With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Becerra, 155 F.3d at 753-54; Lyons, 888 F.2d at 1075. As for the change-in-the-law exception, the Supreme Court did address the question whether a duty to disclose arises from a defendant’s market activities and therefore Stoneridge does not affect the legal basis of the Fifth Circuit’s holding in Regents. (The Financial Institution Defendants insist Lead Plaintiff previously argued that Defendants’s alleged market activities gave rise to a duty to disclose and lists a number of examples in # 5986 at 4, 7 n. 5, 8 and nn. 6-7, and 10-11 and nn. 8-9.) Moreover, they maintain, logically Lead Plaintiff cannot rely on a case decided in 1977, Virginia Bankshares, and yet argue a change in controlling law. See Loa-Herrera v. Dept. of Homeland Sec., 239 Fed.Appx. 875, 880-81 (5th Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>). Furthermore the Supreme Court’s refusal to

A: holding that an intervening change in statutory interpretation did not amount to a change in controlling law under the mandate rule where plaintiffs attempted on remand to rely on a different but related statute which could have been but was not previously raised and the interpretation of which had not changed
B: holding that state had waived argument because it could have been raised in an earlier appeal but was not and because it fell outside the scope of remand
C: holding that plaintiffs had no vested interest in former interpretation of state law
D: holding that where a contractor relied on montgomery countys prior reasonable and debatable interpretation of the statutory phrase nonhabitable structures and constructed its building based on that interpretation and with a valid permit it would be inequitable for the county board of appeals to apply a changed interpretation to require removal of the buildings fourth floor
A.