repression Against the Syrian People', 18 May 2011.

[101] Farnaz Fassihi, Jay Solomon, and Sam Dagher, 'Iranians Dial Up Presence in Syria', *Wall Street Journal*, 16 September 2013; Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer, 'Iranian Strategy in Syria', 19; Heydemann, 'Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism', 64.

[102] Heydemann, 'Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism', 67.

[103] Joseph Holliday, 'The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency To Civil War', *Institute for the Study of War*, accessed 23 October 2013, <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime>.

to be members of the Republican Guard were arrested in Syria,[104] and in 2013 media reports cited video evidence of Republican Guards living in Iran and of a senior Guards member discussing his role as a commander of Syrian Army units.[105] One senior member of Iran's Revolutionary Guards acknowledged the presence in Syria, stating 'before our presence in Syria, too many people were killed by the opposition but with the physical and non-physical presence of the Islamic Republic, big massacres in Syria were prevented'.[106] As well as Iranian support, the Syrian regime benefited directly from the presence of non-state foreign fighters from Lebanese Hezbollah, who crossed the border into Syria and joined the fight against the opposition. Hezbollah benefits extensively from Iranian patronage that passes through Syrian supply lines, and it thus had a strong interest in keeping the Assad regime in power. As well as providing a training and support role for Syrian troops not unlike that provided by Iran, Hezbollah also deployed hundreds of its own fighters to engage in combat activities with the Syrian opposition.[107]

Another cross-border contribution to Syria's coercive capacity came in the form of the supply of weaponry and equipment for use in the repression of the regime's opposition, often in breach of international sanctions. Although reliable figures about material transfers to the Syrian regime are difficult to establish, numerous reports suggest that both Russia and Iran played a significant role in providing material support to the Assad regime in ways that enhanced its coercive capabilities. Russia was linked to a wide range of arms transports to the country, including attack helicopters, weapons, and air defence systems.[108] Iran was also associated with arms shipments to Syria, as well as other forms of material military support. A 2012 Western intelligence report stated that 'planes are flying from Iran to Syria via Iraq on an almost daily basis, carrying IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps) personnel and tens of tons of weapons to arm the Syrian security forces and militias

[104] 'Ex-Guards among Iranian Hostages', *BBC*, 8 August 2012; Damien Cave and Hwaida Saad, 'Syria Rebels Say 48 Iran Captives Are Revolutionary Guards', *New York Times*, 5 August 2012.

[105] Fassihi, Solomon, and Dagher, 'Iranians Dial Up Presence in Syria'.

[106] Saeed Kamali Dehghan, 'Syrian Army Being Aided by Iranian Forces', *The Guardian*, 28 May 2012.

[107] Fulton, Holliday, and Wyer, 'Iranian Strategy in Syria', 21–3; Filkins, 'The Shadow Commander'.

[108] Mark Landler and Neil MacFarquhar, 'Heavier Weapons Push Syrian Crisis Toward Civil War', *New York Times*, 12 June 2012; 'Russian Arms Shipment En Route to Syria: Report', Reuters, 25 May 2012; 'Ship "Carrying Attack Helicopters to Syria" Halted off Scotland Heads for Russia', *BBC*, 19 June 2012; Allison, 'Russia and Syria'.

fighting against the rebels'.[109] An internal UN report found that Iran was implicated in breaching sanctions against Syria by shipping a range of armaments, including assault rifles, machine guns, explosives, detonators, and mortar shells.[110] Reports have also suggested that Iranian troops have been involved in providing equipment (and training) to Syrian security forces to allow them to intercept communications and monitor the internet.[111]

The external military contribution to the Assad regime reached its peak after September 2015, when Russia acted on a long-running build-up of its own security forces within the country and initiated a military campaign within Syria. Although the official rationale for the intervention was to target ISIS forces within Syria, reports suggested that most Russian-led strikes targeted opposition-held areas rather than ISIS forces.[112] The intervention also reflected high levels of cooperation between Assad's two staunchest supporters, Russia and Iran. In the months before the campaign, Iranian officials, including General Suleimani, visited Moscow to brief Kremlin officials on the weakening of Assad's coercive capacity and the need for greater outside support. Iran also accelerated its deployment of troops to Syria in order to support the Russian intervention from the ground.[113]

The coercive capacity of the Syrian state thus clearly has an international dimension. Heavy and light weapons, as well as technological equipment that facilitates political repression, have been supplied across international borders by Syria's international sponsors, enhancing the capabilities of Syrian forces. This support has been accompanied by the provision of foreign fighters who have joined forces with Syrian troops to suppress the opposition and prolong the survival of the regime. Although outside sponsorship was not sufficient to eliminate the threat facing the Assad regime and prevent a descent into civil war, external forces enhanced the state's coercive capacity in ways that have

[109] Louis Charbonneau, 'Western Report—Iran Ships Arms, Personnel to Syria via Iraq', Reuters, 19 September 2012.

[110] Louis Charbonneau, 'Exclusive: Iran Flouts U.N. Sanctions, Sends Arms to Syria: Panel', Reuters, 16 May 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/16/us-iran-sanctions-un-idUSBRE84F14520120516>.

[111] Michael R. Gordon, 'Iran Supplying Syrian Military via Iraq Airspace', *New York Times*, 4 September 2012; 'Iran Accused of Setting up pro-Assad Militias', *Al-Jazeera*, 15 August 2012, <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/08/20128154537913351.html>.

[112] Helen Cooper, Michael R. Gordon, and Neil MacFarquhar, 'Russians Strike Targets in Syria, but Not ISIS Areas', *New York Times*, 30 September 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/europe/russia-airstrikes-syria.html>.

[113] Laila Bassam and Tom Perry, 'How Iranian General Plotted out Syrian Assault in Moscow', Reuters, 6 October 2015.

reinforced the staying power of the Syrian regime and ensured that Assad survived longer than many predicted in 2011.

## CONCLUSION

In moments of large-scale popular unrest, elites and masses engage in a struggle over the survival of the political regime itself. Much of our existing understanding of these crisis moments rests on analyses of interaction between domestic actors and the extent to which the elite and mass groups have the cohesion and capacity to defeat one another. This chapter has sought to focus on the international dimensions of this struggle, and to identify the ways in which external actors can support regime incumbents and enhance the prospects for regime persistence through their impact on the coercive capacity of the state. By offering troops, weapons, and equipment, supportive allies can alter the material balance between domestic forces in ways that support the incumbent elites, and can provide a supplement to pre-existing levels of coercive capacity. This supplement may be temporary in nature, and may not enhance state capacity in the long term, but can nonetheless play a crucial role in maintaining regime survival in the face of robust public challenges.

The cases examined here suggest both the potential and the limitations of such outside influence. In Bahrain, large-scale external military support helped free up domestic forces to engage in violent repression, and the threat from the mass uprisings was comprehensively crushed. Bahrain has experienced intermittent protests since 2011, but nothing on the scale of the events of February/March 2011. In contrast, the Syrian case highlights the ways in which extensive external support may help sustain a regime in power, but cannot easily be utilized to successfully eliminate a mobilized opposition. While international sponsorship can contribute to the implementation of coercive crackdowns and enhance the prospects for regime survival in the face of domestic uprisings, it is thus clearly not a panacea. Even where coercive crackdowns can effectively suppress the opposition, incumbents must also deal with the international fallout that invariably follows. Authoritarian practices as visible and brutal as high-intensity repression rarely go unanswered by the international community. Chapter 6 explores some of these dynamics of international reactions to authoritarian practices, and turns to the topic of post-coup political trajectories.

# 6

# International Politics and Post-Coup Authoritarianism

Central to most definitions of democracy is the requirement that leaders are brought to power through a constitutional process involving free and fair elections. Coups, entailing illegal efforts by regime insiders to overthrow the executive, constitute profoundly authoritarian practices.[1] There is an extensive body of scholarship dedicated to understanding the politics of coups, with a particular focus on the factors that make coups more or less likely to take place. Many scholars have explored the international politics of coup risk, and there are some well-established findings concerning the role that external shocks, international war, and international signals can play in shaping the likelihood of coup attempts.[2]

Yet certain aspects of coup politics have been relatively neglected. In particular, the study of post-coup political trajectories is limited, and has gained sustained scholarly attention only in recent years. This research has uncovered some important findings regarding trends in post-coup politics, but also suffers from a number of flaws. Most notably, recent work has highlighted a shift away from authoritarian resilience in the wake of coups dating from the end of the Cold War. At the height of coup-related regime change in the 1960s and 1970s, coup leaders were generally successful in consolidating enduring authoritarian regimes. By contrast, post-1991 coups are much more likely to be followed by elections within a short period of time.[3] These patterns have led some to talk of the emergence of 'democratic coups'—unconstitutional seizures of power that act as the midwife of democratic rule due to the swift holding of post-coup elections.[4] This pattern has in turn been attributed to the

[1] Jonathan M. Powell and Clayton L. Thyne, 'Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (2011): 249–59.

[2] For a review, see Belkin and Schofer, 'Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk'.

[3] Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, 'Coups and Democracy', *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2014): 799–825.

[4] Ozan O. Varol, 'The Democratic Coup d'Etat', *Harvard International Law Journal* 53, no. 2 (2012): 291–356; Jonathan Powell, 'An Assessment Of The "Democratic" Coup Theory: Democratic

increasing use of democratic conditionality in the post-Cold War era, as (mostly) Western states and international organizations use democratic enforcement measures to pressure coup leaders to give up the reins of power.[5]

Yet these recent accounts remain underdeveloped, and fail to acknowledge both the extent of authoritarian resilience after coups and the role played by international autocratic sponsors in underwriting post-coup autocracy. In this chapter, I examine recent patterns of post-coup politics, and identify a number of ways in which external sponsors contribute to authoritarian consolidation after coups. I make two contributions that shed light on the politics of post-coup trajectories.

Firstly, I show that there are a number of problems with the recent narrative that coups are increasingly associated with democracy. While coups are increasingly being followed by the introduction of some of the institutional trappings of democracy, this trend has not been universal and many of the states that have held elections have done so as part of a process of introducing some form of competitive authoritarian regime. Several regimes that held elections shortly after experiencing coups nonetheless continued to exhibit strong authoritarian tendencies, as incumbents worked to resist genuine democratic rule (e.g. Cambodia after its 1997 coup). Other regimes, such as Pakistan after 1999 and Egypt after 2013, held deeply flawed elections, and a number of regimes held no post-coup elections within five years (e.g. Fiji after 2006). The association between coups and democracy is thus one that should be treated with caution, and there is ample evidence that authoritarian resilience remains a core feature of post-coup politics in the contemporary world.

Secondly, I identify the role played by international autocratic sponsors in accounting for post-coup authoritarian resilience. While international democratizing pressures have undoubtedly played a role in altering the patterns of post-coup politics, it is clear that the recent variation in outcomes must also be accounted for with reference to the permissive and supportive policies of external actors. At times, Western democracy promoters have actively supported post-coup autocratic regimes, and even when Western enforcement has been extensive, non-Western allies have regularly stepped in to compensate for any losses. Using a range of tools of sponsorship, including diplomatic protection and economic assistance, international actors

Trajectories In Africa, 1961–2012', *African Security Review* 23, no. 3 (2014): 213–24; Albert Trithart, 'Democratic Coups? Regional Responses to the Constitutional Crises in Honduras and Niger', *Journal of Public and International Affairs*, 23 (2013): 112–34.

[5] Marinov and Goemans, 'Coups and Democracy'.

have actively contributed to authoritarian consolidation in the wake of many post-1991 coups.

I illustrate these dynamics with reference to events in the wake of coups in Fiji and Egypt, both of which enjoyed supportive international environments for post-coup authoritarian consolidation. The Fijian coup of 2006 was led by army leader Frank Bainimarama, who refused to hold post-coup elections despite intense pressure from neighbouring democracies. Instead, Bainimarama presided over a closed political system and actively suppressed political competition before finally holding elections in 2014. His freedom to manoeuvre in a context of Western condemnation and sanctions was crucially enhanced by robust diplomatic and material support from China. More recently, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi's 2013 coup in Egypt was greeted by its allies with either mild criticism or fulsome praise, and with a range of diplomatic and economic responses that provided a permissive, and at certain points a highly supportive, international environment for the consolidation of post-coup authoritarianism. Both Fiji and Egypt benefited from their regional strategic importance and their diverse spectrum of international linkages.

The chapter examines the international politics of post-coup authoritarianism in five sections. The next section examines some of the existing findings regarding the international influences on coup politics, including the role of external actors before, during, and after coups take place. The following section focuses on post-coup authoritarian resilience, and examines the role that international autocratic sponsors can play in shaping post-coup trajectories. The third section presents descriptive statistics that question any simple relationship between coups and democracy and demonstrate an enduring link between coups and authoritarian rule. The final sections present case studies of post-coup trajectories in Egypt after 2013 and Fiji after 2006 to highlight the crucial role that international autocratic sponsorship can play in protecting and enhancing the position of post-coup incumbents.

## COUPS AND INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

To date, the political analysis of coups has tended to focus on the sources of coup risk, and the factors that make coups more or less likely to occur. That is, scholarship has focused on the 'before' phase of coups as an authoritarian practice. Several studies have pointed to a range of primarily domestic factors that explain the propensity of countries to experience coups. These include economic factors, such as poverty and lack of development, as well as a range

of political factors, such as the legitimacy of the incumbent government, the strength of civil society, the level of exclusion of ethnic groups from power, and the type of coup-proofing strategies pursued by incumbent elites.[6] International factors have not been ignored in this literature, but they are largely secondary. Exogenous shocks such as international war have been shown to trigger coup attempts.[7] Some scholars have pointed to the ways in which coups in one setting can inspire copycat efforts across international borders, giving rise to a diffusion of coup attempts.[8] As well as these passive forms of influence, international actors can also take more active measures that are designed to indicate their support for a potential coup. Scholars have noted the ways in which international actors can send encouraging signals to potential coup plotters in advance, actions that serve to lower the perceived costs of coup attempts.[9] Some recent research has sought to systematically quantify and evaluate the impact of such international signals on the cost–benefit analysis of coup plotters, demonstrating that the amount and type of signal sent (whether supportive or hostile to the sitting government) shapes the likelihood of coup attempts.[10] The US, for example, gave clear signals of support to potential coup plotters in Venezuela in 2002, and the military in Egypt was given signals of encouragement from international allies before ousting President Morsi in 2013.[11]

Once the decision to undertake a coup has been made, international actors can also contribute to the implementation of coup attempts. That is, the international environment can shape the 'during' phase of coups as an authoritarian practice. Material support to coup plotters can enhance their capacity to overthrow sitting governments, while swift recognition of coup leaders can help solidify the position of the new rulers. The long-standing

[6] Thomas H. Johnson, Robert O. Slater, and Pat McGowan, 'Explaining African Military Coups D'etat, 1960–1982', *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984): 622–40; John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, 'Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power', *World Politics* 42, no. 2 (1990): 151–83; Belkin and Schofer, 'Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk'; Philip Roessler, 'The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa', *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 300–46; James T. Quinlivan, 'Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East', *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 131–65.

[7] Belkin and Schofer, 'Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk', 602.

[8] Li and Thompson, 'The "Coup Contagion" Hypothesis'.

[9] Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 89.

[10] Clayton L. Thyne, 'Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitation? The Effect of US Foreign Policy on Coups in Latin America, 1960–99', *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 4 (2010): 449–61; Megan Shannon et al., 'The International Community's Reaction to Coups', *Foreign Policy Analysis* 11, no. 4 (2015): 363–76.

[11] Sikkink, *Mixed Signals*, 209; David D. Kirkpatrick, 'Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi', *New York Times*, 1 March 2015.

president of Chad, Idriss Deby, came to power in a coup in 1990 that was sponsored by Libya and Sudan. Sudan provided refuge for Deby as he planned his overthrow, and some estimates suggest that 40 per cent of his supplies were provided by Libya.[12] Chad in turn would subsequently sponsor coups beyond its own borders. In 2003, Deby (along with the regimes in Congo-Brazzaville and the Democratic Republic of Congo) supported and contributed to the overthrow of the sitting government in the Central African Republic, offering shelter and military support to the forces of General François Bozizé in his successful quest to seize power.[13] During the Cold War, the US played a key, if covert, role in contributing to the success of coups in, among others, Iran in 1953 and Chile in 1973.[14]

Finally, international forces can also shape the 'after' phase of coup politics, that is, the political trajectories of countries that have experienced coups. Post-coup trajectories are highly diverse, with some coup leaders consolidating their positions in power for long-term autocratic rule, while others move to introduce elections and, in some cases, genuine democracy. Compared to the determinants of coup risk, however, the consequences and aftermath of coups have been relatively underexplored, and it is only in recent years that scholars have sought to systematically analyse the political trajectory of coup countries. Many of the findings of this recent scholarship concern the changing patterns of coup politics over time, especially regarding the type of political regime that emerges in the post-coup context.

For the remainder of this chapter, I focus in particular on this crucial period after a coup takes place, and especially on the question of when, and how, coups give rise to enduring authoritarian regimes. In recent scholarship, scholars have suggested that coups are less likely to lead to stable authoritarianism than in the past. I explore these claims, and probe the extent, and sources, of authoritarian resilience in the changing context of post-coup politics.

[12] Sam C. Nolutshungu, *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad* (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1996), 243; Millard Burr and Robert O. Collins, *Africa's Thirty Years War: Libya, Chad, and the Sudan, 1963–1993* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999), 254–63.

[13] ICG, 'Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State', 13 December 2007, 15–16, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central- african-republic/136-central-african-republic-anatomy-of-a-phantom-state.aspx>.

[14] David P. Forsythe, 'Democracy, War, and Covert Action', *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992): 385–95; Mary Lauren Lilley and Alexander B. Downes, 'Covert Action, Democratic Peace, and the Cold War' (Working paper, Duke University, 2007).

## POST-COUP AUTHORITARIAN CONSOLIDATION

Coup plotters face a number of challenges to their efforts to consolidate and solidify their rule. As Svolik has shown, most autocratic rulers are dislodged by coups, and coups are more likely to take place in the early years of an autocrat's rule.[15] Coup leaders thus have to be fearful of being targets of a coup themselves before they can feel secure in power. Furthermore, like all autocratic rulers, coup leaders must also be wary of threats from the masses. While some coups are welcomed by large sectors of the public (e.g. Suharto's coup in Indonesia in 1965), coups are often associated with an increased risk of mass pro-democracy protests.[16] After the Thai army removed the elected government in May 2014, protestors took to the streets to demand a return to civilian rule, and similar demonstrations took place on the first anniversary of the coup in May 2015.[17] Even though the 2013 coup in Egypt was strongly supported among large sections of Egyptian society, supporters of the ousted President Morsi mobilized to denounce the coup (prompting a brutal and violent crackdown by the army).[18]

The ability of coup plotters to successfully navigate these challenges and consolidate authoritarian rule rests on a number of diverse factors, many of them rooted in domestic politics.[19] Although there is little dedicated scholarship on the sources of post-coup authoritarian resilience, insights from the wider literature on authoritarianism shed light on many important coup cases. Elite cohesion plays an important role in reducing the risk from rival elites, and coup leaders thus rely in part on the unity of key actors within the new regime. For cases of military coups, military unity obviously plays a crucial role. Military coups are frequently spearheaded by a single branch of the military, rather than the institution as a whole, and it is by no means guaranteed that the other branches of the military will support the coup leaders.[20] Cleavages within the military often result in failed coups, but even

[15] Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 5, 77.

[16] Brancati, 'Pocketbook Protests: Explaining the Emergence of Pro-Democracy Protests Worldwide', 1520.

[17] Vasudevan Sridharan, 'Thai Police Arrest Dozens after Anti-Coup Protests Flare up', *International Business Times*, 23 May 2015; 'Thailand Anti-Coup Protests Continue', *BBC*, 25 May 2014.

[18] 'Egypt Protests: Bloodshed as Pro-Morsi Camps Cleared', *BBC News*, accessed 18 August 2015, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23691571>.

[19] Göbel, 'Authoritarian Consolidation'.

[20] Naunihal Singh, *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).

when coups are successful, institutional factionalism can undermine the prospects for stable and enduring authoritarianism. For example, Thailand's history of short-lived military regimes punctuated by military coups in the decades after WWII was the result of endemic military factionalism, with rival military leaders consistently seeking to outmanoeuvre one another. By contrast, a potent threat of communist mobilization in Indonesia forged military unity that contributed to prolonged rule after Suharto's coup of 1966.[21] Elite unity and cohesion can also be facilitated by the use of political institutions. Autocratic regimes that utilize legislative institutions are likely to endure much longer than those that do not.[22] The creation of ruling political parties can channel public support and facilitate co-option and oversight of potential elite rivals. Enduring post-coup autocratic regimes in countries such as Egypt and Iraq rested in significant part on the establishment of ruling political parties.[23] Coup leaders also often combine institutional innovations with political repression, outlawing opposition parties, imprisoning rival elites, and using violence against the public. For example, Suharto did not rely on military unity alone, and also engaged in large-scale and brutal repression of his communist rivals.[24]

Yet the fate of post-coup regimes does not rest exclusively on domestic politics, and international factors play an important role. Some international forces lower rather than raise the prospects for authoritarian consolidation. Insights from the literature on the international dimensions of democratization highlight how external actors can pressurize post-coup regimes and increase the prospects for post-coup transitions to democracy rather than autocratic consolidation. There are two broad mechanisms that are relevant for post-coup regimes. Firstly, international actors can enhance the domestic threats that post-coup regimes face from both rival elites and the masses. In terms of rival elites, external actors can support the ousted government and work to restore the former authorities to power, thus increasing the risk that the coup leaders will themselves be ousted. For example, the international community played a major role in supporting the return to power of political leaders ousted by coups in both Haiti after the 1991 coup and Sierra Leone after 1997.[25] In terms of the masses, international attention and condemnation

[21] Slater, *Ordering Power*, 241.

[22] Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*, 111–12; Gandhi and Przeworski, 'Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats'.

[23] Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*; Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*.

[24] Vincent Boudreau, *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[25] Morton H. Halperin and Kristen Lomasney, 'Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record', *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998): 134–47.

can inform and embolden domestic opposition actors, and contribute to domestic protests.[26] The second mechanism entails a reduction of the capacity of the new regime to respond to such threats. International actors can use punishments such as trade sanctions or reductions in financial aid that can materially affect the capacity of the ruling government. Several international organizations have introduced provisions to sanction member states whose leaders have acquired power by overthrowing elected governments.[27]

The most well-developed account of post-coup political development that takes international forces seriously is offered by Goemans and Marinov, and focuses primarily on the democracy-supporting and autocracy-subverting role of international actors.[28] The authors make two significant contributions. Firstly, they identify a post-Cold War trend away from post-coup authoritarian consolidation. Prior to 1991, most coups were followed by the consolidation of enduring authoritarian regimes. In contrast, after 1991 most coups have been followed by free and fair elections within five years. This finding is supported by other recent research. For example, Powell and Thyne's analysis of a global sample of authoritarian regimes suggests that coups can increase the likelihood of democracy, and do so in particular in the regime types that otherwise would be most resistant to democracy (e.g. regimes with strongly authoritarian or long-standing leaders).[29] This association between coups and democracy has given rise to the idea of the 'democratic coup', in which coup leaders overthrow an autocratic leader with a view to guiding the country to democracy rather than for personal gain and power.[30]

Secondly, Goemans and Marinov offer an original theory for this shift in post-coup trajectories, and argue that the increase in international democracy promotion explains the shift away from post-coup authoritarian consolidation. With the end of the Cold War, Western states and international organizations developed a strong normative preference for democracy, and increasingly used their material leverage to promote democratic development abroad. In particular, the rise of democratic conditionality created a new incentive structure for coup leaders who come to power in countries that

[26] For a discussion of similar dynamics regarding election monitoring, see Kelley, *Monitoring Democracy*, 103; Tucker, 'Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions', 541–2.

[27] Wobig, 'Defending Democracy with International Law'; Legler and Tieku, 'What Difference Can a Path Make?'.

[28] Marinov and Goemans, 'Coups and Democracy'.

[29] Clayton L. Thyne and Jonathan M. Powell, 'Coup D'état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008', *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2014, doi:10.1111/fpa.12046.

[30] Varol, 'The Democratic Coup d'Etat'; Powell, 'An Assessment Of The "Democratic" Coup Theory: Democratic Trajectories In Africa, 1961–2012'; Trithart, 'Democratic Coups?'.

rely on international donors for significant national income. Countries that are dependent on Western aid are much more likely to be vulnerable to democratic conditionality applied by Western donors, and more likely to introduce elections to satisfy those donors as a result. In this account, the combination of aid dependence and international democratic conditionality explains the decline of post-coup authoritarian resilience.[31]

However, I argue that recent accounts of the relationship between coups and post-coup regimes have oversold the link between coups and democracy, and have neglected the patterns of authoritarian resilience in many post-coup settings. While increasing rates of post-coup elections are not in doubt, the contribution of these elections to processes of genuine democratization has so far been taken too much at face value. Coups still frequently give rise to closed or competitive authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, while international politics undoubtedly plays a role in encouraging elections in the wake of political coups, insufficient attention has been paid to the diversity of international influences to which coup leaders are subjected. Goemans and Marinov, for example, explore only the Western, pro-democratic international influences on domestic-level coup leaders. In order to understand the variation in post-coup trajectories, and in particular the resilience of authoritarianism in many coup countries, it is essential to examine not only the pro-democracy pressure to which coup leaders are subjected by Western states and international organizations, but also the permissive and supportive international environments that are often created by the active sponsorship received from supportive external allies. Many coup leaders find that they are located within an international environment that includes not only critical democracy enforcers, but also supportive international sponsors. Some of these considerations have been incorporated into studies of the *causes* of coups,[32] but the scholarship on the consequences of coups has yet to adequately consider them.

