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Solinger, Dorothy J.

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ENDING ONE-PARTY DOMINANCE: KOREA, TAIWAN, MEXICO

Dorothy J. Solinger

Dorothy J. Solinger *is professor of political science at the University of California, Irvine and adjunct senior research scholar at Columbia University's East Asian Institute. Her most recent book is* Contesting Citizenship in Urban China *(1999). She is also coeditor of* States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy *(1999).*

The last few years have witnessed a series of astonishing electoral victories by opposition-party presidential candidates in regimes that had experienced decades of one-party hegemony—Kim Dae Jung in South Korea in December 1997, Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan in March 2000, and Vicente Fox in Mexico in July 2000.[1] Although authoritarian rule had effectively come to an end in all three countries somewhat earlier, these elections marked the first time that an opposition leader had captured the presidency. How did these victories come to pass? In each instance, the elections were predicted to be close; commentators had not foreseen the defeat of the ruling party. To what extent should we view these contests as the clinching moment in which a long process of democratization was sealed and a full-fledged democracy revealed?

These opposition victories should be regarded not simply as the product of a finally freed-up, democratically expressed public will, but as the outcome of a lengthy process of unraveling of single-party domination, first unleashed long before by the decision to allow "limited elections" and then given a critical boost by the perhaps necessary result of those elections, a split in the ruling party. I contend that similar factors have been at work in all three countries, and I will seek to demonstrate that a certain logic and a set of regularities marked the chain of events that culminated in opposition victories. Each step in the process I will describe prepared the way for the step that followed, eventuating in the same outcome at almost the same historical moment in all three countries. Moreover, as I will show, the playing out of this sequence may create severe obstacles for the subsequent task of democratic consolidation.

I do not attempt to account for the underlying conditions that enabled events in these three countries (and not others) to follow this particular logic. My explanation sets aside the usual list of historical, political, socioeconomic, cultural, and international factors cited to explain transitions from authoritarian to democratic government—the nature of the prior regime, the effects of modernization and industrialization, the rise of a middle class, the birth and growth of popular organizations (and the protests and demands issuing from them), the spread of literacy and the media, international pressure, and demonstration effects from other recently democratized polities. I will also ignore the strategic choices and calculations, the crafting and engineering of "four-party games," and the pacts among elites that have been viewed as especially important in such contexts. In Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico, democratization did not simply occur "by elections," and the impact of these other factors cannot be denied; indeed, most or even all of them were present—and surely contributed to the outcome—in all three cases.

My own approach, however, is to isolate six structural factors present in all three countries, related to and emerging from long-term authoritarian one-party rule. These factors are: 1) decades of *elections* (at a minimum for local offices) that were instituted to bolster the questionable legitimacy of one-party rule, but were manipulated and dominated by the ruling party through fraud, intimidation, the power of incumbency, official rules, or some combination thereof; 2) the presence throughout these decades of at least one *opposition party* (or, in Taiwan's case, local factions that later merged into an outside-the-Party *[dangwai]* movement), permitted to exist largely to shore up the perception of the dominant party's right to govern; 3) eventual *electoral reforms,* undertaken to uphold the ruling party's claim to be the proper governor of a "free" regime, as well as to stifle external criticism and the demands of the party's domestic opponents by giving a greater voice to the opposition; 4) a very high and ultimately intolerable level of *corruption* and fraud in the ruling party, made possible by uninterrupted rule; 5) one or more *split-offs* from the dominant party, with the result that at least *three significant parties* (one composed of politicians who were formerly members of the dominant party) were in contention in the critical election; and finally, 6) a *charismatic opposition leader,* able quite convincingly and credibly (because of his own past political record) to promise change. The sequencing of this list suggests that each of these factors is linked, both temporally and causally, to the preceding factor, and leads in turn to the succeeding ones.

A Long History of Elections

Mexico, South Korea, and Taiwan all held more or less regular elections for half a century before the victory of the opposition leader.

