THE CONSEQUENCES OF NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS IN CIVIL WARS, 1945–1993

ROY LICKLIDER *Rutgers University*

We know very little about how civil wars end. Harrison Wagner has argued that negotiated settlements of civil wars are likely to break down because segments of power-sharing governments retain the capacity for resorting to civil war while victory destroys the losers' organization, making it very difficult to resume the war. An analysis of a data set of 91 post-1945 civil wars generally supports this hypothesis but only in wars over identity issues. Moreover, while military victories may be less likely to break down than negotiated settlements of identity civil wars, they are also more likely to be followed by acts of genocide. Outsiders concerned with minimizing violence thus face a dilemma.

As the threat of thermonuclear extinction declines, our concern with internal conflicts increases. With the ending of the Cold War, great powers have less stake in ensuring that "their side" wins and more stake in peaceful settlements. There is a substantial literature on the *causes* of such violence, an important topic. However, from the point of view of outsiders, the *ending* of such violence is often the major consideration, whether for reason of policy or humanitarianism; but ironically, we know much less about how this happens, with or without outside assistance.

This project is part of a research enterprise designed to help find out how to facilitate the end of civil violence. Nothing is said here about justice, about whether a policy of war termination is *appropriate* toward any state or group of states, about who will benefit or suffer from it. The ending of violence may well not be the goal of concerned outsiders in any particular situation. While they will hopefully not support violence for its own sake, they may certainly not wish to encourage a civil war to end on terms that they think are inappropriate (e.g., genocide for much of the population, a nondemocratic government, repression of one group by another, adoption of policies they dislike). This research rests on the normative assumption that at some times we will want to know the conditions under which civil wars are more or less likely to end. In particular I am concerned with the *consequences of ending civil wars with negotiated settlements or military victories*.

A number of authorities argue that civil wars will be more difficult to end than interstate wars. Interstate opponents will presumably eventually retreat to their own territories (wars of conquest have been rare since 1945), but in civil wars the members of the two sides must live side by side and work together in a common government after the killing stops. Compromise is particularly difficult because the stake is control of this new government and is thus, literally, life and death for the combatants (Bell 1972, 218; Iklé 1971, 95; Modelski 1964, 125–26; Pillar 1983, 24–25; Zartman 1993, 1995).

This leads us to expect civil wars to be both more *intense* and therefore more *difficult to resolve by negotiation* than interstate wars. There is some support for both hypotheses. Hugh Miall's data show that 15% of international wars involved major violence, while a full 68% of civil and civil/international wars did (1992, 124). Paul Pillar's data show that about two-thirds of interstate wars but only one-third of civil wars ended by negotiation (1983, 25). Using a somewhat modified version of Pillar's data, Stephen Stedman found that when colonial wars and other "special" cases were eliminated, the percentage of civil wars settled by negotiation declined to about 15% (1991, 9).

The implications of these findings are ambiguous. On the one hand, casualties do seem to be higher and settlements more difficult in civil wars, suggesting that there may be interesting theoretical differences between the different sorts of violence. On the other hand, while suppression, genocide, or partition are certainly possible, negotiated settlements to civil violence do in fact occur: the cell is not empty.

Sustained wars produce and reinforce hatred that does not end with the violence. How do groups of people who have been killing one another with considerable enthusiasm and success come together to form a common government? How can you work together, politically and economically, with the people who killed your parents, siblings, children, friends, or lovers? On the surface it seems impossible, even grotesque.

But in fact we know that it happens all the time. Fred Iklé's apt title, *Every War Must End*, applies to civil wars as well as interstate ones. The mass violence stemming from Catholic-Protestant religious differences within Western Europe several centuries ago has ended. England is no longer crisscrossed by warring armies representing York and Lancaster or King and Parliament. The French no longer kill one another over the divine right of kings. Americans seem agreed that they will be independent of English rule and that the South should not secede. Argentines seem reconciled to living in a single state rather than several. The ideologies of the Spanish Civil War now seem irrelevant, and even the separatist issues there are not being resolved by mass violence. Nige-

ria experienced one of the most brutal civil wars of our time, but the violence ended 20 years ago, and while the country is politically unstable, the divisions are not the same as in the civil war. In Colombia, a power-sharing agreement in 1957 facilitated an end to *la violencia* and was followed by 15 years of relative peace during which old rivals traded control of the government in a process resembling a quadrille. A settlement between the combatants in North Yemen produced a regime sturdy enough to merge with South Yemen some years later and, more recently, to wage with success another civil war to oppose southern secession. Somehow, effective new societies were constructed after these wars, involving most of the people who had fought on opposite sides.

How did this happen? We know very little about the processes involved. I shall explore one particular aspect of this process, the consequences of negotiated settlements and military victories for renewed violence.

DEFINITIONS AND RESEARCH DESIGN

This line of reasoning also suggests that the conventional definition of a civil war—large-scale violence between groups holding sovereignty within a recognized state—is inadequate. The problem is the notion of *recognized state*, which is essentially a legal criterion. However, conflict increasingly seems to pay little attention to the distinction. Is it appropriate to see the Palestinian Intifada as not a civil war because Israel is an occupying force rather than a recognized sovereign in the territories? The war in Zimbabwe from 1972 to 1980 can be viewed as a colonial struggle, since there was no legitimate government in place before the end of the war, but in fact, the fighting on both sides was carried out by local residents, not troops from a colonial homeland. Whether Bosnia was a state before it was torn by violence is an interesting question, but it begs the more significant issues of why the violence has been so intense, how it is likely to end, and what its consequences will be.

