With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Constr. Co. v. Industrial Dev. Board of the Town of Vincent, 590 So.2d 218 (Ala.1991); Ex parte Warrior Basin Gas Co., 512 So.2d 1364 (Ala.1987). See, also Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 87 L.Ed.2d 444 (1985). The 1995 customer agreement contains a broadly worded arbitration clause that is clear on its face — it covers “any” and “all” controversies that may arise between Merrill Lynch and Ms. Kirton — and, like unambiguous statutes, it leaves no room for interpretation. See, Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson, 684 So.2d 102, 103 (Ala.1995) (discussing the ride that general principles of contract law apply to the interpretation of an arbitration provision); Coastal Ford, Inc. v. Kidder, 694 So.2d 1285, 1286 (Ala.1997) (<HOLDING>); Ex. parte Lorance, 669 So.2d 890, 892-93

A: holding that an assignment of all causes of action  claims and demands of whatsoever nature constituted an express assignment of rico claims
B: holding that the language of the arbitration clause   any controversy or claim arising out of     was broad enough to encompass the plaintiffs claim alleging fraud in the inducement of the contract
C: holding that the parties choice to require arbitration for disputes which arise under a contract when the standard language was arising out of or relating to demonstrated that the parties intended the agreement to be narrow
D: holdingthat the language of an arbitration clause applying to all claims demands disputes or controversies of every kind or nature that may arise  concerning the vehicle was not ambiguous and was broad enough to encompass the claims at issue
D.