With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". that the plea was knowing and voluntary,” the petitioner is not “ipso facto, entitle[d] ... to relief.” Id. Instead, such a showing “is sufficient to shift the burden of going forward to the State,” and [t]he State may rebut the allegation with proof of substantial compliance with the advice requirement, which would show that the petitioner was made aware of his constitutional rights, or the State alternatively may show that the petitioner was aware of his constitutional rights and that therefore the trial court’s failure to give the mandated advice was harmless error. Id. The post-conviction court took the latter track, and the record supports that court’s determination that the State countered the petitioner’s evidence of a deficient en masse hearing. See Neal, 810 S.W.2d at 139 (<HOLDING>). In this case, “the [general sessions] court’s

A: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to accept the defendants guilty pleas to two counts of the indictment and stating that even if the trial court erred the error had not prejudiced the defendant because he was found guilty by the jury of the charges to which he intended to plead and the evidence of the other crimes would have been admissible in the trial for the first degree murder charge
B: holding that when the petitioner establishes that the trial court failed to inform him of his constitutional rights and that he would not have pleaded guilty absent the omission then the burden shifts to the state to justify the error by establishing through extrinsic evidence the defendants knowing and voluntary relinquishment of the involved constitutional protections despite the erroneous omission
C: recognizing the right to trial by jury is a constitutional right to be given the same protections as other constitutional rights
D: holding that omission was not plain error
B.