With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". as of right. It would therefore be improper to interpret “occasions,” and § 1915(g) generally, to limit the Court’s appellate function in a defined class of cases. With these considerations in mind, we must decide what Congress intended the term “occasions” to encompass and, therefore, what qualifies as a “prior occasion[ ]” on which a dismissal may count as a strike under § 1915(g). The interpretation of “occasions” which adheres most closely to Congress’s dual intentions is one that includes both the appeal and its underlying action. We hold, therefore, that a “prior occasion[ ]” under § 1915(g) cannot include the dismissal of the underlying claim, and such a dismissal cannot act as a strike to preclude IFP status on its own appeal. See Pigg v. 106 F.3d 1497, 1498 (10th Cir.1997) (<HOLDING>). In practice, our interpretation preserves the

A: holding that a routine dismissal for failure to exhaust administrative remedies does not count as a strike under  1915g
B: holding fda seizure action did not constitute final agency action
C: holding that plaintiffs dismissal of personal injury action and subsequent dismissal of declaratory judgment action concerning extent of tortfeasors insurance coverage did not trigger double dismissal rule
D: holding district court dismissal of plaintiffs present action did not constitute prior action  and thus did not count as third strike
D.