Definite imposters as coherent anaphors

April 27, 2016

Speakers cannot generally refer to themselves using a proper name or definite description (Schlenker (2004b, 197), Schlenker (2005, 14)). Proper names and definite descriptions have another well-known limitation: they cannot generally be referentially dependent on other expressions (see e.g. condition C in Chomsky (1981), Lasnik (1989) and subsequent work). Yet this behaviour of definites is not unexceptionable. In this paper, I put forward a pragmatic, coherence-driven account of the exceptional anaphoric behaviour of certain definites, which I will call *definite imposters*. The account has it that definite imposters are coherent forms of nominal polysemous extensions, with specific anaphoric implications. I argue that the pragmatic account is better than its syntactic rival and than several other semantic suggestions of how to tackle imposters.
Keywords: *imposters, noun phrases, definites, person, specificity, agreement, indexicals, anaphora, coherence, ambiguity, polysemy, dependence, contrast, parallel, relevance, modality, presupposition, syntax, semantics, pragmatics.*

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1 Exposing imposters

Reference can easily become a heated topic. The sports journalist Steve Rushin wrote a spirited article about the American athletes' predilection for referring to themselves in the third person rather than the more typical first person. As Rushin points out, this linguistic phenomenon is widespread, reaching other professions and cutting across national and historical boundaries. Thus, we get not only the basketball player Alonzo Mourning stating that "Alonzo Mourning has to make the best business decisions for Alonzo Mourning", but the Wizard of Oz too makes such statements ("The Great Oz has spoken!"), and the list of personalities using similar self-referential devices can be extended from God (according to the Old Testament), to Saddam Hussein and Richard Nixon, to the Muppets and many other fictional and non-fictional characters.[1]

Apart from conveying a sometimes annoying sense self-importance, this third person self-referential device has been alleged to build team spirit and promote modesty among players. Thus Rushin tells us how the baseball player Wade Boggs' father shaped the player's self-referential manners. His father always urged Boggs "not to be a braggart, not to say I I I". Alluding to the same idea, Rushin's article is entitled "There is no 'I' in Steve."[2] The idea that there is no 'I' in proper names but we can use the latter instead of the former is interesting beyond its moral and stylistic undertones, as it seems to both reinforce and at the same time weaken our common sense notion of a grammatical divide between the person features. It suggests that these referential devices are both successful (in meeting their communicative goals) and anomalous (in transgressing grammatical person boundaries). In this paper I purport to clear up this tension by widening the scope of investigation to a larger class of anomalous reference. Anomalous self-reference appears to be part of a larger pattern of anomalous reference. Although I acknowledge that this kind of anomalous reference is a broader issue with interesting social, cultural, and literary underpinnings, my interests here need to be confined to those of the semanticist and pragmatist.

Adopting this latter perspective, we can begin by looking at anomalous reference through the lenses of the linguistic divide between indexical and non-indexical expressions. Since Kaplan (1989) introduced us to his elegant semantic analysis of indexicals like *I* and *you* in terms of their character or standing meaning (similar to

[1] You can find Rushin's article at http://www.si.com/vault/1969/12/31/8266086/there-is-no-i-in-steve-. See also our §1.3 for more examples.

[2] And one also hears e.g. in French writing classes that self-effacement is a standard in academic writing (don't say 'I I I', say 'we we we').

the meaning of *the speaker* and *the hearer*) and their content (the actual speaker and hearer in the context of utterance), a lot of effort has been devoted to refining his analysis as well as to extending it to new linguistic expressions.[3] I am concerned here with the latter project of finding out new forms of indexicality and the grammatical principles they abide by. Can we extend the empirical coverage of indexicality even to expressions that do not seem to be indexical on the face of it? What kind of argument and data would be convincing to make a case for new forms of indexicality? Now, as we suggested, there is a nominal device of self-reference that behaves like indexical pronouns but isn't itself indexical—on the surface at least—and this kind of self-referential construction constitutes, I think, the best testing case for answering our questions. This referential phenomenon suggests that we can indeed extend the domain of indexicality even to third-person noun phrases, and thus that the indexical vs non-indexical divide isn't as clear cut as we might have thought while focusing on the typical uses of pronouns.

