With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". of section 2j65, as generally understood by the courts and the legal profession, was to abolish the common-law doctrine of Chapman v. Chapman, and to provide that the possession of such estate or term, without notice of other evidence of title in such occupant, should not be notice to such subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration. Id. at 105-06, 73 S.E. 467 (emphasis added). As explained by the Supreme Court of Virginia, the only time when the language concerning possession is relevant is when that possession has been transferred to the grantee. Under those circumstances, the law of Virginia is that mere possession by an alleged grantee, as Defendant Davis claims here, is not sufficient to put bona fide purchasers on notice. See Norfolk & Portsmouth, 113 Va. at 107, 73 S.E. 467 (<HOLDING>); Kiser v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 200 Va. 517,

A: holding that defendant did not breach oral agreement because among other things the plaintiff had not established that the term in question was part of the oral contract
B: holding that oral listing agreement did not preclude recovery of a commission
C: holding that mere possession by a grantee under an oral agreement is not notice
D: holding that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to find that an oral agreement existed and that it was not modified
C.