With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". has stated that it “attribute[s] postrevocation penalties to the original conviction.” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 701, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000). This position finds support in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(a), which notes that supervised release is “a part of the sentence.” When read as such, a revocation sentence should be seen as part of the initial sentence, even when the same act triggers multiple revocations. See United States v. Soto-Olivas, 44 F.3d 788, 790 (9th Cir.1995). Coupled with the conclusion that a district court has statutory discretion under 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) to impose consecutive sentences upon revocation of concurrent terms of supervised release, Double Jeopardy is not implicated here. See also United States v. Clark, 984 F.2d 319 (9th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). D. Next, Dees asserts that the District Court

A: holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release
B: holding that term of supervised release was not automatically terminated when defendant was deported from united states and thus defendants subsequent commission of another offense illegal reentry after deportation prior to expiration of term of supervised release violated condition of supervised release that defendant commit no new offenses
C: holding that a defendant who was on probation and supervised release for separate offenses could be resentenced consecutively for the same conduct that led to his probationsupervised release violation
D: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release
C.