With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". is supported by and entirely consistent with our recent decision in Patel v. State, supra, where we held violative of OCGA § 17-8-57 a trial court’s statement before jurors that “[v]enue is proper in Fayette County.” Although the trial court in the instant case did not specifically reference “venue” in its statement, we find no substantive difference between a court’s statement that “[v]enue is proper in Fayette County” and a statement that the crime “happened in Muscogee County.” Both statements inform or intimate to the jury the trial court’s opinion as to a critical element of the State’s case, thereby potentially influencing jurors in their evaluation of whether the State has met its burden of proof at trial. See also State v. Anderson, 287 Ga. 159, 161 (695 SE2d 26) (2010) (<HOLDING>). The State asserts that reversal is not

A: holding that trial courts question whether venue had been established and questioning of a witness as to the location of the crime followed by the comment i just wanted to make sure constituted an improper expression of opinion that venue had in fact been proven
B: holding that where a defendant if given the opportunity to renew a motion for a change of venue immediately prior to trial but fails to do so the right to challenge venue is waived
C: holding that the failure of three defendants to object to venue did not waive a fourth defendants objection and therefore affirming the trial courts decision to transfer venue
D: holding that if a modification petition is filed in a county where venue is appropriate it is improper to transfer the venue to another county merely because venue also would have been proper in the other county however once an enforcement proceeding is undertaken in an appropriate venue venue is improper in a different county over a subsequently filed petition to modify the decree which was the subject of the enforcement proceedings
A.