With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (applying Tennessee law); see also Kerr v. Coming Glass Works, 284 Minn. 115, 169 N.W.2d 587, 589 (1969). Most other courts, however, have set a lower bar. For example in Mondido v. Cory Corp., 483 F.Supp. 26 (E.D.N.Y. 1979), the plaintiff was injured when the glass carafe from her coffee pot broke. The carafe itself was manufactured by Corning, but it was converted into a coffee decanter and sold by Cory, a separate company. Id. at 27. After both companies were found liable, Corning moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict arguing that the plaintiff failed to produce evidence sufficient to support the jury’s determination that the carafe was defective when it left Coming’s plant. Id. The court rejected the motion, noting the plaintiffs evidence that Cory converted the 1967) (<HOLDING>); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Fresno,

A: holding that there was a triable issue of fact whether a defendant who applied a sprayon fireproofing material was an agent for the manufacturer of the material and thus whether plaintiff is in privity with the manufacturer
B: holding that manufacturer had no duty to warn its purchasers retailer and transporter of gas of dangers where those purchasers had operated a gas business for years were familiar with the trade journals and already knew the dangers
C: holding that plaintiff had successfully traced the defective condition to the manufacturer where there was no evidence of tampering by the retailer
D: holding that the trial court properly failed to instruct the jury on voluntary intoxication and manslaughter where there was no evidence that the appellant was intoxicated at the time of the offense although there was evidence that the appellant had been drinking beer on the day of the offense where there was no evidence concerning the quantity of beer he had consumed
C.