Democratization
Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdem20

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Version of record first published: 29 Jan 2013.

To cite this article: Abel Escribà-Folch (2013): Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946-2004, Democratization, 20:1, 160-185

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738866

Democratization, 2013
Vol. 20, No. 1, 160–185, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738866

Accountable for what? Regime types, performance, and the fate of outgoing dictators, 1946–2004

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(*Received 27 October 2011; final version received 3 July 2012*)

For some political leaders losing power might entail further punishment than just being replaced. During the period 1946–2004, 47% of dictators have been jailed, killed, or had to go into exile as a consequence of losing power. The possibility that such punishment occurs can shape and condition present-time decisions rulers make. This article investigates the factors which may affect the fate of outgoing dictators. I find that regime types determine, to a high extent, the fate of rulers as regimes shape internal dynamics and incentives and decisively affect the way rulers are replaced. Due to the lack of regularized succession procedures and to the concentration of power and patronage-based loyalty, personalist leaders are more likely to be killed and to go into exile upon their exit than other autocrats. Military and personalist leaders are also more likely to be imprisoned than monarchs or rulers of single-party regimes. If replaced by democracies, rulers of party and military regimes have a much higher likelihood of not being punished than personalists. It is also found that performance matters for explaining what happens to rulers after the loss of power. Economic crises and defeats increase the likelihood that an authoritarian ruler is imprisoned.

Keywords: dictators; punishment; post-exit fate; exile; regime types

Introduction

For any political leader, losing power is obviously not good: privileges and rents go, as well as the opportunity to advance one's political agenda. Political accountability is usually thought to occur when rulers who perform badly are removed from power by those entitled or able to do so. The sanction for not showing their mettle is losing power. Yet, sometimes accountability does not just end here, and being removed entails being tried and imprisoned, killed, executed or, alternatively, going into exile. Between 1946 and 2004, 47% of dictators faced one of these three fates as a consequence of losing power. The recent events in the Middle East illustrate this variability. Gaddafi was eventually killed in October 2011 by armed rebels, who had overthrown his personalistic regime in Libya. Mubarak was sentenced to life in prison in June 2012 for the killing of unarmed demonstrators. In contrast, Ben-Ali reacted quickly, fled Tunisia and

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took exile in Saudi Arabia as protests began to spread. Also, the Yemeni president, Saleh, eventually stepped down in exchange for immunity.

The strikingly different post-exit fates dictators may face can be relevant to understanding some political outcomes and decisions, such as regime change, repression, economic performance, and foreign policy. Authoritarian rulers may anticipate what the likely consequences of losing power might be in $t + n$, thereby conditioning their behaviour in t. For instance, a dictator perceiving signals indicating that he shall be punished as a result of losing power will likely try to retain power by any means, even if it entails resorting to widespread violence against the population, as Gaddafi in Libya and Al-Assad in Syria did in the wake of increasing popular dissent and international condemnation. Both rulers seem to have anticipated that the revolts, if successful, would mean not only their demise but also further punishment. Gaddafi's indictment by the International Criminal Court in June 2011 may have added more difficulty to the transition process, as it hindered, to some extent, an exit option, namely exile. Declarations by Gaddafi to resist and fight until the end abounded since then.[1] In effect, Gaddafi was eventually killed.

This article explores the determinants of autocrats' post-exit fate. It does so by focusing on two groups of explanatory factors: regime types and performance. The former determine intra-elite dynamics and the way in which rulers are replaced; while the latter indicates the results of rulers' decisions and so potential outcomes they may be held accountable for. I test these theoretical expectations using a large dataset, covering the period 1946–2004 and containing information on the post-power fate of more than 300 authoritarian rulers. The results show that leaders may be punished for their economic performance and the outcomes of international conflict. I also find that leaders of some regime types are more likely to experience a nasty fate than others.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the importance of post-exit fates for the study of transitions and other political and economic outcomes. I then discuss the determinants of those fates, both institutional and contextual, and present the hypotheses. The next section presents the data and methods used. In turn the results are presented and discussed. The final section concludes.

The relevance of post-power scenarios

The fate of dictators once out of power not only has relevant implications for domestic decisions but also for international politics. In particular, it may affect prospects for a peaceful regime change and it can condition the economic and conflict behaviour of autocratic leaders. I review such implications in the following pages.

Democratization

The early comparative literature pinpointed the consequences of regime change for outgoing elites as key to democratization. In one of the earliest attempts at

modelling the transition process, "exit guarantees" appeared as one of the key elements accounting for regime breakdown. Exit guarantees reduce the anticipated personal costs of regime change to outgoing elites and to former supporters who defected to it.[2] Subsequent actor-oriented theories of democratization driven by strategic elite pacts built on this argument. In their classic book, O'Donnell and Schmitter assert that "where they [the military] cannot prevent the transition, they will strive to obtain iron-clad guarantees that under no circumstances will 'the past be unearthed'; failing to obtain that, they will remain a serious threat to the nascent democracy".[3] In Przeworski's setting, extrication processes dominate the transition in those cases where the military remains strong and cohesive, resulting in a democracy with some guarantees.[4] Huntington explicitly states that, to make democratization possible, new democratic authorities should not prosecute former officials for human rights violations when transitions are made through transformation (led by the regime elites) or transplacement (pacts between opposition and regime elites).[5] The case of Yemen in the context of the Arab Spring illustrates this logic. The Gulf Cooperation Council plan for regime change in Yemen, which Saleh and opposition leaders eventually signed in November 2011, stated that Saleh would step down and transfer power in return for immunity from prosecution. Accordingly, recent large-*N* studies find that subsequent democracies are less likely to punish outgoing autocrats.[6]

Despite the apparent relevance of post-tenure fates, the topic had been completely overlooked by both the theoretical and the cross-national empirical literature until very recently. Thus, Sutter's game-theoretic model incorporates the possibility that the dictator is punished by the opposition after he abdicates.[7] This possibility prevents a peaceful transition from taking place, making a costly revolt necessary to bring democracy (such as in Libya and Syria). The essence of the punishment dilemma is that of a commitment nature, hindering not only democratization but also a peaceful change. In order to alleviate this conundrum, two options exist. First, the ex-ruler may go into exile and be granted asylum in a foreign country (such as Tunisia's Ben Ali). Second, the risk of punishment can be played down if the outgoing elites retain the capacity to reintervene in politics should the opposition renege in its commitment not to prosecute them. This capacity typically belongs to military regimes.

