With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". has jurisdiction to review an interlocutory denial of qualified immunity only to the extent that it ‘turns on an issue of law.' ” (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at 2817-18)). In Mitchell, the Court held that a district court’s order denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment was an immediately appeal-able collateral order under Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), where (1) the defendant was a public official asserting a defense of immunity, and (2) the issue appealed concerned whether or not certain given facts showed a violation of clearly established law. Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S.Ct. at 2816-17. 7 . Johnson v. Jones, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). 8 . Id. at-, 115 S.Ct. at 2156 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). 9 . Id. at -, 115 S.Ct. at

A: holding that a defendant entitled to invoke a qualified immunity defense may not appeal a district courts summary judgment order insofar as that order determines whether or not the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial
B: holding that defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity
C: holding in the context of the assertion of a qualified immunity defense that a trial courts summary judgment order that merely determines that the pretrial record sets forth a genuine issue of fact for trial does not meet the requirements of the federal collateral order doctrine
D: holding that a portion of a district courts summary judgment order that determines which facts a party may or may not be able to prove at trial is not appealable
A.