With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". members rather than the board as whole. 87 Ill.App.2d at 32-33, 42, 230 N.E.2d at 467-68, 472. The relevant statute required that all expenditures by a school board be approved at a meeting. Id. at 34, 230 N.E.2d at 468. Noting that the school district had the “general power to contract as it did,” including for “extras” added to a construction project, the court concluded that the contract was not ultra vires simply because the district had not followed the statute requiring full board approval. Id. at 42, 230 N.E.2d at 472. Instead, the district was estopped from refusing to pay, because it had permitted the contractor to perform the extra work and had accepted the benefits of that work. Id.; see also Mahoney Grease Serv., 85 Ill.App.3d at 582, 40 Ill.Dec. 708, 406 N.E.2d at 914 (<HOLDING>). No Illinois case has directly considered the

A: holding that violation of city ordinance does not constitute negligence per se
B: holding a city liable for personal injuries caused by a driver colliding with a girder in the center of a city street where the city did not give a warning
C: holding that city attorneys promise in an oral settlement agreement for city to annex and rezone land was within the legal authority of the city of joliet to accomplish and were not absolutely void acts per se therefore city could be estopped from avoiding enforcement of contract
D: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city
C.