With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". R. App. P. 26(a). Ramos-Lopez concedes that her petition for review was not received in this court until the next day, March 3. Instead, she argues that her petition was timely under the three-day enlargement period of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 26(c). By its terms, Rule 26(c) applies only to actions triggered by “service.” Fed. R. App. P. 26(c) (“When a party may or must act within a specified time after service, 3 days are added after the period would otherwise expire_” (emphasis added)). Section 1252(b)(1) does not mention “service”; the trigger date for filing is the “date of the final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). Thus, Rule 26(c) does not apply to enlarge the period in § 1252(b)(1). See Mounivong v. I.N.S., 49 F.3d 728, at *1 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished) (<HOLDING>); Nahatchevska v. Ashcroft, 317 F.3d 1226, 1227

A: holding that the time limit for filing a petition for review of a final order of deportation is jurisdictional
B: holding that the filing of a motion for reconsideration does not toll the period for seeking judicial review of the underlying order
C: holding that the relevant time of inquiry is the date of the filing of the complaint
D: holding under a prior immigration statute that rule 26c did not enlarge the period for filing a petition for review of the bias decision because rule 26c refers to service while the time for filing under the statute at issue commenced upon the date of the issuance of the final deportation order
D.