The Social Science Journal

ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ussj20

Failed coups, political survival, and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes

Lacin Idil Oztig & Murat Donduran

To cite this article: Lacin Idil Oztig & Murat Donduran (2020): Failed coups, political survival, and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes, The Social Science Journal, DOI: 10.1080/03623319.2020.1827686

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2020.1827686

Published online: 01 Oct 2020.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCE JOURNAL
https://doi.org/10.1080/03623319.2020.1827686

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Failed coups, political survival, and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes

Lacin Idil Oztig [a] and Murat Donduran[b]

[a]Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey; [b]Department of Economics, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Yildiz Technical University, Istanbul, Turkey

ABSTRACT

Nondemocratic regimes are built on coercive state mechanisms that are designed to suppress popular demands for democratization. Nevertheless, in practice, they display different patterns of civil liberties restrictions. This study makes a novel contribution to the literature on comparative authoritarianism and human rights by providing an account of the impact of failed coups on civil liberties restrictions in non-democratic regimes. We argue that failed coups lead to more than targeted repression of coup plotters and potential challengers. After facing coup attempts, nondemocratic leaders have stronger incentives to retain their power by averting not only future coups but also future revolts. As such, they restrict civil liberties in order to prevent the emergence and mobilization of dissent in society. Analyzing 70 nondemocratic regimes during the period of 1976–2016, we find that civil liberties restrictions are more likely to increase in the wake of failed coups.

KEYWORDS

failed coups; civil liberties restrictions; nondemocratic states; winning coalition; inter-elite dynamics

Introduction

State repression refers to the "behavior that is applied by governments in an effort to bring about political quiescence and facilitate the continuity of the regime through some form of restriction or violation of political and civil liberties" (Davenport, 2000, p. 6). Repression might take the form of political and civil liberties restrictions, such as banning political parties, shutting down newspapers and civil society organizations, prohibiting the use of social media platforms, and the like. Repression might also take the more severe form of personal integrity rights violations (e.g., political imprisonment, torture, forced disappearances, and government-sponsored killing) (Cingranelli & Richards, 1999; Demeritt, 2014; Poe & Tate, 1994).

There is a striking difference between democracies and nondemocracies with respect to government-led repressive activities. Democracies tend to be less repressive even when they face domestic challenges (Davenport, 1999, 2007a; Keith, 2002; Krain, 1997; Mitchell & McCormick, 1988; Poe & Tate, 1994; Poe et al., 1999).[1] In sharp contrast to democracies, nondemocratic regimes are characterized by strong coercive apparatuses designed to repress demands for democratization. Furthermore, state-society relations in authoritarian states are governed by norms that discourage citizens from questioning and rising up against state authorities (Grugel & Louis, 2002).

CONTACT Lacin Idil Oztig loztig@yildiz.edu.tr Department of Political Science and International Relations, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Davutpasa Campus, Yildiz Technical University, Esenler, 34210 Istanbul, Turkey

[1]It should be noted that even though there is a difference in the degree of repression employed between democratic and nondemocratic regimes, repression is also observed among democracies. Goldstein (2001), and Rapoport and Weinberg (2012) show that democratic rulers do not refrain from using repressive methods against their political opponents. Rejali (2007) stresses that in some democracies certain torture techniques are used that leave no physical evidence on the victim.

Nevertheless, in practice, there is much variation in the repression of civil liberties in nondemocratic regimes. Existing research has made significant progress in understanding this variation by examining the differences between subtypes of nondemocratic regimes (Davenport, 2007b; Møller & Skaaning, 2013; Poe & Tate, 1994), the impacts of international human rights treaties (Fariss, 2014; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007; Neumeyer, 2005; Vreeland, 2008), elected legislatures (Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014), and political challenges (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014).

This article brings a novel insight into the literature on comparative authoritarianism and human rights by developing and testing an argument on the relationship between failed coups and civil liberties restrictions. There is a growing scholarly attention on the impact of failed coups on state repression. A notable example is the recent study of Curtice and Arnon (2019) that links failed coups to higher levels of physical integrity rights violations. Building their argument on survival-driven leaders, the authors contend that in the midst of uncertainty following coup attempts, incumbents preemptively increase personal integrity rights violations to signal regime strength and discourage potential competitors.

We argue that failed coups incentivize nondemocratic leaders to target not only coup plotters and would-be challengers, but also the broader segments of population. Due to altered inter-elite dynamics, repression employed to show the strength of the regime in the post-failed coup period does not translate into the incumbents' increased political security. More specifically, even if nondemocratic leaders could minimize the threat of a coup in the post-failed coup period through the punishment of coup plotters and other strategies (such as coup proofing and personalization of power), they still remain in a precarious position against the threat of popular mobilization.

We explicate the relationship between failed coups and civil liberties restrictions by giving a special emphasis on inter-elite dynamics. Our study is built upon the argument that elites play a central role in authoritarian stability (Bove et al., 2017; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Magaloni, 2008). Importantly, without elite support, nondemocratic leaders' chances of surviving popular mobilization diminish significantly. For example, when revolts started in Iran in 1978, political elites did not play a mediating role between the regime and the masses (Yom, 2016). In addition to the lack of support from elites, the neutrality of the military played a crucial role in the overthrow of the Shah in 1979. More recent examples come from Egypt and Tunisia. Both the Mubarak and Ben Ali regimes fell down after the military actors refused to act in support of these regimes in the midst of the Arab Spring protests (Bellin, 2012).

Taken all together, in the light of inter-elite problems in the post-failed coup periods, the risk of mass revolts becomes more aggravated for nondemocratic rulers. Under these circumstances, we expect autocrats to have higher incentives to restrict civil liberties as a preemptive repression method to reduce people's collective action capacity as a strategic response to the threat of popular mobilization. A statistical analysis of 70 nondemocratic states from 1976 to 2016 corroborates our theoretical argument. This conclusion is consistent across different model specifications.

The determinants of authoritarian repression

The last decade witnessed a burgeoning literature that examines the determinants of authoritarian repression. Analyzing the impact of regime characteristics on nondemocratic regimes' repressive activities, Davenport (2007b) finds that while military regimes are less restrictive towards civil rights, they are more likely to violate personal integrity rights compared to other nondemocratic regime types. In contrast, Møller and Skaaning (2013) show that subtypes of nondemocratic regimes do not show much variation with respect to civil liberties restrictions. They further note that due to the pressure placed on nondemocratic regimes to liberalize after the Cold War, the differences between democracies and nondemocracies with respect to civil liberties restrictions have declined.

