Original Article

Why Monarchy? The Rise and Demise of a Regime Type

Comparative Political Studies
1–38

DOI: 10.1177/0010414020938090
journals.sagepub.com/home/cps
SAGE

John Gerring[1], Tore Wig[2], Wouter Veenendaal[3], Daniel Weitzel[1], Jan Teorell[4], and Kyosuke Kikuta[5]

Abstract

Monarchy was the dominant form of rule in the pre-modern era and it persists in a handful of countries. We propose a unified theoretical explanation for its rise and decline. Specifically, we argue that monarchy offers an efficient solution to the primordial problem of order where societies are large and citizens isolated from each other and hence have difficulty coordinating. Its efficiency is challenged by other methods of leadership selection when communication costs decline, lowering barriers to citizen coordination. This explains its dominance in the pre-modern world and its subsequent demise. To test this theory, we produce an original dataset that codes monarchies and republics in Europe (back to 1100) and the world (back to 1700). With this dataset, we test a number of observable implications of the theory—centering on territory size, political stability, tenure in office, conflict, and the role of mass communications in the modern era.

Keywords

monarchy, republic, democracy

[1]University of Texas, Austin, TX, USA
[2]University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
[3]Leiden University, Leiden, Zuid-Holland, Netherlands
[4]Lund University, Lund, Sweden
[5]Osaka University, Osaka, Japan

Corresponding Author:
John Gerring, Department of Government, University of Texas at Austin, 158 W. 21st St. STOP A1800, Batts Hall 2.116, Austin, TX 78712-1704, USA.
Email: jgerring@austin.utexas.edu

If one were able to catalog rulers of state-like polities from the beginning of human civilization to the present, one sort of ruler would predominate among all others. Monarchy, in one form or another, has a storied history in every region of the world. The first rulers, as recorded in the first written texts, were usually monarchs, who passed down their title from generation to generation within the same family.[1]

Today, this once-dominant regime type has fallen on hard times. To the extent that hereditary rulers persist, they are likely to be displaced by other actors who exercise executive power in their stead. Only a handful of monarchs retain their titles and their prerogative—in Bahrain, Bhutan, Brunei, Jordan, Kuwait, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Swaziland, Tonga, and United Arab Emirates.

Yet, the question of monarchy remains central to our understanding of how political power is generated and regenerated through history. According to one venerable intellectual tradition, political history is the history of monarchs and their dynasties, who played a principal role in the success or failure of the nations they ruled. In the modern era, Menaldo (2012) argues that monarchies are less prone to instability than other forms of government. The influence of monarchy resonates even in countries where hereditary executives no longer rule or no longer exist (McDonagh, 2015). Since monarchy is the usual precursor to democracy and non-monarchic varieties of autocracy it is also central to our understanding of regime-change.

Helpfully, a gigantic library of work by anthropologists, archaeologists, historians, political scientists, and sociologists chronicles the rise and fall of dynasties and the inner workings of monarchies around the world (Duindam, 2016). A smaller body of studies center on monarchical tenure and succession (e.g., Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). Even so, there is no well-developed theory that might explain the rise and near-demise of monarchy.

One may infer that ideational factors loomed large. Historical sources suggest that monarchs once commanded a great deal of legitimacy. Over time, as reverberations from the age of revolutions and enlightenment diffused, monarchy lost its sanctity and allure. By the late 20th century, monarchies seemed at odds with modern forms of political legitimacy (Huntington, 1966). But why did attitudes toward this ancient regime type change so profoundly over the past two centuries? Why did the bases of legitimacy shift? Distal factors are more elusive.

One may regard the decline of monarchy as the end-product of a seismic sociological shift. As the basis of socioeconomic status shifted from birthright to merit, a system of rule based entirely on inheritance came to seem anachronistic (Wolf, 1991, pp. 255–257). Accordingly, one would expect that measures of socioeconomic development and overall modernization such as

per capita GDP would predict the fall of monarchy. Yet, we find no such correlation in our empirical analyses. Indeed, the monarchies that persist tend to be richer and more developed than republics in their respective regions.

Conceivably, the decline of monarchy is linked to the decline of autocracy over the past two centuries. While there may be some truth to this narrative, one must also bear in mind the persistence of autocratic forms of rule in the 21st century under other guises—military, personal, or partisan (e.g., Ezrow & Frantz, 2011). If autocracy survives while monarchy perishes, this suggests that the two developments are not closely linked.

To account for monarchical survival in the dozen or so countries where a hereditary ruler still wields effective power scholars have invoked a variety of factors including cultural characteristics specific to the Middle East (Lewis, 2000), political leadership (Kechichian, 2001), Ottoman and/or British influences (Ayalon, 2000), Islam (Karawan, 1992), oil rents (Gause, 1994), international security concerns (Gause, 2000), the imperatives of statebuilding (Anderson, 1991b), institutionalization (Lucas, 2012), and the ability of royal families to successfully manage transitions (Herb, 1999). While plausible, these narrowly focused explanations do not purport to provide a general account of the decline—and occasional resilience—of monarchy.

The goals of this article are severalfold. First, we propose a theory intended to explain both the rise of monarchy to global dominance and its subsequent near-demise. Second, we offer a definition of this vexed term, focusing on the most distinctive and consequential aspects of the regime type, and a binary index of monarchy that is coded across polities in Europe back to 1000 and throughout the world back to 1700—an original dataset of unparalleled scope, which we use to track the rise and fall of monarchy in Europe and the world. Finally, we use this data to test a set of hypotheses intended to corroborate the theory.

Framework

A monarchy, for present purposes, is a polity with an executive office that is (a) hereditary, (b) held by a single individual, (c) endowed with life tenure, and (d) of non-trivial importance in running the affairs of state. So defined, state-like forms of political organization around the world from Mesopotamia to the present may be classified as monarchical or republican. (Further discussion of conceptualization and measurement is taken up in the next section.)

Within this expansive frame, we hope to explain why monarchy became the dominant regime type in the pre-modern era and why it fell from grace in the modern era (beginning, following convention, with the French Revolution).

One might be skeptical of a framework that purports to encompass such a large expanse of time and space. However, we shall argue that the rise and decline of monarchy is closely linked. Accordingly, we gain theoretical and empirical leverage by examining the entire life-history of this unique regime type.

We begin with the leaders of states, who play a key role in our theory. The desire of parents to install offspring as their successors presumably stems from a biological propensity to propagate one's genetic heritage (Dawkins, 1978). By passing down power and wealth to one's children (the most common pattern of succession) a ruler perpetuates their lineage. In this light, monarchy is a particular form of inheritance system, designed to assure the smooth transfer of property so that a family's wealth and status is preserved across generations (Goody et al., 1979). Note that property is regarded as belonging not to the individual but to the royal family, or "house." Arguably, all political leaders aspire to be monarchs, just as all parents aspire to bequeath power, status, and wealth to their children.

Evolutionary theory may explain the behavior of leaders, who are well-positioned to influence the selection of their successor. However, whether this dynastic venture is successful or not depends upon those outside the royal family, who must support the family's birthright.

To explain the behavior of non-royals we presume that they, like royals, would prefer to rule—or at least to have a hand in controlling the ruler. However, they may be willing to relinquish this ambition if monarchy promises a more effective solution to the problem of order than other systems currently available, thus promising to preserve their lives, property, and status. The question, then, is why monarchy may have provided an efficient solution to the problem of order in some periods but not in others.

Where the scale of human societies is small—in bands, tribes, or villages—public order may be achieved through a variety of formal and informal institutional arrangements (Crone, 1989). (We exclude such non-state entities from our theoretical purview, as discussed below.) As the scale of a society grows, coordination challenges multiply and are solvable only where there is a single locus of sovereignty.

In any society, there will be many aspirants for the position of sovereign. Moreover, the choice among them is highly consequential. Those allied with the winner are likely to prosper; those allied with the loser may find their fortunes impaired and their lives endangered. A good deal is at stake in the outcome of a contest for leadership. Nonetheless, a leader or leadership group must be chosen, and their authority respected, lest society dissolve into anarchy. In order to establish sovereignty everyone, or most everyone, must agree on where that locus of authority resides.

We argue that a monarchical system of rule is best equipped to solve this coordination dilemma in disconnected societies, where obstacles to coordination are greatest. This explains its appeal in the pre-modern world, where most citizens were illiterate, spoke a babble of tongues, rarely encountered those outside their locality, and consequently had little sense of belonging to a larger community (Crone, 1989). These features, in turn, were by-products of the diffuseness of human settlement, poor communications and transportation infrastructure, and languages that were unwritten or largely untaught. For these reasons, populations in pre-modern societies were not closely interconnected and the flow of information was glacial. In a disconnected society of this sort, monarchy offered a workable solution to society's coordination problem.

As societies became more interconnected other methods of leadership selection became more viable. The muteness of monarchy, its self-evident but non-negotiable quality, became a detriment in an age of mass communications when ordinary citizens were easily reached and mobilized. This explains its demise in the modern age.

To recapitulate, monarchy offers an efficient solution to the primordial problem of order where societies are large—requiring a state-like form of organization—and citizens isolated from each other. Its efficiency is challenged by other methods of leadership selection when barriers to communication are removed.

