With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". per se rule expanding the Edwards rule beyond its well-established parameters, we next analyze the facts of this case as distinguishable from the unique facts in Hutchins. The most significant distinction between Hutchins and this case is that the appellee’s interaction with SA KS consisted of two discrete transactions for purposes of evaluating Edwards. Unlike the facts in Hutchins, in which the request for consent to search and Sgt Huteh-ins’s statement (“is it too late to give my side of the story”) blended into one continuum, here there was a significant break of 15 to 20 minutes between the appellee effectively ending SA KS’s interrogative attempt and the appellee’s subsequent change-of-heart. Cf. Bobby v. Dixon, — U.S. -, 132 S.Ct. 26, 181 L.Ed.2d 328 (2011) (per curiam) (<HOLDING>). It was during these 15 to 20 minutes— while

A: holding that the admission of a statement obtained in violation of miranda v arizona 384 us 436 86 sct 1602 16 led2d 694 1966 resulted in harmless error because the defendant repeated the substance of the statement in a later admissible statement
B: holding that statement to police made thirtysix hours after a different statement to police was not part of one confession and not admissible under the rule of completeness
C: holding that based on passage of four hours between mr dixons uncoerced yet unwarned statement and his subsequent mirandized statement his subsequent statement was admissible and distinguishable from missouri v seibert 542 us 600 661 124 sct 2601 159 led2d 643 2004 because in siebert the unwarned and warned interrogations blended into one continuum
D: holding that in the absence of police coercion a subsequent administration of miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement
C.