With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". D’Oench, Duhme did not preclude a borrower from asserting claims for wrongful acceleration and unreasonable disposal of collateral at foreclosure. Because the claims did not arise from a secret or unrecorded agreement but rather arose from the implied good faith obligation part of every contract under state law, the claims would be apparent to the bank examiners considering the failed thrift’s documents in light of relevant law; D’Oench, Duhme and § 1823(e) were, accordingly, held inapposite. See also New Bank of New England, N.A v. Callahan, 798 F.Supp. 73, 77 (D.N.H.1992) (legal obligations arising from state law rather than purported agreements between parties do not rely upon “agreements” within the meaning of D’Oench or § 1823(e)); In re Beitzell, 163 B.R. 637 (Bankr.D.D.C.1993) (<HOLDING>). But see F.D.I.C. v. Smith, 848 F.Supp. 1053,

A: holding that negligence alone is not sufficient to constitute a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to insureds
B: recognizing cause of action for implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in atwill employment contract
C: holding doench duhme does not bar state law claim based on breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
D: recognizing that evidence of breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing may support punitive damages
C.