With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". As the Superior Ironworks court noted, section 38.004 specifically authorizes a trial court to take judicial notice of the usual and customary attorneys’ fees and of the contents of the case file without receiving further evidence in certain circumstances. 789 S.W.2d at 431. However, the award of appellate attorneys’ fees in this case is predicated on section 305.005 of the Finance Code, not section 38.001 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. This court has previously held that section 38.004 cannot be used to justify the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees recovered outside of section 38.001. See Valdez v. Valdez, 930 S.W.2d 725, 732-33 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1996, no writ); see also London v. London, 94 S.W.3d 139, 147-49 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). We sustain the Parr defendants’ ninth point

A: holding that a party may recover attorneys fees under section 38001 only if the party prevails on a cause of action for which attorneys fees are available and recovers damages
B: holding fees mandatory under predecessor statute of  38001
C: holding that trial courts may not use section 38004 to take judicial notice of reasonableness of attorneys fees awarded under statute other than section 38001
D: holding award of attorneys fees to party prevailing on contract claim is mandatory under section 38001 if there is proof of the reasonableness of the fees
C.