With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Monument Realty L.L.C. v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 535 F.Supp.2d 60, 70 (D.D.C.2008) (citing W. Union Tel. Co. v. Massman Constr. Co., 402 A.2d 1275, 1277 (D.C.1979)). The plaintiff does not assert that, during his August 2001 conversation with the AAdvantage representative, he and the representative formed an agreement. Compl. ¶¶ 62-66. He merely asserts that the representative promised him that his TWA mileage would automatically be converted to AAdvantage mileage if he took no action. Id. ¶ 65. This promise might create a cause of action under the theory of promissory estoppel, as discussed below, but it does not support an inference that the plaintiff and the defendants formed an enforceable contract. See Osseiran v. Int’l Fin. Corp., 498 F.Supp.2d 139, 147-48 (D.D.C.2007) (<HOLDING>). Nor can the plaintiff prevail on a

A: holding that plaintiff stated a claim for breach of contract when it alleged the government failed to purchase insurance for plaintiff as agreed by contract
B: holding that the plaintiff failed to allege breach of a valid and enforceable contract but stated a claim for promissory estoppel
C: holding that the plaintiff had not stated a claim for inducement to breach a contract where she had not alleged facts sufficient to show the existence of an enforceable underlying contract
D: holding that promissory estoppel is applicable only in the absence of an enforceable contract
B.