CSCI 476: Computer Security


Secret Key Encryption/Symmetric Cryptography (Part 2)

Reese Pearsall Fall 2023

Announcement

Project due on **Thursday** (No class on Thursday)

Lab 7 due on **Sunday**



The importance here is that the **keys** used for encryption/decryption are secret (ie not public knowledge)

The innerworkings of the encryption/decryption program *is* public knowledge though

Deterministic programs*

Block Cipher

Split in messages into fixed sized blocks, encrypt eac block separately

Hello there world

01101000 01100101 01101100 01101100 01101111 00100000 01110100 01101000 01100101 01110010 01100101 00100000 01110111 01101111 01110010 01101100 01100100 00001010

Block 3 Block 1 Block 2

 \oplus







Ciphertext

The specifics of this operation vary depending on

your mode of encryption


Decryption is performed by applying the reverse

n bits

Plaintext



- Even small differences in plaintext result in different ciphertexts
- Blocks in plaintext that are the same will also have matching ciphertexts



Block Ciphers

AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) and **DES** (Data Encryption Standard) are both symmetric block ciphers. The way they do block encryptions is slightly different

In AES: Key lengths can be 128, 192, or 256 bits. IN DES, key length can only be 56

Under the hood, these are rather complex ciphers, but each cipher involves multiple rounds of "encryption"

DES is older, broken and has known vulnerabilities, AES is the current widely-used block cipher


Modes of Encryption

- Electronic Codebook (ECB)
- Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
- Propagating CBC (PCBC)
- Cipher Feedback (CFB)
- Output Feedback (OFB)
- Counter (CTR)

All block ciphers!

But if we aren't careful about how we conduct encryption operations, we may accidentally reveal information about the plaintext

Electronic Codebook ECB



Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption

Notice: For the same key, a plaintext always maps to the same ciphertext

Encrypt a .txt file

```
openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt \
-K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
```

- 1 Encrypt using AES (block cipher) with mode ECB using a 128-bit key
- 2 Encrypt
- 3 Input file to be encrypted will be *plain.txt*
- Output file created that contains the ciphertext will be *cipher.txt*
- Key used for encryption will be 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

32 characters in hex → 128 bits


Encrypt a .txt file

openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt \ -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF

plain.txt

1 The FitnessGram Pacer Test is a multistage aerobic capacity test that progressively gets more difficult as it continues. The 20 meter pacer test will begin in 30 seconds. Line up at the start. The running speed starts slowly, but gets faster each minute after you hear this signal. [beep] A single lap should be completed each time you hear this sound. [ding] Remember to run in a straight line, and run as long as sound, your test is over. The test will begin on the word start. On your mark, get ready, start.





Encrypt a .txt file

```
openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt \
-K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
```

Decrypt a .txt file

```
openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -d -in cipher.txt -out new_output.txt \
-K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
```



[11/09/22]seed@VM:~\$ cat new output.txt

The FitnessGram Pacer Test is a multistage aerobic capacity test that progressively gets more difficult as it continues. The 20 meter pacer test will begin in 30 seconds. Line up at the start. The running speed starts slowly, but gets faster each minute after you hear this signal. [beep] A single lap should be completed each time you hear this sound. [ding] Remember to run in a straight line, and run as long as possible. The second time you fail to complete a lap before the sound, your test is over. The test will begin on the word start. On your mark, get ready, start.

Encrypt a .txt file

```
openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt \
-K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
```


Decrypt a .txt file

```
openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -d -in cipher.txt -out new_output.txt \
-K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF
```

Changing the key used for decryption wont decrypt correctly!

We can encrypt many things (everything on computers is just 0s and 1s). Let's try an image!

sus.bmp




When encrypting images on the lab, make sure you use a .bmp image

(You can encrypt jpg and png, but you won't be able to follow the steps on the next few slides)

We can encrypt many things (everything on computers is just 0s and 1s). Let's try an image!

sus.bmp



When encrypting images on the lab, make sure you use a **.bmp** image

(You can encrypt jpg and png, but you won't be able to follow the steps on the next few slides)


BMP files (and most files) have **headers**, which tell the OS what file type this sequence of 0s and 1s is

When we encrypt the image, the header will also get encrypted

The OS loads the encrypted image → Can't display it!

