With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (1974), cases which established the 90-day presumption in reference to speedy trial issues. The Kossman Court noted that “several key changes” had occurred in pretrial confinement proceedings since the Burton decision. These changes provided an accused such protections that a 90-day presumption was no longer necessary. Recognizing the realities of military justice logistics, the Court held that the pre-Burton standard of “reasonable diligence” on the part of the government in bringing an accused to trial is appropriate. Kossman, 38 M.J. at 262. In analogizing post-trial delay to the “reasonable diligence” standard of Kossman, the Thomas Court adopted the reasoning of another 90-day presumption case. See Dunlap v. Convening Authority, 23 C.M.A, 135, 48 C.M.R. 751, 1974 WL 13908 (1974) (<HOLDING>). The language adopted from Dunlap referred to

A: holding that a 19month delay between indictment and trial did not violate the constitutional right to a speedy trial
B: holding that trial court has no power to allow party to amend motion for new trial more than thirty days after trial court signed the final judgment and that denial of amended motion for new trial filed more than thirty days after judgment preserved nothing for appellate review
C: holding the defendant did not demonstrate a denial of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial where even though the delay was substantial and the defendant was detained pretrial for three years the fault for the delay was shared and the defendant continued to request continuances following his assertion for the right to a speedy trial
D: holding that a presumption of denial of speedy review occurred when an accused was continuously under restraint after trial and the convening authority did not promulgate the action within 90 days of trial
D.