With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". such co-conspirators as witnesses at trial. Jackson, 757 F.2d at 1491; Konefal, 566 F.Supp. at 706. If the Government intends to call such co-conspirators as witnesses, the Jeneks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500, expressly makes statements of Government witnesses, including co-conspirators, not discoverable until such time as the witness testifies. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a). This broad interpretation of Rule 16(a)(1)(A) was not followed in the instant case. Cannistraro, 800 F.Supp. at 90; Eisenberg, 773 F.Supp. at 680-83. The weight of authority does not support extending Rule 16(a)(1)(A) beyond its literal mandate requiring disclosure of a defendant’s own statements. See, e.g., United States v. Mayberry, 896 F.2d 1117, 1122 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Tarantino, 846 F.2d 1384, 1418 (D.C.Cir.) (<HOLDING>), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S.Ct. 174,

A: holding that exclusion of hearsay statements violated due process even though statements were not admissible under mississippi law which did not recognize declarations against penal interest as a exception to the rule against hearsay
B: holding rule 16a1a does not include statements made by coconspirators even if those statements can be attributed to the defendant for purposes of the rule against hearsay
C: holding that the sixth amendment confrontation clause was not violated by the admission of hearsay statements under a georgia statute permitting an exception for statements by coconspirators where there was sufficient indicia of reliability supporting the truth of the statements
D: holding rule 16 does not apply to oral statements other than statements of the defendant
B.