To fully appreciate the wider international influences on post-coup trajectories, it is therefore necessary to examine the connections and linkages that each country has with external actors, and assess the type of international environment within which it is located. Historical and deep-rooted linkages with autocratic actors can generate international support for post-coup governments, and coup leaders often appeal to a state's historical allies to approve of their actions. Coups that take place in strategically important countries may also receive external support if they further the strategic interests of outside powers. Consequently, many coup plotters find that their interests align with

[31] Marinov and Goemans, 'Coups and Democracy'.
[32] Thyne, 'Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitation?'.

those of influential external actors, and once they come to power they enjoy an international environment that is largely non-constraining.

For some, the post-coup international environment may simply be a permissive one, and for various reasons international actors may refrain from punishing the new elites. Although Goemans and Marinov's analysis suggests that economic dependence will lead coup plotters to introduce elections for fear of Western punishment, many international conditions frequently are not enforced even in highly dependent countries. Many coups take place in countries that are highly dependent on external donors, but were not subject to the kind of democratic enforcement that would create major incentives for democratic reform. Research by von Soest and Wahman highlights the variation in democratic sanctions by Western powers, and demonstrates the uneven international response to international coups. Their dataset of democratic sanctions episodes reveals a number of enforcement actions against post-coup authorities, but also reveals multiple post-Cold War coup cases, including aid-dependent countries such as Burundi, Mali, and Mauritania, that were not subject to democratic sanctions in the years after the coup took place.[33] Elsewhere, democratic enforcement was relatively half-hearted or short-lived. In the wake of the 1997 coup in Cambodia, Japan (Cambodia's largest donor) temporarily cut off international aid. Yet it resumed aid within a matter of weeks based on verbal guarantees of reform, rather than any real change.[34] Cambodia did go on to hold elections in 1998, but these contributed only to the consolidation of competitive authoritarianism, and Cambodia has been classified as Not Free by Freedom House for every year since those elections. Similarly, although the US has a legal obligation to cut off aid to countries where democratic leaders have been removed through a coup, it is often cautious in applying the rule and regularly avoids using the word 'coup' for purely political purposes.[35]

Many coup leaders, however, benefit from more than a permissive environment, and receive active and intentional international support. Once offered, international sponsorship can help consolidate post-coup authoritarianism in a number of ways, involving both informational and material mechanisms. In informational terms, international sponsors can offer clear signals of support that can help consolidate the position of post-coup incumbents. If

[33] von Soest and Wahman, 'Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive?'.

[34] 'Cambodia: Aftermath of the Coup', *Refworld*, accessed 21 April 2015, <http://www.refworld.org/docid/45cb0fbb2.html>.

[35] Max Fisher, 'U.S. Has Spotty Record on Law Requiring It to Cut Aid after Coups', *Washington Post*, 5 July 2013, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/07/05/u-s-has-spotty-record-on-law-requiring-it-to-cut-aid-after-coups/>.

international supporters offer swift recognition of the new government, it can provide legitimacy to the new regime and support its narrative to justify the overthrow of the previous government. Recognition of the new authorities sends a clear signal of external support that can reassure elite actors and increase the prospects for elite cohesion.[36] It can also send a signal of the strength of the regime to the public, and dampen the appetite for public protests. Vocal diplomatic support of this kind can also involve reinforcing the narrative of the coup plotters, as external actors endorse their stated reasons for undertaking the coup and denounce their critics (see the discussion of Saudi Arabia and Egypt's 2013 coup below).

In material terms, international sponsors can provide newly installed coup leaders with financial or security support to assist their efforts to consolidate their power. Such actions bolster the capacity of the new authorities to fend off potential challenges and increase the prospects for authoritarian consolidation. They can also serve to counter the negative effects of sanctions that may be applied by more critical international actors, as new loans or aid compensate for the losses incurred by democratic enforcement measures. Such sanctions-busting behaviour can protect the new incumbents from the most damaging material effects of international censure.[37]

In the sections that follow I offer empirical support for these arguments. The next section presents descriptive statistics that show the limits of the association between coups and democracy, and highlights the regularity of post-coup authoritarian consolidation. The subsequent sections examine the international sources of post-coup authoritarian consolidation in the Fijian and Egyptian cases.

## THE DIVERSITY OF POST-COUP TRAJECTORIES

One of the problems with current treatments of the relationship between coups and post-coup regime trajectories is that elections are often equated with the attainment of democracy. Although elections are a central element of democracy and are a crucial step in the process of successful democratization,[38] they are not a sufficient condition for the successful emergence of

[36] For a similar argument regarding the politics of repression, see Nepstad, 'Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria'.

[37] Early, 'Unmasking the Black Knights'.

[38] Staffan I. Lindberg, *Democratization by Election: A New Mode of Transition* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).

democracy itself. The spread of elections in the post-Cold War period is not a reliable indicator of the spread of democracy, as many rulers have found ways to use elections to preserve authoritarian forms of rule even while keeping international actors satisfied.[39] Even where transitional elections are free and fair, democratic consolidation is far from guaranteed, and many countries struggle to build upon the promise of initial free and fair elections and quickly relapse into some forms of authoritarianism.[40] Consequently, findings about the relationship between coups and elections cannot easily be translated into findings about coups and democracy, and the language of 'democratic coups' is thus highly misleading. While there has been a clear shift away from universal post-coup authoritarianism after the Cold War, coups frequently still give rise to closed autocratic regimes and often pave the way for electoral forms of autocracy that fall short of the minimum standards of democracy.

Taking the analysis of Goemans and Marinov as a starting point, in this section I examine the post-coup political trajectory in all coup countries after 1991, and use descriptive statistics to highlight the extent of post-coup authoritarian resilience in the post-Cold War period. Goemans and Marinov's central argument is that post-1991 coup countries have had a much greater likelihood of being followed by competitive elections rather than durable authoritarian rule, and that consequently the 'new generation of coups has been far less harmful for democracy than their historical predecessors'.[41] I do not seek to contradict the idea that there has been a shift in patterns after the Cold War, but I show that despite the trend towards post-coup elections, authoritarian rule remains a common outcome in countries that experience coups. Examination of the post-coup politics in all post-1991 cases suggests that coups in these settings are not associated with transitions to durable and high-quality democracy in most cases, and coups still regularly give rise to autocratic regimes.

Table 6.1 shows the post-1991 coup cases listed in Powell and Thyne's coup dataset up until 2015,[42] as well as a series of measures of their post-coup political trajectories, including the presence or absence of free and fair elections, and their levels of political freedom. Two measures are used to capture the extent of democracy or autocracy, based on both Polity and Freedom House data. The evidence presented in the table suggests a number of

[39] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 'Elections Under Authoritarianism'.

[40] Ethan B. Kapstein and Nathan Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

[41] Marinov and Goemans, 'Coups and Democracy'.

[42] Powell and Thyne, 'Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset'.

**Table 6.1.** Post-Coup Trajectories, 1991–2015

| Country | Year of Coup | Polity 5yrs after | Polity 2014 | FH 5yrs after | FH2014 | Elections within 5yrs | Election Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Lesotho | 1991 | 8 | 8 | PF | F | Fair | 1993 |
| Mali | 1991 | 7 | 5 | F | PF | Fair | 1992 |
| Haiti | 1991 | 7 | 0 | PF | PF | Fair | 1995 |
| Thailand | 1991 | 9 | −3 | PF | NF | Fair | 1992 |
| Afghanistan | 1992 | −7 | −1 | NF | NF | No election | |
| Sierra Leone | 1992 | 0 | 7 | NF | PF | Fair | 1996 |
| Algeria | 1992 | −3 | 2 | NF | NF | Fair | 1995 |
| Nigeria | 1993 | −1 | 4 | PF | PF | Unfair | 1998 |
| Lesotho | 1994 | 2 | 8 | PF | F | Fair | 1998 |
| Rwanda | 1994 | −6 | −3 | NF | NF | No election | |
| Gambia | 1994 | −5 | −5 | NF | NF | Fair | 1996 |
| Qatar | 1995 | −10 | −10 | NF | NF | No election | |
| Burundi | 1996 | 0 | 6 | NF | NF | No election | |
| Sierra Leone | 1996 | 2 | 7 | PF | PF | Fair | 1996 |
| Niger | 1996 | 5 | 4 | PF | PF | Fair | 1996 |
| Cambodia | 1997 | 2 | 2 | NF | NF | Fair | 1998 |
| Sierra Leone | 1997 | 5 | 7 | PF | PF | Fair | 2002 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 1999 | −1 | 6 | PF | PF | Fair | 1999 |
| Ivory Coast | 1999 | 0 | 4 | NF | PF | Fair | 2000 |
| Comoros | 1999 | 6 | 9 | PF | PF | Unfair | 2002 |
| Niger | 1999 | 6 | 4 | PF | PF | Fair | 1999 |
| Pakistan | 1999 | −5 | 7 | NF | PF | Unfair | 2002 |
| Fiji | 2000 | 6 | 2 | PF | PF | Fair | 2001 |
| Sao Tome/Principe | 2003 | – | – | F | F | No election | |
| Central African Rep. | 2003 | −1 | 0 | PF | NF | Fair | 2005 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2003 | 6 | 6 | PF | PF | Unfair | 2004 |
| Mauritania | 2005 | −2 | −2 | NF | NF | Unfair | 2006 |
| Togo | 2005 | −2 | −2 | PF | PF | Fair | 2005 |
| Thailand | 2006 | 7 | −3 | PF | NF | Fair | 2007 |
| Fiji | 2006 | −4 | 2 | PF | PF | No election | |
| Guinea | 2008 | 4 | 4 | PF | PF | Fair | 2010 |
| Mauritania | 2008 | −2 | −2 | NF | NF | Fair | 2009 |
| Honduras | 2009 | 7 | 7 | PF | PF | Fair | 2009 |
| Madagascar | 2009 | 6 | 6 | PF | PF | Fair | 2013 |

*Continued*

**Table 6.1.** Continued

| Country | Year of Coup | Polity 5yrs after | Polity 2014 | FH 5yrs after | FH2014 | Elections within 5yrs | Election Year |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Niger | 2010 | n/a | 4 | n/a | PF | Fair | 2011 |
| Egypt | 2011 | n/a | −4 | n/a | NF | Fair | 2012 |
| Maldives | 2012 | n/a | – | n/a | PF | Fair | 2013 |
| Mali | 2012 | n/a | 5 | n/a | PF | Fair | 2013 |
| Guinea-Bissau | 2012 | n/a | 6 | n/a | PF | Fair | 2014 |
| Egypt | 2013 | n/a | −4 | n/a | NF | Unfair | 2014 |
| Ukraine | 2014 | n/a | 4 | n/a | PF | Fair | 2014 |
| Thailand | 2014 | n/a | −3 | n/a | NF | No election | |

*Data Sources*: Polity IV 2014 (Polity2 score); Freedom House Freedom in the World 2015 report; data on coup countries and years based on Powell and Thyne, 'Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset'; data on election fairness until 2009 based on Marinov and Goemans, 'Coups and Democracy', and coded by the author after 2009. Scores are '–' for missing data and n/a if not applicable.

important findings regarding the relationship between coups and regime type that raise questions concerning any simple findings about 'democratic coups'.

Firstly, while the table demonstrates a clear pattern of post-coup elections across most cases, the trend is not universal. A small number of countries that experienced coups in the post-1991 period refrained from holding any elections within five years of the coup, including Afghanistan after its 1992 coup, Rwanda after 1994, and Fiji after 2006. Several others held elections that were not free and fair, including Pakistan after the Musharraf coup of 1999 (flawed elections in 2002) and Mauritania after its 2005 coup (flawed elections in 2006). While most of the forty-two coups between 1991 and 2015 were followed by free and fair elections, a significant minority of twelve held no, or only flawed, elections. Post-Cold War coups have thus given rise to many closed authoritarian regimes.

A second feature of the data concerns the levels of political freedom that can be found in the set of coup cases. Using both Polity and Freedom House data, it is possible to determine whether post-1991 coup countries have experienced transitions to democratic regimes, or have instead consolidated closed and authoritarian forms of rule. An analysis of the Freedom House status for each country five years after the experience of the coup is not particularly encouraging. To consider this measure, it is necessary to restrict the sample to those coups between 1991 and 2009 in order to allow a five-year gap to assess the Freedom House verdict (Freedom House's 2015 scores cover the 2014 calendar year). Of the thirty-four coups that took place between 1991 and 2009, in

only two cases was the country rated as Free within five years of the coup, while in twenty cases the country was rated as Partly Free after five years and twelve were rated Not Free. Even taking a longer perspective, the pattern is remarkably similar and not particularly encouraging. Of the twenty-nine countries that experienced coups between 1991 and 2014, and are thus included in the 2015 Freedom in the World report, only two were rated as Free (Lesotho and Sao Tome and Principe). Sixteen were rated as Partly Free, and eleven were rated as Not Free. Coup events are regularly followed by the consolidation of stable closed autocratic regimes, or forms of competitive authoritarian rule.

The evidence from Polity presents a more optimistic picture, but still shows a clear trend in which most countries that experience a coup retain some form of authoritarian regime. Polity scores are available until 2014, and no Polity scores are available for two small island countries that experienced coups (the Maldives and Sao Tome & Principe). The Polity scale runs from −10 to 10, and Polity recommends scoring cases from −10 to −6 as autocracies, −5 to 5 as anocracies, and 6 to 10 as democracies. Of the thirty-three coups between 1991 and 2009 for which Polity has scores, only eleven (one-third) achieve scores of 6 or above (representing democracy) within five years. Three were autocratic, and the remaining nineteen were anocracies. Just under half (16) were scored at 0 or below five years after the coup. Turning to the longer-term measure to assess the current status of these coup countries, the picture is broadly similar. Of the twenty-seven countries for which Polity has 2014 scores, nine are democracies, one is an autocracy, and seventeen are anocracies. Polity thus suggests a pattern in which the majority of countries that experience coups struggle to move beyond limited levels of democratic rule, and many fall far short of the threshold of democracy. While Polity offers a slightly more encouraging picture than Freedom House (with more countries in the top category, and fewer in the bottom), both sets of data suggest that the post-1991 coup experience includes a considerable role for authoritarian resilience.

Thirdly, a striking feature of the table is that several countries appear multiple times, suggesting that coup countries struggle to maintain post-coup regimes without subsequently experiencing another coup. Young democracies are often highly fragile,[43] and the figures show that many of the post-1991 post-coup regimes succumbed to subsequent coups within a short period. Nine countries that held post-coup elections after 1991 went on to experience at least one more coup in the wake of those elections. These multiple-coup cases were

[43] Kapstein and Converse, *The Fate of Young Democracies*.

(with coup years in parentheses): Egypt (2011 and 2013), Fiji (2000 and 2006), Guinea-Bissau (1999, 2003, and 2012), Lesotho (1991 and 1994), Mali (1991 and 2012), Mauritania (2005 and 2008), Niger (1996, 1999, and 2010), Sierra Leone (1992, 1996, and 1997), and Thailand (1991, 2006, and 2014). In all, the forty-two post-1991 coups listed in the Powell and Thyne dataset were distributed across only twenty-nine countries. Far from ushering in stable democracy, the initial coups in the nine repeat offenders failed to usher in stable regimes of any kind.

Overall, therefore, the trends in post-coup politics after 1991 do not suggest we live in an age of 'democratic coups'. While many coups are followed by some form of free and fair election within five years, the trend is far from universal. Coup leaders still often cling to power and coups regularly give rise to new forms of autocratic rule, often with the use of façade elections. Coups are no longer the near-certain death sentence for democracy that they were during the Cold War years, but authoritarian resilience still remains a common feature of post-coup politics. The following sections examine two case studies to illustrate the role that international politics plays in fostering post-coup authoritarian consolidation: the 2013 coup in Egypt and the 2006 coup in Fiji. The former was characterized by shallow 'enforcement' by the United States, as well as robust sponsorship by powerful states within the region. The latter case featured intense enforcement efforts by Western powers that were nonetheless offset by a surge in Chinese economic and diplomatic sponsorship. Both cases highlight the ways in which permissive and supportive international environments can reinforce the position of authoritarian rulers.

## US POLICY AND EGYPT'S 2013 COUP

The role that international sponsorship plays in the consolidation of post-coup regimes is clearly illustrated by the international reaction to the Egyptian coup of 2013. The Arab uprisings of 2011 led to the swift collapse of the Mubarak regime in Egypt, but the aftermath of the uprisings did not ultimately lead to a transition to democratic rule. The Muslim Brotherhood's Mohamed Morsi was elected to office in the country's first free and fair presidential elections in 2012, but quickly clashed with both the military and the judiciary.[44] After just over a year of Morsi rule, the military intervened and forcefully removed him from

[44] Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, *The Arab Spring*, chapters 4 & 5.

office in July 2013. A major crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood followed, and flawed elections in 2014 brought to power the man who led the coup, former head of the armed forces General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. In the wake of the coup, the new civilian administration installed by Sisi was subjected to limited and temporary punitive action by the United States, but the Obama administration also sent clear signals of diplomatic support. The post-coup leaders also received robust and forceful diplomatic and material support from key powers in the Gulf, who endorsed the coup in strong terms and provided a major surge of financial aid to the new regime.

The roots of the 2013 coup can be seen in part in the events that took place between the fall of Mubarak in February 2011 and the rise of mass anti-Morsi protests in 2013 (although the pattern of military involvement in Egyptian politics has deep historical roots).[45] After Mubarak's fall, Egypt entered a transitional period that included prolonged political instability. The future direction of Egypt's political system was contested between a number of major political camps, including the liberal and radical groups that had driven the public uprising against Mubarak, the Islamist camp led by the Muslim Brotherhood, and the key state actors, especially the armed forces and the judiciary. Each camp sought to manoeuvre in ways that furthered their own goals, and while this sometimes involved cooperation and compromise with rival forces, often it entailed efforts to monopolize power and exclude potential competitors. As the Islamist camp increased political power through the ballot box, gaining a plurality in parliamentary elections in early 2012 and winning the presidential elections with its candidate Mohamed Morsi in June 2012, both the judiciary and the armed forces sought to limit its rise and each side took increasingly drastic steps to pursue their interests. The Muslim Brotherhood and the judiciary tangled over the eligibility of election candidates, each seeking (and the judiciary succeeding) to exclude candidates of whom they disapproved. The Supreme Constitutional Court dissolved the elected parliament in June 2012, and the armed forces issued a constitutional declaration the same month assuming parliamentary powers. President Morsi sought to re-establish the parliament but was overruled by the court. Morsi's major political gamble came in November 2012, when he issued a constitutional declaration that effectively sought to place the presidency above the law, and put the decisions and policies of the president beyond judicial oversight. Although Morsi withdrew the most controversial elements of the decree the following month, the move galvanized opposition to his rule. A grassroots opposition movement, Tamarrud, mobilized in the early months of 2013, and

[45] Ibid.

scheduled mass anti-Morsi protests for 30 June. The protests developed into mass rallies involving many millions of people, and amid increasing tension, the army gave Morsi a two-day ultimatum to meet the protestors' demands. When Morsi remained defiant and refused to leave office and grant early elections, the military intervened on 6 July. Morsi was forcefully removed from office by the armed forces, who immediately also initiated a large-scale crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood.[46] Although a fierce debate emerged within Egypt about whether the intervention amounted to a coup given the extent of the public protests, the removal of Morsi by the armed forces in breach of constitutional provisions clearly met standard academic definitions of a coup d'état.[47] After weeks of sit-in protests by Morsi supporters, the post-coup fallout reached its peak when the security forces engaged in a brutal crackdown to clear the streets, killing over 600 people in their assault on Rabaa Square.[48] The judiciary subsequently banned the Muslim Brotherhood's political party, the Freedom and Justice Party, and Morsi was eventually put on trial for murder and sentenced to twenty years in prison in 2015.[49]

After Morsi's removal, the head of the army, General Sisi, did not seek to instal himself in power immediately, but appointed the president of the Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansour, as interim leader. However, Sisi soon left the army in order to contest the presidential elections of 2014. In a context where the Muslim Brotherhood was severely repressed and many of its leaders imprisoned, Sisi won the elections comfortably, and the architect of the 2013 coup became Egypt's President in 2014.

The international response to the coup varied, and reflected the diverse linkage spectrum that Egypt enjoys on the international stage. Within Africa, there was widespread condemnation, and Egypt was suspended from the African Union under its rules governing the unconstitutional removal of leaders from power (it was re-admitted one year later).[50] Yet the international reaction elsewhere was more sanguine, and its most influential international partners and donors largely backed the regime. Consequently, although the

[46] David D. Kirkpatrick, 'Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military Custody', *New York Times*, 3 July 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html>.

[47] Jay Ulfelder, 'Yes, That's a Coup in Egypt', *Dart-Throwing Chimp*, 3 July 2013, <https://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2013/07/03/yes-thats-a-coup-in-egypt>.

[48] Human Rights Watch, 'All According to Plan: The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt', 12 August 2014, <http://www.hrw.org/node/127942>.

[49] David D. Kirkpatrick and Merna Thomas, 'Egyptian Court Sentences Mohamed Morsi to 20 Years in Prison', *New York Times*, 21 April 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/world/middleeast/egypt-mohamed-morsi-sentenced.html>.

[50] 'African Union Suspends Egypt', Reuters, 5 July 2013.

broader international reaction was mixed, with both critics and supporters, the international actors that counted most (Egypt's principal donors) created a largely supportive international environment. The US in particular, one of Egypt's biggest donors and a long-standing political ally, offered only limited criticism and punitive measures in response to the coup, and its overall policy was broadly supportive of the military's actions. The US had a number of strategic motivations that informed this policy. Egypt had long represented a strategically important partner in furthering several of the US's interests in the region, including the security of Israel and containment of Islamist political movements.[51] Over time, the two countries had developed extensive linkages at the highest levels, forming 'a network of common interests, values and practices'.[52] The militaries of both countries have close ties, and many of Egypt's senior military figures, including Sisi, were trained or educated in the US.[53]

In responding to events in 2013, the US engaged in criticism and conditionality, but also balanced these policies with several key tools of sponsorship, and ultimately remained a supportive ally to the military authorities in the wake of the coup. The US sought to avoid triggering potentially damaging punitive measures against the regime, and also offered a series of diplomatic statements that sent clear signals of support. Under US law, US aid money cannot be 'expended to finance directly any assistance to any country whose duly elected Head of Government is deposed by military coup or decree'.[54] In the wake of Morsi's forced removal from office, there was an intense debate in Washington about whether to describe the events as a coup. US Secretary of State John Kerry described the issue as 'complex and difficult', and argued that the law would have to be balanced with the threat of 'civil war' that existed before the war, suggesting that mitigating circumstances might apply:

> what complicates it, obviously, is that you had an extraordinary situation in Egypt of life and death, of the potential of civil war and enormous violence, and you now have a constitutional process proceeding forward very rapidly. So we have to measure all of those facts against the law, and that's exactly what we will do.[55]

[51] Robert S. Chase, Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy, 'Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy', *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (1996): 33–51; Sharp, 'Egypt: Background and US Relations'.

[52] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*, 9.

[53] 'Close US–Egypt Military Ties Forged on American Soil', AFP, 10 July 2013; Greg Carlstrom, 'Egypt's New Dictator Was Made in the USA', *Politico Magazine*, 18 February 2014, <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/el-sisi-egypt-dictator-103628.html>.

[54] Section 508 of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act. See also Shannon et al., 'The International Community's Reaction to Coups'.

[55] John Kerry, 'Remarks With Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh', US Department of State, 17 July 2013, <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/212075.htm>.

The White House Press Secretary explicitly cited US interests in explaining its initial policy response, stating that 'it would not be in the best interests of the United States to immediately change our assistance programs to Egypt'.[56] Ultimately, the administration avoided characterizing Morsi's overthrow as a coup, and thus shielded the regime from automatic and wide-ranging sanctions. In the early weeks after Morsi's ousting, senior members of the US administration also offered a number of supportive signals from the highest level. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel made regular calls to Sisi to reassure him about the solidity of the relationship between the two countries.[57] In some of the most striking language from the US government during the period, Secretary of State Kerry commented of the military that 'in effect, they were restoring democracy.'[58] The equation of Morsi's forceful overthrow and detention with the restoration of democratic rule constituted one of the clearest international endorsements of the military's actions.

