With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". vis-á-vis a jointly tried co-defendant. 391 U.S. at 135, 88 S.Ct. 1620. A statement is powerfully incriminating only when it is inculpatory on its face. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1702. The confession in Bruton fit that description because it identified both the declarant and his codefendant by name as the perpetrators of the crime. Bruton, 391 U.S. at 124, 88 S.Ct. 1620. Statements that are incriminating only when linked to other evidence in the case do not trigger application of Bruton’s preclusionary rule. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. 1702. This criterion is easier to state than to apply; for example, it does not allow a prosecutor merely to delete a codefen-dant’s name. See, e.g., Gray v. Maryland, 523 U.S. 185, 192, 118 S.Ct. 1151, 140 L.Ed.2d 294 (1998) (<HOLDING>). In this case, Zuñiga and Vega challenge

A: holding that a defendant was pot unduly surprised by the delayed disclosure of evidence showing that he made an inculpatory statement
B: holding recording of eyewitnesss inculpatory statement made in custodial interrogation testimonial in nature
C: holding that a codefendants sentence is not relevant to an appellants guilt innocence or punishment
D: holding that simply replacing a codefendants name with a symbol or a blackedout space is insufficient to wrest an inculpatory statement from brutons precedential orbit
D.