With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Jackson, 378 U.S. at 376-77, 84 S.Ct. 1774. We have recognized that the right to such a hearing is subject to waiver by failure to properly challenge the confession in the trial court. United States v. Gonzalez, 548 F.2d 1185, 1190 (5th Cir.1977). The Supreme Court has also held, in applying the rule of Jackson v. Denno on habeas corpus review, that the “Constitution does not require a voluntariness hearing absent some contemporaneous challenge to the use of the confession.” Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). In the ordinary case, a defendant who fails to raise the issue of voluntariness has waived it. United States v. Renteria, 625 F.2d 1279, 1283 (5th Cir.1980); see also United States v. Knezek, 964 F.2d 394, 397-98 (5th Cir.1992) (<HOLDING>). We have, nevertheless, held that certain

A: holding that consistent testimony given by three officers made it unlikely that defendants motion to suppress his confession as coerced would have been granted even though two witnesses to the interrogation had not testified at suppression hearing
B: holding that a defendant who fails to raise a specific issue as the basis for suppression in a motion to suppress to the district court has waived the right to raise that issue on appeal
C: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that defendant had waived the opportunity for a suppression hearing on his confession by first moving to suppress the confession orally at the start of trial when no motion to suppress was filed no hearing requested and no objection to the admission of the statements was made
D: holding that an appellate court considers the entire record on appeal not just the evidence presented at the suppression hearing in affirming the denial of a motion to suppress
C.