With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". his petition in February 1998. The district court granted this request without comment. The state was not required to (and did not) raise its statute of limitations defense until it filed an answer to Fierro’s petition. 17 . Our precedent forecloses Fierro's related argument that the AEDPA statute of limitations is unconstitutional as applied to his case because it results in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See Graham v. Johnson, 168 F.3d 762, 787-88 (5th Cir.1999) (rejecting the "argument that denying federal court review of a successive habeas application alleging that constitutional violations resulted in the conviction of an innocent person contravenes due process and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment”). 18 . Cf. Felder v. Johnson, 204 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>); Fisher, 174 F.3d at 714 (holding that a lack

A: holding that a pro se prisoners incarceration before the enactment of the aedpa and his lack of notice of the statute of limitations does not present an extraordinary circumstance warranting equitable tolling
B: holding that pro se status does not in itself constitute an extraordinary circumstance meriting tolling
C: holding that mental incapacity is an extraordinary circumstance that may warrant equitable tolling
D: holding that the 120day filing period is subject to equitable tolling and addressing circumstances warranting equitable tolling
A.