Another body of work examined the impact of international human rights treaties on authoritarian repression. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007) find that the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) has no impact on the most repressive states. Along

similar lines, Neumeyer (2005) indicates that nondemocratic regimes with weak civil societies do not decrease civil liberties restrictions after the ratification of the ICCPR, further noting that these states might even become more repressive after ratifying the treaty.

The study of Frantz and Kendall-Taylor (2014) highlights the importance of legislative dynamics in authoritarian repression. The authors show that nondemocratic states with elected legislatures tend to rely on lower levels of civil liberties restrictions. However, they specify that while authoritarian-elected legislatures discourage nondemocratic leaders from repressing ordinary citizens, they do not constrain nondemocratic leaders from applying harsher and more targeted repressive measures against their opponents among the political elites (Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014).

Our study builds on the emerging literature that explains repressive state activities through leaders' political survival incentives (Escribà-Folch, 2013; Ritter, 2014; Ritter & Conrad, 2016; Sullivan, 2015; Young, 2009). Ritter and Conrad (2016) note that rulers might not only repress in response to political challenges (responsive repression), but might also choose to repress to prevent the emergence of political challenges to their authority (preemptive repression). Furthermore, Sullivan (2015) emphasizes that when governments anticipate the development of political challenges to their authority, they attempt to undermine these behaviors both overtly (through personal integrity rights violations) and covertly (through surveillance, wiretapping, etc.).

In his analysis of the link between political threats, nondemocratic leaders' political survival incentives, and repression types, Escribà-Folch (2013) notes that nondemocratic leaders employ civil liberties restrictions to prevent collective action and rely on personal integrity rights violations to target organized opposition groups. Curtice and Arnon (2019) highlight that rulers who survive coup attempts increase personal integrity rights violations preemptively with the objective of discouraging their competitors from orchestrating future coup attempts.

Even though the determinants of authoritarian repression have been examined with recent attention given to preemptive repression and the link between failed coups and personal integrity rights violations, so far, no study has systematically examined the impact of failed coups on civil liberties restrictions. We make a novel contribution to the literature on authoritarian politics and human rights by theorizing the relationship between failed coups and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes.

We argue that failed coups lead to more than the repression of coup plotters and rulers' potential competitors. As nondemocratic leaders always face the risk of being replaced by coups or revolts (Goemans et al., 2009; Svolik, 2009), their political position becomes even more precarious in the aftermath of failed coups even though the elites are suppressed. In the post-failed coup period, we expect the threat of revolts to incentivize a nondemocratic leader to increase civil liberties restrictions as a preventive measure to thwart the emergence and mobilization of dissent. The following section explicates the theoretical linkage between failed coups, inter-elite dynamics, and civil liberties restrictions in nondemocratic regimes.

The theoretical framework

Our argument adopts the assumption of rational leaders who are interested in political survival or the long-term ability to stay in power. The political survival of leaders depends on the support of their winning coalition (Bove et al., 2017; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Magaloni, 2008). The winning coalition consists of a group of people who have authority over choosing and deposing a leader. In nondemocracies, a winning coalition consists of the inner circle of a leader (political and/or military elites).[2] This is in sharp contrast with democracies, in which the winning coalition consists of voters (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). As rational actors, all

[2]Throughout the paper, we use the winning coalitions and elites interchangeably. However, we specify that while the winning coalition consists of elites, there are also elites outside the winning coalition. For different compositions of winning coalitions, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003).

nondemocratic leaders, including iron-fisted dictators, need the support of their winning coalition to hold onto office (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gilli & Li, 2015).

Nondemocratic leaders institutionalize the loyalty of their winning coalition through consultative councils, military juntas, and political bureaus (Acemoğlu & Robinson, 2006; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007; Lutterbeck, 2012; Svolik, 2012a). Unlike democratic leaders, nondemocratic leaders do not need popular support to maintain their power. By receiving the support of their winning coalition, they might rule for decades (Geddes et al., 2014).

Nevertheless, nondemocratic leaders always face the risk of losing office through violent means (Tullock, 1987). Put another way, even at the height of their power, they are not immune to irregular and violent leadership transitions. Coups are the most common strategy to oust authoritarian leaders from office (Goemans et al., 2009; Svolik, 2009, 2012a). By analyzing 316 nondemocratic leaders between 1945 and 2002, Svolik (2009) finds that more than two-thirds of them were toppled by a coup. Similarly, by studying 201 cases of nondemocratic leadership transitions between 1950 and 2004, Bove and Rivera (2015) find that 102 of them were the result of coups.

The costs of losing political office are rather high for nondemocratic leaders. In their analysis of irregularly displaced leaders in 188 countries from 1875 to 2004, Goemans et al. (2009) find that only 20% of them escape post-exit punishment. Murder, imprisonment, and exile are the most common examples of post-tenure punishments for deposed leaders (Chiozza & Goemans, 2004; Goemans et al., 2009). In parallel with the high costs of being associated with a nondemocratic leader's ouster, the cost of defection is high for coup plotters. When nondemocratic leaders survive coup attempts, they first and foremost punish the defectors (targeted/responsive repression). Most failed coups result in the murder of the coup plotters (Svolik, 2012a).

Failed coups present incumbents with a dual opportunity to remove their opponents and provide legal justification or pretext for their removal (Easton & Siverson, 2019; Powell et al., 2019). As shown by Curtice and Arnon (2019), throughout the post-failed coup periods, rulers preemptively arrest, torture, assassinate their political opponents in order to prevent future coup activities (targeted/preemptive repression). If the coup plotters are among a nondemocratic leader's winning coalition, the incumbent might purge other members of the winning coalition by seeing them as potential coup plotters. The leader might go as far as replacing his winning coalition with a new one.

Coup plotters might also be outside of the incumbent's winning coalition. Even if a failed coup is not orchestrated by the incumbent's winning coalition, the incumbent might still become suspicious of his winning coalition's loyalty and adopt political survival strategies to deter the future coordination of coups (targeted/preemptive repression). For example, the leader might rely on coup-proofing strategies, such as fractionalizing the military with the aim of weakening its capacity to launch a coup (Belkin & Schofer, 2005; Böhmelt & Pilster, 2015; Sudduth, 2017). The incumbent might also choose to personalize his power as a political survival strategy. Personalization of power creates a win-lose outcome for members of the winning coalition, as the leader's accumulation of power translates into a decrease in the winning coalition's power (Kendall-Taylor et al., 2017).

