With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". See Tex.R.App. P. 47.1 (requiring appellate court to address only issues necessary to final disposition of the appeal). TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent to the majority opinion in several respects. No Starting Presumption Against Waiver First, I question the applicability of a presumption against waiver in a case such as this, in which the parties entered into a contract containing a jury waiver provision. The case the majority cites for the proposition that every reasonable presumption against waiver should be indulged, Aetna Insurance Co. v. Kennedy, is a 1937 Supreme Court case dealing with whether a party could waive its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial by its conduct during trial. 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 811-12, 81 L.Ed. 1177 (1937) (<HOLDING>); see U.S. CONST. amend. VII. The Seventh

A: holding that a motion for directed verdict should be granted if there is no evidence on which a jury could legally base a verdict for damages against the moving party
B: holding that the party did not waive its right to enforce the arbitration clause
C: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict
D: holding that party did not waive right to trial by jury by requesting directed verdict
D.