With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". outstanding capias warrant for Plaintiff and the law prohibiting a search in such circumstances was not “clearly established” as required in Maldonado, 568 F.3d at 269. For their argument that the law on this issue was unsettled at the time of the search, Defendants cite Malek v. Knightly, No. 94-2113, 56 F.3d 59, 1995 WL 338178, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 13924 (1st Cir.1995). In Malek, the First Circuit declined to determine “whether a bench warrant for civil contempt authorizes entry into the arrestee’s home to effect the arrest.” Id. at *2, 1995 U.S.App. LEXIS 13924 at *2. From this, Defendants argue that Defendant Bartels was conducting himself in an uncertain area of the law defining whether the capias entitled him to enter and search the P 172, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (U.S.1974) (<HOLDING>)). See also U.S. v. Romain, 393 F.3d 63, 69, n.

A: holding defendant assumed risk that third party would consent to search of storage locker where defendant instructed third party to rent locker under third partys name and allowed third party to keep possession of lease papers and to occasionally retain the keys
B: holding that the question of whether police had a reasonable basis for finding that a third party had authority to consent to search is a question of law
C: holding that a third party has authority to consent to a search if the third party is a coinhabitant
D: holding that where a third partys conduct is closely related to the contractual relationship or the contractual dispute and where the third party enjoys financial benefit from the contract the forum selection clause applies to the third party
C.