With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". whether a suspect would submit to a blood-alcohol test was not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda. Thus, a refusal to submit to such tests enjoyed "no prophylactic Miranda protection outside the basic Fifth Amendment protection.” South Dakota v. Neville (1983), 459 U.S. 553, 564 n.15, 74 L. Ed. 2d 748, 759 n.15, 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 n.15. Subsequently, this reasoning was adopted in Illinois cases which held that a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test is admissible even in the absence of Miranda warnings. (People v. Thomas (1990), 199 Ill. App. 3d 79, 556 N.E.2d 1245; People v. Bugbee (1990), 201 Ill. App. 3d 952, 559 N.E.2d 554; People v. Thomas (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 268, 558 N.E.2d 656; see also People v. Roberts (1983), 115 Ill. App. 3d 384, 450 N.E.2d 451 (<HOLDING>).) Based on these cases, we find that the trial

A: holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination
B: holding that the use of a defendants refusal to submit to a bloodalcohol test after miranda warnings were issued did not violate a defendants privilege against selfincrimination under doyle v ohio 1976 426 us 610 49 l ed 2d 91 96 s ct 2240
C: holding that miranda warnings were not required for suspect testifying at inquest when suspects lawyer had previously advised him of his privilege against selfincrimination
D: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination
B.