We can encrypt many things (everything on computers is just 0s and 1s). Let's try an image!

sus.bmp



Header


Offset	BMP marker		File size		Reserved					Offset of the pixel data				Header size		
00000000	42	4D	9E	D2	01	00	00	00	00	00	36	00	00	00	28	00
00000010	00	00	C8	00	06	idth0	C7	00	06	eight)	01	(anes)	18	BPP)	00	Compre-
00000020	O€-ssionO		68	D2	D2 Image size0		13	(X pix per meter0		13 Oy nix per meter)			00 Colors in			
00000030	Godo	r thlO	00	Ungo	rtante	ologs O	23	2E	PixeB	26	31	Pixel)	28	33	Pixel:	27
00000040	33	6C	27	34	6D	29	34	6E	29	34	6F	29	34	6F	26	33
00000050	71	25	30	6F	25	30	6C	25	30	6B	27	31	6C	2B	35	6D
00000060	2E	37	70	29	35	6F	25	34	6F	21	31	6D	22	32	6B	23
00000070	32	69	26	33	6B	25	33	6D	27	35	6D	26	32	6B	25	31
00000080	6B	26	32	6B	29	35	6D	29	34	6E	25	2F	6B	24	2F	6A
00000090	24	2F	6B	29	33	6D	2D	37	70	27	32	6F	26	32	6B	26

Body of the image


Fact: The first 54 bytes of a BMP file will be the header

We can encrypt many things (everything on computers is just 0s and 1s). Let's try an image!

sus.bmp



enc.bmp



Header AND image got encrypted


Step 2: Frankenstein together the encrypted image so our OS can open it

[11/09/22]seed@VM:~\$ head -c 54 sus.bmp > header
[11/09/22]seed@VM:~\$ tail -c +55 enc.bmp > body
[11/09/22]seed@VM:~\$ cat header body > final.bmp

Take the first 54 bytes of the <u>original</u> image (header)
Take everything after the 54th byte of the <u>encrypted</u> image (image)

We can encrypt many things (everything on computers is just 0s and 1s). Let's try an image!


sus.bmp



final.bmp



[11/09/22]seed@VM:~\$ eog final.bmp




Our encrypted image!!!

Step 2: Frankenstein together the encrypted image so our OS can open it

[11/09/22] seed@VM:~\$ head -c 54 sus.bmp > header [11/09/22] seed@VM:~\$ tail -c +55 enc.bmp > body [11/09/22] seed@VM:~\$ cat header body > final.bmp


Take the first 54 bytes of the <u>original</u> image (header)
Take everything after the 54th byte of the
<u>encrypted</u> image (image)

Why does this suck?



Why does this suck?

Lesson learned: ECB can reveal information about our plaintext **after** encryption has occurred




Let retry this experiment on a more **complex** image


```
[11/09/22]seed@VM:~$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in capy.bmp -out enc_capy.bmp -K 001122
33445566778899AABBCCDDEEEE
[11/09/22]seed@VM:~$ head -c 54 capy.bmp > header
[11/09/22]seed@VM:~$ tail -c +55 enc_capy.bmp > body
[11/09/22]seed@VM:~$ cat header body > final_capy.bmp
[11/09/22]seed@VM:~$ eog final capy.bmp
```

capy.bmp





We get much better encryption because the original image uses a lot more colors!




Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption



ECB can reveal information about our plaintext if our blocks are similar!

Solution: Add some randomness to each block during encryption

Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode




Introduces block dependency $C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$

$$C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})$$

Introduces an initialization vector (IV) to ensure that even if two plaintexts are identical, their ciphertexts are still different because different IVs will be used

Using CBC to encrypt images??




You will do this on the lab.

```
openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt \
-K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF \
-iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0EOF

openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain.txt -out cipher2.txt \
-K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF \
-iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0EOE
```

Let's encrypt the same file, but with different IVs

Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode



- Similar to CBC, but slightly different...
 - ...a block cipher is turned into a stream cipher!
- · Ideal for encrypting real-time data.
- Padding not required for the last block.
- · Encryption can only be conducted sequentially have to wait for all the plaintext

Comparing CBC vs CFB

```
openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt \
    -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF \
    -iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F

openssl enc -aes-128-cfb -e -in plain.txt -out cipher2.txt \
    -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF \
    -iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
```

Any differences in output file sizes?


Comparing CBC vs CFB

```
openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt \
      -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF \
      -iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
openssl enc -aes-128-cfb -e -in plain.txt -out cipher2.txt \
      -K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF \
      -iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~$ ls -al | grep "cipher"
                                                 Using CFB results in
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 576 Nov 10 00:36 cipher2.txt
                                                 a smaller output file!
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 592 Nov 10 00:36 cipher.txt
                                                 (woah!)
```

Padding

```
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~$ ls -al | grep "cipher"
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 576 Nov 10 00:36 cipher2.txt
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 592 Nov 10 00:36 cipher.txt
```

In a block cipher (where our block sizes is 4), what happens when we don't have a multiple of 4?




