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Journal of Democracy, Volume 24, Number 3, July 2013, pp. 5-17 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/jod.2013.0043

THE DURABILITY OF REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES

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Revolutionary regimes are remarkably durable. Historically, revolutionary dictatorships like those in the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Vietnam have proven that they can survive for many decades despite intense external pressure, poor economic performance, and large-scale policy failures. Many of these regimes have posed serious—and persistent—challenges to the foreign policies of Western democracies. Yet scholars continue to know relatively little about the sources of their durability.

Building on the work of Samuel Huntington and Theda Skocpol, we define revolutionary regimes as those which emerge out of sustained, ideological, and violent struggle from below, and whose establishment is accompanied by mass mobilization and significant efforts to transform state structures and the existing social order.[1] (We define as "postrevolutionary" all revolutionary regimes in which the generation that participated directly in the revolutionary struggle has died off, such as Mexico and the Soviet Union after the 1960s.) Our definition thus encompasses both classic social revolutions (such as those in China, Cuba, Iran, Mexico, and Russia) and regimes founded in radical national-liberation struggles (like those of Angola, Mozambique, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe).[2] It does not include regimes that emerge from violent independence struggles in which radical transformational goals do not predominate (Indonesia), cases of mass-based regime change in which states and social structures remain intact (the Philippines in 1986, Ukraine in 2004, or Egypt in 2011), or cases of radical change initiated by actors within the state itself (like the "revolutions from above" in Egypt under Gamal Abdel Nasser, Peru under Juan Velasco, or Ethiopia under Mengistu Haile Mariam).

Journal of Democracy Volume 24, Number 3 July 2013

By any measure, the long-run durability of revolutionary (and post-revolutionary) regimes is impressive. Several of the longest-surviving authoritarian regimes of the last century, including those in Mexico (83 years), the USSR (74 years), China (63 years and counting), Vietnam (59 years and counting), and Cuba (54 years and counting), were born of violent revolution. Outside of a handful of oil-based Persian Gulf monarchies, few other contemporary dictatorships have survived as long.[3]

Since the end of the Cold War, the loss of foreign patrons, unprecedented international democracy promotion, and economic crisis have undermined authoritarian rule in much of the world. Yet revolutionary regimes remain strikingly resistant to democratization. Ten of the twelve revolutionary authoritarian regimes that existed in January 1989 survived through 2013, compared to barely a third (29 of 82) of the world's nonrevolutionary authoritarian regimes.[4] Indeed, the only communist regimes that persisted after the collapse of the Soviet Union—China, Cuba, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam—were revolutionary. Likewise, in sub-Saharan Africa, among the handful of authoritarian regimes that remain intact 24 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall are three that were founded in violent liberation struggles: Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe. And in the Middle East and North Africa, the only nonmonarchies that were not seriously challenged during the Arab Spring—Algeria and Iran—were born of violent struggle.

Most revolutionary regimes withstood extraordinary challenges during the post–Cold War period. China's Communist regime survived the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising. Cuba's revolutionary regime survived the collapse of its Soviet patron, a 40 percent decline in GDP, and Fidel Castro's departure from power. The North Korean Communist regime endured a massive famine following the Soviet collapse, as well as the death of founding leader Kim Il Sung. Angola and Mozambique were the only major Soviet client states in Africa to survive the withdrawal of Soviet assistance in the late 1980s. Regimes in both countries endured debilitating civil wars and severe economic crises. The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) regime withstood a potent opposition challenge, international isolation, a GDP contraction of more than 40 percent, and one of the worst hyperinflationary spirals in history. Finally, Iran's Islamic regime remained intact despite intense international pressure and massive opposition protest in the aftermath of fraudulent elections in 2009. Not only did these revolutionary regimes survive, then, but they survived the kinds of challenges that routinely felled other post–Cold War dictatorships.

Explaining Revolutionary Durability

What explains the striking durability of revolutionary regimes? We argue that armed liberation struggle, postrevolutionary state-building, and the violent conflicts triggered by efforts to carry out radical social

change leave four legacies that enhance authoritarian durability: 1) the destruction of independent power centers; 2) cohesive ruling parties; 3) tight partisan control over the security forces; and 4) powerful coercive apparatuses. These revolutionary legacies help to inoculate revolutionary regimes against elite defection, military coups, and mass protest—three major sources of authoritarian breakdown.

