With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". App. at 193 (2). 24 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted) (emphasis supplied); accord Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 25 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord La Quinta Inns, Inc. v. Leech, 289 Ga. App. 812, 816 (1) (658 SE2d 637) (2008); Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 26 Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (punctuation omitted); accord Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 193 (2). 27 See, e.g., Peterson v. Reeves, 315 Ga. App. 370, 375-78 (3) (727 SE2d 171) (2012) (physical precedent only); Purcell v. Breese, 250 Ga. App. 472, 475 (1) (552 SE2d 865) (2001); Brandvain v. Ridgeview Inst., Inc., 188 Ga. App. 106, 116 (3) (b) (372 SE2d 265) (1988); Misfeldt v. Hosp. Auth. of City of Marietta, 101 Ga. App. 579, 583-84 (115 SE2d 244) (1960). 28 See Tucker, 332 Ga. App. at 191 (<HOLDING>); Harvey, 260 Ga. App. at 194 (2) (holding that

A: holding that an inmates suicide was an unforeseeable intervening act for which a detention officer was not liable when inter alia there was no evidence that the inmate was in a rage or frenzy or had an uncontrollable impulse at the time when he took his own life but was instead calm and controlled and appeared to have known what he was doing
B: holding that a detention officers alleged negligent conduct of failing to medically screen an inmate who later committed suicide in a holding cell  in violation of the police departments policies  was not the proximate cause of the inmates death when there was no evidence that the inmate would have been unable to kill himself if he had been medically screened and any claim that the inmate would have presented as suicidal in such screening was purely speculative
C: holding that when defendant was guilty of burglary but the only evidence that he was armed was from his own statement existence of the firearm went only to the degree of the offense and was not as an element of proof
D: holding that in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor the district court relied principally if indeed not entirely on the contract language and that doing so was error because inter alia employment contracts no matter what the circumstances that justify their execution or what the terms may not be used to waive protections granted to an individual under title vii or any other act of congress
A.