This contention speaks about the need to make distinctions between regime types. The ability of some regimes to protect the interests and safety of their elites in a subsequent regime may pave the way for a peaceful and negotiated transition.[8] Thus, in organizational dictatorships, the presence of institutions, such as the party or the military, make it possible that a pact can be reached with opposition forces and commitments concerning the granting of exit guarantees can be made credible. As Huntington puts it, after a transition,

> the party gives up its monopoly of power but not the opportunity to compete for power by democratic means. When they return to the barracks, the military give up both, but they also retain the capacity to reacquire power by nondemocratic means.[9]

Thus, the military can threaten to reintervene. Military officials can hand power back to civilians and return to the barracks and, if their coordination capacity and threatening condition has not been undermined, they can prevent subsequent authorities from prosecuting them. Debs argues that military leaders, having a higher capacity for violence, have a higher risk of being eliminated after ouster precisely to prevent them from using violence in the future.[10] Expecting a nasty fate and seeking to avoid it, military leaders will tend to democratize more quickly than other rulers.

Dominant party regimes also have the ability to protect the interests of former elites. In this case, it is the capacity of party institutions for mobilizing support and retaining important shares of power in subsequent democratic regimes that contributes to protect former elites and to avoid punishment.[11] Former dominant regime parties do very well in elections in post-transition democracies.[12] Party-based regimes can thus ensure a good exit option for former regime elites, and so reduce exit costs. In the case of one-party systems of Communist Europe, others further argue, transitional justice was avoided because notable opposition members had worked as informants for the political police. Hence, the leaders of the new parties in power did not renege on their promise of amnesty to former elites in order to avoid being exposed themselves for having their own "skeletons in the closet".[13]

Following the logic above, the increase in the degree of concern for past abuses and the higher involvement by the international community may worsen the conditions for peaceful step-downs.[14] Recent work shows that some dictators hold tighter onto power when neighbouring countries are carrying out human rights prosecutions after transiting to democracy.[15] In the same vein, the creation of the International Criminal Court in 1998 has been argued to pose a potential obstacle to the spread of democracy.[16] Against this pessimistic view, other scholars have found that human rights prosecutions after transition deter future repression in transitional countries and also in neighbour countries.[17]

Economic performance and conflict behaviour

A similar logic to that underlying the influence of the post-power fates of dictators on regime change has been applied to the field of international relations and political economy to generate new insights. The anticipation of the consequences of certain policy decisions may well lead dictators to mould their actions and policies accordingly.

Concerning decisions affecting economic performance, the anticipation mechanism has been shown to impact growth rates under autocracy. Some research points to the possibility that dictators may refrain from excessive rent extraction if they anticipate that they are likely to be punished in response for their behaviour while in office.[18] Those rulers expecting to be able to control the succession process or to fully forestall it, and even those confident of having a pleasant exile, have no incentive to constrain their greed. Thus, a higher dictator-specific

probability of being punished (that is jailed or killed) is found to be related to higher economic growth rates.

As for conflict behaviour, a growing body of literature examines how leaders' survival considerations affect international policy decisions.[19] The diversionary war literature states that conflict initiation will become more likely when leaders' position in power becomes more insecure. Interstate war is used to boost popular support for government through the mobilization of a rally-around-the-flag effect. Another argument in the same line contends that leaders at risk start (or continue) wars that otherwise they would not initiate (or continue) in order to foster their personal "resurrection". Should the conflict yield successful outcomes, the public perceptions concerning the leader's competence might positively change.[20] However, new empirical evidence indicates that it is actually insecurity in office that leads to peaceful behaviour, and that the risk of an international dispute makes rulers more vulnerable.[21]

Taking into consideration the consequences of losing power permits a finer grain set of predictions. Specifically, if the consequences in terms of punishment of losing an interstate war are particularly nasty, rulers have incentives to continue war, ignoring potential settlement options.[22] All in all, dictators are more conflict-prone because their tenure is more sensitive to war outcomes and their fate is more punitive should they lose office. Under such conditions, leaders are less willing to make concessions to their counterpart.[23] The need to distinguish between types of autocracies has also been stressed as relevant in this case.[24] It is found that more constrained autocrats – more likely to be subject to punishment by elites for war outcomes − use force more selectively, avoiding conflicts they are likely to lose.[25]

The determinants of dictators' post-exit fate

What affects the likelihood that an autocrat goes into exile, is jailed or is killed after losing power? Why are some autocrats able to remain in their countries while others have to flee or are punished? This article concentrates on two basic determinants: the type of regime and the conditions or outcomes at the time of exit. I elaborate on these theoretical expectations in turn.

Regime types

Severe punishment (exile, jail or death) of leaders after exiting power is much more frequent under dictatorship than under democracy.[26] Politics is driven more by conflict and violence than by rule of law under dictatorship. Yet, authoritarian regimes (namely monarchies, personalist, single-party, and military) differ in many regards. Each regime type has a specific set of intra-elite dynamics and a different degree of institutionalization, which determine to a great extent the way in which a leader is replaced.[27] In turn, the way a leader exits power decisively affects his post-tenure fate.[28] The differences in the propensity of falling one way or another in rulers of different regimes is clearly illustrated in Figure 1, which

plots the percentage of regular and irregular leader exits for each regime type.[29] The incidence of irregular exits is clearly much higher under personalist regimes. Out of all personalist rulers who left power, more than 63% were replaced through irregular means. Over 50% of military leaders and 37% of monarchies exited power irregularly too. In contrast, most leaders in single-party regimes (50%) were replaced regularly.

Personalist regimes essentially consist of a ruler who concentrates all the power in his hands and buys the support of a reduced power coalition through patronage networks. The leader has overt control of recruitment and high political appointments.[30] Rents, privileges, and other material rewards constitute the basis of insiders' loyalty. The control of the state and the predation of its resources that this patronage logic entails exacerbate rivalries for its control and grievances among citizens. Other greedy would-be dictators are likely to appear from within the elite, and the only way to take power is by getting rid of the incumbent.

Given that the regime is impersonated by the ruler, the regime usually dies with the dictator. Insiders benefiting from the regime, hence, will likely lose the privileges they enjoy as elite members in subsequent regimes. Remaining in the power coalition is possible in highly-institutionalized regimes with regularized turnover procedures, where leader change does not result in the fall or end of the whole regime.[31] In personalized regimes, where the leader has overt control of political recruitment of elite members, being part of the subsequent power elite is unlikely, since recruitment is normally based on ethnic and family links. To avoid such a scenario, elite members have incentives to take control of the regime before it falls and they are purged by subsequent rulers.



Figure 1. Modes of ruler exit under different regime types (1946–2004).
Note: Data on regimes are from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2012); data on exit modes are from Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza (2009).

