With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". or court of the United States on a prior application for a writ of habeas corpus.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(a), (b)(2); see also id. § 2255(h) (listing exceptions to successive restrictions). 8 . 561 U.S. 320, 130 S.Ct. 2788, 177 L.Ed.2d 592 (2010). 9 . Id. at 323, 130 S.Ct. 2788. 10 . Id. at 323-24, 130 S.Ct. 2788. 11 . See Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 44-46 (2d Cir.2010); Marmolejos v. United States, 789 F.3d 66, 70, 2015 WL 3499660, at *4 (2d Cir. June 4, 2015) ("Magwood and Johnson ... stand for the principle that when a judgment is entered on account of new substantive proceedings involving reconsideration of either the defendant’s guilt or his appropriate punishment, it is a new judgment for purposes of AEDPA.”); see also Urinyi v. United States, 607 F.3d 318, 321 (2d Cir.2010) (<HOLDING>). 12 . 204 F.3d 1221, 1222 (9th Cir.2000). 13 .

A: holding premagwood that where a first  2255 motion was granted so movant could file a direct appeal the second  2255 motion was not a successive motion under aedpa
B: holding that defendant could not raise in a  2255 motion an issue previously decided on direct criminal appeal
C: holding that the application of revised  2255 which would have barred the petitioner who had filed his first  2255 motion prior to aedpas enactment from filing a second  2255 motion would have had retroactive effect because the petitioner might well have waited to file that initial motion had he foreseen aedpas revision of  2255
D: holding that motion filed under fedrcivp 60b properly construed as successive  2255 motion
A.