With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Am. Jur. 2d Limitation of Actions § 95 (2000). No statute explicitly prohibits Fred Lind Manor and Adler from adopting a shorter limitation provision for WLAD claims in their contract. ¶40 Numerous courts have considered whether limitations provisions in arbitration agreements and/or adhesion contracts are substantively unconscionable. Some have held that six-month limitations provisions for Title VII claims are reasonable, but that shorter limitations periods, i.e., 30 days, are substantively unconscionable. Soltani v. W.&S. Life Ins. Co., 258 F.3d 1038, 1044 (9th Cir. 2001) (upholding a six-month limitations provision in an employment contract); Taylor v. W.&S. Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188, 1206 (7th Cir. 1992) (upholding a six-month limitation period). Cf. Alexander, 341 F.3d at 267 (<HOLDING>); Plaskett v. Bechtel Int’l, Inc., 243 F. Supp.

A: holding that an arbitration agreement between a lender and a borrower that included a bilateral exception for claims less than 10000 was not substantively unconscionable even if one party is substantively more likely to bring small claims actions  
B: holding that a 30day limitations provision is substantively unconscionable
C: holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced
D: holding district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to sever numerous substantively unconscionable terms from arbitration agreement
B.