With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 59 . Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). 60 : See Bell Atl., 127 S.Ct. at 1970. 61 . Id. at 1964. Accord ATSI, 493 F.3d at 98 n. 2 (applying the standard of plausibility outside Twombly's anti-trust context). 62 . Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 157-58 (2d Cir.2007) (emphasis in original). 63 . Bell Atl., 127 S.Ct. at 1969 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). Accord id. (“The phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard ....”). 64 . ATSI, 493 F.3d at 98 (quoting Be 82 . In re Par Pharm., Inc. Sec. Litig., 733 F.Supp. 668, 675 (S.D.N.Y.1990). Accord In re Time Warner, Inc. Sec. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 268 (2d Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>); Lapin v. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., 506

A: holding that a duty to disclose arises whenever secret information renders prior public statements materially misleading
B: holding that to state cause of action based on an omission a plaintiff must explain how an alleged omitted fact negates the truth of or renders misleading the statements actually made
C: holding that whether attorney complied with fiduciary duty to disclose all material information was question of fact
D: holding that erisas duty of loyalty creates a duty to disclose certain information to beneficiaries
A.