With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". As such, they are deemed to have abandoned this claim on appeal. See Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9); Brinkmann v. Dallas County Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir.1987) (stating that this court will not raise and discuss legal issues that an appellant has failed to assert). In any event, Plaintiffs’ argument is without merit. It is well-settled that parole is “part of the penalty for the initial offense,” Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 700, 120 S.Ct. 1795, 146 L.Ed.2d 727 (2000), and that “once the original sentence has been imposed in a criminal case, further proceedings with respect to that sentence [have not been] subject to Sixth Amendment protections.” United States v. Work, 409 F.3d 484, 491 (1st Cir.2005); United States v. Hinson, 429 F.3d 114, 119 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). V. Plaintiffs also assert a number of due

A: holding that district courts have the authority to order terms of supervised release following reimprisonment
B: holding that further supervised release may be ordered as a sentence for violation of supervised release
C: holding that defendant is not entitled to a jury trial to determine whether terms of supervised release have been violated
D: holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release
C.