With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (BIA 1992). Its construction of ambiguous statutory provisions — like the term “crime involving moral turpitude” — is entitled to Chevron deference. Ruiz-Lopez v. Holder, 682 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir.2012). Consequently, this court “must uphold the BIA’s construction [of 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)® ] unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Kellermann v. Holder, 592 F.3d 700, 702 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843-44, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our circuit has held— along with a number of other circuits— that the BIA’s interpretation of “crime involving moral turpitude” is reasonable. Novatchinski v. Holder, 516 Fed.Appx. 526, 530-31 (6th Cir.2013) (<HOLDING>); Ghani v. Holder, 557 F.3d 836, 841 n. 3 (7th

A: holding that a court should afford deference to the bias interpretation if reasonable of the phrase aggravated felony set forth in the ina but the court should review de novo the bias determination of whether the elements of a statelaw conviction met that interpretation
B: holding that the ninth circuit erred by failing to defer to the bias reasonable interpretation of the ina
C: holding the bias interpretation reasonable and listing cases reaching the same conclusion
D: holding that bias interpretation of immigration law is entitled to deference except where the interpretation is clearly contrary to the plain and sensible meaning of the statute
C.