1) The Destruction of Independent Power Centers: Revolutions involve considerably more violence than other forms of regime change. Not only do revolutionaries come to power by violent means, but revolutionary consolidation is almost always accompanied by military conflict. Most revolutionary governments face armed counterrevolutionary movements, some of which escalate into civil war (Russia and Mozambique). Moreover, as Stephen Walt has shown, revolutions dramatically increase the likelihood of interstate war (as occurred in France, Iran, and Vietnam).[5]

Wars allow revolutionary governments to do things that most dictatorships cannot do. Not only does war facilitate the elimination (via death or exile) of immediate rivals, but it makes possible the destruction (or substantial weakening) of alternative centers of power—institutions or social classes whose power, resources, or legitimacy can serve as a basis for mobilizing opposition to the regime. One such power center is the old army. In most revolutions, preexisting armies either dissolved with the fall of the dictator (Cuba and Nicaragua) or were destroyed by civil war (China, Mexico, and Russia). Revolutions also weaken or destroy traditional ruling and religious institutions whose "symbolic power" could be used to mobilize opposition to the regime.[6] Thus the Russian, Vietnamese, Laotian, and Iranian revolutions destroyed preexisting monarchic institutions. Likewise, the Cuban and Mexican revolutions weakened the Catholic Church in those countries, leaving it politically emasculated for decades. In rural revolutions such as those in Mexico, Russia, China, and Vietnam, peasant rebellions and subsequent land reforms destroyed once powerful agrarian elites, which in turn has been shown to enhance regime durability.[7]

Finally, postrevolutionary conflict provides revolutionary elites with both a justification and the means to destroy other (often allied) political organizations that could potentially contest for power in the future. In Russia, for example, the 1918–20 civil war allowed the Bolshevik government to eliminate rival socialist parties, including the Socialist Revolutionaries, which had garnered the greatest support of any party in elections after the revolution. In Iran, the Islamic government's ruthless campaign against the Mojahedin-e-Khalq and other insurgent groups in 1980–82 resulted in the liquidation of nearly all effective opposition. In Zimbabwe, the ZANU-PF government used the threat posed by an uprising in the early 1980s to violently repress the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (known as ZAPU), particularly in its stronghold in Matabeleland.

The destruction of traditional rulers, established churches, landowning classes, and other organized political forces—which is often possible only in a context of war—contributes to authoritarian durability by eliminating not only contemporary rivals but also the structural bases of future opposition. In the absence of independent sources of finance, infrastructure, and legitimacy, the organizational bases of opposition effectively disappear.

Regimes that do not destroy alternative centers of power prove less durable. Compare the Mexican revolution to its Bolivian counterpart, which fails to meet our criteria of protracted violent struggle. Whereas the Mexican revolution destroyed the old army and agrarian elite and pushed the Church to the political sidelines for more than sixty years, Bolivia's "revolution," which began in 1952, was (as Huntington observed) a "fairly peaceful affair" that "fail[ed] to eliminate the revolutionary contenders for power."[8] The new Bolivian government fell in a 1964 coup. Nicaragua provides another instructive case. Although the Sandinista revolution destroyed the Somoza regime's National Guard, the revolutionary government—under intense international pressure—did not attempt to systematically destroy nonrevolutionary actors such as the private sector and the Catholic Church. These actors played a major role in mobilizing opposition and in eventually defeating the Sandinistas.

2) Strong Ruling Parties: Various studies have shown that strong parties are a key to durable authoritarianism.[9] Ruling parties mobilize support, deliver votes, and, crucially, reduce the likelihood of elite defection, which is widely associated with authoritarian breakdown. By regulating access to the spoils of public office and providing future opportunities for career advancement, ruling parties create incentives for regime elites to remain loyal, even if they lose short-term factional battles.

Yet not all authoritarian ruling parties are alike. Whereas some ruling parties are powerful and cohesive organizations that provide a foundation for decades of stable authoritarianism (for example, the UMNO in Malaysia and the Communist Party in China, Cuba, and Vietnam), others (such as Zambia's UNIP and Senegal's Socialist Party) broke down amid post-Cold War economic crises.

