With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". explicitly state whether it provides the exclusive means for removing a tow company from the list, and it contains no “explicitly mandatory language” limiting the police departments’ discretion to “maintain” the tow-rotation lists. See Ridgely, 512 F.3d at 735-36. In sum, for our interlocutory review of the denial of a preliminary injunction, the ordinances do not limit discretion sufficiently to confer a property interest in remaining on the tow-rotation list; the ordinances do not contain the requisite mandatory language. This is especially true in the light of our policy of construing ambiguities in defendants’ favor where a purported property interest is not “unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms”. Batterton v. Tex. Gen. Land Office, 783 F.2d 1220, 1223 (5th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>); see also Mills v. Brown, 159 Tex. 110, 316

A: holding that where the entity was incorporated in texas and the shareholders reside in texas and the bankruptcy case is pending in texas texas law  not arizona law  should be applied
B: holding in deciding whether texas law confers a property interest that purported legislative grants of property rights or privileges must be construed in favor of the state  and whatever is not unequivocally granted in clear and explicit terms is withheld quoting texas v standard 414 sw2d 148 153 tex1967
C: recognizing strong interest in protecting texas citizens where tort was committed in whole or in part in texas
D: holding that jurisdiction existed over nonresident printing customer despite the fact that texas printer solicited the business in alabama and nonresident sent no personnel to texas because nonresident placed additional orders from which it expected to profit sent payments to texas sent and received printing materials to and from texas paid for shipping of printed goods from texas and sent payments to texas the transactions were governed by texas law and substantial part of performance occurred in texas
B.