With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". N.J. 319, 571 A.2d 948 (1990); State v. DeLuca, 108 N.J. 98, 527 A.2d 1355, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 944, 108 S.Ct. 331, 98 L.Ed.2d 358 (1987). This rule is directly implicated in this case because it was the judge’s and not the jury’s verdict on the DWI complaint that mandated a three-year period of parole ineligibility. This Court has the constitutional power, and responsibility, to make its procedural rules logical and consistent, and this ease provides the opportunity to do so with respect to Rule 3:15-3. State v. Clark, 162 N.J. 201, 205-07, 744 A.2d 109 (2000) (stating that “the Court’s authority to engage in rule making includes the exclusive power to establish or modify Court Rules through judicial decisions”); George Siegler Co. v. Norton, 8 N.J. 374, 381-83, 86 A.2d 8 (1952) (<HOLDING>). There is no sound reason why a jury in a

A: holding statute addressing procedural aspects of contributory negligence operated within field of courts exclusive rulemaking power and was superseded by courts rules and therefore no longer effective
B: holding that such a decision was within the trial courts discretion
C: recognizing inherent power of courts of appeals
D: recognizing the supervisory power of appellate courts
A.