With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". “[A]n action can ‘affect’ the exercise of powers by an agency without being aimed directly at [the agency].” Hindes v. FDIC, 137 F.3d 148, 160 (3d Cir.1998). In Hindes, the Third Circuit held that the protections afforded to receivers in § 1821(j) extend to third parties. In rejecting the argument that § 1821(j) does not apply to a non-FDIC third party, the court stated, “the statute, by its terms, can preclude relief even against a third party, including the FDIC in its corporate capacity, where the result is such that the relief ‘restraints] or affect[s] the exercise of powers or functions of the [FDIC] as a conservator or a receiver.’ ” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1821(j)). Cf. Telematics Int’l, Inc. v. NEMLC Leasing Corp., 967 F.2d 703, 707 (1st Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We agree with the reasoning in Hindes and

A: holding that  1821j applied to bar a claim seeking to attach a lien to a certificate of deposit in which the fdic had a security interest because the attachment would ultimately have an effect upon the fdics exercise of its powers as receiver
B: holding that section 363f applies only to in rem interests which have attached to the property by way of either the debtors consent to a security interest or the creditors attachment of the property resulting in a lien
C: holding that defendant defrauded fdic when actions diluted value of fdics security interest thereby being likely to frustrate and impair the fdics ability to realize the benefit of the interest
D: holding that the doench doctrine protects the fdic even where the fdic does not have an interest in an asset
A.