With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". settled upon a precise definition of the phrase “interest in such property,” see Ninth Ave. Remedial Group v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 195 B.R. 716, 730-32 (N.D.Ind.1996), we find that the District Court in Leckie Smokeless applied an unduly broad interpretation of the statute when it stated that one has an interest in a debtor’s property simply when one has a right to demand money from the debtor. We have previously observed, for example, that “courts have recognized that general, unsecured claims do not constitute ‘interests’ within the meaning of § 363(f).” Yadkin Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. McGee (In re Hutchinson ), 5 F.3d 750, 756 n. 4 (4th Cir.1998); see also Ninth Ave. Remedial Group, 195 B.R. at 729-32 (obse e Fairchild Aircraft Corp.), 184 B.R. 910, 917-19 (Bankr.W.D.Tex.1995) (<HOLDING>). It is difficult to make further categorical

A: holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien
B: holding that section 363f permitted a sale free and clear of virginias depreciationrecoupment interest in the debtors property even though that interest was unsecured by lien or otherwise
C: holding that unless security interest or lien is avoided bankruptcy discharge has little if any impact on creditors ability to proceed in rem against property securing claim
D: holding that  522f1 requires a debtor to have possessed an interest to which a lien attached before it attached to avoid the fixing of the lien on that interest
A.