With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 25 N.Y.2d 112, 119, 302 N.Y.S.2d 799, 803, 250 N.E.2d 214 (1969)). The parties' briefs assume that New York law applies to plaintiffs’ state law claims. Such "implied consent ... is sufficient to establish choice of law.” Motorola Credit Corp. v. Uzan, 388 F.3d 39, 61 (2d Cir.2004) (citing Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens, Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir.2000)). 131 . E.g., Remington Rand Corp. v. Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank, N.V., 68 F.3d 1478, 1483 (2d Cir.1995). 132 . E.g., Manela v. Garantia Banking, 5 F.Supp.2d 165, 178-79 (S.D.N.Y.1998). As with Rule 10b-5, knowledge or recklessness is sufficient to satisfy the scienter element for common law fraud. See, e.g., Suez Equity Investors, 250 F.3d at 104-05. 133 . E.g., Cont'l Ins. Co. v. Mercadante, 222 A.D. 181, 225 N.Y.S. 488 (1927) (<HOLDING>); In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ.

A: holding that a claim arises from the purchase or sale of a security only if there is an allegation of fraud in the purchase sale or issuance of the  instrument
B: recognizing cause of action where plaintiffs allege fraud in inducing not the purchase of the bonds but their retention after purchase
C: recognizing cause of action
D: holding that where purchaser had taken possession and paid part of the purchase price the statute of frauds did not bar enforcement of a purchase agreement
B.