With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". The Plaintiffs seek an award for a total of 3,748.5 attorney hours and 901.25 paralegal hours for Phelps Dunbar and a total of 2,707 attorney hours for Randolph Lipscomb; the Plaintiffs claim that these hours were reasonably expended on this litigation. The Defendants dispute the total number of hours claimed by the Plaintiffs. Of the 3,748.5 Phelps Dunbar attorney hours for which the Plaintiffs seek an award, the court finds that 1,047.75 of the hours were expended in state court litigation in the Chancery Court of Lowndes County prior to the commencement of this litigation. Accordingly, the fees for those hours are not attorneys’ fees contemplated by § 1988, and no award shall be made for those hours. See Simi Inv. Co., Inc. v. Harris County, Texas, 236 F.3d 240, 255 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Brantley v. Surles, 804 F.2d 321, 325 (5th

A: holding that attorneys fees awards are available under  1988 for frivolous actions
B: holding that a court may award attorneys fees in a successful lmrda action
C: holding that an award of attorneys fees under supreme court rule 38 precursor to rule 222 did not preempt an award of attorneys fees to which one is otherwise entitled and thus appellant could seek an award of attorneys fees pursuant to section 1577300 which permits an award of fees for a party prevailing in an action against a state agency
D: holding that attorneys fees resulting from state court litigation that does not seek to enforce federal constitutional rights but which does precede a successful  1983 suit are not attorneys fees contemplated by  1988
D.