We begin by laying out the advantages of monarchy in a pre-modern setting—namely, a sovereign who could claim: (a) political legitimacy, (b) orderly succession, (c) unity, (d) long time-horizons, and (e) the ability to impose law and order. Supplementing this discussion, Appendix A offers a brief review of the alternatives to monarchy in the pre-modern era. Next, we discuss the demise of monarchy in the modern era.

Legitimacy

Effective governance depends upon legitimacy—the idea that a ruler exercises rightful authority. In establishing legitimacy, monarchs were able to draw upon diverse strands of "traditional" authority (Weber, 1904-05/1958), which they also re-invented and perpetuated.

To begin with, monarchs descended from royalty, a claim that could be enhanced and embellished in a variety of ways. Royal scribes worked hard to establish the bloodlines of the royal family, extending all the way back to a founding ruler or god. Since the official historical record was usually in the hands of the king's men this left plenty of room for myth-making. From this

followed a tradition of meticulous—even obsessive—genealogy (Parker, 2011, pp. 365–367; Sutherland, 2001).

Royal legitimacy rested, second, upon scrupulous attention to the distinctiveness of the king, who occupied a position separate and apart from everyone else. This status was sanctioned by special forms of address, special architecture, and special crowns, scepters, stools, seals, crests and other regalia—a vast assemblage of royal bling. Dynastic founders often came from somewhere else, generating the myth of the stranger-king (Duindam, 2016, p. 44). Royal families were physically isolated from the citizenry. The Japanese emperor (admittedly an extreme case) was visited only by a few select interlocutors; his visage was deemed so sacred that no others could gaze upon it. Where kings were seen, they were generally approached from a distance and with elaborate protocols intended to reinforce a distinction between royalty and commoners. (Exceptions might be made for war and hunting.) The purpose of this distinction-mongering was to remove the monarch from everyday conflicts and jealousies that beset society, and to further ensure that his (occasionally her) special role was respected.

Royal legitimacy rested, third, upon elaborate rituals—coronations, receptions, holidays, parades, dedications, pilgrimages, cremations, and pageants of various sorts—intended to project their personal style of rule across the land (e.g., Elias, 1983). In so doing, kings maintained a central position in society.

Royal legitimacy rested, fourth, upon spiritual authority. Kings might receive special sanction from the clergy and from religious texts, serve as religious leaders, intercede with the gods on behalf of their subjects, or claim the status of a deity themselves. Monarchical authority and spiritual authority were usually closely intertwined (Bendix, 1980).

A final element of legitimacy was the monarch's symbolic role as the head of the body (head of state) and of the family, that is, as father (occasionally mother) of the nation (Bodin, 1955; Filmer, 1991). It is probably not coincidental that the Germanic word for king evolved from the word for kindred. Monarchs were able to invoke a form of authority that was familiar by virtue of being familial, and biologically imprinted. Just as a father ought to procure "his children's welfare . . . so ought a good prince think of his people . . . for a King is trewly Parens Patria, the politique father of his people," thought James I (quoted in McDonagh, 2015, p. 993). Subjects were exhorted to follow the king or queen for the same reason that they were expected to obey their own father or mother, their grandparents, and communal leaders. It was natural to do so, and unnatural—contrary to natural law and divine law—to resist. Monarchy is a patrimonial (and very occasionally, a matrimonial) form of government (Weber, 1987, vol 2, p. 1107). Accordingly, monarchs commanded

a good deal of popular respect, not to mention awe. When Charles I, the King of England, was executed in 1649 it is said that the crowd was overwhelmed by emotion and fear (Hibbert, 1968, p. 280).

The legitimacy of monarchs thus rested on the authority of blood, the body, of patriarchy, of religion, and of tradition more generally. Likewise, monarchs were recognized as the defender of tradition. This "symbolic" aspect of the argument might seem at odds with an explanatory framework centered on coordination. However, symbolic power is an essential component of the monarch's advantage in solving the coordination problem of politics, for hereditary rulers enjoyed many symbolic props that other contenders for power were at pains to muster. In a world in which communication, and therefore rational deliberation, was difficult, decisions on important matters were usually legitimated through force of tradition. The monarch represented that tradition and therefore occupied a central role in society. As a symbol, s/he was irreplaceable.

Succession

Rules of hereditary succession limited claims to the throne, generally to one or several individuals with plausible claims to succeed the sitting monarch. Despite incessant arguments over the legitimacy of rival claimants, potential conflicts were limited in scope. Not only were there a small number of claimants; generally, they were members of the same family, offering the prospect of reaching consensus before violence broke out and healing breaches thereafter.

Without the principle of hereditary rule societies found it difficult to secure a smooth transition from one ruler to the next. Strong men could gain power after great struggle, but who would succeed them? Any number of individuals could claim to be the strongest, most intelligent, most skilled, most virtuous, or most meritorious (along some other dimension). When it comes to judging the ineffable talents of leadership, claims are highly indeterminate. And where claims are indeterminate, disputes are likely to devolve into violence.

Studies suggest that succession conflicts were less likely to arise in European monarchies that practiced primogeniture or son succession rather than other forms of succession such as partible inheritance or agnatic seniority (e.g., Kokkonen & Sundell, 2014). We surmise that the distinction between monarchical and *non*-monarchical rule was even more consequential. Since succession opens up a polity to violent conflict—both internal and external—and since this conflict has drastic consequences (Acharya & Lee, 2019), a method that provides a smooth and orderly transition from one leader to the next enjoys a critical advantage (Burling, 1974).

Unity

The figure of the monarch provided a focal point around which issues of sovereignty could be resolved and unity preserved. Although monarchs often ruled in consultation with others, and although their actual power might be constrained, the existence of a single locus of authority meant that it was easier to preserve unity in a fissiparous society.

By contrast, collective forms of government—centered on an assembly, committee, or open forum—were likely to serve as springboards to societal conflict. Aquinas (2012, Kindle Locations 265–266) observes that "group government [polyarchy] most frequently breeds dissension. This dissension runs counter to the good of peace which is the principal social good." Just as one would not appoint multiple captains to guide a ship, one should not appoint multiple leaders to guide a polity, he argued, echoing a common refrain in the pre-modern era.

It may seem odd that a single individual, especially one who was manifestly *un*-representative, could unify wildly diverse pre-modern societies. Yet, it was the very diversity of society that made the presence of the monarch necessary, as s/he provided one of the few—and sometimes the only—common point of reference (Krieger, 1970, pp. 5–8), and did so without upsetting long-standing ascriptive identities, social ties, and special rights and privileges. Pre-modern societies were viewed "not as collections of equal individuals but as communities composed of different orders, each of which fulfilled its due function according to custom and right order" (Reynolds, 1999, p. 92). In this context, "monarchy celebrates and reinforces identification with both the narrowest of loyalties—the family—and the broadest of universalist attachments—to a transcendent God. What it avoids—indeed rejects—is an exclusive or singular ethnic, linguistic, or cultural identity" (Anderson, 2000, p. 57). Duindam (2016, p. 23) writes, "Ruling demanded treating all groups equitably but not necessarily equally: ruling clans occupied privileged positions; priests, soldiers, peasants, and merchants could expect to be treated in different ways, as could regions or ethnicities." In 17th-century Spain, for example, the monarch was expected to recognize the unique identities and statuses of each principality that composed the empire. "These kingdoms must be ruled and governed as if the king who holds them all together were king only of each one them" (de Solorzano y Pereira, 1776; quoted in Elliott 2009, p. 7).

Monarchs are the antithesis of the national ideal, which presupposes a uniformity of cultural modes—language, religion, ethnicity—throughout a nation (Anderson, 1991a, pp. 18–19). As such, they were ideally suited to pre-modern states and empires, whose hallmark was diversity, which lacked

a common sense of nationality or peoplehood, and which often spanned non-contiguous territories (Burbank & Cooper, 2010).

Time-horizons

A core problem of governance is that of time-horizons, whereby leaders neglect policies that require short-term sacrifices and long-term investments. Monarchy provided a partial solution to this perennial problem by elongating the tenure of the ruler and institutionalizing power in the hands of a ruling house, which aspired to rule in perpetuity.

Rules of hereditary succession usually meant that power was passed to the next generation, or to a younger sibling. Those ascending to the throne might be quite young, and often not yet adult. Once installed on the throne, monarchs were generally expected to rule until their demise or until illness or dotage made them unfit to rule. Monarchs might be deposed, of course, but such unconstitutional interruptions were rare. As a result, monarchs could expect to rule for quite a long time—considerably longer than other sorts of rulers. This matters insofar as leaders with longer terms have elongated time-horizons (Wright, 2008).

Equally important, a sitting monarch considers their reign as part of a dynasty, beginning with their children and stretching far into the future. This is implicit in the notion of the king's "two bodies," one of which referred to their physical body and the other of which lived in perpetuity through the crown (Kantorowicz, 1957). Some dynasties lasted for centuries and a few for millennia, during which time wealth and power accumulated in the hands of a single family. Ruling was a family business, and the prosperity of the family depended upon preserving riches and investing in the future. This, too, should elongate the time-horizons of rulers.

Finally, a sitting monarch—along with the monarch's ruling clique—regarded their political community as a *kingdom*, which would endure even if one ruling family was replaced by another. Here, time-horizons extended as far into the future as a ruler's political imagination might allow.

