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## ***Economic Performance and Elite Defection from Hegemonic Parties***

ORA JOHN REUTER\* AND JENNIFER GANDHI

Hegemonic party regimes are non-democratic regimes that (1) rule with the aid of a dominant political party and (2) hold multi-party elections. Elite coalitions organized under the aegis of a hegemonic party are most vulnerable in elections that coincide with poor economic performance. A declining economy provides elites with a platform around which they can mobilize support to challenge incumbents in elections. As a result, the likelihood of defections from hegemonic parties increases as income declines. This study's original dataset, which includes 227 elections for the chief executive in hegemonic party dictatorships from 1946 to 2004, and its case studies of defections in Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF in 2008 and Turkey under the Democratic Party in 1955 provide evidence for this proposition.

In recent years, scholars of comparative politics have devoted increasing attention to variation in authoritarian regimes.<sup>1</sup> One important type of authoritarian regime is the hegemonic party regime. Hegemonic party regimes are those regimes in which dictators rule with the aid of one dominant party, while still holding regular multi-party elections. Prominent examples of hegemonic party regimes include Zimbabwe under the Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Mexico under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), Taiwan under the Kuomintang (KMT), Senegal under the Parti Socialiste (PS) and Paraguay under the Colorado party.

The defining institutions of hegemonic party regimes (elections and a single dominant party) serve the regime in distributing patronage, gathering information, co-opting elites and binding supporters to the regime.<sup>2</sup> The latter function of these institutions has led some scholars to note that party regimes are particularly durable forms of authoritarian

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<sup>1</sup> Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, 'Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa', *World Politics*, 46 (1995), 453–89; Barbara Geddes, 'Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument' (prepared for the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 1999); Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, 'Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion under Dictatorships', *Economics and Politics*, 18 (2006), 1–26; Beatriz Magaloni, 'Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule', *Comparative Political Studies*, 41 (2008), 715–41; Joseph Wright, 'Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment', *American Journal of Political Science*, 52 (2008), 322–43.

<sup>2</sup> Samuel Huntington, 'Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems', in Samuel Huntington and Clement Moore, eds, *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems* (New York: Basic Books, 1970); Beatriz Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Jason Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

regimes, able to maintain their integrity even through calamities such as economic crises.<sup>3</sup> But the same institutions that provide benefits to the regime can also have unexpected, indeed undesirable, consequences for the incumbent authoritarians. These regimes do fall, and often they fall at an election time, when key actors cease to acquiesce to the regime. One quite simple and direct way that elections can subvert an authoritarian regime is when key members of the hegemonic party defect from the party ranks and challenge the regime in the elections. Even when such defectors do not defeat the incumbent and initiate regime change, their defections can serve as defining moments in the life of these parties, compelling incumbents to change their ruling strategy.

We argue that economic performance can motivate potential defectors' decisions over whether to split from the regime party. Disgruntled party members defect in times of economic crisis in order to capitalize upon popular and elite discontent with the regime in the hope of successfully challenging the incumbent in elections. Our main hypothesis is that poor economic performance should encourage elites to defect from hegemonic parties and challenge the regime in elections. We test our hypothesis using an original dataset that includes 227 relevant elections in all hegemonic party regimes from 1946 to 2004. The dependent variable is the first large-*N* measure of defection developed in the field. Our results are consistent with our hypotheses, even when including important control variables. To support our claim further, we examine two cases, Turkey and Zimbabwe, in which elite defections occurred in authoritarian elections. Both the historical and contemporary cases provide evidence of the underlying mechanisms linking the economy and elite strategies.

In this article, we contribute to existing literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the literature on authoritarian regimes by showing how the integrity of hegemonic parties is vulnerable to exogenous shocks. Thus, elite coalitions in these regimes are not only a function of the party's apparent invincibility or the institutional bonds that constrain and channel elite conflict, but also a function of economic performance. Secondly, this research contributes to an older literature on democratization. While in this article we do *not* explore the relationship between economic crisis and democratic transition, we *do* provide the first empirical examination of one of the possible causal mechanisms behind the robust correlation between economic growth and transitions.<sup>4</sup> In this vein, we move beyond the earlier transitions literature, which emphasized elite cohesion as a necessary condition for authoritarian survival by positing exogenous factors that determine this cohesion in the first place.<sup>5</sup>

#### HEGEMONIC PARTIES AND ELITE DEFECTIONS DISCUSSED IN THE LITERATURE

Ruling parties are institutions that serve to contain elite conflict while co-opting larger groups within society. Consequently, party regimes are more durable than other types of

<sup>3</sup> Geddes, 'Authoritarian Breakdown'; Dan Slater, 'Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia', *Comparative Politics*, 36 (2003), 81–101; Benjamin Smith, 'Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single Party Ruler', *World Politics*, 57 (2005), 421–51; Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*.

<sup>4</sup> See Mark Gasiorowski, 'Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change: An Event History Analysis', *American Political Science Review*, 89 (1995), 882–97; Geddes, 'Authoritarian Breakdown'.

<sup>5</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986); Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995).

authoritarian regimes.<sup>6</sup> Yet party regimes vary enormously in their survival – an empirical pattern that has been explained by the behaviour of both the opposition parties that compete against hegemonic parties in authoritarian elections<sup>7</sup> and the party cadres whose role is so central to the operation of ruling parties.<sup>8</sup> Party regimes appear to be most in danger when members have incentives to defect from the ruling institution. Defections lead directly to the unravelling of the party, or signal to other important actors (for example, the opposition or the military) that the regime is weak, or may even prompt illiberal changes in the regime's ruling strategy.

What do we know about defection? Under what conditions are departures from the regime party more likely to occur? Many of our intuitions on this point come from the democratization literature. Elite cohesion has been used as an explanatory factor in studies of democratic transition.<sup>9</sup> In the late 1990s, however, this early transitions literature was criticized for over-reliance on a construct – elite cohesion – that was seen to evaporate when contextual circumstances changed.<sup>10</sup> Attention has since turned to the identification of secondary factors that make elite cohesion more likely. Fissures within the elite are thought to be most likely to appear when material circumstances dictate: either an economic crisis or destructive conflicts make defection from the regime more appealing.<sup>11</sup>

More recently, a body of work on ruling parties in authoritarian states also examines the importance of elite defection. Elite unity is maintained in party regimes either through the strength of the party's institutional bonds or via other mechanisms, such as the perceived electoral invincibility of the party, its ability to deliver patronage and its ability to use coercion in order to deter candidate entry.<sup>12</sup>

To examine these claims empirically, scholars have adopted two strategies. One approach is to examine mechanisms – the conditions under which defections occur and their effects on regime stability – directly through the detailed study of particular cases. Consider the well-known example of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas in Mexico. After a half-decade of economic stagnation and restructuring in the early and mid-1980s, a wing of the ruling Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) emerged advocating an end to austerity programmes imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and a return to the PRI's statist and popularist roots.<sup>13</sup> This PRI faction, called Corriente Democrática (CD),

<sup>6</sup> Geddes, 'Authoritarian Breakdown'; Smith, 'Life of the Party'.

<sup>7</sup> Todd Eisenstadt, *Courting Democracy in Mexico: Party Strategies and Electoral Institutions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Kenneth Greene, *Why Dominant Parties Lose: Mexico's Democratization in Comparative Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>8</sup> Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*; Magaloni, 'Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule'.

<sup>9</sup> See O'Donnell and Schmitter, *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*; Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market*.

<sup>10</sup> Michael Bratton and Nicolas Van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Valerie Bunce, 'Rethinking Recent Democratization: Lessons from the Post-Communist Experience', *World Politics*, 55 (2003), 167–92.

<sup>11</sup> Haggard and Kaufmann, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*; Elizabeth Jean Wood, *Forging Democracy from Below: Insurgent Transitions in South Africa and El Salvador* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

<sup>12</sup> Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*; Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*; Magaloni, 'Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule'.

<sup>13</sup> Judith Teichman, *Policy Making in Mexico: From Boom to Crisis* (Boston, Mass.: Allen and Unwin, 1988).

united around the figure of Cárdenas, son of one of Mexico's most popular presidents, Lazaro Cárdenas, who was also one of the PRI's founding fathers. As the 1988 presidential elections approached, the CD and Cárdenas recognized the opportunity for challenging the regime that the economic crisis was creating. As Langston observes, 'The CD quickly realized that it had support in both the regime and society because of the past seven years of crisis and their effects on the Mexican people.'<sup>14</sup> Thus, in early 1988 prominent members of CD left the PRI and joined a coalition of parties, the National Democratic Front (FDN), which shortly thereafter nominated Cárdenas as its candidate in the 1988 elections. Magaloni notes that the reason the PRI in 1988 witnessed its first prominent defection since 1952 was that potential defectors sensed better electoral prospects outside the ruling party.<sup>15</sup> As history has shown, they were correct in their estimation. Cárdenas secured 31 per cent of the vote, more than any other opposition candidate in Mexican history, although most accounts agree that the PRI was forced to resort to massive electoral fraud in order to secure its own victory. Although the PRI would not lose office until 2000, the Cárdenas defection was clearly a turning point in the history of the PRI, demonstrating the vulnerability of the regime, emboldening opponents and attenuating the support base of the PRI. It is also clear that Cárdenas's reckoning that he could achieve more by defecting and competing against the regime was predicated, in large part, on his observation of the economic crisis racking the country at that time.<sup>16</sup>

The second approach is to test the implications of these claims using cross-national data in an attempt to provide circumstantial evidence for the mechanisms. So the idea of poor economic performance inducing splits within the ruling elite that ultimately lead to the demise of the regime is confirmed by robust quantitative evidence of the link between economic crisis and democratic transition.<sup>17</sup>

In this article, we embrace a different empirical approach by examining cross-national data that shows how economic crisis impacts the integrity of elite coalitions in one important type of authoritarian regime, hegemonic parties.<sup>18</sup> We test our hypothesis using an original dataset that includes 227 relevant elections in all hegemonic party regimes during the post-war period. In using this approach, we attempt to combine the virtues of directly examining mechanisms with data and tools of analysis that speak to the generality of our claims. We adopt this approach in an attempt to find systematic evidence for the linkages between elite cohesion, economic growth and authoritarian regime survival. Finally, in finding that weak economic performance is connected to the defection of party members, we raise a larger theoretical point: while hegemonic parties are institutions that

<sup>14</sup> Joy Langston, 'Breaking Out is Hard to Do: Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Mexico's One-Party Hegemonic Regime', *Latin American Politics and Society*, 44 (2002), 61–81, p76.

