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Africa

An Introduction to
History, Politics and Society

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Rainer Tetzlaff
Political Science
University of Hamburg
Hamburg, Germany

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Preface

This textbook is the result of an almost lifelong preoccupation with a fascinating continent that I had the privilege of getting to know during numerous travels and research stays in some 40 African countries from 1963 to 2015. Diverse encounters with Africans have probably prevented me from making facile sweeping judgments about people and political regimes, about economic practices and cultural idiosyncrasies in African societies. Nevertheless, generalising statements are sometimes unavoidable in order to be able to name context-specific *patterns of 'developments' or 'aberrations'*. In doing so, I cannot exclude the possibility that I, as a historian and political scientist with a socialisation-related imprint as a European and a German, may represent 'scientific points of view' and value judgements—certainly often unconsciously—that bear culture- and gender-specific colourings. One sees the reality of foreign cultures through a *specific*, *by no means universally valid*, *prism* (Schulz and Seebode 2010, p. 24f.), and this kind of 'historical entanglement' is probably impossible to escape, so that my representations and interpretations of African social realities made here can hardly be more than an offer for dialogue—a well-founded one, however. To counteract this, I have endeavoured both to allow African authors to have their say wherever possible and appropriate and to duly integrate gender aspects and the research findings of female scholars. For example, the almost ubiquitous phenomenon of *political corruption*—which plays a prominent role in the case studies on Gabon, Kenya, DR Congo, Nigeria, Mali, Zimbabwe, or South Africa—is assessed differently (namely in the cultural context of solidarity and moral community values) by some African authors (Murove 2009) than by many authors with Western socialisation, which should have consequences for the European-African development dialogue.

I have to thank numerous people whose studies, thought-provoking impulses, opinions, or critiques have flowed into this book. These include the African students

I had the privilege of teaching at *Jacobs University Bremen* between 2008 and 2015, as well as some of my colleagues and seminar participants in courses at the universities of Berlin, Hamburg, Konstanz and Eichstätt. I owe special thanks to Christine Hoffendahl, Heike Watermueller and Nadia Javanshir from the *Africa Library of the GIGA Institute of African Studies Hamburg (IAS),* who were very helpful in helping me to use the extensive Africa literature. Of necessity, I 'refrain' from thanking by name all colleagues to whom I am indebted for advice and assistance: Those of the *Association of African Studies in Germany (VAD)*, the *Institute for African Studies (IAK,* now renamed *IAS, Institute for African Studies*), the *Afrika-Kollegium Hamburg*, the Hamburg *Collaborative Research Centre 'Upheavals in African Societies and their Management'* (1998–2002), the *Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg (IFSH)*, the *Hamburg Academy of World Religions and* the *Institute for Political Science at the University of Hamburg,* where I was, with interruptions, Professor of *Political Science* between 1974 and 2006. But I am aware that without the stimulating academic and political climate in the Free and Hanseatic City of Hamburg for Third World Studies, I would have missed out on many productive thought-provoking impulses and encounters.

Thanks are due to the three research funding organisations, the *German Research Foundation (DFG), the Volkswagen Foundation (VWS)* and the *German Society for Peace and Conflict Research (DGFK),* which made several third-party funded projects for Africa field research possible. During a long academic life, one owes valuable suggestions and encouragement to a large number of colleagues and friends, but at least to some of them I would like to express my sincere thanks by *name:* Franz Ansprenger (+), Mohammed Ali Bakari, Sonja Bartsch, Rolf Benndorf, Joachim Betz, Helmut Bley, Oheneba Boateng, Jens Breitengroß, Lothar Brock, Stefan Brüne, Jörg Callies, Carola Donner-Reichle, Rolf Hanisch, Yero Haidara (+), Andreas Eckert, Hartmut Elsenhans, Georg Elwert (+), Ulf Engel, Gero Erdmann (+), Hans-Dieter Evers, Wolfgang Fengler, Mir Ferdowsi (+), Marc Frey, Belachew Gebrewold, Kurt Gerhard, Elke Gravert, Gerhard Grohs (+), Laura Gross, Mussie Habte, Rolf Hanisch, Cilja Harders, Leo Harding, Wolfgang Hein, Andreas Heuser, Key and Hans Hielscher, Manfred Hinz, Kurt Hirschler, Nicole Hirt, Rolf Hofmeier, Barbara and Fouad Ibrahim, Hans Illy, Cord Jakobeit, Robert Kappel, Volker Kasch, Sory Ketouré, Ulla and Heinrich Köhler, Jonas Koudissa, Uli Leffler, Alexanda Leiseder, Peter Lock, Volker Matthies, Andreas Mehler, Ulrich Menzel, Dirk Messner, Stefan Mair, Peter Meyns, Peter Molt, Fritz Mühlenberg, Dieter Neubert, Charlotte Nguébong-Ngatat, Antonie Nord, Salua Nour, Franz Nuscheler, Emeka Nwokedi (+), Christian Peters, Ralph-Michael Peters, Sarah Perumalla, Almuth Schauber, Fred Scholz, Siegmar Schmidt, Gunter Schubert, Volker Seitz, Dieter Senghaas, Thomas Siebold, Wolbert Smidt, Judy

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Hamburg, Germany   Rainer Tetzlaff
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Contents

Abbreviations

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific States
ANC	African National Congress (South Africa)
ASS	Africa South of the Sahara
AU	African Union
BMZ	Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development
BRICS	Group of countries: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa
BTI	Bertelsmann Transformation Index
COSATU	Congress of South African Trade Unions
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
DSE	Deutsche Stiftung für Entwicklungsländer (German Foundation for Developing Countries)
ECA	Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EPAs	Economic Partnership Agreements (economic agreements with the EU)
EPRDF	Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front
EU	European Union
EZ	Development cooperation ('development aid')
FAO	Food and Agricultural Organization
FDI	Foreign direct investment (FDI)
FLN	Front de Libération Nationale (Algerian)
GDP	Gross domestic product
GIGA	German Institute for Global and Area Studies based in Hamburg
GNP	Gross national product
GTZ	German Agency for Technical Cooperation (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit)
HDI	Human Development Index of the UNDP
HIPC	Heavily indebted poor countries
IAK	Institute for African Studies (Institut für Afrika-Kunde) (Hamburg)

IFIs	International finance institutions
IMF	International Monetary Fund
KfW	Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation)
LDCs	Least developed countries
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
NGO	Non-governmental organisations
NIC	Newly industrialised countries
OAU	Organisation of African Unity
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (based in Paris)
PPP	Purchasing power parities
PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
SAP	Structural adjustment programs
SADC	Southern African Development Community based in Gaborone/Botswana
SDGs	Sustainable Development Goals
TPLF	Tigray People's Liberation Front
UN	United Nations
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UP	University Press
VENRO	Association of German Development Non-Governmental Organisations (Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen)
WHH	Welthungerhilfe
WHO	World Health Organization
WTO	World Trade Organization

Introduction

1.1 Explanation of the Structure and Content of the Textbook

This textbook consists of five parts, which build on each other, but which can also—depending on the reader's interest—be read as separate units. The **theoretical** part (Chap. 2) is followed by four **historical** topics (Atlantic slave trade and its consequences; colonisation; England, France, and Germany as colonial powers; decolonisation). Part three then presents chapters accentuated primarily in **political science**: socialist experimentation; postcolonial state-building; and democratization. This is followed by five chapters dealing with key **developmental and socio-economic** aspects of Africa's post-colonial development in the period from c. 1960 to 2017: population growth; poverty and hunger; commodity economies; war and peace; corruption. The fourth section aims at the PRC, the European Union, and the World Bank as major **international actors.** The concluding chapter summarizes the findings of the preceding discussions from the perspective of the future challenges for Africa and Europe.

The first part of the textbook begins with a brief topical introduction to the subject matter—**Africa as unity in diversity**—in order to then provide all readers (not only scholars and students) with a general overview of the social science *literature* on Africa as well as some 'classics' on a central aspect of this textbook—development theories and development policy. At this point, reference can only be made to a few handbooks and standard works on the study of Africa, past and present, in order to facilitate student's access to a continent of now 55 states that were once colonised by 7 European states. This includes pointing out a selection of the many Africa-related *journals*. For reasons of space, it was not possible (except for individual references to revealing African novels) to also systematically consider

in more detail the **literary products** of the great African writers, who convey a multifaceted, often highly critical picture of African realities. Since they often assume the political role of courageous opposition figures (denied to professional politicians in their homelands by repressive regimes), their novels, novellas, and short stories are a treasure trove of insights into everyday African life. Quotations from English and French sources have been translated by me.

The 30-page **theory chapter** outlines notable *development theories and approaches, divided* into 16 sub-chapters that have been discussed among social scientists and economists from the 1950s to the present day, including dependency and modernization theories, neo-liberal and post-colonial approaches, and the *developmental state concept*. The **terms and definitions** presented in this context are intended to help classify and understand more profoundly the terms used in the empirical country studies for phenomena such as 'development', 'underdevelopment', 'social change', 'modernization', 'ethnicity', 'state class', 'patronage state', 'corruption', 'rentier economy', 'curse of commodities' 'African mode of production' etc. in terms of theoretical history. Since the textbook is also aimed at students, three or four **tasks** (mostly in the form of questions and with assignments) are always attached to each main chapter. The answers to be found can be obtained from reading the text without further research. The first version of this textbook was used by Professor Michael Stoiber at the Distance Learning University of Hagen as a teaching script in 2016/2017.

1.2   Africa—Europe's Neighbour

Africa only exists in the plural, and therefore blanket judgements about Africa—for example as the 'crisis continent', as the 'lost continent', as the 'poorhouse of the world' or, on the contrary, as the 'continent of the future'—are not very helpful (critically: Böhler and Hoeren 2003; Go and Page 2008; Goldberg 2008; Padayachee 2010; Cichon et al. 2010; Tetzlaff 2011; Johnson 2013; Carmody 2016). Other major regions of the world, such as Western Europe, East Asia, the Arab world of the Middle East, and the Andean countries of Latin America, are also highly *heterogeneous* entities politically, economically, and culturally, but in Africa, twenty times the size of Europe, the contrasts between climatic zones and the different development paths of the 55 states seem even more significant than elsewhere. With two exceptions (Ethiopia and Liberia), all of today's African states were once *colonies or protectorates of European powers* and have been shaped by them in different cultural and linguistic ways.

Our imagined *images of Africa* are colourful and contradictory, sometimes confused and racist (Böhler and Hoeren 2003; Schulz and Seebode 2010; Köhler 2010; Danner 2012)—as not least African intellectuals have complained (Mbembe 2014; Obenga 2010; Cichon et al. 2010). Currently, they are fondly remembered by great figures that made history, for better or worse. On the one hand, we are quick to recall the bizarre monsters, popularly dubbed 'vampire elites', 'crocodiles' or 'vultures' in the African vernacular (Nugent 2004; Ayittey 2005; Olopade 2014). These include, for example, *Idi Amin*, President of Uganda, who had about 300,000 countrymen killed (and memorialized by actor Forest Whitacker in the film 'The Last Emperor of Scotland'); or President *Joseph Mobutu*, who in 37 years of kleptocratic presidency wrecked Zaire (now DR Congo) economically, allegedly embezzling more than US$4 billion of state revenue; or Nigerian coup President *Sani Abacha*, who also usurped billions of dollars in revenue from his country's booming oil exports (Ellis 2016) and who had courageous civil rights activist *Ken Saro Wiwa*, who was outraged against the ecologically and socially ruinous petroleum economy in the Niger Delta, killed in prison; or the aging dictator *Robert Mugabe*, who was ousted by his generals in November 2017 after 37 years in office, leaving behind a ruined country from which a quarter of the suffering population had been forced to flee to neighboring countries. All these tragedies are as much a part of the many facets of African reality as the spectacular African success stories: For example, the South African shining light *Nelson Mandela*, who after 27 years of imprisonment as a political prisoner of the *apartheid regime* reached out to his tormentors for reconciliation; or the story of the Kenyan environmental activist *Wangari Maathai*, who in 2004 became the first woman in Africa to receive the Nobel Peace Prize for her fight for 'sustainable development, peace, and democracy'; or that of the South African Afro-pop singer *Miriam Makeba*, who became world-famous with her moving '*Pata-Pata' song*. In contrast, the sufferings and achievements of the millions of hard-working women farmers, traders, and educators who are busy day after day to support their families under unspeakably difficult living conditions in an *economy of survival* that has become precarious, usually remain in the dark (Tröger 2004; Eberlei 2009; Sy 2010; Dilger and Luig 2010; Schulz and Seebode 2010; Collier 2010; Tekülve and Rauch 2017).

It is therefore appropriate to always distinguish between the social class of the rulers, which in African discourses (as power elite, state class, patronage state, neo-patrimonial state, supply agency, *gate-keeper state*, etc.) have experienced the most diverse designations, on the one hand, and a diversely ethnically-politically fragmented mass of the working population on the other. The latter was addressed by the Swiss journalist *Georg Brunold* more than 20 years ago with the assessment

that Africa was the "borderless" and "vital" continent "which not only inflicts wounds but also heals them, which not only produces its millions of refugees but also always accommodates them and . . . bears all its other problems" (Brunold 1994, pp. 22–23). Today—a quarter of a century later—the question may and probably must be asked whether this heroic image of the unlimited solidarity and capacity for the suffering of African civil society still applies everywhere (Moyo 2009; Olopade 2014; Jakob and Schlindwein 2017; Theroux 2017). In *Libya*, for instance, refugees from West Africa are harassed, tortured, and exploited in the meanest of ways; millions of Africans are real or mental refugees fleeing their homeland towards 'Europe'—the imagined paradise of the desperate and ill-informed (Gatti 2010). With the disappointments of the partially unsuccessful 'Arab Spring', the movement of North Africans towards the North intensified, and various *push and pull factors* caused swelling of migrants from African countries to the European Union (Jakob and Schlindwein 2017). The journalist *Asfa-Wossen Asserate* warned in his book *The migration of peoples* (*Die Völkerwanderung*):

> We need to improve the living conditions of the people in Africa so that this exodus does not happen. Only if they find a future in their homeland will they stay. Europe should not cherish the illusion that this migration of peoples can be stopped by patrols at sea, by fences or walls (Asserate 2016, pp. 38–39).

There is no doubt about it: hundreds of thousands of mostly younger Africans in Eritrea, Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and in numerous countries of sub-Saharan Africa are, metaphorically speaking, sitting on packed suitcases waiting for their chance to get to 'Europe'. Since a legal route is usually closed to them—another omission on the part of the EU member states—they have little choice but to use the services of smugglers. It is not the poorest who make the dangerous journey through the Sahara and across the Mediterranean at great risk, but more and more young, well-educated people who see no sufficiently enticing prospects for a better life for themselves and their children in their countries, even if these have made progress in terms of development policy (such as Tunisia, Kenya, Senegal, Ghana, Ivory Coast, Nigeria).

As a rule, European societies do not know much about the culture and society of those who come to them from African countries. This should change as soon as possible because, without knowledge of some fundamentally important components of *African worldviews* (which are also in a state of flux), it is almost impossible to decipher how African contemporaries think and behave (Mugambi and Getui 2004; Schulz and Seebode 2010; Beer 2017). This will be indicated here by two examples.

Religion, culture, and social life are so closely intertwined in pre-colonial as well as today in 'post-colonial' Africa that religious practices can only be understood in the overall social context. And this is shaped by the community goal of *sustaining life*. Since achieving this is often only possible as the sum of community efforts, individual claims to self-realization recede into the background. Rites, festivals, symbols (including, for example, masks), and mythical narratives consolidate community consciousness (Plankensteiner 2007; Heidemann 2011; Förster 2017); helped by the omnipresent ancestors, spirits, and deities. Of particular relevance for the construction of one's identity as part of the community is the belief in causal relationships between the world of the living and the world of the dead (Chabal and Daloz 1999, pp. 66 f.; Beier 1999, pp. 85 f.; Heuser 2015; Beer et al. 2017, pp. 183 f.): *Ancestors* are closest to the people; not every deceased person automatically becomes an ancestor: "One must have led an exemplary life, been buried in a ritually orderly manner, and have held a respected position" (Sundermeier 1988, p. 521). Africans have also developed a very distinct notion of the concept and practice of *human rights*, which are strongly focused on values such as solidarity and the common good (Bösl and Diescho 2009; Ruppel and Winter 2011).

What Europeans may also often be unaware of is the fact that postcolonial societies also practice a remarkable degree of *religious tolerance* towards other faith communities. For example, the Kenyan political scientist *Ali Mazrui* (1933–2014), who was the director of the Institute for Global Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, pointed out that the Muslim population of *Senegal*, for example, elected and re-elected a Christian president (Leopold Sedar Senghor) and that in Tanzania Catholic and Muslim presidents alternated in office (for example, the Catholic *J. Nyerere* was succeeded by the Muslim *Ali Hassan Mwinyi*). He further recalled the historical fact: "Africa did not know religious wars before Islam and Christianity came in. But at present, when Africa has produced its expressions of Islam and Christianity, it is developing an ecumenical attitude towards religion and is far ahead of the rest of the world in this. Africa's *ecumenical spirit* could contribute to the emergence of a *global ethic*" (Mazrui 2009, p. 51; emphasis RT). Equally consciousness-raising is the recognition that Islam is rarely "the cause of conflict" in Africa, but that religion often "serves as the best interpretive force without religion itself generating the conflict" (Schulze 2006, p. 8).

Therefore, the forms of *intercontinental cooperation* between Africa and EU-Europe that have already been developed over the past 50 years need to be further developed according to the situation—cooperation on the following five levels of action (see also Africa-Yearbook 2015, pp. 21–33):

- At the *economic* level: Europeans continue to have a dominant self-interest in Africa's rich mineral resources and consumer markets. On the African side, the interest in development credits, budget support, trade agreements, access to markets, and participation in technological and scientific know-how predominates. The volume of financial transfers from labour income of African migrant workers and migrants to their countries of origin is already higher than the total development aid flowing to Africa, worth about 50 billion euros annually. However, the value of financial transfers is challenged by *capital flight* in the opposite direction: Between 1970 and 2014, capital flight from Africa was estimated at US$578 billion, of which $405 billion was from sub-Saharan Africa (Ndikumana 2017, p. 6). The main cause of this is over-or under-invoicing in trade in goods, or, in the words of DC Minister Gerd Müller, "the aggressive tax avoidance" of multinational corporations (BMZ 2017, p. 8);
- At the level of *development policy*: here there is an interest on the part of the European Union in the political stabilisation and economic development of African countries, which is what the Association Agreements (*Lomé* and *Cotonou* Conventions) and *Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)* were intended to serve, while African politicians pursue their interest in financial budget support, trade privileges and in assistance in realising their development plans and economic projects. In 2016, OECD countries budgeted a total of US$ 142.6 billion in foreign aid to developing countries; the lion's share of which went to Africa. In 2017, Germany's Federal Ministry for Cooperation and Development (BMZ)—in competition with China—lured with a '*Marshall Plan with Africa*' and the Ministry of Finance also propagated a '*Compact with Africa*'; it remains to be seen whether this will result in effective strategies to put a stop to the seven *main developmental ills*—namely wars, corruption, trade discrimination on the part of the industrialised countries, climate turmoil, Islamist terror, organised crime and barely curbed population growth. As a result, only very few countries can be expected to achieve lasting success. What is needed is a *constructive exit strategy* for international development cooperation with Africa to gradually dismantle the toxic effects of financial transfers that have become automatic and are not reciprocated (*rent-seeking* and lack of *ownership*). The aim should be to allow indigenous African capitalism with local entrepreneurship to grow up, which would be competitive on globalised markets;
- At the level of *migration policy*: until 2011, a ring of seemingly stable dictatorships in the Maghreb had protected the countries of the EU from the influx of too many refugees from Africa; now, gangs of smugglers do the business with refugees from Africa, among them mostly 'economic refugees'.

Between January and August 2016 alone, 86,000 *refugees* from Africa reached Italy and thus the European Union alive by sea: 22,329 from *Nigeria* (motivations included: poverty, state failure, terror by Boko Haram), 15,043 from *Eritrea* (dictatorship; economic crisis), 8066 from *Sudan* (dictatorship and civil war), 7750 from The *Gambia* (dictatorship; introduction of Sharia law); 7676 from *Côte d'Ivoire (*opposition repression after a civil war); 7468 from *Guinea* (opposition repression; Ebola epidemic); 6.025 from *Somalia* (state failure, civil war; Islamist terror); 5954 from *Mali* (state failure, civil war, Islamist terror); and, remarkably, 5884 refugees from *Senegal* (democracy; regional conflict over *Casamance*) (figures according to *Die Zeit, October 6, 2016, No. 42, p. 2*). The other EU countries have largely left the Italian authorities and municipalities alone with the stranded people from Africa;

- The *European Union* has strongly urged African states and regional organizations to participate in global trade—but under its liberal economic rules. With trade deals on offer, African governments are expected to open their markets to European products and services, even though such measures would destroy jobs that should then be recreated elsewhere with development funds. "Protected borders and open markets are what the EU dreams of. Africa dreams of protected markets and open borders. As long as this dilemma of interests is not solved, there will be no real partnership," *Christian Jakob and Simone Schlindwein* conclude in their book "Dictators [in Africa] as Europe's Doormen" (Jakob and Schlindwein 2017, p. 261);

- On a *socio-cultural* level, there is a strong interest on the part of Africa's educated youth and growing urban 'middle classes' to participate in European educational policy offerings in the form of scholarships and apprenticeships. Also important is the *protective function* of European democracies in providing a safe second home for politically persecuted writers, artists, and scientists from Africa, many of whom can only live and create safety in the European diaspora. European societies, for their part, benefit from immigrant and diaspora communities in many ways: from their scientific contributions, from African music, from African art, or top African athletes in football;

- At the *military* level, since the end of the Cold War and then increasingly after *9/11* (the terrorist attack by Islamists on the *World Trade Towers* in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on September 11, 2001), there has been a growing need on the part of European states not only to ensure greater security for their citizens at home, but also to ward off threats from the 'near abroad' in the form of piracy, drug smuggling, illegal immigration or, more recently, terrorist infiltration. Efforts to build *security partnerships* have therefore emerged, including in the context of development cooperation. Today, the doctrine is: 'Without

political security, socio-economic development successes are of little use; without development successes, security efforts come to nothing'. Moreover, *military deployments* from France, England, Belgium, and Germany have occurred in state collapse countries (Somalia, DR Congo, Sierra Leone, Chad, Mali) in the mutual interest of stabilizing political capital regimes and avoiding waves of refugees as a result of state collapse. Whether they will be of much use is and remains a legitimate question.

In reality, the *inter-continental relations* between Africa and Europe are much more complex than outlined here, but it should suffice at this point, for now, to make clear how closely our fate in the countries of the European Union is linked to the contradictory developments and dramatic events in African countries (see also Köhler 2010). For centuries, Africa has been a component of the modern world economy (as a supplier of labour slaves and raw materials) and for decades it has been part of the gradually emerging world economy and world politics. Political scientists speak of the growing *interdependence* between peoples as an expression of contemporary *globalization*, which also entails growing dependence and vulnerability of people to 'foreign' forces. German Chancellor *Angela Merkel* articulated this new complex set of *interdependencies* in October 2016 under the slogan "*Africa's well-being is in Germany's interest*" as follows:

> Twenty years ago, people there [in Africa] were generally even poorer [than today]. But they couldn't see as well as we live, they couldn't compare. And they couldn't leave as easily. Digitization is making a big difference. Today, almost anyone can find out about any place in the world. When you see how things are elsewhere, your desires grow as well. Then families get the idea to send at least one relative there, where you can achieve a certain income, which might then give the whole family a better living. Just as the people of the world are becoming more knowledgeable about us, we, in turn, need to become more knowledgeable about them. We need to learn more about Africa and the Arab world. Stability in our country also depends on us giving hope there. On the other hand, we also need to educate people that the seemingly quick and easy path to a better life does not necessarily lead to that better life. We need to help people when they are fleeing war and persecution, and even more, we need to help them to be able to stay in or near their homes . . . One thing is absolutely clear: The entire Western world has robbed Africa of development opportunities in previous eras, and has done so for centuries . . . Of course, this gives rise to a responsibility for us . . . If I, as German Chancellor, want to ensure that we Germans are doing well, that the European Union holds together, I must also see to it that things are done in Europe's neighbourhood in such a way that people there can also feel that home is home. In concrete terms, this means in our time that we have to deal with Africa in a new way. That is how it is in the 21st century (Angela Merkel, "Das Wohl Afrikas liegt im deutschen Interesse", in: Die Zeit, 6 October 2016, p. 3).

Since then, the chancellor has visited *Niger* several times, the largest transit country for West African refugees, which has now promised (for cash) to wave through fewer migrants; she negotiated with *Tunisians* to take back rejected asylum seekers; she worked to improve coastal and border protection in *Algeria* and *Libya*; and, as host, she ensured that the issue of Africa aid was on the agenda at the G-20 summit in Hamburg in July 2017 (Jakob and Schlindwein 2017; Kappel and Reisen 2017). None of this is wrong, but the assistance promised seems rather ineffective given the scale of the challenge—including climate change with its destabilising consequences (Welzer 2008). A reference to the plight of youth will illustrate this: 20 million new jobs for school leavers would need to be created annually in Africa if young people there were to be given the prospect of staying at home (BMZ 2017; Tetzlaff 2016).

For critical observers of the times, the question thus arises as to whether the goals of combating the causes of flight, which are discussed today in Europe in the context of 'development aid', can be achieved at all under today's power relations in the world (Adukele 2016). *Thomas Scheen*, one of Germany's most experienced Africa correspondents, gave the following assessment in October 2016:

> If development aid in its current form had ever been of any use, we would be discussing its reduction today instead of its increase .... That Europe will succeed in stopping the flow of refugees from Africa is nevertheless an illusion. The problems on the continent are too big for that, awareness is too low and time is simply too short. We will have to live with the fact that our world will be much more African in the foreseeable future (T. Scheen, "Wir werden afrikanischer", in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11 October 2016, page 1).

The persistent *divide in interests* is unmistakable: From an African perspective, migration to Europe is seen as a welcome contribution to economic development and a useful outlet for alleviating socio-economic frustration, while in Europe many people see immigration from Africa as undesirable that must be fought.

1.3   References to the Literature on Africa: Introductory Notes

The student is offered a wide range of primary and secondary sources if he or she wishes to study politics and economics, culture, and society of African countries. The following is a compilation of useful handbooks, reference works, monographs,

readers, and social science journals to facilitate the entry into the study of Africa's history and present:

- An informative account of the *political and economic development* of the individual African countries is offered in the Handbook Africa (*Handbuch Afrika*), in three volumes written by the Austrian historian *Walter Schicho*, Frankfurt am Main 1999, 2001, 2004. On 20–30 pages each, the history of the countries is told, beginning with the pre-colonial phase, through colonial policy to post-colonial development, ending around the year 2000. Complementary to Schicho's Handbuch Afrika, the work presented in a gripping language is recommended: *The Fate of Africa. From Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair. A History of Fifty Years of Independence* by the English historian *Martin Meredith*, New York 2005 (752 pp.).
- The *Africa Yearbook* (*Afrika Jahrbuch*), initially edited by *Rolf Hofmeier*, is indispensable for political information on all states of sub-Saharan Africa. Since 2004 it has been continued as an English-language *Africa Yearbook* up to the present (2017), edited by *Andreas Mehler* (Arnold Bergstresser Institute Freiburg), *Henning Melber* (Nordic Africa Institute in Uppsala/Sweden), and by *Klaas van Walraven* (African Studies Centre at Leiden University).
- The **Institute of African Studies (Institut für Afrikastudien)**, part of the **GIGA** (German Institute of Global and Areas Studies) in Hamburg, publishes what is probably the most important social science journal on Africa in this country, the **Afrika Spectrum** (**Africa Spectrum**; since 2009 entirely in English as Africa Spectrum), three times a year. Other publications of the IAK are the *GIGA Focus AFRIKA*—analyses of current Africa-related topics—and the GIGA Working Papers.
- Among the **historical foundations** is the 1995 published monography *The Africans* by **John Iliffe** of Cambridge University (in German translation: *Geschichte Afrikas*, Munich 2000, 2nd ed.). It covers the history from the beginning of human evolution in the steppes of East Africa to the South African apartheid regime (435 pp.). On sources and literature for African studies, **Leonhard Harding**, *Geschichte Afrikas im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (*History of Africa in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries*) Oldenbourg Grundriss der Geschichte, Munich 1999 (272 p.), is recommended.
- More up-to-date and thematically comprehensive is the *History of Africa. From 1800 to the present* (*Geschichte Afrikas. Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart*) by the historian **Christoph Marx**, Paderborn etc. 2004, UTB (389 pp.). Also of great use are: *Little history of Africa* (*Kleine Geschichte Afrikas*) by historian **Winfried Speitkamp**, published by Philipp Reclam jun. in Stuttgart 2009 in

2nd ed. (516 p.); and *Africa 1500–1900*. *History and society* (**Afrika 1500–1900**. *Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, Vienna 2010, edited by historians **Andreas Eckert, Ingeborg Grau and Arno Sonderegger** (234 p.).

- For those interested in the **pre-colonial history of Africa**, we recommend: **Francois-Xavier Fauvelle**, *Das Goldene Rhinozeros*. *Afrika* im *Mittelalter* (*The Golden Rhinoceros. Africa in the Middle Ages*), Munich 2017 (319 p.) as well as **Adam Jones**, *Geschichte Afrikas vor 1850* (*History of Africa before 1850*), Frankfurt a. M. 2016. The social and cultural anthropologist **Barbara Plankensteiner** conveys in the reader she edited "*Benin. Kings and Rituals. Court Arts from Nigeria*", Vienna & Ghent 2007, provides profound insights into the African culture.

- Indispensable for understanding **German colonial history** is the reader by the Hamburg historian **Jürgen Zimmerer** *(ed.), Kein Platz an der Sonne. Erinnerungsorte der deutschen Kolonialgeschichte* (*No Place in the Sun. Places of Remembrance of German Colonial History*), Frankfurt/New York 2013 (524 pp.).

- The textbook *Post-colonial Africa. Politics—Economy—Society* (*Das nachkoloniale Afrika. Politik—Wirtschaft—Gesellschaft*) in the series Grundwissen Politik, published by **Rainer Tetzlaff** and **Cord Jakobeit** im Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften im Jahr 2005, deals, among other things, with basic social science terms and basic topics for understanding Africa (304 pp.). See also **Hermann Korte & Bernhard Schäfers (eds.)**, *Einführung in die Hauptbegriffe der Soziologie* (*Introduction to the main concepts of sociology*), Opladen 2002, 6th ed. (269 S.).

- The political scientist **Jürgen Osterhammel**—also author of the magnificent work *Die Verwandlung der Welt. Eine Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts* (*The Transformation of the World. A history of the 19th century*), 2009, 3rd ed., Munich (C.H. Beck)—has presented a **theoretical classification** of the formation and rule of colonial empires: *Colonialism. A Theoretical Overview*, Princeton 2005 (147 pp.).

- English-language works on the **decolonization of Africa** include *The Decolonization Reader*, edited by **James D. Le Sueur**, New York & London 2003 (462 pages). It contains contributions by Frederick Cooper, William Roger Louis, Ronald Robinson, Martin Shipway, John Londsdale, and Crawford Young, among others. More recently, the reader *Decolonization and its Impact. A Comparative Approach to the End of the Colonial Empires*, ed. V. **Martin Shipway**, Malden/USA, etc. 2009 (269 pages). **Frederick Cooper'**s monograph *Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present*, Cambridge 2006 (216 pp.).

- Indispensable for understanding **postcolonial** discourse is **Peter Cichon, Reinhart Hosch, Fritz Peter Kirsch** (eds.). (*Der undankbare Kontinent? Afrikanische Antworten auf europäische Bevormundung*) *The ungrateful continent? African Responses to European Paternalism*. Hamburg 2010 (285 pp.). See also **Helmut Danner**, *The End of Arrogance. Africa and the West—Understanding their differences* (*Das Ende der Arroganz. Afrika und der Westen—ihre Unterschiede verstehen*), Frankfurt am Main 2012 (253 p.).
- A condensed **overview of Africa's problems today** is offered by the English political scientist **Heather Deegan** in her **textbook** *Africa Today. Culture, economics, religion, security*, London & New York 2009 (235 pp.). **Catherine Boone**, *Property and Political Order in Africa: Land Rights and the Structure of Politics*, Cambridge 2014 (409 pp.), provides deep insights into property rights, elections, and land conflicts in Africa. Africa needs well-functioning **institutions** is the leitmotif in **Ali Mazrui & Francis Wiafe-Amoako**, *African Institutions*, Lanham 2016 (181 pp.).
- The **dtv paperback by ex-diplomat Volker Seitz** has rightly been widely read: *Afrika wird armregiert oder Wie man Afrika wirklich helfen kann* (*Africa is being poor-governed or how to really help Africa*), Munich 2014, 7th ed. (215 S.). The **current reader** by ex-Federal President **Horst Köhler** (ed.), *Schicksal Afrika. Denkanstöße und Erfahrungsberichte* (*Destiny Africa. Food for thought and testimonials*), Reinbek bei Hamburg 2010 (381 pp.) is suitable as an introduction, as is **Franz Ansprenger**, *Geschichte Afrikas*, Munich 2002: Beck (128 pp.).
- Key texts by 20 eminent **African scholars** on "**Politics, Development, and International Relations**" appeared in 2017 in: *The African Affairs Reader*, ed. by **Nic Cheeseman, Lindsay Whitfield & Carl Death,** Oxford University Press (372 pp.).
- As a **reference work in economics** with a focus on development theories and development policy, it is recommended to read **Adam Szirmai**, *The Dynamics of Socio-Economic Development. An Introduction*, Cambridge 2005 (711 pp.). See also **Barbara Hahn**, *Welthandel. Geschichte—Konzepte—Perspektiven* (*World Trade. History—Concepts—Perspectives*). Darmstad 2009 (192 pp.). On **Europe's trade policy** towards Africa, see **Yash Tandon**, *Handel ist Krieg* (*Trade is War*). Cologne 2014 (271 p.).
- An up-to-date handbook with an **economic** accent is **Greg Mills, Jeffrey Herbst, Olusegun Obasanjo & Dickie Davis**, *Making Africa Work. A handbook for economic success*, London 2017 (317 pp.). On the international and domestic background to Africa's **resource plunder**, see **Tom Burgis**, *Der Fluch des Reichtums. Warlords, Konzerne, Schmuggler und die Plünderung Afrikas*

(The Curse of Wealth. Warlords, Corporations, Smugglers and the Plundering of Africa), Frankfurt a. M. 2017, 2nd edition, (351 pp.).

- An approach to **religious and ethical ideas** of African peoples is provided by **Theo Sundermeier**, *Nur gemeinsam können wir überleben. Das Menschenbild schwarzafrikanischer Religionen (Only together can we survive. The Image of Man in Black African Religions)*, 3rd ed., Gütersloh 1997*; **Munyaradzi Felix Murove (Ed.)**, *African Ethics. An Anthology of Comparative and Applied Ethics*, University of KwaZulu-Natal 2009 (450 pp.)*; **Chandra Lekha Srinam & Suren Pillay (Eds.)**, *Peace Versus Justice. The Dilemma of Transnational Justice in Africa*, Cape Town (373 pp.). On the relationship between **religion and development policy**, there is a multi-layered reader by **Jürgen Wilhelm and Hartmut Ihne** (eds.), *Religion und globale Entwicklung (Religion and global development)*, Berlin 2009 (362 pp.).

- On the subject of **Islam and Africa**, **Johannes Harnischfeger**, *Demokratisierung und islamisches Recht. Der Scharia-Konflikt in Nigeria (Democratization and Islamic Law. The Sharia Conflict in Nigeria)*, Frankfurt & New York: 2006 (280 p.) as well as various studies by **Ali A. Mazrui, Roman Loimeier and** Reinhard **Schulze.** More generally on **Islam**, see **Irene Schneider**, *Der Islam und die Frauen (Islam and women)*, Munich 2011 (288 pp.) and **Mathias Rohe**, *Der Islam in Deutschland. Eine Bestandsaufnahme (Islam in Germany. A stocktaking)*, Munich 2016 (416 p.).

- The diversity of **cultural aspects** and their reception in the cultural and social sciences is offered in the reader by **Ray Richard Grinker, Stephan C. Lubkeman & Chistopher Steiner** *African: Perspectives. A Reader in Culture, History and Representation*, Chichester/Sussex and Malden USA 2010, 2nd ed. (671 S.).

- The **philosopher Paulin Jidenu Hountondji** from Côte d'Ivoire wrote *African Philosophy. Myth and Reality (Afrikanische Philosophie. Mythos und Realität)*, Berlin 1993 (240 pp.). Equally worth reading is *African Religions and Philosophy* by **John Mbiti,** Kenyan professor of religious studies, Oxford 1990, 2nd ed. (288 S.). Among the pioneers of postcolonialism is the political philosopher **Achille Mbembe** from Cameroon: *Kritik der schwarzen Vernunft (Critique of Black Reason)*, Frankfurt 2014 (331 pp.).

- **Ethnology**, as a centrally important science for understanding African **societies** and **cultures**, has differentiated itself from a colonial science to a social science committed to understanding foreign cultures with various sub-disciplines: **Frank Heidemann**, *Ethnologie. Eine Einführung (Ethnology. An Introduction)*. UTB basics. Göttingen 2011 (284 pp.); **Bettina Beer, Hans Fischer & Julia Pauli (eds.)** (2017), *Ethnologie. Einführung in die Erforschung kultureller*

Vielfalt (Ethnology. Introduction to the study of cultural diversity). 9th ed. Berlin (484 pp.); **Dorothea E. Schulz & Jochen Seebode (eds.)** (2010). *Spiegel und Prisma. Ethnologie zwischen postkolonialer Kritik und Deutung der eigenen Gesellschaft. Festschrift für Ute Luig (Mirror and prism. Ethnology between postcolonial critique and interpretation of its own society. Festschrift for Ute Luig)*, Hamburg (382 p.).

- **Ethnicity and ethnic conflict** is discussed in: **Andreas Wimmer et al (eds)**, *Facing Ethnic Conflicts*, Lanham 2004 (384 pp). Armed conflict in Africa is the central theme of the 2017 reader *Africa's Insurgents. Navigating an Evolving Landscape*, edited by **Morten Boás** & **Kevin C. Dunn**, Boulder & London (285 p.).

- On the subject of **women and wars,** the ethnologist **Rita Schäfer** offers extensive material in her masterpiece Women and wars in Africa. A contribution to gender research (*Frauen und Kriege in Afrika. Ein Beitrag zur Genderforschung)*, Frankfurt am Main 2008, 520 pages of extensive material. On the **gender topic** in general, see the new publications *Under Development: Gender* by **Verschuur, Guérin & Buétat-Bernard, Houndsmill** 2014 as well as **Ali A. Mazrui & Francis Wiafe-Amoako:** *African Institutions*, Lanham etc. 2016 (181 pp.).

- The topic of **violence, war and peace**—presented from the perspective of German **peace and conflict research**—is dealt with in: *The Future of Peace. A review of peace and conflict research (Die Zukunft des Friedens. Eine Bilanz der Friedens- und Konfliktforschung)*, ed. by **Astrid Sahm, Manfred Sapper & Volker Weichsel**, Wiesbaden 2006, 2nd ed. (434 S.).

- The close connection between **development and law** is addressed by economists **Robert D. Cooter & Hans-Bernd Schäfer** in: *Solomon's Knot. How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations*. Princeton & Oxford (325 p.). Among other things, they analyze the costs of bribery and **corruption** as well as the importance of **trust** between *innovators* and *investors*. On **legal pluralism** in Africa, see: **Oliver C. Ruppel & Gerd Winter**, *Law from Within: Legal Pluralism in Africa and Elsewhere*, Hamburg 2011 (636 p.).

- From a **geographical** point of view, **Fred Scholz** has presented an up-to-date inventory of issues relevant to development policy on *Countries of the South. Fragmenting Development and Globalization (Länder des Südens. Fragmentierende Entwicklung und Globalisierung)*. Braunschweig 2017, (192 p.); see also **Theo Rauch**, *Afrika im Prozess der Globalisierung (Africa in the process of globalization)*, Diercke Spezial, Braunschweig 2012 (127 p.).

- **Poverty and overcoming poverty** is the focus of the study by the English Oxford professor of social sciences **Paul Collier**—also the author of the

bestseller *The Bottom Billion* (2008)—*Wars, Guns & Votes. Democracy in Dangerous Places*, London 2009 (255 p.).

- The **classic work** by **Franz Nuscheler** *Development policy. Learning and workbook (Entwicklungspolitik. Lern- und Arbeitsbuch)*, which was published in 2012 in its 7th edition (429 p.). It is complemented by the reader by **Reinhard Stockmann, Ulrich Menzel & Franz Nuscheler** *Entwicklungspolitik. Theorien—Probleme—Strategien (Development Policy. Theories—Problems—Strategies)*, Munich 2016, 2nd edition is recommended. In the first part, political scientist *Menzel* gives an overview of development theories in terms of the history of ideas; this is followed by a critical essay by *Nuscheler* on "world problems". Finally, sociologist *Stockmann* brings the effectiveness of international development cooperation into the focus of the analysis (528 p.).
- Students will find basics, central fields of action, instruments, experiences, and problems of **development policy** in the *Introduction to Development Policy (Einführung in die Entwicklungspolitik)*, edited by **Hartmut Ihne & Jürgen Wilhelm**, Münster 2006. The reader contains 27 contributions by scholars from different disciplines and by experts in development practice (412 p.). Also useful is the textbook *Development Policy. Volume I: Fundamentals (Entwicklungspolitik. Band I: Grundlagen)* by **Werner Lachmann**, Professor of Economics, 2nd ed., Munich and Vienna 2004 (301 pp.).
- The reader *Effective development policy. Findings, Reforms, Instruments (Wirksame Entwicklungspolitik*. *Befunde, Reformen, Instrumente)*, ed. by **Jörg Faust & Susanne Neubert**, Baden-Baden 2010. Volume 8 of the series Development Theory and Development Policy. Insights into the contradictory **practice of development policy** are offered by the reader "*Development as a profession. Festschrift for Peter Molt (Entwicklung als Beruf. Festschrift für Peter Molt)*", 2009 edited by **Theodor Hanf, Hans Weiler & Helga Dickow** from the Arnold Bergstraesser Institute Freiburg. It contains 48 contributions on development policy, by scholars as well as practitioners and policy makers (541 pp). Critical of the theory and practice of **development policy** is the multifaceted reader *The Challenge of Africa. Society and Space in Transition (Herausforderung Afrika. Gesellschaft und Raum im Wandel)*, edited by the geography professor **Johannes Michael Nebe**, Baden-Baden. Here 33 experts have their say (432 p.).
- For those seeking a deeper insight into the **classics of development theory**, *Classics of development theory. From Modernization to Post-Development (Klassiker der Entwicklungstheorie. Von Modernisierung bis Post-Development)* (Vienna 2008, 300 pages), ed. by the Austrian historians **Karin Fischer, Gerald Hödl & Wiebke Sievers** opens up an interesting field. Complementary

to this is *Entwicklung und Unterentwicklung. Eine Einführung in Probleme, Theorien und Strategien (Development and Underdevelopment. An introduction to problems, theories and strategies*, Vienna 2007, ed. by **Karin Fischer, Gerald Hödl, Irmi Maral-Hanak & Christof Parnreiter** (276 pp.).

- In addition to the relevant publications of the World Bank and the IMF (all accessible on the Internet), the almanacs published annually in September by Fischer Verlag are also useful as **statistical aids**: **Der neue Fischer Weltalmanach**. Figures, Data, Facts. The latest volume—The New World Almanac 2017—contains 735 pages and is also available in digital form.
- **African narrative and novel literature** can be seen as a particularly fruitful entry point into understanding Africa. See **A. Seiler-Dietrich**, *Afrika interpretieren. 50 Jahre Unabhängigkeit. 50 Jahre Literatur*, (*Interpreting Africa. 50 years of independence. 50 years of literature*, Heidelberg 2007 as well as **James Currey**, *Africa Writes Back. The African Writers Series & the Launch of African Literature*, Oxford 2008.
- **'African journalists'** have also published valuable reports on African events, most notably Andrea Böhm, Hans Dembowski, Johannes Dieterich, Markus Haefliger, Christiane Grefe, Bartholomäus Grill, Christian Jakob, Dominic Johnson, Ryszard Kapuscinski, Arne Perras, Keith B. Richburg, Thomas Scheen, Ute Schaeffer, Michaela Schießl, Simone Schlindwein, Thilo Thielke, Renate Wilke-Launer, Michela Wrong.

As far as **journals and series** relevant to Africa are concerned, the following may be mentioned:

- **African Affairs**. The Journal of the Royal African Society. Published by Oxford University Press, four times a year.
- **Africa Review**. Journal of African Studies Association of India, New Delhi, www.tandfonline.com/loi/rafr20
- **Africa Confidential**, based in London. Every month for 57 years, it has published a 12-page compilation of current events in African countries.
- **Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (Sheets for German and International Politics)**, Berlin
- The **Canadian Journal of African Studies/**Revue canadienne des études africaines
- **D + C**. Development and Cooperation, Bonn (euz.editor@fs-medien.de). The journal will be published in its 59th year in 2018 and is funded by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development.

- **The Journal of Modern African Studies**, published by Cambridge University Press in England for 54 years. The monthly magazine is regarded as a serious, highly qualified academic journal on Africa in history and the present.
- **KFW Development Research**. In the 'Meinungsforum' series, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation) in Wiesbaden publishes personal statements by renowned development researchers on current development policy issues in a loose sequence. Frequent authors: Stefan Mair, Denis Tull, Annette Weber.
- **Newsletter of African Studies at the University of Bayreuth (NAB)**. The journal is now in its 16th year and informs about teaching and research at the University of Bayreuth. At **BIGSAS** (Bayreuth International Graduate School of African Studies), 172 doctoral students and alumni from 37 countries have already been trained as of 2015, 55% of them from African countries.
- **Periphery. Journal of Politics and Economics in the Third World (Peripherie. Zeitschrift für Politik und Ökonomie in der Dritten Welt**), published by the Scientific Association for Development Theory and Policy e.V. (Wissenschaftliche Vereinigung für Entwicklungstheorie und Entwicklungspolitik e. V.), Münster.
- **Guide to History**, published by the Military History Research Office. It is a publication of the Center for Military History and Social Sciences of the German Armed Forces, published by Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh, Paderborn, etc.
- **Welthungerhilfe:** Annual reports; The magazine; also: World Hunger Index (annual). Bonn
- **WorldTrends.** Journal for International Politics. Potsdam
- **Journal for Peace and Conflict Research (Zeitschrift für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, ZeFKo**), edited on behalf of the Board of the Working Group for Peace and Conflict Research (Arbeitsgemeinschaft für Friedens- und Konfliktforschung (AFK)). Marburg

Developmental Theories at a Glance

<div align="right">**2**</div>

2.1 Introduction to the History of the Concept of Development

Development, like *progress* or *happiness*, is an ambiguous concept whose content can only be determined contextually by the viewpoint of the observer, his cultural socialisation, or his specific experiences. It was not until the eighteenth century that the term 'development' was condensed into the notion of a process of *self-awareness* of a European age that seemed to be designed for progress. The Christian conception of salvation history was now secularized, and the *modernization of enlightened* society by technological-scientific innovation was claimed as the goal. In the broadest sense of the word, it still conveys in many minds today the idea of a change of state towards a *somehow better* life. It is used as a *culture-dependent* construct, associated with the hope of actualizing the potential of an individual, a group of people, or a nation. Nevertheless, there have been political convergences since 1945, reflected in the near-universal acceptance by the governments of the United Nations of the Declaration of Universal Human Rights of December 10, 1948. In October 1986, the UN General Assembly even codified a *right to development* as a human right (Nuscheler 1996; Tetzlaff 2008) in response to the demand for more development aid and better world trade conditions on the part of numerous Third World states.

Whether there are *universals of development*—as claimed, for example, by US social scientists, which would therefore be valid for all modernizing societies in the world—was and is scientifically disputed and is today rather rejected by the majority of development theorists who have become skeptical. *Talcott Parsons* (1902–1979), who wrote his doctoral thesis on the concept of capitalism in Marx, Weber and Sombart, replaced the *evolutionism* of the 1920s and 1930s (according to

which all living systems strive towards a linear higher development) with *structural-functionalism* and thus established a way of thinking in terms of *functions* rather than substances. He understood *development* as the growing adaptability of a social system to its environment, its active transformation, and not its passive toleration. The difference between *traditional* and *modern* societies lies in the different degrees of differentiation of social roles and the different adaptive capacities for mastering the world. This would result in universally necessary adaptations or inventions such as legal, market, monetary, religious, and educational systems.

Modernization, which first occurred in Western Europe in the seventeenth century as a *process of transformation* over centuries (Bayly 2004; Mitterauer 2004), has retained its global attraction to this day (Tetzlaff 2011). The scientific-technical civilization of the West—mediated by colonialism and imperialism—has unfolded a "singular dynamic of expansion" (Lübbe), the result of which is globalization. In the meantime, the institutions and values transported by it into the world have been taken up by modernizing societies and partly developed further self-reliant "in the meantime to a large extent unaffiliated to migration" and "mission-independent": "The global spreading success of the scientific-technical civilization owes itself to the evidence of the advantages for life connected with it" (Lübbe 2005, pp. 68–69). The overwhelming majority of people on this globe would probably not withhold their agreement with the following six assertions (after Harrison 2002, p. 25), excluding some radicalized religious groups such as the *Wahhabists* life is better than death; health is better than a disease; freedom is better than servitude; prosperity is better than poverty; education is better than ignorance; justice is better than injustice. From this, a *normative* concept of development can be derived: Development occurs when, *first, violence* between people, groups, and the respective social system decreases; *second*, socio-economic *justice* between them increases; and *third*, when men and women can thereby optimize their *choices* for a self-determined life. The only question is whether the economic and social model that first produced these universally coveted life advantages is also transferable to other cultural and historical contexts under changed international conditions. In the face of a world society that continues to grow in social inequality, in which nearly one billion people in the southern hemisphere still have to live in absolute poverty, while a tiny minority of the rich in industrialized countries and more successfully developing countries are becoming ever richer, there are justified doubts about the hope of a universally valid life in dignity for all as a result of *development* (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996; Behrens 2005). Sociologists *Dietmar Dirmoser* and *Reimer Gronemeyer* have defamed 'development' as a dangerous

myth, as "a collective act of aggression and collective delusion to which people and cultures fall victim by hecatombs" (Dirmoser et al. 1991, p. 11). And the Swiss UN Special Envoy *Jean Ziegler* even speaks of a "cannibalistic world order" that allows 40,000 children to starve to death every day (Ziegler 2005).

The following is a brief outline of the chequered history of development theories,[1] which is intended to provide an insight into the changing experiences and findings of social and economic scientists into *motors of change* (Bayly 2004, p. 473) and the goals, successes, and failures of development strategies. For this purpose, it is useful to acquire the guiding concepts, theses, and fallacies of the classics of development theory; for such insights can be used in dialogue with others to give clarity and authority to one's ideas (Fischer et al. 2008). A guiding concept that recurs in various development discourses is the dazzling notion of *modernity*. If one follows *Jürgen Habermas'* definition, the project of modernity includes four components: *First*, individualism as the comprehensive development of all individual particular idiosyncrasies; *second*, the right of critique, that is no one should acknowledge anything that he does not regard as justified; *third*, the autonomy of action, and *fourth*, idealist (constructivist) philosophy itself (Habermas 1988).

Theories—also developmental theories—are mental constructs about a real object of the world, which *ideally* have or can have four functions: *First*, they are supposed to name observable phenomena and select those of them that are 'relevant'; *second*, they are supposed (if possible) to show *causal* connections and to order and interpret phenomena; *third,* such interpretations (explanations) are also supposed to give clues to political action. *Fourth,* theories (in the sense of ideologies) are often constructed and used or misused to legitimize interest-driven political action. According to recent understandings of theory in political science, theories are no longer closed systems of thought, but open *contextual discourses* or

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[1]As a supplement, it is recommended to read Entwicklungspolitik, ed. by R. Stockmann/U. Menzel/F. Nuschheler, Munich 2010, 528 pages. Furthermore, the most important publications on this topic include F. Müller, E. Sondermann, I. Wehr, C. Jakobeit and A. Ziai. PVS Special Issue *48 "Development Theories" of* 2014. See also: W. Lachmann (2004); A. Szirmai (2005); U. Engel, C. Jakobeit, A. Mehler and G. Schubert (2005); D. H. Perkins, S. Radelet and D. L. Lindauer (2006); K. Fischer et al. (2008); J. Goldberg (2008); P. Meyns (2009); J. Faust and S. Neubert 2010; D. Acemoglu and J. A. Robinson (2012); F. Nuscheler (2012); Y. Tandon 2014; and F. Fukuyama (2015). Among the somewhat older works that are nonetheless worth reading are U. Menzel (1992); D. Nohlen and F. Nuscheler (1993); W. Sachs (1993); E. Altvater & and B. Mahnkopf (1996); M. Schulz (1997); K. Zapotoczky and P. C. Gruber (1997); W. Hein 1998; R. E. Thiel (1999); D. Landes (1999); U. Menzel (1995, A bibliography on the history of development theory); D. Senghaas (1972, 1974, 1979).

maps centered on a central *paradigm*. *Thomas Kuhn*, in his widely acclaimed study *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, showed that scientific progress would consist of replacing a paradigm that was less and less able to explain new or newly perceived facts with a new paradigm that could account for those facts more satisfactorily. "To be accepted as a paradigm, a theory must appear better than those in competition with it, but it need not—and never does—explain all the facts with which it is confronted" (Kuhn 1967, p. 37). In this respect, theories cannot "fail", but can only be relativized, superseded, or replaced in their explanatory power. It should be kept in mind that *theories* are often used synonymously with *paradigms* or *theoretical approaches* or *theoretical concepts* and thus cannot claim to be valid for all observed phenomena of an object beyond time and space.

In the nineteenth century, two great researchers shaped the discourse on evolution, with consequences that continue to the present day: one was the English naturalist *Charles Darwin (1809–1882)*. With his writing The *Origin of Species,* he was able to show how the adaptation of living beings to their habitat takes place through variation and natural selection, whereby their genes mutate. Suitable changes often prevail and lead to new forms of life, while less adapted creatures perish in the competitive struggle. The other was the German philosopher of history, economist, and social theorist *Karl Marx* (1818–1883). Influenced by *Hegel's teleological* philosophy of history, he outlined an *evolutionary* theory of history according to which humanity would progress from one stage of society to the next higher revolutionary one through social class struggles. Whenever the relations of production of a historical epoch (in the sequence: primitive society, ancient slave-holding society, feudalism, capitalism, socialism, communism) had fully developed the productive forces appropriate to it, a new, more humane epoch would be born through the unavoidable contradictions between obsolete property relations and advancing productive forces. Material existence—the relations of production—determined human consciousness, the ideal superstructure of society that is its culture. And the underdeveloped, colonized peoples would follow the example of the developed ones, as Marx proclaimed in the famous (albeit inaccurate) thesis: "The industrially developed country only shows the underdeveloped one the image of its future", because the capitalist mode of production with the dominant profit motive would prevail everywhere in the world, sweeping away all cultural obstacles (for more on this see Menzel 2010, p. 56 f.).

This positively *teleological view of history* initially found its continuation after the Second World War in the free-market theories of a gradually developing economic growth as well as the modernisation of underdeveloped *Third World* societies formerly oppressed by colonial rule. Against the historical background of the intensifying global East-West conflict, both the 'First World', led by the

capitalist USA and the 'Second World', led by the socialist-communist Soviet Union, endeavoured to draw the young states of Africa and Asia onto their side. *Official Development Assistance (ODA)* or 'development aid', that is financial loans, personnel aid (secondment of experts), and technical aid (transfer of know-how), appeared to both sides as a suitable means for this. A great deal of propaganda and ideological effort was expended to justify the respective development assistance policies. The initial hopes that development aid from the industrialised countries would soon make itself superfluous because poverty in the *Less Developed Countries* (what a terminological misjudgement on the part of the UN authorities!) would have been overcome and externally induced economic growth would have led to successes similar to those in the metropolises, soon turned out to be an illusion. The optimism of the early decades was followed by deep development pessimism, especially in the academic milieu; the 1980s were spoken of as a 'lost development decade' (in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia) because modernisation strategies had largely failed in practice. Africa was stylized as a 'lost continent' (Ferdowsi 2008).

However, the *development norms* which had grown up historically in the West have partially retained a certain appeal for former colonies (Landes 1999; Szirmai 2005; Lübbe 2005; Tetzlaff 2011; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). In the concept of the emerging *world society* (Sander and Scheunpflug 2011; Hein 1998) this experience has found its scholarly expression. It is intended to express the new *interdependence consciousness*, which is based on the insight that the world will only be able to survive as a *global risk community*, given the limited natural resources and ecological catastrophes, through *global politics* (Kaiser and Peter Schwarz 2000; Stiftung Entwicklung und Frieden 2006). To be able to shape globalization politically, *Inge Kaul*, the co-founder of the *Human Development Index* (HDI), has called for the creation of ten *global public goods,* including *universal access to basic education and health care*; *respect for national sovereignty; concerted management of the global natural commons to promote their sustainable use* (Kaul et al. 2003, p. 44). Here the dream of a *responsible-ethical world government* comes to the fore. However, the ruthless growth fetish still triumphs, and the gap between globalization winners and globalization losers is by no means narrowing everywhere.

Political scientist *Franz Nuscheler* defined the task of *development theory* as "to trace the secrets of (development policy) success stories" and in doing so to reflect "on the function of culture, of traditions, values, attitudes, and behaviour in the process of modernisation" (Nuscheler 2001, p. 392). Thus, in the course of the past 60 years, some two dozen 'theories', 'theorems', 'paradigms' or 'models' of development have been presented and discussed, some of which will be discussed

in more detail below because they may be of particular relevance to the analysis of African societies.

2.2   Theories of Economic Growth and Modernization

In the 1950s and 1960s, the debate on development theory (in the West) was dominated by theories of *economic growth* and *social modernisation* (see Lachmann 2004, pp. 57–194 for a detailed discussion). Starting from the USA as the new Western leading power, development was understood as *catching-up* economic growth, which was to be given a jump-start in developing countries through an influx of capital from abroad; for the central difference between the First and the Third World was the *capital gap*. Unspokenly, this optimistic (and ahistorical) world explanation scenario was based on the idea that the developing countries were only *lagging behind* (for internal reasons) and would only *catch up* economically with the help of the financially strong industrialized countries: from the level of the *traditional subsistence economy* through the *take-off phase (*incipient industrialization) to the preliminary final stage of *mass consumption* (following the US model). In the process, the World Bank, IMF, and UN authorities were to create the *infrastructural* conditions so that the new states could be integrated as smoothly as possible into the existing capitalist world economy. Economic growth generated in this way, initially in the modern sectors (where foreign capital dominated in the form of the multinationals and banks), and through which profits and income could be generated, would—so the naive assumption—'*trickle-down*' overtime to the poorer sections of the population (called the *trickle-down theorem*).

The problematic questions that the pioneer development economists argued about (Cassen 1990) were: How can the acceleration of economic growth in 'lagging behind' countries be achieved—through the market, through development plans, or cyclical government intervention in the sense of the *deficit spending theorem* (after *John Maynard Keynes*)? The most popular contribution to growth theory was made in 1960 by *Walt Whitman Rostow* (1916–2003) with his Five *Stages of Economic Growth* (reprinted in Fischer et al. 2008, pp. 39–52). He was not only an economic theorist but in his capacity, as a high-ranking member of the administrations of US Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, he was also able to exert a decisive influence on US development policy in the 1960s. His *stage theory* (outlined above) was highly influential because of its simplicity, although it did not envisage any practical measures whereby society could move from one stage of growth to the next. Only the ultimate goal was certain: convergence with the US

model of *mass consumption* and the *welfare state*. In deliberate antithesis to Marx, the subtitle of his book was "A Non-Communist Manifesto".

In parallel with such stage theories of economic growth, which were translated into practical projects mainly by the World Bank, political science theories of political change emerged in the USA. *Gabriel A. Almond* and *Lucian W. Pye* formulated a category system of political development that defined political change as a crisis-like process of gaining *capacities.* These included integration capacity, modernization capacity, participation capacity, welfare capacity, distribution capacity, and (according to systems theorist *Karl W. Deutsch*) international adaptive and self-regulatory capacity. The differences between political systems could be understood as differences in their capacities to cope with developing crises through structural differentiation and the creation of new institutions. In the controversy over *neoliberal* versus *state-interventionist* development strategies, the search for the best way to accelerate structural change continues to this day (Szirmai 2005). This is always about the optimal role of the *state* in the development process and the causes of state failure and market failure, both of which are possible (Brown 1995; Easterly 2006; Goldberg 2008; Tandon 2014).

In Germany, the *Bertelsmann Transformation Index* has proven to be a sophisticated analytical tool. The normative model is the synthesis of representative democracy with a market economy flanked by social policy, based on the assumption that both systemic elements are mutually dependent. Using 17 criteria and 52 indicators, a *status index*, which measures the current state of democracy and market economy, and a *management index*, which assesses the quality of government and management performance in moving towards the guiding principle, are compiled, so far for 125 developing countries. (A synopsis of all country developments is published every 2 years as the *Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)*—an important source of guidance on how individual world regions and countries are developing).

2.3   Dependency Theories and Theory of Auto-Centered Development

When, during the 1970s, development successes in the former colonies largely failed to materialise, *dependency theories* and *world society theories* by left-wing authors (Samir Amin, Armando Cordova, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Immanuel Wallerstein, Dieter Senghaas) came into fashion. These shared the view that "development" of Third World countries was not possible as long as *structural dependency* and *economic exploitation* via *unequal exchange* in foreign trade

remained within the framework of the capitalist world market order. Authors of this school could refer to the classical theories of imperialism by *Hobson, Lenin, and Rosa Luxemburg*, who thought they had proved that the European states could only survive for a while via forced export of capital to the colonies, without being able to induce progress and freedom there. Dependency theorists were certain that poverty and underdevelopment could only be overcome by *decoupling* the former colonies (the *peripheries* of the capitalist world system) from the metropolises; for the ex-colonies, which were *only* integrated into the world economy via raw material exports, would remain continuously exploited as a result of unequal trade structures (Senghaas 1972, 1974; Lachmann 2004, p. 65 f. and p. 230 f.).

One of the most influential theorists of the dependency school and opponents of modernisation theory was the development economist *André Gunder Frank* (1929–2005). He argued that development in the centres and underdevelopment in the peripheries were both products of the same historical process of capitalist development, the *world society* thus forming. Therefore, *modernization of the peripheries* by means of trade with the industrialized nations could only mean the *development of underdevelopment*—so his famous thesis (Frank 2008). This was contradicted by a Latin American representative of the *dependency school*, namely *Fernando Henrique Cardoso* (born 1935), who argued that the centre-nation-periphery-nation relationship would not be the main conflict of the capitalist world system; because this simplistic worldview would ignore the *internal* conflicts in the dependent countries (between the *parasitic* bourgeoisie and *marginalized* masses) and their internal social dynamics. "It ignores the internal division of these countries and the attraction that [modern] development exerts on different social strata, not only on the *upper class* ... One must learn to understand that in certain situations development and dependence occur simultaneously" (Cardoso 1974, pp. 218–219). This provided the appropriate keyword for the future: *dependent development*, or *development despite structural dependence* on industrial-scientific-technological centers (Cardoso 1974, p. 219).

The *Prebisch-Singer thesis* of falling *terms of trade*, that is deteriorating exchange relations in terms of the level of prices for imports and exports of developing countries over a certain period, also became prominent. The economists *Raúl Prebisch* and *Hans Singer* were able to demonstrate that developing countries would be trapped in their *enclave economy*; for the monetary value they obtained for their exports (of raw materials) would fall over time, so that they would have to pay more and more of their goods (raw materials) or foreign exchange for the same imported product (industrially manufactured goods). Trade could thus no longer be seen as an *engine of growth*, which led to *export pessimism* among dependency theorists (Szirmai 2005, p. 283); for a permanent *transfer of value* from the

periphery countries to the metropolises would block the industrialization of the peripheries. Underdevelopment was not understood as a *transitory stage* on the way to successful modernization (as claimed by modernization theorists) but as a structural result of *exogenously* caused deficits. They underestimated—as we see more clearly today—the importance of *endogenous* factors in the analysis of underdevelopment and underdevelopment processes, as well as the opportunities that world trade, despite an unfavourable starting position, would offer to societies willing to modernise. Indeed, the categorical imperative of dependency theory 'No development without *dissociation* from the world market' (on which see Senghaas 1974) was to prove a *developmental dead end* (Hein 1998; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2015). By *dissociation* was meant the (temporary) disconnection of a country from external trading conditions, as the economic historian *Friedrich List* (1789–1846) had justified it in his theory of 'productive forces' (with 'educational tariffs' for *infant industries* to make them internationally competitive; List 1961, Lachmann 2004, p. 67 f.).

In the 1970s, the camp of authors on dependency theory and imperialism theory split into several separate strands of discussion, in which often only individual aspects—*social marginalisation* of the periphery countries, unjust world market structures, price developments on the world market, indebtedness of Third World countries, the work of multinational corporations (and their intra-corporate transfer prices), etc.—were pursued. Some attention was paid to the *theory of auto-centred development* by the Egyptian *Samir Amin*, not least because of the vividness of his theory, which saw itself as a Marxist counter-model to Western theories of modernisation. Briefly outlined, it involved the following interpretation of *North-South relations* shaped by colonialism and imperialism. His model distinguishes between *four economic sectors*: the export sector, the mass consumer goods sector, the luxury consumer goods sector, and the capital goods sector. In the *peripheral* societies, capitalism would have entered only in a crippled form—so his thesis. Only in the metropolises was it possible for an *auto-centred* (self-directed) structure of reproduction to develop; for their decisive link was that between sector 2 (production of mass consumer goods) and sector 4 (production of capital goods). In contrast, the basic linkage in the *peripheral dependent* model had been that between sector 1 (export of commodities) and sector 3 (production of consumer goods for higher-income groups at home). Thus, a competitive domestic market could not develop in the dependent Third World countries. In social terms, the *periphery-dependent model* of social reproduction produced the *marginalization of* the masses. *Amin, like Senghaas,* therefore advocated a policy of generating *mass purchasing power to satisfy mass needs* through the local production of mass

consumer goods—a strategy also favoured by the political scientist *Hartmut* Elsenhans (1981).

The dissociation theory was also followed by the *world system theory* of the US sociologist *Immanuel Wallerstein* (born 1930 in New York), who divided the "*One World*" (he rejected the term Third World) into three types of countries, whose rank would be determined by their *position in the international division of labour*. First, there are the *centres*, characterised by a strong state, a high technical and scientific level, and a relatively high standard of living for its population; secondly, they are contrasted by the *peripheries*, which mainly produce and export raw materials at a low technical level and are held together in a makeshift manner by a fragile weak state; and thirdly, the *semi-peripheries, which* functionally stand between centres and peripheries, occupy a mediating position. *Semi-peripheries* (such as pre-industrial Portugal or Tsarist Russia) historically played an important role as *stabilizing* intermediaries of a dynamic world system, because they exploited the peripheral countries to the best of their ability and were themselves exploited and instrumentalized by the centers. In contrast to earlier world empires, the modern *world system* is no longer dependent on a centre of power (a hegemon) but is shaped by the logic of capitalist market relations and the dynamics of international trade (Wallerstein 1974).

Wallerstein's *structural-functionalist* theory has been criticized by historians as too apodictic and under-complex, for there might very well have been *autonomous* social spaces in the peripheries and semi-peripheries that were not determined by the existence of an exploitative imperialist system. Wallerstein's fixation on trade flows and the tendencies of self-reinforcement of international power imbalances through world trade was further criticized, neglecting counter-tendencies against the simple reproduction of centre-periphery imbalances (Hein 1998, p. 190 f.). The empirical diversity of the past decades has shown how former peripheries (South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Brasil) can become flourishing trading centres of the globalised world. It remains to be said, however, that Wallerstein's worldview has opened our eyes to the functional interrelationships of the "modern world system" (Hauck 2014, pp. 376–377).

The Berlin geographer *Fred Scholz* has enriched the world system discussion with his "*theory of fragmenting development*". The world, penetrated by *global players,* has fragmented the continents across national borders into zones of different capital penetration: into *global places* as the command centres of the world economy, into *globalized places,* subdivided into '*affected global cities and regions,* and into *"the new periphery", the "new South" as an "ocean of poverty"* (Scholz 2005, p. 5). *Scholz* came to the radically pessimistic conclusion: "Not catching-up but fragmenting development is taking place in times of globalization

(in the North as well as in the South) ... These processes are reflected in the simultaneity and spatial coexistence of inclusive and exclusive processes" (Scholz 2017, p. 33). Thus, the number of the "superfluous" would increase in all regions of the earth: the number of people who would not be needed by global finance capital (Scholz 2017, p. 38; Stiglitz 2002).

2.4   Socialist Theories of Catch-Up Development

In the first two decades of post-colonial development, "socialism was a fixture as a political ideology, social model and development strategy in Africa" (Meyns 2001, p. 566). Under Moscow's guidance, advocates of socialism—in response to the West's two grand theories (modernization and dependency)—had produced the theory of *non-capitalist development* as a precursor to socialist development. From this perspective, the 'backward held' countries of the Third World were to be liberated from their predicament by means of development models of *central state planning*. Governments in developing countries were encouraged or persuaded to set up state farms and state-run factories. The bureaucratic state as controller of the means of production was heroized as a catalyst for structural change. Great emphasis was placed on the training of skilled personnel; private sector initiatives were not encouraged; traditional African institutions were considered backward. Since real class relations in most developing countries made the emergence of a revolutionary subject for liberation by its efforts seem impossible—which, according to Marxian theory, would have to be the role of the industrial proletariat, but which was only rudimentary—the 'international solidarity aid' of brother socialist countries was constructed as a necessary element to fill this historical gap. For some leaders of national liberation movements, the *Soviet Union* appeared to be a model for development policy, since, after the October Revolution of 1917, backward Russia had succeeded in a relatively short time in implementing land reform and growing into an industrial state that had brought its population modest prosperity (after the "great purges" of the 1930s, in which millions of kulaks (large farmers) and alleged opponents of the regime had been killed).

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union, which led to the disillusionment of socialists almost everywhere in the world, there was a widespread belief in Africa that the struggle against colonialism was also a struggle against exploitative capitalism or neo-colonialism. *Kwame Nkrumah*, Ghana's first president, spoke of "neo-colonialism" as the last stage of imperialism (Nkrumah 1965; see also Houtondji 1993, p. 149 f.). Today it can be said that this path of a *socialist* development

alternative has also proved to be a dead end: Cuba and North Korea as well as Ethiopia, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, or Guinea-Bissau, which followed this path (mostly only for a few years), have hardly any economic successes to show. The planning of economic and social development under conditions of repression and bureaucratic arbitrariness, which was not subject to any institutional control of power, proved to be a dangerous utopia—dangerous because it was bound to lead to an *alienation* between political leadership and the disconnected population that would hinder development. The example of *Julius Nyerere*, who attempted a path of 'African socialism' in Tanzania, will be used to show this dilemma (see Sect. 7.2).

2.5 Bielefeld Interdependence Approach and *Gender-Studies*

In the 1980s, the 'Bielefeld interdependence approach' added the dimension of the subsistence economy to the discussion on development theory. Authors around the development sociologist *Hans-Dieter Evers*, who was able to establish a focus of research on developing countries at the University of Bielefeld, criticised that conventional growth and modernisation theories 'forgot' a large economic sector, namely the *informal economic sector*. This refers to the area of reproduction of a society that is not directly subject to the capitalist relationship of capital and wage labour, but is nevertheless existentially important for the majority of people in many developing countries. "The struggle for the preservation of existence, for the reproduction of human labour power, thereby appeared as a fundamental process of social development or underdevelopment in general" (Evers 1987). Through field research by the Bielefelders, the hitherto predominant bird's-eye view of Third World research was usefully supplemented by a *frog's-eye view* (Hanisch and Tetzlaff 1981; Hennings 2009, p. 252).

Production for the survival of kinship groups or small families includes a variety of activities in all sectors and their combination with each other. The *informal sector* includes: Housewife labour; agrarian subsistence farming; domestic and farm labour; crafts run as family enterprises; unpaid women's and child-rearing labour; the labour of migrant workers and migrants. The notion of the *interweaving* of forms of production was intended to express the recognition that the expectation of an evolutionary transition from a subsistence economy to a market economy in the process of modernization was unrealistic. Rather, with the mixture and interweaving of different forms of production within the framework of the capitalist mode of production, *permanent* forms of reproduction would certainly emerge. *Wage labour*

could also be included in this mix of interdependencies, whereby minimally remunerated wage labour would have a different quality in the peripheral societies than in the metropolises, where wage labour would be linked to minimum social standards and protective rights fought for by trade unions.

This approach has helped to see development as a whole-society process of reproduction and to produce complex household analyses. For the first time, *feminist* positions were also systematically introduced into the development discourse. With their studies on the importance of subsistence economic activities of women's groups in marginal economic sectors, researchers such as *Veronika Bennholt-Thomsen, Maria Mies, Gudrun Lachenmann,* and *Vandana Shiva* broadened the discourse horizon (for more on this, see Ziai 2014). A pioneer of feminist development research and practice was the Danish *Esther Boserup* (1910–1999), who in her book *The Economic Role of Women in Africa, Asia, Latin America* showed, among other things, how the introduction of machines caused working peasant women to suffer a loss of social status: 'Usually the men learn to use the new machines, while the women continue to use the hand-operated implements' (cited in: Fischer et al. 2008, p. 112).

Since then, *feminist development theory* has undergone significant development and differentiation. In 1975, the United Nations proclaimed the *UN Women's Year* intending to seek "to ensure the full integration of women in the overall development effort with recognition of their responsibility and significant role in economic, social and cultural development". Demands of the global women's movement were taken up, as first put forward at the UN World Conference on Women in Mexico (1975) and later in Copenhagen (1980), Nairobi (1985), and Beijing (1995). A milestone in *gender-related* norm-building was the *Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women* (CEDAW of 1981), which led to the *Gender and Development (GAD) approach.* From the mid-1990s onwards, *gender mainstreaming* was regarded as a strategy of international and European gender equality policy, the central aim of which was to reflect gender differentiations at all levels of action and to implement gender justice (Zdunnek 1997; Burchardt and Tuider 2014, p. 382). Given a situation of glaring gender inequality—still about 70% of the 1.3 billion people living in poverty worldwide are women—this gender theory approach was more than overdue.

In their 1990 classic *Women's Power Without Domination,* ethnologists *Ilse Lenz and Ute Luig* presented studies of women's and men's differential access to resources that can be economic, political, or ritual-religious in nature (Lenz and Luig 1990). The anthology signaled a "shift from earlier class-based analyses of power relations to studies that focused on power relations between the sexes." In this context, *Ute Luig's* particular interest was the field of *ritual-religious practices*

"as a site of negotiation of gender competition" (Schulz and Seebode 2010, p. 17; Dilger and Luig 2010).

Feminists from developing countries questioned the claim of feminist groups from industrialized countries to be able to speak for *all* women in the world. Existing relations of domination and dependency between feminists from the North and women from the South were critically discussed and the alleged *universalism* of development theory was questioned in the mirror of concretely existing cultural diversity. Postcolonial feminist debates have called for the woman in the developing world, who was thought to be subordinate, to be assessed or analyzed "from an object of mercy to a democratic actor" (Burchardt and Tuider 2014, p. 389). For a long time, it was overlooked that women were not only victims of *social exclusion processes* that were often cemented by *gender-blind* development projects of the World Bank and OECD countries, but they also often represented *creative survivors* as market women or traders of the informal sector (Gravert 1994; Ruppert 1995; Harders 2002; Schauber 2008; Bellows and Valtente 2016; Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako 2016).

The *African Gender Equality Index*, published by the *African Development Bank*, found that only 15% of the land in Africa belonged to women. African women's, family, and gender research has been proving this for years: *The private is political*. The "invisible" must be made visible, "in order to restore local realities and struggles, but also to give a voice to the subaltern. This includes women who have been ignored, despised and passed over by history' (Verschuur et al. 2014, p. 6). The anthology '*Under Development: Gender*', produced by 17 sociologists, regional researchers, and scholars involved in *gender studies,* mostly from Holland, provides ample illustrative material for the thesis: "Gender moves power back to the centre of the analysis of social change; in which the "central axis of development" is made visible: "social reproduction" (Verschuur et al. 2014; p. 6).

The ethnologist *Rita Schäfer* used the *gender perspective to* also show the social background and the disturbing brutalities of the African *civil wars.* Of central importance, she said, were violent concepts of masculinity as well as gender and generational conflicts. In her field research in *Sierra Leone, Zimbabwe, Namibia,* and *South Africa,* she explored the different, changeable roles with which women participated in the war—as combatants, child soldiers, victims of violence, or refugees. Mass rape in DR Congo, Nigeria, Rwanda, and Mozambique was used as a "weapon of war or perverted form of non-verbal communication" to permanently destroy the social cohesion of communities (Schäfer 2008, p. 510). Current gender discourse has focused not least on the important issue of *democratization and women* and has examined role transformation among women in modern social movements (Mazrui and Wiafe-Amoako 2016).

In conclusion, the great diversity of interdisciplinary *gender studies* in the international research community has opened our eyes to the dynamics of constructed gender roles (Luig 2017, p. 203 f.), which can be analysed in an insightful way using the categories of difference and identity, power and domination, production and reproduction, private and political, heterogeneity and hybridity.

2.6   Good Governance and Washington Consensus

After the collapse of the socialist camp and with the increasing indebtedness of many developing countries, two new paradigms came to the fore in development discourse in the 1990s: First, *good governance* (governance that is consistent with development), and second, *sustainable development theorem*. According to the Oxford Dictionary, the term *governance* describes "*the act or manner of governing*"; unlike the government, it encompasses not only state action but also decision-making processes beyond the state institutional system. It also includes activities that cannot be derived from formal and legally defined responsibilities, especially the participation of private, civil society actors in cooperative decision-making processes (after Nuscheler 2009, pp. 5–6). The political *good governance concept* was brought into play by the World Bank in a high-profile way at the historical moment when, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact Organization, it was believed that less consideration would have to be given to political sensitivities in Third World countries. Given the numerous disappointments with practical development aid, it was now possible—also for one's relief—to state, with recourse to the findings of the New Institutional Economics of *Oliver E. Williamson* and *Douglas C. North* (whose credo was: *institutions matter*), that internally caused *bad governance* had been the central cause of the failure to overcome poverty, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The *good governance postulate* contains the following six reform demands on developing countries (based on Nuscheler 2009, pp. 13–14): (1) establishment of the *rule* of *law*; (2) establishment of functioning *administrations* for improved management of the public sector; (3) *transparency* of government and administrative action, especially in the use of own and external financial resources; (4) *accountability* of those in power to the population and their elected representatives; (5) combating corruption as a particularly serious systemic element of *bad governance;* (6) respect for fundamental political and social *human rights* enshrined in international law.

The *good governance concept* has been adopted and further developed by all OECD countries as well as by UN organizations. Often further demands for democratisation, budget discipline, and reduction of 'excessive military expenditure' have been added. What has remained open is how *good governance* can be implemented against the declared unwillingness of a government that invokes the principle of national sovereignty and vehemently rejects 'external interference' in supposedly 'internal affairs' of a state. Given the development successes of authoritarian states (in Asia), the *good governance paradigm* cannot claim universal validity, but it has acquired great significance for the practice of North-South politics. *Structural adjustment policies (SAP)* can be seen as a variant of *good governance* (Tetzlaff 1993). First of all, it is based on the plausible idea that over-indebted developing countries could in the future only spend as much budget funds as they had available on the revenue side. Often, this demand by creditors amounted to acceptance of the four main criteria of the *Washington Consensus*: (1) *expenditure reduction* of public budgets, which could be achieved mainly by cutting personnel costs and by reducing government subsidies of basic foodstuffs (flour, millet, etc.) and petrol; (2) *liberalization* of foreign trade and reduction of politically induced trade licenses; (3) *deregulation* of the economy, which could be achieved by dissolving or privatizing state farms and state enterprises; (4) introduction of *realistic exchange rates*, which mostly involved devaluation of national currencies. This 'lean state' approach aimed at macroeconomic stability through market-friendly policies, reduction of trade tariffs, and opening markets to foreign direct investment. '*Getting the prices right*'—was the mantra used by World Bank experts to tract governments in over-indebted countries (Tetzlaff and Nord 1996; Tetzlaff 2012). These policies "reflected a global change of course in the political climate and were promoted by powerful financial institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank" (Szirmai 2005, p. 343). In the highly indebted developing countries, the application of SAP prescriptions triggered resentment and sometimes popular uprisings because the social costs of such kind of market reforms seemed unbearably high (Körner et al. 1984; Ayittey 2005; Goldberg 2008; Tandon 2014). The neo-liberal doctrine was justified with the postulate of *international systemic competitiveness* as a necessary precondition for successful development in the era of globalization (Messner 1995).

