With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". statute, however, applies to a more restricted class of cases. We observed in Mercedes Lighting and Electrical Supply, Inc. v. Department of General Services, 560 So.2d 272, 277 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), that the “requirement[s] of rule ll[are] directed at three substantive prongs: the factual basis of the paper, the legal basis of the paper, and its legitimate purpose.” In contrast, section 120.57(1)(b)5 was enacted to punish only the filing of a pleading or paper for an improper purpose. Nevertheless, the similarity between the statute and the rule has prompted us to rely on the federal cases interpreting the rule as persuasive authority. See Mercedes; Procacci; see generally, Department of Prof’l Regulation, Div. of Real-Estate v. Toledo Realty, Inc., 549 So.2d 715 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989) (<HOLDING>). Applying principles of federal law, we held

A: holding that where florida state court had not addressed choiceoflaw issues with regard to directors liability federal court could presume that florida court would follow the restatement second of conflict of laws based on the florida courts past reliance on the treatise
B: holding that a state statute modeled after a federal statute will take the same construction in the florida courts as its prototype has been given in the federal courts insofar as such construction is harmonious with the spirit and policy of florida legislation on the subject
C: holding that when a statute is patterned after a similar provision in another states statute it is proper to resort to judicial constructions placed on the statute by the courts of the state whose statute provided the model in determining the proper construction  
D: holding that a courts prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to chevron deference only if the prior court decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency discretion
B.