With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment. Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 25, 107 S.Ct. 1519, 95 L.Ed.2d 1 (1987) (Marshall, J., concurring). Several lower federal courts relied on Justice Marshall’s approach to expand Rooker-Feldman, holding that federal claims were barred because they were “inextricably intertwined” with state-court judgments. Indeed, Rooker-Feldman tripped up plaintiffs in our circuit even though they did not seek relief from a state-court judgment and their claims were not identical to claims asserted in state court. See, e.g., Prince v. Ark. Bd. Exam’rs in Psychol., 380 F.3d 337, 340 (8th Cir.2004) (quoted ante at 754-55); Ace Const. v. City of St. Louis, 263 F.3d 831, 833 (8th Cir.2001) (<HOLDING>); Lemonds v. St. Louis County, 222 F.3d 488,

A: holding certain plaintiffs did not have standing to attack ordinance governing sexually oriented businesses where the record did not reveal that any one of these plaintiffs was subject to the ordinance even though the city attorney conceded at oral argument before the supreme court that one or two of them had had their licenses denied under the ordinance
B: holding that a plaintiff had standing to attack an entire ordinance including portions of the ordinance not applied to the plaintiff
C: holding that religious corporation which owned property had standing to challenge zoning ordinance
D: holding that the plaintiffs due process challenge to a city ordinance was barred because it was inextricably intertwined with a statecourt ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance
D.