With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". INS, 314 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir.2003); Sierra v. INS, 258 F.3d 1213, 1218 (10th Cir.2001). III. Jurisdiction Because removal proceedings were commenced after April 1, 1997, the permanent provisions of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) apply. Tapia Garcia v. INS, 237 F.3d 1216, 1218 n. 2 (10th Cir.2001). A. Procedural default. We address first the government’s claim that Mr. Latu did not exhaust his remedy of seeking an appeal to the court of appeals on direct review, and, therefore, the district court lacked habeas jurisdiction over his case. The government cites Fifth Circuit cases that note, “under [IIRIRA’s] transitional rules, habeas jurisdiction lies to consider constitutional and statutory claims that cannot be h 3 (10th Cir.1986) (<HOLDING>). And as the government points out, the Fifth

A: holding district court was without jurisdiction to consider appellants collateral attack on an administrative suspension order that he  had not timely appealed
B: holding that when the district court dismissed rather than transferred a case not within its jurisdiction and a party appealed that dismissal the circuit court could consider only the propriety of the dismissal on appeal and determining that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction on appeal to consider the merits of the action
C: recognizing collateral attack on void order
D: holding that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction to hear the petitioners collateral attack under  1331
A.