With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". that a prosecutor's coercion of a witness would violate a defendant's rights but would not give rise to tort liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983). 6 . See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 164 F.3d 1285, 1289 (10th Cir.1999); LaFrance v. Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir.1974) (“Due process does not permit one to be convicted upon his own coerced confession. It should not allow him to be convicted upon a confession wrung from another by coercion.”) (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401, 430-31, 65 S.Ct 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029 (Rutledge, J., dissenting)); McMillian v. Johnson, 878 F.Supp. 1473, 1512-14 (M.D.Ala.1995), rev’d in part on other grounds, 88 F.3d 1554 (11th Cir.1996); Tucker, 721 P.2d at 642. 7 . See, e.g., Webb v. Texas, 409 U.S. 95, 98, 93 S.Ct. 351, 34 L.Ed.2d 330 (1972) (<HOLDING>). 8 . See Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30, 97

A: holding that a trial judges action in singling out a defense witness for a lengthy admonition on the dangers of perjury effectively drove that witness off the stand and thus deprived the defendant of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment
B: holding that trial court has discretion to permit defendant to call accused witness to stand and permit witness to invoke fifth amendment privilege in front of jury where entire defense was centered on witness commission of crime
C: holding that a judges lengthy perjury warnings to a defense witness effectively drove the witness off the stand thereby denying the defendant his due process right to present his defense
D: holding that the defendants due process rights were violated when the trial judge singled out the only defense witness and indicated to that witness that he expected the witness to he and would personally ensure that the witness was prosecuted for perjury and thereby effectively drove that witness off the stand
A.