With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (citing Nazareth International, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Corporation, Inc., No. 3:04-CV-1265-M, 2005 WL 1704793, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2005) (Lynn, J.) (discussing evolution of pleading requirements for negligent misrepresentation after Benchmark Electronics, Inc. v. J.M. Huber Corporation, 343 F.3d 719 (5th Cir.2003), and American Realty, 115 Fed.Appx. 662)). Here, Kennard enumerates three causes of action, none of which is fraud eo nomine. See Original Complaint ¶¶ 27-46. With no allegations “intertwined” with those of fraud, the court finds that Rule 9(b) should not be applied to Kennard’s claims under the DTPA and Texas Insurance Code. See, e.g., Infomart (India), Pvt., Ltd. v. Metrowerks Corporation, No. 3:04-CV-1299-N, 2005 WL 292433, at *7 (N.D.Tex. Feb. 7, 2005) (God-bey, J.) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, Kennedy’s motion to dismiss on

A: holding that plaintiffs dtpa causes of action were actually negligence claims because they all complained of earles failure to hold to the applicable standard of care
B: holding statute of limitations for dtpa action including claim for breach of express or implied warranty under the dtpa is two years
C: holding that since the court could disentangle the inadequately pleaded fraud claims from the plaintiffs dtpa causes of action the defendant was not entitled to dismissal of the plaintiffs dtpa claims for failure to meet rule 9b pleading requirements
D: holding that the plaintiffs failure to meet any one of the elements requires dismissal of claim
C.