With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749, 750-52 (1st Cir.1983) (permitting suit by families to prevent termination of Medicaid benefits vis-a-vis stepchildren). That jurisprudence includes several cases holding that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits seeking prospective injunctive relief against state actors relative to EPSDT benefits. E.g., Mitchell v. Johnston, 701 F.2d 337, 344 (5th Cir.1983); Stanton v. Bond, 504 F.2d 1246, 1251 (7th Cir.1974). This line of cases seems solidly embedded in constitutional terrain left undisturbed by Seminole Tribe. Reversing these precedents would require a dramatic — -and unwarranted — departure from both the common understanding of Ex parte Young and its historic role in administering the Social Security Act. We note, too, that our holding (6th Cir.2002) (<HOLDING>); Joseph A. ex rel. Corrine Wolfe v. Ingram,

A: holding that ex parte young permitted injunctive relief in equal protection challenge to states distribution of public school land funds because the expenditure of state funds that might accompany the injunction did not amount to an award for monetary liability
B: holding that the medicaid act does not provide the type of detailed remedial scheme that would supplant an ex parte young action
C: holding that the cwa does not include a remedial scheme sufficient to preclude an ex parte young action
D: holding that the medicaid act provision allowing reduction of funds to noncompliant states is not a detailed remedial scheme sufficient to show congresss intent to preempt an action under ex parte young
D.