With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". Rent-a-Car is not a proper defendant to this case.” (Garnishee Defs.’ Resp. PL’s Verified Mot. Remand, Ex. J at 1.) In response, Mr. Johnson’s lawyer wrote on January 25, 2001: “I concur that my theories of possible negligence against Enterprise have not developed. Thus, regarding the underlying tort action it does not appear that Enterprise was negligent or that Wilson was your agent.” (Id., Ex. L at 1.) What remained was a dispute between Mr. Johnson and Enterprise with respect to whether Enterprise could have some secondary liability rather than some independent liability to Mr. Johnson. Under Indiana law, Mr. Johnson could not bring a direct action against Enterprise as a part of the underlying negligence action. See Rausch v. Reinhold, 716 N.E.2d 993, 1002 (Ind.Ct.App.1999) (<HOLDING>); Araiza v. Chrysler Ins. Co., 703 N.E.2d 661,

A: holding that an insurer which insures a tortfeasor under a liability policy has no obligation of good faith and fair dealing to an injured third party even where the injured third party also carries a separate policy with the insurer
B: holding that there is an actual controversy between an insurer and the party injured by the insured
C: holding that an injured third party does not have the right to bring a direct action against a tortfeasors liability insurer
D: holding that there can be no common liability upon which to base a contribution claim between a third party and an injured partys employer because the exclusive remedy provision means that the employers liability is not based on negligence so that application of the common liability rule deprives a third party of the opportunity to secure contribution from the injured partys employer
C.