With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". § 2802(c) dealing with franchisee misconduct was proper, but refusing to extend that rationale to § 2802(c)(4)); accord Marathon Petroleum v. Pendleton, 889 F.2d 1509, 1512 (6th Cir.1989) (“[W]e must scrutinize the reasonableness of terminations even when an event enumerated in § 2802(c) has occurred.”). Sun’s contention that courts are not authorized to second guess franchisors’ decisions pursuant to the underlying lease exception in § 2802(c)(4) is grounded in our holding in Lugar that there is no statutory basis to inquire into the objective reasonableness of franchisor business decisions made in conformity with § 2802(c)(4). See 755 F.2d at 58. The Patels challenge the viability of Lugar, arguing that the decision is in conflict with our earlier opinion in Rago, 741 F.2d at 673 (<HOLDING>), and that the 1994 Amendment to § 2802(e)(4)

A: holding that per se statutory rule is not permissible under fourth amendment
B: holding that constructive amendments which are per se reversible under harmless error analysis are also per se reversible under plain error analysis
C: holding that violation of state law was not a per se constitutional violation
D: holding that the enumerated events in  2802c are not per se reasonable
D.