With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". U.S.C.App. § 762; Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 622-26, 98 S.Ct. 2010, 2013-15, 56 L.Ed.2d 581 (1978). We disagree. In Lockerbie I, we adopted the federal common law to govern causes of action under the Warsaw Convention. 928 F.2d at 1278. In Lockerbie II, we held that damages under the Warsaw Convention should be determined “by an examination of maritime’law, which is probably the oldest body of federal common law.” 37 F.3d at 828. While two maritime statutes — DOHSA and the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C. app. § 688 (1988) — preclude recovery for non-pecuniary loss, general maritime cases not brought under such statutory restrictions allow recovery. Lockerbie II, 37 F.3d at 829; Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 585-88, 94 S.Ct. 806, 814-16, 39 L.Ed.2d 9 (1974) (<HOLDING>). Looking at the language and underlying

A: holding punitive damages unavailable for survival claims under general maritime law
B: holding that general maritime law preempts state law
C: holding that although congress has never enacted a comprehensive maritime code federal courts may not award loss of society damages under general maritime law because the death on the high seas act expressly prohibits recovery of such damages
D: recognizing loss of society damages as remedy available under general maritime law
D.