With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". disposition of the action roughly corresponds with the framework we outlined in Meyer-land for disposing of a case which is being appealed in state court when removal is effected. According to Meyerland, "the district court [should] take the state judgment as it finds it, prepare the record as required for appeal, and forward the case to a federal appellate court for review.” Id., 960 F.2d at 520; see also Matter of 5300 Memorial Investors, Ltd., 973 F.2d 1160, 1162 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Meyerland). We further note that the district court's failure to reenter the state court judgment on a document separate from its order, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 58, does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction. See Bankers Trust Co. v. Mollis, 435 U.S. 381, 387, 98 S.Ct. 1117, 1121, 55 L.Ed.2d 357 (1978) (<HOLDING>). 10 . We reject at the outset the plaintiffs’

A: holding that technical inadequacy in the notice of appeal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction
B: holding that there was appellate jurisdiction under principle that a premature notice of appeal from a nonfinal order may ripen into a valid notice of appeal if a final judgment has been entered by the time the appeal is heard and the appellee suffers no prejudice
C: holding that identification of appellant in notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and that the failure to name a party in a notice to appeal constitutes a failure of that party to appeal
D: holding that the same principles of commonsense  that led the court  to conclude that the technical requirements for a notice of appeal were not mandatory where the notice did not mislead or prejudice the appellee demonstrate that parties to an appeal may waive the separatejudgment requirement of rule 58
D.