With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". the prevailing party could seek enforcement of the award as a judgment under the predecessor arbitration statutes. Generally, the prevailing party could, upon compliance with the statute’s provisions, secure a judgment on the award as on the verdict of a jury in most instances. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1927, ch. X, par. 1; Rev. Stat. 1845, ch. VII, par. 8; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1917, ch. X, par. 9; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, ch. 10, par. 9. However, strict compliance with the statute’s provisions was necessary before the circuit court could exercise its subject-matter jurisdiction and enter judgment on the award. Absent such compliance, the court lacked the authority to enter judgment, and the prevailing party was relegated to his common law remedies. See Low v. Nolte, 15 Ill. 368, 374 (1854) (<HOLDING>); Eisenmeyer v. Sauter, 77 Ill. 515, 516 (1875)

A: holding that an order remanding an arbitration award is not a final appealable order when the order does not also vacate the arbitration award
B: holding the conditions imposed by the arbitration statute were indispensable formalities in order to give the court jurisdiction to enter judgment upon the arbitration award and explaining that where these formalities were not met the parties must be left to their common law remedies
C: holding that where the arbitration agreement was silent on feesplitting and the costs imposed upon the plaintiff by the aaa were not prohibitive the plaintiff had presented little evidence to indicate that arbitration would be prohibitively expensive and the fees and costs of arbitration did not render the arbitration scheme unconscionable
D: holding that arbitration award is binding on the parties
B.