Iklé's argument suggests that the particular intensity of a civil war stems from the *nature of the stakes*—from the expectation that after the violence, regardless of the results, the participants will have to live together in the state which is being shaped by the war. Thus the term civil war is applied to any conflict that satisfies *all* of the three following criteria:

1. Some influential leaders must be concerned about possibly having to live in the *same political unit* with their current enemies after the killing stops. This concern must be important enough to influence the kind of settlement they are prepared to accept.
2. There must be *multiple sovereignty*, defined by Charles Tilly as the population of an area obeying more than one institution. "They pay taxes [to the opposition], provide men to its armies, feed its functionaries, honor its symbols, give time to its service, or yield other resources despite the prohibitions of a still-existing government they formerly obeyed" (Tilly 1978, 192). This criterion differentiates civil wars from other types of domestic violence, such as street crime and riots, in which there is no centralized control of the opposition. To distinguish civil wars from colonial wars, each side must have significant numbers of troops made up of local residents.
3. A civil war, by our definition, involves *large-scale violence*, killing people. I used the operational definitions of the Correlates of War project: (a) 1,000 battle deaths or more per year and (b) effective resistance, that is, at least two sides must have been organized for violent conflict before the war started or else the weaker side must have imposed casualties on its opponent equal to at least 5% of its own (to distinguish between civil wars and political massacres) (Small and Singer 1982, 214–15).[1]

Several implications of this definition are worth noting explicitly. First, it includes both *revolutions* (a war for the control of the central state apparatus, regardless of the degree of social transformation sought) and wars of *secession*. Indeed, it may even include events often called *coups* (Argentina and Bolivia) if they meet the criteria. Second, international involvement is not included in the definition. While such involvement may indeed be critical in determining the course of the war, its presence or absence is irrelevant in determining its *existence*. If significant numbers of inhabitants of the area are combatants on *both* sides, the violence is classified as a civil war, regardless of the level of involvement of other actors.

Thus the Palestinian uprising satisfies the first condition (since Arabs and Jews are likely to cohabit some states, regardless of the outcome) but is excluded because its death count is too low. The South African riots in 1976 met the first and third criteria but had insufficient central control to be classified as a civil war.[2] Zimbabwe is included because the issue of the war was the nature of the government that would control the state in which most of the combatants expected to reside and because the combatants were primarily local on both sides. Indeed, this definition would include wars of *conquest*, where one group tries to incorporate another into the same state, but very few of them can be found after 1945.

But what does it mean to say that a civil war *ends*? It is commonplace, for example, to say that the American Civil War has not yet ended, that the struggle between differing cultures in the North and South continues to this day in various ways. But there is a distinction between *war* and *conflict*. The distinguishing qualities of *war* are multiple sovereignties and violence, as set forth above. The *underlying conflict* which triggered the violence may well continue, but if (1) the concern about living together, (2) the multiple sovereignty, or (3) the violence ends, the civil war ends for purposes of this analysis.

These issues were first explored in a series of six case studies of large-scale civil wars after 1945 that had been *ended for at least five years*: Greece, Colombia (1957), North Yemen, Nigeria, Sudan (1972), and Zimbabwe. The American Civil War was also included. The studies were written by country experts in response to a framework paper (Licklider 1988). After the first drafts had been written, the authors were brought together with specialists in war termination at a conference sponsored by the U.S. Institute of Peace and Rutgers University. The framework was greatly simplified, the cases were revised, and several theoretical papers were also written to produce an edited book (Licklider 1993).

The seven cases are remarkably varied in a number of aspects, which makes them particularly useful for theory construction. They include three negotiated settlements (North Yemen, Sudan, and Colombia); two total victories (Greece and Nigeria); and two mixed examples of military dominance combined with negotiation (more negotiation in Zimbabwe, less in the United States). Some of the wars were separatist (Nigeria, the United States, and Sudan); others were revolutions (Greece, North Yemen, Colombia, and Zimbabwe). There was extensive outside intervention in North Yemen and Greece; somewhat less in Nigeria, Sudan, and Zimbabwe; and much less still in Colombia and the United States. Their only apparent shared characteristic is that large-scale civil violence ended for a considerable time after the settlement.

However, despite this diversity, they were not a random sample of the Small and Singer data, which itself is legitimately subject to question. They were designed to be used for *theory construction*, but they were not appropriate for *theory testing*.

To remedy these problems a data set of 91 civil wars (see Appendix) was constructed. These data are intended to include all civil wars from 1945 to 1993 (inclusive) that fit my definition and thus provide a stronger basis for generalizations than the seven cases. They were created by applying these definitions to the conflict data sets of several other authors, primarily Small and Singer (1982), Pillar (1983), Stedman (1991), Sullivan (1994), Brogan (1990), Maill (1992), and Sivard (1992, 1993). In general these sources agreed with one another on particular episodes. When they did not, the source reporting longer duration and higher casualty figures was generally selected. In a few cases particular information on specific wars was used. (The codings for Burma and Algeria B, for example, rely on M. Smith 1991, 88–101 and Spencer 1994, respectively.)