After a coup attempt, a nondemocratic leader might successfully expand his political power to the point of deterring future coup conspirators (Easton & Siverson, 2018; Svolik, 2012a). However, even when the leader does not aim to punish his winning coalition directly, his political survival strategies (such as coup-proofing strategies and personalization of power) result in the weakening of the winning coalition's political, military, or economic power. In this new strategic setting, even with the minimization of the coup risk, the incumbent still remains in a precarious political position.

As underlined previously, losing the support of the winning coalitions is detrimental to nondemocratic leaders' political survival (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2011; Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2003). Importantly, the incumbent's ability to withstand popular uprisings rests primarily on the support of his winning coalition. Goemans et al. (2009) and Svolik (2009) indicate that along with coups, revolts are common types of leadership change in nondemocratic states. Hendrix and Salehyan (2017) show that when leaders ruling countries with divided security forces face challenges from the masses, the orders of the leaders to repress the population might not be followed by

security forces and even cause military and police defections. The winning coalition's lack of support for the incumbent during revolts might even lead to the incumbent's downfall.

Even if revolts do not result in unseating the current incumbent, they put the incumbent's political survival at risk by augmenting the threat of elite defection. Galetovic and Sanhueza (2000) show that popular unrest increases the risk of coups in nondemocratic regimes. Revolts send a signal to the elites about the popular dissatisfaction with the current regime. The public signal that the leadership transition will be tolerated by the masses incentivizes the potential defectors among the elites to coordinate and stage the coup against the incumbent (Casper & Tyson, 2014; Johnson & Thyne, 2016).

We argue that in the new strategic setting followed by failed coups, nondemocratic leaders have the highest concern about their overthrow, not only by the elites, but also by the masses. Since incumbents' chances of surviving revolts are low when there are commitment problems at the elite level, in the post-failed coup periods marked by high uncertainty, we expect authoritarian leaders to restrict civil liberties by perceiving a greater risk of popular mobilization.

In outlining our theoretical argument, we do not indicate a direct linkage between failed coups and revolts. In linking failed coups to civil liberties restrictions, we rather focus on authoritarian leaders' concerns about the outbreak of revolts (perceived risk) when they are in a precarious political position after failed coups, rather than the objective risk of revolts. In other words, given the importance of the support of the winning coalition in authoritarian survival and the changed inter-elite dynamics in the post-failed coup periods, we expect authoritarian leaders to be more concerned about their political survival in case of a mass mobilization against the regime.

Under these circumstances, we expect nondemocratic rulers to repress to quell any future threats from the masses. As nondemocratic leaders are interested in maximizing political longevity and avoiding their post-tenure fates, from their perspective, repressing the masses becomes an ex-ante optimal political survival strategy in the face of the future threat of revolt. In other words, in the post-failed coup periods, civil liberties restrictions are *preemptive repression* (repression ex-ante) applied in anticipation of revolts. Civil liberties restrictions (e.g., restricting the freedom of assembly, closing newspapers, prohibiting social media platforms) enable nondemocratic leaders to not only render the coordination of organized opposition groups more difficult, but also prevent the emergence of potential dissidents among the society.

Taken all together, we argue that post-failed coup periods are characterized by altered inter-elite dynamics. In such periods, irrespective of whether defectors are among the winning coalition and whether the incumbent directly or indirectly targets his winning coalition, the strategic relationship between the incumbent and his winning coalition substantially changes. In the new strategic setting characterized by the transformation of inter-elite dynamics, the incumbent feels insecure vis-à-vis both the elites and the masses. Overall, under these circumstances, we expect nondemocratic leaders to restrict civil liberties as a preemptive measure to discourage people's collective action.

Illustrative cases

This section illustrates changed inter-elite dynamics and civil liberties restrictions against the masses in aftermath of the failed coups in Libya and Kenya. The Libyan Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), under the leadership of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, usurped power by overthrowing the monarchy in a non-violent coup in 1969. Overtime, the RCC was divided into two factions: one that consisted of technocrats skeptical of the Gaddafi regime and another that consisted of Gaddafi's supporters. In 1975, the leader of the opposition faction and the Minister of Planning, Abd al-Salam al-Mahaysh attempted to stage a coup against Gaddafi (Bassiouni, 2013).

Following the coup attempt, al-Mahaysh was sent into exile and other RCC members from the opposition faction were either forced to exile or put under house arrest. Gaddafi abolished the RCC and purged all his opponents from political and military institutions. The Gaddafi regime also targeted regime opponents from a wide range of political spectrum including Marxists, communists,

Ba'thists, trade unionists, workers, businessmen, and religious leaders. In the uncertain political environment following the post-failed coup period, the masses were also seen as a threat. In order to prevent popular mobilization, the masses were targeted through a number of anti-subversion laws and limitations on savings (Bassiouni, 2013).

The coup attempt in Kenya is also illustrative. In 1982, junior air force officers from the Kenya Air Force attempted to overthrow Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi by taking control of the national radio. However, they were not supported by the army and did not possess heavy arms. The army and paramilitary forces soon crushed the coup which led to the killing of hundreds of people and the arrest of thousands of people, including most members of the Air Force (Ross, 1992).

In the post-failed coup period, many civilians were accused of disloyalty on the grounds that they celebrated the coup attempt (Citizens for Justice, 2003). University students, who were seen as potential suspects, were sent to detention camps. In addition, a ban was imposed on the university staff union. The passports of university professors, who voiced their concerns about the Moi regime, were seized (Adar & Munyae, 2001). The Moi regime also targeted the traditional opposition, the radical intelligentsia, and judges (Ajulu, 1992). Similar to Libya, the uncertain political environment drove President Moi to repress civil liberties of the general population in order to thwart collective action. The strict limitations of press freedom, the abolishment of trade unions, and an enhanced political control over the bureaucracy are a few examples that illustrate increased civil liberties restrictions in Kenya in the aftermath of the coup attempt (Meredith, 2005).

