With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 933 (4th Cir.1986), and United States v. Farnsworth, 729 F.2d 1158 (8th Cir.1984). In both of those cases, the courts permitted police officers and parole officers to identify defendants in surveillance videos and rejected the defendants’ arguments that the identifications were unduly prejudicial specifically because “ ‘[n]othing at trial gave the jury any reason to conclude that [the witnesses] were involved in law enforcement.’” Hardie, 513 So.2d at 793 (quoting Allen, 787 F.2d at 937). Under those circumstances, the proper identification testimony did not give rise to an improper inference of prior criminal conduct. Other courts have since applied this same limitation to identification testimony by police officers. Compare State v. Price, 701 So.2d 1204, 1206-07 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997) (<HOLDING>), and Edwards v. State, 583 So.2d 740, 741

A: holding that the trial court did not err in charging the jury that the defendant was in the custody of the victim officer when he shot and killed the officer due to the undisputed evidence presented at trial including the defendants pretrial statement to police admitting that fact
B: holding that the trial court had properly granted prices motion for new trial because while the state properly introduced identification testimony from a police officer who was not a witness to the offense it improperly elicited testimony that the witness was in fact a police officer who knew the defendant from working in his neighborhood
C: holding that trial court properly barred certain questions about witness who was in federal witness protection program
D: holding that trial court abused its discretion in permitting the testimony of a witness who was not listed in the pretrial order and no reason was given for the failure to list the witness
B.