<sup>15</sup> Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*.

<sup>16</sup> Langston attributes elite ruptures in the PRI as well as the KMT in Taiwan to increased electoral competition and succession crises; Joy Langston, 'Elite Ruptures: When Do Ruling Parties Split?' in Andreas Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition* (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner, 2006), pp. 57–76. Analysing the same cases, Haggard and Kaufman find no relationship between crisis and elite defection in dominant party autocracies while finding substantial case-study evidence for the linkage in Latin American military regimes (Haggard and Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*).

<sup>17</sup> See Gasiorowski, 'Economic Crisis and Political Regime Change'; and Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, 'Endogenous Democratization', *World Politics*, 55 (2003), 517–49.

<sup>18</sup> However, we did conduct a separate analysis which shows that defections have a positive effect on the probability of a hegemonic regime losing power.

contain elite conflict in order to perpetuate authoritarian rule, the success of these institutions in controlling elites also varies as a function of exogenous circumstances.

While the defection of elites from ruling coalitions is not unique to hegemonic party regimes, we focus on this regime type for two reasons. One reason is operational, in that defections from the ruling party at election time allow for clear, observable and systematic coding of the dependent variable. Another reason is more substantive: the dynamics of defection in hegemonic party regimes may be unique in that they provide the institutions through which elites and masses can form expectations about the strategies to pursue. Scholars of 'electoral' or 'competitive' authoritarianism have emphasized the importance of elections for dictators in maintaining power.<sup>19</sup> Yet as Brownlee observes, the empirical evidence is mixed: elections sometimes have helped to consolidate authoritarian rule while, at other times, they have led to regime failure.<sup>20</sup> Brownlee argues that the crucial intervening variable is a strong ruling party such that elections can extend authoritarian rule in the presence of a dominant party and undermine it in the absence of such a party. In looking only at hegemonic party systems, we argue that the ability of elections to entrench regimes depends also on the satisfactory performance of the economy.

#### HEGEMONIC PARTY REGIMES: THE EFFECT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE ON ELITE STRATEGIES

Hegemonic party regimes are those authoritarian regimes in which one party controls access to most important political offices, shares powers over policy and patronage, and uses privileged access to state resources or extra-constitutional measures to dominate multi-party elections.<sup>21</sup> This definition conforms closely to several others in the literature.<sup>22</sup> Operationally, hegemonic parties exist when the regime is authoritarian, the members of the legislature are chosen in multi-party elections, and the ruling party controls an absolute majority in the primary legislative chamber. Majority control of the assembly marks an operational dividing line between those incumbent rulers who have invested in organized institutions of bureaucratic co-optation and mobilization and those that seek to buy off supporters and/or compete with opponents on an ad hoc basis. The 50 per cent cut point thus is intended to capture not only the party's electoral dominance, but its degree of influence. A lower figure is clearly unwarranted since that would mean that the dominant party controls less than a majority of seats in the legislative chamber and could not, without securing other parties' support, pass its own initiatives. By contrast, a higher figure is too restrictive since it would eliminate dominant party regimes that have operated in the presence of strong, but divided, opposition parties (such as KANU in Kenya after 1992).<sup>23</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, 'The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism', *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (2002), 51–65; Schedler, ed., *Electoral Authoritarianism*.

<sup>20</sup> Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*.

<sup>21</sup> We use the terms 'hegemonic party' and 'dominant party' interchangeably throughout the text.

<sup>22</sup> Giovanni Sartori, *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976); Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*; Kenneth Greene, 'The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single Party Dominance', *Comparative Political Studies*, 43 (2010), 1–27; Ora John Reuter and Thomas Remington, 'Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem: The Case of United Russia', *Comparative Political Studies*, 42 (2009), 501–26.

<sup>23</sup> While we have theoretical foundations for the 50 per cent cut point, we also examine whether the choice of threshold affects our results by including an interaction term between economic growth and the

Some definitions of hegemonic parties include a durability criterion.<sup>24</sup> We intentionally do not use the number of years ruling parties have been in power as part of our definition for several reasons. First, durability and the extent to which the hegemonic party structures politics are two different concepts, even if length of tenure often is an operational indicator of the latter. Secondly, even if durability and institutional strength are closely intertwined, then the issue of choosing a durability criterion becomes an issue of dichotomizing a continuous variable (i.e., length of tenure). Choosing to call ‘dominant’ those parties that survive in power past some threshold age only obscures variation on the lower end of the age variable. Finally, since our dependent variable of interest is elite defection, which may be tied conceptually to the duration of hegemonic parties, it becomes potentially tautological to include a durability criterion into the definition of these parties.<sup>25</sup>

From 1946 to 2004, eighty-four hegemonic parties existed in seventy countries accounting for 23.7 per cent of all authoritarian country-years. As Figure 1 shows, hegemonic party regimes have consistently comprised about one quarter of the world’s non-democratic regimes.




Fig. 1. Multi-party autocracies and hegemonic party regimes in the world

This pattern was stable until the 1990s when that proportion shot up to over 35 per cent. As of 2002, hegemonic party regimes have represented nearly half of all the world’s authoritarian regimes. Hegemonic party regimes, in most years, have comprised around 60 per cent of the world’s multi-party autocracies.

(Footnote continued)

seat share of the dominant party in the statistical analysis. In this way, rather than impose an ex ante criterion, we allow the data to ‘speak’ as to whether the choice of threshold affects the results. The results, to be discussed, show that the size of the hegemonic party’s legislative majority does not condition the effect of growth on defections.

<sup>24</sup> Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*; Greene, ‘The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single Party Dominance’.

<sup>25</sup> As with the choice of seat share threshold, we examine whether durability affects the results and is thereby justified as a criterion, by including an interaction term between duration and growth in the statistical analysis. As we show, the age of the hegemonic party does not appreciably affect the substantive results.

The set of hegemonic parties in the world today includes many well-established and frequently studied parties, such as the National Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt, ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe, and the People's Action Party (PAP) in Singapore. But it also includes many 'new' hegemonic parties such as the OTAN in Kazakhstan and the Cambodia People's Party (CPP) in Cambodia. Indeed, it appears that some of the world's most notable 'emergent' authoritarian regimes are opting for a hegemonic ruling party strategy. In Russia, Vladimir Putin's regime has invested heavily in a pro-Kremlin political party, United Russia.<sup>26</sup> In 2007, the Nigerian People's Democratic Party (PDP) facilitated the transfer of executive power from Olusegun Obasanjo to Umaru Musa Yar'Adua. Among dictatorships, hegemonic party regimes appear to be increasingly common.

Hegemonic parties confer an array of benefits on both leaders and other elites. The party may serve as: (1) a tool for co-opting latent allies and binding current supporters to the regime, (2) a mechanism for making the flow of patronage and the distribution of political appointments a routine affair, (3) a device for gathering information and/or (4) an apparatus for controlling legislatures. The institutional bonds of the ruling party serve to lengthen the time horizons of elites, thereby making these regimes uniquely resistant to defections and extending their lifespan. Like parties, elections confer many benefits on regime leaders. Besides serving as tools of co-option, elections also provide opportunities for the regime to put its dominance on public display, thereby deterring schisms and third-party challenges.

Yet fealty to the party is not maintained only by factors endogenous to the design of regime institutions, but also by exogenous changes that affect elites' calculations of the costs and benefits associated with remaining in the party, such as the performance of the economy. Moreover, elections provide the opportunities at which elites, on the basis of their calculations, decide whether to stay within the fold or to defect from the regime party. As we argue, these regimes are more vulnerable to defection at electoral moments when the economy is faring poorly. Elections also present the most visible opportunity for members of the party to signal their dissatisfaction with the regime.

What motivates the decision to defect on the part of party members? In other words, what benefits result from defection? For those who truly go into opposition against the regime, departure from the ruling coalition to contest elections may hold out the hope of regime change. This may be the case if potential defectors expect that incumbents are so vulnerable that they will not be able to get away with 'stealing the election'. In addition, if the potential defector leaves to become a credible challenger, he has the chance of obtaining political power for himself. The defector may win political office through elections or by creating a power-sharing deal with more viable opposition candidates who seek the defector's endorsement. In Kenya, for example, Raila Odinga left the ruling coalition to support Mwai Kibaki's opposition candidacy in the 2002 elections. In exchange, Odinga was promised the premiership under a potential Kibaki presidency.<sup>27</sup>

Even if alternation in power is a distant possibility, defectors may stand to gain if the party makes changes in response to their actions. In this case, defection may be a threat carried out to win concessions. In Malaysia, for example, some leaders of the dissident

<sup>26</sup> Reuter and Remington, 'Dominant Party Regimes and the Commitment Problem'.

