With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 332, 336 (1st Cir.1995); Robinson v. Volkswagenwerk AG, 940 F.2d 1369, 1373 n. 4 (10th Cir.1991). 12 . See Kerr v. Lyford, 171 F.3d 330, 337 (5th Cir.1999) (citing Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 98 S.Ct. 1099, 55 L.Ed.2d 331 (1978)). 13 . See Henzel, 608 F.2d at 657; see also Reid, 56 F.3d at 336; Robinson, 940 F.2d at 1373 n. 4. 14 . See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (considering stage of criminal justice process in determining functional characterization of the conduct); see also Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 263 (4th Cir.1994) (considering pendency of judicial proceedings in making immunity determination). 15 . See Hill, 45 F.3d at 662 (immunity applicable because conduct occurred “after the pros-ecutorial phase of the case had begun”); Carter, 34 F.3d at 263 (<HOLDING>); see also Milstein, 257 F.3d at 1011 (holding

A: holding that a defendant does not have the right to be represented by counsel in postconviction proceedings which are civil proceedings
B: holding that the pendency of postconviction motion does not negate the finality of convictions for immigration removal purposes
C: recognizing judicial immunity for acts committed within their judicial jurisdiction
D: holding pendency of postconviction judicial proceedings relevant to immunity determination
D.