Furthermore, non-binding institutions under personalism are used to reward supporters, instead of working as mechanisms for power-sharing or channelling opposition's demands. Rotations of high officials are frequent in order to prevent them from developing their own power bases. This exclusionary logic leaves outsiders devoid of access to rents and other political opportunities. The grievances this creates increase the risks of plots leading to the assassination of the ruler. Moreover, to reduce the collective action capacity of the military under personalist regimes, coup-proofing strategies aimed at undermining the capacity of the military are common.[32] These practices, though, cause resentment among officers and may increase the risks of coups.

Power concentration and weak institutions also cause a lack of institutionalized procedures for leadership succession and for dealing with disputes and challenges from within the elite clique and opposition leaders. Would-be dictators must resort to plots, coups, or assassination to get rid of the incumbent, whereas angry citizens must protest massively or take arms and revolt.[33]

Concerning the masses, grievances such as political exclusion, repression, predation, and corruption can lead the public to the perception that revolting is the only way out.[34] In Bratton and Van de Walle's words, under neopatrimonialism, "shrinking economic opportunities and exclusionary patterns of reward are a recipe for social unrest".[35] Indeed, personalist dictators are more likely than other types of autocrats to be ousted by an armed revolt and to experience civil wars.[36] If that is the case, and the contest is lost (or about to be lost), only two options are left: fleeing the country and going into exile (such as Mobutu Sese Seko and Jean-Claude Duvalier) or being captured by angry masses with many scores to settle and probably being imprisoned or killed for years of oppression and mismanagement (as recently happened to Muammar Gaddafi).[37]

Due to the high likelihood of fleeing or being killed upon exit and to the inability of their weak institutions to protect the interests (and safety) of the ruler after a regime change, it does not make much difference for a personalist autocrat if he is replaced by a democracy or not. The following hypotheses summarize the insights above. First, given their higher propensity to be ousted irregularly by both elite members and the opposition, I generally expect the following:

> H1a: Personalist rulers are much more likely to be punished (jailed, assassinated or executed) than rulers of other regime types after losing power.

Second, given their higher odds of being removed by a civil war or a popular revolt, I further hypothesize that:

> H1b: Upon losing power, personalist rulers are more likely to exile than other dictators.

Personalist dictators are characterized not only by being more likely to be punished but, in particular, by being much more likely to be assassinated or executed than

other rulers. A number of factors account for this expectation. First, as personalist regimes lack regularized methods for leadership succession, elites (and masses) must turn to irregular means.[38] Given that elites are kept to a minimum and constantly rotated (and purged), and the military alienated and undermined, assassination becomes more feasible than a coup, as it requires less coordination and a smaller group of plotters (sometimes just one).[39] Finally, social exclusion and widespread repression also give reasons to masses and opposition members to resort to political violence, settle scores, and get rid of the tyrant. The leader incarnates the whole regime. So, be it to replace the leader and take over his position or be it to bring democracy, putting an end to the regime necessarily entails eliminating the incumbent dictator. If the dictator is killed, the likelihood that such a regime will return becomes zero. These insights give place to the following hypothesis:

> H1c: Personalist rulers are much more likely to be assassinated or executed than other dictators.

In monarchies, as in personal regimes, one individual usually exclusively dominates the political apparatus. However, in monarchies, succession is regularized by formal hereditary rule, which makes leaders less prone to be ousted through irregular methods and to be punished.[40] Sometimes though, impatient and greedy heirs or relatives not willing to wait until the king's death may speed up the succession process by staging a palace putsch, which might lead to the assassination of the incumbent monarch.[41]

In contrast to personalistic (and monarchic) forms of autocracy, organizational dictatorships are those characterized by concentration of power on a collective organization rather than a single individual. Institutional dictatorships replace leaders in a regular manner more often. Plus, these organizations (party or military) can protect the interests of former authoritarian elites under a subsequent democracy, so regime changes tend to be peaceful and pacted. This underscores the necessity to distinguish between those ruler exits that lead to a democracy and those that do not in the case of organizational dictatorships.

Some rulers in party-based regimes are forcibly replaced by elites dissatisfied with poor performance and are punished as a result of this. Such was the case of Mátyás Rákosi, General Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party and de facto ruler of the country until 1956, who was removed under pressure from insiders and amidst intrigue, and eventually forced to leave the country.

Nonetheless, most rulers in party-based regimes are replaced through regular means. Institutionalized methods for leader replacement are commonly well established in single-party regimes. Non-hereditary successions and even the holding of elections are frequent. Elections usually ensure a smooth transfer of power in the case of defeat, make possible a continued prominent role of the dominant party in future regimes, and prevent violent ousters since the opposition can compete within regime institutions.[42] Additionally, single-party regimes are able to enhance credible power-sharing agreements by delegating to the party the capacity to

select and appoint power positions, which, in turn, help neutralize threats from regime insiders.[43] Institutionalized regimes offer formal arenas for elite bargaining, for enhancing insiders' career prospects and influence, and for channelling the demands of relevant social groups.[44] These features enable and provide incentives for elite and faction cooperation and reduce the likelihood of coups and assassinations. Besides, single-party regimes mobilize public support and co-opt opposition members through the control of public resources and positions and through the granting of access to the decision-making process.[45] By being able to integrate a larger part of the population, rebellions and civil wars are infrequent and so is leader punishment.

In the case of transitions to democracy, as emphasized in the first section, authoritarian parties usually have the ability to affect the distribution of power in a subsequent democracy, thereby protecting the interests of former authoritarian elites.[46] Dominant authoritarian parties with broad support coalitions have the capacity to negotiate with opposition leaders the terms of the transition and can often compete and even win power in democratic elections.[47] In sum, leaders of party-based regimes are unlikely to be punished if they are replaced by a democratic regime and even by a subsequent autocratic leader. This can be summed up in the following hypothesis:

H2: Monarchs and rulers of party-based regimes are the least likely to be punished.

As for military regimes, distinguishing between successor regimes is also relevant. Military elites are characterized by their dislike of disunity and factionalism within the armed forces.[48] This makes these regimes more prone to negotiate power transfers with civilian elites, as long as exit guarantees are offered.[49] The commitment not to punish is made credible here by the military's advantage in the use of violence and, so, their capacity to reintervene and lead to an authoritarian reversal.[50] For example, in Argentina, military unrest and the threat of a coup due to the prosecution of former junta leaders eventually impelled Alfonsín's government to pass the Full Stop Law and the Law of Due Obedience in 1986 and 1987, respectively.[51] Debs suggests a different rationale to account for military regimes' short duration, which has implications for our topic of interest.[52] According to him, the military's greater capacity for violence makes them more likely to be "eliminated" upon their exit, as they may be more threatening to subsequent rulers. Anticipating this, military elites are more prone to hand power to civilians and allow for a democratic transition.

