With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". was the owner, owner pro hac vice, agent, operator, or charterer of the vessel.” 33 U.S.C. § 905(b). In Bush v. Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc., 927 F.2d 445, 449 (9th Cir.1991), we incorrectly stated in dicta that the amendment barred all dual-capacity suits. We have already acknowledged this error. See Heise v. Fishing Co. of Alaska, Inc., 79 F.3d 903, 907 n. 2 (9th Cir.1996) (noting that the statement in Eagle-Picher that the 1984 amendment barred dual-capacity suits was incorrect dicta). To the extent any confusion remains, the 1984 change bars only shipbuilders, ship repairers and ship breakers from bringing a claim where the employer and the vessel owner are the same entity. See also Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 608 (1st Cir.1996) (en banc); G 5, 1033 (5th Cir.1985) (<HOLDING>). The Second Circuit, in a case preceding Jones

A: holding that a charter party creates no contractual duty towards a longshoreman on the part of a time charterer
B: holding that the duty of good faith and fair dealing is a contractual duty
C: holding that the duty owed by a shipowner to a longshoreman under section 905b is that established by scindia and its progeny this duty is neither heightened nor diminished when the longshoreman is employed directly by the vessel
D: holding that clause eight requires time charterer to indemnify shipowner for any damages awarded because of injury to longshoreman
C.