With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". order denying its motion to quash a § 1782 subpoena. The Ninth Circuit addressed an analogous situation when it concluded that it “ha[d] appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order denying the motion for a protective order” on a § 1782 subpoena. Id. at 567. Similarly, the Second Circuit has held that denials of motions to vacate § 1782 orders and denials of motions to quash subpoenas issued pursuant to such orders are immediately appealable. See In re Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1993) (“The [discovery targets] moved to vacate the district court’s [§ 1782] order and quash the subpoenas.... We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.”); In re Letters Rogatory Issued by Dir. of Inspection of Gov’t of India, 385 F.2d 1017, 1018 (2d Cir. 1967) (<HOLDING>). Unlike Credit Suisse, which appealed only the

A: holding that a denial of a motion to quash a grand jury subpoena is not final and therefore not appealable
B: holding that an order denying a motion to vacate a  1782 order and denying a motion to quash the subpoena was immediately appealable
C: holding that untimeliness is sufficient grounds for denying a motion to quash
D: holding an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocutory and not appealable
B.