With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". serves to toll it. See Fisher v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir.2001). Thus, Mr. Hubler’s July 2003 and June 24, 2005, applications for post-conviction relief are of no consequence. The limitations period for § 2254 motions is also subject to equitable tolling in extraordinary circumstances, Gibson v. Klinger, 232 F.3d 799, 808 (10th Cir.2000), such as where “a constitutional violation [will] result[ ] in the conviction of one who is actually innocent or incompetent,” Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). But in order for a petitioner to avail himself of the actual innocence exception he must demonstrate that his claim is based on a an independent constitutional violation. See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400, 404, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1995) (<HOLDING>). Mr. Hubler’s claim of actual innocence is

A: holding that the defendants habeas claim was procedurally barred because it could have been or was raised in his postconviction motion
B: holding that a habeas claim is procedurally barred where it was already raised on direct appeal and decided on the merits by this court
C: holding that habeas claim not included in petition and never raised by petitioner before the district court as basis for habeas relief is procedurally defaulted
D: holding that although actual innocence is not itself a recognized constitutional claim it can serve as a gateway through which a habeas petitioner may advance an otherwise procedurally barred constitutional claim
D.