As Huntington observed several decades ago, revolutions produce strong ruling parties.[10] Most successful liberation parties develop powerful mass organizations, based on extensive networks of activists and supporters that penetrate the entire national territory. More important, military struggle gives rise to cohesive organizations. The exigencies of armed conflict compel revolutionary organizations to institutionalize military-style discipline—a characteristic that often persists after the seizure of power. In Mozambique, for example, the violent struggle against Portuguese rule waged by the Mozambique Liberation Front

(Frelimo) generated a "military ethos" and discipline that persisted into the 2000s. In Zimbabwe, "military commandism" remained deeply ingrained in ZANU-PF structures long after the guerrilla struggle ended in 1979. In Laos, decades of armed struggle against French and U.S.-backed forces contributed to the "impressive cohesion" of the ruling Lao People's Revolutionary Party.[11] In Russia, cohesion was rooted in post-revolutionary conflict. Whereas the Bolshevik party was marked by "anarchy and indiscipline" in 1917, the war against the Whites convinced party members that "truly iron party discipline . . . was the only way to win the life and death struggle." By 1921, "discipline and obedience had become bywords of Bolshevik consciousness and behavior."[12]

Violent conflict also enhances elite cohesion by strengthening partisan identities and hardening partisan boundaries. As Adrienne Lebas argues, intense polarization sharpens "us-them" distinctions, strengthening within-group ties and fostering perceptions of a "linked fate" among party cadres. Where cadres have participated in prolonged violent struggle, they are more likely to view party membership in "moral" terms, and to frame choices about cooperation or defection in terms of loyalty rather than a simple material calculus.[13] The polarization generated by revolutionary wars often persists into the postrevolutionary era, effectively "trapping" potential defectors within the ruling party. When the opposition can be credibly linked to a historic enemy and when abandoning the ruling party is viewed as disloyalty or even treason, the cost of defection will be high. In such a context, ruling-party defectors generally fail to mobilize support. Thus, in Mexico in 1940 and 1952, in Nicaragua in the early 1980s, and in Zimbabwe in 1989 and 2008, high-profile defectors failed to persuade many leaders or activists to follow them out of the party.

Finally, successful liberation struggles tend to produce a generation of leaders with extraordinary legitimacy and unquestioned authority, which can be used to unify the party and impose discipline during crises. In China, for example, the generation of the Long March (1934–35) appears to have been critical in forging a unified response to the 1989 prodemocracy protests. A group of party "elders" drawn from the revolutionary period strongly supported a crackdown and possessed the authority to unify the party behind such a strategy. Likewise, in Yugoslavia Tito and the generation of Partisans who fought in World War II enjoyed nearly unquestioned authority within the ruling League of Communists, and in Mozambique liberation leaders (*antigos combatentes*) helped to ensure cohesion within Frelimo.

In sum, violent liberation struggles and the polarization generated by revolutionary seizures of power produce unusually disciplined ruling parties, marked by militarized structures, strong partisan identities, intense within-group loyalties, and a founding generation of leaders with extraordinary legitimacy. These characteristics raise the cost of elite de-

fection. Indeed, ruling parties in China, Cuba, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe have suffered strikingly few defections in the post–Cold War era, despite confronting severe crises. In China, the Communist Party closed ranks in the face of the Tiananmen Square protests; in Mozambique, Frelimo experienced few defections despite the devastating civil war and economic collapse of the mid-1980s; and in Zimbabwe, ZANU-PF remained intact in the 2000s despite a serious opposition challenge, stolen elections, international isolation, and an extraordinary economic collapse. By contrast, where ruling parties were not founded in violent struggle (and were consequently organized strictly around patronage, as in Kenya, Senegal, and Zambia), economic crises or opposition challenges often triggered large-scale defection and, in many cases, collapse.

