With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 1085 (9th Cir. 2003). 23 . 798 F.3d at 747. 24 . Id. at 745-48; see also Lair y. Bullock, 697 F.3d. 1200, 1204-06 (9th Cir. 2012). 25 . 335 F.3d 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 26 . Lair, 798 F.3d at 747; accord Lair, 697 F.3d at 1204 (“Randall is not binding authority because there was no opinion of the Court.”). 27 . Lair, 798 F.3d at 748; accord Lair v. Motl, No. CV 12-12-H-CCL, 189 F.Supp.3d 1024, 1031, 2016 WL 2894861, at *4 (May 17, 2016) (noting Eddleman "provides the overall analytical framework” for evaluating the constitutionality of a contribution limit).' 28 . Lair, 798 F.3d at 742 (quoting Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1092). 29 . Eddleman, 343 F.3d at 1094 (quoting Shrink Missouri, 528 U.S. at 397, 120 S.Ct. 897). 30 . Contra Motl, 189 F.Supp.3d at 1035, 2016 WL 2894861, at *7 (<HOLDING>). 31 . 424 U.S. at 30, 96 S.Ct. 612. 32 . Id.

A: holding that claim preclusion did not apply even though the legal theory at issue in that case was addressed in a previous case because the case at issue was based on a different set of operative facts
B: holding that directors of a whollyowned corporation could consider the interests of the parent company as well as the interests of their corporation because there was only one substantive interest to be protected
C: holding base limits at issue in that case could never be said to focus narrowly on a constitutionallypermissible anticorruption interest because they were expressly enacted to combat the impermissible interests of reducing influence and leveling the playing field
D: holding on summary judgment that a regulation is narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest
C.