With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Eddie L. Sampson appeals pro se the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his 1995 convictions and sentence for two counts of residential burglary, in violation of Cal.Penal Code § 459. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we affirm. Sampson contends that his prior 1994 conviction should not have been used to enhance his sentence because the attorney who represented him in that proceeding rendered ineffective assistance of counsel. Sampson’s contention is foreclosed by Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v. Cross, 532 U.S. 394, 403-04, 121 S.Ct. 1567, 149 L.Ed.2d 608 (2001) (<HOLDING>). Sampson next contends that he again received

A: holding that a defendant generally may not challenge an enhanced sentence through a section 2254 petition on the ground that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained
B: holding that where a statute provides for an enhanced penalty based on a defendants prior conviction the fact of conviction is a sentencing factor to be determined by the court rather than a jury
C: holding that sixth amendment not violated when sentence enhanced based on prior convictions that were not charged in indictment or admitted by defendant
D: holding that a sentence may be enhanced based on a prior conviction that was not alleged in the indictment admitted on the record or proved beyond a reasonable doubt
A.