With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". clearly noted that there were disputed points of fact with regard to whether Ceccarelli’s representation of Stuart was authorized; however, the trial court did not resolve this factual dispute. Before the trial court could set aside the judgment under OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) for lack of personal jurisdiction based on insufficient service, the trial court had to make a determination of whether that defense was waived when Ceccarelli filed the answer on Stuart’s behalf without raising that defense. See Hall, supra, 282 Ga. at 441 (1). If Ceccarelli was authorized to represent Stuart when the answer was filed, then Stuart’s insufficient-service defense must be deemed waived. See Smith v. Local Union No. 1863, Intl. Longshoremen’s Assn. of Clerks, 260 Ga. App. 683, 687 (4) (580 SE2d 566) (2003) (<HOLDING>). Since a determination of whether Ceccarelli

A: holding that for immunity an official must first prove that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred 
B: recognizing general rule that attorneys apparent authority terminates at death of client
C: holding that attorneys acts within scope of his authority are binding on client
D: holding trial court erred when it sanctioned client where the evidence showed that the attorney filed frivolous pleadings on behalf of the client but the client did nothing more than rely on her attorneys advice
C.