With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 59.27(4). Again, in an effort to ascertain the scope of Sheriff Clarke's constitutional authority, our inquiry focuses on the nature of the task involved, as opposed to Sheriff Clarke's general power of appointment or his ability to assign a task. See Kocken, 301 Wis. 2d 266, ¶ 54 n.37 (discussing the inquiry to be made, pursuant to WPPA I); see also id., ¶ 67 ("Adhering to case law, we focus on the nature of the job assigned, that is, providing food, rather than the general power of job assignment."). ¶ 24. DSA casts a wide net in its effort to liken this case to Kocken by contending that "as was the case in Kocken, the real issue is whether Sheriff Clarke has constitutional authority to hire and fire personnel to transport prisoners under § 59.27(4)." See Kocken, 301 Wis. 2d 266, ¶ 4 (<HOLDING>). We are not convinced that this case can

A: holding that in south carolina sheriffs and deputies are state officials
B: holding that the sheriffs hiring and firing of personnel to provide food service to the county jail is not a time immemorial principal and important duty that characterizes and distinguishes the office of sheriff and as such is not within the sheriffs constitutional powers
C: holding that sheriffs deputies were not employed in the service of marshall county and that the county personnel board therefore had no jurisdiction to review their respective terminations ordered by the sheriff
D: holding that under north carolina law a sheriff is an agent of the office of the sheriff and an officialcapacity suit against him is a suit against that office
B.