With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 131 (1992); Pugh v. State, 103 Md.App. 624, 650-51, 654 A.2d 888, cert. denied, 339 Md. 355, 663 A.2d 73 (1995); Maryland Rule 4-324(a). In the present case, appellant argued at trial that the State was required to produce the cocaine she distributed to Trooper Elzey in order to establish that she had committed the offenses charged. This was not a correct statement of law. The nature of the substance distributed to the trooper could have been proved by other, sufficient evidence. One 1979 Cadillac Seville v. State, 68 Md.App. 467, 471-2, 513 A.2d 927 (1986) (admission by owner of vehicle that substances found in the vehicle were marijuana and cocaine was sufficient evidence upon which to base forfeiture of the vehicle). See also Best v. State, 79 Md.App. 241, 255, 556 A.2d 701 (1989) (<HOLDING>). In her brief, appellant broadens her

A: holding that a reasonable jury could have concluded based on repeated references to the substance as cocaine and testimony from witnesses who had used the substances which they believed to be cocaine that substance was cocaine
B: holding intent to intimidate or threaten may be proved by circumstantial evidence such as ones conduct or statements
C: recognizing that identity of a substance as cocaine may be proved by circumstantial evidence
D: holding that intent and knowledge can be proved by circumstantial evidence
C.