With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". California state prisoner, Roy Lee Brown, Jr., appeals pro se the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition as untimely. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Miles v. Prunty, 187 F.3d 1104, 1105 (9th Cir.1999), and we vacate and remand. Brown contends that his § 2254 petition was timely filed because his state habeas petitions statutorilly tolled the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one-year statute of limitations. We agree. Brown is entitled to tolling during the time he was seeking one full round of collateral review by the California courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d); Delhomme v. Ramirez, No. 00-56148, 2003 WL 21947183, at *3 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2003) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>); Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 220, 122

A: holding that it would be inappropriate to predict whether state law would foreclose state postconviction review of the petitioners habeas claim where the state permitted second or successive state petitions when the procedural bar would result in fundamental injustice
B: holding that overlapping state habeas petitions begin a separate round of review and do not disturb the pendency of petitioners first round of review
C: holding that second and third state habeas petitions that were dismissed as impermissible successive petitions were properly filed
D: recognizing that a habeas petitioner may be entitled to tolling during a second round of petitions but holding that the statute is not tolled between rounds
B.