

RUSSIAN RESEARCH CENTER STUDIES, 11

*How Russia is Ruled*



# *How RUSSIA is Ruled*

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*Revised Edition*

*Merle Fainsod*

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*For Johnny, Elizabeth, and Mary*



## *Preface*

The aim of this book is to communicate a sense of the living political processes in which Soviet rulers and subjects are enmeshed. When the first edition of the book was published in 1953, shortly after the death of Stalin, the barriers to such analysis were formidable. Most scholars were denied access to the Soviet Union and were perforce compelled to study Soviet developments at a distance. Many important areas of Soviet life were closed to scholarly investigation as a result of Stalin's obsession with secrecy. Fortunately, the meager gleanings from official sources could be supplemented by a wealth of material derived from careful interviewing of Soviet refugees who left their country during and after World War II. The testimony of these "living witnesses," when cautiously utilized, provided a reservoir of fresh data which has proved of great importance in enriching our understanding of Soviet realities.

Since Stalin's death the climate of scholarly inquiry has improved substantially. Opportunities for travel in the Soviet Union have again become available, and contacts with Soviet scholars, students, officials, and the man in the street are currently not too difficult to establish in regions open to foreign travelers. While secretiveness stills operates to inhibit investigation of areas of Soviet life which the regime deems sensitive, in other areas Soviet publications are both more informative and yield far richer insights into Soviet realities than was true under Stalin. This revised edition has drawn heavily on such sources to illuminate aspects of Soviet political life which were previously concealed from view.

In revising the book, the basic scheme of organization of the earlier edition has been retained. Part One presents a historical analysis of the forces and factors that produced the Bolshevik Revolution and transformed its character once power had been attained. Part Two is concerned with the Party and its changing role in theory and practice. In Part Three other instruments of rule are examined — the constitution and the hierarchy of soviets, the bureaucracy, the police, and the armed forces. Part Four portrays the impact of the Soviet pattern of controls on factory and farm, analyzes the tension which they produce, and concludes with an appraisal of the problems and prospects of the Soviet political system.

The new material presented in this edition incorporates the important

changes of the post-Stalinist era. Since these changes have affected virtually every aspect of Soviet life, they are reflected in every part of the book except the introductory historical chapters. The questions which they pose are re-examined in the final chapter, which has been entirely rewritten and, perhaps more important, rethought.

A book of this character necessarily relies on the contributions of a wide company of scholars in the Slavic field. I should like particularly to record my indebtedness to my colleagues at Harvard's Russian Research Center and to the stimulating company of students who have participated in my seminars on Soviet government and politics over a period of years. How much I owe to all of them only they will realize, although I need hardly add that the final responsibility for the views expressed here is my own.

I am also profoundly grateful to my secretary, Miss Mary Towle, who undertook the major burden of preparing the manuscript for the press, to Miss Rose DiBenedetto who helped with the typescript, and to Mrs. Joyce Lebowitz of Harvard University Press who edited it.

A word of explanation is due on the vexing problem of rendering Russian words and titles into English. An effort has been made to strike a balance between the needs of the general reader and the Russian specialist. For the convenience of the general reader the plurals of most Russian words, after their first mention, are anglicized in the text, and the English style of capitalization is adhered to in transliterating titles of books and articles in the notes and bibliography. The system of transliteration follows that of the Library of Congress, with some minor exceptions. Ligatures and diacritical marks have been eliminated, and the sounds *iu* and *ia* are transliterated as *yu* and *ya*. Established English usage has been observed in the spelling of Russian proper names.

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MERLE FAINSOD

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*PART ONE*

*The Pursuit of Power*

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## *Chapter 1*

# *The Seedbed of Revolution*

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Every revolution bears the stamp of its own distinctive genius. It is a product of the historical forces that go before, of the leaders who shape its course, and of the problems with which they are confronted. It is a shallow view of Russian history which sees Bolshevism as an alien excrescence grafted on the Russian body politic by a handful of power-lusting conspirators without roots in the past. The triumph of the Bolshevik Revolution was in no sense inevitable, but Bolshevism as a movement was an indigenous, authoritarian response to the environment of Tsarist absolutism which nurtured it. Autocracy generates its own authoritarian antibodies and endows them with its own peculiar contours.

To insist that Bolshevism has an organic connection with the Russian past is not to say that the Russian is congenitally destined to be governed despotically or that there is some mystic substance in the Russian soul which breeds submission before authority. There is a fashionable but equally shallow view of Russian history that sees the Soviet regime as an inevitable outgrowth of the Russian past and as an expression of a need for domination which is deeply imbedded in the national character. To those who hold this view, the mounting struggle for freedom during the last century of tsardom represents an aberration which is outside the main stream of historical development. To them, the miscarriage of the struggle is proof of the Russian lack of genius for self-government. While sweeping formulations of this type share the attractiveness of all simple solutions for highly difficult problems, the simplicity is delusive. Cultural determinism carries the same dangers as other forms of determinism. “Totalitarianism,” George F. Kennan has wisely observed, “is not a national phenomenon; it is a disease to which all humanity is in some degree vulnerable.”<sup>1</sup>

The problem of the origins of Communist totalitarianism is too com-

plex to be disposed of by impressionistic judgments of Russian national character. The frame of analysis must include as well those distinctive characteristics of the Russian historical legacy that have left the Russian people badly prepared for self-government. It must give due weight to the profound social and economic dislocations which attended the abolition of serfdom, the beginnings of industrialization, and the efforts to modernize the Russian economy. It must embrace the armory of ideas which the Bolsheviks borrowed from the West and adapted to their own purposes. And it must recognize the cataclysmic importance of the First World War, which precipitated the Revolution of 1917 and gave Lenin his golden opportunity to bid for power.

### *The Heritage of Autocracy*

On the eve of the First World War, Russia was still ruled by a tsar-emperor whose conception of the plenitude of autocratic power dated back to the fifteenth century. The system of autocracy was in process of erosion. Its foundations had been rudely shaken in the aftermath of defeat in the Crimean and Russo-Japanese wars. But the more its moral authority was undermined, the more insistently it clung to the substance as well as to the semblance of its power. Nicholas II, forced by the 1905 revolution to convoke a Duma, nevertheless proclaimed that "the Supreme, Autocratic power belongs to the All-Russian Emperor" and repeated the ancient formula: "Obedience to his authority, not only for wrath but also for conscience sake, is ordained by God Himself."<sup>2</sup> The words of Nicholas II rang like an atavistic echo of Ivan the Terrible, who pronounced that "the Rulers of Russia have not been accountable to any one, but have been free to reward or chastise their subjects,"<sup>3</sup> and of Peter the Great, who wrote, "The autocratic monarch has to give an account of his acts to no one on earth, but has a power and authority to rule his states and lands as a Christian sovereign according to his own will and judgment."<sup>4</sup>

The dominating role of the Autocrat was institutionalized through a highly centralized but far from efficient bureaucracy, whose uncertain dominion extended into the farthest reaches of the empire. The army and the police provided the cohesive force which sustained the authority of the Autocrat. The social pillars that supported him were chiefly the church and the majority of the landowning gentry. The populace had no active part in this system of government; the duty of the people was to serve the Autocrat by yielding implicit obedience to his dictates. Directive authority was largely reserved for the representatives of the autocracy; their commandments were to be obeyed as the paternal expression of the supreme wisdom of the Autocrat. In the words of Pobedonostsev, tutor and adviser of the last two Romanovs:

The history of mankind bears witness that the most necessary and fruitful reforms — the most durable measures — emanated from the supreme will of statesmen, or from a minority enlightened by lofty ideas and deep knowledge, and that, on the contrary, the extension of the representative principle is accompanied by an abasement of political ideas and the vulgarisation of opinions in the mass of the electors.<sup>5</sup>

This was not a conception calculated to give scope to popular initiative or to test the capacity of the citizenry for self-government. Concessions had to be made in the face of popular restiveness as they were made after the Crimean and Russo-Japanese wars. But concessions were followed by reassessments of bureaucratic power. The mood of the autocracy was to yield reluctantly under irresistible pressure and, at the first opportunity, to reassert absolutist pretensions.

Insistence on maintaining the full range of autocratic authority helped to radicalize the opposition. If Communism became, in Herzen's phrase, Tsarism turned upside down, not the least of the contributing causes were the conditions of combat which Tsarism imposed. The policies pursued by the tsar-autocrats alienated substantial sections of the vital and creative forces in society. They denied these forces experience in self-government and, where they could not deny, they limited such experience to the narrowest possible range. By damming up the constitutional channels for the expression of social grievances, they helped create a situation in which popular disaffection overflowed into revolutionary turbulence.

One of the characteristic features of Tsarist Russia was the separation of state and society. With a few striking exceptions, the higher offices of the public service were largely a monopoly of the nobility and landowning gentry. Until the creation of the *zemstva*, or local government assemblies, in 1864 and the Duma reforms after the 1905 revolution, other social classes were for all practical purposes excluded from participation in state affairs, and, even after these reforms, their activity was constrained in a tightening circle. But while opportunities were limited, appetites were growing. Klyuchevsky's pithy summation of tsardom, "The state became swollen while the people shrank," needs to be modified for the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The state, to be sure, continued to swell, but the people refused to shrink. The history of nineteenth-century Russia is more than a history of autocratic power and its exercise; it is also a record of a great awakening.

Even earlier, Peter the Great had, as Pushkin said, cut a window into Europe. But Peter's interests were thoroughly practical and technical, and no Western liberal philosophical currents were permitted to pass through his window. Catherine the Great opened the window wide, and strange winds of Western doctrine began to blow. Voltaire, Montesquieu,

Adam Smith, and the Encyclopedists became the possessions of a newly awakening intellectual class in Russia, and other Western thinkers were eagerly read and discussed. But the peasant rising of Pugachev and French revolutionary excesses frightened Catherine and brought an abrupt stop to the journalistic activity and discussions stimulated by Western ideas. The intellectual ferment which Catherine herself had done so much to inspire was forced underground, where it largely remained through much of the reign of Alexander I.

New winds carrying the Western doctrine came in the wake of the Napoleonic campaigns; returning officers brought back in their baggage liberating ideas as well as trophies of war. The explosive force of these ideas was manifest in the abortive Decembrist revolt (1825), and, though Nicholas the Gendarme disposed of the conspirators, he was unable to stamp out the ideas they represented. Russia's iron age of repression was also its golden age of literature, and literature, despite all the force of censorship, was the great outlet "for an oppressed people's dreams and aspirations."<sup>6</sup>

### *The Great Awakening*

The first stirrings of the awakening were visible among the nobility and landed gentry. Most members of this class, to be sure, identified their interests with that of the autocracy. They staffed the higher ranks of the administration and the army. They looked to the state to protect their privileges. Though some among those who sought state service were prepared to press for modernization of the governmental apparatus and even for far-reaching social and economic reforms, the great majority were content with the status quo. They supported the autocracy because the autocracy supported them.

Yet all was not well with this privileged group. The literature of the golden age is a barometer of their discontents. A whole generation of "superfluous men"—Griboyedov's Chatsky, Pushkin's Onegin, Lermontov's Pechorin, Herzen's Belkov, Turgenev's Rudin—register the gathering disillusionment. Repelled by the atmosphere of servility that permeated the state service, rejecting the obscurantism and smug self-satisfaction of high society, cut off from the people by a deep, unbridgeable social chasm, weighed down by a feeling of uselessness on their estates, they agonized their sick consciences without being able to find a constructive outlet for their energies. Their tragedy of frustration was unresolved, but, like the lightning that precedes the storm, their dissatisfaction signaled a loss of faith and an alienation of confidence within the inner citadel of the autocracy itself.

Their ranks were soon to be supplemented by more determined men, aware of the evils with which they had to contend and ready to act on

their convictions. Again it is literature that sounds the call. Belinsky, writing his famous denunciatory letter to Gogol, proclaims:

Russia sees her salvation not in mysticism, nor asceticism, nor pietism, but in the successes of civilization, enlightenment and humanity. What she needs is not sermons . . . or prayers (she has repeated them too often!), but the awakening in the people of a sense of their human dignity lost for so many centuries amid the dirt and refuse; she needs rights and laws conforming not with the preaching of the church but with common sense and justice, and their strictest possible observance.<sup>7</sup>

The search for the new man is the keynote of Dobrolyubov's striking article, "What is Oblomovism?" Reviewing Turgenev's *On the Eve*, Dobrolyubov had written, "We are seeking, thirsting, waiting. We are waiting for somebody or other to explain to us what to do."<sup>8</sup>

Foreshadowed by the enterprising and self-reliant burgher figure of Stolz in Goncharov's novel *Oblomov*, the new hero of his time is practical, hard-working, and devoted to a life of order and reason. He finds expression in the protagonist of *On the Eve*, the Bulgarian revolutionary Insarov, who consecrates his life to the liberation of his people from the Turks; and again more brilliantly in the hero of Turgenev's *Fathers and Children*, the nihilist Bazarov, who dedicates his life to science and the destruction of illusions that others may build firmly on fact. With Chernyshevsky's novel *What Is to Be Done?* the circle is complete. The new man (and woman) claims the center of the stage, and overshadowing the main characters of the novel is Rakhmetov, the professional revolutionary, portent of the Bolshevik to come. Rakhmetov, to be sure, is a Narodnik, or Populist, but he is above all a man of action devoting the whole of his life to the revolutionary cause. It is a conception to which Lenin was to return again and again; indeed, it is not without significance that the title of the famous essay in which Lenin developed the organizational principles of Bolshevism was borrowed from Chernyshevsky's novel.

Literature was the laboratory of society. Just as the generation of "superfluous men" had their prototypes in the life around them, the activists mirrored in the novels of Turgenev and Chernyshevsky reflected the aspirations of the new intelligentsia who were beginning to assert their claims to shape the destiny of Russia. After the middle of the nineteenth century, the composition of the intelligentsia underwent rapid change. Their social roots were no longer overwhelmingly in the nobility and landed gentry. Infusions of new blood from the *raznochintsy* (the men of different classes) gave the intelligentsia an increasingly plebeian character. Belinsky was the son of a country doctor. Dobrolyubov came from a clerical family. Chernyshevsky, also a priest's son, was originally destined for a clerical career. There was an increasingly large number of

professional men — physicians, lawyers, teachers, and journalists — who "belonged to the people by birth and . . . to the intellectual group by higher education."<sup>9</sup> Some of the more pliable and enterprising made very successful careers in the state service. For most, the road to bureaucratic power was closed, sometimes because of personal distaste for this type of activity, more often because of the court's preference for scions of the aristocratic families.

The new intelligentsia harbored some of the most active, energetic, and restless spirits of Russian society. Many of them were increasingly critical of the existing social and political structure — an attitude to which the autocracy responded by developing a sharp distrust of the group. The resulting estrangement of state and intelligentsia turned out to be a tragedy for both sides. The autocracy was unable and unwilling to harness the reforming zeal of the intelligentsia to state purposes. The rebels among the intelligentsia in turn were denied an opportunity to acquire experience in the arts of responsible government and were condemned to pursue their dream of justice in loose word-spinning or conspiratorial violence. Deprived of the chance to share in power, they placed themselves at the head of all the forces of discontent in Russian society and ended by releasing a Pandora's box of unintended consequences which represented a tragic betrayal of the dreams of freedom on which their revolt was nourished.

### *The Miscarriage of Reform*

The tragedy of the estrangement was underlined by disillusionment with the belated concessions which the autocracy was forced to yield. The local government reforms which followed in the wake of the Emancipation Edict of 1861 had potentialities which, if developed, could have given important sectors of Russian society experience with self-rule. The Zemstvo Statute of 1864, for all its limitations in the form of high franchise qualifications and divisions of the electorate into discriminatory colleges, opened the way to popular participation in the affairs of local government. The work of the zemstvos in the fields of popular education, medicine, and sanitation forms one of the brightest pages of Russian history between the Emancipation reforms and the Revolution of 1917. It is a page that could not have been written without the devoted work of the rural *intelligentsia*, school teachers, doctors, and zemstvo clerks, who gave themselves unstintingly to the cause of popular enlightenment. They labored in the face of great difficulties — the apathy of the villagers, the suspicions of the more reactionary landowners, and the frustrations imposed by the central bureaucracy. But the concessions granted in 1864 were whittled down in the reaction that followed the attempt on the tsar's life in 1866 by the student Karakozov. The stunting of zemstvo

institutions alienated and drove away the more liberal zemstvo workers, who, cut off from creative participation in zemstvo work, became ripe for more drastic, revolutionary alternatives. Harassment and persecution bred their antidotes.

A somewhat similar fate befell the great judicial reforms of 1864. The legal edifice erected by the Act of 1864 was imposing, even by advanced Western standards. The judicial system was made independent of administration, with judges subject to removal only for judicial misconduct; trial by jury was introduced in criminal cases; justices of the peace were to be elected by zemstvo and town assemblies; legal proceedings were to be public. These and other reforms, modeled on the best Western practices, promised to carry Russia far along the road to constitutionalism and due process. But like the zemstvo reforms, their continued existence depended on the favor of the Supreme Autocrat, and what the autocrat could give, he could also take away. In the reaction which followed the acquittal in 1878 of Vera Zasulich, who shot the governor of St. Petersburg for ordering the flogging of a student revolutionary, much was taken away. Again the dashing of high hopes produced disenchantment. The professional bar created by the Act of 1864 might have become one of the strongest pillars of a constitutional order, but instead it found its position undermined and its dependence on the autocracy emphasized. Like other sections of the intelligentsia, it began to look elsewhere for protection. Its professional attachment was to legal processes, but many of its members became convinced that in an autocracy even the struggle for legality could be carried out only through illegal means.

The revolution of 1905 ushered in a new wave of reforms and offered a fresh opportunity for the tsar-autocrat to conciliate public opinion. But once more the opportunity was passed by. The majority of the marchers who followed Father Gapon to the great square opposite the Winter Palace on Bloody Sunday (January 9, 1905—Old Style\*) came in a mood of humble petition.

We, working men and inhabitants of St. Petersburg of various classes, our wives and our children and our helpless old parents, come to Thee, Sire, to seek for truth and defense.

. . . Destroy the wall between Thyself and Thy people, and let them rule the country together with Thyself. Art Thou not placed there for the happiness of Thy people? But this happiness the officials snatch from our hands. It does not come to us. We get only distress and humiliation. Look without anger, at-

\* For the convenience of the reader, events occurring after January 1, 1917, are dated in accordance with the Western (Gregorian) calendar, which was adopted officially by Russia on February 14, 1918. Dates prior to 1917 follow the Old Style Julian calendar which is thirteen days behind the Gregorian. Both styles are given in the notes in cases where both were included in the primary source.

tentively upon our requests. They are directed, not to evil, but to good for us as well as for Thee.<sup>10</sup>

The petition was answered by a volley of bullets; hundreds were killed and wounded. The letter which Father Gapon sent the tsar after the demonstration displays a different spirit. Addressed to "Nicholas Romanov, formerly Tsar and at present soul destroyer of the Russian Empire," it reveals bitter disillusionment.

With naive belief in thee as father of thy people, I was going peacefully to thee with the children of these very people. Thou must have known, thou didst know, this. The innocent blood of workers, their wives and children, lies forever between thee, O soul destroyer, and the Russian people. Moral connection between thee and them may never be any more.<sup>11</sup>

In the initial panic inspired by general strikes, land seizures, and the burning of manor houses, the tsar and his advisers prepared to make large-scale concessions. A commission was set up to draft labor legislation. The tsar promised a representative assembly, though the first proposal incorporated in the Imperial Manifesto of August 6, 1905, limited the functions of the Duma to that of an advisory body which could merely discuss laws, the budget, and the report of the state auditor. The popular disorders continued and were followed by wider concessions. The Manifesto of October 17, 1905, promised universal suffrage, freedom of speech, assembly, conscience, and organization. It pledged that no law would become effective without the approval of the Duma and gave assurances that the Duma would have authority to investigate the legality of all actions of governmental authorities. The October Manifesto was supplemented by measures designed to placate the peasantry. The redemption payments which the peasants were still making for the land which they received when serfdom was abolished were at first reduced and then canceled. Purchase of land through peasant land banks was facilitated.

The policy of concessions paid rich dividends. The revolutionary tide began to ebb, and the solid ranks of the opposition were broken. The rural gentry and the wealthier merchants and manufacturers rallied around the government as a symbol of law and order, while the uprising of Moscow workers in December alienated liberals and moderates who sought to direct the energies of the nation into constitutional channels.

Once the moment of supreme danger had passed, the autocracy again began to qualify its concessions. The Fundamental Law promulgated by the tsar on April 23, 1906, sought to make the Duma as innocuous a legislative body as possible. Though the electoral law provided for the representation of workers, peasants, and intellectuals as well as the landed gentry, the latter were heavily overrepresented; the class

character of the suffrage provisions was designed to dilute the force of the opposition to autocracy. Despite these provisions, the first electoral campaign yielded a great victory for the opposition in general and the Kadets (Constitutional Democrats) in particular. For the first time, organized legal political parties assumed a role on the Russian political stage.

The history of the Dumas is largely a record of the frustration of parliamentary hopes. The First Duma (1906) was quickly dissolved after a bitter struggle in which the Kadet majority refused to bow before the will of the government. The Second Duma (1907), with strengthened radical representation, proved even less tractable than its predecessor, and it too was soon dissolved. Stolypin, the tsar's prime minister, was prepared to work with the Duma, but only on his own terms. Since he held himself accountable solely to the tsar, the fabric of collaboration with the forces of popular representation became irreparably strained. Repression replaced concession as the reactionary "ruling spheres" around the throne consolidated their dominant position. The new electoral law proclaimed on the occasion of the dissolution of the Second Duma greatly increased the influence of the wealthier categories of the electorate, and the composition of the Third and Fourth Dumas reflected their increased power. The reconstruction of the Duma provided a pliant and accommodating majority for the government, and the Third Duma was permitted to serve out its full term (1907-1912). The elections to the Fourth Duma (1912-1916) resulted in a victory for the conservative nationalist groups, but even these groups were pushed into opposition to the government by the incompetence of the autocracy in grappling with the problems presented by the First World War.

Despite the government's measures to restrict the effectiveness of the Duma and to emasculate its representative character, its substantive accomplishments were impressive. Owing largely to its initiative, and in the face of the deep-rooted opposition of the so-called Ministry of Public Instruction, the expenditures for education grew steadily from 44 million rubles in 1906 to 214 million rubles in 1917. On the eve of the war in 1914, 8 million pupils, or approximately half of the eligible child population, were enrolled in primary schools.<sup>12</sup> The plans of the educational committee of the Duma contemplated universal instruction by 1922. Under pressure from the Duma, the civil rights of peasants were equalized with those of other citizens, and the centrally designated land captains were displaced in judicial matters by local justices of the peace. These and other achievements testified to the continuing vigor of the progressive forces in the Duma, held back though they were by the dead weight of the autocracy. Even though the Duma became increasingly conservative over the years, it remained a sounding board of

ameliorative reform. Unfortunately, the ears that should have listened were closed, and the appeals of the shriller voices that came afterwards were addressed to a different audience.

The frustration of the constitutional impulse which the Duma sought to provide prepared the way for revolution and the ultimate triumph of Soviet totalitarianism. Constitutionalism in its inception is a tender plant; it needs a favorable environment in which to grow and prosper. The environment of the last decades of tsardom was not favorable. To be sure, many members of the Russian intelligentsia were deeply attracted by Western parliamentary models and did their utmost to transplant these constitutional conceptions to Russian soil. But in the vastness of Russia, they were a pathetic fragment doomed to defeat by the recalcitrant forces of ignorance, apathy, and blind opposition that surrounded them. Confronted with a system of autocratic power that could not assimilate Burke's lesson of preservation through reform, the constitutionalists saw the ground slipping from under them. The rebuffs they received led many of their potential followers to embrace more extreme leadership. The political arrangements they preached had little support in native tradition. The demands they made on the electorate could not be realized without a generation of widespread popular education. The parliamentarians were themselves the victims of their own parliamentary inexperience. Their only secure social support was a weakly developed middle class; their moderate programs fell far short of meeting the extreme grievances of a substantial part of the peasantry and industrial labor force. In the race between reform and revolution, the constitutional forces found themselves handicapped at every turn.

The hour of the autocracy was rapidly running out. It found itself increasingly isolated from the society which precariously sustained it. The power that was escaping from the hands of the autocracy had many potential claimants. Besides the intelligentsia, there was the vast inert mass of the peasantry and a new working class in process of creation. Their aspirations were diverse, but they were united by a common sense of grievance. The march of events was to insure that each would be compelled to test his claim in the crucible of revolution.

#### *The Peasant's Claim to Power*

In a country as predominantly agricultural as Russia, it was perhaps inevitable that many would look to the peasantry to become the residuary legatees of power. The orientation of the pre-Marxian Russian revolutionaries was based overwhelmingly on the peasantry, for the peasant, in their eyes, was a "socialist by instinct and a revolutionary by tradition." They tended to idealize the *mir*, or village commune, as an embodiment of cooperative fellowship, and they saw the risings of Stenka Razin,

Pugachev, and other eruptive peasant jacqueries as a verification of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. For many of them, Western Europe had little to offer by way of example. At first attracted by its atmosphere of freedom, luxuriant after the stifling confinement of Russia, they found themselves increasingly repelled by the bourgeois tone of European society, by capitalism with its slogan "Enrichissez-vous!" and by the ugly cancer of the urban industrial proletariat. Parliamentary institutions seemed to them little more than a cloak for business domination. Russia had to find another and better path of social development.

Herzen, in his post-1848 phase, illustrates this trend of thought. Repudiating the whole apparatus of parliaments and representation, he called on Russia to throw off serfdom, the nobility, the bureaucracy, and the Byzantinized church and to seek her destiny in a cooperative federation of free communes founded on the peasant's partnership in the mir. This dream may seem fantastic in the light of later developments, but the system of agrarian socialism and free federation which Herzen adumbrated supplied the staple ideas of the Narodniks, or Populists, and their successors, the Socialist Revolutionaries, until they were crushed by the Bolsheviks.

The pre-Marxist revolutionaries differed in the strategies which they espoused, but they were at one with Herzen in looking to the peasant for salvation. For Bakunin, the peasantry was ripe for revolt; all that was required was that the flames be ignited by determined groups of professional revolutionaries skilled in conspiratorial tactics. For Tkachev, writing in the 1870's, the seeds of capitalism in Russia were already discernible; his theory of "preventive revolution" involved seizing power before the bourgeoisie could become strong in order to insure an agrarian path of development for Russian socialism.

#### *The Russian Intelligentsia and the Peasantry*

Maximalist tactics had a powerful fascination for many members of the Russian intelligentsia. The conditions of repression under which they worked and the inadequate and pitiful crumbs of reform thrown their way by the autocracy inspired an impatience with gradualism in any form. Their reaction to the Emancipation Edict of 1861 provides a vivid illustration. When it appeared that the peasants were being condemned to impoverishment as a result of the smallness of the land allotments and the excessive redemption payments, a strong current of disillusionment set in, and insurrectionist and terrorist elements among the intelligentsia began to come to the fore. Great hopes were placed in the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. A secret organization, *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom), planned a peasant rising for the summer of 1863, but nothing came of it, and a number of the leaders were executed. An

attempt was made to assassinate the tsar in April 1866, but this also failed. The societies which had helped plan the assassination were discovered, and many of their members were exiled to Siberia.

Russian revolutionaries during this period, however, were by no means united on terrorist and insurrectionary tactics. An important segment of the intelligentsia during the seventies was much attracted to the doctrines of Peter Lavrov, who preached education and propaganda among the masses. Lavrov's *Historical Letters*, written for the most part between 1867 and 1869, emphasized the duty of the "critically thinking individual" to devote himself to the welfare of the masses. No revolution was possible, argued Lavrov, without preparatory education of the *narod*, the people. The obligation of the intelligentsia was to stop talking among themselves and go out into the villages to help awaken the peasant masses. Lavrov's idealistic message had a striking response, the famous movement of "going to the people," which assumed the proportions of a crusade. Students, teachers, lawyers, physicians, officers, and "repentant noblemen" joined in, and from the summer of 1872 to the summer of 1874 the countryside swarmed with crusaders and evangelists.

What happened is depicted in unforgettable fashion in Turgenev's *Virgin Soil*. The "dark forces" of the village could make nothing of the invaders. The gulf that divided what the Russians call "people" and "persons" was too deep. Most of the intelligentsia did not know how to talk to the people when they met them. The peasants could not understand what they were driving at. Some of the missionaries were confused with antichrist, and many were turned over to the police. For the intelligentsia, the experience was sobering and disillusioning. A few responded by committing suicide. Others, for the first time brought up against hard realities, were forced to recognize that vague idealism was not enough, that the task of educating the peasant was more than a weekend in the country, that patient devotion was required, and that a whole life had to be lived together.

A few — too few — digested the lesson and settled down in the countryside to undertake the long, disagreeable task of overcoming suspicion and proving their usefulness. Many — too many — flocked back to the towns and cities to torture their consciences in endless conversation and, when the pressure became too great, to break out with heroic acts of terrorism which brought the police down on town and countryside alike. As one of the best of the organizers who stayed behind in the country said, "As soon as we have started something going, bang! — the intellectuals have killed somebody, and the police are on us. Why don't they give us a chance to organise?"<sup>13</sup>

The history of the Narodnik movement during the late seventies and early eighties is one of increasing dedication to terror. The triumph of

the extremists found expression in the organization in 1879 of *Narodnaya Volya* (People's Will), perhaps the first tactically unified and tightly organized Russian revolutionary party. Like its predecessors, *Narodnaya Volya* was primarily concerned with the liberation of the peasantry. Liberation, its members felt, could not be secured without constitutional reforms. Indeed, as the famous letter of its executive committee to Alexander III upon his accession makes clear, its aim was a constituent assembly composed overwhelmingly of peasant representatives who could be trusted to put a program of agrarian socialism into effect. Denied constitutional channels of expression, *Narodnaya Volya* turned to terror instead, hoping through a series of key assassinations to disorganize and intimidate the government into concessions, to arouse the people, and perhaps to seize power at the center. From the fall of 1879 to the spring of 1881, the terrorists waged a relentless duel with the government. A number of important officials were killed, and finally in March 1881 *Narodnaya Volya* accomplished its chief aim, the assassination of Alexander II. Instead of ushering in a constituent assembly, the revolutionists only succeeded in intensifying the repression. The peasants were deaf to the revolutionary signal, and after a short-lived panic in court circles, reaction consolidated its hold. The Narodnik groups were broken to pieces by the authorities; revolution was reduced, in the words of one boasting official, "to a cottage industry."<sup>14</sup> The Narodniks dwindled in effectiveness, although many of their ideas were to enjoy a remarkable revival with the organization of the Socialist Revolutionary Party in the opening years of the twentieth century.

Meanwhile, the land was ominously quiet. The rumbling land-hunger of the peasant world was still muffled, though the condition of the muzhik was far from good. Grievances were repressed, and peasant resentment smoldered just below the surface of the deceptively peaceful countryside.

#### *Land-Hunger and Revolution*

The Emancipation Edict was deeply disappointing to the peasantry. Limited allotments and high redemption payments meant, in the words of Geroid T. Robinson, that "the scales were weighted against the peasant; he was coming forth from the Emancipation with limited rights and little land, but abundant obligations."<sup>15</sup> During the decades following emancipation, the position of the peasantry worsened. The growth of the village population was prodigious. Although the amount of land available to the peasantry increased between 1877 and 1905, it failed to keep pace with the muzhik's fecundity. The average size of household allotments declined from 13.2 desyatins (one desyatina equals 2.7 acres) in 1877 to 10.4 in 1905.<sup>16</sup> The shrinkage in the size of household allotments was not

offset by more intensive cultivation of allotment land. The agricultural practices of the mir retained their primitive character, and as a result the yield per desyatin was far below the average in Western Europe.

Rural distress was aggravated by the long agrarian depression from 1875 to 1895. The peasant who had grain to sell had to operate in a market in which the prices were fixed by international competition; the manufactured goods which he bought were purchased at prices maintained at a high level by the protectionist policies of the government. As a result, redemption payments became an intolerable burden to the average peasant. Arrears accumulated, and the situation became so critical that the government was forced to pare down the total redemption debt. Beginning in 1881, a series of laws was enacted deferring some of the redemption payments and canceling portions of the debt. In 1886 the poll tax on all peasants was abolished. But even these concessions turned out to be half-measures; the arrears continued to accumulate and redemption payments remained a running sore.

The efforts of the government to grapple with the land problem during the post-Emancipation period were at best palliatives which left the land-hunger of most of the peasantry unappeased. In 1883 a Peasant Land Bank was established to provide credit for the peasantry in purchasing land. In the period from 1887 to 1903, peasants bought more than five and a half million desyatins with the help of the bank.<sup>17</sup> These purchases helped to create a small class of more substantial peasants (seeds of the later kulaks), but they hardly touched the peasant mass.

The government also utilized resettlement and colonization to relieve the land pressure. The completion of the Siberian railroad in 1893 gave a powerful impetus to emigration; during the years from 1894 to 1903, new settlers aided by grants of state lands and state loans moved into the Siberian domain at an average rate of nearly 115,000 a year.<sup>18</sup> Even this by no means inconsiderable stream of colonization did little to relieve the overcrowded villages. The natural increase of the rural population in forty *gubernii* (provinces) during the years from 1897 to 1900, when the Siberian immigration was at its height, was nearly fourteen times as great as the net loss incurred through emigration.<sup>19</sup>

Given the basic factors of rural congestion and agrarian distress, it was perhaps inevitable that an exodus from the village should take place. With the growth of industry and commerce, the muzhik swarmed into the industrial centers in search of work and livelihood. The first general census of the population in 1897 disclosed more than five million "villagers" in the cities of European Russia.<sup>20</sup> The five million undoubtedly included many temporary migrants from the villages, but, as time passed, the number of peasants who settled permanently in the towns increased. Their connections with the villages became increasingly at-

tenuated but were not completely broken. Indeed, the industrial workers who periodically returned to the villages after exposure to agitation in the factories became one of the most effective conduits through which urban heresies were communicated to the countryside. The peasants who abandoned the villages for the cities undoubtedly provided some relief from rural overpopulation, but their outward flow could not keep pace with procreation, and those who remained behind continued to nurse their grievances and sharpen their land-hunger.

The dissatisfactions which had been accumulating in the villages in the decades after emancipation finally erupted into active violence. In 1902 peasant disorders broke out in Kursk, Poltava, and Kharkov provinces in the wake of a crop failure. The movement gave every evidence of being spontaneous; as a rule, villagers simply banded together to seize grain to feed themselves and their animals.

The movement, however, coincided with a renewal of organized revolutionary activity. The Socialist Revolutionary Party was founded as a united party in 1902. Like its progenitor, Narodnaya Volya, it adopted terroristic tactics and called for nationalization of the soil. The Socialist Revolutionaries carried on considerable agitation in the villages, but there is little evidence to indicate that their agitation exercised much influence in stimulating the initial disorders. As one of the peasants involved in the disturbances of 1902 testified when brought before a magistrate, "No rumors came to me about any little books. I think that if we lived better, the little books would not be important, no matter what was written in them. What's terrible is not the little books, but this: that there isn't anything to eat."<sup>21</sup>

In the years preceding the Russo-Japanese War, peasant restlessness continued to manifest itself in occasional burnings of manor houses and attacks on landlords and their stewards. But the disturbances were scattered and disorganized. The defeat at the hands of the Japanese unleashed the whirlwind. The revolution spread from city to countryside. The rural disturbances began deep in the black-soil region, in the province of Kursk, in February 1905, and rapidly extended to neighboring provinces. Initially the peasants confined their defiance to illicit timber cutting and pasturing and to rent and labor strikes. Instances of estate pillaging and land seizure were at first uncommon.

As the disorders spread, the peasants became bolder. The Constitutional Assembly of the All-Russian Peasants' Union, which met secretly in Moscow on July 31-August 1, 1905, declared: "Private property in land should be abolished . . . The land should be considered the common property of the whole people."<sup>22</sup> On November 3, 1905, the government announced the cancellation of all redemption dues. Even earlier, arrangements had been made to expand the facilities of the peasant bank and

to transfer some crown and fiscal lands to the bank for distribution among the peasants.

But these belated sops could not quell the peasant uproar. The disturbances widened, became more violent, and reached a climax in November 1905. Looting, burning, and land seizures were common, and the local authorities showed themselves impotent in the face of the anarchic violence. During the winter there was a lull, but in the spring the peasants returned to the attack. By the end of the summer of 1906, the revolt began to show signs of exhausting itself. As the fury died down, the government recovered its nerve and dispatched punitive military expeditions to deal with the rebels. In the face of overwhelming force, the peasants usually submitted, and a holocaust of summary executions, floggings, and other punishments followed.

The striking quality of the peasant uprising of 1905–1906 was its elemental, unplanned, and largely unorganized character. Unlike the great revolts of Pugachev and Stenka Razin, it gathered around no dramatic personal symbol of leadership. Its fires were fed by misery and land-hunger, and its leaders were scattered in the villages and merged in the crowds' grievances. Its spokesmen at the peasant congresses and the Duma were usually sober men with a single-minded absorption in the problems of the land and an earthy common-sense quality that frequently distinguished them from their more fluent colleagues among the intelligentsia. But these peasant delegates followed the revolution rather than led it. They gave voice to its demands, but they did not know how to organize to make their demands effective. The professional revolutionaries, on the other hand, were prepared to supply leadership, but they lacked a vital connection with the peasantry. The Socialist Revolutionaries were particularly active in carrying on agitation in the villages; as the disturbances spread, they did their utmost to fan the revolutionary flames. Their activities, however, were scattered and sporadic, and they too gave the impression of being caught up and swept along by the elemental force of the uprising rather than of directing its energies in disciplined channels. The appeal of both the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions of the Social Democrats was primarily to the urban proletariat rather than to the peasant mass; their rural agitation was largely confined to the agricultural laborers of the Baltic regions where the capitalistic organization of agriculture was most advanced. On the whole, the influence of the revolutionaries on the course of the uprising was slight. The momentum came from the isolated villages, and the movement dissipated itself in hundreds of uncoordinated outbreaks doomed to be crushed by the centralized military force of the autocracy.

*The Stolypin Reforms*

The peasant uprising of 1905–1906 forced the government to re-examine the basis of the agrarian policy which it had been pursuing for many decades. That policy had been to maintain the mir with its system of mutual responsibility and repartitional holdings on the assumption that the mir nurtured conservatism in the villages. The agrarian disorders challenged the old faith that the mir was a stabilizing force in the countryside. Instead, the landholding nobility now denounced the mir as “based upon socialistic foundations” and as “the nursery of socialist bacilli.”<sup>23</sup> The First Congress of Representatives of the Nobles’ Societies, meeting in St. Petersburg in May 1906, called on the government to break up the mir into private peasant holdings. The Most Humble Address which they forwarded to the tsar stated:

The recognition and confirmation of the full property-right of the peasants in respect to the lands in their possession is a primary need of the national life. The strengthening of property-rights among the peasants . . . will increase their attachment to that which is their own, and their respect for that which belongs to others.<sup>24</sup>

Expropriation of the holdings of the nobility was categorically rejected.

This program won acceptance from the government and became the basis of Stolypin’s agrarian reforms which were incorporated in a ukase of November 6, 1906, and approved by the Third Duma in 1910. The legislation was inevitably complex since it had to provide for many different varieties of land tenure, but its essential purpose was to facilitate the separation of the individual peasant from the mir and ultimately to reconstruct Russian agriculture on a basis of individual peasant holdings. The latter, however, was a long-term goal. The incredible tangle of village legal relationships and the drag of peasant inertia made certain that the readjustment of the land system would be a long drawn-out process. As a result of World War I, the process of dissolution was virtually suspended, and, even before the outbreak of the war, the number of separators showed a steady decline after the substantial exodus of 1908–09.

By January 1, 1916 [according to the economic historian Lyashchenko], requests for acquisition of land in personal ownership were submitted by 2,755,000 householders in European Russia . . . Altogether, 2,478,000 householders owning an area of 16,919,000 *desyatins* left the communes and secured their land in personal ownership. This constituted about 24 per cent of the total number of households in forty provinces of European Russia.<sup>25</sup>

The available data give no precise picture of the character of the separators, but the indications are that the more prosperous layer of the peas-

antry which saw its interests and welfare impeded by the mir was substantially represented. At the same time, the reform also made it possible for households owning little land to withdraw, sell their land, and break their ties with the village. Undoubtedly, some of the land thus disposed of found its way into the hands of the more well-to-do peasant separators.

The objective of the Stolypin reform was to create a class of trustworthy small proprietors who could be counted on to provide a bulwark against revolution. Prime Minister Stolypin supplied an unforgettable statement of his purposes in an address to the Third Duma. "The government," he said, "has placed its wager, not on the needy and the drunken, but on the sturdy and the strong — on the sturdy individual proprietor who is called upon to play a part in the reconstruction of our Tsardom on strong monarchical foundations."<sup>26</sup>

The "wager on the strong" was a bold conception which even Lenin recognized as a serious effort to create a new class backing for the autocracy.<sup>27</sup> As it turned out, the wager was lost, not because of what the Stolypin reform did, but because of what it left undone. While the landholdings of the nobility declined steadily in the post-Emancipation period, in 1905 they still accounted for 53,200,000 desyatins.<sup>28</sup> The Stolypin reform left these large holdings more or less intact. The exodus of the separators from the mir sharpened social stratification in the villages and created antagonisms between "the sturdy and strong" and "the needy and drunken," but the villages still faced the manor houses with a hunger for land unappeased. The peasant deputy Sakhno, addressing the Second Duma, spoke for the village poor and the landless when he said:

When they are in great need, when they are poor, when they are hungry, when there is nothing with which to heat their huts, nothing with which to cook soup to feed their children, when they hear the priest who says: "Look first for the kingdom of heaven, for your home is in the heavens," they forsake the priest and begin to grumble. Why can the *pomiestchik* [large landowner] have so much land and to the lot of the peasant there falls only the kingdom of heaven?<sup>29</sup>

It was a question which would be heard again in 1917.

#### *Russian Industrial Development*

The changes taking place in the villages were paralleled by even more striking developments in the cities. The Industrial Revolution came late to Russia, and, precisely because it came late and to Russia, it displayed peculiarities which differentiated it sharply from its Western counterparts.

Mid-eighteenth-century Russian industry, popular impressions to the contrary, was not hopelessly backward compared with the rest of Europe.

The industrial structure, however, was primarily oriented toward the fulfillment of the military requirements of the state.<sup>30</sup> The great lag in Russian economic development was essentially a phenomenon of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The technological revolution that gave such powerful impetus to English industrial productivity was slow to penetrate Russia. While England, and later the United States and Western Europe, shifted to machine methods of production and reliance on the steam engine and coal, Russia clung tenaciously to traditional techniques. Between 1800 and 1861, the production of pig iron in Great Britain increased twenty-four fold; in Russia it barely doubled, and Russia was reduced to eighth place among the nations producing pig iron.<sup>31</sup> The vision of Peter the Great in building his power on a heavy-industry base was denied his successors. The backwardness of industry reflected the backwardness of the court on whose impetus and initiative Russian economic development so largely depended.

One of the peculiarities of the Russian industrial system prior to emancipation — a peculiarity which may go far to explain its backwardness — was its heavy dependence on serf labor. The state factories were almost exclusively manned by ascribed serfs, state peasants who were assigned to work in the factories. The so-called possessorial factories, though owned by private merchant-manufacturers, operated with "possessorial serfs" who were attached to the factory and could be employed only in it. There were also so-called manorial factories, owned by land-owners and operated on their estates by serfs belonging to them.

Even before the Emancipation Edict of 1861, the trend was in the direction of increasing reliance on free labor. The manorial factories declined in importance. Many of the owners of possessorial factories were quick to take advantage of a law of 1840 which permitted them to liberate their serf workers. While forced labor continued to predominate in the mines and Ural ironworks until emancipation, the textile industries turned increasingly to free labor. It was perhaps not accidental that the cotton industry, which by 1840 was based entirely on free labor and which enjoyed relatively little government patronage, was also the industry which made most rapid technical progress. After removal of the British ban on the export of spinning machinery in 1842, a number of cotton factories were built and equipped with British assistance. Although their expansion was handicapped by the limited domestic market which serfdom imposed and they faced serious problems in recruiting needed skills, their equipment reflected the advanced techniques of the day. By 1850-1860, the Russian cotton industry had mastered the whole cycle of cotton production from the spinning of yarn to the output of finished fabrics, though it still depended on imported machinery and foreign technical direction. The notable industrial progress which took place in the textile industry

should not, however, be exaggerated. In 1866 in all of Russia there were only forty-two mechanized cotton mills, and the number of employees working in textile factories amounted to 94,600 persons.

In other areas, the mid-nineteenth-century Russian economy appeared even more hopelessly backward. The metallurgic industry remained stagnant. Railroad construction, although begun as early as the 1840's, had only token achievements to its credit, and water and road transportation was still organized on a primitive basis. A modern system of credit institutions was lacking; privately owned credit institutions were virtually nonexistent; and the first joint-stock commercial bank was not founded until 1864. No stable currency existed, and the depreciated paper currency in circulation did not inspire business confidence. All this hardly established a promising base for industrial expansion.

The effect of the Emancipation Edict was to make part of the peasantry available for industrial employment. Peasant mobility, however, was limited. Under the system of mutual guaranty, the village assembly was held responsible by the government for the payment of taxes and redemption payments by its members. Permission to leave the village depended on the consent of the assembly and was granted only when assurances were forthcoming that the continuing obligations of the departing peasant would be discharged. One class of peasants, however, the so-called household serfs who received no land allotments and who were not retained as domestic servants by their former masters, were practically forced to resort to the towns for employment. Many were destined to become part of the new labor force which industrialization called into being.

Emancipation helped clear the way for industrial modernization, but its effects were not immediately felt. A whole battery of measures had to be launched to prepare the ground for industrial advance. State investments, as in previous periods of industrial advance, played a major formative role. State policy was also designed to create favorable conditions for industrial investment by both domestic and foreign capital. The reversal of the high-tariff policy, which began in the fifties and lasted until the eighties when protection was once again adopted, was an important step in opening the door to the West. Although it dealt a serious blow to the obsolete Ural ironworks, it gave a considerable stimulus to railroad construction by permitting the importation of rails and other equipment either duty-free or under very low rates. Reutern, who served as Minister of Finance from 1862 to 1878, gave every encouragement to commercial and industrial development. Financial administration was reorganized. By increasing the treasury's reserve, preliminary steps were taken to place Russia on a gold standard, though it was not until 1897 that this policy was finally successful. The State Bank was reformed and

the establishment of commercial banks encouraged. The organization of joint-stock companies was permitted; a rash of company promotions, financial speculation, and stock-exchange activity introduced new westernizing elements into Russian commercial life. Through a system of concessions, subsidies, and guaranties, the state gave substantial assistance to industrial development; both domestic and foreign capital benefited by the government's fostering care.

The first surge of industrial progress manifested itself in railroad construction. During the decade from 1866 to 1875, 14,083 versts (one verst equals 0.66 English miles) of new railroad lines were opened compared to 3,543 versts completed in all the years up to 1866. Although most of these lines were constructed by private companies, government assistance was extensive. After 1880 a number of them were purchased by the government, and the major share of new construction was undertaken by the state.

During the 1860's and 1870's, capital flowed chiefly into railroads and banking, attracted by prospects of quick returns. The large influx of foreign capital came later; in this period Russian industry still depended heavily on native capital.<sup>32</sup> But foreign investments were growing, and Russia was deeply indebted to foreign technicians and entrepreneurs for modernizing her textile industry and laying the basis for the emergence of new industries such as coal, steel, and petroleum. The Welshman John Hughes founded the southern iron and steel industry in the Donets basin in 1869, although it was not until the eighties that, thanks to Belgian and French capital, its tremendous expansion began. The visit of Robert Nobel to Baku in 1874 served as the prelude to the phenomenal oil development which, by the beginning of the twentieth century, raised Russia to second place in the world production of petroleum. During the seventies, however, these developments were still in the womb. Important beginnings were made toward creating a modernized heavy-industry base, but they were only a start, and the advance was very small in comparison with that of Western Europe and of the United States.

The economic depression which spread from Europe to Russia in 1873 and continued with minor interruptions until the nineties administered a sharp setback to Russia's rate of industrial growth. The boom of the early seventies was followed by a long period of decline. Railroad construction, for example, after adding 7,400 versts of new lines during 1871–1875, dropped to only 3,074 versts in 1881–1885 and to 2,864 versts during 1886–1890.<sup>33</sup> Capital investment slackened; business activity languished; a number of less efficient enterprises, established in the earlier period, were forced to the wall. The prolonged stagnation gave an impetus to concentration. It was also a period when the working class began to stir in sporadic outbursts of discontent and poorly organized strikes.

The long depression was followed by an industrial upsurge. During the nineties, Russia entered on a decade of intensive industrialization. Between 1891 and 1900, 21,396 versts of railroad were added, over three times the construction of the previous decade. Oil production increased 132 per cent, pig iron 190 per cent, coal 131 per cent, and cotton manufactures 76 per cent.<sup>34</sup> While the textile industry was still in the forefront in terms of value of output, heavy industry was rapidly overtaking light industry. Railroad construction and new investment in heavy industry operated as the spearhead of the industrial boom.

Governmental policy supported and stimulated industrialization. The guiding genius of the decade was Count Witte, Minister of Finance from 1892 to 1903. Under Witte the gold standard was finally introduced. The construction of the great Trans-Siberian Railroad was largely his achievement. While a shift, chiefly for fiscal reasons, from free trade to higher tariff duties began in 1877, during the nineties Witte became the firm supporter of a protectionist policy designed to safeguard the newly established "native" industries from foreign competition. Government contracts reinforced this protectionist policy. Government orders were reserved for domestic firms, and the prices paid by the treasury frequently represented a form of outright subsidy to the beneficiary. Not atypical was the rejection of the offer of English manufacturers to deliver rail for the Siberian railway at seventy-five kopecks in favor of a payment of two rubles to Russian producers.<sup>35</sup> The iron and steel industry in effect became a dependent of the treasury. The "protecting" hand of the government guided industrial development.

The striking industrial advance of the nineties was interrupted by the severe commercial crisis of 1900–1903 and the revolutionary disturbances of 1905–1906. By 1909, however, progress was resumed, and in the years before World War I there was a steady growth of production, particularly in the textile, metallurgic, and mining industries.<sup>36</sup> Although the over-all rate of growth was impressive, Russia remained backward by Western standards. Coal production in Russia in 1913 amounted to 36 million tons, compared with the German production of 190.1 million tons and the United States total of 517.1 million tons. The Russian pig-iron production of 4.6 million tons was far below the German production of 16.8 million and the United States total of 31.5 million tons.<sup>37</sup> Russian machine-building industries were in the most rudimentary stage of establishment, and almost all machinery was imported. The automotive industry was nonexistent. Chemical industries were poorly developed, and the production of electric power was markedly deficient. Despite striking gains since the nineties, Russia lagged far behind the most advanced industrial nations of the West.

*The Weakness of the Russian Bourgeoisie*

The auspices under which the belated Russian industrialization drive was conducted were not such as to stimulate a modernization and liberalization of political institutions. Russian economic development was intimately intertwined with the state and heavily dependent on bureaucratic guidance and tutelage. Industrial growth was based on sustained intervention by the government. By 1913, two thirds of the total railroad mileage was owned and operated by the government; the private lines that remained were subject to strict state supervision. Government enterprise was extensive. The state owned valuable mines and processed their ores in state plants. It operated a liquor monopoly. It controlled vast tracts of land and 60 per cent of the country's forests. Through the State Bank and other credit institutions, it financed private enterprises. It extended protection through the tariff. It granted concessions and subsidies. Government orders and contracts largely sustained heavy industry and were important in other areas as well. Private industry operated within the framework of governmental direction and supervision. While there was a noticeable tendency on the part of some Russian industrialists to seek release from bureaucratic restrictions and to develop a nongovernmental market, the dominant metal and fuel industrialists were not among them. In the words of their representatives, "The idea of building up our metallurgical industry on the basis of the horseshoes, axles, forged wheels, plows, and iron roofs needed by the Russian peasant will not appeal to practical people."<sup>38</sup>

Russian industrialists were accustomed to lean on the state for sustenance. However much they might resent bureaucratic stupidity or arrogance, they could find no easy escape from the shelter and confinement of government paternalism. Because of the belated industrialization of Russia, the bourgeois stratum of society was still weakly developed and was hampered in its aspiration for independent power by its excessive dependence on the state.

Native business leadership was also handicapped by its large-scale reliance on foreign capital to finance industrial activity and expansion.<sup>39</sup> Foreign investment played a particularly important role in the strategic areas of banking and heavy industry and inevitably influenced the course of business management. Russian entrepreneurial decisions in these fields were conditioned not only by bureaucratic direction but by dependence on representatives of foreign investors. It was not a setting calculated to stimulate bold initiative. In the years before World War I, native Russian business leadership showed many signs of restlessness and self-assertiveness, but the economic and bureaucratic fetters which bound it operated as a serious barrier to full emancipation.

Limited though Russian industrial development was, a highly important role was played by large-scale enterprise. This factor, too, operated to limit the spread of business influence, to facilitate labor organization, and to prepare the way for a revolutionary seizure of power. As early as the nineties, the degree of concentration of Russian industry exceeded that of Germany.<sup>40</sup> By 1910 Russian industrial establishments with over five hundred workers employed 53.5 per cent of the total working force. The comparable figure for the United States in 1910 was 33 per cent. During the first decade of the twentieth century, nine metallurgic plants accounted for more than half of the total pig-iron production. By 1912 six large enterprises produced 65 per cent of the total petroleum output. Seven plants accounted for 90 per cent of the total rail production.<sup>41</sup> The heavy industries, supported by substantial pools of foreign capital and huge government and railroad orders, became centers of large-scale production and concentration. The predominance of the giant enterprises and their geographic concentration in the St. Petersburg, Moscow, Donets, and Baku areas paved the way for labor organization and, even more significantly, provided a fulcrum for revolutionary action.

At the same time, the organization of employers was also stimulated. After the turn of the century, a number of syndicates were formed for market control, such as *Prodomet* in the metallurgic industry and *Produgol* in the coal industry. Employer associations became quite common and were utilized not only to combat labor unions and stabilize markets but also as a sounding board for political aspirations. As might be expected, big business continued to call for state support of "the industries of the fatherland." During the Duma period, leading industrialists were attracted to the Octobrist Party, a conservative alliance of businessmen and landowners who anchored their hopes for a constitutional monarchy in the guaranties of the Manifesto of October 17, 1905. Frightened by the revolutionary temper of the workers in 1905-1906, business leaders turned to the government for protection against strikes and revolutionary demands for social change.

The ambivalence of their role was to plague them to the end. They were anxious to modernize the autocracy but not to destroy it. As yet too weak to become a significant independent political force, they were reluctantly drawn into the system which sustained the autocracy, since they were threatened by the same revolutionary challenge and were dependent on the state for their privileges and perquisites. The uneasy alliance was broken only when the autocracy collapsed of its own incompetence. By that time, Russian industry was too compromised by its identification with the old regime to gather up the power which the tsardom had dissipated. By one of those paradoxes in which history delights, the mantle of the succession was to fall not on those business leaders who had con-

tributed so much to initiate Russia's belated industrialization but on those who were able to exploit the grievances of the industrial labor army which Russia's newly developing capitalism had called into being.

*The Grievances of the Proletariat*

The formation of the modern Russian industrial proletariat was essentially a post-Emancipation phenomenon. It has been estimated that approximately four million peasants of both sexes were rendered landless by the reform.<sup>42</sup> They constituted the great labor reservoir on which the new factories drew. Industrialization was accompanied by a steady flow from the village to the cities. The link with the village remained a characteristic feature of Russian industrial development not only up to 1917 but even into the period of Soviet industrialization. As time passed, connections with the village became strained and then broken; a proletariat with its own "factory genealogy" appeared. The enlarging nucleus of "true" proletarians tended to develop class consciousness and to take leadership in articulating the grievances of their fellow workers, while the fresh arrivals brought with them the backwardness of the village and a passive endurance of the misery of their lot.

In the early phase of industrialization, during the seventies and early eighties, labor exploitation was at its worst. The working day for men, women, and children rarely ran less than twelve to fourteen hours and sometimes extended to sixteen or eighteen hours. Wages were miserably low and were frequently reduced by fines pocketed by the factory owner, and payments in kind were valued at prices well above the market. Sanitary conditions in the factories were unsatisfactory, and workers were often crowded together in huge factory barracks without distinction as to age or sex. For the most part workers bore what they could not change, though beginning in the mid-seventies there were occasional outbursts of protest, sporadic strikes, and even the elemental germs of labor organization.

The government made some effort to ameliorate conditions. In 1882 children under twelve were excluded from employment, and the working hours of adolescents from twelve to fifteen were limited to eight hours a day. In 1886 payment in kind was prohibited, and wages were required to be paid at least once a month. Although factory inspectors were appointed to prevent the evasion of these regulations, enforcement was weak, and ukases were frequently honored in the breach. Indeed, in 1890 the government, at the insistence of some manufacturers, relaxed the regulations to permit night and holiday work for children in some industries and to sanction the employment of children from ten to twelve, provided the Ministries of Finance and Interior approved. After this retreat, a forward step was taken in 1897 when day work of adults was limited to

eleven and a half hours and night work to ten hours. In 1903 a social-insurance law was enacted, but its scope was limited and its benefits meager. In 1912 the law was amended and much improved. By 1914 over two million workers were enrolled in sick-benefit funds.<sup>43</sup> While the record of Tsarist social legislation was one of slow progress over the years, as in so many other fields the concessions were belated and largely extorted under pressure. Advances were interrupted by retreats, and enforcement was uncertain. The credit that might have accrued to the autocracy was dissipated by the impression it left of intransigent opposition to the very reforms which it was reluctantly sponsoring.

Perhaps the most effective contribution made by the autocracy in preparing the way for Bolshevism consisted in its unwillingness to tolerate moderate trade unionism. Not until 1906 were unions finally legalized; even then, only local unions were permitted, and indeed most of them were wiped out in the reactionary period following the dissolution of the Second Duma. In 1907, at the height of union development in the period before the First World War, the total union membership was 250,000.<sup>44</sup> In these circumstances, it was perhaps inevitable that factory labor would offer an inviting field for revolutionary agitation.

The history of Tsarist policy toward labor organization is a tragic story of wasted opportunities. In the early spontaneous strikes of the seventies and eighties, the demands of the workers were moderate. Ordinarily they struck against reduction of wages, and occasionally they demanded freedom to elect a "headman" to negotiate with the employers on behalf of the workers. The answer of the authorities was to crush these incipient organizations by arresting the leaders and more active workers and condemning them to prison or exile. Labor organizations were consequently forced into conspiratorial channels, and the hostility of the government helped to divert the grievances of the workers from economic to political programs.

During the late eighties, the groups among the revolutionary intelligentsia who were later to organize the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party utilized such opportunities as were available to them to implant socialist political consciousness in the scattered workingmen's "circles" which they were also instrumental in organizing. Although their zeal was great, their influence was limited. The wave of strikes which broke out in the period 1895–1898, though more aggressively led than earlier disturbances and more responsive to Social Democratic leadership, was essentially a spontaneous movement inspired primarily by economic grievances. A number of strikes led to concessions by employers, and this period witnessed the enactment of the law of 1897 limiting the working day to eleven and a half hours.

In this relatively favorable atmosphere, an influential group of Social

Democratic leaders and workers began to call for the cessation of revolutionary activity and political agitation and concentration on "pure and simple" trade-union activity dedicated to winning immediate material advantages for the workers. The movement which this group led became known as Economism. Its leading doctrines were expounded in the "Credo" drafted by Madame Kuskova in the late nineties. The "Credo" was greatly influenced by Eduard Bernstein and the reformist and revisionist currents running strong in the European socialist movement around the turn of the century; indeed, its orthodox Marxist critics dubbed it "Russian Bernsteinism." Essentially, the "Credo" summoned the workers to fight for economic gains and the Marxian intelligentsia to join with the liberals in the struggle to reform the state.

The Marxism which is negative, the primitive, intolerant Marxism (which employs in a too schematical way its division of societies into classes) must give way to democratic Marxism, and the position of the party in contemporary society will thereby be greatly changed. The party will find its *narrow corporative* and mostly sectarian aims changed into a tendency to reform contemporary society in the democratic direction adapted to the contemporary state of affairs, with the aim of more successfully and completely defending the rights . . . of the labouring classes.<sup>45</sup>

The doctrines of the "Credo" had considerable attraction for the Marxist intelligentsia of the day. Lenin sought to demolish Economism in his celebrated pamphlet *What Is to Be Done?* (1902), but the real work of destruction was performed not by Lenin but by the police absolutism which refused to permit trade unionism to take root.

The curious episode of Zubatovism, or police socialism, mirrored the dilemma of the autocracy in dealing with the rising challenge of illegal labor organization. Deeply suspicious of an independent trade-union movement and yet fearful of rising labor unrest, the political police in the years 1900–1904 developed an ingenious scheme by which they hoped to control the labor movement, insulate it from revolutionary propaganda, and concentrate its energies on purely economic aims. The originator of the scheme was one Zubatov, the chief of the political department of the Moscow police. His plan was to have labor organized by carefully selected agents of the political police whose identification would be unknown to the workers. For several years Zubatovism flourished, and societies of workingmen were widely organized. But as the movement spread, it passed beyond the control of Zubatov and the police. The disorders which broke out in Odessa in 1903 in the wake of activity by Zubatov agents expanded into a general strike which had to be suppressed with much bloodshed. Zubatov was held responsible and banished to the north of Russia. Although the associations which he had sponsored were dis-

credited and disbanded, Zubatovism left a double legacy. It discouraged further efforts by the autocracy to outbid the socialists at the expense of employers. At the same time, it taught wide circles of workingmen how to combine, a lesson that was to be more effectively applied when instructors from the political police were unavailable.

The 1905 revolution demonstrated that the lesson was beginning to be learned and that the objectives of labor organization could no longer be contained within narrow trade-union demands. The year 1905 witnessed the greatest strike movement in Russian history; at some point in the year practically every worker was involved. While the eight-hour working day figured very largely in the workers' economic demands, political strikes became commonplace, and many ordinary workingmen joined with the radical intelligentsia in calling for the abolition of the autocracy and the convocation of a constituent assembly to establish a democratic republic. At the height of the crisis, the autocracy appeared to be shaken to its foundations, but it soon regained a partial equilibrium by policies which combined concession and repression. The concessions of 1905-1906 were followed by increasing resort to repression. The trade unions which had been legalized in 1906 remained objects of suspicion and were subjected to the closest police supervision in the ensuing years. Although strikes declined markedly during the relatively prosperous years up to 1912, beginning in that year there was an ominous upsurge in labor unrest which reached a climax during the first seven months of 1914 and was interrupted only by the outbreak of war. The industrial workers remained a festering pocket of discontent in Russian society. An independent trade-union movement patterned on Western European and American models and dedicated to immediate improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions might have contributed greatly to stabilize industrial relations and to give Russian workers a stake in the community. Such a movement was never permitted to strike roots. The grievances which might have found an outlet and a remedy in collective bargaining became the fertile soil for extremist appeals. State policy barricaded the road to reform and opened the flood gates to revolutionary upheaval.

History is movement, and rulers who ride its whirlwinds must learn to bow before storms which they cannot control. The unyielding quality of tsardom incapacitated it for survival in an era of rapid change. The downfall of the Russian autocracy was ultimately attributable to its inability to comprehend the forces which were shaping its course. The tragedy of its failure lay not in its own disappearance but in the creative energies of Russian society which it could not utilize, the frustrations which it engendered, and the maximalist temper which it imposed on Russian political life. Its most disastrous blunder was that it prepared the seedbed out of which Bolshevism grew.

## *Chapter 2*

# *Bolshevism before 1917*

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An acute observer of Russian society in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries might have found the potential of revolution in every corner of the realm. Had he predicted that it would be the Bolsheviks who would ultimately inherit the tsar's diadem most of his contemporaries would probably have dismissed him as mad. Until 1917, the tiny handful of revolutionaries who followed the Bolshevik banner appeared to be swallowed in the vastness of Russia. Lenin, in a speech before a socialist youth meeting in Zurich on January 22, 1917, expressed strong doubts that he would "live to see the decisive battles of this coming revolution."<sup>1</sup> The sudden rise of Bolshevism from insignificance to total power was as great a shock to the Bolshevik leaders as it was to those whom Bolshevism displaced.

Yet it would be the height of superficiality to treat the triumph of Bolshevism as a mere accident. The great crises of history are rarely accidents. They have their points of origin as well as their points of no return. The doctrine, the organizational practices, and the tactics which Bolshevism developed in its period of incubation enabled it to harness the surge of revolutionary energy released by deeper forces of social unrest and war. If in the process Bolshevism also succeeded in replacing the lumbering, inefficient police absolutism of tsardom and the short-lived democratic experiment of the Provisional Government by the first full-scale venture in modern totalitarianism, that result too was implicit in the doctrinal, organizational, and tactical premises on which the structure of Bolshevism was built.

### *The Development of Doctrine*

Until the 1880's the Russian revolutionary movement, as was natural in a country so predominantly agricultural, revolved around the peasant

and his fate. Whatever may have been the tactical divergences among Narodnik intellectuals — whether they dedicated themselves to agitation or terror — their whole orientation was toward Ilya of Murom, the peasant hero of the folk poems (*byliny*), who, as Masaryk puts it, “when the country is in straits . . . awakens from his apathy, displays his super-human energy, and saves the situation.”<sup>2</sup> Even the industrial awakening of the seventies did little to disturb this fundamental preoccupation with the peasant and his destiny.

Narodnik philosophers from Herzen to Lavrov and Mikhailovsky were not unaware of Marx and Engels; indeed, the Narodniki were largely responsible for translating Marx and Engels into Russian and introducing them to a wide audience of the intelligentsia. For the Narodniki, however, the stages of industrialization and proletarianization which Marx and Engels described were dangers to be avoided rather than paths to be traversed. Nor were Marx and Engels themselves at first certain that the course of economic development in Russia would have to recapitulate that of the West. In a letter which Marx wrote in 1877 to a Russian publication, *Notes on the Fatherland*, he referred to his theory of capitalist development as not necessarily everywhere applicable and spoke of Russia as having “the best opportunity that history has ever offered to a people to escape all the catastrophes of capitalism.”<sup>3</sup> By 1882 Marx and Engels began to qualify their views on the possibility of Russian exceptionalism. In an introduction to a new Russian translation of the *Communist Manifesto*, they saw the capitalist system in Russia “growing up with feverish speed.” They still thought, however, that the mir might “serve as a starting-point for a communist course of development” but only “if the Russian revolution sounds the signal for a workers’ revolution in the West, so that each becomes the complement of the other.”<sup>4</sup>

By 1892 Engels had in effect written off the mir as a Narodnik illusion. In a letter to Danielson, the Narodnik translator of *Capital*, Engels commented, “I am afraid that we shall soon have to look upon your mir as no more than a memory of the irrecoverable past, and that in the future we shall have to do with a capitalistic Russia.”<sup>5</sup> In a brief reference to earlier hopes, he continued, “If this be so, a splendid chance will unquestionably have been lost.” To the end of their lives, Marx and Engels remained warm admirers of the Narodnaya Volya and its courageous revolutionary Narodnik successors. Terror, for Marx and Engels, had a special justification in the struggle against Russian absolutism, and they deplored the efforts of their own Russian Marxist followers to discredit the Narodnik revolutionaries. Indeed, one of the last interventions of Engels in Russian affairs was his attempt in 1892 to arrange a merger of Narodniki and Marxists into a single party.<sup>6</sup> The effort, needless to say, failed.

*The Beginnings of Russian Marxism*

Russian Marxism as an independent political movement originated in the split in 1879 of the Narodnik organization *Zemlya i Volya* (Land and Freedom). The seceders, who stood for propaganda and agitation as opposed to terrorism, established a rival organization, the *Chernyi Peredel* (Black Repartition), to propagate their doctrines. One of their leaders was George Plekhanov, soon to be known as the father of Russian Marxism, but then still clinging to the Narodnik belief in the peasant as the driving force of revolution. The roundup of revolutionaries which followed the assassination of Alexander II in 1881 caused Plekhanov to flee abroad. His break with *Zemlya i Volya* on the issue of terror, the apparent bankruptcy of Narodnik policies in the reaction which followed 1881, and the manifest failure of the peasantry to respond either to agitation or terror impelled Plekhanov to re-examine his views. The search for a new faith led him to Marxism. In 1883 Plekhanov, Paul Axelrod, Leo Deutsch, and Vera Zasulich, all of whom had been members of the Chernyi Peredel, joined in establishing the first Russian Marxist organization, the group known as *Osvobozhdenie Truda* (Emancipation of Labor). Plekhanov from the beginning was the intellectual leader of the group. In a series of brilliantly written polemical works,<sup>7</sup> he laid the doctrinal foundations for Russian Marxism.

Russian Marxism thus emerged out of disillusionment with the Narodnik infatuation with the peasantry. As a result, it quickly took on a strong anti-peasant orientation. "The main bulwark of absolutism," argued the 1887 program of the Emancipation of Labor group, "lies in the political indifference and the intellectual backwardness of the peasantry."<sup>8</sup> In a later pamphlet by Plekhanov, *The Duty of the Socialists in the Famine*, the point was put even more strongly:

The proletarian and the muzhik are political antipodes. The historic role of the proletariat is as revolutionary as the historic role of the muzhik is conservative. The muzhiks have been the support of oriental despotism for thousands of years. The proletariat in a comparatively short space of time has shaken the "foundations" of West European society.<sup>9</sup>

Since peasant worship still exercised a powerful hold on the minds of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia, the task of Plekhanov, and later of Lenin,<sup>10</sup> was to undermine this faith and to turn the attention of the intellectuals from the village to the city, where capitalism was taking root and a new industrial proletariat was in process of creation. There, argued Plekhanov, was the coming revolutionary force. The challenge to the Narodniks was summed up in his famous dictum: "The revolution-

ary movement in Russia can triumph only as a revolutionary movement of the working class. There is not, nor can there be, any other way!"<sup>11</sup>

The sharp antithesis which Plekhanov made between revolutionary worker and backward peasant had great polemical value in combating the influence of Narodnik ideology. But it also meant that the Social Democratic movement turned its back on the countryside. Its long-term legacy was an attitude of suspicious distrust toward the peasantry which affected both the Bolshevik and Menshevik wings of Russian Social Democracy and was never altogether extirpated. Even so perceptive and skillful a revolutionary engineer as Lenin did not really sense the revolutionary potential of the peasantry until the peasant risings of the 1905 revolution forced him to re-examine the tenets of his faith.

The first problem of the early Russian Marxists was to win acceptance for their proposition that Russia was launched on an irreversible course of capitalist development and that the Narodnik dream of skipping the stage of capitalism and leaping directly from the mir to socialism was nothing but a mirage. The struggle in its inception was a battle of books and pamphlets. The polemic of the Marxists against the Narodniks was even welcomed by the government, since in its eyes the Narodniks were still dangerous revolutionaries and the Marxists a rather harmless literary group.

The diffusion of Marxism among the intellectuals of the nineties was also attended by confusion about its content and significance. For many of the "fellow travelers" of the Legal Marxist period, "Marxist" was hardly more than a generic name for the protagonists of the industrial development which appeared to be in full triumph in the early nineties. Even Peter Struve, who counted himself a Marxist in that period and drafted the manifesto of the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, held in Minsk in 1898, could end his "Critical Remarks on the Problem of the Economic Development of Russia" (1894) with the appeal: "Let us recognize our backwardness in culture and let us take our lessons from capitalism."<sup>12</sup> For still others, the so-called Economists of the late nineties, Marxism meant little more than "bread and butter" trade unionism, bargaining with employers for that extra kopeck on the ruble for which Lenin had such fierce contempt.<sup>13</sup> Other professed Marxists — and by 1899 Struve had become one of them — responded to Bernstein's challenge to orthodox Marxism by establishing a Russian branch of Critical Revisionism, a movement which was to lead them from Marxism to idealism and to an eventual break with the Social Democratic Party.<sup>14</sup>

In the face of these divergent trends (later to be described as deviations), the doctrinal problem which Plekhanov and Lenin faced in the nineties was to buttress the orthodox Marxian analysis and to reassert its

revolutionary content. In the international socialist controversies of the period, Plekhanov and Lenin took their stand with Kautsky, the guardian of the true faith, against the heterodoxies of Bernstein. In Russia they denounced the objectivism of the Legal Marxists and the reformist tendencies of Economism and Critical Revisionism. For both Plekhanov and Lenin, Marxism was a revolutionary creed not to be diluted by opportunistic waverings.

During this period, Plekhanov was still the master and Lenin the pupil. Both considered themselves orthodox Marxists. Marx's panorama of capitalist development seemed to imply that the socialist revolution stood its greatest chance of success in those countries in which the processes of industrialization were most highly advanced and in which the working class formed a substantial part of the population. How apply such a recipe for a successful socialist revolution to Russia with its nascent industrialism, its weakly developed proletariat, and its overwhelmingly peasant population? Confronted with Russia's industrial backwardness, both Plekhanov and Lenin agreed that the first order of business was to achieve a bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia. With the further development of Russian capitalism, Russia would become ripe for a successful proletarian revolt. In this analysis they merely followed the familiar two-stage sequence laid down in the *Communist Manifesto*. Plekhanov, the theorist, was to remain loyal to this formulation for the rest of his life. Lenin, the activist, was to find it increasingly uncongenial and, though he continued for many years to pay it verbal tribute, his whole revolutionary career was essentially an escape from its confines.

### *The Problem of Industrial Backwardness*

The question of the shape and pace of the Russian revolution was to produce furious controversies among Social Democrats of all shades. The heart of the problem was Russia's industrial backwardness and the political consequences to be drawn from it. The Social Democratic Labor Party based itself on a weak and undeveloped industrial proletariat. What was the role of the party to be? Should it attempt to seize power at the first promising opportunity, or would it have to wait patiently until Russia's industrialization matched that of the most advanced Western nations? If it limited its immediate activities to organizing the proletariat and helping the bourgeoisie to overthrow the autocracy, would the party not be strengthening its most dangerous enemy by surrendering to it the power of the state? If, on the other hand, the party emphasized its hostility to the bourgeoisie and its role as capitalism's gravedigger, would the bourgeoisie not be driven to unite its fortunes with those of the autocracy? Questions such as these might be argued in terms of Marxian

exegesis, but the answers that were evolved depended more on temperament than on theory.

The Menshevik wing of Russian Social Democracy, with which Plekhanov was finally to ally himself, saw the arrival of socialism in Russia as the climax of a long process of development. The Menshevik response to the challenge of industrial backwardness was to preach the postponement of the socialist revolution until industrial backwardness had been overcome. Strongly influenced by orthodox Western Marxism and impressed by the weakness of the Russian industrial proletariat, the Mensheviks concluded that a socialist Russia was a matter of the distant future and that the immediate task was to clear the way for a bourgeois, middle-class revolution. Their first charge as good Marxists was to help the bourgeoisie to carry out its own historical responsibilities. They were therefore prepared to conclude alliances with liberal bourgeois forces who opposed the autocracy and to join them in fighting for such limited objectives as universal suffrage, constitutional liberties, and enlightened social legislation. Meanwhile, they awaited the further growth of capitalism in Russia to establish the conditions for a successful socialist revolution. Essentially, the Mensheviks had their eye on Western European models; they expected to march to power through legality and to be the beneficiaries of the spontaneous mass energy which the creation of a large industrial proletariat would release.

At the opposite extreme from the Menshevik conception was the theory of "permanent revolution" developed by Parvus and adopted by Trotsky during and after the 1905 revolution.<sup>15</sup> For Parvus and Trotsky, the industrial backwardness of Russia was a political asset rather than a liability. As a result of backwardness and the large role played by state capitalism, the Russian middle class was weak and incapable of doing the job of its analogues in Western Europe.\* Thus, according to Parvus' and Trotsky's dialectic of backwardness, the bourgeois revolution in Russia could be made only by the proletariat. Once the proletariat was in power, its responsibility was to hold on to power and keep the revolution going "in permanence" until socialism was established both at home and abroad. The Russian revolution, Trotsky thought, would ignite a series of socialist revolutions in the West. This permanent revolution would offset the resistance which developed. Thus Trotsky's prescription for Russia's retarded economy was a new law of combined development. The two revolutions — bourgeois-democratic and proletarian-socialist —

\* For an interesting anticipation of this view, see the following passage in the program drafted by Peter Struve for the First Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, in 1898: "The farther east one goes in Europe, the weaker in politics, the more cowardly and meeker becomes the bourgeoisie, and the greater are the cultural and political tasks which fall to the lot of the proletariat" (*VKP[b] v Rezolyutsiyakh* [4th ed.], I, 2).

would be combined, or telescoped, into one. The working class would assert its hegemony from the outset and leap directly from industrial backwardness into socialism. Implicit in the Trotsky-Parvus formula was a clear commitment to the theory of minority dictatorship for Russia. An industrial proletariat which was still relatively infinitesimal in numbers was called upon to impose its will and direction on the vast majority of the population. Out of such theoretical brick and straw, the edifice of Soviet totalitarianism was to be constructed.

The position of Lenin and the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Party was much closer in spirit to Trotsky than to the Mensheviks, though the verbal premises from which Lenin started seemed indistinguishable from the Menshevik tenets. Like the Mensheviks, Lenin proclaimed that Russia was ripe for only a bourgeois-democratic revolution. His "Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution" (1905) contained at least one formulation which Mensheviks would wholeheartedly have endorsed:

The degree of economic development of Russia (an objective condition) and the degree of class consciousness and organization of the broad masses of the proletariat (a subjective condition inseparably connected with the objective condition) make the immediate complete emancipation of the working class impossible. Only the most ignorant people can ignore the bourgeois nature of the democratic revolution which is now taking place . . . Whoever wants to arrive at socialism by a different road, other than that of political democracy, will inevitably arrive at absurd and reactionary conclusions, both in the economic and the political sense. If any workers ask us at the given moment why not go ahead and carry out our maximum program, we shall answer by pointing out how far the masses of the democratically disposed people still are from socialism, how undeveloped class antagonisms still are, how unorganized the proletarians still are.<sup>16</sup>

Again, in the same pamphlet, Lenin reiterated: "We Marxists should know that there is not, nor can there be, any other path to real freedom for the proletariat and the peasantry than the path of bourgeois freedom and bourgeois progress."<sup>17</sup>

While dicta such as these can be and have been cited to establish a basic area of agreement between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks on the two-stage perspective of the Russian revolution, the kinship was more illusory than real. Plekhanov summed up one of the important differences when he observed to Lenin, "You turn your behind to the liberals, but we our face."<sup>18</sup> For Lenin, as for Trotsky, the bourgeois liberals were a weak and unreliable reed. Like Trotsky, Lenin came to believe that the proletariat would have to take leadership in completing the bourgeois revolution; but unlike both Trotsky and the Mensheviks, Lenin looked to an alliance with the peasantry to provide the proletariat with a mass base.

In this rediscovery of the strategic significance of the peasantry, Lenin reclaimed the Narodnik heritage which both he and Plekhanov had done so much to repudiate in the nineties. In the essay on "Two Tactics," Lenin declared:

Those who really understand the role of the peasantry in a victorious Russian revolution would not dream of saying that the sweep of the revolution would be diminished if the bourgeoisie recoiled from it. For, as a matter of fact, the Russian revolution will begin to assume its real sweep . . . only when the bourgeoisie recoils from it and when the masses of the peasantry come out as active revolutionaries side-by-side with the proletariat.<sup>19</sup>

The first task was to consolidate "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." After this was achieved, the socialist revolution would become the order of the day.<sup>20</sup> Lenin's formula thus envisaged two tactical stages: first, the alliance of proletariat and peasantry to complete the democratic revolution and, second, an alliance of the proletariat and village poor to initiate the socialist revolution.

Given Lenin's activist temperament, it was inevitable that he should feel greater affinity for Trotsky's revolutionary dynamism than for the Menshevik's passive fatalism. As the excitement of the 1905 revolution mounted, we find him speaking the language of Trotsky: "From the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just in accordance with the measure of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious and organized proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution. We stand for uninterrupted revolution. We shall not stop half way."<sup>21</sup> Despite many intervening conflicts, the bond with Trotsky was to be sealed by the experiences of 1917. The dialectic of backwardness was "resolved" by the Bolshevik seizure of power.

Out of that adventure a new theory of revolution was to be developed with world-wide applications. Stalin has given it authoritative exposition:

Where will the revolution begin? . . .

Where industry is more developed, where the proletariat constitutes the majority, where there is more culture, where there is more democracy — that was the reply usually given formerly.

No, objects the Leninist theory of revolution; *not necessarily where industry is more developed*, and so forth. The front of capitalism will be pierced where the chain of imperialism is weakest, for the proletarian revolution is the result of the breaking of the chain of the world imperialist front at its weakest link; and it may turn out that the country which has started the revolution, which has made a breach in the front of capital, is less developed in a capitalist sense than other, more developed, countries, which have, however, remained within the framework of capitalism.<sup>22</sup>

Thus Marx, who turned Hegel on his head, was himself turned on his head. Industrial backwardness was transformed from obstacle to oppor-

tunity. The concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat shifted from a weapon of the majority into a tool of minorities. Consciousness triumphed over spontaneity, and the way was cleared for the organized and disciplined revolutionary elite capable of transmuting the grievances of a nation into a new formula of absolute power.

### *Organization: The Elite Party*

The organizational conception embodied in Bolshevism was essentially an incarnation of this elitist ideal. "Give us an organization of revolutionaries," said Lenin, "and we shall overturn the whole of Russia!"<sup>23</sup> It was Lenin who forged the instrument, but the seeds of his conspiratorial conceptions were planted deep in Russian history and were nurtured by the conditions of the revolutionary struggle against the autocracy. Pestel among the Decembrists, Bakunin, Nekhayev, Tkachev, and the Narodnik conspirators of the seventies and early eighties, all provided organizational prototypes of the professional revolutionary as the strategic lever of political upheaval. It was a tradition from which Lenin drew deep inspiration even when he found himself in profound disagreement with the particular programs which earlier professional revolutionaries espoused. His works are filled with tributes to the famous revolutionaries of the seventies (figures like Alekseyev, Myshkin, Khalturin, and Zhelyabov).<sup>24</sup> In developing his own conceptions of party organization in *What Is to Be Done?* he refers to "the magnificent organization" of the revolutionaries of the seventies as one "which should serve us all as a model."<sup>25</sup> Lenin's conviction that Russian Marxism could triumph only if led by a disciplined elite of professional revolutionaries was reinforced by his own early amateur experiences as a member of the Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class. This organization was easily penetrated by the police, and the first effort of Lenin and his collaborators in 1895 to publish an underground paper — *Rabochee Delo* (The Workers' Cause) — resulted in the arrest of Lenin and his chief associates and a quick transfer of domicile to Siberia.<sup>26</sup>

It is against this background that the organizational conceptions of Lenin took shape. By 1902, with the publication of *What Is to Be Done?* they were fully developed. In this essay, the seminal source of the organizational philosophy of Bolshevism, Lenin set himself two main tasks: (1) to destroy the influence of Economism with its repudiation of revolutionary political organization and its insistence on trade unionism as the basic method of improving the welfare of the working class, and (2) to build an organized and disciplined revolutionary Marxist party which would insure the triumph of socialism in Russia.

The polemic against the Economists clearly revealed Lenin's elitist preconceptions. More than a quarter of a century earlier Tkachev had

written: "Neither in the present nor in the future can the people, left to their own resources, bring into existence the social revolution. Only we revolutionists can accomplish this . . . Social ideals are alien to the people; they belong to the social philosophy of the revolutionary minority."<sup>27</sup> Now Lenin was to repeat:

The history of all countries shows that the working class, exclusively by its own effort, is able to develop only trade-union consciousness . . . This [Social Democratic] consciousness could only be brought to them from without . . . The theory of socialism . . . grew out of the philosophic, historical, and economic theories that were elaborated by the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals . . . quite independently of the spontaneous growth of the labor movement . . .

Our task, the task of Social Democracy, is to *combat spontaneity*, to *divert* the labor movement from its spontaneous, trade-unionist striving to go under the wing of the bourgeoisie, and to bring it under the wing of revolutionary Social Democracy.<sup>28</sup>

To accomplish this objective, Lenin sought to weld together a disciplined party of devoted adherents, "a small, compact core, consisting of the most reliable, experienced, and hardened workers, with responsible agents in the principal districts and connected by all the rules of strict secrecy with the organization of revolutionaries."<sup>29</sup> "I assert," Lenin continued in a passage which laid bare his basic faith:

(1) that no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organization of leaders that maintains continuity; (2) that the wider the masses spontaneously drawn into the struggle, forming the basis of the movement and participating in it, the more urgent the need of such an organization, and the more solid this organization must be . . . (3) that such an organization must consist chiefly of people professionally engaged in revolutionary activity; (4) that in an autocratic state the more we *confine* the membership of such an organization to people who are professionally engaged in revolutionary activity and who have been professionally trained in the art of combating the political police, the more difficult will it be to wipe out such an organization; and (5) the *greater* will be the number of people of the working class and of other classes of society who will be able to join the movement and perform active work in it.<sup>30</sup>

Democratic management, Lenin held, was simply inapplicable to a revolutionary organization.<sup>31</sup> *What Is to Be Done?*<sup>32</sup> disclosed the profoundly elitist and antidemocratic strain in Lenin's approach to problems of organization. It also made clear that, in Lenin's new model party, leadership would be highly centralized, the central committee would appoint local committees, and every committee would have the right to coopt new members. But it still left a precise blueprint to be worked out. This was the task which Lenin undertook to perform at the Second Party

Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, which met in Brussels and then in London in the summer of 1903. Lenin prepared for this congress with a meticulous attention to detail of which he alone among his revolutionary contemporaries was capable. His one desire was to construct a compact majority which would dominate the congress and build a party willing "to devote to the revolution not only their spare evenings, but the whole of their lives."

The foundations seemed to be well laid. The rallying point of the "compact majority" was *Iskra* (The Spark), a journal which had been established abroad in 1900 largely on Lenin's initiative. Wisely, Lenin and his young associates, Martov and Potresov, enlisted the cooperation of Plekhanov and other members of the Emancipation of Labor group as coeditors. The association generated its own sparks; Lenin has provided a vivid record of the conflict in his "How the Spark Was Nearly Extinguished."<sup>32</sup> But the quarrels for supremacy were composed; Lenin still needed the prestige of the older generation of revolutionaries in mobilizing adherents to the *Iskra* platform. Meanwhile, Lenin retained control of the secret agents who smuggled *Iskra* into Russia and maintained the closest connections with the underground organizations which distributed the journal. This organization of *Iskra* men was to provide the core of Lenin's majority at the Second Congress.

When the Second Congress assembled in Brussels in 1903, thirty-three votes, a clear majority of the fifty-one official votes, belonged to the *Iskra* faction. The remaining eighteen delegates represented a collection of Bundists (members of the All-Jewish Workers' Union of Russia and Poland), Economists, and miscellaneous uncommitted representatives, whom the Iskraites described contemptuously as "the Marsh" because they wallowed in a quagmire of uncertainty. The Iskraites appeared to be in full control. They named the presidium and easily pushed through their draft program and various resolutions on tactics.

The next order of business was the adoption of the party rules, and here trouble developed. The Iskraites were no longer united; Lenin and Martov offered rival drafts. The initial issue was posed by the definition of party membership. Lenin's draft of Paragraph One read: "A *Party* member is one who accepts its program and who supports the Party both financially and *by personal participation in one of the Party organizations*." Martov's formulation defined a party member as "one who accepts its program, supports the Party financially, and renders it regular personal assistance under the direction of one of its organizations."<sup>33</sup> To many of the delegates, the difference in shading between the two drafts appeared slight, but, as the discussion gathered momentum, the differences were magnified until a basic, and ultimately irreconcilable, question of principle emerged.

The issue was the nature of the party. Lenin wanted a narrow, closed party of dedicated revolutionaries operating in strict subordination to the center and serving as a vanguard of leadership for the masses of workers who would surround the party without belonging to it. Martov desired a broad party open to anyone who believed in its program and was willing to work under its direction. Martov conceded the necessity of central leadership, but he also insisted that party members were entitled to have a voice in its affairs and could not abdicate their right to think and influence party policy.

As the debate raged, the *Iskra* group fell apart. Plekhanov rallied to Lenin's defense; the Leninist formula seemed to him admirably adapted to protect the party against the infiltration of bourgeois individualists.<sup>34</sup> Axelrod and Trotsky supported Martov. To Axelrod it seemed that Lenin was dreaming "of the administrative subordination of an entire party to a few guardians of doctrine."<sup>35</sup> And after the congress had adjourned, Trotsky, in a sharp attack on Lenin, provided the classic formulation of the opposition. In Lenin's view, he pointed out, "the organization of the Party takes the place of the Party itself; the Central Committee takes the place of the organization; and finally the dictator takes the place of the Central Committee."<sup>36</sup> It was to turn out a more somber and tragic vision of things to come than Trotsky realized at the time.

At the congress, Martov's draft triumphed by a vote of twenty-eight to twenty-two. But Lenin had not yet shot his last bolt. He still retained the leadership of a majority of the Iskraites, though his group was now a minority in the congress. This minority was soon transformed into a majority by a series of "accidents" to which Lenin's parliamentary maneuvering and planning contributed. When the congress rejected the Bundist claim to be the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat, the five delegates of the Bund withdrew from the congress. Their departure was followed by the withdrawal of the delegates from the League of Russian Social Democrats, an Economist-dominated organization, which the congress voted to dissolve on Lenin's motion. With the exit of these two groups, the *Iskra* majority became the congress majority and proceeded to elect its representatives to the central party organs. It was this triumph which gave Lenin's caucus the title of Bolsheviks (the majority men), while his defeated opponents became known as Mensheviks (the minority men).

But the triumph was short-lived. The central party institutions elected by the Second Congress consisted of the editors of *Iskra*, the Central Committee in Russia, and a Party Council of five members (two representing *Iskra*, two the Central Committee, and a fifth elected by the congress). The board of editors of *Iskra* was given power equal to and

indeed above that of the Central Committee. Disputes between *Iskra* and the Central Committee were to be settled by the Party Council. Lenin, Plekhanov, and Martov were elected as editors of *Iskra*. Martov refused to serve unless the original editorial board, which included Axelrod, Zasulich, and Potresov, was restored. Lenin and Plekhanov were thus left in exclusive control. The Central Committee in Russia was composed entirely of Bolsheviks, and they were given power to coopt other members. The party apparatus appeared to be safely in Bolshevik hands when Plekhanov, out of a desire to heal the breach with his old associates, acceded to Martov's conditions and insisted on the restoration of the original *Iskra* board. Lenin promptly withdrew, and at one stroke *Iskra* was transformed into an organ of Menshevism.

Differences now began to develop in the Bolshevik Central Committee in Russia; a majority group emerged which advocated a policy of conciliation toward the Mensheviks. Three Mensheviks were coopted into the Central Committee, and in the summer of 1904 this strategic power position, which Lenin had regarded as impregnable, passed over to the opposition. After all his careful planning and apparent triumph, Lenin was left isolated and alone, betrayed by his own nominees in Russia, alienated from the leading figures of the emigration, and the chief target of abuse in the party organ which he had been primarily instrumental in establishing.

After a temporary fit of utter discouragement, Lenin rallied and began once more to gather his forces. The remnants of the faithful in the emigration were welded into a fighting organization. Connections were re-established with the lower party committees in Russia, and a new body, the Bureau of the Committee of the Majority, was established to coordinate the work of Lenin's supporters. Toward the end of 1904 a new paper, *Vpered* (Forward), was founded as the organ of the bureau. A second effort to capture control of the party organization was now in the full tide of preparation. But this time the Mensheviks were wary and refused to attend the so-called Third Congress of the Social Democratic Labor Party, which assembled on Lenin's initiative in London in May 1905.<sup>37</sup> The Mensheviks met separately in Geneva.

The 1905 revolution brought Bolsheviks and Mensheviks closer together. Responding to the élan of the uprising, Mensheviks became more militant and Bolsheviks seemed to abandon their distrust of uncontrolled mass organization. As Lenin put it, "The rising tide of revolution drove . . . differences into the background . . . In place of the old differences there arose unity of views."<sup>38</sup> Joint committees were formed in many cities, and finally a Joint Central Committee was created on a basis of equal representation to summon a "unity" congress. Both parties were flooded with new members for whom the old quarrels were ancient

history and the practical tasks of the moment were paramount. The misgivings of the leaders were swept aside in a widespread yearning for unity.

The Fourth so-called Unity Congress, which took place at Stockholm in 1906, reflected this surge from below.<sup>39</sup> Thirty-six thousand workers took part in the election of delegates. Menshevism flourished on legality, and of the one hundred eleven voting delegates selected, sixty-two were Mensheviks and forty-nine Bolsheviks.<sup>40</sup> As a result, the Mensheviks dominated the proceedings. They wrote the program and resolutions and controlled the leading party organs. The Central Committee elected by the congress was composed of seven Mensheviks and three Bolsheviks; the editorial board for the central party newspaper (which never appeared) was composed exclusively of Mensheviks. Perhaps the most important organizational action taken at the congress was the admission of the Bund and the Polish and Latvian Social Democratic parties as constituent units in the united party. The Polish and Latvian parties joined as autonomous organizations operating in their respective territorial areas; the Bund renounced its claim to be the sole representative of the Jewish proletariat on the understanding that it would be permitted to retain its program of national cultural autonomy and to organize Jewish workers without respect to territorial boundaries. The admission of these groups introduced an additional complication into the power structure of the party. Given the relatively even distribution of strength between Mensheviks and Bolsheviks in this period, the balance of power now shifted to the Bund and the Polish and Latvian Social Democrats, and their votes became of crucial significance in shaping the party's future course.

Although Lenin suffered defeat at the Stockholm congress, he continued to maneuver for ascendancy. The Bolshevik factional apparatus was maintained, and funds to finance the apparatus were partly obtained through "expropriations" (robberies and holdups). The effort to capture local organizations was continued, and Menshevik policies were attacked with relentless ferocity. As a result of this activity, the Bolsheviks registered marked gains at the Fifth Congress, held in London in 1907. While the precise strength of the Bolshevik and Menshevik blocs is still in dispute, all accounts agree that the Bolsheviks achieved a slight preponderance over the Mensheviks at the congress.<sup>41</sup>

This did not mean, however, that the Bolsheviks controlled the congress. The real power of decision rested with the Bund and the Polish and Latvian Social Democrats, who exercised a role of balance between the conflicting Russian factions. On the whole, the Mensheviks attracted Bundist support, while the Bolsheviks were dependent on the Poles and Latvians for such majorities as they obtained.<sup>42</sup> While the Bolsheviks failed to secure the support of the national delegates in their

efforts to condemn the work of the Menshevik Central Committee and of the Duma faction of the party, and were themselves condemned for their sponsorship of expropriations, they were able to defeat the Mensheviks on a number of important resolutions. The Menshevik policy of cooperating with the Kadets was repudiated. The proposal of Axelrod and other leading Mensheviks to call a nonparty labor congress and to transform the Social Democratic Party into a broad, open labor party was denounced by Lenin as "liquidationism" and decisively rejected by the congress. But the Bolsheviks were unable to achieve a dependable, monolithic majority, and the elections to the Central Committee yielded five Bolsheviks, four Mensheviks, two Bundists, two Polish Social Democrats, and one Latvian Social Democrat.

During the period of reaction and repression which accumulated momentum after the London congress, both Menshevik and Bolshevik segments of the party underwent a serious crisis. Party membership crumbled away, and police spies penetrated such remnants of the organizational apparatus as remained. The crisis was particularly acute for the Mensheviks. Potresov, in a letter to Axelrod toward the end of 1907, reflected an almost hopeless despondency:

Complete disintegration and demoralisation prevail in our ranks. Probably this is a phenomenon common to all parties and fractions and reflects the spirit of the times; but I do not think that this disintegration, this demoralisation have anywhere manifested themselves so vividly as with us Mensheviks. Not only is there no organisation, there are not even the elements of one.<sup>43</sup>

The situation within Bolshevik ranks was not much better. "In 1908," notes the Bolshevik historian Popov, "the Party membership numbered not tens and hundreds of thousands, as formerly, but a few hundreds, or, at best, thousands."<sup>44</sup> The plight of the Moscow organization was not atypical. From the end of 1908 to the end of 1909, membership declined from five hundred to one hundred fifty; in the next year the organization was completely destroyed when it fell under the control of a police spy.<sup>45</sup> The Bolsheviks, by virtue of their conspiratorial traditions and tight discipline, made a better adjustment than the Mensheviks to the rigors of illegal existence, but even Bolshevik vigilance could not prevent the secret agents of the police from penetrating the underground hierarchy and rising to high places in the party apparatus. Meanwhile, the leaders of both the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions fled abroad once more where they were soon engaged in resurrecting old quarrels and giving birth to new differences.

Both factions fell victim to internal dissension. The Mensheviks divided between the "Liquidators" (as Lenin dubbed them), who counseled the abandonment of the underground party and concentration

on legal work in the trade unions and the Duma, and the "Party" Mensheviks, who continued to insist on the necessity of an illegal organization. Bolshevism spawned in rapid succession a bewildering series of controversies. First, there were the Duma Boycotters, led by Bogdanov, at that time one of Lenin's closest associates. On this issue Lenin joined with the Mensheviks and supported party participation in the election of the Third Duma. Then there were the Otzovists and Ultimatumists, the former demanding the immediate recall or withdrawal of the Duma party delegation and the latter insisting that an ultimatum be dispatched to the delegation with the proviso that its members should immediately be recalled if the instructions contained in the ultimatum were rejected. Lenin again opposed both tendencies. Next came the philosophical heresies, the neo-Kantian Machism of Bogdanov and the God-Creator religionism of Lunacharsky and Gorky. These were heresies that Lenin endured as long as the heretics were enrolled in his political camp; they became intolerable only when Bogdanov and the rest challenged his control of the party faction. Finally, there were the Bolshevik Conciliators who insisted that peace be made with the Mensheviks after Lenin had determined that a final split was essential.

In the parlance of latter-day Bolshevism, each of these deviations had to be liquidated if Lenin was to build the party in his own image. He was determined to accomplish precisely that task. The first act took place in the summer of 1909 at an enlarged editorial conference of *Proletarii*, the organ of the Bolshevik caucus. Again Lenin made careful advance preparations and, equipped with the necessary votes, he carried a resolution declaring that Boycottism, Otzovism, Ultimatumism, God-Construction, and Machism were all incompatible with membership in the Bolshevik faction. Over bitter protest, Bogdanov was ousted from the Bolshevik central leadership where he had been second only to Lenin, and he and his associates were declared "to have placed themselves outside the faction." Expelled from the fold, the dissidents proceeded to declare themselves "true Bolsheviks," established a new journal utilizing an old name, *Vpered*, and became known during the next years as Vperedist Bolsheviks.

Having disposed of the Vperedists, Lenin confronted the new opposition of the so-called Conciliators, or Party Bolsheviks, who called for reconciliation with the expelled faction and unity with the Mensheviks. At a plenary session, held in January 1910, of the Central Committee elected by the London congress, Lenin received a sharp rebuff when the Conciliators turned against him. The conference voted to discontinue the Bolshevik paper *Proletarii* as well as the Menshevik *Golos Sotsial-Demokrata* (Voice of the Social Democrat) and to replace both with a general party organ, *Sotsial-Demokrat*, which would have two Menshevik

editors, Martov and Dan, two Bolshevik editors, Lenin and Zinoviev, and one representative of the Polish Social Democrats, Warski, to break any deadlocks that might develop.

Again the attempt at "unity" miscarried. With the support of Warski, Lenin won control of the new party journal and denied the Menshevik editors the right to publish signed articles in what was supposed to be the organ of the united party. Martov replied by attempting to discredit Lenin through an exposure of the seamy side of Bolshevism — the hold-ups, the counterfeiting, and expropriations which Lenin had allegedly sanctioned and defended.

Lenin now moved toward an open and irrevocable break. Despite the protest of the Bolshevik Conciliators, he summoned an All-Russian Party Conference which met in Prague in January 1912 to ratify the split. Although the conference was dominated by a carefully selected group of Lenin's most reliable supporters, the uneasiness of the delegates in the face of Lenin's ruthless determination to move toward schism manifested itself in a belated decision to invite Plekhanov, Trotsky, and others to attend. To Lenin's great relief, both Plekhanov and Trotsky refused on the ground that the conference was too one-sided and imperiled party unity. Martov and the Menshevik Liquidators were not invited. The Bund and the Polish and Latvian Social Democrats also stayed away.

The "rump parliament" proceeded to assume all the rights and functions of a party congress (indeed, Lenin called it the Sixth Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party). The old Central Committee created by the London congress was declared dissolved, and a new "pure" Bolshevik Central Committee was elected from which all Bolshevik Conciliators were excluded. The Prague conference marked the decisive break with Menshevism and the turning point in the history of Bolshevism as an independent movement. There were to be many subsequent attempts to bring the Bolsheviks back into the fold of a united party, but all were doomed to failure. The last effort, sponsored by the International Socialist Bureau of the Second International, was slated to take place at the Vienna congress of the Second International in August 1914. War intervened, and the congress was never held. By an ironical turn of events, the International which attempted to close the breach in the Russian party was itself split by the Bolsheviks whom it tried to bring to heel.

The early organizational history of Bolshevism, which has been briefly summarized here, holds more than historical interest. The experience of the formative years left an ineradicable stamp on the character and future development of the party. It implanted the germinating conception of the monolithic and totalitarian party. The elitism which was so deeply ingrained in Lenin, the theory of the party as a dedicated revolutionary order, the tradition of highly centralized leadership, the

tightening regimen of party discipline, the absolutism of the party line, the intolerance of disagreement and compromise, the manipulatory attitude toward mass organization, the subordination of means to ends, and the drive for total power — all these patterns of behavior which crystallized in the early years were destined to exercise a continuing influence on the code by which the party lived and the course of action which it pursued.

#### *The Tactics of Bolshevism*

The organizational and doctrinal attributes of Bolshevism were supplemented by great tactical flexibility. The history of Bolshevism is a record of willingness to make sharp adjustments in the party line when circumstances appeared to require such adaptation, realism in appraising the actual configuration of power forces at any given moment, and the determination to make tactics serve the grand design of arousing and mobilizing the revolutionary potential inherent in Russian society. Perhaps it is more accurate to speak of these qualities as attributes of Lenin rather than of Bolsheviks in the mass, but Lenin's leadership in revolutionary engineering played such a decisive role in determining the tactical decisions of Bolshevism that the two became virtually indistinguishable. An analysis of changing attitudes toward the peasantry, the Soviet of 1905, the Duma, and nationality policy will serve to illustrate the flexible nature of Leninist tactics.

*The appeal to the peasant.* Lenin, like his master Plekhanov, at first underestimated the revolutionary potential of the peasantry. In their desire to discredit the Narodniks and to emphasize the industrial proletariat as the prime revolutionary force, both men turned their backs on the peasantry. Lenin, however, was to try to correct his errors; Plekhanov remained essentially indifferent to the problem. At the 1903 party congress, Lenin, alert to peasant restiveness, succeeded in incorporating an agrarian plank in the party program. In terms of peasant appeal, the plank left much to be desired, but it did call for the return to the peasants of the *otrezki* (the land cut off from their allotments by the landlords at the time of emancipation), for the abolition of redemption payments and the return of those already made, and for the repeal of all laws restricting the peasants in disposing of their lands.

As the peasant disorders mounted and land seizures and the burning of manor houses spread, Lenin began to realize that what the muzhik wanted was not merely the return of the *otrezki* but all of the land. The immediate problem for Lenin in 1905 was the overthrow of the autocracy. The bourgeoisie could not be trusted as allies. Peasant support was essential. Hence Lenin's slogan calling for a "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry." But how cement an alliance with the

peasantry? What was the price of its support? If the land were simply turned over to the peasantry for redivision, would not that immediately create a class of bourgeois peasant proprietors who would solidly oppose a socialist revolution?

The problem was a painfully difficult one, both for Lenin and for all Marxists who tried to find a place in their thinking for the peasant. At the London Bolshevik congress in 1905, Lenin pushed through a resolution which was designed to meet all contingencies. To attract peasant backing, the Bolsheviks pledged the "most energetic support of all the revolutionary measures undertaken by the peasantry that are capable of improving its position, including confiscation of the land belonging to the landlords, the state, the church, the monasteries, and the imperial family." At the same time, party workers were instructed "to strive for the independent organization of the rural proletariat, for its fusion with the urban proletariat under the banner of the Social Democratic Party, and for the inclusion of its representatives in the peasant committees."<sup>46</sup>

The first proposition appeared to be an explicit endorsement of peasant land seizures. But Lenin quickly introduced qualifications.

We are in favor of confiscation . . . But to whom shall we recommend that the confiscated land be given? On this question we have not tied our hands . . . What we do say is that this is a question we shall fight out later on, fight again, on a new field, and with other allies. Then we shall certainly be with the rural proletariat, with the entire working class *against* the peasant bourgeoisie. In practice, this may mean the transfer of the land to the class of petty peasant proprietors — wherever big estates based on bondage and feudal servitude still prevail, where there are as yet no material prerequisites for large-scale socialist production; it may mean nationalization — provided the democratic revolution is completely victorious; or the big capitalist estates may be transferred to *workers' associations*.<sup>47</sup>

This parade of alternatives could scarcely have been very meaningful to peasants hungering for land. If Lenin expressed uncertainty about how agriculture would ultimately be organized under Bolshevik auspices, he made it altogether clear that the alliance with the peasantry in general was a transitory phase and that the peasant bourgeoisie would be treated as a class enemy. This too was hardly a program calculated to rally a united peasantry to the banner of Bolshevism. Indeed, Bolshevism in this period had virtually no support among the peasantry, and such influence as it exerted was largely limited to landless agricultural workers on a few large estates.

At the Stockholm Unity Congress of 1906, Lenin sharpened, but did not substantially change, his agrarian program. Again he called for confiscation, with the understanding that the disposition of the land would

be left to local peasant committees pending the establishment of a constituent assembly. After the triumph of a democratic republic, the party would support the nationalization of all the land. What would happen after nationalization was left vague. Lenin's formula of nationalization was rejected by the Menshevik majority in favor of "municipalization," that is, the transfer of ownership to official local government bodies which would presumably rent or lease the land to the cultivators. From the point of view of the muzhik who coveted the landlord's land, the debate over nationalization versus municipalization was a rather meaningless pastime of the intellectuals, but Lenin at least came nearer the peasants' heart's desire with his proposal of local peasant committees to superintend the land seizures.

During the period of reaction which set in with the ebb of the 1905 revolution, Lenin made no important modifications in his land program. He watched the Stolypin agrarian reforms with the greatest interest and respected Stolypin as a dangerous and redoubtable enemy whose effort to create a peasant bourgeoisie might operate to add real strength to the counterrevolution. At the same time, he insisted that the result of Stolypin's policy would be to accentuate class difference in the village and thus make it all the more necessary for the Bolsheviks to address their primary appeal to the agricultural laborers and the village poor.<sup>48</sup>

The Revolution of 1917 found Lenin and the Bolsheviks with their old peasant program essentially intact. The Resolution on the Agrarian Question of the Bolshevik April Conference repeated the demands for confiscation and nationalization of the land. The immediate transfer of the land was to be organized under "Soviets of Peasants' Deputies, or under other organs of local government elected in a really democratic way and entirely independently of the landlords and officials."<sup>49</sup> The resolution also advised "the rural proletarians and semi-proletarians to strive to organize on all landed estates fair-sized model farms to be conducted for the public account by the Soviets of Agricultural Laborers' Deputies under the direction of agricultural experts and with the application of the best technique."<sup>50</sup>

Although this program, compared with the Bolshevik starting point in 1903, represented a striking advance in its awareness of peasant grievances, it still failed to come to terms with the basic peasant demand — the desire to seize and divide up the landlords' estates. Lenin was still too powerfully dominated by Marxian categories and habits of thought to be able to meet the peasant on the least common denominator of his primeval land-hunger. The 1905 revolution had impelled him a long step forward. The Revolution of 1917 provided the final push.

Through the spring and summer of 1917 the peasants were on the move, seizing land without benefit of legal sanction and brushing aside

all pleas of government leaders to postpone a land settlement pending the decision of a constituent assembly. "Too often it has happened," observed Lenin in this period, "that, when history has taken a sharp turn, even advanced parties have been unable for a fairly long time to adapt themselves to the new situation and have continued to repeat slogans which had formerly been true, but which had now lost all meaning."<sup>51</sup> Lenin now moved to rectify his agrarian tactics and condensed the whole Bolshevik program to one phrase, "Land to the Peasants." Thus Lenin capitalized on the grievances of the peasants and won their neutrality, or at least passive acquiescence, in a march to power which many of them were to live to regret bitterly. Subsequently they were to be reminded that in the Bolshevik lexicon "nationalization," "estates operated collectively," and "model state farms" were slogans with more continuing content than "Land to the Peasants."

*The Soviet of 1905 and Duma tactics.* Leninist attitudes toward the 1905 Soviet and the Duma illustrate another facet of Bolshevik tactics. Bolshevism has traditionally sought to attack, boycott, or slander any agency which it believes it cannot effectively utilize or control. It has regarded every outside organization or legislative body in which it participates as a field of battle where it might carry on agitation, infiltrate leading positions, discredit every competitor for mass support, and win sole ascendancy as the spokesman for the proletariat. This tactical instrumentalism is brought out sharply by the shifts in Bolshevik attitudes toward both the Soviet and the Duma.

The Bolsheviks were at first extremely cool toward the whole idea of the Soviet. As a spontaneous organization of factory labor delegates which had sprung up during the 1905 revolution without visible leadership from the Bolshevik faction, it appeared to be a potentially dangerous competitor. The local Bolshevik leaders in St. Petersburg at first boycotted the Soviet and then confronted it with an ultimatum that it recognize their program and "join" the party. Lenin was more realistic. Writing from Stockholm before his return to Russia and with only fragmentary reports of the activities of the Soviets before him, he rebuked the local leaders: "Comrade Radin . . . is wrong to pose the question: 'The Soviet of Workingmen's Deputies or the Party.' It seems to me that the solution ought to be: *Both* the Soviet of Workingmen's Delegates *and* the Party."<sup>52</sup>

Impressed by the mass support which the Soviet rallied, Lenin saw in it both a field of activity for the expansion of Bolshevik influence and "the germ of a provisional revolutionary government" to replace the autocracy. As it turned out, the Mensheviks, and especially Trotsky, played a far more active role in the life of the Soviets than the Bolsheviks; the latter found it much more difficult to make a quick readjustment from

underground existence to open political activity. For Lenin, the lesson of this experience was not to boycott the soviets but to intensify Bolshevik activity within them in order to establish control. It was a principle which Lenin would apply again in 1917, on that occasion more successfully than in 1905.

The Duma tactics of the Bolsheviks revealed a similar instrumental approach. The Bolsheviks, like other revolutionary parties, began by boycotting the elections to the First Duma on the assumption that the revolutionary tide of 1905 was still running high and that the Duma was at best a sop designed to placate unrest and to divert the energies of the revolt into pseudo-parliamentarianism. Indeed, at a Bolshevik conference held at Tammerfors, Finland, in December 1905, the assembled delegates asserted "that Social Democracy must strive to disrupt this police Duma, rejecting all participation in it."<sup>53</sup> At this conference, Lenin astonished his colleagues by declaring himself against the boycott, but then, according to Stalin's report, "he saw his mistake and took his stand with the faction."<sup>54</sup> Lenin's uneasiness arose out of his fear that the boycott tactics would be self-defeating. By surrendering electoral leadership to the Kadets and *Trudoviks* (Party of the Peasant Union), the Bolsheviks ran the danger of isolating themselves from the masses. Officially, however, Lenin took his stand with the faction and defended its decision as "the only correct tactics at that time," given "the temper of the revolutionary proletariat."<sup>55</sup>

As the revolutionary tide receded, Lenin became convinced that the boycott tactics would have to be reversed. At the Stockholm Unity Congress in April 1906, he joined with the Mensheviks against most of his own faction in a decision to give up the boycott. By that time, most of the elections to the First Duma had been concluded. Only the Transcaucasian elections remained. There the Social Democratic Party participated and won a sweeping victory, returning seventeen deputies, all Mensheviks.

At this time and for a considerable period afterwards, Lenin found himself in a peculiar position. A substantial element among his own followers insisted that the boycott tactics should not have been abandoned; Lenin had to persuade them that participation in the elections provided a useful platform for revolutionary agitation. While he voted with the Mensheviks against the boycott, at the same time he disagreed violently with their conception of parliamentary tactics. Their willingness to enter into electoral agreements and to make parliamentary "deals" with the Kadets seemed to him a betrayal of the revolutionary position. In Lenin's view, the Menshevik eagerness to use the Duma to advance reform legislation could only breed harmful constitutional illusions. Lenin sought to expose the "parliamentary comedy," to undermine faith

in the Duma, and to use the opportunities which it afforded to impress the masses with the necessity for revolutionary action. The Mensheviks too were competitors for working-class support. Their influence had to be destroyed if Bolshevik ascendancy were to be ensured.

Lenin consequently was forced to conduct his battle on a double front. The struggle within his own faction had ended with the purge of the Boycottists, Otzovists, and Ultimatumists at the *Proletarii* conference in the summer of 1909. The war with the Mensheviks was more protracted. After the dissolution of the First Duma, the Mensheviks expressed their willingness to enter into electoral agreements with the Kadets. Lenin denounced this policy on the ground that the interests of the liberal bourgeoisie and the proletariat were fundamentally incompatible and that the Kadets had proven themselves traitors to the revolution. Lenin called instead for alliances with the representatives of the peasantry, the Socialist Revolutionaries and Trudoviks, whom he termed real bourgeois democrats as opposed to the Kadet "renegades."

In the elections to the Second Duma, the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks maintained a precarious unity that constantly threatened to, and in St. Petersburg did, spill over into open warfare. When the returns were in, sixty-five partisans and adherents of the Social Democratic Party had been elected. Of these, thirty-six were Mensheviks (including four sympathizers), eighteen were Bolsheviks (including three sympathizers), and eleven took no definite stand, although they joined more often with the Mensheviks.<sup>56</sup> As a result, the Mensheviks organized the party Duma group, though not without the most bitter conflict with the Bolsheviks. The differences between the two factions persisted throughout the session, with the Bolsheviks insisting that parliamentary working agreements be limited to the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks, while the Mensheviks, as earlier, were also willing to work with the Kadets. Their running battle with each other and their joint battle with the autocracy were brought to an abrupt end when Stolypin insisted on the expulsion of the Social Democratic faction from the Duma. When the Duma hesitated, Stolypin dissolved it.<sup>57</sup>

The dissolution of the Second Duma provoked a new outburst of boycottist sentiment among the Bolsheviks, but again Lenin proved himself master of the situation. Both Bolsheviks and Mensheviks participated in the elections to the Third and Fourth Dumas, though as a result of the new electoral law their representation was greatly reduced. The total Social Democratic faction in the Third Duma was thirteen. In the Fourth Duma, Social Democratic representation increased to fourteen: seven were Mensheviks, one a Polish Socialist who supported the Mensheviks, and six were Bolsheviks. These six, the Bolsheviks never tired of pointing out, were elected in workers' districts, while the majority of the Men-

shevik delegates came from mixed constituencies of workers and other social categories. The internecine warfare between the factions, which had already manifested itself in the Second Duma, intensified and finally led on October 25, 1913, to a complete break. After that, the Bolsheviks operated as an independent faction.

The reminiscences of A. E. Badayev, who served as a Bolshevik deputy in the Fourth Duma, provide a somewhat naive but very revealing account of Bolshevik Duma tactics.<sup>58</sup> As Badayev makes clear, the Bolshevik leadership took steps to ensure that its Duma representatives, in contrast with the Mensheviks, would all be workers from the bench. This was done in order to dramatize the notion that the Bolsheviks were the party of the proletariat with workers as spokesmen for workers. At the same time, as Badayev points out, the Bolshevik Duma group operated under the most intimate supervision of the party leadership.

As the activity of the fraction developed, the connection of our "six" with the Central Committee, and above all with Lenin, became closer. Material, information, etc., was sent to Cracow, and from Cracow the Bolshevik deputies received literature, theses for speeches, instructions on separate questions which arose in the course of their work.<sup>59</sup>

The main duty of the Bolshevik Duma deputy was to use his Duma privileges to conduct revolutionary agitation. In the election campaign, the Duma candidates were instructed to hammer home the three "whales," the demands for a democratic republic, an eight-hour working day, and the confiscation of all landlords' estates.

The problem of relations with the Mensheviks was more complicated. When Bolshevik and Menshevik candidates confronted each other in elections in workers' districts, no stone was to be left unturned to destroy the influence of the Mensheviks among the working class. At the same time, as long as a common Duma group was preserved, a show of outward unity was to be maintained in Duma work. But the Bolshevik deputies were also instructed to do their utmost within the Duma group to secure the adoption of Bolshevik slogans and programs. When these efforts were thwarted by the Menshevik majority, the Bolshevik deputies were enjoined to split the group and operate independently — at the same time attempting in their propaganda among the workers to pin responsibility for the split on the Mensheviks. These guidelines continued to shape the work of the Bolshevik deputies until their arrest in 1914, after which, of course, the parliamentary rostrum ceased to be available as a sounding board for Bolshevik agitation.

The experience in the Duma dramatized a basic Leninist strategy of combining legal with illegal forms of struggle and of utilizing even the most reactionary instruments if Bolshevik purposes could be advanced

through such action. It was a conception to which the Bolsheviks were to return after their seizure of power, when they assumed the task of providing guidance through the Comintern for other Communist parties facing the same problem of combining illegal with parliamentary forms of struggle.

*Nationality policy.* The development of Lenin's nationality policy illustrates still another aspect of Bolshevik tactics. It dramatizes his determination to exploit and mobilize every possible source of minority discontent in order to undermine the power of the autocracy, while at the same time preserving the integrity of the party itself against the danger of disintegration into its nationality components.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Tsarist effort to cope with the minority problems of its multinational empire emphasized stubborn russification, suppression, and the divide-and-rule strategy of deliberately provoking national, racial, and religious antagonisms. While the stress on Great Russian nationalism was intended to, and in a measure did, build support for the autocracy among the people of the dominant nationality, the reaction among other nationalities, particularly in the borderlands, was only to kindle separatist aspirations and to unleash centrifugal tendencies which threatened the disintegration of the empire. Moreover, while the leadership of the national movements among the minorities tended to gravitate into the hands of the upper stratum of the native society, the national movements themselves united all classes of society against the common Great Russian enemy and thus served to blur or obfuscate class antagonisms within the minorities themselves.

The rising tide of nationalism, both among the Great Russians and the minorities, posed a difficult series of questions for the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, with its aim of organizing the proletariat of the entire Russian Empire. As a class party, it cut across national lines. Should the party modify its internal structure in order to adjust to the wave of nationalisms that threatened to engulf the working-class masses of the empire? What attitude should the party take to the separatist strivings of the borderlands? What position should be adopted toward the demands for federation and autonomy within the empire?

The first tendency of Lenin and most Russian Social Democrats was to withdraw from and underestimate the importance of the national question. Following the text of the resolution adopted at the London congress of the Second International in 1896, the Second Congress of the Russian Party declared itself in favor of the full right of self-determination for all nations. But the formula still had vague connotations for most of the party.<sup>60</sup> As one member of the Committee on the Party Program stated at the Second Congress:

So far as the national question is concerned, our demands can only be negative ones, that is to say, we are against all restrictions imposed on nationalities. But whether this or that nationality will be able to develop as such, is none of our business as Social Democrats. That will be decided by an elemental and spontaneous process.<sup>61</sup>

When a spokesman for the Bund moved an amendment to the "right of self-determination" resolution providing for the establishment of "institutions guaranteeing full freedom of cultural development" to national minority groups, the congress overwhelmingly rejected it.<sup>62</sup> A second Bund amendment that minorities should be guaranteed "freedom of cultural development" was similarly defeated. The Bund next proposed that the congress endorse "the right of every citizen to use his language everywhere — in government institutions and schools."<sup>63</sup> This time the congress made a concession. It endorsed:

the right of a people to acquire an education in its mother tongue, which right is to be guaranteed by the establishment of such schools as are necessary therefore, at the expense of the state and the organs of self-government; the right of every citizen to use his mother tongue in public meetings; the use of the mother tongue in all local, public and governmental agencies together with the official language of the state.<sup>64</sup>

But the congress refused to sanction the transfer of jurisdiction over minority groups to autonomous institutions of the minorities themselves. Its only major departure from centralism was a resolution advocating "regional self-government for those border areas in which the way of life and composition of the population differ from those in genuinely Russian areas."<sup>65</sup> Even this amendment offended Lenin's centralist predilections; his proposal to substitute "local" for "regional" self-government was, however, defeated.

At the Second Congress, the party also faced the problem of the impact of nationality on its own internal structure. The issue was precipitated by the Bund, which had been admitted into the party as an autonomous organization in 1898 and which now pressed for a recognition of its claims to be the "sole representative of the Jewish proletariat in whatever part of Russia it lives." When the congress refused to accede, the Bund withdrew. In the debate, Lenin was particularly insistent in rejecting national autonomy as a basis for party organization.

Up to this point, Lenin had revealed himself as a centralist on issues of both party and state organization. He rejected all demands for a federated party or a federal republic. The proposals of the Austro-Marxists, Renner and Bauer, from whom the Bund had drawn inspiration for its national program, were utterly repugnant to him. Renner and Bauer had developed a theory of nonterritorial cultural autonomy by which mem-

bers of different nationalities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire were to be organized, regardless of their place of residence, under national councils with exclusive jurisdiction over educational and cultural affairs. By making this concession to nationalism, the Austro-Marxists hoped to preserve the economic and political unity of the empire. At the same time, they also applied their theory of national autonomy to party organization, and the Austrian Social Democratic Party was reorganized (1899) into a federation of six autonomous national parties — German, Czech, Polish, Ruthenian, Italian, and South Slav.

To Lenin, this was no solution for the national problem. As his protégé Stalin said in his attack on the Austro-Marxists (*Marxism and the National Question*):

In this way a united class movement is broken up into separate national rivulets . . . Nay more, it only serves to aggravate and confuse the problem by creating a soil which favors the destruction of the unity of the working-class movement, fosters national division among the workers, and intensifies friction among them.<sup>66</sup>

What then was Lenin's "solution" for the problem? How could the party exploit the genuine upsurge of national discontent among the oppressed minorities? Lenin's answer was breathtakingly simple — by holding out to the minority nationality the right to secede from the metropolitan area. To Rosa Luxemburg and the Polish Social Democrats who faced the problem of combating native chauvinism in Poland, Lenin's slogan seemed tantamount to a surrender to Polish bourgeois nationalism and an abandonment of working-class unity. Lenin's reply made it clear that the significance of the slogan of secession was largely tactical.

The right of self-determination [secession] is an *exception* from our general policy of centralism. This exception is absolutely necessary in view of Great Russian arch-reactionary nationalism, and the slightest renunciation of this exception is opportunism — it is a simple-minded playing into the hands of Great Russian arch-reactionary nationalism.<sup>67</sup>

If the Social Democrats of the oppressing nations find it tactically necessary to emphasize the freedom to secede, this need not prevent the Social-Democrats of the oppressed nations from insisting on the freedom to unite.

No Russian Marxist [said Lenin] even thought of blaming the Polish Social Democrats for being opposed to the secession of Poland. These Social Democrats err only when, like Rosa Luxemburg, they try to deny the necessity of including the recognition of the right to self-determination in the program of the *Russian Marxists*.<sup>68</sup>

At the so-called August (1913) Conference<sup>69</sup> of the Central Committee and leading party workers, the Bolsheviks summed up their nationality tactics in a five-point resolution: (1) they demanded a democratic republic with full equality of rights for all nations and languages, school instruction in the local language, and a wide measure of local self-government; (2) they repudiated the Austrian principle of "cultural-national" autonomy on a countrywide scale; (3) they rejected any division of working-class organizations on national lines; (4) they supported the right of all the oppressed nations of the Tsarist empire to self-determination, which they defined as the right to secede and form an independent state; (5) they pointed out that the right to take such steps should not be confused with the expediency of such action.<sup>70</sup> Whether the right should be exercised in any particular case had to be decided by the party "from the point of view . . . of the interests of the class struggle of the proletariat for socialism."<sup>71</sup>

Whereas points one and four of this program were designed to provide guidelines for Bolshevik agitation among the oppressed minorities and points two and three were intended to protect the party against the danger of national disintegration, it was point five which was to become of crucial significance after the Bolshevik seizure of power, when the party at last confronted the problem of preserving the Tsarist patrimony which it had inherited. Stalin, in 1913, had in a sense anticipated the problem when he wrote:

The Transcaucasian Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their Diet and, succumbing to the influence of their beys and mullahs, decide to restore the old order of things and to secede from the state. According to the meaning of the clause on self-determination, they are fully entitled to do so. But will this be in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tatar nation? Can Social Democrats remain indifferent when the beys and mullahs take the lead of the masses in the solution of the national problem? Should not Social Democrats interfere in the matter and influence the will of the nation in a definite way?<sup>72</sup>

By 1918, when the borderlands began to secede under non-Bolshevik auspices, the answer of Stalin was clear:

All this points to the necessity of interpreting the principle of self-determination as a right not of the bourgeoisie, but of the working masses of the given nation. The principle of self-determination must be an instrument in the struggle for socialism and must be subordinated to the principles of socialism.<sup>73</sup>

In other words, the proletariat of the borderlands had to be "assisted" in exercising their right of self-determination against the bourgeoisie; self-determination was a right to unite as well as to secede, and the

supreme test was the interest of the toiling masses as interpreted by the party.

In the grand strategy of Bolshevism, "self-determination," like so many other slogans, turned out to have almost exclusively tactical significance. It was useful in stirring up the forces of minority unrest and in winning supporters among the oppressed nationalities. As such, it justified itself. But it always remained a formula with which Bolshevism was fundamentally uneasy. For, to the extent that it fed the flames of nationalism, it set in motion fissiparous tendencies which would ultimately have to be harnessed and bridled. The doctrinal and organizational premises of Bolshevism were, after all, profoundly centralistic. Exceptions would be tolerated only when, and only as long as, they served the purpose of smoothing the road to power.

Toward this larger end, Bolshevik doctrine, organization, and tactics were all directed. The period before 1917 was a proving ground in which doctrine was elaborated, organization tempered, and tactics tested. In this crucible the strategy of 1917 was developed, and Bolshevism as a system of governance took form. Still later, the experiences of this period were to provide a set of precedents on the basis of which decisions would be defended and attacked, orthodoxies would harden, and heresies be condemned. History would be rewritten in the language of the victors; the tale of the defeated would be twisted beyond recognition. Out of the totalitarian embryo would come totalitarianism full-blown.

## *Chapter 3*

# *The Road to Power*

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On the eve of the Revolution of March 1917, the total membership of the Bolshevik Party was generously estimated as 23,600.<sup>1</sup> The forces of the party were scattered and disorganized. Lenin was marooned in Switzerland and out of touch with his adherents in Russia. Oppressed by the staleness of émigré life, he immersed himself in a ceaseless round of literary and political activity, editing the journal *Sotsial-Demokrat* with Zinoviev, carrying on polemics with other socialists, working on his treatise on imperialism, and participating in a series of meetings and conferences with antiwar socialists at which he called for the transformation of the war among the nations into an international civil war.

In Russia itself, most of the better-known Bolshevik leaders like Kamenev and Stalin languished in prison or in Siberian exile. Such remnants of the Bolshevik underground organization as survived the severe wartime repression functioned under the general supervision of the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, which was then located in Petrograd<sup>2</sup> and consisted of two workingmen, Shlyapnikov and Zalutsky, and a twenty-seven-year-old student at the Polytechnic Institute, Molotov.

### *The Collapse of the Autocracy*

The Revolution to which all the revolutionary parties had looked forward took them all by surprise. The collapse of the Romanov autocracy occurred with a catastrophic suddenness which stunned even those who had done most to bring it about. The dynasty had survived the 1905 revolution because in the hour of decision it could still count on the allegiance of the army, the police, the bureaucracy, the majority of the landed gentry, and the leading figures of the business and financial world. By 1917 these sources of support were melting away. The Grand Duke Alexander Mikhailovich was not far wrong when he wrote to the tsar in

February of that year, "Strange though it may be, the government itself is the organ that is preparing the revolution."<sup>3</sup> The war — with its vast losses in men, territory, and resources, its revelation of impotence, incompetence, and degeneration in the highest court circles, its mounting weariness, its deprivations and hunger — stretched loyalty to tsardom to the final breaking point. All that was needed was a precipitating incident to reveal the real weakness of the ties which sustained the autocracy.

The incident was provided on March 8, 1917, when bread riots and strikes occurred in Petrograd. During the next few days, the disorders expanded into a general strike. The decisive step toward revolution was taken when mutiny spread to the garrison and the soldiers of the regiments refused to obey the commands of their officers to fire on the crowds. The power was in the streets, but it was still formless, anarchic, and without clear direction. The fate of the Revolution turned on who would rush in to fill the vacuum of leadership which had been created.

*The Dual Power*

Out of the chaos of the early days two centers of initiative began to take shape. One was the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; the other was the state Duma. The soviet, which was modeled on its 1905 prototype, began its activities on March 12 when a miscellaneous group composed of left-wing Duma deputies, members of the labor group of the War Industries Committee, and representatives of trade unions and cooperatives constituted a Temporary Executive Committee and invited delegates from factories and regiments to assemble that same evening in the Tauride Palace to organize the soviet. In the absence of any other authority, the soviet quickly assumed such governmental functions as the regulation of the food supply and the organization of a workers' militia as a temporary substitute for the police. Perhaps the most famous of its early decrees was "Order Number One" (March 14) which, in effect, transferred control of the military forces to elected committees of soldiers and sailors by entrusting them with the disposition of all forms of arms. The same decree was also designed to make the armed forces subject to the paramount jurisdiction of the soviet. From the beginning, the soviet was far closer to the workers and soldiers than was the Duma; its decrees carried a persuasive power that no official body could command. Yet the members of the soviet gave no indication of any eagerness to proclaim themselves the supreme rulers. They groped their way in the confusion, assumed authority by default, and took such action as the moods of the marching soldiers and workers seemed to dictate.<sup>4</sup>

Meanwhile, the more conservative leaders of the Duma moved to bring order out of confusion. Their first hope was to persuade the tsar

to concede a ministry responsible to the Duma. The tsar's response was to dissolve the Duma. The Duma leaders still cherished the dream of saving the monarchy by securing the abdication of Nicholas II in favor of his son or his brother Michael. This dream exploded when Michael, in whose favor Nicholas II had abdicated, refused the throne. Nothing was left except to establish a provisional government; for, as V. V. Shulgin, one of the Duma leaders, put it, "If we don't take power, others will take it, those who have already elected some scoundrels in the factories."<sup>5</sup>

No government with any pretension to authority could be formed at this juncture without the support, or at least the acquiescence, of the soviet. The Duma leaders consequently negotiated an arrangement with representatives of the soviet by which the latter agreed to give conditional support to a provisional government, provided that it met certain conditions designed to guarantee the establishment of civil liberties and democratic institutions.<sup>6</sup> The first Provisional Government, which was headed by Prince G. E. Lvov, the head of the Union of Zemstvos, was predominantly Kadet and Octobrist in composition. An effort to broaden the political base of the cabinet by including several soviet leaders met with a rebuff. The only member of the soviet in the cabinet was the Socialist Revolutionary Kerensky, who, despite a resolution of the Soviet Executive Committee declaring against the participation of its members in the new government, accepted the portfolio of Minister of Justice.

Thus began the system of dual power under which the formal authority of government was vested in a cabinet supported by a relatively narrow stratum of articulate society, while much of the actual power of veto and decision reposed in a body of unofficial soviets which appeared to enjoy the confidence of the masses.<sup>7</sup> The arrangement between the Provisional Government and the soviet was a fragile truce rather than a solid agreement. The Soviet Executive Committee promised support only "in the measure in which the newborn government will act in the direction of fulfilling its obligations and struggling decisively with the old government."<sup>8</sup>

The silences of the arrangement were eloquent of future difficulties. There was no mention of the land question, no allusion to the organization of industry, no reference to peace or foreign policy. On issues such as these, a cleavage was to develop which could not be bridged. The task of Bolshevism was to deepen the chasm.

#### *Bolshevik Waverings and Leninist Intransigence*

During the first months of the Revolution, the Bolsheviks played a minor role. Elections to the soviets yielded a heavy preponderance of Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries (SR's). In the general upsurge

of revolutionary sentiment, sectarian political distinctions among the rank and file tended to be obliterated. Until the appearance of Lenin on the scene, the Bolshevik leadership responded to the mass mood by pursuing a relatively conciliatory policy toward other left-wing parties in the soviet. While the first manifesto issued by Molotov and his associates called for the creation of a provisional revolutionary government,<sup>9</sup> and the Provisional Government itself was subsequently denounced as "a class government of the bourgeoisie and the large landlords,"<sup>10</sup> the Bolsheviks did not demand that the soviet take power. Instead, as a Bolshevik resolution submitted to the soviet phrased it, "The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies must reserve for itself complete freedom of action in the selection of means of realising the fundamental demands of the revolutionary people, and in particular in the selection of means of influencing the Provisional Government."<sup>11</sup>

With the return of Kamenev, Stalin, and Muranov from Siberian exile on March 25 and their assumption of the direction of the party in Petrograd, the policy of conciliation and compromise won strong reinforcement. Kamenev, in an article published in *Pravda*, the party journal, on March 28 took a position on the war with which many Mensheviks and SR's would have fully agreed. He wrote:

Our slogan is — pressure on the Provisional Government with the aim of forcing it openly, before world democracy, and immediately to come forth with an attempt to induce all the belligerent countries forthwith to start negotiations concerning the means of stopping the World War.

Up to that time, however, each remains at his post.<sup>12</sup>

Kamenev was by no means alone. His position reflected the dominant view of the party leadership in Petrograd at that time.<sup>13</sup>

Meanwhile, Lenin, still in Zurich, was plotting a different course. In a letter to Alexandra Kollontai (March 16, 1917) he wrote, "We, of course, retain our opposition to the defense of the fatherland."<sup>14</sup> The next day, he wrote again,

In my opinion, our main task is to guard against getting entangled in foolish attempts at "unity" with the social-patriots . . . and to continue the work of our own party in a consistently *internationalist* spirit.

Our immediate task is . . . to prepare the seizure of power by the *Soviets of Workers' Deputies*. Only this power can give bread, peace, and freedom.<sup>15</sup>

"Bread, peace, and freedom" — these slogans were to be endlessly reiterated and emphasized, and they were to lift Bolshevism to power. "We shall see," wrote Lenin to Madame Kollontai, "how the People's Freedom Party [the Kadets] . . . will give the people freedom, bread, and peace . . . We shall see!"<sup>16</sup>

On the evening of April 16, Lenin arrived at the Finland Station in Petrograd. There he was coolly greeted by Chkheidze, the President of the soviet. "We suppose," said the Menshevik Chkheidze, "that the main problem of the revolutionary democracy is the defense of our Revolution against any attacks on it, whether from without or from within. We suppose that for this end not disunion but consolidation of the ranks of the whole democracy is necessary. We hope that you will pursue these objectives along with us."<sup>17</sup>

It was to be a vain hope. Lenin's plan of campaign had already matured, and cooperation with the Chkheidzes had no place in it. His first words to Kamenev were a sharp rebuke for the tone of *Pravda*. In a speech delivered to his own followers on the day after his arrival, he demanded a complete break with the old line of "revolutionary defensism" and a repudiation of the Provisional Government. He called for "a republic of Soviets of Workers', Agricultural Labourers' and Peasants' Deputies throughout the land, from top to bottom . . . abolition of the police, the army, the bureaucracy," and an arrangement by which all officers were "to be elected and to be subject to recall at any time, their salaries not to exceed the average wage of a competent worker." He proposed "confiscation of all private lands, nationalization . . . immediate merger of all the banks in the country into one general national bank, over which the Soviet of Workers' Deputies should have control . . . control of social production and distribution of goods . . . immediate calling of a party convention . . . changing the party programme . . . changing the name of the party," and "rebuilding the International."<sup>18</sup>

Lenin's intransigence was at first almost completely unacceptable to his own party. At a meeting of the Petrograd committee of the party, his theses were rejected by thirteen votes to two, with one abstention.<sup>19</sup> Kamenev, in an article in *Pravda* entitled "Our Differences," referred to these theses as Lenin's "personal opinion"; "as regards Comrade Lenin's general line," he wrote, "it appears to us unacceptable inasmuch as it proceeds from the assumption that the bourgeois-democratic revolution *has been completed* and it builds on the immediate transformation of this revolution into a Socialist revolution."<sup>20</sup>

The controversy between Lenin and Kamenev exposed a deep fissure within Bolshevik ranks which was to continue right up to the seizure of power, and even beyond. To Bolsheviks of Kamenev's persuasion, Russia was simply not ripe for a socialist revolution. Like the Mensheviks and like Lenin up to the 1905 revolution, these Bolsheviks made a sharp demarcation between the successive stages of bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolution. The first stage had to be completed before one could embark on the second, and the tactics suitable for the first stage excluded

a Bolshevik coup d'état and the assumption of supreme power. In the perspective of Kamenev and his followers, the Russian revolution still had to run a long bourgeois course. The agrarian revolution had to be completed. The bourgeois-democratic revolution would culminate in the establishment of a revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, and only then would the socialist revolution become the order of the day.

To Lenin this perspective was now anathema. Impatient to take power, he brushed aside Kamenev's delaying formula. "Our doctrine," he quoted Marx, "is not a dogma, but a guide to action."<sup>21</sup> "The peculiarity of the present situation in Russia," Lenin declared, "is that it represents a *transition* from the first stage of the revolution, which, because of the inadequate organisation and insufficient class-consciousness of the proletariat, led to the assumption of power by the bourgeoisie — to its second stage which is to place power in the hands of the proletariat and the poorest strata of the peasantry."<sup>22</sup> "To that extent," Lenin insisted, "the bourgeois, or the bourgeois-democratic, revolution in Russia is *completed*."<sup>23</sup> Kamenev's use of the formula of "the revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" seemed to him "antiquated." "The Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, — here," Lenin argued, "you have 'revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry' already realised in life." "Theory, my friend," Lenin goaded Kamenev, 'is grey, but green is the eternal tree of life.' The orthodox theory of the Old Bolsheviks that "the rule of the proletariat and peasantry, their dictatorship, can and must follow the rule of the bourgeoisie" had to be discarded as no longer corresponding with "living reality."<sup>24</sup>

Instead, Lenin offered his conception of dual power, "the fact that by the side of the Provisional Government, the government of the *bourgeoisie*, there has developed *another*, as yet weak, embryonic, but undoubtedly real and growing government — the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies."<sup>25</sup> To Lenin it appeared incontrovertible that such a combination could not endure. "There can be no two powers in a state."<sup>26</sup> For the moment, the two powers were interlocked; the Provisional Government rested on the support of the soviet, and the soviet yielded such support because it was still under the spell of "petty-bourgeois" delusions implanted by the SR and Menshevik leaders of the soviet. These delusions had to be destroyed if the Provisional Government were to be overthrown. "The only way it can and must be overthrown," Lenin insisted, "is by winning over the majority in the Soviets."<sup>27</sup> Thus the slogan "All Power to the Soviets" merged into the recipe of all power to the Bolsheviks in the soviets.

Despite the opposition of Kamenev and others whom Lenin described

contemptuously as Old Bolsheviks, Lenin carried the day. His program was approved first at the Petrograd City Conference of the party, which took place from April 27 to May 5, 1917, and then at the even more important All-Russian Conference of the party (described in party histories as the April Conference), which lasted from May 7 to May 12, 1917. The resolutions adopted by the conferences represented a great personal triumph for Lenin. Although the opposition continued to smolder and, at critical moments, even erupted into open defiance, henceforth Lenin's ascendancy in the party was never effectively challenged.

#### *The End of the Honeymoon and the Rise of Bolshevik Influence*

Meanwhile, events were moving in a direction which the Bolsheviks could only welcome. The honeymoon period of revolutionary exaltation and camaraderie was drawing to a close. The issues and the problems of state which the March Revolution had inherited could no longer be evaded. The economic situation continued to deteriorate, and the workers in the factories were increasingly rebellious in the face of higher living costs and food shortages. While the Provisional Government temporized with the land problem, peasant restiveness mounted and encroachments on the estates of landlords grew bolder. Discipline in the armed forces steadily deteriorated, particularly among the inactive garrisons in rear areas such as Petrograd. Military units resisted assignment to the front, and insubordination and desertion were on the rise.

If the Provisional Government was aware of the pressing character of these problems, it showed itself either unable or unwilling to come to grips with them. Blinded by the patriotic resurgence of the early days of the revolution and determined not to betray its self-imposed mandate of fulfilling Russia's international obligations and safeguarding Russia's position as a great power, it insisted on fighting the war to a finish in the face of patent evidence that the war was becoming increasingly unpopular.

The first major crisis developed with the publication on May 3 of Foreign Minister Milyukov's note to the Allies emphasizing Russia's determination to carry on the war and fulfill its obligations to the Allies. Soldiers, sailors, and workers marched in demonstrative protest under banners bearing such inscriptions as "Down with Milyukov," "Down with the Provisional Government," and "Down with the War." As a result of the storm of disapproval which Milyukov's note had aroused, the government issued "an explanation" which was designed to square its war aims with the demand of the leaders of the soviet for a peace without annexations and indemnities. Guchkov, the Minister of War, and Milyukov resigned from the cabinet. After protracted negotiations with the leaders of the soviet in the course of which the Executive Committee first pronounced against

participation in the cabinet and then reversed itself, Prince Lvov announced a new cabinet on May 18 which included three SR's — Kerensky as Minister of War, Chernov as Minister of Agriculture, and Pereverzev as Minister of Justice; two Mensheviks — Tseretelli as Minister for Posts and Telegraphs, Skobelev as Minister for Labor; and the Populist-Socialist Peshekhanov as Minister for Food. This coalition cabinet, in which the moderate socialist parties which dominated the soviet participated and for which they necessarily assumed responsibility, ensured an exit from the immediate crisis, but it still left the aspirations for peace, land, and bread to be fulfilled.

Indeed, the moderate socialist parties of the soviet, by shouldering formal governmental responsibility for the continuing crisis, were maneuvered into a position in which they inevitably became a target for mass frustration and dissatisfaction. The sobering complexities of the problems which the government faced were not conducive to hasty action. Delay, on the other hand, only strengthened the force of extremism. Caught in the tangles of coalition in a period when revolutionary zeal was still intensifying, the moderate socialists found themselves compelled to dampen the revolutionary ardor of the dissatisfied and were condemned to lose influence even with their own supporters.

This process did not take place all at once. At the National Congress of Soviets of Peasant Deputies, held in Petrograd from May 17 until June 10, the Bolsheviks mustered an insignificant minority of fourteen out of a total of 1,115 delegates.<sup>28</sup> The congress was dominated by the SR's who wrote the resolutions and elected a heavy majority of the Executive Committee. By late summer, as a result of the failure of the Provisional Government to come to grips with the agrarian problem, the SR Party itself divided into a right and left wing, the former still giving support to the Provisional Government while the latter called for the transfer of power to a government "responsible to the Soviets." At the meeting of the Council of the SR Party in late August 1917, the left wing mobilized thirty-five votes to fifty-four for the right-wing majority.<sup>29</sup> The next month, the left wing captured control of the party's strategically important Petrograd committee.<sup>30</sup> The steady growth of left-wing influence in the SR Party served as an index of growing peasant disenchantment with the policy of the Provisional Government. It was to lead the left to break away in November to form an independent party of Left Socialist Revolutionary Internationalists and even to join the Bolsheviks in a coalition which did much to sustain their regime in its early precarious days.

The rise of direct Bolshevik influence was more evident in the key cities. As early as June 13, the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet, by a vote of 173 to 144, passed a resolution endorsing the Bolshevik for-

mula of "All Power to the Soviets." Meeting at about the same time, June 12-16, the Conference of Factory Committees in Petrograd yielded a Bolshevik majority.<sup>31</sup> At the first All-Russian Congress of Soviets, which met in Petrograd on June 16, the Bolsheviks were still in a definite minority. Of the 777 delegates who declared their political affiliations, 285 were SR's, 247 Mensheviks, 105 Bolsheviks, and 32 Menshevik Internationalists. The remainder belonged to various minor parties and groupings.<sup>32</sup> At this stage of revolutionary development, Bolshevik support was largely concentrated among the workers of the larger industrial centers; the military formations had yet to be effectively penetrated.

Meanwhile, the Bolshevik Party continued to gather its forces and strengthen its organization. At the so-called All-Russian April Conference (May 7-12), the 151 assembled delegates represented 79,204 party members,<sup>33</sup> over three times the membership figure on the eve of the March Revolution. At the party's Sixth Congress (August 8-16), the 157 voting delegates who participated represented 112 organizations with a membership of 177,000.<sup>34</sup> Sverdlov, who delivered the organizational report of the Central Committee at the congress, claimed a total membership of 200,000 distributed among 62 organizations. Almost half of the membership was concentrated in the Petrograd and Moscow areas. Other strong points were the industrial areas of the Urals and the Don Basin and the Finnish and Baltic areas where Bolshevik influence was particularly powerful among the sailors of the fleet.<sup>35</sup> At this congress, the *Mezhraiontsy* (Interborough Organization of the United Socialist Democrats), some four thousand strong, merged with the Bolsheviks. This group, which numbered among its leaders such well-known figures as Trotsky, Lunacharsky, Uritsky, and Volodarsky, shared the Bolshevik attitude toward the war and had cooperated closely with the Bolsheviks on tactical matters in the preceding months. The accession of the Mezhraiontsy was especially important because of the talents of its leadership. Trotsky, in particular, was to play a dominant and crucial role in organizing the insurrection in the November days.

The flooding of the party by new members and the proliferation of new local party units inevitably created serious problems of direction and control. The sheer mass of the fresh forces which inundated the party in the 1917 days carried an implied threat of swamping the old leadership. The Bolshevik Party of 1917 was far from being the monolithic organization of which Lenin had dreamed in 1903 or which it later became. Lenin tried, so far as it lay in his power, to keep the threads of control in the hands of the seasoned underground veterans who had been closely associated with him in the prerevolutionary days. The Central Committee, except for the new recruits from the Mezhraiontsy, was constituted almost entirely of such elements. Of the 157 voting delegates at the Sixth

Congress, 149 had worked in the party organization since 1914 or earlier.<sup>36</sup>

Responsibility for the organizational work of the party was concentrated in Lenin's faithful lieutenant, Sverdlov, who officiated as the one-man secretariat of the Central Committee and gave the party machine such coherence as it was able to attain. Through Sverdlov, communication was maintained with the local party units, workers were dispatched where needed, and visits to or from the center were arranged. The Central Committee as a body devoted itself chiefly to broad policy and tactical matters; most of its energies were concentrated on developments in the capital, Petrograd. The guidance it provided for the party was exerted largely through *Pravda* and other party publications. Relationships between the Central Committee in Petrograd and adjoining party organizations in the Baltic, in Finland, and Moscow were fairly close. Communications with the peripheral areas, despite the strenuous efforts of Sverdlov, remained tenuous and adventitious. The new recruits who formed the party base were frequently illiterate, sometimes turbulent, badly disciplined, and unreliable.

The authority of the party leadership rested largely on its capacity to persuade and convince rather than to direct and dictate. In 1917, agitation and propaganda were the keys to party leadership; many who emerged from the ranks to become leaders in this period were precisely those who showed themselves gifted agitators and propagandists. If some semblance of order and homogeneity was imposed on the heterogeneous elements that flocked to the Bolshevik banner, it was due less to the perfection of the organizational instrument than to the party leadership's ability to articulate slogans and improvise tactics which rallied the support of the rank and file. It is symptomatic of this stage of development in Lenin's career that, under the influence of the revolutionary ferment, he temporarily abandoned the distrust of mass spontaneity which characterized so much of his earlier outlook. "Do not be afraid," he now cried, "of the initiative and independence of the masses."<sup>37</sup> The transformation of the Bolshevik Party from a small conspiratorial band into a mass revolutionary organization was a visible expression of this change of outlook, although Lenin, as always, took precautions to ensure that control of the organization which he had created would not gravitate into other hands.

The Bolshevik march to power can, for purposes of analysis, be conveniently divided into three periods. During the first period of upsurge, which ended with the July uprising of soldiers and workers in Petrograd, the Bolsheviks gathered their forces, sought to increase their strength in the soviets, and called for a transfer of "All Power to the Soviets." During the second period of reaction, which lasted from the repression

of the party in mid-July until the collapse of the Kornilov plot in September, the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" was withdrawn. The soviets were denounced as "fig leaves of the counterrevolution," and the party was called upon to prepare its forces for the decisive struggle while avoiding the danger of premature outbreaks.<sup>38</sup> For a brief moment, when the danger of the Kornilov coup was at its height, Lenin returned to "the pre-July demand of all power to the Soviets, a government of S.-R.'s and Mensheviks responsible to the Soviets."<sup>39</sup> But this slogan quickly disappeared with the evaporation of the Kornilov danger. The third period began in mid-September with a resurgence of Bolshevik strength and the attainment of majorities in the Petrograd and Moscow soviets. During this period, the slogan of "All Power to the Soviets" was again revived,<sup>40</sup> and the summons went out to prepare the insurrection.

#### *The First Phase: Caution*

During the first period, the Bolsheviks moved relatively carefully. They were still a small minority. When the Petrograd Bolshevik Committee issued the slogan of "Down with the Provisional Government" during the May demonstrations, Lenin rebuked the committee for its premature adventurism.<sup>41</sup> During the next few months, the Bolshevik leaders concentrated their major energies on winning a dominant position in the Petrograd factories. By mid-June their efforts had been crowned with considerable success; they won control of the Workers' Section of the Petrograd Soviet and carried a resolution embodying the Bolshevik formula of transfer of power to the soviets. As their mass support increased, the Bolsheviks grew bolder. The party leadership voted on June 21 to stage a large street demonstration two days later. There is evidence to indicate that some of the more aggressive and adventurous spirits among the Bolsheviks anticipated a clash with the authorities and were laying their plans for a seizure of power in Petrograd. But this was a design not shared by the responsible leaders of the party, who at this point were all too conscious of their relative weakness in the provinces and in the army. Indeed, the leaders themselves were divided about the wisdom and risks of the demonstration. When both the Executive Committee of the Petrograd Soviet and the All-Russian Soviet Congress joined in prohibiting it, the Bolshevik Central Committee decided at the last moment to call it off.<sup>42</sup>

A week later the Bolsheviks had their revenge when the Congress of Soviets authorized a demonstration, held July 1, which was intended to be a vote of confidence in the congress. Instead, it was transformed into a triumphal procession for Bolshevism, with the Bolsheviks' banners demanding "Bread, Peace, and Freedom" and "All Power to the Soviets" dominating the demonstration.

The First of July demonstration coincided with the launching of the ill-fated Kerensky offensive on the Galician front. The announcement of early successes kindled a brief flare-up of patriotic ardor. When the offensive turned into a debacle, it became crystal clear that the army had lost its will to fight. Many of the peasant soldiers began to vote against the war "with their feet" by deserting in droves and rushing back to their villages to participate in the partition of the landed estates which was beginning unofficially to gather momentum.

The failure of the offensive seriously weakened the position of the Provisional Government and its Menshevik and SR supporters. They could offer the country neither victory nor peace. Meanwhile, the influence of the Bolsheviks was obviously mounting, particularly in the Petrograd area among the factory workers, the soldiers of the inactive garrison, and the sailors of Kronstadt and the Baltic fleet. The only potentially effective counterpoise to Bolshevik power was the officer corps and such loyal regiments as it could command. The moderate socialists thus faced a painful dilemma. The deepening Revolution polarized the forces of revolution and counterrevolution. If the moderate socialists invoked the support of the army generals to suppress the Bolshevik threat, they faced the hazard of being themselves displaced by a dictatorship of the generals from the right. If they joined with the Bolsheviks to ward off the threat of a rightist coup d'état, they faced an even more certain danger that the Bolsheviks would attempt to dump them on the "dust heap of history" at the first favorable opportunity.

The moderates began by temporizing with the first of these unpalatable alternatives. The July risings raised the specter of a Bolshevik seizure of power. Soon after the launching of the Kerensky offensive, discontent and unrest spread among the military units and factory workers of Petrograd. The Bolshevik leadership, not yet ready to try to take power, sought at first to prevent street manifestations. When that proved impossible, the Central Committee issued a call for "a peaceful organized demonstration" to demand the assumption of power by the soviets. The movement of July 16-18 quickly got out of control.<sup>43</sup> Masses of soldiers and workers poured through the streets shooting aimlessly, breaking into houses and stores, and looting their contents. For two days both the government and the soviet were powerless to deal with the rioting mobs; order began to be restored only on July 18 when reliable troops were brought in to patrol the streets of the capital.

The July rising represented one of the most curious episodes of the Revolution. The Bolshevik Central Committee — believing that the rising was premature but feeling that it could not dissociate itself from the elemental activism of the demonstrators — assumed the leadership reluctantly. The crowds marched to the soviet demanding that the mod-

erate socialists who still controlled the Executive Committee take power; the leaders of the committee replied by calling on the demonstrators to disperse. With both the Bolsheviks and the Executive Committee unprepared to assume the reins of government, the rising was deprived of a political objective. The soldiers and workers were left no alternative except to trickle back to the barracks and factories with a sense of frustration and bewilderment.

The government, relying on the loyal regiments which were available to it, now moved to the counterattack. The Ministry of Justice released documents designed to prove that Lenin was a German spy. On the morning of the eighteenth, the offices of *Pravda* were raided and a newly established Bolshevik printing plant destroyed. The next day, an order was issued for the arrest of Lenin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev. Lenin and Zinoviev succeeded in avoiding arrest by going into hiding; but during the next few weeks Kamenev, Trotsky, Lunacharsky, Madame Kollontai, and many lesser Bolsheviks were apprehended and imprisoned. Some of the more turbulent regiments were dissolved. On July 25, four days after Kerensky replaced Prince Lvov as premier, the death penalty at the front was restored.

This display of firmness by the Provisional Government was more fictive than real. Trotsky and other prominent Bolsheviks, to be sure, were confined to prison, but they were released in mid-September after the failure of the Kornilov coup. The second level of the party apparatus remained largely intact, and Lenin continued to direct its operations from his various hideouts. Agitators were still at work in the factories and the garrisons, and Petrograd and the Baltic fleet remained Bolshevik strongholds. The Sixth Congress of the party, which met *sub rosa* in August, registered a striking increase in party membership. Despite repression, the party continued to flourish, and the policy of striking at a few leaders left their roots of support still intact.

#### *The Second Phase: Preparation of Forces*

The lesson which the Bolshevik leadership drew from the July rising was embodied in the resolutions of the Sixth Congress. The slogan "All Power to the Soviets" was temporarily withdrawn.<sup>44</sup> The party was warned that power had passed "into the hands of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie" and that it was necessary to organize to wrest power from it.

The congress appeared to commit the party to the path of insurrection, but it set no time schedules, and indeed, with the experience of the July days fresh in mind, it warned against the danger of premature outbreaks. The party was still waiting for the revolutionary tide to come to full flood.

Meanwhile, Kerensky sought to strengthen the position of the Provisional Government by invoking the support of "the live forces of the country," as the current phrase had it. The Moscow State Conference, which assembled from August 25 to August 28 at the call of the Provisional Government, included representatives of every class, profession, and shade of political opinion in Russia except Bolshevism. The conference had no legislative mandate; it was intended to be an advisory, consultative body which would provide a sounding board of national sentiment.

This effort to rally "the flower of the nation" behind the Provisional Government turned into a dismal fiasco. To begin with, the absence of the Bolsheviks gave all references to national unity a somewhat specious ring. Despite a dramatically staged reconciliation in the course of which the soviet leader Tseretelli and the prominent industrialist Bublikov exchanged handshakes, the conference revealed a deep and tragic chasm between the right, which was heavily overrepresented, and the moderate socialists of the left. While the conference was in session, preparations for a right-wing military coup d'état were already far advanced. The speeches of such military leaders as Kornilov and Kaledin bordered on open defiance of the government and inspired a bitter taunt from Lenin: "Kaledin mocked the Mensheviks and S.-R.'s who were compelled to keep silent. The Cossack general spat in their faces, and they wiped themselves off, saying: 'Divine dew!'"<sup>45</sup> Kerensky's efforts to pour oratorical oil on the troubled waters were in vain. His speeches, as Trotsky noted later, "were merely a sumptuous pounding of water in a mortar."<sup>46</sup> The basic alignment of forces was left undisturbed.

With the conclusion of the conference, the military plot to seize power and install General Kornilov as dictator moved toward its climax. Kornilov's plan involved an envelopment and march on Petrograd by Cossack, Caucasian, and other supposedly loyal divisions. Before the plot could be executed, Kerensky got wind of it and ordered the immediate dismissal of Kornilov as Commander-in-Chief of the Army. Kornilov ignored the order and, in a mood of high confidence, gave the word for the "promenade" to proceed to Petrograd. Difficulties quickly developed — railroad workers sabotaged trains carrying the troops of the expedition; telegraph operators refused to dispatch the messages of the staff; agitators penetrated Kornilov's picked divisions and, without too great difficulty, persuaded them not to fight against the legal government.

The collapse of the Kornilov expedition marked an important turning point in the revolution. It revealed the emptiness of the power of the generals and the weakness of the appeal of traditional conservatism. When troops regarded by the general staff as its most reliable support were no longer willing to obey the commands of their officers, it became

patently clear that the officer corps had lost the power to determine the destiny of the Russian Revolution. Who would inherit the loyalties which the generals had forfeited? With the elimination of Kornilov, the ground was prepared for the final battle between the moderate socialists and the Bolsheviks.

The first temporary effect of the Kornilov scare, however, was to throw the moderate socialists and the Bolsheviks into each others' arms. On Menshevik initiative, the Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the Congress of Soviets created a Committee for Struggle with Counter-revolution in which Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, and SR's were represented by three members each. For a brief moment at the height of the Kornilov crisis, Lenin played with the idea of a compromise, an arrangement by which the Mensheviks and SR's would organize a government responsible to the soviets and "the Bolsheviks . . . would refrain from immediately advancing the demand for the passing of power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants."<sup>47</sup>

But this idea was abandoned almost as quickly as it was conceived. In a letter to the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party written on September 12, Lenin made his own position clear: "We will fight, we are fighting against Kornilov, even as Kerensky's troops do, but we do not support Kerensky. *On the contrary*, we expose his weakness. There is the difference. It is rather a subtle difference, but it is highly essential and one must not forget it." Lenin called on his cohorts to intensify their propaganda among the workers, soldiers, and peasants involved in the struggle with Kornilov: "Keep up their enthusiasm; encourage them to beat up the generals and officers who express themselves in favour of Kornilov; urge *them* to demand the immediate transfer of the land to the peasants; give *them* the idea of the necessity of arresting Rodzyanko and Milyukov, dispersing the State Duma, shutting down the *Ryech* and other bourgeois papers, and instituting investigations against them. The 'Left' S.R.'s must be especially pushed on in this direction."<sup>48</sup> The rise in mass militancy which accompanied the frustration of the Kornilov coup worked to the advantage of the Bolsheviks. By mid-September a strong shift of sympathy toward them was apparent. For the first time, Bolshevik resolutions commanded majorities in both the Petrograd and the Moscow soviets.<sup>49</sup>

The position of Kerensky and the moderate socialists was visibly deteriorating. The defeat of Kornilov had eliminated one contender for power, but, with Bolshevism resurgent, a far more formidable antagonist confronted the government. After the Kornilov affair, the officer corps spared no love for Kerensky; in any case, its support by this time had become an asset of dubious value. With defeatism rampant in the army and many units in a state of mutinous disintegration, the determination

of Kerensky and the moderate socialist leaders to carry on with the war was hardly calculated to make them very popular with the rank-and-file soldier or sailor.

Even in the countryside, where the SR Party had its strongest support, the position of the government was perceptibly weakening. Faced with the autumn upswing of peasant violence and land seizures, Kerensky countered on September 21 by issuing a military order forbidding the peasants to take other people's land or property and threatening them with dire legal penalties if they persisted. Since there was no power capable of enforcing the order, the peasants paid no attention to it. Its only effect was to serve as an irritant and drive the peasants into the arms of the Left SR's and, sometimes, into the arms of the Bolsheviks, who were willing to bless what the peasants in any case were determined to do. In the cities, industrial disorganization spread and intensified. The government was powerless either to restore worker discipline or to check the rise in living costs which helped undermine it. The Bolsheviks, with their call for workers' control, intensified the chaos and were themselves the beneficiaries of the chaos which they helped create.

The political coalition which supported the Provisional Government showed many signs of strain and weakness. After the resignation of the four Kadet ministers from the coalition cabinet on July 15 as a protest against the government's concession to Ukrainian demands for autonomy, and particularly after the Kornilov affair, many Kadets of the right hardly scrupled to conceal their distaste for Kerensky. They gave him grudging and reluctant support only because Bolshevism appeared to them so much the greater evil. Nor were the Mensheviks united in their approval of the Provisional Government. A substantial group of Menshevik Internationalists led by Martov was sharply critical of Kerensky's foreign policy; the backing which they extended was at best wavering and hesitant.

The situation within Kerensky's own SR Party was, if anything, even more critical. The resignation of Chernov, perhaps the most respected of SR leaders, from the Kerensky government on September 13, in protest against the postponement of a land settlement, did much to undermine the position of Kerensky within his own party. The party divided into a right-wing minority which supported Kerensky, a growing left wing which moved close to the Bolsheviks, and a large center group led by Chernov, which occupied an intermediate position. On every side, Kerensky's support seemed to be melting away.

Toward the end of September, Kerensky made a last desperate effort to cement the coalition which was so obviously falling apart. On September 27, the so-called Democratic Conference assembled in Petrograd; the twelve hundred odd delegates represented soviets, cooperatives, trade unions, and municipal and county dumas. The conference first passed a

resolution to exclude Kadets from the coalition, and then added a final touch of absurdity to the proceedings by overwhelmingly defeating the formula of "coalition without the Kadets." When the SR orator Minor made his plea for a coalition government with the warning that otherwise "we will begin to cut to pieces," voices from the floor inquired, "Whom?" Minor's reply, "We will cut each other to pieces,"<sup>50</sup> had more than a touch of prophetic vision.

The Democratic Conference was succeeded by the so-called Council of the Republic, or Pre-Parliament, a much smaller body which gave more substantial representation to the nonsocialist groups which had been meagerly represented in the larger Conference. The Pre-Parliament was intended to serve as a stopgap consultative and deliberative body until the convocation of the much-delayed Constituent Assembly which was scheduled to open December 11. The first session of the Pre-Parliament was marked by a mass walkout of the Bolshevik delegation.<sup>51</sup> The departure of the Bolsheviks removed a discordant element from the council's deliberations, but it left the same old problems to be resolved and the same inability to come to grips with them.

### *The Third Phase: Insurrection*

Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks debated the question of insurrection. Lenin, who was still in hiding, precipitated the issue in two letters to the party's Central Committee. The first letter, dated September 25–27, began "Having obtained a majority in the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies of both capitals, the Bolsheviks can and must take power into their hands."<sup>52</sup> "To 'wait' for the Constituent Assembly," Lenin insisted, "would be wrong . . . It would be naive to wait for a 'formal' majority on the side of the Bolsheviks; no revolution ever waits for *this* . . . History will not forgive us if we do not assume power now."<sup>53</sup> The second letter, dated September 26–27, continued:

*Victory is assured to us . . . we must push our whole fraction into the factories and barracks: its place is there; the pulse of life is there; the source of saving the revolution is there . . .*

And in order to treat uprising in a Marxist way, *i.e.*, as an art, we must at the same time, without losing a single moment, organise the staff of the insurrectionary detachments; designate the forces; move the loyal regiments to the most important points; surround the Alexander Theatre; occupy Peter and Paul Fortress; arrest the general staff and the government; move against the military cadets, the Wild Division, etc., such detachments as will die rather than allow the enemy to move to the centre of the city; we must mobilise the armed workers, call them to a last desperate battle, occupy at once the telegraph and telephone stations, place *our* staff of the uprising at the central telephone station, connect it by wire with all the factories, the regiments, the points of armed fighting, etc.

"Of course," Lenin concluded, "this is all by way of an example, to illustrate the idea that at the present moment it is impossible to remain loyal to the revolution *without treating uprising as an art.*"<sup>54</sup>

The Central Committee took up Lenin's letters at its meeting on September 28.<sup>55</sup> They exploded like bombshells. Some four years later, Bucharin, at an evening of reminiscences, described the meeting of the group:

We all gasped. Nobody had posed the question so abruptly . . . At first all were bewildered. Afterwards, having talked it over, we made a decision. Perhaps that was the sole case in the history of our party when the Central Committee unanimously decided to burn a letter of Lenin . . . Although we believed unconditionally that in Petersburg and Moscow we should succeed in seizing the power, we assumed that in the provinces we could not yet hold out, that having seized the power and dispersed the Democratic Conference we could not fortify ourselves in the rest of Russia.<sup>56</sup>

The actual minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee are more laconic and provide a somewhat contradictory version of the affair. They merely record that by a vote of six to four, with six abstentions, the committee voted to preserve only one copy of the letters.<sup>57</sup> Kamenev, as in earlier days, emerged as one of the leaders of the opposition to Lenin. His resolution, which proposed an outright repudiation of the conclusions contained in Lenin's letters, failed of approval. The vote was not recorded.<sup>58</sup>

While the Central Committee hesitated and busied itself with such questions as the party's attitude toward the Democratic Conference and the Pre-Parliament, Lenin grew more and more impatient. From the beginning, he demanded a boycott of both bodies on the ground that the pressing task before the party was the preparation of the insurrection. The decision of the party led by Kamenev and Rykov went in favor of participation, although the Bolshevik delegation did withdraw at the first meeting of the Pre-Parliament.<sup>59</sup> In his diary on October 6 Lenin noted, "Not all is well at the 'parliamentary' top of our party . . . There is not the slightest doubt that in the 'top' of our party we note vacillations that may become *ruinous.*" But he reserved a plaudit for Trotsky: "Trotsky was for the boycott. Bravo, Comrade Trotsky!"<sup>60</sup>

Faced with substantial opposition in the Central Committee, Lenin sought to mobilize his supporters in the local organizations. While the Central Committee continued to temporize, Lenin grew desperate. In a letter of October 12, he tried to shock the party leaders into action by proffering his own resignation from the Central Committee.<sup>61</sup> No action was taken on the offer of resignation, and Lenin followed up his implied threat of war against the Central Committee by firing a volley of letters at the Petrograd and Moscow committees and the Bolshevik participants

in the Northern Regional Congress of Soviets. With these letters,<sup>62</sup> Lenin sought to build a fire under the Central Committee.

The tactics were effective. On Lenin's initiative, the Petrograd City Conference, held October 20–24, passed a resolution which "insistently" requested "the Central Committee to take all measures for the leadership of the inevitable insurrection of the workers, soldiers and peasants."<sup>63</sup> The denouement came at a meeting of the Central Committee on October 23 in Petrograd, to which Lenin journeyed in disguise from his hiding place in Finland. Present at the meeting besides Lenin were Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sverdlov, Uritsky, Dzerzhinsky, Kollontai, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, and Lomov. The minutes record that Lenin reproached his colleagues for "a certain indifference toward the question of uprising"<sup>64</sup> and that his restatement of the case for insurrection was apparently powerful enough to win the support of all committee members except Kamenev and Zinoviev. By a vote of ten to two, the Central Committee placed "the armed uprising on the order of the day." "Recognizing therefore," the resolution read, "that an armed uprising is inevitable and the time perfectly ripe, the Central Committee proposes to all the organizations of the party to act accordingly and to discuss and decide from this point of view all the practical questions."<sup>65</sup>

The issue was still not finally resolved. Kamenev and Zinoviev were adamant in their opposition to the Central Committee's decision. Following the example set by Lenin earlier, on October 24 they sent a letter to the Petrograd and Moscow city committees, the Moscow and Finnish regional committees, and the Bolshevik factions of the VTsIK and of the Northern Regional Congress of Soviets, in which they stated the case for postponement of the insurrection. The arguments of Kamenev and Zinoviev reduced themselves to three.<sup>66</sup> (1) The majority of the people of Russia were still not with the Bolsheviks; (2) the international proletariat was not yet ready to come to the assistance of the Russian revolution; (3) the likelihood of a successful uprising was remote.<sup>67</sup> Proceeding from this analysis, Zinoviev and Kamenev argued that it would be suicidal to stake the entire game on one card. Instead, they called for a continued buildup of strength through the soviets and the Constituent Assembly. "The Constituent Assembly plus the Soviets — this is that combined type of state institutions towards which we are going. It is on this political basis that our party is acquiring enormous chances for a real victory."<sup>68</sup>

The stubborn opposition of Kamenev and Zinoviev to the insurrection was again made manifest at an enlarged meeting of the Central Committee on October 29 in which key leaders of the Petrograd party organization also participated. At this meeting, Lenin's resolution calling for the most energetic preparation of the armed uprising carried by a vote of nineteen to two, with four abstentions. The lack of unanimity in the group

was more sharply brought out by the vote on Zinoviev's resolution, which stated: "Without delaying the reconnoitering preparatory steps, it is considered that such uprisings are inadmissible until a conference [is held] with the Bolshevik part of the Congress of Soviets." This time the vote was six for and fifteen against, with three abstaining. At the conclusion of the meeting, Kamenev announced his resignation from the Central Committee with a warning that the party had embarked on the road to disaster.<sup>69</sup> On October 31, Kamenev published a statement in *Novaya Zhizn'*, a nonparty paper of the left, in which, speaking in his own name and in that of Zinoviev, he declared himself "against any attempt to take the initiative of an armed uprising."<sup>70</sup>

The hint in the declaration that the party had taken its stand for insurrection and the violation of party discipline involved in the disclosure sent Lenin into a towering rage. In an angry letter addressed to party members that same day, he demanded the immediate expulsion of Kamenev and Zinoviev from the party. "I say outright that I do not consider them comrades any longer, and that I will fight with all my power both in the Central Committee and at the congress to expel them both from the party."<sup>71</sup> Meanwhile, the party faced the problem of undoing the damage of Kamenev's revelation. At a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet, also on October 31, Trotsky stated that no immediate uprising was planned. Kamenev, who spoke after Trotsky, blandly associated himself with Trotsky's statement. To Lenin, this added insult to injury. In a letter to the Central Committee dated November 1, he again reiterated his demand for the expulsion of the "strike-breakers" from the party.<sup>72</sup>

The issue came to a head at a meeting of the Central Committee on November 2 from which Lenin was absent. That morning before the meeting, there had appeared in the party's central organ, *Rabochii Put'* (Workers' Road), side by side with Lenin's attack on Kamenev and Zinoviev, a letter from Zinoviev announcing that his views were "very far" from those which Lenin combated and that he subscribed to Trotsky's declaration in the Soviet. Appended to Zinoviev's letter was an editorial note prepared by Stalin in which he expressed the hope that the declaration of Comrade Zinoviev (as well as the declaration of Comrade Kamenev in the soviet) could be considered as closing the debate. "The sharpness of the tone of Comrade Lenin's article," Stalin continued, "does not change the fact that basically we remain of one mind."<sup>73</sup>

Stalin's effort to play the role of peacemaker had only moderate success. Though Kamenev and Zinoviev were not expelled from the party, Kamenev's resignation from the Central Committee was ratified by a vote of five to three, with Stalin in the minority. At the same time, the Central Committee voted to impose on Kamenev and Zinoviev "the obligation not to make any statements against the decision of the C.C. and the

line of work laid out by it.”<sup>74</sup> It also approved “the proposition of Milyutin that no member of the C.C. shall have the right to speak against the adopted decisions of the C.C.”<sup>75</sup> Kamenev and Zinoviev suppressed their dissatisfaction and refrained from further outbursts against the uprising. A last-minute truce was arranged, and Kamenev reappeared as a member of the Central Committee at its meeting of November 6.<sup>76</sup> At the moment of insurrection, the unity of the top command was restored. It was not to be long-lasting.

While the battle raged in the Central Committee, preparations for the uprising were going forward. The military forces on which the Bolsheviks relied were (1) the Red Guard recruited from factory workers; (2) the sailors of Kronstadt and the Baltic fleet; and (3) the units of the Petrograd garrison which were favorably inclined. Of these, the most dependable was the workers’ Red Guard, approximately twenty thousand strong. Compared with professional soldiers, they were poorly trained and equipped, but what they lacked in arms they made up in morale and dedication to the Bolshevik cause. The sailors were unruly and undisciplined, but their fighting spirit was high, and they too could be counted on to play an active role in the insurrection. Bolshevik influence in the fleet was strong, though it had to dispute for supremacy with units of Left SR’s and Anarchists. The most dubious quantity was the Petrograd garrison. While the major part of the troops could probably be depended on not to oppose the insurrection, they could not be relied on to give it vigorous support. The struggle to gain control of the garrison constituted the last stage preparatory to the insurrection itself.

The medium through which the Bolsheviks organized their forces for the final coup was the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet. With the Bolsheviks in full control of the soviet, a resolution to create the committee was carried on October 29, and the committee itself was named on November 2, four days before the insurrection. The staff of the committee was composed only of Bolsheviks and sympathetic Left SR’s. Trotsky, the president of the soviet, also served as chairman of the committee and surrounded himself with a core of reliable Bolsheviks who, in effect, comprised the general staff of the insurrection. Liaison with the Bolshevik Central Committee was maintained through a secret “military revolutionary center,” consisting of five members of the committee, Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky, and Dzerzhinsky.<sup>77</sup>

The party’s role in directing the insurrection was camouflaged behind the facade of the soviet. This shrewd strategem provided a measure of pseudo-legality for the organizers of the insurrection. It was of particular value in mobilizing the support of the wavering and hesitant who were ready to respond to an appeal of the soviet when they would have been unwilling to follow the naked leadership of the Bolsheviks. It was of out-

standing importance in dealing with the Petrograd garrison which early in the Revolution had formed the habit of looking to the soviet as its protector against transfer to the front and refused to take orders not countersigned by that body.

In its preparations for the insurrection, the Military Revolutionary Committee relied heavily on the Bolsheviks' Military Organization, which counted approximately a thousand members in the Petrograd area — among them a number of young officers as well as others with military experience. Through this organization, commissars were assigned "for observation and leadership" to the garrison's combat units, as well as to arsenals, warehouses, and other institutions of military importance.<sup>78</sup> Arrangements were made through the commissars, who were in charge of issuing arms, to prevent the arming of the *Junkers*, or cadets in the military schools, and at the same time to divert rifles and other equipment to the Red Guard. Kernels of resistance developed. The Bolshevik commissar was unable to establish his authority in the important Fortress of Peter and Paul which commanded the Winter Palace. On the afternoon of November 5, this obstacle was overcome when Trotsky appealed to the soldiers of the fortress. With this peaceful surrender went a prize of one hundred thousand rifles, no mean contribution to future success.

On the evening of the fifth, the Provisional Government made a belated attempt to fight back. The decision was made to close the Bolshevik newspapers, *Rabochii Put'* and *Soldat* (*Soldier*), to initiate criminal proceedings against the members of the Military Revolutionary Committee, to arrest leading Bolsheviks, and to summon reliable military units from the environs of Petrograd. The first tests of strength augured badly for the government. The Bolshevik printing plants were raided by government troops at 5:30 A.M. on November 6 and copies of the newspapers confiscated; by eleven o'clock that morning the newspapers reappeared. The government ordered the cruiser *Aurora*, manned by a Bolshevik crew and moored in the Neva uncomfortably close to the Winter Palace, to put to sea on a training cruise; the order was effectively countermanded by the Military Revolutionary Committee.

On the morning of the sixth, Kerensky appeared before the Pre-Parliament, proclaimed a state of insurrection in Petrograd, and asked for unqualified support in suppressing the Bolsheviks. After prolonged debate, with the Kadets and Cossack delegates in opposition, a resolution drafted by Martov, a Menshevik Internationalist, was adopted by the close vote of 113 to 102, with twenty-six abstentions. The resolution condemned the insurrection, but it pointed the finger of responsibility at Kerensky by calling on him "first of all, to pass immediately a decree transferring the land to the land committees and to take a decisive stand on foreign policy proposing to the Allies that they announce the conditions of peace and

begin peace negotiations." The resolution concluded by recommending the creation of "a Committee of Public Safety comprised of representatives of municipal corporations and the organs of the revolutionary democracy, acting in concert with the Provisional Government."<sup>79</sup>

Kerensky at first threatened to resign. A delegation headed by the Menshevik Dan called on the premier to plead for quick action in the spirit of the resolution. According to Dan's account,

[We told him] that we had a definite and concrete proposal to make to the Provisional Government: that resolutions on the question of peace, land, and the Constituent Assembly should be passed at once and made known to the population by means of telegraph and by posting bills [in the city]. We insisted that this must be done that very night in order that every soldier and every worker might know of the decisions of the Provisional Government by the next morning . . .

We pleaded . . . with Kerensky that even from a purely military point of view the struggle against the Bolsheviks would have a chance of success only if the peasant-soldiers knew that they were defending peace and land against the Bolsheviks . . .

Our conversation did not last very long. Kerensky gave the impression of a man completely enervated and worn out. To every argument he replied with irritation, saying finally with disdain that the government did not need any of our advice, that this was not the time to talk but to act.<sup>80</sup>

### *The Seizure of Power*

Lenin, still in hiding, had also decided that the moment had come for action. Burning with impatience, he sped a last letter to the comrades of the Central Committee on November 6: "We must not wait! We may lose everything! . . . History will not forgive delay by revolutionists who could be victorious today (and will surely be victorious today), while they risk losing much, tomorrow they risk losing all." Addressing himself to those who urged delay until the meeting of the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets on the evening of the seventh, Lenin continued:

If we seize power today, we seize it not against the Soviets but for them . . .

The government is tottering. We must *deal it the death blow* at any cost. To delay action is the same as death.<sup>81</sup>

On the same day, the Bolshevik Central Committee assembled to make the last dispositions for the uprising. Sverdlov was assigned to keep watch on the Provisional Government, Bubnov was allotted railway communications, Dzerzhinsky posts and telegraphs, and Milyutin the organization of food supplies. Kamenev and Berzin were instructed to negotiate with the Left SR's to insure their support for the insurrection. Lomov and Nogin were dispatched to Moscow to coordinate the activities of the Bolsheviks there.<sup>82</sup> With events rushing toward a climax, Trotsky took

time out on the evening of the sixth to address a meeting of the Petrograd Soviet. In reporting on the measures already taken to checkmate the Provisional Government, he referred to it "as nothing more than a pitiful, helpless, half-government, which waits the motion of a historical broom to sweep it off . . . But if the government wishes to make use of the hours — 24, 48, or 72 — which it still has to live, and comes out against us, then we will meet it with a counterattack, blow for blow, steel for iron."<sup>83</sup>

During the night of the sixth and the early morning of the seventh, the Bolshevik forces moved quickly to seize the strong points of the capital city. Resistance was virtually nominal, and the seizures were accomplished with almost no bloodshed. The military support on which the Provisional Government counted simply melted away. A pathetic effort was made to hold the Winter Palace with the help of the Ural Cossacks, Junkers, officers, and the Women's Battalion who were stationed there. But as the Bolsheviks moved up their forces, the Cossacks and part of the Junkers and officers slipped away, and the Women's Battalion was disarmed after sallying forth in counterattack. Shortly after midnight of the seventh, the attacking forces captured the last stronghold of the Provisional Government and arrested the ministers who remained in the Palace.

