With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". is a reasonable probability that the result of phase, we hold that, under Huizar, the trial court should have instructed the jury pursuant to article 37.07 during the punishment phase about the prior fondling offenses. See Huizar, 12 S.W.3d at 483-85. Graves was therefore entitled to a reasonable-doubt instruction during the punishment phase. As set forth above in issue five, we hold that the absence of a reasonable-doubt instruction during the punishment phase did not deprive Grave of a fair and impartial trial. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. Graves therefore fails to satisfy the second prong of Strickland—that the result of the proceedings would have been different had counsel requested the instruction. See Allen v. State, 47 S.W.3d 47, 54-55 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d) (<HOLDING>). Graves does not show how the results of his

A: holding that defendant did not satisfy second prong of strickland because court analyzed that error was harmless under almanza
B: holding that the prejudice prong in strickland was not satisfied because counsels failure to raise an evidentiary issue would not have altered the result of the proceedings because the erroneous admission of the evidence would have constituted harmless error
C: holding that any error was harmless and thus not plain error
D: holding that cotton does not  control nor aid our analysis because that case was analyzed under plain error not harmless error
A.