With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of ‘conscious shocking’ conduct.”) (quoting Natale, 170 F.3d at 263). The Individual Defendants point to their affidavits, which universally state that they did not act to intentionally deprive Mr. Watrous of his rights and were acting within what they believed to be the scope of their employment and in furtherance of their official roles. See Defs.’ 56(a)l, Ex. A at ¶ 104-11; Ex. B at ¶ 30-38; Ex. C at ¶ 30-38; Ex. D at ¶ 11-17. At the outset, the court notes that the Second Circuit has strongly suggested that actions taken without authority under state law, such as when a board lacks jurisdiction over property, give rise to a conclusion that the state entity lacked a rational basis for their actions, and that such actions violate substantive due process. See Brady, 863 F.2d at 216 (<HOLDING>); see also Cine SK8, 507 F.3d at 789 (“[I]f the

A: holding that discretion of zoning board was not sufficiently circumscribed to support substantive due process claim
B: holding that where a zoning board had no authority under state law to take certain actions with respect to a protected property interest a trier of fact could conclude that there was no rational basis for the towns zoning boards actions and that as a result the zoning board violated appellants rights to substantive due process
C: holding that because pennsylvania law limited a state courts review of a zoning boards decision to the issue whether the boards determinations were supported by substantial evidence the rookerfeldman doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from filing a federal action claiming that the zoning board had engaged in disability discrimination following a state courts review of the boards determinations
D: holding that an associations president who was not a party before the board of appeals was not entitled to appeal the boards decision granting a zoning application that his association had opposed in the board proceedings
B.