With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Kowalski, for instance, we found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in assessing the obligor’s earning capacity based on the finding that the obligor was voluntarily unemployed. 806 P.2d at 1372. We recognized that the noncustodial parent had the burden of establishing his earning capacity. Id. However, in Nass, we remanded because the trial court had not entered sufficiently detailed findings of fact in determining the obligor’s potential income after finding that the obligor was voluntarily underemployed. 904 P.2d at 418-19. We remanded so the trial court could make findings “which disclose its methodology, as well as the factual basis, for its determination of the appropriate imputed potential income.” Id. at 419; cf. Adrian v. Adrian, 838 P.2d 808, 812 (Alaska 1992) (<HOLDING>). The superior court found that Larry’s imputed

A: holding district court may treat bankruptcy courts findings and conclusions as proposed
B: holding that bankruptcy court may issue proposed findings and conclusions in a core proceeding over which the bankruptcy court does not have constitutional authority
C: holding that trial court failed to provide raw numbers for child support calculation and may have relied too heavily on attorneys proposed findings and conclusions of law
D: holding that court is not required to state findings of fact and conclusions of law when denying  3582 motion
C.