Thus, although monarchy represented a personalization of power it also, at the same time, institutionalized power through the royal family and through the abstract notion of an everlasting kingdom. Insofar as kings represented a family lineage stretching forward through time, they were conditioned to assume long time-horizons. Monarchs thus resemble "stationary bandits," and as such were more likely to respect private property and to provide public goods than "roving bandits" (Olson, 1993, p. 572). In addition, because the lineage of the royal family extended into the future this provided for some continuity of rule and the possibility of intertemporal bargaining—with the

understanding that the monarch's descendants would respect agreements struck by the current occupant of the throne, establishing credible commitment (Kiser & Barzel, 1989, p. 400). In this respect, royal families may have functioned in much the same fashion as political parties within modern polities, expanding the time-horizons of the present ruler (Magaloni, 2008).

Law and Order

Advantages in legitimacy, succession, unity, and time-horizons culminated in a public good that was in short supply in pre-modern societies—law and order (North et al., 2009). In an ordered society, there are basic rules of governance that everyone knows and most everyone obeys, and mechanisms of enforcement to punish those who do not. This opens up the possibility of providing more expansive public goods—property rights, infrastructure, education, social provision—all of which depend upon, and to some degree flow from, public order. By contrast, where public order does not exist, or has broken down, a state of anarchy reigns, in which violence is common, insecurity high, private investment correspondingly low, and public goods entirely absent.

Anarchy is not a theoretical abstraction. "There was one thing that almost all medieval and early modern aristocrats feared more than tyranny; and that was anarchy," writes John Morrill (2004, p. 295). While we are accustomed to credit autocratic rule with threats of expropriation (North & Weingast, 1989), it is important to bear in mind that before the existence of settled government a greater risk of expropriation stemmed from the lack of public order. Monarchy was an eminently rational solution if its principal alternative was anarchy. Indeed, the juxtaposition of monarchy (order) and chaos (anarchy) is a common theme in political texts from many lands and many historical eras (Grossman, 2002).

By virtue of solving the coordination problem of government on a large scale, monarchy promised a solution to the perennial problem of public order. Note that the king's interest in maintaining sovereignty over the land coincided with the citizen's interest in preserving life and property. The imposition of a "king's peace" meant that brigands, as well as more serious cases of civil conflict, would be suppressed, allowing for a degree of security for property and for trade to flourish throughout the realm (Myers, 1982, pp. 136, 140, 187–192). Monarchs played a direct role in establishing the rule of law by dispensing royal charters and establishing royal courts (Nelson, 1995: 409). This occurred because of the happy coincidence that by dispensing justice monarchs could extend the writ of their authority, displacing regional powers and sometimes earning extra income (since judgments were often

contingent upon payment of a fee). Although decisions rendered by the king, or the king's courts, were not always predictable or rulebound, they had the virtue of being decisive and backed by force (Myers, 1982, p. 187). Prior to rule *of* law there must be rule *by* law, and monarchs were effective in laying down the law—their law.

The Demise of Monarchy

Monarchy's institutional advantage in the pre-modern era stemmed from its capacity to overcome coordination dilemmas in disconnected societies. As societies became more connected in the modern era, this advantage disappeared.

Greater connectivity can be credited to improvements in infrastructure, trade, schooling, and the increasing density of human settlement. Of these, the factor with greatest political relevance is probably the development of mass communications, allowing leaders to establish a direct connection to their followers by communicating with all of them simultaneously. The printing press, newspapers, national postal systems, the telegraph, television, and the internet all played their part, in various historical eras (Headrick, 2000). Of these, the tool with the most immediate and far-reaching impact may have been the radio, which became widely used in many advanced industrial countries in the 1920s and spread quickly to the developing world, where it remains a dominant channel of information today (Castro, 2013; Hale, 1975). W. Philips Davison (1965, p. 136) calls radio "the greatest single instrument for involving people in emerging countries in political activity."

The effect of mass communication was to overcome the tyranny of distance, assuring that local communities were no longer isolated from each other. Over the past three centuries, a public sphere arose (Habermas, 1991), and with it consciousness of a cross-regional "national" identity based on the (presumed) shared characteristics of lay citizens (Anderson, 1991a). Using new communication tools at their disposal, elites developed new systems of rule, all of which bore the imprint of mass politics. Whether democratic or autocratic, representative or plebiscitarian, all contemporary systems of rule featured mass mobilization—via political parties, elections, referenda, public demonstrations, or other vehicles (Huntington, 1968). In this respect, they contrasted starkly with the age-old system of hereditary succession, which engaged citizens only as passive spectators and in which there was no (or very little) common identity as a people or nation, except that provided by the over-arching dignity and magnificence of the monarch.

To be sure, monarchs might appropriate new tools of mass communication for their own purposes (Blain & O'Donnell, 2001). However, they could not

embrace a mass ideology without compromising the terms of their special place of privilege and power. People could be mobilized to witness coronations and other rituals presided over by a monarch. However, there was little for them to do. They had no role to play, other than to passively observe.

Indeed, mobilizing the masses is at cross-purposes with the raison-d'etre of monarchy—to remove masses from politics and depress the mobilization of humanity against the state, that is, to keep order and maintain a central locus of sovereignty. So, embracing modern telecommunications was not in the long-term interests of monarchs. It generally worked to de-sacralize sitting monarchs, exposing their personal lives—and, inevitably, their foibles—to public scrutiny. Observed up-close and personal, royals were revealed to be human, all too human.

Mass communications also privileged those who could use it to their advantage, which meant cultivating a personal relationship between leader and followers. One can televise a coronation, but it takes a different set of skills to hone a strong media presence. Immediacy, rather than transcendence, is required. And this sort of charisma is unlikely to be transmitted intergenerationally through a royal line.

The core problem for monarchs was that their traditional form of leadership was no longer needed. The effect of increasing connectedness was to mitigate the primordial coordination problem of government, making other forms of political organization practicable on a grand scale for the first time in human history and undermining the principal rationale of monarchy as the only viable alternative to anarchy.

Remaining justifications for monarchy tended to be parochial rather than cosmopolitan. In an age of mass communications, monarchs could no longer claim an exclusive role in knitting together a diverse and far-flung empire. But they could plausibly claim to preserve the unique features and independence of a small and homogeneous people, those who share the monarch's own ethnic, religious, or linguistic identity. Hence, in modern times we find monarchs emphasizing their representation of—rather than their differentiation from—society. In this vein, the Prince of Liechstenstein claims to represent the distinctive people of that micro-state (Veenendaal, 2014). Instead of universality, monarchs came to symbolize particularity in the modern era.

Concept and Measure

Despite its ubiquity, monarchy is rarely defined in an explicit fashion. Over the centuries, it has carried a variety of connotations including (a) rule by one (the classical sense, dating back to Aristotle), (b) absolute power, (c) grandeur,

(d) hereditary succession, (e) divine right, and (f) aristocracy. It has also been associated with a multitude of formal titles, often centered in a particular region or language, for example, baron, basileous, caliph, czar, emir, emperor, huangdi, huey tlatoani, kaiser, khagan, khan, king, maharaja, malik, padishah, pasha, pharaoh, prince, raja, sapa inka, shah, shahanshah, sultan, tenno, tianzi, and wang.

A useful definition for social-scientific purposes should identify features of a subject that resonate with current usage, that clearly demarcate it from closely related phenomena (in this case, other regime types), that carry a consistent meaning across settings (historical and geographic), and that may potentially shed light on outcomes of interest.

With these goals in mind, we propose that the core idea of monarchy is to monopolize power, money, and status in the hands of a single ("royal") family (Herb, 1999). This is achieved through an executive office that is (a) held by a single individual, (b) endowed with life tenure, (c) hereditary, and (d) of non-trivial importance. After reviewing these attributes, we develop a binary index along with several alternative indices. In the final section, we compare these indices to each other and to extant indices produced by other researchers.

Rule by One

The office of monarch is usually held by a single individual—the *monarch* or *king*. There are just a few exceptions. In Swaziland, power is formally shared by the king and his mother, though the latter generally plays a secondary role (Kuper, 1986). In many instances, power is temporarily shared between a monarch who is not yet of age or otherwise impaired and a regent, generally a family member. Nonetheless, the office remains under control of the royal family, which is what qualifies it as a monarchy according to our interpretation.

Life Tenure

Once crowned, a monarch enjoys life tenure. There are no term limits and no formal means to remove a sitting monarch except in circumstances of extreme malfeasance or incapacity. Of course, many monarchs have abdicated, been deposed, or overthrown, and in some polities these were frequent events. This might signal a flawed monarchy. But it is still a monarchy, according to our definition, so long as methods of removal are not institutionalized. A monarch must have the constitutional right to hold on to the crown unto death.

Heredity

Under normal circumstances only members of the royal family are eligible to assume the position of monarch. Royalty means descent from a previous ruler, typically the founder of a dynasty. Granted, rules for defining membership in the royal family could be mesmerizingly complex, as they were for Japan (Webb, 1968, pp. 78–80). Sometimes, the (extended) royal family is large and many individuals can therefore mount a plausible claim to the throne, as in Saudi Arabia (Herb, 1999). Nonetheless, family defines the universe of eligible rulers and the closer one is to the current ruler or the founder (by some recognized principle of descent), the better one's claim to the throne. By contrast, where no royal family is able to monopolize power we regard the system as non-monarchical—even if the ruler assumes the title of king (e.g., Poland during the pre-modern era) or emperor (e.g., the Roman Empire, where rule was only occasionally passed down within a family).

