With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". lab in 1988, but that “the plaintiffs classified status terminated when the legislature [in the 1994 amendments] made all positions of the lab limited appointment positions subject to the approval of the Commission.” The motion justice further ruled that, after the 1994 amendments, “as a matter of law, plaintiff had no constitutionally protected interest [as a limited-appointment, crime-lab employee] * * * to which due-process protections attached.” She based this conclusion on her belief that the 1994 amendments had stripped Wilkinson of his classified full-status employment at the crime lab because the 1994 crime-lab amendments were a specific-effect statute that superseded the general, earlier-enacted provisions of the merit system. See Casey v. Sundlun, 615 A.2d 481, 483 (R.I.1992) (<HOLDING>). This Court “reviews the granting of a summary

A: recognizing the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern
B: holding that when two statutes are in conflict the more recent and specific statute should prevail so as to repeal the earlier general statute
C: holding that gl1956  43326 embodies a policy of statutory construction that requires courts to give precedence to a specific statute over a general statute when the two are in conflict
D: holding that a general statute is superseded by a more recent specific statute only if the two statutes are in conflict
C.