With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357, 83 S.Ct. 1246, 1257, 10 L.Ed.2d 389 (1963). At the outset, we consider the effect of TAPAA’s introductory paragraph. Section 1653(c)(1) prescribes that, “Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law,” the owner of a vessel carrying trans-Alaska oil and the Fund “shall be strictly liable without regard to fault in accordance with the provisions of this subsection....” 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(1). Section 1653(c)(1) is the general statement of liability, and as such it introduces the subsequent subsections which contain TAPAA’s operational details. While some courts have found “notwithstanding” phrases to preempt explicitly the application of other laws, see, e.g., Complaint of Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F.Supp. 631, 634 (D.Alaska 1981) (<HOLDING>), we do not find the phrase dispositive in this

A: holding that similar notwithstanding language in the clean water act preempted application of limitation act to limit owners liability for cleanup costs
B: holding that denial of permit under section 404 of the clean water act was a taking
C: holding that adequate notice is a mandatory precondition of a clean water act citizen suit
D: holding that district courts are without jurisdiction to review preenforcement orders issued under the clean water act
A.