With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". period. See Dkt. No. 76 at 2-3, ¶¶ 3-6 (Smith Decl. of April 2008), and id. Ex. 1 at 7, ¶¶ 1-7 (Smith Report of April 2005); see also Dkt. No. 79, Ex. 3 at 70-71 (Firestone Dep.) (similar). A strikingly similar expert opinion on the cumulative effect of a manufacturer’s asbestos product resulted in a prima facie case of proximate causation against the manufacturer in Lockwood. See Lockwood, 109 Wash.2d at 247-248, 744 P.2d at 613. Such evidence, when coupled with the conclusions by plaintiffs’ additional experts, also establishes a genuine issue of material fact that Mr. Headley’s exposure to Ferro’s crystalline silica-containing product constituted a “substantial factor” in causing his silicosis. See Mavroudis v. Pittsburgh-Coming Corp., 86 Wash.App. 22, 30, 935 P.2d 684, 688 (1997) (<HOLDING>). In an attempt to avoid this conclusion, Ferro

A: holding plaintiff could not prevail on productsliability action where there was no proof he used defendants product
B: holding that no products liability claim lies in admiralty when commercial party alleges injury only to product itself resulting in purely economic loss insofar as the tort concern with safety is reduced when an injury is only to the product itself
C: holding that when multiple asbestos products exists as potential causes of asbestosis a plaintiff can prevail by showing that the defendants product was a substantial factor in bringing about the injury
D: holding that when a plaintiff can establish that she was in the vicinity in which asbestos dust from defendants products was inhaled a jury can reasonably infer that plaintiff was injured by defendants products
C.