With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". with the government’s discovery violation. Lastly, appellant argues the military judge could not properly determine whether a mistrial was appropriate because he was also the finder of fact and had already announced findings. Appellant essentially argues the military judge was unable to make a proper, objective determination regarding the motion for mistrial because he was also the subjective fact-finder. We find no merit in this assertion. It is hardly unusual for legal issues to arise after findings are made, including ones for which mistrial may be a permissible remedy. Both the military judge’s roles of fact-finder and judicial arbiter of whether mistrial was appropriate are actions done in an official capacity. See United States v. Soriano, 20 M.J. 337, 340 (C.M.A.1985) (<HOLDING>). As detailed above, we find the military judge

A: holding that the fact that the judge received adverse publicity for granting postconviction relief in another case did not require the judge to recuse herself
B: holding a military judge need not recuse himself solely on the basis of prior judicial exposure  
C: holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion
D: holding that under section 455 a judge should not recuse himself based upon conclusory unsupported or tenuous allegations
B.