With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". filed recently by this Court, we rejected the argument that Richardson and Trujillo required the application of intermediate scrutiny when deciding the constitutionality of another statute of repose, NMSA 1978, Section 37-1-27 (Repl.Pamp.1990) (placing a ten-year limitation on actions for injuries resulting from “the defective or unsafe condition of a physical improvement to real property”). Both Richardson and Trujillo addressed the constitutionality of damage caps, which limited the amount of damages an individual otherwise entitled to recover damages could collect. See Trujillo, 110 N.M. at 623-32, 798 P.2d at 573-82 (addressing the constitutionality of NMSA 1978, Section 41-4-19(A)(2) (Repl.Pamp.1986), the Tort Claims Act’s damage cap); Richardson, 107 N.M. at 699, 763 P.2d at 1164 (<HOLDING>). Both cases recognized that an individual’s

A: holding that the commission had jurisdiction to review rates and thus delay implementation of nmsa 1978 section 623a18a 1999 replaced by section 62645 in 2003 because the removal of franchise fee charges from the rate base necessarily required a modification of rates
B: holding the broad jurisdictional grant given the bankruptcy courts under the 1978 bankruptcy act unconstitutional
C: holding that the termination of the fee cap did not affect litigation in progress when the fee cap was in effect
D: holding that nmsa 1978 section 411111 replpamp1986 the damage cap in the dramshop act was unconstitutional
D.