Their leaders did so in order to improve their country's image with the world's advanced democracies (especially the United States, with which each had a special relationship), as well as to convince their own people that the party in power was the country's rightful ruler. In none of these countries, however, did these elections—at least until the late 1970s in Taiwan and the late 1980s in Mexico and South Korea—offer voters genuine policy choices.[2]

In Mexico, according to Roderic Ai Camp, "the most important principle of political liberalism" celebrated by the Revolution of 1910 and later enshrined in the Constitution of 1917 was "increased participation in governance expressed through effective suffrage." Elections were regularly held at all levels, but they have been characterized as "ritualized," fraudulent, and manipulated.[3]

The leaders of South Korea had a strong incentive to maintain the appearance of democracy because of their rivalry with the North and their dependence on the goodwill of the United States, which propped up their regime with development and security assistance. Notwithstanding military coups in 1961 and 1980, two or more supposedly genuine political parties generally participated in elections at the national level, and—up to 1961 and after 1991—at the local level as well. Unlike in Mexico, however, there was no direct election of the president in South Korea from 1960 until the transition to democracy in 1987.

In Taiwan, as in South Korea, the holding of elections was motivated by the leaders' desire to draw a sharp distinction between their regime and that of their communist rivals on the mainland and to appear to the external world as "free" and democratic. The ruling Kuomintang (KMT) also sought, however, to win the support of the local Taiwanese population (which they had, in essence, conquered), and thus they put local elections in place almost immediately. At first, they simply continued to hold the universal-suffrage elections for township representatives that they had instituted on the mainland in 1946. In 1950, however, they extended these contests to township heads, city executives, and city council members. The next year, the KMT held competitive elections for the first Taiwan Provincial Assembly, as well as for village executives and councils.[4] Unlike in coup-prone South Korea, elections were never cancelled in Taiwan, and after 1969 the people were permitted to take part in direct elections for some seats at the central level as well. Moreover, opposition candidates started to win local office in the 1970s. The president and vice-president, however, were chosen indirectly until 1996.

In each country, it turned out that elections instituted to enhance the ruling party's legitimacy eventually paved the way for its loss of power many decades later. For in order to hold elections that exhibited even the minimal trappings of authenticity, the rulers had to permit some form of opposition that would at least appear to contest their position in power.

Over time, in each of these countries, the degree of authenticity of the contests gradually increased.

Opposition Parties

Of the three countries, Mexico had the largest number of "opposition" parties. The presence of opposition parties dates back to the early days of independence after 1821. In the twentieth century, conflicts and internal splits on the left produced what Daniel Levy and Kathleen Bruhn termed "countless parties, quasi parties, and currents" that supplied "a facade of competition."[5] The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) incorporated, co-opted, or colluded with the many smaller leftist parties in the 1930s, and by the time it had taken on its present name and consolidated its rule in 1946, only the National Action Party (PAN), created in 1939, remained apart. Even the PAN, up until the late 1980s, was more a "symbolic counterweight" to the PRI than an actual competitor for power.[6]

Since 1948, South Korea's party system has seen an amazingly confusing succession of parties emerging and then disappearing along with the politicians who led them. Indeed, one can identify nearly 20 differently named parties worth noting over this period if one counts both the dominant party at each juncture and the coexisting opposition parties. Yet each of the parties that dominated in the successive "republics," from the Liberal Party founded by Syngman Rhee in 1948 to today's Grand National Party (GNP, so named in late 1997), has been based in the same region—the Kyongsang provinces in the southeast—and has evidenced continuity in personalities as well. Given the importance of regional cleavages, this continuity has given the succession of dominant parties the appearance of a single hegemonic ruling party over the years.

In Taiwan, the case was superficially different, as Taiwan essentially had a one-party state for four decades (only two tiny, co-opted, and totally inconsequential parties were allowed to exist outside the KMT until 1986). Local factions appeared within counties or cities, but for the most part were incorporated into the KMT. As early as the 1970s, however, a growing and maturing opposition movement began to coalesce among the native Taiwanese, nurtured through the opportunities local elections provided for the expression of protest and mobilization. At the start of that decade, politicians involved in this movement took on the title *dangwai* for their grouping, and by the late 1970s they were coordinating their campaigns and attracting increasing support. Yet it was not until 1986 that the KMT, under President Chiang Ching-kuo, recognized and legalized the opposition movement, which only then took on the name Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).

Thus in all three countries, either one hegemonic party (the PRI in

Mexico and the KMT in Taiwan) or what amounted to one party in Korea[7] held the reins of power, manipulating elections to prevent any truly significant challenge from the opposition until the late 1980s.