This data set is fairly primitive. The number of cases is quite small, even when the entire population rather than a sample is analyzed. Many of the variables are nominal, and the reliability of some of the figures is questionable. I do not believe this data warrants the use of sophisticated statistical techniques. Instead, I simply report Pearson's chi-squared, the probability that the two variables are independent of one another, and associated statistics. Even these are handicapped by the small expected values in some cells, but at least they give us some sense of the likelihood that the relationships have occurred by chance.

HOW DO CIVIL WARS END?

Do civil wars indeed end at all? We can all recite examples where internal violence seems endless, going on for decades or longer—Lebanon, Cambodia, Burma, East Timor, and so on. I. William Zartman (1993, 1995) makes a powerful argument that a likely outcome of internal wars is de facto secession, where each side has effective, unchallenged control of a territory and population. Most uprisings will be crushed, but for many others a kind of balance emerges. The government will have more resources than its opponent, but the rebellion is not the only—or even the most important—item on its agenda. The rebels compensate for lack of resources with intense commitment.

Often a military stalemate and a rough kind of equality emerge. In an interstate war this might provide the basis for some sort of negotiated settlement. However, in an internal war the government abandons its legitimacy if it openly negotiates with the rebels. It is easier simply to withdraw from part of the country (usually to the capital) and continue normal life. The commitment of the rebels makes them equally unwilling to abandon the struggle, which has become their life, even if they could get government agreement to their demands and some guarantees that the agreements will be carried out after they disarm, which is difficult. They too find it comfortable simply to establish their own government in a limited area indefinitely.

The Zartman (1993, 1995) argument is persuasive, and it clearly describes a number of his examples quite well in the short run. However, it has at least two major problems. First, this sort of de facto secession does not really seem to be a final result. Both sides may find stalemate more attractive than negotiation, but neither is usually prepared to accept it as a long-term solution. Thus the level of violence is likely to stay fairly high, although with considerable variation.

A more serious problem is that it is unclear when de facto secession may *not* apply—when settlement of some sort may become more attractive than stalemate. Put differently, Zartman's argument implies that *no civil war will ever end*. But in fact, this does not seem to be true.

Aside from the obvious historical examples mentioned, more systematic analysis suggest that modern civil wars do indeed end. Small and Singer list 44 civil wars from 1940 to 1980, only 4 of which (Philippines, Angola, El Salvador, and Afghanistan), or 10%, were classified as still in progress at the end of the period (1982, 222). Stephen Stedman (1991), drawing on work by Paul Pillar, Quincy Wright, and Small and Singer, developed a list of 47 civil wars after 1945 and

said that only 3 (Angola, Cyprus, and Lebanon), or a bit less than 10%, were still going.

My data generally confirm this pattern. Of the 91 civil wars, 7 (South Africa II, Nicaragua B, El Salvador, Ethiopia, China C III, Morocco, and Mozambique) were discarded because violence ended there less than five years before 1994. Thus they were not ongoing, but it was too early to call them ended. Of the 84 remaining, 32% (27) are classified as ongoing in 1994. This figure is higher than earlier studies, reflecting the outbreak of civil violence following the end of the Cold War.

The data also show that most civil wars do not last very long. Of the 84, 27% ended during the same calendar year in which they began; we can call these *abortive* civil wars. Over half ended within 5 years. By 10 years, the figure is almost two-thirds. Malaysia, Laos, and Vietnam ended between 11 and 20 years from when they started, and China A lasted 22 years before ending. Of the 27 ongoing civil wars in 1993, 14 had already lasted over 10 years. Therefore, if we define *protracted* civil wars as those lasting over 10 years, 21% of all civil wars (18, i.e., 4 concluded and 14 ongoing) fall into this category.

Protracted *conflicts* thus may well be fairly common; protracted *civil wars* are somewhat less so. Zartman's argument, then, goes a long way toward explaining the *difficulty* of ending such wars, but we return to our original question: Given that some (all?) civil wars *do* end eventually, how does this happen, and what difference does it make?

As noted, reasonable argument backed by evidence suggests that civil wars are very difficult to end through negotiation because the stakes are so high and because (as in interstate war) no institution can be trusted to enforce agreements. Indeed, this proposition is one of the major analytic justifications for studying civil wars separately from interstate wars.

Those wars which have ended were divided rather crudely into (1) those which ended with a military victory of one side and (2) those which ended in some sort of negotiated settlement (defined as an end to the violence reached while both sides had significant military capabilities remaining and therefore presumably could have decided not to stop fighting if the terms were unacceptable). The data suggest that most civil wars are ended by military victory but that negotiated settlements are a regular phenomenon. Of the 57 civil wars which have ended, one quarter (14) ended by negotiation, while the remaining 43 ended in military victory.

NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENTS IN CIVIL WARS AND THE WAGNER HYPOTHESIS

Given that negotiated settlements do occur, what are their consequences? In particular, are they efficient in bringing peace? Many outsiders regard a negotiated settlement as a good way to end civil violence, for at least two reasons: (1) it will result in *fewer casualties* than the alternative of military victory for one side, and (2) because it involves some sort of *power sharing* among the two parties, it is likely to make future violence among the parties less likely. In fact, however, neither conclusion is intuitively obvious.

