With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". individual litigation.” Id. To ensure that (b)(2) classes are cohesive in nature, the Third Circuit has explicitly “committed to the district court the discretion to deny certification in Rule 23(b)(2) eases in the presence of ‘disparate factual circumstances.’ ” Geraghty v. United States Parole Commission, 719 F.2d 1199, 1205 (3d Cir.1983) (citing Carter v. Butz, 479 F.2d 1084, 1089 (3d Cir.1973)). In Santiago, the court held that “court[s] should be more hesitant in accepting a (b)(2) suit which contains significant individual issues than it would under subsection 23(b)(3).” Santiago, 72 F.R.D. at 628; see also Society for Individual Rights, Inc. v. Hampton, 528 F.2d 905, 906, aff'd in part, 528 F.2d 905 (9th Cir.1975); Rice v. City of Philadelphia, 66 F.R.D. 17, 20 (E.D.Pa.1974) (<HOLDING>). The Santiago court identified two reasons as

A: holding that this is the rule in virtually all circuits
B: holding that a case should not proceed as a b2 action where virtually all of the issues would have to be litigated individually in order to determine whether a particular alleged class member was entitled to any damages at all
C: holding that all matters litigated or which could have been litigated in al foreclosure action are forever at rest 
D: holding prior order was interlocutory and subject to change at any time because all claims not yet litigated
B.