With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44, 111 S.Ct. at 2132 (citation omitted). Accordingly, a court’s inherent power to shift attorneys’ fees “should be used sparingly and reserved for egregious circumstances.” Jones, 990 F.2d at 3. Significantly, we have held that a district court exercising its inherent powers in this fashion must describe the bad faith conduct with “sufficient specificity,” accompanied by a “detailed explanation of the reasons justifying the award.” See Gradmann & Holler v. Continental, 679 F.2d 272, 274 (1st Cir.1982) (vacating fee award for district court’s failure to provide a sufficiently detailed justification) (citing F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129, 94 S.Ct. 2157, 2165, 40 L.Ed.2d 703 (1974)); cf. Janes, 990 F.2d at 3-4 (<HOLDING>). These principles, when combined with the

A: holding that the district courts specific meticulously detailed finding of bad faith was supportable on appeal
B: holding that a bad faith claim is a tort
C: holding that a finding of plaintiffs bad faith is not a prerequisite to the trial courts exercise of discretion to award fees
D: holding that although the fee award was assessed against plaintiffs in a complex civil rights suit it was proper because the district courts order imposing fees meticulously describes each instance of perjury and bad faith
A.