But I think that the issue is deeper than our coming to terms with the various forms of linguistic indexicality and that it ultimately has to do with anaphora—with the ways expressions are referentially linked to other expressions in the same discourse. This is the broad theme of the paper. The phenomenon of anomalous reference has been long noticed in the linguistics literature, but because the theoretical interests there vary with the particular frameworks being used, to fully uncover the phenomenon will take some reconstruction. This is what we will be doing in this section.

Several theorists noted the special 'coreferential' properties of definite noun phrases (definites, for short) like those in (1).[4]

(1) a. *Mummy* is going to buy *Johnny* ice cream. (mummy = the speaker, Johnny = the addressee)
b. Oscar is now paying the lawyer who tricked *the idiot*. (the idiot = Oscar)

If we start our analysis with the Kaplanian picture in mind, we might observe that *mummy* and *Johnny* seem to have characters and contents that overlap with the characters and contents of the indexicals *I* and *you*—they mean, in part, something like *the speaker* and *the hearer* and refer to the corresponding individuals in the context of utterance—and we may quickly conclude that there is a hidden 'I' in *mummy* and a hidden 'you' in *Johnny*. The reaction would not be unreasonable. But let us take a more detached perspective and look at the bigger picture: there

[3] See for instance Stern (1985) on the indexical character of metaphor, Rothschild and Segal (2009) on the indexicality of predicates and Sudo (2015) on the indexical presupposition of *come* and *go*.

[4] See e.g. Collins and Postal (2012) and Schlenker (2004a) for cases like (1a) and Lasnik (1989, 157ff.), Corazza (2005, 17), Collins and Postal (2012, 135ff.), and Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) for cases like (1b). See also Jaszczolt (2013) for general discussion.

are similarities between the expressions in (1) that do not concern their apparent indexicality.

The key similarity between the italicised noun phrases in (1) is that they all give rise to *unexpected coreference*—unexpected from a theoretical perspective—and so to an identity assumption to the effect that e.g. mummy is the speaker and the idiot is Oscar. Adopting a term introduced by Collins and Postal (2012), I call these expressions *imposters*: they make reference to a salient individual[5] even if they do not seem to have the grammatical features (viz. person and specificity) to do so. The term 'imposter' is intended to capture a sense of grammatical pretence. It is as if imposters pretended to have the underlyingly different grammatical features that would qualify them to refer to certain salient individuals, in spite of the grammatical appearances that would preclude them to do so. For all their surprising features, there is nothing linguistically wrong about imposters, at least if uttered in contexts providing suitable information. Imposters come out as perfectly felicitous against the right informational background. As we will see, in this respect they contrast with other definites, which are not in general felicitous in the same contexts.

The examples in (1) exhibit two main types of imposters.[6] First, we have indexical imposters (1a), that is, first- and second-person imposters. The expression *mummy* in (1a) is a first-person indexical imposter. As for second-person indexical imposters, we have a first example in the addressee-oriented *Johnny* of example (1a). Think also about noun phrases like *Your Majesty* which are employed to refer to the addressee of the utterance in order to convey respect or, in some cases, irony. Second, we have non-indexical or third-person imposters, like the definite *the idiot* in (1b). I hasten to add that this division between indexical and non-indexical imposters is theoretically neutral, as it simply marks a division in the *role* of imposters rather than their syntactic or semantic nature. So according to the 'role-type' division, imposters are not necessarily syntactically or semantically indexical, tempting though that position might be.

[5] Some theorists (see fn. 25) assume that this salient individual is represented in the syntax. Instead, in order to analyse imposters I will make the more modest assumption that an utterance makes the speaker and hearer salient (see my §4.2 as well as Stalnaker (1978, 323), Roberts (forthcoming, 5), Bittner (2012, 10), and Schlenker (2005)). Of course, another way of making a discourse referent salient is to use noun phrases that have that referent as denotation—and this is precisely the case with (1b).

