

# US professional military education and democratization abroad

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## Abstract

United States Professional Military Education (US PME) has commonly been blamed for training some of the worst abusers of human rights — Latin American dictators and thugs like Argentina's Leopoldo Galtieri and Panama's Manuel Noriega, Timorese counter-insurgents, and even some officers who would eventually serve the Taliban in Afghanistan. We test this conventional wisdom using both large-N analyses and case studies of Argentina, Greece, and Taiwan. Our large-N results suggest that US PME trained foreign officers prove to be an important stabilizing force during times of democratic transition. Our case studies uncover very few cases of US PME officers linked to human rights abuses; interestingly, in each of our cases, the US PME trained officers provided the initial infrastructure needed to begin domestic military education programs that encouraged civilian control of the military in emerging democracies.

## Keywords

coup-proofing, democratization, human rights, Professional Military Education, socialization,

## Introduction

Critics of the education of foreign military officers by the United States have associated professional military education programs with the training of future dictators, insurgents, and thugs. As a British editorial lamented, the School of the Americas in Fort Benning,

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Georgia, trained, 'Argentina's dictators Roberto Viola and Leopoldo Galtieri, Panama's Manuel Noriega and Omar Torrijos, Peru's Juan Velasco Alvarado and Ecuador's Guillermo Rodriguez ... the leader of the Grupo Colina death squad in Fujimori's Peru; four of the five officers who ran the infamous Battalion 3-16 in Honduras (which controlled the death squads there in the 1980s) and the commander responsible for the 1994 Ocosingo massacre in Mexico' (Monbiot, 2001). Graduates from other United States programs aided Indonesia's military prior to the violence committed in East Timor and even trained future Taliban leaders during their struggle against Soviet forces (Newton, 2002).<sup>1</sup>

While these examples are horrifying and constitute some of the worst outcomes of American military training, they do not represent the bulk of foreign military education programs in the United States. In this article we present evidence that, contrary to popular opinion, United States Professional Military Education (US PME) provides an important stabilizing force, especially in emerging democracies. While established as a bridge between the US and foreign militaries, the US PME program also provides professional and technical education and extensive exposure to democratic values. The foreign military officer returns as a professional soldier, better educated, and more likely to be sympathetic to democratic values. The cumulative effect of this process is a depoliticization of foreign militaries during economic and political disruptions — which may occur during democratization — and, in many cases, a changed military culture.

We begin in the next section by describing the dangers of regime transition and how civilian control of the military can potentially minimize these problems. We follow this discussion with a brief outline of the US PME program, matching the curricula and intentions of the program to their likely effects on transition instability. For our analyses, we focus on one portion of our overall argument and examine the effects of US PME on the likelihood of military coups d'état, finding that professional military education of foreign officers does lead to increased stability abroad. We support these large-N findings with case studies on the effectiveness of US PME in maintaining military stability in three countries: Argentina, Greece, and Taiwan. Finally, we conclude our argument by examining other possible explanations for our findings.

## **The military, government stability, and the democratic process**

Huntington (1957) was probably the first to seriously explore the relationship between the officer and the state. According to Huntington, the professional soldier accepts civilian control over policy, is conservative in the application of military force, and has a policymaking role that is largely advisory. Civilian leaderships need advice regarding potential security threats and the security risks inherent across policy choices, but once policy has been made, the professional soldier executes civilian policy no matter how 'violently' they run counter to his own judgment (1957: 72). Huntington's analysis leads to the conclusion that professionalization of the military should be equated with inculcating these 'democratic' values in the officer corps (1957: 229–30).

Later analyses have largely echoed Huntington's original insights. Desch (1999: 4), for example, argues that 'the most important issue of civil–military relations in developed democracies is civilian control: can civilian leaders reliably get the military to obey when

civilian and military preferences diverge?' This question becomes all the more important in an age when policymakers are often unable to share their goals with the military leadership (Cohen, 2001), or during times of political transition, when civilian leaderships are likely to turnover rapidly.

Of course, these are normative concerns, and they stem primarily from the difficulty in maintaining civilian control of the military in unstable regimes. The military is often incredibly useful for state domination in developing countries. Not able to financially support the creation or maintenance of large air or naval forces, developing countries often rely on large land armies to protect against foreign threats. During times of domestic unrest, these armies can be turned against opposition forces in order to protect elite political power, and, thus, when a country undergoes changes in political leadership, control of the military largely determines the fate of the transition.

Mansfield and Snyder's (1995) original story of unrest during democratic transitions describes the process of domestic competition well. Elite interests fear the loss of rents and the political retribution that come with more democratic rule, and, thus, embattled elites have an incentive to manipulate nationalistic tendencies in order to create an alternative to mass democracy movements. Since the elites are easier to coordinate, often have better political access, and are better able to use the weak institutions of emerging democracies to their advantage, elite leaders are able to use the new nationalistic movement to take control of the military and the government. Finally, because of the rising international tensions and potential for threats to the state, authoritarian measures are favored domestically, and the transition is halted. This is why coups d'état are more likely to occur during transition periods, and it is no coincidence that most coups begin with military mutiny. Elite capture of the military can ensure that democratic transition does not happen.

The fear of coups d'état often leads governments to educate their militaries. By emphasizing technical expertise, military schools break down the corporate identity and corporate loyalties of the military, and the professionalism instilled in the officers isolates the military from civilian interests. Interestingly, this is a key strategy in many of the most repressive regimes (Quinlivan, 1999). In the Middle East, for example, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Syria have all begun comprehensive professionalization programs so that the military remains responsive to the leaders rather than those who wish to challenge the ruling elites.<sup>2</sup>

Though the rationale is similar, 'coup-proofing' does not have to be limited to authoritarian regimes. Removing the threat of a military coup benefits all at-risk regimes, and often the least stable regimes are those that are undergoing or have recently completed transitions to democracy. The political tensions experienced in transitioning regimes, and the susceptibility of the military to elite capture, makes professionalization and even democratization of the military essential tools for liberalization of these regimes (see Gheciu, 2005, for this point as it relates to NATO and the former Soviet-bloc states). Unfortunately, most regimes in the developing world cannot afford the costs and do not have the technical expertise needed to begin professional military education systems on their own, and, therefore, the US PME system has played a major role both in professionalizing foreign officers and in giving them the technical skills needed to begin professional military education schools of their own.

The importance of the cultural experience in US PME may be best explained by comparison to an earlier, French PME program. Prior to World War II, the French *École*

*Supérieure de Guerre* provided elite education for the world's top officers, including Marines from the United States. The *École* graduated more professional, better-educated officers, and these officers also had a strong tendency to be Francophiles following the year-long program. Top Marine Corps officers were often sent one year ahead of time in order to learn the necessary language skills and acclimate to French culture because the education returns from these schools were so highly valued. More than this, the Marine Corps systematically used these graduates to learn about the French military system, its conduct and strategies. According to a Marine Brigadier General of the 1930s, graduates from Paris were 'assigned to the Staff at the Marine Corps Schools in order that the benefits of the knowledge they have acquired in France may be available to these schools' (Bittner, 1993: 507).

This is the role that US PME now plays in the world. US officers and US PME represent the top level of professional education worldwide, and foreign militaries often vie for the opportunity to learn at these schools. For countries without military education or even those with limited programs, the US PME program provides an opportunity for educating top officers, for instilling professionalism in the military, and for exposing the officers to the concepts of civilian control. In transitioning countries, especially those with small militaries, sending top field grade officers each year to the United States leads to an officer corps heavily educated and influenced by the PME curriculum. In states with larger militaries, the proportion of officers educated is not high, but the PME programs have a large effect because, historically, officers sent to these programs often return to key leadership positions in their home countries. Some of these officers even begin the task of building domestic PME programs based on the US model.