After the violent events at Rabaa and the extent of the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood became clear, the US did move to restrict some military assistance. Yet this was primarily based on criticism of the use of violence rather than the coup itself, and it was also presented in cautious rather than condemnatory terms. The US withheld delivery of military hardware, including helicopters and warplanes, as well as the disbursement of $260m for the Egyptian budget (while leaving counterterrorism assistance and other financial support in place). However, the administration also clearly signalled the temporary nature of the restrictions, with one senior official quoted as saying, 'This is not meant to be permanent; this is meant to be the opposite'.[59] Further diplomatic support was quickly forthcoming. Rather than isolating the regime, in November 2013, a month after the restrictions were put in place, Kerry made a high-profile visit to Cairo, where he met with General Sisi and praised the military for pursuing its declared 'roadmap' to democracy. Kerry also sent further signals about the sympathetic position of the US administration, stating that the cut in assistance 'is not a punishment', and calling it a 'small issue' compared to the two countries' common interests.[60]

[56] '"Coup" or Not, Egypt Aid Can Continue', *ABC News*, 9 July 2013, <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/coup-or-not-egypt-aid-can-continue/>.

[57] Carlstrom, 'Egypt's New Dictator Was Made in the USA'.

[58] Matt Bradley, 'Kerry Lauds Egypt Military for "Restoring Democracy"', *Wall Street Journal*, 1 August 2013.

[59] Michael R. Gordon and Mark Lander, 'In Crackdown Response, U.S. Temporarily Freezes Some Military Aid to Egypt', *New York Times*, 9 October 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/world/middleeast/obama-military-aid-to-egypt.html>.

[60] Karen DeYoung, 'Kerry in Cairo: Suspension of Aid to Egypt "not a Punishment"', *Washington Post*, 3 November 2013.

When the arms freeze was lifted in March 2015, a year after Sisi had assumed power through flawed elections, no effort was made to suggest that Egypt had made the kind of democratic progress that had initially been a requirement of lifting the restrictions, and the decision was justified with reference to national security interests (the timing coincided with deteriorating security conditions in Egypt and the wider region, including violence in the Sinai, the rise of ISIS, and the decline of security in Libya).[61]

The US policy thus fell far short of full democratic enforcement, and the administration sent a number of clear signals that it was prepared to work with and support the coup leaders. The US administration never labelled Morsi's overthrow as a coup, it reserved its principal punitive action as a response to violent repression rather than the military's July intervention, and even then it framed the restrictions on assistance as temporary, small, and non-punitive. The US re-established normal relations within a year of Sisi's ascension to the presidency after profoundly flawed elections where genuine competition was prohibited. If post-coup trajectories are determined in part by the fear of enforcement from major donors, Egypt's post-coup leaders would have had little to worry about regarding the long-term support of the United States. Partial and temporary enforcement translated into only limited pressure from the US, while diplomatic statements and official visits signalled steady support and contributed to the legitimacy of the post-Morsi authorities at a time when other actors, such as the African Union, were seeking to question their constitutional authority.

Yet the international story of Egypt's post-coup trajectory also includes a role for even more supportive international allies, who offered full and unconditional diplomatic and material sponsorship. Several Gulf countries offered immediate and unequivocal support and ensured that Egypt remained part of a powerful 'in-group' of sympathetic states. Saudi Arabia was quick to applaud the Egyptian military in the immediate aftermath of the coup, issuing a statement offering congratulations to the new interim leader, Adly Mansour, and praising the military directly for managing to 'save Egypt'.[62] Saudi Arabia had been a long-standing supporter of the Mubarak regime, and viewed the Muslim Brotherhood as a threat to the Saudis' preferred model of political control both domestically and within the region. A strong Muslim

[61] Peter Baker, 'Obama Removes Weapons Freeze Against Egypt', *New York Times*, 31 March 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/world/middleeast/obama-lifts-arms-freeze-against-egypt.html>.

[62] Elizabeth Dickinson, 'UAE, Saudi Arabia Express Support for Egyptian Military's Removal of Morsi', *The National*, accessed 2 December 2015, <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/uae-saudi-arabia-express-support-for-egyptian-military-s-removal-of-morsi>.

Brotherhood administration in Egypt challenged Saudi Arabia's desire to be the leading power in the Middle East, and also offered an alternative model of election-based Islamist rule that was viewed in Riyadh as a potential threat to monarchical rule at home.[63] Several other Gulf countries, including Bahrain and Kuwait, also offered praise and congratulations to the new authorities.

This diplomatic sponsorship was complemented with a large spike in material assistance. Within a week of the coup, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates jointly pledged a total of $12bn to Egypt.[64] The Saudi regime had significantly reduced aid to Egypt during Morsi's presidency, so the swift offer of a new and generous economic package starkly illustrated the political nature of the assistance.[65] It represented support for a particular set of Egyptian elites, rather than Egypt in general. The package offered crucial support at a time when Egypt was struggling economically, as it sought to finance its expensive public subsidies despite limited domestic economic productivity.[66] Yet while the economic support from the Gulf helped address Egypt's chronic economic problems, it also sent a clear message that any punitive action by Egypt's Western donors (including the US) would be offset and compensated for by its regional allies. The countries attached no conditionality to the aid package, and redoubled their efforts after Sisi's election to president, offering another $12bn package in 2015.[67] These figures dwarf the $1.3m in military assistance offered annually by the US, and highlight the potential for non-Western allies to undercut any leverage that Western actors might wish to apply. In the two years after the coup, total Gulf aid amounted to $23bn compared to $2.8bn from the US.[68]

[63] Oz Hassan, 'Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia's Counteracting Democracy Strategy', *Democratization* 22, no. 3 (16 April 2015): 479–95; Crystal A. Ennis and Bessma Momani, 'Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies', *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 6 (2013): 1127–44.

[64] Mohsin Khan and Richard Lebaron, 'What Will the Gulf's $12 Billion Buy in Egypt?', *Atlantic Council*, accessed 24 April 2015, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/what-will-the-gulfs-12-billion-buy-in-egypt>.

[65] Robert F. Worth, 'Egypt Is Arena for Influence of Arab Rivals', *New York Times*, 10 July 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/middleeast/egypt-is-arena-for-influence-of-arab-rivals.html>.

[66] Adeel Malik and Ty McCormick, 'Egypt's Economy of Dependence', *New York Times*, 6 August 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/opinion/global/egypts-economy-of-dependence.html>.

[67] David D. Kirkpatrick, '3 Persian Gulf Nations Pledge $12 Billion in Aid for Egypt', *New York Times*, 13 March 2015.

[68] Wehrey, 'Saudi Arabia's Anxious Autocrats', 76.

Egypt thus received a broad range of diplomatic and material support from its most important and influential allies in the wake of the 2013 coup. Even though it was subjected to some enforcement measures, they were all temporary, and mostly either half-hearted (in the case of the more critical US policies) or relatively pain-free (for example, AU suspension for a single year). By contrast, Egypt received much more influential diplomatic and material sponsorship, not least in the form of a massive injection of funds from Gulf allies in the immediate aftermath of the coup. Far from being isolated and exposed because of its dependence on external actors, Egypt's post-coup leaders were praised and kept afloat by its most influential donors, facilitating the consolidation of authoritarian rule in the ensuing months and years. The following section explores a similar dynamic in external support for post-coup authoritarianism in Fiji.

## ELECTION-FREE POLITICS IN POST-COUP FIJI

For a small country of limited strategic importance, Fiji has been the focus of a disproportionate level of academic interest due to its high rates of political instability and its regular efforts at institutional reform. Fiji has been at the centre of scholarly debates over the suitability of various institutional designs for managing ethnic conflict,[69] and Fiji's history of regular coups (two in 1987, and then further coups in 2000 and 2006) has attracted sustained attention.[70] The most recent coup in 2006 is noticeable for its unusual aftermath—the principal coup leader, head of the armed forces Commodore Voreqe 'Frank' Bainimarama, resisted domestic and international pressure and refused to hold elections until 2014 (elections he comfortably won). The analysis below explores Fiji's post-coup political trajectory after 2006, and highlights in particular the ways in which supportive international influences helped

[69] Jon Fraenkel and Bernard Grofman, 'Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of Fiji', *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 5 (2006): 623–51; Donald L. Horowitz, 'Strategy Takes a Holiday: Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote', *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 5 (2006): 652–62; Peter Larmour, *Electoral Systems in Divided Societies: The Fiji Constitution Review* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2012).

[70] Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, *From Election to Coup in Fiji: The 2006 Campaign and Its Aftermath* (Canberra: ANU Press, 2007); Roderic Alley, 'The 1987 Military Coups in Fiji: The Regional Implications', *The Contemporary Pacific* 2, no. 1 (1990): 37–58; Jon Fraenkel, 'The Origins of Military Autonomy in Fiji: A Tale of Three Coups', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (2013): 327–41.

Bainimarama to consolidate power even in the face of vocal and costly international condemnation.

Formerly a British colony, Fiji achieved independence in 1970 but struggled to consolidate a stable political system due to political tensions between the country's divided ethnic communities. During British rule, large numbers of indentured labourers were brought to the colony from South Asia, and by the time of independence the Fiji Indian community represented a major demographic and political force. However, policies of systematic discrimination excluded Fiji Indians from significant political authority and in the post-independence period the prospect of Fiji Indian involvement in government led to a series of political crises in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s.[71] A political breakthrough by Fiji Indian parties in the 1987 elections led to the country's first political coup, when military officers intervened to remove the newly installed Fiji Indian Prime Minister and restore indigenous Fijian rule. A subsequent coup in 2000 also reflected political unease in the wake of the election of a Fiji Indian Prime Minister after the 1999 elections. Both the 1987 and 2000 coups were quickly followed by fresh elections in which indigenous Fijian parties dominated.[72]

The 2006 coup differed from the earlier instances in that the military stepped in to remove a government that was led and supported by the indigenous Fijian community. After the 2000 coup, Bainimarama had installed Laisenia Qarase as the Prime Minister in an interim government, but by 2006 he had become a harsh critic of Qarase's rule (not least due to government policies that had pardoned the perpetrators of the 2000 coup, who had challenged the military's authority).[73] When Qarase retained the position of Prime Minister after the 2006 elections, relations with Bainimarama deteriorated further, and the leader of the armed forces staged his coup on 6 December, quickly and bloodlessly assuming full political power. The rationale for the coup was predicated on a stated desire to move beyond the traditional ethnic tensions within the country. Bainimarama justified the coup on the basis that Fijian politics needed to be transformed in a way that would eradicate ethnic-based politics and lead to a new political culture based on multiracialism, good governance, and freedom from corruption. It was

[71] Stewart Firth, 'Reflections on Fiji since Independence', *The Round Table* 101, no. 6 (2012): 575–83.

[72] Fraenkel and Grofman, 'Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies?'; Fraenkel, 'The Origins of Military Autonomy in Fiji'.

[73] Brij V. Lal, '"Anxiety, Uncertainty, and Fear in Our Land": Fiji's Road to Military Coup, 2006', *The Round Table* 96, no. 389 (2007): 135–53.

presented as a coup that would end the 'coup culture' in Fiji and usher in a new political landscape that would be free of the ethnic divisions of the past.[74]

However, despite initial promises of a 'roadmap' to elections, Bainimarama assumed the role of Prime Minister and retained it without elections until 2014, when he retired from the armed forces to fight, and win, in a free and fair vote.[75] This lengthy abrogation of democratic rule, which included a series of broken promises, came in the face of extensive domestic and international pressure. The international reaction to the coup had been swift and decisive. Australia, New Zealand, and the European Union were Fiji's largest donors and all were forceful critics of the coup.[76] Australia and New Zealand both quickly imposed a range of sanctions, including robust travel bans on military personnel and members of the interim administration, as well as the suspension of new development aid. New Zealand imposed visa restrictions on Fijian workers, cancelled military training for Fijian soldiers, and halted the approval of new development assistance schemes.[77] The Pacific Islands Forum also took a robust stance, and dispatched an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to Fiji to identify the causes of the coup and recommend steps that could be taken to restore democracy. The EPG's report was unequivocal and damning, branding the coup as 'unconstitutional and unacceptable', and demanding that the military withdraw from government, the state of emergency be lifted, and elections be held within two years.[78] The European Union also sought to put the new post-coup regime under pressure. In April 2007, the EU set down a series of conditions for further dialogue with Fiji under the ACP–EC Contonou Agreement that covers EU development programmes in the region. The EU sought assurances that there would be democratic elections before March 2009, as well as evidence of respect for human rights, rule of law, and judicial independence. Seemingly in response to this sustained international pressure, Bainimarama made a public commitment in October 2007 that elections would be held in March 2009 in line with international demands.

[74] Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, 'The Enigmas of Fiji's Good Governance Coup', in *The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups?*, ed. Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal (Canberra: ANU Press, 2009), 3–17.

[75] Quoted in Jon Fraenkel, 'The Great Roadmap Charade: Electoral Issues in Post-Coup Fiji', in *The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups?*, ed. Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal (Canberra: ANU Press, 2009), 155–84, 155.

[76] ODA figures from Fijian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, <http://www.foreignaffairs.gov.fj/trade-policy/international-cooperation/oda-trend>.

[77] Brij V. Lal, '"This Process of Political Readjustment": Aftermath of the 2006 Fiji Coup', *Fijian Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji* 5, no. 1 (2007): 135–53.

[78] Lal, '"Anxiety, Uncertainty, and Fear in Our Land"'.

However, by mid-2008 he had abandoned the commitment and ruled out elections before 2010.[79]

Any slim hopes of imminent elections were comprehensively dashed after a constitutional crisis broke out in April 2009. After a long-running legal fight, the Court of Appeal ruled that the 2006 coup had been illegal and the interim administration was 'invalid'. Bainimarama immediately engineered the suspension of the constitution, introduced emergency rule, and announced that elections were to be pushed back to 2014.[80] Bainimarama demonstrated a firm resistance to any domestic and international pressure to hold swift elections, and Fiji thus became one of the few countries in the post-Cold War period to eschew any form of elections in the years after experiencing a coup.

## Sources of Authoritarian Consolidation in Fiji

Explanations of authoritarian resilience often point to the importance of domestic-level factors, and in particular the role of domestic institutions.[81] Fiji's experience suggests both domestic and international sources of authoritarian resilience, and the Bainimarama regime combined well-known domestic-level strategies for consolidating authoritarian rule with less-known strategies designed to expand the country's non-Western international linkages and build up a bulwark against international democratic enforcement.

Some of the most influential accounts of authoritarian resilience have emphasized the role of co-optation as a tool of political control.[82] Despite the absence of a strong political party, Bainimarama pursued a strategy of co-optation with considerable success. In the immediate aftermath of seizing power, Bainimarama relied in part on the acquiescence of the Fijian President, Ratu Josefa Iloilo,[83] who addressed the nation and endorsed the coup, stating that Bainimarama had acted in the interests of the nation and that the coup was 'valid in law'. Bainimarama also succeeded in recruiting senior figures in

[79] Fraenkel and Firth, 'The Enigmas of Fiji's Good Governance Coup'.

[80] Jon Fraenkel, 'Fiji', *The Contemporary Pacific* 23, no. 2 (2011): 456–76.

[81] Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*; Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*; Gandhi and Przeworski, 'Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats'; Joseph Wright and Abel Escribà-Folch, 'Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracies', *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 2 (2011): 283–309.

[82] Gerschewski, 'The Three Pillars of Stability'; Gandhi and Przeworski, 'Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships'; Beatriz Magaloni, 'Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule', *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4–5 (2008): 715–41.

[83] In Fiji, Ratu is a title used by members of society of a chiefly rank.

the Fijian Labour Party, which largely represented the Fiji Indian community and was willing to support Bainimarama on the grounds that his coup had ousted a government that was deeply antagonistic to Fiji Indian interests.[84]

The new regime sought to combine its efforts at co-optation with strategies designed to marginalize critical voices and institutions. The Great Council of Chiefs (GCC) was one of the major institutions of political authority and legitimacy for the ethnic Fijian chiefly system.[85] However, while it had largely supported Fiji's previous coups that had dislodged Fiji Indian-led governments, it opposed the ousting of Qarase's largely indigenous Fijian government and urged the army to return to the barracks. In response, Bainimarama sought to systematically weaken the Council, directing it not to meet without army approval, and in April 2007 suspending its operations and declaring it a security threat. In 2012, the government formally disbanded the Council by decree.[86] After the constitutional crisis in 2009, Bainimarama also significantly increased the use of repression of civil and political liberties. The constitution was abrogated and a state of emergency was introduced that lasted until 2012 under 'Public Emergency Regulations'. Media freedom was strictly curtailed, the right to assembly was restricted, and opposition actors were targeted with politically motivated court cases. Both former prime ministers Qarase and Chaudhry were pursued in the courts; Qarase was jailed in 2012 and Chaudhry went on trial in 2014.[87]

These domestic strategies were not pursued in isolation, however, and Bainimarama also sought to use the international environment in ways that would support his rule. The post-coup regime was subjected to considerable international pressure and punitive enforcement, but enjoyed a diverse international linkage spectrum, and benefited from international sponsorship as well as international condemnation and isolation. Bainimarama thus faced a

[84] Jon Fraenkel, 'The Fiji Coup of December 2006—Who, What, Where, and Why?', in *From Election to Coup in Fiji*, ed. Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth (Canberra: ANU Press, 2006), 420–49, 445.

[85] Robert Norton, 'The Changing Role of the Great Council of Chiefs', in *The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups?*, ed. Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal (Canberra: ANU Press, 2009), 97–116, 97–8.

[86] Jonathan Pearlman, 'Fiji's Military Ruler Disbands Great Council of Chiefs', *Telegraph*, 14 March 2012.

[87] Human Rights Watch, 'Joint Letter to Commodore Bainimarama Regarding Ongoing Rights Abuses in Fiji', 4 December 2012, <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/04/joint-letter-commodore-bainimarama-regarding-ongoing-rights-abuses-fiji>; 'Justice Madigan to Sum up in Chaudhry Trial', *Fiji One*, accessed 3 April 2014, <http://fijione.tv/chaudhry-justice-madigan-to-sum-up-in-chaudhry-trial/>; 'Former Fiji Prime Minister Jailed for Corruption', *Telegraph*, 3 August 2012.

contested international environment, and actively sought to play the different sides against each other.

On one hand, Fiji was subjected to costly enforcement measures. After initial sanctions in the wake of the 2006 coup, international powers placed further pressure on Fiji after the April 2009 crisis in which the constitution was abrogated and elections shelved until 2014. The Pacific Islands Forum suspended Fiji the following month, and in September 2009 Fiji was suspended from the Commonwealth for dropping its commitment to hold elections.[88] Not long after, Fiji expelled New Zealand's and Australia's high commissioners, and both countries responded by expelling Fiji's senior diplomats, leading to a lack of formal diplomatic relations until 2012.[89]

Isolated by the West, Fiji nonetheless persisted for many years without compromising. This authoritarian resilience can be explained in part by the diversity of its international linkage spectrum, and especially its ties to China. Fiji and China already had a history of close relations before 2006. Fiji was the first Pacific Island country to recognize the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1975, and it is an open advocate of the 'One China' policy (although it retains some diplomatic ties with Taiwan).[90] Fiji had also sought to strengthen ties with China after each of its previous coups, and these policies complemented China's increasing interest in acting as a regional power within the Asia-Pacific.[91] Each party thus had an interest in close ties and policy alignment with the other. In the wake of the 1987 coup, the then military leader Sitiveni Rabuka sought to broaden Fiji's relations to help compensate for the economic sanctions being levied by Australia and New Zealand, and worked to increase ties with China, South Korea, Japan, and Malaysia.[92] Shortly after the coup of 2000, in the wake of another wave of Western condemnation, Fiji's post-coup Prime Minister Qarase initiated a 'Look North' policy that explicitly sought to encourage political and economic ties with China. Beijing refrained from directly criticizing Fiji after the 2000 coup, and both countries initiated a period of 'visit diplomacy', in which they solidified their ties through a series of high-level reciprocal

[88] 'Fiji Suspended from Commonwealth', *BBC*, 1 September 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8231717.stm>.

[89] Bonnie Malkin, 'Australia and New Zealand Expel Senior Fijian Diplomats', *Telegraph*, 4 November 2009.

[90] Jian Yang, 'China in Fiji: Displacing Traditional Players?', *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 65, no. 3 (2011): 305–21.

[91] Sandra Tarte, 'Fiji's "Look North" Strategy and the Role of China', in *China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?*, ed. Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2010), 118–32.

[92] Ibid.

official visits culminating in a visit by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to Fiji in April 2006.[93]

After the 2006 coup, Fiji actively sought to cultivate this external assistance, and Bainimarama immediately moved to reinvigorate its Look North policy. Within days of the coup, the Look North policy became a major element of the new regime's international relations.[94] China responded by once again offering support rather than condemnation, and used a combination of tools to bolster and shield the post-coup regime in Fiji. A statement from the Chinese Foreign Ministry's deputy director not only suggested support for the post-coup government, but also offered a barely disguised criticism of Fiji's Western critics: 'We have always respected Fiji's status as an independent nation and we have called on the other countries to do the same and reconsider their attitudes towards Fiji and the current situation in the country.'[95]

China supplemented diplomatic support with increased economic assistance. In 2005, the year before the coup, China pledged only US$1m to Fiji. Aid and loan pledges jumped to US$167m in 2007, the year after the coup. Given a steep decline in Australian and New Zealand aid, China helped 'fill the void' that was created by Western sanctions.[96] Consistent with Beijing's aid and development policy across the globe, it has refrained from publicly criticizing the Fijian government for its lack of democracy and did not seek to make its economic support conditional on election-related progress.[97] In the following years, China and Fiji's relationship continued to tighten. China offered a $135m loan in 2009 and introduced direct flights from Hong Kong in a move that would boost Fijian tourism.[98] The overall shift in Chinese financial support to Fiji after 2006 fundamentally changed Fiji's international economic relations. In the years prior to 2006, Australia and the EU alternated as Fiji's largest donor, and China was a negligible player. In the year 2006, Australia gave $17.4m, the EU gave $8.4m and China gave just $1.4m.[99] Between 2006 and 2013, however, China was Fiji's largest donor, pushing Australia into second place.[100]

[93] Ibid.

[94] 'New Fiji Government Looks to Asia for New Alliances', *New York Times*, 8 January 2007.

[95] 'China Likes to Help Developing Nations', *Fiji Times*, 10 November 2007.

[96] 'China's Help May Harm Fiji', *The Australian*, 23 April 2009, <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/chinas-help-may-harm-fiji/story-e6frg6zo-1225701907555>.

[97] Halper, *The Beijing Consensus*.

[98] Paul McGeough, 'Pressure on Fiji Fails as China Lends Hand', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 November 2009, <http://www.smh.com.au/world/pressure-on-fiji-fails-as-china-lends-hand-20091130-k14u.html>.

[99] ODA figures from Fijian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[100] Lowry Institute, 'Chinese Aid in the Pacific', 2015, <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/chinese-aid-map/>; 'Big Fish in a Big Pond', *The Economist*, 25 March 2015.

Fiji's diplomatic sponsorship in the wake of the coup was also significant. Fiji received a significant and high-profile visit from Vice-President Xi Jinping in February 2009. At the time, Xi was widely (and correctly) expected to become China's next leader, and his visit thus amounted to an endorsement of the post-coup regime from the highest levels of Chinese government. Diplomatic cables released by Wikileaks have shown that Australia sought to prevent Xi's visit and appealed to China to join international efforts in isolating the Bainimarama regime. Instead, Xi met directly with Bainimarama and signed off on a number of development assistance deals.[101] Although the diplomatic reports suggest that Xi did urge Bainimarama to hold elections, no conditions were placed on the assistance deals that were finalized.[102] By 2013, Bainimarama was expressing gratitude to China for development assistance in a wide range of areas.[103]

Chinese motives were not purely altruistic or normative. During these years Fiji became a focal point in the 'soft balancing' policies at work in the South Pacific region, where China engaged in efforts to balance US, Australian, and New Zealand influence in the region not through military manoeuvring and contestation, but through carefully cultivated economic and diplomatic alliances. China's soft balancing policies focused in particular on development assistance, including both direct aid and 'soft' loans with low interest rates and lengthy repayment terms. Lanteigne suggests that Fiji is the country 'where the soft balancing competition can be most acutely observed', as Chinese and Western powers apply their different policies toward Bainimarama's post-coup regime.[104] Consequently, and consistent with recent research on China's policies towards autocratic regimes,[105] China's support for the Bainimarama regime should not be seen as an exercise in ideologically driven autocracy promotion. Yet the implications of its unconditional and increasing support for Fiji during the crucial years in the immediate aftermath of the 2006 coup were highly significant for authoritarian resilience. By giving Bainimarama diplomatic

[101] Tamara McLean, 'Leaks Reveal China's Strong Ties to Fiji', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 April 2011.

[102] Wikileaks, 'PRC Vice President Xi's Visit to Fiji' (Wikileaks, 5 March 2009), <https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SUVA82_a.html>; Wikileaks, 'Australia and New Zealand Demarche PRC on Fiji Visit', 13 February 2009, <https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING383_a.html>.

[103] J. V. Bainimarama, 'Remarks by the PM at His Meeting with the Premier of PRC', Prime Minister Bainimarama, accessed 4 April 2014, <http://bainimarama.org/remarks-by-the-pm-bainimarama-at-his-meeting-with-h-e-mr-li-keqiang-premier-of-prc/>.