3) Invulnerability to Coups: Revolutionary regimes are also strikingly invulnerable to coups. Military coups are a major cause of authoritarian breakdown. As scholars such as Milan Svolik have argued, most autocrats face a dilemma: The repression needed to sustain authoritarian rule requires the creation of a powerful coercive apparatus, yet an empowered coercive apparatus may easily be turned against the regime itself.[14]

Revolutionary regimes almost never experience coups. Because revolutions are accompanied by state collapse, revolutionary elites frequently remake the state. This entails either the creation of new armies or a radical purge and reconstruction of existing ones. As a result, the army and other security forces are almost invariably commanded by cadres from the liberation struggle and imbued with a revolutionary ideology.[15] In Cuba, for example, the revolutionary regime was marked by "almost total overlap" between the ruling civilian and military elites. In Vietnam, civilian and military roles were "blurred" during the revolutionary struggle, and postrevolutionary army commanders were "without exception . . . high-ranking party leaders." In Mexico, all top military posts were filled by officers with revolutionary credentials until the 1950s. In revolutionary Nicaragua, all top military officials were ex-guerrilla commanders who were active in the ruling Sandinista National Liberation Front. And all of Zimbabwe's security forces, including the army, police, and intelligence agencies, were led by veterans of the liberation struggle into the 2000s.[16]

Revolutionary armies are thus highly partisan and thoroughly committed to the regime. Unlike military officials in other authoritarian regimes (for example, Egypt and Tunisia), who may view their interests as distinct from those of the particular leadership in power, revolutionary army commanders view themselves as "partner(s) in the revolutionary movement" and tend to be "unswervingly loyal to the revolution and its dogmas."[17] For example, Sandinista military officials were "possessed by a genuine sense of mission" that cast them as "defenders . . . of a revolutionary political project," and Iran's Revolutionary Guard viewed

itself as the "principal bastion and perpetuator of revolutionary purity." In China, the fusion of army and party during the revolutionary war gave rise to an extensive commissar system that infused troops with "revolutionary and nationalistic fervor," and in Vietnam, the army's revolutionary origins ensured that its "loyalty to the party was above question."[18]

Such partisan penetration enhances discipline and cohesion within the security forces. Where revolutionary forces build the armed forces from scratch, fill the officer corps with revolutionary combatants, and infuse them with a revolutionary ideology, the security forces are less likely to suffer problems of insubordination and rebellion. Revolutionary governments are almost never overthrown by their own armed forces. Eric Nordlinger reported in the 1970s that no state characterized by a "penetration model" of civil-military relations had ever experienced a coup.[19] Likewise, with the exception of Romania in 1989 (a regime that was not founded in violent struggle), no communist regime has been toppled by a coup. Given that military overthrow is the primary cause of death of authoritarian regimes, such invulnerability is a critical source of authoritarian durability.

4) Enhanced Coercive Capacity: Finally, as Skocpol has argued, revolutions produce powerful coercive structures.[20] As noted above, revolutions invariably trigger armed counterrevolutionary resistance movements that must be defeated if the new regime is to consolidate power. Revolutions also frequently trigger external wars, often with neighboring states whose governments feel threatened by the revolutionary regime or perceive a window of opportunity in the wake of state collapse. Such existential threats create powerful incentives for revolutionary governments to build up the state's coercive capacity.

Almost invariably, then, revolutions give rise to "garrison states."[21] In Russia, for example, the civil war compelled the Bolshevik government to build a massive and effective political police, the Cheka (which later became the KGB). In Cuba and Nicaragua, security forces expanded tenfold in the aftermath of revolution.[22] Such expanded security forces are able to draw upon a large pool of experienced ex-combatants from the revolutionary struggle and subsequent civil or external wars. The former soldiers may be formally incorporated into the security forces (as in the case of Iran's Revolutionary Guard) or mobilized into informal militias (as in the case of ZANU "war veterans" in Zimbabwe).

Beyond their sheer size, revolutionary security forces possess greater coercive capacity than do their counterparts in nonrevolutionary states. This is particularly true of *high-intensity coercion,* or highly visible acts of repression that target large numbers of people, well-known individuals, or major institutions.[23] Unlike more routine (or *low-intensity*) forms of repression (such as surveillance, harassment and detention of activists, and "legal" persecution of critics on libel, tax, or corruption charges), repression of mass protest involves considerable risk. Not only

is it likely to trigger international condemnation and (in some cases) punitive action, but it may erode the domestic legitimacy of the security forces, which can undermine internal discipline and morale.[24] Due to fear of prosecution or other forms of public retribution, both security officials and rank-and-file soldiers may resist orders to repress. For this reason, governments are often reluctant to order high-intensity coercion, and where such orders are issued, security officials often refuse to systematically carry them out. Indeed, numerous authoritarian regimes have collapsed due to the government's unwillingness—or inability—to repress protest in a consistent and sustained manner. Recent examples include Serbia in 2000, Madagascar in 2002 and 2009, Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, Kyrgyzstan in 2005 and 2010, and Egypt and Tunisia in 2011.

