With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". district court ... shall be construed by [our court] as a renewed application for a [COA]. llth Cir. R. 22-1 (c)(2). 23 . This point is discussed at length in Part IV, infra. 24 . The majority also relies on Kellogg v. Strack, 269 F.3d 100 (per curiam) (2d Cir.2001). The grounds for the petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion in that case are unclear from the court’s opinion. 25 . While Langford is not entirely clear on this issue, I assume that AEDPA’s effective date fell after the petitioner filed his motion but before he filed his notice of appeal. The Supreme Court had not settled the question whether AEDPA's COA requirement applied in this circumstance until after 1998, the year of the Langford decision. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 481, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 1602, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000) (<HOLDING>). 26 . This conclusion is not, as the majority

A: holding that under preaedpa law a habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing so long as his allegations if true and if not contravened by the existing factual record would entitle him to habeas relief
B: holding that  2253 applies to appellate proceedings initiated postaedpa even when the underlying habeas proceeding was initiated a district court preaedpa
C: holding that court lacked jurisdiction to review merits of question of whether immigration officer correctly initiated expedited removal proceedings
D: holding that there is no right to habeas review of administrative evidentiary determinations before a district court where direct review of the administrative proceedings is available in the appellate courts
B.