Data and research design

To test the hypothesized relationship between failed coups and civil liberties restrictions, we use a fixed effects regression analysis (with year dummies and robust standard errors clustered at the country level) for panel data in all of our models. A fixed effects regression analysis allows us to capture unobserved heterogeneity (which could lead to omitted variable bias and erroneous estimates of the beta coefficients) (Allison, 2005; Antonakis et al., 2010) and measure the impact of the independent variable on the dependent variable by focusing on within-case variation over time (Allison, 2005; Neumeyer, 2005). The unit of our analysis is the county-year. Our dataset covers 70 nondemocratic states in the period between 1976 and 2016.[3]

To identify nondemocratic regimes, we rely on the Autocratic Regimes Dataset (ADS) provided by Geddes et al. (2014). In this dataset, a country is classified as nondemocratic if the chief executive comes to power without free and fair elections. While the Freedom House and Polity scores provide a measure of nondemocratic regime, the incorporation of repression in their coding renders the test of the independent effect of failed coups on authoritarian repression problematic. Considering the endogeneity issues, we note that selecting nondemocratic states on the basis of electoral attributes is appropriate for testing our research query.

Dependent variable: civil liberties

To measure civil liberties (CL), we used the Civil Liberties Index of the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2020a). This index measures civil liberties based on the absence of constraints placed upon private and political liberties by the government. The CL is a continuous variable that takes values between 0 and 1, with 1 indicating the highest respect for civil liberties (Coppedge et al., 2020b).

Independent variable: failed coups

Our main independent variable is failed coups. Failed coups refer to "illegal or overt attempts by the military or other elites within the state apparatus to unseat the sitting executive" (Thyne & Powell,

[3]All nondemocratic countries for which complete data are available are included in the analysis.

2011, p. 252). In measuring failed coups, we draw upon the coup d'état dataset provided by Thyne and Powell (2011).[4] The occurrence of a failed coup or multiple failed coups in a given year is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. Attuned to the question of reverse causality and potential endogeneity (higher levels of repression might lead to coup attempts, not vice versa), we lag the failed coup variable. To capture the longer-term effects of failed coups on state repression (civil liberties restrictions and personal integrity rights violations), we measure 5-year lagged values of the failed coup variable.

Control variables

In our analysis, we include a set of control variables that might impact the repression levels and severity in nondemocratic regimes. As Gurr (1988) indicates, recurrent repression paves the way for the establishment of a coercive state apparatus and the consolidation of a political culture that creates an enabling environment for further repression. By taking into account the linkage between past repression and current repression, we measure lags of the dependent variable as our control (CL). The inclusion of lagged dependent variables also enables us to control for serial autocorrelation (Poe et al., 1999).

The variable of GDP per capita does not simply control for the effect of the level of wealth on repression (Poe et al., 1999), but also helps to take into account that the decline in wealth increases the risk of coups by leading to a decrease in economic rewards that leaders give to their winning coalition (Galetovic & Sanhueza, 2000; Londregan & Poole, 1990). To better capture the impact of economic conditions on authoritarian repression, we also include the inflation rate, calculated based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI).

Landman (2005) finds population size to be positively related to greater restrictions on civil liberties. Scale dissident activities (Poe et al., 1999; Raleigh & Hegre, 2009; Soysa & Nordås, 2007) and resource scarcity (Henderson, 1993) in populous states are highlighted as potential theoretical explanations for the impact of demographic dynamics on state repression. Taking these studies into consideration, we include the population size variable as our control.

The data on GDP per capita (at 2010 prices), the CPI (at 2010 prices), and population size are obtained from the World Bank Data Bank (The World Bank, n.d.). We include natural logs of GDP per capita and population size by considering that their impact on the dependent variable might not be linear.

Whether states were engaged in a civil or an interstate war are crucial control variables when estimating the impact of failed coups on authoritarian repression. Davenport (2007b) finds civil and interstate wars to be associated with greater restrictions on civil liberties. That said, we also take into account the possibility that interstate wars might be associated with lower civil liberties restrictions by leading to a decrease in dissident activities and increased social cohesion (Sirin, 2011).

We use measures of civil war and interstate war from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset (ACD) (2002.). Civil war is defined as an armed conflict between government/territory and internal opposition groups, resulting in a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths in a given year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Interstate war is defined as an armed conflict between two states that leads to a minimum of 25 battle-related deaths in a given year (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Both variables are lagged to address potential endogeneity problems. We code 1 if a state is engaged in a civil or an interstate war in a given year and 0 otherwise.

Even though previous studies have found no impact of the ratification of the ICCPR on states' repressive activities (Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui, 2007; Neumeyer, 2005), we include the ICCPR variable in our analysis of the determinants of civil liberties restrictions by taking into consideration the cooperation of the majority of states in the covenant's reporting procedures and the high participation in the sessions of the Human Rights Committee (a body that monitors the implementation of the ICCPR) (McGoldrick, 1991). The data on the ICCPR are taken from the United Nations

[4]For the updated data, see *Coups d'état, 1950 to Present*. http://www.uky.edu/%7Eclthyn2/coup_data/home.htm

(UN) website (The United Nations, n.d.). These variables take the value of 1 for the ratification year and every year thereafter.

We include the military regime variable to capture the distinctions between military and non-military regimes (Davenport, 2007b). For measuring the military regimes, we use the Authoritarian Regimes Dataset (Hadenius & Teorell, 2007; Teorell & Wahman, 2018; Wahman et al., 2013). We code 1 for the presence of a military regime and 0 otherwise. We also control for the possibility that nondemocratic states with elected legislatures become less repressive (Frantz & Kendall-Taylor, 2014). For measuring the elected legislature, we draw upon the legislative electoral regime index provided by the V-Dem project (Coppedge et al., 2020a). A coding of 0 indicates the absence of a legislative body or nonelected legislative body, whereas 1 indicates the presence of an elected legislative body. We include the post-Cold War variable to control for the impact of the post-Cold War period on the level of civil liberties restrictions (Møller & Skaaning, 2013). The post-Cold War variable is coded 1 in 1991 and thereafter.

While failed coups refer to unsuccessful attempts by the elites to change the leadership, coups result in leadership change. In more specific terms, a coup refers to "a forceful seizure of executive authority and office by a dissident/opposition faction within the country's ruling or political elites that results in a substantial change in the executive leadership and the policies of the prior regime" (Marshall & Marshall, 2010, p. 1). We include the coup variable in our analysis to control for whether leaders who take power in a coup d'état increase civil liberties restrictions. Interestingly, coups might even create permissive conditions for democratization (Derpanopoulos et al., 2016; Thyne & Powell, 2016). In measuring coups, we draw upon the coup d'état dataset provided by Thyne and Powell (2011). The absence of a coup is coded as 0 and the occurrence of a coup or multiple coups in a given year is coded as 1. In response to a potential endogeneity concern (increased repression might increase the risk of a coup), we lag the coup variable.

