With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Boeing, since plaintiff was promoted to the P & A position in July 1990, over 2 years before she filed her administrative claim, any alleged sex discrimination had to occur prior to July 1990, well outside the 300-day statutory period. Plaintiff does not respond directly to Boeing’s argument. Rather, she contends that her failure to promote claim is part of a “continuing violation,” a series of discriminatory acts and a conspiracy of discrimination on the part of Boeing. (Doc. 47, p. 9). The “continuing violation” doctrine is simply not applicable to this case. That doctrine involves circumstances in which a series of connected violations occur both before and during the statutory period. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380-81, 102 S.Ct. 1114, 1125, 71 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (<HOLDING>); Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., Inc., 975 F.2d

A: holding that the charge was timely when filed within the statute of limitations period even though served after the period
B: holding that the limitations period for  1983 actions arising in ohio is the twoyear period found in ohio rev code  230510 and that the limitations period starts to run when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action 
C: holding in the context of the 90day period during which a plaintiff must bring suit after receiving a right to sue letter that in the absence of a recognized equitable consideration the court cannot extend the limitations period by even one day
D: holding discriminatory incidents which occur outside the limitations period are actionable where a plaintiff  challenges not just one incident  but an unlawful practice that continues into the limitations period
D.