## US PME program overview

United States PME develops career officers through a three-tier system of education separate from the specialty training that defines individual officer career fields. The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act (1986) mandates all United States officers complete these programs either in residence or by correspondence, but the resident programs generally accept only the top officers promoted to field grade ranks — Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel.

Note that US PME is much different from conventional training programs. The PME programs focus on education in accredited graduate schools with professional educators and faculties. Training, on the other hand, deals with technical proficiency in specific tasks geared toward performing a function in their specific career fields. While the US trains officers and enlisted members from militaries around the world in various military proficiencies, those persons come to the US for a very specific course that is limited to technical skills. The year-long PME courses, on the other hand, are qualitatively different since the courses are part of a larger, degree-granting curriculum. The difference is equivalent to taking a course in writing composition versus earning a degree in English or another language.

The Air Force consolidates its PME at the Air University at Maxwell Air Force Base in Montgomery, Alabama. The Army Command and General Staff College is located at Ft Leavenworth outside of Kansas City, Kansas, and the Army War College is located at Carlisle Barracks, Carlisle, Pennsylvania. The Navy War College (which until 2007 was a

single program for both Intermediate and Senior Service School) is in Newport, Rhode Island, while the Marine Corps Command and Staff College is at Quantico, Virginia. Finally, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces and National War Colleges are the national-level Senior Service Schools at the National Defense University in Washington, DC.

The total number of foreign military personnel trained in all Defense Department programs is impressive. Charles Moskos reports that since 1950, half a million foreign officers have been trained or educated in the US — 9000 officers from over 100 countries in the year 2000 alone (Moskos, 2004: 1). Of these foreign officers, about 200 attend year-long PME with their American counterparts at the service schools each year.

These programs present a standardized joint-service education so officers in command and joint-staff positions develop understandings of how other services operate and how national political decisions and military policies, strategy, and doctrine are made and staffed. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required to ensure the curricula are current and standardized. The schools are funded by the services with the expectation that a small percentage of officers will be removed from their career fields for a year to attend these programs. The international officers are funded in one of two ways. Most countries that send officers to these schools reimburse the US Department of Defense through the Foreign Military Sales program, much as they would if they were buying fighter aircraft. Developing countries not able to fund officers for the period are provided military assistance through State Department programs.

### *Program curricula*

The purpose statements of the international officer education programs can be found on the web sites of the various service schools. For example, the International Officer School at Maxwell Air Force Base pursues the following mission:

To educate and support international officers and their families and to manage international programs enabling Air University to accomplish US security assistance objectives, support USAF international involvement, and build lasting military relationships.<sup>3</sup>

The key words of ‘supporting US security assistance,’ ‘international involvement,’ and ‘lasting relationships’ or their synonyms can be found in the mission statements of the other PME schools. The general aim of educating international officers through these schools is to establish ‘valuable channels of communications with foreign governments and promote democratic principles’ around the world (Dunphy, 2000: 31). One constant throughout this education is an emphasis on civilian control of the military, democratic decision-making, and social responsibility in the military. For many foreign officers, this is their first exposure to graduate military education, making the US PME program an important path toward developing a truly professional military for these countries.

While the schools differ somewhat in their specific course offerings, all meet a standard of instruction set by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. For example, the Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) curriculum includes graduate seminar courses in three primary areas: leadership and command, national and international security studies, and operational military planning processes. International officers attending the service

schools follow the same graduate curriculum as American officers. Upon completion of the program requirements, all international officers enrolled in the graduate program can earn the degree of Master of Science in Military Arts and Sciences.

Aside from the education, US PME also increases these officers' exposure to American society. International officers do not simply live on a base for the year; most come to the US with families and live in the cities where their schools are located. Their children go to American schools, and their spouses attend weekly culture classes. The officers themselves have the opportunity to learn more about how American officers think, both through school-sponsored weekly intramural sporting activities and through the more frequent informal social and professional gatherings. In fact, one US PME study team discovered that 'of all the experiences which foreign military students remember, contact with the American culture stands out.... Curiosity about the United States and how free market democracy functions today is greater than ever' (Cope, 1995: 36).<sup>4</sup>

## Analyzing the effects of US Professional Military Education

We began this article by describing the conventional wisdom associated with US PME: that the US has been training dictators and thugs that are then sent abroad. Using the conventional wisdom as a null hypothesis is probably too low a standard, however, and our review of US PME suggests the United States seriously tries to instill democratic values and professionalism in the soldiers they train. Thus, the remainder of this article tests whether US PME is associated with regime stabilization and democratization in the militaries it helps train.

Our argument rests on the ability of US PME graduates to temper political unrest within the military during times of domestic transition, and, thus, our dependent variable is the presence (or absence) of a coup d'état in any given year. We use the publicly available Alesina et al. (1996) data that include coup attempts, successful and unsuccessful. Their data set has a temporal range of 1950 to 1982, so we supplemented the data to 1999. We did this by using keyword searches of both *Keesing's* and Lexis-Nexus, which provide near-exhaustive coverage of major worldwide newspapers during the post-1980 era.

Since the possibility of a coup attempt can often be an excuse for the government to enforce stricter controls on the populace, leaders have incentives to manufacture claims of unsuccessful coup attempts. Therefore, we did not code 'rumors,' 'possible coup attempts,' or the arrest of individuals as failed coup attempts, unless non-governmental sources identified the threats to the government as real.<sup>5</sup>

Our primary explanatory variable is foreign military officer attendance at US PME, and we measure this by state-year. We obtained attendance data for all international officer attendees by state-year from 1950 to 1999 of the Air Command and Staff College, the Air War College, the Army Command and General Staff College, the Army War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, and the National War College.<sup>6</sup> We selected intermediate- and senior-level schools due to their advanced curricula and the fact that these programs are generally one year in length. We believe that given the short duration of the first-level PME schools and the service-specific officership objectives of those courses as well as the professional, vice-educational, goals of training courses, the graduate-level education offered by the staff colleges and war colleges offered the best opportunity for socialization of international officers to the value of civilian control of the military.



Nearly 11,000 foreign officers have attended these US PME schools since 1950, representing over 75 percent of all countries. The average number of officers sent by any one country is 3.34 per year, spread among the various US schools. Fifty percent of the observed state-years have two or fewer officers, 25 percent have three to four officers, and almost 20 percent have five to 10 officers. Attendance has varied dramatically over time and across countries, but several countries have had an exceptionally large number of their officers attend US PME schools: Taiwan (331), Philippines (377), Thailand (481), and South Korea (507). These four countries represent about 15 percent of the total number of officers attending US PME. However, their numbers in the last 10 years are far more in line with other countries that send their officers.

The 'Hall of Fame' data (distinguished foreign graduates) maintained by the service schools shows that a large number of foreign graduates become chiefs of their services, militaries, or hold other senior positions in their countries several years after graduating from US PME. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing, in aggregate, the relative position of all graduates in their respective militaries. We have no data for the total number of officers in each country, the percentage of a country's officers that have attended the US PME programs, or even how long PME graduates serve in their militaries upon their return. This is unfortunate because we have anecdotal evidence that the number of officers who graduated from US PME schools as a percentage of the total officer corps in any given country matters greatly.<sup>7</sup>

Because of this lack of detailed information about the composition of foreign militaries, we employ summary counts of the total number of US PME graduates in a country over a span of five years. Five years represents a conservative estimate of the length of tenure of each returning officer; however, analyses with 10-year counts are not substantively different to those reported here. The summary count variable is lagged to the year of the analysis. Thus, analysis of a country in 1992 includes the total number of US PME graduates for 1987 to 1991.

