With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (2000). See Smith v. Smith, 737 So.2d 641, 645 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999). Margarita now earns more than she was earning before the dissolution proceedings began. She “voluntarily” sought additional income through full-time instead of part-time employment. The trial court properly and carefully considered Margarita’s recent work history and occupational qualifications before determining that income should not be imputed to her. There is no requirement that a person be employed earning the highest wages available in his or her field. See Daniel v. Moats, 718 So.2d 949, 949-50 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). Given the trial court’s broad discretion in this matter, we find no error in the court’s decision not to impute income to Margarita. See Pribble v. Pribble, 800 So.2d 743, 746 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001) (<HOLDING>). Domingo also contends that the trial court

A: holding that a claimant is required to establish a physical inability to follow any occupation from which he can earn a reasonably substantial income rising to the dignity of an income or livelihood although the income may not be as much as was earned prior to the disability
B: holding that wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to damages in the amount due during the remainder of the wrongfully terminated contract offset by the amount of income which employee received from other employment during the remainder of the contract period
C: holding that in determining the amount of income to impute to a party the court does not necessarily have to impute the amount of income the party would earn by his or her best efforts to gain employment equal to the parties capabilities
D: holding that when trial court orders restitution at sentencing pursuant to statute the defendant is entitled to notice of the amount claimed and the opportunity to dispute the amount
C.