[104] Marc Lanteigne, 'Water Dragon? China, Power Shifts and Soft Balancing in the South Pacific', *Political Science* 64, no. 1 (2012): 21–8, 36.

[105] Bader, *China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies*.

and material assistance, China bolstered the regime at precisely the time when its Western partners were seeking to put pressure on it. Chinese policy allowed the regime to reinforce its claims to legitimacy by pointing to a powerful international ally, while also softening the economic pain associated with the new sanctions regime.

Bainimarama actively sought to capitalize on Chinese support as part of his efforts to legitimize his rule. He trumpeted Fiji's improved relations with China, and used it to both criticize his own international critics and also justify his continued rule by pointing to significant international allies. Visiting China in 2008, Bainimarama stated:

> Fiji will not forget that when other countries were quick to condemn us following the events of 1987, 2000 and 2006, China and other friends in Asia demonstrated a more understanding and sensitive approach to events in Fiji. The Government of the People's Republic of China expressed confidence in our ability to resolve our problems in our way, without undue pressure or interference.[106]

Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly in 2013, Bainimarama returned to this theme as he sought to justify the 2006 coup and began criticizing old allies while praising the new:

> Regrettably, and to our great disappointment, some of [our] oldest friends had no faith in us. They abandoned us and sought to punish us with sanctions. We sought their assistance and understanding, but they turned their backs on us.
> Our isolation led us to seek out new relationships that have proven fruitful. Now, our standing in the world has never been stronger.[107]

In recent years, Fiji's international standing has indeed improved. In 2012, it lifted its emergency regulations and moved to introduce a new constitution and prepare for the 2014 elections. Australia and New Zealand restored diplomatic ties and promised to review travel sanctions on a case-by-case basis. After steady progress towards elections, including Bainimarama's resignation from the armed forces in order to run for election as a civilian, both Australia and New Zealand lifted their travel sanctions in March 2014, and fully embraced a policy of diplomatic engagement.[108] The 2014 elections, which Bainimarama won comfortably, were deemed largely free and fair by

[106] Quoted in Bertil Lintner, 'The South Pacific: China's New Frontier', in *Looking North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and the South Pacific*, ed. Anne-Marie Brady (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), 3–33, 28.

[107] J. V. Bainimarama, 'Statement of President Bainimarama at the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly', 25 September 2013, <http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Speeches/STATEMENT-BY-COMMODORE-JOSAlA-VOREQE-BAINIMARAMA-P.aspx>.

[108] 'Australia, New Zealand Lift Travel Sanctions on Fiji', *Channel News Asia*, 31 March 2014.

the international community.[109] Whether Bainimarama's professed objective of post-racial politics in Fiji can be realized remains to be seen, as does the depth of his commitment to a democratic future for Fiji. For nearly eight years, Bainimarama ruled without electoral legitimacy and with little time for his critics. Much of his rule took place without a constitution in place, and he relied on all the central pillars of authoritarian rule to maintain his position in power. Yet the story of post-coup authoritarian resilience in Fiji is not purely a story of 'strongman' rule and domestic political manoeuvring. Fiji benefited from robust international sponsorship, both diplomatically and materially, and Bainimarama's post-coup tenure was bolstered and shielded by his international allies.

## CONCLUSION

The politics of post-Cold War coups is systematically different from what has gone before. During the Cold War, coups were highly likely to initiate long-term authoritarian rule. By contrast, recent coups are much more likely to be followed by competitive elections than their Cold War predecessors. Yet authoritarian resilience is still a feature of post-coup politics, and international sponsorship plays an important role in facilitating post-coup authoritarianism.

In this chapter I have sought to explore the relationship between coups and autocracy in greater detail, and to caution against any undue optimism about the rise of the 'democratic coup' and the role of international democratizing pressures. I do not seek to contradict existing findings that post-Cold War coups are more likely to be followed by competitive elections. Rather, I make two separate arguments. Firstly, I show that while most post-1991 coups are indeed followed by competitive elections within five years, a significant proportion hold only flawed elections or no elections at all. Even among those countries that embrace open electoral competition, many struggle to consolidate democracy without backsliding to authoritarian rule and experiencing further government overthrows. Overall, while coups are increasingly associated with post-coup elections, the pattern is not universal and post-coup authoritarianism is a common feature.

Secondly, I argue that the variation in post-coup trajectories can be explained in significant part by the variation in the international environment that coup

[109] 'Int'l Monitors Endorse Fiji Election as Credible', AP, 18 September 2014, <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6e44f8f77b6e4c0e867b9d8750689e5b/international-monitors-endorse-fiji-election>.

countries experience. Although there has been a considerable increase in democratizing pressures since the end of the Cold War, the international environment remains far from constant and countries regularly face a diverse spectrum of linkage relationships. These may include close ties to committed and forceful democracy promoters, but can also involve ties to democracies that are willing relax their democratic conditionality policies to achieve alternative interests, as well as non-democratic states that have little interest in, or commitment to, promoting democratic rule. Even where states are economically dependent on Western democracies, it does not follow that they will necessarily face pro-democratic pressures in the wake of unconstitutional seizures of power. Democracy promoters can sometimes exact powerful and transformative pressure on the countries they target. Yet often they refrain from using the leverage they have, and prioritize strategic over ideological goals by actively supporting autocratic incumbents. Even when democracy promoters seek to wield influence to undermine post-coup authorities, their impact is structured by the role of other international actors who wish to sponsor post-coup regimes. International autocratic sponsors can helps consolidate authoritarianism in a number of ways, legitimizing coup leaders and their actions, blocking international sanctions, and offering direct material assistance to help bolster post-coup authorities. Acknowledging and addressing the role of international autocratic sponsors is essential if we are to gain a full and proper understanding of the variety of post-coup political trajectories in the post-Cold War world.

# Conclusion

The end of the Cold War generated a great deal of optimism about the prospects for the global spread of democracy. The wave of transitions that followed washed away many long-standing autocratic regimes, and democratic politics took root in many unexpected settings. A key insight of the scholarship that sought to account for these changes was that the changing international environment associated with the end of the Cold War played an important role in fostering transitions to and consolidation of democracy.[1] Yet as has been well documented, the power of the Third Wave ebbed, leaving behind many autocratic regimes that either resisted it completely or responded by introducing only the most superficial trappings of democracy.[2] In turn, scholars have increasingly sought to explore the international dimensions of authoritarian resilience in the contemporary world. Just as external forces were tied to the spread of democracy, so too are they increasingly linked to the endurance of autocracy.

The aim of this book has been to examine the ways in which these international forces contribute to the politics of authoritarianism. Building on the emerging field of scholarship in this area, the book has sought to offer conceptual clarity regarding the distinct international influences at play, and provide an analytical framework with which to examine the manner of international influence on domestic-level autocratic politics. In particular, the book has focused on the role of active international sponsorship of autocratic regimes, and has sought to examine *how* international sponsorship shapes authoritarian regimes. The book does not offer a single theory of the international politics of authoritarian rule; the subject area is too broad and complex to be explained with one overarching theory. Rather, the book makes

[1] Huntington, *The Third Wave*; Whitehead, *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*; Pridham, 'The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice, and Interregional Comparisons'; Youngs, *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy*.

[2] Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*; Morse, 'The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism'; Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

a number of distinct contributions that improve our ability to systematically analyse the international influences at play. In this concluding chapter, I summarize the main findings of the book under three broad headings: the variation in the array of international influences on authoritarian politics that exist, the factors that determine which types of influences individual countries are more or less likely to experience, and the variation in the manner in which international forces shape domestic-level authoritarian rule. I also illustrate the ways in which the findings contribute to a range of particular academic literatures, and point to avenues for further research.

## CLARIFYING THE BOUNDARIES: VARIATION IN TYPES OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

There are a vast array of international forces that can shape political outcomes at the domestic level. A key aim of the book has been to tease out the boundaries that distinguish different influences from one another, and examine the extent to which the international politics of authoritarian rule constitutes a distinctive set of political relationships. The book makes two main contributions in this respect: firstly, by distinguishing the international politics of authoritarian rule from the international politics of democracy and democratization; and secondly, by offering a typology to help differentiate types of influence *within* the broad category of the international influences on autocracy.

### International Dimensions of Autocracy versus Democracy

One important finding of the book is that the international politics of authoritarian rule are systematically different from the international politics of democracy and democratization. This is not simply because of the fact that democratic and autocratic regimes differ from one another, so that similar international forces are translated into domestic effects in different ways across different regime types. For example, both democracies and autocracies are situated within an international system of sovereign states, but the impact of that system on domestic politics often varies according to domestic regime type.[3] It is also because of the fact that the 'supply side' differs in systematic ways. The international forces that serve to promote or foster autocracy are

[3] Boix, 'Democracy, Development, and the International System'.

not simply the flip side of those that serve to bolster autocracy, and there are a distinct set of international influences at play. This is in large part because democracy and authoritarianism each have a very different status in international politics, with the idea of democracy holding a greater degree of legitimacy as a 'world value'.[4] Consequently, international sponsors of authoritarian regimes have fewer strategies that they can openly pursue. As discussed in Chapter 2, autocracy promotion does not play a corresponding role to that of democracy promotion, and many sponsors of autocratic regimes offer their support not because of a desire to foster autocracy abroad but to avoid the negative externalities of regime change. There is no transnational network of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and agencies dedicated to spreading autocracy in the way that actors like the Soros Foundation, Westminster Foundation, National Endowment for Democracy, and many others work towards spreading democracy. Similarly, democratic conditionality finds no counterpart in contemporary international politics that could reasonably be described as autocratic conditionality. International organizations that have been associated with the protection of authoritarian regimes, such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, do not require member states to meet certain authoritarian criteria in the way the European Union or the Organization of American States requires member states to meet democratic criteria.[5] While some states and international organizations impose 'democratic sanctions',[6] there are no corresponding 'autocratic sanctions' levied against countries that are insufficiently authoritarian.

The international politics of authoritarian rule, therefore, do not neatly correspond to the international politics of democratic rule, or represent the flip side of the same coin. Different forces are at work, and we cannot simply import the concepts that have so helpfully shed light on the external dimensions of democratization.

## Typology of International Dimensions of Autocracy

Having identified a distinct set of international dimensions of authoritarian rule, it becomes important to identify the nature of the variation of the

[4] McFaul, 'Democracy Promotion as a World Value'.

[5] Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*; Jorge Heine and Brigitte Weiffen, *21st Century Democracy Promotion in the Americas: Standing Up for the Polity* (London and New York: Routledge, 2014).

[6] Christian von Soest and Michael Wahman, 'Not All Dictators Are Equal: Coups, Fraudulent Elections, and the Selective Targeting of Democratic Sanctions', *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 1 (1 January 2015): 17–31.

international influences involved. A central contribution of the book has been to offer a new typology of international influences on authoritarianism. A wide and diverse set of scholarship has offered insights into international-level forces that serve to enable, bolster, or support authoritarian rule at the domestic level. As discussed in Chapter 2, factors such as international political structures, state actors, and cross-border flows of people and ideas have all been linked to authoritarian resilience. Yet, we have lacked any clear sense of how these diverse factors may relate to one another, and what precisely distinguishes different forms of international influence. Two problems in particular have limited clarity in this area. The first involves over-aggregation, in which diverse and quite distinct international forces have been grouped together under common headings in ways that obscure rather than illuminate the contours of the terrain being examined. The concept of 'autocracy promotion' is a key example, and has been linked to a wide variety of international forces that often appear to have very little to do with the intentional promotion of a particular type of regime by external actors.[7] When scholars group together such diverse phenomena as energy subsidies, international trade, and the demonstration effects from distant events, it becomes difficult to identify the core meaning of the concept being invoked.

The second problem is one of fragmentation, especially as indicated by the lack of integration that characterizes much of the scholarship in this area. Although recent research on international politics and authoritarianism has contributed to an emerging field of study in this area,[8] many of the contributions that offer relevant insights come from separate literatures that are not primarily concerned with authoritarianism and that do not often acknowledge one another. Some of the scholarship from the international political economy tradition that illustrates the autocracy-enabling consequences of international aid, for example, does not engage with the comparative politics literature on authoritarian politics, and in turn receives little attention from comparativists interested in the politics of authoritarianism.[9] The scholarship in this area would benefit from a greater appreciation of the diverse range of relevant

[7] Burnell, 'Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?'; Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Melnykovska, Plamper, and Schweickert, 'Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?'.

[8] Burnell and Schlumberger, 'Promoting Democracy–Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes'; Ambrosio, 'Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research'; von Soest, 'Democracy Prevention'.

[9] Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol, 'The Curse of Aid'; Bräutigam and Knack, 'Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa'.

findings on the topic, many of which can be found in unexpected or unexplored sectors of the academic literature.

The typology presented in Chapter 2 provides a single conceptual framework in which a wide variety of disparate insights may find a place, and the accompanying stock-take of the academic scholarship fosters greater integration of these diverse literatures and findings. Together they constitute an effort at academic brush-clearing,[10] with a view to bringing some order to the prevailing disorder, and advancing a case for greater clarity and coherence within what should be seen as a common field of study. By identifying a number of categories of influence distinguished by the role of agency, intentions, and motivations, it becomes possible to distinguish previously conflated influences and develop more fine-grained analytical insights. Although the main categories of influence are ideal types—passive international effects, unintended consequences, and active autocratic sponsorship—they capture much of the variation that exists and provide the foundations for further analysis of how international factors influence domestic authoritarianism in systematically different ways.

## UNEVEN EXPOSURE: VARIATION IN THE SUPPLY SIDE

Having established the range of international forces that can serve to bolster authoritarian rule, a key question to address is why some countries are exposed to some of these international influences, while others are not. In this section, I examine a number of factors that help account for variation in exposure to external forces, and especially to active autocratic sponsorship by international actors. Not all countries face the same international environment, and autocratic incumbents thus have different prospects of benefiting from the support and sponsorship of external actors.

### Democratic and Autocratic Sponsors: Similar, but Not the Same

The international sponsorship *of* authoritarian regimes has often been equated with international sponsorship *by* authoritarian regimes. Academics and

[10] Virginia Page Fortna and Reyko Huang, 'Democratization after Civil War: A Brush-Clearing Exercise', *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no.4, 2012: 801–8.

policy-makers have expressed concern about the rise of authoritarian great powers and the resurgence of authoritarian activism on the international stage.[11] A 2015 project of the National Endowment for Democracy on 'Resurgent Dictatorship' identified a group of non-democratic regimes—the 'Big Five' of China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Venezuela—that together represent a global assault on democracy and a threat to the liberal international order.[12] While illuminating, there are also some problems with this type of analysis, which presents a somewhat alarmist view of contemporary trends and risks over-aggregating and over-simplifying the actions of a set of states have often have highly divergent foreign policy priorities.[13] It also places the analytical spotlight on the actions of authoritarian states in a way that minimizes the role played by democratic states in the sponsorship of autocratic regimes abroad. The international sponsorship of autocratic regimes is an activity that is not the preserve of authoritarian regimes, and many democratic states actively play a role in protecting and bolstering the rule of non-democratic incumbents. The United States has a long history of supporting authoritarian incumbents, a pursuit that continues to sit uneasily with its rhetorical and policy commitment to democracy promotion.[14] The United Kingdom shares many of the United States' foreign policy priorities, and maintains close links with several autocratic Middle Eastern regimes and often contributes to their state capacity.[15] As discussed in Chapter 4, South Africa has been a close ally and defender of Zimbabwe's Mugabe regime. The international sponsorship of authoritarian incumbents should not, therefore, be confused with a policy unique to authoritarian regimes. Many of the tools of sponsorship remain the same whether the sponsor is democratic or autocratic, and the mechanisms of influence are not inherently different.

[11] Gat, 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers'; Walker, 'The Authoritarian Resurgence'; William C. Martel, 'Grand Strategy of the Authoritarian Axis: How Will the West Respond?', *The Diplomat*, accessed 16 November 2015, <http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/grand-strategy-of-the-authoritarian-axis/>; Alexander Cooley, 'The League of Authoritarian Gentlemen', *Foreign Policy*, accessed 16 November 2015, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/30/the-league-of-authoritarian-gentlemen>.

[12] 'Resurgent Dictatorship: The Global Assault on Democracy', accessed 10 November 2015, <http://www.resurgentdictatorship.org>.

[13] Jason Brownlee, 'Is Autocracy on the March?: Reexamining the Authoritarian Resurgence' (Unpublished paper, 2015).

[14] Carothers, *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*; Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*; Jamal, *Of Empires and Citizens*.

[15] 'Hidden Agreements on Justice and Policing: UK's Appeasement of Saudi Arabia', *Financial Times*, accessed 16 November 2015, <http://blogs.ft.com/david-allen-green/2015/10/12/hidden-agreements-on-justice-and-policing-uks-appeasement-of-saudi-arabia/>.

Nonetheless, there is an important distinction regarding the *motivations* that drive democratic and autocratic regimes. As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, states may have multiple reasons to sponsor authoritarian regimes abroad. Some of the strategic interests and linkage-based relationships at work will play a broadly similar role in motivating the policies of both democratic and autocratic sponsors. Yet in the case of one particular motivation—the fear of contagion associated with potential democratization in nearby autocracies—external sponsors have very different incentives. Autocratic regimes have much to fear from the repercussions of autocratic breakdown and democratization, as such transitions may foster similar pressures for regime change at home. Scholarship on diffusion has consistently found that the example of autocratic collapse abroad can foster the emergence of democratic activism in nearby or highly linked autocratic regimes.[16] The resulting fear of contagion thus creates incentives for autocratic regimes to protect and defend authoritarianism abroad, as has been the case with Russian and Saudi Arabian autocratic sponsorship in their respective regions.[17] By contrast, democracies have no corresponding fear of contagion, as a transition to democracy abroad by definition offers no threat to regime type at home. This is not to say that democracies have no strategic interests in preventing democratization in authoritarian states. There may be many other spillover effects from regime change that would prompt democracies to support incumbent autocrats abroad, but a key difference with autocratic sponsors is that they need not worry that the overthrow of an autocrat abroad will lead to a domestic democratic movement to overthrow the regime at home. For example, Brownlee demonstrates that over several decades the US has had many reasons to support authoritarian incumbents in Egypt, but these relate largely to its strategic interests in the Middle East, and do not relate to concerns about the implications for political stability within the US itself.[18] By contrast, countries such as Russia and Saudi Arabia must take into account the risk that successful democratic movements abroad may embolden democratic movements within their own regimes. Democratic and autocratic regimes can thus both act as sponsors of autocracy abroad, but they do not share the same set of incentives for doing so.

[16] Harvey Starr, 'Democratic Dominoes Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (1991): 356–81; Bunce and Wolchik, *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*; Weyland, *Making Waves*.

[17] Way, 'The Limits of Autocracy Promotion: The Case of Russia in the "Near Abroad"'; Kamrava, 'The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution'.

[18] Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*.

## Sponsorship and the Linkage Spectrum

Just as external sponsorship may vary due to the characteristics of external sponsors, so too may it vary due to the characteristics of target countries, and the relationship between sponsor and target. For obvious reasons, wealthy or powerful autocratic states are less likely to need or receive external sponsorship, and geo-strategic location also informs the decisions of external actors regarding the need for sponsorship. Even small, weak states (such as Bahrain) will attract external support if they are strategically located. Yet, variation in sponsorship is not driven purely by variation in the national interests of international sponsors. The pre-existing relationships and linkages between sponsor and target country also matter. Several scholars have previously observed how international influences on domestic regimes vary according to the linkages between regimes. Levitsky and Way's work on competitive authoritarian regimes highlights the ways in which democratic pressures vary systematically according to different linkage patterns with countries in different parts of the world. Different patterns of linkage to the West lead to variation in democratizing pressures on competitive authoritarian regimes.[19] Others have pointed to the importance of linkages between autocratic regimes.[20] In this book, I have sought to build on these insights and address the role of each individual country's 'linkage spectrum', including ties to both democratic and autocratic powers abroad. The importance of linkage lies not just in 'linkage to the West', but also in the linkages that individual countries have to autocratic regimes. Linkages between autocratic regimes have systematic effects on patterns of autocratic regime survival.[21] It is therefore essential to take into account the full range of linkage ties that autocratic countries enjoy in order to understand the patterns of external sponsorship that exist. External sponsors are more likely to offer support to regimes with which they have close ties. This is not least due to the incentives discussed above concerning the fear of contagion. The higher the level of linkage between autocracies, the more likely it is that regime contention in one country will diffuse to another. As a result, autocratic regimes thus have particular incentives to sponsor autocratic regimes abroad when linkage is high and regime elites are threatened by domestic challengers.

[19] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*.

[20] Vanderhill, *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*; Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*.

[21] Tansey, Koehler, and Schmotz, 'Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival'.

By looking at the linkage spectrum of each country, it becomes possible to identify the type of international environment that autocratic incumbents face. As Levitsky and Way observe, some patterns of international linkage are regional in nature, and linkage to the West varies systematically across region. Yet there is also intra-regional variation in linkage, and autocratic incumbents within the same region can face quite distinct international environments based on their different linkage spectrums. The result is that countries can face up to four different types of international environment based on the balance of international pressures and assistance they face. Much of the literature on the international dimensions of democratization has portrayed an international environment in which democratic pressure is high and autocratic sponsorship is low or non-existent. This kind of *constraining international environment* for autocratic incumbents has certainly played an important role in fostering democratic reforms and transitions in a number of settings, as states and international organizations have pressured incumbents to loosen their hold on power.[22] But not all autocratic regimes face this mix of influences. In certain settings, such as in Syria and Zimbabwe, autocratic elites face a *contested international environment*, in which high levels of external democratic pressure are matched with high levels of autocratic sponsorship. In these circumstances, incumbents can offset the pressures from pro-democratic external actors by relying on the diplomatic and material support of loyal allies. The Assad regime survived longer than it otherwise would have due to the support of Russia and Iran, which helped balance the external support that was provided for Assad's opponents. In Zimbabwe, intense Western condemnation and sanctions were blunted by the support that President Mugabe received from regional states and organizations. External autocratic sponsorship can thus act as a potent check on Western democratic pressure. The final two international environments are distinguished by low levels of external democratic pressure. In these settings, autocratic incumbents at the very least face a *permissive international environment*, without significant external pressure or sponsorship. But in some cases, such as Bahrain in 2011, incumbents can face a largely *supportive international environment*, as few international actors seek to constrain the government and some external powers actively offer robust support. In Bahrain, key Western democracies such as the US and UK offered only mild criticism of the regime and applied no significant leverage. In the absence of pro-democratic constraints, the regime was

[22] Jon C. Pevehouse, 'Democracy from the Outside-in? International Organizations and Democratization', *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 515–49; Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*; Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*.

largely free to pursue its desired policies, and was actively and materially supported by the Saudi-led military intervention of the Gulf Cooperation Council. The international politics of authoritarian rule thus vary systematically from context to context, and different regimes, even within the same region, often face very different international environments.

## VARIATION IN EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL AUTOCRATIC SPONSORSHIP

Different states sponsor autocratic regimes for different reasons, and autocratic regimes face different international environments as a result. But once applied, how does international sponsorship contribute to authoritarian rule? In this book, I have focused on the ways in which international sponsorship influences key authoritarian practices, that is, the nondemocratic strategies that autocratic elites use to secure and maintain power. By disaggregating the politics of authoritarian rule in this way, it becomes possible to arrive at more fine-grained findings about the role that international influences play, and how they shape authoritarian politics in different ways at different moments in time. There are three broad types of variation that must be considered when assessing the manner in which international sponsorship affects authoritarian rule in different ways, at different times.

### Authoritarian Practices

The first issue concerns the ways in which external sponsorship is likely to operate across different authoritarian practices. Similar tools of sponsorship are likely to vary in their effect according to the type of strategy that domestic elites are pursuing. As discussed in Chapter 2, external sponsors have a range of tools available to them to support autocratic incumbents, including economic and military assistance, as well as diplomatic support and strategic advice. Certain tools of sponsorship are likely to be much more effective in contributing to some authoritarian practices than others. Military and security assistance, for example, is much more likely to contribute to repressive policies than to election fraud (or other authoritarian practices that do not rely on the coercive apparatus of the state, such as propaganda and co-optation). By contrast, diplomatic forms of support such as the public recognition of autocratic leaders is likely to play a greater

role when the legitimacy of incumbents is challenged, such as in the wake of fraudulent elections or coups. In Zimbabwe, President Mugabe repeatedly benefited from public recognition by key international allies at the critical moments when his international opponents sought to claim that his election victories lacked legitimacy. International autocratic sponsorship is thus likely to shape domestic politics in different ways in different arenas of domestic politics.

