With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". subject to setoff, the court emphasized the legislative purpose underlying the availability of fees, namely, to encourage the availability of effective legal representation. See id. at 1366. In response to the argument that the provision of the statute mandating the award of fees to the plaintiff (and not to the attorney) vests ownership of the award in the plaintiff, the court indicated that this approach emphasized form over substance; reasoned that reliance upon such allocation to the detriment of attorneys practicing truth-in-lending law would undermine the purpose of the fee-shifting provisions; and determined that “the fee once awarded becomes in effect an asset of the attorney, not the client.” Id.; see also Sullivan v. Crown Paper Board Co., 719 F.2d 667, 669-70 (3d Cir.1983)(<HOLDING>); Rodriguez v. Taylor, 569 F.2d 1231, 1245 (3d

A: holding that court of appeals erred by rendering judgment for full amount of attorneys fees sought after reversing 0 fee award because jury awarded less in damages than amount sought and therefore uncontroverted attorney testimony on amount of attorneys fees did not establish amount of reasonable and necessary fees as a matter of law
B: holding that public policy considerations require that the burden be placed on the attorney to provide for allocation of courtawarded attorneys fees in the contingent fee agreement
C: holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees
D: holding that attorneys representing plaintiffs in federal antidiscrimination cases should be permitted to obtain the amount established by their contingent fee agreement or the courtawarded fees whichever is greater citing sargeant v sharp 579 f2d 645 649 1st cir1978
D.