With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". or exclusion.”); see also Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 67-75, 116 S.Ct. 437, 442-46, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995)(discussing the “negative pregnant” rule of statutory construction, that the inclusion of a term in one section of a statute implies its intentional exclusion from another section). That is the same reasoning the Sixth Circuit used. See Rutledge, 33 F.3d at 674. Therefore, we hold that § 4B1.4(b)(3)(A) applies even if the defendant was not actually convicted of the crime of violence in connection with which he possessed the firearm. Instead, the government need only prove that a crime of violence was committed in connection with the firearm possession, and that proof can be by a preponderance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Skenberg, 89 F.3d 1461, 1476 (11th Cir.1996)(<HOLDING>). In this case, the government met its burden.

A: holding that criminal conduct of which defendant is acquitted may be used as sentencing factor if proved by preponderance of the evidence
B: holding at trial a criminal defendant has the burden to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence
C: holding that the government must prove the facts used in sentencing by a preponderance of the evidence
D: recognizing that sentencing facts are based on the evidence and testimony presented at sentencing under a preponderance of the evidence standard
C.