With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". § 13-917(B) and instead allowed Botkin to continue on standard probation. The State filed a notice of appeal after the December 2006 ruling and a “supplemental” notice of appeal after the February 2007 ruling. The State is entitled to challenge the trial court’s refusal to apply the mandatory sentencing feature of § 13-917(B), and we have jurisdiction in accordance with Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 9, AR.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1) (2003), and § 13-4032(5) (2001). See State v. Dawson, 164 Ariz. 278, 281, 792 P.2d 741, 744 (1990) (“The trial court’s failure to impose a sentence in conformity with the mandatory provisions of the sentencing statute makes that sentence ‘illegal’ ... and therefore properly appealable.”); State v. Vargas-Burgos, 162 Ariz. 325, 326-27, 783 P.2d 264, 265-67 (App.1989) (<HOLDING>). Statutory Analysis ¶ 10 This appeal presents

A: holding a specific sentencing statute controls over the general sentencing provisions of section 9031
B: holding that a sentence not in compliance with the mandatory provisions of a sentencing statute was illegal and appealable
C: holding if the plea agreement was not conditioned on the sentencing guidelines an appellant is not entitled to relief because his sentence is not illegal
D: holding that a sentence was based on a mandatory statutory minimum sentence even though it was lowered under another statute
B.