With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". that the district court committed reversible error by defining “knowingly” in Instruction No. 10. We generally review challenges to jury instructions for abuse of discretion, United States v. Rush-Richardson, 574 F.3d 906, 910 (8th Cir.2009), but our review is for plain error where, as here, the defendant failed to object to the offending instruction at trial, see United States v. Gianakos, 415 F.3d 912, 921 (8th Cir.2005). A person commits aggravated sexual abuse if he “knowingly causes another person to engage in a sexual act — by using force against that other person.” 18 U.S.C. § 2241(a)(1). In this case, Count I charged Robertson with attempted aggravated sexual abuse, which is a specific intent crime. Cf United States v. Kenyon (Kenyon II), 481 F.3d 1054, 1070 (8th Cir. 2007) (<HOLDING>). “[U]nder its usual definition, specific

A: holding that there is no crime of attempted felony murder in florida
B: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse
C: holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime
D: holding that specific intent is an element of attempted illegal reentry
C.