With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". § 707-711(1)(a) (1993), it was within the inherent power of the first circuit court (the court) to grant or to deny the motion of Defendant-Respondent Shawn Reilly (Defendant) for a DANC plea. In this case, it is aptly noted that the Hawai'i Penal Code defines three types of bodily injury in HRS § 707-700 (1993 & Supp.2002). HRS § 853-4(2) (Supp.2002) specifically prohibits the court from granting a deferred plea when “bodily injury” or “serious bodily injury” results from an assault. However, HRS § 853-1(2) is silent as to an assault involving “substantial bodily injury.” In such a case, I conclude that the trial court’s inherent power to grant or deny a motion for DAG plea or DANC plea is applicable as to HRS § 853-4(2). See State v. Keahi, 66 Haw. 364, 365, 662 P.2d 212, 213 (1983) (<HOLDING>); State v. Buchanan, 59 Haw. 562, 584 P.2d 126

A: holding that rule 11 does not require court to ensure that defendant understands consequences of nolo contendere plea on parole eligibility in sexual assault case
B: holding that plea of guilty or nolo contendere is not rendered involuntary because it is a product of plea bargaining an accepted plea bargain must be recorded and court may accept a bargained plea to a lesser offense reasonably related to a charged offense
C: holding that the trial court had inherent power to grant or deny acceptance of a deferred acceptance of nolo contendere plea
D: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals
C.