With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". plan; and (2) relieved DSS from the requirement of pursuing reasonable efforts to eliminate the need to place the minor children with respondent. Respondent filed timely notice of appeal from this order. Preliminarily, we note that on 9 February 2007, the trial court entered an order terminating respondent’s parental rights. Our Supreme Court has held that the “pending appeal of a custody order does not deprive a trial court of jurisdiction over termination proceedings,” In re R.T.W., 359 N.C. 539, 542, 614 S.E.2d 489, 491 (2005), and that the court’s entry of a termination order while an appeal is pending from a permanency planning order “necessarily renders the pending appeal moot.” Id. at 553, 614 S.E.2d at 498; see also In re Stratton, 159 N.C. App. 461, 464, 583 S.E.2d 323, 325 (<HOLDING>), appeal dismissed and disc. rev. denied, 357

A: holding because an initial order contemplated the subsequent entry of a judgment the initial order was not considered a final adjudication
B: holding that an order terminating parental rights rendered moot an appeal from an initial adjudication and disposition
C: holding an order imposing sex offender registration after the juvenile courts initial disposition can be a final appealable order
D: holding that an adjudication on summary judgment is an adjudication on the merits
B.