With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". standing doctrine resembles its federal counterpart. See Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St.3d 13, 979 N.E.2d 1214, 1218-20 (2012). By contrast, the Ohio state courts repeatedly have held that statutory standing is a question to be resolved with reference to the specific language of the applicable statute rather than to abstract standing principles. See, e.g., Ohio Valley Assocd. Builders & Contractors v. DeBra-Kuempel, 192 Ohio App.3d 504, 949 N.E.2d 582, 585-87 (2011) (discussing statutory standing and stating that the “only issue” is whether the plaintiff was an “interested party” as defined in the relevant statute, “common-law standing notwithstanding”); Rose-Gulley v. Spitzer Akron, Inc., No. 21778, 2004 WL 1736982, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2004) (<HOLDING>). “To incorporate common-law standing

A: holding that plaintiff lacked standing to assert cspa claim because she was not a consumer within the meaning of that statute
B: holding that a plaintiff may not assert claims based on statements she did not view
C: holding that a litigant may not claim standing to assert the rights of a third party
D: holding that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
A.