With no explanation, chose the best option from "A", "B", "C" or "D". he was an actor or viewer with respect to transactions or occurrences that are part of the subject matter of the lawsuit. Such an expert should be treated as an ordinary witness. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee note (1970). Courts and commentators now widely recognize the distinction between those experts whose knowledge and views lie within the ambit of Rule 26(b)(4) and those whose do not. E.g., Marine Petroleum Co. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 206 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 641 F.2d 984 (D.C.Cir.1979); Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 70 F.R.D. 326 (D.R.I.1976); accord, In re Application for Water Rights v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Dist., 677 P.2d 320 (Colo.1984) (en banc) (Colo.R. Civ.P. 26(b)(4)); see also Teen-Ed, Inc. v. Kimball International, Inc., 620 F.2d 399 (3d Cir.1980) (<HOLDING>). See generally, 4 J. Moore, J. Lucas & G.

A: holding that plaintiffs accountant whom trial court had prohibited from testifying about damages in breach of contract action because plaintiff had not identified him as an expert witness in fed rcivp 26b4 response should have been allowed to testify pursuant to fedr evid 701 as ordinary witness on basis of knowledge of plaintiffs records acquired in his capacity as plaintiffs accountant
B: holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing plaintiffs expert witness to testify when it also allowed defendants expert witness who disputed the methodology used by plaintiffs expert to testify
C: holding that the trial court did not err in allowing a witness to testify regarding the child victims hearsay statements prior to the child testifying because ocga  24316 allows testimony about a childs outofcourt statements even in cases when the child does not appear as a witness as long as the child is available at the trial to testify
D: holding that a forensic accountant is an expert witness not a lay witness
A.