With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". homes;” and 2) there is no specific language in either statute from which one could reasonably infer legislative intent to subvert express language of restrictive covenants inasmuch as section 4A provides that “[t]his section shall not affect the validity of any deed restriction that is otherwise valid.” Dempsey, 737 S.W.2d at 593. Courts who have considered the scope of restrictive covenants prohibiting “mobile homes” and “trailers” have uniformly construed the definitions broadly. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Bliss, 559 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex.1977) (finding that “trailer” is to be understood in its usual meaning regardless of whether it is referred to or described as “house trailer” or “mobile home”); Gigowski v. Russell, 718 S.W.2d 16, 20-21 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1986, writ ref'd n.r.e.)(<HOLDING>); Bullock v. Kattner, 502 S.W.2d 828, 829

A: holding that the antimodification provision of 11 usc  1322b is applicable to a mobile home irrespective of whether the home is attached to the real property on which it sits
B: holding that prohibition of any kind of mobile home included doublewide manufactured home which was finished out with foundation skirt and added porches by concluding difference in nomenclature did not alter intention of framers of restrictive covenants saying that it is bigger better and more expensive than the great majority of the mobile homes of 1967 does not alter its character
C: holding that an assembler of a mobile home is deemed to be a manufacturer of a finished product that is the mobile home for purposes of determining the applicability of the affirmative causalrelation defense under the aemld
D: holding that one finance company did not perfect its lien in the mobile home in question and that second finance company which financed purchase of the home by a bona fide purchaser for value did perfect its lien
B.