With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". tolls the running of the Ross one-year period during the pendency of petitioner’s proceedings in state court for collateral review, in effect applying the tolling provision of thé AEDPA to the judge-made limitations period announced in Ross. Although the Second Circuit has yet to decide the issue, at least three judges in this district have held that the tolling provision of the AEDPA does apply to the Ross one-year period. See Brooks v. Artuz, No. 98 Civ. 4449, 1999 WL 138926, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. March 15, 1999) (Chin, J.); Duncan v. Griener, No. 97. Civ. 8754, 1999 WL 20890 at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan.19, 1999) (Koetl, J.); Joyner v. Vacco, No. 97 Civ. 7047, 1998 WL 633664 at * 3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.15, 1998) (Cote, J.); but see Cole v. Kuhlmann, 5 F.Supp.2d 212, 213-214 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (Rakoff, J.) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the circuit courts that have

A: holding that  2254 petitions of prisoners whose convictions became final before the passage of the aedpa are timely if filed within one year from the aedpas effective date
B: holding that the aedpas tolling provision is inapplicable under peterson v demskie where petitioners conviction became final prior to the effective date of the aedpa
C: holding that petitioners whose convictions became final before the enactment of aedpa had a oneyear grace period after aedpas effective date to file their federal habeas petitions
D: holding that habeas petitions challenging judgments of conviction that became final before the effective date of the aedpa are not time barred if filed within one year from aedpas effective date april 241996
B.