However, when military rulers are not replaced by a democracy but another dictator, leader change is usually the result of a coup.[53] Although some military regimes establish regularized methods for turning over leaders, these arrangements are much less frequent than under party-based regimes. When devoid of turnover mechanisms, regime narrowing and the progressive personalization of power is a major cause of military resentment among units and top officers.[54] The mere exercise of power may become the cause of tensions. In this case, the capacity

for violence military leaders have, plus the fact that elite rivals and factions within the regime also have access to weapons and troops and can more easily coordinate, might be a disadvantage for outgoing military rulers.[55] This makes military regimes relatively vulnerable to coups due to internal rivalries or to forced removals under the threat of a coup. Since outgoing military rulers and elites may represent a threat to new elites, they are more likely to be further sanctioned, or "eliminated" in Debs' terms,[56] with a view to preventing subsequent reinterventions and conflicts between outgoing and current factions. These insights lead to two more hypotheses.

> H3: Military rulers (like personalist ones) will more likely be punished after exiting power than other leaders.

This hypothesis applies principally to those rulers succeeded by another dictator. However, the distinction between types of successor regime is required to refine the expectations concerning the impact of regime types on the fate of rulers when autocrats are followed by a democracy. As stated, military and party regimes have institutional mechanisms to protect the elites' interests after a democratic transition. Elites in a military regime can threaten to reintervene after a transition if the new regime encroaches on their interests, whereas the dominant political party in party-based dictatorships competes in and often wins post-transitional elections. Therefore, I further hypothesize:

> H4: If succeeded by a democratic regime, rulers of military and party-based regimes are expected to be much less likely to be punished than personalist autocrats.

Performance and context

Autocrats may be held accountable and therefore punished for their poor performance. Based on existing evidence on authoritarian survival, this article contends that authoritarian rulers are evaluated according to their performance at both the domestic and the international levels, that is, for their economic results and their conflict behaviour. As Norpoth puts it, "war and economics have few rivals when it comes to making or breaking governments".[57]

It has traditionally been argued that economic performance affects the stability of non-democratic regimes. Poor performance weakens authoritarian regimes and rulers through a variety of mechanisms: it undermines their rent distribution capacity, it aggravates existing grievances and thus facilitates collective action, and it creates conflict over policy responses.[58] Economic crises may not only increase the likelihood that a leader is ousted; they might also well augment the probability that he is further punished. Three simple reasons may account for this. First, attribution of responsibilities in a context of economic recession is eased and exacerbated by power concentration. Poor economic performance signals incompetence and, above all, corruption and mismanagement by the leader. Considered the main responsible person in such situations, dictators

ousted under such circumstances are likely to be further punished for their predatory behaviour once out of power. Second, "economic crises undermine the 'authoritarian bargains' forged between rulers and key sociopolitical constituents and expose rulers to defection from within the business sector and protest 'from below'".[59] Third, economic crises and low per capita income foster popular discontent. Growth, as a basic form of public good, decreases the likelihood of revolutionary events and the incidence of dissent.[60] Coup attempts are certainly more likely during economic recessions and widespread discontent is likely to increase.[61] Military officers detest social unrest and political instability.[62] Consequently, economic downturns fuel the occurrence of irregular ousters.[63]

H5: Leaders ousted during times of economic crisis are more likely to be punished as a consequence of leaving power.

Authoritarian rulers are accountable for their performance in the international arena too. The involvement in and the outcomes of international conflicts strongly affect the ability of autocrats to retain power. Initial evidence revealed that costly involvement in an interstate war shortens the tenure of leaders, while the involvement in a war has little effect on the tenure of long-lasting dictators.[64]

If involvement in war per se does not result in much of a consequence, do outcomes of interstate conflict matter? In this case the existing evidence is more conclusive. Recent evidence reveals that autocrats' tenure is very sensitive to the outcome of war.[65] In particular, defeat in a war or in a crisis significantly increases autocrats' risk of being removed from office. More specifically, it seems that defeat in conflict increases the chance of a dictator being removed through irregular means.[66] Further evidence suggests that this is particularly true for constrained autocrats, that is, those who do not have control over selection of high posts and do not control personally the security forces or tamper with them.[67]

Leaders replaced after a defeat may face further sanctions. Wars lead to high societal costs, and defeats add to these costs the consequences of losing the contest: making important policy concessions, the loss of territory, or the loss of access to resources. The existence of these costs may mean that the ruler who decided to engage his country in the conflict is not only replaced but further punished. A defeat shows incapacity, incompetence and, as in economic crises, renders the ruler's position weak vis-à-vis elite members and the public. Seemingly, leader punishment may also work as a signal to future leaders, deterring them from costly and risky foreign policy decisions.[68] For instance, military ruler of Argentina, Galtieri, was arrested and tried in 1983, shortly after having been replaced due to his defeat in the Falklands War against the UK. In 1986, Galtieri was found guilty of incompetence during the war and sentenced to serve 12 years.[69]

H6: Autocrats who have been defeated in an international conflict are more likely to be punished after losing power.

Data and methods

I test the propositions above using a large dataset on dictators and their post-tenure fate covering the period 1946–2004. The data on leaders' fates is taken from *Archigos*, which codes the leader's fate for the period up to one year after he lost office.[70] The dependent variable can take four values (1–4): 1 if the ruler remains unpunished after being replaced; 2 if the ruler goes into exile and leaves the country; 3 if the leader is imprisoned after being ousted; and 4 if the leader is assassinated or executed.

The independent variables capture the type of regime and the context under which leaders exit power. The regime variable distinguishes four types of regimes following Geddes, Wright, and Frantz's updated data and classification:[71] monarchies, personalist regimes, single-party regimes, and military regimes. Hybrid regime types are dealt with in the following manner: military-personal are grouped with pure military regimes and all party-hybrid regimes are coded as party regimes. Party regimes are used as the reference category in the models.

