With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". to their § 924(e) convictions it removed the condition underlying the original legality of their unenhanced § 841 sentences. Whether those § 841 sentences actually became illegal at that moment may be too metaphysical a question to answer. But given the interdependency, the appellants could not — at the moment of launching their challenges — have entertained any reasonable expectation in the finality of their § 841 sentences. Rhodes, 106 F.3d at 432 n. 3. It makes no difference that these defendants challenged their § 924(e) sentences under § 2255, while in Rhodes the challenge occurred on direct appeal. In both the defendant “voluntarily” brought the challenge, id., and that controls. Cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2078-79, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (<HOLDING>). Appellants make much of certain language in

A: holding that prosecutorial misconduct bars retrial after conviction overturned because of perjured testimony only where this stringent standard met
B: holding possibility of more severe sentence on retrial after appeal or collateral attack does not violate double jeopardy or due process protections
C: holding double jeopardy did not bar retrial where a jury could not render a verdict and a mistrial was granted
D: holding that fact that conviction has been overturned at defendants behest removes double jeopardy bar to increased sentence after retrial
D.