With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1210 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1012 (1996). While, theoretically, we are not bound by the decisions of the First Circuit, we elect to follow the First Circuit on this subject. See State v. Miller, 155 N.H. 246, 256 (2007); see also Sprague, 146 N.H. at 336 (“[T]he IAD is a federal law subject to federal construction.”). Although the defendant’s first motion to dismiss under the IAD could have served to toll the 180-day period, at the time he filed the motion, the 180-day period was already tolled by the continuance of trial from March 10 to September 25, 2006. More significantly, the defendant’s filing of his motion to dismiss did not “occasion” the period of delay from September 25 to November 13, 2006. See Vining v. State, 637 So. 2d 921, 925 (Fla.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1022 (1994); Cf. State

A: holding sanctions were appropriate where party filed motions merely for purposes of delay
B: holding that although the defendant filed a number of motions because the original trial date never changed as a result of those motions no delay could be attributed to the motions
C: holding that the state did not meet its burden under the iad of establishing that the defendants motions and requests for discovery delayed the trial because 1 the record disclosed no reason why those motions could not have been disposed of within a short time after they were filed 2 there was no evidence the process of discovery did in fact delay the trial and 3 the record failed to suggest how those pleadings could have resulted in delay
D: holding in part that the presumption of public access attaches to pretrialnondiscovery motions whether preliminary or dispositive and the materials briefs and documents filed with the court in support of or in opposition to such motions but not to pretrial discovery motions
B.