Ousmane Sy, a development economist from Mali, found the following explanation for the frequent failure of the neo-liberal good governance concept: "A governance model is only effective if it is anchored in the cultural frame of reference of the society or country concerned. How does one think of the relationship between the individual and the collective? How does one think of the relationship to state power? How does one think of the relationship to the general? How does one think

of the placement of society in its current and future environment? The model of governance to be promoted in a country and at a given moment must be the reflection of the real context to be managed at that moment and the means available to do so" (Sy 2010, p. 134). In this way, Ousmane Sy recalled early findings by social anthropologists such as Maurice Godelier and Catherine Coquery-Vidrovitch, whose research on village, communal patriarchal modes of production had pointed to the importance of the cultural embeddedness of economic processes (on this, see Goldberg 2008, pp. 158 f.). In African societies, material reproduction was and in many cases still is "integrated into the ensemble of social and religious life" (Coquery-Vidrowitch 1997, p. 70 f.). Production is thus not to be understood as a purely economic field of action, which could be dealt with by appeals to one's maximization of utility. *Abdel Kader Yéro Haidara* from Mali has used the example of *the tòn cooperatives* in Mali to demonstrate the complexity of cultural and social norms that determine production decisions: More important than the accumulation of capital from harvest revenues, he argues, is the satisfaction of social needs of young and old, of women and men, to optimize economic activity (Haidara 1992, p. 122 f.).

2.7   Theory of Sustainable Development: Sustainable Development

With the sustainability discussion, the development discourse finally also acquired an *ecological* dimension: development can be called *sustainable* if it meets the needs of the present generation without endangering the possibilities of future generations to satisfy their own needs and choose their lifestyles. It thus aims at *solidarity between generations.* The concept can be traced back to findings of the 1972 *report to the Club of Rome: The Limits to Growth*, prepared by the US Americans *Denis* and *Margret Meadows*, which sought to raise general awareness of the finite nature of earthly raw materials and energy reserves. But it was not until 1987 that the plausible theorem of the *limits to growth* found its way into the development-theoretical discourse of the United Nations in the form of the *Brundtland Report* (named after the Norwegian UN envoy for environment and development), which focused on the question of ecologically appropriate development. It pointed out the interdependence of the three equally important areas of *economy, environment, and society*: If one of the three areas is favoured unilaterally and to the detriment of the others (as is currently happening through the idealisation of permanent economic growth), the (intellectually convincing) project of

sustainable development is bound to fail in practice. In the current theoretical discussion, two different ecological strategy approaches stand out: the theorem of *ecological modernization* on the one hand and the theorem of *ecological structural change* on the other (Fritz et al. 1995; Eblinghaus and Stickler 1996). Both, in contrast to aftercare and repair strategies, see themselves as *preventive* approaches and both, in the sense of a continuum, can merge and build on each other. While the theorem of *ecological modernization* focuses on innovative technical solutions, the proponents of *ecologically induced structural and mental change* argue for a *dismantling of global networks* of production and consumption in favor of decentralized and democratic centers of power. One representative of this attitude is the world-famous Indian *Vandana Shiva*.

Since the *UN Conference on Environment and Development,* held as the first *Earth Summit* in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the term *sustainability* has become internationally accepted as a guiding concept in development policy. On closer examination, however, a *justice dilemma* has emerged, which *Wolfgang Sachs* (social scientist at the Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment, and Energy) formulated as follows: "Any attempt to alleviate the crisis of nature threatens to exacerbate the crisis of justice, and vice versa: Any attempt to alleviate the crisis of justice threatens to exacerbate the crisis of nature". That is, "whoever demands more agricultural land, energy, houses, medical and school services, in short, more purchasing power for the poor, puts himself at odds with those who want to protect soils, animals, forests, atmosphere or health. And whoever, for the sake of nature, demands less energy, less transport, no deforestation, and no intensive agriculture, puts himself in contradiction with those who insist on the fair share of the fruits of development" (Sachs 2002, p. 88).

The concept of *'ecodevelopment'*, which is favoured by *Ignacy Sachs* and *Hans-Jürgen Harborth*, among others, also seeks a way out of the nature-justice dilemma. It contains the following programme points (Harborth, cited in Eblinghaus and Stickler 1996, p. 31): (1) Satisfaction of basic needs; (2) No copying of the consumption style of the industrialized countries; (3) Development of a satisfying social ecosystem; (4) Anticipatory solidarity with future generations; (5) Conservation of resources and the environment; (6) Energy conservation and application of alternative energy sources; (7) Real participation of those concerned; (8) Trust in one's power' (*self-reliance)*; (8) Accompanying educational programmes. The *Heinrich Böll Foundation*'s 'green environmental policy' aims in the same direction, arguing that "a departure from *business as usual* in global agricultural policy is overdue in view of the scarcity of land and the ecological and social consequences of the industrial agricultural model". Information and education about the global

consequences of meat consumption are *one* central prerequisite for "a different ethical and sustainable consumer behavior" (Fatheuer et al. 2015, p. 44).

In 2009, the Bonn-based *Development and Peace Foundation (SEF)* declared the further development of the social market economy into a *sustainable market economy* to be the "new guiding principle for the 21st century" and made the following recommendations: Economic growth should no longer be judged by economic criteria alone but in terms of its contribution to increasing the *quality of life*. For this reason, the EU states should demand of their DC partner countries that their civil societies also be involved in dialogues, as agreed in the *Accra Agenda for Action for improved development cooperation effectiveness* (SEF 2009, pp. 6–8).

Today, there is growing evidence that the (originally Western) development model would be an 'ecological disaster model' at its core, not least because it would burn up too many fossil energy sources—for example in the motorization of agriculture (Harborth 1993, p. 231 f.). Only a *qualitative* change in our lifestyle—i.e. the reduction of resource-intensive 'overdevelopment' in the modern growth centres of the world—could still bring about a turnaround. Whether humanity has enough time to do this is debatable, and is denied, for example, by the Oxford Professor of *Computational Science, Stephen Emmott*: "If we want to avoid a global catastrophe, we have to do something radical [avoid further global warming as a result of over-consumption of fossil fuels]—and I mean really *do it*. But I don't think we will do that" (Emmott 2014, p. 202).

2.8   Theory of the Developmental State

The theory of the *developmental state* or the theory of the bureaucratic developmental state has recently become popular again—as a beacon of hope for development in Africa as well. It had already accompanied the rise of fast-growing developing countries in Asia to rapidly advancing *emerging economies*. While modernization theories had neglected the (unequal) economic conditions of exchange, dependency theorists exaggerated the alleged political powerlessness of the native elites,—often defamed as dependent or parasitic *bridgeheads* of the center nations. The latter by no means proved in all cases to be helpless *prisoners of structural world market constraints*. The emerging countries, led by the *four little tigers* (also called *four little dragons*), namely *Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan*, were able to profitably exploit the existing world market with all its neo-colonial structures and trade policy injustices for themselves. Through planned exports and intelligently managed economic growth, prosperity was generated for a

broad middle class. This socio-economic transformation has been called the *Asian miracle* because it came about in just a few decades through unorthodox *state interventionism* against the logic of action and recommendations of the World Bank (Amsden 2001; Szirmai 2005, p. 343 f., Tetzlaff 2012).

The proponents of *developmental state theory* belong to the school of *control theorists* (or also called *interventionists*, in contrast to the school of *neo-liberals*); it was founded by researchers such as *Chalmers Johnson,* who had presented a pioneering study on the positive role of the market-friendly *interventionist state* in the rise of Japan. The issue has always been the appropriate, that is development-friendly, weighting of *four variables influencing* the development process: the state (steering), the market, the bureaucracy (public administration), and the private sector. In parts of Asia, *a different type of capitalism* has emerged through specific forms of intelligent state management and intervention in the service of realizing ambitious development goals (Amsden 2001; Messner 1995). This included the creation of a range of instruments to motivate domestic businessmen to achieve international efficiency standards in the production of goods. Essential to this was the strategic, albeit selective, use of *protectionist* measures to allow key domestic industries to exist as *infant industries.* All successful NICs have made a state-orchestrated strategic shift from *initial industrialization through import substitution (ISI strategy*) to *export-oriented industrialization (EOI).* Where this happened early enough—as in the case of the *four small tigers* and later also in *Thailand, Malaysia, and China*—high growth rates were achieved; where the appropriate time was missed (as in Brazil, Mexico, Argentina, and India), the countries reaped "relative stagnation" (Szirmai 2005, pp. 338–339; Perkins et al. 2006, pp. 709 f.).

The secret of success apparently lies in a happy mix of restrained state control and actively used *autonomy of action* at the sub-state level to achieve *systemic competitiveness* (at least in some sectors). Prussia's effective and disciplined bureaucracy is often cited as a historical example of this (Fukuyama 2015, p. 75 f.). *Dirk Messner* (today President of the *German Development Institute, DIE* in Bonn) stressed that the ability of managers "to be able to shape their area of responsibility (the company, the department, the union, the research institution) without coercion" would enable independent learning processes among themselves. Only a minimum of autonomy of action would "produce responsible behaviour in the sense of the respective organisation" (Messner 1995, p. 205). The functional differentiation between state, economy, and society—i.e. "*the art of separation*"— is just as important as systemic control—"*the art of connection*". The state has the task of *central monitoring,* of directing these processes of interaction towards the common goal of the higher development of society as a whole, e.g. by means of 5- or 7-year development plans (Messner 1995, p. 209 f.).

First developed for Europe in the interwar period as a reaction to the Great Depression of 1929–1931, the theory of the *intervening developmental state* proved useful after World War II, first in Latin America and later (after 1989) for Eastern and Central Europe and Africa. The over-indebtedness of states and the weakness of market forces have played a catalytic role. *Charity Musamba*, Executive Director of the *Foundation for Democratic Process* in Lusaka, Zambia, has summarized the core propositions of *Developmental State (DS) Theory in the* following four terms to demonstrate its praxeological-programmatic significance for Africa:

- First, successful liberation from dependency and poverty requires *political leadership* that collectively and resolutely pursues a policy focused on promoting development. In doing so, it must ensure political stability and economic development at the same time (*developmental-oriented political leadership*).
- Second, there is a need for an independently and professionally acting, efficient *bureaucracy* as an executing and planning state power, which must be capable of creating and enforcing an economic policy, forging business alliances, and organizing state intervention in the markets.
- Third, a *production-oriented private sector* is also essential. This must be characterized by high flexibility and adaptability to international technical standards.
- Fourth, *performance-oriented governance* belongs also to the conditions for successful development. Governments seek respect and legitimacy less through electoral victories (*input legitimacy*) and more through material achievements for the population (*output legitimacy*).

This paradigm of the authoritarian developmental state aimed at accelerating economic growth 'renounces' at first democratic legitimacy through free and fair elections in order to enforce social discipline among the working masses (low wages) by means of state authority. Utilizing forced capital accumulation, more shares of GNP can be productively invested, which would make accelerated industrialization and modernization possible. If the economic and social strategy of the *developmental state* has an initial success, social mobilization of the urban middle classes inevitably sets in (in a second phase), pushing for corporate self-determination (trade union freedom) and voice. Thus, in a third phase, an industrializing society may even force a constitutional change towards overcoming the 'developmental dictatorship' and replacing it with a democratic multi-party system (see the case studies in Schubert et al. 1994; Amsden 2001; Szirmai 2005; Menzel 2010; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2015).

Can Africa learn from Asia's development successes? This is not out of the question, but it is obvious that countries with the heritage of *pre-colonial advanced civilizations* today have an easier time overcoming these high hurdles for autonomously controlled development processes than, say, African colonies without comparable cultural traditions that could provide modern checks on power. As one of the possible control instances, self-control by means of an *ethic conducive to bureaucracy* comes into question, as practised, for example, in the Confucian virtues and promoted in China by the educational system. More effective today might be control mechanisms by third parties, such as parliaments, independent courts, or a free press. Only if such control instances function, "then the danger of corruption, nepotism, and particularism, which is also omnipresent in bureaucratic developing states, can be contained" (Menzel 2010, p. 144). Nevertheless, *Thandika Mkandawire* (former director of the *Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa*), citing *Mauritius* and *Botswana,* believes that the introduction of this *governance-centred* development paradigm could also succeed in Africa (Mkandawire 2004). Using *Botswana* as an example, we will be able to test this optimistic opinion in Sect. 11.5.

A deepening of the development debate was provided by the study of *Robert D. Cooter (lawyer) and Hans-Bernd Schäfer (economist):* the two professors showed the crucial importance of legal certainty, property protection, and confidence-building between innovators and investors. Their *legal theory of economic growth* convincingly demonstrates how wealth can emerge as a means to the end of development and either be used wisely or gambled away recklessly: Sustainable growth, they argue, comes from businesses (*business ventures*) that innovate; however, the willingness to innovate requires investor *trust*, which can only come from practical experience with good (corruption-free) cooperation with government authorities and with a level playing field: 'If trust issues were resolved, law and the rule of law would provide the framework that would give economic innovation space to end the poverty of nations' (Cooter and Schäfer 2012, p. 222). Law and social norms would have to merge into institutions and mutually reinforce each other—like the individual threads of a rope. In this way, *Solomon's Knot* (the Gordian knot) of poverty could be shattered. But who can guarantee a trusting investor in an authoritarian ruled country that the rule of law will be respected by all?

2.9   Theories on "Resource Curse" and "Rentier State"

From a global perspective, unhindered access to Africa's raw materials is an important component of the national security policy of the industrialized countries. At the same time, it is regarded as an indispensable component of *global resource governance of* the future that has yet to be implemented (Behrens 2005), to guarantee raw material security for the *global players*, including the People's Republic of China, India, and Brazil, as far as possible and to avoid the threat of raw material wars. Africa's situation is often referred to as the 'paradox of wealth': Rich nature, poor societies; or to put it another way: why has it so far been impossible, but in exceptional cases, to convert the wealth of natural mineral resources into social well-being? Is there even a *resource curse* at work here? Social scientists have presented various models claiming to make the phenomenon of the alleged resource curse comprehensible. The aim is always to uncover political causal connections: between state policy on the one hand and the structure of society and the economy on the other (see Chap. 11). Due to the complexity of the subject matter, it is advisable to differentiate between three functional areas of the state as an actor: that of *security*, of socio-economic *welfare* (for society), and of *legitimacy* in the sense of the rule of law (following Schneckener 2006). The hypothesis here is that whether a state uses the resource wealth of its territory as a blessing or allows it to become a curse depends on the degree to which it fulfils *rule of law* functions in the areas of security and welfare. The functional area of *welfare* includes the guarantee of the necessary framework conditions and the provision of public goods such as health and education as a prerequisite for economic activity and social security (after Meißner 2013, p. 20). But why do the governments of resource-rich countries *fail* to spend more on *social* welfare services, even though they could do so more easily than resource-poor countries? Self-interested calculations alone would make such a *preventive* security policy seem advisable.

The effect of resource wealth—as a curse or as a blessing—depends on numerous contextual factors: (a) the nature of the (mineral) resources; (b) the geographical location of their deposits (on the surface or deep underground); (c) demand and prices on domestic and foreign consumer markets, etc. Experts distinguish between *renewable or regenerable* resources (such as grain, timber, and fish) and *non-renewable* resources (such as oil, copper, iron, or coltan), or between those that can be plundered by rebel groups without much effort and sold on black markets (*lootable resources such as* diamonds and gold) and those natural resources that can only be extracted and marketed by means of technically complex processes, such as copper, uranium and crude oil (Basedau and Mehler 2005). What they have in

common is the feature that their financial value increases, the greater the demand, the scarcer the deposits.

One can speak of a '*resource curse*' when the natural wealth of a country causes avoidable damage to the population or parts of it. The case of *Dutch Disease* in Holland is a classic example: After the discovery of large natural gas deposits in Holland in the 1960s, this phenomenon was first observed here. It is based on an exchange rate mechanism: the export of large quantities of raw materials gives rise to foreign trade surpluses that lead to an appreciation of the country's currency. Because of the increasing competition from imports, sales of the products of the exporting industrial sector, which is already weakened by the one-sided state support of the raw materials sector, fall. This leads to an unpleasant shift in the economic sectors: As a result of the boom in the energy sector, scarce production factors (capital and skilled labour) are being withdrawn from other sectors of the economy, from manufacturing, and also from agriculture. The trend toward de-industrialization is offset by the rising consumption of imported goods due to the unexpected flow of foreign currency. Necessary investments in agriculture and rural infrastructure are being neglected so that the population's self-sufficiency in local foodstuffs is declining. The concentration on the *one enclave sector* leads in the medium term to a loss of prosperity in society and thus to a 'disease' (Buchberger 2012; Meißner 2013; see below Chap. 11).

A majority of social scientists today argue that *political* variables are more important than resource-related or purely economic ones in explaining the resource curse because of *political matters* (Meißner 2013, p. 33 f.; Mosbacher 2016, p. 295–296). Their thesis is that in the exploitation of resource wealth, the political behaviour of the state class in the context of existing social or constitutional *institutions of control* (such as parliaments, independent courts, a critical press or a vigilant civil society) is crucial. Since the *resource curse* obviously has two dimensions—an economic and a political one—the central political challenge for resource-rich developing countries is to distribute the resource rent 'properly' or to use it wisely, that is in an *environmentally friendly, poverty-oriented and regionally equitable way* (von Hadenwang 2012), so that social peace can be preserved.

Among the variants of explanations for *state failure* or *bad governance* in resource-rich countries, the theory of the *rentier state* rightly enjoys great popularity (Ross 2001; de Soysa 2006; Meißner 2013, p. 31 f.). *Commodity rents* are (predominantly) unearned incomes that receive their foreign exchange value in each case through foreign demand. Only small parts of the domestic labour force are needed to generate this value: in the case of oil and gas production, this concerns a privileged, professional minority of engineers and skilled workers; in the case of copper, iron, or uranium production, likewise only a few specialists with their

manual labourers. The abundance of foreign exchange earnings—balanced against only little own contribution—puts the rulers in the favourable position of not having to tax their population, or hardly at all, whereby the mechanism of democratisation (first tried in the USA)—*no taxation without representation*—is suspended. Rather, the situation is: '*no taxation and therefore no representation*'. This lack of financial nexus between the state and the working population logically blocks the emergence of a reciprocal *social contract* (taxation of citizens in exchange for the guarantee of security and the provision of public goods). Thus, the pressure from below on the political regime to legitimize itself through participation rights and output benefits remains low. If a *crisis of legitimacy* does occur, a financially strong government will distribute financial gifts to influential people and try to buy opposition politicians for reasons of self-preservation. If such a practice becomes habitual, a *rent-seeking mentality* can also develop in the upper and middle classes, resulting in the long run in a *rent-seeking society* in which any form of solidarity with the poorer social lower classes disappears. In extreme cases—as happened in Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Nigeria—the state class becomes entangled in the pitfalls of 'organised crime' (Burgis 2015; Ellis 2016). For *kleptocracies*, this form of income generation still has the 'advantage' that state presidents can access large sums of foreign currency without these funds being tied to any conditions on the part of the foreign credit providers.

2.10 Cultural Critical Theories of Development: *Culture Matters*

Since the time of *Adam Smith*, social scientists have been concerned with the question of why some countries have become rich and others have remained poor. Economists and anthropologists are among the scholars, who tend to display a certain scepticism towards *culturalist* explanations of development—in contrast to historians, political scientists, and sociologists. For the latter, *Max Weber's* 1904/05 paper *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (revised 1920) represents a useful approach to understanding the Western path of development. Weber formulated the famous theorem, which to this day can provide a first suitable orientation for social analyses: "Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, directly dominate the actions of people. But: the 'world pictures', which are created by 'ideas', have very often set the course, in which the dynamics of interests moved action forward". After all, it was according to the world view "'what' and 'for what' one wanted to be 'redeemed' and—not to forget—could be" (Max Weber,

Economy, and society (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft), 1976, p. 101; see also Wehler 1998, p. 96 f.). In his "Observations of Modernity", sociologist *Niklas Luhmann* added the insight (influenced by Pierre Bourdieu) that culture was important to *legitimize* distinctions and differences (Luhmmann 1992). In the Weberian tradition, US historian *David S. Landes*, in *Wealth and Poverty of Nations*, articulated his research finding that cultural factors were central to explaining differences between rich and poor nations: "If we learn anything from the history of economic development, it is this: Culture makes all the difference" (Landes 1999, p. 517; see also Geertz 1973/2000).

   If one equates the word "*trajectories*" in Max Weber's quote reproduced above with "*institutions*" as necessary mediators between ideas and interests, one easily finds access to the developmental theories that receive much attention today and that foreground the importance of *institutions as cultural products of societies.* For example, the two institutionalists *Douglass C. North* & *Robert Paul Thomas* drew from the unique rise of the Western world the development-theoretically relevant lesson that only the evolution of appropriate, culturally embedded *institutions* would have made economic growth and social progress possible. In doing so, the authoritative guarantee of *individual property rights* was singled out as a supremely effective spur to economically creative activity: By providing legal guarantees for the *intellectual property including new ideas, inventions, and innovations,* the state would have created individual investment incentives that would also have benefited the general public. "*In the absence of such property rights, few would risk private resources for social gains*" (North and Thomas 2008, p. 3). As convincing as *North and Thomas* arguments may be, a monocausal explanation via property rights is not suitable for a general theory of development. More comprehensive is therefore the large study by the two US economists *Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson* entitled *Why Nations Fail—The Origins of Power, Prosperity and Poverty* from 2012, in which the authors demonstrate, based on numerous examples from past centuries, that the decisive factor determining the poverty or wealth of a nation was the type of *public institutions*: development was brought about by the incentives that *institutions* produce. The authors distinguish between two types of institutions: on the one hand "extractive economic institutions" and on the other "inclusive economic institutions". *Extractive economic institutions*, they argued, were those that would maximize profits from inherited institutions under existing conditions—for example, African mines and plantation operations during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Such institutions were defined as "*extractive*" "because they were created to transfer income and wealth from one part of society for the benefit of another" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, p. 76). Such societies, they argue, are highly unequal and conflictual and therefore carry the seeds of decline. In the

process of decline, a *vicious circle* would ensue: in order to secure their power, oligarchies would maintain the extractive economic institutions that were useful to them and would fend off both innovation and competitors who thought differently, thereby perpetuating economic stagnation. This is typical of the behaviour of post-colonial elites in sub-Saharan Africa (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, p. 345).

In contrast, *inclusive economic institutions* are those "that secure private property, as well as an impartial legal system and public services that establish a level playing field under which people can trade and contract. They must also allow the entry of new businesses and allow people to choose their careers" (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, pp. 74–75). Against this, it is arguable that a society in which such 'inclusive economic institutions' are already in place will find it easy to further develop economic growth and social modernisation under optimal conditions because it has 'the worst' already behind it, that is the institutionally necessary reforms of adjustment to market competitive conditions. More relevant, therefore, is the question of *how* a society in which *status-quo-oriented* ruling interests dominate and extractive economic institutions are in the self-interest of such centres of power can reach a state in which inclusive economic institutions can develop. This—according to the authors—can only occur with the shaping of a new social class situation. *Development* is thus understood here as the interplay of three factors: (1) political leadership capable of innovation, (2) an economic and civil society insistent on change, and (3) institutions that allow an elite willing to innovate to break out of old trajectories and push through reforms. The result would then be a socially fairly broad self-empowerment (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, p. 458).

2.11   Empowerment, Self-Efficacy and "Cultural Adaptation"

Self-empowerment, *empowerment, self-efficacy*—these are keywords of a current debate among social scientists who call for a change of mentality critical of modernization (Nebe 2011; Wallacher et al. 2008). The Kenyan *James Shikwati* (who was awarded the title of '*Young Global Leader*' in Davos in 2008) criticizes Western neocolonial development aid policies and implores his compatriots to embrace a creative '*Gandhi spirit*' *to* increase productivity and participation of the broad masses without submitting to Western models of growth and development (Shikwati 2011, pp. 167–172). And more and more Africans are self-confidently demanding the right to participate and help shape public life (Kihiu 2010).

This is also the starting point for modern *self-efficacy theory*, which attributes individual intentional action to the belief in one's abilities (self-efficacy). Developed in the 1970s by the Canadian developmental psychologist *Albert Bandura*, this approach has since been extensively empirically tested in various applications and effective methods for promoting *self-efficacy* have been developed (Bandura 1997; Drosten 2018). It places the individual's cultural and psychological capacity to learn and act at the heart of development. *Self-efficacy*, he argues, is crucial for enabling change by making people agents in *Amartya Sen*'s sense; it influences cooperation, innovation diffusion, risk assessment, investment behavior, time discounting, persistence, goal setting, and political participation. *Self-efficacy* arises in response to environmental cues: the natural and social environment demands punishes, ignores, or rewards human intervention and action in different ways. If humans have to exert effort, plan, invest, learn in order to survive (well) and if the environment is reliable in its responses, humans learn that these activities are 'right' and so develop a corresponding propensity to act. This is passed on vertically and usually uncritically as a heuristic from parent to child. What in stable living conditions has the advantage of saving information and decision costs is a major problem in the case of sudden climatic or other changes such as migration: one's *self-efficacy,* as well as the learned heuristics, are adapted to a familiar historical reality of life, but not to a new, modern or even foreign one. Optimising *self-efficacy* as a basic motive for human action is therefore a development policy target for all *empowerment* strategies (Drosten 2018).

Finally, the culture-emphasizing approach of the Cameroonian development expert *Daniel Etounga-Manguelle* will be presented. As a member of the *Harvard Academy*'s 2000 symposium on the *cultural paradigm,* his thesis that '*Africa needs a cultural adjustment programme*' attracted some attention, but also harsh criticism. *Etounga-Manguelle* saw the cultural reality of Africa at the beginning of the twenty-first century—generalized in the term 'the African'—as determined by the following *nine characteristics,* which will be indicated here with a few strokes:

- *Hierarchical distance*: Subordinates consider their superiors "special—they are entitled to privileges. Since strength goes before right, the best way to change a social system is to overthrow those in power" (p. 107).
- *Control of uncertainty*: Societies have three ways to help their members achieve security, through technology, law, or religion. For Africans, "submission to a ubiquitous, inexorable divine will" is typical . . . The African remains a slave to his environment. Nature is his mistress and determines his destiny" (p. 107).

- The *tyranny of time*. The African, "anchored in his ancestor worship, is so convinced that the past can merely repeat itself that he has little concern for the future" (p. 108).
- *Unity of power and authority*: "In Africa, the power of religion still weighs on the individual as well as on collective destiny. It is not uncommon for African leaders to invoke magical powers. It is difficult to explain African passivity in any other way than by the fear of that God who is hidden in the garb of every African chief . . . We complain of the difficulty of promoting the private sector in our States. These difficulties are rooted in the envious jealousy which dominates all personal relations, and which manifests itself less in the desire to possess what another possesses than in the desire to prevent any change in social status" (p. 109).
- The *community* dominates the individual. "How can we restore to the individual that measure of autonomy which is necessary for his self-assertion as a political, economic, and social agent, and at the same time preserve that social bond which is the essence of the African's existence?" (S. 110).
- *Excessive sociability and aversion to open conflict*: "The African shows a taste for celebration . . . Everything provides an excuse for a feast: Baptism, marriage, birthday, promotion, election to office, return from a short or long journey . . . Whether one earns well or modestly, whether the barns are full or empty, the feast must, in any case, be beautiful, and it must attract the maximum number of guests . . . Differences, which are otherwise the basis of social life, are either unnoticed or else ignored in order to maintain the appearance of social cohesion" (pp. 111–112).
- *Inefficient homo economicus*: Apart from some social groups such as the *Bamileke* in Cameroon or the *Kamba* in Kenya, the African is a bad *homo economicus*. "Because of the African's peculiar relationship to time, saving for future purposes has lower priority for him than immediate consumption. To avoid the temptation to accumulate wealth, the recipients of regular income must finance the studies of brothers, cousins, nephews, and nieces, house newcomers, and pay for the numerous festivities that characterize social life" (p. 112).
- *High cost of irrationalism*: "A society in which magic and witchcraft flourish is now a sick society, dominated by tensions, fears and moral confusion. Witchcraft is a costly mechanism for settling conflicts and maintaining the status quo—and this is what matters most to African culture . . . Witchcraft is both an instrument of social coercion (it helps to maintain and possibly strengthen the loyalty of individuals to their clan) and a very convenient political tool for eliminating any opposition that might be stirred up. Witchcraft is for us a psychological refuge

where all our ignorance finds an answer and our wildest fantasies become reality" (p. 113; see also Signer 2004).

- *Cannibalistic societies*: "What Africans do to each other is unbelievable. Genocide, bloody civil wars, and rampant violent crimes suggest that African societies at all levels are cannibalistic to some extent. The same people who write laws and are responsible for enforcing them trample them underfoot … Did African totalitarianism come with independence? Of course not! It has always been there, sunk into the foundations of our tribal cultures. Authoritarianism rules our families, our villages, our schools, our churches. It is a way of life for us … We are doomed to change or perish" (p. 115; see also Richburg 1998).

Therefore, African societies today need to "undertake a peaceful cultural revolution in education, politics, economics and social life". As far as post-colonial education was concerned, this system "offered children little incentive to develop their skills, to innovate or to do better than their parents" (Etounga-Manguelle 2002, p. 116). The role of *African women*—"the disregarded backbone of our societies"—also needed to be reshaped and upgraded; for women "today have no access to bank accounts, credit, or property. They have to remain silent. They produce much of our food, yet they have little access to agricultural training, credit, technical assistance, and so on" (Etounga-Manguelle 2002, p. 117). Finally, like the Cameroonian intellectual *Axelle Kabou* 20 years before him, he calls for a *cultural renewal of Africa (*Kabou 1993*) to meet* the challenges of globalization:

> We need more self-confidence, more trust in each other, and a commitment to progress that benefits all. We desperately need more discipline and a systematic approach to the formulation of strategies or the enforcement of decisions once they have been taken … We must go to the very heart of our morals and customs in order to remove the layer of mud that is blocking the way to modernity for our societies. We must bring about this revolution in our minds—without which there can be no transfer of technology—ourselves. We must rely on our intelligence; for if they have capable leaders, Africans are very capable of refraining from the envious jealousy, blind submission to the irrational and lethargy that are our ruin (Etounga-Manguelle 2002, p. 118; see also similar arguments in Sy 2010 and Adukele 2016).

Certainly, numerous Africans will reject this conservative, static view of the world drawn here and point to the existence of a *cultural change of adaptation* that has long been underway, that has always existed (Beier 1999) and that has already differentiated itself into diverse forms, institutions, and symbols (Beer 2017, p. 71 f. and Schulz and Seebode 2010). Journalist *Bettina Gaus* also encountered very different people during her travels to the gradually emerging "middle class of

Africa" than those described by Etounga-Manguelle as "typically African" (Gaus 2011),—namely merchants, lawyers, teachers, artists, brides or administrators, all modern people who would have very similar dreams of a better life as most Europeans (See also the reports of Ugandan lawyer *Winnie Adukule*; Adukele 2016). The US anthropologist *Kelly M. Askew* has used East African Swahili culture to demonstrate the dynamics of African urban societies in which the *modern-traditional* bipolarity has long been overcome and displaced by permanent socio-cultural change. For 2000 years, traders from the Swahili coast (in present-day Tanzania and Kenya) had traded with the states of India, learning to innovatively incorporate foreign influences into indigenous cultural patterns and thus to exploit a relative advantage: "They appropriated foreign elements, but at the same time they reworked internally existing elements into new compositions. And because they were familiar with the competition, they defeated potential rivals—with their artful linguistic skills. In other words, the aesthetic principles we identified in *ngoma* [dances of traditional origin] and *dansi* [more modern dances] were useful in economic terms and could help explain the economic success of Swahili" (Askew 2003, p. 632). Moreover, African cities today must be thought of as vibrant *melting pots* of cultures and peoples, where people of different origins, often each living in their neighborhoods, engage in lively exchanges as they take advantage of every opportunity that presents itself to increase their incomes and to participate in social and family networks that alone ensure survival (Locatelli and Nugent 2009; Beer et al. 2017: Urban Ethnology, pp. 317–334).

Above all, the impression must be countered that African folk cultures are static and not changeable (Harding 1999, pp. 126–162). Without denying the "mental rigidity" of post-colonial elites in Nigeria and elsewhere, the novelist *Chinua Achebe* has painted a very different picture of the *Yoruba* and *Igbo cultures* of Nigeria: Adolescents were traditionally brought up in the spirit of tolerance, reverence for parents and elders, and personal responsibility. Absolute truths' were frowned upon; people believed "in the possibility of simultaneous truths" and were conditioned to find pragmatic solutions to problems, primarily within the circle of the *extended family,* which saw itself as partly protected and partly threatened by gods and ancestors (*Chinua Achebe, Wole Soyinka* and *Rowland Abiodun* in conversations with the anthropologist and artist *Ulli Beier*; Beier 1999, p. 13). It was only through the encounter with the West and its modern consumer economy that African cultures had come into crisis: Now "a situation has arisen in which money is valued more highly than people … The elitist thinking of rich Yoruba businessmen and politicians has taken on extreme proportions. They isolate themselves from the community. They build themselves huge concrete castles to protect their ill-gotten gains. This is where the most serious conflicts occur. We have

a class that is getting richer every day and imposing an alien lifestyle on us" (Beier 1999, pp. 158–160). *Ulli Baier*, who founded the *Iwalewa House* at the University of Bayreuth in the 1990s as a place of encounter with African sciences and cultures, described the Yoruba culture he was striving to preserve, not entirely in vain, as follows: "What makes Yoruba culture so beautiful and so alive is its flexibility and adaptability. It cannot be reduced to rules, and there is no sacred book that claims to be dictated by God. There are no ten commandments. And since the Yoruba did not establish a catalogue of commandments and prohibitions, it was said that the Yoruba was immoral!" (Beier 1999, p. 164). Today, Yoruba culture and art— especially the *Osun Grove in Osogbo*—have been recognized as a World Heritage Site, and the world-famous painter *Twins Seven Seven,* who emerged from the *Osogbo* artists' colony, is now one of the celebrated representatives of African modernity.

Certainly, *Etounga-Manguelle*'s stereotypes do not do justice to Africans in the European and American *diaspora*, who have learned to cope in foreign cultural milieus and have become members of global modernity. However, if one examines critical accounts of the cultural behaviour of Africans in contemporary contexts, one does indeed often find empirical evidence of attitudes and behaviours that can arguably be described as *out of context* (Kabou 1993; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Ayittey 2005; Calderisi 2006; Tetzlaff 2008; Mbeki 2009; Wrong 2009; Sy 2010). However, the current glories of modern African culture should not go unmentioned—in literature and plastic arts, in painting and music (Asserate 2010), in sports and science. African novels, for example, reflect highly sensitively a very complex reality of postcolonial societies—a treasure trove for anyone who wants to look behind the scenes of noisy everyday life (Schraeder 2009, pp. 194–216; Seiler-Dietrich 2007).

Recent studies dealing with *culture and religion* also corroborate the finding that religious ideas very often strongly influence the development prospects of a community. This applies, for example, to the large number of Muslim mosque communities and Christian *Pentecostal churches* that have turned Africa into a 'continent of booming churches' (Heuser 2015). *Birgit Meyer* (Chair of Religious Studies at the University of Utrecht), for example, has interpreted the *boom of Pentecostal churches* in West Africa, which has been going on for years, as a reaction to socio-economic changes in the context of globalization, and interpreted the renewed faith as a pragmatic aid to life: "Pentecostal churches help the individual believer to break away from traditional social structures, which also include the old gods. The Holy Spirit, she said, is often portrayed as a knife that cuts the old blood ties and allows the individual to come out. 'Break with your past', the preachers shouted to the faithful, 'be a born-again person without old imprints'.

In this respect, Pentecostal churches are a project of modernity" (Meyer 2013, pp. 30–31).

2.12 Microcredit: A Recipe Against Poverty?

The economist *Prof. Muhammad Yunus*, Nobel Peace Prize winner in 2006 and founder of the *Grameen Bank* in Bangladesh, surprised the world with his vision of completely eradicating poverty in the world by 2030 (Yunus 1999, 2007). The means touted were microloans that a "rural bank" (the translation of *Grameen Bank*) would provide to a group of seven female micro-entrepreneurs at a time to protect them from rogue loan sharks. *Grameen Bank* microloans must also be repaid by the collective of women borrowers, but the loan rates are far lower than the usual excessive rates charged by local middlemen and moneylenders: the former is 20% or more in Bangladesh and between 15% and 70% in sub-Saharan Africa. The unfavourable cost structure in Africa—the sometimes low population density and poor transport conditions—makes servicing clients extremely arduous and hardly profitable: two-thirds of the interest earned on a loan is eaten up by administrative costs in extreme cases. Nevertheless, the potential for microcredit in Africa is great because the growing *informal sector* is far from saturated.

The *informal sector* is defined as that sector of the economy in which the usual rules of a market economy or a state-planned economy do not apply; for those employed in the informal sector have neither regulated working hours, nor fixed remuneration, nor qualified schooling or vocational training. Therefore, it is a well-founded assumption that demand for microcredit tends to be high in this sector because that must appear to be the only chance for talented, enterprising small entrepreneurs and employees to work their way out of poverty. Only under this condition is it also reasonable to assume that the informal sector is not a *bleak siding* for non-placeable workers in the formal private or state sector, but a *springboard* for the brave who have lacked only the start-up capital. Because microcredit is often provided for food production and other basic needs, its beneficiaries are less dependent and vulnerable to shocks and fluctuations in the global economy than other borrowers. The very low default rates for microcredit are exceptional. They are as low as 2%, according to the United Nations. Women are considered to be more reliable, socially responsible debtors with a high payment record because they know they only get one chance. Once they cannot pay the interest due, they will not get another loan. Microloans are tied to specific projects and are often granted to village communities, "which not least increases the social pressure on each

borrower. Since the group is also jointly and severally liable for the timely repayment of all microloans, credit discipline is also high for this reason" (Hamburgisches Weltwirtschafts-Institut 2010, p. 75).

The idea and practice of the *Grameen Bank* have now also gained a foothold in China, India, Africa, and other regions of the world so that it was estimated that between 1980 and 2010 some 500 million people would have made use of such microcredits, of which almost 12% were Africans (HWWI 2010, p. 74). The total of all microcredits amounted to an estimated 45 US$ billion in 2009 (Hamburgisches Weltwirtschafts-Institut 2010, p. 76). Unlike official *DC programmes*, microfinance sees itself as aid from below—that is a '*bottom-up approach*'. The average size of a microloan was 150 US$ in Asia and around 300 US$ in Africa, with a female participation rate of 80% in South Asia and around 60% in Africa. Microcredit is thus a useful aid in individual cases, but should not be idealised as 'the' solution to the problem of poverty.

2.13 Post-colonial Approaches and *Post-development* Approaches

As early as the 1990s, critics of the current development aid policy of the OECD countries and the World Bank, which was largely perceived as unsuccessful, made their voices heard with studies that fundamentally denied the usefulness of the development paradigm and sought *alternatives to development* rather than alternative development theories. This was often linked to a critique of "*unleashed capitalism*", which today is perceived by many as a threat—especially in Third World countries with reference to the omnipotence of global corporations (Jessen 2006). Researchers from Latin America in particular perceived "development" not as *helpful for self-help*, as the official justification formula of the OECD member countries read, but as a misleading ideology of the West (Ziai 2014, p. 405). They criticised the *ethnocentrism* of Westerners, "who was only able to understand the foreign as a retarded form of their own (set as a positive norm), as 'less developed', as 'deficient'". Criticism thus denied, on the one hand, the superiority of 'developed' societies, and on the other, the possibility of comparing culturally different ways of life on the basis of a universal scale of values. It insisted on the *plurality* and *diversity* of equally-weighted values (Ziai 2014, p. 408).

Postcolonial approaches point to the persistence of colonial differences that were and are important for the maintenance of domination (see the contributions by J. Comaroff, A.-M. Brandstetter, G. Hauck, and R. Kößler in Schulz and Seebode

2010, pp. 29–86). Thus, postcolonial development cooperation (DC) ties in with patterns that came into use as *developmental colonialism* in the late phase of European colonial rule, when self-serving colonial masters finally wanted to '*put in value*' ('mise en valeur') 'their' protectorates (see Sects. 4.2 and 5.5). There is also a place here for studies that examine the colonial imprint on representation and identities even after formal decolonization. Their interest is directed at how knowledge of domination over 'the others' is also produced in contemporary discourses and what less eurocentrically poisoned forms of knowledge might look like (Ziai 2010). *Creative directors* of this critical understanding of modern forms of domination were *Mahatma Gandhi* in the 1930s (ideal of the simple life; the idea of village republics); *Karl Polanyi* (critique of the market system's independence from society and nature in "Great Transformation"); *Ivan Illich* (turning away from the economic growth idol through human self-limitation; milieu-based limitation of technology, industry, and bureaucracy); *Michel Foucault* (all knowledge is "entangled in power" and must be "deconstructed"); *Edward Said*, the author of "Orientalism" (cultural identities have been "essentialistically" defined and distorted by the West); *Stuart Hall* (hybridity of identities and cultures is the normal case in history). Postcolonialists today resist the depoliticization of social inequality as a "development problem," often misinterpreted as a lack of capital, technology, and expert knowledge. Marxist critics have objected that the analysis of material relations is often neglected "in favor of mere representations" (See *Periphery No. 120* (November 2010) focusing on: postcolonial perspectives on "development", and Ashcroft et al. 2007).

The supporters of the *post-development approach* see in the generally practiced politics of development neither a goal worth striving for, nor a goal that can be realized for humanity as a whole. Rather, they see it as a construct that would primarily pursue the goal of consolidating the dominance of industrial metropolises over the rest of the world (Sachs 1993). The intellectual forefather of *post-development advocates* is considered to be the French philosopher *Michel Foucault*, who brought into play the *discourse-theoretical* conviction that modernity was characterized by all sorts of sinister, unilaterally controlled power relations. *Power*, however glamorous and fearsome it might appear, was not a substance but only a particular *type of relationship* between individuals, with the state, with its ensemble of institutions, procedures, analyses, and reflections, representing the most complex and important form of political control (quoted in Reese-Schäfer 2000, p. 239; see also Heidemann 2011, pp. 131 f.). Discourses would determine thinking and whoever determined the discourse on truth and society would exercise power; thus, *alternative forms of knowledge* would be excluded, which would thus threaten the autonomy of non-Western communities (Ziai 2014, pp. 408–409).

Admittedly, the question to be asked here is: autonomy for what? Is cultural autonomy still possible in the era of globalization?

In his critique of development theories and development policy, *Ulrich Menzel* also denied the concept of developing the quality of an emancipatory, enlightened project that would, for example, pursue the implementation of modernity in the southern countries of the world. Rather, today it is "only about alleviating the most blatant cases of poverty, hunger, civil war, refugee misery, human rights violations, the disintegration of states and the dissolution of state order per se". There is even a threat of "*de facto recolonization*" in some parts of the world, "be it through the conditions of the IMF, the blue helmets of the United Nations, the various conditions of development cooperation (human rights conditions, environmental compatibility, women's component, etc.)" (Menzel 2010, p. 155).

In summary, it can be stated with *Aram Ziai*: in the eyes of *post-development authors,* the common development discourse is to be criticized as "Eurocentric, power-entangled, economistic, and domination-shaped" and also fulfills an ideological function (Ziai 2014, p. 414). However, this dismissive stance has been met with criticism by numerous authors, who have been able to point, for example, to successes in poverty reduction through development policy or to the unexpected rise in the quality of life in emerging Asian countries. A convincing alternative to mainstream development theories and development paradigms has not yet been presented, although the central insight of *post-development critics* should not be minimized, namely that the Western economic model (with its fetishization of economic growth at all costs) can claim neither global applicability nor global acceptance (Goldberg 2008; Hennings 2009; Tandon 2014). Accordingly, Ghanaian-born economist *George Ayittey,* in his book *Africa Unchained. The Blueprint for Africa's Future,* "conceived of a "new development strategy" that revolves around a vision of *participatory village development* in a pacified society (Ayittey 2005; see also Olopade 2014). However, the test of its practicality is still pending here.

2.14   Conclusion: Development—The Discussion Continues

At the end of this overview of some instructive development theories and development discourses, it should be noted that in the international *developmental debates* there are numerous approaches, perspectives, paradigms, and theorems, which often contradict each other and illuminate different empirical findings. A master narrative has not been found, but some plausible empirical findings have. Twenty years ago,

Wolfgang Hein had already formulated three transnational "*basic insights*": *First,* a strategy to overcome poverty would have to start with the broad promotion of improved *income opportunities in rural areas. Second*, poor societies would have to create the conditions for themselves to create the economic structures for a continuous *improvement in the satisfaction of needs,* "without dependence on external aid". To this end, "the combination of market-based allocation mechanisms with the targeted promotion of essential linkages in the internal economic structure, as well as some export sectors appropriate to local opportunities, has generally proved useful". The development of social and physical infrastructure was also "of key importance". *Third*, he said, *the "environmental sustainability of development* should not be lost sight of." However, *Hein* added warningly, any theory of development would fail in practice if it did not take into account the *specific characteristics* and dynamics of local society and its position in world society (Hein 1998, p. 374). It was striking that no significant role was attributed to external development assistance. At about the same time, the Bremen cultural scientist *Dieter Senghaas* published his theses on development theory, which culminated in the realization that without development of productive forces in the agricultural sector accompanying industrialization, prosperous development could not be expected, and that in the course of the modernization of society "expanded opportunities for political participation" were needed (Senghaas 1979, 1998). Who would want to contradict this? In the meantime, however, the discussion has become more detailed and broader (Szirmai 2005; Goldberg 2008; Hennings 2009; Hahn 2009; Stockmann et al. 2010; Faust and Neubert 2010; Schulz and Seebode 2010; Nebe 2011; Meyns 2009; Nuscheler 2012; Tandon 2014; Rauch et al. 2016; Mills 2010) and has, in my view, produced the following intermediate results and food for thought.

FIRST. Given the progressive differentiation of the "Third World" under the present conditions of globalization, *generalizations* should be refrained from; for the 'grand theories' have almost all proved to be deficient or only partially true. Among the now disproved doctrines are, for example, the hypothesis that exports of raw materials (mining products and agricultural goods) from poor countries could contribute nothing significant to economic development (Szirmai 2005, pp. 5–6), or the hypothesis that production for the world market, to which *less developed countries* (*LDCs*) are at the mercy of due to their *structural dependence* on techno-scientific metropolises, would represent a *dead-end of* development. Equally flawed has been the assumption of modernization theorists that lack of capital is the all-important *missing link* of development (which, however, *Jeffrey Sachs* still claims today; Sachs 2005) and therefore 'more development aid' could show the

way out of the 'poverty trap' (critically: Calderisi 2006; Easterly 2006; Goldberg 2008; Kölner Aufruf 2016; Mills 2010).

SECOND: 'Development' as a component of modernity is today meaningfully to be thought only "in the plural of possible paths of development" (Goetze 1997, p. 436). Through the differentiated critical discourses on development, as conducted not least by representatives of *post-development* and (feminist) *gender research,* a salutary *sensitization* to unjust, asymmetrical social structures and gender relations has become possible, which also attaches more importance to the local (Haidara 1992; Harding 1999; Schiefer 2002; Goldberg 2008; Hennings 2009; Meyns 2009). Today, *cultural diversity* is trump (Heidemann 2011; Verschuur et al. 2014; Mersmann and Kippenberg 2016).

THIRD: This dissolution of modernity into manifold, partly overlapping, partly contradictory modernities has, however, come at the price of widespread *uncertainty about the terms, norms, and practices* surrounding development policy and social analysis. Any statement can be scrutinised for undiscovered messages and 'traps', so development concepts that require a minimum of generalization, if they are to serve a particular target group, are also always open to attack. However, such a justified sensitization must not lead to powerlessness to act, which would hardly serve people in developing countries. It is not enough to denigrate 'development' as a myth or to want to 'deconstruct' it as an expression of Eurocentrism. Anyone who wants to make a political difference must "make a theoretical effort" (Altvater and Mahnkopf 1996, p. 575). Not least in the field of *anthropology,* which is concerned with "an understanding of the conditions, possibilities, and limits of human ways of life (cultures)" (Fischer 2017, p. 28), as well as in *gender studies*, such theoretical efforts have found their *sensitivity-building* expression (Schulz and Seebode 2010; Verschuur et al. 2014; Luig 2017). What is needed, therefore, are context-specific policies that are capable of satisfying specific local societal needs by mobilizing their potentials.

FOURTH: In my opinion, the first step in analyses of Third World countries should be to determine the type of developing country, whereby *four types* can be distinguished in *terms of regulatory policy*[2]:

1. *Articulated market economies* as *Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs)* or 'emerging economies'—the result of developmental state efforts.

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[2]In the final chapter, I have combined these four types of economic systems with four patterns of political systems, resulting in a matrix of 13 possible *types of developing countries.*

2. *Rent economies*. They are concerned with maximizing export revenues (*rents),* derived from state control over economic resources whose value is realized on world markets (not by own national efforts).
3. Classic *commodity economies*, dependent on the export of two or three commodities and without competitive industries. Dependent on suitable political policies and the economic cycle, they may or may not generate economic growth.
4. *Economies of violence* reproduce through illegal and/or criminal activities, such as piracy, diamond, and drug smuggling, human trafficking, and looting. Those afflicted by *state collapse* survive by retreating to *subsistence economies*, through migration, or by means of international disaster relief.

Tasks

1. State the differences between modernization and dependency theories.
2. How does the Bielefeld interdependence approach differ from other theories?
3. Describe key issues and topics in gender research.
4. Explain the controversial statements about the relationship between culture and development.

The Legacy of the Slave Trade and Colonialism

3.1 Five Phases of African History

There are probably few social scientists who would suppress or minimize the recognition that the continent of Africa, with its large empires and thousands of smaller communities, has been heavily shaped since the Atlantic slave trade (i.e. under the influence of *external* powers),—with implications to this day (for debate see Rodney 1976; Harding 1999; Iliffe 1969, 2000; Ansprenger 2002; Marx 2004; Nugent 2004; Meredith 2005; Speitkamp 2005; Parker and Rathbone 2007; Bayart 2009; Osterhammel 2005, 2009; Eckert et al. 2010; Fukuyama 2015). Looking first at Africa's recent history, concentrated from a bird's eye view, at least *five phases* can be defined:

- Phase 1: The long phase of the *Atlantic slave trade*, with its peak between the mid-seventeenth century and the end of the eighteenth century: it began after European colonialists discovered that the Caribbean islands were very suitable for growing sugar cane and that this required 'importing' large quantities of labor. It ended with the movement in Europe to abolish slavery (called the 'abolitionists') and with the Civil War in the USA in 1861–1865.
- Phase 2: The nineteenth century as a *time of great upheavals*, triggered on the one hand by reforms of African societies themselves, and on the other hand by the early phase of the policy of gradual seizure and *penetration* of African territories by merchants, trading companies and military expeditions from Europe. The latter occurred notably in Egypt (beginning with Napoleon's 'North Africa Expedition' in 1799), Algeria (from 1830 onwards, with Algerians resisting for three decades), four port cities in Senegal, and South Africa, where discoveries of gold and diamonds aroused desires. Nevertheless, the nineteenth

century was "*essentially a century of history shaped by Africans themselves, marked in all regions of the continent by the spatial expansion of political systems into territorial states ... Many of these states introduced new forms of social organization. This meant not only more powerful militaries, as among the Zulu, for example, but also new economies (on the west coast, the export of palm oil as a substitute for slaves) and, especially among peoples influenced by Islam, reform movements to purify and deepen the faith and activate the deeds it demanded*" (Ansprenger 2002, pp. 64–65).

- Phase 3. This is the time of *formal colonization:* imperialist rivalries between England and Russia (Afghanistan, India) as well as internal tensions in the industrializing states of Europe had triggered a *colonial fever that* would eventually lead, from the 1880s onwards to a large-scale general *scramble for Africa* and its raw materials and markets. The main participants were England, France, Portugal, Belgium, Italy and Germany. The diplomatic climax was the Berlin Congo Conference of 1884/85, chaired by the German Chancellor *Otto von Bismarck*. It has also been called the "high phase of imperialism" (1880–1960) (Osterhammel and Petersson 2003).

- Phase 4: The phase of *decolonization* began after the *Second World War* with the attainment of state independence by Libya (1951), Tunisia (1956), Sudan (1956), and the Gold Coast/Ghana (1957), and reached its first climax in 1960 with the liberation of 17 colonies, including almost all *francophone* territories. It finally ended with the negotiated decolonization of Namibia in 1990, which was ultimately achieved without violence—the separation of 'South West Africa' from South Africa, which itself overcame the apartheid system four years later with the electoral victory of the *African National Congress*-led by *Nelson Mandela*. While the seven white settler colonies (Algeria, Kenya, Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe, Namibia, South Africa, Mozambique, and Angola) could only be liberated through military resistance on the part of African liberation movements, regime change in all other colonies took place as a process of political negotiation of compromises between reluctant colonial Europeans and African elites demanding freedom (Le Suer 2003; Shipway 2008).

- Phase 5: The *post-colonial phase* covers the six decades since the attainment of political independence (from 1956/1960 to the present). Characteristics of this phase were (a) the holding of free parliamentary elections for independence; (b) the centralization of political power by authoritarian presidential regimes in the name of *nation-building* and *state-building*, often opposed by their military; (c) the manifold efforts of the now liberated countries to 'develop' their colonially deformed and backward economies through development aid projects; and (d) the relatively high national investments in the hitherto neglected education

system and other areas of infrastructure. The term *post-colonial* expresses the continuity of influences from the period of colonial foreign rule on the culture, economy, and society of African countries that have not yet been overcome (Hall 1996; Ashcroft et al. 2007; Mbembe 2014). This phase also includes the younger generation of *born-free people*, who only know colonialism from hearsay.

Imperialism refers to a violent form of rule that starts from a territorial or national core—the empire—and subjugates, exploits, and dominates neighboring peoples. Ethnocentric or racist stereotypes are invoked to justify subjugation and exploitation. "Imperialism is characterized by a particular style of politics: Transgressing borders, disrespecting the status quo, interventionist, using the military quickly, risking war, dictating peace. Imperialist politics assumes a hierarchy of peoples, always one of strong and weak, usually culturally or racially graded. Imperialists see themselves as a superior civilization and therefore entitled to rule over others" (Osterhammel 2009, p. 621). In contrast, *colonialism* refers to the formal form of domination by a country that perceives itself as 'superior' to other people who are oppressed and whose land is subordinated and exploited for the economic and political purposes of the mother country. Imperialism is thus the broader concept of foreign domination.

About the causes for the emergence of imperialism and colonial expansion, mainly 'left' economists (*Hilferding*) and Marxists (*Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg*) developed theories. While some said imperialism was mainly due to the compulsion to *export capital* from the metropolises to overseas territories, others claimed that the 'high rates of profit' overseas enticed companies to acquire colonies (Mommsen 1977). In reality, the annexation of African territories by the West was more complicated and multifaceted; however, there is agreement on one thing: colonialism, from the perspective of Africans, meant above all violence and racial discrimination, defamation of *autochthonous* culture, and compulsion to (partial) modernization (Fanon 1966; Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2014).

3.2   Colonial History and Eurocentrism

The coming to terms with the violent transformations and ruptures that colonial Europeans triggered in Africa, whether consciously or unintentionally, has also found expression in the *historiography of* Western states, specifically in their respective *colonial histories*. To characterize this multi-layered process, the Kassel historian *Winfried Speitkamp* uses the term *colonial history*, which he defines as

follows: "*Colonial history in this sense is firstly the history of violence, conquest, and penetration as well as of self-assertion and resistance. Colonial history is secondly the history of the 'colonial situation', overseas as well as in the metropolis. This includes perceptions, encounters, and processes of exchange. Here it is important to avoid a mere* dichotomous *view of perpetrators and victims and to include the possibilities of action of the colonized, to consider fields of participation, cooperation, and collaboration. Thirdly, colonial history is the history of the intended and unintended effects triggered by colonization, of destruction and decline as well as of development and modernization, of ethnic fragmentation and dissolution as well as of social reconstruction and nation-building in colonial and post-colonial times. Finally, colonial history is, fourthly, the history of the memory of colonial rule, the history of the struggles over interpretations and evaluations of the colonial experience. In this context, the metropolis and the former colonies are more closely bound to each other than is usually perceived today. It is precisely in this respect that colonial history is not yet over*" (Speitkamp 2005, pp. 11–12).

While in the past colonial history was mostly based on a *Eurocentric* view (e.g. Horst Gründer's standard work on German colonies), more recent studies have taken up a large amount of space that attempt to do justice to the colonial period from the perspective of Africans (e.g. Marx 2004; Eckert et al. 2010; Zimmerer 2014, Parker and Rathbone 2007). *Eurocentrism* means the conscious or unconscious method of one-sided worldview in which European values and European cultural institutions are presented as the natural and universally valid ones. In the process, value-laden *self-images and images of others are* often *invented* or *constructed*, i.e. they do not always correspond to an objective assessment. One's own culture is valorized, while foreign cultures tend to be devalued (Van Reybrouck 2012).

For a long time, the prevailing opinion in Europe was that Africa was a 'history-less', 'dark' continent where nothing important for the world had happened until the arrival of the whites (Martin 1993). In a sense, 'Africa' has been invented or constructed by Europeans—as a *paradigm of difference*, of otherness. Congolese philosopher *V. Y. Mudimbe* suggested that Africa served as "*an exotic prism*" through which foreigners, mostly Europeans, produced fractured images of the 'Other' and themselves (cited in Parker and Rathbone 2007, p. 5). The *ethnocentric* method of viewing history, a variant of Eurocentrism, has now been replaced by a differentiated, polycentric, or pluricultural approach (Harding 1999; Zimmerer 2013; Eckert 2015). According to this view, Africans were not only helpless victims of other peoples and/or curious objects of study for ethnologists, but in many ways active co-creators of their history. They acted as commanders, rulers over great kingdoms and sultanates, as hunters, merchants, traders, and peasants, as gold

miners, art smiths, scholars, and diplomats. West Africa, for example, had been linked to the trading powers of the rest of the world (especially the Mediterranean riparians) for millennia through the legendary gold trade across the Sahara, and not just since the supposedly beneficial *opening up of* the continent by explorers, colonial pioneers, and Christian missionaries from the white world. There is, as everywhere else in the world, a wealth of local histories and regional events in Africa that form part of people's cultural heritage and shape memory and behavior (Braudel 1993). These are now increasingly being researched or artistically shaped, not least by African scholars (Nugent 2004) and artists themselves (e.g. the Kenyan writer *Ngugi wa Thiong'o*).

One of the *Eurocentric clichés* about Africa is the assertion that African 'tribes' or 'hordes' had no culture. Only through the encounter with the culturally superior representatives of the 'white race' had Africans been 'culturally elevated', i.e. through great efforts on the part of the whites had they been placed on a 'higher cultural level'. Reference was made to schools, mission stations, hard forced labor on farms, plantations and mines, and railway construction. *Make people out of N . . .!*—was the hypocritical 'justification' of European colonial rule in Africa around 1900. In today's worldview, we would say that our ancestors were unintentionally involved in *Making N . . . out of people*, i.e. bending people who possessed their own culture to fit the white man's Eurocentric image of the 'Negro' (Fanon 1966; Mbembe 2014). Since Africans were "by nature" lazy, indolent, and uneducated, and only capable of hard physical work, they had to be educated to culture by force (Zimmerer 2013, p. 414 f.).

In the process of formal colonization, Christian missionaries—in addition to geographers, ethnologists, and merchants—also played an essential role in the nineteenth century: the Basel Mission, the North German Missionary Society based in Bremen, the Rhenish Missionary Society founded in Barmen, the Gossner Mission based in Berlin, the French Catholic Fathers of the Holy Spirit, to name but a few. According to their self-image, they wanted to bring 'the light of civilization' and the 'true' faith of the Christian religion to the Africans living in superstition, magic, and darkness. Not all missionaries behaved like willing helpers of European colonial rule; quite a few came into conflict with the land-hungry white settlers and pursued 'the conservative goal of turning Africans into independent farmers and craftsmen with family businesses and thus producers for the world market and demanders of European goods' (Reinhard 2013, p. 291). But it can probably be generally stated that colonized Africans viewed Christian missionaries as the 'soft part' of the colonial oppressive system. Objectively speaking, they were *nolens volens* mediators of European values that constituted a general cultural assault on the life-worlds of African village communities.

3.3   Transatlantic Slave Trade and Its Abolition

Slavery as a *deprivation of human freedom rights* has existed in various forms for millennia, all over the globe, where people of different cultures violently clashed. Most often, they were victims of wars as booty, sold into slavery as prisoners of war, or forced into drudgery (i.e., working for the master). The purpose of *enslavement* was the inexpensive exploitation of foreign labor. In the early modern period, when robust labor was needed in large numbers for sugar cane, tobacco, and cotton plantations in Brazil and the Caribbean, an era of the destruction of African habitats began. The work of destruction continued into the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the rapid expansion of *rapacious and plunderous colonialism*; the unchecked demand for labor in the colonial tropics gave the institution of slavery, in the form of the *Atlantic slave trade,* its monstrous drama. It is considered the greatest collective human crime of the modern era—victims at the time were almost exclusively people from Africa (Braudel 1986, pp. 479–491; Hochschild 2002; Postma 2003; Osterhammel 2009; Eckert 2010; Schicho 2010).

On the subject of slavery, a distinction is made between relatively tolerable *domestic slavery,* in which those held had certain rights and were often regarded as another member of the family (as in antiquity, for example), and *commercial slavery, in which* people were bought, sold and exported as *commodities* and treated as completely lawless *serf* laborers deprived of human dignity. Since the Crusades of the Middle Ages, this abhorrent practice also existed in Central Europe and the Orient: Christians and Muslims alike enslaved their prisoners of war or sold them abroad, while they were anxious to spare their brothers and sisters in the faith this terrible fate. For Africa, slavery played a particularly destructive role in the form of the *Atlantic slave trade,* which lasted for three centuries (sixteenth-nineteenth centuries); between 11 and 12 million people were trafficked across the oceans to North and South America. If one adds the large number of people who died on the way in Africa due to exhaustion and disease, the *human loss* of the African continent increases to almost 14 million (according to Postma 2003; Marx 2004, p. 19).

The period from 1726 to 1850 is considered the peak of transatlantic *export slavery,* which integrated Africa into a global migration system—with indirect consequences far into the interior of the continent. Each year an average of 76,000 people were exported from Africa; 40% of all slaves went to *Brazil*, a total of about four million. They came from *Angola* and the *Congo Basin*, and also came from the *Guinea Coast* region, the *"Gold Coast"* (now *Ghana*), the *Ivory Coast*, and other regions of West Africa. Because of the horrors of *middle passage*

(during the Atlantic crossing on sailing ships, slaves were naked and chained with minimal food), "the number of arrivals was 10–20% lower (comparable to losses of no more than 5% on European emigrant ships"; Osterhammel 2009, p. 230).

The so-called *Oriental slave trade* also had disastrous consequences for Africa. In the recipient countries of the Oriental slave trade, slaves were used on plantations or in the households and harems of the wealthy. *Mohammed Ali*, for example, who as ruler of Egypt established a kind of *development dictatorship in* his country after Napoleon's invasion, needed supplies for his slave army, which had been built up since the 1920s and which continued an old Ottoman tradition of military slavery. At the height of this demand, 10,000 to 12,000 such military slaves arrived in Egypt annually around 1838. This was the great period of Arab slave hunts in eastern Sudan, the Horn, and East Africa: from Khartoum or Darfur, squads of Muslim slave hunters advanced into the territories of 'infidels' who were defenseless against them. "Murderous captive caravans sometimes marched a 1000 km before reaching the Red Sea" (Osterhammel 2009, pp. 230–231). According to *Johannes Postma's* calculations, about 25% of the hunted slaves died on the way to the coast of the *Sultanate of Oman* and to the neighboring Muslim dominions, which had already been importing slaves since the ninth century—a total of about nine million Africans (Postma 2003, p. 78f).

European merchants were able to make use of African middlemen and *chiefs* from the coastal regions, with whom they also maintained other business relations—trade in palm oil, cocoa, peanuts, etc.—when acquiring the coveted labor. For these middlemen 'procured' the *black ivory* from the interior of the continent, which remained closed to Europeans for a long time (simply because of tropical diseases and territorial empires that were heavily secured militarily). The fact that Africans of the coastal regions (in order to be spared themselves) professionally hunted other Africans from neighboring tribes and the interior and then resold the 'goods' as middlemen is one of the great tragedies of African history (Braudel 1986, p. 482 f.; Davidson 1992). In this context, colonial Europeans probably bear the greatest share of the blame for the abduction, because it corresponded to their greed and the logic of the early capitalist mode of production that the continent of Africa should be integrated into the world economy at the lowest level in the course of the imperial *triangular trade* (Hahn 2009, p. 17 f.).

This was only achieved by force, as Africa was not primarily seen as an equal trading partner, but as a supplier of labour and carriers of raw materials such as ivory, gold, salt, and rubber. Later, other *colonial goods* were added, such as coffee, cocoa, peanuts, and especially cotton, the latter the coveted raw material for the European textile industry. The intercontinental triangular trade consisted of Africa supplying, in addition to gold and ivory, above all the *raw material man,* for which

it received (in the late nineteenth century) above all firearms (guns, cannons, ammunition), glass beads, and schnapps. The recipient countries of slaves—the two Americas and the Caribbean islands of *Cuba, Haiti, San Domingo,* etc.— exported sugar, spices, tobacco, palm oil, cotton, and other *colonial goods* to Europe, which in return sold textiles ('Manchester' fabrics) and other consumer goods to newly opened overseas markets. European port cities such as Venice, Genoa, Lisbon, Marseilles, London, Manchester, Bristol, Rotterdam and Hamburg benefited greatly from this unequal international trade in goods.

There are not many documents from African pens that can provide information about the origins and practices of European greed for *black gold.* All the more remarkable are the letters of complaint from the converted king named *Nzinga Mbemba Affonso,* ruler of the *Mani-Congo Empire*, who ascended the throne in 1506 and ruled as *Affonso I* for almost 40 years. He did his best to resist the creeping destruction of his empire by writing letters of entreaty to the Portuguese king, *Joao III.* For example*,* he wrote in 1526: "Day by day the merchants snatch and carry off people from among our people—children of this country, sons of our nobles and vassals, even people of our own family . . . This corruption and wickedness are so widespread that our country is completely depopulated . . . We need in this kingdom only priests and teachers and no merchandise, except when it is wine and flour for the mass . . . We wish this kingdom to be no place for trade or the transport of slaves" (quoted. in Hochschild 2002, p. 24). *King Affonso I.* kept coming back to the seduction of his countrymen by the glitter of Portuguese goods (fabrics, jewelry, tools): "These commercial goods, " he wrote, " exert such an attraction on simple and ignorant people that they become the object of their faith, and faith in God is forgotten . . . My prince, tremendous greed drives our subjects, even Christians, to seize the members of their own families and ours to do business and sell them as captives" (Hochschild 2002, p. 25). The royal court of Lisbon was, unfortunately, unwilling to listen to the complaints and pleas of the Mani-Congo ruler and continued the work of destruction.

Jürgen Osterhammel, in his multifaceted *History of the Nineteenth Century (Geschichte des 19. Jahrhunderts)*, has argued that "the most important legacy of the slave trade was slavery itself". Slavery had "already existed before the arrival of European slave traders in the sixteenth century, but the slave trade brought about a generalization of this institution and gave rise to societies whose logic was the making of slaves in war campaigns. Between 1750 and 1850, about one-tenth of the African population may have been in a slave status . . . The town of Banamba in what is now Mali, for instance, was founded only in the 1840s and soon functioned as the center of a far-reaching slaveholding network; it was surrounded by a 50-km-wide belt of slave plantations . . . There is much to suggest that slavery was by no

means merely an archaic relic of the pre-modern era, but that a slave *mode of production was well adapted to* the new opportunities of the nineteenth century . . . In West Africa, there were states such as the Sokoto Caliphate, Asante, and Dahomey, that often imported slaves from far away to work on plantations or in handicrafts. The population of the city of Lagos is said to have been nine-tenths of slaves in the 1850s, on the eve of its placement under British protectorate (1861)" (Osterhammel 2009, pp. 232–233).

Presumably, people in Christian societies, as well as those in Islamic societies, became aware early on (unlike the people of ancient Greece) that slavery was 'sin' (before God) or a 'crime against humanity'. For example, anyone who was baptized or converted to the faith as a foreigner was no longer allowed to be enslaved. This was another reason why, for example, conversion to Islam was very popular among people from lower classes (e.g. in India), because it was associated with the hope of a better life. There is still controversy in research today (Postma 2003; Marx 2004; Osterhammel 2009; Eckert 2010) as to which of the two main motives and interests led to the *abolition* of slavery in the nineteenth century—moral concerns or material self-interest. Some can point to the fact that the legacy of the Enlightenment and the Christian commitment to the equal treatment of all people led more and more politically influential groups to argue for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade. Others, on the other hand, draw attention to the fact that profit rates in the international slave trade declined as 'supply problems' increased and the use of paid contract labor on the Caribbean and Brazilian plantations was more cost-effective in the long run. Slaves often attempted escapes and resisted, necessitating increased guards. Besides, only a smaller percentage of looted and trafficked slaves arrived in their new forced overseas homes (estimated at 30–50%). Inspired by true horror stories of the disastrous sanitary conditions on slave ships and slave plantations, that made the rounds in London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, The Hague, and elsewhere, European humanists fought for the abolition of the slave trade and slavery. Most notable among these was a pious preacher from England named *William Wilberforce* (1759–1833). In 1789, as the leader of the abolitionists, he introduced the first of 12 resolutions in the British Parliament to abolish slavery; but it would be another 28 years before the abolition resolution was adopted by the British Parliament in 1807. The U.S. is the only country to have a civil war in 1861–1865 over the abolition of slavery. The southern states wanted to keep the slave economy and separate from the rest of the Union (War of Secession). President *Abraham Lincoln* (1860–1865) freed all slaves in the Southern (the "Confederate") territory in 1863 in what became known as the Emancipation Proclamation. Two years later he was assassinated for this.

In 1888, Brazil also finally abolished slavery. However, the illegal international slave trade and the exploitation of slave labor continued until the First World War. In West Africa, powerful rulers continued to resist the abolition of slavery, which was lucrative for them and had become the basis of their mode of production. In *Ibadan*, West Africa's largest city in the nineteenth century with a population of 70,000, there were more than one hundred entrepreneurs in the 1860s and 1870s, each owning more than 500 slaves. The African plantation economy was thus comparable in this respect to that in the southern states of North America before the Civil War. Both forms of production were based on slave labor and have since been recognized by scholars "as a specifically modern, capitalist economic form that was embedded in a system of modernized political rule." This economic form can be understood as *endogenous modernization*: that is, as the transition of African societies from a subsistence economy to a market-driven form of commercial production. But this attempt, too, was later "stifled by colonialism" (Marx 2004, p. 29); for the black competition was undesired by the white *master race.*

The crimes of the Atlantic slave trade have often been compared to those of the *Holocaust* by the German National Socialists (Postma 2003, p. 81): in both cases, a brutal variant of racism had come to light. Nevertheless, the difference should not be overlooked that the aim of the murder of six million Jews of Europe served the extermination of a people—a monstrous delusion; while the purpose and aim of the slave trade was their maximum exploitation of their labor power—thus following an economic method fed by unrestrained greed. Should the West today apologize to the descendants of the Atlantic slave trade and possibly make reparations? There are African intellectuals who answer this question in the affirmative. In 1996, when U.S. President *Bill Clinton,* on his African tour, expressed *regret to Africans* for the atrocities committed against Africans associated with the slave trade without addressing the controversial *issue of compensation,* many were disappointed. An argument for reparations to Africans can be seen in the long traumatic aftermath of the transatlantic slave trade. But to whom should what be paid, and in what amounts? The Nigerian writer *Wole Soyinka*, who was the first black African author to win the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1986, argued in his book *The Burden of Memory, the Muse of Forgiveness* that compensation payments by Europe to African governments in the office today would be inappropriate because of the equally devastating consequences of the "Arab-Muslim dimension" of the slave trade (Soyinka 2001, p. 55 and pp. 73–74).

We can state: From the perspective of world society, a concatenation of four processes—the Atlantic slave trade, the slave economy in the two Americas and the Islamic Orient, intra-African slavery, and the early imperialist colonial triangular trade based on export slavery—severely impeded and in some cases blocked

altogether the organic unfolding of development opportunities in African societies (Rodney 1976); for entire regions were depopulated, the emergence of larger settlements and inland towns was impeded, many people hid from slave hunters, and general insecurity and fear of being enslaved by hostile neighboring ethnic groups or strangers fostered traumatic fears. Moreover, an African internal differentiation along master-and-servant, hunter-and-hunted lines set in, making it difficult to discern who was the victim and who was the perpetrator. Even today, slavery (in the form of domestic slavery and the purchase of unfree people who thus become the property of the buyer) is still not completely overcome in countries such as Mauritania and Sudan.

Tasks

1. What types of slavery are mentioned in the text? How do they differ?
2. How were African rulers involved in the Atlantic slave trade?
3. Slave trade and Holocaust—can the two crimes against humanity be compared? First, work out the events in their historical contexts.

The Phase of Formal Colonization (1880–1960)

4

4.1 The Berlin Conference 1884/5

Colonialism is a cultural phenomenon of domination that has developed in various contexts and forms with *European expansion over the past* 500 years or so and, in the form of *post-colonialism,* still provides an important approach to understanding North-South relations today. Colonialism can be defined in the most general sense as the domination of a non-local (originally) power over a local population whose resources are exploited for self-enrichment and the consolidation of one's power. In the process, ideological justifications are constructed based on the claimed own racial or cultural superiority, e.g. of white 'colonial masters' over colonial subjects devalued as 'exotic-foreign' or 'uncivilized' (Osterhammel 2005, p. 21; Zimmerer 2013, p. 15). The influential US-American Africa researcher *Frederick Cooper* has named as the unique selling point of colonial rulers the endeavour to reproduce social and cultural differences between the conquerors and the subjugated (Cooper 2006, p. 16).

In the collective memory of both Europeans and Africans, the 80-year phase of *formal colonialism 1880–1960* lives on to the present: Among Africans most certainly as a collective memory of a painful period of humiliations and exploitation (Fanon 1966; van Reybrouck 2012; Mamdani 1996; Mbembe 2014), among the Europeans involved more as a memory of the heroic 'good old days' when the European colonial powers as great powers were still considered something in the world and could convince their compatriots of their respective civilizing mission overseas. *Colonial places of remembrance* still bear witness to the widespread awareness of cultural superiority in the present day. In an anthology on colonial *sites of memory*, the historian *Jürgen Zimmerer*, who teaches in Hamburg, has put forward the plausible thesis that colonialism was and still is a Pan-European project

and should therefore also be "explored as a Pan-European memory" (Zimmerer 2013, p. 32). German colonialism was also "intensively linked to European colonialism", of which the international *scramble for Africa* and the Berlin Conference on the Congo are striking examples. *Sites of memory* can be understood as crystallization points of the collective memory of a population, whereby these can be deconstructed and thus also changed depending on the context. Popular colonial sites of memory are, for example, 'the loyal askaris of General Lettow-Vorbeck' in German East Africa, or the 'civilizing achievement' of the German settlers in 'Southwest' (see the contributions by Stefanie Michels, Henning Melber, Volker Langbehn and Gordon Uhlmann in Zimmerer 2013).

In the second half of the nineteenth century, explorers, geographers, explorers, and Christian missionaries had awakened the imagination and interest of people in Europe in the *dark continent,* of which not much was known until then. Not all explorers allowed themselves to be harnessed to the cart of colonial political interests, as will be indicated by two examples—*Heinrich Barth* and *Gustav Nachtigal.* The historian, philologist, and geographer *Heinrich Barth*, born in Hamburg in 1821, is one of the most important representatives among German African researchers. He undertook extensive research trips to West and Central Africa and also spent seven months in the Islamic cultural metropolis of *Timbuktu*, where he conducted his ethnological studies. In doing so, he described their people and their autochthonous cultures with respect and recognized them as equals to the inhabitants of the Western world. Admittedly, this did not fit in with the euphoria of the colonial movement in the Wilhelminian Empire. In contrast to Barth, the African explorer *Gustav Nachtigal* (1834–1885), who had earned great scientific merits through his exploratory journeys to North and West Africa, supported the colonial propaganda of his time. He was persuaded by the German Chancellor *Prince Bismarck* to establish colonial rule in Togo and Cameroon and thus became a colonial conqueror.

The US explorer *Henry Morton Stanley had an* even greater political impact. By crossing Africa from west to east and exploring the Congo Basin (since 1874), he had erased the last great *blank spot* from the map of Africa. From 1879 to 1884 *Stanley* again travelled to Africa, this time on behalf of *King Leopold II of Belgium,* on a secret mission to hastily establish colonial trading posts through alleged 'treaties' with local rulers (Hochschild 2002; van Reybrouck 2012). Haste was required, for his fear that others might beat him to it was not unfounded. To the south, Portugal claimed 'its' old colony (at the mouth of the Congo); in the service of the French army, the officer *Piere Brazza* travelled to the western Congo basin and raised the French flag there in 1881, naming the place *Brazzaville*. It became the capital of the colony 'Republic of Congo' founded by *Brazza* on his own. The race

for Africa had begun. In 1881, France occupied Tunisia, 3 years later Guinea; in 1882, Great Britain occupied Egypt, nominally still part of the Ottoman Empire, which had become entangled in a debt trap and which itself claimed dominion over Sudan and parts of Somalia; Italy took possession of parts of Eritrea; and the German Empire, after some hesitation, placed the coasts of Togo and Cameroon under its *protection, as* well as *Lüderitz-Land*, later German Southwest Africa, and the *protectorate* of German East Africa.

From the African point of view, the violent invasion of the colonial Europeans meant a breach of civilization that was not accepted without complaint. In the 1880s, for example, such a *clash of civilizations* occurred in the Anglo-Egyptian semi-colony of *Sudan* (in what is now the province of Kordofan), when a dervish[1] who called himself *al Mahdi* (the Redeemer) launched a strong religious movement opposed to slavery, foreign domination, and foreign cultural influences. He organized an uprising against the Egyptian-English administration, had Khartoum stormed in 1885, and had the English governor, General *Gordon,* assassinated. His empire of pious, fanatical Muslims (a kind of militant religious state led by a caliph) lasted until 1898 when it was destroyed by an English army (Pleticha 1981).

King Leopold was anxious to gain international recognition for his acquisitions in Africa; at the same time, it became apparent that the growing rivalry between European states over Africa required new rules of the game. Therefore, the German Chancellor *Otto von Bismarck* called 14 states together in Berlin. From November 15, 1884, to February 26, 1885, the so-called *Berlin Conference* met in the Palace of the Chancellor of the German Reich in Wilhelmstrasse. Ostensibly, Africa was to be opened up to free trade and civilization; but in the end, it was not the territorial division of Africa that was codified—as is often falsely claimed—but the so-called *Congoact* that was adopted. Its main provisions, agreed to by all 13 European states and the United States (only the Ottoman Empire rejected it), were as follows: (1) In the entire catchment area of the Congo and Lake Nyassa (now Malawi), and east of it as far as Cameroon in the west (in 18 African 'states' in all), all signatory states enjoyed the freedom of trade; (2) The Niger and Congo rivers were opened to navigation; (3) If a state claimed territory, it had to be an 'effective seizure', by which was meant investment in the development of infrastructure suitable for trade; (4) The slave trade was now considered internationally prohibited. The Berlin Conference "stands for European paternalism and arrogance, for megalomania [exaggerated self-assessment] and misjudgments . . . For many Africans, the Berlin

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[1]A dervish is a member of an Islamic religious order whose rites include music and rhythmic dancing.

Africa Conference, has become "the symbol for the beginning of the continent's permanent crisis" (Eckert 2013, p. 148).

At the same time, negotiations were being conducted on King Leopold's claim to international recognition of the *Congo Free State*—an area as large as Western Europe—as the private property of the Royal *Congo Society,* which actually happened. Prince *Bismarck*, the English, and French diplomats—they were all blind to the danger of handing over millions of Africans to a greedy despot. *King Leopold II*, in Belgium a constitutional monarch, in Africa now, where he owned hardly more than a handful of trading stations on the Congo River, an unscrupulous exploiter, ruled the *Free State* for 23 years until it, by now completely ruined, had to be taken over by the Belgian state as a colony in November 1908 (Hochschild 2002, p. 183).