Temporary violations of hereditary succession may be caused by war, foreign occupation, coup/revolution, lack of a qualified heir, or disagreements among the royal family and other actors about whom should succeed to the throne. If the interregnum is short, and the polity reverts to hereditary rule, we shall regard the polity as retaining a monarchical form. For example, if one ruling family loses power and another assumes office in its stead, establishing a new royal line, the regime type is constant despite a change of personnel. What matters is that family status is regarded as an essential criterion for holding executive office.

Granted, the point at which power becomes hereditary—that is, when the family status of would-be occupants of executive office comes to overshadow other characteristics—is often difficult to ascertain (Lachaud & Penman, 2008). As in many European polities, the French monarchy evolved from a system of election in which a variety of contestants—not necessarily related to the current ruler—could compete. France's first dynasty ruled from 987 to 1328, but the Capetians "never made a specific claim to a hereditary right to the throne" (Fawtier, 1960, pp. 49). Yet, because there was no real opposition to the successors nominated by the Capetian family we classify the system as monarchical. Over time, the hereditary principle became firmly established such that it was virtually inconceivable that anyone other than a member of the royal family could qualify for the job. A similar pattern may be establishing itself in North Korea today; until it is, we shall regard North Korea as a republic.

Operationally speaking, we code a system as hereditary if the practice is enshrined in law, if it is avowed by a sitting ruler (who proclaims his or her intention to restrict succession to family members), or if it is so well-established that it may be regarded as a norm (as evidenced by family trees

showing relationships among successive rulers). Either *de jure* principles or *de facto* practices are sufficient to qualify a system as hereditary. Only where both are absent is a system classified as republican.

Hereditary practices of succession vary considerably across monarchical systems and even within the same polity. Preference for the first-born, or *primogeniture*, may be understood as (a) absolute/equal/lineal (whether male or female), (b) agnatic/patrilineal (first-born male or female through the male line), (c) uterine (first-born male through the female line, e.g., the son of the sister of the previous monarch), (d) male-preference (females accorded the throne only if no males available), (e) Salic (females excluded altogether), (f) porphyrogeniture (preference to the first male born "in purple," that is, after his father ascended to the throne), or (g) matrilineal (female-preference). Other practices include *ultimogeniture* (precedence to youngest son), *agnatic seniority* (where brothers precede sons), *partible inheritance* (division of the realm among offspring), *designation* (where the sitting monarch designates a successor—sometimes crowned prior to the death of the sitting monarch), *election* or *acclamation* (generally by a group of unelected elites), or *contest* (generally among sons of the sitting monarch) (Duindam, 2016, ch 2).

One might regard primogeniture, ultimogeniture, agnatic seniority, and designation as the purest versions of monarchy since they privilege and preserve the family unit. However, it is important to bear in mind that these principles of selection were not always clearly defined or strictly adhered to, and often intermingled. For example, preference might be given to the monarch's first-born except in instances when that individual was not regarded as suitable—a matter of opinion, evidently, and one that might be determined in the final instance by the sitting monarch or by a college of electors.

Hereditary succession by election may seem like a contradiction in terms; yet, this method was widely used in Europe in the Middle Ages and persisted in the Holy Roman Empire. We regard a system as hereditary if candidates were limited to those with royal blood. Note also that elections were unlikely to constitute a level playing field, and might serve merely to validate choices already made by a sitting monarch or high-ranking family members. Accordingly, Wolf (1991, pp. 193, 253) does not regard election as qualitatively different from other succession rules employed in Europe.

It is sometimes difficult to say which precise method of selection was the law of the land in a given polity at a given point in time (Duindam, 2016, ch 2). Even where rules of descent were clear, controversy was bound to erupt in situations when no immediate descendants of the ruling monarch were available and when different rules came into conflict with one another (Wolf, 1991). However, it is usually clear when a system of system of leadership selection is limited to members of a royal family, which is what qualifies it as hereditary in our schema.

Power

An executive must serve a non-trivial function in order to qualify as a monarch. S/he might make all key decisions himself, with little consultation and few constraints on the exercise of power—an "absolutist" form of rule. S/he might appoint policymakers who are accountable (at least to some degree) to him or her, as in Jordan and Monaco today, or the Ottoman Empire previously.

By contrast, where a hereditary executive has no share in policymaking and is displaced by a fully democratic body we surmise that the king neither reigns nor rules; popular sovereignty has supplanted monarchic sovereignty (Huntington, 1966, pp. 763–764). Accordingly, we do not regard present-day United Kingdom or Sweden as monarchical regime types.

Granted, it is sometimes difficult to pinpoint the precise moment in time when an elective body eclipses a monarch, rendering the latter superfluous. Nonetheless, it is critical to distinguish hereditary executives who matter from those whose position is purely vestigial. In coding, we have tried to discern whether the monarch exercises more political influence than any other actor in the polity. If so, we categorize the state as monarchical (e.g., contemporary Tonga); if not—if non-hereditary rulers overshadow the hereditary ruler—it is coded as republican.

Coding

Regime types are identified as monarchical if they satisfy the four conditions laid out above—rule by one, life tenure, heredity, and power. Information required to make these judgments is drawn from a diverse set of historical sources including general histories, Wikipedia entries, and general works on monarchy.

States within Europe are coded from 1100 to 1700 at centennial intervals. We adopt a "Braudellian" definition of Europe including territories at the periphery, that is, parts of west Asia in the East, Anatolia in the Southeast, and North Africa in the South. After 1700, all states throughout the world are coded annually. Historical polities and their GIS polygons are drawn from a variety of datasets, as indicated in Table 1.

The resulting index may be compared with extant indices of monarchy, as shown in Table 2. It will be seen that extant indices offer broad coverage in the contemporary period, but none extend prior to 1789, omitting the golden age of monarchy. Importantly, codings across these indices are highly correlated. Despite small variations in coding rules there appears to be fairly strong consensus about which polities qualify as monarchical in the contemporary

Table 1. Sources for Polities and Polygons.

Source	Period	Region	Data
Coppedge et al. (2017)	1789–	World	Polities
Gleditsch and Ward (1999)	1800–	World	Polities
Gerring et al. (2018)	1789–	World	Polygons
EuroAtlas (Nussli, 2017)	1100–1800	Europe	Polities and polygons
GeaCron (geacron.com/the-geacron-project/)	1700–1900	World	Polities and polygons

Table 2. Monarchy Indices.

	States	Years	Obs	Pearson's *r*
Authors	681	1100–2005	24,308	-
Wahman et al. (2013)	189	1972–2010	6587	0.9325
Cheibub et al. (2010)	194	1946–2008	8858	0.8285
Geddes et al. (2014)	152	1946–2010	7891	0.8953
Anckar and Fredriksson (2016)	194	1800–2015	17,531	0.9579
Teorell and Lindberg (2015)	173	1789–2016	16,562	0.7674

Where datasets provide alternate operationalizations of monarchy we record values for the coding scheme that is closest to our own conceptualization. Observations are annual except for the authors' monarchy index, which is centennial from 1100 to 1700 and annual thereafter.

era, offering comfort to those who might worry about a lack of consensus around this complex concept.

Scope-conditions

Our dataset, along with other datasets noted in Table 2, are limited to polities with a state-like form of government. States are understood as political units with a single locus of power (although perhaps not a fixed capital), some degree of sovereignty (sufficient to allow a choice of governmental forms), a recognized territory which the government controls (although frontiers may be only loosely delimited and controlled), and a governmental apparatus that persists from one ruler to the next (perhaps with some changes of a patrimonial nature). This is a fairly standard definition of the subject as it pertains to the pre-modern era and is consistent with the way in which states are identified by our sources (discussed above).

The justification for focusing on states is both practical and theoretical. From a practical perspective, there is no way we can code political practices in non-state entities prior to the modern era in a comprehensive fashion. Such an exercise would be limited in scope and highly speculative.

From a theoretical perspective, we surmise that a monarchical form of government was likely to develop only in state-like polities. Other political units such as bands, tribes, and chiefdoms were small enough to be governed in an informal fashion and power could be widely diffused without encountering significant coordination problems; there was little justification for monopolizing power in the hands of a single family. Moreover, because small societies are unable to support bureaucracies, whoever leads the group will need to do much of the work of governing him/herself, such as leading forces into battle and assuring that food and shelter is available. This puts a premium on merit rather than heredity in the choice of leaders, and since merit is fairly easy to judge and to monitor—being up close and personal—there is a disincentive to appoint the person who happens to be related to the former ruler if there is someone better qualified for the job.

Historical Portrait

Using the monarchy index described above, we are able to map the rise and fall of this distinctive regime type in Europe at 100-year intervals from 1100–2000, as shown in figures posted in Appendix B. These snapshots confirm that monarchies were the dominant regime-type in this region of the world through 1800. Republics were largely limited to areas along the Baltic Sea (1400), the Italian peninsula (1400–1800), the Alpine region (1500–), the Low Countries (1600–), the Grecian archipelago (1700), France (1800–), and parts of North Africa (1800). Most of the territory of Europe, and most of its state-like entities, were monarchical. After the French Revolution, the tide turned against monarchy in Europe, leaving only a few micro-states (e.g., Liechstenstein) on the continent and a few on the North African periphery (e.g., Morocco) at the turn of the 21st century.

