With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Mgmt. Ltd. P’ship, 209 F.3d 678, 685 (7th Cir.2000) (“[g]etting to and from work” is not itself a separate major life activity); Colwell v. Suffolk Co. Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 643 (2d Cir.1998) (same). Jones also argues that she is significantly limited in her ability to work. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492, 119 S.Ct. 2139 (working assumed to be major life activity). When the major life activity at issue is working, “[t]he inability to perform a single, particular job does not constitute a substantial limitation in the major life activity of working.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). Rather, Jones must show that the disabilities precluded her from a substantial class of jobs. See 29 -C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i). This she has not done. Cf. Helfter v. UPS, 115 F.3d 613, 618 (8th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). Jones has extensive experience and education,

A: holding that a plaintiff who could not perform some jobs because he wore a pacemaker was nevertheless still capable of performing most jobs in the workforce
B: holding plaintiff not substantially limited in working because plaintiff failed to present evidence of disqualification because of knee condition from any jobs in the geographic area to which she had reasonable access
C: holding that the plaintiffs inability to engage in frequent lifting of more than ten pounds  would not significantly restrict her ability to perform a broad range of jobs in various classes
D: holding that similar impairments do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether her impairment rendered the plaintiff unable to perform a class of jobs or a broad range of jobs in various classes within a geographical area to which she had reasonable access
D.