With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". [M]ere presence in another’s apartment, without more, would not suffice to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy. More than mere presence, however, is arguably shown in this case. Id. at 27, 537 A.2d at 619-20 (citations omitted). The Court in Ricks went on to find that, whereas appellants had standing to challenge the search, the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 27-28, 537 A.2d at 620. In State v. Sampson, 362 Md. 438, 765 A.2d 629 (2001), Judge Wilner, speaking for this Court, adopted the refined two-prong test articulated in California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. at 39, 1 10th Cir.1986) (finding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of cave where he had been staying for eight months); Commonwealth v. Gordon, 546 Pa. 65, 683 A.2d 253, 259 (1996) (<HOLDING>); State v. Linton, 356 N.J.Super. 255, 812 A.2d

A: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment because hardly more than a fugitive presence would not be one that could be accepted by society
B: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned apartment which he had occupied solely for the business of packing for distribution for narcotics
C: holding that squatter had no standing to challenge search of abandoned house where he was staying
D: holding that defendant staying in abandoned house had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the house despite having a key to the house and the ability to let people in and out of it
C.