With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". directed a de novo investigative hearing, its order ended all litigation concerning the conduct of the prior Board hearing. In addition, we noted that "denial of appeal now may deny the Railroad an opportunity for later review” of the district court’s order. 648 F.2d 905, 911 (3d Cir.1981). Consequently, we held that the district court’s order was an appealable final order. While we recognize that the finality in Union Railroad arose out of an administrative context, the principle giving rise to finality in that case is analogous to the principle expressed here—that when a district court’s order has the effect of a final disposition which may be denied later review, appellate jurisdiction under § 1291 may be found. 9 . See, e.g., Air-Shields, Inc. v. Fullam, 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.1989) (<HOLDING>); Foster v. Chesapeake Insurance Co., 933 F.2d

A: holding 30day limit to be mandatory and jurisdictional
B: holding that the district judge who remanded a properly removed case where there was diversity jurisdiction exceeded statutory authority when he remanded that case based on efficiency
C: holding that a case remained pending where the time to file a rehearing petition had not expired
D: holding review appropriate where district court had remanded case for procedural defects after 30day time limit in  1447c had expired
D.