With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". and the intervenors opposed. The court held that, by operation of 1 M.R.S. § 302 (2006), the Mining Ordinance is not applicable to Lane Construction because Lane’s application for mineral extraction was pending before the Planning Board at the time the Town passed the Mining Ordinance. The court issued a permanent injunction against the Town and declared “the conditional use permit granted to the Plaintiff is not subject to the mining ordinance that became effective March 23, 2002.” Only the intervenors appealed. II. DISCUSSION [¶ 6] The only substantive issue raised in this appeal is whether the Washington Mining Ordinance is retroactive and applicable to a permit application that was pending at the time of passage of the Mining Ordinance. By I, 541 A.2d 160, 161, 163-64 (Me.1988) (<HOLDING>). [¶ 7] We look first to the Mining Ordinance

A: holding it unnecessary to consider vagueness challenge to an ordinance unquestionably applicable to the parties before the court
B: holding a continuance of lawyer disciplinary proceedings pending resolution of related criminal proceedings is not constitutionally required
C: holding that ordinance which stated it was applicable to all pending proceedings overrode section 302
D: holding that section 1429 does not divest district court of jurisdiction when deportation proceedings are pending
C.