Electoral Reforms

Certainly the opposition, such as it was, would never have become a threat in any of these places had it not been for electoral reforms. These were inaugurated, first and most continuously in Mexico (from 1977 through to 1996), but also in Taiwan in 1980 and 1986, and in South Korea in 1987. In every case, the reforms were prodded by opposition protests, but they were chiefly inspired by the same motivations that had led to the instituting of elections in the first place—the desire to silence and co-opt opposition and discontent, to impress the external world, and to give the opposition improved (but actually impotent) channels through which to express their interests and demands. Each governing party had its own incentives to appear increasingly democratic to the outside world, while seeming to be authoritative, relatively representative, and legitimate at home.

In Mexico, reforms in 1977 legalized the participation of the independent leftist parties, and reserved 100 (of 400) seats in the Chamber of Deputies for opposition parties (though these seats had to be divided proportionately among these parties, thereby limiting the share of any one of them). Opposition parties also received more access to the media. Nine years later, in 1986, President Miguel de la Madrid introduced much more significant reforms that decreed that the leading party could never obtain more than 70 percent of the seats in this lower chamber. At the same time, the share of seats allocated on the basis of proportional representation was increased from 100 to 200, now out of a total of 500 seats. The only hitch was that the party that won the largest number of seats (always, of course, the PRI) was permitted to retain a simple majority in the lower chamber.

Further reforms were passed in the mid-1990s under the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo. In 1994, the right of a party winning a plurality to guarantee itself a legislative majority was eliminated; a Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was instituted to monitor elections; campaign spending was limited; and media access for the opposition was increased. In 1996, the IFE was turned into an independent agency, greater quantities of public funds were provided for campaigns, and free media advertising was extended to all candidates, thereby for the first time significantly leveling the playing field.

In South Korea, several reforms of the electoral process occurred in the 1990s. In 1994, a new Comprehensive Election Law was passed that placed many limitations on campaigning and spending, and an amendment to the local autonomy law mandated the direct election of

provincial governors, city mayors, and county chiefs every four years, reinstating contests that had been eliminated in 1961. But most critical was the June 1987 decision of General Roh Tae Woo, presidential nominee of the ruling party, to respond to a public outcry by supporting an immediate constitutional amendment permitting direct popular election of the president. Had Roh not thrown his support behind the amendment, he would have been essentially appointed by his predecessor, Chun Doo Hwan; as it turned out, Roh won at the polls with a mere 36.6 percent of the vote, as the opposition failed to unite behind a single candidate.

In Taiwan, both domestic and international pressures spurred the KMT to make greater efforts to legitimize itself. At home, the expansion of opposition sentiment and the deepening challenge from the opposition pushed the party to make some changes. These also were a response to the decline in Taiwan's international stature throughout the decade, as it lost its seat in the UN in 1971 and was successively forced to sever diplomatic relations with Canada, Japan, the United States, and other industrialized countries as they established diplomatic ties with China. The KMT reformed its own central organs in 1972 and undertook major personnel changes that ultimately led to the Taiwanization of the party. In 1980, it promulgated a landmark electoral law that facilitated competition.

The most significant measures, however, were President Chiang Ching-kuo's decisions in 1987 to lift martial law and to eliminate the nearly 40-year-old ban on genuine opposition parties. With the end of the ban, the DPP began at once to contest elections. In 1989, the first elections were held in which opposition parties could openly compete with KMT candidates. In 1994, the first direct gubernatorial election was held, and direct mayoral elections were restored in Taipei and Kaohsiung. In 1996, the first direct, popular presidential elections finally took place.

So in all three polities, very significant electoral reforms occurred in the late 1980s and 1990s, principally as a result of elite officeholders' efforts to stave off any further draining of their power. This draining, one might argue, had been set in motion precisely because earlier leaders had allowed elections in the first place, and had authorized the opposition forces that were later to become genuine rivals of the ruling party. Even so, electoral reform might have worked as its authors intended had long-term authoritarian rule not corroded the ruling parties' own integrity and legitimacy by permitting unchecked corruption to proceed without penalty.

Fraud and Corruption

Authoritarian rule is, by its very nature, unaccountable. Those who wield power are free to amass and allocate resources as they wish.

