With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (1987) (noting that the plaintiffs decision to sue only under the state law theory, eschewing a claim under the CBA, was entitled to deference under the well-pleaded complaint rule). Regardless of whether this choice serves them well on the merits, it is entitled to deference under the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. (“Caterpillar’s basic error is its failure to recognize that a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including state-law contact rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collective bargaining agreement”). If Plaintiffs do not wish to press their additional CBA rights in this case, federal law does not force them to do so. Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637, 639, 646 (7th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>); Chavez v. Don Stoltzner Mason Contractor,

A: holding that erisa does not preempt the plaintiffs claim that the erisa plan administrator is liable for medical malpractice where the plaintiff premised the claim solely on state law and did not invoke the erisa plan
B: holding that erisa does not preempt professional malpractice claims
C: holding that district courts order remanding an erisa benefits determination to a plan administrator was nonfinal and therefore not appealable after the remand to plan administrator plan participant still could appeal the district courts decision that erisa preempted her state law claim and if successful she would be able to pursue punitive damage
D: holding that plan administrator of an erisa health plan did not have to anticipate the confusion of a plan participant
A.