With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Cf. BSO, 406 Mass. at 10, 545 N.E.2d 1156 (“It is axiomatic that an insurance company’s duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify.”). Adopting this approach would be more than an academic exercise; it might in some cases change the outcome (or the amount of settlement), by moving the key battle lines to the duty to indemnify stage. Fortunately, there is no need to adjudicate this esoteric dispute, as the SJC has, at least on one occasion, applied the “suddenness” rule announced in Belleville retroactively to excuse an insurer from its duty to defend— analyzing a pollution exclusion clause in light of Belleville in a ease where the insurer disclaimed its duty to defend prior to Belle-ville but after Shapiro. See SCA, 412 Mass. at 335-36 & n. 5, 588 N.E.2d at 1349, & n. 5 (<HOLDING>). In SCA, the SJC dismissed as unsupported the

A: holding that the court may consider an article not attached to the complaint in determining whether to dismiss the complaint because the article was integral to and explicitly relied on in the complaint and because the plaintiffs did not challenge its authenticity
B: holding that the plaintiffs second complaint did not relate back to her first complaint because her second complaint was not an amendment to her first complaint but rather a separate filing
C: holding that complaint was not reasonably susceptible of an interpretation that the release of pollutants was sudden and accidental where complaint alleged that insured had emptied toxic substances into open barrels in the course of routine business activity lasting several months
D: holding original complaint was admission where it alleged an accident occurred on a different date than the amended complaint
C.