The establishment of criteria for the recognition of colonial possessions under international law ("*effective occupation*") triggered a race for the territories not yet occupied and the definitive demarcation of the previous possession. Within a few years, Africa, except for *Liberia* and the Christian empire of *Ethiopia*, was divided among the European powers. More than ten million square miles of African land and over 100 million Africans came under European foreign rule in just over two decades. From today's perspective, it is not easy to understand why the seven European states took it upon themselves to seize every corner of the African continent at the end of the nineteenth century. The territorial conquests were, after all, likely to be very arduous, costly in terms of loss and effort due to the expected resistance of African empires and peoples who had already come into possession of firearms. Would not the continuation of the *informal rule* have sufficed to continue exploiting Africa's raw materials? The history of peoples does not proceed rationally and logically, for instance, determined only by economic interests and other considerations of utility, but it often emerges unplanned as a concatenation of time-bound circumstances and human calculations that may sometimes appear rational, sometimes irrational. The imperialist zeitgeist spurred the need of power elites in competing for industrial states to be guided by national prestige thinking. In Wilhelmine Germany, such an interest was also widespread in conservative circles of society, e.g. among '*Kolonialvereine*', '*Flottenvereine*' and individual representatives of the military, churches, industrial associations, and university colleges. By acquiring their colonies, people thought they could demonstratively increase their national standing in the world as an imperialist state.

4.2   Motives and Interests of European Colonialism

Seven European states participated in the division of Africa into *"Schutzgebiete"*, *protectorates*, *crown colonies*, *overseas territories*, and *colonies* in the nineteenth century: England, France, and Germany, as well as Portugal, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. Notably absent were Austria-Hungary, the Netherlands, and Russia. With few exceptions, all of Africa has been colonized by force by Europeans (von Albertini 1976; Ki-zerbo 1981; Marx 2004; Cooper 2006). African colonies were eight times larger in area than the European continent. At least two phases of formal colonialism (1880 to 1960) can be distinguished: In the first particularly violent phase (until about 1900), the final division of the vast continent among the colonial powers occurred in a fairly short period. This *courtship* was characterized by violent and mostly fraudulent land seizures by private "colonial pioneers" such as *Adolf Lüderitz* in Southwest Africa, *Gustav Nachtigal* in Cameroon, and Carl *Peters* in East Africa on the one hand, and by fierce defensive struggles by the indigenous population on the other. In the second phase, which began after the suppression of the African resistance (the African *primary resistance*), more systematic efforts were made by the Europeans to establish a functioning administration and also to 'get something out' of the colonies. This is called the *in-valuation* of the colonies (or 'put in value', as if the land had had no 'value' for the people living there before!).

England had the largest colonial possessions with 24 colonies and protectorates (a *protectorate* is in legal status less than a *colony* where the 'natives' were administered directly by the government of the colonial mother country). The most economically important colonies were Cape Colony and Natal in *South Africa, Nigeria,* and *Gold Coast* in West Africa. They were part of the *Pax Britannica*—a term for not-so-peaceful world domination—that, in the name of free trade imperialism, ensnared other peoples in Asia, Latin America, and the Ottoman Empire in a global network of capitalist commodity production. After the clash with Napoleonic France, Britain had emerged "as the owner of the world's only operational navy" (Osterhammel 2009, p. 650), which was now deployed to make the island empire the richest nation in the world. Britain's trading partners had to abolish interstate tariffs and liberalize foreign trade by signing free trade treaties so that Britain, which had become the *workshop of the world,* could sell its industrial products without hindrance. Moreover, the *Empire* dreamed of a continuous possession from the *Cape to Cairo*.

France had also been able to gather together a huge colonial possession (18 colonies). In a few years, France had conquered a colonial empire from the

small and insignificant coastal settlements in *Senegal,* which stretched from Dakar across Lake Chad to the mouth of the Congo. At the same time, the conquests of *Indochina, Tunisia*, and *Madagascar* took place. The governments in Paris had partly covered, partly deliberately pushed the expansion of the military, but the financial burdens on the colonial metropolis were to be kept as low as possible—as in England. Thus, in 1895 the *Federation of French West Africa (Afrique-Occidentale Française, AOF) was* founded with *Dakar/Senegal* as its administrative center, and in 1910 the *Federation of Equatorial Africa (AEF)* was created with its headquarters in *Brazzaville/Congo*. Laws for the administration of the colonies were prepared by the Colonial Ministry in Paris and enacted by decree of the President of the Republic. *Algeria*, which had already been taken into possession by force since 1830 and which was considered an integral part of metropolitan France (until 1962), had a special position in this context (von Albertini 1976, p. 273 f.).

Imperial *Germany* had entered the circle of colonial powers relatively late under Kaiser Wilhelm I and his Imperial Chancellor Prince von Bismarck, who had initially shown little interest in own colonies in Africa. It was therefore only able to acquire economically unattractive countries (those without gold, copper, diamonds and other mineral resources): *Tanganyika* or German East Africa with its capital Dar es Salaam (plus the dwarf states of Rwanda and Burundi in the interior of the '*Dark Continent*') in the east; *Namibia* or *German Southwest Africa* with Windhoek as its capital in the south; and *Cameroon* (Duala) and *Togo* (Lomé) in West Africa (Gründer 1985; Speitkamp 2005).

The *Portuguese*, as Europe's first seafaring nation, had been able to occupy vast African coastal landscapes and offshore islands (useful for slave exports), a total of six colonial territories several times the size of the mother country (*Angola, Portuguese Guinea,* and *Mozambique,* as well as the tiny islands of *Cape Verde, Sao Tomé and Principe*). The Kingdom of *Belgium* acquired colonial possessions only in the Congo Basin. *King Leopold II* (1865–1909) had founded the Congo Free State in 1884 and had its inhabitants brutally exploited ever since. His methods have gone down in colonial history as the so-called *Congo atrocities,* which included the chopping off of hands if taxpayers had not collected and delivered enough rubber (De Witte 2001; Hochschild 2002; van Reybrouck 2012). *Italy* played no less inglorious role as a colonial power. Between 1927 and 1935, Italy squabbled with Britain, France, and the Emperor of Ethiopia over Red Sea territories, with the result that the habitat of the nomadic *Somali* tribes was divided into four colonial protectorates or empires. Britain secured the port of *Berbera* and its environs (*British Somalia*); France was awarded the port of *Djibouti* (now an independent mini-state of the same name); *Ethiopia* conquered the *Ogaden* and annexed the

Somali-populated territory as state property, which has led to warring conflicts to the present (Matthies 2005). And Italy got the lion's share with *Mogadishu* as its capital: *Italian Somalia*. This 'Balkanization' (fragmentation into numerous smaller territories) of the *Somali* settlement area (predominantly nomadic) is only one particularly striking example of the colonial rulers' practice of arbitrarily drawing borders—irrespective of organically grown habitats of the locals.

All European colonial powers followed the logic of *valorizing the* conquered territories to generate state revenues with which the colonies could then be administered, infrastructural developed and exploited as cheaply as possible. The obligation to pay head or hut taxes to the colonial state was—along with drudgery— the most effective economic means of coercion to break up the relatively autono- mous subsistence economy of the Africans and to integrate a part of society into the capitalist market system. As far as the *types of administration of colonies* are concerned, at least four basic forms can be distinguished, which provided for different roles for Africans:

Firstly, in the beginning, the *trading colony* was the dominant type: colonial Europeans had not come to Africa as settlers here but were active as hunters, adventurers, traders, or administrators. Many were primarily interested in acquiring natural wealth such as rubber, ivory, animal hides, gold, and palm oil and shipping them to Europe. Africans were used here mainly as laborers for road and railway construction, and were sought out and conscripted as load-bearers of 'colonial goods' (partly as substitutes for slaves). Where possible, plantation colonies could later develop from this.

Secondly, *plantation colonies*: These were to produce *cash crops* (as opposed to *food crops*, which were grown only for subsistence) for the 'mother country'. For this purpose, enough Africans had to be acquired for the front-line work in European-run farms—by means of work contracts or, if necessary, by force. Since this always involved *land managers* who, as farmers, herdsmen and hunters, were themselves harnessed as labourers to reproduce the families, conflicts arose con- stantly: the proverbial 'worker question'. *Christoph Marx* described this type of colonial mode of production as follows: 'Plantations . . . were usually enclaves of intensive capitalist production amid a peasant environment. Because plantations were markedly labor-intensive production sites, however, they drew large segments of the surrounding population into the plantation environment either as laborers or as service providers, petty traders, transporters, prostitutes, and [those] engaged in other functions. For example, white planters in southern Côte d'Ivoire ran prosper- ous cocoa and coffee plantations with migrant workers from Upper Volta, which led to the permanent settlement of many people from the north in Abidjan and the coastal region . . . In addition, there were state-initiated large-scale projects such as

the huge *Gezira* cotton plantation in Sudan, which was run from about 1920 onwards with artificial irrigation on about 400,000 ha of land south of Khartoum by smallholder tenants. Cotton plantations were lucrative ventures for members of the Egyptian upper classes as early as the nineteenth century, while vine cultivation in Algeria or sugar production in South Africa was in the hands of white settlers. Other plantation colonies were largely under the control of overseas monopoly companies, e.g. Liberia, where the American tyre manufacturer Firestone had been operating rubber plantations on 400,000 ha of land since 1926 and exercised strong influence as a creditor of the government" (Marx 2004, p. 170).

Thirdly, there were *mining colonies* which, due to natural endowment with the coveted mineral resources such as iron, copper, gold, silver, platinum, and later oil and uranium, were mainly functionalized as suppliers of mineral raw materials for the colonial mother country. These included, for example, *Belgian Congo* (copper), *Northern Rhodesia* (copper), *South West Africa* (copper), and *Southern Rhodesia* (coal and platinum). Here Africans, formally employed as *contract laborers,* had to extract ores from the ground and transport them to markets under hair-raising working conditions. African mining—first in the *Cape Colony*, where the largest diamond deposits (1867) and then also the largest gold deposits in the world (1886) were discovered—gave rise to "a special form of city that was mono-culturally oriented, i.e. owed its existence solely to mining and geared its entire infrastructure to it": the *mining cities* (Marx 2004, p. 171).

Fourth, there was the small group of *settler colonies* dominated by a white minority of Europeans who hoped to live and work there 'forever' as 'master-men' on plantations and cattle ranches. "Colonial policy was land policy. Acquisition of land, disposal of land, and use of land were the focus justified successes and caused problems of colonization" (Speitkamp 2005, p. 73). It was under this type of colony that the African rural population suffered the most because they were driven from their cultivation areas in large numbers to make way for the expansive settlers—which threatened their ability to survive. It is therefore not surprising that it was almost exclusively in such settler colonies that militant 'uprisings' (from the point of view of the whites) or 'wars of resistance and liberation' (from the point of view of the Africans) occurred.

The fifth group is the '*mixed-economy colony*' type, in which there was a (mostly un-peaceful) coexistence between white settlers and African *cash crop producers:* Both groups produced goods for the world market. African smallholders responded to market signals and switched their mode of production to the cultivation of lucrative *colonial goods* (or *cash crops*). They were "smallholder, quasi clod-bound people who farmed in a market-oriented manner while remaining rooted in

their communities." They were more likely than proletarians to be won over to Christian attitudes and loyalty to the authorities (Speitkamp 2005, p. 83).

The 'colonial state' as an administrative system—in contrast to the state in the colonial 'mother countries'—had little vertical depth; for it reached down to the village level in only a very few cases. Moreover, administrative hierarchies were flat: Between the governor at the top and the *District Commissioner* (British Africa) or the *Commandant de Cercle* (in French Africa) or the *Bezirksamtmann* (German Africa) at the bottom, there was only the Provincial Commissioner as an intermediate level. Colonial administration was supposed to be cheap, so that the European district officials, who were responsible for all aspects of life, had an enormous amount of power. At the same time, this meant—in the absence of separation of powers—an institutional invitation to *despotic* behavior. This came to fruition in the use of corporal punishment, which has not been forgotten in post-colonial Africa to this day.

Common to the 'colonial state' of the Europeans was the endeavor to provide a minimum of formal education to a small part of the African colonial population. The main beneficiaries of these *colonial schools*, which were either established and run by Christian missionaries (in British and German colonies) or by the state (in French colonies and protectorates), were the sons of chiefs. As well as teaching the basic skills of reading, writing, and arithmetic that were necessary for employment as altar boys, clerks, overseers, drivers, cooks, gardeners, or assistants in the production of newspapers, colonial schools were also intended to instill 'European' values such as *punctuality, diligence, reliability, and humility*. The African was to look up to the white man' as "to a higher being" (Tetzlaff 1970, p. 200). The value was denied to African traditions, which were usually associated with stereotypes of barbarism, savagery, and crudeness. It was only in the final phase of colonization that this chauvinistic racist attitude changed somewhat. An integral part of the 'colonial state' was the so-called *native penal code*, which in its various national variants regulated corporal punishment and forced labour of 'natives'. The hippo whip—*kiboko* in German East Africa became notorious (Speitkamp 2005, p. 68f.). Only for Africans, a form of law was created that referred to African traditions, the so-called *customary law*. In this process, local legal customs were collected, homogenized, and put in writing (Marx 2004, p. 165). "Colonialism takes away your initiative; you are thrown out of your history into someone else's history"—as *Chinua Achebe* later put it (Beier 1999, p. 22).

The unintended consequences of colonial schools have been rightly pointed out time and again (Grohs 1967; Mbembe 2014): by coming into contact with Western values, Christian teachings of charity, and European experiences such as the Enlightenment and Reformation in their educational process, Africans became

Fig. 4.1 Africa–Colonial division until 1914. Scale: 1: 60 mio

acquainted with the intellectual weapons with which the young educated elite after 1945 could justify their demands for freedom, equality, and respect in the decolonization struggle. The colonial masters wanted submissive servants and obedient assistants; what they could not prevent in the process was their political emancipation as a reaction to the culture shock they had suffered. A large part of the African leaders of the national independence movements after 1945 were former missionary students, such as *Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia,* or *Patrice Lumumba in the Belgian Congo*. They learned to find their way in two quite different worlds without giving up their dream of a better life in freedom (See Fig. 4.1 "Africa - Colonial division").

4.3 Britain as a Colonial Power: 'Divide and Conquer'

Due to its long tradition as an imperial power with large overseas possessions (especially in India), the United Kingdom was considered the most experienced colonial power in the world around 1900 (Winkler 2011, p. 470 f.; Osterhammel 2009). The British were dependent on food imports from climatically more favorable zones of the world and had established a world empire through a strong fleet, which was expressed in the proud slogan *Britannia rules the waves*. In the process, the British Empire tried out various methods of dominating foreign peoples. It practiced the doctrine of *free trade in the* nineteenth century and ruled in the protectorates and crown colonies by *indirect* methods of domination. A telling document on Britain's political self-image as a colonial power with a mission to civilize is the writing *The Dual Mandate* of the year 1922 *by Lord Frederick Lugard* (1858–1945). Lugard, born in England, had attended the famous *Royal Military College* at Sandhurst before serving as a colonial officer and official in various Asian colonies. In 1894 he was posted to *Uganda* and then to *northern Nigeria* to establish *protectorates* (protectorates where English law applied) for the British Crown in the old native territories. Between 1922 and 1936 *Lord Lugard* was also a member of the League of Nations and was able to contribute his ideas to the work of the League of Nations in the Commission on Mandates (protectorates). The principle of the "*double mandate*" meant that Great Britain should administer its colonies in such a way that they should both benefit the colonial mother country materially and promote its colonial subjects:

> Just as the Roman Empire laid the foundations of modern civilization and so led the savage barbarians of these islands [Britain] on the path of progress, so today in Africa we are repaying our debt. We bring the torch of culture and progress to the dark places

of the earth where barbarism and cruelty are at home. In doing so, we serve the material needs of our nation. In this task, the nations of Europe have pledged themselves to cooperate in a sacred alliance. To attain the common end, each nation will advance by means of the methods suited to its genius . . . British methods have promoted happiness and prosperity among the primitive races. Those who doubt this should impartially examine the results. If there is unrest and a desire for independence, as in India and Egypt, it is because we have taught these peoples the value of freedom, which they had not known for centuries. Their discontent is a measure of their progress. We held these lands because it is the genius of our nation to colonize, to trade, and to govern (Lugard 1922/1965, pp. 618–619).

In Africa, it was soon to become apparent that imperial rhetoric and colonial reality were far apart. The *indirect rule* in *Nigeria* was exercised in a cost-saving manner at several levels: at the top level stood the British governor with his colonial officials, who defined the general administrative guidelines. At the middle level stood African intermediaries and involuntary collaborators (e.g., cooperating chiefs) who had to carry out the usually unpleasant orders and commands from above (tax payment and drudgery) in exchange for some privileges. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the simple *natives*, who developed various strategies of passive resistance and parody of the whites to survive the hard-to-bear daily life as *subjects* of the British Crown. Thus, the cautious modernization of the colonies was to be initiated 'from within' while preserving traditional structures. The native rulers allotted land, levied taxes for themselves and the colonial administration, and held court independently. Only murder cases had to be tried by colonial officials. Thus, ten million northern Nigerians were administered and "governed" by only 250 British administrators in the interwar period (1919–1933) (von Albertini 1976, p. 247)—a cheap form of *in-valuing* foreign territories.

From an African perspective, the British policy of *indirect rule* received a less glorious assessment. The Ugandan-born historian and Harvard graduate *Mahmood Mamdani,* for example, has shown how Africa's traditional authorities were preserved and functionally expanded through colonial instrumentalization, but that they changed at their core (as hitherto embedded in the conventional culture) so that the result was a "*decentralized despotism*". The cause of this was the fact that the traditional checks and balances on power, by the people on the one hand, by the *peer group* on the other, disappeared because the authority of the chiefs ultimately depended on the colonial supreme power of the governor. This then entailed a de-legitimization of tradition (Mamdani 1996, p. 43). The delusional practice of the British to take *tribes* and *native authorities* into service everywhere had the same effect, even if there were no 'tribes' there at all (e.g. among the *Kikuyu* in Kenya, the *Igbos* in Nigeria, or among parts of the population of Rhodesia): "The population

was divided into *separate containers*, each in the custody of a *Native Authority* claimed to be the rightful representative of centuries-old customs and traditions" (Mamdani 1996, p. 49). Thus, on occasion, African tribal traditions were literally "invented" (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983).

In eastern Africa, too, in *Uganda*, *Lord Lugard*, who had himself been involved in the conquest of the country, ensured that the well-organized kingdom of *Buganda,* which had remained intact, was not broken up, but transformed into a British protectorate as smoothly as possible. Thus, for 60 years, it functioned to some extent as an "indirect" dominion of the British,—but without allowing for organic *nation-building*. After Uganda gained independence, the kingdom of *Buganda* was destroyed by President *Milton Obote* and his cruel successor *Idi Amin* (then still a non-commissioned officer in the British colonial army). The two post-colonial presidents, fearing rivals, preferred African centralism as their method of rule, in which there was no room for federalism (in the sense of, say, American states). Each of them had about 300,000 compatriots killed during his term in office; they thus far surpassed their colonial predecessors.

One case will be described as an example of direct colonial *interference* in evolved African social systems: the destruction of the once-powerful kingdom of the *Ashanti* people in the West African forest belt (in the old royal city of Kumasi in present-day Ghana). It began in 1874 when the British declared the so-called *Gold Coast* a protectorate. In doing so, they expressed their desire to maintain and expand political control there in the interest of trade. Denied access to the sea, the *Ashanti* took up arms but succumbed—as everywhere else—to the superior firepower of modern rapid-fire European rifles. Nevertheless, the weakened *Ashanti king* refused to comply with the governor's request to accept "voluntary British protection" (von Albertini 1976, p. 245). In 1895, the governor marched 3000 men to Kumasi, the *Ashanti* capital and royal city, and without initially encountering resistance, occupied the city. The king was supposed to deliver a lot of gold and the 'Golden Chair' of the *Ashanti*—for the *Ashanti the* symbol of their nation—, but the king refused. So he was captured and deported without hesitation. When the British then introduced colonial taxation and stopped traditions such as slavery and forced labor for the king, the *Ashanti* rebelled once again, again in vain. It wasn't until 1902 that the country was finally 'pacified'—as the colonials liked to express themselves— and *Ashanti land* was declared a British Crown Colony. Today—more than a hundred years later—mountainous *Ashanti Land*, with Kumasi as the country's second most important city, is one of Africa's most prosperous agricultural regions; for here cocoa cultivation has come to full bloom and brought some prosperity to the industrious farmers. Kumasi, now linked to the coastal towns by tarred all-weather

roads, is also the site of a capable university that is training a new generation of intelligent professionals.

As far as the *economic* dimension is concerned, the British externally induced economic growth in the trading colonies of West Africa, i.e. through the demand of the major trading houses. It was based on the forced expansion of three *cash crops*: palm oil, cocoa, and groundnuts. In the process, African farmers played an active role as producers for the market: When they realized that they could make profits from their field products, they intensified cultivation and trade; thus, large parts of the coastal zone and the hinterland were inserted into the cash economy and thus also made dependent on the price fluctuations of the world economy (von Albertini 1976, p. 262; Goldberg 2008, p. 80 f.; Hahn 2009).

Finally, it should be emphasized that from the 1920s the British began to take the first steps towards *self-governance* for the African population in the form of the *Legislative Councils*, in which African councilors, some elected and some appointed by the governor, took part and were supposed to participate in the *Native Administration in an* advisory capacity. The urban elite, which also had to assert itself against the traditional chiefs, was thus first provided with a mouthpiece. It also opened an arena for the politicization of society. A far-sighted governor (*Frederick Gordon Guggisberg*, 1919–1927) pushed ahead with the modernization of the country (Ghana), among other things by founding *Achimota College* in 1927, which he saw as the nucleus of a West African university (Schicho 2001, p. 186.). Eventually, *Executive Councils* with African participation were also established—another step on the way to preparing the colonies for national independence (Meredith 2005, p. 19 f.). On an ethnic basis, professional associations, training centers, youth clubs, and rudiments of political parties now emerged, building "in a sense a bridge from pre-colonial to post-colonial Africa" (von Albertini 1976, p. 268). The result, however, was not a unified nation (along European lines, united by class struggles and legal institutions developed over centuries), but rather a fragmented *ethnic nationalism* that demanded a dual loyalty from each citizen: to the ethnic group of origin, on the one hand, and to the newly forming nation, on the other (Mamdani 1996; Cooper 2006). Could this work?

4.4   South Africa: Diamond and Gold Mining, 'Boer Wars'

The history of South Africa (the Union of South Africa) is the consistent attempt of a white minority of immigrants from Europe to exercise political and economic control over foreign peoples to exploit the riches of the country for themselves. In

doing so, they permanently encountered resistance from the marginalized inhabitants. The stronger this resistance became, the more ruthless became the methods of the invaders to keep the majority of the Africans in check, to *separate* them spatially, culturally, and politically. Before that, however, wars were lasting several years between two European peoples (Boers and English) over mineral resources, which is unique in the history of colonization—not least because of the methods of warfare practiced.

The displacement of the various peoples at the Cape by Boers from Holland and other Europeans had begun here early. Already in 1652, *Jan van Riebek* had founded the first European settlement at the Cape as a supply base of the *Dutch East India Company*. The various peoples of the *Khoikhoi* ('Hottentots') and *San* ('Bushmen') encountered by the Dutch inhabitants were displaced, enslaved, exterminated, or mixed with the immigrants. Peasants of Christian creed 'made themselves masters of land which, according to their way of thinking, God had assigned to them. It was their God in whose name they were allowed to oppress, exploit and disenfranchise people of other 'race' and ideology" (Schicho 1999, p. 138). As Bantu peoples invaded South African climes from the north in search of living space, and the Boers 'trekked' north with their oxcarts with the same intention (also to escape the English), several war battles ensued in the nineteenth century, in which the Boers eventually prevailed after considerable losses. "Both sides proved themselves as pioneers, raiders and cattle rustlers" (Schicho 1999, p. 138). Weapons' superiority and the skillful exploitation of rivalry between some Bantu peoples eventually enabled the Boers to appropriate more and more settlement land and establish three Boer republics: *Natal, Orange Free State,* and *Transvaal.*

The existing tensions between Boers and British, e.g. because of the prohibition of slavery (slaves were used by the Boers e.g. in viticulture in the Cape Province) intensified when the discoveries of diamonds and gold at the *Witwatersrand* (a chain of hills in the south of the Transvaal) in the 60s and 70s of the nineteenth century increasingly drew the attention of the British to the natural riches at the Cape. Mining the world's largest gold deposits proved difficult and costly. Only a few British corporations were able to initiate the mining of gold—at that time the most sought-after metal in the world—with large amounts of capital. Gold mining became "the engine of industrialization in South Africa, attracting immigrants in large numbers to the hitherto rural Boer Republic" (Marx 2004, p. 120). Against a backdrop of constant political and military conflict, the establishment of a global company took place, which to this day has a near-monopoly in the mining and marketing of diamonds: *De Beers*. With the establishment of *compounds* called workers' camps, "whose access was rigorously monitored, the introduction of strict

working hours and the intensification of work performance, *De Beers* became exemplary for the disciplining and exploitation of African labor" (Schicho 1999, p. 142). Since the mining corporations needed labour in large numbers, they generated conflicts with the Boer farmers who also needed many hands to work their fields. Imperialists of the type of *Cecil Rhodes*, who dreamed of an English colonial empire from the Cape in the south of the continent to Cairo in the north, drove the parties of interest into a war that broke out in October 1899. Ultimately, it was greed for gold and power that drove the richest industrial state of the nineteenth century into a colonial war of subjugation, the 'Boer War' (1899–1902):

> Britain was able "only with huge military effort and brutal methods to put down the republics [of the Boers] . . . In 1900 the Boers went over to a highly effective guerrilla war, which the British won only with the help of a gigantic work of destruction in the rural regions. The war became a scandal because of the 'scorched earth' strategy employed by Lord Kitchener and also because of the concentration camps in which a total of 26,000 women and children died of epidemics. The fact that the only methods used against whites were those that had been common practice against Africans since 1811 and were universally regarded as legitimate, was deliberately overlooked . . . The Boers surrendered on May 31, 1902, for the same reasons for which the Xhosa, who were tactically vastly superior to the British, had laid down their arms in 1853: Their livelihood was so threatened that they would have starved to death had they continued to fight" (Marx 2004, p. 121).

With the end of the Boer War, the colonial conquest in southern Africa was completed for the time being. Gold production could be ramped up again. The four colonies *Transvaal, Orange River, Natal,* and *Cape Colony* joined together in 1910 to form the *Union of South Africa.* Boers and British now had to live together in one state *nolens volens.* Two years later, the *African National Congress (ANC) was* founded, Africa's oldest party, which *Nelson Mandela* later joined. It would take another eight decades until the final liberation of the black African majority.

4.5   France as a Colonial Power: Main Features of Its African Policy

France's colonial policy evolved from the initial phase of forcible subjugation of the autochthonous population to a policy of central administration and exploitation of its colonies and protectorates, including the promise of cultural *assimilation* to Africans willing to adapt. Compared to English (and German) colonial policy in Africa, rival France, with its initially pursued policy of cultural assimilation of

Africans, exhibits a peculiarity: Those who embraced French culture and learned to speak the French language could hope to rise from the status of colonial subjects (*suje*t) to equal citizens (*citoyen*). This initially appeared to be an attractive proposition for young Africans hungry for education. Early on, a primary school system was established in the colonies. The French colonial doctrine of *assimilation* aimed at 'uplifting', educating Africans in the spirit of French civilization. They were, in a sense, to be re-educated into black Frenchmen, and their social status was made dependent on the achievement of these (utopian) goals. Thus, as early as 1659, a French cultural bridgehead had been established in West Africa—at the mestizo settlement of *St Louis* on the Senegal River. Here, due to the slave trade, a formal colonial rule was established, while the other French possessions on the west coast of Africa remained only bases (for merchants and warships) until the 1970s. Four communes, known as the *Quatre Communes,* namely *Gorée, St Louis, Dakar,* and *Rufisque, were* each granted French citizenship between 1848 and 1851. A peculiarity of *French* colonial policy was also the dominance of the *military officers* on the ground. The governors with their colonial officers were not merely executive organs of a colonial policy conceived in Paris but were essentially themselves the motor of a colonial expansion policy. As an example, the commander, later general, and governor, *Louis Léon César Faidherbe* (1818–1889) should be mentioned. He occupied *Senegal*, made *Dakar* the new administrative centre from which the entire territory of western Africa was later conquered. No wonder that France came into conflict with the so-called *Jihad empires in* the process. With this aim of giving new impetus to the population of the Sudan zone, which had become Islamic, Islamic preachers appeared in various regions of the Sahel, who were at the same time warlords and acted against foreign cultural influences. It was a time of great social upheaval, in which a clash of civilizations—a clash of cultures and religions—occurred (Iliffe 2000, p. 214 f.).

Another special feature of colonial political practice is the fact that an African could be elected to the French National Assembly as a representative of an African colony (from predominantly Islamic *Senegal*)—which was granted to the poet *Leopold Senghor* (1906–2001) in 1945. From 1960 to 1980 he was the first president of Senegal. Similarly, a culturally assimilated African from Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast)—*Felix Houphouet-Boigny* (1905–1993)—was elected a deputy and even a deputy minister in Paris (1945–1946) before becoming the first President of the Ivory Coast decades later—a post he held for 33 years until his death. But this privilege of French suffrage has only benefited a tiny educated elite. Had all 100 million Africans living in French colonies been treated as assimilated, there would have been a majority of black French in the *mother country*—which, understandably, Paris did not intend.

The (illusory) colonial doctrine of cultural assimilation was soon replaced by that of *association.* Association meant the direct incorporation of a colonial territory into the European mother country, with greater consideration for existing social and political structures, but without entirely renouncing cultural assimilation of an educated elite. *Indirect rule*, as practiced by Great Britain in northern Nigeria and Uganda, remained rather the exception in French Africa. Paris relied more on centralism and pursued its authoritarian administrative structure down to the village level (Harding 1999, p. 52). France intervened much more rigorously than her British competitor from above in the evolved structures of African societies, thus accelerating the process of their internal dissolution. To this end, the *French language* served not least as *the* instrument of domination: those who had learned to master it could dare to change sides and feel part of the new social class of the arriviste because they had now become the *evolué* (i.e. the developed, the civilized). With the appropriation of the foreign language as part of the master culture, the importance of the indigenous languages faded, contributing to the *alienation* between the new French-reading and French-speaking elite on the one hand and the less educated, partially illiterate, and in addition highly ethnically fragmented population on the other. For postcolonial *nation-building,* this was to prove a burdensome mortgage (Fanon 1966; Brüne 1995; Ayittey 2005; Bayart 2009).

4.6   France's Aberration in Algeria

French expansion into North African territories did not follow a uniform pattern: Algeria in 1830, Tunisia in 1881, and Morocco as late as 1912. While Algeria formally became part of the national territory, Tunisia and Morocco remained protectorates with different customs and trade regulations. Common to all three *Maghreb states* (*Maghreb* is the Arabic collective name for these three western Mediterranean states) was their importance as potential settlement areas for Frenchmen willing to emigrate (Elsenhans 1974; von Albertini 1976, pp. 207 f.; Meredith 2005. How had the French Algerian adventure begun? To gain prestige in foreign policy given the upcoming elections in Paris, the beleaguered King *Charles X* had come up with the idea of distracting attention from domestic problems through a foreign policy adventure. In 1830, he sent an expedition of soldiers to Algiers to occupy the city and depose the *Bey*, the governor of the Ottoman Empire. A decades-long resistance to the French occupation then developed. The *Berber* people in the mountains of *Kabylia* resisted particularly bitterly (until 1857). Initially, the only rule over the cities was planned; the rural regions were to be

controlled indirectly. But the continuing hostility of the Muslims triggered a momentum of violent territorial seizure. Thus, as early as 1848, Algeria was declared an integral part of the French state and divided into three *departments.* Military officers played a major role in the development and administration of Algeria; they created the *Bureaux Arabes* from 1844 onwards as a form of direct rule over the indigenous population (Marx 2004, p. 57). To the French of the nineteenth century, Algeria appeared as an extension of the motherland beyond the Mediterranean and thus as part of a *Greater France.*

For centuries, Algeria was of economic importance to France. In Napoleon's time, the *Bey,* i.e. the ruler of Algiers, exported grain to Marseille. A hundred years later, some 200,000 French settlers had appropriated almost 40% of the arable land of northern Algeria (i.e. 2.3 million ha out of a total of 5.9 million ha); the indigenous population had had to switch from low-yielding cereal farming to intensive cultivation of pulses and horticultural plants. Soon after the First World War national movements of various tendencies arose, which at first only strove for the realization of full civil rights for Muslims. The "Federation of French-educated Muslims" led by *Ferhat Abbas* in 1930 called for integration with France based on full equality. When the plan of *Léon Blum's* Popular Front government of 1938 to grant citizenship rights to some 30,000 Algerians failed in the French parliament, Algerian nationalists began to abandon the concept of assimilation and instead sought autonomy in the sense of national independence. When protests broke out in *Sétif* in 1945 at the end of the World War and were bloodily suppressed by France (with 15,000 Algerians dying), the political utopia of peaceful coexistence of Europeans and Africans in a French territorial state was shattered: colonial racism did not permit equality between the peoples.

Thus came what had to come: this white settler colony (similar to Kenya and Rhodesia) was also unwilling to voluntarily grant national independence to the Africans. Deluded into thinking that they could ignore the zeitgeist of national liberation as a demand of all colonial peoples, the French waged a losing and ultimately futile war for 8 years. In 1954, the *National Liberation Front (FLN)* had been founded, whose leader *Achmed Ben Bella* pitted peasant guerrilla units against a well-armed French army (which eventually mustered 500,000 men)—with success. In 1960, the French head of state *Charles de Gaulle*, by then convinced of the hopelessness of the French war, publicly recognised the Algerians' right to national self-determination, which was interpreted as 'treason' by a section of the white settlers (and almost triggered a military coup against *de Gaulle* in France). In March 1962, negotiations between the French government and FLN leaders took place in *Evian,* Switzerland, and ended with the *Evian Agreement.* The FLN was given the right to establish its sovereign state, and France was granted, in addition to

some economic privileges (rights to mine uranium deposits), the right to continue using the *Mers el-Kebir* naval base for 15 years and the nuclear test site in the Sahara for 5 years.

In the referendum set for July 3, 1962, 91% of Algerians voted for independence (and thus also for continued limited cooperation with France). What had begun almost by accident as a limited military action in 1830 was to end miserably after 130 years of painful and, at its core, misguided colonial policy: The Algerian war cost the lives of over a million people; it destroyed established economic and social structures; for a third of the population had been resettled for security reasons. 70% of the population had become unemployed by 1962. With the hasty flight or emigration of almost one million Europeans, the country lost almost all its entrepreneurs, technicians, skilled workers, administrators, doctors, and teachers. The white settlers had 40% of the agricultural land under their control, and over 80% of industry, banks, and utilities were in French hands. All these businesses stood empty and deserted at the end of the war (Elsenhans 1974; Marx 2004; Meredith 2005). The situation was even worse for the *Harkis*, the Algerian auxiliary troops, who were denied legal resettlement in France by Paris. Some 150,000 *Harkis* were killed by vengeful Algerian compatriots, and some 67,000 *Harkis* managed to escape with their relatives to France (where they still lead a miserable existence as outcasts). For the war crimes (torture and oppression) France has not apologized to the Algerians until today.

Germany as a Colonial Power in Africa

5

5.1 Notes on the Study of German Colonial Rule

Although German colonial rule in Africa lasted only about a generation (1885–1919), it left its mark on the German consciousness, both in West Germany and in the then *German Democratic Republic (GDR).* On the one hand, there was a cultivation of colonial tradition and a heroic culture of remembrance in the West until the 1960s; on the other hand, GDR historians (such as Helmut Stoecker, Thea Büttner, Heinrich Loth and Horst Drechsler) castigated the imperialist machinations of European countries in their African colonies. The latter threw new light on European-African relations, which was also noted appreciatively by historians in the West. In the course of the student movements and anti-imperialist solidarity groups, a willingness to critically examine the German legacy in Africa increasingly developed. Parallel to the pioneering studies of Anglo-American colleagues such as *John Iliffe* and *T. O. Ranger*—the pioneering historical works of German authors were published: *Franz Ansprenger* (Auflösung der Kolonialreiche (Dissolution of the Colonial Empires), 1966), *Rudolf von Albertini* (Dekolonisation (Decolonization), 1966 and europäische Kolonialherrschaft (European Colonial Rule), 1880–1940), *Gerhard Grohs* (Stufen afrikanischer Emanzipation (Stages of African Emancipation), 1967); by *Helmut Bley* (German Southwest/Namibia, 1968), *Detlef Bald (*German East Africa, *1970); Rainer Tetzlaff* (German East Africa, 1970), *Karin Hausen* (Cameroon, 1970), and *Albert Wirz* (German Colonies in Africa, 1976).

In 1985, the first comprehensive account appeared in the form of *Horst Gründer*'s Geschichte der deutschen Kolonien (History of the German colonies), which went through five editions until 2005. In 1981, the first comprehensive account of the history of sub-Saharan Africa was published by the historian *Joseph*

Ki-Zerbo from *Burkina Faso* (formerly Upper Volta). The three-volume 'Handbuch Afrika ('Handbook Africa')' by the Austrian historian *Walter Schicho* (1999–2004) and 'The *Fate of Africa. A History of Fifty Years of Independence*' by the Englishman *Martin* Meredith (2005) have proved to be indispensable reading. Since then, numerous other studies on the topic of (German) colonial rule have appeared, among which the studies by *Leo Harding (1999), Christoph Marx (2004), Sebastian Conrad (2004), Winfried Speitkamp (2005), van der Heyden & Zeller (2007), Andreas Eckert (2010) and Jürgen Zimmerer (2013)* should be highlighted as particularly useful. Ongoing discussions about the due renaming of streets and squares that still bear the names of dubious figures of colonial rule demonstrate the need for a closer examination of this part of European history. This also includes the current discussion about the African artefacts in *German museums*, most of which came to Europe during the colonial period, often in dubious ways. While some see them as legally acquired art objects, progressive anthropologists such as the curator of the Bremen Kunsthalle, *Julia Binter*, director of the 2017 exhibition "Der blinde Fleck" ("The Blind Spot"), problematize them as looted art and, together with colleagues from the Berlin Humboldt Forum, plead for a *decolonization* of European museums.

5.2   German Colonial Rule

Whether Germany needed its own colonies at all was still a matter of great controversy among politicians, public figures and citizens in the1880s. Hamburg merchants, for example, flatly rejected such an acquisition, citing the high costs and the advantages of *free trade*.[1] But against the colonial enthusiasm of the middle class—this included the *Fleet Association* with about two million members and the various *colonial associations* in the German lands—the opponents of colonialism finally could not hold their ground. Even Imperial Chancellor *Otto von Bismarck* had resisted the *colonial fever* of the German colonial lobby for a long time. This included all those who propagandized in public and in parliament for the acquisition of own colonies. Bismarck had said: "My map of Africa lies here in Europe" (Wehler 1969). Nevertheless, in the mid-1980s, he felt compelled to act as an 'honest broker'—in the words of the press at the time—in resolving international conflicts over the division of Africa among the colonial powers. Thus, on November

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[1]Free trade is the economic system whereby all economic and commercial enterprises have free access to all markets.

15, 1884, he opened the Africa Conference in Berlin in order to bring the different interests of the European colonial powers in the area of the Congo—hence the common name *Congo Conference*—to a balance through negotiations (see above Sect. 4.1).

Under *Kaiser Wilhelm II*, who dismissed the successful chancellor in 1888, Germany impatiently and clumsily strove for 'world standing' and demanded its *'place in the sun'* (according to *Reich Chancellor von Bülow* on November 6, 1897 in the Reichstag; Van der Heyden and Zeller 2002, p. 69). Without the acquisition of colonies, the achievement of this imperialist goal was hardly conceivable. *Wilhelm II's* ambitious expansion of the fleet and the colonial policy he actively supported marked a clear departure from the previous principles of Bismarckian policy. Even the oppositional Social Democrats later relativized their initial opposition to *'imperialist colonial policy';* thus *August Bebel* confessed in the Reichstag session of December 1, 1906:

> Gentlemen, the conduct of colonial policy is not in itself a crime. To carry on colonial policy may under certain circumstances be a cultural deed; it depends only on how the colonial policy is carried on ... Do the representatives of cultured and civilized peoples, such as the European nations and the North American nations are, come to foreign peoples as liberators, as friends and educators, as helpers in need, to bring them the achievements of culture and civilization, to educate them to become cultural people, if this happens with this noble intention and in the right way, then we social democrats are the first to be prepared to support such colonization as a great cultural mission (Van der Heyden and Zeller 2002, p. 68).

The reality was different. Africans knew how to defend themselves against the poisoned offer of 'civilization'. There was not only armed resistance, but also a petition movement arguing under the rule of law. For example, in 1913, kings and officials of the *Duala* people of Cameroon, led by Prince *Manga Bell,* presented complaints to the German Reichstag. They declared that by the treaty of July 12, 1884, concluded with the representatives of the firms *C. Woermann* and *Jantzen & Thormählen,* "the German Empire had by no means acquired full absolute sovereignty over the sphere of power of the Duala." "A legal basis for the occupation" [of their land] would therefore not exist.[2] No less remarkable was the petition from Togo to the State Secretary of the Imperial Colonial Office in Berlin in the autumn of 1913. In the letter, the African complainants demanded, among other things, "the elimination of chain imprisonment and corporal punishment, the

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[2]Manga Bell was executed in 1914, for 'treason' - a judicial murder (Bommarius 2015).

admission of representation of the [natives] to the governorate session" as well as the "introduction of a general national code" and "free trade for the [natives]" (Zimmerer 2014).

In the following, three aspects of German Africa policy will be examined in more detail, which on the one hand shed light on the methods of rule in dealing with colonized Africans and which on the other hand appear to be of particular relevance because of their lasting significance for the present: the colonial wars in the two largest colonies, *German Southwest Africa* and *German East Africa,* as well as the beginning of 'scientific colonialism' in the *Dernburg era* (1906–1910),—a policy that can be interpreted as a precursor of today's development aid policy.

> Colonial wars—defined by Jürgen Osterhammel—were "'extra-systemic' wars beyond the European state system. Therefore, they were waged without regard to the balance of power and equally without (or with little) regard to those scanty rules of international humanitarian law that already existed at that time. In colonial wars, therefore, 'no prisoners were taken', and the prisoners who nevertheless existed, had nothing good to expect" (Osterhammel 2009, p. 698).

5.3　　German South West Africa/Namibia

The German colonial administration pursued an ambiguous policy: On the one hand, it was interested in land purchases because it wanted to persuade the *Herero*—a people of cattle herders—to settle down and do wage labour. On the other hand, however, she also wanted to avoid (if possible) the pauperization and 'proletariatization' of the indigenous population. To this end, on the advice of the *Rhenish Mission,* it began to establish *reservations* on fairly barren land. This process of displacement was accelerated by the construction of the railway line from *Swakopmund* (on the Atlantic Ocean) to *Windhoek*, which drew more German settlers into Herero country. For the Herero chief *Samuel Maherero*, who was initially kept in power and alimented by the Germans, this created an economically highly precarious situation. The cattle herds of the Herero, the basis of their nomadic existence and also a symbolic expression of rank and status, had already been severely decimated by the devastating cattle plague of 1896/1897, and now the colonial Germans were further threatening their habitat by means of their harassing policy of displacement (Bley 1968; Speitkamp 2005, pp. 123–128).

In 1904, a total of 40% of the reservation was in the hands of nine concession or charter companies. The chief's son *Samuel Maharero* had allowed himself to be

seduced by Governor *Leutwein* into ceding more and more tribal land to the whites; however, the different concepts of ownership could not be reconciled: "The Africans did not know any form of vested property rights to land, but at best a usufruct for a limited period of time. But now German settlers, mostly veterans of the "Schutztruppe", were making themselves at home in ever greater numbers on the land on which the Herero cattle herds had previously grazed" (Marx 2004, p. 144). This led to an uprising of the desperate—with numerous raids on German farmers (123 Germans died). The initially successful war of the *Herero* (Chief *Maharero* had changed sides) against the seemingly endless expansion of German settlers took the Germans by surprise and prompted Governor *Leutwein* to attempt to reach a negotiated peace with *Maharero*, which was met with outrage in Germany. As a result, the Imperial Government in Berlin sent *General Lothar von Trotha* (1848–1920), who had already 'proved himself' in the violent suppression of the 'Boxer Rebellion' in China in 1900,[3] to South West Africa. *Von Trotha* requested and received massive troop reinforcements from Germany. Almost 4000 German soldiers went ashore in August 1994, equipped with over 30 guns and 12 machine guns. Now *von Trotha* could wage a war of extermination "in a manner that was to remain unique in Africa until the end of the colonial era" (Marx 2004, p. 145). *Von Trotha* wanted not only victory over the *Herero* force (and the *Nama* under their leader *Hendrik Witbooi*, who had joined the *Herero* uprising a few weeks later), but the extermination of the people. *Von Trotha's* infamous order of October 2, 1904 read:

> I, the great general of German soldiers, send this letter to the Herero people. Herero are no longer German subjects . . . The Herero people must leave the country . . . Within the German border every Herero with or without a rifle, with or without cattle, will be shot. I will no longer take in women and children, drive them back to their people or have them shot (quoted from Marx 2004, p. 146).

Seven months after the first raids, the Herero were encircled at the *Waterberg* in the northeast of the colony. We owe the following report on the massacre to *Captain Franke* of the German Schutztruppe:

> The Herero had gathered at the Waterberg massif with their wives, children and cattle—estimated at around 35,000 people and 10,000 head of cattle. Some 1500 'Schutztruppler' with 30 guns and 12 machine guns were on the German side . . . This was not a decisive battle against an enemy of war, but the intended annihilation of an

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[3]The 'Boxer' Uprising was a war of resistance by Chinese "pugilists for law and unity" against European foreign domination, ridiculed by the West as "Boxers".

entire people who were desperately and valiantly defending every handbreadth of ground . . . An entire people was fighting for its land, for its cattle, for its survival. Behind the battle lines stood the Herero women, cheering on their men and chanting over and over again, 'Who owns Hereroland? To us belongs Hereroland' (eyewitness Captain Franke, quoted in: Graichen and Gründer 2005, pp. 144–145).

It was a deliberate and uncompromising strategy of extermination. Von Trotha's plan to encircle and annihilate the *Herero* had failed; for most were able to escape encirclement by fleeing into the nearly waterless *Omaheke Desert.* Von Trotha's frustrated and derelict soldiers occupied the few waterholes and killed whoever approached them. They also refused to allow the refugees to return. There was mass murder of women, men and children—acts of "de-limited violence" (Häußler and von Trotha 2012, p. 79 f.), with only a few *Hereros* surviving the escape. *Maherero* managed to escape with a small band of followers to the neighbouring *Bechuana country* (Botswana). Of those who survived, thousands ended up in prisoner-of-war camps or concentration camps; there they had to perform years of forced labor. Thus, about 75–80% of the Herero people and 35–50% of the Nama, formerly called '*Hottentots*', were exterminated at that time. *Lothar von Trotha* reported to Berlin in October 1904: "These half-starved and thirsty bands [. . .] are the last ruins of a nation that has ceased to hope for rescue and restoration" (quoted in Melber 2013, p. 475).

When the general's methods became known in Germany, there was tumult in the Reichstag and among the outraged public. Further protectorate loans (credits) to German Southwest were refused by the Reichstag, which finally called for new elections (the so-called *Hottentot elections* of December 1907). Economically, German colonial rule over '*Southwest*' was a losing proposition. The defeat of the rebels had cost the Reich 585 million Reichsmarks. Of the 14,000 German soldiers sent to Africa, around 2000 had fallen or died of disease. On the question of whether the war against the Herero and Nama must also be called *genocide,* official post-war Germany has still not found a clear answer, while the majority of historians now answer this question in the affirmative (Bley, Eckert, Marx, Melber; Speitkamp, Van der Heyden, Zeller, Zimmerer). *Genocide* occurs when it can be proved that there was a political intention to exterminate a people or part of a people. While this intention cannot be imputed to the government in faraway Berlin—on the contrary, Reich Chancellor *Prince von Bülow* disapproved of *General von Trotha*'s actions and urged an immediate halt to the war of extermination (in November 1905 *von Trotha* had to resign from his post)—it can be imputed to the responsible General *Lothar von Trotha*, whose intention to exterminate the Herero cannot be doubted (Zeller and Zimmerer 2016). Nevertheless, there were and still are serious

researchers who think they have to take a differentiated position (among them was *Brigitte Lau*, head of the Namibian National Archives in Windhoek, who died in 1996). The Africa correspondent of '*Der Spiegel*', *Bartholomäus Grill,* took the following position on this in 2016:

> The accusation of a genocidal plan of the Reich government carried out under his direction can no more be substantiated than the thesis [for example, that of the Hamburg historian Jürgen Zimmerer] that Germany at that time had taken a special path that led to fascism and culminated in the Holocaust. All colonial powers covered the conquered territories with murder and terror: the Spanish in Cuba, the Belgians in the Congo, the British in Sudan, South Africa or Tasmania. In the age of colonial excesses of violence, the destruction of civilians was 'part of submission and domination', there was no German 'breaking of taboos', finds the military historian Robert Gerwarth (Grill, Der Spiegel, No. 24/2016. p. 58).

Even if one follows this narrative, then the question would not yet be decided whether the German government should not today find itself ready to duly apologize (i.e. verbally and monetarily) to the Namibians for the genocide. So far, only the former Social Democratic Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul,* has asked for an apology at a memorial service at *Waterberg* in August 2004. She could not promise compensation either and vowed to mobilize more development aid. In the meantime, diplomatic movement has come into this unresolved matter in the summer of 2016: On the German side, CDU politician *Ruprecht Polenz* has been appointed as a special envoy to work with Namibian plenipotentiary *Zedekia Ngavirue* on a joint genocide declaration (so far unsuccessfully). However, this would not automatically mean that the current compensation claims of the Herero (*Chief Vekuii Rukoro*), the Nama (*Chief Gaob David Frederick*) and other ethnic groups, which amount to several billion euros, would be recognized. Since *Namibia's* independence, the Federal Republic of Germany has provided a total of 870 million euros in development aid—in other words 348 € per capita, the highest per capita amount to African nations. Namibia is now the third richest country among sub-Saharan countries (after South Africa and Mauritius) with an average wealth of US$10,800, and the number of millionaires is reported at 3300 in 2016 (Namibia Magazine, No. 2/2017, p. 6).

5.4   German East Africa/Tanzania

One year after the beginning of the *Herero-Nama War* against the Germans, a defensive and liberation war began in German East Africa by large parts of the desperate colonial population against German colonial rule. Here, the main triggers for organized resistance were the forced cultivation of *cotton* on communal fields, the increase of cottage and poll taxes, and forced labor. The warriors had applied *Maji-Maji* (the Kiswahili word for water), sanctified by a prophet and magician, to their bodies in the hope that white men's bullets would drop off like water on oilskin. Unnoticed by the Europeans, the charismatic prophet *Kinjikitile* had managed to convince numerous clan leaders within a radius of 100 km to take part in the planned rebellion—trusting in the magical effect of the sacred water, which was also understood as a symbol of fertility and prosperity. The causes and local backgrounds of the fact that in 1905 about forty ethnic groups in southern and southwestern Tanganyika (such as the *Ngoni, Matumbi, Pangwa*) decided to engage in armed resistance are extremely complex (Iliffe 1969; Gwassa 1973; Becker and Beez 2005; Pesek 2005; Deutsch 2006).

Already the prelude to the foundation of the protectorate of German East Africa had not been under a good star. After the 'colonial pioneer', *Dr Carl Peters* had concluded some 'treaties' with chiefs of the East African hinterland in 1884, the agents of the German East African Company (*Deutsch-Ostafrikanische Gesellschaft, DOAG*), which he had co-founded, started their 'work' of collecting trade products such as ivory and rubber (Peters 1906). The Sultan of Zanzibar had been forced to relinquish much of his territorial claims to the opposite mainland, but the coastal inhabitants resisted the land grab. The 'rebels' of the so-called *Bushiri Rebellion of 1888*, whose 'crime' had been to resist the thuggish exploitation methods of the *DOAG,* were hanged. Now the German Empire felt compelled, after the failure of the private-sector DOAG, to take over the administration of the protectorate directly itself. The *charter*—a letter in which the government had given the private acquisition company the right to use and the duty to administer the protectorate—was annulled. But with the assumption of full responsibility by the German Empire, which now had its colonies each administered by a governor (head of government) as the Kaiser's deputy, little changed for the natives at first: this special form of tyranny was continued and systematically expanded under the name of 'pacification'.

This was followed by a further 84 armed conflicts (from 1888 to 1905) between the colonial administration and the indigenous population, which led to 'punitive expeditions' by the Schutztruppe. The strongest primary resistance was by the

Wahehe people (until 1898). Germany's aim was to develop its East African possession into a settler colony and to make it a supplier of raw materials for the mother country. In order to *valorize* the colony, a 1250 km long railway line was built from the coast (Dar es Salaam) to Lake Tanganyika (Kigoma) and financed by imperial bonds. From 1900 onwards, German farmers and planters arrived in the ecologically and climatically favorable areas (e.g. in the *Usambara Mountains*)— until 1914 about 5000 Europeans, among them about 800 settlers (Tetzlaff 1970). Sisal (for the production of ship ropes), coffee, cotton and tea were cultivated and exported. The production of these *colonial goods* never attained an economic relevance for the supply of Germany that would have justified the high costs of the violent 'pacification'.

The *Maji-Maji* uprising, which had been prepared for a long time, began on July 20, 1905 as a peasant uprising in the *Matumbi Mountains* in the south of the colony, when a small group of Africans led by *Maji-Maji* healers set out for one of the notorious 'communal *shamba*' (*shamba* is the Kiswahili term for field) to uproot the cotton plants grown there under forced labor—for them the symbol of foreign rule, exploitation and oppression. Initially, the intrepid *Maji-Maji* warriors inflicted significant casualties on the defenders of the German stations, missions, and plantations through frontal assaults. Then, when the startled Imperial Government, at the request of Governor *Gustav Adolf Graf von Götzen,* dispatched hundreds of naval soldiers to German East and brought guns and machine guns to bear, mass destruction began. The *scorched earth strategy* employed—the systematic burning of grain fields and cattle sheds—made no distinction between combatants and civilians, depriving both of their livelihoods. The clan leaders of the ethnic groups who had taken part in the war of liberation had to be handed over, if they could be caught; they were hanged without further ado. The exact number of victims has never been determined. While 75,000–130,000 direct war victims were estimated in the past, Tanzanian historians today tend to assume 300,000 direct and indirect victims, including the starvation deaths (Majura 2005, p. 201). A supra-regional or even national resistance alliance of East African peoples did not come about, as the ethnic groups and clans "strove to return to their traditional small-scale structure" (Speitkamp 2005, pp. 130–131).

Tanzanian historians have put forward a different assessment of the significance of the *Maji-Maji* War for discussion—ever since Tanzania's first president, *Julius Nyerere,* described the war as the beginning of the Tanzanian people's struggle for *Uhuru* (the Kiswahili word for freedom), which culminated in the then *Tanganyika* gaining its independence in 1961. Recently, the Tanzanian secondary school teacher *Alfred Fuko* expressed the following view in an essay entitled "The Difficult Search for Historical Truth" ("Die schwierige Suche nach historischer Wahrheit"):

> For the people of Tanzania, the Maji-Maji teachings have a special meaning. For us, it is a philosophy that our ancestors used to give themselves courage to attack the troops that occupied their land. For the Germans, on the other hand, the Maji-Maji war was the act of a civilized nation disciplining the savages … When TANU [Tanganyika African National Union, the state party that led the country to freedom in 1961 under its leader Julius Nyerere] came on the scene, the goal of unity became the basis of a national ethic. In this sense, the Maji-Maji movement with its diverse peoples was a prelude to the unity and peace Tanzania enjoys in the present (Fuko 2005, p. 179 and p. 183).

5.5   'Rational Colonial Policy': The Dernburg Reform Era

The two great wars of resistance of the Africans in *German Southwest* and *German East Africa* against the ruthless policy of repression of the colonial Germans caused a political rethinking in Berlin. The colonial enthusiasm was followed by disillusionment. The scandals around General *Lothar von Trotha* and *Carl Peters*, the meagre success in the exploitation of the colonies and the high costs had made members of the Reichstag and parts of the middle classes 'tired of colonialism'. Therefore, Reich Chancellor *Bernhard von Bülow* (1849–1929) decided to carry out a fundamental reform: In autumn 1906, he appointed a man of business, the former director of the Darmstädter Bank, *Bernhard Dernburg,* as State Secretary in the Imperial Colonial Office. In speeches and publications, *Dernburg* had expressed his conviction that "colonization was a science and technique like any other". The elections of January 1907 brought the hoped-for absolute majority in the Reichstag to the pro-colonial parties. Now State Secretary *Dernburg*, who had meanwhile advanced to the head of an independent imperial authority (the *Imperial Colonial Office*), could begin to implement his reform plans. As Dernburg put it in his "*Objectives   of   German   Colonialism*" ("*Zielpunkten   des   deutschen Kolonialwesens*") of 1907—"colonizing means exploiting the soil, its treasures, the flora, the fauna and above all the people for the benefit of the economy of the colonizing nation, and the latter is obliged in return to give its higher culture, its moral concepts, its better methods". If, however, one interferes forcibly with the traditional structures, if one transfers German legal concepts to Africa without further ado and, for example, enforces German ideas of work on Africans, then one provokes uprisings at best. In the past, one would have colonized with "*means of destruction*", with alcohol and weapons, now one could colonize with "*means of preservation*"*,* which included "just as much the missionary as the doctor, the

railway, the machine, i.e. the advanced theoretical and applied science in all fields" (quoted from Steltzer 1984, p. 21; Speitkamp 2005, p. 243).

During his 4-year term of office (1906/1907–1910), *Dernburg's* efforts were primarily directed at promoting the production of tropical products by African family businesses, also in order to make the Empire less dependent on the import of 'foreign raw materials' (cotton, rubber, fruits). The expansion of the railway network in the German 'protectorates', which had been extended from just scarce 1000 km in 1906 to 4600 km by the outbreak of the First World War, also served this purpose. The governor, *Freiherr Albrecht von Rechenberg,* who was appointed in 1906 after the disaster of the *Maji-Maji* uprising, was of the same opinion as his boss; he too made himself unpopular with the white settlers when he set about favoring so-called African 'folk cultures'. African peasant families were to become producers for the market themselves (Iliffe 1969; Steltzer 1984; Speitkamp 2009)—an *early policy concept of development promotion*.

Dernburg's colonial policy, insofar as it was implemented in German East Africa by Baron *Albrecht von Rechenberg*, was able to demonstrate economic success after some time. The production of *cash crops* such as coffee and tea, cotton and palm oil in African fields had increased considerably (Tetzlaff 1970), which was a clear confirmation of the assumption that African family farms reacted positively to market incentives—even under the conditions of colonial rule. There were also notable successes in the *education sector*: school attendance on the part of African children increased by leaps and bounds between 1910 and 1914. In 2014, 155,000 pupils attended 1852 mission schools, and 6100 pupils went to the 99 government schools (Afoláyan 2007, p. 250).

Part of Dernburg's reform program had also been the plan to accompany colonial policy practice in *Hamburg* as a maritime trading center (not in Berlin) by establishing chairs for 'colonial sciences' in order to qualify the civil servants intended for colonial service. Until then, these had been trained at the *Seminar für orientalische Sprachen (Seminar for Oriental Languages)* in Berlin, without thereby gaining sound expert knowledge about the country and people of the protectorates. As early as 1901, the *Institute for Ship and Tropical Diseases* (*Institut für Schiffs- und Tropenkrankheiten*) had been established in Hamburg (today's *Bernhard Nocht Institute* (*Bernhard-Nocht-Institut*)), but it was not until 1908 that plans finally matured among Hamburg merchants (first and foremost *Edmund Siemers*, 1840–1918, education politicians as well as Senator *Werner von Melle* (1853–1937), the president of the Higher Education Authority and later mayor) to found a colonial institute in Hamburg (which became the *University of Hamburg* in 1919). The focus here was on "the colonial reformist claim, namely to create an organizational and spatial link between colonial education and colonial science

through 'practical-technical instruction and scientific teaching'" (Ruppental 2013, p. 263). The practical and scientific courses held at the Colonial Institute from the winter semester of 1908/1909 onwards were led by a total of 35 full-time and part-time lecturers from various scientific disciplines.

The First World War put an end to this 'development experiment'. Since then, Germans have liked to associate *German East Africa* with the alleged heroic deeds of General *Paul von Lettow-Vorbeck* (1870–1964). The colonial myth of *Lettow-Vorbeck*, undefeated in the field and faithfully served by his *Askaris* to the end, is one of the central *memories* of the German population. In reality, the 4-year delay in the surrender of his Schutztruppe (2500 African Askari and 260 German officers) on a sideshow of the world war meant an enormous burden for the African civilian population, at whose expense the foreigners had to feed themselves. In the 4-year war of attrition, about 700,000 Africans, mostly civilians, are said to have died in East Africa (Michels in Zimmerer 2013, p. 379 f.).

Thus, it can be summarized that the hopes of the Wilhelminian Empire associated with the colonial acquisitions in Africa were not fulfilled. Except for the alleged 'model colony' Togo, all colonies were financial subsidies for the German Empire, which was due to the investments for railway, road and port construction as well as for administrative and school buildings, but also to the enormous costs for the military 'pacification' of the protectorates. In its final phase, German colonial policy underwent a process of learning and adaptation, following the pattern of *pathological learning:* After the initial violent reaction to the 'outrageous' challenge of the 'black savages' who dared to resist colonial oppression, came the forced realization that peace could only be achieved and profit made *with* African subjects. And Africans also changed during this period as a result of the *change in colonial conditions* generated by their resistance: Wherever material incentives and fair market conditions were created, there has been a noticeable growth of the African agricultural and consumer economy even in the pre-war period.

"If there is a little secret of the colony, then, it lies in the subjugation of the native by his desire [for the consumer goods imported by Europeans] . . . Through this, the colonized enters into another being and experiences his work, his language and his life now as a process of enchantment and disguise"—wrote Cameroonian historian and political philosopher *Achille Mbembe* in 2014 (Mbembe 2014, p. 224). Indeed, since the days of the Mani-Congo ruler *Alfonso II*, there have arguably been recurrent "processes of enchantment and disguise"—alongside colonial atrocities.

Tasks

1. What were the similarities and differences in the colonial policies of the three European countries Great Britain, France and Germany?
2. What is meant by the policy of *indirect rule?*
3. What does recent historical research understand by the term *developmental colonialism?*

Decolonization as Liberation: Continuities and Change

6

6.1 Global Drivers of Decolonization: World Wars, Pan-Africanism

African decolonization reached its dynamic phase after the Second World War and can best be understood as part of the international systemic change that took place after 1945 in the wake of the Cold War and the *Non-Alignment Movement* that influenced the entire Third World (Grohs and Tibi 1973; Kühnhardt 1992; Kaiser and Peter Schwarz 2000; Martel 2010). But decolonization as a global phenomenon had begun with the liberation struggle of the English colonies in North America against the British Crown, from which the *United States of America* emerged in 1776. As a young state, the USA developed a fundamentally critical attitude towards colonial policy, partly because the European colonial powers had erected onerous economic barriers for US companies through their exclusive trade treaties with their own colonies. During the First World War, *US President Woodrow Wilson's* famous 14-point plan as a vision for a peaceful post-war order had provided an intellectual spark for demands by nationalists from the colonies. *Wilson* proclaimed the right of nations to national self-determination and called for the renunciation of territorial annexations. This unbelievably progressive voice for many contemporaries at the time "was also heard in the colonial and semi-colonial spheres; from China to Morocco, nationalists invoked the right of self-determination and thus directed themselves against the colonial powers" (von Albertini 1966, p. 15).

While the peace treaties after the First World War ignored the legitimate concerns of the Asian, Oriental and North African colonial peoples, the League of Nations' *mandate system* gave rise to a new idea: colonial foreign rule was to last only for a transitional period, during which the peoples were to be led and

'educated' to the 'maturity' of self-government. "It was mainly British pacifists, socialists, and colonial reformers whose efforts now to achieve a lasting peace were directed toward ending the colonial rivalry of the great powers by internationalizing the colonies, while at the same time developing new forms of administration for 'primitive' peoples not yet capable of independence. By making the colonial power the mandate-bearer of an international authority and subject to its control, exploitation of the natives was to be prevented and administration was to take place in the sense of an effective *trusteeship*" (von Albertini 1996, p. 16). However, since the League of Nations as an international organization did not have any means of sanction (in contrast to its legal successor, the UN) to be able to react appropriately to complaints submitted by colonized people, the mandate system did not bring about any noticeable improvement in the situation of the colonized people: for example all German colonies were transformed into British, French and Belgian League of Nations mandates under international law and their inhabitants were hardly treated any better than those of the classical colonies.

In the same year that *Woodrow Wilson* stirred the world with his reform ideas, a second fanfare of freedom sounded with the *Russian October Revolution* of 1917: *Vladimir Lenin* also proclaimed the right of peoples to self-determination, and he and his *Bolsheviks* recognized in the *anti-colonialism* of the peoples (especially in Asia) an effective means to accelerate their development towards communist world revolution. Thus, the Second *Communist International (COMINTERN)* was founded, which was also to help the parties and liberation movements in the colonial world to complete their anti-imperialist struggle victoriously (Hobsbawm 1994, p. 69 f.). Above all, the national forces in *China, Vietnam, Afghanistan* and *Persia,* as well as those in *Egypt, Algeria* and *Morocco* were supported in the interwar period.

Great Britain cleverly responded to the new international situation by transforming its empire into a *Commonwealth of Nations*. When the four British *dominions* of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand demanded more political autonomy, London created a new form of organization between equal states in December 1931 with the *Statute of Westminster,* which were constitutionally bound to each other only by a voluntary pledge of 'allegiance to the Crown' (Winkler 2011, p. 470 f.). After the Second World War, the *Commonwealth* was to evolve into a successful multi-cultural 'club': *British India* became a member of the *Commonwealth* simultaneously with independence in 1947, as did *Ceylon* in 1948, *Pakistan* in 1949 and, with the *Gold Coast/Ghana* in 1957, the first 'black African' country. *Nigeria* followed in 1960 and then all the Anglophone colonies without exception, even a Portuguese-speaking country with the accession of *Mozambique* in 1995 and a former Belgian colony with *Rwanda* in 2009. Today, the

Commonwealth of Nations has 53 members, 48 of which are former colonies; it also functioned as an intergovernmental forum that worked to end white rule in *Rhodesia, South Africa*, and *Namibia,* and it continues to provide various technical and scientific services to its members today. In 1991, the *Heads of States,* which meet every 2 years, adopted a Declaration of Principles, which set out to promote democracy, respect for human rights and environmental protection.

The *Second World War*, in which the colonial powers France and England had also suffered the most severe damage, spurred national aspirations for independence in the colonies (Le Suer 2003). The carefully cultivated myth of the civilizational superiority of the white peoples had crumbled in the face of the rapid military surrender of the French armies to the German Wehrmacht. The fugitive *General Charles de Gaulle* had established a territorial base for *'Free France'* in Equatorial Africa and arranged for a post-war 'progressive' order to be envisaged for French Africa in *Brazzaville, Congo* in 1944. Britain had also suffered a spectacular defeat in the war, not in Europe, but in its own colonial sphere at the hands of Japan:

> The fall of Singapore, this powerfully developed naval base—which had become a symbol of Britain's economic interest, military presence and will to rule Asia—must be seen in world historical perspective as an event of the first order and a landmark in the process of decolonisation. And not only because it entailed the loss of Malaysia and Burma and made possible the Japanese conquest of Dutch India, but because this collapse, thought impossible, of a system of rule that was, if not hated, then perceived as alien, made a deep impression on these peoples (von Albertini 1966, pp. 34–35; see also Farrell 2017).

From British Africa, 372,000 Africans were required to serve in the British Army during Second World War, of whom 166,000 were deployed outside their own territory, including outside Africa. From French Africa, there were an additional 141,000 soldiers sent to serve in the Great War (Geiss 1968, p. 283). The West African historian *Joseph Ki-Zerbo* saw the importance of the Second World War for the decolonization of Africa from a different perspective, according to the *bottom up* world view on the part of African soldiers directly involved in the war effort (see also van Reybrouck 2012). There were hundreds of thousands of Africans who had to fight in the various theatres of war in Libya, the Orient, Indochina and Burma, but also in Italy, Germany and Normandy:

> Significantly more than in the First World War, Black Africa made contact with the whole world for the first time under the generally shaken conditions. In 1940, 127,320 Senegalese snipers from French West Africa, 15,500 soldiers from Equatorial Africa, and 34,000 from Madagascar fought [against the enemies of France]. At the armistice the number of 'Senegalese' had been reduced by 24,271, that of the Madegasses by

4350! For hundreds of thousands of blacks, this war offered the opportunity to relentlessly expose the true face of the white man, without imperialist mask, without pro-consular accessory. Whites worked with their hands, they sweated, they loved, they were hungry and thirsty. Others trembled with fear, tortured, committed treason and killed each other with fury. Some were heroes, too. 'Black people are neither better nor worse than people anywhere else on the globe,' wrote David Livingstone. This simple sentence, a revolutionary one for the 19th century, took on a clear, unequivocal meaning for millions of Africans in 1942. The whites, who in Africa struggled equally for domination and colonial violence, revealed themselves among themselves not infrequently as ravening wolves. In the raw contempt in which Hitler embraced other whites and blacks, blacks suddenly discovered their own worth. At the same time they attained the stature and status of knights, here the true distinction between men was revealed: human dignity. The African soldiers were the founders of African emancipation (Ki-Zerbo 1981, p. 517).

African war veterans who were able to return home to their villages and towns with such experiences were on the one hand disillusioned and on the other highly motivated to shake off the colonial rule of the Europeans as quickly as possible. They found new quasi-political organizations in the rapidly growing cities, equipped with a heightened political consciousness and a critical press. Strikes against unjust white supremacy proliferated in the ports and factories as well as railroads and educational institutions of the African colonies. Added to this, in 1946–1947, *Indonesia, India* and other Asian colonies were granted independence; and the Soviet Union, under dictator Stalin, did all it could to intensify calls by African socialists and intellectuals for an end to colonial rule—'the imperialists of the West'.

The world war also gave new impetus to the movement of *Pan-Africanism.* Intellectuals increasingly began to take pride in their black skin color. In the worldwide defiance movement of *Pan-Africanism,* more and more people of black skin color in the USA, in the Caribbean and in the African colonies now became aware of their common origin from 'Mother Africa'. The beginnings of the idea and politics of *Pan-Africanism* can be traced back to the late nineteenth century, when the demand *Africa to Africans* arose among the black educated class in the historical context of the global anti-slavery movement. It was a movement of collective self-discovery of such victims of the transatlantic slave trade—building on the racist illusion of global 'black racial unity' (Geiss 1968). In Manchester in 1945, the Fifth Pan-African Congress was held (the first Congress had taken place in 1900); it now acted as a driving force for concrete political anti-colonial demands (Speitkamp 2005, p. 332).

On the Gold Coast in 1948, the charismatic *Kwame Nkrumah* rose to become the leader of the African freedom struggle. He became one of the leaders who brought

about the creation of the *Organization for African Unity (OAU)* in Addis Ababa in 1963. This club of heads of state and government comprised two rival groups: While the '*Casablanca Group*' led by *Kwame Nkrumah* and *Julius Nyerere* of Tanzania promoted the *Union idea*, the '*Monrovia Group*' (as the association of Francophone countries) preferred only loose cooperation (Geiss 1968). The OAU charter was based on two core principles—that of state *sovereignty* for all members, which included the inviolability of (colonial) borders, and the imperative of *non-interference* in 'internal affairs'. Only with the transformation of the OAU into the African Union in 2002 was this self-restraint to change (Tetzlaff 2015).

6.2   Continuity and Change of the Postcolonial State

The *colonial situation,* as shown above, was fundamentally characterized by racial discrimination, but at the same time it also contained a fan of possibilities for some subjects to pursue their own interests openly or secretly. Patterns of articulation were by no means uniform: while some representatives of ethno-cultural communities or social interest groups refused to cooperate with colonial instances, others were more inclined to take advantage of opportunities to acquire formal education and technical skills (Grohs 1967; Küper 2001; Adick 2009; Thomson 2010). The latter behaviors in particular contributed to the acceleration of the process of detachment that *decolonization* signified. An African educated and functional elite had gradually grown up through attendance at Christian missionary schools or state-sponsored institutions, as well as through sojourns abroad, and had come into contact with European cultural heritage, including the ideals of the French Revolution (liberty, equality, fraternity) and Christian charity. Faced with the real colonial situation, contradictions between humanist ideals and colonial practice were inevitably discovered, so that more and more educated Africans began to organize themselves, in associations, trade unions, and later in political parties and national liberation movements. They learned to challenge their oppressors with their own intellectual weapons: If human rights and charity were to be universal values, then they had to apply to Africans as well; to that extent, the realization was inevitable: Colonialism—in theory and practice—is morally *wrong,* if not *sinful,* and justifies resistance (Grohs and Tibi 1973; Nugent 2004; Shipway 2008) (Fig. 6.1).

   Decolonization can be described as the partly peaceful, partly violent process of liberation of African colonial peoples from European foreign rule. This also includes the conflicts and wars *in* the *settler colonies*, in which a more violent

Fig. 6.1 The political states of Africa. (Source: Kämmer cartography, Berlin 2013)

liberation dynamic developed. In *Madagascar,* the French Republic responded to the popular uprising of 1947 by killing approximately 70,000 Madegasses. A relatively low-violence, negotiated version of decolonization ideally proceeded in *three short phases of interaction* between Africans and European colonizers and contained the following features: In response to massive *civil protests by the native population,* colonial administrations, after prolonged reluctance, finally reacted by making concessions to African spokesmen in the struggle for more rights for the 'natives': from participation in *legislative councils* (in the case of the British colonies) to participation in new laws and in a democratic constitution. Once consent was obtained to form political *parties* and hold free *elections*, the first phase of decolonization was complete. Often, imprisoned political party leaders and

representatives of civilian national liberation movements had to be released from prison because they were now needed to participate in election campaigns (the so-called *prison graduates*). After the *political elections,* still supervised by the outgoing colonial power, had brought the first freely elected African government into office in each case (second phase), the *reconstruction of the political system* began soon after the victory celebrations—the *third and pioneering phase of decolonization*. European professionals and experienced white colonial officials were replaced by indigenous cadres in what has been called the policy of *Africanization* of the system of government and administration. Often associated with this was a policy of *nationalizing* business enterprises that dated back to the colonial period.

The concept of democratic pluralism in the guise of a constitutional competitive order—a late product of European development—was rejected as 'un-African'. The political ideal did not consist in the notion of *power* as a temporally limited mandate of the people for which one had to be accountable to the sovereign (people), but rather, on the contrary, it was based on the construction of political power as a temporally unlimited 'right to rule' of a president of the state who was to rule without onerous controls through a constitution of separation of powers. In *Zambia,* for example, the slogan of the *United Independence Party* (*UNIP*) was '*One Country, One Nation, One Party'.*

With the attainment of political independence, there was something like the *revolution of rising expectations* in wide circles of the population that is strong hopes for a better life, free from racial humiliation and free from poverty, low income and poor education (Grohs and Tibi 1973; Le Sueur 2003; Shipway 2008; van Reybrouck 2012). Objectively, as legacies of colonial and racist rule, African societies faced *four centrally important challenges*:

First, the task of *state-building* to be accomplished: how was one to govern appropriately in a colonial state that had been taken over by the colonial masters and was, after all, poised for oppression, exploitation and *divide-et-impera strategies?* Should one, could one, dissolve the 'inherited state', reconstitute it, found it anew or merge it with other states, as some *Pan-Africanists* had in mind as an ideal?

Second, the task of *nation-building*: How were the dozens, if not hundreds, of tribes, ethnic groups, peoples, kingdoms, emirates, nomadic groups, etc. (clear definitional criteria have not prevailed; but see Harding 1999, p. 136, Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, pp. 59–80 and Korte and Schäfers 2002) to be combined and unified into a nation with a state constitution accepted by all, without violating traditional rights and privileges of the peoples? Often it was also a matter of alleviating long-simmering conflicts of interest between ethnically and religiously and culturally different groups and of allowing them to merge into a national sense of

community—at least among the younger generation, for example by means of clever state educational offers (Adick 2009).

Third, the task of *economic development* and *infrastructural integration of* the whole country: This had hitherto been dualistically fragmented, in that a *modern* enclave-like export sector was juxtaposed with a backward subsistence economic sector in the hinterland. According to which economic or development strategy should the colonially deformed countries be reconstructed, modernized or developed: (a) according to the capitalist model? (b) according to the socialist model? or (c) according to state capitalist recipes, such as those tried out in India and other 'non-aligned' (neutral) countries? What role should or could *external* forces play in this process that is the institutions of the former colonial mother country, the UN authorities or the *International Finance Institutions* such as the IMF and the World Bank?

And *fourth,* the task of socio-cultural modernization of society had to be tackled simultaneously: In view of the great educational deficits of the masses, how could a functional education and health system be rapidly established that would meet the needs of the predominantly illiterate rural masses? How could processes of *mental decolonization* be initiated in order to arrive at a self-determined synthesis of what is worth preserving and useful elements of Western modernity?

All these tasks were objectively serious and therefore difficult to solve, which would have required the skills of experts in many different fields. But African colonies had been very poorly prepared by Europeans for self-government and the exercise of state sovereignty (Le Sueur 2003; Nugent 2004; Marx 2004; Cooper 2006; Shipway 2008) and this is also why there have been so many failures (Ansprenger 2002; Meredith 2005; Ayittey 2005; Bayart 2009; Thomson 2010; Padayachee 2010). The phenomenon of more or less successful *decolonization*—its inception, its drivers, its internal and external conditioning factors, its beneficiaries and victims—has been the subject of *controversy* among social scientists around the world for years. While a group of historians and political scientists focused on the actions and imperialist interests of the European colonial powers and investigated the question at what point England, France, Belgium and Portugal were ready to give in to and shape the Africans' drive for freedom (Ansprenger, von Albertini, Iliffe), more recent research focuses on the local and regional social processes on the ground in the colonies (Le Sueur 2003; Cooper 2006; Shipway 2008; Ziai 2010). They see the process of decolonization as the culmination of a dialectic between colonizers and the colonized, as the story of interplay and conflict between the two camps, influenced by *external* processes and determined by *internal* structures (Shipway 2008, p. 5). *Top-down analyses* can be distinguished from *bottom-up analyses*: While the former look at political processes in imperial metropolises from

the point of view of the end of an imperial epoch, the latter also and above all fathom the social local roots (the *grass roots*) of anti-colonial national movements (Kennedy 1988; Shipway 2008; Le Sueur 2003; Cooper 2003).

In pre-colonial times, there had been a plethora of independent or semi-autonomous formations of rule, forming an elastic network structure that was greatly altered by colonization and decolonization. The post-colonial era did not bring the citizens of the *new states* a sudden departure from the institutions and practices of European colonial rule, but on the contrary, the dynamic continuation and further development of social patterns of reproduction with great historical depth. The historian *Frederick Cooper* has used the image of the *gatekeeper state* to illustrate political continuity as a trend in African history before and after the Second World War:

> The colonial gatekeeper state had only "weak institutions to penetrate the social and cultural space of Africans, but it sat astride the seam between colonial territory and the outside world. Their main source of revenue was taxes on imports and exports of goods at the ports; they [state rulers] could decide who could leave the country for education and what kind of educational institutions came in; they set rules and licenses that determined who could trade internally and externally . . . Most rulers [after gaining independence] noticed from the beginning that their own interests were served by means of the same strategy of 'gatekeeping' as those of the colonial state before Second World War: limited avenues for advancement that were controlled by the state would be less risky than wide-open channels that could become focal points for opposition. But the post-colonial gatekeeper state, lacking the external coercive power of its predecessor, was a vulnerable state, not a strong state" (Cooper 2006, p. 5).

At its core, this successful narrative reflects the predominantly tragic history of the African independence phase from around 1960 to the present: political rulers still anxiously guard the lucrative "doors" to the outside world, thus stifling competition and future hopes of talent pushing after them (as also Mbeki 2009 and Mills 2010). The same view had already been expressed 40 years earlier by *Frantz Fanon*, who had still had the opportunity (before he died in 1961) to become acquainted with the behavior of the new masters in post-colonial Africa as temporary ambassador of the provisional Algerian government in *Accra/Ghana.* He articulated his scathing verdict on the *ignorance, incompetence and high-handedness* of African liberation leaders in his famous magnum opus, *The Damned of the Earth* (*Die Verdammten dieser Erde*)*,* as follows:

> The classical, as it were innate weakness of the national consciousness of the under-developed countries is not only the result of the mutilation of the colonized man by the

colonial regime. It is also the result of the inertia of the national bourgeoisie, its destitution, the profoundly cosmopolitan formation of its mind . . . . In its *voluntarist narcissism,* the national bourgeoisie easily convinced itself that it could advantageously replace the bourgeoisie of the mother country. But independence, by which it is slenderly cornered, provokes catastrophic reactions and forces it to make fearful appeals to the address of the former motherland . . . . The national bourgeoisie of the underdeveloped countries is not oriented towards production, invention, construction and work; it is interested exclusively in *intermediary activities* . . . And it is probably true that the greed of the colonial masters and the embargo system established by colonialism have left it little choice . . . This underdeveloped, numerically weak, capital-less bourgeoisie, which rejects the revolutionary path, will stagnate miserably after independence (Fanon 1966, pp. 116–117; emphasis in italics by RT).

