With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". contained in the juvenile statutes. The same argument was raised in an analogous case, J.M. v. State, 783 So.2d 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001), where this court agreed with the appellant’s argument and held that an adjudication of delinquency could not be deemed a conviction for purposes of the sexual-predator statute: [T]he provision in section 985.233(4)(b), excluding adjudications of delinquency from the definition of “conviction” takes precedence in a juvenile’s ease over the definition of “conviction” in section 775.21(2)(c), which generally applies to all sexual offenders. Id. at 1206 (emphasis in original). In J.M., we found no legislative intent to give the trial court authority to declare a juvenile to be a sexual predator. See also C.C.M. v. State, 782 So.2d 537 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001)(<HOLDING>). As in J.M., we certify conflict with the

A: holding that various fifth and sixth amendment protections apply to juvenile proceedings
B: holding that sexual offender conditions mandated by section 948035 apply to adults and juveniles sentenced as adults but do not apply to a juvenile who is adjudicated a delinquent child
C: holding that bookeys holdings do not apply to section 3582c2 proceedings and therefore do not require treating section lb110b as advisory
D: holding child abuse statute clearly did not apply to fetuses and therefore did not apply to a mother who ingested cocaine during pregnancy
B.