[6] The term *imposter* is due to Collins and Postal (2012), but the classifications that follow are mine. In particular, Collins and Postal (2012) do not present third-person imposters as specificity-imposters.

1.1 Specificity

Apart from the role-type classification, we can also classify imposters according to the specific grammatical principles that they seem to violate or obviate. From this standpoint indexical imposters are *person*-imposters, since they obviate person requirements. In spite of being third-person phrases, person-imposters get to pick out the speaker or the addressee and so they behave like (first- or second-person) indexicals. We will discuss person requirements in the next section. On the other hand, non-indexical or third-person imposters are *specificity*-imposters since they obviate a specificity requirement, namely the requirement that more specific noun phrases pick out new individuals rather than the individuals already talked about. To be a 'more specific' noun phrase is to semantically provide more information about the intended referent towards the identification of that referent.

For instance, *the man in black* is more specific than *he*. This has effects on anaphora. If we say *The man in black came in and he sat down* we understand the pronoun *he* as referring to the man in black. If instead we reversed the order of the conjuncts and said *He came in and the man in black sat down*, the pronoun could no longer be interpreted as referring to the man in black. This stems from the specificity requirement: a more specific expression, here *the man in black*, cannot be in general interpreted as being anaphoric on—or referring back to—a less specific one (*he*), whilst a less specific expression *can* be interpreted as anaphoric on a more specific one.[7] Generalising from this example, the specificity requirement asks that, all things being equal, more specific forms (e.g. definite descriptions and proper names) introduce their own referents, while less specific ones (e.g. pronouns and 'reduced' definites like *the man*) should be anaphoric on referents which either are introduced by other expressions or are salient in the context of utterance.[8] (If this is right, it follows that

[7] There are several syntactic formulations of what I call the specificity requirement. See e.g. Safir (2004, 76ff.) 's form to interpretation principle FTIP, the morphological and referential economy principles in Burzio (1991a), Burzio (1991b). Safir (2004 ch3) is a critical discussion of the relevant literature.

The specificity condition also follows from semantic principles under the assumption of the condition C of the traditional binding theory (or similar conditions). Condition C requires that definites have distinct indices from any other c-commanding noun phrase. On this assumption, Büring's (2005, 30) prohibition against accidental coreference—to the effect that an admissible assignment function maps different numerical indices to different denotations—entails that the denotation of a definite has to differ from the denotations of the other c-commanding noun phrases. A similar conclusion follows from the previous assumption and Schlenker's (2005) Non-Redundancy principle, which requires that sentences should be interpreted relative to non-redundant sequences of discourse referents—sequences that do not include the same discourse referent twice. On this formulation, non-redundant sequences of referents do the same job as the admissible assignment functions mentioned above, thus implementing the specificity requirement in yet another way.

[8] I will assume that specificity is not a syntactic phenomenon (cf. fn. 7). On the syntactic conception,

indexical-imposters are not only person-imposters, but also specificity-imposters, since they provide more information than the regular indexical pronouns do, while having the same referents.)

It would be good to have a definition of specificity for definites, independent of issues of anaphora. Here it is.

(2) A singular definite with semantic value $[\![\textit{the } P]\!]$ is more specific than another singular definite with semantic value $[\![\textit{the } Q]\!]$ iff $P \subset Q$ at every possible world in any context (assuming that the definites are defined).

You can already see how the definition will apply: e.g. *the American robin* is more specific than *the bird* because in every world and context where there exists a unique American robin there will also exist a bird (but not vice versa). *The man in black* is more specific than *the man* for the same reason.[9]