We include several variables commonly identified as predictors of coups d'état. First, we include two variables that measure the level of and changes in wealth in each country. Although the effects of these variables may be modest in the short term, Londregan and Poole (1996) demonstrate that, even after controlling for institutional context, the idiosyncratic features of individual country histories, and the potential simultaneity of leadership and regime change, wealth and changes in wealth, significantly affect regime change. Poorer countries and countries suffering difficult economic times are generally more likely to suffer coups; wealthier countries are more stable in aggregate, and coups are less likely in countries with improving economies.

We use data from the Penn World Tables (1950–9) on real GDP per capita (international prices) and take the difference between state-years to measure changes in wealth. In our sample, the mean GDP per capita from 1950–9, excluding the United States, was just under \$598. The mean change in GDP per capita during the same time period was 2.5 percent.

Our second set of variables captures several aspects of the international security environment. First, we add a control variable for the presence of an alliance with the United States. This control is added to determine whether the effects of US PME are spurious to overall US support for a regime. US interests probably influence the acceptance of foreign officers to US PME programs, but the two are not coterminous.

Countries not in an alliance with the United States sent officers to US PME in 46 percent of the state-years of our study; in only 64 percent of state-years did US allies send their officers to attend US PME. We use the recent update of the Correlates of War formal alliance data, 1816 to 2000, to determine allied countries (Gibler and Sarkees, 2004). No differentiation is made between defense pacts, neutrality/non-aggression pacts, or ententes; the presence of an alliance is measured dichotomously. We also include a dummy variable that captures the presence of the Cold War (1950 and 1999 for our analyses) as US strategic interests and patterns of global democratization demonstrate marked changes with the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Our final variable measures the level of democracy in each state-year. The Polity IV data provides 'democracy' and 'autocracy' ratings for most countries during the time period of our study (Marshall and Jaggers, 2004). The combined Polity scale ranges from -10 (complete autocracy) to 10 (complete democracy), and we use the continuous measure in the analyses that follow.

### *The likelihood of coups d'état*

The dependent variable in these analyses – the presence of a coup attempt in a state-year – is dichotomous, and we therefore use logistic regression to estimate the effects of each independent variable on the likelihood of a coup d'état.<sup>8</sup>

Table 1 lists the coefficients for all coup attempts, and in these analyses, the presence of US PME officers has a negative, statistically significant (at  $p < 0.01$ ) effect on the likelihood of coup attempts, even after controlling for several likely predictors of government instability.<sup>9</sup> Interestingly, the presence of an alliance with the United States had a

**Table 1.** Effects of PME on likelihood of coups d'état

|                                       | Coup Attempt           | Successful Coup        |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
| Sample Size                           | N = 4546               | N = 4546               |
| Number of PME Officers (last 5 years) | -0.0143***<br>(0.0049) | -0.0076<br>(0.0064)    |
| Alliance with the United States       | 0.7661***<br>(0.1292)  | 0.9216***<br>(0.1899)  |
| GDP                                   | -0.0004***<br>(0.0001) | -0.0002<br>(0.0001)    |
| Change in GDP from previous year      | -0.0569<br>(0.2833)    | -0.7228**<br>(0.3496)  |
| Cold War Dummy                        | 0.2291<br>(0.1753)     | 0.6157*<br>(0.0149)    |
| Democracy Score                       | -0.0966***<br>(0.0092) | -0.1194***<br>(0.0149) |
| Constant                              | -2.7476***<br>(0.1612) | -4.3600***<br>(0.3134) |
| LR Chi <sub>2</sub>                   | 197.95***              | 116.75***              |

\* $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$



**Table 2.** Predicted probabilities of coups d'état, 1946–99\*

|   | All Coups | % Change |
|---|-----------|----------|
| Per state-year, 1946–99, base probability of... | 4.91%     |          |
| New base probability found by...                |           |          |
| Adding Alliance with the United States          | 10.00%    | 103.62%  |
| Decreasing GDP by \$100 per capita              | 5.08%     | 3.48%    |
| Adding One PME Officer                          | 4.85%     | –1.35%   |
| State-year is during the Cold War               |           |          |
| Decreasing change in GDP by 50% per annum       |           |          |
| Increasing Democracy Score by 1                 | 4.65%     | –5.37%   |

\* Probabilities based upon insignificant results are not reported. All probabilities calculated by holding economic variables at their mean, all other variables at 0.

positive impact on the likelihood of a coup attempt, but the presence of the Cold War had no effect. The finding for US allies probably results from a selection effect in which US governments tried to manage domestic instability abroad by reinforcing the legitimacy of the government, or, perhaps, allied with regimes under severe external threat. Whichever the case, controlling for the presence of a US alliance relationship does not affect the direction and strength of the US PME coefficient. Higher levels of wealth were associated with a reduced risk of coups. However, once wealth is included in the model, additional changes in wealth have no significant effect.<sup>10</sup>

To ease the presentation of these results, we calculated predicted probabilities for the model, and these are presented in Table 2. Dominating this table is the relative effect of adding an alliance with the United States. An alliance doubles the prospect of a coup attempt in any given state-year, raising the probability to 10 percent. Increasing the democracy score by 1 decreases the likelihood of attempts by 5 percent, while a reduced GDP provides roughly a 2 percent increase in the likelihood of a coup attempt.

The presence of at least one US PME graduate decreases the likelihood of a coup attempt by 1.3 percent to a probability of 4.85 percent. For countries that send large numbers of their military to the United States, the effects of PME can therefore be quite substantial. Twenty officers trained over the course of five years is equivalent to a 20 percent reduction in the likelihood of a coup attempt.

An interesting story emerges from these statistical results. First, the presence of an alliance with the United States generally increases the probability of instability due to coups d'état, and this effect outweighs the effects of Cold War politics. Second, wealth and democracy both have pacifying effects on regime change attempts. Finally, and most important for our argument, the US PME graduates seem able to affect their governments positively by obstructing coup attempts. The relative effect of each graduate is small, but cumulatively, a large number of graduates can stabilize a regime, and these results are significant even after controlling for the confounding effects of other important explanatory variables. Leaders would also have a much easier time sending their graduates to US PME, especially compared to the other variables in the model. Substantially altering the

overall wealth of a country, changes in wealth, or even overall alliance relationship with the United States would most likely prove much more difficult than sending a few top officers to US PME.

## **US PME and democratization — Argentina, Greece, and Taiwan**

The US PME schools tout several graduate success stories. For example, in Mali, pro-democracy US PME graduates overthrew a 23-year-old military dictatorship; in Thailand, US PME graduates rallied pro-democracy demonstrators and championed representative government; and in Venezuela, US PME graduates quashed two attempted coups in 1992 and prevented attacks on civilians more recently.<sup>11</sup>

Recall that our initial null hypothesis, or the conventional wisdom, was that US PME was associated with the worst possible abuse practices in foreign militaries. US-trained graduates were assumed to return to their home countries and serve as useful tools for oppressive dictators. Our quantitative analyses suggest that this conventional wisdom is in error, but, as with any statistical study, there are always deviations from the norm, and therefore we use this section to provide additional, qualitative evidence on the role of returning US PME graduates in their countries. Here, we conduct a detailed examination of graduates from three countries (Argentina, Greece, and Taiwan) in order to assess their roles during the processes of democratization. By focusing on three specific countries, we gain better leverage in the ability to track the career paths of individual graduates.

