With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (1981); W. Page Keeton, Pros-ser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 128, at 972 (5th ed.1984). [¶ 27] Although Brown, 2011 SD 21, ¶ 39, 798 N.W.2d 422, suggests attorney fees through appeal may be appropriate for slander of title under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 633(l)(b), we have found no cases, and the parties have cited none, explicitly addressing the propriety of awarding attorney fees on appeal in a quiet title action involving slander of title under a statutory provision comparable to N.D.C.C. § 49-19.1-09. In another context, however, this Court has decided statutory provisions authorizing an award of attorney fees to a prevailing party entitle that party to attorney fees in successfully defending a judgment on appeal. Troutman v. Pierce, Inc., 402 N.W.2d 920, 925 (N.D.1987) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 28] The plain language of N.D.C.C. §

A: holding that prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants seeking attorney fees are to be treated alike
B: holding that a summary judgment was final and appealable even though a request for attorney fees and expenses pursuant to the alaa remained pending because any award of attorney fees is collateral to the judgment
C: holding a prevailing consumers attorneyfee award under the magnusonmoss act at the trial level should not be dissipated by uncompensated costs expenses and attorney fees in successfully defending a judgment on appeal
D: holding that offer of judgment statute does not provide a basis for an award of attorney fees and costs unless dismissal is with prejudice
C.