With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". was presented that J.A.R. would receive more appropriate treatment in a moderate-risk placement than in a low-risk placement. See K.M. v. State, 891 So.2d 619, 620-21 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (rejecting trial court’s reasoning that a high-risk placement was more appropriate because the juvenile “was a risk to public safety” where the Department had recommended moderate-risk placement and there was “no evidence that a moderate-risk placement would be insufficient to keep [the juvenile] under control”). The prosecutor’s assertion that a low-risk residential placement could not provide programs to address J.A.R.’s needs did not constitute evidence on which the trial court could rely in the absence of a stipulation by J.A.R.’s counsel. See State v. Brugman, 588 So.2d 279, 279 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (<HOLDING>); Leon Shaffer Golnick Adver., Inc. v. Cedar,

A: holding that hearsay statement did not constitute competent evidence and thus could not be considered in opposition to motion for summary judgment
B: holding that unsworn pleadings do not constitute proper summary judgment evidence
C: holding that probation does not constitute a sentence
D: holding that an attorneys unsworn statement does not establish a fact in absence of a stipulation and does not constitute competent evidence
D.