With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". § 404.1527(d), he does not have to do so where there is "reliable medical evidence from a treating or examining physician controverting the claimant’s treating specialist." Newton, 209 F.3d at 453 (emphasis added). In rejecting some of Haji's opinions, the ALJ relied on the opinions of two examining doctors, Wong and Dr. Gupta, in addition to relying on the medical expert, Felkins. Moreover, although the ALJ did not seek clarification from a treating physician when he rejected some of Haji’s opinions, the AU is not required to do so unless the evidence in the record is inadequate or insufficient to reach a conclusion about the applicant’s disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(3), 404.1512(e). That is not the case here. 4 . See Carey v. Apfel, 230 F.3d 131, 145-46 (5th Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). 5 . The Commissioner asserts that this

A: holding that vocational expert testimony in response to a hypothetical can constitute substantial evidence of residual functional capacity
B: holding that a vocational expert must be consulted when an rfc falls between two categories
C: holding that vocational experts testimony that there were jobs claimant could perform constituted substantial evidence
D: holding that an alj is entitled to rely on vocational experts testimony that is based on assumptions that are supported by evidence in the record
A.