Unlike definiteness, specificity is a relative notion.[10] In assessing whether *the American robin* is a definite we do not need to look at other expressions, but to assess whether it is specific, we do need to look at other expressions. We need to know what the objects of comparison are. This is particularly important when we consider specificity in interaction with anaphora. For our purposes, the object of comparison will always be the potential antecedent of the definite.[11]

specificity is determined by syntactic complexity, and so e.g. *the man in black* is syntactically more complex and more specific than *the man*. On my conception, specificity is a function of semantic generality in the sense that specificity varies inversely with semantic generality. E.g. *the man in black* is more specific (because less semantically general) than *the man*. But the two conceptions do not give the same verdicts about specificity. Compare *the robin* with *the bird*. On the syntactic conception, there is no difference in specificity between the two, whilst on the semantic one there obviously is: *the robin* is less semantically general than *the bird*. So using the specificity requirement along with the semantic conception of specificity we can predict that only *the bird* can be anaphoric on *the robin* (not vice versa). This is right. If I utter, in succession, *the robin flew in the Natural History Museum* and *the bird sat on a dinosaur's head*, you could easily infer that I'm talking about the same bird; you could not infer the same, however, if I were to utter the two sentences in inverse order. Since the syntactic conception of specificity cannot make the same prediction, this is strong motivation for the semantic notion of specificity.

[9] My examples involve definite descriptions, but the specificity requirement covers all forms of definites. I'm assuming, in particular, that pronouns are definites—cf. Elbourne (2005), Neale (2005)—and thus that they are subject to (2). If we take pronouns to have other types of semantic values, the definition of specificity will need to be modified.

[10] The notions of specificity and definiteness have been extensively discussed in the literature, the former with respect to readings of indefinites (e.g. *a woman*) on which some specific entity (e.g. Mary) is meant (cf. von Heusinger (2002)), and the latter as a way of describing the properties that uniquely identify definites (see von Fintel and Iatridou (2014) for a recent proposal). In the present paper, specificity applies to definites and means something like maximal informativeness, in roughly the sense in which von Fintel and Iatridou (2014) conceive of definiteness.

[11] Note that *The man in black greeted the man in black* sounds dubious under an interpretation that

The pragmatic rationale of the specificity requirement on anaphora appears to be the Gricean informativeness requirement "don't say more than you are required" (Grice 1989). More informative—viz. more specific—noun phrases are assumed to be referentially disjoint, because less informative (especially pronominal) forms could have been employed instead if coreference were intended.[12] Note that this pragmatic principle is about what interpretation is to be *assumed*. There is no guarantee that such assumptions are always correct. This is to say that the specificity requirement is a defeasible phenomenon subject to further pragmatic factors. Some of these factors, I will argue, are responsible for imposter readings.

In line with our guiding idea that imposters are special anaphoric devices that obviate person and specificity requirements, we can begin by giving a sharper characterisation of the intuitive specificity requirement on anaphora in terms of the notion of specificity given in (2). There are two ways of going about this, in terms of syntactic properties or in terms of discourse properties. The first requires imposters to bear the same index with another lexical item. The second requires the imposter's discourse referent to be the same as another referent previously introduced in the discourse or simply noticeable in the given context.

According to the first (syntactic) view, when the indices on the imposter and some other lexical item are the same, they encode the identity assumptions implied by successful imposter utterances that obviate the specificity requirement.[13] In this way

takes the two men to be identical. Yet the two definites are just as specific (obviously, since they are the same) so a purported violation specificity requirement wouldn't cover this construction. To cover such cases, we need to generalise this requirement.

The anaphoric implications of the specificity of a noun phrase need to depend not only on the noun phrase's specificity with respect to its *potential antecedent* (as before) but we need to have the additional option of a noun phrase's specificity depending on the *alternative noun phrases* with the same referent (and anaphoric properties). *The man in black* is more specific than *he*, whether the latter pronominal form is the intended antecedent or the potential anaphoric alternative (or competitor) of the former definite.

Specificity, as defined here, is an underspecified principle. Certainly, the disjunctive formulation of specificity does not get to the heart of the matter, since it does not say when each of the two senses of specificity is at play. Nonetheless this problem belongs with the theory of anaphora in general rather than the anaphoric properties of imposters, as imposters are defined in terms of obviation of the specificity requirement with respect to antecedents.

