With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". 768 S.W.2d 590, 592-93 (Mo.App.1989); State ex rel. Connett v. Dickerson, 833 S.W.2d 471, 475 (Mo.App.1992). The court in Light distinguishes a suspended imposition of sentence from a suspended execution of an imposed sentence, stating “Suspension of imposition of sentence is an entirely different matter from imposing sentence and then suspending execution of it. In the first instance, the person has no criminal conviction, in the second, he does.” 768 S.W.2d at 592. Under the versions of §§ 559.016 and 559.036 in effect at the time Appellant was convicted, the court was prohibited from granting a second period of probation following a revocation that would extend beyond the five year maximum set forth in § 559.016. See State ex rel. Musick v. Dickerson, 813 S.W.2d 75 (Mo.App.1991) (<HOLDING>). As a term of probation cannot be extended

A: holding that probation is not a sentence
B: holding that the revocation of probation and the imposition of a term of total confinement was not violative of the double jeopardy clause since the defendant was given one conditional sentence which merely deferred sentencing the defendant to a fixed term of total confinement until such time as he violated the conditions of his probation
C: holding that under statutes in effect at the time a court may not by revocation and granting a second period of probation extend the total time on probation beyond five years as the statutes do not speak of terms of probation but speak in plain language of the total time which may be spent on probation for a felony
D: holding that upon revocation of probation a court must grant credit for time served on probation and community control towards any newly imposed term of imprisonment and probation so that the total period of control probation and imprisonment does not exceed the statutory maximum
C.