With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". court nevertheless dismissed these claims in their entirety, concluding that “Section 1981 is not a substitute for an employment discrimination claim.” We have previously noted our “puzzlement” with this conclusion, Leung v. New York Univ., 495 Fed.Appx. 124,125 n. 1 (2d Cir.2012), and we now hold that it was error. Congress “intended § 1981 to apply to employment discrimination” and Section 1981 “provid[es] a vehicle for every employee to remedy racial discrimination in the workplace.” Lauture v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 216 F.3d 258, 263, 264 (2d Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, despite the district court’s concerns, plaintiffs’ failure to point to a specific written contract outside of their employment relationship is not fatal to their claim. See id. at 260 (<HOLDING>). In addition, “42 U.S.C. § 1981 encompasses

A: holding that an atwill employee may not be discharged for refusal to violate the law
B: holding that an atwill employee may bring a cause of action under section 1981
C: holding that an atwill employee may not recover for discriminatory discharge under section 1981 because the atwill relationship was not sufficiently contractual under tennessee law
D: holding that an atwill employee may sue under  1981 for racially discriminatory termination
D.