[12] Ruys (2015, 344ff) and Beaver (2001, 94fn. 15) suggest that a principle very much like the specificity requirement—what they call the *distinctness effect/implication*—is a conversational implicature. They consider a conditional sentence like "If Herb comes to the party, then the boss will come to the party too". Here, the conversational implicature requires that the consequent of the conditional be informative and so implies that the boss is distinct from Herb. On the other hand, Levinson (2000) considers the same type of effect as a (non-conversational) manner implicature sensitive to the informational features of the expression.

[13] Of course, on this view when the indices are different, indices encode the non-identity assump-

coindexation comes out as a notational variant of the implied identity statements like "the idiot = Oscar", which in turn represents coreference—the fact that these expressions have the same referent. When we are saying that the idiot equals Oscar, we are also saying that the two expressions are coreferent and this can be expressed in the syntactic view by giving the expressions in question the same index, namely *Oscar*$_1$, *the idiot*$_1$. I will later argue that imposters involve a type of necessary coreference.

Other options are available, as I suggested. Apart from the syntactic version of specificity defined in terms of indices, we can also see specificity from the perspective of a definite's role in discourse, in terms of the rules that govern what sort of discourse referent (new or old) is assigned to this definite. (It is this latter pragmatic perspective that I will favour in giving my positive account of imposters.)

Accordingly, we can define the principle of specificity in two alternative ways.

(3) **Specificity requirement** (syntactic and discourse-oriented defintions).
   i. Noun phrases that are more specific than their potential antecedents or anaphoric competitors must bear different indices from their potential antecedents.[14]
   ii. Noun phrases that are more specific than their potential antecedents or anaphoric competitors introduce different discourse referents than their potential antecedents in the sequence of evaluation.[15]

We have already said what the indices in (3i) do. They track the identity of referents. The sequence of evaluation in (3ii) does the same. Borrowing a related notion from computer science, we can see the sequence of evaluation as a stack—a *referential* stack. It piles up the referents of noun phrases as the noun phrases come in at us during an utterance.[16] Crucially, the sequence of evaluation also keeps track of whether the discourse referents are new or old and thus it treats the referents that have already appeared in the stack differently from those that have not. The point of the specificity requirement is that the distinction between new referents and old referents is determined through the specificity properties of the referring expressions.

The specificity property of noun phrases is just one of the reasons for disjoint reference. Mismatched number, gender, and person features (the so-called ϕ-features) of noun phases are further reasons for disjoint reference. Out of these features, only

tion which is implied by 'failed' imposter utterances, viz. utterances that comply with the specificity requirement.

[14] Cf. Safir (2004, 76ff.) 's Form to interpretation principle, FTIP. See also §5.2 on conventionality.

[15] Cf. the rule for full noun phrases introduced by Schlenker (2005, 4, 9ff), and Levinson's (2000) M-implicature.

[16] For related views, see Bittner (2001), Dekker (1994), Muskens (1996), Schlenker (2005).

the specificity and the person conditions seem to be systematically obviated. And it is then that definites receive specificity- and person-imposter interpretations, with the associated coreference readings rather than disjoint reference readings.

1.2 Person

Person features on pronouns impose requirements on their referents. In formal semantics these requirements are cast as presuppositions—that is, conditions on these expressions' having a semantic value at all. The condition that first person pronouns have to meet in order to pick out a referent is that they refer to the speaker or author of the utterance. Similarly, second person pronouns must refer to the hearer or addressee of an utterance. And third person pronouns must refer to someone (or something) that is neither the speaker nor the hearer of the utterance.

(4) a. $[\![1p]\!]^{g,c} = \lambda x\ .x$ if x is the speaker in c; undefined otherwise.
b. $[\![2p]\!]^{g,c} = \lambda x\ .x$ if x is the hearer in c; undefined otherwise.
c. $[\![3p]\!]^{g,c} = \lambda x\ .x$ if x is different from the speaker or the hearer in c; undefined otherwise.

The *if* -clauses in these definitions represent the presuppositional requirements on the referents of the noun phrases having person features. Pronouns come with indices and these indices—the arguments of assignment functions—are another kind of constraint on the referents of pronouns. Since pronouns and other noun phrases happen to enter anaphoric relations, their person requirements (like their specificity requirements) will constrain these anaphoric relations, including the shape their antecedent expressions must have.