The collapse of resistance in Petrograd was complete. The proclamation of the Military Revolutionary Committee summed up the day's happenings:

All railroad stations and the telephone, post, and telegraph offices are occupied. The telephones of the Winter Palace and the Staff Headquarters are disconnected. The State Bank is in our hands. The Winter Palace and the Staff have surrendered. The shock troops are dispersed, the cadets paralyzed. The armored cars have sided with the Revolutionary Committee. The Cossacks refused to obey the government. The Provisional Government is deposed. Power is in the hands of the Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.<sup>84</sup>

At eleven o'clock on the evening of November 7, the Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets assembled for its opening session. Of the approximately 650 delegates in attendance, the Bolsheviks claimed 390 and with the help of the Left SR's quickly asserted control over the proceedings.<sup>85</sup> Confronted with a fait accompli, the Mensheviks and SR's of the right and center abandoned the congress. Martov, the Menshevik Internationalist whom Trotsky described contemptuously as the "inventive statesman of eternal wavering,"<sup>86</sup> attempted to patch up a truce by proposing "to end the crisis in a peaceful manner, by forming a government composed of representatives of all the democratic elements."<sup>87</sup> Trotsky's reply was drenched in vitriol:

What do they offer us? . . . To give up our victory, to compromise, and to negotiate — with whom? With whom shall we negotiate? With those miserable cliques which have left the Congress or with those who still remain? But we saw how strong those cliques were! There is no one left in Russia to follow them. And millions of workers and peasants are asked to negotiate with them on equal terms. No, an agreement will not do now. To those who have left us and to those proposing negotiations we must say: You are a mere handful, miserable, bankrupt; your rôle is finished, and you may go where you belong — to the garbage heap of history.<sup>88</sup>

The congress concluded its first day's business by issuing a proclamation announcing its assumption of supreme power, transferring all local authority to the soviets, and appealing to the country to defeat all efforts of Kerensky and other "Kornilovists" to return to power. With a sure revolutionary instinct for the issues that would attract maximum support for the Bolsheviks, the proclamation promised:

The Soviet authority will at once propose a democratic peace to all nations and an immediate armistice on all fronts. It will safeguard the transfer without compensation of all land . . . to the peasant committees; it will defend the soldiers' rights, introducing a complete democratization of the army, it will establish workers' control over industry, it will insure the convocation of the Constituent Assembly on the date set; it will supply the cities with bread and the villages with articles of first necessity, and it will secure to all nationalities inhabiting Russia the right of self-determination.<sup>89</sup>

The next day Lenin made his first appearance at the congress and was received with a tumultuous ovation. After the applause had died down, he quickly assumed the reins of leadership with nine fateful words, "We shall now proceed to construct the socialist order."<sup>90</sup> With Lenin presenting the main reports, the congress approved the important decrees on peace and on land<sup>91</sup> and then concluded its work by entrusting the power of government to the newly created Council of People's Commissars.<sup>92</sup> The Sovnarkom, as it quickly became known, was exclusively Bolshevik in composition; its membership included Lenin as Chairman, Trotsky as Commissar of Foreign Affairs, Rykov as Commissar of the Interior, Lunacharsky as Commissar of Education, and Stalin as Chairman for Nationalities. The hour of triumph had finally come. Lenin rarely indulged in introspection or backward glances, but at that moment he paused in wonder and confided to Trotsky, "You know . . . from persecution and a life underground, to come so suddenly into power . . . *Es schwindelt.*"<sup>93</sup>

If Lenin found victory intoxicating and slightly unbelievable, in the eyes of his opponents the Bolshevik march to power had a nightmarish quality of incredible unreality. In the brief period of eight months, a tiny band of underground revolutionaries, numbering less than 25,000 on the eve of the March Revolution, had catapulted themselves into a governing

authority of nearly 150,000,000 people. It is easier to discern in retrospect the significant factors which contributed to the Bolshevik conquest than it was at the time. If the Provisional Government had been able to withdraw from the war and carry through a land settlement satisfactory to the peasantry, it is highly doubtful that the Bolsheviks could have gathered enough support to stage a successful coup d'état. Yet to state this alternative, so plausibly reinforced by hindsight, is to miss the tragic imperatives of 1917.

Each of the parties which maneuvered for ascendancy in the months between March and November was the prisoner of its own illusions, its own interests, and its own vision of the future. To a Kadet leader like Milyukov it was inconceivable that Russia could betray her allies and her own national interests by suing for a separate peace; consequently, it was all too easy to attribute his own sense of patriotic exaltation and dedication to soldiers, workers, and peasants who had lost their taste for war. To SR's of the right like Kerensky, who in a measure shared Milyukov's illusions, the successful prosecution of the war was paramount, with the agenda of economic reforms to be postponed until properly constituted legal bodies could be assembled to deal with them. To SR's of the center and left, who were much closer to the aspirations and expectations of the villages, land reform brooked no delay. Frustrated by the procrastinations of the Provisional Government, the Left SR's were thrown into the arms of the Bolsheviks. For Mensheviks of all shades, still loyal to the orthodox Marxian two-stage panorama of capitalist development, the socialist revolution had to be postponed until the bourgeois-democratic revolution was completed. The Mensheviks demonstrated real insight in emphasizing the difficulties of building socialism in a backward country. Their theoretical acumen was less well attuned to the political dynamism and revolutionary élan which the downfall of tsardom released. For the Bolsheviks, economic backwardness was the springboard to power; for the Mensheviks, it pointed a path toward legal opposition in a consolidating bourgeois order. This was hardly a prospect for which the wretched and disinherited could develop more than qualified enthusiasm. As the Revolution deepened, the Mensheviks found themselves out-promised and out-maneuvered, with their strength sharply receding in the urban industrial centers on which they counted heavily.

Until the arrival of Lenin from exile, the Bolsheviks, too, were prisoners of ancient formulas. They oriented their policies on a perspective not very different from that of Menshevism. Lenin reversed this course and set the party on the road to the conquest of power. With an unswerving faith in his goal and a readiness to take any measures whatever to realize it, Lenin, frequently over bitter opposition, managed to transform the party into an obedient instrument of his will. His remarkable talent as a

revolutionary strategist was based on an unerring sense for the deeply felt dissatisfactions of the masses and a genius for finding the slogans to catalyze grievances into revolutionary energy. Except for his insistence on striking at the right moment, Lenin had relatively little to do with the actual mechanics of the insurrection. His great contribution was to set the stage for insurrection by identifying Bolshevism with the major forces of mass discontent in Russian society. Lenin did not create the war-weariness which permeated the army and the nation: the material was at hand; his task was to exploit it. With one word — peace — Lenin and the Bolsheviks fused it into a revolutionary amalgam. The land-hunger of the peasants was an ancient grievance of which all parties were aware. The SR's built their ascendancy in the villages on the promise to satisfy it, but, while they temporized, Lenin stole their program from under their noses. When accused of the theft, Lenin replied, "Whether it be according to our ideas or in the direction of the SR program does not matter. The essential point is to give the peasantry a firm conviction that there are no more pomeshchiks [landlords] in the villages, and that it is now for the peasants themselves to solve all questions and to build their own life."<sup>94</sup> With one word — land — Lenin insured the neutrality of the villages.

Factory workers constituted the strongest phalanx of Bolshevik support. Lenin bought their support by promising them a government which "takes surplus products from the parasites and gives them to the hungry, that . . . forcibly moves the homeless into the dwellings of the rich, that . . . forces the rich to pay for milk, but does not give them a drop of it until the children of *all* the poor families have received adequate supplies."<sup>95</sup> With two slogans — bread and workers' control — Lenin captured the allegiance of substantial sections of the industrial workers from the Mensheviks.

The Bolshevik Revolution was not a majoritarian movement. The last free elections in Russia, the elections to the Constituent Assembly which took place toward the end of 1917, clearly demonstrated that the Bolshevik voting strength in the country at large was not more than 25 per cent.<sup>96</sup> But, as Lenin subsequently observed, the Bolsheviks did have "an overwhelming preponderance of force at the decisive moment in the decisive points."<sup>97</sup> In the areas and units strategically important to the success of the insurrection — Petrograd, Moscow, the Baltic fleet, and the garrisons around Petrograd — Bolshevik ascendancy turned the scale. The enemies of Bolshevism were numerous, but they were also weak, poorly organized, divided, and apathetic. The strategy of Lenin was calculated to emphasize their divisions, neutralize their opposition, and capitalize on their apathy. In 1902 in *What Is to Be Done?* Lenin had written, "Give us an organization of revolutionaries, and we shall overturn the whole of Russia!"<sup>98</sup> On November 7, 1917, the wish was fulfilled and the deed accomplished.

## *Chapter 4*

# *The Dynamics of Power*

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"The question of power," observed Lenin in 1921, "is the fundamental question of every revolution."<sup>1</sup> To understand the turnings and twistings of Soviet policy, the advances and the retreats, the continuities and the reversals, it is essential to comprehend the preoccupation with power which has motivated the responsible Bolshevik leadership at every crucial stage in the development and consolidation of the Soviet political system.

This is not to imply that the men who made the October Revolution were inspired solely by an infatuation with power for power's sake. They shared a sense of historical mission, a fanatic belief in their own destiny as agents chosen to carry forward a program of profound social reconstruction, and they sought to impose their vision on the obdurate material which history had placed at their disposal. They fashioned their instruments of power to make their dream of the future come alive, and the strategy and tactics which they improvised were designed to bring them nearer the Promised Land. Like many revolutionaries before them, they found themselves involved in a complex struggle to master the recalcitrant realities of their environment. They pressed forward where they could, and they gave way where they had to. The tragedy of unintended consequences overtook them. As they sought to come to terms with the pressures which impinged on them, visions of the future had to be modified or abandoned. Instruments became ends; the retention and consolidation of power dwarfed all other objectives. The party of revolution was transformed into the party of order.

The history of this transformation is the record of an intricate interplay among Bolshevik goals, strategy and tactics, instruments of power, and the problems posed by the environment in which they were compelled to function. When the Bolsheviks seized power on November 7, 1917 (Octo-

ber 25, O.S.), their blueprint of the future represented an ambivalent juxtaposition of long-term utopian objectives and short-term realistic expedients. In the realm of agricultural policy, their ultimate goal was the organization of large-scale socialist cultivation. They proposed to move gradually toward that goal by urging "*the village proletarians and semi-proletarians to try to transform each private estate into a sufficiently large model farm, to be conducted, at the expense of the community, by the local Soviet of agricultural workers under the direction of trained agriculturists, with the use of the best technical appliances.*"<sup>2</sup>

Since this prospect was hardly likely to kindle the enthusiasm of a land-hungry peasantry, it was, in practice, subordinated. The land decrees enacted by the Bolsheviks on the morrow of the revolution gave their blessing to the peasant division of the landlords' estates. In order to entrench themselves in power, the Bolsheviks adopted the peasants' own program. The goal of large-scale socialist cultivation was relegated to the distant future. The Bolsheviks found themselves in the paradoxical position of presiding over an agricultural revolution which created as its first fruit a powerful stratum of petty-bourgeois peasant proprietors.

The Bolshevik program for industry faced a different set of contradictions. In an important article, "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" written in October 1917, Lenin outlined the measures which the Bolsheviks hoped to institute after the seizure of power.<sup>3</sup> He called specifically for the nationalization of the banks and the large syndicates such as iron, coal, oil, and sugar; the "compulsory trustification (i.e., compulsory amalgamation) of industrialists, merchants, and proprietors generally"; consumer rationing; a grain monopoly; and universal labor service.<sup>4</sup> He pronounced himself "in favor of centralism and of a 'plan.'" "The proletariat, when victorious," Lenin stated, "will act thus: it will set the economists, engineers, agricultural experts and so on to work out a 'plan' *under the control* of the workers' organizations, to test it, to seek means of saving labor by means of centralism, and of securing the most simple, cheap, convenient, and general control."<sup>5</sup>

Once the dictatorship of the proletariat was established, Lenin anticipated no particular difficulty in enforcing workers' control. "Capitalism," he declared, "has simplified the functions of accounting and control, and has reduced them to such comparatively simple processes as to be within the reach of any literate person." Capitalists and higher state employees who resisted the establishment of workers' control would be treated "with severity,"<sup>6</sup> but he anticipated little difficulty in breaking such resistance and putting all but the "incapable ones" and the "incurrigible 'resisters' to new state service."<sup>7</sup> "As for the organizational form of the work," Lenin continued, "we do not invent it, we take it ready-made from capitalism: banks, syndicates, the best factories, experi-

mental stations, academies, etc.; we need adopt only the best models furnished by the experience of the most advanced countries.”<sup>8</sup>

The laboring masses, he professed to believe, could be quickly educated to take over the responsibilities of state administration. Mistakes would be made, but workers would learn by experience. “The most important thing,” Lenin declared, “is to instil in the oppressed and laboring masses confidence in their own power.”<sup>9</sup>

The chastening responsibilities of power introduced a new perspective. On April 28, 1918, Lenin addressed himself to the theme of “The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government.”<sup>10</sup> Gone was the earlier faith in a smooth transition from capitalism to socialism, in the easy capitulation of the capitalists and the bourgeois specialists, in the ready adaptability of the proletariat to the tasks of state administration, in the self-disciplined productive élan of the working masses. It was far easier, Lenin admitted, to expropriate and nationalize industry than to manage it. “Our work of organizing proletarian accounting and control has obviously . . . lagged behind the work of directly ‘expropriating the expropriators.’” “The art of administration,” he proclaimed, “is not an art that one is born to, it is acquired by experience . . . Without the guidance of specialists in the various fields of knowledge, technology and experience, the transition to socialism will be impossible.”<sup>11</sup> Because of the indispensability of the specialists, Lenin continued,

we have had to resort to the old bourgeois method and to agree to pay a very high price for the “services” of the biggest bourgeois specialists . . . Clearly, such a measure is a compromise, a departure from the principles of the Paris Commune . . . *a step backward* on the part of our Socialist Soviet state power, which from the very outset proclaimed and pursued the policy of reducing high salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker.<sup>12</sup>

Lenin justified the measure as a necessary “tribute” which the Soviet state was compelled to pay to compensate for the backwardness of the masses. “The sooner we workers and peasants learn to acquire the most efficient labor discipline and the most modern techniques of labor, using the bourgeois specialists for this purpose, the sooner shall we liberate ourselves from having to pay any ‘tribute’ to these specialists.”<sup>13</sup>

Lenin’s sober words reflected a new appreciation of the difficulties that the Soviet state confronted in breaking “with the accursed past.”<sup>14</sup> The appeal for labor discipline was combined with an ominous rationalization of the necessities of coercion. The dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin made clear, might have to be exercised not only to destroy capitalism but to impose discipline on the working masses. He proclaimed that “large-scale machine industry calls for absolute and strict unity of will, which directs the joint labors of hundreds, thousands and tens of

thousands of people . . . today the . . . revolution demands, in the interest of socialism, that the masses *unquestioningly obey the single will* of the leaders of the labor process."<sup>15</sup> Within less than six months after the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks were already embarked on a course which foreshadowed increasing reliance on repression.

The vision of the "commune state" yielded to the pressing contingencies of expediency. At all costs, the Leninist leadership of the Party was determined to hold onto power, and it encountered no difficulty in identifying its own ascendancy with the fulfillment of the sacred mission of realizing socialism. Persuaded of its own ultimately beneficent purposes as the surrogate of the working masses, it was prepared to destroy ruthlessly all who stood in its way, to make temporary concessions to the forces which it could not master, and to utilize those willing and unwilling allies who could be induced to march the same highway into the uncertain future.

Lenin's decisions were shaped by the conviction that the first duty of revolutionaries was to stabilize their authority. Faced with a German advance which threatened to destroy the new Soviet republic, Lenin carried the day for an onerous Tilsit peace at Brest-Litovsk which surrendered space in order to gain time and won the Bolsheviks a respite to consolidate their control of the territory which remained under their rule. Accused of betraying the world revolution and strengthening the forces of reaction in Germany, Lenin replied, "Yes, we shall see the international world revolution, but for the time being it is a . . . fairy tale — I quite understand children liking beautiful fairy tales. But I ask: is it seemly for a serious revolutionary to believe fairy tales?"<sup>16</sup> Repudiating revolutionary romanticism, Lenin called on his critics "to set to work to create self-discipline . . . by that you will help the German revolution, the international revolution." The preservation of the Soviet fatherland was the first duty of all revolutionaries. A disgraceful peace which preserved the Communist power to maneuver was infinitely preferable to "dying in a beautiful pose, sword in hand."<sup>17</sup>

#### *The Civil War and War Communism*

Faced with the onslaughts of the White generals, the Allied intervention armies, the Poles, and rebellious anti-Bolshevik nationalist movements in the borderlands, the new Bolshevik regime recruited thousands of former Tsarist officers to supply needed military skills for the Red Army and used every variety of opportunistic appeal to disarm opposition and mobilize support for its cause. During the so-called Civil War, the Communists fought at least three different kinds of war. In one aspect — the struggle against the Whites — the Civil War was portrayed as a war to prevent the restoration of the old regime. In another aspect, in the battles

to repel the Allied interventionists and to win back the borderlands, the Civil War was presented as a patriotic war, a war to cast out the foreign invader and to reclaim the national patrimony. In a third aspect, it was a war to consolidate Bolshevik power, to eliminate every competitor from the scene, and to establish the Communist Party as the dominant and unchallenged master of the new Soviet state.

The first two aspects of the Civil War had more popular appeal than the third. By assuming the role of leader in the struggle against reaction and by purporting to serve as the custodian of the national interest, the Bolsheviks were able to tap reservoirs of sympathy and assistance which their persistent drive for exclusive power could never win. The peasant might harbor no love for Communism, but as long as the Bolsheviks stood as the only barrier which prevented the landlords from reclaiming their estates, many peasants were prepared to give the Bolsheviks grudging, or at least passive, support. Left-wing intellectuals who were at odds with the Bolsheviks found themselves drawn to the Soviet cause because the policies espoused by the Whites were even more repugnant to them. Patriotic Tsarist army officers to whom the Communist program was anathema enrolled, nevertheless, in the Soviet ranks because they saw the new Soviet state as the residuary legatee of historic national interests. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik leadership gathered its allies where it could, utilized the forces which circumstances had placed at its disposal, and drove to solidify its power.

From the beginning, the Bolsheviks concentrated all their efforts on building firm instruments of power. The Civil War period was a drawing-board stage in the development of latter-day totalitarianism, but the outlines of the future edifice were already clearly apparent. Although the Party leadership still played a cat-and-mouse game with its left-wing SR and Menshevik opponents, granting them limited toleration when their support appeared essential in the struggle against the Whites and withdrawing such toleration when their activities threatened to be "harmful," the dominating position of the Communist Party was definitely established. After the break with the Left SR's in March 1918, the Bolsheviks held exclusive possession of the Council of People's Commissars and mobilized an overwhelming majority in the central Soviet organs. They occupied the commanding positions in state administration, controlled the army and the Cheka (secret police), and exercised a paramount influence in the field of mass communications and propaganda.

Nevertheless, the machinery of control fell far short of the tightly centralized bureaucratic structure into which the Soviet regime later developed. Under the impact of the Civil War, the trend toward centralism in Party management was strongly reinforced, but the Party remained

a battleground of competing factions, and the mass influx of new members brought with it a miscellaneous array of discordant and not readily disciplined personalities and views. While trusted Bolsheviks held the strategic positions at the top of the administrative pyramid, the lower levels of the bureaucracy were still composed predominantly of old-regime carry-overs whose knowledge made them indispensable and whose skills frequently enabled them to determine the policies of the institutions with which they were connected. As Lenin was later to observe in his political report to the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922,

Suppose we take Moscow with its 4,700 responsible Communists, and suppose we take that huge bureaucratic machine, that huge pile — who is directing whom? I doubt very much whether it can truthfully be said that the Communists are directing this pile. To tell the truth, they are not doing the directing, they are being directed.<sup>18</sup>

What was true of Moscow was infinitely truer of the periphery. Localism flourished, and the effectiveness of Communist controls decreased in direct relationship to the distance from the great urban centers. Even the Red Army was far from being the monolithic machine which Trotsky sought to make it. The top command encountered the greatest difficulty in enforcing its authority on the armies in the field. Guerrilla units loosely attached to the army fought their own war in their own way. The former Tsarist officers whom the Bolsheviks enrolled as military specialists often met defiance from the Communist commanders and rank and file, and not even the word of Trotsky himself was proof against the suspicion which the old officers generated. The Cheka was a law unto itself. While it served the purposes of the Party leadership by striking terror into the hearts of the class enemy, it also became the refuge of all sorts of adventurers and scoundrels who used their untrammeled power to commit acts of pilfering and pillage for their own personal advantage.

Despite the most strenuous efforts of the Bolshevik leadership to impose central direction on the course of events, the first years of Soviet power were uniquely a period when the spontaneous and anarchic forces of the revolution had their way. The flood of decrees from the center bore little relation to the actual sequence of developments in the localities. The breakdown of supply and communications, the shifting lines of battle, and the initial inexperience of the new regime combined to create a situation in which authority was dispersed and broken into fragments. The capacity to lead was tested by the ability to extemporize an effective response to the crisis of the moment. *Ad hoc* improvisation became the order of the day.

For the Bolsheviks during the Civil War, there was only one determining priority — survival. And survival involved mobilizing the men and the

material to defeat the enemy. Every other consideration gave way before this compulsion. The policy of War Communism was the rule of the besieged fortress. Efforts to put utopian dreams into practice were reluctantly adjusted to the compelling necessities of the siege.

Policy toward the peasants was a by-product of the problem of supplying the Red Army and the workers who provisioned it. The Soviet regime faced the task of extracting grain from the peasants without being able to provide them with consumer goods in exchange. It met the problem by forcible requisitions. "The essence of this peculiar 'War Communism,'" Lenin later admitted, "was that we actually took from the peasant all the surplus grain and sometimes even not only surplus grain, but part of the grain the peasant required for food, for the purpose of meeting the requirements of the army and of sustaining the workers."<sup>19</sup> The peasants retaliated in typical peasant fashion. They hid what they could and refused to sow more crops than were necessary to meet their own needs. While the danger of the landowners' return still loomed, the peasants refrained from more extreme measures.

With the final defeat of the Whites in 1920, the Bolsheviks were left face to face with the peasantry. As peasant disorders began to mount, the leaders had to assay the consequences of a continued catastrophic decline in agricultural production. They came to the reluctant conclusion that the food shortage could not be relieved unless inducements were held out to the peasant to increase his production. The decision to abandon the policy of forced requisitions marked the conclusion of the period of War Communism.

The industrial policy of the Bolsheviks during the Civil War reflected an overriding concern with immediate military considerations. During the first months of the revolution, Lenin tried to confine nationalization to the commanding industrial heights and to smooth the transition from the old order to the new by utilizing the managerial skills of former capitalists and bourgeois specialists. These efforts quickly revealed themselves as abortive. Capitalists and managers abandoned their plants in large numbers, and many others were driven out by workers intent on revenging past grievances.

In the first surge of revolutionary spontaneity, the working classes displayed marked syndicalist proclivities. Assuming that the factories now belonged to them, they sought to operate them for their own account and in their own interest. The results were usually disastrous. Lacking managerial talent and technical skill and unable to impose discipline on their own members, the factory committees frequently brought their enterprises to a standstill. Their problems were, of course, greatly accentuated by the chaos and disorganization of war and revolution. Failures of communications and transport, as well as shortages of raw material, led

to work stoppages, and industrial breakdowns were contagious and cumulative. The entire industrial life of Russia threatened to grind to a halt.

Under pressure of the Civil War, the Bolshevik leadership exerted every effort to revive production, to restore labor discipline, and to organize industry to serve military needs. A Supreme Council of National Economy with local branches was established to provide the framework for central direction of the economy. On June 28, 1918, virtually every important branch of industrial life was nationalized, though Lenin still sought to preserve a distinction between those enterprises to be run by state administrators and others to continue operation under their former owners for state account. Spurred on by Lenin, the Central Council of Trade Unions issued a regulation on April 3, 1918, which empowered trade-union commissions to fix productivity norms, approved the use of piece rates and bonuses to raise the productivity of labor, and invoked the sanction of expulsion from the union for violators of labor discipline.<sup>20</sup> After the nationalization decree, the "workers'" state, in theory at least, became the main employer. In January 1920 the Council of People's Commissars drew what it conceived to be the logical inference by introducing universal labor service and transforming military units into labor armies.<sup>21</sup>

As the Civil War pursued its difficult course, Lenin turned again and again to his favorite recipes for raising productive efficiency — centralized control, one-man management, and the employment of bourgeois specialists to provide technical and managerial advice. Each of these measures met strong resistance from elements in the Party, but Lenin continued to urge their adoption, and his views won increasing acceptance. The Supreme Council of National Economy gradually expanded its authority and began to master the syndicalist and localist tendencies which prevailed in industrial management. It imposed central priorities to ensure supplies for the army and closed down poorly run factories in order to concentrate production in the most efficient enterprises. At Lenin's insistence, large numbers of bourgeois specialists and technicians were incorporated into the industrial bureaucracy. Their employment was defended by Lenin as a transitional necessity until the working class could produce its own specialists. In pressing the case for one-man management, Lenin met particularly strong resistance from the trade unions, for whom any retreat from collegiality implied an abandonment of the principle of workers' control. While the issue of collegial versus one-man management was never unequivocally resolved during the Civil War period, Lenin's views were approved in principle by the Ninth Party Congress in March 1920,<sup>22</sup> and a considerable extension of the scope of one-man management was actually achieved.

Despite Lenin's strenuous efforts to improve the administrative efficiency of the nationalized enterprises, industrial disorganization was endemic. The ravages of world war, revolution, and civil war could not be overcome by mere administrative expedients. The cities suffered from cold and hunger; the workers abandoned the factories in large numbers. Supplies were cut off; industrial production declined catastrophically. In practice, the army and the industrial labor force were supplied by a process of desperate improvisation. The output of those factories that continued to operate was reserved almost entirely for the Red Army. Any existing supplies that might be useful to the army were simply requisitioned. Such food and consumer goods as remained were available, theoretically, for distribution to the town populations at fixed prices under a system of differential rationing which favored workers performing assignments of vital urgency to the war effort.

In practice, shortages became so extreme as to render price and rationing controls meaningless. Money lost all value. Workers had to be paid in kind, and a rapidly expanding black market largely displaced the official channels of trade. Except for privileged groups in the army and the government and "bagmen" and black marketeers who flourished on the proceeds of illicit trade, want and hunger were general. The egalitarian aspirations of the revolution were made real by the egalitarianism of universal sacrifice.

For those who identified themselves with the Bolshevik Revolution, the epoch of Civil War and War Communism was nevertheless a period of great exaltation and dedication. The revolutionary ardor of the dedicated Communists in the Red Army and elsewhere was inspired by a vision of a new social order that imparted the will to victory. For those who believed in the Communist cause, the October Revolution marked a great release of social energy. It appeared as a liberating act which brought the toiling masses to the forefront of world history. It aroused hopes and dreams of a world to be remade in the image of brotherhood, equality, and justice. Thus the totalitarian face of the revolution, with its reliance on terror and bureaucratic controls, was slow to reveal itself to the ideologically committed and the idealistically consecrated. For them, what loomed large was the break with the past and the intoxicating freedom of a new epoch in which old taboos and institutional restraints were cast aside while new bridles and halters had still to be securely fastened.

The Civil War period, in one of its aspects, was a stage in which the power instruments of totalitarianism were being forged. In another aspect, it was also an era of considerable social experimentation during which the new regime was feeling its way into the future. The overthrow of the old regime was accompanied by a rebellion against the family and

traditional moral values, by a loosening of marital ties and a new emphasis on the emancipation of women and the authority of youth, by educational innovations, and a relatively unfettered ferment of literary and artistic productivity. For many, the revolt against the old order overshadowed the consolidation of the new. Amidst the grimness of the ruins of War Communism, the rebels against the old society luxuriated in their new freedom, lived exciting lives of romantic adventure, tasted the heady wine of power, and found it good.

It is not easy to draw a balance sheet for the period of revolution and civil war. The Party's monopoly of legal power, the domination of the Party by its central organs, the creation of a centralized bureaucratic edifice, the rise of the secret police, the permeation of the army by Party and police controls, the tightening of labor discipline, the subordination of the trade unions to the Party — all owe their development to practices which congealed and hardened under the pressures of War Communism. Yet it was also a period when the egalitarian aspirations of the revolution received powerful expression, when voices could be raised on behalf of "workers' control," when Party discussions were lively and uninhibited, and criticism of the leadership was not equated with treason. Utopian dreams of the rule of the masses still tempered the realities of dictatorship.

The peasant during this period was caught up in cross currents. In one sense he came into his own. The land settlement adopted and reluctantly blessed by the Bolsheviks was actually deeply repugnant to them, since it introduced the Trojan horse of private property into the very midst of the Communist citadel and raised ultimate dangers of counter-revolution. Thus it could be defended only as a tactical maneuver to facilitate the Bolshevik rise to power — and as such it was brilliantly successful. The policy of compulsory requisitions to feed the army and the towns, however, was less happy in its consequences. Although it probably saved the Soviet regime from defeat, it also alienated the countryside and caused such a sharp decline in agricultural production that repressive controls on the peasantry had to be temporarily abandoned. In the first trial of strength, the peasantry was able to extract substantial concessions despite the fact that the Communists retained their hold on the strategic instruments of power.

The lessons learned in the Civil War discredited the utopian strain in Communist ideology. As Lenin pointed out on the fourth anniversary of the October Revolution,

Borne along on the crest of the wave of enthusiasm . . . we reckoned . . . on being able to organize the state production and the state distribution of products on communist lines in a small-peasant country by order of the pro-

letarian state. Experience has proved that we were wrong. It transpires that a number of transitional stages are necessary — state capitalism and socialism — in order to *prepare* by many years of effort for the transition to communism . . . . We must first set to work in this small-peasant country to build solid little gangways to socialism by way of state capitalism. Otherwise we shall never get to communism; we shall never bring these scores of millions of people to communism. That is what experience, what the objective course of development of the revolution has taught us.<sup>23</sup>

The legacy of War Communism was a new appreciation of the complexities of industrial management and administration, a new sensitivity to the values of technical skill and professional competence, a newly discovered understanding of the importance of production incentives, and a fresh realization of the indispensability of labor discipline. The lessons were underlined at the end of the Civil War by famine in the countryside and hunger in the cities, by the almost complete disappearance of consumer goods, by factories standing idle and land that was not tilled. The moral was pointed even more sharply by a swelling tide of sporadic peasant risings, by strikes of factory workers, and the revolt of the Kronstadt garrison in March 1921, with its call for a third revolution to throw off the yoke of the Communists. Although the Kronstadt revolt and other risings were bloodily suppressed, their meaning was not lost on the Communist high command.<sup>24</sup>

The reaction of the Bolsheviks to these events illustrated a strategy to which they were to resort again and again in moments of extreme crisis. On the one hand, dissident elements who vocalized the existing discontent and who were prepared to give it organized leadership were subjected to harsh attack. On the other hand, steps were also taken to ameliorate the dissatisfaction of the mass of peasants and workers. The campaign of repression was directed in the first instance at the Menshevik and SR remnants who were held responsible for the events of the spring of 1921.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, Lenin also ordered a purge of the Party "from top to bottom."<sup>26</sup> One of the primary objects of the purge was to eliminate Party members who reflected the mood of worker restiveness and who sought to take advantage of it to oppose the Party leadership.

### *The New Economic Policy*

Simultaneously, the Party moved to placate mass unrest by a series of measures which collectively became known as the New Economic Policy (NEP). The most important reversal of policy was the abandonment of forced requisitions in favor of a tax in kind which left the peasants free to dispose of such surpluses as remained after the tax assessment had been met. The "peasant Brest-Litovsk," as David Ryazanov called it,

sought to guarantee the Party a new breathing space. As Lenin said at the Tenth Party Congress, "only an agreement with the peasantry can save the socialist revolution in Russia until the revolution has occurred in other countries."<sup>27</sup>

The tax in kind represented a determined, if temporary, effort to win back the favor of the peasantry. In order to persuade the peasants to part with their surpluses, incentives had to be provided in the form of increased supplies of consumer goods. This made a revival of industrial production imperative. The NEP industrial policy put initial emphasis on the development of small industries, whether in the form of private enterprise or in the form of industrial cooperatives, in the hope that they would most readily increase the flow of consumer goods. New enterprises were promised freedom from nationalization. Small enterprises which had been nationalized were leased to their former owners or industrial artels (producers' cooperatives) for fixed terms with the provision that rentals were to be paid in the form of a definite proportion of the output of the enterprise.

The so-called "commanding heights" of large-scale industry remained under state administration, though even these enterprises, organized in the form of trusts, were to be operated on commercial principles with precise economic accounting (*khozraschet*), with substantial freedom to buy and sell on the open market, and with the obligation to operate on a basis of profitability. Private trade was restored, and a new generation of so-called Nepmen arose to carry on the functions of buying and selling, sometimes through private trading concerns of their own, sometimes concealed as cooperatives, and not infrequently as official agents of the state trading organizations themselves. The Soviet leadership sought to attract foreign capital by offering "concessions" to capitalist entrepreneurs, but the bait proved unalluring and in all but a few cases negotiations collapsed.

The NEP marked a profound change in the political climate of the new Soviet regime. After the romantic heroics of the Civil War period and the tense expectation that all problems would be resolved by the imminent triumph of the world revolution, the Party found itself thrown back on its own resources, faced with the humdrum task of building the conditions of survival out of the ruins which it inherited from War Communism. Many Party members found it all but impossible to adjust to Lenin's injunction, "Learn to trade." As Lenin declared in his political report to the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922:

The whole point is that responsible Communists — even the best of them, who are unquestionably honest and loyal, who in the old days suffered penal servitude and did not fear death — cannot trade, because they are not businessmen, they have not learned to trade, do not want to learn, and do not under-

stand that they must start from the ABC. What! Communists, revolutionaries who have made the greatest revolution in the world . . . must they learn from ordinary salesmen? But these ordinary salesmen have had ten years' warehouse experience and know the business, whereas the responsible Communists and devoted revolutionaries do not know the business, and do not even realize that they do not know it.<sup>28</sup>

The effect of the NEP was to bring the Party organizers to the fore; the revolutionary agitators and Civil War heroes began to fall by the way. A powerful impulse was given to the transformation of the party of revolution into the party of order.

The Party compensated for its concessions to the peasantry and the private trader by utilizing the interval of the NEP to tighten its hold on the political instruments of power. After 1922 any form of Menshevik, SR, or other anti-Communist political activity was treated as counter-revolutionary and ruthlessly extirpated. While the battle for the succession which set in even before Lenin's death produced a major Party crisis, the outcome of the struggle was a strengthening of the power of the central apparatus and the emergence of Stalin as the undisputed ruler of the Party's destiny. The Party leadership maintained a firm grip on the army, the secret police, and the administrative and trade-union apparatus. While the Party continued to be weakly represented in the countryside, it greatly expanded its membership in the major urban areas. No organized force appeared to challenge its dominating position on the Soviet political scene.

The initial recuperative effects of NEP policies fortified the position of the Party leadership. With the introduction of the tax in kind, peasant disorders died down; and after the disastrous harvest of 1921, a steady improvement in agricultural production was evident. A marked revival of light industry took place, and consumer goods became more plentiful. Although there was a lag in heavy industry accompanied by considerable unemployment and worker dissatisfaction, a modicum of relief was provided by unemployment benefits and the perceptible improvement in economic conditions generally.

The new Soviet state, nevertheless, faced a dilemma for which there was no easy resolution. However firmly it controlled the instruments of state power, it remained essentially an army of occupation in an overwhelmingly peasant country. It might conceivably have transformed itself into a peasant government by shaping its policy around peasant demands, but the socialist and industrial orientation of Communism well-nigh precluded such a transformation. Both the logic of long-term survival and the dogmas of inherited ideology dictated a program of industrialization. As Lenin put it in his report to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, in November 1922:

The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on the peasant farms — that is not enough; and not only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with consumer goods — this too is not enough; we also need *heavy* industry . . .

. . . Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without heavy industry we shall be doomed as an independent country . . .

Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we cannot provide them, then we are doomed as a civilized state — let alone as a socialist state.<sup>29</sup>

Given the situation in which the Soviet regime found itself in the twenties, the only important source from which an industrialization fund could be accumulated was the peasantry. Long-term foreign loans, the historical instrument of industrial development in backward countries, were not available. The concessions policy of the Soviet regime met almost complete frustration. The only remaining alternative was aptly described by V. M. Smirnov and E. A. Preobrazhensky as "primitive socialist accumulation," the diversion of the output of the peasantry and the private sector of the economy to finance investment in socialized heavy industry.

The NEP provided no ready expedients for securing a large-scale diversion of peasant production to subsidize industrialization. The introduction of the tax in kind stimulated a considerable increase in agricultural output; but it was also accompanied by a substantial reduction in agricultural exports as compared with pre-World War I days when the surpluses extracted from the peasants were used to finance a considerable inflow of foreign capital goods and luxury items. Under the NEP, the peasant, after paying his tax in kind, could dispose of his remaining output in any way that pleased him. Since the terms of trade with the towns after 1922 were increasingly unfavorable to the peasantry (the so-called scissors crisis), the small peasant's propensity to consume his own output, which had been spurred by the agricultural revolution, was given an additional fillip. The kulaks, or well-to-do farmers, produced a far larger share of their output for the market, but when price relationships were unfavorable, they were also prepared to withhold their grain in order to drive a hard bargain to safeguard their interests. As the NEP developed, social differentiation in the countryside intensified; the less efficient peasant landowners fell back into the status of poor peasants and hired laborers, and the position of the kulaks was strengthened.

Broadly speaking, the Party leadership confronted two polar extremes among the alternatives which were available for dealing with the problem of the peasant and industrialization.<sup>30</sup> One position, which is commonly associated with the program of Bukharin and the Right Opposition of 1928–29, counseled avoidance of repressive measures in dealing with the

peasantry. The Bukharin group was prepared to offer price concessions to the peasantry in order to encourage production for market. As long as the Party maintained its control of the instruments of power, the right wing believed that the road to socialism was safeguarded. It saw no danger in tolerating and even encouraging the emergence of strong peasant holdings which would direct larger proportions of their output to the market. Although it was prepared to squeeze the kulak through increased taxation, it also recognized that, in order to obtain large grain deliveries, more and cheaper consumer goods would have to be made available to the rural population. The implications of this position were twofold: (1) a substantial part of the burden of industrialization would be shifted to the urban population, and (2) industrialization would have to proceed at a relatively slow pace.

The opposing position, ultimately incorporated by Stalin in the First Five-Year Plan, started from the assumption that a program of rapid industrialization was imperative and that nothing short of a wholesale reconstruction of Soviet agriculture could guarantee the grain reserves to carry it forward. The Stalinist plan, which was borrowed in many of its aspects from the proposals of the Left Opposition which he had earlier repudiated, involved the preliminary application of "emergency measures" against the kulaks in order to expropriate the surpluses which they were allegedly hoarding and the subsequent liquidation of the kulaks as class enemies. In order to increase the productivity of agriculture, mechanized grain factories or state farms were to be extended, and the poor and middle peasants were to be enrolled in collective farms which would be served by machine-tractor stations equipped with modern agricultural implements. This grandiose scheme also carried its hidden implications, as later events were to disclose. The main burden of accumulating an industrialization fund was to be transferred to the countryside.

Fundamentally, the Stalinist program meant a revival of the Civil War policy of forced requisitions under conditions giving the state much more powerful instruments to enforce its demands. By herding the agricultural population into state and collective farms, the regime would be able to operate through a relatively limited number of controlled collective units instead of dealing individually with millions of peasant households. While the advocates of this plan professed to believe that rapid industrialization could be combined with an increase in consumption as the result of the application of modern technical methods to agriculture, in practice this hope was soon shown to be illusory. Mechanization could only be introduced slowly, and meanwhile the state faced the problem of extracting the grain from the collective and state farms to pay for the industrial base on which the production of tractors and

other agricultural implements depended. Stripped of its propaganda verbiage, the Stalinist program foreshadowed a profound extension of the scope of totalitarian power. The peasantry was to be brought to heel and tied to state ends. The surpluses extracted from the peasantry were to provide the wherewithal to create a powerful industrial structure which would render the Soviet citadel impregnable.

### *The Era of Five-Year Plans*

As Stalin consolidated his position in the Party, he pressed forward with the realization of his program. The NEP was liquidated, and the era of five-year plans began. The new phase in the development of the Soviet system marked a Third Revolution, far more important in its long-term consequences than the February and October Revolutions of 1917 which were its prologues. It represented a determined effort to destroy the petty-bourgeois peasant revolution which had been achieved in 1917 and to seize the positions which the peasantry had occupied during the NEP. It launched the Soviet Union on a course of industrialization which transformed it into a first-class military power. It was also accompanied by the emergence and consolidation of a full-blown totalitarian regime which ruthlessly crushed any trace of political dissent and subordinated every form of social organization to its own purposes.

When the Third Revolution was launched in 1928 with its program of collectivization and mechanization in the countryside and rapid industrialization in urban areas, great stress was placed on its welfare objectives. The proponents of the First Five-Year Plan proclaimed that it would both double the fixed capital of the economy and produce a marked increase in per capita consumption. The assumption proved highly unrealistic: the expansion of heavy industry was accompanied by a marked decline in living standards. Convinced that its own survival and future as a great power depended on a high tempo of industrialization, the regime showed itself adamant in pushing forward its program of investment in heavy industry.

Power took precedence over welfare. Stalin, in his speech to the First All-Union Conference of Managers of Socialist Industry on February 4, 1931, was insistent: "It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo a bit, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced!"<sup>31</sup> Returning to the same theme at a joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Party on January 7, 1933, Stalin explained that one of the primary purposes of the First Five-Year Plan "was to create . . . all the necessary technical and economic prerequisites for increasing to the utmost the defensive capacity of the country," and frankly conceded that the production of consumer goods had been

relegated "to the background." "The Party," he continued, "whipped up the country and spurred it onward . . . so as not to lose time, so as to make the utmost use of the respite to create in the U.S.S.R. the basis of industrialization, which is the foundation of her power. The Party could not afford to wait and manoeuvre; it had to pursue the policy of accelerating development to the utmost."<sup>32</sup>

In mobilizing support for the five-year plan, the Party leadership resorted to a variety of appeals. The sacrifices of today were justified in terms of the Promised Land of plenty toward which they were directed. The boldness and constructive vision of the plan were contrasted with the pessimism and demoralization which spread through the West in the wake of the Great Depression of 1929. As Stalin strengthened his hold on the Party by eliminating his left- and right-wing competitors, he also sought to stimulate unity by unleashing a powerful resurgence of revolutionary zeal. After the lassitude and grey dullness of the NEP, the plan opened up an exhilarating period of struggle and combat, a leap forward into the New Jerusalem. The last remnants of private capitalism appeared to be headed for extinction. The immensity of the planned enterprises, their call for sacrifice, and their promises for the future exercised a particularly powerful attraction for Communist youth. Many of the activists and idealists who had previously been drawn to Trotsky and the left-wing banner now rallied behind Stalin.

The first years of the five-year plan marked a return to the militant traditions of the Civil War period and War Communism. The air was electric with positions to be stormed, class enemies to be destroyed, and fortresses to be built. At least within Party and Komsomol or Young Communist circles, the outpouring of enthusiasm was genuine and impressive. It was accompanied by a temporary reaffirmation of proletarian orthodoxies. Strenuous efforts were made to increase the proportion of Party members from the bench. Egalitarianism was given a brief stimulus. Antireligious campaigns took on new life. Komsomol fervor manifested itself in the re-establishment of communes, in participation in the collectivization drive, and in the assumption of all sorts of disagreeable assignments. As the plan gathered momentum, it left no aspect of Soviet life untouched. Literature and the arts became subject to its command. The schools were drawn into its service. The Soviet scene became a battlefield in which class lines were sharpened and the Party moved to the attack.

As always, when difficulties developed and hardships mounted, scapegoats were provided as a lightning rod for mass discontent. The liquidation of the kulaks was accompanied by a campaign against the old intelligentsia who were charged with economic sabotage and conspiracy with foreign powers to overthrow the Soviet regime. A whole series of

proceedings — the Shakhty prosecutions of 1927–28, the trial of the Industrial Party in December 1930, the arraignment of the Menshevik professors in March 1931, the trial of the Metro-Vickers engineers in January 1933 — offered a dramatic procession of “saboteurs” and “enemy agents” who were alleged to be the source of all difficulties and who played their part in diverting dissatisfaction from the regime.

### *The Imperatives of Industrialization*

Meanwhile, industrialization imposed its own imperatives. Construction and production became the prime problems. Revolutionary zeal alone could not produce steel, dig coal, or manufacture tractors. Mass meetings were exciting, but oratory was no substitute for locomotives. After the first burst of grandiose intoxication had exhausted itself, it became evident that industrialization presented the challenge of a new discipline which had to be patiently mastered. Efficient factory managers had to be developed and trained and engineers and technicians provided in large numbers. Illiterate or half-literate peasants had to be transformed into a modern industrial labor force, taught necessary skills, and domesticated to the demands of the assembly line. Incentives had to be provided to stimulate production and habits of order and precision instilled to assure quality production. The educational system had to be remodeled to indoctrinate students in the values of efficiency and conscious discipline and to produce the officers as well as the soldiers and “noncoms” of the new labor army. Sanctions had to be invoked to keep workers on their jobs and to prevent absence, tardiness, or “labor-flitting.” The large-scale organizational requirements of industrialization appeared to call for the reinforcement of authority, the focusing of responsibility, a hierarchical structure that capitalized the values of specialization and division of labor, accounting regulations that ensured precise control, and a system of income distribution that provided incentives for increased production and efficiency. One of the most pressing needs was a vast expansion of managerial, engineering, and technical personnel. The Party leadership sought to meet this need by utilizing the remnants of the old intelligentsia, by importing foreign specialists, and by setting in motion a vast training program to produce a new Soviet-bred technical intelligentsia which might ultimately take over the management of the economy. The utilization of the old intelligentsia presented real problems since the group had only recently been assigned the role of scapegoat for the early difficulties attendant upon industrialization. Now it appeared that the technical skills of the intelligentsia were indispensable, and Stalin boldly announced a change of front. In June 1931, he proclaimed:

We must change our policy towards the old technical intelligentsia . . . Whereas during the height of the wrecking activities our attitude towards the

old technical intelligentsia was mainly expressed by the policy of routing them, now . . . our attitude towards them must be expressed mainly in the policy of enlisting them and solicitude for them. It would be wrong and undialectical to continue our former policy under the new, changed conditions. It would be stupid and unwise to regard practically every expert and engineer of the old school as an undetected criminal and wrecker. We have always regarded and still regard "expert-baiting" as a harmful and disgraceful phenomenon."<sup>33</sup>

Both the employment of the old intelligentsia and the hiring of foreign specialists were viewed as stopgap expedients; the major long-term task was the education of a new Soviet-trained intelligentsia. Over the next years, many new technical institutes were established, and the most ambitious members of the younger generation crowded into them to become the engineers and industrial managers of the future.

The program of rapid industrialization lifted the new managerial and technical intelligentsia to positions of power and influence in Soviet society. The industrial revolution, like the October Revolution before it, involved a tremendous release of energy and swift upward mobility for those with the gifts and inclination to take advantage of the situation in which they found themselves. The expansion of industry opened up many new opportunities for quick promotion to commanding responsibilities. The graduates of the technical institutes entered a career arena in which there was an almost insatiable demand for qualified technical personnel. At the same time, the curricula of the technical institutes and the taxing character of the assignments which awaited their graduates enforced increasingly rigorous standards of aptitude and knowledge. Komsomol and Party membership and favorable class origins facilitated admission into the technical institutes, and even subsequent promotion, but they no longer operated as the sole guaranty of a successful career. The ability to master complex technical data became a basic and inescapable requirement for survival in important positions in Soviet industry. Leading posts were still reserved for qualified Party members. But trusted non-Party engineers were also thrust forward into positions of considerable responsibility requiring high technical qualifications, and class origin became a subordinate requirement for admission to the higher educational institutions.

As the Party leadership found itself more and more preoccupied with the complex problems of managing a society in process of rapid industrialization, it also became increasingly dependent on the technical skills of its new managerial class. During the middle and late thirties, the Party placed increasing emphasis on the recruitment of the new technical intelligentsia. At the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, the last barriers were razed when the Party Rules were modified to facilitate the admission of managerial and technical personnel. The reception of the technical

intelligentsia into the Party constituted an important step in the direction of merging Party and state administration. The proletarian base of the Party was submerged, and its social composition registered the rising ascendancy of the new administrative and managerial elite.

As the new industrial elite emerged and crystallized, it sought to strengthen both its authority and its privileges. The Party leadership allotted it high material rewards and perquisites in order to consolidate its loyalty to the regime. Managerial prerogatives were reinforced, and one-man management became the prevailing practice in industry. The powers of the trade unions were curbed, and the activities of local Party organizations were redirected toward broad control rather than detailed interference in the minutiae of managerial decision making. Factory directors were vested with considerable discretion to maneuver with the means at their disposal as long as the goals assigned to them were fulfilled.

At the same time, the leaders of the regime took measures to ensure that the powers of the new elite would be kept within bounds. Police and Party controls were used as instruments of surveillance to guarantee that the demands of the top leadership were fulfilled. Failure of performance or the slightest evidence of disloyalty was subject to drastic punishment. Despite its privileges and new-found authority, management functioned in a milieu of insecurity and institutionalized suspicion. The industrial elite as a class was indispensable; its individual members were expendable. Given the pressures under which it operated, the new industrial elite remained a circulating rather than a stabilized elite. Privileges attached to function; they disappeared when the function was no longer performed.

While rapid industrialization brought new prerogatives as well as responsibilities to the technical intelligentsia, its primary impact on labor was a tightening of discipline. Planned industrialization was accompanied by increasing resort to compulsion. After the defeat of the Right Opposition in 1928–29, the trade unions were stripped of such wage-bargaining functions as they still retained. Their role was limited to settling minor grievances, exhorting the workers to increase production, and administering social-insurance and welfare programs.

Labor recruitment took the form of large-scale transfers of the surplus rural population to the new industrial centers. Although voluntary in form and sanctified by contracts entered into between industrial firms and collective farms, the transfers were in fact mandatory, and collective farms had no choice except to deliver the quotas assigned to them. In 1940, with the establishment of the State Labor Reserves, the recruitment of youth for service in industry was placed, in effect, on a conscription basis.

As industrialization gathered momentum, the severity of job discipline was greatly intensified. The First Five-Year Plan was marked by tremendous labor turnover and absenteeism as workers rushed from factory to factory in search of better working conditions. Exhortation to workers to stay on the job proved ineffective. In October 1930 the Party leadership turned to penalties. "Deserters" and "absentees" were threatened with the loss of industrial employment for six months. This, too, proved unworkable since labor was scarce and factory managers hired any worker who offered himself. In 1932 a system of internal passports was introduced. In order to check labor-flitting, the regime next decreed that deserters and absentees be deprived of ration cards and living quarters. Even these drastic penalties were frequently evaded by enterprises desperate for labor.

Beginning in 1938, even stricter rules of discipline were instituted. In December 1938 all wage earners were provided with "labor books" containing a full record of their employment. No worker could be hired except upon presentation of his book, which remained with the enterprise as long as he was employed by it. Infractions of labor discipline could be punished by dismissal from the job, which also involved loss of living quarters and a reduction of social-insurance benefits. Managers who failed to enforce these penalties were themselves subject to penal prosecutions. A decree issued in June 1940 made employees who were more than twenty minutes late for work without a valid medical excuse subject to a penalty of compulsory labor at their usual place of work with a deduction of up to 25 per cent of their wages, and repetition of the offense carried more drastic penalties. Cases of petty larceny and acts of hooliganism committed at the place of employment were punishable by imprisonment for one year. In June 1940 all workers were frozen on their jobs. Changes of employment required the express permission of management, and departures from employment without such authorization were punishable by imprisonment. In the case of defense industries or industries connected with defense, unauthorized abandonment of work was triable by court martial and punishable by sentences of from five to eight years of forced labor.<sup>34</sup>

Since exclusive reliance on compulsion offered a poor stimulus to increased labor productivity, the regime turned early to more positive incentives. In the first surge of enthusiasm aroused by the five-year plan, considerable emphasis was placed on socialist competition. The *udarnik*, or shock worker, who broke production records was featured as the new hero of Soviet society and awarded special privileges in the form of better living quarters and better supplies of food and consumer goods. This departure from the egalitarianism for which the trade unions had pressed during the NEP soon received the authoritative blessing of Stalin himself.

In an address to a conference of Soviet business executives in June 1931, Stalin denounced "the Leftist practice of wage equalization" and called for a readjustment of the wage structure which would check labor turnover and provide incentives to workers to improve their skills and raise their productivity.<sup>25</sup>

The effect of his speech was soon felt in a major overhauling of the system of wage payments. Wage differentials were developed to attract workers to heavy industry and to encourage their migration to the Urals and the eastern regions. Piece rates were rapidly extended in order to tailor wage payments to productivity. Output in excess of fixed norms was paid at progressively increasing rates, and the performances of Stakhanovites, or outstanding workers, were rewarded by impressive bonuses, special privileges, publicity, and honorifics. The achievements of the Stakhanovites, which were frequently managed with the unnoted assistance of supplementary helpers, led to a general raising of the average norms of output and involved increased pressure on so-called backward workers who did not enjoy Stakhanovite advantages. Wage differentials widened sharply, and the profile of the working class reflected a strange combination of a select labor aristocracy and a large mass of poorly paid "sweated" workers who enjoyed few, if any, amenities. The industrialization drive exacted its price in the cities as well as the countryside. Its burdens fell heavily on the mass of unskilled and semiskilled workers in the factories.

The Third Revolution, with its stress on rapid industrialization and the building of military strength, had a profound effect on the development of the Soviet system. Egalitarianism was repudiated in the search for a system of wage payments and income distribution that would maximize efficiency and stimulate production; mass welfare gave way to capital expansion and the accumulation of armaments. While the self-interest of the regime dictated the maintenance of the labor force at a level which would sustain its efficiency and command its support, the continued emphasis on construction of heavy industry and large military expenditures made the fulfillment of this objective difficult. When pressure threatened to become unbearable, as it did toward the end of the First Five-Year Plan, the regime temporarily relaxed its demands. The improvement in the standard of living in the mid-thirties was designed to revive hope and to provide a foretaste of the better life to come, but the acceleration of military preparations on the eve of World War II and the bitter experience of the war itself subjected the Soviet populace to another period of great hardships. In the immediate postwar period, the standard of living rose markedly compared with the low point during the war, but the resumption of the industrialization drive at the end of the war and the new armament race ushered in by the cold war au-

gured another phase of downward pressure on further improvement of living conditions.

*Stalin's Totalitarian Formula*

The organization of the economy and society to maximize industrial and military strength involved a strengthening of the totalitarian features of the regime. "The revolution from above" which was imposed on the peasantry and the cuts in consumption which "primitive socialist accumulation" demanded could not be achieved without increasing resort to compulsion. The consolidation of Stalin's absolute power, the ruthless purge of party dissidents, the strengthening of the bureaucratic and hierarchical features of the regime, the expansion in the role of the secret police, and the rise of forced labor advanced hand in hand with forced-draft industrialization and militarization.

The formula of totalitarian rule as it took shape under Stalin's ministrations was a complex one. It represented, in one aspect, a drive to safeguard his own security by obliterating all actual or potential competing centers of power. Positively, it tried to saturate and paralyze the minds of the Soviet populace with a monolithic stream of agitation and propaganda stressing the superiority of the Soviet system and the virtues of its leaders. Negatively, it sought to deny the people access to any alternative by cutting them off from the outside world and from each other. Through the secret police, it attempted to create a milieu of pervasive insecurity founded on ever-present fear of the informer and the labor camp. The Party and the secret police guarded the loyalty of army and administration and, in turn, watched each other. In this system of institutionalized mutual suspicion, the competing hierarchies of Party, police, army, and administration were kept in purposeful conflict and provided with no point of final resolution short of Stalin and his trusted henchmen in the Politburo. The concentration of power in Stalin's hands rested on the dispersal of power among his subordinates.

In another of its aspects, the Stalinist formula sought to come to terms with the demands of industrialization. It enlisted the new Soviet intelligentsia in its service and rewarded the elite among them with high material privileges and elevated social status. It created a labor aristocracy of honored Stakhanovites to serve as the bellwether of the working class. It arranged its incentive system to reward the more productive workers and to penalize the backward and the inefficient. It risked the alienation of the mass of unskilled and semiskilled workers by paying them poorly and supplying them inadequately, but it maintained its control over them by subjecting them to the most rigorous discipline.

In order to consolidate his position as the leader of the party of order in Soviet society, Stalin also endeavored to identify totalitarian rule with

the forces of tradition and respectability in Russian life. This search for stability and legitimacy took him along some strange and devious paths. It led to a drastic reorganization of the educational system, the abandonment of its early experimental and progressive features, and its transformation into an authoritarian instrument to instill devotion to the regime and to prepare youth for their appointed roles in the Soviet hierarchical structure. It manifested itself in a restoration of the authority of the family, in restrictions on abortions, in encouragement of child bearing, and in tightening marriage bonds. It produced an uneasy *de facto* "concordat" with the church in which the political loyalty of the clergy and their communicants was exchanged for a precarious toleration of religious practices. It expressed itself in a striking rehabilitation of patriotism as the cohesive force of Soviet society and sought increasingly to present the Soviet regime as the legitimate heir of the best in the Russian past. It induced a new emphasis on law as an instrument to enforce the responsibility of the subject to the state and to introduce rationality and order in the relations among state enterprises and individuals.

The drive to stabilize the regime's authority was accompanied by a profound reorientation in Soviet ideology directed toward the exaltation of statism. The theory of the withering away of the state was all but repudiated. The primacy of base over superstructure, one of the hallowed Marxist orthodoxies, was in effect reversed and the determining influence of environment minimized. The state superstructure was glorified and magnified as the creative source of all initiative and direction in Soviet society. The role of the individual was redefined in terms of conscious, disciplined subordination to state purposes.<sup>36</sup>

This remarkable development has its parallels in the natural history of other revolutions. Every revolutionary movement undertakes to consolidate its authority after it has won power and exhausted the dynamic momentum of its program. Even the most authoritarian of regimes cannot evade the problem of coming to terms with its environment. The price of survival involves the abandonment of utopian goals which cannot be realized, the repudiation of orthodoxies which were previously sacrosanct, and the adoption of expedients which offend the most treasured dogmas of the original revolutionary program. The most ironical chapters of revolutionary history are its unintended consequences.

The complex of influences and circumstances which contributed to the Soviet restoration of traditional symbols of authority is not easily unraveled. Industrialization was an important shaping force. In the realm of education, for example, industrial discipline appeared to call for a school system which would liquidate illiteracy; teach the elements of reading, writing, and arithmetic to all; instill habits of order, obedience, and precision; and provide an adequate foundation in mathematics and

scientific subjects for those students who would go on to higher technical institutes and eventual employment in technical, engineering, and managerial capacities. The child-centered Soviet school of the twenties did not fulfill these objectives: discipline was lax; the authority of teachers was minimized; traditional subjects were not taught; experimentalism ran riot; and curricula were in process of constant revision. The educational reforms of the early thirties with their emphasis on the restoration of discipline, the reinforcement of the authority of the teacher, and the teaching of fundamentals represented a first adjustment of the educational system to the needs of the industrial order.<sup>37</sup> The encouragement of authoritarian family relationships and the tightening of divorce requirements find at least partial explanation in the same pattern of response: the habits of order and obedience nurtured in the well-disciplined family circle were expected to carry over to the assembly line.

The legal reforms of the thirties were also partly a consequence of the industrialization drive.<sup>38</sup> During the twenties law tended to be regarded as an outworn survival of bourgeois society which would soon wither away. Its transitional utility was limited to service as a proletarian weapon to suppress class enemies. Members of the working class who committed "socially dangerous" acts tended to be treated more leniently than members of the former ruling classes. The dominant legal philosophy of the period was based upon a deterministic and mechanistic version of Marxism. Criminals were looked upon as victims of their environment to be rehabilitated rather than individuals who had to be made to suffer for their faults. As Soviet society moved in the direction of Communism, crime was expected to disappear.

The large-scale social disorganization and crime waves which accompanied industrialization and collectivization made such views appear increasingly anachronistic. An industrial society called for order and discipline, and the Soviet leadership demanded that the legal system fulfill these requirements. In 1930 Stalin pronounced:

We are for the withering away of the state. But at the same time we stand for strengthening of the proletarian dictatorship, which constitutes the most powerful, the mightiest of all governing powers that have ever existed. The highest development of governmental power for the purpose of preparing the conditions for the withering away of governmental power, this is the Marxian formula. Is this "contradictory"? Yes, it is "contradictory." But this contradiction is life, and it reflects completely the Marxian dialectic.<sup>39</sup>

The revisions in the legal codes which followed were marked by a substantial extension of the repressive machinery of the state and by the emergence of a new voluntaristic concept of crime in which the individual was held to strict accountability for his shortcomings and failures in meet

ing the demands of the regime. Blame could no longer be shifted to the environment; for, Stalin proclaimed, "There are no fortresses which Bolsheviks cannot storm."<sup>40</sup> The prestige of legal institutions was re-established; Stalin declared in 1936, "We need the stability of laws more than ever."<sup>41</sup> The new functions of law were to enforce the ruthless pace of industrialization, to instill the habits of self-discipline and voluntary subordination which it required, to lay the legal foundations for a rationalized industrial order, and to stabilize the position of the ruling group by providing a system of regularized sanctions and controls which would reinforce its authority.

Industrialization was important but by no means exclusive among the interacting forces that nourished the cultural and social transformation of the thirties. Behind industrialization lay the determination to create an impregnable, self-sufficient citadel which would be safe from outside attack and which could itself develop into a springboard for the expansion of Soviet power into the outside world. Dimming hopes of world revolution during the twenties threw the Soviet leadership back on its own resources. After the defeat of Trotsky and the Left Opposition, Stalin's doctrine of "socialism in one country" was enshrined as official dogma. Inevitably, it took on strong nationalistic overtones. In theory, the Soviet Union remained a beacon for the oppressed masses of the world. In practice, the Comintern was transformed into an instrument for the pursuit of Soviet state interests, and the leaders of the Soviet regime became increasingly absorbed in extending and consolidating their power in the only arena which was then effectively open to them.

During the early years of the industrialization drive, the nationalist orientation which it embodied was obscured by the atmosphere of class struggle which it generated. The first surge of enthusiasm was marked by a revival of orthodox Marxism and a tightening of ideological lines. This was the period of the temporary dictatorship of RAPP (Russian Association of Proletarian Writers), when writers were being mobilized as "shock workers of the Plan," when violent attacks were launched against "class enemies on the history front," and when nationalist historians such as Tarle and Platonov were accused of "bourgeois objectivism" and exiled. History as taught by the then leading historian M. N. Pokrovsky was a dance of Marxian categories; it was "politics projected into the past," with the Tsarist epoch portrayed as a period of unrelieved oppression for the masses.

As industrialization and collectivization generated their tensions and discontents and as the rise of Hitler transformed the fear of capitalist encirclement from a slogan into a real danger, the Stalinist leadership turned to nationalistic and patriotic sentiments to provide the ideological cement for its people which orthodox Marxism was powerless to give.

*Pravda* on June 9, 1934, sounded the new appeal: "For the Fatherland!" "That cry," *Pravda* declared, "kindles the flame of heroism, the flame of creative initiative in all fields, in all the realms of our rich, our many-sided life . . . The defense of the fatherland is the supreme law. . . . For the fatherland, for its honor, glory, might, and prosperity!"<sup>42</sup>

The new cry was to swell into a mighty chorus during the next few years. In 1934 the dead Pokrovsky was denounced as a "vulgarizer" of Marxism, and, under the guidance of Stalin, Kirov, and Zhdanov, the writers of history texts received instructions which resulted in a complete revision of attitude toward the Russian past.<sup>43</sup> The nationalist historians were recalled and restored to their posts. The new history sought to establish the Soviet regime as the custodian of national interests. It celebrated Tsarist military victories and territorial expansion, taught pride in Russia's achievements and the accomplishments of her great men. It addressed itself particularly to those critical moments when the nation fought for its existence and repelled the invader from Russian soil. The heroic deeds of Tsarist generals such as Suvorov and Kutuzov were toasted in historical novels and plays. Peter the Great and eventually even Ivan the Terrible were refurbished as Soviet heroes and presented as farsighted patriots and great statesmen whose despotic measures were justified by the constructive ends they served.

The rewriting of history also extended into the Soviet period. Stalin was portrayed as a hero of legendary proportions; the Old Bolsheviks whom he purged were completely denigrated. The new patriotism and the cult of Stalin went hand in hand. They were propagated with particular intensity in the army, but no sector of Soviet society was neglected. As *Krasnaya Zvezda*, the army newspaper, put it in 1940, "History knows many instances when large nations and splendid armies fell to pieces, only because they were not supported by national unity, the unity of the country."<sup>44</sup>

The patriotic sentiments so assiduously revived in the prewar years were cultivated with redoubled vigor during World War II. They were fed by hatred of the Nazi invaders, and they contributed to bringing regime and people nearer together. The war became the Great Patriotic War, the Great Fatherland War, and a National War of Liberation. The regime sought both to stimulate and capitalize on the genuine nationalist upsurge which the Nazi invasion evoked. Marxist slogans were temporarily subdued, the Patriarchate was restored, a new national anthem replaced the "International," the army was glorified and patriotism stressed at every turn.

With the approach of victory, there was increasing evidence of a tightening of ideological lines. Beginning with the turn of the tide at Stalingrad and intensifying during 1944 and 1945, theoretical training of

both Party and non-Party personnel in Marxist-Leninist doctrine, which had been neglected during the early phases of the war, once more was stressed. Special attention was devoted to the proper indoctrination of the population of the districts that had been liberated from the Germans. *Pravda*, in its issue of October 17, 1944, pronounced:

During the occupation, the German invaders tried by every method to poison the consciousness of Soviet men and women and to confuse them . . .

It is the duty of Party organizations to stimulate tirelessly the political activity of the workers . . . Particular attention must be paid to the question of implanting in the population a socialist attitude toward labor and public property, strengthening state discipline, and overcoming the private-property, anti-collective-farm, and anti-state tendencies planted by the German occupants.<sup>45</sup>

The mood and temper of the Soviet populace at the end of the war posed serious difficulties for the regime. After the bitter sacrifices of the war, many yearned for peace and quiet, for a relaxation of tempo, and for an opportunity to enjoy the good things of life. Soldiers who served in the West caught a glimpse of capitalist comforts and luxuries which were unavailable in the Soviet Union and transmitted disquieting doubts about the perfection of the Soviet paradise. Party propagandists and agitators encountered considerable mass apathy when they lectured on political themes. Some members of the intelligentsia displayed disturbing apolitical tendencies. Their openly expressed admiration for Western ideas and artistic models, which was partly tolerated during the honeymoon period of the war alliance, became a dangerous infection as the cold war intensified.

A series of authoritative pronouncements by Party leaders at the end of the war served as a reminder that the historical perspective of Marxism-Leninism had not been cast into the discard. Stalin's election speech of February 9, 1946, opened with an affirmation of the basic Communist postulates on the nature and causes of capitalist wars and called for a powerful industrial upsurge emphasizing heavy industry and designed to guarantee the "homeland . . . against all possible accidents."<sup>46</sup> The increasingly strong Western resistance to Soviet expansion, expressed in the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, was accompanied by a rapid deterioration in Soviet-Western relations. Zhdanov's blunt speech at the organizing conference of the Cominform in September 1947 left no doubts about the Soviet position. The world, Zhdanov announced, was divided into two camps, the imperialist camp led by the United States and the anti-imperialist camp led by the Soviet Union. Foreign Communists were summoned to lead the battle against the "imperialist aggressors." The Communist Party of the Soviet Union was called upon to make the

Soviet population aware of the perils they faced and to discipline the masses for new sacrifices.<sup>47</sup>

Soviet patriotism in its Stalinist manifestation represented a many-sided effort to mobilize support for the regime and to combine the specifically Russian nationalism of the war period with an ideological commitment to Marxism-Leninism. A basic ingredient was pure love of country, with particular accent on the leading position of the Great Russian people in the Soviet family of nations.<sup>48</sup> This Great Russian orientation took the form of emphasizing the positive civilizing mission of Tsarist imperialism, in contrast with the previous custom of defending it as a "lesser evil" and the still earlier practice of denouncing Tsarist rule as "a prison-house of nationalities." In another aspect, the new patriotism stressed the superiority of the Soviet social and political order over capitalism and boasted of the achievements of Soviet science and learning, industry and agriculture, literature and art.

Under the cover of Soviet patriotism, Stalin also attempted to ignite a xenophobic hatred for the outside capitalist world. Beginning with the Zhdanov anticosmopolitan decrees which sought to destroy any Soviet remnants of adulation of the West and subservience to foreign literary schools and forms, the campaign mounted to a shrill crescendo in which the "capitalistic warmongers" of the West were portrayed as ready to spring upon the Soviet Union at the first opportunity. By parading dangers, fanciful rather than real, by sealing off the Soviet populace from virtually all contact with the outside world, by appealing to the most primal instincts of obscurantist nationalism, and by saturating the consciousness of its people with a sense of the superiority of the Soviet order, the regime sought to stimulate whole-souled devotion to Party and state interests as proclaimed by the Stalinist leadership.

Soviet patriotism thus operated as an ideological tool to weld the people to the regime. Through Soviet patriotism the Party leadership proposed to create the Soviet man of the postwar world — politically conscious, proud of his society, aware of the dangers of "capitalist encirclement," and prepared to make his contribution to the consolidation and expansion of Soviet power.

In the tangled web of interacting influences which contributed to the "traditionalist" restoration that began in the thirties, probably the most basic was the leadership's drive to stabilize its position and to extend its power in both the Soviet and world arenas. Rapid industrialization and the revival of traditional nationalism were both directed toward this larger purpose. Most of the significant "conservative" innovations which accompanied them were introduced because of the same dominating preoccupation. The educational reforms of the thirties, intended first to serve the needs of a society in process of rapid industrialization, also created

a channel through which future Soviet citizens were indoctrinated in a conception of state service and total dedication to its demands. The revolution in jurisprudence during the mid-thirties provided the legal foundations for an industrial society but, in an even more fundamental sense, represented an affirmation of the power of the state to control every aspect of the life of its subjects. The new policy toward the family had clear state purposes: prohibition of nontherapeutic abortions, rigid restrictions on divorces, the establishment of child subsidies, and the rewards held out to "heroine-mothers" of large families appeared unmistakably designed to breed fodder for army and industry. The modus vivendi with the Orthodox Church was also calculated to strengthen the position of the regime. Though the concessions made to the church were no doubt offensive to zealous Party members, they helped during the war to cement the loyalty of the clergy and the mass of believers to the Soviet cause and insured the continued political subservience of the church hierarchy in the postwar period.<sup>49</sup>

After the end of the war, the Party leadership pursued an unremitting campaign to tighten its totalitarian grip on every facet of Soviet life. The primary purpose was the ideological rearmament of the Soviet peoples, and the prime victims were the intellectuals. Literature, drama, music, art, and every branch of learning were purged of every trace of "bourgeois objectivism" and apoliticalness. *Partinost'* (Party consciousness and Party spirit) became the new watchword. In practice *partinost'* meant total dedication to the commands of the leadership. The bureaucratic model of Stalinism left no room for autonomy except where, as in the limited freedom accorded to the Orthodox Church, it continued to serve state interests.

The emergence of Stalinism in the conservative garb of the party of tradition and order was once described as a "Great Retreat."<sup>50</sup> It gave that surface appearance, yet the phrase was delusive. In utilizing such traditional pillars of authority as nationalism, family, and the church, Stalin did not surrender power. He consolidated it. By tapping the well-springs of national sentiment, he broadened the base of his own influence, tightened his control of his own dominion, and increased the leverage which he could exert in the world theater of power.

#### *Stalin's Legacy*

The great tour de force of Stalinism was the construction of a totalitarian edifice which sought to bestride the revolutionary and authoritarian heritage of Leninism, the traditional nationalism of tsarism, the stabilizing equilibrium of conservative social institutions, the dynamics of rapid industrialization, and the terror apparatus of a full-blown police state. The patrimony which Stalin handed on to his successors was in some

respects impressive. Under his leadership in the space of a few decades the Soviet Union became a leading industrial and military power. In a positive sense, the success of the industrialization drive was ensured by massive investments in the expansion of elementary and higher education, in the emphasis placed on the training of engineers, technicians, and scientists, in the reorganization of the incentive system to reward the crucial skills essential to the production process, and in the prestigious place accorded to the new industrial elite in Soviet society. But forced-draft industrialization also exacted its toll. Its costs under Stalin could be measured in the millions who were consigned to forced-labor camps, in mass purges and the denial of human rights, and in the chronic shortages of food, consumer goods, and housing which accompanied the industrialization drive.

Stalin's death left a legacy of suppressed aspirations with which his successors had to reckon. First, there was a widespread desire for improvement in the standard of living — for more food and consumer goods, better housing, more leisure, and more adequate provision for old age and other disabilities. The most disadvantaged groups were the collective farmers and the unskilled and semiskilled workers, but the pressure for improvement extended well beyond these groups into the middle and even relatively privileged strata of Soviet society.

Second, there was an equally widespread yearning for greater security, for a life of stable expectations, for liberation from the threat of the concentration camp and the numbing uncertainties of constant surveillance and denunciation. In the last weeks before Stalin's death, the Soviet air was heavy with a sense of impending doom. The announcement of the arrest of the Kremlin doctors (most with Jewish names) on January 13, 1953, for allegedly having cut short the lives of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov and conspiring to destroy the health of leading Soviet military personnel, evoked grim memories of the earlier "doctors' plot" during the Great Purge and seemed to portend its repetition on a mass scale.<sup>51</sup> As Khrushchev later revealed in his "secret" speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, even the members of Stalin's innermost circle feared for their lives. "It has happened sometimes," Khrushchev quotes Bulganin as saying, "that a man goes to Stalin on his invitation as a friend. And when he sits with Stalin, he does not know where he will be sent next — home or to jail."<sup>52</sup> To read Khrushchev's speech and his even more dramatic revelations at the Twenty-Second Party Congress is to sense the terror which the lieutenants felt as they lived from day to day at the mercy of a fickle and suspicious despot. And it is not hard to imagine how they yearned for firm ground under their feet and, in yearning, mirrored the fears and hopes of every bureaucrat in the hierarchy. Perhaps not altogether paradoxically, the resentment against Stalin's system of calculated insecurity

was most intense among those who had most to lose as a result of arbitrary arrest and removal, although the cloud of fear which Stalin projected cast its shadow over the whole of Soviet society.

Third, there was the desire for greater freedom, not necessarily freedom in the Western political sense, but freedom to use one's talents and capacities, freedom to perform one's function without fearing the consequences, freedom to travel outside Soviet boundaries, and freedom to transcend the Stalinist doctrinal rigidities in thinking and writing about Soviet realities. Suppressed though these aspirations were during the Stalinist era, they were nevertheless fermenting behind the facade of Stalinist ideological conformity. Understandably, these aspirations found their sharpest focus in the new Soviet intelligentsia who were coming into positions of responsibility and influence during the latter part of Stalin's reign. Their dreams of larger autonomy, moreover, did not necessarily involve an overt challenge to the ruling ideology; indeed, many of those who harbored thoughts of greater independence and authority operated within a framework of loyalty to the Soviet system and envisaged such developments as strengthening a regime of which, after all, they were an integral part.

Stalin's death posed the question of how his successors would face these aspirations. A host of difficult decisions had to be made. There was the immediate need to achieve an orderly transfer of power and to set forces in motion which would launch the new regime on a stable course. There was the issue of succession which could not be evaded and which was already implicit in the parceling out of appointments and powers within twenty-four hours after the release of the news of Stalin's demise. Could the Stalinist system be perpetuated without Stalin? Should a determined drive be made to diminish popular discontent by lifting living standards, or should the regime adhere to the traditional policy of giving high priority to heavy industry and armaments, even at the cost of continued austerity and sacrifice? Should the terror apparatus be reduced or dismantled? Could the regime be reshaped in a consensual direction by placing greater reliance on indoctrination and persuasion, on incentives and participation rather than on coercion and force? Could the leadership relax its controls over the populace and officialdom without placing its authority in peril?

#### *Post-Stalinist Developments*

Compared with the glacial silences of latter-day Stalinism, the mood of post-Stalinist Russia was one of ferment and change. Improvisation and experiment became the order of the day. Stalin's successors revealed an awareness of the grievances of their constituents, a disposition to go at

least part way to placate them, and a determination to reach out for broader mass support.

The first response of Stalin's lieutenants to the crisis of Stalin's death on March 5, 1953, was to submerge their differences and to rally the forces of national unity around Party and government. Two facts quickly became apparent: first, no one of Stalin's former colleagues had the strength immediately to assume the position of undisputed leadership which Stalin commanded; second, all of them were at least temporarily agreed on the necessity of presenting a united front to the nation and the world. Faced with the uncertainties of the transitional period and the necessity of stabilizing their authority, they rapidly embarked on a policy of concessions designed to win popularity. The funeral oration of Malenkov, the new chairman of the Council of Ministers, on March 9 and his address to the Supreme Soviet on March 15 set the pace: peace and the advancement of popular welfare became the key slogans of the new regime. On March 27 an amnesty decree was announced. On April 1 came the news of a substantial cut in retail prices. On April 3 the Kremlin doctors, who had been arrested in January for allegedly plotting the downfall of the regime, were released as guiltless; a *Pravda* editorial three days later promised that all cases of official "highhandedness and lawlessness" would be severely punished and that the legal "rights" of the Soviet citizenry would henceforth be safeguarded. "Great Russian distortions" in nationality policy were denounced, and instructions were issued to revive the use of minority languages and to enlist national representatives in the service of Party and government. During April the negotiations for an armistice to put an end to the Korean War were resumed on Soviet initiative, and the conclusion of the armistice itself on July 27, 1953, dramatized the regime's search for a detente in foreign affairs. On May 23, for the first time in many years, wheat flour was placed on daily sale in government stores in Moscow and other principal cities. On June 28 the state loan (voluntary in form but mandatory in application) was cut in half. By July, the columns of all Soviet newspapers began to fill with articles promising more consumer goods, increased housing, better restaurant facilities, and closer attention to workers' grievances. The campaign culminated in Malenkov's address to the Supreme Soviet on August 8 in which he elaborated government plans to expand the production of consumer goods, to supply more housing, and to raise incentives to encourage increased agricultural output.<sup>53</sup>

The "disorder and panic" which the new leadership feared might accompany the death of Stalin did not develop. The domestic front remained quiet. The East German rising of June 1953 was suppressed by the Soviet army, and scattered demonstrations in other satellite areas

were quickly brought under control. The combination of a firm display of power and a policy of concessions and promises served to facilitate acceptance of the new regime and gave it a breathing space to consolidate its authority.

Meanwhile, the issue of the succession remained to be resolved. In the first weeks after Stalin's death, the triumvirate of Malenkov, Beria, and Molotov appeared to emerge as the leading force of the new regime. The surface show of unity and collective leadership which they maintained was suddenly shattered when the Soviet press revealed on July 10, 1953, that Beria had been arrested and expelled from the Party as an "enemy of the people" who had sought to utilize his control of the security police to dominate the Party and government. The purge of Beria seemed to reinforce the principle of collective leadership, but appearances proved deceptive. The election of Nikita Khrushchev in September 1953 as First Secretary of the Party Central Committee (a post to which he had succeeded on a *de facto* basis after Malenkov's retirement from the Secretariat in March) marked the emergence of a new star in the Soviet constellation of power. Following in the footsteps of Stalin, he utilized the great powers of his office to install his henchmen in leading Party and governmental posts and eventually managed to construct a Party machine powerful enough to crush his rivals in the Presidium. During 1954 he gradually displaced Malenkov as the chief spokesman of the Party. The redistribution of authority was confirmed at the February 1955 session of the Supreme Soviet when Malenkov was forced to retire as chairman of the Council of Ministers and was replaced by Bulganin on Khrushchev's nomination.<sup>54</sup>

The rise of Khrushchev did not go unchallenged. Faced in June 1957 with a hostile majority in the Presidium, which by this time included Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Bulganin, Voroshilov, Pervukhin, and Saburov, Khrushchev took his appeal to a special session of the Party Central Committee and emerged triumphant.<sup>55</sup> Moving swiftly to consolidate his authority, he followed up his victory over the so-called anti-Party group by ousting his erstwhile supporter, Marshal Zhukov, in October 1957 from his positions as Minister of Defense and member of the Presidium and Central Committee, on the charge that he had "pursued a policy" of underestimating and curtailing Party leadership of the armed forces.<sup>56</sup> On March 27, 1958, Khrushchev assumed the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, thus combining in his own person both the top governmental and the top Party post.

Several features of this second struggle for the succession merit special comment. In many respects, the rise of Khrushchev to supreme power represented a striking recapitulation of the earlier Stalinist experience. In both cases, the authority vested in the First Secretaryship and the

command of the Party apparatus proved to be the decisive weapons. In both cases, too, the victors displayed a rare capacity for shrewd maneuver, the ability to exploit differences of view among their rivals for their own advantage. Yet there were also important differences. The struggle between Stalin and his opponents was fought in the Party cells as well as in the Politburo, the Central Committee, and the Party congresses. In the case of the left-wing opposition it reached out into the streets and shook the Party from top to bottom. But the battle for Stalin's mantle was contained in the top organs of the Party, the Central Committee and its Presidium. The Party rank and file and the Soviet populace at large were closed off from participation. Perhaps the deepest imprint of the Stalinist era was registered in the willingness of the Soviet citizenry to accept these rules of combat.

#### *Priorities in Economic Development*

Inherent in the succession struggle but transcending it in ultimate significance were the issues which agitated the Soviet scene in the period after Stalin's death. For the ordinary Soviet citizen none was perhaps more immediately vital than the question of whether Stalin's successors would continue their initial welfare concessions and devote substantial additional resources to raising the depressed living standards of the populace. At leadership levels the same issue reappeared in the form of a debate on priorities in economic development. Those who viewed the problem in terms of the paramount claims of power and national security argued that any large-scale commitment to expand consumer goods and housing ran the danger of weakening the nation's military position and slowing down the rate of growth of heavy industry. Those who manifested a consumer orientation minimized these dangers and emphasized the advantages to be obtained in rooting the regime in broader-based popular support. In the initial stages of the struggle for the succession, Malenkov's association with the consumer-goods campaign won him mass popularity, but it also contributed to his undoing. Supported by powerful allies in the Presidium and the military, Khrushchev joined battle with Malenkov on this issue and succeeded in trimming down the consumer-goods targets. The signal for the resumption of the heavy-industry drive which was given by Khrushchev in his speech to the Central Committee on January 25, 1955, appeared to mark a rededication to the goals of industrial development which Stalin had championed.<sup>57</sup>

But Khrushchev also sought to make clear that he was not neglecting consumer interests. Beginning in the fall of 1953 he sponsored a series of ambitious schemes designed to achieve a substantial increase in agricultural output. The original (and subsequently discarded) control figures for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960), while according priority to

heavy industry, still called for an increase of 60 per cent in the gross output of consumer goods, compared with 70 per cent for producer goods. During the next year, consumer interests were very much in the forefront of Khrushchev's public pronouncements. In May 1957 he launched a campaign to catch up with the United States in the per capita production of meat, milk, and butter. In July of the same year he promised "to liquidate the housing shortage in the course of ten to twelve years."<sup>58</sup> At the celebration of the fortieth anniversary of the revolution on November 7, 1957, he outlined an ambitious set of consumer targets for the fifteen-year plan to end in 1972. In the spring of 1958 he initiated a program to raise the production of chemicals and synthetics — measures that promised a substantial increase in the supply of fabrics and other consumer items.

Promises for the future, however, need to be tested against actual achievements and commitments, and here the Khrushchevian record pointed a contrast between grandiose pronouncements and modest deeds. The control figures for the seven-year plan to end in 1965, which were published in mid-November 1958, were far less consumer-oriented than the preceding Sixth Five-Year Plan.<sup>59</sup> The spread in favor of producer goods widened to a projected 85-88 per cent increase as opposed to a 62-65 per cent rise in consumer-goods production. The banner harvest of 1958 was followed by a series of mediocre harvests and, instead of catching up with the United States in livestock production, output stagnated and shortages were widely reported. In June 1962 the price of meat was raised 30 per cent and the price of butter 25 per cent.<sup>60</sup> Capital investment in agriculture lagged far behind investment in heavy industry, and in January 1961, at the Central Committee plenum on agriculture, Khrushchev registered a verbal complaint: "Some of our comrades have developed an appetite to give the country more metal. That is a praiseworthy desire, providing no harm is done to other branches of the national economy. But if more metal is produced while other branches lag, their expansion will be slowed down. Thus, not enough bread, butter, and other food items will be produced. This will be a one-sided development."<sup>61</sup>

Four months later at the British Fair in Moscow, in a statement which was not reproduced in the Soviet press, Khrushchev declared: "Soviet heavy industry is considered built. Therefore, in the future, light and heavy industry will develop at the same pace . . ."<sup>62</sup> But the Party program sponsored by Khrushchev and approved at the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October 1961 categorically reaffirmed the priority of heavy industry. The program, to be sure, promised a rapid rise in the output of food, consumer goods, and housing, but it also warned that the planned increases could only be attained under conditions of peace, and

it left the clear implication that consumer welfare must continue to bow to the urgencies of heavy industry and defense.

Although achievement fell short of promises, the standard of living of the Soviet citizenry registered significant improvement when compared with Stalinist days. Collective farmers benefited by the substantial rise in state procurement prices in the early post-Stalinist period. While the disappointing harvests of 1959-1961 were reflected in lowered collective-farm incomes compared with the banner year of 1958, increases in procurement prices for livestock products put into effect in 1962 gave some substance to the hope that collective-farm income would again begin to mount. Progress was also visible on the industrial front. The harsh criminal penalties previously used to enforce labor discipline were largely abandoned, and greater reliance was placed on economic inducements and sanctions to achieve the same ends. Old-age pensions were raised, and the position of the most depressed sector of the Soviet labor force was somewhat improved by raising the minimum wage to 300 (old) rubles in the cities and 270 in the countryside. The work-week was reduced from 48 to 46 hours in 1956, to 41 hours in 1960, and further reductions were projected for the years ahead. Many new state housing projects were constructed to relieve the acute housing shortage and, stimulated by a state program, private housing construction grew rapidly in 1958-1960. But the virtual abandonment of the loan program for the construction of private housing in the second half of 1960 (a move largely inspired by the alleged speculative excesses which accompanied it) and the pressure for investment funds in other directions led to a significant underfulfillment of housing goals in 1960 and 1961. Many of the new housing projects, moreover, were shoddily constructed, and the space assigned on a per capita basis was well below Western standards. Though actual construction lagged behind plans and promises, what was achieved was warmly welcomed, particularly by those Soviet citizens who were fortunate enough to benefit by the new housing which became available.

In the years after Stalin's death, the quantity and variety of consumer goods also increased markedly, even though they continued to fall far short of mounting demand. Many essential as well as luxury items were priced at levels which ruled out the more poorly paid workers from the marketplace. By 1965, the end of the seven-year plan, the average wage of the Soviet worker was expected to rise by 26 per cent, from 785 to 990 (old) rubles a month. While this projected level still left a great deal to be desired in terms of the purchasing power which it represented, it opened a vista of gradual improvement in living standards, and it served Khrushchev well as a symbol of his concern for the welfare of the masses. The public image which he sought to convey was that of a regime seeking

closer ties to its people than its Stalinist predecessor had. Although his concessions were modest in absolute terms, they moved in a direction which the Soviet people could only welcome.

#### *De-Stalinization and Khrushchev's Reforms*

If the masses looked to Khrushchev to alleviate their material lot, for the managerial, technical, and cultural intelligentsia there were other important issues at stake. For many of them the transcendent questions were whether the new leadership would dissolve the pall of terror which brooded over the land and whether it was prepared to respond to their aspirations for greater security and freedom. Here again two distinct sets of attitudes emerged, both at leadership levels and in the lower ranks of officialdom. There was general agreement that some form of response and adjustment was unavoidable, if for no other reason than that Stalin was dead. Those who later came to be dubbed Stalinists counseled caution in embarking on large-scale innovations; they feared that any relaxation of controls over the population would open up a Pandora's box of unpredictable consequences that might put the very life of the regime in peril. Those who felt that it was essential to dissociate themselves from the "sins" of the Stalinist era argued that the arbitrary and irrational terror of latter-day Stalinism impeded progress and that a thoroughgoing rationalization of policy and methods was imperative.

The de-Stalinization campaign provided a dramatic index of this difference in outlook. Khrushchev's secret speech at the Twentieth Party Congress, which portrayed Stalin as a murderer and a paranoiac and provided a lurid bill of particulars on some, if not all, of his "crimes," not only demolished the Stalin myth but clearly was intended to symbolize a determination to come to terms with expectations and aspirations which were thwarted during the Stalin era. For the so-called Stalinists, on the other hand, as Kaganovich confessed in his speech at the same congress, the decision to embark on a struggle against the cult of the individual was "no easy question."<sup>63</sup> Indeed, if Khrushchev's later testimony at the Twenty-Second Party Congress is to be credited, "Molotov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Voroshilov, and others categorically objected to this proposal. In answer to their objections, they were told that if they continued to oppose the raising of this question, the delegates to the Party congress would be asked to decide the matter. We had no doubt that the congress would favor discussion of the question. Only then did they agree, and the question of the cult of the individual was presented to the Twentieth Party Congress . . ."<sup>64</sup>

The ebb and flow of policy in the legal arena, while by no means registering a steady retreat from Stalinism, gave evidence of a desire to create a climate of greater security in Soviet society. The purge of Beria

in July 1953 was accompanied by the subordination of the security police to Party controls. Measures such as the series of amnesty decrees after Stalin's death, the large-scale release of prisoners from the forced-labor camps, the abolition of the Special Commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the rehabilitation, frequently posthumous, of many persons condemned as "enemies of the people" during and after the Great Purge, the strengthened powers of the procuracy, the curbs on the security police, the enactment of a new series of "fundamental laws" as the basis of a long-promised revision of legal codes, the abandonment of the practice of pronouncing persons guilty of serious crimes on the basis of confessions extracted from them, and the strengthening of other procedural safeguards to protect the rights of the accused — all appeared to augur a new era of socialist legality in Soviet affairs. Compared with the dark Stalinist days, there was significant progress in the direction of a more rational and humane legal system. But the dimensions of the "new legality" remained subject to the caprice of the Party leadership, and Khrushchev himself hardly contributed to respect for law when, in a speech to the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress on April 19, 1962, he proclaimed: "We should not wait until he [a thief] is caught red-handed to indict and try him."<sup>65</sup> His espousal of community gatherings with power to exile so-called parasites and his support of comrades' courts in which culprits were judged by fellow workers without the possibility of judicial appeal from their verdicts marked a definite retreat from legality. The widespread extension of capital punishment in 1961–62 provided a grim reminder that the harshly punitive sanctions of Stalinism had not been entirely left behind. Despite the pruning of the powers of the security police, it remained a formidable power in reserve, and no less a figure than Khrushchev felt impelled at the Twentieth Party Congress to pay tribute to its importance and to warn against discrediting its role. While fear of the police receded and confidence in legal processes mounted in the post-Stalinist period, there was also a general awareness that the regime's self-imposed legal norms could and would be ruthlessly swept aside whenever the power of the leadership was challenged.

On the ideological front, too, Stalin's successors embarked on a policy of controlled relaxation in which bonds were alternately loosened and tightened. Although disposed to shed Stalinist rigidities, Khrushchev insisted on maintaining the authority of the Party leadership as the ultimate custodian of orthodox doctrine. The cultural thaw which followed Stalin's death soon encountered its limits as the guardians of ideological purity pounced on such suspect works as Zorin's *Guests*, Panova's *The Seasons*, and Ehrenburg's *Thaw*, and initiated a not altogether successful effort to harness the craftsmen of the pen at the Second Writers' Congress in 1954. The Twentieth Party Congress with its denigration of Stalin spurred a

fresh probing of the boundaries of the new freedom, and the result was a major outburst of protest literature. This time, there is reason to believe, the Party leadership miscalculated. Genuinely shocked and outraged by the unintended consequences of de-Stalinization — the challenge of events in Hungary and Poland, the ferment among students and intellectuals in the Soviet Union itself — the regime replied in a not unfamiliar pattern: with force and terror in Hungary, with suspicion and reluctant acquiescence in Poland, and with a renewed war on "unhealthy" ideological manifestations in the Soviet Union. The educational reforms announced toward the end of 1958, with their effort to ensure that most students would have the experience of working before entering higher educational institutions, were in part inspired by the desire to discipline the restiveness of youth. After Hungary the swing of the cultural pendulum moved temporarily in a neo-Stalinist direction, but it did not move all the way. Discordant voices continued to be heard, and the Third Writers' Congress in 1959 as well as the Twenty-Second Party Congress in October 1961 provided some elbow room for divergent intellectual trends. The Party leadership, however, showed no disposition to relax its demand that *partiinost'* be the dominant value in all scholarly and creative work.

The Khrushchevian reforms in the governmental and administrative area sought to combine wider popular involvement and participation in the political process with measures to correct the top-heavy centralization which carried over from the Stalinist era. The Supreme Soviet was given an appearance of greater importance by convening it more frequently, stirring its commissions into life, and using it as a platform for important reports and announcements. Local soviets which had languished under Stalin were revived, given broader responsibilities, and directed to enlist the public in their activities. New as well as older variants of so-called agencies of public self-government, such as the people's militia (*druzhiny*) and comrades' courts, were activated in an effort to involve the population more directly in the preservation of law and order and the maintenance of labor discipline. The impressiveness of these efforts was qualified, however, by the insistence of the Party on controlling the activities of these bodies and on dictating the policies which they were duty bound to execute.

The trend toward devolution of operational responsibilities in administration represented a recognition of the increasing complexity of the Soviet economy and its decision-making processes. It was evidenced in the grant of larger discretionary powers to factory managers, *sovkhоз* directors, and chairmen of collective farms; in the transfer of functions from the central government to the republics and from the republics to lower organs; in the establishment in 1957 of a nation-wide network of

regional economic councils to take over management functions formerly vested in a large number of central economic ministries. These measures endeavored to correct the overcentralization of the Stalinist era, to revive initiative in the lower ranks of the bureaucracy, and to stimulate greater efficiency by bringing the responsibility for operational decision making closer to the problems to be solved. As with all delegations of power, they involved some risk of weakening or undermining central authority and, when "localist" practices manifested themselves in industry and agriculture, controls were again imposed. Meanwhile, the Party retained its highly centralized organization, and the leadership counted on its discipline to hold disintegrative tendencies in check.

### *The Primacy of the Party*

Perhaps the major political development of the Khrushchevian era has been the reinvigoration of the Party and the reaffirmation of its leading place in Soviet society. Under Stalin the Party had fallen on evil days, and its role was reduced to one of a number of transmission belts through which he exercised his personal hegemony. The purge of Beria prepared the way for a reassertion of Party direction of the police, and the rise of Khrushchev was accompanied by a tightening of Party controls in all other sectors of Soviet life. The effort to pour new vitality into the Party largely took the form of a call for wider participation of members in Party life, adherence to the forms of elections in choosing Party officialdom, and more frequent and regular convocations of assemblies and governing bodies at every level of the Party hierarchy. But the so-called democratization campaign operated within prescribed limits. Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev made it clear that the new leadership was determined to preserve the system of Party dictatorship, that deviations from the Party line would not be tolerated, and that all challenges to the monolithic unity of the Party would be sternly rebuffed.

The insistence on the paramount role of the Party also extended to the military. The post-Beria decline in the status of the security police was accompanied by many indications of the rising importance of the military on the Soviet scene. Perhaps the most obvious was the return of Marshal Zhukov to a position of prominence and his rapid rise to Presidium eminence. But a display of independence on Zhukov's part led in the fall of 1957 to the loss of all the high posts which he had previously occupied, and the military high command was thus sharply reminded of the Party's controlling role as the ultimate Ministry of Coordination.

The military strength of the Soviet Union continued to mount rapidly. The Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb in 1949 was followed by the acquisition of a thermonuclear weapon in 1953, the intercontinental jet bomber in 1954, and the intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957. By

outstripping the United States in developing powerful rocket engines and by taking the initial leadership in the exploration of outer space, the Soviet Union scored a series of resounding successes which had reverberations in both the domestic and the international arenas. Within the Soviet Union itself there was an upsurge of pride and patriotism which the regime fully exploited for its own purposes. The effect abroad was equally electrifying. There was a sharply heightened respect for the Soviet Union's military and scientific prowess, a crisis of confidence in Western leadership, and an increasingly vivid realization that the Communist bloc and the West were engaged in a grim race that threatened the world with disaster.

The shape of Khrushchev's Russia offers striking contrasts with latter-day Stalinism. Inside the Soviet Union there has been less emphasis on police surveillance and coercion and more on positive efforts to induce loyalty by relying on incentives, increasing amenities, and involving wider strata of the population in the processes of administration. The lot of the collective farmer has improved measurably. The burdens of the industrial workers have been somewhat lightened with a reduction in the hours of work, the lifting of old-age pensions, the abandonment of the most drastic disciplinary sanctions of the Stalinist era, more attention to the housing problem, and a rise in real wages. The managerial and administrative elite has enjoyed greater operational autonomy and a degree of security denied it under Stalin. The intelligentsia has been given a broader field within which to maneuver, though any disposition to challenge Party tenets brings a quick reminder that scholars and writers are still artists in uniform. At the same time, the welfare concessions, the continued accent on growth, the sense of expanding vistas which this communicates to oncoming generations, the pride inspired by Soviet scientific and military achievements, the heightened prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena, all combine to provide the regime with an underpinning of popular support — contrasting sharply with the fear and alienation which prevailed under Stalin.

The regime remains totalitarian in its essence, still asserting its all-encompassing authority over the whole of Soviet society and tolerating no derogation of the monopoly powers of the Party leadership, but it can claim that it has responded to grievances which Stalin ignored. The impression which Khrushchev and his associates convey is one of stability and confidence, of faith in their continued ability to channel and control the aspirations which Stalin's death unleashed. Like Stalin before them, they remain determined to make their revolution the last revolution and to preserve the Party monolith as the repository of ideological "truth." They have still to face what E. I. Zamyatin (one of the talented writers whom the Soviet regime muzzled) once observed, that "There is no such thing as the last revolution; the number of revolutions is infinite."<sup>68</sup>

*PART TWO*  
*The Role of the Party*

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## *Chapter 5*

# *The Dictatorship of the Party in Theory and Practice*

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The coup d'état of November 7, 1917, transformed the Bolsheviks at one stroke from a revolutionary to a governing party. In assuming the responsibilities of governance, the Bolsheviks faced the problem of defining their relationships to other parties and to the organs of state power which they inherited or hoped to create. The Marxist intellectual armory on which Lenin drew offered little in the way of precise guidance for revolutionaries come to power. Lenin's pamphlet, "The State and Revolution," written while he was still in hiding in August and September 1917, assembled most of the brief quotations from Marx and Engels which bore on the subject; but as a vade mecum for the construction of the socialist state, they left much to be desired.

The Leninist exegesis of Marxism represented an effort to reassert its revolutionary content. Disregarding the occasional passages in which Marx and Engels envisaged the possibility of a peaceful, democratic road to socialism,<sup>1</sup> Lenin seized on the conception of the dictatorship of the proletariat as summing up the essence of Marxist doctrine on the character of state power in the transitional period between capitalism and Communism. Following Marx and Engels, he turned to the experience of the Paris Commune to illustrate the nature of the dictatorship of the proletariat in action.<sup>2</sup> For Lenin, the Commune demonstrated that "the working class cannot simply seize the available ready machinery of the state and set it going for its own ends"; it must "shatter the bureaucratic and military machine." He heralded measures of the Commune—the abolition of the old army and the old police, the payment of workers' wages to officials, the organization of the Commune into "a working corporation, legislative and executive at the same time," the election of

delegates, the filling of all administrative and judicial posts on the basis of universal suffrage and recall—as foreshadowing the practices which the Bolsheviks would adopt on coming to power. The “commune state” would represent the incarnation of the interests of the proletariat. The power of the state would be used to crush the bourgeoisie and prepare the way for the eventual emergence of a classless communist society in which class repression would be replaced by voluntary cooperation.<sup>3</sup>

For socialists who visualized their victory as the culmination of a long process of industrialization in the course of which the working class became the preponderant element in society, the dictatorship of the proletariat implied majority rule. This “democratic” refuge was denied to Lenin and the Bolsheviks. The Russian industrial proletariat was a small minority in an overwhelmingly agrarian country. To exercise power in the name of the proletariat was to impose the rule of the few on the many; the dictatorship of the Russian proletariat was by definition a minority dictatorship. To make the problem more complex, the industrial working class was itself divided in its political loyalties. Some followed the leadership of the Bolsheviks; others gave their allegiance to the Mensheviks and even to the Socialist Revolutionaries, whose main strength was with the peasantry.

#### *One-Party Rule versus Coalition Government*

After their seizure of power, the Bolsheviks confronted a difficult choice. To govern alone was to bear the stigma of a minority dictatorship and to cement the strength of the opposition. To share power with other parties and to await the judgment of a constituent assembly based on popular elections was to risk losing the fruits of the insurrection. The path of dictatorship led irrevocably in the direction of civil war, the suppression of the opposition, and the invocation of terror. The path of coalition and constitutionalism meant compromise, concession, and the abdication of supreme power.

Within the bosom of Bolshevism, two conflicting patterns of thought struggled for ascendancy. The majority group, led by Lenin and Trotsky, pronounced in principle in favor of a Party dictatorship, though they expressed a reluctant willingness to admit representatives of other socialist parties into the government, provided the hegemony of the Bolsheviks was safeguarded. The minority, led by Kamenev and Zinoviev, advocated a coalition of Soviet parties, an agreement to share power with the Mensheviks and SR's in order to broaden the base of support for the new regime.

The position of the Leninist majority was sharply expressed in the inter-Party negotiations on the composition of the new government after the uprising of November 7. Under Lenin's leadership, the Party Central

Committee instructed its negotiators to insist on "a majority in the Central Executive Committee [TsIK], a majority in the government, and [the acceptance of] our [Bolshevik] program." Trotsky went even further and at a meeting of the Central Committee on November 14, 1917, cried out, "We should have 75 per cent."<sup>4</sup> Lenin's deep-rooted skepticism toward coalition came out even more sharply at a session of the Petrograd Committee of the Party held on the same day: "As for conciliation," he said, "I cannot even speak about that seriously . . . Our present slogan is: No compromise, i.e., for a homogeneous Bolshevik Government."<sup>5</sup>

Meanwhile, the minority led by Kamenev and Zinoviev sought to escape the grim logic of one-party dictatorship. Frustrated in the Central Committee, they insisted on airing their views outside. Despite Lenin's effort to silence them by invoking the threat of Party discipline, the minority persisted in demanding a coalition. On November 17, 1917, they took the unprecedented step of using the forum of the Central Executive Committee of the Congress of Soviets to move the repeal of the press decree of November 9, utilized by the Bolshevik Sovnarkom to suppress hostile newspapers. When this motion was defeated, the minority representatives resigned from the Sovnarkom and the Central Committee of the Party. Five of the fourteen members of the Sovnarkom joined in the following statement which was read to the Central Executive Committee on November 17:

We take the stand that it is necessary to form a socialist government of all parties in the Soviet. We believe that only the formation of such a government can preserve the fruits of the heroic war won by the working class and the revolutionary army in the October-November days.

We deem the alternative to be a purely Bolshevik government which can maintain itself only by means of political terror. It is this last-named alternative which the Soviet of People's Commissars has chosen. We cannot and will not accept it. We can see that it will alienate the proletarian masses and cause their withdrawal from political leadership; it will lead to the establishment of an irresponsible regime and to the ruin of the revolution and the country. We cannot assume responsibility for such a policy, and, therefore, we give up the name of People's Commissars.<sup>6</sup>

At the same time, five members of the Central Committee — Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rykov, Milyutin, and Nogin — issued a declaration announcing their resignation. They charged that "the leading group of the Central Committee . . . is determined not to permit the formation of a government of the parties in the Soviet and to insist on a purely Bolshevik government . . . regardless of the sacrifices to the workers and soldiers." The statement continued:

We cannot assume responsibility for this ruinous policy of the Central Committee, carried out against the will of a large part of the proletariat and

soldiers, who are most eager for an early cessation of blood-shedding by the different wings of the democracy.

We resign therefore from membership in the Central Committee so that we may be free to express our opinion openly to the masses of workers and soldiers and to ask them to support our slogan: Long live the government of the parties in the Soviet! For an immediate understanding on these terms.<sup>7</sup>

Although all the signers of this statement subsequently recanted and reassumed positions of responsibility in the Party and government, the views which they expressed at this juncture revealed a significant crisis of conscience in Bolshevik ranks. "We have become very fond of war," said Lunacharsky, "as if we were not a workers' party but a party of the soldiery, a party of war. It is necessary to create, but we are doing nothing. We continue to polemicize in the party, and we'll keep on polemizing, until only one man remains — a dictator."<sup>8</sup>

#### *The Consolidation of Single-Party Dictatorship*

The determination of the Leninist majority to ensure Bolshevik hegemony pushed inexorably in the direction of the consolidation of a single-party dictatorship. Except for the brief period between December 22, 1917, and March 15, 1918, when three Left SR's held portfolios in the Sovnarkom, the cabinet remained exclusively Bolshevik in composition. Faced with the problem of justifying one-party rule, Lenin resorted increasingly to dialectical casuistry. In order to demonstrate that Bolshevik power was securely founded on popular consent, he pointed to the Bolshevik majority in the Congress of Soviets. When the elections to the Constituent Assembly disclosed an SR majority in the country, Lenin dismissed the electoral results as without significance. Replying to criticism of the dissolution of the assembly, Lenin said:

Those who remind us of the time when we also stood for the Constituent Assembly and rebuke us for now "dispersing" it don't have a grain of sense in their minds, only pompous and empty phrases. For as compared with Tsarism and the Kerensky republic the Constituent Assembly at one time seemed to us better than their notorious organs of power; but with their establishment the Soviets, being revolutionary organizations of all the people, naturally became immeasurably superior to any parliament in the world . . . All power to the Soviets we said then, and for this we are fighting . . . The Constituent Assembly, which failed to recognize the power of the people, is now dispersed by the will of the Soviet power . . . All power to the Soviets! And we shall crush the saboteurs.<sup>9</sup>

Leninist ingenuity thus embodied the will of the people in the soviets and the will of the soviets in the party of the Bolsheviks. When some of his own followers encountered difficulty in following the argument, Lenin warned:

Every attempt, direct, or indirect, to consider the question of the Constituent Assembly from a formal, legal aspect, within the framework of ordinary bourgeois democracy, ignoring the class struggle and civil war, would be a betrayal of the cause of the proletariat, and the adoption of the bourgeois standpoint. It is the bounden duty of revolutionary Social Democracy to warn all and sundry against this error, into which a few Bolshevik leaders, who have been unable to appreciate the significance of the October uprising and the tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat, have fallen.<sup>10</sup>

With the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly on January 22, 1918, the Bolshevik break with the bourgeois legal order was complete. As Sverdlov announced in his opening speech to the Third Congress of Soviets the next day: "The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have definitely taken the stand for a dictatorship of the toiling elements."<sup>11</sup> Lenin in his speech to the congress was even more explicit, "Every time I speak on this subject of proletarian government someone . . . shouts 'dictator' . . . You cannot expect . . . that socialism will be delivered on a silver platter . . . Not a single question pertaining to the class struggle has ever been settled except by violence. Violence when committed by the toiling and exploited masses against the exploiters is the kind of violence of which we approve."<sup>12</sup>

Lenin still found it inexpedient to say bluntly that the Party deemed itself the exclusive custodian of the interests of "the toiling and exploited masses" and that it proposed to assume exclusive direction of the instruments of class violence. Events were to prove more eloquent than words. The suppression of opposition parties, however, did not take place at once but proceeded by slow stages. The attack began with a Sovnarkom proclamation on December 11, 1917, declaring the Kadet Party "an organization of counterrevolutionary conspirators" and an "enemy of the people."<sup>13</sup> On the same day an order was issued to arrest leading members of the Kadet Party and to hand them over to the revolutionary tribunal. "We have made a modest beginning," commented Trotsky.<sup>14</sup>

At first, the Bolsheviks moved cautiously in dealing with their socialist rivals. Opposition newspapers continued to appear, but they were subjected to harassment in the form of suspensions and the cutting-off of newsprint. On December 31, 1917, the Cheka ordered the arrest of a number of important Right SR and Menshevik leaders,<sup>15</sup> but both parties continued to be nominally represented in the Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) of the Congress of Soviets. This inconsistency was eliminated on June 14, 1918, when the VTsIK issued a decree excluding both parties from its ranks on the ground that they were engaged in alleged counterrevolutionary and anti-Soviet activities.

This meant that the Left SR's were the only major group remaining in the VTsIK aside from the dominant Bolshevik majority. By this time,

relations between the Bolsheviks and the Left SR's had reached a stage of extreme tension as the result of the opposition of the Left SR's to the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and to the confiscatory grain requisitions enforced on the countryside. On July 6, 1918, two Left SR's assassinated the German ambassador Mirbach in the hope of forcing a breach with the Germans. The abortive Left SR uprising which followed prepared the way for the elimination of this last vestige of effective opposition to Bolshevik one-party rule. Most of the Left SR delegates to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets were arrested, and thirteen were shot. In reprisal, the Left SR's turned the weapon of political terror against the Bolsheviks. On August 30, 1918, Uritsky, the head of the Petrograd Cheka, was assassinated, and Lenin was seriously wounded. The Cheka replied in kind, and the Red Terror assumed a mass character.

By the autumn of 1918, all non-Communist political organizations had been rendered practically impotent though some continued to exist in a precarious limbo of quasi-legality. Under the press of the Civil War, the Bolshevik leadership made an effort to distinguish between "loyal" Mensheviks and SR's, who supported the Soviet government in its struggle against the Whites, and "disloyal" elements, who gave their support to the counterrevolution. On November 30, 1918, the loyal Mensheviks were readmitted to the VTsIK, and this action was followed on February 25, 1919, by the reinstatement of SR's who were prepared to repudiate "external and internal counterrevolution." But Bolshevik toleration was based solely on expediency and the good behavior of the "captive" representatives of the minority parties. Lenin contemptuously said of them at the Eighth Party Congress, "We say to it: 'You are not a serious enemy. Our enemy is the bourgeoisie. But if you march with it, then we shall have to apply to you too the measures of the proletarian dictatorship.'"<sup>16</sup>

During the next few years, the position of the minority parties became more and more unenviable. Though Menshevik and SR party conferences took place occasionally and their newspapers and manifestos made sporadic appearances, these activities were subjected to constant harassment and interference. Despite Cheka arrests and persecutions, the Mensheviks as late as 1920 continued to elect delegates to local soviets, to control important trade unions, and to participate, though without voting rights, in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets.

With the end of the Civil War and the inauguration of the New Economic Policy in 1921, the policy of contingent toleration of opposition groups was abandoned. No formal decree was issued dissolving the minority parties, but the signal for extinction was given by Lenin himself in May 1921, when he proclaimed: "We shall keep the Mensheviks and SR's, whether open or disguised as 'non-Party,' in prison."<sup>17</sup> After the Kronstadt revolt, this condition came close to total realization. The fiction

of a legal opposition was completely abandoned. Kadets, Mensheviks, and SR's were arrested in large numbers and exiled to the far north, Siberia, and Central Asia. Some avoided arrest and won temporary absolution by writing statements to Bolshevik papers renouncing connections with the outlawed political groupings. By 1921-22, almost all opposition political activity had been driven underground, and the consolidation of the one-party dictatorship was virtually completed. The Communist Party dominated the political life of the country. With the liquidation of its competitors, there was no effective organizational voice left inside Russia to challenge the Party's claim that it constituted "the authentic spokesman of the will of the masses."<sup>18</sup>

How was this claim to be validated? Since the masses were no longer offered a free choice among competing political alternatives and the Communist Party commanded a monopoly of force as well as of legality, the Communists' effort to demonstrate that their regime rested on consent involved the development of a surrogate theory of representation.

Stalin has provided the most authoritative Communist exposition of this representational mystique. In his writings on the role of the Party, he began by stressing its elite character: "The Party must be, first of all, the *vanguard* of the working class." In representational terms, it must function as a priestly guardian of the highest interests of the working class.

The Party cannot be a real party if it limits itself to registering what the masses of the working class feel and think . . . if it is unable to rise above the momentary interests of the proletariat, if it is unable to elevate the masses to the level of the class interests of the proletariat. The Party must stand at the head of the working class; it must see farther than the working class; it must lead the proletariat, and not follow in the tail of the spontaneous movement.<sup>19</sup>

At the same time, Stalin insisted upon the Party's maintaining its connections with the working class; it must be "closely bound up with it by all the fibres of its being." It must function as a school for the training of leaders of the working class; it must transform "each and every non-Party organization of the working class into an auxiliary body and transmission belt linking the Party with the class."<sup>20</sup> The leadership of the Party must be asserted in trade unions, cooperatives, soviets, and every other form of mass organization. "The highest expression of the leading role of the Party, here, in the Soviet Union . . ." Stalin proudly proclaimed, "is the fact that not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directions from the Party." "*In this sense*," he continued, "it could be said that the dictatorship of the proletariat is *in essence* the 'dictatorship' of its vanguard, the 'dictatorship' of its Party."<sup>21</sup>

Implicit in the Stalinist analysis of the role of the Party are two contradictory and unresolved strains. The major thrust of the theory is clearly elitist and manipulative. The Party stands above class and mass. It insists on a monopoly of leadership. It guides and directs the entire machinery of state. It does not test its policies in a forum of free elections; it mobilizes and enforces consent. At the same time, the elitist presuppositions of the Stalinist theory are tempered by what might be described as a pseudo-democratic strain.

Stalin expressed this "populist" facet of Party ideology when he observed, "Contacts with the masses, the strengthening of these contacts, readiness to listen to the voice of the masses — in these lie the strength and impregnability of Bolshevik leadership." In the same speech, he cited the legend of Antaeus — the hero who was invincible as long as he touched the earth, his mother — and then concluded, "It may be taken as a rule that so long as Bolsheviks keep contacts with the broad masses of the people, they will be invincible. And, contrariwise, it is sufficient for Bolsheviks to break away from the masses and lose contact with them, to become covered with bureaucratic rash . . . to lose all their strength and become converted into nonentities."<sup>22</sup>

When Stalin referred to "contact" with the masses, he did not mean control of the Party by the masses. The "solution" which he envisaged ran in terms of the Party's capacity for leadership, its ability to divine mass aspirations and to convince the masses of the correctness of the Party's slogans. Authority derives from above rather than from below. The masses are given periodic opportunities to register their approval of the Party leadership; there is no effective way in which they may register their disapproval since no alternatives are presented to them. The Bolshevik theory of Party leadership is rich in sanctions to enforce centralized control; it is characterized by an almost total absence of sanctions to ensure the responsibility of the Party leadership to the masses. As a result, the "populist" strain in Bolshevik ideology is robbed of much of its potential significance.

Authority based on anointment and investment from above does not usually breed responsiveness to the forces below. All the compulsions of dictatorship drive toward the manufacture of synthetic unanimity rather than the recognition of genuine differences. The search for a "popular" basis of the dictatorship is, as Stalin rightly insisted, a necessary condition of its survival. But it is not a search for which dictatorships ordinarily come well equipped. When restraints on arbitrary authority are self-imposed and the will of the dictator becomes the supreme law, the temptation to resort to the short cuts of compulsion becomes well-nigh irresistible. "You know yourselves," Peter the Great once observed, "that anything that is new, even though it is good and needful, will not be

done by our folk without compulsion."<sup>23</sup> It is a sentiment that the Bolshevik practice of leadership amply documents.

The consolidation of one-party dictatorship in the USSR has been accompanied by an increasing tendency on the part of Communist ideologues to rationalize it as the highest form of democracy. To the Western ear, the rationale rings strangely.

As to freedom for various political parties [Stalin proclaimed in 1936], we adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a part of a class, its most advanced part. Several parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, can exist only in a society in which there are antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually hostile and irreconcilable — in which there are, say, capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, kulaks and poor peasants, etc. But in the U.S.S.R. there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the U.S.S.R. there are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose interests — far from being mutually hostile — are, on the contrary, friendly. Hence there is no ground in the U.S.S.R. for the existence of several parties, and, consequently, for freedom for these parties . . . In the U.S.S.R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end . . .

They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? Democracy in capitalist countries . . . is, in the last analysis, democracy for the strong, democracy for the propertied minority. In the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, democracy is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy for all.<sup>24</sup>

Embedded in Stalin's bland semantic jugglery is the usual dictatorial coup de main, the assertion that the nation is an organic unity whose true interests only the Party dictatorship can adequately express. In the Communist lexicon, class solidarity in the USSR needs no demonstration; it is simply assumed to exist. When Communist ideologists describe a single-party dictatorship as the most "democratic" form of government in the world, it is presumably because they identify the policies of the Party leadership with the welfare of the masses. If, as the Communist ideologues claim, the masses are conscious of the beatitudes which have been conferred on them by single-party rule, it might also be assumed that Communists would have no objection to testing their hold on the masses in free elections in which other parties participated. The unwillingness of Communists to submit to such tests may suggest that the Party leadership has no great confidence that the masses would in fact validate their claims. Indeed, the Communist attitude toward opposition betrays a degree of insecurity bordering on the hypochondriac. "It would be wild," says an official commentator on the 1936 Constitution,

to grant freedom of assembly, meetings, street processions, for instance to monarchists of any sort; incongruous in our streets would be people bearing Tsarist flags and singing in the Soviet land "God Save our Tsar." It would be wild to imagine that Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries should appear in our

halls with an appeal to turn back from socialism to capitalism . . . And he who would attempt to call for the overthrow of the socialist system . . . or attempt to weaken the system will appear before the peoples of the Union as a criminal, having no right to enjoy the liberties envisaged by the Constitution . . .

. . . There can be no meetings of lunatics, just as there can be no meetings of criminals — monarchists, Mensheviks, SR's, etc.<sup>25</sup>

The fear that the masses will be corrupted by the slightest exposure to alien doctrine runs side by side with the Party's claim that it commands the monolithic confidence of the masses. Both strands, incongruous as they may seem, form part of the Communist pattern of belief. The first derives from a basic distrust of the masses which demands their protection from error by stern guardians of their true interests, and the second rests on the faith that a Party elite in possession of the true doctrine can spread its influence among the masses by devoted application and organization. Thus, indoctrination is fused with repression, and opposition to the Party leadership in any form becomes a heresy which defenders of the true creed have an obligation to stamp out.

In Marxism-Leninism, Communists profess to believe that they have a scientific method which unlocks the secrets of the universe and which equips them alone to apprehend reality and change the world in accordance with general laws of social development. This does not mean, as Stalin pointed out, that Marxism recognizes "immutable conclusions and formulas obligatory for all epochs and periods," or that a conning of Marxist texts will yield precise solutions for all varieties of practical problems. Stalin expressed his scorn of "the exegetes and Talmudists [who] . . . think that if they learn these conclusions and formulas by heart and begin to quote them here and there, then they will be able to solve any questions whatsoever, figuring that the memorized conclusions and formulas suit them for all times and countries, for all of life's contingencies."<sup>26</sup> In the eyes of Communists, such "abuses" do not impair the validity of the substance of Marxism-Leninism itself. Indeed, they make it the more necessary to have authoritative pronouncements from the Party leadership to protect the essence of the doctrine against distortions of application.

Since Marxism-Leninism as doctrine provides no ready-made answers for the multitudinous decisions which confront a governing party as it adapts itself to new situations, the possibility of differences of view within the Party must constantly be envisaged. Serious differences if pressed to their logical conclusion mean a split in the Party; the suppression of differences deprives Party membership of much of its potential creative significance. The official doctrine of the Party purports to avoid both extremes. As Stalin once put it:

The achievement and maintenance of the dictatorship of the proletariat is impossible without a party which is strong by reason of its solidarity and iron discipline. But iron discipline in the Party is inconceivable without unity of will, without complete and absolute unity of action on the part of all members of the Party. This does not mean, of course, that the possibility of contests of opinion within the Party is thereby precluded. On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes criticism and contest of opinion within the Party. Least of all does it mean that discipline must be "blind." On the contrary, iron discipline does not preclude but presupposes conscious and voluntary submission, for only conscious discipline can be truly iron discipline. But after a contest of opinion has been closed, after criticism has been exhausted and a decision has been arrived at, unity of will and unity of action of all Party members are the necessary conditions without which neither Party unity nor iron discipline in the Party is conceivable . . . from this it follows that the existence of factions is incompatible either with the Party's unity or with its iron discipline. It need hardly be proved that the existence of factions leads to the existence of a number of centres, and the existence of a number of centres connotes the absence of one common centre in the Party, the breaking up of the unity of will, the weakening and disintegration of discipline, the weakening and disintegration of the dictatorship.<sup>27</sup>

#### *Lenin and the Opposition*

The problem of combining unity and diversity has plagued the Party since its inception. While Lenin lived, the scope of intra-Party democracy was being progressively narrowed, but, compared with what was to develop later, discussion within the Party remained relatively free and uninhibited. Lenin's Party opponents could still propagate their views with comparative impunity, and, although Lenin frequently denounced them in unbridled terms, his bark was fiercer than his bite. Thus, when Zinoviev and Kamenev broke Party discipline and agitated in the non-Party press against the October insurrection, Lenin, after the victory, was ready to forgive. In a speech before the Petrograd Committee of the Party on November 14, he is reported to have said, "I should not like [now] to assume a severe attitude toward them."<sup>28</sup> When Zinoviev and Kamenev, along with others, again opposed Lenin on the issue of a coalition government, he threatened them with expulsion from the Party; but when the sinners repented, they were again welcomed back into the fold.

The debate on the Brest-Litovsk Treaty shook the Party from top to bottom, but differences were freely aired. At one point the Central Committee was split into three factions: Lenin's followers advocated acceptance of the German ultimatum; Bukharin's group of Left Communists called for a revolutionary war; and Trotsky and his supporters offered the formula of "no peace, no war." The motion to notify the Germans of readiness to accept peace terms carried in the Central Committee by the narrow vote of seven to six,<sup>29</sup> and the motion to accept the terms was won by a plurality of seven to four, with four members abstaining.<sup>30</sup> The issue

of ratification was widely discussed in local Party organizations and finally submitted to the Seventh Party Congress, which assembled in Petrograd on March 6–8, 1918. On the day before the opening of the congress, the Left Communists appeared with an opposition newspaper — *Kommunist* — which sharply attacked the policies of Lenin. After a bitter debate, the congress ratified the treaty by a vote of thirty to twelve.<sup>31</sup> In the interim, the Left Opposition captured control of the Moscow Party organization and the following month issued several numbers of another opposition journal, also called *Kommunist*.

No sanctions were invoked against members of the opposition. With the Brest issue out of the way, the Left Opposition swung over to criticism of Lenin's alleged opportunistic capitulation before the petty bourgeoisie and pressed for the extension of proletarian control in industry and administration. Lenin responded with a smashing critique of the utopianism of the Left Communists in his article, "On Left Infantilism and the Petty-Bourgeois Spirit,"<sup>32</sup> but he took no disciplinary measures to prevent the left from expressing its views. Meanwhile, the intensification of the Civil War and the Left SR uprising of mid-1918 brought the two factions together and restored Party unity in the face of the common menace.

The effect of the Civil War was not only to solidify the Party but to reinforce earlier tendencies to concentrate power in the hands of the top leadership. At the Eighth Party Congress, held in March 1919, Osinsky and Sapronov, former Left Communists who were soon to organize another opposition group called the Democratic Centralists, raised their voices against excessive centralization and bureaucratic control and led a wholly unsuccessful movement to expand the power of the local Party organizations.<sup>33</sup>

More serious was the challenge offered by the so-called Military Opposition led by V. Smirnov, also a former Left Communist. The Military Opposition was sharply critical of the policy of employing former Tsarist officers as military specialists in the Red Army and of organizing the army on a basis of professional military discipline; it called, instead, for primary reliance on partisan detachments. In a test vote at the Party congress, Smirnov's resolution mobilized 95 votes to 174 for the majority. Again, no effort was made to invoke Party discipline against the opposition. The issue was submitted to a conciliation commission on which both majority and minority were represented, and the resulting resolution, which made some slight concessions to the Military Opposition, was unanimously affirmed by the congress.<sup>34</sup>

At the Ninth Congress, in March 1920, the Democratic Centralists appeared as a full-fledged opposition group. Sapronov described the Leninist Central Committee as a "small handful of party oligarchs." Other members of the opposition complained that the Central Committee "was

banning those who hold deviant views." Yakovlev was even more specific. "The Ukraine," he charged, "is being transformed into a place of exile. Those comrades who for any reason are not agreeable to Moscow are exiled there." Yurenev accused the Central Committee of "playing with men" and spoke of the dispatching of oppositionists to far places as a "system of exile."<sup>35</sup> Lenin's reply was evasive. It was the task of the Central Committee to distribute the forces of the Party. "Of course," he conceded, "if the Central Committee had banned the opposition before the Congress, this would be an inadmissible matter." "Perhaps," he admitted, "mistakes have been made." But, he concluded, "whatever Central Committee you choose to elect, it cannot desist from distributing forces."<sup>36</sup> At the Ninth Congress, Lenin was apparently still on the defensive against charges of repressing the opposition. The disciplining of oppositionists took the relatively mild form of transfer of work assignments from the center to the periphery, and even such actions were not openly acknowledged.

During the summer and autumn of 1920, growing unrest among the Party rank and file crystallized in the form of the so-called Workers' Opposition. The program of the Workers' Opposition called for trade-union administration of industry, democratic management of the Party, and reliance on the industrial proletariat to direct state affairs. The movement was aimed largely against the tendency of the Party leadership to arrogate all important decision making to itself. In pressing for more autonomy and more workers' control, the Workers' Opposition registered a growing disillusionment with the failure to realize the utopian, egalitarian slogans under which the Party had marched to power. Under the leadership of Madame Kollontai and Alexander Shlyapnikov, a former metalworker and the first People's Commissar for Labor, the Workers' Opposition gathered considerable rank-and-file support, particularly in the trade unions, but it found itself greatly handicapped in its bid for power by its failure to attract any of the first-rank leaders of the Party.

In the trade-union discussion which raged in the Party prior to and during the Tenth Party Congress, which met in March 1921, three platforms vied for supremacy. The Workers' Opposition called for trade-union control and management of industry; Trotsky and Bukharin pressed for the "statification" of the trade unions; Lenin and nine other members of the Central Committee offered an intermediate program designed to preserve a degree of autonomy for the trade unions without entrusting them with direct responsibility for economic administration. In the crucial vote at the congress, Lenin's platform carried by an overwhelming majority. Although the Workers' Opposition was able to mobilize but 18 votes, compared with 50 for Trotsky's motion and 336 for Lenin's,<sup>37</sup> the vote was far from reflecting the real strength of the Workers' Opposition

among the Party rank and file. Lenin was genuinely alarmed by the dissension, and his anxiety was deepened by the Kronstadt mutiny which broke out on the eve of the congress.

This time Lenin was ready to invoke stern measures. In a pamphlet called "The Party Crisis," he first rebuked Trotsky for factionalism and then turned his main fire against the Workers' Opposition. He denounced its program as out of bounds: "Of course it is permissible (especially before a Congress) for different groups to organize in blocs (and so is it to canvass for votes). But it must be done within the limits of Communism (and not Syndicalism)."<sup>38</sup>

In discussions at the congress, the Workers' Opposition showed no disposition to give ground. In the eyes of Shlyapnikov, the platforms of Lenin and Trotsky were equally reprehensible; both were "economic militarizers." In the event of defeat at the congress, the leaders of the Workers' Opposition proclaimed that there would be no retreat; they would remain within the Party, fight for their point of view, "save the Party and correct its line." To Lenin, this was the last straw.

All these arguments about freedom of speech and freedom of criticism, which appear in variegated form throughout this entire pamphlet and all the speeches of the "Workers' Opposition" constitute nine-tenths of the sense of speeches, which have no particular sense — all these are words of this order. Comrades, it is necessary to talk not only about words, but about their content as well. You cannot trick us with words like "freedom of criticism." When we said that the Party showed symptoms of disease, we meant that this indication deserves threefold attention; undoubtedly, the disease is there: Help us to heal this disease. Tell us how you can heal it. We have spent a great deal of time in discussion, and I must say that now it is a great deal better to "discuss with rifles" than with the theses offered by the opposition. We need no opposition now, comrades, it is not the time! Either on this side, or on that, with a rifle, but not with the opposition . . . And I think that the Party Congress will have to draw that conclusion too . . . that the time has come to put an end to the opposition, to put a lid on it; we have had enough of opposition now!<sup>39</sup>

This outburst was a prelude to more drastic action. The resolution which the Tenth Party Congress adopted "On the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party" condemned the ideas of the Workers' Opposition as "a complete rupture with Marxism and Communism," called for "an unswerving and systematic ideological struggle against these ideas," and declared "the propaganda of these ideas as being incompatible with membership in the Russian Communist Party."<sup>40</sup> Lenin, however, still expressed a hope that the oppositionists could be salvaged for the Party. "A deviation," he explained to the congress, "is not a fully formed movement. A deviation is something that can be corrected. People have strayed a little from the path or are beginning to stray, but

it is still possible to correct it."<sup>41</sup> When members of the Workers' Opposition who had been re-elected to the Central Committee offered to resign, the resignations were not accepted. Instead, they were called upon to submit to Party discipline.

Nonetheless, the Resolution on the Workers' Opposition and the even more important Resolution on Party Unity adopted by the Tenth Congress mark an important dividing line in the history of the Party. They greatly consolidated the power of the central Party leadership and set a master precedent, on the basis of which any opposition to the dominant Party machine was eventually to become identified with treason. "All class-conscious workers must clearly realize," said the Resolution on Party Unity, "the perniciousness and impermissibility of fractionalism of any kind, for no matter how the representatives of individual groups may desire to safeguard Party unity, in practice fractionalism inevitably leads to the weakening of team work and to intensified and repeated attempts by the enemies of the Party, who have fastened themselves onto it because it is the governing Party, to widen the cleavage and to use it for counter-revolutionary purposes." The resolution continued:

In the practical struggle against fractionalism, every organization of the Party must take strict measures to prevent any fractional actions whatsoever . . . Every analysis of the general line of the Party, estimate of its practical experience, verification of the fulfillment of its decisions, study of methods of rectifying errors, etc., must under no circumstances be submitted for preliminary discussion to groups formed on the basis of any sort of "platform," etc., but must be exclusively submitted for discussion directly to all members of the Party . . .

The Congress therefore hereby declares dissolved and orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without exception that have been formed on the basis of one platform or another (such as the Workers' Opposition group, the Democratic Centralism group, etc.). Nonobservance of this decision of the Congress shall entail absolute and immediate expulsion from the Party.<sup>42</sup>

These statements were followed by the famous Point Seven which remained unpublished until, on the motion of Stalin, it was released for general circulation at the Thirteenth Party Conference in January 1924, just before Lenin's death. The Tenth Congress' decision to keep Point Seven secret revealed an understandable reluctance to document the growing power of the central Party machine. Point Seven provided:

In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity in removing all fractionalism, the Congress authorizes the Central Committee, in cases of breach of discipline or of a revival or toleration of fractionalism, to apply all Party penalties, including expulsion, and in regard to members of the Central Committee to reduce them to the status of alternate members and even, as an extreme measure, to expel them from the Party. A necessary condition for the application of such an

extreme measure to members of the Central Committee, alternate members of the Central Committee and members of the Control Commission is the convocation of a plenum of the Central Committee, to which all alternate members of the Central Committee and all members of the Control Commission shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most responsible leaders of the Party, by a two-thirds majority, deems it necessary to reduce a member of the Central Committee to the status of alternate member, or to expel him from the Party, this measure shall be put into effect immediately.<sup>43</sup>

The resolutions of the Tenth Congress foreshadowed the Party purge of 1921–22 and the tightening of restrictions on all brands of oppositionist activity. Lenin set the tone for the purge when he called for the expulsion of all “rascals, bureaucrats, dishonest or wavering Communists, and of Mensheviks who have repainted their ‘façade’ but who have remained Mensheviks at heart.”<sup>44</sup> The Party historian Yaroslavsky later estimated that approximately a third of the Party membership was either expelled or left the Party at this time.<sup>45</sup>

Despite the ban on factionalism, leaders of the Workers’ Opposition continued their agitation against the line of the Central Committee. On August 9, 1921, Lenin, in accordance with Point Seven, convened a meeting of the plenum of the Central Committee to consider the expulsion of Shlyapnikov from the committee and the Party. The motion failed by one vote to secure the necessary two-thirds majority, and Shlyapnikov escaped with a stern censure and a threat that the matter would be reopened if he continued to violate Party discipline.<sup>46</sup> Just before the Eleventh Party Congress met in March 1922, the opposition made a desperate and pathetic bid for the support of foreign Communists by filing an appeal with the Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (IKKI). “The Declaration of the Twenty-Two,” as this document came to be known, echoed the familiar grievances of the Workers’ Opposition. It was submitted without the consent of the Party Central Committee or the Russian delegation to the IKKI. The Comintern, not unexpectedly, replied with a resolution affirming its faith in the Russian Party leadership. The problem of dealing with the dissenters was shifted back to the Eleventh Congress of the Party, which appointed a commission<sup>47</sup> consisting of Dzerzhinsky, Zinoviev, and Stalin to recommend the appropriate penalties.

At the Eleventh Congress, a rapidly thinning but still determined band of Workers’ Oppositionists returned to the fray. Shlyapnikov complained that “since the time the 10th Party Congress sent me into the Central Committee as whip of the workers’ opposition, that committee has often sat in judgment upon me.” He declared that “Comrade Frunze brought up the possibility of convincing me with machine guns that he was in the right,”<sup>48</sup> and he designated both Lenin and Frunze as machine gunners. V. Kossior averred:

The administrative system of our Party has remained as authoritarian and to a certain degree militaristic as it was in the war period. If anyone had the courage or deemed it necessary to criticize or point out a certain deficiency which exists in the area of Soviet and Party work, he was immediately counted among the opposition, the appropriate places learned of it, and the comrade in question was relieved of his office. Let us take the Ural region as an example. Comrades Sapronov, V. Kossior, Mrachkovsky and a whole array of our Ural comrades were removed from their work in the Ural area under entirely irrelevant pretenses.<sup>49</sup>

Kossior characterized the Party regime as the regime of the "mailed fist." Madame Kollontai accused the Party leadership of suppressing thought and of inadequate attention to the welfare of the workers.<sup>50</sup>

Lenin's reply was to insist on the continued necessity of iron Party discipline. The NEP, he pointed out, was a period of retreat:

During a retreat . . . discipline must be more conscious and a hundred times more necessary . . . under such circumstances a few panic-stricken voices are enough to cause a stampede. The danger is enormous. When a real army is in retreat, machine guns are set up; and when an orderly retreat degenerates into a disorderly one, the command is given: "Fire!" And quite right.

If, during an incredibly difficult retreat, when everything depends on preserving good order, anyone spreads panic — even for the best of motives — the slightest breach of discipline must be punished severely, sternly, ruthlessly.<sup>51</sup>

The veiled threat of "machine guns" was explained away by Lenin in his concluding speech as directed against Mensheviks, SR's, and their ilk; oppositionists, he made clear, would be dealt with through "Party measures of discipline."<sup>52</sup> The commission appointed to adjudicate the affair of the Twenty-Two brought in a recommendation that Kollontai, Shlyapnikov, Medvedev, Mitin, and Kuznetsov be expelled from the Party. The Congress concurred in the expulsion of the last two, who were relative newcomers to the Party, but it could not steel itself to expel such Old Bolsheviks and prominent Party workers as Kollontai, Shlyapnikov, and Medvedev. It contented itself with a stern warning to them that the Central Committee would resort to expulsion in the event of further anti-Party activities on their part.<sup>53</sup>

The Eleventh Congress was the last in which Lenin participated. As long as he remained active, his influence was clearly exerted in the strengthening of Party discipline and consolidation of the hold of the central machine on the Party. The Party faction was anathema to him, and in the Resolution on Party Unity, which he had drafted for the Tenth Congress, he did everything in his power to destroy the embryonic development of a two- or multi-faction system within the framework of the

single-party dictatorship. He could find a place for criticism in his organizational scheme only if it presented no political challenge to the Party leadership and if it was "practical" criticism which served to improve the efficiency of the Party machine.

At the same time, his intolerance of opposition in principle was tempered by a practical realization that differences of view within the Party were unavoidable and that the function of a Party leader was to persuade first and to invoke sanctions only as a last resort. Thus he cajoled, argued, and even pleaded with his Party opponents before he confronted the necessity of declaring open war on them. Despite violent threats and tirades, the most drastic penalty which he imposed on dissenters was expulsion from the Party, and even this penalty was rarely utilized against Party members of any prominence who had rendered distinguished services in the past. If on occasion Lenin seemed to equate dissent with treason, he still shrank from drawing the practical consequences, at least so far as intra-Party struggles were concerned.

Yet the body of precedents which he created steered a course toward the outlawing of all opposition. However much practice meliorated theory with Lenin, he was responsible for the germinating conception on the basis of which all intra-Party opposition came to be extinguished. As the Party encompassed the political life of the nation and imposed a monolithic pattern on it, the Party leadership became the exclusive sanctuary of power and orthodoxy. The Party was transformed into a rigid, hierarchical, military formation in which the duty of the lower ranks was to obey and the obligation of the leadership was to command. Stalin's pronouncements were treated as the incarnation of divine wisdom; his decisions brooked no dispute. The political monopoly of the Party was transformed into the personal supremacy of the Iron Dictator.

#### *Stalin and the Monolithic Party*

The consolidation of Stalin's power proceeded by slow steps. In the first phase of the struggle for the succession, while Lenin lay dying, Stalin, Zinoviev, and Kamenev joined in a triumvirate within the Politburo to prevent Trotsky from taking over the leadership. While Stalin was consolidating his hold on the Party machine from the strategic vantage point of the General Secretaryship, he gave the appearance of being yielding and conciliatory both in his relationships with his fellow triumvirs and with Trotsky. When Trotsky launched his first public attack on the triumvirate, December 5, 1923, with his open letter to the Communists of *Krasnaya Presnya* in which he called for a revival of criticism within the Party and an end to the regime of machine repression,<sup>54</sup> it was Zinoviev who demanded Trotsky's immediate arrest and Stalin who counseled caution. It was "inconceivable," Stalin said in an article in *Pravda*, to

eliminate Trotsky from the leadership of the Party.<sup>55</sup> In view of later developments, the warning Stalin addressed to his colleagues at this time has more than piquant interest. "We did not agree with Zinoviev and Kamenev," he revealed to the Fourteenth Party Congress, "because we knew that a policy of chopping off [heads] is fraught with great dangers for the Party, that the method of chopping off and blood-letting — and they did demand blood — is dangerous, infectious: today you chop off one [head], tomorrow another, the day after a third — what in the end will be left of the Party?"<sup>56</sup>

While appearing as the apostle of moderation and restraint, Stalin did not hesitate to press home the charge that Trotsky and his supporters were guilty of the crime of factionalism. In his attack on Trotsky at the Thirteenth Party Conference in January 1924 Stalin wrapped himself in the mantle of Leninism and, as the loyal pupil of Lenin, accused Trotsky and his associates of violating the Resolution on Party Unity which Lenin himself had drafted. Trotsky, he insisted, sought to place himself above the Party and its Central Committee; the factional freedom which he claimed could only lead to the destruction of the Party.<sup>57</sup> "The opposition," Stalin declared, "expresses the temper, moods, and aspirations of the nonproletarian elements in and outside the Party. The opposition, itself unconscious of it, unlooses a petty-bourgeois element. The fractional work of the opposition is water on the mill of the enemies of our Party, on the mill of those who wish to weaken and overthrow the dictatorship of the proletariat. I said that yesterday, and today I reaffirm it."<sup>58</sup> The resolution adopted by the conference called upon the Party to wage "a systematic and energetic battle" against Trotskyism as a "petty-bourgeois deviation in the Party."<sup>59</sup> Meanwhile, the secretariat took steps to remove or transfer the supporters of Trotsky from strategic Party and governmental posts; they were replaced by trusted followers of the General Secretary.

At the Thirteenth Congress, which assembled in May 1924, after the death of Lenin, Zinoviev led the assault on Trotsky and demanded that he confess his errors. Trotsky's reply mirrored the tragic dilemma which habitually disarmed the opposition when it faced a conflict between loyalty to conscience or to Party:

The Party in the last analysis is always right because the Party is the single historic instrument given to the proletariat for the solution of its fundamental problems. I have already said that in front of one's own party nothing could be easier than to say: all my criticisms, my statements, my warnings, my protests — the whole thing was a mere mistake. I, however, comrades, cannot say that, because I do not think it. I know that one must not be right against the Party. One can be right only with the Party, and through the Party, for history has created no other road for the realization of what is right.<sup>60</sup>

For the moment, Stalin was unwilling to press as far as Zinoviev had. He demanded only the cessation of oppositional activity. Indeed, his organizational report to the congress ended with a vague conciliatory gesture: "We are for friendly collaboration with the opposition . . . Whether unity will come about, I do not know, since unity in the future depends entirely on the opposition . . . The majority wishes unity . . . Whether the minority sincerely wishes it, I do not know. That depends entirely on the Comrades of the opposition."<sup>61</sup>

Unity on Stalin's terms meant the dissolution of the opposition and its complete subordination to the dominant group in the Politburo. This the comrades of the opposition were unwilling to accept. At the January 1925 plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, three categories of resolutions were offered for the consideration of those bodies. One proposed the exclusion of Trotsky from the Party; the second demanded his removal from both the Politburo and the War Commissariat; the third limited itself to requesting his departure from his military post.<sup>62</sup> On Stalin's initiative, the mildest of these variants was adopted.

With Trotsky disarmed, the rivalry which had been brewing below the surface among the triumvirs broke into the open. Stalin, now well-entrenched in the Party machine, abandoned his former colleagues and joined with the so-called right wing of the Politburo, Bukharin, Rykov, and Tomsky, to form a new majority. Trotsky stood aloof. The issue between the new Stalinist majority and Zinoviev and Kamenev was joined at the Fourteenth Congress in December 1925. It was preceded by a series of bitter preliminary skirmishes in the course of which Zinoviev maintained his hold on the Leningrad Party organization while the Stalinist Party machine was victorious everywhere else. On the eve of the congress, Stalin offered Zinoviev and Kamenev some slight concessions on condition that they abstain from attack at the congress, but the offer was unacceptable, and the Leningrad delegation entered the congress as a solid bloc opposed to Stalin's leadership.<sup>63</sup>

The position of Zinoviev and Kamenev was unenviable. While both were given a full opportunity to develop their differences with Stalin at the congress, they now found themselves in much the same position as Trotsky at the Thirteenth Congress. As the chief executioners of Trotsky at that congress, they had led the call for Party unity and the suppression of factionalism. Now, like Trotsky, they found themselves in the position of appearing to challenge the very slogans which they had earlier defended. "When there is a majority for Zinoviev," Mikoyan remarked at the Fourteenth Congress, "he is for iron discipline, for subordination. When he has no majority . . . he is against it."<sup>64</sup> Zinoviev and Kamenev pleaded in vain that they had a right to appeal to the congress as the highest tribunal in the Party to settle disputed questions. Krupskaya, the

widow of Lenin, aligned herself with the opposition and made a poignant appeal against steam-roller suppression of the voice of the minority:

For us Marxists, truth is that which corresponds to reality. Vladimir Il'ich [Lenin] said: the teachings of Marx are invincible because they are true. And our Congress should concern itself with searching for and finding the correct line. Herein lies its task. It is wrong to reassure ourselves with the fact that the majority is always right . . . The majority should not gloat in the fact that it is the majority, but should disinterestedly seek for a true decision. If it will be true . . . it will put our Party on the right path.<sup>65</sup>

For the assembled stalwarts of the Party machine who dominated the congress, the distinction was too subtle. The truth to which they were committed consisted in the directions they received from their leader Stalin. The point was dramatically brought home when Kamenev climaxed a long speech with a personal attack on Stalin and the whole theory of vesting supreme power in a *vozhd'* or leader. The congress dissolved into a noisy uproar with Stalin's supporters shouting "Stalin! Stalin!" while the Leningrad delegation shouted back, "Long live the Central Committee of our Party! . . . The Party Above All!"<sup>66</sup> With that demonstration, less than two years after Lenin's death, the Stalin cult was launched. Stalin for the moment was too shrewd to associate himself publicly with its development. In his final remarks to the congress, he modestly stated, "To lead the Party except collegially is impossible. It would be stupid to dream about it after Il'ich (applause), stupid to speak about it. Collegial work, collegial leadership, unity in the Party, unity in the organs of the Central Committee under the condition of the subordination of the minority to the majority — that is what is necessary for us now."<sup>67</sup>

Stalin's overwhelming triumph at the Fourteenth Congress was followed by a determined and successful effort to purge the Leningrad Party organization of Zinoviev's followers. With this base of power gone, Zinoviev and Kamenev had little left except their prestige and oratory to sustain them. At this low point in their fortunes, they joined forces with Trotsky in the hope of staging a recovery. The decision came too late.

Securely entrenched in the Party organization, Stalin now moved firmly and ruthlessly to destroy the opposition. In a speech delivered to the active workers of the Leningrad organization on April 13, 1926, he announced that the time had come to put an end to the idea that the Party was a "discussion club."<sup>68</sup> When the discovery was made soon afterwards that Lashevich, a close friend of Zinoviev, was using his position as Deputy Commissar of War to organize an opposition faction in the army, Lashevich was promptly dismissed from his post and expelled

from the Central Committee; Zinoviev was removed from the Politburo. The opposition, nevertheless, persisted in organizing meetings, sending speakers to address local Party cells, and seeking to mobilize mass support for the impending Party conference. These activities did not go unnoticed. In the words of Trotsky, "The apparatus counter-attacked with fury . . . The opposition was obliged to beat a retreat."<sup>69</sup>

On October 4, 1926, Trotsky and five other prominent leaders of the opposition addressed a submissive declaration to the Central Committee in which they, in effect, sued for peace. On October 11, Stalin in a speech to the Politburo stated the terms: unconditional subordination to the decisions of the Party organs, public acknowledgment that the factional work of the opposition had been mistaken and harmful to the Party, and an agreement to desist from factional battle within the Comintern. If these conditions were accepted, Stalin agreed to moderate the tone of the attack on the opposition and to recognize the right of the oppositionists to present their views at Party congresses.<sup>70</sup> The opposition bowed to the ultimatum, in word, at least. On October 16, it issued a public statement renouncing factional activities which might lead to a Party split but reiterating its criticisms of Stalin and Bukharin and indicating its intention to express its views within the framework of Party discipline. Meanwhile, in late October, Trotsky was dropped from the Politburo, Kamenev lost his position as an alternate member of the Politburo, and Zinoviev was removed from the leadership of the Comintern. All, however, remained members of the Central Committee. At the Fifteenth Party Conference, which met from October 26 to November 3, 1926, the opposition was denounced as a "Social Democratic" deviation in the Party and was warned that any effort on its part to initiate a general discussion of its platform would not be tolerated.<sup>71</sup>

The opposition refused to capitulate. After a temporary lull which lasted through the spring of 1927, oppositionist hopes and activities flared up again in response to the Comintern defeat in China, the breakdown of the Anglo-Soviet trade-union agreement, and the tension created by the British decision to suspend diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In the midst of these events, the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition issued the so-called "Platform of the Eighty-Three" in which they blamed Stalin for all the recent failures of foreign and domestic policy and charged that the Soviet Union was in the grip of a Thermidorian reaction. In the event of war, Trotsky declared, his policy would be like that of Clemenceau; he would fight to displace the present ineffective leadership with a government capable of waging the war victoriously. Meanwhile, the opposition continued its efforts to build its own apparatus, spread its literature, and organize its mass support.

At the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control

Commission which met from July 29 to August 9, 1927, the Stalinist forces were again in complete control. Stalin did not mince words. Addressing himself to the charge of "degeneration" in the Party, he pointed to the opposition as the source of the danger and ominously concluded, "That danger must be liquidated."<sup>72</sup> Again Trotsky and Zinoviev beat a retreat, promised to submit to majority discipline, and thus temporarily saved themselves from expulsion from the Central Committee.

The new truce was broken even before it was concluded. This time Stalin was in no mood to be indulgent. Rank-and-file oppositionists who had engaged in clandestine activity were arrested in large numbers and ousted from the Party. Still others were offered the alternative of recantation or expulsion, and a parade of penitents began. The opposition leaders refused to be intimidated and persevered in their course, holding secret meetings, establishing an illegal printing press, and engaging in open demonstrations in the streets. On October 23, 1927, Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Central Committee after insinuations were raised on the basis of GPU documents that the opposition was entangled with White Guardists in a military conspiracy against the regime. Trotsky struck back hard in his speech on the motion to expel him from the Central Committee. He dismissed the charge that the opposition was engaged in counterrevolution as a crude fabrication of the GPU. "The regime of party repression," he claimed,

flows inevitably from the whole policy of the leadership . . .

The immediate task that Stalin has set for himself is to split the party, to cut off the Opposition, to accustom the party to the method of physical destruction. Fascist gangs of whistlers, fist work, throwing of books and stones, the prison bars — here for a moment the Stalin régime has paused in its course. But the road is predestined . . . The goal: to cut off the Opposition and physically destroy it. Voices are already to be heard: "We will expel a thousand, and shoot a hundred, and have peace in the party."<sup>73</sup>

Events now moved to their inevitable climax. On November 7, the tenth anniversary of the revolution, Trotsky reported,

The oppositionists decided to take part in the general procession, carrying their own placards, with their slogans . . . the placards of the opposition were snatched from their hands and torn to pieces, while their bearers were mauled by specially organized units . . . A policeman, pretending to be giving a warning, shot openly at my automobile . . . A drunken official of the fire-brigade, shouting imprecations, jumped on the running-board of my automobile and smashed the glass . . .

A similar demonstration took place in Leningrad. Zinoviev and Radek, who had gone there, were laid hold of by a special detachment, and under the pretense of protection from the crowd, were shut up in one of the buildings for the duration of the demonstration.<sup>74</sup>

On November 14, one week later, Trotsky and Zinoviev were expelled from the Party. Two days later, Joffe, one of Trotsky's closest friends, committed suicide. On January 17, 1928, Trotsky started on the first leg of a long journey which was to take him first to exile in Alma Ata, then to deportation to Prinkipo, and finally to death by an assassin's hatchet in Mexico. The journey, which began under GPU direction, was to end under the same auspices.

The Fifteenth Congress, which met in December 1927, witnessed the final crushing of the opposition. Only a handful of oppositionists dared to appear on the platform. Rakovsky, Evdokimov, Muralov, and Bakaev were all shouted down and drowned out by a constant roar of uninterrupted heckling; Kamenev alone received a half-respectful hearing. In a dignified speech, reminiscent of Trotsky's statement at the Thirteenth Congress, Kamenev said,

I come to this tribune with only one aim, to find a path of reconciliation between the opposition and the Party (Voices: "A lie, you're late") . . . The battle in the Party . . . for the last two years has attained such a state of bitterness as to place before all of us a choice between two roads. One of these roads is that of a second party. That road under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat would be fatal for the revolution . . . That road is closed to us, forbidden and excluded by the whole system of our ideas, by all the teachings of Lenin on the dictatorship of the proletariat . . .

There remains, consequently, the second road . . . This road . . . means that we submit entirely and completely to the Party. We choose that road, for we are deeply convinced that a correct, Leninist policy can be victorious only inside the Party and only through it, and not outside the Party and against it. To take that road means that we submit to all the decisions of the Congress . . .

But if in addition we are to renounce our point of view, that would not be Bolshevik. This demand, comrades, for the renunciation of one's opinions has never before been posed in our Party . . . If I were to come here and declare: I renounce views that I printed two weeks ago in my theses, you would not believe me; it would be hypocrisy on my side, and such hypocrisy is unnecessary.<sup>75</sup>

The congress found the declaration unsatisfactory. The Stalinist leadership demanded more than organizational capitulation. It insisted, as Stalin made clear in his political report to the congress, on a complete repudiation of the platform which the opposition had sponsored.<sup>76</sup> On December 18, the Congress voted to expel seventy-five leading members of the Trotskyite opposition as well as twenty-three members of the Sapronov group. The next day Zinoviev, Kamenev, and twenty-one of their followers offered their unconditional surrender.

Harsh as the demands of us by the Congress may be, we are obligated to bow our will and our views to the will and views of the Party . . . the sole

supreme judge of what is useful or harmful to the victorious surge forward of the revolution . . .

We beg the Congress to return us to the Party and to give us the opportunity of participating in its practical daily work.<sup>77</sup>

Even this did not suffice. The Congress voted "to instruct the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission to accept applications from active leaders of the former opposition only on an individual basis and not to make decisions on such applications until at least six months after their submission."<sup>78</sup> Taking advantage of these provisions, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and a substantial group of their supporters managed during the following years to gain readmission into the Party. With their surrender and degradation and the exile and imprisonment of the Trotskyites who refused to capitulate, Stalin's triumph over the Left Opposition was complete.

In the development of the struggle with the Left Opposition, the Stalinist ideology of Party leadership unfolded and crystallized. In this ideology opposition had no place. The Party was indeed not a discussion club; it was an instrument of action. The Party line as proclaimed by the leadership was sacrosanct and unchallengeable. To oppose the leadership was to weaken the Party and aid the enemies of Soviet power. Opposition thus became tantamount to treason.

The Party critic of Stalin's policies faced a number of unpalatable alternatives. The safest was to keep silent. Should the critic insist on speaking out, he risked expulsion from the Party or even worse. Since an open appeal to the Party rank and file was no longer tolerated by the leadership, oppositionists were necessarily pushed in the direction of conspiratorial organization. As long as the Party apparatus remained subservient to Stalin, any effort to storm the ramparts of power from within the Party was a quixotic adventure foredoomed to defeat.

The state of siege within the Party imposed its commanding imperatives on Stalin as well as upon the oppositionists. From Stalin's point of view any opposition came to represent a potential challenge to his power which had to be stamped out. In this frame of reference, the oppositionist who recanted and was silent was merely biding his time and had to be watched. A display of independent views on policy matters was a signal of opposition in process of organization. Any adventitious gathering of the disaffected became a conspiracy in being. With each new outcropping of opposition, the margin of permissible dissent narrowed and eventually disappeared. The compulsive logic of the siege marched inexorably from the arrests and imprisonment of Trotskyites in the twenties to the extermination of the Old Bolsheviks in the Great Purge of the mid-thirties.

As always with Stalin, the design unfolded by stages. Having settled accounts with the Left Opposition, he now moved against Bukharin,

Tomsky, and Rykov on the right. Disagreements over policy toward the peasantry and the pace of industrialization set the stage for the conflict. "To each new situation," Trotsky once pointed out, "the Party adapted itself only by way of an inner crisis."<sup>79</sup> The right-wing allies whom Stalin had mobilized to destroy the left became restive as Stalin borrowed the program of the left and moved toward collectivization and intensive industrialization.

With a full awareness of the danger, Stalin moved ruthlessly and expeditiously to cut down his opponents one by one. Commanding a majority in the Politburo, he first silenced his opponents in that body by insisting that all decisions be recorded as unanimous and forbidding the opposition leaders to air their differences publicly. Speaking to leaders of the Moscow organization on October 19, 1928, he announced, "In the Politburo there are neither Right nor 'Left' deviations, nor individuals conciliatory toward these deviations. This must be said quite categorically. It is time to put a stop to the gossip spread by the enemies of the Party and by the oppositionists of all kinds to the effect that there is a Right deviation, or a conciliatory attitude toward it in the Politburo of our Central Committee."<sup>80</sup> The same assurance was repeated, with no evidence of any embarrassment, in a speech before a plenum of the Central Committee a month later, when news of the conflict was already common knowledge among all high-ranking leaders of the Party.<sup>81</sup>

Events now unwound toward a familiar denouement. In a speech before a joint session of the Politburo and the presidium of the Central Control Commission at the end of January 1929, Stalin announced the "discovery" of a factional right-wing group led by Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov. Bukharin, he pointed out, had engaged in negotiations with Kamenev to establish a bloc with the former Left Opposition. Bukharin's article, "Notes of an Economist," was a veiled attack on the Politburo line. Stalin warned that factionalism would not be tolerated.<sup>82</sup> At the April plenum of the Central Committee and the Control Commission, Stalin launched a full-scale offensive against Bukharin and his colleagues. He revealed that Bukharin had rejected his "compromise" offer of February 7, 1929, by which Bukharin would be allowed to remain at his post in exchange for a complete repudiation of his views.<sup>83</sup> He continued:

Bukharin spoke here of the "civil execution" of three members of the Politburo, who in his words, "were being picked to pieces" by the organizations of our Party. He said that the Party had subjected three members of the Politburo . . . to "civil execution" by criticizing their errors in the press and at meetings, while they, the three . . . were "compelled" to keep silent.

All this is nonsense, comrades. These are the false words of a Communist gone liberal who is trying to weaken the Party in its fight against the Right deviation. According to Bukharin, even though he and his friends have become entangled in Right deviationist mistakes, the Party has no right to expose these

mistakes, the Party must stop fighting the Right deviation and wait until it will please Bukharin and his friends to abandon their mistakes.

Is not Bukharin asking too much of us? Is he not under the impression that the Party exists for him and not he for the Party? Who is compelling him to keep silent, to remain in a state of inaction when the whole Party is mobilized against the Right deviation and is conducting determined attacks against difficulties? Why should not he, Bukharin, and his close friends come forward now and engage in a determined fight against the Right deviation and the conciliationist tendency? Can anyone doubt that the Party would welcome Bukharin and his close friends if they decided to take this, after all not so difficult, step? Why do they not decide to take this step, which, after all is their duty? Is it not because they place the interests of their group above the interests of the Party and its general line?<sup>84</sup>

Stalin then pronounced the verdict of the plenum: to condemn the views of Bukharin and his group and to remove Bukharin and Tomsky from their official posts with a warning that they would be expelled from the Politburo in the event of any future insubordination. Measures would also be taken, Stalin promised, to prevent any member or candidate member of the Politburo or any Party journals from giving expression to any views departing from the Party line.<sup>85</sup> On April 23, 1929, Bukharin was removed from the leadership of the Comintern. On June 2, Tomsky lost his position as head of the trade unions. On November 17, the plenum of the Central Committee approved the expulsion of Bukharin from the Politburo. On November 25, the Right Opposition capitulated. *Pravda* on the next day carried the following declaration signed by Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov:

In the course of the last year and a half there were disagreements between us and the majority of the Central Committee on a number of political and tactical questions. We stated our views in a series of documents and submissions at the plenums and other meetings of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission.

We consider it our duty to say that in this dispute the Party and its Central Committee were right. Our views, developed in well-known documents, showed themselves to be mistaken. Recognizing our mistakes, we on our side will apply all our strength, together with the whole Party, to conduct a determined battle against all deviations from the general line of the Party and, above all, against the right deviation and conciliation with it, in order to overcome all difficulties and to guarantee the most complete and speedy triumph of socialist construction.<sup>86</sup>

Even this self-abasement did not suffice. At the Sixteenth Party Congress (June 26 to July 13, 1930), Tomsky was dropped from the Politburo. Toward the end of December, Rykov was also removed from that body, as well as from his position as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars.<sup>87</sup> The rout of the Right Opposition was complete. Addressing the Seventeenth Congress in January 1934, Stalin could boast:

The present Congress is taking place under the flag of the complete victory of Leninism; under the flag of the liquidation of the remnants of the anti-Leninist groups.

The anti-Leninist Trotskyite group has been defeated and scattered. Its organizers are now to be found in the backyards of the bourgeois parties abroad.

The anti-Leninist group of the Right deviationists has been defeated and scattered. Its organizers have long since renounced their views and are now trying in various ways to expiate the sins they committed against the Party.

The national deviationist groups have been defeated and scattered. Their organizers have either completely merged with the interventionist émigrés, or else recanted . . .

It must be admitted that the Party today is united as it has never been before.<sup>88</sup>

The delegates at the congress vied with each other in proclaiming their fealty to Stalin. Not a single note of jarring criticism disturbed the monolithic serenity of the gathering.

On December 1, 1934, a young Communist called Nikolayev assassinated Sergei Kirov, member of the Politburo, head of the Leningrad Party organization, and one of Stalin's most important henchmen. The circumstances surrounding the Kirov assassination remain obscure.\* In the official version released at the time, the assassin was alleged to be a member of an "underground counter-revolutionary terrorist group . . . consisting of former members of the Zinoviev opposition."<sup>89</sup> The shot fired by Nikolayev signaled the inauguration of an unparalleled campaign of repression and vengeance against former oppositionists.

The saturnalia of blood and violence within the Party over the next four years claimed victims in the hundreds of thousands. The generation of Old Bolsheviks was virtually decimated. Tomsky committed suicide. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, and most of the leaders of the former left and right oppositions were shot. Marshal Tukhachevsky, the

\* In his secret speech of February 25, 1956, at the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev declared, "It must be asserted that to this day the circumstances surrounding Kirov's murder hide many things which are inexplicable and mysterious and demand a most careful examination. There are reasons for the suspicion that the killer of Kirov, Nikolayev, was assisted by someone from among the people whose duty it was to protect the person of Kirov. A month and a half before the killing, Nikolayev was arrested on the grounds of suspicious behavior, but he was released and not even searched. It is an unusually suspicious circumstance that when the Chekist assigned to protect Kirov was being brought for an interrogation, on December 2, 1954, he was killed in a car 'accident' in which no other occupants of the car were harmed. After the murder of Kirov, top functionaries of the Leningrad NKVD were given very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. We can assume that they were shot in order to cover the traces of the organizers of Kirov's killing." In his speech of October 27, 1961, at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, Khrushchev presented a dramatic elaboration of this tale, with some emendation of the "facts." This time Khrushchev asserted "that Kirov's killer had been apprehended twice before by the Cheka near the Smolny and that weapons had been found on him. But he was released both times on somebody's instruction." The innuendo that Stalin might have been responsible for the assassination was probably not lost on Khrushchev's audience.

chief of staff, and other leading Red Army generals shared their fate. The ravages of the purge extended through the entire Party and governmental apparatus; the list of the eliminated was a *Who's Who* of Soviet celebrities.<sup>90</sup> The macabre spectacle had to be justified, and a series of show trials were staged in order to demonstrate, in the words of the official Party history,

that the Trotsky-Bukharin fiends, in obedience to the wishes of their masters — the espionage services of foreign states — had set out to destroy the Party and the Soviet state, to undermine the defensive power of the country, to assist foreign military intervention, to prepare the way for the defeat of the Red Army, to bring about the dismemberment of the U.S.S.R., to hand over the Soviet Maritime Region to the Japanese, Soviet Byelorussia to the Poles, and the Soviet Ukraine to the Germans, to destroy the gains of the workers and collective farmers, and to restore capitalist slavery in the U.S.S.R.<sup>91</sup>

Implausible as the accusations were, they were trumpeted through the length and breadth of the Soviet Union. To the Soviet citizen, whether inside or outside the Party, they were clear warning that any form of opposition to Stalin's policies could now be construed as treason. The rank-and-file Party cadres and the highest Party officials were equally suspect and equally vulnerable. "The foul murder of Comrade Kirov," Stalin declared, "was the first serious warning showing that the enemies of the people will practice duplicity and, in doing so, will disguise themselves as Bolsheviks, as Party members, so as to worm their way into our confidence and open a path for themselves into our organizations."<sup>92</sup> "Is it not clear," he asked, "that as long as capitalist encirclement exists there will be wreckers, spies, diversionists and murderers in our country, sent behind our lines by the agents of foreign states?"<sup>93</sup> "An indispensable quality of every Bolshevik in the present conditions," he went on to point out, "must be the ability to recognize the enemy of the Party no matter how well he be masked."<sup>94</sup>

Stalin's call for "the conversion of the Party into an impregnable fortress into which not a single double-dealer could penetrate"<sup>95</sup> ignited a fire of denunciations which threatened to consume the Party in the blaze of its own suspicion. When a halt was finally called to the process of self-destruction in 1938, it was revealed that thousands of innocents had been sacrificed along with the allegedly guilty. The abuses in turn were attributed to enemies of the people who had "wormed their way" into local Party organizations;<sup>96</sup> thus the legend of Stalin's infallibility was preserved. The eerie quiet of the graveyard and the prison descended on the Party. The Eighteenth Party Congress, which took place in 1939, recorded not a single dissenting vote.

With the consolidation of Stalin's power in the Party, the operative

theory of the role of Party leadership underwent profound changes. While lip service continued to be given the doctrine of democratic centralism, with its provision for "the election of all leading Party bodies from the highest to the lowest," practice diverged so far from theory as to make the provision meaningless. The characteristic mode of selecting Party officials became designation from above rather than election from below. Even where elections continued to be held, they represented procedures for mobilizing and recording assent rather than forums of free choice. The Party was transformed into a disciplined military phalanx. Opposition was mutiny. The function of the command was to issue orders; the duty of the Party functionary was to carry them out.

In Lenin's day, Party leadership was still visualized as collegial. Lenin, to be sure, was recognized as *primus inter pares* within the Politburo, but his authority derived from his stature rather than his position in the Bolshevik hierarchy. Though the climate of decision was one of tightening discipline, discussion and debate were still active and vigorous in the leading Party organs, and the tradition of collective consultation and leadership was maintained. Under Stalin, the fiction of collegiality continued to be affirmed, even after the elimination of his competitors for the succession robbed it of any substantive content. In contrast with the Leninist period, however, a new symbolism was fostered and developed by which the leadership role of the impersonal Party and its Central Committee became personalized and embodied in the stern figure of the all-wise, godlike Stalin.

The process began with the virtual deification of Lenin after his death. The initiation of a Leninist hagiolatry prepared the way for the admission of Stalin into the company of Communist saints. The modest niche which Stalin first carved out for himself was that of the faithful pupil of Lenin, the conservator of the Leninist heritage. The shouts of "Hail Stalin!" with which his faithful supporters greeted his triumph over Zinoviev and Kamenev at the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925 marked the first stage of the ascension to the pedestal hitherto reserved for Lenin alone. As Stalin emerged undisputed master of the Party, the names Lenin and Stalin became interlocked and hyphenated. In the new mythology, they made the revolution together; together they laid the foundations of the Soviet state. The Party was now referred to as a Lenin-Stalinist Party. Stalin became "the Lenin of today." His fiftieth birthday in 1929, the year which witnessed the expulsion of Trotsky from the Soviet Union and the crushing of the Right Opposition, was the occasion for a national celebration. Party propagandists vied with one another in tributes to his greatness. Poster portraits, statues, and busts of Stalin appeared everywhere. The cult of Stalinism was given a powerful impetus, and it gathered increasing momentum during the next decades.

As an accompaniment of the overowering ascendancy of Stalin, the figure of the infallible dictator emerged as the operative theory of Bolshevik leadership. His colleagues in the Politburo functioned as administrative henchmen and assistants on a high level; the Central Committee went into a shadowy eclipse; Party congresses became rallies of the faithful; and the Party apparatus served as the institutionalized projection of his will. Where Lenin had struggled, not always successfully, to hold the disparate elements in the Party together, for Stalin the suppression of disagreement and the crushing of opposition became the key to survival. The Party ceased to be a creative association which shaped policy and was transformed instead into a bureaucratic extension of the personality and dynamism of the dictator, a privileged chorus of sycophants who sang his praises and enforced his will.

*The Party in the Post-Stalin Era*

The death of Stalin left the further development of the theory and practice of Party dictatorship to be spelled out anew. During the first week of the new regime, there were indications that Malenkov was thrusting himself forward as Stalin's successor. He remained senior Party secretary and assumed the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers. *Pravda* gave him special prominence. He was pictured addressing the Nineteenth Party Congress in the fall of 1952 with Stalin looking on benevolently in the background. He was moved to the center of the stage with Stalin and Mao in a doctored photograph from which all other Presidium figures were excluded. But these none too subtle efforts to imply that Malenkov was the heir-apparent soon ceased, and on March 21, 1953, *Pravda* carried an announcement that a plenary session of the Central Committee had voted on March 14 "to grant the request . . . of Malenkov to be released from the duties of Secretary of the Party Central Committee." The maneuvers of the early days suggested a determined and successful effort to circumscribe Malenkov's powers and to prevent him from donning Stalin's mantle. At the same time, the delicate problems attendant on the transition and the need to consolidate the authority of the new regime compelled the new rulers to submerge their differences in the interest of presenting a united front to the nation and the world. In these circumstances, collective leadership emerged as a suitable formula to describe the configuration of relationships at the Party summit.

The legacy which Stalin bequeathed to his successors, however, did not easily adapt itself to collective rule. In the absence of the Supreme Despot, power was precariously apportioned and distributed with no point of coordination short of the Presidium itself. Malenkov, as chairman of the Council of Ministers, rested his authority on command of the administrative apparatus and on such informal connections as he retained

in the Party organization itself. Beria, as head of the MVD (Ministry of Internal Affairs), had the formidable police weapon in his hands. Molotov, as Foreign Minister and Old Bolshevik, enjoyed the prestige of an elder statesman but lacked an organizational power base. Khrushchev, who succeeded Malenkov as senior Party secretary, identified his authority with that of the Party functionaries, but in the first months of the new regime he remained largely in the background. Bulganin as Defense Minister supervised the armed forces, but the degree of personal control which he exercised over them appeared far less clear. With Stalin gone, the interrelations of these plural power centers were, to say the least, ambiguous. Since Party, police, and administrative controls overlapped and duplicated each other, it was difficult to envisage how a clash of wills and interests could be avoided.

With power dispersed in the ruling group and ambitions unleashed, a complete harmony of outlook could hardly be anticipated. In a political system where opposition is outlawed, policy conflicts ultimately lead to the suppression or elimination of one or another of the antagonistic forces. This deeply rooted Party practice augured ill for the stability of collective leadership.

The first challenge came from Beria. The very existence of a powerful secret police controlled by one member of the oligarchy posed a constant threat to his colleagues, and their fears were doubtless reinforced by the uses to which the secret police had been put in past Party struggles. Signs of activity on Beria's part were soon apparent. On April 3, 1953, Beria's MVD announced that the Kremlin "doctors' plot" had been a hoax, and that those responsible would be disciplined and punished.<sup>97</sup> In mid-April came the dramatic announcement of a thoroughgoing purge of the Georgian Party and governmental organization and the reinstatement of a number of Beria's henchmen who had been the victims of an earlier purge. Beria's hand in the purge was frankly acknowledged in a speech to the Georgian Supreme Soviet by V. M. Bakhradze, the new chairman of the Georgian Council of Ministers. In this case, as in the Kremlin doctors' plot, the reinstated officials were declared to have been the victims of "a provocation 'case,' falsified from beginning to end, concerning a nonexistent nationalism . . ."<sup>98</sup>

The evidence at hand makes it impossible to plot Beria's machinations in detail. The remark attributed to Khrushchev by the French Socialist senator, Pierre Commin, that Beria "was clearly preparing a conspiracy against the Presidium" has the ring of authenticity, but it is still unclear whether the countermeasures which his enemies invoked represented a response to imminent peril or were prophylactic in character.<sup>99</sup> In any case, on July 10, 1953, the Soviet press announced that Beria had been removed from his governmental and Party posts and expelled from the Party as

an enemy of the people. According to *Pravda*, "Beria's evil scheming to seize power began with trying to set the Ministry of Internal Affairs above the Party and government and to employ the agencies of the MVD, both in the center and locally, against the Party and its leadership, against the government of the USSR . . ."<sup>100</sup> Beria was also accused of undermining the collective farms and creating "difficulties in the country's food supply," of seeking "to sow friction among the peoples of the USSR and to activize bourgeois national elements in the Union Republics," of "illegality and highhandedness," and of having long been "an agent of international imperialism" who sought to destroy the Communist Party and restore capitalism.

In this curious melange of accusations, the one which carried conviction was that Beria had sought to utilize his base in the MVD to strike out for a position of leadership. The arrest of Beria was followed by a purge of his supporters in Georgia and by the removal of his old associate, M. D. Bagirov, from the posts of chairman of the Azerbaijan Republic Council of Ministers and Party First Secretary.<sup>101</sup> Party organizations were instructed to tighten control over the MVD at all levels, and the elimination of Beria's entourage in the MVD extended down to the regional and district organizations. The final chapter of the Beria story unfolded on December 24, 1953, when the Soviet press announced that Beria and six associates had been executed by a firing squad after a secret trial.\*

\* Accompanying Beria to his doom were V. N. Merkulov, former USSR Minister of State Security and later Minister of State Control; V. G. Dekanozov, Georgian Minister of Internal Affairs; S. A. Coglidze, former head of the Georgian MVD and one-time director of the network of forced-labor camps in the Soviet Far East; B. Z. Kobulov, former USSR Deputy Minister of State Security and subsequently one of Beria's deputies in the MVD; P. Y. Meshik, head of the MVD in the Ukraine; and L. E. Vlodzimirsky, former head of the Investigation Department "for particularly important matters" in the MVD (*Pravda*, December 24, 1953).

Four grim postscripts remained to be added. In July 1954 the news was released that Ryumin, the responsible investigator in the original doctors' plot, had been shot, an action which may well have been inspired by the desire to remove an inconvenient witness who also offered an obvious scapegoat to symbolize the new regime's repudiation of past MVD brutality (*Pravda*, July 23, 1954). On December 24, 1954, came the announcement that V. S. Abakumov, former Minister of State Security, had been tried and executed for carrying out "enemy assignments for Beria against the Communist Party and the Soviet government." At the same time, three of his associates in the ministry were shot while two others were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment in corrective labor camps. The indictment charged Abakumov and his associates with fabricating the so-called "Leningrad case" (1949), in which "many Party and state officials were arrested without grounds and falsely accused of very grave state crimes." The Abakumov affair, timed exactly a year after the announcement of the shooting of Beria, served as a reminder that the road to supreme power in the Soviet system lay elsewhere than through exclusive reliance on control of the police apparatus (*Pravda*, December 24, 1954). On November 22, 1955, Radio Tbilisi revealed that A. N. Rapava and N. M. Rukhadze, both former police chiefs of the Georgian republic, and four of their associates had been executed, while two others were sen-

The liquidation of Beria eliminated one of the chief contenders for supremacy, but it left a field of battle in which other contestants could still maneuver while proclaiming their continued loyalty to the principle of collective leadership. In the aftermath of the Beria purge, Malenkov seemed to emerge with renewed prestige. The Soviet press reported that it was Malenkov who spoke for the Presidium at the plenary session of the Central Committee at which Beria was condemned.<sup>102</sup> It was Malenkov again who claimed the spotlight at the August 1953 session of the Supreme Soviet with a wide-ranging speech which covered the gamut of domestic and foreign affairs. But the events of the next months were to show that Malenkov's title to leadership had a fatal flaw. The Central Committee decision of March 14, 1953, which had compelled him to abandon his Party secretaryship, contained the seeds of his undoing. In the first struggle for the succession after Lenin's incapacitating illness, Stalin had demonstrated that control of the Party apparatus was crucial to victory. The lesson was now to be repeated.

The departure of Malenkov from the secretariat left Khrushchev as the senior Party secretary. Beginning in September 1953 his star began to rise. On September 13 *Pravda* revealed that he had been elected First Secretary of the Central Committee. His September 3 report to the Central Committee on agricultural policy was widely reprinted and inaugurated a series of sweeping agricultural reforms. The numerous moves which he initiated, beginning in the fall of 1953, to install his henchmen in leading Party posts in Moscow, Leningrad, and other key areas could hardly fail to arouse concern among his colleagues in the Presidium; one can only surmise that at this juncture, some of them, at least, saw an even greater danger in the ambitions and programs of Malenkov.

The search for an explanation of the alignments of the early post-Stalinist period must take account of issues as well as moves on the chessboard of power. Important policy differences divided the ruling group, and, although they were only faintly illuminated in Soviet official publications, they were visible enough so that patterns could be discerned. During this period Malenkov and Khrushchev emerged as the major antagonists. In the area of foreign affairs, Malenkov saw nuclear war as spelling "the destruction of world civilization" and called for a detente with the West and improvement in relations with the United States through a process of patient negotiation.<sup>103</sup> Khrushchev took a harder

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tenced to long terms of imprisonment. All were accused of having aided Beria in his crimes. In May 1956, M. D. Bagirov, one of Beria's closest collaborators, as well as three of his associates, were shot, and two others were sentenced to twenty-five years' imprisonment. The charges against them again involved collaboration with Beria and responsibility for the virtual decimation of the Old Guard leadership of the Azerbaijan Party (*Bakinski Rabochy*, May 27, 1956).

line. In a fiery speech before the Tenth Congress of the Czech Communist Party on June 12, 1954, he not only boasted of Soviet leadership in developing the hydrogen bomb but asserted that a nuclear war would mean the end of capitalism, rather than of world civilization.<sup>104</sup> He accused reactionary capitalist circles of seeking a way out of their difficulties "by the preparation of a new war" and stressed the aggressive intentions of the imperialist camp. Similar views were expressed in a series of speeches delivered by Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Bulganin.

Malenkov's concern with the lessening of international tensions found its reflection on the domestic scene in his identification with the consumer-goods program. Here again it was Khrushchev who took the hard line. In calling for a reassertion of the priority of heavy industry and armaments, he drew on the support of the armed forces, as well as on those members of the Presidium who shared his world outlook. The alignment on the virgin-lands program was different. Here it was Khrushchev who was the innovator, while, if later testimony is to be credited, Molotov opposed it on the ground that it would not "justify the investment" and was joined by Malenkov and Kaganovich in conservative opposition.<sup>105</sup> On the other hand, Khrushchev commanded the support of Bulganin, Pervukhin, and Saburov, who were later to oppose him on other issues.

These cross currents suggest the danger of viewing the struggle for the succession as merely a series of maneuvers for power and place. Coalitions were cemented by principle as well as by calculations of advantage. The opposition to the Malenkov program provided a powerful rallying point which reinforced the position of Khrushchev. The erosion of Malenkov's strength began to be clearly evident by the spring of 1954. In an address to the Supreme Soviet on April 26, 1954, delivered before Khrushchev's Czech speech, he bowed to the more orthodox views of his opponents and declared that a third world war "would inevitably lead to the collapse of the capitalist social system."<sup>106</sup>

Meanwhile, the battle over heavy industry versus light industry continued to be fought behind the scenes. The conflict rose to full visibility with the appearance of a curious pair of editorials on December 21, 1954. *Izvestiya*, the presumed organ of Malenkov, called for the increased production of consumer goods; *Pravda*, the organ of Khrushchev, summoned "the Soviet people to direct their main attention to fulfilling plans for the further growth of heavy industry." The issue between Khrushchev and Malenkov came to a head at the meeting of the Central Committee in late January 1955. The published version of Khrushchev's speech of January 25, 1955, named no names, but its intent was unmistakable. "In connection with the measures lately taken for increasing output of consumer goods," said Khrushchev, "some comrades have confused the

question of the pace of development of heavy and light industry in our country . . . These pseudo-theoreticians try to claim that at some stage of socialist construction the development of heavy industry ceases to be the main task and that light industry can and should overtake all other branches of industry. This is profoundly incorrect reasoning, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism — nothing but slander of our Party. This is a belching of the rightist deviation, a regurgitation of views hostile to Leninism, views which Rykov, Bukharin, and their ilk once preached.”<sup>107</sup>

The denouement was not long in coming. On February 8, 1955, Malenkov “resigned” as chairman of the Council of Ministers. The letter which was read for him acknowledged his administrative “inexperience” and his past “guilt and responsibility for the unsatisfactory state of affairs in agriculture” and praised the new agricultural reforms which, he declared, were “based upon the only correct foundation — the further all-around development of heavy industry — and only the realization of this program will provide the necessary conditions for a real increase in the production of all necessary consumer goods.”<sup>108</sup> To the initiated, this devious Aesopian language suggested a capitulation which closed the debate.

