With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". reiterated the USAF position: “Malcolm Grow Medical Center is not Dr. Zell’s employer; rather, Malcolm Grow is merely the location where Dr. Zell carries out the contractual duties of his employment. Our records show that Dr. Zell is employed by [THS] of San Antonio, Texas. Any concerns regarding Dr. Zell’s employment should be addressed directly with them.” Relying on these representations, says Zell, he initiated contact with the EEOC only one week later, but failed to mention the USAF in his EEOC intake questionnaire, since he did not believe them to be his employer. (1) The Federal Defendants argue that equitable tolling is precluded because Zell was represented by counsel, which extinguishes any equitable basis for tolling a limitations period. See English, 828 F.2d at 1049 (<HOLDING>) (emphasis added). Zell suggests that the case

A: holding that even if an employer violates the posting requirement the charging period is tolled until the plaintiff acquires actual knowledge of his rights or retains an attorney
B: holding that where the insurer retains an attorney to represent the insured pursuant to an insurance policy the attorney acts in the capacity of an independent contractor for the insured
C: holding that the limitations period should be tolled until the plaintiff became aware of the facts necessary to support a charge of discrimination
D: holding that if an attorney is discharged without cause he is entitled to a charging lien for the reasonable value of his services rendered prior to the date of the substitution of counsel where 1 his representation was entirely competent and successful up until his discharge 2 any potential conflict of interest was disclosed and the plaintiff chose to continue to be represented by the attorney and 3 the discharge of the attorney occurred solely because of a fee dispute
A.