This block is not 4 digits... we need to add more so that our encryption method works!

Padding

```
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~$ ls -al | grep "cipher"
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 576 Nov 10 00:36 cipher2.txt
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 592 Nov 10 00:36 cipher.txt
```

In a block cipher (where our block sizes is 4), what happens when we don't have a multiple of 4?



This block is not 4 digits... we need to add more so that our encryption method works!

Extra data or **padding**, needs to be added to the last block, so its size equals the cipher's block size

Padding

Questions to answer:

- 1. What does the padding look like?
- 2. When decrypting, how does the software know *where* the padding starts?

What happens when data is smaller than the block size?

```
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ echo -n "123456789" > plain.txt
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ ls -ld plain.txt
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 9 Nov 10 00:47 plain.txt

Plaintext is 9 bytes
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt -K
00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEEE -iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ ls -ld cipher.txt
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 16 Nov 10 00:53 cipher.txt
```

Ciphertext is 16 bytes (7 bytes of padding got added on!)

How does decryption software know where the padding starts?

```
openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in cipher.bin -out plain3.txt \
-K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEFF \
-iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F -nopad

[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in plain.txt -out cipher.txt -K
00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEEE -iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -d -in cipher.txt -out result.txt -
K 00112233445566778899AABBCCDDEEEE -iv 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F -nopad
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ ls -ld result.txt
-rw-rw-r-- 1 seed seed 16 Nov_10 02:05 result.txt
```

7 bytes of 0x07 are added as padding data

```
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ xxd -g 1 plain.txt
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 123456789
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ xxd -g 1 result.txt7
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 07 07 07 07 07 07 123456789......
```

How does decryption software know where the padding starts?

```
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ xxd -g 1 plain.txt
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 123456789
[11/10/22]seed@VM:~/padding$ xxd -g 1 result.txt
00000000: 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 07 07 07 07 07 07 123456789......
```

Block 1 Block 1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 07 07 07 07 07 07 07

K = 1

B = 8 characters

In general, for block size B and last block w K bytes,

B-K bytes of value B-K are added as the padding

What if the size of the plaintext is a multiple of the block size? And the last seven bytes are all 0x07?


Block 1 Block 1

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 07 07 07 07 07 07 07


- · Size of plaintext (plain3.txt) is 16 bytes
- · Size of decryption output (plaint3_new.txt) is 32 bytes → a new, full block is added as the padding
- In PKCS#5, if the input length is already an exact multiple of the block size B, then B bytes of value B are added as the padding.

Counter(CTR) Mode


- Use a counter to generate the key streams
- No key stream can be reused; the counter value for each block is prepended with a randomly generated value called a nonce (same idea as the IV)




Modes of Encryption




Electronic Codebook (ECB) mode encryption



Cipher Feedback (CFB) Mode




Counter(CTR) Mode



You will explore these in the lab

Corrupting a Ciphertext + Recovering




using the bless hex editor

When decrypting the ciphertext, we can see

Ah, dis@#@f0w@^@+@@wDer it was in the beak December; And each separate dying ember wrought its ghost upon the ground. Eagerly I wished the marrow; -vainly I had sought to barrow From my books surcease of sorrow-sorrow for my lost Lenore-For the rare and radiant maiden who the angels name Lenore-Nameless here for some more.

Initialization Vectors and Common Mistakes

- Initialization Vectors have the following requirements:
 - IV is supposed to be stored or transmitted in plaintext
 - IV should not be reused -> uniqueness
 - IV should not be predictable -> pseudorandom
- Some modes w/ IVs:




IV should not be <u>reused</u>...

Scenario:

- Suppose attacker knows some info about plaintexts ("known-plaintext attack")
- · Plaintexts encrypted using AES-128-OFB and the same IV is repeatedly used ...

Attacker Goal: Decrypt other plaintexts




Chosen Plaintext Attack:

Suppose we have the plaintext: 110011

And the ciphertext from that plaintext: 101010

Can we recover information about the key used? Can we decrypt other plaintexts?




Chosen Plaintext Attack:


Suppose we have the plaintext: 110011

And the ciphertext from that plaintext: 101010

Can we recover information about the key used? Can we decrypt other plaintexts?



We can XOR P and C to key our key/IV value!




Chosen Plaintext Attack:

Suppose we have the plaintext: 110011

And the ciphertext from that plaintext: 101010

Can we recover information about the key used? Can we decrypt other plaintexts?



Knowing that an encryption scheme uses the same IV + key (you will do this on the lab)