With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". that individual’s compliance with the defendant’s directions, instructions, or terms.” United States v. Possick, 849 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir.1988). Here, the evidence was sufficient to show that appellant organized, supervised, or managed Thaxton, Scott, Majors, Singleton, and Duncan. The evidence established that appellant employed Thaxton as a bodyguard during appellant’s crack-selling activities at the College Street crack house. Thaxton spent six or seven hours a day at that house working with and protecting appellant. His primary job was to look out for appellant, “physically and with a little artillery if need be.” As appellant’s bodyguard, Thaxton was clearly appellant’s subordinate and subject to his supervision. See United States v. Chalkias, 971 F.2d 1206, 1214 (6th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>); United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230,

A: holding that courts failure to tell defendant in rule 11 plea hearing that he faced a mandatory period of supervised release was harmless error because the defendant was on notice of the supervised release requirement set out in the plea agreement and the defendant did not claim he was unaware of the requirement only that court technically had failed to comply with requirements of rule
B: holding that the injury was inflicted by the defendant when it occurred while the defendant applied force directly to the victims person
C: holding that a person employed by the defendant as a bodyguard during the defendants drugrelated activities was supervised by the defendant
D: holding that invitederror doctrine precludes defendant from challenging sentence of supervised release where defendant requested sentence of supervised release
C.