Reducing Casualties

The easiest way to reduce casualties in civil war is for one side to surrender and for the other side not to carry out genocide. This is the usual result; most of the abortive civil wars end in victory without genocide.

The more interesting question is whether civil wars which have lasted for longer than a year will have fewer casualties if resolved by negotiated settlements or by victory. There are theoretical arguments on both sides, because it depends on the counterfactual, What would have happened otherwise? Presumably the short-term casualties will be higher for negotiated settlements if the alternative is that one side surrenders immediately with no subsequent genocide and will be higher for military victory if the alternative is that the war is prolonged by the loser fighting longer because of despair of the alternative or if the winner resorts to genocide after the war.

Casualty estimates in civil wars are notoriously inaccurate, so I measured them by orders of magnitude: 1,000 to 10,000 deaths, 10,000 to 100,000, 100,000 to 1,000,000, and over one million. A similar approach has been applied by Lewis Richardson and Hugh Miall. Using these categories, casualty patterns are similar for wars that end in negotiated settlements and military victories.

Sharing Power

The problem of civil war termination is not simply stopping the killing. If the people involved will continue to live in the same state (and these data show only five cases of political separation after civil war between 1945 and 1994), the more interesting problem is creating a state in which former enemies can work together—if not in love, at least without again resorting to mass violence. (For preliminary discussions of this process in terms of state formation and collective memory, see Licklider 1992, 1995.) Negotiated settlements presumably involve power sharing (otherwise it is hard to see why both sides should accept them), which seems a promising way to begin the formation of a state that can handle the underlying problems that caused the violence in the first place.

However, a number of practitioners have suggested informally that negotiated settlements of civil wars are more likely to break down into large-scale violence than are military victories. R. Harrison Wagner (1993) reaches a similar conclusion with a much more sophisticated analysis, arguing that negotiated settlements are likely to create internal balance-of-power situations that make it difficult for the new

government to function effectively. Military victory, on the other hand, will destroy the organizational structure of one side, making a resumption of the civil war much more difficult. We can call this the Wagner hypothesis and express it formally: Negotiated settlements of civil wars are more likely to break down than settlements based on military victories; consequently, the long-term casualties of negotiated settlements are likely to be greater than those of military victory. (For similar arguments about interstate wars, see Blainey 1988, 109–24 and Maoz 1984.)

Wagner's argument is that without an organizational structure, an opposition will have great difficulty in starting a civil war; this can be called the *repressive* explanation. An alternate argument is that any state that experiences civil war probably has major internal problems but that those problems are unlikely to be resolved unless the postwar government can undertake structural change at the expense of vested interests. A negotiated settlement to a civil war is likely to result in veto groups that will not surrender power for social change whose impact on them is uncertain; but a military victory will destroy the power of such groups, making renewed conflict more difficult and allowing the government to act as it pleases. This *social change* explanation does not assume that all such governments will try to resolve underlying social problems, only that they will be more capable of doing so if they choose.

The Wagner hypothesis is generally confirmed by the data. The 57 civil wars that have been ended for more than five years were coded as to whether there broke out in the country, more than five years after the settlement and before 1994, (1) a civil war with the same sides and issues, (2) a civil war involving different sides or issues, or (3) large-scale violence that was not a civil war. The 11 cases involving the latter two outcomes were removed from the analysis because their implications for the Wagner hypothesis were ambiguous.[3]

Table 1 shows that three-quarters of these cases (34 of 46) were not renewed during the time of the study. Such a renewal occurred in only 15% of the victories, as opposed to 50% of the negotiated settlements. Several different chi-squared measures show this relationship to be significant at the .05 level or better. Interestingly, among those settlements which do break down, military victories do not last as long as negotiated settlements, but the difference is not significant.

Presumably a civil war that recently ended is less likely to break down than one that ended some time ago. Thus, if there were more military victories late in the period, these findings would be suspect. However, victories and settlements have roughly the same pattern over time. Indeed, if anything, victories are somewhat more likely to occur early (44% of all victories occurred before 1960, as compared to only 29% of negotiated settlements), although these relationships do not approach statistical significance. Our data thus generally confirm the Wagner hypothesis that negotiated settlements of civil wars are less likely to endure than the results of military victories.

TABLE 1

Method of Termination and Wars after Settlement

	WARS AFTER SETTLEMENT (%)		
TERMINATION	NO WARS	SAME WARS	N
Military victory	85	15	34
Negotiated settlement	50	50	12

Note: Pearson's chi-squared = .01; Yates continuity correction = .04; likelihood ratio = .02; Fisher Exact Test (one-tailed) = .02; 1 of 4 (25%) cells with expected frequency less than 5.

ARE IDENTITY-BASED CIVIL WARS DIFFERENT?

Much of the recent concern for civil violence is based on struggles between competing identity groups. Current wisdom sees such wars as more difficult to resolve than violence motivated by political-economic issues because they provoke deeper levels of commitment, are more intense, and are therefore harder to resolve by compromise—more broadly, because behavior can be changed more easily than identity (Gurr 1990, 96; A. Smith 1986; Wedge 1986, 56–57). On the other hand, Burton argues that identity issues are easier to resolve because they often involve symbolic issues that can be resolved fairly inexpensively (it does not take much more money to fly two flags rather than one) and because, in the long run, security for one group will produce security for others as well (1987, 42). We can therefore reasonably ask whether the Wagner hypothesis applies to wars involving identity issues.