The resignation of Malenkov opened the way to a reconstruction of the top leadership. Bulganin, on Khrushchev’s nomination, replaced Malenkov as chairman of the Council of Ministers and at the same time yielded his post as Minister of Defense to Marshal Zhukov. Khrushchev remained First Secretary. Five Presidium members, Molotov, Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Saburov, and Pervukhin, served as first deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. Malenkov retained his Presidium post, but was demoted to the position of Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Power Stations. Voroshilov, the senior member of the Presidium group, continued to discharge the protocol functions of head of state. At the July 1955 session of the Central Committee, two new Presidium members were elected, A. I. Kirichenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Party, and M. A. Suslov, a Central Committee secretary with primary responsibility in the ideological realm.<sup>109</sup>

At this same session of the Central Committee, Molotov was marked down as the next candidate for demotion and disgrace. As was subsequently revealed, the chief subject of discussion at this meeting — which came soon after the state visit of Khrushchev and Bulganin to Belgrade — was the question of policy toward Tito.<sup>110</sup> Khrushchev favored reconciliation and an effort to recapture Tito for the Soviet cause; Molotov opposed such concessions as unnecessary and dangerous to bloc unity. But Molotov’s views found little support in the Central Committee and, from that point on, his influence sharply declined. The Party’s theoretical journal, *Kommunist*, in its issue of September 1955, administered an added blow to his prestige as a theorist and Old Bolshevik

when it published a strange letter of recantation signed by him. He acknowledged that in a speech delivered some seven months earlier he had committed a major ideological error in describing the Soviet Union as having constructed only "the foundations of a socialist society," instead of adhering to the orthodox formula that the Soviet Union had achieved socialism and was now building Communism.

Kaganovich was undergoing a similar process of downgrading. In March 1955 his authority in the industrial sphere was diluted when Mikoyan, Pervukhin, and Saburov joined him as first deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. In May 1955 he was designated chairman of the State Committee on Labor and Wages. Despite these humiliations, which were shared by Molotov and Malenkov, all three remained members of the Party Presidium, where they nursed their grievances and hopes of revenge.

The maneuverings which attended the Twentieth Party Congress marked a further stage in the development of the intra-Presidium struggle. The attack on Stalin and the cult of personality, which was first launched by Mikoyan and then documented in detail in Khrushchev's secret speech at the close of the congress, was, according to Khrushchev, strongly opposed by Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov.<sup>111</sup> The indictment, to be sure, was not a total one. Stalin's services during the revolution and civil war, his struggles against the Trotskyites, Bukharinists, and bourgeois nationalists, and his contributions to industrialization and collectivization received some recognition. The brunt of the attack was centered on developments after the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, when the cult of Stalin worship gathered full momentum and the collective character of the Party leadership was allegedly dissolved.

The bill of particulars against Stalin included the murder of thousands of honest, innocent Communists during the Great Purge; the weakening of the Red Army as the result of the liquidation of Tukhachevsky and other high-ranking officers on the basis of slanderous and unjustified charges; Stalin's failure to take necessary defensive measures against the Nazi attack; his inept interference with the Red Army high command during the war; his responsibility for the mass deportation of nationality groups whose loyalties aroused his suspicion; his provocation in the case of Yugoslavia; his fabrication of the so-called Leningrad Case in which N. A. Voznesensky, A. A. Kuznetsov, and other high Party officials lost their lives; and his final responsibility for the completely falsified doctors' plot.<sup>112</sup> The latter-day Stalin was portrayed as a morbidly suspicious paranoiac who suffered from a persecution phobia, saw enemies and spies in his closest associates, and demanded servility and obsequiousness from all who served him.

The motives which inspired Khrushchev to make these sensational disclosures are still subject to debate. His own subsequent explanation stressed his anxiety to "preclude the possibility of such phenomena in the future" and his desire to restore Leninist "norms" in the Party.<sup>113</sup> Yet if we assume, as in the light of later events we must, that Khrushchev was determined to consolidate his own authority, his secret speech can also be read as an effort to discredit his major opponents in the Presidium. In the process of attacking Stalin, he made a studied effort to dissociate himself from responsibility for Stalin's excesses. Other senior members of the Presidium, he pointed out, worked much more closely with Stalin, and he especially singled out Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich as tarred with the brush of their master's misdeeds. He attempted somewhat lamely to demonstrate that he and Bulganin had opposed Stalin's outrages. Even though the explanations were labored, their intent was clear. Khrushchev was seeking to demonstrate that the Party had nothing to fear from him and that, indeed, it had a great deal to fear from those who had been more intimately involved in Stalin's crimes.

Khrushchev also moved to use his powers as First Secretary to extend his influence in the leading organs of the Party. More than a third of the Central Committee members — 53 out of 133 — and more than half of the candidate members of the Central Committee — 76 out of 122 — were newly elected at the Twentieth Party Congress, and, in numerous instances, their elevation in the Party apparatus was directly traceable to earlier associations with Khrushchev. Five additions were made to the alternate membership list of the Presidium: Zhukov; Brezhnev, first secretary of the Kazakhstan Party organization; Mukhitdinov, the Uzbek first secretary; Furtseva, first secretary of the Moscow city organization; and Shepilov, *Pravda* editor. All of them appeared to owe their appointments to Khrushchev, although Shepilov was later to defect to the opposition and Zhukov was stripped of his offices when he loomed as a potential rival to Khrushchev. Khrushchev strengthened his hold over the Central Committee Party secretariat through the appointments of Brezhnev, Furtseva, and Shepilov as Party secretaries. He also assumed personal command of the Russian Party organization. A special Russian Republic Bureau of the Central Committee was established with Khrushchev as chairman; its membership was dominated by Khrushchev's entourage.

The Twentieth Party Congress was followed by a series of blows directed at the Stalinist Old Guard. On June 2, 1956, Shepilov replaced Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Molotov was moved to the lesser post of Minister of State Control. On June 9, Kaganovich was "relieved" of his chairmanship of the State Committee on Labor and Wage Questions, and his designation in September as Minister of the

Construction Materials Industry relegated him from a policy-making post to one of narrower administration. By mid-1936 Khrushchev loomed as the most powerful figure in the Presidium, with no competitor on the horizon to offer a serious challenge.

But appearances were deceptive. The shock of Khrushchev's revelations at the Twentieth Party Congress released a series of wholly unintended consequences. The Hungarian uprising in October and the unrest in Poland which resulted in the return of Gomulka to power appeared for a time to threaten the Soviet satellite system with disintegration. All this gave powerful ammunition to Khrushchev's Presidium opponents who could now argue that Khrushchev's pronouncements at the Twentieth Congress had placed the entire Soviet bloc in jeopardy.

During this period, evidence accumulated that Khrushchev was in trouble. The delegation which was hastily dispatched to Warsaw on October 19, 1956, to discuss "topical problems" with the Polish Politburo, included Molotov and Kaganovich, as well as Khrushchev and Mikoyan — a juxtaposition which seemed to point to a new balance of forces in the Presidium. The break with Tito which followed the Hungarian events served to discredit Khrushchev's policy of reconciliation with Yugoslavia, to which Molotov had been bitterly opposed. Increasing difficulties on the industrial front, which were complicated by the need to buttress the shaky satellite economies, contributed to undermine Khrushchev's leadership. Significantly, at the Central Committee session in December 1956 which lowered the industrial targets and reorganized the planning machinery, Khrushchev did not even make an address. The main speeches were given by Bulganin, Saburov, and Baibakov. At this session, the Central Committee greatly broadened the powers of the State Economic Commission, which was charged with current planning. Pervukhin was designated chairman of the commission and became something of an "overlord of overlords," exercising primary responsibility for the operation of the national economy. The effect of this move was to strengthen the authority of elements in the Presidium identified with the state, rather than with the Party machine. The members of the Presidium who had an interest in restraining Khrushchev rallied behind the reorganization. The scheme was approved by the Supreme Soviet on February 12, 1957.

On the very next day Khrushchev launched a counterattack. Appearing before a specially summoned session of the Central Committee, he offered a plan which was designed to emasculate the Economic Commission, to strengthen the role of Gosplan as the supreme planning authority, to abolish a number of central ministries, and to devolve many of their operational responsibilities on new regional economic councils (*sovmarkhozy*). Khrushchev's scheme was clearly calculated to weaken the power of his ministerial competitors, to enlist support from local and

regional managerial personnel, and to leave the field free for the Party apparatus to become the primary integrating and centralizing force. This served to bring matters to a head.

Why was Khrushchev prepared to throw down the gage to his opponents in February when he was not willing to do so in December? The answer must be speculative, but certain considerations appear to be relevant. By February, far more than in December, the unrest in the satellite empire appeared to be under control and less of a threatening factor. The bountiful harvest in the virgin lands provided a vindication of Khrushchev's agricultural program. Perhaps most important of all, Khrushchev's readiness to act indicated that he counted on the program which he had devised to rally the Party apparatus to his banner.

From this point on, Khrushchev moved swiftly to consolidate his position. The public discussion of what were referred to as "Comrade Khrushchev's theses" and the ensuing debate in the Supreme Soviet were organized to create the impression that they enjoyed overwhelming support, though an occasional hint came through of the opposition they were encountering in the industrial ministries. On May 10, 1957, the Supreme Soviet approved Khrushchev's proposals with some slight modifications. The State Economic Commission and a large number of central ministries were abolished; the powers of Gosplan were strengthened; and the main burden of industrial administration was shifted to the newly established network of regional economic councils. By a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet a week earlier, I. I. Kuzmin, one of Khrushchev's subordinates in the Central Committee apparatus, had already been installed as Gosplan chairman and first vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

Meanwhile, Khrushchev's opponents in the Presidium were also gathering their forces. They remained silent through the public discussion and during the Supreme Soviet session which enacted the new law. But, as Bulganin later confessed, they met regularly in his office to coordinate their strategy, and by June 1957 they were ready to act.<sup>114</sup> Khrushchev found himself in a minority in the Presidium, his support limited to Mikoyan, Suslov, and Kirichenko. Malenkov, Molotov, and Kaganovich were joined in opposition by Bulganin, Voroshilov, Pervukhin, and Saburov, making a total of seven out of eleven full members. They also enlisted the support of Shepilov, an alternate member. The conspirators had their own history of past disagreements, but they found common ground in their determination to curb Khrushchev's bid for supremacy. Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov had all suffered humiliation at the hands of Khrushchev, and the grievances harbored must have spurred thoughts of revenge. The participation of Pervukhin and Saburov in the conspiracy was directly traceable to their opposition to Khrushchev.

shchev's plan for industrial reorganization and the diminution of their role which its adoption involved.<sup>115</sup> The motives of Bulganin and Shepilov were more obscure, since both had been beneficiaries of Khrushchev's rise to power, but it is not unlikely that they thought they were abandoning a sinking ship.

The effort of the group to unseat Khrushchev by confronting him with a hostile majority in the Presidium misfired. During the crucial phase of the conflict, the Presidium was in almost continuous session from June 18 to June 21. Khrushchev's opponents called for his resignation from the first secretaryship and pressed for an immediate public announcement of changes in the leadership in order to confront the Central Committee with a fait accompli. Khrushchev refused and demanded that a meeting of the Central Committee be immediately convened to resolve the issue. As he later revealed to the Twenty-Second Party Congress, "I told them that . . . it was the plenum of the Central Committee that had elected me, and it should therefore be the plenum that made the decision."<sup>116</sup>

Khrushchev initiated action to bring the weight of the Central Committee into the scale. Except for Shepilov, his support among the alternate members of the Presidium remained firm. As word circulated of the Presidium crisis, Khrushchev's followers in the Central Committee who were then in Moscow rallied to his support and sought to intercede in the Presidium discussions. According to one of them, N. G. Ignatov, "instructions were given not to admit the members of the Central Committee to the Kremlin, and many of them had to use literally illegal means in making their way to where the Central Committee's Presidium was in session . . ."<sup>117</sup> A debate ensued in the Presidium as to whether they should be received. The majority sought to make Voroshilov or Bulganin the point of contact in the hope of overawing the unwelcome group and warding off Central Committee intervention. Khrushchev would not agree, and finally Khrushchev and his ally Mikoyan, as well as Voroshilov and Bulganin, were authorized to receive the assembled Central Committee members. What transpired in these discussions is not a matter of record, except that the representatives filed the following statement:

We, members of the Central Committee, have learned that the Central Committee Presidium is in continuous session. We are also aware that you are discussing the question of the leadership of the Central Committee and of the Secretariat. Matters of such importance for our whole Party cannot be concealed from the members of the plenum of the Central Committee. In view of this, we members of the Central Committee urgently request that a plenary session of the Central Committee be called and this matter submitted to it for discussion. We, as members of the Central Committee, may not stand aloof from the question of our Party's leadership.<sup>118</sup>

By this time, no doubt inspired by Khrushchev and allegedly with the aid of military air transport supplied by Defense Minister Zhukov, members of the Central Committee were descending on Moscow from the provinces in large numbers. The Presidium majority was left with no alternative except to accede to the demand for a meeting. The plenary session was dominated by Khrushchev's loyal legions. Of the 309 voting and nonvoting members of the Central Committee and Central Inspection Commission who participated in the meeting, 215 requested the floor to speak on Khrushchev's behalf.<sup>119</sup> In the face of this overwhelming show of strength, the Presidium majority found itself isolated, and some of its members, such as Voroshilov, Pervukhin, and possibly others, turned against their fellow conspirators in the course of the discussion. The resolution of the Central Committee condemning the opposition, which was published on July 4, was recorded as having received unanimous support, with only Molotov abstaining. The resolution itself limited its fire to Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov, and Shepilov "who joined them." The group was accused of having used "anti-Party, factional methods in an attempt to change the composition of the Party's leading bodies" and of having fought the Party line on a number of issues, including industrial reorganization, agricultural policy, and foreign policy.<sup>120</sup> Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Molotov were expelled from the Presidium and the Central Committee; Shepilov lost his posts as a Central Committee secretary, Presidium alternate, and Central Committee member.

The fact that the conspiracy had wider ramifications could be inferred from the fact that Saburov was also dropped from the Presidium and that Pervukhin was demoted to alternate membership. The treatment of Bulganin followed a curious course. After the June plenum he retained both his seat in the Presidium and his position as chairman of the Council of Ministers. Although his public role as a government spokesman declined greatly, he was not replaced as chairman of the Council of Ministers by Khrushchev until March 27, 1958, only ousted from the Presidium on September 5, 1958, and not formally linked with the anti-Party group until Khrushchev's speech of November 14, 1958. His demotion to the relatively obscure position of chairman of the Stavropol Economic Council completed his humiliation. Although Voroshilov's resignation as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and his "retirement" from the Presidium of the Central Committee in July 1960 gave an inkling of his involvement in the conspiracy, his full-scale participation was not officially confirmed until the Twenty-Second Congress in October 1961. His statement of recantation, which "for health reasons" was read by a proxy, was a pathetic tale of an old man who "had been led astray."<sup>121</sup> It provided an opening for Khrushchev to show clemency and forgiveness, and Khrushchev reveled in the part.

The reconstruction of the membership of the Presidium which followed the June 1957 plenum represented a striking triumph for Khrushchev. The Presidium was enlarged to fifteen members. Marshal Zhukov was promoted from alternate to full membership, an action which seemed to imply that the Marshal had given full support to Khrushchev in the struggle against the anti-Party group. The other new members of the Presidium — Furtseva, Aristov, Belyaev, Brezhnev, Ignatov, Kozlov, Kuusinen, and Shvernik — had all rallied to Khrushchev's support in his bid for supremacy and were appropriately rewarded.

The next stage in the consolidation of Khrushchev's authority involved a settling of accounts with Zhukov. The issue was precipitated by friction between the Party's political apparatus in the armed forces and the more professionally oriented officers who followed Zhukov in seeking to subordinate political indoctrination to combat training and military control. The Central Committee resolution of October 1957, approving the ouster of Zhukov from his positions as Minister of Defense and member of the Presidium and Central Committee, charged that he had "pursued a policy" of underestimating and curtailing Party leadership of the army and navy.<sup>122</sup> It reminded the military of the paramount role of the Party and called for an intensification of political work in the armed forces.

By the opening of the Twenty-First Congress in January 1959, it was clear that Khrushchev's leadership was beyond challenge. At the congress, delegate after delegate joined in praising his "Leninist firmness," "profound practical knowledge," "fatherly solicitude," and "tireless energy," and offered effusive thanks for the personal guidance and initiative which Khrushchev had supplied in every sector of Soviet life from foreign policy and the development of guided missiles to cotton growing in Tadzhikistan. If these genuflections were still a far cry from the heights of self-glorification which the Stalin cult achieved, they left little doubt that Khrushchev had reached the summit of the Soviet power structure.

The final settling of accounts with the anti-Party group remained unfinished business. At the Twenty-First Party Congress in January 1959, I. V. Spiridonov, Leningrad Party secretary, N. V. Podgorny, the Ukrainian Party secretary, and others close to Khrushchev launched a bitter attack on the anti-Party group and demanded that stern measures be taken against them. Despite this call for retribution, they were not ejected from the Party. It was reasonably inferred at the time that influential elements in the Party leadership were not then prepared to support any form of drastic retaliation against members of the anti-Party group. Although Khrushchev's decision to renew the attack on them at the Twenty-Second Congress did not necessarily mean that such qualms had evaporated, it did reflect his determination to crush his opponents and his confidence that the existing constellation of forces in the Party would support him.

The elaborate documentation of the involvement of Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov in Stalinist repressions was designed to discredit them once and for all, to destroy them as possible rallying points for any future opposition, and to serve as a warning to those who might be tempted to take the path of factionalism.

In the wake of the Twenty-Second Party Congress, Khrushchev gave every outward sign of being solidly entrenched in command of his machine. The paeans of praise that were heaped on him at the congress provided an almost embarrassing reminder of the Stalinist cult of personality which the Party was ostensibly repudiating. Indeed, so apparent was the parallel that Khrushchev himself was impelled to take note of it:

In many speeches at the Congress, and not infrequently in our press, special emphasis is laid on my person in discussing the activities of the Central Committee. My role is stressed in carrying out the most important measures of the Party and the government. Now I appreciate the kind sentiments guiding these comrades. May I, however, emphasize most emphatically that everything said about me should be addressed to the Central Committee of our Leninist Party, to the Presidium of the Central Committee. Not a single major measure, not a single responsible speech has been made on anyone's personal instructions, but is the result of collective discussions and collective decisions . . .<sup>123</sup>

Even though historians with long memories will recall that Stalin in his early days also sang the virtues of collective leadership, there is danger in pushing the parallel too far. Unlike Stalin, Khrushchev has tried where he could to rest his power on persuasion rather than terror, and his style of leadership had made a place for consultative procedures both within and outside the ruling group. Unlike Stalin, he has sought to incorporate his authority in the Party and to make it the paramount instrument of his rule.

The rise of Khrushchev was marked by a renewed emphasis on the leading role of the Party in Soviet society. In the words of a *Pravda* editorial of July 6, 1956, "As for our country, the Communist Party was, is, and will be the only ruler of thought, the inspirer of ideas and aspirations, the leader and organizer of the people in the entire course of their struggle for Communism . . ." This militant reiteration of the vanguard role of the Party was accompanied by an effort to revitalize Party life. On the ideological front, it manifested itself in a drive to recapture revolutionary momentum and élan by stressing the triumphs of the regime at home and abroad and painting the glories of the Communist future. On the organizational front, it was reflected in efforts to widen the mass base of the party, stimulate rank-and-file initiative, and promote broader participation in discharging Party assignments and chores. Despite the so-called democratization campaign, power remained safely in the hands of

the central Party functionaries, and factionalism continued to be condemned.

In the period after Stalin's death, pressures for the loosening of Party controls over Soviet society began to assert themselves. The restiveness was many-sided. In the intellectual realm, it expressed itself in probes for "creative freedom" and protests against excessive bureaucratic interference in the name of *partiinost'*. In the armed forces, the Zhukov affair dramatized the resistance to Party controls inherent in the claims of military professionalism. In the economic sector, there was widespread insistence on the need for greater autonomy and relief from minute central direction.

Faced with these implicit challenges, the thrust of the Khrushchevian initiative was to respond to these aspirations where they posed no danger to the Party leadership and, at the same time, to reinforce the authority of the Party apparatus as the primary integrating force in Soviet life. This reaffirmation of Party hegemony epitomizes the road by which Khrushchev traveled to supreme power. Embodying himself in the Party and proclaiming its right to unchallenged leadership, he raised his entourage of Party functionaries to heights of authority which they could not have dreamed of in Stalin's day. The victory of Khrushchev symbolized the ascendancy of the Party bureaucracy in its quintessential form.

## *Chapter 6*

# *The Growth of the Party Apparatus*

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One of the striking characteristics of modern totalitarian dictatorship is its dependence on bureaucratic organization to make its control effective. The bureaucratization of the dictator's power is an inevitable out-growth of the magnitude of his responsibilities. Trusted lieutenants and a party machine are indispensable concomitants of his domination. In the process of utilizing them, his authority may be both intensified and diluted. It is intensified to the degree that he succeeds in fashioning an administrative mechanism which is a reflection of his will. It is diluted to the extent that he is compelled to cede power to his subordinates and the party machine acquires a momentum and direction of its own. Every dictatorship faces the problem of institutionalizing its own authority. The power of the Leader depends on his ability to keep the essence of control in his own hands or in the hands of reliable subordinates while transforming the party machine into an obedient instrument ready to execute his slightest command.

The development of the Communist Party apparatus as an extension of the long arm of the dictator constitutes one of the most impressive and formidable organizational achievements of modern totalitarianism. To an extent unmatched by its now defunct Fascist and Nazi rivals, the Communist dictatorship has succeeded in uprooting and destroying every organized form of resistance to its demands. It has managed to survive at least two major changes of leadership, a series of bitter intra-Party struggles, a profound industrial and agricultural revolution, a bloody purge in which the older generation of Bolsheviks was consumed, and a world war of unparalleled destructiveness. Through all these travails, the Party apparatus has played a central role in sustaining the power of the

regime. A network of Party secretaries unites center and periphery, permeates every corner of Soviet life, and imposes the discipline of the apparatus on the society around it. Through the Party machine, loyalty is enforced, opposition eliminated, the Party line executed, new cadres developed, and continuity ensured. Individual secretaries parade into prominence or obscurity, but the machine itself persists as an indispensable adjunct of dictatorship. Behind the monolithic facade, clique rivalries and struggles for power probably continue to rage even though they are rarely publicly ventilated. Reality falls short of totalitarian aspiration. Yet the machine remains the tractable creature of its director, a sounding board on which his praises are sung, and the instrument through which his policies are fulfilled.

### *The Origins of the Apparatus*

The origins of the Communist Party apparatus reach back into the prerevolutionary period. Bolshevism from the beginning was characterized by an emphasis on organizational solidarity and discipline as a necessary basis for successful revolutionary action. In the long struggle to outwit the Tsarist secret police, the Bolsheviks developed an underground organization of local committees which formed the basis of Lenin's revolutionary machine. The committeemen of the underground — the *komitetchiki* (of whom Stalin was one) — were the first prototypes of the men of the apparatus — *apparatchiki* — out of whom Stalin's Party machine was later to be constructed. When the time came for Stalin to weld his own machine together, he drew heavily on the "practical" workers of the underground who had survived the revolutionary struggle in Russia rather than on the more flamboyant cosmopolitan intellectuals who had spent the prerevolutionary years in émigré disputations abroad.

During the march to power in 1917 when the Party was flooded with new members, the Party organization itself remained in the hands of the Komitetchiki. These seasoned workers of the underground maintained a firm grip on the rapidly expanding local Party organizations (see Chapter 3). At the Sixth Congress of the Party — the only one held during the revolutionary year 1917 — an overwhelming preponderance of the voting delegates consisted of underground veterans who had joined the Party in 1914 or earlier.<sup>1</sup> The persisting strength of the underground in the Party apparatus is indicated by the fact that, as late as 1930, 69 per cent of the secretaries of the central committees of the national republics and of the regional (*oblast* and *krai*) committees were still Old Bolsheviks of pre-revolutionary vintage.<sup>2</sup>

With the Party's seizure of power in November 1917 and the assumption of governing responsibilities, a significant differentiation became

evident in the roles played by various groups among the Old Bolsheviks. The intellectuals of the emigration tended to assume the political leadership, but their natural aptitudes and interests drove them into posts where they were preoccupied with broad problems of domestic and foreign policy rather than Party organization. The committeemen of the underground, on the other hand, tended to gravitate into the apparatus, to become local and regional Party secretaries, and to concern themselves with problems of interior Party management.

From early 1917 until early 1919, central responsibility for Party organization was concentrated largely in the hands of Sverdlov, veteran committeeman of prerevolutionary days, whose rich and varied experience in the underground gave him a wide acquaintance among the committeemen. Through his good offices, many of the old underground workers were assigned to the regional and local apparatus of the Party. Sverdlov was an extremely energetic and capable organizer, but he functioned largely without staff, and the only complete record of his transactions was in his head. When he suddenly died on the eve of the Eighth Congress in March 1919, the Party found itself in the embarrassing position of mourning the loss of its record office and central secretarial apparatus as well as the departure of a respected member of the Central Committee.

Sverdlov's death posed the problem of regularizing and rationalizing the central machinery of the Party. The Eighth Congress addressed itself to this task. In order to provide for the direction of the Party's wide-ranging activities, the Central Committee was instructed to create three new organs: (1) a Political Bureau (Politburo), to be composed of five members of the Central Committee; (2) an Organizational Bureau (Orgburo), also to be composed of five Central Committee members; and (3) a Secretariat, to consist of one responsible Secretary, who was required to be a member of the Orgburo, and five technical secretaries to be chosen from experienced Party workers.

The Politburo was charged with the responsibility of deciding all questions requiring immediate action; from the outset it became the top policy-determining organ of the Party. Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, Kamenev, and Krestinsky were its first members. During the debates at the Eighth Congress, the objection was raised that the creation of the Politburo involved the demotion of the rest of the Central Committee into second-class Party leaders. In order to blunt the force of this charge, the Politburo was required to deliver regular reports on its actions to the Central Committee, and members of the Central Committee who were not members of the Politburo were given the right to attend and participate in Politburo sessions with a consultative, though not a deciding, vote.

The Orgburo was authorized "to direct all the organizational work

of the Party."<sup>3</sup> It was to meet at least three times a week and, like the Politburo, was required to render biweekly reports to the Central Committee. Two members of the Politburo, Krestinsky and Stalin, were also named to work in the Orgburo. The assignment of Stalin to the Orgburo was to have momentous significance. As an old committeeman of the Sverdlov stripe, his capacities were adapted to questions of interior Party management. Unlike some of his more intellectually scintillating associates in the Politburo who spurned organizational details, he was quick to realize the crucial importance of the Party apparatus in deciding the issue of supremacy within the Party. The Orgburo became his first base of operations in building his own machine.

The authority of the Secretariat was not defined by the Eighth Congress. Its powers evolved in practice. The first responsible Secretary, Krestinsky, was a lawyer-journalist who had joined the Party in 1903 and who had served in 1917 as chairman of the Ekaterinburg and Ural regional Party committees. His interests were political rather than organizational, and he made no effort to construct an independent power base of his own. Under Krestinsky, the Secretariat remained subservient to the Politburo and the Orgburo. Lenin, in his report to the Ninth Party Congress on March 29, 1920, described the interlocking responsibilities of the three organs as follows:

During the year under review the current daily work of the Central Committee was conducted by the two bodies elected at the Plenum of the Central Committee: the Organization Bureau . . . and the Political Bureau . . . In order to achieve coordination and consistency in the decisions of these two bodies, the Secretary acted as a member of both. The practice arrived at was that it became the main and proper function of the Orgburo to distribute the forces of the Party, while the function of the Political Bureau was to deal with political questions. It goes without saying that this distinction is to a certain extent artificial; it is obvious that no policy can be carried out in practice without finding expression in appointments and transfers. Consequently, every organizational question assumes a political significance; and the practice was established that the request of a single member of the Central Committee was sufficient to have any question for any reason whatsoever examined as a political question. To have attempted to divide the functions of the Central Committee in any other way would hardly have been expedient and in practice would hardly have achieved its purpose.

This method of conducting business was productive of extremely good results: no difficulties have arisen between the two bureaus on any occasion. The work of these bodies has on the whole proceeded harmoniously, and practical fulfillment was facilitated by the presence of the Secretary . . . It must be emphasized from the very outset, so as to remove all misunderstanding, that only the corporate decisions of the Central Committee adopted in the Orgburo or the Politburo, or in the Plenum of the Central Committee — exclusively such matters were carried out by the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party.<sup>4</sup>

Despite this roseate report and Lenin's emphatic insistence that the Secretary had not arrogated any powers which were not delegated to him, it can be surmised that the operative efficiency of the Secretariat left much to be desired. At the Ninth Congress, a resolution was carried to "strengthen" the Secretariat by adding to it three members of the Central Committee who would devote all their time to its work. At the same time, an effort was made to demarcate the respective responsibilities of the Orgburo and Secretariat by reserving the general direction of organizational work to the Orgburo while entrusting current questions of an administrative and executive character to the Secretariat.<sup>5</sup> Krestinsky, Preobrazhensky, and Serebryakov were named as the new secretaries. All three aligned themselves with Trotsky against Lenin in the bitter trade-union discussion of 1920-21, and their secretarial careers were quickly terminated. At the Tenth Congress in 1921, Krestinsky was dropped from his important posts in the Politburo, the Orgburo, and the Central Committee; the others lost their positions on the Orgburo and the Central Committee. They were replaced as secretaries by Molotov, Yaroslavsky, and V. Mikhailov, of whom the first two in particular were among the staunchest supporters of Stalin in his rise to supremacy in the Party.

As a result of the secretarial overturn after the Tenth Congress, Stalin emerged as the dominant organizational spokesman and specialist in the Party. He was the only member of the Politburo who also served on the Orgburo and, as such, became its unquestioned leader. Through his ascendancy in the Orgburo, he began in effect to direct the work of the Secretariat. The announcement on April 4, 1922, of his appointment to the post of General Secretary registered a *de facto* authority which had already been achieved. Molotov and Kuibyshev were also designated as secretaries, but their positions were clearly those of subordinates rather than coequals. From the vantage point of the General Secretaryship, Stalin was to make his successful bid for supreme power.

#### *The Bureaucratization of the Party*

As the Party expanded in size, as its governing responsibilities multiplied, and as it sought to consolidate its hold over every facet of Soviet life, the role of the Party apparatus increased greatly in importance. By 1922 approximately one out of every twenty-five Party members was engaged in full-time Party work. In the first two years of the existence of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, its staff increased from 30 to 602, plus an additional contingent of 140 guards and messengers.<sup>6</sup> Its functions expanded to include the mobilization and allocation of Party personnel, the supervision of regional and local Party organizations through a corps of responsible instructors, and the guidance of propaganda and agitation activities. In addition, special sections were estab-

lished to direct Party work in the villages, among women, and among national minorities. A list of the Party officialdom submitted to the Twelfth Party Conference in August 1922 numbered 15,325 responsible workers.<sup>7</sup>

The bureaucratization of Party life had its inevitable consequences. The weight of the apparatus became determinative in Party affairs. The Party official engaged exclusively on Party business was at an obvious advantage compared with the rank-and-file Party member who had a full-time job in a factory or in a government office. The sheer force of professional preoccupation with Party management rendered the officialdom the center of initiative, direction, and control. At every level of the Party hierarchy, a transfer of authority and influence became visible, first from the congresses or conferences to the committees which they nominally elected, and then from the committees to the Party secretaries who ostensibly executed their will. As long as the secretaries were still locally selected and responsible to the organizations which they served, the structure of the Party remained quasi-federative, and the forces of autonomy and dissidence continued to assert their claims. As the network of local secretaries was absorbed into the central apparatus and became dependent on it for assignments and promotions, the secretarial hierarchy emerged as a distinct group with vested interests of its own. The drive to stabilize its own position and to extend its authority became an end in itself. Its solidarity and *esprit de corps* were promoted by common concerns and intensified by attacks on its prerogatives. The rising influence of the General Secretary symbolized its own aspirations; every effort to delimit his influence was construed as an effort to undermine the power of the apparatus itself. The identification of the Party officialdom with the cause of the General Secretary ensured his eventual triumph as the unchallenged leader of the Party.

The welding of the Party apparatus into a homogeneous, disciplined, and tightly controlled machine was achieved through two implements of central authority: (1) the Secretariat of the Central Committee operating in conjunction with the Orgburo and (2) the control commissions, central and local, which were first established in 1920 to hear "complaints" against the Party apparatus but which were rapidly transformed into instruments through which the apparatus enforced Party discipline and silenced its critics.

The key role of the Central Committee Secretariat developed out of its personnel responsibilities and its supervisory authority over the operations of local Party organizations. In 1920 a special section of the Secretariat — *Uchraspred*, the Account and Assignment Section — was established to control the "mobilizations, transfers and appointments of members of the Party."<sup>8</sup> During the Civil War and immediately after-

wards, the central apparatus had concerned itself almost exclusively with so-called mass mobilizations. When Party workers were needed in quantity for particular assignments, quotas were assessed on local Party organizations which they were obligated to fill. The principle was early established that Party workers were at the complete disposition of the central command. They could be summoned when needed and assigned wherever their services were required.

Shortly after the end of the Civil War, mass mobilizations were abandoned. A report of the Central Committee for the period from March 1922 to April 1923 stated: "The period of broad mobilizations, upon which main attention was focused two to four years ago, has now been succeeded by the epoch of all-around accounting of Party forces, the training and promotion of new cadres of [Party] workers, and intensified direction by the Party in all matters of assigning Party workers."<sup>9</sup> In making individual assignments, the Uchraspred concentrated first on filling Party posts. Appointments to the highest Party positions came under the jurisdiction of the Orgburo; in such cases, the Secretariat made recommendations rather than assignments. At lower levels, the authority of the Secretariat was more extensive. The legal fiction of "elections" was still maintained, but in fact the "recommendations" of the Secretariat were mandatory.

The Uchraspred rapidly extended its control down through the *guberniya* or provincial level.<sup>10</sup> By the beginning of 1923, its controls reached the secretarial personnel at the *uyezd* or county level. The report of the Uchraspred to the Twelfth Party Congress in April 1923 indicated that more than ten thousand assignments had been made in the preceding year. Approximately half of these actions involved so-called responsible officials.<sup>11</sup> Stalin, in his organizational report to the congress, made no effort to conceal the range of the Uchraspred's activities; indeed, he revealed that it was expanding its jurisdiction into the state apparatus and controlling appointments to important administrative and economic posts.<sup>12</sup>

By 1923 the grip of the General Secretary on the Party organization was causing his rivals for leadership the most serious concern. As Trotsky complained in a letter to the Central Committee on October 8, 1923:

In the fiercest moment of War Communism, the system of appointment within the party did not have one-tenth of the extent that it has now. Appointment of the secretaries of provincial committees is now the rule. That creates for the secretary a position essentially independent of the local organization . . .

. . . The bureaucratization of the Party apparatus has developed to unheard-of proportions by means of the method of secretarial selection. There has been created a very broad stratum of party workers, entering into the apparatus of the government of the party, who completely renounce their own

party opinion, at least the open expression of it, as though assuming that the secretarial hierarchy is the apparatus which creates party opinion and party decisions. Beneath this stratum . . . there lies the broad mass of the party, before whom every decision stands in the form of a summons or a command.<sup>13</sup>

The Organization-Instruction Section of the Central Committee Secretariat operated as another powerful lever of control over local Party organizations. Lazar Kaganovich, the head of this section in 1922 and 1923, was one of Stalin's most faithful disciples and was eventually rewarded with a place in the Politburo for his devotion to the cause of the General Secretary.<sup>14</sup> In enforcing its control over local organizations, the Organization-Instruction Section used a corps of "responsible instructors" who regularly visited their assigned areas, attended meetings of provincial Party conferences and committees, conveyed instructions from the center, and carried back reports on the status of Party work in the organizations which they advised and supervised. In the rare cases where local organizations showed themselves recalcitrant and refused to obey central directives, "plenipotentiaries" were sent out by order of the Central Committee "with the right to veto those decisions of the local organizations which interfered with the proper conditions of Party and soviet work." Liaison with local Party functionaries was also maintained by occasional conferences of Party secretaries in Moscow, a regular flow of written reports from the localities, and arrangements by which provincial secretaries and heads of local organization-instruction departments were summoned to Moscow to render an oral accounting of their activities.<sup>15</sup>

In order to strengthen control over the more distantly located provinces, "regional bureaus" were established in the Secretariat in 1920 as an intermediate layer of supervision between the center and the guberniyas. The regional bureaus played a highly important role in buttressing Stalin's hold on the Party machinery. Stalwart supporters of Stalin were assigned to the more important bureaus.<sup>16</sup> The problem of bringing the peripheral Party organizations to heel presented real difficulties.<sup>17</sup> Distance frequently intensified the spirit of independence. Under the whip-lash of purge and pressure, the impediments were mastered, and the outlying guberniyas under the jurisdiction of the regional bureaus became one of the firmest strongholds of the Stalin machine.

The network of control commissions, which expanded greatly after 1920, also served as an important centralizing instrument in enforcing the power of the Party apparatus. By a curious paradox, the original impetus which led to the creation of the control commissions came from members of the Workers' Opposition and Democratic Centralists who were searching for a device to prevent the Party from being dominated by its bureaucratic element. As originally conceived in 1920, the Control

Commission attached to the Central Committee was to consist in its majority of representatives of the more important local Party organizations who would be elected at guberniya Party conferences. The control commissions attached to the guberniya committees in turn were to be locally elected and free from domination by the central Party organs.<sup>18</sup> The oppositionists hoped that the control commissions would thus become independent centers through which bureaucratic malpractices could be exposed.

This hope miscarried. From the beginning, the control commissions met sabotage and opposition from the centrally appointed Party secretaries in the localities. The personnel assigned to work in the control commissions lacked the status and prestige to enforce their somewhat ambiguous authority, and before very long they were converted into instrumentalities of the Party's secretarial apparatus. At the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, the mission of the control commissions was reformulated. Their main responsibility became that of "strengthening the unity and authority of the Party,"<sup>19</sup> and their energies were concentrated on stamping out opposition in the Party, although they also served as courts of appeal for members who were charged with all manner of violations of the Party statutes. At the Eleventh Party Congress in 1922, the authority of the Central Control Commission was broadened to include supervision and direction of the work of all local control commissions.<sup>20</sup> The effect of this action was to bring the local commissions within the ambit of central control and to prevent them from becoming islands of dissidence in the Party organization. Through domination of the Central Control Commission, the General Secretary could be certain that the entire control machinery of the Party was in his hands.

### *The Stalin Machine*

The command of the Party apparatus operated as the master force in Stalin's rise to supreme power. From the vantage point of the Orgburo and the General Secretaryship, Stalin succeeded in constructing a Party machine of apparatchiki who came to exercise a decisive weight in Party affairs. The machine in its inception was far from being the monolithic juggernaut which it later became. Compared, however, with what was available to his rivals for supremacy, it was more than adequate to accomplish the purpose for which it was designed. Through the secretarial hierarchy, Stalin was able to extend his dominion over the local organizations of the Party and to ensure the election of "loyal" slates of delegates to the Party congresses and conferences. Through his alliance with Zinoviev and Kamenev in the Politburo, he succeeded in isolating Trotsky and in neutralizing, at least temporarily, his fellow triumvirs.

Stalin's strength was concentrated in the Party apparatus. The power

centers least amenable to his control in the early stages of the struggle were the policy-making organs of the Party, the Central Committee, and the Politburo. His problem, therefore, was to transmute his influence in the lower reaches of the Party's organizational structure into domination of its top policy posts. The task was not an easy one. Stalin sought to solve it by pressing for the enlargement of the Central Committee on the ground that it was desirable to introduce fresh talent into the upper councils of the Party and to promote outstanding Party workers from the localities to the center. His fellow triumvirs were not insensitive to the possible consequences of packing the committee with Stalin's henchmen, but because they feared Trotsky far more than Stalin, and possibly because they shared an excessive confidence in their ability to outmaneuver their partner of convenience, they grudgingly yielded. The Central Committee was expanded from twenty-five members and fifteen candidates at the Tenth Congress in 1921 to forty members and seventeen candidates at the Twelfth Congress in 1923. Of the eight former candidates who were promoted to full membership in 1923, seven were close supporters of Stalin; the eighth, Pyatakov, was a follower of Trotsky. Of the eight new members elected without previous service as candidates,<sup>21</sup> four identified themselves with Stalin's machine and four became supporters of Zinoviev and Kamenev. Nearly all of the fourteen new candidate members were Party functionaries who were being rewarded for loyal service to Stalin. As a result of this stratagem, made possible by the voting strength of the apparatus on the floor of the congress, the Stalinist caucus in the Central Committee was greatly strengthened.

Stalin's next step was to play off the Central Committee against the Politburo. The organizational resolution adopted by the Twelfth Congress admonished the Politburo for its failure to take the Central Committee into its confidence and called on the Politburo to submit all "fundamental questions" for discussion by a plenum of the Central Committee.<sup>22</sup> As the defender of the prerogatives of the enlarged Central Committee against the "caste of priests" who had hitherto dominated the Party leadership, Stalin even won applause from the small remnant of leftist defenders of inner-Party democracy who were still represented at the congress.<sup>23</sup>

While Stalin maneuvered for power in the Central Committee, he did not neglect other sources of authority and influence. The only change in the composition of the Politburo after the Twelfth Congress was the addition of Rudzutak as a candidate for membership — and Rudzutak was a firm supporter of Stalin. The membership of the Central Control Commission was enlarged from seven to fifty members at the Twelfth Congress; its presidium of nine members was given the right to participate in meetings of the Central Committee, and three representatives of the presidium were authorized to attend sessions of the Politburo. Kuibyshev,

who was named chairman of the Central Control Commission, was one of Stalin's closest associates. In addition, the presidium included such Stalinist stalwarts as Yaroslavsky, Soltz, and Shkiryatov.

Thus, even before the death of Lenin, Stalin had entrenched himself firmly in all the strategic power structures of the Party. Zinoviev's organizational strength was confined largely to Leningrad and the Comintern. Kamenev exercised considerable influence in the Moscow Party organization. Trotsky had a coterie of influential followers in the army and state administration. His prestige as a revolutionary leader was second only to that of Lenin, but he commanded little support among the Party apparatchiki. Their allegiance and ambitions were embodied in Stalin, and collectively they represented the only nation-wide Party machine in existence.

Out of fear of Trotsky, the troika of Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Stalin maintained an uneasy partnership in the Politburo. By the summer of 1923, however, the triumvirate was already showing signs of strain. Zinoviev, in particular, was alarmed by Stalin's growing influence. As he later revealed at the Fourteenth Party Congress, he wavered between two plans to limit Stalin's power.<sup>24</sup> One involved transforming the Secretariat into a technical service apparatus without appointive powers. The other involved politicizing the Secretariat by making it responsible to three members of the Politburo—Stalin, Trotsky, and a third member who might be either Kamenev, Bukharin, or himself. Zinoviev, in true conspiratorial fashion, presented his views to Bukharin, Voroshilov, Ordjonikidze, Lashevich, and Evdokimov at a conference in a cave near Kislovodsk in September 1923. At the end of the conference he drafted a proposal which was entrusted to Ordjonikidze for delivery to Stalin. According to Zinoviev's later testimony,

Comrade Stalin . . . replied with a telegram in a coarse but friendly tone . . . Some time later he arrived . . . and we had several discussions. Finally it was decided that we would not touch the Secretariat, but in order to coordinate organizational and political work, we would introduce three members of the Politburo into the Orgburo. This . . . not very practical suggestion was made by Comrade Stalin, and we agreed to it. We introduced three members of the Politburo into the Orgburo: Comrades Trotsky, Bukharin, and myself. I attended the sessions of the Orgburo, I think, once or twice, Comrades Bukharin and Trotsky, it seems, did not come even once. Nothing came of it all.<sup>25</sup>

Since neither Trotsky nor Bukharin was prepared at this point to join forces with Zinoviev, Stalin was left in undisturbed control of the Party apparatus. Trotsky's decision toward the end of 1923 to launch a full-scale public attack on the triumvirate forced its members to draw together in mutual protection. By this time, however, it was clear that Stalin was the

senior partner and Zinoviev and Kamenev were dependent allies. Faced with Stalin's control of the Party machine, Trotsky could score only rhetorical and literary successes, and even the latter were limited by the embargo which the apparatus placed on the circulation of his brochure on the *New Course*.<sup>26</sup>

Trotsky's eloquent strictures against the oligarchy of appointed secretaries and his call for a "renovation of the Party apparatus" from below won him considerable support outside the apparatus, particularly among student Communists who comprised approximately 25 per cent of the membership of the Moscow Party organization. Yet even in Moscow, where Trotsky mobilized his greatest strength, the power of the Stalinist machine proved irresistible.<sup>27</sup>

At the Thirteenth Congress, which assembled in May 1924, soon after Lenin's death, Stalin consolidated his hold over the Party machinery. The enlargement of the Central Committee to fifty-three members and thirty-four candidates gave Stalin an opportunity to reward an additional group of loyal functionaries with high office.<sup>28</sup> The Central Control Commission was tripled in size from 50 to 151 members. Again, meritorious service in the apparatus was recognized in making the new appointments, while Kuibyshev remained as chairman of the commission to insure Stalin's control of its proceedings.<sup>29</sup> The vacancy in the Politburo created by Lenin's death was filled by the promotion of Bukharin from candidate to full membership. Stalin's position in the Politburo was now secure. While Trotsky was in opposition, Zinoviev and Kamenev were still allies, and Rykov, Tomsky, and Bukharin could be counted on to follow Stalin's lead. Kalinin, Molotov, and Rudzutak, all firm supporters of Stalin, held on as candidates. Of the three new candidates added at this time, Dzerzhinsky and Frunze were followers of Stalin, and Sokolnikov associated himself with Zinoviev.

Although signs of strain were evident in the relations between Stalin and his fellow triumvirs after the Thirteenth Congress, their hostility to Trotsky continued to hold them together in a precarious truce. In October 1924 Trotsky returned to the attack with the publication of *Lessons of October*. This pamphlet was designed to destroy the authority of Zinoviev and Kamenev as Party leaders by reminding the Party of their sorry role in the 1917 Revolution. It was provoked by Trotsky's bitter resentment of the attacks which Zinoviev and Kamenev had leveled against him. As a political maneuver to increase Trotsky's influence, its effect was disastrous. While it accomplished its purpose of discrediting Zinoviev and Kamenev, by the same token it made them more than ever dependent on Stalin. It exacerbated their determination to revenge themselves on Trotsky, and it left Stalin's strength untouched. Stalin defended his colleagues against Trotsky's strictures but with overtones of coolness and

reservation which were not lost on his supporters. He resisted the insistent demands of Zinoviev and Kamenev that Trotsky be dropped from the Politburo and Central Committee and even be excluded from the Party, but he availed himself of their support in relieving Trotsky of his duties as Commissar of War.<sup>30</sup>

As the prestige of Zinoviev and Kamenev fell, Stalin's rose. In a disingenuous effort to regain lost ground, Kamenev advanced Stalin's candidacy for the vacancy in the War Commissariat with the hope of dislodging him from the General Secretaryship.<sup>31</sup> Stalin declined the honor and appointed Frunze instead. When Frunze died shortly afterwards, he was succeeded by Voroshilov, one of Stalin's closest associates. Within the Politburo itself, Zinoviev and Kamenev now found themselves thrust aside and isolated, while Stalin leaned on Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov to carry his majority. The secretarial hierarchy remained firmly in Stalin's hands. Zinoviev and Kamenev were left with the alternative of resigning themselves to second-class rank or fighting to regain their status.

They determined to fight. The prospects were not very encouraging. Zinoviev and Kamenev were in a minority in the Politburo and had only a handful of supporters in the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. Trotsky was still alienated from them and stood aside. The assets on which they counted were Zinoviev's firm grip on the Leningrad Party organization and the hope that they would also be able to carry the Moscow organization with them. Kamenev and Zinoviev had taken the initiative in arranging the transfer of Uglanov as Party secretary from Nizhni Novgorod to Moscow, and they apparently calculated on his help in swinging the support of the Moscow organization to their side. Uglanov proved to be a frail reed and espoused Stalin's cause.<sup>32</sup> As a result, Zinoviev and Kamenev entered the Fourteenth Congress (December 1925) with a solid bloc of delegates from Leningrad but with hardly any voting strength elsewhere. The resolution to approve Stalin's report on behalf of the Central Committee carried by an overwhelming majority of 559 to 65.<sup>33</sup> The Stalinist apparatus demonstrated itself in complete control of the proceedings.

At the Fourteenth Congress, the size of the Central Committee was again greatly increased, this time to sixty-three members and forty-three candidates. The new positions were once more used to reward faithful members of the secretarial hierarchy. The new Politburo elected after the Fourteenth Congress was enlarged from seven to nine members. Stalin, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov remained as members. Molotov, Kalinin, and Voroshilov, all part of the Stalinist entourage, were advanced to full membership for the first time. Kamenev, who had delivered one of the sharpest attacks on Stalin at the congress, was demoted from full member to candidate. The other candidates —

Rudzutak, Dzerzhinsky, Petrovsky, and Uglanov—were regarded as henchmen of Stalin. The promotion of Uglanov appeared to be a recognition of the service which he performed in holding the Moscow Party organization in line for Stalin.<sup>34</sup>

By the beginning of 1926, the Stalinist machine was so solidly entrenched in all the key positions in the Party apparatus as to be virtually impervious to attack. The belated decision of Trotsky, Kamenev, and Zinoviev in the spring of that year to unite their forces for a last desperate onslaught rapidly revealed itself as an act of quixotic martyrdom.<sup>35</sup> "It is enough," said Kamenev to Trotsky, "for you and Zinoviev to appear on the same platform, and the party will find its true Central Committee."<sup>36</sup> This remark, which Trotsky attributes to Kamenev, laid bare a confidence in messianic oratory and an insensitivity to the power of the Party's bureaucratic phalanx which were to prove the opposition's undoing. The opposition could muster a brilliant coterie of generals, but they were generals whose forces were scattered, disorganized, and improvised, and they confronted an enemy who securely controlled both the local organizations and leading organs of the Party.

In the unequal struggle which ensued, all the power of the state and the disciplined battalions of the apparatus were on Stalin's side. The opposition was torn to pieces, limb by limb (see Chapter 5). With the annihilation of the Left Opposition, Stalin was free to turn his energies against the right. The Politburo which was elected after the Fifteenth Congress was soon to divide into two factions. Molotov, Rudzutak, Kuibyshev, Voroshilov, and Kalinin followed Stalin; Rykov, Tomsky, and Bukharin emerged as a right-wing opposition to challenge the pace and direction of Stalin's industrial and agrarian program. The Right Opposition proved as powerless as the left when it confronted the Stalin machine.

The right wing's dream of winning supreme power was based on a complex set of calculations. First, it expected to attract the support of Voroshilov and Kalinin and thus achieve a majority of five to four in the Politburo. The hope proved illusory. "Stalin has some special hold on them that I do not know of,"<sup>37</sup> Bukharin was reported later to have said. Second, the right wing counted on the solid support of the Moscow Party organization, and it expected to accumulate considerable support in the provinces as the result of dissatisfaction in Stalin's apparatus with the collectivization program. These expectations, too, were disappointed. Uglanov, the head of the Moscow Party organization, supported the right wing, but he proved unable to control his own subordinates. Stalin intervened in a dramatic personal appeal to a plenum of the Moscow committee and control commission which proved decisive.<sup>38</sup> On November 28, 1928, Uglanov and his associate Kotov were removed as secretaries of the Moscow committee and replaced by Molotov and Baumann. The les-

son was not lost on the rest of the apparatus, and the anticipated revolt in the provinces failed to develop. Third, the right wing also counted on considerable support outside the Party apparatus. Through Tomsky, the head of the trade unions, it expected to mobilize the support of the trade-union functionaries; through Bukharin, the leader of the Communist International, it anticipated help from the Comintern apparatus; through Rykov, the chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, it looked for assistance in the top administrative hierarchy. According to Boris Souvarine, it also had the sympathy of Yagoda, the deputy chief of the GPU, but if Yagoda's attitude was benevolent, it displayed itself in covert rather than in open assistance to the right.<sup>39</sup>

As always, Stalin moved resolutely to cut off his enemies' lines of power at the source. In April 1929, Uglanov was removed from his posts as candidate member of the Politburo and secretary of the Central Committee. Bukharin was relieved of his duties in the Comintern. In June, Tomsky lost his position of leadership in the trade unions. In November, Bukharin was dropped from the Politburo. At the Sixteenth Party Congress (June 26-July 13, 1930), Tomsky was ejected from the Politburo. In December, Rykov was dismissed as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and also expelled from the Politburo.


The purge of the right-wing leaders left Stalin in undisputed control. The Politburo as reconstructed after the departure of Rykov consisted of Stalin, Voroshilov, L. M. Kaganovich, Kalinin, Kirov, S. Kossior, Kuibyshev, Rudzutak, and Ordjonikidze. The triumph of the apparatchiki was complete.

#### *The Organization of the Central Committee Secretariat*

As Stalin consolidated his hold on the Party and state machinery, the organization of the Central Committee Secretariat underwent substantial changes. Its basic structure from 1924 to 1930 is outlined in Chart I. By 1925, at least 25,000 Party members, one out of every forty, were full-time employees in the Party apparatus.<sup>40</sup> The Central Committee Secretariat alone included 767 full-time workers.<sup>41</sup> The arrangement of the work of the Secretariat mirrored the preoccupation of the Stalinist leadership with the selection of trusted personnel for important Party and governmental posts. The key section in the Central Committee Secretariat was the Organization-Assignment Section (*Orgraspred*). It was created in 1924 by a merger of the Uchraspred and the old Organization-Instruction Section. The Orgraspred functioned as the cadre office of the Stalinist machine. Its responsibilities were wide-ranging. It made recommendations for appointments, promotions, and transfers not only to Party offices but also to important positions in the commissariats, the trade-union bureaucracy,

industry, and the cooperative network. It maintained dossiers on leading Party workers and controlled their assignments. It prepared directives on all questions relating to Party structure and organization. Through a corps of responsible instructors, it supervised the activities of local Party organizations directly, received and analyzed their reports, participated in their meetings, arranged conferences of secretaries and other Party functionaries, transmitted advice and instructions to them, and, where necessary, arranged for changes in leadership.<sup>42</sup> In addition, the Central Committee Secretariat included an Information Section, an *Agitprop* or Agitation

CHART I  
*Organization of the Central Committee Secretariat, 1924-1930*



\* The Press Otdel was placed under the Agitation and Propaganda Otdel in 1928.

and Propaganda Section, a Press Section, a Women's Section, a Village Section, and other activities of lesser importance. The organization of the Central Committee Secretariat served as a model for similar secretariats at lower levels of the Party hierarchy.


The structural pattern outlined above remained in effect until 1930. During this period, the powers and responsibilities of the Secretariat steadily mounted. Between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congress, the Orgraspred handled the placement of 8,761 Party workers.<sup>43</sup> At the Fifteenth Congress, Kursky, the chairman of the Central Auditing Commission of the Party, warned that the Orgraspred was trying to do too much. He pointed out that only 1,222 of the 8,761 Party members whom the Orgraspred had placed in the preceding two years were leading Party workers. He suggested that it delegate the appointment of less responsible Party workers to lower Party organs while reserving to itself the more extensive study and placement of leading Party cadres.<sup>44</sup> Despite Kursky's criticism, the Orgraspred was not disposed to narrow its jurisdiction. At the Sixteenth Congress in 1930, L. Kaganovich announced that

the Orgraspred had arranged the assignments of approximately eleven thousand Party workers in the preceding two years.<sup>45</sup>

As the First Five-Year Plan gathered momentum, the clamor for new cadres in industry and agriculture mounted in volume. The Orgraspred found itself swamped by the demands which descended on it. As Kaganovich made clear in a frank speech to the Orgburo, the Orgraspred became a serious bottleneck which impeded the rapid procurement and placement of needed Party workers.<sup>46</sup> This was the main driving force behind the reorganization of the Secretariat in 1930 (see Chart II).

The essence of the reorganization was a decentralization of cadre responsibilities within the Secretariat. The Orgraspred was broken up into two new sections: an Organization-Instruction Section and an Assignment Section. The Organization-Instruction Section concerned itself only with the placement of personnel in the Party apparatus and the supervision of local Party organizations. The Assignment Section was established to

CHART II  
*Reorganization of the Central Committee Secretariat, 1930*



serve the personnel needs of the administrative and economic apparatus and was itself divided into a number of subsections: Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Transport, Agriculture, Foreign Cadres, Financial-Planning-Trade, Soviet Administration, and Accounting. Each subsection exercised specialized personnel responsibilities within its area of jurisdiction.

The old Agitprop Section was also divided into two new sections: an Agitation and Mass Campaigns Section and a Culture and Propaganda Section. The new Section for Agitation and Mass Campaigns was designed to whip up mass enthusiasm for industrialization and collectivization. Agitation in the villages and special work among women were included in its program, and the separate sections formerly devoted to these activities were abolished. The Culture and Propaganda Section absorbed the old Press Section and was also given supervisory authority over education, science, literature, and the propaganda of Marxism-Leninism. Both the Culture and Propaganda Section and the Agitation and Mass Campaigns Section were entrusted with appointment and personnel powers within their respective areas of operation.


The decentralization of placement responsibilities within the Central Committee Secretariat was one response to the cadre crisis which the party faced with the inauguration of the First Five-Year Plan. Another took the form of seeking to economize on cadres by eliminating a link in the Party and governmental hierarchy. The decision of the Sixteenth Party Congress (1930) to abolish the *okrugi* (circuits) made approximately thirty thousand Party workers available for placement elsewhere. Of the actual disposition of these cadres there is no record, although Kaganovich indicated in his organizational report to the Sixteenth Party Congress that a substantial proportion would be utilized to strengthen the *raion* or district organizations of the Party.<sup>47</sup>

While the 1930 reorganization of the Secretariat enabled it to deal more expeditiously with its placement responsibilities, the structure of the Secretariat was poorly adapted to enforce unified Party control over the various branches of the economy and of government. There were no sections in the Secretariat where responsibility for all of the activities of a particular sector of industry or administration could be centered. Under the prevailing functional scheme of organization, the subsections of the Assignment Section had jurisdiction over personnel problems, the Organization-Instruction Section verified the fulfillment of decrees, and the Agitation and Mass Campaigns Section controlled activities in its area. In a period when industry was rapidly expanding and agriculture was undergoing fundamental change, this division of responsibility yielded increasingly unsatisfactory results. At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, the decision was made to abandon the functional system and to re-

place it by a "production-branch" approach, by which concentrated responsibility could be achieved.

The 1934 reorganization (see Chart III) represented an effort to adapt the structure of the Secretariat to the pressing tasks of economic control. The Central Committee Secretariat was divided into the following main sections: Agriculture, Industry, Transport, Planning-Finance-Trade, Political-Administrative, Leading Party Organs, Culture and Propaganda of Leninism, and the Special Section.<sup>48</sup>

CHART III  
*Reorganization of the Central Committee Secretariat, 1934*



Each of the first five of these sections was constructed on the same pattern. Each had its subsections corresponding to more specialized branches of industry and administration. Each exercised the full range of Party control over the particular sector of Soviet life which was entrusted to it. Within this sector it was responsible for cadres, Party organizational work, mass agitation, and checking on the fulfillment of Party and governmental decrees. The objective was not only to assure more effective direction of the burgeoning economic development of the mid-thirties but to sharpen the accountability of the Party apparatus itself.

The Section of Leading Party Organs limited its area of supervision to the Party apparatus itself. Its functions were confined exclusively to furnishing cadres for Party work and supervising leading Party organs at the oblast, krai, and republic levels. The new Section on Culture and Propaganda of Leninism (*Kul'tprop*) continued the work performed previously by the Culture and Propaganda Section. During the next year, it was itself dissolved into five new sections — Party Propaganda and Agitation, Press and Publishing, Schools, Cultural-Instruction Work, and Science.<sup>49</sup> The Special Section, the functions of which were left undescribed in the reports of the Party congress, provided a link between the Central Committee and the NKVD or police apparatus. Another facet of

the 1934 reorganization involved the substitution of the Party Control Commission for the old Central Control Committee.<sup>50</sup> Its mission was outlined as the strengthening of control over the fulfillment of decisions of the Party and Central Committee, the enforcement of Party discipline, and punishment of violations of Party ethics.<sup>51</sup>

The 1934 reorganization represented an attempt to cope with the increasingly complex problem of imposing effective Party controls on an economy which was rapidly developing and diversifying. The effort to keep pace with the new industrial and agrarian developments, to guide and direct them, forced a reconstruction of the apparatus around the principle of industrial specialization. Every new branch of industry had to have its parallel agency of specialized Party control; by the same token, every sector of Soviet life was subordinated to its corresponding supervisory Party organ.

By 1934 Stalin's apparatchiki appeared to be in complete command of every strategic position in the Party and governmental hierarchy. The Seventeenth Party Congress which met in that year was described by Kirov as "the congress of victors." The parade of Party secretaries who reported at the congress outdid each other in fulsome flattery of Stalin. In a gesture which mingled reconciliation and humiliation, such former leaders of the opposition as Bukharin, Rykov, Kamenev, and Zinoviev were also permitted to address the congress. They paid for the privilege by joining in the chorus of adulation and again confessing their sins. "At this Congress . . ." Stalin rejoiced, "there is nothing more to prove and, it seems, no one to fight."<sup>52</sup>

#### *The Apparatus and the Great Purge*

The assassination of Politburo member Kirov by the Communist Nikolayev on December 1, 1934, transformed complacency into panic. Behind Nikolayev's desperate act (the motives of which remain shrouded in mystery), Stalin professed to discover a large-scale conspiratorial plot of former oppositionists and other enemies of the regime who planned to murder the top Party leadership and seize power for themselves. The mass purges of the mid-thirties, which gathered momentum after Kirov's assassination, were not confined to the extermination of former oppositionists. A substantial proportion of Stalin's own apparatchiki disappeared in the fury of the holocaust. Perhaps the most dramatic and authoritative indication of the destructive effect of the purge on the top Party leadership was provided by Khrushchev in his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress when he noted that "of the 139 members and candidates of the Party's Central Committee who were elected at the Seventeenth Congress, 98 were arrested and shot (mostly in 1937-38)" and that of 1,966 delegates

with either voting or advisory rights at the same congress, "1,108 persons were arrested on charges of antirevolutionary crimes . . ."<sup>53</sup>

The tremendous turnover which took place in the Party apparatus as the result of the Great Purge can be verified from figures quoted by Zhdanov at the Eighteenth Congress. In 1938, according to Zhdanov, "35 per cent of the members of committees of primary Party organizations, 41 per cent of the members of district committees, 46 per cent of the members of city committees, and 60 per cent of the members of regional committees, territorial committees and Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the national republics were elected for the first time."<sup>54</sup> By 1939 the top echelon of regional, territorial, and republic committee secretaries consisted predominantly of younger Communists who had joined the Party after the death of Lenin. Of a total of 333 secretaries of republic, oblast, and krai committees, 303, or 91 per cent, were under forty years of age, and 268, or 80.5 per cent, were reported as having joined the Party after 1924. At lower levels of the secretarial hierarchy, these youthful characteristics were even more striking. Of the 10,902 secretaries of district, city, and area committees who held office in 1939, 10,020, or 92 per cent, were under forty years of age and 10,193, or 93.5 per cent, had joined the Party since 1924.<sup>55</sup> The decimation of the Old Bolsheviks and the damage inflicted by mass arrests and expulsions created vast gaps in the Party apparatus into which the younger generation of the Party flowed. By 1939 the leading functionaries of the Party apparatus largely represented a generation which had been drawn into Party activity in the period after Lenin's death. A new postrevolutionary elite emerged as the anchor of Stalin's power. By enlisting its energies and appealing to its ambitions, by promoting it rapidly to leading Party posts, and by rewarding it with the symbols of power and privilege, Stalin consolidated a fresh core of leadership and reconstructed his Party apparatus around it.

#### *Reorganization of the Secretariat*


The rejuvenation of the Party apparatus was followed in 1939 by a reorganization of its structure. One of the legacies of the Great Purge was a crisis of cadres; the recruitment of new leaders was perhaps the most serious problem which the Party confronted. Under the system put into effect in 1934, responsibility for the selection of cadres had been divided up among numerous industrial-branch departments of the Secretariat. Because of the scarcity of trained personnel, this arrangement created difficulties. "These departments," said Zhdanov, "fight and contend among themselves for people. This militates against the proper study, selection and promotion of cadres."<sup>56</sup> The resolution of the Eighteenth Congress on Zhdanov's report put the problem succinctly, "The division of the

work of selecting cadres . . . has tended to reduce the scope of organizational work, has hampered necessary transfers of people from one branch to another, their promotion, and their efficient utilization in those sectors which at the given moment are most important to the Party."<sup>57</sup> "Our task now," proclaimed Stalin, "is to concentrate the work of selecting cadres, from top to bottom, in the hands of one body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik level . . . This body should be the Cadres Administration of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and a corresponding cadres department in each of the republican, territorial, and regional Party organizations."<sup>58</sup>

At the 1939 congress, Zhdanov also called for the almost complete elimination of the industrial-branch departments, the merits of which Kaganovich had propounded so vigorously in 1934. "Today," said Zhdanov, "the industrial-branch departments do not know what their functions are, properly speaking; they encroach on the functions of the business organizations, compete with them, and this gives rise to a vagueness as to who is responsible for a job, or kills responsibility altogether." Two exceptions were to be allowed, an Agricultural Department, "in view of the particular importance of controlling and supervising the activities of the Soviet and Party organizations in the sphere of agriculture," and a School Department, "in view of the fact that we have no People's Commissariat of Education for the U.S.S.R., and in view of the necessity of controlling the work of public education in all the republics, territories, and regions."<sup>59</sup>

The reorganization put into effect in 1939 was almost a complete return to the functional scheme which prevailed prior to 1934 (see Chart IV). The Central Committee Secretariat was divided into the following units: (1) Cadres Administration, (2) Propaganda and Agitation Administration, (3) Organization and Instruction Department, (4) Agricultural Department, and (5) School Department. At the republic, terri-

CHART IV  
*Reorganization of the Central Committee Secretariat, 1939*




torial, regional, and area level, the School Department dropped out, and instead a Military Department was added. At the city and district level, both Agricultural and School Departments were omitted, but the Military Department remained. The function of the latter was "to assist the military authorities in organizing the registration of persons liable to military service, in the calling up of recruits, in mobilization in the event of war, in the organization of air defense, etc."<sup>60</sup> The Cadres Administration exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the selection of all key personnel. The Organization and Instruction Department supervised the operation of lower Party organizations. The Propaganda and Agitation Administration, as its name implied, had a general responsibility for mass agitation and Party propaganda. The Agricultural and School Departments had the more specific mandates of checking on the fulfillment of Party and Soviet decrees within their respective areas of jurisdiction. The Party Control Commission was made subject to election and direction by the Party Central Committee and thus in effect became a part of the Central Committee apparatus. Its assigned duties were to "a) Keep a check on the fulfillment of the directions of the Central Committee . . . by Soviet organs, business organs, and Party organizations; b) Exercise supervision over the activities of the local Party organizations; c) Call to account persons guilty of violating the Program and Rules . . . or Party discipline."<sup>61</sup>

The abolition of the industrial-branch departments in the 1939 reorganization created a new set of problems. Responsibility for industrial performance was now dispersed throughout the entire Party apparatus, and no points of focus existed at which a total view of a particular industry could be obtained. The result, according to Malenkov's report at the Eighteenth Party Conference in 1941, was that the local Party organizations began to ignore industrial and transport problems on the ground that they had no authority or responsibility in these areas.<sup>62</sup> The conference condemned this view as utterly without justification. To emphasize the continuing obligations of the Party in the economic sphere, it ordered all republic, territorial, regional, and city committees to appoint several secretaries who would be exclusively concerned with the industrial problems of the area and also, where necessary, to designate a secretary for railroad transport and another for water transport.<sup>63</sup> The creation of these new secretaries represented an important step away from functionalism, though as long as Zhdanov's influence remained strong within the Secretariat, the functional pattern of organization retained its vitality.

The death of Zhdanov on August 31, 1948, and the assumption of operational command of the Secretariat by G. M. Malenkov coincided with another major reorganization of the apparatus, this time marking an almost complete return to the principles espoused by Kaganovich in 1934, when the Party machinery was designed to parallel governmental and eco-

nomic organization (see Chart V). While no detailed, systematic description of the new structure of the Party apparatus was made available by Soviet authorities, it is possible to reconstruct its main outlines on the basis of fragmentary material appearing in Soviet publications.<sup>64</sup> The em-

CHART V  
*Reorganization of the Central Committee Secretariat, 1948*



\* Functions as Military Otdel of Central Committee Secretariat.

phasis of the reform was on the decentralization of personnel work and the creation of new specialized industrial-branch departments to supervise Party work in their areas. As *Moskovskii Bolshevik* stated on February 2, 1949:

The basic goal of the reorganization consisted in improvement of work regarding the selection of cadres and the implementation of the decisions of the Party and government. If previously the question of the selection, assignment, and education of cadres was studied solely by the cadres sections, now the entire apparatus . . . studies this question. The reorganization of the Party apparatus will assist in the improvement of the Party organizations, in raising their leading role and strengthening control over the activity of governmental, economic, and public organizations.<sup>65</sup>

The old Cadres Department was abolished, and its functions were redistributed within the Secretariat. The Organization-Instruction Department was replaced toward the end of 1946 by the Administration for Checking Party Organs, which in turn had its duties absorbed by a new unit called the Department for Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol Organs. The new department, as its name implied, supervised lower Party organizations, the Komsomol apparatus, and trade-union functionaries. Its functions included the placement of cadres, organizational activities, and checking on the fulfillment of Party decrees.

The most striking aspect of the reorganization was the recreation of

a series of industrial-branch departments — Heavy Industry, Light Industry, Agriculture, Transport, Planning-Finance-Trade, Administration, and others. Each was vested with personnel functions as well as responsibility for increasing the effectiveness of Party control in its area.<sup>66</sup> The functions of the Agitprop Department continued largely unchanged, though it also controlled the assignment of key personnel in all major agencies within its field of supervision. Its range of activities embraced Party propaganda, agitation, lectures, the press, schools, the arts, literature, science, publishing, cultural-enlightenment agencies, and all Party educational and research institutions. In addition, the Secretariat included a Foreign Section (INO) which concerned itself with the choice of personnel for service abroad, relations with foreign Communist parties, and the assembly of material for decisions of the Party high command in the foreign-policy field. There was also a Special Section, which was presumed to exercise jurisdiction over the secret police. The Main Political Administration of the Armed Forces (MPA), although formally located within the Ministry of Defense, could also be regarded as a part of the Central Committee apparatus, since, under the Party Rules, it functioned "with the powers of a department of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U."

#### *The Party Apparatus under Khrushchev*

After Stalin's death, Khrushchev's control of the central secretarial machinery of the Party played a crucial role in settling the issue of the succession. Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev used the patronage available to him as First Secretary to install his supporters in key Party posts. In the two and a half years between Khrushchev's assumption of the First Secretaryship in September 1953 and the assembly of the Twentieth Party Congress in February 1956, some forty-five out of eighty-four first secretaries of republic and regional Party committees were replaced; both the new appointees as well as those who were left undisturbed had special reason to rally to Khrushchev's support.<sup>67</sup> From the vantage point of the Secretariat, Khrushchev repeated Stalin's classic maneuver, packing the Central Committee with his supporters and using it ultimately to crush his Presidium opponents.


While Khrushchev placed heavy reliance on the Secretariat in his march to power, the fundamental basis on which it was organized remained largely unchanged. The name of the Department for Party, Trade Union, and Komsomol Organs was shortened to Party Organs, but the main organizational scheme remained one of paralleling every sector of Soviet life with a branch of the Secretariat. Perhaps the most important development was the creation within the secretariat of a series of separate departments to deal with RSFSR affairs. Beginning in 1955 with

the establishment of special Russian departments of Party Organs and Agriculture, the next year the secretariat was in effect divided into two sets of parallel branches: one dealing with the RSFSR and the other with the remaining union republics. On February 27, 1956, a Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR was created to provide a capstone for the branches of the secretariat concerned with Russian affairs, and a subsequent Central Committee decree of March 14, 1956, set up the following departments under the Russian Bureau: Party Organs; Propaganda and Agitation; Sciences, Schools, and Culture; Agriculture; Industry and Transport; Administrative, Trade, and Financial Organs.<sup>68</sup> Significantly, the Russian Bureau was headed by Khrushchev and filled with his supporters. While its establishment represented a response to the need for territorial specialization within the Secretariat, it also provided Khrushchev with a convenient instrument to consolidate his control of Russian Party and governmental organs.

The resulting structure of the Central Committee Secretariat is reflected in Chart VI. It should perhaps be noted that this chart is reconstructed from fragmentary data derived from the Soviet press and from a report prepared by a group of Italian Communists who interviewed senior members of the Soviet Central Committee Secretariat in 1958.<sup>69</sup> As the chart indicates, in addition to the two tiers of departments which bear separate responsibility for the RSFSR and the rest of the union republics, there are a number of departments which serve general purposes. The Department of Administrative Affairs is concerned with the internal housekeeping of the Secretariat, and the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy is essentially the Military Department of the Secretariat. The functions of the Departments of Foreign Affairs, Liaison with Bloc Parties, and Liaison with Non-Bloc Parties are indicated by their names; all three have become increasingly active and prominent in response to the Soviet Union's world role.

While the prestige and power of the Central Committee Secretariat has never been higher than under Khrushchev, he has undertaken to devolve some of its supervisory responsibilities on lower Party organs. A series of Central Committee decrees in 1956-1958 abolished the Political Administrations of the Railroads, Militia, Merchant Fleet, and Machine-Tractor Stations, which formerly reported directly to the Central Committee, and transferred Party organizations in these fields to supervision by the established hierarchy of regional and district committees.<sup>70</sup> Another Central Committee decree of August 17, 1956, liquidated the network of Party organizers in important enterprises who reported directly to the Central Committee and made Party organizations in these enterprises responsible to local committees.<sup>71</sup> Another series of Central Committee decrees in 1957-1958 gave union republic and lower Party

**CHART VI**  
*Organization of the Central Committee Secretariat, 1960*



organs larger discretion in dealing with organizational, financial, and budgetary questions involving staff expenditures, distribution of staff assignments, the issuance of local journals, and similar matters.<sup>72</sup> Such decisions, however, ordinarily require the "agreement" of the Central Committee, and quarterly reports to the Central Committee of actions taken must also be submitted. In the agricultural area, however, the most recent trend has been in the direction of recentralization. As a result of dissatisfaction inspired by lagging farm output, in March 1962 the management of agriculture was reorganized, and special Party organizers responsible to higher bodies were attached to the newly established territorial production administrations.<sup>73</sup> In July 1962 the Party Central Committee subordinated the rural *raikomy*, or district committees, to the Party organizers and decreed that the raikom first secretaries serve as their deputies.<sup>74</sup> The result was to reestablish central controls on a pattern made familiar when the MTS Political Administration served as the spearhead of Party control in the countryside.

At the November 1962 meeting of the Central Committee, further impetus was given to these recentralizing tendencies when the Party was reorganized on a production basis and the Party machine divided into two parts: one concerned with industry and the other with agriculture. Under this scheme all Party organizations in industrial establishments were to be administered by a vertical hierarchy of industrial Party committees, while Party organizations in kolkhozes, sovkhozes, and other agricultural enterprises were to be subject to a similar hierarchy of agricultural Party committees. The reorganization involved the abolition of all existing rural raikoms and the transfer of their authority to agricultural production administration Party committees, whose jurisdiction was expected, on the average, to embrace three of the old raions. These committees in turn were to be responsible to oblast or krai (regional) agricultural Party committees, which were to be paralleled by oblast or krai industrial committees with jurisdiction over town and zonal industrial Party Committees in their areas. The first point of coordination for these separate hierarchies was provided at the republic level, where there was to be one central committee and one presidium.

The effect of the reorganization was to strengthen the powers of the Central Committee Secretariat in Moscow. Three new Central Committee bureaus were created to supervise agriculture, heavy industry and construction, and chemical and light industries. Two new commissions were also established with jurisdiction over ideological and organizational questions. A special Central Asian Bureau directly subordinate to the Presidium was formed to supervise and coordinate Party work in the republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirghizia. The Bureau of the Central Committee for the RSFSR was retained, but at-

tached to it there were to be two new bureaus, one for industry and the other for agriculture. By tightening central controls, placing more emphasis on specialization within the Party apparatus, and focusing Party activity on the solution of economic problems, Khrushchev hoped to achieve an upsurge in production.

Despite the numerous structural reorganizations to which the Party's secretarial apparatus has been exposed over the years, a substantial continuity in its work is manifest. In one form or another, it has remained responsible for recommendations of candidates for leading Party and governmental posts, and it has exercised a considerable degree of autonomy in filling positions of lesser significance. As the eyes and ears of the Politburo and its successor, the Presidium, it has always borne a special responsibility for supervising the work of lower Party organizations, and it has been the avenue through which the control of the high command has been enforced on the rank and file. It has checked on the fulfillment of decrees by both Party and governmental organs. It has sustained the major burden of preparing and executing the propaganda line of the Party. It has also served as a funnel through which information has been channeled to the Soviet rulers. As the Party staff of the members of the leadership group, the Secretariat has brought problems to their attention, prepared materials for their deliberations, and embodied their decisions in the form of Party resolutions and decrees.

The search for an effective structure to realize these wide-ranging responsibilities has involved the apparatus in a whole series of abrupt reorganizations of which the latest is not necessarily the last. The waves of reform have oscillated between a functional and an industry-branch emphasis.

Each pattern of organization revealed its characteristic advantages and disadvantages. The functional scheme, by concentrating responsibilities for cadres in one center, facilitated the flexible disposition and interchange of personnel. By abolishing or minimizing Party organs which paralleled government departments, it economized on personnel, eliminated friction, strengthened the authority of the administrator, and made him solely accountable for his performance. From the point of view of Party control of the economy, however, the functional principle had obvious weaknesses. The advantages of specialization in the choice of cadres and the enforcement of Party decrees were lost.

Organization around branches of industry, too, had its strengths and defects. It offered an effective method of adjusting Party control to an increasingly complex and differentiated economy, and it created a favorable milieu for the growth of expertness both in the choice of personnel and the character of supervision. But it also involved duplication of machinery, the possibility of friction between Party and administrative or-

gans, the disappearance of any central responsibility for personnel policy, and the danger that each industry branch would become a miniature secretariat in itself.

The history of the Secretariat would appear to indicate that the choice of one or the other of these principles of organization at particular periods has been determined largely by the controlling urgencies of the moment. In the early days of the Secretariat, the emphasis was on the consolidation of the Party machine and the projection of its influence throughout the Soviet structure. A unified cadre apparatus played a central role in achieving this objective. As industrialization and collectivization generated an insatiable demand for new trained personnel, a dispersal of cadre functions began to occur, and in 1934 the organization of the apparatus was largely shifted over to an industrial-branch basis. The large-scale destruction of cadres during the Great Purge of the mid-thirties and the necessity of rebuilding the Party machine introduced a new functional imperative, and, under Zhdanov's aegis, in 1939 a unified cadre administration was reintroduced. As problems of industrial development reasserted their importance, the Zhdanov reforms were first whittled away in 1941 and then completely reversed in 1948-49 with a return to the industrial-branch emphasis. Under Khrushchev the same basic approach has continued to prevail, with greater emphasis on production specialization.

The size of the present-day Party apparatus, in the sense of full-time paid workers, remains a well-guarded secret. Estimates must necessarily be more or less plausible guesses. If the report of the Central Auditing Commission at the Nineteenth Party Congress is given credence, the number of full-time Party functionaries in 1952 was approximately the same as in 1939, despite the fact that Party membership more than doubled in the intervening period.<sup>75</sup> In 1937, when the membership of the Party was approximately two million, or a half million below the 1939 level, Stalin had occasion in the course of a speech to a Central Committee plenum to calculate "the leading forces of our Party."

In our Party, if we have in mind its leading strata, there are about 3,000 to 4,000 first rank leaders whom I would call our Party's corps of generals.

Then there are about 30,000 to 40,000 middle rank leaders who are our Party corps of officers.

Then there are about 100,000 to 150,000 of the lower rank Party command staff who are, so to speak, our Party's non-commissioned officers.<sup>76</sup>

If the upper range of these figures is accepted as a rough index of the size of the apparatus in October 1952, the calculation yields a total of 194,000 paid functionaries serving a Party membership of 6,882,145, or approximately one full-time Party official for every thirty-five members and

candidates. This proportion is slightly higher than the one-to-forty ratio which Molotov announced at the Fourteenth Party Congress as prevailing in 1925.<sup>77</sup> After the death of Stalin, there were some indications that the ranks of the Party apparatus continued to swell. As a counterpoise to the announcement by Moskatov at the Twentieth Party Congress that the Central Committee apparatus had been reduced by 24.7 per cent since the Nineteenth Party Congress, a Central Committee decree of May 21, 1957, ordering a reduction in the number of paid secretaries of primary Party organizations, admitted that the number of such paid secretaries had quintupled since 1940 while the number of primary Party organizations had only doubled.<sup>78</sup> The concern of the leadership with the inflation of the Party apparatus was demonstrated in a series of decrees in 1956–1957, calling for a 25–30 per cent decrease in the staff of obkoms, kraikoms, and union-republic central committees, a 15–20 per cent cut in the staffs of rural raikoms, and a 10–15 per cent reduction in the staff of city and urban raion committees.<sup>79</sup> At the Twenty-Second Party Congress, A. F. Gorkin, the chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, announced that as a result of the movement to enlarge oblasts and raions, 12 oblast Party committees and 1,186 rural and city Party committees had been abolished between January 1, 1956, and October 1, 1961: "This permitted a 25.2 per cent reduction of responsible officials and a 22.7 per cent reduction of technical personnel."<sup>80</sup> The drive to cut down on paid Party functionaries also took the form of putting increasing reliance on nonstaff (unpaid) instructors, nonstaff sections of Party committees, and commissions and councils attached to committees to which Party members contribute voluntary labor. In the three years following the September 30, 1958, decree of the Central Committee authorizing raion, city, oblast, krai, and union-republic central committees to appoint nonstaff instructors, more than 80,000 were registered on the rolls of Party committees.<sup>81</sup> At the beginning of 1962, there were also about 4,000 nonstaff sections in raion, city, oblast, and krai committees, and more than 90,000 Party members participated in the work of special commissions and councils.<sup>82</sup>

Although these measures appear clearly designed to reduce the number of paid Party apparatchiki, no specific figures have been released on their total number. P. Pigalev, deputy chief of the Party Organs Department for the union republics, stated that the number of paid officials per thousand Communists in late 1961 was almost 33 per cent of what it was in 1940.<sup>83</sup> If the assumption is made that the size of the paid apparatus in 1940 was in the 150,000–200,000 range, one can infer a somewhat similar size in 1961, since Party membership nearly tripled between 1940 and 1961. A. Kirakosyan, head of the Party Organs Department of the Armenian Central Committee, indicated in January 1962 that the paid

Party apparatus of all Party committees in Armenia was less than 850. If the ratio to Party membership which this figure represents is projected to other republics, it yields a total for the USSR as a whole of some 100,000. In the absence of official statistics, these estimates can only be recorded as indicative of the range of inference which fragmentary data invite.

Whatever the precise size of the Party apparatus, it represents the hard core of the Party. From the point of view of the Party leadership, it provides a continuous circulatory system by which new elites are lifted to positions of responsibility and the demands of the leadership are transmitted to the rank and file. Over the years its character has undergone substantial change. Except in the highest circles, the underground workers of prerevolutionary days have practically disappeared. For most of the present apparatus, the Revolution of 1917 is either a page in the history books or something that happened so far back in childhood that its spirit and mood have to be consciously recreated in order to be a meaningful part of experience. The lives of the generation that has risen to power within the party have revolved around the great tasks of the postrevolutionary period—industrialization and collectivization and, more recently, the war against the Nazi enemy and the postwar reconstruction. The new generation of apparatchiki is increasingly technical-minded, involved intimately in problems of production, of organization, and of administration, and it is educated with these responsibilities in mind.

It has also been strongly indoctrinated in the virtues of the Soviet order. Despite increasing contacts with the outside world, its outlook tends to be insular, and its energies have been almost wholly absorbed in building the foundations of Soviet power. Proud of the growing might and prestige of the Soviet Union, its loyalty reinforced by the privileges which it enjoys, the new generation of Party apparatchiki is characterized by toughness, discipline, and strength.

The life of the apparatchik remains hazardous. Though there have been no blood baths on the scale of the Great Purge since the mid-thirties, shakeups in the apparatus are frequent, and punishment for serious missteps is severe. Even the most powerful may fall from the heights to the lowest depths with dizzying swiftness. Yet the apparatus continues to attract the movers and shakers of Soviet society, the organization-minded men who identify themselves with the views of the top leadership and who achieve their ambitions as wielders of power rather than as architects of policy. Those who adapt themselves skillfully to the conditions of survival advance rapidly in the Party hierarchy and may even dream of attaining a place in the highest organ of Party power, the Presidium itself. The great majority must content themselves

with aspirations toward lesser glory, perhaps the prize of a regional or district committee secretaryship or a less conspicuous but still influential position in the Party hierarchy.

While the individual members of the apparatus remain expendable and serve as readily available scapegoats when difficulties develop, the apparatus has become indispensable. It provides the organizational cement which holds the Party together. The personal dictatorship of the Leader has embodied itself in the Party dictatorship of the apparatus. Like Frankenstein's monster, the apparatus has acquired a momentum of its own, a vested interest in its own survival which promises to outlive its creator and to perpetuate its system of rule long after the forces which gave birth to it have been forgotten.

## *Chapter 7*

# *Party Organization, Activities, and Problems*

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An analysis of Communist Party organization must carefully distinguish between professed principles and operative practices. The organizational principles which Communism avows radiate a democratic aura. Democratic centralism, inner-Party democracy, and the stress on criticism and self-criticism carry overtones for Western ears which conjure up libertarian visions of free discussion and the interplay of competing ideas. In borrowing the phraseology of liberal democracy, Communism pays its opponents the semantic compliment of recognizing the continuing strength of the tradition which they embody. The verbal masquerade which Communism adopts, however, should not be permitted to obscure the dictatorial essence of its organizational philosophy.

### *Democratic Centralism in Theory and Practice*

Democratic centralism is advanced as "the guiding principle of the organizational structure of the Party." It is defined in the Party Rules as follows:

- (a) election of all Party executive bodies from bottom to top;
- (b) periodic accountability of Party bodies to their Party organizations and to higher bodies;
- (c) strict Party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority;
- (d) the absolutely binding character of the decisions of higher bodies upon lower bodies.<sup>1</sup>

Taken at face value and read through uncritical Western eyes, these tenets seem to have an obvious democratic character. The power of the Party leadership seems to rest on elections and to derive from the majority

will of the Party membership. The Party leadership purports to be responsible to the rank and file, and presumably it can be replaced when it no longer satisfies the aspirations of the majority.

The hard realities are in striking contrast. In the slogan "democratic centralism," centralism has primary significance. Some authority must, of course, be delegated to lower Party organs, but its exercise must be consistent with the wishes of the high command. The position of the top Party leadership is sacrosanct; it cannot be subjected to challenge or criticism. The characteristic mode of selecting Party leaders is by cooption and designation from above rather than by elections from below. Party elections ordinarily represent formal devices for registering assent rather than forums of free choice. Reports are rendered by Party leaders to the mass membership, but no report which incorporates policy decisions of the leadership can be rejected or criticized; it can only be enforced.

The attempt to define democratic centralism in terms of the "subordination of the minority to the majority" is meaningless. Party factions are prohibited, and competing centers of power are outlawed. The Party leadership tolerates no competitors. Its voice is the voice of the entire Party. Its claims are total, and it demands a total outpouring of loyalty from its subordinates. The essence of "democratic centralism" is contained in article (d) of its formal definition: "the absolutely binding character of the decisions of higher bodies upon lower bodies." The organizational pattern of the Communist Party is that of a military hierarchy in which policy directives come from the central command and the obligation of the subordinate is to carry them out.

The Communist claim that the organizational practices of the Party are based on inner-Party democracy cannot sustain serious scrutiny. The Party Rules contain a number of references to "inner-Party democracy." While this phrase is never explicitly defined, the rules declare that "The free and businesslike discussions of questions of Party policy in individual Party organizations or in the Party as a whole is an inalienable right of the Party member and an important principle of inner-Party democracy."<sup>2</sup> But while the rules profess to safeguard the free expression of the views of Party members until a decision has been reached, discussions must all "be carried out in such a way as to . . . prevent the possibility of attempts to form factional groupings destructive to Party unity or of attempts to split the Party."<sup>3</sup> As these somewhat enigmatic statements make clear, any discussion which takes the form of an organized challenge of the policy of the Party leadership will not be tolerated. F. R. Kozlov, in his report on the revised Party Rules to the Twenty-Second Party Congress, put it clearly: "Naturally one must not allow a situation to come about in which the Party can be drawn into a sterile discussion at

the whim of some small group of muddleheaded or immature people, in which individual anti-Party elements can undertake actions leading to the subversion of Party unity . . . That is why the rules provide guarantees against attempts by an insignificant minority to force its will on the majority, as well as against attempts to form factional cliques and to split the Party.”<sup>4</sup>

What then is the scope of permissible discussion? Its content in practice is subject to definition by the Party leaders. The leadership may open up certain limited areas for discussion and invite suggestions and criticisms from lower Party organs and individual members — as it did in connection with the revision of the Party Rules in 1939, 1952, and 1961. It may permit a “free and businesslike discussion” so long as the discussion is addressed to the question of how the policies of the top command can be most effectively and efficiently carried out and involves no encroachment on the decision-making power of the leadership itself. “Inner-Party democracy” in the Soviet system is largely a creature of dictatorial pleasure; its frail structure lacks any other base of support.

Communist insistence on the existence of inner-Party democracy is frequently buttressed by citing the wide array of criticism and self-criticism (*samokritika*) which fills the Party press and is expressed at Party conclaves and public gatherings. Less frequently stressed are the carefully defined limits within which such criticism is tolerated or encouraged. Criticism cannot be directed at the regime, its top leadership, or the policies which they espouse. It cannot be organized criticism in the sense of representing the platform of a dissident faction. It must be “constructive” criticism — that is to say, criticism which is acceptable to the Party command, which serves a useful purpose in supporting its authority, and which contributes to the operational efficiency of the system over which the directing elite of the Party presides.

Typically, criticism and self-criticism are directed at levels of the Party and governmental hierarchy below the top ruling group and take the form of revelations of bureaucratic inefficiency or venality, of neglect of Party duties or administrative responsibilities, of deviation from strict Party orthodoxy, and of failure to make flexible adjustment to a changing Party line. Frequently they assume the character of a campaign which gives every evidence of being centrally directed and which is designed to concentrate public attention on the elimination of an abuse or on a shift in policy which the Party leadership is particularly concerned to emphasize at a given moment.

From the point of view of the Party command, the institution of criticism and self-criticism serves a number of useful purposes. It operates as an actual or potential prod to the inefficient, venal, or irresponsible Party or governmental administrator. Controlled criticism may be used

periodically to discipline or replace local Party leaders who are ineffective, who demonstrate independence of views, or who are excessively ambitious. Criticism in such circumstances discharges an important function in ensuring an energetic and loyal Party apparatus. To the extent that denunciations and exposures are encouraged by the regime and complaints are freely volunteered, the leadership is also provided with a barometer of mass discontent. By opening up at least one channel for the ventilation of grievances, the Party leadership provides an officially approved outlet through which the vexations and tensions which accumulate in Soviet society can find partial, even if greatly restricted, expression. At the same time, the leadership protects its own infallibility by providing victims in the lower ranks of the Party and governmental hierarchy on whom popular anger and frustration can be vented. By diffusing the targets against which complaints can be directed, it dissipates the expression of resentment and prevents criticism from becoming an organized challenge to the regime itself. The regulated procedures of criticism and self-criticism are the Communist substitute for free discussion. They constitute a form of mass manipulation rather than spontaneous and creative acts of mass participation.

The new Party Rules approved by the Twenty-Second Party Congress, in October 1961, appear on the surface to broaden the scope of inner-Party democracy. They incorporate the principle of rotation in office and would thus seem to impose institutional restraints on the Party leadership. Under the new system not less than one quarter of the members of the Presidium and the Central Committee are to be "renewed" at all regular elections, and Presidium members will "as a rule" not be elected for more than three successive terms. Outstanding individuals of proven usefulness, however, may serve in these bodies for longer terms, provided they are re-elected by not less than three quarters of the votes cast in secret ballot. Central Committees at the union-republic, territorial, and regional level are to have at least one third of their membership renewed at each regular election; lower Party committees are similarly required to renew at least half of their membership. Members of executive Party bodies at these levels "may be elected for not more than three terms," while secretaries of primary Party bodies "may be elected for not more than two successive terms." Again, special exceptions are made for highly qualified individuals, provided they are re-elected by the necessary three-quarters majority.

In explaining these changes to the congress, Khrushchev pointed out that they were designed to accomplish three purposes: (1) "to provide a guarantee against any recurrence of the cult of personality," (2) to open the way to the promotion of talented young people to leading Party posts, and (3) to enable the Party to root out leaders who organize

"family circles" around them and engage in "mutual concealment of shortcomings and mistakes in work."<sup>5</sup> While the rules on their face provide a formal mechanism by which even Khrushchev could be voted out of office, it is highly unlikely that this prospect has occasioned him any loss of sleep. More important than statutory niceties is the actual structure of power within the Party, and, as long as Khrushchev or whoever succeeds him retains a tight grip on the Party apparatus, it can safely be predicted that such a person will emerge as one of those Party workers who, in the language of the rules, "by virtue of their recognized authority and high political, organizational, or other abilities" are eligible for re-election to executive bodies "for a longer period."<sup>6</sup> As Kozlov put it, "It is essential to say that the principle of a systematic renewal of the Party organs is closely linked with the principle of continuity of leadership . . . Without a more or less steady group of leaders, the continuity of leadership or the transfer of accumulated experience cannot be ensured."<sup>7</sup>

Indeed, from the point of view of the Party leader, the new rules sanction and legitimize what can only be described as a new form of permanent purge. In the hands of strong Party leaders like Khrushchev, the provisions for rotation in office can be manipulated not only to rid the Party apparatus of the inefficient and to make way for the able, but also to eliminate those who prove troublesome, to reward the faithful, and to maintain sufficient uncertainty about future prospects to evoke sustained effort and loyalty to the leader's cause.

Despite recent tendencies to provide for greater participation by Party activists in Party management, the operative organizational principles of Communist Party life remain saturated in elitism. The directing Party center is immune from rank-and-file control. It exercises a monopoly of leadership, replenishing its ranks by cooption. In the eyes of the leadership, the rank-and-file member is essentially an agent or a tool rather than an independent source of authority in his own right.

The prototype of the ideal Bolshevik whom the Party leadership seeks to fashion and create is essentially that of a dedicated subordinate who sees the ruling group as the incarnation of the organizational wisdom of the Party. The stern demands which the Party requires its members to meet are made dramatically manifest in the new Party Rules: "It is the duty of a Party member," they state,

(a) to fight for the creation of the material and technical base of communism, to set an example of the Communist attitude toward labor, to raise labor productivity, to take the initiative in all that is new and progressive, to support and propagate advanced experience, to master technology, to improve his qualifications, to safeguard and increase public socialist property — the foundation of the might and prosperity of the Soviet homeland;

(b) to carry out Party decisions firmly and undeviatingly, to explain the

policy of the Party to the masses, to help strengthen and broaden the Party's ties with the people, to be considerate and attentive toward people, to respond promptly to the wants and needs of the working people;

(c) to take an active part in the political life of the country, in the management of state affairs and in economic and cultural construction, to set an example in the fulfillment of public duty, to help develop and strengthen communist social relations;

(d) to master Marxist-Leninist theory, to raise his ideological level and to contribute to the molding and rearing of the man of Communist society. To combat resolutely any manifestation of bourgeois ideology, remnants of a private-property psychology, religious prejudice, and other survivals of the past, to observe the principles of Communist morality, and to place public interests above personal ones;

(e) to be an active proponent of the ideas of socialist internationalism and Soviet patriotism among the masses of the working people, to combat survivals of nationalism and chauvinism, to contribute by word and deed to strengthening the friendship of peoples of the USSR and the fraternal ties of the Soviet people with the peoples of the socialist countries and the proletariat and working people of all countries;

(f) to strengthen the ideological and organizational unity of the Party in every way, to safeguard the Party against the infiltration of persons unworthy of the lofty title of Communist, to be truthful and honest with the Party and people, to display vigilance, to preserve Party and state secrets;

(g) to develop criticism and self-criticism, boldly to disclose shortcomings and strive for their removal, to combat ostentation, conceit, complacency, and localism, to rebuff firmly any attempt to suppress criticism, to resist any actions detrimental to the Party and the state and to report them to Party bodies, up to and including the Central Committee of the CPSU;

(h) to carry out unswervingly the Party line in the selection of cadres according to their political and work qualifications, to be uncompromising in all cases of violation of the Leninist principles of the selection and training of cadres;

(i) to observe Party and state discipline, which is equally binding on all Party members . . .

(j) to help in every way to strengthen the defense might of the USSR, to wage a tireless struggle for peace and friendship among peoples.<sup>8</sup>

What is striking about this vision of the dedicated Bolshevik — this positive hero who is endlessly propagated in Soviet literature — is its predominantly instrumental character. In theory, the model Bolshevik is expected to be a responsible individual who freely follows the Party line because he knows that it embodies the "truth." In practice, his freedom consists in unquestioning identification with the goals proclaimed by the Party leadership and complete subordination to its directives. While the motivational patterns which determine Party affiliation are complex and represent varying blends of careerism and idealistic dedication, successful adaptation to Party life and advancement in the hierarchy are likely to be facilitated for those who feel themselves fully identified with the views of the Party leadership, whose personality structures do not require

expression of independent political views, and whose satisfactions are obtained and ambitions realized as cogs in an infallible organization. The operational philosophy of Communism is designed to breed willing robots whose "freedom" is exercised in ingenious and energetic efforts to discharge the tasks which the Party leadership assigns to them.

### *The Functions of the Party Organization*

From the point of view of the leaders of the regime, the Party organization operates essentially as a disciplined phalanx to carry out their will. The Party has its units in every major organization and establishment in Soviet society. The Party leadership holds its local representatives responsible for the fulfillment of plans in all areas and organizations to which they are assigned. To be sure, day-to-day operating responsibilities are vested in the governmental hierarchy of managers and administrators. But every level of the governmental hierarchy is both interpenetrated with, and subject to check by, the corresponding level of the Party hierarchy. Since the Party leadership is the incarnation of supreme power in the Soviet state, its local emissaries serve not only as the eyes and ears but also as the voice of the Kremlin. As a matter of accepted practice, they are expected to keep in touch with all the enterprises and activities within their jurisdiction, to be alert to any failure of performance, to report constantly to their own higher authorities on the state of plan fulfillment, and to take such measures, in collaboration with local administrators, as will ensure the realization of the goals and tasks which the Party high command has set.

Through the Party organization, the leadership seeks to consolidate its dominion over the key positions in Soviet society. It incorporates and assimilates the governing elite into the Party's ranks. The road to power and preferment in the Soviet system lies through affiliation with the Party; important posts in the Soviet control apparatus are reserved for trusted Party members. By absorbing the power seekers in Soviet society and making access to authority dependent on enrollment in the Party, the Party leadership endeavors to construct a dependable governing machine which will be responsive to its commands. At the same time, it attempts to prevent the emergence of any competing power center which might challenge its monopoly of political direction. Although the ruling group is primarily concerned with the selection of cadres for governing responsibilities, it also tries to preserve its link with the masses by recruiting leading workers and collective farmers as Party members. The mass membership of the Party serves the double purpose of widening its popular support and of facilitating the acceptance and execution of policies determined by the top command.

A constant objective of the Party leadership is to transform the Party

organization into a completely trustworthy instrument of the ruling group. The Bolshevik steeling of the Party is accomplished primarily by indoctrination. Through an elaborate network of Party educational institutions, the leadership seeks to instill *partinost'* (devotion to the Party) in every member. Conformity is enforced by stringent discipline, but the leadership demands more than mere conformity. It strives to convert every member into a responsible agent who is deeply persuaded that the ruling group possesses the keys which will unlock the secrets of the universe. The leadership endeavors in this fashion to breed a conscious acceptance of the necessity of subordination. It seeks to build a disciplined army solidified by a unifying faith.

The Party organization also utilizes its members to expand the influence of the Party among non-Party Soviet citizens. A significant feature of modern totalitarian dictatorship is the careful attention devoted to the manipulation of mass sentiment for the purpose of enrolling support for the regime. The Communist dictatorship, in part because of its own historical rise to power on a tide of exploitation of mass grievances, has always taken this function of mobilizing mass support with high seriousness. Through a complex network of agitational, educational, and propaganda activities, which are largely manned by Party specialists, and through control of the media of mass communication, the Party leadership assiduously pursues its objective of winning doctrinal ascendancy over the mind of Soviet man. Party agitation insinuates itself into every crevice of the Soviet social structure, and no competitors are tolerated. As missionary to the heathen, the Party member communicates the goals and demands of the ruling group into the farthest reaches of Soviet society.

#### *The Central Organs of the Party*

The structure of the Party is designed to accomplish these multiform purposes. At the peak of the Party pyramid stands the Presidium. Created at the Nineteenth Party Congress (1952) to replace the old Politburo and Orgburo, in late 1962 it consisted of twelve members and six alternates. Headed by Khrushchev, it contained the top Party leaders of the Soviet Union. The Party Rules provide for its election by the Central Committee and empower it "to direct the work of the Central Committee between plenary sessions."<sup>9</sup> Its authority vis-à-vis the Central Committee depends on circumstances. In periods of transition, when a struggle for the succession is under way and the Presidium is sharply divided, control of the Central Committee may be decisive in resolving the conflict. When Khrushchev was faced with a hostile majority in the Presidium in 1957, the preponderance of support which he was able to muster in the Central

Committee not only turned the scales in his favor, but enabled him to purge the Presidium of his opponents and to pack it with his own faithful entourage. Once a succession issue is settled, however, the role of the Central Committee tends to recede while the prestige of the Presidium mounts. Whenever dominating figures such as Stalin and Khrushchev succeed in consolidating their power in both the Presidium and the Central Committee, new Presidium members tend to be coopted by the leaders, and the role of the Central Committee is limited to ratifying their choices.

According to the Party Rules, the "highest body" of the Party is the Party congress, which is to be convened "not less often than once every four years." Under the rules which prevailed prior to 1952, congresses were supposed to meet at least once every three years. Actually, a period of four years elapsed between the meeting of the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 and the assembly of the Seventeenth Congress in 1934. The Eighteenth Congress did not meet until 1939, some five years later, and the Nineteenth did not take place until 1952, after an interval of more than thirteen years. Since Stalin's death, congresses have met with far greater regularity. The Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 was followed by a special congress, the Twenty-First in January 1959, and by the Twenty-Second in October 1961.

Since the late twenties, however, Party congresses have ceased to provide an arena in which opposition voices are raised. Under Stalin, congresses were transformed into rallies of Party and state functionaries who assembled to applaud and ratify the policies proclaimed by the Supreme Leader. All decisions were made unanimously, and the discussions gave every outward evidence of having been carefully organized in advance to reach a foreordained result. Under Khrushchev, strenuous efforts have been made to give the Party congresses a more "democratic" and "representative" tinge. Thus, at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, of the 4,394 voting delegates present, 984 were workers, brigade leaders, or foremen in industry, and 469 were collective farmers, state-farm workers, or brigade leaders and heads of collective and state-farm sections.<sup>10</sup> But decisions are still announced as unanimous, and no organized opposition is permitted. The Khrushchevian Party congresses have been replete with dramatic revelations of the abuses of the Stalinist era and the sins of the anti-Party group, but no member of the latter has been permitted to present his views to a Party congress, and those who have been allowed to speak since 1957 have confined themselves to confessing their "mistakes." While the permissible range of disagreement in delegates' speeches has been widened under Khrushchev, the Party congress remains a rally of the faithful, chiefly significant as a convenient platform from which the leadership proclaims new policies and goals, announces modi-

fications in the rules and program, and obtains formal approval of shifts in the top Party command.

The Party Rules require the Congress to elect a Central Committee and a Central Auditing Commission. The latter body is of minor importance. According to the rules, it "checks on the promptness of the conduct of affairs in central bodies of the Party and audits the treasury and undertakings of the Central Committee."<sup>11</sup> The chairman of the Central Auditing Commission renders a brief report to the congress in which attention is ordinarily called to instances of lax financial discipline in the affairs of Party organizations, and the size and efficiency of the Party apparatus are critically appraised.

The Central Committee is assigned a far more significant role. In the words of the Party Rules, "In the intervals between congresses, the Central Committee . . . directs the entire work of the Party and local Party bodies; selects and places executive cadres; directs the work of central state organizations and public organizations of the working people through the Party groups within them; creates various agencies, institutions, and enterprises of the Party and directs their work; appoints the editorial boards of central newspapers and magazines that function under its control; and distributes the funds of the Party budget and supervises its implementation."<sup>12</sup>

The Central Committee itself, however, is not in a position to carry out these broad responsibilities on a day-to-day basis. It is a large and unwieldy body. The Central Committee elected at the Nineteenth Congress comprised 125 members and 111 alternates. The Twentieth Congress increased these totals to 133 members and 122 alternates, and at the Twenty-Second Congress the Central Committee was again enlarged to 175 members and 155 candidates. The size of the committee and the fact that many of its members are located at some distance from Moscow detract from its operational significance. As it is now constituted, the largest single contingent in the Central Committee consists of Party secretaries from the center, the union republics, and the more important regions. The next largest group is the state functionaries, including leading members of the USSR Council of Ministers and the chairmen of the Councils of Ministers of the union republics. In addition, there is a sprinkling of representation from the top military command, the foreign service, the police, outstanding Party ideologists, intellectuals, and scientists. The great majority of its members are weighed down with outside administrative responsibilities which absorb most of their energy. For most of them, membership in the Central Committee is a mark of prestige and status rather than an onerous daily chore. The flood of decrees which issue in the name of the Central Committee are actually prepared by its Secretariat subject to the immediate direction of the

Central Committee secretaries and the policy guidance of the Presidium itself.

In Lenin's lifetime and for some years thereafter, the Central Committee met more or less regularly and provided a forum where policy issues were hotly debated. With the rout of the left- and right-wing opposition in the late twenties and the consolidation of Stalin's personal power, the role of the Central Committee declined greatly. Khrushchev, in the course of his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, had occasion to comment on the eclipse of the Central Committee during the last fifteen years of Stalin's life:

Central Committee plenums were hardly ever called. It should be sufficient to mention that during all the years of the Patriotic War not a single Central Committee plenum took place. It is true that there was an attempt to call a Central Committee plenum in October 1941, when Central Committee members from the whole country were called to Moscow. They waited two days for the opening of the plenum, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and to talk to the Central Committee members . . ."<sup>13</sup>

After Stalin's death, the moribund Central Committee took on new life. It emerged not merely as an organ to legitimize the daily decisions of the Secretariat and Presidium, and as a forum in which major policy changes were announced, but also as a force in its own right. Under the new Party Rules, it is required to hold "not less than one plenary session every six months." Directly following Stalin's death, it met jointly with the Council of Ministers and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to approve the allocation of Party and governmental posts, and a week later it met alone to ratify Malenkov's resignation from the Central Committee Secretariat. In July 1953 it was again convoked to endorse the arrest of Beria, and in September it met to elect Khrushchev First Secretary and to hear his report on agriculture. In the years since 1953, it has always assembled at least twice annually, sometimes more often. In 1957, for example, it held four sessions and in 1958 six.

The frequency of its meetings provided one index of its enhanced importance, but its real power potential was disclosed in the role which it played in settling the issue of succession after Stalin's death. With the Presidium divided, Khrushchev sought to counterbalance his weakness there by building up the authority of the Central Committee, where he was increasingly strong. Khrushchevian proposals which encountered opposition from some Presidium members were referred to the Central Committee for approval and support. These tactics were pursued in connection with the virgin-lands program at the February 1954 meeting, the reconciliation with Tito at the July 1955 session, the de-Stalinization program at the Twentieth Party Congress, and, after a temporary ebbing of

Khrushchev's prestige in the wake of the Hungarian and Polish events, in February 1957 in connection with the industrial reorganization. The apogee of Central Committee authority was reached in June 1957, when Khrushchev successfully mobilized his supporters in the Central Committee to purge the Presidium of the hostile majority which sought to unseat him.

Once Khrushchev's ascendancy in both the Presidium and Central Committee had been effectively established and the Central Committee ceased to be an instrument of inner-Party struggle, its authority tended to recede. The published proceedings of Central Committee sessions after 1957 provide dramatic evidence of Khrushchev's dominating role and of the subordinate position of the Central Committee itself. Despite these indications of increasing weakness, the Central Committee has emerged from the obscurity to which it was consigned by Stalin, and it represents a reservoir of experience and counsel on which Khrushchev draws in formulating his policies. Its inherent importance as an assembly of leading Party notables is reinforced by the crucial role which it has played and may well continue to play in deciding the outcome of succession struggles or policy differences that cannot be resolved at the Presidium level.

The day-to-day work of servicing the Central Committee and its Presidium and preparing the decrees which are issued in its name is performed by the Secretariat. The Party Rules provide that the Secretariat shall "direct current work, chiefly in the selection of cadres and organization of checkup on fulfillment."<sup>14</sup> Responsibility for supervising the activities of the Secretariat and of lower Party organs falls on a relatively small but highly influential group of Central Committee secretaries, headed by Khrushchev as First Secretary.

Secretaries are formally "elected" by the Central Committee, but a slate designated by the dominant Party leadership is ordinarily automatically approved. In the post-Stalinist period, the number of secretaries has varied from a low of three to a high of twelve. In late 1962 there were twelve Central Committee secretaries.

Of the present group, four — Khrushchev, F. R. Kozlov, M. A. Suslov, and O. V. Kuusinen — are full members of the Presidium. The remaining eight are P. N. Demichev, former Moscow gorkom first secretary, who serves as chairman of the Central Committee Bureau for Chemistry and Light Industry; L. F. Ilyichev, the chairman of the Central Committee Ideological Commission; B. N. Ponomarev, former head of a department in the Central Committee Secretariat concerned with liaison with non-bloc Communist parties; A. N. Shelepin, one-time Komsomol first secretary and State Security Committee (KGB) chairman, who is presently chairman of the Party-State Control Committee; V. I. Polyakov, the chair-

man of the Central Committee Bureau for Agriculture; A. P. Rudakov, the chairman of the Central Committee Bureau for Heavy Industry and Construction; V. N. Titov, the chairman of the Central Committee Commission for Organizational-Party Questions; and Yu. V. Andropov, one-time ambassador to Hungary, who has been active in maintaining liaison relations with Communist bloc parties.

The division of duties among the secretaries is not a matter of public record, though some indication of their areas of primary interest can be inferred from reports of their activities and their own pronouncements. The paramount directing role is, of course, reserved for Khrushchev. Kozlov apparently functions in the secretariat as Khrushchev's main deputy. In announcing the composition of the Secretariat after the Twenty-Second Congress, the Soviet press departed from the usual practice of listing members in alphabetical order and put Kozlov in second place, immediately after Khrushchev.<sup>15</sup> Since Kozlov had already been singled out as the only other official to present a major report to the congress — on the new Party Rules — these moves were widely interpreted as implying that Kozlov was the designated heir-apparent. His area of specialization in the Secretariat — Party cadres and organizational questions — is of strategic importance, but it needs to be remembered that Kozlov's predecessor in that post, A. I. Kirichenko, did not last long<sup>16</sup> and that V. N. Titov, as chairman of the Central Committee Commission for Organizational-Party Questions also exercises authority in this area. Suslov, one-time head of the Agitprop Department in the Secretariat, by virtue of his seniority bears the main responsibility for Party ideological work, though he is assisted in this area by Ilyichev, who was designated chairman of the Central Committee Ideological Commission at the November 1962 session of the Central Committee. Kuusinen, a veteran Comintern functionary now past eighty, probably shares responsibility for relations with the international Communist movement and bloc parties with Ponomarev and Andropov. Shelepin's area of jurisdiction embraces the police, the law, the procuracy, and the judicial organs, as well as Party-state control functions. The duties of the other Party secretaries are specifically defined. Polyakov is responsible for agriculture, Rudakov for heavy industry and construction, and Demichev for chemical and light industries.

The Central Committee apparatus also includes a Party Commission which is presently headed by N. M. Shvernik, a Presidium member and Old Bolshevik. Its functions are limited to enforcing Party discipline and passing on appeals from decisions of lower Party organs on expulsions from the Party and Party penalties.

The Party Commission is a truncated successor to the old Party Control Committee, which was abolished at the November 1962 session of

the Central Committee. The drastic reorganization of the Party-state control apparatus announced at that time resulted in the creation of a new Party-State Control Committee, responsible both to the Central Committee and to the USSR Council of Ministers.<sup>17</sup> This committee merged the parallel control functions formerly performed by the State Control Commission and the Party Control Committee.

Until the reorganization, the Control Committee was concerned not only with matters of internal Party life, but also with transgressions of state discipline. As Shvernik noted in his speech to the Twenty-First Congress, "Of late, the Party Control Committee has received complaints about violations by some sovnarkhoz [regional economic council] workers of state discipline, about serious shortcomings in the work of some enterprises, involving mismanagement and procrastination, and on the nonfulfillment of coordinated deliveries by some enterprises."<sup>18</sup> He went on to point out that the committee had exposed illegal activity in the Mordovian and Ivanovo sovnarkhozes, that it had intervened on behalf of the Saratov glass works to accelerate delayed deliveries of machine tools from Novosibirsk, and that it had exercised its authority in a variety of ways to ensure plan fulfillment. These and similar functions have now been transferred to the Party-State Control Committee.

The main business of the Party Commission will now be its appellate work. At the Twenty-Second Congress, Shvernik stated that, since the last congress, the Control Committee "examined over 70,000 appeal applications by Communists from the decisions of local Party organs to expel them from the Party and to impose Party penalties."<sup>19</sup> In an oblique reference to "the liquidation of the consequences of the cult of personality," he revealed that "over 15,000 persons had been restored to Party ranks, among them a large number expelled from the Party in the past owing to unfounded political charges."<sup>20</sup>

#### *The Lower Party Organs*

The central organs of the Party are the repository of supreme power in the Party hierarchy. Their orders and directives control the activities of all local agencies; the practice of "democratic centralism" involves subordination of lower Party organs to higher ones. Like all armies and bureaucratic organizations, the Party operates under a system of graded responsibilities. It has its generals, its senior and junior officers, and its noncommissioned personnel. Its pattern of organization reflects and parallels the governmental structure of the Soviet Union. At least four and sometimes five layers of administration can be distinguished. Below the all-union level, in all republics except the RSFSR, there are republic Party organizations. These in turn are ordinarily broken down into *oblasty* (regional Party units). Below the oblasts are the *gorod* (city) and

rural production Party organizations. The larger city organizations in turn are subdivided into urban raion, or ward, organizations.\* The lowest level of the pyramid consists of the primary Party organizations in factories, offices, collective farms, state farms, military units, educational institutions, and other establishments where there are not less than three members. Under the 1961 Party Rules, "Primary Party organizations may also be set up on a territorial basis at the places of residence of Communists in villages or in apartment-house administrations."<sup>21</sup>

As a result of the sweeping reorganization of the Party structure approved at the November 1962 meeting of the Central Committee, all Party primary organizations will henceforth be classified either as agricultural or industrial in character and be administered by separate hierarchies of Party committees which will converge only at the republic level. The agricultural chain of responsibility will run from kolkhoz, sovkhoz, or other primary agricultural Party organizations to newly established production administration Party committees (representing essentially enlarged rural raions), which in turn will report to oblast or krai agricultural Party committees responsible to the republic. The industrial Party pyramid will rest on factory and urban primary Party organizations which will be supervised by town and zonal industrial committees, which in turn will report to oblast or krai industrial committees responsible to the republic.

The RSFSR, largest of the union republics, does not possess its own congress and central committee. Instead, the subordinate Party organizations in the RSFSR are coordinated and directed by the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee, to which are attached separate Bureaus for Industry and Agriculture, each of which will supervise the Party organizations in its vertical chain of command. In other republics, which elect central committees, Central Committee Bureaus for Industry and Agriculture will perform similar functions.

In these union republics, the "highest" Party body is the republic Party congress, which is required to assemble at least once every two years, except in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan, where congresses need not be called more than once every four years. Whereas republic congresses have met with considerable frequency both before and since the death of Stalin, like the all-union congress they are convoked to ratify decisions which have already been reached and to echo the criticisms and directives which their superiors in the Party hierarchy pronounce. The Party Rules provide that the republic con-

\* In the wake of the reorganization of the Party structure initiated in November 1962, proposals are now under consideration to abolish the city Party organizations in large cities where oblast Party committees are centered. The ward organizations in such cities would report directly to the oblast Party committee.

gresses elect a central committee which in turn elects a bureau, since November 1962 designated as the Presidium. In practice, initiative and authority tend to be concentrated in the secretarial apparatus and more particularly in the hands of the republic first secretary, who is ordinarily a central appointee of considerable stature and influence. In some of the union republics, however, where considerations of nationality policy dictate the appointment of a native of the republic as first secretary, the trusted agent of the central Party authorities may in fact be the Russian second secretary, who exercises the decisive voice in republic councils. The Presidium also plays an influential role, since its membership reflects the configuration of power in the union republic and in the past has included such important personalities as the Party secretaries, the chairman and first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the chairman of the sovnarkhoz, and one or more of the first secretaries of the key regional Party organizations.

The secretarial apparatus of the republic Party organizations is organized on the model of the Central Committee Secretariat in Moscow, except that departments differ from republic to republic in terms of the special character of their economic life. The first obligation of the Party apparatus of the republics is to carry out and enforce the directives and decrees which the central Party leadership transmits to it. The secretariat in each union republic performs important operational and supervisory duties. It is responsible for the selection and placement of key Party, Komsomol, trade-union, and administrative personnel in all job categories which the central apparatus assigns to its *nomenklatura* (jurisdiction); appointments to so-called leading state and Party posts are reserved for central action. Through its staff of inspectors, the republic secretariat studies and reports on the operations and deficiencies of lower Party and governmental organs and seeks to remove the shortcomings revealed in the course of its investigations. Its responsibilities in the propaganda and agitation field embrace the publication of Party newspapers and agitators' handbooks, the operation of courses and schools for the political training of Party and governmental personnel, the organization of lectures and the preparation of propagandists, and the supervision of the cultural life of the republic to ensure ideological orthodoxy and to prevent nationalist deviations. In recent years, increasing emphasis has been placed on Party control of economic life. Party functionaries have been enjoined to take leadership in solving economic problems instead of confining themselves to a passive reporting role.

Below the level of the republics is the territorial (krai) and regional (oblast) stratum of Party administration. Here there are two parallel committees and secretariats, one for industry and one for agriculture,

with no provision for coordination between them except at the republic level. The equivalent of the Party congress at this level is the Party conference, which is required to meet at least once every two years. Separate conferences are projected for industrial and agricultural Party organizations. The Party Rules direct the conference to elect a committee (*obkom* or *kraikom*), which in turn chooses a bureau and secretaries to guide its work. Actually, the appointment of the first secretary of a kraikom or obkom, as well as of other leading Party officials within the region, is within the jurisdiction of the central Party apparatus, and its "recommendations" are decisive whenever made. In the past the bureaus of the regional Party organizations have embraced the most powerful personalities of the oblast: the Party secretaries, the chairman of the oblast executive committee (*oblispolkom*), the secretary of the Party committee of the chief city of the oblast, the sovnarkhoz chairman, and such other leading figures as the obkom first secretary coopts. With the reorganization of the Party structure on production lines, both the bureaus and the secretariats of the regional Party organizations will undoubtedly reflect the specialized economic interests assigned to their care.

The obkom first secretary is an important personage in Communist Party administration, and his role has been magnified in recent years by Khrushchev's tendency to rely on the Party apparatus as his primary instrument of direction and coordination. Particularly in areas far removed from Moscow's immediate supervision, the obkom first secretary operates with considerable independence and viceregal authority. One Soviet émigré has described such a secretary as "on a small scale, God and Tsar in the oblast." This pattern, however, is one which the top Party leadership seeks to discourage. Its system of controls is designed to emphasize the insecurity of local satraps and to transform them into pliant tools of the central authority. Nevertheless, the vastness of the problem of governance and the necessity of adapting general directives to fit local conditions inevitably require the obkom secretary to exercise a considerable measure of executive initiative and vest him with important residual powers. Despite the relatively high degree of centralization which still characterizes Party administration, there remain large areas in which the top ruling group must depend on the discretion of local administrators. The selection and placement of personnel to occupy local Party and governmental posts furnish a striking example. As Louis Nemzer pointed out in 1950, when the pattern was one of supercentralization, "Some Party organs on the provincial level are responsible for personnel in as many as 2,600 types of positions, while others in the lower district or county level are concerned with some 700 job-categories, which would mean that each places thousands of men in these posts."<sup>22</sup> While the recent division of functions between obkom agricultural and

industrial secretaries may operate to dilute their authority and narrow their control of appointments, within their respective bailiwicks they remain powerful figures with important patronage to dispense.

These cadre activities form only a small part of the duties of the regional Party secretariat. It bears a primary responsibility for the efficient functioning of all city and rural Party and Komsomol organizations in its jurisdiction, and it has a staff of inspectors or instructors to keep its subordinate agencies under supervision. It is held accountable by the center for plan fulfillment in the region, and consequently it must keep in touch with developments within its sector and exert constant pressure on factories and farms to achieve and surpass the goals that have been set for them. It is also required to carry on a constant barrage of agitation and propaganda in order to raise the political consciousness of its membership and to extend the influence of Party ideology among the non-Party masses. The multiple demands which the Party leadership makes on regional organizations are not easily resolved, and the high attrition rate among Party secretaries reflects the difficulty of the assignment. A careful study by John A. Armstrong of the Ukrainian apparatus for the period 1939-1956 revealed that "the average tenure of the *obkom* first secretary is slightly over three years."<sup>23</sup> His findings are probably not untypical for the Soviet Union as a whole. In the wake of the agricultural scandals and procurement failures ventilated at the January 1961 plenum of the Central Committee, this rate of turnover was, if anything, accelerated. At the beginning of 1961, there were a total of 114 kraikom and obkom first secretaries in the Soviet Union. In a period of less than a year, between October 29, 1960, and October 6, 1961, fifty-five obkom first secretaries were replaced.

The disillusionment which such drastic action reflected helped to prepare the ground for the reforms of November 1962. Because of even greater dissatisfaction with the performance of raion authorities in the agricultural field, in early 1962 responsibility for agricultural production and procurement at the local level was transferred to territorial collective farm-state farm production administrations, which ordinarily embraced groups of raions in their jurisdiction. Party organizers attached to these administrations and responsible to the union-republic central committees or the Russian Bureau were given jurisdiction over the Party organizations in the collective and state farms of the territory, and thus seemingly duplicated the powers exercised by the raikoms in this important field. The problem of defining the relations between Party organizers and the raikom secretaries produced a bitter dispute. It was finally resolved at the November 1962 session of the Central Committee by abolishing the raion Party organs and establishing new agricultural production administration Party committees, whose jurisdiction coincided with that of the

territorial collective farm-state farm production administrations and ordinarily embraced at least three of the old raions. As outlined by Khrushchev in his speech to the Central Committee on November 19, 1962, these Party committees will be "headed by a secretary," who will be assisted by a group of inspector-organizers and two deputy secretaries in charge of ideological and organizational departments.<sup>24</sup> The group of inspector-organizers will deal with the Party organizations of the collective and state farms, "helping them to carry out the main task: to increase the output of agricultural products."<sup>25</sup> Presumably the Party functionaries staffing these committees, which will operate under the direction of the agriculture obkoms, will be chosen with an eye to their expertise in agriculture and their responsibilities will be limited to that field.

Party guidance of industry in cities will be exercised, as before, by city Party committees, or *gorkomy*. Where industrial enterprises are located in the territory of agriculture production administrations, they will be supervised by zonal industrial production Party committees. Enterprises with more than 500 Communists located outside urban centers will have their own Party committees and, together with the zonal committees and gorkoms, will report directly to the regional industrial committees. Party functionaries attached to these committees will be expected to have industrial experience, and their prime responsibility will be Party guidance of the industrial enterprises assigned to their care. Precisely how these committees will be organized, the leadership has still to state.

The activities of Party organizations at these levels mirror the work of the regional and republic organizations on a smaller stage. The selection and approval of personnel for local Party assignments play major roles. The election of all full-time paid secretaries of primary Party organizations must be ratified by the bureau of the higher committee in whose jurisdiction the primary Party unit falls. The gorkom secretary and bureau, or their rural equivalent, take the initiative in filling important local governmental posts. Ordinarily their influence will be exercised indirectly, and the forms of local elections will be observed. If, for example, the office of chairman of the gorispolkom (the executive committee of the city soviet) is empty, the bureau of the gorkom, with the consent of higher authority, will designate a candidate who will be nominated at a meeting of the city soviet. The nominator will declare that the Party group in the soviet and the gorkom recommends the candidate. Since no other candidates are ordinarily presented, the nominee is usually elected unanimously. Similar procedures are employed in filling other elective posts.

One of the continuing concerns of city and rural committees is the supervision of the activities of primary Party organizations. In dis-

charging this responsibility, the city and rural secretaries operate through a staff of instructors, each of whom is assigned to oversee the work of one or more primary Party units. Each instructor is required to familiarize himself with the protocols or minutes of all meetings of the organizations for which he is responsible and to spend most of his time in grass-roots contacts with members of such organizations. It is his job to identify the more promising Party activists who can be counted on to provide leadership, to know the moods and needs of the membership, to criticize inadequacies in the operations of the units, and to supply concrete guidance in remedying defects.

The rural and city organizations also control admissions and expulsions from the Party. No new member can be admitted into the Party without their formal approval. Under a new procedure first authorized on an experimental basis in Moscow, Leningrad, and the Moscow oblast in December 1960, and later extended by a Central Committee decree of January 11, 1962, to a nation-wide basis, nonstaff Party commissions of not more than fifteen members chosen by city and raion Party committees were charged with the preliminary review of questions of entrance into the Party and personal cases of Communists (after the primary Party organizations had made their recommendations).<sup>26</sup> A secretary of the city or rural Party committee must attend the meeting of the nonstaff Party commission, and its actions are still subject to confirmation by the bureau of the respective committee. Under the Party Rules, decisions of an organization to return a Party member to candidate status must be ratified by the rural or city committee, and expulsions of Party members must not only be approved by the committee but also by the next higher Party organ. A person expelled from the Party, the rules state, "retains the right to submit an appeal within two months to superior Party bodies, up to and including the Central Committee of the CPSU."

The rural and city committees function as the basic record offices of the Party. They are obligated to maintain record cards for all members and candidates in their areas. The record cards, each of which bears the same number as the membership or candidate's card carried by a holder, provide complete up-to-date documentation on all Communists, including biographical data, changes in employment, education, awards, penalties, and so on. Transfers of Party members from district to district are carefully regulated by Party instructions.

While the city and rural Party organizations exercise general supervision over the economic, administrative, and cultural life of the production units in which they operate, their jurisdiction is not all-inclusive. Party work in military units which happen to be located in the district is ordinarily exempt from control by Party units in the area, although the production Party organizations maintain liaison with and render assistance

to the military cells. Party organizations in the armed forces have their own independent channels of command; at the top is the Main Political Administration of the Ministry of Defense, which functions with the rights of a department of the Central Committee Secretariat. Under Stalin, the local Party organizations exercised no direct control over the operational activities of the police in their areas; indeed, the reverse was ordinarily the case, and the surveillance of the secret police embraced the local Party organizations as well as non-Party personnel. Since the elimination of Beria, the Party has reasserted its control over the security police by reactivating the Party cells which operate within it.

The Party officialdom at district and city levels has long been characterized by a high rate of turnover. The lower-level members of the Party apparatus occupy a particularly vulnerable and exposed position. The official doctrine makes them an approved target for criticism, and many are sacrificed as scapegoats for difficulties which are inherent in the position in which they find themselves. While the rate of dismissal varies in different periods, replacements constantly take place. In the eighteen-month period after the end of World War II, 90 per cent of all the first secretaries of raikoms in the Belorussian Republic were removed, and in the Ukraine the attrition rate approached 50 per cent. Since that period the turnover rate has probably declined considerably, but it remains substantial. The 1961 purge of obkom and kraikom secretaries referred to earlier had even more drastic repercussions at the raion level. In the eyes of the Party leadership, the lower Party apparatus is a testing ground for the steeled Bolshevik apparatchiki. Those who survive move upward, but even a cursory sampling of the Party press indicates that a large number fall by the wayside.

#### *The Primary Party Organizations*

Below the level of the rural and city Party organizations are the primary Party units which form the base of the pyramid. As of October 1, 1961, they totaled 296,444. Table 1 provides a partial breakdown of their distribution.

A primary Party organization may be organized in any enterprise or institution where there are not less than three Party members. Its establishment requires the approval of the next higher Party committee. In Party organizations having less than fifteen members, no bureau is formed, and a secretary and assistant secretary are elected by the Party membership. Larger primary organizations choose bureaus for a one-year term; their number is fixed by the Party meeting.\* Party organiza-

\* In large enterprises and institutions with over 300 members and candidates (and also in organizations with more than 100 Communists where special production conditions or geographical dispersion make it necessary), a Party committee may be

*Table 1. Distribution of Primary Party Organizations*

Distribution	All primary organizations	Primary organizations with Party committees
Total	296,444	13,220
Industrial, transport, communications, and construction enterprises	75,681	2,057
Collective farms	41,387	5,721
State farms	9,206	2,718
Institutes, organizations, and economic agencies (from central to district level)	52,501	256
Educational institutions and scientific, cultural-enlightenment, and medical institutions	56,968	347
Trade and public catering enterprises	12,594	2

Source: "KPSS v Tsifrakh" (The Party in Figures), *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1 (January 1962), pp. 44-54.

tions of collective farms with fifty members may set up Party committees.

Whether a primary Party organization is served by paid Party functionaries depends on its size and the importance attached to the sector of the economy which it serves. The new Party Rules specify that "full-time Party posts are as a rule not set up in primary Party organizations embracing fewer than 150 Party members." A Central Committee decree of May 21, 1957, after noting that the number of paid functionaries attached to primary units had quintupled since 1940, laid down a set of rules to limit the inflation of paid staffs.<sup>27</sup> It called attention to the provision then contained in the rules that in organizations having less than a hundred members, the Party secretary and members of the bureau were ordinarily not to be exempted from their regular jobs and were to receive no compensation for performing their Party duties. It did, however, allow some exceptions. It permitted the retention of paid Party functionaries in primary units with not less than fifty members in coal, oil, transport, lumbering, construction, and a few other critical industries, as well as in sovkhoz Party units with not less than twenty-five members. Provision was also made for partly paid secretaries, who could receive from one

formed with the sanction of the obkom, kraikom, or union-republic central committee; in such establishments, the shop organizations are granted the rights of primary Party organizations. In establishments with over 50 members and candidates, shop or sector organizations may be established as subunits of the primary organizations with the consent of the district, city, or regional Party committee. Within shop and sector organizations and primary Party units of less than 50 members, smaller Party groups may also be constituted.

fourth to one half the regular salary of a secretary of a primary Party unit, though in no case more than seven hundred (old) rubles a month. At the same time, the obkoms, kraikoms, and union-republic central committees were strictly enjoined to eliminate paid functionaries wherever they could.

The functions of primary Party units are outlined by the Party Rules as follows:

- (a) admits new members to the CPSU;
- (b) rears Communists in a spirit of devotion to the cause of the Party, ideological conviction, and communist ethics;
- (c) organizes the study by Communists of Marxist-Leninist theory in close connection with the practice of communist construction and opposes any attempts at revisionist distortions of Marxism-Leninism and at its dogmatic interpretation;
- (d) concerns itself with enhancing the vanguard role of Communists in labor and in the sociopolitical and economic life of the enterprise, collective farm, office, educational institution, etc.;
- (e) acts as the organizer of the working people in carrying out routine tasks of communist construction; heads socialist competition for the fulfillment of state plans and pledges of the working people; mobilizes the masses for disclosing and making better use of the internal reserves of enterprises and collective farms and for widely introducing in production the achievements of science, technology, and the experience of leading workers; works for the strengthening of labor discipline and for a steady rise in labor productivity and an improvement of quality of output; shows concern for protecting and increasing public wealth at enterprises and state collective farms;
- (f) conducts mass agitation and propaganda work; rears the masses in the spirit of communism; helps the working people to develop skills in administering state and public affairs;
- (g) on the basis of broad development of criticism and self-criticism combats manifestations of bureaucracy, localism, and violations of state discipline; thwarts attempts to deceive the state; takes measures against laxity, mismanagement and waste at enterprises, collective farms, and institutions;
- (h) assists the region, city, and district Party committees in all their activity and accounts to them for its work.<sup>28</sup>

The work of primary units is directed by the secretary and the Party bureau. The secretary's role is central. He is not permitted to delegate such functions as the collection of Party dues, the supervision of work with Komsomols, and the leadership of the agitators' collective. The agitators' collective is composed of Party and Komsomol activists who undertake to whip up enthusiasm for Party slogans and goals by vocal agitation among their fellow workers. One of the secretary's primary responsibilities is to recruit agitators, to provide them with material, to help train them, and to regulate their assignments. In the larger primary units where the secretary has the assistance of a Party bureau, it is also his

duty to allocate responsibilities among various members of the bureau: one member of the bureau, for example, may be charged with the organization of political study circles, lectures, and conferences; another may occupy himself with the stimulation of paramilitary training in the enterprise; a third may edit the factory wall newspaper; and so on. The secretary and the bureau are required to make periodic reports to meetings of the membership of the primary Party unit; these meetings furnish the occasion for a review of the unit's work and an evaluation of its leadership.

One of the most important functions of the primary units is the admission of new members. The procedure connected with applications for admission is designed to achieve a searching scrutiny of the candidate's qualifications. The applicant must file a declaration of his desire to enter the Party, fill out a detailed questionnaire which includes a complete life history, and submit recommendations from three Party members of not less than three years' standing who have known and worked with the applicant for not less than one year. These recommendations must be verified by the secretary of the primary unit, and the applicant must serve a probationary period as a Party candidate for at least a year. In Party organizations where bureaus exist, applications for membership are first subject to examination by the bureau, which then makes its recommendation through the secretary to a general membership meeting of the unit. If the meeting approves the applicant, his application is forwarded to the bureau of the next higher committee for ratification. Applicants for admission to the Party must be at least eighteen years old. Young people up to twenty-one can join the Party only after affiliation with the Komsomol or Young Communist League. The recommendation of the district committee of the Komsomol organization is counted as the equivalent of the recommendation of one Party member.

In recent years the Party leadership has sought to enhance the control functions of primary Party organizations. The Party Rules specify that "primary Party organizations of production and trade enterprises, state and collective farms, and planning organizations, design bureaus, and research institutes directly connected with production have the right to supervise the work of the administration."<sup>29</sup> This apparently unequivocal statement conceals a considerable measure of ambiguity. The primary units have no right to change the goals of the enterprise, for these are established by higher organs; nor can they interfere with any orders of the director of the enterprise which he is authorized to issue. Indeed, their major responsibility is to struggle for the fulfillment of goals and to aid management in carrying out orders and decrees designed to achieve this objective. The Party organization is, however, obligated to search for inadequacies in the work of the enterprise, to recommend measures

which will eliminate deficiencies, and to keep its superiors in the Party hierarchy informed about the state of affairs in the enterprise. In order to secure the more effective performance of these functions, a Central Committee decree of June 26, 1959, authorized primary Party units in production and trade enterprises (and subsequently in state farms) to establish special control commissions composed of Party activists to check on the fulfillment of state orders and deliveries, the quality of output, the rational use of equipment, and similar measures designed to meet plans and reduce costs.<sup>30</sup> By bringing its authority to bear in this grass-roots fashion, the Party leadership has sought to assure its control over the execution as well as the formulation of economic plans and programs.

Comments in the Soviet press would appear to indicate that these commissions have not entirely realized the great hopes placed in them. As G. Shitarev noted in an article in *Partiinaya Zhizn'* in June 1961, "it would be incorrect to think that in the matter of achieving Party control everything has already been done . . . Certain commissions have been insufficiently incisive and principled in their formulation of the problems they have been encountering, while executive Party agencies have given poor support to their businesslike suggestions. Is it not this that accounts for the fact that some commissions have overlooked the instances of padding, hoodwinking, and delivery of substandard goods that had become common at particular enterprises, construction projects, and state farms?"<sup>31</sup>

Party work in the state apparatus takes a somewhat different form. In the words of the Party Rules:

The Party organizations of ministries, state committees, economic councils, and other central and local soviet and economic institutions and agencies, which do not have the function of supervising the work of the administration, must actively promote improvement of the work of the apparatus; foster among the personnel a high sense of responsibility for the work entrusted to them; take measures to strengthen state discipline and improve service to the public; vigorously combat bureaucracy and red tape; and inform the proper Party bodies in good time about shortcomings in the work of the institutions as well as of individuals, regardless of the posts they occupy.<sup>32</sup>

The injunction that Party members in the state apparatus signal defects in the work of their establishments to higher Party authorities is more easily given than heeded, since its effect is to put state employees at odds with their administrative superiors. The position of the Party employee who finds himself caught in the cross pressure of departmental and Party loyalties is not an enviable one.

The life of the Party member is ordinarily busy and demanding. A,

a member of an elite group, he is privileged, but he is also duty-bound. At work he is expected to set an example of devotion; his so-called leisure hours are filled with extracurricular Party duties and assignments. As a former Party member put it: "You have to attend meetings, pay dues, go to the Party school, study the short course of the history of the Party, study the works of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin, read the Party newspapers, explain the decisions of the Party to non-Party people, take part in putting up wall newspapers; at the time of election you have to be an agitator . . . I had to be very disciplined and behave well, I could not be a drinking man or engage in hooliganism, or I could not have unbecoming behavior . . . Party discipline wrapped people in a wall, and the members of the Party did not behave naturally." The Party member who distinguishes himself in discharging the obligations which are heaped upon him reaps substantial advantages. His upward mobility in the Soviet system is facilitated. Promotion brings new privileges and perquisites, but it also means added responsibilities and the hazards that go with them. The pressures which exert themselves on the upwardly mobile Communist make him a driver of those below him while he is at the same time driven from above. The laws of survival in the totalitarian party favor the tough and the adaptive; the tenderhearted and the independent-minded tend to fall by the way and disappear.

There is danger, however, in uncritical acceptance of the stereotype of the Bolshevik as an iron-disciplined, dedicated, and completely integrated instrument of the Party. This conception represents an ideal type which the Party leadership seeks to foster rather than a picture of the very diverse human material which the Party actually contains. The criticism and self-criticism appearing in the Party press make clear that some join the Party for purely careerist reasons, that others neglect their Party obligations or go through the motions of fulfilling them in a "passive, formalistic" spirit, and that still others have only the most cursory notion of Party ideology or doctrine. The average rank-and-file Party member falls far short of the ideal type.

#### *Informal Party Organization*

The "monolithic" Party is a facade which conceals a variety of expectations, tensions, and rivalries which in turn provide a distorted reflection of the very diverse interests which Soviet society seeks to contain. Given the character of Soviet totalitarianism, such interests can rarely express themselves openly, but it is perhaps not too wildly venturesome to suggest that they exist below the outwardly placid surface of Party uniformity and that they manifest themselves in devious maneuvers, in struggles for power, and even in conflicting conceptions of proper strategy.

and tactics. The informal organization of the Party probably approximates a constellation of power centers, some of greater and some of lesser magnitude and each with its accompanying entourage of satellites with fields of influence extending through the Party, the police, the administrative and military hierarchies.

The secrecy with which the Party functions and the absence of adequate documentation make it impossible to "prove" such hypotheses. Their applicability can only be inferred from the past history of inner-Party controversies and on the basis of meager hints which can be gleaned from the Party press in more recent times. In a speech to the plenum of the All-Union Central Committee on March 3, 1937, Stalin made a frank and critical reference to the phenomenon of the personal entourage and the family group.

Most frequently workers are selected not according to objective criteria, but according to accidental, subjective, narrow and provincial criteria. Most frequently so-called acquaintances are chosen, personal friends, fellow townsmen, people who have shown personal devotion, masters of eulogies to their patrons, irrespective of whether they are suitable from a political and a business-like standpoint.

Naturally, instead of a leading group of responsible workers, a family group, a company, is formed, the members of which try to live peacefully, not to offend each other, not to wash their dirty linen in public, to eulogize each other and from time to time to send inane and nauseating reports to the center about successes . . .

Take, for example, Comrades Mirzoyan and Vainov. The former is secretary of the regional Party organization in Kazakstan; the latter is secretary of the Yaroslav regional Party organization. These people are not the most backward workers in our midst. And how do they select workers?

The former dragged along with him from Azerbaijan and the Urals, where he formerly worked, into Kazakstan thirty or forty of his "own" people, and placed them in responsible positions in Kazakstan.

The latter dragged along with him from the Donbas, where he formerly worked, to Yaroslav a dozen or so of his "own" people also, and also placed them in responsible positions. Consequently, Comrade Mirzoyan has his own crew. Comrade Vainov also has his.

. . . These comrades evidently have wanted to create for themselves conditions which give them a certain independence both of the local people and of the Central Committee of the Party.<sup>33</sup>

There is reason to suspect that the practices of which Stalin complained in 1937 continue to form an essential ingredient in the informal organizational life of the Party. As Malenkov reported to the Nineteenth Party Congress,

The main shortcoming is that in selecting cadres some executives are guided not by their political and professional qualifications, but by considera-

tions of kinship, friendship, and cronyism . . . Such distortions of the Party line in selecting and promoting cadres have given rise in some organizations to the formation of a closed circle of people who shield one another and who place the interests of their group above those of the Party and state.<sup>34</sup>

Similar complaints have been frequently heard in the post-Stalinist period. A dramatic recent example was aired in the 1961 purge of top Party leaders in Tadzhikistan, who, over a three-year period, managed to conceal their failures in cotton procurement by padding their accounts and reporting falsified data. Among those involved were First Secretary Uldzhabayev of the Tadjik Central Committee; Chairman Dokhudoyev of the Tadjik Council of Ministers; Deputy Chairman Dodabayev of the Council of Ministers; First Deputy Chairman Yusupov of the Tadjik sovnarkhoz; Republic Procurator Khuseinov, Takhirov, Minister of Trade; Kasinov, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs; and many lesser lights. "All these major shortcomings and political mistakes were possible," reported *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, "because Comrade Uldzhabayev, with the connivance of a number of members of the Tadjik Central Committee Bureau, distorted Leninist principles in the selection and indoctrination of personnel. The practice of selecting and advancing personnel not for their businesslike and political qualities, but according to the principle of kinship, local origin, and personal ties, was widespread. This gave birth to nepotism and mutual protection and led to the suppression of criticism and the penetration of alien attitudes into several Party and Soviet organs . . . In a number of instances, fawners and persons who had compromised themselves were in leading work for a long time . . ."<sup>35</sup>

There is abundant indication that careers are still made by clinging to the coattails of the great lords of Communism and that cliques rise and fall in the Soviet hierarchy depending on the fortunes of their patrons. Perhaps the most striking recent instance is provided by the promotions awarded the so-called Ukrainian contingent, who formed part of Khrushchev's entourage during his long period of service in the Ukraine and who forged rapidly ahead at the center under his tutelage.<sup>36</sup>

Absence of information makes it all but impossible to trace the real lines of power and personal influence within the Party apparatus. The existence of so-called family circles at lower levels of the Party and governmental hierarchy is incontrovertible; the Soviet press itself provides more than adequate documentation. The establishment and persistence of these family circles are attributable to a yearning for security and stability on the part of the lower Party and governmental apparatus. Faced with demands from the Party leadership which are difficult if not impossible to fulfill and confronted with the constant possibility of a crossfire of criticism from many directions, Party as well as governmental

functionaries are tempted to seek a degree of independence from control by organizing mutual-protection associations in which they agree informally to refrain from mutual criticism and to cover up for each other's mistakes and deficiencies. These arrangements may embrace the vertical relationships between a regional Party secretary and his subordinate district secretaries, the horizontal relationships between a Party secretary and the governmental or economic institutions which he theoretically controls, or both. In some instances they are cemented by a species of "local patriotism." Insensibly, even in a "monolithic" Party, local officials reflect the pressures of the environment in which they work and are transformed, to some degree at least, into spokesmen for local interests.

For the ruling group, the family circles and mutual-protection associations represent evils which must be destroyed. The Party leadership seeks a rationalized impersonal hierarchy which will respond sensitively to its every wish. The family circle creates a nodule of autonomous power which eludes control and frustrates the execution of central policy. A variety of countermeasures have been developed to discourage the formation of mutual-protection associations. District and city Party secretaries are rarely recruited from the areas in which they serve. Secretaries are frequently rotated from district to district to keep them from sinking roots into the locality. Control organs such as the Procuracy and the KGB are organized as independent, centrally directed hierarchies to facilitate local surveillance. Superior Party bodies are instructed to keep careful watch over their subordinates in the Party apparatus. Denunciations by local Party members are specifically encouraged in the Party Rules and appropriately rewarded. Where family circles are revealed, they are vigorously condemned and broken up, but their detection is far from easy. Despite the most drastic disciplinary measures, family circles and mutual-protection associations persist in reappearing even after they have been theoretically extirpated. Their continuing vitality is a reminder of the difficulties which the totalitarian Party confronts in seeking to fulfill its totalitarian aspirations.

#### *Operations and Problems of the Party Apparatus*

The operations of the Party apparatus are the object of constant criticism in the Party press. The flow of criticism reflects the viewpoint of the top Party leadership; as elsewhere in Soviet life, it tends to run in terms of slogans and campaigns which vary with the subjects of uppermost concern to the ruling group at the given moment. Some themes, however, persistently reappear.

One of the most frequently reiterated is the complaint of inefficiency in carrying out orders from above, which is usually attributed to bureau-

cratic attitudes toward Party work. Party officials are accused of restricting their activities to paper work, of spending all their time in compiling and demanding reports, or in receiving and forwarding mimeographed instructions of a general character. These immemorial habits of bureaucracy came in for a frank airing in an interchange between Kaganovich and Stalin at the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934:

*Kaganovich*: . . . Formal paper measures are useless; you receive a report, scribble an order, and [are] finished. Sometimes an order from above is received, it is slightly paraphrased and sent down to the next link, and they send it down still lower. And so the red tape is spun out.

*Stalin*: And then the document is put in the files.

*Kaganovich*: Quite right, and then the document is put in the files.<sup>37</sup>

More than twenty years later, at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, Khrushchev had occasion to revert to the same theme: "It must be admitted that for many years our Party cadres were insufficiently indoctrinated with the spirit of high responsibility for the solution of practical problems of economic construction. This led to widespread red tape, bureaucratic methods in the management of the economy, to the fact that many Party functionaries . . . frequently replaced live organizing of the masses with mere talk or drowned it in a boundless sea of paper . . . We can no longer tolerate a situation in which many workers of the Party apparatus, instead of being constantly in the midst of the masses, lock themselves up in offices and issue resolutions while life passes by."<sup>38</sup>

Six years later (June 27, 1962), at a conference of central Russian agricultural production administrators, he returned to the problem. His description of the agricultural activities of the raion apparatus merits extended quotation:

the raikom convenes in conference, inviting 400 persons, and gives to leaders of collective and state farms the most general directives. Then, after the raikom conference, inevitably the raiispolkom calls a conference. If the raikom gathered 400 persons, the raiispolkom may not gather less. It gathers 450 persons. The secretary of the raikom reports on the tasks facing agriculture. The chairman of the raiispolkom repeats the same.

The raion organizations adopt resolutions and give instructions as to the line to be followed in work. But who carries out these instructions? . . . So, some time would elapse, and another conference would be convened. One person would reprove another, one reprimand another, and all hoped that now all must go well. But time passed, and no material change took place in the situation. Again a conference or session was convened, but this time for the failure to carry out the tasks. As our saying runs, the culprit catches hell . . . General talk on questions of agricultural production is empty chatter . . .<sup>39</sup>

A common complaint, closely tied to this addiction to meetings and paper resolutions, is the absence of working contact between leaders and

the led. Lower Party organs grumble that their superiors are quick to rebuke them for failures but are rarely on the spot to help them with suggestions which would have averted their errors. The grievances of the lower organs are suggested by the following example of typical criticism appearing in the Party press: "The leading officials of the oblast Party committee make only flying visits to the raions. Almost each time they visit a kolkhoz or sovkhoz, the result is a cursory and superficial acquaintance with the farm . . . Leading officials in the oblast meet very rarely with the secretaries of primary Party organizations and with ordinary Communists. In Smolensk, one cannot recall an instance when any of the executives of the oblast Party committee or the oblast executive committee traveled to a lagging raion or farm, spent a week or two there, examined its economy in detail, studied the people's needs, and helped them solve urgent problems."<sup>40</sup>

One of the greatest defects in the work of the lower organs is their failure to check on the execution of plans and decrees. As Khrushchev put it in his report to the Twentieth Party Congress:

Another great evil is the fact that the practical work of many Party and Soviet officials shows an irresponsible attitude toward adopted pledges. If one checks up on how some of the regions, districts, collective farms, and state farms fulfill their socialist obligations, a great discrepancy often comes to light between words and deeds. Is the fulfillment of obligations always checked? No, as a rule it is not. No one bears responsibility, material or moral, for non-fulfillment of the pledges.

It must be said that our press and radio extol all who undertake these obligations, but keep silent when they fail to meet them, even though all the conditions exist for meeting them. People should be held more responsible for their commitments . . .

There are still officials in executive posts who can be classified in the category of "busy idlers." At first glance they seem busy enough. They do work hard. But their work is wasted effort. They hold meetings "until the cock crows thrice," and then make the rounds of the collective farms at a gallop, upbraiding the backward, holding meetings and delivering general speeches — usually prepared beforehand — urging the farmers to "pass the test," "surmount all difficulties," "take a turn for the better," "justify confidence," and so forth. But, however they try, at the end of the year it transpires that matters have not improved. As the saying goes, "he wrought with might and main, but nothing did it gain."<sup>41</sup>

Party control of economic agencies also presents its serious problems. As Khrushchev noted at the Twentieth Congress:

Unfortunately, many Party organizations draw an absurd distinction between Party political work and economic activity. One still meets so-called Party "officials" who consider Party work one thing and economic work and

state administration another. One can even hear complaints from such functionaries that they are being diverted from so-called "pure Party work" and compelled to study economics, technology, farming, and production.

Such a conception of the tasks of Party work is fundamentally wrong and harmful.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union is the ruling Party and every thing that happens on our Soviet soil is of vital interest to the Party as a whole and to each Communist. A Communist has no right to be a detached bystander.

This is why the Party demands that Party cadres not separate Party work from economic work and that they supervise the economy in a concrete and competent manner. This, of course, does not mean confusing the functions of Party bodies with those of economic agencies or the substitution of Party bodies for economic agencies. Such substitutions would obliterate personal responsibility and lead to irresponsibility in general. The idea is that Party work should be aimed at organizing and teaching the masses, at improving management of the economy, at constant growth of the socialist economy, at improving the living standard of the Soviet people, and raising their cultural level.<sup>42</sup>

The problem of steering a path between neglect of economic work and excessive interference with managerial prerogatives is not easily resolved. Many Party functionaries become impaled on one or the other horn of the dilemma. Their effectiveness is judged by the indices of economic achievement in their area. This responsibility drives them to assume operational supervision over the economy. If they press their directing role too far, they risk the charge that they are usurping the authority of state and economic agencies. If they deflect their attention from the immediate decision of economic problems, they run the equally grave risk that plans will not be fulfilled and production will lag. Both Party officials and managerial personnel share a responsibility for actual economic results which neither can altogether evade. Their mutual dependency sometimes leads them, as we have seen, into "friendly relationships" in which they agree to cover up for each other and not "wash their dirty linen in public." As long as economic targets are generally fulfilled, no untoward results may follow from this armistice on mutual criticism. On the other hand, the disclosure that production breakdowns have been concealed and that economic objectives have not been attained may lead to a debacle in which the whole "family" of involved Party and managerial officials is severely disciplined.

Other sources of difficulty in the economic sphere are illustrated by the charges of bribe taking, theft, and embezzlement which the Soviet press occasionally hurls at Party functionaries. A not uncommon situation is that of the Party functionary who uses his position of authority and trust to extract favors or receive bribes from the economic organizations and administrative agencies which he is charged with supervising.

Malenkov, in the course of his report to the Nineteenth Party Congress, referred frankly to the prevalence of such practices:

Some workers in Party, Soviet, and agricultural bodies, instead of guarding the interests of the collective farms' common enterprise, themselves engage in pilfering collective-farm property, flagrantly violate Soviet law, engage in arbitrary practices, and commit lawless acts in relation to collective farms. These workers take advantage of their official position to occupy collective-farm land, make collective-farm boards and chairmen supply them with grain, meat, milk, and other commodities free of charge or at low price . . . and so on. All these anti-collective farm, anti-state actions inflict serious harm on the collective-farm peasantry, impede the further organizational and economic consolidation of the collective farms, and undermine the prestige of the Party and Soviet state.<sup>43</sup>

Similar practices have continued to crop up in the post-Stalinist period. In May 1954 *Partiinaya Zhizn'* reported: "Comrade Yermolayev, secretary of the Party committee [in the USSR Ministry of Construction] grossly violated the Party Central Committee decree prohibiting payment of Party officials not engaged in production duties out of the budgets of ministries and departments. For a long time he received pay from the ministry for filling a fictitious post — deputy minister . . . Minister Comrade Dygai irresponsibly fixed rates of payment to Party officials . . . As the Party Central Committee has repeatedly pointed out in its decrees, such practices are in the nature of bribery . . ."<sup>44</sup>

There have been numerous instances in which high and lower-level Party and governmental officials have illegally diverted state funds and construction materials to build houses and dachas for themselves. A typical example, revealed in the Tadjik scandal, involved such leading personages as the republic finance minister, the deputy chairman of the sovnarkhoz, and a district procurator.<sup>45</sup> Because of the scarcity of housing, its allocation not infrequently becomes a fertile source of graft and bribe taking in which Party officials become involved. Another example from Tadjikistan may be cited to illustrate the process. In the city of Dushaobi, a nest of officials charged with the distribution of housing space made sure, as the formula had it, that "it won't move without grease." In the words of *Kommunist Tadjikistana*, "They took bribes from citizens . . . for ready apartments, and for nonexistent apartments. The criminals imposed an illegal tariff: 3000 old rubles for a one-room apartment, 5000 for a two-room apartment, and 8000 for a three-room apartment."<sup>46</sup> "The Party organization . . . closed their eyes" to what was happening, and indeed its leaders seemed to have profited by the transactions. According to an *Izvestiya* report, the first secretary of the city Party committee and the chairman of the city executive committee were finally "expelled from the Party and brought to criminal responsi-

bility for the abuse of their official positions and squandering the city land and housing."<sup>47</sup> Party officials on occasion become involved in large-scale embezzlement of state property. The breakup of a ring in Frunze in 1961, in the course of which several million rubles of valuables were confiscated from the culprits, revealed the participation of a raikom first secretary as well as the former chief of the Kirghiz Gosplan, several supply officials, militia officials, and an assistant procurator. The investigation revealed that the raikom secretary was not only an accomplice, but "was supported by hooligans and took bribes from them."<sup>48</sup> As a reaction to the widespread incidence of embezzlement and bribery, punishments for such crimes were sharply increased in 1961-62, with the death penalty reserved for aggravated and repeated cases.

Another line of attack to which the Party apparatus is periodically subjected is the charge of inadequate attention to political indoctrination of both its own membership and the non-Party masses. The stream of criticism in the Party press suggests that many Party officials encounter considerable difficulty in finding a proper balance between political and economic work. Faced with a steady bombardment of multiple instructions from above, they try to develop a feel for the ruling priority of the moment and make a pragmatic adjustment to its urgency. As Stalin long ago noted, the Soviet system functions by campaigns. "At the turning points of the revolutionary movement," Stalin declared, "some basic slogan is always advanced as the key slogan in order, by catching on to it, to draw in the whole chain."<sup>49</sup> If the emphasis of the current campaign is on agitation and propaganda, local Party organizations break out in a rash of agitators' study circles, propagandist seminars, Party schools, and meetings of Party activists. If primary attention is being devoted to economic work, questions of labor productivity, socialist competition, and plan fulfillment become the order of the day. The alternating current which charges the Party line regulates the tempo of the apparatus. The adaptive Party functionary who survives and advances in the Party hierarchy has developed a keen sensitivity to its radiations and learns to respond to the "key slogans" of the moment. The unadaptive supply the grist for the mill of criticism and discipline and are ground up in its remorseless turnings.

#### *Party Schools*

Central to the vitality of the Party as the ruling force in Soviet society is the quality of the corps of functionaries who manage its affairs. The direction of a vast empire in process of rapid industrialization requires technical knowledge as well as dedication to the Party cause. In the early years after the revolution, the Party apparatus was more noted

for its zealotry and fanatic determination than for its mastery of the administrative art. As vast new and complex managerial responsibilities were assumed by the Party leadership, the Party apparatus began to be reshaped with these responsibilities in mind. Over the years the character of the Party functionaries has undergone substantial change. Present-day functionaries tend to be better educated than their predecessors of several decades ago, and they are more technically oriented in outlook and experience. They are recruited and trained with a view to the supervisory posts which they will probably occupy and the variety of functions which they may be called on to discharge. The Party secretary assigned to a large factory or the functionary designated to head an industrial branch of the Secretariat is likely to be someone with engineering training and an understanding of industrial processes; the Party worker dispatched to an agricultural district will usually have some training and background in agricultural affairs.

The system of selection is reinforced by an elaborate network of Party schools to which the more promising younger members of the apparatus are assigned for additional indoctrination and education. The present organization of higher Party schools, as outlined in a Central Committee decree of June 26, 1956, and subsequently somewhat revised, consists of a substantial number of interoblast and republic higher Party schools and a Higher Party School attached to the Central Committee in Moscow.<sup>50</sup>

Beginners who desire careers in the Party apparatus are not eligible for admission to the higher schools; training in these schools is reserved for those who are already launched on Party or state careers and who are marked out for advancement up the Party ladder. The two-year Higher Party School attached to the Central Committee is designed to train leading officials for republic and oblast level duties and is reserved for those having a higher education and considerable experience in responsible work. Candidates must be forty years of age and come recommended by republic, krai, or oblast Party committees. The interoblast and republic higher Party schools, which provide training for less senior officials, are of two types: a two-year school for those having a higher education and a four-year school for those with a secondary education. The Moscow Higher Party School also provides a correspondence course for the latter group. Applicants to the four-year higher Party schools must be under thirty-five years of age and are required to take entrance examinations in USSR history, the Russian language (written), and geography. They also require recommendations from oblast, krai, or union-republic Party committees.

Because of complaints that the course of study in higher Party schools was excessively academic and divorced from life, the curriculum

was reorganized in 1956 to place more emphasis on practical subjects.<sup>51</sup> In addition to the traditional array of lectures on Party history, dialectical and historical materialism, political economy, history of the Soviet Union, history of international working-class and national-independence movements, Party and state administration and law, the list of subjects now studied includes economic geography, planning in industry and agriculture, the technology of the most important branches of industry, construction, agronomy, livestock raising, the mechanization and electrification of agriculture, local industry and communal economy, trade, finance and credit, bookkeeping, statistics, mathematics, a foreign language, the Russian language, and automobile driving and repair. Journalists assigned to the school have a somewhat different curriculum which places less emphasis on economic subjects and substitutes instead literature, journalism, photography, and stenography. Students graduating from the four-year schools receive a diploma testifying that they possess the equivalent of a university education. At the end of the course, enrollees undergo state examinations in selected subjects, and their standing in these examinations presumably influences the nature of their next assignments.

In addition to the higher Party schools, there are many republic and oblast courses for lower-level Party workers, and the higher schools themselves provide short intensive courses and seminars for Party specialists in various fields. Thus, in response to the Central Committee decree of May 5, 1961, "Concerning Measures for Improving the Selection and Training of Propaganda Personnel," monthly courses for oblast, krai, and union-republic agitprop officials were established in Moscow under the auspices of the Academy of Social Sciences and the Central Committee's Higher Party School; similar courses for agitprop officials at the raion and city level were widely scheduled in other cities.<sup>52</sup>

Over the ten-year period 1946-1956, some 55,000 Party workers were reported to have graduated from the oblast and republic Party schools, while the Central Committee's Higher Party School claimed 2,843 graduates and its correspondence division an additional 6,000.<sup>53</sup> As these impressive figures indicate, the Party takes the job of training its future Party leaders with high seriousness. "But," as Khrushchev reminded the delegates at the Twenty-First Congress, "much remains to be done in assigning and training cadres . . . Some Party bodies are not always able properly to appreciate efficient and capable people and to give them timely promotion; they put up with the fact that sometimes responsible posts are held for a long time by weaklings who do not cope with the work and have lost touch with the people's life. Instead of getting rid of such executives, they are often shifted from one post to another, from district to district, from region to region, making for stagnation and preventing an inflow of young blood . . ."<sup>54</sup>

What Khrushchev did not add was that the Party functionaries operate under the challenge of a set of expectations and goals which strain the capacity of the officials who are charged with their realization. The pressure from the center is incessant and unyielding. The struggle to meet the arduous objectives imposed by the high command elicits a variety of responses from the local leadership. Sometimes it produces bold and ingenious efforts to attain a crude index of over-all success even at the cost of illegal transactions and manipulation of existing instructions. Sometimes it results in efforts to cover up local failures of performance. At other times it may involve a desperate appeal to higher authority for assistance on the ground that the resources available make the attainment of the planned goals difficult if not impossible.

The Party leadership holds the local functionaries responsible for results. It would like them to display initiative, but not at the expense of imperiling the authority of the leadership. Violations of minor regulations may be tolerated and forgiven, provided they promote the objectives of the ruling group. But any display of localism or independence which raises an implicit threat of disloyalty will be dealt with summarily. The leaders of the regime guard their power jealously. They are willing to forgo the advantages of a single, clearly defined administrative hierarchy, and they blur lines of authority by multiplying controls at every point of the government structure. The fragmentation of authority at the periphery serves as a guarantee that the Kremlin's power monopoly will remain undisturbed. It continues to anchor its primacy on a formula in which responsibility is universalized and command remains the prerogative of one small group.

## *Chapter 8*

# *The Composition and Social Structure of the Party*

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The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has undergone profound social changes since the early days of its incubation as the Bolshevik wing of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party.\* From a tiny circle of less than 8,500 outlawed professional revolutionaries at the beginning of 1905, it has expanded into a ruling party of over nine and a half million members and candidates, with a major responsibility for the destiny of a third of the world's population.<sup>1</sup> The transformation from revolutionary to governing party has left its impact on rulers as well as ruled. The leading cadres of the Party constitute a new elite which has risen from the lower reaches of the Tsarist social system to occupy all the peaks of authority in the Soviet state.

### *Membership Problems of the Party*

The Party's monopoly of political power has exerted an increasingly compelling influence in regulating its membership and social composition. As a closed elite group, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has never placed a premium on mere numbers. Its primary concern has been to preserve its character as a ruling party. Its first imperative is to staff

\* An analysis of the composition and social structure of the Communist Party must draw heavily on the data which the Party has chosen to release. During the twenties, the Party issued a heavy volume of statistical material, but its reliability left much to be desired. Definitions of social categories such as workers, peasants, and employees changed over the years and made comparisons difficult. The unsatisfactory state of local Party records was notorious. In some instances, the concealment of social origins by Party members introduced an additional element of distortion. After the twenties, the publication of Party statistics dropped off markedly, though some improvements have been registered since Stalin's death.

the important power positions in Soviet society with qualified members who are loyal and devoted to the Party leadership. As the tasks of government become more complex and demanding, increasing weight is attached to technical competence and training. The talents of the new technical intelligentsia are not only in great demand; the Party leadership finds it expedient also to assimilate its leading members into the Party inner circle. The control apparatus of the Party demands subalterns as well as chieftains. The lower ranks of the new Soviet-trained intelligentsia provide a recruiting ground from which such needs are replenished.

To the extent that the Party puts exclusive emphasis on its responsibilities as a ruling elite, it runs the risk of isolation from the masses. The pressure to absorb the governing elements of Soviet society into the Party tends to divorce the Party from the lower strata of Soviet life—the worker at the bench and the rank-and-file collective farmer. The logic of elitism runs counter to the inherited symbolism of the Party as a detachment of the working class. The membership policy of the Party faces the constant strain of mediating between the indispensable requirement of a Party-dominated directing apparatus on the one hand and, on the other, the desirability of enlisting support among the mass of ordinary workers and farmers. The periodic efforts to widen the base of the Party by drawing the most active and ambitious factory workers and collective farmers into its ranks represent a search for a point of equilibrium between elitist compulsions and the need to maintain living links with the Soviet population.

The numerical strength and the social composition of the Party depend on a series of conscious and deliberate decisions on the part of the leadership. The factors which it must take into account are complex. The desiderata which it sets itself have to be reconciled with the possibility of their attainment at a given time and place. The nature of the choices which the Party confronts can be suggested by a series of questions. Is there an optimum size beyond which the Party ought not to be permitted to grow? Should the Party aim at a cross section of the Soviet population, or should it deliberately favor particular categories or groups? In recruiting new members, what weight should be given to social origin, occupation, educational level, previous identification with the Komsomols, or other evidence of effort on behalf of Party goals? Should the Party anchor itself in the younger age groups or should it reserve the privileges of Party membership for the older generation? Should it make a strenuous effort to attract women into its ranks? What balance should it strive for between urban and rural areas? Should its membership mirror the nationality composition of the population? If not, which nationalities should it favor and which should it ignore? The answers which evolved to these questions have reflected the Party's doc-

trinal predilections, the changing responsibilities which it has assumed, the need to fuse the Party into a trustworthy and efficient governing elite, and the pressure to strengthen its hold on those strata of Soviet society which were likely to yield it maximum support. The balance that the Party has struck among these factors has varied in different periods of its development. To understand their interplay, the history of Party membership must be reviewed.

During the Bolshevik march to power in 1917, the conditions of admission into the Party were the same for all social categories. The Party Rules approved by the Sixth Party Congress in August 1917 provided only that new members recognizing the Party program, participating in one of its organizations, subordinating themselves to all Party decrees, and paying dues would be received into the Party on the recommendation of two Party members, subject to the approval of a general assembly of the members of the local organization with which they affiliated.<sup>2</sup> These simple rules were designed to facilitate entry during the period of revolutionary upsurge, and, with their aid, Party membership more than quadrupled from 23,600 on January 1, 1917, to 115,000 on January 1, 1918. While the Party leadership during this period came almost exclusively from the intelligentsia, the rank-and-file members were predominantly recruited from the urban proletariat of Petrograd, Moscow, and a few other industrial centers. The vast peasant population of Russia was virtually unrepresented within Bolshevik ranks. At the beginning of 1917, only 7.6 per cent of the total membership of the Party was classified as of peasant origin. By January 1, 1918, this proportion had increased to 14.5 per cent, still an insignificant element in the total peasant population. On the same date, workers accounted for 56.9 per cent, and employees and others claimed 28.6 per cent of the total strength of the Party.

The Civil War years witnessed a tremendous growth in the size of the Party (see Table 2). By January 1, 1921, the Party membership totaled 576,000, a fivefold increase in three years. During this period, the conditions of admission were somewhat tightened, but entrance remained relatively easy, and no distinctions were made between workers and peasants. The new Party Rules proclaimed by the Eighth Party Conference in December 1919 introduced a preliminary stage of Party candidacy. Candidates for membership required the recommendation of two Party members with a Party standing of at least six months. Workers and peasants were to remain candidates not less than two months; others were required to spend at least six months as candidates. In exceptional cases, new members could be admitted without passing through the stage of candidacy, provided that they were recommended by two Party members who had entered the Party before October 1917.<sup>3</sup>

The influx of new Party members during the Civil War period was

Table 2. *Party Membership, 1917-1961*

January 1	Members	Candidates	Total
1917	23,600	—	23,600
1918	115,000	—	115,000
1919	251,000	—	251,000
1920	431,400	—	431,400
1921	576,000	—	576,000
1922	410,430	117,924	528,354
1923	381,400	117,700	499,100
1924	350,000	122,000	472,000
1925	440,365	361,439	801,804
1926	639,652	440,162	1,079,814
1927	786,288	426,217	1,212,505
1928	914,307	391,547	1,305,854
1929	1,090,508	444,854	1,535,362
1930	1,184,651	493,259	1,677,910
1931	1,369,406	842,819	2,212,225
1932	1,769,773	1,347,477	3,117,250
1933	2,203,951	1,351,387	3,555,338
1934	1,826,756	874,252	2,701,008
1935	1,659,104	699,610	2,358,714
1936	1,489,907	586,935	2,076,842
1937	1,453,828	527,869	1,981,697
1938	1,405,879	514,123	1,920,002
1939	1,514,181	792,792	2,306,973
1940	1,982,743	1,417,232	3,399,975
1941 (Feb.)	2,515,481	1,361,404	3,876,885
1945	3,965,530	1,794,839	5,760,369
1947 (Sept.)	—	—	6,300,000
1952 (Oct. 1)	6,013,259	868,886	6,882,145
1956	6,767,644	405,877	7,173,521
1957	7,001,114	493,459	7,494,573
1958	7,296,559	546,637	7,843,196
1959	7,622,356	616,775	8,239,131
1960	8,017,249	691,418	8,708,667
1961	8,472,396	803,430	9,275,826
1961 (Oct. 1)	8,872,516	843,489	9,716,005

Source: Adapted from "Voprosy Chlenstva v VKP(b), po Dokumentam i Tsifram za 30 Let" (Questions of Membership in VKP[b]), *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 20 (October 1947), pp. 73-83, and *Pravda*, October 6, 1952, p. 6. The figures for 1917-1920 are derived from Bubnov, "VKP(b)" in *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (1930 ed.), XI, 533; those for 1941 from *Partiinoye Stroitel'stvo*, no. 4-5 (February-March 1941), p. 143; those for 1947 from Malenkov, *Informatsionnyi Doklad o Deyatel'nosti Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (bol'shevikov)* (Informational Report on the Activities of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party [Bolshevik]; Moscow, 1947), p. 26; those for 1956-1961, "KPSS v Tsifrah," *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1 (January 1962), pp. 44-54.

attended by substantial shifts in the social composition of the Party. As the data in Table 3 indicate, the percentage of members of worker origin declined sharply from 56.9 per cent at the beginning of 1918 to 41 per cent at the beginning of 1921. During the same period, the peasant ele-

Table 3. *Social Composition of the Party, 1905-1929*

Year	Workers		Peasants		Employees and others	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
1905	—	61.7	—	4.7	—	33.6
1917	—	60.2	—	7.6	—	32.2
1918	—	56.9	—	14.5	—	28.6
1919	—	47.8	—	21.8	—	30.4
1920	—	43.8	—	25.1	—	31.1
1921	—	41.0	—	28.2	—	30.8
1922	171,625	44.4	102,997	26.7	111,691	28.9
1923	154,920	44.9	88,673	25.7	101,441	29.4
1924	196,339	44.0	128,358	28.8	121,392	27.2
1925	453,141	56.7	211,700	26.5	133,961	16.8
1926	612,202	56.8	278,706	25.9	185,906	17.3
1927	637,768	55.7	217,411	19.0	288,874	25.3
1928	740,731	56.8	299,091	22.9	264,649	20.3
1929	940,136	61.4	333,287	21.7	258,924	16.9

Source: *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (1930 ed.), XI, 534.

ment in the Party rose from 14.5 per cent to 28.2 per cent and the proportion of employees and others increased from 28.6 per cent to 30.8 per cent. The rise in peasant representation was largely explained by the Party's recruitment of Red Army personnel of peasant origin; the absorption of peasant contingents into the Party represented a conscious effort of the Party to widen its influence in rural districts during the crucial Civil War period. At the same time, as the tide of battle moved in favor of the Bolsheviks, the attraction of Party membership increased for those who had previously held aloof, and the Party began to absorb more than its usual share of careerists and power seekers.

#### *The Character of the Party during the Twenties*

With the turn to the NEP, the Party leadership grew alarmed at the declining percentage of proletarian strength. The purge of 1921, in the course of which approximately 175,000 members were expelled from the Party, was aimed, in Lenin's words, at ridding the Party "of rascals, bureaucrats, dishonest or wavering Communists, and of Mensheviks who have repainted their 'facade' but who have remained Mensheviks at heart."<sup>4</sup> Faced with the necessity of retreat and concessions to the peasantry and the private trader, the Party sought to purify its ranks and root itself in the support of its proletarian formations.

At the Twelfth Party Conference in August 1922, the Party Rules were revised to discourage the admission of nonproletarian cadres.<sup>5</sup> During the twenties, the Party waged a vigorous campaign to increase its prole-

Table 4. Number of Candidates Accepted and Their Social Origins, 1924-1929

Period	Number accepted	Workers (per cent)	Peasants (per cent)	Employees and others (per cent)
1924				
Jan.-June	212,330	92.4	5.8	1.8
July-Dec.	103,878	64.5	22.2	13.3
Total	316,208	83.3	11.1	5.6
1925	321,862	54.8	29.5	15.7
1926	167,184	48.4	38.8	12.3
1927	176,180	70.2	23.9	5.9
1928	262,043	73.4	21.9	4.7
1929	297,630	81.2	17.1	1.7

Source: *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (1930 ed.), XI, 534.

tarian component. Lenin's death provided the signal for a series of recruitment drives which were deliberately designed to attract workers to the Party. As Table 4 demonstrates, of the 212,330 persons admitted to Party candidacy during the "First Lenin Call" in the first half of the year 1924, 92.4 per cent were classified as workers, 5.8 per cent as peasants, and only 1.8 per cent as office employees or others. The "Second Lenin Call" in 1925 was less successful in achieving overwhelming proletarian predominance, but beginning with the "October Call" in 1927, the stress on worker ascendancy was resumed. In that year, 70.2 per cent of the Party candidates were classified as workers. By 1929, the corresponding figure reached 81.2 per cent, while candidates of peasant origin provided only 17.1 per cent of the total, and office workers and other categories accounted for only 1.7 per cent.

The impact of these recruitment drives was registered in the changed social composition of the Party. The worker element in the Party increased from 41 per cent in 1921 to 61.4 per cent in 1929, while the peasant proportion declined from 28.2 per cent to 21.7 per cent and the category of office employees and others fell even more sharply from 30.8 per cent to 16.9 per cent. The emphasis on worker recruitment continued to manifest itself through the year 1932. On July 1 of that year, 65.2 per cent of the Party's membership was listed in the worker category. Between 1929 and 1932, however, the peasant element in the Party also increased from 21.7 per cent to 26.9 per cent, while the classification of employees and others showed a further steep decline from 16.9 per cent to 7.9 per cent.<sup>5</sup>

The high proportion of so-called worker Communists who were enrolled in the Party during this period is open to misinterpretation. The statistics on the social composition of the Party classify members by social

origin rather than by occupation. A different picture emerges when occupational classifications are examined. Thus, on July 1, 1932, when 65.2 per cent of the Party membership were classified as workers, only 43.5 per cent were actually workers by occupation. While 26.9 per cent were classified as peasants, only 18.3 per cent were employed in agriculture. In terms of actual work performed, 38.2 per cent of the Party members were engaged in administrative or other forms of nonmanual labor.<sup>7</sup> Although strenuous efforts were made during the late twenties to increase the proportion of production workers in the Party, these efforts were only partially successful.

The November 1928 plenum of the Central Committee set a goal of 50 per cent which was to be attained by 1930. The goal was never reached, though it was closely approached on July 1, 1930, when 48.8 per cent of the Party consisted of workers from the bench. From that point on, the proportion of production workers began to decline sharply, and by July 1, 1932, it had fallen to 43.5 per cent. One reason was the promotion of worker Communists to soviet, Party, economic, and other administrative responsibilities. Substantial groups of Communist workers were sent to rural areas to spark the collectivization drive, and others were dispatched to schools to be trained for the technical and managerial responsibilities which industrialization thrust upon the Party. The insistent needs of the Party for trusted personnel to discharge its governing responsibilities led to a steady transfer of its best worker cadres into administration. The pressure was all the more compelling because the Party Rules as well as Party sentiment raised a barrier to recruitment from the old intelligentsia, and a new Soviet-trained intelligentsia was still in an embryonic stage. The Party thus operated as a funnel through which the upward social mobility of the most ambitious worker Communists was accelerated.

While these changes were taking place within the Party, the total size of the Party registered a striking growth after an initial period of contraction in the early twenties. Following the purge of 1921, Party strength declined from 576,000 members on January 1, 1921, to 472,000 members and candidates on January 1, 1924. From that low point, it increased by January 1, 1933, to 3,555,338 members and candidates, the highest level reached in the pre-World War II period.

Though the Party expanded tremendously from the mid-twenties to the early thirties, it remained essentially an urban outpost in a predominantly rural nation. As Table 5 reveals, even as late as 1927, the number of village Communists totaled only slightly more than 300,000 in a rural population of more than 120,000,000, a ratio of one Party member to every 400 peasants. M. Khataevich, writing in *Bolshevik* in February 1925, described the great bulk of the village Communists as functionaries

whose tie with the land was tenuous and whose rate of political illiteracy was high.<sup>8</sup> The Red Army was frequently the school which initiated the village Communist into the Party. A careful investigation of Communist peasants in the Belorussian villages in 1929 disclosed that more than three fifths of those surveyed had received their Party indoctrination in the

*Table 5. Comparison of Urban-Rural Distribution of Population and of Communist Party Membership, 1920-1927*

Residence	Population census	Party census	Number of Communists per 10,000 population
	August 28, 1920	July 1, 1922	
In cities	20,239,500	313,780	155.0
In villages	109,152,200	200,749	18.4
Total	129,391,700	514,529	39.8
	December 17, 1926	January 10, 1927	
In cities	26,297,300	839,617	319.3
In villages	120,716,300	307,457	25.5
Total	147,013,600	1,147,074	78.0

*Source:* Statisticheskii Otdel Tsk VKP(b) (Statistical Department of the CC A-UCP[b]), compiler, *Sotsial'nyi i Natsional'nyi Sostav VKP(b), Itogi Vsesoyuznoi Partiinoi Peregisi 1927 goda* (Social and National Composition of the A-UCP[b], Results of the All-Union Party Census for 1927; Moscow-Leningrad, 1928), p. 18.

army.<sup>9</sup> The layer of indoctrination, however, was thin. In the 1929 purge more than 15 per cent of the village Communists were expelled from the Party.<sup>10</sup>

The weakness of the Party in the villages greatly hampered the collectivization drive. Although the Party leadership took the drastic step in 1930 of dispatching 25,000 worker-activists from the industrial centers to the countryside in order to strengthen the village cadres, its rural forces remained inadequate. With the intensification of the pace of collectivization, energetic efforts were made to enlist the new kolkhozniks in local Party organizations. These efforts enjoyed only moderate success. By mid-1932, the total number of Communists in village organizations had mounted to 800,000, a ratio of approximately one Communist to every 150 rural inhabitants. A large proportion of these village Communists, however, represented new recruits of uncertain loyalty and dubious quality.<sup>11</sup>

The real strength of the Party was concentrated on the industrial front. The 1927 Party census revealed that Communists formed 11.6 per cent of the total industrial labor force. This average, however, concealed sharp

variations in different branches of industry. In the oil industry, the proportion was 18 per cent, in the polygraphic industry 17.9 per cent, in the leather industry 16.9 per cent. At the other extreme were the textile industry with only 7.3 per cent, the ore-mining industries with 8.9 per cent, and the coal industry with 9.2 per cent. In between were the important metal-fabricating industries with 13.8 per cent and the food industries with 14.6 per cent.<sup>12</sup> While no comparable breakdowns are available for the early thirties, the Party stratum among all industrial workers on January 1, 1932, was reported to be 13.3 per cent.<sup>13</sup> The greatest lags were noted on the new large construction projects where the proportion of Party members ran from 2.2 per cent to 7 per cent.<sup>14</sup> The constant inflow of fresh workers from the countryside served to dilute the Party nuclei on the new projects. Party representation in the industrial labor force as a whole, nevertheless, remained substantial and impressive.

