With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". to admit that he had committed robbery with a deadly weapon, which would have qualified the D.C. robbery offense as a crime of violence under the Maryland predecessor statute to CL section 14-101. The State points out that here, in contrast to Bowman, Scott agreed to facts proffered by the government that would constitute a crime of violence under CL section 14-101(a)(19). It maintains that Scott’s agreement, without reservation, to these facts was sufficient for the sentencing court to infer that he had an intent to cause serious physical injury. A factfinder “may infer the necessary intent from an individual’s conduct and the surrounding circumstances[.]” Chilcoat v. State, 155 Md.App. 394, 403, 843 A.2d 240 (2004). See also In re Lavar D., 189 Md.App. 526, 590, 985 A.2d 102 (2009) (<HOLDING>). As such, the facts underlying Scott’s D.C.

A: holding that the court as the factfinder was permitted to draw the inference that a group of juveniles intended to inflict serious physical injury by repeatedly hitting punching and kicking the victim
B: holding that begay rejected that circuits earlier approach under which an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another
C: holding that torture occurs when the victim is subjected to serious physical abuse before death that serious sexual abuse may constitute serious physical abuse that facts supporting a finding of torture will also support a finding of depravity of mind and that the age of the victim may be considered in determining whether the evidence shows depravity of mind
D: holding purposely inflicts  serious injury and intended to cause serious injury convey the same specific intent such that it is impossible to commit one without the other
A.