With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Co., 238 S.C. 539, 544, 121 S.E.2d 94, 96 (1961) (citations omitted). An insurer is not insulated from liability for bad faith merely because there is no clear precedent resolving a coverage issue raised under the particular facts of the case. In Tadlock Painting Co. v. Maryland Casualty Co., 322 S.C. 498, 473 S.E.2d 52 (1996), our supreme court underscored its holding from previous cases that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing extends not just to the payment of a legitimate claim, but also to the manner in which it is processed. The court recognized that “the benefits due an insured are not limited solely by those expressly set out in the contract.” Id. at 503, 473 S.E.2d at 55. Our supreme court has consistently made this point. See Howard, 316 S.C. at 451, 450 S.E.2d at 586 (<HOLDING>); Varnadore v. Nationwide Mut. Ins., 289 S.C.

A: holding jury could have found the insurer was unreasonable in failing to pay claims it received after the original injury viewing the evidence and its inferences in light most favorable to insured notwithstanding insurer relied upon lack of definitive prior case law and its own attorneys advice to deny a claim for medical expenses
B: holding that evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements  beyond a reasonable doubt
C: holding that the relevant question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt
D: holding that in light of evidence that the insurer would have denied coverage even if it had received suit papers on a timely basis the insurer could not show prejudice
A.