With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991). In Casey, the Court held that because § 1998 did not at the time contain an explicit provision authorizing the award of expert witness fees, such fees were not available under the statute. Shortly after this decision, Congress amended § 1988 explicitly to authorize the award of expert witness fees to prevailing parties, at the district court’s discretion. Congress has not passed a similar amendment to IDEA’S fee-shifting statute, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B), which otherwise uses language similar to that in the former version of § 1988. Several courts have held that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Casey and Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987) (<HOLDING>) dictate a similar holding under IDEA’S

A: holding that courts may not tax expert witness fees against the losing party beyond the 30 per day authorized in 28 usc  1821b unless otherwise authorized by statute
B: holding that paschall is inconsistent with the holding of crawford fitting to the effect that expert witness fees are to be determined solely in accordance with 28 usc  1821b
C: holding the contract was not authorized by law
D: recognizing that under georgia law attorneys fees are allowed where authorized by statute or contract
A.