With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 117 S.Ct. 1382 (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 694, 98 S.Ct. 2018). When a local government official’s decisions are unre-viewable within the governing structure, those decisions may fairly be said to represent official as well as final policy because within that official’s sphere of discretion, she is the vessel through which the municipality acts. See id. That authorizing legislation requires an official to make her decisions based on “merit and fitness alone” makes her authority no less final when that official herself is the sole determiner of whether that standard has been met. See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 126, 129, 108 S.Ct. 915 (plurality opinion); see also, id. at 145 n. 7, 108 S.Ct. 915 (Brennan, J., concurring); Martinez v. City of Opa-Locka, 971 F.2d 708, 714-15 (11th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); Melton v. Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706, 724-25

A: holding that security interest was not perfected since debtor conducted business only in one town in the state and creditor did not file financing statement in that town
B: holding that under praprotnik a town charters directive that city managers personnel decisions be based on merit and fitness did not preclude city managers final policymaking authority where no other town officials were empowered to enforce that provision
C: holding that city managers single unconstitutional action was sufficient for the imposition of municipal liability
D: holding that a jurys finding that a city had delegated its final policymaking authority in the area of law enforcement to a city police chief was supported by the evidence and warranted imposing liability upon the city
B.