With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 55, 100 S.Ct. 915, 63 L.Ed.2d 198 (1980). In Lewis, the Supreme Court held that a prior state conviction obtained where defendant had been wholly deprived of counsel could form the predicate for a felon-in-possession conviction. Id. at 56, 65, 100 S.Ct. 915. While the defendant in Lewis was convicted under a different statute than Sharpley, the reasoning of Lewis regarding the use of the unrestricted word “conviction” applies with equal force here. Id. at 61-62, 100 S.Ct. 915. To the extent that Sharpley attacks his prior conviction as part of his sentencing proceedings, he can do so only if the prior conviction is constitutionally infirm under the standards of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963). See Custis, 511 U.S. at 491-92, 496-97, 114 S.Ct. 1732 (<HOLDING>). Gideon, in turn, establishes that criminal

A: holding that where a sentence was enhanced under 18 usc  924e for prior convictions absent statutory language authorizing collateral attacks defendant could not challenge prior conviction except for gideon error
B: holding that apprendi did not affect enhanced sentence under  924e
C: holding that apprendi does not affect enhanced sentence under  924e and citing cases
D: holding that district court may enhance sentence based on fact of prior convictions under  924e regardless of whether admitted by defendant or found by jury
A.