With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". his automobile was set apart under §§ 34-14 and 34-17 when the clerk received the homestead deed in proper form with fees paid on October 3, 1997, well before the fifth day after the creditors meeting. The exemption was therefore claimed in a timely manner. Generally, statutes creating debtors’ exemptions must be construed liberally in favor of the debtor and the exemption. See Shirkey v. Leake, 715 F.2d 859, 862 (4th Cir.1983); Cheeseman v. Nachman, 656 F.2d 60, 63 (4th Cir.1981). Nevertheless, the debtor must comply with procedural requirements, in this case those of § 34-17. See e.g., Morgan, 689 F.2d at 472 (disallowing exemption when debtor timely filed in wrong place); In re Tate, 41 B.R. 946 (Bankr.W.D.Va.1984) (same). But see In re Davies, 96 F.Supp. 416, 419-20 (W.D.Va.1949) (<HOLDING>). It is not enough to comply with the filing

A: holding that a bankruptcy debtor may claim the homestead exemption for real property transferred to a selfsettled revocable trust even though the settlor and the beneficiary as well as the bankruptcy debtor were the same person
B: holding that a wife could claim a homestead exemption even though she only had a beneficiary interest in the property held in trust
C: holding that homestead exemption was unavailable even though claimants were  living on the land and claiming it as homestead with the permission or acquiescence of the owner for they could have no homestead right or interest in land to which they had no title
D: holding that bankruptcy court had equitable discretion to allow exemption even though homestead deed was recorded one day late
D.