With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". . .” N.C.G.S. § 14-27.1(4) (1993). Section 14-27.4’s gravamen, or gist, is to criminalize the performance of a sexual act with a child. The statutory definition of “sexual act” does not create disparate offenses, rather it enumerates the methods by which the single wrong of engaging in a sexual act with a child may be shown. Furthermore, our Supreme Court has expressly determined that disjunctive jury instructions do not risk nonunani-mous verdicts in first-degree sexual offense cases. State v. McCarty, 326 N.C. 782, 784, 392 S.E.2d 359, 360 (1990) (upholding jury instruction that the defendant could be found guilty of first-degree sexual offense “if [the jury] found [the] defendant [had] engaged in either fellatio or vaginal penetration”); Hartness, 326 N.C. at 565, 391 S.E.2d at 179 (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial court instructed the

A: holding that the title of the statute did not limit the reach of the statute
B: holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction  
C: holding that disjunctive instructions did not result in a fatally ambiguous verdict in an indecent liberties case and noting that the indecent liberties statute is more similar to the statute relating to firstdegree sexual offense    than to the trafficking statute discussed in diaz
D: holding that where a statute uses the disjunctive term or the provisions of the statute plainly encompass two distinct situations
C.