With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Dep’t Stores Inc. v. Le, 324 Md. 71, 595 A.2d 1067 (1991). The Maryland courts have not, contrary to Judge Niemeyer’s assertion, “historically restricted liability to acts authorized by the employer or performed by the employer’s alter ego.” Ante at 29, 595 A.2d 1067 (Opinion of Niemeyer, J.). In fact, when the Maryland Court of Appeals considered the question over a decade ago, it did not merely “cast doubt” on the alter ego approach. It expressly declined to read the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act to require a showing that the employee was the “alter ego” of the employer, rejecting the approach taken in Schatz v. York Steak House Sys., Inc., 51 Md.App. 494, 444 A.2d 1045 (1982) and Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Mirabile, 52 Md.App. 387, 449 A.2d 1176 (1982). See Le, 595 A.2d at 1074 (<HOLDING>). Moreover, the Le court made clear that the

A: holding that the intent to injure exception to the general exclusivity of the workers compensation act does not embodyf  the particular restriction upheld  in mirabile and schatz
B: holding that an injured workers initial election to seek state compensation does not implicate the exclusivity provision to preclude the worker from later seeking compensation under the longshore act
C: holding that the trial courts authority to initiate workers compensation benefits before the final adjudication was not divested by the legislature and was consistent with the stated purpose of the workers compensation act
D: holding that exclusivity provision of workers compensation act barred wifes loss of consortium claim
A.