With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Fuentes, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1071, 649 N.E.2d 519 (1995), which interpreted section 2 — 1202(c), defendants contend that the circuit court here lost its jurisdiction even though no Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)) finding was made as to the directed verdict’s immediate appealability. Doe, relying on Rule 304(a), argues that defendants’ argument is flawed conceptually in that it fails to recognize that a posttrial motion is not a prerequisite for a trial court to retain jurisdiction to vacate or modify a directed verdict where other claims in the matter remain pending and undetermined. Doe further argues that a posttrial motion is not ever required after a directed verdict. In support of this position, Doe relies on Keen v. Davis, 38 Ill. 2d 280, 282, 230 N.E.2d 859 (1967) (<HOLDING>), and Fitzpatrick v. ACF Properties Group,

A: holding defendants failure to file motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict did not prevent district court from granting motion for directed verdict for which court reserved decision
B: holding that directed verdict does not violate seventh amendment
C: holding that a posttrial motion is not required after a grant of a directed verdict
D: holding that the trial court erred in granting the school boards posttrial motion for directed verdict because although the school board timely moved for a directed verdict during trial it did not serve its motion for directed verdict until the eleventh day after the verdict
C.