With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Zap, 328 U.S. at 628, 66 S.Ct. at 1279, 90 L.Ed. at 1482. The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the specific question whether a parole agreement executed by a parolee constitutes valid consent to support a waiver of Fourth Amendment rights. See Samson, 547 U.S. at 852 n. 3, 126 S.Ct. at 2199 n. 3, 165 L.Ed.2d at 259 n. 3 (“Because we find that the search at issue here is reasonable under our general Fourth Amendment approach, we need not reach the issue whether ‘acceptance of the search condition constituted consent in the Schneckloth ... sense of a complete waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights.’ ” (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118, 122 S.Ct. 587, 591, 151 L.Ed.2d 497, 504-05 (2001))). See generally Griffin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (<HOLDING>). We too have not previously decided the

A: holding a search of a probationers home pursuant to a wisconsin probation regulation was permissible under a special needs theory but not addressing whether the probationer had consented to the search under the regulation
B: holding search provision in probation order constitute a reasonable and necessary element of the courts regulation of probationers which did not require the defendants consent
C: holding that the special needs of wisconsins probation system justified a warrantless search of a probationer by probation officers pursuant to a wisconsin regulation that allowed probation searches based on reasonable grounds
D: holding wisconsin supreme courts interpretation of regulation requiring reasonable grounds for warrantless search of probationers residence satisfies fourth amendment reasonableness requirement
A.