Though the composition of the Party remained predominantly masculine in this period, the roster of women in the Party showed a steady growth from 8.2 per cent of the Party membership on January 1, 1924, to 15.9 per cent on July 1, 1932. In absolute terms, the increase was far more impressive. On July 1, 1932, the number of women Communists totaled slightly less than 500,000 compared with 38,500 on January 1, 1924. In terms of social origin and occupation, women Communists revealed some substantial divergences from the pattern of the Party as a whole. In 1926, for example, when 25.4 per cent of the Party membership consisted of members who were peasants in origin, the corresponding percentage among Communist women was only 14.9 per cent. Women in the category of employees and others totaled 27.3 per cent compared with only 17.4 per cent for the Party at large. These same relationships carried over to occupational categories. Women Communists were very weakly represented in peasant employment and much more strongly entrenched in nonmanual occupations. During the late twenties, these disparities became less evident as a result of the Party drive to recruit women in rural areas. By 1930, the occupational classification of women Communists closely mirrored the picture for the Party as a whole. In terms of social origins, however, the 1926 divergences continued to manifest themselves, though in lesser degree.

The nationality complexion of women Communists revealed a striking predominance of Great Russians in terms of sheer numbers and a particularly strong representation among Jewish, Finnish, Lettish, Estonian, and Polish women (see Table 6). The high proportion of Communists in these groups is probably explained by a combination of educational advantages and the progress of the emancipation movement in the western borderlands. As Table 6 makes clear, the Party encountered its greatest difficulty in recruiting women Communists in areas where old religious

and social customs retained their hold despite the revolution. The tradition of treating women as an inferior group carried over into Party life.

The nationality composition of the Party as a whole during the twen-

*Table 6. Communist Women in Various Ethnic Party Groups  
Based on Party Census Data for 1922 and 1927*

Ethnic group	1922			1927		
	Total number	Percentage of all Communists of ethnic group	Rank by per cent	Total number	Percentage of all Communists of ethnic group	Rank by per cent
Jewish	4,717	24.1	1	8,684	23.0	1
Finnish	185	19.8	2	271	17.6	3
Lettish	1,775	18.7	3	2,119	18.1	2
Estonian	285	14.5	4	476	15.2	4
Polish	641	11.3	5	1,245	13.3	5
Cherkessi	4	11.1	6	9	7.0	11
German	230	10.4	7	414	10.8	7
Lithuanian	126	8.6	8	232	10.0	8
Russian	19,558	7.2	9	58,283	11.3	6
Armenian	219	5.7	10	542	4.4	20
Buriat	5	4.9	11	39	8.2	9
Ukrainian	1,041	4.7	12	5,580	6.7	13
Komi	31	3.4	13	76	7.5	10
Belorussian	183	3.3	14	1,247	5.0	17
Kalmyk	5	3.2	15	17	4.6	19
Turko-Tatar-						
Kumic	174	2.7	16(Tatar)	425	4.7	18
Mordvian	43	2.6	17	88	3.8	—
Georgian	178	2.5	18	376	3.7	—
Bashkir	11	2.3	19	34	2.5	—
Chuvash	23	2.2	20	85	4.4	—
Votiak	7	2.1	—	29	6.9	12
Mariat	3	0.9	—	30	5.9	14
Avars	—	—	—	17	5.4	15
Karelian	5	2.1	—	22	5.1	16

Source: *Sotsial'nyi i Natsional'nyi Sostav VKP(b)*, p. 139.

ties showed a strong Great Russian coloration. As Table 7 demonstrates, the Great Russian Communists accounted for 72 per cent of the Party membership in 1922. Despite strenuous efforts to broaden the nationality base of the Party, they still claimed 65 per cent of the Party membership in 1927, while the Great Russian component in the total population was less than 53 per cent. An analysis of the 1927 Party census also reveals that the Jewish, Latvian, Estonian, Polish, Armenian, and Georgian Communists recorded a substantially higher percentage of Party strength than did their compatriots in the total population. On the other hand, the

Party representation of Ukrainians, Kazakhs, Uzbeks, Tatars, and other minorities was notably less than their proportion in the total Soviet population.

*Table 7. Comparison of National Ethnic Groups in the Total Population and in the Party*

National ethnic group	Percentage of total population 17 Dec. 1926	Rank	Percentage of national ethnic group to total number of Communists		
			1922 Party census Members only	Rank	1927 Party census Members and candidates
Russian	52.91	1	72.00	1	65.00
Ukrainian	21.22	2	5.88	2	11.72
Belorussian	3.22	3	1.47	7	3.18
Kazakh	2.70	4	—	—	1.05
Uzbek	2.65	5	0.54	13	1.19
Tatar	2.02	6	1.05	9	1.37
Jewish	1.82	7	5.20	3	4.34
Georgian	1.24	8	1.96	5	1.49
Turkic	1.16	9	0.65	11	0.98
Armenian	1.07	10	1.02	10	1.66
Mordvian	0.91	11	0.43	16	0.34
German	0.84	12	0.59	12	0.49
Chuvash	0.76	13	0.28	18	0.33
Polish	0.53	14	1.50	6	1.06
Kirghiz	0.53	15	1.32	8	0.24
Bashkir	0.49	16	0.13	21	0.21
Osetian	0.19	17	0.45	15	0.40
Karelian	0.17	18	0.06	27	0.07
Estonian	0.10	19	0.53	14	0.35
Latvian	0.09	20	2.53	4	1.17

Source: For population, Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects* (Geneva, 1946), pp. 55-61. For Party, "On the Question of the National Composition of the RKP," *Izvestiya TsK*, no. 7-8 (55-56) (August-September, 1923), p. 61; *Sotsial'nyi i Natsional'nyi Sostav VKP(b)*, p. 114.

Although comparable data have not been released for succeeding years, an analysis of the nationality affiliations of the delegates to the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 gives some indication of prevailing trends. The Great Russian group at the congress accounted for 57.4 per cent of the delegates, compared with 62 per cent at the Fifteenth Congress in 1927. The Jewish delegation increased from 7.4 per cent in 1927 to 10.6 per cent in 1930. The Ukrainians declined from 9.8 per cent to 8.6 per cent; the Letts from 4.7 per cent to 4.3 per cent; and the Belorussians from 2.9 per cent to 2.8 per cent.<sup>15</sup> Both the Armenian and Georgian delegations at the Sixteenth Congress were substantially stronger than their ratio of the

general population, while the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens, and other minority delegations were notably weaker.

The efforts of the Party to expand its strength among the minority nationalities enjoyed only moderate success. While the membership in thirty-four national Party organizations grew from 762,000 on January 1, 1931, to 1,087,000 on April 1, 1932, the percentage of indigenous nationals in these organizations increased only from 50.9 per cent to 53.8 per cent.<sup>16</sup> These averages, moreover, concealed wide variations in individual performance. The data available for 1930 make this clear. As of July 1, 1930, for example, the Armenian Party organization was 89 per cent Armenian, while only 17.8 per cent of the Bashkir Party organization were Bashkirs. Other national organizations in which Communists of the indigenous nationality were particularly weak included the Karelian organization with 25.3 per cent, the Buriat-Mongol with 31.6 per cent, the Tatar with 36.3 per cent, the Azerbaidjan with 39.5 per cent, the Kirghiz with 42.8 per cent, the Turkmen with 43.2 per cent, the Kazakh with 45.2 per cent, the Tadjik with 47.9 per cent, and the Uzbek with 48.5 per cent.<sup>17</sup> Such national Party organizations tended in fact to be dominated by Great Russians or other representatives of dominant nationalities in the Party who were stationed in the area. The Party press of the period is replete with references to the backwardness of the local minority cadres in these regions. As late as 1932, 36.7 per cent of the Tadjik and 24.9 per cent of the Uzbek Party organizations were officially classified by the Party Central Committee as illiterate.<sup>18</sup>

One of the striking aspects of the Party in this period was its youthful character. According to the Party census of 1927, 25.3 per cent of the members were under twenty-five years of age, 53.8 per cent under thirty, 85.8 per cent under forty, and 97.2 per cent under fifty. The extreme youth of the Party rank and file was matched by the relative youth of its top command. Of the 121 members and candidates elected to the Central Committee at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1927, 56, or 46.3 per cent, were under forty years of age; 90, or 74.4 per cent, were under forty-five; and 105, or 86.8 per cent, were under fifty.<sup>19</sup> The data available clearly reveal that the face of the Party was turned toward youth and that the Party leadership found its firmest support in the younger age spans.

The educational level of the Party membership during the twenties was low. As Table 8 indicates, some over-all progress was registered between 1922 and 1927 in increasing the Party stratum with a higher or middle education. Illiteracy decreased. At the same time, the emphasis on the recruitment of production workers resulted in a substantial dropping off of Party members with a formal lower-school education.

The low educational qualifications of the factory workers who were

welcomed into the Party during this period set a barrier against their utilization in managerial and administrative posts. The dilemma which the Party leadership faced was mirrored in the comments of the Party

*Table 8. Comparison of Educational Level of Party Members in 1922 and 1927 Distributed by Social Classification (per cents)*

Social origin	Higher		Middle		Lower		Home and self		Illiterate		Not indicated	
	1922	1927	1922	1927	1922	1927	1922	1927	1922	1927	1922 only	
Workers	—	0.1	1.0	3.9	80.5	63.9	15.4	30.3	2.7	1.8	0.4	
Peasants	—	0.1	0.6	3.6	70.3	60.9	17.1	28.5	11.3	6.9	0.7	
Employees	2.2	3.0	19.8	20.9	72.8	62.8	4.7	12.8	0.3	0.5	0.2	
Others	1.8	1.6	19.6	12.7	65.4	51.9	7.9	30.5	4.5	3.3	0.8	
Total	0.6	0.8	6.3	7.9	75.1	62.8	13.0	26.1	4.6	2.4	0.4	

Source: For 1922, *Izvestiya TsK*, no. 1 (49), (January 1923), p. 45. For 1927, *Izvestiya TsK*, no. 47-48 (220-21), (December 31, 1927), p. 18.

press. Party organizations were scolded for tolerating illiteracy and for neglecting political schooling. The more ambitious Communist workers were encouraged to enroll in tekhnikums in order to raise their qualifications, and great emphasis was placed on home study as well as on factory schools which were designed to prepare cadres of skilled workers. As the industrialization and collectivization programs generated a growing demand for engineers, technicians, agronomists, scientific workers, and managerial personnel, hints were thrown out that the Party would welcome into its ranks members of the technical intelligentsia and that the Party Rules might have to be modified to facilitate their entry.<sup>20</sup> No immediate action was taken, but the great change which ultimately took place in 1939 was already foreshadowed.

The difficulty which the Party leadership was encountering in recruiting qualified Party cadres for managerial positions was revealed in an analysis of the educational backgrounds of directors of state enterprises as of January 1, 1928. Of the directors studied, 89.3 per cent belonged to the Party, and 10.7 per cent were non-Party. Of the Party directors, only 2.8 per cent had a higher education, compared with 58 per cent of the non-Party directors. Of the Party directors, 78.6 per cent had only a lower-school education compared with 14.8 per cent for the non-Party directors. More than 70 per cent of the Party directors consisted of workers who were promoted to managerial posts.<sup>21</sup> The problem of training Party cadres for high technical and managerial responsibilities was still unsolved.

Within the Party organization itself, the leading posts were still monopolized by Old Bolsheviks. Of the 121 members and candidates

elected to the Central Committee at the Fifteenth Congress in 1927, all but ten had joined the Party before 1917. Most of them were former professional revolutionaries and underground workers who had won their spurs in the struggle to overthrow tsarism. At lower levels in the Party organization, the Old Bolsheviks were much less strongly represented. In 1927 they accounted for only 22.6 per cent of the central committees of the national republics; 58.2 per cent of the members of these committees entered the Party in the period from 1917 to 1920. The oblast or regional committees had an Old Bolshevik contingent of 12.1 per cent. Civil War veterans of the 1917-1920 period accounted for 63.9 per cent. In the guberniya or provincial committees, the percentage of Old Bolsheviks declined to 11.9 per cent and in the okrug or circle committees to 5.2 per cent. In both cases, the committees were dominated by the 1917-1920 generation.

A different pattern emerges when the more than 31,000 secretaries of primary cells are analyzed. In 1927, less than 1 per cent were pre-1917 veterans. The majority, 50.9 per cent, joined the Party in 1924 or later.<sup>22</sup> At the base of the Party apparatus, the secretarial hierarchy already represented a new postrevolutionary generation around which Stalin was to consolidate his power.

The characteristics of the Party at the end of the twenties and the beginning of the thirties can be briefly summarized. In terms of social origin, its membership was predominantly working class. In terms of occupation, workers at the bench only slightly exceeded those performing administrative or other nonmanual work. The Party was overwhelmingly urban in composition; its rural representation was woefully weak. The primary strength of the Party was concentrated in the industrial centers and in large-scale enterprises in heavy industry. Although the number of women was increasing, in 1932 they constituted less than one sixth of the Party membership, and of this by far the greater part was embraced in the Great Russian, Jewish, and western border nationalities. The nationality weight of the Party was concentrated among the Great Russian, Jewish, Latvian, Estonian, Polish, Armenian, and Georgian Communists. The Ukrainians, the Central Asian groups, and the other minor nationalities of European Russia were still very inadequately represented in the Party. The age levels of Party members and leaders revealed a strikingly youthful profile, though the leading posts in the Party were still reserved for veterans of the prerevolutionary struggle. The educational level of the Party was low, and one of its consequences was a serious deficiency in trained Party personnel capable of discharging the large managerial tasks which industrialization and collectivization imposed on the Party leadership.

*Party Membership in the Thirties*

The peak numerical strength of the Party during the thirties was reached in 1933 when the number of members and candidates exceeded three and a half million. The mass enrollment and tremendous expansion of the early thirties created serious problems of assimilation. The quality of the new members who were recruited in the factories and collective farms left a great deal to be desired; their ideological level was extremely low. On December 10, 1932, the Party Central Committee announced the suspension of further admissions and ordered a purge of all members and candidates. The determination to restrict entry was reinforced by a drastic change in the Party Rules enacted by the Seventeenth Party Congress in early 1934. In regulating admissions, four categories were established: (1) industrial workers with a production record of not less than five years; (2) industrial workers with a production record of less than five years, agricultural workers, Red Army men from among workers or collective farmers, and engineers and technicians working directly in shops or sectors; (3) collective farmers, members of handicraft or artisan artels, and elementary school teachers; (4) other employees. Persons in the first category were required to submit three recommendations from Party members of five years' standing and were to remain candidates for one year. The period of candidacy for all other categories was fixed at two years. Persons in the second category had to obtain five recommendations from Party members of five years' standing; persons in the third category, five recommendations from Party members of five years' standing plus the recommendation of the representative of the political department of the machine-tractor station (MTS) or of the district Party committee; and persons in the fourth category, five recommendations from Party members of ten years' standing.<sup>23</sup> While the 1934 revision of the Party Rules registered a substantial improvement in the relative position of engineering and technical personnel (an adjustment which represented a response to the urgencies of industrialization), the severity of the new entrance requirements raised a barrier which even the most favored group found difficult to surmount.

Beginning in 1933, the Party underwent a series of purges which resulted in a reduction of membership from 2,203,951 on January 1, 1933, to 1,405,879 on January 1, 1938. In the same period, the number of candidates shrank from 1,351,387 to 514,123. The impact of the 1933 purge was particularly severe, reducing the total number of members and candidates from more than 3,500,000 on January 1, 1933, to slightly more than 2,700,000 on January 1, 1934. The incidence of the 1933 purge was especially great among collective farmers and the new industrial workers of peasant origin who had flocked into the Party during the First Five-

Year Plan. The older industrial centers such as Moscow and Leningrad were less hard hit than the newly developed areas in the Urals and eastern Siberia.<sup>24</sup>

The 1933 purge was limited to ten of the leading krai and oblast organizations. During 1934, the purge was extended to the rest of the Party. By January 1, 1935, the total number of members and candidates had declined to 2,358,714, a loss of over 340,000 within the period of a year. The assassination of Kirov in December 1934 gave the purge a new urgency, and its sharpest edge was turned against former members of the opposition.

In the course of the 1933-34 purge, the Party leadership discovered that Party records were in a chaotic state and that no effective control was exercised over Party cards and other documents. On May 13, 1935, the Party Central Committee demanded that all Party documents be screened in order "to bring Bolshevikistic order into our own Party house." On December 25, 1935, it issued another order demanding the completion of the screening operation by February 1, 1936, at which time local Party organizations were to begin exchanging new Party cards for old ones. In its decree of December 25, 1935, the Central Committee also ordered the termination of the purge, but in practice the screening of Party documents and the provisions for the exchange of Party cards operated to prolong the purge.<sup>25</sup> Local Party organizations were enjoined to use these opportunities to unmask "enemies" who had infiltrated into the Party and to eliminate passive elements "who do not deserve the high name of party members." By January 1, 1937, the total number of members and candidates had declined to slightly less than 2,000,000, a loss of over 350,000 in two years.

The resumption of recruitment, which had originally been set by the decree of December 25, 1935, for June 1, 1936, was subsequently postponed until November 1, 1936. The year 1937 marked the height of the Great Purge (the *Yezhovshchina*), and the Party was caught up in a wild fury of denunciations and mass expulsions. By January 1, 1938, despite new admissions, Party strength had declined to 1,920,002, the lowest level reached during the thirties. The signal for the end of the Yezhovshchina was given in January 1938 by the Party Central Committee in its decree "On the Mistakes of Party Organizations in Excluding Communists from the Party, On Formal Bureaucratic Attitudes toward the Appeals of Excluded Members of the VKP(b), and On Measures to Eliminate These Deficiencies."<sup>26</sup> The blame for past excesses was placed on so-called careerist Communists who had sought to advance in the Party by bringing irresponsible accusations and denunciations against those who stood in their way. The immediate result of the decree was a purge of careerists. It was followed in due course by the reinstatement of some

Party members who had been "unjustly" expelled and by a sharp increase in admissions.

By January 1, 1939, the number of members and candidates reached 2,306,973 and by January 1, 1940, the total Party strength was listed at 3,399,975. More than 40 per cent of this total represented new members and candidates who had joined in the preceding two-year period. This vast increase was greatly facilitated by a revision of the Party Rules at the Eighteenth Congress in 1939. Under the new rules, all differentials among workers, peasants, and intellectuals were eliminated. A uniform candidacy period of one year was established, and all applicants for membership were required to submit recommendations from three Party members of three years' standing who knew the applicants from having worked with them for not less than a year.

#### *The Enlistment of the Intelligentsia*

The social structure of the Party underwent substantial modifications during the late thirties. Although comprehensive data on Party membership were no longer released after 1932, the trend of development can readily be deduced from scattered material appearing in the Party press. The most significant change was the reception of the new Soviet-trained intelligentsia into the Party. The five-year plans bred a new social stratum of plant managers, engineers, technicians, and scientific personnel who played an increasingly important role in running and directing the economy. As long as this social element was penalized by discriminatory admission requirements barring it from Party membership, the leadership faced the danger that the bureaucratic-managerial group on which it had to rely would develop into an antagonistic force that would be isolated from Party influence. To avert the danger, this group had to be assimilated into the Party, and the Party had to overcome its traditional attachment to the notion that the proletariat was the leading class in Soviet society.

The Party's shift in attitude was authoritatively foreshadowed by Stalin in a speech delivered to a conference of business executives on June 23, 1931. He declared, "No ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia." "Our policy," he proclaimed, "is by no means to transform the Party into an exclusive caste," and he called on the working class to "*create its own industrial and technical intelligentsia.*"<sup>27</sup> In his speech "On the Draft Constitution of the USSR," delivered to the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets on November 25, 1936, he carried his theme one step further. "Our Soviet intelligentsia," he now pronounced, "is an entirely new intelligentsia, bound up by its very roots with the working class and the peasantry . . . 80 to 90 per cent of the Soviet intelligentsia are people who have come from the working class, from

the peasantry, or from other strata of the working population . . . Formerly it had to serve the wealthy classes . . . Today it must serve the people . . . And that is precisely why it is now an equal member of Soviet society, in which, side by side with the workers and peasants . . . it is engaged in building the new, classless, Socialist society."<sup>28</sup>

When the Party resumed large-scale recruitment in 1938, the technical intelligentsia was eagerly welcomed into the ranks. The enlistment assumed the character of a campaign. The reports of local Party organizations gave primacy to the number of engineering-technical personnel that they had succeeded in recruiting for the Party.<sup>29</sup> This profound shift in the social base of the Party created its strains. As Stalin remarked at the Eighteenth Party Congress:

In spite of the fact that the position of the Party on the question of the Soviet intelligentsia is perfectly clear, there are still current in our Party views hostile to the Soviet intelligentsia and incompatible with the Party position. As you know, those who hold these false views practise a disdainful and contemptuous attitude to the Soviet intelligentsia and regard it as an alien force . . . hostile to the working class and the peasantry . . .

This theory is now out-of-date and does not fit our new, Soviet intelligentsia. Our new intelligentsia demands a new theory, a theory teaching the necessity for a cordial attitude towards it, solicitude and respect for it, and cooperation with it in the interests of the working class and the peasantry.<sup>30</sup>

The abolition of differential entrance requirements by the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 gave formal recognition to a change of policy which was already far advanced. Zhdanov, in proposing the new policy of uniform admission for all categories, made the objective of the new rules crystal clear.

Our best Stakhanovites, once they have become foremen or directors, that is, have been promoted to executive posts because of their abilities and services, find themselves, when applying to join the Party, in the position of second rate people.

These antiquated requirements are clung to by retrograde people who are not anxious for the advancement of new and young forces.

. . . They furnish a pretext for the cultivation of an attitude of disdain towards advanced people who because of their education or services have been promoted to leading posts.<sup>31</sup>

During the next years, the Party continued its efforts to absorb the new intelligentsia into its ranks. While no data are available for the Soviet Union as a whole, figures on local Party organizations bear witness to the trend. In Chelyabinsk province, for example, during 1941 and the

first two months of 1942, the new Party candidates consisted of 600 workers, 289 collective farmers, and 2,025 white-collar workers. Members admitted in the same period numbered 903 workers, 399 collective farmers, and 3,515 white-collar workers.<sup>32</sup> More than 70 per cent of the new candidates and members could be broadly classified as belonging to the new intelligentsia.

This striking change in the social structure of the Party was part of a process of adaptation to the insistent demands of industrialization and collectivization. The problem of the relationship of the new Soviet intelligentsia to the Party was "solved" by facilitating its absorption into the Party. After the elimination of the Old Bolsheviks in the Great Purge of 1936-1938, the Party was replenished and reinvigorated by the admission of younger cadres of bureaucrats, engineers, plant directors, collective farm chairmen, foremen, and Stakhanovites. In the process, a considerable step was taken, at least at the level of personnel, toward a fusion of Party and administration.

The dominant weight of the Party remained strongly urban. In the early thirties, a determined effort was made to strengthen the rural Party organizations. As Kaganovich pointed out at the Seventeenth Party Congress, between 1930 and 1934 about 50,000 urban workers were sent into the rural districts on Party assignments. Over 18,000 of these workers were dispatched to political departments of machine-tractor stations and state farms.<sup>33</sup> Between the Sixteenth Party Congress in 1930 and the Seventeenth Congress in 1934, the rural membership of the Party increased from 400,000 to over 800,000, or approximately 30 per cent of the total membership. Despite this impressive growth, about 50 per cent of the kolkhozes remained without Communists.<sup>34</sup>

The impact of the purge of the mid-thirties was particularly severe in rural areas. On January 1, 1933, the Party claimed 36,196 kolkhoz Party organizations. By November 1, 1934, their number had declined to 24,333 and by January 1, 1935, had shrunk further to 18,313. Between November 1, 1934, and January 1, 1935, the number of territorial organizations in rural areas dropped from 11,193 to 8,696. This decrease left many collective farms and rural areas either with no Party members or with "single Communists" whose isolation from the Party became a matter of serious concern.<sup>35</sup>

During the next years, the situation continued to deteriorate. At the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, Andreyev referred "to the unsatisfactory number of primary organizations and Communist Party members on the collective farms." "In the past year," he declared, "we have had a certain increase in the number of Party members on the collective farms, but we cannot consider it a normal state of affairs when on 243,000 collective farms there are only 12,000 primary Party organizations with

a total membership of 153,000, including candidate members.<sup>36</sup> A substantial majority of the rural Communists, moreover, consisted of administrative and managerial personnel — chairmen of rural soviets and rural cooperatives, teachers and agricultural experts, kolkhoz chairmen, bookkeepers, and brigadiers, and state-farm and MTS employees. Rank-and-file collective farmers were sparsely represented. The rural membership of the Party largely represented a projection of the bureaucratic state apparatus into the countryside.

Though the Party remained overwhelmingly urban in composition, its strength among actual workers declined substantially during the thirties. The emphasis on recruitment of the technical intelligentsia consigned workers at the bench to a secondary role. In recruiting new working-class cadres, the Party turned increasingly toward so-called leading workers — shop chiefs, foremen, and Stakhanovite workers — who represented the aristocracy of industrial labor. Statistical tabulations on the number of Party members directly engaged in production disappear after the early thirties; the Party press showed no disposition to document the receding influence of the ordinary worker in the Party. Trends can, nevertheless, be deduced from the extremely fragmentary material that was made available. At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934, Kaganovich cited data to demonstrate the high proportion of Communists engaged in industry. Out of 700,000 workers in eighty-five of the largest enterprises, 94,000, or slightly under 14 per cent, were members of the Party.<sup>37</sup> Later material indicated a substantial drop in the proportion of worker Communists. In 1937, for example, the Party organization in the Leningrad Metal Plant numbered 1,076 out of a total working force of 10,000. Of this group, 170 had a higher education, and 277 had a secondary education, from which the inference can be drawn that the proportion of Party members actually engaged in production probably did not exceed 6 or 7 per cent.<sup>38</sup> While the profile of the Party remained preponderantly urban, its center of gravity was shifting perceptibly from production workers to the new managerial and technical intelligentsia.

The data on the role of women in the Party during the thirties indicate a tendency toward stagnation and arrested development. As of July 1932 women composed about 16 per cent of the total Party membership compared with 8 per cent on January 1, 1924. By January 1, 1941, however, the proportion of women in the Party had declined to 14.9 per cent.<sup>39</sup> At the lowest levels of the Party hierarchy, women occupied approximately one sixth of the offices.<sup>40</sup> Women encountered much greater difficulty in penetrating the higher Party hierarchy, though here some progress was registered. At the 1934 Party Congress, women comprised 7.2 per cent of the voting delegates. In the 1939 Congress, the figure rose to 9.1 per cent.<sup>41</sup> In general, the influence of women in the Party lagged

behind their increasingly significant role in the social, economic, and educational life of the Soviet Union. The top leadership of the Party was reserved for its male element.

The withholding of data by the Party press makes it virtually impossible to establish the precise national-ethnic composition of the Party during the thirties. Some general conclusions can be inferred from the Eighteenth Congress data summarized in Table 9. As this table indicates, the strength of such regional Party organizations as Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo, and Yaroslavl testified to the continuing power of the Great Russians in the Party. Outside the Great Russian heartland, the Party was particularly strong in the Transcaucasus area of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. The Ukrainian Party organization was somewhat under-represented in relation to the population of the Ukraine. The weaknesses of the national Party organizations were most strikingly evident in Belorussia and the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan.

*Table 9. Comparison of Party Strength and Population Ratios in Selected Regions and National Republics of the USSR, 1939*

Region or republic	Percentage of voting delegates, 18th Party Congress	Percentage of total population
Moscow oblast	13.3	5.2
Leningrad oblast	9.1	3.8
Ivanovo oblast	2.4	1.6
Yaroslavl oblast	1.7	1.3
Armenia	1.23	.74
Georgia	2.36	2.08
Azerbaijan	2.8	1.88
Ukraine	17.3	18.2
Belorussia	2.36	3.27
Uzbekistan	1.40	3.68
Tadzhikistan	.25	.91
Turkmenistan	.31	.73
Kazakhstan	2.42	3.6

Source: Report of the Mandate Commission to the Eighteenth Party Congress in XVIII S"ezd VKP(b) Stenograficheskii Otchet, pp. 146-147, and Frank Lorimer, *The Population of the Soviet Union: History and Prospects*, pp. 241-243.

It should be noted that the statistical data contained in Table 9 tend to obscure the extent of Great Russian ascendancy in the Party. In the Central Asian republics, for example, Great Russians and other outside nationalities were strongly represented in the local Party organizations and tended to dominate the top levels of the Party hierarchy. The indigenous nationalities were, however, registering gains compared with earlier periods. In 1935 native Uzbeks accounted for 65 per cent of the

membership of the republic Party organization compared with 48.5 per cent in 1930, the Tadjiks for 50 per cent compared with 47.9 per cent in 1930, and the Turkmens for 50 per cent compared with 43.2 per cent in 1930.<sup>42</sup> Comparable data are unavailable for other groups. The Jewish Communists seem to have lost strength in the wake of the Great Purge of the late thirties. A study of the composition of the supreme soviets of the national republics in 1938 revealed that only 2.5 per cent of those elected were Jews.<sup>43</sup> Eight years earlier, they had accounted for more than 10 per cent of the delegates to the Sixteenth Party Congress. By the end of the thirties, the Great Russian and Transcaucasian Communists appear to have emerged as the most solidly entrenched ethnic groups in the Party.

While the Party retained its dominantly youthful character during this decade, a marked increase in average age level was noticeable by the mid-thirties. The purge of 1933–34 wreaked its greatest havoc among recent Party recruits, who were predominantly in the younger age range.<sup>44</sup> Although no comprehensive material on the age distribution of the whole Party is available for this period, a report on the composition of the Tula Party organization in 1935 gives some indication of the trend.<sup>45</sup> Three per cent of the Tula members were less than twenty-five years old compared with 25.3 per cent for the Party at large in 1927; 27 per cent were under thirty years, compared with 53.8 per cent for the Party as a whole in 1927.

The Great Purge of 1936–1938 reversed this trend. The decimation of the Old Bolsheviks and the destruction wrought among the Civil War generation opened the way for the recruitment of younger cadres and the rejuvenation of the Party. At the 1939 Party congress, Malenkov reported that 70 per cent of the Party members dated their membership from 1929 or later; only 8.3 per cent of the membership had joined the Party before 1920. At the 1934 Party congress, 80 per cent of the delegates had a pre-1920 Party standing; the corresponding percentage at the 1939 Party congress was only 19.4. The delegates at the 1939 congress were a remarkably youthful group: 49.5 per cent were under thirty-five, 81.5 per cent were under forty, and 97 per cent were under fifty.<sup>46</sup> The secretarial hierarchy of the Party revealed an even greater accent on youth (see page 196). The available statistics emphasize the youth of both Party rank and file and officialdom; particularly significant is the fact that leading Party functionaries had been drawn into Party activity largely in the period after Lenin's death. The Party was on the way to being dominated by a new postrevolutionary generation consolidated around the power and leadership of Stalin.

The period of the thirties witnessed a substantial improvement in the educational qualifications of Party members. The reception of the tech-

nical intelligentsia into the Party was accompanied by a striking rise in the proportion of Party members with a higher or secondary-school education. The number of Communists with a higher education increased from approximately 9,000 in 1928 to 127,000 in 1939; the number with a secondary education rose from 110,000 to 335,000 over the same time span.<sup>47</sup> This advance was particularly noteworthy among the leading cadres of the Party. At the Seventeenth Congress in 1934, about 10 per cent of the delegates had a higher education. At the Eighteenth Congress, in 1939, the comparable figure was 26.5 per cent.<sup>48</sup> In 1939, 28.6 per cent of the secretaries of regional, territorial, and republic Party committees had a complete university education, and 30 per cent had either a complete secondary-school education or an incomplete university education. Nearly 5 per cent of the secretaries of district, city, and area committees were university graduates, while 23.5 per cent had either an incomplete university education or had been through secondary schools.<sup>49</sup> At the Eighteenth Congress, Andreyev claimed impressive gains in the educational qualifications of Soviet administrative and economic personnel: "The proportion of university graduates among the People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the R.S.F.S.R. is 53 per cent, among the Assistant People's Commissars 68 per cent, among the directors of the chief boards and syndicates of the People's Commissariats 60 per cent and among the directors of economic establishments 27.6 per cent."<sup>50</sup> Comparable gains were reported at lower levels of the economic and administrative hierarchy. These developments represented a response to the overriding need for qualified personnel in responsible positions. The assimilation of the new Soviet intelligentsia into the Party was followed by its rapid elevation to leading positions.

The changes in the character of the Party during the thirties can be briefly summarized. After a period of rapid expansion in the early thirties, the Party suffered a series of purges which reduced its membership by almost one half. In 1938 growth began again, and by the beginning of 1940 the Party had almost reached the peak membership registered in 1933. The most significant social change was the reception of the new Soviet-trained intelligentsia into the Party. The industrial worker lost his preferred position, and after 1934 peasant strength also shrank substantially. Although the Party remained predominantly urban in composition, the newly favored categories both in town and country were the administrators, the technicians, and the "leading workers." The role of women declined slightly; their influence was more marked in the lower reaches of the Party hierarchy than in the male-dominated higher echelons. The Great Russian and Transcaucasian Communists maintained their strong position, while the Jewish Party membership declined in importance, and Ukrainians and Belorussians continued to be underrepresented.

Communist weight in the Central Asian republics remained weak although some progress was registered in comparison with the twenties. The Party retained its youthful character. After an increase in the average age of Party members in the first half of the thirties, the trend was reversed by the elimination of most of the Old Bolsheviks in the Great Purge. The rejuvenation of the Party was accompanied by a considerable improvement in the educational backgrounds of Party members, with the most impressive gains at higher levels of the economic, administrative, and political apparatus.

#### *War and Postwar Expansion*

With the end of the Great Purge, the Party entered a phase of rapid expansion. In the three years from the beginning of 1938 to early 1941, the Party doubled in size; at the Eighteenth Party Conference, which met in February 1941, a total of 3,876,885 members and candidates were represented. During the war years, the membership of the Party soared to a new peak. Early in the war, the Party relaxed its standards of admission in order to encourage members of the armed forces and particularly front-line fighters to apply for entrance.<sup>51</sup> According to one Soviet authority, during the year 1942 alone 1,340,000 new members were inducted.<sup>52</sup> Many of the new members were recruited without particular attention to their ideological equipment or political sophistication. The Party's first concern was to strengthen its mass base in the crucial military formations. By January 1, 1945, the size of the Party attained the unprecedented figure of 5,760,369. By September 1947 it had mounted to 6,300,000. Almost half of this number was accounted for by those who had joined the Party during the war and postwar period.<sup>53</sup> After 1947, expansion continued at a much slower rate. Data released at the Nineteenth Party Congress indicate that the total membership of the Party on October 1, 1952, was 6,882,145, of whom 6,013,259 were full members and 868,886 candidates.<sup>54</sup>

After the war, admission of new Party members was much more carefully regulated. The Party concentrated on weeding out recent recruits who were found deficient in political knowledge or who proved inefficient, untrustworthy, or venal in discharging Party assignments or administrative tasks. While no official figures were released on the total number of postwar Party expulsions, at least one indication of the attrition of membership is available. In the Azerbaijan Party organization, which had a total membership of 108,737 on April 1, 1951, 12,685, or more than 10 per cent, lost their status as Party members between January 1949 and April 1951. In the same period, 10,249 new members were added.<sup>55</sup> It cannot be automatically assumed that these figures are typical of the Party as a whole, but they do point to a continuing turnover of substantial proportions in Party membership.

The tremendous expansion in the size of the Party during the war years was accompanied by changes in its social composition. The prewar emphasis on recruitment of the technical intelligentsia was temporarily interrupted. The mass admissions of rank-and-file Red Army soldiers during the war had the effect of strengthening both the worker and peasant components of the Party. During the war years, workers constituted 32.1 per cent of those accepted as candidates of the Party, compared with 24.4 per cent in a comparable period before the war.<sup>56</sup> While similar figures are unavailable for collective farmers, it appears very likely that the Red Army enticed a higher proportion of peasants into the Party than did the kolkhozes from which they came. It is also probable that the postwar purge had a particularly severe impact on worker and peasant Communists, since their deficiencies in political knowledge made them peculiarly vulnerable to expulsion.

After the war, the drive to recruit the new Soviet intelligentsia and to identify the Party with the administrative, managerial, and technical elite was resumed and intensified. The proportion of workers accepted as candidates for Party membership decreased substantially. From Minsk in 1949 it was reported that only 11.6 per cent of the postwar Party recruits were workers. In Kirghizia the corresponding figure was 15.9 per cent. In December 1951 a writer in *Bol'shevik* pointed out that workers constituted only 22.7 per cent of those admitted into the Party in Yaroslavl province in the preceding eighteen months.<sup>57</sup> At the congress of the Kazakhstan Party in December 1951, the proportion of workers was reported as 26 per cent, compared with 46 per cent in the employee category.<sup>58</sup> Despite indications of the leadership's concern over the relatively low number of worker recruitments and campaigns to broaden the Party's social base after 1948, the new Soviet intelligentsia maintained its dominant position in the Party.

The Party retained its predominantly urban character in the war and postwar years. Its strength in rural areas, however, appeared to be increasing. By 1947 the number of rural Communists totaled 1,714,000, or approximately 27 per cent of the Party membership.<sup>59</sup> Of this total, however, a substantial number probably consisted of rural administrative and technical personnel and the bureaucracies of the kolkhozes, state farms, and machine-tractor stations. The significant absence of statistics on the number of rank-and-file Communist collective farmers would seem to indicate that the Party continued to be thinly represented in this stratum. On the rare occasions when concrete data were cited, presumably to present the most favorable picture, this weakness became apparent. At the Azerbaijan Party congress in May 1951, M. D. Bagirov boasted that of 672 rural candidates for Party membership admitted into the Azerbaijan Party organization from January 1949 to April 1951, 226

or 36 per cent were collective farmers.<sup>60</sup> In 1948, according to Khrushchev, then secretary of the Ukrainian Party, only 11,895 of the 28,207 collective farms in the Ukraine had Party organizations.<sup>61</sup> One of the factors contributing to the decision in 1950 to merge collective farms into larger units was the sparseness of Party representation in many of the old kolkhozes. In reducing the number of kolkhozes from 254,000 on January 1, 1950, to approximately 97,000 in October 1952,<sup>62</sup> it became possible to establish Party units on the great majority of the collective farms and to strengthen direct Party controls appreciably. Although the rural Party organizations still remained the weakest link in the Party apparatus, their strategic leverage in the countryside was substantially increased by the amalgamation movement.

One of the striking by-products of the war years was the enhanced role of women in the Party. The proportion of women increased from 14.9 per cent on January 1, 1941, to 17 per cent on January 1, 1945, and 20.7 per cent on July 1, 1950.<sup>63</sup> During the war the burden of sustaining the home front fell heavily on Soviet women, and many were rapidly advanced to positions formerly reserved for men. Among those admitted to territorial (nonmilitary) Party organizations during the war, 41.3 per cent were women.<sup>64</sup> This trend perpetuated itself in the postwar period and was also reflected in the increasing utilization of women for Party administrative work. On January 1, 1945, 40,370 women functioned as secretaries of primary Party units. By January 1, 1950, their number had increased to 47,106. On January 1, 1945, there were 951 women serving as secretaries of district, city, region, provincial, territorial, and republic committees; by January 1, 1950, 1,386 women held such posts.<sup>65</sup> At the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952 women accounted for 12.3 per cent of the total number of voting delegates, compared with 9.1 per cent at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939. The directing agencies of the Party, however, remained masculine preserves. No woman was named to the new Presidium. Of the 125 full members of the Central Committee chosen by the Nineteenth Party Congress, two were women; of the 111 alternate members, four were women. In certain regions, moreover, women played a markedly subordinate role.<sup>66</sup> The Party journal *Bolshevik*, in its issue of January 1, 1951, noted that in the newly acquired areas such as Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and the western provinces of the Ukraine and Belorussia, as well as in the Soviet republics of Central Asia, "the women's aktiv is still small . . . the training of cadres of women of the nationalities still lags behind."<sup>67</sup>

The data released by the Party during this period yield no specific information on the national-ethnic composition of the Party. Ethnic trends can only be inferred from the over-all figures on Party membership in the various national republics and the Great Russian regions. Table 10

summarizes the available material, drawn from the Report of the Mandate Commission of the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952. It should be stressed that the figures listed for various regions and national republics are totals and provide no breakdown between the local indigenous

*Table 10. Party Membership in Selected Oblasts, Krais, and National Republics and Ratio of Party Membership to Population, 1952*

Area	Voting delegates, 19th Party Congress (1 delegate per 5000 members)	Party members (candidates excluded)	Estimated population (1950)	Ratio of Party members per 1000 population
USSR	1,192	6,013,259	201,300,000	29.91
Moscow	129	646,000	9,450,000	68.36
Leningrad	60	300,000	4,800,000	62.50
Gorky	25	125,000	3,600,000	34.72
Sverdlovsk	23	115,000	3,000,000	38.33
Rostov	18	90,000	2,550,000	35.29
Saratov	18	90,000	2,400,000	37.50
Khabarovsk	18	90,000	1,250,000	72.00
Krasnodarsk	17	85,000	3,000,000	28.33
Voronezh	17	85,000	3,450,000	24.64
Primorye	17	85,000	1,475,000	57.63
Chelyabinsk	16	80,000	2,100,000	38.09
Kuibyshev	16	80,000	1,950,000	41.02
Bashkiria	15	75,000	3,000,000	25.00
Tatar	15	75,000	2,850,000	26.31
Molotov	14	70,000	2,250,000	31.11
Kemerovo	14	70,000	1,950,000	35.89
Altai	14	70,000	2,400,000	29.17
Ukraine	153	765,000	40,500,000	18.88
Kiev	20	100,000	3,500,000	28.57
Kharkov	16	80,000	2,500,000	32.00
Stalinsk	15	75,000	3,000,000	25.00
Dnepropetrovsk	12	60,000	2,200,000	27.27
Kazakhstan	42	210,000	6,000,000	35.00
Georgia	32	160,000	3,555,000	45.00
Belorussia	28	140,000	7,220,000	19.39
Uzbekistan	25	125,000	6,000,000	20.83
Azerbaijan	23	115,000	3,100,000	37.09
Armenia	—	61,440 (1949)	1,345,000	45.69
Latvia	—	50,000	1,800,000	27.78
Lithuania	—	36,000	2,700,000	13.33
Estonia	—	31,000	1,000,000	31.00
Moldavia	—	22,266 (1949)	2,660,000	8.00

Source: Voting delegate or membership figures derived from Report of the Mandate Commission of the Nineteenth Party Congress, *Pravda*, October 9, 1952, p. 6; population estimates derived from Theodore Shabad, *Geography of the USSR* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1951).

nationality and members of other nationalities who happen to hold membership in the Party organization.

As Table 10 makes clear, the Great Russian oblasts and krais were generally characterized by high rates of Party membership. This was particularly evident in the capital region of Moscow with its concentration of officialdom, but it was also true of Leningrad and other industrial areas. Party representation, however, fell off substantially in rural oblasts. Voronezh oblast in the central Black Earth area, for example, had only 24.64 Party members per thousand population, a ratio well below the national average of 29.91 per thousand.

The Transcaucasian Communist Party organizations retained the strong position which they had won in an earlier period. The Armenian Party with a representation of 45.69 Communists per thousand population, the Georgian Party with 45 per thousand, and the Azerbaijan organization with 37.09 per thousand were all considerably in excess of the national average. Table 10 also reveals the Kazakhstan Party as surprisingly strong, with a ratio of 35 members per thousand. It is possible that this ratio is inflated because of an inadequate allowance for the substantial increase in the population of Kazakhstan in recent years.

The Ukraine, with an over-all average of 18.88 Party members per thousand population, remained one of the weaker Party bases. Party strength in the capital region of Kiev and in industrial oblasts such as Kharkov, Stalinsk, and Dnepropetrovsk was much closer to the national average. The low Party representation in the Ukraine was primarily a reflection of the thinness of Party membership in rural areas. Other areas in which Party membership fell substantially behind the national average included Moldavia with 8 members per thousand, Lithuania with 13.33

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*Note to Table 10*

*Note:* The membership figures in this table are approximations derived by multiplying the number of voting delegates assigned to a particular Party organization by 5,000. The rules of the congress specified that each voting delegate would represent 5,000 Party members. In cases where exact membership figures are available, they do not always correspond with the data listed above. As of September 1, 1952, the exact membership of the Georgian Party was 160,045, compared with the 160,000 in the table. The Azerbaijan membership was 103,517 instead of 115,000; the Kazakhstan figure was 201,687 instead of 210,000; and the Ukrainian Party organization had only 676,190 members rather than the 765,000 indicated in the table. (See *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, IV, no. 41 [November 22, 1952], 7, 16, 24, 29.) These discrepancies are probably explained by the fact that the congress delegations include representatives from the military and MGB-MVD units stationed in the area and that the latter are not ordinarily included in the membership reported at regional or republic Party congresses. This supposition is supported by the size of the delegations from Khabarovsk and Primorye (the Maritime Province) which almost certainly reflects the concentration of units of the Soviet Far Eastern Army and MGB-MVD security troops in the area.

per thousand, Belorussia with 19.39 per thousand, and the Central Asian Uzbek republic with 20.83 per thousand. All these represented areas of previous weakness. The Latvian and Estonian parties, which had also been numbered among the weaker organizations in the immediate post-war period, registered sharp gains in membership after 1949. By 1952 Party penetration in these republics approximated the national average. Though information on Jewish Party membership in recent years is unavailable, the postwar campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans," with its marked anti-Semitic overtones, would suggest that the eclipse of the Jewish element in the Party which set in during the thirties was probably accentuated.

During the war years the Party maintained its position as the party of youth. Indeed the mass Party recruitment of Red Army soldiers substantially lowered the average age of Party members. By 1946, 18.3 per cent of all members were under twenty-five; the corresponding figure before the war was 8.9 per cent. In 1946, 63.6 per cent of the membership was under thirty-five years.<sup>68</sup> While the Party rank and file retained its youthful character, the top leadership of the Party was perceptibly aging. At the Eighteenth Congress in 1939, 49.5 per cent of the voting delegates were under thirty-five. At the Nineteenth Congress in 1952, only 5.9 per cent of the delegates were in this age group. In 1939, 32 per cent of the delegates were in the thirty-six to forty age group; in 1952, only 17.7 per cent were in this age range. In 1952, 61.1 per cent of the delegates were between forty and fifty years of age; in 1939, only 15.5 per cent of the delegates had been in this age span. The over-fifty group claimed 15.3 per cent of the delegates in 1952 compared with a mere 3 per cent in 1939.<sup>69</sup>

Educational qualifications of Party members continued to show improvement. By 1947 the Party claimed more than 400,000 Communists with higher education.<sup>70</sup> This represented 6.32 per cent of the total Party membership as compared with 5.08 per cent in 1939. Nearly 1,300,000 Communists, or 20.54 per cent of the Party, were listed in 1947 as having completed secondary schools.<sup>71</sup> This compared with 14.2 per cent of the Party membership in 1939. The improvement in the upper sector of the Party apparatus was even more impressive. At the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, only 26.5 per cent of the delegates had a higher education.<sup>72</sup> At the Nineteenth Congress, 709, or more than 58 per cent of the 1,192 voting delegates, had equivalent educational backgrounds. Of the 709 delegates with a higher education, 282 were engineers.<sup>73</sup> The absorption of the new Soviet technical cadres into the inner circles of the Party was strikingly manifest.<sup>74</sup>

At the end of Stalin's reign, the Party, along with much else in Soviet society, appeared to be fixed in a relatively rigid mold. Few new members

were being admitted, and there was little disposition to "chase after numerical growth." Despite some efforts to widen the Party's social base by recruiting leading workers and collective farmers, the administrative, managerial, and technical intelligentsia provided the hard core around which the Party was built. The Party's representation in rural areas had broadened but still had far to go to match its urban strength. One of the effects of the war was to create greater opportunities for women in the Party; there was a marked rise in the representation of women in the lower Party apparatus as compared with prewar days. The mass recruitment of young Red Army men during the war resulted in a rejuvenation of the Party rank and file, but the leadership of the Party was aging. The educational level of the Party continued its upward trend, but the national-ethnic composition of the Party remained much as it was during the thirties, with the Great Russian and Transcaucasian areas registering high rates of Party membership, and the Central Asian republics, Belorussia, the Ukraine, and some of the newly acquired regions lagging far behind.

#### *Post-Stalinist Trends*

The death of Stalin cleared the way for a re-examination of the Party's membership policy. Seeking to strengthen their link with the masses, the new leaders decided both to enlarge the size of the Party and to widen its social base. Starting in 1954, there was a renewed emphasis on Party growth. In the three and a half years between the Nineteenth and Twentieth Party Congresses, some 736,000 new members were recruited,<sup>75</sup> between the Twentieth Congress in February 1956 and the Twenty-Second Congress, held in October 1961, more than 2,500,500 members and candidates were added.<sup>76</sup> On the eve of the Twenty-Second Party Congress, the Party numbered 8,872,516 members and 843,489 candidates, a peak in its history up to that time.<sup>77</sup>

The determination to broaden the social composition of the Party assumed the character of a campaign. In the period of restricted recruitment up to 1954, the tendency had been to favor white-collar employees even more strongly than before. In Belorussia, for example, between October 1952 and January 1954, 57.4 per cent of the new Party candidates were employees, compared with 50.2 per cent in the first half of 1952.<sup>78</sup> This trend was now sharply reversed. Khrushchev set the new direction in his speech to the Central Committee on February 13, 1954. Pointing out that only 16,620 collective farmers had been taken into the Party in 1953 and that three quarters of all primary Party units on collective farms and 585 rural district committees had failed to admit a single collective farmer during the same year, Khrushchev declared, "Many raikoms take absolutely no interest in admitting collective farmers into the Party. Of

course, in recent years the Party has pursued a policy of restricting admissions, but this does not mean that the recruitment of the foremost collective farmers must be stopped altogether . . . This shortcoming must be eliminated."<sup>79</sup> The new policy was even more strongly articulated at the Twentieth Party Congress, when Suslov, who delivered the main speech on Party organizational work, insisted: "Party organizations must . . . radically increase the proportion of workers and collective farmers among new recruits."<sup>80</sup>

The effect of the new directives was soon felt. Of the candidates admitted to the Party in the RSFSR in 1955, workers represented 34.2 per cent, collective farmers 17.5 per cent, and employees 46 per cent. By 1957 the proportions had substantially changed. Of the new candidates, workers accounted for 40.8 per cent, collective farmers 20 per cent, and employees 37.8 per cent. During the first nine months of 1958, the worker component among new recruits mounted to 55 per cent, of whom more than half were reported to be engaged in physical labor.<sup>81</sup> Similar changes were manifest in the other union republics. In the Ukrainian Party in 1957, for example, workers and collective farmers together accounted for more than 65 per cent of the new recruits.<sup>82</sup> Of those admitted to membership in the Party in the period between the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Party Congress, workers constituted 40.7 per cent, collective farmers 22.7 per cent, employees 35.6 per cent, and students 1 per cent.<sup>83</sup>

Although the present recruitment policy of the Party evidences concern over possible isolation from the masses, the emphasis is still on enrolling "leading" workers and collective farmers, and the definitions of both workers and collective farmers are apparently elastic enough to embrace many foremen, brigadiers, and other administrative and specialist personnel who are not themselves engaged in physical labor. It is also possible to exaggerate the effect of the new recruitment directives in modifying the composition of the Party. Despite the seeming intensity of the drive to enroll workers and collective farmers, the statistics on the Party's composition indicate that between January 1956 and July 1961 the collective-farmer contingent increased only from 17.1 per cent to 17.5 per cent and the worker component from 32.0 to 34.5 per cent.<sup>84</sup> During the same period, the "employee and others" category registered a small decline, from 50.9 per cent to 48.0 per cent.<sup>85</sup> But even this decline may be deceptive. Social classifications in Communist Party statistics are currently determined by occupation at the time of entry into the Party, and a good proportion of those who are admitted as workers or collective farmers quickly find their way with the help of Party membership into administrative posts. While the present swing of the pendulum is toward broadening the Party's mass base, the administrative, managerial, and

technical intelligentsia continue to represent the predominant element in the Party, and their preponderance is particularly marked in leading posts.

Although the major stronghold of the Party is still in urban industrial areas, Khrushchev's drive to build up rural Party strength has enjoyed some success. In 1953 Communist membership in the collective farms totaled 930,000. During 1954-55 more than 100,000 urban Communists were shifted to the countryside, and injunctions to recruit collective farmers more actively began to take effect. By January 1, 1956, the number of Communist collective farmers mounted to 1,160,000, and by July 1, 1961, another 300,000 members had been added, many of them, however, transferred from MTS rolls.<sup>86</sup> On the same date, state-farm Party organizations claimed a membership of 577,800, a fivefold increase since January 1, 1956, which reflected the dramatic expansion of state farming in the virgin lands, as well as the transformation of kolkhozes into state farms.<sup>87</sup>

*Table 11. Occupational Distribution of CPSU Membership in Territorial Party Organizations, July 1, 1961*

Occupation	Per cent
Industry and construction	33.5
Agriculture and forestry	23.3
Transport and communications	9.2
Procurements, material and technical supply and marketing, trade and public catering	5.4
Education, science, public health, culture	15.6
Apparatus of state and economic agencies and Party and public organizations	10.8
Communal economy and other branches	2.2
	100.0

Source: "KPSS v Tsifrakh," *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1 (January 1962), p. 50.

As might be expected, the continued rapid industrialization of Soviet society has strengthened the weight of Party membership in urban industrialized areas. Table 11 indicates the distribution of Communists in territorial Party organizations among the major branches of the national economy. Between February 1956 and July 1961 the number of Communists in industry, construction, transport, and communications increased by more than 876,000. Particularly large gains were made in the category of the technical intelligentsia, as Table 12 demonstrates. By December 1, 1960, of a total of 8,784,000 Soviet citizens classified as specialists working in the national economy, 2,495,200, or 28.5 per cent, were Party members.<sup>88</sup>

The sharp upsurge in the recruitment of women into the Party during

Table 12. Distribution of CPSU Employee Category, 1956-1961

Employee category	January 1, 1956		July 1, 1961	
	Number	Per cent	Number	Per cent
All employees	3,410,300	100	4,224,000	100
Heads of organizations, institutions, enterprises, construction projects, state farms, Repair and Technical Stations and their subdivisions	480,852	14.1	430,848	10.2
Engineers, technicians, agricultural specialists, economists, architects	685,470	20.1	1,233,448	29.2
Personnel in service, education, public health, art, and literature	641,136	18.8	908,160	21.5
Personnel in trade and public catering	160,284	4.7	206,976	4.9
Personnel in inspection, accounting and clerical work	450,160	13.2	502,656	11.9
Other employees (communications, utilities, etc.)	992,397	29.1	941,952	22.3

Source: "KPSS v Tsifrakh," *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1 (January 1962), p. 48.

World War II and the immediate postwar years leveled out in the post-Stalinist period. Although the total number of women in the Party continued to increase, reaching a figure of 1,414,456 on January 1, 1956, and 1,898,759 in October 1961, the proportion remained more or less stable, approximating one fifth of the total Party membership.<sup>89</sup> At the same time, women appeared to be working themselves slowly into more responsible positions in the Party hierarchy. Of the voting delegates at the Twenty-Second Congress, 22.3 per cent were women, compared with 17.2 per cent at the Twenty-First Congress, 14.2 per cent at the Twentieth Congress, and 12.3 per cent at the Nineteenth. The designation of Madame Furtseva as a full member of the Presidium in June 1957 marked the first time that a woman had attained that lofty eminence, though she lost her place in October 1961. Despite the recognition temporarily accorded Furtseva, women remained scarce in top Party councils. The Central Committee elected at the Twenty-Second Party Congress contained only fourteen women, six serving as full members and eight as alternates.

The strength of various national-ethnic groups in the Party as of July 1, 1961, is indicated in Table 13. As the table reveals, Russians, Georgians, and Armenians are considerably overrepresented in the Party in relation to their share of the total USSR population. The most underrepresented groups include the Moldavians, Lithuanians, Latvians, Estonians, Uzbeks, Kirghiz, Tadjiks, and Turkmens. In recent years special efforts have been made to build up the Party organizations in some of the

Table 13. National-Ethnic Composition of the CPSU, July 1, 1961

Nationality	Number in Party	Percentage of Party	Number in population (1959 census)	Percentage of population
Russians	6,116,700	63.3	114,114,000	54.5
Ukrainians	1,412,200	14.7	37,253,000	18.0
Belorussians	287,000	3.0	7,913,000	3.8
Uzbeks	142,700	1.5	6,015,000	2.9
Kazakhs	149,200	1.6	3,622,000	1.7
Georgians	170,400	1.8	2,692,000	1.3
Azerbaidjani	106,100	1.1	2,940,000	1.4
Lithuanians	42,800	.44	2,326,000	1.1
Moldavians	26,700	.27	2,214,000	1.1
Latvians	33,900	.35	1,400,000	.7
Kirghiz	27,300	.28	969,000	.5
Tadjiks	32,700	.35	1,397,000	.7
Armenians	161,200	1.7	2,787,000	1.4
Turkmens	27,300	.28	1,002,000	.5
Estonians	24,400	.26	989,000	.5
All members and candidates	9,626,700	100		

Source: "KPSS v Tsifrakh," *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1 (January 1962), p. 49.

lagging national republics. Between January 1, 1957, and October 1, 1961, when Party membership as a whole increased by nearly a third, the Party organizations in a number of republics expanded at a far greater rate: the Ukraine 59 per cent, Belorussia 55 per cent, Lithuania 54 per cent, Moldavia 50 per cent, Tadzhikistan 49 per cent, Uzbekistan 48 per cent, and Kirghizia 42 per cent.<sup>90</sup> On the other hand, such traditional strongholds as the Armenian and Georgian Party organizations increased by only 22 per cent and 13 per cent, respectively.

Despite these efforts to secure more balanced and diversified Party representation in the union republics, substantial disparities persist, as Table 14 demonstrates. From the table we see that, despite the recent emphasis on building up the weaker union republic Party organizations, areas of traditional strength and weakness persist. The RSFSR, Georgia, and Armenia continue to boast particularly high membership rates, while the Azerbaidjan Party organization retains its historically strong position. Moldavia and Lithuania are still at the bottom of the ladder. The Belorussian Party organization remains small in proportion to population, and the Ukrainian Party, despite its relatively rapid recent growth, is still well below the USSR average. In Central Asia, the Uzbek and Tadjik organizations are the greatest laggards, with the Turkmen and Kirghiz organizations claiming somewhat higher membership rates, though still substantially below the national average. The relative strength of the

Kazakhstan Party organization reflects an influx of Russian and other nonindigenous Party personnel who have moved into the area as an accompaniment of its rapid industrialization and the opening up of its virgin lands.

*Table 14. Proportion of Communists to Population by Union Republics, 1961*

Republic	Population (Jan. 1961)	Party members and candidates (Oct. 1961)	Per 1000 population
RSFSR	120,554,000	6,534,000	54.19
Ukraine	43,091,000	1,447,000	33.58
Kazakhstan	10,000,000	366,000	35.23
Uzbekistan	8,665,000	239,000	27.58
Belorussia	8,226,000	243,000	29.54
Georgia	4,200,000	222,000	52.85
Azerbaijan	3,973,000	160,000	42.28
Moldavia	3,040,000	63,000	20.72
Lithuania	2,804,000	65,000	23.18
Kirghizia	2,225,000	68,000	30.56
Latvia	2,142,000	76,000	35.48
Tadzhikistan	2,104,000	55,000	26.14
Armenia	1,893,000	88,000	46.48
Turkmenistan	1,626,000	49,000	30.14
Estonia	1,221,000	41,000	33.57
USSR as a whole	216,200,000	9,716,005	44.93

Source: "KPSS v Tsifrakh," *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1 (January 1962), p. 44.

While native ethnic recruitment in the republic Party organizations appears to be increasing, Russian Party members continue to play a disproportionate role. Thus, in a series of union-republic Party congresses held in 1958, Russians accounted for nearly a third of the delegates at the Moldavian congress, 26 per cent at the Turkmen congress, and 15 per cent at the Lithuanian congress.<sup>91</sup> Although there have been some recent indications of a tendency to push native leadership to the fore, Russians continue to occupy a substantial number of key posts in the weaker republic organizations.

The present age distribution of the Party reflects a less youthful profile than was true during the War and immediate postwar period. In 1946 18.3 per cent of the Party was under twenty-five. While a comparable figure is not currently available for the USSR as a whole, in the Ukrainian Party, which can be regarded as fairly typical, the under-twenty-five group in 1958 accounted for less than 4 per cent of the total membership. Despite this drastic reduction in the very youngest age group, the rank and file of the Party remained quite youthful. More than 55 per cent of the Ukrainian membership in 1958 was in the forty-or-under group.<sup>92</sup>

A more general indication of the aging of the Party and its increasing

reliance on more experienced Party cadres are provided by the statistics on length of Party membership (see Table 15).

Table 15. Length of Party Membership

Years in Party	1952	1956	1961
10 years or less	66%	42%	40%
11 to 25 years	29	51	52
Over 25 years	5	7	8
	100%	100%	100%

Source: "KPSS v Tsifrakh," *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1 (January 1962), p. 49.

On the eve of the Twenty-Second Party Congress (October 1961), 67 per cent, or more than two thirds of the Party membership, consisted of persons who were born and brought up under Soviet rule.<sup>93</sup> The same trend was increasingly evident at leadership levels. By the time of the Twenty-Second Congress, the Old Bolsheviks and Civil War veterans were on the road to extinction. Among the voting delegates there were only forty-two who had joined the Party before the October Revolution and only 1.3 per cent who had enrolled during the Civil War years from 1917 to 1921. More than two thirds of the voting delegates dated their Party affiliations from 1941 or later.<sup>94</sup> As these figures emphasize, the majority in the Party will soon be those for whom World War II represents the beginning of meaningful political experience, with all that this connotes in terms of remoteness from the revolution, pride in victory, and absorption in the responsibilities of managing an increasingly complex economy.

The educational qualifications of Party members continued to rise in the post-Stalinist years. The proportion of Party members and candidates with a complete secondary-school education or better increased from 37 per cent in January 1956 to 42.9 per cent in July 1961.<sup>95</sup> At the same time the number of Party specialists with a higher or secondary specialized education mounted from 1,877,773 in 1956 to 3,076,237 on July 1, 1961.<sup>96</sup> The same trends were visible in the higher Party apparatus, but as a result of a deliberate effort to feature the participation of leading collective farmers and workers in the post-Stalinist Party congresses, the percentages of delegates with a higher education declined slightly from 59.5 per cent at the Nineteenth Congress to approximately 55.8 per cent at both the Twentieth and Twenty-First Congresses and 52.5 per cent at the Twenty-Second. Of the delegates with a higher education, the largest single occupational group remained the engineers.

The membership of the Party mirrors its weaknesses as well as its strength. In enlisting the new technical and administrative intelligentsia

as its primary cadre beginning in the late thirties, the Party's position among rank-and-file workers tended to weaken, and it risked increasing isolation from the production line. The recent emphasis on the recruitment of leading workers and collective farmers represents an effort to redress the balance by achieving an adequate modicum of Party representation in all Soviet social and occupational groups. Despite the new direction of recruitment, Party membership among rank-and-file workers and farmers remains thin, and the ordinary collective farmer, even more than the factory worker, falls outside the circle of the Party elite. Although the Party has strengthened its position among women, their role remains limited, and in outlying areas such as Central Asia they continue to be largely inactive in Party affairs. The nationality weaknesses of the Party offset its Great Russian, Georgian, and Armenian strength. Moldavia, Lithuania, and Belorussia remain particularly retrograde areas, reflecting the slowness of Communist penetration in the rural sections of the areas acquired since World War II. While the Party has expanded its membership in the Central Asian republics over the years, these regions, except for Kazakhstan, also represent relatively weak Communist outposts. Party controls become increasingly attenuated as one moves from the great industrial centers into the peripheral areas of the border nationalities and the agricultural hinterlands.

The membership policy of the Party poses a problem for which there is no easy solution. As the dominating force in Soviet society, the Party can discharge its governing responsibilities effectively only by assimilating the most highly trained and educated representatives of the younger generations. In consolidating its position as a governing elite, the Party needs to incorporate the rising stratum in Soviet society — the engineers and technicians, the plant managers, the bureaucrats, and other representatives of the new technical, administrative, and cultural intelligentsia. To the extent that it anchors its power on the support of these groups alone, the Party runs the risk of increasing alienation from the mass of workers and peasants who remain outside its ranks. Thus the Party in recent years has sought to broaden the base of its membership by enrolling leading workers and collective farmers in its ranks. The ability of the Party to survive as a functional elite may well depend on its continuing skill in balancing the pressures for both leadership and popular support.

## *Chapter 9*

# *The Komsomol— Youth under Dictatorship*

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One of the most striking characteristics of modern totalitarianism is the conscious attention which it devotes to the organization and indoctrination of youth. The Soviet dictatorship from its earliest days has carried on such activity at a level of intensity unmatched by its now defunct Fascist and Nazi rivals. Through the Young Communist League, or Komsomol, and its junior affiliate, the Pioneers, the leaders of the regime undertake to harness the energy of youth and to prepare its most active and loyal members for Party responsibilities. The membership of the Communist Party today is overwhelmingly composed of individuals who served their apprenticeship in the Young Pioneers and the Komsomol, and waiting at the threshold of power is a new generation of nearly nineteen and a half million Komsomols and more than eighteen and a half million Pioneers from whose ranks the Communist elite of the future is to be recruited.<sup>1</sup>

What is the history of this effort to assimilate and discipline the younger generation? What manner of training do the young people receive? What are the values that the present leadership seeks to implant in them? What motives induce them to join the Komsomol? How is the Komsomol organized? What are the activities of its membership? How are the oncoming waves of Soviet youth relating themselves to the society which has produced them? To what extent are they deeply loyal to the present regime? Is there evidence of disaffection among them, and, if so, does this disaffection present any important threat to the stability of the regime?

To put these questions is not to suggest that anything resembling con-

clusive answers can be deduced from the available data. Interpretations of the moods and attitudes of Soviet youth run a spectacular gamut. The official view of the Party leadership is that the younger generation is fanatically and passionately devoted to Communism. The counterclaim of some former Soviet citizens is that the whole body of Soviet youth is ready to rise up in revolt against the regime at the first opportunity. Neither of these extreme views can stand serious scrutiny. Even a cursory reading of the literature of self-criticism in the Soviet press yields sufficient denunciations of political passivity in Komsomol circles to cast grave doubt on the official picture of Soviet youth as a monolithic embodiment of zealous orthodoxy. On the other hand, interviews with Soviet defectors and nonreturners, many of whom themselves passed through the Komsomol school, indicate the continued presence, though in diminished degree, of a hard core of fanaticism among Komsomols. Such testimony from individuals who bitterly hate the Soviet regime makes it clear that the Komsomol still has an important role to play in training the true believers.<sup>2</sup>

#### *The Growth and Development of the Komsomol*

The problem of the generations in Soviet society can only be understood in terms of the historical background in which it has evolved. Every generation bears the unmistakable imprint of the formative experiences to which it has been exposed. The history of Soviet youth, and indeed of Soviet society, has been a unique tale of turmoil in a turbulent age. The Revolution, the Civil War and War Communism, the NEP, the five-year plans, collectivization, the Great Purge of 1936-1938, World War II, and the years of strain which followed have all left their marks on succeeding generations of youth. Over most of the period, life has been lived in an atmosphere attuned to crisis, of dangers real and fancied, of superhuman demands on youth, of endless emergencies, and of constant strife and tension. The casualties have been high. The revolution has consumed its children as well as its makers. Like most revolutionaries who attempt a sharp break with the past, the Communist leadership has placed its primary reliance on youth to generate the momentum of innovation. It was Lenin who wrote, long before the revolution, "We mean to leave the collection of weary thirty-year-old ancients, revolutionaries 'come to their senses,' and Social Democratic renegades to people like the Constitutional Democrats. We always mean to remain the Party for the youth of that class to which the future belongs."<sup>3</sup>

Before the revolution, the Bolsheviks maintained no separate organization for the younger generation. The reason was an obvious one. The cadres of the Party were themselves recruited largely from the youth. Through these cadres the Party sought to penetrate and exercise influence

on the circles of young students and workers which sprang up sporadically in the period of the 1905 revolution and the years thereafter.<sup>4</sup> Indeed, a resolution calling for such action among students, introduced by Lenin at the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party in 1903 (when the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks were still organizationally united), represents the first recorded party action in this area.<sup>5</sup> But until 1917, aspirations reached far beyond achievement, and the Bolsheviks remained a small sectarian group with little in the way of mass influence either among the youth or their elders.

Even after the outbreak of the February Revolution, the Bolsheviks were slow to assume the initiative in organizing an affiliated youth movement. In Petrograd, the storm center of revolutionary activity, the leadership in youth organization was taken by an idealistic young student, P. Shevtsov, who attempted to turn the energies of youth in a cultural and nonpolitical direction. Under his auspices, a number of young workers in the Petrograd factories were banded together in a league called Work and Light which repudiated the class struggle and called upon youth "to join no party, but to work together ourselves according to the precepts of brotherly feeling."<sup>6</sup> The program of the league urged a great expansion of schools, the foundation of a university for working-class youth, the establishment of clubs and theaters, youth hostels, and excursions into the woods to share the joys of nature.

The vagueness of this program, removed as it was from the immediate realities of political and economic struggle, provided the Bolsheviks with their opportunity to make a vigorous counterappeal to working-class youth. They sent their representatives into the Work and Light league with the objective of attacking its program, discrediting Shevtsov, and winning support for their cause. Under the leadership of a twenty-one-year-old Bolshevik, V. Alekseyev, a Socialist Association of Young Workers was organized. It called for an intensification of the class struggle and immediate measures to improve the working conditions of juvenile labor. Faced with a vigorous challenge from this group, Shevtsov began to lose his grip over his own league, and in August 1917 Work and Light was disbanded by a vote of its members. Meanwhile, the Socialist Association of Young Workers expanded into a city-wide organization of working-class youth with a program copied largely from the Bolshevik model. By December 1917 it had attained a membership of approximately 15,000.<sup>7</sup> In the large industrial centers, the Bolsheviks sought to increase their appeal to youth by stressing such popular reforms as the outlaw of child labor, the six-hour day for young workers, the establishment of minimum wages, social-insurance benefits, compulsory free education for those under the age of sixteen, and the right to vote at the age of eighteen. By identifying themselves with the specific economic grievances of young

workers, the Bolsheviks mobilized an additional increment of support in their successful bid for power in October–November 1917.

The organization of a Communist youth affiliate on an all-Russian scale was delayed until almost a year after the October Revolution. The 176 delegates who foregathered for the First Congress of the Komsomol, or Communist Association of Youth, in Moscow from October 29 to November 4, 1918, represented an initial membership of only 22,100.<sup>8</sup> They were, as was to be expected, overwhelmingly Communist in their political sympathies, but also present was a scattering of non-Party youth as well as a few delegates from other left-wing groups still collaborating with the Communists. The major struggle at the congress took place over the designation of the organization as Communist. Some expressed concern that this appellation would frighten youth away from affiliation, but their anxiety was swept aside by the majority. The congress, although proclaiming itself an "independent" organization, declared its solidarity with the Party and adopted the Communist tag by an overwhelming majority. At the Second Congress, meeting in October 1919, with 96,000 members represented, the Party bond was tightened. The congress expressed its complete adherence to the program and tactics of the Party and recognized its own central committee as immediately subordinate to the Party Central Committee.

During the Civil War period, all of the energies of the Komsomol were concentrated on the struggle against the Whites. In successive mobilizations the Komsomols were rushed to the front, where they functioned as agitators, commissars, and shock troops to provide leadership and inspiration for less dependable conscripts. But through the end of 1919, they remained a relatively small band, and it was not until the prospects of victory brightened during 1920 that they began to take on the character of a mass organization. By the time the Third Congress met in October 1920, their membership had climbed to approximately 480,000.

The rapid growth in membership brought forth new problems. The Komsomol was not then as tightly controlled as it was later to become. It began to spawn deviations.<sup>9</sup> Even before the Second Congress, a group led by V. Dunayevsky had been pressing for the organization of special youth sections in the trade unions. This was denounced by the Party as an effort to pit the interests of young workers against those of their elders and as a syndicalist deviation detracting from the authority of the Komsomol organization itself. Dunayevsky and others continued to urge wider mass participation in determining Komsomol policies, but their claims were decisively rejected, and disciplinary measures were taken against the deviators. Restiveness under the central controls which were already emerging within the Komsomol found its expression in renewed demands for more organizational democracy and local autonomy. This

position was strongly espoused by the so-called Ukrainian opposition, which also insisted on the exclusion of intellectuals from the association. These oppositionist tendencies, which had their analogue in the Workers' Opposition within the Party itself, were sharply attacked and repudiated at the Third Komsomol Congress.

The Third Congress marked the beginning of the turn from war to peace. In addressing the congress, Lenin sounded a new call. "The task before the elder generation of revolutionaries," he declared, "was comparatively simple. For them it was a matter of doing away with the bourgeoisie, of inspiring hatred for it among the masses, of awakening class-consciousness in the workers. The task before your generation is infinitely more complicated: the erection of the Communist society."<sup>10</sup> Lenin's injunction to the congress to "learn, learn, learn," to master the knowledge that the despised capitalist society had accumulated, to practice discipline, and to seek proficiency in the prosaic tasks of school and workshop came as something of a shock. The shock was accentuated by the adoption of the New Economic Policy in the spring of 1921.

After the heroics of Civil War battlefields and War Communism, adjustment to the NEP did not come easily. To many, the NEP seemed a retreat from socialism, a surrender after victory. Opposition to it was lively and violent in Komsomol circles. A few of the more fanatic committed suicide in protest. Still others were unable to make the transition from military to civilian life and sank into despair as unhappy victims of the revolution they had helped to create. Grumbling among young workers mounted as working conditions failed to register hoped-for improvements and as unemployment increased. Enthusiasm gave way to disillusionment, and the Komsomol organization itself underwent a crisis. By October 1922, at the meeting of the Fifth Congress, membership had plummeted to 247,000, and Party leaders were seriously alarmed.<sup>11</sup>

From 1922 on, strenuous efforts were made to recapture and consolidate the loyalty of Soviet youth. One of the resolutions passed by the Fifth Congress provided for the organization of the Pioneer association to attract the pre-Komsomol generation and to condition and prepare it for Komsomol membership. Measures were taken to improve working conditions for young factory workers and to give them some degree of protection against unemployment by imposing a minimum quota of juveniles on every industrial undertaking.<sup>12</sup> The system of factory schools (FSU) was extended, thus making available a modicum of education to young workers in the factories. Efforts were also made to compensate for the weakness of the organization in the countryside by sending Komsomol activists to rural centers to recruit members and build up local organizations. Greater stress was placed on political indoctrination within the Red Army, where peasant youths called up for military service were

more amenable to Komsomol blandishments than they were in the villages where counterinfluences were still powerful.

As a result of these measures, the tide was reversed. By January 1, 1924, the membership of the Komsomol again exceeded 400,000.<sup>13</sup> By January 1, 1925, after the "Lenin Levy" when the Party appealed to youth to commemorate Lenin's death by closing ranks, membership rose to a million. The second million was reached in 1927 on the eve of the five-year plan.<sup>14</sup>

While the Komsomol registered substantial gains in membership during the later phases of the NEP, the period was not without its problems. The level of political literacy among Komsomols was low, particularly in rural areas. Among the more politically alert, the grey dullness of the NEP dampened enthusiasm. The strong response which Trotsky and the Left Opposition received among the more educated and politically conscious Komsomols becomes explicable against this background. Trotsky's call for world revolution evoked stirring memories of the first days of the revolution and drew on a tradition of militant activism which the NEP had the effect of thwarting. The purge of the Left Opposition within the Party left its scar on the Komsomol, though, as events turned out, the wound healed quickly.

The initiation of the First Five-Year Plan in 1928 aroused an outburst of zeal and fervor among the Komsomols for which only the period of revolution and civil war furnished a parallel.<sup>15</sup> Here was an enterprise which in its immensity, its call for sacrifice, and its promise for the future was peculiarly appealing to youthful idealism. Komsomols were mobilized in the thousands to construct such industrial giants as the Stalingrad tractor factory, the Dnepropetrovsk electric station, and the new factories in the Urals and Siberia. They were drafted to work in the Don Basin when coal production lagged. They built a new industrial center on the Amur River in the Far East, named Komsomolsk in their honor. They were sent by the thousands to participate in collectivization, to liquidate the kulaks, to help establish kolkhozes, and to staff the new machine-tractor stations. They set the pace as *udarniki*, or shock brigadiers, and as leaders in socialist competition. They took upon themselves the task of stamping out illiteracy and conducting antireligious propaganda among the backward masses. They crowded the newly established technical institutes to prepare themselves to become the engineers and industrial managers of the morrow.

The outpouring of energy was impressive, yet the almost superhuman demands which the plan imposed on youth also exacted their toll. The initial delirium of dedication and enthusiasm was succeeded by more prosaic daily irritations compounded of poor food, crowded housing, and the constant spur to make bricks out of straw. The more tenderhearted

among the Komsomols were broken by the harsh realities of dekulakization and famine in the villages. "These years are very difficult for our young people," wrote the novelist Gladkov. "They burn out quickly, overwork themselves, and suffer from nervous troubles; at the age of eighteen or nineteen many are either stunted or dried up and old in spirit. No fewer than one-third of the patients in the sanitarium are Komsomolites, and they are all like aged, used-up people, who have gone through a great deal already."<sup>16</sup>

It was the hard and the tough who survived. The sensitive and the weak dropped out as casualties of forced-draft industrialization and collectivization. Their places were taken by representatives of the oncoming generation recruited from the Pioneers. The size of the Komsomol organization continued to expand. By the time of the Ninth Congress of the Komsomols in 1931, membership had reached the three million mark. At the Tenth Congress in April 1936 the membership approximated four million.<sup>17</sup>

The mid-thirties marked an important turn in the membership policies and program of the Komsomol. Until that period, the Komsomol had been regarded as a relatively exclusive class organization. The rules of the Komsomol described it as "a mass organization, proletarian in its essence, uniting in its ranks the broad strata of the foremost class-conscious and politically literate youth."<sup>18</sup> Membership was mainly recruited from proletarian elements in the cities and from the poorer peasantry in the villages. At the 1936 congress, the rules were modified to liberalize the conditions of admission. Henceforth, the Komsomol was to be "a mass non-party organization, affiliated with the VKP(b), which unites in its ranks the broad stratum of the progressive, politically literate, toiling youth of the town and village." Social origins were no longer decisive in determining eligibility for membership. The new rules stressed instead the broader criterion of loyalty to the Soviet regime.<sup>19</sup>

This deliberate decision to widen the base of the Komsomol was accompanied by a marked shift of program. In the stress on emergency economic activity during the First Five-Year Plan, the Communist education of the youth was neglected. "Some of our regional committees," reported A. V. Kosarev, first secretary of the Komsomol, "had become, so to say, some sort of small, sickly economic Narkomats [ministries] . . . We have to remember that our basic task is the organization and Communist education of the youth and children."<sup>20</sup> Under the banner of Stalin's new watchword, "Cadres decide everything," the main task of the Komsomol was reformulated as the Communist indoctrination of youth. The Komsomol leadership was also called upon to emphasize "cultural" as well as political work, to organize athletic competitions, ski excursions, musicales, dramatics, dances, and evening literary discussions in order to minister

to the many-sided interests of youth and to attract its support. Under the impetus of these measures, membership grew sharply. By October 1939 it had climbed to nine million.<sup>21</sup>

The late thirties brought trials and tribulations as well as successes. The Great Purge had its maximum impact on the Party, but it also struck the Komsomols hard. The central apparatus of the Komsomol was decimated. Kosarev, the first secretary, was removed, and many of the top functionaries of the organization disappeared with him.<sup>22</sup> At the height of the Yezhovshchina, a veritable reign of terror was unleashed among Komsomols as well as Party members. Denunciations were rife in all the local organizations. Expulsions took place in the hundreds and thousands as the NKVD relentlessly pursued the "Trotskyite-Bukharinist-German-Japanese-Fascist spies, diversionists, murderers, double-dealers, hostile elements, and enemies of the people" who were alleged to have infiltrated the Komsomol as well as the Party.<sup>23</sup> By the spring of 1938, the Party leadership was prepared to admit that many mistakes had been committed in the course of the wholesale expulsions. Efforts were made to repair the damage by punishing "slanderers responsible . . . for unjust accusations" and restoring some of the victims to their former status in the Komsomol organization.<sup>24</sup> But the heritage of bitterness left by the purge persisted, and its continuing effects were visible as one of the motivations which inspired Soviet defection during and after World War II.

Not all of the consequences of the purge, however, were negative. The havoc wrought among the older generation was much greater than among the youth. In the process, many responsible posts in both the Party and governmental hierarchies were vacated, presenting the Komsomol activists who survived the purge with magnificent opportunities for rapid promotion to positions of influence and large responsibilities. Those Komsomols who were catapulted to power over the graves of their elders were welded to the regime and incorporated in its leadership group.

Other developments in the prewar years served to generate discontent among some members of the Komsomol rank and file. On October 2, 1940, the government instituted a system of tuition fees for the last three years of secondary education and higher schools.<sup>25</sup> It also established a State Labor Reserve scheme whereby each year up to a million youths between the ages of fourteen and seventeen were to be drafted for training as industrial workers.<sup>26</sup> The introduction of tuition fees meant that those students who could not qualify for scholarships or were unable to draw on family resources to support them had to abandon their hopes of higher education. The advantages conferred on the financially better-situated left a reservoir of bitterness among those who were forced to withdraw

from the higher schools as a result of the decree. At the same time, the restrictions on freedom of occupational choice as a result of the labor draft also induced frustration and discontent. While it is difficult to appraise the significance of the dissatisfaction produced by these measures, the testimony of young Soviet defectors is virtually unanimous in stressing the growth of a mood of disenchantment in that segment of Soviet youth which was most adversely affected.

The success of the Soviet army in surviving the Nazi onslaught and pressing on to victory may suggest that the mood was a passing one or that in any case it did not go deep enough to affect the will to fight. Yet the problem of the loyalty of Soviet youth to the regime cannot be disposed of with a mere reference to the pragmatic fact of Soviet victory. The mass surrenders of the early days of the war point to a serious problem of morale as well as difficulties of matériel and generalship. All of the evidence available through interviews indicates that the mass atrocities committed by the Nazis in the course of their Russian campaign and the contempt with which they treated the Slav *Untermenschen* had much to do with stiffening resistance. Hatred of the Nazis unleashed a genuine and widespread national upsurge of feeling which the Party leadership was shrewd enough both to stimulate and exploit. Communist slogans were muted, and the wellsprings of national sentiment were tapped to the full. The bars of admission to Party and Komsomol were lowered for members of the armed forces; the millions who enrolled during the war responded primarily to patriotic appeals. By October 1945 the claimed membership of the Komsomol was fifteen million, approximately half of the population in the eligible age group.<sup>27</sup>

After the war there was a sharp drop in Komsomol membership. The data released on the occasion of the Eleventh Congress of the Komsomol in March 1949 showed a membership roll of 9,283,289, a figure roughly equivalent to the 1939 membership.<sup>28</sup> No official explanations of this decline were vouchsafed, though reports in the Komsomol press indicated considerable concern over the large number of automatic exclusions as "a result of nonpayment of dues, failure to attend meetings, and unwillingness to discharge the social and political obligations that go with membership."<sup>29</sup> At the congress, the Komsomol bylaws were amended to lower the age of admission from fifteen to fourteen, and the candidacy stage was abolished.

After the Eleventh Congress, an intensive campaign was waged to increase Komsomol membership. By August 1952 more than sixteen million youths were enrolled in its ranks.<sup>30</sup> According to N. Mikhailov, then Komsomol first secretary, the organization enlisted nearly 75 per cent of all university students, 61 per cent of those attending industrial schools, and about 65 per cent of the students in the seven- and ten-year schools who

were eligible for membership.<sup>31</sup> The Komsomol appeared well on the way to becoming an all-embracing mass organization of Soviet youth, rather than an elite category second only to the Party.

After Stalin's death, Komsomol enrollment at first mounted sharply, reaching a peak of 18,825,327 in March 1954.<sup>32</sup> Since that date, perhaps partly as a reflection of the lower birth rate during World War II, the organization has grown much more slowly; at the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress in April 1962, total membership was listed as 19,400,000.<sup>33</sup>

The changes of the post-Stalin era had their impact on the Komsomol as on all other sectors of Soviet life. Under Khrushchev's aegis, the activities of the Komsomol were again given a marked economic orientation, and its members were mobilized in the hundreds of thousands to settle the virgin lands, to undertake construction projects in the north and the far eastern expanses of Siberia, to open new mines in the Donets Basin, and to tackle other difficult pioneering jobs. The effort to pour new vitality into the Komsomol and to recapture something of the élan of the stirring years of the First Five-Year Plan was not an unqualified success. The reluctant "volunteers" inspired *Komsomolskaya Pravda* to lament: "What's happened to youth?" you hear nowadays. Why are there so many indifferent people in the Komsomol? . . . It is impossible not to agree that in the lives of Komsomol members of the older generation there was more fervor, more of a Komsomol spark."<sup>34</sup>

The shock of Khrushchev's demolition of the Stalin cult at the Twentieth Party Congress, the suppression of the Hungarian uprising by the Red Army, and the repudiation of Stalinist leadership in Poland unleashed a flood of doubt and questioning among Komsomols which, for a short period at least, threatened to get out of hand. Particularly in student circles, orthodox explanations were rejected and so-called nihilist views aired. In an unprecedented outburst of "democratization," officially sponsored candidates for Komsomol office were challenged in primary-unit elections, and discussions moved beyond permissible bounds. The ferment and restiveness in the universities, however, proved short-lived. The authorities moved quickly to discipline the recalcitrant and to reassert the infallibility of the official Party line. The 1958-59 educational reforms, with their insistence that students combine educational and practical work, represented a further reminder to the restive that their first obligation was to the Communist cause. Meanwhile, the successful firing of the sputniks and other space exploits produced an upsurge of pride and patriotism that served, at least temporarily, to still the voices of the dissident and cement youth's loyalty to the regime.

The history of the Komsomol is a record of persistent and strenuous efforts by the Party leadership to mobilize, harness, and direct the energies of youth to state and Party purposes. Where necessary, the Party has

not hesitated to invoke repressive measures to enforce discipline. Understandably anxious to base itself on the support of the younger Soviet generations, however, it has also relied heavily on indoctrination. Each new generation as it grows to maturity offers the Party leadership a fresh opportunity to implant its stamp upon the future. The capacity of a totalitarian regime to mold the malleable minds of the young is a formidable weapon. Its power should not be underrated.

#### *Training the Komsomols*

The educational process starts in the kindergarten, where children's play, singing, and storytelling are used "to instill love of the Soviet fatherland, its people, its leaders, and the Soviet Army."<sup>35</sup> The child is first enrolled in the "little Octobrists" where his political indoctrination begins. At the age of ten, he joins the Young Pioneers. Membership in the Young Pioneers, which numbered more than 18,500,000 in April 1962, is virtually universal in the eligible age group of ten to fifteen.<sup>36</sup> Indeed, the drive to affiliate is so great in the early impressionable years that the threat of exclusion is frequently a sufficient sanction to discipline the most unruly. Entrance into the Pioneers is the occasion for an impressive initiation ceremony, replete with symbolism and emblems calculated to appeal to the very young.

Once enrolled in the organization, the new member becomes part of a Pioneer brigade.<sup>37</sup> Brigades with twenty or more members are broken down into detachments which ordinarily include all Pioneers studying in the same class. Detachments with ten or more members are in turn subdivided into "links." Each brigade chooses its council or chairman to represent it and carries on its activities under the direction of a Komsomol leader. These activities vary with the age level of the Pioneers. In the younger classes, meetings provide the occasion for tales of the childhood of Lenin and other Party leaders, or stories of heroism on the part of Young Pioneers in the war against the Nazis. With older children, political instruction becomes more pointed. The biographies of Lenin and other leaders are studied more carefully, with emphasis on their revolutionary activities. The heroic exploits of the Soviet army are celebrated; there are lectures on the Constitution, and national and international events are reviewed from the Party standpoint.

Political instruction in the narrow sense forms only one part of the Pioneer program. There are also organized excursions for nature study; trips to museums and places of historical interest; athletic competitions; literary, dramatic, and musical evenings; and opportunities to pursue hobbies at school or at the so-called Houses of Pioneers which are set aside as centers for extracurricular activity. There is a requirement to engage in socially useful work, which may embrace such diverse obliga-

tions as gathering scrap, working in the school garden or on a neighboring kolkhoz, or even helping to combat "religious prejudices" in the home. The interference with school programs which such assignments breed has led to periodic protests by Soviet school authorities against overburdening the child with outside tasks. Despite these protests, the present tendency is to stress "more extensive enlistment of Young Pioneers in active public life and above all in socially useful labor."<sup>38</sup> Pioneer leaders have been enjoined to set "concrete assignments" for their troops and to maintain the closest ties with plants, factories, and collective farms.

The Pioneers are designed to take care of children in the younger age range. At the age of fourteen, the child becomes eligible for membership in the Komsomol, provided, of course, that he can satisfy the conditions for admission.<sup>39</sup> These conditions include recommendation by one member of the Communist Party or by two persons who have been Komsomol members for at least a year. Recommendation by the council of a Pioneer brigade is equivalent to one recommendation by a Komsomol member and is obligatory for all Pioneers entering the ranks of the Komsomol. The candidate for admission must be approved both by the local Komsomol organization which he seeks to enter and by the district or town Komsomol committee which exercises jurisdiction over the local organization. Members who violate Komsomol rules or are guilty of other offenses may be excluded from the ranks by a two-thirds vote of those present at a meeting of the primary organization. Such action must be ratified by the district or town Komsomol committee. During an ensuing two months' period, the excluded member retains the right to appeal to higher Komsomol organs, including the central committee, to reverse the action. The age range of Komsomol membership is fourteen to twenty-eight; members attaining the age of twenty-eight who are not elected to leading Komsomol organs are automatically taken off the rolls.

Enrolling in the Komsomols is a much more selective process than joining the Pioneers. The Komsomol is the reservoir from which Party members will be recruited and, in the eyes of the Party leadership at least, this is the period of tutelage when qualifications can be sifted and political ardor tested. The rules of the organization require each member to study Marxism-Leninism, to engage in constant efforts to raise his political literacy, to expound the political line of the Party and the Komsomol organization, to participate actively in the political life of the country, to provide an example of socialist attitudes toward work and study, to protect socialist property, and to struggle decisively against all breaches of socialist legality and order. The Komsomol is also supposed to demonstrate political vigilance by guarding military and state secrets; to master the cultural, scientific, and technical knowledge which will enable him to perfect his qualifications; to be always ready to give his

strength and if necessary his life for the defense of his socialist fatherland; to fulfill all tasks entrusted to him swiftly and accurately; to put the interests of society before personal interests; and to conduct a determined struggle against bourgeois ideology, money grubbing, parasitism, religious prejudices, and other "survivals of the past."<sup>40</sup>

These requirements represent a Party ideal rather than a realistic description of the behavior of a rank-and-file Komsomol initiate. There are Komsomol activists who seek to approximate the ideal and who demonstrate all the hallmarks of ideological devotion and dedication. They radiate pride in being singled out as potential leaders. The motives that inspire others to affiliate tend to be both more earthy and more complex. For many, careerism apparently plays a major role. The knowledge that Komsomol and Party membership opens the way to power and pre-ferment in the Soviet system is a strong inducement for the ambitious to affiliate even when ideological fervor burns low. Sometimes the attraction of membership is predominantly social. Komsomol-sponsored excursions, dances, and discussion clubs contribute to the attractions of membership. Others are so molded and formed by previous indoctrination that they simply accept Komsomol membership as a natural expression of the role which they are expected to play in life. This attitude of uncritical acknowledgment of the existing structure of authority appears to be widespread, at least until it is challenged by unhappy personal experiences in Soviet society, exposure to alternative systems, or other corrosive influences.

#### *Organization of the Komsomols*

The organization of the Komsomols is closely modeled on the hierarchical pattern of its big brother, the Communist Party. At the bottom of the pyramid are the primary organizations in factories, collective farms, state farms, educational and other state institutions. Each primary organization must have at least three members and is established with the consent of the district or town committee which exercises supervision over it. In factories, offices, and educational institutions where there are more than a hundred members and in kolkhozes and sovkhozes where there are more than fifty members, the primary Komsomol organization may be broken down into shop, brigade, class, or other subunits, which in turn may be subdivided into Komsomol groups headed by a group organizer elected for one year. Komsomol units with less than ten members elect a secretary and deputy secretary to direct current work. In larger units, a committee or bureau as well as a secretary serve as the directing nucleus. In a drive to eliminate paid functionaries at this level, the new Komsomol rules approved in April 1962 require all officials of

primary organizations to combine their Komsomol duties with other full-time regular employment.<sup>41</sup>

The Komsomol organizational hierarchy parallels the structure of the Party, and there is the usual tier of central, republic, regional, and district organizations bifurcated on a production basis. Except in the armed forces, primary Komsomol organizations operate under the supervision of rural or town Komsomol committees and their secretaries. But even in the armed forces, where the Komsomol units are subject to the direction of the Main Political Administration of the Army and the Navy, they are instructed to maintain a close link with local Komsomol production organizations and "to participate in the work of local Komsomol committees."

At the district or town level, the highest formal organ is the conference; it chooses the Komsomol committee which in turn elects a bureau and a number of secretaries. The first secretary must be a Party member or candidate with at least two years of Komsomol service. In the revision of the rules in March 1958 designed to cut down the number of paid functionaries, district and town committees were authorized to supplement the professional secretaries with one or two nonstaff secretaries who continued to work in production or carry on their studies.<sup>42</sup> At the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress in April 1962, it was indicated that the number of nonstaff raikom and gorkom secretaries had passed the 6,500 mark. As a result of the more extensive use of nonstaff secretaries and other nonstaff personnel, the Komsomol Central Auditing Commission reported that the paid staff of the Komsomol had been cut by 28.3 per cent in the four years between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses; no figures, however, were cited on the existing size of the professional Komsomol apparatus.<sup>43</sup>

The district and gorkom first secretaries are still full-time functionaries who are ordinarily designated to their posts by higher echelons and automatically "elected" by the committees which they serve. The Komsomol first secretary works closely with the Party organization in his town or district, and it is his responsibility to see that Komsomol work is geared to the Party priorities of the moment. In exercising general supervision over Komsomol activities in his assigned area, he is assisted by members of the district or town Komsomol apparatus and Komsomol activists who undertake specialized assignments.

The next higher levels in the Komsomol hierarchy are the regional and, above them, the republic organizations. Essentially they represent enlarged versions of the district and town organizations. There are the usual conferences (in the case of the republics, congresses), which elect committees, which in turn choose bureaus and secretaries. All secretaries at these levels are required to be Party members with at least three years

of service in the Komsomol. They are almost invariably paid functionaries whose appointments are controlled by higher Party and Komsomol echelons.

The central directing apparatus of the Komsomol consisted in 1962 of a Central Committee of 145 members and 68 candidates, a Central Auditing Commission of 45 members, a bureau of 16 members and 6 candidates, 7 secretaries, and a substantial secretariat.<sup>44</sup> All of them operated under the general direction of First Secretary S. P. Pavlov, who served his apprenticeship as a secretary of the Moscow City Komsomol organization before being raised to central leadership. According to the rules, the Central Committee directs the work of the Komsomol between congresses, while the Central Auditing Commission checks the efficiency, financial transactions, and budget of the central apparatus. The Central Committee "elects" the bureau and the secretaries (all of whom are also bureau members); in fact, the election involves ratifying a list approved by the Party Secretariat.

In formal terms, the highest Komsomol organ is the congress, which is required to meet at least once every four years. Until the Tenth Congress in 1936, meetings were held with reasonable regularity. There then ensued a thirteen-year break before the Eleventh Congress assembled in 1949 and another five-year interval before the Twelfth Congress met in 1954. With the convocation of the Thirteenth Congress in 1958 and the Fourteenth in 1962, procedural regularity was re-established. There remains, however, a profound gulf between the legal powers of the congresses under the rules and their operative content. In theory, the congress is the supreme Komsomol authority; in fact, it is a large and unwieldy rally of Komsomol functionaries and other honored guests who assemble in Moscow once every four years to affirm and applaud the decisions of the leadership.

The reports of the mandate commissions at the most recent Komsomol congresses are revealing.<sup>45</sup> Of the 1,236 delegates who participated in the Thirteenth Congress, 438 were Komsomol functionaries. Only 261 delegates were classified as workers and 173 as collective farmers or farm specialists. A total of 735 delegates, or almost 60 per cent, were either Party members or candidates. Despite the fact that Komsomol membership then expired at the age of twenty-six (extended at the congress to twenty-eight), 644 delegates were twenty-six or older. Of these, 167 were over thirty. While forty-eight nationalities were represented at the congress, the Russian republic claimed 690 delegates, or approximately 56 per cent. The impression unmistakably conveyed was of an assembly dominated by Party members and apparatchiki disguised as overaged Komsomols and with a marked Great Russian coloration.

At the Fourteenth Congress, some effort was made to temper this

impression. Of the 3,862 delegates present at the congress, 855 were Komsomol functionaries, a sizable percentage reduction from the previous congress. The participation of 1,237 workers and 780 collective farmers, state-farm employees, and agricultural specialists served as symbols of popular involvement. A total of 2,297 delegates, or nearly 57 per cent, were Party members or candidates. No statistics were made available for the group of twenty-six or over, though 292 delegates were in the twenty-nine to thirty range, and 259 were over thirty. The proportion of delegates from the Russian republic remained more or less stable at slightly more than 55 per cent. Although the composition of the congress, like the Twenty-Second Party Congress which preceded it, was regulated to provide the appearance of more rank-and-file representation, the Party and Komsomol functionaries continued to dominate the proceedings.

#### *Activities of the Komsomols*

The responsibilities of the Komsomol organization embrace a wide range of diversified activities. The emphasis given to each of them varies over time and tends to reflect the ruling priorities of the moment. Komsomol activities include (1) political instruction of Komsomol members; (2) political instruction and leadership supplied by the Komsomols to the Pioneers, to nonaffiliated youth, and to other groups; (3) military and paramilitary training and physical culture and sports; (4) leadership and assistance in carrying out governmental and Party programs; (5) social and cultural activity.

The political indoctrination of all Komsomol members is a central concern of the Party. As has been observed, it begins seriously with the Young Pioneers and increases in scope and intensity as the children grow older. No aspect of the school curriculum is without some political content, though in the upper grades instruction in history and a new course authorized in 1960, "The Fundamentals of Political Knowledge," are used as the primary vehicles for instilling Party consciousness and loyalty.<sup>46</sup> In the universities and institutes, there are compulsory courses on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, dialectical materialism, and Party history. Such instruction is invariably entrusted to Party members. In addition, the Komsomol organization carries on an extensive program of political education under its own auspices. Pavlov, Komsomol first secretary, in his report to the Fourteenth Congress, boasted that approximately nine million young men and women were studying the documents of the Twenty-Second Party Congress in political-education circles, but he also noted that young people "do not take kindly to dry fare or declaratory pronouncements, and they become justly indignant when propagandists occasionally rehash long-known truths . . ."<sup>47</sup> A. N. Shelepin, former Komsomol first secretary, was even more critical in his report to the

Thirteenth Congress: "It must be admitted that the YCL political network still functions poorly, that instruction is not adequately linked with practice, with life, and that dogmatism and pedantry have not been completely eliminated; many circles and political schools exist only on paper. The main reasons for the poor work of political circles are underestimation of this work, poor leadership of them, and unsatisfactory selection of propaganda personnel."<sup>48</sup>

A specialized press serves as a vehicle of Komsomol and Pioneer indoctrination. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, the central Komsomol journal, claimed a circulation in 1958 of three million, and *Pionerskaya Pravda*, the central Pioneer journal, was issued in editions of more than a million.<sup>49</sup> Altogether, in 1962 the Komsomol published approximately two hundred newspapers and magazines with a combined circulation of twenty-two and a half million copies.<sup>50</sup>

Komsomol members are not only the objects of indoctrination; they are also expected to serve as agitators and propagandists of the Communist cause. The Komsomols have special responsibility for the Young Pioneers. The Komsomol leaders of the Pioneer brigades not only supervise play and social activity but are supposed to instill Communist consciousness in their charges. Komsomol activists also serve as counselors in Pioneer summer camps. They take the lead at school assemblies in delivering reports and speeches on current political themes. They serve as agitators to explain Party policy to the "backward" masses. They participate actively in pre-election campaigns and collections for a variety of revolutionary causes.

Komsomols are also expected to provide leadership in the area of physical culture, sports, and military training. The first obligation of the Komsomol, according to one Soviet text, is to ready himself for service in the Soviet Army. "The Komsomol member must be a leading physical culturist."<sup>51</sup> Preparatory to their own military service, they are required to take an active role in DOSAAF, the paramilitary civilian defense agency which serves the various branches of the armed services. In this capacity, they engage in shooting practice, air-raid drills, first aid, long marches, parachute and glider training, and political meetings at which the necessity for military preparedness is constantly reiterated.

The Komsomol member is also expected to serve as a model and example for the youth of the country by assisting his Party and government in every way. He is supposed to volunteer for the most strenuous and disagreeable tasks, to help with the harvest, to enlist for new construction jobs, to work in the mines, or to go wherever his organization sends him. Whether he is in a factory, farm, or school, he is expected to be an outstanding worker, a paragon of discipline, a stimulus to his associates, and a constant help to his superiors in carrying out their responsi-

bilities. He is counted on to play an active role in the maintenance of public order, and Komsomols in the hundreds of thousands have been enlisted since 1959 to serve in the *druzhiny*, or people's volunteer groups, who are supposed to aid the police in patrolling streets and public places to combat hooliganism and drunkenness, enforce traffic regulations, and cope with petty crimes.

Finally, the Komsomol member is expected to cultivate many-sided interests in order to make himself a "whole" man. This is an aspect of Komsomol work which the less fervid members find most attractive because of its relative removal from the political realm. The literary, dramatic, dancing, and singing groups sponsored by the Komsomol provide some relief from the incessant and concentrated political bombardment to which youth is exposed, but even these forms of social-cultural activity are far from being apolitical. Thus, Komsomols participating in a series of evenings devoted to Pushkin discuss papers on such themes as "Pushkin and the Decembrists," "Pushkin on Capitalism," "Pushkin-Patriot," "Pushkin and the Present," and "Pushkin's Criticism of America."<sup>52</sup> The dramatic groups read and produce plays from the contemporary Soviet repertoire which are heavily saturated with doctrinal content. Even the dancing and singing are partly organized around political themes. In the Soviet state there is no real escape from the long arm of ideological control.

### *Problems of Loyalty and Disaffection*

What manner of man does the Komsomol seek to create, and what values does the top Party leadership seek to implant in the minds of youth? A Soviet monograph entitled *Young Communists in the USSR*, which describes the demands made on Komsomols, furnishes a vivid and illuminating insight into Party goals and purposes. "The most important task of the Komsomol organization," says the monograph, "is to maintain in all the youth Soviet patriotism, Soviet national pride, the aspiration to make our Socialist state ever stronger."<sup>53</sup> "Whatever the Komsomol may do, with whatever works or studies he may occupy himself, he must always be prepared to enter the ranks of the Soviet Army at the first call of the Party and the Soviet government."<sup>54</sup> In civil as well as military life, he must provide a shining example of self-sacrifice and discipline. The Komsomol is told that he lives in the greatest and most progressive country in the world and that what gives his country its strength is the leadership of the Communist Party guided by the teachings of Marxism-Leninism. Every Komsomol is obligated to carry out the policies of the Party steadily and consistently. "All his life must be subordinated to the great aim — the struggle for Communism."<sup>55</sup>

This image of the ideal Komsomol man with its stress on the virtues of disciplined obedience to Party dictates embodies the ultimate values which the Party leadership seeks to inculcate. But the energies of youth, even under dictatorship, elude such tight constraints. In the words of the anonymous author of *Young Communists in the USSR*, "The survivals of the old way of life have still not been finally overcome . . . The baneful influence of bourgeois ideology sometimes penetrates into the midst of our youth."<sup>56</sup>

It is no easy matter to come to any reliable appraisals of the state of mind of Soviet youth. Judgments must necessarily be reached on the basis of material appearing in Soviet publications, on interviews with ex-Komsomols and other former Soviet citizens who have had extensive contacts with Soviet young people, and on the reports of perceptive travelers to the Soviet Union who have managed to engage youths in frank conversation. The data derived from these sources do not lend themselves to sweeping conclusions or exact statistical formulations; at best, when cautiously utilized, they point to the existence of certain stresses and weaknesses in the ability of the regime to command the support of the younger generation.

It is possible to identify categories of young people about whose whole-souled devotion to the regime one can at least raise questions. The youths who find themselves consigned to manual labor when they would greatly prefer to continue their education; the university or institute graduates who are sent off to the countryside or a remote area while they dream of the bright lights of Moscow, Leningrad, or Kiev; the independent-minded young intellectuals who are forced to suppress their views lest they cost them their careers; the victims of denunciations and tale-bearing; the politically "backward" young people who find the constantly reiterated propaganda a bore and long for "bourgeois" comforts and gaiety—these are only samples of Soviet life-situations which breed irritation and frustration, though they are ordinarily well hidden under a surface show of political orthodoxy and conformity.

Some corroboration of the existence of such attitudes among Soviet youth is available in official Soviet sources. A. N. Shelepin in his keynote speech to the Thirteenth Congress of the Komsomol observed:

Some young people grow up in hothouse conditions; they are not fitted for the least serious trials of life and shirk their very first difficulties . . . Having claimed their rights, they forget their duties to society; they demand of the state much, but give it little in return. Among our young people there are still shirkers and drunkards, people who use foul language and who violate the norms of Communist morality. In a number of large cities there are young people who do no work anywhere, who lead an idle life. All this is nothing but a manifestation of philistine individualism and egotism.<sup>57</sup>

Referring to the ferment which followed the Twentieth Party Congress, he continued: "Some young men and women, primarily among the students, made nihilistic statements belittling the achievements of the Soviet people and distorting our Soviet reality. Some YCL organizations at times forget about the influence of the rabid imperialist propaganda which the capitalist states are waging against the Soviet Union. There are still people who fall prey to bourgeois propaganda, who are captives of tastes alien to us, who are carried away with vulgar dances and abstract painting and sculpture, and who dress like parrots . . ."<sup>58</sup>

More important than the antics of the *stilyagi*, whose protest against the drabness of the Soviet scene takes the form of imitating Western fashions and cultivating American jazz, is the tendency of some Soviet youths to alienate themselves from the official optimism of Soviet life. Evidence of this skeptical mood can be found in a number of works by young Soviet writers, and they have produced bitter counterattacks by the Party and Komsomol guardians of the morals of youth. In a report to the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress, First Secretary Pavlov declared: "Of late some authors have begun heavily accenting the so-called complexity of life . . . Every young hero is in their conception a kind of crazy quilt. A hero is not a hero without a touch of dry rot, beauty is not beauty without some wrinkles, and optimism is not optimism without a dose of despondency . . . We have opposed and will continue to oppose works in which the reader savors the adventures and views — if I may be pardoned the term — of all sorts of sickly youths grown old before their time and infected with skepticism and cynicism."<sup>59</sup>

Seeking an explanation for these distressing phenomena, a 1957 Komsomol Central Committee resolution declared: "It should not be forgotten that the present generation of youth has not gone through the hard school of revolutionary struggle . . . has not experienced those deprivations and difficulties which fell to the older generation . . . It is no accident that part of our youth poorly conceives at what price . . . the conditions under which it now lives were won . . . and at times fails to appreciate the great achievements of the Soviet people." But the committee comforted itself with the reflection that most of the youth "deeply values the care of the state and recognizes its obligation to the Fatherland."<sup>60</sup>

Both Soviet reports and the information supplied by ex-Soviet citizens and visitors to the Soviet Union indicate some degree of disaffection among Soviet youth. But they sharply disagree on the quantitative distribution of such attitudes. In the official view, Soviet youth is overwhelmingly devoted and loyal, and it is only a small minority that is backward, indifferent, or hostile. The impression derived from other sources is more ambiguous. They agree that there is a firm nucleus of

Komsomol activists who are genuine ideological converts. This group rarely loses faith and indeed may even become more fanatic and vigilant in spirit as it grows older. Around this nucleus, there is a much larger circle of youth who join the Komsomol for reasons which may be described as largely careerist in character. Overtly, they are pro-regime; they take an active part in political life and go through the motions of conformity in order to make their way in Soviet society. But they lack the fanaticism of the first group. Their inner "real" political affiliation may embrace such widely different attitudes as passive acceptance of the regime, apathy, cynicism, or even bitterly suppressed resentment of the situations in which they find themselves. Such apt terms as "the outer cover" (*vnenyaya obolochka*) and "the reddish scale" (*krasnovataya okalina*) have been coined to describe these careerists with the implication that you do not have to scratch very deep to find the real animal. Yet so far as surface behavior goes, they give every evidence of being not only loyal but active Soviet citizens who support the regime's purposes.

There are also millions of Soviet young people who never join the Komsomol. This group includes the majority of collective farmers, a substantial number of workers in industry, and some young intellectuals who evade membership despite the fact that nonaffiliation may involve considerable risk to their future careers. It is not easy to generalize on their political attitudes. Most comply with the regime's demands, but they are not disposed to sacrifice or zealotry in any form.

Both Soviet and anti-Soviet sources emphasize a decline in the ideological élan of youth as compared with the idealism of Civil War days and the great outpouring of energy and dedication which accompanied the first phase of the five-year plans. A recent poem, "Stantsiya Zima" (Winter Station) by the young poet Yevgeny Yevtushenko furnishes a striking example from the Soviet side. Addressing a member of the younger generation, the old fisherman of the poem proclaims:

I well recall your mother's friends aflame,  
When they were young, with yearning to create.  
Yes, I remember them, their noble aim,  
Their passionate ideas and fierce debate.  
They were ridiculous sometimes, it's quite true,  
Their ideas sometimes harmful, we all know,  
But I'll be frank, it worries me that you  
Or youngsters like you lack their drive and go.  
And worst of all — maybe I'm wrong, my friend —  
Young thoughts with you are mighty hard to find;  
And after all a man is in the end  
The same age as the thoughts that fill his mind.  
I say we've got young people, but no youth.<sup>61</sup>

The difference in generational moods sometimes finds expression at the very highest political levels. Khrushchev admonished the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress:

You young people, don't become conceited; we haven't lived for nothing, you know, nor did we spend our time swatting flies with our noses, as the saying goes! I am proud of my generation, of the fact that for a time we lived together with Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, that we participated in the October Revolution, the Civil War . . . People of the older generation lived through hunger and devastation; they restored the economy by heroic effort, fought for the new cause at the construction projects of the five-year plans, served as soldiers in the Second World War and defeated the most terrible enemy of mankind, fascism! . . . Yes, we are proud of our times. You too should take pride in our times . . .<sup>62</sup>

What Khrushchev left unmentioned were the vast social and political transformations of the intervening years. As Soviet society crystallized into a hierarchical, militarized, and totalitarian pattern during the Stalinist era, the apocalyptic vision of the free, classless Communist utopia became an increasingly tarnished dream, with little power to engage the imagination or stir the enthusiasm of those who found themselves face to face with Soviet reality. Under Khrushchev one senses an almost wistful desire to turn the ideological clock back, to refurbish the vision, to recapture something of the spirit and egalitarianism of the revolutionary era and of the exciting years of the plan period before the blight of the Stalinist purges blackened the face of Russia. But time has worn its grooves, and youths intent on making their careers in the tough competitive arena of present-day Soviet society do not find utopian appeals compelling. The rewards they seek are in the here-and-now, the job and career which will lift them into the privileged strata or bring them a life free of sacrifices and hardships. But they do respond to patriotic appeals, and they manifest genuine pride in Soviet technical and scientific achievements and the rise of the Soviet Union to great-power status. The problem of the regime is to tap this patriotic temper, to maintain the production ethic, and to harness the energies of youth to the task of building the Communist future. In attempting to solve this problem, ideology is only one of many weapons and not necessarily the most important.

Perhaps the most potent is the power of the regime to control the career expectancies of youth, to reward achievement which fits in with the goals of the leadership, and to penalize deviant conduct wherever it manifests itself. The system of incentives offers the highest prizes to those who rise to lofty positions in the Party, army, police, and administration; it provides attractive emoluments for the intellectuals who are willing to

pipe the tunes of the regime; and it gives special rewards and bonuses to the scientists, managers, engineers, and leading workers who distinguish themselves in production. It buttresses financial awards with a system of honorifics designed to be particularly attractive to the less sophisticated.

The obverse side of the medal is the use of negative sanctions to punish those who fail to respond to the regime's demands. For the workers who lag in production there is the discipline of a wage system that consigns the laggard to a low level of subsistence. For those who deviate from the path of conformity, there is the danger of exile, arrest, or denial of a responsible job. Whip and carrot combine to discourage deviant behavior.

At the same time, the regime is shrewd enough to understand that this system of rewards and punishments must be given ideological justification if it is to appeal to the minds of youth as well as enlist its energies. The new Party program approved by the Twenty-Second Congress represents an attempt to revivify utopian goals and to give them substantive content by featuring the improved supply of food, housing, and consumer goods which will come with the triumph of Communism. But dreams of a future of plenty are hedged with warnings of present dangers. Blame for the relatively slow pace of improvement in living conditions is placed on the continued threat from the imperialist enemy without; the Soviet Union must accelerate its industrialization program and maintain its impregnability as an armed fortress if it is to survive and triumph over the hostile capitalist world. In the interim, the rise of Communist power on the world stage is used to support the theses that the ultimate world victory will not be too long delayed, that the voice of the future is the voice of Communism, and that present sacrifices prepare the way for the Promised Land of peace and plenty to come.

Meanwhile, Soviet young people are told they must work, obey, and exert all their energies to build the future. They are called on to make the sternest sacrifices to defend their homes, their families, and their fatherland. Soviet achievements, they are taught to believe, are a symbol of hope and liberation for the oppressed masses in capitalist-dominated countries.

This in its basic outlines is the indoctrination to which Soviet youth is being exposed. It is reiterated in all mass media, in oral agitation, and in every nook and cranny of the Soviet educational and propaganda system. Its power to persuade encounters limits. There is indication, both in Soviet and non-Soviet sources, of stirrings of independent thought in student circles, of the beginnings of a disposition to question the production ethic and to embrace consumer values, and of the existence of a not inconsiderable degree of apathy and boredom in the face of Komsomol and Party appeals. But there is also evidence of an upsurge of patriotism

and pride in recent Soviet achievements which functions as a potent ideological instrument to weld the loyalties of youth to the regime.

The power of the Kremlin to mold the children who have come of age since World War II should not be underestimated. Their upbringing is subject to careful manipulation by the Party leadership. In the years since the revolution, the attrition of loyalties in the middle-aged and the elderly has been counterbalanced by the capacity of the regime, through the Komsomol and the Young Pioneers, to indoctrinate a part of each new generation with its own values. Whether or not this indoctrination survives the trials and tribulations of later life, it has played and may continue to play a role of crucial significance in replenishing the life energies of the regime.

## *Chapter 10*

# *The Party Command— Politburo and Presidium*

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The Presidium of the Communist Party occupies the most exalted position in Soviet society. Established in October 1952 at the Nineteenth Party Congress as a successor agency to the Politburo and the Orgburo, it stands at the pinnacle of the Party and governmental hierarchies, supplying the goals and policies which determine the direction of Soviet development and representing the highest level of decision making in the Communist world. Its manifest importance as the center of initiative for Soviet Communism makes the closest study of its composition, its actions, and its outlook a matter of imperative concern. Yet few ventures in scholarly inquiry face such baffling and frustrating obstacles. Since the consolidation of Stalin's power in the late twenties, the internal operations of the Soviet high command have been shrouded in mystery and secrecy. No records of its deliberations are accessible, and its working processes are among the best-kept secrets of Soviet life. Some clues concerning the role which the Presidium plays can be obtained by examining the history of its main predecessor, the Politburo, which long occupied the leading place in Soviet life.

### *Origins and Development of the Politburo*

The first reference to the organization of a political bureau occurs in the minutes of the Central Committee meeting of October 23, 1917. On the motion of Dzerzhinsky, a Politburo was established to provide "political leadership in the uprising." Its membership consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov, and Bubnov.<sup>1</sup> With the success of the insurrection, its purpose was achieved, and the Politburo

as originally constituted passed out of existence. At the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919 the Politburo was re-established as a permanent organ of Party leadership (see Chapter 6).

From the beginning, the Politburo played a dominating role in Party affairs. The urgencies of Civil War and Allied intervention contributed to centralization of power. Under the impact of crises, the meetings of the Central Committee took place less frequently, and the actual initiative in directing the course of policy and administration was largely transferred to the Politburo.

The habits of War Communism carried over into the NEP period. Even issues of trivial significance could not be resolved without reference to the Politburo. In his political report to the Eleventh Congress in March 1922, Lenin cited the classic case of the effort of the Moscow Consumers' Cooperative Society to arrange for the purchase of a small quantity of canned goods from a French businessman who had a cargo available in Libau and was willing to accept Soviet currency in payment.<sup>2</sup> The transaction could not be consummated until the Politburo had enacted a proper authorizing resolution and Commissar of Foreign Trade Krasin had discussed the proposal with Kamenev, a member of the Politburo. "I have given you one example," reported Lenin, "to show that concrete minor matters are dragged before the Political Bureau . . . everything that comes up at the Council of People's Commissars is dragged before the Politburo." "I hope," he continued, "that the Congress will . . . endorse the resolution that the Political Bureau and the Central Committee be relieved of minor matters, and that the responsible officials should take greater responsibilities upon themselves."<sup>3</sup>

Despite Lenin's protest, the tendency to overburden the Politburo with detail persisted after his death. As late as 1927, when such information was still being released, Kursky, the chairman of the Central Auditing Commission, reported to the Fifteenth Party Congress that during the preceding year each member of the Politburo was deluged with 6,682 pages of material which he was required to read in order to deal adequately with the Politburo agenda.<sup>4</sup> The Politburo's work plans, which were published for the years 1926 and 1928, represent a formidable conspectus of the entire range of Soviet life. The subjects covered by the 1926 plan include the five-year perspective plan, the plan for electrification, the control figures for the year 1926-27, the condition of war industry, a report on the metal industries, the state budget, credit and finance, a report on exports and imports, the procurement of grain, the condition of the trading network, a report on concessions, trade-union activities, wage payments, labor discipline, the revision of the territorial-administrative structure, elections to the Soviets, the condition of the Red Army, artels, consumers' cooperatives, state and collective farms,

reports by the Ukrainian, Moscow, and northern Caucasus Party organizations on their activities, a report by the Orgburo on the Party apparatus and its links with the state apparatus, and so forth.<sup>5</sup> Missing from the list are all references to foreign affairs. The omission did not imply any lack of attention to that important area of Politburo responsibilities. Indeed, there were few fields in which the Politburo was more constantly engaged. As Lenin observed in 1923, "Have we not in the Political Bureau discussed from the Party point of view many questions, both minor and important, concerning the 'moves' we should make in reply to the 'moves' of foreign powers in order to forestall their, say, cunning, if we are not to use a less respectable term? Is not this flexible amalgamation of a Soviet institution with a Party institution a source of great strength in our politics?"<sup>6</sup>

As the 1926 work plan reveals, the typical procedure of the Politburo involved discussion and action based on a report by the agency charged with initial responsibility in the given field. When the report was delivered by one of the governmental departments or commissariats, a co-report by the Central Control Commission and the Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection was customary. When the subject matter fell outside the jurisdiction of the commissariats or was purely Party in scope, the Politburo acted on the basis of reports by its own subcommittees, special commissions of the Central Committee, recommendations of the Orgburo, and statements of republic and regional Party organizations. Sometimes the matter was carried over for further discussion by the plenum of the Central Committee; in most instances, however, the Politburo made the final decision.

The excerpt from the 1928 work plan which is available follows the pattern of the 1926 plan, though it is briefer and less informative.<sup>7</sup> Again, the work plan demonstrates the extraordinary scope of the Politburo's interests; the subjects listed range from crop deliveries and the industrial and financial plan for 1928-29 to the program of the Communist International, universal obligatory primary education, and measures to improve radio and cinema programs.

Even for the relatively well-reported period of the twenties, the accessible official documentation on the internal deliberations of the Politburo is sparse and unrevealing. The scattered excerpts from Politburo minutes contained in the Trotsky Archives in the Harvard College Library are curiously lifeless documents which represent little more than a log of those in attendance, proposals made, and actions taken. There is no summary of the flow of the discussion and no report of the surging debates which shook the Politburo to its foundations in those restless years. If a relatively rich record of the main outlines of the struggle for power within the Politburo is now available, it is largely because the conflict

spilled over the walls of the Politburo, involved the Central Committee and other leading Party organs, was ventilated in Party congresses and conferences, and was chronicled in the Party press and opposition literature. With the elimination of the Left and Right Oppositions in the late twenties and the consolidation of Stalin's power, a curtain of darkness descended on the inner deliberations of the Politburo. The legend of a monolithic Politburo was propagated to buttress the ideal of the monolithic Party. As the Stalin cult gathered momentum and lifted him to a position of undisputed supremacy, his Politburo lieutenants seemed to shrink into a secondary orbit of pale stars who shone in his radiance and emphasized his eminence by the sycophantic character of their public genuflexions.

The men whom Stalin gathered round him as he consolidated his hold on the Politburo were profoundly different in background and outlook from those who had fallen by the wayside in the bitter struggles of the twenties (for Politburo members and their length of service before 1952, see Table 16). The group of the shelved and the defeated included

*Table 16. Politburo Members, 1919-1952*

Lenin, V. I.	1919-1924	Kaganovich, L. M.	1930-1952
Stalin, J. V.	1919-1952	Kirov, S. M.	1930-1934
Trotsky, L. D.	1919-1926	Kossior, S. V.	1930-1938
Kamenev, L. B.	1919-1925	Ordjonikidze, G. K.	1930-1937
Krestinsky, N. N.	1919-1921	Andreyev, A. A.	1932-1952
Zinoviev, G. E.	1921-1926	Chubar, V. Ia.	1935-1938
Rykov, A. I.	1922-1930	Mikoyan, A. I.	1935-1952
Tomsky, M. P.	1922-1930	Zhdanov, A. A.	1939-1948
Bukharin, N. I.	1924-1929	Khrushchev, N. S.	1939-1952
Molotov, V. M.	1925-1952	Beria, L. P.	1946-1952
Voroshilov, K. E.	1925-1952	Malenkov, G. M.	1946-1952
Kalinin, M. I.	1925-1946	Voznesensky, N. A.	1947-1949
Rudzutak, Ia. E.	1926-1932	Bulganin, N. A.	1948-1952
Kuibyshev, V. V.	1927-1935	Kosygin, A. N.	1949-1952

Krestinsky, Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Tomsky, and Rykov. With the exception of Tomsky, all were intellectuals of cosmopolitan interests and experience derived from years spent in emigration. Even Tomsky, who began his career as a lithographic worker and quickly became a Bolshevik trade-union organizer, attended the London congress as a delegate in 1907 and participated in the Paris conference of the editors of *Proletarii* in 1909. As a group, they were articulate, argumentative, and independent; all of them, including Tomsky, had opposed Lenin at one time or another in the course of their Party careers. During the period of revolutionary preparation, they had functioned primarily as

agitators, propagandists, and journalists; they were men of the word and the pen whose original interests ran to oratorical and literary pursuits.

After the Bolshevik conquest of power, they moved quickly into positions of prominence in public life. Trotsky, Kamenev, Rykov, and Tomsky all displayed great organizing talents, but as a group they found themselves attracted to policy posts in state administration and foreign affairs and tended to avoid the drabber responsibilities of internal Party management. Krestinsky served for a brief period (1919–1921) as secretary of the Central Committee, but the experiment was unsuccessful, and the bulk of his career was spent as Ambassador to Germany and Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs. Trotsky was briefly Commissar for Foreign Affairs and then served with outstanding distinction as Commissar of War. Zinoviev made his primary contribution as chairman of the Communist International. Kamenev occupied a variety of important administrative posts, including the chairmanship of the Moscow Soviet, the vice-chairmanship of the Council of People's Commissars, the chairmanship of the Council of Labor and Defense, and the directorship of the Supreme Council of National Economy. He also served briefly (1926–27) as Ambassador to Italy. Bukharin's assignments included the editorship of *Pravda* (1917–1929), responsibility for the Communist International after Zinoviev's downfall, and the editorship of *Izvestiya* after his own decline in power. Tomsky concentrated almost exclusively on trade-union affairs; as chairman of the All-Russian Central Council of Trade Unions, he played a central role in shaping trade-union policy until his dismissal from that post. As chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of both the USSR and the RSFSR, Rykov's energies were almost exclusively engaged in directing and coordinating the governmental apparatus. Perhaps the most striking common characteristic of the group (and an important cause of their failure) consisted in the fact that after 1921 not a single one of them was concerned in an important way with the management of the Party organization and its Central Committee Secretariat.

Stalin's own sympathies were with the "practical" workers of the Party apparatus. In a very revealing letter to the German Communist leader Maslow in 1925 (and not included in his collected works), he wrote, "With us in Russia, 'old leaders' from among the literati wither away continuously. This process increased during periods of revolutionary crisis and slowed down during periods of crystallization of forces, but it took place continuously . . . That is a process necessary for the renovation of the leading cadres of a living and developing party."<sup>8</sup> Stalin's distaste for the literati was notorious. He found himself much more at ease with the apparatchiki who, like himself, were frequently of lowly origins, had had limited opportunities for education and foreign travel,

had little interest in theoretical disputations, and who served their apprenticeship in the Party organization.

#### *Stalin's Lieutenants*

An analysis of the Politburo lieutenants whom Stalin included in his circle as he eliminated his left- and right-wing opponents makes this crystal clear. Of the ten members of the 1931 Politburo, only three—Kuibyshev, Ordjonikidze, and Molotov—can be positively identified as of middle- or upper-class origin.<sup>9</sup> All three, however, shared Stalin's predilection for the details of Party management. The career profiles of the 1931 Politburo reveal that loyal, disciplined service in the apparatus served as the highroad to admission into Stalin's inner circle. Except for Voroshilov and Kalinin, whose later reputations were made outside the secretarial hierarchy, this is the common tie which binds the lives of the lieutenants.

Molotov from the beginning showed the traits of the perfect apparatchik. His gifts and interests were organizational, and he devoted himself to his secretarial labors with assiduous application. In 1916 he was assigned to the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee of the Party. After short periods of service as chairman of the Council for National Economy in 1918 and chairman of the Executive Committee of the Novgorod region, he became secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party in 1920 and secretary to the Central Committee of the Party in 1921. When Stalin was made General Secretary of the Party in 1922, Molotov remained as a cosecretary and faithful subordinate. His election to the Politburo in 1925 came as a reward for meritorious service in the Party apparatus and undeviating loyalty to the General Secretary.

L. M. Kaganovich, after serving as chairman of the Nizhni Novgorod guberniya committee in 1919 and head of the Tashkent government in 1920, became the director of the Organization-Instruction Department of the Central Committee Secretariat and a member of the Turkestan Bureau of the Central Committee in 1922. In 1924 he was named one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. The following year he became general secretary of the Ukrainian Party organization. In 1928 he returned to Moscow as secretary of the Central Committee and was made a member of the Orgburo. In 1930 he became head of the Moscow Party organization and was also elected to full membership in the Politburo.

Kirov's rise to power conformed to the same pattern. After long pre-revolutionary experience as an underground Party worker, he was appointed secretary of the Azerbaijan Party organization in 1921 and secretary of the Northwest Bureau of the Central Committee in 1926. In the latter year, he was transferred to Leningrad as first secretary and from this vantage point was elevated to the Politburo in 1930.

S. V. Kossior's career followed a parallel course. After serving as a local Party secretary and member of the Party central committee in the Ukraine, he was named secretary of the Siberian Bureau of the Central Committee in 1922. In 1925 he became one of the secretaries of the Central Committee; in 1928 he was designated as the first secretary of the Ukrainian Party organization; and in 1930 he was raised to membership in the Politburo.

Kuibyshev achieved prominence as one of the secretaries of the Central Committee in 1922-23. He became chairman of the Party Central Control Commission and Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection in 1923, from which point he found his way into the Politburo in 1927.

Ordjonikidze's rise was almost identical. After occupying the position of secretary of the Transcaucasian Party organization, he followed Kuibyshev in 1926 as chairman of the Central Control Commission and People's Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. In 1930 he was made a member of the Politburo.

Rudzutak served as chairman of the Central Asian Bureau of the Party from 1921 to 1924. In 1923-24 he moved into the limelight as one of the secretaries of the Party Central Committee. In 1924 he became vice-chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and the Council of Labor and Defense, while he also occupied the post of Commissar for Transport. In 1927 he was raised to Politburo membership.

The careers of Voroshilov and Kalinin fall into a somewhat different pattern. Although Voroshilov served an apprenticeship in the apparatus as a member of the Southeastern Bureau of the Central Committee between 1921 and 1924, his advancement was achieved primarily along military lines. As an outstanding guerrilla leader during the Civil War, he was closely associated with Stalin in the defense of Tsaritsyn. After the Civil War and until 1924, he commanded the North Caucasus Military District, was then transferred to the Moscow Military District, and succeeded Frunze as War Commissar in 1925. The next year he became a member of the Politburo.

Kalinin, the only member of the group of peasant background, began his career as a Party organizer and underground worker. Chosen in 1919 to replace Sverdlov as chairman of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, he continued to perform the same functions in the Central Executive Committee of the USSR after 1924 and was named to the Politburo in 1926. From the beginning, his role was more ceremonial than influential. As the symbol of the muzhik came to power, he provided a link with the countryside that Stalin was quick to appreciate and exploit.

The history of the Politburo during the thirties is still wrapped in darkness and obscurity despite the revelations contained in Khrushchev's

secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress and his concluding address at the Twenty-Second Congress. Of Stalin's nine Politburo associates in 1931, only four — Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Kalinin — survived the Great Purge. One, Kirov, was assassinated in 1934 in circumstances which Khrushchev described as "inexplicable and mysterious."<sup>10</sup> The death of Kuibyshev in 1935 involved its own unresolved mystery. If the highly suspect version circulated by Vyshinsky at the 1938 Moscow trial is to be credited, both the assassination of Kirov and the alleged medical murder of Kuibyshev were organized by Yagoda, the head of the NKVD, and his fellow conspirators, though in the case of Kirov, at least, Khrushchev's later testimony implied that the order came from Stalin. The death of Ordjonikidze was announced in 1937 as due to a "paralytic stroke."<sup>11</sup> According to Khrushchev, "Stalin allowed the liquidation of Ordjonikidze's brother and brought Ordjonikidze himself to such a state that he was forced to shoot himself."<sup>12</sup> Two other members of the Politburo, Rudzutak and Kossior, disappeared in the Great Purge around 1938. Their execution on the basis of "false . . . slanderous materials" has since been officially confirmed. According to Khrushchev, "Comrade Rudzutak . . . completely retracted in court the confession which was forced upon him . . . [and] was not even called before the . . . Politbureau. Sentence was pronounced on him in 20 minutes and he was shot."<sup>13</sup> Chubar, who was added to the Politburo in 1935, met a similar fate.<sup>14</sup> In addition, three candidate members of the Politburo also vanished during this period. Yezhov, who succeeded Yagoda as head of the NKVD, became the scapegoat for the excesses of the purge. The somewhat ludicrous charge of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" was directed against Postyshev, a Great Russian, but according to Khrushchev his real crime consisted in having questioned the necessity for mass terror at the February-March Central Committee session in 1937.<sup>15</sup> Eikhe, Khrushchev revealed, was arrested on April 29, 1938, "on the basis of slanderous materials," "was forced under torture" to sign a fabricated confession, and was finally shot on February 4, 1940.<sup>16</sup> The elimination of these close collaborators of Stalin went unheralded and unexplained at the time. None figured in the great Moscow trials of 1936-1938. The system of insecurity on which Stalin's power was founded ended by enveloping and devouring members of his own inner circle in the Politburo itself.

The four new persons added to the Politburo during the thirties who managed to survive the purge were Andreyev, admitted in 1932; Mikoyan, admitted in 1935; and Zhdanov and Khrushchev, both admitted in 1939. The careers of these members of the Politburo followed the traditional course of upward mobility through the apparatus. Andreyev, who began as a specialist in trade-union affairs and was chairman of the Railroad

Workers' Union between 1920 and 1928, also drew important Party assignments. In 1924-25, he served as one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. In 1928-29, he was assigned to the secretaryship of the North Caucasus Party organization. In 1930-31, he became chairman of the Central Control Commission, from which post he was promoted to the Politburo.

Mikoyan, a veteran of the Baku Bolshevik Committee in 1917, was deeply involved in revolutionary activity in the Caucasus until 1920. From 1920 to 1922 he occupied the post of secretary of the Nizhni Novgorod guberniya Party committee; from 1922 to 1926 he served as secretary of the North Caucasus Party organization. In 1926 he became People's Commissar for Trade; in 1931, Commissar for Supplies; and in 1935, Commissar for the Food Industry. At that point he was also elevated to membership in the Politburo.

Zhdanov's first important Party assignment was the secretaryship of the Nizhni Novgorod Party organization, which he filled for the twelve-year period between 1922 and 1934. After the assassination of Kirov in 1934, he was transferred to Leningrad as Party secretary, was made a Politburo candidate the next year, and in 1939 was promoted to full membership.

Khrushchev was the harbinger of a new Politburo generation. He was the first member to be admitted to the inner circle who had entered the Party after the revolution. A coal miner and the son of a coal miner, without education, he joined the Party in 1918 and enrolled in a Rab-Fak or Workers' Faculty, which provided elementary schooling for adult workers. After graduation, he was assigned to Party work in Stalino and Kiev as a "promoted worker." In 1929 he was sent to the Industrial Academy for training as a future industrial executive. At the same time, he served as head of the Party organization in the academy. When he completed his course, he was retained for Party work, and in 1934 Kaganovich, the head of the Moscow Party organization, chose him as his second secretary. He succeeded Kaganovich as first secretary in the following year. In 1938 he was shifted to the Ukraine as first secretary, and the next year became a full member of the Politburo.

During the forties, five new members were added to the Politburo: Beria and Malenkov in 1946, Voznesensky in 1947, Bulganin in 1948, and Kosygin in 1949. Of the five, only Malenkov and Beria fall more or less clearly into the pattern of apparatchiki who rise to power through the secretarial hierarchy. In the case of Beria, however, a long period of service in the secret police both preceded and succeeded his tour of duty as a Party secretary. The three others, Bulganin, Kosygin, and Voznesensky, were primarily state administrators rather than Party managers. The stress on experience in state administration and economic management

which these promotions signified represented a marked break with the earlier practice of reserving Politburo membership for successful apparatchiki. As a response to the complex urgencies which the Soviet high command faced in managing a society in process of rapid industrialization, this new departure was not without considerable long-range significance.

Notable also in these promotions was an absence of emphasis on lowly economic origins. Although Beria has been described in Soviet sources as the son of a poor peasant, an element of doubt is introduced by the fact that he received a higher education at the Baku Polytechnic Institute, a rare feat in that period for children of poor peasants. Malenkov's social origins are obscure, but the fact that he attended a gymnasium in Orenberg between 1912 and 1917 points to the existence of some family means. Voznesensky and Bulganin have both been listed as sons of white-collar workers; only Kosygin derives from a working-class family.

The background of technical training which characterized the group also deserves emphasis. Beria's attendance at a polytechnic institute has already been noted. Malenkov spent three years at an engineering institute in Moscow between 1922 and 1925. Kosygin was also trained as an engineer. Voznesensky completed a postgraduate course in economics at the Institute of Red Professors in Moscow and became an economic planner. Bulganin's educational background is unknown, but his reputation as a competent industrial manager was made between 1922 and 1931 when he became, first, head of the construction department and, later, manager of the important Soviet electrical equipment plant Elektrozavod in Moscow. "In these years," one of his official biographies reports, "Bulganin completed his education 'on the run' from the technical experts under him."<sup>17</sup>

Another characteristic shared by the group is the fact that not a single one of the five can be classed as an Old Bolshevik. Beria and Bulganin joined the Party in 1917, Voznesensky in 1919, Malenkov in 1920, and Kosygin, the youngest of the group, in 1927. Beria, Bulganin, and Malenkov underwent their baptism of fire in the Civil War period, though none of them played an outstandingly significant role in the stormy events of that period. Voznesensky's Civil War role is obscure; his official biography indicates only that he was sent to the Sverdlovsk Party University in 1921 for a higher education. Kosygin, who was a mere boy of twelve when the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, is completely a product of the Soviet era.

The career lines of the five reveal quite divergent patterns. Malenkov represents the quintessence of the Party apparatchik. During the Civil War, he served as a political commissar on the Eastern and Turkestan fronts and became head of the Political Department of the Turkestan

Army. Between 1922 and 1925 he attended the Higher Technical School in Moscow and also occupied the post of secretary of the school's Party organization. In 1925 he joined the apparatus of the Party Central Committee and became a member of Stalin's personal secretariat. Between 1930 and 1934 he headed the Organization-Instruction Department of the Moscow Party organization, and from 1934 to 1939 he directed the Department of Leading Party Organs in the Central Committee Secretariat; here his responsibilities included the placement of Party cadres and the supervision of local Party organizations. In 1939 he became one of the secretaries of the Central Committee, in which position he continued to direct the cadre activities of the Party. In 1941 he was made a candidate member of the Politburo. During the war, he played a crucial role as a member of the State Committee for Defense, which functioned as an inner war cabinet. His major assignments during and after the war included responsibility for the production of aircraft and the chairmanship of the Committee for the Economic Rehabilitation of Liberated Areas. In 1946 he became a vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and a full member of the Politburo.

Beria's career exemplifies the combination of the successful Chekist and Party secretary. In 1921 he entered the service of the Cheka. During the next ten years, he rose rapidly in the secret-police hierarchy, finally becoming the head of both the Georgian and the Transcaucasian GPU organizations. He was transferred to Party work in 1931 and, during the next seven years, served as secretary of the Georgian and Transcaucasian Party organizations. In 1938 he replaced Yezhov as head of the NKVD and the next year was made a candidate member of the Politburo. During the war, he continued as head of the secret police, served as a member of the State Committee for Defense, and was entrusted with the special assignment of raising the output of armaments and munitions. In 1946 he was rewarded by promotion to full membership in the Politburo.

The case of Voznesensky provides a marked variant from the typical tale of rapid upward mobility through service in the Party hierarchy. Although Voznesensky served as a Party official in the Donets mining area after graduation from the Sverdlovsk Party University in 1924, his advancement to the Politburo was essentially a reward for specialized competence in the field of economic planning. After he was graduated from the Institute of Red Professors, he became a professor there and in 1934, at the age of thirty-one, was made its president. The next year, at the invitation of Zhdanov, the secretary of the Leningrad Party organization, he was named chairman of the planning commission in that area. As a protégé of Zhdanov and a beneficiary of the Great Purge, his promotion was rapid. In 1938 he became chairman of the State Planning Com-

mission of the USSR (Gosplan) and in 1941 was made a candidate member of the Politburo. In 1941 he was named to the newly created post of Vice-Premier for Economic Affairs, and the next year he was also appointed to the State Committee for Defense. He became a full member of the Politburo in 1947. In 1949, without any explanation, he suddenly disappeared from public life. As Khrushchev tells the story, Voznesensky was liquidated for his part in the so-called Leningrad Case, together with A. A. Kuznetsov, a Central Committee secretary who supervised the state security organs; M. I. Rodionov, the premier of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; P. S. Popkov, first secretary of the Leningrad Party organization; and many others. According to Khrushchev, "the elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beria," and he proceeded to fabricate evidence of their involvement in a plot against Stalin. "Without examining these slanderous materials," Khrushchev reports, "he [Stalin] ordered an investigation of the 'Affair' of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov. With this their fate was sealed."<sup>18</sup>

For Bulganin and Kosygin the road to supreme power appeared to represent recognition of superior administrative rather than Party achievements. Although Bulganin began his career as an officer in the Cheka, he transferred to economic work in 1922 and made his reputation in the next decade as a talented industrial administrator. From 1931 to 1937 he served as chairman of the Moscow Soviet. In 1938 he became chairman of the State Bank. During the war, he served as political commissar of the Moscow Front; the military rank of lieutenant general was conferred on him in 1942 in recognition of his part in the successful defense of Moscow. In 1944 he became a full general and also replaced Voroshilov as a member of the State Committee for Defense. Two years later he was named Minister of the Armed Forces and a candidate member of the Politburo. His promotion to full membership followed in 1948.

Kosygin's rapid advance began in 1938, during the purge period, when he was named Commissar of the Textile Industry. In 1940 he became vice-chairman of the Council of People's Commissars with special responsibility for all consumer-goods industries. A year later he was named Premier of the RSFSR and continued in this position during the war. In 1946 he became a candidate member of the Politburo as well as vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers. In 1948 he served temporarily as Minister of Finance. In 1949 he was shifted to the Ministry of Light Industry while retaining his position as vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers. During the same year, he also became a full member of the Politburo. For reasons which were undisclosed, Kosygin was demoted to an alternate membership on the new Presidium in October 1952 and was removed altogether from that body when it was reorganized after Stalin's death.

*Division of Responsibilities in the Politburo*

Before it was dissolved at the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, the Politburo consisted of eleven full members and one candidate. The members, in the order of their seniority, were Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Andreyev, Mikoyan, Khrushchev, Beria, Malenkov, Bulganin, and Kosygin. The candidate member, Shvernik, had been frozen in that status since 1939. Stalin's position was one of unique authority. As General Secretary of the Party and chairman of the Council of Ministers, his was the power of ultimate decision over the whole range of Party and state concerns. The other members of the Politburo, with the exception of Khrushchev, held the titles of vice-chairmen of the Council of Ministers.

Molotov was commonly regarded as Stalin's first deputy for state administration with a special responsibility in the area of foreign affairs. In the decade preceding World War II he had served as chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, and between 1939 and 1949 he also held the portfolio of Commissar (later Minister) of Foreign Affairs. His retirement from that post was part of a general policy of divesting Politburo members of specific ministerial duties in order to reserve their energies for policy making, coordination, and supervision.

Voroshilov's role was that of a senior military adviser. Until June 1940 he served as Defense Commissar. After the debacle of the first phase of the Finnish war, he was replaced by Timoshenko. During the war, he remained a member of the State Committee for Defense until 1944 when he was succeeded by Bulganin and dispatched to the Far East to help prepare the Soviet attack on Japan. Voroshilov, who was born in 1881, was the oldest member of the Politburo group, next to Stalin. While he probably continued to exercise an important influence on military decisions, his responsibilities in this area were increasingly shared with Bulganin.

Kaganovich had the reputation of being the troubleshooter of the Politburo. His career was a long record of being rushed from breach to breach to repair breakdowns and introduce order where chaos had prevailed. As first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party between 1925 and 1928, he attracted nation-wide attention for his energetic leadership in the construction of Dneprostroi. As secretary of the Moscow Party organization between 1930 and 1935, his most dramatic achievement was the building of the Moscow subway. In 1933 he was temporarily shifted to the critical agricultural front and was largely responsible for organizing the political sections of the machine-tractor stations through which the disintegrating collective-farm structure was salvaged and restored. In 1935 he became Commissar of Railroads and applied similar tech-

niques to improve the efficiency of the Soviet Union's overloaded and poorly functioning transportation network. When Ordjonikidze died in 1937, Kaganovich succeeded him as Commissar of Heavy Industry. When oil production began to lag in the prewar years, he was given the assignment of putting the oil industry on its feet. In 1938 he returned to the railroads and during the war, as a member of the State Committee for Defense, was responsible for all wartime transportation. After the war, he was put in charge of a newly created Ministry of Building Materials. When the 1946 drought created an emergency in the Ukraine, Kaganovich was dispatched there to replace Khrushchev as first secretary and to lead the work of reconstruction. In December 1947 he returned to Moscow, where as one of the vice-chairmen of the Council of Ministers, it was assumed that he continued to exercise major supervisory authority over the group of ministries concerned with transportation and heavy industry. Kaganovich's talents as an executive and administrator made him an important figure in the Politburo, but during the postwar period he no longer occupied the outstanding position which he had attained in the early thirties when he was frequently referred to as a favorite disciple of Stalin.

Andreyev's duties in the Politburo were twofold. As chairman of the Party Control Commission, he had a continuing responsibility for enforcing Party discipline. As vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers and chairman of the Council on Kolkhoz Affairs, he operated as one of the top agricultural experts of the Politburo. Andreyev's original assignment was trade-union affairs, and he remained active in that area until 1928. In the trade-union discussion of 1920-21, Andreyev followed the lead of Trotsky and Bukharin. Although he quickly disassociated himself from these mentors and threw in his lot with Stalin, he remained the only member of the Politburo with a record of past association with oppositionists. He was also the only member to whom a public rebuke was administered by name in the postwar years. On February 19, 1950, an unsigned article appeared in *Pravda* severely criticizing Andreyev for championing the use of the *zveno* or link system of organizing work on collective farms in preference to reliance on the larger unit of the brigade (see Chapter 16). On February 28, a little more than a week later, *Pravda* published a letter from Andreyev "confessing" his errors. The *Pravda* attack obviously echoed an earlier Politburo debate and decision. The use of Andreyev as a public scapegoat to signal a change in policy was followed by more drastic measures. At the Nineteenth Party Congress, he was removed from the chairmanship of the Party Control Committee and not included as a member or candidate member of the new Presidium. Although he remained a member of the Central Committee, the decline in his status marked the end of his career as a major political figure.

Mikoyan functioned as the Politburo specialist on foreign and domestic trade. For ten years prior to 1949, he headed the Ministry (formerly Commissariat) of Foreign Trade. Still earlier, he served variously as People's Commissar for Trade, for Supplies, and for the Food Industry. As vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, he continued to supervise the Soviet domestic and foreign trade network.

Khrushchev devoted himself mainly to Party affairs. For many years, he was known as the Politburo's Ukrainian expert. He served as first secretary of the Ukrainian Party organization from 1938 to 1949, except for the year 1946-47 when he was temporarily replaced by Kaganovich. In December 1949 Khrushchev was shifted to the Moscow Party organization as first secretary and was also designated as one of the Central Committee secretaries. In addition, Khrushchev became a Politburo spokesman on agricultural policy. His election speech of March 7, 1950, initiated a far-reaching collective-farm merger campaign.<sup>12</sup> Like Andreyev earlier, Khrushchev soon found himself in troubled waters. Whereas Andreyev had been publicly rebuked for his conservatism in clinging to the link system of organizing agricultural production, Khrushchev suffered a rebuff because of the radical and overambitious character of his proposals for the resettlement of the rural population in large *agrogorods* or rural towns (see Chapter 16). But Khrushchev's status remained unaffected by the indirect attack launched against the views he had espoused. Unlike Andreyev, he became a member of the new Presidium and played a leading role at the Nineteenth Party Congress as the Party spokesman on the revised rules approved by the congress.

Beria was the Politburo specialist on the police and terror apparatus of the regime. Although he abandoned his ministerial post in 1946, both the Ministry of Interior (MVD) and that of State Security (MGB) continued to function under his direction. Because of the security aspects involved, it was also widely assumed that the Soviet atomic energy developments were subject to Beria's general supervision. He also maintained a special interest in the Georgian Party organization.

Malenkov's primary area of jurisdiction was the Party apparatus. During the immediate postwar years, his prestige suffered a temporary eclipse, and in 1946 he ceased to be listed as a Party secretary. Meanwhile, Zhdanov occupied the limelight as the ideological spokesman of the Party. On July 21, 1948, *Pravda* revealed that Malenkov had been restored to his secretarial authority. The death of Zhdanov on August 31, 1948, was followed by a ruthless purge of his dependents in the apparatus, many of whom were liquidated for their alleged involvement in the Leningrad Case. By filling many of the vacancies created with his own henchmen, Malenkov strengthened his position in the Party apparatus, although after 1949 his authority was diluted by the appointment of

Khrushchev as Central Committee Secretary with some jurisdiction over Party organizational affairs.

Bulganin's activities were concentrated in the area of national defense, where he shared responsibility with Voroshilov in advising the Politburo on military affairs. In 1949 Bulganin relinquished his duties as Minister of Armed Forces to Marshal Vasilevsky but, as vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, he continued to play a major role in supervising and co-ordinating defense administration on behalf of the Politburo.

Kosygin's area of responsibility was light industry. As Minister of Light Industry, he was the only Politburo member to retain a ministerial portfolio. As vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers, his jurisdiction probably extended as well to the group of ministries most closely related to his major specialty.

Shvernik, the only candidate member of the Politburo, was for many years the Party specialist on trade-union affairs. In 1930 he succeeded Tomsky as chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and held that post for fifteen years. When Kalinin resigned as titular head of the Soviet state shortly before his death in 1946, Shvernik replaced him. As chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, he performed the heavy burden of ceremonial duties connected with that office.

As this enumeration indicates, each of Stalin's lieutenants in the Politburo was vested with specific responsibilities which he discharged while also ostensibly participating in the collective deliberations of that body. Malenkov and, to a lesser degree, Khrushchev provided the link with the Party secretarial apparatus, Beria with the police, Bulganin and Voroshilov with the armed forces, with Molotov and the remaining members of the Politburo assuming jurisdiction over other aspects of administration and economic policy. The division of functions among the members of the Politburo served to reinforce Stalin's general control of the strategic levers of power in Soviet society.

In fact, the Politburo as an organ of collective leadership dwindled into insignificance in the last years of Stalin's life. The secondary role assigned to the Politburo was officially confirmed in Khrushchev's secret speech. "The sessions of the Politburo occurred only occasionally," Khrushchev reported:

many decisions were taken either by one person or in a roundabout fashion, without collective discussions . . . its work was disorganized by the creation within the Politburo of various commissions — the so-called "quintets," "sex-tets," "septets," and "novenaries" . . . The result of this was that some members of the Politburo were in this way kept away from participation in reaching the most important state matters.

One of the oldest members of our Party, Kliment Yefremovich Voroshilov, found himself in an almost impossible situation. For several years he was

actually deprived of the right of participation in Politburo sessions. Stalin forbade him to attend the Politburo sessions and to receive documents. When the Politburo was in session and Comrade Voroshilov heard about it, he telephoned each time and asked whether he would be allowed to attend. Sometimes Stalin permitted it, but always showed his dissatisfaction. Because of his extreme suspicion, Stalin toyed with the absurd and ridiculous suspicion that Voroshilov was an English agent . . . A special tapping device was installed in his home to listen to what was said there.

By unilateral action Stalin had also separated one other man from the work of the Politburo — Andrei Andreyevich Andreyev. This was one of the most unbridled acts of willfulness.<sup>19</sup>

The fear which Stalin inspired among his lieutenants is best summed up by Khrushchev's remark that all of them lived in dread of "annihilation." "It is clear," he added, "that such conditions put every member of the Political Bureau in a very difficult situation."<sup>20</sup>

### *The Presidium*

At the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952, the Politburo and Orgburo were abolished and replaced by a greatly enlarged Presidium. No satisfactory explanation of this startling move was provided at the time. Khrushchev's theses on changes in the Party Rules merely proclaimed: "It is expedient to transform the Politburo into a Presidium of the Party Central Committee, organized to direct the work of the Central Committee between plenary sessions, since the title Presidium better accords with the functions which the Politburo actually performs at the present time. As regards the current organizational work of the Central Committee, as practice has shown, it is expedient to concentrate this work in one body, the Secretariat, in which connection there is to be no Orgburo of the Central Committee in the future."<sup>21</sup>

The new Presidium of twenty-five members and eleven alternates seemed greatly to broaden the character of the Soviet high command. Its members and alternates included all ten of the Central Committee secretaries and all thirteen of the vice-chairmen of the USSR Council of Ministers. In addition to merging the commanding heights of Party and state administration, the Presidium included the head of the trade unions and the former first secretary of the Komsomols, two representatives from the Ukraine, the first secretary of the Belorussian Party, a sprinkling of regional Party leaders, two high-ranking Party ideologists, an old Comintern specialist, and some of the Soviet Union's outstanding economic administrators.\* The appointments to the Presidium could have been and

\* The following were named to the Presidium as full members: J. V. Stalin, General Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; V. M. Andrianov, First Secretary of the Leningrad obkom; A. B. Aristov, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and First Secretary of the Chelyabinsk

were interpreted at the time as an effort to rejuvenate and consolidate the peak structure of authority in Soviet society around its most powerful Party and governmental leaders.

Actually, if Khrushchev's testimony is to be credited, Stalin's motives were more sinister. According to Khrushchev, "Stalin evidently had plans to finish off the old members of the Politburo. He often stated that Politburo members should be replaced by new ones. His proposal after the Nineteenth Congress concerning the selection of twenty-five persons to the Central Committee Presidium was aimed at the removal of the old Politburo members and the bringing in of less experienced persons so that these would extol him in all sorts of ways. We can assume that this was also a design for the future annihilation of the old Politburo members and in this way a cover for all shameful acts of Stalin, acts which we are now considering."<sup>22</sup>

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obkom; L. P. Beria, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; N. A. Bulganin, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; K. E. Voroshilov, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; S. D. Ignatiev, Minister of State Security and representative of the Central Committee in Uzbekistan; L. M. Kaganovich, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; D. S. Korotchenko, Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers; V. V. Kuznetsov, head of the Soviet trade unions; O. V. Kuusinen, Chairman of the Presidium of the Karelo-Finnish Supreme Soviet and veteran Comintern functionary; G. M. Malenkov, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; V. A. Malyshev, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister of Shipbuilding; L. G. Melnikov, First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party; A. I. Mikoyan, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; N. A. Mikhailov, former First Secretary of the Komsomol and Secretary of the Party Central Committee; V. M. Molotov, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; M. G. Pervukhin, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers; P. K. Ponomarenko, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and Minister of Procurement; M. Z. Saburov, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Chairman of the State Planning Committee (Gosplan); M. A. Suslov, Secretary of the Party Central Committee; N. S. Khrushchev, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and First Secretary of the Moscow obkom; D. I. Chesnokov, chief editor of *Voprosy filosofii* and codirector of *Kommunist* (formerly known as *Bolshevik*); N. M. Shvernik, Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet; M. F. Shkiryatov, Chairman of the Party Control Committee of the Central Committee.

The following were named to the Presidium as alternate members: L. I. Brezhnev, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and former First Secretary of the Moldavian Party organization; A. Ya. Vyshinsky, Minister of Foreign Affairs; A. G. Zverev, Minister of Finance; N. G. Ignatov, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and First Secretary of the Krasnodar kraikom; I. G. Kabanov, Chairman of Gossnab (State Committee for Material-Technical Supply of the National Economy); A. N. Kosygin, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister of Light Industry; N. S. Patolichev, First Secretary of the Belorussian Party organization; N. M. Pegov, Secretary of the Party Central Committee and former head of the Light Industry Section of the Central Committee Secretariat; A. M. Fuzanov, former First Secretary of the Kuibyshev obkom and Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; I. F. Tevosyan, Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and Minister of the Metallurgical Industry; P. F. Yudin, high-ranking Party ideologist and active in Cominform affairs.

The sudden death of Stalin on March 5, 1953, put an end to this "design" and precipitated a new reorganization of the top structure of Party and government authority. Under pressure of the emergency, the old Politburo members in the Presidium rallied to present a united front to the nation and to the world. Within twenty-four hours after the release of the news of Stalin's death, a whole series of arrangements and dispositions of offices was announced as a "decision" of a joint meeting of the Party Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The Party Presidium was reduced in size to ten members and four alternates. The assignments of its members as of March 15, 1953, are listed in Table 17.

*Table 17. Membership and Assignments of the Presidium, March 15, 1953*

Members	
1. G. M. Malenkov	Chairman of the Council of Ministers
2. L. P. Beria	Minister of Internal Affairs and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
3. V. M. Molotov	Minister of Foreign Affairs and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
4. K. E. Voroshilov	Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet
5. N. S. Khrushchev	Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party
6. N. A. Bulganin	Minister of Defense and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
7. L. M. Kaganovich	First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
8. A. T. Mikoyan	Minister of Internal and External Trade and Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers
9. M. Z. Saburov	Minister of Machine Building
10. M. G. Pervukhin	Minister of Electric Power Stations and the Electrical Industry
Alternates	
1. N. M. Shvernik	Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
2. P. K. Ponomarenko	Minister of Culture
3. L. G. Melnikov	First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party Organization
4. M. D. Bagirov	First Secretary of the Azerbaijan Party Organization

*Note:* Members and alternates are listed in the rank order of the official announcement.

As the rank order in Table 17 makes clear, Malenkov emerged, temporarily at least, as the leading figure in the reconstructed Presidium. Control of the police gave Beria a position second only to that of Malenkov. Molotov became Minister of Foreign Affairs and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Stalin's old comrade-in-arms, Voroshilov, was assigned the largely honorific dignity of head of state, a position formerly occupied by Kalinin and Shvernik. Khrushchev was relieved of his duties as head of the Moscow Party organization but retained his position as Central Committee secretary. The "release" of Malenkov from

his secretarial duties made Khrushchev the senior Party secretary and provided the vantage point for his meteoric rise to supreme leadership. Bulganin resumed the important post of Defense Minister and, together with Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, and Kaganovich, became a member of the presidium, or inner directing group, of the Council of Ministers. Kaganovich's duties as one of the first deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers were not disclosed, although it was widely assumed that his area of jurisdiction embraced transportation and possibly heavy industry. Mikoyan became Minister of Internal and External Trade, areas of Soviet life which had long been subject to his supervision, but his designation as merely a deputy, instead of First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, appeared to reflect a lowering of his status. The two remaining members of the Presidium — Saburov and Pervukhin — were successful economic administrators in the field of heavy industry.\* Their inclusion in the inner group testified to the importance which the new leadership attached to achievement in this sphere.

The designation of Shvernik to head the Soviet trade-union apparatus returned him to a post which he had occupied from 1930 to 1946, when he replaced Kalinin as titular head of state. Ponomarenko was relieved of his duties as Central Committee secretary and transferred from his former position as Minister of Procurements to head the new Ministry of Culture. Melnikov served as the link with the Ukrainian Party apparatus. M. D. Bagirov, who headed the Soviet secret police in Azerbaijan from 1921 to 1930 and held the post of first secretary of the Azerbaijan Party organization after 1933, was the first Communist of Turkic and Moslem origin to be included in the leadership group.

#### *Turnover in Presidium Membership*

Within a period of less than a decade, all but three members of this original group of fourteen had been ejected from their Presidium posts (see Table 18). The survivors in the struggle for the succession were

\* M. Z. Saburov first came to public notice as deputy chairman of Gosplan in 1938. During World War II, he played an important role in Gosplan and as chairman of the Economic Council for Defense Industry. In the early postwar period, he served as deputy chief of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany. In 1946, he resumed his duties as deputy chairman of Gosplan. In 1949, he was promoted to the position of chairman, succeeding Voznesensky, and was also named a vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers.

M. G. Pervukhin also began to attract attention in 1938 when he was named Deputy Commissar for Heavy Industry. The next year he was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Party and also designated People's Commissar for Electric Power Stations and the Electrical Industry. During World War II, he served as one of the vice-chairmen of the USSR Council of People's Commissars. From 1940 to 1943, he chaired the USSR Council for Electricity and Fuel. From 1943 to 1950, he was Commissar and Minister for the Chemical Industry. In 1950, he became a vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers.

Table 18. *The Presidium, March 15, 1953–December 1, 1962*

<i>Members</i>	<i>Alternates</i>
G. M. Malenkov (1953–1957)	N. M. Shvernik (1953–1957)
L. P. Beria (1953–1953)	P. K. Ponomarenko (1953–1956)
V. M. Molotov (1953–1957)	L. G. Melnikov (1953–1953)
K. E. Voroshilov (1953–1960)	M. D. Bagirov (1953–1953)
N. S. Khrushchev (1953– )	G. K. Zhukov (1956–1957)
N. A. Bulganin (1953–1958)	L. I. Brezhnev (1956–1957)
L. M. Kaganovich (1953–1957)	N. A. Mukhtidinov (1956–1957)
A. I. Mikoyan (1953– )	D. T. Shepilov (1956–1957)
M. Z. Saburov (1953–1957)	Ye. A. Furtseva (1956–1957)
M. G. Pervukhin (1953–1957)	F. R. Kozlov (1957–1957)
M. A. Suslov (1955– )	P. N. Pospelov (1957–1961)
A. I. Kirichenko (1955–1960)	D. S. Korotchenko (1957–1961)
G. K. Zhukov (1957–1957)	J. E. Kalnberzin (1957–1961)
O. V. Kuusinen (1957– )	A. P. Kirilenko (1957–1961)
A. B. Aristov (1957–1961)	A. N. Kosygin (1957–1960)
N. I. Belyaev (1957–1960)	K. T. Mazurov (1957– )
N. G. Ignatov (1957–1961)	V. P. Mzhavanadze (1957– )
F. R. Kozlov (1957– )	M. G. Pervukhin (1957–1961)
Ye. A. Furtseva (1957–1961)	N. V. Podgorny (1958–1960)
L. I. Brezhnev (1957– )	D. S. Polyansky (1958–1960)
N. M. Shvernik (1957– )	G. I. Voronov (1961–1961)
N. A. Mukhtidinov (1957–1961)	V. V. Grishin (1961– )
N. V. Podgorny (1960– )	Sh. R. Rashidov (1961– )
D. S. Polyansky (1960– )	V. V. Shcherbitsky (1961– )
A. N. Kosygin (1960– )	L. N. Yefremov (1962– )
G. I. Voronov (1961– )	
A. P. Kirilenko (1962– )	

Khrushchev, who towered above the rest, Mikoyan, and Shvernik. Melnikov fell by the wayside early when he was accused in June 1953 of "distortions of the Lenin-Stalin nationality policy" and removed from his position as first secretary of the Ukrainian party. The announcement of the arrest of Beria on July 10, 1953, was followed by the purge of his old associate Bagirov, and both were subsequently executed. Ponomarenko, who was shifted to Poland as ambassador in 1954, lost his seat as a Presidium alternate after the Twentieth Party Congress. Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Saburov, Pervukhin, Bulganin, and Voroshilov were all involved in the so-called anti-Party conspiracy to unseat Khrushchev in 1957. Of this group, the first four were ejected from the Presidium at a Central Committee session of June 1957. The same plenum also decreed the demotion of Pervukhin to alternate membership in the Presidium, a post of which he was subsequently deprived along with his Central Committee status after the Twenty-Second Congress. The treatment of Bulganin followed a curious course. After the June plenum he retained both his Presidium seat and his position as chairman of the Council of Ministers. Although his public role declined greatly, he

was not removed as chairman of the Council of Ministers until March 27, 1958, ousted from the Presidium only on September 5, 1958, and not formally linked with the anti-Party group until Khrushchev's speech of November 14, 1958. Voroshilov was relieved of his posts as Party Presidium member and chairman of the Supreme Soviet in July 1960, ostensibly "at his own request"; it was not until the Twenty-Second Congress that his role in the anti-Party conspiracy was publicly aired.

The vacancies created by these purges opened the way to a series of new Presidium appointments.\* At the Central Commission session of July 1955, M. A. Suslov and A. I. Kirichenko were advanced to full membership in the Presidium. Suslov, who joined the Party in 1921, was a veteran apparatchik in the Stalinist tradition. One-time head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee Secretariat, he had been briefly a member of the enlarged Presidium between the Nineteenth Party Congress and Stalin's death, and, although dropped from the Presidium at that time, he continued as a Central Committee secretary with special responsibilities in the ideological realm. Kirichenko represented a younger generation of Party apparatchiki and dated his Party membership only from 1930. The son of a railroad worker, he attended a school for tractor mechanics, worked as a mechanic on state grain farms in the Ukraine, and graduated in 1930 from the Azov-Black Sea Institute for Farm Engineer-Mechanics. His rapid rise in the Ukrainian Party apparatus coincided with Khrushchev's period of overlordship in the republic. After serving as first secretary of the Odessa obkom, he became second secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee in 1949 and succeeded Melnikov as first secretary in 1953. In December 1957 he was transferred to Moscow, where as a Central Committee secretary with responsibility for Party organizational and cadre activities, he occupied a position in the Party hierarchy second only to that of Khrushchev. But his stay at the summit was brief. In January 1960, without explanation, he was relieved of his position as Central Committee secretary, shifted to Rostov as obkom secretary, dropped from the Presidium in May 1960, and ejected from the Central Committee after the Twenty-Second Party Congress.

Nine new members were added to the Presidium in the reconstruction of its composition which followed the elimination of the anti-Party group in June 1957. The career of one, the popular World War II hero, Marshal Zhukov, was short. After being rescued from the obscurity to which he was consigned by Stalin's jealousy in the postwar years, he rose rapidly to become Minister of Defense after Bulganin's assumption of the chair-

\* The biographical material on recent Presidium appointees is derived from data in *Ezhegodnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii* (Yearbook of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia; Moscow, 1957-1961).

manship of the Council of Ministers, was named a Presidium alternate after the Twentieth Party Congress, and was subsequently dropped from the Presidium and Central Committee in October 1957 on the ground that he harbored Napoleonic ambitions which had manifested themselves in a policy of impeding Party control of the armed forces.

The other eight appointments rewarded faithful service in the Party apparatus, and most of the beneficiaries had reason to be grateful to Khrushchev for their rise to Presidium eminence. Two were Old Bolsheviks — N. M. Shvernik, who joined the Party in 1905, and O. V. Kuusinen, whose Party membership dated back to 1904. For Shvernik, the perpetual alternate, promotion to full membership in the Presidium was a belated triumph. The elevation of Kuusinen to Presidium status at the age of seventy-six was even more startling. One of the founders of the Finnish Communist Party, he was a veteran Comintern functionary, who had also served as chairman of the Presidium of the Karelo-Finnish Supreme Soviet. His promotion to the Presidium and a Central Committee secretaryship brought to the ruling group a fund of long experience and intimate knowledge of the international Communist movement.

Two others, A. B. Aristov and N. I. Belyaev, represented the Civil War generation. Both joined the Party in 1921. Aristov, the son of a fisherman, graduated from the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute in 1932, taught and carried on scientific work in Leningrad during the next five years, and was then shifted to Party assignments. He was briefly a member of the enlarged Presidium in 1952-53 after serving as secretary of the Chelyabinsk Party organization. First secretary of the Krasnodar kraikom in 1954-1955, he became a Central Committee secretary in 1955 with assignments in the industrial sector and was elevated to the Presidium in 1957. Relieved of his Central Committee secretaryship in 1960, he served briefly on the Central Committee's bureau for the Russian republic and was then shifted to Warsaw as ambassador. Dropped from the Presidium after the Twenty-Second Congress, he retained his seat on the Central Committee.

Belyaev's stay on the Presidium was even more short-lived. Trained as an economist, he was soon moved into Party work. After serving as first secretary of the Altai kraikom, he became a Central Committee secretary in 1955 and was promoted to the Presidium in June 1957. Transferred to Kazakhstan as first secretary in December 1957, he was publicly attacked by Khrushchev in December 1959 for poor management of Kazakh agriculture, was demoted in January 1960 to a local Party secretaryship in Stavropol, subsequently dismissed from that post, and expelled from the Presidium in May 1960.

Two members of the group, N. G. Ignatov and F. R. Kozlov, represented the mid-twenties generation of Party recruits. Ignatov was the son

of a worker and as a youth was employed as a carpenter. He fought in the Red Army during the Civil War, joined the Party in 1923, and worked continuously for the Cheka and OGPU until 1932. During the next two years he studied Marxism-Leninism in courses sponsored by the Central Committee and was then assigned to Party work. After occupying a variety of secretarial posts in Leningrad, Kuibyshev, Orel, Krasnodar, Voronezh, and Gorky, he was elevated to the Presidium in June 1957 and in December became a Central Committee secretary with particular responsibility in the agricultural sector. Relieved of his duties as Central Committee secretary in May 1960, he was dropped from the Presidium after the Twenty-Second Congress.

Kozlov, the Central Committee secretary now in charge of cadres and organization, has frequently been referred to as Khrushchev's most likely successor. Of peasant origin, he joined the Party in 1926. Like Aristov, he was a graduate of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute and soon entered Party work. He made his way up the Party ladder to become secretary of the Leningrad gorkom from 1949 to 1952, second secretary of the Leningrad obkom in 1952-1953, and first secretary from 1953 to 1957 when he was elevated to the Presidium. After serving as chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, in March 1958 he became first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers under Khrushchev and in May 1960 was released from that office to replace Kirichenko as Central Committee secretary.

Ye. A. Furtseva and L. I. Brezhnev belong to a still younger Party generation. Furtseva, the first woman to become a member of the Presidium, joined the Party in 1930 at the age of twenty. Born in a family of textile workers, she received her first academic instruction in Leningrad in civil aviation, graduated in 1942 from the Moscow Fine Chemicals Institute, and also took correspondence courses in the Central Committee's Higher Party School. She began her Party career as an instructor of the Komsomol Central Committee in 1936-1937, served as a raikom secretary in Moscow from 1942 to 1950, was then promoted to second secretary of the Moscow gorkom, and served as first secretary of the gorkom from 1954 to 1957. After the Twentieth Party Congress she became an alternate member of the Presidium and a Central Committee secretary. In May 1960 she was relieved of her Central Committee secretaryship and designated Minister of Culture. After the Twenty-Second Congress, she was dropped from the Presidium, though she retained her Central Committee membership and her ministerial status.

Brezhnev's career represents another case of the trained engineer who shifted to Party work. He entered the Party in 1931 at the relatively late age of twenty-five. After graduating from the Dneprodzerzhinsk Metallurgical Institute in 1935, he soon won Party assignments and became

the propaganda secretary in the Dnepropetrovsk obkom in 1939. During the war he turned to industrial work and managed a metallurgical plant in the Urals, but not long after the end of the war he became first secretary of the Moldavian Party. After Stalin's death he served briefly as chief of the Political Administration of the Red Fleet and was then moved to Kazakhstan where he occupied the posts of second and then first secretary until 1956. His elevation to the Presidium in 1957 was accompanied by appointment to a Central Committee secretaryship, a position which he was compelled to abandon in July 1960 when he replaced Voroshilov as chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

N. A. Mukhittdinov, who was raised to Presidium status in December 1957, was not only the first Uzbek to enter that body, but also the first representative of the World War II generation of Party members to attain Presidium rank. Born of a family of poor peasants, he graduated from a cooperative teknikum, worked in consumers' cooperatives, and attended a trade and economics institute as well as pedagogical courses. He served in the Soviet Army from 1940 to 1945, joined the Party in 1942, and carried out Komsomol and political assignments. After the war he worked his way up the Party ladder in Uzbekistan, becoming first secretary of the Tashkent obkom in 1950, chairman of the Uzbek Council of Ministers in 1951, and first secretary of the Uzbek Party in 1955. Elected an alternate member of the Presidium in 1956, he was promoted to a Central Committee secretaryship in December 1957 at the same time that he was named a full member of the Presidium. His meteoric rise, however, was short-lived. Dropped from the Presidium after the Twenty-Second Congress, he was relegated to the relatively minor post of deputy chairman of the Central Union of Consumer Cooperatives, though he retained his membership in the Central Committee.

At a plenary session of the Party Central Committee on May 4, 1960, A. N. Kosygin, N. V. Podgorny, and D. S. Polyansky were named full members of the Presidium. Kosygin, the youngest member of the Politburo under Stalin, was dropped to alternate status when the enlarged Presidium was established after the Nineteenth Party Congress and omitted altogether from the Presidium after Stalin's death. Beginning in June 1957, his star began to rise again when he was designated a Presidium alternate and vice-chairman of the Council of Ministers. In March 1959 he replaced I. I. Kuzmin as USSR Gosplan Chairman and in May 1960, on the occasion of his elevation to the Presidium, he was relieved of his planning duties to become first vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, a status which he shared only with Mikoyan.

Podgorny, the Ukrainian first secretary, joined the Party in 1930 at the relatively late age of twenty-seven. A graduate of the Kiev Technological Institute, he occupied a variety of economic posts for many years and

served from 1946 to 1950 as the representative of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers to the Council of Ministers of the USSR. First secretary of the Kharkov obkom from 1950 to 1953, he became second secretary of the Ukrainian Party organization in 1953, and first secretary in 1957, when Kirichenko was called to Moscow. His promotion to full membership in the Presidium followed two years of service as an alternate member from 1958 to 1960.

D. S. Polyansky, one of the youngest members of the Presidium, was born in 1917 and joined the Party in 1939. A graduate of the Kharkov Agricultural Institute, he attended the Central Committee's Higher Party School, was assigned to Party work in the Altai krai and in the Central Committee secretarial apparatus, served as second secretary of the Crimean Party organization in 1949-52, and as first secretary from 1953 to 1955. From 1955 to 1957 he occupied the post of first secretary of the Chkalov obkom and in 1957-58 served in a similar capacity in the Krasnodar kraikom. In March 1958 he was appointed chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers and designated a Presidium alternate.

The two most recent recruits to Presidium membership are G. I. Voronov and A. P. Kirilenko. Voronov, who joined the Party in 1931, engaged in construction and factory work after finishing middle school. He later attended the Tomsk Industrial Institute and was then sent to study at the Novosibirsk Institute of Marxism-Leninism. Beginning his Party career in the agitprop apparatus in Tomsk, he worked in the Chitinsk obkom from 1939 to 1955, occupying the post of first secretary after 1948. From 1955 to 1957 he was deputy USSR Minister of Agriculture and from 1957 to 1961 he served as first secretary of the Orenburg obkom, where his record of agricultural achievement won Khrushchev's praise. Designated a Presidium alternate in January 1961, he was raised to full membership in October and made first vice-chairman of the Central Committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic.

A. P. Kirilenko, whose Party membership also dates from 1931, was a graduate of an aviation institute; he was given a series of increasingly responsible Party assignments and served as first secretary of the important Sverdlovsk Party organization from 1955. Elected a Presidium alternate in June 1957, he was dropped from that post after the Twenty-Second Party Congress, only to reappear as a full member of the Presidium in April 1962. At the same time he was also named first vice-chairman of the Central Committee's Bureau for Russian Affairs, a responsibility which he then shared only with Voronov.

Of the twenty-five Party leaders who served as candidate members in the reconstituted Presidium in the period from Stalin's death until the end of 1962, eight — Shvernik, Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Polyansky, Kozlov, Voronov, and Kirilenko — now sit in the Presidium as full mem-

bers. Another five — Mukhitdinov, Furtseva, Pospelov, Korotchenko, and Kalnberzin — have been demoted to Central Committee rank. Five others — Ponomarenko, Melnikov, Zhukov, Shepilov, and Pervukhin — suffered a far greater loss of status, and one — Bagirov — was shot because of his connection with Beria. Of the remaining six, who presently enjoy alternate status, two, Mazurov and Mzhavanadze, became candidate members in June 1957; one, V. V. Grishin, in January 1961; two, Sh. R. Rashidov and V. V. Scherbitsky, in October 1961 after the Twenty-Second Congress; and one, L. N. Yefremov, in November 1962.

Mazurov, the Belorussian first secretary, joined the Party in 1940, served with the partisans behind the German lines during World War II, graduated from the Higher Party School, and was then assigned to Komsomol and Party work. After occupying the posts of Minsk gorkom secretary in 1949–1950 and Minsk obkom first secretary in 1950–1953, he became chairman of the Belorussian Council of Ministers in 1953 and Belorussian first secretary in 1956.

Mzhavanadze, the first secretary of the Georgian Party organization, joined the Party in 1927. A graduate of the Leningrad Military-Political Academy, he served in responsible political posts with the Soviet Army in the Ukraine until his transfer to Georgia in 1953.

Grishin, who succeeded Shvernik as the trade-union specialist in the ruling group, joined the Party in 1938. Graduate of a Moscow teknikum, he worked as a machinist and as deputy chief of a railway roundhouse. Transferred to Party work, he first served as secretary of a railroad Party committee in Serpukhov in 1941–42, became gorkom secretary there in 1942, joined the Moscow Party apparatus in 1950, and served as secretary of the Moscow committee from 1952 to 1956. In the latter year he was designated chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

Rashidov, the first secretary of the Uzbek Party organization, displaced Mukhitdinov as the Central Asian representative in the top Party group. A member of the Party since 1939, he graduated from Samarkand University in 1941 and served as secretary of the Samarkand obkom from 1944 to 1947. During the next few years he pursued a journalistic career and was chairman of the Uzbek Writers' Union in 1949–1950. In 1950 he became chairman of the Presidium of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet where he remained until March 1959, when he was made Uzbek first secretary.

Scherbitsky, who became chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers in February 1961, joined the Party in 1941. A graduate of the Dnepropetrovsk Chemical-Technological Institute, he served in the Soviet Army during World War II and held engineering posts in the immediate postwar years. In 1948 he was assigned to Party work, became second secretary of the Dnepropetrovsk obkom in 1954 and first secretary

in 1955. From 1957 to 1961 he served as a secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee and was then shifted to his ministerial post.

L. N. Yefremov, first secretary of the Gorky obkom at the time of his elevation to Presidium alternate membership, joined the Party in 1941 at the relatively late age of twenty-nine. Prior to his transfer to Gorky in 1958, he served for a number of years as secretary of Kursk oblast in which Khrushchev's native village of Kalinovka is located.

#### *Khrushchev's Presidium versus Stalin's Politburo*

When the composition of the present-day Presidium (Table 18) is compared with the Politburo under Stalin, or even with the enlarged Presidium which temporarily came into being after the Nineteenth Party Congress in October 1952, some interesting contrasts are evident. Stalin's high command contained representatives of the police in the persons of Beria and later S. D. Ignatiev; at present there are no representatives of the police ministries in the Presidium circle. While Stalin's inner group included no professional army officers (unless Voroshilov be so regarded) Khrushchev for a brief period enlisted the services of Marshal Zhukov, only to cast him aside when he loomed as a potential competitor for supreme power. Stalin's Presidium included some of the Soviet Union's outstanding economic administrators; Khrushchev demoted them to a lower order of influence and status in the Party hierarchy. Under Khrushchev, more than ever before, the Presidium became the inner sanctum of the Party functionaries.

The present composition of the Presidium dramatizes the ascendancy of the Party apparatchiki. Of the twelve full members and six alternates of the Presidium in late 1962, twelve occupied Party posts and of the remaining six, all, with the exception of Kosygin, served a long period of apprenticeship in the Party hierarchy before being assigned to state responsibilities. The membership of the Presidium underlined the central importance of the Party apparatus in Khrushchev's formula of governance.

A close look at the biographies of the Presidium members reveals still other group characteristics. Most are of humble social origin, children of workers and poor peasants, whose rise to eminence was deeply intertwined with the opportunities made available to them by the Soviet system. Many shared with Khrushchev the distinction of being "pushed-forward workers" who were selected by the Party for special training and were soon moved into leading Party positions. A good number had been close associates of Khrushchev's, either in the Ukraine or in Moscow, and their rapid advancement was expedited by the fact that he had confidence in them. The esprit de corps of this group was cemented by the fact that they formed part of the Khrushchevian entourage and shared the outlook bred by common origins and a common life experience.

Within the Presidium at least four distinct Party generations were represented: the Old Bolsheviks, the Civil War band, the generation of the twenties and the early thirties, and the youngest group which dated its membership from the post-purge and World War II years. The Old Bolsheviks, Shvernik, Mikoyan, and Kuusinen, were obviously passing from the center of the stage, though Mikoyan, in particular, continued to be an influential figure. The leading representative of the Civil War generation was Khrushchev himself, though Suslov also had joined the Party at the end of this period (1921) and still played an important role. By far the largest group was the seven members and alternates who joined the Party in the twenties and early thirties — Kozlov, Brezhnev, Voronov, Kirilenko, Kosygin, Mzhavanadze, and Podgorny. In a sense this was the succession generation, deeply indebted to Khrushchev for the recognition which had come its way, the men whose adult lives had been shaped by Soviet power, and for whom the revolution was little more than a childhood memory and the Tsarist past a nightmare in the history books. And well behind them, skipping the missing generation of the years of the Great Purge, were the harbingers of the next generation of leadership — Polyansky, Mazurov, Grishin, Rashidov, Yefremov, and Shcherbitsky — dating their Party membership from the period 1938–1941. For them collectivization and industrialization already represented legacies of the past, and World War II was the great divide which marked out their entrance into the future.

