With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we vacate the trial court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remand for the entry of an order dismissing Walker’s complaint. Judgment vacated and case remanded with direction. Ellington, C. J., and Phipps, P. J., concur. Decided September 6, 2012. Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Jennifer L. Dalton, Assistant Attorney General, for appellants. Hube & Tucker, Josh D. Tucker, Douglas G. Exley, for appellee. 1 See Welch v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 276 Ga. App. 664, 665 (624 SE2d 177) (2005) (“We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss under the de novo standard of review.” (punctuation omitted)). 2 OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (2). 3 OCGA § 50-21-26 (a) (4). 4 Id. 5 Cummings v. Ga. Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 2 86 SE2d 826) (1997) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Camp v. Coweta County, 280 Ga. 199, 201

A: holding that a notice of deficiency was invalid where it was the second notice mailed for that year and the taxpayer timely petitioned the court as to the first notice
B: holding that due process is satisfied where notice is mailed to the wrong address if the appellant received actual notice
C: holding that plaintiff complied with plain language of the notice requirement when notice was mailed within statutory period although it was not received until after
D: holding that owners notice substantially complied with federal requirements because the owner intended to demolish the housing units and noted that ajlthough the notice did not follow the statutory language it would have been misleading had it strictly followed the statute
C.