With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". if KRS 304.86-085 is read as analogous to 11 U.S.C. § 362, several considerations weigh against reading it as tolling the revival limitation period. First of all, while the Bankruptcy Code does have an effect on statutes of limitation, it employs 11 U.S.C. § 108(c), a statute separate from the automatic stay provision to do so. Under that section, a nonbankruptcy statute of limitation that “has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition ... does not expire until the later of — (1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or (2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay under section 362....” 11 U.S.C. § 108(c); see also Raikes v. Langford, 701 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Ky.App.1985) (<HOLDING>). However, while “Section 108(c) of the

A: recognizing that  108c is a savings feature for statutes of limitations that have not expired before the filing of the petition
B: holding that although  108c states that it tolls priority periods only in nonbankruptcy cases congress intended  108c and 26 usc  6503b and h to toll the threeyear period of  507a8ai
C: holding that the oneyear period begins to run after the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari has expired
D: holding statute of limitations for filing petition for postconviction relief not tolled by general savings statute tolling limited to reasons enumerated in state postconviction relief act
A.