## The Life-Cycle of Authoritarian Practices

A second type of variation relates to the timing of the international support. Chapter 3 introduced the 'life-cycle' of authoritarian practices to illustrate the ways in which international sponsorship can play distinct roles at different points in time. The first stage in the life-cycle is the period before authoritarian practices are carried out, and in which autocratic incumbents are considering their options. This period often involves a process of careful calculation, as actors consider the benefits of their actions (overcoming challenges and maintaining power) related to the costs involved (domestic and international backlash leading to possible loss of power). International sponsorship can play a key role in this period that is distinct from the effects it can have in later stages. At this point, the key contribution of international sponsorship is to lower the perceived costs of authoritarian practices for incumbent actors, and to make it more likely that such practices will be pursued. International allies can send signals that they will at the very least refrain from criticism should the incumbents in question pursue their non-democratic strategies, and often that they will offer active support and sponsorship. Such signals can thus alter the cost–benefit analysis of autocratic incumbents and make certain practices, such as violent repression, appear less risky. Chapter 4 highlighted the repeated signals that Mugabe's allies sent over a series of electoral cycles that lowered the perceived costs of election fraud in Zimbabwe. In the case of Bahrain, Saudi Arabia sent clear signals before the March 2011 crackdown that it favoured, and would support, a repressive response rather than a political compromise involving concessions to the regime's opponents.

The effects of international sponsorship differ in later stages of the life-cycle. Once the decision has been made to engage in fraud, or stage a coup, or forcefully repress the opposition, external sponsors can contribute more directly to the implementation of the strategy. Here, material forms of assistance can be particularly important, as international allies contribute to the economic or security capacity of autocratic elites in ways that enable them to achieve their

goals. Saudi Arabia's military intervention in Bahrain is a blatant and unusually visible example of a direct military contribution to a regime's coercive crackdown. In both Bahrain and Syria, international sponsors provided incumbent autocrats with a level of state capacity to implement their repressive practices in ways that otherwise would not have existed. The Syrian case also highlights the ways in which international sponsors can offer crucial strategic advice and guidance, and can influence not just the material capacity of the regime but also the strategic balance of power relative to opposition actors.

The final stage of the life-cycle concerns the aftermath of these key moments, as incumbents seek to consolidate the gains they have accrued from engaging in authoritarian practices. International sponsors can legitimize the position of coup leaders and election fraudsters by publicly recognizing their position, as well as providing crucial material support to offset the costs of democratic sanctions applied by international critics. The post-coup regimes in Fiji and Egypt were assisted considerably by the diplomatic and material sponsorship they received after they seized power. Fiji's Bainimarama was recognized quickly by China, and benefited from a surge of Chinese economic support that helped offset sanctions from regional democracies and the European Union. The post-coup regime in Egypt in 2013 also benefited from a massive injection of aid from Middle Eastern allies and received swift recognition. When key allies refrain from criticizing a coup, arrange high-level visits, and offer surges in economic support, then autocratic sponsorship contributes to solidifying the gains of authoritarian practices in important ways. Sponsorship can thus help not only bring about, and contribute to, authoritarian practices, but also help protect the gains that such practices bring about for autocratic elites.

## Mechanisms of International Influence

Another way in which the influence of autocratic sponsorship varies concerns the mechanisms through which the actions of outside actors translate into domestic-level effects. As discussed in Chapter 3, a key argument of the book is that the effects of external sponsorship are felt most crucially at the individual level. Although international forces are often structural (such as the nature of the international system) and the effects of international influences are sometimes located in domestic structures (such as the levels of the state's coercive capacity), such structural dynamics only translate into domestic change through the actions of individual actors. Consequently, at least one step of the causal chain linking international sponsorship to domestic

authoritarianism operates at the individual level, where political actors work within the prevailing structures.[23]

Insights into the international influences of democratization have often focused on the ways in which international actors can alter behaviour at the domestic level, either through some form of conditionality or through processes of persuasion and socialization.[24] Yet the mechanisms of influence are different when it comes to the international sponsorship of authoritarian rule, as external actors are seeking to underpin and support patterns of domestic behaviour, rather than alter them. The mechanisms of influence thus entail *reinforcing* the pre-existing preferences of domestic actors, rather than the creation of new preferences and behaviour through pressure or persuasion. There are two broad mechanisms of influence through which international sponsorship can enable domestic autocrats. The first is informational, and involves the role of international signals and cues that provide information to domestic political actors about levels of current and future support. Signals of staunch support, especially when repeated over time, can alter the cost–benefit analyses of incumbent autocrats, who may come to expect that future authoritarian behaviour will be met not only by international condemnation and possible sanctions, but also by international support and protection. They can also provide information about the relative strength of incumbents versus opposition groups in times of crisis, as external statements and actions indicate the level of international support the regime holds. Such signals can shape domestic perceptions of the balance of power in ways that reinforce the ruling elites, as potential challengers both within the elite and the wider public reassess the perceptions of state strength. The types of sponsorship that were offered to President Mugabe and discussed in Chapter 4 were largely informational in nature, as regional actors sent crucial signals before and after fraudulent elections that the regime had widespread backing and would be protected within the region.

The second mechanism of influence is material in nature, as external economic and security assistance materially alters the resources and capacity of domestic incumbents. Transfers of money, weapons, troops, and other material resources contributes directly to the strength of the regime. As outlined in Chapter 5, external security sponsorship can reinforce the coercive capacity of the state, which in turn provides incumbent rulers with greater resources with which to repress and defeat their domestic challengers. Both

[23] Peter Hedström and Petri Ylikoski, 'Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences', *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (2010): 49–67.

[24] Schimmelfennig, 'Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe'; Kelley, *Ethnic Politics in Europe*; Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*.

Bahrain and Syria benefited materially from the support of their international sponsors. Similarly, the post-coup cases examined in Chapter 6 include a key role for material sponsorship, as incumbents in both Fiji and Egypt were assisted in their efforts to consolidate power, and reduce the damage inflicted by outside sanctions, by significant economic assistance from international sponsors.

Several of the cases discussed in the book involved both informational and material mechanisms of influence, as sponsors made public statements in support of incumbent elites and offered sometimes highly visible economic or military sponsorship. Visible material assistance can also have an influence through informational mechanisms, as it not only adds to the material capacity of incumbent elites but also helps distinguish between strong and weak signals of support.[25] Saudi Arabia, for example, signalled its support for the al-Khalifa regime in Bahrain not only through rhetorical statements, but also through its high-intensity military intervention, which itself had an impact through both material and informational channels.

## CONTRIBUTION TO THE LITERATURE

The findings of the book contribute to a number of literatures. Firstly, it speaks most directly to the recent strand of scholarship that has coalesced around the topic of the international dimensions of authoritarian rule in a self-conscious and explicit way. As discussed in Chapter 2, there are many contributions in the wider political science literature (and beyond) that offer insights into the ways in which international forces can bolster authoritarian rule, but it is only in recent years (especially since 2010) that a more coherent field of study in this area has emerged.[26] The aims of this book have been to build on the insights of this new field of study, but also to bring some conceptual and theoretical order to it. Conceptually, the book has sought to identify some of the unclear terminology and fuzzy conceptual boundaries within the field. The typology presented in Chapter 2 seeks to overcome some of these problems, and provide a set of

[25] On the difference between cheap and costly signals, see Clayton L. Thyne, 'Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War', *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 6 (2006): 937–61.

[26] Burnell and Schlumberger, 'Promoting Democracy—Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes'; Ambrosio, *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*; Brownlee, *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*; Tolstrup, *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*; Whitehead, 'Anti-Democracy Promotion: Four Strategies in Search of a Framework'; von Soest, 'Democracy Prevention'.

categories according to which international forces can be classified by using a clear set of criteria. By focusing on the role of agency, intentions, and motivations, it becomes possible to distinguish between a set of ideal-type categories of international influence. The typology both builds on and adds to the recent conceptual insights of this new field. In terms of theory, the book also seeks to add an analytical framework that allows for more fine-grained insights into the nature and effects of the active international sponsorship of authoritarianism. By distinguishing between authoritarian practices, and illustrating the life-cycle of such practices, it becomes possible to identify the ways in which the impact of international forces varies across different arenas and across time. The conceptual and theoretical contributions of the book thus bring together existing insights from the literature, overcome some of its flaws, and build upon the promising foundations that have already been laid.

The book also contributes to the more niche literatures on the three main authoritarian practices examined in the empirical chapters. Each of the three main topics—coups, fraud, and repression—is the subject of its own dedicated and distinct field of scholarship. Common to each field has been a tendency to downplay or underappreciate the role of international politics. To the extent that external forces have been included, it is usually with a view to explaining how international democratizing pressures constrain domestic autocrats and reduce their room to manoeuvre. The empirical chapters of the book, however, highlight the crucial role played by international actors in contributing to the successful pursuit of these various practices. Chapter 4 contributes to our understanding of the politics of electoral fraud by highlighting the role that supportive international signals can play in offsetting the perceived costs of fraud that are associated with possible international condemnation and democratic sanctions. By highlighting the range of supportive international signals that exist, the analysis shows not only the ways in which international actors seek to support incumbents that pursue fraud, but how those incumbents actively seek out such support, and express gratitude for it. Chapter 5 contributes to the literature on coercive crackdowns by identifying the ways in which external actors can add to the coercive capacity of the state in times of regime crisis. Recent studies of repression and crackdowns have shown how the coercive capacity of the state is crucial in determining the outcome of these moments of regime crisis, but the international dimensions of state capacity have been underappreciated. Building on work that has identified international economic assistance as a key contributor to state capacity,[27] the chapter illustrates the role played by material security

[27] Bellin, 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'; Brownlee, Masoud, and Reynolds, *The Arab Spring*.

assistance in times of crisis. Regarding coups, the literature in this area has contained some important discussions of the ways in which international actors can contribute to the success of coup attempts,[28] but it has so far underappreciated the role of international politics in the consolidation of post-coup political regimes. Chapter 6 identifies the ways in which diplomatic and material assistance to post-coup incumbents can offset the costs imposed by international critics and can legitimize and solidify the position of new rulers.

The book also contributes to the literature on democracy promotion and democratic enforcement. Many recent efforts to explain the success or failure of democratic enforcement measures have offered crucial insights into the ways in which external actors can punish autocratic regimes. However, with some important exceptions, many of these contributions have taken insufficient account of the role played by autocratic sponsors, who can seek to counteract the effects of international enforcement. The international audience that domestic elites face is not a single, pro-democratic force.[29] Rather, it is a complex and heterogeneous one that includes multiple actors with multiple priorities. The book builds on the work of those who have identified the ways in which international actors (sometimes called 'black knights' or 'negative actors') can work to frustrate democracy enforcement measures.[30] In particular, the book highlights the ways in which such actors have different effects across different arenas and different periods of time. Scholars have often focused on the period *after* autocratic states violate international democratic norms and conditions in a way that triggers international enforcement measures. I have shown how such actors can play a role in earlier stages, emboldening autocratic incumbents and sending signals that reduce the likelihood of democratic enforcement. International sponsors of autocracy do not just offset the costs of democratic sanctions, they can also shape the extent to which democratic enforcers seek to impose sanctions.

## FURTHER RESEARCH

Although there is a wide array of literature that sheds light on the international politics of authoritarian rule, in many ways this is a field of scholarship at an

[28] For an overview, see Belkin and Schofer, 'Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk'.

[29] Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*.

[30] Levitsky and Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*; Tolstrup, 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"'; Early, 'Unmasking the Black Knights'.

early stage of development. It has only recently come to take on a distinct identity as a separate field of study in its own right, and has yet to develop the breadth of scholarship that characterizes the study of the international politics of democracy and democratization. There are many topics that remain underexplored, and many avenues for further research. Scholars could focus on the international influence on other authoritarian practices than those examined here, such as co-optation, propaganda, and surveillance. Recent scholarship on how technological advances and internet communications present not only threats but also opportunities for authoritarian regimes highlights the potential for analysis on alternative authoritarian forms of control.[31] The international dimensions of domestic political institutions are largely underexplored, and there is considerable scope for analysis of external influences on state structures used by authoritarian regimes, such as political parties, security structures, elections, and legislatures. This book has focused primarily on how international sponsors support autocratic incumbents directly, but scholars could also address the ways in which they offer sponsorship of those regimes more indirectly by seeking to undermine the democratic opposition forces that work within them. Finally, there is considerable scope to examine the role that international organizations play in supporting and promoting authoritarianisms. We currently know much more about how international organizations with high levels of democratic density (e.g. the European Union, the Organization of American States) shape domestic politics than we do about the ways in which regional and international organizations enable and support authoritarian elites.[32] While there is some literature that highlights the ways in which democracy-supporting international organizations can sometimes act in ways that support autocratic regimes,[33] the literature that examines the international organizations that actively serve to

[31] Kalathil and Boas, *Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*; Evgeny Morozov, *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom* (New York: PublicAffairs, 2012); Ron Deibert, 'Cyberspace Under Siege', *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 3 (2015): 64–78.

[32] Pevehouse, 'Democracy from the Outside-in? International Organizations and Democratization'; Vachudova, *Europe Undivided*; Schimmelfennig and Scholtz, 'EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange'; Donno, *Defending Democratic Norms*.

[33] Richard Youngs, *The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010); Gerald Knaus, 'Europe and Azerbaijan: The End of Shame', *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 3 (2015): 5–18.

protect autocratic regimes is in the early stages of development, with much more scope for theoretical research.[34]

Scholars could also reverse the causal arrow, and ask how authoritarian regimes shape outcomes at the international level. The most advanced scholarship in this broad area concerns the role of regime type and its implications for international and civil conflict.[35] Recent scholarship has also examined the impact of authoritarian rule on cooperation more broadly.[36] Yet there is considerable scope for more scholarship in this area. Analysis of the evolution and workings of the institutions of global governance would benefit from consideration of the role played by authoritarian regimes, and the extent of active cooperation between them. Although alarmist fears of an authoritarian axis widely miss the mark, there is reason to examine the extent to which regime type does (and does not) play a role in shaping political outcomes at the international level in a wide area of global governance arenas, including the fields of human rights, international political economy, international peacekeeping, the environment, and many other areas. On many of these major international issues, the cleavages that divide the international community cross-cut the divide between autocratic and democratic regimes, and both democratic and autocratic regimes often work together at the international level. For example, international negotiations over issues such as climate change and the 'Responsibility to Protect' norm have often seen states of both regime types collaborate rather than compete with each other on each side of the debate. Nonetheless, more scholarship is needed to examine the conditions under which regime type helps explain the workings and outcomes of contemporary international politics.

This is not an exhaustive list of potential areas of examination, but it highlights some key areas where further study would add considerably to the limited amount we already know about the international politics of authoritarian rule. This is an evolving research field, covering an ever-changing international environment for authoritarianism, and the wide scope for further research is both a challenge and an opportunity.

[34] Ambrosio, 'Catching the "Shanghai Spirit": How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia'; Cameron and Orenstein, 'Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its "Near Abroad"'.

[35] Russett, *Grasping the Democratic Peace*; Håvard Hegre et al., 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992', *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001): 33–48; Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War*; Mark Peceny, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry, 'Dictatorial Peace?', *American Political Science Review* 96 (2002): 15–26; Jessica L. Weeks, 'Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict', *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (2012): 326–47.

[36] Mattes and Rodríguez, 'Autocracies and International Cooperation'.

# Bibliography


Abdo, Geneive. 'The New Sectarianism: The Arab Uprisings and the Rebirth of the Shi'a-Sunni Divide'. Saban Center Analysis Paper. Washington DC: Brookings Institution, April 2013.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

'African Union Suspends Egypt'. *Reuters*, July 5, 2013.

'Africa's Shame.' *The Economist*, 3 July 2008. <http://www.economist.com/node/11670822>.

al-Rasheed, Madawi. 'Sectarianism as Counter-Revolution: Saudi Responses to the Arab Spring'. *Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism* 11, no. 3 (2011): 513–26.

Albertus, Michael, and Victor Menaldo. 'Coercive Capacity and the Prospects for Democratization'. *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 151–69.

Alden, Chris. 'China in Africa'. *Survival* 47, no. 3 (2005): 147–64.

Alesina, Alberto, and David Dollar. 'Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?'. *Journal of Economic Growth* 5, no. 1 (2000): 33–63.

Alley, Roderic. 'The 1987 Military Coups in Fiji: The Regional Implications'. *The Contemporary Pacific* 2, no. 1 (1990): 37–58.

Allison, Roy. 'Russia and Syria: Explaining Alignment with a Regime in Crisis'. *International Affairs* 89, no. 4 (2013): 795–823.

Ambrosio, Thomas. 'Catching the "Shanghai Spirit": How the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Promotes Authoritarian Norms in Central Asia'. *Europe–Asia Studies* 60, no. 8 (2008): 1321–44.

Ambrosio, Thomas. *Authoritarian Backlash: Russian Resistance to Democratization in the Former Soviet Union*. London: Ashgate Publishing, 2009.

Ambrosio, Thomas. 'Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research'. *International Studies Perspectives* 11, no. 4 (2010): 375–92.

Ambrosio, Thomas. 'The Rise of the "China Model" and "Beijing Consensus": Evidence of Authoritarian Diffusion?'. *Contemporary Politics* 18, no. 4 (2012): 381–99.

Ambrosio, Thomas. 'Democratic States and Authoritarian Firewalls: America as a Black Knight in the Uprising in Bahrain'. *Contemporary Politics* 20, no. 3 (2 May 2014): 331–46. doi:10.1080/13569775.2014.911497.

Anglin, Douglas G. 'International Election Monitoring: The African Experience'. *African Affairs* 97, no. 389 (1 October 1998): 471–95.

Ansell, Ben W. *From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Redistributive Political Economy of Education*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Applebaum, Anne. *Iron Curtain: The Crushing of Eastern Europe, 1944–1956*. London: Penguin Books, 2012.

Aras, Bülent, and Richard Falk. 'Authoritarian "Geopolitics" of Survival in the Arab Spring'. *Third World Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (2015): 322–36.

Arriola, Leonardo R. 'Patronage and Political Stability in Africa'. *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 10 (2009): 1339–62.

Art, David. 'What Do We Know About Authoritarianism After Ten Years?'. *Comparative Politics* 44 (2012): 351–73.

'A Talk with Peninsula Shield Force Commander Mutlaq Bin Salem Al-Azima'. *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 28 March 2011.

'Australia, New Zealand Lift Travel Sanctions on Fiji'. *Channel News Asia*, 31 March 2014.

Autesserre, Séverine. *Peaceland: Conflict Resolution and the Everyday Politics of International Intervention*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Avelino, George, David S. Brown, and Wendy Hunter. 'The Effects of Capital Mobility, Trade Openness, and Democracy on Social Spending in Latin America, 1980–1999'. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 625–41.

Bader, Julia. 'China, Autocratic Patron? An Empirical Investigation of China as a Factor in Autocratic Survival'. *International Studies Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (1 July 2014): 23–33.

Bader, Julia. *China's Foreign Relations and the Survival of Autocracies*. London: Routledge, 2015.

Bader, Julia. 'Propping up Dictators? Economic Cooperation from China and Its Impact on Authoritarian Persistence in Party and Non-Party Regimes'. *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (2015): 655–72.

Bader, Julia, Jörn Grävingholt, and Antje Kästner. 'Would Autocracies Promote Autocracy? A Political Economy Perspective on Regime-Type Export in Regional Neighbourhoods'. *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 81–100.

Badza, Simon. 'Zimbabwe's 2008 Harmonized Elections: Regional and International Reaction'. In *Defying the Winds of Change: Zimbabwe's 2008 Elections*, edited by Eldred V. Masunungure, 149–75. Harare: Weaver Press and Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2008.

Baffour, Ankomah. 'Mugabe: "No Remote Control Ever Again"'. *New African*, May 2002.

'Bahrain Opposition Figure Decries "Devastating" Crackdown'. *CNN*, 17 March 2011. <http://edition.cnn.com/2011/WORLD/meast/03/17/bahrain.protests/>.

Bainimarama, J. V. 'Statement of President Bainimarama at the 68th Session of the United Nations General Assembly'. 25 September 2013. <http://www.fiji.gov.fj/Media-Center/Speeches/STATEMENT-BY-COMMODORE-JOSAlA-VOREQE-BAINIMARAMA-P.aspx>.

Bainimarama, J. V. 'Remarks by the PM at His Meeting with the Premier of PRC'. *Prime Minister Bainimarama*. Accessed 4 April 2014. <http://bainimarama.org/remarks-by-the-pm-bainimarama-at-his-meeting-with-h-e-mr-li-keqiang-premier-of-prc/>.

Baker, Bruce. 'When to Call Black White: Zimbabwe's Electoral Reports'. *Third World Quarterly* 23, no. 6 (1 December 2002): 1145–58.

Baker, Peter. 'Obama Removes Weapons Freeze Against Egypt'. *New York Times*, 31 March 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/world/middleeast/obama-lifts-arms-freeze-against-egypt.html>.

Bank, André, Thomas Richter, and Anna Sunik. 'Long-Term Monarchical Survival in the Middle East: A Configurational Comparison, 1945–2012'. *Democratization* 22, no. 1 (2015): 179–200.

Barany, Zoltan. 'The Role of the Military'. *Journal of Democracy* 22 (2011): 24–35.

Bassam, Laila, and Tom Perry. 'How Iranian General Plotted out Syrian Assault in Moscow'. Reuters, 6 October 2015.

Bassiouni, Mahmoud Cherif, Nigel Rodley, Badria Al-Awadhi, Phillipe Kirsch, and Mahnoush H. Arsanjani. 'Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry'. 2011.

Bauerkämper, Arnd. 'Transnational Fascism: Cross-Border Relations between Regimes and Movements in Europe, 1922–1939'. *East Central Europe* 37, no. 2–3 (2010): 214–46.

Baum, Matthew A., and David A. Lake. 'The Political Economy of Growth: Democracy and Human Capital'. *American Journal of Political Science* 47, no. 2 (2003): 333–47.

Beissinger, Mark R. 'Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions'. *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 2 (2007): 259–76.

Belkin, Aaron, and Evan Schofer. 'Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 47, no. 5 (2003): 594–620.

Bellin, Eva. 'The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective'. *Comparative Politics* 36, no. 2 (2004): 139–57.

Bellin, Eva. 'Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring'. *Comparative Politics* 44, no. 2 (2012): 127–49.

Bermeo, Nancy. 'Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship'. *Comparative Politics* 24 (1992): 273–91.

Bermeo, Nancy. *Ordinary People in Extraordinary Times: The Citizenry and the Breakdown of Democracy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003.

Bermeo, Nancy. 'Democracy Assistance and the Search for Security'. In *New Challenges to Democratization*, edited by Peter Burnell and Richard Youngs, 73–92. London and New York: Routledge, 2010.

Bermeo, Sarah Blodgett. 'Foreign Aid and Regime Change: A Role for Donor Intent'. *World Development* 39, no. 11 (November 2011): 2021–31.

'Big Fish in a Big Pond'. *The Economist*, 25 March 2015.

Birch, Sarah. 'Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct'. *Comparative Political Studies* 40 (2007): 1533–56.

Birch, Sarah. *Electoral Malpractice*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.

Bjornlund, Eric. *Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy*. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004.

Black, Ian. 'Syrian Opposition Takes Arab League Seat'. *The Guardian*. Accessed 6 May 2015. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/26/syrian-opposition-appeals-nato-support>.

Blair, Tony. *A Journey: My Political Life*. London: Hutchinson, 2010.

Blanton, Shannon Lindsey. 'Instruments of Security or Tools of Repression? Arms Imports and Human Rights Conditions in Developing Countries'. *Journal of Peace Research* 36, no. 2 (1999): 233–44.

Boix, Carles. 'Democracy, Development, and the International System'. *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 4 (2011): 809–28.

Boudreau, Vincent. *Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Bradley, Matt. 'Kerry Lauds Egypt Military for "Restoring Democracy"'. *Wall Street Journal*, 1 August 2013.

Brancati, Dawn. 'Pocketbook Protests: Explaining the Emergence of Pro-Democracy Protests Worldwide'. *Comparative Political Studies* 47, no. 11 (2014): 1503–30.

Bratton, Michael. *Power Politics in Zimbabwe*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2014.

Bratton, Michael, and Eldred Masunungure. 'The Anatomy of Political Predation: Leaders, Elites and Coalitions in Zimbabwe, 1980–2010'. *Development Leadership Programme Research Paper* 9 (2011).

Brautigam, Deborah. 'Governance, Economy, and Foreign Aid'. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 27, no. 3 (1992): 3–25.

Bräutigam, Deborah A., and Stephen Knack. 'Foreign Aid, Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa'. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 52, no. 2 (2004): 255–85.

Brinks, Daniel, and Michael Coppedge. 'Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy'. *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 4 (2006): 463–89.

Brown, David S. 'Reading, Writing, and Regime Type: Democracy's Impact on Primary School Enrollment'. *Political Research Quarterly* 52, no. 4 (1999): 681–707.

Brown, Stephen. 'Authoritarian Leaders and Multiparty Elections in Africa: How Foreign Donors Help to Keep Kenya's Daniel Arap Moi in Power'. *Third World Quarterly* 22, no. 5 (2001): 725–39.

Brownlee, Jason. '…And yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes'. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 37, no. 3 (2002): 35–63.

Brownlee, Jason. 'Low Tide after the Third Wave: Exploring Politics under Authoritarianism'. *Comparative Politics* 34, no. 4 (2002): 477–98.

Brownlee, Jason. *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Brownlee, Jason. 'Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies'. *World Politics* 59, no. 4 (2007): 595–628.

Brownlee, Jason. 'Portents of Pluralism: How Hybrid Regimes Affect Democratic Transitions'. *American Journal of Political Science* 53 (2009): 515–32.

