With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". by a state employee. As PWR has demonstrated, Defendant was neither subjectively ignorant nor acting in reliance upon any misleading communications from the state. We elaborate below: First, Defendant did nothing to investigate Ms. Nelson’s work status, despite the fact that the accident took place at mid-day on a work day and Ms. Nelson’s declaration that she used the vehicle to drive to and from work. See PWR Resp. 7 (citing Tucker Dep. 132:24-133:2). A claim by Defendant that it “lacked knowledge or the means of knowledge of the matter in question” here would be unpersuasive, given that even the most rudimentary inquiry into the matter would likely have disclosed Ms. Nelson’s status as a state agency employee. Cf. City of Crown Point v. Lake Cnty., 510 N.E.2d 684, 687 (Ind.1987) (<HOLDING>); see also City of Evansville v. Follis, 161

A: holding that estoppel cannot be applied if the facts are equally known by or accessible to both parties
B: holding that parties are bound by the stipulated facts in a pretrial order
C: holding where terms are unambiguous any facts about the parties intent are immaterial
D: holding that both plaintiff and defendant could be prevailing parties within meaning of lease agreement because both parties achieved some judgment on the merits of their claims or counterclaims at trial
A.