Fanon was to be proved right with his prophetic warning against narcissistic self-delusion on the part of African state politicians: With a few exceptions (Mauritius, Botswana, Tanzania, Burkina Faso), nowhere has succeeded in building popular, self-determined economies in the course of the nearly six decades since his death, but his idea that the young African educational and political elite should and could have taken "*the revolutionary road*" is to be assessed as understandable wishful thinking rather than a feasible utopia. In order to be able to initiate a "revolutionary" overthrow of the existing conditions in an economically externally dependent and underdeveloped country, not only a revolutionary subject would have been needed, but also a sufficient amount of pressure and means of struggle to overcome the expected resistance, as well as strong international support. *Fanon* believed in the liberating effect of a class struggle "under the pressure and leadership of the people, that is, in defiance of the interests of the bourgeoisie" (Fanon 1966, p. 127). As is well known, the Soviet Union was prepared to support a handful of "revolutionary governments" (in Guinea, Mali, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola, Mozambique), but nowhere did these succeed in realizing Fanon's vision of genuine popular rule without alienation between government and people. On the contrary, *Fanon* criticized the emerging form of the postcolonial single party as "the modern form of bourgeois dictatorship without mask, without make-up, ruthless and cynical" (Fanon 1966, p. 127).

After all, there was one African president who tried to do this for 4 years until he was killed by the petty bourgeoisie of his own country, which he had begun to dispossess—*Thomas Sankara* of Burkina Faso, president from 1983 to 1987 (see Sect. 9.5). This tragic case also underscores the realization that there was no *zero hour* in the attainment of independence because the dynamics of *continuity lines* from the past were far too powerful. *Paul Nugent* has pointed out that the real beneficiaries of decolonization were not the few African entrepreneurs who took the

place of whites, but the *Lebanese* in West Africa and the *Asians* (mostly Indians) in East Africa because they were more educated, better connected and more competitive than Africans. Therefore, the African entrepreneurial bourgeoisie remained quite small in numbers and was "largely limited to access to political patronage from the center of power". Situationally, African competition in business thus took the form of "a by-product of the struggle for power in the state", which in his view constituted "the fundamental weakness" of African entrepreneurship (Nugent 2004, p. 63).

Forty years after *Fanon,* the Berlin historian of Africa *Franz Ansprenger* came to an assessment of the fatal undesirable development of post-colonial Africa through corrupt dictatorships that was identical in substance:

> The mixture of populistically whitewashed dictatorship and corruption typical of almost all civilian and military governments on the continent from the mid-1960s to the end of the 1980s, which prevailed after democratic 'ballast' had been thrown off [meaning the abolition of free elections, "which offered real chances for minorities to become the majority" (p. 21)], has been responsible for the coups and civil wars, and more recently for uncontrollable interstate wars. It has ruined Africa's economy, torn apart the once solidary society, let the state disintegrate (Ansprenger 2003, p. 22).

With the attainment of political independence, the African government elected to office was saddled with all the burdens, duties and privileges of a formally sovereign member of the international community. In the jubilation of the independence celebrations, it initially remained hidden that the new states were *artificial* entities with little vitality. The fragile state entities were, after all—by their very origin— colonial political offshoot states whose borders were guaranteed not by their own strength but by norms of international law (Shipway 2008, p. 12). *Robert H. Jackson* and *Carl G. Rosberg* have made a useful distinction between the *juridical state* and the *empirical state*, between the *legal idea* of the modern state as the bearer of nation-state sovereignty, on the one hand, and the *empirical reality of* individual state entities, on the other, from which citizens can expect but do not receive concrete social benefits. This is connected with two different forms of political *legitimacy:* While the state as a subject of international law can only claim *external legitimacy* because its formal existence is secured by the protective guarantees of other states, the *empirical state* can only acquire legitimacy for itself through its own achievements vis-à-vis its citizens (Jackson & Rosberg 1985). It is thus also understandable that *the late colonial state,* which set out to become an entity capable of political action both internally and externally, was initially characterized by *unprecedented lability*; this was because, unlike the colonial state, it lacked automatic recourse to the mother country's means of violence.

Mindful of this instability, numerous governments (especially francophone ones) entered into *military base agreements* with the colonial motherland during the transition to independence—as a safeguard against military coups and secessionist movements (Schraeder 2009, pp. 244–266; Nugent 2004; Meredith 2005; Falola & Njoko 2010).

Another aspect of the fragile weak state relates to the question of *who governs*? At the time of independence, which was still under the political control of the colonial powers, the *multiparty system* (resulting from founding elections) had been the standard model. But almost everywhere, after a short time, it was transformed by state presidents into the *one-party regime* that was becoming typical. "There were subjectively 'good reasons' for this: the preservation of power was high on the political agenda, fueled by the fear of being driven out again by rivals and opponents at the next elections. Concerns about protecting the newly minted state from regionalist, even *secessionist* tendencies—key words and key dates being Southern Sudan (1955), Katanga (1960), Biafra (1967)—were also not unfounded. These trouble spots formed in states that had achieved independence with a more (Nigeria) or less (Zaire) tested multiparty system. Both goals—'modernization' and 'anti-tribalism'—were subsumed under the cipher *nation-building* (Ansprenger 1999, p. 80).

The fact that the *new states* of post-colonial Africa developed in the direction of one-party systems was also a reaction to the illusory policies of the colonial Europeans in the phase of hasty decolonization. In the majority of cases, the *negotiated settlement* had proved to be the key to the political independence of the colony. This was promised by the outgoing colonial power if (a) a democratic constitution was adopted by parliament and if (b) multiparty parliamentary elections were held. These conditions were supposed to guarantee a pluralistic democracy and the rule of law—an illusion that political scientist *Alex Thomson* has derided 'as the ultimate irony of colonial rule': 'imperial powers wanted to leave a legacy of constitutional liberal democracy' when they themselves had ruled in an 'authoritarian, bureaucratic and interventionist manner' during their reign (Thomson 2010, p. 21). But the refusal of the African state classes to engage in the democratic game of *checks and balances* and instead to form the *patronage state* had deeper causes, which are also to be sought in cultural traditions and institutional deficits (see Chap. 9).

The postcolonial state was also a fragile state in financial terms, measured by its ability to tax its population adequately. The taxes actually collected consisted mostly of customs duties and indirect taxes of all kinds (value-added taxes) rather than income taxes; thus, state budgets had to be financed through external sources (Padayachee 2010, pp. 110–131; Fukuyama 2015, pp. 289–290). In doing so, the

first postcolonial regimes produced a paradox relevant to development: while their political development was expressed in the pursuit of autonomy of action (independence), their financial dependence on external forces increased, especially on 'development aid' (dependence). The latter became visible in the increasing interdependence of African countries with the world market, world politics (Cold War) and international institutions such as the UN, IMF and World Bank. As an integral part of a globalizing world of states, new perspectives for action opened up for the postcolonial states of Africa, without, however, being able to escape the "shadow of globalization" (Stiglitz 2002; Osterhammel 2005; Ferguson 2006; Tetzlaff 2008a).

In summary, we can state: The decolonization of Africa was part of a general *emancipation* of the colonized peoples, the so-called '*Third World*'. African governments were ill-prepared to meet the four major post-colonial challenges of state consolidation, nation-building, socio-economic development and cultural modernization. However, young nationalists in colonial cities were impatient to now be able to take their country's destiny into their own hands as soon as possible. "*Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things will follow*"—this famous demand of the young activist *Kwame Nkrumah* from the *Gold Coast* expresses the great illusion of the first generation of African politicians: the longed-for 'political kingdom' quickly turned out to be an authoritarian presidential one-party system in which separation of powers in conformity with the constitution, a free press and political opposition parties usually had no place (Tetzlaff 1973, p. 229). In many places, incompetence and narcissistic self-overestimation spread among the African presidential regimes, which *adapted* themselves to the inherited *gatekeeper state* of their colonial predecessors in order to be able to control society and the economy and fleece them materially for the purpose of maintaining their own power.

6.3   Ghana: The Struggle for Political Independence

When the British colony of the *Gold Coast* became the first black African country to achieve political independence through negotiation in March 1957—an event of great international impact—the new government immediately changed its name to *Ghana*. '*Ghana*' had been the name of the ancient *Mande Empire* west of *Timbuktu* in what is now the state of Mali, whose power had been broken by the Muslim *Almoravids* in 1076. The new state thus continued a glorious tradition of empire-building *before* the two great *external interferences*, Islamization and colonization. Establishing a politically viable entity within the framework of a now required modern constitution proved to be a major challenge, given that the Gold Coast was

still an ensemble of 108 independent mini-states (after *Adu Boahen* 1975, cited in Schicho 2001, p. 182). In the 1950s, various protests by the mobilized people of the Gold Coast had created an explosive atmosphere; these involved indigenous cocoa farmers who felt unfairly treated; politicized trade unionists demanding higher wages; disillusioned soldiers who had returned from the frontlines of Second World War; unemployed youths who had dropped out of school (the famous *veranda boys*); graduates of Christian missionary schools who now demanded a political voice as a stratum of *intelligentsia*; urban fathers and wives suffering from rising consumer prices dictated by foreign trading companies.

The first political party (which was only allowed to call itself a *convention*) was the *United Gold Coast Convention (UGCC)* under the leadership of *Dr. Danquah* and *Dr. Busia,* which initially did not immediately demand political state independence, but advocated 'self-government' of the African educated elite and chiefs—for '*responsible government'* for the internal affairs of the colony. This united *men of property and standing*, that is merchants, lawyers, prosperous cocoa farmers and also chiefs (Cooper 2003). The speeches of a radical nationalist named *Kwame Nkrumah,* who began to inspire the masses with the bold political slogan *independence now*, thwarted the green table plans devised by the British Colonial Secretary in London for an orderly gradual transfer of power. The young activist, who had studied economics, sociology and philosophy for twelve years in the USA and England, founded his own party, the *Convention People's Party (CPP),* in 1947. The CPP—a split from the UGCC, of which *Nkrumah* had been secretary-general—was supported by the *Trade Union Congress* (TUC) and recruited petit-bourgeois, impatient youth from the urban lower classes. In early 1950, it launched a campaign of 'civil disobedience' (modelled on *Gandhi*) in the form of strikes and boycotts of English goods (Nkrumah 1958).

Nkrumah managed to transform the CPP into a modern political machine and, to everyone's surprise, won 34 of 38 publicly contested parliamentary seats with it in 1951, while the politically moderate honorary party of his rival *Dr. Danquah* could only win three seats. The governor had no choice but to release the election winner from prison (to which he had been sent a year earlier for his strike actions) and appoint the 1952 election winner as *prime minister.* Corruption, nepotism and the cult of personality that would characterize the *Nkrumah regime* until its demise soon made themselves felt. In 1947, the British colonial administration had established the *Cacao Marketing Board* (CMB), a marketing agency for cocoa that bought African farmers' harvests at a fixed price (often less than half the world market price) and had them transported to the ports. The difference was used to pay the colony's administrative costs and to build up cash reserves. Under Prime Minister *Nkrumah,* the CMB was transformed into a *Cocao Purchasing Company* (CPC),

which on the one hand forced the local middlemen out of business and on the other gave loyal officials of the ruling party access to the revenues from the cocoa business. As soon as *Nkrumah* was in office as prime minister, he gave instructions that the CMB should keep the cocoa price as low as possible in order to be able to finance the planned development projects and its own clientele with the money that was thus withheld from the farmers. Thus, the revenues of the CMB/CPC were misappropriated in order to be able to grant loans, contracts, orders, licenses and jobs to CPP supporters (Meredith 2005, p. 25).

Such practices increased oppositional sentiment in the country. Open conflict arose over the attempted *constitutional change*: while the *CPP* preferred a *centralist* system of government, the cocoa-producing *Asante regions* (Ashanti) advocated a *federalist* model, pointing to Nigeria. *Asante* from all social classes, as well as opposition small parties from other regions of the colony, soon joined together to form the *National Liberation Movement (NLM)* and flirted with secession. However, neither the colonial administration nor the CPP were willing to agree to the idea of a federal constitution. In the 1957 elections for full independence, *Nkrumah's CPP* was able to assert itself as the strongest political force, winning 72 parliamentary seats out of a total of 104 (with only 57% of the votes cast) (Meredith 2005, p. 25).

On the eve of independence, then, the country was already divided politically and regionally, and 'the unity of the nation' was by no means the only political ideal of the freedom fighters. The celebration of independence for Britain's first black African colony in March 1957 was followed worldwide with great recognition and curiosity. Six months earlier, in October 1956, the United Kingdom had suffered a painful diplomatic defeat in the *Suez Canal Crisis,* which heralded the end of the British Empire. Under pressure from the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, Prime Minister *Anthony Eden* had been forced to recall his invasion forces from the Suez Canal Zone, which (along with France and Israel) had been intended to overthrow the new star of the Arab world—President *Abdel Nasser* of Egypt. Now London, under Eden's successor *Harold Macmillan,* showed generosity: the *Duchess of Kent,* representing Queen Elizabeth II, appeared at the celebration, as did US Vice President *Richard Nixon* and delegations from another 54 countries; congratulations came from *Zhou En-lai* (China), *Nehru* (India), *Bulganin* (USSR), and US President *Eisenhower* (Meredith 2005, p. 26).

The prospects for the rapid economic rise of the young state, to which the British had bequeathed £200 million from cocoa sales, and given a friendly climate in the world towards the newcomer, seemed good, if not rosy. But the joy of the peaceful withdrawal of the British from the Gold Coast, now called *Ghana,* did not last long; this is because the CPP under its Prime Minister *Nkrumah*, soon to be called the

"Saviour", began to roll back the measures that the opposition (and the British Colonial Ministry) had enforced in the years before. Members of the ruling party were appointed as *Regional Commissioners*; the regional parliaments were stripped of their powers and their functions eventually transferred to the national parliament. Nkrumah dissolved the *Kumasi State Council* and seized its assets. He removed the Paramount Chief of Akyem, *Nana Ofori Atta,* and filled chiefs' posts with 'sympathizers'. The *Preventive Detention Act* of summer 1958 gave the government the power to imprison people for up to 5 five years without judicial approval and conviction. The *Industrial Relations Act* of 1958 mandated the settlement of labor disputes through arbitration boards, largely eliminating strikes (Schicho 2001, p. 195).

As far as the *economic policy* orientation of the young state was concerned, the African president had the following alternative: either he cooperated most closely with foreign companies and the 'advisors' of the former mother country and, as a junior partner, tried to get at least a share of the commercial success of the continuing businesses, or he pushed foreign businessmen and company owners aside in order to occupy the command posts alone by way of *Africanization.* While francophone countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon or Senegal preferred the *pragmatic* path of cooperation as junior partners of foreign companies, the Nkrumah regime took the foolhardy path of *confrontation* in dealing with foreign interests, ignoring the structural vulnerability of a classic commodity economy. But his government's rather anti-market economic policies—nationalizing the country's gold mines, establishing state farms, disenfranchising unions, bludgeoning striking dockworkers and market women—scared off foreign investors. As long as the regime still had foreign currency, it invested in ambitious infrastructure and energy projects. The construction of the *Volta Dam,* which would provide electricity for bauxite processing, was among the most hopeful investments of the era. At the same time, *Nkrumah* concentrated more and more power on his person; in 1964, the 'president for life' had the country officially declared a one-party state, and state-directed 'socialism' was declared the economic form suitable for Ghana.

The economic decline was accelerated by the fall in *world market prices of cocoa*: while they had reached a maximum of £460 per ton at the time of Ghana's independence (1954), by 1960 they had fallen to £222, and by the end of the Nkrumah era they had reached only £138 (in 1965, figures according to Nugent 2004, p. 70). There has often been speculation as to whether the collapse in cocoa prices was influenced or even brought about by Western industrialized countries. There is no clear evidence of this, but since Ghana was the largest supplier of cocoa and since consumption of this tropical product had not declined, there is much to be said for this assumption. The *Nkrumah regime* defended itself for several months

with a '*cocoa hold-up'*, but could not win the competition against financially strong US chocolate companies (as the buyers of Ghanaian cocoa). The government reacted defiantly to the shrinkage of state revenues with further borrowing from abroad, until this too was no longer possible because the IMF and World Bank demanded tough structural adjustment measures as a precondition for further support (Siebold 1988, p. 35 f.).

Between 1961 and 1965, the *external debt* increased 30-fold. In 1966, Ghana had more than $511 million in foreign liabilities (Siebold 1988, p. 45). With the decoupling from the British pound and the introduction of the domestic currency *Cedi,* the government was able to demonstrate an apparent ability to act by issuing more and more banknotes, but this opened the door to higher rates of inflation (40% in 1966), which particularly affected the urban lower classes. Food prices rose by 23.5% in the last two years of the *Nkrumah era* (Schicho 2001, p. 198). Nine years after gaining independence, the *Nkrumah regime* was brought down by a military coup in February 1966, at the very moment when the country's foreign debt had become a burning problem for which there was no longer a politically acceptable solution. As a *balance sheet of the Nkrumah era,* the Hamburg political scientist *Thomas Siebold* has made a differentiated judgement:

> When a group of army and police officers staged a coup on February 24, 1966 . . ., it was primarily a coup to protect the corporate interests of the military. They had to fear that Nkrumah, who was becoming increasingly suspicious of the regular army, would further curtail their privileges and eventually threaten their existence by expanding a regiment under his control alone ('President's Own Guard Regiment') . . . If the desolate economic situation was not the cause of the coup (it affected the army only indirectly), it was nevertheless made possible by it. By refusing to provide aid to the beleaguered country (which was matched by Nkrumah's refusal to submit to IMF disciplinary measures), the Western industrialized countries, the IMF and the World Bank had played their part in making the domestic situation 'ripe for a coup'. With the severe supply crisis and the high rate of inflation causing a loss of income, the regime had lost the support of ever larger sections of the originally loyal lower classes, and the hostility of the middle classes towards Nkrumah had meanwhile grown even stronger. That the West would welcome a change of government was obvious (Siebold 1988, p. 44).

The urban population reacted to *Nkrumah's* fall predominantly with joyful relief, while the people in the countryside, "as always, took note of the change unmoved" (Schicho 2001, p. 198). *Nkrumah*, who was in Vietnam with a 200-strong delegation at the time of the coup, supposedly to contribute to peace in Indochina, fled into exile in *Conakry*, the capital of Guinea, to his socialist friend, President *Sékou Touré*. *Nkrumah* left behind large foreign debts, embittered cocoa farmers,

disillusioned youth, and an impoverished urban underclass. By the time he died in 1972, lonely and embittered in exile (and later brought home in celebration as a dead hero), for many Ghanaians the misdeeds of their first president had been displaced and vaulted by a nostalgic heroic myth. "Never has the career of a Ghanaian begun so promisingly and ended so disastrously as the career of *Osagyefo* [Saviour] Kwame Nkrumah"—wrote Ghanaian historian *Prof. Adu Boahen* in 1975 (Boahen 1975, p. 225; cited in Schicho 2001, p. 199). It was not until twenty years later that Ghana would once again find its way out of a self-fabricated misery—this time through a pragmatically thinking coup officer named *Jerry Rawlings,* who was finally able to push open the door for a genuine democratization of the country (see Sect. 9.6).

Tasks

1. What international events influenced the emergence and course of *decolonization* in Africa?
2. What does Frederick Cooper term *gatekeeper state* mean? To what extent was Ghana under President *Nkrumah* such a gatekeeper state?
3. What does *Frantz Fanon* criticize about the behavior of African political elites?

African Socialism

<div style="text-align: right;">**7**</div>

7.1 Socialist Experiments

In their struggle for *Uhuru* (freedom) and political independence, African politicians had launched *populist* mass movements against colonial rule and mobilized the population in the cities with far-reaching promises (Ansprenger 1999, p. 114 f.; Bayart 2009, p. 119 f.). Many of them—such as *Kwame Nkrumah* (Ghana), *Leopold Senghor (*Senegal), *Jomo Kenyatta* (Kenya), *Felix Houphouet-Boigny* (Côte d'Ivoire) and *Hastings Banda* (Malawi)—knew Western countries and were not unimpressed by their social achievements. These politicians were well aware of the weakness of the colonial state of which they were now heirs, which is why they were initially anxious to secure their political rule also through benefits for the population. Not a few African politicians therefore experimented with socialist ideas:

- *Kwame Nkrumah* on the Gold Coast/Ghana (1909–1972), who was the first president of Ghana to put forward his own socialist conception, *Consciencism,* and to promote the Pan-African vision of unity. He was overthrown by a military coup in 1966 and died in exile.
- *Sékou Touré* in Guinea (1922–1984), who, as a trade unionist, Muslim and president, turned abruptly away from metropolitan France and turned Guinea into a "revolutionary socialist people's republic" that persecuted political opponents without measure and drove millions of citizens to flee. His economic and development policies were disastrous for the population; the dictator died of heart surgery in Ohio/USA in 1984.
- *Mobito Keita* in Mali (1915–1977), who was the first president of Mali to advocate African socialism and a federation with the 'progressive' states of

West Africa (Ghana and Guinea). He was overthrown by a military coup in 1968 and died in a labour camp in the Sahara in 1977.

- *Julius Nyerere* in Tanzania (1922–1999), who became the first president of his country in 1962. With the *Ujamaa concept*, he brought his own theory of *African socialism* into the discussion and practiced it from 1967 onwards—without success. It was a synthesis of the socialist planning model and the community spirit of the pre-colonial village community.
- *Ahmed Ben Bella* in Algeria (1918–2012), who became Algeria's first president in 1962 and transformed the *Front de Liberation National (FLN)* into a socialist single party that was guilty of neglecting the peasant agricultural sector (Tibi in Grohs and Tibi 1973). In 1964, he was awarded the order *Hero of the Soviet Union*; a year later, he was overthrown in a military coup and placed under house arrest. He was succeeded by *Houari Boumedienne.*
- *Amilcar Cabral* in Portuguese Guinea (1924–1973), political and intellectual leader of the liberation movement *PAIGC* of Guinea and Cape Verde, who sought a culturally based, grassroots African socialism. In 1963—one year before Cape Verde gained independence—he was assassinated in a military coup by political opponents from his own ranks.
- *Patrice Lumumba* in Belgian Congo (1925–1961), who was the first elected president of Congo to openly advocate African socialism and expected help from the Soviet Union. In 1961, he was assassinated in a clandestine operation by Belgian and US intelligence services (De Witte 2001; Hochschild 2002; Van Reybrouck 2012).
- *Léopold Senghor* in Senegal (1906–2001), the country's first president (1960–1980) and founder of the ideology of *Négritude*. He wanted "to make Marxism fruitful as a method and as humanism for the cosmos of world culture—a cosmos into which the African must enter by his nature as a religious man who believes in God" (Ansprenger 1961, p. 342; Senghor 1967). In 1980, he voluntarily resigned from office in favor of his prime minister, *Abdou Diouf.*
- *Eduardo Mondlane (1920–1969)*, the president of the People's Liberation Movement of *Mozambique*, *Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO)*. After FRELIMO achieved independence from Portugal in 1975 following an 11-year war of liberation, it was declared a Marxist Unity Party. A civil war ensued between FRELIMO and a South African-backed opposition party, RENAMO, which did not end until 1992.
- With the flight of the Ethiopian dictator *Mengistu Haile Mariam* (b. 1937) to Zimbabwe in 1991, the "scientific socialism" of Marxist-Leninist character lost all meaning for Africa. The military junta, called the *Derg,* which had ruled since 1977, had established a brutal socialist experiment (state farms, land reforms,

forced resettlements, expropriation of foreign companies without compensation; 'Red Terror' against 100,000 'class enemies', etc.). Even with massive military support from the Soviet Union, the military regime failed to win the civil war against the Tigrayan and Eritrean liberation organizations (Brüne 1986; Kreuter 2010; Uhlig et al. 2017).

The following is a closer look at an experiment in socialism: Tanzania's *Ujamaa* model. It was the expression of an internal will-formation under the leadership of a *big man*—the former missionary pupil, teacher and party politician *Julius Nyerere*. It can be shown that there was *room for political manoeuvre,* despite the existing *external* limitations ('shadow of globalization'), even for the 'new states': It could be *used* skilfully internally, or it could be *squandered*; it could be *expanded* in the short term or sustainably, or it could be *narrowed* further by its own failures. There was no *determinism* of trade (negating free will). While *Tanzania* experimented with the theory and practice of an *African socialism,* which meant a move away from a market economy, neighboring *Kenya*, under its first president *Jomo Kenyatta*, favored the continuation of the capitalist path of development taken by the British settlers and colonial officials, which was denigrated by Kenyatta's opponents as 'neo-colonialist' (see Sect. 13.2). The one-party state of *Tanzania* was politically stable and dominated by its charismatic President *Julius Nyerere* until 1994; it was only his abdication that opened the way for a move away from the now failed *Ujamaa* socialism. Which system, an oft-asked question, has provided citizens with a better life—Tanzania or Kenya? (see Sect. 13.2).

7.2   Tanzania: Theory and Practice of Ujamaa Socialism

In the era of its first president, *Julius Nyerere,* Tanzania formed the exemplar of a self-defined African socialism—an ideology less a scientific method than a modern creed that, in the words of *Aristide Zollberg,* would reveal "to the initiated the secrets of economic development" (Zollberg, cited in Thomson 2010, p. 38). As African leaders in the Cold War era were encouraged in this belief by the politicians and pundits of socialist states in Europe, the widespread reception of socialist ideas in Africa (and other Third World regions) as an alternative to capitalism and colonialism was to some extent also due to the *Zeitgeist* (*spirit of the times*). It was not until the 1990s—after the destruction of the illusion about actually existing socialism—that a political turnaround also occurred in Africa: towards more

democracy, more political participation from below, and more respect for the laws of the market economy.

From the outset, the Tanzanian president placed *nation-building* as the top political task in order to prevent ethnic tensions and power struggles from arising, as was the case in neighboring countries. In the first 5 years after independence (1961/1962 to 1966/1967), the government in *Tanganyika/Tanzania* continued the policy of *exporting* agricultural goods (sisal, coffee, cotton, pyrethrum and cashew nuts) as best it could. Cloves, coveted worldwide, were exported from *Zanzibar*. The target group of the development politicians were the *progressive farmers,* who were to be encouraged by the state and harassed by the party to encourage the rest of the rural population to make greater efforts. Until 1967, economic development was relatively satisfactory; with an average annual economic growth of 5.9%, there remained, after correction (i.e. taking into account the rate of inflation and population growth), a real growth of 1.5%. On the other hand, the deterioration in the *terms of trade* worked against economic improvement: Prices for cotton, coffee and especially sisal fell, and the cost of imports, both consumer and capital goods, rose (Schicho 2004, p. 327). And above all, the increase in petrol prices as a result of the drastic rise in the price of crude oil by the OPEC states in the 1970s caused the territorial state great financial concern.

President *Nyerere*, disappointed with these minor developmental achievements and inspired by Chinese agrarian socialism under the leadership of *Mao Zedong*, left governance to his vice-president *Rashidi Kawawa* for a while and in 1966 produced *Ujamaa—Foundations of an African Socialism*, which was to become the ideological and organisational basis for the future orientation of the party and the state. *Nyerere's* ideological concept *Ujamaa* was one of the many variants of *African Socialism*; thus, the Tanzanian one was animated by the spirit of avoiding the formation of social classes through a return to the village community of the pre-colonial period. Among the party cadres, elitist and parasitic behaviors had already made themselves felt, and *Nyerere* would not tolerate them. *Ujamaa*—he wrote—meant *family-hood* and, as an African word, was an indication of "the way we want to go in the future: the idea of mutual participation in the family as we know it":

> For us, socialism means building the future according to our ideas on the foundations of our past. We do not import foreign ideology ... We have decided to grow as a society from our roots, but in a particular direction and toward a particular goal. We do this by emphazising and extending special characteristics of our traditional organization so that they can include the possibilities of modern technology, so that we can meet the challenge of life in the twentieth century (Nyerere 1969, p. 28).

Not individualism but egalitarian communalism was to determine social life. *Land* was an inalienable gift of God, entrusted to the whole community for its use; in the new society to be built there would therefore be no individual ownership of land, no right to exploit the labor of others, and no unequal valuation of different types of work. In traditional society, everyone had been a 'worker', social classes had not existed, and social equality in the community of the extended family had been the ethical norm. "The first step in our moral renewal," he said, "must be to re-educate ourselves and re-appropriate our former ethos". Therefore, he said, it was only logical that Africa should rely "on its own strength", which was paraphrased as *Self-Reliance.* Foreign development aid could therefore only play a *complementary* role (Othman 2000; Meredith 2005, p. 252; Fukuyama 2015, p. 331).

In the *Arusha Declaration* of 1967, President *Nyerere* summarized these ideas and had them adopted by the state party TANU (*Tanganyika African National Union*) as the official development ideology of the state—without any prior public debate on the country's change of political course.[1] Central to the *Arusha Declaration* was the *Leadership Code*, a kind of code of conduct for TANU officials: People who held leading positions in the state and in the party were now prohibited from drawing more than one salary, owning real estate or shares, or renting out townhouses. While Tanzanian politicians, businessmen and the relatively wealthy class of Indian merchants reacted with little enthusiasm or understanding to the new state doctrine, foreign countries, especially the two German and Scandinavian countries, were enthusiastic about it; for once it seemed as if an African developing country wanted to get serious about the aid programme propagated by the West - development aid was merely 'help for self-help'. Could *Nyerere's* commitment to *self-reliance* not be understood in this sense? In any case, the World Bank and numerous donor states rewarded the country in such a generous way within the framework of bilateral and multilateral development aid programmes that the meaning and purpose of *self-reliance* were ultimately reversed (Donner-Reichle 2005; see also Rolf Hofmeier in the Africa Yearbooks of the 1970s).

So now TANU officials were charged with putting into practice the ethically demanding concept of their *Mwalimu* (the Kiswahili word for teacher). *Ujamaa villages* with modern infrastructure were established and farmers who had cultivated their fields as families for generations were strongly encouraged to form production and consumption cooperatives and farm communal fields. The

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[1]TANU was renamed CCM (*Chama cha Mapinduzi*, 'Revolutionary Party') in 1977 after merging with the *African Shirasi* Party, which dominated Zanzibar, to form a united party (Bakari 2001).

use of 'experts' and party officials was intended to ensure the functioning of the cooperatives and help improve crop yields. Initially, *Nyerere* had promised that neither the state nor the party would use coercion to convince smallholder farmers to adopt the *Ujamaa* policy. However, when success failed to materialize—by mid-1973, only 5000 *Ujamaa* villages had been established for about two million people, representing 15% of the population (Meredith 2005, p. 254)—the president changed strategy and had about 11 million farmers and their families forcibly resettled between 1973 and 1977. It was the largest resettlement operation in post-colonial Africa. As peasants often refused to voluntarily take the high risks of *forced resettlement* on ecologically unsuitable land, they were forcibly resettled by party officials unfamiliar with the area, which only increased grassroots resistance to the poorly planned socialization program. In the face of peasant resistance to work on communal fields, public administration functionaries fell back on coercive methods similar to those once used by the colonial administration. Simultaneously with land reform, industrial enterprises, banks, shops, and utilities were nationalized or converted into para-state enterprises run by a bureaucrat—an ideal breeding ground for patronage and corruption. By 1979, there are said to have been around 300 nationalizations (Meredith 2005, p. 257; Donner-Reichle 2005). This was especially true of the various *marketing boards* that bought up and marketed the farmers' export products, whereby the margin between the buying-up price paid to the producer and the selling price obtained by the state on the world market was considerable, amounting in some years to around 50%.

    In itself, the idea of grouping scattered peasants into communal centres with schools, hospitals, wells and marketplaces was not wrong, especially as *Tanzania* was a sparsely populated country in which peasant families had to live a rather miserable life in structural poverty and - latently threatened by droughts - at subsistence level for generations (Tröger 2004). And the claim that these peasant communities should have lived conflict-free, harmonious and self-sufficient has been revealed as a myth meanwhile. But the desired transformation through forced *villagisation* was not to succeed and ended in economic disaster: Food production fell so sharply that between 1974 and 1977, there was a deficit of one million tons of maize, which had to be made up by imports from abroad, which in turn caused the country's foreign exchange reserves to shrink. The opposite of *self-reliance* had occurred: An increasing *dependence* of the country on foreign countries had taken place, and the government had to acknowledge with disappointment that the idea of *communal fields* was perceived as a foreign body to the lifeworld practices of African farmers, who everywhere preferred the family farm as a form of production. Professor *Goran Hyden,* who taught in Dar es Salaam, coined the classic phrase "*uncaptured peasantry*": As long as the state did not succeed in convincing small

farmers of the benefits of modern production methods, they would not be prepared to generate a *surplus* (multi-product) that would indicate the beginning of the *take-off phase.* But this would then require a capitalist mentality of *progressive farmers,* which could not be skipped on the way to socialism (Hyden 1983, 1996).

Ten years after the promulgation of the *Ujamaa* policy, President *Nyerere,* in a secret speech in 1977, attributed the failure of his policy to the failure of his managers and especially to the sloppiness of employees in the para-state enterprises. There was still no revision of the obviously failed economic policy, and no one dared to instigate an intra-party rebellion against the highly revered *Mwalimu,* who enjoyed great prestige in the world as a widely respected spokesman for the Non-Aligned Movement. Here one can see a parallel with the passivity of the comrades of the CP of China when party leader *Mao Tse-tung* had ordered the 'Great Leap Forward' policy (1958–1961) that starved more than 30 million peasants to death and no party faction dared to stop him. The consequences for the Tanzanian people, however, were not comparable to those in China, and in Tanzania the failure of the single political party at least increased pressure in society on the government to make the course correction that was due. At a special party congress in February 1992, *CCM* politicians approved a constitutional amendment to abolish the single party system. It was immediately used by 46 groups, each of which could now register as a political party (Schicho 2004, p. 332).

However, considerable pressure also came from the experts of the *World Bank* and the *International Monetary Fund*, who issued increasingly urgent reminders to abandon the unsuccessful *Ujamaa* policy and to now finally begin with the policy of market-conforming structural adjustment (Tetzlaff 1980, pp. 484–497; Holtom 2007). At its core, the *structural adjustment policy (SAP)* consisted of: privatization of state-owned enterprises, liberalization of foreign trade, deregulation of the economy, devaluation of the local currency (the Tanzanian shilling) to promote exports; savings in the state budget, including the dismissal of staff in ministries. After all, foreign countries had given the country more than three billion US dollars in emergency aid during the 1970s, most of which came from Western countries (Calderisi 2006, p. 108 f.). In some regions of the country, which were difficult to reach by disaster relief, people were starving, and industrial production also declined drastically due to the lack of spare parts, which could not be imported for lack of foreign currency.

The years between 1979 and 1985 were marked by the struggle against black markets and excessive profits in trade. In 1982—at the height of the crisis—the country needed foreign aid of US$ 600 million, but it was not until 1985 that Julius Nyerere resigned as *president,* leaving his successor *Hassan Mwingi* (a politician from Zanzibar) to reverse his policies. Now, *nolens volens*, the government

accepted the *structural adjustment postulates* of the donor countries. Since then, Tanzania developed, slowly but steadily, in the direction of market-oriented exploitation of the country's natural riches, with coffee, tea, cashew nuts and cotton gaining in importance alongside gold (for most of the years the biggest foreign exchange earner). But also food production for own consumption could be intensified by peasants freed from coercion, so that the country even achieved surpluses in good weather conditions. Even in the post-Nyerere phase, the national economy was not *fully capitalized*; around the year 2000, one in three households was still dependent on the 'informal sector' (Hirschler & Hofmeier in Afrika-Jahrbuch 2003, p. 317; Goldberg 2008, p. 156 f.).

With and after the end of the socialist experiment, an old evil—*corruption* in the state apparatus—has flourished again. During the CCM's rule, the state bureaucracy, comprising some 300,000 *public servants,* had enriched itself through various *dirty tricks.* With the privatization of state-owned enterprises (primarily in the energy sector), some US$122 million was transferred to black-money accounts of senior state officials, as a parliamentary investigation report revealed in November 2014 (Gray 2015, p. 383). *Hazel S. Gray* was able to show that there would have been a roughly equal distribution of power within the all-powerful state party CCM between four factions, each of which had had a corporate interest in maintaining the illicit money flows. All four would have benefited from this in roughly the same way, "making it difficult for the state president or any group within the ruling party to stop the *grand corruption*" (Gray 2015, p. 385). However, the neo-liberal economic reforms pushed through by the creditors, with their emphasis on *privatization* of state-owned enterprises, including hotels, and *deregulation* of the economy, would also have facilitated corruption among state officials (Gray 2015). Even after the transition to a democratic multiparty system, the state party CCM won all parliamentary elections, so that the officially proclaimed anti-corruption policies remained inconsequential. The cause of this was obvious: The perpetrators of the evil were and are in the state apparatuses. This was true not only in *Tanzania,* but also in countries such as *Nigeria, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Angola, Malawi, Gabon, Mali* and *Kenya*. The *patronage state* functioned as what Burgis has called the *looting machine* (Burgis 2015). In 2015, *Tanzania* ranked 117th (out of 168 countries listed) on *Transparency International Corruption Index*—compared to *Kenya,* which ranked 139th. In *Tanzania,* a vibrant civil society had created vindicating pressure for politicians to reform. In September 2016, President *John Magufuli* announced a campaign against corruption within his own ranks. He had 120 senior civil servants suspended from office and some charged with corruption; 17,000 'ghost workers' were also removed from the payroll. The tax authorities were ordered to collect millions of dollars in unpaid taxes from companies and

businessmen and to remit them to the tax office in order to realize *Tanzania's* ambitious industrialization plans (*Africa Confidential: "Tanzania. Push-ups and push-backs"*, September 23, 2016, p. 5).

7.3   Conclusion: Learning Processes and Development Successes

Tanzania today belongs to the category of 'defective democracies' (see below the country typology in Sect. 15.2). Compared with *Kenya, Uganda, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea* or *Sudan, Tanzania's* path to what is today a relatively flourishing *neocolonial-type economy* has been bumpy and with setbacks, but decidedly peaceful. There has never been a military coup or ethnic massacre (apart from the internal Zanzibar conflict). The country's popular reform effort after overcoming the ill-fated *Ujamaa* experiment of the 1970s showed continuity. The systemic error of the *Ujamaa* policy—collectivization of the agricultural economy in the name of a nostalgic 'African socialism' far removed from reality—has been corrected under *Nyerere's* successors. Since the first decade of the twentieth century, *Tanzania* now belongs to the group of the fastest growing and continuously developing economies in Africa. Nevertheless, the absolute level of development, measured in terms of material poverty of the vast majority, is still low: Per capita income increased from US$ 290 in 2003 to US$ 910 in 2015, which did not quite reach the level of a *middle income country* (US$ 1045 per capita per year). Measured in *ppp-dollars* (*power-purchasing-parities*), this meant a GNI per capita of $2620 (compared to 3060 ppp-$ for Kenya in 2015). The extent to which *Tanzania*, which is much poorer in resources, had caught up socio-economically with *Kenya* (with its layer of rich white and African large-scale farmers) was shown by the *HDI* values for 2015: For *Tanzania*, it was 151 (out of 188 countries), for *Kenya* 145. In 2003, the difference between the two had still been 12 ranking points.

In structural terms, the central deficit of the Tanzanian development path is that it has not yet succeeded in producing an indigenous African capitalism with local entrepreneurship that could hold its own in global markets (Brown 1995, p. 190 f.). This would have required "the development of efficient *rent management capabilities* to be able to discipline the internal political factions. In this way, it would have been possible to deploy substantial rent revenues according to specific development criteria, which in turn would have required a very different discourse on governance criteria" (Gray and Khan 2010, p. 353). Looking at the legacy of President *Nyerere's* government from a *nation-building* perspective, the assessment

is positive (Holtom 2007; Harrison 2008). It is based on three achievements. *First, Julius Nyerere*, as a widely revered *Mwalimu*, discredited all approaches to *tribalism* and ethnic egoism; he pursued a deliberate policy of ethnic mixing in the appointment of party and state officials, each of whom was appointed irrespective of regional origin. *Second*, the country has had considerable success in *literacy*, thanks largely to free access to primary schools (albeit at the expense of secondary schools, which received little support). Today, both countries—*Tanzania* and *Kenya*—have primary school enrolment rates of 82% for boys and 85% for girls (average for 2007–2014). *Third,* the *Nyerere regime* avoided the otherwise widespread bad habit of *urban bias* (i.e. allocating the lion's share of government budgets to support cities and their populations, thus countering political unrest): It moved the capital from the coast to the interior, from Dar es Salaam to *Dodoma*, and took care to develop rural infrastructure, such as health care, within the limits of its financial resources. The great popularity of the president among the population, who remained party leader until 1990, thus had tangible reasons. He failed because of the mistaken assumption that in a world of capitalist market temptations, an egalitarian socialist mentality could emerge among people, the majority of whom lived in rural poverty. It had to be realized that poor villagers preferred their (concrete) family interests to an (abstract) common good ideal. The *Ujamaa experiment* was not only a political mistake, but also a moral overreach.

Tasks

1. What does the term patronage state mean?
2. Why did the attempt in Tanzania to introduce a variant of African socialism (*Ujamaa*) in the country fail?
3. What do you see as President *Julius Nyerere*'s special achievements in terms of consolidating the state and society?

State Formation and State Disintegration

8

8.1 The Weak State: Social Spaces of Limited Statehood

"Europe invented the state"—so begins the German classic on the *history of state power* by the historian *Wolfgang Reinhard* (Reinhard 2002, p. 15). In world history there would have been numerous societies without a state, but during the era of European colonialism (1880–1960) all colonies had been subjected to the ruling logic of the modern administrative state. Fundamental to understanding post-colonial Africa is the recognition that despite the similarity of forms (government, ministries, elections), the European state and the African state had and have little in common. In Europe, the modern state emerged through centuries of elimination struggles between territorial rulers (kings, dukes, bishoprics) until one territorial ruler could prevail over his rivals as a monopoly ruler. With the military monopoly came the chance to gain the tax monopoly as well, in which the king could enforce the *taxation* of his countrymen in return for his task of defending the country. This provided the material basis for the socio-genesis of Western civilization with its flourishing urban culture (Elias 1978/1979).

In his theory of the *civilizing hexagon*, the Bremen political scientist and peace researcher *Dieter Senghaas* has traced the genesis of the European state in six steps or innovations. According to this theory, the process of civilization began with the monopolization of state power (innovation 1); in order to avoid dictatorship and tyranny, the *rule of law* and the independence of the judiciary had to develop in the process of the separation of powers (innovation 2). Only this stable political structure is a suitable basis for the formation of *interdependencies* in trade and economy, across state borders, which finds its counterpart on the individual level in the formation of *affect controls*. The 'courtly' man becomes the 'polite' man and learns to calculate rationally (innovation 3). Only then—that is, relatively late—

Fig. 8.1 The hexagon of de-civilization through state collapse (Source: own representation: Rainer Tetzlaff & Cord Jakobeit, Das nachkoloniale Afrika. Wiesbaden Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, p. 151)

does the *democratic participation* of a society that has become mobile occur (innovation 4). If a democratic society based on the rule of law is to remain stable in the long term, a response to social *inequality and injustice is* necessary, which helps social policy and, in isolated cases, the social market economy to achieve a breakthrough (innovation 5). The process of civilisation sketched here in ideal-typical terms reaches its conclusion when tensions and conflicts between interest groups can be resolved without violence and through negotiation (innovation 6). If state-building fails in such a process of civilization, what can be called the *hexagon of de-civilization through state disintegration* occurs (see Fig. 8.1).

Modernization theorists and development planners initially understood the state in Africa as well, rather instrumentally, as an agency that would have to perform universally encountered functions of modern states. However, because this did not cover specific manifestations of African statehood such as informal, *neo-paternalist networks, endemic nepotism* (cronyism) or *corruption,* social and cultural factors came to the fore that seemed suitable to explain the dysfunctionality of the state. Thus, terms such as *patronage state*, *kleptocracy* (rule of thieves), *politics of the belly (*Jean-Francois Bayart) or even *vampire state* (Ayittey 2005) were coined. They express that the relationship between the state and the modernizing acquisitive

society was different from that in modern Europe, where a *social contract* could emerge on the *basis of mutual utility*—tax payment by citizens for government action, public security for the granting of freedom of trade. This allowed citizens to gradually develop a political attitude that *Immanuel Kant* called modern man's 'exit from self-induced immaturity'—*the formula* for the revolution of the Western Enlightenment (Landes 1999; Reinhard 2002; Mitterauer 2004). The stark opposite of social civilization and the formation of the rule of law is occurring today in areas of increasing state decay, where the de-civilization of society and the de-functionalization of state power go hand in hand and mutually reinforce each other. The end result is the *privatization* of violence and the law of the jungle, a relapse into *subsistence* and *predatory economics*, *dictatorship* and an *explosion of emotions* in combat groups, including the mass rape of women as a means of war, as well as a *disintegration* of society into mutually antagonistic factions.

African societies have not been granted this process of civilizational maturation—perhaps with one exception, *Ethiopia* (Uhlig et al. 2017). A distinctive feature of the post-colonial African state is its weak financial base, mainly due to the fact that its ability to tax its citizens adequately in order to develop its own sources of finance independent of foreign countries as investment funds is very weak. The more import and export taxes dwindle (as foreign trade declines), the more important—in theory—income and business taxes become for the state. On this point, all sub-Saharan states are in great need of reform (Jonathan Di John in Padayachee 2010, pp. 110–131). If there were adequate lawful taxation of the wealthy classes, the social pressure among the population to maintain informal networks of corruption that function as a parallel order to the state would also gradually diminish. Then, for example, government spending on the health sector could be increased; the costs of containing the HIV/AIDS epidemic alone amount to about 3% of GNP in some countries (Lule and Haacker 2010, p. XI and p. 42; Rüb n.d.).

The third global wave of democratization (Huntington 1991), which had emerged towards the end of the East-West conflict, also reached sub-Saharan Africa around 1990. In a few years, about two-thirds of all 48 countries underwent democratic transition processes: Multi-party systems emerged, constitutions were amended, free and fair elections were held, and quite a few dictators were overthrown through popular uprisings and/or elections. In some cases, intended reforms failed and democratic experiments ended in violence: for example, in *Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Sudan and Zimbabwe*. Then the democratization process stalled, and the authoritarian presidential model of rule regained its appeal. In the process, at times (demonstrably in *Ethiopia, Rwanda, Zimbabwe and Tanzania*) the *PRC* as a *development model* played a role as a role model for democracy-resistant rulers. It

can be characterized as follows: monopoly-like political conditions at the center of power, plus market-friendly economic policies with opportunities for personal enrichment of all kinds, promoted by an authoritarian state at the expense of respect for human rights (Halper 2010; see also below Sect. 14.4). But there is much to suggest today that the Chinese growth model is a historical exception that not even the other BRIGS countries can follow. In the future, world politics will perhaps be determined less by the contrast between democratic and autocratic states than by the contrast between functioning states and weakening or even failing states (Tetzlaff 2016a).

The *Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)*, named after the successful Sudanese businessman *Mo Ibrahim,* who founded the *Mo Ibrahim Award* for Excellence in Governance, measures African *governance achievements* through four criteria *(Safety & Rule of Law, Participation & Human Rights, Sustainable Economic Opportunity, Human Development)*. On a scale of 0–100—the scores obtained ranged from 81.7 points for the best performance in *Mauritius* to 8.6 points for the worst performance in *Somalia*—eleven countries were identified in 2014 that scored at least sixty points and all of which had made *governance progress* over the past 5 years (2009–2014) (increase in points in parentheses):

8.2   Governance Performance of African Countries (Table 8.1)

The average of all 54 countries was 51.5 points—overall not a performance with which the political leadership of the *Mo Ibrahim Foundation* could be satisfied. Since 2006, the foundation has awarded the *Mo Ibrahim Prize* for excellent *governance performance* to African presidents: The chosen laureate receives US$5 million for the first 5 years and US$200,000 annually thereafter for life. The first recipient was *Nelson Mandela* of South Africa; in 2007, *Joachim Alberto Chissano*, the president of Mozambique, received the prize for his commitment to peace. A year later, *Festus G. Mogae*, the president of Botswana, was recognized for his contribution to consolidating democracy in the country, and in 2011, *Pedro De Verona Rodrigues Pires* received the prize for his role in transforming *Cape Verde* into a model of democracy, political stability and prosperity. Between 2010 and 2014, the *Mo Ibrahim Committee* shamefully failed to find a suitable candidate to receive the award. It was not until 2015 that the prize was awarded again, this time to the outgoing president of *Namibia: H. Lucas Pohamba.*

Table 8.1 Governance performance of African countries

State	Governance performances according to points
Mauritius	81.7 points (plus 1.3)
Cape Verde	76.6 points(plus 1.3)
Botswana	76.2 points (plus 1.3)
South Africa	73.3 points (plus 0.5)
Seychelles	73.2 points (plus 2.7)
Namibia	70.3 points (plus 1.1)
Ghana	68.2 points (plus 1.6)
Tunisia	66.0 points (plus 2.2)
Senegal	64.3 points (plus 4.6)
Lesotho	62.3 points (plus 3.8)
Rwanda	60.4 points (plus 4.6)

Source: Mo-Ibrahim Index (2014)

8.3   Somalia: State Collapse and Islamist Terror

The disintegration of post-colonial states "in many ways represents the greatest security problem of our time," US Secretary of Defense *Robert Gates* wrote in *Foreign Affairs* in 2015. By 2015, their number had risen to 15.[1] Today, it doesn't look like that number will be reduced anytime soon. For one thing, *Libya* and *Mali* are already to be added to the list of *failed states*, and for another, politically unstable states such as *Ethiopia, Eritrea, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria* and *Niger* are also facing serious security problems. What becomes of a society that in the twenty-first century can no longer find its way to state unity because none of the parties to the civil war has managed in a 20-year process of disintegration to unify the country, either violently or peacefully, can be impressively studied in the fate of Somalia on the Horn of Africa.

Somalia, the former colony of Italy, has become synonymous with *state collapse* as the extreme variant of state collapse. *Somalia* was from time immemorial a society of nomadic clans who had no central state because they did not need a state for their life as nomads. Only through the colonial Europeans and their African heirs did they gain experience with modern statehood; the clans experienced it as an instrument of dispossession and oppression, most recently in the guise of repressive

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[1]They are Somalia, South Sudan, Central African Republic, Sudan, Chad, DR Congo, Guinea, Nigeria, Burundi and Zimbabwe, according to Failed States Index 2015.

military rule by coup General *Siad Barre* (1968–1991). Since his overthrow after 23 years of misrule, society has disintegrated into diverse clan-based, politico-religious groups that are at war with one another. Out of material need, some groups have turned to piracy and have since threatened international maritime traffic in the Red Sea. By early 2011, they had taken control of 40 ships carrying some 800 sailors; by then, they are said to have extorted more than $100 million in ransom from the ship-owners. Only a small part of this money benefits the suffering Somali families; the large 'rest' is taken by transnational networks of criminal businessmen based in Yemen and Mombasa/Kenya (Wiese 2010).

How did the *state collapse* in this former colonial territory of the Italians and the English? Structural (climate), endogenous (fragmentation of the clans) and exogenous factors (colonialism, East-West conflict) all played a role. The population of Somalia consists of numerous larger and smaller descent groups, for which the terms *clans, sub-clans* and/or *lineage-groups* have become common. Alliances and rivalries between clans and extended families occurred frequently. Every child of 8 years of age—as Somali social scientist *Ion Lewis* opined—was expected to be capable of reciting the genealogy of the father's family as far back as ten or twenty generations to a progenitor (cited in Meredith 2005, p. 465). Consequently, a *national identity* among all the clans and subgroups has never really been able to develop. The large group of *Somal* or *Samal* includes the *Darod, Dir, Hawiye* and *Isaq,* who altogether make up the majority of the population, living as nomads mainly from cattle and goat herding.

External disruptive factors were the European colonial policy, the rivalry between Italy, England and France over maritime bases, and Ethiopia's expansionist policy. Between 1884 and 1910, these four powers concluded numerous occupation treaties without ever having asked the *Somalis* for their wishes. While *Italy* annexed southern Somalia with *Mogadishu*, *Britain* claimed the northern Somalia country with *Hargeisa* as its center to ensure that the British garrison in opposite *Aden/ Yemen* could be adequately supplied with meat. *France* secured the Red Sea port city of *Djibouti* as a coal station for its fleet. In addition, there were also numerous Somalis living in the north-east of the British crown colony of *Kenya,* in the *Northern Frontier District,* who, in the course of decolonization, also wanted to belong to the much-discussed *United Somalia project.* As a fourth political actor, the *Ethiopian Empire* played a rather important, even disastrous role, as it claimed Somali-inhabited areas in the border region of *Ogaden* for itself and then subjected them to its military control. Because the arid regions of the Horn of Africa were not very productive, little was invested in the development of infrastructure; only the Italians made some effort by promoting banana plantations and sugar cane crops in Eritrea.

In the course of decolonization, a *Pan-Somali movement* emerged that claimed to unite all Somali-inhabited territories in a new unitary state to be founded. However, the UN decided in 1949 to give Italy trusteeship of its former colony for 10 years, with the stipulation that it would lead the country to independence by 1960. This continued and deepened the territorial division of the region. When *Somalia* was finally to become independent under pressure from the UN General Assembly in July 1960, Somali politicians of the Italian and British parts, each organized in different political parties, decided to merge to form the *state of Somalia*. Now, within the new state, there existed "two different systems of legislation and jurisprudence, separate salary schemes for civil servants and soldiers, different systems of taxation, tariffs and customs duties, etc." (Schicho 2004, p. 252). An ethnically balanced coalition of representatives of the northern and southern parties formed the government; it set for itself the goal of uniting all Somalis in a new unitary state to be created.

This idea of unity could not be realized. One third of the four million Somalis lived outside the Somali state. The French enclave of *Djibouti* became its own ministate; and the neighbouring states of *Kenya* and *Ethiopia* were unwilling to cede territories with Somali populations to the new state of Somalia. Nine years later, the political system of rival parliamentary parties collapsed, the elected president was assassinated, and in October 1969 the army seized power in a coup. From then on (until 1991), a 24-member military council, led by General *Mohamed Siyad Barre,* determined the country's destiny. The democratic constitution was abolished and 'scientific socialism' was declared the basis of state development. This marked the beginning of the first phase of state collapse, as the diverse segmentary social associations of *Somalis* could not come to terms with this foreign social and economic model, with its obsessive tendency to centralize power and resources. In his novel *State Property* (*Staatseigentum*; Athenaeum 1980), the Somali writer *Nuruddin Farah* described the oppressive atmosphere to which the people were painfully exposed during the era of *Siyad Barre.*

The regime of the dictator *Siyad Barre*, who was a member of the *Darod* clan, ensured that politically influential posts were filled by members of his kin, leading to frustration among the marginalized clans. With the help of the Soviet Union, *Siyad Barre* increased his army from about 3000 to 37,000 men in 1977. Even more serious was the mistake of allowing the conflict in the *Ogaden*, which had been simmering since 1963, to escalate into war in 1977—just at the moment when the Ethiopian regime appeared weakened as a result of internal power struggles. The USSR, bound by treaties to *Ethiopia* like *Somalia,* increasingly sided with the socialist regime of coup leader *Mengistu*, the president of *Ethiopia*. The result was the severance of Soviet-Somali relations in October 1977 by *Siyad Barre*.

Within weeks, 6000 Soviet experts and their families had to leave the country, further weakening the country. After *Siyad Barre* had to change political fronts of necessity, he now solicited Western support, which was also granted to him in abundance according to the proverbial logic 'the enemy of my enemy is my friend'—until the collapse of the regime in 1991.

In April 1978, there had been a rebellion by Somali army units returning from the *Ogaden,* led by generals from the *Majerteyn* clan. The Isaq-backed *Somali National Movement (SNM)* also made its presence felt in the 1980s as opposition to the *Barre regime.* The government, busy mercilessly suppressing all opposition groups, could not stop the crash of the country's economy: While food crops and sugar production declined, illegal transactions, smuggling, black market and dirty deals with refugees increased. Faced with the threat of anarchy, regional antagonisms intensified until civil war broke out openly in 1988. A report by the *Africa Watch Committee* (1990) stated, "It is difficult to exaggerate the brutality of the Somali government against its own people or to gauge the impact of its murderous policies" (quoted in Schicho 2004, p. 257).

In 1989, rebels launched an attack on the center of power in *Mogadishu,* which was met by massacres of the population by the dictator's forces. But in early 1991, *Siyad Barre*, who in the end could only rely on his clan (the *Marehan* of the *Darod* group), had to capitulate and flee into exile. The remnants of the army fled southward in an armored convoy "loaded with gold bars, foreign currency, and loot plundered from Western embassies" (Meredith 2005, pp. 469–470). Most of the population in the famine areas survived only thanks to international food aid; hundreds of thousands, however, starved to death in the chaos wrought by the collapse of the state. The tragic balance sheet of the first 30 years of Somali independence includes the fact that the country, which had started out as self-sufficient in food, had now become permanently dependent on imports of food.

What followed the *implosion* of the Somali state—the 25 years up to 2017—was a period of political *anarchy* and *social anomie*: the dissolution of all order. For the population, it meant a chain of catastrophes: latent famine, threats to security, displacement and flight, tyranny by militias, and repeatedly dashed hopes that foreign powers might yet manage to restore political order. In May 1991, the north of the country—the former *British Somaliland*—declared itself independent, but the dwarf state, which is functioning reasonably well, has still not been recognized internationally. Neighboring *Puntland* also declared independence. The remaining regions of the country were controlled and harassed by the respective dominant clans and their militias, with hundreds of thousands having to flee to neighbouring countries. In the capital Mogadishu, the *Somali United Congress (SUC)*, whose leader *Ali Mahdi Mohamed* had declared himself president, and

General Muhammed Farah Aideed, the military leader of the *United Somali Congress (USC)*, who did not recognize this usurpation of power, engaged in fierce fighting. Attempts by neighboring states and the United States to persuade the various rebel groups to negotiate peace did not bring the hoped-for end to the violent clashes. In the *Baidoa* region*,* some 200,000 people had already died of starvation—partly because Somali militias blocked international aid deliveries and used *food aid* as a weapon (Clay and Stokke 2000, p. 125 f.).

It was not until the UN Security Council, at the urging of UN Secretary-General *Boutros Boutros Ghali,* decided on a humanitarian intervention to save the Somalis in *Mogadishu* and *Baidoa* who were threatened with starvation that new hope germinated. Under *Operation Restore Hope,* so named by the US President *George Bush* and now with a *peace enforcement mandate*, the UN force under the military leadership of former Admiral *Jonathan Howe* made the mistake of interfering in the internal power struggle between *Ali Mahdi Mohamed* and *Muhammad Farah Aideed* in this second humanitarian intervention *(Unosom II).* In an attempt to disarm *Aideed's* supporters, 23 Pakistani blue helmets were killed. *Aideed*, seen as an obstacle to a new national government being formed, was chased through *Mogadishu* by US soldiers using *Black Hawk helicopters to* liquidate him, killing scores of uninvolved Somalis and severely damaging the UN's reputation. "The UN had lost its neutrality in the conflict"—it was said soon after (Thomson 2010, p. 183, Debiel 2003).

On October 3, 1993, US soldiers were ambushed and 18 of them were killed; two bodies were dragged triumphantly through the streets of Mogadishu. The corresponding television images went around the world. The militia leader, *Aideed,* had escaped once again, and his followers were looting and rioting through the streets of the capital, which was divided into mutually hostile districts. As a result, on October 6, 1993, the U.S. government under President *Bill Clinton* decided to immediately call off the U.S. mission in Somalia and bring all U.S. soldiers home by March 1994. Other nations that had participated in the UN's attempt to enforce peace in *Somalia* also withdrew their soldiers. *UNOSOM II* thus ended (Pape 1997, pp. 183–208), and the country was once again at the mercy of rival *war lords* and militiamen who could no longer be controlled by anyone. Approximately US$ 4 billion had been spent on the two failed UNOSOM missions, which symbolized a spectacular failure of UN and US policy (Meredith 2005, p. 4). The tragic consequences were to become apparent that same year: The US government, faced with the mass slaughter of the *Tutsis* in *Rwanda,* refused to adopt a renewed 'humanitarian intervention' to prevent the genocide there, which it would have been obliged to do under international law (Des Forges 2002; Debiel 2003).

Almost 10 years after the failed UN missions in *Somalia* in 1992/1993, another attempt was made in Kenya in October 2002 to bring a peaceful end to the civil war—this time under the leadership of the regional organization *Inter-governmental Authority on Development (IGAD),* to which *Kenya, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia, Djibouti* and *Uganda* belong. But the 22 warring parties, led by their clan leaders, could not agree on the composition and powers of a federal *Transitional National Assembly* (*TNA*). The resulting power vacuum was soon exploited by the Islamist *Al-Shabaab militia*, whose terrorist actions in the south of the country and in the capital further exacerbated the precarious security situation in the country: Hundreds of thousands of desperate civilians made their way across the border to Kenya—to the huge *Dadaab* refugee camp. Finally, representatives of international diplomacy, including the UN blue helmets sent into the field, succeeded in installing a transitional government in Mogadishu in the Somali rump state—with little success so far. President *Hassan Sheikh Mohamud,* who has been in office since July 2012, first fought the incumbent head of government, *Abdiweli Sheikh Ahmed,* and then, after he was voted out of office by parliament, the new head of government, *Omar Abdirashid Ali Sharmarke,* who had already held the post of prime minister in 2009–2010. According to UN figures, around one third of Somalis are dependent on humanitarian aid, and more than one million Somali refugees are still waiting to return home (Der neue Fischer Weltalmanach 2016, pp. 420–421).

The political scientist *Jutta Bakonyi* has put forward the thesis that Somali society has become "highly militarized" since the outbreak of the civil war in 1988 as a result of the ongoing experience of violence, and that conflicts are therefore "often settled violently". Civil mechanisms of conflict resolution—for example, through the negotiation of settlements and compensation for damages by the elders—have been largely suspended (Bakonyi in Afrika-Jahrbuch 2003, Somalia, p. 300). That it is indeed a relapse into *anomic* (lawless) conditions can also be seen from the fact that faction and militia leaders are hardly able to exercise control over combatants and self-proclaimed holy warriors. What is certain is that the implosion of the state (with its army, police, courts) has created a power vacuum that seems tempting, especially to young men from impoverished families, to use it violently for their own purposes. It is to be expected that there will not be a consolidated Somali nation-state again in the foreseeable future,—not only because the rifts between the rival clans have become even deeper, but mainly because 'society' as such has changed through the criminalization of its fragmented segments (clans, militias, warlords): International Caritas ensures that the consequences of permanent famines are somewhat mitigated, but people in societies artificially kept alive by international *food aid* also lose their dignity and values along with their gainful employment (Clay and Stokke 2000; Caparros 2015).

8.4   Zimbabwe: Self-Staged State Terror

In the following, the chronicle of the collapse of the state of *Zimbabwe* is presented—a particularly tragic case, because here, in contrast to Somalia and the Central African Republic (CAR), for example, the *structural* (geographical and ecological) factors were considered favorable for prosperous development. When *Robert Mugabe*, the *freedom fighter* was released from prison and came to power in 1980 (first as prime minister, then as president from 1988), Southern Rhodesia was considered the *breadbasket* of Southern Africa, with a well-developed agricultural sector and a powerful industrial sector by African standards. Not much of this remains after 37 years of mismanagement (Ayittey 2005, pp. 214–218; Roschmann and Brandmeier 2012). Backed by the army, police and thugs of his state party *Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF)*, Mugabe defied the electoral vote several times, each time pitting police forces and thugs against opposition parties. In the first round of the 2008 presidential election, the incumbent Mugabe had received 43.7% of the votes, while his two challengers, *Morgan Tsvangirai* and *Simba Makoni*, had received 47.9% and 8.3% respectively. Before run-off elections could take place (the electoral law required an absolute majority to elect the president), *Tsvangirai* and about 300 of his associates were arrested, his party headquarters vandalized, and about 200 opposition supporters murdered in rural areas. More than 200,000 people were displaced. In districts with a majority of opposition voters, the regime had food aid from abroad suspended—a disgustingly punitive action. *Tsvangirai* then withdrew his candidacy for the run-off and fled in fear of his life to the Dutch embassy in *Harare*. The regime, however, insisted on holding the run-off and *Mugabe* scored an 'overwhelming' victory with 85.5% of the votes against 9.3% for *Tsvangirai* (Africa Yearbook 2008, p. 508). In August 2016, a broad alliance of 19 parties and opposition groups demonstrated in Harare against the aged president, led by former guerrilla fighter *Joice Mujuru*. Regardless of the protests, 90-year-old President *Robert Mugabe* allowed himself to be crowned party leader and frontrunner for the 2018 presidential election one more time. At the same time, his 41-year-old younger wife *Grace Mugabe*—popularly derided as *Guzzi-Grace* for her excessive shopping trips to Paris—indicated her intention to succeed her senile husband.

To enable her to do so, *Mugabe* dismissed his loyal companion and vice-president *Emmerson Mnangagwa. In* doing so, he had overstepped the mark; for now, in mid-November 2017, the military started a putsch and placed Mugabe and his wife under house arrest. ZANU-PF leaders withdrew their leader's member-ship—a particularly humiliating act—and transferred their allegiance to the

'crocodile', as Vice-President *Mnangagwa* is known in Zimbabwe for his committed atrocities against political opponents. In Harare's streets, residents danced with joy and relief. Just 2 days later, on November 23, 2017, *Mnangagwa* was sworn in as the new president. A 37-year era of self-orchestrated decline of a rich country by a 'kleptocrat' had come to an embarrassing end.

The Zimbabwe tragedy has a long history. The conflict over the fertile land in the southwest of the continent began at the end of the nineteenth century, when *Cecil Rhodes* came to South Africa and founded the *British South Africa Company (BSAC)*. In 1890, he became premier of the Cape Province and decided to build an economic and political empire for himself. Through war, raids and fraud against the *Matabele* Empire (under their king *Lobengula*), the two *Rhodesian* colonies were thus created. The white settlers of the British colony of Southern Rhodesia were granted the privilege of *responsible government* in 1923—but not the political independence as a state that these additionally coveted,—a status that the white settlers of South Africa had received from Britain a generation earlier. The administration of the Afrikaners was and remained a matter for the British *Department of Native Affairs* and its *commissioners* sent from London. The *Land Appointment Act,* passed in 1930, allocated 50% of the land to the few white settlers, while about half the African population was crammed into cramped 'native reserves'. *Southern Rhodesia* then became a colony with thriving agriculture based on corn, tobacco, beef, sugar and cotton, exporting gold, asbestos, nickel, copper, chrome and cobalt. In the 1960s, when the white population, which had by then grown to 220,000, resisted the general trend of decolonization, the *Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI)* on the part of the settlers occurred in November 1965. Unilaterally declared against the wishes of the British government, 'independence' was announced by *Ian Smith*, the spokesman for the white farmers and leader of the *Rhodesian Front*, the rallying party of the right. He had been elected prime minister by the white population in 1962 on the basis of a racist constitution. UDI was not recognized internationally and was punished by the United Nations with economic sanctions, which were, however, only half-heartedly followed or deliberately undermined (especially by South Africa).

For 15 years the white settler regime under *Ian Smith* was able to hold on, then the fighters of the two African liberation movements had gained the upper hand. These were the *Zimbabwe African National Union* (ZANU), founded in 1963 in Dar es Salaam by *Ndabaningi Sithole*, and the *Zimbabwe African Peoples Party (ZAPU),* whose leader was *Joshua Nkomo*, the political spokesman for the *Ndebele people*. Both parties had long been banned and fought underground against foreign rule, increasingly successfully. As the civil war between the Smith regime of the white settlers and the liberation fighters of ZANU and ZAPU neared its end, their

leaders had to be released from prison, which also benefited the co-imprisoned *Robert Mugabe*. The balance of the war was depressing: 25,000 people had died in the 7 years of the fight, of it 15,000 African civilians, 7700 fighters of the resistance movements; furthermore 1500 soldiers of the Rhodesian army (of it 950 Africans) and 800 white civilians (*Jeune Afrique* of December 24, 1979, quoted after Schicho 2004, p. 386). What was now to happen to the thousands of decommissioned fighters?

As early as 1976, *constitutional talks* had begun in Geneva between Great Britain, the rebellious settler regime of *Ian Smith* and four rival African liberation movements; however, they could not be successfully concluded until 1979 in London. Still under British administration, parliamentary elections were held in late February 1980, which *Robert Mugabe's ZANU* faction won with 63% of the votes and 57 of 100 parliamentary seats. It was not surprising that a majority of the *Shona* people (77% of the total population) voted for *Robert Mugabe,* a Shona politician who had become popular through radical demands. His political rival, the far better known *Joshua Nkomo*, representing an ethnic minority of the Ndebele (with about 19% of the total population), had only been able to win 20 parliamentary seats. Thus, the first government was formed by a coalition of the two strongest parties, in which *Mugabe* became the prime minister. When he took office, he had spent 11 years in prison and some difficult years as a guerrilla leader who was by no means accepted by all. Victory at the ballot box gave him and his associates power over a rich country that they were no longer prepared to relinquish under any circumstances. In the capital, *Salisbury,* now called *Harare,* the new black elite scrambled for property, farms and businesses. Mugabe ruled the country "through a complex system of patronage, rewarding loyal aides and henchmen with offices and contracts from the state, and ignoring the increasingly widespread plague of corruption" (Schicho 2004, p. 386).

As early as October 1980, *Mugabe* signed an agreement with the communist government of *North Korea* to help train a special army brigade to eliminate internal 'dissidents'. Who was meant by this was soon to become apparent in *Matabele land.* In November 1980, the first wave of persecution of ZAPU supporters began; in February 1981, more than 300 ZAPU members, former freedom fighters of Nkomo, died; and in 1983 and 1984, the 'Fifth Brigade', drilled by North Koreans, devastated the province that Prime Minister *Mugabe* considered a political stronghold of rival *Nkomo*: hundreds of *Matabele villages* were destroyed, thousands of civilians were beaten, food depots were closed, leaving thousands of farmers to starve. When *Nkomo's* ZAPU won all 15 parliamentary seats in *Matabeleland* again in the 1985 general elections, Mugabe, in an operation of blind rage, had his rival's house vandalized, his supporters arbitrarily arrested by the hundreds, including

11 *Bulawayo* City Council councilors, the mayor, and some 200 administrators (Thomson 2010, p. 265). About 10,000 civilians were murdered by Mugabe's thugs in *Matabeland* by 1987. A scared to death *Joshua Nkomo* signed the *Unity Accord* with *Mugabe* in December 1987, uniting ZANU and ZAPU to form the unity party *ZANU-PF (Patriotic Front)* (Meredith 2005, pp. 620–626). In 1988 Mugabe allowed himself to be appointed president and could now, after the final solution of the power question, set about the second task: the solution of the *land question*.

Good arable and pasture land had also become scarce in Zimbabwe, and it was unequally distributed. In the early 1980s, some 780,000 families lived in the *communal areas*, formerly *tribal trust land*, with the land only being able to support an estimated 325,000 families. Most of the *commercial farmland* (these were privately owned farms) was still cultivated by 4800 white farmers, who produced about four-fifths of the agricultural output. The government bought up and distributed farmland after 1980, so that by the end of the first freedom decade about 52,000 families (416,000 people) had been settled on formerly 'white farm-land'. But some 300 large farms, to be distributed among African smallholders, had been awarded to ministers and senior officials (Meredith 2005, p. 631). An inner circle of power around Mugabe used its privileged position to seize property itself at the expense of the impoverished rural population, about 8% of *commercial farm-land*. Few of these farms were managed in such a way that they yielded economic benefits. For example, in 1985 *Solomon Mujuru*, commander-in-chief of the army, acquired "two adjoining farms in Shamva, a hotel in Bindura, a supermarket chain and some properties in the Bindura area, all with Mugabe's blessing . . . By the time he retired from the army in 1992 to devote himself entirely to his businesses, he had become one of the richest people in Zimbabwe, all in just twelve years" (Meredith 2002, p. 82, quoted in Schicho 2004, p. 388). Britain, which had provided 44 million British pounds for *land resettlement* since independence, stopped further payments in 1997: The state of Zimbabwe had degenerated into a *looting machine* (Tom Burgis) under the new masters.

Since the 1990s, the Mugabe government's failed economic policies have led to declining growth rates, rising foreign debt, devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar, and high inflation rates. In addition, Zimbabwe's participation in the war in Congo alongside rebel leader *Laurent Kabila,* who overthrew President *Mobutu*, gobbled up scarce foreign exchange but opened up dark avenues of enrichment for him, his officers and some businessmen in the mining business (Burgis 2015, p. 219 f.). Skilled workers left the country, unemployed workers went on strike with increasing frequency; only a small proportion of the 200,000 or so school leavers each year found paid employment. A new opposition party, *Movement for Democratic Change (MDC),* formed in 1999 under the secretary-general of the trade union

federation, *Morgan Tsavangirai,* was narrowly defeated by the ruling party in the 2000 parliamentary elections. "Evidence of manipulation and violence was abundant, forcing the president to secure the election results by decree" (Schicho 2004, p. 390). The support of the opposition by significant sections of the white population eventually triggered a campaign by Mugabe against the white farmers: Land occupations and expropriations were intended to secure a livelihood for land-hungry African smallholders and in this way enable *Mugabe* to remain in power. In the view of the excessive military spending, the major donors—the World Bank, the IMF and the EU—reduced their financial support for the regime and pushed for a policy of *structural adjustment (SAP).* In February 2000, the population, 70% unemployed, rejected by a surprisingly clear 55% in a referendum the draft of a new constitution: it was to expand presidential powers (regarding re-election) and at the same time allow for the radical expropriation of the white-owned land without compensation (Schicho 2004, p. 390; Marx 2012).

To distract attention from the real causes of his unpopularity, the president responded with a strategy of *permanent vilification* of white settlers and *illegal occupation and expropriation* of white farmland. Lists appeared with the names of farms that had been cleared for illegal acquisition—without compensation. Members and alleged members of the *War Veterans Association* were sent to white farms by Mugabe's aides to pressure their owners into surrendering, beating, robbing and in some cases murdering them. The 400,000 black farm workers on white farms feared for their livelihoods and most of them have become unemployed during the crisis that continues to this day. Those constituencies where a majority had voted for the opposition were again punished with the withdrawal of food aid; for the state-controlled *Grain Marketing Board* held a monopoly of importing and distributing maize to communities and practiced the maize boycott under a government decree. In 2005, *Operation Clear the Filth* caused a sensation when security forces destroyed the huts and homes of more than 700,000 residents of Harare's poor townships.

The approximately 220,000 white settlers with their roughly 6000 large farms, who dominated the country until 1980, formed the economic backbone of Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe for a long time. They have been expropriated and driven out of the country except for a remnant of a few hundred farmers. After all, there has been a *legal battle* that has become famous: In 2008 a court upheld farmer *Mike Campbell*'s claim for unlawful expropriation of his farm before the SADC Tribunal (the court of the 'South African Development Community'), joined by 77 other claimants. But the Mugabe government, backed by a like-minded judiciary, ignored the binding legal ruling. This internationally high-profile legal case, '*Mike Campbell v. Republic of Zimbabwe*', marked a high point in Zimbabwe's evolution

towards rule of lawlessness (Roschmann and Brandmeier 2012). A peaceful coexistence of black and white failed here—in contrast to the two other British settler colonies *Kenya* and *Namibia* (Leys and Saul 1995). During the famine years, one third of the total population (i.e. about 15 million Zimbabweans) was dependent on international food aid; about 90% of the population had become unemployed (in the formal economic sector); millions fled to neighboring countries to escape persecution, material hardship and lack of prospects.

Until his ouster in November 2017, Mugabe had been supported by a tightly woven web of party officials, government officials, and private entrepreneurs that constituted a patronage system based on corruption with Mugabe at its center. Although the Mugabe regime was shunned and criticized by the Commonwealth as well as by the US, EU countries, the World Bank, IMF and UN agencies, it did enjoy some sympathy in parts of Africa, especially among ANC politicians in South Africa. Mugabe was seen as a courageous freedom fighter who also fought against 'super-rich' white farmers for the benefit of landless African smallholders, ignoring the fact that the mismanagement of the kleptocratic Mugabe regime mainly affected its own citizens. An entire generation of young people has been cheated out of their future—thanks to the regime of an obscene fanatic of violence with no sense of responsibility or decency (Marx 2012, p. 311 f.). In the face of this self-orchestrated decline of an African country that had had the very best conditions for developing into a diversified economy with a high level of production, political explanations that rely on neocolonial clichés have a hard time. The brutal mismanagement of the Zimbabwean kleptocracy no longer has anything to do with the situationally justifiable behavior of a *bureaucratic state class* that would have had to suffer from a heavy 'colonial legacy', but here an obscene patronage state had enriched itself at the expense of the vast majority of its own population and left only social misery in its wake. This behavior is perhaps best described by what the Ghanaian-born *George Ayittey* has called the mismanagement of *vampire elites* (Ayittey 2005, p. 21 and p. 365).

8.5 Rwanda: Genocide and a New Beginning for the State

In the small *land-locked country* of Rwanda, too, there has been a glaring policy failure, but unlike *Zimbabwe* and *Somalia,* there has been an astonishing state reconstruction here after a national catastrophe in 1994. It provides an example of what is possible in terms of developmental achievements in a resource-poor country when an authoritarian government takes the *developmental state approach* seriously

(see Chap. 2). The engine of development is smallholder intensive agriculture with tea and coffee as export products. In 2016, the country had a functioning bureaucracy and a low level of corruption compared to neighboring countries. With a per capita income of US$700 or PPP $1530 (in 2015) and an HDI rank of 151 (compared to *Kenya* with HDI rank 147, *Cameroon* with rank 152, *Tanzania* with rank 159, *Zimbabwe* with rank 160, *Malawi* with rank 174 or *DR Congo* with rank 186; 2014 figures), *Rwanda* is one of the few African countries with an iron will to work its way out of poverty. The regime of President *Paul Kagame* (winner of the civil war), 40% of whose national budget is financed by foreign countries in the form of budget support, has so far invested massively in the education, transport and energy sectors, as well as in the modernisation of agriculture. In its *Vision 2020* development plan, the regime in *Kigali* focuses on the expansion of information and communication technology in order to make the country not only a centre of mountain tourism (gorillas in the *Virunga Volcano Mountains*), but also one of international conference diplomacy.

There have been *three major events in Rwanda's* recent history: *First,* the country's political independence from Belgian colonial rule on July 1, 1962, accompanied by the 'Hutu Revolution' (in which the numerical *Hutu majority* defeated the ruling *Tutsi minority* in independence elections); *second,* the genocide of the *Tutsi* in 1994,—planned and carried out over the long term by a radicalized, power-hungry *Hutu regime* and triggered by the never-resolved shooting down of President *Juvenal Habyarimana's* plane on April 6, 1994. The genocide claimed the lives of some 800,000 *Tutsis* and moderate *Hutus* in 100 days. And *thirdly,* there is the tightly organized state reconstruction under the strongman of the new Tutsi-dominated regime of *Paul Kagame,* president since 2000. The final reconciliation between perpetrators and victims—if it is at all politically desired and socially and psychologically made possible on a broad front—has yet to take place, however. On the passports valid today the ethnic designations *Tutsi* or *Hutu,* which were registered since the Belgian colonial rule, have been removed. A real overcoming of the ethno-political conflict of the century would require even greater efforts.

For years now, the resource-poor state of *Rwanda* has enjoyed annual economic growth averaging 6–8% and low unemployment (below 3%). The economic success of the *Kagame* regime is overshadowed by the regime's latent mistrust of real or imagined opponents of the regime, against whom brutal action is also taken by extra-legal means (Amnesty International Report 2015/2016, pp. 382–385). Because of the continuing simmering opposition between the two main ethnic groups, *Hutu* (84% of the total population) and *Tutsi* (14%), which is ignored by the official side, *Rwanda* today can be described as a repressive *façade democracy*. Although there are more than ten political parties in parliament, the ruling *Front*

Patriotique Rwandais (FPR) has held a majority in all constitutional bodies since 1994, because a genuine opposition party is not tolerated by the *Kagame* regime out of traumatic fear of a return to power by the majority ethnic group. Rwandan exile organizations are pursuing the overthrow of the *Kagame regime,* as are Rwandan *Hutu militias* who fled to Congo after the genocide. International irritation was caused in 2012 by the report of a UN panel of experts that revealed how the *Kagame regime* had supplied arms and ammunition to the armed rebel group *March 23 Movement (Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23))* operating in eastern Congo, which temporarily led to the suspension of financial transfers from the US, UK, Germany, Netherlands and Sweden. In December 2015, the population voted in favor of a constitutional amendment that allowed incumbent President *Paul Kagame* to run for a third term, with a reported 98.3% turnout. According to the observers on the ground, many Rwandans feared a power vacuum if *Kagame* was not allowed to run again. So far, there is no successor in sight for the hard-line president.

