With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. Boeing Co., 437 F.Supp. 1138, 1191 (E.D.Pa.1977). The Supreme Court, however, has stated that there must exist some nexus between alleged improper conduct and a term, condition, or privilege of employment. Of course, ... not all workplace conduct that may be described as “harassment” affects a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment within the meaning of Title VII. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. Moreover, the “mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings in an employee” does not sufficiently affect the conditions of employment to violate Title VII. Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d at 238, quoted with approval in, Vinson, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. at 2405, see also, Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87 (8th Cir.1977) (<HOLDING>). The Supreme Court has decided that for racial

A: holding that employers occasional reference to plaintiff as dago and to other italianamerican employees as the mafia constituted isolated or sporadic derogatory ethnic comments as part of casual conversation that did not rise to level necessary for violation of title vii
B: holding that individual employees are not liable under title vii
C: holding that relief granted under title vii is against the employer not individual employees whose actions constituted a violation of title vii emphasis in original
D: holding that supervisors routine vulgar references to plaintiff could not support a hostile work environment claim because plaintiff was unaware of the comments and to show that he or she perceived the environment as hostile a title vii plaintiff must at least have been aware of those comments
A.