With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". United, Inc., 137 Idaho 747, 751, 53 P.3d 330, 334 (2002). The Holcombs cite to various Idaho cases in which this Court applied the I.R.C.P. 54(e) factors to determine the amount of attorney fees to award where the fees were awarded by contract; however, all of these cases are distinguishable from the facts and issues at hand. Therefore, we hold that I.R.C.P. 54(e)(3) is inapplicable because it is inconsistent with the language of the contract. However, we caution that contractual language such as “its attorney fees” or “all attorney fees” does not give the prevailing party an unqualified right to unlimited attorney fees. The non-prevailing party may still argue that the amount claimed is an unconscionable penalty. Clampitt v. A.M.R. Corp., 109 Idaho 145, 148, 706 P.2d 34, 37 (1985) (<HOLDING>). The Holcombs also argue the district court

A: holding that in civil theft claim once jury sets the amount of actual damages it is a ministerial act for the trial court to triple those damages and enter final judgment in that amount
B: holding that because liquidated damages under the adea are punitive in nature a jurys award of state punitive damages and adea liquidated damages constitutes a double recovery and therefore reducing the total recovery by the amount of the liquidated damages award
C: holding that language of contract did not limit plaintiffs recovery to liquidated damages
D: holding that a liquidated damages amount set by contract is enforceable where the amount bears a reasonable relation to the damages actually sustained
D.