With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". much a part of the term as the antecedent fixed term,” Shackelford, 138 Ga. at 162, and that “the mere expiration of the term of the incumbent does not create a vacancy,” id. at 163. Appellant contends that, because the end of his four-year term did not create a vacancy and because his holdover term was an extension of his original term, he was entitled to the protection of the removal-for-cause provision of the City Charter. Appellant, however, overlooks the fundamental character of a holdover term, which is that the holdover official has the right to the position only until a successor is appointed. See OCGA § 45-2-4 (saying that holdover officers hold the office only “until [their] successors are commissioned and qualified”); Garcia v. Miller, 261 Ga. 531, 532 (408 SE2d 97) (1991) (<HOLDING>); Shackelford, 138 Ga. at 161-162 (saying that

A: holding that a holdover superior court judge could exercise the power of that office until his successor was qualified
B: holding that where a superior court judge was named a defendant in an action for a writ of mandamus the prosecuting attorney is the proper court representative of the superior court judge
C: holding that rule 18 granted a successor to a deceased judge the power to file findings
D: holding that it was not error for successor trial judge to direct a judgment for defendant based on the statute of limitations where initial judge had denied a motion for summary judgment on the same issue
A.