With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". U.S.C. 136j(a)(2)(A); Hawkins v. Leslie’s Pool Mart, Inc., 184 F.3d 244, 251 (3d. Cir.1999) (“FIFRA disallows any changes to an EPA-approved label unless the EPA approves the change.”). FIFRA preempts state laws through an express preemption provision, which prohibits states from “imposfing] or con-tinu[ing] in effect any requirement for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from this required under [FI-FRA].” This provision not only pre vents states from enacting legislation which conflicts with FIFRA’s labeling requirements, but preempts, as well, state common law actions based on an alleged failure to warn or to convey information about a product through its EPA-approved label. Andrus, 178 F.3d at 398 (citing MacDonald v. Monsanto Co., 27 F.3d 1021, 1024 (5th Cir.1994)) (<HOLDING>). Thus, as has been widely held, state

A: holding that there is  no doubt but that the fifra term any requirements makes no distinction between positive enactments and the common law 
B: holding that there is a rational basis for the distinction
C: recognizing distinction between tolling and estoppel
D: holding that there is no distinction in the right to jury trial between sentencing factors and elements
A.