A corresponding set of maps in Appendix C show the location of monarchies around the world at centennial intervals from 1700 to 2000. Here, the fate of monarchies in Europe is replicated, with important regional differences. Relative to Europe, monarchies died more quickly in the New World and lasted longer in Asia. In any case, by 2000 they were all but extinguished in every region except the Middle East.

Figure 1 displays the number of states that were monarchies and republics in Europe from 1100 to the present. In the High Middle Ages, there were roughly sixty states that could be characterized as monarchical, and only a

Figure 1. Monarchies and republics in Europe, 1100–2005.

handful that were not. The number of monarchies grows over the next two centuries, largely as a product of the increasing number of states in Europe. Monarchies begin to decline in the 15th century, and in the 16th century the number of republican states begins to grow, narrowing the gap between these regime types. In the 18th century, monarchy undergoes a steep decline, which is partially a product of the consolidation of states in Europe (the number of republics also declines, though only modestly). Monarchy recovers briefly after the passing of the Napoleonic era, and then experiences a final decline in the late nineteenth and early 20th century. By 1920 there are only a handful of monarchies left in Europe.

Globally, the number of monarchies and republics is tracked over the past three centuries in Figure 2. Here, the patterns are easier to follow. The number of monarchies remains fairly constant in the 19th century until 1870, at which point monarchies enter a long, slow decline. By contrast, republics are fairly stable in number through the 19th century but undergo a dramatic increase in the 20th century. The tipping point is in 1910, at which point republics out-number monarchies for the first time in recorded history. After 1980, the number of monarchies stabilizes at about 16 (reduced to thirteen as of today).

An important caveat is that our survey is limited to state-like entities, as described in the previous section. If one were able to include bands, tribes,



Figure 2. Monarchies and republics in the world, 1700–2005.

and chiefdoms—most of which fail to reach our definition of statehood and most of which were probably non-monarchical—the dominance of monarchy would recede as one travels back in time for the simple reason that there were fewer states.

Hypotheses and Analyses

We have argued that monarchy solved the primordial coordination problem of politics in the pre-modern era. Where societies are disconnected a focal point is needed and monarchy was, for millennia, a readily available heuristic for establishing legitimate government. In the modern era, as societies became more interconnected, monarchy's advantage disappeared. With societies now highly mobilized and interconnected, monarchy's inability to integrate the masses into politics became a defect rather than an asset.

Although coordination cannot be directly observed, suggestive evidence may be drawn from the histories of states employing varying regime types. Here, we lay out a set of hypotheses that bear on the strength, stability, and institutionalization of regimes—with the expectation that monarchies will be more effective in solving coordination problems than republics in the pre-modern era and republics will out-perform monarchies in the modern era. A final hypothesis concerns the proximal cause of monarchy's demise in the

modern era. Each hypothesis is subjected to a brief empirical test. To conserve space, variable definitions, sources, and descriptive statistics are relegated to Appendix D.

Territory (H_1)

Insofar as a regime type is successful it ought to be capable of organizing power on a grand scale. State size is an especially important test for the theory given that it imposes a direct barrier to coordination, making connections among citizens more difficult. It also serves as a proxy for social diversity (e.g., by language, ethnicity, religion, race, or socioeconomic standing), imposing a second barrier to coordination. As a rule, we expect that larger states are more diverse, an association that is likely to be especially strong in the pre-modern era when social groups were generally smaller and more localized. This leads to our first hypothesis.

> H_1: Monarchies control larger territories in the pre-modern era and smaller territories in the modern era.

To test this hypothesis, Figure 3 compares the territorial size of monarchies and republics in Europe (from 1100) and globally (from 1700). To do so, we calculate the average size of monarchies (M) and the average size of republics (R) in Europe and globally in each year of observation. If $M>R$, we record the value of M/R. If $M < R$, we record the value of R/M as a negative number. The line at 0 thus represents the point of equality, where the average size of monarchies and republics is the same.

It will be seen that monarchies were many times larger than republics through most of the pre-modern era. From the 16th century to the mid-19th century monarchies were from *ten* to *thirty* times as large as republics within Europe—with the notable exception of a short period around the time of the French Revolution, when republican rule extended briefly across a wide swath of Europe. Not until World War One did republics surpass monarchies in size, a pattern that persists to this day in Europe. Note that the only remaining European monarchies—Liechtenstein and Monaco—are tiny, though the graph shows parity because of the inclusion of Morocco, a large state which is defined as part of Europe. Across the world, the turning point is the early 19th century, when the two regime types approached parity, reversing an ageold pattern.

One might also measure the size of states by their population. Such an analysis would yield very similar results, as territory and demography are correlated—especially prior to the 20th century when populations settlements were more diffuse.



Figure 3. (A) Relative size of monarchies in Europe, 1100–2005 and (B) Relative size of monarchies in the world, 1700–2005.

Political Stability (H_2)

Insofar as a regime type is successful it ought to pave the way for political stability. This leads to our second hypothesis.

H_2: Monarchical states are more stable in the pre-modern era and less stable in the modern era.

Menaldo (2012) finds evidence for this proposition in a sample centered on the MENA region in the postwar era. To test the proposition in a global sample and across a longer time-period we define stability as continuity of constitutional rules pertaining to who sets policies and how these individuals are selected, that is, *regimes*, as coded by Djuve et al. (2020). For example, a consolidated democratic regime is defined by elections as the mode of selecting principals and (indirectly) policies, so a regime change would occur if there is a substantial departure from this. A personalist dictatorship is characterized by the rule of the dictator, so there is a regime change if this dictator is removed from office through an unscripted process. An authoritarian party regime such as China hinges on the rules by which the ruling party is governed, so any change in those rules is understood as a regime change.

With this definition of regimes (not to be confused with regime-types), we examine the probability of regime breakdown (i.e., change) in Table 3. This binary outcome is analyzed with logistic regression models. The first set of tests focus on the pre-modern era (1800–1920). Model 1 includes a variety of covariates that might serve as confounders such as per capita GDP (log), population (log), democracy and its quadratic (to account for non-linearity in the relationship), and per capita GDP growth. We also include time-trends capturing temporal persistence in regime-duration using duration terms that are linear, squared and cubed, following the standard in the literature (e.g., Carter & Signorino 2010), as well as region and year fixed-effects. Standard errors are clustered by state. Model 2 drops all covariates except per capita GDP, population, and the time-trends. Model 3 returns to the benchmark specification, while restricting the sample to regime breakdowns that do *not* constitute transitions from monarchy to republic. Estimated coefficients for the monarchy variable show that monarchies are less likely to experience regime breakdowns during this early period. We presume that this pattern would be even stronger if we examined a longer historical period.

The second set of tests focus on the contemporary era (1920–2006), where we repeat the same battery of specifications and sample restrictions. In Models 4–6 it will be seen that monarchies are more vulnerable, that is, more likely to experience a regime breakdown—though the effect attenuates when we remove transitions from monarchy (Model 6). Taken together, these tests suggest that monarchies were less prone to breakdown in the 19th century and more prone to breakdown in the 20th century, corroborating our hypothesis.

Table 3. Regime Breakdown.

Time period	1800–1920			1920–2006		
Sample	All	All	Nontransitional Breakdowns[a]	All	All	Nontransitional Breakdowns[a]
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**
Monarchy	−0.547**	−0.341**	−0.770***	0.430**	0.290**	0.176
	(−2.14)	(−2.02)	(−2.99)	(2.55)	(2.05)	(0.87)
GDPpc (log)	−0.339**	−0.255***	−0.364**	−0.277***	−0.339***	−0.266***
	(−1.96)	(−2.78)	(−2.09)	(−4.02)	(−7.04)	(−3.84)
Population (log)	−0.161**	0.067***	−0.171**	0.002	0.011	0.000
	(−2.33)	(3.37)	(−2.24)	(0.09)	(0.66)	(0.01)
Democracy	2.796		2.626	7.346***		6.852***
	(1.60)		(1.48)	(6.47)		(5.98)
Democracy	−8.594***		−8.203***	−10.973***		−10.270***
(squared)	(−3.17)		(−2.99)	(−7.47)		(−7.12)
GDPpc growth	−0.039**		−0.038**	−0.025***		−0.025***
	(−2.28)		(−2.11)			
				(−4.49)		(−4.40)
Region dummies	✓		✓	✓		✓
Year dummies	✓		✓	✓		✓
Duration 1	−0.039***	−0.048***	−0.042***	−0.074***	−0.069***	−0.077***
	(−3.02)	(−3.81)	(−2.96)	(−7.18)	(−7.07)	(−7.44)
Duration 2	0.001**	0.000**	0.001**	0.001***	0.001***	0.001***
	(2.52)	(2.33)	(2.44)	(5.32)	(3.90)	(5.49)
Duration 3	−0.000**	−0.000*	−0.000**	−0.000***	−0.000***	−0.000***
	(−2.37)	(−1.85)	(−2.30)	(−4.35)	(−2.99)	(−4.45)
N	2803	3748	2776	8913	9767	8872
Log likelihood	−779.810	−1093.807	−751.047	−1960.126	−2267.092	−1912.058

Outcome: 1 = breakdown, 0 = no breakdown. *Model*: logistic regression, *t* statistics in parentheses. *$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .01$. Constant not reported. Results are robust to random intercept specifications. [a]indicates that models 3 and 6 restrict the sample to regime breakdowns that do not constitute transitions from monarchy to republic.

