With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". the trial court here was without authority to grant attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 13-6-11 on summary judgment, and we reverse the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to that extent. Decided June 12, 2013 Jeremy E. Citron, for appellants. Waldon, Adelman, Castilla, Hiestand & Prout, Jonathan M. Adelman, for appellees. Because we agree that a binding agreement was reached but hold that the trial court lacked authority to award OCGA § 13-6-11 attorney fees at summary judgment, we affirm in part and reverse in part. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Andrews, P. J., and McMillian, J., concur. 1 See OCGA § 44-14-473 (c) (l)-(2) (providing requirements for healthcare-provider lien affidavits to validate a release of a cause of action, which affid 730 SE2d 518) (2012) (<HOLDING>); Penn v. Muktar, 309 Ga. App. 849, 850-51 (711

A: holding that although sellers acknowledgment was not valid acceptance of buyers offer under  22071 buyers subsequent acceptance of and payment for goods along with buyers objection to a particular term within counteroffer constituted assent to remaining terms of counteroffer
B: holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when it conditioned settlement upon satisfaction of liens
C: holding that purported acceptance letter was a counteroffer when it conditioned settlement upon additional act of resolving medical liens that were not mentioned in offer
D: holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when response required additional act of resolving all liens
B.