With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 192 F.Supp.2d 247, 263 (S.D.N.Y.2002) (stating that courts "uniformly have determined that [statements from a coworker relaying a supervisor's statement] are not within the scope of employment when the declarant neither is the plaintiff's supervisor nor has a significant role in the employment decision at issue”). They are also not admissible to demonstrate the relaying declarant’s state of mind because it is not at issue. These statements are therefore neither admissions of a party opponent nor admissible pursuant to an exception to the hearsay rule as to the relaying declarant. Accordingly, the statements relayed in paragraphs 83, 84, and 85 are not admissible evidence and are not considered. Id.; see Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 951 (7th Cir.1998) (<HOLDING>); Karnes v. Runyon, 912 F.Supp. 280, 285

A: holding that the optional character of the contract at issue is vicious in itself and not warranted by that clause in the statute which authorizes the creation and issue of new stock
B: holding that the timeliness of the employees suit is measured from the later of the date the employee knew or should have known of the employers final action or the date the union appeals procedure is exhausted or otherwise broken down to the employees disadvantage
C: holding that statements by nondecisionmakers are not relevant to satisfying the plaintiffs burden of proving discrimination
D: holding that statements repeated by nonplaintiff women employees are inadmissible because although the women knew the outcomes of the managerial decisions at issue  the decisionmaking process itself  which is the relevant issue in proving a pattern or practice of discrimination  was outside the scope of the womens agency or employment
D.