With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24, 40 (1st Cir.1998) (defendant did not exercise due diligence when he had seven days to locate witnesses who allegedly could have provided evidence that would directly contradict the testimony of a witness at trial, yet defendant neither requested a continuance nor moved to compel their appearance). We recognize that appellant’s trial lasted a relatively short three days, and he did not have as much time as the defendants in Wall and DeLuca to interview Croskey between learning her name and the submission of the case to the jury. However, Croskey was still residing at 2125 10th Street, next door to the crime scene, at the time of the trial, and it would have required minimal effort to locate her. See, e.g., Haley v. United States, 799 A.2d 1201, 1211 (D.C.2002) (<HOLDING>). We reject appellant’s contention that the

A: recognizing implied obligation to use reasonable diligence
B: holding that section 9545b1h was not satisfied where pcra petitioner relied upon an affidavit containing facts that could have been previously ascertained upon the exercise of due diligence
C: holding that inquiry notice triggers an investors duty to exercise reasonable diligence and that the  statute of limitations period begins to run once the investor in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered the facts underlying the alleged fraud
D: holding that defendant failed to exercise due diligence by neglecting to use a thirtysixhour window to secure an affidavit
D.