With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of public access discussed to this point, courts have identified a similar presumption stemming from the First Amendment. See, e.g., Lugosch, 435 F.3d at 124; Gambale, 377 F.3d at 140 n. 4. In its arguments in opposition to NASD’s protective order motion, Standard conflates the two presumptions of access, claiming that NASD must “overcome the commonlaw [sic] right of public access with its First Amendment foundation.” (See Standard’s Surreply 4 (citing common law and First Amendment precedent in same footnote).) Nevertheless, due to the important constitutional principles at stake, the Court construes Standard’s argument as a separate assertion of both the common law and the First Amendment presumptions of access with respect to all of the documents. See, e.g., Gambale, 377 F.3d at 141 (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation marks and citations

A: holding that a a representative plaintiff acts as fiduciary for the others requiring the representative to act in the best interest of class
B: holding records did not qualify as exempt confidential commercial information under exemption 4 because the information was not actually confidential
C: recognizing courts role as primary representative of the public interest and its duty to determine whether confidential treatment over records filed wholesale under seal is warranted
D: recognizing that the primary issue to be considered in whether the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class is a determination of whether any antagonism exists between the interests of the plaintiffs and those of the remainder of the class
C.