By contrast, the "garrison states" that emerge from liberation struggles and postrevolutionary armed conflict are often well equipped to crack down on protest. Years of military struggle give rise to a generation of elites and cadres with experience in sustained and risky violence. Ruling elites that have engaged in violent conflict are more likely to remain united behind coercive measures, and security officials who belong to those revolutionary elites are more likely to carry out orders to engage in high-intensity repression—even in the face of domestic and international condemnation. Revolutionary ties between government and security forces facilitated the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) government's brutal repression of student protesters in Mexico City in 1968, as well as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) government's high-intensity crackdown on the Tiananmen Square protesters in 1989. In Zimbabwe, close ties between ZANU and the security forces facilitated large-scale police and paramilitary repression in the face of serious opposition challenges in 2000, 2002, and 2008. In Iran, the Revolutionary Guard and the Basij—organizations created by revolutionary forces and strengthened during the postrevolutionary counterinsurgency and the eight-year war with Iraq—consistently and brutally carried out orders to repress in the face of the 2009 Green Revolution protests. This stands in stark contrast to Egypt and Tunisia, where more autonomous armies refused to repress and eventually abandoned governments in the face of large-scale popular protest.

Revolutions thus often trigger a chain of processes that culminate in durable authoritarian rule (see the Figure on page 13). Individual cases vary, but in most successful revolutions, armed struggle engenders cohesive ruling parties that, upon seizing power, reconstruct and thoroughly penetrate the coercive apparatus. Such party-army fusion dramatically reduces the likelihood of military coups. Moreover, postrevolutionary efforts to carry out radical social change invariably threaten existing societal interests and institutions, triggering armed counterrevolutionary movements, civil wars, and in some cases, interstate wars. Some

FIGURE—HOW REVOLUTIONS CREATE CONDITIONS FOR DURABLE AUTHORITARIANISM



revolutionary regimes (Cambodia and Nicaragua) do not survive such conflicts, but where they do, postrevolutionary violence facilitates the destruction of independent power centers and gives rise to a larger and more powerful coercive apparatus. Such developments may limit the potential for opposition mobilization for decades to come. Postrevolutionary violence also deepens polarization and reinforces ruling-party cohesion, which reduces the likelihood of regime-threatening elite defection. Consequently, revolutionary regimes have been among the most durable and long-lasting authoritarian regimes in the modern world.

As the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrated, revolutionary legacies are not permanent. Although some elements of the revolutionary legacy, such as an institutionalized ruling party and a strong and loyal coercive apparatus, may be quite enduring, others degrade over time, particularly with the passing of the revolutionary generation (those individuals who led and participated directly in the revolutionary struggle). The extraordinary cohesion that characterizes most revolutionary parties erodes with generational turnover. As partisan identities weaken and ideological commitment fades, and as the unifying force of the founding generation disappears, revolutionary parties gradually "normalize" into ruling-party "machines." Ambition and patronage replace identity and ideology as the primary glue binding together regime elites.[25] As in most established party machines, corruption and petty factionalism grow more open and widespread. This generational change had clearly taken place in Mexico and the Soviet Union by the 1960s, it occurred in China and Vietnam in the 1990s, and will soon take place in Cuba.

Once ambition and patronage replace shared identity and ideology as the bases for elite cohesion, revolutionary parties grow more vulnerable to defection. For example, Mexico's PRI, a highly cohesive party that suffered few significant defections between 1940 and the mid-1980s, experienced a debilitating schism in 1988 and a series of additional defections before losing power in 2000. Likewise, the Kuomintang in

Taiwan transformed from a disciplined quasi-Leninist party into a clientelistic machine that fell prey to crippling defections in the 1990s.

The departure of the revolutionary generation also affects regimes' coercive capacity, particularly their ability to engage in high-intensity repression. Succeeding generations often lack the legitimacy to impose unity during a crisis, as well as the experience, self-confidence, and ideological commitment to engage in high-intensity repression. The erosion of revolutionary cohesion was evident in the Soviet Union, where high-intensity coercion largely disappeared beginning in the 1960s and proved difficult to carry out in the early 1990s. Likewise, it is not clear that the contemporary Chinese government could successfully undertake the kind of high-intensity repression in the face of a serious threat that it did in 1989, when Deng Xiaoping and other revolutionary veterans were still on the scene.

