With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". her due process by depriving her of “any procedure by which she could claim” successor permanent total disability benefits pursuant to Schoemehl. Her claim is without-merit. We addressed and rejected the same claim in Carter I, where Mrs. Carter argued “that her right to due process was violated because there was no procedure available to her to litigate her right to Schoemehl benefits.” 606 S.W.3d at 373. Carter I held: If [Mrs.] Carter’s dependency at the time of [Mr, Carter’s], iryuiy had been established as a matter of law in thp final award, it would have preserved the issue of her contingent right to Schoe-mehl benefits for future determination by the Commission. See, e.g., State ex rel. ISP Minerals, Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Relations Comm’n, 465 S.W.3d 471, 476 (Mo. banc 2015) (<HOLDING>). Had the issue of [Mrs.] Carter’s contingent

A: holding that employers insurer who provided workers compensation benefits to employee but did not consent to employees settlement with thirdparty tortfeasor may maintain an action for payments that become payable in the future
B: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act
C: holding that rule 6e did not extend the period in which a workers compensation carrier was required to pay a compensation award under the longshore and harbor workers compensation act where the act required payment within ten days of filing of the order as opposed to within ten days of service of notice provided for in the rule
D: holding that where a workers compensation settlement which was akin to a final award left the issue of the employees entitlement to compensation for future medical care indeterminate and open the commission retained the authority to determine the extent of the employers liability for the open claim
D.