With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". § 440.093(3), Fla. Stat. (2006). In this case, it is undisputed that Claimant’s com-pensable physical injury to her arm reached maximum medical improvement on January 9, 2014; that she was receiving impairment benefits based on her twenty-percent permanent impairment rating; that it was not until July 3, 2014, that Claimant obtained an admissible medical opinion that the compensable injury was the major contributing cause of her PTSD; and that the PTSD renders section 440.093(3) to set a strict deadline after which no TTD benefits are payable on psychiatric injuries. The plain language of the statute marks a date on the calendar, or starts a clock that stops six months to the day after the date of physical MMI. See, e.g., Perez v. Rooms To Go, 997 So.2d 511, 512 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (<HOLDING>). The JCC drew a contrast between the operative

A: holding that although a statute regarding sentencing for firsttime drug offenders was plain obvious and unambiguous in its terms construing the statute by its plain language would be inconsistent with contrary to and illogical in light of the legislatures intent in enacting the statute
B: holding when ordinance language is clear courts must give language its plain meaning
C: recognizing a court must look beyond the plain language of a statute when the literal interpretation would lead to an absurd result
D: holding that in construing statute courts must first look to its plain language
D.