With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. Davis, 203 F.3d 627, 636 (9th Cir.2000). The pertinent part of § 2255 reads: “A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall run from the latest of(l) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” Id. The phrase “becomes final” is capable of at least two meanings. In this case, the district court interpreted “final” to mean the date the court of appeals affirms the judgment of conviction. Both parties contend on appeal, however, that a judgment is final only when the time for seeking certio-rari review has expired. This date is 90 days after entry of the court of appeals’ judgment. See Sup.Ct. R. 13. Our sister circuit courts have split over this issue. Compare Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>) with Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565 (3d

A: holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired
B: holding that the oneyear period begins to run when the mandate of the court of appeals issues
C: holding that the twoyear period for filing a motion for postconviction relief begins to run upon issuance of the directappeal mandate
D: holding that the statute of limitations period begins to run when the allegedly discriminatory pension plan is applied to the plaintiffs and leaving determination of the actual date the statute begins to run on each claim to the district court
B.