With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". however, had received the full procedural due process to which he was entitled for the 1996 events to which the court was referring. The events, in fact, culminated in a decision and order of the Lincoln County Appeal Board calling for Pratt’s reinstatement. Defendants, therefore, are entitled to a summary judgment on this issue. Furthermore, because the LCPO has been dissolved, the issue of Pratt’s employment status, particularly after he was reinstated, is now moot. B. Constitutionally Protectable Property Interest Neither Exists In Pratt’s Job Duties Nor In Pratt’s Suspension When Such Suspension Is With Pay. [¶ 19] Pratt argues the defendants are not entitled to a qualified immunity because the defendants obstructed the reinstatement order of the Appeal Board -42 (4th Cir.1990) (<HOLDING>); Fields v. Durham, 909 F.2d 94, 98 (4th

A: holding that constitutionally protected property interest in employment does not extend to right to possess and retain particular job or to perform particular services
B: holding inmates possess a constitutionally cognizable property interest in the interest earned on money held in their prison accounts
C: holding that under article i section 9 a person has no constitutionally protected privacy interest in abandoned property
D: holding that sovereign immunity does not protect the state from claims for statutory employment benefits that constitute a protected property interest
A.