In the following, the genesis and the consequences of the *genocide in Rwanda* will be examined in more detail. Although the *genocide* had mainly internal and colonial historical causes, its murderous dimensions cannot be understood without the incredible failure of the United Nations and the veto powers of the UN Security Council, above all the USA. The *Clinton* administration at the time wanted 'no second Somalia' and therefore failed in its duty under international law to stop the genocide that was taking place in front of the whole world. A timely diplomatic intervention by the world powers through the deployment of blue helmets, which the Canadian commander of the UN blue helmets stationed in *Kigali, Romeo Dallaire,* urgently demanded several times in New York, but which fell on deaf ears there, could with some certainty have stopped the bloodbath earlier.

The reasons and backgrounds of the singular events during the 3 months April, May, and June 1994 are numerous and extraordinarily complex (Harding 2005; Reyntjens 2014, p. 637 f.). Through the 1000-page study by *Africa Watch,* edited by the US professor of history at the State University of New York, *Alison Des Forges*, a wealth of detailed information has come to light, which nevertheless allows quite a few clear findings. As is almost always the case with state-perpetrated political violence in post-colonial Africa, in *Rwanda* too three things were causally at stake: the question of maintaining political power, the defense of one's own (ethnic) identity against threats from competitors, and the material interest in securing the country's natural resources—in this case scarce settlement land—for one's own we-group. In the case of *Rwanda,* however, the question arises as to how it could happen that peaceful citizens could become murderers en masse, killing even their neighbors, who were often members of the same Christian church community or belonged to the inner circle of friends, with machete in hand. The indisputable fact

that the *ethnic propaganda argument*—that all *Tutsis* were "*cockroaches*"—played a prominent causative role in the mobilization of citizens by the *Hutu* power elite, which is why looking at the genesis of the *ethnic* conflict situation can be a key to understanding the genocide.

When Belgium received the mandate from the League of Nations after the end of the First World War to administer, 'develop' and eventually lead the former German protectorate of Rwanda to independence, the sharp contrast between *Tutsi* and *Hutu* as clearly definable ethnic groups did not yet exist. The people of the region we now call *Rwandans* had worked together over the past (pre-colonial) centuries to build the complex, hierarchical state of Rwanda. They created a unified, sophisticated language, *Kinyarwada*, shared common religious and philosophical beliefs "as well as a culture in which song, dance, poetry, and rhetorical skills were held in high esteem. They worshipped the same heroes. Even during the genocide, the killers and their potential victims sang songs of the common leaders of the past" (Des Forges 2002, p. 55). The words *Tutsi* and *Hutu* were not initially *ethnic categories* but socio-economic terms: thus, Tutsi referred to "a person of great cattle wealth" and "eventually became a term for the elite as a whole," while *Hutu* "originally stood for a subordinate or follower of a more powerful person and eventually for the mass of ordinary people" (Des Forges 2002, p. 57). The designation of *Tutsi* pastoralists as rulers headed by a king and the designation of *Hutu* peasants as subjects who had to render servitude to the royal court and its chiefs and sub-chiefs only became common after the first Europeans arrived in Rwanda towards the end of the nineteenth century.

For practical reasons, the Belgians changed the political system insofar as they elevated the 'Tutsis' to the (racially and culturally) superior people and gave them a monopoly position in the public life of the mandate territory. It was the *divide-et-impera* method that was popular in the colonial circles. "The only Hutu who escaped their banishment into the working masses were the few who were allowed to study in seminaries" (Des Forges 2002, p. 61). Thus, by excluding the historical contribution of the *Hutu* in the joint construction of the state, the historical myth of the *superiority of the Tutsi as a race* was created. "Members of both groups learned to believe that in every major conflict in Rwanda, the Tutsi were the winners and the Hutu the losers" (Des Forges 2002, p. 62). Thus, a triumvirate of Belgian-dominated colonial administration, *Tutsi* nobility, and Christian mission came to organize the exploitation and oppression of the peasant population with the approval of the *Tutsi* king (who held the title *Mwami*). This process can be described as *ethnogenesis*—the creation of ethnic demarcations in real and mental terms—and its outcome as *politicized ethnicity* (see also Strizek 1996, p. 74 f.).

The colonial valorization of the mandate territory through the introduction of *cash crops*—coffee and tea, later also tobacco, cotton, cinchona bark and pyrethrum—soon reached its limits in view of the scarcity of land and high population density. From 1890 to 1945, there are said to have been twelve famines in the country, with the one from 1942 to 1944 probably the worst, with about 300,000 people starving to death (Schicho 1999, p. 244). Until near its end, the Belgian mandate administration relied on the support of the *Tutsi* ethnic minority: in 1959, of 530 *sous-chefs* (sub-chiefs), 520 were *Tutsi*, and there was not a single *Hutu* among the 45 *chiefs*. The army was also dominated by *Tutsi* officers. But now, when the United Nations pressed for early decolonization of the mandated territories of Rwanda and Burundi and called for general elections to recruit national governments, the administration and mission were faced with a problem: If the hitherto oppressed majority were allowed to vote, they would certainly use their ballots to send their previous tormentors (the Tutsis) packing.

The first local elections already brought about the reversal of the political balance of power. In September 1961, some 80% of Rwandans voted to abolish the Tutsi monarchy and to establish a republic with a multiparty system in which the ethnic majority also claimed the democratic majority and thus political power. "In the beginning, the Hutu attacked only those in power and left their ordinary Tutsi neighbors alone. As a rule, they sought only to expel the Tutsis, not to annihilate them. They 'cleansed' the north, where the colonial administration had placed Tutsi administrators three decades earlier, almost entirely of the Tutsi population" (Des Forges 2002, p. 65). Thus was born the first wave of *Tutsi* refugees into exile. Some of these refugees returned armed and attempted—a total of ten times in the years 1961–1967—to achieve a restoration of the old political conditions,—but to no avail. At this time, *Hutu* politicians also created a link between alleged patriotism and their own profit motive: The supposed enemies of the nation were attacked and their property looted. This *looting mechanism* created a constant incentive for the new masters in the administration and army to expand the circle of *Tutsis* to be wiped out. According to the Belgian historian *Gérard Prunier,* approximately 20,000 *Tutsis* were reportedly killed during this politically turbulent initial phase of the Republic of Rwanda; and more than 30,000 found themselves forced to flee abroad (Prunier 1995, p. 62). By the time of the invasion of the *RPF* from Uganda in 1990, the number of *Tutsis who* had fled to neighboring countries would have grown to about 600,000.

In July 1973, *Juvénal Habyarimana*, the highest-ranking officer in the armed forces, seized power and promised to reconcile the growing tensions within the *Hutu population* (between the *Hutu* in the north and the powerful *Hutu clans* in the south). He created the Second Republic with a coup d'état that initially passed

without bloodshed, although some fifty prominent leaders of the First Republic were later executed or perished in prison. It created a one-party state in which the government and the single party *MRND (Mouvement Révolutionnaire Nationale pour le Développement)* became closely intertwined (Des Forges 2002, p. 69). Abroad, the country, which appeared so politically stable, was valued as a model state in Africa, and so it enjoyed considerable foreign support in the 1970s and 1980s, which the *Habyarimana* government used to build an *impressive infrastructure*, especially in the areas of road construction, telephone and electricity supply. "The true nature of Rwanda's apartheid regime was ignored" (Melvern 2004, p. 22). Also overlooked was the increasing hardship of the peasant population, which continued to impoverish:

> More than 90% of the population lived off agriculture, and while it continued to grow, the cultivable land remained the same. The land area available to ordinary peasants shrank even further as local government officials released fields for development projects and members of the urban elite bought up the land of the poor to establish themselves as tenant lords living far from their land. According to a 1991 government study, the richest 16% of landowners owned 43% of the land, while the poorest households had to eke out their meager livelihoods from a holding of one-quarter to three acres, or even less than one acre. In the most densely populated areas, some young people could not even marry because they could not find land to cultivate and it was customary that a man without land ownership could not marry a woman either. In the commune of Ngoma in the prefecture of Butare, the situation was so precarious that many young people lived together unmarried and fathered children, which was considered a serious violation of time-honoured codes of conduct (Des Forges 2002, pp. 72–73).

Imagine what people in this desperate living situation must have felt if they heard that an army of 'enemies' (*Tutsi*) had crossed the state border and were advancing towards the capital to take back power and 'their' land? If the invaders were to succeed, it could almost certainly mean the demise of their own existence (*Hutu*). In my opinion, this is the most important reason for the lower social strata of the *Hutu* population to take part in the defense of their survival interests ordered from above, if necessary by any means up to and including the murder of the *Inyenzi* ('cockroaches'). The main enemy was defined by the army as the 'extremist Tutsis', "who longed for power, who have *never* and will *never* acknowledge the realities of the 1959 social revolution, and who want to retake power by any means necessary, including force of arms" (Des Forges 2002, p. 91).

The 1990 attack by the *Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF),* from Ugandan exile, had a history that can lend further evidence to the thesis of *peasant land scarcity* as the cause of their existential self-defense to mass murder. In 1982, the Ugandan

government of President *Yoweri Museveni* had deported thousands of refugees to *Rwanda*, who were sent back across the border to *Uganda* only a short time later; for the authorities in *Rwanda* declared that the country was overpopulated and therefore the refugees could not be allowed to return (Des Forges 2002, p. 75). In *Uganda,* resentment against the refugees from *Rwanda* increased and the government now decided to exclude all non-Ugandans, including refugees from *Rwanda*, from land ownership. "This is said to have been the catalyst for the invasion and the refugees' attempt to regain citizenship rights in their country of origin" (Melvern 2004, pp. 24–25). However, the incipient 1990 invasion was quickly stopped by the Rwandan army with the help of French military forces; the *Habyarimana* regime responded with a "strategy of ethnic division" (Des Forges): between 1990 and 1994, it ordered massacres five times, each of which resulted in the death of large numbers of domestic *Tutsis*; among the *Hutu* population, the doctrine of *Hutu Power* was spread. Ethnic discrimination and state terror were ignored by foreign countries or—in the case of *France*—tolerated benevolently. The Christian churches supported—with exceptions—the *Habyarimana* regime until the end, probably out of opportunism.

In the 1990s, the material situation of Rwanda's majority population deteriorated more and more. The country's over-indebtedness abroad forced unpopular structural adjustment measures by the World Bank. More than one million people, mainly in southern Rwanda, were at risk of starvation in 1993, according to the International Red Cross. Many of them enlisted as recruits in the army and private militias (Schicho 1999, p. 252). Three other factors contributed to the further escalation of conflicting interests in the pre-war period from 1990 to 1994: *First,* the massive *drop in the price of coffee* on international markets,—a product that accounted for 75% of Rwanda's foreign trade. Suddenly, Rwanda was among the many debtor countries that had to accept the imposed fiscal measures of the World Bank and the donor countries. *Second, the donor countries,* as well as Rwandan civil society, had increased the pressure on the regime to such an extent that the economically weakened autocrat had to engage in negotiations on a return to a *democratic multi-party system* and power-sharing with the opposition, including the exiled Rwandans stationed at the border. And *thirdly,* the constant massacres of the *Hutus* in the neighboring state of *Burundi,* where there had been no replacement of *Tutsi* rule, showed the *Hutus* what they might face if the oppressors of old returned. On October 21, 1993 the first Hutu president of Burundi, *Melchior Ndadaye*, had been assassinated (Strizek 1996, pp. 230–231).

On April 6, 1994, two missiles hit the plane on approach to *Kigali* in which Rwandan President *Habyarimana* and his Burundian colleague *Ntaryamira* were killed as they flew back from peace negotiations in *Arusha,* Tanzania. Those

responsible for this crime—were the *Tutsis* at the behest of *Paul Kagame* or extremist *Hutus* who wanted to prevent Habyarimana's compromise policy?— have never been identified. All that is certain is that a small group of *Habyarimana*'s closest associates decided, just hours after the assassination, to carry out the extermination campaign that had been planned for years. Both in the capital *Kigali* and in the provinces, soldiers and militias were ready to attack the notified victims, who had been listed in advance. With the backing of the militias, members of the presidential guard and troops under Captain *Théoneste Bagosora* (head of cabinet in the Ministry of Defense under *Habyarimana*) murdered numerous 'enemies' and 'traitors'. Soldiers and militias went from house to house, taking *Tutsis* out of their homes to place them in government buildings, churches, schools or other public buildings, where they were later massacred with machetes in large-scale operations. *Interahamwe* ("*those who attack together*") recruits, who had been trained by the regime months before the genocide and who were particularly prominent in the killing of the *Tutsis,* played an important role. The authorities offered material incentives to anyone who participated in the collective killing: they gave food to hungry and unemployed young men, as well as alcohol and other intoxicants; they encouraged peasants to loot livestock, crops, and building materials. For the nearly 60% of Rwandans under the age of 20, tens of thousands of whom could hardly hope to ever cultivate their own land, the promise of land was a powerful motivation to join (Des Forges 2002, p. 28). Threateningly, *Kagame's* RPF fighters stood in the northern border regions of the country, soon to advance on the capital.

But there were no appeals from abroad to put an end to the killings, quite the contrary: The French and Belgians withdrew their blue helmets, although the Canadian General *Roméo Dallaire*, commander of the UN peacekeeping force, had already warned the UN General Secretariat in a telegram from *Kigali in* January 1994 that a great bloodbath was being prepared in *Rwanda.* He believed that averting the looming genocide was still possible by April 8 and urged UN headquarters not to withdraw the few blue helmets but to reinforce the contingent and provide it with a robust UN mandate. But the permanent members of the UN Security Council denied or ignored the threat of genocide and then the genocide itself; Belgium withdrew its soldiers altogether (after ten Belgian Blue Helmets had been murdered); the US administration under President *Clinton* did not want to finance any further 'humanitarian interventions' in Africa after the disaster in *Somalia* in 1993; and France was paralyzed, having supplied the *Hutu* regime with weapons for decades and supported it politically until the end.

When the RPF fighters finally reached *Kigali* in mid-July 1994, *Hutu power* was over. The mad dream of the extremist *Hutu politicians to* create a nation of solidary perpetrators, which should have been led to a new strong identity through the jointly

committed murder, was shattered in the face of an opponent who was himself determined to go to extremes. The *RPF*, with some 700,000 former refugees in its wake, killed some 60,000 Hutu on its way to ending the genocide in their country of origin (Des Forges 2002, p. 35). A two million *Hutu* exodus of refugees from *Rwanda* to *DR Congo* and *Tanzania* and *Burundi* began. The *Hutu groups* responsible for the genocide quickly reorganized in refugee camps in neighboring countries without abandoning their policy of ethno-political cleansing. In the five large camps around *Goma/Zaire,* with a total of 850,000 refugees, the masterminds of the genocide reorganized the population, monopolized the distribution of food aid, and once again bought weapons in China, South Africa, and elsewhere in order to be able to plan and carry out incursions into *Rwanda* (Prunier 1995). The overthrown government had fled to Zaire, taking all the money from the central bank with them. In Rwanda, 300,000 parentless children were wandering around in search of food (see the eyewitness account by Englebert Munyambonwa, in Hatzfeld 2016).

The *historic verdict* on the *Rwandan* genocide has been delivered by *Human Rights Watch* in the words of *Alison Des Forges as* follows:

> The genocide was the result of a conscious decision, made by a modern elite seeking to maintain power by spreading hatred and fear. This small, privileged group initially pitted the majority against the minority in order to deal with the growing opposition within Rwanda. Then, however, faced with the RPF's successes both on the battlefield and at the negotiating table, those in power changed the strategy of ethnic division and instead set their sights on genocide. They believed that a campaign of extermination could restore Hutu solidarity under their leadership and help them either win the war or at least improve their chances of a peace negotiation outcome favorable to them. They seized control of the state and used its machinery and authority to carry out their bloodbath (Des Forges 2002, p. 16).

Like the organizers of the genocide, the perpetrators "were by no means demons or puppets subject to forces they could not escape. They were human beings who had chosen to do evil. Tens of thousands of people driven by fear, hatred, or the hope of profit made a quick and easy choice. They began to kill, rape, rob and destroy. Until the end, they attacked Tutsis again and again—without doubt or remorse. Many of them made their victims suffer horribly and took pleasure in it. Hundreds of thousands were reluctant to participate in the genocide, some under duress or fearing for their lives … The fact that supposedly legitimate authorities incited or ordered attacks made it easier for the doubters to commit crimes and yet believe or pretend that they had done nothing wrong" (Des Forges 2002, p. 16).

Sociologist *Dieter Neubert* and ethnologist *Anna-Maria Brandstetter* have attempted to describe the complexity of the genocidal causes as follows: (1) massive social explosive due to the threat to livelihood and lack of prospects of the young rural population; (2) regional tensions as criticism of the dominance of the Rwandan North in government; (3) factional struggles within the power elite as resources became scarcer; (4) forced democratization by industrialized countries as creditors and donors; (5) pressure from the Ugandan government to repatriate Rwandan refugees; and (6) a military and political threat from the RPF (Neubert and Brandstetter 1996, p. 418). The Rwandan genocide had destabilizing effects for all of Africa, which will only be hinted at here. Three to four million people, including many *Rwandan refugees,* died in *Eastern Congo (Zaire)*—of malnutrition and starvation, as a result of military incursions from *Rwanda*, as a result of the civil war in *Zaire* that led to the overthrow of the ailing *Mobutu* regime in 1997, which in turn triggered the first continental war in Africa. French historian of Africa *Gérard Prunier* argued that the Rwandan genocide acted as a catalyst that made visible an "enormous African crisis" throughout the Lake District of Africa and beyond (Prunier 2009).

The process of coming to terms with the trauma of the 1994 genocide also got stuck halfway. In view of the initially chaotic conditions, the new government under the leadership of the strongman *Paul Kagame*—to this day President of the Republic (appointed in 2000 and re-elected in 2003, 2010 and 2017)—found it difficult to make a fresh start and would not have been possible without extensive financial and political support from abroad. The new regime, like the international community, found it even more difficult to deal with the issue of punishing the perpetrators and national reconciliation. Efforts to bring about reconciliation between perpetrators and (surviving) victims at the local level by means of[2] *Gacaca courts* (although charges of murder were not allowed to be tried) deserve special mention. At the national level, genuine reconciliation between *Tutsi* and *Hutu* has been blocked under President Kagame. Although the Rwandan parliament created the legal conditions for punishing criminals and for reconciliation between perpetrators and victims with the 2001 *Gacaca law*, it is probably still too early for real reconciliation at the national level between the antagonistic parties. As of March 2005, some 13,000 *Gacaca courts* were indeed operating across the country, allowing for a

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[2]Gacaca means 'soft grass', like the grass under the trees under which the village arbitration courts have been sitting since time immemorial. From 2002 onwards, gacaca courts were set up to supplement the state judicial apparatus. They were supposed to serve the reconciliation between perpetrators and victims through oral confrontation.They are not considered particularly successful.

recorded debate between offenders and victims, with community participation and witnesses being heard, culminating in the conviction of convicted offenders. But in June 2012, the *Gacaca courts* were discontinued without all the detained genocide perpetrators receiving a verdict. Prosecutions at the international level began in 1995 with the establishment of the *International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda* (*ICTR*), based in *Arusha, Tanzania,* which was assigned jurisdiction over the offence of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes under Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. Since it began its work in November 1995, it handed down judgments in 75 cases up to the beginning of April 2014, 12 of which were acquittals, and 16 of the 75 cases were on appeal. In addition, ten cases were transferred to national courts, two defendants died before the end of the trial, and two charges were dropped (according to https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internationaler_Strafgerichtshof_f%C3%BCr_Ruanda, accessed October 16, 2016; Tull and Weber 2016).

Today, *Rwanda* pursues a '*top-down policy*' along the lines of Asian tiger economies: ambitious, goal-oriented and controlled, but "democratic rules of the game have fallen by the wayside for the time being" (Schaeffer 2012, p. 216). *David Booth* and *Frederick Golooba-Mutebi* have aptly characterized this policy as "*developmental patrimonialism*." This is present "when a ruling elite imposes centralized pension management, which is a peculiarity of early capitalism, and deploys it over the long term" (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2011, p. 1).

8.6   Conclusion: Politicized Ethnicity

If one takes a comparative view of the cases of state failure analyzed here—*Somalia, Zimbabwe and Rwanda*—three common features are particularly striking: firstly, the extent of *political violence* that African rulers are prepared to use against sections of their own population when it is a matter of defending their own power interests and privileges. Second, the deliberate policy of *discrimination and instrumentalisation* of *ethnic differences* among the population as a means of political struggle, which prevents *nation-building* under the rule of law. Third, the legitimate concern of the lower strata of the rural population for access to the *primary survival resource,* namely *arable and grazing land* (Barret et al. 2008; Oya 2010). In the face of rapid population growth, land scarcity and lack of land, the basis for food insecurity and hunger, are becoming a material motive for the use of violence and ethno-political discrimination in numerous countries in Africa (Boone 2014; Becher 2016). Above all, anyone who wants to understand African history

must also address the mechanisms, contexts of emergence, and consequences of *politicized ethnicity*—an often underappreciated reality (Tetzlaff 1992). Anyone writing about ethnicity in Africa today—as the ethnologist *Carola Lenz* put it in 2001—is faced with "a paradox":

> On the one hand, Western historians and ethnologists largely agree that pre-colonial Africa did not consist of the currently known ethnic groups between which clear cultural, linguistic and political-territorial boundaries could have been drawn. The defining characteristics of most African societies were (and still are) mobility, overlapping networks, multiple group memberships, and context-dependent boundary demarcations. On the other hand, however, ethnic community ideologies have now gained such a strong foothold in Africa that the idea that the ethnic groups known today have existed for centuries is widespread. Whether ethnicity is viewed positively as adherence to cultural traditions or negatively as illegitimate political nepotism, it is an integral part of public political discourse in Africa and also in Europe (Lenz 2001, pp. 161–162).

In her habilitation thesis "The Construction of Ethnicity. A Political History of North-West Ghana 1870–1990", *Carola Lenz* was able to show that the linking of pre-colonial and colonial patterns of community formation had created a complex web of different ways of "drawing boundaries, defining affiliations and justifying common action". These possibilities produced "ethnic communities" insofar as they could invoke descent and birthright-defined membership. But these "ethnic communities" were "differently inclusive and not constructed according to one and the same principle of construction" depending on the context of action: "territory/native *state*, language/culture and kinship/patrilineal clan" were the *three basic principles of construction* according to which "ethnic communities" were formed in these regions of Ghana. "In all seemingly unambiguous ethnic categories, these three models resonate, each implying a slightly different demarcation. It is precisely this ambiguity that makes 'ethnicity' a successful idiom of community formation" (Lenz 1998, p. 644; see also Heidemann 2011, pp. 138 f.).

When considering *cultural traditions*—which in Africa also include *tribes*, clans, chiefdoms and ethno-religious groups (Beer 2017, p. 80 f.)—there have been and still are two controversial analytical approaches in the literature—the primordialists and the constructivists. While *primordialists* assume hereditary or otherwise "given" (natural) characteristics of social distinction between groups— such as, above all, common language, physical similarity or common descent from an ancestor—and thus take as their basis an *essentialist* concept of culture, *constructivists,* on the contrary, emphasize the relativity of cultural characteristics, which are context-dependent and thus changeable (Fischer 2017, pp. 27 f.).

Constructivist approaches emphasize above all that ethnicity is not a supra-historical and quasi-natural group membership, but a social attribution constructed in specific historical-political constellations. Ethnic groups, according to the basic assumption of all constructivists, exist only as an "us" in relation to "others" (Geertz 1987; Elwert 1989; Beer 2017).

This controversy has since been decided very clearly in favor of the constructivists in the social sciences (Taylor 1993; Schulz and Seebode 2010; Schönhuth 2017, p. 362 f.). *Eric Hobsbawm* and *Terence Ranger,* in their 1983 classic *The Invention of Tradition*, were able to show that in southern and eastern Africa, prior to the arrival of 'the white man', societies were fluid entities characterized by overlapping networks, multiple group memberships, and context-dependent boundary demarcations. Only the colonial Europeans' thinking in terms of opportunity and power would have 'fabricated' ethnic community ideologies from a plethora of different collective identities; that is 'tribal traditions' would have been downright *'invented'*. The inventors of 'tribes' could, on the one hand, have been European colonial officials who, for reasons of cost, needed easily manageable *chief-districts*, with a responsible chief at the head, and if none could be found, someone was appointed traditional *chief.* And secondly, colonized Africans themselves may also have found it useful to belong to a strong *tribe* considered 'noble' with a culturally influential past. If necessary, a 'founding father' and mythical ancestor of a people was 'invented'—in a sense, the earliest form of politicized ethnicity.

Often, small ethnic-cultural groups have only been welded together into larger interest groups through *political pressure from outside,* which then located themselves as a *people* or *ethnic group.* The consciousness of ethnic belonging thus forms an important orientation, although not the only one (Waldmann and Elwert 1989). The ethnologist *Thomas Zitelmann* has used the example of the 200 subgroups and clans of Ethiopians, who were linked by a common language and a social order based on age classes, to show how it was only through the modernization and democratization of the monarchical state that a common *Oromo* consciousness emerged as a political movement in the struggle for self-assertion, which had not existed before. It was about the rejection of the *Amharic* claim to rule, which *Oromo* leaders fought as "black colonialism". In the refugee camps in *Somalia,* a "self-identification" as Oromo emerged among Ethiopian refugees, with the younger generation (pupils and students) setting the tone (Zitelmann 1989, p. 71). In the British colony of *Kenya,* it was primarily the graduates of the mission schools who 'discovered' or invented the *Kikuyu* as a distinct *tribe* and proclaimed their ideology with this purpose-optimistic claim (further examples in Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, pp. 84 f.). The ethnologist *Georg Elwert* defined ethnic

groups as "groups spanning and encompassing families, which ascribe themselves a (possibly also exclusive) collective identity. In this context, the attribution criteria that set the external boundary are changeable. However, they claim dominance over other attribution criteria. The concept of ethnicity, as used by a social anthropology dissident to the 'völkisch' understanding of everyday life (Mühlmann 1965, Barth 1969), is broader than that of the nation. It lacks the reference to a central authority and the element of exclusive 'citizenship'" (Elwert 1989, p. 32).

Ethnicity thus means above all the awareness of belonging to an exclusive group. It is experienced in dealings with other people and communities and actualized through the drawing of boundaries. This is the process that takes place in the minds and hearts: the fictitious or real drawing of boundaries, which can express itself in many forms in everyday life, for example negatively through the exclusion of 'strangers' from common institutions, festivals or meals. Since in Africa we are usually dealing with non-consolidated states, the occupation of the voids that have arisen in political space takes place through the articulation (and conceptualization) of ethnic or religious identity. However, since several population groups always invoke their specific cultural identity when it comes to property rights, distribution conflicts or access rights to resources, the real task in modern civilizations is to endure the social conflicts that naturally arise and subject them to peaceful settlement through negotiating compromises (see also Sect. 12.4 'Peace through social inclusion').

Tasks

1. State the endogenous, exogenous & structural causes of the *Somali* tragedy.
2. How can the state failure in *Zimbabwe* under President Mugabe be explained?
3. The genocide in *Rwanda* in 1994 had several causes. Try to establish a (possibly controversial) context of conditions and reasons by ranking the causes.

Democratisation: Democracy Under Conditions of Poverty

9

9.1 Democracy and Development: Theoretical Findings

The democratisation of African societies and governments is historically still a fairly recent *process of social and political transformation*. It began at the end of the colonial era in the course of decolonisation, when small social groups of the *intelligentsia*, trade unionists and human rights activists began to demand political reforms (Ansprenger 2002). But it was soon stifled during the first era of liberation by one-party governments or military coupists. Then, around 1989/90, the "third wave of democratization" at the world level (Huntington 1991) also reached Africa, so that today we can look back on an 30-year history of democratic experiments in Africa.[1]

The specialist literature on the concept of democracy is endlessly extensive, multi-layered and stimulating. As the basis of many studies in *transition research*, the minimal definition of *Robert Dahl* has proven itself who linked democracy (which he calls *polyarchy*) with the basic principles of *competition and participation.* With this he had linked a catalogue of criteria for the qualification of democratic systems (Dahl 1971). These include: (1) freedom of association and coalition; (2) freedom of expression; (3) the right to vote and be elected; (4) the right of

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[1]The 1999 study by the Berlin political scientist Wolfgang Merkel is a systematic standard work on the subject of system transformation (Merkel 1999). It complements the classic study by Manfred Schmidt (1995) on "Theories of Democracy. An Introduction". Also important are the studies by Michael Bratton and Nicolaus van de Walle of Michigan State University: "Democratic Experiments in Africa", 1997. Their starting point is institutionalized neopatrimonialism, which led Africa into a dead end and made internal reforms necessary. See also Mehler (1993), Nwokedi (1995), Berg-Schlosser (1997), Schubert and Tetzlaff (1998), Temelli (1999), Basedau (2003), Nord (2004), Buchberger (2012), Diouf (2013), Riedl (2014), Cheeseman (2015), Becher (2016), Smidt (2017), Heyl (2017) as well as the articles in the journal 'Democratization'.

political elites to compete for votes and support; (5) existence of alternative, political sources of information (freedom of information); (6) Institutions, that make government policy dependent on votes and citizen preferences (see also Merkel 1999, p. 31 and Nord 2004, p. 20). Until the 1980s, it was widely held that democracy as a form of political rule could actually only take root in developed industrial societies. This view was justified with reference to *social pre-requesits* that would take generations to mature before political rulers would be prepared to allow themselves to be *voted out of office* by the sovereign, that is the electing people. Underlying this is the idea of power-sharing and competition between political parties. In this context, the thesis of the modernization theorist *Seymour Martin Lipset* played a major role: "*The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance that it will sustain democracy*" (Lipset 1959). Measured against five indicators of socio-economic development—namely, per capita income, mass communication, industrialization, urbanization and schooling—*Lipset* was able to demonstrate empirically that in the Anglo-Saxon world, Europe and Latin America such a correlation could claim great plausibility. The success of the emerging Asian countries (*Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia,* etc.), all of which first embarked on democratic reforms in the direction of the rule of law and a multiparty system as a result of economic development successes, initially gave the Lipset thesis further recognition. Then, when a "third wave of democratization" emerged worldwide in the mid-1980s (Huntington 1991), which also encompassed poorer developing countries such as the Philippines, Benin, and Mali, it was necessary to search for suitable explanations for these 'atypical' development paths.

For Africa as a continent with numerous very poor states, the basic problem of rule around 1990 was fundamentally different from the one underlying the *Lipset scenario* just mentioned: After an initial phase of neo-patrimonial rule by presidential dictatorships, most of which had brought about political stability (at best) but little 'development', democratic movements emerged from among frustrated urban elites, led by oppositional groups ready for conflict, who simply wanted to achieve a *change of system*—as the negation, so to speak, of the existing repressive order. It was a cry for freedom and for respect for human rights, combined with the hope of a materially better life with more opportunities (Mehler 1993; Schubert et al. 1994; Temelli 1999; Basedau 2003; Nord 2004; Deegan 2009, pp. 76–95). The pioneers of democratization in Africa were not the relatively rich resource states of *Nigeria, Congo/Zaire, Angola or Gabon*, but a few destitute states such as *Benin* and *Mali*. Then, between 1989 and 1994, *competitive elections* took place for the first time or for a long time in about 40 African states, either to parliament or for the office of president or for regional authorities (Bratton and van de Walle 1997). While in 16 cases the incumbent president was somehow confirmed in office, 15 incumbents

were *voted out* on the basis of a new democratic constitution. This had happened only once before in the three decades since independence began: in *Mauritius* in 1982/83, which had already developed a well-functioning multiparty system for its multicultural society for many years (Leffler 1988). In the same 5-year period there have been 14 so-called *founding elections*, by which *transition research* understands elections that lead not only to a *change of government* but also to a *qualitative regime change* (Engel et al. 1994).

For years there has been a debate among social scientists about the question of whether *autochthonous forms of democracy* might not already have existed in pre-colonial Africa, which could be taken up again today. The thesis of the Tanzanian President *Julius Nyerere,* who died in 1999, became famous: "The traditional African society, whether it had a chief or not, or even several, was a society of equals and conducted its affairs through discussion . . . *They talk till they agree*. That was the core content of traditional African democracy" (Nyerere 1966, quoted in Nord 2004, p. 24). Anthropologist *Herbert S. Lewis*, who conducted research in Ethiopia between 1958 and 1991, argued that with the *gada ideology*, the *Oromo* had developed a political culture of social participation and egalitarianism "that could be called democratic, even republican in the classical sense" (Lewis 1995, p. 26). The *gada system*, which was practiced in several places in present-day Ethiopia over the course of 400 years and is still practiced in some places, refers to a ranking of classes in which the ruling class must hand over its functional offices to the younger age group that comes after it after 8 years, which is celebrated with a formal ceremony of transfer of power (Lewis 1995, p. 27). This custom could be described as the opposite of the hierarchically structured culture of the *Amhars. Gada* embraced the following principles: (1) local self-government is through free election of comrades and of membership in cooperatives; (2) election of leaders who act on behalf of the community; (3) the time of office bearers is limited by the establishment of *age groups.* The spiritual content of *Oromo culture* further included the idea of law, concerning both customary and positive law; the valuing of peace and reconciliation; and the idea of equality (of all Oromo members). However, *Lewis* had to concede, the egalitarian *grassroots system* had been largely dissolved by the growing power of warlords, large landowners and kings, as well as by the influence of Islam and by way of conquest by *Amharic* warriors (Lewis 1995, p. 27; see also Ezekiel Gebissa in Uhlig et al. 2017, pp. 56–61).

The Kenyan historian *Vincent Simiyu* has critically argued that the ideal of free participation by all in community decision-making was an illusion. In many of the pre-colonial societies supposedly known as *egalitarian,* such as the *Kikuyu* and *Maasai,* a hierarchical system of *age classes* existed, which excluded women and younger men from the public palaver and favoured the class of older and richer men

(Nord 2004, p. 25). However, one must accept the argument that in such pre-colonial ruling associations there were sometimes checks and balances in place to limit the power and abuse of power by chiefs—for example, through adherence to rites and customs, deference to ritually prescribed advisors and 'kingmakers', and ethical obligations to maintain internal peace (Beier 1999; Harding 1999, pp. 129–148; Plankensteiner 2007). *Communitarianism,* often brought into play, with its *four basic ethical norms—respect* for public officials and hierarchies; *restraint*, which stands for the restraint of individual claims vis-à-vis the claims of the community; *responsibility*, as in the responsibility of the individual for his actions vis-à-vis the collective; *reciprocity,* which is the obligation to help in solidarity according to the principle of reciprocity of performance and return (Cobbah 1987)—represents a noble 'regulative idea', but today it has little relation to reality. The ethnologist *Carola Lenz* has described the chiefdom in Ghana as by no means homogeneous, monolithic or even idyllic:

> There is hardly a village or a paramouncy where an opposing faction does not want to depose the incumbent or where, for example, village chiefs exploit the competition between the paramount chiefs to raise their own status. Most such conflicts go far back into colonial times and have been intensified by subsequent (party) political instrumentalization and economic interests, to the point of civil war-like clashes such as those in Yendi in 1969 and Wa in the north of the country [Ghana] in 1978/ 80, or in Winneba, Ajumako, Assin Akropong and Akuapim in the south in 1993 and 1994 (Lenz 1998).

Comparative democracy research has now established with some evidence that there is no *clear* link between economic development (industrialization) and political development (democratization) (Berg-Schlosser 1997; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Bendel et al. 2002; Basedau 2003, Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, Deegan 2009, Cheeseman 2015) and that there are also "no fundamental obstacles to realizing and permanently practicing democratic forms of government in Africa" (Berg-Schlosser 1997, p. 91). Nevertheless, there is reason to consider that today— ~~almost~~ 30 years after the beginning of the second attempt at democratization—only about 16% of Africa's states—nine out of 55[2]—can be considered *competitive democracies* (on the road to consolidation). Democratization in African countries is—as will be shown in more detail with the help of a few examples—a very complex and, as a

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[2]In 2017, democratic countries in Africa can be counted as: Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Senegal, Ghana, Benin, Cape Verde, Seychelles and possibly still Gambia (since January 2017). See also Grauvogel and Heyl (2017).

result, always endangered process of transformation from dictatorship to a multi-party system—a process that defies any deterministic logic.

9.2   The SKOG Model by Schubert and Tetzlaff

In transition research, a distinction can be made between two methodological approaches: *system- or structure-oriented approaches* and *actor-oriented approaches*. While *system-oriented* approaches derive democratic transition primarily from changes in the socio-economic system (industrialization, urbanization, influence of global players, etc.) and the associated repercussions on society and politics (e.g. emergence of social strata), *actor-oriented* approaches place greater emphasis on the motivations and strategies of oppositional counter-elites who challenge the authoritarian system (Schubert 2005; Nohlen 2005). In the following, the *SKOG model* will be used to illustrate how both approaches can be combined without giving up the primacy of the *actor-oriented* approach favoured here. The SKOG model developed by *Gunter Schubert and Rainer Tetzlaff* considers democratisation processes as the result of changing power relations between the so-called *strategic* groups in power, on the one hand, and *groups capable of and willing to engage in conflict (SKOG)* in the opposition, on the other. Both groups of actors possess specific resources of power and action, which they use in a strategic way to realize their respective group interests. This results in certain figurations of cooperation and conflict, which determine the initiation of a transition as well as the course and quality of a democratic consolidation. From this perspective, then, democratization is to be understood as a consequence of strategic action and a resulting redistribution of access to state-controlled resources. In this context, this actor-theoretical approach borrows from the theory of strategic groups developed by the *Bielefeld school* of development sociology around *Hans-Dieter Evers*, who defined *strategic groups* as follows: they consist of individuals "who are bound together by a common interest in maintaining or expanding their joint opportunities for appropriation" (Evers and Schiel 1988, p. 10). Since the forces in opposition to the ruling party also act *strategically* insofar as they strive to expand their material as well as ideal "opportunities for appropriation" (access to state offices and state finances, influence on the media, on foreign partners, and on civil society associations), a social dynamic results whose outcome is not determined solely by subjective intentions and personal motives. The society-changing interaction between *strategic* groups in power (also called 'state class' or ruling alliance) and their challengers who are *capable of conflict* (based on their disposal of resources)

and *willing to conflict* (based on their determination and organizational strength) is determined by *other influencing factors* (after Schubert et al. 1994, pp. 31 f. and Schubert 2005, pp. 357–358):

- *Subjective-personal factors*, above all the willingness of the leading representatives of the regime coalition and the regime opposition to use force or compromise. This also includes the *charisma* of the leaders and their ability to mobilize ethnic-regional clientele networks and to skillfully employ means of resistance;
- *Structural factors* such as the historical legacy of colonialism with its experiences of violence or cooperative problem solving. In particular, this includes the *path dependency* of institutions, or in other words, the historically conditioned constitution and quality of political institutions;
- *Socio-structural* factors, such as the social, ethnic or religious homogeneity or heterogeneity and fragmentation of the population*;*
- *Economic factors*, in particular the natural resource endowment and the level of economic development of a society with the associated opportunities for material revenue extraction or redistribution;
- *Cultural factors* such as the influence of clientelistic or patrimonial traditions, the importance of (religiously or ethnically determined) charisma, or traditional notions of conflict and cooperation;
- *External influences and interests*, especially through the political conditionality imposed by international donors in the context of development aid, which encourages or discourages action and promotes the establishment or dismantling of certain institutions.

The same factors must be taken into account not only in the success of democratic transition (chances of consolidation), but also in explaining processes of blockade or even authoritarian regression (Schubert and Tetzlaff 1998; Schubert 2005, pp. 358–359). Such a perspective grants the state only limited autonomy of action and understands it rather as a flexible condensation of a social relationship of domination. *Conflict-capable groups* must become *strategic groups* and gain access to the state with its revenue sources and to the power to shape policy that emanates from it, insofar as they must secure their interests socially in order to be able to succeed. In this respect, state and society remain intertwined and do not confront each other as *separate* spheres with different logics of action. Ideally, the necessary process of change towards a pluralistic and democratic transition can be described as a process of change in *five phases*, which takes place as a *power struggle* between the *alliance of interests in power,* which wants to defend the *status quo* as long as

possible, and a *social opposition movement of competitors and opponents*, which wants to replace the incumbent and claims to use the resources of the state for itself and its patronage networks (see Fig. 9.1):

- The *incubation phase*, in which the desire for change gradually emerges in the population out of dissatisfaction with existing conditions among individual group: It is the period of erosion of ruling legitimacy and destabilization of authoritarian rule, often triggered by a rift in the ruling alliance or by economic and financial crises.
- The phase of *liberalization* of the old system: Either the government declares reforms from above out of enlightened self-interest in maintaining government power, or it is coerced from below, that is—by dissatisfied groups capable of conflict (by students and teachers, by poorly paid public employees and workers, by lawyers, human rights activists and church representatives, etc.), to make *constitutional changes* and gradually roll back the restriction of *human rights.* The decisive factor at this stage is whether or not the *military,* with its preventive power, agrees to open up the system.

- At the height of the *legitimacy crisis,* the phase of *negotiations* between the government and its challengers on a new electoral code, on the modalities of fair competition for the electoral vote, and on a referendum on a new constitution (based on the rule of law) begins. It is the delicate moment when the old authoritarian system, which has become fragile, is no longer strong enough to repressively block demands for reform, and when at the same time the challengers in waiting are not yet capable of conflict and established enough to take power in the state.
- In the fourth phase—provided that the barely controllable process of change has not already collapsed—*political elections* of a competitive nature take place. They are the prerequisite for the *redistribution of state power* (formation of government and parliament) and for the establishment of new institutions after the successful appointment of a government.
- Finally—fifthly—if there is no *regression*, the process ideally leads to the long phase of *consolidation* of democracy. First, the democratically elected government will attempt to gain the *trust and legitimacy* of the civil population through developmental achievements (*output legitimation*). Then the *civil society,* which has been suppressed for a long time, and the *political parties* as responsible actors must have and use the opportunity to internalise and test democratic values and behaviour.

Fig. 9.1 The SKOG model (Source: own representation)

The SKOG model is thus based on the premise that without a political struggle of oppositional groups capable of conflict from the state and civil society against the ruling state class, democratisation that would produce *sustainable* results cannot occur; for it has been shown time and again that an incumbent president, supported

by the army and his legal or illegal patronage networks, defends the political status quo tooth and nail or is at most prepared to make sham reforms. The fact that African presidents often manage to stay in office for a long time despite their lack of popularity is often also due to a divided opposition that becomes entangled in internal power struggles among its leaders or allows itself to be co-opted by the president, sometimes with attractive promises. In such cases, a necessary prerequisite for a democratic transition of the political system is not present: *organized conflict capacity*. Probably the most important means of achieving this is the organization of oppositional interests into *parties* that challenge the legitimacy of the incumbent in presidential and parliamentary elections by mobilizing previously passive opponents of the regime. *Ethno-nationalist mobilization* of opposition groups that overcome the fear of the *big man* at the head of the state is often a solid prerequisite for the success of a transition. Situations in which political mobilization leads to acts of violence on the part of both the regime and—albeit more rarely—the opposition are hard to avoid (Vorrath 2013; Becher 2016).

The process of democratic transition is full of risks and can fail or is blocked in any of the five phases (see also Schraeder 2009, pp. 267–290; Hartmann 2002; Becher 2016). From empirical studies, it is possible to distinguish at least six *courses of democratization or democratization* with different logics of action between the coalition of rulers (government plus supporter networks) and dissatisfied political groups capable of conflict (extra-parliamentary opposition), leading to correspondingly different outcomes (after Schubert and Tetzlaff 1998, p. 176):

- *Democratization from below after a hard struggle* as a result of the protest of groups capable of conflict against unpopular, incompetent one-party or military dictatorships (e.g. Benin under President Kérékou);
- *Permitted democratization from above* (staged democracy) as a reaction of authoritarian governments to formally meet demands of the domestic opposition or foreign countries, whereby the process is designed (manipulated) in such a way that everything remains the same after the election (e.g. Côte d'Ivoire under President Houpouët-Boigny);
- *Negotiated democratization* in a stalemate situation in which neither the strategic groups in power can continue to govern nor their opposition challengers can win (South Africa in the final phase of the apartheid system under President *Patrik de Klerk* and opposition leader *Nelson Mandela*; see also. Lapierre 2009);
- *Fake democratisation* (façade democracy) by staging elections that are not 'free and fair' but are intended to formally legitimise the existing regime (*Ethiopia under Meles Zenawi, Cameroon under Paul Biya, Togo under Gnassinbé Eyadéma*);

- *Refused or annulled democratization* as a result of the resistance of the ruling military to hand over governmental power to politically undesirable forces after lost elections (*Nigeria under Babangida in 1993*; *Algeria* after the unrecognized election victory of the Islamists in 1990, which led them to a militant resistance with terrorist actions similar to civil war);
- *Hybrid democratization as a result of power sharing* between the (supposed) election winner and the (supposed) election loser (Bendel et al. 2002). It has happened several times (*Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Burundi*) that ousted presidents, supported by the military and/or ethnic militias and by party-owned thugs, do not leave the stage of power and thus allow at most a rotten compromise between two opposing parties. The costs of this *policy of forced power-sharing* can be very great: On the one hand, the will of the electorate is disregarded (which is likely to have adverse consequences for voter turnout), and on the other hand, such a *hybrid* government (neither purely democratic, nor purely dictatorial) cannot be expected to undertake urgently needed reform steps, because one party can always make use of its veto position (see the articles in *Africa Spectrum* 3/2009: "Power Sharing in Africa").

From this it becomes clear that no single factor can guarantee the (limited) success of democracy in Africa. Political scientist *Matthias Basedau* defined five necessary *conditions for success for* a *lasting, consolidated democracy*: a minimum level of statehood; a minimum level of democratic integrity of the (ruling) elites; a low level of social, not ethnic, violence; a minimum level of pro-democratic political culture; and the absence of an anti-democratic foreign interventionist power (Basedau 2003, pp. 442–444). However, the case of The *Gambia* proves how cautiously such results should be evaluated. Here, according to *Basedau*, all five necessary conditions for success were fulfilled, and yet a military coup occurred in 1994 that drove the elected president *Dawda Kairabe Jawara* into exile. When parliamentary elections were allowed again in 2002, the main opposition parties boycotted the election because of continuing political repression. As a result, 33 of 48 constituencies went to ruling party candidates without a fight. Since then, coup president *Yahya Jammeh* has had himself confirmed in office as head of state and government two more times (most recently in 2011), declared the country an Islamic Republic in December 2015, announced the introduction of Sharia law, and had protesters arbitrarily arrested. Frustrated and frightened young people left the country in droves, fleeing to *Senegal* or making the arduous journey to Europe. In 2016, the finally united opposition succeeded in voting the long-term dictator out of office after 22 years (with 43.3% against 39.6%). *Jammeh* refused to recognize the election results, threatened war against all political opponents, but then had to

bow to pressure from ECOWAS in early 2017: he had to step down and fled abroad,—not without having looted the state coffers first. High-ranking military officers and police officers had assumed the key role of 'conflict-ready groups' during this delicate transitional phase and declared their support for the new government under President *Adama Barrow*. Thus, in January 2017, *Gambian* society was given a new chance for democratic development.

African examples confirm the insight that liberal democracy lives on *cultural preconditions* that it cannot create itself, at least not in the short term. For presidents of the first generation after independence, a *paternalistic understanding of office* was deeply rooted. In the tradition of *neo-patrimonialism*, they regarded themselves, often supported by a clique of courtiers, as rulers chosen by fate for life, as the incarnation and patron of the nascent nation, and not functionally as the bearers of a temporary political mandate. Thus it is known of the Malian dictator *Moussa Traoré* that even shortly before his fall he had perceived the demands of regime critics for democratization as an illegitimate personal attack on his own person (Hanke 2001, p. 205). A similar attitude is known from Emperor *Haile Selassie* of *Ethiopia* and from President *Mobutu Sésé Séko* in *Zaire* (Kapuscinski 1986; Wrong 2001). In addition to the personal vanity of politicians and the African traditions of perpetual rulership, another structural problem is that for retired presidents there was *hardly* an adequate professional alternative in the country—for example, as a highly honoured and well-paid representative figure in the private sector; and a life in exile is usually not an enticing prospect for a deposed politician (and for his family) either. This is how the *merciless struggles for power* come about at almost any price,—even after successfully conducted elections, namely when the loser of the election does not recognize the vote of the people and accuses them of the manipulation of election.

As can be seen from the results of the *Afrobarometer*, there has been considerable progress in the awareness of African citizens since the beginning of the second phase of African democratisation. Based on 56,000 interviews in 12 African countries in 2000 and 2005, three research institutes *(Institute for Democracy in South Africa, Ghana Centre for Democratic Development, Michigan State University, Departement of Political Science)* obtained the following results, among others (Afro-Barometer, Working Paper No. 61, 2006, pp. 1–17)[3]:

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[3] See also Afro-Barometer (2014) findings confirming this trend; Grauvogel and Heyl (2017, p. 7).

- 81% of respondents (79% in 2002) believed that "we should select our leaders through regularly scheduled, open and honest elections."
- 66% (62% in 2002) of respondents were in favour of the autonomy of Parliament vis-à-vis the executive: *the national assembly should make laws for this country.*
- 63% of respondents (55% in 2002) favored a multi-party political system.

There were major differences between the countries: While there had been an increase in confidence in the democratic majority system in nine (of 12 countries studied) between 2002 and 2005, disappointment predominated in three countries (South Africa, Namibia, and Tanzania). In 2014, the *Bertelsmann Foundation*'s *Transformation Index*, which measures both the progress and regression of democratic transformation towards a *liberal multiparty democracy*, as well as economic transformation towards a *capitalist market economy*, concluded that of the 18 *West and Central African* countries, nine could be described as halfway 'democratic', while nine were 'autocracies' with a tendency towards state collapse (DR Congo, Chad, CAR etc.; BTI 2016, p. 80). In the twenty countries of *East and South Africa* covered by the BTI, the picture was similarly heterogeneous: two consolidated democracies (Mauritius and Botswana) and ten "defective democracies" (see Table 9.1) contrasted with eight "autocracies" and countries of state failure (see below). The five *hard-line autocracies* included Rwanda, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the state-default country Somalia.

The editors of the BTI 2016 commented on this: The poor result of the region of sub-Saharan Africa was not only due to the poor quality of the presidential and parliamentary elections, but rather due to "the typically hard grip of the executive on the constitutional organs, despite the constitutionally guaranteed separation of state powers". Above all, they said, the *independence of the judiciary* is threatened and often abolished in *praxis*. Even in the four parliamentary democracies of *Botswana, Lesotho, Mauritius and South Africa,* parliaments are often unable to exercise their function of government control because of the close institutional linkage between party and state offices: "Patronage and patronage networks undermine the logic of democratic competition, even when key figures explicitly accept democratic institutions" (BTI 2016, p. 93).

The BTI divides the world's countries into *five political categories*: *democracy in consolidation, defective democracies, highly defective democracies, moderate autocracies,* and *hardline autocracies.* In order to have the 56 individual indicators determined by country experts, the points achieved in the democratic transition are plotted on a scale from 10 (consolidated democracy) to zero (state collapse). The table shows the spread of political development (BTI 2016):

Table 9.1   "Democratic transition" in 18 states of West and Central Africa

Scores 10 to 8	Scores 8 to 6	Scores 6 to 4	Scores 4 to 2	Scores <4
Ghana	Benin, Senegal, Niger, Sierra Leone, Liberia	Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire	Guinea,Togo, Mauritania, Mali, Cameroon	Rep. Congo, Chad, CAR, DR Congo
Democracy in consolidation	Defective democracies	Highly defective democracies	Moderate autocracies	Hard-line autocracies
1	5	3	5	4

Source: Bertelsmann Transformation Index 2016, p. 82

9.3   The Renaissance of Political Parties

Competitive political elections have become a familiar event in sub-Saharan Africa. Elections remain an important component of the liberal peace model in Africa (Stroh 2014; Smidt 2017). As a result, the importance of political parties also grew: In the face of socially differentiating societies, they are indispensable as *rallying points for group interests.* Regardless of their very different 'faces', they fulfil two functionally necessary core tasks: On the one hand, they articulate the *interests* of citizens and bundle them into party programmes and electoral alliances, and on the other hand, they participate in the *recruitment of political personnel,* from whom office holders of state power as well as representatives of the opposition can emerge. It is useful to *distinguish* between *eight types of party* in Africa (see also Erdmann 1999; Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, p. 170 f.; Elischer 2008):

- *Including ruling or state parties* that purport to represent the 'whole nation' and often emerged from national liberation movements;
- *Ethno parties or regional parties* that preferably represent the special interests of a region with a dominant ethnic group;
- *Clientelist parties* that allocate resources to politically close interest groups, crossing ethnic lines;
- *Substitutive opposition parties* from among groups capable of conflict that offer or impose themselves as a political *alternative* to the government;
- *Fundamental opposition parties* whose initiators have set themselves the goal not only of changing the government but also of changing the system—as genuine *transition parties;*

- *Programmatic opposition parties* that have taken up the cause of implementing area-related (alternative) political and social goals;
- *Class parties* whose founders advocate the interests of a particular social class;
- *Sham parties, quasi-parties, taxi parties, or sofa parties,* which are essentially, micro parties whose few founding members would fit, figuratively speaking, on a sofa or in a taxi. They often represent nothing more than presidential electoral clubs.

Typical of Africa is the formation of parties by political 'dissidents'; these are politicians who had previously been members of the ruling state party, then fell out of favour and finally founded a new party by splitting off in order to be able to continue to participate in the lucrative struggle for state sinecures. It is in the logic of democratisation as a competitive event that ethno-cultural group identities take on a new significance—in comparison with the situation in the one-party state—which not infrequently leads to violent forms of confrontation. In this context, *politicized ethnicity, chauvinism*, and the *politicization of religious differences* can emerge as political spoilers in the struggle for supporters and votes (Harnischfeger 2006; Loimeier 2002; Schlee 2002; Basedau et al. 2007; Collier 2009; Cheeseman 2015; Becher 2016; Smidt 2017). With a deficient awareness of the rule of law, political violence is often the price for democratic engagement.

9.4   Benin: Successful Democratic Transition

Benin, which was called *Dahomey* until 1975, was the first African state in which a civil *coup d'état* took place in the course of the global 'third wave of democratisation': In 1990, a civil society, frustrated by the dire economic situation, overthrew a military dictator who had run the country down over an 18-year period. Civil society's protest actions led to the adoption of a democratic constitution (with a multi-party system). This achievement remains in force today, respected by all political groups and staunchly defended by the conflicting civil society groups. The Beninese love of the constitution becomes virulent whenever a sitting president tries to 'secure' a third term, which the constitution does not allow. This is a widespread evil among African presidents, because they must fear that their successor in office might file suit against the predecessor for abuse of office and corruption (which has happened often enough).

Benin is a small West African state with 10.9 million inhabitants in 2016 (in 1990 there were only 4.4 million inhabitants) and around 60 ethnic groups,

with the *Fon* making up the lion's share with a share of around 46%. 43% of the population are Christians, 22% are Muslims and 13% are followers of indigenous religions. In addition, 30,000 French people still lived in the country around 1990. It has one of the highest growth rates in Africa, with an annual population increase of 3.1% (between 1990 and 2015). The following outlines the dramatic success story of an African democracy under difficult economic conditions.

In contrast to the type of democratization in Asian emerging countries, whose political transition from dictatorship to democracy is to be interpreted as a consequence of *economic successes*, the democratic turn in West Africa occurred as an alternativeless *negation of negation,* or in other words, as a desperate resistance against hardship, mismanagement, corruption and incapacitation. The opponents of the corrupt regime, however, were no longer the opposition party politicians of the 1960s and 1970s, but spokespersons for the petty bourgeoisie and proletariat, as whose champion President *Mathieu Kérékou* had once claimed to be himself. Also in opposition to the regime were parts of the military, "who wanted to come to power themselves in a time of increasingly fierce struggle for distribution of dwindling state revenues and privileges" (Schicho 2001, p. 118). After 17 years of one-party socialist rule in the name of Marxism/Leninism, the country had become insolvent due to policy failures.

The creeping *crisis of legitimacy* of the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary regime under the leadership of the dictator *Kérékou,* which had been in power since 1974, had reached its climax in 1988/89, after two coup attempts against the hated military regime had already been attempted the previous year. In the fall of 1988, the two state banks had become illiquid, so that not even the employees, teachers, soldiers and students could be paid or supported. Prolonged strikes in all sectors of the civil service and desperate efforts by the government to clear the arrears then dominated the whole of 1989, which had begun in January with a teachers' and pupils' strike, quickly joined by students and later by bank employees and unionized professional groups. The 22,000 teachers constituted by far the largest conflictual *pressure group* among state employees, whose total number had increased about fivefold in 20 years, from 9000 to 47,000. In addition, 13,000 military personnel had outstanding paychecks. Taken together, these confrontational, well-organized groups of urban civil society constituted such a powerful political force that it could dare to engage in a power struggle with the heavily indebted, externally dependent, and delegitimized regime. The people articulating resistance demanded political change (Bratton and van de Walle 1997).

Nevertheless, the third elections for the 'Revolutionary National Assembly' (parliament) took place in June 1989, in which the population could only vote "yes" or "no" to the regime's official unity list. With a turnout of (allegedly) 86%,

89% of voters reportedly voted 'yes'. Parliament then elected *Kérékou* to another 5-year term as president on August 2; but just 6 months later he was politically ousted by a combative civil society—an object lesson in the fragility and irrelevance of rigged elections in the face of a structural crisis of legitimacy. Not understanding the signs of the times, the re-elected dictator defiantly declared that a multi-party system was beyond question, citing dangers of '*tribalism*' and mindful of the negative experiences with the multi-party system[4] in the 1960s; after all, 'democracy' was already in place in Benin (Rolf Hofmeier in Afrika-Jahrbuch 1989, pp. 88–91). The crisis of legitimacy of the *Kérékou* regime came to a head after the arrest in July 1989 of *Amadou Mohamed Cissé,* a long-time confidant of the President of the Republic, on suspicion of criminal financial transfers in connection with the *Banque Commerciale du Bénin* in Paris. In August 1989, ex-president *Emile Zinsou* had published a scathing critique of the Benin regime in the newspaper *Le Monde.* It culminated in the accusation of a "system of state banditry" and the description of "corrupt leaders guilty of frequent and extensive misappropriation of public funds" (Africa Yearbook 1989, Benin, p. 90). Meanwhile, in faraway Versailles, opposition forces in exile from a broad spectrum met for a "round table" and adopted—exactly 200 years after the beginning of the French Revolution—a so-called *Versailles Charter* with demands for a new political beginning under a pluralistic sign. Behind the scenes, important donors such as the IMF, the World Bank and France in particular exerted massive pressure on the insolvent government with the aim of implementing radical structural reforms. France showed little interest in saving the bankrupt Marxist regime in Benin. Also a pastoral letter of the seven bishops of *Benin* unmistakably demanded a political change. A special joint meeting of the government, the party's central committee and the parliamentary steering committee was held in the capital on December 6–7, 1989, along with a parallel meeting of the military leadership. Surprisingly, it was decided to abandon Marxism-Leninism as the official ideology, to end the leading role of the Party and to convene a national conference with the participation of all active forces of the nation, —regardless of their respective political convictions. The aim was to draw up a new constitution. "Thus, after exactly 15 years, Marxism-Leninism as a guiding ideology had ended as unprepared as it had originally been introduced" (Rolf Hofmeier in Afrika-Jahrbuch 1989, pp. 90–91). The beginning of 1990 saw the resumption of strikes by teachers and students, the spearhead of the opposition ready for conflict, who were quickly joined by employees of ministries and

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[4]Before *Kérékou*'s military coup in 1972, there had already been eight governments, including five military governments.

provincial administrations. A government ultimatum to resume work the day after New Year was ignored. The population had ceased to be politically paralyzed for fear of state security.

On February 19, 1990, the *Kérékou* government invited some 500 prominent citizens from all parts of the country to a *national assembly*, which was chaired by a distinguished bishop (*de Souza*, later archbishop of *Cotonou*). On the sixth day, the conference declared itself the sovereign of the people with executive powersia*un coup d'Etat civil (a civil coup)*—on the model of the French Assembly of Estates 200 years earlier. A new constitution was passed (later approved in a referendum) and the president and government declared themselves deposed—which they learned about ~~over~~ on the radio, but without offering any resistance. *Nicéphore D. Soglo* (born 1934), an economist who had gone into exile after the military coup of 1972 and had worked for a time at the World Bank and the IMF, was appointed interim president. General *Kérékou* nominally remained head of state and commander-in-chief of the army until 1991, but was in fact largely stripped of his political power. He was amnestied for his crimes against the state, so that he was later able to take part in the struggle for power in the state again—then in the role of a *civilian* party politician.

The final phase of the democratic transition proceeded quietly and quickly. The new government under *Soglo* again received financial support from outside and was able to meet the salary demands of civil servants and financial grants to students. The *referendum on the new constitution* on December 2, 1990, the seventh in 31 years, finally replaced the 'socialist' one-party system with a democratic multi-party system. It was approved by 93% 'yes' votes with a turnout of 63.5% of Beninese eligible voters. Among those in favor of adopting the draft constitution, 73% voted in favor of limiting the age of future presidential candidates, thus precluding the return of the three former heads of state from the period before the military dictatorship to the highest office of state (Dirk Kohnert in Afrika-Jahrbuch 1990, p. 88). The parliamentary elections of February 1991 and the presidential elections of April 1991 allowed for a complete reshaping of the political landscape. However, the elections also indicated a clear persistence of the regional and ethnic *north-south divide.* In the second round, 95% of the vote in the north went to the newly ousted military dictator *Kérékou*, while *Soglo* received 67% of the vote in the much more populous south, making him the new prime minister. The 64 seats in the newly elected *parliament* were divided among 21 of the 23 parties that ran in the election, the majority of which were political groups with a strong regional base and no specific political program, mostly focused on one *big man*. A new generation of political leaders finally took over the reins of government, who had professionalism,

experience of exile and personal suffering to show for it, but who also felt the need to participate appropriately in the "*politics of the belly*" (Bayart).

The new prime minister was *Nicéphore Soglo*, who had been *Benin's* finance minister from 1965 to 1967, after he had been able to assert himself against his predecessor *Mathieu Kérékou* in a run-off election that had become necessary in March 1991. One of the first acts of the new government was the release of all political prisoners, the dissolution of the concentration camp in *Ségbana (Parakou)* and the creation of a Beninese human rights organization independent of the government. In September, the High Council of the Republic ratified the International Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination against *Women* and other international conventions *protecting human rights*. The extensive cancellation of Benin's foreign debt by France, the USA and other creditors facilitated the start of a democratic future for the new political regime in *Cotonou.*

Overall, the Benin elections of 1991 have been seen as the first triumph of democracy in West Africa—as a glimmer of hope for a renaissance of democracy in Africa (Nwokedi 1995, p. 78 f.). For the first time a military dictatorship had been forced to give up by a courageous civil society ready for conflict and then forced to hold free competitive elections, without violence. Now an army reform also came about, which included the abolition of the approximately 1500-strong militia, the separation of the police, customs and forestry service from the army, the reform of the intelligence services and the merging of the infantry and the presidential guard. Overall, the bloated civil service and employee apparatus was reduced under pressure from creditors (as part of structural adjustment programs).

However, there was a piquant punchline to the Benin success story in the subsequent election (in 1996), when the democratically elected President *Soglo* was voted out of office again by a dissatisfied population and replaced by the dictator of old—*Kérékou. Soglo*, an economist and financier, had failed in his task of achieving a national consensus for the necessary *structural adjustment programs* that the heavily indebted country had to implement *under pressure from Western creditor states* and the *World Bank.* These imposed enormous burdens on the poorer classes (e.g., higher prices for basic foodstuffs), which challenged the resistance of the strong trade union federations and the Christian churches. The opposition criticized nepotism and corruption, mismanagement, and an over-reliance on France. In January 1996, the president had declared *Voodoo* the third recognized religion (along with Christianity and Islam), "which many Beninese saw as unfair campaign interference" (Kohnert in Afrika-Jahrbuch 1996, p. 95). *Kérékou*, on the other hand, popularly known as the *Caméléon*, styled himself in the election campaign as the 'representative of the poor': He had broken away from the ideas of Marxism/Leninism and had converted to Christianity as a member of a Puritan

sect. *Soglo,* who had lost the election, challenged the election results on the grounds of alleged massive electoral fraud and even threatened to take violent action. In the end, *Kérékou* was appointed president after all, and the Benin model of democracy had once again passed a test. The independent jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court played a significant role in this.

How unstable democracy and the rule of law still were in the bitterly poor state of *Benin* was also shown by the *corruption scandal in the judiciary* in 2002: At the end of a court trial, 50 court officials, including half of the country's approximately 90 judges, were arrested because of falsified expense accounts. The courageous President of the Constitutional Court, *Elisabeth Pognon*, who played a major role in this outcome, was presented with the annual Africa Prize by the *German Africa Foundation of the German Bundestag* in Bonn on—November 25, 1996, in recognition of her fearless personal commitment to defending the independence of the judiciary and democracy.

How difficult it is even for a popular, democratically elected party leader to maintain democratic institutions in a poor small state with a rapidly growing urban population and a mobilized civil society was also clearly demonstrated during the period of government from 1996 to 2006: Satisfying all the influential groups and individuals in the distribution of government posts while at the same time fighting the political class's nasty habit of 'milking' the state and its resources in private or corporate interests was like squaring the circle; even the Kérékou II government did not succeed (Schicho 2001, p. 122). Since 1997, trade union federations, parliament and the government have been engaged in a controversial discussion, escalated by warning strikes, about *performance-related* pay for public sector workers and employees, which the trade unions rejected but which international donors expected. Previously, it had been customary to automatically increase wages and salaries every 2 years. In March 2002, therefore, there was a *general strike* by all the trade unions, which lasted for months and paralysed the country's public service, and since the Parliament was also unable to agree either on a budget or on the plans to privatise the postal and telecommunications services, *Kérékou* tried to push through the 2002 budget by *decree,* bypassing the Parliament!

Reforms were carried out in at least two areas, one concerning the proliferation of some 150 political parties, the other the abolition of practices discriminating against women. In May 2002, a *charter of* Benin's *political parties* was passed in parliament, which stipulated that each party had to be represented at both the national and regional levels, thus putting a stop to regionalism and tribalism. After years of controversial debate, the parliament passed a new *family law* in June 2002 that was intended to contribute significantly to strengthening the *role of women* in society. Accordingly, only civil marriages were legally binding (e.g. with

regard to inheritance rights), and the woman had to be at least 18 years old. The traditional marriage of underage girls arranged by their parents was prohibited, as was the practice of *levirate, which is* the practice of forceful marriage of the widow of a deceased person to his brother or son. At the same time, polygamy was to be restricted by stipulating that the written consent of all spouses would be required. The customary payment of the *bride price*, which cemented the rule of the head of the family over his future son-in-law and his bride, was also abolished and reduced to a symbolic contribution. However, the new family regulations met with little approval in Benin's patriarchally dominated society, especially in the northern regions (Kohnert in Afrika-Jahrbuch 2002, pp. 93–95).

Since President *Mathieu Kérékou* had in the meantime passed the age limit of 70 (as had opposition leader *Nicéphore Soglo*) and the constitution prohibited a third term in office, new elections were held in 2006 without the old masters. Surprisingly, an outsider by the name of *Yayi Boni*, a banker, was elected in March 2006 in the second round from a list of 26 candidates—after all with a majority of 74.5% of the votes cast. He had earned a doctorate in France and then worked as a banker at the *West African Development Bank.* As ~~a~~ president, he appointed a cabinet made up mostly of technocrats to spur the economic growth and fight corruption. The new regime received several loans from the World Bank to fight poverty and develop the education sector, public administration and the judiciary. A sensation was caused by the 'Green March' of July 7, 2007, when thousands of demonstrators ~~took~~ went to the streets in the government town of *Cotonou* against "bad governance and corruption that make our country poor" (Laurens Nijzink in Africa Yearboook 2007, p. 55).

But at the end of his first term as president, a scandal occurred that damaged his political credibility as an advocate for the little people. In 2010, it was revealed that several senior government officials were involved in a fraud scandal involving a 'pyramid investment fund' that allegedly caused 100,000 people to lose their savings. Nonetheless, President *Yayi Boni* managed to secure his re-election in 2011 and thereafter re-staffed key government positions with people loyal to him,—including the Constitutional Court. The latter was important because he planned to amend the 1990 constitution to allow himself a third term. The loud protest of the political opposition, the trade unions, the media, the churches and other civil society groups ready for conflict was not long in coming. As in 2006 and 2009, when attempts had been made to push through similar constitutional revisions, a *Don't touch my constitution movement* now emerged again. Starting in July 2013, the so-called *Red Wednesdays* street protests were organized against the government (Banegas 2014, p. 451). Every Wednesday, hundreds of residents in their red shirts demonstrated in the streets of the capital *Cotonou*. Clearly, the *Boni*

government had underestimated the love of Beninese people for their constitution, which was won in 1990. Professor *Richard Banégas*, professor of politics at the famous *Sciences Po* in Paris and the president of the *Joint African Studies Program* (with Columbia University), commented on this development in 2014 as follows:

> In Benin, a pioneer of democratization, the constitution is perceived as a safeguard against dictatorship and a centerpiece of a broader national narrative. Indeed, the pride of citizens in their country is based on their reputation as a 'model of democracy'. Although they may argue constantly over political issues, Beninese had been united for twenty years by the 'shared religion of democracy and constitutionalism' ... The sense of moral crisis and acrimony over 'bad governance' are palpable. 'Enough is enough!' is the cry heard today in all southern regions of the country. If the president continues to pursue this revisionist path, he is likely to face the same determined resistance that President Abdoulaye Wade experienced in Senegal in June 2011, when a similar 'Enough is Enough!' movement formed (Banegas 2014, p. 451; translation by RT).

Banégas was to be proved right: President *Yayi Boni* made "the mistake of eating alone too often" and paying for it with increasing isolation (Banegas 2014, p. 457). In the parliamentary elections held in April 2015—which were seen as a test of the atmosphere for the president—the ruling party *Force Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent (FCBE), as well as* the opposition party, suffered heavy losses. With a fairly high voter turnout of about 66%, the ruling party received only 30.2% of the vote and thus 33 (instead of the previous 41) of the total of 83 parliamentary seats; the largest opposition party, *L'Union fait la Nation/UN,* received 14.4% and thus 13 seats (instead of the previous 30). Following this electoral debacle, President *Yayi Boni* declared that he would not seek a third term. In his place, the non-party businessman *Lionel Zinsou* entered the election campaign, whom the latter had appointed as head of government in June 2015. Before that—on May 14, 2014—he had pardoned cotton tycoon *Patrice Talon* and others accused of an alleged coup attempt. *Talon* had fled to France in 2012 after a warrant was issued for his arrest; but now he ran for president as an independent in March 2016, winning 65.4% of the vote in the second round. This time the loser of the election (ex-Prime Minister *Zinsou*) immediately acknowledged his defeat and congratulated *Talon* on his victory. Thus, probably the richest man of the country, who had earned millions in the cotton business and also ran the port of the economic metropolis *Cotonou,* had been elected the 18th president of Benin. At his swearing-in ceremony on April 6, 2016, *President Talon* promised—as usual—economic recovery and a fight against corruption. That same month, he, who had also made himself the head of the government, announced a *privatization of the cotton industry* to make it more

attractive to foreign investors. He handed control of the sector, which generates about 40% of the country's export revenue and accounts for 60% of the total industrial output, back to the *Association interprofessionelle du Coton (AIC) (Inter-professional Cotton Association)*, which had been headed by *Tolon* himself, among others, before he was elected president. Understandably, the measure was met with criticism, as thousands of cotton farm families and many small businesses lived off the 'white gold' and now saw their livelihoods threatened by the AIC's quasi-monopoly (Banegas 2014, p. 455). This raises the question of for whom the decades-long struggle for democratic reform has been worthwhile.

In conclusion, following this Benin pattern of the formation of a national assembly from the *bosom of frustrated civil society*—which lays claim to and asserts sovereignty—reform processes also subsequently took place in *Congo-Brazzaville* and *Togo*, but both failed in each case due to militant resistance from the hitherto dominant forces—the strategic groups in possession of state power. The fact that in Benin (which was marked by political turbulence in the 1960s) the *democratic transition* could be completed on the basis of a constitution created and defended by civil society was perhaps decisively due to the democrats' modest approach to their political opponents: even dictator *Kérékou*, who bore the main blame for the mass misery, was *not* completely degraded and permanently humiliated, but succeeded in gradually incorporating his head and shoulders into the *national reform process*. He even became—compared to all predecessors and successors—the most popular politician in the country. This demonstrated that the loss of state power and the defeat of a party in elections can be *reversible* processes and need not always mean an existential catastrophe.

In Benin, an increase in democratic substance, also and especially on the part of civil society, could be observed—*a democratic deepening* (Gisselquist 2008, p. 809): a new generation of judges has grown up in the courts, who takes the *rule of law* very seriously (Banegas 2014, p. 456); numerous political actions of the organized interest groups have been inspired and also carried by their 'love of the constitution' Nevertheless, a word of caution is in order: it should not be overlooked that any democratically elected government faces almost impossible problems of legitimacy in an underdeveloped country where the existential needs of a rapidly growing population plagued by unemployment are permanent; moreover, a flourishing cocaine trade makes any government struggle. With an average per capita income of US$ 820 today (2016) compared to US$ 370 at the beginning of democratization, the small country is one of the moderately successful economies in West Africa; but its dependence on cotton as its main export has not yet been overcome.

9.5   Burkina Faso: Military in Power (Thomas Sankara)

Burkina Faso, a relatively poor *land-locked country* with 14 million inhabitants and around 60 ethnic groups, which was called *Upper Volta* until 1984, has managed to oust a military dictator who had gagged the country for 30 years and to launch a new democratic constitution in 2015. The story of Burkina Faso shows how a military regime can wreck a country until a courageous civil society, out of frustration, forces a peaceful overthrow of conditions. In the case of *Burkina Faso,* the democratically elected president is *Roch Marc Christian Kaboré*, an economist by training who held the office of president of the National Assembly from 2002 to 2012. He was a companion of the dictator *Blaise Compaoré* until he then went into political opposition. He emerged as the clear winner of the peaceful elections held on November 29, 2015, with 53.5% of the vote. An international arrest warrant has been issued for the ousted ex-dictator *Compaoré* on charges including the assassination of his predecessor *Thomas Sankara in* 1987.

The previous history: In Upper Volta/Burkina Faso, military coups have taken place several times, with accusations of *bribery and corruption* of the previous civilian government being used as justification—here as everywhere in Africa. One of the first military coups in independent West Africa took place in Upper Volta (after the coup in Togo in 1963); in 1966, the freely elected first head of state, *Maurice Yaméogo*, was forcibly replaced by Lieutenant Colonel *Aboubacar S. Lamizana* (1966–1980) as a result of a budget crisis (an attempt to cut the salaries of state employees by 20%) under pressure from the strong trade unions. He created the *Third Republic* by means of a new constitution, but could not stop the rise of crime (corruption and nepotism). When *Lamizana* who in the meantime had promoted himself to 'General', tried to switch to the civilian camp in order to remain in power, trade unions, student associations, teachers and even parts of the army protested. A military coup, like all previous ones largely non-violent, brought a new military council to the helm in 1980, which banned all political parties. But tensions within the officer corps, between the older and younger generations of officers, intensified. "The third generation was clearly characterized by an intention to oppose the conservative representatives of a neocolonial dependency by a radical policy of self-determination" (Schicho 2001, p. 153). They formed a *Conseil National de la Révolution* (Revolutionary Council), and *primus inter pares* became *Thomas Sankara*, who was favoured by the youth and the left-wing civil society groups and who had visibly been inspired by Ghana's military tribune *Jerry Rawlings* (see next chapter below).

The Sankara era: The officers of the new African armies initially found it difficult to coup against the heads of their states. Not only was personal respect for the 'fathers of the fatherland' at play, but socialisation at European military schools had also taught them political neutrality. *Sankara* was one of the personally undemanding leaders who presided over a social-revolutionary military regime and accordingly wanted to implement structural reforms in the society. *Franz Ansprenger* paid tribute to him, not without sympathy, as follows:

> Sankara did not organize a protracted class struggle. He hoped to eliminate the enemies of the people in one fell swoop—through incendiary speeches, by decree, by encouraging the youth and women to political action. Apparently, for him, the enemy was not a power-tested class that must be challenged for the disposal of the means of production (after all, there is no industry in the country!), but a bunch of morally depraved individuals. He was realistic enough to recognise the people on the other side as what they clearly are in Burkina Faso, and in Africa as a whole: an old-fashioned peasantry that is becoming increasingly impoverished under population pressure and environmental destruction (Ansprenger 1999, p. 107).

Sankara's vision of the future was already expressed in the new name he invented for the state of *Haute-Volta* (Upper Volta). *Burkina Faso* means 'Republic of Free and Fair People', a combination of the languages of the country's two main peoples the *Mossi* and the *Fulbe*. Over radio and television, *Sankara* proclaimed on October 2, 1983:

> The struggling people of Upper Volta have mobilized as one, behind the Conseil National de la Revolution (CNR), to build a new Voltaic society—free, independent and prosperous, having shaken off centuries of domination and exploitation by international imperialism . . . Our revolution is taking place in a backward agrarian country, where the weight of traditions and ideology produced by a feudal-type social organization weighs enormously on the popular masses . . . It is a popular democratic revolution (une révolution démocratique et populaire). It has as its main tasks the liquidation of imperialist domination and exploitation, the purification of the peasant country of all the social, economic and cultural ills which keep it in a state of backwardness. Hence comes its democratic character (Thomas Sankara, quoted in Ansprenger 1999, pp. 107–108).

The policy of the Revolutionary Council under the energetic leader *Sankara* was characterized by an intensive and purposeful concentration of the state's scarce resources on the promotion of rural areas, combined with a curtailment of benefits for urban dwellers. One can speak of a politically intended *rural bias*, which was evident, for example, in the accompanying measures to promote subsistence grain production—such as the construction of dams, rural roads, anti-erosion dams, water

retention basins and tree nurseries to regenerate vital tree cover. In addition, *Sankara* was both a social reformer and a moralist. In the social sphere, the improvements in health care are particularly noteworthy: Significant improvements have been achieved through the establishment of 7500 health posts, which were placed under the ownership of the village population, and through a large-scale vaccination campaign for 2.5 million children aged seven to 14 against the most important infectious diseases (meningitis, measles, yellow fever). The school enrolment rate was almost doubled from 12% (1984) to 23% (1987), although after a strike (over the reduction of public sector wages by about 20%) about 1400 teachers were dismissed and replaced by less well trained 'revolutionary' staff (Schmitz in Afrika-Jahrbuch 1987, pp. 81–82). The sale of luxury items was restricted, the wearing of native cotton clothing was decreed, and the sale of alcohol was made much more difficult. Prostitution, polygamy and begging were banned and nightclubs were closed—all morally demanding measures that met with little sympathy from urban middle class *professionals* and working people. Following the example of *Mahatma Gandhi* and *Julius Nyerere*, *Sankara* was concerned to make it clear to the people that they themselves could significantly improve their situation through their own initiatives and by refraining from consumption.

The fact that this hopeful social-revolutionary experiment failed after only 4 years was a tragedy from the peasant point of view. The conservative *Mossi* aristocracy and the urban middle class—public employees, unionized teachers, merchants and traders—were rather glad to be rid of this inconvenient populist and moralist who had dared to challenge their social privileges. The immediate cause of *Sankara's* fall, however, was an intra-elite dispute in the Revolutionary Council: when *Sankara,* against the veto of his three colleagues (including *Compaoré*), had the establishment of a security police force subordinate to him approved by the government and parliament, a coup took place the next day: *Sankara* along with eleven other people was shot dead on the night of October 15–16, 1987 and buried in a cemetery for the poor on the outskirts of *Ouagadougou.* "The lack of institutional networking as well as clear delimitation of competences and allocation of the central state organs were the decisive determinants for the fact that the political conflict between the leaders of the Burkinabé revolution and the groups behind them could hardly be solved in any other way than by a—though not necessarily bloody—coup d'état"—*Erich Schmitz* opined (Afrika-Jahrbuch 1987, p. 88). The historian *Walter Schicho* judged that "despite all its shortcomings, the development of the years between 1983 and 1987 became a formative experience for the society of the country": With increasing distance, "collective memory" would have created a myth "more significant than the concrete traces of the revolution" (Schicho 2001, p. 155). It would take almost 30 years before this heroic

myth would drive a new generation of young discontented people onto the streets against the renewed dictatorship.

