With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Id. at 210. Thus, Connecticut law would still control with respect to the length of the limitations period. Id.; see also. ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 360 (2d Cir.1997). 89. The FRCD of CERCLA would clearly preempt the accrual date of Conn. GemStat. § 52-577, which is an occurrence statute where the limitations period begins to run at the moment the act or omission complained of occurs. See Gibbons v. NER Holdings, Inc., 983 F.Supp. 310, 314 (D.Conn.1997). The start of the running of the limitations period is not delayed until the injury has occurred or the cause of the injury has been discovered. Fichera v. Mine Hill Corp., 207 Conn. 204, 212, 541 A.2d 472 (1988); see Visconti v. Pepper Partners Ltd. P’ship, 77 Conn.App. 675, 688, 825 A.2d 210 (2003) (<HOLDING>). 90. Similarly, the FRCD would preempt the

A: holding that connecticuts threeyear limitations period for tort suits set forth in conn genstat  52577 is the appropriate limitations period for civil rights actions under  1983
B: holding that the statute of limitations begins to run under federal law when plaintiffs knew or should have known of the injury which forms the basis of their claims
C: holding that the plaintiffs claims under  22a452 were barred by the statute of limitations but declining to decide which statute to apply
D: holding that the plaintiffs claims under conn gemstat  22a16 were barred by the threeyear statute of limitations in conn genstat  52577 which began to run when the vendor caused the contamination of the property even though this was prior to the plaintiffs ownership of the contaminated property
D.