With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 123 Nev. 71, 75, 157 P.3d 704, 706 (2007), we have not addressed whether a division of property in a divorce case is an affirmative recovery to which a lien may attach. In light of our disposition of this case, this question is not fairly presented, and we decline to examine it on a hypothetical basis. 7 The court quotes NRS 18.015(3) but incorrectly cites to NRS 18.015(2). 8 The Schlang court cited In re Nicholson, 57 B.R. 672 (D. Nev. 1986) (discussing when an attorney lien attaches to property). 9 Compare Kramer v. Kramer, 96 Nev. 759, 762, 616 P.2d 395, 397 (1980) (the court loses jurisdiction over property divided by a divorce decree where the parties wait for longer than six months to modify the decree), with Collins v. Murphy, 113 Nev. 1380, 1384-85, 951 P.2d 598, 600-01 (1997) (<HOLDING>), superseded by rule amendment, In the Matter

A: holding that it was unfairly prejudicial and an error to adjudicate a motion for attorney fees filed after the deadline for filing a notice of appeal had passed
B: holding that the filing of an opening brief within the time period for filing a notice of appeal could constitute notice of appeal
C: holding filing of motion for reconsideration does not toll the 30day deadline for filing petition for review
D: recognizing that an appeal filed within 30 days of the entry of an order awarding attorney fees was timely filed as to the issue of attorney fees
A.