With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". ”) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). Applying this standard, the Court found that Nurriddin pled viable factual allegations of Title VII discrimination that should not be dismissed pre-discovery. Now, however, the parties have completed discovery and submitted motions for summary judgment, which are evaluated under an entirely different standard. See, e.g., Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In conducting this evaluation, the Court finds it appropriate to use the expanded record in determining whether there are any genuine disputes of material fact, including whether Nurriddin meets his burden under the McDonnell Douglas framework. See Murphy v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP, 580 F.Supp.2d 4, 9 n. 7 (D.D.C.2008) (<HOLDING>); Mazloum v. District of Columbia Metro. Police

A: holding that the court had an adequate record to grant the defendants motion for summary judgment because the relevant evidence would have been in plaintiffs possession
B: holding that plaintiffs lawofthecase argument fails because the arguments presented in defendants motion for summary judgment were based at least in part on an expanded record
C: holding that a litigant who fails to raise an argument in opposition to a properly raised motion for summary judgment will not be permitted to raise that same argument later either in a motion for reconsideration or on appeal
D: holding that arguments not raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment are waived
B.