The populist *Sankara* was transfigured into a revolutionary myth, and the memory of his vision of politics for "the good and honest common people" in the struggle against imperialism and feudalism (Ansprenger 1999, p. 106) inspired the civil society actors of the 2014 and 2015 uprisings (Frère and Englebert 2015, p. 295 f.). Today, the young democracy is not primarily threatened by the political opposition (in October 2016, there was an attempted coup by *Compaoré supporters* against the government of President *Kaboré*), but by the *terrorist attacks by Islamist militias and jihadists,* who threaten the political stability of the West African states of *Mali, Niger, Nigeria* and also *Burkina Faso* (see also the Mali story in Chap. 12).

9.6   Ghana: on the Way to Consolidated Democracy

Ghana has often been the scene of new developments with some relevance for Africa as a whole. First, the British tried out on negotiated decolonization in the *Gold Coast*, then the country became an early World Bank experiment in *structural adjustment policies* to deal with over-indebtedness crises, and finally Ghana became the darling of the international donor community when it began a successful policy of *democratization from above* in the 1980s. Ghana represents an interesting case of a genuine institutional metamorphosis, from a crude military dictatorship to a democratically consolidated multiparty system that has seen free elections five times since 1992 and regime change through free and fair elections four times—the latter in 2000, 2008, 2012 and 2017.[5] Under several civilian and military governments, Ghana had fallen into a severe economic and social crisis after the overthrow of *Kwame Nkrumah*, who had led Ghana to political independence (see Sect. 6.3). *Nkrumah*, whose left-wing party (CPP) had embodied the expectations of the petty bourgeoisie for prosperity and progress, was followed, after a military interlude, by the brief rule of the opposition party under Professor *Kofi A. Busia*

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[5]The political leaders/presidents of Ghana were: Kwame Nkrumah 1957–1966; General Joseph A. Ankrah 1966–1969; General Akwesi A. Afrifa 1969; Kofi A. Busia, elected, 1969–1972; Colonel Ignatius K. Acheampong 1972–1978; Colonel Frederick W. Akuffo 1978–1979; Hilla Limann, elected, 1979–1981; Captain Jerry John Rawlings 1979 and 1981–2001; John Agyekum Kufuor (NPP), elected, 2001–2009; Atta Mills (NDC), elected, 2009–2013; John D. Mahama (NDC), elected 2013–2017; Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo (NPP), since January 2017.

(1969–1972), which served primarily the economic interests of the conservative bourgeoisie centered in the Ashanti region.

In 1972, the democratically elected *Busia* regime failed in its risky attempt to solve the economic crisis with drastic austerity measures at the expense of the urban working class. Under the military ruler who succeeded *Busia, Colonel Ignatius K. Acheampong* (1972–1978), and his successor, Colonel *Frederick W. Akuffo* (1978–1979), the country experienced falling world market prices for cocoa, Ghana's main export, and at the same time rising prices for oil, which had to be imported in large quantities (at the time). Annual inflation rose by 50%, the black market flourished, and the practice of market traders, known as *kalabule*, namely offering their scarce goods at inflated prices, made it difficult for the urban population to survive. The military council finally capitulated to the economic malaise and cleared the way for another *experiment in democracy*. In July 1979, Dr. *Hilla Liman* won the elections; his inauguration as head of government was preceded by "an interlude that should have been a warning to the new politicians. Young officers led by Flight Lieutenant *Jerry John Rawlings* took power on June 4, 1979, with the intention of cleansing Ghana's political and economic leadership of corrupt and self-serving elements so as to also give the new civilian government a better starting position. The officers had leading figures of the old regime publicly executed, including [three ex-presidents and generals] *Acheampong, Akuffo and Afrifa*. Unexpectedly for all, the officers responsible for the killings kept their promise and handed over power to President-elect Liman in September (Schicho 2001, p. 204).

The democratically elected president now tried a policy between austerity and sufficient supply of vital goods to the market, but could not prevent the continuation of the old business practices of *kalabule* (a form of corruption), ordered price controls remained ineffective and high inflation was maintained. *Ghana* clearly demonstrated the negative side of a country's structural dependence on one or two commodities (cocoa and bauxite): if demand and prices for these commodities fell on the world market, government revenues fell and with them the chances of raising the necessary foreign exchange to diversify and industrialise the economy. *Ghana,* like other African commodity countries such as *Zambia, Zimbabwe, Kenya* and *Côte d'Ivoire,* sensibly opted for the *import substitution industrialisation (ISI)* strategy, which aimed to replace consumer goods hitherto imported from abroad by building up its own industries (see Sect. 2.4). This required, first, substantial investment capital, second, technical and administrative business and professional staff, and third, a wise policy in dealing with protective tariffs. Private domestic capital was hardly available due to the *lack of a national bourgeoisie* (Goldberg 2008, p. 185 f.). If a government now tried to replace the lack of equity capital with foreign loans and development aid loans, it easily fell into the vicious circle of over-

indebtedness—especially when a government was too weak to rein in the rising consumption desires of urban dwellers as well as unreasonable wage demands of its public employees. Ghana also fell into this *debt trap* under both military and civilian governments (Körner et al. 1984).

No fewer than 235 *parastatals* emerged—these were industrial and service enterprises whose management was determined by a ministry, but which were expected to operate according to business rationality and generate profits. This practice was a fertile breeding ground for the *neo-patrimonial system at government and administrative levels* that typified many post-colonial countries in Africa. The *patronage state government* now instrumentalized the *Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board* to obtain increased government spending and desired investment funds for the *ISI strategy* mentioned above: Cocoa farmers were offered buy-out prices for their crop that were far lower than world market prices, which in the long run encouraged the smuggling of cocoa across the borders into *Côte d'Ivoire,* as well as encouraging the shift of gainful employment to other activities. Whereas *Ghana* had exported 560,000 t of cocoa in 1965, the (officially registered) harvest had fallen to 150,000 t in 1981. A similar fatal development was also evident in the extraction of timber and bauxite, Ghana's most important ore (from which aluminium is made) (after Thomson 2010, p. 206).

Faced with an economic situation that had become hopeless, *Jerry Rawlings* took power again on December 31, 1981, abolished the constitution and banned political parties. With him and through him, the 'Ghanaian miracle' began—the top-down orchestrated transformation of a failed modernization state into a democratic multi-party state based on an economy that had been rehabilitated by the state. Initially, Rawlings' main concern was to put an end to the social cancer of corruption—*kalabule*—which had attacked at its core the social contract *Nkrumah* had made with the masses. *Kalabule* was a popular expression among Africans of eating as a metaphor for the immoral accumulation of wealth of the few at the expense of the majority (Bayart 2009); it referred to making profits "either by means of the machinery of the state or by means of the failure of the state to control the traders" (Nugent 1996, p. 27). *Francois Bayart* has described the rapacity of African politicians in terms of *politics of the belly* (a Cameroonian metaphor), and continuing this approach, *Paul Nugent* has detailed how, among Ghanaians, the cultural valuation of wealth—food—had impacted on politics. *Kalabule* would not have characterized the behavior of politicians alone, but had also been practiced by market women and traders in times of great material need. Hence, *Rawlings* would have begun his campaign of popular revolution by fighting both the *big men* and the *small boys in* markets across the country (Nugent 1996, pp. 79 f.). In the Ghana

novel *The Beautiful Ones Are Not Yet Born,* the Ghanaian writer *Ayi Kwei Armah* sensitively portrayed this theme (Armah 1982; Utley 2009).

Historian Martin Meredith hailed Air Force Lieutenant *Jerry Rawlings* as a "star" among African reformist presidents who would have succeeded in pulling Ghana out of severe governance and especially economic crisis:

> Rawlings entered the political arena in 1982 surrounded by Marxist advisers; he expressed admiration for the likes of Castro and Gaddafi and railed about the pernicious effects of 'imperialism.' But after launching a series of populist experiments, he acknowledged the need for a different course. By 1983, Ghana was on the verge of collapse. The supply of food was erratic; production levels were at an all-time low; the value of spending on health was a quarter of what it had been in 1976; medical care was non-existent; within seven years infant mortality had grown from 80 per thousand to 120 per thousand; roads were impassable; inflation was reaching 123%; loss-making para-state organisations were gobbling up 10% of government spending; in 1983 the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board employed more than 130.000 people managing a crop half the size that had been managed more efficiently by 50,000 employees twenty years earlier; gross national product per capita had fallen by 7% annually. What exacerbated the crisis were the one million Ghanaians who had been displaced from Nigeria and a severe drought that resulted in power outages and bushfires (Meredith 2005, pp. 371–372).

After his pragmatic turn, *Rawlings* concluded agreements with the World Bank and the IMF that imposed the usual *structural adjustment measures* on the country (see Sect. 2.4). The head of state left no one in the dark about the fact that the rehabilitation of the economy by means of drastic discipline, ordered and enforced from above, would have absolute priority over democratization. *Rawlings* had over-indebted state-owned enterprises closed or privatized; state subsidies of consumer goods were reduced; at the same time, the bad habit of *kalabule* was ended by decree by reducing the price of the staple food corn by 37% and that of cooking oil by 69%. Furthermore, Rawlings' *Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC)* initiated a *job inspection programme* with 60 inspectors who ensured that the number of public employees was reduced by 24,000 within 2 years (this also affected numerous names of long-dead employees). The national currency, the *cedi,* was devalued and its exchange rate brought into line with international levels through auctions. The policy of discrimination against cocoa farmers, which had become customary by then, in that the purchase prices for their harvest were set extremely low, was continued for another 2 years, but then, on the advice of the World Bank and under pressure from the public, it was reversed: at the heart of the reforms were various programmes to revive the economy, with the World Bank

once again providing support in the form of stabilisation loans (Brown 1995, pp. 65–82).

This was an economic liberalization program that included, among other things, the promotion of the neocolonial export economy, the privatization of state-owned enterprises, the streamlining of the state administration (dismissal of *civil servants*), the reduction of social expenditures for education and health, and strict adherence to budget discipline. When the austerity measures met with understandable opposition from the urban population, the Accra government, in consultation with World Bank consultants, decided to launch a modified reform programme: *The Programme of Action to Mitigate the Social Costs of Adjustment (PAMSCAD).* It aimed at decentralising development planning and implementing projects, and reducing poverty in Ghana, for example through *food for work—road works*. This was later followed by further grants from the international donor community, which wanted to make reform-minded *Ghana* the flagship of its new pro-poor neo-liberal development policy. In the course of the *Highly Indebted Poor Countries* (HIPC) initiative adopted by the *World Bank,* a large part of the country's foreign debt was cancelled for the first time in 2002 (and several times thereafter), combined with the promise that the government would in future sustainably combat poverty in the country by the means of *Ghana Poverty Reduction Programmes* (Tetzlaff 2012).

The first successes in the fight against poverty soon became apparent. Between 1991 and 2006, the proportion of poor people in Ghana's population is said to have fallen from 51.7% to 28.5%. However, the regional uneven distribution of development successes remained problematic: while the proportion of poor people in the cities ranged between 11% and 14%, the percentage in the country's three Northern provinces always remained above 70% (Apusigah 2009, pp. 25–28). Between 1992 and 2006, 2.5 million Ghanaians in southern Ghana were lifted out of poverty, while during the same period the number of poor in northern Ghana increased by almost one million (Eberlei 2009, p. 94). *Rawlings'* success was based on a pragmatic alliance of, *first,* a strong reliable state that invested in infrastructure (electricity supply to the villages, construction of schools and roads), *second,* an efficient, educated middle class as well as experienced national businessmen who took advantage of the new opportunities, and *third,* foreign companies that were willing to invest in this 'island of peace', which stood out pleasantly from the *failing states* in the neighbourhood (Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Liberia). Only this calming of the situation enabled the political parties—"after the double shock of military regime and structural adjustment" (Schicho 2001, p. 208)—to renew themselves and, after a learning phase, finally to hold fair and free elections.

The *Rawlings era* can be described as the key period in Ghana's emergence as West Africa's *first middle-income country*—demonstrating a high level of maturity,

which it reached in 2011 according to the World Bank assessments (a PCI of over US$ 1045). By 2016, its PCI stood at US$1380. Economic recovery and political democratization went hand in hand here, albeit accompanied by political turmoil and economic setbacks. Nevertheless, it should not be overlooked that *Ghana,* even as a partner country of *China,* has not yet managed the structural transformation from a commodity economy to *diversification and industrialisation.* Some economists therefore speak of a *Ghanaian paradox*: despite the solid transition to democracy and despite the country's remarkable economic recovery, there would still be structural and personnel weaknesses in the transition to an Asian-type 'emerging market'. The neo-patrimonial state would have failed to provide sufficient *public goods* for the benefit of all (Killick 2008, p. 27).

Ten years have passed since then, and *Ghana* has now moved up to the ranks of the oil-exporting states. But Ghana has not become a rentier state or even a '*vampire state*'—comparable to the *DR Congo, Sudan, Zimbabwe, Angola or Equatorial Guinea*. The *culture of silence*—a frequently used expression for the lack of accountability of repressive governments—was now over: The Christian churches, which had suffered under Rawlings, the marginalised trade unions and civil society groups increased the pressure on the regime to return to a multi-party system, which the Western donor states also wanted. In this delicate situation, Rawlings was wise enough not to refuse to open up the political system. A *Movement for Freedom and Justice (MFJ)* led by *Hilla Liman* and a *New Patriotic Party* under its founder *Adu Boahen* took part in the 1992 presidential elections, in which Rawlings himself also participated at the last moment. To the surprise of many, it was not the candidates of the old-established political parties of the *Danquah-Busia* tradition who won, but the strong, unpredictable man of the regime in the tradition of Nkrumah: *Rawlings* won with 58.3% of the vote, ahead of his rivals *Boahen* with 30.4% and Liman with 6.7%, on a turnout of 48.3% (3.989 million voters) (Nugent 1996, p. 233). Four years later, the electoral scenario was repeated: in 1996, the incumbent *Rawlings* won the presidential election with 57.4% of the votes in the first round, ahead of his challenger from the NPP (*New Patriotic Party*), *John Kufuor*. The result of the parliamentary elections confirmed the trend: *Rawlings'* party NDC, the *National Democratic Congress*, accounted for 132 of the 200 seats, the opposition party NPP for 60 seats.

But the *Rawlings* regime had lost its initial reform momentum, as structural industrial change had not been sustained. However, the courting of foreign investors and the sale of the state's shares in the mining company *Ashanti Goldfields* showed that the solution to domestic economic problems was still sought in the use of Western capital and still in the hope of generous development aid. "Of the 55 registered mining companies, the majority were in foreign hands. 74% of

investment between 1994 and 1998 came from abroad-and most of it from the United States … The combination of an efficient bourgeoisie, an authoritarian government, and foreign capital guaranteed success, though this success was by no means synonymous with a better life for all" (Schicho 2001, pp. 207–208). Since the constitution did not allow re-election and *Rawlings* played by the rules, the next time his vice-president Professor *John Atta Mills* ran for office. The latter clearly lost in the December 2000 presidential election to his rival from the NPP, *John Kufuor,* who had a clear lead over *Rawlings'* favourite with 3.6 million votes and a share of 56.9% of the votes cast (in the second round of voting). The generous financial support of the Electoral Commission, especially from the EU, had made the marathon election possible, thus guaranteeing the conduct of free and fair elections (Africa Yearbook 2000, Ghana, pp. 104–105).

Since then, *Ghana* has made good progress on the path to *democracy and a market economy.* The *Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)* placed Ghana in first place among all the West African countries. *Freedom House* gave the country top marks for *granting political and civil rights.* The two power groupings of different ideological orientation can be understood as rival strategic groups in the sense of the *SKOG approach* (see Sect. 9.2): each political group sought to increase its appropriation opportunities through *access to state resources* and thus to aliment its networks. As a result, a fairly *stable two-party* political *system* has developed in Ghana: On one side is the *Danquah-Busia* tradition (*Danquah* was the political conservative-leaning counterpart of *Nkrumah*), which was associated with the wealthy business and educated elites in southern Ghana, with the majority belonging to the ethnic *Akan family.* In opposition to this alliance, a left-wing, more social-democratic party tradition has formed since Nkrumah, characterized verbally by an anti-elitist orientation and enjoying strong sympathies among the rural population. This pattern of a two-party system, in which two numerically almost equally strong political traditions, each with a strong core constituency, confronted each other, strongly favored the democratization process (Osei 2015). Both were united by the same goal—the capture of state power and its resources. Both political camps now share the belief that the road to power must be through free and fair elections. *Osei* speaks of *consensually united elites* who have learned to see each other as *trustworthy competitors* for power. The *social networks* of the members of parliament played an important role in this: the parliamentarians of both parties cultivated intensive communication not only among themselves, following party logic, but also across party boundaries, whereby ethnic solidarity was also conducive to reducing mistrust. "*We disagree on politics, but we eat together*" (Osei 2015, p. 546; see also Cooter and Schäfer 2012).

But what has fallen by the wayside is the opening up of this system, especially for the bottom quarter of the population living below the poverty line. In August 2016, AU and UN experts in *Accra* released a report that 37% of adults suffered from the effects of growth and developmental disorders due to childhood malnutrition, which would have resulted in a 7.3% reduction in the labour force. And due to the high rate of child malnutrition, Ghana would lose about US$ 2.6 billion annually, which would be about 6% of its gross domestic product (Der Neue Fischer Weltalmanach 2018, p. 176). This appalling social statistic in an economically and politically successful state once again highlights how deeply rooted the *problem of poverty* is in post-colonial African states.

9.7 Ethiopia: Cultural Boundaries for Democratization

After a quarter of a century, the 'third global wave of democratisation' (Samuel Huntington) seems to have come to an end. The most recent figures from the relevant US *Freedom House* specified this trend of declining democratisation successes as a consequence of an increase in the power of 'populists and autocrats'. The year 2016 was the 11th consecutive year of deteriorating democracy scores in the world: out of 195 countries, only 87 countries (45%) were considered 'free', 59 (30%) were qualified as 'partly free' and 49 (25%) as 'unfree' (Freedom House 2017, p. 1). Currently, *Algeria* can also be seen as a confirmation of this thesis: In April 2014, the population overwhelmingly elected the authoritarian ruling 77-year-old President *Abdelaziz Bouteflika* for the fourth time—with 73.8% of the votes cast and a voter turnout of 61%. Oriental scholar *Hanspeter Mattes* explained the popularity of the president, who rules with a hard hand, "with the population's adherence to a political leader who is credited with restoring stability after the civil war in the 1990s" (Mattes 2014, p. 1).

The example of *Ethiopia* will now be used to illustrate in an ideal-typical way that the democratic model of Western provenance is not applicable to all *critical juncture* cases[6] in developing countries. In 1989, after decades of armed struggle with numerous victims among its own ranks, a national liberation movement (the Tigray) succeeded in putting to flight the political tyrant (military dictator Mengistu), who had oppressed the country's population by means of brutal military

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[6]*Critical juncture* situations refer to the turning points, i.e. the rare moments in the life of a nation or a state, wherein policy options emerge and political leaders have to make decisions that determine the future; see Acemoglu and Robinson (2012).

dictatorship and structurally hindered its prosperous development. The liberation movement, which was based on a regionally limited ethnic minority that made up only about 6% of the multi-ethnic state (Tigray), felt legitimized by the military victory over the dictatorship to draft a new federal constitution and also to provide the next national government. It was a *critical juncture* situation*,* the like of which rarely presents itself in the history of any country: How could the traditional domination of a repressive ethno-cultural group (the Amhar people, who make up about 27% of the total population) be peacefully ended and a new legitimate order established? The triumphant military government, which believed itself to be in possession of a historic mandate, was now being pressured by the USA and EU states to hold 'free and fair' elections, which was considered a precondition for the granting of international reconstruction aid. The government found itself in a delicate situation that is without a *democracy-compatible* way out: if it actually ensured that the regional and parliamentary elections were held freely and fairly, it would certainly not be able to achieve a majority of its own to form a government, as two ethnic-regional power blocs (*Amhars* and *Oromo*), based on centuries of experience, would be in opposition to it (Oromo accounting for about 35% of the total population). So, in order to not be cut off from much-needed development aid from abroad in the West, the victorious TPLF had little choice but to formally hold elections—as demanded by foreign countries—and at the same time ensure that its militarily acquired power in the country would not slip away through the elections. This was the birth of *electoral authoritarianism* in Ethiopia—a violence-based form of regime that organizes elections without giving political rivals a fair chance. This type of rule has survived to this day, which was not possible without state violence, but without being able to unite the people of Ethiopia into a united nation.

So what was meant to happen, did happen: In 1992, the ruling party with its carefully selected regional offshoot parties and election candidates won the parliamentary elections through manipulation and unfair treatment of the opposition rival parties; however, they were not recognized as 'free and fair' by the international election observers of the United Nations, the donor states and the German government. While idealistic non-governmental organizations spoke of a 'missed opportunity' and denounced the new government as 'undemocratic', the governments of the international community went back to normal and granted generous financial and technical aid of 1.3 billion dollars for the year 1993 (Niggli 1992).

What happened here in *Ethiopia* in 1992 only illustrates the general dilemma of foreign interventions in societies with different cultures and different levels of development: How can one expect that in a multi-ethnic state with about 80 ethnic groups, the representatives of different ethnic groups, some of which had been at war with each other for centuries, would peacefully come together in a few months

or years to form a democratic constitutional order? It is worth recalling the insight from the theoretical discussion that "a minimum of democratic integrity and moderate conflict behaviour on the part of the civil elites, above all those in power" was necessary so that a "political culture compatible with democracy" could mature as a precondition for political democracy (Basedau 2003, p. 442 and p. 467). Shortly after the end of the civil war in 1989, these cultural preconditions were not in place; therefore, there could be no talk of a "missed opportunity" (Niggli 1992) for democracy. Traditional conflict patterns, world views and historical experiences alone do not determine the decisions of politicians, but they do make certain actor behaviour more likely, because it must be understood as *context-dependent* and as culturally embedded in social value relations.

Under the state party EPRDF, which is still in power today, a *federal* state with nine regions (and two cities with special status) was built which, however, was only apparently granted regional autonomy rights. In the 1990s, the establishment and stabilization of an *authoritarian* regime of an ethnic-political minority at the center of state power appeared to be without alternative, and not only from the perspective of the victors. However, what might appear justified in an initial political phase as a means of bringing about political stability could not be accepted as *political normality* in the long term. In the long run, two-thirds of the citizens (Oromo plus Amhars plus Somalis plus Sidama, etc.) cannot be excluded from power (Lefort 2016).[7] Indulging in this illusion should be seen as the structural flaw of the political regime under *Meles Zenawi* (Prime Minister from 1995–2012). Instead of building a participatory *democracy from below* through local elections by means of a serious *decentralization of* power and investment, the regime founded by Marxist ex-students, in which the *Tigrians* were and remained in charge, stiffened on repression, exclusion and a spiral of violence. Political elections were held regularly, but increasingly became a farce. Even under Meles Zenawi's successor—the civil engineer *Hailemariam Desallegn* -the regime, in the role of a *developmental state* (see Chap. 2), sought to gain a sufficient degree of *output legitimacy* through economic modernization. But the political legitimacy crisis continues to smolder. Since 2005, political protests—mostly following rigged elections and in the face of expropriation of peasant land—have been bludgeoned: hundreds have been murdered, thousands imprisoned. Since then, the number of refugees has increased; the

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[7] "This is the original sin of federalism 'Ethiopian style'", cit. in René Lefort: "The 'Ethiopian Spring'": "Killing is not an answer to our grievances". https://www.opendemocracy.net/ren-lefort/ethiopian-spring-killing-is-not-answer-to-our-grievances. Heruntergeladen am October 2, 2016.

number of Ethiopians living in diasporas in the US and in European countries of refuge has exceeded four million (see also Uhlig et al. 2017).

Since 2015, the country has once again found itself in a crisis of legitimacy with an uncertain outcome. In the *Oromo* and *Amhar* areas, there have been months of demonstrations and uprisings against the government, led by spokespersons for a new middle class and by young people with a good education but without prospects and frustrated by the obvious failure of the state. In October 2016, the government declared a state of emergency following street clashes, looting, factory fires and attacks against foreigners. Hundreds of citizens were killed and thousands imprisoned in the rebelling cities, while more than five million people in villages in the southeastern parts of the country faced drought and famine. A representative of the demonstrators commented on the uprising with the sentence: "*Killing is not an answer to our grievances*" (Lefort 2016, p. 5).

The youth, including the academic youth, suffered and still suffer from a lack of professional prospects. Thanks to an expansive education policy of the regime, Ethiopia now has about 700,000 students in the country's 20 universities and 13.6 million internet users. In 2012, there were "about 35,000 graduates who had completed their studies with a bachelor's degree, but only 5% of them could be employed in their country" (Asserate 2016, p. 32). Who is surprised that migration to Europe appears to them as an attractive alternative to a life at home?

9.8   Balance: Elections and Political Parties

Taking stock after 25 years of party activities reveals a picture of an increasingly virulent scene of power competition: there have been some successes, several failures, or even setbacks, but mobilized groups ready for conflict emerged almost everywhere to fight for political reforms and against dictatorial presidential regimes (Vorrath 2013; Cheeseman 2015; Becher 2016; Smidt 2017; Heyl & Leininger 2016). Balancing generalizations are hardly possible, but the following *normative-institutional innovations* affect a majority of countries that have embarked on the path to democracy:

- First, today in the twenty-first century, political *legitimacy* to govern is associated with the ethical *norm of 'free and fair' elections* within the framework of a democratic constitution (Engel et al. 1994; Becher 2016);
- Second, the old democratic ideal of *limiting the power of rulers over time* has been reflected in the widely enshrined constitutional norm (based on the US

model) that an elected president may be re-elected only *once*. As a rule, although the incumbent tries to sneak a third term through an illegal constitutional amendment, he increasingly encounters a *wave of civil society protests* demanding respect for the constitution (Tagou 2006; Grauvogel and Heyl 2017);

- Third, the opening up of political competition associated with democratisation also gives ethnic-cultural, religious or social *minorities*, who have hitherto been unable to make their voices heard, the political space to articulate their interests, although this also increases the chances of encountering *violent* resistance from other campaigners. Is this the price of broader social participation? (Collier 2009; Smidt 2017).
- Fourth, presidential and parliamentary elections often promoted the trend of highlighting national identity features in order to weaken political rivals of 'foreign' origin. The politics of *exclusion of 'strangers'*—especially in multi-ethnic cities—constructed or instrumentalized cultural differences, which not infrequently led to xenophobic outbreaks of violence and ethnic expulsions in the context of a *politics of belonging* (Chabal 2009, pp. 57–64);
- Fifth, the *institutional heritage of previous regimes* (Bratton and van de Walle 1997) plays a distinctive role in the formation of the party landscape. Political parties are always strongly related to a *big man*, which can then collapse like houses of cards in the event of his fall (Riedl 2014);
- Sixth, in presidential elections, in view of the mostly non-existent public *campaign financing*, there is a trend for parties to depend for survival on financial donations from a few rich businessmen, who then of course have not always had a beneficial influence on the nomination of candidates (Basedau et al. 2007, p. 281).

Tasks

1. Discuss the different postcolonial development paths of the six countries presented here *Somalia, Zimbabwe, Rwanda* on the one hand, *Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana* on the other! What explains the difference between state collaps here, democratic development there?
2. Describe the conflicting groups (according to the SKOG model) that have been involved in the crucial turning points in Benin's political life since 1989.
3. What are the "limits of democratization"? Can authoritarian regimes also bring economic progress and peace to a society—like *Ethiopia's?*

Population Growth, Poverty, Hunger

This chapter is based on the question: Is there a causal relationship between *development progress and population growth*? What role does hunger play as an expression of food scarcity, food insecurity and malnutrition? Is the frequently expressed thesis that development is the best contraceptive accurate? (see also e.g. Sen 2000, p. 257). Development politicians and aid workers ask with concern: What is the sense and use of the development aid policy of the industrialised countries if any progress in production is cancelled out by disproportionately high population growth? This is because the *surplus* generated, which is only consumed for the simple reproduction of the growing society, can no longer be productively invested, which, however, must be regarded as a central prerequisite of any development (Hein 1998; Schrader et al. 2001; Szirmai 2005; Barret et al. 2008).

In 2011, the European Union declared that food security is a human right. It would be guaranteed "if all people at all times had physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food" that would meet their nutritional needs and dietary habits "with a view to leading an active and healthy life" (European Parliament, cited in Brüntrup 2015, p. 6). In the spirit of optimism at the turn of the millennium, heads of state and government adopted a *Millennium Declaration* and eight *Millennium Development Goals* in 2000 with a time horizon of 2015, by which time the number of hungry people in the world was to be halved. Successes were achieved—especially in China—but the global goal was missed; a sustainable breakthrough has not yet been achieved. The gap between rich and poor widened further; and at least *795 million* people in the world still went hungry in 2016. As a continuation of the *Millennium Development Goals,* the United Nations announced the *Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in* 2015. According to these, hunger in the world should be completely overcome by 2030, which for Africa would mean that a quarter of the total population or 220 million, who were still counted as

hungry in 2015 (FAO statistics 2015), would or would be freed from the poverty trap within a few years. How realistic is such a programme?

10.1   Population Growth and Theory of Demographic Transition

The life we people of the twenty-first century lead is considerably different from the life our ancestors led in the nineteenth century, and in many ways it has changed for the better. There is a fairly objective measure of this that few people would deny: the longer lifespan and extended life expectancy of humans at birth. If life is recognized as an asset worth protecting, then longer life is more valuable than shorter life, especially since survival conditions have widely improved thanks to advances in medicine, health care, and popular education. The quality of life has also improved for many people in the world's temperate climates. While global life expectancy averaged 58 years in 1970, a person born today lives to an average of 71 years. Even in poor African countries such as *Mali, Niger and Senegal,* life expectancy has risen from less than 40 years to more than 55 years in the same period; and only half as many babies die in their first year of life today compared to the death rate of babies in 1970 (Deutsche Stiftung Weltbevölkerung 2014, retrieved from the internet on March 2, 2015).

As far as Africa is concerned, in the course of the twentieth century (1900 to 2000) the population increased about sevenfold. The fertility rate of African women, with an average of 3–4 children, is still higher than that of Asian or European women, so that in countries such as *Niger* or *Uganda* half the population is younger than 15 years. As a result, the so–called *dependency ratio* is also high: it measures the proportion of the young population belonging to age groups that do not (yet) contribute to the economically productive activities of society. Changes in these structures take a long time; because "demographic development is a sluggish steamer, because it is predetermined for decades on the basis of the current age structure" (Berlin Institute for Population and Development: Africa's Demographic Challenge 2011, p. 4).

During the first three post-colonial decades, *food production* in sub-Saharan Africa increased by a meager 1.6% per capita per year, but the population grew by 3.1% annually during the same period, indicating *precarious food security.* On this issue, experts distinguish four aspects: availability, access, utilization and stability (sustainability). As far as the deficit in food availability is concerned, a central cause of this misery is the *low agricultural productivity* in sub-Saharan Africa: at the

beginning of the twenty-first century, 1 ha of arable land yielded about 700 kilos of grain annually, and each farmer could cultivate 1 ha on average. This was less than a farmer in the Roman Empire (who could harvest about 1 ton of grain on 3 ha) and less than a farmer in the European Middle Ages, who could produce two and a half tons of grain annually on 4 ha. In the United States in the middle of the twentieth century, an acre of land yielded 2 tons of grain, and each farmer could cultivate an average of 25 acres by means of his machinery, yielding 50 tons of grain per farm. "In few areas is inequality as glaring as in agriculture, our source of food," commented Argentine publicist Martín Caparrós (2015, p. 64).

The formula that *the rich get richer and the poor have children* (which was coined as a reflection of social conditions in the course of industrialisation and urbanisation in Europe) does not apply to Africa. What 'rich' means depends on the cultural values of a society. In Africa, it is often considered 'rich' to have a large number of offspring, and materially well-off men and women are generally proud of having a large number of children, because this is perceived and valued as a visible expression of the woman's fertility and the man's virility. In orthodox Muslim families, the myth of Muhammad as a potent husband, who married eleven more women after the death of his first wife Khadijah, may also play a role. But there is also a practical reason for the ideal of high family fertility in pre-modern social milieus: where there is no state provision for old age (pensions), children function in the perception of their parents as guarantors of their *own security in old age*. The greater the number of children the greater the chance that one of the children will later earn a sufficiently high income to be able to provide for the parents. Today, however, a distinction must be made between the role of children in the city and their role in the countryside, when the family lives off the cultivation of the land: On the farm, each healthy child functions as a real or potentially employable *labor force*, needed in weeding and harvesting the fields and thus contributing to the family's household income. In the city dwelling, on the other hand, where the family usually lives on the narrow income of the father or mother, a large number of children is more of a *pecuniary burden*: the more young mouths to feed, the lower the consumption level and savings rate of the family. If the breadwinner becomes unemployed, the domestic situation becomes precarious and the slide into old-age poverty and destitution can hardly be stopped. It is not uncommon for children to end up in the proverbial gutter in a state of neglect—for example as members of a youth gang, or they are sold into prostitution out of necessity.

The English clergyman and author *Thomas R. Malthus* (1766–1834) played a central role in the debate about the world's 'population explosion', which remains relevant today. In his 1776 bestseller *The Wealth of Nations,* the influential economist *Adam Smith* (1723–1790) had criticized traditional barriers to a free market

economy such as crafts, guilds and royal trade monopolies. He propagated the benefits of a social order that left economic agents free to follow their self-interest. The more this would happen, the more likely and the more sustainable the *invisible hand of the market* could promote the common good of society. *Malthus*, on the other hand, was pessimistic, suggesting that the rapid population growth of the modernizing society was bound to lead to the pauperization of the lower classes as a consequence of economic growth. In 1798 he had published the *Essay on the Principle of Population*, which became known in German as the Malthusian Law of Population. In it, he attempted to prove that, so far in world history, population would have increased in a geometric series (1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, etc.) (~~what~~ we now call it *exponential* growth), while at the same time food production would have increased only at the rate of an "arithmetic series" (1,2,3,4, etc.) (*linear* growth). This would inevitably create a gap between food demand and food supply, which would inevitably cause famine and eventually rebellion and war. Therefore, *Malthus* preached—virtually as a prescription against the coming catastrophe— sexual abstinence and birth restriction. However, *Malthus* himself considered this desirable change in the population's mentality to be unrealistic because, according to his 'population law', any improvement in the supply of food would again stimulate further population growth (Nuscheler 2010, p. 269 f.).

The centuries-old Malthus concern has not lost its explosive force for Africa to this day, as the *Club of Rome* has not been tired of pointing it out. The natural and social scientists commissioned by it confirmed in easily understandable publications the fatal interaction of population growth, resource consumption, environmental destruction, and growing poverty, which all international efforts to provide development aid for poor countries could do little to change. According to this thesis, humanity is in danger of exceeding the *natural limits* of healthy, sustainable growth, which would then pose a serious threat to human survival as long as "exponential growth" is not prevented in all areas of human activity: "The population, the production of food and industrial goods, the consumption of raw materials and the burden on the environment have been growing ceaselessly on earth [since the Industrial Revolution]" (Meadows et al. 1992). As a result of these processes of change, a *population-poverty trap* was diagnosed for Africa: 'Poverty creates population, and population creates poverty',—a statement that was directed towards a human and an ecological tragedy: 'The human tragedy: an agricultural achievement, a previously unimaginable increase in food production was nevertheless not enough to give hungry people more; it only kept more people alive hungry. And the ecological tragedy: greater food production came at the cost of great damage to the land. These now make it harder to increase crop yields further in the future. More hungry people and larger deserts: these are the consequences of the poverty trap

over two decades" (Meadows 1992, pp. 65–66). As a caveat, it should be noted that strong population growth also increases the number of available workers, which can also be an advantage, namely if the increased amount of labor contributes to economic growth. However, this empirical value from the history of industrialisation in Europe and Asia only applies if the 'surplus' labour force in the countryside can be used in the simultaneously expanding industries (Szirmai 2005, p. 307 f., Nuscheler 2010, p. 269, Fukuyama 2015, p. 464f)—which is usually not the case in Africa. Today, only one in five people who (have to) leave agriculture in SSA finds a job in industry or another sector of the formal economy (Scherrer 2018).

Today, demographers favour the theory of *demographic transition,* which is able to depict the relationship between population growth and the increasing prosperity of society in the course of *four phases.* According to demographic transition theory, the *first* phase of high birth rates and high death rates is followed by a *second* phase of declining mortality (as a result of improved health care) with continued high birth rates. In this phase, high population growth occurs as a result of excess births—while mortality rates remain constant. In the following *third* phase, the birth rate falls more sharply than the death rate (as a result of the higher standard of living and the change in couples' attitudes to fertility and careers), so that the birth surplus declines steadily. In the *fourth and final* stage, birth rate and death rate have again converged,—but this time at a low level, so that there will be little population growth (or even negative growth) (in the absence of migration). This four-stage model is only a rough approximation ~~of~~ to the real development of European societies and can hardly be generalised, because numerous variables and social peculiarities (appreciation of women's work, of childbearing and career patterns; the respective state of technical and scientific development, etc.) must be regarded as culture-dependent.

Let us note: Although the pessimistic Malthus theory can claim some plausibility, it must be rejected as the 'iron law' of human development. It can rightly be argued that artificial fertilizers, the use of machines in the context of the 'Green Revolution' or the artificial production of food from the sea (by means of fish farms) could increase the supply of food enormously, quite independently of population growth. The Swiss journalist *Jean Ziegler* said: "A child who dies of hunger is murdered", with which he wanted to emphasize his conviction that a world without hunger is possible; because the planet could feed 12 billion people with today's production methods (Ziegler, in: Caparros 2015, p. 12). In fact, the growing demand for meat and fish among the world's wealthy is reflected in an alarmingly rapid expansion of fields for animal feed such as maize and soya (at the expense of primeval forests, the 'lungs of the earth'), as well as in the (often illegal) fishing

expeditions of EU countries in front of the coasts of Africa. We are heading inexorably towards a global shortage of the raw materials we need to produce our food (Hirn 2009). If food becomes even more expensive, it will also become increasingly difficult for international organisations to provide sufficient *food aid to* the world's hungry regions (Clay and Stokke 2000; Caparros 2015).

10.2   Niger: A Muslim Country in the Poverty-Population Trap

Using the example of the landlocked West African state of Niger—the main transit country for refugees from West Africa towards Europe—the connection between population growth, poverty and migration will be examined in more detail. High population growth regularly leads to food crises; overuse of soils and erosion of fields and pastures constantly endanger agricultural production. Only 15% of the country is currently arable (Seitz 2014). The Muslim-majority country has the fastest-growing population in the world: in 2017, it was home to 20.7 million inhabitants, three million of whom were children under the age of five. Hundreds of thousands of them die each year, much of it is from malnutrition (Caparros 2015, p. 81). The GNI per capita is US$370, and it is also the country where France exploits one of the largest uranium deposits in the world. Uranium is the coveted raw material for France's nuclear power plants and nuclear missiles, the *force de frappe*. In this desperately poor country of the *Sahel* (which comprises eleven states, from Mauritania in the west to Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia in the east), hunger is pretty much ever-present. *Sahel* is Arabic and means "coast"—coast of the great Sahara desert. Hunger becomes brutal when the period begins which the French call *soudure*, the Anglo-Saxons *hunger gap*. These are the months from June onwards, "when the previous crop is exhausted and the next struggles with difficulty out of the barren soil. Then governments ask for help or not, international organizations warn of the danger and send their aid or not, millions of people have food or not" (Caparros 2015, p. 17). The biggest problem—says Argentine publicist *Martín Caparrós*—is *malnutrition*, even when there is enough millet porridge. Worldwide, about two billion people suffer from it. Even when the poor do eat, they usually do not consume enough nutrient-rich foods—such as meat, eggs, fish, milk, fruits and vegetables. Anemia due to iron deficiency is therefore a common consequence.

On the one hand, Africa is associated with the loss of millions of people through the transatlantic slave trade, but on the other hand it is also associated with 'abundance of children' and 'overpopulation'. In evolutionary terms, Africans are

'frontier pioneers', that is, particularly robust extended family groups "who opened up a particularly inhospitable region of the world to the human species as a whole. This is their most important contribution to human history. Therefore, they deserve admiration, support, and careful scholarly attention" (Iliffe 2000, p. 9). However, the colonial political penetration of Africa by Western missionaries, medical doctors, military officers, and colonial officials altered the fragile balance that had developed over centuries between the numbers of people and their ability to feed themselves in and from the land: The control of endemic tropical diseases by means of modern medicine (vaccinations) caused birth rates to rise and death rates to fall, *without a parallel increase* in the yield of land and livestock systems. Improving the food security of the African rural population was not an issue of concern for European colonial administrations.

The complexity of the causal relationships of the living conditions in one of the poorest countries in Africa can be seen in the following report by former German Ambassador *Volker Seitz*; he wrote about *Niger* as "the country on the brink":

> Nowhere in the world is the population growing as fast as in Niger. The population has increased sixfold since independence in 1960—to almost 20 million. Each woman has an average of 7.6 children. The population is growing by 3.9 percent a year, a global record. This inevitably leads to poverty and hunger. In the UNDP's ranking of human development, the country is in last place. But as long as the population continues to grow at this rapid pace, there will be no improvement. To this end, the country is living on a time bomb, and it is called unemployment. The high birth rates are not accompanied by job creation, and this, along with the lack of education, is a breeding ground for radicalization and extremism. Many people have little chance of earning a regular income. Years ago when I was working in Niger, at least half the people in the capital Niamey were not in any particular occupation, had no steady work. They were hired out as day laborers, trading something or guarding something. Nothing has changed . . . Niger has the highest illiteracy rate in the world. There, about 80 percent of men and women over the age of 15 can neither read nor write. According to Elke Erlecke, the head of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation's West Africa Regional Political Dialogue Program, there are "70 percent illiterates in parliament in Niger." The education situation in Niger is very worrying. Educational efforts cannot keep up with the rapid population growth. Teachers are often miserably trained and poorly paid. While the president elected since 2011 is trying to do more than before, education quality and adult literacy are not yet getting enough attention. However, it is also important for the long-term success of literacy campaigns that they are accompanied by measures to improve reproductive health and family planning" (Volker Seitz 31.03. 2016: www/achgut.com/article/a_country_on_the_kipp_report_aus_niger).

Martín Caparrós has pointed out another aspect of the hunger problem - cultural taboos. This would include, for example, the *Islamic* rule neither to eat nor to drink

from sunrise to sunset in the month of Ramadan. *Martin Caparrós* from *Madaoua* in Niger wrote from his own experience:

> Twelve hours a day without food, at forty degrees in the shade, without a drop of water. I know of no more brutal expression of the power of a leader, a god, a dictator: look how I make you do the utmost, that which is against nature. Look how I force you: believe, obey me, submit to my law, no matter how arbitrary it is … But as with any power relationship, this is a barter: fasting is giving something to a cherished god—giving up something you care about—in order to get something in return. By sacrificing pleasure and satisfaction, by renouncing, we pay for something that is important to us: the well-being of a loved one, a bountiful harvest, a victorious battle, the guarantee of food, the salvation of a soul (Caparros 2015, pp. 93–94).

Just as President *Bourghiba* of Tunisia once decreed that hard-working people could be exempted from observing the fasting rule so as not to endanger their health and performance, exemptions could be created elsewhere: With the support of mosques, responsible politicians in drought-prone countries could decree special regulations to protect the health of at-risk groups, especially families with malnourished children and young people.

Where should international development aid start in this country with a very poor population, 98% of which is Muslim? Should investment be made first in *education* or first in better *health care* to reduce the number of miscarriages and lower fertility rates? Or should the government of President *Mahamadou Issoufou*, elected to office in 2011 and re-elected in 2016 with 92.5% of the vote (in the second round), give top priority to the *security issue?* For years, the region around the town of *Diffa* has been considered a retreat for the *Boko Haram* terrorist organization, which has driven hundreds of thousands of residents here to flee. The terror exacerbated the humanitarian crisis in the remote border region, which is home to some 150,000 refugees from Nigeria. The Niger city of *Agadez* is one of the busiest transit cities for refugees on their way from West Africa to Europe via Libya and at the same time a stronghold of people smugglers and traffickers—a hotspot of social and political conflicts and a classic 'social space of limited statehood' where numerous *non-state actors* go about their business. How are 'development' and the fight against the causes of flight supposed to get off the ground here? Moreover, Niger, like neighbouring Mali, has for decades had military and political conflicts with the *Tuareg,* who demand more self-determination and a share in national wealth, especially the revenues from lucrative uranium mining (see Chap. 12). There are more pressing questions here than convincing answers. The Indian economist *Amartya Sen*, however, claims in his studies to have found a solution to the poverty problem. Let us examine his claim.

New perspectives on the connection between population growth and overall social development were made possible by the studies of the Indian economist and philosopher *Amartya Sen* (born in 1933), who received the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1998 for his studies on the theory of economic development (welfare economics). His concern was to overcome the Malthusian pessimism regarding famines as a consequence of allegedly uncontrollable population growth (Sen 2000, pp. 249–250). He has identified the loss of *access rights* of poor people to resources essential for survival as the most important cause of famine, for which there would be two scenarios: people threatened by hunger or starving in precarious emergency situations are unable to buy food because their incomes have fallen, food prices have risen and/or other wage jobs are not available. Alternatively, the need arises because food is not available regionally (e.g. because of hoarding or export of goods), although food surpluses are available in other regions of the country and are offered at normal market prices. If one wanted to avoid famines (in Africa) in the future, one should, by way of "famine prevention", firstly diversify the economy in order to reduce the one-sided dependence on only a few foodstuffs (risk minimisation) and secondly create political incentives for the democratisation of society; for "in a functioning multi-party democracy" there would "never have been a famine" (Sen 2000, p. 217). He argued that "if there are no elections, no opposition parties, no space for uncensored public criticism, the rulers do not have to bear the political consequences of their inability to prevent famine" (Sen 2000, p. 220; see also Sen 2010: 347f). The great droughts and famine crises since the years 1970s and 1980s, Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, as well as in the countries of the Sahel zone are examples of "how bad everything can get when opposition parties and the news media cannot call the government to order" (Sen 2000, pp. 222–223).

Here, the structural causes of poverty in unproductive economies are underestimated; monocausal recipes—democracy promotion—do not do justice to the complexity of the permanent ecological crisis. Empirical experience speaks against the naïve belief that famines in the Sahel could be avoided by oppositional "calls for order" (on this see Calderisi 2006; Stockmann et al. 2010, p. 253 f.). Even people in democracies such as Mali, Benin, Ghana or Senegal often go hungry, for example if they live in remote or climatically fragile regions. How are political systems supposed to be able to legitimize themselves democratically in the long run when half of the population lives below the poverty line and has become dependent on international aid organizations (Seitz 2016)? The central argument of the US economist *Jeffrey Sachs* is also unconvincing, namely that the "capital gap" must first be closed by means of massively increased foreign aid in order to enable the poor countries to escape the "poverty trap" (Sachs 2005). The endemic *corruption* within the patrimonial state class—whether the president was democratically

elected or not—blocks any sustainable solution to the poverty problem by the means of money transfers from abroad. *Harouna Siduku*, a sociologist at the University of *Niamey*, the capital of Niger, lamented that "everyone knew that his country had to expect the regular recurrence of food crises, but neither the rulers nor the aid agencies had adjusted to this. There was neither a real agricultural policy nor investment in agricultural technology or in renewable energies or even in the training of agricultural engineers" (quoted from Seitz 2016).

10.3   Agrarian Modernization and Land Grabbing in Ethiopia

For centuries, Ethiopia has been an agricultural country marked by periodic droughts and famines. Of its population of over 100 million people, three-quarters live off agriculture. About seven million people receive food aid from international aid agencies on a more or less regular basis. Under Prime Minister *Meles Zenawi*, who transformed himself from a Marxist-Leninist inspired guerrilla fighter to a pragmatic modernizer during his long tenure (1991–2012), the Ethiopian people have once again experienced a turbulent period in their history. It has been marked by three things: First, *political stability* enforced by a martial *façade democracy* in the service of an ethnic minority; second, ambitious economic and development policies of an authoritarian *developmental state*; and third, a largely unsuccessful policy of *ethnic federalism* that formally granted autonomy to the nine ethnic provinces but without substantially granting democratic co-determination, resulting in latent destabilization by regional opposition groups. In the following, the analysis focuses on the question of the strategies pursued here to overcome hunger and food shortages.

During the past decades, Ethiopia has achieved relatively high rates of economic growth (between 7% and 11% annually). Public investments in the road system, electricity supply and markets have succeeded in integrating farmers from subsistence farming into the market and cash economy. According to UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development) statistics, *foreign direct investment* increased by 240% between 2012 and 2013 to $953 million, with Asian companies particularly active. In this context, low wages—around US $40 per month for farm workers—are among the material incentives for foreign businessmen. Even in the industrial sector (leather processing, textiles), monthly wages of around US$40 are paid, which is only a quarter of what must now be paid in China (according to Jean-Pierre Kapp, Addis Ababa: "Ethiopia's long march", in: NZZ, March 14, 2015).

"Paradoxically, it is Ethiopia's socialist past and the nationalization of all its land that has now allowed foreign capitalists to gain a foothold" (Pearce 2012, p. 23). The government's five-year plan envisaged that by 2015, three million ha could be offered for large-scale lease for mechanical farming.

At the same time, the country's *cereal production* had fallen short of the expectations of government development planners (Pearce 2012, p. 23). Apparently, the unsuitability of the main cereal *teff (Eragrostis tef, Eragrostis abyssinica)* as a staple food crop, which is grown on half of all planted land, played a role: It claims an extremely large amount of labor for weeding, but is one of the least productive cereals in the world; for *tef* yields only 0.5–1.2 tons per hectare, compared with wheat, which could yield about 1.7 tons on the same land. If the cultivation of *teff*—said an agricultural expert from *Welthungerhilfe (World Hunger Relief)*—which is used as the basis for the national staple dish *injera*, were replaced by the cultivation of, for example, potatoes, then hunger and malnutrition could be greatly reduced. But cultural resistance by farmers and consumers made the realization of a reasonable solution to the problem seem unpromising. Also, lack of available arable land and fragmentation of land ownership—on average, smallholders and tenants have no more than 0.5–1 ha of land available for cultivation (as a result of traditional inheritance division)—prevent higher crop yields and block the use of tractors (and thus the mechanization of agriculture). Finally, land tenure insecurity, lack of fertilizers and of irrigation facilities are also important causes in explaining the low yield of the Ethiopian peasant economy (Meier zu Biesen 2009).

The Ethiopian government has invested in powerful *dams*, but many small retention basins and canal systems in the countryside are missing. Moreover, the artificial irrigation of large-scale farms owned by foreign tenants is politically highly explosive: On the one hand, large-scale projects such as flower, vegetable or sugar cane farms are often irrigated in such a way that many local farmers in their vicinity lose their usual access to wells and natural water reservoirs because the groundwater level has dropped. After 9 years of construction, in October 2016, the government was able to commission Africa's third-highest dam (*Gilgel-Gibe-III*), with a height of 243 m, which—built with Chinese support—is expected to double national electricity generation. The damming of the *Blue Nile* on the border with Sudan—the *African Renaissance Dam*—is intended to provide irrigation for the Ethiopian highlands,—an ecologically risky mammoth project that has also led to ongoing protests from neighboring countries. Egypt and Sudan, in particular, rely on the waters of the Blue Nile, which rises in Ethiopia's Lake Tana. How an 'equitable' sharing of the Nile water between the eight riparian states of the Nile

could look like, is one of the great unresolved questions of fate of the continent (Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2006; Leiseder 2016).

One cannot reproach the Ethiopian government for not having vigorously tackled the diversification, modernization and industrialization of the country. The only question is whether the means and methods chosen were and are appropriate—appropriate for solving the acute problems of population growth and unemployment. Instead of allowing private-sector development along the lines of emerging Asian countries (privatization of land ownership and licensing of private credit and development banks), the *Meles* government relied on state-led modernization through foreign capital investment. In the lowlands (*Gambella*), for example, the state became active by removing traditional political, legal and physical obstacles to the rapid market-economy 'development' of these regions, which had hitherto been considered 'unsettled'. Between 1990 and 2008, some 3.5 million ha were reportedly re-leased in this way (Fana Gebresenbet 2016, p. 12). The beneficiaries were capital-intensive investors who, with the support of the state, which acted as a door-opener for private investors, triggered a forced structural change in agricultural production: subsistence farmers and herders were registered, controlled and often forcibly expropriated by the regional government in what Ethiopian researcher *Fana Gebresenbet* has described as a 'project of state restructuring based on an expropriation economy' (Fana Gebresenbet 2016, p. 28; see also Kress 2012; Pearce 2012).

In *Gambella*, in the south of the country, no less than 420 *land purchases* have been made in the period from 2003/4 to June 2014, covering approximately 545,000 ha. Twelve foreign investors participated in these land deals, including the Indian group *Karaturi Global* with 100,000 ha, *BHO BIO* with 27,000 ha, *Rucci* with 25,000 ha, *Saudi Star Agricultural Development* with 10,000 ha and *Bazen Agricultural Industry* with 10,000 ha (Fana Gebresenbet 2016, p. 13). The majority of tenants, however, are financially strong Ethiopians and mostly from Tigray, the home of the victorious liberation movement TPLF, which still sets the tone in government today. Requests for *land deals* by local people and members of Ethiopian diaspora communities have mostly been rejected by the regional government (which operates under the control of the central government). The profiteers were local members of the politically influential and wealthier classes, who here engaged in the original sense of the *accumulation of capital* through the politico-legal separation of producers (peasants) from their means of production (land and water),—after the manner in which Karl Marx had described the capitalization of early modern England. Would there have been an alternative to this in contemporary Ethiopia? In any case, the eviction of peasants from 'their' land (which legally belongs to the state) is a very high price to pay for *socially unsustainable* land use

and agrarian modernisation: for even if more food were produced and then offered as commodities on local markets, uprooted rural dwellers without jobs and secure incomes would have no purchasing power to buy it (Rauch et al. 2016, p. 8).

As it can be seen from the problem analysis, *monocausal* explanations for Ethiopia's status as a permanent recipient of international food aid would also be out of place here. Since the times of the monarchy, all governments have tried in different ways to enable parts of the Ethiopian population to lead a better life by means of *land reforms.* The central problem of *food insecurity* could not be solved, not least because violent political measures from above (forced resettlement, collectivization; *land grabbing* methods) were always applied, always treating the actual cultivators of the land as a means to an end. Creative potentials of the peasants were not activated, on the contrary: land was allocated to them for use mostly by local cooperatives, and these not infrequently used their power of distribution for political purposes. Those who did not conform to the party ran the risk of losing their right to use the land. Through this arrangement, the state class has a tight grip on peasants, and this insecurity must be seen as a significant reason why peasants have no incentive to invest in the fertility of their fields. All governments have also stood idly by and watched *population growth*; what role the religious authorities in the country—the Orthodox Church, Islamic associations, traditional councils of elders—may have played in this is a legitimate question, but one that cannot be answered here (Smidt and Abraham 2007; Saleh et al. 2008).

From this difficult situation, a social geographer researching in Ethiopia—*Friedrich von Schönfeld*—drew the conclusion that the governments of the rich countries—despite all developmental scruples—should continue to maintain the aid payment of about $1 billion a year in disaster relief to Ethiopia. He justified his demand by warning, "What would we do if the 730,000 refugees in Ethiopia [who have crossed over from neighboring countries], along with some of the 18 million Ethiopians in need, were fleeing northward from hunger?" (von Schoenfeld 2016, p. 24).

10.4   Family Planning: A Developmental Imperative

The number of children in the world is still growing faster than the number of trained midwives, kindergarten teachers, doctors, teachers and industrial entrepreneurs. This creates a growing discrepancy between the need for human subsistence and the available capacity to meet this urgent demand. This problem of relative overpopulation—relative in the light of global production and consumption

patterns—could be alleviated if *family planning* policies were not held back or thwarted by numerous religious, ideological, and nationalistic worriers in both developed and developing countries. This *alliance of ignoramuses* includes the Vatican, which demonizes abortion, as well as Muslim imams and mullahs, evangelical fundamentalists in the United States, some feminists in Europe or and several African presidents (such as Uganda's President *Yoweri Museveni,* who sees his nation's strong population growth as a sign of power and strength). For example, the political influence of lobbying Protestant evangelicals in the U.S. was enough to persuade the U.S. government under *George W. Bush to* block funding for the United Nations Population Fund. Together with the representatives of conservative Islamic countries such as Iran or Libya, these groups forged alliances that were as surprising as they were unholy, and which repeatedly prevented the issue of population growth from being raised at UN summits.

It is therefore worth recalling the French Enlightenment philosopher *Marquis de Condorcet* (1743–1794), who was one of the first to argue for the universal education of women, because he recognized "that women's voices are needed in public affairs as much as in family and social life." Unlike *Malthus*, he was convinced "that a better educated society, by means of social enlightenment, public discussion, and widespread female education, might considerably retard, perhaps even arrest or reverse, the growth of population" (Condorcet, quoted in Sen 2010, pp. 139–140). Today, more than 200 years later—modern population scientists affirm the importance of female education. "Anything that leads to smaller families is beneficial here, and the strategic pivot for developmentally appropriate family planning is investment in women's education. Since, in general, women desire fewer children than men do, the way to lower childbearing rates is primarily through empowering women through more education. In a study of 103 countries it could be demonstrated, that not a single country has developed socio-economically without a parallel decline in the birth rate" (Berliner Institut für Bevölkerung und Entwicklung 2011, p. 6). Therefore, the *Berlin Institute for Population and Development,* in cooperation with the *Stiftung Weltbevölkerung (World Population Foundation)*, recently asserted that family planning and the promotion of women are the best approach to break the Malthusian cycle, because birth rates are demonstrably falling,

- "if women are given more opportunities to have a say in the family and society, and when alternatives to the role of mother alone are opened up to them."
- if girls and women have unhindered access to sexuality education, family planning and contraceptives;

- "if girls and women obtain a better education". In particular, attending secondary school leads to "women having children later and being more active in family planning";
- "when new life perspectives arise, for example through a move from the country to the city, through better earning opportunities or through new family images transported by the media";
- when child mortality is reduced. "For couples are only willing to have fewer offspring if the chance of survival for each individual child increases" (Berlin Institute for Population and Development: Africa's Demographic Challenge, Berlin 2011, p. 6).

Tasks

1. How many different causes of hunger and misery in *Niger* and *Ethiopia* can you find in the text? Sort the causes found according to the typology: structurally, endogenously or exogenously caused.
2. Is the Malthus thesis still relevant for *Ethiopia* today?
3. What are seen as plausible ways to overcome poverty and underdevelopment in the two poverty–stricken countries (*Niger* and *Ethiopia*)?

Resource Wealth: Curse or Blessing?

11

11.1 The *Paradox of Plenty*: Countries in Possession of Coltan, Uranium, Iron, Bauxite

The effect of raw material deposits—as a curse or a blessing—depends on numerous contextual factors: (a) the nature of the (mineral) resources; (b) the geographical location of their deposits (on the surface or deep underground); (c) demand and prices on domestic and foreign consumer markets, etc. (see above Sect. 2.9). For centuries, Africa's wealth in *natural resources*—in gold, ivory, rubber, sisal, and coffee; but also in copper, phosphate, uranium, oil and natural gas—has been both a blessing and a curse. From an African perspective, the white man's greed for Africa's raw materials meant martyrdom until decolonization changed things in some places. From a global perspective, unfettered access to Africa's raw materials is one of the most important components of the national security policies of the industrialized countries (Burgis 2015), and the tussle over Africa's raw materials is still in full swing today, as will be demonstrated by the example of *coltan.* Like cobalt, *coltan* is an indispensable raw material for the high-tech industry. *Coltan* is a made-up word and stands for the mineral group *columbite-tantalite*, which consists of the elements *tantalum* and *niobium.* It is impossible to imagine modern electrical devices without the *tantalum* extracted from coltan ore; it is used for capacitors in mobile phones, laptops, game consoles, digital cameras and flat screens. Around 80% of the world's known coltan reserves are located in the Central African rainforest (according to Dennin 2013, pp. 199–200). An ongoing international competition has broken out between globally active commodity corporations for access to this rare metal, with Chinese companies being very successful. At the beginning of the noughties of the twenty-first century, the price of coltan per tonne increased fivefold from US\$ 80 to over US\$ 400.

The fact that *coltan mining* leads to social and ecological damage is known to all parties involved, but is carelessly accepted by the politically responsible authorities in DR Congo as well as by the international mining companies. Mining in DR Congo (formerly Zaire) follows a pattern that has remained the same over the years: In the jungle areas in the east of the Congo, small groups dig the coveted metal by hand—on average, one worker can extract about one kilogram from the earth every day. For a handful of US dollars, the metal reaches the provincial towns of *Goma* and *Kisangani* via countless middlemen or is captured by the child soldiers of the *Maji-Maji* [ethnic militias notorious for their cruelty]. From here, the coltan ore is transported by truck via *Rwanda* to *Dar es Salaam/Tanzania*, from where the cargo is shipped all over the world. "The working conditions here are conceivably bad. Violence, child labour and forced labour are the order of the day. Because micro-mining nevertheless earns more money than agriculture many people abandon their fields and food shortages are the result" (Dennin 2013, p. 201). The main beneficiaries of the illegal coltan trade in the war zone of eastern Congo are the governments of *Rwanda* and *Uganda*. According to a 2001 UN report by panel experts, the *Rwandan Patriotic Army of Paul Kagame*'s government allegedly smuggled 30 tons of coltan worth US$.250 million out of Congo every month for 18 months in 1999 and 2000. This involved 27 companies trading in the highly coveted metal in Congo—in defiance of all UN sanctions. In November 1998, foreign mining companies had the Congolese SOMINKI company (*Kivu Mining and Industrial Company,* an association of nine local mining companies) transport about 1000 tons of coltan from *Kivu* to *Kigali*, the capital of Rwanda. From *Kigali,* the cargo was transported to Amsterdam, Germany and Southeast Asia (*UN Report, Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of National Resources of the Congo, April 2001, paragraph 130, cited in:* French 2010, p. 488). In 2006, *Rwanda* exported US$ ten million worth of coltan. Like *Paul Kagame* in Rwanda, *Yoweri Museveni*, President of Uganda, was involved in the criminal coltan trade. Members of his family are said to have owned shares in some mining companies in Congo (*2001 UN report, paragraph 205,* cited in: French 2010, p. 488). In addition to the predominant local mining, the Swiss commodity trading company *Glencore* is pursuing the plan to become the world's largest producer of coltan through its subsidiary *Katanga Mining*.

Uranium is also one of the African commodities for which global demand is rising. In 2011, 440 nuclear power plants were in operation in over 30 countries worldwide, together generating just under 15% of the world's electricity. This statistic did not include about 250 research reactors and about 200 nuclear-powered ships and submarines. At the same time, 60 new nuclear reactors were under construction worldwide, half of them in China. Already in 2011, 20% of the

uranium consumed mainly in the US, China, Russia and in Europe came from African mines. *Namibia, Niger, Malawi* and *South Africa* have been the main producing countries; these four countries produced ca. 10,000 tons of uranium, ranking second behind Kazakhstan and ahead of Canada and Australia. The *Rössing mine* in *Namibia* (near *Swakopmund*) is the third largest uranium mine in the world, producing between 3000 and 4000 tons. However, water consumption is already so significant that there have been protests by the local population. The *Rössing* mine consumes as much water per month as the capital *Windhoek* with over 300,000 inhabitants (according to Dennin 2013, pp. 135–144), and water is one of the scarcest commodities on the continent.

New *uranium mines* are being advanced in *Tanzania, CAR and Zambia. Niger* has been supplying uranium to French nuclear power plants for over 40 years. French state-owned *Areva,* in collaboration with the *Niamey* government, plans to establish the country's largest mining project at the *Imouraren deposit* (located south of Arlit and Akokan); it is expected to supply 5000 tons of uranium annually for 35 years. Chinese companies are pursuing similar goals: annual production is to be doubled to 5000 tons by 2020. The Canadian industry leader *Cameco* is also involved in the project. The Nigerien state has not been particularly squeamish when it comes to granting mining licences: the *Tuareg* uprisings a few years ago, for example, stemmed from the fact that they were no longer able to use their traditional grazing areas due to the granting of uranium mining licences and had not been given a share of the profits from uranium mining (after Dennin 2013; Burgis 2015, pp. 164–193; see also Sect. 12.4).

For some years now, the People's Republic of China has been investing increasingly in the mining of *iron ore*—in *South Africa, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, Gabon, Cameroon* and the *DR Congo.* West Africa is said to have the potential to produce over 400 million tons of iron ore per year, "which would be equivalent to a quarter of current global demand" (Dennin 2013, p. 162; Burgis 2015, p. 178). The small West African nation of *Sierra Leone* (71,740 km^2), with its population of 7.4 million and an average annual income of US$490 (2016), is also rich in mineral resources, but ironically its natural wealth has not brought happiness to its people. Under the leadership of its President, *Siaka Stevens* (1968–1985), corruption and ethnic conflict had increased to the point where the country could be systematically plundered by rogue companies. Government officials were also able to enrich themselves from the state-controlled diamond mines. Today, the country is slowly recovering from the aftermath of a 10-year civil war (1992–2002) that gained sad notoriety for the atrocities committed by its rebels. President *Ernest Bai Koroma* (elected in 2007 and re-elected in 2012) now hopes to boost the economy and society by developing new iron ore mines. The London-listed *African Minerals*

group and the Chinese steel producer *Shandong Iron & Steel* are investing billions in plans to gradually increase iron ore production in Sierra Leone from around 15 million tons today to over 80 million tons, making it the largest exporter of iron ore in West Africa once and for all (Dennin 2013, p. 168).

Guinea—a coastal country with a population of 12.4 million (2016) and a modest gross national income per capita of US$ 490 annually—is also among the most resource-rich countries on the African continent. It is the world's largest exporter of *bauxite*, the raw material used for the production of aluminium. Deposits of bauxite are estimated at over ten billion tons, representing more than one-third of the world's reserves. In addition, significant uranium and iron ore deposits have recently been discovered. In September 2011, the government under President *Alpha Condé* (elected in 2010 and re-elected in 2015) passed a new mining law that stipulates that the state should receive a 15%–20% share of all mining projects and that domestic companies should be given preferential treatment when mining rights are awarded.

For generations, *Liberia*—a small, poor country with a population of 4.6 million and a GNP of US$ 370 (2016) per capita—has been one of Africa's suppliers of raw materials. It had already gained its independence in 1847, when freed slaves from the USA settled here on the West African coast. Until 1980, Liberians were ruled by a conservative party (*True Whig Party*); then, however, the military overthrew President *William R. Tolbert Jr.,* known for corruption and greed, which drove the country into a disastrous civil war (with over 200,000 dead). It was not until 2005 that regular democratic elections could be held for the first time, from which the experienced ex-minister and banker *Ellen Johnson Sirleaf* would emerge victorious. In 2011, the popular president was re-elected, and in the same year she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her reconciliation work. Since then, her government has endeavoured to extract the abundant iron ores (at Mount Nimba) with the help of foreign investors. Liberia's raw materials economy thus underwent its first welcome diversification, since the country had become an informal colony of the US companies *Firestone* and *Goodrich,* which had established extensive rubber plantations here since the beginning of the twentieth century. *Firestone* had already opened the world's largest rubber plantation in *Harbel* in 1926, after a lease agreement for one million hectares of land (at a price of US$ 0.06 per hectare for 99 years) had been concluded. *Firestone* was able to renew its lease with the Liberian transitional government in 2005 for a period of 37 years at a rent of US$ 0.50 per hectare (after Dennin 2013, pp. 238–239). But the vast majority of the population remained poor or emigrated abroad. Nearly one-third (31%) of the gross domestic product today comes from remittances from Liberians living abroad (Der neue Fischer Weltalmanach 2018, p. 287).

11.2 Shadow Sides of the Boom of Raw Materials: Displacement of Food Production

The issue of the *curse or blessing of raw materials* will play an even greater role for Africa in the future than it has in the past (see Chap. 2), as no fewer than 12 countries are expected to join the group of oil and gas producing countries: six in East Africa (*Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Malawi and Mauritius*) and six in West Africa (*Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal and Sierra Leone)* (after Mosbacher 2016, p. 294), with oil production already underway in some countries. Thus, within a decade, a third of African states or even more could derive the lion's share of their export revenues from oil and gas sales, which would darken rather than brighten the prospects for sustainable broad-based development, should the practice that has prevailed in Africa to date continue (Mosbacher 2016, p. 294). *Resource-rich* countries have had lower economic growth than *resource-poor* countries—an apparent paradox that needs to be explored.

As is well known, during European colonialism African countries underwent an economic transformation: They changed from a state of economic self-sufficiency (subsistence economy) into a process of partial integration of African products into capitalist market and money circuits, with plantation economy and mining dominating as economic systems (see above Chaps. 4 and 5). By means of brutal violence against the 'natives', who were forced to pay poll taxes and taxes on huts, this transformation from a subsistence to a market economy (called by the colonial rulers *'set-in-value'*) was enforced. The benefits of this trade policy were predominantly enjoyed by the Europeans in the colonial 'mother countries' (Szirmai 2005, pp. 278–288). The fact that today more than 60% of exports from sub-Saharan African countries still consist of unprocessed (low value-added) raw materials indicates that the developmental potential logically inherent in the export of desirable raw materials has not been exploited, or not sufficiently exploited, for generations to the benefit of the countries of origin. The pattern of the *colonial economic division of labour*—peripheral countries (colonies) supplying raw materials and centre nations (industrialised states) supplying finished industrial goods and modern services—has been able to survive for a long time.

The copper-exporting state of *Zambia* is a good example of this. The *Copperbelt* is the most important mining region in Central Africa and, along with the *Bushveld complex in* South Africa, the largest industrial area on the continent. The mining district extends over 800 km in length and 250 km in width from the centre of Zambia to the southeast of the DR Congo, to *Katanga*. In the early 1970s, *Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM)*, under the chairmanship of President *Kenneth*

Kaunda, had become the largest company in sub-Saharan Africa—through the nationalisation of foreign mining companies in return for compensation. Because the young nation lacked experienced professionals and managers of its own, Zambian mines quickly fell into insolvency. As part of the privatizations that soon became due, Australian mining company *Equinox Minerals* acquired some mines, later joined by Chinese and Canadian companies and Kazakhstan's largest mining conglomerate *Eurasian Natural Resources*, which also sought to capitalize on the copper boom of the noughties. The *copper prices* had quintupled from US$ 2000 per ton in 2000 to about US$ 10,000 per ton in 2011. As a result, *Zambia's* copper production, in tandem with that in neighbouring Zaire (*DR Congo*), rebounded, temporarily making Zambia one of the fastest growing commodity countries in the world. The world's largest commodity trader *Glencore* (based in Switzerland and with a turnover of 153 billion euros (2016)) played an active role in this, securing ownership of high-yield copper mines in *Zambia* and *Katanga*. In most cases, private *middlemen* with good personal contacts to presidents and his ministers (such as the Israeli Dan Gertler) played a dubious role (Burgis 2015). These deals have enabled billions in profits for Glencore and Co. but have failed to *diversify* the Zambian economy: Even after 50 years of independence, non-ferrous metals still account for 74% of the country's export earnings (2016), with the result that the mass of the population of a country very rich in natural resources has remained economically poor: 60% of the population now (in 2016) live below the poverty line. (See also Martin Vetterli https://www.beobachter.ch./economy/soil-scales-how-glencore-africa-extracts, July 16, 2012, retrieved January 11, 2018).

It is noteworthy that *resource-poor* countries in sub-Saharan Africa have grown by an average of 2%–3% over the past three decades more than the twelve largest oil-exporting countries, namely: *Angola, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Zaire), Republic of Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan and South Sudan* (Buchberger 2012). Aggressive tax avoidance by foreign corporations is one explanation. Moreover, in classic commodity-exporting countries (*rentier states*), the cultivation of food for the population's own supply is declining because a *rentseeking society* spends all its energies on optimizing rent incomes. High foreign exchange earnings undermine the need to diversify the economy, expand infrastructure or create jobs outside the commodity sector (see Sect. 2.9).

Even the plantation economy which is still dominated by foreign investors and marketing companies has not been able to resolve the *paradox of plenty* and provide a better life for the majority of the population of African agricultural states. While a few workers and employees found permanent employment with the large food corporations, local land managers were marginalized by the expansion of the

agricultural corporations or even lost their ancestral right to grow crops for their own use. For example, environmental organisations have accused the French *Michelin Group*, which maintains rubber plantations in *Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana and Benin,* of ignoring the rights of use of the 20,000 people living there when it expanded its rubber plantations (in Edo Province in south-west Nigeria) by 3500 ha of arable land. In total, around 300,000 ha of land are used for the cultivation of rubber in *Nigeria*—an area four times the size of Berlin. In *Côte d'Ivoire,* too*,* the agricultural area planted with rubber (from a production output of about 100,000 tons in 2000) has more than tripled—also at the expense of local subsistence farmers. Thus *Torsten Dennin* came to the conclusion: "Although rubber is an important source of foreign exchange earnings for the respective countries, it should be critically noted that natural plantations have to be cleared for these areas in favour of large monocultures and that these areas are also not available for the production of food" (Dennin 2013, p. 240).

The political effects of mega-investments by foreign agro-enterprises and commodity corporations on the respective African government, which concludes lease and trade agreements with them, are to be assessed as ambivalent. On the one hand, they *stabilise* the existing power relations (e.g. in Angola, DR Congo, Zimbabwe, Sudan) by providing the most powerful representatives of the national governments with high foreign exchange earnings from commodity exports as well as with due bribes (from 5% to 10% of the contract value), but on the other hand they can also *destabilise* the socio-political fabric of a country. The latter happens when the victims of transnational complicity feel provoked into resistance by foreign investors, kleptocratic governments and the globally active middlemen (who arrange and broker both legal and illegal financial and trade contracts, based on their knowledge of business networks). Probably the most blatant case of this kind to date occurred in *Madagascar*, where indecent leases led to the overthrow of a state government. In 2008, it was revealed that the South Korean company *Daewo Logistics* had signed leases with the state government of *Marc Ravalomana* (who had been elected to office in 2002) for 1.3 million hectares of land (over a period of 99 years), representing more than half of the island nation's fertile land. The directors of *Daewo Logistics* planned to grow corn and palm oil primarily for Korea's own consumption, which must have seemed like mockery in the eyes of a large number of needy people who depended on international food aid. Against this sell-out of national land in times of a hunger crisis, a political opposition was formed under *Andry Rajoelina*, who eventually overthrew the incumbent president after a brief but bloody power struggle and helped the protest movement to power. *Rajoelina* became the next president of the state (2009–2014), and one of his first acts in office was to cancel the scandalous lease agreement with the *Daewo*

Corporation, after which the latter withdrew from Madagascar (after Dennin 2013). But even after this event, the impoverished inhabitants of this island nation did not come to rest, as devastating climatic phenomena such as *El Nino* (in 2016) and *Cyclone Enawo* (in 2017) once again wreaked hunger crises and devastation on residential and crop areas, so that large parts of the island's inhabitants could only survive through international disaster and economic aid (Witt 2016).

Some governments of African commodity countries can be credited with the fact that, in their dubious deals with foreign companies, they are probably also pursuing the interest of deliberately bringing about a structural change in their politically and economically fragile countries through *foreign direct investment.* In the following, three further country examples—*Gabon, Nigeria* and *Botswana*—will be used to show how the myth of the 'curse of raw materials' could arise.

11.3   The Oil State of Gabon: An Example of a Neocolonial Rentier State

There is hardly a country in Africa today where export revenues from one or more commodities do not contribute substantially to the national budget. Since land is usually declared state property, the revenues from commodity exports accrue to those who embody state power that is the central bank and the ministry of finance if it is a democracy, and the president of the state if it is a patronage state, a 'defective democracy' or a dictatorship. In 2016, Gabon exported US$ 4.5 billion worth of oil, timber and manganese, mainly to the US, France and the PRC. That year, the small West African coastal state of two million inhabitants, 70% of whom are of Christian faith, achieved an average *per capita income* of a remarkable US$ 7210, or PPP-$ 16,720, making Gabon one of the richest countries on the continent—on a par with the 'flagship state' of *Botswana* (at PPP-$ 16,380). But a third of Gabon's population still lives below the poverty line (averaged over 2008–2015).

The '*paradox-of-plenty*' theme will be illustrated in the following using the example of the *oil state of Gabon.* The narrative is based on observations by the journalist *Thomas Scheen,* which he published as the Africa correspondent of the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on September 2, 2016 under the headline: "*Chaos in France's backyard. In oil-rich Gabon, the Bongo clique has ruled for almost 50 years. Now the opposition is resisting an election victory for the incumbent Ali Bongo Ondimba*":

In Gabon, after the announcement of the preliminary final results of the presidential election, serious riots broke out between supporters of the two leading candidates, Ali Bongo Ondimba and Jean Ping. According to initial information, two people were killed when the presidential guard stormed the opposition headquarters on Wednesday evening. Earlier, unknown persons had set fire to the parliament building in the capital Libreville. United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon urged both sides to show moderation on Thursday. The incumbent, Alo Bongo Ondimba, was declared the provisional winner on Wednesday evening by the National Election Commission by a razor-thin margin. According to official figures, he received 49.8 percent of the vote. His opponent Jean Ping achieved 48.23 percent. Ping had already announced in advance that he would not recognise the result due to alleged massive falsifications. The election observers of the European Union had reported numerous irregularities in the counting of votes and demanded that the results of all 2500 polling stations be published. This demand was echoed on Thursday by election observers from the African Union and the US State Department. Former colonial power France said it was 'very concerned' about the riots in Libreville and the second largest city, Port-Gentil.

Thomas Scheen goes on to say:

At first glance this outbreak of violence is surprising because Gabon, with its 1.7 million inhabitants, was long considered a haven of stability. The small country is comparatively prosperous thanks to its large oil reserves. At the same time, however, the term '**Francafrique**' applies to no other country so well as it does to Gabon. La Francafrique' is the wheeling and dealing between Paris and its former colonies in Africa, which gives political backing to black autocrats in exchange for lucrative contracts for French companies. From the point of view of the opposition in countries such as Côte d'Ivoire, Chad, Togo, Cameroon and Gabon, this patronage is the main reason why democratic reforms are treading water (see also Mbembe 2016).

For 42 years—from 1967 until his death in 2009—the father of the current president, Omar Bongo, ruled Gabon with the help of the French state oil company Elf Aquitaine. Because money was abundant, however, opposition figures in Gabon never had to fear for their lives. Bongo used to buy off his opponents. When Omar Bongo died in office in 2009, his son Ali Bongo Ondimba succeeded to the throne as a matter of course. The election results were probably rigged. But the protests did not turn out too briskly, if only because no one wanted to trade relative prosperity for civil-war-like conditions. At the time, no one suspected that a few years later the source of this prosperity, oil, would be the cause of the biggest crisis in the country's history. At the end of 2014, the price of a barrel of crude oil fell from almost 120 dollars to 45 dollars. The gross national product of Gabon, which is almost entirely dependent on crude oil, halved. In Port-Gentil, the country's economic center, oil companies and their suppliers took drastic austerity measures. The American company Halliburton stopped its engagement in Gabon completely. More than 4000 jobs were lost within a few months in Port-Gentil alone. At the same time, each permanent job in sub-Saharan Africa supports on average ten family members, which means that the 4000 lost jobs have become 40,000 affected people. That is almost half of the population of Port-Gentil.

Yet Ali Bongo Ondimba had long warned against dependence on oil and made serious efforts to diversify domestic industry. According to the World Bank, foreign investment beyond the oil industry has increased by 66% since he took office. But this is a drop in the ocean compared to the oil industry's tax payments. These foreign investments account for just 7.6% of Gabon's gross national product. The government under Bongo Ondimba has also reacted textbook-like to the layoffs in the oil industry by drastically increasing investment in infrastructure measures. Gabon is currently undergoing a real overhaul with taxpayers' money: bridges, roads, airports, a gas-fired power plant and a new refinery are intended to make up for the loss of jobs in the oil industry. The success is limited, however, because the change in economic policy of recent years has not been able to eradicate the mistakes of the past 50 years. The biggest of these is called 'fonction publique'. The administration is by far the largest employer in Gabon. Those who were not successful in the oil industry could still become civil servants. The civil service in Gabon has always served as a catch-all for unemployed school leavers, and is therefore grotesquely bloated and interminably slow. But since the collapse of oil revenue, there has been a hiring freeze in the civil service, which has angered many Gabonese, especially the youth. 60% of the Gabonese population is under 25. One in three of them is now unemployed. This has led to the paradoxical situation that, while Gabon is considered a middle-income country, one third of its population lives below the official poverty line of two dollars a day.