Within the newer members of the Presidium group was to be found a degree of technical training and competence that was noticeably lacking in the earlier generation of Party functionaries recruited by Stalin. As has already been noted, Kozlov was a graduate of the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute; Voronov was trained at the Tomsk Industrial Institute; Brezhnev was a metallurgical engineer and a former factory director; Kosygin was a textile engineer; Podgorny was a graduate of the Kiev Technological Institute; Kirilenko was an aviation engineer; Polyansky was a graduate of the Kharkov Agricultural Institute; and Shcherbitsky was trained at the Dnepropetrovsk Chemical-Technological Institute. Despite the fact that most of them made their real careers as Party functionaries, they brought to their assignments a technical sophistication and understanding which greatly facilitated communication with their opposite numbers in industry and agriculture and, indeed, was indispensable to the task of directing a complex industrial society.

*The Operations of the Presidium*

Some indication of the division of responsibilities within the Presidium group can be derived from the formal positions which its members occupy (see Table 19), the record of their activities, and the pronounce-

ments which they make. Khrushchev, in his double capacity as Central Committee first secretary and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, obviously plays a central directing role. Kozlov operates as his main deputy for Party affairs, exercises general supervision over the Central Committee Secretariat, and has primary responsibility for Party cadres and organization. Suslov's jurisdiction embraces ideology, agitation and propaganda, and relations with bloc and foreign Communist parties, though Kuusinen, too, appears active in the latter realm. Shvernik, as chairman of the Party Commission, occupies himself with Party dis-

*Table 19. Membership and Assignments of the Presidium, December 25, 1962*

<i>Members</i>	
1. N. S. Khrushchev	First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
2. F. R. Kozlov	Secretary of the Central Committee
3. A. I. Mikoyan	First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
4. M. A. Suslov	Secretary of the Central Committee
5. O. V. Kuusinen	Secretary of the Central Committee
6. L. I. Brezhnev	Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet
7. N. M. Shvernik	Chairman of the Central Committee's Party Commission
8. N. V. Podgorny	First Secretary of the Ukrainian Party organization
9. D. S. Polyansky	Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
10. A. N. Kosygin	First Vice-Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers
11. G. I. Voronov	Chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers
12. A. P. Kirilenko	First Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic

<i>Alternates</i>	
1. K. T. Mazurov	First Secretary of the Belorussian Party organization
2. V. P. Mzhavanadze	First Secretary of the Georgian Party organization
3. V. V. Grishin	Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions
4. Sh. R. Rashidov	First Secretary of the Uzbek Party organization
5. V. V. Shcherbitsky	Chairman of the Ukrainian Council of Ministers
6. L. N. Yefremov	First Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic

ciplinary matters. Yefremov and Kirilenko serve as Khrushchev's deputies on the Central Committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic, with Yefremov taking the lead on agricultural problems and Kirilenko exercising responsibility in the industrial realm. Voronov's appointment on November 23, 1962, to the chairmanship of the RSFSR Council of Ministers was accompanied by relief from his Party post. Yefremov, who was first secretary of the Gorky obkom when elevated to a Presidium alternate membership in November 1962, succeeded Voronov as first vice-chairman

of the Bureau for the Russian Republic. In the USSR Council of Ministers, Mikoyan and Kosygin serve as Khrushchev's deputies, though the precise demarcation of their duties has yet to be publicly revealed. Polyansky, until November 1962 chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, is presently a vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Brezhnev, as chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, performs the largely ceremonial functions of head of state, while Grishin's area of special jurisdiction is trade-union affairs. Representation for some, but not all, of the important non-Russian republics is provided through Podgorny and Shcherbitsky from the Ukraine, Mazurov from Belorussia, Mzhavanadze from Georgia, and Rashidov from Uzbekistan.

Information on the operations of the Presidium as a collective body is sparse, since meetings are not ordinarily reported and no agenda or records of proceedings are publicly released. Since the Presidium is the top policy-making and coordinating body in the Soviet system, it can be assumed that its concerns embrace the definition of goals, the determination of priorities in both domestic and foreign policy, the reconciliation of conflicting bureaucratic interests, the identification of major problems, the formulation of broad policy directives, checks on their implementation, and decisions on important appointments to Party and governmental offices. It is at the Presidium level that the basic decisions of Soviet life are either made or approved — the tempo of growth, the level of investment in heavy and light industry, military and scientific requirements, the satisfaction of consumer needs, the direction of agricultural policy, and the management of foreign affairs. Since resources are limited and choices and priorities have to be enforced, the Presidium necessarily becomes a battleground on which the converging and conflicting bureaucratic interests of Soviet society seek to carve out their domains. Presidium members with special assignments not infrequently become spokesmen for the areas which they supervise. When Molotov, for example, was in charge of railroad transport, according to Khrushchev, "he tried to get everything he could for the railroads."<sup>23</sup> It would not be surprising if members of Khrushchev's entourage with particularized responsibilities behaved similarly. The Presidium thus offers an arena of bargaining in which accommodations and compromises may take place.

Much obviously depends on the personalities involved and the power alignment within the Presidium group. In the last two decades of Stalin's rule, no member of the Politburo dared voice views displeasing to the *vozhd*, though this did not prevent them from occasionally pressing self-serving programs which fitted into Stalin's larger schemes. During the early stages of the succession struggle after Stalin's death, the Presidium was transformed into an unstable oligarchy, in which the majority joined first to eliminate Beria and then to limit Malenkov's power. Khrushchev

gradually amassed authority by forming *ad hoc* alliances to divide his potential Presidium opponents while he consolidated his control over the Party machine. By the time a majority of the Presidium was ready to unite to impose restraints on Khrushchev, it was too late. Faced with what he later termed "an arithmetical majority" against him in the Presidium, Khrushchev appealed to the Central Committee in which he was powerfully entrenched. The reconstructed Presidium of June 1957 was packed with Khrushchev's followers and registered his undisputed ascendancy within the ruling group.

With the consolidation of Khrushchev's power, the Presidium entered a new phase. Khrushchev's paramount position was no longer subject to challenge, but the way in which he exercised hegemony differed significantly from that of Stalin. The Presidium continued to meet at stated intervals, and Khrushchev evidenced a willingness to delegate operational authority to his associates and subordinates and to listen to their views. Thus the Presidium appeared to operate in a deliberative and consultative fashion in which the final power of decision rested with Khrushchev, whose judgment in turn was influenced by the specialized knowledge of his colleagues and a flow of expert advice from below.

All too little is known of the decision-making process within the Presidium itself, but it is clear that urgent issues and information reach it through a variety of channels. Problems for Presidium deliberation and decision frequently are raised by governmental agencies or subordinate Party organizations, though the Presidium may also seize the initiative in response to a developing crisis or scandal which is brought to its attention in some other way. Information filters through to the Presidium not merely through the reports of administrative bodies but also through the intelligence provided by the Party hierarchy, the police, the press, and letters of complaint which call attention to local abuses. The Central Committee Secretariat, which operates essentially as a staff agency for the Presidium, plays a key role in collating such information, screening proposals for Presidium consideration, arranging its agenda, and preparing background papers and recommendations on the basis of which the Presidium can act.

The attention which the Presidium gives to problems naturally reflects their continuing, as well as current, importance. All of the available evidence suggests that Khrushchev, as well as Mikoyan and several other members of the Presidium, are intimately involved in a day-to-day consideration of foreign policy, and, though their judgments are no doubt influenced by the technical advice which they receive from Foreign Minister Gromyko and his associates, the major initiative is retained by the Presidium group. Agriculture has long been in the forefront of Khrushchev's interests, and, if the number of Central Committee plenums

devoted to that subject in recent years may serve as a criterion, the agenda of the Presidium have no doubt reflected this concern.

In analyzing the operations of the Presidium as an institution, it is important to distinguish between decisions which are effectively made at the secretarial level or by Presidium members in their individual capacities and questions which are subjected to full-dress debate. An example cited by a member of the Secretariat to a visiting delegation of high-ranking Italian Communist Party officials may help illustrate the secretarial role. The case involved a reprimand administered to the journal *Voprosy Istorii* in 1957 for ideological errors, which was followed by a decision to reorganize its staff. As the member of the Secretariat described its role:

It depends on the importance of the matter. Information can be given orally to one of the secretaries of the Central Committee. On the other hand, information can be given at the appropriate meetings of the Secretariat or Presidium at which representatives of writers and artists sometimes participate.

Our own department [Culture and Science] is not limited simply to keeping the Central Committee informed on developments in the cultural debate but also takes part in working out the projects and decisions of the Secretariat and the Central Committee. For example, the decision about *Voprosy Istorii* was taken after long discussion inside the Secretariat of the Central Committee which was based on a project drawn up by the department. To draw up the project we invited at the start the comrades from the editorial board of the review to the department. Next, in January [1957], we held a bigger meeting, convened by our department, and the propaganda department, at which [there] participated not only the editorial board of the review, but also the president and vice-president of the Academy of Sciences and representatives from the Academy of Sciences. For two days we had eight- to nine-hour discussions. At the next meeting of the Secretariat, the editors of the review, the comrades of the propaganda department and our department, and finally Comrades Pospelev and Suslov all spoke. After this debate, the decision to change the editorial board of the review was approved.<sup>24</sup>

Since this decision was embodied in a Central Committee decree while the committee itself was not in session, it can be presumed that it was at least formally approved by the Presidium, though probably without debate. As the account makes clear, the effective decision was made at the Secretariat level and approved by Presidium member and Party Secretary Suslov who served as a court of next-to-last resort on ideological questions.

There are no doubt many issues of similar middling or lesser importance which are in effect resolved at the secretarial level or by individual Presidium members. While the Presidium reserves to itself the ultimate right to decide all questions, its deliberative processes would be clogged beyond repair unless it developed institutional mechanisms to

distinguish between greater and lesser problems. Here the Central Committee Secretariat plays a key role, even though the top leadership seeks to ensure that secretarial screening will not inhibit its own exercise of initiative.

Is the Soviet high command kept accurately informed of developments at home and abroad? Are there flaws in the data supplied to it? Is it insulated from reality by the nature of the system over which it presides, the character of its own information-gathering facilities, or by the climate of expectations in which it moves? Important as these questions are, they cannot be definitively answered with the facts at hand.

Official sources make it clear that there are pressures built into the Soviet system which operate to block channels of communication. Where, for example, unrealistic production demands are made on Soviet enterprises and collective farms, there is abundant evidence to indicate that some managers and officials conspire to conceal failures of performance and falsify the statistical reports which they transmit to higher authorities. Although it is not easy to document the scale of these machinations with any precision, the problem is an endemic one in the system and not easily uprooted. Indeed, the widespread instances of data juggling in Soviet agriculture that were uncovered, after long delays, at the January 1961 session of the Central Committee led Khrushchev to burst out: "If we don't restore order, the plans will be statistically fulfilled, but products there won't be enough of. As is known, you can't make pancakes out of statistics."<sup>25</sup> But despite every effort on the part of the center to close loopholes and to make examples of those who practice falsification, the relentless pressure under which local officials operate leads some of them to embark on the most ingenious feats of circumvention to obscure short falls in production.

In the area of foreign affairs, distortions are of a different order. There is authoritative evidence indicating that the top Party leadership receives accurate statistical reports on foreign economic performance and that the texts of important pronouncements by foreign leaders reach it in uncensored form. There is also clear evidence that Soviet news services abroad transmit comprehensive and detailed coverage of the world press to Moscow, and that this flow of information is supplemented by voluminous embassy reports and other intelligence data. But the mountains of material thus made available have to be reduced to manageable proportions before they are brought to the attention of the leadership. What the rulers read reflects the selection and emphasis of a screening staff, which may be guided by its own preconditioning as well as its sensitivity to the anticipated reactions of its readers. The tendency to embrace data that confirm established predilections while rejecting the unpalatable facts that offend one's preconceptions is a weakness from which no one

is wholly free. Totalitarian societies with a strong ideological commitment appear to be particularly susceptible to such manipulation. Every dictatorship has a tendency to breed sycophancy and to discourage independence in its bureaucratic hierarchy. When the views of the leadership are well known, the words which subordinates throw back at it tend to confirm its beliefs rather than to challenge its analyses. No dictatorial regime can wholly escape the distortion of this echo effect. The ideological screen through which facts are received, filtered, and appraised contributes an additional possibility of misrepresentation. The danger in the case of the Soviet Union is accentuated by the rigid doctrinal stereotypes about the outside world which acceptance of the Communist ideology imposes.

It is also clear, however, that the Soviet high command has developed its own methods of safeguarding the integrity of its sources of information. By pitting the competitive hierarchies of administration, Party, and secret police against each other at lower levels of the governmental structure, it frees itself from exclusive dependence on any single channel of fact gathering and encourages rivalries among the various agencies to correct distortion and prevent concealment. In this fashion it mobilizes the cumulative resources which competition sometimes generates. The same technique is applied in the foreign field where a variety of intelligence agencies function side by side with no point of final coordination short of the Kremlin itself.<sup>26</sup> It would be a profound mistake to identify the version of the news circulated by the press to the Soviet public with the full range of facts and data on the basis of which the leadership acts. The Soviet press, in the Communist view, is primarily a channel for the propagation of policies which have already been decided upon rather than a news-gathering instrument on the basis of which decisions are reached. If a conclusion may be drawn from very fragmentary data, it would be to suggest that the climate of decision making in top Party circles is more deeply affected by the mental screen through which facts are interpreted than by any profound lacunae in the facts themselves. The values with which the leaders confront reality represent the distortions from which they cannot escape.

Perhaps the greatest single source of distortion in foreign affairs derives from the image of "the enemy" which is deeply imbedded in Marxist-Leninist patterns of thought. The politics of Communism are built around the concept of the implacable capitalist adversary who has to be disarmed and defeated lest he in turn annihilate Communism. The Leninist dialectic which the leadership has been trained to apply is essentially a vision of progress and triumph through conflict and struggle. Such a Weltanschauung reduces any accommodation to a negative virtue. Compromise becomes at best a disagreeable necessity rather than a crea-

tive achievement. Retreat can be defended only "as a legitimate form of struggle"; as Stalin once put it, "under certain unfavorable circumstances the retreat is as appropriate a form of strife as the advance."<sup>27</sup> The essence of politics remains the clash with the capitalist enemy. As Khrushchev restated it in his fortieth-anniversary report to the Supreme Soviet on November 6, 1957, "Marxist dialectics teach that all development proceeds through the disclosure and overcoming of contradictions. Under the conditions of the capitalist system, where antagonistic classes oppose one another, these contradictions are irreconcilable and can be resolved only in the course of class struggle."<sup>28</sup>

Since leaders of capitalist and imperialist states are credited with hostile intentions against the Soviet Union and even the temporary ally of today represents a potential political enemy tomorrow, the information that filters through to the ruling group tends to be perceived, arranged, and analyzed in categories which take such hostility for granted. Expressions of antagonism to the Soviet Union constitute verification of the profundity of the Communist perception of reality; professions of friendship tend to be discounted as wily or naive stratagems designed to lull the vigilance of the Soviet leadership. The basic premises from which the Kremlin operates breed their polar reactions and induced confirmations. Hostility generates counterhostility, and the theory of the enemy contributes to the creation of the very circumstances that it was devised to explain.

#### *The Goals of the Soviet Leadership*

How do the Soviet leaders visualize their objectives? What is their outlook on relations with their "imperialist" antagonists? The classic Leninist formulation, which Stalin chose to repeat in his 1938 letter to Ivanov,<sup>29</sup> accepted war as inevitable. "We live," Lenin pronounced, "not only in a state, but in a *system of states*, and the existence of the Soviet Republic next to a number of imperialist states for a long time is unthinkable. In the end, either the one or the other must triumph. Until that end comes, a series of most terrible conflicts between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois states is inevitable. This means that the ruling class, the proletariat, if only it wants to and will rule, must prove this also by its military organization."<sup>30</sup>

This perspective was amended in an important respect by Khrushchev in his report to the Twentieth Party Congress:

As long as imperialism exists, the economic base giving rise to wars will also remain. That is why we must display the greatest vigilance. As long as capitalism survives in the world, reactionary forces, representing the interests of the capitalist monopolies, will continue their drive toward military gambles and

aggression and may try to unleash war. But war is not a fatalistic inevitability. Today there are mighty social and political forces possessing formidable means to prevent the imperialists from unleashing war, and, if they try to start it, to give a smashing rebuff to the aggressors and frustrate their adventurist plans. For this it is necessary for all antiwar forces to be vigilant and mobilized; they must act as a united front and not relax their efforts in the struggle for peace. The more actively the peoples defend peace, the greater the guarantee that there will be no war.<sup>31</sup>

The new formulation that "war is not fatalistically inevitable" laid the groundwork for a reaffirmation of the theory of peaceful coexistence. But peaceful coexistence as proclaimed by Khrushchev did not imply a static acceptance of the existing correlation of forces between the camps of Communism and capitalism or a balance of power that was forever frozen. As he stated in his interview with William Randolph Hearst, Jr., in 1957, "Society develops in accordance with its laws, and now the era has come when capitalism must make way for socialism as a higher social system than capitalism."<sup>32</sup> Nor apparently did he envisage that these changes would take place everywhere peacefully. "Of course," he noted in his report to the Twentieth Congress, "in those countries where capitalism is still strong, where it possesses a tremendous military and police machine, serious resistance by reactionary forces is inevitable. The transition to socialism in these countries will take place amid sharp revolutionary class struggle."<sup>33</sup> While renouncing any intention of initiating an aggressive war, he has also promised full Soviet support to "colonial peoples" engaged in so-called wars of national liberation. Speaking on January 6, 1961, to the Party organizations of the Higher Party School, the Academy of Social Sciences, and the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, he proclaimed: "What attitudes do Marxists have toward such uprisings? The most favorable . . . Communists fully and unreservedly support such just wars and march in the van of the peoples fighting wars of liberation."<sup>34</sup> And in the same speech he continued: "The struggle against imperialism can be successful only if the aggressive actions of imperialism are firmly resisted. Verbal denunciations will not restrain the imperialist adventurers. There is only one way to curb imperialism — by tirelessly strengthening the economic, political, and military might of the socialist states, by rallying and strengthening the world revolutionary movement in every way and by mobilizing the broad masses for the struggle to ward off the danger of war."<sup>35</sup>

Although the strategy and tactics employed by Khrushchev's Presidium differ in many important respects from those employed by its Stalinist predecessor, their goals and objectives bear many resemblances. The basic task which Khrushchev and his associates have posed for their people was summed up long ago by Stalin as that of overtaking and sur-

passing the most developed capitalist countries in a historically brief period — in other words, becoming the most powerful industrial nation in the world as soon as possible. Like Stalin before them, they remain dedicated to the notion that they are engaged in a desperate race with the West for industrial and military superiority, and that the race must be won even at the cost of sacrifices on the part of their own people. They proclaim their faith in the invincibility of the Communist cause and reiterate familiar Marxist-Leninist tenets on “the progressive disintegration of the world capitalist system” and “the irresistible advance of all mankind toward Communism.” To be sure, they declare that war between the camps of capitalism and Communism is no longer fatalistically inevitable, though such hopes of peace as they hold out are posited on the assumption that the “capitalist” enemy will cooperate in his own destruction by peacefully fading from the scene. Their devotion to Communism as the wave of the future remains a leading article of faith.

But Communist dreams of world power are not based on economic and military force alone. They profess to believe that they are building a form of social order which is superior to that of the West and which will exercise an increasingly magnetic attraction for people everywhere. They offer a formula for rapid economic growth which is calculated to have special appeal to restive elements in the underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. And believing as they do that the capitalist system is doomed by history and condemned to chronic unemployment and exploitation of the working classes, they expect over time to surpass the mass living standards of even the most advanced Western countries. As Khrushchev put it in his interview with Hearst, “In challenging the United States to compete in producing more meat, butter, clothing, and footwear, to build more good housing, to manufacture more television and radio sets, vacuum cleaners and other goods and articles necessary to man, the Soviet people are confident of victory . . . This competition will show which system is better.”<sup>36</sup> But even Khrushchev appears prepared to concede that this is very much the “music of the future.” Speaking to the Supreme Soviet on the fortieth anniversary of the revolution, he pointed out that a cutback in military expenditures would make possible a more rapid development of the living standards of the people, but, he continued, “regrettably, the hostile policy and actions of the ruling groups of imperialist states do not allow us to do this.”<sup>37</sup>

The Communist leadership also confronts the problem of promoting its dynamic goals in a world in which thermonuclear destruction is an ever-present danger. Despite Khrushchev’s often-reiterated assertion that in such a war the “capitalist system would perish” and “the socialist system would win,” he has also recognized that war “would bring in its wake tremendous disaster to all mankind,”<sup>38</sup> and he has called for its

avoidance. Faced with the hazards of total war, the Kremlin searches for alternative means to advance its objectives. It attempts to translate missile power into political and diplomatic advantages. It seeks to lull the fears of its potential antagonists by proclaiming itself the exponent of peaceful coexistence. It counts on exploiting divisions and rivalries within the anti-Communist camp. It seeks to project its influence among the new nations of Asia and Africa by identifying itself with their national aspirations and anticolonial feelings as well as by a challenging program of trade, aid, and technical assistance. It attempts to create a so-called zone of peace, great neutralized areas in Asia, Africa, and Europe, which will be immune to Western influence and open up future opportunities for Communist penetration and subversion. It utilizes its Communist and fellow-traveler outposts throughout the world to win sympathy and support for Soviet foreign policy. It holds itself ready to promote "liberation wars" in vulnerable areas by supporting the efforts of local Communists to stir up unrest and bid for power.

Whether these tactics will be effective remains to be seen. If they are not successful, they will undoubtedly be modified. The Communist faith in ultimate victory makes room for periods of retreat as well as advance, for the ebb and flow of the revolutionary tide, for oscillating phases of relative quiescence and strong offensive. Whenever the Kremlin faces opponents whose power is appraised as appreciably greater than that of the Soviet bloc, a period of defensive consolidation is indicated. Whether the pause will be prolonged or become the springboard for a new outburst of Soviet expansion will depend on developments during the interval. If the Kremlin succeeds in attaining a predominant power position, it can be expected to attempt to translate its strength into new gains. Only if its relative position becomes weaker over the years and the dynamic momentum of its forward drive is decisively checked, will it become possible to envisage a future in which the Soviet leadership gradually loses its evangelical fervor and sense of imperial destiny and resigns itself to function within a framework of limited objectives and circumscribed ends.



*PART THREE*  
*Instruments of Rule*

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## *Chapter 11*

# *Constitutional Myths and Political Realities*

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In Western eyes, constitutions exist to impose limits on the governments which they create. Whether embodied in formal documents or in customary usage, they attempt to confine each branch of government to its prescribed role, to safeguard citizens against abuse of power by officialdom, and to enforce the continuing responsibility of the governing authorities to the electorate. In more positive terms, they seek to liberate political energies by creating a forum in which competing political forces find free expression, in which the government of the day is subject to a constant flow of criticism from its opponents, and in which changes of government and shifts in public policy may be achieved by registering the shifting preferences of the voting constituency. Where constitutionalism is incorporated in the living texture of society, it generates respect for the dignity of the individual. Men walk in freedom and dare to dissent from the views of their rulers.

This conception of constitutionalism is alien to the Soviet Union. Its ruling party is self-perpetuating, and it cannot be dislodged save by revolution. Its powers are all-embracing and without limit. So-called "constitutional" arrangements derive such force as they possess from the regime's sanction; the whole apparatus of government and administration is subject to its dictates. The leadership enforces a standard of orthodoxy from which there can be no dissent. Opposition is outlawed and invested with the stamp of treason. Citizens have duties and obligations; such rights as they exercise depend on the precarious beneficence of the ruling group. Freedom is equated with obedience. Individual values must conform to the system of values prescribed by the top leader-

ship. Men seek fulfillment in serving a power which they dare not defy.

From the point of view of the Soviet rulers, the constitutional documents of the USSR and the union republics perform several useful functions. In the first place, they make the formal governmental structure explicit. No dictatorship can escape the problem of devising a system of central and local authorities which will be responsive to its will. By incorporating these arrangements in pseudo-constitutional form, the ruling group gives them an air of legitimacy and stability which no series of administrative ukases can ever communicate. In the second place, the constitutions play an important propaganda role both at home and abroad. The emphasis in the constitutions on mass mobilization of the electorate and mass participation in the proceedings of the Soviets is designed to evoke an illusion of monolithic support for the dictatorship. The manipulated unanimity of "plebiscitary democracy" is intended to demonstrate that opposition to the regime has ceased to exist and that the ruling group is the living incarnation of its people's aspirations. From this platform the regime's spokesmen go on to claim that their constitution is the most democratic in the world, that Western constitutions serve as mere camouflage for the dictatorship of monopoly capital, and that only the Soviet constitution guarantees the advancement of mass welfare. The utilization of the constitution as an instrument of propaganda is not limited to domestic audiences. The Constitution of the USSR has been carefully drafted to leave the impression that ultimate power resides in the hands of the toilers rather than in a narrow ruling clique and to implant a vision of an idyllic society in which all conflicts have been resolved and all problems can be solved. It seeks to rally support for the Soviet cause in non-Soviet lands by appealing to the dissatisfied, the frustrated, and the gullible whose perceptions of the inadequacies of the societies in which they live can readily be transformed into an idealization of the virtues of a social system which they have not experienced.

#### *The Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly*

The early history of Soviet constitutional development is a reminder that Bolshevism has never been greatly concerned with constitutional niceties. When the Bolsheviks seized power on November 7, 1917, one of their first acts was to utilize the All-Russian Congress of Soviets to decree the establishment of "a temporary worker and peasant government" to "bear the name of the Council of People's Commissars" and to rule "until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly."<sup>1</sup> In the days before the seizure of power, the Bolsheviks had launched bitter attacks against the Kerensky government for its delay in calling a constituent assembly. As a result of pressure from the Bolsheviks and other parties, the Kerensky government fixed November 25, 1917, as the day for holding

elections to the assembly. Once the Bolsheviks were in power, they faced the question of whether elections should be held and, if held, whether the Constituent Assembly should be permitted to assemble and complete its work. The Bolsheviks found themselves in a curious dilemma. They had attacked the Provisional Government so sharply for its dilatory tactics that it did not appear politically expedient to cancel or even delay the elections. They had, however, no intention of depositing their newly won power in a hostile Constituent Assembly. Lenin advocated postponement of the elections but, after a very warm intra-Party discussion, other counsel prevailed. The decision to proceed with the elections was approved, recognizing, as one Bolshevik put it, that if the Constituent Assembly turned out to be refractory, "we may have to dissolve it with bayonets."

The elections were held in an atmosphere of relative freedom. The Bolsheviks received approximately 25 per cent of the total vote. Sixty-two per cent went to the moderate socialists of various hues, with the Socialist Revolutionaries receiving a predominant majority. The remaining 13 per cent was distributed among the Kadets and other middle-class and conservative parties.<sup>2</sup> The Bolshevik vote was concentrated largely in Moscow, Petrograd, and other industrial centers. The big SR vote was rolled up in the rural districts where the Bolsheviks had yet to penetrate and consolidate their authority.

On January 18, 1918, the first and only meeting of the Constituent Assembly took place at the Tauride Palace in Petrograd. The palace was heavily guarded and surrounded by trustworthy Bolshevik sailors and Red Guards. The Bolshevik bloc failed to gain control of the proceedings. With the aid of their allies, the Left SR's, the Bolsheviks were able to muster only 136 votes, while the Right SR's commanded 237 votes on the crucial motion to make their program the order of the day.<sup>3</sup> The Bolsheviks and Left SR's then withdrew from the assembly, leaving the rest of the delegates to continue their talk until far into the night. At five in the morning, a sailor who headed the guard of the palace approached Chernov, the chairman of the assembly, and requested the delegates to leave the hall "because the guard is tired."<sup>4</sup> The delegates dispersed, presumably to meet again the next day. The next session was never held.

On January 19, 1918, the Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, which was dominated by the Bolsheviks, issued a decree dissolving the Constituent Assembly on the ground that it served as a cover for "the bourgeois counter-revolution in its efforts to crush the power of the Soviets."<sup>5</sup> The delegates who sought to reassemble on the nineteenth were not allowed to enter the palace. This marked the end of the first post-1917 experiment in constitution making.

On January 23, 1918, the Third Congress of Soviets, which was con-

trolled by the Bolsheviks and Left SR's, met to endorse the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, Sverdlov, the Bolshevik chairman of the congress, declared,

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly must be counterbalanced by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets — the sole sovereign organ which represents truly the interests of the workers and peasants . . .

The Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars have definitely taken the stand for a dictatorship of the toiling elements . . . We are of the opinion that during the period of socialist construction there should be a dictatorship . . . to insure the victory of socialism.<sup>6</sup>

The logic of this position led inexorably toward the consolidation of a one-party dictatorship. Having overthrown both the Provisional Government and the Constituent Assembly and having established complete control of the Congress of Soviets and the machinery of government, the Bolsheviks faced the problem of giving these profound changes some form of pseudo-constitutional expression. The outline of the new "constitutional" order soon began to take shape. The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was followed by formal assumption of supreme governing authority by the Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets. At the closing session of the congress on January 31, the assembled delegates unanimously approved a proposal to abandon the designation of "Provisional Workers' and Peasants' Government" and to refer to the supreme power henceforth as the "Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Russian Soviet Republic."<sup>7</sup>

#### *The Constitution of 1918*

On January 28, 1918, the Congress of Soviets initiated action to embody these changes in constitutional form. By resolution, the Russian Socialist Soviet Republic was declared to be "a federation of Soviet republics founded on the principle of a free union of the peoples of Russia." Its supreme organ was defined as the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. The Congress of Soviets was to choose a Central Executive Committee which was to be vested with supreme power between sessions of the Congress of Soviets. The Council of People's Commissars was to be "elected or dismissed in whole or in part" by either the Congress of Soviets or the Central Executive Committee. "All local matters" were to be settled exclusively by the local soviets, but higher soviets reserved the right "to regulate affairs between the local soviets and to settle differences that may arise between them."<sup>8</sup>

The Central Executive Committee was charged with the task of drafting a constitution in accordance with these principles for submission to the next Congress of Soviets. On April 1, 1918, it designated a committee

of fifteen, headed by Sverdlov and including two Left SR's and one Maximalist, to prepare the final document.<sup>9</sup> The presence of the non-Bolsheviks on the committee and the relative looseness of Party discipline in this period assured a wide airing of views, and the debates revealed substantial differences of outlook. The basic conflicts were between those who pressed for a strengthening of central power and others who wished to safeguard the autonomy of the local soviets; between some who favored a concentration of legislative and executive powers in the supreme organs of government and others who sought their separation and delimitation; between some who urged a syndicalist solution based on autonomous trade-union federations and those who rejected syndicalism in favor of political centralization; between those who supported a form of federalism built on nationality-territorial divisions and others who advocated the establishment of federal republics organized around economic-territorial interests; and between some who pressed for equal representation of the peasantry and industrial workers and those who sought to safeguard the hegemony of the industrial proletariat by guaranteeing it a preferred electoral position. Under the influence of Sverdlov and Stalin, who played a major role in the deliberations of the committee, the luxuriant debate was brought under control, and the basic lines of Bolshevik policy were impressed on the constitutional draft. They involved subordinating the local soviets to centralized authority, safeguarding the concentration of legislative and executive power in the supreme governmental organs, repudiating the syndicalist deviation, organizing the federal republic on nationality-territorial lines, and recognizing the industrial working class as the principal supporting pillar of the regime.

The Constitution of the Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic (RSFSR) as finally approved by the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets on July 10, 1918, consisted of two parts. The first, the Declaration of the Rights of Toiling and Exploited People, stated the policies of the new regime and ratified specific actions which it had taken. The remaining chapters elaborated the general principles of the new constitution and spelled out the forms of the new governmental structure. The primary objective, in Steklov's words, was to establish "a dictatorship of the proletariat, a powerful centralized government."<sup>10</sup> Members of the so-called exploiting classes — businessmen, monks and priests of all denominations, police agents of the old regime, and other similar categories — were disfranchised and denied the right to hold public office. All central and local authority was vested in the laboring masses and their plenipotentiary representatives in the soviets.

The Bill of Rights was restated in class terms. Freedom of speech, of press, of association, of assembly, and of access to education was to be reserved to the working class. Liberty of conscience was guaranteed "for

the workers" by separating church from state and school from church; freedom of religious and antireligious propaganda was to be assured to every citizen. Discrimination against national minorities was outlawed; "Soviets of regions with special usages and national characteristics" were to be permitted to unite in "autonomous" regional unions which would enter the RSFSR on a federal basis. The constitution specified duties as well as privileges. Universal military service was established, and "the honor of bearing arms in defense of the revolution" was reserved for the working class. The duty to work was proclaimed; "he who does not work," the constitution stated, "shall not eat."

The structure of government outlined by the constitution represented essentially a codification of institutions which had already emerged. Supreme authority was vested in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets. This congress was to be composed of representatives of urban soviets on the basis of one deputy per 25,000 *voters* and representatives of provincial congresses of soviets on the basis of one deputy for every 125,000 *inhabitants*. The ratio in favor of urban workers and the system of indirect elections for rural deputies were designed to neutralize the numerical preponderance of the peasantry and to prevent it from swamping the Soviet machinery.

In the intervals between sessions of the All-Russian Congress, supreme power was deposited in a Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) consisting of not more than two hundred members chosen by the congress. VTsIK was authorized to appoint a Council of People's Commissars to direct the various branches of government and administration. Each of the eighteen commissariats was to be headed by a people's commissar and a collegium attached to the commissariat. The right to make decisions was reserved to the people's commissar; in the event that the collegium disagreed, it could appeal to the Council of People's Commissars or to the presidium of the VTsIK. The competence of the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the VTsIK was all-embracing. Their enumerated powers were supplemented by a provision that they could "decide on any other matter which they deem within their jurisdiction."

Below the level of the All-Russian central institutions, the constitution provided for a hierarchical arrangement of local soviets which extended downward from the regional (*oblast*) level to the provincial (*guberniya*), county (*uyezd*), rural district (*volost*), and village soviets. The larger urban soviets were represented directly in the oblast or guberniya congress of soviets; the urban soviets of towns of less than ten thousand population sent their delegates to the county soviets. Each level of local government down to the rural district had its own congress of soviets and its own executive committee. Town and village soviets also designated their own executive committees.

The responsibilities of local authorities were stated with intentional vagueness. While they were required to adopt "all appropriate measures for developing the cultural and economic life of their territory" and to solve "all questions of purely local importance," they were also subject to the control of superior organs in the Soviet hierarchy and were required to execute "all instructions issued by the appropriate higher organs of Soviet authority." Since the authority of the supreme Soviet organs was subject to their own determination, the centralist thrust of the constitution was patent. The system of local soviets was visualized essentially as machinery of local administration. In the first turbulent phase of the revolution, the slogan "All Power to the Local Soviets" had infected elements in the Party itself. The Constitution sought to tame these dispersive and autonomous tendencies. Its budgetary provisions made this clear. A national budget was authorized, and the authority to distribute revenue between central and local authorities was reserved to the All-Russian Congress of Soviets and the VTsIK. Although local soviets were authorized to impose taxes for "purely local needs," their budgetary estimates had to be approved by higher Soviet authorities, and the estimates of all town, provincial, and regional soviets had to be ratified by the VTsIK and the Council of People's Commissars. In this context, the reference to the new Soviet constitution as "federal" appears to be largely verbal jugglery. All of its important operative provisions fit the pattern of a highly centralized unitary state.

In presenting the constitution to the Fifth All-Russian Congress of Soviets for ratification, Steklov described it as "not a finished product."<sup>11</sup> The most glaring example of its incompleteness was its failure to contain a single reference to the Party of the Bolsheviks, the chief architect of the constitution and the real source of authority in the Soviet state. The 1918 constitution resembled a play with its most important character missing or at least lurking in the wings. Behind the facade of the soviets and the toiling masses was the Party caucus, arrogating to itself the right both to determine the composition of the soviets and to speak as the sole voice of the masses. While other socialist parties still maintained a precarious existence during this period, the Bolshevik monopoly of legality was rapidly being consolidated, and its control of the formal machinery of government was already far advanced.

#### *The Struggle to Reclaim the Tsarist Patrimony*

The circumstances of Civil War and Allied intervention contributed to the constitution's tentative and transitional character. The writ of Bolshevik authority was largely confined to the Great Russian interior; the task of reclaiming the Tsarist patrimony had still to be achieved. The new Bolshevik regime was engaged in a desperate struggle for survival.

Faced with insurrection and counterrevolution on a whole circle of fluid fronts, the limits of its effective authority shifted with the changing fortunes of war and the strength which its opponents could muster. Confronted with opposing force, the Bolsheviks imposed their rule when the means were available and granted independence when no alternative solution was feasible. After the Bolsheviks had recognized the independence of Finland on December 31, 1917, Soviet military forces combined with Finnish Red Guards to capture Helsinki and establish a Finnish Socialist Workers' Government on January 28, 1918. A treaty of friendship was concluded by the new Soviet regime with that government on March 1, 1918, but the attempt to seize power encountered unanticipated resistance. The Bolsheviks were driven out, and the independence of Finland was finally confirmed by a peace treaty in 1920.

The experience in the Baltic states was broadly parallel. At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, Lithuania was under German occupation. Soviet regimes were established in Latvia and Estonia but were dissolved by the advancing German armies. After the German collapse in November 1918, anti-Soviet national governments emerged, but Soviet armies quickly rushed in to fill the vacuum created by the German retreat and proclaimed Soviet republics in all the Baltic states which were immediately recognized by the RSFSR. As with Finland, the fate of the Baltic states was decided on the battlefield. Local military forces enjoying British and Allied aid succeeded in driving the Soviet armies beyond the frontier, and in 1920 treaties were concluded recognizing the independence of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania.<sup>12</sup>

In Belorussia and the Ukraine, the Bolshevik forces succeeded in establishing and consolidating their ascendancy. Toward the end of December 1917, the anti-Bolshevik Belorussian Rada was overthrown by the Bolsheviks and replaced by a Soviet government. This government in turn was swept away in February 1918 by the advancing German armies which installed a Belorussian Rada of their own. After the armistice in November 1918, Soviet troops occupied Belorussia, expelled the Rada, and proclaimed a provisional Belorussian Socialist Soviet Republic on January 1, 1919. The new Belorussian SSR was a purely Bolshevik creation. It was established on the authority of the Sixth Northwestern Regional Conference of the Russian Communist Party which, acting on the instructions of the Party Central Committee, quickly transformed itself into the First Congress of the Communist Party of Belorussia and voted to establish the Belorussian SSR.

Developments in the Ukraine were more complicated. The Central Rada was originally established in the spring of 1917 as a broadly representative alignment of Ukrainian political groups supporting autonomy within a federated republic of Russian states. Its representative character

was certified by Stalin himself when he referred to the Rada as "organized on the principle of a sharing of power between the bourgeoisie, on the one side, and the proletariat and the peasantry, on the other."<sup>13</sup> Since the Rada was not a Soviet organ and resisted Bolshevik domination, the Bolshevik leaders quickly decided that its authority had to be undermined. Building on the soviets which had sporadically erupted in various parts of the Ukraine in the course of 1917, the Bolsheviks sought to weld them together into a political force capable of displacing the Rada as the governing power in the Ukraine. On December 6, 1917, Stalin dispatched the following instruction to the Kiev Soviet: "The power in the country, as in other parts of the state, must belong to the workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies . . . Convene at once the regional congress of workers', soldiers', and peasants' deputies of the Ukraine . . . On the issue of Soviet power . . . there can be no concessions whatever."<sup>14</sup> On December 24, 1917, a so-called All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, dominated by the Bolsheviks, assembled at Kharkov and announced that it had assumed full power in the Ukraine. Since actual authority still reposed in the Rada, which refused to yield to the soviets, the Bolsheviks determined to establish a Soviet regime by force. With the Red Army advancing on Kiev, the Rada on January 22, 1918, proclaimed the independence of the Ukraine. On February 8, 1918, the Soviet army occupied Kiev and installed its own Soviet government there.

The Rada then appealed for help to the Germans, who quickly swept out the new Ukrainian Soviet government and, dismissing the Rada itself, soon installed their own puppet government in the form of the *hetman* Skoropadsky. After the German military collapse, elements of the old Rada proclaimed a Ukrainian Directorate in Kiev, while Soviet armies once more advanced into the Ukraine and occupied Kharkov and Kiev. On March 5, 1919, the Third All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets assembled in Kharkov and approved a constitution for the Ukrainian SSR which was substantially a replica of the constitution of the RSFSR.

During the next two years the Ukraine became a no-man's land through which rival armies marched and countermarched, and Reds, Whites, and peasant Greens were locked in combat of indescribable confusion. In July 1919 Denikin's White armies seized Kiev and advanced northward. In December, after Denikin had been defeated, the Red armies recaptured Kiev. The next year, Petlura, the "dictator" of the Directorate, joined with the Poles in a fresh invasion of the Ukraine and occupied Kiev in May-June 1920. With the repulse of the Polish invasion, a peace of sorts settled on the Ukraine, though partisan activity against the Soviet regime continued through much of the next year. By mid-1921 Soviet power in the Ukraine was more or less firmly established.

Developments in the Transcaucasus followed a somewhat analogous

pattern. At the time of the October Revolution, the Bolsheviks constituted a weak force in the Transcaucasian provinces. Their chief stronghold was Baku, where, for a period, they established a local Bolshevik government; elsewhere, they formed small minority groups which could not aspire to power without outside aid. The leading party in Georgia was the Menshevik, in Armenia the Dashnak, in Azerbaijan the Musawat or Equality Party. All were anti-Bolshevik. After an abortive effort to establish a Transcaucasian Federal Republic, the three constituent units, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, each proclaimed its independence and sought to go separate ways. But the viability of the new republics was short-lived. In mid-1918 Turkish forces occupied the greater part of Armenia and Azerbaijan, and a German garrison, on the invitation of the Georgians, took over Georgia to prevent its falling into Turkish hands. The retreat of the German and Turkish armies after the armistice left a vacuum which the British temporarily filled. With the withdrawal of the British forces toward the end of 1919, the independent Transcaucasian republics were left face to face with Soviet Russian power.

The Bolshevik leadership wasted no time in pouncing on the helpless victims. The first casualty was Azerbaijan. In the spring of 1920, a Communist rising in Baku challenged the power of the Azerbaijan government. The Military Revolutionary Committee in charge of the rising addressed an urgent appeal to Lenin: "Being unable to repulse the attacks of the united bands of the internal and foreign counterrevolution by our own forces, the Military Revolutionary Committee offers the government of the Russian Soviet Republic a fraternal alliance for the common struggle against world imperialism. We request . . . aid."<sup>15</sup> Aid was quickly forthcoming. The Red Army overran Azerbaijan and established the Azerbaijan Socialist Soviet Republic.

Armenia came next. In late November of 1920 another Communist rising was contrived on the border between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and again the Military Revolutionary Committee in charge invoked the aid of the "heroic" Red Army. On December 2, 1920, the new Armenian Soviet Republic was recognized by Moscow; it was badly shaken by a revolt in mid-February 1921, in the course of which the anti-Bolshevik rebels seized Erivan and a number of principal towns, but the Red Army again came to the rescue and saved the new Soviet regime.

It was now Georgia's turn. The seizure of Georgia was made awkward by the terms of the peace treaty which the Soviet government had concluded with Georgia on May 7, 1920, in a period when the Polish war was going badly. Article I of the treaty stipulated that "Russia recognizes unconditionally the existence and independence of the Georgian state, and voluntarily renounces all sovereign rights which belonged to Russia

with respect to the Georgian people and territory." In Article II, Russia agreed "to refrain from any kind of interference in the internal affairs of Georgia."<sup>16</sup> Despite the treaty, an armed Communist insurrection broke out in February 1921. Again Soviet aid was requested, and on February 21, 1921, Soviet forces crossed the frontier, seized Tiflis four days later, and immediately proclaimed the Georgian Socialist Soviet Republic.

The next step in the consolidation of Communist power in the area was the establishment in 1922 of the Transcaucasian Federated Socialist Republic. This measure met strong resistance from a group of Georgian Communists led by Budu Mdivani, as well as scattered resistance in Armenia and Azerbaijan. Mdivani and his followers were dismissed from their Party posts and purged because, as Stalin put it, "they not only disobeyed, but struggled against the decision of the Party."<sup>17</sup> Thus local patriotism, even when wrapped in a Party guise, was compelled to bow to the centralizing tendencies of the Party leadership.

The extension of Soviet power to other areas was largely determined by Bolshevik military success during the Civil War period. As the Allies withdrew their military contingents and the White armies were dispersed and defeated, the Bolsheviks encountered little difficulty in disposing of such organized centers of local resistance as remained. The devices used to incorporate the newly regained territory varied with the local situations. In the course of 1920, the VTsIK issued decrees creating the Bashkir, Tatar, and Kazakh Autonomous SSR's as well as the Chuvash and Kalmyk Autonomous Regions. All were included within the framework of the RSFSR. As Soviet authority penetrated the North Caucasus, two new autonomous SSR's were established in January 1921 as part of the RSFSR—Daghestan and the Republic of the Mountaineers. The latter was subsequently subdivided into several autonomous regions. In October 1921, after the subjugation of the turbulent Tatars in the Crimea, that area was constituted the Crimean Autonomous SSR within the RSFSR.

The establishment of Soviet ascendancy in Central Asia had to await the arrival of Red Army contingents in 1920. With their aid, the independent principality of Khiva was dissolved and replaced by the Soviet Republic of Khorezm which soon signed a treaty yielding military and political control to the RSFSR. Meanwhile, the Bolshevik forces also invaded Bokhara, drove out the emir, proclaimed a Soviet Bokhara, and transferred effective power to an embryonic and none too reliable Bokharan Communist Party led by Faizulla Khodjayev. Soviet Bokhara followed the example of Soviet Khorezm and subordinated its military and economic policy to that of the RSFSR by a treaty of alliance signed on March 4, 1921, which nominally guaranteed the complete "independence" of the new republic. The new structure of government in Soviet

Central Asia was completed in April 1921, when a decree of the VTsIK created an autonomous Turkestan SSR, with headquarters at Tashkent, as a unit of the RSFSR.<sup>18</sup> Despite the presence of the Red Army, disorders continued and erupted in the form of a serious anti-Soviet rebellion led by Enver Pasha and the Basmachi. After considerable fighting, the revolt was quashed, and on August 4, 1922, Enver himself was killed. By the fall of 1922 Soviet authority was substantially established in most of the Central Asian region, though minor missions of Red Army pacification continued to be necessary over the next years.

The projection of Soviet power into Siberia faced a series of obstacles in the form of the Czech legions, local authorities of anti-Bolshevik complexion, the Kolchak armies, the forces of Semenov, the ataman of the Siberian Cossacks, and the Japanese military forces entrenched in the Maritime Province. The withdrawal of the Czech legions and the disintegration of the Kolchak armies toward the end of 1919 opened the way for the assertion of Bolshevik power in western Siberia. Meanwhile, the Far Eastern Republic, a so-called buffer state between the Japanese and Soviet armies, established its authority in the Trans-Baikal territory of eastern Siberia. Although ostensibly independent and recognized as such by the Soviet government on May 14, 1920, the Far Eastern Republic was soon transformed into a puppet regime of the Bolsheviks and was eventually annexed to the RSFSR by a VTsIK decree of November 15, 1922. The Japanese and their henchman Semenov remained in control in Vladivostok and the Maritime Province until the end of October 1922, when the Japanese troops were withdrawn, and the Soviet occupation of Siberia was completed.

In reclaiming the Tsarist patrimony, the Bolsheviks depended heavily on the strength of the Red Army. But force was not their only weapon. The presence of foreign interventionist armies on Russian soil aroused patriotic sentiments which the Bolsheviks were able to use for their own purposes. The reactionary character of the policies espoused by the White generals antagonized many who bore no love for the Bolsheviks but reluctantly embraced their cause because the alternative of a restorationist regime appeared even more unpalatable. To some of the poorer peasants and to the submerged groups among the national minorities, the Bolsheviks frequently appeared in the guise of liberators. The promises that they made held out a hope of escape from old oppressions which the White generals symbolized.

#### *Soviet Nationality Policy*

Soviet nationality policy was designed to fuse the scattered fragments of the empire which the Red Army was welding together. The Russian Constitution of 1918 proclaimed "the equality of all citizens,

regardless of race or nationality" and declared it "contrary to the fundamental laws of the Republic . . . to repress national minorities, or to limit their rights in any way." Regions "with distinctive customs and national characteristics" were to be permitted to unite into "autonomous regional unions" which could enter the RSFSR "on a federal basis." But autonomy as defined by Stalin, the Commissar of Nationalities, was a divisive as well as a unifying concept. Stalin stated the official view in May 1918 with unvarnished clarity: "Autonomy is a form. The whole question is what class content is contained in that form. The Soviet Power is not against autonomy — it is for autonomy, but only for an autonomy where all power rests in the hands of workers and peasants, where the bourgeoisie of all nationalities are not only deprived of power, but also of participation in the elections of the governing organs."<sup>19</sup> In creating autonomous soviet socialist republics or regions within the RSFSR, the obligation was to dislodge the national bourgeoisie from power and to deposit authority in the hands of the representatives of the toiling masses, the Communist Party itself. Any departure from this principle could be justified only on grounds of expediency. In Central Asia, for example, substantial concessions were made to local merchants and clergy in the early days of Soviet rule in order to facilitate the acceptance of Soviet power; as Communist control was consolidated, the concessions were abrogated.<sup>20</sup>

At the same time, as the Bolsheviks entrenched themselves in power and faced the complex problem of governing the diverse nationalities of the new Soviet empire, divided counsel was manifest. At one extreme were the abstract internationalists among the Bolsheviks for whom any manifestation of national consciousness was outdated. This group took as its point of departure Lenin's maxim of 1913, "The proletariat not only does not undertake to fight for the national development of every nation, but . . . warns the masses against such illusions."<sup>21</sup> The supporters of this point of view were sometimes Great Russians but also frequently russified non-Russians who had fallen under the spell of the Luxemburg "heresy" and who considered any efforts to stimulate national feeling among the backward peoples as dangerous and reactionary. Since they opposed any concessions to the demands of the national minorities for autonomy, their practical program gave unwitting support to Great Russian chauvinism and coincided with the real interests of the state bureaucracy, which was still in large part a carry-over from the old regime and predominantly Great Russian in composition. The assumption of Great Russian superiority penetrated the highest Party circles. Even Zinoviev, speaking before the Petrograd Soviet on September 17, 1920, gave vent to a Soviet version of the "white man's burden" when he declared, "We cannot do without the petroleum of Azerbaijan or the

cotton of Turkestan. We take these products which are necessary for us, not as the former exploiters, but as older brothers bearing the torch of civilization.”<sup>22</sup> Lenin had in mind such deeply ingrained attitudes when he declared at the Eighth Party Congress in 1919, “Scratch many a Communist and you will find a Great Russian chauvinist.”<sup>23</sup>

At the other extreme were the Communists of the national republics, such as Skrypnik in the Ukraine and Mdivani in Georgia, who not only sought to minister to the cultural and economic aspirations of the minority nationalities but also pressed for real autonomy at the periphery. Carried to the extreme, these views yielded the heresy of local nationalism. It was perhaps no mere coincidence that Mdivani was soon to be purged and Skrypnik was to end his days by suicide.

The dominant view as embodied in Party resolutions during this period sought to avoid both the extremes of Great Russian chauvinism and excessive concessions to local nationalism.

The task of the Party [a resolution of the Tenth Party Congress stated] is to assist the toiling masses of the non-Great Russian peoples in catching up with Central Russia . . . and to help them:

*a.* To develop and consolidate their own Soviet state system in forms consistent with these people's national way of life;

*b.* To develop and consolidate their own courts, administrative agencies, economic bodies, and government organs, using the native tongue and staffed by local people familiar with the customs and psychological characteristics of the local population;

*c.* To set up a press, schools, theaters, community centers, and cultural and educational institutions generally, using the native tongue;

*d.* To organize and develop a comprehensive system of instruction and schools (with first attention to the Kirghiz, Bashkir, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Tadjiks, Azerbaidjanians, Tatars, and Daghestanians), for the purpose both of general education and vocational and technical training, and conducted in the native tongue, in order more speedily to train indigenous personnel as skilled workers and as Soviet and Party staff members in all spheres of administration, and above all in the sphere of education.<sup>24</sup>

As this resolution made clear, the Party leadership was prepared to encourage the use of the native tongue among the minority nationalities and to exert its influence to raise their educational standards. In doing so, however, its primary purpose was to utilize the native language, culture, and educational system as a vehicle for the sovietization of the minority peoples. In order to win the support of non-Russian nationalities, it was necessary, as Stalin pointed out, that “all Soviet organs in the border territories — the courts, the administration, the economic organs, the organs of direct government (as well as the organs of the Party) be composed, as far as possible, of local people who know the way of life, the manners, customs, and language of the local population.”<sup>25</sup> This

policy of *korenizatsia* (from *koren'* or root) which involved utilizing persons of the native or "rooted" populations, was easier to announce than to apply. Insofar as it was applied, however, it helped strengthen the hold of the new Soviet regime on the minority nationalities.

In fostering the cultural development of the backward minorities, Soviet nationality policy endeavored to draw a sharp distinction between form and content. As Stalin said in an address at the Communist University of the Toilers of the East on May 18, 1925:

How are we to make the building of a national culture, the development of schools and courses in the native tongue, and the training of personnel from among the ranks of local people, compatible with the building of socialism, with the building of a proletarian culture? Is this not an unresolvable contradiction? Of course not! We are building a proletarian culture. That is absolutely true. But it is also true that proletarian culture, which is socialist in content, assumes different forms and modes of expression among the various peoples that have been drawn into the work of socialist construction, depending on differences of language, way of life, and so forth. Proletarian in content and national in form — such is the universal human culture toward which socialism is marching.<sup>26</sup>

As this quotation makes clear, Stalin envisaged a multinational state which remained in essence a Communist monolith. The monopoly of direction from the Communist center was to remain undisturbed.

While the Party leadership was prepared to recognize the necessity of adjusting its mode of government to the specific features of different national cultures, it was not prepared to abandon the principle of centralism on which the Party organization itself was constructed. In the early struggles against the Bund and other national groups which sought to organize the Party on federalist and nationality lines, both Lenin and Stalin had decisively rejected organizational federalism as concealing within itself "the elements of disintegration and separatism."<sup>27</sup> Faced with the responsibilities of power, they continued to insist upon "a single, indivisible proletarian collective body, a single party, for the proletarians of all the nationalities in a given state."<sup>28</sup> As the Bolsheviks expanded their control of the borderlands, nominally separate Communist parties were organized, such as the Communist Party of Bolsheviks of the Ukraine and the Communist Party of Belorussia. But such parties functioned in all essential respects as administrative subunits of the Russian Communist Party. They sent delegates to its congresses and were expected to subordinate themselves to the directives of the Central Committee and other leading bodies of the Russian Party. As Andreyev declared at the Fourteenth Party Congress: "Our Party . . . is a centralized party. All the national Parties which exist among us — the Ukrainian,

Transcaucasian, Central Asian—all exist with the legal right of regional or provincial committees; the Party remains centralized, a unity from top to bottom.”<sup>29</sup> Leaders of the local parties who manifested restiveness under central discipline or who defied the central Party authorities did not remain leaders long. The supreme Party organs brooked no challenge. The national Party groups remained incorporated in the Russian Party until the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1925, when the name of the Party was changed from the Russian Communist Party of Bolsheviks—RKP(b)—to the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks—VKP(b). The change of name marked no substantial change in relationships between center and periphery. It merely registered the response of the Party to the formal creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and represented a semantic adjustment to the new constitutional entity.

As the new Soviet state emerged from the chaos of Civil War and regained a substantial part of the Tsarist patrimony, it faced the problem of devising a unified governmental structure for the reclaimed areas and embodying this settlement in constitutional form. The solutions arrived at in the heat of conflict were essentially improvisations. Some of the reconquered territories were simply incorporated in the RSFSR as autonomous republics or regions. In other cases, as in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Transcaucasus, nominally independent SSR's were established with which the RSFSR concluded treaties of alliance that, in effect, subordinated these republics to the RSFSR. The treaty with the Ukrainian SSR, signed on December 28, 1920, provided essentially for a military and economic union.<sup>30</sup> The Russian and Ukrainian Republics merged their Commissariats of War and Navy, People's Economy, Foreign Trade, Finance, Labor, Transport, and Posts and Telegraphs. This model was followed in Belorussia and the Transcaucasus with only minor variations. The status of the Bokhara and Khorezm Soviet Republics in Central Asia involved a greater degree of autonomy. There were no unified commissariats; instead, the treaties concluded with them provided for a military alliance and a preferred economic position for the RSFSR. The “independence” of Bokhara and Khorezm did not last long. In October 1923 Bokhara was transformed into a socialist state, and in 1924 Khorezm followed. In that year, the Turkestan ASSR was abolished, and Soviet Central Asia was divided into two new union republics, the Uzbek and the Turkmen. Bokhara was absorbed into the Uzbek SSR, and Khorezm was broken up and allotted to the Uzbek republic and the Kazakh ASSR.

#### *The Establishment of the USSR and the Constitution of 1924*

The signal for formal unification of the new Soviet empire was first given in the resolution on the national question which was enacted by the

Tenth Party Congress in 1921. The resolution called for a "union of the several Soviet republics as the only path of salvation from the imperialist yoke and national oppression."<sup>31</sup> At the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, in December 1921, delegates appeared from the ostensibly separate republics of the Ukraine, Belorussia, Azerbaidjan, Georgia, and Armenia, and no objections were registered. Their representatives were included in the VTsIK of the Russian congress, and the decrees of that body were treated as binding in the territories of the allied republics.<sup>32</sup> Meanwhile, the stage was set to have the demand for unification come from the national republics themselves.<sup>33</sup> On December 13, 1922, the first Transcaucasian Congress of Soviets, which had itself only recently been organized over the strenuous objection of Mdivani and other leading Georgian Communists, passed a resolution urging the formation of a Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The same day, the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets enacted a similar resolution, and the next day the Belorussian Congress of Soviets joined the chorus. On December 26 the Tenth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, on a motion by Stalin, added its approval. Four days later the delegates of the four republics, who were in fact already represented in the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, reconstituted themselves as the First Congress of the Soviets of the USSR. In that capacity, they ratified a solemn declaration approving the formation of the USSR and a draft treaty which was to become the basis of the constitution of the new union. The guiding role of the Party was evidenced from the outset. Of the delegates to the First Congress, 94.8 per cent were Party members.

The First Congress selected a new VTsIK or Central Executive Committee, and its presidium designated a commission to draft the final version of the new constitution. Important differences of view among members of the drafting commission soon became evident. A running battle ensued which extended to the Twelfth Party Congress and the Central Committee and was finally resolved only by the Politburo itself. The debate revealed at least three different conceptions of the shape which the new union should possess. At one extreme were the opponents of federalism, who, according to the Twelfth Party Congress resolution on the national question, regarded the union of republics "not as a union of equal state entities with a mandate to guarantee the free development of the national republics, but as a step toward the liquidation of the republics, as a beginning of the organization of the so-called 'one and indivisible' republic."<sup>34</sup> This group opposed the creation of a second chamber in which the nationalities would have separate representation; they sought to weld the Soviet empire into a tightly organized unitary state. At the Twelfth Party Congress, Stalin denounced them as "Great Power chauvinists"; without identifying the culprits, he referred to speeches

which were delivered at the February 1923 plenum of the Central Committee which "had no resemblance to Communism, speeches which had nothing in common with internationalism."<sup>35</sup>

At the other extreme were the Ukrainian Party leaders, Rakovsky and Skrypnik, and representatives of the other minority nationalities, who pressed for a form of union which would guarantee the non-Russian republics a measure of real autonomy. This group favored a second chamber composed of representatives of the four union republics. To prevent the RSFSR from dominating this chamber, Rakovsky proposed that no single republic could have more than two fifths of the total votes. The Ukrainian delegates also suggested that the Union Soviet and the Soviet of Nationalities should each have its own presidium. Loath to give up the perquisites which they had previously enjoyed in the foreign field, they also urged that the Commissariats for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade should be made union-republican rather than all-union or unified commissariats, as the official draft proposed. Stalin, in the course of a speech on June 12, 1923, to a gathering of responsible workers from the national republics and oblasts, made frank reference to the difficulties which the Ukrainians were causing.

I must say that the Politburo is in some disagreement with the Ukrainian comrades . . . It is not true that the question of confederation versus federation is a trivial issue. Was it an accident that the Ukrainian comrades . . . omitted from the Constitution the sentence that the republics "join in one union state"? . . . Was it an accident that the Ukrainian comrades in their counter-proposal proposed not to unite the People's Commissariat for Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs, but to transfer them into the category of directed commissariats? Where would the one union state be if each republic retained its own NKID and NKVT? . . . I perceive from the insistence of several Ukrainian comrades their desire to define the Union as something between a confederation and federation, with the preponderant weight on the side of confederation . . . We are constructing, not a confederation, but a federal republic, one union state, uniting military and foreign affairs, foreign trade, and other matters.<sup>36</sup>

The constitution of the USSR as it was finally approved by the VTsIK on July 6, 1923, and ratified by the second All-Union Congress of Soviets on January 31, 1924, embodied the views of Stalin and the Politburo. Its opening section was an ideological manifesto that described the world as divided into the rival camps of capitalism and socialism, declared the need for a united front of Soviet republics in the face of the capitalist encirclement, and boldly proclaimed the organization of the USSR as "a new decisive step towards the union of workers of all countries in a World Socialist Soviet Republic." Part two of the constitution contained the treaty by which the partners to the union — the Russian, Ukrainian,

Belorussian, and Transcaucasian republics — declared their agreement to unite "in one union state." The powers of the supreme organs of the USSR were outlined in an all-embracing list which included foreign affairs and foreign trade, questions of war and peace, direction of the national economy, fiscal policy, the state budget, control of the armed forces, and other matters of lesser importance.

The jurisdiction of the union republics was stated in residual form; the republics were authorized to exercise such powers as were not vested in the government of the USSR. Since the authority of the central government embraced education, public health, courts of justice, and other matters ordinarily conceived of as of local significance, the initiative of the union republics was confined within relatively narrow limitations. The boundaries of the union republics, however, could not be changed without their consent, and the constitution also solemnly proclaimed that each union republic retained the right "freely" to secede from the union. The real meaning of this right was elucidated by Stalin in an article in *Pravda* on October 10, 1920. "Of course," he commented, "the border regions of Russia, the nations and tribes, which inhabit these regions . . . possess the inalienable right to secede from Russia," but "the demand for secession . . . at the present stage of the revolution [has become] a profoundly counterrevolutionary one."<sup>37</sup>

The constitution established the Congress of Soviets as the supreme organ of authority in the USSR. Following the pattern of the 1918 Russian constitution, its membership consisted of representatives of city and town soviets on the basis of one deputy for each 25,000 voters and of representatives of provincial and district congresses of soviets on the basis of one deputy for every 125,000 inhabitants. The Congress of Soviets elected a Central Executive Committee (VTsIK) composed of two chambers, a Council of the Union, selected on the basis of population, and a Council of Nationalities, made up of five delegates from each union and autonomous republic and one delegate from each autonomous region. The two chambers shared the powers reposing in the VTsIK, which functioned as the supreme authority of the USSR between sessions of the Congress of Soviets. The concurrence of both chambers was required for all decrees and regulations promulgated in the name of the VTsIK. In the intervals between sessions of the VTsIK, its presidium, which included representatives of both chambers, exercised the authority vested in the VTsIK.

The constitution provided for three categories of people's commissars. The first category of all-union commissariats, which existed only in the Sovnarkom or Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, included Foreign Affairs, Military and Naval Affairs, Foreign Trade, Ways of Communication, and Posts and Telegraphs. The second category of union-

republic or unified commissariats existed both in the government of the USSR and the union republics, with the latter responsible for executing the decisions taken at the center. This group included the Supreme Council of National Economy and the Commissariats of Food, Labor, Finance, and Workmen's and Peasants' Inspection. The OGPU or Unified State Political Administration, which was also provided for in the constitution, was attached to the Sovnarkom of the USSR but functioned locally through representatives "attached to the Sovnarkoms of the union republics." The third category of so-called republic commissariats existed only in the republics and had no counterparts in the government of the USSR. These commissariats included Internal Affairs, Justice, Education, Health and Social Welfare. The government of the USSR, however, retained authority to issue basic regulations in all these fields. While these arrangements provided varying degrees of decentralized administration for different types of governmental functions, policy control remained highly centralized. Behind the facade of the federal structure loomed the discipline of a unified Party hierarchy. Neither its monopoly of political power nor even its existence was acknowledged by the constitution.

Unlike the 1918 constitution, the constitution of the USSR made provision for a Supreme Court and a Procurator attached to the Central Executive Committee of the USSR. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court included giving opinions on questions of union legislation to the Supreme Courts of the union republics, examining decisions of the lower courts to discover infractions of union law, rendering decisions on the constitutionality of laws passed by the union republics, and settling disputes among them. The Supreme Court, however, had no power to pass on the constitutionality of union legislation or to declare any act of its organs *ultra vires*. In the event that the Procurator disagreed with any decisions of the Supreme Court, he had the right to protest before the presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee. The Supreme Court was thus strictly subordinate to the VTsIK, which retained supreme judicial as well as legislative and executive power.

The USSR Constitution of 1924, like the Russian constitution before it, radiated a sense of legerdemain and make-believe. It outlined the formal governmental structure of the new union, but the springs of power in the Soviet system were hidden. The dominating role of the Party was concealed behind an elaborate array of pseudo-representative institutions which functioned as transmission belts to register the will of the Party leadership.

This is not to imply that the employment of constitutional forms served no useful purpose for the Soviet ruling group. Dictatorships ordinarily prefer not to reveal themselves in all their stark nakedness. By assuming

a constitutional disguise, they clothe the realities of arbitrary power in the protective garb of tradition and legitimacy. They pay constitutionalism the ultimate compliment of borrowing its facade to conceal the authoritarian character of their governing formula.

Nor were the debates in Party circles which accompanied the drafting of the constitution without significance. They revealed that the Party still mirrored the tensions which accompanied the creation of the union. The efforts of the Ukrainian and other non-Russian Communists to retain a measure of autonomy expressed deep-rooted aspirations which continue to plague the Soviet empire. At the same time, the decision of Stalin and his associates in the Politburo to reject an undisguised unitary solution and to find a place in their constitutional scheme for a Council of Nationalities and a federation of union republics demonstrated political acumen. Though the constitution actually circumscribed national autonomy within narrow bounds, the preservation of the forms of nationality representation was calculated both to placate national feeling and to become a platform for mobilizing support among the submerged nationalities of the East.

The admission of new union republics into the USSR in succeeding years illustrated the continuing value of the device. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan joined the ranks of Soviet Socialist Republics in 1925. Tadzhikistan was elevated to the status of a union republic in 1929. At the same time, new autonomous republics and regions were created to give formal recognition to minority nationality aspirations.

Soviet nationality policy during the twenties and early thirties represented an ingenious endeavor to combine central control with the forms of local autonomy. Particularly during the twenties, a genuine, if not always successful, effort was made to broaden the use of the local language in the national republics and regions, to recruit native personnel into the Party, and to employ them in public administration, sometimes even in posts involving considerable responsibility. At the same time, the central Party authorities were quick to stamp out any display of independence or local chauvinism by the new native leadership. A frank letter from Stalin to Kaganovich and other members of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, written on April 26, 1926, but published in full for the first time in 1948, reveals the real thrust of Soviet nationality policy in this period.<sup>38</sup> Though Stalin declared himself in favor of the gradual Ukrainianization of the Party and governmental apparatus, he made clear that he was opposed to forcible Ukrainianization and particularly opposed to any Ukrainian movement which assumed "the character of a struggle for the alienation of Ukrainian culture and Ukrainian social life from general Soviet culture and social life."<sup>39</sup> He bitterly attacked the Ukrainian Communist novelist Mykola Khvylovych, who had

advanced the slogan "Away from Moscow" as a guide to Ukrainian intellectuals, and he warned that such an "un-Marxist" motto could lead only to "a struggle against 'Moscow' in general, against Russians in general, against Russian culture and its supreme achievement — Leninism."<sup>40</sup> Khvylov's patron, Shumsky, the Ukrainian Commissar of Education, was soon removed from his post. A campaign inaugurated against Ukrainian chauvinism led to the arrest in 1929 of many prominent intellectuals who had opposed the Bolsheviks during the Civil War and who were alleged to hold membership in a conspiratorial Union for the Liberation of the Ukraine (SVU). Skrypnik, Shumsky's successor as Ukrainian Commissar of Education, committed suicide in 1933 when he too came under attack as a Ukrainian chauvinist.

During the late twenties, a concerted effort was also made to eradicate centers of local chauvinism in other national republics. In Belorussia, a large number of officials and intellectuals were arrested in 1929 because of their supposed membership in the National Democratic Party, an underground organization opposed to Communist rule. The purge of "nationalists" extended to Armenia, the Crimea, Turkestan, and other areas and included Party members as well as non-Party intellectuals. The consolidation of Stalin's control over the Party and governmental apparatus was accompanied by increasingly rigorous supervision of the national republics from Moscow.

The industrialization program inaugurated in the late twenties also contributed to reinforce the tendencies toward centralization. The new industrial commissariats which were charged with the administration of the program were created on an all-union or unified basis. Only small-scale local industry remained subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the union republics. By the mid-thirties, Soviet federalism was revealing itself as an increasingly transparent fiction.

#### *The USSR Constitution of 1936*

At this time a new chapter in the constitutional history of the USSR was suddenly unfolded. On February 1, 1935, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party instructed Molotov to appear before the Seventh All-Union Congress of Soviets and to suggest changes in the constitution directed toward

(a) Further democratization of the elective system — in the sense of substituting equal elections for elections not fully equal; direct elections for elections having multiple stages; and secret elections for elections which were open; and (b) making more precise the social-economic bases of the Constitution — in the sense of bringing the Constitution into conformity with the present correlation of class forces in the USSR (the creation of new socialist

industry, the liquidation of the kulaks, the confirmation of socialist property as the basis of Soviet society, etc.).

The Congress of Soviets unanimously approved Molotov's proposal, and its Central Executive Committee designated a Constitutional Commission headed by Stalin to draft the text of the new constitution. Among the members of the commission were Bukharin and Radek who were shortly to discover the real value of the constitutional "safeguards" which they were elaborating.

On June 1, 1936, Stalin submitted a draft of the new constitution to a plenum of the Central Committee of the Party. The plenum approved and ordered the convocation of an Extraordinary All-Union Congress of Soviets to ratify the Constitution. Meanwhile, some unusual steps were taken. On June 12, 1936, the draft of the constitution was published, and the citizenry of the Soviet Union was invited to engage in a nationwide discussion of its contents. Proposals for amendment were invited. In the words of Vyshinsky, "The draft was read with delight and discussed in all the industrial and transport enterprises, in sovkhozes and kolkhozes, and in government offices . . . The Soviet people greeted the appearance of the draft of the new USSR Constitution with enormous enthusiasm and approved it with one accord."<sup>41</sup> It was evident that Stalin was anxious to have the world note that a discussion was proceeding and that the people of the Soviet Union "approved" the work of their leaders. On November 25, 1936, the Extraordinary Eighth All-Union Congress of Soviets assembled, and Stalin appeared personally before it to present a final draft of the constitution which incorporated some of the suggestions which had emerged in the course of the discussion. On December 5, 1936, the final text of the constitution was unanimously approved by the congress.

Stalin's speech before the congress provided at least a partial clue to the motives which inspired the revision of the constitution and the large-scale mass discussion that accompanied it. Stalin began his address by pointing out that a new constitution was necessary in order to bring the fundamental law into conformity with the social and economic changes that had taken place in the Soviet Union since 1924. The developments which he stressed were the socialization of industry under the five-year plans after the mixed economy of the NEP, the collectivization of agriculture, the liquidation of the kulaks, and the emergence of the collective-farm system. As a result of these changes, he claimed, the class structure of the Soviet Union had been transformed. Landlords, kulaks, capitalists, and merchants had been eliminated. There remained only workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia, all joined together in a harmonious pattern of common interest. "The new Constitution . . ." Stalin stated, "pro-

ceeds from the fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes in society; that society consists of two friendly classes, of workers and peasants; that it is these classes, the labouring classes, that are in power."<sup>42</sup> Hence, argued Stalin, it was possible to introduce universal suffrage without any restrictions and without any disfranchised classes. Hence, it was also possible to abolish inequality between workers and peasants, to eliminate indirect elections and the system of weighting the votes of urban workers more heavily than the votes of the rural peasantry. Hence, it became possible to have secret elections because all classes were solid in their loyalty to the regime. He paused briefly to deflate the arguments of critics that the draft constitution changed nothing since it left the monopoly of the Communist Party unimpaired. "I must admit," he declared, "that the draft of the new Constitution . . . preserves unchanged the present leading position of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. . . . In the U.S.S.R. only one party can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously defends the interests of the workers and peasants to the very end." The Party, he argued, was the custodian of the interests of the working masses; it provided "democracy for the working people, *i.e.*, democracy for all . . . That is why I think that the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly democratic Constitution in the world."<sup>43</sup>

The real significance of this exercise in casuistry became evident toward the end of Stalin's speech when he dealt with the value of the new constitution as a weapon of Soviet foreign policy.

The international significance of the new Constitution . . . can hardly be exaggerated.

Today, when the turbid wave of fascism is bespattering the Socialist movement of the working class and besmirching the democratic strivings of the best people in the civilized world, the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will be an indictment against fascism, declaring that Socialism and democracy are invincible. The new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will give moral assistance and real support to all those who are today fighting fascist barbarism.<sup>44</sup>

This was the period of popular fronts when the Soviet Union was seeking to pacify liberal opinion in the so-called capitalist democracies, when it was preaching collective security and trying to organize a system of pacts and alliances against Hitler and his allies. The Soviet Constitution of 1936 and the large-scale discussion which attended its adoption were designed to persuade the Western democracies that the Soviet Union was a true democracy or that it was at least moving in a democratic direction and that it enjoyed the full support of the Soviet peoples. In the larger context of Soviet foreign policy, one of the major objectives of the 1936 essay in Soviet constitution making appears to have been the desire to forge a common bond with the Western powers in resisting Nazi, Fascist, and

Japanese aggression. The Great Purge which followed hard on the heels of the adoption of the constitution destroyed much of its effect, and the alliance which it sought to cement did not come until the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union.

The plan of the Constitution of 1936 can be briefly summarized.<sup>45</sup> Chapter One, entitled the Organization of Society, proclaimed the USSR as a "socialist state of workers and peasants" and outlined the role of state, collective-farm, and private property. The next eight chapters of the constitution laid down the political structure of the state. After reiterating that the USSR was a federal state and that each union republic reserved the "right freely to secede," the powers of the central governmental organs were specified in such all-embracing terms as largely to negate the federal pattern on which the government was allegedly constructed.

The highest organ of state authority was declared to be the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. As presently constituted, the Supreme Soviet is divided into two chambers: the Council of the Union, which is directly elected on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 inhabitants, and the Council of Nationalities, which is also directly elected on the basis of twenty-five deputies from each union republic, eleven deputies from each autonomous republic, five deputies from each autonomous region, and one deputy from each national district. Both chambers serve for a term of four years and have equal rights in initiating and enacting legislation. In case they disagree and their disagreements cannot be reconciled (an eventuality that is hardly likely to occur under a system of one-party rule), the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet has the authority to dissolve the Supreme Soviet and order new elections.

The Presidium is elected at a joint session of both chambers. As originally established in 1936, it consisted of a chairman, eleven vice-chairmen, a secretary, and twenty-four members. Its membership has since been reorganized to provide for a chairman, fifteen vice-chairmen (one for each of the union republics), a secretary, and sixteen members. The Presidium functions as a collegial presidency. It performs the ornamental functions of head of state, convenes and dissolves sessions of the Supreme Soviet, and appoints and relieves cabinet ministers on the recommendation of the Council of Ministers and subject to subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet. It has the power to annul decisions of the Council of Ministers (before 1946 called the Council of People's Commissars) in the event they do not conform to law. It interprets laws of the USSR, issues decrees, exercises the right of pardon, ratifies and rescinds treaties, proclaims martial law, issues mobilization orders, is authorized to declare war in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, and performs a number of other functions of lesser significance.

Executive and administrative authority is vested in a Council of Ministers whose appointment requires the confirmation of the Supreme Soviet. Theoretically the Council of Ministers is responsible to the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium; in practice members are chosen and relieved at the pleasure of the top Party leadership. The 1936 constitution, like its predecessor, provided for three types of ministries: all-union, union republic, and republic. The union constitution contains a list of all-union and union-republic ministries, as well as of various committees and administrations, which provide the framework of central administration in Moscow. The number and character of these agencies have undergone frequent modification since 1936; with each reorganization, the constitution has had to be amended to take account of the change. The authority of the center, however, remains paramount. Decisions and orders of the Council of Ministers of the USSR are binding on all lower organs.

The government of the union republics consists of a Supreme Soviet of one chamber, its Presidium, and a Council of Ministers composed of union-republic and republic ministries, as well as representatives of assorted committees and administrations. The union-republic ministries are subordinated to the Council of Ministers of the union republic and its Supreme Soviet as well as to their counterparts at the center. The republic ministries are directly subordinate to the union Council of Ministers and its Supreme Soviet. Autonomous republics also possess their own supreme soviets, presidiums, and councils of ministers. The local organs of state authority (territories, regions, districts, cities, rural localities, and so on) include soviets elected for a two-year term and the executive committees or *ispolkomy* which are formally responsible to the soviets and selected by them.

As an accompaniment of the recent reorganization of the Party structure into parallel industrial and agricultural hierarchies, the soviet organs are slated for similar division. In an address to the Central Committee on November 19, 1962, Khrushchev announced: "In all regions and territories where regional and territorial Party committees for industrial and agricultural production are to be set up, two independent Soviets of Workers' Deputies with their executive committees will be established. One will cover the population engaged in industrial production and the other the population engaged in agricultural production."

The constitution also provided for a judicial system consisting of a Supreme Court of the USSR, supreme courts of the union republics, territorial and regional courts, courts of the autonomous republics and autonomous regions, city courts, people's courts, and military tribunals. Judges of the people's courts are popularly elected for five-year terms; the people's assessors who assist them are elected for two-year terms. The judges of other courts are selected by their corresponding soviets for

five-year terms, while members of military tribunals also serve for five years and must be formally approved by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. Cases are heard in public "unless otherwise provided by law." The constitution guaranteed the accused "the right to be defended by counsel," a right which many survivors of the Great Purge testify was suspended in their cases despite the explicit language of Article 111. According to Article 112 of the constitution, judges were to be "independent and subject only to the law." What this means in Soviet terms is perhaps best expressed by the Soviet jurist, N. N. Polyansky:

The independence of the judges referred to in Article 112 of the Stalin Constitution does not and cannot signify their independence of politics. The judges are subject only to the law — this provision expresses the subordination of the judges to the policy of the Soviet regime, which finds its expression in the law.

The demand that the work of the judge be subject to the law and the demand that it be subject to the policy of the Communist Party cannot be in contradiction in our country.<sup>46</sup>

The Procurator General, who is appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR for a seven-year term, and the procurators in lower jurisdiction who operate under him were directed to exercise "supervisory power over the strict execution of law by all ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by public servants and citizens of the USSR." The constitution also provided (Article 127) that "no person may be placed under arrest except by decision of a court or with the sanction of a procurator." Yet, as Khrushchev freely admitted in his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, this injunction, along with other constitutional provisions, was honored in the breach during the Stalinist epoch. Commenting on the arrest and execution of Kossior, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Kosarev, and others, he stated, "They, like many others, were arrested without the Procurator's knowledge."<sup>47</sup> The extensive powers of the Procuracy are elaborated in statutory rather than in constitutional form (see Chapter 12). They include the right to protest decisions of the USSR Supreme Court to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, to appear in criminal cases in support of the state's indictment, and to intervene in civil cases when state interests are involved.

The statement of the Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens in Chapter Ten of the constitution included the right to work, the right to rest and leisure, the right to maintenance in old age and in case of sickness or loss of capacity to work, the right to education, sex equality, absence of discrimination on account of race or nationality, freedom of conscience, freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of assembly, freedom of street processions and demonstrations, freedom to unite in

public organizations, the inviolability of the person and the homes of citizens, and privacy of correspondence.

This impressive list of "rights" needs to be interpreted against the background of Soviet actualities. The right to work is not a right to choose one's work freely but a duty to work in disciplined subordination to state and Party regulations. It frequently means working at the post to which one is assigned, at wages and in conditions which are determined by higher authorities over whom one has no control. There is no right to strike, and trade unions function essentially as glorified state company unions (see Chapter 15). For millions of Soviet citizens during the Stalinist era, the right to work meant forced labor in concentration camps under conditions of unspeakable misery and oppression.

The right to rest and leisure depends in the Soviet Union, as in other parts of the world, on the availability of means to enjoy rest and leisure. Although measures have been taken in recent years to alleviate the critical housing shortage, housing space remains at a premium, and the cramped and crowded conditions which many ordinary Soviet citizens are forced to endure conduce neither to rest nor to leisure. The more affluent and high-ranking members of the Soviet community command ready access to vacation resorts and rest homes; those without sufficient resources or status find entrance more difficult to arrange. On the other hand, recent reductions in the work week, improved social-insurance benefits, and free medical care contribute substance to this right.

The right to education also needs to be defined. The expansion of educational facilities under the Soviet regime has been impressive, particularly in the scientific and technical fields, but the commitment of the state to provide free education for all is limited to the first eight grades plus such vocational training as is necessary to train youth for work in industry, agriculture, or other sectors of Soviet society. Students who gain admission to higher educational institutions, however, may also receive extensive state aid. There are no tuition fees, and deserving students may also be awarded state stipends or scholarships, which vary with their academic achievements and needs. For many the aid available falls short of covering basic living expenses, and the gap which remains is bridged by parental help. Where outside resources are not available, there are real obstacles to embarking on a full-time course of study in a higher educational institution. The effect of recent developments in Soviet educational policy has been to screen out the vast majority of Soviet youth for training and service in lower industrial and agricultural ranks, while reserving opportunities for higher education to the specially qualified who also can command the necessary means.

The constitutional provision which accords equal rights to women (Article 122) registers the fact that women have become an integral part

of the Soviet industrial and agricultural labor force and that the regime has made a determined effort to mobilize their skills and productive capacities for state purposes. For many women with families for whom outside work is a necessity and domestic chores represent an additional burden, the formula of equal rights is far from an unmitigated blessing. Although the proportion of women in high Party and governmental offices is small, there has been a notable increase in the number of women occupying administrative and professional posts of lesser responsibility. The effect of the new attitude toward women has been particularly revolutionary in Soviet Central Asia, where women had long been relegated to a servile and secluded role.

The constitutional inhibition against any racial or national discrimination (Article 123) needs to be read against the tendency to accord priority and leadership to the Great Russian nation and to regard any display of local patriotism among the non-Great Russian nationalities as a threat to the unity of the Soviet empire. The emergence of Great Russian chauvinism under the cover of Soviet patriotism, which began prior to World War II, prepared the way for a postwar campaign against "rootless cosmopolitans" with clear anti-Semitic as well as anti-Zionist overtones. Although official policy remains ostensibly opposed to anti-Semitism, evidence of discrimination against Jews in Soviet public life accumulated in the postwar years and has persisted into the post-Stalinist period.<sup>48</sup>

The constitutional guarantee of freedom of conscience (Article 124) must also be classified as a qualified right. Religious organizations in the Soviet Union operate under the tutelage of State Councils on Church Affairs. They are forbidden to undertake any functions other than the practice of religious rites. Strenuous pressure has been exerted to transform them into adjuncts of the regime. At the same time, the official policy of the Party leadership remains hostile to religion in any form, and the whole weight of the educational system has been thrown on the side of discouraging religious belief. Members of the Party and Communist youth organizations are forbidden to participate in religious ceremonies; antireligious propaganda forms an essential element in Communist indoctrination. The ultimate objective, in Vyshinsky's words, is the eradication of religion "by socialist re-education of the toiling masses, by anti-religious propaganda, by implanting scientific knowledge, and by expanding education."<sup>49</sup>

The clauses in the constitution (Article 125) safeguarding freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and freedom of street processions and demonstrations are prefaced by the significant proviso that these rights are to be exercised "in conformity with the interests of the working class, and in order to strengthen the socialist system." Put more bluntly, they cannot be utilized to criticize or challenge the ascend-

ancy of the Party leadership. As innumerable commentaries on the constitution make clear, these "liberties" are reserved for adherents and denied to opponents of the regime. Freedom, in the Soviet constitutional lexicon, is the duty to ratify the policies of the ruling group and not the right to criticize them. "The right to unite in public organizations" (Article 126) is subject to the same qualification. It is the right to join organizations which the regime has established and which it approves.

The constitutional articles providing for inviolability of the person (Article 127) and the inviolability of the homes of citizens and privacy of correspondence (Article 128) also have had dubious operative content. They were transformed into a hollow mockery by the ravages of the Great Purge, which reached the peak of its intensity in the first year of the life of the new constitution. They remained a dead letter during the Stalinist period, and such significance as they now have is traceable to the self-restraint with which Stalin's successors have thus far operated. Due process in the Soviet sense is not a matter of constitutional definition but largely a product of dictatorial indulgence.

Other provisions of Chapter Ten defined the responsibilities of Soviet citizens. These included the duty to abide by the constitution, to observe the laws, to maintain labor discipline (Article 130), to safeguard and strengthen socialist property (Article 131), and the "sacred" duty to defend the fatherland (Article 133). Article 132 proclaimed universal military service as part of the fundamental law of the land. Unlike the proclamation of rights, this statement of duties carried its sanctions in the form of a substantial body of legislation designed to ensure enforcement.

The remaining substantive chapters of the 1936 constitution were concerned with the electoral system and the procedure for amending the constitution. The chapters on the electoral system provided for universal, direct, and equal suffrage and the secret ballot (Article 134). They established the minimum age for voting as eighteen and guaranteed the right to vote to all except "insane persons and persons who have been convicted by a court of law and whose sentences include deprivation of electoral rights" (Article 135). "The right to nominate candidates," according to Article 141 "is secured to public organizations and societies of the working people: Communist Party organizations, trade unions, cooperatives, youth organizations, and cultural societies." This equivocal statement, which merely listed the Party as one of a number of public organizations which submits nominations, was apparently designed to obscure the fact that Soviet voters are presented with a single slate of candidates chosen by the Party in advance of the election. The constitution also provided (Article 142) that deputies were liable to recall "upon decision of a majority of the electors." Constitutional amendments required a majority of two thirds of the votes cast in each chamber of the

Supreme Soviet (Article 146). Since Party discipline ensures unanimous votes, the leaders of the regime have encountered no difficulty in securing the enactment of any amendments which they deemed desirable. Indeed, no negative vote has ever been registered against a constitutional amendment.

The Constitution of 1936 marked an important advance over earlier constitutional efforts in at least one important respect. For the first time, the existence of the Party was acknowledged in a constitutional document. The Party was mentioned in two places. Article 141, as already noted, listed the Party as one of the organizations which had the right to nominate candidates for public office. Article 126 specified that "the most active and most politically conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state." The description of the Party as the core of all public and state organizations represented the first frank constitutional recognition of its position, even though other provisions of the constitution appeared deliberately drafted to minimize or even conceal its real role.

Prior to the drafting of the 1936 constitution, the USSR consisted of seven union republics — the Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Transcaucasian, Turkmen, Uzbek, and Tadjik. In 1936 the Transcaucasian Federated Soviet Republic was dissolved, and its constituent units — Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia — were admitted to the USSR as union republics. At the same time, two new union republics — the Kazakh and Kirghiz SSR's — were also added, making a total of eleven union republics. The next burst of expansion, which brought five more into the fold, took place in 1940. As an aftermath of the Russo-Finnish War, the Karelian Autonomous Republic, which had been part of the RSFSR, was reorganized as the Karelo-Finnish SSR. In June 1940 Rumania ceded Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina to the Soviet Union, and on August 2, 1940, the Moldavian Autonomous Republic, which had previously been part of the Ukrainian SSR, absorbed the newly organized territory and became a union republic. In August 1940 the three Baltic States — Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia — were also incorporated into the Soviet Union as separate union republics. In 1945 part of the Karelo-Finnish republic was transferred to the RSFSR, and in 1956 the rest of the republic was reabsorbed by the RSFSR, thus bringing the Soviet Union to its present level of fifteen union republics.

The 1936 constitution was subjected to numerous amendments in succeeding years, but none significantly changed its basic character or altered the political configuration of the regime. Most were minor in

nature, registering the admission of new union republics, shifts in political subunits, and rearrangements in administrative structure. Perhaps the most startling development took place in February 1944 when amendments were enacted providing that "each Union Republic has the right to enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange representatives with them" (Article 18a) and also providing that "each Union has its own Republican military formations" (Article 18b). At the same time, the Commissariats of Defense and Foreign Affairs were transformed into union-republic instead of all-union commissariats. In presenting the amendments for adoption by the Supreme Soviet, Molotov hailed them as signifying "a great broadening in the range of activity of the union republics, which had become possible as a result of their political, economic, and cultural growth."<sup>50</sup>

The broadening of activity which Molotov saluted failed to develop during the Stalinist years. The Ukraine and Belorussia were duly admitted to the United Nations, where they provided two additional votes for the USSR, but none of the sixteen republics then existing was permitted to exchange diplomatic representatives with foreign states or enter into agreements with them. A British proposal to establish diplomatic relations with the Ukraine, which was made in August 1947, met a frigid rebuff. In retrospect, it seems clear that the 1944 amendments represented an effort to equip the union republics with the external appurtenances of statehood in the hope that all sixteen could gain admission into the United Nations as separate entities. When this hope was defeated, the amendments lost most of their meaning, though they remained on the books as a vestigial reminder of an unsuccessful diplomatic maneuver.

Equally curious was the amendment of March 15, 1946, which changed the name of the Council of People's Commissars to the Council of Ministers.<sup>51</sup> This reversion to Tsarist and bourgeois terminology was variously hailed as a manifestation of the pull of traditionalism, as a symbol of the Soviet search for respectability, and as another Machiavellian maneuver to quiet the fears of the West. Whatever the underlying pattern of motivation, the old wine continued to ferment in the new bottles.

The changes released by the death of Stalin were slow to find constitutional expression. At the Twenty-First Party Congress, Khrushchev intimated that a revision of the constitution was necessary,<sup>52</sup> and at the Twenty-Second Congress he spoke of a "new Constitution of the USSR that we are beginning to draft,"<sup>53</sup> but it was not until his speech to the Supreme Soviet on April 25, 1962, that he proposed "the formation of a commission to prepare a draft of the new Constitution of the Soviet Union."<sup>54</sup> While he observed that it was "premature" to "prescribe in detail" what the new constitution should contain, he defined its basic tasks

as follows: "They are to reflect the new stage in the development of Soviet society and the Soviet state, to raise socialist democracy to a still higher level, to create still stronger guarantees of the democratic rights and freedoms of the working people and guarantees of the strict observance of socialist legality, and to prepare the conditions for the transition to communist public self-government."<sup>55</sup> He indicated that the new constitution would reflect the principles embodied in the Party program and undertake to formulate the basic goals and objectives of Soviet foreign policy. As was to be expected, the Supreme Soviet unanimously approved Khrushchev's proposal, and a Constitutional Commission, chaired by Khrushchev and consisting of ninety-six dignitaries, was designated to prepare a draft. At its first sitting on June 15, 1962, "the following subcommissions were established: for general political and theoretical questions of the Constitution; for questions of public and state structure; for questions of state administration and the activities of soviets and public organizations; for economic questions and administration of the national economy; for questions of nationality policy and national-state construction; for questions of science, culture, public education, and public health; for questions of foreign policy and international relations; for questions of popular checking and socialist order; editorial subcommission."<sup>56</sup> Until the Constitutional Commission has reported, it would be premature to anticipate its results. But one prediction can be made with safety. However drastic the apparent changes, the monopoly position of the Communist Party as the directing force in Soviet society will not be disturbed.

The Soviet experiments in constitution making and the elaborate paraphernalia of elections and meetings of soviets which they have produced raise interesting questions concerning the role of these institutions in a one-party dictatorship. To the observer who approaches Soviet elections from the viewpoint of Western parliamentarianism, they seem a meaningless show in which the Soviet voter is presented with no alternative except to endorse a slate of candidates designated by the Party leadership. Why does the regime go to great expense to hold elections, and why does it exert tremendous pressure to drive its people to the polls to ratify foreordained choices? Are not elections a superfluous and dispensable luxury in a totalitarian system?

The leaders of the Soviet regime do not think so. In their view, to quote Vyshinsky, "The Soviet election system is a mighty instrument for further educating and organizing the masses politically, for further strengthening the bond between the state mechanism and the masses, and for improving the state mechanism and grubbing out the remnants of bureaucratism." The elections show "that the entire population of the land of the Soviets are completely united in spirit."<sup>57</sup>

These statements hint at the real functions of Soviet elections. They offer a dramatic occasion for a campaign of agitation and propaganda on behalf of the Soviet system. In the words of *Kul'tura i Zhizn'* (Culture and Life), the journal of the Department of Agitation and Propaganda of the Central Committee of the Party:

The tasks of Party organizations in preparing for the elections is to strengthen further the ties between Party and people, to ensure a new and mighty increase in the political activity and labor of the working people and to direct this activity toward fulfillment of the post-war Stalin Five Year Plan ahead of schedule.

By concrete fact and example, Party organizations must show the advantages of the Soviet social and state system over the capitalist system and the superiority of Soviet democracy over bourgeois democracy. They must explain the great principles of the USSR Constitution and the significance of the mighty motive forces of the Soviet system — Soviet patriotism, moral-political unity in Soviet society, the friendship of peoples in the USSR.<sup>58</sup>

Soviet elections serve as a form of national mobilization. Like the plebiscites under Napoleon and Hitler, they are intended to demonstrate, both to the world outside and the enemy within, that the people of the Soviet Union are solidly aligned with the regime. The announcement, for example, of the results of the 1962 elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet solemnly proclaimed that 99.95 per cent of all eligible voters cast ballots in the elections and that 99.47 per cent voted for "candidates of the Communist and non-Party bloc" to the Council of the Union and that 99.60 per cent provided the same endorsement for candidates to the Council of Nationalities.<sup>59</sup> Not surprisingly, these statistical triumphs were widely heralded in the Soviet press as a "majestic demonstration of the unity of the Soviet people." By such manipulated unanimity, totalitarian regimes strive to create an impression of monolithic support and unshakeable strength.

Soviet elections are also designed to create an illusion of representation and participation in public affairs. Candidates meet with groups of voters, address them, and receive "instructions" from them which are ordinarily aimed at the elimination of bureaucratic shortcomings or at obtaining some improvement in local services and facilities such as a new school or hospital or a better water and electric-power supply. Even though these instructions are confined within narrowly prescribed limits and can never be utilized to air any disagreement with the policies of the regime, they provide a channel through which localities may file their petitions of grievances. In this sense, they approximate a form of limited local representation. Since deputies are sometimes influential persons in their own right, they may intercede with the ministries to obtain some

redress of grievances for the localities they represent. Such intervention has its boundaries. As one former deputy, P. K. Ignatov, noted philosophically in his memoirs, "One must accustom oneself to take a broad, government view of things and not to regard everything from Armavir's narrow view."<sup>60</sup> Since locality interests must defer to projects with higher priorities which are centrally determined, the role of the deputy as a spokesman for local interests has its defined limits. His first obligation is to follow the Party directive and execute the commands of the Party leadership. In the final analysis, the leaders of the regime visualize themselves as the ultimate custodians of the interests of the Soviet electorate.

The utilization of the soviets as an instrument of governance has its own supporting rationalization. In the words of Stalin, the soviets are a "transmission belt" linking the Party with the masses, "organizations which rally the labouring masses . . . under the leadership of the Party."<sup>61</sup> They are also, according to Stalin, "*the most democratic* and therefore the most authoritative organizations of the masses, which facilitate to the utmost their participation in the work of building up the new state and its administration, and which bring into full play the revolutionary energy, initiative and creative abilities of the masses in the struggle for the destruction of the old order, in the struggle for the new, proletarian order."<sup>62</sup>

Stripped of their rhetorical flourishes, these statements point to the important role the soviets play in the Communist system of political controls. The soviets themselves are Party-dominated. Responsibility for selection of the membership of the soviets and for direction of their activity remains with the Party. In each soviet, the inner board of control is invariably the Communist faction. At the same time, the Party leadership seeks to utilize the mechanism of the soviets to broaden its influence with the masses, to enlist sympathetic non-Party elements in the tasks of administration and government, and to reward outstanding achievement by designating the deserving for membership in the soviets.

At lower levels of the governmental hierarchy, the soviets perform an important function in ensuring large-scale participation in community activities. In the elections of 1959 and 1961, more than 1,800,000 deputies were chosen to serve in local soviets.<sup>63</sup> In each soviet the deputies are organized into various standing committees and are assisted in discharging their duties by activists who either volunteer or are assigned to the task. While responsibility for directing day-to-day administration is reserved for the ispolkoms or executive committees of the soviets rather than ordinary Soviet deputies or members of the aktiv, the latter are drawn into a consideration of communal plans and activities, check on the execution of work assignments by soviet officials, assist in mobilizing

voluntary labor for civic improvements, and serve as agitators among the masses to spread devotion to soviet goals. Since a substantial part of the work plans of local soviets is concerned with the maintenance and expansion of communal services and involves such everyday needs of the electorate as housing, sanitation, transportation, and recreation, interest in the activities of local soviets is not too difficult to arouse. Party-directed participation at this level of government builds on a genuine concern with community requirements.

By contrast, the role of the Supreme Soviet appears more strictly ornamental. The two chambers of the Supreme Soviet, to be sure, have their standing committees on legislative proposals, the budget, and foreign affairs, and the Council of Nationalities in addition has an economics committee to which deputies from each of the union republics are named. But the committees function within sharply circumscribed limits and discharge a largely perfunctory role. The matters which engage their attention are of transcendent importance and embrace such weighty problems as the budget, economic plans, and foreign affairs. But the proceedings of the Supreme Soviet convey the impression of a well-rehearsed theatrical spectacle from which almost all elements of conflict have been eliminated. The slight budget modifications which are permitted to the Supreme Soviet and the occasional criticisms of the performance of lagging ministries give every evidence of being part of a prepared script. Like the elections, the meetings of the Supreme Soviet are intended to symbolize national unity. The proposals of the government are unanimously hailed and unanimously ratified.

The composition of the Supreme Soviet reflects its character as a rally of the faithful. Although the largest groups within it are composed of Party and state officials, its membership is also designed to reflect a cross section of Soviet society, and "leading" workers and collective farmers are included as well as scientists, engineers, economic managers, doctors, teachers, writers, and members of the armed forces. The Supreme Soviet provides a mobilization of leading and representative figures in Soviet society, but the forum in which they operate lacks creative significance. All important decisions come ready-made from the Party leadership. The task of the Supreme Soviet is not to question but to execute, to clothe the Party thesis in the garb of constitutional legality. The result is necessarily to minimize the authority of the whole apparatus of soviets. As long as the top Party command remains the real seat of power in Soviet society, the soviets and the constitutional structure built around them exist as imposing facades rather than sovereign organs.

The Soviet regime has demonstrated great skill in using the trappings of mass democracy to mask the entrenched position of the dictatorial elite which dominates Soviet society. Constitutional myths and symbols

have been ingeniously adapted to contribute to the illusion of mass control. But the actual configurations of power in the system are difficult to conceal. The political realities of Soviet life speak the unmistakable language of a one-party dictatorship in which ultimate power is deposited in a narrow ruling group in the Kremlin.

## *Chapter 12*

# *The Control of the Bureaucracy— Public Administration in the Soviet Union*

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One of the salient outgrowths of modern totalitarianism is the bureaucratization of its power structure. The Leader who bestrides the peak of the totalitarian edifice is the victim of his own limitations. He cannot decide everything, and even when he exercises his power to decide, he must depend on bureaucratic instruments to project his will. Authority becomes institutionalized, and its fragments are distributed among the manifold sub-bureaucracies which collectively contribute to the illusion of totalitarian omniscience.

The ways of bureaucracy elude totalitarian and nontotalitarian labels. Bureaucracies everywhere generate their own special interests and aspirations. They guard the expert knowledge which is the source of their power and resist the encroachment of interlopers who seek to invade their jurisdiction. They display what Soviet critics have termed "a narrowly departmental approach" and build their loyalties and hopes around the complex of concerns that have been entrusted to their care. They develop their own routines and working habits and are not easily persuaded to abandon them once they have become established. The Soviet bureaucracy manifests many of the traits characteristic of bureaucratic behavior generally.

At the same time, Soviet totalitarianism also imposes its own peculiar

requirements on the bureaucracy. Soviet public administration exhibits attributes which sharply differentiate it from the administrative systems prevailing in Western constitutional democracies. Its scope is all-embracing. It seeks to organize the total experience of man in Soviet society. Every branch of the economy and every form of social expression, from art, music, and letters to sports and the circus, are subject to administrative regulation and direction. The totalitarian imperative drives to transform the nation into a hierarchy of public servants operating within a framework of disciplined subordination to state purposes.

Soviet public administration is one-party administration. The conception of the politically neutral civil servant who serves his successive political masters "with equal fidelity and with equal contempt" is utterly foreign to the Soviet scene. Soviet public administration is suffused with political content. Every field of administration, however technical, is regarded as a channel for the propagation of the Party line and the directives of the top leadership. As Stalin put it, "not a single important political or organizational question is decided by our Soviet and other mass organizations without guiding directions from the Party."<sup>1</sup> The Party itself is a creature of its high command. Functioning in this capacity, it permeates Soviet society, occupies the strategic positions of power in state administration, issues policy instructions which guide administrative activity, checks on their execution, and attempts to serve as an organ of continuous discipline and control.

In practice, this picture of monolithic unity is only imperfectly realized; the struggle of the elite formations of Soviet society for power and influence continues to find expression. The Party apparatus, the police, the army, and the administrative bureaucracy vie with one another for preferment, and the local and departmental interests of different sections of the bureaucracy exercise their counterinfluence on the Party. The public affirmations of unanimity on which all totalitarian regimes insist serve to obscure the diversity of interests which they can neither eliminate nor openly acknowledge. Although Soviet totalitarian controls drive some of the most vital interests in the society into a subterranean zone of illegality, other equally important concerns find partial and distorted articulation through the frequently camouflaged processes of bureaucratic representation and manipulation. The play of these pressures continues to operate within the limits imposed by the ruling priorities of the Party leadership. The monolithic control of the Party high command largely takes the form of enforcing its priorities and resolving the conflict which their execution generates. The pressure from above is ruthless and unremitting, and evasion from below is resourceful and not unavailing.

Soviet public administration gives relatively little weight to the rights of the individual as such. Although the arbitrary authority exercised by

the security police during the Stalinist era has been curbed and the powers of the courts and the procuracy have been strengthened, public policy remains oriented toward a conception of Party and state interests which every branch of government is dedicated to promote. Safeguards to protect the individual against the abuse of administrative power, which play such an important role in Anglo-American and Continental jurisprudence, are weakly developed. When Soviet jurists speak of administrative responsibility, they have in mind a concept of state service and controls designed to ensure efficient performance of official functions, rather than a set of constitutional or legal restraints on administration aimed to protect individual liberties against state interference.<sup>2</sup> Soviet administrative law in the final analysis is built around the interests of the collectivity as interpreted by the Party leadership.

The Soviet bureaucracy is also characterized by a formidable proliferation of control agencies without parallel in the West. The typical Soviet administrator functions in an environment in which every major decision is subject to the possibility of check, recheck, and countercheck. The long-range plan under which he operates must be approved by the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) and the short-range plan by the All-Union Council of the National Economy. His staff arrangements and financial transactions are subject to the scrutiny of the Minister of Finance. The Party-State Control Committee maintains a watch on his efficiency, seeks to prevent fraud and deception, and checks to make certain that he is fulfilling all government orders and decrees. The Procurator General watches the legality of his actions. The KGB (State Security Committee) enforces security regulations and keeps him under observation to ensure his political reliability. The whole range of his activity, as well as that of the control organs, is always under careful surveillance by representatives of the Party. It is not too far-fetched to describe this complex network of controls as a system of power founded on the institutionalization of mutual suspicion.

The insecurity developed by these arrangements engenders its own antidotes. In order to escape the heavy burden of distrust which the system imposes on those who are involved in it, both controlled and controllers not infrequently cover up for each other's sins and omissions in discharging the tasks for which they are held jointly responsible. The urge to find a peaceful sanctuary is deep-seated among Soviet administrators, and it comes into sharp conflict with the Hobbesian war of all against all upon which the ruling group relies in order to maintain its own control and security. The literature of Soviet administration is filled with criticisms of administrators who enter into so-called family relations with each other and with the control organs that surround them. Despite the virulence of the denunciations, the phenomenon is recurrent, and it

apparently registers a strongly felt need to erect barricades against the intrusive checks used by the regime to maintain the pressure of its power. The interstices of every totalitarian regime contain concealed pockets of effective bureaucratic resistance. The Soviet rulers engage in a ceaseless effort to stamp out this resistance and forge the bureaucracy into a pliable instrument of their will.

*The Background of Soviet Public Administration*

The history of Soviet public administration is the record of a search for a formula to guarantee both the loyalty and the efficiency of the administrative apparatus. After the seizure of power, the Soviet regime was plagued by an absence of trained administrators in whom the leadership could have confidence. The prerevolutionary bureaucracy was a repository of established governmental routines and procedures, but its skills were not readily adaptable to the new order, and, in any event, many of its members regarded their new overlords with enmity. The Party itself attracted few members trained in the arts of civil administration. The problem of transforming a revolutionary party into a governing party presented real problems. The qualities which made for success in agitation and propaganda were not easily transferable to industrial management or other administrative responsibilities. Five years after the revolution, Lenin commented,

We now have a vast army of governmental employees, but we lack sufficiently educated forces to exercise real control over them. Actually, it often happens that at the top, where we exercise political power, the machine functions somehow; but down below, where these state officials are in control, they often function in such a way as to counteract our measures. At the top, we have I don't know how many, but in any event, I think several thousand, at the outside several tens of thousands, of our own people. Down below, however, there are hundreds of thousands of old officials who came over to us from the Tsar and from bourgeois society and who, sometimes consciously and sometimes unconsciously, work against us. Nothing can be done here in a short space of time, that is clear. Many years of hard work will be required to improve the machine, to reform it, and to enlist new forces.<sup>3</sup>

The Party leadership resorted to a variety of expedients in order to cope with the problem of its inadequate administrative resources. Since it could not dispense with the old-regime specialists and bureaucrats, it enlisted them in its service and surrounded them with Party and police controls in order to ensure their loyalty. Party members who displayed a talent for administration were sent to special "industrial academies" for intensive training and assigned to responsible administrative posts. The major long-term effort was concentrated on educating the oncoming generation for technical and administrative responsibilities.

To a remarkable degree, the goals of industrialization and collectivization, which were incorporated in the First Five-Year Plan, imposed their own administrative imperatives. The execution of a program involving rapid industrialization and the collectivization and mechanization of agriculture placed a great premium on technical and managerial competence. Technical education took important strides forward, and a new Soviet-trained intelligentsia began to pour out of the higher educational institutions established to serve the needs of industry and administration. Though the level of technical education at first fell far short of the best Western standards, a considerable improvement was registered in comparison with past Soviet performance, and significant additions to the pool of managerial and technical personnel were achieved.

The importance of management found increasingly strong recognition. This took various forms. Old-regime technicians and specialists, who had been utilized as scapegoats for the early difficulties which attended the industrialization drive, began to be treated with unaccustomed consideration. The vista opened up to the new generation of managers and engineers was one of rapidly expanding opportunities and hopes of speedy promotion. Managerial salaries and bonuses were greatly increased, and efforts were made to strengthen the operating authority of the managerial class.

During the early thirties there was an increasing tendency to turn from collegial to one-man management. Authority which had been dispersed among many specialists along functional lines was now concentrated in a single executive. He was held accountable for the over-all operations of a particular enterprise or factory or the administrative activities of a commissariat in a defined territory, and his approval was required for all orders issued in the name of the organization for which he was responsible. In resolving the competing claims of hierarchy and specialty, the balance was tilted in favor of hierarchy. The day-to-day operating authority of the line administrator was reinforced, even though the results of his labors were still subject to constant surveillance and control.

The rewards and responsibilities heaped upon the administrator were not without their countervailing hazards. Representatives of the Party and the secret police watched him carefully, and a fall from grace might involve a sentence to a forced-labor camp or an even worse fate. The Great Purge did not spare the ranks of industrial and administrative management. Yet its effect was to emphasize the indispensability of the managerial and technical group, and it was followed in 1939 by a revision of the Party Rules expressly designed to facilitate the assimilation of the administrative and managerial class into the Party. Indeed, the calculated effort in the late thirties to recruit new Party members from this group

did much to transform the Party into an administrative and managerial elite and to unite Party and state administration.

By the late 1930's, the Soviet Union had gone far toward consolidating a tightly disciplined bureaucratic hierarchy. Increasing attention was given to administrative, technical, and managerial competence, and growing emphasis was placed on inequality of reward as a method of recognizing status, rewarding achievement, and penalizing incompetence. Whatever dissatisfactions the system generated received little opportunity for overt expression. Doctrinal unity was rigidly enforced. Through a series of purges culminating in the Great Purge of 1936-1938, the remnants of old and new oppositions were liquidated. Stalin and his entourage emerged as infallible spokesmen of the new orthodoxy and undisputed masters of Party and state.

#### *Prewar and War Developments*

With the rise of the Hitler menace, economic and administrative resources were increasingly turned toward the armament industries and military preparations. The prewar period was marked by considerable progress in rationalizing the administrative structure. A host of new commissariats were created, particularly in the heavy-industry field. Old industrial commissariats were broken up and divided into smaller and more manageable units. Efforts were made to eliminate unnecessary intermediate layers of supervision between the basic production units and the central commissariats in Moscow and the republics. The so-called two- or three-link system was adopted as a model scalar pattern for the organization of a commissariat. Under this system, the factory or enterprise in the field reported either directly to the commissariat or through not more than one, or at the most two, intermediate links. Active measures were instituted to reduce bloated administrative staffs, to install systems of job description and classification, and to transfer central office personnel into the field. Yet practice lagged far behind aspiration, and the speech of Malenkov at the Eighteenth Party Conference in February 1941 furnished numerous examples of wasteful utilization of manpower in many branches of industry and transport.<sup>4</sup>

During the war and the immediate postwar period, the multiplication of new industrial commissariats continued. The basic motivation for their creation appeared to be the same as in the prewar period — the drive for more readily manageable units. Yet the very expansion in their number created a serious problem of coordination. The problem was recognized with the outbreak of war. On June 30, 1941, the State Committee of Defense was constituted as an inner or super cabinet.<sup>5</sup> It was composed exclusively of members of the Politburo circle. (Originally it consisted of Stalin as chairman, Molotov as vice-chairman, and Voroshilov, Beria, and

Malenkov. On February 3, 1942, Mikoyan and Voznesensky were added to its membership. On February 20 of the same year, Kaganovich joined the committee. On November 22, 1944, Voroshilov was relieved of membership and Bulganin filled his place.) Until its dissolution on September 4, 1945, it functioned as a supreme war cabinet. Specific supervisory powers over related groups of commissariats were allocated to various members of the committee, and the committee as a group undertook to give coordinated direction to the war effort. For the most part, the committee functioned through established agencies of government. In specified areas near the front, however, it had its own field representatives in the form of local committees of defense.<sup>6</sup> These local committees were composed of the secretary of the regional or city Party committee as chairman, the local military commander, a representative of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs, and the chairman of the regional or city soviet — a significant quadrumvirate of Party, army, police, and administration which illuminated the basic structure of power in the Soviet Union under Stalin. In the areas in which these committees were established, they exercised supreme governing authority for the duration of the war. At the end of the war, both they and the State Committee of Defense were dissolved, and the previously existing system of governmental controls was reinstated.

#### *Postwar Administrative Developments*

With the end of hostilities, the Soviet Union faced serious problems of demobilization, reconversion, and reconstruction. The pattern of industrial location had been substantially shifted to the east during the war, and administrative readjustments had to be made to take account of these new developments. In the war-ravaged areas, enormous tasks of rehabilitation presented themselves. As early as 1943, a special committee attached to the Council of Commissars was designated to direct work on the restoration of the economy in regions liberated from the German occupation. Early in 1946, the first of the postwar five-year plans was announced. Its proclaimed objective was not only to restore but to surpass the prewar level in industry and agriculture. Long-range plans were sketched to triple the prewar level of industrial production.

The announcement of these ambitious economic goals was followed by few spectacular changes in administrative structure. The commissariats were rechristened ministries by a constitutional amendment of March 15, 1946, but this reversion to traditional nomenclature involved no redefinition of functions.<sup>7</sup> More significant was the movement which was inaugurated in 1948 to reduce the number of ministries. The following tabulation makes this tendency clear.<sup>8</sup>

	<i>Early</i>					<i>March 15,</i>
	1924	1936	1947	1949	1952	1953
All-union ministries	5	8	36	28	30	12
Union-republic ministries	5	10	23	20	21	13
Total	10	18	59	48	51	25

The reduction from fifty-nine ministries in 1947 to forty-eight in early 1949 was largely brought about by consolidating or abolishing various industrial ministries which had grown in such profusion after 1936. It registered a conviction that the process of ministerial atomization had gone too far, that scarce manpower was being wasted in unnecessary administrative overhead, and that more of the burden of coordination had to be shifted to the ministerial level. Between 1949 and 1952 several new ministries were created, though the total still fell far short of the 1947 peak. After the death of Stalin, the process of ministerial consolidation was given a sharp impetus, and the total number of ministries was reduced to twenty-five.\*

The amalgamation movement did not last long. The new ministries proved top-heavy and unwieldy. As Khrushchev put it in his speech to the Supreme Soviet in April 1954, "With large ministries which unite many branches of the national economy and a large number of enterprises, it is difficult to carry out efficient direction of these branches and enterprises. For this reason it was considered expedient to break up such ministries into smaller units."<sup>9</sup> By that time the number of ministries had increased from twenty-five to forty-six, and the total was to mount to fifty-six by January 1956. The proliferation of central ministries was defended as a necessary method of coping with an increasingly complex economy.

At the same time, Stalin's successors also undertook to correct the supercentralization of the Stalinist era. Within less than two months after Stalin's death, the powers of the ministries were enlarged, and the ministers were given much greater flexibility in dealing with their subordinate enterprises and allocating resources among them. Beginning in 1954, some first cautious steps were taken in the direction of administrative decentralization. Under Stalin, heavy industry had been controlled by

\* As a result of the drastic reorganization put into effect after Stalin's death and ratified by the Supreme Soviet on March 15, 1953, the following ministries made up the new Council of Ministers: (1) Foreign Affairs, (2) Internal Affairs, (3) Defense, (4) Internal and Foreign Trade, (5) Agriculture, (6) Culture, (7) Light and Food Industry, (8) Metallurgy, (9) Machine Building, (10) Transport and Heavy Machine Building, (11) Electric Power Stations and the Electrical Industry, (12) Coal, (13) Oil, (14) Chemicals, (15) Defense Industry, (16) Building Materials Industry, (17) Timber and Paper, (18) Construction of Heavy Industry and Machine-Building Plants, (19) Transport, (20) Communications, (21) Sea and River Transport, (22) Health, (23) Justice, (24) Finance, (25) State Control.

highly centralized all-union ministries. The establishment of a Ministry of Coal Production in the Ukrainian republic in May 1954, and the subsequent transformation of the Ministry of Communications from an all-union to a union-republic ministry with branches in each of the republics, marked a significant break with past practice which was to gather momentum during the next years.

The problem which Stalin's successors had to resolve was not merely one of finding a workable balance between central controls and decentralized authority, but of determining who among them would exercise ultimate power. The issue split the Presidium. One faction, strongly entrenched in the state administrative apparatus, favored the retention of the ministerial system, a modest decentralization of authority to the republics, and reliance on a strong ministerial coordinating group to give coherence and direction to the economy. As the struggle developed, the other faction, led by Khrushchev, with its power base in the Party apparatus, pressed for far greater decentralization, the dissolution of most of the central economic ministries, and reliance on Gosplan and, above all, Party controls to enforce the priorities of the center on the regions. Although the two groups were probably genuinely divided on the merits of their respective approaches, the conflict also had its obvious political overtones. Those opposed to Khrushchev, later to be denounced as the anti-Party group, were determined to prevent him from utilizing his strength in the Party apparatus to extend his control over the national economy, while Khrushchev himself sought to dislodge his enemies from their ministerial strongholds.

During the first phase of the struggle, Khrushchev's opponents scored a temporary victory. At the Central Committee plenum in December 1956, a decision was approved to broaden the powers of the USSR State Economic Commission for Current Planning and to install Pervukhin and other leading economic administrators in controlling posts within it. The effect of this move was to strengthen the authority of elements in the Presidium identified with the state rather than with the Party machine. Against the background of later developments, it now appears clear that the scheme was unpalatable to Khrushchev. Departing from his usual custom, he delivered no report to the December plenum nor did he associate himself with the plan. Perhaps reluctant to do battle so soon after the Hungarian and Polish debacles, he apparently acceded to the demands of his rivals in the Presidium to fortify the powers of the Economic Commission and even allowed the Supreme Soviet to ratify the reorganization scheme on February 12, 1957.

On the very next day a specially summoned session of the Central Committee convened to hear a report by Khrushchev which proposed a radically different approach to the managerial problem. Apparently now

assured of the necessary support in the Central Committee, Khrushchev counterattacked with a plan designed to emasculate the Economic Commission and to place control of the economy securely in the hands of the Party apparatus.

The resolution approved by the Central Committee was cautiously worded. It spoke merely of "reorganizing the work of the State Economic Commission" and "of the need to increase the role of the State Planning Commission in planning and managing the country's national economy."<sup>10</sup> It called for a reduction of the central apparatus of the ministries and for a transfer of personnel and functions to new regional organs of administration which would be closer to production and provide for integrated development of regional economic areas. But its political thrust lay elsewhere. By weakening the power of the central bureaucracy and initiating a major reorganization of the central planning agencies, it cleared the way for a purge of Khrushchev's opponents and the installation of his friends in key posts. By pitting local and regional managerial personnel against the central ministries, it permitted Khrushchev to enlist new support on a country-wide scale. Above all, by dispersing ministerial authority in the localities, it left the field free for the Party apparatus to serve as the primary integrating and centralizing force.

The subsequent unfolding of the plan for industrial reorganization made all this unmistakably clear. The law approved by the Supreme Soviet on May 10, 1957, abolished the Economic Commission and established Gosplan as the dominant economic planning agency.<sup>11</sup> It virtually destroyed the ministerial system of industrial management by eliminating over 140 all-union, union-republic, and republic ministries in one fell swoop. It replaced them with 105 (subsequently in 1960 reduced to 101) regional economic councils, or *sovnarkhozy*, to which were transferred the shops and enterprises of the liquidated ministries as well as many factories of such all-union ministries as were retained. In the great majority of cases, the boundaries of the new economic regions coincided with that of the oblasts, thus reinforcing the coordinating authority of the obkom first secretary in the economic realm.

This root-and-branch assault on the ministerial pattern of industrial management had its origin in abuses that were endemic to the system as it had operated for many years. These included the excessive concentration of authority in Moscow, the suppression of local initiative, the red tape and delay that characterized communication with the enterprises in the field, the difficulty of achieving rational cooperation among enterprises in the same locality which were controlled by different ministries, and the tendency of each ministry to seek to free itself of dependence on other ministries by building a self-sufficient empire of ancillary enterprises that could not be justified on grounds of efficiency alone. But efforts

at fundamental reform had been held back by Stalin's commitment to supercentralization and by the fear of some of his successors that any substantial relaxation of central controls would result in localism running rampant.

Khrushchev himself was not unaware of the danger. Noting in his speech to the Supreme Soviet on May 7, 1957, that "under the new structure of management, where local agencies are granted extensive rights, there arise tendencies toward autarchy" and temptations to satisfy "local needs" at the expense of the interests of the state, he made clear that the Party, as well as other agencies subordinate to it, would have as one of its main missions the "struggle against such harmful . . . tendencies."<sup>12</sup> But he also saw tremendous advantages in active, on-the-spot management by the new sovnarkhozes. Aware of local resources and potentials and closer to the enterprises which they supervised, the staffs of the regional councils were counted on to act more expeditiously, to achieve smoother cooperation among enterprises under their jurisdiction, and to realize significant economies by reducing administrative overhead, shifting unused resources from one enterprise to another, achieving savings in interregional transportation, and substituting consolidated regional warehousing, trucking, and other services for the inefficient appendage operations spawned by the ministries.

The adoption of the reorganization plan was followed by a substantial shift of managerial responsibility from the center to the regions. In April 1958, I. I. Kuzmin, then USSR Gosplan chairman, stated that the industrial enterprises transferred to the regional economic councils accounted "for almost three fourths of the country's industrial output."<sup>13</sup> Savings were widely reported under the new scheme, although sovnarkhoz staffs showed a tendency to proliferate in much the same way as the old ministries had. Other difficulties which developed were more serious. Perhaps the most troublesome was *mestnichestvo*, or localism. This phenomenon appeared in various forms. Regional economic councils were condemned for diverting capital funds from high-priority projects to finance local extravagances. Some sovnarkhozes displayed autarchic tendencies. They sought to create self-contained regional empires instead of meeting national needs. They placed the demands of their own plants ahead of deliveries to "foreign" regions and failed to meet their inter-regional commitments. At the same time, officials of the sovnarkhozes also protested that Gosplan, following the pattern of the old ministries, was holding them in too tight a leash; particularly sharp criticism was directed at the RSFSR Gosplan for planning delays and inefficiency.

The reaction of the central authorities was to tighten controls to enforce central priorities. Regional officials who illegally misused central funds for local purposes were disciplined and punished. In April 1958,

the Supreme Soviet decreed that officials who failed to fulfill interregional or interrepublic deliveries without valid cause could be fined up to three months' salary or subjected to other severe disciplinary penalties, while repeated nonfulfillment was made a criminal offense.<sup>14</sup> In three of the major republics — the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan — in January and July 1960, new republic-level sovnarkhozes were created to supervise and coordinate the activities of their subordinate regional economic councils, especially with respect to problems of supply and interregional and interrepublic deliveries. In addition, in May 1961 the country was divided into seventeen major economic regions — ten in the RSFSR, three in the Ukraine, and one each embracing Kazakhstan, the four smaller Central Asian republics, the three Baltic states, and the three Transcaucasian republics. Under this scheme Belorussia and Moldavia, though smaller units, remained independent economic regions. Coordinating and planning councils were appointed to develop a long-term plan for the integrated economic development of each of these natural regions; in Kazakhstan this function was entrusted to the republic Gosplan. The councils were expected to work closely with Gosekonomsoviet, the agency then in charge of long-range planning, and to provide correctives and safeguards against excessive localism.

At the November 1962 session of the Central Committee, a further impetus was given to recentralization. Khrushchev announced that the existing 67 economic councils in the RSFSR would be reduced to 22–24, that the 14 councils in the Ukraine would be replaced by 7, and that the four councils in the Central Asian republics of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tadzhikistan, and Kirghizia would be combined into one Central Asian sovnarkhoz. The enlarged economic areas thus created — 40 to 42 for the whole USSR instead of more than 100 — were designed to strike a blow against excessive localism and to provide better-rounded units for economic management. At the same time, the sovnarkhozes were deprived of their control over construction, new designs, and new technology. Control over industrial construction was centralized in *Gosstroj*, the USSR State Committee for Construction, which was charged with supervising a network of independently organized building organizations which would carry out construction work for the sovnarkhozes on contract. Control over the introduction of new technology and design was similarly centralized in the USSR State Industrial Committees, which, in Khrushchev's words, "would have the decisive say in elaborating plans for new machinery." Gosekonomsoviet, the agency for long-range planning, was abolished and replaced by Gosplan, whose authority was limited to the long-range field. A new agency, the All-Union Economic Council, absorbed the short-range planning functions formerly performed by Gosplan. According to Khrushchev, the new council was to be pri-

marily concerned with ensuring the fulfillment of annual plans. He promised that its administrative authority would be strengthened and that it would be given the power to reallocate resources and to make other administrative readjustments quickly within the bounds of the approved annual plan.

Despite this reassertion of central control and the insistence of the top Party leadership on maintaining its policy priorities, the tug of war between center and locality promises to continue. The devolution of operational decision making to the regions and their subunits generates its own dispersive tendencies. These probably offer no fundamental political challenge to the Party high command, but they dictate a continuing administrative adjustment in which central priorities are periodically reasserted against local pressures and aspirations.

#### *The Structure of Soviet Administration*

The structure of Soviet administration can be briefly sketched. At the apex of the pyramid stands the USSR Council of Ministers, a large cumbersome body of more than fifty members. On December 15, 1962, it consisted of:

The chairman.

Two first vice-chairmen.

Nine vice-chairmen.

Five all-union ministers: Foreign Trade; Merchant Marine; Transportation; Medium Machine Building; Transport Construction.

Ten union-republic ministers: Higher and Specialized Secondary Education; Geology and Conservation of Natural Resources; Public Health; Foreign Affairs; Culture; Defense; Communications; Agriculture; Finance; Power and Electrification.

Thirty-one heads of the following committees, commissions, councils, and administrations: State Planning Committee (Gosplan); All-Union Economic Council; State Committee for Coordinating Scientific Research; State Procurements Committee; Party-State Control Committee; State Labor and Wages Committee; State Committee on Vocational and Technical Education; State Radio and Television Committee; State Committee on Automation and Machine Building; State Committee on Aviation Technology; State Committee on Defense Technology; State Committee on Radioelectronics; State Committee on Electronics Technology; State Committee on Shipbuilding; State Committee on Chemistry; State Committee on Ferrous and Nonferrous Metallurgy; State Committee on the Fuel Industry; State Committee for the Lumber, Pulp-and-Paper and Wood-Processing Industries and Forestry; State Atomic Energy Committee; State Construction Committee; State Committee for the Fish Economy; State Committee on Foreign Economic Relations; State Committee on Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries; State Security Committee; the All-Union Farm Machinery Association; the USSR State Bank; Central Statistical Administration; State Committee on Electrical Equipment; State Committee on Light Industry; State Committee on the Food Industry; State Committee on Domestic Trade.

In addition, the fifteen chairmen of the union-republic Councils of Ministers serve as *ex officio* members of the USSR Council of Ministers, and leading officials in Gosplan and the All-Union Economic Council as well as the first vice-chairman of the State Procurements Committee also enjoy ministerial status.

Within the Council of Ministers internal cohesion and coordination are provided by its presidium, a species of inner cabinet, consisting of the chairman, the first vice-chairmen, the vice-chairmen, and such other "individuals" as may be personally nominated by the Council of Ministers.<sup>15</sup> The administrative units which make up the USSR Council of Ministers are of various types: ministries, state committees, and other specialized agencies.<sup>16</sup> Ministries administer specific sectors of the nation's economic, political, military, or social cultural life. Their names ordinarily indicate their field of responsibility, except that Medium Machine Building is employed as a euphemism for atomic energy. There are two kinds of ministries, all-union and union-republic. The former, which are organized on a highly centralized pattern, directly administer activities and enterprises under their jurisdiction, regardless of their physical location. The union-republic ministries may administer a few activities directly, but they ordinarily operate through counterpart ministries bearing the same name in each of the republics. Thus the USSR Ministry of Culture will transmit its directives for execution by the ministries of culture in each republic. Legally, the union-republic ministries in the republic are also responsible to the republic councils of ministers and legislative organs as well as to their superior ministry in Moscow. In the unlikely event of a conflict between central and republic authorities, it is a reasonably safe presumption that the views of the center will prevail.

The state committees and other specialized agencies differ from ministries in that their duties ordinarily involve developmental, coordinative, and planning functions rather than direct administrative operations. But there are exceptions. The KGB, or State Security Committee, is organized much like an all-union ministry with representatives in the localities reporting directly to it. The state banks are similarly centralized. Gosstroi, the State Construction Committee, as a result of the decisions of the November 1962 Central Committee session, is to be reorganized on the pattern of a union-republic ministry, with branches in the republics to which all building organizations will be subordinate.

Nonministerial agencies can perhaps best be classified in terms of the responsibilities vested in them. Some, like Gosplan and the All-Union Economic Council, are over-all planning agencies. Others like the State Committees on the Fuel Industry, Ferrous and Nonferrous Metallurgy, and Chemistry limit their coordinating and planning missions to a specific

industrial field. Still others, such as the State Committee for Coordinating Scientific Research, the Committee on Automation and Machine Building, the Labor and Wages Committee, the State Construction Committee, and the Committee on Foreign Economic Relations, are oriented around problems which cut across a number of ministries and areas and which involve planning, developmental, coordinating, and directive functions of peculiar difficulty. Others, such as the Party-State Control Committee, the KGB, and, in some of its aspects, the Central Statistical Administration, are primarily control organs. Despite recent tendencies toward administrative devolution of operational decision making, the central administrative establishment remains massively formidable, reflecting the inescapable burdens which efforts at the total management of a society impose.

Each republic of the USSR also has its own council of ministers as well as representatives of state committees and other specialized agencies. At the republic level, there are two types of ministries — the union-republic ministries already noted and republic ministries which vary in number and character from republic to republic, but which ordinarily include at least Education, Social Security, Defense of Public Order, Motor Transport and Highways, Trade, Local Industry, and Municipal Services. The republic ministries have no counterparts in the all-union Council of Ministers, and they operate under the immediate supervision of the councils of ministers and legislative organs of the individual republics.

Below the level of the republic, there are usually at least three subordinate layers of administration — the autonomous republics, oblasts, or krais, which may be treated as regional administrative units; the territorial production or enlarged rural district units; and the towns, villages, and hamlets, which may be described as local units. The urban areas operate under a separate regime. The largest cities are directly subordinate to the republic and are themselves broken up into raions. The cities of moderate size report to the oblasts or krais, while the rural hamlets and villages are subordinate to the enlarged rural district units. When the reorganization projected at the November 1962 Central Committee session is carried out, there will be separate soviets and executive committees for industry and agriculture at regional and local levels.

At each level of this hierarchy there are various departments and administrations which are responsible both to the *ispolkom* (executive committee) of the soviet elected at that level and to the administrators exercising corresponding functions at the next higher level. In the event of conflict arising out of such double supervision, the higher soviet organs are vested with the right to resolve the dispute. As might be expected, the administrative structure diminishes in complexity as it descends from region to locality. In the RSFSR, for example, there are regional depart-

ments for Health, Communal Economy, Education, Construction and Architecture, Finance, Social Security, and General Affairs. There are also regional administrations for Motor Transport and Highways, Defense of Public Order, Culture, Local Industry, the Building Materials Industry, Fuel Industry, Trade, Planning, and Production and Procurement of Agricultural Products. The KGB also has its regional representatives, and additional regional departments or administrations may be established with the consent of the republic Council of Ministers.

Until the reorganization of November 1962, the raion government also had its full complement of administrative services, though on a less comprehensive scale than the regions. The administrative sections of the raion tended to reproduce those of the region, though they were apt to be fewer in number and staffed on a much more modest scale.

Administrative organization in cities, towns, and villages is largely a function of the size of the community and the complexity of the services which have to be performed. In the larger cities which are directly subordinate to the republic or region, the range of administrative activity and the number of administrative sections may rival those of the oblast governments. Communal services and local trade necessarily play a central role. In the smaller towns the scope of administrative activity is substantially narrower; in sparsely populated villages and hamlets administrative duties are usually performed by the chairman and secretary of the executive committee of the village soviet.

Superimposed on and cutting across this structure of regional and local administration are specialized agencies in agriculture and industry with their own independent powers. As a result of the reforms in agricultural administration decreed by the Party Central Committee plenum of March 1962, interdistrict territorial production administrations were established in the union republics to organize procurements and to provide more effective supervision of state and collective farms.<sup>17</sup> These bodies operate under the supervision of regional agencies charged with the production and procurement of agricultural products. The effect of their creation was to limit the powers of the raion and to shift the center of gravity in agricultural administration from the raion to the larger interdistrict production units. Foreshadowed by the recommendations made by Khrushchev in his June 1962 speech to a conference of territorial production administrators, in November the existing raions were abolished and amalgamated into large districts, with boundaries coinciding with those of the territorial production administrations.<sup>18</sup> These enlarged districts will presumably inherit many of the administrative functions performed by the old raions.

In the industrial area, the sovnarkhozes created as a result of the 1957 industrial reorganization have also posed problems of adjustment to

previously established territorial units of government. With the reduction in late 1962 of the number of sovnarkhozes from more than a hundred to approximately forty, the boundaries of the great majority of the sovnarkhozes in the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan will no longer coincide with those of the regions in which they are headquartered, and their lines of control will run directly to the republic economic councils and the Party committees at that level. The four Central Asian republics will operate under one Central Asian sovnarkhoz, responsible to the Central Asian Bureau operating under the direction of the Presidium of the Central Committee in Moscow. As now planned, the remaining republics will each retain their own separate sovnarkhozes, which will be responsible to the councils of ministers and Party authorities in the republics.

The division of responsibility between the sovnarkhozes and local governmental bodies has created troublesome jurisdictional problems.<sup>19</sup> In numerous cities and oblasts, the sovnarkhoz enterprises control more housing and are responsible for more municipal services than the soviets and manage them without consulting soviet bodies. Until recently, local industry, which accounted for 11 per cent of the total industrial output of the USSR, remained subject to the control of the soviets, and the latter frequently encountered difficulty in obtaining adequate allocation of materials and resources in competition with their more powerfully situated sovnarkhoz brethren. In his speech to the Central Committee on November 19, 1962, Khrushchev announced: "Some time ago the USSR Council of Ministers decided to hand over to the economic councils local industrial enterprises engaged in manufacturing garments and footwear, tanning leather, and making furniture. This job should be completed. The main task of the local soviets . . . which now handle local industries, should be concern for improving the public services, while the production of goods for the population should be handled by the economic councils which should bear in mind local needs." There was no injunction, however, to transfer housing and other services now controlled by sovnarkhoz enterprises to the local soviets.

As this sketch indicates, the structure of Soviet public administration is built around differential treatment of various types of administrative functions and activities. In the case of the all-union ministry and similarly organized central agencies, the pattern remains one of extreme centralization, with the field organizations responsible directly to Moscow. In the union-republic ministries, policy control is centralized, but some administrative decentralization is achieved by utilizing the republic and its subordinate layers of government as instruments of supervision and operation. Where administrative activities are of diversified local significance, the point of policy control is the republic, with operational

responsibilities lodged at the regional, district, and local levels. In the industrial field the main brunt of supervision is borne by the network of regional economic councils, while in agriculture the interdistrict territorial production administrations and their superior organs play a similar role.

At each level of government, administrative action is theoretically subject to check by the soviets which are popularly elected at that level. Such checks are described by Soviet jurists as infusing elements of mass participation and control into the administrative process. Largely moribund under Stalin, they have been activated by Khrushchev and assigned broader functions, particularly at the local level. Although they provide for more widespread popular participation in the governmental process and furnish an outlet for criticism of local officialdom, such criticism usually gives evidence of having been carefully organized in advance by Party authorities. From the regime's point of view, the larger role assigned to the soviets serves the triple purpose of mobilizing support for Party policies, fostering closer contact with the masses, and diverting criticism from the top leadership by focusing it on local bureaucrats. If the soviets do little more now than provide the trappings and symbolism of "socialist democracy," they do represent an embryonic instrument of mass control which may conceivably become more significant under different auspices and circumstances. At present, the Soviet administrative apparatus turns for its significant controls in other directions.

These controls include (1) the Party, (2) the security police, (3) the plan, (4) financial controls, (5) the Party-State Control Committee, (6) legal controls, and (7) personnel controls. The functions performed by Party and police controls are treated elsewhere (Chapters 6, 7, 13, 15, 16); the discussion below will be devoted to an analysis of the other controls exerted on Soviet administration.

#### *Planning Controls*

Over the years, the central-planning machinery has undergone a number of major reorganizations. After Stalin's death in 1953, all planning functions were concentrated in Gosplan. In 1955 its responsibilities were divided, with Gosplan charged with long-term planning, while a newly created organ, *Gosekonomkomissiya*, emerged as the State Economic Commission for Short-Term Planning. The sweeping industrial reorganization of 1957 abolished the State Economic Commission and transferred its functions to Gosplan, which once again became the supreme organ for all planning. In April 1960 its functions were again divided. Gosekonomsoviet, the State Scientific-Economic Council, created in March 1959, was designated as the long-term planning agency, while Gosplan was


limited to short-term planning. At the November 1962 session of the Central Committee, Khrushchev announced the abolition of Gosekonomsoviet and its replacement by Gosplan as the agency charged with long-term planning. At the same time he revealed that a new agency, the All-Union Economic Council, would perform the annual planning functions formerly entrusted to Gosplan. The oscillation between integration and bifurcation of the planning function pointed to a continuing dilemma in reconciling the organizational requirements of short- and long-range planning.

The Party and government decree of April 7, 1960, vesting long-range planning functions in Gosekonomsoviet, charged it with formulating twenty-year plans for the development of the economy as well as plans for five- to seven-year periods.<sup>20</sup> Subsequently various research and project-planning organizations were placed under its jurisdiction, including the Scientific-Economic Research Institute and the Council for the Study of Productive Forces, which had earlier been under Gosplan. The regional coordinating and planning councils established in 1961 were also closely integrated with Gosekonomsoviet and directed to work out proposals and recommendations for the long-term development of the large economic regions. Presumably these activities are now inherited by Gosplan.

Current planning is now the major responsibility of the All-Union Economic Council. Its duties include determining the production target for the plan period in conformity with the control figures approved by the government, coordinating the plans of the union republics and central ministries and agencies, working out the over-all supply balances for major branches of production as well as indices of trade, finance, wages, exports, and imports, and checking on the execution of plans. The planning and control of all interrepublic deliveries of commodities, functions formerly performed by Gosplan, are now the tasks of the All-Union Council.

Chart VII, which reflects the internal organization of Gosplan after the 1960 reorganization, points to the pattern on which the All-Union Economic Council will probably be organized. As the chart makes clear, the central organization of Gosplan represented a miniature replica of the whole range of governmental functions. With the liquidation of most of Moscow's economic ministries, Gosplan's role as a planning and coordinating body became of crucial significance. Indeed, Gosplan encompassed all of Soviet society, and its representatives could be found at the most distant periphery as well as in the capital city. Each of the union republics had its separate Gosplan organization operating under the supervision of the central planning body. There were planning committees in all the regions, sovnarkhozes, districts, cities, and important towns,

**CHART VII**  
*Organization of USSR Gosplan, 1960*



and planning organs in every ministry and all agencies and enterprises responsible to it.

In the Soviet system, long- and short-range planning are, in theory at least, intimately interconnected. The long-range plans provide the broad goals, the short-range plans the detailed implementation. The process of forward planning begins with the assembly of data on the existing state of plan fulfillment, the determination of the main targets for the next planning period, and the working out of preliminary balance sheets which will make it possible to realize these targets. Basic guidelines and policies are established by the high Party command, but the more refined elaboration is made by Gosplan and the All-Union Economic Council in the light of specific plans submitted by ministries, enterprises, and the various republics, territories, and regions. These plans are interlinked, and, when necessary, modified to meet the demands of the Party leadership and to conform with available resources. Frequently, concrete targets for the various ministries, branches of the economy, and regions are established only after strenuous and protracted negotiations between planners and the affected agencies, in the course of which the agencies seek to extract a maximum allocation of materials, labor, and financial means from the planning body; it in turn, under pressure from its superiors, seeks to raise goals with minimum expenditure of resources. "There are some enterprise directors, collective-farm chairmen, and heads of state farms and other departments," Khrushchev openly acknowledged in his Central Committee report of October 17, 1961, "who make a specialty of requesting year after year that their production assignments be reduced and their payrolls and capital investments increased . . ."<sup>21</sup> And S. Vezarov, the chairman of the Azerbaijan Economic Council, in a recent article referred to the planners' "widespread practice of paring down the statements of requirements drawn up by the economic council's industrial administrations." "Knowing about this tendency," he continued, "the administrations as a rule try to inflate their statement of requirements. This undermines the very foundation of precise planning."<sup>22</sup> At every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy, lower and higher organs struggle for preferential advantage until the enterprises and agencies at the base of the planning pyramid end up with a set of defined tasks which theoretically regulates their performance for the period specified in the plan. The national economic plan worked out by Gosplan and the All-Union Council requires the approval of the Council of Ministers. After such approval is given, it is issued as a directive which is binding on all subordinate agencies.

The original emphasis of Gosplan was on the drawing-up of plans. Recently, more attention has been devoted to checking on execution, with increasing use of report devices and field inspections to ascertain

progress and detect evasions. Soviet plant managers and bureaucrats have developed remarkable ingenuity in manipulating the criteria of plan fulfillment to create an illusion of over-all successful performance. Soviet official sources constantly refer to the necessity of combating this type of abuse. "It is necessary," says A. Kursky in his volume on Soviet planning,

ruthlessly to expose such anti-state practices as deliberately drafting output plans for enterprises below their capacity, setting crop targets below capacity, and fulfilling plans quantitatively at the expense of quality. Some business executives are prone to fulfill the plan for gross output by producing articles that require the expenditure of less labour, while failing to produce the planned assortment of articles, or else fail to reach the target for reduction of cost of production, or turn out inferior-quality goods.

It is the function of the planning bodies to expose such cases in good time and to secure the fulfillment of the state plan in respect of all its indices.<sup>23</sup>

The "localist" orientation built into the new system of regional economic councils has contributed to complicate the task of the central economic planners. In a speech to the Central Committee on June 29, 1959, Khrushchev complained:

It is also necessary to mention such outrageous facts as the failure of some economic managers to meet assignments for delivering goods and supplies to other economic councils on time. Some officials refuse to reckon with state interests; they exceed their rights and powers and behave as though the laws were not made for them. They act on the principle: I do what I want.

Despite repeated warnings, the Archangel Economic Council systematically fails to meet its program for deliveries of lumber, timber, and prefabricated housing to other economic councils. At the same time, considerable amounts of these materials were spent above the plan within its own economic region.

The Party Central Committee recently disclosed that the East Kazakhstan Economic Council expended considerable resources on work not provided for in the plan. This was done at the expense of the resources of enterprises of nonferrous metallurgy and to the detriment of their further expansion . . .

Violations of Party and state discipline and manifestations of selfish local interests have also taken place in Kaliningrad province and in the Latvian, Kirghiz, and Uzbek republics . . .<sup>24</sup>

In reaction to such abuses which threaten disruption of central plans and policies, disciplinary sanctions have been invoked against guilty officials, and the list of commodities included in the central plan for material-technical supply has been greatly expanded from some 6,000 in 1958 to more than 14,000 in 1961.<sup>25</sup>

Despite these evidences of recentralization, there has been persistent pressure to escape the burdens of overcentralized planning. The growing complexity of the economy has virtually driven the Soviet leadership

toward some devolution of decision-making processes. The prerogatives of lower planning organs and factory managers have been enlarged, and the regional economic councils and republics exercise many rights which were formerly reserved to the central ministries. But the essential pattern is still one of high centralization, and the administrative reforms announced in November 1962 reinforce the pattern. Factory managers complain that the sovnarkhozes keep them in leading strings, and the sovnarkhozes in turn have criticized Gosplan for hamstringing their operations. In the larger republics, such as the RSFSR, Gosplan and the All-Russian Economic Council have duplicated each other's operations. As A. Davidov, chairman of the Buryat sovnarkhoz, recently noted: "Two stage planning (Gosplan plus the Russian Economic Council) causes double coordination, now and then red tape and confusion. As a result, even by the end of January [1962] the sovnarkhoz had not completely obtained the plans for 1962 . . . The agreement of plans for 1962 between the sovnarkhoz and the Russian Economic Council on which so much time was spent and so many people worked became an unnecessary operation, since the majority of agreement articles established by the deputy chairman of the Russian Economic Council was ruthlessly broken by Gosplan . . ."<sup>26</sup>

As the guardian of central priorities, the planning body frequently is driven to take action to safeguard national interests, and its decisions inevitably inhibit local freedom of action. Since the task set for it is to obtain maximum production with limited resources, it must necessarily steer a course which puts intensive pressure on management at all levels of the economic hierarchy. Its encroachments on the aspirations of lower economic organs are no doubt deeply resented, and its excessive intrusion into their affairs may sometimes operate to defeat its own purposes, but, given its mission of enforcing central plans and policies, it must constantly stand guard against those who seek to conceal or minimize local production potentialities. In striking a balance between local rights and centralization, its bias is necessarily toward central authority.

Nor are its responsibilities exhausted once a plan is proclaimed. Between the plan as blueprinted and the plan in action, gaps can and frequently do develop, and the result is inevitably a great deal of hasty improvisation, adjustment, and manipulation all along the line. The Soviet planning process is not a clocklike mechanism that regulates the timetable of production and administration with exact precision. It registers the tensions generated by a leadership intent on rapid industrialization and a bureaucratic and managerial apparatus which is struggling to meet or temper the heavy demands made on it. The plan is a spur to intensified effort, and as such it forms one of the distinguishing features of Soviet administration in all of its related aspects.

### *Financial Controls*

The Soviet system of financial controls provides an essential instrument for ensuring financial discipline, checking fiscal aspects of the execution of plans, and improving administrative efficiency generally. Financial powers are distributed among the Ministry of Finance, the State Bank, and the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments. These two banks operate independently of the Ministry of Finance and are directly responsible to the USSR Council of Ministers.

The control functions of the Ministry of Finance include the preparation of government-wide budgets, the enforcement of budgetary discipline, and the investigation of dubious financial transactions on the part of administrative agencies. The role of the Ministry of Finance in budgeting administration gives it strategic leverage as a control agency.<sup>27</sup> The budget in the Soviet Union may be regarded as the financial expression of the plan. One of the main tasks of the ministry is to translate the physical objectives of the plan into financial terms. All budgets are prepared in accordance with instructions issued by the ministry, and every governmental unit from the smallest village to the central government is required to operate within a budgetary framework. Each level of government has its assigned objects of expenditure and its specified allocation of revenues. In recent years, largely as a result of the 1957 industrial reorganization, the share of the union republics in the USSR budget has increased substantially. Under Stalin the central government received the overwhelming bulk of expenditures and revenues, nearly 80 per cent in 1951. In the 1962 budget this proportion dropped to 44.3 per cent, a significant index of the changing fiscal balance between the center and the republics.<sup>28</sup>

The unified budget of the USSR includes the budgets of all local as well as central institutions. After initial preparatory work by the Minister of Finance, it is first submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval. If approved, it is then presented to both houses of the Supreme Soviet and referred to their respective budget commissions. While suggestions for change may be made by these commissions, these changes are subject to veto by the Council of Ministers. After discussion in the Supreme Soviet, the budget is unanimously ratified. Similar procedures are enacted at each of the lower levels of government.

Once the budgets have been approved and allocations made to the various ministries and units of government, the control machinery of the Ministry of Finance comes into play. Regularly scheduled reports of overall financial operations must be rendered to the ministry. In addition, the ministry has its own control-inspection apparatus. Its inspectors may descend upon an enterprise or government department at any time and

conduct investigations on the spot, with free access to all financial and other data. The report prepared by the inspector is made available to the agency being investigated for such explanatory comment as it may wish to append. Thus supplemented, it is then forwarded to the ministry for action. If violations of law or of budgetary discipline are revealed, the report may form the basis for punitive action.

Important controls are also exercised by the banks. As its name implies, the All-Union Bank for Financing Capital Investments provides long-term credit for capital construction. In administering its loans, it is supposed to secure "the efficient use of capital investments, the fulfillment of plans for putting production capacity and other basic projects into operation, and the reduction of construction costs."<sup>29</sup> The State Bank, which is primarily a supplier of short-term credit, also exercises important control powers. Since credit is provided in order to implement the plan, State Bank officials are expected to maintain a close watch on the enterprises to which they supply credit in order to ensure against over-expenditures or diversion of resources to unauthorized uses. In the event that enterprises delay repayment or otherwise fail to meet their obligations, the Bank may after a certain interval cut off all further credit and draw on funds which accumulate in the enterprise's account to discharge the bank loan.

#### *The Party-State Control Committee*

From the earliest days of Soviet rule, specialized control agencies have been established to check on the fulfillment of Party directives and governmental decisions. These agencies have had a troubled administrative history. Originally organized as separate Party and governmental bodies, they were combined at Lenin's insistence by merging the Party Central Control Commission and the governmental Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (CCC-WPI). Under Stalin they were later divided into separate Party and state bodies and remained divided until the Central Committee session of November 1962, which reunited them in the present Party-State Control Committee.<sup>30</sup>

The latest reorganization is a reflection of the continuing difficulties which the regime has faced in coping with such problems as embezzlement, bribery, corruption, and waste. When the State Control Commission, the immediate predecessor of the Party-State Control Committee, was established in July 1961, it was charged with:

checking on behalf of the government on the actual fulfillment of its decisions on the most important questions of the national economy and on the observance of state discipline in the spending and conservation of financial resources and valuable materials; checking on the fulfillment of plans established

by the government for delivery of materials, equipment, farm produce, and manufactured goods into the all-union fund and for interrepublic deliveries; controlling the state of accounting and state reports, deceit and hoodwinking, as well as combating manifestations of localism, departmentalism, bureaucratism, and red tape; and checking on work on improving the state administrative apparatus and on the reduction of expenditures for its maintenance.<sup>31</sup>

Khrushchev in his speech to the Central Committee on November 19, 1962, condemned it for having failed to prevent "grave malpractices." He pointed out that the pilfering and embezzlement of state and cooperative property in the first half of 1962 exceed 56 million rubles, judged only by the cases dealt with in the courts. He cited as instances of "rather widespread" practices that "140 cases of padded and distorted reports to the state were exposed in collective and state farms of the Kalinin region in the first quarter of 1962" and that "116 cases of this kind took place in collective and state farms of the Zaporozhe region in the first six months of the current year . . ."

In calling upon the new Party-State Control Committee to eliminate such abuses, he expressed the hope that it would be able to take preventive measures by enlisting such active participation of Party, Komsomol, and trade-union members that "even a mosquito will not fly by unnoticed."<sup>32</sup> He urged that Party-state control committees be set up in the various republics, territories, and regions as local organs of the USSR Control Committee and that these bodies "have teams of qualified inspectors to investigate cases involving corruption, theft, embezzlement, and speculation."

The new Control Committee has been created too recently to determine whether it will be able to improve on the record of its predecessors. Because many of the abuses which it seeks to stamp out are endemic in the system, the task facing it does not promise to be an easy one.

#### *Legal Controls*

Legal controls over administration are primarily exercised through three channels: (1) the Procuracy, (2) the courts, and (3) the system of state arbitration (*Gosarbitrazh*) for settling disputes between government enterprises.

The constitution of the USSR (Article 113) vests the Procurator General with "supreme supervisory power over the strict execution of the laws by all ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by public servants and citizens of the USSR." The Procurator General is elected by the Supreme Soviet for a seven-year term; he, in turn, appoints procurators of republics, territories, and regions and approves the appointment by the republic procurators of district, area, and city procurators. The hierarchy of procurators operates independently of local authorities

and the courts. It is subordinate solely to the Procurator General of the USSR, who is in turn responsible to the USSR Supreme Soviet and its presidium, which may countermand orders and instructions of the Procuracy "if they do not correspond to the law."

The Procuracy's supervisory powers over administration cover a wide field.<sup>33</sup> It operates under a general mandate to prevent Soviet governmental bodies from exceeding their powers. Procurators are entitled to receive copies of all orders and decrees issued by administrative agencies, to demand information, to investigate the work of institutions, and to check on all complaints and reports of violations of law. They may also file protests against illegal decisions and decrees with the responsible agency or with a higher agency; such protests must be examined by the agency within a ten-day period, during which the effect of the protest is to suspend action against persons charged with violating such decisions and decrees. If the administrative agency chooses to disregard the protest, the procurator may appeal the case to the agency's superiors.

The powers of the Procuracy also embrace supervision over the courts, the administration of justice, and the observance of law in places of detention. Procurators serve as public prosecutors in criminal cases. Arrests require the sanction of the Procuracy, which is also responsible for maintaining legal standards in the conduct of criminal inquiries and pretrial investigations. Procurators also exercise a general supervision over all civil proceedings and may enter such cases at any time. They may appeal the decisions of lower courts in both civil and criminal cases, and appellate courts are required to hear their opinion before rendering a decision.

Although the powers of the procurators appear important and wide-ranging, their actual impact on administration is difficult to assess. It is now officially admitted that during the Stalinist period they exercised virtually no influence in checking the arbitrary authority of the security police.<sup>34</sup> At present they are vested with control over the security organs, but little is known about how such controls operate. Like all Soviet officialdom, the Procuracy takes its directives from the Party, and its pronouncements and activities reflect changing Party opinions and needs. Its position of relative independence in the government hierarchy is designed to free it from local pressure and to facilitate its efforts to impose restraints on administrators who abuse their power. Occasional press reports, however, reveal that some procurators are themselves susceptible to bribery and corruption and that others are drawn into a network of close "family relations" with local officials. The effort to make the procurator impervious to local influence by subordinating him completely to the center has apparently not been entirely successful. Nevertheless, the Procuracy remains, on the whole, a guardian of state interests, and the leaders of the

regime rely on it as an important instrument in restraining bureaucratic excesses and in enforcing devotion to state purposes.

Legal restraints on administration are also enforced by the courts. Under Stalin the penalties for administrators who misused their authority were drastic. In the first years after his death, the new leadership amnestied many former officials who had been consigned to labor camps for "economic" crimes, ameliorated punishments for dereliction of official duty, and undertook to provide greater security for administrators by freeing them of the threat of arrest for trivial mistakes. The 1941 decree imposing criminal penalties for unauthorized disposal of surplus material was revoked, and an edict of January 19, 1955, lightened the penalties for petty theft of state property.

As new abuses began to disclose themselves, however, harsher sanctions were invoked. As noted earlier, the failure of a number of sovnarkhoz officials to honor their commitments for interregional or interrepublic deliveries produced a 1958 Presidium decree which made repeated violations a criminal offense. The agricultural procurement scandals, in which many officials were deeply involved, prepared the ground for a new series of extreme penal acts. On May 5, 1961, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet decreed the death penalty for the pilfering of state or public property "in especially large amounts."<sup>35</sup> On May 25, the padding of state reports was made punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years.<sup>36</sup> On December 29, negligence in the use and maintenance of farm machinery was declared punishable by deprivation of freedom or corrective labor up to one year and, where committed repeatedly, by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years.<sup>37</sup> On February 20, 1962, the penalties for bribery were greatly increased and now range from a minimum sentence of two years to capital punishment.<sup>38</sup> The publication of these edicts was followed by a wave of prosecutions of local officials, which testified to the pervasive character of the abuses the regime sought to extirpate.

The courts, like other agencies in the Soviet control apparatus, operate by campaign and example. As acute problems appear in one or another sector of the Soviet scene, the energies of the courts are mobilized to cope with them. The recent decrees directed against official corruption and the publicity accorded to cases in which severe penalties have been imposed provide a revealing barometer of the regime's concerns. They appear to indicate that drastic sanctions for misconduct are still needed to ensure the devotion of the bureaucracy to state interests.

Another form of legal control over officialdom is exercised through the system of arbitration known as Gosarbitrash. The Chief Arbitrator, who is attached to the USSR Council of Ministers, supervises a hierarchy of arbitrators which penetrates the major sectors of Soviet industry and

reaches down into the republics, territories, and regions. Uniformity is maintained through the power of the Chief Arbitrator to issue general instructions and through the appellate function which he exercises on request of the councils of ministers of the union republics. By the terms of a decree of the Council of Ministers of July 23, 1959, which sought to lighten the burden on the central arbitration agency, broader powers were devolved on republic and lower-level agencies, while the competence of the central agency was limited to important cases involving substantial sums of money.<sup>39</sup> Arbitration officials were directed to give special attention to the fulfillment of interregion and interrepublic deliveries by the sovnarkhozes.

The jurisdiction of Gosarbitrash embraces "disputes concerning the execution of a contract or the quality of goods, and also other property disputes between institutions, enterprises, and organizations of the socialized sector of the national economy." In effect, Gosarbitrash functions as a commercial court. It is obligated to enforce "contractual and plan discipline," and its decisions are guided "by the laws and dispositions of the central and local organs of state power and also by the general principles of the economic policy of the USSR." The cases decided by Gosarbitrash cover the whole range of conflict points between enterprises in the USSR — disputes over failure to deliver supplies or delayed deliveries, refusals to accept delivery or pay the prices demanded, wrangles over the quality of goods supplied, and a host of other disagreements which arise in the complicated relationships between buyers and sellers. The awards of the arbitrators may invalidate some contracts, order specific performance of others, and assess penalties for violations in accordance with the damage inflicted. In the course of disputes before Gosarbitrash, illegal acts by managers of enterprises or other responsible administrators may be disclosed. Gosarbitrash itself has no power to take direct action against such officials. This does not mean, however, that their acts go unpunished. If the economic crime is a serious one, the procurator may order the arrest of the offending official, and criminal penalties will be invoked by the courts.

#### *Controls on Personnel*

Soviet personnel controls rely on a combination of compulsion, incentives, and exhortation to stimulate administrative efficiency and inculcate loyalty. The drive for efficiency has been accompanied by increasing emphasis on the rationalization of personnel practices.

One of the persistent problems of Soviet administration has been the marked tendency of Soviet public servants to gravitate to the central ministry rather than to the field and to seek out the white-collar rather than the work-bench assignment. The inflation of administrative overhead

furnishes a recurrent theme in the Soviet literature of self-criticism. The organization of the Commissariat of Worker-Peasant Inspection in 1920 represented one of the earliest efforts to keep such bureaucratic excesses in check. Through this commissariat, a primitive system of personnel classification was introduced, and ceilings were placed on the size of staffs to be employed in the various government agencies.

In more recent times, the function of controlling personnel practices in government has fallen on the Central Establishments Administration in the USSR Ministry of Finance and its subordinate agencies in the republics.<sup>40</sup> Among its functions are the establishment of standard systems of job classification for all government employees, the fixing of ceilings on the size of staffs, the approval of changes in organizational structure, the initiation of measures to eliminate surplus staff or unneeded administrative apparatus, and the determination of typical organizational structures and tables of organization for different kinds of governmental units. In carrying out these responsibilities, the Establishments Administration works closely with the Council of Ministers and the State Committee on Labor and Wages. Classification systems of major importance are submitted to the Council of Ministers for approval and may even be promulgated jointly by the council and the Central Committee of the Party. Salary scales and staff ceilings in ministries and agencies of the central government require the affirmation of the Council of Ministers and are issued as decrees of that body. The Establishments Administration also relies heavily on the inspection staff of the Ministry of Finance in enforcing its regulations. All government agencies are required to register their staffs with the Ministry of Finance; such registration is intended to ensure compliance with establishment regulations.

The Establishments Administration, in contrast with the United States Civil Service Commission, is not a recruiting body. Recruitment of highly qualified administrative and technical personnel is the responsibility of the various ministries and agencies. Every sector of industry and administration has its parallel system of advanced schools and institutes which feed their graduates into the branch of public administration for which they prepare. Annual admission quotas are set for each school. Students who are accepted and who graduate with a satisfactory record are referred to an appropriate government agency or enterprise for assignment to a job. They are ordinarily required to remain on this job for at least three years. In theory, the more desirable positions are assigned to the abler students, but accounts in the Soviet press make clear that influential Soviet personalities are not above using their status to obtain better posts for their children. The reluctance of many young people to accept assignments in remote areas sets the stage for an annual battle for preferential placement.

The recruitment and placement of personnel are closely intertwined with the educational system at every level of the Soviet hierarchy. Under the Khrushchevian educational reforms of 1958, with their emphasis on "strengthening ties between school and life," this relationship promises to be even more intimate than in earlier years. The more responsible positions in industry, agriculture, and administration presumably will continue to be reserved for graduates of the universities and the specialized institutes, and the students will have acquired some production or other working experience in their projected lines of activity prior to graduation. Technicians, skilled workers, and semiprofessionals will be recruited from graduates of the secondary labor-polytechnic schools and the network of specialized tekhnikums serving the various sectors of the Soviet economy. Semiskilled and relatively unskilled labor will be supplied by town and rural vocational schools offering rapid low-level technical training in industry and agriculture. These schools replace the former labor-reserve schools, as well as all other factory and trade schools, and operate in accordance with policies set by the USSR State Committee on Vocational and Technical Education. They are expected to feed their graduates into nearby factories, plants, collective and state farms, and to work closely with them.

As these arrangements indicate, Soviet personnel policy operates in disciplined subordination to state purposes and reflects the ruling priorities which regulate the mobilization of manpower. While there has been considerable relaxation of control as compared with the militarized discipline of Stalinist days, labor remains subject to a degree of direction without parallel in Western society. Every employee is required to carry a "labor book" in which a record is kept of all past employment and reasons for transfers. Pressure is exerted through Party and Komsomol channels to direct labor wherever it may be needed and to discourage abandonment of jobs. University or institute graduates may, in effect, be ordered to work in remote areas, and, though they sometimes find ways of evading such assignments, the sanctions available to the Party and the state frequently make it inadvisable to refuse.

Compulsion does not exhaust the complex pattern of Soviet personnel policies. Positive incentives to higher productivity are provided by differential wage payments carefully graded to reflect and stimulate increased work output on the part of individual workers. A system of supplementary incentives in the form of bonuses, prizes, orders, and medals is utilized to recognize outstanding work. Appeals are made to emulative instincts by organizing campaigns of "socialist competition" among enterprises and individual workers and rewarding the winners with a fanfare of publicity as well as more tangible recognition. Through exhortation and indoctrination, the Party leadership attempts to persuade

both officials and workers to identify their interests with state interests and to reconcile themselves to sacrifices in the present for the promise of a paradise to come. Soviet personnel policy thus remains many-sided. Its unifying objective is the drive to increase output through every means and at any price.

#### *Bureaucratic Politics in a Totalitarian System*

The Soviet bureaucratic structure is commonly visualized as a tightly centralized administrative hierarchy in which all initiative and decision-making power are concentrated in the top leadership and in which the lower officials serve as mere automatons to execute the will of the ruling group. While this stereotype performs the useful function of emphasizing the high degree of centralization which characterizes the Soviet system, it also distorts reality by ignoring the fluid play of bureaucratic politics that underlies the monolithic totalitarian facade.

The Soviet bureaucracy operates under the strain of constant pressure from above to accelerate the program of rapid industrialization to which the regime is committed. This program accords top priority to military needs and the expansion of heavy industry. Scarce resources are allocated in accordance with these dominating priorities. The "key sectors" which have been chosen for intensive development enjoy a preferential position in the Soviet economy, but no part of the bureaucracy is immune from the insistent and implacable demands of the leadership for maximum output and effort.

The success of the bureaucracy is judged by its ability to meet the demands made on it. Since the demands are great and the resources available to meet them are ordinarily limited, each sector of the bureaucracy is driven to fight for a plan which it can carry out and for an allocation of resources which will enable it to discharge its obligations. This struggle is in essence political. Although it is broadly contained within the framework of the ruling priorities of the leadership, there is still considerable room for maneuver. The planning experts, whose precise calculus is supposed to define the tasks of the bureaucracy, are not divorced from the play of bureaucratic politics. Indeed, the planning bodies are a focal point around which the battle for special treatment rages. The battle is waged by negotiation, by personal influence, and by invoking the assistance of the powerful. Each bureaucratic group is constantly engaged in an effort to mobilize as much political support as it can muster, right up to the member of the Party Presidium responsible for its performance.

Bureaucratic representation in the Soviet context expresses itself in a struggle for preferential advantage. Because each part of the bureaucracy operates with an eye to the feasibility of the demands which are made

on it, it becomes an unwitting spokesman for the claims of that sector of Soviet life for which it is responsible. The dictates of survival compel it to mediate between two types of pressure, the drive from above to extract the last reserves of energy from the population and the resistance from below which seeks to tailor commitments to capabilities. In the process, Soviet administrators develop a certain agility in counteracting the squeeze in which they are caught, and the more powerful or influential manage, in some degree at least, to shift the viselike grip to other sections of the bureaucracy or the economy.

This crossfire of pressures occurs at every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy. Once a plan has been determined, the same ministry or regional economic council which has fought for a "reasonable" plan and "favorable" allocations for itself must resist the efforts of its own subordinate enterprises to carve out protected positions for themselves which will shift the squeeze to other enterprises in the same domain. The enterprises, like the ministries and regional economic councils, struggle with every means at their disposal to obtain plan quotas that will be easy to meet and to accumulate large reserves of supplies and other resources to facilitate plan fulfillment. The responsibility of the enterprise is limited to its own performance, while the record of the ministry or sovnarkhoz is the record of all the agencies subordinate to it. The enterprise is in the same difficult position with respect to its component parts.

The tensions generated by the industrialization drive set the stage for a steady tug of war between the central leadership and the bureaucracy. The leadership faces the constant problem of ensuring that the pressure which it exerts will be transmitted to the base of the bureaucratic pyramid and not be diffused and frustrated by bureaucratic manipulation and resistance. The ruling group has developed a variety of ingenious devices to make its control operative throughout the bureaucratic structure. It appeals to the self-interest of the bureaucratic elite by an incentive system which offers attractive bonuses and other large rewards for production in excess of plan. It combines positive incentives with negative controls which impose harsh penalties for failure. It pits one bureaucracy against another and relies on the rivalry between them to enforce its demands on both. It depends heavily on the separately organized Party and police hierarchies to control administration, and it supplements this type of surveillance and pressure by planning, financial, personnel, legal, and investigatory controls which are built into the administrative structure. It endeavors to prevent the growth of "family relations" between the controlled and the controllers by frequent shifts of personnel and by periodic campaigns against officials who cover up for each other's sins. It takes advantage of the activist's desire to move ahead in the Soviet system by stimulating pledges of "over-plan" produc-

tion and by encouraging denunciations of officials who evade the demands made on them. It seeks to protect the activists and careerists from retaliation by punishing "suppressors of criticism" who attempt to escape the controls which surround them by eliminating the critics in their own domain.

The essence of bureaucratic politics in the Soviet system consists in a search for a viable equilibrium between the pressures from above for maximal output and the inescapable limitations which factors of scarcity and human frailty impose. The successful Soviet administrator must be more than loyal and efficient. He must learn to manipulate the environment around him to meet the demands which are made on him. He cannot afford to be overscrupulous in obeying legal regulations if the price of conformity means failure to meet his set goals. He operates under an overriding compulsion to drive through to plan fulfillment, and every expedient is justified which advances this transcendent purpose. In the Soviet Book of Acts, much is forgiven success, but nothing is forgiven failure.

Despite the remarkable skill with which some administrators manipulate the system for their own ends, the Soviet bureaucracy as a whole responds to the regime's inexorable demand for rapidly expanding industrial production. The pressure from above may be distributed unevenly as it is transmitted through the bureaucratic hierarchy, but it is distributed nonetheless. The administrators who fail to meet the expectations of the leadership disappear from the scene. The drivers and the manipulators survive.

The high-pressure system of Soviet administration imposes its costs. The administrators who drive are also driven, and the toll on their nervous energy and reserves of strength is great. The strain under which they operate is communicated to those below. The ultimate victims are not the administrative and managerial class, but the mass of collective farmers and unskilled and semiskilled workers who bear the major burden of the industrialization effort. The price of forced-draft industrialization is the tensions and dissatisfactions which it inevitably generates.

The Party leadership attempts to protect itself against these consequences by both negative and positive measures. Its powerful instruments of surveillance discourage any overt expression of disloyalty. It acts positively to build a labor aristocracy by reserving special rewards for its Stakhanovites and more productive skilled workers. It places great emphasis on attaching the loyalties of the new Soviet intelligentsia to the regime. It accords a privileged position to its bureaucratic elite and holds out the promise of rapid promotion for the most loyal and talented representatives of the younger generation. This conscious effort on the

part of the regime to consolidate a subservient, but nonetheless privileged, layer of bureaucracy between itself and the Soviet populace represents an important aspect of its search for stability. The road which the regime has chosen to tread is that of primary reliance on a system of bureaucratic and Party controls to engage the energies of the masses and to hold popular discontent in check. It builds its power on its elite formations and places its wager on their capacity to command that degree of popular support which even a totalitarian dictatorship needs if it is to function effectively.

## *Chapter 13*

# *Terror as a System of Power*

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Every totalitarian regime makes some place for terror in its system of controls. Whether exercised on a massive scale by a Stalin or held in reserve by a Khrushchev, an awareness of its potentialities conditions the behavior of the totalitarian subject. Under Stalin, the pervasive fear of the informer and the secret police made the air heavy with suspicion and distrust. Under Khrushchev, Soviet citizens breathe and talk more freely, but the knowledge that the police remain vigilant serves as a brake on those who remember the past.

This does not mean that coercion is the only method by which a totalitarian regime maintains itself in power. Loyalty and devotion must also be elicited. The skillful totalitarian dictator weaves a complex web of controls in which social pressures and incentives have their appointed places and indoctrination plays a key role. Agitation and propaganda may rally fanatic support, and appeals to self-interest may enlist the energies of the ambitious and bind their fortunes to the regime. When discontent accumulates, "loyalty" to the regime may be consolidated by providing scapegoats on whom frustrated aggression may exhaust itself. The shrewd totalitarian dictatorship may go further and permit ventilation of grievances of a nonpolitical and nonorganized character. It may even institutionalize such expression as the Soviet dictatorship does when it sanctions criticism of bureaucratic malpractice or inefficiency. Such criticism may play a constructive role in strengthening the regime since it accomplishes the triple function of draining off aggression on the part of its subjects, prodding the bureaucracy to improve its performance, and sustaining the belief that the supreme leadership is genuinely concerned about popular complaints and vexations.

Yet ultimately the totalitarian dictatorship must depend on terror to safeguard its monopoly of power. The instrument of terror can always be

found, ready for use when needed, operative, above all, even when not visible by the mere fact that it is known to exist. Because the totalitarian regime provides no legitimate channel for the expression of political dissent, its constant concern is to prevent or eliminate its illegal existence. To accomplish this purpose, it recruits its specialists in surveillance and espionage and uses fear as a political weapon. The task of the secret police is to serve as the eyes and ears of the dictator, to perform a prophylactic as well as a punitive function. It must not only hear what people say; it must also be prepared to diagnose their souls and plumb their innermost thoughts. It must transform every citizen into a potential watchdog and informer, not merely to paralyze the activities of "imperialist agents," but also to uncover "unstable Soviet people who have erred and fallen under alien influence." It must, as N. Mironov, the head of the Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs, put it, "rear Soviet people in a spirit of revolutionary vigilance," for only vigilance can be trusted to protect the regime against those who seek to "harm" and "undermine" it.<sup>1</sup>

### *The Defense of Terror*

The practice of totalitarian terror generates its own underlying theoretical justifications. The role of terror in Communist ideology furnishes a prime example. Violence is accepted as implicit in the class struggle. As Lenin said in defending the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, "Violence when it is committed by the toiling and exploited masses is the kind of violence of which we approve."<sup>2</sup> This instrumental attitude toward violence prepares the way for its sanctification when employed by the Party in the name of the working class and by the Party leadership in the name of the Party.

The rationalization of terror embraces two central propositions. The first emphasizes the safety of the revolution as the supreme law. In the words of Lenin, "The Soviet Republic is a fortress besieged by world capital . . . From this follows our right and our duty to mobilize the whole population to a man for the war."<sup>3</sup> The second emphasizes the intransigence of the enemies of the revolution, the necessity of crushing them completely if the revolution itself is not to be destroyed. "What is the 'nutritive medium,'" asks Lenin,

which engenders counterrevolutionary enterprises, outbreaks, conspiracies, and so forth? . . . It is the medium of the bourgeoisie, of the bourgeois intelligentsia, of the kulaks in the countryside, and, everywhere, of the "non-Party" public, as well as of the Socialist Revolutionaries and the Mensheviks. We must treble our watch over this medium, we must multiply it tenfold. We must

multiply our vigilance, because counterrevolutionary attempts from this quarter are absolutely inevitable, precisely at the present moment and in the near future.<sup>4</sup>

In essence, Stalin's defense of terror, delivered in an interview with a visiting foreign workers' delegation on November 5, 1927, covers much the same ground, though with notably less frankness.

The GPU or Cheka is a punitive organ of the Soviet government. It is more or less analogous to the Committee of Public Safety which was formed during the Great French Revolution . . . It is something in the nature of a military-political tribunal set up for the purpose of protecting the interests of the revolution from attacks on the part of the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie and their agents . . .

People advocate a maximum of leniency; they advise the dissolution of the GPU . . . But can anyone guarantee that the capitalists of all countries will abandon the idea of organizing and financing counterrevolutionary groups of plotters, terrorists, incendiaries, and bomb-throwers after the liquidation of the GPU . . . ?

. . . We are a country surrounded by capitalist states. The internal enemies of our revolution are the agents of the capitalists of all countries . . . In fighting against the enemies at home, we fight the counterrevolutionary elements of all countries . . .

No, comrades, we do not wish to repeat the mistakes of the Parisian Communards. The GPU is necessary for the Revolution and will continue to exist to the terror of the enemies of the proletariat.<sup>5</sup>

The real significance of Stalin's theory did not become fully manifest until the period of the Great Purge in the thirties. The liquidation of the Old Bolsheviks made it altogether clear that the salient role of terror in Stalinist ideology was to serve as a bulwark of defense for his own monopoly of Party leadership. Since this involved establishing a regime of terror within the Party, Stalin was faced with the problem of reconciling his innovation with the traditional notion that terror was reserved for the class enemy. The problem was neatly and ruthlessly solved by identifying any form of opposition to Stalin with counterrevolution and foreign espionage. The formula of capitalist encirclement proved elastic enough to embrace the enemy inside the Party as well as the enemy outside. Stalin put it as follows:

It should be remembered and never forgotten that as long as capitalist encirclement exists there will be wreckers, diversionists, spies, terrorists, sent behind the frontiers of the Soviet Union by the intelligence services of foreign states . . .

It should be explained to our Party Comrades that the Trotskyites, who represent the active elements in the diversionist, wrecking and espionage work of the foreign intelligence services . . . have already long ceased to serve any

idea compatible with the interests of the working class, that they have turned into a gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies, assassins, without principles and ideas, working for the foreign intelligence services.

It should be explained that in the struggle against contemporary Trotskyism, not the old methods, the methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods, methods for smashing and uprooting it.<sup>6</sup>

After the Great Purge, Stalin again faced the problem of reconciling the retention of these strong-arm methods with the claim that antagonistic classes had ceased to exist in the Soviet Union. In his report to the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939, Stalin addressed himself to the issue, "It is sometimes asked: We have abolished the exploiting classes; there are no longer any hostile classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; hence there is no more need for the state; it must die away — Why then do we not help our socialist state to die away? . . . Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum of antiquities?" Again Stalin rested his case for the retention of the terror apparatus on the allegation of capitalist encirclement:

These questions not only betray an underestimation of the capitalist encirclement, but also an underestimation of the role and significance of the bourgeois states and their organs, which send spies, assassins and wreckers into our country and are waiting for a favourable opportunity to attack it by armed force. They likewise betray an underestimation of the role and significance of our socialist state and of its military, punitive and intelligence organs, which are essential for the defense of the socialist land from foreign attack.<sup>7</sup>

At the height of the purge in 1937, Stalin had sought to justify mass terror on the ground that the internal class struggle was becoming more and more acute as the Soviet Union moved toward socialism. Khrushchev condemned this theory in his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, but he did not reject that part of Stalin's formulation which stressed the danger from without. "It must not be forgotten," Khrushchev declared, "that enemies have always tried and will go on trying to hinder the great work of building communism. The capitalist encirclement sent many spies and saboteurs into our country. It would be naive to suppose that our enemies will now give up their efforts to harm us in every way . . . We must therefore raise the revolutionary vigilance of the Soviet people and strengthen the state security agencies in every way."<sup>8</sup> Addressing the Twenty-First Congress, he repeated: "The state security agencies, which direct their spearhead primarily against agents sent into the country by imperialist states, must be strengthened, as must other agencies which have the mission of blocking the provocative actions and intrigues of our enemies from the imperialist camp. Our enemies are spending enormous sums on subversive work against the socialist coun-

tries. How, then, can we abolish agencies which have the duty of safeguarding the security of the socialist state? That would be foolish and criminal."<sup>9</sup> Behind these latter-day rationalizations lies the conviction that the Soviet regime cannot dispense with surveillance, even though the mass incidence of terror has been greatly curbed.

### *The Creation of the Cheka*

The genealogy of the Bolshevik terror apparatus reaches back to the first weeks after the seizure of power. In prerevolutionary days, the Bolsheviks had occasion to acquire an intimate familiarity with the operations of the Tsarist *Okhrana* or secret police; the lessons they learned then were later to be applied and amplified. Lenin quickly decided that the Bolsheviks would have to develop their own *Okhrana*. In a memorandum dated December 19–20, 1917, he called on Dzerzhinsky, the commandant of Smolny, to organize the struggle against counterrevolution and sabotage.<sup>10</sup> On December 20, the Council of People's Commissars approved a decree establishing the Cheka or All-Russian Extraordinary Commission.<sup>11</sup> Dzerzhinsky was made the first chairman of the eight-member commission. One of its early acts was an appeal "to all local soviets to proceed immediately to the organization of similar commissions." Workers, soldiers, and peasants were instructed to inform the Cheka "about organizations and individual persons whose activity is harmful to the Revolution."<sup>12</sup> At the same time, a system of revolutionary tribunals was established to investigate and try offenses which bore the character of sabotage and counterrevolution. The judges of the revolutionary tribunals were to fix penalties in accordance with "the circumstances of the case and the dictates of the revolutionary conscience."<sup>13</sup>

In the confusion of the first months of the Bolshevik Revolution, terror was far from being a monopoly of the specialists in terror. The Cheka was still in its organizational phase, and its regime was singularly mild compared with what was to come. Acts of violence against the bourgeoisie were common, but they were usually committed by revolutionary mobs and undisciplined sailors and soldiers and were not ordinarily officially authorized and inspired. The early death sentences of the Cheka were imposed on bandits and criminals. As the White forces began to rally their strength, the Cheka spread its net more widely and turned to sterner measures. On February 22, 1918, the Cheka ordered all local soviets "to seek out, arrest, and shoot immediately all members . . . connected in one form or another with counterrevolutionary organizations . . . (1) enemy agents and spies, (2) counterrevolutionary agitators, (3) speculators, (4) organizers of revolt . . . against the Soviet government, (5) those going to the Don to join the . . . Kaledin-Kornilov band and the Polish counterrevolutionary legions, (6) buyers and sellers of arms to

equip the counterrevolutionary bourgeoisie . . . all these are to be shot on the spot . . . when caught red-handed in the act.”<sup>14</sup>

The terror began to gather momentum. Gorky’s newspaper *Novaya Zhizn’* (New Life) reported, “Executions continue. Not a day, not a night passes without several persons being executed.”<sup>15</sup> On the night of April 11, 1918, the Cheka staged a mass raid on anarchist centers in Moscow; several hundred were arrested and approximately thirty were killed while resisting arrest.<sup>16</sup> Though the curve of Cheka activity was rising, its operations still remained on a limited scale.

