the importance of these problems. . . ." As a result, a major work on the all-volunteer force did not air the most explosive issue surrounding the all-volunteer force. This certainly weakens the work.

*Civilian Control of the Military: Theory and Cases from the Developing Countries,* edited by CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976. 337 pp. $20.00 cloth.

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If social patterns were counted like the members of a species, civilian control of the military would soon be on the endangered list. Only nations with strong governments—legitimate regimes enjoying widespread popular support—can apparently count on awakening each morning to observe the military at a civilian feeding station. It is for this reason that civilian governments are becoming the whooping cranes of the Third World. Each time a count is made, there seem to be fewer of them. Between 1961 and 1972, the worldwide fraction of national governments formed by military coups increased from 12% to 27%. This increase is mainly attributable to events in the Third World during roughly the same period (1960–1972): Among countries with per capita annual GNP's of less than $259, military coups felled fifty-eight governments—nearly 80% of the seventy-five governments in this class. In this volume, Claude Welch, Jr., along with nine political scientists and historians, presents case studies of ten nations (not all in the Third World) which have managed (with the exception of Peru) to buck this trend.

Elegies for Clausewitzian doctrine are common nowadays, especially in writings about the Third World. Civilian control of the military has too often, in studies of Asian, African, and Latin American countries, had the ring of hollow rhetoric. The circumstances of the subversion of parliamentary rule and of the infringement of civilian liberties by military actors have been so heterogeneous that scholars have for a long time looked pessimistically upon the prospects for civilian control. Welch, a Clausewitzian purist in his definitions at least, allows the idea of civilian control to embrace any regime of non-military domination of government—a formulation that includes, as these case studies do, the People's Republic of China (Parris Chang), the Philippines under Martial Law (Sherwood Goldberg), Finland (William Stover), India (Stephen P. Cohen), Guyana and Malaysia (Cynthia Enloe), Japan (James Buck), Mexico (Franklin Margiotta), and Lebanon (Abdo Baaklini). Peru (Albert Michaels) is the exception. Welch seeks new insights into the supports for civilian control by comparing governments that have weathered military threats or re-emerged as civilian regimes out of military pasts.

There is a certain hope in this strategy, like trying to discover the chemistry of viral antibodies in people who never get the flu. But it turns out, from the conclusions based on these studies at least, to be a false hope. The studies themselves are excellent, and they are generally written in a clear style that will make them useful for teaching. Also, they illustrate concretely how practical significance comes to attach to five factors of civilian control specified in Welch's introduction—constitutional constraints, the ascriptive composition of the military, party controls, geopolitical factors affecting the size and responsibilities of the military, and the delineation of military codes and of spheres of legitimate military activity (professionalism). That they do so explicitly, and with an eye to delivering from their specific societies information about as many of these factors as possible, makes this volume one of the more coherent collections of comparative material yet to appear on the military.

Yet all this information on Welch's five species of civilian control—things we have counted at the feeding station before—do not add up to new hypotheses or to much in the way of a practical primer for despairing civilian politicians. Welch is nonetheless very good about putting the problems of civilian control into comparative perspective. Some military involvement in politics is inevitable, and his failed attempt at answering definitively why it passes in some cases from influence (as in the West) to participation, and from participation to shared or complete control of government, should signal the rest of us that the old conceptual motors driving this kind of in-

quiry fail to develop enough power to carry us out of the ruts. "These homilies," he concedes, after concluding that only the long-term development of a government's legitimacy effectively restrains military intervention, "will tax the ingenuity of the wisest readers."

## Organizations

*Academic Power in Italy: Bureaucracy and Oligarchy in a National University System,* by BURTON R. CLARK. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. 205 pp. $15.00 cloth.

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This extremely valuable study focuses on the Italian system of higher education with a view to analyzing the distribution of power in that system and the ways in which this power distribution has helped to obstruct educational progress and reform in Italy. In a broader cross-national sense, it is concerned with the Italian case as one especially striking example of the relationship between guild resistance on the one hand, and bureaucratic regulatory efforts by public authorities on the other. This is a type of adversary relationship which appears, in a variety of guises, in every system of higher education including our own.

The author begins by tracing the development of the Italian university system over the past eight centuries. At first dominated by guilds of prosperous, potentially itinerant students, the Italian universities eventually became more closely identified with self-governing cities and permanent structures and thus came under faculty dominance. Lacking the flexibility and the support of a rising middle class that would have enabled them to adapt to the age of scientific discovery, they tended to stagnate after the early fifteenth century. Thus Italy entered the twentieth century with a university system which lagged well behind those of northern Europe.

Clark then proceeds to outline the organization of the Italian system of higher education with a refreshing clarity that reveals some of the unique features which distinguish it, not only from the American system, but from those of most other Western European countries as well: the remarkably low output of university graduates (superseded only very recently by indiscriminate mass production), the absence of a substantial nonuniversity sector in higher education, and the fragmentation of the university system into self-governing "faculties." These "faculties" (comparable to individual colleges within a single U.S. university) are closely tied to the interests and traditions of certain historic towns, but cannot command the financial and administrative support of strong regional units of government like the German Länder.

Italy, like France, has attempted to subject her universities to uniform control from the center. However, the Ministry of Public Instruction lacks the assistance of a strong and versatile prefect on the French model who could supervise the field agencies of national ministries instead of merely maintaining law and order in the province. Also, the Ministry has no regional units of supervision and inspection to assist it in managing the far-flung system of faculties loosely federated in universities. The result is that what appears on the surface to be an overcentralized, rigid, legalistic form of control—placing recruitment, curriculum changes, and even individual salary rankings under the direct supervision of the Roman bureaucracy—is in some respects a mere facade. For the great number of autonomous faculties elect their own deans and the individual chair-holding professors possess both high social status and high civil service rank. Consequently, the lower levels of this formally centralized structure possess a remarkable degree of freedom from effective oversight. Rome has the legal powers but lacks the necessary coordinating tools, as well as the moral authority, to overcome the entrenched status and privileges of chair-holders.

Thus, central rules must inevitably be administered (and thereby to some degree reshaped) by the deans and individual chair-holders at the grass roots. Behind the facade of central control, local pyramids of power, composed of individual chair-holders—each surrounded by his circle of academic clients and assistants—are able to operate with a remarkable degree of freedom from central supervision or public responsibility. From this situation spring the notorious oligarchic abuses of the Italian university system: the many roles and