Accordingly, leaders in all three countries managed elections corruptly, buying votes with money, gifts, and banquets in Taiwan; stuffing ballot boxes, bribing voters, busing villagers to the polls to vote for the PRI, and tampering with tallying computers in Mexico; and controlling the media, working hand in glove with the *chaebol* to skew elections in their favor, and sometimes jailing opposition leaders in South Korea. In each case, the ruling party and the government were so tightly linked as to be virtually indistinguishable. Hegemonic power enabled them to collect vast sums of campaign money, to monopolize the media, and even, when necessary, to mobilize the military or police to commandeer "electoral" victory. But gradually, as the opposition's growing strength began to compensate for the ruling parties' increasingly blatant graft, fraud, and intimidation, these dominant parties began to find themselves in real trouble.

This increased strength of the opposition was compounded by something else that aroused popular anger—namely, the corruption fostered by the once-unobstructed sway of the ruling parties. In Mexico, the problem was exacerbated by economic hardship brought on by government economic policies—the debt crisis of 1982 and its aftermath and the crash of the peso in late 1994 (which has been blamed on former president Carlos Salinas's bungled attempt to secure his legacy). The working class, which had no input in policy making, suffered most of all from the crises. There were also shocking cases of corruption, especially one involving Salinas's brother, which surfaced just as he stepped down from power.

In South Korea, the misdeeds of the ruling party under military rule were dramatically highlighted by President Kim Young Sam in order to deepen his own support. In 1995, he had his two immediate predecessors, former presidents Chun Doo Hwan and Roh Tae Woo, arrested, brought to trial, charged with corruption, and sentenced to lengthy jail terms, in part over slush-fund scandals. Kim Young Sam himself was later implicated in another scandal—concerning illegal loans to the bankrupt Hanbo Steel Corporation—in which his son and confidants were involved. These cases enraged a public that had already had a taste of democratic opening.

In Taiwan, the vote-buying that had always been a problem only got worse when elections became truly contested. By the late 1990s, politics on the island were significantly marred by charges of underworld ties and serious financial irregularities on the part of the KMT. These stains of crime and corruption were symbolized by the derisive term "black gold."

Initially, corruption was made possible and thrived in these countries because of the unimpeded political sway that was exercised by authoritarian ruling parties. Once elections, opposition parties, and electoral reforms (and the freer press that accompanied these

developments) gathered force, such corruption was brought to the surface and exposed.

Defections from the Ruling Party

Against the background of this unfolding history, perhaps it was inevitable that eventually a portion of the ruling party—frustrated by the persistence of one-sided policies and corrupt practices or emboldened by the new space accorded opposing voices—would split off, once electoral reforms made it clear that elections would no longer be a fiction. In all three countries, such splits proved to be the final, clinching condition that precipitated the ruling party's loss of the presidency.

These splits meant that when the critical, truly competitive, and certifiably fair election took place in each country, there were at least three significant parties running candidates. Had there still been just two parties in South Korea in 1997 and in Mexico and Taiwan in 2000, it is quite likely that the GNP, the PRI, and the KMT would have remained in power. Then again, however, it may be that splits within the ruling party are inevitable as the process I have described unfolds.

The first such split came in Mexico. In 1986, the "Democratic Current," the more leftist-oriented, populist section of the PRI that opposed President Miguel de la Madrid's austerity policies, tried to alter the structure of the PRI to make it more democratic. The Democratic Current's continual criticism led to its leaders being expelled from the party in 1987. At the core of the group was Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, who became the new party's candidate in the 1988 presidential election. According to official figures, Cárdenas captured 31 percent of the vote (with the PAN receiving 17 percent and the PRI just over 51 percent). Indeed, a suspicious computer breakdown at a crucial moment caused some observers to suspect that Cárdenas might actually have won the election. The following year, various segments of the left came together to form the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD).

This split had a number of consequences that eventually led to the PRI's defeat in the 2000 presidential election. Most obviously, some of the once-reliable rural vote shifted away from the PRI, as did part of the more traditional populist wing of the party. In addition, the split sent a signal that the PRI could be challenged and its policies defied. The victor in 2000 was not Cárdenas but PAN candidate Vicente Fox (who took about 43.5 percent of the vote, to PRI candidate Francisco Labastida's 36.9 percent and Cárdenas's 17 percent). Yet if Cárdenas and his followers had not broken with the PRI, it is possible that Labastida's chances would have been far greater.

