With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". proposition that the licensing of the Blanks’ trademark was an executory contract or that trademark law is “applicable federal law” for purposes of section 365(c)(1). However, they dispute whether applicable trademark law would bar assignment to a third party without consent of the assignor. Whether under the federal common law of trademarks a licensor would have the power to reject “performance by an entity other than the debtor” appears to be an issue of first impression in this circuit. However, the Ninth Circuit and other circuits have come to the conclusion that two other forms of intellectual property, copyrights and patents, are personal and assignable only with the consent of the li-censor and therefore unassumable under section 365(c)(1). See In re Catapult, 165 F.3d at 750 (<HOLDING>); In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269

A: holding that applicable federal patent law made patents personal and unassignable without consent of the licensor
B: holding that  1338a jurisdiction inures when a complaint establishes that federal patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiffs right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal patent law in that patent law is a necessary element of one of the wellpleaded claims
C: holding that the complaint placed the defendant on notice when it alleged ownership of the asserted patent named the individual defendants cited the patents that are allegedly infringed described the means by which the defendants allegedly infringed the patents and pointed to specific sections of the patent law invoked
D: holding that an exclusive license granting the licensor a reversionary interest in the patent in the event of the licensees bankruptcy was a grant of all substantial rights such that the licensee could sue for patent infringement
A.