Results and analysis

Table 1 reports the results of regression models with fixed effect regression analysis. Model 1 displays the results of the first part of the investigation, exploring the overall determinants of the CL. CL_{t-1} has a robust positive effect on the CL at the 0.01 level, indicating that current civil liberties are a function of civil liberties of the previous year. This result confirms the argument of Gurr (1988) that specifies a causal link between past and current repression.

The coefficient of the failed $coup_{t-1}$ variable on the CL is negative and statistically significant at the 0.01 level, indicating that failed coups are associated with the deterioration of civil liberties. Furthermore, no statistically significant relationship was found between 2- to 5-year lags of the failed coup variable and the CL. In our sample, the CL variable is normally distributed with a mean of 0.47 and standard deviation of 0.22. The worse civil liberty score takes the value of 0.04 and the highest civil liberty score takes the value of 0.9 (Appendix, Table A1).

Our results show that a failed coup in the preceding year is associated with a decrease of 0.017 in the current CL level. This finding supports our theoretical argument that expects civil liberties restrictions to increase in the wake of failed coups. The failed $coup_{t-1}$ variable has a statistically significant impact on the CL at the 0.01 level and as such adds explanatory power to the model.

Even though the magnitude of the coefficient of the failed $coup_{t-1}$ variable is low (−0.017), it should be underlined that a decrease of 0.017 in the civil liberties scores after a failed coup attempt in the previous year has substantial effects. For example, in 2008, a failed coup took place in Ethiopia. In the following year, according to V-Dem Civil Liberties Index Ethiopia's civil liberties scores decreased by 0.008 (Coppedge et al., 2020a). According to the Freedom House Index (Freedom House, 2010), the media law enacted in 2008 significantly curtailed freedom of speech. In 2009, two journalists were imprisoned for disseminating false information. In the same year, the House of People's Representatives passed the Charities and Societies Proclamation that gave the government an authority to restrict NGO activities. A counter-terrorism law (adopted in 2009) interpreted terrorist activity in very broad terms

Table 1. The effect of failed coups on civil liberties, 1976–2016.

	Model 1	Model 2
CL_{t-1}	0.899***	0.906***
	(0.013)	(0.012)
Failed $coup_{t-1}$	−0.017 ***	−0.014**
	(0.006)	(0.005)
Failed $coup_{t-2}$	0.008	0.008
	(0.008)	(0.007)
Failed $coup_{t-3}$	−0.001	0.000
	(0.007)	(0.006)
Failed $coup_{t-4}$	0.007	0.006
	(0.013)	(0.010)
Failed $coup_{t-5}$	0.005	0.003
	(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP per capita (Log)	0.001	
	(0.004)	
Inflation	0.007	
	(0.008)	
Population size (Log)	−0.025*	−0.017
	(0.014)	(0.011)
Civil war_{t-1}	−0.003	
	(0.005)	
Interstate war_{t-1}	−0.004	
	(0.009)	
ICCPR	−0.003	
	(0.005)	
Elected Legislature	0.005	
	(0.006)	
$Coup_{t-1}$	0.000	
	(0.016)	
Military Regime	−0.017**	−0.016***
	(0.006)	(0.005)
Post-Cold War	0.052***	0.044***
	(0.013)	(0.010)
Constant	0.418	0.302
R^2	0.942	0.956

Number of countries 65 70.
Observations 1834 2191.
Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
Year dummies are omitted.
* for p <.10, ** for p <.05, *** for p <.01.

and gave great powers to the security forces. This evidence illustrates that small changes in civil liberties scores are meaningful and associated with impactful policies of restriction.

It should also be noted that in our dataset that consists of 2,541 cases, there are only 60 failed coups. While in the year preceding a failed coup, the average civil liberties score of authoritarian states is 0,47, in the year after a failed coup, the average civil liberties score decreases to 0,46 which translates into a % 1 change in civil liberties. As failed coups are rare events, we underline that even slight changes made in the area of civil liberties after these events are substantively important.[5]

Population size and the military regime variables exert statistically significant impacts on the dependent variable. In contrast to the study of Davenport (2007b) that finds military regimes to be less restrictive towards civil rights compared to other regime types, our results indicate a negative relationship between the military regime variable and civil liberties. Consistent with the findings of Landman (2005), population size is found to be negatively associated with civil liberties. Our results also indicate a temporal variation in civil liberties. The coefficient of the post-Cold War variable is in the positive direction and statistically significant. This result confirms the conclusion that Møller and

[5]In our dataset, there are a number of differences between states that registered failed coups and those that did not. States that witness failed coups have lower respect for civil liberties, smaller population size, lower GDP per capita, and higher inflation rate than states that do not have a history of failed coups.

Skaaning (2013) reached in their study: civil liberties restrictions of authoritarian states have decreased in the post-Cold War era. Furthermore, GDP per capita, inflation, civil war$_{t-1}$, interstate war$_{t-1}$, ICCPR, elected legislature, coup$_{t-1}$ variables exert no statistically significant effect on the dependent variable.

While the inclusion of control variables is preferred to avoid omitted variable bias, scholars warn that the addition of too many control variables might also lead to biased results (Achen, 2002; Ray, 2005). Taking this into account, we ran Model 2 with the exclusion of statistically insignificant variables from the previous model. In Model 2, the lagged CL, failed coup$_{t-1}$, military regime, and post-Cold War variables retain their statistical significance, while the variable on population size is found statistically insignificant.

Robustness tests

We performed a number of alternative model specifications to ensure the robustness of the failed coup variable on the CL (Table 2). In Model 1, we reran our analysis with the inclusion of only nonmilitary regimes as a robustness test, since failed coups are expected to be closely associated with military regimes (Thyne, 2010). The failed coup$_{t-1}$ variable retains its statistical significance when

