With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 2371, 2377, 60 L.Ed.2d 994 (1979); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-05, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208-09, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). The lower courts have held unanimously, since 1975, that this category includes eminent domain proceedings. See, e.g., Ahrensfeld v. Stephens, 528 F.2d 193, 198-99 (7th Cir.1975); Dash v. Frech, 1989 WL 75422, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7771, *9 (N.D.Ill.1989); Campbell v. City of Phoenix, 1983-2 Trade Cases ¶ 65,753, at 69,838, 1983 WESTLAW 2197, *4 (D.Ariz.1983); Schiessle v. Stephens, 525 F.Supp. 763, 768-69 (N.D.Ill.1981); Sorger v. Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority, 401 F.Supp. 348, 353-54 (E.D.Pa.1975). But cf. Joiner v. City of Dallas, 380 F.Supp. 754, 759-61 (N.D.Texas 1974) (per curiam), aff'd mem., 419 U.S. 1042, 95 S.Ct. 614, 42 L.Ed.2d 637 (1975) (<HOLDING>). And, the Supreme Court seems to have ratified

A: holding that younger abstention was appropriate while the case works its way through the state appellate process
B: holding that younger abstention is jurisdictional
C: holding that because the federal plaintiffs claims were essentially derivative of the state defendants younger abstention applied
D: holding before huffman was decided that younger abstention was inapplicable to an eminent domain proceeding
D.