In South Korea, after General Roh's announcement in July 1987 that he would call for an amendment to allow for direct election of the president, the opposition (at that time united under the name of New

Korean Democratic Party) stood an excellent chance of winning the election. The difficulty, however, was that in the months prior to the December vote opposition leaders were unable to unite around a single candidate. With this split in the opposition vote, Roh's ruling Democratic Justice Party won with a mere 36.6 percent of the vote, while the three opposition leaders—Kim Dae Jung, Kim Young Sam, and Kim Jong Pil—won 27, 28, and 8 percent of the vote, respectively. In that round, the splits benefited the ruling party.

By the time of the 1997 elections, however, shifts had occurred that undermined the former ruling party, which had merged with Kim Jong Pil's New Democratic Republican Party and Kim Young Sam's Reunification Democratic Party to form the Democratic Liberal Party in 1990. It then changed its name to the New Korea Party (NKP) in 1995 and to the Grand National Party in 1997, just before the election. Indeed, the maneuvering from 1995 to 1997 had a great deal to do with Kim Dae Jung's victory. To begin with, Kim Jong Pil's party broke off from the ruling NKP in 1995 to create the United Liberal Democratic Party (ULD) and later formed an alliance with Kim Dae Jung's new National Congress for New Politics. Kim Dae Jung's prospects were also increased when a popular governor, Rhee In Jae, split off from the Grand National Party in 1997. These defections from the ruling party permitted Kim Dae Jung to win the 1997 presidential election with 39.7 percent of the vote, ahead of the GNP's Lee Hoi Chang, with 38.2 percent, and Rhee, with 18.9 percent.[8] This victory would not have been possible without these transfers of allegiance and the resultant three-way race.

In Taiwan, the critical splits that mortally weakened the KMT occurred in 1993 and again in mid-1999. The first group to separate itself from the KMT was a predominantly mainlander, traditionalist faction, led by Premier Hau Pei-tsun, which favored eventual unification with the mainland. As intraparty tensions mounted between Hau's "non-mainstream" and President Lee Teng-hui's "mainstream" factions, Lee finally forced Hau out of the KMT; soon thereafter, Hau created his own party, the New Party.

Later, as the campaign for the 2000 presidential election was taking shape, the KMT suffered the defection of James Soong. The enormously popular governor of the island's provincial government and leader of a significant power bloc, Soong seemed to President Lee to constitute a threat to the latter's chosen successor, Lien Chan. Mounting conflict led to Soong's marginalization within the KMT, and ultimately to his decision in July 1999 to mount an independent challenge for the presidency. In fact, opinion polls indicated a strong likelihood that Soong himself would have won the election had a damaging financial scandal not surfaced less than three months before the voting.

Although the New Party was no longer a force to be reckoned with by 2000, the three-way split between Soong, the KMT, and the DPP was

undoubtedly a critical factor in the victory of Chen Shui-bian of the DPP, who took a mere 39 percent of the vote, to Soong's 37 percent and KMT candidate Lien Chan's 23 percent. Although the KMT had lost much of its popularity, primarily because of its corruption, it surely could have remained in power had Soong stayed on board.

Commentators on all three elections argue that the splitting of the vote among three serious contenders made all the difference. Among the victors, only Fox achieved as much as 44 percent of the popular vote, with Kim and Chen obtaining under 40 percent. In each case, more of the voters cast their ballots *against* the winner than *for* him. *Had the ruling party still contained the faction that split off from it, it would have had a majority.*

Charismatic Opposition Candidates

It may be true that structural conditions were crucial in each country, and that any opposition candidate could have come to power once long-term hegemonic rule had promoted rampant corruption, electoral reforms had changed the nature of the political game, and splits in the ruling party had cut into its constituency. Nonetheless, in each case the victorious opposition parties were blessed with charismatic leaders who could convincingly proclaim their intention to promote change, to deal harshly with corruption, and to make the government more democratic. Because of their personal histories, their principled stands, and their commanding personalities, Vicente Fox, Kim Dae Jung, and Chen Shui-bian were ideal for the job at hand.

