With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". at *2 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist] Dec. 15, 2005, no pet.) (applying section 154.001 to modification suit under Chapter 156) (mem. op.). 5 . These statutes permit a trial court to order a parent to pay the other parent or an amicus attorney reasonable attorney’s fees as child support in a non-enforcement modification suit. Because these statutes do not expressly mention attorney's fees, our dissenting colleagues conclude that no statute permits such an order. See post at pp. 718-21. But the Texas Legislature is free to express itself through general rather than specific language, and the meaning of a statute can be implied from the express statements in the statutory text. See Tex. Indus. Energy Consumers v. CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC, 324 S.W.3d 95, 105-07 (Tex.2010) (<HOLDING>); Sturgis Air One, L.L.C. v. Harris County

A: holding that transferors request to recover fee it had paid was within the scope of the general statutory language allowing recovery of reasonable costs of participating in a proceeding even though other party was initially responsible for paying this fee and even though statute did not specifically provide that such recovery was allowed
B: holding that an attorney was entitled to a quantum meruit recovery even though his oral contingency fee agreement with the client violated the ind rules of professional conduct which require a contingency fee agreement to be in writing
C: holding that the fee applicant bears the burden of showing that  an adjustment is necessary to the determination of a reasonable fee 
D: holding that where a contract for legal services fails to expressly provide for the amount of the fee a reasonable fee is implied
A.