We can use the definition of person features to formulate the corresponding person requirements on anaphora, as we did for the case of specificity. According to person (agreement) requirements there should be agreement in person features between the antecedent and the anaphor (whether we conceive of anaphors as driven by syntactic or discourse rules). If the antecedent and the anaphor need to share their person features, then indexical imposters will appear to violate this requirement, since they disagree with their antecedents.

There are several ways in which the definitions in (4) are not exact, but for understanding imposters it is crucial that these requirements are not set in stone and that they can be defeated in certain conditions. Among these conditions, there will be those that give birth to indexical imposters.[17]

[17] Kratzer (2009) argues that a better theory of pronominal agreement and binding can be had by

1.3 Successful imposters vs failed imposters

It is worth noting that the imposters mentioned in (1) are not isolated cases. Here are a few more examples of indexical imposters (5) and third-person imposters (6).[18] Bear in mind in reading these examples that I am using coindexation and identity statements to represent syntactic or discourse anaphora indiscriminately.

(5) a. *The author* (= the speaker/writer) finds the literature on the subject unsatisfactory.
b. *The semanticist* (= the addressee) forgot her syntax 1.01?!
c. Hamlet$_1$ to Laertes$_2$: Was't *Hamlet*$_1$ wrong'd *Laertes*$_2$?[19]
d. Jesus$_1$: Labor for food that endures to eternal life, which *the Son of Man*$_1$ will give to you (John 6:27)
e. Here's one thing people don't know about *Herman Cain*$_1$: I$_1$'m in it to win it.[20]
f. I$_1$ wanted to do what was best for *LeBron James*$_1$ and what *LeBron James* was going to do to make him happy.[21]

(6) a. James Madison$_1$ took the floor, but almost nobody could see *the little president*$_1$. (James Madison = the little president)
b. One thief distracted John$_1$, and the other poached *the nice man*$_1$.

c. Queen Elizabeth reigned throughout Blair's office as British Prime Minister. She$_1$ became exasperated with the policies of the Prime Minister

giving up the assumption that there are third person features. Moreover, when combined with number features, person features do not—of course—require the relevant denotation to be identical to any unique person (be that the speaker, the hearer, or someone else); rather this denotation has to include the speaker. Kratzer points out that even this latter 'inclusion' condition is inadequate, since utterances of the first person plural pronoun *we* need not include the speaker. For instance, *We eat a lot of meat* may be felicitously uttered by a vegetarian speaking on behalf of their community. I think that my account will be compatible with Kratzer's observations, for even if the so-called 'third person' features are not in fact person features, we want an account of how these features are defeated in the context of imposter utterances. Moreover, the plural *we* whose denotation does not include the speaker is itself a case of imposterhood, so the current account, if correct, can be extended from singular noun phrases to plural noun phrases.

[18] The phenomenon exhibited in (5) is typically called *illeism*, which in our terminology is just a species of imposter: first-person indexical imposters. It is very popular with politicians and athletes, and is sometimes taken to express narcissism. Illeism was used as literary device by Shakespeare (Viswanathan (1969)). It has many occurrences in the Bible as well (Elledge (2015)). For examples, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Illeism and http://grammar.about.com/od/il/g/illeismterm.htm. See also the Language Log discussion at http://itre.cis.upenn.edu/myl/languagelog/archives/004762.html.

[19] From Shakespear's play *Hamlet*, cited and discussed in Viswanathan (1969).

[20] http://grammar.about.com/od/il/g/illeismterm.htm

[21] As cited in http://grammar.about.com/od/il/g/illeismterm.htm.

whom *Her Majesty*$_1$ otherwise admired. (she = Her Majesty)

d. Through a number of slipups, John$_1$ (inadvertently) led his students to conclude that *the idiot*$_1$ could not teach.[22]

e. Martin asked [the MIT professor and philosopher]$_1$ about grassroots involvement, which prompted *Chomsky*$_1$ to mention Sen. Bernie Sanders' (I-VT) campaign for the Democratic Party's presidential nomination.[23]

f. Steyer's goal, at his fund-raiser for Obama$_1$, was not so much to berate *the President*$_1$, he said, as to "do the old F.D.R. thing," showing Obama that the green movement was growing, and that supporting its goals was good politics.[24] (Obama = the president)

Here, as in (1), we find the same patterns of obviation of the person and specificity requirements.