Table 2. The effect of failed coups on civil liberties, 1976–2016.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
CL_{t-1}	0.880***	0.897***	0.900***
	(0.020)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Failed coup$_{t-1}$	−0.017**	−0.017***	−0.018***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Failed coup$_{t-2}$	0.002	0.008	0.008
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Failed coup$_{t-3}$	−0.004	−0.000	0.00
	(0.009)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Failed coup$_{t-4}$	0.017	0.007	0.007
	(0.017)	(0.013)	(0.013)
Failed coup$_{t-5}$	−0.004	0.004	0.005
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)
GDP per capita (Log)	−0.002	−0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.010)
Inflation	0.019	0.007	0.009
	(0.012)	(0.008)	(0.010)
Population size (Log)	−0.020	−0.035	−0.032
	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.026)
Civil war$_{t-1}$	−0.010	−0.003	−0.004
	(0.007)	(0.005)	(0.006)
Interstate war$_{t-1}$	0.014	−0.004	−0.006
	(0.016)	(0.009)	(0.012)
ICCPR	−0.001	−0.001	−0.004
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.007)
Elected legislature	−0.003	0.005	0.004
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Coup $_{t-1}$	0.028	0.000	0.001
	(0.031)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Military		−0.014**	−0.018*
		(0.006)	(0.007)
Post-Cold War	0.060***	0.051*	0.048*
	(0.016)	(0.013)	(0.028)
Constant	0.374	0.601	0.538
R^2	0.950	0.925	0.924
Number of countries	62	59	38
Observations	1403	1670	1184

Robust standard errors clustered at the country level.
Year dummies are omitted.
* for p <.10.** for p <.05. *** for p <.01.

military regimes are removed from the analysis. In a further effort to gauge the robustness of the CL-failed coup relationship, we reran the analysis by excluding countries whose GDP per capita is higher than 10.000 $ (Model 2) and countries that witnessed neither coup attempts nor coups (Model 3). The one-year lag of the failed coup variable retains its statistical significance in both models.

Conclusion

Our paper offers a new rationale for the variation in civil liberties restrictions among nondemocratic regimes. We argue that failed coups incentivize nondemocratic leaders to target not only the elites but also the whole population. While nondemocratic leaders always face the risk of being ousted by coups and revolts, in post-coup periods, their political position becomes even more precarious, as they are trapped in a circle of threats: the very political survival strategies they employ to cling to power decrease their political security vis-à-vis both the elites and the masses. During such periods, nondemocratic leaders have the highest concerns about revolts. As such, they have stronger incentives to apply civil liberties restrictions as a preemptive repression method to avert the threat of revolt. Analyzing 70 nondemocratic regimes between 1976 and 2016, we found failed coups to be positively associated with civil liberties restrictions. This result holds across different model specifications. In addition, we find that past repression, population size, the military regime, and the post-Cold War period exert substantial causal impacts on civil liberties.

Our results also indicate that while civil liberties decrease in the post-coup periods, civil liberties restrictions do not take the form of drastic curtailments. In other words, citizens do not see massive changes to their everyday civil liberties. This may be related to leaders' fear of reprisals in the wake of failed coups. Our argument indicates that leaders' fear of revolts in the post-failed coup periods incentivize them to restrict civil liberties with the objective of preventing collective action against the regime. On the other hand, acting too aggressively might threaten leaders' political survival by creating a permissive environment for revolts.

Furthermore, repressing civil liberties on a large scale necessitates giving greater power to the state security apparatus. While civil liberties restrictions prevent collective action (Escribà-Folch, 2013), as Svolik (2012b) shows, giving more power to the state security increases the risk of a coup. All in all, taking into consideration their need to consolidate their power in the context of their precarious positions after failed coups, authoritarian leaders might opt for reducing civil liberties to a lesser degree.

In the post-coup periods, in addition to restricting civil liberties, nondemocratic leaders might also rely on cooptation strategies in order to remain in power (Buckles, 2019). For example, they might choose to thwart opposition mobilization by mitigating popular discontent through an increase in public spending (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith, 2010; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2007). Cooptation strategies also enable nondemocratic leaders to create division among the existing opposition groups (Bertocchi & Spagat, 2001). Whether nondemocratic leaders turn to civil liberties restrictions as a substitute for cooptation or utilize both repression and cooptation in post-coup periods constitutes a profitable avenue for further research.

ORCID

Lacin Idil Oztig http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7192-193X

References

Acemoğlu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Paths of economic and political development. In B. R. Weingast & D. Wittman. (Eds.), *The oxford handbook of political economy* (pp. 673–692). Oxford University Press.

Achen, C. (2002). Toward a new political methodology: Microfoundations and art. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *5*(1), 423–450. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112801.080943

