With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". we consider a number of factors, including the force of the unfairly prejudicial evidence, whether that force was mitigated by curative instructions, and the weight of the admissible evidence that supports the verdict. See United States v. Eccleston, 961 F.2d 955, 959-60 (D.C.Cir.1992). In this case, the analysis of those factors is straightforward. First, there was nothing unfairly prejudicial, per se, about the investigator’s testimony that he had recovered ammunition from McLendon’s room. See United States v. Gloster, 185 F.3d 910, 914 (D.C.Cir.1999) (noting that “Rule 403 focuses not on prejudice but on the danger of unfair prejudice”) (internal quotation marks omitted); cf. Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 255-56, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (<HOLDING>). As the district court acknowledged, this

A: holding that a court may not disregard the doctrine of harmless error simply in order to chastise what the court views as prosecutorial overreaching  quoting united states v hasting 461 us 499 507 103 sct 1974 76 led2d 96 1983
B: holding that the interests preserved by the doctrine of harmless error cannot be lightly and casually ig nored in order to chastise what court viewed as prosecutorial overreaching
C: holding that bcmr decisions are subject to judicial review by federal courts and can be set aside if they are arbitrary capricious or not based on substantial evidence quoting chappell v wallace 462 us 296 303 103 sct 2362 76 led2d 586 1983 alterations in original
D: holding that an attorneys fee award must be reasonable in relation to the success achieved quoting hensley v eckerhart 461 us 424 436 103 sct 1933 76 led2d 40 1983
A.