With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". that calls for the exercise of professional judgment (see 12/17/09 Tr. at 103; Defs.’ Mem. at 33 (“no credible argument can be made that there is a systemic lack of professional judgment exercised by treating professionals in the IDD system”)), that proposition is not supported by Youngberg. Youngberg expressly states that a court must “make certain that professional judgment in fact was exercised ” in attempting to protect the rights of an involuntarily committed individual. 457 U.S. at 321, 102 S.Ct. 2452 (emphasis added) (quotation omitted). As other courts have recognized, in order for this requirement to have any substance, it cannot be met purely at the systemic level; rather, professional judgments must be implemented in a timely fashion. See, e.g., Thomas S., 902 F.2d at 252 (<HOLDING>); Halderman v. Pennhurst, 901 F.2d 311, 324 (3d

A: holding that traditional allocation of burden of proof to the party challenging the decisions applies to decisions under the tca
B: holding that where the alj had already  obtained and considered reports from treating physicians the alj had before him a complete medical history and the evidence received from the treating physicians was adequate for him to make a determination as to disability
C: holding that remand was not required and that the aljs failure to mention treating physicians opinion was harmless error because the alj adopted the treating physicians recommendations
D: holding that district court properly imposed liability because it found that many of the decisions of the treating professionals had not been implemented and found areas in which the decisions of the treating professional substantially departed from accepted standards
D.