With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 n. 7, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995)). In denying the motion, the district court rendered detailed factual findings with regard to each appellant, specifically assessing the effect of Gibson’s testimony on the trial, and the additional evidence supporting the verdicts. Appellants argue that the district court erred in denying the motion for a new trial. We disagree. As demonstrated by the district court’s findings, the government presented overwhelming evidence— separate and apart from Gibson’s testimony — establishing: (1) that each of the appellants participated in the conspiracy; (2) their respective roles in the conspiracy; and (3) the vast amounts of crack being distributed by them. Cf. White, 238 F.3d at 540 (<HOLDING>). Consequently, Gibson’s testimony was, in

A: holding that though the government may have failed to disclose exculpatory testimony in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendants involvement in narcotics sales there was no reasonable probability that a defense based upon that testimony would have been successful
B: holding expert testimony provided no evidence as to causation since testimony was not based upon reasonable medical probability
C: holding that even if attorney had secured defense witnesses  2255 relief was not warranted where the evidence against defendant at trial was so overwhelming that no reasonable probability exists that the result of the proceeding would have been different
D: holding that upon remand if the trial court determined that the testimony in a newly discovered evidence claim was reliable the trial court must review that new evidence as well as brady claims that were previously rejected in a prior postconviction motion because the evidence was equally accessible to the defense and there was no reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed
A.