With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Similarly, the Council argues that the Rules must rise or fall as a single regulatory scheme. ¶ 49 Our courts have repeatedly held that if part of a legislative act is unconstitutional, it alone should be severed if the balance of the act remains workable. Randolph v. Groscost, 195 Ariz. 423, 427, ¶ 13, 989 P.2d 751, 755 (1999); Long v. Napolitano, 203 Ariz. 247, 266, ¶ 70, 53 P.3d 172, 191 (App. 2002). The Rules have “the same effect and force as a law.” Goodman v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 201, 203, 665 P.2d 83, 85 (1983). Consequently, no reason appears, and neither the Cooperatives nor the Council suggest any, why we cannot similarly sever R14r-2-1611(A) from the Rules if the remaining regulatory framework is workable. See Burbridge v. Sampson, 74 F.Supp.2d 940, 954 (C.D.Cal.1999) (<HOLDING>). ¶ 50 We will sever R14-2-1611(A) and leave

A: holding that an arbitration provision that waived class actions and thus required the consumer to pay a 125 fee to vindicate a 150 claim was substantively unconscionable but also holding that the waiver provision was severable from the remainder of the arbitration provision which would be enforced
B: holding that because pennsylvania law limited a state courts review of a zoning boards decision to the issue whether the boards determinations were supported by substantial evidence the rookerfeldman doctrine did not prevent the plaintiffs from filing a federal action claiming that the zoning board had engaged in disability discrimination following a state courts review of the boards determinations
C: holding boards unconstitutional regulations severable from remainder
D: holding that the proof at sentencing1 provision contained in 42 pacs  97121 is unconstitutional in light of alleyne and is not severable from the remainder of the statute
C.