With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of “automob source payments under the plain meaning of the statute. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 859-60. In this case, by contrast, the UIM benefits were paid by respondent’s insurer. They were not direct-source payments. Do is therefore inapposite. Respondent argues that, because statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, the collateral-source statute should be interpreted to exclude UIM coverage unless it expressly provides otherwise. See Do, 779 N.W.2d at 858 (recognizing that statutes in derogation of common law must be strictly construed). In another case addressing the interpretation of the collateral-source statute, the appellant raised a similar argument, contending that a broad interpretation of the statute was inappropriate. See Swanson, 784 N.W.2d at 279 (<HOLDING>). The supreme court declined to adopt the

A: holding that the term payments in the collateralsource statute encompasses the value of a negotiated discount for medical services
B: holding that employers knowledge of employees injury followed by the employers failure to provide the necessary medical services sufficient to impose liability upon the employer for medical services selected by the employee
C: holding that term court encompasses trial by both judge and jury
D: holding parties negotiated price of vehicle was evidence of market value as represented
A.