We selected these three cases so as to provide maximum variation on several independent variables of interest in the quantitative analyses. Thus, the cases are geographically and geo-strategically different while also providing some variation on wealth, alliance relationship with the United States, and the timing of their democratization. Also important is that the processes of democratization differ markedly across these cases.

Given the nature of our data (names of graduates) we cannot conduct extensive case studies linking graduates to specific democratization processes. Instead, we return once again to the null hypothesis and explore whether US PME graduates were associated, by name, with human rights abuses during democratizations or with any particular programs associated with democratization. Thus, this section should be considered a way of analyzing the variance found in the quantitative studies. If the conventional wisdom has any merit whatsoever, then we should consistently find several students associated with domestic abuses of some sort. Absence of this data would provide further confirmation that US PME has positive effects on foreign military officers and their home countries.

### ***Argentina***

Between 1930 and 1983, Argentina never witnessed a civilian president hand over the reigns of power to an elected successor. Instead, Argentines continually suffered under the reigns of either military dictatorships or civilian leaders dominated by the military. The armed forces so influenced Argentina that they were considered ‘as much a part of the political system as any political party’ (Norden, 1990: 163). The military’s rationale for these continued civil interventions echoed the conservative political theorists of

the time by arguing that nation building and modernization required order and authority to control the violence caused by damaged interests.<sup>12</sup> This led to an almost cultural acceptance of military control of the government (Zagorski, 1994). However, the military defeat in the Malvinas (Falklands) War, and the lack of money for continued military spending, led Argentina to restructure and professionalize its armed services through emulating the US PME system. This process resulted in the removal of the Argentine military from domestic affairs.

Strong military government reached its peak with the *Proceso de Reorganización Nacional* that ruled from 1976 to 1983. In 1976, senior Argentine military leaders completed a successful coup d'état against Isabel Martínez de Perón who had served as president for two years after the death of her husband, General Juan Perón. The junta was the supreme organ of state and responsible for choosing the President, judges of the Supreme Court, and the Attorney General, and for carrying out the national reorganization program. Rather than use existing civilian institutions under military control, the junta replaced the institutions and divided control equally among the services (Norden, 1990: 162). A Legislative Advisory Commission comprised of nine high-ranking members drawn from each of the services was established to advise the junta on military opinion regarding domestic policies.

The results of the reorganization were disastrous. Not only did this government oversee more than 9000 political disappearances in the 'Dirty War,' it was also responsible for spiraling inflation — peaking at 165 percent — and negative economic growth of 5 percent. Nevertheless, the real end of the junta came in the failed war against Great Britain over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Gen. Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri resigned as president on 17 June 1982, two days after the Argentinean surrender to Britain (Zagorski, 1994: 423).

The year following Galtieri's resignation saw the junta trying to retain power in the face of growing popular unrest. Recognizing the impossibility of continued military rule, the armed forces were unified in trying to configure ways in which they could rule indirectly or at least shelter themselves from possible reprisals, but a split emerged as to how to implement these goals. The army wanted an extensive negotiating process with a new administration before it would hand over power; the air force wanted to involve civilian leaders immediately in order to obtain better terms (and more money) from the international banking community. Political trials would surely focus on the army, while the air force needed money for modernization following the failed war. The need for money dominated, and Raúl Alfonsín Foulkes won the general elections of 30 October 1983. He was inaugurated as President of Argentina on 10 December 1983 (Keesing's, 1983).

Alfonsín campaigned on a platform of extensive reforms of the armed forces, 'including the abolition of compulsory military service; (ii) the curbing of military spending to within 2 per cent of the gross national product as opposed to its present level of about 10 per cent; (iii) reform of the code of military justice to bring it more into line with civil justice; and (iv) the creation of a special body to make available "privileged information" to organizations dedicated to the defence of human rights' (Keesing's, 1983). He was able to maintain limited military support through the campaign by promising to differentiate between the military as an institution and the officers who committed the human rights abuses. However, while pursuing the punishment of several senior officers and the creation of new military command structures, the military balked, demanded immunity from prosecution, and refused to prosecute offending officers

through military courts. The growing tensions culminated in three military rebellions against the policies of the Alfonsín government.

In April 1987, December 1987, and December 1988, mid-level army officers, mainly lieutenant colonels who graduated together from Argentine military schools in 1964, pressed the government to stop the trials, pardon the convicted, install a new command structure, and equip and train the armed forces. The rebellious officers rationalized their actions by arguing that the military needed to restore professionalism and prestige and to be more active in preventing a possible communist takeover (Norden, 1990; Zagorski, 1994). The mutineer leaders achieved their ultimate goal — the end of prosecutions — and the military was able to purge their middle ranks effectively; this political compromise ended the mutiny and ensured the survival of Alfonsín's government.

President Carlos Menem was elected on 14 May 1989, and began his tenure by granting amnesty to military members accused of human rights abuses. Menem argued that he was willing to suffer the political cost of the compromise in order to promote national healing and military modernization. The modernization plan had three main goals — the privatization of military property to offset foreign debt and modernize military hardware, significant military downsizing to control corruption, and extensive changes in promotion criteria to include consideration of behavior during previous uprisings and coup attempts. The reforms had their effect as a 1990 coup led by mid-level officers was crushed by military leaders loyal to the civilian government; unlike previous pardons, the coup-plotters were granted no quarter in military trials (Zagorski, 1994: 431).

The Argentine military underwent profound changes in the decade following the Falklands (Malvinas) War — a massive demobilization amid budget cuts, a shift to a volunteer force, and, most importantly, the adoption of increased professional military education using the US model. Traditionally, the Argentine military had always guarded the type of education its officers received by managing both the curriculum and the exposure of its officers to civilian values. This level of control ensured domestic autonomy for the military, but it also contributed to the Falklands debacle suffered at the hands of the more advanced, professional British soldiers.

Realizing the need for increased professionalism, the Argentine military encouraged its recruits and officers to attend universities, both domestically and abroad. The highest-ranking officers attended US PME at a rate of roughly five per year beginning in 1988, and by 1997, all Argentine officers had earned college degrees of some kind while all non-commissioned officers had secondary school diplomas. The influence of US PME was immediately felt in 1991 when Argentina created a new Command Staff College that has become one of the most renowned institutions in the country. The curriculum explicitly copied the US PME model and now emphasizes a 'respect for and subordination to the constitution and the law' as one of its prime objectives (Balza, 1996).

Argentina has seen several major governmental changes in response to the financial crises of its recent past — crises that would have led to coups and counter-coups in earlier years — but the military has continued to remain quiet. As Argentine Army Chief of Staff General Ricardo Brinzoni commented:

The Argentine army has given sufficient proof during the past 18 years about our steady assimilation into a democratic society. The army's mindset has changed a great deal about this

issue. Frankly, I think that our armed forces have made the most earnest attempt of all Latin American forces to integrate themselves into a democratic government. (D'Odorico, 2001: 62)

We conducted searches using several large academic and electronic search engines (each of which includes fully sourced stories from the major Argentine newspapers) for the names of US PME graduates since 1945. Seventy-one Argentine officers were educated in the US PME system prior to Menem's inauguration in 1989, and only one was found to have played any role during the 23 coups — he had a minor role in the 1976 coup that brought the junta to power.<sup>12</sup> In 1996, an Italian court accused another graduate of committing acts against Italian citizens during the 'Dirty War' when he served as a provincial security officer.<sup>13</sup> An Argentine court sentenced a third graduate for human rights abuses during the time of the military junta. Finally, another PME graduate was placed in a government ministerial position in the last year of the junta's rule, but he was not part of the original coup.<sup>14</sup> In sum, two officers were accused of human rights abuses in Argentina during the years of the junta. This rate of four percent indicted (two out of more than 50 US PME graduates prior to 1983) is well below the estimates of over 20 percent Argentine officer involvement in the 'Dirty War.'

