With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 804 F.2d at 97; see Lynch v. Milwaukee, 747 F.2d at 428. We do, however, have another concern with the decision of the district court that requires that it revisit this matter. We believe that, because the reductions in question are the product of independent judicial scrutiny of the record, the district court must afford the plaintiffs an adequate opportunity to respond to the district court’s critique of the submitted petition. The party submitting the petition has, of course, the burden of justifying the fees requested in the petition. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437, 103 S.Ct. at 1941. We have no doubt that the district court has an independent obligation to scrutinize the legitimacy of such a submission. See Hutchison v. Amateur Elec. Supply, Inc., 42 F.3d 1037, 1048 (7th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, the district court’s willingness to

A: holding that the district court acted within its discretion when it denied plaintiffs request for counsel
B: holding that a district court may dismiss a frivolous complaint sua sponte notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff paid the statutory filing fee
C: recognizing discretion of district court in determining a fee award
D: recognizing in a case where the court sua sponte reduced the attorneys fee request that the district court has discretion to reduce the amount of the fee request and stating when  defense counsel fails to do so the district court should not reward the defendants by denying the plaintiffs counsel an opportunity to defend his claim against specific challenges whatever their source
D.