With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". and B & G were to pay fringe benefit contributions, interest, liquidated damages, fees and costs. The settlement sums were for amounts then owed under the CBAs—-the bonded obligation—and nothing more. (B & G Settlement Agreement, Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 20, ¶ 1, Doc. 45-9; Brown Settlement Agreement, Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J., Ex. 21, ¶ 1, Doc. 45-9.) The Plaintiffs even agreed to waive liquidated damages if Brown and B & G complied with the settlement agreements, which would have decreased IFIC’s surety liability. (B & G Settlement Agreement, ¶ 2; Brown Settlement Agreement, ¶ 2.) Therefore, the settlement agreements did not substantially increase IFIC’s liability and discharge is not warranted. Cf. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Penn Paving, Inc., 557 Pa. 439, 734 A.2d 833, 839 (1999) (<HOLDING>). IFIC analogizes this case to R.P. Richards,

A: holding that proceeds means profits only when imposing a money laundering count leads to a radical increase in the statutory maximum sentence and only when nothing in the legislative history suggests that congress intended such an increase
B: holding that in pleading scienter arguing that the motive for defrauding investors was to increase the companys profits or to increase officer compensation is not sufficient
C: holding that an increase in sellers costs by 522 resulting in the sellers loss of approximately 267 million failed to con stitute commercial impracticability
D: holding that an unconsented increase in an indemnity obligation from 150000 to 5 million was a material modification sufficient to discharge indemnitors liability
D.