If identity wars are more intense than others, they would presumably be more likely to be ongoing, last longer, have higher casualties, and be more likely to involve genocide. In turn, as a result of all these factors, it should be more difficult to end these civil wars with *negotiated settlements* than it is to end other civil wars. What do our data tell us about these hypotheses?

Civil wars were first divided rather crudely into those primarily driven by ethnic-religious-identity issues and those driven by other concerns (primarily socioeconomic). Of the 91 civil wars, 69% (63) were classified as identity wars. Identity civil wars are not exclusively a product of the end of the Cold War, although they have increased recently, from about half of all civil wars starting in the 1940s and 1950s to about three-quarters thereafter.

Again discarding the seven cases which ended less than five years earlier, 37% of the 59 identity wars were still ongoing in 1994 as compared to 20% of the 25 others, as the conventional wisdom would predict. However, identity wars do not last longer; of the 57

civil wars which had ended, 5% of the 37 concerned with identity lasted longer than 10 years, as compared to 15% of the 20 political-economic wars, and the differences were not statistically significant.

In general, identity and political-economic wars do not have clearly different casualty patterns, and the divergences are not linear. Nonidentity casualty figures are slightly more concentrated at the extremes, either in the thousands or millions, with identity civil wars more commonly scoring in the tens or hundreds of thousands.

Another measure of intensity is taken from Barbara Harff's data set on genocide. She distinguishes between two different types of political mass murder: "By my definition, genocides and politicides are the promotion and execution of policies by a state or its agents that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a group. In genocides the victimized groups are defined primarily in terms of their communal characteristics. In politicides, by contrast, groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and dominant group" (1992, 27–28). I have dichotomized this information, classifying each civil war whether Harff reports genocide and/or politicide for it or not and whether before, during, or after the war. The resulting indicator is labeled *genocide* (my definition of the term being broader than Harff's). From the 91 civil wars, the 7 that began after 1990 are excluded, because Harff's list ends at this point; this leaves 84 wars, including those which are ongoing. Of the 59 identity civil wars, 25% were associated with genocide, as compared to 20% of the 25 other wars; the difference is in the expected direction, but it does not approach statistical significance. Genocide casualties are actually heavier among nonidentity wars; 60% of the 5 political-economic genocides involved casualties of over a million, as compared to only 13% of the 16 identity genocides. (The Pearson chi-squared figure is .04, but the Yates continuity correction is only .14.)

On our five measures of intensity (continuance, length, casualty patterns, recurrence, and genocide), despite the conventional wisdom, *identity civil wars are not clearly more intense than nonidentity ones*. The differences that do exist tend to be fairly small, as are the number of examples. It is therefore not entirely a surprise that *identity and political-economic civil wars are about equally likely to end in negotiated settlements* (26% and 20%, with Ns of 37 and 20). It is apparently no more difficult to reach a settlement of identity civil wars than others. In particular, negotiated settlements can indeed be reached in civil wars focusing on identity issues, despite the high level of hostility involved.

None of this analysis, however, tests the Wagner hypothesis specifically for identity civil wars that negotiated settlements will be less likely to hold than military victories. To put it differently, if negotiated settlements are *possible* ways to end identity civil wars, are they *effective* at resolving the conflicts? Table 2 suggests that they are not. On the contrary, *negotiated settlements of identity civil wars are less likely to be stable than military victories*. Seventy-nine percent of the identity wars that ended in military victory were not followed by violence until 1994, as compared to only 33% of identity wars that ended in negotiated settlements, and the chi-squared statistic is .01. The Wagner hypothesis seems to hold for identity civil wars.

TABLE 2

Issue, Method of Termination, and More Wars after Settlement

TERMINATION	WARS AFTER SETTLEMENT (%) NONE	SAME	N
Identity civil wars[a]			
Military victory	79	21	24
Negotiated settlement	33	67	9
Political/economic wars[b]			
Military victory	100	0	10
Negotiated settlement	100	0	3

Notes: [a]Pearson's chi-squared = .01; Yates continuity correction = 1.0; likelihood ratio = .01; Fisher Exact Test (one-tailed) = 1.0; 1 of 4 (25%) cells with expected frequency less than 5.
[b]Chi-squared statistics cannot be calculated because there is only one column that is not empty.

At first glance, the policy implications of these data would seem obvious: if you want to end an identity-based civil war, encourage a military victory, presumably by supporting the strongest side. This is not an easy prescription to accept. Outsiders will not necessarily find justice exclusively in the side that is winning. Indeed, as in former Yugoslavia today, many may believe that supporting winners may mean opposing justice. Moreover, there are at least two obvious problems with the argument.

First, one-third of the negotiated settlements of identity civil wars that last for five years "stick." We can not simply say that such settlements do not work, although we need to know more about why some work better than others and, in particular, why their record in identity wars seems so poor.

