With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". United States v. Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir.2007). Defendant’s challenge to the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss is premised on the Speedy Trial Act’s requirement that a defendant be given at least 30 days to prepare for trial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c). In United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 236,106 S.Ct. 555, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985), however, the Supreme Court held that the Speedy Trial Act “does not require that the 30-day trial preparation period be restarted upon the filing of a superseding indictment....” The Court further made clear that although the 30-day period does not start over at the filing of a superseding indictment, this does not mean “that a defendant must always be compelled to go to trial less than 3 6 (10th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>), abrogated on other grounds, United States v.

A: holding that the dismissal of an indictment before trial and institution of a superseding indictment does not trigger double jeopardy
B: holding that the proper remedy if the superseding indictment operates to prejudice a defendant is a continuance
C: holding that proper remedy for failure to exhaust is dismissal of the claim without prejudice
D: holding that there was no violation of defendants speedy trial act rights where the district court granted a continuance due to a superseding indictment returned five days before trial which added new charges based on recently acquired information
B.