With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". F.3d 385, 393 n. 9 (3d Cir. July 12, 2011). We need not reach the merits of this claim, which should be addressed by the District Court in the first instance. 3 . In this case, the Commonwealth argues that McLaughlin's second PCRA will be held to be untimely in the state courts. We are mindful of the fact that, should that happen, his petition will provide no basis to toll AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); See Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 414, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005) (“When a postconviction petition is untimely under state law, "that [is] the end of the matter” for purposes of § 2244(d)(2)”). If so, the District Court's disposition of McLaughlin’s petition may effectively bar him from raising any federal claims. Urcinoli, 546 F.3d 269

A: holding petition for writ of mandate seeking return of property does not toll the statute of limitations
B: holding that a dismissal on limitations grounds is a judgment on the merits
C: holding that such a dismissal may provide grounds to equitably toll the statute of limitations for a second habeas petition
D: holding statute of limitations should not be equitably tolled for taxpayer who filed a refund claim after the applicable statute of limitations
C.