With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of class arbitration would make it impossible for Parisi to arbitrate a Title VII pattern-or-practice claim, and that consequently, the clause effectively operated as a waiver of a substantive right under Title VII. See Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. (In re Am. Express Merchants’, Litig.), 667 F.3d 204, 219 (2d Cir.2012). Gol ting Parisi to managing director contains a broad arbitration clause that covers her Title VII claims. Since her claim is a statutory claim, we must next consider whether or not Congress intended for the claim to be arbitrated, or whether the district court was correct that arbitration was barred because it effectively precluded Parisi’s Title VII claim. See JLM Indus., Inc. v. Stolt-Nielsen SA, 387 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.1994) (<HOLDING>). Parisi contends that she has a substantive

A: holding that a court considering a motion to compel arbitration of statutory claims must consider whether congress intended those claims to be nonarbitrable
B: holding that trial court properly denied motion to compel arbitration of claims for fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices because arbitration clause in agreement only applied to indemnification claims and there were no other arbitration clauses in agreement
C: holding that in ruling on a motion to compel arbitration a court must consider 1 whether the parties have entered into a valid arbitration agreement 2 whether an arbitrable issue exists and 3 whether the right to arbitration has been waived
D: holding that once the party seeking to compel arbitration establishes the existence of an arbitration agreement and that the claims raised fall within the scope of that agreement the trial court must compel arbitration
A.