With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 103-322, § 250002, 108 Stat. 2082, 2083 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2327(b)(3)). Contrary to Vicky’s assertion, the variation among these restitution statutes does not mean that Congress eliminated the proximate cause requirement for the specifically enumerated losses in subsections 2259(b)(3)(A) through (E). Rather, variances among these restitution statutes “demonstrate that Congress viewed particular offenses as causing foreseeable risks of certain losses [meriting enumeration] in the[se] [restitution] statutes.” Id. at 97 n. 13. The First Circuit concluded that, although Congress determined that restitution offenses foreseeably cause the losses in subsections (A) through (E), the defendant — to be liable — still must proximately cause the victim’s losses. See id. at 95-97, 99-100 (<HOLDING>). This court agrees. Congress determined that

A: holding that the decedents estate had standing because the traditional requirement that the plaintiff show an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the conduct of the defendant is met by the allegation in the complaint that the defendants actions resulted in the diminishment of the assets of the estate
B: holding that the government may be an identifiable victim
C: holding that the victim impact and victim vulnerability aggravators were not overbroad and explaining that though the concepts of victim impact and victim vulnerability may well be relevant in every case evidence of victim vulnerability and victim impact in a particular case is inherently individualized
D: holding that the proximate cause requirement was satisfied  because the defendants actions resulted in identifiable losses as outlined in the expert reports and vickys victim impact statements footnote and citation omitted
D.