With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". entry) (that statute also covered lawful entry, another reason it was broader than Taylor "burglary,” see Ortega-Gonzaga, 490 F.3d at 396 & n. 5). Of course, if the intent could be formed anytime, then every crime committed after an unlawful entry or remaining in would be burglary. Re-latedly, one who lawfully enters a building does not "unlawfully remain” just because he later commits a crime, parlaying the crime into burglary because now intent and unlawful remaining coincide — a shoplifter, for instance, who enters lawfully but intending to steal does not "unlawfully remain” when he commits the theft. 2 . The plain text of § 39-14-402(a)(3) does not require such intent, as a Tennessee court has recognized. See State v. Wesemann, 1995 WL 605442, at *2 (Tenn.Crim.App. Oct. 16, 1995) (<HOLDING>). 3 . One could argue that the teenagers

A: holding that the exclusion of prospective jurors from either the area where the crime was committed or where the defendant resided does not violate the sixth amendment
B: holding that attempted sexual abuse is a specific intent crime
C: holding that  201b makes attempted bribery a crime and so long as a bribe is offered or promised with the requisite intent to influence any official act the crime is committed
D: holding that  3914402a3 requires only that a crime be committed or attempted once the perpetrator enters the building  criminal intent does not have to occur either prior to or simultaneous with the entry
D.