<sup>27</sup> Kimuli Kasara, 'A Prize Too Large to Share: Opposition Coalitions and the Kenyan Presidency, 1991–2002' (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, 2005).



faction that later became 'Semangat 46' were lured back to UMNO with cabinet posts and promises to reform.<sup>28</sup>

Yet in order for these benefits to accrue to potential defectors, they must compete successfully in elections. The threat that a potential defector might pose to the regime is indicated by vote share. High vote shares for challengers indicate substantial support for the opposition in spite of regime attempts to manipulate the outcome. But in order to make a strong showing in elections, potential candidates must consider their position with voters. They must anticipate what issues might mobilize voters to care enough to express their discontent with incumbents and, in turn, support potential defectors. Otherwise, their bids for election are likely to fail in that they will have incurred the costs of challenging the regime while reaping few of the benefits.

Economic performance is one issue around which challengers might mobilize support. One reason why the performance of the economy is important is because it determines the level of benefits that can be distributed to voters. Increasing growth of total output allows the regime to spend more in buying votes. Indeed, evidence of political business cycles in non-democratic elections indicates that authoritarian incumbents do use fiscal and monetary tools to ensure victory at the polls. In Egypt, for example, NDP candidates have offered cash and benefits in kind to the urban poor while the government has provided public sector bonuses, increases in pensions and currency devaluations in an effort to buy votes.<sup>29</sup> During hard times, when the regime may have fewer resources at its disposal, these tools may disappear, creating an opening for possible challengers.

In addition, potential challengers may use the fact that economic performance influences voter evaluation of the regime's competency.<sup>30</sup> Indeed, the ability of regime parties to deliver good economic performance should occupy a prominent space in political debate since the task of modernization (especially its economic facet) was a primary justification for their hegemonic status. Members of the regime party were expected to 'play an active entrepreneurial role in the formation of new ideas, in the establishment of a network of communication for those ideas, and in the linking of the public and the leadership in such a way that power is generated, mobilized, and directed.'<sup>31</sup> In order to carry out these functions, however, it was necessary for other parties to play, at most, an auxiliary role to the regime's own organization. As a self-stated goal, then, improvement of the material well-being of their citizens can be expected to serve as a yardstick by which voters evaluate hegemonic parties.

Economic decline, then, can provide a motive for elites to defect from the regime: poor economic performance leads to the loss of patronage and the emergence of policy differences.

<sup>28</sup> Hari Singh, 'Political Change in Malaysia: The Role of Semangat 46', *Asian Survey*, 31 (1991), 712–28.

<sup>29</sup> Lisa Blaydes, 'Electoral Budget Cycles under Authoritarianism: Economic Opportunism in Mubarak's Egypt' (prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, 2006).

<sup>30</sup> While the literature on economic voting includes a large debate on this point, there is some evidence that voters evaluate incumbents based on economic performance. See, for example, Michael Lewis-Beck, *Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); Karen Remmer, 'The Political Impact of Economic Crisis in Latin America in the 1980s', *American Political Science Review*, 85 (1991), 777–800; G. Bingham Powell Jr and Guy Whitten, 'A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context', *American Journal of Political Science*, 37 (1993), 391–414; Alexander Pacek and Benjamin Radcliff, 'The Political Economy of Competitive Elections in the Developing World', *American Journal of Political Science*, 39 (1995), 745–59; Raymond Duch and Randy Stevenson, 'Assessing the Magnitude of the Economic Vote over Time and Across Nations', *Electoral Studies*, 25 (2005), 528–47.

<sup>31</sup> David Apter, *The Politics of Modernization* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1965), p. 186.

But it also provides the opportunity by which elite members can split from the party and not fade into irrelevance. Anticipating that voters care about the economy and are more likely to vote against incumbents when the economy is performing poorly, party members who are considering jumping ship will be more likely to defect during hard times. Therefore, the slower the growth of income, the more likely members are to leave the party and challenge authoritarian incumbents in elections.

### *Alternative Theories and Causal Mechanisms*

A variety of alternative theories leads to different predictions about the relationship between economic performance and defection from the hegemonic party. First is the prediction that defection should be positively correlated with economic growth. This may be the case if, as voters become wealthier, they forgo the clientelism that characterizes their relations with the hegemonic party to make what Magaloni calls 'ideological investments' in other parties.<sup>32</sup> Party members, anticipating this behaviour on the part of voters, then, would be more likely to defect from the regime party during periods of prosperity.

Second is the prediction that defection and economic performance should appear uncorrelated. One reason may be because party institutions maintain elite loyalty even in times of hardship. Greene finds economic growth has an inconsistent and minor effect on the vote total of hegemonic party regimes.<sup>33</sup> Or, as Magaloni suggests, the party's seemingly unassailable electoral position should allow it to deter elite splits even in times of crisis, since defectors would stand little chance of winning anyway.<sup>34</sup> Another possibility is that because dictatorships are regimes in which there has never been turnover in power and information flows are restricted, voters have little information about the policy positions of parties. As a result, the only informative cue that voters can utilize in this context is a pro-regime and anti-regime dimension. Anyone too closely identified with the regime will have difficulty drawing support. Anticipating this, potential defectors will realize that they have little chance of running against the regime during economic hard times. In this case, the likelihood of defection is not significantly different during times of good and bad economic performance.

We have argued that economic performance affects the decision of elites to leave the hegemonic party by influencing their expectations about how much support they can obtain from citizens in their electoral challenge to incumbents. In this way, the decision to defect is one that is made by elites, but conditioned on their anticipation of mass behaviour. A negative correlation between economic performance and defection would support this causal account, but would support three others as well. One is that a declining economy might result in a smaller pool of spoils for regime elites to divide amongst themselves. The loss of patronage that comes with poor economic performance might lead elites to re-evaluate remaining within the hegemonic party. We find this mechanism implausible because there are many empirical examples of dictators who have managed to funnel resources to elites and the military even during periods of extreme hardship for the citizens. Indeed, studies consistently report a negative correlation between corruption and economic growth,<sup>35</sup> indicating that even in the face of poor economic performance, political and economic elites rarely suffer.

<sup>32</sup> Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*.

<sup>33</sup> Greene, 'The Political Economy of Authoritarian Single Party Dominance'.

<sup>34</sup> Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*.

<sup>35</sup> Pranab Bardhan, 'Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues', *Journal of Economic Literature*, 35 (1997), 1320–46; Paolo Mauro, 'Corruption and Growth', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 110 (1995), 681–712.

Secondly, it may be that policy disputes and personal disagreements between high-ranking party members lead to defections, and they are more likely to emerge during economic hard times. Indeed, these are the reasons often cited as the proximate sources of discord in hegemonic parties.<sup>36</sup> Yet disputes over promotions and positions are likely to be ever-present regardless of the state of the economy. And policy disagreements may be exacerbated by economic crisis, but they are not likely to provoke an exodus from the regime party unless party members believe they can leverage their departure into yielding changes in policy. The degree of leverage potential defectors can maintain should be determined by how much mass support they can command. So economic crises are likely to present an *opportunity* for elites to challenge the regime when festering personal or policy disputes exist. When this is the case, the logic of our theory is unchanged. Elites will calculate that they can capitalize on popular disenchantment with the regime and be more successful in challenging the regime when the economy is faring poorly.

Finally, another possibility is that the correlation between poor economic performance and defection may be the result of reverse causation: the departure of key elites from the ruling coalition foments political instability which, in turn, adversely affects the economy.<sup>37</sup> Some of this concern is put to rest by the fact that our measures of economic growth are lagged to tap the performance of the economy before defection is witnessed. But to analyse this possibility further and to examine the micro-foundations of the link between economic performance and defection more generally, we shall turn to qualitative cases in a later section.

#### CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS

##### *Data and Methods*

A major challenge in analysing the link between elite defection and economic performance lies in the problem of systematically identifying what behaviour constitutes elite defection. To address such problems, we define defection as a situation in which a member of the hegemonic party leaves the party to run either as an independent candidate or as a candidate for another party in elections that determine the chief executive. The unit of analysis thus is an election under dictatorship in which there are multiple contenders. To delineate the sample of non-democratic regimes, we rely on Przeworski *et al.*'s dichotomous measure.<sup>38</sup> We include all multi-candidate/party elections in country-years coded: (a) as a dictatorship and (b) as a democratic transition when there is evidence that the election occurred under the auspices of the outgoing authoritarian regime. Since we are interested in defectors who contest elections for the chief executive, the elections included in the sample may be either presidential or legislative, depending on the identity of the effective head of government. When the effective head of government is a directly-elected president, the relevant election is presidential; when the effective head is either an indirectly-elected president or a prime minister, we look at legislative elections.<sup>39</sup>

<sup>36</sup> Singh, 'Political Change in Malaysia', p. 714; Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*.

<sup>37</sup> Alberto Alesina, Sule Özler, Nouriel Roubini and Phillip Swagel, 'Political Instability and Economic Growth', *Journal of Economic Growth*, 1 (1996), 189–211.

<sup>38</sup> Adam Przeworski, Michael Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, *Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-being in the World, 1950–1990* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

<sup>39</sup> Since we cannot gather information on all legislative candidates in parliamentary regimes, we look only at the founders and leaders of parties in parliamentary regimes. If the founders and/or leaders of an opposition party were members of the hegemonic party prior to the election, this counts as a defection.

The sample includes 227 elections that were held between 1946 and 2004. These cases are listed in Table 1.

