With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Morgan, 536 U.S. at 101, 122 S.Ct. at 2061; Gibbs v. Pierce County Law Enforcement Support Agency, 785 F.2d 1396, 1400 (9th Cir.1986) ("As each plaintiff in the instant action filed charges with the EEOC within 180 days of a [wage] payment, we conclude that plaintiffs’ action is not time-barred.”); Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1009 (10th Cir.2002) ("Bazemore ... has taught a crucial distinction with respect to discriminatory disparities in pay, establishing that a discriminatory salary is not merely a lingering effect of past discrimination — instead it is itself a continually recurring violation.”), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 941, 123 S.Ct. 340, 154 L.Ed.2d 248 (2002); Anderson v. Zubieta, 180 F.3d 329, 335-37 (D.C.Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Some circuits relied on the so-called

A: holding that under bazemore the continued application of a discriminatory compensation scheme is itself an actionable violation and that the plaintiffs could therefore be made whole for those paychecks received during the applicable limitations period
B: holding discriminatory incidents which occur outside the limitations period are actionable where a plaintiff  challenges not just one incident  but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period 
C: holding that statute of limitations did not prevent trustee from accounting for all transfers received by a claimant for purposes of selecting a distribution methodology including those that occurred outside the limitations period
D: holding in a  1981 case that under bazemore each discriminatory paycheck constituted a new violation for which suit could be brought within the statute of limitations period beginning with its occurrence
A.