Jean Ping, Ali Bongo Ondimba's challenger in the presidential election, had promised to change all that. In doing so, Ping has taken advantage of the citizens' exasperation with the reign of the Bongos, which has now lasted 47 years, and with the Francafrique system associated with it. Yet the 73-year-old son of a Gabonese woman and a Chinese timber merchant has always been in the thick of it himself. Ping's first wife, with whom he has two children, is named Pascaline Bongo and is the daughter of Omar Bongo and the sister of the current president. Under Omar Bongo, Ping had [been] Minister of Planning, Environment and Tourism, then Minister of Mines, Energy and Crude Oil. This was followed by a stint as foreign minister (1998–2008) before Omar Bongo elevated him to the chair of the African Union (AU) Commission president. The supposed hopeful Ping is probably more like the old Bongo than his own son.

A spokesman for Bongo accused the opposition candidate on Thursday on the French foreign radio station RFI of having planned the unrest for a long time. Ping, on the other hand, said he feared for his freedom and physical integrity and was therefore in hiding. He called on the EU and France to intervene in his favour (Thomas Scheen, Chaos in France's Backyard, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 205, September 2, 2016, p. 5).

Gabon is thus a textbook example of the external vulnerability of a rent economy. As a result of crashing oil prices and related political turmoil in the country, the state's rentier income, and thus per capita income, declined from US$ 9956 (2014) to US$ 7741 in 2016. Parliamentary elections, scheduled for October 2016, were postponed until July 2017 on the grounds that the state budget lacked money (Der

neue Fischer-Weltalmanach 2018, p. 171). To overcome the country's dependence on one commodity, the government has engaged in negotiations with commodity corporations from China and other countries. For example, the Singapore-listed agro-corporation *Olam International* has signed a lease for 300,000 ha to grow palm oil—among other things for use as bio-fuel (Dennin 2013, p. 247).

11.4   Nigeria: The Turbulent History of an Oil State

> The trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership
> (Chinua Achebe, Nigerian Nobel laureate, quoted in Burgis 2015, p. 207).

Nigeria is considered the classic African example of the so-called *resource curse*, even more than *Angola* and *DR Congo/Zaire*,—the three resource giants of Africa. The unexpected, very large oil wealth has divided the population into a tiny minority of profiteers, who appropriate the resource rents through the occupation of state offices by all legal and illegal means (Alberts 2013, p. 228 f.), and into a majority that has become poorer on average over the course of five decades—poorer than at the end of the colonial era. What are the causes of this undesirable development?

11.4.1 Nigeria: A Difficult Country to Govern

With 923,768 km^2, Nigeria is one of Africa's large territorial states. At the beginning of the twentieth century, it was estimated that only 15–16 million people lived in the area that is now Nigeria—today there are more than ten times as many: 186 million (in 2016). The population is made up of some *430 ethnic groups* with different cultures and creeds. Nigeria's hallmark is its great ethnic plurality and cultural diversity. Since colonial times, the fate of the country has been determined by a rough tripartite division of territories and peoples, which were artificially and forcibly squeezed into a federal state: The *Hausa/Fulani* (about 21% of the total population) and other Hamitic ethnic groups such as the *Kanuri* and *Tuareg* dominate the north; the *Yoruba* (about 21%) dominate the southwest of the state; and the *Igbo* and *Ibibio* (together about 21%) dominate the southeast. The remaining 37% of Nigerians are made up of a variety of smaller ethnic groups in the *Middle Belt* (with *Bauchi* and *Jos* as central places) and in peripheral areas,

including the *Fulbe nomads*. The three major regions at the time of British colonial rule have since given rise to 36 federal states.

About 45–50% of Nigerians are of the Muslim faith, the majority of them Sunnis. They follow the orders of their feudalistic overlords, the *Emir of Kano* and the *Sultan of Sokoto*. Both are on the government payroll and their offices are constitutionally protected. The Emir of Kano (named *Lamido Sanusi*) is a former Wall Street banker who, as head of the central bank, subjected his agency to much-needed reform. The small group of Shiites combines its faith with political demands and aspire to an Iranian-style state of God. Annually there are murders and sometimes massacres in several states: Christians against Muslims, Muslims against Christians, often for seemingly trivial reasons. The conflicts are of an ethnic-political and socio-economic nature rather than of a religious nature, whereby the dividing lines between the causes of the conflicts are extremely blurred.

At independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria was a federation of three large states held together by a weak central government. It had an elite oriented towards England, a system of government, parties and trade unions that was largely indebted to the English model, and an economy that was largely controlled by foreign companies and banks (Schicho 2001, p. 82). But this system was a brainchild of those who wanted to get the necessary decolonization over with quickly: Given the history of the country, there could hardly be peaceful development. Above all, there was no agreement in sight on the *question of Nigeria's fate*: How could the state revenues from the production of oil, which had begun to gush forth abundantly in the east of the country since 1958, be *divided fairly and equitably* among the many regions of the country that did not have oil? Control of the oil fields became a "*key goal, propelling the country toward civil war*" (Meredith 2005, p. 202).

Today, the violent conflicts (with different causes) are concentrated firstly in the oil-rich *Niger Delta*, where the clashes of interests between ethnic groups, tribal militias, youth gangs and state administrative agencies constantly give rise to attacks and counterattacks (Traub-Merz and Yates 2004); second, to the Middle Belt (comprising Plateau, Benue, Gombe, Nasarawa, Taraba, and Kaduna states), where Christians and Muslims have their conflicts of interest over land ownership, leadership positions, and access to financial resources; and third, to the poverty-stricken northeastern part of the country (*Borno* State), which for years has been criminally neglected by politicians in socioeconomic terms. This is one cause of the emergence of one of Africa's most brutal terrorist organizations: the Islamist sect *Boko Haram* (Smith 2015; Sändig 2016). Its founder and leader was a penniless theology student. *Boko Haram* (meaning 'Western education is sin') gained world-wide attention with the abduction of the 270 schoolgirls of *Chibok* in 2014. *Chibok* has become a cipher for the incredible brutality with which this sect has destabilized

an entire region, as well as a cipher for the staggering incompetence of Nigerian security forces, who sought to cover up their failure to free the Chibok hostages. Yet Nigeria nominally has a force of about 90,000 soldiers, but they are ill-equipped and poorly motivated to obey their officers, whose venality is known nationwide (Sändig 2016, p. 34). From 2009 to the beginning of 2016, a total of 17,000 people are said to have fallen victim to the terror of *Boko Haram,* and there is no end in sight to this Islamist *jihad* against the Nigerian central state and against people of other faiths.

The following analysis will show that the 'curse of commodities' does not fall from heaven or rise from hell, but is fabricated by human beings. Once it has taken hold of a society, however, it seems to be very difficult to free oneself from it again.

11.4.2 Nigeria: Struggles Over Oil Rents

The country witnessed the first coup by army officers as early as 1966; ostensibly, the coup plotters aimed at ending the already rampant corruption in the state class. Thus, *Sir Ahmadu Bello*, the ruler (with the title of *Sardauna of Sokoto*) and also Premier of the Northern Government, as well as leading politicians in the Western Region (*Chief Akintola* and Premier *Tafawa Balewa*) were killed. However, the coup plotters soon failed and *General Ironsi*, an Igbo, took power, which in turn led to the expulsion and massacres of *Igbo* trading in the North. *Ironsi* provoked with a decree to abolish the federal constitution, which increased the fears of the people in the north of being excluded from the two southern ethnic groups (*Igbos and Yoruba*) in the distribution of state offices and state revenue. As a result, the military governor of the Eastern region, British-trained army officer Lieutenant Colonel *Emeka Ojukwu*, the son of a wealthy Ibo businessman, declared the independence of his region in May 1967 and named the new 'state' *Biafra*. He portrayed his country as 'a nation that would be threatened with genocide' and mobilised strong political and material support (including an airlift) in other Western countries through skilful propaganda, enabling him to continue his hopeless struggle for another year until surrender—at the expense of a starving desperate population. In January 1970, *Ojukwu* fled abroad, leaving behind a shambles: the majority of Nigerians preferred political unity for the country.

After the civil war over Biafra ended in 1969, oil production finally became the dominant factor of politics and economy in Nigeria (Bergstresser 2010, Duruji 2012, Ellis 2016). By 1974, the production of petroleum reached 112 million tons (compared to 20 million tons in 1966), making petroleum 90% of the national budget. The country benefited from the increase in oil prices that the cartel of

oil-producing countries (OPEC) was able to impose in October 1973: US$ 14.69 for a barrel of oil in November 1973 was almost seven times the price of November 1967. The *Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation,* founded in 1971, replaced the *marketing boards* dating from colonial times in financing the federal budget. As almost all industries were nationalized, Nigerian private capital was offered profitable investment opportunities, while corporate policy remained largely a matter of foreign capital. Corruption and mismanagement flourished under the *Gowon* military government, as they had earlier under the political parties, which had ~~since~~ been banned meanwhile.

> The *cement scandal* reached gigantic proportions in the 1970s: Because all the ministers (generals) wanted to collect an extra-legal commission (usually of 10% of the import value) when ordering cement abroad (especially the heads of the Ministry of Defense), they ordered oversized quantities, with the result that the country's ports were so clogged with ships fully loaded with cement that foreign trade collapsed in 1975. The cement was unusable after a few months of lay-up off the coast, and it took years "for the government to clear the financial and legal consequences" (Schicho 2001, p. 90).

During the same period that Nigeria experienced the so-called *curse of commodities*, there was *a* drastic change in agriculture, hitherto the backbone of the national economy: between 1964 and 1974, the volume of production of agricultural products declined by 40%, partly because increased purchasing power led to the replacement of local foodstuffs with imported foreign goods, which in turn led to a decline in investment in local agriculture (Schicho 2001, p. 89). At the end of the rule of the military presidents, the supply situation in Nigeria could hardly be described as anything other than miserable:[1]

> Despite an oil bonanza of US$ 280 billion, the economy was in total disrepair; public services were chronically decrepit; schools and hospitals were in a state of disrepair; higher education had virtually collapsed; roads were littered with potholes; the telephone system barely worked. There were frequent power outages; even failures in domestic supplies of kerosene. On average, Nigerians were poorer in 2000 than they had been at the beginning of the petroleum boom. Per capita income was less than

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[1]Military rule was exercised by: Yakubu Gowon (1966–1975), Murtalla Mohammed (1975–1976), Olusegun Obasanjo (1976–1979), Shehu Shagari (1979–1983), Muhammed Buhari (1983–1985), Ibrahim B. Babangida (1985–1993), Chief Ernest Shonekan (1993), General Sani Abacha (1993–1998), General Abdusalami Abubakar (1998–1999), Olusegun Obasanjo (1999–2007), Umaru Yar'Adua (2007–2010), Goodluck Jonathan (2010–2015), Muhammadu Buhari (since May 2015).

one-third of that in 1980; half the population lived on 30 cents a day; central institutions such as civil service gobbled up huge sums of money but barely functioned; embezzlement and graft were rife . . . Large sums had been spent on prestige projects. No less than US $8 billion had been spent on the construction of a steel mill complex at Ajaokuta without a ton of steel ever being produced. Billions of dollars had been sunk into the construction of an ultra-modern capital city, Abuja . . . Even more significant were the huge sums swallowed by corruption. **Abacha**'s greed exceeded that of all his predecessors. It has been estimated that he stole more than US$ 4 billion by taking the money directly from the central bank, or by cashing in on government contracts, or by fraud, for example, by illegally tapping the 'Petroleum Trust Fund' (Meredith 2005, pp. 580–581).

How can the resource wealth of a federal state with 36 individual states be 'fairly' distributed? Should all the states receive the same amount from the centre or should the producing states be favoured because of the ecological damage caused by oil production there? At present, distribution conflicts are mainly playing out in the *Niger Delta* region on the *Gulf of Guinea,* which covers a vast area of 70,000 km^2 and stretches 560 km along the Atlantic coast. It is home to some 20 million people living in 3000 communities, divided into more than 40 ethnic groups speaking 250 different dialects. And this region, of all places, which produces Nigeria's national wealth, has remained one of the poorest regions in Nigeria (Engel 2005, p. 192). With a large ethnic divide in society, there are always minorities who feel aggrieved and are then tempted to seek 'justice' through intimidation or even at the point of a gun. In these militant conflicts, young people without career or job prospects play an increasingly important role. In areas with weak statehood, violent organisations are taking the law into their own hands and forcibly taking what they believe is rightfully theirs from the oil economy. At the forefront for a time were the "*Bakassi Boys*" and the "*Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta*" *(MEND)*. The causes of the protests were a mixture of environmental pollution from oil wells and defective, illegally tapped oil pipelines, neglected infrastructure development, and misappropriation of funds by the respective regional administrations (Ellis 2016, pp. 137–156).

11.4.3 Nigeria: A 'Strategic Conflict Analysis'

With the help of the method of *strategic conflict analysis (SCA)* applied by the political scientist *Ulf Engel* (University of Leipzig), which is based on a concept developed by the *British Department for International Development (DfID)*, the highly complex resource conflict in Nigeria's Niger Delta will be traced in brief.

This approach combines insights into an actor's resources (material as well as cultural) with the nature of its strategies for action. *Two narratives* are followed: One is about violence as a consequence of oil wealth (*oil violence*), and the other narrative is about 'ethnic conflict'. Engel argues that a complex "culture of violent conflict" has emerged in Nigeria, which today encompasses political, economic, ethnic, cultural, geographical, ecological and military dimensions. Central causes, he argues, are: the military suppression of local protests by vigilantes against environmental degradation; the quest for autonomous resource control on the part of the affected oil-producing communities; the ethnic chauvinism of some peoples living in the Niger Delta; and the rivalry between larger and smaller ethnic groups in a region over the 'fair' distribution of compensation payments.

In *conflict mapping,* the first to stand out are the international oil companies: at the top is *British Shell,* which has been prospecting oil and gas in the Gulf of Guinea since the 1930s, followed by *Royal Dutch/Shell* with its production monopoly until 1965. In 1971, the *Nigerian National Petrol Corporation (NNPC)* was added, which has since awarded numerous other concessions to *Elf* (France), *AGIP (*Italy), *Chevron* (USA) and other interested parties. Since the 1970s, the U.S. has developed a "strategic partnership" with Nigeria with three main objectives: (1) reducing US dependence on oil from the insecure Middle East region; (2) militarily securing sources of supply by arming Nigeria and building up AFRICOM (Africa Command, under the Pentagon); (3) containing the influence of the PRC, which increased its trade volume with Nigeria from US\$ 2.3 billion in 2007 to "at least US\$ 7.5 billion in 2010" (Raphael and Stokes 2011, p. 912).

In *second* place in the conflict analysis are the Nigerian *federal and state authorities*, whose strategy is to maximise oil rents—at the expense of the local populations in the extraction areas, who form the *third* actor. The latter is primarily concerned about ecological damage and is fighting for damage limitation and compensation payments. And *fourth*, local organizations such as ethnic minorities, student secret societies, and youth gangs emerge as violent actors seeking a way out of a seemingly hopeless situation of their marginalization, not infrequently specializing in drug smuggling and oil theft (Ellis 2016, p. 150). The organized crime of oil thieves has reached such proportions that great material damage has been and continues to be done to the country and its corporations. For instance, *Shell Petroleum Development Company* announced in 2004 that it was losing 40,000 barrels of oil a day to theft; as its more than 1000 oil wells and 6200 km of oil pipelines in Nigeria were easy prey for local thieves. In the first 7 months of 2016, Shell lost 250,000 to 300,000 bpd (barrels per day), "which amounts to US\$ 3 billion at a price of US\$ 45 per barrel" (Africa Confidential, 23/9/2016, p. 3). The heaviest losses come as organized oil thieves have also learned to attack the subsea

pipelines of oil multinationals. Every day, "about 232,000 barrels of oil would disappear this way, costing the state $ 6.7 billion a year in lost revenue: 232,000 barrels of oil out of a daily production of about 2 million barrels" (Ellis 2016, p. 151), which means that more than a tenth of Shell's daily output is stolen.

The method of *conflict mapping* is also suitable for analysing the phenomenon of *oil violence* in more detail. In the Niger Delta, a peaceful demonstration took place in 1990 by the *Etche Local Government Authority* in *River State* (near Port Harcourt) protesting against the pollution of their land by oil companies. Concerned *Shell Petroleum Development Company* then called in para-military police forces to protect them, who shot dead some 80 unarmed protesters and destroyed 495 houses. Another ethnic protest movement against the ruinous oil business was launched in the same year by the small ethnic minority of the *Ogoni: the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP).* Their spokesman *Ken Saro-Wiwa* drafted an *Ogoni Bill of Rights,* also endorsed by local chiefs, demanding "a fair share of the oil wealth" created on their land. US$ 6 billion was expected as a participation gain and a further US$ 4 billion as compensation for severe ecological damage as a result of oil production (Engel 2005, pp. 196–197). As there was no adequate reaction from the politicians involved, the *Ogoni* and other ethnic groups such as the *Ijaw* now also turned to violent resistance, looting and kidnapping employees of the oil company. As a result, the military government under President *Sani Abacha* had civil rights activist *Ken Saro-Wiwa*, the charismatic leader of the Ogoni people, and eight of his co-accused arrested in November 1995 and murdered in prison despite worldwide protests. "The execution was followed by a global boycott of Nigeria. The Commonwealth and the EU froze their relations and development assistance respectively, but consideration for ongoing business soon allowed the discourse around the violation of human rights to become very translucent again: Shell was doing business and did not need a clean slate to do so" (Schicho 2001, p. 99). After all, *Shell*'s management preferred soon afterwards to stop the oil business in the troubled *Ogoni country* for the time being: the losses, which had also resulted from illegal tapping of the oil pipelines ('the bunkering'), hit the books; oil production was now shifted *off-shore*.

During a state visit by Buhari in March 2016, close cooperation in the fight against terrorism was agreed with US President *Barak Obama*, including US military instructors and support for a regional security concept involving neighbouring West African states. But as early as July 2016, several newly formed violent local militias again carried out explosive attacks on oil production facilities belonging to the *Chevron Corporation* and Nigerian oil companies; and in May 2017, *New Delta Avengers* announced a "petroleum war" (The New Fischer World Almanac 2018, p. 336). As a result of *Ulf Engel*'s strategic conflict analysis, it can

be noted that a "*public culture of violence*" has emerged in Nigeria's oil-producing areas, deeply rooted in the repertoires of collective options (*choices*) and of overcoming obstacles (*constraints*): Violence had "become a legitimate, i.e. successful, means of asserting interests for many actors" (Engel 2005, p. 214; see also de Oliveira 2006, p. 83). This also included "organized state crime" (Ellis 2016, p. 217).

When President *Goodluck Jonathan*, whose patronage state could be seen as the incarnation of *state failure in security matters, economic incompetence, and grand corruption*, was voted out of office in May 2015, he left behind a budget deficit of US\$ 15 billion (partly as a result of the 70% drop in world oil prices since mid-2014) and a politically destabilized northern region where *Boko Haram* could carry out almost daily assassinations, hostage-taking, and suicide attacks. *Jonathan*, a Niger Delta man, was succeeded by an opposition alliance called the *All Progressives Congress* led by *Muhammadu Buhari*—an ex-general and professed Muslim from the north. One of his first acts in office was to sack 93 ambassadors who were suspected of favouritism, as well as the head of the *Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation* (*NNPC*). *Buhari* accused his predecessor's government of misappropriating state assets worth about US\$ 150 billion. In November 2015, a commission of inquiry charged Jonathan's defence adviser, *Dasuki*, with allegedly embezzling US\$ 2 billion in the award of fictitious defence contracts. According to the commission, he also moved about US\$ 150 million to accounts in the US and the UK, among others, through payment orders to the central bank. Upon his arrest, *Dasuki* blamed the president for approving the criminal contracts (Der neue Fischer Weltalmanach 2017, pp. 330–332).

In the times of high oil prices, no financial reserves had been built up. When oil prices in the world market fluctuated sharply and then collapsed, spending cuts and price increases (for basic foodstuffs) were implemented, which mainly affected the poor strata of the people. Also, large loans were recklessly taken abroad, which pushed Nigeria further into the *debt spiral:* While in 2000 the debt had amounted to US\$ 24 billion, by 2015—despite multiple debt rescheduling with the help of the IMF and the World Bank—the debt had grown to a total of US\$ 69.6 billion (of the capital territory Abuja plus the 36 federal states; Bergstresser 2018).

It does not look like that *The Present Darkness* in Nigeria—to pick up *Stephen Ellis'* book title (Ellis 2016)—is coming to an end yet. The majority of the population of the state, which is so rich in natural resources, has remained poor; or, to be more precise, has been driven into *social poverty* by policy failures. At the same time, in terms of the provision of public services (health services, schools), major *social disparities* in the quality of life have developed between urban and rural areas: While 75% of Nigerians in urban areas have access to *clean drinking water*,

only 45% in rural areas do. While 60% of children in urban areas are able to attend *secondary school*, only 36% do so in rural areas. The country's social and regional inequality as a *major cause of political power struggles* is reflected today in the following income or poverty statistics, broken down by the *six geo-political zones*: the oil-rich *South-South zone* has the highest gross national product (GNP) per capita of US$ 3617, followed by the *North-West zone* with US$ 1899, the *North-Central zone* US$ 1320 and the *South-West zone* US$ 1309. In contrast, in the *North-East* (the zone of origin of the terrorist *Boko Haram sect*), GNP per capita is only US$ 343 and in the *South-East, it is* as low as US$ 292.2 (African Economic Outlook 2015, p. 184). Can such a fractured nation live together *peacefully*? Can one even speak of *one* nation?

11.5   Botswana: Resource Management Instead of the 'Resource Curse'

11.5.1 Democratic Continuity

The frequently cited, in this respect classic African example for the refutation of the thesis of the *resource curse*—which suggests a determinism operating in history—is Botswana, a landlocked country in southern Africa with today 2.3 million inhabitants. Only gaining independence in 1966, the colonial protectorate under British rule called *Bechuana Land* went from being one of the poorest countries in the world to having the highest per capita income in Africa since the 1970s: US$ 6510 in 2016 (or PPP$ 16,380). About 80% of Botswana's population lives in a narrow strip along its eastern border, with the rest consisting of desert and swamps. Four-fifths of the inhabitants are land cultivators ('farmers'). Ethnically, Botswana is relatively homogeneous: Apart from illegal immigrants from neighbouring countries (estimated at 20% of the current population), 80–90% of the population belong to the *Tswana* people, divided into eight ethnic sub-groups. There are also other Bantu groups, about 15,000 Europeans and 40,000–100,000 *San or Koe ('Bushmen')*. As far as the *structural* factors of development are concerned, this vast territory (582,000 km^2) is not one of those favoured by nature and geography. With an average rainfall of 416 mm per year, Botswana is considered the second driest country in southern Africa, after Namibia. Around 84% of the land area are made up of the sands of the *Kalahari Desert*. However, Botswana is rich—apart from coal—in *diamond deposits*, which were discovered in 1967 and have been providing about 70% of export revenues for years. Before that, cattle and meat

accounted for 78% of the country's total exports, most of which were transported to the neighbouring Republic of South Africa, with which Botswana had entered into a close customs and economic union as a junior partner. The owners of the herds were members of the upper classes (the chiefs and their entourage): about 4% of the population owned 30% of the cattle, and the whites (colonial Europeans) owned 20% of the stock.

In 1966, the British-influenced *protectorate of Bechuanaland/Botswana* gained its independence: The *Bechuanaland Democratic Party, BDP*, under the leadership of *Seretse Khama* had been able to mobilize the rural population and thus achieved 80% of the votes in the parliamentary elections, which according to the British constitutional model resulted in 28 seats in the 35-member parliament. By contrast, the more radical opposition *Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP)*, whose programme called for the political and economic disempowerment of the traditional upper classes, obtained only 14% of the vote (mainly in the cities). The election winner, *Seretse Khama,* was re-elected three times until his death in 1980, not least because of his patriotic sentiments and pragmatic economic policies. This political success pattern of *stable hegemony* by means of a democratically elected state party (with a simultaneous opposition that had almost no chance) has been repeated in all of the following eleven elections up to the present. The personality of *Seretse Khama* has been of great importance for the development of Botswana. Born in 1921, the son of a chief of an influential ethnic group (*Ngwato*), he married the Englishwoman Ruth Williams in 1951, what brought the heir to the *Ngwato* throne the loss of his office and a 5-year ban on residence in his homeland and thus exile in England. When he returned to *Bechuana land* with his wife and children in 1956, he became vice-chairman of the *Ngwato Tribal Advisory Council* and soon the leading figure in his country's national political liberation movement. In 1962, he founded the moderate *Bechuana Democratic Party (BDP)*, which represented the middle class that had emerged from the traditional upper class. His rejection of the apartheid government in South Africa secured him the support of the emerging new elite and the sympathies of the common people. *Seretse Khama* "combined traditional legitimacy and peasant support with modern education and lifestyle" (Schicho 1999, p. 129). His three successors in the office as head of state—*Sir Ketumile Masire* (1980–1998), *Festus Mogae* (1998–2008) and his son *Ian Khama* (since 2008, re-elected in 2014)—essentially continued the prudent pragmatic policies of the state's founder—in a word *good governance*. The country's courts continue to function effectively and are independent to this day; the press generally enjoys remarkable freedom (as long as the president is not criticized), and according to the German ex-ambassador *Volker Seitz*, Botswana is the only country in Africa where no political opponent has ever served time in prison (Seitz 2018, p. 231).

11.5.2 Botswana: A Model of Sustainable Development?

The highlight of Botswana's political diplomacy is the system of negotiations and contracts between the Botswana state, which formally claims the rights to all mineral resources, and the South African mining company *De Beers,* long owned by the *Oppenheimer* family, which acted as the world leader in the production and marketing of diamonds. As early as 1967, *De Beers* gave the Botswana state a 15% stake in the first diamond mine (*Orapa*), "which, including taxes and royalties, gave the state about 52% of gross profits in the early years. Then, in the mid-1970s, the partners agreed to increase the state's share of the company to 50%, which increased the state's share of profits to between 65% and 70%, without any harm to De Beers in this deal" (Schicho 1999, p. 131). A *joint venture* called *DEBSWANA (De Beers Botswana Mining Company)*, owned equally by both partners, now markets most of *De Beers*' diamond production,—a company that has since become a subsidiary of the global *Anglo-American group. De Beers* produced 27.9 million carats of diamonds worldwide in 2013, the lion's share of which came from Botswana's four diamond mines (20.2 million carats). This gave Africans access to the global company's management and supervisory board for the first time, allowing them to have a say in workers' wages and strike arbitration.

The peak of this profitable multi-national partnership occurred in 2012 when, at the urging of its Botswana partner, the group agreed to move its headquarters from London to *Gaborone* and to have the rough stones processed there. *De Beers* now has its entire supply of rough diamonds from around the world sorted and marketed in *Gaborone. The* exact distribution key of profits between *De Beers* and the Botswana state is treated as a state secret, but is estimated at 25:75 in favour of Botswana (Mokhawa 2005, p. 111). There is no doubt that Botswana's dependence on its mineral resources is very high, with approximately 83% of its total revenue coming from the export of diamonds (2015); but the state has escaped the 'resource curse', as can be seen from the fact that state imports (2016: US$ 6.1 billion) have never exceeded export revenues (2016: US$ 7.4 billion).

How can it be explained that Botswana seems to have escaped the *curse of raw materials*? Have Botswana's political leaders been able to realize their desired goal of *diamonds for development?* Undoubtedly, a favourable combination of endogenous and exogenous factors tipped the scales here, with arguably intelligent leadership, good governance and functioning constitutional institutions accounting for the exceptionalism of the Botswana case (Mogae 2010). Specifically, there were quite a number of correct macro-economic decisions taken by the *joint venture leadership*, including a number of adjustment measures involving the exchange rate, the level of

bank interest rates, public sector wages, and measures that kept inflation in check (Mokhawa 2005, p. 110). This has allowed government spending to increase by 11% or more annually since 1970 without incurring significant government debt (the debt service ratio was 1.7% in 2015). For military purposes, the state spent 2.7% of GDP, or US$ 514 million, with state revenues from commodity exports of US$ 7.4 billion (2016).

The profits from mining were invested: *firstly*, to develop infrastructure (education, health, transport, tourism); *secondly*, to create jobs and diversify the publicly supported economy; *thirdly*, in a credit system to develop social housing; and *fourthly*, to support various social programmes. For 2014, the social budget—paving the way for a *Botswana Poverty Eradication Strategy*—amounted to 2381 billion *pula* or about 300 million euros, benefiting 35,236 orphans and children in need, 34,845 beggars, 99,000 elderly and 1161 sick people receiving home care. In addition, 66,757 persons were engaged in labour-intensive special programmes (road construction), and 20,636 citizens benefited from other social assistance actions (figures for November 2014; Sebudubudu and Bodilenyane in Africa Yearbook 2015, Botswana, p. 6). Between 2002 and 2016, the *poverty rate* fell from 31% to 19%. However, the *Gini coefficient* as a measure of social inequality is 0.61—a relatively high (unfavourable) value. The government continues to pursue the goal of creating new jobs in the digital sector of the economy—which is not easy to achieve. This is because the relatively high social transfers from the state have given rise to a patronage network that has reduced the willingness to work in broad sections of the population. Another unresolved problem is the settlement with the *San/Basarwa* ("*bushmen*")—who were evicted from their traditional habitat reserves and resettled to make room for the construction of further diamond mines. The reserve inhabitants are now demanding large sums of compensation from the state.

On the positive side, the Botswana government stands out from other African governments in that it takes the *sustainability issue* seriously. Part of the national revenue from commodity sales is paid into a savings pot or future fund (based on the Norwegian model, which had accumulated about US$ 75 billion in 2016) to take into account the interests of later generations, the so-called *Pula Fund*. It was established in 1994 as a *Sovereign Wealth Fund* (SWF) accepting the *Santiago Principles*, which are the result of an international agreement on *General Accepted Principles and Practices for SWF*. It is estimated to have accumulated US$ 5.7 billion to date, with financial reserves invested in foreign currency (e.g. in VW shares) sometimes used for spending needs in the present, such as during the 2008 global financial crisis or to establish the *Public Officers Pension Fund* (Sebudubudu and Bodilenyane 2015). But on the whole, the impression is that the State Bank is

carefully managing the funds and holding them in trust for later generations to use after the end of the diamond bonanza.

Despite Botswana's continuing political stability and its high economic growth rates, the country is not yet 'out of the woods' if this is understood to mean the structural transformation to a sustainable and competitive development state. The problem remains that only about 5000 people found permanent work in the mining sector, representing only 5.6% of the number of all employees in private and parastate enterprises and companies (Motlhabane 2015, in Africa Yearbook, Botswana, p. 6). It is obviously due to factors such as training and motivation that only about 3000 diamond cutters have found permanent jobs in Botswana, while in *Surat,* India—a city in a country with no diamond deposits—there are nearly one million diamond cutters at work (Motlhabane 2015, p. 13).

There are observers who believe that *political corruption* could become part of Botswana's political culture (Good 1993; Schicho 1999, p. 134; Motlhabane 2015, p. 12). This is seen in the context of the paternalistic role of the state and its multitude of *parastatals* that have created their own utilities for all the needs of the societies, but without the competent personnel to do so (*Global Competitiveness Report* 2015/2016, cited in Motlhabane 2015, p. 15). How the 50% of the population that has come to enjoy a high standard of living today will be able to maintain it is a legitimate question, but one that cannot be answered conclusively today. The structural transformation to an industrializing country that would be effectively integrated into international value chains of *global players* (today a prerequisite for sustainable economic success beyond the commodity economy) is still very much in its infancy. This would require tackling the major challenge of structural diversification of the Botswana economy, in other words saying goodbye to the focus on diamond production (which will end in 20–30 years anyway due to depletion of deposits). What would be needed is the opening up of new avenues of manufacturing industrial products in a cosmopolitan business atmosphere, which still seems to be lacking in Botswana today. In the opinion of *Motlhanane, a* connoisseur of the country, private businessmen, pampered by the subsidising state, also lack an entrepreneurial spirit because they are more interested in doing business quickly than in expanding and modernising their companies in a way that is fit for the future (Motlhabane 2015, p. 16).

11.6   The International Fight Against 'Blood Diamonds'

Blood diamonds' are also smuggled from Botswana—albeit on a small scale compared to those from *Sierra Leone, Liberia* or the two *Congos. Blood diamonds'* are smuggled diamonds that have financed or are financing civil wars in Africa (*Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, DR Congo, Chad,* etc). Easily minable gemstones are stolen by rebel groups and *warlords* and smuggled out of the country by means of internationally active buyers, whereby the same prices are obtained as for legally traded diamonds. The proceeds from these illegal transactions can be used to buy new weapons and further destabilize countries politically—another variant of the "curse of raw materials" (Mokhawa 2005, p. 115 f.).

An international initiative has been formed against the fatal business in 'blood diamonds' by rebel groups and war-lords leading ethnic militias: In May 2000, representatives of both several diamond-producing countries and industry and civil society met in *Kimberley*, South Africa (the hometown of the *De Beers Group*), and initiated a series of conferences that became known as the *Kimberley Process.* In 2002, following agreement at the 29th Congress of the *World Diamond Organisation* in *Antwerp* and a further conference in *Interlaken,* Switzerland, an international regime of conduct was created, the *Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS).* The essence of the scheme is that only diamonds for which official certificates of origin from the respective country of origin are available may be traded. From mining to transport to the port or airport, a series of guarantees must now be provided regarding the authenticity of each mined quantity. Furthermore, only certified mine operators and traders with a special license are allowed to participate in this business. Developing countries can make use of technical assistance from the *World Diamond Council.* Control mechanisms were also agreed upon. After the UN General Assembly endorsed this initiative, the *Kimberley Process* came into force on September 1, 2003. More than 80 states (including all African and EU countries) have now signed up to it, but its effectiveness is controversial because of the latent danger of abuse (forged certificates, corruption). *Congo-Brazzaville* was the first country to be convicted of falsifying certificates and bringing smuggled diamonds from neighbouring states into the trade (Paes 2005, pp. 314–318).

The practice of the many *small and micro entrepreneurs* who mine easily extractable diamonds on their own initiative and using the simplest technologies in the Eastern Congo, in Zimbabwe, in the Ivory Coast, in Sierra Leone and elsewhere—under inhumane production conditions—remains unsettled. The 'blood diamonds' extracted in this way are then illegally brought onto the market

by dubious middlemen. These artisanal rough diamonds are said to account for 25% of world trade—and would thus be a business model that would provide a livelihood for many poor Africans. In principle, the *Diamond World Council*'s international regime to legalize a globally operating trade in a high-value and coveted commodity is positive, but it would make little sense to criminalize an industry on which so many poor families' incomes depend.

That is why the ten-member *Africa Progress Panel,* headed by the former UN Secretary-General *Kofi Annan,* made an alternative proposal in its *Africa Progress Report of* 2013: during the most recent decade, impressive economic growth had been achieved due to the strong demand for raw materials, but this had brought about comparatively "minor improvements" for the people, especially in the three areas of life "health, education and nutrition". So far, economic growth would have taken place without broad social development, although not only foreign mining companies were involved, but also about *eight million African artisans and small entrepreneurs* who, under early capitalist conditions, would extract raw materials such as gold in Mali and Tanzania, diamonds in Sierra Leone and Liberia, cobalt and coltan in Congo (Zaire). *Artisanal mining* was "one of Africa's fastest growing industries and a major source of employment". Therefore, new resource extraction policies would have to be developed in the future, which would have to effectively link the exploitation of raw materials *with the local economy* (Africa Progress Report 2013, p. 35). This is the only way to reduce poverty and achieve *inclusive growth*, which is understood to mean sustainable socio-economic growth for the benefit of the lower and middle classes.

Discussion

1. When can we speak of the 'curse of commodities'?
2. What were the social consequences of oil production in Nigeria's Niger Delta?
3. Why and how did Botswana escape the 'curse of commodities'?

War and Peace: Causes of War and Peace Efforts

12

12.1 Wars in Postcolonial Africa

War and peace, destruction and reconstruction are among the most important themes of African history and politics (Münkler 2002; Debiel 2003; Matthies 2005; Schäfer 2008; Falola and Njoku 2010; Ansorg 2013; Boas and Dunn 2017). Between 1952 and 2012, there have been 88 successful military coups in Africa, of which nearly two-thirds (63) occurred *before* 1990. After the establishment of the *African Union (AU)*, the legal successor of the weak OAU in 2002, there have been few military coups (Souaré 2014, p. 69; Tetzlaff 2015), probably because the AU's governing bodies now refused to recognize the coup plotters' actions as legitimate. The long-standing principle of *non-intervention* in internal affairs has been replaced by the principle of *non-indifference* to political grievances (Murithi 2009).

Political stability is not a value in itself, because what matters is what it is used for and whether the political succession issue can be settled constitutionally. *Cameroon* is a good example of the phenomenon of 'political stability without development and without sustainability'. For 32 years, the country has been oppressed by a kleptocrat (President *Paul Biya*) who has based his now sclerotic rule on the support of the military and the police, rigged elections and on the insidious repression of opposition and suppression of civil liberties. France and Germany alimented this regime (which is among the most corrupt in Africa) with a total of US$ 6.293 billion and US$330 million annually, respectively, from 1990 to 2008 (Africa Yearbook 2009; Nguébong-Ngatat 2017). Political turmoil is expected after the demise of the ailing dictator, who has blocked the career advancement of a generation of younger officials to this day. For the same reasons, *Côte d'Ivoire* slid into political chaos in 1993 after the demise of the 'father of the nation' *Felix*

Houphouet-Boigny, who had ruled the country authoritatively for 33 years with no succession in place—with military coups, much 'electoral violence' and a civil war that was 'due to politics of ethnic patronage, anti-immigrant populism and social exclusion' (Smidt 2017, p. 207).

In 2016, there had been 226 violent political conflicts in the world, including 18 wars and 20 'limited wars' (according to the *Conflict Barometer* released by the *Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research* (HIIK) on February 24, 2017). The term '*limited war*' is used to describe a violent conflict in which there is repeated and organized use of organized violence, while a '*war*' is about when there is continuous and systematic use of violence as well as sustained destruction. *Seven types of 'wars'* (and 'limited wars') can be identified for the period 1960–2017 (Nugent 2004, pp. 204–259; Matthies 2005; Zeleza 2008; Deegan 2009, pp. 148–197; Falola and Njoku 2010):

1. The *anti-colonial* war of national liberation (against a colonial power),
2. The *interstate* war (e.g. over border areas),
3. The *war of secession* (secession of a region from the federation or state),
4. The *anti-regime war*, also called '*internal war*' (against the incumbent government),
5. The *asymmetric* war, in which a subnational actor rebels against the state and relies on robbery and plunder, creating an economy of war,
6. The limited war of rival political ethno-parties ('*party wars*' for political hegemony),
7. The war of *Islamist* terrorists, which is about a fundamental new social order, not a misnamed religious war.

In the course of decolonization, African countries gained importance as allies in the Cold War, because the founding of the *United Nations* created a platform that was also important for Africans to articulate and bundle their own interests. Thus, the African liberation movements in *southern Africa* succeeded in obtaining support from the USSR and the People's Republic of China for their goals. This was not without problems, since in this way *local* conflicts—including those in the Horn of Africa, Namibia and the Portuguese colonies of Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau—grew into the so-called *proxy wars* of the global East-West conflict. Thus, the *Algerian War of Liberation* (1954–1962), the *Suez Canal Crisis* of 1956 (in Egypt), the *Congo Wars* (1960–1965), the *Biafra War* (1967–70) (in Nigeria), and the decades-long struggle against the South African *apartheid regime*—to mention only the most important regional conflicts with international involvement—made headlines in the world press (on Namibia, see Nujoma 2001,

pp. 251 f.; more generally on wars and insurgencies, see Boas and Dunn 2017). *Interstate wars*, meanwhile, have become rare; these include the Ethiopian-Eritrean War 1998–2000 (Matthies 2005) or the 'great war' in and around Zaire/DR Congo 1996–2002, involving eight neighbouring states (Prunier 2009).

In the *research on the causes of war*, there has long been a debate about whether wars and limited wars happen more because of the material hardship of the population (*poverty*) or more due to their oppression (*grievance*) or due to the greed of *war lords* and leaders of ethnic militias for power, prestige and quick wealth (*greed*) (Sahm et al. 2002; Tetzlaff and Jakobeit 2005, pp. 113–115; Matthies 2005; Collier 2009; Falola and Njoku 2010). *Paul Collier* and *Anke Hoeffler* have made an important contribution in this regard by pointing out the importance of *opportunities:* The weak internal security architecture of the state and the ease of effort to gain possession of valuable (easily looted) resources would provide an incentive for limited wars. The use of politicized violence against representatives of the state outside the major cities would thus correspond to a rational calculation (Collier and Hoeffler 2006; Lock 2002; see also Dennin 2013, p. 242).

Conflict researcher *Mary Kaldor* has described these new phenomena of politicized violence as *new wars*—"new" because it is not so much the technology of war that has changed, but rather the social basis of wars: "The new wars are 'globalized wars'. They are accompanied by the fragmentation and decentralization of the state" (Braml et al. 2010; Kaldor 2012, p. 10). In their comprehensive anthology on *War and Peace in Africa*, Nigerian editors *Toyin Falola* and *Raphael Chijioke Njoku* have noted that armed conflicts, rebellions, secessionist movements and civil strife that have been witnessed in Africa since the period of decolonization, can be understood as an expression of the masses, through which they wanted to express their disenchantment with both the former colonial state and the postcolonial state that followed it.

Not infrequently, (resolvable) *conflicts over the distribution* of power and resources escalate into *identity conflicts* (which can hardly be settled peacefully) over ethnicity and religion. This *escalation mechanism* was at the root of the 50-year war between the Arab-Islamic *northern Sudan* and the Christian-animist *South Sudan.* In the allocation of money and posts, the government of President *Gaafar Numeiri* (1969–1985) permanently discriminated against the South; and when Sharia laws were forcibly introduced (1983), the second civil war ensued, which eventually led to the secession of the South (2011) (Tetzlaff 1998; Rottenburg 2002; Thielke 2006; Cockett 2010; Mamdani 2011).

It cannot be ruled out that in the future there will be violent conflicts, perhaps even wars, over the most precious resource—*water*. River water is not only in Africa a "regional conflict material with global significance" (Barandat 1997).

Above all, the distribution conflict over *Nile water* has been coming to a head for years, mainly between Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia and South Sudan. At its core is the difficulty of finding an equitable distribution of the scarce resource among the 11 countries that share the Nile water. Of these countries, Eritrea, Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan, Burundi, Rwanda, DR Congo and Kenya are in the south and have *water surplus*, while Egypt, Sudan and parts of Ethiopia are in the north and (with the exception of Ethiopia where the Blue Nile originates) have acute *water shortages.* The Nile thus links the water-surplus area of the south and east (the Blue Nile feeds 90% of the White Nile) with Egypt and Sudan in the arid north, which itself has almost no water supply from rainfall (Mauser 2010, p. 77 f.). With Ethiopia intensively damming Blue Nile water on its territory in recent years, further exacerbating water scarcity in Egypt, Egyptian presidents have threatened the government in Addis Ababa to enforce their ancient rights to privileged water extraction militarily if necessary (Leiseder 2016). Population growth and climate change further exacerbate the problem of scarcity (Ibrahim and Ibrahim 2006; Welzer 2008).

Africa, too, has not been spared militant *religious* conflicts. Where does the ban on killing believers as enshrined in the Ten Commandments of the Bible and in some passages of the Koran ('Let there be no compulsion in religion'), still apply? The doctrinal edifices of religions manifestly have both a potential for escalating violence and a potential for social peace, sometimes actualizing one side, sometimes the other, depending on the specific historical contexts (Graf 2014). In 2014, there have been no less than 32 "violent conflicts" worldwide (Global Trends 2015, p. 41), with religious conflicts or *clashes of civilizations* (Huntington) playing a prominent role. In the politically unstable regions of the world, where state authority is increasingly decaying and societies are suffering from great poverty and a lack of prospects for young people, orgies of violence against 'unbelievers' ('religious wars'), i.e. collective acts of violence against others in the name of a 'uniquely valid' religious creed, are increasingly appearing today. In the process, they often serve only as an outlet for social frustration. In *Libya and Egypt, in Sudan and South Sudan, in Somalia and Nigeria,* and in more than eight states in Central and West Africa, believers fought each other, Muslims against Muslims, Muslims against Christians, Christians against Muslims, and jihadist groups in Central and North Africa (as offshoots of the globally effective Islamist terrorist organizations *Al-Qaeda* and "*IS*") against Africans who think differently (see the case studies in Boas and Dunn 2017; also Beumler 2017; Smidt 2017).

Violent resource conflicts (such as those in the *DR Congo and Sudan*) also lead to a *militarisation of* civil society: since the weak state cannot protect them—let alone a *kleptocracy*—from brutal male war violence, the self-defence of citizens

becomes a necessity for survival. Congo expert *David Van Reybrouck* concluded, "The ethnically motivated violence in *Ituri* was not an atavism, not a primitive reflex, but the logical consequence of land scarcity in a war economy that served globalization—and in that sense an omen of what is yet to come for an overpopulated planet. The Congo is not behind in history—it is ahead of history" (Van Reybrouck 2012, p. 554).

12.2   Women: Victims of War and Political Insecurity (Gender Research)

Gender has now become a term used to address and analyse gender relations in a social context (Luig 2001; Schäfer 2008; Verschuur et al. 2014). As women are mostly not legally equal to men, they also have very limited access to bank credit and land tenure rights (Boone 2014; FAO. Statistical Yearbook 2014–2016: Africa food and agriculture). Such kind of discrimination inhibits development because women (can) become prudent entrepreneurs if given the opportunity, as is known from research on the use of micro-credit. Women of the urban lower classes, who come from rural areas and have not had any education, are particularly exposed to violence and humiliation by men without protection. Many are left with only prostitution as a means of survival (Deegan 2009, p. 96). In addition, women are still prevented by cultural traditions from being able to determine the number of children they have. For example, it is estimated that only about 17% of African women have access to modern contraceptives. In most cases it is the husband who prevents his wives from participating in family planning projects.

As early as the colonial period, social power structures were justified by cultural patterns of justification, with *martial constructs of masculinity* reinforcing existing social and regional differences. Especially in the settler colonies, economic interventions (land expropriation, forced resettlement, plantation and migrant labour) brought about changes in gender and generational relations at the expense of women's roles. 'Black workers' on plantations and in mines were seen as immature and downgraded in social status as 'boys'. "These forms of de-masculinization resulted in serious changes in masculine self-images in African societies. It was not uncommon for black men to use domestic violence as an instrument of self-assurance in their domestic refuge of power" (Schäfer 2008, p. 506; on Namibia see O. Ruppel 2008).

In national liberation movements, women have played a leading role as fighters, porters, intelligence transmitters or logisticians. After the end of the fighting, they

were often forced back into old role patterns that were thought to have been overcome. Since they had no time or opportunity to further their education because of their active participation in the war (unlike their comrades in exile), they were usually left empty-handed when posts were later distributed. This was compounded by social ostracism as 'bush women' returned to their villages and neighbourhoods unmarried with one or more children. Although the post-colonial governments of *Mozambique, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia or Zimbabwe* have incorporated progressive women's rights into their constitutions, the *reality of life* for ex-combatants today is far removed from the proclaimed norms of equality. Old and new gender hierarchies have rapidly re-established themselves in private and public life. Nevertheless, the struggle for emancipation of former female guerrilla warriors has continued in isolated cases, after independence was achieved. The ethnologist *Rita Schäfer*, for example, could report on the post-colonial struggle for emancipation of once-colonized women:

> They had not only risked their lives in the guerrilla wars for political independence and the removal of the racist settler regimes. They also fought to overcome domestic violence, for greater equality in private and public life, for their own land rights, and for better educational and career prospects. For many black women and girls categorically rejected the limited housewife roles, coloured by Victorian images of women, which benevolent white farmers' wives and pious missionaries tried to impose on them in courses on woolen sock knitting and tablecloth crocheting, and which they wanted to impose with maternal authority. For the most part, they saw themselves—much like their own grandmothers and great-grandmothers—as agricultural producers and providers for their families. As such, they wanted to put their inherited agrarian-economic knowledge into practice and therefore they demanded the land back. Furthermore, they demanded more equality in all areas of life (Schäfer 2008, pp. 506).

In doing so, they brought to mind the buried practices of matrilineal societies that had abounded in pre-colonial Africa. Since women were the responsible land managers in agriculture and were also entrusted with the care and upbringing of the offspring, they also had a leading position in the regulation of community tasks. *Female chiefs* were not uncommon, as the Senegalese historian *Cheikh Anta Diop* (1923–1986) recounted. He demonstrated the continuing importance of *matriarchy* among the Berbers and other ethnic groups of Islamized North Africa (Diop 1959). He even believed to see in matriarchy the "nucleus around which all the common features [of African cultures] revolve and to which they go back" (Harding 1999, p. 201). The products of working women embodied the collective wealth of an agrarian society. According to historian *Marsha R. Robinson,* societies of matriarchy are said to have existed continuously for centuries, usually much more permanently than aggressively expansive society with patriarchal order of rule. It was only

under the influence of Western world views and colonial gender constructs (the father as head of the family with all property rights over the wife and children) that matriarchy was displaced and replaced as a hegemonic norm of order—much to the detriment of African peoples (Robinson 2010, p. 108 f.).

The *gender concept* also offers an analytical key to gaining a better understanding of the dynamics and consequences of *war in Africa. Mass rape* of women has become one of the most destructive acts of war because it destroys ethnic-cultural communities in the long run. In ravishing girls and women in front of their relatives, they in a sense ridicule the men of the enemy group as 'failures' because they were supposedly incapable of protecting the lives and honour of their women. This simultaneously represented a massive attack on a man's masculine sense of self. "Men were deprived of control over sexuality and fertility through public and ritually staged rapes. In some wars, where political ethnicity or aggressive nationalism were belligerents, the aim was also to attack women as guardians of ethnic unity, culture and nation" (Schäfer 2008, p. 510). The Swedish UN Special Envoy on Sexual Violence, *Margot Wallström*, reported that 70% of all rapes worldwide occurred in *eastern Congo*—that is 1000 rapes in a month. All warring factions had been involved in the atrocities during the great Central African war (since 1993): the ethnic militias, the Congolese army, the former fighters of the *Tutsi rebels, the Hutu militias* driven out of Rwanda, as well as blue-helmet soldiers of the United Nations. 700,000 people were accommodated as refugees in camps, where they could not be protected from rape even there (eyewitness accounts in Schaeffer 2012, p. 101 f.). What further distresses women in war zones is their experience that they cannot expect any protection from their respective government. Perpetrators are not reported by their superiors, and government representatives show no interest in putting a stop to serious human rights crimes against the civilian population—for fear that they might appear in a bad light abroad.

12.3   The African Union: A Pan-African Organisation in Transition

Keeping the peace and making peace are—according to its statutes—among the most noble tasks of the *African Union (AU)*, which was newly founded in 2001 and is itself an expression of the resurgent Pan-Africanism, the *African Renaissance*. The AU is the successor organisation to the *Organisation of African Unity (OAU)*, founded in 1963, which had campaigned for the liberation of all African colonies (especially in southern Africa). A special Liberation Committee of the OAU, based

in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, supported the struggling liberation movements in southern Africa. A central cause for the re-establishment of the Union was the political self-paralysis caused by the adherence to the principle of nation-state sovereignty of the states. With its weak, underfunded secretariat, the OAU acted on the principle of 'non-interference in the internal affairs' of its member states. This has now been replaced by the principle of *collective responsibility* of African states to solve African problems: '*No indifference*'. This has already been reflected in the deployment of AU-mandated *peacekeeping missions* to countries such as Burundi, Sudan, South Sudan, Chad and Mali. The Constitutive Act of the AU contains the important clause that "in the face of grave circumstances" interventions can (not must) be made in a member state, even against its will.

The AU is a regional organization within the meaning of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter; it forms the umbrella of various sub-regional organizations, the most important of which include *SADC (Southern African Development Community), ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)*, *IGAD (Inter-Governmental Authority on Development)* and *UMA (L' Union du Maghreb arabe) (The Arab Maghreb Union).* The founding fathers and mothers of the AU were guided by the institutional model of the European Union, although the institutional and political conditions in the two cultural areas were not comparable. At the top is the *Assembly of the Union*, which is the heads of state and government of the member states, with its seat in *Addis Ababa/Ethiopia.* They meet at least once a year, under an annually rotating presidency. There is also a *Pan-African Parliament,* based in Midrand/South Africa, composed of 265 representatives elected by the parliaments of the AU member states, which has only consultative functions. The implementation of political decisions of the heads of state and government is the responsibility of the politically important *African Union Commission* (*Commission*) based in Addis Ababa. The judiciary of the AU is the *African Court of Justice and Human Rights*, based in Arusha, Tanzania. Unlike the European Court of Human Rights, it does not provide for individual actions, but only allows member states to bring actions (Leininger 2012; Tetzlaff 2015).

The most important body of the new African *Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)* is the *Peace and Security Council (PSC).* Three representatives per subregion (East, West, Central, North and South Africa) are elected by the foreign ministers. Only those states that have contributed to recent peace missions, their financial contribution to the AU and the *Peace Fund* are eligible for selection (Debiel 2003). An *African Standby Force (ASF)* is on the rise for several years—a *peacekeeping force* with military, police and civilian contingents under the direct leadership of the AU. Five regional *standby brigade forces,* which are currently being established, are to be deployed by the continent's regional security

communities in crisis areas, thus gradually reducing the dependence on the former colonial powers of France, England and Portugal. Very little of these collective security plans has yet been fully realized.

In 2016, all of Africa's military spending amounted to US$ 37.9 billion, an increase of about 70% since 2006. North Africa accounted for US$ 18.7 billion and SSA for US$ 19.2 billion. Countries with the *highest growth rates* between 2006 and 2015 included: The Gambia (380%), R. Congo (287%), Ghana (227%), Libya 225%, Algeria (210%), Namibia (200%), Mali (185%) and Zimbabwe (184%) (SIPRI Fact Sheet: Military Expenditures 2015).

Regional economic integration has a tradition in large parts of the continent that goes back to colonial times.

> The Addis Ababa-based *UN Economic Commission for Africa (UN-ECA),* under the impression of the dominant developmental approaches of *self-reliance* and *South-South cooperation,* developed ambitious models to bring the continent, including the already existing *Regional Economic Communities (RECs)*, together in a common market. "First the *Lagos Plan of Action of* the OAU (1980) and later the *Abuja Treaty* (1991) represent the—to put it charitably—over-optimistic or, critically, unrealistic dreams of Pan-Africanists to unite Africa economically. These concepts also hardly ever got beyond a generally placative and descriptive stage. A developmental reorientation of regional integration did not take place—instead, the traditional *neo-classical five-stage model of* trade-inspired integration was also codified by African heads of state for continental economic unification: A first stage of *free trade area* (abolition of internal tariffs; strict application of the 'rule-of-origin' principle) is followed as a second step by the establishment of a *customs union* (single external tariff with an open internal market). The next stages of a *common market*, a *monetary union* and finally a *political union* are all based on the successful implementation of the customs union. For this model, the European integration process stood (and still stands) as a successful shining example. In the African context, however, the neo-classical approach quickly proved unsuitable: for one thing, African economies were (and still are) heavily geared to the export of raw materials and the import of capital and consumer goods, while hardly any regionally tradable goods and services are produced, so that the potential for intra-African trade (which today amounts to about 10%) remained manageably low. Secondly, the national elites, most of whom have only weak political legitimacy, fear nothing more than a loss of political control. They therefore continually undermine the obligations arising from regional agreements and treaties to hand over national competences (such as the levying of tariffs, bans on non-tariff trade barriers) to a regional, i.e. supra-national, authority outside their direct control (Peters 2010).

Parallel to the debate on the institutional revitalization of the OAU and its replacement by the more efficient AU, a group of 15 states sought a programmatic reorientation of African *development cooperation*. A "*New Partnership for Africa's Development*" (*NEPAD*) was to be launched. The group was led by the five political

heavyweights of the AU: namely, the presidents of South Africa (Thabo Mbeki), Nigeria (Olusegun Obasanjo), Algeria (Abdelasis Bouteflika), Egypt (Hosni Mubarak), and Senegal (Abdoulaye Wade). The overarching objective of NEPAD was "to create and promote an African-designed, African-led and African-shaped framework for accelerated and sustainable growth and development of the African continent." This was "achievable through significant improvement in the management of national resources and by increasing Africa's competitiveness in global markets. The promotion and maintenance of good economic and corporate governance, complemented by 'good political governance'", are "necessary components to achieve this goal" (UN ECA 2014: "Summary of NEPAD Action Plans"). The key point of the NEPAD programme, which was very close to the neoliberal objectives of the World Bank, was the creation of an *African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)*.

The *APRM* is a kind of self-audit of governance performance on a voluntary basis in order to escape humiliating criticism from international finance organizations such as the IMF, the World Bank and the EU Commission in the future (Grimm et al. 2009). The litmus test for the seriousness of the NEPAD architects came as early as 2002, when the newly formed AU, led by South African President *Tabor Mbeki,* refused to publicly criticize the ruinous policies of Zimbabwe's dictator, *Robert Mugabe*, whose corrupt governing apparatus made a mockery of all vows of '*good governnance*' and '*rule of law*'. Even thereafter, the practice of NEPAD policies led to disappointment; as of January 2011, only 30 African states had joined the APRM mechanism and only 14 governments had been willing to be audited (Leininger 2012, p. 77; Peters 2016 for more detail).

12.4   Mali: The Vicious Circle of Rebellion and Broken Promises of the State

In the following, the complexity of a national and international attempt at political stabilization of a *failing state* will be illustrated by the means of an important and current example. Since Mali is a *conflict of the century* that revolves around the peaceful coexistence of culturally heterogeneous peoples, only the *long-durée perspective* of conflict analysis offers a realistic impression of the difficulty of stabilizing the country through primarily *external* intervention powers.

Mali—the second largest state in the Sahel in terms of area (after Niger)—has, with interruptions, been in civil war since 2011. It has become a symbol of a

multiple conflict of interests involving local actors (above all various *Tuareg groups*), regional neighbours (such as Algeria, Niger, Libya and Nigeria) and multinational actors (ECOWAS, the African Union, the UN and the European Union), both militarily and politically (Hofbauer and Münch 2016; Beumler 2017). It gains particular severeness by the confrontation between *Islamist* organizations in the region, which in alliance with disaffected local *Tuareg clans* want to establish a Sharia-based separate state (called *Azawad*) by force, and a democratically elected government in the south of the country based in the capital Bamako, which is fighting for the territorial preservation of the state (Klute and Lecocq 2016).

Mali is a landlocked country with a population of 18 million (2016), of which just under half (48%) are under the age of 15. With a fertility rate of 6.1 (birth rate 43, death rate 10), Mali is one of the world's fastest increasing countries (along with Niger 7.6 and Chad 6.1). Gross national income per capita is US$ 790 or PPP-$ 2040, with 44% of the population living below the poverty line. 37% of the population belongs to the *Bambara* people, 14% are *Fulbe* (also called *Peul*), 9.5% *Senufo*, 9% *Soninké*, 8% *Dogon*, 7% *Songhai*, 7% *Malinké*, 3% *Diola*, 2% *Bobo* and *Oulé*, and only 2% (or 300,000 people) belong to one of the *Tuareg clans*. When Mali became independent in 1960, the *Tuareg clans* found themselves as citizens of a so-called nation-state, whose new masters treated them with contempt, since they belonged to peoples who had once performed slave services for the Tuareg.

In Mali, several attempts at *nation-building* have failed. The first Tuareg uprising in northern Mali against the elected government of *Modibo Keita* took place only 2 years after the country's independence in 1960. His ministries were dominated by groups that had lived in tension with the *Tuareg* since time immemorial and who now abused their political power to economically harass their inconvenient compatriots in the far north by means of high cattle taxes, while hardly anything was invested in the infrastructure of the north. The rebellion at *Gao* and *Timbuktu* was suppressed by brutal means, which included poisoning wells and aerial bombardment and public executions of leaders (Brüne 2014, p. 87). In political terms, post-colonial Mali underwent a similarly turbulent evolution as Ghana during its first three decades. The country's first freely elected president was *Modibo Keita* (1960–1968), who quickly became unpopular with the population through actions and plans to turn the country into a socialist state with nationalization of the means of production and trade. The socialist government had little sympathy for the nomadism of the *Tuareg* and their 'autonomous tribalism'. In 1968 it was ousted by a military coup; the new president was *Moussa Traoré* (1968–1991)—for the next 23 years! During his term of office, the great *Sahel droughts* (of the 1970s and

1980s) occurred, which caused 40–50% of the Tuareg and Moor livestock to perish. Numerous inhabitants of the north fled to the neighbouring countries of Libya and Algeria, where they found work or were recruited as soldiers.

When *Traoré's* experiment with socialism had led the country into a dead end—a decline in economic output and rising foreign debt—schoolchildren and students, trade unionists and civil society groups rebelled against the dictator. Thus, on March 26, 1991, *Moussa Traoré* was deposed and arrested by military officers. When he was overthrown, the president was credited with a fortune of 1000 billion CFA francs (20 billion French francs), of which only 2 billion could be unearthed when he was tried in 1998 (Jeune Afrique, September 22, 1998, p. 26, cited in: Schicho 2001, p. 281). The overthrow of the dictator was preceded in July 1990 by a renewed *Tuareg rebellion* because their demand to place their territories under self-government had remained unfulfilled. *Tuareg* groups attacked the Malian army, which led to the displacement of thousands of *Tuareg* to Mauritania, Algeria and Burkina Faso. Finally, a ceasefire agreement was once again reached between the state and the rebels in *Tamanrasset*, Algeria (1991). It provided for the withdrawal of Malian forces from some bases in the north and the adoption of a law granting autonomy for the provinces of *Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao.* Economic concessions were also promised: 47.3% of the money for the fourth national investment programme was to be allocated to the north (Kétouré 2009, p. 103). After President *Moussa Traoré was* overthrown 2 months later and the transitional government under Lieutenant Colonel *Amadou Toumani Touré* was installed, a *Pacte Nationale (National Pact)* was again negotiated with the four relevant *Tuareg* associations*,* which once again granted the northern regions a (vaguely defined) *special status.* It was also agreed that a limited number of *Tuareg* warriors should be integrated into the national army and that programmes for the reintegration of refugees should be implemented (after Brüne 2005, pp. 102–103).

The regime in Bamako enforced only a few of the agreements reached, so that the escalation mechanism of broken promises, resistance by the bruised and new treaties did not come to a halt. In March 1997, several rebel organizations vowed to disband and agreed to have their weapons symbolically burned in a reconciliation ceremony in *Timbuktu* attended by ECOWAS Chairman Jerry Rawlings, Ghana's president. What was to happen to the non-integratable combatants initially remained a matter of dispute, especially since the government put their number at around 1000, while the *Mouvement et Fronts unifiés de l'Azawad (Movement and Unified Fronts of Azawad) (MFUA)* spoke of 4000, and later even 7000, demobilized fighters (Brüne 2005, p. 103). UNDP and other international donor agencies funded economic integration projects for these ex-combatants,—for example, to the tune of some US\$ 10–12 million in 1997 (Kétouré 2009, p. 151). As the agreed integration

measures were implemented only slowly, a rebellion broke out again on May 23, 2006, after 10 years of peace efforts. The *Tuareg* soldiers, who had until then been integrated into the Malian army, deserted with weapons and vehicles, attacked military barracks of the government army in the northern cities of *Kidal, Ménaka and Tessaliten,* and finally fled to areas on the border with Algeria (after Kétouré 2009, p. 160).

With the Libyan crisis in 2011 and the fall of Gaddafi, social tensions also intensified in northern Mali: Frustrated Tuareg, warriors who had proven themselves in the use of modern weapons, returned home from Libya and formed the *National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA).* This was the first group to publicly call for the establishment of an independent state of *Azawad.* The social base of this group was the *Ifoghas tribe*, but their political secular goals did not represent the will of the majority of Tuareg (Beumler 2017, p. 102 f.). In order to drive Malian government forces out of the north, the MNLA formed an alliance of convenience with *AQIM, Ansar Dine* and *MUJAO*—three Islamist groups. No sooner had this achieved its goal in 2012 than the three Islamist groups turned against the MNLA. *AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)*, an Islamic resistance movement founded in Algeria that had moved to Mali as a result of the Algerian state's policy of repression against Islamists, now set the tone. Since then, it has pursued a strategy of *winning the hearts and minds* of the local population in northern Mali. AQIM warriors supported development projects and married into local *Tuareg* families to consolidate broad social networks, facilitated by the practice of polygamy. The *Tuareg* of the Kidal region did not see AQIM members as enemies (although they rejected their Salafist ideology), but "as brothers who help them with social services and invest money in development projects" (Beumler 2017, p. 86).

After MNLA fighters and Islamist rebels had conquered *Kidal, Timbuktu, Ménaka and Konna*, military officers, led by Captain *Amadou Haya Sanogo*, staged a coup in March 2012 against President *Touré*, who was accused of inaction in the fight against the rebels. The *African Union* then imposed sanctions on the coup regime, and *France*, *ECO WAS* and the *European Union* provided military assistance to Mali in the months that followed (until today). Mali was in danger of being split in two. In April 2012, the MNLA—secular-oriented Tuareg—proclaimed the independent state of *Azawad*, but it was not recognized internationally. *Timbuktu*, a traditional scholarly city with venerable libraries, tombs and mosques, was occupied and partially destroyed by Islamist rebels. The transitional government in Bamako asked ECOWAS for military assistance in September 2012, and the UN Security Council decided in December 2012 to send an international intervention force *AFISMA (African-led International Support Mission to Mali)* on the condition

that the government engage in a "credible dialogue" with the *Tuareg rebels*. French troops succeeded in halting the rebels' march on the capital Bamako. The West and the African Union now pressed for rapid new elections, and in August 2015 *Ibrahim Boubacar Keita* was elected president with 77.6% of the vote in the second round.

Financially, the new government was on the verge of national bankruptcy and was only kept reasonably afloat by IMF loans and donations from EU reconstruction aid (the EU had already pledged US$ 3.25 billion in June 2013). The government of President *Keita* got into a moral mess right at the beginning, after it became known that the president secretly ordered a jet for an estimated 20 million US dollars by means of a Corsican businessman with contacts to international crime (Michel Tomi), as well as various dubious loans. US dollars were ordered as well as various dubious purchases of military equipment were carried out—a scandal that prompted IMF President *Christine Lagarde* to fly to Bamako to have the orders cancelled (*Bruce Whitehouse* in Africa Yearbook 2015, Mali, pp. 2 and 4). Despite all the military support provided by 3000 French troops and thousands of ECOWAS soldiers, and despite ceasefires being agreed again and again, and even a peace agreement being reached in Algiers between the government in Bamako and several separatist and Islamist rebel groups (March 2015), violence continued to escalate in northern, central and even southern Mali. In 2017, the *security situation in Mali* remained highly precarious, with reported assassinations, kidnappings, suicide bombings, rocket attacks on army posts, and killings of UN blue helmets—actions committed by a wide range of rebel groups. On January 18, 2017, an attack in Gao on one of the country's main military bases killed 77 people; some 57,000 Malians were forced to flee *Gao, Mopti* and *Timbuktu* for other regions of the country (since April 2015), bringing the number of internally displaced persons to over 100,000 (The New Fischer World Almanac 2017, p. 298). Mali was in danger of finally becoming a *failing state*; as the central government lost power and influence on all three principles: authority, legitimacy, and the capacity to govern the entire country. As a result, it can be said that in the course of the past 67 years, as a consequence of policy failures, there has been a *militarization and ideologization* of a political distributive conflict that has today escalated into a multi-state warfare and that poses enormous challenges to all the intervening forces.

12.5   Conclusion: Peace in Africa Through External Intervention Powers?

Should EU states permanently participate in such an African permanent conflict as peacemakers? The immense expanse of space in northern Mali, consisting mainly of desert and the mountainous backwater on the border with Algeria, with only a few cities (Gao, Kidal, Taoudenni) and hardly any infrastructure that can be used for military purposes, makes it extremely difficult and costly to track down military opponents and organise one's own supplies of food and war materiel (Beumler 2017). In addition, France is by no means intervening altruistically and does not want to lose its political influence in West Africa because of its raw material interests (uranium) (Ehrhart 2014, pp. 84–85). It was also influenced by the NATO partner USA, which since nine/eleven has opened a new front in Africa in the so-called *Global War on Terror* (President Obama had opened a US drone base in Niger and conducted aerial reconnaissance); but what are the chances of a military conflict resolution?

For 5 years now, the *Federal Republic of Germany* has also been involved in the UN-supported attempt to turn Mali back into a stable and functioning state. The German contingent is currently on the ground with around 400 soldiers as part of the UN peacekeeping mission *MINUSMA (Mission Multidimensionnelle Intégrée des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation au Mali) (United Nations Integrated Multidimensional Stabilization Mission in Mali)*. Since 2013, Germany has been participating in the *European Union Training Mission (EUTM)*, which trains Malian soldiers so that they can defend themselves against the feared Islamists in the future. By early 2016, some 8000 Malian soldiers had been trained by the European trainers, or nearly half of the roughly 15,000-strong force. Given the size of the country—it is two and a half times the size of Afghanistan, where more than 300,000 soldiers and police provide security—the manpower commitment does not seem sufficient. In September 2016, Defense Minister *Ursula von der Leyen* announced an increase in the defense budget from 34.29 billion euros for 2016 to 36.61 billion euros for 2017 (11.1% of the total federal budget), which she also justified with the additional tasks of the Bundeswehr in fighting Islamist groups from Afghanistan to Mali (Das Parlament No. 37–38, September 12, 2016, p. 8). Parliamentarians from the Green party and the Left party criticized the federal government for the 'militarization of security and development policy' and, in contrast, called for more funding for *humanitarian projects*. Germany's (and the European Union's) new military engagement in West Africa should also be seen in

the current context of political efforts to contribute to combating the *causes of flight* in Africa.

The efforts of the NATO countries militarily engaged in Africa to help the African governments of the region and their *counterinsurgency forces* to counter the Islamist terrorists within the framework of a concerted strategy of the *Regional Security Complex* can be qualified as meaningful to a limited extent (for more on this, see Beumler 2017). Although it seems reasonable to assume that without external support such a strategy would be unlikely to achieve sustainable success, it is plausible to argue that the key to conflict resolution lies not in Brussels, Paris, Berlin, or Washington, but in *Addis Ababa (African Union), Bamako (Mali), Niamey (Niger), Abuja (ECOWAS), and Kidal (northern Mali).* As long as development planners, politicians and military leaders of the African state classes do not act in a *credible and contractual manner* when implementing peace agreements with rebels and separatists—the past teaches this with the many wasted opportunities of a fair reconciliation of interests with rebels—the *centrifugal* forces will not be able to be integrated into state-preserving strategies (if this is still possible at all). The *jihadists'* water must be siphoned off by abandoning and reversing the policy of *rural neglect:* Possibly the key to conflict resolution lies in a policy that creates a minimum level of services, especially in the hitherto neglected north, in the form of access for the local population to water, electricity, education and health. This would cost a great deal of money; but the credible offer of socio-economic alternatives can be seen as a necessary, if not decisive, precondition for enabling former combatants to return to civilian life. This requires a "change of mentality" among the Malian elite, "which bears the main responsibility in this process" (Konopka 2016, pp. 112–113).

Tasks

1. Describe the 'patterns' of causes of war using three examples of your own choosing.
2. Why do women suffer in a particular way as a result of war?
3. Do you consider the military deployment of Germany and other EU states in Mali (a) necessary, (b) promising or (c) inappropriate?

Corruption and Bad Governance

13

13.1 Corruption: A Universal Evil with Culture-Specific Contexts

Corruption is a global phenomenon; it is as old and as diverse as humanity. The fight against corruption and the praise of morally correct behavior accompany the development of civilizations from Jewish-Greek-Latin antiquity to the present. The Second Book of Moses 23:8 states, "You shall not be bribed by gifts, for gifts blind the sighted and pervert the cause of those who are in the right" (quoted in von Alemann 2005, p. 22). The international organization that works to record and outlaw this phenomenon worldwide, namely *Transparency International (TI)*, defines corruption in very general terms as "the misuse of public power for private ends". The damage caused to a society by corruption can be significant; because corruption in trade prevents pricing in line with the market, which as a result should reflect real existing scarcity conditions. "Corruption cements power relations and dependencies, where initiative and commitment would be required, corruption reduces public revenues in favor of private profits, corruption creates uncertainty and mistrust instead of predictability and reliability, corruption calls state legitimacy into question, corruption undermines the conditions for economic growth. The purpose of corruption is to pervert politics, that is, to buy wrong decisions. Projects are chosen with the ulterior motive of how much corruption money can be earned" (Seitz 2009, p. 93).

The greatest social damage is undoubtedly done by the deliberate form of misappropriation of government revenues and public assets by government leaders, ministers of state and their supporters for their own benefit. What public revenue is consumed by greedy elites is lost to potential investment in productive sectors. In the process, they cooperate with internationally active middlemen who are

indispensable as hinges between local production and international marketing for black market transactions. They are linked by a mutual protection of interests, because bribery, embezzlement of money, appropriation of rents, drug and arms smuggle, and the elimination of political competitors and opponents have merged into a *criminal* joint venture: into "*markets of protection*". An interpenetration of politics, business and crime ("*intersection of politics, business, and crime,*" Ellis and Shaw 2015, p. 528) is taking place at the highest levels of the state. Such *"markets of protection"* also include state contracts with foreign mining and oil companies as well as the appropriation of development aid funds, which is attributed to a *lack of effective law enforcement* (Cooter and Schäfer 2012; Alberts 2013).

A widespread evil in Africa is the embezzlement of salaries from police and army employees by their superiors. In a patriarchal society without a tradition of the rule of law, it is almost impossible for an aggrieved employee to sue a superior for his rights. In many places, there has also arisen the bad habit of illegal 'ripping off' of 'tolls' that motorists have to pay to soldiers and customs officers on roads and at border crossings. This practice of illegal road tolls thus also increases transport costs in Africa, further affecting the international competitiveness of African economies. Border officials not infrequently find themselves in role conflict, as they must observe different moral norms as part of the local community, involving not only law-abidingness but also solidarity with the hardships and expectations of women and men from their own social milieu (Howson 2012, pp. 421–445).

State dignitaries are sometimes involved not only in corrupt practices, but also in *organised crime*. This is usually understood to mean a criminal enterprise set up for the long term with the aim of systematically making a profit from illegal activities, the existence of which is secured by the use of force, threats, monopoly control and/or corruption. When this takes place across borders, it is referred to as *Trans-national Organised Crime (TOK)*. TOK is a collective term for a range of activities linked to highly diverse illicit markets and value chains. On the subject of *capital flight and the shadow economy*, the German ex-ambassador *Volker Seitz* formulated the following conclusion: "When it comes to systematic plundering of citizens and disastrously poor administrative organisation, this presence of the state can often already be described as overwhelming. In most countries there can be no question of the state withdrawing from everyday economic life. A confusing chaos of legal regulations always gives state functionaries an excuse to siphon off funds from private companies. This leads to a pronounced shadow economy and forces numerous entrepreneurs into a precarious existence between legality and illegality" (Seitz 2009, p. 128). When the state is unwilling or unable to enforce its laws, voids of state power are created that can be used and enlarged by criminal *non-state actors.*

"When government and the judiciary are so corrupted that they cannot help parties assert rights under a contract, the only enforcing power left is the mafia. In this sense organized crime should be seen as both a cause and a result of increasing corruption" (Krastev 2006, p. 16).

Dudu Musway (professor of medicine and once the rector of the DR Congo's medical school) has described how *endemic corruption* also disrupts a society *morally*, using the example of *Zaire* under President *Mobutu* and his successor *Kabila*: "Practically only people who get enough money from abroad and are thus more independent can afford not to play along with corruption. But completely disadvantaged are those who can't play along because they can't approve or sign anything, the poor small farmers or street vendors or small artisans in the informal sector. They can only sell one thing: their vote in politics. Buying votes is one thing, but already Mobutu had a shrewd system of buying whole opposition parties or even founding them with his money, often just so that the opposition would be fragmented (Musway, quoted in: der überblick, 2/2006, p. 9). The recent corruption scandal in *Mozambique* was somewhat different: after a new president was elected in October 2014 (*Filipe Jacinto Nyusi* of Frelimo), it came to light that his predecessor *Armando Guebuza* had accumulated previously concealed public debt of US$ 1.4 billion and had engaged in various illegal private transactions." "Public disgust at the self-enrichment of Guebuza and his family, who were said to have risen from this poor country to the top of Africa's richest individuals" (Adam 2015, p. 3), had contributed to his fall. Again, to the detriment of the population, "the lines between sections of politics, the police and organized crime" were so blurred (Adam 2015, p. 2) that several donors suspended their financial aid and the opposition party *Renamo* threatened to resume the civil war.

Data on the level of *capital flight* from Africa are, by their very nature, estimates. The *Africa Progress Report* for 2013, issued by the ten-member *Africa Progress Panel* headed by *Kofi Annan*, lamented that "Africa would lose twice as much to illicit capital outflows as it receives in international aid" (p. 7). In doing so, he put the loss of potential government revenue as a result of illicit capital flight at about US$ 200 billion annually. Amazingly, the *African Progress Report* cited as evidence of official corruption the foreign-acquired assets of the presidents of Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and the Republic of Congo: numerous luxury cars, estates and villas. It concludes with an appeal to the international community to also take responsibility on its part in establishing transparency and honesty in commodity trading: "We appeal to the G8 and G20 to take the lead in developing a credible and effective regime to combat tax evasion and tax avoidance" (ibid.). In the German Development Aid Minister *Gerd Müller*'s so-called *Marshall Plan,* the "illicit financial flows" leaving Africa each year were put at US$ 50 billion, with 60% of

the damage due to "aggressive tax avoidance by international corporations" (based on UN and ECA data; BMZ 2017, p. 8). In *Tanzania,* a conflict escalated in 2017 between the Tanzanian government under President *John Magufuli* and the international commodities group *Acacia*, which a Tanzanian commission of inquiry has accused of defrauding the Tanzanian tax office of US$ 48 billion between 1998 and 2017. Corrupt employees and Tanzanian ministers were also allegedly involved in the practice of tax avoidance,—a crime that could have come about by misdeclaring the gold content of the quantities of gold that was exported (Africa Confidential, June 23, 2017, p. 7).

When *corruption* in the sense of private appropriation of public wealth exists, it is controversial among African scholars, especially since the boundaries between 'public' and 'private' are judged to be indeterminate and fluid. Scholars such as *P. Ekeh, W. De Maria, J. De Sardan and D. Smith* (all in *M. F.* Murove 2009) resisted what they saw as Euro-centric understandings of corruption, suggesting that in the "cultural realities of life" allegedly 'corrupt' behaviour had its rightful place as a moral component of communal cohesion. Thus, *J. De Sardan* identified five *traditional logics of action* in relation to the accusation of corruption that would be necessary to grasp in order to counter kleptocratic behaviour at the state level today: (1) *negotiations:* the pluralism of different legal systems (local-traditional, Sharia-based, Western-based, etc.) provides an opportunity to enter into negotiations about the moral norm to be applied in each case. (2) *Gift giving*: the traditional moral obligation to express one's gratitude for a gift received can quickly merge with bribing a public official. (3) *Solidarity*: every individual is caught up in a wide web of obligations that compels solidary behavior as well as compulsions to accept and return favors. (4) *Predatory authority*: where customary practices have long existed, public authority figures can claim a 'right' to demand tributes and enjoy special privileges. (5) *Redistribution*: patrimonialism empowers the superior to redistribute accumulated wealth to members of the extended family, business partners and subordinates, thus satisfying the duty to display cardinal virtues such as generosity and gratitude (after De Sardan 1999, cited in De Maria 2009, p. 368). This narrative perhaps also makes it easier to understand that Africans in the process of transition to modernity also easily come into conflicts of ethical interests and goals when they have to choose between *ideas of justice and norms of peace*, between *justice* and *peace* (Sriram and Pillay 2009).

A key to understanding everyday "corruption" in the social relations of African communities lies in understanding the cultural tradition of *giving gifts* to dignitaries. The act of giving of gifts expresses respect for age and experience. The purpose of the gift is "not only a social protection against possible blows of fate in the future" but also "equally a core element of self-determination and an affirmation of the

moral integrity of the 'other'" (Chabal 2009, p. 73). This cultural interpretation of gifts as the *cement of community* can make it understandable that in such a social milieu the moral boundary between permissible advantage-taking and unlawful bribery is blurred, but it cannot be a justification for what the *kleptocratic* state presidents deny their own people in terms of life chances and development hopes through often shameless self-enrichment.