The Search for Stability

Following the disappearance of the revolutionary generation, then, revolutionary regimes must find alternative bases for stability. Central to this transition is the development of institutionalized mechanisms of leadership succession. This was accomplished (at least through the 1990s) in Mexico and may now have been accomplished in China, Vietnam, and Mozambique. (Cuba's revolutionary regime began this process in the 2000s, but its outcome remains uncertain.) By contrast, the regime in Zimbabwe has not institutionalized leadership succession, and Mugabe's looming departure from the scene poses a clear threat to regime stability.

Another basis for postrevolutionary regime stability is economic growth. While the founding generation lived, many revolutionary regimes survived despite poor—and in some cases, disastrous—economic performance. With generational change, economic performance becomes more vital. In the Soviet Union, the rise of the postrevolutionary generation of leaders in the 1960s coincided with the regime's increased focus on the provision of consumer goods. Similarly, steady growth enhanced regime stability in China and Vietnam in the 1990s and 2000s, and it may play a similar role in Laos. Mexico's PRI was unable to achieve similar economic success in the 1980s and 1990s, and economic growth will be a major challenge for post-Castro Cuba and post-Mugabe Zimbabwe.

An alternative—and far riskier—basis for cohesion is renewed conflict. Continued conflict with the United States almost certainly reinforced regime cohesion in post–Cold War Cuba and Iran. Similarly, North Korea's aggressive nuclear posturing in the 1990s and 2000s might be explained as an effort to re-create an atmosphere of conflict as the regime's founding generation died off. Efforts to create (or reignite) conflict may have tragic consequences. In Zimbabwe, for example, intense polarization and conflict in the 2000s—characterized by the ZANU government as a struggle

against white settlers and British colonialism—probably reinforced elite cohesion, but it did so at the cost of large-scale violence and economic devastation. In Yugoslavia, where the Partisans had built a sufficiently cohesive party to overcome ethnic particularism and withstand a confrontation with Stalin, a second generation of leaders, lacking revolutionary sources of cohesion, retained power by sponsoring nationalist conflict—again, with devastating consequences.

Revolutions are rare events that are accompanied by considerable violence and, in many cases, war. Although revolutionary violence is catastrophic in terms of destroying human lives, it engenders strikingly robust regime institutions. These institutions have enabled revolutionary regimes to survive challenges—economic crisis, large-scale opposition protest, and the sudden withdrawal of external patronage—that have undermined many other authoritarian regimes.

If correct, our argument has important theoretical and policy implications. First, our findings suggest that not all authoritarian institutions are alike. Although they may appear similar, ruling parties that emerge out of revolutionary conflict function differently from those that do not. As Andrew Janos wrote of East European communist regimes, "The party is . . . only the body, while the 'soul' represents an agglomeration of solidarities, purposes, and identities. Without this soul the body remains an empty shell, a set of roles, principles, and organizational charts."[26] Nor can revolutionary institutions be easily designed. Contrary to many recent analyses of dictatorship, which treat authoritarian institutions as a product of elite choice or strategy,[27] the institutions that underlie revolutionary-regime durability—cohesive ruling parties, tight partisan penetration of the security forces, disciplined and effective coercive structures—cannot be willed into existence by ambitious autocrats. Rather, successful autocrats either inherit such institutions or succeed in building them due to the existence of conditions (such as state breakdown or prolonged violent conflict) over which they have limited control. Even Lenin's Bolshevik party, which became a model for top-down Leninist ruling parties in the developing world, only became a tightly disciplined "Leninist" party after extended violent struggle.

In terms of policy, revolutionary regimes in Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Vietnam have posed some of the most enduring challenges to the foreign policy of the United States and its allies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. All four regimes have proven extraordinarily robust in the face of decades of efforts to isolate and undermine them. A better understanding of why revolutionary regimes endure might help policy makers to develop more fruitful approaches to dealing with such regimes. Most importantly, our findings suggest that hard-line confrontational strategies—which deepen polarization and thus reinforce revolutionary cohesion—may be exactly what revolutionary and postrevolutionary regimes need to survive.

