With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". the investigation, expended minimal effort to obtain Scott’s supplemental statement: Jackson did not try to reschedule the interview, tell Scott there was a deadline of any kind, or even return her calls. Furthermore, the ALJ’s finding that Scott “jeopardized [BRA’s] opportunities to provide continued contract services with the District Government for mentally and physically challenged individuals” is not supported by substantial evidence. There is no evidence that BRA’s contract or li cense was jeopardized. So far as appears, BRA submitted a satisfactory report of its investigation to DDS within the required time frame and the matter was closed. Further, Scott’s conduct pales in comparison to cases in which this Court has upheld findings of gross misconduct. As in Ode 89-90 (D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Rodriguez v. Filene’s Basement Inc., 905 A.2d

A: holding that the employer had not demonstrated the employee was discharged for gross misconduct because the conduct was an isolated incident and the employer did not try to show that its staffing ability had suffered serious  or indeed any consequences as a result of the employees conduct
B: holding that correctional officers contacting of inmate housed in correctional facility other than the one the officer staffed did not constitute gross misconduct because employer had not shown the officer deliberately or willfully violated an unambiguous and consistentlyenforced employer rule
C: holding in a case in which the alj found the employer had failed to establish a rule violation under 7 dcmr  3127 but nevertheless determined the employer had established the employees gross misconduct that because there was scant evidence as to the employers written requirements pertaining to employee behavior this court could not conclude that there was substantial evidence that the employee had violated the employers rules in a manner that amounts to gross misconduct under 7 dcmr  3123
D: holding that although the employer had discretion to make a for cause determination the employment contract between the former presidentchief executive officer and the defendant employer did not constitute an erisa plan because administration of the benefits required only a single discretionary decision
B.