With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". claims that, as of August 28, 1998, Marathon owed it $28,605.46 in Recurring Fees pursuant to Section 7 of the License Agreement. Defendants Marathon and Gage respond that plaintiffs submission of an affidavit claiming that plaintiff is owed “approximately” that amount, with no further evidence, is insufficient to support summary judgment in plaintiffs favor. The court agrees, and denies summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claim for $28,605.46 in Recurring Fees damages. For the same reason, the court denies summary judgment with respect to plaintiffs claim for pre-judgment interest. Pursuant to Section 7.3 of the License Agreement, defendants are liable for 1.5% pre-judgment interest. See Mid-Jersey Nat’l Bank v. Fidelity-Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640, 645 (3rd Cir.1975) (<HOLDING>). Because the principal amount has not yet been

A: holding that award and rate of prejudgment interest are within trial courts discretion
B: holding that the proper rate for prejudgment interest is the rate fixed by the parties in a contract
C: holding that the petitioner can claim no rate as a legal right  other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the agency commission
D: holding that a utility can claim no rate as a legal right that is other than the filed rate whether fixed or merely accepted by the commission
B.