With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Ungar elected not to contest the majority of Islamov’s testimony. Regarding the court’s jurisdiction to enter a judgment against Ungar after making its determination of non-discharge-ability, our review is de novo. We agree with the determinations of the other circuits that have addressed this issue and unanimously concluded a “bankruptcy court, in addition to declaring a debt non-dischargeable, has jurisdiction to liquidate the debt and enter a monetary judgment against the debtor.” Morrison v. W. Builders of Amarillo, Inc. (In re Morrison), 555 F.3d 473, 478 (5th Cir.2009); see also Johnson v. Riebesell (In re Riebesell), 586 F.3d 782, 793 (10th Cir.2009) (collecting cases from the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits); Abramowitz v. Palmer, 999 F.2d 1274, 1279 (8th Cir.1993) (<HOLDING>). Ungar’s argument appears to go further than

A: holding a bankruptcy court possessed relatedto jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust on a debtors home and enter a monetary judgment against the debtors wife where the wife had colluded in perpetrating a fraud on the creditor
B: holding that a lender who held a deed of trust had priority over a debtors subsequent judgment creditor
C: holding creditor willfully violated the automatic stay in refusing after notified of debtors bankruptcy filing to turn over debtors funds in his possession
D: holding that a debtors  522d1 exemption was invalid when the debtor exempted proceeds from the prepetition sale of the debtors marital home which were paid to a judgment creditor with an attachment on the debtors interest in the home
A.