With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". by needlessly delaying the trial. He had never requested to substitute counsel previously and had no history of “gaming” the system. The trial judge repeatedly referred to Carlson’s motion as “late,” but considering that the charges against him had been pending such a relatively short time and that he filed his motion to substitute immediately after he retained new counsel, the timing of his motion was certainly understandable. Finally, Carlson was not asking for a long continuance. Notably, we do not know how long Ms. Shellow would have needed to prepare because the trial judge never asked her. Apparently, any delay would have been unacceptable to the trial judge. That sort of rigidity can only be characterized as arbitrary. See, e.g., Linton v. Penny 656 F.2d 207, 212 (6th Cir.1981) (<HOLDING>). The State’s argument that Carlson was not

A: holding that the length of a continuance was not unreasonable because of defendants part in extending the delay
B: holding that when determining whether a delay in prosecution violates a defendants right to a speedy trial courts must consider the length of the delay the reason for the delay whether the defendant asserted his rights and the resulting prejudice to the defendant
C: holding that in a case involving serious charges a trial judge acted arbitrarily in denying a continuance where there was no evidence of a scheme to delay the trial no showing of inconvenience to the witnesses opposing counsel or the court and the length of the requested delay was not unreasonable
D: holding that one minute delay between the initial stop of the defendant and the officers question regarding whether the defendant had any illegal substances and his request to search the defendants car was sufficiently contemporaneous with the issuance of the citation such that there was no appreciable delay and certainly no unreasonable delay
C.