With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of the plaintiffs emotional distress; and (4) the distress suffered was so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Buckley v. Trenton Sav. Fund Soc., 111 N.J. 355, 366, 544 A.2d 857 (1988). Defendants submit that Kounelis’s IIED claim must fail because his distress cannot be characterized as severe. Defendants assert that, despite Kounelis’s allegations of emotional distress, he has never been treated for his alleged anxiety, nor has he presented any objective medical evidence suggesting that his emotional distress was the proximate result of Defendants’ conduct. Contrary to Defendants’ assertions, neither medical treatment, nor expert testimony is necessary in order for a plaintiff to prevail on an IIED claim. Bolden v. SEPTA, 21 F.3d 29, 34 (3d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, in New Jersey, there is generally no

A: holding that a tort claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress is distinct from a claim for emotional distress damages under the employment discrimination statute
B: holding inter alia that expert testimony was not required to prove damages for emotional distress in an abuse of process claim
C: holding that expert testimony is not required to corroborate a claim for emotional distress
D: holding emotional distress is a distinct claim from wrongful death
C.