With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". IV & XIV; Fla. Const, art. 1, § 12. The demand for a speedy trial sounds in the constitutional right to a “speedy and public trial.” U.S. Const, amend. VI & XIV; Fla. Const, art. 1, § 16(a). A person does not ordinarily abandon the right to seek suppression of evidence unlawfully seized merely by demanding a speedy trial. Indeed, the Florida Supreme Court has made clear that a speedy trial demand can be compatible with a pending motion to suppress. State v. Embry, 322 So.2d 515, 518 (Fla.1975) (“[T]he mere filing of a motion to suppress is not tantamount to a finding of law that the speedy trial deman-der does not have a bona fide desire to obtain trial, that he is not prepared and will not be prepared for trial.”); see also Williams v. State, 548 So.2d 898, 899 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). Nor are we persuaded by the trial court’s

A: holding that trial court erred in considering pro se motion for new trial filed when defendant was represented by counsel
B: holding that the trial court erred by granting the defendants motion to dismiss
C: holding a trial court erred in determining that a motion to suppress was waived by a speedy trial demand
D: holding that aggressiveness with which defendant asserted his speedy trial right was lacking because he merely filed one demand for speedy trial and opposed his original counsels withdrawal
C.