With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". a district court’s original grant or denial of a 'stay put' order or 'stay put’ injunction. No case cited deals with appellate review of a district court's refusal to enjoin a preexisting 'stay put' order. See Zvi D. v. Ambach, 694 F.2d 904, 906 (2d Cir.1982) (stating that [§ 1415(j) ] 'substitutes an absolute rule in favor of the status quo for the court's discretionary consideration of the factors of irreparable harm and either a likelihood of success on the merits or a fair ground for litigation and a balance of hardships'); see also Drinker v. Colonial Sch. Dist., 78 F.3d 859, 864 (3d Cir.1996) (quoting Zvi D. and adopting the reasoning of the Second Circuit); Bd. of Educ. of Cmty. High Sch. Dist. No. 218, Cook County v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 103 F.3d 545, 550 (7th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>).” Johnson, 287 F.3d at 1180. 13 . An IFSP

A: holding that use of the preliminary injunction equitable factors would dilute the statutory framework under the stay put provision
B: holding that the stay put provision establishes a strong preference but not a statutory duty for maintenance of the status quo
C: holding that when the district court applies the wrong preliminary injunction standard this court may review the record to determine whether the injunction is justified
D: holding that a federal action to enforce the stay put provision is not itself a pending proceeding under  1415 that triggers stay put
A.