The contextual and outcome variables include the following. First, to capture the economic situation at the time of exit, I include the rate of economic growth and the (logarithm) of GDP per capita.[72] I lag the growth variable one year to avoid the estimated effects being due to reversed causality, that is, that the decrease in growth is caused by the instability associated to a leader change. Second, conflict performance is measured using two variables. The first is a dummy variable indicating whether or not a given leader has been defeated in a war or an international crisis.[73] The variable takes value 1 from the year the defeat took place until the last year the ruler was in office. The second is another dummy, which indicates whether the country was involved in an international conflict at the time of the ruler's exit.[74]

The temporal dimension is captured by a dummy which takes value 1 for all Cold War years (1946–1990), and 0 for the post-Cold War era. The logarithm of the squared kilometres that a country's surface has seeks to capture the practical difficulties of crossing borders and exile. Some dictators were able to flee their countries and were hosted by a former colonial power, such as "Baby Doc" Duvalier, who left power in 1986 amidst popular protests and exiled in France. To take this possibility into consideration, a dummy indicating whether a country had previously been a colony has also been constructed.[75] To further capture a dictator's ability to flee the country and find asylum abroad, I have constructed a dummy variable coded 1 if a country has a formal alliance with one of the permanent members of the UN Security Council (US, UK, France, Russia/USSR, or China) in a given year.[76]

Additionally, I control for the number of years a dictator has been in power up to time *t*. More time in office usually means the accumulation of grievances and greater personalization of power, and so it might create the perception that only an irregular ouster, probably a revolt, will lead to ruler change. It is precisely the longest-lasting rulers who have been ousted by popular uprisings in the Arab

Spring: Ben Ali (Tunisia) 24 years, Mubarak (Egypt) 30 years, Gaddafi (Libya) 42 years, and Saleh (Yemen) 21 years (or 32 if his rule in North Yemen prior to the unification is considered).

Finally, two other variables help us control for conditions at the time of exit. The first one is a dummy for the presence of civil war in the country.[77] Being the result of continued grievances against the state and its leaders, I expect leaders removed amidst a context of violence, such as a civil war, to be more likely to exile or to be killed. The second variable takes value 1 if a presidential election has been held in a country in a given year.[78] Elections regularize access to power, thereby helping leaders to manage the elites and co-opt (at least) part of the opposition.[79]

Due to the characteristics of the dependent variable, the empirical models are estimated using multinomial logit with errors clustered on country. I estimate the probability of each different fate (exile, jail, death), conditional on having left power. Therefore, exiting dictators are the units of analysis and there is just one observation per leader. Rulers who died in office are excluded. The coefficients should be interpreted in relation to the base outcome, which is remaining unpunished after exit. I include a series of region dummies to control for region-specific effects.

Results

Table 1 reports the estimated coefficients and their standard errors. In models 1–3 only the regime type variables and the region dummies are included. Model 4 includes the full set of variables: regime types, performance, and all contextual controls.

In model 1 all regimes are included in the sample, dealing with hybrids in the way detailed above. The results show that, compared to the reference category (party regimes), leaders of personalist regimes who exit power are significantly more likely to be killed, to be jailed, and to go into exile. Military rulers are also significantly more likely to be imprisoned after being replaced than party-regime leaders. In model 2 we run the same simple model but in this case I have excluded hybrid regimes from the sample. This model, including only "pure types", allows us to confirm that the results in model 1 are not driven by the inclusion of hybrid regimes and their classification. Actually, the impact of regime types gets stronger if hybrids are excluded.[80] The differences between regimes are clearly illustrated in Figure 2, which shows the predicted probability of each leader's fate for each leader's type (given that the ruler has exited power) using the estimates from model 4, which includes all regimes in the sample and all control variables.

First, the highest probability of going into exile and of being killed corresponds to personalist leaders, confirming hypotheses 1b and 1c. This was the fate, for example, of Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic), Anastasio Somoza Garcia (Nicaragua), and Ibrahim Baré Maïnassara (Niger). A personalist leader who loses power has a 13.5% probability of being killed. Anticipating that, many flee before it is too late and seek asylum in friendly countries, such as Milton Obote

Table 1. The determinants of autocrats' post-exit fate, 1946–2004.

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Coeff.	Std. error	Coeff.	Std. error	Coeff.	Std. error	Coeff.	Std. error
Exile abroad								
Monarchy	0.875	(0.602)	1.18**	(0.550)	0.745	(0.652)	−0.219	(0.666)
Personalist	1.30***	(0.380)	1.88***	(0.398)	1.11***	(0.452)	0.763*	(0.399)
Military	0.104	(0.426)	0.275	(0.484)	−0.058	(0.483)	−0.092	(0.471)
Leader duration							0.057**	(0.024)
Log GDP per capita							−1.06***	(0.323)
Economic growth $_{t-1}$							−2.99	(2.98)
Surface (log km2)							−0.406**	(0.182)
Cold War							0.336	(0.545)
Presidential election							−0.830**	(0.409)
Former colony							−0.436	(0.509)
Alliance with superpower							0.357	(0.599)
Civil war							0.642*	(0.365)
International war							1.24**	(0.611)
Defeat in int. conflict							−0.267	(0.702)
Constant	−1.44***	(0.396)	−2.19***	(0.417)	−1.48***	(0.453)	11.39***	(3.22)
Imprisoned, arrested								
Monarchy	0.086	(0.717)	0.557	(0.827)	0.048	(0.749)	−0.849	(1.13)
Personalist	1.15***	(0.355)	1.44***	(0.460)	0.916**	(0.400)	1.33***	(0.420)
Military	0.929**	(0.382)	1.32***	(0.485)	1.16***	(0.447)	1.31***	(0.456)
Leader duration							0.067**	(0.031)
Log GDP per capita							0.168	(0.376)
Economic growth $_{t-1}$							−6.80*	(3.52)
Surface (log km2)							−0.210	(0.162)
Cold War							1.53***	(0.480)
Presidential election							−0.878**	(0.416)

(*Continued*)

Table 1. Continued.

	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Coeff.	Std. error	Coeff.	Std. error	Coeff.	Std. error	Coeff.	Std. error
Former colony							0.136	(0.729)
Alliance with superpower							−0.434	(0.760)
Civil war							−0.543	(0.490)
International war							0.802	(0.849)
Defeat in int. conflict							1.04*	(0.591)
Constant	−2.31***	(0.324)	−2.66***	(0.461)	−2.48***	(0.381)	−2.37	(3.82)
Assassinated, executed								
Monarchy	0.127	(0.659)	0.849	(0.634)	−0.032	(0.695)	−1.44	(1.16)
Personalist	1.49***	(0.382)	2.58***	(0.535)	1.56***	(0.432)	1.76***	(0.480)
Military	0.388	(0.436)	1.09	(0.692)	0.533	(0.525)	0.764	(0.638)
Leader duration							0.065**	(0.030)
Log GDP per capita							−0.823*	(0.481)
Economic growth $_{t-1}$							6.62	(4.59)
Surface (log km2)							−0.303	(0.248)
Cold War							2.37**	(0.922)
Presidential election							−0.025	(0.631)
Former colony							−0.748	(0.581)
Alliance with superpower							0.852	(0.580)
Civil war							1.35***	(0.509)
International war							0.816	(0.794)
Defeat in int. conflict							0.296	(0.825)
Constant	−2.91***	(0.496)	−3.80***	(0.527)	−3.21***	(0.483)	3.67	(4.86)
Log-likelihood	−433.099		−317.358		−338.462		−311.839	
N	389		312		307		316	
Sample	All regimes		Hybrids excluded		Rulers succeeded by a dictator		All regimes	
Region dummies	Yes		Yes		Yes		Yes	

Note: Base outcome: "Exit and ok". *$p < 0.1$, **$p < 0.05$, ***$p < 0.01$. Errors clustered on country.