Of these elections, 159 are presidential elections and 68 are parliamentary. Sub-Saharan Africa is the source of approximately 40 per cent of the observations while Latin America is the region with the next largest share with a quarter. Consistent with the increasing number of hegemonic parties shown earlier in Figure 1, over half of all elections in the sample occurred after 1980.<sup>40</sup>

Defectors must have been members of the hegemonic party in order to be considered as such. Departure from the party must be voluntary. Expulsion from the party is not coded as a defection, because in such cases, the member no longer has a choice over leaving.<sup>41</sup> Departure from the party must occur between two elections or, in the country's first multi-party election, after elections have been called or parties have been made legal. This latter rule is devised to address situations in which a single-party dominated politics for so long that anyone involved in politics and competing in the first (or subsequent) elections had to have been a member of the single party at some time in the past. In these cases, prior membership in the party is not a sufficient criterion for discerning defection. Finally, we assume that once a member leaves a party, he cannot return. So if any member runs in more than one election, it is not possible for the individual to be a defector in all elections subsequent to the one for which he may be a defector. Our measure of defection is dichotomous, coded 1 if there is a defection for a given election year and 0 if there is not. Since our measure of defection only taps high-level defections – instances in which a defector leaves to challenge for executive office – there are very few instances of multiple defections in the same year. Of the forty-two elections in which defection occurred, only in four did two defectors present themselves as candidates in the same election. There are no cases in which more than two defectors contested the same election.

Our main independent variable of interest is economic growth. Our primary measure of this is average growth in gross domestic product (GDP) for the period beginning with the year of the previous election in the hegemonic party regime and ending with the year prior to the election at hand. For those cases in which there is no prior election, the period begins five years before the election at hand. With this variable we seek to test our primary hypothesis that defection is more likely in relatively hard economic times: *Average Growth* should have a negative sign.<sup>42</sup>

According to modernization accounts, voters will be more likely to make ideological investments in opposition candidates and/or value political competition in its own right as the level of economic development increases. Therefore, we also control for real *GDP/capita*. Higher levels of development may be associated with more defections.

We include a number of analytic control variables to capture the actions that regimes may take in order to deter elite departures from the party. As a proxy measure of the repressiveness of the regime, we include the POLITY measure of regime type, which varies

<sup>40</sup> For information on the sources used for all variables in the analysis, see the author's webpage: [http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~oreuter/Reuter\\_Site/Home.html](http://userwww.service.emory.edu/~oreuter/Reuter_Site/Home.html)

<sup>41</sup> We recognize that this coding rule may exclude instances in which a potential defector challenges the regime with the precise goal of being expelled. But we choose not to code these cases as defection, for admitting such cases would also oblige us to include regime-initiated purges in which notable party members are simply expelled against their own will.

<sup>42</sup> We also test the effect of long-run economic growth (i.e. the average growth rate over the life of the hegemonic party) and one-year lag of economic growth. As we discuss below, the results are highly similar.

TABLE 1 *List of Cases Included in Analysis*

Angola	1992	Ethiopia	1995
Azerbaijan	1998	Ethiopia	2000
Azerbaijan	2003	Gabon	1961
Bangladesh	1973	Gabon	1964
Benin	1960	Gabon	1967
Bolivia	1956	Gabon	1993
Bolivia	1960	Gabon	1998
Bolivia	1964	Gambia, The	1966
Botswana	1969	Gambia, The	1972
Botswana	1974	Gambia, The	1977
Botswana	1979	Gambia, The	1982
Botswana	1984	Gambia, The	1987
Botswana	1989	Gambia, The	1992
Botswana	1994	Gambia, The	2001
Botswana	1999	Georgia	2000
Botswana	2004	Ghana	1960
Brazil	1966	Ghana	1992
Brazil	1970	Ghana	1996
Brazil	1974	Guinea	1998
Brazil	1978	Guinea	2003
Burkina Faso	1978	Guinea-Bissau	1994
Burkina Faso	1998	Guinea-Bissau	1999
Cambodia	1998	Guyana	1968
Cambodia	2003	Guyana	1973
Cameroon	1965	Guyana	1980
Cameroon	1992	Guyana	1985
Cameroon	1997	Guyana	1992
Cameroon	2004	Honduras	1948
Chad	1996	Honduras	1954
Chad	2001	Indonesia	1971
Colombia	1958	Indonesia	1977
Congo	1992	Indonesia	1982
Cote d'Ivoire	1990	Indonesia	1987
Cote d'Ivoire	1995	Indonesia	1992
Djibouti	1993	Indonesia	1998
Djibouti	1999	Kenya	1963
Dominican Rep.	1947	Kenya	1992
Dominican Rep.	1952	Kenya	1997
Dominican Rep.	1957	Kenya	2002
Dominican Rep.	1962	Korea, South	1963
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1956	Korea, South	1967
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1958	Korea, South	1971
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1965	Korea, South	1987
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1970	Liberia	1951
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1976	Liberia	1955
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1981	Liberia	1959
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1987	Liberia	1963
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1993	Liberia	1967
Egypt, Arab Rep.	1999	Liberia	1971
El Salvador	1956	Liberia	1975
El Salvador	1962	Madagascar	1965
El Salvador	1962	Madagascar	1972
El Salvador	1967	Madagascar	1992
El Salvador	1972	Malaysia	1969
El Salvador	1977	Malaysia	1974
Equatorial Guinea	1996	Malaysia	1978
Equatorial Guinea	2002	Malaysia	1982

TABLE 1 (Continued)

Malaysia	1986	Senegal	1978
Malaysia	1990	Senegal	1983
Malaysia	1995	Senegal	1988
Malaysia	1999	Senegal	1993
Malaysia	2004	Senegal	2000
Mauritania	1961	Seychelles	1993
Mauritania	1992	Seychelles	1998
Mauritania	1997	Seychelles	2001
Mauritania	2003	Sierra Leone	1973
Mexico	1946	Sierra Leone	1976
Mexico	1952	Sierra Leone	2002
Mexico	1958	Singapore	1968
Mexico	1964	Singapore	1972
Mexico	1970	Singapore	1976
Mexico	1976	Singapore	1980
Mexico	1982	Singapore	1984
Mexico	1988	Singapore	1988
Mexico	1994	Singapore	1991
Mexico	2000	Singapore	1997
Mozambique	1994	Singapore	2001
Mozambique	1999	Sri Lanka	1977
Mozambique	2004	Sri Lanka	1982
Namibia	1994	Sri Lanka	1988
Namibia	1999	Sri Lanka	1994
Namibia	2004	Taiwan	1969
Nicaragua	1947	Taiwan	1972
Nicaragua	1950	Taiwan	1975
Nicaragua	1957	Taiwan	1980
Nicaragua	1963	Taiwan	1983
Nicaragua	1967	Taiwan	1986
Nicaragua	1974	Taiwan	1989
Niger	1993	Taiwan	1992
Niger	1996	Taiwan	1995
Nigeria	1999	Taiwan	1996
Nigeria	2003	Taiwan	2000
Paraguay	1954	Tanzania	1995
Paraguay	1958	Tanzania	2000
Paraguay	1963	Togo	1961
Paraguay	1968	Togo	1963
Paraguay	1973	Togo	1993
Paraguay	1978	Togo	1998
Paraguay	1983	Togo	2003
Paraguay	1988	Tunisia	1959
Paraguay	1989	Tunisia	1989
Paraguay	1993	Tunisia	1994
Paraguay	1998	Tunisia	1999
Peru	1995	Tunisia	2004
Peru	2000	Turkey	1946
Philippines	1969	Turkey	1950
Philippines	1981	Turkey	1954
Philippines	1986	Turkey	1957
Republic of Yemen	1993	Zambia	1968
Republic of Yemen	1997	Zambia	1991
Republic of Yemen	1999	Zimbabwe	1990
Russia	2004	Zimbabwe	1996
Rwanda	2003	Zimbabwe	2002
Senegal	1963		

considerably across our sample of hegemonic party regimes.<sup>43</sup> Higher POLITY scores indicate less repressive/more open regimes, so *Polity* should have a positive effect on defections. As a proxy measure of the resources that authoritarian leaders may have at their disposal, *Rents* is included as a control variable. It is a five-point scale variable measuring the value of exports from fuel, minerals and/or ores as a percentage of GDP. As *Rents* increase, defection should be less likely, since these autocrats have more resources to co-opt elites.

We also include several indicators of the regime's perceived electoral vulnerability. Potential elite defectors should be less prone to defect when the perceived chances of defeating the regime or even making a respectable showing at the polls are slim. This perception is likely to be influenced by how well the regime was able to obtain support in previous elections – whether by genuine appeals, manipulation or fraud. Therefore, we control for the vote share of the regime candidate/party in the previous election with a variable called *Previous Vote*.<sup>44</sup> The variable's coefficient should have a negative sign. In addition, elites may be in a good position to gauge the electoral position of the regime prior to an election. Therefore, we also control for the vote share of the regime in the election at hand: *Vote share*.

Our control for the incumbency status of the regime candidate is related to this. Dictatorships, in general, are vulnerable around the issue of succession, since they usually lack regular, institutional mechanisms for the alternation of power.<sup>45</sup> Potential defectors may be emboldened to run when an incumbent leader steps down, leaving a new, untested designate to run as the regime's candidate. The variable *Incumbency* is coded 1 if the incumbent leader is running in the election, 0 otherwise and is expected to have a negative effect on departures from the ruling party.

Potential defectors, like any prospective electoral candidates, need to consider not only the regime, but also the strategies of the extant opposition. In particular, the number of other challengers affects the entry decision of potential candidates.<sup>46</sup> Highly fractionalized oppositions may be more conducive to defector entry than are highly united opposition forces. We measure the fragmentation of the opposition by dividing the vote share of the first opposition party by the sum of the vote share of all opposition parties,  $p_1/\sum p_i$  where  $p$  is the vote share received by the  $i$ th opposition party. This measure returns a value of 1 when there is only one opposition party, indicating a united opposition. This variable, *Opposition Strength*, should have a negative impact on defection.

