With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 66; United States v. Ginn, 47 M.J. 236, 242 (1997); see also United States v. Hoffer, 869 F.2d 123, 126 (2d Cir.1989). We are satisfied, under the facts of this ease, that when assaulted, SSG D was performing a law enforcement act or service required and authorized by regulation and standard operating procedures. See Benchbook, para. 3-54-6. Thus, he was in the execution of law enforcement duties. Further, we find that appellant knew at the time of the assault that SSG D had such duties and was in the execution of those duties. In light of our factual findings above, we hold that the providence inquiry was sufficient to establish appellant’s guilt of assault upon a person in the execution of law enforcement duties. There is no substantial basis in law or fact to distu 190 (3d Cir.2000) (<HOLDING>). As the Supreme Court recognized in Sandin v.

A: holding that defendant entitled to resentencing if the sentence imposed under the unconstitutional 1995 sentencing guidelines would constitute an impermissible departure sentence under the 1994 guidelines
B: holding the confrontation clause of the united states constitution does not apply at sentencing under the us sentencing guidelines manual and the procedural protections afforded a convicted defendant at sentencing are traditionally less stringent than the protections afforded a presumptively innocent defendant at trial
C: holding defendant sentenced to term equal to maximum guidelines sentence under improperly calculated sentencing guidelines scoresheet was not entitled to be resentenced because defendant was habitualized such that sentencing guidelines score sheet was irrelevant and the sentence imposed was not illegal
D: holding that a cook supervisor was not a corrections officer for purposes of the sentence enhancing provisions under the us sentencing guidelines manual  3a12b
D.