Figure 2. Predicted probability of dictators' post-tenure fate by regime type.
Note: Predicted probabilities using estimates from model 4 in Table 1. The rest of the variables held constant at their means.

and Idi Amin (Uganda), and Ferdinand Marcos (Philippines). The probability of a personalist leader exiling is almost 29%.

Second, supporting hypotheses 1a and 3, personalist and military leaders are found to be the most likely to be imprisoned. The predicted probabilities are 18% and 23.6%, respectively. This was the fate, for example, of Sukarno (Indonesia), Moussa Traoré (Mali), Saye Zerbo (Burkina Faso), and Christophe Soglo and Alphonse Alley (Benin). Regarding military rulers, note that they were expected to be more susceptible to being punished. The evidence indicates that the form of punishment they are more likely to experience is imprisonment. One potential explanation for this is that because of a higher coordination capacity and better equipment, factions within military regimes are less inclined than elites in personalist regimes to attempt an assassination. Such a strategy might also trigger a violent contest between factions.

Note, however, that for all regime types, the most likely fate of an autocrat is to remain unpunished upon exiting office. Monarchs and leaders of party-based regimes have the highest likelihood of enjoying a safe post-tenure fate: 75% for monarchs and 66% for party regime rulers, which confirms hypothesis 2. Both regime types have (extremely different, but still) regularized methods for substituting leaders. Conversely, the likelihood of a personalist autocrat having a safe exit fate is just 39%.

Most authoritarian rulers are replaced, regularly or not, by another dictator.[81] This suggests that the patterns identified concerning the effect of regime types

are principally driven by rulers replaced by subsequent dictators. Model 3 proves this point by including in the sample only those dictators replaced by another dictator.[82] Distinguishing the successor regime has an important implication, as hypothesis 4 emphasizes. Leaders of military and party regimes are less susceptible to punishment after they step down, because they have institutional mechanisms for retaining some power even after a democratic transition. This implies that the differences in the fates of personalist rulers and those of organizational dictatorships should be stronger for those rulers replaced by democratic regimes. For personalist rulers it does not make much difference whether they are replaced by a dictator or by a democracy. To test hypothesis 4, I have coded a dummy variable indicating whether a ruler is replaced by a democracy or by a subsequent autocrat. Table 2 shows the fate of rulers by regime type and by the type of successor,[83] confirming that rulers of party-based and military regimes tend to have a safer post-exit fate when they are succeeded by democracies.[84] If replaced by a dictator, 49.3% of military rulers remain unpunished after losing power. If replaced by a democracy, the percentage of military rulers that enjoy a safe fate is 58.3%.[85] The increase is even bigger for party-regime rulers: 60.3% remain unpunished if replaced by a dictator, while 84.2% share this same fate when replaced by a democracy. On the contrary, the fates of personalist rulers do not vary much if they are replaced by democracies, as the first two rows reveal, because personalist regimes do not have institutions that can "protect" the interests of the outgoing dictator.

Distinguishing the type of successor regime calls attention to a second difference, namely that military rulers are only highly likely to be imprisoned if they are replaced by a dictator. If followed by another autocrat, the likelihood that a

Table 2. The fate of dictators, regime type and type of successor.

		Post-exit fate			
Rulers' regime	Succeeded by	OK	Exile	Prison	Death
Personalist	Dictator	31.82% (21)	33.33% (22)	16.67% (11)	18.18% (12)
	Democracy	34.62% (9)	34.62% (9)	19.23% (5)	11.54% (3)
Military	Dictator	49.33% (37)	17.33% (13)	24% (18)	9.33% (7)
	Democracy	58.33% (21)	25% (9)	11.11% (4)	5.56% (2)
Single-party	Dictator	60.29% (82)	20.59% (28)	11.03% (15)	8.09% (11)
	Democracy	84.21% (16)	5.26% (1)	5.26% (1)	5.26% (1)

Note: Cell entries report row percentages and frequencies (in parentheses). Monarchs are not reported as only one ruler was replaced by a democracy in the sample.

military ruler is imprisoned (or placed under house arrest) is even higher than that of personal rulers and significantly higher than that of party-regime leaders.[86] If followed by a democracy, in contrast, military regime leaders' likelihood of being jailed is much smaller than that of personal leaders. Moreover, the differences between military rulers and party leaders in terms of the likelihood of being jailed are not significant (although it is still higher for military rulers).

In model 4 all control variables are included.[87] This model confirms that the effect of regime types found in the previous models is robust to the inclusion of all controls. Furthermore, the results demonstrate that dictators are held accountable and sanctioned if they perform poorly. In particular, short-term economic downturns significantly increase the likelihood that a dictator is jailed after being replaced. Moving from a positive growth rate of 2% to having a recession with a rate of −2% increases the probability of being imprisoned by more than three percentage points on average, from 12.7% to 15.9%.[88] If, at the time of exit, the country is in a deeper crisis, with a growth rate of −5%, the likelihood of being jailed is 18.6%. The long-term performance of the economy also matters for post-tenure fates. A higher GDP per capita significantly reduces the likelihood of a deposed ruler exiling or being killed.

Defeats in international wars or crises have a significant impact as well. A leader who has been defeated after engaging his country in an international conflict has a significantly higher probability of being imprisoned.[89] A "defeated" dictator has an average 30% probability of being jailed, while for non-defeated leaders that probability is just 12.6%. For instance, Dimitrios Ioannidis, leader of the Greek military regime in the mid-1970s, was arrested, tried, and sentenced to death (eventually commuted to life sentence) after his decision to annex Cyprus led to a war against Turkey over the control of the island, ending up with its division. Weakened by this defeat, the military junta broke down in 1974. Being defeated at war does not significantly affect the likelihood of the other post-exit fates. The mere involvement in an interstate war at the time of being replaced does not increase the likelihood of punishment, but it does increase the probability that a leader goes into exile, presumably to avoid being punished by foreign forces or some domestic actor.

