With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 318 (1987)). However, “not every dispute concerning employment, or tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301 or other provisions of the federal labor law.” Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206 (1985). “It is only ‘when resolution of a state-law claim is substantially dependent upon analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor contract, that [the] claim must either be treated as a § 301 claim ... or dismissed as pre-empted by federal labor-contract law.’” Brittingham, 526 F.3d at 278 (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp., at 471 U.S. at 220, 105 S.Ct. 1904); see also Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 405-06, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) (<HOLDING>). A careful reading of the complaint in this

A: holding that a statelaw claim is preempted and removable from state court if resolution of the claim depends on an interpretation of the collectivebargaining agreement
B: holding that the power of a federal court to hear and to determine statelaw claims in nondiversity cases depends upon the presence of at least one substantial federal claim in the lawsuit
C: holding that if the resolution of a statelaw claim depends upon the meaning of a collectivebargaining agreement the application of state law  is preempted and federal laborlaw principles  necessarily uniform throughout the nation  must be  employed to resolve the dispute
D: holding that petitions for confirmation or vacatur must show how the ultimate disposition of the matter by the federal court necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law
C.