With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (1986), it explicitly did so only prospectively. See id., 42 Cal.3d at 388, 228 Cal.Rptr. at 905-06, 722 P.2d at 179-180. Galindo’s trial was held in early-December of 1984, a year-and-a-half before Collins. Thus, as the California court of appeals held on Galindo’s direct appeal, California’s Luce-type rule does not apply retroactively to Galindo’s case. Because at the time of his trial Galindo “was not required to testify in order to preserve for appeal a claim of improper impeachment by prior conviction,” it would be “intolerable” and “fundamentally] [un]fair” to apply a Luce-type rule to his appeal. Id. More important, we are bound by the state court’s determination that state law permits Galindo to appeal the impeachment issue. See Zal v. Steppe, 968 F.2d 924, 927 (9th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). Luce (or a Luce-type rule) therefore does not

A: holding the rule that an accused has a right to counsel at any critical confrontation announced in united states v wade 388 us 218 87 sct 1926 18 led2d 1149 and gilbert v california 388 us 263 87 sct 1951 18 led2d 1178 not to be retroactive
B: holding that the blakely rule does not apply retroactively on collateral review and cannot authorize a successive habeas petition
C: holding that bjecause there has never been a definitive statement by the united states supreme court clarifying the recognized ambiguity in cooper v california 386 us 58 87 sct 788 17 led2d 730 1967  we are free to adopt our own view of its holding unconstrained by opinions of federal courts of appeal
D: holding that although walker v birmingham 388 us 307 87 sct 1824 18 led2d 1210 1967 upheld a rule that barred collateral challenges of contempt citations appellant nevertheless could challenge his contempt citation on habeas because california elected not to adopt a collateral bar rule
D.