Brownlee, Jason. *Democracy Prevention: The Politics of the US–Egyptian Alliance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Brownlee, Jason. 'Is Autocracy on the March?: Reexamining the Authoritarian Resurgence'. Unpublished paper, 2015.

Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew Reynolds. *The Arab Spring: Pathways of Repression and Reform*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Brownlee, Jason, and Joshua Stacher. 'Change of Leader, Continuity of System: Nascent Liberalization in Post-Mubarak Egypt'. *Comparative Democratization* 9, no. 2 (2011): 1–9.

Bunce, Valerie J., and Sharon L. Wolchik. *Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Burnell, Peter. *Democracy Assistance: International Co-Operation for Democratization*. London: Frank Cass, 2000.

Burnell, Peter. 'The Domestic Political Impact of Foreign Aid: Recalibrating the Research Agenda'. *The European Journal of Development Research* 16, no. 2 (2004): 396–416.

Burnell, Peter. 'Is There a New Autocracy Promotion?'. Working Paper 96. Madrid: Fride, March 2010.

Burnell, Peter, and Oliver Schlumberger. 'Promoting Democracy—Promoting Autocracy? International Politics and National Political Regimes'. *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 1–15.

Burr, Millard, and Robert O. Collins. *Africa's Thirty Years War: Libya, Chad, and the Sudan, 1963–1993*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999.

Byman, Daniel. *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

'Cambodia: Aftermath of the Coup'. *Refworld*. Accessed 21 April 2015. <http://www.refworld.org/docid/45cb0fbb2.html>.

Cameron, David R., and Mitchell A. Orenstein. 'Post-Soviet Authoritarianism: The Influence of Russia in Its "Near Abroad"'. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 28, no. 1 (2012): 1–44.

Capoccia, Giovanni. *Defending Democracy: Reactions to Extremism in Interwar Europe*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005.

Capoccia, Giovanni, and Daniel Ziblatt. 'The Historical Turn in Democratization Studies: A New Research Agenda for Europe and Beyond'. *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 8–9 (2010): 931–68.

Caprariis, Luca de. '"Fascism for Export"? The Rise and Eclipse of the Fasci Italiani all'Estero'. *Journal of Contemporary History* 35, no. 2 (2000): 151–83.

Carapico, Sheila. 'Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Arab World'. *Middle East Journal* 56, no. 3 (2002): 379–95.

Carey, Sabine C. 'The Dynamic Relationship between Protest and Repression'. *Political Research Quarterly* 59, no. 1 (2006): 1–11.

Carlstrom, Greg. 'Egypt's New Dictator Was Made in the USA'. *Politico Magazine*, 18 February 2014. <http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/el-sisi-egypt-dictator-103628.html>.

Carothers, Thomas. *Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1999.

Carothers, Thomas. *Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.

Carothers, Thomas. 'The Backlash against Democracy Promotion'. *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 2 (2006): 55–68.

Carothers, Thomas. 'Democracy Aid at 25: Time to Choose'. *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 59–73.

Carothers, Thomas, and Richard Youngs. *Looking for Help: Will Rising Democracies Become International Democracy Supporters?* Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2011.

Cave, Damien, and Hwaida Saad. 'Syria Rebels Say 48 Iran Captives Are Revolutionary Guards'. *New York Times*, 5 August 2012.

Charap, Samuel. 'Russia, Syria and the Doctrine of Intervention.' *Survival* 55, no. 1 (2013): 35–41.

Charbonneau, Louis. 'Iran Flouts U.N. Sanctions, Sends Arms to Syria: Panel'. Reuters. 16 May 2012.

Charbonneau, Louis. 'Western Report—Iran Ships Arms, Personnel to Syria via Iraq'. Reuters, 19 September 2012.

Chase, Robert S., Emily B. Hill, and Paul Kennedy. 'Pivotal States and U.S. Strategy'. *Foreign Affairs* 75, no. 1 (1996): 33–51.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jennifer Gandhi, and J. R. Vreeland. 'Democracy and Dictatorship Revisited'. *Public Choice* 143, no. 1 (2010): 67–101.

Chen, Dingding, and Katrin Kinzelbach. 'Democracy Promotion and China: Blocker or Bystander?'. *Democratization* 22, no. 3 (16 April 2015): 400–18. doi:10.1080/13510347.2014.999322.

Chesterman, Simon. *You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.

Chigora, Percyslage, and Taderera Hebert Chisi. 'The Eight Years of Interaction: Lessons from Zimbabwe's "Look East" Policy and the Future of African Countries and Asia-Pacific Region'. *Journal of Sustainable Development in Africa* 10, no. 4 (2009): 92–8.

'China Likes to Help Developing Nations'. *Fiji Times*, 10 November 2007.

'China's Help May Harm Fiji'. *The Australian*, 23 April 2009. <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/opinion/chinas-help-may-harm-fiji/story-e6frg6zo-1225701907555>.

Chitiyo, Knox, and Martin Rupiya. 'Tracking Zimbabwe's Political History: The Zimbabwe Defence Force from 1980–2005'. In *Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of Militaries in Southern Africa*, edited by Martin Rupiya, 331–63. Pretoria, South Africa: Institute for Security Studies, 2005.

Chivers, C. J. 'China Backs Uzbek, Splitting With US on Crackdown'. *New York Times*, 25 May 2005. <http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/25/world/europe/china-backs-uzbek-splitting-with-us-on-crackdown.html>.

Chivers, C. J. 'As Conflict Continues in Syria, Assad's Arms Face Strain'. *New York Times*, 2 August 2012.

Chrisafis, Angelique. 'Sarkozy Admits France Made Mistakes over Tunisia'. *The Guardian*, 24 January 2011. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/24/nicolas-sarkozy-tunisia-protests>.

'Close US–Egypt Military Ties Forged on American Soil'. AFP, 10 July 2013.

Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 'Democracy with Adjectives'. *World Politics* 49 (1997): 430–51.

Colombo, Silvia. 'The GCC and the Arab Spring: A Tale of Double Standards'. *International Spectator* 47, no. 4 (2012): 110–26.

Commonwealth Observer Group. 'The Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe 24–25 June 2000: The Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group', 2000.

Commonwealth Observer Group. 'Report of the Commonwealth Observer Group: Zimbabwe Presidential Elections 9–11 March 2002', 2002.

Cooley, Alexander. *Great Games, Local Rules: The New Great Power Contest in Central Asia*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.

Cooley, Alexander. 'Countering Democratic Norms'. *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 3 (2015): 49–63.

Cooley, Alexander. 'The League of Authoritarian Gentlemen'. *Foreign Policy*. Accessed 16 November 2015. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/01/30/the-league-of-authoritarian-gentlemen/>.

Cooper, Helen, Michael R. Gordon, and Neil MacFarquhar. 'Russians Strike Targets in Syria, but Not ISIS Areas'. *New York Times*, 30 September 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/01/world/europe/russia-airstrikes-syria.html>.

Cordesman, Anthony H. *Iran's Developing Military Capabilities*. Washington DC: CSIS, 2005.

Cornell, Agnes. 'Does Regime Type Matter for the Impact of Democracy Aid on Democracy?'. *Democratization* 20, no. 4 (1 June 2013): 642–67.

Corrales, Javier. 'Conflicting Goals in Venezuela's Foreign Policy'. In *Venezuela's Petro-Diplomacy: Hugo Chavez's Foreign Policy*, edited by Ralph S. Clem and Anthony P. Maingot, 32–48. Florida: University Press of Florida, 2011.

'"Coup" or Not, Egypt Aid Can Continue'. *ABC News*, 9 July 2013. <http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2013/07/coup-or-not-egypt-aid-can-continue/>.

Crawford, Gordon. 'Foreign Aid and Political Conditionality: Issues of Effectiveness and Consistency'. *Democratization* 4 (1997): 69–108.

Crawford, Gordon. 'Promoting Democracy from Without—Learning from Within (Part I)'. *Democratization* 10, no. 1 (2003): 77–98.

Croissant, Aurel, and Stefan Wurster. 'Performance and Persistence of Autocracies in Comparison: Introducing Issues and Perspectives'. *Contemporary Politics* 19, no. 1 (2013): 1–18.

Dahl, Robert A. *Polyarchy: Participation & Opposition*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1971.

Davenport, Christian. 'State Repression and Political Order'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 10, no. 1 (2007): 1–23.

Davenport, Christian. *State Repression and the Domestic Democratic Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

Daxecker, Ursula E. 'The Cost of Exposing Cheating: International Election Monitoring, Fraud, and Post-Election Violence in Africa'. *Journal of Peace Research* 49 (2012): 503–16.

De Nevers, Renee. 'Imposing International Norms: Great Powers and Norm Enforcement'. *International Studies Review* 9, no. 1 (2007): 53–80.

de Soysa, Indra, Thomas Jackson, and Christin M. Ormhaug. 'Tools of the Torturer? Small Arms Imports and Repression of Human Rights, 1992–2004'. *International Journal of Human Rights* 14, no. 3 (2010): 378–93.

Debs, Alexandre, and Hein E. Goemans. 'Regime Type, the Fate of Leaders, and War'. *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 430–45.

Dehghan, Saeed Kamali. 'Syrian Army Being Aided by Iranian Forces'. *The Guardian*, 28 May 2012.

Deibert, Ron. 'Cyberspace Under Siege'. *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 3 (2015): 64–78.

DeNardo, James. *Power in Numbers: The Political Strategy of Protest and Rebellion*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014.

DeYoung, Karen. 'Kerry in Cairo: Suspension of Aid to Egypt "not a Punishment"'. *Washington Post*, 3 November 2013.

Diamond, Larry. 'Thinking about Hybrid Regimes'. *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 21–35.

Diamond, Larry. 'Liberation Technology'. *Journal of Democracy* 21, no. 3 (2010): 69–83.

Diamond, Larry. 'Facing Up to the Democratic Recession'. *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 141–55.

Dickinson, Elizabeth. 'UAE, Saudi Arabia Express Support for Egyptian Military's Removal of Morsi'. *The National*. Accessed 2 December 2015. <http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/middle-east/uae-saudi-arabia-express-support-for-egyptian-military-s-removal-of-morsi>.

Diwan, Kristin. 'The Dire Consequences of Saudi Intervention in Bahrain'. 21 March 2011. <http://globalpublicsquare.blogs.cnn.com/2011/03/21/the-dire-consequences-of-the-saudi-intervention-in-bahrain/>.

Djankov, Simeon, Jose G. Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol. 'The Curse of Aid'. *Journal of Economic Growth* 13, no. 3 (22 July 2008): 169–94.

Donno, Daniela. 'Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforcement of Democratic Norms'. *International Organization* 64 (2010): 593–625.

Donno, Daniela. *Defending Democratic Norms: International Actors and the Politics of Electoral Misconduct*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

Dorman, Sara Rich. '"Make Sure They Count Nicely This Time": The Politics of Elections and Election Observing in Zimbabwe'. *Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 43, no. 2 (2005): 155–77.

Downes, Alexander B., and Jonathan Monten. 'Forced to Be Free?: Why Foreign-Imposed Regime Change Rarely Leads to Democratization'. *International Security* 37, no. 4 (2013): 90–131.

Dreher, Axel, Peter Nunnenkamp, and Rainer Thiele. 'Are "New" Donors Different? Comparing the Allocation of Bilateral Aid Between Non-DAC and DAC Donor Countries'. *World Development* 39, no. 11 (2011): 1950–68.

Drezner, Daniel W. *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Drury, A. Cooper, Jonathan Krieckhaus, and Michael Lusztig. 'Corruption, Democracy, and Economic Growth'. *International Political Science Review* 27, no. 2 (2006): 121–36.

Dugger, Celia W. 'Accounts of Violence Spread in Zimbabwe'. *New York Times*, 9 April 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/09/world/africa/09zimbabwe.html>.

Dugger, Celia W. 'Zimbabwean Opposition Leaders Held by Police'. *New York Times*, 5 June 2008. <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/05/world/africa/05zimbabwe.html>.

Dunning, Thad. *Crude Democracy: Natural Resource Wealth and Political Regimes*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Early, Bryan R. 'Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions'. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 7, no. 4 (2011): 381–402.

Economist Intelligence Unit. *Democracy Index 2014: Democracy and Its Discontents*. Economist Intelligence Unit, 2015.

'Egypt Protests: Bloodshed as Pro-Morsi Camps Cleared'. *BBC News*. Accessed 18 August 2015. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23691571>.

EISA. 'Zimbabwe: 2008 Post-Election—Parallel Vote Tabulations', 16 April 2008.

El-Tablawy, Tarek. 'GCC Pledges $20 Billion in Aid for Oman, Bahrain'. *Washington Post*, 10 March 2011. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/10/AR2011031003629.html>.

Ennis, Crystal A., and Bessma Momani. 'Shaping the Middle East in the Midst of the Arab Uprisings: Turkish and Saudi Foreign Policy Strategies'. *Third World Quarterly* 34, no. 6 (2013): 1127–44.

Erdmann, Gero, André Bank, Bert Hoffmann, and Thomas Richter. 'International Cooperation of Authoritarian Regimes: Toward a Conceptual Framework'. GIGA Working Papers, 2013.

Erikson, Daniel P., and Paul Wander. 'Raul Castro and Cuba's Global Diplomacy'. *Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy* 18 (2008): 390–401.

Escribà-Folch, Abel. 'Authoritarian Responses to Foreign Pressure: Spending, Repression, and Sanctions'. *Comparative Political Studies* 45, no. 6 (2012): 683–713.

Escribà-Folch, Abel. 'Repression, Political Threats, and Survival under Autocracy'. *International Political Science Review* 34, no. 5 (2013): 543–60.

Escriba-Folch, Abel, and Joseph Wright. *Foreign Pressure and the Politics of Authoritarian Survival*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.

Ethier, Diane. 'Is Democracy Promotion Effective? Comparing Conditionality and Incentives'. *Democratization* 10 (2003): 99–120.

European Union. 'Zimbabwe: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade with the World', 2013.

Evans, Peter B., Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. *Bringing the State Back in*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.

'Ex-Guards among Iranian Hostages'. *BBC*, 8 August 2012.

Fair, C. Christine. 'The US–Pakistan Relations after a Decade of the War on Terror'. *Contemporary South Asia* 20, no. 2 (1 June 2012): 243–53.

Falleti, Tulia G., and Julia F. Lynch. 'Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis'. *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 9 (2009): 1143–66.

Fassihi, Farnaz, Jay Solomon, and Sam Dagher. 'Iranians Dial Up Presence in Syria'. *Wall Street Journal*, 16 September 2013.

Faul, Michelle. 'Dissent over Mugabe Cracks African Unity'. *USA Today*, 13 July 2008. <http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-07-13-1812490162_x.htm>.

Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. 'Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical View'. In *Handbook of International Relations*, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 52–72. London: SAGE, 2002.

Fearon, James D. 'Rationalist Explanations for War.' *International Organization* 49, no. 3 (1995): 379–414.

'Fiji Suspended from Commonwealth'. *BBC*, 1 September 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/8231717.stm>.

Filkins, Dexter. 'The Shadow Commander'. *The New Yorker*, 30 September 2013. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/30/the-shadow-commander>.

Finkel, Steven E., Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. 'The Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003'. *World Politics* 59 (2007): 404–39.

Firth, Stewart. 'Reflections on Fiji since Independence'. *The Round Table* 101, no. 6 (2012): 575–83.

Fisher, Max. 'U.S. Has Spotty Record on Law Requiring It to Cut Aid after Coups'. *Washington Post*, 5 July 2013. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2013/07/05/u-s-has-spotty-record-on-law-requiring-it-to-cut-aid-after-coups/>.

'Former Fiji Prime Minister Jailed for Corruption'. *Telegraph*, 3 August 2012.

Forsythe, David P. 'Democracy, War, and Covert Action'. *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 4 (1992): 385–95.

Fortin-Rittberger, Jessica. 'The Role of Infrastructural and Coercive State Capacity in Explaining Different Types of Electoral Fraud'. *Democratization* 21, no. 1 (2014): 95–117.

Fortna, Virginia Page. 'Peacekeeping and Democratization'. In *From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding*, edited by Anna K. Jarstad and Timothy D. Sisk, 39–79. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Fraenkel, Jon. 'The Fiji Coup of December 2006—Who, What, Where, and Why?'. In *From Election to Coup in Fiji*, edited by Jon Fraenkel and Stewart Firth, 420–49. Canberra: ANU Press, 2006.

Fraenkel, Jon. 'The Great Roadmap Charade: Electoral Issues in Post-Coup Fiji'. In *The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups?*, edited by Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal, 155–84. Canberra: ANU Press, 2009.

Fraenkel, Jon. 'Fiji'. *The Contemporary Pacific* 23, no. 2 (2011): 456–76.

Fraenkel, Jon. 'The Origins of Military Autonomy in Fiji: A Tale of Three Coups'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 67, no. 3 (2013): 327–41.

Fraenkel, Jon, and Stewart Firth. *From Election to Coup in Fiji: The 2006 Campaign and Its Aftermath*. Canberra: ANU Press, 2007.

Fraenkel, Jon, and Stewart Firth. 'The Enigmas of Fiji's Good Governance Coup'. In *The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups?*, edited by Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal, 3–17. Canberra: ANU Press, 2009.

Fraenkel, Jon, and Bernard Grofman. 'Does the Alternative Vote Foster Moderation in Ethnically Divided Societies? The Case of Fiji'. *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 5 (2006): 623–51.

Franklin, James C. 'Shame on You: The Impact of Human Rights Criticism on Political Repression in Latin America'. *International Studies Quarterly* 52, no. 1 (2008): 187–211.

Frantz, Erica, and Natasha Ezrow. '"Yes Men" and the Likelihood of Foreign Policy Mistakes Across Dictatorships'. Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, 2009.

Fray, Peter, and Ed O'Loughlin. 'Zimbabwe an International Pariah'. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 March 2002. <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/03/21/21zimlead.htm>.

Freedom House. 'Countries at the Crossroads 2012: Bahrain', 2012.

Friedman, Milton. *Foreign Economic Aid: Means and Objectives*. Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 1995.

Fulton, Will, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. 'Iranian Strategy in Syria'. Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War, May 2013.

Gandhi, Jennifer. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. 'Elections Under Authoritarianism'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12, no. 1 (2009): 403–22.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 'Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships'. *Economics & Politics* 18, no. 1 (2006): 1–26.

Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 'Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats'. *Comparative Political Studies* 40, no. 11 (2007): 1279–301.

Gasiorowski, Mark J. 'Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis'. *American Political Science Review* 89, no. 4 (1995): 882–97.

Gat, Azar. 'The Return of Authoritarian Great Powers'. *Foreign Affairs* 86, no. 4 (2007): 59–69.

Gause, F. Gregory. 'Is Saudi Arabia Really Counter-Revolutionary?'. *Foreign Policy*, 9 August 2011. <http://foreignpolicy.com/2011/08/09/is-saudi-arabia-really-counter-revolutionary/>.

Geddes, Barbara. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003.

Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 'Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set'. *Perspectives on Politics* 12, no. 2 (2014): 313–31.

Geisler, Gisela. 'Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do with It? Vagaries of Election Observations and Democratic Standards'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 31 (1993): 613–37.

Gel'man, Vladimir, and Tomila Lankina. 'Authoritarian versus Democratic Diffusions: Explaining Institutional Choices in Russia's Local Government'. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 24, no. 1 (2008): 40–62.

George, Alexander L., and Andrew Bennett. *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005.

Gerschewski, Johannes. 'The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and Co-Optation in Autocratic Regimes'. *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 13–38.

Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Michael D. Ward. 'Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization'. *International Organization* 60, no. 4 (2006): 911–33.

Göbel, Christian. 'Authoritarian Consolidation'. *European Political Science* 10 (2010): 176–90.

Goemans, Henk E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 'Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders'. *Journal of Peace Research* 46, no. 2 (1 March 2009): 269–83.

Goodarzi, Jubin M. *Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East*. London: IB Tauris, 2009.

Goodarzi, Jubin M. 'Syria and Iran: Alliance Cooperation in a Changing Regional Environment'. *Ortadoğu Etütleri* 4, no. 2 (2013): 31–54.

Gordon, Michael R. 'Iran Supplying Syrian Military via Iraq Airspace'. *New York Times*, 4 September 2012.

Gordon, Michael R., and Mark Lander. 'In Crackdown Response, U.S. Temporarily Freezes Some Military Aid to Egypt'. *New York Times*, 9 October 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/10/world/middleeast/obama-military-aid-to-egypt.html>.

Gorenburg, Dimitry. 'Why Russia Supports Repressive Regimes in Syria and the Middle East'. *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo 198*, 2012.

Gowan, Richard. 'The Peacekeeping Quagmire'. *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* (12 August 2015): 39–46.

Graham, Victoria. 'How Firm the Handshake? South Africa's Use of Quiet Diplomacy in Zimbabwe from 1999 to 2006'. *African Security Studies* 15, no. 4 (2006): 113–27.

Grauvogel, Julia, and Christian von Soest. 'Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes'. *European Journal of Political Research* 53, no. 4 (2014): 635–53.

Grebe, Jan. 'And They Are Still Targeting: Assessing the Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions against Zimbabwe'. *Africa Spectrum* 45, no. 1 (2010): 3–29.

Greenberg, Joel. 'Israeli Officials Say Syria's Assad Is Doomed'. *Washington Post*, 14 December 2011. <https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israeli-officials-say-assad-is-doomed/2011/12/14/gIQAYBuEuO_story.html>.

Gude, Ken. 'Case Studies in Collective Response'. In *Protecting Democracy: International Responses*, edited by Morton H. Halperin and Mirna Galic, 63–100. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005.

Gunitsky, Seva. 'From Shocks to Waves: Hegemonic Transitions and Democratization in the Twentieth Century'. *International Organization* 68, no. 3 (2014): 561–97.

Gurr, Ted Robert, Keith Jaggers, and Will H. Moore. 'The Transformation of the Western State: The Growth of Democracy, Autocracy, and State Power since 1800'. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 25, no. 1 (1990): 73–108.

Hadenius, Axel, and Jan Teorell. 'Pathways from Authoritarianism'. *Journal of Democracy* 18, no. 1 (2007): 143–57.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie. *Making Human Rights a Reality*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2013.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., Susan D. Hyde, and Ryan S. Jablonski. 'When Do Governments Resort to Election Violence?'. *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 1 (2013), 1–31.

Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. 'Human Rights in a Globalizing World: The Paradox of Empty Promises'. *American Journal of Sociology* 110, no. 5 (2005): 1373–411.

Haggard, Stephan, and Robert R. Kaufman. 'The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions'. *Comparative Politics* 29, no. 3 (1995): 263–83.

Halper, Stefan A. *The Beijing Consensus: How China's Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Basic Books, 2010.

Halperin, Morton H., and Mirna Galic. *Protecting Democracy: International Responses*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2005.

Halperin, Morton H., and Kristen Lomasney. 'Guaranteeing Democracy: A Review of the Record'. *Journal of Democracy* 9, no. 2 (1998): 134–47.

Halperin, Morton H., Joseph T. Siegle, and Michael M. Weinstein. *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace*. Washington DC: Council on Foreign Relations/Psychology Press, 2005.

Hanson, Jonathan K., and Rachel Sigman. 'Measuring State Capacity: Assessing and Testing the Options'. Unpublished paper, 21 March 2013.

Hassan, Oz. 'Undermining the Transatlantic Democracy Agenda? The Arab Spring and Saudi Arabia's Counteracting Democracy Strategy'. *Democratization* 22, no. 3 (16 April 2015): 479–95.

Hedström, Peter. 'Studying Mechanisms to Strengthen Causal Inferences in Quantitative Research'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Methodology*, edited by Janet M. Box-Steffensmeier, Henry M. Brady, and David Collier, 319–35. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.

Hedström, Peter, and Richard Swedberg. 'Social Mechanisms: An Introductory Essay'. In *Social Mechanisms: An Analytical Approach to Social Theory*, edited by Peter Hedström and Richard Swedberg, 1–31. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Hedström, Peter, and Petri Ylikoski. 'Causal Mechanisms in the Social Sciences'. *Annual Review of Sociology* 36 (2010): 49–67.

Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates, and Nils Petter Gleditsch. 'Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992'. *American Political Science Review* 95 (2001): 33–48.

Heine, Jorge, and Brigitte Weiffen. *21st Century Democracy Promotion in the Americas: Standing Up for the Polity*. London: Routledge, 2014.

Held, David. *Models of Democracy*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2006.

Hertog, Steffen. 'Rentier Militaries in the Gulf States: The Price of Coup-Proofing'. *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 43, no. 3 (2011): 400–2.

Hertog, Steffen. 'Petro-Populist States in the International System'. Unpublished paper, 2014.

Heydemann, Steven. 'Syria and the Future of Authoritarianism'. *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 59–73.

Heydemann, Steven, and Reinoud Leenders. 'Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the "Arab Awakening"'. *Globalizations* 8, no. 5 (2011): 647–53.

'Hidden Agreements on Justice and Policing: UK's Appeasement of Saudi Arabia'. *Financial Times*. Accessed 16 November 2015. <http://blogs.ft.com/david-allen-green/2015/10/12/hidden-agreements-on-justice-and-policing-uks-appeasement-of-saudi-arabia/>.

Hill, Fiona. 'The Real Reason Putin Supports Assad'. *Foreign Affairs*, 25 March 2013.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. *Syria: Revolution from Above*. London: Routledge, 2002.

