With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". is based in large part on the Court’s determination that the decisions of the Second and Eleventh Circuits hew more closely to the Supreme Court’s instruction that the jurisdictional provision of § 1001 should not be construed in a narrow or technical manner. See Rodgers, 466 U.S. at 480, 104 S.Ct. 1942. In addition, the Court also notes as persuasive the Government’s argument that this somewhat broader interpretation of § 1001’s jurisdictional scope is consistent with that taken by the Fourth Circuit in its interpretation of the jurisdictional scope of 18 U.S.C. § 111, which imposes criminal liability on, inter alia, persons who assault federal marshals or “person[s] employed to assist” federal marshals. 18 U.S.C. §§ 111, 1114; see United States v. Murphy, 35 F.3d 143 (4th Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Although § 111 differs from § 1001 in that §

A: holding that 18 usc  3625 does not preclude claims that the bop acted contrary to established federal law violated the constitution or exceeded its statutory authority when it acted pursuant to 18 usc  3621
B: holding that a district court is not authorized to sentence a defendant below the statutory minimum unless the government filed a substantial assistance motion pursuant to 18 usc  3553e and ussg  5k11 or the defendant falls within the safetyvalve of 18 usc  3553f
C: holding that employees of county jail that housed federal prisoners pursuant to contract with the federal government were not federal employees even though county jail had to comply with federal rules and regulations
D: holding that the scope of 18 usc  111 is broad enough to include assaults on local law enforcement officials responsible for housing federal prisoners pursuant to a contract with the marshals service
D.