With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". improperly determined that the “neither expected nor intended” language in the CGL policy constitutes an exclusion. This conclusion alone, however, does not bar coverage for Ribi; it merely imposes on it the burden of establishing an “occurrence.” ¶21 The CGL policy’s core provision defines “occurrence” by reference to those accidents or conditions that result in damage that was “neither expected nor intended.” This provision contains no temporal component and focuses instead on the insured’s expectations regarding damages. Thus, acts that take place over a significant period of time, but cause unexpected damage fall within the definition of an “occurrence” and are entitled to coverage. Millers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Strainer (1983), 204 Mont. 162, 663 P.2d 338 overruled on other grounds (<HOLDING>). ¶22 Here the District Court found that Ribi

A: holding that intentional acts do not exclude coverage under the occurrence language unless the injury was expected or intended
B: holding that an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intended or expected would be inconsistent with insurance coverage for damage resulting from ordinary negligence
C: holding that under maine law the occurrence provision focuses on the property damage after the initial discharge and whether it was expected or intended from the insureds point of view
D: holding that under georgia law similar language was virtually absolute and noting that it intended to exclude liability coverage for all liabilities arising out of pollution
A.