With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Statutes (2003). 883 So.2d at 376. The Fifth District held that “[i]t was not until this court reversed the denial of the lien ... and the trial court entered a judgment on the lien that the entitlement to fees under this statute ripened.” Id. Similarly, Alpaugh’s entitlement to attorneys’ fees on the lien foreclosure claim did not ripen until the trial court disposed of that claim in the amended final judgment. Alpaugh’s December 23, 2005, motion for attorneys’ fees was timely filed because it was filed within 30 days of the amended final judgment. See Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.525 (“Any party seeking a judgment taxing costs, attorneys’ fees, or both shall serve a motion within 30 days after filing of the judgment....”); McFarland & Son, Inc. v. Basel, 877 So.2d 964, 966 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (<HOLDING>). The judgment entered on October 20, 2004, was

A: holding that the requirement to serve a motion for attorney fees or costs within thirty days after filing of judgment applies even where the final judgment reserves jurisdiction to award same
B: holding that the judgment referred to in rule 1525 must be the judgment under which the party claims the right to costs or fees
C: holding that charging lien only includes fees generated in obtaining the judgment not fees unrelated to the judgment
D: holding that the trial court in entering judgment affirming an earlier judgment for an award of attorney fees after having discovered that it mistakenly entered the earlier judgment before the expiration of time for the filing of objections had the inherent power under orcp 71 cs modification authority to change the effective date of the judgment without vacating or setting aside the judgment
B.