With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Quinn would have standing under Washington law, we need not decide this issue. The continuous ownership requirement imposed by Rule 23.1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is procedural and therefore applies in diversity actions such as this one. Kona, 179 F.3d at 769. 6 . Quinn attempts to distinguish Lewis, arguing that, unlike in Lewis, 719 F.2d at 1048, here there was inadequate disclosure concerning the Board members' purported conflicts and Quinn's allegations. Even assuming that Anvil’s disclosure to shareholders was less extensive than that in Lewis, that alone is not enough for us to conclude that equity warrants a different result here. 7 .The state cases cited by Quinn likewise involved challenges to mergers. See Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 n. 10 (Del. 1984) (<HOLDING>); Platt Corp. v. Platt, 21 A.D.2d 116, 124, 249

A: recognizing that the federal litigant has a personal right subject to exceptions in certain classes of cases to demand article iii adjudication of a civil suit
B: recognizing exceptions to the continuous ownership requirement in certain merger cases
C: recognizing first two exceptions
D: recognizing the efficiencies defense in merger cases
B.