We also include a number of other control variables related to the institutional environment surrounding the election. We control for the age of the party since the capacity of hegemonic parties to deter defection may increase with age. Older hegemonic parties may

<sup>43</sup> Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, *Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2002*. Version p4v2002e [Computer File]. College Park: Center for International Development and Conflict Management, University of Maryland, 2002URL: <http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm>.

<sup>44</sup> If there is no prior presidential election, we take the regime party's vote total in the prior legislative election. In the first elections after single-party rule, *Previous Vote* receives a value of 100. In the first elections after independence, we take the hegemonic party's vote share in elections for territorial or colonial assemblies.

<sup>45</sup> Marc Morje Howard and Philip G. Roessler, 'Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes', *American Journal of Political Science*, 50 (2006), 365–81.

<sup>46</sup> Gary Cox, *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Simon Hug, *Altering Party Systems: Strategic Behavior and the Emergence of New Political Parties in Western Democracies* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001). We cannot measure the spatial location of candidates and parties in authoritarian elections. But arguably, policy differences among opposition parties in dictatorships hardly play a role in electoral campaigns, since realistically these parties have little chance to implement their platforms (Howard and Roessler, 'Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes', p. 371).

TABLE 2 *Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Analysis*

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	N
<i>Defection</i>	0.19	0.39	0	1	223
<i>Average Growth</i>	2.92	5.15	-10.53	47.80	191
<i>Age of Party</i>	19.52	15.64	1	72	227
<i>First Elections</i>	0.11	0.30	0	1	227
<i>Incumbency</i>	0.83	0.39	0	1	226
<i>Indirect Elections</i>	0.30	0.46	0	1	226
<i>GDP/Capita</i>	4,090.20	4,416.10	411.86	28,361.03	191
<i>Opposition Strength</i>	0.51	0.35	0	1	219
<i>Past Defections</i>	0.21	0.40	0	1	227
<i>Previous Vote</i>	71.99	23.72	0	100	214
<i>Polity</i>	-1.30	5.52	-9	9	224
<i>Rents</i>	1.26	1.31	0	4	227
<i>Sub-Saharan Africa</i>	0.43	0.49	0	1	222
<i>Vote Share</i>	71.90	18.93	31.01	100.00	221

Note: See text for definition of variables.

have more developed organizational and institutional capacity to ensure elite loyalty through the efficient distribution of patronage, making them appear more invincible. However, long-lived hegemonic parties may elicit more defectors than young ones because they are unable to pass the buck for any given malady. Whatever the relationship, we include a continuous measure in years of the length of time that the hegemonic party has held office: *Age of Party*.

A dummy variable, *First Elections*, indicates whether the election is the first multi-party election held under the hegemonic party after a period of single-party rule. Defections should be more likely when the opportunity to oppose the regime in elections emerges for the first time. We also control for the type of election (i.e., presidential or legislative) which determines the chief executive with a dichotomous variable called *Indirect Elections*. This variable takes the value of 1 when legislative elections determine the identity of the chief executive (i.e., the prime minister) or when the legislature votes for the president, and 0 for direct presidential elections.

Some countries may simply be characterized by more fractious political environments that engender constant defections from the ruling party. Therefore, we include a dichotomous variable, *Past Defections*, which takes a value of 1 if the party has experienced a defection at some time in the past.

Finally, since many of our cases come from Sub-Saharan Africa, we include a dummy for the region, *Sub-Saharan Africa*.

Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis. Within the sample, there are forty-two instances of defection. Due to the dichotomous nature of this variable, we estimate the effect of economic growth on defection using logit models. Variance in the error structure may be attributable to non-observable, party-specific factors that make defections more likely in some hegemonic party regimes. Therefore, we cluster robust standard errors on hegemonic party. Clustered standard errors take into account unit heterogeneity in the error structure and, along with it, the most likely source of serial correlation in our data.<sup>47</sup>

<sup>47</sup> Recent studies using cross-national electoral data with low country (*N*) to time-period (*T*) ratios such as ours (3.8 elections per hegemonic party) have settled on this approach (see Matthew Golder, 'Presidential Coattails and Legislative Fragmentation', *American Journal of Political Science*, 50 (2006),



## Results

The results from the models show strong support for our hypothesis about the effect of economic performance on defection. The first column of Table 3 shows the results of a binary model that includes only the primary independent variable of interest. *Average Growth* rates over the most recent election cycle have a significantly negative impact on defection. When short-term economic performance has been good, elites are less likely to leave the ruling party. As subsequent models show, this result is remarkably robust to the inclusion of numerous controls.

Model 2 shows the impact of economic performance on the likelihood of defection after the battery of control variables discussed above has been included. The effect of economic performance remains robust. Most of the other control variables are statistically insignificant with some exceptions. The negative and statistically significant impact of *Vote Share* implies that if party members anticipate a strong incumbent showing, they are less likely to defect.<sup>48</sup> *Age of Party* approaches statistical significance. Older parties may be more likely to experience defection.

Other control variables in this model exhibit no effects significantly different from zero. Whether elections to the chief executive position are direct or indirect does not influence the likelihood of defection. In addition, the possibility of splits in the ruling party appears not to be influenced by issues of succession, as indicated by the results on *Incumbency*. The availability of *Rents* has no deterrent effect on departures from the hegemonic party. The level of development also appears not to matter, as signified by the insignificant coefficient on *GDP/capita*. Neither the strategies of the opposition nor the pattern of past defections from the party appear to influence possible defectors. *First Elections* is also insignificant, indicating that defections are not more likely in multiparty elections after a spell of single-party rule or no elections.<sup>49</sup> Finally, no variation in defection is explained by regional differences.<sup>50</sup>

(Footnote continued)

34–48; and Allen Hicken, *Building Party Systems in Developing Democracies* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009). Including a lagged dependent variable to correct for serial autocorrelation within units is impractical given the large number of observations that would be lost and the uneven spacing between elections. Even so, models that include *Past Defections* (a measure of whether a hegemonic party has experienced a defection at some time in the past) as a control variable reveal little indication of temporal dependence.

<sup>48</sup> However, reverse causation is possible in that a defection may affect the vote share of an incumbent in the contemporaneous election. Also, this variable is highly correlated with both *Polity* and *Previous Vote*. Indeed, when removing *Vote Share* from Model 2, *Previous Vote* becomes significant. Therefore, in most of the subsequent models we use *Previous Vote* in place of *Vote Share* to circumvent the endogeneity problems posed by *Vote Share*.

<sup>49</sup> The importance of opportunity structure in determining the likelihood of defection raises the issue of endogenous elections. If dictators anticipate elite defections from their coalitions in upcoming elections, they can cancel elections, opening the possibility for selection effects that may bias our results. Upon investigating cancelled elections, we found that dictators in party regimes cancel elections very infrequently. In Africa, for example, scheduled elections were cancelled only four times (i.e. Angola 1997 and 2002, Burkina Faso in 1974, and Guinea-Bissau in 1992). Given the rarity of cancelled elections, we choose not to use a selection model because the skewness of the dependent variable in the first stage (cancelled elections) will produce highly inefficient and possibly biased estimates of covariates that affect the decision to hold elections and of the Inverse Mill's Ratio. In addition, since the severity of selection bias is directly proportional to the percentage of the sample that is truncated, we are sanguine about the robustness of our results in the face of potential selection bias.

<sup>50</sup> The model shown includes only Sub-Saharan Africa as a control variable. In other results, we tested other regional dummies and found them to be collectively insignificant.

TABLE 3 *Effect of Economic Growth on Defection from Hegemonic Parties*

Variables	Coefficients											
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
<i>Average Growth</i>	-0.189*** (0.062)	-0.180** (0.072)	-0.236*** (0.054)	-0.238*** (0.066)	-0.242** (0.095)	-0.292** (0.127)	-0.038 (0.235)	-0.391* (0.201)	-0.208*** (0.061)	-0.297*** (0.067)		
<i>Previous Vote</i>		-0.001 (0.017)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.014 (0.010)	-0.060** (0.029)	-0.019* (0.010)		-0.041 (0.026)	-0.018* (0.011)	-0.018* (0.011)	-0.018* (0.010)	-0.013 (0.011)
<i>Age of Party</i>		0.031 (0.026)	0.036*** (0.012)	0.024* (0.014)	0.034 (0.024)	0.033*** (0.012)	0.033** (0.013)	0.084** (0.033)	0.029** (0.012)	0.042*** (0.013)	0.038*** (0.011)	0.032*** (0.010)
<i>Rents</i>		0.243 (0.188)										
<i>Indirect Elections</i>		-0.547 (0.572)										
<i>GDP/capita</i>		0.000 (0.000)										
<i>Incumbency</i>		0.219 (0.745)										
<i>Vote Share</i>		-0.038* (0.021)					-0.051*** (0.013)					
<i>Opp Strength</i>		0.552 (0.854)										
<i>Past Defections</i>		0.543 (0.646)										
<i>Sub-Sahara Africa</i>		-0.013 (0.618)										
<i>First Elections</i>		0.885 (0.985)										
<i>Polity</i>		0.062 (0.050)										
<i>Single Party</i>				-0.231 (0.748)								
<i>Military</i>				-0.881 (1.672)								
<i>Personal</i>				-1.256 (0.842)								
<i>Triple Threat</i>				-3.106* (1.600)								

TABLE 3 (Continued)

Variables	Coefficients											
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8	Model 9	Model 10	Model 11	Model 12
<i>Military/Personal</i>				-0.750 (1.758)								
<i>Single Party/Pers</i>				-0.785 (1.037)								
<i>Press Freedom</i>					0.298 (0.509)							
<i>Electoral Decline</i>					0.027 (0.019)							
<i>Age of Party</i> × <i>Average Growth</i>						0.003 (0.004)						
<i>Vote Share</i> × <i>Average Growth</i>							-0.003 (0.003)					
<i>Average Growth over Life of Party Lagged Growth</i>											-0.222*** (0.068)	-0.107*** (0.033)
Constant	-1.042*** (0.230)	-0.131 (1.414)	-0.464 (0.731)	0.236 (1.060)	0.911 (2.924)	-0.369 (0.801)	1.653* (0.953)	-0.059 (1.558)	-0.259 (0.871)	-0.461 (0.760)	-0.423 (0.724)	-1.026 (0.732)
Observations	187	159	183	183	77	183	185	56	127	180	182	183

Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered by hegemonic party) \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\* $p < 0.05$ , \* $p < 0.1$ .

