With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Leonard, 61 F.3d 1181, 1188 (5th Cir.1995); United States v. Scur-lock, 52 F.3d 531, 541-42 (5th Cir.1995), unlike the Eighth Circuit, we have not required a specific “targeting” of a vulnerable victim beyond the requirement that the defendant knew or should have known of the vulnerability. The Third Circuit, which had not addressed whether specific targeting was required, followed the First, Second, and Ninth Circuits in holding that § 3A1.1 contained no targeting requirement. United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d 1134, 1138-39 (3rd Cir.1997); see also United States v. Hershkowitz, 968 F.2d 1503, 1506 (2d Cir.1992) (declining to impose a specific targeting requirement); United States v. O'Brien, 50 F.3d 751, 755 (9th Cir.1995) (same); United States v. Gill, 99 F.3d 484, 488 (1st Cir.1996) (<HOLDING>). We hold that the amendment does not implicate

A: holding the record did not contain enough facts to determine whether the statute was constitutional as applied to the particular facts and circumstances of the case
B: holding in a postamendment case that the preamendment guideline did not contain a targeting requirement
C: holding that the lowering requirement of  3582c2 is identical to the requirement in ussg  ib 110a2 that the amendment to the guidelines have the effect of lowering the defendants applicable guideline range 
D: holding that a postamendment fca case was compensatory and not punitive
B.