With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 755 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.2006) (concluding that § 522(p)’s exemption cap applies separately to each debtor in joint cases). 8 . Similarly, in Wallace v. Rogers (In re Rogers), we also passed on an opportunity to adopt either the title or equity interpretations of § 522(p)(l), finding that it was unnecessary to the resolution of the case before us at that time. 513 F.3d at 222-23. 9 . The bankruptcy court found that the Feh-mels made a down payment of $73,841.23. However, they took out a mortgage of $304,000 on the property, larger than was necessary to finance the rest of its purchase price of $375,000. Consequently, when the Fehmels took title to the Lampasas property, they only had equity in their property of $71,000, not $73,841.23. 10 . If the Fehmels acquired $278,01 162 (S.D.Ohio 1991) (<HOLDING>). In this case, the Fehmels’ decision to claim

A: holding that the burden of proof is initially placed upon the objector with respect to any objections he files and  this burden does not shift to the debtor merely upon a showing that the debtor has failed to allocate the personal injury settlement into its various component parts
B: holding that the trustee objector cannot escape the burden of proof assigned to an objecting party under rule 4003c because the exemption claim relates to a settlement agreement which fails to allocate damages into specif ic categories of recovery
C: holding that objector cannot escape the burden of proof assigned to an objecting party under rule 4003c because the exemption claim relates to a settlement agreement which fails to allocate damages into specific categories of recovery
D: holding that the burden of proof is on the claimant
A.