With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas cor-28 U.S.C. § 2254. 512 U.S. 477, 486-87, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (footnote omitted). Because a judgment in favor of Reed would “necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence,” id. at 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, and because Reed has not “demonstrate[d] that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated,” id., we conclude that his claim for money damages is likewise not cognizable under § 1983. See also Edwards v. Balisock, 520 U.S. 641, 648, 117 S.Ct. 1584, 137 L.Ed.2d 906 (1997) (<HOLDING>). However, where a prisoner “seek[s] injunctive

A: holding that the proper procedures for challenging the results of a prison disciplinary hearing are appeal administrative review collateral attack or habeas corpus
B: holding that a state university is not a person within the meaning of  1983 and therefore is not subject to suits brought under  1983
C: holding that heck is applicable to  1983 suits premised on alleged violations of prison disciplinary procedures
D: holding heck applicable to claims that implicate the validity of civil commitment proceedings
C.