With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". alleged, and thus the indictment was sufficient to confer jurisdiction on the district court. See Teal v. State, 230 S.W.3d 172, 180 (Tex.Crim.App.2007). Point of error one is overruled. The judgment of conviction is affirmed. 1 . In this case, the trial court's jury charge included an instruction on unanimity that paraphrased section 21.02(d). Then, in applying the law to the facts, the court authorized appellant’s conviction if the jury found that he committed two or more of the acts of sexual abuse alleged in the indictment, with no requirement that the jurors agree as to which acts he committed. Appellant does not contend that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction pursuant to this charge. 2 . See, e.g., Pizzo v. State, 235 S.W.3d 711, 719 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (<HOLDING>); Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 833

A: holding that statute which defined sexual contact as any touching of the anus breast or any part of the genitals of another person with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person was not vague
B: holding that touching anus and touching genitals are separate offenses under penal code section 2211a1
C: holding even though appellants two acts may have been committed during the same occurrence appellants touching of the victims genitals with his finger was a separate and distinct criminal act from touching her genitals with his penis
D: holding that the first charging phrase of section 505 is unconstitutionally vague as applied where it was not clear whether touching a minors genitals through her pants constituted sexual conduct as defined by the statute
B.