With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". must be provided for by the express terms of the statute in question.” Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex.1999). Because the legislature expressly consented to suit for certain types of damages but not others, we cannot conclude, as Denton County urges, that it intended a blanket waiver of immunity from suit and liability for all damages. To the contrary, the statute limits the suit to a judicial determination of the common boundary and authorizes the recovery of surveying expenses to establish that boundary, but otherwise retains governmental immunity from suit for attorney’s fees. Denton County also argues that the Declaratory Judgments Act waives governmental immunity from suit for attorney’s fees. See Tex. Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 446 (Tex.1994) (<HOLDING>). Tarrant County counters by asserting that

A: recognizing that a party can obtain declaratory relief but still not be entitled to an award of attorneys fees under the declaratory judgments act
B: holding that a case under the declaratory judgments act remains a live controversy even if all requests for substantive declaratory relief become moot during the actions pendency as long as a claim for attorneys fees under the act remains pending
C: holding attorneys fees waived in lawsuit brought under declaratory judgments act to interpret statute
D: holding award of attorneys fees to defendants under the declaratory judgments act was proper because recovery of fees was separately authorized by section 5006a of the texas property code
C.