Argentina presents a strong case for positive US PME influence in the democratization process. The Argentine military had consistently dominated civilian life and often resorted to coups when civilian authorities were unable to rule effectively or when they proved unwilling to rule in the military's interest. The military defeat of the junta and the financial turmoil that followed gave Argentina a window of opportunity through which it could restructure its military, and it did this by building a PME system based on the US model. By educating and professionalizing their officer corps using US PME curricula, Argentina effectively removed the military from domestic affairs as the country underwent the transition to democracy.

## Greece

Greek democratization, like the Argentine case, came after the economic and political failure of a military junta. Coming to power through a coup in 1969, the Colonel's regime became progressively more authoritarian as Greece's economic climate worsened. Threatened with a Turkish invasion during the Cyprus crisis of 1973, the military leaders removed themselves from power and asked for the return of civilian government. Elections followed, and, institutionally at least, Greece was fully democratic by 1975. However, some recent interview evidence demonstrates that, though disgraced, the military still considered intervention in political life a viable option, and coup threats remained until the mid-1980s. The education of the Greek officer, through the US PME system and through domestic PME modeled after the US PME system, was a key factor that brought about a change in the military mindset and ensured full democratic consolidation.

The National Unity Government returned to Greece following liberation from the Nazis in October of 1944. Defeated in the war, the National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS) established a provisional government in the northern mountains. Civil war ensued between ELAS and Greek Democratic National Army (EDES) for several months until British forces established order. The communists disbanded their forces at a conference in

February 1945, and a general election was held in Greece in March 1946. The communists and their followers refused to vote, resulting in a large royalist majority at the polls. In September 1946, Greece restored the king, but the communists countered by launching a full-scale guerrilla war. By then Greek defense had become too burdensome for Great Britain and prompted the famous call for United States leadership in the fight against communism. The resulting Truman Doctrine guaranteed an immediate and significant increase in military and economic aid from the United States (Hook and Spanier, 2000).

The second communist rebellion lasted until 1949 when the US-supplied Greek army managed to clear the rebel forces from the mountainous Greek interior. On 16 October 1949, the Greek communist broadcasting station announced the end of the war, and many of the remaining communist fighters fled the country into neighboring Albania. Strong US-led military and economic support for anti-communism continued to be a staple of Greek political life in the 1950s. NATO's first expansion was the joint invitation to Greece and Turkey on 22 October 1951, and both became full members in February 1952. The slow healing of Turkish–Greek relations also included tripartite alliance pacts with Yugoslavia (February 1953 and August 1954) and similar agreements that attempted to settle the Cyprus question (February 1959 and August 1960).

Domestically, beginning about 1957, a Greek military officer organized a secret organization of mid-level officers that he named the Union of Young Greek Officers (EENA) (Xydis, 1974: 508). Ten years later, while serving on the Greek Army Staff, Colonel Georges Papadopoulos, along with 19 other officers from this organization, carried out a swift and bloodless coup on 21 April 1967 (Danopoulos, 1983: 487). A royal counter-coup tried to install King Constantine as head of state on 13 December 1967, but the royalists failed to garner any decisive support from the military. The royal family fled to Rome, and Colonel Papadopoulos formed a new government, installing himself as Prime Minister. The new junta immediately purged the military (roughly 150 officers from all branches) through forced retirements and dishonorable discharges (*Keesing's*, 1968); significantly, two of the six highest ranking purged officers were US PME graduates.<sup>15</sup>

The right-wing military junta continued for six years. Abolishing the Greek monarchy-in-exile and declaring that Greece was a republic on 1 June 1973, Papadopoulos held a referendum on the new constitution and declared himself President by 30 July 1973. The aftershocks of a navy mutiny that occurred in May dominated the months prior to the referendum and voting took place among charges of governmental intimidation at the polls. Despite strong-arm tactics, Papadopoulos was unable to hold the presidency for long, and on 25 November 1973, he was overthrown by the military as the coup leaders proclaimed a return to the 1967 regime (see both Danopoulos, 1983; Xydis, 1974). A broadcast statement issued immediately after the coup stated that Greece had strayed from the mission of the 1967 coup and had led the armed forces down a path toward 'electoral travesty.' The new Prime Minister, Adamantios Androutsopoulos, argued that the constitution of Greece had 'accumulated powers in the hands of one man,' and that such a concentration constituted 'the very definition of tyranny.' A purge of the military followed within days forcing 13 generals into retirement; only the Navy was unaffected (*Keesing's*, 1974).

This military government fell apart, and civilian rule was restored in Greece during the crisis in Cyprus. On 23 July 1974, the Greek armed forces called upon nine prominent civilian politicians to form a new government. Ex-premier Konstantinos Karamanlis



returned from exile in France and formed a government on 24 July 1974. The Greek Parliament adopted a new constitution within one year (7 June 1975) and elected Konstantinos Tsatsos to the presidency three days later (*Keesing's*, 1975). The new civilian government forced several top officers to retire or resign in the following year,<sup>16</sup> and the two US PME graduates purged following the 1967 coup were returned to service and rose to the most senior ranks in the Hellenic military.

The military was disgraced by their actions during the junta period, and this helped maintain civilian authority, but the threat of military coups took much longer to extinguish. Interviews by Neovi Karakatsanis demonstrate that 'the overwhelming majority of both retired pro- and anti-junta officers interviewed' agreed that military intervention might have been necessary if external threats increased or if domestic politicians 'make terrible mistakes.' This helps explain why military coup attempts continued until the mid-1980s (Karakatsanis, 1998).

The attitudinal change for the Greek military finally came with the restructuring of its PME. Beginning in 1983, the new socialist government undertook reforms of the military academies. Admission was integrated with the nationalized university exams and political background investigations were discontinued. The curricula of the schools were altered to the US PME model in an effort to inculcate democratic values in the officers. Actual US PME attendance more than doubled, and the change in recruitment patterns ensured that the top officers were sent to the American schools.

Taken together, these changes ensured that liberal education dominated the academies and effectively altered the mindset of the Greek officer. As one officer told Karakatsanis (1998: 299):

By teaching constitutional law, the rights of citizens, human rights, etc., [the possibility of intervention] ... is becoming less and less likely.... They understand that each person is suited for his own job, and, furthermore, that the opportunity exists for those who want to run for office. And there are officers in both parties — but not with weapons. They understand that it is one thing to command a military camp and another to command a ministry.

While this may seem far from the mindset of American civil–military relations, it showed a serious progression away from direct military intervention in politics.

The change in military culture continued despite efforts to re-politicize the Greek military. Party politics in the late 1980s and through the 1990s influenced promotions, retirements, appointments, and reappointments, but, as Veremis (1997) points out, the military officers had already been fully integrated into civil society. Their participation in politics declined markedly as the officers were professionalized, and this is why the period of coups is over in Greece today.