A number of factors ensure the felicity of imposters, and my task will be to make clear what these factors are. I said that imposters appear to elude the specificity condition, which, once more, requires specific noun phrases to introduce new referents (or to bear new indices), rather than to inherit previously introduced referents (or indices). Noun phrases do not generally elude this requirement. Otherwise all noun phrases would be imposters, which would entirely trivialise the notion. Once we start to think through some cases of definites, it becomes clear that many noun phrases would fail to be imposters in their contexts of use. We can easily construct, for instance, two failed imposters corresponding to the successful ones in (1). Suppose that, in (7) below, the speaker is a short woman and Oscar is a short guy. Even so, the resulting utterances appear to be infelicitous.

(7) a. #*The short woman* (= the speaker) is going to buy you ice cream.

b. Oscar is now paying the lawyer who tricked #*the short guy* (= Oscar).

Even if the utterances in (7) were made with the intention of referring to the speaker and Oscar, coreference readings would not be acceptable. These unacceptable coreference readings of definites are what I call *failed* imposter readings.

Failed imposters correlate with pragmatic irrelevance, so we expect that any time the descriptive part of the imposter does not make a contribution to the communicative exchange, we wind up with failed imposters. So the failed imposters in (7) are by no means isolated cases. Here is another example.

(8) a. #John$_1$ is angry at the nun who sold *the snobbish guy*$_1$ a fake bible.

[22] Cf. Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998) Corazza (2005), Schlenker (2004a)

[23] http://www.rawstory.com/2015/11/watch-chomsky-explains-why-progressives-need-to-focus-more-on-movements-than-candidates/

[24] http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/09/16/the-president-and-the-pipeline

b. #*The semanticist* (=the addressee) is tired.

To properly state the same anaphoric properties for *indexical* imposters (as we did for non-indexical imposters), we need to assume that utterances like (7a) have a notional or syntactic logical form that represents the speech act being performed. This means assuming that the logical form contains phrases for three types of semantic values: the speaker, the hearer and the speech act that the speaker makes in addressing the hearer. So, an utterance of a sentence S with semantic content p will have an extended notional or syntactic logical form with the following structure: the speaker $\langle s \rangle$ ⟨utters⟩, ⟨asserts⟩ etc. to hearer $\langle h \rangle$ the proposition $\langle p \rangle$. We will return to the representation of speech acts in the coming discussion.[25] For now the key assumption is that the speaker and the hearer are somehow reflected in the (notional or syntactic) logical form of (7a) and other indexical imposter utterances.

In (7a), the definite *the short woman* and the notional or syntactic representation of the speaker are coreferent, although the specificity condition requires disjoint reference. Likewise, in (7b), the definite *the short guy* bears a different index than *Oscar* and yet the two expressions are intended as having the same denotation. The violations of the specificity requirement regulating anaphoric links explains the unacceptability of (7a-b). At the same time the specificity requirement is at odds with the felicity of imposters. For imposters are more specific than their antecedents and yet they are coreferential with them.

1.4 Two views of imposters

So far we have encountered two main challenges posed by imposter phenomena. One challenge is to find ways of motivating the identity assumptions following from (successful) imposter utterances. The other challenge is to find ways of differentiating between (successful) imposters and failed imposters. There are two potential views that one might adopt to tackle these challenges.

[25] There is a long history of positing speech act roles within some level of the syntactic representation of natural language, starting with Katz and Postal (1964), Ross (1970) (Ross's view being avowedly favoured by Collins and Postal (2012) themselves), continuing more recently with Rizzi (1997) and Speas and Tenny (2003) (among others). See also Schiffer (2015) for conceptual reasons to posit speech acts in the logical forms of natural language utterances. This postulation is not without problems, since the speech act phrases seem to be extremely restricted in their embedding behaviour, which is surprising given that phrasal projections are generally embeddable (see e.g. Gärtner and Steinbach (2006), Krifka (2014)). Instead of making this assumption, I prefer to assume that the speaker and the hearer are made salient not by the syntax but rather by the fact that the speaker typically makes an utterance to a speaker (see §4.2).

