With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". was triggered when Giles became aware of his injury, which here was no later than June 2007, he was required to have filed his Section 1983 action by June 2009. His June 2011 complaint was filed well beyond the limitations period and, as a result, is time-barred. IV. For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s Order granting the motion to dismiss. 1 . If the ruling on the motion for reconsideration involved factual findings, we would review those findings for clear error. Max’s Seafood Cafe ex rel. Lou-Ann, Inc. v. Quinteros, 176 F.3d 669, 673 (3d Cir.1999). 2 . In fact, the majority of courts faced with this issue had concluded before 2009 that a Section 1983 claim was available in this situation. See, e.g., McKithen v. Brown, 481 F.3d 89, 99 (2d Cir.2007) (<HOLDING>); Savory v. Lyons, 469 F.3d 667, 670-72 (7th

A: holding that no  1983 claim exists for injunctive relief to compel dna testing
B: holding that a claim seeking dna testing is cognizable under section 1983
C: holding claim is not cognizable
D: holding that a  1983 claim requesting release of evidence for dna testing is cognizable because plaintiff only seeks access to evidence
B.