With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". F.Supp.2d at 1287-91. However, because the statute is ambiguous, 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a) could easily be interpreted as merely granting Customs broad authority to require some form of security from an importer — security which had been provided here — rather than contemplating additional security. Here Customs appears to have adopted the more restrictive interpretation. See, e.g., Sioux Honey Ass’n v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., — CIT-, 700 F.Supp.2d 1330, 1347 (2010) (discussing how 19 U.S.C. § 1623(a) should be read in conjunction with 19 U.S.C. § 1675(a)(2)(B)(iii)) (affd in part, vacated in part on other grounds 672 F.3d 1041, cert. denied, — U.S.-, 133 S.Ct. 126, 184 L.Ed.2d 28 (2012)); see also Chevron USA v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) (<HOLDING>). The National Fisheries court ultimately

A: holding that the evidence must be sufficient to support the agencys findings of fact and that the agencys inferences from those facts must be reasonable
B: holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable
C: holding that an agencys reasonable reading of an ambiguous statute must be affirmed
D: holding that where statute is ambiguous deference is appropriately accorded to agencys interpretation
C.