Tenure in Office (H_3)

An advantage of monarchy, according to our theory, is that monarchs are apt to have longer time-horizons than other sorts of leaders—at least during the pre-modern era. While time-horizons are unobservable, we can observe the length of tenure enjoyed by leaders, which may be regarded as a proxy for their time-horizons. (If a leader can expect to enjoy a long tenure in office s/he may be more inclined to make long-term investments.)

Importantly, actual tenure in office is not simply a function of how an office is defined. A monarch's tenure might be cut short by death (a likely occurrence if monarchs accede to the thrown in their dotage), by abdication,

or by forceful removal. Consequently, the actual tenure in office enjoyed by monarchs is also a proxy for the legitimacy of that office. Illegitimate rulers are presumably more liable to removal.

Accordingly, we hypothesize:

H_3: Monarchs enjoy longer tenure in office than other executives in all periods.

We test this hypothesis with data from the Historical Varieties of Democracy project (Knutsen et al., 2019), which provides information on 3937 heads of state and 2874 heads of government, as well as 196 leaders who served simultaneously in both roles. A head of state (HOS) is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of a polity. A head of government (HOG) is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In some states these roles are combined while in most they are separated. After excluding leaders who reigned for less than 100 days, this dataset provides exact dates of appointment and dismissal for 6933 leaders in 174 states from 1789 to the present.

Across the entire sample, excluding those currently holding power (whose tenure in office is unknown), average tenure among monarchs is nearly 16 years while average tenure among non-monarchs is nearly 5 years. Monarchs, on average, serve three times as long as other heads of state and heads of government.

To analyze these relationships in a multivariate fashion, we present a series of Cox proportional hazards models in Table 4 where tenure in office serves as the dependent variable. The first model pools all executives and includes only a Monarchy dummy. In the second model, we also include a dummy indicating whether the leader was head of state (HOS) or head of state *and* government (HOS&HOG) (=1) or only head of government (HOG) (=0), a measure of the relative power of the HOS over appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers, as well as three auxiliary regime characteristics: freedom of association, extension of the suffrage, the quality of elections, and state control over territory (a Weberian measure of stateness).

The third and fourth models retain these controls and instead vary the sample. Since a majority of all monarchs are heads of state, we first drop all heads of government from the sample (Model 3). In the final model, we only retain the executives who exercised some influence over the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers (Model 4).

The evidence across all these models suggests that monarchs endure much longer in office than non-monarchs. This is true for the entire sample as well as for sub-samples focused on different kinds of executives.

Table 4. Leader Tenure, 1789–2016.

Sample	All executives	All executives	Heads of state	Influential executives
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**
Monarchy	0.369***	0.372***	0.327***	0.317***
	(0.014)	(0.019)	(0.019)	(0.019)
HOS or HOS&HOG		0.737***		
		(0.024)		
HOS versus HOG power		1.058	1.126**	
		(0.036)	(0.064)	
Freedom of association		1.212**	1.134	1.310***
		(0.093)		
			(0.109)	(0.108)
Suffrage		0.778***	0.599***	0.693***
		(0.036)	(0.039)	(0.038)
Free and fair elections		0.838***	0.902	0.982
		(0.053)	(0.072)	(0.070)
State control over territory		0.995***	0.995***	0.997***
		(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
States (N)	196	190	190	190
Subjects (N)	6932	6312	3677	4827
Failures (N)	7722	7032	3824	5279
Observations (N)	31101	27499	18838	19938

Cox proportional hazard models with exponentiated coefficients and standard errors in parentheses.
*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .01$. Constant not reported.

Conflict (H_4)

Violent conflict is a signal that politics may not be fully institutionalized, and that existing institutions are not doing their job—or not doing their job very well. We anticipate that monarchies enjoy an advantage in this area over non-monarchies, at least in the pre-modern era. All of the distinctive institutional features of monarchy discussed in Section I may damper the impetus for conflict. A ruler who is legitimate is less susceptible to attack (internal or external) and has less need to prove himself by launching an attack against others. A smooth and instantaneous leadership transition—epitomized in the phrase, "The King is dead; Long live the King"—overcomes what is typically the most vulnerable period for a state. A unified leadership leaves few openings for dissenters who might foment conflict. Longer time-horizons

may prompt rulers to think twice before entering hostilities, lest they jeopardize their kingdom and their family's heirloom, the crown. Hence, our fourth hypothesis:

H_4: Monarchical states are less prone to conflict in the pre-modern era.

In the modern era, it might make sense to differentiate internal and external conflict, with the idea that internal conflict is more clearly a failure of institutions. However, in the pre-modern era this distinction rings hollow, especially in Europe. Here, virtually every conflict had an "internal" and "external" component. Foes of the state within the boundaries of the state had allies outside, and foes outside had allies inside, so it is difficult to identify any conflict that was purely domestic. This has something to do with the tangled nest of aristocratic alliances that crisscrossed Europe. And it also stems from the fact that most states were small, and many tiny.

To identify conflicts, we rely on Dincecco and Onorato's (2018) conflict database, drawing on comprehensive sources from military historians and covering major military conflicts fought on land in Europe between the year 1000 and 1799. Our principal dependent variable counts the number of conflicts each state is engaged in across each century from 1100 to 1800. The outcome varies from zero to 200 (France in the 18th century). To mitigate the extreme right skewness of this variable it is transformed by the natural logarithm. The resulting variable is regressed against our Monarchy dummy variable along with century dummies and selected controls in Table 5. Right side variables are measured at the beginning of each century while the outcome records the number of conflicts occurring in the subsequent 100 years.

A bivariate regression of conflict against monarchy reveals a positive relationship: monarchies experience more conflicts than republics. However, we have shown that monarchies were also more extensive than republics in the pre-modern era (Figure 3), and it stands to reason that a larger state will be entangled in more conflicts as it has more territory to control and more potential adversaries to combat. We construct a number of measures to control for this background feature. Model 1 includes the length of a state's borders (log), along with a dummy variable indicating whether the state sits at the edge of Europe—in which case its full extent is not measurable by polygons in the EurAtlas dataset. Model 2 adds a variable measuring the number of neighbors (log). Model 3 adds the area of the territory (log). The estimated coefficient for Monarchy is negative, highly significant, and remarkably stable across these specifications.

In a second set of tests, we dichotomize the outcome, re-coding the variable as 0 if a state is not involved in any conflicts over the course of a century

Table 5. Conflict.

Conflict measure	*Cumulative (log)*			*Binary*	
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**5**	**6**
Monarchy	−0.259**	−0.259**	−0.246**	−0.111***	−0.101***
	(0.104)	(0.104)	(0.105)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Border length (ln)	0.291***	0.239***	0.289***	0.110***	0.121***
	(0.036)	(0.040)	(0.090)	(0.011)	(0.029)
Edge	−0.166	−0.045	−0.021	−0.174***	−0.129**
	(0.254)	(0.251)	(0.254)	(0.060)	(0.061)
Neighbors (ln)		0.184***	0.176***		0.061***
		(0.057)	(0.058)		(0.020)
Area (ln)			−0.034		−0.019
			(0.048)		(0.017)
Century dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
States (N)	344	344	341	344	340
Centuries (N)	8	8	8	8	8
Observations (N)	654	654	650	654	649
R-squared	0.328	0.345	0.335	0.279	0.312

Units of analysis: state-century. Ordinary least squares, standard errors clustered by state in parentheses.
*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .01$. Constant not reported.

and 1 otherwise. This is a reasonable approach insofar as the descent from peace into war represents a qualitative change, while the addition of more conflicts might be viewed as a marginal deterioration. It also solves the problem of extreme outliers. Instead of repeating each specification in the previous sequence, we show only the minimal and maximal specifications—Models 5 and 6. Here, too, the coefficient is negative, highly significant, and stable. (Results are robust when replicated with a logit estimator.)

In summary, there seems ample empirical support for our conjecture that monarchies were less conflict-prone in the pre-modern era. This contradicts the usual impression offered by mythic and historical accounts of kings who make war as a matter of occupation (Jones, 2013). When Tilly (1985) declared that "states make wars and wars make states" he was doubtless thinking of kings as the instigators. And it is true that the great monarchies (England, France, Spain) had considerably more wars to their credit than their smaller republican neighbors. However, we have seen that this is a product of grandeur rather than truculence. Small monarchies were more peaceful than similarly sized republics.

While we do condition on several geographic features that are expected to shape regimes and conflict patterns, we do not claim to have clear evidence for a causal effect of monarchy on conflict risk. For example, we cannot decisively rule out selection effects, such as would operate if monarchies are less likely to emerge in war-prone territories. However, we have no strong theoretical reason to suspect such effects, and our coefficients remain quite insensitive to the inclusion of confounders that should correlate with such selection processes.

Mass Communications (H_5)

If monarchies were initially successful because they solved coordination problems in situations where coordination among citizens was extremely difficult, their demise should be tied to the decline of this comparative advantage. Specifically, we surmise that monarchies face extinction as tools of mass communication—especially radios—spread.

> H_5: The diffusion of radios is associated with the decline of monarchy in the modern era.

