With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Cir.1985). In Pelleport, the Ninth Circuit explicitly noted that “[h]ad the district court based its remand order on [a lack of jurisdiction], section 1447(d) would no doubt apply, because, even if clearly erroneous, a district court’s decision that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear a case is not renewable.” 741 F.2d at 276 (9th Cir.1984). Nevertheless, in two eases which would not have come within the scope of the Pelle-port/Clorox doctrine because they implicated subject matter jurisdiction, see In re TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II, 940 F.2d 832, 843 (3d Cir.1991) and Aliota v. Graham, 984 F.2d 1350 (3d Cir.1993), we did not rely on Pelleport/Clorox even though we had invoked that doctrine elsewhere. See Foster v. Chesapeake Insurance Co., 933 F.2d 1207 (3d Cir.1991) (<HOLDING>). We discuss those cases and this court’s

A: holding review of remand order based on forum selection clause not barred by  1447d
B: holding order dismissing action without prejudice based on contractual forum selection clause is final and appealable because it terminates the litigation in the plaintiffs chosen forum
C: holding that a permissive forum selection clause containing a waiver of any claims of forum non conveniens amounts to a mandatory forum selection clause at least where the plaintiff chose the designated forum
D: holding that remand order based on forum selection clause is reviewable on appeal
A.