With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Co. v. American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir.1998), which, if we adopted the Commonwealth’s view that the pro se petitioner bears the burden of anticipating exceptions to the statute of limitations, would prevent the petitioner from raising a tolling argument for the first time under Rule 59(e). And, even if a pro se petitioner is not required to anticipate the statute of limitations issue, we still believe that Rule 59(e) is not an adequate avenue for the petitioner to pursue a tolling argument because it affords a narrower basis for relief than is available prior to entry of a judgment. Thus, the better course is for the district court to provide a chance to respond before judgment is entered against the petitioner, not afterwards. See Herbst, 260 F.3d at 1043-44 (<HOLDING>). D. Finally, the Commonwealth argues that Hill

A: holding that rule 59e is not sufficient to permit a pro se petitioner to respond to the sua sponte dismissal of a  2254 petition for untimeliness
B: holding that rule 59e applies to a motion to reconsider
C: holding a court can restrict future pro se pleadings if it first provides a pro se litigant notice and an opportunity to respond
D: holding that untimeliness is sufficient grounds for denying a motion to quash
A.