With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 1981 but, rather, reflect only conclusions. Those conclusions, being based on faulty if unexpressed premises, are unsupportable. As such, this court finds that those cases do not represent a helpful, or appropriate, mode of analysis for the resolution of the issue presented here. A second approach, adopted by many courts, allows Hispanic plaintiffs and those of other ethnic groups to state a claim under section 1981 sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Nonetheless, these courts have required the plaintiffs to amend their complaints to allege “racial” discrimination and/or to bear the burden of producing evidence that the alleged discrimination was of a “racial,” as opposed to a national origin, character. See, Bullard v. OMI Georgia, Inc., 640 F.2d 632, 634 (5th Cir. 1981) (<HOLDING>); Khawaja v. Wyatt, 494 F.Supp. 302, 304-05

A: recognizing that the distinction between national origin and racial discrimination is an extremely difficult one to trace and holding that plaintiffs allegations of racial discrimination were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss
B: holding that racial discrimination is a personal injury tort
C: holding that racial discrimination is not a personal injury tort
D: holding official immunity is available in claims of discrimination if plaintiff fails to establish his treatment by defendants was so at variance with what would reasonably be anticipated absent racial discrimination that racial discrimination is the probable explanation
A.