With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". case because in Revenue Cabinet, as here, the sales tax statute did not impose a test for passage of title, and an administrative rule did impose a test for passage of title. Id. at 738-39. Here, Hales makes no claim that the impermanence of its materials results in a generally understood, implicit agreement to pass title at some point before delivery. Moreover, our statute requires an explicit agreement on passage of title before the statutory presumption can be rebutted; there is no obvious provision in this statute for an implicit understanding, which the Kentucky court thought sufficient. Consequently, the facts of Revenue Cabinet aré inapposite and its result is inapplicable to the case at bar. See also Kurtz Concrete, Inc. v. Spradling, 560 S.W.2d 858, 862 (Mo.1978) (en banc) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the Commission applied the

A: holding in a slander of title action that attorneys fees are recoverable as part of the costs of removing the cloud from the title
B: recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim
C: holding that title insurer not in business of supplying information in issuing either title commitment or policy of title insurance for purposes of exception to moorman prohi bition against recovery of economic losses in tort further holding that contract defines title insurers liability
D: holding that title passes on mixture of readymix concrete because of usage of trade
D.