With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". that, after a district court grants a motion for relief under § 2255, it may exercise its discretion to entertain during resentencing a motion for downward departure due to post-sentence rehabilitation. Much as a district court conducts de novo resentencing after a general remand, see, e.g., Jennings, 83 F.3d at 151, so too may it choose to broaden the scope of resentencing after it chooses to grant relief pursuant to § 2255. See United States v. Jones, 114 F.3d 896, 897 (9th Cir.1997) (permitting, during resentencing pursuant to § 2255, the re-imposition of a fine on the basis of information developed after sentencing) (“[T]he statute gives district judges wide berth in choosing the proper scope of post-2255 proceedings.”); United States v. Moore, 83 F.3d 1231, 1234-35 (10th Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Pasquarille v. United States, 130 F.3d

A: holding that the constitutional right to crossexamination must be satisfied first before the court can exercise its discretion in limiting the scope or extent of crossexamination
B: holding that upon vacating a sentence pursuant to  2255 a district court must exercise its discretion to determine the appropriate scope of resentencing proceedings
C: holding that to grant a writ of mandamus a court in the exercise of its discretion must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances
D: holding that in considering dismissal of an appeal the court should exercise discretion to determine whether dismissal is appropriate in the circumstances presented by the case
B.