With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". at 480) (concluding that this court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an order compelling Umana to arbitrate his claims because that order was not a final order under § 11—721(a)(1), because it was not an appealable interlocutory order under Brandon because it did not frustrate (in contrast with facilitate) arbitration, and because § 16-4317 of the UAA did not attempt to make orders compelling arbitration final and appealable); Hercules & Co. v. Shama Rest. Corp., 566 A.2d 31, 35 n. 4 (D.C.1989) (citing Brandon v. Hines, 439 A.2d 496, 504 (D.C.1981)) (characterizing the fact that "Hercules [was not] claiming] that the referral to arbitration [wa]s a final judgment” as a "correct assessment”). But see Parker v. K & L Gates, LLP, 76 A.3d 859 n. 3 (D.C.2013) (citations omitted) (<HOLDING>). 4 . The District’s first argument in its

A: holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award
B: holding that an order compelling arbitration is not appealable because it is not listed in the uaa statute and because it is not final
C: holding that an order compelling arbitration in an independent proceeding is appealable as a final order because in that context the order compelling arbitration resolves the sole issue before the court
D: holding that orders compelling arbitration are not appealable not because of the uaa appeals provision but because it has been definitely settled by the supreme court of this state that an order compelling arbitration is not final and therefore is not appealable
C.