With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". be brought in district court, on the theory that the right sought to be enforced arises from the due process clause and is not a suit on the contract itself. See Transohio Sav. Bank v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 967 F.2d 598, 610-11 (D.C.Cir.1992); Sharp v. Weinberger, 798 F.2d 1521, 1523-24 (D.C.Cir.1986). Our circuit has taken a stricter view, however, and has held that constitutional claims based on a contractual property interest fall within the Tucker Act and may not be brought in district court. See Tucson Airport Auth. v. General Dynamics Corp., 136 F.3d 641, 647-48 (9th Cir.1998) (rejecting Transohio rule); cf. North Star, 14 F.3d at 37-38. In this view, we are joined by the Second Circuit. See Up State Fed. Credit Union v. Walker, 198 F.3d 372, 377 (2d Cir.1999) (<HOLDING>). Indeed, one district court in New York has

A: holding that the district court did not have jurisdiction and remanding the matter to state court
B: holding that a subsequent action was not barred because the initial court did not have jurisdiction over the claim
C: holding that court of claims has jurisdiction over actions for breach of standard contract
D: holding that district court did not have jurisdiction over any claims that could not exist independently of a contract
D.