With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". To the contrary, C.M. implicitly waived her right against self-incrimination and testified in her mother’s defense. Despite appointed counsel s presumed advice, C.M. s testimony exonerated her mother of the charged offense and inculpated herself. Though not clear, appellant appears to suggest that the trial court’s conduct in some manner shaded or inhibited C.M.’s testimony. Appellant does not refer us to any portion of the record to support her contention that C.M.’s testimony was altered in some manner by the trial court’s conduct. To the contrary, on redirect examination, C.M. confirmed that her testimony was the same as the statement that she had given police on the day of her mother’s arrest in this case. See Johnson v. State, 208 S.W.3d 478, 503 (Tex.App.Austin 2006, pet. ref d) (<HOLDING>). Given the context and circumstances of the

A: holding witnesss prior consistent statement admissible in part because defense counsel implied during opening statement that witness had fabricated her testimony
B: holding that warnings given to a witness by the trial court and the prosecutor concerning the possibility that testifying could place the witness in jeopardy of revocation of his plea agreement and charges of perjury or false statement did not violate the defendants due process rights because the warnings merely corroborated in a straightforward and nonthreatening manner the information given by the witness attorney
C: holding that defense counsels failure to object to testimony did not warrant a new trial because there was no prejudice from admission of the testimony
D: holding that trial courts perjury admonishment to defense witness did not violate defendants due process rights because it had no effect on trial testimony record revealed that testimony was consistent with previous recorded statement given to defense counsel
D.