With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". (see Docket Entries 1 and 9), and therefore there is no legal or factual basis for this claim to go to the jury. Thus, defendants’ ninth affirmative defense and third counterclaim should be dismissed to the extent it is based on the parties’ lease. There is also no basis to submit to the jury defendants’ attorneys fees claim under the Fair Housing Act. Indeed, 42 U.S.C. § 3613(e)(2), upon which defendants rely, clearly provides that “[i]n a civil action under [the Fair Housing Act], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee and costs.” (Emphasis added). Thus, whether and to what extent defendants or plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs will be decided by the Court. Sassower, 973 F.2d 75, 79 (<HOLDING>) (quoting Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,

A: holding a district court may in its discretion award attorneys fees upon a finding that plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith
B: holding that courts may award prevailing title vii defendant attorney fees upon a finding that the plaintiffs action was frivolous unreasonable or without foundation even though not brought in subjective bad faith and fees also may be awarded if plaintiff continued to litigate after its action clearly became frivolous unreasonable or without foundation
C: recognizing provisions of the fair housing act that forbid false statements that housing is unavailable to a person because of his race
D: holding that feeshifting is permitted under the fair housing act where prevailing defendant shows that suit is frivolous unreasonable or without foundation
D.