With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 98 & n.17, 104 S.Ct. 2948, 2959 & n. 17, 82 L.Ed.2d 70 (1984); Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-44, 102 S.Ct. 2466, 2472-73, 73 L.Ed.2d 48 (1982). The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26, grants a private right of action to, inter alia, a person “injured in his business or property” by a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. Smith misconstrues the law in arguing that the Supreme Court has refused to limit antitrust remedies to commercial interests. The cases she cites address whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries within the meaning of the Clayton Act; in that context, the Court held that the statute was not limited to redressing injuries to commercial interests. See Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 338-39, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2330-31, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979) (<HOLDING>); Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465,

A: holding that use of tangible property must be proximate cause of injury and that property does not cause injury if it does no more than furnish the condition that makes the injury possible
B: holding that injury to business or property was not limited to commercial interests
C: holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property
D: holding that claims for breach of fiduciary duty do not arise from the purchase or sale of limited partnership interests where the wrongful conduct occurred after the sale of those interests
B.