With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". also argues that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not apply to its written warranty because, it says, a mobile, or manufactured, home is not a "consumer good” for purposes of the FAA, 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1), and that the Magnuson-Moss Act does not preclude enforcement under the FAA of a binding arbitration agreement contained in a written warranty. We do not decide those issues, because we interpret the arbitration provision not to foreclose McCollough ultimately from suing Homes of Legend. Homes of Legend also challenges the partial summary judgment entered in favor of McCollough. However, that issue is not properly before this Court, because the partial summary judgment is not a final, appealable judgment. See Precision American Corp. v. Leasing Serv. Corp., 505 So.2d 380, 382 (Ala.1987) (<HOLDING>). JOHNSTONE, Justice (dissenting). The trial

A: holding summary judgment order was not a final judgment because it did not dispose of the defendants claim for attorneys fees
B: holding that the trial courts oral expression in open court of its future intention to render a judgment was not itself a judgment but rather the trial courts written findings of fact and conclusions of law were its judgment
C: holding that the trial courts rule 54b ala r civ p certification of its partial summary judgment on a single claim leaving open the amount of damages was erroneous therefore the appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because there was no final judgment
D: holding that entry of final judgment on a claim in a multiparty action pursuant to rule 54b should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying the decision to grant 54b certification
C.