With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". We agree with KR. that Druhan was not appointed pursuant to the applicable rules governing such appointments and that his orders are therefore void. Initially, we note that KG.S. argues that KR.’s challenge of Druhan as the temporary probate judge is untimely. K.G.S. is correct; K.R. did not file her original mandamus petition with the Court of Civil Appeals until 17 days after Dru-han’s August 3, 2015, order denying K.R.’s supplemental motion requesting that Dru-han recuse himself. This is beyond the presumptively reasonable 14-day time in which to file a mandamus petition in an adoption proceeding. See Rule 21(a)(3) and § 26-10A~26(a). Regardless, we may consider K.R.’s argument because it concerns the probate court’s jurisdiction. See Bush v. State, 171 So.3d 679 (Ala.Crim.App.2014) (<HOLDING>). The timeliness of K.R.’s challenge to

A: holding that a defendant was not entitled to a relief under section 2255 when he asserted that the sentencing judge who was not the trial judge was influenced by the sentence imposed by the trial judge on a codefendant
B: holding that an order or judgment issued by a disqualified judge is void but not because the court lacked jurisdiction
C: holding that the improper appointment of a judge to a case deprived the court of jurisdiction to rule on any motions pending before that judge the orders entered by that judge were entered without jurisdiction of the court and were thus void
D: holding that an order purporting to amend a judgment was void because it was entered after the trial court had lost jurisdiction to rule on the parties postjudgment motions
C.