The terror was given a sharp impetus by the effort of the Left SR’s to seize power in Moscow soon after the assassination of German Ambassador Mirbach on July 6, 1918. Large-scale arrests of Left SR’s followed, and at least thirteen were shot.<sup>17</sup> As the punitive actions of the Cheka increased, the SR’s replied in kind. On August 30, 1918, Uritsky, the head of the Petrograd Cheka, was assassinated, and Lenin was seriously wounded. The attacks on Uritsky and Lenin unleashed mass reprisals. In Petrograd alone, more than five hundred “counterrevolutionaries and White Guards” were immediately shot. The slaughter in Moscow included “many Tsarist ministers and a whole list of high personages.” The president of the Provincial Soviet of Penza reported, “For the murder from ambush of one comrade, Egorov, a Petrograd worker, the Whites paid with 152 lives. In the future firmer measures will be taken against the Whites.”<sup>18</sup> The prominent Chekist Latsis declared,

We are no longer waging war against separate individuals, we are exterminating the bourgeoisie as a class. Do not seek in the dossier of the accused for proofs as to whether or not he opposed the soviet government by word or deed. The first question that should be put is to what class he belongs, of what extraction, what education and profession. These questions should decide the fate of the accused. Herein lie the meaning and the essence of the Red Terror.<sup>19</sup>

The demonstrative massacres which followed the attack on Lenin were designed to strike fear into the hearts of all opponents of the Bolsheviks. The terror was mainly directed against the former nobility, the bourgeoisie, the landowners, the White Guards, and the clergy. But it was by no means confined to these groups. The SR’s and Mensheviks, too, felt its sharp edge, and peasants who resisted the requisitioning of grain or who deserted from the Red Army were also among its victims. The Red Terror had its counterpart on the White side; the victims in this grim competition were numbered in the tens of thousands and perhaps hundreds of thousands.<sup>20</sup>

As the Cheka broadened the scope of its activities, it also jealously resisted any interference with its claimed authority. Its tendency to set

itself above and beyond the law aroused concern even in Bolshevik circles. At the Second All-Russian Conference of Commissars of Justice held in Moscow on July 2–6, 1918,

Comrade Lebedev . . . pointed out that granting the necessity for the existence of the Extraordinary Commissions, it was nevertheless important to delimit their sphere of activity . . . Otherwise we shall have a state within a state, with the former tending to widen its jurisdiction more and more . . .

Comrade Terastvatsatuov said that . . . in the provinces the question of the activities of the Extraordinary Commissions is a very acute one. The Commissions do everything they please . . . The president of our Cheka in Orel said: "I am responsible to no one; my powers are such that I can shoot anybody."<sup>21</sup>

The reply of Krestinsky, the Commissar of Justice, emphasized the difficulty of imposing restraints on the Cheka. "So long as the Cheka functions," concluded Krestinsky, "the work of justice must take a secondary place, and its sphere of activity must be considerably curtailed."<sup>22</sup> The Cheka was vigorous and effective in asserting its prerogatives both against local soviet authorities and the Commissariat of Justice. The Chekist Peters put it bluntly, "In its activity the Cheka is completely independent, carrying out searches, arrests, shootings, afterwards making a report to the Council of People's Commissars and the Soviet Central Executive Committee."<sup>23</sup>

After the end of the Civil War and the inauguration of the NEP, an effort was made to impose legal limits and restraints on Cheka operations. On the initiative of V. M. Smirnov, an Old Bolshevik of the Left Opposition, the Ninth Congress of Soviets, meeting in December 1921, adopted a resolution, which, after expressing gratitude for the "heroic work" of the Cheka "at the most acute moments of the Civil War," recommended that curbs be imposed on its powers.<sup>24</sup>

### *The GPU*

On February 8, 1922, the VTsIK (the All-Russian Central Executive Committee) issued a decree abolishing the Cheka and its local organs and transferring its functions to a newly created State Political Administration (GPU), which was to operate "under the personal chairmanship of the People's Commissar for Interior, or his deputy." The following tasks were assigned to it: "(a) Suppression of open counterrevolutionary outbreaks, including banditry; (b) Taking measures to prevent and combat espionage; (c) Guarding rail and water transport; (d) Political policing of the borders of the RSFSR; (e) Combating contraband and crossing of the borders of the republic without proper permission; (f) Executing special orders of the Presidium of the VTsIK or of the Sov-

narkom for protecting the revolutionary order." Special army detachments were placed at the disposal of the GPU, and the field organization was made directly subordinate to the central GPU. Although the GPU was given full authority to undertake searches, seizures, and arrests, procedural restraints were imposed on it. Arrested prisoners were to be supplied with copies of their indictments not later than two weeks after their arrest. After holding a prisoner for two months, the GPU was required to free him or hand him over for trial, unless special permission for continued detention was received from the Presidium of the VTsIK. The decree further provided that criminal cases "directed against the soviet structure or representing violations of the laws of the RSFSR" were henceforth to "be exclusively judged by the courts," and the People's Commissariat for Justice was vested with authority to supervise the execution of these provisions.<sup>25</sup>

After the establishment of the USSR, the GPU was transformed into the OGPU and given all-union functions. The new constitution of the USSR attached the OGPU directly to the Council of People's Commissars and granted its chairman an advisory vote in that body. The constitution also gave the Procurator of the Supreme Court "supervision of the legality of the actions of the OGPU."<sup>26</sup> A special decree of the Presidium of the TsIK (Central Executive Committee) of the USSR dated November 15, 1923, codified these changes.<sup>27</sup>

The bridles imposed on the GPU-OGPU by these decrees proved verbal rather than real. Although uneasiness over the arbitrary authority exercised by the GPU was widespread even in Party circles, Lenin was persuaded that the regime could not dispense with terror. On May 17, 1922, he wrote Kursky with reference to the Criminal Code, "The Courts must not do away with terror; to promise such a thing would be either to fool ourselves or other people."<sup>28</sup> In the eyes of the Party leadership, the OGPU had become indispensable; its *de facto* authority to take summary action against enemies of the regime was a weapon which the regime showed no disposition to relinquish.

During the NEP period, the vigilance of the GPU was particularly directed against two categories, the "KR's or counterrevolutionists" and the "politicals." The KR's included one-time Kadets and supporters of the rightist parties in the prerevolutionary period, Tsarist bureaucrats, White Guards, priests, landowners, nobility, industrialists, and other former members of the well-to-do classes. The politicals represented the remnants of the parties of the left — Mensheviks, SR's, and Anarchists — who had once shared the amenities of Tsarist prisons together with the Bolsheviks. As old comrades-in-arms as well as opponents of the Bolsheviks, the politicals for a time enjoyed relatively favorable treatment in OGPU prisons and camps; toward the end of the NEP, their privileges

were abolished, and all traces of prerevolutionary sentimentalism virtually disappeared.<sup>29</sup>

In retrospect, the NEP period appears as a comparatively peaceful and "liberal" interlude in the state of siege which the Soviet regime maintained after 1917. Older ex-Soviet citizens who abandoned their native land during and after World War II still refer to it as the "golden age" of the Soviet period. While the OGPU was building and consolidating its power during the mid-twenties, its direct impact on the mass of Soviet citizens who had no connections with the "former people" or with the prerevolutionary parties of the left was still slight. The OGPU no doubt inspired fear even among those who were not caught in its toils, but the limited character of the categories against which its punitive actions were directed created a widespread illusion of safety and security.

The operations of the OGPU during this period reflected the dominant preoccupations of the Party leadership. Particular attention was devoted to checking on church activities, persons of unfavorable social origins, and former members of opposition parties. As the struggle of the Trotsky opposition mounted in intensity, the OGPU concerned itself increasingly with nonconformity and deviation within the Party itself. Its field of supervision included the foreign embassies and foreign visitors. Through its Economic Administration, it sought to restrain malpractices and sabotage in industry; its Special Section penetrated the armed forces and kept a watchful eye on their morale, loyalty, and efficiency. Its Foreign Section conducted espionage abroad, observed the activities of Russian émigré colonies, and reported on personnel in all Soviet foreign missions. Its specially assigned troops were charged with guarding rail and water transport, policing the borders of the Soviet Union, and suppressing any counterrevolutionary risings which might take place.<sup>30</sup>

During the NEP, most prisons and "corrective labor colonies" were outside the jurisdiction of the OGPU. The concentration camps directly administered by the OGPU were reserved for hardened criminals, so-called counterrevolutionaries, and politicals. The Northern Camps of Special Designation (SLON), of which the most notorious were located on the Solovetski Islands, formed the primary base of the OGPU detention network. According to one former inmate, in 1925 the Solovetski Monastery housed about 7,000 prisoners. "Two or three years later the prisoners totalled well over 20,000."<sup>31</sup> Prisoners at first worked solely to meet camp needs. The system of large-scale exploitation of prison labor in lumbering, mining, and construction of public works had its antecedents in NEP experiments, but during the middle twenties its operations were still on a limited scale.

With the abandonment of the NEP and the decision to proceed with a program of rapid industrialization and agricultural collectivization, the

OGPU began to play a much more prominent role. Its energies were concentrated on three targets: the Nepmen or private traders, who had been permitted to flourish under the NEP; the old intelligentsia, who were made the scapegoats for early failures and difficulties in the industrialization drive; and the kulaks, who offered active or passive opposition to the collectivization program. As a result of the cumulative impact of these campaigns, the OGPU became the intimate caretaker of the destinies of millions instead of tens of thousands.

The roundup and repression of the Nepmen assumed intensified form as the NEP period drew to a close. At the height of the NEP in 1924, the number of privately owned shops totaled 420,366.<sup>32</sup> The proprietors of these shops became a special object of OGPU attention. There is no way of knowing precisely how many were incarcerated, how many were condemned to administrative exile, and how many succeeded in eluding the OGPU by shifting their occupations and disappearing into the anonymity of the rapidly expanding industrial labor force. Many were caught up in the drive which the OGPU spearheaded to accumulate gold and other sources of foreign exchange (*valuta*) in order to finance the purchase of machinery abroad. Nepmen, members of the former well-to-do classes, and other persons suspected of hoarding gold or other valuables were arrested in large numbers and their property confiscated.<sup>33</sup>

The persecution of the old intelligentsia, which revived in intensity after the beginning of the five-year plan, was inspired by doubt of their loyalty to the Soviet regime. As hardships mounted and living conditions deteriorated, the Party leadership utilized the old intelligentsia as a scapegoat to divert popular discontent and frustration. Every breakdown in production tended to be treated as an act of sabotage for which some old-regime engineer was held personally responsible. The acts of "sabotage" were in turn magnified into conspiracies to overthrow Soviet power in which foreign capitalist enemies of the USSR were alleged to be deeply involved.

The OGPU was given the responsibility of preparing a series of show trials which would lend plausibility to these flimsy accusations. The production lag in the Donets Coal Basin in 1927-28 led to the widely advertised Shakhty prosecution of Russian technicians and old-regime engineers who were alleged to have conspired with the Germans to commit acts of sabotage and espionage. In the autumn of 1930, forty-eight specialists in the food industry were arrested and shot for alleged membership in a counterrevolutionary organization charged with sabotaging the workers' food supply. In December 1930 came the famous *Prompartiya* (Industrial Party) trial in which Professor Ramzin and seven other prominent Soviet engineers were accused and convicted of organizing a secret political party, committing acts of sabotage, and conspiring with France

to overthrow the Soviet regime. Six of the defendants received death sentences which were subsequently reprieved; the two others were given ten-year terms of imprisonment. In March 1931 another trial was dramatically staged. Fourteen professors and officials were convicted of counterrevolutionary activity and sabotage in conspiracy with the Mensheviks abroad. One of the main culprits was Professor Groman of the Gosplan, whose real sin apparently lay in insisting that the targets of the First Five-Year Plan were unrealistically high.

The drive against the intellectuals was not limited to show trials. As Sidney and Beatrice Webb observed in a volume notable for its generally friendly tone to Soviet achievements:

This much-discussed prosecution of Professor Ramzin and his colleagues inaugurated a veritable reign of terror against the intelligentsia. Nobody regarded himself as beyond suspicion. Men and women lived in daily dread of arrest. Thousands were sent on administrative exile to distant parts of the country. Evidence was not necessary. The title of engineer served as sufficient condemnation. The jails were filled. Factories languished from lack of technical leadership, and the chiefs of the Supreme Economic Council commenced to complain "that by its wholesale arrests of engineers the GPU . . . was interfering with industrial progress."<sup>34</sup>

On June 23, 1931, Stalin called a halt to the policy of specialist-baiting (see Chapter 4). Having accomplished his purpose of frightening the intellectuals into submission, he now faced the necessity of utilizing their indispensable skills. The new line announced by Stalin was soon echoed and re-echoed by lesser dignitaries. Soltz, a member of the Central Control Committee of the Party, proclaimed, "We are not accustomed to value the human being sufficiently. To withdraw men from important posts in industry and civil service by arresting and sentencing them without adequate justification has caused the state tremendous loss."<sup>35</sup>

In the period immediately after Stalin's pronouncements, a substantial number of engineers were released from prison or recalled from exile. Ramzin, the convicted "agent" of the French General Staff, resumed his lectures at the Institute of Thermodynamics. Other engineer "traitors" and "saboteurs" received similar treatment. Encouraged by the promise of a more liberal dispensation, the old technical intelligentsia again began to take its place in industry, to recover its courage, and to assume the "production risks" out of which so many earlier charges of wrecking had developed.

The liberal interlude was not destined to be prolonged. With the sharp deterioration of living conditions in the winter of 1932-33, scapegoats again became necessary, and a new wave of persecution engulfed the old intelligentsia. In January 1933 another show trial was staged, this

time directed against six British Metro-Vickers engineers, ten Russian technicians, and a woman secretary who had been associated with them. All were charged with sabotage of power stations and the usual accompaniment of conspiracy and espionage. Two months later, the OGPU announced the discovery and punishment of a large-scale conspiracy in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture and State Farming. The accused were charged with using their authority to wreck tractors and to disorganize sowing, harvesting, and threshing in order "to create a famine in the country." Thirty-five of the alleged culprits were shot; twenty-two received ten-year sentences; and eighteen were ordered confined for eight years. The victims were all alleged to be descended "from bourgeois and landowning classes."<sup>36</sup> The pall of terror enveloping the old intelligentsia was lifted slightly after the favorable harvest of 1933. In July 1934 Andrei Vyshinsky, then deputy state prosecutor, ordered local prosecutors to cease their policy of indiscriminate prosecution of engineers and directors for administrative failures.

The mass incidence of OGPU arrests during the period of the First Five-Year Plan was most widely felt in the countryside. The commitment to collectivize and mechanize agriculture involved a decision to liquidate the kulaks as a class, on the ground that they were inveterate enemies of Soviet power and could be counted on to sabotage collectivization. Stalin estimated in November 1928 that the kulaks constituted about 5 per cent of the rural population, or more than one million of the twenty-five million peasant families. The OGPU was assigned the task of ejecting them from their land, confiscating their property, and deporting them to the north and Siberia. Some of the more recalcitrant were shot when they resisted arrest or responded with violence to efforts to dispossess them. The great majority became wards of the OGPU and were sentenced to forced labor in lumber camps or coal mines, or on canals, railroads, and other public works which the OGPU directed. At one stroke, the OGPU became the master of the largest pool of labor in the Soviet Union. Its own enterprises expanded rapidly to absorb them; those for whom no work could be found in the OGPU industrial empire were hired out on contract to other Soviet enterprises encountering difficulty in mobilizing supplies of free labor.

The mass deportation of the kulaks meant a tremendous growth in the network of forced-labor camps. At the same time, the jurisdiction of the OGPU over ordinary criminals was enlarged. All prisoners serving sentences of more than three years were transferred to OGPU care, even if the crimes were not of a political character. No official statistics were made available on the population of the camps in the early thirties, but some indication of the magnitudes involved is provided by the fact that Belomor, the canal project connecting Leningrad and the White Sea,

alone utilized more than two hundred thousand prisoners.<sup>37</sup> By the end of the First Five-Year Plan, forced labor had become a significant factor in manning the construction projects of the Soviet economy.

### *The NKVD and the Great Purge*

The powers of the OGPU were concurrently enhanced. It was given authority to enforce the obligatory passport system introduced in large areas of the Soviet Union at the end of 1932. In July 1934 the OGPU was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, or NKVD. The enlarged activities of the NKVD included responsibility for state security, all penal institutions, fire departments, police (militia), convoy troops, frontier guards, troops of internal security, highway administration, and civil registry offices (vital statistics). The reorganization of 1934-35 involved a consolidation of the repressive machinery of the Soviet state. For the first time, all institutions of detention were placed under one jurisdiction. The secret police and their supporting military formations were united with the ordinary police. A formidable structure of power was cemented.

Some contemporary commentators tended to view the reorganization as an effort to impose limits on the arbitrary authority of the secret police.<sup>38</sup> The bases for these hopes were twofold. In July 1933 a new office, the Procuratorship of the USSR, was established, and among its duties was "the supervision . . . of the legality and regularity of the actions of the OGPU." The statute creating the NKVD appeared to restrict its judicial powers. A special council attached to the NKVD was vested with authority "to issue orders regarding administrative deportation, exile, imprisonment in corrective labor camps for a term not exceeding five years."<sup>39</sup> No mention was made of any NKVD authorization to inflict the death penalty. The statute seemed clearly to imply that criminal cases not disposed of administratively by the NKVD were to be transferred to the courts for trial and that crimes such as treason and espionage, which involved the possibility of the death penalty, were to be triable by the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court or other military tribunals. Whatever may have been the intent behind these measures to restrict the NKVD, subsequent events testified to their futility. In the Great Purge, legal forms lost all significance. The arbitrary power of the NKVD reached previously unattained heights; the Yezhovshchina (as the worst phase of the purge became known after its sponsor, the NKVD head Yezhov) entered the language as a symbol of lawlessness run riot.

Before 1934 the victims of the OGPU-NKVD were largely former White Guards, the bourgeoisie, political opponents of the Bolsheviks, Nepmen, members of the old intelligentsia, and kulaks. During the late twenties and early thirties, some members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev and

Right oppositions were also arrested by the OGPU and condemned to administrative exile or confinement in political *isolators*; but as Anton Ciliga, who was sentenced to one of the latter, records, the political prisoners received "special treatment," had books at their disposal, held meetings and debates, published prison news sheets, and lived a relatively privileged existence compared with the wretched inhabitants of the forced-labor camps. Until 1934, the Party was largely exempt from the full impact of the OGPU-NKVD terror; the relatively few oppositionists who were confined in OGPU prisons were still treated with comparative humanity.<sup>40</sup>

In December 1934, when Kirov was assassinated by Nikolayev, allegedly a former member of the Zinoviev opposition, a new era in NKVD history opened. The "liberal" regime which the imprisoned oppositionists enjoyed came to an abrupt end. The concentrated power of the NKVD was now directed toward uprooting all actual or potential opposition in the Party. For the first time, the Party felt the full brunt of the terror.

The murder of Kirov was followed by drastic reprisals. Nikolayev and a group of his alleged confederates were charged with having formed a so-called Leningrad Center to organize the assassination and were condemned to death. More than a hundred persons who had been arrested prior to Kirov's death as "counterrevolutionaries" were promptly handed over to military commissions of the Supreme Court of the USSR for trial, were found guilty of preparing and carrying out terrorist acts, and were instantly shot. This demonstrative massacre was accompanied by the arrest and imprisonment, on charges of negligence, of twelve high NKVD officials in Leningrad. In the spring of 1935, thousands and perhaps tens of thousands of Leningrad inhabitants who were suspected of harboring opposition sentiments were arrested and deported to Siberia. In the sardonic nomenclature of exile and concentration camp, they came to be referred to collectively as "Kirov's assassins."

Zinoviev, Kamenev, and all the principal leaders of the Zinoviev group were also arrested and transferred to the political isolator at Verkhne-Uralsk. During the summer of 1935, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and an assortment of lesser figures were secretly tried for plotting against the life of Stalin. According to Ciliga, "Two of the prisoners were shot: one collaborator of the G.P.U. and one officer of the Kremlin Guard. The others escaped with sentences ranging between five and ten years."<sup>41</sup> Stalin, in addressing the graduates of the Red Army academies at the Kremlin on May 4, 1935, observed,

These comrades did not always confine themselves to criticism and passive resistance. They threatened to raise a revolt in the Party against the Central

Committee. More, they threatened some of us with bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening us and compelling us to turn from the Leninist road . . . We were obliged to handle some of these comrades roughly. But that cannot be helped. I must confess that I too had a hand in this.<sup>42</sup>

During 1935 the purge gathered momentum, but its proportions were still relatively restricted. The dissolution of the Society of Old Bolsheviks on May 25, 1935, was an ominous portent of things to come.<sup>43</sup> On May 13, some two weeks earlier, the Party Central Committee had ordered a screening of all Party documents in order to "cleanse" the Party of all opposition elements.<sup>44</sup> As Zhdanov stated in a report at the plenum of the Saratov kraikom, "Recent events, particularly the treacherous murder of Comrade Kirov, show clearly how dangerous it is for the Party to lose its vigilance . . . I have to remind you that the murderer of Comrade Kirov, Nikolayev, committed his crime by using his Party card."<sup>45</sup> By December 1, 1935, 81.1 per cent of all Party members had been subjected to screening, and 9.1 per cent of these were reported as expelled.<sup>46</sup> On December 25 the Central Committee of the Party, dissatisfied with the modest results of the verification of Party documents, ordered a new purge. Beginning February 1, 1936, all old Party cards were to be exchanged for new cards; the issuance of new Party documents was to serve as the occasion for a rigorous unmasking of enemies who had survived the earlier screening.<sup>47</sup> The bite of the first phase of the purge is indicated by the striking decline of Party membership from 2,807,786 in January 1934 to 2,044,412 in April 1936.<sup>48</sup> In a little over two years, more than one out of every four members and candidates disappeared from the Party rolls. Their fate can be inferred from the diatribes which the Soviet press of the period directed against "wreckers, spies, diversionists, and murderers sheltering behind the Party card and disguised as Bolsheviks."<sup>49</sup>

The Great Purge reached its climax in the period 1936–1938. Its most dramatic external manifestation was the series of show trials in the course of which every trace of Old Bolshevik opposition leadership was officially discredited and exterminated. The first of the great public trials took place in August 1936.<sup>50</sup> Zinoviev, Kamenev, Ivan Smirnov, and thirteen associates were charged with organizing a clandestine terrorist center under instructions from Trotsky, with accomplishing the murder of Kirov, and with preparing similar attempts against the lives of other Party leaders. All sixteen were executed. In the course of the trial, the testimony of the accused compromised many other members of the Bolshevik Old Guard. A wave of new arrests followed. On August 23, 1936, Tomsky, hounded by a sense of impending doom, committed suicide.

In January 1937 came the trial of the Seventeen, the so-called Anti-Soviet Trotskyite Center, which included such prominent figures as

Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, and Muralov. This time the accused were charged with plotting the forcible overthrow of the Soviet government with the aid of Germany and Japan, with planning the restoration of capitalism in the USSR, and with carrying on espionage, wrecking, diversionary, and terrorist activities on behalf of foreign states. Again, the trial was arranged to demonstrate that Trotsky was the *éminence grise* who inspired, organized, and directed all these activities. The prisoners in the dock fought for their lives by playing their assigned role in a drama designed to destroy Trotsky's reputation. Radek and Sokolnikov were rewarded with ten-year prison sentences. Two minor figures were also sentenced to long prison terms. The remaining thirteen were shot.

On June 12, 1937, *Pravda* carried the announcement of the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other prominent generals of the Red Army "for espionage and treason to the Fatherland." This time no public trial was held. The Party press merely declared that the executed generals had conspired to overthrow the Soviet government and to re-establish "the yoke of the landowners and industrialists."<sup>51</sup> The conspirators were alleged to be in the service of the military intelligence of "a foreign government," to which they were supposed to have indicated their readiness to surrender the Soviet Ukraine in exchange for assistance in bringing about the downfall of the Soviet government.\* Besides Tukhachevsky, the Deputy People's Commissar of Defense, the list of the executed included General Yakir, Commander of the Leningrad Military District; General Uborevich, Commander of the Western Military District; General Kork, Commander of the War College in Moscow; General Primakov, Budenny's Deputy Commander of Cavalry; Feldman, head of the Administration of Commanding Personnel in the Defense Commissariat; Putna, the former Soviet military attaché in Great Britain; and Eideman, President of the Central Council of Osoaviakhim, the civilian defense agency. Gamarnik, who served as the Party's watchdog over the army in his capacity as head of the Political Administration of the Red Army (PUR), committed suicide to avoid arrest. The execution of Tukhachevsky and his associates was the prelude to a mass purge of the Soviet armed forces.

\* Speaking to the Twenty-Second Party Congress, Khrushchev "rehabilitated" them and explained what happened: "Such outstanding military commanders as Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Yegorov, Eideman, and others fell victim to the mass repressions . . . A rather curious report once cropped up in the foreign press to the effect that Hitler, in preparing the attack on our country, planted through his intelligence service a faked document indicating that Comrades Yakir and Tukhachevsky and others were agents of the German General Staff. This 'document,' allegedly secret, fell into the hands of President Benes of Czechoslovakia, who, apparently guided by good intentions, forwarded it to Stalin. Yakir, Tukhachevsky, and other comrades were arrested and then killed. Many splendid commanders and political officials of the Red Army were executed . . ." *Pravda*, October 29, 1961.

in the course of which the top commanding personnel was particularly hard hit.

The slaughter of the Old Guard continued with the Trial of the Twenty-One, the so-called Anti-Soviet Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites, in March 1938. Among the prisoners in the dock were Bukharin, Rykov, and Krestinsky, all former members of the Politburo; Yagoda, the former head of the NKVD; Rakovsky, the former chairman of the Council of People's Commissars in the Ukraine and Soviet ambassador to England and France; Rosengoltz, the former People's Commissar of Foreign Trade; Grinko, the former People's Commissar of Finance; and Khodjayev, the former chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of Uzbekistan. The indictment against them embraced the usual combination of treason, espionage, diversion, terrorism, and wrecking. The bloc headed by Bukharin and Rykov was alleged to have spied for foreign powers from the earliest days of the revolution, to have entered into secret agreements with the Nazis and the Japanese to dismember the Soviet Union, to have planned the assassination of Stalin and the rest of the Politburo, and to have organized innumerable acts of sabotage and diversion in order to wreck the economic and political power of the Soviet Union. If the testimony of Yagoda is to be believed, he not only murdered his predecessor in office, Menzhinsky, but also tried to murder his successor, Yezhov; he facilitated the assassination of Kirov, was responsible for the murder of Gorky, Gorky's son, and Kuibyshev; he admitted foreign spies into his organization and protected their operations; he planned a palace coup in the Kremlin and the assassination of the Politburo.

If these lurid tales strain the credulity of the reader, they nevertheless represent the version of oppositionist activity which Stalin and his faithful lieutenants found it expedient to propagate. Without access to the archives of the Kremlin and the NKVD, it is doubtful whether the web of fact and fancy behind the show trials will ever be authoritatively disentangled. Khrushchev's secret speech to the Twentieth Congress and the revelations of the Twenty-Second Congress left no doubt that the charges were unfounded, but he was singularly silent about the show trials themselves, and no tears were wasted on the oppositionists who were destroyed.

How then explain the confessions of guilt in open court? It is important to recall that the great majority of the executed, including all the military leaders, were tried *in camera*; presumably, despite the pressure to which they were exposed, they could not be persuaded to confess publicly to the crimes with which they were charged. The prisoners who appeared in the show trials represented a small handful of the accused, though they included a number of the leading figures of the Leninist epoch of the Party. What inspired them to pour out their guilt and to

confess to deeds of which they were patently incapable? Why did only one of them, Krestinsky, use the opportunity of the public trial to repudiate the admissions of guilt which he had made in his preliminary examination, and why did he return the next day to repudiate his repudiation? Were Krestinsky and the rest shattered by the continuous interrogations and tortures of the NKVD examiners? Did they perform the roles assigned to them in the show trials in the desperate hope of winning clemency for themselves or their families? Were they inspired by a twisted sense of Party loyalty in which the ritual acknowledgment of crimes they had not committed and recantation of sins they were not guilty of served as an act of atonement for earlier breaches of Party unity? Was their attachment to the Communist dream so strong that their own capitulation and debasement appeared as a minor perversion in the glories and achievements of Soviet construction? Did they genuinely believe, as Bukharin claimed in his final plea, that "everything positive that glistens in the Soviet Union acquires new dimensions in a man's mind. This in the end disarmed me completely and led me to bend my knees before the Party and the country"?<sup>52</sup>

The answers to these questions are buried with the dead. From Stalin's point of view, the motivations of the repentant sinners at the show trials were irrelevant. What counted was the creation of a legend which stamped the oppositionists irrevocably as spies and traitors to the Soviet cause. To liquidate the whole generation of Old Bolsheviks without pretext or explanation would have represented too naked an exposure of the mechanics of a regime in which any form of dissidence had become a sufficient ground for extermination or imprisonment. The role of the show trials was to demonstrate to the Soviet public and to the world that the Bolshevik Old Guard had become a fifth column which was desperately seeking to undermine and dismember the Soviet state and that the Great Purge had its ultimate justification in considerations of national security and defense. Behind the camouflage of this myth, Stalin proceeded with ruthless determination to consolidate his own power by eliminating every actual or potential rallying point for an alternative government.

The full history of the Great Purge has still to be written. The sordid stories of mass murder and criminality documented by Khrushchev and his associates at the Twentieth and Twenty-Second Party Congresses focused exclusively on the activities of Stalin, Beria, and such members of the "anti-Party" group as Molotov, Malenkov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov. The involvement of Khrushchev as Stalin's pro-consul in the Ukraine and of other members of his triumphant entourage elsewhere was passed over in dead silence. In Khrushchev's own words, "There are still many, a great many unclarified circumstances."<sup>53</sup>

The course of the purge can be conveniently divided into three periods. The first dates from the assassination of Kirov to the removal of Yagoda as head of the NKVD in late September 1936. During this period, the purge was gathering momentum, but its sharpest edge was reserved for the remnants of the Trotsky-Zinoviev group and other left-wing oppositionists inside and outside the Party. The symbol of this phase of the purge was the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial in August 1936. In this period, Stalin appeared to be settling accounts with the left, and, though the victims were by no means confined to Old Bolsheviks suspected of harboring sympathies for Trotsky or Zinoviev, they constituted a primary target. The public signal for the widening of the purge was given at the Zinoviev-Kamenev trial; the prearranged testimony implicated the right as well as the left in the "plot" to wipe out Stalin. The whole Bolshevik Old Guard appeared compromised. The climax of this phase was reached with the removal of Yagoda as head of the NKVD and the purge of his leading associates in the secret-police apparatus. In his secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, Khrushchev quoted a telegram dated September 25, 1936, from Stalin and Zhdanov at Sochi to the Politburo, which read: "We deem it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be nominated to the post of People's Commissar for Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely proved himself to be incapable of unmasking the Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc . . ."<sup>54</sup> The mystery of Yagoda's demotion was later officially "clarified" when he was attacked as one of the prime movers in the conspiracy. The actual cause of Yagoda's fall from grace remains an enigma. Plausible hypotheses stress his alleged sympathy for the Right Opposition in 1928-29, the danger which his entrenched position in the NKVD represented to Stalin, and the desirability from Stalin's point of view of eliminating an official who knew too much.

The crescendo of the Great Purge was reached in the second period, which extended from September 1936, when Yezhov took command of the NKVD, until the end of July 1938, when Lavrenti Beria was designated as Yezhov's deputy and eventual successor. The announcement of Yezhov's removal did not come until December, but meanwhile Beria assumed *de facto* command of the NKVD organization, and early in 1939 Yezhov disappeared and was liquidated.

The period of the Yezhovshchina involved a reign of terror without parallel in Soviet history. Among those arrested, imprisoned, and executed was a substantial proportion of the leading figures in the Party and governmental hierarchy. The Bolshevik Old Guard was destroyed. The roll of Yezhov's victims included not only former oppositionists but many of the most stalwart supporters of Stalin in his protracted struggle with the opposition. No sphere of Soviet life, however lofty, was left untouched. Among the purged Stalinists were three former members of the

Politburo, Rudzutak, Chubar, and S. V. Kossior, and two candidate members, Postyshev and Eikhe.<sup>55</sup> An overwhelming majority of the members and candidates of the Party Central Committee disappeared (see Chapter 6). The senior officer corps of the armed forces suffered severely. According to one sober account, "two of five marshals of the Soviet Union escaped arrest, two of fifteen army commanders, twenty-eight of fifty-eight corps commanders, eighty-five of a hundred and ninety-five divisional commanders, and a hundred and ninety-five of four hundred and six regimental commanders."<sup>56</sup> The havoc wrought by the purge among naval commanding personnel was equally great. The removal of Yagoda from the NKVD was accompanied by the arrest of his leading collaborators, Agranov, Prokofiev, Balitsky, Messing, Pauker, Trilisser, and others. The Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and the diplomatic service were hard hit. Among the Old Guard only Litvinov, Maisky, Troyanovsky, and a few lesser lights survived. Almost every commissariat was deeply affected.

The purge swept out in ever-widening circles and resulted in wholesale removals and arrests of leading officials in the union republics, secretaries of the Party, Komsomol, and trade-union apparatus, heads of industrial trusts and enterprises, Comintern functionaries and foreign Communists, and leading writers, scholars, engineers, and scientists. The arrest of an important figure was followed by the seizure of his entourage. The apprehension of members of the entourage led to the imprisonment of their friends and acquaintances. The endless chain of involvements and associations threatened to encompass entire strata of Soviet society. Fear of arrest, exhortations to vigilance, and perverted ambition unleashed new floods of denunciations, which generated their own avalanche of cumulative interrogations and detentions. Whole categories of Soviet citizens found themselves singled out for arrest because of their "objective characteristics." Old Bolsheviks, Red Partisans, foreign Communists of German, Austrian, and Polish extraction, Soviet citizens who had been abroad or had relations with foreign countries or foreigners, and "repressed elements" were automatically caught up in the NKVD web of imprisonment. The arrests mounted into the millions; the testimony of the survivors is unanimous regarding crowded prison cells and teeming labor camps. Most of the prisoners were utterly bewildered by the fate which had befallen them. The vast resources of the NKVD were concentrated on one objective — to document the existence of a huge conspiracy to undermine Soviet power. The extraction of real confessions to imaginary crimes became a major industry. Under the zealous and ruthless ministrations of NKVD examiners, millions of innocents were transformed into traitors, terrorists, and enemies of the people.

How can one explain the Yezhovshchina? What motives impelled

Stalin to organize a blood bath of such frightening proportions? In the absence of revealing testimony from the source, one can only venture hypotheses. Stalin's desire to consolidate his own personal power appears to have been a driving force. The slaughter of the Bolshevik Old Guard may be viewed partly as a drastic reprisal for past insubordination; it was more probably intended as a preventive measure to end once and for all any possibility of resistance or challenge from this direction. The extension of the purge to the Stalinist stalwarts in the Party and governmental apparatus is much more difficult to fathom. It is possible that many fell victim to the system of denunciations in the course of which their loyalty to Stalin was put in question, that a number were still involved in official or personal relationships with former oppositionists, that some were liquidated because they displayed traces of independence in their dealings with the Supreme Leader, that others were merely suspected of harboring aspirations toward personal power, and that still others simply furnished convenient scapegoats to demonstrate the existence of a conspiracy reaching into the highest circles.

Implicit in any understanding of the Yezhovshchina is a theory of the role of terror in Stalin's formula of government. The consolidation of personal rule in a totalitarian system depends on the constant elimination of all actual or potential competitors for supreme power. The insecurity of the masses must be supplemented by the insecurity of the governing elite who surround the dictator. The too strongly entrenched official with an independent base of power is by definition a threat to the dictator's total sway. The individuals or groups who go uncontrolled and undirected are regarded as fertile soil for the growth of conspiratorial intrigue. The function of terror thus assumes a twofold aspect. As a preventive, it is designed to nip any possible resistance or opposition in the bud. As an instrument for the reinforcement of the personal power of the dictator, it is directed toward ensuring perpetual circulation in the ranks of office-holders in order to forestall the crystallization of autonomous islands of countervailing force.

The manipulation of terror as a system of power is a delicate art. A dictator in command of modern armaments and a secret police can transform his subjects into robots and automatons, but, if he succeeds too well, he runs the risk of destroying the sources of creative initiative on which the survival of his own regime depends. When terror runs rampant, as it did at the height of the Yezhovshchina, unintended consequences follow. Fear becomes contagious and paralyzing. Officials at all levels seek to shirk responsibility. The endless belt of irresponsible denunciations begins to destroy the nation's treasury of needed skills. The terror apparatus grows on the stuff it feeds upon and magnifies in importance until it overshadows and depresses all the constructive enterprises of the

state. The dictator finds himself caught up in a whirlwind of his own making which threatens to break completely out of control.

As the fury of the Yezhovshchina mounted, Stalin and his intimates finally became alarmed. Evidence accumulated that the purge was overreaching itself and that much talent sorely needed by the regime was being irretrievably lost. The first signal of a change of policy was given in a resolution of the January 1938 plenum of the Party Central Committee entitled "Concerning the Mistakes of Party Organizations in Excluding Communists from the Party, Concerning Formal-Bureaucratic Attitudes toward the Appeals of Excluded Members of the VKP(b), and Concerning Measures to Eliminate these Deficiencies."<sup>57</sup> The resolution identified a new culprit, the Communist-careerists, who sought to make capital out of the purge by securing promotions through denunciations of their superiors. It was these careerists, the resolution charged, who were primarily responsible for sowing suspicion and insecurity within Party ranks and for decimating the Party cadres. The resolution concluded with a ten-point program designed to put an end to mass expulsions and to secure the rehabilitation of former members who had been expelled as the result of slanders. The immediate effect of this resolution was to produce a new purge of so-called Communist-careerists. At the same time, the Party press began to carry stories of the reinstatements of honest Communists who had been the unfortunate victims of unfounded denunciations.<sup>58</sup>

The third and final phase of the Great Purge involved the purging of the purgers. In late July 1938 Yezhov's sun began to set when Beria took over as his deputy. In December, Yezhov was ousted as head of the NKVD and appointed Commissar for Inland Water Transport, from which post he soon disappeared unmourned but not forgotten. During the same month came the sensational announcement of the arrest, trial, and shooting of the head of the NKVD of Moldavia and a group of his examiners for extracting false confessions from innocent prisoners. The enemies of the people, it now appeared, had wormed their way into the NKVD apparatus itself and had sought to stir up mass unrest and disaffection by their brutal persecution of the guiltless.

It was now the turn of Yezhov and his collaborators to play the role of scapegoat for the excesses of the purge. A wave of arrests spread through the NKVD organization. The prisons began to fill with former NKVD examiners; many prisoners who had been tortured by these same examiners had the welcome experience of greeting their former tormentors as cellmates in prisons and labor camps.<sup>59</sup> The Great Change, as it was soon to become known, was marked by a substantial amelioration in prison conditions and examining methods. According to Beck and Godin, "Prisoners were released by the thousands, and many were re-

stored to their old positions or even promoted.<sup>60</sup> A new era appeared to have dawned.

Stalin now presented himself in the guise of the dispenser of mercy and justice. Excesses of the purge were blamed on subordinate officials who had exceeded their authority, saboteurs who had tried to break the indissoluble link which bound leader and people, and careerists and counterrevolutionaries who had insinuated themselves into the Party and NKVD organizations in order to subvert and undermine the Soviet regime. At the Eighteenth Congress in 1939, Zhdanov reeled off case after case of so-called slanderers and calumniators who had tried to advance themselves in the Party by wholesale expulsions of honest Party members. Quoting from Stalin, he repeated, "Some of our Party leaders suffer from a lack of concern for people, for members of the Party, for workers . . . As a result of this heartless attitude towards people . . . discontent and bitterness are artificially created among a section of the Party, and the Trotskyite double-dealers artfully hook on to such embittered comrades and skillfully drag them into the bog of Trotskyite wrecking."<sup>61</sup> Zhdanov called for a change in Party rules to ensure "an attentive approach and careful investigation of accusations brought against Party members," which would "protect the rights of Party members from all arbitrary procedure," and "abolish the resort to expulsion from the Party . . . for trifling misdemeanours."<sup>62</sup>

Thus, the pressure of the purge was temporarily relaxed as Stalin sought to enlist the energies and loyalties of the new governing elite which he had promoted to positions of responsibility over the graves of its predecessors. Again, as in the collectivization crisis earlier, Stalin demonstrated his remarkable instinct for stopping short and reversing course at the brink of catastrophe.

The full circle of the Great Purge offers a remarkable case study in the use of terror. Arrests ran into the millions. The gruesome and harrowing experiences of the victims blackened the face of Stalinist Russia. The havoc wrought in leading circles appeared irreparable. Yet despite the damage and the hatred engendered, the dynamic momentum of the industrialization program was maintained. The arrests of responsible technicians and officials frequently produced serious setbacks in production, but, as their replacements acquired experience, order was restored and production began to climb again. While many functionaries reacted to the purge by shunning all responsibility, others responded to the fear of arrest by working as they had never worked before.<sup>63</sup> Terror functioned as prod as well as brake. The acceleration in the circulation of the elite brought a new generation of Soviet-trained intelligentsia into positions of responsibility, and Stalin anchored his power on their support. Meanwhile, Stalin emerged from the purge with his own position consolidated.

The major purpose of decapitating the Bolshevik Old Guard had been accomplished. Every rival for supreme power who was visible on the horizon had been eliminated. The Party and the nation were thoroughly intimidated. The purgers had been purged and the scapegoats identified. The ancient formula of protecting the infallibility of the Leader by punishing subordinates for their excessive ardor was impressively resurrected.

The moving equilibrium on which Stalin balanced his power structure entered a new phase. The temporary lifting of the blanket of fear was designed to restore morale, to revive hope and initiative, and to reforge the bonds between regime and people which the purge had dangerously strained. But the mitigation of the terror involved no abandonment of the system. The Stalinist refinement on the use of terror as a system of power involved oscillating phases of pressure and relaxation which varied with the dictator's conception of the dangers confronting him. The essence of control was never abandoned. At the same time, when the pressure became too great, a mirage of security and stability was held out in order to enlist the energy and devotion of the oncoming generations. It is a system which devours many of its servants, but, as in games of chance, since the winners and survivors are highly rewarded and cannot be identified in advance, the ambitions of the players are periodically renewed and the regime bases its strength on their sacrifices.

As the Great Purge drew to a close, the major efforts of the NKVD were concentrated against elements which might prove unreliable in the event that the Soviet Union became involved in war. After the Soviet-Nazi pact and the partition of Poland, the NKVD undertook wholesale arrests in the newly occupied areas. The victims ran into the hundreds of thousands and included whole categories of people whose "objective characteristics" could be broadly construed as inclining them to anti-Soviet behavior. The great majority were deported to forced-labor camps in the north, from which the survivors were amnestied by the terms of the Polish-Soviet pact concluded after the Nazi attack on the Soviet Union.<sup>64</sup> The Soviet occupation of the Baltic states in June 1940 was also followed by large-scale NKVD arrests and deportations of so-called anti-Soviet elements.<sup>65</sup>

After the Nazi invasion, the NKVD engaged in widespread roundups of former "repressed" people and others whose records aroused suspicion of disloyalty to the Soviet regime. The Volga-German Autonomous Republic was dissolved, and its inhabitants were dispatched to labor camps or exile in the far reaches of Siberia. With the turning of the tide at Stalingrad and the advance of the Soviet armies westward, the NKVD found new victims among the population of the reoccupied areas. Many were arrested on the ground of actual or alleged collaboration with the Germans, and the forced-labor camps reaped a new harvest. A number

of the national minorities served as a special target of NKVD retribution because of their alleged disloyalty. The Crimean Tatars were penalized for their "traitorous" conduct by the abolition of the Crimean Autonomous Republic. As Khrushchev later acknowledged: "Already at the end of 1943 . . . a decision was taken and executed concerning the deportation of all the Karachis from the lands on which they lived. In the same period, at the end of December 1943, the same lot befell the whole population of the Autonomous Kalmyk Republic. In March 1944 all the Chechen and Ingush people were deported and the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were deported to far away places from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkar Autonomous Republic. The Ukrainians avoided meeting this fate only because there were too many of them, and there was no place to which to deport them. Otherwise, he [Stalin] would have deported them also."<sup>66</sup> Meanwhile, German war prisoners accumulated, and the NKVD took over the responsibility of running the camps in which they were confined.

After the capitulation of the Nazis, the NKVD confronted the vast new assignment of sifting the millions of Soviet citizens who found themselves in Germany and Austria at the end of the war. Most of them were war prisoners and *Ostarbeiter* who had been shipped west by the Germans as forced laborers. Some, however, had retreated with the German armies in order to escape Soviet rule. Others had fought in Nazi military uniform or in separate anti-Soviet military formations such as the Vlasov Army. The latter when caught received short shrift; the great majority were executed.<sup>67</sup> All of these groups on whom the NKVD could lay its hands were rounded up at assembly points and subjected to intensive interrogations before being shipped back to the Soviet Union. The NKVD followed a calculated policy of treating the "returnees" as contaminated by their contact with the West. In order to isolate them from the Soviet populace, large numbers were dispatched to labor camps on suspicion of disloyalty or traitorous conduct.<sup>68</sup> Mass deportations were also reported from the border areas of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Karelia, and the western Ukraine; the native population was shifted to remote areas in Siberia and replaced by Russians, frequently war veterans, brought in from other regions.

After the war, according to Khrushchev, "Stalin became even more capricious, irritable and brutal; in particular his suspicion grew."<sup>69</sup> The MGB, successor organ to the NKVD, fed "his persecution mania" by manufacturing new enemies who had to be suppressed. The so-called Leningrad Case which occurred shortly after the death of Zhdanov on August 31, 1948, involved a thoroughgoing purge of his entourage. Among its victims were Politburo member N. A. Voznesensky; A. A. Kuznetsov, the Central Committee secretary who had been entrusted by Stalin him-

self with the supervision of state security organs; M. I. Rodionov, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers; P. S. Popkov, first secretary of the Leningrad Party organization; and many others. The circumstances of the case remain mysterious. Khrushchev, in his speech to the Twentieth Congress, acknowledged that it was fabricated from beginning to end; according to him, "the elevation of Voznesensky and Kuznetsov alarmed Beria," who took advantage of Stalin's suspicion to destroy his political rivals.<sup>70</sup> In the same speech Khrushchev also revealed that the so-called case of the Mingrelian nationalist organization of 1951–1952 in Georgia represented still another MGB invention. In Khrushchev's words, "On the basis of falsified documents, it was proven that there existed in Georgia a supposedly nationalistic organization whose objective was the liquidation of the Soviet power in that Republic with the help of imperialist powers. In this connection, a number of responsible Party and Soviet workers were arrested in Georgia . . . As it developed, there was no nationalistic organization in Georgia. Thousands of innocent people fell victim to willfulness and lawlessness."<sup>71</sup>

There were other areas of MGB activity in the postwar period which Khrushchev chose to ignore. One of the most notable was the anti-Jewish campaign of the years 1948–1952, which began with a sweeping denunciation of rootless cosmopolitans and culminated in 1952 with the execution of several dozen leading Jewish writers. Khrushchev did, however, denounce the "doctors' plot" of 1952–1953 as a fabrication, although without mention of its anti-Semitic connotations. Of this affair, which involved an alleged conspiracy of Kremlin doctors (mainly Jewish) to cut short the lives of Zhdanov and Shcherbakov and to destroy the health of leading Soviet military personnel, Khrushchev observed:

Actually there was no "Affair" outside of the declaration of the woman doctor Timashuk, who was probably influenced or ordered by someone (after all, she was an official collaborator of the organs of state security) to write Stalin a letter in which she declared that doctors were supplying supposedly improper methods of medical treatment.

Such a letter was sufficient for Stalin to reach an immediate conclusion that there were doctor-plotters in the Soviet Union. He issued orders to arrest a group of eminent Soviet medical specialists . . . Present at this Congress as a delegate is the former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev. Stalin told him curtly, "If you do not obtain confessions from the doctors we will shorten you by a head."

Stalin personally called the investigative judge, gave him instructions, advised him on which investigative methods should be used; these methods were simple — beat, beat and, once again, beat.

. . . When we examined the "case" after Stalin's death, we found it to be fabricated from beginning to end.<sup>72</sup>

The tense atmosphere which prevailed in high Kremlin circles at the

time of the doctors' plot, an atmosphere reminiscent of the period of the Great Purge, is suggested by still another of Khrushchev's revelations. According to him, Stalin had plans "to finish off the old members of the Politburo."<sup>73</sup> Andreyev was ejected from the Politburo; Voroshilov was forbidden to attend meetings, was spied upon, and was accused by Stalin of being an English agent. Molotov and Mikoyan were under suspicion, and the decision to create a Presidium of twenty-five members after the Nineteenth Congress was intended as a cover "for the future annihilation of the old Politburo members."<sup>74</sup> If Khrushchev's testimony is to be credited, only Stalin's fatal illness averted a blood bath in the very highest Kremlin circles.

### *Post-Stalinist Reforms*

After Stalin's death, steps were taken to mitigate the terror. The amnesty decree of March 27, 1953, was widely saluted as the beginning of a new dispensation. On April 3 the Kremlin doctors were released, and a *Pravda* editorial three days later promised that all cases of official "high-handedness and lawlessness" would be rooted out and that constitutional rights would be safeguarded. A wide-ranging series of reforms unfolded, involving among others, a curbing of the extrajudicial powers of the security police, a reassertion of Party control over the police, the dismantlement of the security police's economic empire, the release of hundreds of thousands of prisoners from the forced-labor camps, and the rationalization of the system of criminal justice.

The first stages of the reform movement became entangled in the struggle for the succession when Beria, the MVD chief, was accused by his Presidium colleagues of seeking to set the MVD "above the Party and government" (see Chapter 5). The news of his arrest in July 1953 was followed by an announcement on December 23, 1953, that he and six associates had been executed by a firing squad after a secret trial. The fall of Beria opened the way to a series of drastic reprisals against his subordinates and followers. In July 1954, Ryumin, the former deputy chief of the MGB who had been in charge of the investigation of the doctors' plot, was executed; in December 1954, a similar fate befell the former MGB chief, Abakumov, and a number of his associates, who were held responsible for fabricating the Leningrad Affair. In November 1955 came the announcement of the trial and execution of a group of Georgian secret-police officials, and in the following April, M. D. Bagirov, a former alternate member of the Presidium and a long-time associate of Beria, was executed together with a number of his subordinates. The elimination of Beria and his entourage was accompanied by an effort to make them the scapegoats for all the crimes of the Stalinist era. In the new mythology, Beria was transformed into a "rabid enemy" of the Party, "an

agent of a foreign intelligence service," who wormed his way into Stalin's confidence, exploited his suspicions, and was ultimately responsible for the liquidation of "tens of thousands of Party and Soviet workers."<sup>75</sup>

In the wake of the Beria purge, the Party also sought to reassert and tighten its control over the police. Party organizations were activated at every level of the police apparatus. In March 1954 the state-security organization of the MVD (the former MGB) was again separated from its parent and established as an independent body, the KGB, or Committee for State Security. At first both the MVD and the KGB were headed by professional police officials, but they were soon replaced by Party functionaries. In February 1956, S. N. Kruglov was succeeded as MVD chief by L. P. Dudurov, a veteran of the Party secretariat and, in December 1958, General I. A. Serov yielded his place as head of the KGB to A. N. Shelepin, a former Komsomol first secretary, who in turn was replaced in late 1961 by Y. Ye. Semichastny, another former Komsomol functionary.

Meanwhile, the powers of the MVD and the KGB were also being pruned. A secret edict of September 1953, which went unmentioned in the Soviet press until 1956, abolished the Special Board of the MVD, which had previously exercised a virtually unrestricted power to punish all those who fell into MVD hands.<sup>76</sup> An act of April 19, 1956, repealed the so-called Kirov decrees which laid the legal basis for mass executions by the security police both during and after the Great Purge.<sup>77</sup> A new statute on the Procuracy (April 20, 1956) authorized the establishment of a special department to supervise the operations of the security police and held out the promise of tighter control.<sup>78</sup>

Beginning in mid-1953, functions previously exercised by the MVD were shifted to other agencies. The MVD border and internal troops were temporarily transferred to the Ministry of Defense, though they later reverted to KGB control. In August 1953 a new Ministry of Transport and Highways was established to take over the responsibility for roads and highways previously vested in the MVD. Many of the economic enterprises earlier managed by the MVD's Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps (GULAG) were placed under the jurisdiction of the economic ministries. The remaining camps were first made the responsibility of the Ministry of Justice and then shifted to a new agency, the Main Administration of Corrective Labor Colonies (GUITK), which presumably is responsible to the Soviet authorities in the regions and the councils of ministers of the union republics.

Measures were also initiated to ameliorate conditions in the forced-labor camps and to arrange large-scale release of certain categories of prisoners. The first post-Stalinist amnesty of March 27, 1953, provided for the liberation of prisoners sentenced for terms of five years or less, a

reduction by one half in the confinement time of those serving longer sentences, and the unconditional release of women with children under ten, pregnant women, minors under the age of eighteen, men over fifty-five years of age, women over fifty, and all those suffering severe incurable diseases.<sup>79</sup> The amnesty, however, did not apply to those convicted "for counterrevolutionary crimes, large thefts of socialist property, banditry, and intentional murder." Thus so-called political criminals were among those specifically exempt from its benefits. Their desperation expressed itself in a series of unprecedented camp strikes and uprisings, Norilsk in mid-1953, Vorkuta in both 1953 and 1955, and Kingir in mid-1954.<sup>80</sup> Although all of them were suppressed with much bloodshed, they did lead to a considerable improvement in the camp regimens and may have helped prepare the way for the amnesties which followed. Teams of procurators were sent into the camps to re-examine the cases of the "politicals," and in a number of cases prisoners were released and rehabilitated. In April 1954, a second amnesty decree provided for the release of young prisoners who had been less than eighteen when they had committed their crimes, and this was followed on September 17, 1955, by still another amnesty "for Soviet citizens who collaborated with occupiers during the Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945." Again, the decree contained significant exceptions. It did not apply to those convicted of the murder and torture of Soviet citizens, persons tried for sabotage, participation in anti-Soviet organizations, the wrecking of government equipment and property, and other forms of counterrevolutionary activity. An amnesty of 1956 freed former members of the armed forces convicted of surrendering to the enemy, and the fortieth anniversary of the revolution on November 7, 1957, furnished the occasion for the release of additional prisoners.

The measures described above marked a significant reduction in the incidence of Stalinist terror, but they did not mean its complete abolition. The fate of those released from the forced-labor camps is instructive. Some were completely rehabilitated and permitted to return to their homes. Others were either required to remain in the area of their previous incarceration or were confined to certain districts which they were not permitted to leave without express permission. There they remained under police surveillance; indeed, even some former political prisoners allowed to return home were also required to report to the local police officials at regular intervals. While the labor camps themselves have presumably been either abolished or transformed into corrective labor colonies with milder and more humane regimes, the Soviet government has yet to release official statistics of categories of persons under detention, and opportunities for outside observers to conduct firsthand checks are virtually nonexistent, except at a few showplace prisons and colonies.

Informed visitors to the Soviet Union agree that most Soviet citizens appear far less fearful of the KGB than they were of its predecessor organizations under Stalin, but they also report that the KGB continues to be active, subjecting the politically suspect to careful surveillance and relying as of old on networks of informers to report disloyal utterances or conduct. The Special Board of the MVD has been abolished and the authority of the courts has been restored, but the Law on Criminal Liability for State Crimes enacted on December 25, 1958, contains many of the same sweeping prescriptions of sabotage, wrecking, anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, and other counterrevolutionary crimes which made Article 58 of the old Criminal Code notorious.<sup>81</sup> Under Khrushchev terror has been held in leash, but it is there to be used if the Party leadership deems it necessary. As the Deputy Procurator General of the USSR, P. I. Kudriavtsev, put it in an interview with Harold J. Berman of Harvard Law School in May 1957, "Do not forget that we have in the Soviet Union the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that law must serve the state authority . . . Compulsion may be necessary. The Special Board of the MVD was necessary in its time, in the late 'thirties. Only it was later abused. The Cheka, which Lenin introduced, was entirely justified . . . If it becomes necessary we will restore the old methods. But I think it will not be necessary."<sup>82</sup>

Khrushchev has sought to give the KGB a fresh and more humane image. The official view of the new KGB was perhaps best expressed by Shelepin, former chairman of the KGB, in his speech to the Twenty-Second Party Congress:

The entire activity of the agencies of the State Security Committee is now under the continual supervision of the Party and government and is founded on complete trust in Soviet people and on respect for their rights and dignity . . . The Chekists derive their support from the people and have close links with the working people and the Soviet public at large. The state-security agencies are no longer the bugbear that enemies — Beria and his aides — sought to make them not very long ago but are truly peoples' — in the literal sense of the word — political agencies of our party . . . What is fundamentally new in the work of the state-security agencies is that, along with intensifying their efforts to deal with hostile intelligence agents, they have begun extensively applying preventive and educational measures in the case of Soviet citizens who commit politically improper acts, sometimes bordering on crimes, without any hostile intent but simply out of political immaturity or thoughtlessness.<sup>83</sup>

N. Mironov, the head of the Central Committee Department of Administrative Organs, in an article in *Kommunist*, described these new "forms and methods of prophylactic work" as follows:

For example, a person may be called into state-security agencies for the purpose of explaining the antisocial nature of his actions and warning him that

he is embarked on an incorrect and dangerous path . . . In most cases, the people summoned for talks, realizing that the state-security agencies are sincerely interested in their fate and want to help them, frankly admit their guilt, promise to reform, and fulfill this promise . . .

Another method used is the submitting of material on those who have committed an antisocial act out of political stupidity for the examination of Party, trade-union, and Komsomol organizations and groups of working people. Public influence is now becoming the chief method of reforming such people . . .

Of course, the conduct of prophylactic educational work cannot be interpreted as a policy of tolerance toward persons who commit state crimes . . . As for the enemies of the Soviet state, they must bear responsibility for their crimes in the full measure of strictness of Soviet laws.<sup>84</sup>

The Khrushchevian drive for political homogeneity seeks to mobilize the forces and pressures of social coercion as a supplement to and substitute for police coercion. The revival of comrades' courts, the antiparasite laws with their dependence on neighborhood assemblies to identify and exile persons not engaged in socially useful labor, and the use of voluntary people's detachments (*druzhiny*) to aid the militia in maintaining public order represent Khrushchev's effort to enlist the energies of the "activists" in Soviet society in a major campaign to eliminate drunkenness and hooliganism, speculation and idleness, imitation of Western dress, and all the deviant varieties of social behavior which Soviet ideologists lump together as the survivals of capitalism in the consciousness of Soviet man.

These attempts to extend the range of social controls and to internalize them in the disciplined behavior of the Soviet citizenry were described by Party ideologists at the Twenty-First Party Congress as part of a process by which "coercion" was to be replaced by "persuasion" and controls shifted from administrative organs to public organizations.<sup>85</sup> They were accompanied by criminal-law reforms in 1958-1959 which reduced penalties, provided for more enlightened treatment of criminals in penal institutions and corrective labor colonies, made more extensive use of paroles, and not infrequently sent minor offenders to be reformed by the collectives from which they came rather than dispatching them to prison.

The swing of the pendulum in the direction of judicial "liberalism" was not, however, long-lasting. Whether because the social controls were proving ineffective or the hoped-for results were too slow in developing, harsher punitive sanctions were soon adopted. Signs of a reaction were already visible in August 1960 when *Sovetskaya Rossiya* launched an attack on the pampering of criminals in prisons and corrective labor colonies.<sup>86</sup> During 1961-1962 a series of decrees was enacted restricting the right of parole and providing the death penalty for such crimes as the pilfering of state or public property in especially large amounts, counterfeiting, speculation in foreign currency, bribery and rape when com-

mitted under aggravating circumstances, and assaults on policemen and prison guards. Shelepin in his speech to the Twenty-Second Congress pronounced: "Soviet laws are the most humane in the world, but their humaneness should extend only to honest workers, while the law should be stern in the case of parasitic elements, all who sponge off the people — for persons in this category are our internal enemy . . . In our time, when the Soviet people are engaged in the practical solution of the task of building communism, the actions of hooligans, thieves, loafers, bribe takers, and slanderers should be classed as grave crimes."<sup>87</sup> And Khrushchev, speaking to the Fourteenth Komsomol Congress in April 1962, went even further, "Some people reason that even if a man has stolen something but has not been caught he cannot be called to account, although many people know him to be a thief. But this kind of morality is characteristic of bourgeois society, where people say, 'A man isn't a thief until he has been caught.' Our principles should be different . . . We should not wait until he is caught redhanded to indict and try him."<sup>88</sup> Sentiments such as these did not augur well for the future of socialist legality. They served as a reminder that self-imposed legal norms, however lofty-sounding, could be ruthlessly brushed aside whenever it served the regime's convenience.

#### *The Organization of the Police Apparatus*

Over the years, the police apparatus of the Soviet state has passed through alternating phases of parturition and fusion. The NKVD, which was established in 1934 as a successor organ to the OGPU, united all police functions under its control. In February 1941 it was announced that the NKVD would be divided into two commissariats, the NKGB or People's Commissariat of State Security and the NKVD or People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.<sup>89</sup> With the outbreak of war, however, the two commissariats were reunited,<sup>90</sup> and the planned division did not take place until April 1943. In 1946 the commissariats were renamed ministries and became the MGB or Ministry of State Security and the MVD or Ministry of Internal Affairs.<sup>91</sup> The MGB inherited the secret police functions of the old NKVD; all other functions were relegated to the MVD. In 1949–50 the border guards and troops of internal security were also transferred to MGB jurisdiction.<sup>92</sup> After the death of Stalin in March 1953, the MGB and MVD were again reunited in a new Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) under Beria. The union did not prove long-lasting. In March 1954 the state-security apparatus of the MVD was again separated from its parent ministry and emerged as the KGB, or Committee for State Security.<sup>93</sup> At present the security police, border guards, and internal-security troops are subject to the control of the KGB, which

functions as a state committee under the USSR Council of Ministers. Until 1960 the militia, or ordinary police, was under the jurisdiction of a union-republic MVD. In that year the union-republic ministry was dissolved and replaced by republic ministries of internal affairs. In August-September 1962 their titles were changed to Ministries for Defense of Public Order.

The KGB is particularly important in terms of its surveillance functions. Its responsibilities include the protection of high Party and governmental officials, the enforcement of security regulations, the conduct of espionage abroad, the tracking down of foreign intelligence agents in the Soviet Union, the censorship of correspondence within the Soviet Union and with foreign countries, and the supervision of a network of informers to detect disloyalty or political instability and to report on the attitudes of the Soviet populace toward the regime.

The KGB is organized on the pattern of a union-republic ministry with the main organization at the center and branches in each of the fifteen republics. Its extensive field organization, which is subject to more highly centralized control than is customary in the usual union-republic ministry, extends down to the regional, city, and district levels. In a report to the Twenty-Second Party Congress, Shelepin, then the KGB Chief, stated that its size had "been cut down substantially," but, perhaps understandably, no data were provided.<sup>94</sup>

Although authoritative current information on the internal structure of the KGB is unavailable, the organization of its predecessor agency in the NKVD has been extensively described in the reports of escapees who served in it or who had occasion to familiarize themselves with its operations.<sup>95</sup> A number of accounts compiled by different informants agree in identifying many of the same basic subdivisions, usually described in Soviet terminology as main administrations. A special administration was concerned with the security of high Party and governmental leaders. The Economic Administration (EKU) was responsible for coping with wrecking, sabotage, production failures, and other "counterrevolutionary" activity in Soviet industry and agriculture. All personnel occupying responsible positions in Soviet economic life had to be investigated and cleared by the EKU, which operated through special sections located in all industrial enterprises of any importance. The EKU was also responsible for the collection of economic information from foreign countries. The Secret Political Administration concentrated its fire against members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev and Right oppositions, former Mensheviks, SR's, and members of other anti-Bolshevik parties, leaders of the church and religious sects, national deviationists, and members of the intelligentsia whose devotion to the Soviet regime was in question. The Special Section was concerned with the loyalty of the armed forces. Its

representatives were assigned to all military and naval formations and constituted an elaborate special hierarchy with its own independent channel of command responsible directly to the NKVD. The Counter-intelligence Administration directed its efforts toward combating foreign intelligence agents operating within the USSR. Its responsibilities included surveillance of foreign visitors and foreign embassies and consulates on Soviet soil. The Transport Administration focused its activities on the protection of goods in transit, the fulfillment of state plans for freight movements, and protection against sabotage or other damage to the transportation network. The Foreign Administration devoted its primary efforts to espionage activity outside the Soviet Union. Its responsibilities included the control of Soviet personnel stationed abroad, the penetration of Russian anti-Soviet émigré organizations, the collection of intelligence of value to the Soviet leadership, and the recruitment of foreign Communists, sympathizers, and others as agents in the Soviet spy network.

The central administrations of the security organization had their counterparts in the union republics, the krais, oblasts, and larger urban centers. The lowest links in the system were the raion or district organizations where the nature of operations was governed largely by the character of the raion. In the rural raions, the state-security representatives operated through circles of informers who penetrated the collective and state farms, the machine-tractor stations, and the villages of the area. In the urban raions, which correspond to large wards in American cities, the headquarters staff directed a network of agents strategically placed to cover the apartment houses, factories, offices, and other communal enterprises of the district. The majority of the informers utilized by the professional staff of the security service were unpaid. They usually consisted of zealous members of the Party and Komsomol organizations, compromised individuals on whom the NKVD had a special hold, and others who were intimidated into serving the secret police because they feared unpleasant consequences if they failed to cooperate.

The meager information which is available on the recruitment and training of professional security personnel is derived largely from reports of former members of the Soviet secret police. Before the Great Purge, the higher circles of the NKVD organization were still dominated by Old Chekists who had won their spurs during the Civil War period and who had supported Stalin in his struggle with the Right and Left oppositions during the twenties. New officials of the NKVD were recruited almost exclusively from trusted Party members who were assigned to NKVD work by the cadre sections of the Secretariat of the Party Central Committee and lower Party organs. The purge of Yagoda and his entourage was also accompanied by the elimination of many Old Chekists from

responsible positions. Rapid promotions from the ranks became the order of the day. At the same time, the NKVD was compelled to resort to widespread mass recruiting of new personnel in order to cope with the burdens of the Yezhovshchina. Again, the selection and assignment process was handled through Party channels. Under orders transmitted through the Central Committee Secretariat, quotas were imposed on local Party and Komsomol organizations, and Party and even Komsomol members who were deemed trustworthy were transferred to NKVD work. The purge of Yezhov and his followers created another personnel crisis for the NKVD. Again upward mobility was rapid, and the vacancies were filled by the designation of Party personnel for NKVD assignments. Under Beria, more emphasis was placed on professional qualifications in recruiting NKVD personnel. The new employees were used to control sectors of Soviet life with which they were familiar. Particularly noteworthy was the use of engineers for work in the special sections of industrial enterprises. The purge of Beria and his group was followed by a new infusion of Party personnel into the security organs. As Shelepin pointed out to the Twenty-Second Congress, "The Party has assigned a large contingent of Party, Soviet, and Komsomol workers to positions in them."<sup>96</sup>

During the Great Purge, the training of professional NKVD personnel had to give way to the urgencies of speeding new recruits into operative work. Even in this period, a network of special schools was maintained to instruct those who had been selected for NKVD duty. Courses were accelerated, and the training of lower-ranking personnel was concentrated in "inter-krai" schools located in Moscow, Leningrad, Kharkov, Kiev, Odessa, Baku, Tiflis, and other large centers. At these schools students were exposed to a combination of political indoctrination, military training, and instruction in criminal law and procedure, investigation, intelligence and counterintelligence. NKVD officials who were slated for promotion to responsible positions in the apparatus were dispatched to the central NKVD school in Moscow where more intensive training was given in specialized aspects of NKVD work.

The NKVD encountered no difficulty in attracting recruits. The privileges which it commanded marked it out as an elite service. A major in the state-security organization had the rank and perquisites of a commander of an army brigade; a colonel of state security was on the same level as the commander of an army division. In a scarcity economy, the NKVD officialdom inhabited an island of plenty. The advantages of affiliation were not lost either on the cynical careerists or the fanatics among Soviet youth. The Party leadership depended on the NKVD as one of its primary pillars of support. The rewards which were held out were designed to bulwark the edifice of NKVD loyalties.

*The Methods of the Secret Police*

During the Stalinist era the apparatus of the secret police reached directly into every organized formation in Soviet society. The head of the special section in the factory, the plenipotentiary of the secret police in the regiment, the chief of the raion office in rural areas, all operated under the same mandate to keep the Soviet populace under the most careful observation. This did not mean that every Soviet citizen was equally exposed to police surveillance. Certain categories were singled out for special attention. Among them were one-time members of hostile social classes or political parties, former oppositionists, "repressed people," and others whose political sentiments were regarded as particularly dubious. Certain areas of Soviet life were subject to more intensive supervision than others. The armed forces, military plants, industries of strategic military significance, transport, the universities and institutes, and the intelligentsia were scrutinized particularly closely.

In carrying out its surveillance, the secret police relied on a variety of techniques. A dossier was maintained on every subject in whom the police had an interest. In plants of strategic military importance, for example, responsible workers could not be employed or promoted without clearance by the police. All such employees were required to fill out questionnaires listing detailed biographical information which was subject to check by the police. In addition, the head of the special section in the plant or his counterpart elsewhere employed a network of informers to gather compromising material on persons with whom they had contact. Denunciations were encouraged, sometimes to be checked and sometimes merely to be filed for later use. Interrogation also served as a form of intimidation, since reasons were rarely disclosed. Those summoned for questioning were frequently shattered by the conviction that the shadow of imminent arrest hovered over them.

The procedure in connection with arrests was equally harrowing. During the Great Purge almost all arrests were made in the dead of night. Agents presented themselves at the home of the victim with an order authorizing them to make the arrest and search the premises. All material regarded as compromising was confiscated; at the same time, a list was made of the articles appropriated and a receipt given for their detention. Once the search was finished, the agents escorted the accused to the place of detention, where his money and any articles on his person which he could use to harm himself were expropriated. Again, receipts were punctiliously given for the money and goods expropriated. The accused was then put in a cell to await the pleasure of the examiner assigned to his case. During the Great Purge, this waiting interval sometimes stretched out to several weeks or even several months.

When the prisoner was finally called out for interrogation, usually at night, the examiner ordinarily began by trying to persuade the prisoner to make a voluntary admission of guilt. The examination was almost invariably based on the assumption of the guilt of the accused; the primary task of the examiner was therefore to extract a confession from the prisoner and to compel him to disclose the names of all accomplices with whom he was involved. If the accused proved unamenable to persuasion, the examiner resorted to intimidation, threats, or physical violence. The prisoner might be warned that failure to confess would lead to retaliation against his family; the longer the accused held out, the more severe would be the penalty. If the prisoner still proved recalcitrant, he would be subjected to the nerve-wracking ordeal of continuous interrogations which might stretch over a period of weeks. During this period "on the conveyor" as it was called, the accused would be deprived of sleep, interrogated constantly by a rotating team of examiners, made to stand at attention while the questioning was going on, and beaten or slapped into consciousness when he collapsed from exhaustion. All but the iron-willed succumbed to this incessant bombardment. At the end, a "confession" would be signed, and the accused would be ready for trial or sentencing.

In the case of most political prisoners during the Great Purge, the indictment was usually based on Article 58 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR or similar provisions in the codes of other republics. The paragraphs of this article provided vague definitions of such crimes as high treason, armed revolt, espionage, sabotage, terror, counterrevolutionary agitation, and association with counterrevolutionary organizations. The task of the examiner was to extort a confession which could be brought within the ambit of one or more of these paragraphs. Once the confession had been obtained, the pronouncement of sentence would depend on the seriousness of the offense. In most cases, prisoners were sentenced in absentia by special boards attached to the NKVD, the so-called troika or committee of three in the provinces, or by a special council in Moscow. "When the Yezhov period was at its height," Beck and Godin report, "sentences of less than five years' forced labor were very rare. Normally they were for eight or ten years' forced labor, but sentences of twenty-five years' forced labor or imprisonment were not uncommon."<sup>97</sup> In some areas, perfunctory closed trials were held before the military tribunal of the Supreme Court. Although the accused was present, counsel was not provided, and no opportunity was given to call witnesses to prove innocence or guilt. The death sentences pronounced by the military tribunal claimed many victims among senior military officers, officials of the NKVD, and high Party personnel. A very few cases, usually covering less serious offenses, were referred to the ordinary regional courts for disposition.<sup>98</sup>

*Forced Labor*

The prisoners condemned to forced labor became charges of GULAG, the Main Administration of Corrective Labor Camps. This agency, a subdivision of the NKVD, administered the vast network of labor camps. The great mass of the prisoners at the disposal of GULAG during the Great Purge were assigned to heavy, unskilled labor — cutting timber, building roads, mining coal, dredging for gold, and other similarly burdensome tasks. Norms were established for all varieties of labor; the degree of fulfillment determined the rations to which the prisoners were entitled. Those who met their norms received five hundred to six hundred grams of bread a day and a hot meal of inferior quality, enough to sustain life only at a very low level. While overfulfillment was rewarded with more normal rations, the work targets were set so high that such an accomplishment was extraordinarily difficult. Those who failed to attain the norms received a basic ration of three hundred grams of bread a day, a diet which was virtually a sentence to starvation. Intellectuals unused to hard physical labor often fell into this category. Some highly qualified specialists among them were given an opportunity by GULAG to work at their specialties; the great majority were utilized as unskilled laborers.

The position of the political prisoners was made even more difficult because of the persecutions to which they were subjected by the ordinary criminals. As enemies of the people, the "politicals" represented the lowest stratum of prison society. In the organization of prison labor, foremen and overseers tended to be drawn from the ranks of the criminals. Camp authorities looked on with benevolent neutrality as the criminals stripped the politicals of their food and their possessions. The long arm of the secret police followed the prisoners into the prison barracks themselves. Attached to each camp was a security section which operated an informers' network both among the prisoners and the free personnel who formed part of the camp administration. Prisoners who spoke their minds too freely ran the risk of denunciation, reduction of rations, confinement in isolators, or even an extension of their terms of confinement.

Estimates of the number of people confined in forced-labor camps under Stalin run a wide gamut, even within the same period. The Soviet government has not seen fit to release any official statistics. Most estimates represent the guesses of former prisoners who escaped from the Soviet Union and whose personal experience was ordinarily confined to one or a few camps or even sections of camps. Beck and Godin, in an account of the Great Purge which is distinguished by its sobriety and restraint, estimated the total number of prisoners "living in detention under the NKVD" during the Yezhovshchina as between seven and four-

teen million.<sup>99</sup> Alexander Weissberg, a distinguished scientist who was imprisoned in Kharkov during the Yezovshchina, hazarded the guess that between 5 and 6 per cent of the local population was arrested in the 1937–1939 period. By projecting this percentage to the country at large, Weissberg arrived at a total of nine million arrests, of which two million represented criminal charges and seven million were attributable to the purge.<sup>100</sup> After reviewing a wide variety of estimates by former inmates of labor camps. Dallin and Nicolaevsky, in a work devoted exclusively to forced labor, concluded that the totals ranged in different periods from seven to twelve million.<sup>101</sup> In the nature of things, these estimates are not susceptible to precise corroboration.

Perhaps the most revealing collection of unquestionably authentic data on the role of forced labor in the Soviet economy is contained in an official Soviet document entitled "State Plan of Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1941."<sup>102</sup> This classified Soviet document, which was captured by the Nazis in the rapid advance of the first months of the war, contains a detailed statement of economic targets for 1941; it also includes a rich assortment of material on the economic activities of the NKVD. The 1941 plan lists a projected capital investment of 37,650,000,000 rubles, exclusive of capital investments of the Commissariats for Transportation, Defense, and Navy. Out of this sum, the NKVD accounted for 6,810,000,000 rubles, or about 18 per cent. In presenting the 1941 economic plan. Voznesensky, the chairman of Gosplan, reported the total capital investment planned for 1941 as 57,000,000,000 rubles.<sup>103</sup> The NKVD share of this total was approximately 12 per cent. On the basis of the 1941 capital-investment data, Naum Jasny reached the conclusion that the NKVD was expected to account for 17 per cent of the total 1941 construction and that the number of concentration camp inmates engaged in NKVD construction projects alone would approximate 1,172,000. The 1941 plan indicated that lumbering was the second most important industrial activity of the NKVD. The total share of the NKVD in this industry was about 12 per cent, but this percentage was substantially exceeded in the northern areas of the USSR. In Archangelsk oblast, it was 26 per cent; in the Khabarovsk krai and the Karelo-Finnish republic, more than 33 per cent; in Murmansk oblast, more than 40 per cent; and in the Komi Autonomous Republic, more than 50 per cent.<sup>104</sup> Other NKVD industrial targets mentioned in the plan included 5,300,000 tons of coal out of a total 191,000,000 tons; 250,000 tons of oil out of a total 35,000,000 tons; 150,000 tons of chrome ore out of a total of 370,000; and 82,000,000 bricks to be produced in the Kharbarovsk and Maritime krais.<sup>105</sup>

It should be noted that the captured version of the 1941 plan is incomplete. Data on gold production and armaments were not included

and were apparently reserved for separate supplements which circulated among a very restricted group. Information from other sources indicates that gold mining was virtually an NKVD monopoly; the vast development in the Kolyma region was administered by the NKVD through its subsidiary *Dalstroi* and was largely manned by forced labor. On the basis of sober reading of the reports of former inmates of the concentration camps in the Kolyma area, it would appear that *Dalstroi* utilized from two hundred thousand to four hundred thousand forced laborers in the 1941 period.<sup>106</sup> This, it should be stressed, is a conservative figure. The estimate of Dallin and Nicolaevsky runs from one and a half to two million prisoners.<sup>107</sup>

The 1941 plan did not list the number of camp inmates. The data on the economic activities of the NKVD, however, made it possible to arrive at a fairly reliable estimate of approximately three and a half million.<sup>108</sup> This total applied only to forced labor confined in prison camps under direct NKVD jurisdiction. It did not include forced laborers hired out to other enterprises. It did not include persons sentenced to exile in remote areas who remained under NKVD supervision even though they lived and worked under the same conditions as the rest of the population. Nor did it include the arrested who were being held for investigation and sentence in remand prisons or those serving terms of confinement in ordinary prisons. It did not include workers penalized for tardiness and absenteeism by being compelled to work at their jobs at substantially reduced pay. And it took no account of the degree of compulsion then attached to job assignments and transfers of so-called free labor. It is obvious that estimates of "forced labor" must necessarily vary widely, depending on the categories which are included.

Since 1941, no authoritative internal source comparable to the "State Plan" has become available. Large contingents of new prisoners continued to flow into the camps during and after World War II, but estimates of their numbers must necessarily be speculative. In his interview with Berman in 1957, Deputy Procurator General Kudriavtsev admitted that about three million persons were under detention in March 1953, "about half of whom were 'politicals,'" but what relation this estimate bore to reality is difficult for an outsider to judge.<sup>109</sup>

The large-scale release of prisoners from the forced-labor camps since the death of Stalin and the transformation of such camps as remain into so-called corrective labor colonies suggest that prison labor at present plays a much smaller role in the Soviet economy than it did at the height of the Stalinist purges. But it would be a mistake to assume that the Soviet regime relies only on economic incentives in allocating its labor force. The employment of the system of exile and forced residence in remote areas to penalize those who violate the norms of Soviet society con-

stitutes a more humane form of punitive action than prevailed under Stalin, but for those who suffer its restrictions it remains a species of coercion which no high-flown rhetoric can conceal. The crude terror and massive exploitation of the forced-labor camps have been largely abandoned, but that subtler form of terror induced by police surveillance and manipulated social pressure persists.

### *The Hazards of Terror*

The reliance on terror as an instrument of dominion has its elements of danger. It is not easy to control. A secret police develops its own laws of growth. The more discord it discovers or unfolds, the more indispensable it becomes. Its tendency is always to extend its own sovereignty, to emancipate itself from external controls, to become a state within a state, and to preserve the conditions of emergency and siege on which an expansion of its own power depends. From the viewpoint of the leadership, there is an even greater worry, the fear that the secret police will become a menace to the security of the highest Party leaders themselves. It is a risk of which the leadership has been aware and against which it takes precautions. Every effort is made to subordinate the KGB to central Party controls. Responsible employees are required to be Party members. Appointments and promotions must be cleared with the Department of Administrative Organs of the Central Committee Secretariat, which maintains a particularly close watch over the KGB. The secretaries of Party organizations in the KGB are used as the eyes and ears of the Central Committee. Special groups in the Party-State Control Committee are assigned to observe the KGB. In these and perhaps other ways, the Party leadership seeks to safeguard itself against the possibility that "the avenging sword of the revolution" may turn against the revolutionary leadership itself.

Thus far, no head of the Soviet secret police has succeeded in using his position as a platform from which to strike out for supreme power. The first director of the Cheka and OGPU was Felix Dzerzhinsky, an Old Bolshevik of unimpeachable idealism whose whole career documented the proposition that there is no fanaticism so terrible as that of the pure idealist. Dzerzhinsky gave no evidence of Napoleonic ambitions and died in 1926 without attaining Politburo status. His successor, Menzhinsky, was a much lesser figure, and though he continued as head of the OGPU until 1934, he never moved beyond the second rank of Party leaders. Yagoda, who came next, was removed from office in 1936 and executed in 1938. His successor, Yezhov, was relieved of his duties in 1938 and disappeared in 1939. Neither Yagoda nor Yezhov could be counted in the front ranks of Party leaders. Beria, who succeeded Yezhov, was the first head of the NKVD to enter the Politburo, where he became

a leading figure. But he too was executed in the succession struggle after Stalin's death. His successors were two professional police officers, Kruglov, the MVD chief, and Serov, head of the KGB, neither of whom seemed to pose any real danger to the ruling group. But they too were soon replaced by two Party functionaries, Dudorov and Shelepin, both then outside the Presidium circle of top Party leaders. In late 1961 Shelepin was promoted to a Central Committee secretaryship and yielded his KGB post to Semichastny, former Komsomol first secretary. Thus far, the vigilance of the Party leadership has been proof against all dreams of utilizing the police apparatus as the road to supreme power.

Even if the Party leadership is successful in controlling the secret police, there are other disadvantages in a regime of police surveillance which are not so amenable to skillful manipulation. A system which puts large-scale reliance on a secret police is wasteful of manpower. The atmosphere of suspicion which surveillance breeds is not ordinarily conducive to creative thinking and displays of individual initiative. There is always the hazard that the secret police will run amok, as it did during the Great Purge, and do serious and perhaps unintended harm to the productive and administrative machinery of the state. It is no easy task to apply terror and at the same time to hold it in leash.

Perhaps the most subtle danger posed by police surveillance is its effect on political decisions at the very highest levels. The KGB is an important source of intelligence regarding both domestic and international dangers. Since the KGB apparatus lives and grows on emergency and crisis, its justification hinges upon the maintenance of a state of siege. Consequently, the intelligence that filters through the KGB to the top political leadership is apt to emphasize the storms that are brewing, the plots against the regime, and sinister threats at home and abroad. The risk which the Party leadership faces is that it too will become the unconscious victim of the Frankenstein's monster which it has created. The ultimate hazard of terror as a system of power is that it ends by terrorizing the master as well as the slave. To read Khrushchev's secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress is to sense the extent to which Stalin was trapped by his own suspicions and fears. In turning his back on the Stalinist legacy of mass terror and in bridling the KGB, Khrushchev may well be building his power on a more rational and ultimately more secure base.

## *Chapter 14*

# *The Party and the Armed Forces*

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Every revolutionary movement which comes to power faces the task of building a loyal and efficient military establishment to consolidate its conquests. In order to ensure loyalty, the leaders of the revolution fill the army with their supporters. In order to secure efficiency, they find themselves compelled to professionalize their fighting force. In the aftermath of profound social upheaval, these two objectives are not easily fused. Revolutionary armies do not automatically inherit the technical military skills and professional leadership of the armies which they displace. The destruction of the old army involves the dispersal of its officer cadres. The sympathies of the officer corps are seldom enrolled on the side of the revolution. When loyalty is in question, technical qualifications are a dubious asset. Revolutionary armies thrive on the devotion which they elicit and the new talent which they bring to the fore. But they cannot dispense with discipline and professional direction.

### *The Creation of the Red Army*

After the seizure of power in November 1917, the Bolsheviks inherited an army in process of dissolution. Its disintegration had been speeded by Bolshevik propaganda which played on the war-weariness and land-hunger of the peasant rank and file. With the old army scattered to the four winds, the Bolsheviks confronted the problem of creating a new army on which they could build their power. The military formations on which they could rely were a motley lot. They consisted of armed workmen recruited in the Petrograd and Moscow factories and organized into so-called Red Guards, sailors from the Baltic Fleet, and a few army units of the Petrograd garrison. With these elements at their immediate disposal, the Bolsheviks faced the task of staving off a rapid German advance and coping with the forces of counterrevolution.

The first decision of the Bolsheviks was to make peace with the Germans. This meant making peace on German terms. The terms were harsh, and many of the Bolshevik leaders were not prepared to accept them. After prolonged debate, Lenin prevailed with the argument that there was no alternative. On March 3, 1918, the Bolsheviks signed the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk by which they gave up 34 per cent of Russia's population, 32 per cent of her agricultural land, 54 per cent of her industry, and 89 per cent of her coal mines. Colossal as these losses were, they left the Bolsheviks free to concentrate their energies on the armed struggle against the Whites and the Allied intervention. This was the school in which the Red Army was forged.

The first steps in the construction of the new army represented a curious melange of visionary utopianism and gradually sharpening realism. The dream of an egalitarian people's army, derived from the Paris Commune, possessed the minds of the Bolshevik leadership and guided the early army decrees. The order of December 29, 1917,<sup>1</sup> abolishing military ranks and titles was followed by another decree of the Council of People's Commissars on January 12, 1918, proclaiming the formation of a socialist army which was to be "built up from below on the principles of election of officers and mutual comradeley discipline and respect."<sup>2</sup>

The army was recruited on a voluntary basis. According to the decree of January 28, 1918, the new Worker-Peasant Red Army was to be composed "of the more class-conscious and organized elements of the toiling masses." Their loyalty to the regime was to be vouched for by the Party, trade unions, army committees, "or democratic organizations, standing on the platform of the Soviet Government."<sup>3</sup> Volunteers were required to enlist for a period of three months' service; they received a salary of fifty rubles a month plus keep and provision for their dependents. In the next few months, only 106,000 men joined the Red Army. The recruitment drive was a failure.

The early Red Army was a sorry organization from a professional point of view. Discipline was virtually nonexistent. Soldiers spent most of their time holding meetings, debating orders, and shaping up bargaining demands. The speech made by a soldier delegate to a conference of Red Army men in Petrograd in late March 1918 suggests the temper of the rank and file. "Either give us 300 rubles a month with food, clothing and lodging," he shouted, "or we will show the Council of People's Commissars that we are able to defend our interests."<sup>4</sup> The men attracted to the Red Army were not always drawn by idealistic motives. Trotsky put it bluntly when he reported, "Although we got a number of self-sacrificing young workmen, the majority of those who enlisted were vagabonds of the worst kind."<sup>5</sup>

The units of the Red Army functioned as quasi-autonomous principal-

ties which were held together by common interest rather than command. Officers were ordinarily elected from the ranks. A typical letter reported, "A private . . . was elected commander of our brigade . . . The brigade is run by a committee . . . in which there is not a single officer. Things are in great confusion and every battery lives as it pleases."<sup>6</sup> It was this disorder which led Trotsky to conclude, "A real army cannot be run by elected committees and elected officers who may be dismissed at any moment by their subordinates."<sup>7</sup> The survival of the Bolshevik regime in the early months of 1918 was less a tribute to its military prowess than it was a by-product of the weaknesses and disunity of its antagonists.

### *The Trotsky Reforms*

In March 1918 Leon Trotsky was designated People's Commissar for War and entrusted with the responsibility of reorganizing the military establishment. The series of reforms that he inaugurated laid the foundation for the professionalization of the Red Army and its transformation into an effective and loyal fighting force.

The first of Trotsky's major achievements was the creation of a central military authority. In early 1918 the control of military operations was dispersed and disintegrated. The organization of units of the Red Army was the responsibility of military departments of the local soviets. The local soviets did not limit themselves to recruitment; they assumed full control of the forces they had mobilized. "Local patriotism" took on virulent forms. "Every county," Trotsky complained, "almost every township, believes that the Soviet power can be best defended by concentrating on the territory of the given township as much as possible of aviation, matériel, radio equipment, rifles, armored cars. All try to conceal this matériel — not only in the provinces, but even in the centers, nay, even in the regional organizations of Petrograd."<sup>8</sup> Local army commanders insisted on retention of their own freedom of action and resented and defied the dictates of Moscow.

Trotsky addressed himself to the task of overcoming these centrifugal tendencies in the interest of coordinated operations and unified strategy. The Supreme Military Council, which was established on March 1, 1918, limited its activity to the German front. In May 1918 an Operations Department was created to direct Red Army strategy on the various Civil War fronts, but it continued to meet strong local resistance. In July the command of all the armed forces in the field was entrusted to I. I. Vatsetis, an ex-Tsarist colonel of the general staff. On September 2, a Revolutionary War Council under the chairmanship of Trotsky was set up to coordinate all operational, administrative, and supply activities relating to the Red Army. A member of the council had to countersign orders of

the commander in chief; his freedom of action, however, was to be safeguarded "in all questions of a strategic-operative character."<sup>9</sup> On November 30, 1918, the structure of central authority was completed with the establishment of the Council of Defense. Its functions embraced "the mobilization of the forces and resources of the country in the interests of defense."<sup>10</sup> The strengthening of the organs of central control was an important factor in molding the Red Army into a homogeneous fighting unit.

In order to guarantee a supply of trained manpower for the army, Trotsky strongly supported the introduction of compulsory military training and conscription. By the spring of 1918, voluntary recruitment had demonstrated its complete ineffectiveness. The total size of the Red Volunteer Army on May 10 was only 306,000 men. The great majority had enlisted for short-term service, and replacements were difficult to obtain on a volunteer basis.<sup>11</sup> On April 22 the Soviet government instituted compulsory military training. Peasants who did not employ hired labor and all workers in the age group of eighteen to forty were required to undergo twelve hours of military training per week for a period of eight weeks. Soon afterwards, members of the bourgeoisie, who were excluded from the new army, were mobilized for hard noncombatant labor in rear areas. Trotsky told them, "Our grandfathers and fathers served your grandfathers and fathers, cleaned up dirt and filth, and we will compel you to clean up dirt."<sup>12</sup>

On June 12, 1918, conscription began with the mobilization of five age groups (twenty-one to twenty-five) in fifty-one counties in the Volga, Ural, and western Siberia areas which were threatened by White invasion. This action was followed by partial mobilizations in the Moscow and Petrograd areas. The decree of June 29 made all males between the ages of eighteen and forty liable to military service. By the end of the year, the size of the Red Army had increased to eight hundred thousand. By January 1, 1920, it reached a total of three million, and during 1920 it mounted to a peak of five and a half million. This impressive reservoir of manpower was one of the decisive elements in determining the outcome of the Civil War.

Trotsky also seized the initiative in pressing for the restoration of discipline in the army. In the summer of 1918 the election of officers was abolished and the authority of appointed commanders reinforced. Stern punishment was meted out to deserters, mutineers, and cowards. "At all costs, and at any price," insisted Trotsky, "it is necessary to implant discipline in the Red Army."<sup>13</sup> When doctrinaire word-spinners among the Bolshevik military workers began to busy themselves with elaborating new military theory to guide the operations of the Red Army, Trotsky provided an earthy reminder:

We must now devote our whole attention to improving our material and making it more efficient rather than to fantastic schemes of reorganization. Every army unit must receive its rations regularly, foodstuffs must not be allowed to rot, and meals must be cooked properly. We must teach our soldiers personal cleanliness and see that they exterminate vermin. They must learn their drill properly and perform it in the open air as much as possible. They must be taught to make their political speeches short and sensible, to clean their rifles and grease their boots. They must learn to shoot, and must help their officers to ensure strict observance of the regulations for keeping in touch with other units in the field, reconnaissance work, reports and sentry duty . . . they must learn to wind their puttees properly so as to prevent sores on their legs, and once again they must learn to grease their boots. That is our programme for next year in general and next spring in particular, and if anyone wants to take advantage of any solemn occasion to describe this practical programme as "military doctrine," he's welcome to do so.<sup>14</sup>

This classic deflation of the amateur Party strategists was designed to bring home the basic importance of training and discipline, virtues which too many of the Red Army warriors were ready to discard as outworn relics of the bourgeois past. The martinet qualities of Trotsky left an indelible impress on the Red Army; without his attention to the practical details of army organization — of transport, supply, training, and discipline — the Red Army might have degenerated into a loose confederation of guerrilla bands.

Perhaps the most important of Trotsky's reforms was his insistence on the necessity of building the Red Army around a corps of trained military commanders. The material out of which such a corps could be constructed consisted of the remnants of the Tsarist cadre officers who remained in Bolshevik territory, the former noncommissioned officers of the old army, professional revolutionaries and leaders of the Red Guard who had displayed an aptitude for military affairs, and outstanding Red Army men who could be quickly trained for command responsibilities. The glaring deficiency of the Red Army was the absence of trained personnel to fill the higher command and staff posts. For Trotsky, the moral was clear. The Red Army had to enlist the knowledge of the old officers and utilize them until the Red Army produced its own trusted cadres.

The decision to employ the Tsarist officers met sharp opposition within the Party on practical as well as doctrinal grounds. The critics argued that the old officer corps was hostile to the Soviet regime, could not be trusted to discharge command responsibilities, and would betray the Soviet cause at the first opportunity. Trotsky replied:

There is danger in everything. We must have teachers who know something about the science of war. We talk to these generals with complete frankness. We tell them: "There is a new master in the land — the working class. He needs instructors to teach the toilers . . . how to fight the bourgeoisie" . . . If these

generals serve us honestly we shall give them our full support . . . If they attempt . . . counterrevolution, we shall find a way to deal with them.<sup>15</sup>

Backed by Lenin and despite unremitting grumbling in the ranks of the Party, Trotsky proceeded to carry out the decision to employ former Tsarist officers. From June 1918 to August 1920 more than forty-eight thousand were either drafted or volunteered for service in the Red Army.<sup>16</sup> The list included S. Kamenev, a former Tsarist colonel of the general staff who became commander in chief of the Red Army in June 1919, Colonel Boris Shaposhnikov, who later became a marshal of the Red Army and chief of staff, A. A. Svechin, a former major general of the imperial general staff who headed the Red Army Supreme Staff and later occupied the chair of military history at the Soviet War College, and a group of young officers including Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, Primakov, Kork, and Putna, all of whom rose rapidly to high Soviet commands in the Civil War period and held leading posts in the Red Army until they were liquidated in the Great Purge of 1937.

"A small group of officers . . .," Trotsky reported, "have caught the spirit of the Revolution and the new age . . . They are doing everything they can to increase the military power of the Soviet Republic. They should be respected and supported."<sup>17</sup> But not all of the officers proved useful. Trotsky described many of them as "time-servers, men without initiative, without principles, and without even enough energy to join the Whites."<sup>18</sup> Stalin complained to Lenin: "The 'staff' workers know only how to 'draw schemes' and propose plans . . . they are absolutely indifferent to operational activities . . . in general, they feel themselves to be strangers, guests."<sup>19</sup> Trotsky frankly admitted that "many of them betrayed us and went over to the enemy."<sup>20</sup> Yet he continued to insist that the old officers were indispensable. "To refuse the service of military specialists because individual officers play the traitor is about as reasonable," he argued, "as to drive out all the railway engineers . . . because there are a few saboteurs among them."<sup>21</sup>

Stern measures were taken to ensure the "loyalty" of the old army officers who were inducted into Red Army service. A system of hostages was instituted. If officers betrayed the Red Army, Trotsky warned that their families would suffer the consequences. His notorious order of September 30, 1918, called for the immediate arrest of "the families of . . . deserters and traitors." "Let them know," Trotsky declared, "that they are at the same time betraying members of their own families: fathers, mothers, sisters, brothers, wives, and children."<sup>22</sup>

The installation of a system of political commissars was also designed as a safeguard against treason and sabotage. The commissar functioned as the direct representative of the Soviet regime in the army. His primary

duty, as outlined in Trotsky's decree of April 6, 1918, was "to prevent army institutions from becoming nests of conspiracy or employing weapons against workmen and peasants."<sup>23</sup> Commissars were instructed to direct Party work in the army, to carry on political propaganda among the raw peasant and worker recruits, and to control the activity of the commanding personnel. Orders and reports were to be signed jointly by commander and commissar. Authority to issue military, operative decisions was to rest with the commanding personnel. The responsibility of the commissar in countersigning such orders was limited to certification that the order was not dictated by counterrevolutionary considerations. Where commissars could not approve orders, they were to report their opinions to higher authorities. "A Commissar," said the decree, "may prevent the execution of a military order only when he has justifiable grounds for belief that it is inspired by counter-revolutionary motives."<sup>24</sup>

The juxtaposition of imperial army officer and Communist commissar was fraught with conflict, since it was impossible to draw a precise line between their powers. Mutual suspicion poisoned the relationship and made friction inevitable. Trotsky made a determined effort to drive his two horses in tandem. "A commissar who fails to prevent the desertion of a commanding officer," he warned, "will have to answer for his negligence with his own life."<sup>25</sup> At the same time, commissars were directed not "to give orders, but to watch," to avoid quarrels, and to "behave respectfully to military experts who fulfill their duties conscientiously."<sup>26</sup> Such instructions were easier to deliver than to translate into practice. As the commissars acquired military competence and experience, the scope of their control inevitably widened. The majority of the officers of the old army were regarded as potentially disloyal, to be used because of their professional training but to be discarded as soon as the Red Army had trained its own proletarian replacements. Many of the Tsarist officers were destined to become expendables as a new generation of Red commanders rose from the ranks.

The new corps of commanders for the Red Army also drew heavily on the noncommissioned officers of the old army. On August 13, 1918, Trotsky pronounced: "Non-commissioned officers! . . . The Soviet government calls you to the posts of commanding officers . . . You are the children of the toiling people; the worker-peasant army is *your* army . . . Every non-commissioned officer serving in the Red Army . . . is hereby raised to the status of squad commander. The Soviet government gives you the opportunity . . . to rise to the very height of military art."<sup>27</sup> Between June 12, 1918, and August 15, 1920, the Red Army received 214,717 former Tsarist noncommissioned officers, as well as 26,766 lower medical and veterinary personnel.<sup>28</sup> Their number included at least three future marshals of the Red Army, Voroshilov, Budenny, and Blücher.

Trotsky also established a number of short-term command courses to which workers who had served in the Red Guard and others who had demonstrated leadership ability in the ranks were dispatched for rapid conversion into Red commanders. During the Civil War years, nearly forty thousand cadets were graduated from these courses.<sup>29</sup> Trotsky frankly admitted that the courses were "quite inadequate." "But," he continued, "considering the fact that many in the army did not even know how to handle a rifle, these four-month short-course men [stood out and] were made . . . officers."<sup>30</sup> The percentage of Communists among the graduates of the command courses was high. In 1918, they composed 70 per cent of the graduates; in 1919, 54 per cent; in 1920, 62 per cent; and in 1921, 65 per cent.<sup>31</sup> The zeal and devotion of the cadets helped to make up for their lack of military knowledge. "Everywhere," reported the director of Soviet Military Education, "praise was given to the revolutionary firmness and self-sacrifice of the young *kraskomy* [abbreviation for Red commander]."<sup>32</sup>

Trotsky relied heavily on the Party to infuse spirit and resolution into the Red Army. From a third to a half of the total Communist Party membership was sent into the Red Army during the Civil War period. According to the Soviet military historian F. Nikonov, the combat efficiency of units of the Red Army was measured in terms of the percentage of Communists in the ranks. Units with less than 4 to 5 per cent of Communists were regarded as poor; units with 6 to 8 per cent were average; and those with 12 to 15 per cent were treated as shock troops.<sup>33</sup> Trotsky claimed:

*The conduct of Communists* in the Red Army has a decisive significance for the morale and the military capability of units. It is necessary, therefore, to distribute Communists in an organized way, to guide them attentively and to keep careful check of their work . . .

. . . It is necessary that in each platoon, section and squad there should be a Communist, even if a young one — but devoted to the cause. He should observe the morale of the nearest fellow-fighters, explain to them the problems and the aims of the war, and, in case he is himself perplexed, approach the commissar of his unit or some other responsible political worker for elucidation. Without such internal, unofficial, personal, day-by-day and hour-by-hour agitation . . . under all conditions of the combat situation, the official agitation through articles and speeches will not give the required results.<sup>34</sup>

As the Civil War entered its later phases, an elaborate Party organization was built up within the army. Party cells and collectives were established in all military units. The Party cells functioned under the supervision of the political commissars, who were now required to be Party members and who directed all propaganda and "cultural enlighten-

ment" work in the army. The commissars operated with their own independent chain of command. The All-Russian Bureau of Military Commissars, which originally coordinated their activity, was soon replaced by the Political Department of the Revolutionary War Council, which in turn was transformed in May 1919 into the Political Administration of the Red Army and placed "under the immediate guidance of the Central Committee of the Communist Party."<sup>35</sup>

If the Party provided the leaven without which "the army would have fallen into dust," it was the commissars who supplied the fanatical faith and enthusiasm which inspired the Party rank and file to take the lead on the battlefield. "In . . . our commissars, the foremost front-fighter Communists," said Trotsky, "we have obtained a new communist order of Samurai, which — without any caste privileges — knows how to die and teaches others to die for the cause of the workers' class."<sup>36</sup> Lenin added his tribute at the Eighth Congress of the Party on March 23, 1919, when he observed, "If this war is waged with much greater energy and with exalted gallantry, it is only because for the first time in history an army has been created which knows what it is fighting for."<sup>37</sup> While this panegyric hardly applied to the great mass of the peasantry who were dragooned and conscripted into Red Army service in the course of the Civil War, it was largely true of the disciplined phalanx of indoctrinated Party members who supplied the driving power and iron will which held the Red Army together and carried it to victory.

By the spring of 1921 the Bolsheviks were undisputed masters of Russia. The White armies had been defeated, and the Allied forces were in process of withdrawal. The Civil War served as a great school of military affairs for the new Soviet state. A new crop of military leaders had emerged — Trotsky, Frunze, Budenny, Voroshilov, Timoshenko, and Stalin on the Party side and Tukhachevsky, Shaposhnikov, Egorov, and numerous others among the old Tsarist officers. The experience of civil war and intervention left a heritage of military-mindedness and a conviction of the necessity of being constantly prepared for war. Its effect on the Communist leadership was to reinforce a feeling of isolation and encirclement, to buttress the view that the world was divided into armed camps and that the camp of socialism would always be in danger unless there was adequate military strength to sustain and defend it. Lenin declared at the Eighth Congress of Soviets in late 1920: "We must maintain our military preparedness. We cannot deem our task ended with the blow already dealt imperialism, but we must exert our strength to the utmost to preserve our Red Army in complete military preparedness and to heighten its military preparedness. This, of course, will not interfere with the freeing of a certain part of the army and its swift demobilization."<sup>38</sup>

*The Peacetime Military Establishment*

Although a substantial demobilization took place over the next few years, the transition from war to peace was accompanied by a sharp division of opinion over the character of Soviet military policy and the nature of its future military establishment. The professional officers of the old imperial army who had risen to high positions in the Red Army were almost unanimous in favoring a large regular army. Such an army, they believed, would not only be far more efficient than a citizen army of militia; it would also provide a far more hospitable environment for the utilization of their talents. A few of them, like Tukhachevsky, who had become imbued with revolutionary zeal, supported the concept of a large regular army on other grounds. Tukhachevsky visualized a professional army composed of ardent, dedicated sons of the proletariat. Such an army, he believed, would be ideally suited to carry the revolutionary offensive to other lands. It would enlist reinforcements "from the workers inhabiting the territory occupied by the Red Army." "This accession of a stream of international fighting forces," he declared, "is a characteristic feature of the Red Army methods of warfare."<sup>39</sup>

The Party leadership was inclined to favor a citizen army of territorial militia. In the context of the NEP "breathing spell," Tukhachevsky's militant internationalism seemed out of place. A professional army, moreover, raised the specter of Bonapartism; the Party was concerned to construct an army which it could control. At the Ninth Party Congress, in April 1920, Trotsky advanced an ingenious scheme for organizing a militia system around the production process. Under his plan, militia units were to be established in all industrial centers, and commanders were to be recruited from "the best elements of the local proletariat."<sup>40</sup> The plan was designed to safeguard the ascendancy of the numerically weak proletariat. Its disadvantages consisted in its failure to tap the large reservoir of rural manpower and in the dubious military efficiency of militiamen whose major energies were engaged in production. Although the Ninth Party Congress approved Trotsky's project in principle, no steps were taken to carry it out.

The Kronstadt rebellion and the wave of peasant uprisings at the end of the Civil War involved a setback for the advocates of the militia system. "For the present moment," the Tenth Party Congress (1921) resolved, "the agitation of some comrades for the factual liquidation of the existing Red Army and the immediate transition to the militia is wrong and dangerous in practice."<sup>41</sup> After the introduction of the NEP, relations with the countryside improved, and the hazard of recruiting peasants for militia duty appeared less serious. At the same time, the lesson of the

peasant risings left a permanent impress, and the Party leadership showed itself loath to base its power solely on a territorial militia.

The conflicting views with regard to the Soviet peacetime establishment were finally resolved in 1923-24 by a compromise. The army was to consist of two elements: a regular or cadre army and a territorial army based on the militia system. The size of the cadre army was fixed at 562,000 men and remained at that level until 1935. The period of service in the cadre army varied with the branch of service. Under the 1924-25 regulations, it was two years in the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, three years for the air force and coastal defense units, and four years for the navy. In addition, special military formations were separately maintained under the jurisdiction of the OGPU. These included some 100,000 frontier guards and another 150,000 troops of internal security. In the territorial army, the term of active service varied from eight to eleven months. This was usually spread over a five-year span with periods of six weeks to three months each year spent in camp or on maneuvers.<sup>42</sup>

Under the system of obligatory service which was put into effect in 1923-24, all eligible males were required to undergo pre-draft service training. This program included some 420 hours of political indoctrination and basic military instruction spread over a two-year period. Each year some 1,200,000 men reached military age. Of these, approximately 850,000 to 900,000 were certified as physically fit for service. Only those whose social origins were proletarian or quasi-proletarian were eligible for assignment to the army. "Nontoiling" elements and others whose social background was questionable were relegated to service detachments in which they performed menial tasks. Draftees with dependents, those performing work of state importance, or those who were adjudged unfit for service in the regular army were assigned to the territorial army. The remaining recruits were posted for service in some branch of the regular army. On completion of service with the colors, the Red Army soldier passed into the reserve, where he remained subject to recall to active duty in the event of war.<sup>43</sup>

As a result of this reorganization, the cadre army receded in numerical importance. "Until 1934," according to Erich Wollenberg, "74 per cent of the Red Army's divisions were territorial ones, leaving only 26 per cent for the standing army."<sup>44</sup> The percentages, however, are deceptive. Within each territorial unit, cadre troops numbered from one tenth to one sixth of the total. Technical arms such as the air force, tank and armored-car detachments, the engineers, and the signal corps were manned almost exclusively by cadre units. The great bulk of the territorial units were composed of infantry.<sup>45</sup>

The reconstruction of the army was marked by a number of important

developments. The paramount goal remained the welding of the armed forces into an efficient instrument of the Party leadership. Especial emphasis was placed on the training of new commanding personnel. The short-term command courses of Civil War days were discontinued. Regimental schools were developed for the training of "lower command personnel." A whole network of military academies was established with courses of from three to four years' duration to prepare higher commanding personnel. In regulating admission, preference was given to young Red commanders who had risen from the ranks. Officers of worker or peasant origin who had distinguished themselves in the Civil War period were marked out for special training and advancement, while officers of the old imperial army were mustered out in large numbers. Of the more than forty-eight thousand Tsarist officers who were recruited during the Civil War, only forty-five hundred remained in the Red Army in 1930. They constituted approximately 10 per cent of the total officer personnel, compared with 76 per cent in 1918.<sup>46</sup> By 1927, Communists, candidates for Party membership, and Komsomols together formed more than 55 per cent of the total officer corps.<sup>47</sup> Over the next few years, the number of Party-affiliated commanders continued to increase. By 1931, 51 per cent of all Red Army officers were Communists. By 1934, the proportion of Party members had risen to 68.3 per cent. In the higher strata of the officer corps, Party saturation was even more impressive. By 1928, 53.6 per cent of all regimental commanders, 71.9 per cent of all divisional commanders, and 100 per cent of all corps commanders were Party members.<sup>48</sup>

As the Communist element in the army took possession of the command posts, the position of the political commissars became anomalous. Their situation was aggravated by the fact that many of them sided with Trotsky in the intra-Party struggle against the triumvirate of Stalin, Kamenev, and Zinoviev in 1923. The removal of Trotsky and his deputy Skliansky from the leadership of the War Commissariat was followed by a purge of the personnel of the Political Administration. Frunze, who succeeded Trotsky as War Commissar in 1924, died the next year and was replaced by Voroshilov, a staunch supporter of Stalin. The new head of the Political Administration, Bubnov, took measures to transform it into a Stalinist stronghold in the army and installed loyal followers of Stalin in all key positions.

In June 1924 the Organization Bureau of the Party issued an order which in principle provided for unity of command in the army. A Central Committee circular dated March 6, 1925, elaborated the Orgburo pronouncement.<sup>49</sup> Two forms of "unity of command" (*edinonachalie*) were declared permissible. Under one, the commander retained full control of all combat training and economic and administrative work, while the

commissar was given jurisdiction over Party work and the political and moral guidance of the unit. Under the other, which was only to be put into effect when the commander was especially trustworthy, the functions of the commissar were also handed over to the commander. The general guidance of political work remained under the control of the Political Administration, which continued to operate under the supervision of the Central Committee of the Party.

Although the command authority of the new officer corps was considerably strengthened by these measures, in practice "unity of command" was still subject to substantial limitations. Commissars were retained in most units and operated with complete autonomy in the area of Party and political-enlightenment work. Their Party status and independent channel of command made them important factors to be reckoned with, particularly when the commander was non-Party or a Party member of very recent vintage. Promotion frequently turned on the recommendation of the political workers. Once the Stalinist leadership had transformed the Political Administration into its own creature, it found the commissar a useful balance wheel in checking the professional esprit de corps to which even Communist commanders fell victim as they immersed themselves in their military duties. Unity of command was further delimited by the organs of the OGPU in the army. The OGPU special sections operated independently of the military command and kept a sharp watch on the loyalty of both commanding personnel and rank and file.

The emphasis during the twenties on strengthening the position of the Party in the army gave the Political Administration a new role of central importance. Under its aegis, the army barracks were transformed into schools of Communism. The political workers were charged with the indoctrination of the annual contingents of largely peasant recruits who arrived for training. At least two hours of every day were devoted to classes on political and allied subjects. The steady pounding away was not without its effect. When the 1924 class was recruited, it included 24,700 Communists. When discharged two years later, Party membership had risen to 66,000. Between 1924 and 1928 the proportion of Party members, candidates, and Komsomols in the army increased from 16 per cent to 37 per cent.<sup>50</sup>

The predominantly peasant composition of the army nevertheless caused the Party leadership concern. The prevalence of "peasant moods" among recruits created a barrier which Party propaganda had difficulty in penetrating. The dissatisfactions of the village were carried over into the army and raised questions about the dependability of the troops in the event that they were ordered to suppress peasant disorders. While the Party pursued its indoctrination program with unremitting zeal, at

the same time it took precautions to ensure a strong proletarian core in key branches of the armed service. A minimum of 50 per cent of troops of proletarian origin was assigned to armored and transportation units. The air force was allocated 40 per cent, the signal troops 30 per cent, the OGPU units 25 per cent, the cavalry 12 per cent, while the infantry was given only 8 per cent.<sup>51</sup> This quota system, which traced its roots to Trotsky's original proposal to build the army on a firm proletarian base, was designed to distribute proletarian strength where it was calculated to be most effective.

The period of the middle and late twenties represented an era in the history of the Red Army when primary emphasis was placed on training and Party penetration. Within the officer corps, the ascendancy of the Red commanders was being consolidated. While the cadre army was well trained, the territorial militia was a more doubtful military asset. Both, however, were subjected to intensive Party propaganda and control. By the end of the twenties, the regime appeared to have made marked progress in transforming the army into a dependable political instrument.

#### *Mechanization and Mobilization*

The great weakness of the Red Army in this period was its inadequate utilization of modern means of technical warfare. This lag reflected Russian industrial backwardness. As far back as 1924, Frunze, the Commissar of War, warned that the Red Army, for all its vast manpower resources, was at a marked disadvantage in competing with Western armies which were solidly supported by a strong industrial base. "The war of the future," he predicted, "in a considerable measure, if not entirely, will be the war of machines."<sup>52</sup> Because of the slow tempo of industrialization and the primitive character of the Soviet automotive industry, the Red Army made little progress in mechanization during the NEP. The ordinary Russian soldier lacked technical training and had little opportunity to acquire it. Tukhachevsky and other top Soviet commanders during the twenties declared repeatedly that the technical backwardness of Russia had to be overcome if the Red Army was to avoid defeat in future wars.

This was one of the principal impelling forces behind the industrialization program which was embodied in the five-year plans. The First Five-Year Plan laid the industrial base for a powerful armament industry. From the beginning, the equipment of the Red Army was given priority over all competing demands. Much technical military progress was achieved. While the size of the army remained the same, the qualitative improvement in weapons was tremendous. During the Second Five-Year

Plan (1933-1938), defense industries expanded about two and a half times as rapidly as industry as a whole. The Red Army acquired ultra-modern weapons and was put on wheels and wings. Particular emphasis was placed on the development of artillery, tanks, and planes. The mechanization of the army involved a tremendous growth in defense appropriations. The military and naval budget rose from 1,420,700,000 rubles in 1933 to 23,200,000,000 rubles in 1938.<sup>53</sup> By 1940, it had mounted to 56,800,000,000 rubles.<sup>54</sup> The rise in defense expenditures was accompanied by great emphasis on industrial self-sufficiency. New industrial centers were erected beyond the Urals, and military factories were dispersed with the contingency of war in mind.

At the same time, increasing emphasis was placed on the psychological and technical preparation of the Soviet people for war. In 1927 a number of state-sponsored organizations which supported the activities of various branches of the armed services were merged into one agency — *Osoaviakhim*, the Society for the Promotion of Defense and Aero-Chemical Development. *Osoaviakhim* was organized to coordinate the defense training of civilians. By 1939, more than twelve million members were enrolled in its ranks. *Osoaviakhim* sponsored mass sports of a military nature; it trained air-raid wardens, drivers, parachutists, machine gunners, snipers, marksmen, and technical specialists in all fields related to military defense. In essence, it constituted a form of total mobilization for total war and was a significant factor in making the Soviet population both machine-minded and war-minded.

The technical instruction provided by *Osoaviakhim* was supplemented by increasing use of nationalistic appeals to provide the emotional driving power behind total mobilization. During the late thirties, all the resources of the Soviet propaganda apparatus were mobilized to inculcate patriotism. The glorious military traditions of the Russian past were revived; Tsarist generals like Suvorov and Kutuzov were exalted as popular heroes who had fought to preserve the national heritage. The new patriotism was designed to unify the nation against the imminent danger which seemed to loom from Hitler's Germany. The new oath required of soldiers in the Red Army eliminated all references to "loyalty to the international proletariat." The recruit now swore "to defend my homeland, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." Proletarian class-consciousness was soft-pedaled in the interest of national unity.

Meanwhile, radical changes were taking place in the Red Army. One of the most important was the great increase in the size of the standing army. In 1934 its strength was raised from 562,000 to 940,000 men. In the next year, it was further expanded to 1,300,000 men. By 1939 the whole army was placed on a cadre basis. Voroshilov reported to the Eighteenth Party Congress in that year:

The territorial system . . . began to conflict with the defensive requirements of the state as soon as the principal imperialist countries started to increase their armies and to put them in a state of readiness for war even in peace-time . . .

As a consequence, it was found necessary to abolish the territorial system as the structural basis of our army and to adopt the cadre system exclusively. Today our whole army is uniformly built on the cadre principle.<sup>55</sup>

At the same time, all national military units in the army were dissolved, and their troops were scattered and merged in the cadre army.

The Universal Military Service Act of 1939 made service in the armed forces obligatory for all citizens of the USSR. The test of class origins was abandoned in determining eligibility to bear arms. The term of service was substantially increased. Ground troops were required to serve two years, junior commanders three years, troops and junior commanders in the air force and frontier guard three years, coast-defense forces four years, and the navy five years. The imminent threat of war and the intricacy of modern technical weapons furnished the compelling reasons for the change. In addition, the draft age was lowered to nineteen and the age limit for reservists increased from forty to fifty.

While the army was undergoing technical renovation and greatly expanding in size, it was also subjected to a political crisis of major proportions. The announcement on June 12, 1937, of the execution of Marshal Tukhachevsky and seven other high-ranking Soviet generals "for espionage and treason to the Fatherland" and the suicide of Gamarnik, the Deputy People's Commissar for Defense who headed the Political Administration of the army, was the prelude to a large-scale purge of the Soviet high command and the top Party apparatus in the army.

The purge of the high command was followed by a series of measures to strengthen the Party leadership's control over the army. Gamarnik was replaced as head of the Political Administration by L. Mekhlis, a staunch Stalinist, who promptly removed the remnants of the Gamarnik entourage from leading positions in the army's Party apparatus. The reconstruction of the political machinery of the army involved a heaven-sent opportunity for those in the lower ranks. Mekhlis claimed at the Eighteenth Party Congress that "many thousands of splendid Bolsheviks of the Leninist-Stalinist breed have been promoted from below to leading posts."<sup>56</sup> The installation of trustworthy personnel was also accompanied by a restoration of the authority of the political commissars. The decree of August 15, 1937, made the commissars coequal with the commanding personnel in military as well as political affairs. Voroshilov stated the new relationship at the Eighteenth Party Congress: "The commander and the military commissar constitute a single unit in the matter of directing the military and political training and education of their unit . . . Both the

commander and the military commissar will lead their unit, their formation, into action."<sup>57</sup> This double-headed system of command under which all orders were to be signed jointly by the commander and by the commissar was an index of the nervousness and apprehension which the Great Purge had aroused. The decision to keep the army under the closest political supervision reflected the contemporary fears of the Party leadership.

At the same time, the Party leadership sought to mobilize the support of the younger commanders, who were rapidly promoted to the numerous leading positions vacated by victims of the purge. While many of the officers who were lifted to large responsibilities lacked the experience of high command, their mastery of the newer technical methods of warfare was frequently greater than that of the less adaptable Civil War generation whom they replaced. Their devotion to the Party was secured by the recognition which their talents had received.

In order to consolidate the loyalty of the reconstructed officer corps, their perquisites, rates of pay, and living conditions were considerably improved. As the following table demonstrates, salaries were substantially raised, though part of the increase was canceled out by inflation.<sup>58</sup>

	<i>Pay in rubles</i>	<i>Percentage increase</i>
	1934	1939
Platoon Commander	260	625
Company Commander	285	750
Battalion Commander	335	850
Regimental Commander	400	1200
Division Commander	475	1600
Corps Commander	550	2000

The well-being of the commanding personnel was also assured by a special system of military cooperatives, *Voentorg*, which guaranteed the officer corps and their families a variety of food, clothing, and other supplies and services which were not available to the general population. Officers enjoyed preferential advantages in obtaining housing for their families.

Rank, gold braid, high pay, and well-tailored uniforms were only the outer symbols of the new-found prestige of the commanding personnel. Relationships between officers and men were repatterned on a rigid hierarchical basis. Discipline was tightened. Compulsory saluting of superiors became mandatory. Insubordination in the ranks was to "be punished by the most unmerciful measures."<sup>59</sup> As World War II approached, the authority and perquisites of the new officer corps were reinforced in every direction. The professional imperatives of a smoothly functioning fighting machine reasserted their importance.

One major problem remained — the familiar problem of balancing

the competing demands of professionalism and Party control. The system of command under which authority was shared by commander and commissar had obvious military disadvantages. It undermined the authority of the commander and was fraught with possibilities of conflict. Yet the Party leadership could not abdicate its control of the army without running a risk that the officer corps would develop into an independent power center. The very privileges which the Party leadership conferred on the officer corps to ensure its loyalty accentuated the danger. Even the enrollment of most of the higher commanding personnel in the Party provided no guarantee that professional *esprit de corps* would not develop into a more decisive cohesive force than Party membership.

The setbacks suffered in the first stages of the Russo-Finnish war sharpened the dilemma. Numerous instances of friction between commander and commissar in the heat of battle documented the inefficiency of the double-headed system of command.<sup>60</sup> With the replacement of Voroshilov as People's Commissar of Defense by Marshal Timoshenko, the army reverted to unity of command. The decree of August 12, 1940, abolished the political commissars and replaced them with Assistant Commanders for Political Affairs (*zampolity*), whose sphere of action was limited largely to political propaganda and education. Although this order greatly strengthened the authority of the army command in purely military matters, the hierarchy of political workers in the army remained subject to the instructions of the Political Administration of the army, which in turn functioned as part of the apparatus of the Party Central Committee. As A. I. Zaporozhets, one of its high officials, explained in a speech on December 13, 1940, "We Bolsheviks cannot separate work on political education from the business of military preparation. All Party political work, including propaganda, must be directed to lifting the military capabilities of the unit. Every political worker must occupy himself with military preparation, with administration, and with all other questions involving the life of the unit."<sup>61</sup> The Party leadership was not ready to interpret unity of command as meaning that the Party abandoned its supervision of the armed forces. Although military initiative and leadership were stimulated by the abrogation of the requirement that orders of the commander required the commissar's countersignature, the political workers still functioned as the Party's eyes and ears in the army. The officer corps remained conscious of their presence and of the authority which they represented.

On July 16, 1941, shortly after the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union, the institution of political commissars was re-established. This action was taken apparently because of the large-scale surrenders of the early days of the war and the collapse of resistance which they seemed to portend. The restoration of the powers of the commissars was designed to stiffen

the will to resist and to guard against the possibility of treachery in the officer corps. The response of the Party to crisis was to strengthen the authority of its most loyal phalanx.

When the tide of battle turned, the Party reverted to earlier arrangements. On October 9, 1942, the zampolits again replaced the commissars, and unity of command in military matters was restored. By this time, the loyalty of the Soviet officer corps had survived the test of battle; the Party could afford to experiment with a pattern of military-political relations in which the high command was left free to press home the assault while the political workers concentrated on building morale and inspiring the troops with patriotic ardor.

During the war, the Party continued its unremitting efforts to strengthen its position in the army. On the eve of the war, according to Voroshilov's speech at the Eighteenth Congress, more than half of the army consisted of Communists and members of the Young Communist League.<sup>62</sup> The proportion in the officer corps was strikingly higher. The political personnel of the army in 1939 totaled 34,000, compared with 15,000 in 1934 and only 6,389 in November 1918, at the height of the Civil War. Early in the war, when the army was undergoing vast expansion, the Party relaxed its standards of admission in order to encourage members of the armed forces, and particularly front-line fighters, to apply for entrance. During the year 1942 alone, more than 1,340,000 new members were recruited into the Party. The great majority came from the armed forces. It was evident that the Party was consciously reaching out to strengthen its mass base in the crucial military formations.

The Party leadership found it expedient during the war years to broaden its appeal both to army and nation by muting revolutionary and class ideology and stressing nationalism and patriotism as socially unifying objectives. The glorification of the army and the high command formed part of the pattern of the national rally. As the war drew to a close, however, the Party reasserted its ascendancy. The Soviet organs of mass communication put increasing emphasis on the role of the Party as the major instrument of victory, and the heroic exploits of Soviet marshals and generals were painted in subdued colors. Precautionary measures were taken to fend off the possibility of Bonapartism. When there were signs at the end of the war that Marshal Zhukov was becoming too prominent a figure, he was promptly removed from the limelight and given a much less conspicuous military command in the Ukraine. Ideological indoctrination of the army, which had been relaxed during the war, was revived and intensified. The Party leadership tightened its grip on the army. The officer corps was not only expected to be efficient; it was required to demonstrate unswerving devotion to the regime.

*The Party and the Army after Stalin*

With the death of Stalin, the struggle for control of the armed forces entered a new phase. The maneuverings which accompanied the battle over succession projected the military into the center of the political stage. As part of the "national rally" after Stalin's death, the popular Marshal Zhukov was restored to a position of prominence as one of two First Deputy Ministers of Defense. When Beria sought to use his control of the security police to extend his power into the Party domain, his rivals in the Presidium turned to the army to provide a counterweight. Loyal army units in large numbers were brought into Moscow as a precautionary measure at the time of Beria's arrest.<sup>63</sup> Marshal Zhukov was appropriately rewarded with the seat on the Central Committee which Beria had previously filled. Promotions were bestowed on the generals and admirals in the wake of the Beria purge.

The elimination of Beria and the downgrading of the security police inevitably increased the importance of the military on the Soviet political scene. It set the stage for a degree of professional assertiveness which would have been inconceivable in Stalin's time. There was a temporary shift of control of both border guards and internal troops from the MVD to the Ministry of Defense. The role of police and Party representatives in the armed forces declined. And there came about an increasing involvement of the military in the succession struggle.

In the confrontation between Khrushchev and Malenkov, Zhukov and his fellow marshals threw their weight behind Khrushchev. Their decision was strongly influenced by Khrushchev's willingness to find common ground with them in opposing aspects of Malenkov's program that appeared to threaten military interests. The Malenkov consumer-goods campaign was accompanied by a retrenchment in military appropriations; the budgetary allocations to the defense ministry were reduced from 110 billion rubles in 1953 to 100.3 billion in 1954. Moreover, Malenkov's action in drawing on state reserves in order to provide quick consumer benefits endangered the stockpiles which the military considered essential in order to preserve defense capabilities. By emphasizing increased investment in consumer goods at the expense of heavy industry, he also seemed to be undermining the economic base on which an expansion of Soviet military power depended. When Khrushchev in late 1954 opened an indirect attack on Malenkov for his underestimation of heavy industry, his views were enthusiastically endorsed in the military press, which presumably reflected the views of the marshals.

The ouster of Malenkov from his position as chairman of the Council of Ministers in February 1955 was accompanied by assurances to the military that its interests would be safeguarded. Malenkov's successor, Bul-

ganin, then a close associate of Khrushchev's, announced to the Supreme Soviet that "heavy industry is the foundation of the indestructible defense capability of the country," and, after declaring that "reserves comprise our might," avowed that "to increase the state reserves is our most important task."<sup>64</sup> At the same session of the Supreme Soviet, the military budget was increased by 12 per cent, and Zhukov replaced Bulganin as Minister of Defense.

The next stage in the complex tale of Party-army relations was marked by a determined effort on Marshal Zhukov's part to raise the status and prestige of the armed forces, to carve out an area of autonomy for its leadership, and to assert the priority of professional over Party demands. While Stalin was alive, the achievements of Soviet military science during World War II were universally ascribed to Stalin's military "genius," and the commanders in the field were assigned a lesser and subordinate role. After Stalin's death, a cautious redressing of the balance began, but it was not until Khrushchev's denunciations at the Twentieth Party Congress that the way was opened for a more or less objective effort to give credit where it was historically due. In the course of the speech, Khrushchev not only heaped praise on the military commanders; he went out of his way to present himself as Zhukov's loyal friend who had defended him against Stalin's strictures that he was not a good soldier.<sup>65</sup> At the end of the congress, Marshal Zhukov was named a candidate member of the Presidium, the first professional officer to achieve that distinction. The Central Committee elected in 1956 included six full and twelve candidate members from the ranks of the Soviet military, all of them high-ranking officers holding professional rather than political posts. In the wake of the congress, the reputations of military leaders who had been purged and persecuted by Stalin were rehabilitated, and the prestige and status of the army high command attained unprecedented heights.

Meanwhile, Zhukov and his associates manifested a high degree of independence in revising and introducing new elements into Soviet military thought. Old Stalinist doctrines were swept aside, and strategy and tactics were reshaped to fit the technology of the nuclear age. Perhaps even more remarkable, Marshal Zhukov took steps to curb the interference of political workers in military affairs. In 1955, the position of *politruk* (political leader) at the company level was abolished. Even earlier, permission had been granted officers to pursue ideological studies on a voluntary basis. Addressing a Party conference of the Moscow military okrug in January 1956, Marshal Zhukov vigorously upheld the prerogatives of the army commanders: "In the okrug, certain efforts have been made to subject the official activity of commanders to criticism at [Party] meetings. Such efforts are reprehensible. Our task is the comprehensive strengthening of the authority of the commanders, giving support to

exacting officers and generals."<sup>66</sup> Speaking to a conference of political workers in April 1956, he urged them to be soldiers first and ideologists afterwards. "The task of propaganda consists not only in explaining the theory of Marxism-Leninism, but also in contributing to its practical implementation. The theoretical side of propaganda work must give more space to the problems . . . connected with practical tasks of the troops . . . A political officer who does not know his military duty cannot cope with the tasks which are set him . . ."<sup>67</sup>

The line which was being pursued by Marshal Zhukov with its obvious implications of a curtailment of the influence of the Party functionaries in the armed forces could not help but arouse Khrushchev's concern, since his own authority ultimately rested on the power and discipline of the Party apparatus. However, as long as the final outcome of the succession struggle remained uncertain and the support of Zhukov appeared useful, Khrushchev was prepared to tolerate the potential challenge. In the meantime he made skillful use of his patronage powers to strengthen his own position in the army command and to exploit leadership rivalries within it. Marshals Konev, Moskalenko, Grechko, and others, who had been closely associated with Khrushchev during the war or in the Ukraine, were singled out for favored treatment. Zhukov himself was treated with the greatest respect and brought into the Presidium circle. During the spring of 1957, when the opposition to Khrushchev was gathering its forces for the final confrontation Khrushchev went out of his way to conciliate Zhukov and to find common ground with him on the Party role in the armed forces.

The Central Committee decree of April 1957 on "Instructions to Party Organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy" bore every mark of a compromise. Although the full text was not released, the quotations cited in the Soviet press gave some indication of its nature. The instructions, to be sure, proclaimed the paramount role of the Party and reiterated that the Main Political Administration functioned with the independent status of a department of the Central Committee. But they went on to declare that the military commander was responsible for both military and political training and that "criticism of the orders and edicts of commanders will not be permitted at Party meetings."<sup>68</sup> This last provision represented a concession to professionalism which Marshal Zhukov could only welcome.

In June 1957 Khrushchev found himself faced with a hostile majority in the Presidium. His successful appeal to the Central Committee was reinforced by the support which Marshal Zhukov and the army gave him. Zhukov was rewarded for his help with full membership in the Presidium and doubtless considered his position unassailable. But having disposed of his Party rivals, Khrushchev was in no mood to tolerate an island of auton-

omy in the armed forces. The day of reckoning was not long in coming.

On October 4, 1957, Marshal Zhukov left the USSR on a combined official and vacation trip to Albania and Yugoslavia. One hour after his return on October 26, Tass carried an announcement of his removal as Minister of Defense and his replacement by Marshal Malinovsky. Still later, on November 3, the Soviet press revealed that at a plenary session of the Central Committee at the end of October, Zhukov had also been ejected from the Presidium and the Central Committee. The Central Committee resolution published at the same time accused the Marshal of "pursuing a policy of curtailing the work of Party organizations, political agencies, and Military Councils and of eliminating the leadership and control of the Party, its Central Committee, and the government over the army and navy."<sup>69</sup> He was also denounced for "surrounding himself with sycophants and flatterers" who, with his encouragement, promoted a personality cult, and he was finally described "as a politically deficient figure, disposed to adventurism both in his understanding of the major tasks of the Soviet Union's foreign policy and in his leadership of the Ministry of Defense."<sup>70</sup>

The last charge, which might have had reference to the Marshal's alleged support of military intervention in Poland in 1956, was never spelled out, but the rest were reiterated and elaborated ad nauseam in the wake of his dismissal. *Pravda* reported proudly that many outstanding military figures including Marshals Malinovsky and Konev had pointed out Zhukov's serious shortcomings in the Central Committee plenary session, and an article published by Konev at the time was particularly savage in its denigration of Zhukov's reputation.<sup>71</sup> From all this it was possible to infer that Khrushchev had encountered little difficulty in exploiting the rivalries and ambitions of the marshals in preparing the ground for Zhukov's dismissal. Zhukov himself was in no position to strike back. The only word from him was a *Pravda* report that he had acknowledged that the criticism directed at him had "in the main been correct" and that he had promised the Central Committee to "eliminate" his shortcomings.<sup>72</sup>

The removal of Zhukov signalized a reassertion of Party primacy over the armed forces. As the Central Committee resolution of October 1957 put it, "The chief source of the might of our army and navy lies in the fact that the Communist Party, the guiding and directing force of Soviet society, is their organizer, leader and instructor. We must always remember V. I. Lenin's instructions to the effect that the 'policy of the military department, as of all other departments and institutions, is pursued in strict accordance with the general directives given by the Party in the person of the Central Committee and under its direct control.'"<sup>73</sup>

The campaign to liquidate the remnants of the Zhukov legacy took

the form of a major shakeup in the Political Administration and an intensification of Party control and political indoctrination in the armed forces. Colonel-General F. I. Golikov (soon to be made a marshal) replaced A. S. Zheltov as head of the Main Political Administration, and there were similar shifts in the more important military districts. A new directive for officers issued after the October 1957 session of the Central Committee set aside a minimum of fifty study hours of training time for Marxist-Leninist instruction, instead of relegating it to after duty hours. Attendance at these sessions was declared obligatory, and senior officers were sternly enjoined to schedule their work days to provide "the proper conditions" for these studies.

At the same time, steps were taken to raise the prestige and increase the prerogatives of the political officers. Young military commanders were shifted into political work, and the training of political workers was modified to place much more emphasis on military science. Under Marshal Golikov's aegis, a new policy was announced of interchanging military and political personnel in command and political assignments; it was made clear that no officer could divest himself of responsibility for political indoctrination and that promotions would depend on political as well as military knowledge. As Golikov put it, "the political agencies must considerably step up their participation in the recruitment, placement, and certification of officers, generals and admirals." "The political agencies," he insisted, "must concern themselves . . . with all aspects of military and political training."<sup>74</sup>

Measures were also initiated to strengthen the role of Party and Komsomol organizations in the armed forces. A special recruitment drive was launched to enlist noncommissioned officers and rank-and-file soldiers in the Party, and their relative weight in military Party organizations increased sharply. As a result of the increase in Party membership, primary Party organizations were moved down from the regimental to the battalion level, and Party groups were established in more than half of all army companies and sometimes even at the platoon level. Party secretaries at every level were recruited from among officers and men with military experience and given increased authority. In the words of *Krasnaya Zvezda*, "the Party secretary is obligated to go into all sides of the unit's life, with knowledge of the matter, including the condition of military study and servicemen's discipline."<sup>75</sup>

Fears that the authority of commanders would be subverted were brushed aside, and Marshal Zhukov's dictum that commanders should not be criticized at Party meetings was expressly repudiated. Officers were told that they must welcome Party criticism, even from their subordinates. The new image which Party workers sought to impose was that of the Party-oriented commander who leans heavily on the collective and

works through and with the Communist and Komsomol groups in his unit. Military personnel could no longer limit their activities to issuing operational commands to their subordinates through the traditional military hierarchy; they were not only required to accept responsibilities in the political field but to cooperate with Party and political workers in discharging their military duties. The principle of unified command was reiterated, but with a difference. As interpreted by the Main Political Administration in 1959, it was to be exercised "in strict conformity with the laws of the Soviet state and the decisions of the Communist Party."<sup>76</sup> Commanders were reminded that there were specific instructions from the Central Committee to utilize Party organizations in carrying out their assignments and in enforcing discipline. Thus the balance was tilted toward Party control, and the Party remained the ultimate master.

#### *The Soviet Armed Forces and Thermonuclear Warfare*

The technical modernization of Soviet military units was proceeding at an accelerated pace. At the dawn of the nuclear age, the Soviet Union was in no position to challenge the American atomic monopoly and sought to make up for its deficiency by maintaining a large land army. But an intensive effort was quickly initiated to acquire the new instruments of nuclear warfare and to overtake and surpass the United States. The Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb in 1949 was followed by the acquisition of the thermonuclear weapon in 1953, the intercontinental jet bomber in 1954, and, most spectacular of all, the intercontinental ballistic missile in 1957.

While the race was proceeding, the Soviet Union continued to put heavy dependence on its large army. As late as 1955, according to Khrushchev, the strength of the Soviet armed forces totaled 5,763,000 men.<sup>77</sup> From that point on, the Soviet leadership embarked on a program of demobilization of personnel. In the period 1955-58, according to Soviet sources, the size of the armed forces was reduced by 2,140,000 men. In January 1960 Khrushchev proclaimed a further reduction of 1,200,000 men to take place over the next year or two, which was expected to cut the size of the armed forces to 2,423,000 men by the end of 1961.<sup>78</sup>

These dramatic announcements served a variety of purposes. The Soviet leadership pointed to its large-scale demobilization as an earnest of its peaceful intentions and as a unilateral contribution toward the program for universal and total disarmament which Khrushchev presented to the United Nations on September 18, 1959. Each announcement of a cut became the occasion for a world-wide propaganda campaign to demonstrate that the Soviet Union and its allies were peace-loving nations fighting indefatigably to end the arms race and prevent a new war. But more earthy and less idealistic reasons also operated to enforce

military manpower cuts. Soviet leaders stressed the changing requirements of warfare in the thermonuclear age, the cost of the transition to rocketry and nuclear weapons, the savings made possible by reducing military personnel, the impetus to industrial development which their reemployment in civilian life would provide, and, above all, the fact that the defense capacity of the Soviet Union would in no way be impaired. As Khrushchev put it in his January 1960 speech to the Supreme Soviet: "A reduction in the size of the army does not prevent us from maintaining the country's defense capacity at the proper level. We shall continue to have all the means necessary for the country's defense, and an opponent will be well aware of this; if he is not, we warn him and openly declare: While reducing the minimal strength of the armed forces, we shall not reduce their firepower; on the contrary, it will increase many times over in terms of quality."<sup>79</sup>

At this point Khrushchev's pronouncements must have struck many military professionals in the more traditional arms and services as a real threat to their interests. He disparaged the surface fleet of the navy as obsolete and announced that "almost the whole of the air force" would be replaced by "rocket equipment." "Looking into the future," he indicated that the size of the infantry would be drastically reduced and replaced in substantial part by territorial military units composed of personnel undergoing military training "without interrupting their regular work." His immediate proposal envisaged the release of a million servicemen, including a quarter of a million officers, many of whom had spent their lives in the armed forces and had little training or aptitude for civilian posts.

Even as Khrushchev aired his views, some rumblings of professional military discontent were already evident. At the same session of the Supreme Soviet in January 1960 at which Khrushchev made his dramatic announcement, Marshal Malinovsky, Zhukov's successor as Minister of Defense, also spoke.<sup>80</sup> Though supporting Khrushchev on the proposed troop cuts, he also stressed the difficulties attendant on large-scale demobilization, and his assertion that no one service arm could win a war and that the cooperation of all arms would be needed served to qualify Khrushchev's more extreme pronouncements.

The originally projected troop cuts did not in fact take place. Whatever opposition may have been offered by the military professionals was given added force by external developments. The decision of the Kennedy administration to respond to the Berlin crisis and a deteriorating military situation in Southeast Asia by raising its military budget was quickly followed by Soviet action to suspend the reduction of armed forces, to increase its own military budget by a third, and to resume nuclear testing.<sup>81</sup>

Current Soviet military doctrine attributes central importance to nuclear weapons. In the words of a recent article in *Krasnaya Zvezda*, "Nuclear missiles constitute the basis of the fighting power of all branches of the USSR Armed Forces."<sup>82</sup> A special Rocket Forces Command was established in 1960 with control over strategic rocket troops and missiles.<sup>83</sup> According to Marshal Malinovsky, "a number of military higher educational institutes" have been shifted to rocket specialization, and much greater attention is being devoted "to the learning of the physical and mathematical sciences and of chemistry in military higher educational institutions."<sup>84</sup> Developments such as these point to an increasingly strong emphasis on professionalism and technical training in staffing the cadres of the armed forces.

At the same time, Soviet military commentators also contend that "the decisive role of nuclear missiles in war does not lessen the importance of other types of weapons."<sup>85</sup> *Krasnaya Zvezda* states, "Complete and decisive victory over the imperialist aggressors can be achieved only through the joint, well-coordinated, and decisive actions of all branches of the armed forces and all types of troops. Nuclear-missile warfare will be waged by mass armies of many millions," although it also added that those who use the older weapons will have to learn to adjust to "the conditions of nuclear-missile war."<sup>86</sup>

The predilection of Soviet military professionals is thus to combine technical modernization with their traditional attachment to mass forces, consisting of well-trained cadres and served by a large officer corps. The problem which faces the Party leadership, on the other hand, is to limit the drain of rising military expenditures without harming the national defense. Khrushchev's abortive 1960 suggestion of a return to the territorial system, by which military training would be combined with regular work, promised a large reserve army at minimum cost, but it left the quality of the resulting product very much in doubt. Behind Khrushchev's proposal there may also have been other thoughts. When the territorial system was instituted in the twenties, it was designed in part to provide a counterweight to the professional contingent in the armed forces and to ensure that the Red Army would retain a civilian and, above all, a Party outlook. Against the background of the Zhukov affair, the revival of the territorial idea may provide an indication that the specter of Bonapartism has not yet vanished from the Soviet scene.

#### *Party and Police Controls in the Army*

In order to ensure the loyalty of the Soviet armed forces, the Party leadership has developed a complex but highly integrated system of controls which seeks to penetrate every aspect of army life. The system is composed of two parallel hierarchies which operate side by side with the

professional military command. One, which may be called political, consists of the political workers and the network of Party and Komsomol organizations in the Red Army. It has the task of infusing the armed forces with Party spirit by positive indoctrination and agitation. The other, which may be described as punitive, consists of security organs of the KGB, whose duties are to root out disaffection and disloyalty.

The control of political work in the Soviet army is presently centered in the Main Political Administration (MPA), which functions both as a part of the USSR Ministry of Defense and as the Military Department of the Central Committee of the Party. The responsibilities of the MPA embrace all propaganda and educational activities in the army, including the supervision of Party and Komsomol organizations. Its central organization prepares the programs of political instruction which are followed in the army; edits and publishes army publications of an educational or propaganda character; and supervises the army clubs, movies, educational circles, libraries, and other organized centers of army life through which the Party line is constantly propagated. Through its subordinate apparatus of political instructors and inspectors, it keeps in touch with the state of army morale and renders regular reports to the Party leadership. It also maintains a series of special schools for the training of junior political personnel and the Lenin Military Political Academy in Moscow for senior political officers. Candidates for admission to these schools are ordinarily recruited from Party members in the army who combine military knowledge with some practical experience in political work in army units.

The organizational structure of the MPA follows the military chain of command. In the army, for example, MPA representatives are stationed at all levels of the organization, down through the regiment and the battalion. In the zone of the interior, the MPA operates through the Political Administration of the military districts (PUOKR); in the combat forces, its organization stretches down from the Political Administration of the army group (PUARM) to the battalion. The chiefs of the PUOKR and PUARM and their deputies are appointed by the MPA with the sanction of the Central Committee. Party regulations provide that the heads of Political Administrations of military districts, fleets, and armies be Party members of five years' standing; those responsible for political work in other military units must have a Party membership of three years. At lower levels of the army hierarchy, the MPA is represented by corps zampolits, or Deputy Commanders for Political Affairs, who head the corps political departments; by zampolits who direct the divisional political departments, and finally by regimental and battalion zampolits who are responsible for political work in their units.

The functions of the political officers vary with their position in the hierarchy and the jurisdiction of the staffs to which they are assigned.

At the level of the military district and the army group and even the corps and the division, the responsibilities of the political departments center largely on supervision and direction of the work of political officers in lower echelons. Problems of training and assignment of political officers; inspection of the quality of political instruction and the state of work in lower units; preparation of programs and materials for use in classes; the editing of newspapers, pamphlets, and other publications; and even the routing of books, magazines, movies, and speakers to military units occupy the major energies of the staff. At the level of the regiment and below, political agitation assumes an increasingly operative and face-to-face character. The zampolit of the regiment heads a Political Section (*politchast*) which is ordinarily composed of his secretary, a propaganda instructor, the club director, and the secretary of the regimental Party bureau. Instructors attached to the divisional staff are also available to provide assistance when necessary.

The regimental zampolit is responsible for the political health of the regiment. He is in charge of all Party political work and all cultural-educational activity. It is his task to make certain that all the soldiers and officers of the regiment are being thoroughly indoctrinated, that the Party and Komsomol organizations are flourishing, that recreational facilities are provided, and that the leisure-hour activities of the unit are being properly directed into "constructive" political channels. He is required to render weekly reports to the divisional zampolit on the state of regimental morale and to keep a constant check on the political reliability of the unit to which he is attached. Battalion zampolits, where they are available, assist him.

The political conditioning of the Red Army conscript begins with his first contact with army life. Even before he is called up, his political record is subject to scrutiny by Party and Komsomol authorities, the KGB, and the *raivoenkomat* (district military office). After being checked, recruits are dispatched to military camps where they are divided into groups of twenty-five or thirty for purposes of political indoctrination. During this period, a political worker lives with them, leads discussions, and familiarizes himself with the political attitudes of the group.

After the first intensive period of indoctrination, the political life of the soldier revolves around the regiment. The study plan for the troops, which was put into effect after Zhukov's removal, provides one hundred and twenty hours for political classes and talks.<sup>87</sup> The topics discussed may include the duties of service and the oath of induction, the dangers of foreign espionage, and lectures on such subjects as "The Soviet People — Builders of Communism," "V. I. Lenin — Leader and Organizer of the Communist Party and Founder of Our Soviet State," "The USSR Armed Forces on Guard over the Motherland," and similar themes. Political

workers also strive to fill the soldiers' free hours with political content. The movies shown at the army clubs or Red Army Houses are designed to impress the current demands of the Party line upon them. The unit newspaper and the books and pamphlets in the regimental reading room or "Leninist corner" are also calculated to steep the soldiers in Party orthodoxies. The political environment in which they are placed is arranged to leave them no alternative except to demonstrate devotion to the regime.

Nor is the political indoctrination of the officer corps neglected. Special efforts are made to increase the proportion of Party membership among the officers. Systematic courses and lectures on Marxist-Leninist theory and on more important international and domestic themes are provided to heighten their political awareness. As officers of the Soviet army, they are expected to take leadership in contributing to the political preparedness of the units for which they are responsible.

In order to check on the quality of political work in the army, MPA officials periodically inspect army units, visit political classes, interrogate officers and men on political themes, and evaluate the state of political morale. Unfavorable political reports reflect on the commander as well as on the zampolit; the pressure to lift the level of political consciousness is incessant and unyielding.

In projecting Party influence into the army, the MPA relies heavily on the network of Party and Komsomol organizations which permeates every military unit. These organizations in the army are directly responsible to the MPA and the Central Committee and are independent of the territorial Party organs of the areas in which they happen to be located. They are, however, exhorted to maintain the closest ties with these agencies and to "keep them periodically informed about political work in the military units." Under the Party Rules, "the secretaries of military Party organizations and the heads of political bodies participate in the work of the local Party committees."<sup>88</sup> Party secretaries of military units down to and including the regiment devote a major portion of their time to Party work; they function, in effect, as part of the MPA apparatus. The Party secretaries, or *partorgy*, of primary Party organizations or groups in the battalions and companies perform their Party assignments in addition to their regular military duties.

The Party secretaries have a specific obligation to stimulate the growth of Party organizations in the armed forces and to strengthen the devotion of Party members to the regime. They are responsible for Party education, for the organization and conduct of Party meetings, for carrying out all Party decrees, and for the enforcement of Party discipline within the unit. It is also their duty to mobilize Party members to assist the zampolit in carrying on agitation among non-Party army personnel.

Party members are expected to inspire others by their exemplary behavior, sense of discipline, political consciousness, and willingness to sacrifice themselves in the interests of Party and state. They are the cornerstone on which the activity of the Political Administration of the army is based.

The activities of the Party in the army are reinforced by the organization of Communist youth. The army Komsomols are directed by the Komsomol section of the MPA; like the Party organs, they are responsible to the zampolits of the units in which they function. Secretaries of Komsomol organizations at the level of the regiment and higher are required to be Party members or candidates; their appointments must have the approval of the unit zapolit. Primary Komsomol organizations function at the company and even the platoon level. By 1959 almost 70 per cent of all army servicemen were enrolled in Komsomol ranks.<sup>89</sup>

The Komsomol organizations also provide a reservoir of activists on which the Political Administration draws. The abler among them may be assigned to act as group leaders in study groups and discussions at the platoon level. Komsomols are enjoined to carry on cultural-educational work among their more passive colleagues, to assist in the editing of unit news sheets, to help in regimental club work, to popularize the "Leninist corners" where books and pamphlets are available, and to serve as a stimulus and example in heightening the political awareness of the army rank and file. By appealing to the ambitious as well as to the ideologically dedicated, the Political Administration manages to enlist a flow of energy from Komsomol ranks which helps to charge the army with Party zeal.

Party organization within the Red Army may be visualized as a series of widening concentric circles designed to bring even the least active and politically conscious elements under the spell of Party influence. At the center are the MPA apparatus and the paid Party secretaries who direct and coordinate all political activity. Around them is a much larger circle of Party members and candidates who are particularly strongly represented in the officer corps but who also make their weight felt among the noncommissioned officers and the rank-and-file soldiers. Around the Party is the far wider circle of Komsomols who are primarily recruited among the younger soldiers and noncommissioned personnel. The outer circle consists of the unaffiliated passive elements in the army who are least responsive to Party and Komsomol influence but who are nevertheless saturated in an incessant stream of agitation and propaganda which radiates out from the MPA apparatus.

In order to strengthen its hold on the army, the Party is constantly struggling to expand its field of influence. The soldier who stands out in the ranks and shows leadership potential is drawn into the Komsomol or the Party. The army Komsomol who demonstrates activist qualities is

advanced to Party membership. The ambitious officer knows that Party membership will facilitate his promotion. A bond of interest as well as of indoctrination unites Party member and Komsomol to the Party cause. The strength of the Soviet system of political controls consists in the determined effort to capture the positive loyalty of the armed forces and to incorporate their most activist elements in the ruling elite.

Affirmative appeals are supplemented by a system of security controls designed to prevent or stamp out disaffection. The KGB organization in the armed forces parallels the military and political hierarchy and operates through so-called counterintelligence sections down through the regiment. Although KGB representatives wear the uniforms and insignia of the units to which they are attached and are nominally subordinated to unit commanders, in fact they are ultimately responsible to the Committee on State Security. During the Stalinist period they were notorious for the arbitrary power which they exercised and the fear which they created. Since Stalin's death and the elimination of Beria, their operations have been less obtrusive, but their presence is still felt. In carrying out surveillance functions under Stalin, KGB representatives utilized nets of informers who were recruited from Party and Komsomol activists as well as from those who might be "blackmailed" into service because of past misdemeanors. Whether such practices still persist is not known. KGB control is applied to the officer corps as well as to the rank and file, to Party as well as non-Party personnel. Dossiers are maintained on all members of the armed forces, and personal-history files are thoroughly checked for any evidence of past anti-Soviet activity. A special watch is kept on the security of documents, facilities, and secret installations, and maximum efforts are exerted to safeguard the services against foreign intelligence penetration.

The punitive sanctions for the commission of state crimes and violation of military regulations are severe. High treason, which is defined to include "defection to the side of the enemy, espionage, and handing over a state or military secret to a foreign state," is punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of ten to fifteen years or by death.<sup>90</sup> Divulging a military secret in the absence of indications of high treason carries the risk of a two- to five-year prison sentence; the same act, if it has grave consequences, is punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of five to eight years. The conduct of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda is subject to a penalty of deprivation of freedom for a period of six months to seven years or exile for a period of two to five years. Insubordination and unwarranted abandonment of a unit or duty station for more than three days in peacetime are punished by deprivation of freedom for a period of one to five years; in wartime or in a combat situation, the maximum penalty may be death. Violation of service regulations on routine garrison

duty carries a penalty of a prison sentence of three to six months, while unwarranted abandonment of a battlefield, refusal to use a weapon during a battle, or voluntary surrender may be punished by death or by deprivation of freedom for fifteen years. The Disciplinary and Service Regulations put into effect in 1960 "emphasize that a Soviet fighting man may be taken captive only if he is in a helpless condition in consequence of having been seriously wounded or shellshocked."<sup>91</sup> The threat of death is not recognized as a valid ground for surrender.

The formula by which the Party leadership imposes its will on the armed forces is a blend of many elements, of which punitive controls are only one. In order to instill affirmative loyalty, the leadership relies on indoctrination and skillful manipulation of incentives. The appeal to patriotism and pride in Soviet achievements is an important cementing force. The perquisites reserved for the officer corps contribute to the same end. The ruling group is interested in maintaining defense forces which will not only be powerful and efficient but also loyal and subservient. Yet it cannot dispense with controls. Both the MPA and the KGB operate as checks on the military command, and the KGB itself is held in leash by its Party controllers. By establishing independent and competing lines of authority and by exploiting the rival ambitions of the commanders themselves, the Party leadership seeks to prevent the armed forces from developing into an autonomous political force. The separate channels of command within the armed forces converge at no point short of the Party Presidium. The ascendancy of the Party ruling group depends on the diffusion of power within the armed forces. The political insecurity of the military command is a guarantee of the military security of the political command.

#### *Tensions in the Soviet Army*

The strains and tensions which this system of control generates reflect the specific characteristics of Soviet military organization. The intrusion of independent political and police hierarchies into the army chain of command produces multiple zones of conflicting authority with their by-products of friction and rivalry.

The Soviet army officer finds himself at the center of a series of cross pressures which are not easily resolved. As a professional army officer, he has a prime responsibility for the military efficiency of his unit. Whether or not he is a member of the Party, he is also held accountable, together with his zampolit, for the political education of his troops. Neither military nor political preparedness can be neglected without running the risk of reprimand or a more serious penalty. If he is a Party member, he is further obligated to devote extra hours to such Party assignments as fall

to his lot. He is expected to be a model of behavior, and he lives with the constant knowledge that his every word and action are subject to scrutiny by his political officer or the representative of the KGB.

Relations with the zampolit offer a fertile source of friction. The cadre officer, even when he is a Party member, tends to place his military duties first. The zampolit is driven by the nature of his assignment to emphasize political work among the troops. Conflicts between commander and zampolit may frequently develop out of the competing claims which they make on the time and energies of the military unit for which they are both responsible. The commander who is jealous of his command prerogatives encounters a formidable rival in a zampolit who can report to his own higher authorities that the commander is ignoring the importance of political indoctrination. The cadre officer knows that his advancement depends on political loyalty as well as on military efficiency and that one important criterion of his loyalty is the political report which his zampolit writes about him. As a result, the officer is placed in the frustrating situation of being in some respects subordinate to the zampolit whom he theoretically commands. If his attitude to the zampolit is too submissive, he risks undermining his own authority with his troops. If he presses the zampolit too hard, he invites retaliation.

In the aftermath of the Zhukov purge, many of these problems were frankly aired. Numerous examples were cited of generals and senior officers who, during the Zhukov period, had avoided or neglected political work. One officer, when asked to give a political lecture to his troops, replied, "I am not an idler," while another, serving in East Germany, when faced with a similar request, retorted, "Do you want to make me into a demagogue?" Professional army officers openly manifested their resistance to criticism by political workers. A senior officer in Germany was quoted as saying: "Criticism should be directed by a superior officer towards his subordinates, and not the other way round," and another officer was reported as having said, "If I have done something wrong, let my commanding officer come to me and tell me to my face; all this public criticism undermines the authority of an officer."<sup>92</sup>

The reassertion of Party primacy over the armed forces after the Zhukov affair was accompanied by efforts to heal the breach and improve relations between military professionals and political workers. Marshal Golikov, then director of the MPA, undertook to outline the official Party position:

Creative cooperation between commanders and political workers in army units and on navy ships has noticeably increased of late. But efforts should be made to achieve even greater contact and coordination in their work. Commanders and political workers should confer more often in settling matters dealing with life in a unit or aboard ship and display unity of action and

purpose in striving to carry out military training plans. The joint work of commanders and political workers should be imbued with profound and mutual respect, adherence to principle, comradeship in mutual relations, and an organic need for united efforts toward a single goal set by the Communist Party. In the interests of this matter, there should be active and systematic assignment of commanders to political work and of political workers to command posts. There should also be more boldness in advancing Communists from command, engineering, and staff posts to the post of Party bureau secretary.<sup>98</sup>

Relations between cadre officers and representatives of the KGB also pose difficult problems. During the Stalinist period, these relations were particularly exacerbated. Most officers, like other Soviet citizens, adjusted themselves to an environment in which the presence of an informer was a likely possibility, but few learned to enjoy it. Those who fled to the West not infrequently attributed their break with Soviet society to a desire to be free of the atmosphere of suspicion and distrust which police surveillance generated. Since Stalin's death the fear of the KGB appears to have lessened, but the continued presence of KGB representatives in the units of the armed forces serves as a reminder that no form of anti-regime activity will be tolerated. The officer who wishes to survive and advance in the armed forces learns to suppress rebellious thoughts, discipline his tongue, and make the public affirmations of loyalty to Party and state which will demonstrate his complete devotion. One of the lessons of the Zhukov purge has been to underline the dangers of independent political expression.

The grievances of the army rank and file take a somewhat different form. Although they too are not unmindful of surveillance, they are less likely to attract KGB attention. The complaints of men in the ranks chiefly concern the special privileges of the officer corps, poor living conditions, and the extent to which even their leisure hours are invaded by political indoctrination.

In the Red Army of the twenties, the commanders led a relatively spartan existence which was, in many respects, indistinguishable from that of their men. Their pay was low; in 1924, a corps commander received 150 rubles a month, roughly the amount earned by a skilled metal-worker. There was no special officers' mess; officers and men shared the amenities of the Red Army clubs. The hierarchy of military life was tempered by egalitarianism; soldiers and commanders mingled freely, with no social barrier to separate them.

The Soviet army today is organized on a very different basis. Officers form a privileged caste. The gap between their standard of life and that of the army rank and file is substantial. Officers have their separate mess and their separate clubs. Relations between officers and men have become increasingly formalized and hierarchical. In recent years the Soviet leader-

ship has shown itself not unaware of the possible disruptive consequences. Commanders have been enjoined to "show fatherly concern for Soviet fighting men," and steps have been taken to raise the material living conditions of the armed forces. In June 1960 Marshal I. Kh. Bagramyan reported: "A year and a half ago white bread was introduced into the soldiers' basic rations. The quotas of fat and sugar have been raised . . . The clothing supply of army and navy personnel has improved. At present sergeants and privates have three uniforms apiece . . . The situation with regard to the billeting of troops has become much easier. Barracks are being provided with everyday service rooms, driers, store-rooms, and excellent study rooms . . ."<sup>94</sup> But the Marshal also went on to stress some deficiencies:

"Unfortunately, we are still a long way from utilizing all the opportunities the state makes available to us for further improving the material and everyday living conditions of the fighting men. It often happens that kitchens receive good rations but that the meals made from the rations are monotonous and unsavory. We still encounter much conservatism and obsolete operation in providing material conditions for the troops."<sup>95</sup>

Some two years later, shortly after the replacement of Marshal Golikov, head of the MPA, by General A. A. Yepishev, a Party official, a major campaign was launched to improve living conditions in the armed forces. A conference of quartermaster personnel held in Moscow in July 1962 provided a platform at which leading military and political figures called attention to poor army housing, bad food, and shortages of consumer goods at post exchanges. Marshal A. A. Grechko, First Deputy Defense Minister, disclosed that about 30 per cent of the summer uniforms were issued to troops in the autumn and winter, while winter wear was issued in the spring and summer.<sup>96</sup> Yepishev's deputy, P. I. Yefimov, cited incomplete bedding, unsanitary kitchens, and an unappetizing and monotonous diet at a number of military posts, and criticized "the poor work of political officers and Party units" in failing to eliminate these defects.<sup>97</sup> At the root of these criticisms was an obvious concern about the morale of the armed forces and a recognition that better conditions would have to be provided to ensure the political reliability of combat personnel.

The program of political education also encounters a certain amount of passivity and indifference among the rank and file. Soldiers complain that agitation and political meetings are boring, intrude into their free periods, and leave little time for rest and relaxation. The steady propaganda bombardment to which the Soviet armed forces are exposed creates its own immunities and defenses. Soldiers learn — as one former Red Army man put it — to sleep through political speeches with their eyes open. Few warriors challenge the assertions of political workers;

those who harbor doubts are ordinarily wise enough to conceal them. Such resistance as exists takes the form of apathy and inertia.

The strains and tensions which are present in the Soviet armed forces should not be interpreted to mean that the Party leadership stands in any danger of losing its control over them. The officer corps may resent the intrusion of political workers into command responsibilities and the surveillance of KGB representatives, but it is ordinarily powerless to change the situation in which it finds itself. Distaste for the negative aspects of Soviet army life is counterbalanced by the vested interest which the officers have acquired in the survival and expansion of Soviet power. According to Marshal R. Ya. Malinovsky, in October 1962, almost 90 per cent of all Soviet officers were Communists or Komsomols and 82 per cent of the armed forces consisted of Komsomols or Party members.<sup>98</sup> The top command is composed exclusively of Communists. Promotion and advancement depend on identification with the system. The Soviet officer corps occupies a privileged position in the Soviet social system; its material advantages and the honors accorded it make it one of the most attractive havens in Soviet life.

The grievances of the army rank and file also appear to present no serious threat to the top ruling group. Severe discipline, the gulf between officers and men, and lack of attention to creature comforts induce grumbling and resentment, but their undermining effect is counterbalanced by factors which operate to consolidate the loyalty or obedience of the armed forces to the regime. Improvements in the standard of living since Stalin's death, industrial progress, the growth of Soviet power, and spectacular space achievements contribute to a sense of accomplishment and national pride. The emphasis on Soviet patriotism and love of fatherland, figuring powerfully in recent Soviet army propaganda, functions as a unifying factor. The continuous indoctrination to which the armed forces are exposed leaves its residual deposits. While some Red Army soldiers remain more or less indifferent in the face of the propaganda barrage, large numbers find themselves unconsciously absorbing an image of a hostile outside world and a pride in Soviet achievements. The soldier activists who join the Komsomol and the Party set a tone which commands the passive acceptance of the more apathetic. Military discipline and KGB surveillance reinforce obedience. There is no readily available channel through which the dissatisfactions of the rank and file can find organized expression and present an effective challenge to the regime.

As long as control over the armed forces remains in the hands of a unified Party leadership, it is improbable that the Soviet military will emerge as an independent political force. The diffusion of power within the armed forces and the mutual suspicion which the control organs generate contribute to the atomization of the officer corps and the fragmenta-

tion of possible centers of organized opposition. The appearance of a Soviet variety of Bonapartism would seem to depend on the emergence of a sense of professional solidarity which transcends Party loyalty and on the enervation of Party and police controls in the armed forces. It is unlikely that this will take place short of a succession crisis or an inner-Party struggle which totally shatters Party cohesiveness and discipline.

*PART FOUR*  
*Problems and Prospects*

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## *Chapter 15*

# *Management and Labor in Soviet Industry*

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Industrialization imposes its own discipline wherever it spreads. It requires the creation of a trained labor force which will work in subordination to the rhythm of the assembly line. The complex division of labor of the industrial order puts a special premium on skill in planning and directing a multitude of minute interdependent relationships. Since management plays a key role in providing such direction, the inevitable effect of a program of intensive industrialization is to lift the commanding staffs of factories and enterprises to positions of great importance and responsibility. The leaders of the Soviet regime have perforce been driven to adapt their structure of authority to absorb the new elite created by the industrial revolution. The preoccupation of the top leadership with problems of production has made the technical and managerial intelligentsia an indispensable adjunct of power and given its members an increasingly significant role in the directive apparatus of the Soviet state.

### *The Crucial Role of Management*

The dependence of the regime on the industrial elite presents the Soviet ruling group with difficult problems. The leadership must be concerned both with the efficiency and loyalty of its managerial and technical cadres. It cannot dispense with efficiency since the productive potentialities of its industrial machine hinge on the quality of management. At the same time, it must also command the undivided loyalties of its managers and technicians if its own position of supreme authority is not to be gradually undermined. The effort to guarantee both efficiency and loyalty produces ambivalent and contradictory organizational pres-

sures. The drive for efficiency leads to emphasis on one-man management and a reinforcement of the authority and perquisites of the managerial class. The anxiety about loyalty induces strenuous efforts to assimilate the technical and managerial intelligentsia into the Party and involves reliance on Party and police controls to hold the power of the managerial elite in check. The distribution of authority in the Soviet factory registers the effect of these cross pressures.

A brief reference to earlier patterns of organization in the Soviet factory may bring recent developments into sharper perspective. In the first years of the Soviet regime, the Communist Party had few members who were qualified to undertake managerial assignments in industry. Many of the old-regime managers and technicians fled abroad. Although those who remained were regarded with keen distrust, it was also recognized that their skills would have to be utilized. Faced with the task of operating the newly nationalized industries, the Party found itself compelled to resort to a variety of expedients. Usually a Communist or a trusted worker who had demonstrated some initiative but lacked technical training was put in charge of a factory as the Red director, while an old-regime engineer was designated as his assistant to provide technical guidance. Sometimes the roles were reversed, and the engineer-expert was appointed manager, while a trusted Party member served as his deputy or controller to guard against sabotage and to make certain that orders were carried out. In either case, this system of dual control functioned badly. The Red directors or controllers commonly regarded the experts with suspicion and hostility, and the experts reciprocated with hatred and contempt. The experts were reluctant to take responsibility, and the Party representatives were equally reluctant to grant it. Friction and turmoil were the inevitable by-products.

The situation was further complicated by the existence of the so-called triangle. Party authorities, trade-union representatives, and management divided and shared responsibility for the operations of the plant. During the first decade of the Soviet regime, various efforts were made to demarcate their respective jurisdictions, but none of these attempts enjoyed notable success. The Party secretaries in the factories regarded virtually every action of management as within their province to review and reverse, and the trade unions, at least until 1929, continued to intervene actively in all managerial decisions affecting labor.

In 1929, as the First Five-Year Plan gathered momentum and emphasized the crucial role of management in determining its success, a strong effort was made to fortify managerial prerogative. The trade-union apparatus was purged, and its members were warned not to "intervene directly in the running of the plant and moreover, not [to endeavor] to replace plant management." Trade-union representatives were instructed

to "help to secure one-man control" and to concentrate their efforts on enforcing labor discipline and stimulating "the productive initiative of the working masses." The same Party resolution which incorporated this injunction also cautioned Party organizations against "direct intervention . . . in the operational-productive work of the plant management."<sup>1</sup> The Party cells were to concern themselves with checking the execution of Party directives and were not to interfere in the hiring of personnel, the allocation of work assignments, or other "operational-economic orders" of management. Although the 1929 Party resolution dealt a permanent blow to the managerial pretensions of the trade unions, it was less effective in clarifying relations between Party and management. The line between general supervision and detailed interference was not easy to draw. The intent of the resolution was clearly to buttress the authority of management, but the Party leadership had no intention of abdicating its control functions. It continued to hold its local functionaries responsible for the economic performance of the factories in which they were placed.

The strengthening of managerial authority was accompanied by strenuous efforts to improve the technical qualifications of old Communist managers and to train new specialists in large numbers. Veteran Communist factory directors were given leave to attend the Industrial Academy in order to fill in the gaps in their educational background. Special arrangements were made to provide private lessons and correspondence courses for directors who could not be released from their factory assignments. In the first phase of the five-year plans, great emphasis was also placed on the accelerated training of new specialists, who were recruited heavily from so-called proletarian cadres. The courses to which they were exposed were intensive and highly specialized. The system of accelerated education and narrow specialization proved seriously defective. It was replaced in the mid-thirties by a more rounded engineering curriculum, which allowed adequate time to master fundamentals and to which admission was regulated by strict entrance examinations rather than favorable social origins.

A substantial improvement in the educational qualifications of managerial and technical personnel was soon noticeable. As late as 1934, 50 per cent of the factory directors in the Soviet Union had only a primary-school education. By 1936, this percentage had been reduced to 40 per cent.<sup>2</sup> In the same period, the proportion of factory directors with some form of higher education increased from 26 per cent to 46 per cent, a sharp rise which reflects the attendance of many veteran Communist directors at the cram courses of the Industrial Academy as well as the infusion of new blood from the technical institutes.<sup>3</sup>

The Great Purge of 1936–1938 sharply altered the social and educational physiognomy of the directing personnel in Soviet industry. The

Red directors of the early twenties largely disappeared from the Soviet stage. Many of the Red specialists, who were given accelerated training in the first stages of the five-year plan and who rapidly rose to positions of responsibility, also fell by the wayside. They were replaced by young engineers who had only recently graduated from the technical institutes and universities. The new generation lacked the practical experience of its predecessors, but it was far more broadly and systematically educated. The effect of the Great Purge was to lift the best of the recent graduates of the engineering schools into posts of key industrial importance. By 1939, from 86 to 87 per cent of the factory directors in defense industries and ferrous metallurgy were listed as having a higher education.<sup>4</sup> Most of the young engineers who rose to power in the wake of the Great Purge were affiliated with the Party. Their indebtedness to the regime was reinforced by the exceptional opportunities to which they fell heir. With the assimilation of the new Soviet technical intelligentsia into the Party, the position of the manager and the engineer grew stronger. The new industrial elite exerted increasing influence in the higher councils of Party life, and a number of its members were promoted to important posts in leading Party organs.

The drive for industrial efficiency also helped strengthen managerial authority. Although the 1929 Party resolution endorsed the principle of one-man management in Soviet industry, its thoroughgoing adoption was another matter. While the interference of trade unions in production decisions was substantially eliminated and the power of local Party cells somewhat curbed, most plants continued to be managed on the "functional" system. Under this regimen, various managerial responsibilities were divided among functional departments, each enjoying the right to issue orders within its area of jurisdiction. The factory manager under this arrangement was at best a coordinator, with little real power to enforce his demands. Responsibility was dissipated among a host of independent departments each of which was sovereign in its own sphere.

The Seventeenth Party Congress, which met in 1934, launched a full-scale attack on the functional system of management.<sup>5</sup> As a result, the authority of plant directors and shop chiefs was substantially fortified. The functional departments were not abolished, but the rule was established that any instructions which they prepared to guide factory operations required the approval of the director, and all factory orders were issued in his name. The factory director was made fully responsible for the internal operations of the plant. The shop chiefs reported directly to him and received their orders from him.

This did not mean, however, that the factory director operated without checks and restraints. Over him was a highly complex system of supervision. During the Stalinist period these controls took four main forms.

First, there was the discipline of the plan. Each year the factory director received a program which indicated how much he was to produce, what his product mix was to be, how many workers he could hire, and how much would be available to pay them. In addition, he was assigned allocation orders which, in theory at least, entitled him to buy such scarce materials and goods as he needed. His plan was stated in both physical and monetary terms—that is to say, he was expected to produce a specified number of units with a specified ruble value. The prices for the material acquired and for the goods sold were fixed by the government. His job was to produce the planned output, and as much more as possible, with the resources that were made available to him.

Second, the factory manager was subordinated to a highly centralized ministerial chain of command. If his plant was under the jurisdiction of an all-union ministry, he reported directly to a glavk (chief administration) of the ministry in Moscow which supervised his sector of industrial life. If his factory was under a union-republic ministry, his immediate point of contact was with the representatives of the ministry in the capitals of the republics. In either case, such discretion as he exercised was hedged about by all manner of legal restrictions. In theory, the factory director had few opportunities for maneuver; in practice, as we shall see, he was compelled to seize them.

In the third place, there were the Party controls which paralleled the ministerial controls and operated in the plant through a Party secretary whose reports reached the center through an independent Party hierarchy. The Party secretary had a twofold responsibility: to assist the factory manager in increasing output and also to signal deficiencies and abuses in factory management to his Party superiors.

Finally, there were police controls. Every factory of any importance had its special or secret section, headed by a representative of the security police who functioned independently of the factory administration and reported directly to his superiors in the police chain of command. The responsibilities of the head of the special section included checking on the political reliability of all employees, enforcing security regulations, and investigating and punishing cases of sabotage, industrial breakdowns, or other "economic crimes" which impeded plan fulfillment or harmed state interests. The head of the special section had his own network of factory informers who reported secretly to him; the atmosphere of fear and distrust which they created was one of the ineluctable marks of the Stalinist era.

How, then, did the factory director perform his functions in this milieu of ambitious plans, supply scarcities, and restrictive controls?<sup>26</sup> Much depended in the first instance on the type of plant with which the manager was associated. If it was located in the high-priority areas of

Soviet industry — armaments and heavy industry — the factory director encountered relatively little difficulty in obtaining the supplies, skilled labor, and finances needed in order to fulfill the planned assignments. All the pressures of centrally enforced priorities converged to make these resources available through legal channels. If, on the other hand, the manager operated in a low-priority area, he faced a much more difficult problem in coping with the restrictions of a scarcity economy. Since the measure of his success was plan fulfillment, he was driven to all kinds of expedients, legal and illegal, in order to meet his quota. He bargained to the best of his ability with his superiors in the ministry and Gosplan to obtain a plan which he might reasonably fulfill. His search for a safety factor sometimes led him to overstate his requirements and to try to accumulate hoards of scarce materials against the danger of future shortages. He upgraded jobs and overexpended his wage fund in order to attract skilled labor and to keep what he had. He built up auxiliary enterprises in his own factory in order to decrease his dependence on uncertain outside supplies. If his supply of so-called funded or allocated commodities was inadequate, or if, possessing the necessary allocation orders, he still found it difficult to obtain the materials to which they entitled him, the manager employed *tolkachi*, "expediters" or supply agents, whose job it was to use all and any means to obtain the supplies which the factory needed. Sometimes scarce items were obtained by payment of black-market prices, sometimes by exchange between factories on a quid pro quo basis, and sometimes as compensation for past or future favors. The *tolkachi* depended heavily on *blat*, or personal influence, to dislodge the supplies which they were seeking. They cultivated potential suppliers by lavish entertainment, favors, gifts, and even bribes. Expenditures were substantial, and factory directors and their bookkeepers had to arrange methods of concealing them in the enterprise accounts, while running the risk of criminal prosecution if their machinations were exposed.

The factory director who fell behind in his plan or only partially fulfilled it was sometimes tempted to conceal his failure by manipulating the indicators of plan fulfillment. Thus, over-all plan fulfillment might be reported in terms of ruble value or number of items produced, when in fact the claimed production included subquality output, incomplete items, or an incorrect assortment of goods. The director who encountered difficulty in completing his plan was frequently prone to concentrate on goods of high value or items which were easy to produce, while less attractive items went unproduced. Needless to say, such ingenious subterfuges did not long go unnoticed, and they exposed their practitioners to the danger of dismissal or even worse.

The life of the average Soviet factory director in Stalinist Russia was

not easy. The penalties for failure were drastic. His authority was subject to rigid ministerial and Gosplan restrictions. The police and Party controls which surrounded him generated fear and insecurity. The pressure from above for greater and greater output was unrelenting. He was frequently forced into a life of illegality in an effort to meet the demands which were being made on him. Yet, for the successful manager, there were also compensating satisfactions. There was the pride of achievement, the satisfaction of building and producing despite what often appeared to be insurmountable obstacles. There were the prestige and power attached to office and the substantial material rewards which went with it, at least as long as the manager met or surpassed his output goals. And there was always the hope that the manager might be able to make his position secure and to earn promotion in the Soviet hierarchy as he proved his indispensability. Even during the darkest days of the Stalinist era, these motivations and aspirations worked to offset the depressing effects of the prevailing system of calculated insecurity and terror.

#### *Post-Stalinist Developments*

With the death of Stalin, the winds of change began to blow, and their effects were soon felt in the industrial sphere. There were two fundamental aspirations of factory managers which Stalinism thwarted: (1) the desire for security from police terror, and (2) the freedom to manage, to exercise greater discretion in operational decision making, and to enjoy an area of functional autonomy in fulfilling state obligations. At the same time, considerations of efficiency and administrative rationality impelled Stalin's successors to try to correct the centralistic bias of Stalinist administration by decreasing the burdens on the center and unbinding initiative at the grass roots. The interests of rulers and managers converged to set the stage for reform.

The new regime moved quickly to create an atmosphere of greater security in the industrial sphere. Among the chief beneficiaries of the first amnesty of March 1953 were all persons serving prison terms for "economic" crimes. The decree further provided that trials in progress for such offenses were to be dropped and that the laws were to be revised with a view to substituting administrative and disciplinary sanctions for criminal penalties in cases of lesser economic offenses. On May 13, 1955, the 1941 law, which made it a crime for managers to resell or exchange commodities and equipment without authorization, was abrogated, and the next day a decree was issued outlining and simplifying legal procedures for the disposal of surpluses.<sup>7</sup> These actions were followed on August 9, 1955, by a new decree of the USSR Council of Ministers which sought to broaden the discretion of directors of enterprises with respect to planning and the allocation of the resources assigned to them for con-

struction, repairs, staff, and associated purposes.<sup>8</sup> Yet even these steps, which were designed to placate managers, left some of them dissatisfied. One of them spoke out boldly in a statement published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on December 1, 1955, nearly three years after Stalin's death: "We are fettered by the framework of present planning, by the framework of the present organization of administration. A charter of the rights of the director has got to be worked out quickly and put into practice. I am not talking about obligations — the comrades of the Center will take care of the obligations without being reminded. But I as a director would like to get, along with the charter of obligations, the right to stand up for my rights and simply to have them finally in my hands."

Stalin's successors were moving to lighten the administrative burdens on the center by transferring operational responsibilities downward. The excessive degree of detail contained in the national economic plan was substantially reduced, and the task of pouring specific content into the plan's major targets was transferred to the producing ministries and their subsidiary enterprises. The number of funded commodities, for which central allotments were required, was reduced in the early decentralization moves of 1953–1956 from sixteen hundred to about eight hundred.<sup>9</sup> Union-republic ministries were substituted for all-union ministries in many branches of heavy industry. At the end of 1956, about fifteen thousand industrial enterprises formerly administered by the central government were reporting instead to the republics. By that time the enterprises under the jurisdiction of the republic councils of ministers accounted for 55 per cent of all industrial production, as compared to 31 per cent in 1953.<sup>10</sup>

However drastic these measures may have appeared at the time, they turned out to be merely harbingers of greater changes to follow. At a plenary session of the Central Committee in February 1957, Khrushchev launched a full-scale attack on the ministerial system.<sup>11</sup> He denounced it as clumsy, creating unnecessary administrative layers between the enterprises and the central ministries in Moscow and thus contributing to delay in communication and decision making. He charged that the departmental approach which dominated the ministries, their desire to make themselves as self-sufficient as possible in the interest of plan fulfillment, greatly hampered the possibility of rational cooperation among enterprises in the same region which belonged to different ministries. He also attacked the ministerial system because of the bloated administrative staffs which it fostered; he sought a simplification of the apparatus which would transfer skilled personnel to the "enterprise and construction sites, to the places where commodities are being directly created."

The reorganization which Khrushchev proposed, and which with

minor modifications was enacted by the Supreme Soviet on May 10, 1957, involved the abolition of a large number of central economic ministries and the establishment of a network of regional economic councils (see Chapter 12). The effect of this dramatic administrative innovation was to shift a substantial part of the operational control over industry from the center to the regions. As a direct result, three fourths of the industrial output of the Soviet Union was subjected to the jurisdiction of the sovnarkhozes.