NOTES

The authors thank Jean Lachapelle, Kai Thaler, and Aaron Watanabe for research assistance and Canada's Social Science and Humanities Research Council for financial support of this project.

1. Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 264; Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 4. We operationalize sustained violent struggle as one in which armed conflict (guerrilla struggle, large-scale postrevolutionary counterinsurgency or civil war, or external war resulting from revolutionary seizure of power) persists for at least one year. Armed conflict may precede (e.g., China) or immediately follow (e.g., Russia) the seizure of power. We treat armed struggle as ideological where it aims at the radical transformation of the existing social order, whether it seeks to achieve racial equality, large-scale land reform, socialism, radical anticlericalism, or Islamic rule.

2. We also include the regime in North Korea, which was installed by the Soviet Union after World War II, but was founded by veterans of an earlier guerrilla struggle against Japanese colonial rule and consolidated amid the Korean War.

3. Other durable authoritarian regimes include those rooted in what Dan Slater calls counterinsurgency "protection pacts," such as Malaysia and Singapore. See Dan Slater, *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

4. Revolutionary regimes that survived include Algeria, Angola, China, Cuba, Iran, Laos, Mozambique, North Korea, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. Those that collapsed are Albania and Nicaragua. If we include postrevolutionary regimes, or cases in which the revolutionary generation had died off by 1989 (Mexico, USSR, Taiwan, Yugoslavia), the survival rate falls to 63 percent (10 of 16), which is still far greater than that of nonrevolutionary regimes. Note that we exclude South Yemen, which ceased to exist after Yemeni unification in 1990. Calculations are based on data collected by Milan Svolik (*http://publish.illinois.edu/msvolik*).

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6. See Dan Slater, "Revolutions, Crackdowns, and Quiescence: Communal Elites and Democratic Mobilization in Southeast Asia," *American Journal of Sociology* 115 (July 2009): 203–54.

7. David Waldner, *Democracy and Dictatorship in the Postcolonial World* (forthcoming).

8. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies*, 327–28.

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12. Robert Service, *The Bolshevik Party in Revolution, 1917–1923: A Study in Organizational Change* (London: Macmillan Press, 1979), 95, 93, 92, 133.

13. Adrienne LeBas, *From Protest to Parties: Party-Building and Democratization in Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 44–47.

14. Milan Svolik, *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 4–5, 10–12.

15. See Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions*, and Huntington, *Political Order*, 311–13.

16. Jorge I. Domínguez, "The Cuban Army," in Jonathan Adelman, ed. *Communist Armies in Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1981), 45–46, 54; William Turley, "The Vietnamese Army," in Adelman, *Communist Armies in Politics*, 66–68; Roderic Ai Camp, *Mexico's Military on the Democratic Stage* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2005), 45; Dennis Gilbert, *Sandinistas: The Party and the Revolution* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 52; Norma Krieger, "Zimbabwe Today: Hope Against Grim Realities," *Review of African Political Economy* 27 (September 2000): 443–50.

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18. Roberto J. Cajina, *Transición política y reconversíon militar en Nicaragua, 1990–1995* (Managua, Nicaragua: CRIES, 1997), 125; Kenneth Katzman, *The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1993), 23; David Shambaugh, "The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work System in the People's Liberation Army," *China Quarterly,* no. 127 (September 1991): 530; Turley, "Vietnamese Army," 66–68.

19. Eric Nordlinger, *Soldiers in Politics, Military Coups and Governments* (London: Prentice Hall, 1977), 17.

20. Skocpol, *States and Revolutions*; see also Ted R. Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," *Comparative Political Studies* 21 (April 1988): 45–65.

21. Gurr, "War, Revolution, and the Growth of the Coercive State," 57.

22. Dominguez, "Cuban Army," 47; Cajini, *Transición política*.

23. Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism*: *Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 57–59.

24. Eva Bellin, "Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring," *Comparative Politics* 44 (January 2012): 131–32.

25. On this transformation, see Kenneth Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).

26. Andrew C. Janos, "The One-Party State and Social Mobilization: East Europe between the Wars," in Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, eds., *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970), 231.

27. See, for example, Jennifer Gandhi, *Political Institutions Under Dictatorship* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).