With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". ... evidence and the opinions on both sides of the issues.” McDonald v. W.-S. Life Ins. Co., 347 F.3d 161, 172 (6th Cir.2003). B. Zurich’s retention of Maguire does not alter the applicable standard of review The parties agree that the Plan gives Zurich discretionary authority to determine eligibility for benefits and to construe the terms of the Plan. As noted above, this vesting of discretionary authority in Zurich would typically lead us to apply an arbitrary-and-capricious standard of review. But the Kovaches argue that, even where a plan vests the administrator with discretion, a de novo review of claim determinations is required if an entity or person other than the one authorized by the plan renders the decision. See Sanford v. Harvard Indus., 262 F.3d 590, 597 (6th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>). The Kovaches contend that de novo review

A: holding that where an unauthorized body that does not have fiduciary discretion to determine benefits eligibility renders such a decision arbitraryandcapricious review is not warranted
B: holding that  rjegardless of the administrators ultimate authority to determine benefit eligibility  factual determinations made by the administrator during the course of a benefits review will be rejected only upon the showing of an abuse of discretion 
C: holding that plan fiduciary is entitled to deferential review if empowered by the plan to construe its terms in order to determine benefit eligibility
D: holding that when a plan fiduciary initially determines that a covered employee is eligible for benefits and later determines that the employee is not  eligible for those benefits by virtue of additional medical information received the plan fiduciary is not required to obtain proof that a substantial change in the ltd recipients medical condition occurred after the initial determination of eligibility and noting that a contrary holding would basically prohibit a plan fiduciary from ever terminating benefits if it later discovered evidence that the erisa plaintiff was not disabled at the time of the initial grant of benefits and that such a rule would have a chilling effect on the prompt ness of granting initial benefits in the first place
A.