With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Inc., 731 F.3d 592, 599 (6th Cir.2013); see also Capriotti v. Con-sol. Rail Corp., 878 F.Supp. 429, 434 (N.D.N.Y.1995) (“Under a negligence per se theory, if a plaintiff proves that a statutory violation has occurred[,] he need not prove the traditional negligence elements of foreseeability, duty[,] and breach, but he is still required to prove causation.”). The standard for causation under FELA leans favorably to the injured employee, requiring juries to be instructed that “a defendant railroad ‘caused or contributed to’ a railroad worker’s injury ‘if [the railroad’s] negligence played a part— no matter how small — in bringing about the injury.’ ” McBride, 131 S.Ct. at 2644 (alteration in original); see also Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 181, 69 S.Ct. 1018, 93 L.Ed. 1282 (1949) (<HOLDING>). Thus, in order to prove the element of

A: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning
B: holding that when language is exactly the same in two statutory provisions the meaning of that language is also identical
C: holding that an agency is not required to undertake a search that is so broad as to be unduly burdensome
D: recognizing that felas language on causation is as broad as could be framed
D.