With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". evidence supporting the trial court’s May 17, 2011 removal of K.N.D. from her custody. Nor did she object to the sufficiency of the evidence to show that K.N.D. was properly removed either at trial or in her motion for new trial. I would conclude from this undisputed record evidence that the procedures for involuntary removal were followed in this case and that the evidence in the record was legally and factually sufficient to show that K.N.D. was properly removed from A.D.’s custody under Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect and that temporary custody of K.N.D. was properly awarded to DFPS pending A.D.’s completion of her Family Service Plan and final hearing on termination. See D.F. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 393 S.W.3d 821, 830-31 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2012, no pet. h.) (<HOLDING>); In re C.M.C., No. 14-12-00186-CV, 2012 WL

A: holding that evidence was sufficient that child was removed under chapter 262 for abuse or neglect when record contained evidence that parent made no effort to contact child left at shelter and trial court made findings of immediate danger to childs physical health or safety in emergency temporary order
B: holding evidence sufficient to show child was removed under chapter 262 for abuse or neglect when undisputed evidence showed family service plan stated reason for involvement with family was two referrals alleging neglectful supervision and physical abuse caseworker testified to basis of referrals and the record eontained the trial courts temporary order following an adversary hearing which appointed dfps as temporary managing conservator and included the findings required by section 262201 of the family code
C: holding in termination of fathers rights that evidence was sufficient to support finding children were removed for abuse or neglect when previous decree reflected trial court made findings that children were removed from mother under chapter 262 for abuse or neglect
D: holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in changing the surname of the child where the court made factual findings that the name change would be in the best interest of the child
A.