With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". claimant. Id. Smith contacted Prudential regarding his second appeal on August 1, 2005. In this letter, he did not formally request an appeal; however, on August 31, 2005, he confirmed in writing through his attorney that his August 1 letter was intended as a request for an appeal. Thus, Prudential’s review period began to run on August 31, 2005 at the latest; it expired on October 15, 2005, well before Prudential contacted Smith to seek an extension or to request further documentation. Although Pru dential did notify Smith on November 18, 2005 that it was taking a 90-day extension, by this time it was too late — the response period had expired and Smith’s appeal had been deemed denied. See Schmir v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., No. 03-187, 2003 WL 22466168, at *3 (D.Me. Oct. 30, 2003) (<HOLDING>). Because Smith exhausted his administrative

A: holding that appeal from denial of rule 60b motion raised for review only the district courts order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself
B: holding that appellate court had jurisdiction over claimants appeal from the denial of his motion for reconsideration separable from underlying judgment despite claimants failure to appeal from the underlying judgment because the reconsideration motion raised changes in the relevant medical criteria
C: holding that prudential could not avoid the effectiveness of a deemed denial by issuing a belated response to claimants appeal
D: holding that although the denial notice that claimants received failed to satisfy the requirements of due process the only claimants who could have been injured by the inadequacy are those who detrimentally relied on the inadequate denial notice
C.