Second, military victory by definition is the ability to threaten the enemy's civilian population with impunity (Schelling 1966). The winning side can punish its enemies by genocide rather than war. Presumably this is much less likely after a negotiated settlement, where both sides keep some of their power. Barbara Harff reports cases of genocide *after* identity civil wars (mass murder before or during the war already being included in the earlier indicator of intensity) in 19% of the military victories and none of the negotiated settlements (see Table 3). The difference is not significant even by the conventional chi-squared measure, but the numbers are small, and two of the four cells have less than five cases. Noting the risk of overinterpreting small differences, *military victories in identity civil wars may be more likely to be followed by genocide than negotiated settlements*. (Note

TABLE 3

Issue, Method of Termination, and Genocide after Civil Wars

TERMINATION	GENOCIDE (%)	NO GENOCIDE REPORTED (%)	N
Identity civil wars[a]			
Military victories	19	81	27
Negotiated settlement	0	100	10
Political/economic wars[b]			
Military victories	7	93	16
Negotiated settlement	0	100	4

Notes: [a]Pearson's chi-squared = .14; Yates continuity correction = 1.00; likelihood ratio = .06; Fisher Exact Test (one-tailed) = 1.00; 2 of 4 (50%) cells with expected frequency less than 5.
[b]Pearson's chi-squared = .61; Yates continuity correction = 1.00; likelihood ratio = .50; Fisher Exact Test (one-tailed)= 1.00; 3 of 4 (75%) cells with expected frequency less than 5.

that genocide is less likely to follow the termination of nonidentity conflicts in general.)

These data suggest that in political-economic conflict outsiders can reasonably pursue negotiated settlements; they seem about as stable as military victories and are unlikely to be followed by genocide, although the possibility cannot be ruled out. However, in the identity wars that are becoming increasingly common, there may be a dilemma: negotiated settlements are somewhat less likely to "stick" than military victories, but military victories may be more likely to result in genocide or politicide after the war. The key to this puzzle may lie in trying to determine why some negotiated settlements in identity wars "stick" and others do not and why some victories are followed by mass murder while others aren't.

Clearly this is only one of many issues to be explored. How are armed societies disarmed? Under what circumstances do outside interventions (military assistance to one or both sides, mediation, humanitarian aid) help or hinder a settlement? Are lasting solutions more likely before or after total military victory by one side? Does it make a difference whether the underlying issues are ethnic divisions or political differences or whether the goal has been separation from the state or conquest of the state apparatus? Is peace more likely when both sides are strong or when they are divided? Can the central issues be compromised in the initial settlement, or does a draconian solution work best in the long run? Why do some "solutions" last and others collapse? What can we learn from these experiences about the circumstances under which civil societies may be constructed after civil violence? We cannot answer most of these questions now, but it is time to begin examining them, because they are likely to dominate our foreign policy agenda over the next few decades.

APPENDIX: CIVIL WARS FOUGHT AFTER 1945

Table A-1 includes all of the cases as of July 1994 but not all of the variables. I will be glad to send a complete data set to anyone interested. Table A-1 begins on next page.

TABLE A-1

CASE	START & END YEAR[a]	LENGTH[b]	TERM[c]	GEN. BDA[d,k]	DEATH LOG[e]	SOURCE[f]	MORE WAR?[g]	NEXT WAR[h]	ISSUE[i]	STATES[j]
Afghanistan	78	—	1	212	6.1	2	0	2	2	—
Algeria	62/63	1	2	1	3.2	2.	1	—	2	1
Angola	75	—	1	—	5.4	3	0	—	1	—
Argentina	55/55	0	2	—	3.4	2	1	—	2	1
Azerbaijan	88	—	1	—	4.2	3	0	—	1	—
Bangladesh	85/85	0	2	—	5.2	3	2	—	1	1
Bolivia	52/52	0	2	—	3.2	2	1	—	2	1
Bosnia	92	—	1	—	6.1	4	0	—	1	—
Burma	48	—	1	—	5.2	3	0	—	1	—
Burundi	72/72	0	2	111	5.1	2	1	—	1	1
Cambodia	67	—	1	21	6.1	4	0	—	2	—
Chad	80/87	7	3	—	3.7	2.	1	—	1	1
China A	27/49	22	2	211	6.1	2	1	—	2	1
China B (Taiwan)	47/47	0	2	—	3.1	2	3	—	1	1
China C I (Tibet)	50/51	1	2	—	3.2	2	4	5	1	1
China C II	56/59	3	2	221	5.5	2	4	7	1	1
China C III	66/68	3	2	—	—	3	4	20	1	1
China C IV	88/89	1	4	—	—	3	0	—	2	—
Colombia A	48/57	9	3	—	5.3	4	2	—	2	1
Colombia B	78	—	1	—	4.2	2	0	—	2	—
Costa Rica	48/48	0	2	—	3.2	4	1	—	2	1
Croatia	91	—	1	—	4.3	4	0	—	1	—
Cuba	58/59	1	2	—	3.5	2	1	—	2	1
Cyprus I	63/64	1	3	—	—	—	4	10	1	1
Cyprus II	74/74	0	3	—	3.5	2	1	—	1	2
Dom. Republic	65/65	0	3	—	3.3	2	1	—	2	1
El Salvador	79/91	12	4	212	4.8	2	0	—	2	—
Ethiopia	67/91	24	4	212	5.7	1	0	—	1	—
Georgia A (Abkh.)	92	—	1	—	3.1	4	0	—	1	—
Georgia B (Mold.)	92	—	1	—	3.1	4	0	—	1	—
Greece	45/49	4	2	—	5.2	2	1	—	2	1
Guatemala A	54/54	0	2	—	3.1	2	3	—	2	1
Guatemala B	61	—	1	111	6.1	4	0	—	1	—
India A I (Partition)	46/48	2	3	—	5.8	2	4	17	1	2
India A II (Kashmir)	65/65	0	3	—	4.2	4	4	24	1	1
India A III (Kashmir)	89	—	1	—	4.1	3	0	—	1	—
India B (Sikh)	84	—	1	—	4.6	4	0	—	1	—
Indonesia A (Mol.)	50/50	0	2	—	3.5	2	1	—	1	1
Indonesia B (Dar.)	53/53	0	2	—	3.1	2	1	—	1	1
Indonesia C	58/60	2	2	—	4.3	4	3	—	2	1
Indoesia D (Tim.)	75/82	7	2	211	5.2	4	2	—	1	1
Indonesia E (Ach.)	86/86	0	2	—	—	—	1	—	1	1
Iran	78/79	1	2	221	4.9	4	1	—	1	1
Iraq A (Shammar)	59/59	0	2	—	3.2	2	1	—	1	1
Iraq B I (Kurds)	61/75	9	2	221	5.1	2	4	6	1	1
Iraq B II (Kurds)	81	—	1	—	5.1	3	0	—	1	—
Iraq C (Shiites)	91	—	1	—	4.5	3	0	—	1	—
Jordan	70/70	0	2	—	4.1	2	1	—	1	1
Korea A (Army)	48/48	0	2	—	3.1	4	3	—	2	1
Korea B	50/53	3	3	—	6.3	2	1	—	2	2
Laos	59/72	13	2	212	4.3	2	1	—	2	1
Lebanon I	58/58	0	3	—	3.2	2	4	17	1	1
Lebanon II	75/76	1	3	—	5.1	2	4	6	1	1
Lebanon III	82	—	1	—	4.6	2	0	—	1	—
Liberia	89	—	1	—	4.2	3	0	—	1	—
Malaysia	48/59	11	2	212	4.1	2	1	—	1	1
Moldova	92	—	1	—	3.1	4	0	—	1	—
Morocco	75/91	16	4	—	4.2	3	0	—	1	—
Mozambique	81/92	11	4	—	6.1	3	0	—	2	—
Nicaragua A	78/79	1	2	—	4.5	2	3	—	2	1
Nicaragua B	81/89	8	4	—	4.3	2	0	—	2	—
Nigeria A	67/70	3	2	122	6.3	1	1	—	1	1

