With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 1124 (9th Cir.2008) (citing Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-92, 73 S.Ct. 921). In Triton Marine, however, we found it unnecessary to conduct a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis because the contract at issue contained a choice-of-law clause. See Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 413; see altso Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 588-89, 73 S.Ct. 921 (“Except as forbidden by some public policy, the tendency of the law is to apply in contract matters the law which the parties intended to apply.”). Relying on prior Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit case law, we concluded that “absent compelling reasons of public policy, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract should be enforced,” and a Lauritzen choice-of-law analysis was unnecessary. Triton Marine, 575 F.3d at 415; see also Bominflot, Inc., 465 F.3d at 148 (<HOLDING>). Thus, for the reasons set-forth in Triton

A: holding that party waived an objection to choice of law
B: holding that the choice of law question was made easy by the partys contractual provision agreeing that english law would apply
C: holding that tort law and the law of punitive damages are not controlled by the contract choice of law provision
D: holding that under texas choice of law principles contractual choice of law provisions are generally upheld
B.