The advantages claimed for the new sovnarkhozes were threefold. First, there would be much more direct and efficient supervision. As Khrushchev put it, "The organization of economic councils will make it possible to settle on the spot highly important economic questions, many of which were formerly settled only in the center by the ministries and administrators."<sup>12</sup> Second, they would produce improved and more rational cooperation among enterprises in the same locality. The sovnarkhozes were counted on to discover new ways of utilizing local resources, to transfer unused supplies and equipment from one intraregional enterprise to another, and to achieve savings in transportation by stopping unnecessary interregional crosshauling. They were also expected to eliminate inefficient plant subsidiaries and to replace them with consolidated regional services in such fields as construction, warehousing, foundry work, and trucking. Finally, it was hoped that many of the qualified specialists and administrators released by the abolition of the central ministries could be redirected to the regional economic councils and their affiliated enterprises, thus involving them more directly in the production process.

It is not easy to measure the degree to which these hoped-for benefits have been realized. The reluctance of employees of the disbanded ministries to exchange the amenities of the metropolis for the dubious joys of provincial life can be documented in the Soviet press. There have been persistent complaints of an unnecessary multiplicity of construction organizations in the regions, and factories which have developed subsidiaries on which they depend to guarantee plan fulfillment have understandably fought to retain them. At the same time, while most factory directors appear to value the accessibility of the sovnarkhozes and regard them as a vast improvement over the ministerial system in this respect, there are also allegations that the councils have become administratively top-heavy and reluctant to delegate sufficient authority to the plants and enterprises which they supervise. More than five years after the adoption of the reorganization plan, V. Andreyev, director of the Lenin Nevsky Machine-Building Plant, commented: "Now about the powers of the directors. Formally they are very broad, but on many questions, even minor ones, the manager of an enterprise is under petty tutelage. Can I,

the director of an enterprise, hire even one economist, for example, in order to improve economic analysis or planning? Can I hire one engineer for the mechanization of production in order to free five workers as a result? To all these and tens of similar questions there is one answer: I cannot. All this is prescribed for the plant from above.<sup>13</sup>

Where the old ministerial system stimulated autarchic or "empire-building" practices on an industrial-sector basis, the new sovnarkhozes unleash similar tendencies on a territorial basis. In the absence of strong central controls, there is a built-in tendency to put regional interests first at the expense of national interests. This bias toward *mestnichestvo* (localism) has expressed itself in various forms. The sovnarkhozes, by the very nature of their limited territorial jurisdictions, are not oriented to take account of national needs. In framing regional plans they naturally think in terms of regional development and are in no position to weigh the comparative advantages of alternative patterns of development on an all-union scale. At a different level, the pressure for regional plan fulfillment drives the sovnarkhozes to give preference to supplying their own enterprises from local resources, even at the cost of failing to fulfill their delivery commitments to other regions. In some cases, capital and material resources have been illegally diverted to provide local amenities not contemplated by the plan.

The regime has sought to combat these tendencies by tightening central controls and invoking disciplinary and penal sanctions to punish regional officials who illegally expend central funds for local purposes or fail to meet their commitments for interregional or interrepublic deliveries. Bonuses for the overfulfillment of plans have been denied to factory directors or sovnarkhoz officials where assigned quotas of shipments to other areas were not met. While these drastic measures have served to check localist practices, they have not succeeded in driving them out completely, since each sovnarkhoz continues to feel primarily responsible for fulfilling its own plan.

The pressure of the sovnarkhozes and their subordinate enterprises for greater local autonomy is not easily reconcilable with a system of centrally enforced priorities. Consequently, the central planners retain the right to determine major plan targets, to approve or modify the plans of the sovnarkhozes, to allocate and plan the distribution of products in serious short supply, and to regulate interregional and interrepublic deliveries. In three of the major republics, the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, new republic-level councils of national economy were constituted in 1960 to coordinate the activities of subordinate regional councils. In May 1961 further steps were taken to check localism by establishing new coordinating councils to develop long-term plans for the integrated economic development of some nineteen large "natural" regions;

the new councils were superimposed on the existing 101 sovnarkhozes (see Chapter 12).

The November 1962 decisions of the Central Committee carried these recentralizing tendencies still further. The number of sovnarkhozes was reduced to approximately forty, and their powers in the field of construction, standardization, and the introduction of new techniques were transferred to USSR state committees operating through independent organizations. The four republics of Uzbekistan, Tadzhikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kirghizia were placed under one Central Asian sovnarkhoz controlled by a Central Asian Bureau reporting directly to the Presidium of the Central Committee. In the large republics of the RSFSR, the Ukraine, and Kazakhstan, the sovnarkhozes which were formerly coordinated in Party terms by the oblast committees were made directly subject to republic Party supervision.

Despite these measures, the problem of ensuring a smooth uninterrupted flow of supplies from plant to plant remains troublesome, and many enterprises continue to find it expedient to employ supply agents to expedite the delivery of needed goods or to obtain scarce items through extralegal channels. In an article in *Izvestiya* on April 4, 1959, A. Burkaltsev, a senior inspector of the USSR Soviet Control Commission, charged that "their number does not diminish but rather increases." Citing specific instances, he pointed out that

in eleven months the Urals Automobile Plant dispatched 2,762 representatives on business trips and the Krivoi Rog Steel Plan 2,813 . . . About 3,000 representatives visited the Red Sermovo Plant in eight months, and more than 700 turned up at the Kuibyshev Bearings Plant in six months. Eight enterprises . . . keep full-time representatives at the Kuibyshev Cable Plant. There are 15 such "permanent representatives" at the Magnitogorsk Metallurgical Combine. The trade administration of the Novosibirsk City Executive Committee maintains 5 representatives — they are listed as "senior goods experts" — in Kiev, Tashkent, and Vinnitsa.

"There is no need to demonstrate," he continued, "that the large flow of 'expeditors' violates planning discipline and disrupts material and technical supply." But he was also frank in recognizing the pressures to which factory managers were responding. "After all, enterprise directors are often forced to send 'expeditors' as a result of the failure of certain enterprises and economic councils to observe schedules in the shipment of goods."

In a recent letter to *Izvestiya*, one M. Zhebrak, who described himself as "a supply manager by occupation and expeditor against his will," commented:

How often people write in your newspaper and in the press as a whole about expeditors, about their unenviable role as superfluous people in the

Soviet apparatus. They are depicted as sharp dealers, pushers, and contortionists who always manage to crawl back in through the window whenever they are pushed out the door. And it is true that our brother expediter can be found in the corridors of chief administrations, plant offices, and the administration of railroads. We expedite strenuously, using all legitimate and illegitimate means to justify our existence and to push through the next shipment of materials that at times are desperately needed by the organization that sent us.<sup>14</sup>

He then proceeded to describe how the Zhmerinka Leather Plant, which he represented, was forced to stand idle because the Transvolga Chemical Plant persistently refused to honor an allocation order for 900 kilograms of dye. "And so, esteemed editors," asked the unwilling expediter, "who do you think is to blame that we expediter exist?" As one Soviet official put it, "Very often there are moments in the life of an enterprise when the fate of the plan is decided by an insignificant number of kilograms of this or that material . . . Unfortunately, almost every day we face the problem that there is not enough of one small item, then of another."<sup>15</sup>

Thus, despite the reorganization, supply problems continue to plague the managers of Soviet industry. The deeper causes are traceable to the regime's insistence on the rapid expansion of output, its inability or unwillingness to provide adequate reserves to compensate for shortfalls in individual plan fulfillment, and the difficulty of operating any centrally planned system with absolute precision. It can safely be predicted that, as long as supply scarcities persist and the fate of a factory manager is dependent on his success in meeting his plan, the hard-driving industrial executive will continue to resort to all means, legal and illegal, to guarantee plan fulfillment.

#### *Party Controls in Industry*

Party controls in Soviet industry have undergone substantial modifications in recent years. Under the old ministerial system, with the most important factories and enterprises reporting directly to the center, the position of local Party organizations was intrinsically weak. They could report deficiencies in industrial management to their Party superiors and contribute to plan fulfillment by conducting agitation and propaganda in the factories and by assisting, through Party channels, in the procurement of supplies. But factory directors still felt ultimately responsible to their ministerial superiors; it was through the ministers that the industrial executives received their approved plans, their specific directives, their assigned personnel, their bonuses, and their promotions.

The industrial reorganization of 1957 greatly strengthened the position of the republic and oblast Party organs, as well as the Party organizations subordinate to them. Even prior to the creation of the regional economic councils, at the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 Khrushchev had

called on local Party groups to intensify their activities in the economic realm. With the establishment of the sovnarkhozes and the transfer to their jurisdiction of many enterprises formerly operating under ministerial supervision, the regional Party organs were lifted to a role of new importance. The activities of each sovnarkhoz were ordinarily limited to an oblast or one of the smaller republics, and the authority of the oblast or republic first secretary in these areas was paramount. Important positions in the sovnarkhozes and in the industrial enterprises subordinate to them were included in the jurisdiction (*nomenklatura*) of the obkom or republic Party central committee, which meant that all significant industrial appointments had to be channeled through and ratified by the Party apparatus at these levels. The regional and republic Party organs were enjoined to help give shape to sovnarkhoz plans, to check on their execution, and to assist in their fulfillment. They were also vested with the responsibility of coordinating the operations of the sovnarkhozes with related activities in the area. In addition to the industrial enterprises subject to sovnarkhoz jurisdiction, there remained many smaller enterprises and services which were managed by soviet organs, and there were still others, such as the railroad system, which were responsible to a central ministry in Moscow. The burden of regulating their interrelations in the regions and the republics ultimately fell on the Party.

In the course of the industrial reorganization of November 1962, local industry was shifted from the jurisdiction of the Soviets to the sovnarkhozes, thus lessening the need for coordination by regional Party organs. At the same time, the increase in the size of the sovnarkhozes in the larger republics meant that their boundaries no longer coincided with those of the smaller oblasts and that Party control over the sovnarkhozes was exercised at the republic, rather than the oblast, level. One of the obvious purposes of the reform was to eliminate excessive localist practices in which the oblast party organs had become enmeshed. Its effect was to weaken the oblast link in Party industrial administration and to strengthen the position of republic and central agencies.

Party activities in the factories reflected the increased emphasis on economic control. In 1959 all primary Party organizations in industrial and trade enterprises were instructed to set up special control commissions in the economic sphere. In a speech to the Central Committee on June 29, 1959, Khrushchev described their duties as follows:

These commissions must keep a systematic check on the enterprises' timely fulfillment of their production quotas, state orders and deliveries of all the articles specified and their quality; they must also see to it that all the personnel of the enterprises strictly abide by state discipline and combat all manifestations of local selfish interest and a narrow departmental approach as harmful to statewide interests. They can lodge a protest against a decision taken by the man-

agement and report to Party and governmental bodies on any unlawful, wrong actions or decisions that are contrary to the law or Party and government decisions . . .<sup>16</sup>

The Party apparatus undertakes to differentiate its role from that of management, despite the fact that most top factory executives are also Party members. Operating through its own independent hierarchy of secretaries in the factories and enterprises, the Party seeks to project a distinctive image of itself as the custodian of the nation's interests in contrast to the more narrowly oriented outlook of some industrial managers. This special mandate of the Party apparatus involves it in both collaborative and potentially antagonistic relations with factory management.

Both the Party secretary and the factory manager share a common interest in the success of the plant, since both are held responsible for its results. Indeed, since it is the entrepreneurial talents and executive gifts of the factory director which go far to determine the efficiency of the plant, the Party secretary is in a certain sense dependent on the director, and he may be driven to overlook irregularities of one kind or another as long as the director produces results. An example cited in the Soviet press as transgressing all tolerable limits will illustrate the underlying problem. V. A. Maiorov, head of the Kirov shipyards in Astrakhan, was subjected to heavy attack for "infringements of staff discipline, illegal granting of premiums, [employment of] supply agents, squandering of funded materials,"<sup>17</sup> and other crimes; despite this, he received strong support from the local Party committee because he had transformed a previously lagging enterprise into a successful one. When newspaper correspondents asked why he had not been punished for his crimes, the obkom second secretary replied, "Maiorov is not a man who is lining his own pockets. If he permits such violations, then it is only for the sake of production . . . You try to lead such an enterprise. How can you possibly get along without law violations?"<sup>18</sup>

As this illustrates, the Party secretary may find himself driven to make common cause with the successful factory director, even to the extent of overlooking irregularities which in theory he should bitterly combat. But interpretations of the criteria of success may also diverge sharply in response to the very different organizational pressures to which factory directors and Party secretaries respond. It is in the interest of the factory manager to have a plan which he can realize and to confine proposed increases to modest increments. An important factory director, V. Andreyev, recently described the drafting of the annual plan as follows: "The planning agencies argue vigorously with the managers of enterprises to induce them to accept a higher plan. The representatives of the enterprises, on

the other hand, argue with equal energy that the high assignments are unrealistic."<sup>19</sup> To some extent, the position of the factory Party secretary is ambivalent. Since he shares responsibility with the factory director for plan fulfillment, he has an interest in securing a plan which is realizable. At the same time, he is under constant pressure from above through Party channels to goad factory directors into promising increases and to organize "spontaneous" pledges by both management and labor to accelerate plan fulfillment and overfulfillment. The factory director may welcome agitation for extra effort in meeting his plan, but he can only be bitterly opposed to making promises which he knows he cannot perform.

Similar difficulties arise in connection with the control functions of the Party secretary. It is his duty to keep in touch with all parts of the enterprise, to be alert to any failure of performance, to signal his superiors in the Party hierarchy in the event of difficulties, and to report constantly to his own higher authorities on the state of plan fulfillment. The Party secretary may be tempted to gloss over deficiencies in order to achieve neighborly relations with the factory director. He may allow himself to become indebted to the factory director for favors, in exchange for which he tempers his criticism or withholds unfavorable reports. But if he surrenders to such temptations, he also exposes himself to serious risks. The Party secretary who becomes too personally involved with the administrator whom he is ostensibly controlling is not likely to endear himself to his superiors in the Party hierarchy. The reasons are obvious. He ceases to be a dependable reporter, and the regime can no longer rely on him to keep it informed of industrial developments. He blocks one of the most important avenues of pressure by which the leadership maintains its grip on the industrial manager.

The dilemma confronting the factory Party secretary is a painful one. He faces real difficulty in defining his role vis-à-vis the director and his relations with his own higher Party authorities. If the Party secretary subordinates himself completely to the director, he loses his usefulness as a control instrument and risks a serious reprimand from his superiors in the Party hierarchy. If he presses his control too far, he may be reprimanded for interfering with the director's prerogatives and displacing, instead of controlling, economic organs. As one Party secretary put it, "We know that a replacing of economic and soviet organs is an unfit method [of leadership] which is condemned by the Party. But we ask, what should be done when things go poorly."<sup>20</sup> The Party secretary must steer a wary course to avoid the shoals of excessive interference and inadequate control.

Fortunately for most Party secretaries, the task is not necessarily an insoluble one. The relationship between Party secretary and factory director need not be one of pure antagonism. If the factory director can help

make the reputation of the Party secretary by successfully mastering production problems, the Party secretary can also be of assistance to the director. The Party's agitation and propaganda activities may spur the workers to intensified efforts when plan fulfillment threatens to lag. When supplies cannot be obtained through any other means, the resourceful Party secretary may be able to utilize Party channels to get the needed items. Collaborative assistance of this sort may do a great deal to temper the latent antagonism which is implicit in the role of the Party secretary as a guardian and controller.

Yet the Party secretary dare not abdicate his role as an independent nucleus of power in the factory. The canny secretary quickly develops a sense of the potentialities and limits of his authority. He will be prompt to expose the deficiencies which the weak factory director is powerless to remedy. He will be equally sensitive to the necessity of maintaining an entente cordiale with the strong factory director who produces results. His professional career as a Party functionary depends on his success in reconciling the cross pressures to which he is exposed. The authority which he exercises is a function of the situation in which he finds himself.

#### *The Role of the Trade Unions*

The role of the trade unions in the factory has undergone a substantial transformation since the early days of "workers' control," when an abortive effort was made to realize the syndicalist dream of the factory run by and on behalf of the workers. During the Stalinist period, the trade unions were relegated to the position of minor satellites of management and the Party in the factory constellation of power.<sup>21</sup> Under Khrushchev, an effort has been made to breathe new life into the trade-union movement, but, though the unions have been given more powers and larger responsibilities, in essence they remain creatures of the Party.

The Soviet trade unions, unlike their counterparts in the Western democracies, do not enjoy a large sphere of autonomous action. In the words of the Trade Union Statute, "The Soviet trade unions carry on all their work under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." The resolution of the December 1957 Central Committee plenum was even more explicit: "Having in mind that the Party exercises its influence . . . through Communist members of the trade unions, the plenum obligates Party committees to increase the responsibility of all members of the Party for work in trade unions, to improve practical activity of the Party groups established in elected trade union organs in accordance with the Party statutes."<sup>22</sup> Key functionaries at every supervisory level of the trade-union apparatus are on the nomenklatura of the corresponding or superior Party committee. Their appointments are initiated and approved through Party channels; trade-union elections

serve merely to ratify decisions which the Party has already reached. At the lowest level, however, in the shops, factories, and similar units, union members exercise some choice in nominating and electing the committees to represent them. The list of nominees is usually larger than the number of places to be filled; elections are by secret ballot; and instances have been reported where unpopular candidates supported by the Party have been voted down.<sup>23</sup> Ordinarily, however, an approved slate is prepared in advance by the Party organization, and the Party caucus operates to make sure that "democracy" will not get out of hand.

As an accompaniment of the November 1962 reorganization of the Party into industrial and agricultural segments, the structure of Soviet trade unions has been remodeled to fit the new pattern. At the top of the pyramid is the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions (ACCTU) with its own directing apparatus. It brings together representatives of the twenty-two unions which enlist the bulk of the Soviet labor force. Each union has its own central committee and its branch headquarters in the republics and regions. Coordination among unions at the regional level is achieved through two separate councils, one joining trade unions working in industry, construction, and urban economy and the other uniting unions engaged in agriculture or serving rural areas. At the center and the republic level, the reform provides for only one trade-union council, which will, however, have separate Bureaus for Leadership of Trade Union Organizations in Industry and in Agriculture.

The Soviet trade unions are not bargaining units in the Western sense of the term. They do not have the right to strike, and decisions on basic wage rates, output norms, hours of labor, and similar matters are a prerogative of government rather than of the trade unions. Such determinations on a national scale are made by the State Committee on Labor and Wages, and the Central Council of Trade Unions plays chiefly a consulting and advisory role. At lower levels, however, in the plants and factories where the problem arises of applying these general regulations, there is provision for more active participation by the trade-union committees. Management is required to obtain their agreement in assigning workers to wage categories, in establishing work quotas, in introducing regulations on progressive piecework and bonus systems, and in determining other matters involved in wage administration. But the Regulations on the Rights of Factory, Plant, and Local Trade Union Committees approved in 1958 also made clear that such determinations must be "in accordance with existing standard regulations."<sup>24</sup> The same regulations provided for a strengthening of the authority of the local trade-union committees in other respects. They were given the right to "participate" in working out production and financial plans of enterprises, to supervise the observance of labor legislation and collective agreements, to

express their opinions on candidates nominated for management posts, and to veto discharges of workers and employees initiated by management. How effectively these rights are exercised is not easily ascertainable.

The Soviet collective labor agreement is a very different instrument from its Western contractual counterpart. The overriding drive which regulates the tempo of the Soviet factory is the compulsion to produce, and the trade unions have had to adjust their activities to this perspective. In the main, the agreement represents a joint promise by management and the unions to fulfill and surpass the production plan of the government. The trade unions pledge that labor will observe discipline and increase its productivity. Management promises to provide the conditions which will make such an increase possible. A small area remains within which a modicum of bargaining may take place. The factory shop committee may press management to undertake housing construction and repairs, to provide greater amenities for the workers, and to carry out other types of welfare activity. The obligations which management assumes in this sphere are necessarily limited by the budgetary and material allocations which it can obtain from its superior authorities in the sovnarkhozes and the plan organs. In a report to the Twelfth Trade Union Congress in March 1959, V. V. Grishin, chairman of the ACCTU, summarized recent developments as follows:

Substantial changes have been made in the practice of collective agreements. The sending out of standard collective agreements was stopped in 1957. Now the factory trade-union committee and the managerial personnel themselves decide what obligations should be included in the collective agreement, taking into account the specific features of the enterprise and the specific working and living conditions of the workers and employees. In large shops additional agreements are drawn up on measures for improving working conditions. In some republics and provinces special agreements are concluded between the economic councils and the trade-union councils . . . However, some trade-union organizations are still not taking an adequate part in this work. At some enterprises the collective agreements, especially in the field of labor protection and everyday services for the working people, are not being carried out . . .<sup>25</sup>

One of the major purposes of the recent activation of the trade unions is to increase the workers' responsibility for production. Under the 1958 regulations, local trade-union committees are directed to organize socialist competition, to encourage inventions and rationalization proposals, and to sponsor and direct production conferences at which management reports on progress and problems. The union committees are enjoined to criticize management and to make suggestions either directly to them or to higher organs. The vesting of these rights in the trade

unions appears clearly designed to stimulate worker interest in increased productivity. It may also be viewed as an effort to use the trade unions as a counterweight to prevent factory directors from concealing production deficiencies or otherwise abusing their authority.

Another function of the trade unions is to promote "strict labor discipline." Since the repeal in 1956 of the stringent Stalinist decrees prohibiting unauthorized changes of employment and ordering criminal prosecution for absenteeism, workers who wish to leave a job can do so legally by giving management two weeks' notice, except in cases where contract violations are involved. Until 1960, however, a change of job carried with it a loss of seniority rights and a corresponding scaling down of benefits under the social-insurance rules.<sup>26</sup> While this penalty no longer applies where a worker takes another job within a month, the worker who abandons his job is still subject to sanctions which discourage such behavior. If the factory has assigned him a house or a garden plot, he has to give them up when he severs his connection with the enterprise. If the labor book which he is required to carry shows too many job changes, he may find himself seriously handicapped when he tries to find better-paid work. If he is a Party or Komsomol member, the threat of expulsion may operate as a constraint.

Administrative and social pressures also operate to strengthen labor controls. To aid management in enforcing production discipline, since 1959 comrades' courts have been established in all plants and enterprises with more than fifty workers. These courts, which in form at least are elected by and composed of workers, are expected to punish such offenses as absenteeism without valid reason, tardiness, drunkenness, negligence, neglect of safety regulations, noncompliance with orders, and other infractions of discipline.<sup>27</sup> The punishments which can be imposed include public reprimands, fines up to a hundred rubles, and recommendations for demotion, dismissal, and even prosecution by legal organs. Hearings take place in the factory itself, and the results are widely publicized by both management and trade unions. Their "educational" effect is heightened to the extent that the sanctions imposed appear to derive not from management but from the workers themselves. In this sense, the comrades' courts, as well as the trade unions which support them, play an important shock-absorber role in relieving managers of the onus of directly asserting their disciplinary authority.

A limited role is also allotted to the unions in the settlement of workers' grievances against management. The factory trade-union committee participates on an equal basis with management in the work of labor-disputes commissions. Representatives of the trade unions and management take turns in presiding. The jurisdiction of the commissions does not embrace all types of disputes which might arise between labor and man-

agement. Essentially, their work is confined to the application of existing legislation, collective agreements, work contracts, and other rules and regulations defining the rights of workers and management. Typical workers' grievances dealt with by the labor-dispute commissions include the application of established output quotas and rates; cases of dismissal or transfer to other work; claims for overtime, bonus, vacation, and severance pay; and deductions for material damage done to factory property.

Ordinarily, cases are referred to a labor-disputes commission only if a preliminary discussion between the factory foreman and the trade-union representative fails to produce a settlement. If no agreement is reached by the commission or if a worker is dissatisfied with its decision, he may carry an appeal to his local union committee. If the decision of the committee is deemed unsatisfactory by the worker or if management believes that it conflicts with existing legislation, either party may appeal the case to a people's court. Disputes concerning dismissals of workers and employees occupying nonexecutive posts are reserved for decision by people's courts. Decisions of the people's courts may be appealed or protested in the usual manner.

Judgments as to the efficacy of this grievance procedure vary widely. The impression conveyed by official Soviet sources is that the labor-disputes commissions and the people's courts decide a majority of labor cases in favor of the workers. Ex-Soviet workers as well as outside observers point out that basic wage rates and basic wage classifications are outside the competence of the courts and commissions, that the most important decisions affecting the livelihood of workers are administratively determined, and that the grievance machinery at best has only a limited role to play in dealing with the full gamut of labor's aspirations.

To the extent that the existing procedures provide an outlet for the ventilation and adjustment of certain types of grievances, they serve the Party leadership well. The much-publicized cases in which workers' complaints lead to corrective action have important symbolic significance. They help to renew faith in the regime's sense of equity, and they appear to validate the paternal concern of the Soviet rulers for the condition of the masses. Even though the grievance machinery is restricted in scope, such relief as it affords commands popular support and makes a positive contribution to the strength and productive efficiency of the regime.

From the point of view of the workers, perhaps the most important function performed by the trade unions is in the social-welfare area. These activities include the administration of social-insurance funds, the management of sanatoria and rest homes, responsibility for auxiliary housing and farm and garden enterprises attached to factories, the enforce-

ment of safety regulations, the stimulation of mass sports, and the provision of clubhouses and other factory recreational facilities.

These welfare features of the Soviet regime have their roots in developments which go back to the early postrevolutionary and even pre-revolutionary years. The Soviet social-welfare budget has long included appropriations for maternity benefits, medical care, sickness and disability benefits, family-allowance payments, and old-age pensions. On paper at least, the scope and coverage of these programs were impressive even under Stalin; in fact, the actual benefits accruing to rank-and-file workers during the Stalinist era were meager in the extreme.

A realization of their inadequacy led to substantial reform and improvement after Stalin's death. Until 1956 the maximum old-age pension was 210 rubles a month. The law enacted in that year fixed 300 rubles as the minimum pension for those qualified by length of service and set a new ceiling at 1,200 rubles a month. Similar upward adjustments were made for those suffering permanent disabilities and for their dependents. The period for which maternity benefits were to be paid was lengthened from 70 to 112 days.

Comparable action was taken in the wage and hour field. In 1956 a new minimum-wage law fixed a floor of 300–350 rubles per month in urban areas and 270 rubles in the countryside. The Seven-Year Plan (1958–1965) held out a promise that the minimum wage would be increased to 400–450 rubles per month during the period 1959–1962 and to 500–600 rubles during 1963–1965. A law of the Supreme Soviet, enacted on May 7, 1960, also sought to improve the relative position of lower-paid workers by abolishing income taxes on all wages up to 500 rubles a month after October 1, 1960. The law stipulated that the income tax would be discontinued on wages up to 600 rubles a month on October 1, 1961, and on wages up to 700 rubles a month on October 1, 1962.\* Those receiving higher wages were promised a substantial decrease in their income tax payments.

Reductions in working hours were also put into effect. After the Twentieth Party Congress in 1956, the normal work week was reduced from forty-eight to forty-six hours. In September 1959 a detailed time schedule was announced for the introduction of a six-hour day for underground workers and a seven-hour day for all other Soviet workers to be completed by the end of 1960. The effect of this action, subsequently ratified by the Supreme Soviet on March 7, 1960, was to lower the standard work week to forty-one hours (seven hours daily Monday through

\* On September 24, 1962, *Izvestiya* announced that the projected income-tax cuts would be suspended "until further notice." The explanation given stressed the tense international situation and the government's need for resources to strengthen defense and to step up industrial and agricultural output.

Friday, six hours on Saturday). In his Central Committee report to the Twenty-Second Congress on October 17, 1961, Khrushchev declared: "It is contemplated that in the next few years a forty-hour week will be introduced for workers and employees working a seven-hour day."<sup>28</sup>

These measures were accompanied by a sharp acceleration in housing construction, an increase in the supply and variety of consumer goods, and a slow but steady rise in the real wages of the working class. Together, they have undoubtedly contributed to ease the lot of the Soviet worker. Although much remains to be done, and shortages in housing, consumer goods, and livestock products are still severe, such improvements as have taken place have served to blunt the edge of discontent and to bring worker and regime closer together.

The transformations in the position of both management and labor during the post-Stalinist period reflect the search of the Party leadership for a more rational and efficient totalitarian order capable of directing the dynamic processes unleashed by industrialization. On the organizational plane, the effort to escape the top-heavy overcentralization of the Stalinist era resulted in the creation of a network of regional economic councils, an ingenious experiment in the territorial decentralization of supervisory authority. While these councils produced their own characteristic localist excesses, they also enabled the regime to tap the initiative of its trained managerial cadres and provide more direct and effective supervision for its far-flung and diverse enterprises. Organizational changes in the management of industry sought to adapt the system of controls to the intricate problems posed by an increasingly complex economy.

The drive for rationality also involved an effort to come to terms with the thwarted aspirations of the Stalinist epoch. A population cowed by terror and enforced deprivation hardly provided a promising seedbed for future progress. If the loyalties and energies of an awakened and increasingly educated citizenry were to be engaged in support of Party and state objectives, incentives and rewards had to be forthcoming. The post-Stalinist leadership had to respond to its own revolution of rising expectations and still maintain the pressure for rapid industrialization.

The reforms of the post-Stalinist era represent an adjustment to these imperatives. Given a system in which the central priorities of forced-draft industrialization and military power continue to regulate the tempo of economic development, the resources available to improve living standards are necessarily limited. Within these limits, nevertheless, Stalin's successors have expanded their welfare allocations and raised real wages. They have placed less reliance on compulsion and repression and have greatly strengthened the role of incentives and persuasion. The ultimate

significance of recent changes may well lie in the regime's belief that a combination of efficient controls, an effective incentive system, and a strong welfare program holds the key to reconciling totalitarianism with the needs of a modern industrial order.

## *Chapter 16*

# *Controls and Tensions in Soviet Agriculture*

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The peasantry, perhaps more than any other element in transitional societies, tends to be distrustful of change. The world of the peasant is bounded by a profound attachment to the land. When he is landless or has only dwarf holdings, his revolutionary aspirations take the form of a hunger for land. When he is established on his own property, he obstinately resists being swept into the anonymity of the collective. Of all the major revolutionary transformations of the Soviet period, none was more difficult to effect than the collectivization of agriculture. Once achieved, the persistent efforts of the peasantry to evade its discipline presented the regime with problems of control and adjustment which have still to be satisfactorily resolved.

In its inception the Communist attitude toward the peasantry represented a curious combination of dependence and hostility. The dependence came from the necessity of appealing to the peasants' land-hunger in order to win and consolidate power in an overwhelmingly agrarian country. The hostility and distrust carried over as an ineluctable legacy from Marx, deriving from the conviction that the petty-bourgeois aspirations of the peasantry made it a natural enemy of any form of collectivism. In Lenin's words, "Small-scale production gives birth to capitalism and the bourgeoisie constantly, daily, hourly, with elemental force, and in vast proportions."<sup>1</sup>

The strange amalgam of hostility and dependence is reflected in Soviet agricultural policy. When the regime feels powerful enough to disregard peasant sentiment, opposition is brushed aside, and the Communist leadership ruthlessly imposes its will on the peasants. When

it operates under the necessity of wooing peasant support or holding out greater incentives to stimulate output, concessions to the peasantry are forthcoming. Although the pendulum of policy has swung back and forth with the regime's changing assessment of its own position and needs, its ideological commitment is firmly to collectivism. In the words of the 1961 Party program, "The economic flowering of the collective-farm system creates the conditions for gradually bringing closer together collective-farm ownership and public ownership and in the long run for their merging in a single communist ownership."

### *The Development of Soviet Agricultural Policy*

The course of development of Soviet agricultural policy illustrates this tendency. The peasant revolution of 1917–18, which involved the expropriation of the landlords' estates and their division among independent peasant households, was fully sanctioned by early Soviet legislation. But this was primarily a tactical expedient. As Lenin observed in 1919, "In October 1917 we seized power *together with the peasantry as a whole*. This was a bourgeois revolution, inasmuch as the class war in the rural districts had not yet developed . . . the real proletarian revolution in the rural districts began only in the summer of 1918."<sup>2</sup> In carrying on this struggle, the major enemy was identified as the kulak, or rich peasant, while the major support on which the Bolsheviks relied was the so-called Committees of Poor Peasants. The middle peasants were treated as a vacillating force whom the Bolsheviks could not afford to alienate. Lenin frequently urged his followers to refrain from coercion in dealing with them.<sup>3</sup>

In practice, the pressures of the Civil War drove Soviet authorities to seize grain wherever they could lay hands on it. Little distinction was made among different social strata of the peasantry in carrying out the requisition policy. The response of the peasants to this type of confiscation was what might be expected. Peasants reduced their plantings to meet only their own consumption needs, did their utmost to conceal their reserves from the requisitioning authorities, and occasionally responded to seizures by violent attacks on the food collectors. The catastrophic decline in production caused severe food shortages in the cities as well as in many rural areas. Grumbling mounted as food became increasingly scarce, and the Bolsheviks stood in danger of completely alienating the countryside. The Kronstadt revolt in March 1921 and the peasant rising in Tambov and other provinces in the winter of 1920–21 marked the height of the crisis. Even though the Bolsheviks ruthlessly punished the participants in these disorders, they also concluded that a change of policy was imperative.

The New Economic Policy, which was introduced in 1921 and lasted

until 1927-28, marked a reversion to the policy of concessions to the peasantry. A tax in kind replaced compulsory requisitioning, and peasants were free to dispose of their surpluses after satisfying their fixed obligation to the state. Although the title to land remained in state hands, the tenure of the peasant in the land was guaranteed by law. Peasants were permitted considerable freedom in leasing additional land and employing hired labor, practices which had been prohibited under War Communism. The peasant was given an incentive to produce, and a considerable revival in agricultural output soon followed. Peasant home consumption increased substantially, and a general improvement in the living standard of the countryside was visible.

If the concessions of the NEP were received with considerable satisfaction by the peasantry and contributed to its partial reconciliation to the regime, they raised more troublesome problems for the Communist leadership. While Lenin was adamant in justifying the necessity for the NEP, his defense did not extend beyond defending it as a strategic retreat which gave the Soviet regime an opportunity to consolidate its position and to prepare the way for the next leap forward toward socialism. The NEP unleashed tendencies which appeared to challenge the basic premises of Communist ideology and strategy. As Lenin himself observed when the NEP was first introduced, "We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the replacement of requisitioning by the tax means that the kulak element under this system will grow far more than hitherto. It will grow in places where it could not grow before."<sup>4</sup> The entrenchment of a substantial class of independent peasant proprietors could only be viewed with alarm by a Party which had been taught that the kulak was the prime enemy in the countryside and that the nationalization of the land was a prelude to the spread of large-scale socialist agriculture.

The agricultural pattern that crystallized under the NEP raised still other difficulties. As the rural population increased, the average size of peasant holdings declined. The retention of the scattered-strip system of farming and the lack of draft animals and modern implements resulted in inefficient farming. The new peasant farm units placed a smaller proportion of their output on the market, both because home consumption mounted and the scarcity and high price of consumer goods offered peasants few inducements to sell their surpluses. The unfavorable terms of trade between rural and urban areas mirrored the dilemma which the regime faced in dealing with the peasantry. In order to stimulate agricultural output and to entice the peasants to part with a larger share of their production in a free market, it was necessary for the regime to make consumer goods available at relatively favorable prices. If they were not available, the peasants tended to curtail their output, to increase their consumption, and to hoard such surpluses as they accumulated.

The regime's decision to embark on a program of rapid industrialization, with major emphasis on the expansion of heavy industry, greatly sharpened this dilemma. The implication of this decision was clearly that consumer goods would be scarce and high-priced and that the regime would have little to offer the peasants in the way of incentives to increase their output or to dispose of their surpluses. At the same time, it was imperative that a large supply of grain be available at low prices, both to feed the expanding industrial population and to provide exports to pay for imports of machinery and other essential industrial items. With the regime committed to a program of accelerated, large-scale industrialization, it soon became apparent that this objective could not be realized within the framework of the NEP. The ruling group therefore determined to shatter the NEP relationships. Inevitably they were driven toward a revival of the practice of compulsory requisitions which had proved so disastrous during the period of War Communism. The policy of concessions to the peasantry was terminated, and a new era of open warfare loomed.

The first victims were the kulaks, the more prosperous peasants on whom the regime had to depend heavily during the NEP to provide surpluses for urban consumption. The efforts of the kulaks to withhold grain from the government because of their dissatisfaction with the low prices offered by the state were met with what Stalin described as "emergency measures . . . methods of public coercion."<sup>5</sup> In plain language, force was employed to seize the kulaks' stores. As the kulaks fought back, the regime intensified its offensive. In 1929 it launched the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. Under the banner of this slogan, approximately a million peasant families were deprived of their farms and property and sent into exile or forced labor.

In order to replace and expand the grain surpluses which the kulaks had produced and to avoid the difficulties which had attended compulsory requisitioning under War Communism, the regime turned confidently to collectivization and mechanization. Soviet agriculture was to be reorganized around two types of large-scale production units, the *sovkhоз*, or state farm, and the *kolkhoz*, or collective farm. Initially, great hopes were placed in the *sovkhозes* to provide a quick substitute for the kulak output. The *sovkhозes* were visualized as great grain factories which would be completely mechanized with tractors and combines, which would be operated by skilled agricultural technicians and workers, and which would serve the peasants as socialist models of large-scale farming and advanced technique. Beginning in 1928 a number of huge new state farms were organized on free land in the southeastern, eastern, and southern regions of the USSR. Difficulties quickly developed. The land allotted to the grain *sovkhозes* was usually semiarid, full of weeds,

and sparsely settled. Crop failures were common because of drought. The soil required intensive cultivation and weeding, but seasonal labor to perform these operations was difficult to obtain and was not particularly efficient. Combines and tractors were not effectively utilized. Skilled operators and repair facilities were lacking. Combines became clogged with weeds and were put out of commission. Tractors broke down and could not be mended. Because of the vast expanse of the sovkhozes, supervision was difficult in the best of circumstances, and inexperienced managers had great difficulty in providing the necessary skillful leadership. The grandiose expectations which were centered on the sovkhozes met bitter disappointment. At the Seventeenth Party Congress in 1934 Stalin openly acknowledged the "discrepancy" between "the enormous sums the state has invested in the state farms with the actual results they have achieved to date."<sup>6</sup> The decision was made to subdivide the large farms into smaller, more manageable units, and a halt was called on their expansion. For the rest of Stalin's reign, the state farms receded in importance, and it remained for Khrushchev to provide a new impetus for their expansion.

The original plan for the establishment of kolkhozes contemplated a relatively slow tempo of development. By 1932 the crop area included in collective farms was expected to embrace about 36 million acres, compared with 298 million acres to remain in individual holdings.<sup>7</sup> This relatively modest objective was apparently dictated by the shortage of mechanical power. Until tractors and combines could be provided in large numbers, there appeared to be little advantage in rushing ahead with wholesale collectivization. Meanwhile, the available tractors, combines, and other farm machinery were pooled in the MTS or machine-tractor stations, which were designed to serve the needs of a group of neighboring collective farms and to make possible maximum utilization of equipment.

#### *The Drive for Collectivization*

Toward the end of 1929 the policy of gradual collectivization was suddenly reversed. In a series of speeches and decrees, Stalin gave the signal for a rapid acceleration of the collectivization program. It was no longer necessary, he claimed, to wait until tractors and combines were produced in large quantities. "A tremendous expansion of the crop area" could be achieved simply by merging individual holdings and by tilling waste land, field boundaries, and virgin soil.<sup>8</sup> The land of the kulaks would be absorbed into the new collective farms, and this additional "sweetening" would serve as an extra inducement to make the poor and middle peasants join.

Behind the move to intensify the rate of collectivization was the

realization on the part of the Party leadership that most of the peasants were opposed to the new kolkhozes. As long as the regime relied on persuasive measures and voluntary affiliation, progress was painfully slow. By October 1929 only 4.1 per cent of the total number of peasant households had organized themselves into kolkhozes. When the signal came from the Kremlin that speed was essential, the whole machinery of Party and government was mobilized to force the peasants to join.<sup>9</sup>

The use of pressure tactics yielded a quick statistical triumph. The proportion of peasant households enrolled in collective farms mounted to 58.1 per cent in March 1930.<sup>10</sup> But as reports accumulated that the peasants were slaughtering their cattle and draft animals in order to avoid confiscation and that the new collective farms were paper organizations to which the peasants refused to contribute their labor, the leaders of the regime began to realize that they had won a Pyrrhic victory. On March 2, 1930, Stalin again reversed course with the publication of his famous article, "Dizziness from Success."<sup>11</sup> In this and subsequent pronouncements, he blamed misguided local Party and Soviet authorities for excesses in forcing the pace of collectivization. Stalin's article was interpreted by many peasants as a *laissez-passer* entitling them to withdraw from the kolkhozes. The mass exodus which followed reduced the percentage of peasant households in the kolkhozes from 58.1 in March to 23.6 in June 1930. In the central Black Soil region, where 82 per cent of the peasants had been reported as collectivized in March 1930, only 18 per cent were left in May.<sup>12</sup>

Despite this setback, the campaign for collectivization was resumed in the fall of 1930. This time more subtle means of "persuasion" were combined with the old reliance on force and threats. Discriminatory taxation was imposed on individual peasants, while those who joined the collective farms were offered certain forms of tax alleviation as well as the advantages of sharing in the credits, machinery, seed grain, and other privileges and preferences. The regime was now adamant in insisting on entry, and efforts to avoid collectivization were increasingly hazardous and difficult. By the middle of 1931, 52.7 per cent of all peasant households had been collectivized. The proportion increased steadily over the next years, amounting to more than 90 per cent in 1936 and 96.9 per cent in 1940.<sup>13</sup>

The collectivization crisis of the early thirties exacted a terrible price.<sup>14</sup> The liquidation of the kulaks involved the uprooting and exile of millions of peasants and robbed the countryside of its most efficient and enterprising element. The slaughter of livestock and draft animals inflicted a wound on the Soviet economy from which it took nearly a decade to recover. The disorganization of work in the new collective farms contributed to the disastrous harvests of 1931 and 1932. Despite the drastic

decline in crop yields, the authorities were ruthless in enforcing their demands on the countryside, and near-famine conditions prevailed in many rural areas. Motivated by an overriding compulsion to feed the rapidly growing industrial centers and to provide supplies for export, the regime "contracted" with the kolkhozes to obtain grain and other items in amounts determined exclusively by the regime's needs and quite unrelated to the problem of keeping the members of the kolkhozes alive. An unknown number of peasants, variously estimated at from one to several million, died of starvation in these hungry years. The "contracts," by which obligatory deliveries to the state were enforced, were in effect a revival of the compulsory requisitions of War Communism. Although the substitution of a relatively small number of collective farms for millions of peasant households greatly facilitated the state's food collection activities, the large-scale expropriations of the early thirties offered the collective farmers little impetus to produce. The regime again found itself faced with the problem of fashioning incentives to stimulate output.

Beginning in 1933 the procurement system was revised. Fixed deliveries based on acreage planted (or supposed to be planted) were substituted for the largely arbitrary assessments which had previously been made in the guise of contracts. The new system provided inducements to increase production. Since the obligations to the state were definite and any surplus which the kolkhoz accumulated was distributed to its members in proportion to the workdays which they earned, the self-interest of the membership was served by an expansion of output.

As this stimulus took effect and as the disorder of the early days was overcome, the performance of the kolkhozes improved substantially. The harvests of 1933, 1934, and 1935 registered yearly gains. Although there was a sharp drop in 1936 as a result of drought, the 1937 harvest yielded a bumper crop. During the next two years, production declined but still remained above the output of the NEP years.<sup>15</sup>

During the mid-thirties, the kolkhozes went through a process of consolidation and stabilization. After the bitter friction of the first phase of collectivization, the regime succeeded in imposing its controls, and a precarious modus vivendi with the peasantry was arranged. In exchange for obligatory deliveries to the state at very low prices, the collective farmers received certain minor concessions. Each peasant household was granted a small garden plot adjacent to its dwelling and was also permitted to own a few cattle, sheep, and goats, as well as an unlimited number of fowl and rabbits. Any surplus which the collective farmers achieved out of kolkhoz earnings could be sold at prices prevailing in the free market rather than at the low prices fixed for delivery to the state. The principles of remuneration embodied in the Collective Farm Charter of 1935 were designed to reward skill and productivity. The farmers were

thus provided with individual incentives to increase their production within the framework of the burden which they collectively shouldered.

While these concessions were welcomed by most of the peasantry, they did not necessarily reconcile them to the collective-farm yoke. The demands of the state were great, and the procurement plan had to be met regardless of whether the harvest was good or bad. In years of poor crops, the plight of the collective farmers bordered on desperation, and even when crops were good the standard of living of the average collective farmer was rarely much above a minimum level of subsistence. Despite the fact that the Collective Farm Charter called for payments to collective farmers which reflected their output, egalitarian tendencies frequently prevailed in the distribution of kolkhoz income, and the incentive to work hard on the collective farm operated with only limited effectiveness. Most collective farmers preferred to pour their energies into their own garden plots. They performed their assignments on the collective farm without spirit and without enthusiasm.

Though the attitude of the peasants toward the collective farms remained largely negative, from the point of view of the regime collectivization marked a triumphant step forward. As an accompaniment of collectivization and mechanization, a substantial migration of rural labor to the new industrial centers was achieved without impairing the output of the countryside. Even more important, collectivization, after overcoming its initial difficulties, provided a greatly improved system for ensuring the urban food supply. The collective farms were an infinitely more efficient food-gathering device than the millions of small farms which they replaced. Instead of trying to collect taxes in kind from twenty-five million peasant households, each with its developed techniques of evasion, the regime could now largely limit its procurement activities to a quarter of a million collective-farm units. From the administrative point of view, this represented a vast improvement and simplification. Moreover, evasion was rendered difficult by the intimate participation of machine-tractor stations in the harvesting of crops of many collective farms. The MTS themselves functioned as procurement agencies, since they collected fees in kind for their services, while they also operated as an unparalleled local intelligence service to check on the performance records of the collective farms they served. The dimensions of state procurement steadily mounted.<sup>16</sup>

As the Soviet authorities consolidated their ascendancy in the countryside, they intensified their demands on the collective farmers. In 1939 a new campaign was launched to tighten control of the collective farms. Investigation revealed that more than two and a half million hectares of land had been unlawfully diverted from the collective farms to private garden plots and that many so-called collective farmers had only a

nominal attachment to their kolkhozes and spent most of their time on their own gardens. The joint Party and governmental resolution of May 27, 1939, "On Measures toward Safeguarding the Collectivized Land from Being Squandered," was designed to put an end to these abuses.<sup>17</sup> A survey to check the size of all garden plots was ordered, so that land stolen from the collective farms could be reclaimed. Severe penalties were provided for those farmers found in unlawful possession of such land. A minimum number of workdays was prescribed for each member of the kolkhoz regardless of sex. The USSR was divided into three zones, and the minimum for each was fixed respectively at 100, 80, and 60 labor days. Nonfulfillment of these minima was to be punished by expulsion from the kolkhoz and loss of garden plots. A joint Party and governmental resolution of April 13, 1942, subsequently raised the minima to 150, 120, and 100 labor days and provided a specific allocation of labor days which had to be worked during different seasons of the year.<sup>18</sup>

Meanwhile, efforts were also made to stiffen work discipline and to provide additional inducements for increased productivity. On August 1, 1940, Soviet agricultural authorities were ordered "to put an end to the intolerable practice that in some kolkhozy, MTS, and sovkhozy, kolkhozniki and the workers of the MTS and sovkhozy, instead of starting work at 5-6 o'clock, report for harvesting work at 8-9 o'clock and stop work in the field before sundown."<sup>19</sup> A government decree of December 31, 1940, first introduced in the Ukraine and later extended to other areas, provided a premium system to encourage output in excess of planned goals. Under this system, kolkhoz brigades exceeding their plan were to be rewarded with a certain proportion of the surplus they produced. This was to be made available either in kind or in the form of a cash equivalent.

At the same time, the regime made further demands of the peasantry. In 1940 the basis for computing crop deliveries to the government was shifted from the actual acreage planted to the amount of tillable land in possession of the kolkhozes. This change in the method of assessing compulsory deliveries was accompanied by a substantial boost in the amounts which the collective farms were required to yield to the state. While this measure was probably influenced by the pressure to accumulate reserves against the contingency of war, its effect on the collective farmers was onerous and sharpened their resentment of the burdens which the state imposed on them.

#### *World War II and Postwar Developments*

The impact of World War II on Soviet agricultural production was critical. In the first years of the war the Nazis occupied a large part of the richest and most productive land in the Soviet Union. The regime at-

tempted to compensate for this loss by substantially increasing the production of foodstuffs in Siberia and Central Asia, but despite these efforts and the encouragement of urban workers to cultivate vegetable plots, food shortages were frequently desperate. Though the basic needs of the armed forces and essential industry were met by drawing on reserves and Lend-Lease aid, malnutrition accounted for many civilian casualties, and in besieged localities such as Leningrad there were few families whom starvation passed by.

Despite the disorganization of war, the kolkhoz remained the basic form around which Soviet agriculture was organized. In areas occupied by the Nazis, many kolkhozniks hopefully looked forward to the dissolution of the collective-farm system. These expectations were disappointed when the Nazis determined to retain the great majority of the kolkhozes because of their convenience as food-gathering devices. Disappointment was succeeded by complete disillusionment as the Nazi requisitions became increasingly burdensome and many villages began to experience the full brunt of Nazi atrocities. The patriotic sentiment aroused by Nazi brutality led many of the kolkhozniks in occupied areas to identify their fate with the survival of Soviet power. While the Soviet authorities continued to be regarded as oppressors, they were, as some of the kolkhozniks are reported to have remarked, "at least ours." In nonoccupied areas, similar patriotic impulses narrowed the gap between collective farmers and the regime. As the armed forces drained the kolkhozes of manpower, the women, old men, and children who replaced them worked all the harder because they were bound to the front by the knowledge that the fate of husbands, brothers, and sons depended on them. The reservoir of patriotism on which the regime was able to draw buttressed the wartime effectiveness of the kolkhoz as a procurement mechanism.

Another effect of the war, however, was to weaken the fabric of kolkhoz controls. In areas abandoned by the Nazis, the kolkhozes usually had been stripped of their cattle and draft animals, and only the most primitive farm implements remained. Collective farmers utilized the general confusion and disorder to enlarge their garden plots at the expense of the kolkhoz. In the reoccupied areas, farms usually had to be reorganized from the ground up, and the shortage of supervisory personnel, draft animals, and mechanical power heightened tendencies toward individual self-help. In nonoccupied as well as reoccupied areas, collective farmers were under a powerful incentive to pour maximum effort into their own garden plots rather than into the communal enterprises of the kolkhoz. With food scarce, prices skyrocketed on the free market. Any surpluses from the garden plots could be readily bartered at advantageous rates for the possessions of the hungry population of the towns. Collective farmers who were in a position to do so used the war emergency to

accumulate stores of goods as well as substantial hoards of currency. Within the framework of the collective-farm system, a lively revival of individual enterprise found spontaneous expression. While the war still raged, little was done to curb these tendencies. Indeed, rumors were ripe in the villages (and were apparently tolerated by the regime) that the end of the war would see a fundamental revision of the kolkhoz system and a new charter of freedom for the peasantry.

These sanguine expectations met a sharp rebuff. The history of Soviet agricultural policy in the post-World War II period is essentially a record of tightening control over all kolkhoz activities. The opening gun in this postwar campaign was fired on September 19, 1946, with the publication of a joint resolution of the Party Central Committee and the Council of Ministers, "On Measures for the Liquidation of Violations of the Charter of the Agricultural Artel in the Collective Farms."<sup>20</sup> The brunt of the resolution was directed against the "plundering" of collective-farm property which had taken place during the war as a result of illegal enlargements of house and garden plots. Other abuses were also listed. As a result of the inflation of the administrative staffs of the kolkhozes, the resolution charged, "Grafters and parasites frequently hide themselves on useless, artificially invented jobs, avoiding productive work . . . and live at the expense of the labor of those collective farmers who work in the fields and tend the cattle."<sup>21</sup> Local Party and governmental officials were accused of squandering collective-farm property "by forcing the management and the chairmen of the collective farms to issue them, free of charge or at low price, property, cattle, and produce belonging to the collective farms."<sup>22</sup> The principles of the Collective Farm Charter were being violated by excluding collective farmers from "participation in the business of the collective farms." "The matter has reached such a point of outrage," the resolution piously proclaimed, "that the chairmen are appointed and dismissed by the district Party and government organizations without any knowledge of the collective farmers."<sup>23</sup>

A special Council on Kolkhoz Affairs was established on October 8, 1946, to put an end to these abuses and to restore order on the collective-farm front.<sup>24</sup> This council was headed by A. A. Andreyev, a member of the Politburo, and was composed of important Party officials, agricultural administrators, and heads of collective farms. Operating through its own inspection service of controllers, the council reached down from the center through the oblasts, from which it supervised the regular agricultural agencies charged with kolkhoz administration.

The Council on Kolkhoz Affairs was given a broad charter. It was to enforce collective-farm rules, to prevent the alienation of collective-farm land or property, to strengthen discipline in the kolkhozes, to regulate

the relations between the kolkhozes and the MTS, and to see that the kolkhozes fulfilled their obligations to the state. Subject to the consent of the Council of Ministers, the Council on Kolkhoz Affairs was authorized to issue directives to all governmental agencies concerned with kolkhoz life. As a result of its activity, *Pravda* asserted, some fourteen million acres of illegally appropriated land were restored to the kolkhozes.<sup>25</sup> Measures were also taken to reduce padded administrative staffs. In the two years following the issuance of the September 1946 decree, an official Soviet agricultural organ claimed, some 535,000 members of kolkhozes were shifted from administrative to productive work and another 213,000 were removed from kolkhoz payrolls because they had no real connections with the kolkhozes.<sup>26</sup> Despite this apparently substantial achievement, complaints about bloated administrative staffs continued, and on September 14, 1948, new measures were ordered to deal with this endemic disease of kolkhoz bureaucracy.

While the leaders of the regime utilized the Council on Kolkhoz Affairs to tighten administrative control of the kolkhozes, they also sought to reinvigorate Party controls in rural areas. At the February 1947 plenum of the Central Committee, Andreyev called for a mobilization of Party organizers to strengthen Party authority in the kolkhozes and machine-tractor stations. After the plenum, trusted Communists from urban areas were sent in substantial numbers to serve as assistant directors of political affairs in the MTS. From this vantage point, a vigorous campaign was launched to expand the network of MTS and kolkhoz Party organizations. Despite this effort, Party representation in rural areas remained thin. Although the number of kolkhoz Party units tripled between 1939 and 1949, approximately 85 per cent of the kolkhozes were still without primary Party organizations.<sup>27</sup> At the Seventeenth Congress of the Ukrainian Communist Party in September 1952, L. G. Melnikov, the first secretary, reported that only 138,054 members and candidates, or 17.7 per cent of the total in the republic, were engaged in agricultural pursuits.<sup>28</sup>

In the postwar years, determined efforts were also made to reduce the private property of kolkhozniks to a minimum and to discourage them from diverting their energies from the kolkhoz to their own private plots. The 1947 monetary reform struck a particularly heavy blow at the hoards of currency which some collective farmers had accumulated. The rate of taxation on income from sources other than the collective farm was substantially increased in 1948 and raised again in 1950 and 1951. Holders of garden plots who owned cows, sheep, and poultry had to deliver increasingly large percentages of their output of meat, milk, eggs, and other products to the state.<sup>29</sup>

At the same time, the system of remuneration within the collective farm was revised to penalize laggards and to reward the productive. The

seven-category system of classifying and compensating labor was replaced in 1948 by a nine-category system.<sup>30</sup> Under the new arrangement, income differentials were substantially widened, and a number of less-skilled kolkhoz jobs which had previously been paid at relatively high rates were reclassified into less well-paid categories. Kolkhozniks who exceeded their plans were rewarded with credits of additional workdays in proportion to the percentage of overfulfillment. Failure to reach planned goals was punished by deductions of workdays. Thus, incentives and penalties were combined in order to raise the output of kolkhoz labor.

A somewhat similar scheme was adopted in 1949 in connection with the launching of a three-year plan to increase communal livestock herds on collective and state farms. Collective farms which succeeded in building up their herds to the minima prescribed by the plan were rewarded with a 10 per cent reduction in their delivery quota of animal products to the state; those kolkhozes which failed to meet the new requirements were compelled to deliver an additional 10 per cent above their normal quota.<sup>31</sup>

The postwar drive to re-establish effective control over the kolkhozes was also accompanied by a campaign to replace the *zveno* (literally, link) or small team by the much larger brigade as the basic unit of agricultural production. During the early and middle thirties, the brigade had been the officially approved form of organizing kolkhoz labor. Toward the end of the thirties, there was an increasing tendency to break down the brigades into *zvenya* or teams of a dozen or so workers who concentrated on working a small plot from the sowing through the harvest. Originally, the *zveno* was used in connection with technical crops such as sugar beets and cotton where a great deal of hand labor was required, but in the late thirties it spread rapidly to grain farming. At the Eighteenth Congress of the Party in 1939, Andreyev, the agricultural spokesman of the Politburo, strongly endorsed the *zveno* system. He argued that "the collective farmers working in large brigades are not held personally responsible for the quantity and quality of their work . . . the more the work on the collective farm is individualized, that is, performed by teams or separate collective farmers, and the greater the material encouragement of their labour, the more efficient it will be as regards crop yields and stock raising."<sup>32</sup> During the war and immediate postwar years, the *zveno* system was widely heralded as the most efficient method of organizing kolkhoz labor. The loss of tractor power during the war and the consequent necessity of relying on hand labor contributed to strengthening the position of the *zveno* system.

Suddenly, in one of those sweeping reversals in which Soviet history is embarrassingly rich, the *zveno* system was repudiated. On February 19, 1950, an unsigned article in *Pravda*, entitled "Against Distortions in

Collective Farm Labor Organization," explicitly condemned Andreyev for his advocacy of the zveno system, criticized the use of the zveno in grain farming as obstructing the effective use of tractors, combines, and other machinery, reasserted the importance of the brigade as the basic form of organizing kolkhoz labor, and indicated that the zveno system would be retained only temporarily for the cultivation of sugar beets, vegetables, and certain other intensive crops "inasmuch as production of these crops is not yet adequately mechanized."<sup>33</sup> The appearance of this authoritative pronouncement was followed on February 25 by the publication of a letter in *Pravda* by Andreyev in which he confessed his errors and promised "to rectify them in deeds."<sup>34</sup>

This unusual spectacle of the use of a Politburo member as a whipping boy to signal a change in policy pointed to the importance of the issues at stake in this seemingly minor conflict over methods of organizing kolkhoz labor. Behind the attack on the zveno system, as Lazar Volin has indicated, was the apprehension "that the small zveno unit might eventually supplant not only the brigade but also the kolkhoz itself."<sup>35</sup> As the *Pravda* article put it, "Substitution of teams for brigades would signify the splitting of a single large-scale collective unit into small cells, scattering the energies and reserves of the collective farm, and a return from advanced technology and collective forms of labor to individual, manual labor. It would mean shaking the very foundations of large-scale collective socialist agriculture."<sup>36</sup> The fear of the disintegrative potentialities of the zveno system was reinforced by the difficult control problem which it presented. The zveno system required a much greater number of politically reliable leaders than the brigades, and such leadership was in short supply in rural areas. From the point of view of the regime, the kolkhoz could be more effectively controlled through a few trusted brigadiers who were amenable to Party influence than through a large number of zveno leaders whose interests were identified with the rank-and-file collective farmers.

The replacement of the zveno by the brigade was closely linked with the kolkhoz merger movement which was launched almost simultaneously. On March 8, 1950, Khrushchev, who had succeeded Andreyev as the Politburo's agricultural spokesman, used the columns of *Pravda* to signal the opening of the new campaign. In calling for the amalgamation of contiguous small kolkhozes into larger units, Khrushchev listed a number of benefits which the regime hoped to attain. The mergers, he claimed, would facilitate mechanization and the adoption of the most advanced agricultural practices. They would yield increased production and higher income for collective farmers, greater farm surpluses, and, presumably, larger deliveries to the state. They would also make possible a substantial reduction in administrative expenditures and the selection of outstand-

ing managers and agricultural specialists to direct the new kolkhozes.

One of the paramount objectives of the merger campaign — left unstated by Khrushchev — was the regime's desire to tighten its control over the collective-farm structure. The merger of small collective farms resulted in a substantial increase in the number of kolkhozes with primary Party organizations and an intensification of Party influence. The reduction in the number of collective-farm chairmen meant that those who were retained were likely to be the most politically reliable, as well as technically proficient. The regime appeared headed toward the consolidation of a managerial corps in the kolkhozes which would be increasingly isolated from the rank-and-file farmers and which would function as an effective state instrument to extract maximum output from them.

The merger campaign inaugurated by Khrushchev in the spring of 1950 rapidly gathered momentum. By the end of the year, Minister of Agriculture I. A. Benediktov reported that the number of kolkhozes had been reduced from 252,000 to 123,000. In October 1952 Malenkov indicated that only 97,000 were left.<sup>37</sup> In many cases, however, the amalgamation was "legal" rather than real, and actual unification of operations remained to be carried out. In some areas, including Leningrad oblast, the size of garden plots was substantially contracted, to the consternation of many kolkhozniks.<sup>38</sup>

As the merger campaign intensified, more grandiose aims unfolded. In a speech delivered in January 1951 and published in *Pravda* on March 4, Khrushchev proposed the construction of collective-farm settlements or agro-cities around which the new collective farms would be organized. He also suggested that private garden plots be reduced in size, be located on the outskirts of the new settlements, and be tilled in common.<sup>39</sup>

This apparently authoritative pronouncement, however, was soon repudiated. The next day, March 5, *Pravda* announced that "through an oversight in the editorial office . . . an editorial note was omitted in which it was pointed out that Comrade N. S. Khrushchev's article was published as material for discussion."<sup>40</sup> Soon thereafter, G. A. Arutyunov, the first secretary of the Armenian Party, stated that the proposal to relocate collective farmers in agro-cities was opposed to Party and Soviet government policy. The scheme to reduce private garden plots was also pronounced "unacceptable" and "contrary to the collective farm statutes."<sup>41</sup> At the Nineteenth Party Congress, Malenkov declared:

Some of our leading workers, especially in connection with the merging of the smaller collective farms, were guilty of a wrong, narrow, utilitarian approach to questions of collective-farm development. They proposed the hasty, mass resettlement of villages to form big collective-farm towns, the scrapping of all the old farm buildings and the farmers' homes and the setting up of big "col-

lective-farm towns," "collective-farm cities," "agro-cities" on new sites, regarding this as the most important task in the organizational and economic strengthening of the collective farms. The error these comrades make is that they have forgotten the principal production tasks facing the collective farms and have put in the forefront subsidiary, narrow, utilitarian tasks, problems of amenities in the collective farms. Amenities are undoubtedly of great significance, but after all, they are subsidiary, subordinate, and not principal tasks and can be solved successfully only on the basis of developed common production.<sup>42</sup>

As this statement clearly implies, the first priority of the regime was to raise collective-farm output and procurement. The heightened control over the kolkhozes which the merger movement made possible was designed to achieve that objective.

Despite all of the forceful measures which Stalin took in the postwar years to bring pressure on the collective farms to increase their production, Soviet agriculture remained backward and stagnant. The full dimensions of the agricultural crisis were not publicly revealed until after his death. Tables 20 and 21, based on official data, tell their own story.

Table 20. Total Livestock in the Soviet Union (in Millions)

Year (beginning)	Cows	Cattle (in- cluding cows)	Hogs	Sheep and goats	Horses
1916	28.8	58.4	23.0	96.3	38.2
1928	33.2	66.8	27.7	114.6	36.1
1941	27.8	54.5	27.5	91.6	21.0
1950	24.6	58.1	22.2	93.6	12.7
1951	24.3	57.1	24.4	99.0	13.8
1952	24.9	58.8	27.1	107.6	14.7
1953	24.3	56.6	28.5	109.9	15.3

Source: Report of Khrushchev to the Plenary Session of the Central Committee, Sept. 3, 1953, *Pravda*, September 15, 1953, and *Vestnik Statistiki*, no. 5 (May 1961), pp. 61-65.

Table 21. Gross Physical Output for Selected Food Items (in Million Tons)

Year	Grain	Potatoes	Vegetables	Milk	Meat (dressed weight)	Eggs (in billions)
1940	83.0	75.9	13.7	33.640	4.695	12.214
1950	81.4	88.6	9.3	33.311	4.867	11.697
1951	78.9	59.6	9.0	36.154	4.671	13.252
1952	92.0	68.4	11.0	35.702	5.170	14.399
1953	82.5	72.6	11.4	36.475	5.822	16.059

Source: Joint Economic Committee (86th Cong., 1st sess.), *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies* (Washington, 1959), pp. 231-232.

As these tables make vividly clear, Stalin's successors inherited a difficult and recalcitrant agricultural problem. The Central Committee Resolution of September 7, 1953, "On Measures for the Further Development of USSR Agriculture," described the situation in animal husbandry as "especially bad." In the words of the resolution, "livestock is not well cared for . . . The number of livestock has been increasing very slowly in recent years . . . The meat and dairy yields are low; much of the livestock dies of disease; many cows are dry. The fodder base for animal husbandry on the collective farms is poorly developed. The livestock is unsatisfactorily provided with shelter . . ."<sup>43</sup> Khrushchev in his report of September 3 to the Central Committee noted, "Since the war the number of cows which are the personal property of the collective farmers has been reduced by 6,500,000. The number of collective farmers' holdings without cows has increased to 45 per cent."<sup>44</sup> The Central Committee resolution also acknowledged "a serious lag in raising potatoes and vegetables, which is preventing improvement in the supply of these products to the people in cities and industrial centers."<sup>45</sup> "In recent years," Khrushchev reported, "yields and gross harvests of these crops, far from increasing, have decreased. The area sown to vegetables is 250,000 hectares less than in 1940."<sup>46</sup> Despite an upsurge in grain output in 1952, which inspired Malenkov to remark at the Nineteenth Party Congress that the grain problem had been "solved definitely and irrevocably," the 1953 harvest decreased sharply and even sank below the 1940 level. The only successes to which the regime could point were the increased output of cotton, sugar beets, and several other industrial crops. In other areas of agriculture, the picture was one of stagnation and unrelieved gloom.

The explanation for this record of sorry performance reached out in many directions. First and foremost, the kolkhozniks lacked incentive to work at their collective-farm tasks. Government procurement prices for compulsory deliveries were set at so low a level as to leave very little available to compensate collective farmers for such kolkhoz work as they performed. As a result, they transferred their energies to their private garden plots where they could hope to farm more profitably, since any surpluses which they produced there could be sold at much higher free-market prices. In 1952, it has been estimated, total cash distributions to kolkhozniks from collective-farm earnings were only about one fourth of the cash income which they received from the output of their private plots.<sup>47</sup> Earnings from collective-farm labor — whether in kind or in cash — were so depressed, on the average, as to provide little stimulus to strive for increased kolkhoz output.

The limited capital investment in agriculture also contributed to low farm productivity. Heavy industry enjoyed a prior lien on scarce Soviet resources; the claims of the rural areas received short shrift. Meager

inputs of selected seed, fertilizer, pesticides, tractors and other agricultural equipment, spare parts and repair shops, shelter for cattle, irrigation facilities, and rural housing exercised their inexorable effect in producing a stagnant agricultural sector.

Meanwhile, Stalin made little effort to open up new lands for cultivation to make up for the inability to increase food yields on existing acreage. Instead, maximum attention was concentrated on industrial crops while the fodder and feed base so essential to animal husbandry was grossly neglected.

The backwardness of Soviet agriculture was accentuated by organizational deficiencies. Although provisions for training skilled agricultural personnel were made increasingly available, the ablest young men and women sought careers in industry, and graduates of the agricultural academies and institutes went to great lengths to avoid assignment to the countryside. The competence of collective-farm chairmen left much to be desired, and their effectiveness was hampered by frequent transfers and high rates of turnover. The rural cadres of the Party constituted its weakest link, and the efforts of the leadership to compensate for these weaknesses by tightly centralized planning and excessive procurement demands were frequently self-defeating. The division of responsibility between the collective farms and the machine-tractor stations introduced an added complication. As Khrushchev noted in his September 1953 report to the Central Committee,

Last year more than half the MTS did not meet the work plan . . . Considerable losses in the harvest have occurred, because a considerable part of the tractors and other equipment stand idle during the time for field work . . . The rich and complex machinery of the MTS needs skilled workers, but it is in the hands of seasonal workers assigned from the collective farms for the field work period. The tractor driver is actually not subordinate to the MTS director. If he likes, he goes to work; if he does not go, it is difficult for the director to influence him. Today he drives a tractor, tomorrow he returns to the collective farm or departs for industry. This to a considerable extent explains the low work discipline and the large personnel turnover . . .<sup>48</sup>

#### *Post-Stalinist Reforms*

The first response of Stalin's successors to this many-sided crisis was tentative and groping but unmistakably designed to meet some of the grievances of the kolkhozniks and to raise their material interest in work. In a speech to the Supreme Soviet on August 8, 1953, Malenkov, then chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, announced a rise in the procurement price for kolkhoz obligatory deliveries of meat, milk, potatoes, and vegetables and promised higher purchase prices for surpluses of grain, vegetables, potatoes, meat, milk, eggs, and other farm products.<sup>49</sup>

There were also important concessions involving the collective farmers' private plots. Cash taxes and norms for obligatory delivery of animal products were substantially reduced; tax arrears were canceled; and collective farmers who did not own cows were offered special relief from taxation for the years 1953 and 1954 in order to encourage acquisitions. In addition, Malenkov stated that the supply of mineral fertilizers and agricultural machinery would be increased, that rural electrification would be extended, that agricultural specialists on the staff of the MTS would be assigned for "steady work" on each collective farm, and that permanent cadres of tractor drivers and machine operators would be established in each MTS. All told, Malenkov estimated that these measures would yield a rise in collective-farm and farmers' income of more than 13 billion rubles over the rest of 1953 and more than 20 billion rubles over a full year.

Less than a month later, a plenary session of the Central Committee assembled to hear a special report by Khrushchev on the agricultural crisis. The line laid down by Khrushchev and approved by the Central Committee followed in the main the program which Malenkov had already announced. In addition to increased reliance on incentives to stimulate output and a substantial rise of capital investment in agriculture, Khrushchev called for an intensive effort to train needed agricultural skills, to redirect agricultural specialists from office jobs to production assignments, and to strengthen administrative and Party controls in the countryside. The training of skilled agricultural personnel was to be advanced by the establishment of new schools and institutes for the mechanization of agriculture and by refresher training for MTS administrative personnel and specialists. Meanwhile, engineers and mechanics from industry were to be reassigned to work in the MTS as directors, chief engineers, and repair-shop managers. By the spring of 1954, a hundred thousand agricultural specialists were to be detached from office assignments and put at the disposal of the MTS, with the expectation that every collective farm would thus be supplied with an agricultural specialist and "each large collective farm with an agricultural specialist and an animal husbandry specialist."<sup>50</sup> In order to strengthen rural administrative and Party controls, fifty thousand Communists were to be dispatched from the cities to district Party headquarters and MTS centers. The post of assistant director of political affairs in the MTS was abolished. Instead a district Party secretary and a group of instructors, operating under the direction of the raikom first secretary, were to be assigned to each MTS, with each instructor serving one or at most two collective farms. Thus, in theory at least, responsibility for every collective farm was concentrated in a full-time Party functionary who could be held accountable for its performance.

The new program contemplated no retreat from the collective-farm system. While higher incentives were held out to encourage increased output on the private plots of collective farmers as well as on the kolkhozes, the September 1953 Central Committee Resolution on Agriculture clearly stated that "the communal economy is central and decisive" and that "the right to have a small, private auxiliary plot" is granted "to satisfy consumer needs until they can be satisfied fully by the communal economy."<sup>51</sup> The spearhead of the initial effort to raise output was the MTS, which was greatly strengthened both in skilled personnel and equipment. Tractor drivers who formerly served the MTS as seasonal employees while retaining their membership in the collective farms became full-time MTS employees, owing their livelihood exclusively to it and compensated at higher rates than they had previously received as kolkhozniks. Concessions to the collective farmers in the form of improved incentives were counterbalanced by tighter and more rigorous Party and administrative controls designed to ensure increased output.

#### *The Virgin-Lands Program*

In the first year after Stalin's death, the new Soviet agricultural program centered on livestock products, potatoes, and vegetables as critical deficiency sectors. Relatively little attention was devoted to grain, since it was assumed that the problem was well in hand. This turned out to be an incorrect assumption. The sharp drop in the 1953 grain harvest as compared with the preceding year dramatized the failure of grain production to keep up with the demands of the growing urban population. The grain problem now came into the forefront, and in a speech to the Central Committee on February 23, 1954, Khrushchev unfolded a new grandiose program to open up and cultivate so-called virgin lands in Kazakhstan, Siberia, the northern Caucasus, the Volga, and the eastern regions.<sup>52</sup> The program as originally announced called for 32 million new acres; by 1960 it had been expanded to more than 101 million acres, equal to more than one third of all the grain area in Russia in 1953 and considerably in excess of the total wheat area cultivated in the United States. The new lands were seeded mostly with spring wheat and cultivated largely by tractor power. The organizational form chosen to achieve this vast expansion of acreage was the state farm rather than the collective farm.

More than 150,000 workers and technicians — predominantly young people — were initially mobilized to settle on the new lands. Special financial inducements were held out to encourage migration, but these were also reinforced by appeals to sacrifice and by pressure through Party and Komsomol channels to accept virgin-land assignments. The

campaign was conducted with great fanfare and excitement. Tens of thousands of students from all corners of the Soviet Union were shipped to the virgin lands to help in the harvests, and the heroic exploits of the new pioneers were widely celebrated and extolled. But a great many of those who volunteered or who were mobilized for service in the virgin lands did not remain there. "In 1960 and 1961," according to *Pravda*, "103,650 tractor drivers and combine operators were trained [in Kazakhstan] and 53,744 equipment operators arrived from other parts of the country to take up permanent jobs. During that same period, more than 180,000 equipment operators left the state and collective farms."<sup>53</sup> Harsh living conditions and lack of accommodations and amenities led them to abandon their posts on the new frontier. The regime faced the challenge of creating sufficiently attractive conditions in the virgin lands to hold its labor force as the initial wave of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice dimmed.

The cultivation of the new lands presented and still presents other serious problems. Much of the newly plowed acreage in Kazakhstan and Siberia is marginal land located in a zone of unfavorable climatic conditions. Winters are severe, and the growing season is short, with ever-present dangers of late frosts in the spring and early frosts in the fall. Rainfall is sparse, with an average annual precipitation of less than sixteen inches and in some areas only about ten inches. Droughts and dust storms are common, though irrigation offers some possibility of alleviation in selected areas. The hazards of weather dictate low-yielding spring crops and harvests that are likely to fluctuate sharply from year to year. The record so far bears this out, as Table 22 demonstrates.

*Table 22. Grain Harvests, 1953-1961 (in Millions of Metric Tons)*

Harvests	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961
Total grain harvest	82.5	85.6	106.8	127.6	105.0	141.2	125.9	134.3	137.3
Harvested in virgin lands	27.1	37.6	28.0	63.6	38.5	58.8	55.3	59.1	n.a.
Harvested in Kazakhstan	5.4	7.7	4.8	23.8	10.5	22.0	19.1	18.8	14.8

Sources: for 1953-60, *Narodnoye Khozyaistvo SSSR v 1960 godu*, pp. 440-441; for 1961, *Pravda*, March 6, 1962. Reproduced from Alec Nove, "Soviet Agriculture Marks Time," *Foreign Affairs*, XL (July 1962), 578.

In 1954, the new lands were favored with plentiful rainfall, and a good crop was harvested. It helped make up for drought in the Ukraine and the lower Volga region, with the over-all result, as Table 22 indi-

cates, that the 1954 grain crop represented about a 4 per cent gain over 1953. In 1955 the new lands were visited by drought, but as a result of a good crop in the older lands of the Ukraine, there was a sharp increase in the total harvest. The next year, 1956, was marked by an excellent crop in the new lands, and the result was a banner harvest, despite some drought in the Ukraine. In 1957 there was extensive drought in Kazakhstan, the southern Urals, and the lower and middle Volga regions; the over-all harvest fell below the 1955 level. In 1958 the Soviet Union gathered a bumper crop, the best in its history, with weather conditions favorable almost everywhere, both in the new and old lands. Largely on the basis of this performance, the Seven-Year Plan approved in 1959 projected a grain crop of 165 to 180 million tons by 1965. But the grain output in 1959 fell well below the 1958 level, despite the fact that the new lands were less affected by drought than other important agricultural regions. The 1960 grain crop registered some improvement, although Kazakhstan in particular suffered from dust storms, delayed planting because of frosts, and great harvesting losses as a result of bad weather, shortages of machinery, and inadequate storage facilities. In 1961 the grain crop again increased slightly, but the situation in the Kazakh virgin lands continued to deteriorate.

Thus far, the gamble on the new lands appears to have paid off, despite the bad record in Kazakhstan over the 1959-1961 period. The large additional acreage brought into cultivation has not only operated to lift the average level of total output, but has also served to diversify the risks of Soviet agriculture. To be sure, there remains a real danger that careless plowing up of the dry steppes and a succession of dry years may create dust-bowl conditions and lead to a series of disastrous crop failures. But Khrushchev himself has been inclined to minimize the danger. "Some comrades might ask," he reminded the Twentieth Party Congress, "whether we are doing right in developing virgin lands in areas subject to drought." He answered in the affirmative:

If in five years we have only two good, one average, and two poor crops, it is possible with the relatively small outlays needed for grain cultivation in these conditions to farm at a big profit and produce grain at low cost.

The results of our work in virgin-land development make it possible to draw the indisputable conclusion that the line of the Party is correct. This policy assures a substantial increase in grain production within the shortest possible time and with the least outlay of labor and resources.<sup>54</sup>

He should perhaps have added that both human and capital investments in the new land program will have to mount substantially if the fertility of the soil is to be preserved and its future productivity safeguarded.

*Corn and Animal Husbandry*

Another facet of the new agricultural program was unveiled in late January 1955 when Khrushchev launched a crash program for the expansion of corn acreage in order to bolster the lagging feed supply and to provide a more adequate feed base for animal husbandry.<sup>55</sup> The new program represented a response to the disappointing performance of animal husbandry in the first two post-Stalinist years. From January 1, 1953, to January 1, 1955, the total number of cattle including cows increased from 56.6 million to only 56.7 million and the number of hogs from 28.5 million to 30.9 million. In the latter case, the 1955 figure actually represented a decrease of 2.4 million from the preceding year.

The main object of the new program was to expand corn-hog farming in the older agricultural lands. Khrushchev had long been known as a corn enthusiast, and his enthusiasm was greatly reinforced by the report of the Soviet Agricultural delegation which visited the United States and Canada in 1954, made a special study of corn-hog farming, and returned with a recommendation for its rapid expansion in the Soviet Union.

Until Khrushchev initiated this program, corn had been a minor crop in the Soviet Union compared with such feed grains as oats and barley. In 1954 less than 11 million acres were planted to corn compared with 277 million acres to all grains. By 1956 corn accounted for 59 million acres, but more than 60 per cent of the crop was harvested in an immature stage and used either for silage or green forage, a clear indication that in the initial enthusiasm a good deal was planted in regions where the climate was not suitable for corn growing. In the next year corn acreage was reduced by nearly a fourth, but in 1958 corn acreage again began to expand and reached a total of nearly 70 million acres in 1960. The new corn acreage undoubtedly played a significant role in laying the base for an increase in the number of hogs in the Soviet Union from 30.9 million on January 1, 1955, to 58.6 million on January 1, 1961. But the raising of corn continued to present great difficulties. According to Khrushchev, 40 per cent of the total area sown to corn in the Ukraine in 1960 yielded green forage which he described bluntly as "water, not fodder." "Our corn crops," he complained at the Central Committee meeting on January 17, 1961, "have been very small" and "much of it is lost through late harvesting or is stolen."<sup>56</sup>

As part of the new emphasis on the expansion of animal husbandry, Khrushchev announced as early as May 1957 that he proposed before very long to overtake the United States in the per capita production of meat, milk, and butter, areas in which Soviet agriculture had been traditionally backward.<sup>57</sup> Since the per capita production of meat in the United States was over three times that of the Soviet Union in 1956,

Khrushchev's statement was received with considerable scepticism, even, he frankly admitted, by his own economists. A year and a half later, speaking to the Central Committee, Khrushchev was less ebullient:

Now to turn to our plans and potentialities for increasing meat production. In 1958 the Soviet Union produced 38 kilograms of meat per capita; in the United States the anticipated figure was approximately 94 kilograms. In order to overtake the United States in per capita meat production, we must increase gross meat production to 20 or 21 million tons. Our country now produces about 8 million tons of meat, and 16 million tons are scheduled for production in 1965.

From this it is clear that the meat-production assignments laid down in the control figures are below the level required to catch up with the United States in this commodity. But this by no means signifies that our country has no chance of raising meat production to 20 or 21 million tons . . .

At the same time, a great deal of work remains to be done before we can overtake the United States in per capita output of livestock products and of meat in particular.<sup>58</sup>

The banner harvest of 1958 was followed by three less successful crops, and the output of livestock products in 1960 was far behind the estimates of the seven-year plan. Despite this, Khrushchev was reluctant to forsake his goal. In his report to the Central Committee on January 17, 1961, he declared, "You know, comrades, that I am an optimist, and I believe that we can overtake the United States of America in these five years in per capita output of farm products. The whole question is how to organize the work."<sup>59</sup>

The organizational problem remained one of the most difficult that the regime had to resolve. The rapid and even bewildering changes of the post-Stalinist era testify to a continuing search for a set of administrative arrangements calculated to raise the efficiency of agricultural production and stimulate increased output. One of the early steps taken was an effort to reduce the excessive centralization of farm planning. A joint decree of the Party Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, dated March 9, 1955, sought to spur the initiative of managers of collective and state farms by assigning them larger responsibilities for detailed production planning in their enterprises.<sup>60</sup> Under the provisions of this decree, superior planning authorities were to provide each farm with a set of delivery quotas or procurement targets which it was required to meet; they were to refrain from their traditional practice of issuing specifications for how much of each crop to plant, where to plant it, and when to sow and reap. District executive committees under the terms of this decree, however, were still required to review and even change farm plans to make sure that they would result in fulfilling targets, and the long-standing habit of intervention was not easily abandoned.

Responsibility bred interference, and the strengthened prerogatives of farm management continued to be hedged by a multiplicity of controls.

### *The Abolition of the MTS*

Another important landmark in agricultural reorganization was the decision to liquidate the machine-tractor stations and to transfer most of their machinery, equipment, and personnel to the kolkhozes. This was a tremendously significant change. Historically, the MTS operated not merely as an instrument of mechanization but as the spearhead of Party control in the countryside. It also served as an important agency of procurement, since collective farms made substantial payments in kind for the services of the MTS. The MTS had been the guiding force in collectivization, the cement which kept the collective-farm structure together.

In Stalin's day some economists had dared to suggest that greater work efficiency could be achieved by transferring or selling agricultural machinery to the kolkhozes. Stalin gave short shrift to such arguments. In his last work, *Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR*, he pronounced:

What . . . would be the effect of selling the MTS's to the collective farms as their property? The effect would be to involve the collective farms in heavy loss and to ruin them, to undermine the mechanization of agriculture, and to slow up the development of collective-farm production.

. . . The collective farms would become the owners of the basic instruments of production . . . Would it not be truer to say that such a status could only dig a deeper gulf between collective-farm property and public property and would not bring us any nearer to communism, but, on the contrary, remove us further from it?<sup>61</sup>

Stalin distrusted the collective farmers, and he saw the MTS as an indispensable instrument of control and procurement.

Khrushchev's decision to eliminate the MTS was influenced by a number of factors. For one, by 1958 the Party organizations on collective farms were much stronger than they had been in Stalin's day. More than 90 per cent of all collective-farm chairmen were Party members, and there appeared to be less need for outside political control. With the enlargement in the size of the collective farms as a result of the merger movement, the economic case for a self-sufficient machine park on each collective farm was also much stronger. Finally, the division of authority and responsibility between the MTS and the collective farm created unnecessary friction and was proving increasingly inefficient. In Khrushchev's words, "the current practice means none other than the existence of two masters — the collective farm and the MTS — on one and the same land.

Since the MTS controls the complex machinery, the collective farms cannot directly do what they want with it or employ it effectively. The collective farm and the MTS both have to maintain an administrative apparatus in order to perform one and the same task; this greatly increases the cost of farm output.<sup>62</sup>

The signal for the liquidation of the MTS was given by Khrushchev in a speech in Minsk on January 22, 1958, when he announced that the agricultural machinery of the MTS would be sold to the collective farms, that a substantial part of the MTS staffs would also be shifted to the kolkhozes, and that what remained of the MTS would be transformed into RTS (Repair and Technical Service Stations), which would be given the functions of repairing machinery, selling the collective farms new equipment, spare parts, fuel, fertilizer, and other supplies, and renting to the collective farms road-building and other heavy machinery for specialized tasks.<sup>63</sup> Khrushchev's proposals were embodied in a decree which was approved by the Supreme Soviet on March 31, 1958.<sup>64</sup>

The MTS reorganization posed a whole series of difficult transitional problems. The MTS employees numbered more than two million persons in 1957. Their transfer to the rolls of the collective farms raised prickly issues, since the MTS staffs constituted a kind of rural aristocracy with higher average incomes than the collective farmers and with salaries based on guaranteed minima. In order to ease the transition, Khrushchev promised, among other things, that tractor drivers transferred to collective farms would continue to receive the guaranteed minima which they previously enjoyed.

There was also the problem of the availability of collective-farm resources to purchase the MTS machinery and the terms on which the sales were to be effected. While precise information on the terms of sale is lacking, the purchase of machinery by collective farms had the effect of sopping up a substantial part of their reserve funds. By July 1, 1959, 94 per cent of the collective farms had purchased machinery either for cash or on credit. These purchases included 512,000 tractors and 221,000 grain combines, and they were supplemented by the purchase of 100,000 new tractors and more than 25,000 grain combines and other new machinery. The total cost approximated 21.7 billion (old) rubles, of which 17.2 billion represented the cost of machinery acquired from the MTS.<sup>65</sup>

The newly created RTS failed to work as intended, and their inability to provide adequate repair services or machinery and parts when needed led to another major reorganization of the supply system, announced on February 21, 1961.<sup>66</sup> A new organization, *Soyuzselkhoztekhnika*, the All-Union Farm Machinery Association, was made responsible for the sale of farm machinery, spare parts, mineral fertilizers, and other materials and for the repair of machinery on collective and state farms. Under the

new system collective and state farms were required to place advance orders for the machinery which they needed, and industrial production plans were to be shaped around these orders. The All-Union Farm Machinery Association was to be represented in the localities by district or interdistrict machinery associations, which would include representatives of collective and state farms in their administration and which would undertake to receive orders, distribute supplies, and perform the repair functions formerly assigned to the RTS. In presenting this plan, Khrushchev was frank enough to recognize that the new association would not be in a position immediately to fill all orders which it received and that "allocation of equipment" would therefore continue to be necessary. Meanwhile, he announced a reduction in the prices charged for fuel and equipment, estimating the saving to collective farms during the year at 539 million (new) rubles, or approximately 3.9 per cent of the total earnings of collective farms in 1959.

#### *Procurement Reforms*

The drive to increase agricultural output was accompanied by reforms in the procurement system which undertook to provide an improved structure of incentives for collective-farm labor.<sup>67</sup> Procurement under Stalin was characterized by a multiple-price system. In the case of compulsory delivery quotas calculated per unit of tillable land, the price paid by the state was very low. Higher prices were paid by the state for above-quota purchases, and each collective farm also made payments in kind to the MTS for services performed.

The first round of changes in the fall of 1953 took the form of increasing prices for both compulsory deliveries and above-quota purchases of many farm products. In the case of grain, however, compulsory-delivery prices remained at the old level, while above-quota purchase prices were increased to approximately ten times those of compulsory deliveries. By 1955 these extreme differentials were narrowed. Compulsory-delivery prices were increased some two and a half times and above-quota prices were reduced, thus producing a new differential of about three to one. The price revisions of 1956 involved a further narrowing of differentials, but at the same time the average price received by collective farms for their output was substantially raised. As a result of these reforms and the increased output to which they contributed, the cash income of collective farms more than doubled between 1952 and 1956-57, increasing from 42.8 billion rubles to 95 billion, while direct cash payments to collective farmers more than tripled, rising from 12.4 billion rubles in 1952 to 42.2 billion in 1956.<sup>68</sup>

In 1958 the procurement system was again revised. The old practice

of state procurement at differential prices was abolished and replaced by a single system of state purchases. Under the new arrangement, quotas were fixed on a per-hectare basis and the state purchased farm produce from each collective farm in accordance with these quotas at a fixed price, which was subject to regional variations. Premium payments for above-quota production were no longer provided by the state, though collective farmers retained the privilege of disposing of their surpluses at a free-market price if the commodity was traded on the kolkhoz market. This reform was calculated to help the average or less prosperous farm rather than the more productive, since regional prices were adjusted upward to cover the costs of the less favorably situated regions and downward for those more favorably situated. As Khrushchev put it in sponsoring this reform, "Although the total expenditures of the state for the purchase of agricultural products will remain approximately at the same level as last year, they will be distributed more fairly among the collective farmers, thanks to the new prices."<sup>69</sup>

The substantial increase in the income of the collective farms also prepared the way for major reforms in the system of compensating collective farmers for their labor. Under the old system, the income that was left to the collective farm at the end of the year after set-asides for seed and other communal needs was divided up among the collective farmers in proportion to the workdays they contributed. The payments were made partly in kind and partly in cash. On March 6, 1956, a joint resolution of the Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers authorized collective farms to make advance monthly payments to the farmers in anticipation of the end-of-the-year settlement, and during the following years the system was widely adopted. Some collective farms went still further and instituted a system of guaranteed cash payments under which the collective farmers no longer received payments in kind and could purchase the products they needed from the collective farms out of their earnings. Indeed, the sharp increase in the income of some collective farmers became a matter of concern to the top Party leadership. Khrushchev in his speech to the Central Committee on December 25, 1959, put it this way:

Now that our collective farms have pulled themselves up and advanced, the collective farmer's earnings have grown. In some regions they even considerably exceed a worker's earnings. This is not just . . . The pay for a workday in a given zone should be fixed at a certain amount, but at such a level that the pay of a collective farmer will as a rule not exceed the earnings of a state-farm worker in the given zone doing similar work . . .

We must establish a payment system on the collective farms that will preclude excessively high, unjustified earnings, but we must do it in such a way that material incentive remains, that the collective farmers are not deprived of a stimulus for further developing communal production . . .<sup>70</sup>

Khrushchev made clear that procurement prices in some regions would be lowered to exclude the possibility of such "excessively high, unjustified earnings."

With the two disappointing harvests after the excellent 1958 crop, the gain in collective-farm income came to a standstill. As Ye. Lazutkin frankly admitted in an article in *Partiinaya Zhizn'* in April 1961, "The monetary incomes of agricultural artels per collective-farm household have remained at almost the same level for the past two years. Because of this, the collective farmer's incentive to develop communal production has dropped noticeably."<sup>71</sup> Many collective farms which had adopted the system of guaranteed cash payments found themselves unable to meet their wage commitments and reverted to the old method of settling accounts with their members on the basis of workday units accumulated over the year. "In present-day conditions," Lazutkin stated, "it is hardly appropriate to counterpose the monetary form of material remuneration of collective farmers to the workday unit, and even less to discard the workday unit as the measure in distributing income among the members of an agricultural artel. For the majority of artels the workday unit remains a necessity—it is only by means of the workday unit that it is possible to apply correctly the socialist principle of distribution in accordance with the quantity and quality of work."<sup>72</sup> Following the lead of Khrushchev, Lazutkin called for a system of payments in the kolkhoz graded to productivity with extra pay to reward outstanding production feats.

In early 1961 still another major reorganization of the procurement network was announced. It emerged as a response to the widespread corruption, evasion, and deception which attended the efforts of many regional Party and governmental officials to conceal the fact that they had failed to meet their production and procurement goals in the two preceding years. At the Central Committee meeting in January 1961 and in a series of regional meetings afterwards, these practices were openly ventilated and of course sternly condemned by Khrushchev. In some cases, procurement officials were bribed or pressured into reporting deliveries which in fact were not made. In still others, collective farms were forced to deliver their seed stocks in order to meet their procurement goals. In yet other cases, collective farms drew on their reserve funds to purchase meat and butter from state stores, or on the open market, to fulfill their delivery quotas. The faking, double counting, and inflated figures which resulted were elaborately documented in Khrushchev's well-known "you can't make pancakes out of statistics" speech.<sup>73</sup> The exposure of these abuses was followed by a widespread purge of Party, government, and farm officials.

Under the new procurement system announced on February 26, 1961,

contracts were to be concluded between the collective and state farms and the procurement agency for periods of from two to five years; the contracts would specify the obligations of each farm from year to year in accordance with the planned goals of the different regions and districts.<sup>74</sup> The administration of the scheme was entrusted to a new agency, the USSR Council of Ministers' State Procurement Committee, which was to be represented by state purchase inspectors in each district. In order to put teeth into the scheme, the inspectors were vested with powers of supervision over both production and procurement plans, including the authority to terminate or limit cash advances or credits to collective and state farms which failed to live up to their obligations. Another decree, published on the same day, was designed to put an end to the system by which collective farmers had to travel long distances to dispose of their surpluses in kolkhoz markets.<sup>75</sup> The Central Union of Consumers Cooperatives was instructed to take over such trade by purchasing surpluses from individuals "at prices agreed upon with them" and by undertaking to dispose of collective-farm surpluses on a commission basis through their own outlets.

### *Organizational Changes*

The establishment of the new procurement arrangements was accompanied by a radical reorganization of the Ministry of Agriculture. Under the terms of a decree published on February 21, 1961, the ministry was stripped of all planning, supply, repair, and supervisory functions and was directed to confine its work to the guidance of scientific institutions in the agricultural sector, the training of personnel, the organization of seed growing, seed selection, and breeding, the control of crop diseases and pests, the management of agricultural experiment stations, and the popularization and dissemination of advanced farm practices and scientific knowledge throughout the Soviet Union.<sup>76</sup> The effect of the reorganization was to reconstitute the ministry into a research and extension service.

The sweeping reorganization of agricultural agencies in February 1961 had the effect of dividing and dissipating responsibility for the management of agriculture. Procurement, agricultural machinery and supplies, and research and extension were administered by independent agencies. There was no single governmental organization with over-all responsibility for production planning. State farms were supervised by trusts at the oblast level, which took their orders from republic organs. Collective farms had no similar roof organization. In practice, such co-ordination as was achieved depended on the intervention of district and regional Party organs.

The confusion which this produced led to another major reorganiza-

tion in March 1962.<sup>77</sup> A new All-Union Committee on Agriculture was created to coordinate agricultural requirements and plans and to check on the fulfillment of Party and state directives on production and procurements. Headed by a vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, its membership included the chief of the Central Committee's Department of Agriculture for the union republics, the chairman of the State Procurements Committee, the USSR Minister of Agriculture, the chairman of the All-Union Farm Machinery Association, and the vice-chairmen of Gosplan and the State Scientific-Economic Council charged with planning responsibilities for agriculture. At the republic level, similar committees were established, headed in this instance by the first secretary of the republic central committee and composed of a first vice-chairman of the union-republic council of ministers who also served as minister of production and procurement of agricultural products; the head of the agriculture department of the union-republic Party central committee; the chairman of the republic farm-machinery association; the minister of agriculture; the vice-chairman or other representative of the republic Gosplan in charge of agriculture; and the official in charge of water resources in republics that had such agencies. At the republic level the newly established Ministries of Production and Procurement of Agricultural Products took over the functions previously exercised by the ministries of procurement and state-farm administrations. Agricultural committees at the oblast, krai, and autonomous-republic level followed the republic pattern, with the Party first secretary chairing the group. At this level, procurement agencies, state-farm trusts, and other agricultural agencies were all eliminated and their functions transferred to representatives of the new ministries of production and procurement, who henceforth were to bear the primary administrative responsibility for the management of agriculture in their areas.

The basic units in this hierarchical pyramid consisted of newly created territorial production administrations. Ordinarily established on an inter-district basis, each production administration was responsible for all the collective and state farms in its area. It was charged with increasing their output, supervising their production plans, and ensuring their fulfillment of procurement quotas. Inspector-organizers working under directors of the territorial production administrations were required to "spend a great deal of their time directly on the collective and state farms and in the brigades and livestock sections."<sup>78</sup> Each territorial production administration was assigned a Party organizer and a group of instructors designated by and responsible to superior Party authorities, as well as a Komsomol organizer and instructors, to spur primary Party and Komsomol organizations into taking the lead in working "for the timely fulfillment of . . . plans for the production and procurement of farm products."<sup>79</sup> Attached

to each territorial production administration was a council composed of the director, who served as chairman, the Party and Komsomol organizers, collective-farm chairmen and state-farm directors, first secretaries of district Party committees, chairmen of district executive committees, and heads of departments of the farm-machinery associations.

This radical reorganization of agricultural administration was designed, in the words of the authorizing resolution, "to create agricultural management agencies that will . . . exert active influence on the organizations of production on every collective and state farm."<sup>80</sup> By merging agencies, bringing them together under a central roof, projecting centrally controlled officials directly into the collective and state farms, and making republic and regional Party first secretaries responsible for results, Khrushchev sought to use maximum administrative pressure to realize his ambitious plans.

However much Khrushchev hoped to achieve by administrative reforms, there were also indications that he recognized that, taken alone, they promised no panacea. In his report to the Central Committee on March 5, 1962, he observed: "We cannot but be disturbed by the fact that the supply of certain machines to agriculture has declined in comparison with 1957, when far more attention was paid to problems of mechanization. For example, 55,000 corn-harvesting combines were supplied to agriculture in 1957 and only 13,000 in 1960, although the area under corn was greater; 208,000 tractor-cultivators were supplied to agriculture in 1957 and 79,000 in 1960."<sup>81</sup> He went on to document the persisting shortage of spare parts and the fact that fertilizer production was far behind schedule. "The seven-year plan," he pointed out, "called for increasing the output of mineral fertilizers from 12,000,000 to 35,000,000 tons, an increase of 23,000,000 tons. Three years have passed, and the production of fertilizers has increased by only 2,900,000 tons. In the first three years of the seven-year period, the plan for new capacity was fulfilled by only 44 per cent. The same thing is happening with the organization of herbicide production . . ."<sup>82</sup> The remedy for such deficiencies obviously had to be sought in a redirection of investment rather than in administrative streamlining.

Faced with tight restrictions on available resources, Khrushchev turned to other expedients to increase the output of fodder. Attacking the prevalent grassland system of crop rotation, he called for the plowing up of meadows and fallow land and demanded that such feed crops as corn, peas, beans, and sugar beets be sown instead. This call for a further intensification of agricultural practices was followed by an effort to heighten the material interest of the collective and state farms in increasing the production and delivery to the state of livestock and poultry. On June 1, 1962, the state purchase prices for livestock and poultry were

raised by an average of 35 per cent for the country as a whole.<sup>83</sup> This was accompanied by a rise in the retail price of butter of 25 per cent and meat and meat products of 30 per cent, thus shifting the main burden of financing higher procurement prices to the urban consumer.

At the same time, new penal measures were adopted to tighten the discipline of the agricultural labor force. "With a view to strengthening the struggle against mismanagement in the use and maintenance of farm machinery," a Supreme Soviet decree of December 29, 1961, made criminal negligence in the use or maintenance of farm machinery punishable by deprivation of freedom or corrective labor for a period of up to one year, while the same actions, if committed repeatedly or resulting in great damage, were punishable by deprivation of freedom for a period of up to three years.<sup>84</sup> A later joint Party and government resolution of April 12, 1962, which was designed to strengthen the prerogatives and perquisites of farm specialists, also provided that they could not be released from their jobs on the collective farms, except with the permission of the supervising territorial production administration.<sup>85</sup>

Important organizational changes were also taking place at the grass roots. The merger movement with its drive for larger collective farms, initially launched under Khrushchev's aegis in 1950, continued unabated after Stalin's death. By the end of 1960, the number of kolkhozes had been reduced to 44,000. The average land area per collective farm in 1960 was nearly 15,600 acres, and the average sown area nearly 6,800 acres. The average kolkhoz contained nearly 400 households. In many areas, moreover, neighboring kolkhozes had joined together in so-called inter-kolkhoz unions to establish construction organizations, irrigation projects, electric stations, artificial-insemination centers, and other types of specialized enterprises where the resources of a group of kolkhozes could be advantageously pooled. In 1962 most of these projects were transferred to the jurisdiction of the newly established territorial production administrations.

At the same time, a decline in the kolkhoz sector was clearly apparent.<sup>86</sup> In 1953 kolkhozes accounted for 89.5 per cent of the land sown to grain while the sovkhozes tilled 8.7 per cent. By 1959 the kolkhoz share decreased to 66.8 per cent while the sovkhozes increased their proportion to 32 per cent. These statistics dramatized the determination of the regime to push the extension of state farming wherever it promised to be more productive. The drive to extend state farming in the post-Stalinist period began quietly in 1954 when a number of weaker kolkhozes in the war ravaged western regions of the USSR were replaced by sovkhozes. But the major move to extend the sovkhoz sector came with the opening of the virgin lands, where almost exclusive reliance was placed on state farming as the spearhead of development. Beginning in 1958, a new

movement was launched to establish specialized state farms growing potatoes and vegetables near large cities and industrial centers. These farms were organized by amalgamating existing kolkhozes. In the Moscow region, the Party Central Committee in March 1960 ordered the transformation of 365 of the 615 kolkhozes of the oblast into new specialized state farms. Finally, in a number of cases state farms also absorbed neighboring collective farms. Between 1954 and 1958, 1,039 new sovkhozes were created from existing kolkhozes, and the total number of sovkhozes mounted to over 9,200 by October 1, 1961. During the first half of 1960, the sovkhoz labor force increased by 1,700,000 persons as the result of the absorption of kolkhozes by sovkhozes. By the end of 1960, the sovkhoz share in state purchases of grain was reported as 43 per cent, vegetables 47 per cent, potatoes 27 per cent, livestock and poultry 27 per cent, milk 32 per cent, wool 31 per cent, and eggs 29 per cent. Should these trends continue, a major transformation will have been achieved in the organization of Soviet agriculture.

The effect of recent developments has been to bring the kolkhoz and the sovkhoz closer together — in size, in problems of management, and even in methods of compensating their respective work forces. Yet important differences persist, both in theory and practice. The state farm, as its name implies, is owned and operated by the state, and its labor force is hired in much the same way as are factory workers. Unlike most collective farmers, state-farm workers receive regular monthly wages, though on the average their earnings tend to be lower than in industry. Under a new sovkhoz wage system introduced in 1961, the earnings of state-farm workers will henceforth depend not merely on the fulfillment of job norms, but also on the success of their enterprise in meeting its production plan and its procurement target.<sup>87</sup> To the extent that earnings become tied to total farm output, the new wage system will move closer to the principle of compensation hitherto limited to the collective-farm sector.

The average state farm in 1960 had a sown area of over 22,000 acres. The management of such giant enterprises necessarily presents complex problems. Virtually all state farms are divided into subdivisions, with separate worker brigades assigned to each of these subunits. Extensive reliance is placed on mechanization, particularly on the new state farms in the virgin lands where the settled work force is still small and where there has been a heavy dependence on seasonal labor, sometimes brought from great distances to aid in the harvesting. In order to escape such dependence, and the heavy travel costs, inefficiency, and interruptions in industrial and student work which it entails, a joint Party-government resolution of July 12, 1962, undertook to impose a brake on the drafting of urban labor for farm work.<sup>88</sup> Thus far, however, the state farms in the

virgin lands have encountered great difficulties in building up permanent cadres of equipment operators. High turnover rates reflect the lack of amenities, and, until these are provided, machine operators will continue, as a Soviet economic journal recently put it, "to better their lives by moving to jobs in industry."<sup>89</sup>

As a result of the merger movement, the collective farms too have become sizable enterprises, with an average sown area in 1960 of nearly one third that of the average sovkhoz. As the gap in size between sovkhozes and kolkhozes has narrowed, their problems of management and organization have become increasingly comparable. Their juridical status has also become less sharply distinguishable. In theory, the property of the kolkhozes remains the common possession of the collective farmers. In practice, the state's claim is paramount, and kolkhozes which have been converted into sovkhozes have simply had their indivisible funds transferred to the sovkhozes without any compensation other than payment to the collective farmers for accumulated workday credits. Over time, the distinction between collective-farm and state-farm property appears destined for obliteration.

In theory again, the highest authority in the kolkhoz is the general meeting of working members over sixteen years of age. Indeed, the Collective Farm Charter of 1935 specifically authorized the general meeting to elect a chairman, a board of managers, and an auditing commission to check kolkhoz accounts. Official Soviet publications then and since have hailed this grant of power as an indication of the impressive extent of "kolkhoz democracy." In reality it is largely nonexistent. Formally the chairman is elected by the kolkhoz, but the general meeting of its authorized representatives ordinarily has no alternative except to ratify a candidate who is designated or approved by higher Party and government authorities. Frequently, the chairman is an outsider who has had no previous connection with the kolkhoz which "elects" him as its leader. The management board usually consists of the chairman and four or five top technicians, such as the agronomist, veterinarian, agricultural engineer, or bookkeeper, most of whom are sent to work on the farm from the outside rather than recruited from its membership.

The increase in the size of the collective farms has tended to accentuate the directing role of management and to limit rank-and-file participation in decision making. The dispersion of the kolkhozniks among a large number of widely separated villages make it difficult to convene general kolkhoz meetings, and a number of larger kolkhozes have turned instead to representative bodies elected by the collective farmers to dispose of general kolkhoz business while making wider use of brigade meetings to popularize decisions. Even with these substitute devices, the inevitable effect of giantism has been to increase the distance between management

and the rank and file and to reserve the major initiative in kolkhoz affairs to the collective-farm chairman and the group immediately around him.

Size has also posed an increasingly difficult management problem. The crucial importance of the managerial function has been recognized, and a variety of measures have been taken to strengthen collective-farm management. Efforts have been made to shift reliable and qualified administrators and specialists from the cities to the farms, and agricultural training has been intensified. Former MTS directors and their leading assistants have been transferred to the collective farms in order to strengthen the quality of kolkhoz managerial cadres. While management in the kolkhozes in recent years has undoubtedly been subjected to an increasing degree of professionalization, there are still frequent criticisms of poor performance and malpractices, and rates of turnover among collective-farm chairmen continue high. As Khrushchev put it in his speech to the Central Committee on June 29, 1959:

Weak organizational work is the chief defect . . . We must reinforce the collective farm cadres; we must particularly strengthen the collective farms with experienced chairmen who are able organizers . . . the Party organization in many places cannot find good chairmen for the backward collectives. It is as the proverb has it, "With seven nurses in attendance, the child still manages to lose an eye." And what does it mean to select good chairmen of collective farms, good brigadiers? It means the success of the enterprise . . . Why is it that collective and state farms do not organize their work as well as factory personnel? Because some collective farms have been headed by poor chairmen for a long time; some have brought as many as three collective farms to ruin and are looking for a fourth to ruin. And the Party organizations put up a weak fight against this evil . . .<sup>90</sup>

While this is far from being the whole story of collective-farm backwardness, it is an important part of it. The managerial problem continues to be a serious, if not insoluble, one.

Equally important is the system of incentives which operates in the kolkhoz. The general picture is one of substantial improvement since Stalin's death, but considerable variations persist between weak and strong kolkhozes, and the spread in income between collective-farm management and the rank-and-file farmer remains wide. The compensation of collective-farm chairmen is based on a complicated formula which is designed to recognize responsibility and effectiveness. The basic pay in terms of workday credits and monthly cash payments may be increased substantially by supplements which give recognition to seniority, farm cash income, and plan fulfillment. On the other hand, penalties are imposed for plan underfulfillment. The American group of agricultural economists who visited the Soviet Union in 1958 reported as follows: "We were told that chairmen of most collective farms receive a credit of

1700 work day units per year on which they receive the regular cash disbursement per work day unit at the end of the year. The average worker earns about 330 work day units. If the income of the farm is over 1.4 million rubles, the chairman receives a bonus of 400 rubles per month. The chairman of a large collective farm that we visited reportedly received about 70,000 rubles a year.<sup>91</sup> It should be added, however, that such earnings are far from typical and that the incomes of chairmen, while many times that of rank-and-file kolkhozniks, vary widely, depending on the prosperity of the kolkhoz. Even when the kolkhoz chairman is relatively poorly off in terms of official earnings, the strategic position which he and his fellow officials occupy frequently enables them to supplement their income by extralegal tapping of kolkhoz resources. The exposés in Soviet official journals provide many an example of kolkhoz administrators whose search for a good life has led them into extra-curricular activities of this type.

The compensation of subordinate managerial personnel follows the pattern applicable to kolkhoz chairmen. Thus the joint Party-government resolution of April 12, 1962, on farm specialists set the monthly pay of senior agronomists, zootechnicians, engineers, and veterinarians of collective farms at 80 to 90 per cent of the pay of kolkhoz chairmen (including all supplements and incentives) and guaranteed a minimum of 80 (new) rubles per month for those working at their specialty for more than two years.<sup>92</sup> Younger specialists earn correspondingly less, though those with a specialized secondary education are guaranteed a minimum of 60 rubles per month.

All workers in the kolkhoz are hierarchically graded and operate under the same system of incentives and penalties applicable to management. Workers in the highest skilled category may receive as much as five times the compensation earned by those in the lowest category, and extra pay is extended to reward those who are more productive. Since 1956, some of the more prosperous collective farms have introduced a system of guaranteed monetary payments which is in essence indistinguishable from the state farm system of wage payments. The rest retain the workday-credit system but ordinarily provide monthly advance payments to collective farmers pending the end-of-the-year settlement.

Under the workday-credit system, every job has its approved norms of daily output, and a value is assigned to the job in terms of workday credits. These credits should not be confused with actual days of labor performed. Thus, a skilled tractor driver may receive as much as three to five workday credits for each day of labor performed, while the unskilled field worker may earn only one workday credit for his daily stint. Supplementary credits are provided for brigades which exceed their production plan, while deductions may be made in the event that the

plan is not fulfilled. The workday unit, it should be stressed, has no fixed value, either in monetary terms or in kind. Its value may be quite large in the more well-to-do kolkhozes and quite meager in the so-called backward kolkhozes. Efforts have been made in recent years to reduce excessive differentials, but the value of the workday unit necessarily reflects collective-farm performance.

Under this system of remuneration, rank-and-file kolkhozniks ordinarily find themselves in a markedly disadvantageous position. Except for such returns as they derive from their garden plots and private livestock, they have no fixed income. The value of the workday credits which they accumulate represents merely a residual claim on a share of kolkhoz income after all other prior claimants are satisfied. The kolkhoznik is last in a long line when the income of the kolkhoz is distributed.

The state exercises a first lien on kolkhoz output. The "first commandment" of Soviet agriculture demands that government requirements be met, regardless of all other considerations. While the terms of trade for the collective farms are now much more favorable than they were in Stalin's day, they are determined from above, in accordance with state policy. After obligations to the state are fulfilled, including taxes, the kolkhoz is next required to set aside part of its output for various communal purposes. Mandatory set-asides include seed for the next year's sowing, feed for livestock, and emergency reserves. In addition, the kolkhoz is required to reserve part of its income for construction and repairs, purchase of machinery and supplies, and for various educational and cultural purposes. It must also dispose of part of its output in order to obtain cash to meet its fixed ruble commitments to kolkhoz administrative personnel.

After all of these claims have been satisfied, the cash, grain, or other products remaining in the possession of the kolkhoz are available for distribution to its members as part of the end-of-the-year settlement. The amount which each member receives depends on the number of workday credits accumulated and on the value of the workday. Thus, to use a hypothetical example, if 100,000 kilograms of grain and 100,000 rubles are available for distribution and 100,000 workday credits have been earned by all members of the kolkhoz in the course of the year, the value assigned to each workday is one kilogram of grain and one ruble in cash. The farm member who is credited with 300 work days during the year will receive 300 kilograms of grain and 300 rubles as his share of kolkhoz income. The earnings of the kolkhoznik depend not merely on the task which he performs and on the skill with which he discharges it, but also on what remains in the kolkhoz treasury after all prior commitments have been fulfilled.

Although the position of the collective-farm sector as a whole has

improved substantially since 1953, the earnings of collective farmers in average, and especially in poorer, kolkhozes are well below wages on the state farms and in industry. "Statistics show," V. P. Roshin has recently noted, "that there is an especially low payment for labor days in the kolkhozes of the European part of the RSFSR (excluding the raions of the North Caucasus)."<sup>93</sup> The problem is particularly acute in the weak kolkhozes where, according to Roshin, "many kolkhozniks have to supplement family income from their personal plots." The same author states: "the matter of increasing payment for labor in the backward kolkhozes to the level of payments being made in the average kolkhoz, and later to the level in nearby sovkhozes, and finally to the level of wages on state enterprises, does pose difficulties in a number of regions which cannot be eliminated, solely through the use of the forces and funds of the kolkhozes themselves. The solution of this problem depends on the raising of the economically weak kolkhozes to the level of the average and leading farms."<sup>94</sup> What is required to raise the depressed income of the weaker kolkhozes is not merely improved management and additional capital investment, but more explicit recognition of the fact that "some . . . kolkhozniks work on better land, closer to sales centers and supply bases, while others [work] on the worst lands and at a greater distance from these bases."<sup>95</sup> The reluctance of the regime to "subsidize" the backward kolkhozes serves to perpetuate their depressed earnings. Conversion into state farms is held back because of the much higher costs involved in guaranteeing state-farm wage scales. In these circumstances, the low average worth of the workday unit exercises only a limited attractiveness in encouraging the rank-and-file kolkhoznik to work hard in the communal sector.

Farmers in weak and even average kolkhozes still depend heavily on their garden allotments and private livestock to supplement their income. Even in the more well-to-do kolkhozes of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, and the Transcaucasus, such tendencies are strikingly evident. As Roshin has noted, "The kolkhozniks of the fruitful, warm places devote inadmissibly great attention to work in their private plots (vegetable gardens, vineyards, etc.) which bring them even higher incomes. Here, too, are reasons why in Armenia in 1958, for example, 16.2 per cent of the able-bodied kolkhozniks did not fulfill the established annual minimum of labor-days, and in Georgia 13.4 per cent did not fulfill the minimum, while 7.2 per cent and 5.2 per cent respectively did not earn a single labor-day."<sup>96</sup> In that year of a banner harvest, a sample survey revealed that collective farmers depended on their private garden plots for 38 per cent of their incomes.<sup>97</sup> As late as 1959, the private sector (three quarters of which consisted of kolkhoz garden plots) accounted for nearly half of the total meat and milk output in the Soviet Union, more than 80 per

cent of the eggs, 60 per cent of the potatoes, and 46 per cent of the green vegetables.<sup>98</sup>

So great is the temptation to divert energy from kolkhoz labor to intensive cultivation of garden allotments and care of private livestock that the regime has found it necessary to erect a series of barricades to discourage such diversion. Collective farmers who fail to accumulate the minimal workday credits prescribed by law or the regulations of the collective farms are subject to expulsion from the kolkhoz and to loss of their garden allotments. Under pressure from the authorities, many collective and state farms have cut down the size of the private gardens, and in some instances they have been eliminated altogether. Campaigns have also been waged from time to time to "persuade" collective farmers to sell their cows or other livestock to the kolkhoz. Efforts are currently being made to channel the sale of the collective farmers' private output through local consumer cooperatives rather than kolkhoz markets where free-market prices are likely to prevail. Although the regime has thus far refrained from ordering a general abolition of private garden plots, it has sought whenever possible to narrow the scope of the private economy of the collective farmers and to do all in its power to make kolkhoz members look to the communal sector as their primary source of support.

### *Controls in Soviet Agriculture*

The system of controls which the regime has installed in Soviet agriculture follows a characteristic pattern. Broadly speaking, while there are three main lines of control—administrative, Party, and police—Party controls are paramount. At the present time, Party and administrative controls are more closely fused than in any other sector of the economy, and the responsibility of the republic and regional Party apparatus for increasing agricultural output is direct and inescapable.


On the administrative side, planning remains the responsibility of Gosplan (long-range) and the All-Union Economic Council (short-range). At the center there are three principal administrative agencies: the State Procurements Committee, the All-Union Farm Machinery Association, and the Ministry of Agriculture. The State Procurements Committee has wider functions than its name implies; its responsibilities embrace production as well as procurement. The All-Union Farm Machinery Association undertakes to provide both collective and state farms with machinery, spare parts, fuel, and fertilizer; it is also responsible for machine repairs, construction, and rural electrification. The Ministry of Agriculture has been reduced to a research and extension service. Top-level coordination is supplied by the All-Union Agricultural Committee, on which representatives of Party, planning, and administrative agencies sit and which is chaired by a vice-chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

As in other areas of Soviet administration, the administrative chain of command runs from the center through the republics and regions. Chart VIII, which portrays the structure of agricultural management in the RSFSR, illustrates the general pattern elsewhere.

Superimposed on and fused with the administrative chain of command is a system of Party controls designed to achieve effective direction of the agricultural program. In the Russian republic, the Agricultural Committee, which functions as the primary coordinating body, is headed by a first vice-chairman of the Party Central Committee's Bureau for the Russian Republic; in other republics the Party first secretaries play a similar role. At the oblast, krai, or autonomous-republic level, the heads of the agricultural Party committees are held directly responsible for the performance of agriculture in their areas. In the territorial production administration, Party guidance is supplied by a committee, headed by a secretary, two deputy secretaries, and a group of inspector-organizers to deal directly with the Party organizations of state and collective farms.

The task of fitting the district Party apparatus into this structure presented insoluble problems. Historically, the raikom first secretary played a central role in enforcing Party demands on the countryside. He not only supervised the activities of Party and Komsomol organizations in the collective and state farms of the district, but shared responsibility with the district agricultural agencies for the state of plan fulfilment and procurement. With the establishment of the multidistrict territorial production administrations, the position of the district authorities became unclear. Some sought to preserve their traditional prerogatives by asserting the right to control the new territorial organs, and as a result jurisdictional disputes multiplied. Finally, Khrushchev himself intervened to make the new dispensation clear. "The territorial production administration," he pronounced in mid-1962, "is not subordinate to anyone in the district and does not report to any but the higher agencies — the regional, territory, and republic Party and Soviet agencies. Neither the district Party committees nor the district executive committees should interfere in the work of the production administrations. This rule must be driven firmly home . . ."<sup>99</sup> Addressing himself to the relation between the raikom first secretary and the territorial Party organizers, he declared, "We should probably make the first secretary of the district Party committee an assistant to the Party organizer . . . for the collective and state farms in the district of which he is secretary. Then the district Party committees, through their first secretaries, would take their proper place. Then there would be no arguments about who is subordinate to whom."<sup>100</sup> Such action soon followed. Looking beyond the immediate dispute, in the same statement Khrushchev revealed that the Party Presidium had under discussion a radical proposal to abolish the existing district level of

## CHART VIII



administration and to replace it with new larger administrative units which would "probably coincide" with the boundaries of the territorial production administrations.

At the November 1962 meeting of the Central Committee, this measure was ordered. It was combined with a wholesale reorganization of the Party into agricultural and industrial sections, with provision for separate Party and soviet bodies at regional and local levels to be exclusively concerned with agriculture. The functions formerly performed by the raikoms were henceforth to be exercised by the production administration Party committees.

Khrushchev's attack on the district Party apparatus reflected not only dissatisfaction with its performance but also a certain disillusionment with the localist tendencies and hoodwinking of central authorities which the earlier experiments in administrative decentralization had released. His response was to reassert the power of the center and to put his wager on a tightly controlled hierarchy of Party functionaries to restore discipline in the countryside and to take the leadership in the battle for increased production.

The difficulties which the Party has encountered in effectively supervising agriculture reflect the historic weakness of Party organizations in rural areas. As late as 1949, only about 36,000 out of more than 250,000 collective farms had Party organizations. With the merger movement and a substantial increase in rural Party membership after Stalin's death, Party organizations were created in virtually all kolkhozes. Their membership, however, continued to be dominated by the managerial groups and contained only a sprinkling of rank-and-file collective farmers. As late as 1956, less than half of the 3,000,000 rural Communists were directly engaged in agricultural production. By 1959 rural Party membership climbed to 3,500,000, an impressive gain, but both Party and Komsomol members were still thinly spread over the countryside as compared with the concentrations in the cities.

Party and Komsomol members are expected to take a leading role in the life of collective and state farms. It is their responsibility "to occupy front-line positions in the battle for the harvest and for livestock productivity," to conduct agitation for increased production, to explain and popularize Party and governmental decisions, to check the activities of collective and state farm management, to secure rigid enforcement of governmental and Party decrees, and to instill devotion to the regime. These exacting requirements are sometimes only indifferently realized. To quote Khrushchev again:

There are serious shortcomings in the work of many Party organizations in the villages . . . Unfortunately, Party meetings are not always held regularly,

and often they are poorly organized . . . On some collective farms there are, unfortunately, some Communists who work badly on the farm and spend their time making speeches and trying to lecture the collective farmers . . . Such Communists disgrace the lofty title of Bolsheviks.<sup>101</sup>

Strenuous efforts have been made in recent years to strengthen Party controls in the countryside. The overwhelming majority of collective-farm chairmen and state-farm directors are now Party members, and Party controls penetrate more deeply into the collective and state farms than they did in Stalin's day. While shortcomings persist in the enforcement of Party demands, the central role of the Party in the guidance of agriculture is no longer subject to challenge.

Police controls appear to have dwindled in significance. The Committee on State Security continues to be represented in all regional centers by officials whose surveillance extends to the collective and state farms and whose task it is to remain alert to signs of disaffection. But the activities of these agents inspire less fear than they did in Stalin's time, and, on the surface at least, the KGB is less visible and omnipresent. Responsibility for the prosecution and punishment of illegal action in the collective and state farms falls chiefly on local procurators and the regular courts. The procurator may act on the basis of complaints or on his own initiative. His actions are commonly directed against unlawful extensions of private plots, the stealing of collective and state property, the evasion of state deliveries, bribery, corruption, and other forms of illegal activity. In serious cases, the penalties exacted may run to long terms of imprisonment or even death. In less serious cases, sanctions may take the form of warnings, reprimands, trials before comrades' courts, and other forms of social pressure.

#### *Tensions in Soviet Agriculture*

Despite this array of administrative, Party, and police controls, agriculture continues to present the Soviet leadership with its most serious problems. Increases in farm productivity have failed to keep pace with gains in industry and operate as a drag on the growth of the economy. The collective-farm sector has proven particularly recalcitrant over the years, and Soviet official sources are replete with denunciations of "backward collective farmers," "idlers and slackers" who "work at low pressure" and "work only enough to remain in the collective farm and retain the rights and privileges of the collective farmers." There are constant attacks in the press on collective farmers who expend most of their energy on their private plots, who busy themselves with "private business," and neglect the communal sector.

The nub of the issue for most rank-and-file collective farmers is the question of incentives in the communal sector. Where they are adequate,

there is less disposition to concentrate efforts on private plots, though as long as the latter exist they are likely to remain an attractive source of supplementary income. The difficulty is that, despite very substantial improvement in the general position of collective farmers since Stalin's death, there remain many "backward" and some not so backward kolkhozes where earnings from the communal sector are well below state-farm wages and far below wages in industry. In these circumstances, work in the communal sector has little attractiveness. The fundamental sin of the collective farms in the eyes of the Party leadership is the survival of "individual psychology" among kolkhoz peasants. Khrushchev in a speech at Kiev on May 11, 1959, took the occasion to denounce these "petty-bourgeois propensities": "I am not in favor of paying out large amounts of money and produce for labor-days. Let's give a man all he needs to provide for his family, so that children are well fed, clothed, and shod, and the family lives in a respectable cottage . . . But at present there are instances of the rise of an unhealthy kulak psychology; hand out more money so it can be salted away in the strong box. What's the point of this?"<sup>102</sup> The point, as Khrushchev probably well knew, was that there were still many collective farmers who were dissatisfied with their earnings in the communal sector and who would continue to be so until incentives were further improved. Failing such upward adjustments, they were likely to persist in utilizing every available outlet to pursue personal interests in preference to the collective interests of the kolkhoz and the state.

The tensions which prevail in the Soviet countryside arise from deep-seated forces in Soviet life. Historically, the main burden of industrialization fell on the shoulders of the peasantry. The resentment which this inspired in peasants of the older generation merged with their traditional distrust of the city and their belief that they were being exploited by their urban masters. Many of the older peasants felt that collectivization had robbed them of their independence and reduced them to a form of neo-serfdom in which the new Communist bureaucracy replaced the former landowners. The dynamic changes which the Soviet revolution unleashed also profoundly disturbed the equilibrium of traditional rural institutions. Strains were evident in family life, religious practices, adjustments to mechanization, and attitudes toward the Soviet regime. They were most dramatically expressed in the gulf between peasant generations.

For elderly collective farmers, the period of the NEP still looms as the best phase of Soviet rule. Bitter memories of the "great hunger" of the early thirties, the fierceness of the collectivization struggle, and the grimness of life in the kolkhozes under Stalin have probably been somewhat assuaged by the improvements which have taken place under

Khrushchev. The attitude of the older peasant generation toward collectivization can best be defined as one of passive and reluctant acquiescence. The younger generation gives evidence of being more pliable. It has experienced no other form of agricultural organization except the collectives, and, unlike the older generation, it tends to accept them as part of the natural order of things. The post-Stalinist reforms have brought increased income and a taste of city comforts; they have also whetted the appetite for more. The younger people in the kolkhozes appear less attached to their private garden plots; they would willingly forego the labor which they entail if the communal sector could yield them the amenities to which they aspire. More highly educated than their elders and more flexible in their ways, they are in a better position to take advantage of opportunities for advancement. For some, the road to a new life involves flight to the urban industrial centers. The more ambitious become part of the rural aristocracy or acquire skills which enable them to rise above the rank-and-file kolkhozniks. The great majority perforce remain ordinary collective farmers, and, though their standard of living compares unfavorably with that of city and state-farm workers, it has improved perceptibly since Stalin's death. Hope of further improvement serves to mute discontent, but incentives will have to be raised before the younger kolkhoz generation functions as a truly efficient and productive labor force.

In analyzing the tensions which exist in the Soviet countryside, it is also important to distinguish the different strata of Soviet rural society as well as to differentiate between the relative prosperity of the so-called leading kolkhozes and the much more depressed standards of the backward kolkhozes. The social gradations of the countryside are an out-growth of the Soviet system of controls and the recognition accorded professional and technical competence. At the peak of the Soviet rural social pyramid are the local Party and Soviet functionaries, the state-farm directors, and the collective-farm chairmen. The rural aristocracy may also be considered as embracing the agronomists and other specialists on the staffs of the collective and state farms, the bookkeepers and accountants, and the village intelligentsia of doctors, school directors, and teachers. Between the rural aristocracy and the ordinary collective farmers at the base of the social pyramid, there are a variety of intermediate categories. These include the brigadiers and other subordinate managerial personnel in the kolkhozes and sovkhozes, the tractor and combine drivers, and others possessing special skills which command earnings well above the kolkhoz average.

As might perhaps be expected, the burdens of collective-farm existence bear most heavily on the mass of rank-and-file farmers in the backward kolkhozes. It is there that grievances accumulate and maximum

sacrifices are exacted. Because income from the communal sector is low, the collective farmers are driven to use every opportunity to supplement their kolkhoz earnings by work on their private plots. The struggle for survival is hard, and in years of crop shortage there may be a high incidence of thefts of kolkhoz property and stealing of grain from the fields or the kolkhoz storehouse.

The tensions which characterize the rural aristocracy are of a different order. Their grievances are not primarily economic. By the standards of the Soviet countryside, they live relatively well and the privileges they enjoy mark them out from their neighbors. But life on the kolkhozes and sovkhozes and in district towns is far less attractive than in the large urban centers, and the new Soviet intelligentsia does not embrace assignments to rural areas with enthusiasm. In a revealing speech at a plenary session of the Moscow province Party committee, in December 1950, Khrushchev declared:

There are, it seems, a sort of sorry agronomists who have been graduated from the Timiryazev Agricultural Academy, agricultural institutes and technical schools, have received higher and secondary agricultural training, and work in Moscow as conductors, dispatchers, warehousemen, photographers, porters, waiters, etc. Some comrades proposed sending these people into the districts and to the collective farms and using them to advance agriculture. I think such "specialists" would be of no help at all. They are, to put it bluntly, deserters; deserters, because they completed studies at an educational institution and deceived the state, deceived the collective farmers who hoped for their help, while they prefer to set themselves up in Moscow at any work rather than go to work on the collective farms.<sup>103</sup>

These remarks still have their contemporary applications. According to V. V. Grishin, chairman of the Central Council of Trade Unions, "five thousand doctors were assigned to permanent posts in rural areas in 1961, but almost the same number left the rural medical institutions for the cities. Therefore, many rural medical institutions do not have doctors."<sup>104</sup> During 1960-61 the number of equipment operators leaving the state and collective farms of Kazakhstan was greater than the total of new arrivals plus those trained in the republic during the same period. Statistics such as these reflect the difficulties which the regime confronts in recruiting talent to service its grass-roots agricultural programs.

For the rural administrators who accept the responsibilities placed on them, the sources of tensions are fourfold: the extensive demands which are made on them, the difficulties which they encounter in fulfilling these demands, the subterfuges to which they resort when they are unable to meet expectations, and the dangers which they run when they undertake to hoodwink their superiors. As in other areas of Soviet life, the rural administrator works under constant pressure from above to increase out-

put and to fulfill and overfulfill planned goals for production and delivery to the state. Such pressure is always nerve-wracking, but it becomes particularly acute in Soviet agriculture in years of poor weather and bad harvests. Some recent dramatic examples were provided by the series of "scandals" aired at the January 1961 plenum of the Central Committee and in the discussions afterwards. After the bumper crop of 1958, extremely ambitious agricultural goals were incorporated in the Seven-Year Plan, and Soviet administrators undertook pledges to fulfill and even exceed them. The excellent harvest of 1958 was followed by two mediocre harvests in 1959 and 1960, and many of the pledges turned out to be unrealistic. But rather than plead excuses or confess failure, which might put a quick end to their careers, many Party officials and local agricultural administrators resorted to various ingenious and not so ingenious forms of fraud and statistical manipulation to simulate plan fulfillment and even overfulfillment.

One of the extreme glory-seekers was the late A. N. Larianov, the first secretary of Ryazan oblast, who pledged that his oblast would produce 280 per cent more meat in 1959 than in 1958. At the December 1959 plenum of the Central Committee, Larianov reported fulfillment of the pledge, was warmly congratulated by Khrushchev, and the feats of the Ryazaners were widely publicized as examples to be copied. In the course of the next year it developed that the Ryazan performance was a Potemkin village. At the January 1961 plenum Khrushchev revealed that, in an attempt to fulfill the plan, the Ryazaners "reduced the number of livestock and thus undermined their opportunities for the coming year. There were cases of doctoring the records and cases of padded figures, of the purchase of livestock from other provinces and listing it as raised by the collective and state farms. The persons guilty of this received deserved punishment."<sup>105</sup> Whether the disclosures of these malpractices contributed in any way to Larianov's subsequent demise must remain a matter of speculation.

Another particularly ironic case centered around T. U. Uldzhabayev, first secretary of the Tadjik Party organization. For years the Tadjik republic had been widely praised for its record of plan fulfillment and its good yields of cotton, allegedly the highest in the world. At the January 1961 Party plenum there was a hint that trouble was brewing, but the full dimensions of the scandal did not become apparent until the Tadjik Party plenum in April 1961, where Central Committee Secretary Kozlov carried out a purge of the top leaders of the Tadjik republic. At the plenum it was revealed that for the previous three years the Tadjik plan for cotton procurement had not in fact been met, though each year the leaders had reported fulfillment ahead of schedule. The first secretary and many other senior officials were condemned for having committed

"gross political errors" and for "organizing falsified cotton procurement accounts on a mass scale."<sup>106</sup> False data were fabricated by exaggerating figures, by forging directly, and by exerting pressure to pad accounts on kolkhoz chairmen, directors of cotton-ginning plants, and agencies of the Central Statistical Directorate.

Similar practices occurred in other areas on a widespread scale. With the connivance of Party and governmental officials, fictitious receipts were issued to kolkhozes and sovkhozes by procurement organizations in order to exaggerate output and deliveries. Sovkhoz and kolkhoz managers were permitted and even encouraged by higher officials to purchase such products as meat, milk, eggs, and butter at state stores or in kolkhoz markets and then to credit them to the procurement plan of the kolkhoz or sovkhoz. Still another common practice was the delivery of feed and seed stocks of grain in order to fulfill the grain-procurement plan. At the January 1961 Party plenum Khrushchev vehemently denounced those officials — windbags he called them — "who heedlessly make high pledges" and then do not fulfill them, who try "to make life easier for themselves by securing a reduction in the procurement plan" and then seek increased allocations for themselves from all-union stocks, who "in their desire to appear before the public as meticulous in their fulfillment of the obligations undertaken, clean out all the grain from the granaries, taking feed grain and leaving not even grain for seed, and then "turn to the state and ask for seed and feed stocks." Such "pseudo-leaders," observed Khrushchev, are "bankrupts," unworthy of Party membership, and he promised that "those guilty of violating the decrees of the Party and government would be expelled from the Party and placed on trial."<sup>107</sup> Indeed, in the aftermath of the January 1961 plenum, many were.

To read the proceedings of this January plenum is to gain a new appreciation of the dilemma of the Soviet agricultural official who is caught between the demands of the state for higher and higher production and his own inability to fulfill these demands. The answer which Khrushchev gave at the plenum was clear. "If a leader sees," he stated, "that he cannot cope with the job, he should come and say: 'Comrades, I have failed at the work, I cannot lead the province, I have discredited myself — Let me resign.'"<sup>108</sup> But this course of action obviously was less attractive to those to whom he was commanding it than it was to Khrushchev himself. The alternative course was to seek to conceal one's deficiencies, to hope to escape the consequences, and to run the attendant risks. Many Soviet Party and agricultural officials opted for this choice and paid the penalty when caught.

For many years Soviet agriculture has been characterized by a high rate of turnover among collective-farm chairmen and other local Party and governmental officials charged with supervising the rural sector.

This fluidity is explained not only by the problem which the regime confronts in recruiting able personnel for rural administrative assignments, but also by the difficulties which rural administrators encounter in coping with the hazards and special organizational complexities of their task. As in other sectors of Soviet life, agricultural officials have sought to stabilize their position by forming mutual-protection associations designed to insulate them from top control. In order to break up such groups and enforce its demands, the regime has tended to multiply and intensify central controls and has practiced rotation in local assignments as a method of preventing these "family groups" from solidifying. Thus a ceaseless tug of war takes place in which rural officials seek to build buffers against the center while leaders of the regime seek to make their control effective by accentuating the insecurity of their lower echelons and launching periodic scapegoat campaigns against local officials who fail to produce. From the point of view of the regime, there is only one test of the loyalty and efficiency of the rural administrator — his capacity to meet the procurement targets that Party and state establish for him. The tensions generated by this pressure form an inescapable part of the environment in which Soviet rural officialdom functions.

### *The Future of Soviet Agriculture*

Despite the many shortcomings in the organization of Soviet agriculture and the difficulties which have been encountered in meeting production and procurement goals, it would be a mistake to assume that Soviet agricultural output is destined to stagnate. The scientific and technical potentialities for increasing yields exist, and over time they will probably be exploited to the full.

In many respects, agriculture represents the least developed sector of the Soviet economy. As Khrushchev pointed out in his Central Committee report of March 5, 1962, even on the state farms where mechanization is most advanced, "not more than one fourth of the cows are milked mechanically . . . a large part of the corn for grain is harvested by hand . . . the harvesting of sugar beets and potatoes is not mechanized, and . . . there is extremely little equipment for loading and unloading work."<sup>109</sup> The output of agricultural equipment, mineral fertilizers, and herbicides still falls far short of current needs.

The future growth of Soviet agriculture is likely to depend less on any tinkering with organizational controls than it is on the willingness of the Soviet leadership to improve its incentive system and to make large additional capital investments in agriculture. If resources can be mobilized to increase the stock of agricultural machinery, fertilizer, pesticides, and improved seed varieties, to extend irrigation facilities, to train skilled

agricultural personnel, to raise the income of agricultural workers, and to provide them with the equivalent of urban amenities, it can safely be predicted that agricultural output will rise substantially. Until such measures are taken, Soviet agriculture will remain a problem area.

## *Chapter 17*

# *The Soviet Political System— Problems and Prospects*

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A totalitarian system on the march often gives the impression of remorseless and overpowering strength. Its weaknesses become fully apparent only after its downfall. The Soviet regime has survived the arduous vicissitudes of more than forty-five years of revolution, war, internal turmoil, and stormy construction. It has emerged from these ordeals as one of the two most powerful states in the world. Does this capacity to endure and expand signify that Soviet totalitarianism can avoid the fate of its Fascist and Nazi counterparts? Have the Soviet leaders discovered a new formula of power which is likely to carry them to industrial supremacy and world domination? Or are there fatal defects in the Soviet scheme of government which doom it to eventual extinction?

The political cohesiveness of the Soviet system cannot be measured with barometric precision. Strengths and weaknesses can be identified and trends and problems discerned, but the prediction of future developments remains a notoriously hazardous enterprise. The Soviet regime today is different in many respects from the political order that took shape in the first decades after the revolution. The next decades, in turn, may bring changes which even the most prescient observer cannot now anticipate.

The shape of the future is, nevertheless, contained in the past, both in the limits which it enjoins and the potentialities which it unfolds. During the long period of Stalin's rule, a pattern was imposed on Soviet society which still casts its shadow over the land. Stalin erected a structure of centralized, absolute authority in which unquestioned obedience to his dictates became a *sine qua non* of survival. He ruthlessly eliminated

every actual or potential competitor for supreme power and encouraged the development of a leadership cult in which his own godlike infallibility served as an object of official worship. He developed a system of competing and overlapping bureaucratic hierarchies in which both the Party and the police, penetrating and watching each other, simultaneously pervaded and controlled the armed forces, the administration, and all other organized sectors of life. He reserved his own ultimate authority to direct and coordinate the system by providing no point of final resolution for differences and conflicts short of himself. He made a virtue out of the interplay of lines of authority by holding both controllers and controlled responsible for the fulfillment of plans and directives. He capitalized on the diffusion of power among his subordinates to prevent them from challenging his own.

A salient attribute of Stalinist totalitarianism was its relentless determination in mobilizing human and material resources for the attainment of a dominating objective. In more specific terms, this meant concentrating on building the elements of military strength and constructing a heavy-industry base which would accelerate the rate of industrial growth and provide modernized armaments, machinery, and factory plants. This ruling priority colored every aspect of Soviet life. It meant that consumer goods, housing, and agriculture were neglected and ignored. It made the fulfillment of planned industrial targets the central preoccupation of every sector of the Party, police, and administrative apparatus. It gave members of the managerial, technical, and scientific intelligentsia an increasingly significant role in the direction of the Soviet economy, and it resulted in a substantial increase in their prestige and in their access to the scarce material perquisites of Soviet society. It also meant a general tightening of discipline and a corresponding strengthening of the repressive organs of the state to enforce the sacrifices which a high rate of capital expansion entailed. The unifying theme was the harnessing of energies to build state power.

The art of successful totalitarian dictatorship as it evolved under Stalin required a capacity to gauge the endurance of its subjects, to hold out a vista of hope and improvement when the situation threatened to become intolerable, to tap new sources of energy when the old were exhausted, to apply pressure when dangers were minimal, and to reverse course when catastrophe threatened. Stalin revealed himself as a past master of this type of manipulation. While never abandoning the substance of his authority and steadily extending his control of the key power positions in the Soviet state, he also demonstrated considerable skill in interrupting his march toward total power by periodic concessions and breathing spaces. By apparent reversals of policy, he gained time to consolidate his position and to reclaim support which earlier policies had

alienated. He showed himself adept at diverting blame to his subordinates for mistakes and difficulties while reserving credit to himself for all major achievements and acts of clemency. He utilized alternating cycles of intensified repression and relative relaxation to entrench himself in power and to enlist the total strength of the nation in state service.

As Stalinism entered its mature phase of totalitarian development, its institutional characteristics tended to harden. The police, military, and administrative apparatuses took on the character of rigid, bureaucratic hierarchies with a paraphernalia of titles, ranks, uniforms, and insignia reminiscent of Tsarist political arrangements. The official ideology, which emphasized state service and was strongly infused with a nationalist content, congealed into a procrustean conformity which brooked no challenge or criticism. Latter-day Stalinism sought to strengthen its foundations by invoking the traditional supports of authoritarianism — a conservative educational and family policy, an emphasis on the sanctity of state commands and directives, and an arrangement with the Orthodox Church by which submission was purchased at the price of toleration of the practice of religious rites. Increasing stress was placed on the organic efficiency of the nation, on industrialization and militarization as a means of promoting it, and on a system of income distribution which was designed to reward productivity and penalize sloth. The material prerogatives of the elite were strengthened, and the power of the regime came to rest in the last analysis on the reliability of its top layers.

While safeguarding his own personal domination against any possibility of challenge, Stalin was compelled to give his authority institutional expression. The great bureaucratic hierarchies of the Party, the secret police, the armed forces, state administration, and industrial management remained subject to his direction, but they also operated as centers of influence in their own right. Each of them represented a pool of functional competence on which Stalin had to draw in order to effect his purposes. Individuals might be, and were, expendable, but the apparatus as a whole was indispensable. Each of its specialized parts manifested the characteristics of bureaucracy everywhere. Each arm of the apparatus viewed decisions from the vantage point of its own particular interests, and it struggled to defend and expand the area of its own dominion. Behind the monolithic facade of Stalinist totalitarianism, the plural pressures of professional bureaucratic interests found expression. They represented forces with which Stalin's successors inevitably had to reckon.

Stalin's legacy to those who came after him had its constructive as well as its negative aspects. However ruthless his methods, he led the industrialization drive which transformed the Soviet Union into a leading military and industrial power. He recognized the imperatives of industrialization and gave massive support to the system of scientific and tech-

nical education on which present-day Soviet achievements in science and technology are based. Turning his back on egalitarianism, he adopted a system of compensation in which rewards were tailored to productivity. The industrializing elite of managers, engineers, and scientists became favored beneficiaries of the regime's largesse.

But forced-draft industrialization also exacted a heavy price. Chronic shortages of food, consumer goods, and housing became a characteristic feature of Soviet life, and it was felt most deeply at the lower end of the Soviet social scale. Agriculture was neglected, and the word "kolkhoz," as used colloquially by Soviet citizens, became a synonym of backwardness, misery, and a low standard of life. Forced-draft industrialization meant increasing reliance on repression, but Stalin intensified the terror to a point where it yielded increasingly negative returns. He sent millions of Soviet citizens to forced-labor camps and compelled many millions more to work under conditions not far removed from a prison regimen. Fear and suspicion pervaded Soviet society, and, as Khrushchev's secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress demonstrates, even Stalin's closest collaborators lived in terror that their careers would come to a quick end. The Soviet elite had its privileges, but it lacked a sense of stability and had to function in a milieu of constant surveillance and distrust. Stalin built his own security on the insecurity of those who surrounded him; the servile flattery with which they bid for his favor masked a deep-seated bitterness and resentment which is dramatically expressed in Khrushchev's secret speech. As Stalin neared the end of his life, his megalomania and paranoiac suspicion mounted; and only his death prevented a repetition of the Great Purge. His insistence on exercising personal authority led to a congestion of decision making at the center and a paralysis of initiative below. The supercentralization which he practiced hampered the operations of an industrial economy which was becoming increasingly complex.

#### *The New Model of Khrushchevian Totalitarianism*

The death of Stalin marked the end of an era and opened the way for a new constellation of power to emerge. Once the succession crisis had been resolved by Khrushchev's purge of his competitors, the outlines of a new model of totalitarianism began to crystallize. The system of rule which Khrushchev developed represented a response to the aspirations which Stalin had thwarted. It could be described as a form of "enlightened" or "rationalized" totalitarianism which sought to eliminate or mollify the worst grievances of the Stalinist epoch while preserving the substance of totalitarian power.

Many of the basic institutional characteristics of the totalitarian syndrome persist under Khrushchev. He has poured new content into the

official ideology, but he remains its final interpreter and brooks no challenge to its doctrinal foundations from any Soviet source. The Communist Party which he heads retains its monopoly on legality and its monolithic character, and he has strengthened its role in Soviet society by making it the prime instrument of his domination and control. He dissolved many of the forced-labor camps and subordinated the police and the security organs to the Party, but the secret police remain in existence, ready to be used when needed. He has asserted his dominance over the armed forces, strengthening Party controls within them and insisting on loyalty to the Party as the ultimate touchstone of service to the Communist cause. Like Stalin before him, Khrushchev monopolizes control of the media of mass communications, saturating the channels of public opinion with Party propaganda and permitting no outlet for political programs which challenge his own. Seeking a more rational solution to the problem of managing an increasingly complex economy, he undertook to decentralize operational decision making, but at the same time he insists on central direction of the economy and has taken measures to ensure that central policy priorities are enforced. His vision of society is total, and he sees nothing within it that can be permitted to remain free of the Party's paternal guidance and care.

If the pattern of controls on which Khrushchev relies is in essence totalitarian, nevertheless his methods and policies contrast strikingly with those of Stalin. Terror occupied a central place in sustaining Stalin's power edifice, and forced labor for political as well as ordinary criminals was its symbol. Khrushchev has not dispensed with police surveillance and repression in dealing with the politically suspect, but the large-scale consignment of Soviet political prisoners to labor camps appears to be a thing of the past, and the pall of fear which made the Soviet air so heavy in Stalin's time is far less pervasive or evident. The sanctions which Khrushchev has invoked to deal with politically unreliable elements, while mild compared with Stalinist practice, are not necessarily less effective. Thus the university student who expresses heterodox sentiments or associates unduly with visiting Westerners will first be summoned by the KGB and given a warning; if he disregards the warning, the next stage may be expulsion from the university and an end to his dream of higher education. Control of careers and job assignments is usually sufficient to instill caution and orthodoxy in all but the rashly adventurous. The knowledge that the KGB is alert and watchful casts its shadow and serves to discourage deviant political behavior. The ultimate sanctions of exile and imprisonment are far less frequently invoked than they were in Stalin's time, but it cannot be assumed that the abeyance of the terror means that it will never be revived. In a situation of crisis, such as that presented by the Hungarian uprising in 1956, Khrushchev assumed re-

sponsibility for the most brutal kind of repression, though he would obviously have preferred not to have had his power challenged at all. His normal formula of governance relegates terror to a much less central role than it occupied under Stalin, and it reflects his confidence that he can count on more positive sources of popular support.

The welfare concessions and the improvements in the incentive structure which Khrushchev has sponsored have undoubtedly contributed to broaden the popularity of his regime. Under Stalin the collective farms represented the most depressed sector of Soviet life. By raising procurement prices for agricultural products substantially, Khrushchev has lifted the standard of living of the average collective farmer and won new support in the countryside. The concern which he has demonstrated for the urban worker has also commanded mass approval. Such measures as the construction of new housing, the wider availability of consumers goods, the increases in minimum wages and old-age pensions, the shortening of the work week, and a slow but steady rise in workers' real income have helped to alleviate past grievances and to reinforce hopes of further amelioration. The standard of life of the average Soviet worker is still low compared with that of his opposite number in the West, but what appears to matter is that it has been improving. The welfare ingredient in Khrushchev's recipe for power has contributed to raise his popularity and strengthen his authority.

Khrushchev's accent on welfare has been coupled with the most assiduous efforts to create an image of himself as a leader who is close to the people. In striking contrast to Stalin, who rarely ventured forth from the Kremlin and whose charisma of infallibility was magnified by the aura of mystery, aloofness, and remoteness which surrounded him, Khrushchev has been the agitator par excellence, in constant motion, addressing meetings from one end of the country to the other, visiting collective farms and factories, speaking the language of the people, and reaching out for popular support. His common touch and the sharp criticism which he has directed at Stalin's cult of personality have not prevented him from launching his own cult of omniscience, though he has taken great pains to embody his aspirations in the anonymous cloak of Party infallibility. His new populism represents an effort to mobilize the energies of the masses by providing for their more active participation in the tasks of Communist construction, though they, of course, remain subject to Party guidance and control. He has sought to recapture some of the egalitarian appeal of the earliest years of the revolution by correcting the grosser inequalities of the Stalinist era. But he has also insisted on the discipline of a system of differential rewards tailored to productivity in order to maintain the dynamic momentum of the industrialization drive. His educational reforms are designed to bring the schools and production closer

together; by demanding that most candidates for higher education serve an apprenticeship in industry or agriculture, he hopes that the new educated elite will preserve its link with the masses and be prevented from developing into an isolated ruling caste. In struggling with the problem of reconciling the elitist and populist strains in Communist ideology, Khrushchev seeks, in essence, to give elitism a wider base of popular support.

Again, in contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev has used the Party as his primary instrument of rule. Under Stalin, the Party declined in vitality, and its apparatus became simply one of several channels through which he communicated his commands. Khrushchev has revitalized the Party and lifted it to a central position in his structure of direction and control. Within the Party itself he has sought to revive what he describes as Leninist norms — more active participation by the Party rank and file in Party discussions, encouragement of greater criticism from below, more frequent assemblages of congresses, conferences, committees, and other leading Party organs, and greater emphasis on the recruitment of "leading" workers and collective farmers in order to root the Party in a mass base. But the revival of the forms of intra-Party democracy should not be confused with its essence. Khrushchev, like Stalin before him, tolerates no derogation of his own authority, permits no opposition to raise its head within the Party, and insists that the Party function as a unit in executing his will. The Party functionaries, nevertheless, have flourished under Khrushchev. He has depended heavily on them to strengthen his control of the armed forces and the police, to achieve centralized direction of industry and agriculture, and to provide the coordinating framework which holds Soviet society together.

Khrushchev's use of the Party apparatus as an integrating force has been combined with a pragmatic willingness to adopt forms of decentralized administration where they promised more effective operational results. His recognition that the supercentralization of the Stalinist era was ill suited to the rational management of a highly industrialized society led him to experiment with delegations of authority which Stalin would probably have sternly disapproved. He enlarged the decision-making prerogatives of factory managers and collective-farm chairmen, transferred important administrative functions from the center to the republics, dissolved a large number of central economic ministries, and replaced them with a network of regional economic councils which shifted the weight of supervisory authority much closer to the grass roots. His restless search for more rational forms of administration resulted in a series of major reorganizations in agriculture, as well as in industry, but behind them all was the drive to push the experts and the specialists into the production process and to bring his administrators nearer to factory

and farm. The responsibilities which he delegated ran the danger of pluralizing his authority, but he sought to guard against it, not always altogether successfully, by invoking the unifying discipline of the Party to hold fissiparous tendencies in check.

Khrushchev's ideological innovations also distinguish him sharply from Stalin. For Stalin the world consisted of enemies, and the faster one marched forward to socialism, the sharper the class war had to become. Stalin thus justified measures of mass terror and assumed that they could not be dispensed with until Communism had triumphed on a world scale. He considered war between the two hostile camps of "socialism" and "imperialism" as eventually inevitable and the possibility of a peaceful Communist world victory as foreclosed. Khrushchev, by contrast, radiates a sense of confidence that Communism will be able to march to world mastery without unleashing a nuclear holocaust. He believes that the Communist leadership has consolidated its position within the Soviet Union, that mass terror is no longer necessary, and that the regime is solidly based on widespread popular support. He counts on welfare concessions, the Soviet Union's rapid industrial progress, the vista of expanding opportunities which this opens up for oncoming generations, the record of Soviet scientific and military achievements, and the heightened prestige of the Soviet Union in the international arena to hold out continuing appeal, not only within the Soviet Union but to the world at large. The Soviet Union in Khrushchev's view is no longer an isolated island in the capitalist sea. It has broken out of the ring of capitalist encirclement, and it is now a system on the move, destined to sweep the world. Equipped with the most advanced military weapons and supported by powerful allies in Asia and Europe, it need fear no attack from the "declining" capitalist world; a world war, in Khrushchev's words, "is no longer fatalistically inevitable."<sup>1</sup> As he sees it, the magnetic attraction of the Soviet system will enlist increasing numbers of converts throughout the world. In many countries, local Communist forces mobilizing sympathetic allies may come to power by parliamentary means; in other countries, where capitalism is strongly entrenched and offers armed resistance, force may be necessary to dislodge the oppressor regimes.

The opportunities for advancing the Communist cause are regarded as particularly promising in colonial and recently colonial areas. By supporting the aspirations of the colonial peoples for independence, Khrushchev hopes to win new friends throughout the underdeveloped parts of the world. By encouraging his local Communist parties to place themselves at the head of the forces pressing for national liberation and providing them with material Soviet aid, he looks forward to establishing new Communist outposts. He woos the new nations of Asia and Africa by identifying himself with their national aspirations and historic anti-

imperialist grievances, and in return he hopes for their support in his drive to undermine the position of the West. Wherever the situation is ripe and the local nationalist leadership is receptive, he encourages his local Communist representatives to form coalitions with friendly elements in so-called national democratic governments, to strive to attain strategic positions within them, and to press for their ultimate transformation into full-fledged Communist regimes. As Khrushchev envisages the world, Communism is on the march and capitalism is in decline. By a skillful application of Soviet power, diplomacy, propaganda, and infiltration, he hopes to accelerate the process, to force the capitalist nations to surrender their positions without offering forceful resistance, and to win his way to victory without risking the destruction of his own home base.

The Declaration of the representatives of the eighty-one Communist parties which met in Moscow in November-December 1960 and the new program approved by the Twenty-Second Party Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in October 1961 make these designs clear. "The Socialist world," proclaims the new Party program, "is expanding; the capitalist world is shrinking. Socialism will inevitably succeed capitalism everywhere. Such is the objective law of social development. Imperialism is powerless to check the irresistible process of emancipation."<sup>2</sup> The Declaration of the eighty-one Communist parties envisaged the future in equally roseate terms: "The near future will bring the forces of peace and socialism new successes. The USSR will become the leading industrial power of the world. China will become a mighty industrial state. The socialist system will be turning out more than half the world industrial product. The peace zone will expand. The working-class movement in the capitalist countries and the national-liberation movement in the colonies and dependencies will achieve new victories. The disintegration of the colonial system will become complete. The superiority of the forces of socialism and peace will be absolute."<sup>3</sup> Both documents state the possibility of achieving a Communist victory on a world scale without precipitating a world war.

The doctrine of peaceful coexistence which they enunciate is not a formula for stabilizing the boundaries between the Communist and non-Communist parts of the world; it is rather a recipe for weakening imperialism and neutralizing and eliminating any armed opposition to the Communist forward march. The Declaration is explicit on this point: "Peaceful coexistence of states does not imply renunciation of the class struggle, as the revisionists claim. The coexistence of states with different social systems is a form of class struggle between socialism and capitalism . . . Peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems does not mean a reconciliation of socialist and bourgeois ideologies. On the contrary, it assumes intensification of the struggle of the

working class and of all the Communist parties for the triumph of socialist ideas . . ."<sup>4</sup> Both documents express the hope that the capitalist nations will retire from the world scene peacefully, but as the Declaration puts it, "the possibility of nonpeaceful transition to socialism should be borne in mind. Leninism teaches, and experience confirms, that the ruling class never relinquishes power voluntarily. In this case the degree of bitterness and the forms of the class struggle will depend not so much on the proletariat as on the resistance put up by the reactionary circles to the will of the overwhelming majority of the people, on these circles using force at one or another stage of the struggle for socialism."<sup>5</sup>

Both documents also see the national-liberation movements in colonial and former colonial areas as instruments which can be used not only to undermine the strength of the imperialist powers, but also to facilitate an eventual Communist triumph. The task of Communist parties in the emergent nations is to influence them in the first instance to embark on a non-capitalist course of development and to establish national democracies which will "consummate the anti-imperial, anti-feudal, democratic revolution." As Communist influence grows and the balance of world forces shifts away from capitalism, the Communists will be able to bid for undiluted power. In the words of the Declaration: "the working class and its revolutionary vanguard [read Communist Party] will with increasing energy press forward its offensive against the domination of oppressors and exploiters in every field of political, economic, and ideological activity in each country. In the process of their struggle, the masses are prepared and conditions arise for decisive battles for the overthrow of capitalism, for the victory of socialist revolution."<sup>6</sup>

#### *The 1961 Party Program*

It is to the Party program that one must turn to capture Khrushchev's vision of future developments within the Soviet Union itself. The program sets a series of ambitious and grandiose goals. It states that the Soviet Union will surpass the United States in "production per head of population" within the current (1961-1970) decade, and that by 1980 total industrial output will increase by not less than 500 per cent. It proclaims that agricultural output will mount by 150 per cent in the ten years ending in 1970 and by 250 per cent in twenty years. It promises that Soviet national income will increase 400 per cent by 1980, that real income per capita will grow by more than 250 per cent in the same period. To Soviet workers and farmers who are still plagued by an inadequate supply of consumer items and housing, it holds out the alluring prospect of an abundance of goods, a work week of 35-36 hours within the next decade, solution of the housing problem, free rent, water, gas, heating, and public transport, free midday factory and school meals, and an expansion of free

medicine, vacations, education, and other social services. But the program also makes clear that these goals cannot be attained without hard work. "To achieve [them] it is necessary to raise productivity of labor in industry by more than 100 per cent within ten years and by 300 to 350 per cent within twenty years."<sup>7</sup> Communism, the program adds, "does not release the members of society from work. It will by no means be a society of anarchy, idleness, and inactivity . . ."<sup>8</sup> The program also warns that the material and cultural benefits of the program can only be fulfilled under conditions of peace and substantial reduction of armaments. "Complications in the international situation and the resultant necessity of increasing defense expenditures may hold up the fulfillment of the plans for raising the living standards of the people."<sup>9</sup> Khrushchev's blueprint of utopia is thus hedged with reservations.

The program contemplates no abrupt changes in the organization of agriculture and industry. There is no proposal to abolish the kolkhozes or to eliminate private plots immediately. Instead, the evolution of kolkhoz property into public property and the abolition of private plots are to take place "gradually" and "on a voluntary basis." "When collective production at the kolkhozes is able to replace in full that of the supplementary individual plots of the kolkhoz members, when the collective farmers see for themselves that their supplementary individual farming is unprofitable, they will give it up of their own accord." Eventually kolkhozes, state farms, and local industrial enterprises will be brought together into so-called agrarian-industrial associations which will develop joint production ties and ensure more effective use of locally available manpower. As the productivity of the kolkhozes increases, labor will be paid at state-farm rates, enjoy comparable social-security privileges, and "the rural population will ultimately draw level with the urban population in cultural and living conditions." In industry "the economic independence and the rights of local organs and enterprises will continue to expand within the framework of the single national economic plan." Centralized planning will continue, but it will "chiefly concentrate on working out and ensuring the fulfillment of the key targets of the economic plans . . ." Planning will require "firm and consistent discipline"; communist society, the program reminds us, "will be a highly organized community of working men."

The socialist state will enter a new phase. Instead of serving as an instrument of the dictatorship of the proletariat, it will become "an organization embracing the entire people." The organs of state power "will gradually be transformed into organs of public self-government." The role of the soviets, "which combine the features of a government body and a social organization," will expand, and "local soviets will make final decisions on all questions of local significance." In order to provide for

more mass participation in the work of the soviets, the program proclaims that "it is desirable that at least one third of the total number of deputies to a soviet should be elected anew each year," and to guard against abuses of authority by government officials it advises that "the leading officials of the union, republic, and local bodies should be elected to their offices, as a rule, for not more than three consecutive terms." But it also makes provision for longer terms in the case of outstanding officials, provided that such individuals are re-elected, not by a simple majority, but by at least 75 per cent of the votes. In order to strengthen control over officialdom, the role of the standing committees of the soviets will be enlarged, and deputies will be "periodically released from their official duties" in order to concentrate on full-time committee work.

The role of other "social" organizations is also to be heightened. Trade unions are promised "a growing share in economic management," and the Young Communist League is encouraged "to display greater initiative." In the words of the program, "social organizations should be induced to take a greater part in managing cultural and health institutions; within the next few years they should be entrusted with the management of theaters and concert halls, clubs, libraries, and other state-controlled cultural establishments; they should be encouraged to play a greater part in promoting public order, particularly through the people's volunteer squads and comrades' courts." In order to attract more participants to the activities of social organizations, at least half of their governing bodies are to be renewed at each election, and leading functionaries are "not to be elected, as a general rule, for more than two consecutive terms." As the state withers away, "bodies in charge of planning, accounting, economic management, and cultural advancement . . . will lose their political character and will become organs of public self-government." But the program cautions that the complete withering away of the state must await two conditions: "the building of a developed Communist society" and "the final settlement of the contradictions between capitalism and communism in the world arena in favor of communism."

As long as imperialism survives and the threat of war remains, "the strengthening of the defense potential of the USSR" will remain "a most important function of the socialist state." In the words of the program, "The Soviet state will see to it that its armed forces are powerful; that they have the most up-to-date means of defending the country — atomic and thermonuclear weapons, rockets of every range — and that they keep all types of military equipment and all weapons up to standard."

In the field of nationality policy, the program promises to continue to promote the teaching of national languages, but it also stresses the importance of a study of Russian "as the common medium of intercourse and cooperation among all the peoples of the USSR." The thrust of the

program is in the direction of emphasizing homogeneity rather than separateness. It promises that the Party will "conduct a relentless struggle against manifestations and survivals of nationalism and chauvinism of all types, against trends of national narrowmindedness and exclusiveness . . . Manifestations of national aloofness in the education and employment of workers of different nationalities in the Soviet republics are impermissible."

The task of education, as the program sees it, is to make people "Communist-minded," to fit them for both physical and mental labor, and to prepare them "for active work in various social, governmental, scientific, and cultural spheres." The program promises that compulsory secondary general and polytechnical eleven-year education will be introduced for all children of school age during the next decade, and that young people already working will be supplied with eight years of schooling if they do not already possess such an educational base. During the decade 1971-1980, "everyone is to receive a complete secondary education." Higher education and research institutions are also slated for expansion, and literature, drama, and the arts are to be given increased support and responsibility in preparing the Soviet peoples to play their role as the builders of the brave, new Communist world.

The state is destined eventually to wither away, but the Party has a different fate in store for itself. "The period of full-scale Communist construction," the program states, "is characterized by a further enhancement of the role and importance of the Communist Party as the leading and guiding force in Soviet society." The increased responsibilities which will be given to social organizations do not mean that the Party will abdicate its leadership role. Indeed, as the program makes explicitly clear, the Party will become more important than ever, since only the Party, understanding the laws of social development, is in a position to give Communist construction "an organized, planned, and scientifically based character." In order to strengthen Party ties with the masses, to promote inner-Party democracy, and to prevent an excessive concentration of power in the hands of individual officials, the principle of rotation in office will be introduced in filling Party posts. Yet the unity and solidarity of the Party are also to be preserved. The program explicitly rules out "all manifestations of factionalism," and decisions emanating from the Party leadership will presumably continue to be sacrosanct and unopposed. In political terms, the program spells a continuation and even intensification of Party dictatorship; there is not the slightest indication that the Party proposes to give up its "vanguard" role.

The new Party program must be read as music of the future with the notes still to be played. It incorporates the hopes, the aspirations, and the dreams on which Khrushchev and his group subsist. The prediction that

the Soviet Union will attain industrial supremacy within the next decade assumes that the American economy will stagnate or grow very slowly, an assumption that the future may well belie. The ambitious goals projected for the development of the Soviet economy posit an extraordinary effort on the part of the Soviet populace, which may or may not be forthcoming. Against the history of past agricultural failures in the Soviet Union, the prospect of an expansion of agricultural output on the scale projected by the Party program appears very doubtful indeed, even though the technical potential for substantial growth exists. The standard of living of the Soviet citizenry will undoubtedly improve over the next decades, but it has far to go before it can begin to catch up with the prevailing level in the West. Given the Soviet commitment to continuing heavy investments in basic industries and the possibility that the armament burden will not lessen and may even increase, the vision of plenty which the program outlines for the Soviet consumer may well prove a mirage. Should international tensions lessen and armament expenditures be substantially reduced, the prospect of more rapid improvements in the level of consumer welfare would brighten considerably. Unfortunately, the expansionist goals projected in the Party program serve to dim hopes that world tensions will decrease.

With respect to internal political organization, the Party program offers the Soviet citizen little that is new. He is promised an opportunity to participate more actively in social organizations, but he will still have to work in disciplined subordination to the Party leadership, and the opportunity of opting for other alternatives, either inside or outside the Party, will continue to be denied to him. He is told that "the Party exists for the people and it is serving the people," but what he has to look forward to is the continuation of a system under which the Party decides what is good for the people, rather than the people itself.

#### *The Succession Problem*

There are difficulties to be faced and problems to be met on which the Party program sheds little light. One of the greatest sources of strain in the Soviet political system is its failure to make adequate provision for resolving a succession crisis. In the aftermath of Lenin's death, the Party was shaken to its foundations and had to endure a prolonged internal struggle before Stalin gathered all the reins of power in his own hands. Stalin's death ignited another bitter battle for the succession, from which Khrushchev emerged victorious, but not before Beria and his closest associates were executed and such members of Stalin's inner circle as Malenkov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Bulganin were expelled from leading Party posts. In both cases, victory went to the man in command of the Party apparatus; the first secretaryship of the Central Com-

mittee proved to be the vantage point from which Stalin and Khrushchev consolidated their authority over Party and state.

Even though Khrushchev, born in 1894, gives every outward sign of retaining his vigor for many years, the actuarial tables argue that the next succession crisis cannot be too long delayed. It may be that the next round in the succession battle will be resolved more smoothly, but the two precedents point to trouble ahead. It is conceivable that Khrushchev may gradually limit his activities, retire when his energies begin to fail, and seek to transfer power to a designated heir. Even if that should be Khrushchev's design, there is no guarantee that the ambitious younger Party leaders who surround him would rest content with his choice. Dictators, however, do not readily part with their authority while they are still able to exercise it, and the more likely eventualities are that Khrushchev's death will be followed by a new scramble for supreme power and that control of the Party apparatus will again prove decisive in determining the outcome of the struggle.

While a succession issue is being resolved, an element of uncertainty is necessarily introduced in the direction of Soviet affairs. There is always the overhanging question of whether the struggle can be contained inside the confines of palace politics or whether it will find wider reverberations within and beyond the Party. Contests for supreme leadership can never be wholly separated from the policies espoused by the rival candidates. As interests differentiate themselves in Soviet society, the capacity of a successful candidate to manipulate the Soviet power structure may well hinge on his ability to articulate the aspirations of the influential elements in the Party and society. Successful leaders, even in totalitarian societies, cannot divorce themselves from the forces which are shaping the societies over which they preside.

#### *Change and Political Adjustments*

If one is prepared to take a sufficiently long view of internal Soviet history, perhaps the most important single development is the continuing transformation of the Soviet Union from a predominantly agrarian into a highly industrialized society. Industrialization has set new forces into motion. It has lifted the importance of skilled labor at the expense of unskilled or semiskilled labor. It demands widespread literacy and a command of basic technical skills in its labor force. In bureaucratic terms, it has meant a vast expansion of managerial, engineering, technical, and scientific personnel and a recognition that they constitute the spearhead of an "industrializing elite" which must be appropriately rewarded for its crucial contribution to the industrialization process. It calls for a heavy emphasis on scientific training and research, a central place for the scientist in the pantheon of society's culture heroes, and an appreciation

that the dynamic momentum of industrialization is intimately intertwined with scientific creativity and support. In Party terms, it has brought a different type of Party apparatchik to the fore in those areas of Party activity concerned with the management of the economy. For these Party functionaries, mastery of the classics of Marxism-Leninism is no longer enough; technical knowledge is required if they are adequately to perform their role of economic controllers. The armed forces too have undergone a radical transformation as the result of advancing technology. Ballistic missiles and H bombs introduce new scientific and technical dimensions into warfare, demand a fundamentally different order of skills, and pose problems of control which are as perplexingly intricate for the Soviet leadership as they are for Western statesmen.

The dominating role of science and technology in the life of the nation and the habits of thought which they breed make many of the dogmatic constraints of Marxism-Leninism appear obsolete, and they implicitly challenge the Party to accommodate its ideological heritage to a new set of expectations rooted in methods of scientific inquiry. With advancing industrialization come the first tastes of leisure and affluence, with all their distracting temptations and new delights. The austere production ethic of the early phases of the industrialization process is increasingly challenged by a consumption ethic to which concessions have to be made. The spread of elementary and higher education stirs rising aspirations and presents the regime with new problems in adapting its system of controls to these expectations and demands.

There are some who argue that totalitarian dictatorship and a highly industrialized society are fundamentally incompatible, that the necessary result of industrialization is to pluralize authority among the functional groups created by it, that the diverse interests of these groups are likely to reflect themselves in the emergence of factions within the Communist Party, that these factions are likely to transcend the bounds of the Party and to take root in Soviet society, and that the end result of this process will be the emergence of some form of constitutional order which will make room for the legal interplay of parties and groups within the framework of a socialized economic order. While such a development would be warmly welcomed by all those who believe in the superior virtues of constitutional systems, the probability that it will soon take place does not appear great.

Both the doctrines and practice of Bolshevism militate against such a trend. A Party leadership which bases its authority on the suppression of factions is hardly likely to accede to a course of development which produces splits in its ranks and loss of its monopoly of power. There is danger too in being unduly beguiled by that special variety of technological determinism which assumes that those who possess important skills in a

society inevitably transmute such skills into political power. There is no iron law which prevents dictators from presiding over the destinies of highly industrialized societies.

This does not mean that the Communist Party leadership may not find it desirable to make continuous readjustments in its methods of rule to take account of the increasing complexities of managing an industrialized society. It already insists that the Party cadres to whom it entrusts control functions must possess a degree of technological and managerial sophistication adequate to cope with their coordinating and supervisory responsibilities. Experimentation is likely to continue in the search for a proper balance between central Party controls and delegations of operational authority calculated to stimulate local initiative and to increase efficiency. The Party leadership will undoubtedly persist in putting a special premium on the complex of skills so essential to industrialization. But though it counts heavily on the contributions of its industrial elite and rewards its members accordingly, it is highly unlikely to permit them to emerge as autonomous power groups, and even tentative moves in this direction are likely to be nipped in the bud. The first law of the Party leadership is its own self-preservation; it can be expected to take the sternest measures to prevent any encroachment on its own supreme authority.

Nor need the education of the masses or the spread of higher education necessarily operate as a grave threat to Party rule. Universal literacy in some circumstances may open the door to political freedom; in the Soviet setting it is deliberately used as a powerful weapon of indoctrination in Communist values, and its political purpose is to inculcate faith and belief in the regime, rather than to generate doubts about its premises. The Soviet educational system is designed to produce scientists, engineers, and technicians who will bear comparison with the best that the West has to offer, but it also makes strenuous efforts to ensure that they will loyally serve the Communist cause. A good proportion of them are enrolled in Party ranks, and those who are not are not immune from Party pressure. Even where indoctrination is weak or ineffective, the regime disposes of a powerful armory of instruments calculated to enforce compliance with the system and to discourage deviant behavior of any sort. Careers and assignments are at the mercy of the Party, and the incentive system can be manipulated to reward the faithful and penalize the untrustworthy. In extreme cases, police sanctions may be imposed. Even if the effect of exposure to the educational process has been to plant the seeds of inquiry and to stimulate independent thought, most Soviet citizens are deterred from active opposition because the system of controls which encloses them makes the consequences of dissidence very painful indeed.

This does not mean that there are no Soviet citizens prepared to risk these consequences. New generations work their own mysteries, and the hallowed orthodoxies of one may turn out to be the discarded follies of the next. The ferment among Soviet intellectuals and students after the Twentieth Party Congress and the eagerness of many of them to explore the boundaries of the "New Freedom" provide a dramatic index of the kinds of pressures which develop when the Party loosens its bonds. The lesson was not lost on the Party leadership; it permits its intellectuals a wider field of maneuver than that enjoyed under Stalin, but it has also made clear that no derogation of its authority will be tolerated and that the inescapable obligation of the intellectual is to serve the regime. Despite these injunctions, rebels and heretics continue to make their presence felt in the Soviet literary underground, and, though a few have been hunted out and imprisoned, some manage to publish while others continue "to write for the drawer" or exchange their productions among trusted friends. Even though they fall far short of presenting any serious threat to the Party's power, they constitute a worrisome symptom of a deeper malaise.

In a profound sense, the greatest enemy of Party indoctrination is the boredom inspired by its dull uniformity and its constantly reiterated orthodoxies. Boredom expresses itself at one level in hooliganism and lawlessness, in the antics of the stilyagi with their craze for jazz and their aping of foreign ways, and in the emergence of a Soviet version of a *jeunesse dorée*, living idly at the expense of their highly placed parents, indulging in drunken orgies, and seeking a synthetic gaiety in the few night spots that Moscow and other large cities afford. At a more serious level, boredom is evident in the tendency of some students to disparage compulsory courses in Marxism-Leninism, to boycott them if they can, or to attend them simply to register their presence and fulfill an unavoidable requirement. It is displayed too in the search of writers and artists for fresh themes and new forms, in their desire to escape the well-worn grooves and rigid restrictions which the formulas of socialist realism impose. One sees the restlessness also in the almost universal desire of intellectuals to travel abroad, to satisfy their curiosity about distant places, and to taste new experiences firsthand.

The reply of the Party to these disquieting developments has been to address itself to the symptoms, rather than to those deeper causes of apathy which are endemic in this system of drab conformity. It launches campaigns against hooligans, idlers, and parasites, makes public examples of flagrant cases, and applies the full panoply of prison sentences, exile from the cities, and compulsory work assignments to reshape them into model Soviet citizens. Its answer to student restiveness is to intensify indoctrination, to couple work in industry or agriculture with study, and,

when necessary, to invoke such sanctions as expulsion from the university, unfavorable job assignments, and, in extreme cases, arrest. Its formula for writers and artists is to pamper them when they conform to Party demands and to bring pressure to bear when they show signs of defiance. It makes a bow toward satisfying the thirst to travel, though the Soviet citizens permitted to venture abroad must be approved as politically reliable and they usually set forth on their journeys in groups which are carefully observed and controlled.

Effective as these measures may prove to be in safeguarding the Party's dominant role, they still fail to come to grips with that substratum of ideological indifference which threatens to impose an internal brake on the regime's revolutionary élan and momentum. It is still much too early to speak of the Soviet Union as nearing the end of its Age of Ideology, though many careful observers of the Soviet scene believe that they can detect a substantial decline in ideological commitment as compared with the evangelical fervor and apocalyptic expectations of the early revolutionary years. Soviet communications channels, to be sure, are still filled to overflowing with agitation and propaganda denouncing the evils of capitalism and celebrating the superiority of the Soviet system. The intensive indoctrination to which Soviet citizens are exposed is formidable in scale. Yet it has peculiar by-products, which observant visitors have frequently noted. In some respects the rank-and-file Soviet citizen is the most apolitical of men. The ideological bombardment to which he is subjected may alert him to the "correct" responses to political questions and may even shape his underlying political attitudes, but it also deadens his interest in high policy because he knows that decisions are made by leaders and not by ordinary folk. The topics which dominate his conversation are not ideology and politics, but wages, food, clothing, housing, and the concrete experiences and problems of daily life. Most Soviet citizens discover somehow that life in the so-called capitalist world is not as dark as the Soviet journals paint it, and they know from their own experiences that life inside is not as bright as it is usually presented. At the same time, patriotism is deep-seated, and the regime finds its broadest base of support when it turns propaganda to this theme. For many of the rank and file, Marxism-Leninism is jargon and gibberish. They judge the regime by its performance. When the load is heavy, they grumble and endure. When the burden is lightened, they heave a sigh of relief.

In upper Soviet circles, a far higher degree of ideological sophistication prevails. There is a general recognition that a certain minimum skill in manipulating ideological symbols is essential to a successful career in Soviet society. With some it is a matter of deep commitment, and the righteous self-assurance of the true believer is something which has

to be experienced to be fully appreciated. With others it is almost a matter of pro forma faith, an acceptance of Marxism-Leninism as part of the norms of the society of which they are an integral part. With still others it may be a matter of cynical adjustment, where inner doubts are suppressed in the interest of career making.

Even in the highest Party circles, one can detect a certain impatience with ideological discussions that are divorced from production, from what has been termed "the struggle for the realization of the practical tasks of Communist construction." In his speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, Suslov quoted with approval a combine operator who said: "I have been in a Party history study circle for thirteen years. For the thirteenth time our propagandists are explaining the Bund to us. Have we nothing more important to do than to criticize the Bund? We are interested in the affairs of our MTS, of our district, of our province. We want to live in the present and the future, but our propagandists have got so bogged down in Narodnik and Bundist affairs that they cannot get beyond them."<sup>10</sup>

This pragmatic emphasis, one suspects, probably fits in well with the professional drives of the Soviet technical intelligentsia, whose real pre-occupations are administrative, managerial, and production-oriented rather than ideological. There are other developments which support such an orientation. The spread of higher education can be expected to usher in a demand for a more sophisticated and complex picture of reality than is permitted by the orthodox shibboleths of Marxism-Leninism. Indeed, within limits and in its own interest, the Party leadership has been responding to this demand in the effort to promote its production objectives.

But here a note of caution needs to be struck. It is one thing for the Party leadership to develop a more sophisticated variant of Marxism-Leninism. It is quite another to cast the whole structure overboard. Of the latter there is yet no sign, and, short of catastrophe for the Soviet leadership, there is not likely to be one. The regime is still committed to the doctrines that Communism is the wave of the future, that the Party is the true custodian of the interests of the toilers, and that it must remain dominant even after the Communist utopia is realized.

To justify its vocation and its mission, the Party needs a supporting ideology which will engage the energies and loyalties of its people. This is the real significance of the new Party program approved by the Twenty-Second Congress. It represents the climax of Khrushchev's persistent effort to recharge the Party and the nation with ideological zeal by holding out the prospect of great production and welfare gains within the Soviet Union and continuing triumphs on a world scale. Whether the Party can maintain its dynamic momentum will depend in no small part on its record of achievements at home and abroad. In this sense, dramatic space

exploits for which the Party can take credit and the establishment of new Communist outposts in the capitalist world serve to validate doctrine and raise ideological fervor. Communism on the move gives new meaning to ideology; it is loss of dynamism that puts the Party role in peril.

There are some analysts of the Soviet scene who count on the rising affluence of Soviet society to temper and moderate the revolutionary dynamism of the Party. They point out that Khrushchev's regime has made far greater concessions to the welfare needs of the population than Stalin was prepared to make, and that those who come after Khrushchev are likely to have to broaden these concessions if discontent is to be held in check. Improvements in the standard of living, the argument runs, will give Soviet society an increasingly conservative cast; the Soviet populace will acquire a vested interest in its possessions and will increasingly resist any adventurous policies which risk the total destruction of its hard-won gains. Buttressing this argument is the very real hunger of the Soviet citizenry for a respite from sacrifice, for peace, and for a taste of the luxuries which have so long been denied them.

This assumption that an aggressive and expansionist policy abroad cannot be pursued by a regime which is also taking steps to improve the lot of its own people requires close examination. Rising affluence may induce caution on the part of Soviet foreign-policy makers when the risks of extinction loom large, but it may also reinforce the confidence of the regime in its own system. The gratitude which the leadership wins by taking steps to improve the welfare of its own people does not necessarily operate as a brake on its ambitions; it may have just the opposite effect of widening the Party's field of maneuver and encouraging it to embark on adventures precisely because it thinks it can count on popular support.

The future role of the Party in Soviet society will depend heavily on the extent to which it is able to make good on its promises. If it manages to make substantial progress in realizing the goals outlined in the new Party program, and particularly if it succeeds in raising living standards appreciably, the position of the Party is likely to continue to be strong. If its performance over the years is dotted with broken promises and failures, a rising tide of disappointment and disillusionment may prepare the way for an eventual erosion of its power.

