With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". International Harvester Co., 265 Ind. at 178-79, 352 N.E.2d at 489-90. Meade, 644 N.E.2d at 88-89.. The second is a policy prohibiting collateral attacks on judgments: The prohibition against collateral attacks is long-standing. See State ex rel. McClure v. Marion Superior Court (1959), 239 Ind. 472, 158 N.E.2d 264 (vacating collateral injunction in favor of prior action involving appointment power of governor); State ex rel. Montgomery v. Superior Court (1958), 238 Ind. 664, 154 N.E.2d 375 (vacating collateral injunction in favor of pending action to establish possession of business). Such machinations are especially egregious in this context because the interests of children require stability and continuity in the legal process. Cf. In re Lemond (1980), 274 Ind. 505, 413 N.E.2d 228 (<HOLDING>). - Meade, 644 N.E.2d at 89. IV In her brief

A: holding that a child was not barred by a former statute of limitations applicable to actions to establish the existence of a father and child relationship when the current action was to establish the nonexistence of a father and child relationship and the presumed father no longer persisted in maintaining paternity
B: holding judges and attorneys in eriminal contempt for permitting father to attack collaterally mothers eustody of child through sham child in need of services action
C: holding that trial court properly assessed mothers attorneys fees as necessaries against father in case in which trial court ordered father to pay mothers attorneys fees as child support but did not state that the fees were necessaries
D: recognizing a district courts continuing jurisdiction over child eustody and child maintenance determinations
B.