13.2   Kenya: The Cancer of Political Corruption (1963–2017)

Due to its mild climate and fertile *highlands,* Kenya had been a great attraction for white colonists since the end of the nineteenth century. At the time of the country's independence (December 1963), there were about 30,000 *settlers* in the country who had appropriated the most fertile lands in central Kenya and established cattle ranches, coffee and tea plantations. The Danish Baroness *Tania (Karen) Blixen* was one of them, who achieved literary world fame through her novel *Out of Africa (*in German *Jenseits von Afrika),* which was made into a film by Sidney Pollack in 1985 with Meryl Streep, Robert Redford and Klaus Maria Brandauer. Just as Baroness Blixen had fared—her coffee farm at the foot of the *Ngong Mountains* went bankrupt in 1931—so did numerous white *settlers*. What the film did not clearly show was the drama of the expulsion of the resident Kikuyu, Maasai and other ethnic groups who had lived on the Kenyan plateau for centuries as planters and cattle nomads and who had then been forced into *native reservations* by the British colonial administration. Since then, the *land question*, dominates the conflict-ridden history of Kenya, which revolves around the struggle for the right to settle and cultivate land (protected from the claims of rivals and previous owners): Who held political power—first traditionally the tribes, then the colonial Europeans, then alternately individual clans of *Kikuyu, Maasai, Luhya, Kamba, Kalenji, and Luo,* and finally, again since 2013, a faction of *Kikuyu* under the current President *Uhuru Kenyatta*, the son of the first state president, who stood a good chance of grabbing a big slice of the land 'pie', ownership of which promised prosperity beyond the vagaries of a political career (Boone 2014, pp. 139–156). The *land question* had also been the root cause of the rebellion by disaffected *Kikuyu* who had startled the British colonial authorities in 1952 by demanding 'freedom and land'. The resulting movement—known as the *Mau Mau rebellion*—was met with increased repression by the authorities: they imposed a state of emergency on the colony, interned numerous people in 'defence villages' or obliged them to perform forced labour.

At its core, the uprising was an act of desperation by Africans whose very existence was threatened, who had been forced into a precarious situation by the colonial administration's selfish racist land policy in the interests of the white settlers. In the 3-year struggle (1952–55), 13,500 Africans were killed, 95 Europeans and 29 Asians. It would have been wiser for the colonial administration to have implemented a settlement programme for landless peasants than to try to push more people into the already overcrowded reserves. In 1963, Kenya also had to be released into independence, and Jomo Kenyatta became its first president. He refrained from acts of revenge; on the contrary, he guaranteed the white settlers their property and at the same time invited them to offer their plantations and farms for sale in return for very lavish compensation (which Britain paid for). He was then able to monopolise political power with himself and his party, the *Kenya African National Union (KANU).* The constitution was abolished, political opponents were put out of business, and the extra-legal centralization of power became a characteristic of the *patronage state* in Kenya as well.

The president was rarely directly accused of corruption and mismanagement. The focus of public criticism was his fourth wife, the young *Ngina Kenyatta*, who became one of the richest women in the country through the acquisition of plantations, ranches, hotels and landed property, and daughter *Margaret*, the mayor of the capital. Both women of the Kenyatta clan were also involved in the ivory trade and thereby part of the *high-level corruption* that victimized half of Kenya's elephant herds—it involved the slaughter of at least 70,000 animals (Meredith 2005, p. 267). Those who criticized the *royal family* faced drastic punishments—up to and including murder in a faked traffic accident. Among the critics who were liquidated was the young Kikuyu politician *J.M. Kariuki*, who had once been imprisoned by the British during the Mau Mau rebellion and who had subsequently turned himself into an advocate for poor and landless Kenyans. He himself lived a luxurious life as the owner of two farms and several cars, but because of his political advocacy for the poor, he became almost as popular as the president. Opponent *Kariuki* declared that a stable political order could not be built on the poverty of millions of people; for frustration as a result of poverty would breed unrest and violence. He called (much in the spirit of Etounga-Manguelle; see Sect. 2.11) a 'complete overhaul of the existing social, economic and political system in Kenya', claiming that 'a small but powerful elite of greedy, self-serving people in the form of politicians, civil servants and businessmen have steadily and surely monopolised the fruits of independence, leading to exclusion from the majority of the population … We do not want a Kenya of ten millionaires and ten million beggars' (quoted in Meredith 2005, pp. 267–268). In March 1975, the inconvenient

critic was murdered in the open street. As usual, the police found no clear evidence, but traces led to the president's inner circle of power.

After Kenyatta's sudden death in August 1978, Vice President *Daniel arap Moi* (representing the *Kalenji*), with the support of *Mwai Kibaki* and *Charles Njonjo* (both Kikuyu), succeeded in asserting himself as president and party leader in the face of opposition from Kenyatta's cousin *Njorogo Mungai.* Upon Moi's assumption of office, the political "patronage distribution system" established under Kenyatta swung from an orientation towards *Kikuyu* interests to an orientation towards the *Kalenjin* and other ethnic groups that had supported Moi. While in Tanzania the single party TANU sought to redirect resources from the rich to the poor, Kenya's political class redistributed resources from one ethnic interest alliance to the next interest alliance. This overt instrumentalization of the patronage system by ethnic groups in attaining power has been paraphrased as "*It is our turn to eat*" (Wrong 2009; Fukuyama 2015, pp. 331–332). The *idea of nation-building* (i.e. the simultaneous modernization of state, economy and society) thus degenerated into the practice of self-empowerment and self-security of an alliance of ethnic networks.

The Moi years marked a period of regression, marked by political repression, economic incompetence and rampant corruption. In 1982, the constitution was abolished and the one-party system was introduced. A year later, Moi ousted the influential constitutional minister *Njonjo*, who had helped him to power, in a show trial; other top officials were ousted around the 1983 and 1988 elections. The assassination of Foreign Minister *Robert Ouko* in February 1990 sparked violent demonstrations, and in August 1990 Anglican Bishop *Alexander Muge* was killed in a staged car accident. Along with prominent lawyers, writers (such as Ngugi wa Thiong'o) and other church representatives, Bishop *Muge* had been among the most prominent critics of the Moi regime, tirelessly calling for a return to a multiparty system and respect for human rights. Western governments held back with further development aid payments and thus contributed to the fact that at the end of 1991 President *arap Moi* finally had to accept the change to the multi-party system.

The ruling KANU party was able to win the *elections of December 1992* because the hopelessly divided oppositional ethno- parties had not been able to agree on a common strategy. Between 1991 and 1994, 1500 *Kikuyu*, denigrated as '*foreigners',* who had settled in the fertile *Rift Valley* during the *Kenyatta* era, were murdered. "The Minister for *Local government*, a Maasai, openly intervened in the tribalist debate in Parliament, demanding that the Kikuyu leave the land they had once bought from the Maasai" (Schicho 2004, p. 282; Wrong 2009, p. 114; Boone 2014, pp. 261–267). The 1997 elections also failed to bring the hoped-for change in power and regime. Opposition leader *Mwai Kibaki* (a Kikuyu) at least

managed to win a respectable victory with 31% of the vote compared to 40.1% for the incumbent *arap Moi*; but another 5 years of economic stagnation and rampant corruption in office followed until finally in 2002—after 25 years—the incompetent *arap Moi regime* could be voted out. The overwhelming winner of the *2002 parliamentary and presidential elections* was *Mwai Kibaki*, the candidate of the oppositional *National Rainbow Coalition (NARC)*, an alliance of 14 parties. At his inauguration speech in Nairobi's Uhuru Park, election winner *Kibaki* said in the presence of outgoing President *arap Moi*: "I have inherited a country that has been ravaged over the years by mismanagement and incompetence . . . Corruption will no longer be a way of life in Kenya from now on" (quoted in Wrong 2009, p. 5). A few weeks later, as one of their first measures, parliamentarians approved themselves a salary increase of 100,000 Kenyan shillings (about 1050 €) per month and a one-time bonus of 3.3 million shillings (about 34,650 €) for buying a car. "Only well-paid politicians are not at risk of falling prey to corruption through temptation, it was said in justification" (New African 418, May 2003, p. 23, quoted in Schicho 2004, p. 284).

To keep his election promise—to fight corruption—President Kibaki appointed journalist *John Githongo*, also a Kikuyu, as the *Permanent Secretary for Governance and Ethics*. The young man set to work and discovered things that immediately earned him death threats: Looking through the files, he had figured out that his own tribal brothers in high government positions were the thieves who were criminally appropriating lavish portions of the people's wealth (Wrong 2009). In January 2005, the anti-corruption minister had no option but to flee into exile in London, with the secretly recorded minutes of meetings in his luggage. Through them, the fugitive was able to testify to the clear authorship of *Gran Corruption* in Kenya; Githongo published the background to the *Anglo Leasing Scandal* in early 2006: according to it, Vice President *Moody Awori* as well as several ministers were significantly involved in the fraudulent deal. The *Anglo Leasing* scandal involved fictitious supply contracts with an *Anglo Leasing and Finance Company Ltd*—a dummy company with which at least 18 such contracts for the supply of communication systems worth US$ 751 million had been concluded. The money stolen from the state treasury was secretly transferred at private foreign expense and into the black coffers of the ruling party, which was tacitly tolerated by the Attorney General and the head of the anti-corruption agency responsible at the time (Africa Yearbook 2007, p. 341).

The exposure of the scandal had been made possible by the courageous stance of *whistle blower John Githongo*; courageous because, as a member of the Kikuyu ethnic group, he had managed, following his conscience, to publicly accuse his own government colleagues and 'tribal brothers' of corruption. Until then, it was

considered inconceivable that a Kikuyu who had been socialized to 'follow the call of his tribe' (Wrong 2009, pp. 99ff.) would 'betray' his influential fellow tribesmen by publicizing their criminal dealings. The latter, after all, had 'only' exercised their customary right and acted according to the motto "*It's our turn to eat*" (Wrong 2009, p. 163). Western countries reacted to the scandal by withholding development aid pledges (for a limited period of time); but since Kenya was needed in the fight against the Islamist *El Shabaab* militia in Somalia, the USA valued its security interests higher than concerns for democracy and human rights of Kenyans and continued to cooperate with the discredited *Kibaki* regime.

The population therefore went into the next parliamentary and presidential elections in 2007 with great expectations of reform. In view of the growing poverty in the country and the rampant corruption in government circles, which had damaged the country's reputation in the world, the opposition parties led by *Raila Odinga* (son of Oginga Odinga) hoped to be able to defeat the corrupt *Kikuyu* team under *Kibaki's* leadership. Several opinion polls also suggested a lead for the opposition alliance. So when the election results were announced on December 30, 2007 by the Chief Electoral Officer *Kivuitu*—4,584,721 votes for President *Kibaki* and 4,352,993 for his challenger *Odinga*—then the opposition parties and their supporters were shocked. *Odinga* spoke of electoral fraud in at least 48 out of 210 constituencies and refused to acknowledge the election results, especially since even the election commissioner admitted not knowing exactly who would have won the election. One hour after the announcement of the preliminary election results, the incumbent President *Kibaki* was sworn in again as the president in no time at the *State House*, whereupon disappointed voters in numerous regions took to the streets in protest, feeling that they had been cheated out of victory and thus out of the hoped-for transfer of power. The notorious *Mungiki sect* (*Mungiki* means *crowd of ordinary people*) took advantage of the chaotic situation and attacked with weapons those compatriots they considered to be their opponents—first and foremost *Kikuyu*. Since the top *Kikuyu* politician, President *Kibaki*, was blamed for the 'electoral fraud', the anger unloaded mainly in the constituencies that were believed to have supported *Kibaki,* which in turn provoked sharp reactions from the police. This led to an orgy of looting, evictions, rapes and house fires. It was later officially stated that 3661 people had been injured during the riots, property and houses destroyed in 117,216 cases, and 1133 citizens killed. Gunfire wounds had been found in 405 bodies, which were attributed to the intervention of police units (Africa Yearbook 2008, p. 327). In response to the electoral fraud, more than 300,000 people were displaced from their land.

The EU, too, was disappointed with a country it had hoped to win as a strategic partner because of its economic potential, and the London *Economist* spoke

scornfully of "a typical African coup": "It really is both galling and depressing that African leaders continually betray the democratic values they claim to cherish. This is especially true in Kenya [along with Nigeria and DR Congo], which has a long tradition of holding elections, as well as a vibrant political culture, a relatively free press, and a sophisticated economy. Given all these advantages we had highlighted before the elections, Kenya had had an opportunity to set an example for Africa and hold free and fair elections. But the country squandered it; or rather the political elite let it go to waste, to be precise. A small clique of politicians, it is almost certain, stole the election result by fraud" (The Economist, January 5th, 2008, p. 8.).

The 'Kenyan crisis' ended with a *power-sharing agreement* after months of tough negotiations: *Mwai Kibaki* remained president, and opposition leader *Raila Odinga* was given the newly created post of prime minister, with *Uhuru Kenyatta*, a Kikuyu, as his deputy. There were now 23 political parties in parliament, divided into two almost equal blocs that eyed each other suspiciously. All the more astonishing was the fact that in the subsequent *parliamentary elections in 2013* and *2017,* more than three-quarters of the eligible population exercised their right to vote. *Uhuru Kenyatta* won the 2013 elections with a slim majority of 50.7% of the vote, while *Raila Odinga* received only 43.7% this time. Embarrassingly, however, the election winner *Uhuru Kenyatta* had been indicted by the *International Criminal Court (ICC)* the year before (2012) for crimes against humanity (during the 2007/08 riots). Notwithstanding this, *Uhuru Kenyatta,* the winner of the election, was sworn in as president on April 9, 2013. His deputy became *William arap Ruto*, a representative of the *Kalenjin* people. He too was indicted by the ICC in The Hague for crimes against humanity as the mastermind of the bloody unrest that followed the 2007/08 elections. However, criminal proceedings against the incumbent president were then suspended while his deputy had to stand trial in The Hague. This led to threats by some African governments to withdraw their country's membership of the International Criminal Court, which was grotesquely accused of 'neo-colonialist practices'.

President Uhuru Kenyatta's tenure (2013–2017) was characterized by a continued policy of ethnically oriented privilege economy. The *policy of devolution* that was introduced necessitated elections of district governments, which provided new opportunities for political parties to fill many new posts with supporters and award them government contracts. As a result, the share of government expenditure on wages, salaries and allowances to government employees rose to 55% of the national budget, which was equivalent to about 13% of the gross national product (Africa Yearbook 2014, Kenya, p. 9). There were repeated public demonstrations against the rampant corruption of the state class; and at least the Kenyatta government's plan to increase MPs' salaries from 4900 € to 7800 € per month

was defeated. *Transparency International* downgraded the country from 136th to 145th on its *Corruption Perception Index* (2016). The next elections—in 2017—saw a repeat of the ugly spectacle of elections, electoral fraud, ethnic violence and incited supporters of rival ethnic parties no longer willing or able to engage in power-sharing arrangements (Smidt 2017). Under pressure from the opposition, the election had to be rerun because of proven rigging; but again gave incumbent Kenyatta a majority because opposition leader Odinga had called for an election boycott. In January 2018, he appointed himself 'President of Kenya', meaning the politically divided country now has two presidents! Kenya—for all its economic dynamism—has degenerated into an unstable patronage state whose corrupt ruling class is also unnecessarily damaging the development opportunities of the younger generation.

13.3   South Africa: Strong Economy, Weak State

In the African chronicle, the year 1994 is a very memorable one: while on April 6 in *Rwanda* a genocide was unleashed, after the crash (still unresolved) of the plane of President *Habyarimana*, to which 800,000 people fell victim, in the same month (on April 27) in the Republic of *South Africa*, *Nelson Mandela's* party won the first democratic elections that put an end to the apartheid state. On May 9, *Mandela*, who had been imprisoned for 27 years as a political prisoner of the apartheid regime, was elected by the new parliament as South Africa's first black president. A few weeks earlier, on the day of his release from prison (February 11, 1990), *Mandela* had delivered his famous *reconciliation speech* at the Soweto Stadium (the large *township of* Johannesburg) before a cheering audience of 120,000, in which he called on all people who had abandoned the discriminatory policies of apartheid to work together for a "non-racist, united and democratic South Africa with universal, free elections and voting rights for all." This marked the beginning of a cultural transformation that commanded the world's admiration: the peaceful transition from a violent political system based on the alleged superiority of one 'race' over other peoples to a *multi-racial 'rainbow nation'* that focused on *reconciliation* and equality rather than discrimination and inequality.

   Today—a generation later—the picture is very different again: While the government of *Rwanda* under its President *Paul Kagame*, despite all the democratic deficits, has created a new political and economic order that opens up hopeful prospects for the young generation, the South African government under its President *Jacob Zuma* has run down the continent's most economically developed

country through corruption and *bad governance* to such an extent that in 2017 it was rated at junk level by two international rating agencies. Today, social inequality, rampant corruption (especially in government circles), illegal immigration, high youth unemployment and high crime pose major risks.

Despite the current precarious political situation, South Africa's great potential as an African *powerhouse* should not be underestimated. South Africa's GDP accounts for more than two-thirds of southern Africa's GDP, more than one-third of Sub-Saharan Africa's GDP, and more than one-fifth of all of Africa (2007 figures). The percentages for South Africa's share of regional and continental trade and foreign direct investment are similarly high. South Africa has by far the most diversified and industrialized economy on the continent and, with the exception of oil and gas, possesses the broadest range of strategically important resources. In 2007, the country owned 88% of the world's platinum group reserves, 80% of manganese, 72% of chromium, 40% each of vermiculite (phyllosilicate) and gold, and 32% of vanadium. South African companies have invested heavily in other African countries, in some cases achieving dominant positions there and securing access to important resources. It is the country with the highest level of education and has "technological and innovation capabilities that rank it far ahead of any other significant African state" (Mair 2010, pp. 27–28). Finally, with the overcoming of the *apartheid* system, the potential of non-white labour and education was liberated.

The Boer-British *apartheid* system in South Africa (1948–1994) can be seen as an extreme case of colonial rule. *Apartheid* is Afrikaans and in the language of the Boers means 'separate development'—separated by 'races'. This practice began after the 'Boer War' (1899–1902; see Chap. 4) when the English and Boers joined in 1910 to form the *Union of South Africa*, a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, and then passed laws of discrimination against the black majority. It began in 1911 with the reservation of senior positions in mining for whites (*job reservation*) and soon extended to all areas of daily life: separate residential areas, restriction of land rights (reservations), successive disenfranchisement of non-whites (especially *Coloureds* in the Cape Colony), compulsory passports for migrant workers, etc. Of lasting significance was the *Land Act* of 1913, which stipulated that blacks were only allowed to acquire land in specially designated reserves, which together made up no more than about 7% of South Africa's total area. In 1948, the Boerish majority with its *National Party (NP)* came to power; it replaced the less racist domination of the British part of the population and systematically expanded racial segregation by means of laws and practical harassment. The South African population was now divided—by skin colour and origin—into the hierarchy of four 'races': Whites were at the top, privileged in all things regardless of individual achievement; followed by *Asians* (mostly Indians), *Coloureds,* and

finally Afrikaners, who were in turn divided into diverse *tribes.* An African who could not prove employment in the mines or as a service provider in the city was relegated to one of the nine established reservations called *Bantustans* (later *Homelands*), where he eked out a meager existence due to inadequate or even lack of infrastructure. The *Immorality Act* criminalized inter-'race' marriages; the use of restaurants and public washrooms was also segregated by 'race'; '*Whites only*' signs in front of buildings and on lawns were commonplace. The education system was also subjected to racial segregation (*Bantu Education*); ten times as much tax money was spent on a white school child as on a black one.

There is no doubt that the racist system of apartheid was invented and practiced to secure white minority rule in a prosperous resource colony. It represents one of the most serious human rights violations in the twentieth century—"a crime against human dignity" (Rothe 1989, p. 5 f.; Bösl and Diescho 2009). The irrational causal linkage of biology and culture, of descent and ability—represented a colossal aberration of white foreign domination that could hardly be explained without its religious, Old Testament background. To this end, *Calvinist doctrine* has been twisted by Christian missionaries so that it could be used (in the guise of the biblical story of *Sen* and *Ham*—the unequal sons of *Noah*) as a legitimation of white God-ordained rule. According to this, Black Africans were supposedly the descendants of the cursed *Ham*, whom his father *Noah* had condemned to servitude for wrongdoing. This Christian misconception was further reinforced after the discovery of the gold and diamond deposits, when native labor was needed in large numbers, which could not be obtained without coercion. With the *Ham* hypothesis*,* it was easier to persuade oneself and others that violence against 'uncivilized' black Africans not only served the material well-being of whites, but would ultimately promote the education of blacks. The *Dutch Reformed Church (Nederduitse Gereformeerte Kerk, NGK)* also participated in the practice of the racist separation of churches (free exercise of religion since 1956, but in each case in their own churches) and justified the apartheid policy theologically in a synodal decision as late as 1974 (Rothe 1989).

It should not be overlooked that white South African society under the political regime of apartheid was anything but homogeneous; for example, there were both, stubborn conservatives and incorrigible racists, as well as liberal whites like the Member of Parliament *Helen Suzman* or the liberation theologian *Allan Boesak*, who stood up against the racial delusion of their compatriots. That Christian churches in the industrialized countries—also the Lutheran ones, though to a lesser extent—mostly accepted the oppressive practice of the apartheid state with their 'reformed' state church until the 1970s without doing anything, does not exactly belong to the glories of the Christian faith community. Only the *South African*

Council of Churches, 90% of whose members were black Christians, developed from liberal opposition to radical resistance, with the *Kairos* document of 1985 playing a central role as 'document of the people': In the tradition of liberation theology it declared the apartheid government as "unjust", godless rule, against which militant resistance was also permitted to the Christian. The *World Council of Churches* in Geneva also eventually declared apartheid a 'sin', triggering an internationally perceived consumer boycott under the slogan 'Don't buy fruit from South Africa' (Rothe 1989).

It was soon to become apparent that the racist apartheid state could not be reformed. In September 1966, Prime Minister *Verwoerd*—the so-called *mastermind of the apartheid system*—had been killed with four knife wounds by an allegedly insane parliamentary servant. He was succeeded by *Balthasar John Vorster*, a wellknown Boer of the National Party, who immediately had a 'Terrorism Bill' passed that allowed for the indefinite detention of political opponents without a warrant (*Detention without Trial*), "which opened the door to systematic torture" (Marx 2012, p. 254). His government was purely defensive of maintaining the existing order under the banner of paranoid anti-communism. When Soweto schoolchildren resisted an education ordinance in June 1976 (they were to take exams in Afrikaans instead of English), the police smothered the demonstration of the unarmed: More than 100 children died in a hail of police bullets during the first days of the revolt. A year after the Soweto schoolboy uprising, *Steve Biko*, the founder of the *Black Consciousness Movement*, which had set out to promote 'black self-awareness' among students and other opponents of apartheid, died in a remand prison.

Prime Minister *Vorster* stumbled over a corruption affair and was replaced in 1978 by *P. W. Botha,* the former defense minister. During his term in office, a civil society opposition formed alongside the radical opposition, including the *United Democratic Front (UDF)*, an umbrella organization of churches, women's and youth organizations, as well as the *Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu)* and the Anglican Bishop *Desmond Tutu*. The latter had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1984 for his non-violent resistance against the apartheid regime. Five years of state of emergency from 1985 to 1990, during which an all-powerful State Security Council brutally defended itself against the uprisings in the black *townships* and against the decline of the economy, also shook the confidence of international banks and corporations in South Africa as an attractive investment location. The arms export and economic sanctions imposed by the UN did the rest to induce the tottering apartheid regime to enter into secret negotiations with the still banished *African National Congress (ANC)*. But it was only after the departure of President *P. W. Botha*, forced by his own party, and after his

replacement by *F. W. de Klerk* as the new president at the end of 1989 that the country was gradually led out of the political impasse.

Under the courageous reformer *de Klerk,* the apartheid laws were wound up relatively quickly; all imprisoned ANC members were released, and the modalities of the transition to democracy and the core elements of the new constitution were discussed with *Nelson Mandela* and his advisers. Lawyer and freedom fighter *Mandela*, a committed Christian who had been imprisoned for 18 years on *Robben Island* for his beliefs (1964–1982) and eight more years in *Pollsmoor Prison* (Lapierre 2009), had by now reached the age of 72, but had physically and psychologically survived the long imprisonment unbroken (Mandela 1994). How could the mistrust of the white minority, which still held key positions in politics, the military and the economy, be overcome; how could the understandable need for revenge and atonement on the part of the humiliated and oppressed black population be tempered; how could the tensions between the different parties and factions within the black majority population be reduced? In the militant *Inkatha movement* led by *Zulu Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Mandela's* ANC party had grown a dangerous rival in Natal Province. It is probably indisputable that without the personal commitment of ANC President *Mandela* during the risky transition period from 1990 to 1994, the germinating civil war between the Zulus of the Inkatha movement and the supporters of the African National Congress could not have been stifled. *De Klerk* and *Mandela* were aware of their interdependence and brought about the "South African miracle" (Sparks 2003) for which they were both awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1993. *Mandela's* magnanimous policy of forgiveness and reconciliation between yesterday's enemies made it possible to finally agree on a gradual *peaceful transfer of power* and a democratic constitution based on the rule of law. Two particular features should be highlighted for their peacemaking quality: For example, it was agreed that all major parties should participate in the future parliament and that a real majority government should only be elected after a 5-year transition period. It was also agreed that white civil servants would keep their jobs (and pensions); both measures helped to calm frightened minds.

After *Nelson Mandela* was elected South Africa's first democratically elected president on May 10, 1994, securing internal peace and building the 'rainbow nation'—symbol of diversity in unity—based on the idea of reconciliation were among his most important concerns. Under the chairmanship of Archbishop *Desmond Tutu,* the Truth and Reconciliation Commission began its work in early 1996. With public hearings of some 2000 victims of both state violence and guerrilla movements, the Truth Commission became a media event that "contributed significantly to many victims subsequently finding greater recognition in their local communities. The number of amnesties was also very high,

considering that out of about 7000 applications, only 1200 were admitted at all, of which about 700 ended in amnesties. Nevertheless, comparatively few perpetrators applied for amnesty, most of them from the police apparatus" (Marx 2012, p. 294).

The fact that the *Tutu Commission* was not allowed to refer confessing perpetrators who had confessed their crimes to a court of law afterwards and that it could not grant compensation payments to victims of the apartheid regime was often regarded as problematic. Thus, the *Truth Commission* did not receive the broad public response it had hoped to; for a majority of South Africans had "a different sense of justice in which there was no room for the amnesty of torturers and murderers" (Marx 2012, p. 295). On the other hand, to explain the astonishing peacefulness of many victims and their families, the healing tradition of *Ubuntu* should not be misjudged: Even fathers whose daughters had fallen victim to a crime pleaded for forgiveness in the name of *Ubuntu ('humaneness')* in the interest of peaceful coexistence in the community (Ntsebeza 2009, p. 375; Bösl and Diescho 2009, pp. 33 f.; Sriram and Pillay 2009). Bishop *Tutu* justified the peace work of the new South Africa by saying: "It is quite amazing the degree of stability we have achieved. Let us look at Northern Ireland and Yugoslavia. We could so easily have slipped down that path" (Sparks 2003, p. 329).

In 1997 *Mandela* left the presidency to his successor *Thabo Mbeki*. The latter had spent 7 years as a student in English exile and then further years in African exile, during which he had little to do with democratic procedures (Schleicher 2004, pp. 124–136). As an elitist intellectual, he invoked the spirit of Pan-African rebirth with his "African *Renaissance"* speeches (Tetzlaff 2016, p. 101f), but in practice he created a cold bureaucratic "climate of fear of free speech, so that his ministers preferred to cower rather than take political initiatives" (Marx 2012, p, 303). This revealed "how easy it was to switch from the ascetic life of the professional revolutionary to the opulent lifestyle of a member of a new bohemia". The legitimation lay in the successful 'liberation', whereby it was easily forgotten that the ANC had by no means triumphed alone, but had come to power by way of a negotiation process and by means of compromises. *Thabo Mbeki's* policies, which prioritised economic *empowerment* for a fortunate few over general redistribution and social justice, "resulted in this power elite increasingly losing a sense of the needs of its mostly desperately poor constituents and, given the disparity of wealth in the country, parading an almost obscene lifestyle" (Marx 2012, p. 302). His AIDS policy, which was fed by the denial of the fact that the HIV virus was the trigger of AIDS, also caused an international sensation. His misjudgements—he suspected that international pharmaceutical companies wanted to force overpriced drugs on South Africa—"probably cost 300,000 people their lives" (Marx 2012, p. 306).

ANC politicians dissatisfied with *Mbeki* rallied behind his vice president, *Jacob Zuma*, head of the ANC's internal intelligence service. A man from humble beginnings and with no schooling, he was not seen as a serious contender for leadership posts, which is why Mbeki appointed him vice president in 1999. He was soon indicted on suspicion of 783 counts of bribery and embezzlement (Grill 2017, p. 90); and in 2006 he hit the headlines again when a young woman accused him of raping her. The dubious acquittal raised doubts about the seriousness of the court, as the judge in charge thus contributed to the trivialization of one of the most serious crimes—"the up to 50,000 officially registered rapes per year". Despite intensive investigations, the corruption case did not reach court because the *Zuma* case had become a political pawn in intra-party rivalries. In December 2007, *Mbeki* was voted out of office as *ANC* president. His term as president would have expired 5 months later anyway (the constitution forbids a third term). Thus the incomprehensible happened that the scandal-ridden *Jacob Zuma* not only became *ANC president*, but also South Africa's state president in May 2009. Yet South Africa "desperately needed a strong president" during the financial crisis, as mismanagement and corruption repeatedly caused serious electricity supply shortages (Marx 2012, p. 310). In addition, fierce xenophobic riots had erupted in 2008, particularly affecting Mozambicans and Zimbabweans who had fled *Mugabe's* terror. Well-educated professionals emigrated in droves.

Serious allegations of corruption have overshadowed President *Zuma*'s time in office since 2012. The polygamist was accused of having expanded his private estate in the municipality of *Nkandla* with the help of state funds to the tune of around 20 million euros by constructing a theatre, a swimming pool and buildings for his four wives. The president justified the huge expenditure by arguing that it would ultimately serve his security. Not only opposition leader *Helen Zille* accused *Zuma* of corruption, but also the *Economic Freedom Fighters* group led by ANC rebel *Julius Malema*, who called on the president, who had become a laughing stock, to repay much of the stolen state money and also to resign. In February 2016, the Constitutional Court found that *Zuma* had violated the constitution, so he was fined 7.8 million rand (13 rand equals one euro). Outrage was also sparked by the disclosure that money had been taken from the police budget for *Zuma's* four wives to buy eleven mid-range cars. This was made public at a time when tuition fees at the University of the *Witwatersrand* had been increased by 10.5%, leading to nationwide student protests. The president was also blamed for his close relationship with the influential Indian *Gupta* family, who were said to have interfered in the appointment and dismissal of line ministers to further their own neoliberal economic interests (Melber in Africa Yearbook 2015). Under pressure from his party, Zuma was forced to resign as the President of the Republic on February 15, 2018 to

pre-empt an impeachment of parliament. His successor as ANC chairman and president was Cyril Ramaphosa.

A good 20 years after the first democratic elections in South Africa, the state and the economy are not in good shape. Between 1994 and 2017, around three million houses were built, numerous townships were electrified and welfare state measures were introduced, as a result of which 17 million needy citizens received state support (Grill 2017, p. 91). However, economic growth had slowed, with 54% of the population still living below the poverty line between 2008 and 2015; unemployment had risen to 35%, and youth unemployment was as high as a staggering 63% (*Sanusha Naidu* in Africa Yearbook 2015). The HIV infection rate was 19.2%; social inequality in the population had not been reduced: the *Gini coefficient* was 57.8% (compared to 38.2% in Tanzania, 28.9% in Rwanda and 28.3% in Germany). "Ten percent of the 56 million South Africans, predominantly whites, own 90% of the land, the capital, and the wealth assets. 80% of blacks own nothing, and more than half of young men and women have no jobs" (Grill 2017, p. 91). For years, the impression has been growing that the moral capital that the *ANC* possessed at the time of *Nelson Mandela* had been squandered by an unscrupulous power elite under *Thabor Mbeki* and *Jacob Zuma*. Both supported the *kleptocracy* in neighbouring *Zimbabwe*, whose misrule affected the whole of Southern Africa, and both prevented South Africa's African middle class from realising creative industrial development (according to President *Tabor Mbeki*'s brother, *Moeletsi* Mbeki 2009). Democratic South Africa, despite all the *African Renaissance* rhetoric, has unfortunately *not* become a model for a new society in Africa that points the way to a future that is fit for globalisation and more socially just. South Africa is, however, a lesson in the realization that *development-oriented governance* is an indispensable prerequisite for a country's progress.

Discussion

1. Define the different conceptions of '*corruption*'.
2. What role did '*politicized ethnicity*' play in Kenya's development and what specifically promoted it?
3. What is meant here by the '*South African miracle*' and what explains the depletion of '*moral capital*' among Nelson Mandela's successors?

International Development Cooperation in Africa

14

14.1 Strategic Partnerships

At least six *global players* with different interests and strategies are involved in the current competition for raw materials, markets and political influence in Africa: *first*, the two world organisations, the *World Bank* and the *IMF* (in addition to the UN organisations); *second*, the *European Union (EU)* with three economically strong countries which, in addition to the European Commission's joint Africa policy, are also pursuing *bilateral* interest policies in Africa: *England and France* as two former colonial 'mother countries' and *Germany* as a globally oriented industrial and trading state (Staack and Krause 2014); *third*, the former Western superpower *USA* with significantly increased security and commodity interests in Africa; *fourth*, the now ubiquitous *People's Republic of China*, an economic heavyweight with a share of over 40% of world demand for commodities; *fifth*, the new regional leading powers, *India and Brazil*; and *sixth*, *a* large number of *transnational corporations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)*, including Germany's *political foundations* and faith-based organizations (World Bank 1989; Stehnken et al. 2010; Mamdani 2011).

States' engagement with Africa is guided by *domestic* priorities and global *security* challenges; it is also changing in the way they communicate with each other, which will be briefly indicated: The former colonial powers France and England, with their increasingly less productive 'special relations' (mainly political, economic and cultural contacts) with their former colonial territories, are becoming more involved in Europe's overall policy towards Africa than other industrialized states. *France* still maintains isolated military bases in Africa to stabilize regimes willing to cooperate, but is steadily reducing this presence for cost reasons—with the exception of *Mali.* The largest and financially strongest EU state, the Federal

Republic of Germany, has been making increasing efforts since the 1990s to conclude 'strategic partnerships' with some priority countries (Bundesregierung 2014; BMZ 2017). By also participating in military missions to stabilise crisis states and crisis regions (in the Great Lakes region, the Horn of Africa, Mali), Germany's understanding of its role is changing from that of a purely civilian power to that of a 'normal' major European power, which is increasingly willing to assume political responsibility and financial burdens within the framework of a policy of European crisis prevention and stabilisation policy (Stehnken et al. 2010; Staack and Krause 2014; Steinberg and Weber 2015). In the following, three thematic areas will be examined in more detail: The European Union's development policy, the World Bank's development policy in Africa, and the PRC's engagement with Africa.

14.2   The Development Policy of the European Union (EU)

Since the 1960s, the European Community or Union has been trying to promote development in Europe's former colonies namely in the countries of *Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries)*—through special trade relations. At the same time, economic and political self-interest always played a central role, above all secure access to raw materials and markets. France was the driving force behind these plans for *association*, which in principle had already become part of European policy when the *Treaty of Rome* was adopted in 1957. To this end, the *European Economic Community (EEC)* concluded its first association agreement in 1963 with the *Yaoundé Convention* (Yaoundé is the capital of Cameroon), the aim of which was to create a free trade area between the EEC and the ACP countries. A *European Development Fund (EDF)*, financed from the tax revenues of the member states, served as an instrument to initiate economic and social projects. When the colonial power Great Britain also became a member of the EEC, a new trade agreement had to be concluded in order to associate the British colonies with the EEC. In agricultural policy, the EU states granted their ex-colonies imperialist 'preferences' "so that they produced basic foodstuffs (beef, bananas, sugar, etc.) for Europe—at guaranteed prices that were higher than the respective world market price. This was to protect Europe's food security against the backdrop of the Cold War"— commented *Yash Tandon*, the Ugandan-born economist and long-time economic advisor to East African governments (Tandon 2016, p. 106). The *Lomé Convention* (Lomé is the capital of Togo) with initially 46 ACP countries, which came into force in 1973, was welcomed by some governments in the hope of overcoming hitherto neo-colonial relations in favour of a constructive contribution to a '*New*

International Economic Order' *(NiWO).* This was the central demand of the *Non-Alignment Movement (NAM)* of the Third World countries in the 1970s and 1980s: The '*non-aligned*' states fought on the international stage of diplomacy for a 'fairer' economic order that would yield more trade gains for developing countries.

Although the governments of the EEC countries officially rejected dirigiste intervention in the 'free' world market order (although they themselves permanently violated this principle with their policy of agricultural protectionism), they deigned to accommodate the *ACP countries* on the question of *stabilising export earnings (STABEX)* from commodity sales to the EEC. Thus, the STABEX mechanism was created, which provided compensation for ACP countries that suffered non-self-inflicted revenue losses from crop commodity sales (such as cotton, coffee, tea) to EU countries. In total, the European Commission raised funds of US\$ 77.671 billion between 1958 and 2013 (Hill and Smith 2011, p. 327). However, these considerable sums were not sufficient to sustainably support 77 ACP countries in their efforts to move away from their structural dependence on a few export goods—on the contrary: trade structures that had become anachronistic were cemented by the 'preferences' for raw material exports granted by the EU (Tandon 2016, p. 103 f.).

In 2000, the Lomé Convention was replaced by the *Cotonou Agreement* (named after the capital of Benin), which is valid for 20 years. The central innovation was the *Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)*, which are still controversial today and aimed to abandon non-reciprocal trade between EU countries and ACP states (only ACP governments were previously allowed to impose *import duties* on goods from the EU) in favour of a genuine free trade area (Asche and Engel 2008). This involved trade and cooperation agreements between the EU and a total of six *regional economic communities.* The central innovations were that in future the markets of the EU countries would no longer be open exclusively duty-free to African exports and that, in the spirit of *reciprocity,* the ACP governments would now be obliged to reduce their import duties on goods from the EU over a period of 12 years. This EU proposal in particular triggered fears in African countries because the import of subsidised agricultural products (from large European farmers) would jeopardise the survival of local smallholder's food production (Goldberg 2008; Tandon 2016, p. 112 f.).

The EU's original demand that the *EPAs* also liberalise trade in services and protect investors' rights was dropped because of opposition from African governments. This fear, not without reason, that *liberalising* trade and complying with EU standards on environmental, labour rights and human rights issues will cause them to lose control over their economies, especially control over their most important sources of revenue: royalties, trade taxes and levies on commodity exports. For example, at an NGO event in Berlin in June 2017, *Kenneth Ukaoha*

of the *National Association of Nigerian Traders* noted, "The goals articulated for EPAS—regional integration, economic growth and poverty reduction—are not reflected in the texts negotiated for the agreements so far." Instead, he said, the treaties cemented the control of African markets and resources by European corporations. "We in Nigeria want to transform our country, get away from unilateral dependence on oil and control our raw materials ourselves"—the *EPAs* would stand in the way of this (conference report by *Tobias Reichert* of 'Germanwatch': "African experts call for a new start for trade relations with the EU", in: Einblick, No. 2/2017, p. 9). Although the negotiations on *EPAs* should have been concluded by 2007, only one agreement has been concluded with the EU to date.

From the perspective of developing countries, the European Union's trade and development policies cannot exactly be given a positive testimonial (Asche and Engel 2008; Goldberg 2008; Olopade 2014; Kappel 2017; Tandon 2016; Jakob and Schlindwein 2017). The facts force the conclusion that the economic and political self-interests of EU countries are so strong, and so ruthlessly defended and enforced against weaker trading partners that they do more harm than good. The EU's undeclared but practised *trade war* against African countries not only has the effect of further reducing food security there, but also has the opposite effect of combating the causes of flight: Europe generates part of its 'illegal' immigrants itself (Asserate 2016; Nour and Münzing 2015; Jakob and Schlindwein 2017).

14.3 The World Bank's Development Policy

Development policy in Africa and for Africa can hardly be understood without the role of the World Bank; for 60 years it has globally been the lead organisation for development finance. For decades it possessed something like a *power of definition*: an indebted country that wanted to remain internationally creditworthy had to coordinate its financial and economic policies with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in order to obtain the coveted *stamp of approval* for its budgetary policies after often painful negotiations between the government and the World Bank experts (Tetzlaff 1980; Cassen 1990; Brown 1995; Easterly 2006). The World Bank is an organization owned by 189 countries and has expanded its mandate several times since its founding in 1944/45. Its historical mandate was to raise capital from richer industrialized countries for "productive projects" in developing countries and to invest it safely there. In more than five development policy phases it has tried to fulfil this 'development' mandate, admittedly in its own way (Tetzlaff and Nord 1996; Calderisi 2006). In the *first* phase (1947–1969), it

primarily co-financed large infrastructure projects in Latin America and Asia and from 1960 also in sub-Saharan Africa: above all the construction of dams, reservoirs, power stations, ports, airports and roads. This was a continuation of the developmental modernization that the British and French had begun during the colonial period. The *second phase* is mainly associated with the name of *Robert McNamara* (former US Secretary of Defense), who was the World Bank president from 1969 to 1981. Under his aegis, an additional focus of activities was on rural development, family planning and poverty eradication, in line with the slogan *investment in the poor*. Subsidized fertilizers and improved seeds were used to achieve economic growth by promoting *cash crop exports.* The 1980s—often referred to as the 'lost development decade'—constituted the *third phase* of development policy experiments. It was the period in which the increased energy prices as a result of the price policy of the oil cartel OPEC had to be absorbed—by means of *structural adjustment policies (SAPs)*. Only very few countries were to succeed in 'growing out of the vicious circle of debt' by means of the recommended commodity export policy plus austerity programmes (Körner et al. 1984; Tetzlaff 1993; Halper 2010).

In the *Washington Consensus*, the World Bank put the new neoliberal doctrine of *getting the prices right* in a nutshell. By this was meant the triad of *deregulation of the* economy, *privatization* of ailing (state) enterprises, and *liberalization* of financial and economic policies, which specifically meant policy reform on several points: (1) spending discipline; (2) taxation of property and income; (3) reduction of interest rates; (4) increase in necessary spending on health and education; (5) guarantee of property rights; (6) introduction of a competitive exchange rate (devaluation); (7) removal of barriers to foreign direct investment (Williamson cited in Halper 2010, p. 17). Applied to Africa, much of the recommended measures related to the removal or reduction of government subsidies on flour, bread and other staples and also to the dismissal of government employees. But these were precisely the social measures that African governments could hope to use in order to gain support and loyalty from their populations. This is why, from 1993 onwards, the Bank launched the 'second generation SAPs', which sought to achieve the same macro-economic objectives using socially gentler methods (e.g. creating alternative employment opportunities for dismissed civil servants) (Easterly 2006, p. 128 f.; Tetzlaff 2012).

The year 1989—the beginning of the World Bank's *fourth* development phase— also marked a turning point in post-war development history. The qualitatively new guiding principle of *good governance* shaped the course of international development cooperation. World Bank advisors now propagated three goals: An end to the misallocation of scarce public resources (waste); an end to corruption through

democratization of the political system; and consistent liberalization of markets in the spirit of the Washington Consensus (Nuscheler 2008). This marked the beginning of a taboo-breaking process: For according to its statutes, the World Bank is a *neutral* institution that must refrain from political assessments; it may only grant loans according to strictly objective criteria of usefulness. Publicly complaining that the non-development or misdevelopment in so many borrowing countries had *political causes,* attributable to government failure, often corresponded to reality (Calderisi 2006; Easterly 2006; Seitz 2009), but brought the World Bank into discredit in Africa. In the World Bank's *good governance approach*, there is an emphasis on actively improving *public sector management* in order to eradicate the previous internal disruptors to development: lack of fiscal discipline, lack of control over government spending, an oversized civil service prone to corruption, and an economically inefficient para-state sector (Gehring and Kerler 2007). The criticism from outside was often objectively justified, but contradicted the ideal of *ownership* that was held up at the same time: only that which a developmental state adopts itself is actually considered to be conducive to development (Messner and Scholz 2005; Hennings 2009; Faust and Neubert 2010).

The proclamation of the *Millennium Development Goals* by the United Nations in 2000 marked the beginning of the *fifth* phase in the World Bank's development history, which is currently still ongoing. The concept of *poverty reduction* was again placed at the centre of its activities (Barret et al. 2008; Eberlei 2009), which often seems implausible to African governments. But this time it was an intelligent extension of the World Bank's *Poverty Reduction Strategy* (PRS) for highly indebted countries,—an approach that in theory is serious about the principle of helping people *to help themselves*: a *highly indebted poor country* (forming the group of *HIPC* countries) only receives debt relief and a new credit line, if its government can credibly demonstrate that it is working towards the goal of poverty reduction. This includes demonstrating that it has also involved civil society groups in the planning and implementation of development projects with poverty components. In order to assess such *good governance* orientation from a comparative perspective, the World Bank has created a useful analytical tool in the form of the *Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI).* They consist of several indices based on the following six dimensions of *governance*: participation and accountability (*voice and accountability*), political stability, effective governance, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption (World Bank 2008). This strategy has not been very successful either, because not even in the model country Ghana has it been possible to significantly reduce the social gap between rich and poor (Aryeetey and Kambur 2008, p. 296 f.). This may also have been due to the fact that the interests of multinational agro-corporations were unilaterally taken into account at

the expense of *small-holders* in the World Bank's agricultural promotion (Nordiska Afrikainstitutet 2007; Calderisi 2006; Stiglitz 2006; Goldberg 2008, pp. 185–196; Pearce 2012, pp. 257 f.).

The current World Bank president, the American-South Korean doctor *Jim Yong Kim*, born in Seoul in 1959, was appointed by the US President Obama in the summer of 2012—against the will of a majority of developing countries, which had favoured the Nigerian finance minister *Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala. President Kim*, who was appointed for a second term in 2016, has also set his sights on reforming the World Bank, but so far has not been able to make much headway against political opposition from the US and other developed countries. One of the main shortcomings of the current World Bank architecture is the *anachronistic under-representation of emerging markets in its decision-making bodies.* Since the Chinese government established an *Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)* in 2015, which Western countries such as the UK, Germany, France, Australia, Italy and South Korea have also joined as members—against the wishes of the US government—the World Bank has again come under pressure to adapt. For a parallel organization is now emerging that will provide infrastructure loans on more favorable terms than the World Bank has done in the past, and African governments, dissatisfied with the World Bank's aid conditions, may now have hope that the *AIIB* will provide them with an alternative. In conclusion, the World Bank's long history as a financier of infrastructure projects and promoter of export-oriented enterprises has significantly advanced Africa's integration with global markets, but its growth successes have rarely translated into sustainable development progress.

14.4   China in Africa: Its Five Currencies of Power

The economic and political rise of the People's Republic of China since *Deng Xiaoping*'s reforms in the 1980s is one of the most important recent developments in world politics. From the Chinese perspective, this is a return to the 'normal state' of the international system; for eighteen out of twenty of the last centuries, China represented the largest (but not the most powerful) economy in the world and—as the *Middle Kingdom* and the *master of the Silk Road*—was the undisputed supremacy of a Sino-centric world that even before modern globalization had international trade contacts as far away as Africa in the course of its *Silk Road policy* (Frankopan 2016). For some years now, China has found itself in an intermediate position between East Asian regional power on the one hand and rapidly growing world

power on the other—that is, as a power with *multiple roles and identities.* One could say that China is simultaneously a developing country, an emerging economy, a regional power, an emerging world power, an expanding trading nation, a growing military power, a strategic partner of important commodity-exporting countries, and a veto power in foreign policy (in its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council). Its national economy represents a strange mix of Manchester capitalism and state-directed planned economy under the control of a hegemonic central committee. Major foreign investment by Chinese companies, whether private or state-owned, is inconceivable without the knowledge and acquiescence of the state party. Capital movements are strictly controlled, the banking system is state-regulated, the state also sets interest rates, and the exchange rate is also not allowed to fluctuate freely according to supply and demand, which gives China a considerable competitive financial advantage over Western countries.

China's policy for Africa is so multifaceted that one can therefore distinguish five dimensions, depending on one's point of view (Alden 2007; Manji and Marks 2007; Brautigam 2009; Halper 2010; Zeleza 2014; Moyo 2016; Nguébong-Ngatat 2018). The *first* possible interpretation praises China as a *useful and selfless development partner* that helps African countries catch up in development through loans, direct investments, scholarships, and gifts. The *second* interpretation assumes that Beijing has *neo-colonial intentions* in the sense that China's primary interest is in its own supply of African raw materials and that it is therefore indifferent to the consequences of its policy of exploitation. In addition, Africa as a continent with unused land for settlers was attractive for Chinese farmers willing to emigrate. The *third* interpretation focuses on the *opportunistic stabilization of corrupt dictatorships* (as in Angola and Nigeria) or resource-rich pariah states such as Sudan, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. The *fourth* interpretation sees China primarily as an *unfair competitor* that threatens to flood the markets of African countries with cheap consumer goods and thus stifle their own industrial production; for African industries in the textile, shoe, and food sectors, which are still in the process of being established, would not be able to keep up with the low-cost mass production from China. The *fifth* interpretation sees China as *an alternative global regulatory power* that intended to stand up to Western hegemony within the framework of its *cultural offensive and its global South-South cooperation policy.*

Each of these arguments contains 'a grain of truth', which is not least connected to the fact that China's Africa policy can by no means be described as homogeneous or rigid, but that it knows how to maintain 'partnerships' of varying intensity with countries of varying 'interest' (McKinsey 2017). What all patterns of relations have in common is that they are based on the principle of mutual benefit, in which the protection of human rights plays no role. In the following, the structure and

dynamics of these relationships will be examined in more detail on the basis of the five '*currencies of power*' (following the terminology of Michael Staack 2013, *p. 27*).

Power currency 1: economy and trade. For years, the People's Republic of China has been one of the most prosperous major economies in the world,—with annual growth rates between 6% and 12%. China's *trade* with Africa has also increased more than 60-fold over the past 20 years, from US$ 3.86 billion in 1995 to more than US$ 200 billion in 2016/17. In 2014, Africa exported 34% of its exports to the European Union, 18% to China, 6% to India, and only 5.5% of its goods exports went to the US (according to Kappel, Pfeiffer and Reihen, www.oekonomenstimmen.org). *Foreign direct investment (FDI)* is another indicator of economic strength. Here, too, China has achieved a top position in a short time. According to UNCTAD data, they grew 2.3-fold from US$ 9.33 billion in 2009 to US$ 21.23 billion in 2012 (Zeleza 2014, p. 153). China's *package deals* are also well-known: this is the name given to commodity deals by the People's Republic in which services (e.g. road and bridge construction) are exchanged for the right to future commodity imports. However, it is not only Chinese state-owned enterprises that buy raw materials in Africa, but also private-sector companies. In 2017, about 10,000 Chinese companies were active in Africa, of which about 90% were private companies (McKinsey 2017, p. 10). Chinese companies have captured a 12% share of the African market for manufactured goods, equivalent to a trade value of about US$ 500 billion annually. They produce not only for Asian markets but increasingly for African consumers. If the current expansion continues, then Chinese firms' sales in Africa could rise from the current US$ 180 billion to $440 billion in the next 8 years, a McKinsey study predicted (McKinsey 2017, p. 13). Their business success is obviously based on policies of low prices and adaptation to local population needs, as well as political backing from the Chinese government. Bilateral trade and settlement concessions for compatriots have been negotiated with the governments of Kenya, Angola, Tanzania, Zambia and other partner states, as well as guarantees for the *repatriation of profits*.

Power currency 2: development cooperation. As far as China's *development financing* in Africa is concerned, a distinction must be made between two types of financial assistance: The first is funding that meets or at least resembles the OECD countries' *Development Assistance Committee (DAC)* lending purposes and conditions, as it is developmentally motivated and contains a concessional element. These include the grants and interest-free loans administered by China's Ministry of Commerce, as well as low-interest loans from *EXIMBANK (Export-Import Bank)*. On the other hand, however, China also offers commercial loans from the *China*

Development Bank (CDB), which could again bring new over-indebtedness problems for African countries in the near future.

Power currency 3: arms supplies. In *military terms,* too, China is one of the world's great powers. Compared with the five 'classic' arms exporters, the USA, the Soviet Union/Russia, France, the UK and, more recently, Germany, China still ranks at the bottom; but what is remarkable is the trend that in this area, too, China is rapidly catching up and striving to take the political space opened up for it by Western countries, some of which are retreating. Between 2006 and 2010, China emerged as the largest arms supplier to sub-Saharan Africa, supplying 16 countries, led by currency-rich *Nigeria*, which accounted for 35% of all Chinese arms shipments to Africa, which some concerned observers have distrusted as the "poison of the dragon" (Brautigam 2009, pp. 287 f.). *Zimbabwe* under President Mugabe was once considered the "best-known African example of a dictator kept alive by China" (Halper 2010, p. 85). Not only did Beijing prevent UN resolutions for an arms embargo against Zimbabwe, but it also supplied the regime itself with thousands of Chinese AK47 rifles ostensibly "in preparation for the upcoming elections" (Taylor and Wu 2013, p. 466.). In total, US$ 240 million worth of weapons and transport equipment were supplied—including 12 jet fighter aircrafts and a hundred military vehicles (Taylor and Wu 2013, p. 467).

Power currency 4: cultural radiation: Foreign cultural policy has proven to be an indispensable component in shaping the foreign relations of modern great powers. As early as the times of *Mao Tse-tung* (1893–1976) and *Zhou En Lai* (1898–1976), the People's Republic felt close ties with countries that pursued a *non-aligned* foreign policy—such as Tanzania during the time of President Nyerere. The construction of the 1860 km-long TANZAM railway, which—completed by the Chinese in the 1970s—carried copper ore from Zambia to the Tanzanian port of Dar es Salaam (because Portuguese colonial wars blocked the southern routes), was a great propaganda success. But it was not until the 1990s that China launched an unparalleled cultural offensive: Since then, ever greater financial resources have been used to flank and promote China's economic and political rise with attractive cultural offers abroad.

The most visible symbol of this strategy are the now more than 430 *Confucius Institutes* in over 100 countries; but the establishment and expansion of correspondent networks and scholarship programmes for students from developing countries are now also part of the 'power currency of culture' (Hefele et al. 2015, p. 58 f.). Programmatically, the state-organized Confucius Institutes show similarities with the Spanish Cervantes Institutes, as both have a strong focus on language teaching. In 2007, the communist leadership under *Hu Jintao* had proclaimed at the 17th National People's Congress the goal: '*to enhance culture as a part of the soft power*

of our country' (cited in Hefele et al. 2015, p. 62). *Soft power* can be translated as 'exercising power by persuading others', although in China's case the verbal arts of persuasion are certainly garnished with material benefits. China has also become famous for its generosity in enabling the realisation of prestige and pet projects of African presidents, such as stadiums, palaces, people's halls or amusement parks. Furthermore, in the service of *soft power*, China's *media* presence in Africa has been greatly expanded. Since 2012, the television channel *CCTV Africa* has maintained its main office in Nairobi, Kenya; the state news agency *Xinhua* had twenty offices in Africa in 2012. "The government is increasingly opening up special investment incentives for Africa to Chinese telecoms firms, offering technical expertise to African media and inviting African journalists to China for training since 2004 . . . . China's voice is thus increasingly heard and is on its way to becoming an influential competitor in the international media world" (Hefele et al. 2015, pp. 70–71).

The Chinese state's *travel diplomacy* can also be seen as part of cultural policy, linked to economic self-interest. The numerous and high-ranking visits to Africa by top Chinese politicians are intended to convey the message that Beijing—in contrast to the USA, for example—takes African governments seriously as valued partners, even if they may otherwise be internationally isolated. Every African country, according to the official doctrine, represents an important sovereign partner for China, which is treated with respect and tolerance. The fact that this weakens the interests of civil society and the concerns of opposition groups fighting for human rights is accepted with approval (Manji and Marks 2007, p. 71f; Zeleza 2014; Moyo 2016). This opportunistic attitude on the part of China then has particularly serious consequences for the African populations when, in the United Nations *Human Rights Council*, resolutions brought into play by Western states against political countries (such as Sudan, Chad or Zimbabwe) that had been guilty of *ethnic cleansing* or other genocidal crimes are stifled (Halper 2010, p. 115).

China's image as Africa's benevolent hegemon in a spirit of international solidarity is cultivated not least through the summits and conferences that have been held regularly every 3 years since the turn of the millennium, sometimes in Beijing, sometimes in Africa. The first *Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)* was held in Beijing in October 2000 in the presence of four African presidents; at the fifth meeting in Beijing in 2012, the host addressed 50 African leaders and promised to them *US$ 20 billion in* economic loans over the next few years. The *African Talents Program* promised to train 30,000 people and provide government scholarships for 18,000 students (Zeleza 2014, p. 150). At the sixth FOCAC meeting in December 2015, President *Xi Jin-Ping* increased financial support to *US$ 60 billion* for interest-free loans, in addition to food aid to needy

people in Zimbabwe. No Western country has ever been able to stage a comparable politically heavyweight event with African leaders—even the Commonwealth summits in London or the Francophonie summits in Paris cannot compete with China's FOCACs conferences.

The handover of the *African Union*'s new headquarters in Addis Ababa in 2013 represented the climax of the Chinese charm offensive for the time being: To mark the 50th anniversary of the *Organisation of African Unity (OAU)*, the forerunner of the *African Union, the* ostentatious US\$ 200 million government palaces were ceremoniously handed over to African heads of state and government. Three years later, in October 2016, Chancellor *Angela Merkel* inaugurated the African Union's new parliament building, financed by Germany to the tune of US\$ 20 million—the parliament where parliamentarians are only allowed to debate, but not to legislate!

Power currency 5: consensus and veto power. As a permanent member of the *UN Security Council,* Beijing also knows how to use its veto power for its raw material interests in Africa. In the controversies over whether UN sanctions should be imposed against Sudan in view of the accusations of genocide in the Darfur war, Beijing held its protective hand over the criminal regime of President *Mohamed Bashir*—with success: the genocide accusation, although factually justified, was dropped. Sudan had risen to become China's strategic partner in oil supplies; Beijing sourced one-third of its African oil imports from (then undivided) Sudan and had invested 15 billion US\$ in the country since 1996 (Alden 2007, p. 61). Nonetheless, Beijing later relented and allowed a resolution in the Security Council to have the president indicted by the *International Criminal Court* for war crimes and crimes against humanity to pass. Overall, the Chinese now enjoy an overwhelmingly good reputation in Africa among the populations of several countries—as generous development agents (as revealed by a *Gallup poll* and a 2013 *PEW Global Attitude survey*; Zeleza 2014, p. 158).

Conclusion: China will continue to be a world power *sui generis* well into the twenty-first century, "focusing primarily on internal development and pursuing foreign policy primarily to promote and ensure this development" (Staack 2013, p. 15). The observation that China goes to great lengths in pursuit of raw materials and strategic partners, following its national interests, can be considered as 'normal' for a great power. What is special, however, is the strategy of offering Africans an alternative to the neoliberal development policy of the Western industrialised countries, the *Beijing Consensus.* It is based on the triad of controlled market economy, state interventionism and authoritarian statehood, whereby the protection of human rights is not at issue. Beijing can do little to counter the accusation from human rights organizations that blind support for *pariah states* is tantamount to a

license to murder political opponents in those countries with impunity. But African governments unquestionably welcome the People's Republic of China's generous and varied offer of aid because it increases their room for manoeuvre in foreign policy (Nguébong-Ngatat 2018).

Discussion

1. What historical role did and does the World Bank play in the development of African countries?
2. Explain the objections of African governments to the *Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)* of the European Union and assess the various points of view.
3. How does China's policy for Africa differ from the Africa policy of Western industrialised countries? Refer to the concept of 'power currencies'.

Summary and Outlook: Development Policy Perspectives

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15.1 Africa as a Fragmented Continent: Seven Regional Worlds

Africa is a continent in rapid change: problems of all kinds are piling up for the people on the ground, but there are also positive developments. Compared to the state of African countries around 1960, two generations later the African continent has become highly differentiated into groups of countries with different development trajectories: It now represents a **centrifugal ensemble of seven regional country-worlds,** each with diverging development prospects. At the same time, the population in each country and region has become highly differentiated in terms of social structure. Let us start with the country groups:

First, there is the group of **five North African countries** (the **Maghreb states**) that are still struggling with the consequences of the 'Arab Spring' (with the exception of Morocco). In January 2011, popular protests had forced *Tunisian dictator Ben Ali* to leave his country—a consequence of the self-immolation of *Mohamed Bouazizi,* a small trader mistreated by local authorities, in the town of *Sidi Bouzid.* The '*Arab Spring*', which was in reality only a 'North African Spring' and soon turned into a 'North Arab Autumn', just began in a relatively advanced, modern country "that had been seen as a model in many places in Africa: for its relative prosperity, its stability, its emerging middle class, its good popular education and progressive women's rights". Paradoxically, this named the very factors "which, according to the consensus of its enlightened elites, Africa should finally be moving forward" (Johnson 2013, p. 115). The fall of the dictator of Tunisia was followed by the collapse of the tyrannies in *Egypt* and *Libya,* of *President Mubarak* and *President Gaddafi.* In 2017, the civil war country of **Libya** is in the position of a *failing state* with militant rival power groups, while **Tunisia**, though still politically

unstable, has already begun a democratic awakening. **Egypt** has been ruled since May 2014 by President *Abdelfattach al-Sisi,* who ousted elected President *Mohamed Mursi in* July 2013. Since then, a restoration of the repressive conditions takes place on the Nile that had already prevailed under President *Husni Mubarak* before the 'Arab Spring' began. The highly armed oil and gas state of **Algeria** (whose population suffered a civil war in the 1990s with 150,000 deaths) is 'ruled' by President *Abdel al-Aziz Bouteflika* (who has been seriously ill for years), who has been in office since 1999. The unstable country is struggling with major challenges such as high youth unemployment, over-indebtedness and corruption in the omnipresent state party *Front de Libération National (FLN).*

Second, there is the small group of nine relatively **successful** countries with **democratic transition** and managed **market economies***: Benin, Botswana, Ghana, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Namibia, Senegal, Seychelles and South Africa*. These are countries that have also already made considerable progress in developing national productive forces. Four countries have been assigned *investment grade* by international rating agencies: *Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa*. The latter is the only state in Africa that not only has significant strategic natural resources but has also produced competitive industries. Under the slogan *Black Economic Empowerment (BEE)*, the ANC government has launched an economic and investment programme that is mainly intended to provide upward mobility for the new black middle class.

Third, there is the large group of **defective democracies** with **authoritarian patronage regimes,** in which the state is not part of the solution but rather part of the problem. Development opportunities depend on whether **civil society** forces and a middle class capable of conflict succeed in pushing through democratic reforms in the face of state resistance. There are discernible signs of this in *Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Cameroon, Kenya, Mali, Malawi and Tanzania.* The following countries are considered by international investors as markets with speculative profit opportunities: *Ethiopia, Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Cameroon, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Zambia, Senegal and Tanzania* (according to World Bank: Africa's Pulse, Washington, April 2016, p. 25).

Fourth, the group of **failing states** should be highlighted: *Somalia, South Sudan, CAR, Chad, DR Congo, Libya, Sudan, Burundi, Zimbabwe (?) and Mali (?).* Currently, the World Bank and IMF count 19 countries in sub-Saharan Africa as **fragile states**,—that's 40% of all countries in the region with a quarter of Africa's total population of 1.216 billion people (2016). It is important to keep in mind that there is no law of nature in the sense that *failing states* must remain in this state of decay forever. The **ex-civil war states** of *Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone and Rwanda* have shown that, with active support from abroad, destroyed

post-war societies can renew and stabilise themselves. However, *research on the causes of war has* also found that countries that have already suffered a civil war are likely to become the scene of militant conflicts again (this is true of *Sudan, Uganda, Burundi and Mali*).

Fifth, there is the special group of five **territorially large oil-exporting countries**: *Algeria, Angola, DR Congo, Nigeria and Sudan*. What they have in common is that their governments have so far not known how to invest the considerable rents from raw materials for the benefit of their respective populations ('curse of raw materials'), but have spent heavily on armaments. They all had or have to struggle with **regional-secessionist tendencies** or even anti-regime wars. The sheer size of the states, which requires extremely large efforts and financial resources to develop infrastructurally and administratively, should not be underestimated as a structural obstacle to development (a colonial legacy). As a solution to the problem, a policy of gradual **decentralization and federalization** would be appropriate, but its realization is opposed by the widespread *addiction to control on the part of the central states*, which follows the logic: Those who have high state revenue to bestow on some one can lavishly serve themselves and their patronage networks and hope for political loyalty on the part of the beneficiaries.

Sixth, there is the subgroup of **authoritarian countries with development-oriented governance** that come close to the ideal of the ***developmental state.*** Inspired by the Chinese model, the goal of economic progress is placed above the imperative of respect for democracy and human rights. These include above all: *Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda*. As rather resource-poor countries, they are united in the pursuit of economic diversification and partial integration into international value chains.

And seventh, there is the group of countries with particular **structural disadvantages**—due to small internal market size (*Lesotho and Swaziland)*, geographically unfavourable location (*land-locked countries of* the *Sahel)*, including small islands *(Sao Tome and Principe and Comoros)*. Only 'small countries' specialising in tourism (*Seychelles*) have reasonable chances of thriving economic growth and relative prosperity.

If the *four types of economic systems* (see Sect. 2.14) are combined with those of political systems, the result is a country typology with *13 groups of states,* as illustrated in Table 15.1*:*

Table 15.1 Africa—a country typology

Economic system	Political system			
	I Democracy. Rule of law	II Patronage State	III Dictatorship: military/ civilian	IV State disintegration
Jointed market economy	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Profit + Development *e.g. Mauritius*	Profit + Development *e.g. South Africa*	Profit + rents *e.g. Egypt*	–
Rent economy	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	Rent: Diamonds *e.g. Botswana*	Rent: Mining *e.g. Angola*	Rent: Crude oil + cotton *e.g. Sudan*	Rent: Crude oil + metals *e.g. DR Congo*
Postcolonial commodity economy	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
	State revenues: Export of minerals + food + DA *e.g. Namibia*	State revenues: Export of raw materials + food + DA *e.g. Cameroon*	State revenues: Export of raw materials + food + DA *e.g. Rwanda*	State revenues: Export of raw materials + foodstuffs + DA *e.g. CAR*
Economy of violence	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
	–	–	Subsistence; food export; migration tax *e.g. Eritrea*	Subsistence; protection money; disaster DA *e.g. Somalia*

Source: Own presentation. *DA* development aid, *CAR* Central African Republic

15.2   Africa: A Country Typology

One consequence of this *regional and political fragmentation* of Africa is that the establishment of *regional* economic and development communities, as the European Commission also intends to promote with the regional *Economic*

Partnership Agreements (EPAs), will be increasingly difficult to achieve. There is also hardly any material basis left for *Pan-African* community initiatives.

As far as the **socio-cultural internal differentiation** of African societies is concerned, the following **five trends of change** should be highlighted: (a) an increasing social polarization between *urban and rural areas*, with urbanization proceeding rapidly in the sense of the 'ruralization' of cities; (b) the rise of the African *middle classes* in the more economically successful countries (country groups 2, 6 and 10); (c) the growing importance of *religion* and *ethnicity* as means of constructing identification; (d) the visibility of discrimination against *women* and *gender relations*; (e) the increase in ethno-cultural-social tensions and conflicts over economic access to land, pasture and water resources, which is to be seen as the *ubiquitous pattern of conflict* in Africa's more densely populated regions.

The *Global Wealth Report* estimates the number of Africans belonging to the **middle classes** at 18.8 million. They are estimated to have an income of US$ 2 to US$ 13 per capita per day (Melber 2016, p. 53). Members of the middle classes have more choices to spend their somewhat higher incomes according to individual preferences (for consumption or for culture); but, paradoxically, because of their better connections to global communication markets, they also belong to the groups from which economic refugees *willing to migrate* are recruited with preference.

Religion has become an important means of expression especially for people with hopes for the future (Chidester et al. 2004). The number and significance of Christian Pentecostal churches (Nigeria) and Muslim mosque communities (Sudan, Mali) are increasing, with *religious self-assertion* also functioning as a means of social demarcation from other 'we-groups'. However, persistent discrimination against **girls and women in employment** has hindered development progress, though awareness of gender inequity has grown in urban civil societies (UNIFEM 1995; Kihiu 2010; Schäfer 2008; Verschuur et al. 2014).

15.3 Findings and Development Perspectives

In this final chapter, some key findings of the topics discussed on the postcolonial development of African countries will be summarized in **ten points:**

    I. Since independence (1960), some groups of countries in Africa have achieved major **economic growth successes**, but structural change towards industrialisation and systemic competitiveness has largely failed to

materialise ("Growth without Development"; Kappel and Reisen 2017). Africa's share of the world population is about 13%, but its share of world trade is only about 3%. This **economic marginalization** of the continent has many causes; one central cause has long been the *asymmetrical and unfair* structure of trade relations between politically strong industrialized countries (the former colonial powers plus North America) and Third World countries that has developed over centuries. It can be called '*unfair*' because the gap in incomes was not primarily the result of economic competition, but the result of political violence in the times of imperialism and colonialism. Nonetheless, African societies such as Zimbabwe, Nigeria and Cameroon, for example, have failed to make better use of endogenous development potentials due to state failure, unlike emerging Asian economies. Consequently, references to the '*colonial legacy*' can claim less and less credibility as an explanation for the lack of progress in development.

About three-quarters of all exports still consist of **natural resources**, with oil and gas occupying a prominent place as foreign exchange earners (alongside with gold, diamonds, copper, chrome, coltan, bauxite and tropical timber). At the same time, the **fluctuation of world prices** implies an inevitable uncertainty in the planning of government spending and development investments. The sharp rise in commodity exports has not been a boon to African societies as a whole, due in no small part to the ruinous policies of **aggressive tax avoidance** by globally active **commodity corporations** (such as *Glencore*). For a long time, the **commodity boom** masked the fact that Africa's main economic problem, the low participation of the **manufacturing sector in international value chains**, has still not been solved. Africa has arrived in capitalism, but capitalism is not yet everywhere in Africa (Goldberg 2008, p. 17).

II. Concessional and commercial **capital inflows**, including direct investment, roughly quadrupled between 2000 and 2015 (from US$ 25 billion to over US$ 90 billion),—in no small part due to PRC involvement. International commercial banks provided about US$ 7.7 billion in net loans and US$ 4.5 billion in portfolio investments in 2014, suggesting an increased appetite for risk among firms seeking investment (Raschen 2016, p. 3). As recently as the 1990s, African countries were highly indebted: Whereas at that time **external debt** often carried 80% of national economic output, today the debt-to-GDP ratio is only around 20%–25%, thanks to debt relief from creditors and national fiscal policy reforms.

III. The **low productivity of the agricultural sector thwarts** the achievement of food security. Agriculture accounts for only about 22% of national

economic output. The share of the **rural population** in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen from 87% (1961) to less than 60% today, but their absolute number has tripled, and with it the rural population density. **Agricultural production** has grown less than the total population, but much more than the rural population. About 60% of the increase in production can be attributed to *land expansion* and about 40% to an increase in *land productivity.* The crux of African agriculture is that the **productivity** is still too **low**: "No ploughing, hardly any livestock grazing, extensive land use, little use of agro-chemicals, no mechanization, little livestock fertilization, compounded by unfavourable natural conditions such as nutrient-poor soils, erratic rainfall and the burden of diseases such as sleeping sickness spread by the tse-tse fly" (Goldberg 2008, p. 120). Farm sizes have remained largely unchanged for decades. Therefore, promoting the **capacity** of smallholder farmers to **innovate** and **enter the market** would promise the greatest progress in the fight for food security (Nour and Münzing 2015; Rauch et al. 2016). Obviously, however, this approach is not compatible with the nowadays widespread strategy of **land grabbing** (Pearce 2012; Kress 2012; Schlimmer 2017). Empirical studies have shown that investments in the context of *land grabbing* "harm the food security, income, living conditions and environment of local people" (*Committee on World Food Security: Report of the High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition, 2011, p. 8).*

IV. **Hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity** will continue to shape life in at least 15 structurally weak African countries for a very long time to come. Conflicts over land ownership and use rights are increasing (Boone 2014), not least because of unmanaged population growth. According to the *World Hunger Relief Index 2017 (Welthungerhilfe Index, WHH)*, the hunger situation is 'severe' or 'very severe' in eight countries worldwide (seven of which are African): in *CAR, Chad, Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone, Zambia, Sudan,* and the civil war-torn country of *Yemen.* In addition, there were 13 countries for which WHH scores could not be calculated for 2017, but where **food insecurity** was assessed as very high: *Burundi, Comoros, DR Congo, Eritrea, Libya, Somalia and South Sudan.* In most cases, the people and groups who suffer the most from hunger and malnutrition are those with the least **social, economic** or **political power**. The power imbalance is also an expression of **social income inequality**, which is particularly high in the African *middle income countries* (South Africa, Ghana, Botswana, and Kenya) as well as in the oil exporting countries (Angola, Nigeria, and Gabon). In the search for the causes, the "central role of transnational

corporations such as Monsanto, DuPont and Syngenta in the world food system must be taken into account" (Naomi Hossain, Institute of Development Studies, in: WHH: World Hunger Index 2017. How Inequality Creates Hunger, October 2017, pp. 25–26).

V. **Poverty** was reduced in some African countries, but in others the number of poor still increased (especially in the state failure countries). In 2000, with an average **per capita income (PCI)** of US$ 502, sub-Saharan Africa, together with South Asia, was among the world's poorest regions: a large proportion (58%) of the African population lived below the **poverty line** at that time; today (2017) the figure is just below 50% (2012: 43%). The agricultural and commodity continent of Africa still has to **import** a large part of its **food** (US$ 70 billion worth in 2010)! The central goal of the **UN Millennium Development Goals** of halving the poverty rate has been clearly missed in Africa (but not globally); and there is nothing to suggest that this will fundamentally change much in the near future. There are at least three reasons for this. *First,* over the same period (2000 to 2015), economic growth (about 2% per capita) was matched by population growth of 50% (in absolute terms) or 2.7% per year (in relative terms), meaning that the rate of consumption was higher than the rate of production and productivity. *Second*, the **scarcity of natural resources**, which would be necessary for the maintenance and further development of both the *African subsistence economy* and the *export economy,* is becoming increasingly noticeable, for example in the form of the high number of local **land conflicts**. This primarily concerns the *shortage of land*, *pasture and water* for pastoral groups and small farmers, who are additionally weakened by frequent **droughts** (in eastern and southern Africa as well as in the Sahel countries) and who are in danger of being marginalised by large-scale agricultural investment by outsiders (*land-grabbing*). And *third*, in the absence of large-scale **industrialization** and a lack of agricultural productivity gains, there is still no convincing solution to the serious **job problem***: the millions of underemployed and income-less men and women in search of paid work— living frustrated in the waiting room of life.

VI. **Population growth**, which is still far too **high** (relative to available economic resources), is blocking Africa's development like no other single factor. By 2050, Africa's population may have grown from 1.216 billion today to 2.47 billion. While since 60 years, the global birth rate has halved from about 5 to 2.5 children per woman, the rate in Africa has only slightly decreased: to 4.7 in 2015. Every year, about **20 million young** people grow up looking for a job, but only about two million young people are able to

find jobs in formal sectors of the economy each year. Thus, the vast majority of the growing labor force of 18 million annually continues to be pushed into insecure jobs, each with very low productivity and income levels. Young men and women will migrate to *Africa's overflowing megacities* in the course of the rural exodus forced by hardship and will somehow try to make a living there. Some of them will die prematurely as a result of **structural violence** in the slums of the megacities. Who is surprised then that young people without prospects at home are tempted by the vague prospect of a life in Europe (or North America)? **Flight and migration** seem to them to be a rational way out of their non self-inflicted misery. A conflict of interests has arisen that is politically difficult to resolve: African governments and societies argue for *protected* markets vis-à-vis European exporters and *open* borders between Africa and Europe for migrants, while the majority of politicians in EU states advocate *open* markets in Africa for European businessmen and *guarded* borders at the edges of 'Fortress Europe'.

VII. The **rural agricultural area as a survival area** for the vast majority of the population has reached its limits: As long as African families were able to retreat there, they were able to survive with the help of widely ramified kinship relations and to escape social descent into a *lumpenproletariat.* It was not the motive of profit maximization that determined the logic of their actions, but the interest in preserving the family production unit. In the view of an average **doubling of the population** every 25–28 years (since 1960), the pre-modern African mode of production is overstrained and has come apart at the seams. There is therefore an urgent need to **modernize** and **capitalize** peasant agriculture in all countries (Mills 2010).

VIII. **African countries are losing their development potential to foreign countries**. It is tantamount to 'self-mutilation' if the African continent loses three of its centrally important treasures to foreign countries year after year: (1) **productive forces** such as young energetic women and men who are forced to leave their homes either as refugees from war, or as migrants from lack of economic prospects and because of climate change; (2) **flight capital**, about US$ 60 billion annually, which is thus lost to productive investment in the home countries; (3) **social capital**, i.e. professionals, critical intellectuals, opposition politicians and artists who are driven into exile because of political repression or low salaries at home.

The most effective **countermeasures** are considered to be the avoidance of unplanned pregnancies through family planning and the promotion of

education and gainful employment for girls and women. *In the long term*, therefore, the solution to the 'overpopulation problem' lies in a policy that combines **family planning on a large scale** with the labour-intensive **increase in productivity in the agricultural sector.**

IX. It is not money that is the key to development, but **political determination and professional competence on the part of those responsible for the state**. The empirical case studies presented here confirm the findings of the theory of the **developmental state.** The post-colonial **patronage state,** which aims at *extractive practices* for the purpose of self-benefiting its largely unproductive caste (state class), blocks the emergence of an indigenous entrepreneurial class with its positional **preventive power**: as **gate-keeper** of revenues and expenditures, of imports and exports; it controls trade and production and, in extreme cases (Zimbabwe, DR Congo, Angola, Nigeria), develops into a '**looting machine**' (in the sense of Burgis 2015). In the case of commodity-exporting countries, the **rent-seeking** mentality determines policy and thus paralyses the rationality of **profit-seeking** on the part of the national *business community*. The seductive wealth of natural resources has contributed to the development of such an **anti-accumulation political milieu** in many places ('the curse of commodities'). This includes **corruption** at the level of the state bureaucracy, which has become endemic in many places and considerably curbs economic performance and professional perspectives, as many young Africans nowadays lament.

X. There is much to be said for the thesis that the hitherto customary procedures of the international **development cooperation (DC)** have not significantly promoted the development process of African countries (especially in the above-mentioned country groups 3 and 4). In total, post-colonial Africa has received around US$ 1.2 trillion in public and private 'development aid'. While success has been achieved at the **local micro-level** in individual development aid projects (expanding infrastructure, raising education and health standards, increasing food security), the hoped-for positive effects at the **national macro-level** have largely failed to materialize. Instead, a much lamented **dependency syndrome** has developed among the bureaucratic elites of the beneficiary states, paralysing the will to reform and their own initiatives. **DC funding** for sub-Saharan Africa has increased to about US$ 50 billion annually over the past 15 years (Official Development Aid), and 16 countries received more than 10% of their gross national income through ODA funds, opening the door to administrative corruption, as African authors have lamented (Moyo 2009; Shikwati 2011; Nebe 2011). Nevertheless, it should not be denied that this *policy area* should also be understood

as a **permanent learning process** in which smart and committed scholars and practitioners have been striving for decades to improve the methods used. "The search for the adjusting screws to increase the effectiveness of development policy" (Faust and Neubert 2010, p. 78), as the mantra of official development cooperation has been for decades, is understandable, but possibly not very productive, if not counterproductive, on the much-travelled paths (Illy 2007). A **'detoxification' of international development cooperation** would be necessary (Cologne Memorandum on Development Policy 2016; Deaton 2013).

In Africa, too, societies cannot be developed **from outside** if the national will at the highest government level (the commitment to **ownership**) is lacking. The formulas of the World Bank and other donor agencies have mostly failed to work because markets in Africa are still "imperfect, oligopolistic, exclusive and fragmented" (Molt 2010, p. 33). Without an efficient, relatively autonomously operating **administration by professionals** who are able to set appropriate *political and legal framework conditions* for the development of small and medium-sized enterprises (which are also followed!), development in the sense of **self-empowerment** of society cannot succeed. Each African country would need its own **reform agenda** (Olopade 2014; Mills et al. 2017, p. 262 f.). What should be promoted, therefore, is **voice and respect for the priorities of local people,** which include the generation of sustainable income from **gainful employment** as a top priority. The Tanzania-born President of the *Society for International Development (SID)*, **Juma V**. **Mwapachu**, ex-Secretary-General of the East African Community (2006–2011), should have the last word. Asked for advice on **Africa's future**, he replied:

I think the narrative should come from a new breed of leadership. I think the term 'leadership' is too much associated with political leadership. The new leadership has to come from the whole society. We need to harness the energies of Africa's young people . . . The narrative should refocus African thinking on African unity and Africa's economic transformation as a continent . . . I think it is important to re-establish the role of the developmental state, not on socialist, ideological principles, but as a developmental state within a changing global economic landscape in which it first establishes national interests (Mwapachu 2012, pp. 443 and 448).

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