With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (and, according to the indictment, possibly “other persons”), at least tacitly, to commit the substantive crime — heroin distribution, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & (b)(1)(C) — which constituted the object of their agreement, and that he thereafter participated in the conspiracy knowingly and voluntarily. See Echeverri, 982 F.2d at 679. The record here satisfies those criteria. To be sure, the appellant makes an impassioned plea that the evidence shows no more than a buyer-seller relationship between him and Figueroa.' We agree with the premise that underlies this plea: a buyer-seller relationship, simpliciter, is an insufficient predicate for a finding that the buyer and the seller are guilty as coconspimtors. See, e.g., United States v. Mancari, 875 F.2d 103, 105 (7th Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>). But the premise provides the appellant no

A: holding that an agreement on the one side to sell and on the other to buy does not constitute a conspiracy even if the buyer intends to resell the drugs so long as the buyer and seller do not have an agreement to further distribute the drugs
B: holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give instruction that mere buyerseller relationship in single transaction does not alone support a conspiracy conviction where there was evidence of advanced planning among the alleged conspirators to deal in wholesale quantities of drugs obviously not intended for personal use
C: holding that the sale of drugs in small quantities is inadequate without additional evidence to support a finding of conspiracy to distribute drugs to others because the seller could reasonably believe that such purchases are intended for the buyers personal use
D: holding that the evidence did not plausibly support a buyerseller instruction because overwhelming evidence showed that defendants agreed to import drugs with the intent to distribute them and engaged in repeated transactions of large quantities of narcotic drugs for resale
C.