These same considerations apply, in greater or lesser degree, to the activities of the Party in the foreign field. Indeed, domestic and foreign policy are intimately interrelated, and it is their combined impact that will determine the future of the Soviet regime. Domestic successes will ease the problem of Soviet penetration beyond its own borders; domestic failures will dim the Communist appeal abroad as well as at home, though the possibility can never be excluded that the regime may turn in desperation to foreign adventures in the hope that victories abroad will resolve

frustrations at home. Foreign successes *can* compensate for domestic failures, and defeats and debacles abroad can weaken the position of the regime both inside and outside the country.

#### *Problems within the Communist Camp*

Relationships within the Communist camp have changed considerably since Stalin's time. Under Stalin, Yugoslavia was lost to the orbit, but the rest of the European satellites remained tightly controlled by Moscow and responsive to Stalin's command. Communist China constituted a special case; its economic needs and policy orientation enforced a certain dependence on Moscow, but its political leadership was independently based and outside Stalin's control.

Under Khrushchev, polycentric tendencies within the camp became more sharply evident. Efforts to woo Tito back into the fold have thus far enjoyed only partial success. The Hungarian revolt and the Polish display of independence in the fall of 1956 provided dramatic evidence of the hatred which Soviet domination had inspired. Though the Hungarian uprising was suppressed and terms of accommodation were worked out with the Poles which yielded them a considerable measure of autonomy in domestic affairs, the underlying lack of popular support which Moscow could command in these areas was strikingly demonstrated. While Poland has managed to retain a certain special position in regulating its internal life and Albania, most distant from the Soviet Union, has placed itself under Chinese rather than Russian protection, the rest of the Eastern European regimes closely follow the Soviet lead and remain dependent on Moscow for their lives.

Khrushchev's formula for holding the remaining European satellites in check is a complex mixture of many ingredients. The overhanging threat of Soviet military intervention is designed to prevent a repetition of the Hungarian rising. Stalin's policy of exploiting the satellite economies in the interest of the Soviet Union has been substantially abandoned, and indeed, in a number of instances, Soviet aid has been extended to shore up shaky regimes. The effort to build unity on a basis more solid than brute force alone has taken the form of seeking to integrate the economies of the satellites with each other and with the Soviet Union, establishing a joint military command, stressing common interests in foreign policy, cultivating ideological and cultural ties, and permitting the satellite Parties to accommodate their patterns of rule to the diversities of the local scene.

Despite these efforts, it appears extremely doubtful that the deeply rooted national loyalties of the mass of people in Eastern Europe will readily be transferred to the Soviet cause. Where fairly strong indigenous Communist parties existed prior to the Soviet takeover, as in Czechoslo-

vakia and Bulgaria, the task may be somewhat less difficult, but even in these countries national feelings run strong. The combination of Soviet military power and the control exercised by local Communist cadres appears sufficiently formidable now to prevent the secession of the remaining European satellites from the Communist camp. But underlying yearnings for freedom and independence persist, and they may yet rise to plague the Soviet leadership if circumstances develop which allow their effective expression. Any developments which serve to weaken the Soviet control system and to discourage direct Soviet military intervention in the satellite areas would operate to give these forces freer play.

Relations with Communist China present the Soviet Union with a different array of problems. At the present time, the Soviet Union and Communist China are both uneasy partners and active competitors — partners in the sense that they both share a common interest in weakening and eliminating their imperialist antagonists; competitors in that they find themselves divided by profound conflicts on appropriate tactics and by rival ambitions to assert authority and establish spheres of influence in the Communist camp. At the root of these disagreements are the very great discrepancies in the developmental levels of the two nations and the very different conceptions of the priorities which the needs of revolutionary advance impose. The Soviet Union has reached a relatively high stage of industrialization; it believes that its experience has general validity for the entire Communist movement; and it is not ready to sacrifice its own prospects for further rapid development to the task of bringing the Chinese economy up to the level of its own. The Soviet leadership, moreover, has a vested interest in preserving its hard-won gains, and it links the future triumph of Communism with its own power and with the magnetic attraction of its example. While it is prepared to take risks to speed victory, it seeks to avoid a thermonuclear Armageddon which would destroy everything that it has so painfully achieved since 1917.

Communist China, on the other hand, is still an industrially backward country with acute economic problems. Its ambitious industrialization program has been slowed down by severe internal strains and the relatively limited economic aid which has been forthcoming from the other members of the Communist camp. Its efforts to raise the output of its primitive agricultural sector by imposing the discipline of the communes on the countryside have been obstructed by a combination of natural disasters, the pressures of a burgeoning population, and the passive resistance of the peasantry itself. Modifications have been made in the commune system to mollify discontent and industrialization goals have been trimmed to take account of realities, but the frustration thus engendered has only served to accentuate the sense of urgency which impels the Chinese Party leadership toward external adventure. As the Chinese see

it, the balance of military power now lies with the Communist camp, and they would like to see it used to achieve rapid political gains. In their eyes, the task of revolutionaries is to make revolutions, and they criticize the Russians for their failure to pursue more aggressive tactics. They profoundly distrust the Khrushchevian view that the road to Communism lies through propaganda for peace and disarmament, or temporary cooperation with bourgeois nationalist regimes, or any other tactics which run the danger of diverting revolutionary energies from the direct realization of revolutionary aims.

In recent years signs of these differences in outlook have become openly visible and are reflected in a marked cooling of relations between the two Communist giants. If the Chinese leadership vigorously presses its drive to gain hegemony over the Asian Communist parties and to extend its influence elsewhere, the struggle for control of the world Communist movement is bound to provoke deepening bitterness on both sides. Whether the friction already evident will intensify depends on how Mao and Khrushchev strike a balance between mutual need and intransigent determination not to compromise. As long as there are powerful common enemies that stand in the way of the realization of both Communist Chinese and Soviet ambitions, a complete break does not appear to be very likely. If one takes into account Communist China's economic difficulties, her need for Moscow's support in advancing her objectives, and the palpable short-run advantages to both sides in coordinating their efforts, logic would appear to dictate an effort to impose limits on the dispute. But that reason will prevail is no more certain in the Communist world than it is anywhere else.

The prospect that the Soviet Union and Communist China can permanently compose their differences does not appear bright. Should China eventually succeed in its drive to industrialize and build economic and military strength, its capacity to challenge Soviet leadership of the bloc will be sharply reinforced. The pressure to find *Lebensraum* for China's population dictates expansion, and, while the line of least resistance is likely to be to the south, it would not be surprising if Chinese ambitions ultimately turned to the north. In their present relatively weak position, the Chinese have already thrown down the gauntlet to Moscow; as their power grows, they can be expected to intensify the challenge. Over time, the relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union are likely to become increasingly troublesome; should China spurt ahead to become a leading military and industrial power, it is not inconceivable that the day may yet come when the Soviet Union will help forge a Grand Alliance to contain China's outward thrust.

For the time being, the effect of the Sino-Soviet dispute is to undermine the political and ideological unity of the Communist camp. The

world Communist movement can no longer be viewed as a monolith subject to Soviet direction and control. The emergence of two centers of power in Moscow and Peiping, with Tito representing still another magnetic pole of attraction on the fringes, makes for a much more complex equation in which the loyalties of Communist believers are exposed to great strain. The absence of agreement on basic strategy and tactics poses a fundamental challenge to the universal pretensions of Communist ideology. The reverberations are likely to be reflected in a reinforcement of polycentric tendencies and a diffusion of authority within the Communist camp.

There remains the question of how the Soviet Union will regulate its relations with the West and the rest of the non-Communist world. It is an article of faith among Soviet ideologues that economic crises in the West, the rivalries of the so-called imperialist states, the disintegration of the colonial system, and the superior production potentiality of their planned economy will ultimately lead to the collapse of capitalism and the triumph of Communism. In an interview with Adlai Stevenson, Khrushchev put it this way: "You must understand, Mr. Stevenson, that we are living in an epoch when one system is giving way to another . . . a process is taking place in which the peoples want to live under a new system of society; and it is necessary that one agree and reconcile oneself to the fact. The process should take place without interference."<sup>11</sup> Peaceful coexistence, as Khrushchev envisages it, is a prescription for non-Communist nations to abandon themselves to Communism without offering armed resistance. But what if the leaders of non-Communist nations remain stubborn and recalcitrant, refusing to conspire in their own self-destruction? In such cases, the new Party program informs us, "the possibility of a nonpeaceful transition to socialism should be borne in mind."

Fortunately for the non-Communist nations, the alternatives with which the Communist leadership confronts them do not exhaust their choices. The laws of history are made by men acting to shape the future, and there is no inexorable ordinance dictating a Communist triumph. If the non-Communist nations can hold out a vista of expanding productivity, welfare, and freedom to their peoples, they need fear no Communist threat within, and, by pooling their strength and resources, they may reasonably expect to ward off any threat from without. No one can be certain that the collision between Communist and non-Communist nations will not end in war. But it would be an act of total despair to assume that war is inevitable. Communists and non-Communists disagree fundamentally on many issues, but they share a common interest in the survival of the human race. In an era when each side has the capacity to annihilate the other, we can only hope that the danger of coextinction will serve as a restraint on both.



## ***APPENDIX***

### ***Khrushchevism in Retrospect***

To understand Khrushchevism, one must begin with Khrushchev the man, with what he was like in his days of power. Shrewd, earthy, endowed with boundless energy, a bouncing confidence, and a quick, if coarse, wit, he was the very epitome of the self-made man in any society. Like most self-made men, he believed profoundly that the social order which nurtured him and conferred its highest honors on him was a society whose virtues could not be impugned. When Spyros Skouras, the movie magnate, during a Hollywood luncheon for Khrushchev, cited his own rise from rags to riches as a symbol of the opportunities that America holds out for the lowly, Khrushchev replied: "Mr. Skouras said he had risen from the ranks. . . . Would you like to know what I was? I began working when I learned to walk. Till the age of 15 I tended calves, then sheep, and then the landlord's cows. I did all that before I was 15. Then I worked at a factory owned by Germans and later in coalpits owned by Frenchmen. I worked at the Belgian-owned chemical plants, and now I am Prime Minister of the great Soviet State."\*

In the course of his lifetime, Khrushchev saw Russia transformed from a relatively backward country into one of the world's leading industrial and military powers, and he was understandably proud of this rapid progress and his own role in it. He gave every evidence of believing that the Soviet Union not only embodies the most progressive and just social structure that mankind has attained, but that it is also blazing a trail into the future that people everywhere will enthusiastically follow. "I am convinced more than ever," he told reporters toward the end of his American

*Note.* This appendix appeared in *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1965.

\* *Let Us Live in Peace and Friendship—The Visit of N. S. Khrushchev to the U. S. A.* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959), pp. 191-92.

trip, "that the holiest of holies, the best that man can create, is socialist society, the Communist system."\*

Nor can such remarks be dismissed as mere propaganda—the public pronouncements which a Soviet leader is duty-bound to make, and which do not necessarily mirror his fundamental outlook. Difficult as it is to be certain that one has ever penetrated the inner recesses of a man's character, the self-portrait that emerges from Khrushchev's countless impromptu remarks is fairly clear: he saw himself as a man of faith, believing that communism provides a key to the world's problems. He was a propagandist in every fiber of his being, but propaganda in his case was inseparable from his deepest convictions. In a characteristic speech to the Fifth World Congress of Trade Unions in 1961, he observed: "It may be said that Khrushchev is again handing out propaganda. If you think so, you are not mistaken. Yes, I was, am, and always shall be a propagandist. As long as the heart continues beating in my breast, I shall propagate the ideas of Marxism-Leninism, the ideas of Communist construction!"†

### *The School of Stalinism*

A man of limited formal education, he found his teacher in the Communist Party. The party provided him with a view of the world that confirmed his own experience, and its simple tenets were endlessly reiterated in his speeches: Capitalism is a system of exploitation whose days are numbered; communism represents the wave of the future because it is a superior social and economic system that frees the masses from exploitation and promotes the well-being and happiness of all mankind; the Communist Party, which led the working class of old Russia to victory, provides a pattern of organization and leadership which can alone guarantee the triumph of communism on a world scale. For Khrushchev these propositions were sacred and unassailable.

As one of Stalin's lieutenants, he was chained to a jealous master who demanded unquestioning obedience and obsequiousness from all who served him. The evidence now at hand makes clear that Khrushchev chafed under the restrictions, but at the time no one could match him in fulsome tributes to his mentor, and no one was more zealous in defending Stalin's course. The purges that meant catastrophe for countless of Khrushchev's colleagues spelled opportunity for him. With every turn of the wheel, his fortunes prospered; on those rare occasions when he suffered a temporary setback, he demonstrated a remarkable resilience in bouncing back. Khrushchev obviously possessed the qualities of toughness and ruthlessness that were required to maneuver one's way to a top

\* *Ibid.*, p. 338.

† N. S. Khrushchev, *Communism—Peace and Happiness for the Peoples* (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1963), II, 365.

place in Stalin's entourage. Trained in the Stalin school of falsification, he demonstrated an impressive capacity to meet the expectations of his master.

Against the background of the Stalinist years, it is tempting to dismiss Khrushchev as a cynical manipulator for whom ideology had at best an instrumental significance. It is a temptation that should be resisted. The evil that men do in order to survive and gather power may corrupt the ends they serve, but it does not necessarily lessen the need for a justifying vision. Indeed, in some cases it may intensify it. For Khrushchev the justification was found in Stalin's construction program, in building the greatness of Soviet power and helping to lay the foundations for Communist victory at home and abroad.

His administrative assignments under Stalin were largely confined to the party apparatus. Although Stalin heaped increasingly heavy responsibilities on him, they remained party-centered. His were the typical practical concerns of the party apparatchik, prodding and driving his subordinates to meet the ambitious targets of the Five-Year Plans. Already under Stalin he was the agitator par excellence, not content to direct proceedings from a remote office, but enjoying face-to-face contacts, constantly roaming his domain and making frequent appearances at the construction sites and collective farms over which he exercised supervision.

His experience until Stalin's death was narrowly provincial. His secretarial duties within the party provided no opportunities for foreign travel and little in the way of foreign contacts. The world outside the Soviet Union was *terra incognita*, to be comprehended largely in terms of Marxist-Leninist categories. His first direct view of the West did not come until he had passed his sixtieth birthday; it would have been remarkable indeed had he been able to free himself of the stereotypes he brought to that exposure.

Yet there were elements in Khrushchev's character that were responsive to fresh experience. He had a pragmatic bent for testing ideas by their workability. An avid learner in practical affairs and a man of wide-ranging technical curiosity, he was quite prepared to borrow techniques from the West when he thought they could advance his own purposes. Nor were his travels abroad without influence on his assessment of Western developments. "I have seen the slaves of capitalism—and they live well!" Khrushchev declared while visiting the farm of Rosswell Garst in Iowa in September 1959.\* The significance of this spontaneous tribute was not diminished by the fact that it went unreported in the Soviet press.

At the same time, his awareness of the superiority of Western living standards was matched by a conviction that capitalism is a dying system

\* Quoted in Thomas P. Whitney, *Khrushchev Speaks* (Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1968), p. 5.

and that the Soviet Union would soon outstrip America in both productivity and welfare. Running through many of Khrushchev's speeches is a curious defensiveness, an extraordinary sensitivity to outside criticism of Soviet weaknesses, which is overcompensated by a boastful pride in Soviet achievements. Plans for the future tend to be presented as if they were actualities, and demagogic promises mask very real problems. But beneath the rhetoric, one could also detect a growing conviction that the Soviet system would be judged by its results, and that the competition with capitalism could not be won by words alone. "Now I ask you," he said in one of his more homely moods, "would it be bad if we spread our Marxist-Leninist teachings with a piece of butter? I say that with a good bread spread like that, Marxism-Leninism would be even more tasty. And with good housing, with a better and more abundant life, with good schools, we will win all the peoples for socialism and communism."\*

### *Choices and Imperatives*

To understand Khrushchevism as it took shape after Stalin's death, one must begin with the man; but one must also understand the situation in which he found himself and the necessities to which he was compelled to adapt. Stalin's legacy to his successors was replete with problems. His impressive achievements in forcing the pace of Soviet industrialization, in building military power, and in expanding his domain into Eastern and Central Europe were all purchased at a heavy price. Soviet agriculture remained backward and stagnant, and the food available to Soviet consumers was monotonous, scarce, and high-priced. Stalin's obsession with the development of heavy industry meant that light industry was ignored and underdeveloped, and shortages of consumer goods and housing were acute and widespread. The system of terror on which Stalin relied to protect his own security and to enforce his regime of deprivation and sacrifice had its debilitating effects. It bred a cowed and submissive populace for whom the regime was "they" and not "we." Frightened bureaucrats shrank from exercising initiative; there was a frozen and congealed quality about Soviet life that tended to rob it of all dynamism and revolutionary appeal. The East European satellites formed an extension of the Soviet prison-house. Yugoslavia, to be sure, had broken away amid the curses of the Cominform; and in the East, Communist China presented a special case with its own independent power base. For the rest, the Communist bloc was managed by puppets utterly dependent on Stalin. The Soviet empire was, in effect, sealed off from the West, and as a result of the Korean War the Soviet Union and the United States were involved in a spiraling arms race that threatened the world with a nuclear holocaust.

\* *Ibid.*, p. 4.

This was the situation that confronted Stalin's successors. As Communists, the choices open to them were not infinite. They could not be expected to preside over the liquidation of Stalin's empire. As party leaders, they might seek other means than Stalin's to promote Communist objectives; but they shared with him not merely a common experience but also a common commitment. What they now also shared with one another was a responsibility they could not escape: they had to make their own decisions.

The tone set by the new leadership in the months after Stalin's death was one of relaxation of tension at home and abroad. Amnesties, price cuts, and promises of more consumer goods and housing augured a new disposition to seek popular support. The ending of the Korean War contributed toward an easing of relations with the West. So far as we know, Khrushchev participated in and approved of these actions, as he no doubt also ratified the decision to suppress the East German rising in June 1953 and joined in the purge of Beria soon afterward.

At the September 1953 session of the Central Committee, he was elected First Secretary. His report to the Central Committee on the agricultural situation, which was delivered on September 3, represented his first important independent pronouncement in the post-Stalin period. It contained a blunt and even sensational acknowledgment of the seriousness of the agricultural crisis that the new leadership had inherited from Stalin. Although many of the reforms that Khrushchev advocated had been foreshadowed by earlier Malenkov proposals approved by the Supreme Soviet in August, there was a quality of frankness in Khrushchev's speech that was novel. In essence, he argued that Soviet agricultural productivity could not be raised unless additional incentives were offered to the collective farmers. His propensity for bold and daring ventures became more clearly manifest in early 1954, when he obtained the approval of the Central Committee for his virgin-lands program. Undeterred by the obstacles to its success, he pressed ahead and gambled his political future on harvests that might not materialize. Fortune favored him in the early years.

As his power and prestige mounted, the range of his interest broadened, and he began to place his own personal stamp on foreign as well as domestic policy. The Khrushchevian style was characterized by boldness as well as opportunism; above all, it was marked by a willingness to experiment and to strike out in new directions without necessarily calculating or anticipating costs and consequences. Khrushchev's most dramatic initiatives during this period were reserved for the field of foreign affairs. Of these, perhaps the most impressive were his efforts to woo Tito back into the Soviet bloc and to strengthen Soviet influence among the new nations of Asia and Africa.

*The Watershed*

While the new dynamism thus introduced into Soviet foreign policy reflected the Khrushchevian touch, it remained for the Twentieth Party Congress, held in February 1956, to define the content of what has since come to be described as Khrushchevism. The high spot of the Congress was the "secret speech" in which Khrushchev combined a wide-ranging condemnation of Stalin's methods of rule with sensational disclosures of his terrorist crimes. What inspired Khrushchev to open this Pandora's box is still open to debate and may long remain so. Khrushchev himself defended the speech as a necessary surgical operation to restore the health of the party. In repudiating Stalin's terrorist practices, he in effect offered his personal guaranty that he would not repeat them. More positively, he held out a vision of a Soviet society in which citizens could breathe more freely, officialdom could exercise initiative without fearing the consequences, the bond between party and people would be strengthened, and the authority of the regime would be built on the rational foundations of regularized procedures, concern with popular welfare, and confidence rather than fear.

The de-Stalinization campaign, the restatement of the theory of peaceful coexistence, and other innovations launched by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress were intended both to broaden the appeal of the Communist movement and to strengthen Khrushchev's own position within it. In the end, they came close to destroying Khrushchev, and they released divisive forces within the Communist world that have not yet run their full course. Within the Soviet Union, the ferment stirred up by Khrushchev's "secret speech" infected wide circles of the intelligentsia and student youth, inspiring a protest literature that went beyond denunciations of Stalin to criticism of the Soviet system itself. Within the bloc, the disarray assumed proportions serious enough to threaten the Soviet hold over Eastern Europe.

The gathering unrest came to a climax in October 1956. The bloody repression of the revolt in Hungary and the reimposition of cultural curbs within the Soviet Union in reaction to the revolt served to tarnish the image of Khrushchev as the great liberalizer. In the aftermath of Hungary, Khrushchev's prestige declined sharply. His handling of Hungarian events contributed to an exacerbation of relations with Tito. The Chinese party leadership gave him public support, but as subsequent disclosures have made clear, they were privately highly critical of his de-Stalinization campaign, of his ideological initiatives, and above all of his failure to consult with them. Within the Soviet party itself, his Presidium opponents began to organize a cabal to unseat him, and by dint of the additional support they gathered in opposition to his industrial reorganization

plans, they were able, by May 1957, to mobilize a seven-to-four majority against him and to confront him with a demand for his resignation.

It is a measure both of the power concentrated in the office of the First Secretary and of Khrushchev's capacity to turn adverse developments to his own advantage that he was able to triumph even in these circumstances. By transferring the arena of the struggle to the Central Committee, where his followers were strongly installed, he turned the tables on his opponents and emerged from the encounter stronger than ever. In October of the same year he further consolidated his position by ousting his erstwhile supporter, Marshal Zhukov, from the Presidium and moving quickly to bring the armed forces under firm party control.

At this stage of Khrushchev's career, fortune seemed to be smiling on him. He had rid himself of his Presidium opponents, and his position as party leader appeared to be unassailable. He had surmounted the crisis in Eastern Europe, and while restiveness was still evident, there were no threats of armed uprisings. The ferment among Soviet youth and intellectuals gave every outward appearance of having subsided; in any case, it presented no organized challenge to the regime's power.

Most important of all, the world was now treated to a startling demonstration of Soviet accomplishments in rocketry. In the excitement that attended the launching of Sputnik I on October 4, 1957, the simultaneous dismissal of Marshal Zhukov was all but forgotten. The Soviet space exploits had obvious military implications, and Khrushchev was not slow to point out that they marked a significant shift in the balance of power. He quickly initiated a major drive to translate Soviet rocket superiority into diplomatic gains. In a militant speech to a Polish-Soviet Friendship Meeting in Moscow on November 10, 1958, he ignited the Berlin crisis with a demand for the liquidation of the occupation regime in West Berlin. This time, Khrushchev overreached himself. The decision of the Western powers to stand firm exposed the emptiness of his ultimatums, bluster, and threats.

#### *New Alternatives*

It is worth pausing at this point to sketch out the problems and choices that Khrushchev faced. Despite undoubtedly industrial progress and dramatic space achievements, there were limits to the pressure that Moscow could apply on the West. The United States was still a formidable thermonuclear power with larger resources than the Soviet Union, and any confrontation that imperiled vital American interests raised the danger of a thermonuclear war, with potentially disastrous consequences for both sides. As long as relations between the United States and the Soviet Union remained tense and difficult, the stage was set for the continuation of an expensive arms race that diverted resources from domestic develop-

ment and spelled persisting hardships for the Soviet people. An easing of relations with the United States, by contrast, opened up tempting perspectives of more rapid improvement in the Soviet standard of living and accelerated economic development.

A real détente with the West, however, could only be achieved at the price of accepting the status quo in world affairs and foregoing opportunities for revolutionary advance, at least for a defined period. However expedient such a course of action might appear from the Soviet point of view, it held out dangers for Soviet relations with its allies in the world Communist movement. It subordinated their interests to those of the Soviet Union. It implied, for example, that Communist China would not be able to count on Soviet assistance in pressing its campaign to regain Taiwan, and that Chinese expansionist ambitions elsewhere would have to be curbed to serve Soviet national needs. It meant that Khrushchev might be forced to impose brakes on the revolutionary enthusiasm of Communist parties anxious to come to power, and might thus be maneuvered into a position where he could be accused of betraying the revolutionary cause.

It is unlikely that these sharply defined alternatives were either recognized or accepted by Khrushchev. Like leaders elsewhere who face multiple pressures and impulses, he sought to escape hard choices and found himself responding to events and pursuing policies with contradictory implications. Thus, Khrushchev's professed, and probably real, desire to achieve a relaxation of tension with the United States which would enable him to concentrate greater resources on internal development was periodically negated by actions that placed a strain on the Soviet-American relationship. The Berlin ultimatums and the building of the wall between East and West Berlin, the Congo adventure, and the Cuban missile crisis were symptomatic of an unresolved dilemma in an area where doctrinal commitments and considerations of *Realpolitik* clashed.

Equally difficult problems and choices confronted Khrushchev in working out his relations with his main ally in the Communist bloc. The alternative of responding to Chinese demands for increased militancy opened up serious risks. In the underdeveloped areas, it meant breaking the links that Soviet foreign policy had so carefully forged with the neutralist leaders of the new nations. In relations with the West, it meant risking a sharp increase in the danger of nuclear war and intensifying the arms race. In domestic terms, it meant slowing down the Soviet rate of economic growth and negating Khrushchev's vision of a welfare communism which would magnify the Soviet appeal both at home and abroad.

Faced with these alternatives, Khrushchev chose to stand firm on the policy lines to which he was committed. Indeed, as the bitterness and

virulence of the Sino-Soviet dispute mounted and prospects of reconciliation faded, the positions of both sides hardened. In the wake of the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, with its sobering reminder of how close the world had come to thermonuclear extinction, Khrushchev demonstrated a renewed eagerness to improve his relations with the United States and the West. He turned his back on Communist China to sign a nuclear test-ban treaty with the United States and Britain, joined in establishing the so-called "hot line" between Washington and Moscow, undertook in cooperation with the United States to ban missiles in orbit and to cut back the production of fissionable material, negotiated a consular convention with the United States as well as a number of agreements on cultural exchanges, pressed restraint on Castro, and relaxed tension over Berlin. All these efforts to "normalize" relations with the West were greeted by Peking as additional confirmation of Khrushchev's apostasy from true Marxism-Leninism. They served to deepen a split that was rapidly becoming unbridgeable.

Khrushchev's decision to seize the "peace issue" even at the cost of further alienating Peking was not without its positive advantages. To the extent that Khrushchev could make good his indictment of the Chinese leaders as "madmen" and "adventurers" who were prepared to risk world destruction in order to realize their ambitions, he could count on widespread support not only in the Soviet Union but among all people, Communist as well as non-Communist, who feared nuclear war.

#### *Difficulties on the Home Front*

Perhaps the most compelling reasons for Khrushchev to seek a détente with the West had their origins in domestic strains and difficulties. The decision of the post-Stalinist leadership to provide more food, consumer goods, and housing whetted the appetite of the Soviet populace, but did not satisfy it. The widespread yearning of Soviet consumers for a rapid improvement in their standard of living, an aspiration that Khrushchev intensified by his promises of plenty, could not be met without a diversion of investment from armaments and heavy industry to light industry and agriculture. The situation in agriculture was particularly troublesome. The banner harvest of 1958, which was largely attributable to uniformly favorable weather, was followed by a series of mediocre harvests. Disaster struck in 1963, when bad weather and widespread drought sharply curtailed output and compelled the purchase abroad of approximately 12 million tons of grain to meet minimal consumer needs.

While the causes of the decline in agricultural output were many, the most important among them was probably the failure to allocate adequate capital for the land. In a belated effort to face up to the problem, Khrushchev launched a large-scale program for the expansion of the chemical industry, the building and importation of many new fertilizer

plants, the increased output of agricultural machinery, the construction of irrigation facilities, and other measures that required substantial new capital input. With resources already overstrained, the reallocation of the limited capital available meant cuts in such branches of heavy industry as iron and steel, as well as reduced investments in other sectors, including the military.

Nor were Krushchev's problems limited to agriculture. While the Soviet rate of industrial growth remained high, official statistics made clear that it was declining, despite desperate measures to maintain and increase it. This drop and the sharp fall in agricultural output combined to produce a dramatic decline in the overall 1962-63 rate of growth, a development that hardly tended to enhance Khrushchev's prestige, even though a recovery in agriculture from the 1963 low point appeared highly likely.

The difficulties on the domestic front engaged a large share of Khrushchev's attention and offered no temptations for foreign adventure. While there were few clear indications at the time that his position as leader of the party and government was in peril, the image of success and assertiveness that he had previously radiated appeared tarnished. The promises of rapid improvement in living standards that he had made to his own people were belied by food shortages and an apparent inability to master the agricultural problem. The enthusiasm and initiative he had hoped to evoke by his de-Stalinization measures and his efforts to revitalize the party were strangely absent. Instead, the prevailing mood was one of uncertainty, shaken confidence, and lack of a sense of direction. The dynamism that Khrushchev had initially generated showed signs of slackening. Established routines and traditional attachments resisted dislodgement. The continuing debate on allocation policy that was cautiously aired in Soviet journals revealed the usual rivalry of bureaucratic vested interests, each seeking to defend its special position. Despite Khrushchev's efforts to resolve intractable economic problems by periodic reorganization of the state and party machinery and despite his calls for innovation and sacrifice, the Soviet Union was beginning to display many of the signs of a mature and immobile society not easily moved from the grooves into which it was settling.

#### *The Unfilled Balance Sheet*

It is still too early to attempt more than a provisional assessment of Khrushchevism. The announcement in the Soviet press on October 16, 1964, that the Central Committee of the party had met two days earlier and "granted" Khrushchev's request that "he be released" from his responsibilities "in view of his advanced age and deterioration in the state of his health" obviously could not be taken at face value. The first indictment of Khrushchev, which appeared in *Pravda* on October 17, 1964,

listed among his "sins"—without using his name—"harebrained schemes; half-baked conclusions and hasty decisions and actions, divorced from reality; bragging and bluster; attraction to rule by fiat; unwillingness to take into account what science and practical experience have already discovered."

During the ensuing weeks, Khrushchev's successors poured specific content into these general charges. Public polemics with Peking ceased. Khrushchev's drastic reorganization of the party and governmental structure into parallel industrial and agricultural hierarchies was cancelled. A campaign was initiated to free Soviet agricultural research of Ly-senko's baneful influence. The new leaders announced the removal of "unwarranted limitations" on the size of private plots and private livestock holdings. In industry the way was opened for reforms in the incentive system designed to provide increased rewards for managerial efficiency in the use of resources.

The direction of these reforms pointed up the sources of dissatisfaction with Khrushchev's performance. Yet it would be less than fair to rest an appraisal of the Khrushchev era on the latter-day criticisms voiced by his successors. What can be said is that Khrushchev's record at home was not without its achievements, though it was far from a series of unbroken successes. The apogee of his prestige was reached with the space triumphs for which his regime took credit, but the drain on domestic resources which those triumphs entailed and his inability to translate them into concrete foreign policy gains created their own complex of problems. Under his aegis, the Soviet Union continued for a time to make rapid industrial progress and to narrow the gap separating it from the United States, but there were also disturbing indications toward the end of his reign that the industrial growth rate was slowing and that planning and managerial problems were becoming increasingly complex and difficult. Agriculture, with which Khrushchev was most closely identified, was also the area in which least progress was registered.

On the other hand, a reduction in working hours, larger social security benefits, and the increased availability of consumer goods and housing gave some content to Khrushchev's blueprint of welfare communism. Gratefully welcomed by the beneficiaries, these gains still fell far short of need and only sharpened the demand for more. Khrushchev's de-Stalinization program evoked widespread popular support, but it, too, posed its problems, of which one of the most delicate was Khrushchev's own involvement in Stalin's crimes. The flood of disillusionment, criticism, and airing of grievances that de-Stalinization released threatened for a time to pass out of control. Though Khrushchev managed to contain its domestic manifestations, the restrictions that he imposed on creative freedom and the repressive measures he invoked to enforce them alienated

some of the most talented voices in the younger generation and left a residue of smoldering resentment which he was powerless to stamp out. In domestic affairs Khrushchev suffered the fate of many essentially conservative transitional figures who undertake to build a bridge from the old to the new. As the limits within which he was prepared to tolerate change became apparent, his reputation as an innovator dimmed. His early accomplishments and bold initiatives tended to be taken for granted and forgotten, while he found himself increasingly measured by the expectations he had aroused and failed to fulfill.

#### *Lessons in Failure*

Khrushchev's record was least impressive in the foreign policy field. Whereas Stalin could point to a vast expansion of the Communist empire in Europe and Asia, achieved in a period when the Soviet Union was in a much weaker position vis-à-vis the United States, Khrushchev, with much greater power at his command, was unable to register any large-scale gains. The accessions of North Vietnam and Cuba to the Communist camp were not insignificant victories, but taken together they hardly began to match Stalin's triumphs. In Europe Khrushchev was unable to break out of the stalemate inherited from Stalin; his unsuccessful efforts to dislodge the Western powers from West Berlin by threats and ultimatums that had to be withdrawn represented a major loss of face. The rebuff he received during the Cuban missile crisis further tarnished the myth of Soviet invincibility and revealed Khrushchev as an adventurer whose bluff could be called by a willingness to stand firm.

Fortunately for the world, Khrushchev's determination to test the resolution of his antagonists was combined with a vivid appreciation of the dangers of thermonuclear warfare. In contrast to Stalin, Khrushchev operated under a compelling necessity to adjust the strategy and tactics of Soviet foreign policy to the realities of the thermonuclear age. These realities not only brought to the fore the common interest that he shared with Western leaders in avoiding mutual destruction; they also impelled him to seek ways of advancing the Communist cause that would minimize the risks of igniting a holocaust. Khrushchevian policies in the underdeveloped world fitted into this pattern. Trade, military and economic aid, technical assistance, and cultural penetration were the prime levers by which the Soviet Union sought to heighten its influence in these areas. In the interest of cementing relations with the nationalist leaders of these states, Khrushchev discouraged premature revolutionary bids for power by local Communists. From the point of view of the latter, anxious to strike out for power, Khrushchevism was all brakes and no forward charge. However valid Khrushchev's long-term prognosis for the underdeveloped world may turn out to be, it was ill-suited to a mood of

revolutionary impatience, and it only provided fuel for the Chinese charge that Khruschevism represented a betrayal of the cause of world revolution.

Whatever Khrushchev's claims to greatness, his contributions to the unity of world communism are not likely to be listed among them. In the eyes of his Chinese antagonists and their allies in the international Communist movement, Khrushchevism became a term of contempt, the symbol of a peculiarly degenerate form of revisionism that sacrifices the revolutionary élan of Leninism to serve the bourgeoisified interests of a chauvinist great power masquerading as a Communist state. His most poignant legacies to his successors may well be the recognition that a common ideological heritage provides no guaranty of political unity among Communist powers, and that imperial conflict is no monopoly of the capitalist world. It should, perhaps, come as no great surprise that so powerful a force as nationalism should reappear in a Communist guise, but for those who have taken professions of brotherhood among Communist nations at face value, it has nevertheless come as a profound shock.

That Khrushchev should have contributed to the disintegration of the Communist world empire is a phenomenon that invites explanation. But it would be superficial to attribute the development solely to Khrushchev's personal idiosyncracies. However much clashes of personality may have served to exacerbate relations between Khrushchev and Mao, the causes of their differences were more deep-seated, with roots in the very different array of domestic and foreign problems to which they felt impelled to respond. When a Communist regime sinks its roots in national soil, its perception of its needs cannot avoid being colored by the environment in which it functions and by the pressures under which it operates.

Insofar as Khrushchevism was something more than Khrushchev, it must be seen as an ideological expression of the stage of development in which the Soviet Union found itself. After decades of deprivation and sacrifice under Stalin, the regime came under strong pressure to raise the living standards of its own people and was understandably reluctant to make further sacrifices to lift the level of poorer Communist countries up to its own. A relatively advanced industrial power with a vested interest in preserving its hard-won gains, the Soviet Union was not prepared to support a reckless and adventurous revolutionary strategy that would pose unacceptable risks of thermonuclear extinction. As the historic leader and most powerful nation in the Communist camp, it was anything but eager to build up rivals who would challenge its mandate to direct Communist tactics everywhere. As a residuary legatee of Russian national interests, it tended to see China as a threat, in national as well as

in Communist terms. In all these senses, Khruschevism served to articulate the conservative interests of a mature Communist power with a relatively high stake in the preservation of the status quo.

If Khrushchevism bred its polar opposite in Maoism, both unwittingly conspired to create a situation in which even such a previously abject Soviet satellite as Rumania was emboldened to proclaim its economic independence and every Communist regime or party is now tempted to place its own interests in the forefront whenever and wherever it can. The confrontation of Khrushchevism and Maoism became more than a contest for world Communist leadership; it set the stage for the emergence of Communist forces that sought to escape the discipline of both. The ultimate irony of Khrushchevism was the belated discovery that a Communist world empire could not be built on Soviet interests alone.

*List of Readings, Notes, Index*

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- Zagoria, Donald S. *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956-1961*. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1962.

Attention is also called to the following journals which contain useful materials on current Soviet affairs:

*Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (weekly). New York.

*Survey—A Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* (bimonthly). London.

*Problems of Communism* (bimonthly). Washington.

*American Slavic and East European Review*, now named *Slavic Review* (quarterly). Seattle.

*Soviet Studies* (quarterly). Glasgow.

*The Russian Review* (quarterly). Hanover, New Hampshire.



# NOTES

## Abbreviations Used in Notes

<i>History of the CPSU</i>	<i>History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) Short Course</i> (New York, International Publishers, 1939)
<i>The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow</i>	Reports and Speeches at the Eighteenth Party Congress (Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1939)
Lenin, CW	V. I. Lenin, <i>Collected Works</i> (London, Martin Lawrence, 1929)
Lenin, <i>Sochineniya</i>	V. I. Lenin, <i>Sochineniya</i> (Works; 30 vols., 3rd ed., Moscow, 1935)
<i>Outline History of the CPSU</i>	N. Popov, <i>Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union</i> (New York, International Publishers, 1934)
<i>Protokoly Tsentrального Комитета РСДРП, Август 1917—Февраль 1918</i>	<i>Protokoly Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RSDRP, Avgust 1917—Fevral' 1918</i> (Protocols of the Central Committee of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, August 1917 — February 1918; Moscow-Leningrad, 1929)
<i>Socialism Victorious</i>	A collection of the most important reports and speeches at the Seventeenth Party Congress (New York, International Publishers, n.d.)
Stalin, <i>Mastering Bolshevism</i>	Joseph Stalin, <i>Mastering Bolshevism</i> (New York, Workers Library Publishers, 1937)
Stalin, <i>Problems of Leninism</i>	Joseph Stalin, <i>Problems of Leninism</i> (11th ed.; Moscow, Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1940).
Stalin, <i>Sochineniya</i>	Joseph Stalin, <i>Sochineniya</i> (Works; 13 vols., Moscow, 1946— )
Trotsky, <i>History</i>	Leon Trotsky, <i>The History of the Russian Revolution</i> (3 vols.; New York, Simon and Schuster, 1932)
Trotsky, <i>Sochineniya</i>	Leon Trotsky, <i>Sochineniya</i> (Works; 21 vols., Moscow, 1924-1927)
<i>Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (B) v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TSK (1898-1924)</i>	<i>Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (B) v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov TSK (1898-1924)</i> (All-Union Communist Party (B) in Resolutions and Decrees of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee, 1898-1924; 4th ed., Moscow-Leningrad, 1932)

*Chapter I**The Seedbed of Revolution*

1. George F. Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIX, no. 3 (April 1951), 365.
2. Quoted in B. H. Sumner, *Survey of Russian History* (2nd ed.: London, 1947), p. 68.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 67.
4. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 104.
5. K. P. Pobedonostseff, *Reflections of a Russian Statesman* (London, 1898), pp. 27-28.
6. Henry Gifford, *The Hero of His Time* (London, 1950), p. vii.
7. V. G. Belinsky, *Selected Philosophical Works* (Moscow, 1948), p. 504.
8. Quoted in Gifford, p. 181.
9. James Mavor, *An Economic History of Russia* (London and Toronto, 1914), II, 592.
10. Quoted in Mavor, II, 469, 471.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 473.
12. George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia* (New York, 1944), p. 195.
13. Quoted in Sir John Maynard, *Russia in Flux* (London, 1946), p. 193.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 203.
15. G. T. Robinson, *Rural Russia under the Old Régime* (New York, 1949), p. 88.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 101.
18. A. A. Kornilov, *Krest'yanskaya Reforma* (Peasant Reform; St. Petersburg, 1905), pp. 250-251.
19. Robinson, pp. 109-110.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 162.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 182.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 183.
25. P. I. Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution* (New York, 1949), p. 747.
26. Robinson, p. 194.
27. See V. I. Lenin, "Politicheski Zametki" (Political Notes; 1908) in *Sochineniya* (Works; 3rd ed.; Moscow, 1935), XII, 123.
28. Lyashchenko, p. 462.
29. Quoted in Alfred Levin, *The Second Duma* (New Haven, 1940), pp. 183-184.
30. The herculean efforts of Peter the Great succeeded in building "a heavy industry, which in the end supplied all the ordnance requirements both of his army and of his navy; a rope, sail, and lumber industry which met all the needs of his navy; and a cloth industry which furnished uniforms for a large proportion of his troops" (B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia* [New York, 1951], p. 164). This development was largely state-sponsored or state-stimulated, though extensive use was made of the capital of the merchant-traders of the day. By the time of Peter's death in 1725, Russian production of pig iron was probably larger than the English output (*ibid.*, pp. 165-166); by the middle of the eighteenth century, Russia was the world's largest producer of iron and copper. It was not until the end of the century that English production of iron caught up with that of Russia. See Witt Bowden, Michael Karpovich, and Abbott Payson Usher, *An Economic History of Europe since 1750* (New York, 1937), p. 301.
31. Lyashchenko, p. 338. The stagnation of Russian metallurgy was explained by a variety of factors. Protected against foreign competition by a tariff duty which amounted in 1822 to 600 per cent of the cost of pig iron, relying almost entirely on serf labor and adjusting its production targets to a limited domestic demand, the Ural iron industry had little or no incentive to modernize itself (*ibid.*).

32. *Ibid.*, pp. 490-491.

33. *Ibid.*, pp. 494, 502.

34. Bowden, Karpovich, and Usher, p. 607.

35. Lyashchenko, p. 560.

36. The oil industry lagged behind, and indeed the volume of production of petroleum dropped from 632 million poods (a pood equals 36 pounds avoirdupois) in 1900 to 561 million poods in 1913. In the same period, pig iron increased from 177 million to 283 million poods, iron and steel from 163 million to 246 million, coal from 1,003 million to 2,214 million, and cotton consumption from 16.1 million to 25.9 million (*ibid.*, p. 688).

37. *Ibid.*, p. 674.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 676.

39. Data quoted by the Soviet economic historian Lyashchenko indicate that in 1914, of the total basic stock capital of the eighteen major corporate banks, 42 per cent belonged to foreign capital. In 1916-17, the share of foreign capital in the mining industry was 90 per cent, in chemicals 50 per cent, in metal smelting and processing 42 per cent, in wood processing 37 per cent, and in textiles 28 per cent (pp. 708, 716). The significance of these figures should not be exaggerated. It remained true that in absolute terms Russian capital was far more important than foreign capital.

40. According to Lyashchenko (p. 527), "in 1895 only 15.9 per cent of Russia's workers were employed in small enterprises (employing 10 to 15 workers), while Germany had 31.5 per cent in that category; in the larger plants (over 500 workers) Russian industry employed 42 per cent and Germany only 15.3 per cent."

41. Lyashchenko, pp. 669-671.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 419.

43. Michael T. Florinsky, *The End of the Russian Empire* (New Haven, 1931), p. 169.

44. Bowden, Karpovich, and Usher, p. 609.

45. The "Credo," quoted in Mavor, II, 166.

## Chapter 2

### Bolshevism before 1917

1. Quoted in Nadezhda K. Krupskaya, *Memories of Lenin* (New York, 1930), II, 198.

2. Thomas G. Masaryk, *The Spirit of Russia* (London, 1919), II, 303.

3. Quoted in Bertram D. Wolfe, *Three Who Made a Revolution* (New York, 1948), p. 110. The precise language used by Marx was: "If Russia continues to pursue the path she has followed since 1861, she will lose the finest chance ever offered by history to a nation, and will undergo all the fatal vicissitudes of the capitalist regime." See *Perepiska K. Marksа i F. Engel'sа s Russkimi Politicheskimi Deyateliyami* (The Correspondence of K. Marx and F. Engels with Russian Political Figures; 2nd ed.; Moscow, 1951), p. 221.

4. David Ryazanoff (ed.), *The Communist Manifesto of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels* (New York, 1930), Marxist Library, III, 264-265. Engels, in the preface to the German edition of 1890, erroneously ascribed the translation of the Russian edition of 1882 to Vera Zasulich. See Ryazanoff's note in his edition of the *Manifesto*, p. 262.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 154.

6. Wolfe, p. 112.

7. *Sotsializm i Politicheskaya Bor'ba* (Socialism and the Political Struggle; 1883); *Nashi Raznoglasiya* (Our Differences; 1884); *K Voprosu o Razvitiu Monisticheskogo Vzglyada na Istoriyu* (Toward the Development of the Monistic Conception of History; 1895).

8. Quoted in N. Popov, *Outline History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1934), I, 25.
9. G. Plekhanov, *O Zadachakh Sotsialistov v Bor'be s Golodom v Rossii* (The Duty of the Socialists in the Struggle against Famine in Russia; Geneva, 1892), pp. 38-39.
10. See Lenin's pamphlet of 1894, *Chto Takoe "Druz'ya Naroda" i Kak Oni Voyuyut Protiv Sotsial-Demokratov?* (What Are the "Friends of the People" and How Do They Fight the Social Democrats?), reprinted in *Sochineniya*, I, 53-229.
11. G. Plekhanov, "Rech' na Mezhdunarodnom Rabochem Sotsialisticheskom Kongresse v Parizhe, 14-21 Iyulya 1889 g." (Address at the International Socialist Workingmen's Congress, Paris, July 14-21, 1889 [The Second International]), reprinted in Plekhanov's *Sochineniya*, edited by D. Ryazanov (Works; Moscow-Petrograd, 1923), IV, 54.
12. Quoted in P. I. Lyashchenko, *History of the National Economy of Russia to the 1917 Revolution*, p. 432.
13. See "Chto Delat?" (What Is to Be Done?), *Sochineniya*, IV, 402-411.
14. See Sergei Bulgakov's essay "Ot Marksizma k Idealizmu" in *Ot Marksizma k Idealizmu — Sbornik Statei, 1896-1903* (From Marxism to Idealism — Collection of Articles, 1896-1903; St. Petersburg, 1903).
15. See Wolfe, p. 282.
16. Lenin, "Dve Taktiki Sotsial-Demokratii v Demokraticeskoi Revolyutsii" (Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution), *Sochineniya*, VIII, 40-41.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
18. Quoted in Wolfe, p. 121.
19. Lenin, *Sochineniya*, VIII, 95-96.
20. Lenin's recipe for future action was summed up in the following quotation from "Two Tactics": "The proletariat must carry to completion the democratic revolution by allying to itself the mass of the peasantry, in order to crush by force the resistance of the autocracy and to paralyze the instability of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat must accomplish the socialist revolution by allying to itself the mass of the semiproletarian elements of the population in order to crush by force the resistance of the bourgeoisie and to paralyze the instability of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie" (*Sochineniya*, VIII, 96).
21. Lenin, "Otnoshenie Sotsial-Demokratii k Krest'yanskому Dvizheniyu" (The Attitude of Social-Democracy toward the Peasant Movement), *Sochineniya*, VIII, 186.
22. Joseph Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," *Problems of Leninism* (11th ed.; Moscow, 1940), p. 20.
23. "Chto Delat?" *Sochineniya*, IV, 458.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 442.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 464.
26. In *What Is to Be Done?* Lenin provided a thinly disguised account of this and similar experiences. "A students' circle having no contacts with the old members of the movement, no contacts with circles in other districts, or even in other parts of the same city . . . without the various sections of the revolutionary work being in any way organized, having no systematic plan of activity covering any length of time, establishes contacts with the workers and sets to work. The circle gradually expands its propaganda and agitation; by its activities it wins the sympathies of a rather large circle of workers and of a certain section of the educated classes, which provides it with money and from which the 'Committee' recruits new groups of young people . . . its sphere of activities becomes wider . . . [its members] now establish contacts with other groups of revolutionaries, procure literature, set to work to publish a local newspaper, begin to talk about organizing demonstrations, and finally, commence open hostilities (those open hostilities may, according to circumstances, take the form of the publication of the first agitational leaflet, or the first newspaper, or the first demonstration). And usually the first action ends in immediate and wholesale arrests."
- "The government . . ." Lenin went on, "managed to place its . . . agents pro-

vocateurs, spies and gendarmes in the required places. Raids became so frequent, affected such a vast number of people and cleared out the local circles so thoroughly that the masses of the workers literally lost all their leaders, the movement assumed an incredibly sporadic character, and it became utterly impossible to establish continuity and coherence in the work. The fact that the local active workers were hopelessly scattered, the casual manner in which the membership of the circles was recruited, the lack of training in and narrow outlook on theoretical, political, and organizational questions were all the inevitable result of the conditions described above. Things reached such a pass that in several places the workers, because of our lack of stamina and ability to maintain secrecy, began to lose faith in the intelligentsia and to avoid them; the intellectuals, they said, are much too careless and lay themselves open to police raids!" ("Chto Delat?" *Sochineniya*, IV, 438-439).

27. Quoted in Wolfe, p. 156.

28. "Chto Delat?" *Sochineniya*, IV, 170, 177.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 452.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 456.

31. In *What Is to Be Done?* he poured out his scorn on those who called for "broad democracy" in party organization: "Broad democracy in party organization, amidst the gloom of autocracy . . . is nothing more than a *useless and harmful toy*. It is a useless toy because, as a matter of fact, no revolutionary organization has ever practiced *broad* democracy, nor could it, however much it desired to do so. It is a harmful toy because any attempt to practice the 'broad democratic principles' will simply facilitate the work of the police in making big raids; it will perpetuate the prevailing primitiveness, divert the thoughts of the practical workers from the serious and imperative task of training themselves to become professional revolutionaries to that of drawing up detailed 'paper' rules for election systems. Only abroad, where very often people who have no opportunity of doing real live work gather together, can the 'game of democracy' be played here and there, especially in small groups" ("Chto Delat?" *Sochineniya*, IV, 468).

32. See "Kak Chut' Ne Potukhla 'Iskra'?" in *Sochineniya*, IV, 15-31.

33. Lenin, "Shag Vpered, Dva Shaga Nazad" (*One Step Forward, Two Steps Back*), *Sochineniya*, VI, 201. My italics.

34. Popov, *Outline History of the CPSU*, I, 111.

35. Quoted in Wolfe, p. 241.

36. Leon Trotsky, *Nashi Politicheskiye Zadachi* (*Our Political Tasks*; Geneva, 1904), p. 54.

37. At the London meeting of his faction, Lenin tried to undo the organizational damage committed in 1903. Martov's paragraph one of the rules was replaced by Lenin's formulation. The three central bodies set up by the Second Congress were replaced by a single Central Committee, which appointed the editorial board of the new central party paper, *Proletarii*. The Party Council was abolished.

38. Lenin, "Pobeda Kadetov i Zadachi Rabochei Partii" (*The Victory of the Kadets and the Tasks of the Workers' Party*), *Sochineniya*, IX, 123.

39. Popov, *Outline History of the CPSU*, I, 184.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 186. Wolfe (p. 345), cites 46 Bolsheviks.

41. According to Wolfe (p. 383), there were 91 Bolsheviks and 89 Mensheviks at the congress. Stalin in his report on the Fifth Party Congress lists 92 Bolsheviks, 85 Mensheviks, 54 Bundists, 45 Poles, and 26 Latvians (*Protokoly Pyatogo S"ezda RSDRP* [2nd ed., Moscow, 1935], p. x). Popov (*Outline History of the CPSU*, I, 205) reports that the congress "was attended by" 105 Bolsheviks, 97 Mensheviks, 57 Bundists, 44 Poles, and 29 Latvians. A. Bubnov, in his Party history in *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia; 1930 ed., XI, 352), estimates the strength of the delegations within certain ranges: Bolsheviks, 81-90; Mensheviks, 80-85; Bundists, 54-56; Poles, 39-45; and Latvians, 25-26.

42. Stalin's remarks on this division, reported in the Protocols of the Fifth Congress, are of some contemporary interest: "In this connection one of the Bolsheviks (Comrade Aleksinsky, I think) jokingly remarked that the Mensheviks are a Jewish fraction and the Bolsheviks a genuinely Russian fraction; so it would seem not out

of order for us Bolsheviks to hold a pogrom in the Party" (*Protokoly Pyatogo S"ezda RSDRP*, p. xii).

43. Quoted in Popov, *Outline History of the CPSU*, I, 232.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 237-238.

45. Wolfe, p. 478.

46. Lenin, "Otnoshenie Sotsial-Demokratii k Krest'yanskому Dvizheniyu" (The Attitude of Social Democracy toward the Peasant Movement), *Sochineniya*, VIII, 182.

47. *Ibid.*, p. 186.

48. Lenin, "Stolypin i Revolyutsiya" (Stolypin and the Revolution), *Sochineniya*, XV, 221-227.

49. See Appendix IV, "Rezolyutsiya Vserossiiskoi Aprel'skoi Konferentsii RSDRP po Agrarnomu Voprosu" (Resolution of the All-Russian April Conference of the RSDLP on the Agrarian Question) in Lenin, *Sochineniya*, XX, 615-616.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 616.

51. Lenin, "K Lozungam" (On Slogans), *Sochineniya*, XXI, 33.

52. Lenin, "Nashi Zadachi i Sovet Rabochikh Deputatov" (Our Tasks and the Soviet of Workers' Deputies), *Sochineniya* (4th ed.; Moscow, 1949), X, 3.

53. *Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (B) v Rezolyutsiyakh i Resheniyakh S"ezdov, Konferentsii i Plenumov Tsk (1898-1924)* (All-Union Communist Party [B] in Resolutions and Decrees of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee [1898-1924]), I (4th ed.; Moscow-Leningrad, 1932), 64; hereafter cited as *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*.

54. J. V. Stalin, "Rech' na Sobranii v Moskovskom Komitete RKP(b) po Povodu 50-letiya so Dnya Rozhdeniya V. I. Lenina" (Address at the meeting of the Moscow Committee of the RCP[b] in Connection with V. I. Lenin's Fiftieth Birthday), *Sochineniya* (Works; Moscow, 1946-), IV, 316-317.

55. Lenin, "O Boikote" (The Boycott), *Sochineniya*, X, 27. Later, in *Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder*, Lenin frankly admitted, "The boycott of the 'Duma' by the Bolsheviks in 1906 was . . . a mistake, although a small and easily remediable one" ("Detskaya Bolezn 'Levizny' v Kommunizme," *Sochineniya*, XXV, 183).

56. Alfred Levin, *The Second Duma*, p. 70.

57. See *ibid.* for a description of the work of the Duma.

58. A. E. Badayev, *Bol'sheviki v Tsarskoi Dume* (The Bolsheviks in the Tsarist Duma; Leningrad, 1929).

59. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

60. Lenin, in retrospect, insisted that "the right of nations to self-determination" was always understood to mean the right to secession. The evidence to sustain his view is meager.

61. Quoted in Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union* (Syracuse, 1951), p. 25.

62. *Ibid.*

63. *Ibid.*, p. 26.

64. *Ibid.*

65. *Ibid.*

66. Stalin, "Marksizm i Natsional'nyi Vopros" (Marxism and the National Question), *Sochineniya*, II, 331-332.

67. Lenin, "Pis'mo S. G. Shaumyanu" (Letter to S. G. Shaumyan), *Sochineniya*, XVII, 90.

68. Lenin, "O Prave Natsii na Samoopredelenie" (The Right of Nations to Self-Determination), *Sochineniya*, XVII, 455.

69. The conference was actually held October 5-14, 1913. The August appellation was designed to mislead the Tsarist police.

70. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 238-240.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

72. Stalin, "Marksizm i Natsional'nyi Vopros," *Sochineniya*, II, 312-313.

73. Stalin, "Doklad po Natsional'nomu Voprosu" (Report on the National Question), *Sochineniya*, IV, 31-32.

*Chapter 3**The Road to Power*

1. Statistical Table 1 in A. Bubnov, "VKP(b)," *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia; Moscow, 1930), XI, 531.
2. Popov, *Outline History of the CPSU*, I, 351.
3. V. P. Semennikov (ed.), *Nikolai II i Velkie Knyazy* (Nicholas II and the Grand Dukes; Moscow-Leningrad, 1925), p. 122.
4. For the origins of "Order Number One" see N. Sukhanov, *Zapiski o Revolyutsii* (Notes on the Revolution; St. Petersburg, 1919), I, 196-200.
5. V. V. Shulgin, *Dni* (Days; Belgrade, 1925), p. 179.
6. These conditions included political amnesty; civil liberties, freedom to organize trade unions and to strike; abolition of all caste, religious, and national limitations; replacement of the police by a people's militia; local self-government; the convocation of a constituent assembly; the protection of the military units which took part in the revolution from loss of arms or removal from Petrograd; and the guarantee of general civil and political rights to soldiers on condition that they maintain strict military discipline in service (P. N. Milyukov, *Istoriya Vtoroi Russkoi Revolyutsii* [The History of the Second Russian Revolution; Sofia, 1921], I, part 1, 47).
7. "The Provisional Government," wrote the War Minister Guchkov on March 22, 1917, "possesses no real power and its orders are executed only in so far as this is permitted by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, which holds in its hands the most important elements of actual power, such as troops, railroads, postal and telegraphic service. It is possible to say directly that the Provisional Government exists only while this is permitted by the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. Especially in the military department it is possible now only to issue orders which do not basically conflict with the decisions of the above-mentioned Soviet" (A. Shlyapnikov, *Semnadtsayi God* [The Year 1917; Moscow-Leningrad, 1925-1927], II, 236).
8. "Rezolyutsiya Vserossiiskogo Soveshchaniya Sovetov Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov" (Resolution of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies) in N. Avdeyev (editor of vols. I and II), *Revolyutsiya 1917 g., Khronika Sobytii* (The Revolution of 1917, Chronicle of Events; 2nd ed.; Moscow, 1923-1926), I, 198.
9. "Manifesto of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party 'To All Citizens of Russia,'" in V. I. Lenin, *Collected Works* (London, 1929), XX, book 2, 378. This edition of Lenin's works is hereafter cited as *CW*.
10. Popov, *Outline History of the CPSU*, I, 352.
11. *Ibid.*
12. L. Kamenev, "Without Secret Diplomacy," translated in Lenin, *CW*, XX(2), 380.
13. Stalin wrote a number of articles in a similar vein. "These articles," he acknowledged in 1924, "reflect certain wavering of the majority of our Party on the questions of peace and the power of the Soviets which occurred, as is known, in March and April 1917 . . . It is not surprising that Bolsheviks, scattered by Tsarism in prisons and places of exile, and just able to come together from different ends of Russia in order to work out a new platform, could not immediately understand the new situation. It is not surprising that the Party, in search of a new orientation, then stopped halfway in the questions of peace and Soviet power. The famous 'April Theses' of Lenin were needed before the Party could come out on the new road with one leap . . . I shared this mistaken position with the majority of the Party and renounced it fully in the middle of April, associating myself with the 'April Theses' of Lenin" (J. V. Stalin, *Na Putyah k Oktyabryu* [On the Roads to October; Moscow-Leningrad, 1925], pp. viii-ix; quoted in W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution 1917-1921* [New York, 1935], I, 115-116).
14. Lenin, *CW*, XX(1), 19.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 19.
17. Quoted in Chamberlin, I, 117.
18. Lenin, "Speech Delivered at a Caucus of the Bolshevik Members of the All-Russian Conference of the Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, April 17, 1917," CW, XX(1), 95–103.
19. E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (New York, 1951–1952), I, 81.
20. L. Kamenev, "Our Differences," translated in Lenin, CW, XX(2), 380–381.
21. Lenin, "Letters on Tactics," CW, XX(1), 119.
22. Lenin, "On the Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution," *ibid.*, p. 107.
23. "Letters on Tactics," *ibid.*, p. 119.
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 120–121.
25. Lenin, "On Dual Power," *ibid.*, p. 115.
26. Lenin, "The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution," *ibid.*, p. 133.
27. Lenin, "Report on the Political Situation and the Attitude Towards the Provisional Government, April 27, 1917," *ibid.*, p. 204.
28. A. V. Shestakov, "Krest'yanskie Organizatsii v 1917 godu" (Peasant Organizations in 1917) in V. P. Milyutin (ed.), *Agrarnaya Revolyutsiya* (The Agrarian Revolution; Moscow, 1928), II, 116–117.
29. See note 72 in Lenin, CW, XXI(1), 297.
30. See note 80, *ibid.*, p. 299.
31. Avdeyev, II, 242.
32. Chamberlin, I, 159.
33. See note 159 in Lenin, CW, XX(1), 375.
34. See note 49, *ibid.*, XXI(1), 291.
35. See *Protokoly Shestogo S'ezda RSDRP (b)* (Protocols of the Sixth Congress of the RSDLP [b] [August 1917]; Moscow, 1934), pp. 36–37.
36. Appendix 8, *ibid.*, p. 275.
37. Lenin, "One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution," CW, XXI(1), 167.
38. "The Political Situation," *ibid.*, p. 37.
39. "On Compromises," *ibid.*, p. 153.
40. "One of the Fundamental Questions of the Revolution," *ibid.*, p. 165.
41. Lenin, in his report of May 7 to the All-Russian Conference of the Party, said, "The government would like to see us make the first reckless step towards decisive action, as this would be to its advantage. It is exasperated because our party has advanced the slogan of peaceful demonstration . . . The proletarian party would be guilty of the most grievous error if it shaped its policy on the basis of subjective desires when organisation is required. We cannot assert that the majority is with us; in this case our motto should be: caution, caution, caution" (CW, XXI [1], 279).
42. Chamberlin, I, 161; E. Burdzhalov, *Pervyi Vserossiiskii S'ezd Sovetov Rabochikh i Soldatskikh Deputatov* (First All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies; Moscow, 1938), p. 30.
43. For the Bolshevik version, see Stalin's Report on the Political Situation in *Protokoly Shestogo S'ezda RSDRP (b)*, pp. 107–111.
44. During the congress, Stalin, who delivered the political report, was asked for a more concrete definition of the relationships of the Party to the existing soviets. He replied as follows: "Insofar as we are speaking of transferring power to the Central Executive Committee, this slogan is out-of-date . . . The fact that we propose to drop the slogan 'All Power to the Soviets' does not imply that we propose the slogan 'Down with the Soviets!' And, although we have dropped the former slogan, we have not even retired from the Central Executive Committee, despite the wretched role it has played during the last few weeks.  
"The local soviets may still play a role, since they will have to defend themselves against the exactions of the Provisional Government, and we shall support them in this struggle . . . As to our attitude to the soviets in which we have the majority"—most friendly. May those Soviets live and grow in strength!" (*ibid.*, p. 118).

45. Lenin, "From a Publicist's Diary," CW, XXI(1), 144-145.
46. Leon Trotsky, *My Life* (New York, 1930), p. 289.
47. See Lenin, "On Compromises," CW, XXI(1), 153.
48. "To the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party," *ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

49. The great surge of Bolshevik strength did not develop until September. In the election to the Petrograd Municipal Duma on September 2, 1917, the Bolsheviks received 33 per cent of the votes as against 20 per cent in May. (See note 66 in Lenin, CW, XXII[1], 296.) Bolshevik resolutions carried the day for the first time in the Petrograd Soviet on September 13 and in the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies on September 18. On October 8, Trotsky was elected president of the Petrograd Soviet. In the elections of the Moscow Municipal Duma, the Bolsheviks increased their vote from 11 per cent in July to 51 per cent in October (Chamberlin, I, 297). About the same time, Bolsheviks were also elected as chairmen both of the Moscow Soviet of Workers' Deputies and of the Moscow Provincial Soviet.

50. Quoted in Chamberlin, I, 281.

51. Before leaving, Trotsky fired "a little pistol shot" in the form of a declaration: "The Provisional Government, under the dictates of Kadet counter-revolutionaries and Allied imperialists, without sense, without force and without plan, drags out the murderous war, condemning to useless destruction hundreds of thousands of soldiers and sailors and preparing the surrender of Petrograd and the throttling of the Revolution . . . We, the delegation of Bolsheviks, say: we have nothing in common with this government of treason to the people and with this 'Council' of complicity in counter-revolution . . . All power to the Soviets! All land to the people! Long live an immediate, honest, democratic peace! Long live the Constituent Assembly!" (Leon Trotsky, *Sochineniya* [Works; Moscow, n.d.], III, part 1, 323; for translation, see Chamberlin, I, 283-284).

52. Lenin, "The Bolsheviks Must Assume Power," CW, XXI(1), 221.

53. *Ibid.*, p. 222.

54. "Marxism and Uprising," *ibid.*, pp. 226, 228-229.

55. Those present at the meeting were Trotsky, Kamenev, Rykov, Nogin, Stalin, Sverdlov, Bubnov, Bukharin, Lomov, Kollontai, Dzerzhinsky, Uritsky, Joffe, Shau-myan, Sokolnikov, and Milyutin.

56. Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1932), III, 133; hereafter cited as *History*.

57. *Protokoly Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RSDRP*, August 1917-Feval' 1918 (Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, August 1917- February 1918; Moscow-Leningrad 1929), p. 65; hereafter cited as *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*.

58. *Ibid.*

59. The decision to withdraw was made at the session of the Central Committee on October 18. Kamenev voted against the withdrawal and appended the following statement, addressed to the Central Committee, to the minutes of the meeting. "Dear Comrades: I think that your decision to withdraw from the very first session of the 'Soviet of the Russian Republic' predetermines the tactics of the Party during the next period in a direction which I personally consider quite dangerous for the Party. In submitting to the decision of the Party I at the same time request the comrades to relieve me of the duties in the representative bodies (CEC, etc.) and give me some other work" (*Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, pp. 90-91).

60. Lenin, "From a Publicist's Diary," CW, XXI(1), 254.

61. The letter, intended for distribution among the members of the Central Committee, the Moscow and Petrograd Committees, and the Bolshevik delegation in the soviet, read in part: "To refrain from seizing power at present, to 'wait,' to 'chatter' in the Central Committee, to confine ourselves to 'fighting for the organ' (of the Soviet), to 'fighting for the Congress,' means to *ruin the revolution*.

"Seeing that the Central Committee has left even without an answer my writings insisting on such a policy since the beginning of the Democratic Conference, that the Central Organ is deleting from my articles references to such glaring errors of the Bolsheviks as the shameful decision to participate in the pre-parliament, as giving

seats to the Mensheviks in the Presidium of the Soviets, etc., etc. — seeing all that, I am compelled to recognise here a ‘gentle’ hint as to the unwillingness of the Central Committee even to consider this question, a gentle hint at gagging me and at suggesting that I retire.

“I am compelled to *tender my resignation from the Central Committee*, which I hereby do, leaving myself the freedom of propaganda *in the lower ranks* of the party and at the Party Congress.

“For it is my deepest conviction that if we ‘await’ the Congress of Soviets and let the present moment pass, we *ruin* the revolution” (“The Crisis Has Matured,” CW, XXII[1], 278).

62. For texts, see Lenin, CW, XXI(2), 65–70, 100–105.

63. Quoted in Trotsky, *History*, III, 137.

64. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, p. 99.

65. *Ibid.*, p. 101. It was at this meeting that a “politburo” was first created. The motion of Dzerzhinsky defined its purpose as that of “political guidance for the immediate future.” Its membership consisted of Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov, and Bubnov. There is no evidence that it played any role of importance in the insurrection. Trotsky comments: “This new institution . . . turned out [to be] completely impracticable. Lenin and Zinoviev were still in hiding; Zinoviev, moreover, continued to wage a struggle against the insurrection, and so did Kamenev. The political bureau in its October membership never once assembled, and it was soon simply forgotten — as were other organizations created *ad hoc* in the whirlpool of events” (*History*, III, 155).

66. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, pp. 104–108.

67. Zinoviev and Kamenev wrote: “The forces of the opponent are greater than they appear. Petrograd is decisive, and in Petrograd the enemies of the proletarian party have accumulated substantial forces: 5000 military cadets . . . also the staff, shock troops, Cossacks, a substantial part of the garrison, and very considerable artillery, which has taken up a position in fanlike formation around Petrograd . . . The proletarian party at the present time would have to fight under an entirely different interrelationship of forces than in the days of the Kornilov affair. At that time we fought together with the SR’s, the Mensheviks, and to some extent, even with the adherents of Kerensky. Now, however, the proletarian party would have to fight against the Black Hundreds, plus the Kadets, plus Kerensky and the Provisional Government, plus the CEC (SR’s and Mensheviks) . . . In the biggest organizations (railroad unions, unions of post office and telegraph workers, etc.) . . . the influence of our Party is weak” (*ibid.*, p. 107).

68. *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104.

69. *Ibid.*, pp. 124–125.

70. Lenin, CW, XXI(2), 261.

71. “Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party,” *ibid.*, p. 130.

72. “Letter to the Central Committee of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party,” *ibid.*, pp. 133–137.

73. See *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, p. 137.

74. *Ibid.*, pp. 128–129.

75. *Ibid.* In a session notable for its high temper, an added spark with future incendiary effects was provided by Trotsky’s attack on Stalin’s editorial note as “intolerable.” Stalin replied by pleading the necessity for Party unity and announced his readiness to withdraw from the editorial board of *Rabochii Put’*. The Central Committee refused the tendered resignation and moved on to the next item on the agenda.

76. *Ibid.*, p. 141.

77. *Ibid.*, p. 124. The “military-revolutionary center” was created on October 29. The resolution of the Central Committee instructed the members of the center to join the Military Revolutionary Committee of the soviet. According to Trotsky’s account (*History*, III, 110), only Sverdlov was “brought in upon all important matters.”

78. Trotsky, *ibid.*

79. “Resolutions of the Pre-Parliament,” in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1918* (Stanford, 1934), pp. 91–92.

80. "The Proposal of Dan, Gotz, and Avxentiev," in Bunyan and Fisher, pp. 93-94.
81. Lenin, "Letter to the Members of the Central Committee," CW, XXI(2), 144-145.
82. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, pp. 142-143.
83. Trotsky, *Sochineniya*, III, part 2, 55.
84. Bunyan and Fisher, p. 100.
85. No accurate count of the political affiliations of the delegates has been preserved. Non-Bolshevik estimates of the strength of the Bolshevik delegation run from 250 to 300. See Bunyan and Fisher, p. 110.
86. Trotsky, *History*, III, 307.
87. Bunyan and Fisher, p. 113.
88. *Ibid.*
89. "Proclamation of the Congress on the Assumption of Power," *ibid.*, p. 122.
90. Trotsky, *History*, III, 324.
91. The congress also approved a decree transferring authority in the provinces to the soviets and announced the abolition of capital punishment. The latter action, according to Trotsky, aroused Lenin's ire. "When he [Lenin] learned of this first legislative act his anger knew no bounds.
- "This is madness,' he repeated. 'How can we accomplish a revolution without shooting? Do you think you can settle with your enemies if you disarm? What repressive measures have you then? Imprisonment? Who pays any attention to that in a time of bourgeois war when every party hopes for victory?'
- "Kamenief [*sic!*] tried to show that it was only a question of the repeal of the death penalty that Kerensky had introduced especially for deserting soldiers. But Lenin was not to be appeased.
- "It is a mistake,' he repeated, 'an inadmissible weakness. Pacifist illusion . . .' He proposed changing the decree at once. We told him this would make an extraordinarily unfavorable impression. Finally some one said: 'the best thing is to resort to shooting when there is no other way.' And it was left at that" (Leon Trotsky, *Lenin* [New York, 1925], pp. 133-134).
92. According to Trotsky (*ibid.*, p. 132), the name originated in a conversation between Lenin and himself: "What name shall we use?" Lenin considered aloud. 'Not minister, that is a repulsive, worn-out designation.'
- "We might say commissars," I suggested, "but there are too many commissars now. Perhaps chief commissar . . . No, "chief" sounds bad. What about people's commissars?" . . .
- "People's commissars? As for me, I like it. And the government as a whole?"
- "Council of People's Commissars?"
- "Council of People's Commissars," Lenin repeated. "That is splendid. That smells of revolution."
93. Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 337.
94. Lenin, "Krest'yanskii Nakaz o Zemle" (The Peasants' Decree on the Land) in *Vtoroi Vserossiiskii S"ezd Sovetov R. i S.D.* (Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies [November 7-8, 1917]; Moscow-Leningrad, 1928), p. 73.
95. Lenin, "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" CW, XXI(2), 48.
96. See Oliver H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 80; Chamberlin, I, 366.
97. See Lenin, "Vybory v Uchreditel'noe Sobranie i Diktatura Proletariata" (Elections to the Constituent Assembly and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat), *Sochineniya*, XXIV, 635.
98. *Sochineniya*, IV, 458.

## Chapter 4

### *The Dynamics of Power*

1. Lenin, "O Prodovol'stvennom Naloge" (The Tax in Kind), *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 330.
2. Lenin, "Materials Relating to the Revision of the Party Programme," CW, XX(1), 343.
3. CW, XXI(2), 15–56.
4. "Grozyashchaya Katastrofa i Kak s Nei Borot'sya" (The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It), *Sochineniya*, XXI, 163–164.
5. "Will the Bolsheviks Retain State Power?" CW, XXI(2), 40.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
10. "Ocherednye Zadachi Sovetskoi Vlasti," *Sochineniya*, XXII, 439–468.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 445–446.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 447.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 448.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 451.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 462.
16. "Doklad o Voine i Mire 7 Marta" (Report on War and Peace, March 7 [1918]), *Sochineniya*, XXII, 324.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 327.
18. "Politicheskii Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta R.K.P.(B.) 27 Marta" (Political Report of the Central Committee of the RCP[B], March 27 [1922]), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 244.
19. "O Prodovol'stvennom Naloge," *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 330.
20. E. H. Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923* (New York, 1951–1953), II, 110.
21. It fell to Trotsky to provide a frank rationalization for the militarization of labor in the Soviet state. He declared, "We are now advancing towards a type of labour socially regulated on the basis of an economic plan which is obligatory for the whole country, i.e. compulsory for every worker. That is the foundation of socialism . . . And once we have recognized this, we thereby recognize fundamentally—not formally, but fundamentally—the right of the workers' state to send each working man and woman to the place where they are needed for the fulfillment of economic tasks. We thereby recognize the right of the state, the workers' state, to punish the working man or woman who refuse to carry out the order of the state, who do not subordinate their will to the will of the working-class and to its economic tasks . . . The militarization of labour in this fundamental sense of which I have spoken is the indispensable and fundamental method for the organization of our labour forces" (quoted in Carr, II, 215). The end of the Civil War and the introduction of the New Economic Policy were to postpone the application of Trotsky's logical theorem. By an ironic twist of history, it remained for Stalin to execute the program which his archenemy had adumbrated.
22. VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh, I, 391–392.
23. Lenin, "K Chetyreklyetnei Godovshchine Oktyabr'skoi Revolyutsii" (The Fourth Anniversary of the October Revolution), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 29.
24. See Robert V. Daniels, "The Kronstadt Revolt of 1921: A Study in the Dynamics of Revolution," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, X, no. 4 (December 1951), 241–254.
25. "O Prodovol'stvennom Naloge," *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 348.
26. "O Chistke Partii" (On Purging the Party), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 12.
27. "Doklad o Natural'nom Naloge 15 Marta" (Report on the Tax in Kind, March 15 [1921]), *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 238.

28. "Politicheskii Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta R.K.P.(B.) 27 Marta," *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 234. Lenin added on another occasion, "Those who find this work 'dull,' 'uninteresting,' and 'unintelligible,' those who turn up their noses, or become panic-stricken, or who become intoxicated with their own declamations about the absence of the 'previous elation,' the 'previous enthusiasm,' etc., had better be 'relieved of their jobs' and given a back seat, so as to prevent them from causing harm; for they will not or cannot understand the specific features of the present stage of the struggle" (*Novye Vremena, Starye Oshibki v Novom Vide*) [New Times and Old Mistakes in a New Guise], *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 10).
29. "Pyat' Let Rossiskoi Revolyutsii i Perspektivy Mirovoi Revolyutsii" (Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 349.
30. For a very discerning treatment of the industrialization controversy, see Alexander Erlich, "Preobrazhenski and the Economics of Soviet Industrialization," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, LXIV, no. 1 (February 1950), 57-88.
31. "The Tasks of Business Executives," *Problems of Leninism*, p. 365.
32. "The Results of the First Five-Year Plan," *ibid.*, pp. 409-410, 416-417.
33. "New Conditions — New Tasks in Economic Construction," *ibid.*, p. 382.
34. For a more extended discussion of tightening labor discipline in the Soviet Union, see Solomon M. Schwarz, *Labor in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1952), pp. 86-129.
35. Stalin declared, "We must draw up wage scales that will take into account the difference between skilled labour and unskilled labour, between heavy work and light work . . . We cannot tolerate a situation where a railway locomotive driver earns only as much as a copying clerk . . .
- "In every industry, in every factory, in every department of a factory, there is a leading group of more or less skilled workers who must first of all, and particularly, be retained in industry . . . These leading groups of workers are the chief link in production . . . We can retain them only by promoting them to higher positions, by raising the level of their wages, by introducing a system of payment that will give the worker his due according to qualification . . . In order to get skilled workers we must give the unskilled worker a stimulus and prospect of advancement, of rising to a higher position . . . The more boldly we do this the better" ("New Conditions — New Tasks in Economic Construction," *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 372-373).
36. See Raymond A. Bauer, *The New Man in Soviet Psychology* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).
37. See Ruth Widmayer, "The Communist Party and the Soviet Schools, 1917-1937" (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1952).
38. See John N. Hazard (ed.) and Hugh W. Babb (trans.), *Soviet Legal Philosophy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1951); also, Harold J. Berman, *Justice in Russia* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950).
39. Stalin, "Politicheskii Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta XVI S"ezdu VKP(b)" (Political Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the All-Union CP[b]), *Sochineniya*, XII, 369-370.
40. "O Zadachakh Khozyaistvennikov" (The Tasks of Business Executives), *Sochineniya*, XIII, 41.
41. "On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.," *Problems of Leninism*, p. 586.
42. *Pravda*, June 9, 1934, p. 1.
43. J. Stalin, A. Zhdanov, and S. Kirov, "Zamechaniya po Povodu Konspekta Uchebnika po 'Istoriia USSR'" (Remarks Concerning the Conspectus of a Textbook on "The History of the USSR"), *Istorik Marksist*, no. 1(53) (1936), pp. 5-6.
44. Translated in D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton, 1944), p. 413.
45. Quoted in John S. Curtiss and Alex Inkeles, "Marxism in the U.S.S.R. — The Recent Revival," *Political Science Quarterly*, LXI, no. 3 (September 1946), 358.
46. For English text of the speech, see "The Strategy and Tactics of World Communism," *House Doc.* 619; 80 Cong., 2 Sess. (Washington, 1948), pp. 168-178.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 211-230.

48. See Stalin's toast at a Kremlin banquet on May 24, 1945, translated in Solomon Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, p. 72.
49. See N. S. Timasheff, "Religion in Russia, 1941-1950," in Waldemar Gurian (ed.), *The Soviet Union: Background, Ideology, Reality* (Notre Dame, 1951), pp. 153-194.
50. Nicholas S. Timasheff, *The Great Retreat* (New York, 1946).
51. For the text of the announcement of the arrest of the Kremlin doctors, see *Pravda*, January 13, 1953. For an excellent treatment of the affair, see R. Conquest, *Power and Policy in the USSR* (New York, 1961), pp. 154-191.
52. Russian Institute, Columbia University (ed.), *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York, 1956), p. 82.
53. *Pravda*, August 9, 1953.
54. *Ibid.*, February 9, 1955.
55. *Ibid.*, July 4, 1957.
56. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1957.
57. *Ibid.*, February 3, 1955.
58. *Ibid.*, August 2, 1957.
59. *Ibid.*, November 14, 1958.
60. *Ibid.*, June 1, 1962.
61. *Ibid.*, January 21, 1961.
62. *New York Times*, May 20, 1961.
63. XX S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic Report [February 14-25, 1956]; Moscow, 1956), I, 532; hereafter cited as XX S"ezd KPSS).
64. *Pravda*, October 27, 1961.
65. *Ibid.*, April 21, 1962.
66. *My* (We; New York, 1952), p. 140.

## Chapter 5

### *The Dictatorship of the Party in Theory and Practice*

1. See speech by Marx in 1872 at the Congress of the International at The Hague, quoted in Karl Kautsky, *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, trans. H. J. Stenning (Manchester, n.d.), pp. 9-10; also, Engels' preface to the first English translation of Karl Marx, *Capital* (Chicago, 1906), p. 32.
2. See Karl Marx, "The Civil War in France" in his *Selected Works*, edited by V. Adoratsky (New York, n.d.), II, 475-527.
3. See V. I. Lenin, "Gosudarstvo i Revolyutsiya" (The State and Revolution), *Sochineniya*, XXI, 394-395.
4. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP, Avgust 1917-Fevral' 1918* (Protocols of the Central Committee of the RSDLP, August 1917-February 1918), pp. 149-150. At this meeting, the Bolshevik Central Committee adopted the following resolution: "In view of the fact that all previous negotiations have fully demonstrated that the compromisers are not aiming to form a unified Soviet Government but are trying to split the ranks of the workers and soldiers, to disrupt the Soviet Government, and to win over the Socialist Revolutionaries of the Left to the policy of compromising with the camp of the bourgeoisie, the Central Committee resolves to allow Party members . . . to attend today's negotiations in which for the last time the Socialist Revolutionaries of the Left will make a final attempt to form a so-called uniform [Socialist] government. [The Bolshevik delegates] must try to show the impossibility of such an attempt and the futility of further negotiations on the subject of forming a coalition government" (*ibid.*, pp. 155-156).
5. Quoted in Leon Trotsky, *The Stalin School of Falsification* (New York, 1937), pp. 110, 112.

6. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, p. 169.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
8. Quoted in Trotsky, *The Stalin School of Falsification*, p. 114.
9. "Rech' o Rospuske Uchreditel'nogo Sobraniya na Zasedanii VTSIK 19(6) Yanvarya 1918 g." (Speech on the Dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, Delivered at a Meeting of the All-Russian CEC on January 6/19, 1918), *Sochineniya*, XXII, 184–187.
10. "Tezisy ob Uchreditel'nom Sobranii" (Theses on the Constituent Assembly), *Sochineniya*, XXII, 134.
11. *Tretii Vserossiiskii S'ezd Sovetov Rabochikh, Soldatskikh i Krest'yanskikh Deputatov* (Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies [January 23–31, 1918]; St. Petersburg, 1918), p. 5.
12. "Doklad o Deyatel'nosti Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov 24(11) Yanvarya" (Report on the Activities of the Council of People's Commissars, January 11/24, 1918), *Sochineniya*, XXII, 207–208.
13. Text published in *Izvestiya*, no. 289 (November 29/December 12, 1917), p. 1.
14. Trotsky, *Sochineniya*, III, part 2, 138.
15. Reported in *Nash Vek* (Our Age; Petrograd), no. 21 (December 23, 1917/January 5, 1918), p. 3.
16. "Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta 18 Marta" (Report of the Central Committee, March 18 [1919]), *Sochineniya*, XXIV, 120.
17. "O Prodovol'stvennom Naloge" (The Tax in Kind), *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 348.
18. Lenin, "The Revolt of the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries," CW, XXIII, 151.
19. Stalin, "The Foundations of Leninism," *Problems of Leninism*, p. 73.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 74, 78.
21. "On the Problems of Leninism," *ibid.*, p. 135.
22. Joseph Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism* (New York, 1937), p. 57.
23. Quoted in B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Emergence of Russia*, p. 162.
24. Stalin, "On the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R.," *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 578–579.
25. P. Katayan, "Svoboda Sobranii" (Freedom of Assembly), *Izvestiya*, August 6, 1936, p. 3.
26. Stalin, "Otvety Tovarishcham" (Replies to Comrades), *Bolshevik*, no. 14 (July 1950), p. 6. This article has been translated in the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, II, no. 28 (August 26, 1950), 13; hereafter cited as *CDSP*.
27. "The Foundations of Leninism," *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 80–81.
28. Trotsky, *The Stalin School of Falsification*, p. 109.
29. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP*, p. 238.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 252.
31. *Sed'moi S'ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii, Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Seventh Congress of the Russian Communist Party, Stenographic Report [December 5–9, 1919]; Moscow-Petrograd, 1923), p. 146.
32. "O 'Levom' Rebyachestve i o Melkoburzhuanosti," *Sochineniya*, XXII, 503–528.
33. See Lenin, *Sochineniya*, XXIV, 749, note 35.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 750–751.
35. E. Jaroslawski, *Aus der Geschichte der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion (Bolschewiki)* (Hamburg-Berlin, n.d.), II, 205.
36. Lenin, "Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo po Dokladu Tsentral'nogo Komiteta 30 Marta" (Concluding Remarks on the Report of the Central Committee, March 30 [1920]), *Sochineniya*, XXV, 112.
37. See Isaac Deutscher, *Soviet Trade Unions* (London-New York, 1950), p. 58.
38. "Krisis Partii," *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 94.
39. "Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo po Otchetu TsK RKP(B) 9 Marta" (Concluding Remarks on the Report of the CC of the RCP[B], March 9 [1921]), *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 227–228.

40. "Pervonachal'nyi Proekt Rezolyutsii X S"ezda RKP o Sindikalistskom i Anarkhistskom Uklone v Nashei Partii" (First Draft of the Resolution Adopted by the Tenth Congress of the RCP on the Syndicalist and Anarchist Deviation in Our Party) in Lenin, *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 262, 264.
41. "Doklad ob Edinstve Partii i Anarkho-Sindikalistskom Uklone 16 Marta" (Speech of March 16 [1921] on Party Unity and the Anarcho-Syndicalist Deviation), *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 267.
42. "Pervonachal'nyi Proekt Rezolyutsii X S"ezda RKP o Edinstve Partii" (First Draft of the Resolution Adopted by the Tenth Congress of the RCP on Party Unity) in Lenin, *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 259–261.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
44. "O Chistke Partii" (On Purging the Party), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 13.
45. Jaroslawski, II, 253.
46. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 536. Lenin in a speech at the Eleventh Congress reported that the motion failed by three votes. See "Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo po Politicheskому Otchetu TsK RKP(B) 28 Marta" (Concluding Remarks on the Political Report of the CC of the RCP[B], March 28 [1922]), XXVII, 268.
47. See Lenin, *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 495–496, note 2.
48. Jaroslawski, II, 245.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 247.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 247–248.
51. "Politicheskii Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RKP(B) 27 Marta" (Political Report of the Central Committee of the RCP[B], March 27 [1922]), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 239.
52. *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 262.
53. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 538.
54. Appendix VI in Max Eastman, *Since Lenin Died* (London, 1925), pp. 146–149.
55. "Postanovlenie Politburo TsK RKP, Protiv Obostreniya Vnutripartiinoi Bor'by" (Decree of the Politburo of the CC of the RCP, Against Intensifying Intra-Party Strife), *Pravda*, December 18, 1923, p. 4.
56. Stalin, "Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo po Politicheskому Otchetu Tsentral'nogo Komiteta" (Concluding Remarks on the Political Report of the Central Committee), *Sochineniya*, VII, 380.
57. Stalin, "Doklad ob Ocherednykh Zadachakh Partiinogo Stroitel'stva" (Report on the Immediate Tasks of Party Construction), *Sochineniya*, VI, 14–15.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 44–45.
59. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 647–654.
60. *Trinadstatyi S"ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bolshevikov), Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Thirteenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik], Stenographic Report [May 23–31, 1924]; Moscow, 1924), pp. 166–167.
61. Stalin, "Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo" (Concluding Remarks), *Sochineniya*, VI, 233.
62. Stalin, "Rech' na Plenume TsK i TsKK(b) 17 Yanvarya 1925 g." (Address at the Plenum of the CC and the CCC(b), January 17, 1925), *Sochineniya*, VII, 9–10.
63. Stalin, "Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo po Politicheskому Otchetu Tsentral'nogo Komiteta," *Sochineniya*, VII, 388–389.
64. *XIV S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b), Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Fourteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [b], Stenographic Report [December 18–31, 1925]; Moscow-Leningrad, 1926), p. 186; hereafter cited as *XIV S"ezd VKP(b)*.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 165–166.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 274–275.
67. Stalin, *Sochineniya*, VII, 391.
68. "O Khozyaistvennom Polozhenii Sovetskogo Soyuza i Politike Partii" (On the Condition of the Economy of the Soviet Union and Party Policy), *Sochineniya*, VIII, 146.

69. Trotsky, *My Life*, pp. 528–529.
70. Stalin, “O Merakh Smyagcheniya Vnutripartiinoi Bor’by” (On Measures for Lessening the Intra-Party Struggle), *Sochineniya*, VIII, 210–212.
71. Stalin, “Zaklyuchitel’noe Slovo po Dokladu ‘O Sotsial-Demokraticheskem Uklone v Nashei Partii’” (Concluding Remarks on the Report “Concerning the Social Democratic Deviation in Our Party”), *Sochineniya*, VIII, 350–354.
72. Stalin, “Mezhdunarodnoe Polozhenie i Oborona SSSR” (The International Situation and the Defense of the USSR), *Sochineniya*, X, 59.
73. Leon Trotsky, *The Real Situation in Russia*, translated by Max Eastman (New York, 1928), pp. 12, 14–15.
74. Trotsky, *My Life*, pp. 533–534.
75. XV S”ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b), *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Fifteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [b], Stenographic Report [December 2–19, 1927]; Moscow-Leningrad, 1928), pp. 251–252; hereafter cited as XV S”ezd VKP(b).
76. Stalin, “Politicheskii Otchet Tsentral’nogo Komiteta” (Political Report of the Central Committee), *Sochineniya*, X, 351.
77. XV S”ezd VKP(b), pp. 1266–1267.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 1319.
79. Trotsky, *History*, III, 138.
80. Stalin, “O Pravoi Opasnosti v VKP(b)” (The Danger of the Right in the All-Union CP[b]), *Sochineniya*, XI, 236.
81. Stalin, “Ob Industrializatsii Strany i o Pravom Uklone v VKP(b)” (On the Industrialization of the Country and the Right Deviation in the All-Union CP[b]), *Sochineniya*, XI, 290.
82. Stalin, “Gruppa Bukharina i Pravyi Uklon v Nashei Partii” (The Bukharin Group and the Right Deviation in Our Party), *Sochineniya*, XI, 318–325.
83. Stalin, “O Pravom Uklone v VKP(b)” (On the Right Deviation in the All-Union CP[b]), *Sochineniya*, XII, 6–7.
84. *Ibid.*, pp. 103–104.
85. *Ibid.*, pp. 106–107.
86. “Zayavlenie TT. Tomskogo, Bukharina i Rykova v Tsk VKP(b)” (Declaration by Comrades Tomsky, Bukharin, and Rykov to the CC of the All-Union CP[b]), *Pravda*, November 26, 1929, p. 2.
87. L. M. Kaganovich’s comment on the fall of Rykov was significant. In a speech before a Moscow Party gathering he declared, “Comrades, in a period of grandiose construction when the great questions of socialist construction are being decided in our land, can we . . . be satisfied with a Sovnarkom chairman who says that he executes the general line of the Party ‘as much as and as best he can?’ We cannot permit the slightest shade of doubt, the slightest cleavage between the Party and Soviet organs . . .
- “From the Chairman of the Sovnarkom of this great land, there is demanded not only a recognition of the general line of the Party, but first and foremost an active struggle to carry it into effect. That we did not see on Rykov’s part.” L. M. Kaganovich, “Ob Itogakh Dekab’inskogo Ob”edinenennogo Plenuma Tsk i TsKK VKP(b)” (On the Results of the December Joint Plenum of the CC and the CCC of the All-Union CP[b]), *Pravda*, December 30, 1930, p. 4.
88. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 515–516.
89. *History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)*, Short Course (New York, 1939), p. 326; hereafter cited as *History of the CPSU*.
90. For lists see Boris Souvarine, *Staline: Aperçu historique du bolchévisme* (Paris, 1935), pp. 574–581, and Louis Fischer, *Men and Politics* (New York, 1941), pp. 433–439.
91. *History of the CPSU*, p. 347.
92. Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism*, pp. 6–7.
93. *Ibid.*, p. 13.
94. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
95. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

96. See the Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of January, 1938 in *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, II (6th ed., 1941), 671-677.
97. *Pravda*, April 3, 1952.
98. *Zarya Vostoka*, April 16, 1953.
99. See B. D. Wolfe, *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (New York, 1957), p. 316.
100. *Pravda*, July 10, 1953.
101. *Zarya Vostoka*, July 11 and July 15, 1953; *Pravda*, July 19, 1953.
102. *Pravda*, July 10, 1953.
103. *Ibid.*, March 13, 1954.
104. *Izvestiya*, June 13, 1954.
105. *Pravda*, October 25, 1961.
106. *Izvestiya*, April 27, 1954.
107. *Pravda*, February 3, 1955.
108. *Ibid.*, February 9, 1955.
109. *Ibid.*, July 13, 1955.
110. *Ibid.*, July 4, 1957.
111. See Khrushchev's concluding remarks at the Twenty-Second Party Congress, *Pravda*, October 29, 1961.
112. For the text of Khrushchev's secret speech, see Russian Institute, Columbia University (ed.), *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York, 1956), pp. 1-89.
113. *Pravda*, October 18, 1961.
114. *Ibid.*, December 19, 1958.
115. See the speech of I. I. Kuzmin at the Twenty-First Party Congress, *Pravda*, February 5, 1959.
116. *Ibid.*, October 25, 1961.
117. *Ibid.*
118. *Ibid.*
119. See T. H. Rigby, "Khrushchev and the Resuscitation of the Central Committee," *Australian Outlook*, XIII, no. 3 (September 1959), 179.
120. *Pravda*, July 4, 1957.
121. *Ibid.*, October 29, 1961.
122. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1957.
123. *Ibid.*, October 29, 1961.

## Chapter 6

### *The Growth of the Party Apparatus*

1. See Appendix 8 in *Protokoly Shestogo S'ezda RSDRP(b)* (Protocols of the Sixth Congress of the RSDLP[b]), p. 275.
2. XVI S'ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (*bol'shevikov*), *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Sixteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [Bolshevik], Stenographic Report [June 26-July 13, 1930]; 2nd ed.; Moscow-Leningrad, 1931), p. 52; hereafter cited as XVI S'ezd VKP(b).
3. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 353.
4. "Doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta 29 Marta 1920 g." (Report of the Central Committee, March 29, 1920), *Sochineniya*, XXV, 94.
5. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 407.
6. "Otchet o Rabote TsK za Peryod ot 9 do 10 Partiinogo S'ezda" (Report on the Work of the CC for the Period between the Ninth and Tenth Party Congresses), *Izvestiya Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol'shevikov)* (News of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik]), no. 29 (March 7, 1921), p. 7. Hereafter this journal will be cited as *Izvestiya TsK*.
7. These included 325 at the center and regional level; 2,000 at the guberniya or provincial level; 8,000 at the uезд or county level, and another 5,000 full-time

Party secretaries in the volosts or districts and in the larger industrial enterprises (*VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 560–561).

8. The first report — “Otchet Uchetno-Raspredelitel’nogo Otdela” (Report of the Account and Assignment Section) in *Izvestiya TsK*, no. 22 (September 18, 1920), pp. 12–15.

9. “Otchet za God Raboty TsK RKP (s XI do XII S”ezda RKP)” (Report on a Year’s Work by the CC of the RCP, from the Eleventh to the Twelfth Congress of the RCP), *Izvestiya TsK*, no. 4(52) (April 1923), p. 45.

10. During the year 1922, thirty-seven guberniya secretaries were removed or transferred by the central Party apparatus, and forty-two new “recommendations” were made for the post of secretary (“Vypolnenie Direktiv XI S”ezda Partii. Podbor Sekretarei Gubkomov i Obkomov” [Fulfillment of the Directives Issued by the Eleventh Party Congress. Selection of Gubkom and Obkom Secretaries], *Izvestiya TsK*, no. 3[51] [March 1923], p. 51).

11. The same report described the functions of Uchraspred as “detailed and attentive accounting of the commanding cadre of the Party; reassignment of Party forces to strengthen the most important provincial organizations; selection of organizers for Party work, review of the directors of oblast, guberniya, and uезд Party organizations and to a certain extent secretaries of cells; replacement of workers who did not measure up to the standards set forth by the Party Congress” (“Otchet Uchetno-Raspredelitel’nogo Otdela. Obshchie Usloviya i Kharakter Raboty” [Report of the Account and Assignment Section. General Conditions and Character of Work], *ibid.*, p. 28).

12. “Organizatsionnyi Otchet Tsentral’nogo Komiteta RKP(b) 17 Aprelya 1923 g.” (Organizational Report of the Central Committee of the RCP[b], April 17, 1923), *Sochineniya*, V, 212.

13. Quoted in Max Shachtman, *The Struggle for the New Course*, published in one volume with his translation of Leon Trotsky’s *The New Course* (New York, 1943), p. 159.

14. The functions of the Organization-Instruction Section, in the words of an official report, were: “to establish relations of the Central Committee with local organizations, in order to make possible daily study of the conditions of each organization and the activities going on in it; to strengthen the apparatus, bring about a vital link with the localities; to improve the conditions of information so they embrace and reflect the work of the localities; to draw nearer to the life and work of local organizations down to the lowest cells; to single out the most important industrial centers and establish a direct link with them, and, on this basis, to carry on planned work directed toward the strengthening and improvement of Party organizations, liquidation of disputes, [and] improvement of methods of general Party work” (“Otchet Organizatsionno-Instruktorskogo Otdela” [Report of the Organization-Instruction Section], *Izvestiya TsK*, no. 3[51] [March 1923], p. 3). Embraced in this somewhat ambiguous formulation was a major concentration of effort on the elimination of opposition activity in the localities and the transformation of the Party bureaucracy into a solid monolith of support for the General Secretary.

15. *Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

16. The Siberian Bureau was headed by Yaroslavsky until 1922 and then by S. Kossior; the Far Eastern by Kubiak; the North Caucasus by Mikoyan; and the Turkestan (subsequently Central Asian) by Kuibyshev until 1922 and by Rudzutak later.

17. For a description of the Siberian case, see Robert V. Daniels, “The Left Opposition in the Russian Communist Party, to 1924” (doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1950), pp. 417–419.

18. See resolution of the Ninth Party Conference, September 1920, in *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 415–416.

19. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 434.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 523.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 563.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 601.

23. *Dvenadtsatyi S”ezd Rossiiskoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (Bol’shevikov) Sten-*

*ograficheskii Otchet* (Twelfth Congress of the Russian Communist Party [Bolshevik], Stenographic Report [April 17–25, 1923]; Moscow, 1923), p. 122.

24. XIV S"ezd VKP(b), p. 455.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 456.

26. Eastman, *Since Lenin Died*, pp. 81–82.

27. Sapronov, in the course of the debate at the Thirteenth Party Conference in 1924, reported that, while the opposition had elected 36 per cent of the delegates at the raion conferences in the Moscow guberniya, its representation at the guberniya conference was only 18 per cent. "If the opposition," he continued, "lost 18 per cent between the raion conference and the guberniya conference, then I pose the question: of how many votes was the opposition deprived in the workers' cells by the pressure of the apparatus, when these votes went to the raion conference" ("XIII Konferentsiya RKP(b), Rech' Tov. Sapronova," *Pravda*, January 22, 1924, p. 4).

Sapronov's charge that the opposition had been defrauded of a majority in Moscow probably cannot be documented, but there is plentiful testimony to verify the steamroller tactics of the troika. Bukharin, soon to become closely associated with Stalin, provided an authoritative description in a speech at a Moscow Party meeting toward the end of 1923: "As a rule, putting the matter to a vote takes place according to a method that is taken for granted. The meeting is asked: 'Who is against?' and inasmuch as one fears more or less to speak up against, the appointed candidate finds himself elected secretary of the bureau of the group" (quoted in Schachtman, pp. 172–173). Aided by such tactics, the apparatchiki were everywhere triumphant, and the Thirteenth Conference registered a complete rout of the opposition.

28. See Aleksandrov (pseud.), *Kto Upravlyayet Rossiei?* (Who Rules Russia?; Berlin [1933?]), pp. 111–113.

29. *Ibid.*, pp. 114, 119–121.

30. Stalin, "Trotskizm ili Leninizm?" (Trotskyism or Leninism?), *Sochineniya*, VI, 324–357.

31. See Aleksandrov, p. 137; also, XIV S"ezd VKP(b), p. 484.

32. See Uglanov's statement at the Fourteenth Congress, XIV S"ezd VKP(b), p. 193.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 524.

34. In dealing with the opposition, Stalin resorted to the strategy of divide and conquer. Part of the opposition was left in its place. Zinoviev remained in the Politburo; Evdokimov, one of Zinoviev's lieutenants, was re-elected to the Central Committee and even given new posts as a secretary of the Central Committee and member of the Orgburo, though he did not long retain these new dignities. Bakayev, another Zinoviev follower, was returned to the Central Control Commission. Other oppositionists felt the full lash of Stalin's displeasure, though the penalties imposed at this stage of the struggle were comparatively mild. At the same time, Stalin took the precaution of purging the Leningrad Party organization of Zinoviev supporters. At a special Party conference in February 1926 a Stalinist apparatus was installed in Leningrad. Kirov, operating as Stalin's proconsul, presided over the purge and became the new head of the Leningrad Party organization. Thus, the only firm core of organizational strength which remained to Zinoviev and Kamenev was cut out from under them.

35. For a more optimistic judgment of the bloc's prospects, see Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), pp. 537–572.

36. Trotsky, *My Life*, p. 521.

37. Quoted in Souvarine, *Staline*, p. 445.

38. See Stalin, "O Pravoi Opasnosti v VKP(b)" (On the Danger of the Right in the All-Union CP[b]), *Sochineniya*, XI, 222–238.

39. Souvarine, p. 447.

40. See Molotov's Organizational Report in XIV S"ezd VKP(b), p. 81.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 89.

42. Aleksandrov, pp. 106–108.

43. XV S"ezd VKP(b), p. 114.

44. *Ibid.*, pp. 114–115.

45. XVI S"ezd VKP(b), p. 81.

46. The speech "Ob Apparate TsK VKP(b)" (On the Apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union CP[b]) was printed in *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo* (Party Construction), no. 2(4) (February 1930), pp. 9-13.

47. XVI S"ezd VKP(b), p. 83.

48. XVII S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b) *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Seventeenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [b], Stenographic Report [January 26-February 10, 1934]; Moscow, 1934), pp. 561-562, 672, 676. The republic, oblast, and krai secretariats were similarly organized, except that the Industrial and Transport Sections were combined and a Soviet and Trade Section replaced the Political-Administrative and Planning-Finance-Trade Sections.

49. "O Reorganizatsii Kul'tpropa TsK VKP(b)" (On the Reorganization of the Kultprop of the Central Committee of the All-Union CP[b]), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 11. (June 1935), p. 47.

50. At the same time, a Soviet Control Committee was also established to replace the old Commissariat of Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. The Soviet Control Committee later became the Ministry of State Control.

51. XVII S"ezd VKP(b), p. 674.

52. Stalin, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B)" in *Problems of Leninism*, p. 516.

53. Russian Institute, Columbia University (ed.), *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York, 1956), pp. 22-23. When the carnage was over, out of a total of 139 Central Committee members and candidates elected at the Seventeenth Party Congress, 22 carried over to membership in the Central Committee in 1939 and 2 remained as candidates. Among the 22 were Stalin, Andreyev, Beria, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Lazar Kaganovich, Kalinin, Mikoyan, Molotov, Khrushchev, and Shvernik, all 11 of whom were members of the Politburo circle; Bulganin, who was elected a candidate member in 1946; Poskrebyshev, the head of Stalin's personal secretariat; M. M. Kaganovich, the brother of Lazar; Manuilsky, the Comintern expert; Litvinov, the Commissar of Foreign Affairs; Losovsky, a trade-union expert; Budenny, the Civil War cavalry hero; Mekhlis, the head of the Political Administration of the Red Army; and a few others of lesser significance. It is perhaps not too fantastic to suggest that this narrow group of survivors of the purge also included the chief executioners.

54. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow: Reports and Speeches at the Eighteenth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolshevik)* (Moscow, 1939), p. 202.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

57. XVIII S"ezd Vsesoyuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (b) *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Eighteenth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party [b], Stenographic Report [March 10-21, 1939]; Moscow, 1939), p. 670; hereafter cited as XVIII S"ezd VKP(b).

58. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 204-205.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 212.

60. *Ibid.*, p. 471.

61. *Ibid.*, p. 460.

62. G. M. Malenkov, "O Zadachakh Partiinykh Organizatsii v Oblasti Promyshlennosti i Transporta" (Concerning the Tasks of Party Organizations in the Sphere of Industry and Transport), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 4-5 (February-March 1941), p. 13.

63. "O Zadachakh Partiinykh Organizatsii v Oblasti Promyshlennosti i Transporta, Rezolyutsiya po Dokladu Tov. Malenkova, Prinyataya XVIII Vsesoyuznoi Konferentsiei VKP(b)" (Concerning the Tasks of Party Organizations in the Sphere of Industry and Transport, Resolution on the Report of Comrade Malenkov Adopted by the Eighteenth All-Union Conference of the All-Union CP[b]), *ibid.*, p. 151.

64. For a remarkably ingenious effort at reconstruction, see Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff: The 'Apparatus' of the Central Committee, Communist

- Party of the Soviet Union," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV, no. 1 (March 1950), 64-85.
65. *Moskovskii Bol'shevik*, February 2, 1949, p. 6.
  66. For verification, see *Sovetskaya Estoniya*, August 19, 1949.
  67. See T. H. Rigby, "Khrushchev and the Resuscitation of the Central Committee," *Australian Outlook*, XIII, no. 3 (September 1959), 174.
  68. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (Party Workers' Handbook; Moscow, 1957), p. 127.
  69. *Problemi e realtà dell' URSS* (Rome, 1958), pp. 48-83.
  70. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1957), pp. 405, 408-409, 436-439, and *ibid.* (1959), pp. 154-160.
  71. *Ibid.* (1957), p. 429.
  72. *Ibid.* (1957), pp. 441-442, and *ibid.* (1959), pp. 555-556.
  73. *Pravda*, March 24, 1962.
  74. *Sovetskaya Litva*, July 20, 1962.
  75. See *Pravda*, October 7, 1952.
  76. Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism*, p. 36.
  77. See XIV S"ezd VKP(b), p. 81.
  78. *Pravda*, February 16, 1956, and *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1957), pp. 440-441.
  79. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1957), pp. 406-408, and *ibid.* (1959), pp. 545-546.
  80. *Pravda*, October 18, 1961.
  81. *Kommunist*, no. 7 (May 1962), p. 61.
  82. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
  83. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 24 (December 1961), p. 12.
  84. *Kommunist* (Yerevan), January 7, 1962.

## Chapter 7

### *Party Organization, Activities, and Problems*

1. "Ustav Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza" (The Rules of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), *Pravda*, November 3, 1961.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*
4. *Pravda*, October 29, 1961.
5. *Ibid.*, October 19, 1961.
6. *Ibid.*, November 3, 1961.
7. *Ibid.*, October 29, 1961.
8. *Ibid.*, November 3, 1961.
9. *Ibid.*
10. XXII S"ezd Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza, *Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Stenographic Report [October 17-31, 1961], Moscow, 1962), I, 426-427.
11. *Pravda*, November 3, 1961.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Russian Institute, Columbia University (ed.), *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, p. 21.
14. *Pravda*, November 3, 1961.
15. *Ibid.*, November 1, 1961.
16. After a meteoric rise with Khrushchev's support, in January 1960 Kirichenko was downgraded to the position of Party secretary in Rostov, and in June of the same year he was removed from that post. No public explanations for his downfall were vouchsafed.
17. *Pravda*, November 24, 1962.

18. *XXI S"ezd KPSS*, II, 48.
19. *Pravda*, October 26, 1961.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*, November 3, 1961.
22. Louis Nemzer, "The Kremlin's Professional Staff," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV, no. 1 (March 1950), 65.
23. John Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York, 1959), p. 52.
24. *Pravda*, November 20, 1962.
25. *Ibid.*
26. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 21 (November 1962), p. 34.
27. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (Party Workers' Handbook; Moscow, 1957), pp. 440-441.
28. *Pravda*, November 3, 1961.
29. *Ibid.*
30. For text of the decree, see *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1959), pp. 575-580.
31. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 11, pp. 9-16.
32. *Pravda*, November 3, 1961.
33. Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism*, pp. 44-46.
34. *Pravda*, October 6, 1952.
35. *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, April 14, 1961.
36. For an authoritative account, see Armstrong, pp. 146-150.
37. *Socialism Victorious* [a collection of the most important reports and speeches delivered at the Seventeenth Party Congress] (New York, n.d.), p. 179.
38. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.
39. *Pravda*, June 30, 1962.
40. *Ibid.*, January 7, 1961.
41. *Ibid.*, February 15, 1956.
42. *Ibid.*
43. *Pravda*, October 6, 1952.
44. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 3, pp. 47-50.
45. *Izvestiya*, June 14, 1962.
46. *Kommunist Tadzhikistana*, April 21, 1962.
47. *Izvestiya*, June 14, 1962.
48. *Sovetskaya Kirghiziya*, May 25, 1961.
49. Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism*, pp. 27-28.
50. For text of the decree, see *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1957), pp. 410-415.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 410.
52. *Pravda*, September 13, 1961.
53. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1957), p. 410.
54. *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.

## *Chapter 8*

### *The Composition and Social Structure of the Party*

1. G. M. Malenkov, "Otchetnyi Doklad Tsentral'nogo Komiteta VKP(b) XIX S"ezdu Partii" (Report of the Central Committee of the All-Union CP[b] to the Nineteenth Party Congress), *Pravda*, October 6, 1952, p. 7.
2. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 299.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 370-371.
4. Lenin, "O Chistke Partii" (On Purging the Party), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 12.
5. Three categories were established to provide differential conditions of eligibility to Party membership: (1) workers and Red Army men who were workers or peasants, (2) peasants (except Red Army men) and artisans not exploiting the labor

of others, (3) other (office employees, etc.). Candidates in the first and second categories were to be admitted on the recommendation of three members with a Party standing of at least three years. Candidates in the third category required the recommendation of five members with a Party standing of at least five years. For those in the first category, the minimum candidate stage was fixed as six months, for the second category one year, and for the third category two years. Regardless of their social position, former members of other parties required the recommendation of five Party members of not less than five years' standing and could only be admitted with the approval of a provincial Party committee.

At the Fourteenth Party Congress in December 1925 the Party Rules were again revised to provide additional preferential advantages for workers at the bench. The first category of workers and Red Army men of worker or peasant origin was subdivided into two groups: (1) industrial workers permanently engaged as wage earners at physical work, and (2) nonindustrials and Red Army men of worker, peasant, or farm-labor origin. Industrial workers were to be admitted into the Party on the recommendation of two members of not less than one year's standing, while the remaining groups in the first category required two recommendations from Party members of not less than two years' standing. Persons in the second category were to be admitted on the recommendation of three Party members of not less than two years' standing, while persons of the third category continued to require five recommendations from Party members of not less than five years' standing.

6. See V. V., "Rost Partii v Pervom Polugodii 1932 g." (Party Growth in the First Half of 1932), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo* (Party Construction), no. 21 (November 1932), pp. 46-48.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

8. Khataevich, "O Sostoyanii i Rabote Partiinoi Yacheiki v Derevne" (On the Condition and Work of the Party Cell in the Village), *Bol'shevik*, no. 3-4 (19-20) (February 1925), pp. 74-86.

9. See Ya. Paikin, "Kommunisty-Krest'yane Belorusskoi Derevni" (Communist Peasants in the Belorussian Village), *Bol'shevik*, no. 17 (September 15, 1929), pp. 70ff.

10. Of these, 20 per cent were eliminated as "alien elements" or for "connections with alien elements," 9.2 per cent for various criminal offenses such as embezzlement and bribery, 6.4 per cent for refusal to enter a kolkhoz, 3.6 per cent for hiding grain surpluses, 4.6 per cent for performance of religious rites and anti-Semitism, and the remainder for various miscellaneous reasons ("Vypolnim Vazhneishie Reshenie Partii" [We Shall Carry Out the Most Important Decision of the Party], *Bol'shevik*, no. 18 [September 30, 1929], p. 6).

11. V. Vlasov, "Rost i Kachestvennoe Ukreplenie Ryadov Partii" (The Increase and Qualitative Strengthening of the Party's Ranks), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 16 (August 1932), p. 7.

12. See Table 9 in Bubnov, "VKP(b)," *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, XI, 534.

13. Vlasov, *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 16 (August 1932), p. 5. A study limited to the largest industrial enterprises, where the Party organizations were strongest, reported the following percentages as of April 1, 1931: oil, 20.5 per cent; leather, 19.8; metalworking, 17.3; chemical, 16.3; textile, 14.2; paper, 13.1; wood, 12.5; transport, 10.8; ore mining, 8.7; coal, 8.6; and electrical energy, 7.5 (G. Peskarev, "Dinamika Rosta i Problema Regulirovaniya Sostava Partii" [The Dynamics of Growth and the Problem of Regulating the Composition of the Party], *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 17 [September 1931], p. 38).

14. See book review by V. Anichkov, "P. Zaslavsky, 'Parrabota na Krupnykh Stroitel'stvakh,' Ogiz Moskovskii Rabochii, 1931 g., str. 64" (P. Zaslavsky, "Party Work in Large Industries," Ogiz, Moscow Worker, 1931, 64 pp.), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 13 (July 1931), p. 69.

15. "XVI S"ezd VKP(b) v Tsifrakh" (Sixteenth Congress of the All-Union CP[b] in Figures), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 13-14 (July 1930), p. 30; XV S"ezd VKP(b), p. 1107.

16. Vlasov, *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 16 (August 1932), p. 5.
17. V. Vlasov, "Za Uluchshenie Sostava Natsorganizatsii" (For Improvement in the Composition of National Organizations), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 19-20 (October 1930), p. 21.
18. Vlasov, *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 16 (August 1932), p. 9.
19. *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (1930 ed.), XI, 541.
20. See A. Serebrennikov, "O Prieme Intelligentsii v Partiyu" (On the Acceptance of Intelligentsia into the Party), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 6(8) (March 1930), pp. 32-35.
21. M. Ryutin, "Rukovodящие Кадры VKP(b)" (Leading Cadres of the All-Union CP[b]), *Bol'shevik*, no. 15 (August 15, 1928), p. 27.
22. See Table 18 in *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, XI, 542.
23. *XVII S'ezd VKP(b)*, p. 675.
24. The categories of the purged included "passive elements" whose political-ideological training was deficient, "class-alien and hostile elements" who concealed their social origin in applying for admission to the Party, "double-dealers" who hid their real views from the Party, "violators of the iron discipline of the Party," "degenerates" who were accused of softness toward the bourgeoisie and kulaks, "moral degenerates" whose misbehavior undermined the prestige of the Party, and "careerists," "self-seekers," and "bureaucratic" elements who utilized their privileges as Party members for their own ends.
25. *VKP(b)v Rezolyutsiyakh*, II, 635-636, 638, 641.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 671-677.
27. Stalin, "New Conditions — New Tasks in Economic Construction," *Problems of Leninism*, p. 378-380.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 566-567.
29. Thus, the district committee of the Gorky region reported that out of 602 candidates enrolled between November 1936 and November 1938, 208 were engineering-technical personnel, 312 were workers, and the rest belonged to other categories. See I. Shishkin, "Luchshikh Lyudei v Partiyu Lenina-Stalina" (Better People for Membership in the Party of Lenin and Stalin), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 23 (December 1, 1938), p. 40. Djashi's report for the Georgian organization at the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 gave the following breakdown for the more than 26,000 members and candidates admitted since November 1, 1936: workers, 35.6 per cent; collective farmers, 18.3 per cent; and employees, 42.8 per cent (*XVIII S'ezd VKP[b]*, p. 577). His speech also made clear that the Party was pursuing a vigorous drive to enlist the rural intelligentsia and administrators in the Party, and impressive figures were cited on the number of agronomists, teachers, doctors, chairmen of village soviets, chairmen of collective farms, and brigadiers who were listed on the Party rolls. Similar statistics were adduced by other speakers. Cheplakov of the Azerbaijan Party analyzed the candidate group in that republic as composed of 25.5 per cent workers, 30 per cent collective farmers, and 44.5 per cent intelligentsia (*ibid.*, p. 548).
30. Stalin, "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," *Problems of Leninism*, pp. 663, 665.
31. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 181, 183.
32. I. Kiryushkin, "Pouchitel'nye Uroki" (Instructive Lessons), *Pravda*, April 22, 1942, p. 3.
33. *Socialism Victorious*, pp. 217-218.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
35. F. Chivirev, "K Voprosu o Rabote s Kommunistami-Odinochkami" (On the Question of Work with Single Communists), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 14 (July 1935), p. 30.
36. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, p. 244.
37. *Socialism Victorious*, p. 205.
38. V. Egerov, "Za Stalinskoe Vydvizhenie Partkadrov" (For the Stalinist Promotion of Party Cadres), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 13 (July 1, 1937), p. 40.
39. "O Rabote Partiinykh Organizatsii sredi Zhenshchin" (On the Work of

Party Organizations among Women), *Bol'shevik*, no. 1 (January 1951), p. 11. There were substantial variations in the regional pattern. In the Ivanovo region with its large number of female textile operatives, women composed 30 per cent of the Party organization in 1937, but this proportion was far from characteristic of the Soviet Union as a whole (I. Nosov, "Ucheba Partiinogo Aktiva" [Training the Party Aktiv], *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 1 [January 1, 1937], p. 34). In an article entitled "Some Conclusions after the Purge of the Central-Asian Party Organization," Ya. Peters wrote, "The Central Committees of the national Communist Parties . . . show little interest in these questions [concerning the role of women], and in their apparatus it is impossible to find any data about the participation of women in Party work or about the admission of women into the Party or the government—in fact, any material whatsoever about work among women. This field is completely forgotten and neglected" ("Nekotorye Vyvody iz Chistki Sredne-Aziatskoi Partorganizatsii," *Bol'shevik*, no. 3 [February 15, 1935], p. 31).

40. Out of 2,049 secretaries elected in 1937 by primary Party organizations in the Moscow area, 300 or 14.6 per cent were women. In the Ivanovo region in the same year 13.7 per cent of the secretaries and 17.7 per cent of the partorgs were women (A. Bogomolov, "Vybory Partorganov v Moskovskoi Organizatsii" [Election of Party Organs in the Moscow Organization], *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 11 [June 1, 1937], p. 13; L. Kovalev, "Bol'shevistskaya Proverka Snizu" [Bolshevik Verification from Below], *ibid.*, p. 23). In the Leningrad elections of 1938, 18 per cent of the secretaries chosen were women (M. Sokolov, "Partiinyye Massy Proveryayut Svoikh Rukovoditelei" [The Party Masses Check on Their Leaders], *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 10 [May 15, 1938], p. 35).

41. XVIII S"ezd VKP(b), p. 149.

42. Ya. Peters, p. 23.

43. Solomon M. Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, p. 302.

44. See Rudzutak's report to the Seventeenth Congress in XVII S"ezd VKP(b), p. 287.

45. See S. Freiberg, "Iz Praktiki Raboty s Partiinym Aktivom" (From Experience in Work with the Party Aktiv), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 10 (May 1935), p. 26.

46. XVIII S"ezd VKP(b), p. 149.

47. See Malenkov's report, *ibid.*, p. 148.

48. *Ibid.*

49. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 238–239.

50. *Ibid.*, p. 239.

51. By a Central Committee decree of August 19, 1941, such applicants could be received into the Party on the endorsement of three Party members of one year's standing. By a later decree (December 9, 1941), the candidacy stage for these applicants was reduced to three months. These decrees are summarized in "Voprosy Chlenstva v VKP(b), po Dokumentam i Tsifram za 30 Let" (Questions of Membership in the All-Union CP[b], According to Documents and Figures for Thirty Years), *Partiinaya Zhizn'* (Party Life), no. 20 (October 1947), p. 82.

52. P. Pospelov, "Partiya Lenina-Stalina — Rukovodiyashchaya i Napravlyayushchaya Sila Sovetskogo Obychestva" (The Party of Lenin and Stalin Is the Leading and Directing Force of Soviet Society), *Bol'shevik*, no. 20 (October 30, 1947), p. 37.

53. *Informatsionnoe Soveshchanie Predstavitelei Nekotorykh Kompartii v Pol'she v Kontse Sentyabrya 1947 goda* (Informational Conference of Representatives of Certain Communist Parties in Poland at the End of September 1947), p. 144.

54. *Pravda*, October 9, 1952, p. 6.

55. "Report by Comrade M. D. Bagirov at 18th Congress of Azerbaiaidzhan Communist Party on the Work of the Azerbaiaidzhan Communist Party Central Committee," *Bakinskii Rabochii* (The Baku Worker), May 26, 1951, pp. 1–6, translated in *CDSP*, III, no. 24 (July 28, 1951), 9.

56. M. Shamberg, "Nekotorye Voprosy Vnutripartiinoi Raboty" (Certain Questions on Intra-Party Work), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 4 (February 1946), p. 28.

57. S. Kурдин, "Rukovodstvo Priemom v Ryady Partii i Vospitanie Molodyykh

Kommunistov" (Supervision of Admission to Party Membership and the Training of Young Communists), *Bol'shevik*, no. 23 (December 1951), p. 50.

58. "Report of the Party Central Committee of Kazakhstan to the Fifth Congress of the Kazakhstan Communist Party," *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda* (Alma-Ata), December 16, 1951, pp. 1-6, translated in *CDSR*, IV, no. 15 (May 24, 1952), 13. The only notable divergence from this trend was Baku where 56.3 per cent of those admitted as members and candidates in 1950 were reported as workers while only 25.3 per cent were classified as engineers, technicians, and persons of other specialties. This ratio was markedly atypical (Bagirov, *CDSR*, III [July 28, 1951], 9).

59. "Shiroko Razvernut' Politicheskuyu Rabotu v Derevne" (For the Widespread Development of Political Work in Rural Areas), *Bol'shevik*, no. 6 (March 1947), p. 6.

60. Bagirov, *CDSR*, III (July 28, 1951), 9.

61. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 5 (March 1948), p. 11.

62. See Malenkov's speech to the Nineteenth Party Congress, *Pravda*, October 6, 1952, p. 5.

63. "O Rabote Partiinykh Organizatsii sredi Zhenshchin" (On the Work of Party Organizations among Women), *Bol'shevik*, no. 1 (January 1951), p. 11.

64. Shamburg, p. 28.

65. *Bol'shevik*, no. 1 (January 1951), p. 11.

66. See the report of the Mandate Commission to the Nineteenth Party Congress, *Pravda*, October 9, 1952, p. 6.

67. "O Rabote Partiinykh Organizatsii sredi Zhenshchin," *Bol'shevik*, p. 17.

68. Shamburg, p. 28.

69. See *XVIII S"ezd VKP(b)*, p. 149, and the report of the Mandate Commission, *Pravda*, October 9, 1952, p. 6.

70. G. F. Aleksandrov, "Nas Osenyaet Velikoe Znamya Lenina-Stalina" (The Great Banner of Lenin and Stalin Shields Us), *Bol'shevik*, no. 1 (January 1947), p. 14.

71. *Ibid.*

72. *XVIII S"ezd VKP(b)*, p. 148.

73. Report of the Mandate Commission, *Pravda*, October 9, 1952, p. 6.

74. As an indication of its increased hold on the intelligentsia, the Party in 1947 listed among its members 148,000 engineers, 24,000 agronomists and other agricultural specialists, almost 40,000 physicians, and 80,000 teachers (G. F. Aleksandrov, *Bol'shevik*, no. 1 [January 1947], p. 14).

75. See the speech of Kirichenko at the Twenty-First Party Congress, *Pravda*, February 1, 1959.

76. "KPSS v Tsifrakh" (The Party in Figures), *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1 (January 1962), p. 44.

77. *Ibid.*

78. *Sovetskaya Belorussiya*, February 13, 1954.

79. *Pravda*, March 21, 1954.

80. *Ibid.*, February 17, 1956.

81. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 23 (December 1958), p. 18.

82. *Ibid.*, no. 12 (June 1958), pp. 57-59.

83. *Pravda*, October 18, 1961.

84. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1, 1962, p. 47.

85. *Ibid.*

86. *Ibid.*, pp. 51-52.

87. *Ibid.*

88. *Ibid.*, p. 48.

89. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 20 (October 1957), p. 89; *Pravda*, January 30, 1959, October 22, 1961.

90. These computations are based on Party membership data.

91. See Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union* (New York, 1960), p. 567.

92. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 12 (June 1958), pp. 57-59.

93. *Ibid.*, no. 1, 1962, p. 50.
94. *Pravda*, October 22, 1961.
95. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 1, 1962, p. 48.
96. *Ibid.*

## Chapter 9

### *The Komsomol — Youth under Dictatorship*

1. These are the figures supplied by S. P. Pavlov, first secretary of the Komsomol, in his report to the Fourteenth Congress of the YCL, *Pravda*, April 17, 1962.
2. The observations reported here are based both on a consultation of official Soviet publications and on a series of interviews with some fifty Soviet defectors and nonreturners who were at one time members of the Pioneers and Komsomol. The interviews took place in Western Germany and Austria during the summer and fall of 1949. The great majority of those interviewed had left the Soviet Union during World War II; a small minority consisted of recent defectors from the Red Army and the Soviet Military Government in Germany. For a general treatment of the attitudes of Soviet nonreturners and defectors, see Merle Fainsod, "Controls and Tensions in the Soviet System," *American Political Science Review*, XLIV, no. 2 (June 1950), 266-282.
3. Quoted in Klaus Mehnert, *Youth in Soviet Russia* (London, 1933), p. 49.
4. *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya* (Great Soviet Encyclopedia; 1930 ed.), XI, 635-638.
5. For a copy of this resolution, see VKP(b), *O Komsomole i Molodezhi* (On the Komsomol and Youth; Moscow, 1938), p. 76. This volume is a valuable collection of the most important Party resolutions on the Komsomol for the period up to 1938.
6. Mehnert, p. 53.
7. *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, XI, 638.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 640.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 645-649; also VKP(b), *O Komsomole i Molodezhi*, pp. 80-82.
10. Mehnert, pp. 60-61.
11. *Bol'shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopediya*, XI, 649.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 649-650.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 649.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 653-654.
15. See Mehnert, *passim*.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 91.
17. Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York, 1948), p. 140; also "Dvadtsatiletie Komsomola" (Twenty Years of the Komsomol), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo* (Party Construction), no. 16 (August 15, 1938), pp. 52-59.
18. A. A. Andreyev, "Kommunisticheskoe Vospitanie Molodezhi i Zadachi Komsomola" (The Communist Education of the Youth and the Tasks of the Komsomol), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 9 (May 1936), p. 10.
19. *Ibid.*
20. A. V. Kosarev, "O Perestroike Raboty Komsomola" (On the Reorganization of Komsomol Work), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 14 (July 1935), p. 8.
21. Towster, p. 140.
22. See the attack in the editorial "Vyshe Bol'shevistskuyu Bditel'nost' Komsomol'tsev" (Raise the Bolshevik Vigilance of the Komsomol), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 18 (September 1937), p. 8.
23. See for example, D. Smirnov, "Perestroika Raboty v Komsomole" (Reshaping the Work of the Komsomol), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 12 (June 15, 1937), pp. 23-27. See also P. Vershkov, "Sovetskoi Molodezhi — Leninsko-Stalinskoe Vospitanie" (A Leninist-Stalinist Education for Soviet Youth), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*,

no. 7 (April 1, 1938), pp. 28–33, where some typical expulsion figures are cited. In the Komsomol organization of Georgia, 1,577 persons were excluded in the third quarter of 1937, of whom 1,182 were denounced as "hostile elements." In the Omsk region, during the same period, 1,101 Komsomols were excluded, of whom 731 were denounced as "hostile elements and double-dealers."

24. See Vershkov, *ibid.* p. 28.

25. *Sobranie Postanovlenii i Rasporyazhenii Pravitel'stva SSSR* (Collection of Decrees and Ordinances of the Government of the USSR), 1940, no. 27, sect. 637; 1940, no. 29, sect. 698.

26. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Official Journal of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), 1940, no. 37.

27. Towster, p. 140.

28. See A. N. Shelepin, "Doklad Mandatnoi Komissii XI S'ezda VLKSM" (Report of the Mandate Commission, Eleventh Congress of the All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth), *Molodoi Bol'shevik* (Young Bolshevik), no. 8 (April 1949), p. 67.

29. See for examples the following articles: V. Ershov, "Ne Isklyuchat' Ogul'no, a Vospitat'" (Ob Oshibke Kemerovskogo Obkoma Komsomola) (Do Not Exclude Without Foundation, but Educate [On the Mistakes of the Kemerovo Regional Committee of the Komsomol]), *Molodoi Bol'shevik*, no. 21 (November 1949), pp. 39–43; resolutions of the Second Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee, "O Roste Ryadov VLKSM Sverdlovskoi Oblastnoi Komsomol'skoi Organizatsii" (On the Growth in the Ranks of the All-Union LCLY in the Sverdlovsk Regional Komsomol Organization) and "O Rabote Komsomol'skoi Organizatsii Stalingradskogo Traktornogo Zavoda Imeni F. Dzerzhinskogo" (On the Work of the Komsomol Organization in the F. Dzerzhinsky Tractor Factory in Stalingrad), *Molodoi Bol'shevik*, no. 1 (January 1950), pp. 33–44; "O Stile Raboty Molotovskogo Obkoma Komsomola" (On the Style of Work of the Molotov Regional Committee of the Komsomol), *Molodoi Bol'shevik*, no. 9 (May 1950), pp. 30–37.

30. N. A. Mikhailov, "Nepreryvno Uluchshat' Rabotu s Komsomol'skimi Kadrami" (For Constant Improvement in the Work with Komsomol Cadres), *Molodoi Bol'shevik*, no. 15 (August 1952), p. 4.

31. N. A. Mikhailov, "O Roste Ryadov VLKSM" (On the Growth in the Ranks of the All-Union LCLY), *Molodoi Bol'shevik*, no. 3 (February 1951), p. 5.

32. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, March 20, 1954.

33. *Pravda*, April 17, 1962.

34. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, February 23, 1957.

35. E. N. Medynsky, *Narodnoye Obrazovanie v SSSR* (Public Education in the USSR), Moscow, 1947, p. 32.

36. *Pravda*, April 17, 1962.

37. For the Pioneer rules, see *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (Party Workers' Handbook), Moscow, 1959), pp. 787–795.

38. *Pravda*, November 30, 1957 and May 19, 1958.

39. For the text of the Komsomol rules, see *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 21, 1962.

40. *Ibid.*

41. *Ibid.*

42. *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1959), p. 778.

43. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 17, 1962.

44. *Pravda*, April 21, 1962.

45. For the report at the Thirteenth Congress, see *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 17, 1958; for the Fourteenth Congress, *ibid.*, April 18, 1962.

46. For the decree establishing the course, see *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1961), pp. 535–537.

47. *Pravda*, April 17, 1962.

48. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 16, 1958.

49. *Ibid.*

50. *Pravda*, April 17, 1962.

51. *Young Communists in the USSR*, trans. Virginia Rhine (Washington, 1950), p. 19.
52. See D. G. Popov, "Rabota Komsomolskoe Organizatsii v Shkole" (The Work of Komsomol Organizations in the Schools) in *Kommunisticheskoe Vospitanie v Sovetskoi Shkole: Sbornik Statei* (Communist Education in the Soviet School: Collection of Articles), II, 289.
53. *Young Communists in the USSR*, p. 7.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
57. *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, April 16, 1958.
58. *Ibid.*
59. *Pravda*, April 17, 1962.
60. For the text of the Resolution of the Seventh Plenum of the Komsomol Central Committee, dated February 27, 1957, see *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1957), p. 584.
61. For an excellent English translation of portions of the poem, which was first published in *Oktyabr'*, no. 10 (October 1956), see Hugh McLean and Walter N. Vickery (eds.), *The Year of Protest—1956* (New York, 1961), pp. 122–131.
62. *Pravda*, April 21, 1962.

## Chapter 10

### *The Party Command—Politburo and Presidium*

1. *Protokoly TsK RSDRP* (August 1917–February 1918), pp. 100–101.
2. For a description of the incident, see Lenin, "Politicheskiy Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RKP(b) 27 Marta" (Political Report of the Central Committee of the RCP[b], March 27, 1922), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 247–251.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
4. XV S"ezd VKP(b), p. 108.
5. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, II, 100–102.
6. Lenin, "Luchshe Menshe, da Luchshe" (Better Less, but Better), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 413.
7. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, II, 275–276.
8. Quoted in Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), p. 436.
9. Kuibyshev's father was an army officer and his mother a teacher. As a youth he attended a military school and spent a year at the St. Petersburg Academy of Military Medicine, from which he was excluded in 1906 for subversive political activity. From that point on he became a professional revolutionary. Ordjonikidze came from a family of small gentry and was trained as a *feldsher*, or medical assistant. Molotov was born in a family of merchant clerks and interspersed his career as a revolutionary organizer with study at the St. Petersburg Polytechnic Institute. Both Ordjonikidze and Molotov were particularly close to Stalin. Ordjonikidze, a fellow Georgian, was an intimate associate of Stalin in the days of his obscurity in the Caucasus. Molotov, a later acquisition, began his career as a *fides Achates* in 1917 and continued to discharge that role until Stalin's death.
10. Russian Institute, Columbia University (ed.), *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York, 1956), p. 25.
11. *Pravda*, February 19, 1937.
12. *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, p. 69.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 34–35.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 29.
16. *Ibid.*, pp. 31–34.

17. Quoted in Walter Duranty, *Stalin & Co.* (New York, 1949), pp. 201–202.
18. *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, pp. 58–60.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 82–84.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
21. *Pravda*, August 26, 1952.
22. *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, pp. 84–85.
23. Speech by Khrushchev at the All-Union Conference of Railroad Transport Workers, May 10, 1962, in *Pravda*, May 11, 1962.
24. *Problemi e realtà dell' URSS* (Rome, 1958), p. 75.
25. *Pravda*, January 14, 1961.
26. See *The Report of the Royal Commission Appointed under Order in Council P. C. 411 of February 5, 1946 to Investigate . . . Communication by Public Officials . . . of Secret . . . Information to Agents of a Foreign Power*, June 27, 1946 (Ottawa, 1946).
27. See Stalin's letter to Colonel Razin of February 23, 1946, translated in Byron Dexter, "Clausewitz and Soviet Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, XXIX, no. 1 (October 1950), 44. For the original text, see "Otvet Tov. Stalina na Pis'mo Tov. Razina" (Comrade Stalin's Reply to the Letter of Comrade Razin) in *Bol'shevik*, no. 3 (February 1947), pp. 6–8.
28. *Pravda*, November 7, 1957.
29. "Pis'mo T. Ivanova i Otvet T. Stalina" (The Letter of Comrade Ivanov and Comrade Stalin's Reply), *Bol'shevik*, no. 4 (February 15, 1938), p. 14.
30. Lenin, "Otchet Tsentral'novo Komiteta 18 Marta" (Report of the Central Committee, March 18 [1919]), *Sochineniya*, XXIV, 122.
31. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.
32. *Ibid.*, November 29, 1957.
33. *Ibid.*, February 15, 1956.
34. *Ibid.*, January 25, 1961.
35. *Ibid.*.
36. *Ibid.*, November 29, 1957.
37. *Ibid.*, November 6, 1957.
38. *Ibid.*

## *Chapter 11*

### *Constitutional Myths and Political Realities*

1. *Vtoroi Vserossiiskii S"ezd Sovetov R. i S.D.* (Second All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies), p. 79.
2. Oliver H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge, Mass., 1950), p. 80.
3. James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1918* (Stanford, 1934), p. 375.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 378.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 385.
6. *Tretii Vserossiiskii S"ezd Sovetov Rabochikh, Soldatskikh i Krest'yanskikh Deputatov* (Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies), p. 5.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
8. *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94.
9. The richest source on the history of the drafting of the 1918 constitution is G. S. Gurvich, *Istoriya Sovetskoi Konstitutsii* (History of the Soviet Constitution; Moscow, 1923). This volume contains the texts of all proposals which were submitted to the committee and provides a revealing analysis of the debates within the drafting group.

10. Quoted in James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April–December 1918* (Baltimore, 1936), p. 502.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 502, 504.
12. See Stanley W. Page, "Lenin, the National Question and the Baltic States, 1917–19," *The American Slavic and East European Review*, VII, no. 1 (February 1948), 15–31.
13. Stalin, "Ob Ukrainskoi Rade" (On the Ukrainian Rada), *Sochineniya*, IV, 15.
14. "Sovet Narodnykh Komissarov ob Ukraine" (The Council of People's Commissars on the Ukraine), *Pravda*, no. 198 (November 24/December 7, 1917), p. 3.
15. Yu. V. Klyuchnikov and A. V. Sabanin, *Mezhdunarodnaya Politika Noveishego Vremeni v Dogovorakh, Notakh i Deklaratsiyakh* (International Politics of Modern Times in Treaties, Notes, and Declarations; Moscow, 1925–1929), III(1), 22.
16. See W. R. Batsell, *Soviet Rule in Russia* (New York, 1929), p. 217.
17. Stalin, "Organizatsionnyi Otchet Tsentral'nogo Komiteta RKP(b) 17 Aprelya 1923 g." (Organizational Report of the Central Committee of the RCP[b], April 17, 1923), *Sochineniya*, V, 231.
18. See Batsell, pp. 232–235.
19. Stalin, "Vystuplenie na Soveshchanii po Sozyvu Uchreditel'nogo S"ezda Tataro-Bashkirskoi Sovetskoi Respubliki" (Address at the Conference on the Convocation of a Constituent Congress of the Tatar-Bashkir Soviet Republic), *Sochineniya*, IV, 87.
20. According to Batsell, p. 235, about 60 per cent of the original membership of the Communist parties of Bokhara and Khorezm was composed of clergy and merchants. At the Tenth Party Congress in 1921, Safarov, an Old Bolshevik who had visited Turkestan, reported seeing the following notice in a small town of Turkestan: "Since divine service today is being performed . . . by a Communist priest, all members of the Communist Party are invited to the service" (*Protokoly Desyatogo S"ezda RKP[b]* [Moscow, 1933], p. 195).
21. Lenin, "Kriticheskie Zametki po Natsional'nomu Voprosu" (Critical Remarks on the National Question), *Sochineniya*, XVII, 146.
22. Quoted in Batsell, p. 117.
23. Lenin, "Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo po Dokladu o Partiinoi Programme 19 Marta" (Concluding Remarks on the Report Concerning the Party Program, March 19, 1919), *Sochineniya*, XXIV, 155.
24. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 456–457. Translated in Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, p. 37.
25. Stalin, "Politika Sovetskoi Vlasti po Natsional'nomu Voprosu v Rossii" (Policy of the Soviet State on the National Question in Russia), *Pravda*, October 10, 1920; reprinted in *Sochineniya*, IV, 358.
26. Stalin, "O Politicheskikh Zadachakh Universiteta Narodov Vostoka" (On the Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples of the East), *Sochineniya*, VII, 138; quoted in Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, pp. 38–39.
27. Stalin, "Marksizm i Natsional'nyi Vopros" (Marxism and the National Question), *Sochineniya*, II, 343.
28. Stalin, "Doklad po Natsional'nomu Voprosu 29 Aprelya 1917 g." (Report on the National Question, April 29, 1917), *Sochineniya*, III, 55.
29. XIV S"ezd VKP(b), pp. 881–882.
30. For text of treaty see Batsell, pp. 246–247.
31. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 456.
32. *Devyatyi Vserossiiskii S"ezd Rabochikh, Krest'yanskikh, Krasnoarmeiskikh i Kazach'ikh Deputatov, Stenograficheskii Otchet* (Ninth All-Russian Congress of Workers', Peasants', Red Army and Cossacks' Deputies, Stenographic Report [December 22–27, 1921]; Moscow, 1922), p. 299; Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917–1923*, I, 389.
33. See Batsell, p. 276.
34. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, I, 593.
35. Stalin, "Doklad o Natsional'nykh Momentakh v Partiinom i Gosudarstvennom Stroitel'stve" (Report on the National Factors in Party and State Construction), *Sochineniya*, V, 244–245.

36. "Chetvertoe Soveshchanie TsK RKP(b) s Otvetstvennymi Rabotnikami Nacional'nykh Respublik i Oblastei, Zaklyuchitel'noe Slovo" (Fourth Conference of the Central Committee RCP[b] with Officials of the National Republics and Oblasts, Concluding Remarks), *Sochineniya*, V, 335-336.
37. "Politika Sovetskoi Vlasti po Natsional'nому Voprosu" (Policy of the Soviet State on the National Question), reprinted in *Sochineniya*, IV, 353-354.
38. "Tov. Kaganovichu i Drugim Chlenam PB TsK KP(b)U" (To Comrade Kaganovich and Other Members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CP[b] of the Ukraine), *Sochineniya*, VIII, 149-154.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
40. *Ibid.*
41. Andrei Y. Vyshinsky, *The Law of the Soviet State* (New York, 1948), p. 122.
42. Stalin, "On the New Constitution" in *Problems of Leninism*, p. 571.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 578-579.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 589.
45. *Konstitutsiya (Osnovnoi Zakon) Soyuza Sovetskikh Sotsialisticheskikh Respublik* (Constitution [Fundamental Law] of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; Moscow, 1947).
46. N. N. Polansky, "The Soviet Criminal Court as a Conductor of the Policy of the Party and the Soviet Regime," *Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta* (Moscow University Herald), no. 11 (November 1950), pp. 125-139, condensed and translated in *CDSP*, IV, no. 6 (March 22, 1952), 10.
47. Russian Institute, Columbia University (ed.), *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York, 1960), p. 39.
48. For evidence see Solomon Schwarz, *The Jews in the Soviet Union*, pp. 351-364, and the documentation accumulated by *Jewish Minority Research* (New York), and *Jews in Eastern Europe* (London).
49. Vyshinsky, p. 610.
50. *Zasedaniya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, Tret'ya Sessiya, 20-25 Fevral' 1944 g., Stenograficheskii Ochet* (Meetings of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Third Session, February 20-25, 1944, Stenographic Report; Moscow, 1944), p. 311.
51. *Ibid., Pervaya Sessiya, 12-19 Marta 1946 g.* (First Session, March 12-19, 1946; Moscow, 1946), pp. 345-346.
52. *Pravda*, January 28, 1959.
53. *Ibid.*, October 18, 1961.
54. *Ibid.*, April 26, 1962.
55. *Ibid.*
56. *Ibid.*, June 16, 1962.
57. Vyshinsky, p. 722.
58. *Kultura i Zhizn'*, January 11, 1950, p. 1, as summarized and translated in *CDSP*, II, no. 3 (March 4, 1950), 10-11.
59. *Pravda*, March 21, 1962.
60. See P. K. Ignatov, "From a Deputy's Memoirs," *Oktyabr'* (October), no. 1 (January 1950), pp. 138-154.
61. Stalin, "On the Problems of Leninism" in *Problems of Leninism*, p. 149.
62. "Foundations of Leninism," *ibid.*, p. 36.
63. See Howard R. Sweare, "The Functions of Local Elections," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, V, no. 2 (May 1961), 139.

## Chapter 12

### *The Control of the Bureaucracy*

1. Stalin, "On the Problems of Leninism," *Problems of Leninism*, p. 135.
2. See for example, I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov, *Administrativnoe Pravo SSSR* (Administrative Law of the USSR; Moscow, 1946), part I, pp. 3-143.

3. Lenin, "Pyat' Let Rossiiskoi Revolyutsii i Perspektivy Mirovoi Revolyutsii" (Five Years of the Russian Revolution and the Prospects of the World Revolution), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 353.

4. For text of this speech, see, see "O Zadachakh Partiinykh Organizatsii v Oblasti Promyshlennosti i Transporta" (On the Tasks of Party Organizations in the Spheres of Industry and Transport), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo* (Party Construction), no. 4-5 (February-March 1941), pp. 9-83.

5. *Sbornik Zakonov* (Collection of Laws; Moscow, 1945), vol. II, 1933-1944, p. 41.

6. For a brief description of their operation, see I. P. Trainin and I. D. Levin (eds.), *Sovetskoe Gosudarstvennoe Pravo* (Soviet State Law; Moscow, 1948), pp. 435-436.

7. See *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 10(419), March 28, 1946.

8. This and the following table have been adapted from tables reproduced in Trainin and Levin, pp. 391-392. The statistics, however, have been brought up to date.

9. *Pravda*, April 27, 1954.

10. *Ibid.*, February 16, 1957.

11. *Ibid.*, May 11, 1957.

12. *Ibid.*, May 8, 1957.

13. *Ibid.*, April 5, 1958.

14. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Gazette of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR), no. 202, 1958.

15. V. A. Vlasov, *Osnovy Sovetskogo Gosudarstvennogo Upravlenie* (The Fundamentals of Soviet State Rule; Moscow, 1960), p. 45.

16. For a description of the various types, see I. N. Ananov, *Ministerstva v SSSR* (Ministries in the Soviet Union; Moscow, 1960).

17. See the Central Committee Resolution on Reorganizing Agricultural Management, *Pravda*, March 24, 1962.

18. For the text of Khrushchev's speech, see *Pravda*, June 30, 1962.

19. See Howard R. Swearer, "Khrushchev's Revolution in Industrial Management," *World Politics*, XII, no. 1 (October 1959), 45-61, and Howard R. Swearer, "Administration of Local Industry after the 1957 Industrial Reorganization," *Soviet Studies*, XII, no. 3 (January 1961), 217-229.

20. For the text of the decree, see *Spravochnik Partiinogo Robotnika* (Party Workers' Handbook; Moscow, 1961), pp. 262-266.

21. *Pravda*, October 18, 1961.

22. *Izvestiya*, May 17, 1962.

23. A. Kursky, *The Planning of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R.* (Moscow, 1949), pp. 182-183.

24. *Pravda*, July 2, 1959.

25. Yu. I. Koldomasov, *Planirovaniye Material'no-tehnicheskogo Snabzheniya Narodnogo Khozyaystva v SSSR* (Planning of Material-Technical Supply of the National Economy in the USSR; Moscow, 1961), p. 25.

26. *Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta*, no. 6 (February 5, 1962), pp. 5-6.

27. This discussion of the budget draws heavily on A. M. Alexandrova (ed.), *Gosudarstvennyi Byudzhet SSSR* (State Budget of the Soviet Union; Moscow, 1961).

28. *Pravda*, December 7, 1961.

29. See the report by V. F. Garbuzov, USSR Minister of Finance, *ibid.*

30. *Ibid.*, November 24, 1962.

31. *Ibid.*

32. *Ibid.*

33. For an excellent up-to-date treatment, see Glenn G. Morgan, *Soviet Administrative Legality* (Stanford, 1962).

34. See Khrushchev's secret speech to the Twentieth Party Congress, *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, pp. 21-42.

35. *Izvestiya*, May 7, 1961.

36. *Pravda*, May 25, 1961.

37. *Ibid.*, December 30, 1961.
38. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 8, February 1921.
39. For text of the decree see *Spravochnik Partiinogo Rabotnika* (1961), pp. 584-587.
40. For a detailed description of its work, see A. M. Alexandrova, pp. 399-417.

## *Chapter 13*

### *Terror as a System of Power*

1. *Kommunist*, no. 11 (July 1960), pp. 39-48.
2. Lenin, "Doklad o Deyatel'nosti Soveta Narodnykh Kommissarov 24(11), Yanvarya 1918" (Report on the Activities of the Council of People's Commissars, January 11/24 1918), *Sochineniya*, XXII, 208.
3. Lenin, "Vse na Bor'bu s Denikinym" (All Out for the Fight Against Denikin), *Sochineniya* (4th ed.), XXIX, 417.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 415, 417.
5. Stalin, "Beseda s Inostrannymi Rabochimi Delegatsiyami" (Interview with Foreign Workers' Delegations), *Sochineniya*, X, 234.
6. Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism*, pp. 26-27.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
8. *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.
9. *Ibid.*, January 28, 1959.
10. Lenin, "Zapiska F. E. Dzerzhinskому" (Note to F. E. Dzerzhinsky), *Sochineniya*, XXII, 126.
11. The Cheka was assigned the following functions:
  1. To persecute and liquidate all attempts and acts of counterrevolution and sabotage all over Russia, no matter what their origin.
  2. To hand over to the Revolutionary Tribunal all counterrevolutionaries and saboteurs and work out measures of struggle against them.
  3. The Commission is to make preliminary investigations only in so far as that may be necessary for suppression . . .
- " . . . The Commission is to watch the press, sabotage, etc. of the Right Socialist-Revolutionaries, saboteurs, and strikers. Sanctions [to be enforced]—confiscation, confinement, deprivation of food cards, publication of lists of enemies of the people, etc." The text of the decree was printed in *Pravda*, December 18, 1927, p. 2.
12. "Ko Vsem Sovetam na Mestakh" (To All the Local Soviets), *Izvestiya*, no. 252 (December 15/28, 1917), p. 5.
13. James H. Meisel and Edward S. Kozera (eds.), *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System* (Ann Arbor, 1950), p. 44.
14. *Pravda*, no. 33(259) (February 10/23, 1918), p. 1.
15. Translated in James Bunyan and H. H. Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918* (Stanford, 1934), p. 577.
16. *Izvestiya*, April 13, 1918, p. 3.
17. See W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution, 1917-1921* (New York, 1935), II, 56.
18. *Izvestiya*, September 29, 1918, p. 5.
19. Quoted in "Information on Russia," *Senate Document* 50, 67th Cong., 1st sess. (Washington, 1921), p. 64.
20. The Chekist Latsis in a pamphlet entitled "Two Years of Battle on the Internal Front" (*Dva Goda Bor'by na Vnutrennem Fronte* [Moscow, 1920], p. 75), acknowledged 8,389 executions by the Cheka in twenty provinces of Central Russia during 1918 and the first seven months of 1919. A report of the Ukrainian Cheka for 1920 listed 3,879 executions, of which 1,418 occurred in Odessa alone. On the basis of these scattered official data (which, it can be assumed, did not exaggerate

the carnage), an estimate that the victims of the Red Terror during the Civil War period reached at least 50,000 would appear to be conservative (for corroboration, see Chamberlin, I, 73-76). It is not unlikely that this record was matched by equally sanguinary achievements on the part of the Whites.

21. Minutes of the Conference, translated in Bunyan and Fisher, pp. 580-581.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 580.

23. Quoted in Chamberlin, II, 79.

24. The resolution read: "The Congress considers that at present the consolidation of Soviet power within and without makes it possible to narrow the extent of the activity of the Cheka and its organs, reserving for the judicial organs the struggle against violations of the laws of the Soviet republics.

"Therefore the Congress of Soviets charges the presidium of VTsIK to review at the earliest date the statute of the Cheka and its organs in the sense of reorganizing them, of restricting their competence, and of strengthening the principles of revolutionary legality" (*Devyatyi Vserossiiskii S"ezd Sovetov Rabochikh, Krest'janskikh, Krasnoarmeiskikh i Kazach'ikh Deputatov, Stenograficheskii Otechet* [Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets of Workers', Peasants', Red Army and Cossacks' Deputies, Stenographic Report], p. 254; for a translation, see Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, I, 180).

25. For translation of text of decree, see Walter Batsell, *Soviet Rule in Russia* (New York, 1929), pp. 606-609.

26. *Ibid.*, pp. 317-318.

27. Translated, *ibid.*, pp. 609-610.

28. Lenin, "Pis'mo D. I. Kurskomu po Voprosu o Terrore" (Letter to D. I. Kursky on the Question of Terror), *Sochineniya*, XXVII, 296.

29. See David J. Dallin and Boris I. Nicolaevsky, *Forced Labor in Soviet Russia* (New Haven, 1947), pp. 170-177.

30. For a not very reliable description of OGPU organization during the period by a former member, see Georges Agabekov, *OGPU, the Russian Secret Terror* (New York, 1931), pp. 255-277.

31. Quoted in Dallin and Nicolaevsky, p. 173.

32. Michael Farbman, *After Lenin* (London, 1924), p. 134.

33. For an example, see Anton Ciliga, *The Russian Enigma* (London, 1940), pp. 156-157. The memoirs of ex-prisoners of the OGPU during this period testify to mass arrests of the so-called gold-hoarders. Ciliga reported, "In the Leningrad prison I was particularly shocked by the treatment reserved for those who were accused of hoarding gold. At that time, people throughout Russia were arrested on suspicion of possessing gold and precious objects . . . After . . . tortures, those who had any gave it up. The Industrialization Fund grew richer by a hundred or two hundred million roubles throughout the U.S.S.R.; but as the arrests were made in a haphazard way, as a rule on denunciations, most of those who were tortured did not possess any gold, but instead lost their health if not their life."

34. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, *Soviet Communism: A New Civilisation?* (London, 1936), II, 553.

35. Soltz, quoted in *ibid.*, II, 556.

36. Reported in *Izvestiya*, March 12, 1933, p. 2.

37. This is the figure cited by the Webbs, II, 589. Dallin and Nicolaevsky (pp. 212-213), claim that almost 300,000 prisoners were employed at the peak. At the conclusion of the project it was announced that 12,484 prisoners had been amnestied and the sentence of 59,516 others had been reduced (see the Webbs, II, 591).

38. For an example, see the Webbs, II, 591-594.

39. See *Izvestiya*, July 11, 1934, p. 1.

40. See Ciliga, *The Russian Enigma*.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 283.

42. Stalin, *Problems of Leninism*, p. 542.

43. "Ob Obshchestve Starykh Bol'shevikov" (Concerning the Society of Old Bolsheviks), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo* (Party Construction), no. 11 (June 1935), p. 47.

44. *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, II, 635.

45. "Uroki Politicheskikh Oshibok Saratovskogo Kraikoma" (The Lessons of the Political Errors of the Saratov Krai Committee), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 15 (August 1935), p. 6.
46. "Glavnye Uroki Proverki Partiinykh Dokumentov" (The Main Lessons of the Verification of Party Credentials), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 2 (January 25, 1936), p. 12.
47. See *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, II, 635–641.
48. See the report of the Mandate Commission in *XVII S'ezd VKP(b)*, p. 303; also, "Za Individual'nyi — Protiv Gruppovogo Priema v Partiyu" (For Party Membership on an individual Rather than a Group Basis), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 10 (May 20, 1936), p. 3.
49. See Stalin, *Mastering Bolshevism*, p. 10.
50. *Report of Court Proceedings, the Case of the Trotskyite-Zinovievite Terrorist Centre, Heard before the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR, August 19–24, 1936* (Moscow, 1936).
51. Quoted in D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton, 1944), pp. 385–386.
52. *Report of Court Proceedings in the Case of the Anti-Soviet "Bloc of Rights and Trotskyites"* (Moscow, 1938), p. 777.
53. *Pravda*, October 27, 1961.
54. *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York, 1956), p. 26.
55. For an authoritative account of their fates, see *ibid.*, pp. 31–39.
56. F. Beck and W. Godin, *Russian Purge and the Extraction of Confession* (New York, 1951), p. 106.
57. For text, see *VKP(b) v Rezolyutsiyakh*, II, 671–677.
58. For examples see V. Kudryavtsev, "Razbor Appelyatsii v Leninskem Raione" (Review of Appeals in the Leninsk Raion), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 8 (April 15, 1938), pp. 34–38, and "Za Bol'shevistskii Razbor Appelyatsii" (For a Bolshevik Review of Appeals), *Partiinoe Stroitel'stvo*, no. 13 (July 1, 1938), pp. 42–44.
59. See Alexander Weissberg, *The Accused* (New York, 1951), chap. 14, pp. 418–427.
60. Beck and Godin, p. 38.
61. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, p. 191.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 198.
63. See John Scott, *Behind the Urals* (Boston, 1942), pp. 195–196.
64. For accounts of survivors, see *The Dark Side of the Moon* (New York, 1947), and Jerzy Glikman, *Tell the West* (New York, 1948).
65. For a list of the classifications used in NKVD arrests in the Baltic states, see A. K. Herling, *The Soviet Slave Empire* (New York, 1951), pp. 79–81.
66. *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, p. 57.
67. See George Fischer, *Soviet Opposition to Stalin* (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).
68. See Eleanor Lipper, *Eleven Years in Soviet Prison Camps* (Chicago, 1951), pp. 279, 281–282.
69. *The Anti-Stalin Campaign*, p. 59.
70. *Ibid.*
71. *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61.
72. *Ibid.*, pp. 63–64.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 84.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
76. See *Sovetskoye Gosudarstvo i Pravo* (Soviet State and Law), no. 1 (January 1956), p. 3, and *Partiinaya Zhizn'* (Party Life, February 1957, pp. 66, 68).
77. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 9, art. 193 (1956).
78. *Ibid.*, no. 8, art. 186 (1956).
79. *Pravda*, March 28, 1953.
80. For details, see Paul Barton, *L'Institution concentrationnaire en Russie* (Paris, 1959), pp. 321–350.

81. For text, see *Pravda*, December 26, 1958.
82. Harold J. Berman, "Soviet Law Reform — Dateline Moscow 1957," *Yale Law Journal*, LXVI, no. 8 (July 1957), 1214-1215.
83. *Pravda*, October 27, 1961.
84. *Kommunist*, no. 11 (July 1960), pp. 39-48.
85. See the speech of Suslov, *Pravda*, January 31, 1959.
86. See particularly the issue of August 27, 1960.
87. *Pravda*, October 27, 1961.
88. *Ibid.*, April 21, 1962.
89. *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR*, no. 11, 1941.
90. *Ibid.*, no. 37, 1941.
91. See I. I. Evtikhiev and V. A. Vlasov (eds.), *Administrativnoe Pravo SSSR* (Administrative Law of the USSR; Moscow, 1946), pp. 191-192.
92. For official confirmation as to the border guards, see S. S. Studenikin, V. A. Vlasov, and I. I. Evtikhiev, *Sovetskoe Administrativnoe Pravo* (Soviet Administrative Law; Moscow, 1950), pp. 278-279.
93. *Pravda*, April 21, 1954.
94. *Ibid.*, October 27, 1961.
95. See Simon Wolin and Robert M. Slusser (eds.), *The Soviet Secret Police* (New York, 1957).
96. *Pravda*, October 27, 1961.
97. Beck and Godin, p. 76.
98. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 70.
100. Weissberg, pp. 318-319.
101. Dallin and Nicolaevsky, p. 86.
102. *Gosudarstvennyi Plan Razvitiya Narodnogo Khozyaistva*, American Council of Learned Societies Reprint: Russian Series No. 30 (Baltimore, n.d.).
103. *Pravda*, February 19, 1941.
104. See Naum Jasny, "Labor and Output in Soviet Concentration Camps," *The Journal of Political Economy*, LIX, no. 5 (October 1951), 405-410.
105. *Ibid.*, p. 413.
106. See, for example, Book One entitled "Soviet Gold" in Vladimir Petrov, *It Happens in Russia* (London, 1951); Lipper, *passim*; and Jasny, "Labor and Output in Soviet Concentration Camps," p. 419.
107. Dallin and Nicolaevsky, p. 88.
108. This estimate is based on the careful analysis of Naum Jasny's "Labor and Output in Soviet Concentration Camps."
109. See Berman, "Soviet Law Reform," *Yale Law Journal*, p. 1194.

## Chapter 14

### *The Party and the Armed Forces*

1. "Decree on the Equalization of Rights of All Serving in the Army," translated in Meisel and Kozera (eds.), *Materials for the Study of the Soviet System* (Ann Arbor, 1950), pp. 37-38.
2. Quoted in Erich Wollenberg, *The Red Army* (London, 1938), p. 41.
3. Translation in Bunyan and Fisher, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1918* (Stanford, 1934), p. 568.
4. Quoted in W. H. Chamberlin, *The Russian Revolution* (New York, 1935), II, 26.
5. Leon Trotsky, *Kak Vooruzhalas' Revolyutsiya (na Voennoi Rabote)* (How the Revolution Armed Itself [on War Service]; Moscow, 1923-1925), I, 14; hereafter cited as *KVR*.
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7. Trotsky, *KVR*, I, 15.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
9. Decree translated in James Bunyan, *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia, April–December 1918* (Baltimore, 1936), p. 275.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 276.
11. Wollenberg, p. 42.
12. Trotsky, *KVR*, I, 310.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 28.
14. Quoted in Wollenberg, pp. 157–158.
15. Trotsky, *KVR*, I, 63–64.
16. D. Fedotoff White, *The Growth of the Red Army* (Princeton, 1944), p. 51.
17. Trotsky, *KVR*, I, 145.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
19. Quoted in Fedotoff White, p. 53.
20. Trotsky, *KVR*, I, 17.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 159.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
23. See decree translated in Wollenberg, p. 255.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 256.
25. See Trotsky's decree issued August 5, 1918, translated in Wollenberg, p. 71.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 70–71.
27. Trotsky, *KVR*, I, 174; for translation, see Bunyan, p. 273.
28. Fedotoff White, p. 51.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 58.
30. Trotsky, *KVR*, I, 18; translated in Bunyan and Fisher, p. 571.
31. Fedotoff White, p. 62.
32. Quoted, *ibid.*, p. 63.
33. Cited, *ibid.*, p. 91.
34. Trotsky, *KVR*, II(2), 126; for a translation see Fedotoff White, p. 99.
35. Resolution quoted in Fedotoff White, p. 86.
36. Quoted, *ibid.*, pp. 90–91.
37. Lenin, "Rech' pri Zakrytii S"ezda 23 Marta" (Address at the Conclusion of the Congress, March 23 [1919]), *Sochineniya*, XXIV, 176.
38. Lenin, "Doklad o Deyatel'nosti Soveta Narodnykh Komissarov 22 Dekabrya" (Report on the Activities of the Council of People's Commissars, December 22, 1920), *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 26.
39. Quoted in Fedotoff White, p. 194.
40. *Protokoly Devyatogo S"ezda RKP(b)* (Protocols of the Ninth Congress of the RCP[b] [March–April 1920]; Moscow, 1934), p. 451.
41. *Protokoly Desyatogo S"ezda RKP(b)* (Protocols of the Tenth Congress of the RCP[b] [March 1921]; Moscow, 1933), p. 619.
42. Fedotoff White, p. 266.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
44. Wollenberg, p. 177.
45. Fedotoff White, p. 201.
46. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
47. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 235–236.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 260.
52. Quoted *ibid.*, p. 202.
53. *Finansy SSSR za XXX Let (1917–1947)* (The Finances of the USSR for Thirty Years, 1917–1947; Moscow, 1947), pp. 170, 180.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
55. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, p. 275.
56. *XVIII S"ezd VKP(b)*, p. 274.
57. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, p. 292.

58. Fedetoff White, p. 379.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 420.
60. See *ibid.*, p. 402.
61. A. I. Zaporozhets, *O Perestroike Raboty Politorganov i Partiinykh Organizatsii Krasnoi Armii* (On Reorganizing the Work of the Political Organs and Party Organizations in the Red Army; Moscow, 1941), p. 9.
62. *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, p. 298.
63. See Raymond C. Garthoff, *Soviet Strategy in the Nuclear Age* (New York, 1958), p. 22.
64. *Pravda*, February 10, 1955.
65. *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism* (New York, 1956), pp. 50-56.
66. *Krasnaya Zvezda* (Red Star), January 25, 1956.
67. *Ibid.*, April 26, 1956.
68. *Ibid.*, May 12, 1957.
69. *Pravda*, November 3, 1957.
70. *Ibid.*
71. *Ibid.*
72. *Ibid.*
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 27, 1959.
75. October 1, 1960.
76. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 11, 1959.
77. *Pravda*, January 15, 1960.
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*, July 9, 1961, and August 31, 1961.
82. May 11, 1962.
83. *Pravda*, May 8, 1960.
84. *Ibid.*, June 29, 1960.
85. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, May 11, 1962.
86. *Ibid.*
87. *Ibid.*, January 10, 1958.
88. *Pravda*, November 13, 1961.
89. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, April 4, 1959.
90. For the texts of the laws on liability for state and military crimes, see *Pravda*, December 26, 1958.
91. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, September 7, 1960.
92. For these and other similar quotations, see Malcolm Mackintosh, *Khrushchev and the Soviet Army*, St. Antony's Papers on Soviet Affairs (Oxford, 1958), pp. 14-15.
93. *Pravda*, August 29, 1958.
94. *Krasnaya Zvezda*, June 1, 1960.
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*, June 9, 1962.
97. *Ibid.*, June 5, 1962.
98. *Pravda*, October 25, 1962.

### *Chapter 15*

#### *Management and Labor in Soviet Industry*

1. "Vsem Partiinym Organizatsiyam, Vsem Chlenam Partii. Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b) o Merakh po Uporyadocheniyu Upravleniya Proizvodstvom i Ustanovleniyu Edinolichiya" (To All Party Organizations, All Party Members. Decree of the CC

of the All-Union CP[b] on Measures for Regulating the Management of Industry and Instituting One-Man Control), *Pravda*, September 7, 1929, p. 1.

2. David Granick, "Plant Management in the Soviet Industrial System" (doctoral dissertation later published by Columbia University Press), p. 127.

3. *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*

5. L. M. Kaganovich in his report to the congress concentrated his fire on the organizational confusion and the lack of accountability which the functional system produced. Citing the case of the Mytishchy Railway Car Works, Kaganovich stated: "There we have all the symptoms of bureaucratic routine methods of managing the works, *viz.*, the functional system in the structure of the apparatus and the over-staffing. The factory management is split up into 14 departments in which 367 people are employed. In addition, there are 234 office employees in the various shops. The total number of workers employed at these works is 3,832, so that the office staff represents 16 per cent of the total number of workers employed. In addition to the director there is an assistant technical director, an assistant director of the supply department, an assistant director of workers' supply, a production department, a preparatory production department, a chief engineer's department, technical control department, planning and economic department, a staff department, a special department, a department for the supervision of fulfilling of decisions, a central bookkeeping department, a commercial department, which is subdivided into two sub-departments, namely: finance sub-department and sub-department for supplies and sales, a general manager's department, stores department, building department, and workers' supply department . . . .

"In most cases workers have no direct contact with the chiefs of the shops, the only contact they have with them is through the functional departments . . . .

"If the chief of the shop has to apply to the management when he wants anything done, he has to apply to various departments: he has to apply to the Hiring and Discharge Department if it is a matter concerning workers; to the Energetics Bureau of the Machine Department if it is a matter of fuel; to the Supplies Department if it is a matter concerning materials; to the Preparatory Production Department if it is a matter of drawings; to the Production Department and Planning and Economic Department if it is a matter concerning the program of output; to the Wages and Economic Section if it is a matter concerning rates of pay and output, etc.

"This functional system leads directly to the position that a director is relieved of the duty of directly guiding the work of the shops and occupies himself with giving general orders" (*XVII S"ezd VKP[b]*, pp. 534-535).

6. For two excellent treatments of the problems of industrial management, see Joseph S. Berliner, *Factory and Manager in the USSR* (Cambridge, Mass., 1957), and David Granick, *Management of the Industrial Firm in the USSR* (New York, 1954).

7. Berliner, p. 311.

8. *Postanovleniya TsK KPSS i Soveta Ministrov SSSR* (Decrees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the USSR Council of Ministers: Moscow, 1956), pp. 91-98.

9. Herbert S. Levine, "The Centralized Planning of Supply in Soviet Industry," Joint Economic Committee (86th Cong., 1st sess.), *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economics* (Washington, 1959), p. 155.

10. Berliner, p. 302.

11. *Pravda*, March 30, 1957.

12. *Ibid.*

13. *Pravda*, July 23, 1962.

14. *Izvestiya*, July 14, 1962.

15. *Sovetskaya Latvia*, November 15, 1957, p. 2.

16. *Pravda*, July 2, 1959.

17. *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, November 11, 1959.

18. *Ibid.*, April 8, 1960.

19. *Pravda*, July 23, 1962.

20. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 6 (March 1957), p. 62.
21. See Isaac Deutscher, *Soviet Trade Unions* (London, 1950), and Solomon M. Schwarz, *Labor in the Soviet Union* (New York, 1952).
22. *Pravda*, December 19, 1957.
23. See Emily Clark Brown, "The Local Union in Soviet Industry: Its Relations with Members, Party, and Management," *Industrial and Labor Relations Review*, XIII, no. 2 (January 1960), 204.
24. For text, see *Pravda*, July 16, 1958.
25. *Ibid.*, March 24, 1959.
26. See Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy* (New York, 1961), p. 119.
27. For the RSFSR Statute on Comrades' Courts, see *Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR*, no. 26 (1961).
28. *Pravda*, October 18, 1962.

## Chapter 16

### *Controls and Tensions in Soviet Agriculture*

1. Quoted in Lazar Volin, *A Survey of Soviet Russian Agriculture* (Washington, n.d.), Agriculture Monograph, 5, p. 14.
2. Lenin, "Doklad o Rabote v Derevne" (Report on Work in the Rural Districts), *Sochineniya*, XXIV, 161.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 167-168.
4. Lenin, "Doklad o Natural'nom Naloge 15 Marta" (Report on the Tax in Kind, March 15 [1921]), *Sochineniya*, XXVI, 246; quoted in Carr, *The Bolshevik Revolution, 1917-1923*, II, 291.
5. Stalin, "The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)," *Problems of Leninism*, p. 289.
6. "Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," *ibid.*, p. 503.
7. Volin, p. 15.
8. Stalin, "Problems of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R.," *Problems of Leninism*, p. 315.
9. The following account by a village Communist conveys the flavor of the period: "When we were told of collectivization . . . I liked the idea. So did a few others in our village, men like me, who had worked in the city and served in the Red Army. The rest of the village was dead set against it and wouldn't even listen to me. So my friends and I decided to start our own little co-operative farm, and we pooled our few implements and land. You know our peasants. It's no use talking to them about plans and figures; you have to show them results to convince them. We knew that if we could show them that we earned higher profits than before, they would like it and do as we did." "Well, we got going. Then, one day, an order comes from the Klin Party committee that we had to get 100 more families into our little collective. We managed to pull in about a dozen. And, believe me, this was not easy. It needed a lot of coaxing and wheedling. But no coaxing could get us even one more family. I went to Klin and explained the situation to the party committee. I begged them to let us go ahead as we started and I promised them, if they did, to have the whole village in the collective by next year. They wouldn't listen to me. They had orders from Moscow, long sheets saying how many collectives with how many members they had to show on their records. That was all. They told me that I was sabotaging collectivization and that unless I did as I was told I would be thrown out of the party and disgraced forever. Well, I knew that I couldn't get our people in, unless I did what I heard others were doing, in other words, forced them . . . I called a village meeting and I told the people that they had to join the collective, that these were Moscow's orders, and if they didn't, they would be exiled and their property taken away

from them. They all signed the paper that same night, every one of them. Don't ask me how I felt and how they felt. And the same night they started to do what the other villages of the U.S.S.R. were doing when forced into collectives—to kill their livestock. They had heard that the government would take away their cattle as soon as they became members of a collective.

"I took the new membership list to the committee at Klin, and this time they were very pleased with me. When I told them of the slaughter of cattle and that the peasants felt as though they were being sent to jail, they weren't interested. They had the list and could forward it to Moscow; that was all they cared about. I couldn't blame them, they were under orders as well as I was."

"... In our village as well as elsewhere, even though the peasants had formally joined the collectives, they wouldn't work and went on killing the cows and chickens" (Markoosha Fischer, *My Lives in Russia* [2nd ed.; New York-London, 1944], pp. 49-51).

10. V. S. Mertsalov, *Tragediya Rossiiskogo Krest'yanstva* (The Tragedy of the Russian Peasantry; "Posev," n.d.), p. 39.

11. "Golovokrughenie ot Uspekhov," *Pravda*, March 2, 1930, p. 1; reprinted in Stalin's *Sochineniya*, XII, 191-199.

12. Volin, p. 18.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

14. Winston S. Churchill, *The Hinge of Fate* (Boston, 1950), p. 498.

15. See Table 30 in Naum Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR* (Stanford, 1949), p. 793.

16. As Lazar Volin points out (p. 37), "In the aggregate, kolkhoz deliveries to the state and payments in kind to MTS constituted 26 percent of their bumper grain crop in 1937 and 31 and 34 percent, respectively, of the smaller crops in 1938 and 1939. During 1935-37, an average of 68 percent of the meat and animal fats, 45 percent of the milk, and 53 percent of the wool produced collectively went to the state. No statistics are available for subsequent years, but the proportion was doubtless larger, because . . . deliveries have been based on total or tillable kolkhoz acreages since 1940 and not on the area to be seeded to crops or on the number of livestock."

17. For text of the decree, see Vladimir Gsovski, *Soviet Civil Law* (Ann Arbor, 1948), II, 475-483.

18. For text, see *ibid.*, pp. 484-486.

19. Jasny, *The Socialized Agriculture of the USSR*, p. 398.

20. For text, see Gsovski, II, 487-497.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 488.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 491.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 492.

24. *Sob. Post. SSSR*, 1946, nos. 13 and 14.

25. "K Novym Pobedam Kolkhoznogo Stroya!" (On the New Victories of Kolkhoz Construction!), *Pravda*, September 19, 1947, p. 1.

26. *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie* (Socialist Agriculture), September 11, 1948, cited in Volin, p. 32.

27. A. Andreyev, "Speech at the Eighteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)," *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, p. 254; also, A. Andreyev, "Stalin i Kolkhoznoe Krest'yanstvo" (Stalin and the Kolkhoz Peasantry), *Bolshevik*, no. 24 (December 1949), p. 78.

28. Melnikov, "Report of Central Committee of Communist Party (of Bolsheviks) of the Ukraine," *Pravda Ukrayiny*, September 25, 1952, pp. 1-5, as translated and condensed in *CDSP*, IV, no. 41 (November 22, 1952), 24.

29. Harry Schwartz, *Russia's Soviet Economy* (New York, 1950), p. 421.

30. P. P. Pyatnitsky, *Organizatsiya, Oplata i Distsiplina Truda v Kolkhozakh* (Organization, Compensation, and Labor Discipline in the Kolkhozes; Moscow, 1951), p. 35.

31. "Trehletnii Plan Razvitiya Obshchestvennogo Kolkhoznogo i Sovkhoznogo Produktivnogo Zhivotnovodstva (1949-1951 gg.)" (Three-Year Plan for the Develop-

- ment of the Kolkhoz Communal and State Farm Livestock Industry, 1949–1951), *Sotsialisticheskoe Zemledelie*, April 19, 1949, p. 1.
32. XVIII S'ezd VKP(b), p. 117; for translation, see *The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow*, pp. 259–260.
  33. "Protiv Izvrashchenii v Organizatsii Truda v Kolkhozakh," *Pravda*, February 19, 1950, pp. 4–5; translated in *CDSP*, II, no. 9 (April 15, 1950), 12.
  34. Andreyev's letter translated in *CDSP*, II (April 15, 1950), 14–15.
  35. Volin, p. 30.
  36. *CDSP*, II (April 15, 1950), 12.
  37. *Pravda*, October 6, 1952, p. 4.
  38. See D. Brezhnev, "V Novykh Usloviyakh" (Under New Conditions), *Izvestiya*, August 26, 1950, p. 2.
  39. N. S. Khrushchev, "O Stroitel'stve i Blagoustroistvye v Kolkhozakh" (On Building and Improvements on the Collective Farms), *Pravda*, March 4, 1951, pp. 2–3; translated in *CDSP*, III, no. 7 (March 31, 1951), 13–16.
  40. Translated, *CDSP*, III (March 31, 1951), 16.
  41. "Report by Comrade G. A. Arutyunov on Work of Armenian Communist Party Central Committee," *Kommunist* (Organ of the Armenian Communist Party), March 21, pp. 1–6; condensed translation in *CDSP*, III, no. 21 (July 7, 1951), 3–4.
  42. *Pravda*, October 6, 1952, p. 5.
  43. *Ibid.*, September 13, 1953.
  44. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1953.
  45. *Ibid.*, September 13, 1953.
  46. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1953.
  47. See Nancy Nimitz, "Soviet Agricultural Prices and Costs," in Joint Economic Committee (86th Cong., 1st sess.), *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies* (Washington, 1959), p. 273.
  48. *Pravda*, September 15, 1953.
  49. *Ibid.*, August 9, 1953.
  50. *Ibid.*, September 15, 1953.
  51. *Ibid.*, September 13, 1953.
  52. *Ibid.*, March 21, 1954.
  53. *Ibid.*, July 15, 1962.
  54. *Ibid.*, February 15, 1956.
  55. *Ibid.*, February 3, 1955.
  56. *Ibid.*, January 21, 1961.
  57. *Ibid.*, May 24, 1957.
  58. *Ibid.*, December 16, 1958.
  59. *Ibid.*, January 22, 1961.
  60. *Ibid.*, March 11, 1955.
  61. *Ibid.*, October 4, 1952.
  62. *Ibid.*, March 1, 1958.
  63. *Ibid.*, January 25, 1958.
  64. *Ibid.*, April 1, 1958.
  65. See Lazar Volin, "Agricultural Policy of the Soviet Union," in *Comparisons of the United States and Soviet Economies*, p. 298.
  66. *Pravda*, February 21, 1961.
  67. For an excellent treatment of post-Stalinist procurement developments, see Nancy Nimitz, "Soviet Agricultural Prices and Costs," pp. 239–276.
  68. *Ibid.*, pp. 274–276.
  69. *Pravda*, June 21, 1958.
  70. *Ibid.*, December 29, 1959.
  71. *Partiinaya Zhizn'*, no. 7 (April 1961), pp. 17–24.
  72. *Ibid.*
  73. *Pravda*, January 14, 1961.
  74. *Ibid.*, February 26, 1961.
  75. *Ibid.*
  76. *Ibid.*, February 21, 1961.

77. *Ibid.*, March 24, 1962.
78. *Ibid.*
79. *Ibid.*
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*, March 6, 1962.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*, June 1, 1962.
84. *Ibid.*, December 30, 1961.
85. *Ibid.*, April 19, 1962.
86. For an excellent summation of recent developments, see Allen B. Ballard, "An End to Collective Farms?" *Problems of Communism*, X, no. 4 (July-August 1961), 9-16.
87. *Trud* (Labor), March 17, 1961.
88. *Pravda*, July 14, 1962.
89. *Voprosy Ekonomiki* (Questions of Economics), no. 5 (May 1962), pp. 48-52.
90. *Pravda*, July 2, 1959.
91. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Research Service, *Economic Aspects of Soviet Agriculture—Report of a Technical Study Group* (Washington, 1959), p. 41.
92. *Pravda*, April 19, 1962.
93. *Nash Sovremennik* (Our Contemporary), no. 5 (1960), pp. 173-188.
94. *Ibid.*
95. *Ibid.*
96. *Ibid.*
97. U. S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, Lazar Volin, *The Agricultural Picture in the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A.* (Washington, 1962), p. 7.
98. *Ibid.*
99. *Pravda*, June 30, 1962.
100. *Ibid.*
101. *Moskovskaya Pravda*, February 8, 1951.
102. *Pravda*, May 2, 1959.
103. *Moskovskaya Pravda*, February 8, 1951.
104. *Pravda*, March 10, 1962.
105. *Ibid.*, January 22, 1961.
106. *Ibid.*, April 16, 1961.
107. *Ibid.*, January 22, 1961.
108. *Ibid.*
109. *Ibid.*, March 6, 1962.

### *Chapter 17*

#### *The Soviet Political System—Problems and Prospects*

1. See his pronouncements at the Twentieth Party Congress, *Pravda*, February 15, 1956.
2. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1961.
3. *Ibid.*, December 6, 1960.
4. *Ibid.*
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*
7. *Ibid.*, November 2, 1961.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, February 17, 1956.
11. Quoted in David J. Dallin, *Soviet Foreign Policy After Stalin* (New York, 1961), p. 506.



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