With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of its traditional discretionary sentencing authority. Id. We further concluded in Kaua that, insofar as the “hate-crime” law at issue in Appren-di—establishing an extended term for a defendant who committed a crime motivated by an improper bias toward, inter alia, the victim’s race, gender, or religion —was clearly intrinsic in nature, Apprendi, like Jones, comported with our intrinsic/extrinsic analysis in Tafoya and Schroeder II and did not require that extrinsic facts, including those extrinsic facts implicated in HRS § 706-662(4), be found by the trier of fact rather than the judge. Id. at 12-13, 72 P.3d at 484-85 (citing Tafoya, 91 Hawai'i at 271-72, 982 P.2d at 900-01; Schroeder II, 76 Hawai'i at 528, 880 P.2d at 203; State v. Carvalho, 101 Hawai'i 97, 63 P.3d 405 (App.2002) (<HOLDING>)). In the years following Apprendi, the United

A: holding that hrs  706662 was not constitutionally infirm and reading tafoya in harmony with apprendi
B: holding apprendi is not retroactive
C: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively
D: holding that apprendi does not apply retroactively in florida in postconviction proceedings to cases that were final on direct review at the time of the apprendi decision
A.