With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". that, because Mr. Grant refused to allow a search of his house, he knew that he could refuse consent for a search of his property. Of course, the deputies had already searched the property, thus demonstrating to Mr. Grant that they had an absolute right to search and that his “consent” to any further search was a mere formality which he could not refuse. See Gonzalez v. State, 578 So.2d 729, 733-34 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). Under the circumstances before us, Mr. Grant could only conclude that refusing consent would be “a futile gesture amounting to no more than ‘closing the barn door after the horse is out.’ ” United States v. Chambers, 395 F.3d 563, 570 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Gamez, 389 F.Supp.2d 975, 982 (S.D.Ohio 2005); see also Norman v. State, 379 So.2d 643, 648 (Fla.1980) (<HOLDING>). Norman amply supports Mr. Grant’s position.

A: holding that it was unreasonable to believe that womans boyfriend had authority to consent to the search of her purse even though he had authority to consent to the search of the car in which it was kept
B: holding that once initial consent to search has been given passive acquiescence broadens the scope of search
C: holding that acquiescence to a strip and body cavity search did not extend the scope of defendants consent to search his person because of the highly intrusive nature of the search
D: holding consent knowing sheriff had already seen marijuana in prior illegal search was acquiescence to authority
D.