With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Vehicles v. Athey, 261 Va. 385, 388, 542 S.E.2d 764, 766 (2001) (quoting Berry v. City of Chesapeake, 209 Va. 525, 526, 165 S.E.2d 291, 292 (1969)). However, although we construe statutes strictly in criminal cases, we will not apply “an unreasonably restrictive interpretation of the statute” that would subvert the legislative intent expressed therein. Ansell v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 759, 761, 250 S.E.2d 760, 761 (1979). Consistent with these principles, we have recognized that when the legislature seeks to punish the use of a firearm as a criminal act, the term “firearm” must not be unreasonably restricted by judicial construction such that the legislative intent is thereby frus trated. See, e.g., Holloman v. Commonwealth, 221 Va. 196, 198, 269 S.E.2d 356, 358 (1980) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). Similarly, when the nature of some other

A: holding that in a prosecution for possession of an unregistered firearm evidence of an armed robbery committed with the firearm was admissible
B: holding that to enhance a sentence because of the defendants use of a firearm the jury must find the defendant guilty of a crime involving a firearm or otherwise specifically find that a firearm was used
C: holding that code  182531 criminalizing use or display of a firearm in the commission of a felony included use of an instrument that gives the appearance of being a firearm
D: holding that to apply the firearm enhancement the firearm need only reflect the context of the defendants possession and the defendants ability to use the firearm to promote the controlled substance offense
C.