With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". injury. As the State has conceded, the appellant’s prior convictions do not qualify him to be designated as a sexual’ predator. The appellant’s kidnapping conviction does not qualify him for designation as a sexual predator because the victim was not a minor. See § 775.21(4)(a)1.a., Fla. Stat. (2010); Maceo v. State, 870 So.2d 852 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (conviction for life felony of armed kidnapping did not qualify him for classification as sexual predator where victim was not a minor). Additionally, the appellant’s three convictions for violating section 794.011(5), Florida Statutes (2010), do not qualify as they are second-degree felonies and he does not have any prior enumerated convictions. See § 775,21(4)(a)1.b., Fla. Stat. (2010); Lupianez v. State, 909 So.2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reverse the denial of the

A: holding that an offender who violates section 7940115 must have a prior enumerated conviction to qualify as a sexual predator
B: holding that when a criminal court still has jurisdiction over a defendant whose criminal record mandates the court to classify him as a sexual predator the criminal court may designate the defendant as a sexual predator even though the designation was overlooked at sentencing many years earlier
C: holding that a conviction and sentence for a predicate offense that is entered after the commission of the current offense does not qualify as a prior felony within the meaning of the sexual predator statute
D: holding that defendants auto theft conviction could serve to support his conviction for auto theft as a class c felony and as a prior unrelated felony conviction under the habitual offender statute
A.