In light of this evidence, hypotheses 5 and 6 can be confirmed as well. Policy outcomes matter for the post-tenure fate of dictators. The question "accountable for what?" appears to have a clear answer: autocrats are likely to be held accountable for their economic performance as well as for their results in international conflicts.

The impact of some of the control variables merits comment as well.[90] First, as the coefficients of the dummy for the Cold War period indicate, assassinations and imprisonments were far more likely prior to the fall of the USSR. Second, large territories hinder dictators taking exile in foreign countries. For instance, with the air force destroyed by the NATO attacks, and with Gaddafi still hidden, a convoy transporting many of his loyalists took the long desert route and fled to Niger in September 2011. There were rumours affirming that Gaddafi would join them and head for Burkina Faso.[91] Third, having a formal alliance with a

permanent member of the UNSC increases the likelihood of going into exile, but not significantly. Fourth, leaders ousted or removed in the context of a civil war are much more likely to go into exile and to be killed. It is possibly just a matter of what happens first. For example, President Samuel Doe was brutally killed during the Liberian civil war, after being captured by an armed faction. Occasionally, not even exile is enough to escape death. Anastasio Somoza Debayle was overthrown in 1979 by the armed revolt of the *Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional*. Somoza fled to the US but was denied entry and was eventually taken in by his peer Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay. In September 1980, Anastasio Somoza was assassinated in Asunción by a Sandinista commando. Finally, I find that presidential elections significantly reduce the probability that a dictator needs to exile or is jailed once out of power.[92] For example, in Benin, long-lasting President Mathieu Kérékou decided to allow multiparty elections in the 1990s due to increasing popular and international pressure. In the presidential election of 1991, Kérékou was widely defeated by Soglo in the second round. Kérékou retired temporarily but ran for the presidency again in 1996, and won.

Concluding remarks

This article identifies the most relevant factors that account for rulers' fates after losing power. According to the results, with the options for a secure exile highly undermined after the International Criminal Court indictment, Gaddafi's fate was almost written. He was a personalist ruler ousted in a civil war. The probability that he would be killed was extraordinarily high. Personalist autocrats are highly likely to face a nasty fate if they lose power, much more than leaders of other regime types. This is a result of the combination of two basic characteristics of personalist regimes. First, a logic of loyalty based on patronage, corruption, and exclusion undermines economic growth, creates grievances, and ruins public finances, which increases the likelihood of a coup or a popular uprising. Second, a low degree of regime institutionalization and a lack of regular methods of replacing rulers lead rivals to resort to assassination to get rid of the incumbent. The evidence reported also shows that ending up in prison is a more likely outcome for autocrats of personalist and military regimes. In contrast, provided with regular methods for ruler substitution, monarchs and leaders of party regimes have a higher probability of not facing any further sanction after leaving power.

Does this have consequences for the prospects of regime change? If the cost anticipation logic applies, the implications are twofold. First, regarding democratization, as party-based and military regimes are more able to ensure a good fate for their rulers should they transit to democracy, they should be more likely to transit to democracy if the regime falls. Indeed, the data shows that only 35.9% of personalist regimes that fall give way to a democracy. Conversely, out of all regime failures, 62.3% ended in democratization in military regimes, and 40.3% in party-based regimes did so too. Second, personalist rulers should resist regime changes for as long as possible. Expecting a nasty fate should the regime

fall, political change usually has to be imposed, often violently, upon personal rulers. Certainly, personalist regimes are the least likely to transition peacefully. Out of all regime changes from personalist rule since 1946, only 50% have been non-violent. In contrast, 58% and 67.5% of transitions from party and military regimes, respectively, have been peaceful.

Lack of prowess has an impact on autocrats' fate as well. Leaders who lost office amidst an economic downturn and those who were defeated in an international conflict have been found to have faced a higher likelihood of ending up in prison. Hence, autocrats' performance at both domestic and international levels does not only affect their prospects of surviving in power but also whether they will experience further punishment after exit. As in the case of regime change, the anticipation of the costs that losing power may entail can precipitate rulers to make very consequential decisions: go to war (or not) or curb their greed (or not).

Notes

1. See Zeliger, "ICC Indictment of Qaddafi."
2. Dix, "The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes," 567–568.
3. O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, 29.
4. Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*.
5. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 231.
6. Escribà-Folch, "Maten al León"; Debs, "Living by the Sword."
7. Sutter, "Settling Old Scores."
8. Geddes, "Democratization after Twenty Years."
9. Huntington, *The Third Wave*, 120.
10. Debs, "Living by the Sword."
11. Wright and Escribà-Folch, "Authoritarian Institutions."
12. Ibid.
13. Nalepa, *Skeletons in the Closet*.
14. See Snyder and Vinjamuri, "Trials and Errors."
15. Escribà-Folch and Wright, "Human Rights Prosecutions."
16. Goldsmith, "International Criminal Court"; Nalepa and Powell, "To Stay or To Go."
17. Kim and Sikkink, "Explaining the Deterrence Effect."
18. Escribà-Folch, "Potential Punishment under Dictatorship."
19. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "Survival of Political Leaders"; Chiozza and Goemans, "Peace through Insecurity"; Chiozza and Goemans, "Tenure of Leaders"; Weeks, "Accountable Autocrats?"; Weeks, "Rulers, Risk, and Restraint."
20. Downs and Rocke, "Gambling for Resurrection."
21. Chiozza and Goemans, "Peace through Insecurity."
22. Goemans, "Fighting for Survival."
23. Debs and Goemans, "Regime Type," 430.
24. Peceny, Beer, and Sanchez-Terry, "Dictatorial Peace?"; Reiter and Stam, "Identifying the Culprit"; Peceny and Beer, "Peaceful Parties."
25. Weeks, "Rulers, Risk, and Restraint."
26. Debs and Goemans, "Regime Type," 434.
27. Geddes, "Democratization after Twenty Years"; Ezrow and Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships*.
28. Goemans, 'Which Way Out?'.

