With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". § 7292(d)(2). Contrary to Mrs. Jones’s contention, the Secretary’s appeal involves no question of factual determination or application but merely the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing claims for accrued benefits, an issue clearly within our jurisdiction. Furthermore, Mrs. Jones’s argument that, because a remand was ordered, the decision of the Court of Veterans Appeals is not final for purposes of review by an Article III appellate court is similarly without merit. As we have previously held, decisions of the Court of Veterans Appeals rendering an interpretation of a statutory provision and remanding for further proceedings in accordance with that interpretation constitute final and appealable decisions. Travelstead v. Derwinski 978 F.2d 1244, 1248 (Fed.Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); see also Sullivan v. Finkelstein, 496 U.S.

A: holding that secretarys decision not to challenge the sufficiency of the appellees exhaustion was in effect a determination that the agency had rendered a final decision within the meaning of  405g
B: holding that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision
C: holding that a court of veterans appeals decision interpreting 38 usc  8713 overruling the secretarys prior interpretation and remanding back to the board was a final and appealable decision
D: holding that where the board did not mail decision in accordance with the provisions of 38 usc  7104e the period within which to appeal to the court of appeals for veterans claims did not commence to run
C.