With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 746 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct.App.1987); see also State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶ 20, 979 P.2d 799. Although we have cautioned against saddling defendants with a choice between ineffective counsel and no counsel at all, that is not the case presented here. As we have noted above, supra ¶¶ 15-17, Waterfield has not demonstrated that good cause — such as a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown in communication or an irreconcilable conflict — existed for substitution of counsel. Moreover, prior to the denial of substitute counsel, Waterfield had made two requests to proceed pro se and had informed the court that he was prepared to do so. On this record, we conclude that the district court could find that Waterfield’s waiver was voluntary. See Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ¶ 20, 979 P.2d 799 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 28 The colloquy conducted by the district

A: holding that a defendants decision to proceed pro se was voluntary despite having to choose between that course and proceeding with counsel with whom he had expressed dissatisfaction because the defendant had not shown good cause for substitution of counsel
B: holding that a defendant has a right to proceed pro se at trial
C: holding defendants pro se motion to reduce sentence was not properly before the trial court when defendant was represented by counsel since defendant may not proceed both by counsel and pro se
D: holding waiver of right to counsel at sentencing not voluntary when trial court tried to dissuade discharge of counsel defendant believed incompetent for the waiver to be voluntary the trial court must inquire into the reasons for the defendants dissatisfaction with his counsel to ensure that the defendant is not exercising a choice between incompetent or unprepared counsel and appearing pro se
A.