With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". that a grant of a plaintiffs request for a temporary restraining order may be sufficient grounds to grant attorney’s fees to the plaintiff pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). See, e.g., LaRouche v. Kezer, 20 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir.1994) (citing Christopher P. v. Marcus, 915 F.2d 794, 804-05 (2d Cir.1990)). In so suggesting, however, we have explicitly rejected claims for attorney’s fees where the temporary restraining order merely maintained the status quo. See, e.g., Christopher P., 915 F.2d at 805 (“[T]he procurement of a [temporary restraining order] in which the court does not address the merits of the case but simply preserves the status quo to avoid irreparable harm to the plaintiff is not by itself sufficient to give a plaintiff prevailing party status.”); cf. Vacchio, 404 F.3d at 673 (<HOLDING>); LaRouche, 20 F.3d at 74-75 (holding that “a

A: holding that plaintiff may be entitled to prevailing party status where the mediation agreement entered into by the parties was read into the record before a hearing officer
B: holding that to be a prevailing party a plaintiff must obtain a judgment or judiciallyenforced consent decree a party does not prevail without a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties
C: recognizing that a private settlement without judicial imprimatur is insufficient to convey prevailing party status
D: holding that prevailing party status may be conferred by interim judicial relief that alters the parties legal relationship
D.