TABLE A-1 continued

CASE	START & END YEAR[a]	LENGTH[b]	TERM[c]	GEN. BDA[d,k]	DEATH LOG[e]	SOURCE[f]	MORE WAR?[g]	NEXT WAR[h]	ISSUE[i]	STATES[j]
Nigeria B (Muslims)	80/84	4	2	—	3.6	2	1	—	1	1
Pakistan A (Bang.)	71/71	0	2	112	6.1	2	1	—	1	2
Pakistan B (Baluchi)	73/77	4	2	—	3.9	2	1	—	1	1
Palestine	48/48	0	2	—	—	—	1	—	1	2
Paraguay	47/47	0	2	—	3.1	2	1	—	1	1
Peru	80	—	1	—	4.3	4	0	—	2	—
Philippines A	48/50	2	2	—	3.9	4	3	—	2	1
Philippines B (NPA)	72	—	1	—	4.4	2	0	—	2	—
Philippines C (MNLF)	72	—	1	112	4.4	2	0	—	1	—
Rwanda	63/64	1	2	212	5.1	3	1	—	1	1
Somalia	88	—	1	—	5.6	2	0	—	1	—
South Africa	83/91	8	4	—	4.2	3	0	—	1	—
Sri Lanka I	71/71	0	2	—	4.1	2	4	12	1	1
Sri Lanka II	83	—	1	212	4.3	2	0	—	1	—
Sudan I	63/71	8	3	112	5.5	2	4	12	1	1
Sudan II	83	—	1	—	5.6	3	0	—	1	—
Syria	79/82	3	2	212	—	—	1	—	1	1
Tajikistan	92	—	1	—	4.4	3	0	—	1	—
Turkey (Kurds)	84	—	1	—	5.5	4	0	—	1	—
Uganda A (Bagnda)	66/66	0	2	—	3.1	2	1	—	1	1
Uganda B	81/87	6	2	112	5.3	2	1	—	1	1
Vietnam	57/74	17	2	112	6.2	2	1	—	2	1
Yemen (North) A	48/48	0	2	—	3.4	2	3	—	2	1
Yemen (North) B	62/70	8	3	—	4.2	1	1	—	2	1
Yemen (South)	86/87	1	2	—	4.1	2	1	—	2	1
Zaire	60/64	4	2	212	5.1	2	1	—	1	1
Zimbabwe A	72/80	8	3	—	4.1	1	3	—	1	1
Zimbabwe B	83/84	1	3	—	3.2	2	1	—	1	1

Notes: [a]No end year indicates war ongoing as of 1993.
[b]Length of war in years.
[c]Termination:1 = ongoing, 2 = victory, 3 = negotiated settlement, 4 = war ended less than 5 years ago.
[d]Genocide or politicide before, during, and after the war (Gurr 1990; Harff 1993); 1 = reported for the period; 2 = not reported for the period; blank = not reported for the conflict.
[e]Log 10 of reported battle deaths.
[f]Source for battle deaths: 1 = Miall 1992; 2 = Sivard 1992; 3 other; 4 = Sivard 1993.
[g]0= ongoing or ended <5 years; 1 = none; 2 = violence but no war; 3 = war with different sides or issues; 4 = war, same sides and issues.
[h]Years before outbreak of same war.
[i]1 = identity; 2 = political-economic.
[j]Number of states after settlement.
[k]Information on the period after is limited to wars which ended before 1990.