Model 3, then, is our reduced-form model, including only those control variables that approach conventional levels of statistical significance. In order to maximize efficiency and the number of observations, the succeeding models include these controls in addition to whatever other control variable or robustness check is of relevance for the model.

In Model 4, we control for the typology of authoritarian regime type developed by Geddes.<sup>51</sup> This three-fold classification of regime type (*Single Party*, *Personalist* and *Military*) has been widely employed in the literature. We include dummies for Geddes's pure regime categories as well as the hybrid categories. We expected that single-party regimes and their associated hybrids would be more likely to deter defection because of the strength of their institutional bonds.<sup>52</sup> Yet the results show that the type of dictatorship has no independent impact on the likelihood of defection.

We introduce additional control variables in Model 5 to proxy some of the concepts that we attempted to capture with our original list of controls. Instead of *Polity* (which was statistically insignificant), we proxy the predilection of the regime to use repression by including *Press Freedom*, a scale ranging from 1 to 4 measuring the extent to which the press is controlled or censored by the government. Higher values indicate more government control of the media. *Press Freedom* should exhibit a negative effect on the likelihood of defection.<sup>53</sup> Instead of *Previous Vote* as a proxy for the regime's perceived electoral vulnerability, we look at the change in the vote share of the regime candidate over time. *Electoral Decline* is the sum of the regime candidate's difference in vote total for the previous two elections. For example, if Candidate A wins 70 per cent in election  $t$ , 50 per cent in election  $t + 1$ , and 60 per cent in election  $t + 2$ , *Electoral Decline* in  $t + 2$  is  $(70 - 50) + (50 - 60) = 10$ . Since positive values indicate net vote decreases for the incumbent, *Electoral Decline* should be negatively correlated with defections. We include these two proxies in a separate model, because they significantly reduce the size of our sample (from 187 to 77 observations).

Model 6 interacts economic growth with the age of the party to determine whether the effect of the former is conditional on the length of time the party has been in power. The statistically insignificant coefficient on the interaction term indicates that the effect of growth does not vary with the age of the party. Instead, as an examination of the conditional coefficients from this model indicates, the substantive and statistical significance of *Average Growth* is unchanged across different thresholds of party duration. In other words, poor economic performance induces defections from hegemonic parties at the same rate in both young and old hegemonic parties. This result provides an empirical justification for not using a durability criterion in our definition of hegemonic parties.

Model 7 allows *Vote Share* to interact with *Average Growth* in order to test whether the effect of the latter is conditioned by the level of electoral dominance that the regime enjoys. The insignificant coefficient on the interaction term indicates that this is not the case. *Average Growth*'s effect on the probability of defection does not change across

<sup>51</sup> Barbara Geddes, 'What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?' *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1999), 115–44.

<sup>52</sup> We are grateful to Joseph Wright for providing his update of Geddes's regime classification from Wright, 'Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain?'

<sup>53</sup> We also attempted to proxy the propensity of the regime to use repression with a variable that measures the number of 'purges' in a given year, where purges are defined as any systematic jailing or execution of political opposition by the regime. See Arthur Banks, *Cross-National Time Series Data Archive* <<http://www.databanksinternational.com/32.html>> (2005). This variable was not significant.

different levels of party hegemony. A look at the conditional coefficients for this interaction term confirms that the effect of economic performance on defection does not depend on the amount of votes that the party wins. Economic growth discourages defections both in those regimes that enjoy a strong electoral position and in those that are barely winning a majority of legislative seats. This provides some empirical justification for the 50 per cent threshold used in identifying hegemonic parties.

Models 8 and 9 show separate results for parliamentary and presidential regimes, respectively. The number of observations is reduced significantly in the sub-samples. Economic growth appears to have a substantial and significant impact on defection in presidential regimes, while the effect is not statistically significant in parliamentary regimes. While possibly an artefact of the low number of observations in the parliamentary sub-sample, this result also may have substantive foundations: growth's effect on defections may be more volatile in parliamentary regimes due to the difficulty that voters have in assigning responsibility for economic performance in parliamentary regimes as compared to presidential regimes. Voters are more likely to reward/punish incumbents when they can accurately assign responsibility for economic outcomes.<sup>54</sup> In turn, voters in presidential elections are more likely to hold incumbents accountable for the economy than in parliamentary regimes, since, under the latter, legislatures can remove executives from office between elections, allowing those responsible for the performance of the economy to escape the judgement of voters.<sup>55</sup> While these claims concern voters in democracies, they may also be relevant for economic voting in non-democracies even if the possibility of incumbents losing is remote. Voters in non-democratic elections may either believe (incorrectly) that alternation in power is possible or want to signal their unhappiness with incumbent performance. That accountability is obfuscated in these systems, then, may deter potential defectors from exiting, since they anticipate that voters cannot judge the incumbent's record clearly.

*Average Growth* contains several extreme values. To ensure that our results are robust to possible outliers, we examined the Cook's *D* values and dropped four influential observations. The results in Model 10 show that our results remain substantively unchanged after dropping these observations. We also made sure that our results were robust after dropping the observations with the five highest and five lowest values of economic growth.

Finally, Models 11 and 12 show that the substantive results concerning the effect of growth on the likelihood of defection are robust to different measures of our primary independent variable of interest. Model 11 includes the average growth rate over the entire life of the party (*Average Growth over Life of Party*). More specifically, it is the average annual growth rate of real GDP per capita for the period beginning with the hegemonic party's initial year in power and ending with the year prior to the election at hand. Alternatively, Model 12 includes *Lagged Growth*, or the growth rate of real GDP per capita during the previous year. Both models show that the length of time over which growth is measured does not affect the negative impact that good economic performance has on the likelihood of defection.

<sup>54</sup> See, for example, Powell and Whitten, 'A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting'; Christopher Anderson, 'The End of Economic Voting? Contingency Dilemmas and the Limits of Democratic Accountability', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10 (2007), 271–96; Raymond M. Duch and Randolph Stevenson, *Economic Vote: How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

<sup>55</sup> Timothy Hellwig and David Samuels, 'Electoral Accountability and the Variety of Democratic Regimes', *British Journal of Political Science*, 38 (2008), 65–90.

Clearly, the most important results to emerge from the models are the negative coefficients on *Average Growth*. Other results worth considering are the finding that less ‘autocratic’ regimes are more likely to experience defections, and that, even when controlling for regime openness, older parties are more likely to experience defections. This result may shed some empirical light on a tension in the literature between those who would imply that the institutional bonds of the party grow with time<sup>56</sup> and those who point to dominant parties’ tendency to become sclerotic in their old age.<sup>57</sup> Our finding suggests that these coalitions may become more fractious over time even after controlling for their vote share.

The impact of growth on the likelihood of defection also can be seen graphically in Figure 2, which shows the predicted probability of defection in Model 3 as other control variables are held at their sample means and *Average Growth* is varied across its range.

When growth is positive, the predicted probability of defection is very low with a small confidence interval. In cases of negative average growth, the probability of splits in the hegemonic party increases, but the confidence interval in this range widens considerably. It seems that the economic record of incumbents need not be stellar. As long as authoritarian incumbents do not preside over either economic catastrophes or long periods of decline, they need not worry about the departure of members.




Fig. 2. Effect of growth on the predicted probability of defection

The results indicate that economic growth has a consistent effect on the likelihood that regime elites will desert hegemonic parties. In addition, it seems that potential defectors do not anticipate that more prosperous voters will make ‘ideological investments’ in the opposition. When growth of the economy is high, voters are likely to be content with

<sup>56</sup> Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*; Brownlee, *Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization*.

<sup>57</sup> Haggard and Kaufman, *The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions*; Valerie Bunce, *Subversive Institutions: The Design and Destruction of Socialism and the State* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

the status quo. Observing this, members of the hegemonic party have few incentives to leave and challenge incumbents in elections.<sup>58</sup>

#### CRISIS AND DEFECTION IN TURKEY AND ZIMBABWE

We now turn to a more in-depth analysis of the relationship between economic performance and defection under two important hegemonic parties, the Democratic Party in Turkey and ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe. Given that the purpose of the cases is to probe deeper into an already established and well-generalized cross-case relationship, it is entirely appropriate to select cases on values of both the independent and dependent variable.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, the cases chosen are ones in which the hegemonic party suffered a defection in the face of a mounting economic crisis. The two cases contextualize our theory, demonstrating that it has resonance in the real world of authoritarian politics from the more and less distant past. We also examine the possibility that policy and/or personal differences are behind the observed relationship between economic performance and defection. While the historical evidence does not allow us to completely rule out the role of policy and/or personal disputes in motivating defections, the strong temporal link between economic decline and departures from the regime party in both cases is suggestive. The sequential nature of events also casts doubt on the possibility of a reverse causal relationship in which defections affect the macroeconomic situation.

