With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". has jurisdiction to sua sponte impose a pre-filing injunction, and we believe that the rationale of that decision is equally applicable to a modification. Although Martin-Trigona and Brown imply that a district court may sua sponte modify an existing injunction to deter vexatious filings, they do not explicitly adopt this holding. Based on our precedent, we conclude that the exercise of this power is permitted by Rule 60(b)(5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 60(b)(5) states the following: “On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party ... from a final judgment [or] order [when] ... it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application.” See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 215, 117 S.Ct. 1997, 138 L.Ed.2d 391 (1997) (<HOLDING>). The one-year limitation period applicable to

A: recognizing a permanent injunction as a means of ordering specific performance
B: holding that a party may obtain relief from a district courts permanent injunction pursuant to rule 60b5
C: holding preliminary injunction improper where it exceeded the relief sought and granted the same relief which would have been given in a final order of permanent injunction
D: holding that a significant change in decisional law will permit the district court in its sound discretion to prospectively modify a permanent injunction under rule 60b5
B.