In the end, it is difficult to assess the direct effect of individual US PME graduates for the Greek case. Although there were at least 74 US PME graduates at the time of the 1967 coup, none of the 20 coup leaders were PME graduates, and no graduates were indicted for abuses. We found none of the graduate names in our searches of these years — except for those purged by the junta, of course. The two purged officers did return to duty after the institution of civilian rule and actually rose to senior military and ministerial ranks.

The evidence for the overall effects of US PME on the Greek military is both strong and positive. The Greek military completed a significant attitude change following the consolidation of civilian rule and moved away from their modern beginnings as a politically activist military. The US PME system again played a major part in this transformation as US PME educated top officers and provided the framework for an expanded Greek PME system.

## Taiwan

Taiwan took a much different path to democracy by gradually lifting various authoritarian controls in the late 1980s and early 1990s. One of the largest customers of US PME, Taiwan was able to complete democratization without a coup attempt. The military also served as one of the more liberalizing influences within the transitioning regime and heavily influenced the court system, the intelligence service, and the party system.

Taiwan had always been ruled by a civilian dictatorship until the democratic transition that began in 1987. The transition to democracy was the result of a deliberately phased program of loosening authoritarian control — from Chiang Kai-Shek's authoritarian regime to the less autocratic regime of his son Chiang Ching-kuo, and then finally to democratic transformation under Lee Teng-hui. Under Chiang-Kai-Shek, the Taiwanese military was primarily concerned with the potential for invasion by China. Not certain of the US commitment to defend Taiwan, the only option seemed to be the creation of a strong, defensive military (Cheng, 1993; Maclay, 2006).<sup>17</sup>

Taiwan began democracy with two sets of elections and constitutional changes in 1986 and 1992. On 28 September 1986, a loose opposition coalition formed to oppose the one-party rule of the KMT. The Democratic Progress Party (DPP) called for an end to martial law and the establishment of direct trade and links with the People's Republic of China. The goal of party formation was to provide a vehicle for greater coordination of dissent in the December elections (Keesing's, 1986). The party won 12 seats in the Legislative Yuan — the highest legislative organ in Taiwan — and 11 seats in the National Assembly (compared to 73 and 84 seats for the KMT). Seven months following the elections, President Chiang Ching-Kuo lifted the martial law that had been in place for 38 years, and on 14 July 1987, under the new National Security Law, civilians were no longer under threat of prosecution for advocating either communism or Taiwanese independence (Keesing's, 1987).

The DPP used the National Security Law to advocate Taiwanese independence on their platform prior to the elections of 1991. The party hoped to turn the National Assembly elections into a referendum on independence. President Lee Teng-hui described the platform statement as a 'rash and irresponsible act,' and Chinese leaders expressed 'grave concern' and began military maneuvers designed to influence the elections. The KMT under Lee countered with a plan designed to overhaul the political system and won a resounding victory at the polls — 70 percent of votes cast (Keesing's, 1991). However, elections to the Legislative Yuan in the following year saw the KMT winning only half of the seats as the DPP picked up a solid minority of seats with 31 percent of the vote (Keesing's, 1992). Multi-party democracy had finally begun.

The advent of democracy in Taiwan obviously did not stop the continued threat from Mainland China, and the Taiwanese military came into the 1990s as a bloated bureaucracy suffering from turf battles and a lack of cooperation and coordination. The three branches

of the military worked in isolation, even refusing to conduct joint military exercises, and this lack of inter-branch cooperation substantiated growing speculation that China would target an attack against Taiwan's command and control systems, instead of a direct assault against the island's army, navy, or air force. One of the methods suggested (and eventually followed) for overcoming this organizational gridlock was to place a heavier emphasis on using US PME educated soldiers since these officers are more prepared to adapt to rapidly changing military doctrine and warfare technologies (*Taiwan International Review*, 1998).

US PME has played a major role in the Taiwanese PME system. The reorganization of the Taiwanese PME system began in earnest with the creation of a Taiwanese National Defense University (NDU) in May 2000. The university is a combination of the existing Armed Forces University, National Defense Medical College, Chung Cheng Institute of Technology, and National Defense Management College. The Taiwanese NDU, unlike the previous PME schools, offers postgraduate degree programs similar to US PME schools, and serves as a think-tank for Taiwanese military strategy.

The stumbling block for the reorganization process has been the poor quality of the faculty available to staff the new university. According to one conservative estimate, at least 60 percent of the instructors were not qualified to teach at the university (*China Post*, 2000). This meant that returning US PME graduates provided an important resource for new instructors at the Taiwanese NDU at least during the early years of the university.<sup>18</sup> It seems that, in many respects, Taiwan is repeating the Argentine model of military professionalization, by educating key officers in the US PME system and then having these officers reorganize the PME schools at home based on the US PME curricula.

During Taiwan's history, 331 of its military officers have been educated in the United States through the PME programs. With the growing threat of communist China, Taiwan's early years witnessed the return of an extraordinary number of US PME graduates. These graduates were useful contacts should military coordination between the two countries become necessary; these graduates also had direct effects on one of the most sensitive government bureaus (Intelligence). We were unable to find evidence that any of the 331 graduates contributed to conduct that undermined democracy or the state. After the suspension of training during the Reagan years, the resumption of the US PME program was strongly associated with the decline in authoritarianism of the Taiwanese government. With the transition to democracy complete, the past decade has seen US PME graduates return to important positions within the Taiwanese military, overcoming gaps in command and control and providing a valuable resource as PME instructors.

## Competing explanations

It is always difficult for social scientists to conduct experiments, isolate independent variables, or otherwise control for the confounding effects of third variables when studying democratization, regime change, war, and other large-scale human events. These problems often increase the level of skepticism directed at new findings, especially controversial ones. In this instance, we have done our best to isolate the positive relationship between US PME and democratization and pacification of the military from other variables in our case studies. Nevertheless, we use this section to assess several possible competing explanations for our findings.

### *It's the alliance with the United States*

Foreign officer graduates of US PME often come from countries allied with the United States, and some argue that increased security linkages with the United States help democracies flourish abroad. But it would be impossible for our findings in the case studies for Argentina, Greece, and Taiwan to be spurious to an overall US alliance relationship. For example, the United States was a 'partner' of Argentina through the Organization of American States during its transition to democracy, and the change in attitudes of the Argentine military. However, that relationship began well before the democratic transition and continued through some incredibly authoritarian governments in Argentina. In fact, the low ebb of this relationship was during the junta years, when the US chose to favor its alliance with Britain during the Falklands (Malvinas) War, and these sour relations continued during the transitional period following the junta, when all of the Argentine PME changes took place.

In Greece, the expansion of basing rights for the US and NATO militaries began during the years of the Colonel's regime — the most authoritarian regime of Greece's modern era — while the transition to democracy occurred 10 years later, and interviews suggest that consolidation of the military was another decade away. The close military ties at the time were primarily due to the desire of the United States to secure easier access to the Middle East while also countering Soviet influence in the region. Ideologically, an anti-communist government in Greece, even if authoritarian, was preferable to the expansion of Soviet influence in the region.

Finally, in Taiwan, the United States pursued a policy of purposeful ambiguity to ease tensions with China while still maintaining a certain level of extended deterrence. This policy makes it impossible to establish a connection between US alliances and democracy for the Taiwanese — there was no clear US alliance during the late 1980s and 1990s when Taiwan democratized. Even today, when Taiwan often threatens to hold independence referenda, the US publicly sides with China. Taiwan's democratization and professionalization of its PME system occurred despite international hurdles to formal alliance with the US.

