With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. United States, 23 CIT 20, 22 n.6, 41 F. Supp. 2d 319, 323 n.6 (1999) (noting that “[n]ot all rules of statutory construction rise to the level of a canon, however”) (citation omitted). If, after employing the first prong of Chevron, the Court determines that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the Court becomes whether Commerce’s construction of the statute is permissible. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. Essentially, this is an inquiry into the reasonableness of Commerce’s interpretation. See Fujitsu Gen. Ltd. v. United States, 88 F.3d 1034, 1038 (Fed. Cir. 1996). Provided Commerce has acted rationally, the Court may not substitute its judgment for the agency’s. See Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (<HOLDING>); see also IPSCO, Inc. v. United States, 965

A: holding that courts should defer to agencys interpretation of its own regulations if not plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation
B: holding that a reviewing court must defer to an agencys interpretation of an operable statute as long as that interpretation is consistent with legislative intent and is supported by substantial competent evidence
C: holding that a court must defer to an agencys reasonable interpretation of a statute even if the court might have preferred another
D: holding that when a court is asked to construe an ambiguous statute it must defer to the interpretation set out in a regulation promulgated by the agency charged with administering the statute so long as the agencys interpretation is reasonable
C.