#### *The First Turkish Republic: Defection of the Freedom Party*

From 1923 until 1946, Turkey was a single-party state ruled by the Kemalist People's Republican Party (CHP). Party and state were tightly fused in this period and opposition parties were banned. In 1946, the CHP permitted other political parties to organize, holding Turkey's first multi-party elections in July of that year.<sup>60</sup> One of the first opposition parties to emerge was the Democratic Party (DP), founded in that year by a prominent group of CHP ministers and parliamentarians.<sup>61</sup> In the elections of 1950, the DP won easily, taking 416 out of 487 seats in parliament.

While the elections did bring alternation in office, the new DP government did little to further political liberalization. Despite its campaign promises to expunge anti-democratic statutes from Turkey's legislation, the party quickly dropped this agenda and instead moved to further restrict freedom of expression and opposition.<sup>62</sup> As early as May 1951, the party promulgated a decree expanding the state's control over the press. In July of the same year, the party moved to

<sup>58</sup> We also examined this alternative hypothesis by including per capita income. The coefficient on income is never significantly different from 0 while the effects of other variables remain substantively unchanged.

<sup>59</sup> John Gerring, *Case Study Research: Principles and Practices* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>60</sup> Historical accounts suggest that the elections were marred by irregularities. Moreover, the elections were called early so as to exploit the opposition's inability to organize. Although the official results were never made public, the CHP retained a commanding parliamentary majority. See Firouz Bahrampour, *Turkey: Political and Social Transformation* (Brooklyn, N.Y.: Theo. Gaus' Sons, 1967), p. 20; Kemal Karpat, *Turkey's Politics* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1959).

<sup>61</sup> Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p48.

<sup>62</sup> Cem Erogul, 'The Establishment of Multi-party Rule: 1945–1971', in Irvin C. Schick and Ertugrul Ahmet Tonak, eds, *Turkey in Transition* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), p. 108.

liquidate the assets of its main rival (the CHP).<sup>63</sup> Two years later in June 1953, the DP lashed out against another opposition party, the Nation party, at first banning it temporarily and then permanently closing it down. Further restrictions targeted the intelligentsia, as a law was passed in 1953 that banned university professors from engaging in political activity.<sup>64</sup> In these early years, the party also moved to establish tighter control over the judiciary and restricted the use of various types of campaigning. In sum, the DP demonstrated its willingness and ability to continue (and indeed expand upon) the illiberal tactics of the CHP, alienating many of its initial supporters, including members of the intelligentsia and liberal economic elite.<sup>65</sup> According to Erogul, 'The general elections of 2 May 1954 [were] held in a climate where the intelligentsia was increasingly being silenced, the opposition crushed, the population dazzled by continuous foundation laying ceremonies, and where the misleading abundance created by liberal economic policies had not yet turned to crisis'.<sup>66</sup>

The DP won a resounding victory in the 1954 elections capitalizing on the booming economy that had characterized the first four years of its rule.<sup>67</sup> Bolstered by bumper harvests, increasing public investment in heavy industry and mechanized agriculture and foreign loans, the economy expanded by 21 per cent in 1951, 4 per cent in 1952 and 10 per cent in 1953. However, the inability of production to keep up with investment contributed to spiralling inflation.<sup>68</sup> This coincided with a drought in the summer of 1954 that led to an exceptionally poor harvest and subsequent grain hoarding.<sup>69</sup> Moreover, the regime was accruing massive internal and foreign debt and the Central Bank had begun to run a significant deficit balance in its gold and foreign exchange reserves. To make matters worse, a \$300 million loan from the United States that the government had been counting on to cover its deficit was cancelled.<sup>70</sup> Under the weight of these accumulating pressures, the Turkish economy plunged into recession in 1954 with a 12 per cent drop in GDP.<sup>71</sup>

As the economic troubles spilled over into early 1955, opposition to the regime's policies stiffened. With living standards falling and shortages of foodstuffs becoming common, the opposition stepped up its criticism of the government. Society also began to voice its opposition, for the first time. In September, riots broke out in Istanbul, spurred forward by economic dislocation among migrant workers from the countryside. By summer 1955, signs of discord emerged within DP party ranks. A liberal faction within the party began to voice its opposition to statist economic policies and the restriction of

<sup>63</sup> That this act was not a 'morally justified' component of a lustration programme against the RPP is confirmed by the fact that the DP waited until mid 1951 to take these measures and that the resolution was not implemented at first, but only held out as a threat to keep the CHP in check. Only when the DP recognized the CHP as an endemic threat did it move to confiscate the party's assets (Erogul, 'The Establishment of Multi-party Rule', p. 108).

<sup>64</sup> Walter F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution: 1960–1961* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1963), p. 10.

<sup>65</sup> As Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution*, points out, where the laws were not inherently anti-democratic, their selective interpretation and enforcement were.

<sup>66</sup> Erogul, 'The Establishment of Multi-party Rule', p. 111.

<sup>67</sup> The party won 93 per cent of the seats in the legislative assembly.

<sup>68</sup> Kemal Karpat, 'The Turkish Elections of 1957', *Western Political Quarterly*, 14 (1961), 436–59.

<sup>69</sup> Richard Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic: A Case Study in National Development* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 150.

<sup>70</sup> For more on the origins of Turkey's economic difficulties in 1954–55, see *The Economist*, 2 July 1955 and 24 December 1955.

<sup>71</sup> See Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*; Karpat, 'The Turkish Elections of 1957'; and Robinson, *The First Turkish Republic*, on the conditions leading up to the crisis.



political freedoms.<sup>72</sup> Of particular prominence in this liberal faction, were nineteen parliamentary deputies led by former diplomat and interior minister, Fevzi Karaosmanoglu, and former minister of the economy, Fethi Celikbas. Celikbas was a known economic liberal who had long argued for a free market approach to economic development. In the fall of 1955, this 'group of nineteen' introduced a draft bill that would grant newspapers the right to bring evidence against government officials accused of corruption.<sup>73</sup> Unsurprisingly, the DP leadership opposed the bill and threatened to expel its co-sponsors for breaking party ranks. At the October party conference, the leadership followed through on its threat, expelling nine of the 'nineteen'. In response, the other ten resigned from the party. In the following weeks, up to a dozen other deputies joined the defectors and turned in their party cards.<sup>74</sup> In December 1955, these thirty former DP deputies formally established the Freedom party to contest the upcoming elections. The party's support base was primarily among liberals and intellectuals, former supporters of the DP.<sup>75</sup>

Although historical accounts agree that the proximate cause for the deputies' defection was their dissatisfaction with the restrictiveness of the press law, it must be noted that they only acted on their dissatisfaction as the Turkish economy faltered. Indeed, the press law amendment that left liberal deputies disenchanted was enacted in 1951 and, to our knowledge, remained unchanged thereafter. We acknowledge that DP loyalists in this period were increasingly disenchanted with the authoritarianism of the DP but we also emphasize that the DP had consistently demonstrated its non-democratic tendencies in the period from 1951 until 1954, introducing draconian amendments to the aforementioned press law, the penal code and legislation on the rights of the opposition.<sup>76</sup> And yet, crucially, during this early period, when the economy was expanding and incomes rising, the historical record reveals no prominent instances of internal party discord, and no rebellion on the scale seen in 1955. Furthermore, the possibility of an endogenous relationship between economic growth and defection can be ruled out in this case. Exogenous factors (such as the poor harvest in 1954 and the United States' refusal to grant Turkey an additional \$300 million in aid), combined with the Turkish government's mismanagement of macroeconomic policy, put the economy in crisis mode well before the first signs of discord emerged in the ranks of the DP.

### *2008 Zimbabwe: Defection of Simba Makoni*

Since independence in 1980, Zimbabwe has been ruled by President Robert Mugabe and ZANU-PF.<sup>77</sup> Originally chosen by the legislature, the president was selected through

<sup>72</sup> Feroz Ahmad, *The Making of Modern Turkey* (London: Routledge, 1993), p. 113.

<sup>73</sup> Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, p. 424.

<sup>74</sup> Karpat, *Turkey's Politics*, pp. 424–6.

<sup>75</sup> The party faced difficulties building a national organization and fared poorly in the general elections of October 1957, winning 3.7 per cent of the vote and four seats. Months later the party merged with CHP.

<sup>76</sup> Some sources suggest that the DP was adopting more and more authoritarian practices in 1954 and 1955; see Karpat, 'The Turkish Elections of 1957', and Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution*. We readily acknowledge the difficulty in determining whether the Freedom party defections occurred because dissatisfaction with the DP's growing authoritarianism reached some tipping point in 1955 or whether it was due solely to the economic crisis. We can only re-emphasize that the timing of Celikbas's decision to introduce the draft amendment, and the subsequent split from the party came just weeks after the September Istanbul riots, which occurred in response to the economic crisis.

<sup>77</sup> ZANU was Mugabe's original party, incorporating the Patriotic Front shortly before independence. This alliance briefly broke down during the 1980 elections when the PF's original leader, Joshua Nkomo, contested the elections as PF-ZAPU while Mugabe campaigned under the partisan label of ZANU-PF.

direct suffrage for the first time in 1990. Mugabe won this election easily and the following one in 1996 with 83 and 93 per cent of the vote, respectively.<sup>78</sup> He faced a greater challenge in the 2002 election in the form of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). A coalition of human rights, trade and student organizations, spearheaded by the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU), the MDC formed in 1999 with the goal of pressuring Mugabe and ZANU-PF to enact political and economic reforms. Having captured 47 per cent of votes in the 2000 Assembly elections, the MDC and its candidate for the presidency, Morgan Tsvangirai, posed a strong threat to Mugabe and ZANU-PF.

