With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". was convicted of an offense involving 50 grams or more of crack (Neal’s Counts One and Two), the statutory minimum sentence of imprisonment was ten years and the statutory maximum was life. See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (b)(l)(A)(iii) (2007). The FSA lowers the mandatory minimum sentence to five years of imprisonment and lowers the statutory maximum to 40 years. See § 841(b)(l)(B)(iii). The 360-month (30-year) sentences Neal received on Counts One and Two do not exceed the lower statutory maximum under the FSA, and there is no indication in the record that the district court would have imposed a lesser sentence had the lower statutory minimum and maximum sentences of imprisonment been in place at the time of sentencing. Cf. United States v. Hernandez-Gonzalez, 405 F.3d 260, 262 (5th Cir.2005) (<HOLDING>). Therefore, Neal’s substantial rights were not

A: holding that the fact that a sentence imposed under the prebooker mandatory guideline regime was at the bottom of the mandatory range is not enough to create a reasonable probability that the defendant would have received a different sentence upon resentencing under an advisory guidelines system
B: holding that even in the absence of a sixth amendment violation the imposition of a sentence under the former mandatory guidelines regime rather than under the advisory regime outlined in booker is plain error
C: holding that sentencing under the mandatory guidelines regime creates a presumption of prejudice that the government must rebut with clear and specific evidence that the district court would not have  sentenced the defendant to a lower sentence if it had treated the guidelines as advisory
D: holding that the fact that the defendant was sentenced to the bottom of the mandatory guidelines range without more was insufficient to satisfy the third prongs requirement that the defendant show a reasonable probability of a lesser sentence under an advisory guideline system
A.