These cases are not unique in questioning the connection between US-led alliances and the spread of democracy. For example, recent scholarship by Dan Reiter suggests that NATO has not worked well in democratizing its non-democratic members and aspirant members (Reiter, 2001). Three recent expansion countries — the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland — were all committed to democracy regardless of the possibility of joining NATO, and several early NATO members were dictatorships during the Cold War, remaining so for extended periods (Greece, for example). This evidence alone suggests that the link between NATO — one of the strongest US-led alliances — and democracy is weak or non-existent, but one common explanation for why NATO may spread democracy is interesting and deserves further discussion, especially in connection with US PME.

Advocates of NATO expansion often cite the danger of military coups d'état in transitioning states and believe that membership in the alliance assuages these pressures. The argument is that the carrot of membership encourages civilian control of the military, and the transnational linkages of the alliance also help by encouraging the spread of this norm to other member states (Reiter, 2001: 54–6). Again, however, Reiter found no relationship between the spread of NATO and increased civilian control of the military in recent expansion countries. Instead, he found that civilian control was already present

in each country. In Poland, there was a distancing by the military from association with the difficult but necessary economic reforms; the military accepted and wanted civilian leadership. In Hungary, the military was subordinate to party authorities under communism, and this translated to civilian control in the post-communist era. Finally, in the Czech Republic, the military was not well respected and, therefore, posed no significant threat to civilian control (Reiter, 2001: 62–5).

While civilian control of the military was already present in Eastern Europe, each country chose to strengthen that institution and the norms surrounding civilian control through US PME, by educating top-level officers, in large numbers, immediately after the break-up of the Soviet Union. The restructuring was so vast in Hungary and the Czech Republic that an entire domestic PME system was created. While we cannot establish a causal connection here because of our limited data, the association is interesting and, temporally, all of this occurred before even the promise of NATO expansion. Further research may examine whether the expansion of civilian control of the military is actually a by-product of PME rather than any alliance relationships, but for our argument here, it should be evident that US PME is in fact not spurious to US alliance ties.

### *It's the economy*

The literature on democratization has established a clear relationship between wealth and the likelihood of transition. Namely, richer autocracies are more likely to transition to democracy, and richer democracies are more stable than poorer democracies. In aggregate, economic variables may have a more important effect than political variables in explaining why states democratize and remain stable (Feng and Zak, 1999; Londregan and Poole, 1990). Therefore, to isolate the effects of economic variables on regime stability, we included controls for the overall wealth and current trends of each country in our large-N analyses of coups d'état. We found that wealth and changes in wealth were related to the likelihood of a coup, but, more importantly for our argument, US PME still mattered even after controlling for these effects. The presence of US PME-graduated foreign officers has decreased the likelihood of coups d'état since 1950, and these results are statistically significant regardless of wealth or changes in wealth.

In our case study data, we found that, while US PME was related to positive regime changes and overall regime stability, there was little correlation between any economic variables and either democratization or stability. Argentina, for example, began democratization following the disastrous rule of the military junta, when the economy was at its worst in 20 years. According to the Penn World Tables, the GDP for Argentina, measured per capita in constant 1985 dollars, undertook a steady decline during the 1980s, moving from \$6506 in 1980 to \$4706 by 1991 (Heston and Summers, 1991). This steady decline coincided with almost all of the significant regime changes for that country, including the restructuring of the military and its educational system. Obviously, it would be difficult to argue that wealth or increases in wealth caused a democratic transition in Argentina.

In Greece, the GDP increased every year from 1960 to 1974 at an average of \$123 per annum; this rate of increase tripled following the regime change and continued its constant upward trend through the 1980s. From 1975 to 1991, the Greek GDP increased from \$2667 per capita to \$8658 per capita, at an average rate of \$373 per annum.

Increases in wealth are highly correlated with regime change for Greece, but the largest increases occurred *after* the regime change, which suggests the benefits of democratic governance but does not make a strong case for the 'wealth causes regime change' argument. Economic issues also did not seem extremely important during Greece's regime change in 1974; instead, the Cyprus Crisis forced the increasingly disgraced junta to step aside and call for civilian government.

The economy of Taiwan, our final case, follows a similar pattern to that of Greece as large increases in wealth *followed* democratization. The correlation between regime change and increased wealth is especially impressive in the Taiwanese case. During the 1970s and early 1980s, Taiwan increased its per capita GDP at an average rate of \$336 per annum, from \$829 in 1970 to \$6205 in 1986, but then in the five years following, the GDP increased at a rate of \$911 per annum, to \$9850 in 1991. The largest increase in GDP came in the year following the first democratic steps; the per capita GDP in 1987 was \$1114 greater than the per capita GDP in 1986 — a 16 percent rate of growth.

Obviously, problems of endogeneity will always plague research into the effects of wealth and changes in wealth on democratization. Nevertheless, the incredibly strong correlations between regime changes first and increases in wealth immediately following the Greek and Taiwanese cases make it difficult to argue that large changes in wealth brought about democratization. Even if one were to argue that economic variables played a necessary role as a background variable, this would not account of the declining wealth found during Argentine democratization. Taken together with our additional large-N analyses showing that US PME affects regime stability, these cases should provide convincing evidence that economic factors cannot explain the effects of US PME on democratization and stability.

### *It's the strength of the civilian government (or the weakness of the military)*

In each of the three cases we examined, the civilian government had a better political position than the military interests. In Argentina and Greece, the military was still suffering from the humiliation wrought by failed ruling juntas, and, in Taiwan, a strong political party (the KMT) effectively limited military influence. However, (1) this does not mean that strong civilian control explains the *acceptance* of civilian rule by the military in these cases, and (2) US PME was still used extensively by these governments to stabilize their regimes and to consolidate the democratization of the militaries in case civilian rule faltered. We examine these two points in turn for each of our cases.

In Argentina, political failure by the military enabled civilian rule, but military rebellions were still numerous — three of these occurred more than four years following the end of the junta — suggesting that civilian authority was not immediately accepted. One could argue that Menem's guarantee of amnesty in 1989 for the 'Dirty War' of the military junta gave the military the necessary incentive to police themselves. When the final rebellion of mid-rank officers came in 1990, they were able to quash dissent and try the perpetrators in military courts. We would argue, however, that US PME was already being implemented among the top ranks of the military, and the rebellions among the middle ranks were a response to military downsizing, the elimination of corruption, and the overall change in the politicization of the military. The effectiveness of PME in instilling the norm of civilian



authority can be seen in contemporary Argentina (2001–2) as the relative political strength of civilian parties and the military have reversed. The severe economic crisis has forced multiple government turnovers, but the Argentine military continues to remain silent. Given this, while a plausible argument could be made that the complete failure of the military junta left no alternative but civilian political authority, this argument could not then explain the lack of coups d'état, or even coup rumors, in Argentina today.

The Greek case demonstrates convincingly that, even if the civilian government is temporarily stronger, this does not necessarily mean that the military has accepted civilian authority. Our data for Greece show that military officers often thought intervention in political affairs might be necessary should the civilian government falter, and the data demonstrate that this view maintained over a decade after civilian government had been restored. There was no commitment to permanent political withdrawal by the military until the attitudinal shift began in the officer corps of the late 1980s. This is why the socialist government in Greece depended so heavily on US PME and a reorganized Greek PME system.

The military in Taiwan was never weak, but, of course, neither was the KMT. Still, the external focus of the military — guarding against the threat from Mainland China — overshadowed any political power plays that could have taken place, and this same foreign threat ensured that Taiwan would be one of the largest users of US PME. The unintended benefits of increased US PME usage were a more liberal military court system, less corrupt officers, and, lately, an abundant resource for restructuring its entire PME system. In the Taiwanese case then, it was never a struggle between civilian and military government. Instead, it was the use of US PME by both interests to improve their officers and their educational system and other institutions.