To meet this challenge, Mugabe and ZANU-PF resorted to a variety of tactics. Just weeks before the 2002 election, the government enacted a repressive media law and suspended international missions to observe the elections. The regime also sought to mobilize support through a variety of economic measures, notably the intensification of land seizures. Implemented as early as 2000 to combat the growing popularity of the MDC, the government's programme to expropriate white-owned commercial farms for redistribution to landless supporters was a clear bid to play on nationalist sentiment. These pre-electoral policies helped Mugabe secure victory, although with a much smaller share than in the past (only 56 per cent).

These policies, however, also set the stage for economic crisis. As worsening food shortages threatened famine, the government declared a state of emergency, blaming drought. Yet the transformation of Zimbabwe from a net food exporter to a desperate recipient of food aid was due to the disruption in agriculture resulting from the land seizures.<sup>79</sup> In July 2005, the government embarked on Operation Murambatsvina to eliminate illegal dwellings and informal economic activity by bulldozing several shanty-towns surrounding Harare.<sup>80</sup> Designed to intimidate potential MDC supporters, the project deprived several thousand urban residents of their livelihoods. In addition, in 2007 the government prepared legislation that would force foreign-owned companies to transfer majority shareholdings to local interests.<sup>81</sup> Similar in spirit to the land seizures, the proposal had a chilling effect on investment. The cumulative results of these measures were evident in hyperinflation of 66,000 per cent, unemployment of 80 per cent and a formal economy contracting by 65 per cent, so that just three months before the election Zimbabwe had the world's fastest shrinking peacetime economy.<sup>82</sup>

In February 2008, Simba Makoni, a ZANU-PF Politburo member, declared that he would stand as a candidate in the elections. Makoni previously had served in various governments under Mugabe. When the first post-independence government was formed, Makoni was named deputy minister of agriculture. Over the next four years, he served as

<sup>78</sup> Norma Kriger, 'ZANU(PF) Strategies in General Elections, 1980–2000: Discourse and Coercion', *African Affairs*, 104 (2005), 1–34; Lloyd Sachikonye, 'The 1990 Zimbabwe Elections: A Post-Mortem', *Review of African Political Economy*, 48 (1990), 92–9.

<sup>79</sup> Craig Richardson, 'How Much Did Droughts Matter? Linking Rainfall and GDP Growth in Zimbabwe', *African Affairs*, 106 (2007), 463–78.

<sup>80</sup> Michael Bratton and Eldred Masunungure, 'Popular Reactions to State Repression: Operation Murambatsvina in Zimbabwe', *African Affairs*, 106 (2006), 21–45.

<sup>81</sup> 'Industries: Zimbabwe', *Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series*, 44 (July 2007).

<sup>82</sup> 'Power: Zimbabwe', *Africa Research Bulletin: Economic, Financial and Technical Series*, 44 (March 2007); Brian Latham, 'Zimbabwe Currency Plunges to Four Million to the U.S. Dollar', *International Herald Tribune*, 5 December 2007, <http://www.ihf.com/articles/2007/12/04/bloomberg/bxzim.php>, downloaded 10 February 2008.

minister of energy and then minister of youth before abruptly leaving government. His departure was seen as a consequence of his attempts to reform and modernize government. Coming from a generation that came after Mugabe's, Makoni was seen as 'too clever and too young for the older members of the party. They wanted him out of the way'.<sup>83</sup> Makoni returned to government when Mugabe made use of him as finance minister in 2000. The economy already was exhibiting signs of crisis as foreign reserves ran low, debt mounted, unemployment grew and investor confidence declined. Brought in to restore Zimbabwe's image with donors and investors, Makoni quickly embraced measures to liberalize the economy. In his zeal, however, he clashed directly with Mugabe, who worried about the political costs of economic reforms. As a result, Makoni commanded much respect among the business community and those outside of ZANU-PF, but fell out of favour with the president.

Upon launching his candidacy, Makoni immediately mounted a platform centred on improving economic conditions, and in a bid to widen his appeal, he made the argument that solving Zimbabwe's economic crisis was the focus of his platform: 'I also share the widely-held view that these hardships are a result of failure of national leadership and that change at that level is a prerequisite for change at other levels of national endeavour'.<sup>84</sup> Makoni's message attracted support not only from the poor, but also from middle-class professionals who were hurt by declining living standards.<sup>85</sup> Perceiving that Makoni could mount a credible challenge, a group of ZANU-PF members rallied around Makoni 'in the biggest rebellion against the Zimbabwean leader [Mugabe] in decades'.<sup>86</sup>

Ultimately, Makoni polled many fewer votes in comparison to the incumbent, Mugabe, and the primary opposition candidate, Tsvangirai. Yet his departure from ZANU-PF raised expectations for the first time in the country's electoral history that Mugabe might soon be retired from power. Makoni's campaign against Mugabe on the basis of an economic platform is noteworthy for three reasons. First, despite his membership in the ruling apparatus, which was responsible for the economic calamity, Makoni carved out a reputation as someone who consistently advocated economic liberalization even at great cost to his own personal ambitions. That Mugabe did not heed his advice and Zimbabwe landed in such dire straits only seemed to confirm that Makoni potentially had solutions to the crisis. As one voter observed: 'I like Makoni because he has demonstrated in the past that given a chance he can run the economy efficiently'.<sup>87</sup>

Secondly, if policy disagreements and/or career ambitions were the only motivating factor for defections from the hegemonic party, then Makoni should have left ZANU-PF long before February 2008. Policy disagreements with Mugabe, culminating in his

<sup>83</sup> Joseph Winter, 'Simba Makoni: Zimbabwe's Roaring Lion?' *BBC News*, 5 February 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/7228205.stm>, downloaded 10 February 2008.

<sup>84</sup> Winter, 'Simba Makoni'.

<sup>85</sup> Darren Taylor, 'Former ZANU-PF Heavyweight Prepares to Challenge Mugabe', *Voice of America*, 19 March 2008, <http://www.voanews.com/english/Africa/Former-ZANU-PF-Heavyweight-Prepares-to-Challenge-Mugabe.cfm>, downloaded 20 March 2008.

<sup>86</sup> Patricia Mpfu, 'MDC Welcomes New Mugabe Challenger', *ZimOnline*, 6 February 2008, <http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=2671>, downloaded 10 February 2008. Makoni reputedly had the support of former army chief and major party figure Solomon Mujuru, whose wife was vice-president along with other members of ZANU-PF (Winter, 'Simba Makoni').

<sup>87</sup> Simplicious Chirinda, 'Surprise, Disbelief Greets Makoni's Bid for Presidency', *ZimOnline*, 6 February 2008, <http://www.zimonline.co.za/Article.aspx?ArticleId=2667>, downloaded 10 February 2008.

termination as finance minister in 2002, did not lead Makoni to leave ZANU-PF until the 2008 election – the moment when he could take advantage of the deepening economic crisis to make anti-incumbent appeals and to trumpet his own experience as a reformer. While policy and personal disagreements as motives are not inconceivable, they were acted upon only when the state of the economy provided a propitious moment.

Finally, the sequence of events between 2002 and 2008 clearly illustrates that the correlation between economic performance and departures from the regime party run in one direction. Coming after almost a decade of poor economic policies and lack of investor confidence, Makoni's defection is the result, not the cause of these patterns.

## CONCLUSION

Until the fall of the Soviet Union, single-party dictatorships were thought to be invincible due to the co-optive and repressive capacity of the regime party. Hegemonic party regimes share some of the characteristics of single-party states, yet they differ in two key respects: the holding of elections and the presence of opposition parties. While these institutions are likely to be designed to help authoritarian rulers stay in power, they also carry risks for incumbents. The greatest dangers appear to stem not from extant opposition forces, but rather from elites within the regime party who weigh the costs and benefits of staying within the fold.

Two important components of elite calculations are voters and the economy. Regime elites know that they must maintain the acquiescence, if not active support, of citizens. When the economy performs poorly, this social contract is in danger, but, even in economic hard times, mass uprising against the regime is unlikely; first, citizens acting on their own face collective action problems; and secondly, the regime's ability to repress is likely to deter any political entrepreneurs from organizing the masses. By contrast, elites do have a way of reaching ordinary citizens and gathering their support; it is through elections rather than through militancy on the street.

When incomes decline, regime elites have the opportunity to defect from the hegemonic party and to challenge incumbents in elections. The economy provides an issue around which defectors can mobilize support that may cut across other social cleavages. Defectors anticipate that voters will want to punish incumbents at the polls for poor economic performance. Consistent with this idea, we find evidence that the rate of average growth of per capita income prior to elections has an impact on the likelihood of regime elites defecting from the hegemonic party. Particularly when incomes increase, or even remain the same, the incentives for elites to depart from the regime party are low.

This analysis reveals two important points about these regimes. The first is the way in which the regime's own institutions – a ruling party and elections that ostensibly are designed to help incumbents survive – can become the means by which the regime unravels. The second is that the robustness of these institutions is not wholly attributable to the endogenous mechanisms of reproduction that scholars have emphasized, but also to exogenous factors that provide elites with incentives to remain loyal to the regime. Magaloni argues that it is the image of invincibility that deters elite splits in these regimes.<sup>88</sup> By controlling for the percentage of votes won by the regime party, we show that it is more than just this 'hyper-dominance' that contributes to elite cohesion. In addition, it is more than the institutional bonds of the party that ensures elite cohesion in

<sup>88</sup> Magaloni, *Voting for Autocracy*.

these regimes. Indeed, Smith shows that the durability of party regimes relative to other authoritarian subtypes is reduced upon removing a few outliers (Mexico and the Soviet Union) and controlling for economic growth.<sup>89</sup> So, if it is the case that positive economic growth is required to attract and retain elite allies, the independent influence of dominant party institutions on elite loyalty is called into question.

<sup>89</sup> Smith, 'Life of the Party'.