With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". concession, the trial court immediately excluded Wiggins’ testimony and evidence without exploring what substantial procedural prejudice would accrue to the State if he testified. We are mindful that Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(n)(1) authorizes a trial court to exclude evidence as a sanction for a violation of the discovery rules, but this sanction should only be imposed when there is no other adequate remedy. Furthermore, where as here the violation has not been- found to be willful or blatant, this sanction is generally too severe “when the only prejudice to the State is its inability to obtain evidence for impeachment of the witness.” Grace v. State, 832 So.2d 224, 227 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); cf. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the trial court did not make a

A: holding failure of prosecution to disclose evidence that may be favorable to the accused is a violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
B: holding that the district court erred in requiring the defense to disclose a report which the defense did not intend to introduce into evidence and which was merely designed to aid in the crossexamination of a witness for the state
C: holding that if the failure to disclose a defense witness was willful and motivated by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize the effectiveness of crossexamination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence it would be entirely consistent with the purposes of the compulsory process clause simply to exclude the witnesss testimony
D: holding that the appropriate sanction was to require the defendant to disclose the nature of the agreement with the witness
C.