With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 394 Ill. 362, 68 N.E.2d 750; People ex rel. School District No. 88 v. Holland (1943), 384 Ill. 277, 51 N.E.2d 266; Almon v. American Carloading Corp. (1942), 380 Ill. 524, 44 N.E.2d 592.) Although the contrary conclusion was recently reached in Leckrone v. City of Salem (1987), 152 Ill. App. 3d 126, 503 N.E.2d 1093, we adopt the analysis of the court in National Wrecking Co. v. Midwest Terminal Corp. (1987), 164 Ill. App. 3d 621, 518 N.E.2d 193, which adheres to the holding of the Illinois Supreme Court in Almon. See also Leib v. Toulin, Inc. (1983), 113 Ill. App. 3d 707, 447 N.E.2d 900; Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Guaranty Bank & Trust Co. (1978), 59 Ill. App. 3d 362, 375 N.E.2d 522; cf. Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller (1985), 472 U.S. 424, 86 L. Ed. 2d 340, 105 S. Ct. 2757 (<HOLDING>). Since no Illinois Supreme Court Rule

A: holding that disqualification orders do not fall in the collateral order exception
B: holding that disclosure orders adverse to the attorneyclient privilege do not qualify for immediate appeal under the collateral order doctrine
C: holding that orders overruling claims of privilege and requiring disclosure are immediately appealable as collateral orders
D: holding that the disqualification order is an issue completely independent of the merits of the action
A.