To test this proposition, we regress our binary index of monarchy against a measure of radio diffusion, the number of radios extant in a state (log).

Table 6 displays the results from a variety of estimators and specifications. The first set of tests employ a pooled ordinary least squares estimator with standard errors clustered by state (to account for serial correlation) and year fixed effects (to account for unobserved variation through time). Right-side variables are lagged fifteen years behind the outcome to mitigate problems of endogeneity.

Model 1 includes only regional dummies (Eastern Europe/Central Asia, Latin America, MENA, et al.). Model 2 adds a control for democracy, measured in a binary fashion. This is an important confounder since many transitions from monarchy to non-monarchy coincided with a transition to democracy. Model 3 adds a vector of dummy variables measuring different types of authoritarian regimes—party, military, personalist. These are not retained in subsequent specifications because of the loss of sample size, and also because they are collinear with the outcome (personalist regimes, in particular, are very close in conception and measurement to our monarchy variable).

Model 4 adds covariates measuring population (log), natural resource wealth, per capita GDP (log), English colonial heritage, share of population of Muslim heritage, and share of population of Protestant heritage. Model 5

Table 6. Radios and Regime Types.

Model	Pooled linear					Logit	State fixed effects		
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Reduced	Full	Full	Full	Full
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
Radios (ln)	−0.024***	−0.023***	−0.017**	−0.032**	−0.036**	−0.454**	−0.025**	−0.025**	−0.024**
	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.200)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.012)
Democracy (binary)		−0.035	−0.240***	−0.056*	−0.049	−1.964***		0.007	−0.002
		(0.027)	(0.064)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.672)		(0.016)	(0.015)
Population (ln)				0.010	0.016	0.268		0.001	0.010
				(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.259)		(0.034)	(0.029)
Natural resources				0.000***	0.000***	0.000			0.000
per cap				(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)			(0.000)
GDP per cap (ln)				0.032	0.034	0.698**			−0.005
				(0.024)	(0.024)	(0.312)			(0.019)
English colonial				0.098*	0.096*	2.328***			
heritage				(0.055)	(0.056)	(0.786)			
Muslim				−0.000	−0.000	0.013			
				(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.010)			
Protestant				−0.001	−0.001	−0.064*			
				(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.037)			
Party			−0.313***						
dictatorship			(0.067)						

(continued)

Table 6. (continued)

Model	Pooled linear					Logit	State fixed effects		
Sample	Full	Full	Full	Full	Reduced	Full	Full	Full	Full
Model	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**
Military dictatorship			−0.202**						
			(0.082)						
Personal dictatorship			−0.303***						
			(0.067)						
Lagged DV							0.231***	0.231***	0.186***
							(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.052)
Year dummies									
Region dummies	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			
State dummies							✓	✓	✓
Years (max N)	90	90	54	90	89	89	90	90	90
States (N)	152	151	144	141	133	141	152	149	142
Observations	8109	8035	5896	7218	6631	7217	8051	7977	7235
R-squared (pseudo)	0.233	0.230	0.362	0.267	0.291	(0.336)	0.172	0.181	0.142

Regime type (0 = republic, 1 = monarchy). Years: 1910-. Reduced sample: excludes states that lost or were weakened by WWI. Right-side variables lagged fifteen years behind the outcome. Constant not reported. Clustered standard errors (by state) in parentheses.
*$p < .1$. **$p < .05$.***$p < .01$.

omits states that found themselves on the losing side of World War One, or were significantly weakened by the war, that is, Russia, Germany, Ottoman empire/Turkey, Austria/Austria-Hungary, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro/Yugoslavia, and Hungary. Model 6 approaches the binary outcome with a logistic regression model, while maintaining the benchmark specification.

The final set of models apply state fixed effects with a lagged dependent variable. Model 7 is a minimal specification. Model 8 adds population and democracy. Model 9 adds resource wealth and per capita GDP, and thus includes a large set of (measurable) non-static covariates that might serve as confounders.

Across these various tests radios maintains a negative relationship to monarchy. As radios diffuse (in a logarithmic fashion) throughout a population, the probability of having a monarchic regime type declines. Moreover, the coefficient is remarkably stable, despite alterations of specification and estimator. It is notable that cross-sectionally dominated panels as well as temporally-dominated panels behave very similarly. Thus, although the possibility of omitted variables lurks, as it does in all observational research, we regard this as providing fairly strong evidence for the proposition that monarchy's demise was related to the rise of mass communications and the direct, unmediated relationship that it created between leaders and masses, overcoming longstanding coordination problems that had plagued governance in earlier times.

Discussion

In this article, we have laid out a framework for understanding the rise and demise of the most prevalent regime type in the history of state-like forms of political organization. Monarchy, we argue, offers an efficient solution to the primordial problem of order where polities are large and citizens isolated from each other. This explains its preeminence in the pre-modern era. The efficiency of monarchy is challenged by other methods of leadership selection when communication costs are lowered. This explains its loss of appeal in the modern era.

Although it is not possible to directly test an unobservable feature of political life (coordination), we have tested several observable implications of the theory. We have shown that monarchical regimes were more territorially expansive than republics in the pre-modern era and less expansive in the modern era (Figure 3). We have shown that monarchical regimes were less prone to breakdown in the pre-modern era and more prone to breakdown in the modern era (Table 3). We have shown that monarchs enjoyed longer

tenure in office in the modern era (Table 4). We have shown that monarchies were less prone to violent conflicts (internal and external) in the pre-modern era (Table 5). And we have shown that the rise of mass communications, exemplified by the radio, is associated with the demise of monarchy in the modern era (Table 6).

There is much that we do not understand about this under-studied regime type. A vast library of historical work—including troves of primary and secondary historical sources—await systematic inquiry. In particular, we need to know more about why hereditary succession was adopted in most cases and resisted in others. We need to know more about variation across different types of monarchies, including those with different rules of succession and those that evolved into constitutional monarchies. We trust that this survey of the subject will serve as an entrée for scholars to dig deeper into this under-studied research question.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iDs

John Gerring https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9858-2050
Tore Wig https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2596-2399
Jan Teorell https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0628-0096

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Note

1. A longer version of this article, with citations to an immense historical literature, is posted with the replication files.

References

Acharya, A., & Lee, A. (2019). Path dependence in European development: Medieval politics, conflict, and state building. *Comparative Political Studies*, *52*(13–14), 2171–2206.

Anckar, C., & Fredriksson, C. (2016). *Political regimes of the world, 1800-2015. Database, department of political science*. Åbo Akademi University.

Anderson, B. (1991a). *Imagined communities: Reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism* (revised ed.). Verso.

Anderson, L. (1991b). Absolutism and the resilience of monarchy in the Middle East. *Political Science Quarterly*, *106*(1), 1–15.

Anderson, L. (2000). Dynasts and nationalists: Why monarchies survive. In J. Kostiner (Eds.), *Middle East Monarchies* (pp. 53–69). Westview.

Aquinas, St. T. (2012). *De Regno: On kingship to the king of Cyprus*, translated by G. B. Phelan, revised by I. Th. Eschmann, O. P. (Kindle Edition). Veritatis Splendor Publications.

Ayalon, A. (2000). Post-Ottoman Arab monarchies: Old bottles, new labels? In Kostiner J (Ed.), *Middle East Monarchies*. Westview.

Bendix, R. (1980). *Kings or people: Power and the Mandate to Rule*. University of California Press.

Blain, N., & O'Donnell, H. (Eds). (2001). *Media, monarchy and power: The post-modern culture in Europe*. Intellect.

Bodin, J. (1955). *Six Books of the Commonwealth*, abridged and translated by M. J. Tooley. Basil Blackwell.

Burbank, J., & Cooper, F. (2010). *Empires in world history: Power and the politics of difference*. Princeton University Press.

Burling, R. (1974). *The passage of power: Studies in political succession*. Academic Press.

Carter, D. B., & Signorino, C. S. (2010). Back to the future: Modeling time dependence in binary data. *Political Analysis*, *18*(3), 271–292.

Castro, J. J. (2013). *Wireless: Radio, revolution, and the Mexican State, 1897-1938*. The University of Oklahoma Press.

Cheibub, J. A., Gandhi, J., & Vreeland, J. R. (2010). Democracy and dictatorship revisited. *Public Choice*, *143*(1–2), 67–101.

Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Lindberg, S. I., Skaaning, S-E., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Knutsen, C. H., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Mechkova, V., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Saxer, L., Seim, B., Sigman, R., & Staton, J. (2017). *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Codebook v7.1*. University of Gothenburg, V-Dem Institute.

Crone, P. (1989). *Pre-industrial societies: Anatomy of the pre-modern world*. Oneworld.

Davison, W. P. (1965). *International political communication*. Council on Foreign Relations.

Dawkins, R. (1978). *The selfish gene*. Oxford University Press.

de Solorzano Pereira, J. (1776). *Obras posthumas*. Madrid.

Dincecco, M., & Onorato, M. G. (2018). *From warfare to wealth: The military origins of urban prosperity in Europe*. Cambridge University Press.

Djuve, V., Knutsen, C. H., & Wig, T. (2020). Patterns of regime breakdown since the French Revolution. *Comparative Political Studies*, *53*(6), 923–958.

