With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". the District Court’s denial of a post-judgment motion to intervene where the existing party indicated it might not bring an appeal. See 252 F.3d at 470-71. In doing so, we noted that the would-be intervenor’s interests, which had been consonant with those of the existing party, were no longer adequately represented by that party’s litigation of the case. See id. at 471. In those circumstances, we found the post-judgment motion to intervene for the purpose of prosecuting an appeal to be timely, because “ ‘the potential inadequacy of representation came into existence only at the appellate stage.’ ” Id. (quoting Dimond v. District of Columbia, 792 F.2d 179, 193 (D.C.Cir.1986)); see also United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 395, 97 S.Ct. 2464, 2470, 53 L.Ed.2d 423 (1977) (<HOLDING>); Dimond, 792 F.2d at 193-94 (reversing the

A: holding that an untimely postjudgment motion does not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal and that this court has no jurisdiction over an untimely filed appeal
B: holding that the trial court erred in denying as untimely a postjudgment motion to intervene filed promptly after judgment and noting that this holding was consistent with several decisions of the federal courts permitting postjudgment intervention for the purpose of appeal
C: holding that a postjudgment motion to incorporate a sanction as part of the final judgment is a motion to modify the judgment and extends the trial courts jurisdiction
D: holding that a motion to continue a hearing on a postjudgment motion was ineffective to extend the period for the trial court to rule on the motion absent the express consent of the parties
B.