With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of Texas Premises Liability Law for Business Owners, 60 Tex. B.J. 1010, 1021 (1997) (Hanks)). Both conditions of section 95.003 must be met before Chapter 95’s exception to the general rule of nonliability for a premises owner will be imposed. See Rueda v. Paschal, 178 S.W.3d 107, 110 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet. h.); Francis, 130 S.W.3d at 83; Dyall, 152 S.W.3d at 699; Kelly, 27 S.W.3d at 567. As Dow emphasized in moving for traditional summary judgment, section 95.003(2) elevated the alternative, common law, “should have known” test of the premises owner’s knowledge of a dangerous condition, to an “actual knowledge” requirement. Compare Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem.Code Ann. § 95.003(2) (requiring actual knowledge) with Williams v. Olivo, 952 S.W.2d 523, 527 (Tex.1997) (<HOLDING>) (citing Shell Chem. Co. v. Lamb, 493 S.W.2d

A: recognizing common knowledge exception
B: holding that the knowledge requisite to knowing violation of a statute is factual knowledge as distinguished from knowledge of the law
C: recognizing that duty to warn of dangerous conditions could be based on constructive knowledge of that condition as well as actual knowledge
D: holding that countys general knowledge that stones from quarry would occasionally create dangerous condition on road surface was insufficient to impute to county constructive knowledge of condition of road at time of motorcyclists accident because condition was dynamic rather than static and was not predictably recurrent
C.