With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". however, a post-conviction remedy proceeding is not the same as a habeas corpus proceeding, so Section 34-5-8(A)(4) is as equally irrelevant to this case as Section 31-11-6. {14} Second was Section 39-3-15. This statute-titled “Appeals; contempt and habeas corpus” — was an amendment to the 1915 law allowing the State to appeal the district court’s granting of a writ of habeas corpus. 1966 N.M. Laws ch. 28, § 43, at 124-25 (codified at NMSA 1978, § 39-3-15 (1966)). The amendment provided that instead of the State’s appeal going directly to this Court, the State’s appeal is to now go “to the supreme court or the court of appeals, as appellate jurisdiction may be vested by law in these courts.” § 39 — 3—15(B); cf. State v. Smallwood, 2007-NMSC-005, ¶¶ 9-11, 141 N.M. 178, 152 P.3d 821 (<HOLDING>). {15} In sum: (1) Section 31-11-6, on its

A: recognizing that the court declined to craft an exception to settled rules of interlocutory appellate jurisdiction and rejected the argument that the policies behind the qualified immunity defense justify interlocutory appeals on questions of evidentiary sufficiency
B: holding that this court has jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in situations where a defendant may possibly be sentenced to life imprisonment or death
C: holding that a statute providing for interlocutory appeals to be heard in the court where appellate jurisdiction may be vested by law means that this court has appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals in cases where the sentence of life imprisonment or death may be imposed
D: holding that this court has jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals in cases involving a sentence of life imprisonment or death
C.