With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". over personal-injury suits before its termination, concluded that, in drafting ICCTA, Congress was “primarily concerned with transferring the resolution of commercial disputes from the ICC to the courts.” Stewart, 241 F.Supp.2d at 1221 (emphasis added) (citing H.R.Rep. No. 104-311, at 86, 87, reprinted in 1995-2 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 798-99, as indicating that the ICC was responsible for claims for the loss and damage of goods). The Stewart court stated that it was taking the Eighth Circuit’s analysis in Owner-Operator “a step further” by holding that “[sjection 14704(a)(2) creates a private right of action for damages in commercial disputes involving violations of the Motor Carrier Act and its regulations, but not for personal injury actions.” Id.; see also Owner-Operator, 192 F.3d at 785 (<HOLDING>). In Schramm, a case involving an accident

A: holding that section 303i2b expressly authorizes a stand alone award of punitive damages
B: recognizing that no private right of action exists for subsection a violations
C: holding that section 14704a authorizes private actions for damages  to remedy at least some violations of the motor carrier act
D: holding that  1132a3b authorizes the award of appropriate equitable relief to a beneficiary for violations of erisa
C.