With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". to the government.”), abrogated on other grounds by, United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Szur, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3519, *39-46, 1998 WL 661484 (S.D.N.Y.1998) (rejecting defendant’s claims that the NASD “acted pre-textually in conducting their investigations”); see also Marchiano v. National Ass’n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 134 F.Supp.2d 90, 95 (D.D.C.2001) (“[T]he court is aware of no case ... in which NASD Defendants were found to be state actors either because of their regulatory responsibilities or because of any alleged collusion with criminal prosecutors.”). Testimony in an NASD proceeding may entail exposure to criminal liability, but that in itself is not enough to establish the requisite governmental nexus. Shvarts, 90 F.Supp.2d at 222 (<HOLDING>). Cf. United States v. Solomon, 509 F.2d 863,

A: holding that waiver of privilege against selfincrimination is proceeding specific
B: recognizing commonlaw privilege against selfincrimination
C: holding that questions put to the defendants by the nasd in carrying out its own legitimate investigative purposes do not activate the privilege against selfincrimination
D: holding that the drug tax violated the privilege against selfincrimination
C.