With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (Dkt. 39-9). There is, therefore, evidence creating a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Plaintiff “was unable to complete the plan as a result of his being ... on proper FMLA leave.” Martin, 543 F.3d at 1267. Although the record evidence shows that weekly quotas, instead of monthly quotas, are standard in Defendant’s final warnings and that it had legitimate reasons for issuing the Final Warning, (Galloway Deposition, Dkt. 39-13 at 72; Dkt. 39-8), the reasons for the Final Warning and its performance standards are immaterial to whether Defendant interfered with Plaintiff’s FMLA rights by setting performance standards that effectively penalized him for being absent during statutorily-protected leave. See Pagel, 695 F.3d at 629; see also Hurlbert, 439 F.3d at 1293 (<HOLDING>). Plaintiffs interference claim is not

A: holding that court would not imply a statutory cause of action for employers interference in employees assertion of claim for compensation
B: holding that an employers motives are irrelevant to a fmla interference claim
C: holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference
D: holding that a plaintiffs failure to obtain evidence of continuing treatment an element of a serious health condition was fatal to a plaintiffs fmla interference claim regardless of the plaintiffs allegations that the defendant failed to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to cure medical certification deficiencies in so ruling the 7th circuit denied the plaintiffs estoppel arguments and instead placed an affirmative duty on the plaintiff to present sufficient evidence to establish a serious health condition as defined by the regulations in order to overcome a summary judgment motion on an fmla interference claim
B.