With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". or other entity ... in any man ner, including ... any denial ... [of] staff privileges ... because such health care institution, or person, association, or corporation ... declines to participate in a health care service which violates the health care institution's conscience.” (emphasis added)). 7 . The Second Circuit has held that this statutory provision does not imply a private right of action. See Cenzon-DeCarlo v. Mount Sinai Hosp., 626 F.3d 695, 698-99 (2d Cir.2010). However, if the hospitals are indeed entities covered under 42 U.S.C. § 300a-7(c), JWHO would likely have a remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of its statutory right to be free from discrimination in seeking admitting privileges. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980) (<HOLDING>); Banks v. Dallas Hous. Auth., 271 F.3d 605,

A: holding that because  1983 by its plain text broadly encompasses violations of federal statutory  as well as constitutional law plaintiffs could bring suit for violation of social security act
B: holding no exhaustion requirement in  1983 suit alleging violations of the medicaid act
C: holding that title ivd of the social security act did not support a right enforceable pursuant to  1983 in part because the statute mandated substantial compliance with federal regulations
D: holding that plaintiffs social security numbers are not relevant to determining liability for unpaid wages in a suit under the flsa and state law
A.