With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". interference claim. See, e.g., Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 878 F.Supp. 1054 (E.D.Mich.1995) (Gadola, J.), aff'd, 73 F.3d 648 (6th Cir.1996). In the instant case, there is no dispute that plaintiffs business relationship with defendant Health Management Systems of America was created and governed by the CBA between defendant and UAW Local 412. See Exh. D to defendants’ brief. In order to determine whether plaintiff has established the first and third elements of his prima facie case of tortious interference, the Court must examine and interpret the governing CBA controlling the terms of plaintiffs employment. As such, plaintiffs claim of tortious interference is preempted under the LMRA. See Morris v. Ambassador Nursing Home, Inc., 845 F.Supp. 1164, 1167 (E.D.Mich.1994) (Gadola, J.) (<HOLDING>). With respect to Counts II and III, plaintiff

A: holding section 301 preempted plaintiffs claim for tortious interference with contract because that claim would require interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement
B: holding that the plaintiff stated a claim for tortious interference
C: holding that a complaint for interference with a collective bargaining agreement against a nonparty to that agreement is not actionable under  301a of the lmra
D: holding that the lmra preempted plaintiffemployees claim under michigan law for tortious interference with contractual relations breach of contract is an essential element of a tortious interference claim and resolution of such claim would require the court to interpret collective bargaining agreement to determine if that agreement had been breached
D.