With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". for attractive nuisance. See, eg., Thomas v. Hansen, 2013 WL 4590634 (D.Utah 2013); Hill v. National Grid, 11 A.3d 110 (R.1.2011); Craig v. Bailey Bros. Realty, Inc., 304 Ga.App. 794, 697 S.E.2d 888 (2010); MacVane v. S.D. Warren Co., LLC, 641 F.Supp.2d 54 (D.Me.2009); McDaniels v. Sovereign Homes, 2006 WL 3365499 (Ohio App. 10 Dist.2006); Butler v. Newark County Country Club, 909 A.2d 111 (Del.Supr.2006); Lieding v. Blackledge, 2004 WL 1078981 (Mich.App.2004); Mason v. City of Mt. Sterling, 122 S.W.3d 500 (Ky.2003). 4 . As we have recognized, in section 13-21-115(3)(b), the General Assembly departed from the common law's "know or reason to know" formulation of licensee by adopting an actual knowledge standard. Larrieu v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 2013 CO 38, ¶ 29, 303 P.3d 558, 565, n. 9 (<HOLDING>). Section 13-21-115(3)(b)'s actual knowledge

A: recognizing duty of care owed by business invitor to invitee
B: holding that liability must be determined by the common law standards  governing the duty of landowners to invitees
C: holding that a general contractor owed no duty to an employee of a subcontractor to warn of dangers of electrocution
D: recognizing that our statute represents a substantial departure from the common law where landowners owed licensees a duty of care regardless of whether they had actual or constructive knowledge of dangers
D.