With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Billy K. Cruey, acting on behalf of himself and his law firm, B.K. Cruey, PC, seeks to appeal the district court’s orders dismissing some, but not all, defendants and denying his Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(b) motion. This court may exercise jurisdiction only over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2006), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (2006); Fed. R.Civ.P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 545-46, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). The orders that Cruey seeks to appeal are neither final orders nor are they appealable interlocutory or collateral orders. See McCall v. Deeds, 849 F.2d 1259, 1259 (9th Cir.1988) (“[T]he denial of Rule 54(b) certification is not appealable.”); Robinson v. Parke-Davis & Co., 685 F.2d 912, 913 (4th Cir.1982) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for lack

A: holding that a permanency planning order was not immediately appealable under rule 69 absent a rule 54b certification
B: holding that entry of final judgment on a claim in a multiparty action pursuant to rule 54b should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying the decision to grant 54b certification
C: holding that dismissal of some but not all claims or parties not immediately appealable absent rule 54b certification
D: holding that rule 54b certification order should contain specific findings setting forth reasons for certification
C.