With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". See, e.g., Del Lago Partners, Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 775 (Tex.2010) (“As to landowners, we have recognized negligent-activity and premises-liability theories of liability.”). But Occidental neither owned nor controlled the plant at the time of Jenkins’s injury. For the reasons discussed below, we decline to impose the elements of a premises defect claim on the jury’s negligent design finding. See e.g., Barzoukas v. Found. Design, Ltd., 363 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. filed) (op. on reh’g) (finding question of fact on negligence claim against engineering firm based on foundation design work); Goose Creek Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. of Chambers & Harris Cntys., Tex. v. Jarrar’s Plumbing, Inc., 74 S.W.3d 486, 495 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2002, pet. denied) (<HOLDING>); J.D. Abrams, Inc. v. McIver, 966 S.W.2d 87,

A: holding that where contract between contractor and subcontractor allowed subcontractor to recover if contractor recovered contractor was not barred from bringing suit on behalf of subcontractor
B: holding that the owner could maintain a 93a claim against the subcontractor where there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the owner was the thirdparty beneficiary of the contract between the general contractor and the subcontractor
C: holding that a subcontractor could not recover on theory of quantum meruit for an implied contract against general contractor where condition precedent to payment under express contract was not satisfied
D: holding that school district could recover against plumbing subcontractor for negligent construction of pipes
D.