With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of the Miami-Dade owners. Petitioners seek a writ of certiorari quashing the Miami-Dade Circuit Court’s order on the basis that the order departed from the essential requirements of the law, causing irreparable harm that cannot be remedied on plenary appeal. See Sheridan Healthcorp, Inc. v. Total Health Choice, Inc., 770 So.2d 221, 222 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000). We grant the writ. The mandate in Pompano Beach was issued on January 21, 2003, before the Broward Circuit Court transferred the case to the Miami-Dade Circuit Court. Upon the issuance of the mandate from the Fourth District, the Broward Circuit Court’s role became purely ministerial, and its function was limited to obeying the Fourth District’s decree. See Torres v. Jones, 652 So.2d 893, 894 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995) (citations omitted)(<HOLDING>). Pursuant to Pompano Beach, the Broward

A: holding appellate courts must consider the trial courts jury charge as a whole
B: holding that a trial courts role upon the issuance of a mandate from an appellate court becomes purely ministerial and its function is limited to obeying the appellate courts order or decree
C: holding that a lower court is bound by the decree of the appellate court and can only enter a judgment or decree in strict compliance with the appellate courts mandate
D: holding that where both the appellate and trial courts are reviewing the paper record  there is no reason for the appellate courts to defer to the trial courts finding
B.