With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 821 P.2d 731, 740 (1991); State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 389, 814 P.2d 333, 346 (1991); State v. Hall, 129 Ariz. 589, 594, 633 P.2d 398, 403 (1981); State v. Means, 115 Ariz. 502, 504, 566 P.2d 303, 305 (1977); see generally A.R.S. § 13-1105. At that time, Arizona courts had not addressed whether “conditional” intent satisfied the mens rea of a “specific” intent crime. States which had addressed that issue were split. Compare, e.g., State v. Irwin, 55 N.C.App. 305, 285 S.E.2d 345, 349 (N.C.1982) and State v. Kinnemore, 34 Ohio App.2d 39, 295 N.E.2d 680, 681-83 (1972) (both holding that conditional intent not sufficient to satisfy mens rea for specific intent crime assault with the intent to kill); with Holloway v. United States, 526 U.S. 1, 9-11, 119 S.Ct. 966, 143 L.Ed.2d 1 (1999) (<HOLDING>); People v. Vandelinder, 192 Mich.App. 447, 481

A: holding that a mens rea of unlawfully in the indictment was sufficient because the indictment referenced the applicable statute which required a reckless mens rea
B: holding that under california law section 28002 requires a reckless mens rea
C: holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea in federal carjacking statute
D: holding that conditional intent sufficient to satisfy specific intent mens rea for solicitation to commit murder offense
C.