With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of public concern, for any reasonable official would know that unlawfully retaliating against a public employee for his protected speech activities constitutes “significant government misconduct.” Furthermore, we have held that it was clearly established since at least 2007 that testifying pursuant to a subpoena in a judicial or administrative proceeding of public concern constitutes protected speech. See Clairmont, 632 F.3d at 1109. Although none of our earlier cases specifically addressed subpoenaed deposition testimony as opposed to testimony in open court, our holdings have not been so narrowly cabined that Caw could reasonably have believed subpoenaed deposition testimony was excluded from the First Amendment’s ambit of protection. See, e.g., Alpha Energy Savers, 381 F.3d at 925 (<HOLDING>). Second, a reasonable official would also have

A: holding that in order to state a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel based on the failure to call a witness to testify the claimant must allege 1 the identity of the potential witness 2 that the witness was available to testify at trial 3 the substance of the witnesss testimony and 4 an explanation of how the omission of the testimony prejudiced the case
B: holding that closure was limited not only because it lasted only for the testimony of one witness  but also because there was no limitation at all on the right of the public or the press to examine the transcript of the officers testimony
C: holding that not only the employees testimony at the grievance hearing but also the affidavit that he filed and his agreement to be listed as a potential witness were entitled to protection
D: holding that appellant who filed a  2255 motion but produced no affidavit from the witness in question or any other independent support for his claim failed to show prejudice because he offered only speculation that he was prejudiced by his counsels failure to interview the witness which was not enough to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial as required by strickland
C.