## Final thoughts

Admittedly, we were skeptical of the US PME–democracy link at the start of our research, but the evidence convinced us that our prior assumptions (and probably the assumptions of most observers) were wrong. Put simply, educating foreign officers through US PME helps strengthen developing democratic trends. In addition to the obvious benefits of military to military linkages, the US PME system encourages political stability and a democratization of foreign militaries. Our large-N analyses show that foreign officers educated in US PME decrease the likelihood of coups d'état in their home countries, and this finding persists despite the addition of individual country controls for alliance with the United States, presence of the Cold War, regime type, wealth, or changes in wealth. Our case studies extend these findings — in each of our cases, political instability declined with abundant use of US PME, and US PME permanently altered the attitudes of military officers toward accepting civilian authority.

These results are encouraging, especially as the United States considers ways of spreading democracy and stability worldwide. In fact, the Bush Administration continued to fund an increase in the number of foreign officers educated through US PME as part of the ongoing fight against terrorism. While our research suggests that these increases may be a good thing for both foreign militaries and democratic values worldwide, we hope that the benefits of these programs will not be lost in the renewed emphasis on anti-terrorism. A prime focus of US PME has been respect for civilian authority, the rule of law, and the

importance of democratic values, but with a fixed course-load, democratic values might be subsumed by the war on terrorism.

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### **Notes**

1. This popular view has even become the common perception of elected officials in the United States. For example, US Representative Joe Moakley (D-Massachusetts) labeled the School of the Americas a training spot for dictators: 'The School of the Americas has trained some of the most brutal assassins, some of the cruelest dictators and some of the worst violators of human rights that the Western Hemisphere has ever seen. It's time for the United States of America to admit its mistakes and remove this horrible blemish from our military establishment' (Weiner, 1999)
2. This is probably why Belkin and Schofer (2003) come to the conclusion that professionalization should not be included in their model of coup risk. According to their assessment, professional militaries have been associated with both coup-prone and stable regimes. Our argument differs of course because we concentrate on military officers sent to US PME.
3. See Air University International Officers School, Maxwell AFB, AL. Available at: <http://www.au.af.mil/au/cpd/ios/ios.htm>.
4. An anonymous reviewer asked whether attendance in a US-led PME program or just general attendance in a PME program was necessary to instill the virtues associated with civilian control of the military. After all, attendance of foreign PME programs would associate the graduates with professional networks of military officers which would certainly be damaged by participation in coups and other anti-democratic behaviors. This is a really interesting point, and one that is difficult to deal with methodologically because the US system represents the de facto choice of programs that teach best practices for the professional soldier. In other words, there are few alternatives with which to compare US PME training, at least since World War II. While many countries offer PME, none has the number of foreign military officer attendees that the US program does. Canadian, Japanese, and French programs are some of the larger PME programs but still train only a fraction of the number of foreign officers that the US trains. Further complicating this question is that in each of these PME programs the foreign officers are introduced into the network of professional military soldiers as they are learning about civilian control of the military, ethical practices, and liberal society. Thus, it is difficult to differentiate between the effects of the professional network of officers and the effects of the curriculum. Nevertheless, we think this effect reinforces, rather than replaces, the content of civilian military control taught in the PME programs, and, regardless, both of these are positive effects associated with PME and not the conventional linkage of PME with domestic abuses by foreign military officers.

5. We should note that the likelihood of coups in our data set is significantly lower than in the pre-1983 data set. Therefore, we ran the statistical analyses that follow using: 1) the 1950–83 data; 2) 1984–99 data; and 3) the combined, 1950–99 data. Although the overall likelihood of a coup changed between the two data sets, the results across these three different samples for the predictor variables were substantively the same.
6. We were unable to obtain data from the Marine Corps Command and Staff College. The Marine Corps school educates up to 24 foreign officers a year, and since variations in attendance is highly correlated with the other schools, we feel that this missing data should not be problematic for our testing, given the large value of the total population in our sample.
7. For example, a general from one Central European country, and graduate of NDU, remarked: ‘When you are only one or two graduates, you are marginalized and ineffective. We now have a critical mass of senior officers graduated from all of the SSSs [Senior Service Schools] of the US, and permanent, effective change is now possible’.
8. All analyses include corrections for auto-correlation in the BCSTS data (Beck et al., 1998). Results for individual dummy variables for years since previous coups are available from the authors.
9. An anonymous reviewer suggested that these results could suffer from problems associated with endogeneity since US decisions to admit foreign officers into PME might be predicated on the likelihood of a coup d’état in a given country. At the reviewer’s suggestion, we ran a model predicting coups d’état to determine whether the probabilities from the model correlated with US decisions to admit foreign officers. The most common predictors of coups are prior coups, poverty, and changes in wealth (see, for example, Londregan and Poole, 1990), and we compared a coup model with these three explanatory variables to our US PME data. The correlation was not high ( $p < 0.20$ ), which we believe adds greater strength to our argument that the relationship is not endogenous. Our thanks go to the reviewer for this suggestion.
10. We also conducted separate analyses that corrected for possible spatial correlation with dummy variables for each Correlates of War region. South America and Africa were more likely to have coup attempts, but the substantive effects of these regions were relatively small in our models and did not alter the results presented in this article. The separate analyses are available from the authors.
11. The success story in Mali is obviously not a success story for civilian control of the military, but it does emphasize the pro-democracy leanings of these graduates. It also suggests that results in the previous section may be stronger than they appear since coups d’état that instill democracy are included with those that do not.
12. The names of graduates and dates involved with their identities are omitted from these case studies for their own protection.
13. See *The Vanished Gallery*. Available at: <http://www.yendor.com/vanished/index.html>, a continually updated database of information on ‘The Disappeared,’ the name given by Argentines to those missing from the military rule. It lists human rights information, as well as names of accused military personnel.
14. Alfonsín also put a PME graduate in a leadership position shortly after he assumed power. This officer supported the new civilian government and retained his position despite an attempt by army officers to turn him out of office.

15. We would like to thank an anonymous US PME graduate from the Hellenic Armed Forces for his many hours of researching Greek officer biographies.
16. Fifteen generals were retired on 28 February 1982, amid rumors of a coup during planned military exercises. The government denied the coup rumors but appointed new heads of the army, navy, and air force, a new Chief of General Defense Staff, and about 20 senior officers. Two days before the retirements the government announced a fivefold increase in soldiers' pay (see *Keesing's*, 1983).
17. The United States was directly allied with Taiwan from 1954 to 1979, but the level of commitment given to Taiwan since that alliance has been purposefully kept ambiguous by the United States.
18. This is a common process for US officer graduates of PME. As the PME colleges become more rigorous and must satisfy regional accreditation associations for their graduate degrees, top recent graduates are the ones most likely to staff faculty positions for future US PME classes. For example, the US Air War College keeps a small number of its students each year to fill faculty positions, and the Air Command and Staff College is moving toward 100 percent of its military faculty coming from the ranks of recent graduates of in-residence programs. The pattern is similar at most other US PME schools. While the top graduates of the war colleges normally go on to flag rank, all graduates of in-residence war college programs are at the very top of their officer corps. The same is true for foreign graduates of US PME schools. US PME institutions graduate many officers who go back to their countries to teach in their own PME schools. In just one example, the Lebanese and Norwegian officers in the ACSC class of 2000 returned to command PME schools in their own countries.

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