With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". contended that the court's jury in structions at the outset of the trial mitigated any potential prejudice caused by its later interventions. Specifically, the court instructed the jury "not [to] read from my intervention that I may have any message as to what your verdict should be.” The D.C. Circuit and the Second Circuit have adopted the position that where “the trial judge asked questions, objected to by counsel, that could have influenced the jury’s assessment of the defendant’s veracity, such interference with jury fact-finding cannot be cured by standard jury instructions.” Tilghman, 134 F.3d at 421 (adopting by reference the Second Circuit’s approach in United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir.1996)); see also United States v. Hoker, 483 F.2d 359, 368 (5th Cir.1973) (<HOLDING>). Categorical rules are not helpful in cases

A: holding that no amount of boiler plate instructions to the jury  not to draw any inferences as to the judges feelings about the facts from his asking questions or that they are free to disregard factual comment by the judge or as to the presumption of innocence  could be expected to erase from a jurys mind the part taken in this trial by the district judge
B: holding that credibility determinations the weighing of the evidence and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions not those of a judge
C: holding that the defendant is not entitled to be sentenced by the judge who took his plea when the judge made no promise to sentence him
D: holding that where appellant moved to recuse trial judge from deciding the motion for new trial the judge of the administrative district was required to designate a judge to hear the recusal motion
A.