With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". issue with the analogy drawn between the district court’s order in this case and the granting of a motion for new trial. 307 S.W.3d at 271 (“The Company argues that the district court’s order should not be appealable because it was like granting a motion for new trial in a case, which is not appealable. But the analogy does not fit.”). Whether the Court can find a more fitting analogy is beside the point: both precedent and the statute itself direct us to treat much of the process as we would a civil trial, and “an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial.” Stolhandske, 14 S.W.3d at 814; see also Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd. v. Aldridge, 263 S.W.3d 69, 75 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. granted) (<HOLDING>); Thrivent, 251 S.W.3d at 623 (same); Me. Dep’t

A: holding that order to vacate award and order new arbitration is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial  and therefore not subject to direct appellate review quoting stothandske 14 sw3d at 814
B: holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award
C: holding that an order vacating an arbitration award and directing a rehearing is the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial
D: holding order granting motion to withdraw plea to be the functional equivalent of an order granting a new trial because like a postverdict mistrial it returns case to posture it had been before trial
A.