Notes

I acknowledge with gratitude the very helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper at the Rutgers International Relations Colloquium, the 1993 meeting of the American Political Science Association, and the Proseminar on State Formation and Collective Action of the New School for Social Research, especially those of Deena Abu-Lughod, Jeff Goodwin, Ernest Harsch, Jack Levy, and Charles Tilly.

1. Clearly 1,000 battle deaths per year is an arbitrary limit, although it is widely used in the literature. My statistical calculations were run separately for the 75 civil wars with reported casualties of 2,000 or more and for the 67 that lasted a year or longer; none of the relationship changed meaningfully as a result.

2. This case was included in earlier versions of this data set. I am indebted to reviewers at the MacArthur Foundation and the United States Institute of Peace for asking me to reconsider its classification.

3. Alternatively, one can argue that the three cases of large-scale violence but no civil war should be included in the *none* category, because the Wagner hypothesis assumes the destruction of the loser's organizational network, which is presumably why the large-scale violence cannot effectively be coordinated into a renewed civil war. The eight examples of different civil wars may also be classified as *no war* for analyzing the Wagner hypothesis, which assumes that the destruction of an existing organization will make it very difficult to resurrect the same civil war, which has apparently happened in these examples. My analysis was rerun twice, once with the large-scale violence cases added and again with these and the different civil wars as well. None of the reported results were materially affected. Copies of these analyses are available upon request.

References

Bell, J. Bowyer. 1972. "Societal Patterns and Lessons: The Irish Case." In *Civil Wars in the Twentieth Century*, ed. Robin Higham. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.

Blainey, Geoffrey. 1988. *The Causes of War*. New York: Free Press.

Brogan, Patrick. 1990. *The Fighting Never Stopped: A Comprehensive Guide to World Conflict since 1945*. New York: Random House.
Burton, John W. 1987. *Resolving Deep-rooted Conflict: A Handbook*. Lanham, MD: University Press of America.
Gurr, Ted Robert. 1990. "Ethnic Warfare and the Changing Priorities of Global Security." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1:82–98.
Harff, Barbara. 1992. "Recognizing Genocides and Politicides." In *Genocide Watch*, ed. Helen Fein. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Iklé, Fred C. 1971. *Every War Must End*. New York: Columbia University Press.
Licklider, Roy. 1988. "Civil Violence and Conflict Resolution: A Framework for Analysis." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, St. Louis.
Licklider, Roy. 1992. "State Formation after Civil War: Making Peace Pay." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Atlanta.
Licklider, Roy. 1993. *Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End*. New York: New York University Press.
Licklider, Roy. 1995. "Explaining Defeat and Justifying Cooperation After Civil Wars." Presented at the Proseminar on Political Mobilization and Conflict, New School for Social Research, New York, and the Center for Historical Analysis, Rutgers University, New Brunswick.
Maoz, Zeev. 1984. "Peace by Empire: Conflict Outcomes and International Stability, 1816–1976." *Journal of Peace Research* 21:227–41.
Miall, Hugh. 1992. *The Peacemakers: Peaceful Settlement of Disputes since 1945*. New York: St. Martin's.
Modelski, George. 1964. "International Settlement of Internal Wars." In *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, ed. James N. Rosenau. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Pillar, Paul R. 1983. *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1966. *Arms and Influence*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1992. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1991*. 14th ed. Washington: World Priorities.
Sivard, Ruth Leger. 1993. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1993*. 15th ed. Washington: World Priorities.
Small, Melvin, and J. David Singer. 1982. *Resort to Arms: International and Civil Wars, 1816–1980*. 2d ed. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Smith, Anthony D. 1986. "Conflict and Collective Identity: Class, *Ethnie*, and Nation." In *International Conflict Resolution*, ed. Edward D. Azar and John W. Burton. Boulder: Rienner.
Smith, Martin. 1991. *Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity*. London: Zed Books.
Spencer, Claire. 1994. "Algeria in Crisis." *Survival* 36:149–63.
Stedman, Stephen John. 1991. *Peacemaking in Civil War: International Mediation in Zimbabwe, 1974–1980*. Boulder: Rienner.
Sullivan, Michael J. 1994. "Ethnicity and War in the Post–Cold War Era." Presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Washington.
Tilly, Charles. 1978. *From Mobilization to Revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Wagner, Robert Harrison. 1993. "The Causes of Peace." In *Stopping The Killing*, ed. Roy Licklider. New York: New York University Press.
Wedge, Bryant. 1986. "Psychology of the Self in Social Conflict." In *International Conflict Resolution*, ed. Edward D. Azar and John W. Burton. Boulder: Rienner.
Zartman, I. William. 1993. "The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts." In *Stopping the Killing*, ed. Roy Licklider. New York: New York University Press.
Zartman, I. William. 1995. *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars 1995–1996*. Washington: Brookings Institution.

Roy Licklider is Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903-0270.