With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh’g); Nelson v. Regions Mortgage, Inc., 170 S.W.3d 858, 863 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.). It is well settled that the DJA is not a grant of jurisdiction; rather, it is a procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction. Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d 140, 141 (Tex.1996); City of Houston v. Buttitta, 274 S.W.3d 850, 853 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (op. on reh’g). Here, York claims that the justice court’s order awarding the property to the State for the benefit of the Wise County Sheriffs Office is void allas 2003, no pet.); Davis v. Boone, 786 S.W.2d 85, 87 n. 3 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ). But see S. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Powell, 736 S.W.2d 745, 749-50 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, no writ) (<HOLDING>). To prevail on a collateral attack, the

A: holding that dormant judgment is voidable and therefore not subject to collateral attack
B: recognizing bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over such a collateral attack
C: holding in dictum that extrinsic evidence should be permissible to show applicability of automatic stay in collateral attack against judgment
D: holding that a judgment as to the title in a prior litigation was not subject to collateral attack
C.