With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". sound because of changed conditions, and that more good than harm would result from a departure from precedent.' " (quoting Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc. v. Sheehan, 852 P.2d 1173, 1175-76 (Alaska 1993))). 11 . See AS 47.30.1765 (providing that a "respondent has the right to an appeal from an order of involuntary commitment"). 12 . We therefore do not address the dissenting opinion's discussion of the statute. 13 . In re Alfred H.H., 233 Ill.2d 345, 331 IIl.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d 74, 84 (2009) (citing In re Splett, 143 Ill.2d 225, 157 Ill.Dec. 419, 572 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1991)); State v. Lodge, 608 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex.1980); State v. J.S., 174 Vt. 619, 817 A.2d 53, 55-56 (2002). 14 . Alfred H.H., 331 Ill.Dec. 1, 910 N.E.2d at 84. 15 . Id. ("[A] reversal [of commitment order] could provi ) (<HOLDING>); E.J. v. State, 471 P.2d 367, 368-70 (Alaska

A: holding drivers license revocation was not moot because collateral consequences of revocation may be substantial including higher insurance rates and adverse employment consequences
B: holding that revocation of parole does not create collateral consequences sufficient to extend standing beyond expiration of sentence and rejecting as moot a challenge to an allegedly erroneous parole revocation
C: holding that the collateral consequences of a parole revocation were insufficient to create a case or controversy after the petitioner was released
D: holding expired domestic violence restraining order not moot because of collateral legal consequences such as consideration in custody determination and nonlegal collateral consequences such as reputational harm
A.