With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". York, was the true owner of the property, Sergeant Martinez’s testimony does not indicate that he ever contacted or attempted to contact McNutt Co.; he simply concluded that since York could not produce the original VIN plates that the property was “deemed” stolen and that there was no way of ever tracing ownership. McNutt Co. was never served in the 47.01a proceeding or named as an interested party. This is significant because if McNutt Co. were the owner, as evidenced on the DPS registration receipts, and was allowing York to use the property, also as evidenced by the DPS registration receipts, then York would have a superior right to possess the trailer as against appellees, regardless of whether the trailer was deemed stolen or not. See Universal Underwriters, 283 S.W.3d at 901 (<HOLDING>). It seems logical that if DPS were acting in

A: holding that the legal title holders to real property held it in constructive trust for the equitable title holder who was entitled to the real property based on an earlier contract
B: holding that a title holder has  the superior right to possession over one who holds no title
C: recognizing that most other courts apply title vii principles to title ix cases but refusing to apply title viis knew or should have known standard to a title ix claim
D: holding that mortgagee holds legal title subject to defeasance
B.