With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 439, 60 S.Ct. 343, 84 L.Ed. 370 (1940); Howell v. Thompson, 839 S.W.2d 92, 92 (Tex.1992) (opinion issued after filing of bankruptcy proceedings void). Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was void as to relator Pegasus, and the trial court lacked the authority to attempt to correct its judgment by dismissing Pegasus. Because Pegasus has no adequate remedy by appeal, it is entitled to mandamus relief from the trial court’s order. However, the automatic stay in the bankruptcy code does not extend to the individual relators here. “[T]he automatic stay provision does not extend to actions against nondebtors simply because of their relationship to debtor.” Texas-Ohio Gas, Inc. v. Mecom, 28 S.W.3d 129, 144 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2000, no pet.) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation and citation omitted); see

A: holding that the automatic stay terminates as to the debtor personally and as to his nonestate property but that the stay persists as to property of the bankruptcy estate
B: holding stay would not extend to separate legal entities such as corporate affiliates partners in debtor partnerships or to codefendants in pending litigation
C: holding that two citicorp affiliates were not debt collectors under fdcpa because they were corporate affiliates of creditors parent corporation
D: holding that the automatic stay did not bar the filing of a proof of claim where the debtor actively litigated a separate action during the pending bankruptcy proceeding because to permit the automatic stay provision to be used as a trump card played after an unfavorable result was reached  would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of the automatic stay
B.