With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". e.g., United States v. Gomez, 757 F.3d 885, 893 (9th Cir.2014). In light of our disposition of this case, we do not address whether this standard is meaningfully different from the BIA’s articulation. 4 . The IJ’s determination that Garcia’s conviction was an aggravated felony played a role in two distinct issues that arose at the hearing. It was the basis for the charge of removability which the IJ sustained, and it also indicated to the IJ that Garcia was not eligible for relief from removal. Only the latter issue is before us on this petition for review. 5 . Nothing in the record before the IJ negates Garcia’s apparent eligibility, absent an aggravated felony, for both forms of relief from removal. See United States v. Lopez-Velasquez, 629 F.3d 894, 896 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (<HOLDING>) (internal quotation mark omitted). Garcia

A: recognizing the possibility but denying relief
B: holding that prima facie eligibility is demonstrated by a showing that there is a reasonable likelihood that the statutory requirements for relief have been satisfied
C: holding that apparent unlawful influence exists where a military judge is removed through the inappropriate actions of the government
D: holding that apparent eligibility exists where the record raises a reasonable possibility that the petitioner may be eligible for relief
D.