With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". A speaker’s use of “loose, figurative” language can also determine whether his or her statement can reasonably be interpreted as a factual allegation. In Standing Comm. on Discipline of the United States Dist. Court v. Yagman, 55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir.1995), we held that an attorney could not be sanctioned for accusing a district judge of being “dishonest” because the other terms the attorney used to describe the judge — “ignorant,” “ill-tempered,” “buffoon,” “sub-standard human,” and “right-wing fanatic”- — -made it clear that the attorney intended only to signal his general contempt for the judge, rather than to accuse him of corruption. Id. at 1440; see also Old Dominion Branch No. 196, Nat'l Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284, 94 S.Ct. 2770, 41 L.Ed.2d 745 (1974) (<HOLDING>); Cochran, 58 F.Supp.2d at 1124-25(holding that

A: holding that the word interest is to be understood in its ordinary senseto hold that congress intended to use the word in the sense of a penalty is contrary to all rules of interpretation and invokes a special definition of the word interest that is unwarranted citations omitted
B: holding that the use of the word traitor could not be reasonably interpreted as a representation of fact because it was used in a loose figurative sense to demonstrate the unions strong disagreement with the views of those workers who oppose unionization
C: holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language
D: holding the word individuals is not the equivalent of the dictionary acts use of the word persons
B.