With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". by convincing the jury that [the plaintiff] would have been terminated in the absence of First Amendment protected activity. See Mt. Healthy [City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle], 429 U.S. [274,] at 287, 97 S.Ct. [568,] at 576 [(1977)]; Tindal [v. Montgomery County Comm’n], 32 F.3d [1535,] at 1540 [(11th Cir.1994)]; Bryson [v. City of Way cross], 888 F.2d [1562,] at 1565 [(11th Cir.1989)]. Nevertheless, if [the plaintiff] produced enough evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that a retaliatory animus substantially motivated his termination, [the defendants] could only rebut this showing by convincing the jury, not the court, that a legitimate reason justified the decision. See Pullman-Standard [v. Swint], 456 U.S. [273,] at 289-90, 102 S.Ct. [1781,] at 1790-91 [(1982)] (<HOLDING>); Bell v. Birmingham Linen Service, 715 F.2d

A: holding defendants proffer of a false reason for employment action sufficient basis for trier of fact to find that such action was motivated by an improper discriminatory intent
B: holding that the issue of discriminatory intent in a race discrimination case is a factual question for the trier of fact whose findings are reviewed only for clear error
C: holding that matters of statutory construction are questions of law for the court to decide rather than issues of fact
D: holding that issues of discriminatory intent and actual motivation are questions of fact for the trier of fact
D.