With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". L.Ed.2d 737 (1984) (similar); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987) (legislators); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 14, 115 S.Ct. 1185, 131 L.Ed.2d 34 (1995) (court employees). Beyond the fact that the present case involves a war-rantless entry, see United States v. Curzi, 867 F.2d 36, 44 (1st Cir.1989) (observing that “this court has not recognized a good-faith exception in respect to warrantless searches”), not one of these recognized exceptions involves a police officer’s reasonable reliance on the mistake of police personnel. The weight of authority holds that such an exception would subvert the prime objective of the exclusionary rule: the deterrence of police misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1249-54 (10th Cir.2006) (<HOLDING>) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct.

A: holding that with respect to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule article 1 section 11 of the wisconsin constitution affords additional protection than that which is afforded by the fourth amendment
B: recognizing good faith exception to fourth amendment exclusionary rule
C: holding the bad faith rationale inapplicable given that the defendants acted in good faith in appealing the case and in raising defenses to the plaintiffs claims
D: holding that the good faith exception is inapplicable when the mistake resulting in the fourth amendment violation is that of the officer conducting the seizure and search rather than a neutral third party not engaged in the competitive endeavor of ferreting out crime
D.