With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". the general dismissal motion. Claim 1, under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589 and 1595(a) : The defendants’ association with McLean was a “venture,” that is, a “group of two or more individuals associated in fact,” § 1591(e)(5), in conducting which the Patels (and hence Bijal) knowingly benefited, that is, “receiv[ed something] of value,” § 1589(b), through renting space in which McLean obtained, among other things, forced sexual labor or services from Ricchio. United States v. Cook, 782 F.3d 983, 988 (8th Cir. 2015) (“The phrase ‘anything of value’ [in the Act] is extremely broad.”). The Patels acted, at the least, in reckless disregard of the fact that the venture included such conduct on McLean’s part. See 18 U.S.C. § 1589(b); United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1259-63 (10th Cir. 2008) (<HOLDING>). The defendants’ knowing benefit from that

A: holding that labor or services in  1589 is not limited to work in an economic sense and extends to forced sexual acts
B: holding as to the admissibility of prior bad acts that allegedly took place fourteen and twelve years before the acts alleged in that case that the lapse of time between the defendants sexual acts    goes to the weight of the evidence not to its admissibility
C: holding that sexual harassment need not take the form of sexual advances or other explicitly sexual conduct in order to be actionable under title vii
D: holding defendants prior conviction for assault related to sexual abuse of a minor even though it did not require an act of sexual abuse because it required intent to commit sexual abuse  and such a mens rea demonstrate the offense was one relating to sexual abuse
A.