Adar, G. K., & Munyae, M. I. (2001). Human rights abuses in Kenya under Daniel arap Moi 1978-2001. *African Studies Quarterly*, *5*(1), 1–17. https://asq.africa.ufl.edu/adar_munyae_winter01/
Ajulu, R. (1992). Kenya: The road to democracy. *Review of African Political Economy*, *19*(53), 79–87. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056249208703941
Allison, P. D. (2005). *Fixed effects regression methods for longitudinal data using SAS*. SAS Institute Inc.
Antonakis, J., Bendahan, S., Jacquart, P., & Lalive, R. (2010). On making causal claims: A review and recommendations. *The Leadership Quarterly*, *21*(6), 1086–1120. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2010.10.010
Bassiouni, M. C. (Ed). (2013). *Libya: From repression to revolution: A record of armed conflict and international law violations, 2011–2013*. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Belkin, A., & Schofer, E. (2005). Coup risk, counterbalancing, and international conflict. *Security Studies*, *14*(1), 140–177. https://doi.org/10.1080/09636410591002527
Bellin, A. (2012). Reconstructing the robustness of authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab Spring. *Comparative Politics*, *44*(2), 127–149. https://doi.org/10.5129/001041512798838021
Bertocchi, G., & Spagat, M. (2001). The politics of co-optation. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *29*(4), 591–607. https://doi.org/10.1006/jcec.2001.1734
Böhmelt, T., & Pilster, U. (2015). The impact of institutional coup-proofing on coup attempts and coup outcomes. *International Interactions*, *41*(3), 158–182. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.906411
Bove, V., Platteau, J., & Sekeris, P. G. (2017). Political repression in autocratic regimes. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, *45*(2), 410–428. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2016.11.004
Bove, V., & Rivera, M. (2015). Elite cooptation, repression, and coups in autocracies. *International Interactions*, *41*(3), 453–479. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2015.1006727
Buckles, G. T. (2019). Internal opposition dynamics and restraints on authoritarian control. *British Journal of Political Science*, *49*(3), 883–900. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123417000126
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2010). Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of government finance. *American Journal of Political Science*, *54*(4), 936–950. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00463.x
Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2011). *The dictator's handbook: Why bad behavior is almost always good politics*. Public Affairs.
Bueno de Mesquita, B., Smith, A., Siverson, R. M., & Morrow, J. D. (2003). *The logic of political survival*. MIT Press.
Casper, B. A., & Tyson, S. A. (2014). Popular protest and elite coordination in a coup d'etat. *Journal of Politics*, *76*(2), 548–564. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613001485
Chiozza, G., & Goemans, H. E. (2004). International conflict and the tenure of leaders: Is war still ex post inefficient? *American Journal of Political Science*, *48*(3), 604–619. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0092-5853.2004.00090.x
Cingranelli, D. L., & Richards, D. L. (1999). Measuring the level, pattern, and sequence of government respect for physical integrity rights. *International Studies Quarterly*, *43*(2), 407–417. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00126
Citizens for Justice. (2003). *We lived to tell the Nyayo House story*. Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/kenia/01828.pdf
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Luhrmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Seim, B., Sigman, R., Skaaning, S.-E., Staton, J., Wilson, S., … Ziblatt, D. (2020a). *V-Dem [Country–Year/Country–Date] dataset v10*. Varieties of democracy (V-Dem) Project. https://doi.10.23696/vdemds20
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Luhrmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Seim, B., Sigman, R., Skaaning, S.-E., Staton, J., Wilson, S., … Ziblatt, D. (2020b). *V-Dem Varieties of Democracy Codebook*. https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/e0/7f/e07f672b-b91e-4e98-b9a3-78f8cd4de696/v-dem_codebook_v8.pdf
Curtice, T. B., & Arnon, D. (2019). Deterring threats and settling scores: How coups influence respect for physical integrity rights. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894219843240
Davenport, C. (1999). Human rights and the democratic proposition. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *43*(1), 92–116. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002799043001006
Davenport, C. (2000). Introduction. In C. Davenport (Ed.), *Paths to state repression: Human rights violations and contentious politics* (pp. 1–25). Rowman and Littlefield.
Davenport, C. (2007a). *State repression and the domestic democratic peace*. Cambridge University Press.
Davenport, C. (2007b). State repression and the tyrannical peace. *Journal of Peace Research*, *44*(4), 485–504. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078940
Demeritt, J. H. R. (2014). Delegating death: Military intervention and government killing. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *59*(3), 428–454. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002713515406
Derpanopoulos, G., Frantz, E., Geddes, B., & Wright, J. (2016). Are coups good for democracy? *Research & Politics*, *3*(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.1177/2053168016630837
Easton, M. R., & Siverson, R. M. (2018). Leader survival and purges after a failed coup d'état. *Journal of Peace Research*, *55*(5), 596–608. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343318763713
Easton, M. R., & Siverson, R. M. (2019). The Urge to Purge: Forecasting Erdogan's political survival following the failed coup. *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, *43*(4), 222–227. https://doi.org/10.1177/0304375419842749

Escribà-Folch, A. (2013). Repression, political threats, and survival under autocracy. *International Political Science Review*, *34*(5), 543–560. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512113488259
Fariss, C. (2014). Respect for human rights has improved over time: Modeling the changing standard of accountability. *American Political Science Review*, *108*(2), 297–318. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055414000070
Frantz, E., & Kendall-Taylor, A. (2014). A dictator's toolkit: Understanding how co-optation affects repression in autocracies. *Journal of Peace Research*, *51*(3), 332–346. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343313519808
Freedom House. (2010). *Freedom in the world: Ethiopia*. Freedom House. https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2010/ethiopia
Galetovic, A., & Sanhueza, R. (2000). Citizens, autocrats, and plotters: A model and new evidence on coups d'état. *Economics and Politics*, *12*(2), 183–204. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0343.00074
Gandhi, J., & Przeworski, A. (2007). Authoritarian institutions and the survival of autocrats. *Comparative Political Studies*, *40*(11), 1279–1301. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007305817
Geddes, B., Wright, J., & Frantz, E. (2014). Autocratic breakdown and regime transitions: A new data set. *Perspectives on Politics*, *12*(2), 313–331. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592714000851
Gilli, M., & Li, Y. (2015). Coups, revolutions and efficient policies in autocracies. *European Journal of Political Economy*, *39*, 109–124. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2015.04.011
Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *39*(5), 615–637. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343302039005007
Gleditsch, N. P., Wallensteen, P., Eriksson, M., Sollenberg, M., & Strand, H. (2002). Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *39*(5), 615–637. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0022343302039005007
Goemans, H. E., Gleditsch, K. S., & Chizza, G. (2009). Introducing archigos: A dataset of political leaders. *Journal of Peace Research*, *46*(2), 269–283. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343308100719
Goldstein, R. J. (2001). *Political repression in modern America*. University of Illinois Press.
Grugel, J., & Louis, B. M. (2002). *Democratization: A critical introduction*. Palgrave.
Gurr, T. R. (1988). War, revolution, and the growth of the coercive state. *Comparative Political Studies*, *21*(1), 45–65. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F0010414088021001003
Hadenius, A., & Teorell, J. (2007). Pathways from authoritarianism. *Journal of Democracy*, *18*(1), 143–156. https://doi.org/10.1353/jod.2007.0009
Hafner-Burton, E. M., & Tsutsui, K. (2007). Justice lost! The failure of international human rights law to matter where needed most. *Journal of Peace Research*, *44*(4), 407–425. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343307078942
Henderson, C. (1993). Population pressures and political repression. *Social Science Quarterly*, *74*(2), 322–333. https://www.jstor.org/stable/42863631
Hendrix, C. S., & Salehyan, I. (2017). A house divided: Threat perception, military factionalism, and repression in Africa. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *61*(8), 1653–1681. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715620473
Johnson, J., & Thyne, C. L. (2016). Squeaky wheels and troop loyalty: How domestic protests influence coup d'état, 1951-2005. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *62*(3), 597–625. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002716654742
Keith, L. C. (2002). Constitutional provisions for individual human rights (1977-1996): Are they more than mere window dressing? *Political Research Quarterly*, *55*(1), 111–143. https://doi.org/10.1177%2F106591290205500105
Kendall-Taylor, A., Franz, E., & Wright, J. (2017). The global rise of personalized politics: It's not just dictators anymore. *The Washington Quarterly*, *40*(1), 7–19. https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2017.1302735
Krain, M. (1997). State-sponsored mass murder: The onset and severity of genocides and politicides. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *41*(3), 331–360. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002797041003001
Landman, T. (2005). *Protecting human rights: A global comparative study*. Georgetown University Press.
Londregan, J. B., & Poole, K. T. (1990). Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power. *World Politics*, *42*(2), 151–183. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010462
Lutterbeck, D. (2012). Arab uprisings, armed forces, and civil-military relations. *Forces and Society*, *39*(1), 28–52. https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12442768
Magaloni, B. (2008). Credible power-sharing and the longevity of authoritarian rule. *Comparative Political Studies*, *41*(4–5), 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414007313124
Makara, M. (2013). Coup-proofing, military defection, and the Arab spring. *Democracy and Society*, *9*(4), 334–359. https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2013.802983
Marshall, M. G., & Marshall, D. R. (2010). *Coup d'État events, 1946–2009 codebook*. College Park, MD: Center for Systemic Peace. http://www.systemicpeace.org
McGoldrick, D. (1991). *Human Rights committee: Its role in the development of the international covenant on civil and political rights*. Oxford University Press.
Meredith, M. (2005). *The state of Africa: A history of fifty years of independence*. Free Press.
Mitchell, N. J., & McCormick, J. M. (1988). Economic and political explanations of human rights violations. *World Politics*, *40*(4), 476–498. https://doi.org/10.2307/2010315
Møller, J., & Skaaning, S. (2013). Autocracies, democracies, and the violation of civil liberties. *Democratization*, *20*(1), 82–106. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2013.738863

