With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". employer as well as thirteen manufacturers and suppliers of asbestos-containing products and that she had entered into settlement agreements with several of them. Id. Satterfield’s legal position is similar to Jones’s because chapter 149 does not prevent Satterfield from pursuing her remedies or recovering all of her damages, jointly and severally, from numerous other defendants (nor does it affect any settlement that she has already received in this case). Accordingly, chapter 149 does not violate the constitutional prohibition against retroactive laws in article I, section 16. Furthermore, there is no violation of article I, section 16 because chapter 149 is a remedial statute that could be applied to pending cases. See Exxon Corp. v. Brecheen, 526 S.W.2d 519, 525 (Tex.1975) (<HOLDING>); De Cordova, 4 Tex. at 477 (recognizing that

A: holding unconstitutional a state wrongful death statute which denied illegitimate children the right to recover for the wrongful death of their mother
B: holding that children could receive permanent total disability payments after the death of their mother where the mothers claim was pending before the effective date of the 2008 statutory amendments and was still pending at the time of her death
C: holding that plaintiffs failure to prove decedents death was caused by the wrongful acts of the defendant precludes any recovery of wrongful death damages under mississippis wrongful death statute
D: holding that statute which became effective after claimants death but prior to the trial of wrongful death case was remedial constitutional and governed pending litigation proceedings that were pending when statute was enacted
D.