With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". focus on conduct, which almost doomed the defendants’ constitutional Challenge from the outset, has returned to extinguish their argument based on R.AV. Because R.AV. does not apply to statutes that are “directed at conduct,” it does not apply to FACE, which is primarily, or 'even entirely, “directed at conduct.” This assumes, however, that our definition of “conduct” has not changed. With respect to the use of force, this seems to be a safe assumption. See, e.g., Mitchell, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 2201. Moreover, at least one panel in this circuit has held that a civil rights statute that selectively proscribes threats of force is similarly “directed at conduct” and thus not subject to the R.A.V. general rule. Hayward, 6 F.3d at 1251 (42 U.S.C. § 3631); cf. J.H.H., 22 F.3d at 826 (<HOLDING>); but cf. United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297,

A: holding that 18 usc  241 and 42 usc  3631 fall within separate exception to rav
B: holding that interference with the right to service in a restaurant is chargeable under 18 usc  241
C: holding that 18 usc  245 a statute passed on the same day as 42 usc  3631 and for similar purposes constituted a valid enactment under congress thirteenth amendment authority as applied to racially motivated interference with federallyprotected rights
D: holding that 18 usc  1919 did not implicitly repeal 18 usc  1001
A.