With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 4 See, e.g., Anderson v. Benton, 295 Ga. App. 851, 852 (673 SE2d 338) (2009). 5 See, e.g., AKA Mgmt., Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 275 Ga. App. 615, 616 (621 SE2d 576) (2005). 6 Anderson, 295 Ga. App. at 854 (1). 7 Herring v. Dunning, 213 Ga. App. 695, 696 (446 SE2d 199) (1994) (punctuation omitted). 8 Id. at 696-97 (punctuation omitted). 9 Id. at 697. 10 See, e.g., Greenwald v. Kersh, 275 Ga. App. 724, 725-26 (621 SE2d 465) (2005). 11 Anderson, 295 Ga. App. at 855 (1) (punctuation omitted). 12 Id. (punctuation omitted). 13 Id. 14 Turner v. Williamson, 321 Ga. App. 209 (738 SE2d 712) (2013). 15 Id. (punctuation omitted). 16 See, e.g., Millwood v. Art Factory, Inc., 306 Ga. App. 164, 166 (702 SE2d 7) (2010). 17 See Hansen v. Doan, 320 Ga. App. 609, 612 (1) (740 SE2d 338) (2013) (<HOLDING>); see also Turner, 321 Ga. App. at 213 (2)

A: holding that a release between two parties cannot bind a thirdparty who was a stranger to the release
B: holding that a binding contract was formed when plaintiff was invited to tailor limitedliability release to fit his needs no suggestion was made that release constituted a counteroffer or that plaintiff was required to execute the specific release as a condition of settlement and communications clearly contemplated that plaintiff would change portions that were unacceptable
C: holding that purported acceptance was a counteroffer when proposed release contained terms that directly contradicted the demand and letter required execution and return of the release before draft of policy limits could be removed from trust
D: holding that inclusion of a general release was merely a suggestion of how to terminate the lawsuit and that acceptance was not qualified on use of the specific release and party was willing to discuss the terms of a release
B.