With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. Sea-Land Serv., Inc., 12 F.3d 381, 386 (2d Cir.1993); Gay v. Barge 266, 915 F.2d 1007, 1010 (5th Cir.1990). The plaintiff was not hired to provide shipbuilding, repairing or breaking services, and therefore his claim under the LHWCA is not barred by the 1984 amendment. 5 . In Scindia and Howlett, the vessel owner and the employer were separate entities. The Supreme Court has not yet considered the vessel owner’s duties in a dual-capacity case. Our sister circuits have grappled with the question whether the duties outlined in Scin-dia and Howlett should also apply to dual-capacity cases. The First and Fifth Circuits have allocated the same vessel duties of care to dual and single capacity defendants. See Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 612 (1st Cir.1996) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Castorina v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 758 F.2d

A: holding that the exclusions should be applied
B: holding generally that new rules of law should not be applied retroactively in habeas corpus cases
C: holding plaintiff stated claim in his individual capacity
D: holding that the duties of care described in scindia should be applied in dual capacity cases
D.