With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". at 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127. AEDPA’s legislative history likewise makes clear that Congress intended to create a statute of limitations for habeas claims, not a jurisdictional bar. See Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 128 F.3d 1283, 1288-89 (9th Cir.1997) (summarizing the relevant legislative history), overruled on other grounds, 163 F.3d 530, 539 (9th Cir.1998) (en banc). Respondent Bissonnette argues that by setting out a variety of specific circumstances that will delay the running of the statute, see § 2244(d)(l)(B)-(D), and by providing that the one-year period is tolled during the pendency of state collateral review, see § 2244(d)(2), Congress implicitly precluded tolling based on other equitable considerations. Cf. Brockamp, 519 U.S. at 351-52, 117 S.Ct. 849 (<HOLDING>). This is a forceful objection, as this court

A: holding title vii subject to equitable tolling
B: holding that equitable tolling of the time to file a notice of appeal is not permitted
C: holding that equitable tolling is not available under a tax statute because inter alia the statute sets forth explicit exceptions to its basic time limits and those very specific exceptions do not include equitable tolling 
D: holding that the general equitable tolling doctrine is read into every statute of limitations
C.