With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". has been “convicted of any prior or subsequent crime.” This language contrasts with the language of N.J.S.A. 2C:52-3 that bars expungement of disorderly persons offenses only for those “convicted of any prior or subsequent crime * *, or of another three disorderly persons or petty disorderly persons offenses.” By making its disqualifier for another “crime” both retrospective and prospective, the Legislature has frozen the rights of the two-time criminal. The act must be read to disapprove of the language of State v. Chelson, supra, 104 N.J.Super. at 510, that suggested that an offender could expunge the record of a last criminal conviction, although not able to use that to leapfrog backwards to wipe out an entire record. Cf. State v. D’Angerio, 124 N.J.Super. 240 (Law Div.1973) (<HOLDING>). Implicit in this view is that the Legislature

A: holding that a defendants claim challenging his multiple offender adjudication by asserting that the district attorney provided insufficient evidence of his boykin waiver was not entitled to be heard on postconviction relief
B: holding that the multiple offender could not expunge all of his convictions by simply removing them from his record one at a time
C: holding that when a defendant admits prior convictions at a habitual offender hearing he waives any complaints about the validity of the prior convictions
D: holding that defendants sixth amendment right to trial by a jury was not violated by district courts reliance on his prior convictions for purposes of sentencing as career offender
B.