Hinnebusch, Raymond. *The International Politics of the Middle East*. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.

Hobolt, Sara Binzer. *Europe in Question: Referendums on European Integration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Hokayem, Emile. *Syria's Uprising and the Fracturing of the Levant*. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013.

Holliday, Joseph. 'The Assad Regime: From Counterinsurgency To Civil War'. *Institute for the Study of War*. Accessed 23 October 2013. <http://www.understandingwar.org/report/assad-regime>.

Horowitz, Donald L. 'Strategy Takes a Holiday: Fraenkel and Grofman on the Alternative Vote'. *Comparative Political Studies* 39, no. 5 (2006): 652–62.

Howard, Marc Morjé, and Philip G. Roessler. 'Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes'. *American Journal of Political Science* 50 (2006): 365–81.

Hufbauer, Gary, J. Schott, K. Elliott, and B. Oegg. *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington DC: Peterson Institute, 2007.

Hughes, James, Gwendolyn Sasse, and Claire Gordon. 'Conditionality and Compliance in the EU's Eastward Enlargement: Regional Policy and the Reform of Sub-National Government'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 42, no. 3 (2004): 523–51.

Human Rights Watch. 'Joint Letter to Commodore Bainimarama Regarding Ongoing Rights Abuses in Fiji,' 4 December 2012. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/12/04/joint-letter-commodore-bainimarama-regarding-ongoing-rights-abuses-fiji>.

Human Rights Watch. 'All According to Plan: The Rab'a Massacre and Mass Killings of Protesters in Egypt,' 12 August 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/node/127942>.

Huntington, Samuel P. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968.

Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.

Hurrell, Andrew. 'The International Dimensions of Democratization in Latin America: The Case of Brazil'. In *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, edited by Laurence Whitehead, 146–74. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Hyde, Susan, and Carew Boulding. 'Political Terror, Election Fraud, and Foreign Aid: When Do Donors Withdraw Aid to Promote Democracy?'. Paper presented at annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 2008.

Hyde, Susan, and Nikolay Marinov. 'Information and Self-Enforcing Democracy: The Role of International Election Observation'. International Organization 68, no. 2 (2014): 329–59.

Hyde, Susan D. 'International Dimensions of Elections'. In *The Dynamics of Democratization: Dictatorship, Development, and Diffusion*, edited by Nathan J. Brown, 266–82. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011.

Hyde, Susan D. *The Pseudo-Democrat's Dilemma: Why Election Monitoring Became an International Norm*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011.

Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov. 'Which Elections Can Be Lost?'. *Political Analysis* 20, no. 2 (2012): 191–210.

ICG. 'Zimbabwe In Crisis: Finding A Way Forward,' 13 July 2001.

ICG. 'Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State,' 13 December 2007. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/central-africa/central-african-republic/136-central-african-republic-anatomy-of-a-phantom-state.aspx>.

ICG. 'Popular Protests in North Africa and the Middle East (III): The Bahrain Revolt,' 6 April 2011.

ICG. 'Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VIII): Bahrain's Rocky Road to Reform,' 28 July 2011.

Ichino, Nahomi, and Matthias Schündeln. 'Deterring or Displacing Electoral Irregularities? Spillover Effects of Observers in a Randomized Field Experiment in Ghana'. *Journal of Politics* 74 (2012): 292–307.

'Int'l Monitors Endorse Fiji Election as Credible'. AP, 18 September 2014. <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/6e44f8f77b6e4c0e867b9d8750689e5b/international-monitors-endorse-fiji-election>.

'Iran Accused of Setting up pro-Assad Militias'. *Al-Jazeera*, 15 August 2012. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2012/08/20128154537913351.html>.

'Iran's President Visits Belarus'. Associated Press, 21 May 2007.

Jackson, Nicole J. 'The Role of External Factors in Advancing Non-Liberal Democratic Forms of Political Rule: A Case Study of Russia's Influence on Central Asian Regimes'. *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 101–18.

Jamal, Amaney A. *Of Empires and Citizens: Pro-American Democracy or No Democracy at All?*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Jensen, Nathan, and Leonard Wantchekon. 'Resource Wealth and Political Regimes in Africa'. *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no. 7 (2004): 816–41.

Jervis, Robert. *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.

Johnson, Thomas H., Robert O. Slater, and Pat McGowan. 'Explaining African Military Coups D'etat, 1960–1982'. *American Political Science Review* 78, no. 3 (1984): 622–40.

Jongwe, Fanuel. 'Mugabe Begins New Term as Criticism of One-Man Election Mounts'. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 June 2008. <http://news.smh.com.au/world/mugabe-begins-new-term-as-criticism-of-oneman-election-mounts-20080630-2yy9.html>.

Joshi, Madhav. 'Post-Civil War Democratization: Promotion of Democracy in Post-Civil War States, 1946–2005'. *Democratization* 17, no. 5 (1 October 2010): 826–55.

'Justice Madigan to Sum up in Chaudhry Trial'. *Fiji One*. Accessed 3 April 2014. <http://fijione.tv/chaudhry-justice-madigan-to-sum-up-in-chaudhry-trial/>.

Kagan, Robert. 'The End of the End of History'. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 23 April 2008. <http://carnegieendowment.org/2008/04/23/end-of-end-of-history>.

Kagan, Robert. *The Return of History and the End of Dreams*. New York: Vintage, 2009.

Kalathil, S., and T. C. Boas. *Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule*. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010.

Kamrava, Mehran. 'The Arab Spring and the Saudi-Led Counterrevolution'. *Orbis* 56, no. 1 (2012): 96–104.

Kandeh, Jimmy D. *Coups from Below: Armed Subalterns and State Power in West Africa*. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004.

Kane, Ibrahima. 'The Implementation of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance'. *African Security Studies* 17, no. 4 (2008): 43–63.

Kanet, Roger E. 'Four Decades of Soviet Economic Assistance: Superpower Economic Competition in the Developing World'. ACDIS Occasional Paper, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, July 2010. <https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/handle/2142/27702>.

Kapstein, Ethan B., and Nathan Converse. *The Fate of Young Democracies*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

Katzman, Kenneth. 'Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy'. Congressional Research Service, August 2015.

Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Kelley, Judith G. *Ethnic Politics in Europe: The Power of Norms and Incentives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Kelley, Judith G. 'International Influences on Elections in New Multiparty States'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 15 (2012): 203–20.

Kelley, Judith G. *Monitoring Democracy: When International Election Observation Works, and Why It Often Fails*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012.

Keohane, Robert O. *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005.

Kerry, John. 'Remarks With Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh'. U.S. Department of State, 17 July 2013. <http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/07/212075.htm>.

Khalaf, Roula, and Abigail Fielding-Smith. 'How Qatar Seized Control of the Syrian Revolution'. *Financial Times*, 17 May 2013.

Khan, Mohsin, and Richard Lebaron. 'What Will the Gulf's $12 Billion Buy in Egypt?'. Atlantic Council. Accessed 24 April 2015. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/egyptsource/what-will-the-gulfs-12-billion-buy-in-egypt>.

Kinninmont, Jane. 'Bahrain's Economic Challenges'. *Middle East Eye*. Accessed 23 October 2015. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/analysis-bahrains-economic-challenges-1463229931>.

Kirkpatrick, David D. 'Army Ousts Egypt's President; Morsi Is Taken Into Military Custody'. *New York Times*, 3 July 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html>.

Kirkpatrick, David D. '3 Persian Gulf Nations Pledge $12 Billion in Aid for Egypt'. *New York Times*, 13 March 2015.

Kirkpatrick, David D. 'Recordings Suggest Emirates and Egyptian Military Pushed Ousting of Morsi'. *New York Times*, 1 March 2015.

Kirkpatrick, David D., and Merna Thomas. 'Egyptian Court Sentences Mohamed Morsi to 20 Years in Prison'. *New York Times*, 21 April 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/world/middleeast/egypt-mohamed-morsi-sentenced.html>.

Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie, and Andrew Small. 'China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is Beijing Parting with Pariahs?'. *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 3 (2008): 38–56.

Knack, Stephen. 'Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?'. *International Studies Quarterly* 48 (2004): 251–66.

Knaus, Gerald. 'Europe and Azerbaijan: The End of Shame'. *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 3 (2015): 5–18.

Kneuer, Marianne, and Thomas Demmelhuber. 'Gravity Centres of Authoritarian Rule: A Conceptual Approach'. *Democratization*, 2015. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2015.1018898>.

Koesel, Karrie J., and Valerie J. Bunce. 'Diffusion-Proofing: Russian and Chinese Responses to Waves of Popular Mobilizations against Authoritarian Rulers'. *Perspectives on Politics* 11, no. 3 (2013): 753–68.

Kono, Daniel Yuichi, and Gabriella R. Montinola. 'Does Foreign Aid Support Autocrats, Democrats, or Both?'. *Journal of Politics* 71, no. 2 (2009): 704–18.

Kono, Daniel Yuichi, and Gabriella R. Montinola. 'The Uses and Abuses of Foreign Aid: Development Aid and Military Spending'. *Political Research Quarterly* 66, no. 3 (2013): 615–29.

Kopstein, Jeffrey S., and David A. Reilly. 'Geographic Diffusion and the Transformation of the Postcommunist World'. *World Politics* 53, no. 1 (2000): 1–37.

Krain, Matthew. 'J'accuse! Does Naming and Shaming Perpetrators Reduce the Severity of Genocides or Politicides?'. *International Studies Quarterly* 56, no. 3 (2012): 574–89.

Kramer, Mark. 'Russian Policy toward the Commonwealth of Independent States: Recent Trends and Future Prospects'. *Problems of Post-Communism* 55, no. 6 (2008): 3–19.

Kramer, Mark. 'Stalin, Soviet Policy, and the Consolidation of a Communist Bloc in Eastern Europe, 1944–1953'. *Divinatio*, no. 31 (2010): 53–100.

Krasner, Stephen D. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999.

Kriger, Norma. 'ZANU (PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and Coercion'. *African Affairs* 104, no. 414 (2005): 1–34.

Kriger, Norma. 'Zimbabwe's Parliamentary Election of 2005: The Myth of New Electoral Laws'. *Journal of Southern African Studies* 34, no. 2 (2008): 359–78.

Kuran, Timur. 'Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989'. *World Politics* 44, no. 1 (1991): 7–48.

Kuzio, Taras. 'Russian Policy toward Ukraine during Elections'. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization* 13, no. 4 (1 October 2005): 491–517.

La Guardia, Anton. 'South African Deputy Hails Mugabe "Victory"'. *Telegraph*, 15 March 2002. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/zimbabwe/1387887/South-African-deputy-hails-Mugabe-victory.html>.

Laakso, Liisa. 'The Politics of International Election Observation: The Case of Zimbabwe in 2000'. *Journal of Modern African Studies* 40, no. 3 (2002): 437–64.

Lachapelle, Jean, Lucan A. Way, and Steven Levitsky. 'Crisis, Coercion, and Authoritarian Durability: Explaining Diverging Responses to Anti-Regime Protest in Egypt and Iran'. Paper presented at American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, New Orleans, 2012.

Lagerkvist, Johan. 'Chinese Eyes on Africa: Authoritarian Flexibility versus Democratic Governance'. *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 27, no. 2 (2009): 119–34.

Lake, David A. 'Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War'. *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (1 March 1992): 24–37.

Lake, David A., and Matthew A. Baum. 'The Invisible Hand of Democracy: Political Control and the Provision of Public Services'. *Comparative Political Studies* 34, no. 6 (2001): 587–621.

Lal, Brij V. '"Anxiety, Uncertainty, and Fear in Our Land": Fiji's Road to Military Coup, 2006'. *The Round Table* 96, no. 389 (2007): 135–53.

Lal, Brij V. '"This Process of Political Readjustment": Aftermath of the 2006 Fiji Coup'. *Fijian Studies: A Journal of Contemporary Fiji* 5, no. 1 (2007): 135–53.

Landler, Mark, and Neil MacFarquhar. 'Heavier Weapons Push Syrian Crisis Toward Civil War'. *New York Times*, 12 June 2012.

Lanteigne, Marc. 'Water Dragon? China, Power Shifts and Soft Balancing in the South Pacific'. *Political Science* 64, no. 1 (2012): 21–38.

Larmour, Peter. *Electoral Systems in Divided Societies: The Fiji Constitution Review*. Canberra: ANU Press, 2012.

LeBas, Adrienne. *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013.

LeBas, Adrienne. 'A New Twilight in Zimbabwe? The Perils of Power Sharing'. *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 2 (2014): 52–66.

Lee, Terence. 'The Armed Forces and Transitions from Authoritarian Rule Explaining the Role of the Military in 1986 Philippines and 1998 Indonesia'. *Comparative Political Studies* 42, no. 5 (2009): 640–69.

Leenders, Reinoud. 'How the Syrian Regime Outsmarted Its Enemies'. *Current History* 112, no. 758 (2013): 331–7.

Leenders, Reinoud, and Steven Heydemann. 'Popular Mobilization in Syria: Opportunity and Threat, and the Social Networks of the Early Risers'. *Mediterranean Politics* 17, no. 2 (2012): 139–59.

'Legitimacy Crisis Haunts Mugabe'. *Zimbabwe Independent*, 16 August 2013. <http://www.theindependent.co.zw/2008/07/11/legitimacy-crisis-haunts-mugabe/>.

Legler, Thomas, and Thomas Kwasi Tieku. 'What Difference Can a Path Make? Regional Democracy Promotion Regimes in the Americas and Africa'. *Democratization* 17, no. 3 (2010): 465–91.

Lehoucq, Fabrice. 'Electoral Fraud: Causes, Types, and Consequences'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 6 (2003): 233–56.

Lehoucq, Fabrice E., and Ivan Molina. *Stuffing the Ballot Box: Fraud, Electoral Reform, and Democratization in Costa Rica*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism'. *Journal of Democracy* 13 (2002): 51–65.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 'The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes'. *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 5–17.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan A. Way. 'The Myth of Democratic Recession'. *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 1 (2015): 45–58.

Levitt, Barry S. 'A Desultory Defense of Democracy: OAS Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter'. *Latin American Politics and Society* 48, no. 3 (2006): 93–123.

'Libya: Gaddafi Pledges US$900 000 to Mugabe Re-Election Campaign'. *Africa News*, 20 July 2001.

Li, Quan, and Rafael Reuveny. 'Economic Globalization and Democracy: An Empirical Analysis'. *British Journal of Political Science* 33, no. 1 (2003): 29–54.

Li, Richard P. Y., and William R. Thompson. 'The "Coup Contagion" Hypothesis'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 19, no. 1 (1975): 63–84.

Licht, Amanda A. 'Coming into Money: The Impact of Foreign Aid on Leader Survival'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 54, no. 1 (2010): 58–87.

Lilley, Mary Lauren, and Alexander B. Downes. 'Covert Action, Democratic Peace, and the Cold War'. Working Paper, Duke University, 2007.

Lindberg, Staffan I. *Democratization by Election: A New Mode of Transition*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009.

Lintner, Bertil. 'The South Pacific: China's New Frontier'. In *Looking North, Looking South. China, Taiwan and the South Pacific*, edited by Anne-Marie Brady, 3–33. Singapore: World Scientific, 2010.

Linz, J. J., and A. Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996.

Linz, Juan J. *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, and Reequilibration*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Linz, Juan J. *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2000.

Lipton, Merle. 'Understanding South Africa's Foreign Policy: The Perplexing Case of Zimbabwe'. *South African Journal of International Affairs* 16, no. 3 (2009): 331–46.

Lohmann, Susanne. 'The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989–91'. *World Politics* 47, no. 1 (1994): 42–101.

Londregan, John B., and Keith T. Poole. 'Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power'. *World Politics* 42, no. 2 (1990): 151–83.

Louër, Laurence. 'Sectarianism and Coup-Proofing Strategies in Bahrain'. *Journal of Strategic Studies* 36, no. 2 (2013): 245–60.

Lowry Institute. 'Chinese Aid in the Pacific,' 2015. <http://www.lowyinstitute.org/chinese-aid-map/>.

Lust-Okar, Ellen. 'Elections under Authoritarianism: Preliminary Lessons from Jordan'. *Democratization* 13, no. 3 (2006): 456–71.

Lutterbeck, Derek. 'Arab Uprisings, Armed Forces, and Civil–Military Relations'. *Armed Forces & Society* 39, no. 1 (2013): 28–52.

Lynch, Marc. *The Arab Uprising: The Unfinished Revolutions of the New Middle East*. New York: Public Affairs, 2013.

Mabon, Simon. 'The Battle for Bahrain: Iranian–Saudi Rivalry'. *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 2 (2012): 84–97.

McAdam, Doug. 'On the International Origins of Domestic Political Opportunities'. In *Social Movements and American Political Institutions*, edited by Anne N. Costain and Andrew S. McFarland, 251–67. London: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998.

McCarthy-Jones, Anthea. *Origins of Radical Policy-Making: An Analysis of Foreign Policy in the Fifth Republic of Venezuela*. Canberra: University of Canberra, 2010.

McDermott, Kevin, and Jeremy Agnew. *The Comintern: A History of International Communism from Lenin to Stalin*. London: Macmillan, 1996.

McFaul, Michael. 'The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the Postcommunist World'. *World Politics* 54 (2002): 212–44.

McFaul, Michael. 'Democracy Promotion as a World Value'. *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (2004): 147–63.

McFaul, Michael. 'Ukraine Imports Democracy: External Influences on the Orange Revolution'. *International Security* 32 (2007): 45–83.

McFaul, Michael. 'The Missing Variable: The "International System" as the Link between Third and Fourth Wave Models of Democratization'. In *Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World*, edited by Michael McFaul, Valerie J. Bunce, and Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, 3–29. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

McFaul, Michael, and Regine A. Spector. 'External Sources and Consequences of Russia's "Sovereign Democracy"'. In *New Challenges to Democratization*, edited by P. Burnell and R. Youngs, 116–33. London: Routledge, 2009.

McGeough, Paul. 'Pressure on Fiji Fails as China Lends Hand'. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 30 November 2009. <http://www.smh.com.au/world/pressure-on-fiji-fails-as-china-lends-hand-20091130-k14u.html>.

MacKinnon, Rebecca. 'China's "Networked Authoritarianism"'. *Journal of Democracy* 22, no. 2 (2011): 32–46.

McLauchlin, Theodore. 'Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion'. *Comparative Politics* 42, no. 3 (2010): 333–50.

McLean, Tamara. 'Leaks Reveal China's Strong Ties to Fiji'. *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 April 2011.

Magaloni, Beatriz. *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mexico*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 'Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule'. *Comparative Political Studies* 41, no. 4–5 (2008): 715–41.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 'The Game of Electoral Fraud and the Ousting of Authoritarian Rule'. *American Journal of Political Science* 54, no. 3 (2010): 751–65.

Magliveras, Konstantinos. 'The Sanctioning System of the African Union: Part Success, Part Failure?'. Paper presented at an Expert Roundtable on 'The African Union: The First Ten Years', Institute of Security Studies, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, 2011.

Mahdavy Hussein. 'The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran'. In *Studies in Economic History of the Middle East*, edited by M.A. Cook, 428–67. London: Oxford University Press, 1970.

Malik, Adeel, and Ty McCormick. 'Egypt's Economy of Dependence'. *New York Times*, 6 August 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/07/opinion/global/egypts-economy-of-dependence.html>.

Malkin, Bonnie. 'Australia and New Zealand Expel Senior Fijian Diplomats'. *Telegraph*, 4 November 2009.

Mallavarapu, Siddharth. 'Democracy Promotion circa 2010: An Indian Perspective'. *Contemporary Politics* 16, no. 1 (2010): 49–61.

Mangwiro, Charles. 'SADC Nations Want Mugabe at EU Summit'. *The Mail and Guardian*, 16 August 2013. <http://mg.co.za/article/2007-09-24-sadc-nations-want-mugabe-at-eu-summit/>.

March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. 'The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders'. *International Organization* 52, no. 4 (1998): 943–69.

Marinov, Nikolay. 'Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders?'. *American Journal of Political Science* 49, no. 3 (2005): 564–76.

Marinov, Nikolay, and Hein Goemans. 'Coups and Democracy'. *British Journal of Political Science* 44, no. 4 (2014): 799–825.

Martel, William C. 'Grand Strategy of the Authoritarian Axis: How Will the West Respond?'. *The Diplomat*. Accessed 16 November 2015. <http://thediplomat.com/2012/07/grand-strategy-of-the-authoritarian-axis/>.

Martin, Lisa L. *Democratic Commitments: Legislatures and International Cooperation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000.

Mattes, Michaela, and Mariana Rodríguez. 'Autocracies and International Cooperation'. *International Studies Quarterly* 58, no. 3 (1 November 2013): 527–38.

Matthew, Lee. 'US: Assad's Syria a "Dead Man Walking"'. *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 December 2011.

Mawdsley, Emma. 'China and Africa: Emerging Challenges to the Geographies of Power'. *Geography Compass* 1, no. 3 (2007): 405–21.

'Mbeki Urges Patience on Zimbabwe'. *BBC*, 12 April 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/7343907.stm>.

Meijer, Roel, and Maarten Danckaert. 'Bahrain: The Dynamics of a Conflict'. In *Arab Spring: Negotiating in the Shadow of the Intifadat*, edited by William Zartman. Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2015.

Melnykovska, Inna, Hedwig Plamper, and Rainer Schweickert. 'Do Russia and China Promote Autocracy in Central Asia?'. *Asia Europe Journal* 10, no. 1 (2012): 75–89.

Mills, Robin. 'Pioneering Bahrain Finds Itself Reliant on Saudi Largesse'. *The National*, 2 May 2012.

Milner, Helen V., and Bumba Mukherjee. 'Democratization and Economic Globalization'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12 (2009): 163–81.

Mohns, Erik, and André Bank. 'Syrian Revolt Fallout: End of the Resistance Axis?'. *Middle East Policy* 19, no. 3 (2012): 25–35.

Møller, Jørgen, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 'Autocracies, Democracies, and the Violation of Civil Liberties'. *Democratization* 20, no. 1 (2013): 82–106.

Møller, Jørgen, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 'The Third Wave: Inside the Numbers'. *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 4 (2013): 97–109.

Morgan, T. Clifton, Navin Bapat, and Valentin Krustev. 'The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971–2000'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 26, no. 1 (2009): 92–110.

Morozov, Evgeny. *The Net Delusion: The Dark Side of Internet Freedom*. New York: PublicAffairs, 2012.

Morrison, Kevin M. 'Nontax Revenue, Social Cleavages, and Authoritarian Stability in Mexico and Kenya: "Internationalization, Institutions, and Political Change" Revisited'. *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (2011): 719–46.

Morse, Yonatan L. 'The Era of Electoral Authoritarianism'. *World Politics* 64 (2012): 161–98.

Moss, Todd, Gunilla Pettersson, and Nicolas Van de Walle. 'An Aid-Institutions Paradox? A Review Essay on Aid Dependency and State Building in Sub-Saharan Africa'. Working Paper 74, Center for Global Development, 2006.

'Mugabe Pawns Nation's Assets in Deal with Libya'. *The Times (London)*, 23 February 2002.

Mugabe, Robert. 'Speech at 22nd Independence Anniversary', 18 April 2002.

Mugabe, Robert. 'Speech at 63rd Session of UN General Assembly', 25 September 2008.

Mugabe, Robert. 'Speech to Zimbabwe's 7th Parliament', 26 August 2008.

Murphy, Sean D. 'Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and Governments'. *International and Comparative Law Quarterly* 48, no. 3 (1999): 545–81.

Myagkov, Mikhail G., Peter C. Ordeshook, and Dimitri Shakin. *The Forensics of Election Fraud: Russia and Ukraine*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Nako, Madjiasra. 'Regional Leaders Refuse to Recognize Central African Republic Coup Leader'. Reuters, 3 April 2013. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/03/us-centralafrica-rebels-summit-idUSBRE93216M20130403>.

National Endowment for Democracy. 'The Backlash against Democracy Assistance'. Washington DC: The National Endowment for Democracy, 2006.

Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 'Mutiny and Nonviolence in the Arab Spring: Exploring Military Defections and Loyalty in Egypt, Bahrain, and Syria'. *Journal of Peace Research* 50, no. 3 (2013): 337–49.

Neuman, William. 'Chávez Appears to Use Venezuelan Fuel to Help Syrian Leader'. *New York Times*, 22 February 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/23/world/americas/chavez-appears-to-use-venezuelan-fuel-to-help-syrias-assad.html>.

'New Fiji Government Looks to Asia for New Alliances'. *New York Times*, 8 January 2007.

Nodia, Ghia. 'The Revenge of Geopolitics'. *Journal of Democracy* 25, no. 4 (2014): 139–50.

Nolutshungu, Sam C. *Limits of Anarchy: Intervention and State Formation in Chad*. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 1996.

Nordland, Ron. 'Saudi Arabia Promises to Aid Egypt's Regime'. *New York Times*, 19 August 2013.

