With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right’” (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987))); Marrero-Méndez v. Calixto-Rodríguez, 830 F.3d 38, 46 (1st Cir, 2016); Mlodzinski v, Lewis, 648 F.3d 24, 38 (1st Cir. 2011). That makes sense, because [t]he easiest cases don’t even arise. There has never been a section 1983 case accusing welfare officials of selling foster children into slavery; it does not follow that if such a case arose, the officials would be immune from damages liability because no previous case had found liability in those circumstances. K.H. Through Murphy v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 846, 851 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J., for the court); accord Marrero-Méndez, 830 F.3d at 47 (<HOLDING>). What this means is that a plaintiff can meet

A: holding a gun to the head of a child and threatening to pull the trigger is plainly excessive force so closely analogous case is not needed to put police officer on notice
B: holding that because the coerciveness of the officials actions is patently obvious no particular case and certainly not one directly on point heed have existed to put a reasonable officer on notice of its unconstitutionality citation and quotations omitted
C: holding that because some of the most difficult and embarrassing questions which a judicial officer is called upon to consider and determine relate to his jurisdiction the scope of the judges jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the judge citations quotations and ellipses omitted
D: holding that a statute is certainly not so plainly unconstitutional that the failure of the trial court  to hold it so can be regarded as a plain error or a culpable neglect of judicial duty internal citation omitted
B.