With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. W.L. Belvidere, Inc., 579 F.2d 1067, 1070 (7th Cir.1978) (emphasis added), quoted in Morsani, 790 So.2d at 1079. We therefore intended in Morsani that a plaintiff asserting the doctrine would have prior knowledge of the cause of action. Other cases from this Court discussing the doctrine also involved plaintiffs with prior knowledge of their claims. See Barnett Bank of Palm Beach County v. Estate of Read, 493 So.2d 447, 449 (Fla.1986) (where the decedent’s estate induced the bank not to file a formal claim but later invoked the statute of limitations when the bank brought proceedings to collect, noting that “[v]alid grounds, such as estoppel or fraud, may exist that would and should excuse untimely claims”); Rabinowitz v. Town of Bay Harbor Islands, 178 So.2d 9, 11-12 (Fla.1965) (<HOLDING>). In fact, until SAP., every case from this

A: holding that a municipality was estopped from asserting a statutory notice requirement on tort claims where municipal agents misled the injured parties into not filing
B: holding that a defendant was estopped from asserting improper service where the defendants conduct caused the allegedly improper service
C: holding that tribal entity was not equitably estopped from asserting immunity because misrepresentations of the tribes officials or employees cannot affect its immunity from suit
D: holding that the insurer was not estopped from asserting a policy defense not contained in its reservation of rights letter where the delay was not unreasonable and the insured was not prejudiced
A.