Fox campaigned explicitly on a platform of change, and his calls for change struck a chord among the young, the well-educated, and urbanites, all growing sections of the population. According to the *New York Times,* Fox was seen by his supporters as "a clever strategist . . . [who] succeeded in attracting supporters from across the political landscape." His past as a leading business executive suggested to voters that he was a capable administrator and perhaps would be a fighter against mainstream political tactics. Back in 1988, he had attracted support by standing up to soldiers in an attempt to retrieve disputed ballots from the basement of the Congress.[9] And according to noted U.S. political strategist Dick Morris, who helped him in the 2000 presidential election, "Fox has a chemistry with the people of Mexico that is beyond belief."[10]

In South Korea, Kim Dae Jung had been known for decades as a fighter for democracy. In 1971, after Kim was narrowly defeated in the presidential election, President Park Chung Hee nearly had him assassinated, banned all political parties, and introduced the autocratic Fourth (Yushin) Republic. Throughout the 1970s, Kim battled tirelessly for human rights. In 1980, at the time of prodemocracy protests in Kim's home province of South Cholla, General Chun Doo Hwan, soon to grab power for

himself, arrested Kim and had him sentenced to death for allegedly provoking the Kwangju uprising. With his charismatic personality and his impeccable democratic credentials, Kim, like Fox, won supporters in his own right—and an international reputation that helped to earn him the Nobel Peace Prize in 2000.

As for Chen Shui-bian in Taiwan, he too had the image of "a determined fighter."[11] Chen attracted votes for several reasons: his "ethnicity" as a Taiwanese native; his prior support for independence for the island; his effective (and puritanical) governance of the capital as mayor in the mid-1990s; and his wife's paralysis, the result of her having been struck by a truck in 1995 in what was widely believed to have been a deliberate assault.

All told, it is difficult to determine which of these factors were necessary and which sufficient. Who can say definitively that other candidates would not have been able to seize the opportunities that the structural factors linked to long-term one-party rule had fostered? Yet it does seem plausible that, without the splits in the ruling party and the three-way contests that resulted, even remarkable politicians might not have been able to win.

Implications for Consolidation

Commentators have noted how important it is for the consolidation of democracy that elected officials and the institutions they lead be able to function effectively as decision makers and implementers of policy.[12] Paradoxically, in these three cases, triumph at the polls has not meant easy sailing for the victors, at least so far.

In each case, the new leaders have had to confront legislatures that their parties did not control. For Kim Dae Jung, the solution was the simplest: Given the historical fluidity of the Korean party system and the fragility of specific parties, Kim was gradually able, during his first year in power, to coax and coerce a number of GNP representatives and some independents in the National Assembly to switch over to his own party, facilitating his command over policy. This, however, also won him public rebuke.

Lacking the power to win over members of other parties, it was immediately clear that Chen and Fox would have to form coalitions or be thwarted by coalitions among their rivals. A critical issue will be who can form coalitions with whom. After the 1997 Congressional elections in Mexico, the PAN and the PRD controlled more seats together than the PRI did by itself; yet despite negotiations about forming an opposition coalition at least for certain votes, the PAN generally sided with the PRI. Now that Fox is president, it is not unthinkable that the PRI will find common cause with the PRD on some issues in the interest of undermining the PAN.

In Taiwan, the first months of Chen's presidency were marred by the efforts of the KMT, which still dominates the Legislative Yuan, to block his moves. Moreover, there were even indications that the KMT was willing in certain critical situations to act in league with its splitoffs, James Soong's People's First Party (formally established in the immediate wake of the presidential election) and the New Party. Indeed, as early as October—a mere five months after Chen took office—the KMT was already proposing a recall, with the possibility of unseating him.

In each case, the structural feature that enabled opposition leaders to win—the presence of three significant competing parties—is making it hard for them to govern. In none of these countries do the difficulties of divided government appear to have been workably resolved along the lines of "cohabitation" in France. In Taiwan and Korea, the strong leaders who have won the presidency do not seem ready to share their power with a prime minister, as Jacques Chirac and before him François Mitterand have done, and as the KMT has called upon Chen Shui-bian to do. Indeed, Kim Dae Jung reneged on an agreement with ULD boss Kim Jong Pil to convert Korea into a parliamentary system. The clash of institutions between the presidency and the legislature that has emerged from the opposition victories in three-way races (*and not the elections themselves,* as many think) may well prove to be the critical test for these new democracies. Maneuvering around the shoals of this conflict will not only try the political institutions needed for anchoring democracy but will call for a culture of civility, trust, cooperation, and compromise without which these institutions are just a sham.[13]

In sum, once leaders of a one-party dominant authoritarian system permit other parties or factions to participate in elections, these leaders may be setting in motion a chain of events that not only undermines the system they have constructed but that also puts up roadblocks to obstruct the consolidation of a new democratic one.