Neumeyer, E. (2005). Do international human rights treaties improve respect for human rights? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *49*(6), 925–953. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705281667
Poe, S. C., & Tate, C. N. (1994). Repression of human rights to personal integrity in the 1980s: A global analysis. *The American Political Science Review*, *88*(4), 853–872. https://doi.org/10.2307/2082712
Poe, S. C., Tate, C. N., & Keith, L. C. (1999). Repression of the human right to personal integrity revisited: A global cross-national study covering the years 1976-1993. *International Studies Quarterly*, *43*(2), 291–313. https://doi.org/10.1111/0020-8833.00121
Powell, J., Chacha, M., & Smith, G. E. (2019). Failed coups, democratization, an authoritarian entrenchment: Opening up or digging in? *African Affairs*, *118*(471), 238–258. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/ady050
Raleigh, C., & Hegre, H. (2009). Population size, concentration, and civil war. A geographically disaggregated analysis. *Political Geography*, *28*(4), 224–238. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2009.05.007
Rapoport, D. C., & Weinberg, L. (2012). *The democratic experience and political violence*. Frank Cass Publishers.
Ray, J. (2005). Constructing multivariate analyses (of dangerous dyads). *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, *22*(4), 277–292. https://doi.org/10.1080/07388940500339175
Rejali, D. (2007). *Torture and democracy*. Princeton University Press.
Ritter, E. H. (2014). Policy disputes, political survival, and the onset and severity of state repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *58*(1), 143–168. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712468724
Ritter, E. H., & Conrad, C. (2016). Preventing and responding to dissent: The observational challenges of explaining strategic repression. *American Political Science Review*, *110*(1), 85–99. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055415000623
Ross, J. (1992, August 9). How Kenya's rebels botched their coup. *The Washington Post*. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/1982/08/09/how-kenyas-rebels-botched-their-coup/ca1fdf2f-3961-476f-a682-45be109e583f/
Sirin, C. V. (2011). Is it cohesion or diversion? domestic instability and the use of force in international crises. *International Political Science Review*, *32*(3), 303–321. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512110380554
Soysa, I., & Nordås, R. (2007). Islam's bloody innards? religion and political terror, 1980-2000. *International Studies Quarterly*, *51*(4), 927–943. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2007.00483.x
Sudduth, J. K. (2017). Coup risk, coup-proofing and leader survival. *Journal of Peace Research*, *54*(1), 3–15. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343316676885
Sullivan, C. M. (2015). Undermining resistance: Mobilization, repression, and the enforcement of political order. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *60*(7), 1163–1190. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002714567951
Svolik, M. W. (2009). Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes. *American Journal of Political Science*, *53*(2), 477–494. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2009.00382.x
Svolik, M. W. (2012a). *The politics of authoritarian rule*. Cambridge University Press.
Svolik, M. W. (2012b). Contracting on violence: The moral hazard in authoritarian repression and military intervention in politics. *Journal of Peace Research*, *57*(5), 765–794. https://www.jstor.org/stable/24545570
Teorell, J., & Wahman, M. (2018). Institutional stepping stones for democracy: How and why multipartyism enhances democratic change. *Democratization*, *25*(1), 78–97. https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2017.1318279
The United Nations. (n.d.). *United Nations treaty collection*. https://treaties.un.org
The World Bank. (n.d.). *DataBank*. http://databank.worldbank.org/data/home.aspx
Thyne, C. (2010). Supporter of stability or agent of agitation? The effect of US foreign policy on coups in Latin America, 1960–99. *Journal of Peace Research*, *47*(4), 449–461. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310368350
Thyne, C. L., & Powell, J. M. (2011). Global instances of coups from 1950 to 2009: A new dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, *48*(2), 249–259. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310397436
Thyne, C. L., & Powell, J. M. (2016). Coup d'état or coup d'autocracy? How coups impact democratization, 1950–2008. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, *12*(2), 192–213. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310397436
Tullock, G. (1987). *Autocracy*. Kluwer Academic.
Vreeland, J. R. (2008). Political institutions and human rights: Why dictatorships enter into the United Nations convention against torture. *International Organization*, *62*(1), 65–101. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830808003X
Wahman, M., Teorell, J., & Hadenius, A. (2013). Authoritarian regime types revisited: Updated data in comparative perspective. *Contemporary Politics*, *19*(1), 19–34. https://doi.org/10.1080/13569775.2013.773200
Yom, S. (2016). Helping hurts: Why supporting dictators can doom them. *Foreign Affairs*. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-03-07/helping-hurts
Young, J. K. (2009). State capacity, democracy, and the violation of personal integrity rights. *Journal of Human Rights*, *8*(4), 283–230. https://doi.org/10.1080/14754830903324712

Appendix.

Table A1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
CL	2541	0.469	0.220	0.036	0.903
Failed coup	2541	0.024	0.152	0	1
GDP per capita (Log)	2541	7.364	1.265	5.102	11.663
Inflation	1998	0.122	0.319	–0.194	5.47
Population size (Log)	2541	16.081	1.483	12.429	21.044
Civil war	2540	0.233	0.423	0	1
Interstate war	2540	0.028	0.165	0	1
ICCPR	2541	0.669	0.471	0	1
Elected Legislature	2540	0.780	0.414	0	1
Coup	2541	0.023	0.149	0	1
Military	2541	0.241	0.428	0	1
Post Cold-War	2541	0.701	0.458	0	1