With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". brief, Okoli also states: [TDHS] has employed the wrong legal theory to appeal: [TTCA] § 101.057. Mr. Okoli’s malice and fraud claims [sic] come under Crv. PRAC. & Rem.Code § 41.003(a).... Section 41.003 does not establish a cause of action. Rather, that section allows for the recovery of exemplary damages upon clear and convincing evidence of fraud, malice, or gross negligence. Tex. Crv. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 41.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006). By this concession in his appellee’s brief, Okoli has judicially admitted that his petition’s allegations of “malice” and “fraud” were merely allegations on which he might base a request for exemplary damages, rather than their being causes of action. See Jansen v. Fitzpatrick, 14 S.W.3d 426, 431 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>). TDHS’s jurisdictional plea attacked these

A: holding that only deliberate clear and unambiguous statements are judicial admissions
B: holding that the appellant cannot raise new issues in a reply brief he can only respond to arguments raised for the first time in appellees brief internal quotation marks omitted
C: holding that reply brief is appropriate forum to rebut new material raised in appellees brief
D: recognizing that statements in appellees brief can constitute judicial admissions
D.