With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". R. L. c. 135, § 16 (1902), and the widow’s allowance authorized by R. L. c. 140, § 2 (1902), are distinguishable from intestate rights. The other statutes require a positive act of election on behalf of the widow, unlike the rights derived under the intestate statute. These elective rights are distinguishable from intestate rights since assertion of elective rights is necessarily inconsistent with testamentary dispositions provided for by will. We view paragraph ninth as merely requiring the widow to give up her statutory rights which, if exercised, would disrupt the testamentary disposition described by the testator’s will. Therefore, to allow Gertrude’s estate to share in the trust remainder would not defeat any provision of Frank Peabody’s will. See Ness v. Lunde, supra at 287, 295 (<HOLDING>). Our conclusion is in accord with the English

A: holding that any property in which the taxpayer has any right title or interest is subject to foreclosure proceeding including property in which others claim an interest so long as all persons having liens or claiming any interest in the property are joined as parties to the suit
B: holding that doctrine of equitable election did not apply to intestate property where will provided devise to widow in lieu of dower homestead widows award and of any and all rights or interest she might have or claim in my estate
C: holding that even if divorced wife only owned a beneficial interest and not title interest in the residence constituting her homestead she was nonetheless entitled to claim a homestead exemption from the forced sale of the property
D: holding that debtor as grantor and trustee of a trust that held legal title to the property held a sufficient equitable interest in the property to claim it as exempt homestead where she resided on the property prepetition with the intent to maintain it as her primary residence
B.