With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. Superior Court, 172 Ariz. 195, 198, 836 P.2d 408, 411 (App.1992). The State asks us to resolve an issue of first impression in Arizona—the constitutionality of utilizing two-way video testimony at trial under the Confrontation Clause—that is a legal issue of statewide importance and likely to recur. Moreover, the State has no equally plain, speedy, or adequate remedy by appeal. See Ariz. R.P. Spec. Act. 1(a); Lindsay R. v. Cohen, 236 Ariz. 565, 566-67, ¶ 5, 343 P.3d 435, 436-37 (App.2015). Accordingly, we accept special action jurisdiction. ANALYSIS ¶ 13 The State argues the trial court erred as a matter of law by not applying the Maryland v. Craig standard to the State’s requested accommodation for E.P. to testify via two-way video during trial. See 497 U.S. at 849, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (<HOLDING>). ¶ 14 In general, we review a trial court’s

A: holding that the confrontation clause is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment
B: recognizing that the confrontation clauses preference for facetoface confrontation at trial must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case quoting mattox v united states 156 us 237 243 15 sct 337 39 led 409 1895
C: holding that in reviewing confrontation clause challenge appellate courts must first determine whether the confrontation clause is implicated
D: holding that the confrontation clause guarantees the defendant a physical facetoface meeting with the witnesses appearing before the trier of fact
B.