With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". nonrenewal in February 2012 and then merely elaborated on this reason in his response to the EEOC. See Elam, 601 F.3d at 881 (“While ‘[substantial changes over time in the employer’s proffered reason for its employment decision support a finding of pretext, this does not mean that an employer cannot elaborate on its proffered reason.’ ” (quoting Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417 F.3d 845, 855 (8th Cir. 2005))). Rather, Eppard’s response to the EEOC, viewed in the light most favorable to Dunn, is a shift away from his alleged statement that Dunn’s nonrenewal was unrelated to his job performance, and the discrepancy between these two statements is substantial enough to indicate pretext and thereby avoid summary judgment. See Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1023 (8th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>). Taken together, the affidavits from Dunn’s

A: holding that the plaintiff had a right of privacy in the contents of a settlement agreement that stated that the plaintiff had sued his employer for failing to hire him because he was a single gay male and because his employer suspected that he had aids
B: holding that plaintiff raised genuine fact issue com cerning pretext by presenting evidence that his employer initially told him that he was terminated because of poor performance but later claimed the termination was due to a lack of work
C: holding that evidence of pri or poor work performance was inadmissible propensity evidence under rule 404b
D: holding after considering the plaintiffs evidence of pretext that the determination whether the plaintiffs speech was the motivating factor in his discharge turns on a genuine issue of material fact
B.