With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also Iddings v. Mee-Lee, 82 Hawai'i 1, 13, 919 P.2d 263, 275 (1996); Masaki, 71 Haw. at 13-14, 780 P.2d at 573-74. It follows, then, that “[i]n cases involving individual rights, whether criminal or civil, the standard of proof at a minimum reflects the value society places on individual liberty.” Addington, 441 U.S. at 425, 99 S.Ct. at 1809 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under the preponderance of the evidence standard, both “parties share the risk of an erroneous verdict in roughly equal fashion.” Masaki, 71 Haw. at 14, 780 P.2d at 574 (citing Addington, 441 U.S. at 423, 99 S.Ct. at 1807-08); see also Iddings, 82 Hawai'i at 13, 919 P.2d at 275. On the other hand, under the clear and convincing proof standard, the interest 1997) (<HOLDING>). We hold, therefore, that the legislature is

A: holding the due process rights of one acquitted by insanity are not violated when he or she is committed on a determination of risk of danger to self or the person or property of others by a preponderance of the evidence
B: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence
C: holding that doctrine does not violate due process
D: holding hrs  7044114 which places the burden on the insanity acquittee to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she is fit to be released does not violate due process principles
D.