With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. Bell, 833 F.2d 272, 277 (11th Cir.1987) (finding that although federal authorities were highly involved in the defendant’s initial arrest, “it was only after the federal indictment ... that the clock under the Speedy Trial Act began running”). Mr. Bocanegra argues that because the agents that led the investigation and arrested him were federal officials, his arrest was in effect a federal arrest. This circuit’s precedent, however, is contrary to Mr. Bocanegra’s argument given the factual findings of the district court. “[I]f one is held by state officers on a state charge and subsequently turned over to federal authorities for federal prosecution, the starting date for purposes of the Act is the date that the defendant is delivered into federal custody.” Shahryar, 719 F.2d at 1525 (<HOLDING>). That a defendant’s arrest is effected by

A: holding that the statute does not begin to run until at least a demand has been made upon the government but determining that the facts of that case made it unnecessary to choose between the date of demand and the date of actual payment as the triggering date for the running of the statute of limitations
B: holding that the date of the federal indictment not the date of the state arrest was the triggering date for the speedytrial act
C: holding that the date of transfer should be measured by the date that the transfer was good as against a subsequent bona fide purchaser or judgement holder which in accordance with applicable state law was the date of recordation as opposed to the date the deed was signed
D: holding that where the date of the offense is not an element of the charge  a variance between the indictment date and the proof at trial is not fatal so long as the acts charged were committed within the statute of limitations period and prior to the return date of the indictment
B.