Duindam, J. (2016). *Dynasties: A global history of power, 1300-1800*. Cambridge University Press.
Elias, N. (1983). *The court society*. Basil Blackwell.
Elliott, J. H. (2009). *Spain, Europe and the Wider World, 1500-1800*. Yale University Press.
Ezrow, N. M., & Frantz, E. (2011). *Dictators and dictatorships: Understanding authoritarian regimes and their leaders*. Bloomsbury.
Fawtier, R. (1960). *The Capetian Kings of France* (trans. L. Butler & R. Adam). Saint Martin's Press.
Filmer, R. (1991). *Patriarcha and other writings*, (ed.), J. P. Sommerville. Cambridge University Press.
Gause, E. G. (1994). *Oil monarchies: Domestic and security challenges in the Arab Gulf States*. Council on Foreign Relations.
Gause, E. G. (2000). The persistence of monarchy in the Arabian peninsula: A comparative analysis. In J. Kostiner (ed.), *Middle East Monarchies* (pp. 167–186). Westview.
Geddes, B., Frantz, E., & Wright, J. (2014). Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set. *Perspectives on Politics*, *12*(2), 313–331.
Gerring, J, Wig, T., Tollefsen, A. F., & Apfeld, B. (2018). *Harbors and democracy*. Varieties of Democracy Working Paper SERIES 2018:70.
Gleditsch, K. S., & Ward, M. D. (1999). A revised list of independent states since the Congress of Vienna. *International Interactions*, *25*(4), 393–413.
Goody, J., Thirsk, J., & Thompson, E. P. (eds). (1979). *Family and inheritance: Rural society in Western Europe, 1200-1800*. Cambridge University Press.
Grossman, H. I. (2002). Make us a king': Anarchy, predation, and the state. *European Journal of Political Economy*, *18*(1), 31–46.
Habermas, J. (1991). *The structural transformation of the public sphere: An inquiry into a category of bourgeois society*. MIT press.
Hale, J. A. S. (1975). *Radio power: Propaganda and international broadcasting*. Paul Elek.
Headrick, D. R. (2000). *When information came of age: Technologies of knowledge in the age of reason and revolution, 1700-1850*. Oxford University Press.
Herb, M. (1999). *All in the family: Absolutism, revolution, and democracy in the Middle Eastern Monarchies*. SUNY Press.
Hibbert, C. (1968). *Charles I*. Weidenfeld, Nicolson.
Huntington, S. P. (1966). The political modernization of traditional monarchies. *Daedalus*, *95*(3), 763–788.
Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. Yale University Press.
Jones, D. (2013). *The plantagenets: The warrior kings and queens who made England*. Penguin.
Kantorowicz, E. (1957). *The king's two bodies: A study in medieval political theology*. Princeton University Press.
Karawan, I. A. (1992). Monarchs, Mullas, and Marshals: Islamic regimes? *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, *524*(1), 103–119.

Kechichian, J. A. (2001). *Succession in Saudi Arabia*. Palgrave Macmillan.
Kiser, E., & Barzel, Y. (1989). The origins of democracy in England. *Rationality and Society*, *3*(4), 396–422.
Knutsen, C. H., Teorell, J., Wig, T., Cornell, A., Gerring, J., Gjerløw, H., Skaaning, S-E., Ziblatt, D., Marquardt, K. L., Pemstein, D., & Seim, B. (2019). Introducing the historical varieties of democracy dataset: Political institutions in the long 19th century. *Journal of Peace Research*, *56*(3), 440–451.
Kokkonen, A., & Sundell, A. (2014). Delivering stability: Primogeniture and autocratic survival in European monarchies 1000–1800. *American Political Science Review*, *108*(2), 438–453.
Krieger, L. (1970). *Kings and philosophers 1689-1789*. W.W. Norton.
Kuper, H. (1986). *The Swazi: A South African Kingdom*. Holt, Rinehart, Winston.
Lachaud, F., & Penman, M. (eds.). (2008). *Making and breaking the rules: Succession in Medieval Europe, c. 1000– c. 1600*. Turnhout.
Lewis, B. (2000). Monarchy in the Middle East. In J. Kostiner (ed.), *Middle East Monarchies* (pp. 167–186). Westview.
Lucas, R. E. (2012). Rules and tools of succession in the Gulf Monarchies. *Journal of Arabian Studies*, *2*(1), 75–91.
Magaloni, B. (2008). Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule. *Comparative Political Studies*, *41*(4–5), 715–741.
McDonagh, E. (2015). Ripples from the first wave: The monarchical origins of the welfare state. *Perspectives on Politics*, *13*(4): 992–1016.
Menaldo, V. (2012). The Middle East and North Africa's resilient monarchs. *Journal of Politics*, *74*(3), 707–722.
Morrill, J. (2004). Conclusion: King-killing in perspective. In R. von Friedeburg (ed.), *Murder and monarchy: Regicide in European History, 1300-1800* (pp. 293–299). Palgrave Macmillan.
Myers, H. A. (1982). *Medieval kingship*. Nelson-Hall.
Nelson, J. (1995). Kingship and royal government. In R. McKitterick (ed.), *New Cambridge Medieval History* (pp. 381–430). Cambridge University Press.
North, D. C., & Weingast, B. R. (1989). Constitutions and commitment: The evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth-century England. *Journal of Economic History*, *49*(4), 803–832.
North, D. C., Wallis, J. J., & Weingast, B. (2009). *Violence and social orders: A conceptual framework for interpreting recorded human history*. Cambridge University Press.
Nussli, C. (2017). Euratlas historical atlas and gazetteer of Europe.
Olson, M. (1993). Dictatorship, democracy, and development. *American Political Science Review*, *87*(3), 567–576.
Parker, B. J. (2011). The construction and performance of kingship in the Neo-Assyrian Empire. *Journal of Anthropological Research*, *67*(3) 357–386.
Reynolds, S. (1999). Government and community. In D. Luscombe & J. Riley-Smith (eds.), *The New Cambridge Medieval History* (pp. 86–112). Cambridge University Press

Sutherland, I. (2001). *From Warlords to Kings, c.e. 1-752: In search of military and political legitimacy in Germanic Societies*. (PhD thesis). Department of History, Concordia University.

Teorell, J., & Lindberg, S. I. (2015). *The structure of the executive in authoritarian and democratic regimes: Regime dimensions across the globe, 1900-2014* (Working Paper No. 5). University of Gothenburg, Varieties of Democracy Institute.

Tilly, C. (1985). War making and state making as organized crime. In P. B. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, & T. Skocpol (eds.), *Bringing the state back in* (pp. 169–191). Cambridge University Press

Veenendaal, W. (2014). A big prince in a tiny realm: Smallness, monarchy, and political legitimacy in the principality of Liechtenstein. *Swiss Political Science Review*, *21*(2), 333–349.

Wahman, M., Teorell, J., & Hadenius, A. (2013). Authoritarian regime types revisited: Updated data in comparative perspective. *Contemporary Politics*, *19*(1), 19–34.

Webb, H. (1968). *The Japanese Imperial Institution in the Tokugawa Period*. East Asian Institute Ser.

Weber, M. (1904–05/1958). *The protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism*. Charles Scribner's.

Weber, M. (1987). *Economy and Society, ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich vol. I, II*. University of California Press.

Wolf, A. (1991). The family of dynasties in Medieval Europe: Dynasties, kingdoms and tochterstamme. *Studies in Medieval and Renaissance History*, *12*, 185–260.

Wright, J. (2008). To invest or insure? How authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness. *Comparative Political Studies*, *41*(7), 971–1000.

Author Biographies

John Gerring (PhD, University of California at Berkeley, 1993) is a professor of Government at University of Texas at Austin, where he teaches and conducts research on methodology and comparative politics. He is co-editor of *Strategies for Social Inquiry*, a book series at Cambridge University Press, and serves as co-PI of *Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem)* and the *Global Leadership Project (GLP)*.

Tore Wig is a professor in the Department of Political Science, University of Oslo. His research interests lie at the intersection between political violence and institutions, mass mobilization and autocratic politics.

Wouter Veenendaal is an assistant professor at the Institute of Political Science of Leiden University. His research focuses on the political effects of population size, and he is the author of *Politics and Democracy in Microstates* (2014) and *Democracy in Small States: Persisting Against All Odds* (2018).

Daniel Weitzel is a PhD candidate in comparative politics and methodology at the University of Texas at Austin. His research focuses on the interaction of party and voter behavior and the information environment in multi-party elections.

Jan Teorell is a professor of political science at Lund University. He has twice won the Lijphart, Przeworski, and Verba Award for Best Dataset by the APSA Comparative Politics Section, and he is the author of *Determinants of Democratization* (Cambridge University Press, 2010) and co-author of *Varieties of Democracy* (Cambridge University Press, 2020). His work has appeared in journals such as the *American Political Science Review, Comparative Political Studies, European Journal of Political Research, Journal of Democracy, Governance, Political Research Quarterly, and Studies in Comparative International Development*. His research interests include political methodology, history and comparative politics, comparative democratization, corruption, and state-making.

Kyosuke Kikuta (PhD, University of Texas at Austin, 2019) is an associate professor at the Osaka School of International Public Policy at Osaka University. His primary interest is the application of statistical methods and GIS data for better understandings about armed conflict. His articles are published or forthcoming in *Journal of Politics, Political Science Research and Methods, Journal of Conflict Resolution*, and others.