With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). Thus, unless the appellant can demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in the place searched, his mere possessory interest in the searched government quarters will not establish a Fourth Amendment violation. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. at 91-92, 100 S.Ct. at 2552-2553; United States v. Quinn, — U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 1623, 89 L.Ed.2d 803 (1986) (per curiam decision dismissing writ of certiorari as improvidently granted); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105-106, 100 S.Ct. 2556, 2561-2562, 65 L.Ed.2d 633 (1980); United States v. Miller, 13 M.J. 75, 77 (C.M.A.1982) (person seeking to suppress search evidence bears burden of proving he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in area being searched); cf. United States v. Harris, 5 M.J. at 46-47 (<HOLDING>). The test for determining whether appellant

A: recognizing that actual standing by virtue of a reasonable expectation of privacy may be established in certain circumstances by a proprietory interest in premises seized
B: holding that passengers lacked any reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore had no standing to challenge the search of the vehicle
C: holding that society recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy
D: holding defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in blood sample drawn by hospital
A.