With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". one-year period was interrupted from May 23, 1997, through December 14, 2006, due to the pendency of the first (1997) PCR application. See id. § 2244(d)(2). Unless some other tolling mechanism is in play, however, the one-year period expired on December 19, 2006 — more than eight months before the petitioner first sought federal habeas relief. In this venue, the petitioner argues that both his second PCR application and his Rule 35(a) motion constituted tolling mechanisms. If this argument is even partially correct (that is, if either of these filings served to toll the limitations period), the federal habeas petition would be timely. Accordingly, we inquire as to the effect of each filing. A. The 2005 PCR Application. Although the petitioner failed to mention the 2005 PCR applic 03) (<HOLDING>); Hodge v. Greiner, 269 F.3d 104, 107 (2d

A: holding for the same reason that motion for appointment of counsel does not toll the period for filing a federal habeas petition
B: holding filing of motion for reconsideration does not toll the 30day deadline for filing petition for review
C: holding that the timely filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider with the bia does not toll the time period for seeking appellate court review and that the mere act of filing the motion does not render nonfinal the underlying bia decision
D: holding that an unauthorized motion for rehearing does not toll defendants time for filing a notice of appeal
A.