With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (defining “right” as claim that is “recognized or secured by law.”). In that situation, the triggering event that would vest the right to impose New York’s successor-liability law on Crown would be the entry of a final judgment, not the filing of a suit. See Dickson v. Navarro County Levee Improvement Dist. No. 3, 135 Tex. 95, 139 S.W.2d 257, 259 (1940); Durham Transp. Co. v. Beettner, 201 S.W.3d 859, 875 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied); Walls, 900 S.W.2d at 122; Trahan v. Trahan, 894 S.W.2d 113, 119 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied); Houston Chronicle Publ’g Co., 798 S.W.2d at 589; see also Pimienta, 110 F.Supp.2d at 548; Thompson v. Miller, No. 03-98-00627-CV, 1999 WL 549205, at *2, 1999 Tex.App. LEXIS 5538, at *4 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (<HOLDING>). Without a final judgment, Satterfield did not

A: holding that trial counsel did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance where appellant failed to specify the evidence which might have been revealed if the continuance had been granted and counsel had been afforded the opportunity to investigate further
B: holding that any right claimant might have had to receive certain information prior to statutes amendment was not vested because his lawsuit had not been resolved
C: holding that claimant was not required to show monetary loss to claimants corporations in order to receive wage loss benefits where claimant was unable to perform his duties and had to reassign other employees to complete his duties even though he had authority to draw wages from the corporation due to his ownership interest
D: holding that the district court had no right to apply the statute of limitations sua sponte because it had been waived
B.