With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Ryan ex rel. Gapria-Ryan v. Fed. Express Corp., 78 F.3d 123, 127 (3d Cir.1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under the district court’s reasoning, all contract language enforced by statute would become “statutory” language. “The [Davila] test is conjunctive; a state-law cause of action is [completely] preempted only if both prongs of the test are satisfied.” Montefiore, 642 F.3d at 328. Because plaintiffs’ claims do not satisfy either part of the Davila test, we hold that they are not completely preempted by ERISA. C. Other Circuits We recognize that this result is in some tension with holdings of the Third, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits in similar antisubrogation cases, albeit decided before Davila. See Arana v. Ochsner Health Plan, 338 F.3d 433, 438 (5th Cir.2003) (en banc) (<HOLDING>); Singh v. Prudential Health Care Plan, Inc.,

A: holding that claims for misrepresentation under texas insurance code were preempted because the plaintiffs sought to recover benefits under an erisa plan
B: holding that a claim under a louisiana antisubrogation statute could be characterized as a claim under erisa  502a1b because the plaintiffs benefits are under something of a cloud for the insurer is asserting a right to be reimbursed for the benefits it has paid to his account
C: holding a claim under a maryland antisubrogation statute to be completely preempted
D: holding that erisa benefits are not property of the estate
B.