With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 304 (5th Cir.1992); Bennett v. City of Grand Prairie, 883 F.2d 400, 408 (5th Cir.1989); Whatley v. Philo, 817 F.2d 19, 20 (5th Cir.1987). 106 . See Todd v. Hawk, 72 F.3d 443, 446 (5th Cir.1995); Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1430 (5th Cir.1995); Salas v. Car 1991); Streetman v. Jordan, 918 F.2d 555, 556 (5th Cir.1990); Brown v. Glossip, 878 F.2d 871, 874 (5th Cir.1989); and Helton v. Clements, 787 F.2d 1016, 1017 (5th Cir.1986). 110 . See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3042 n. 6, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. at 526-27, 105 S.Ct. at 2815-16; Harlow v. Wilkinson, 3 F.3d at 821. 158 . See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 3105-06, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985); Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 472-73, 105 S.Ct. 87 ), (<HOLDING>); Bennett v. Pippin, 74 F.3d 578, 584-85 (5th

A: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city
B: holding that a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is a suit against the state itself and not cognizable under  1983
C: holding that claims against a city police chief in his official capacity were really claims against the city
D: holding that because a city inspector was not entitled to official immunity the city was not entitled to vicarious official immunity
C.