With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Id. at 314-15, 70 S.Ct. at 657. Service of the motion on a Plaintiffs’ counsel who was relieved from the case is not notice “reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action.” The 1980 order clearly indicated that former counsel was no longer Plaintiffs’ lawyer. Furthermore, even after giving due regard for the “particularities and peculiarities” of this case, those peculiarities do not alter the lack of notice to Plaintiffs. Indeed, when this court, sua sponte, discovered the lack of service, it cured it by the appointment of counsel. Accordingly, the court concludes that Defendants’ failure to serve Plaintiffs resulted in a violation of Plaintiffs’ due process rights. See, e.g., Wetmore v. Karrick, 205 U.S. 141, 27 S.Ct. 434, 51 L.Ed. 745 (1907) (<HOLDING>); United States v. State of Colorado, 937 F.2d

A: holding that the trial court was without authority to set aside entry of default on motion to set aside default judgment
B: recognizing default judgment must generally be set aside without further showing if defendant never received service of process
C: holding a judgment in the absence of notice violates due process rights
D: holding that court cannot consistent with due process set aside judgment of dismissal and render a personal judgment against defendant without notice
D.