29. The number of those removed by foreign forces or who left office due to natural death or ill health was included in the denominator but it is not shown in the bar graph. Therefore, the percentages in the figure do not add up to 100%. *Regular exits* are those which occur "according to the prevailing rules, provisions, conventions, and norms of the country," while "a loss of office is considered irregular when the leader was removed in contravention of explicit rules and established conventions. Most irregular removals from office are the result of the threat or use of force as exemplified in coups, (popular) revolts, and assassinations [...] and occur at the hands of domestic opponents"; Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, "Introducing *Archigos*," 273.
30. Geddes, "Democratization after Twenty Years."
31. Besley and Kudamatsu, "Making Autocracy Work."
32. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing."
33. Iqbal and Zorn, "Sic Semper Tyrannis?."
34. Goodwin, *No Other Way Out*.
35. Bratton and Van de Walle, "Political Transitions in Africa," 460.
36. According to Svolik and Akcinaroglu's data, 13.5% of personalist rulers were ousted by civil wars, while no monarchy and only about 3% of military and party-regime rulers experienced that end. As for revolts, more than 12% of personal rulers are ousted by them, but only 7.7% of monarchs, 4.9% of party-regime leaders, and 9.5% of military rulers. Svolik and Akcinaroglu, "Government Change." See also Gurses and Mason, "Weak States."
37. During the popular uprising that started in 2011, Yemen's President Saleh was severely injured after an attack with an explosive projectile on his palace, which took place on 3 June. He left the country for medical treatment and there were doubts about whether he was ever going to return. He eventually did so in September.
38. Iqbal and Zorn, "Sic Semper Tyrannis?."
39. Ezrow and Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships*, 90.
40. Almost 33% of monarchs manage to retain power until they die of natural causes or are unable to rule due to ill health.
41. Tullock, *Autocracy*.
42. Cox, "Authoritarian Elections"; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism."
43. Magaloni, "Credible Power-Sharing."
44. Brownlee, *Age of Democratization*; Gandhi, *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*; Smith, "Life of the Party."
45. Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*; Greene, *Why Dominant Parties Lose*.
46. Wright and Escribà-Folch, "Authoritarian Institutions."
47. Ibid.
48. Geddes, "Democratization after Twenty Years."
49. Dix, "The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes."
50. Sutter, "Settling Old Scores."
51. Nobles, "Human Rights Violations."
52. Debs, "Living by the Sword."
53. In fact, most military rulers, 67.6%, are succeeded by another dictator.
54. Dix, "The Breakdown of Authoritarian Regimes."
55. Ezrow and Frantz, *Dictators and Dictatorships*, 85–86.
56. Debs, "Living by the Sword."
57. Norpoth "Guns and Butter," 949; cited in Bueno the Mesquita and Siverson, "Survival of Political Leaders."
58. See Acemoglu and Robinson, "Democratic Transitions" for a theoretical explanation. For empirical evidence, see Gasiorowski, "Political Regime Change"; Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown"; Haggard and Kaufman, "Democratic Transitions"; Wright, "Exit During Crisis."

59. Haggard and Kaufman, "Democratic Transitions," 267.
60. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith, "Leader Survival, Revolutions."
61. Londregan and Poole, "Poverty, the Coup Trap"; Galetovic and Sanhueza, "Citizens, Autocrats, and Plotters."
62. Finer, *The Man on Horseback*; Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics*.
63. Goemans, 'Which Way Out?'.
64. Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson, "Survival of Political Leaders."
65. Chiozza and Goemans, "Tenure of Leaders"; Debs and Goemans, "Regime Type."
66. Goemans, "Which Way Out?."
67. Weeks, "Accountable Autocrats?."
68. Chiozza and Goemans, "Tenure of Leaders."
69. Ironically, Galtieri had been cleared of the charges of human rights violations in a previous trial in 1984.
70. Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, "Introducing *Archigos*"; Goemans, "Which Way Out?."
71. Geddes, Wright, and Frantz, "Authoritarian Regimes." See also Geddes, "Democratization after Twenty Years."
72. Both variables are taken from Maddison, "World Population."
73. Compiled from Goemans, "Which Way Out?."
74. The data on interstate conflict are compiled from PRIO's (Peace Research Institute Oslo) Armed Conflict Dataset. See Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946–2001."
75. I further distinguished between French and British former colonies, but this separation did not yield any significant results either.
76. I also coded two additional variables: the total number of international alliances a country has in a given year, and the total number of countries with which a country has alliances in a given year (so each alliance is weighted by the number of countries it includes). However, neither of these variables is significant and their explanatory power is small when region fixed effects are included. A formal alliance is defined as "a written agreement that identifies at least the members and the obligations of each alliance member," and "the alliance commitment must be a defense pact, neutrality or non-aggression pact, or an entente." Gibler and Sarkees, "Measuring Alliances," 212.
77. The data on intrastate wars are compiled from PRIO's Armed Conflict Dataset. See Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict 1946–2001" for a description.
78. Data are from Goemans, see http://www.rochester.edu/college/faculty/hgoemans/data.htm
79. Gandhi and Lust-Okar, "Elections under Authoritarianism"; Cox, "Authoritarian Elections."
80. When only pure types are considered, hybrid regimes with personalistic traits are not included in the military and party-based categories. This increases the differences between pure personalists and party-regimes. Another noticeable difference between both models, besides the size of the coefficients, is that in model 2 monarchs are significantly more likely to exile than party-regime leaders. Once the full set of controls is included (model not reported but available from the author), the dummy for monarchies ceases to be significant.
81. 71.7% of personalist rulers, 87.7% of party-regime leaders, and 67.6% of military rulers are.
82. Alternatively, models 1, 2, and 4 in Table 1 include those replaced by other dictators as well as those followed by a democratic regime.
83. Monarchs are excluded, as only one was replaced by a democracy in our sample: King Birendra of Nepal in 1991.

84. To check this I have also re-run the basic multinomial logit model, splitting the sample and thus running two separate regressions: one for those leaders replaced by dictators and a second one including only those succeeded by democratic regimes. These results are available from the author.
85. Conversely, the percentage of those imprisoned decreases from 24% to 11.1%.
86. This is consistent with Debs' findings. Debs, "Living by the Sword."
87. Due to the use of lags and some other data availability limitations, the period covered in this last model is 1948–2003.
88. Again, the other variables are held constant at their mean values.
89. In a robustness check I allowed the defeat variable to decrease over time, as defeats may lose importance as time passes. The results, however, were very similar, that is, defeats significantly increase the probability that an outgoing ruler is imprisoned. The impact in all models is driven by defeats in wars.
90. Some region dummies are significant: rulers in South America have been significantly more likely to go into exile, while leaders in Africa and the Middle East have had a higher probability of being killed.
91. "Libyan Convoys in Niger, May Be Gaddafi deal." *Reuters*, September 6, 2011. Available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/06/us-libya-idUSTRE7810I820110906
92. Including a variable indicating whether in a given year a parliamentary election was held yields extremely similar results.

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