With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". November 12, 2015 D. Benjamin Sessions, for appellant. Carmen D. Smith, Solicitor-General, R. Leon Benham, Assistant Solicitor-General, for appellee. For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm Barghi’s convictions. Judgment affirmed. Ellington, P. J., and McFadden, J., concur. 1 See Hammont v. State, 309 Ga. App. 395, 396 (710 SE2d 598) (2011). 2 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2). 3 See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1). 4 See OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5). 5 See OCGA § 40-6-20 (a). 6 See former OCGA § 17-3-1 (d) (2011) (“Prosecution for misdemeanors must be commenced within two years after the commission of the crime.”). 7 Effective July 1, 2012, the statute was amended such that former subsection SE2d 59) (1998) (same). 12 See Vanorsdall v. State, 241 Ga. App. 871, 874-75 (2) (a) (528 SE2d 312) (2000) (<HOLDING>). Cf. Smith v. State, 279 Ga. 396, 399 (3) (614

A: holding that because appellant did not become a party by intervention before judgment was rendered appellant may not extend the time to appeal by filing a motion for new trial
B: holding that filing of amended accusation that did not set forth new or different charge did not require state to arraign defendant a second time before proceeding to trial
C: holding that an agency filing deadline set forth in a regulation as a rule of administrative convenience is not jurisdictional
D: holding that the plaintiffs waived any right to seek remand by filing a second amended complaint in federal court
B.