With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". L.Ed.2d at 712 (Marshall, J., dissenting).] See id. at 702-06, 104 S.Ct. at 2072-74, 80 L.Ed.2d at 702-06 (Brennan, J., concurring in the general principles but dissenting in their application in a capital sentencing context) (“the standards announced today can and should be applied with concern for the special considerations that must attend review of ... a capital sentencing proceeding” because “counsel’s general duty to investigate ... takes on supreme importance ... in the context of developing mitigating evidence to present to [a judge or jury considering the sentence of death]”); see also Lockhart v. McCree, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986) (upholding use of death-qualified juries during guilt-phase); Poland v. Arizona, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (<HOLDING>); id. at -, 106 S.Ct. at 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d at

A: holding that under monge double jeopardy does not prevent retrial of an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes
B: holding that resentencing hearing in capital case is not barred by double jeopardy when appeals court rejects sole aggravating factor found by sentencer failure of sentencer to find other alleged aggravating factors is not an acquittal of these factors for double jeopardy purposes
C: holding that aggravating circumstances in capital penalty proceedings are not separate penalties or offenses to which the protection against double jeopardy applies
D: holding for a unanimous court that sentencer in capital case must consider an extensive list of nonstatutory mitigating factors
B.