With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 286 (1996). Instead, “[a]pportionment of a fee award between fees incurred on a contract cause of action and those incurred on other causes of action is within the trial court’s discretion.” Id. In this case, appellants do not challenge the district court’s conclusion that Datacom’s tort and contract claims were inextricably intertwined. Therefore, we affirm the attorney’s fee award against Datacom. However, Moore was not a party to the Charter contract, or to Datacom’s causes of action based on contract. As a result, Moore would not have been entitled to fees against Charter had Moore prevailed on his tort claims. We therefore hold Charter is not entitled to fees from Moore by prevailing on contract claims against Datacom. See Abdallah, 43 Cal.App.4th at 1111, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 286 (<HOLDING>); Hsu v. Abbara, 9 Cal.4th 863, 870, 39

A: holding trial court had no authority to award attorneys fees when arbitrator had stated he would not award attorneys fees
B: holding that each plaintiff is liable for fees if he would have been entitled to his fees if he had prevailed
C: holding that the plaintiff who prevailed in an ipra enforcement action was entitled to an award of damages fees and costs
D: holding that a plaintiff who prevailed on a 42 usc  1983 claim was entitled to an award of attorneys fees incurred on appeal
B.