With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Phillips, 924 F.2d at 1583 (upholding an award of EAJA fees to a client whose contract with her attorney provided that she would be personally liable for $2,500, with any additional attorney’s fees to be contingent upon the success of her appeal and subsequent EAJA application). Courts have also interpreted “incurred” in similar fee-shifting statutes to mean that a party has a legal obligation to pay fees pursuant to a contingency-fee agreement. See, e.g., Preseault v. United States, 52 Fed.Cl. 667, 675 (2002) (citing Osprey Pac. Corp. v. United States, 42 Fed.Cl. 740, 742 (1999) (obligations under contingency-fee agreements are “actually incurred” under the Uniform Real Property Acquisition Policy, 42 U.S.C.A. § 4654)); Gotro v. R & B Realty Grp., 69 F.3d 1485, 1487-88 (9th Cir.1995) (<HOLDING>). Accordingly, we reaffirm our holding in Claro

A: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees
B: holding that by choosing the words any actual expenses including attorneys fees incurred congress did not intend to remove the discretion of the district court to award fees in cases such as contingent fee or pro bono cases where the client has not actually incurred the obligation to pay her attorneys fees
C: holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award attorneys fees after finding respondent failed to make child support payments because movant presented no evidence of any reasonable fees incurred
D: holding trial court erred in awarding attorneys fees to physicians in absence of any evidence of attorneys fees
B.