With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (“SJC”) would follow the few state courts which have held that a hospital can be deemed a seller or distributor of medical devices for the purposes of a product liability claim. Resolving all ambiguities in the law in favor of the Plaintiffs, the Court infers that the Massachusetts state courts would do so. The Defendants bear a heavy burden of proving fraudulent joinder and they have cited no Massachusetts case law in their favor. See Simons, 2007 WL 1306558, at *3. In other similar cases, courts have refused to find fraudulent joinder. See Badon, 236 F.3d at 286-87; In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1789, 2008 WL 2940560, at *6-8 (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 2008); Snyder v. Davol, Inc., No. CV 07-1081-ST, 2008 WL 113902, at *1 (D.Or. Jan. 7, 2008) (<HOLDING>). Even where a court is inclined to infer that

A: holding that a hospital had not been fraudulently joined because there was no definitive ruling from any oregon appellate court foreclosing a strict liability claim against a hospital
B: holding that the hospital was fraudulently joined because it did not meet the definition of seller as defined by mississippis product liability statute or under the uniform commercial code
C: holding that the hospital was fraudulently joined because hospitals are not sellers of medical devices and therefore there was no basis in illinois law to support the plaintiffs claims for strict liability and breach of implied warranty against the hospital
D: holding that because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the expert report adequate as to the vicarious liability claim against the hospital based on the actions of the doctors plaintiffs suit against the hospital including her claim that the hospital was vicariously hable for the actions of its nurses could proceed
A.