Norris, Pippa. *Making Democratic Governance Work: How Regimes Shape Prosperity, Welfare, and Peace*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Norton, Robert. 'The Changing Role of the Great Council of Chiefs'. In *The 2006 Military Takeover in Fiji: A Coup to End All Coups?*, edited by Jon Fraenkel, Stewart Firth, and Brij V. Lal, 97–116. Canberra: ANU Press, 2009.

O'Donnell, Guillermo, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead. *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986.

Obydenkova, Anastassia, and Alexander Libman. 'The Impact of External Factors on Regime Transition: Lessons from the Russian Regions'. *Post-Soviet Affairs* 28, no. 3 (2012): 346–401.

Odinius, Daniel, and Philipp Kuntz. 'The Limits of Authoritarian Solidarity: The Gulf Monarchies and Preserving Authoritarian Rule during the Arab Spring'. *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (1 November 2015): 639–54.

Omorogbe, Eki Yemisi. 'A Club of Incumbents: The African Union and Coups d'Etat'. *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law* 44 (2011): 123–54.

Organisation for African Unity. 'Zimbabwe 2000: OAU Interim Statement', July 2000.

Owen IV, John M. *The Clash of Ideas in World Politics: Transnational Networks, States, and Regime Change, 1510–2010*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010.

Owen, John M., and Michael Poznansky. 'When Does America Drop Dictators?'. *European Journal of International Relations* 20, no. 4 (2014): 1072–99.

Pan-African Parliament. 'Report Of The Pan-African Parliament Election Observer Mission: Presidential Run-Off Election And House Of Assembly By-Elections, Republic Of Zimbabwe', 27 June 2008.

Pattison, James. *Humanitarian Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should Intervene?* Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010.

Pearlman, Jonathan. 'Fiji's Military Ruler Disbands Great Council of Chiefs'. *Telegraph*, 14 March 2012.

Peceny, Mark, Caroline C. Beer, and Shannon Sanchez-Terry. 'Dictatorial Peace?'. *American Political Science Review* 96 (2002): 15–26.

Peksen, Dursun. 'Does Foreign Military Intervention Help Human Rights?'. *Political Research Quarterly* 65, no. 3 (2012): 558–71.

Peksen, Dursun, and A. Cooper Drury. 'Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy'. *International Interactions* 36, no. 3 (2010): 240–64.

'Peninsula Shield Force to Sue News Channels'. *Asharq Al-Awsat*, 10 February 2011.

Pepinsky, Thomas B. *Economic Crises and the Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes: Indonesia and Malaysia in Comparative Perspective*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Peters, Anne Mariel, and Pete W. Moore. 'Beyond Boom and Bust: External Rents, Durable Authoritarianism, and Institutional Adaptation in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan'. *Studies in Comparative International Development* 44, no. 3 (2009): 256–85.

Petrov, Nikolai, and Andrei Ryabov. 'Russia's Role in the Orange Revolution'. In Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine's Democratic Breakthrough, edited by Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, 145–64. Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006.

Pevehouse, Jon C. 'Democracy from the Outside–in? International Organizations and Democratization'. *International Organization* 56, no. 3 (2002): 515–49.

Pevehouse, Jon C. *Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.

Phimister, Ian, and Brian Raftopoulos. 'Mugabe, Mbeki & the Politics of Anti-Imperialism'. *Review of African Political Economy* 31, no. 101 (2004): 385–400.

Pickering, Jeffrey, and Mark Peceny. 'Forging Democracy at Gunpoint'. *International Studies Quarterly* 50, no. 3 (2006): 539–60.

Pierson, Paul. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004.

Pollack, Kenneth Michael. *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991*. Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2002.

Powell, Jonathan. 'Determinants of the Attempting and Outcome of Coups D'état'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56, no. 6 (2012): 1017–40.

Powell, Jonathan. 'An Assessment of the "Democratic" Coup Theory: Democratic Trajectories in Africa, 1961–2012'. *African Security Review* 23, no. 3 (2014): 213–24.

Powell, Jonathan M., and Clayton L. Thyne. 'Global Instances of Coups from 1950 to 2010: A New Dataset'. *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 2 (2011): 249–59.

Pridham, Geoffrey. 'The International Dimension of Democratisation: Theory, Practice, and Interregional Comparisons'. In *Building Democracy: The International Dimension of Democratisation in Eastern Europe*, edited by Geoffrey Pridham, 7–29. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1994.

'Putin Attacks EU Sanctions on Belarus Visit'. Reuters, 31 May 2012. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/31/us-russia-putin-belarus-idUSBRE84U1J220120531>.

Quinlivan, James T. 'Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East'. *International Security* 24, no. 2 (1999): 131–65.

Raftopoulos, Brian, and Ian Phimister. 'Zimbabwe Now: The Political Economy of Crisis and Coercion'. *Historical Materialism* 12, no. 4 (2004): 355–82.

'Rebuff to Mugabe Is Watershed for African Union'. Reuters. 3 July 2008. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/03/uk-zimbabwe-crisis-au-idUKL027452620080703>.

Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. *Democracies at War*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002.

'Resurgent Dictatorship: The Global Assault on Democracy'. Accessed 10 November 2015. <www.resurgentdictatorship.org>. Risse, Thomas, and Nelli Babayan. 'Democracy Promotion and the Challenges of Illiberal Regional Powers: Introduction to the Special Issue'. *Democratization* 22, no. 3 (16 April 2015): 381–99.

Risse, Thomas, and Kathryn Sikkink. 'The Socialization of International Human Rights Norms into Domestic Practices: Introduction'. In *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*, edited by Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, 1–38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink. *The Power of Human Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Roessler, Philip. 'Donor-Induced Democratization and the Privatization of State Violence in Kenya and Rwanda'. *Comparative Politics* 37, no. 2 (2005): 207–27.

Roessler, Philip. 'The Enemy Within: Personal Rule, Coups, and Civil War in Africa'. *World Politics* 63, no. 2 (2011): 300–46.

Ross, Michael. 'Is Democracy Good for the Poor?'. *American Journal of Political Science* 50, no. 4 (2006): 860–74.

Ross, Michael L. 'Does Oil Hinder Democracy?'. *World Politics* 53, no. 3 (2001): 325–61.

Rubin, Barry M., and Thomas A. Keaney. *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy*. London: Frank Cass, 2002.

Rudra, Nita, and Nathan M. Jensen. 'Globalization and the Politics of Natural Resources'. *Comparative Political Studies* 44 (2011): 639–61.

Russell, Diana E. H. *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa*. New York: Academic Press, 1974.

Russett, Bruce. *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

'Russia and China Veto UN Resolution against Syrian Regime'. Associated Press, 5 October 2011.

'Russian Arms Shipment En Route to Syria: Report'. Reuters, 25 May 2012.

'Russian Foreign Minister Says Uzbek Situation Stabilizing, Politicians Express Concern'. Associated Press International, 13 May 2005.

'Russia's Putin Concerned Uzbek Uprising Could Threaten Stability in Central Asia'. Associated Press International, 14 May 2005.

SADC. 'Zimbabwe 2000: SADC-ECF Observer Mission Report', June 2000.

SADC. 'SADC Parliamentary Forum: Statement on the Zimbabwe Elections', 13 March 2002.

Saideman, Stephen M. 'When Conflict Spreads: Arab Spring and the Limits of Diffusion'. *International Interactions* 38, no. 5 (2012): 713–22.

Sarotte, Mary Elise. 'China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen Square and the Power of the European Example'. *International Security* 37 (2012): 156–82.

Sasse, Gwendolyn. 'Linkages and the Promotion of Democracy: The EU's Eastern Neighbourhood'. *Democratization* 20, no. 4 (2012): 1–39.

'Saudi Arabia Voices Support for Mubarak'. *Wall Street Journal*, 29 January 2011.

'Saudi King Backs Egypt's Military'. *Al-Jazeera*, 17 August 2013. <http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/08/201381615196784361.html>.

'Saudi–Qatar Rivalry Divides Syrian Opposition'. Reuters, 15 January 2014.

Schedler, Andreas. 'The Menu of Manipulation'. *Journal of Democracy* 13, no. 2 (2002): 36–50.

Schedler, Andreas. *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition*. Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.

Schedler, Andreas. 'The New Institutionalism in the Study of Authoritarian Regimes'. Mexico: CIDE, 2009.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 'International Socialization in the New Europe: Rational Action in an Institutional Environment'. *European Journal of International Relations* 6 (2000): 109–39.

Schimmelfennig, Frank. 'Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe'. *International Organization* 59 (2005): 827–60.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Hanno Scholtz. 'EU Democracy Promotion in the European Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and Transnational Exchange'. *European Union Politics* 9, no. 2 (2008): 187–215.

Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 'Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe'. *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–79.

Schmitter, Philippe C. 'The Influence of the International Context upon the Choice of National Institutions and Policies in Neo-Democracies'. In *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, edited by Laurence Whitehead, 26–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Schmitz, David F. *The United States and Right-Wing Dictatorships, 1965–1989*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Schock, Kurt. *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements In Nondemocracies*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2004.

Scott, James M., and Carie A. Steele. 'Sponsoring Democracy: The United States and Democracy Aid to the Developing World, 1988–2001'. *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no. 1 (2011): 47–69.

Seeberg, Merete Bech. *The Power to Control: How State Capacity and Economic Control Condition the Effect of Authoritarian Elections on Regime Stability*. PhD thesis, Aarhus University, 2015.

Shannon, Megan, Clayton Thyne, Sarah Hayden, and Amanda Dugan. 'The International Community's Reaction to Coups'. *Foreign Policy Analysis* 11, no. 4 (2015): 363–76.

Sharp, Jeremy M. 'Egypt: Background and US Relations'. US Congressional Research Service, 5 June 2014.

'Ship "Carrying Attack Helicopters to Syria" Halted off Scotland Heads for Russia'. *BBC*, 19 June 2012.

Sikkink, Kathryn. *Mixed Signals: US Human Rights Policy and Latin America*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007.

Silitski, Vitali. 'Preempting Democracy: The Case of Belarus'. *Journal of Democracy* 16, no. 4 (2005): 83–97.

Silitski, Vitali. '"Survival of the Fittest:" Domestic and International Dimensions of the Authoritarian Reaction in the Former Soviet Union Following the Colored Revolutions'. *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 43, no. 4 (2010): 339–50.

Simpser, Alberto. 'Unintended Consequences of Election Monitoring'. In *Election Fraud: Detecting and Preventing Electoral Manipulation*, edited by R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and Susan Hyde, 216–34. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.

Simpser, Alberto. *Why Governments and Parties Manipulate Elections: Theory, Practice, and Implications*. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013.

Singh, Naunihal. *Seizing Power: The Strategic Logic of Military Coups*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014.

Skocpol, Theda. *States and Social Revolutions*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979.

Slater, Dan. 'Revolutions, Crackdowns, and Quiescence: Communal Elites and Democratic Mobilization in Southeast Asia'. *American Journal of Sociology* 115, no. 1 (2009): 203–54.

Slater, Dan. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010.

South African Observer Mission. 'Interim Statement by the South African Observer Mission on the Zimbabwean Presidential Elections of 9 and 10 March 2002', 2002.

'South Africa's ANC Issues Statement on Election Result'. *BBC*, 27 June 2000.

Southern Africa Report Profile. 'Zimbabwe Security Forces', July 2011.

Sridharan, Vasudevan. 'Thai Police Arrest Dozens after Anti-Coup Protests Flare up'. *International Business Times*, 23 May 2015.

Starr, Harvey. 'Democratic Dominoes Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35 (1991): 356–81.

Steinert, Janina Isabel, and Sonja Grimm. 'Too Good to Be True? United Nations Peacebuilding and the Democratization of War-Torn States'. *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 32, no. 5 (1 November 2015): 513–35.

Stephan, Maria J., and Erica Chenoweth. 'Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict'. *International Security* 33, no. 1 (2008): 7–44.

Strange, Susan. *The Retreat of the State: The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

'Summit Backs Zimbabwe over Land'. *BBC*, 8 August 2000. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/870444.stm>.

Svolik, Milan W. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012.

Swarns, Rachel L. 'An Election, Yes. But Free and Fair?'. *New York Times*, 17 March 2002. <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/17/weekinreview/the-world-an-election-yes-but-free-and-fair.html?src=pm>.

Tansey, Oisín. 'The Concept and Practice of Democratic Regime-Building'. *International Peacekeeping* 14, no. 5 (2007): 633–46.

Tansey, Oisín. *Regime-Building: Democratization and International Administration: Democratization and International Administration*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009.

Tansey, Oisín. 'The Problem with Autocracy Promotion'. *Democratization* 23, no. 1 (2016): 141–63.

Tansey, Oisín, Kevin Koehler, and Alexander Schmotz. 'Ties to the Rest: Autocratic Linkages and Regime Survival'. Unpublished paper, King's College London, 2015.

Tarrow, Sidney G. *Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Tarte, Sandra. 'Fiji's "Look North" Strategy and the Role of China'. In *China in Oceania: Reshaping the Pacific?*, edited by Terence Wesley-Smith and Edgar A. Porter, 118–32. New York: Berghahn Books, 2010.

Taylor, Ian. 'Sino-African Relations and the Problem of Human Rights'. *African Affairs* 107, no. 426 (2008): 63–87.

Tellis, Ashley J. 'U.S. Strategy: Assisting Pakistan's Transformation'. *Washington Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (1 December 2004): 97–116.

Tendi, Blessing-Miles. 'Why Robert Mugabe Scored a Landslide Victory in Zimbabwean Elections'. *The Guardian*, 5 August 2013. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/05/robert-mugabe-zimbabwe-election-zanu-pf>.

'Thailand Anti-Coup Protests Continue'. *BBC*, 25 May 2014.

Thompson, Ginger. 'Region Finds U.S. Lacking on Honduras'. *New York Times*, 28 November 2009. <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/28/world/americas/28honduras.html>.

Thyne, Clayton L. 'Cheap Signals with Costly Consequences: The Effect of Interstate Relations on Civil War'. *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 50, no. 6 (2006): 937–61.

Thyne, Clayton L. 'Supporter of Stability or Agent of Agitation? The Effect of US Foreign Policy on Coups in Latin America, 1960–99'. *Journal of Peace Research* 47, no. 4 (2010): 449–61.

Thyne, Clayton L., and Jonathan M. Powell. 'Coup D'état or Coup d'Autocracy? How Coups Impact Democratization, 1950–2008'. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 2014. doi:10.1111/fpa.12046.

Tilly, Charles. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1978.

Tismaneanu, Vladimir. *Stalinism Revisited: The Establishment of Communist Regimes in East-Central Europe*. Budapest: Central European University Press, 2009.

Tolstrup, Jakob. 'Studying a Negative External Actor: Russia's Management of Stability and Instability in the "Near Abroad"'. *Democratization* 16, no. 5 (2009): 922–44.

Tolstrup, Jakob. *Russia vs. the EU: External Actors in Competition for Influence in Post-Soviet States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013.

Tolstrup, Jakob. 'When Can External Actors Influence Democratization? Leverage, Linkages, and Gatekeeper Elites'. *Democratization* 20, no. 4 (2013): 716–42.

Tolstrup, Jakob. 'Black Knights and Elections in Authoritarian Regimes: Why and How Russia Supports Authoritarian Incumbents in Post-Soviet States'. *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (2015): 673–90.

Tolstrup, Jakob. 'Problems in Studying the International Dimension of Authoritarianism'. *APSA Comparative Democratization Newsletter* 13, no. 1 (2015): 1–12.

Traynor, Ian. 'Mugabe Invited to Lisbon Summit despite Ban'. *The Guardian*, 2 July 2007. <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jul/02/zimbabwe.eu>.

Trithart, Albert. 'Democratic Coups? Regional Responses to the Constitutional Crises in Honduras and Niger'. *Journal of Public and International Affairs* 23, (2013): 112–34.

Tsygankov, Andrei P. *Russia's Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity*. Boulder, CO: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006.

Tucker, Joshua A. 'Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored Revolutions'. *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 3 (2007): 535–51.

Ulfelder, Jay. 'Yes, That's a Coup in Egypt'. *Dart-Throwing Chimp*, 3 July 2013. <https://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2013/07/03/yes-thats-a-coup-in-egypt/>.

Ulfelder, Jay. 'Russia Throws Cuba a Lifeline'. *Dart-Throwing Chimp*. Accessed 13 November 2014. <http://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2014/07/17/russia-throws-cuba-a-lifeline/>.

Ulrichsen, Kristian Coates. 'Bahrain's Uprising: Regional Dimensions and International Consequences'. *Stability: International Journal of Security and Development* 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–12.

'UNHCR: Kyrgyz Authorities Send Back 4 Uzbek Asylum Seekers'. Associated Press Worldstream, 10 June 2005.

US Department of State. 'U.S. Relations With Zimbabwe: Fact Sheet', 15 February 2013. <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5479.htm>.

'U.S. Halts Aid For Zimbabwe'. *New York Times*, 13 July 1986. <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/07/13/weekinreview/the-world-us-halts-aid-for-zimbabwe.html>.

'U.S. Makes Sharp Cut In Its Aid to Zimbabwe'. *New York Times*, 20 December 1983. <http://www.nytimes.com/1983/12/20/world/around-the-world-us-makes-sharp-cut-in-its-aid-to-zimbabwe.html>.

US Treasury. 'Administration Takes Additional Steps to Hold the Government of Syria Accountable for Violent Repression Against the Syrian People', 18 May 2011.

'Uzbek Witness to May Massacre Arrested in Kazakhstan'. Agence France-Presse, 5 July 2005.

Vachudova, Milada Anna. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Van Der Vleuten, Anna, and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann. 'Explaining the Enforcement of Democracy by Regional Organizations: Comparing EU, Mercosur and SADC'. *JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies* 48, no. 3 (2010): 737–58.

Vanderhill, Rachel. *Promoting Authoritarianism Abroad*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013.

Vanderhill, Rachel, and Michael E. Aleprete Jr, eds. *International Dimensions of Authoritarian Persistence: Lessons from Post-Soviet States*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2013.

Varol, Ozan O. 'The Democratic Coup d'Etat'. *Harvard International Law Journal* 53, no. 2 (2012): 291–356.

Venter, Denis. 'Zimbabwe before and after the June 2000 Elections: An Assessment'. EISA, 10 June 2005. <https://www.eisa.org.za/wep/zim2000election1.htm>.

Villanger, Espen. 'Arab Foreign Aid: Disbursement Patterns, Aid Policies and Motives'. *Forum for Development Studies* 34, no. 2 (2007): 223–56.

von Soest, Christian. 'Democracy Prevention: The International Collaboration of Authoritarian Regimes'. *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (1 November 2015): 623–38.

von Soest, Christian, and Michael Wahman. 'Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive?'. *Democratization* 22, no. 6 (2015): 957–80.

von Soest, Christian, and Michael Wahman. 'Not All Dictators Are Equal: Coups, Fraudulent Elections, and the Selective Targeting of Democratic Sanctions'. *Journal of Peace Research* 52, no. 1 (1 January 2015): 17–31.

Wahman, Michael, Jan Teorell, and Axel Hadenius. 'Authoritarian Regime Types Revisited: Updated Data in Comparative Perspective'. *Contemporary Politics* 19, no. 1 (2013): 19–34.

Walker, Christopher. 'The Authoritarian Resurgence'. *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 2 (2015): 21.

Way, Lucan A. 'Authoritarian State Building and the Sources of Regime Competitiveness in the Fourth Wave: The Cases of Belarus, Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine'. *World Politics* 57 (2005): 231–61.

Way, Lucan A. 'The Limits of Autocracy Promotion: The Case of Russia in the "Near Abroad"'. *European Journal of Political Research* 54, no. 4 (2015): 691–706.

Wedeen, Lisa. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2015.

Weeks, Jessica L. 'Strongmen and Straw Men: Authoritarian Regimes and the Initiation of International Conflict'. *American Political Science Review* 106, no. 2 (2012): 326–47.

Wehrey, Frederic. 'Bahrain's Decade of Discontent'. *Journal of Democracy* 24, no. 3 (2013): 116–26.

Wehrey, Frederic. 'Saudi Arabia's Anxious Autocrats'. *Journal of Democracy* 26, no. 2 (2015): 71–85.

Weingast, Barry R., and Donald A. Wittman. 'The Reach of Political Economy'. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*, edited by Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, 3–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Weyland, Kurt. 'The Diffusion of Regime Contention in European Democratization, 1830–1940'. *Comparative Political Studies* 43, no. 8 (2010): 1148–76.

Weyland, Kurt. 'The Arab Spring: Why the Surprising Similarities with the Revolutionary Wave of 1848?'. *Perspectives on Politics* 10, no. 4 (2012): 917–34.

Weyland, Kurt. *Making Waves: Democratic Contention in Europe and Latin America since the Revolutions of 1848*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014.

Weyland, Kurt. 'Fascism's Appeal and the Autocratic Wave of the Interwar Years'. Unpublished paper, 2015.

Whitehead, Laurence. *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Whitehead, Laurence. 'Three International Dimensions of Democratization'. In *The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas*, edited by Laurence Whitehead, 3–25. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Whitehead, Laurence. 'Anti-Democracy Promotion: Four Strategies in Search of a Framework'. *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 2 (2014): 1–24.

Whitehead, Laurence. 'International Democracy Promotion as a Political Ideology: Upsurge and Retreat'. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 20, no. 1 (2 January 2015): 10–26. doi:10.1080/13569317.2015.991510.

'Why the Region Rallies to Mugabe'. *Business Day (South Africa)*, 10 August 2000.

Wikileaks. 'Australia and New Zealand Demarche PRC on Fiji Visit', 13 February 2009. <https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09BEIJING383_a.html>.

Wikileaks. 'PRC Vice President Xi's Visit to Fiji'. Wikileaks, 5 March 2009. <https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/09SUVA82_a.html>.

Williams, Paul D. 'From Non-Intervention to Non-Indifference: The Origins and Development of the African Union's Security Culture'. *African Affairs* 106, no. 423 (2007): 253–79.

Willis, Matthew. 'Britain in Bahrain in 2011'. *The RUSI Journal* 157, no. 5 (2012): 62–71.

Wilson, Andrew. *Ukraine's Orange Revolution*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005.

Wintrobe, Ronald. *The Political Economy of Dictatorship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Wintrobe, Ronald. 'Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches'. In *Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by C. Boix and S. Stokes, 363–94. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.

Wobig, Jacob. 'Defending Democracy with International Law: Preventing Coup Attempts with Democracy Clauses'. *Democratization* 22, no. 4 (2015): 631–54.

Worth, Robert F. 'Egypt Is Arena for Influence of Arab Rivals'. *New York Times*, 10 July 2013. <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/11/world/middleeast/egypt-is-arena-for-influence-of-arab-rivals.html>.

Wright, Joseph. 'How Foreign Aid Can Foster Democratization in Authoritarian Regimes'. *American Journal of Political Science* 53, no. 3 (2009): 552–71.

Wright, Joseph, and Abel Escribà-Folch. 'Authoritarian Institutions and Regime Survival: Transitions to Democracy and Subsequent Autocracies'. *British Journal of Political Science* 42, no. 2 (2011): 283–309.

Wright, Joseph, and Matthew Winters. 'The Politics of Effective Foreign Aid'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13 (2010): 61–80.

Yakouchyk, Katsiaryna. 'The Good, the Bad, and the Ambitious: Democracy and Autocracy Promoters Competing in Belarus'. *European Political Science Review*, advance online publication, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1755773914000459.

Yang, Jian. 'China in Fiji: Displacing Traditional Players?'. *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 65, no. 3 (2011): 305–21.

Yom, Sean, and Mohammad Al-Momani. 'The International Dimensions of Authoritarian Regime Stability: Jordan in the Post-Cold War Era'. *Arab Studies Quarterly* 30, no. 1 (2008): 39–60.

Youde, Jeremy R. 'Why Look East? Zimbabwean Foreign Policy and China'. *Africa Today* 53, no. 3 (2007): 3–19.

Younes, M. 'Saudi Troops Quietly Pull out of Bahrain after Crackdown on Anti-Government Protests'. *The Observers*, 7 January 2011.

Youngs, Richard. *The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.

Youngs, Richard. *The European Union and Democracy Promotion: A Critical Global Assessment*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 'Shaping Democratic Practice and the Causes of Electoral Fraud: The Case of Nineteenth-Century Germany'. *American Political Science Review* 103 (2009): 1–21.

'Zimbabwean Opposition Leader Encourages Support from South Africa'. Associated Press, 28 July 2000.

'Zimbabwe Bans Western Observers'. *BBC*, 7 March 2008. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7283061.stm>.

'Zimbabwe Fights US Sanctions'. *Africa News*, 4 August 2000.

'Zimbabwe in 360 Million Dollar Fuel Deal with Libya'. Agence France-Presse, 20 July 2001.

'Zimbabwe; Mugabe Hires Libyan Guards'. *Africa News*, 23 August 2001.

'Zimbabwe's Tainted Election: Verdicts from around the World'. Agence France-Presse, 16 March 2002.

Zisser, Eyal. 'The Syrian Army: Between the Domestic and the External Fronts'. *Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal* 5, no. 1 (2001): 1–12.

Zubok, Vladislav M. *A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009.

Zweifel, Thomas D., and Patricio Navia. 'Democracy, Dictatorship, and Infant Mortality'. *Journal of Democracy* 11, no. 2 (2000): 99–114.

# Index