With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 831, 835 (App.2002). Likewise, we review issues of statutory interpretation de novo. Andrews, 201 Ariz. at 382, ¶ 8, 36 P.3d at 60. DISCUSSION ¶ 7 Although the parties raise multiple issues, one is dispositive: Did the trial court correctly rule that A.R.S. § 33-934 precludes enforcement of Maricopa County’s hen against Barfield, Meyer & Williams, P.C., and Rebanee? ¶ 8 Maricopa County argues the trial court erred in its ruling because A.R.S. § 33-934 does not provide the exclusive mechanism for hen enforcement. Specifically, the County contends that because § 33-934 provides that a lienholder “may” enforce its hen against parties liable for damages, this statute grants non-exclusive hen enforcement rights. See Walter v. Wilkinson, 198 Ariz. 431, 432, ¶ 7, 10 P.3d 1218, 1219 (App.2000) (<HOLDING>). According to the County, § 33-931 implicitly

A: holding that administrative exhaustion is mandatory despite legislatures use of the word may
B: holding that a states use of the word shall is mandatory language
C: holding use of word may generally indicates permissive rather than mandatory intent
D: holding that shall generally indicates a mandatory intent unless a convincing argument to the contrary is made
C.