With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 696 S.W.2d at 553-54. Cavnar does not allow recovery of prejudgment interest on exemplary damages. See id. at 555-56. Although Cavnar involved a personal injury action, its reasoning and holding have been applied to all types of suits, including DTPA actions. See McCann v. Brown, 725 S.W.2d 822, 825-26 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1987, no writ); Quintero v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 709 S.W.2d 225, 230-31 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1985, writ refd n.r.e.). Thus, Cavnar prejudgment interest applies to this case unless article 5069-1.05 governs this issue. In 1987, the Texas Legislature amended article 5069-1.05 to add a section dealing with prejudgment interest. See Tex.Rev.Civ. StatAnn. art. 5069-1.05, § 6 (Vernon Supp.1993). This section codified, modified, and overt pp.—Austin 1990, no writ) (<HOLDING>). Appellee agrees that article 5069-1.05 is

A: holding that prejudgment interest in suit filed before september 2 1987 not governed by article 5069105 section 6
B: holding plaintiff could not recover prejudgment interest on exemplary damages because suit was filed on april 161987 and thus governed by cavnar and not article 5069105
C: holding that section 1602 of the mliia which became effective september 1 1995 requires that judgments include prejudgment interest
D: holding that prejudgment interest should accrue 30 days after fee petition was filed
A.