With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". There was, in other words, no possibility of “stacking” exemptions in Louisiana at the time McManus was decided, and Congress did not modify McManus when it eliminated “stacking” for all debtors in 1984. Pursuant to Allen, Texas debtors are no worse off than Louisiana debtors following McManus, and the 1984 amendment of § 522(b) does not undermine the validity of either holding. Appellants finally resort to the contention that our prior decisions erroneously construe § 522(f) and should be reversed. There is a split of authority on this question concerning the interaction of § 522(f) and state exemption statutes. 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 522.29 n. 2a (15th Ed. 1987). Compare In re Bland, 793 F.2d 1172 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc), questioning In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582 (11th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>), with In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir.1983),

A: holding that state law limiting exemptions on personal property encumbered by nonpurchase money nonpossessory liens did not preclude operation of  522f
B: holding that the scope and application of state exemptions are defined by the state courts and that we are bound by their interpretations
C: holding a county taxpayer has standing to bring a declaratory decree and injunctive action against public officials of the county when the action seeks to enjoin the grant of certain tax exemptions given to other taxpayers in the county on the ground that such exemptions violate specific limitations on the countys authority to grant tax exemptions imposed by the florida constitution
D: holding that congress has made it clear in amending section 522 that a lien will be deemed to impair an exemption even when there is no equity in the property if the sum of all the liens on the property and the hypothetical value of the exemption without liens exceeds the value of the debtors interest in the property in the absence of liens
A.