With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". restitution obligation, noting the Iowa statute, like the Oregon statute, authorized repayment of attorney fees only “ ‘to the extent that the offender is reasonably able to do so.’ ” Id. (quoting Iowa Code § 910.2 (Supp.1983)). We further pointed out that chapter 910 provides the additional protection of making the restitution plan subject to modification when circumstances dictate, for example, “if a probationer later becomes unable to meet the plan of restitution.” Id. We find these cases inapposite because an acquitted defendant does not have the same safeguards afforded a convicted defendant under Iowa law. The restitution procedures and standards of chapter 910 do not apply to an acquitted defendant such as Dudley. See Goodrich v. State, 608 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 2000) (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the statute governing Dudley’s

A: holding no restitution hearing is mandated when defendant did not object to order of restitution or request a hearing
B: holding provisions of chapter 910 apply only to a criminal restitution order
C: holding that equitable restitution is available but that legal restitution is not
D: holding that the existence of a prior bankruptcy settlement does not preclude a subsequent criminal restitution order
B.