With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". But see United States v. Gonzalez, 578 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir.2009) (suppressing evidence recovered during a preGant search that was lawful under then-controlling precedent), petition for cert. filed, No. 10-82 (July 14, 2010). We are aware that the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Davis to address precisely this question. Unless and until the Court instructs otherwise, we are bound to apply this Circuit’s binding precedent in Jackson. 28 . See Buford, 632 F.3d at 276, 2011 WL 447048, at *9 n. 9 (" '[0]ur precedent on a given point must be unequivocal before we will suspend the exclusionary rule’s operation.’ " (quoting Davis, 598 F.3d at 1266)). 29 . We express no opinion on the scope of the rule announced in Gant, the continuing viability of Finley post-Gant, or the ir.1993) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Bascaro, 742 F.2d 1335,

A: holding that a defendants unprovoked physical battery of his attorney in the courtroom constituted extremely serious misconduct that amounts to the forfeiture of the right to counsel regardless of whether the defendant intended to relinquish the right
B: holding that the constitutional right to be present is satisfied so long as the defendant is given an opportunity to register his opinions with counsel after juror questioning and is present when the exercise of strikes is given formal effect even if the defendant is not present when his lawyer actually exercises the peremptory challenges
C: holding that the defendants were not denied their right to be present during the peremptory strike phase of jury selection where they were present during voir dire had a chance to confer with counsel before the jury was impaneled and were present in the courtroom when the peremptory strikes were given actual effect by the clerks reading off the list
D: holding that the defendants right to presence was not violated where the defendant had been present in the courtroom while the venire members were questioned notwithstanding the fact that the defendant was absent later when his attorney made his strikes over the lunch hour because the defendant was present in the courtroom when the clerk gave the strikes effect by reading off the list of jurors who had not been stricken
D.