NOTES

1. At the outset, a few clarifications are in order: In Korea, unlike in Taiwan and Mexico, there was not one omnipotent party but rather a string of them, closely linked to the military until the transition to democracy in 1987, and mostly led by a set of politicians from the same region of the country and (with the exception of Kim Young Sam) with similar authoritarian backgrounds and philosophies of rule. If Korea's leading parties, with their constantly shifting titles, did not constitute a replica of Mexico's Institutional Revolutionary Party (in power under different names from 1929 to 2000) or Taiwan's Kuomintang (which ruled on the island from 1945 to 2000), they behaved in all significant ways as their functional equivalent. Second, whereas Korea had effectively passed through its democratic transition by 1987 (despite the rule of the old dominant party until 1997), Taiwan's democratic transition was completed only in 1996, while Mexico's PRI continued many of its authoritarian ways right up until it lost power in the 2000 presidential election.

2. On Mexico, see Andreas Schedler, "Mexico's Victory: The Democratic Revelation," *Journal of Democracy* 11 (October 2000): 5–19; on Taiwan, see Linda Chao and Ramon H. Myers, "How Elections Promoted Democracy in Taiwan Under Martial Law," *The China Quarterly* 162 (June 2000); and on Korea, see Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, eds., *Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea* (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1999).

3. Roderic Ai Camp, *Politics in Mexico: The Decline of Authoritarianism* (3rd ed.) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 42; Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule and the Question of Democracy," in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (2nd ed.) (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1999), 540, 545.

4. Shelley Rigger, *Politics in Taiwan* (London: Routledge, 1999), 18–19. Hung-mao Tien presents this history a bit differently in "Elections and Taiwan's Democratic Development," in Hung-mao Tien, ed., *Taiwan's Electoral Politics and Democratic Transition: Riding the Third Wave* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), 5. See also Bruce J. Dickson, "The Kuomintang Before Democratization: Organizational Change and the Role of Elections," in ibid., 57.

5. Daniel C. Levy and Kathleen Bruhn, "Mexico: Sustained Civilian Rule and the Question of Democracy," in Larry Diamond et al., eds., *Democracy in Developing Countries,* 542.

6. Ibid., 544; Andreas Schedler, "Mexico's Victory: The Democratic Revelation," 7.

7. This effective one party went under the following names: the Liberal Party during Syngman Rhee's First Republic (1948–60); the Democratic Republican Party, in Park Chung Hee's Third and Fourth Republics (1972–79); the Democratic Justice Party in Chun Doo Hwan's Fifth Republic and Roh Tae Woo's Sixth Republic (from 1981–89) and the Democratic Liberal Party in Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam's Sixth Republic (1990–95); and the New Korea Party (1995–97) under Kim Young Sam. Soon after changing its name once again to the Grand National Party (GNP) in 1997 (a name which it retains at this writing in late 2000), it finally lost power to Kim Dae Jung in the same year, still under the Sixth Republic.

8. Byung-Kook Kim, "Party Politics in South Korea's Democracy: The Crisis of Success," in Larry Diamond and Doh Chull Shin, eds., *Institutional Reform and Democratic Consolidation in Korea,* 57–61.

9. Sam Dillon, "Presidential Challenger in Mexico Pitches Tent in Two Camps," *New York Times,* 11 June 2000.

10. Quoted in Sam Dillon, "Businessman Breaks Political Mold," *New York Times,* 4 July 2000, 3.

11. Mark Landler, "A Determined Fighter Who Paid a Price," *New York Times,* 19 March 2000, 1.

12. Omar G. Encarnacion, "Beyond Transitions: The Politics of Democratic Consolidation," *Comparative Politics* 32 (July 2000): 485–86.

13. Larry Diamond, "Introduction: In Search of Consolidation," in Larry Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Yun-han Chu, and Hung-mao Tien, eds., *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), xv–xlix.