With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". may have a duty to disclose information particularly within its knowledge, [if (1) the] material fact was information peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, and (2) ... the information was not such that could have been discovered by plaintiff through the exercise of ordinary intelligence.” Kriegel v. Donelli, No. 11-cv-9160 (ER), 2014 WL 2936000, *13 n. 14 (S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2014). First Hill does not allege that BlueCrest possessed any such special facts, other than to suggest that BlueCrest knew of its intention to foreclose on Skinit and deal directly with Proveho. But knowledge of intention is not knowledge of facts, and certainly not the kind of facts required under the special facts doctrine. Cf. SSA Holdings LLC v. Kaplan, 120 A.D.3d 1111, 992 N.Y.S.2d 405, 406 (2014) (<HOLDING>). Finally, First Hill fails to sufficiently

A: holding that a duty to disclose did not arise under the special facts doctrine where while there may have been concealment of opinions there was no concealment of the facts upon which those opinions were based and de fendants were not bound to volunteer their opinions citation and internal quotation marks omitted
B: holding that an expert may base his or her opinions and inferences on facts andor data perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the hearing internal quotation marks omitted
C: holding that the state has a compelling interest in protecting the citizens of minnesota from those who pose a severe threat to their health and safety citation omitted internal quotation marks omitted
D: recognizing that while a testifying expert may rely upon facts or data made known to the expert before the hearing and even may rely upon opinions if reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field the ipse dixit of that reliance does not make those facts data or opinions true particularly where  they are derived largely from hearsay
A.