Collins and Postal (2012) lay out two opposing views of *indexical* imposters that could address the aforementioned theoretical problems, and they contend that the two views also extend—with minor adjustments—to non-indexical imposters.

(9) *Notional view*: imposters are syntactically regular third-person noun phrases with the semantic or pragmatic property that they denote the speaker or addressee.

(10) *Syntactic view*: imposters are noun phrases with a distinctive syntax, and their non-3rd person denotations are due to their syntax. More precisely, imposters have 1st or 2nd person denotations because they incorporate indexical pronominal noun phrases—the basis for their 'imposterhood'.

Collins and Postal (2012) defend the syntactic view and posit that imposters have logical forms like *mummy [I]*, *Johnny [you]* where the pronouns in the final position are supposed to be silent. Collins and Postal focus on indexical imposters, so their syntactic view may be called the *hidden indexical view*. They also recommend a natural extension of the hidden indexical view that treats third-person imposters as having special 'imposter' logical forms like *the idiot [he]*. On the (extended) hidden indexical view, we can account for the identity assumptions implied by utterances like (1) through the specific logical forms of imposters. And we can try to account for the difference between imposters and non-imposters by positing an ambiguity regarding noun phrases. It is natural on this view to assume that there are two lexical entries for noun phrases such as *mummy*: one that gives rise to imposter readings and another that gives rise to regular definite readings.

For many theorists assuming ambiguity is the default strategy. Portner (2005) too posits lexical (syntactic) ambiguity in discussing a related phenomenon. He proposes that vocative statements—like *Daddy, you should buy me some ice cream*—are ambiguous between indexical and non-indexical readings, taking on indexical readings in vocative contexts. The definite *daddy* is similar to an imposter in referring to the speaker, despite its apparent third-person feature. So we might assign it two lexical entries with different person-features, thus covering indexical uses by disambiguation to the lexical entry containing a first-person feature, and leaving the regular use of the noun phrase to be handled by the lexical entry containing a third-person feature.

I think the Portner's approach, like Collins and Postal's, is adequate for many theoretical purposes, since it captures the obvious fact that such noun phrases are associated with *two* senses: an imposter sense and a regular, non-imposter sense. This surely is a desideratum for any theory of imposters and similar phenomena. Taking parts of meaning to have a foothold in the syntax comes handy also because it is easy to

implement; so it rightly enjoys some popularity among theorists in both philosophy and linguistics. And yet the postulation of ambiguity is empirically unsupported and thus questionable as long as it is intended as constitutive claim about the lexical (including functional) properties of noun phrases. If I am right that noun phrases do not take on imposter readings through disambiguation, these stipulations are dispensable as far as the truth about the syntactic and semantic constituency of definites is concerned.

1.5 Assumptions and desiderata

In this paper I develop and defend the notional view, which in fact will turn out to be a *pragmatic* view of imposters in general (not just of indexical imposters). My main task is not to rule out the syntactic (hidden indexical) view as unpromising—though some worries will be voiced—but rather to develop a plausible alternative which is attractive enough to compete with its syntactic counterpart. The motivations for this pragmatic view are familiar from the philosophy of language.

Philosophers of a pragmatist bent have expressed scepticism towards positing syntactic parameters (or variables) to vindicate intuitions about the truth of utterances in context, because it is not always clear that there is evidence for such posits. Nor is it clear that grammar (or our explanation thereof) would be better off as a result of multiplying parameters.[26] In the present work I entertain a similar form of scepticism. I think that it is theoretically healthy to eschew an idiosyncratic syntax insofar as we have semantic and pragmatic resources to cope with the same problems. So I am committed to an additional desideratum: a pragmatic account of imposters.

Assembling our observations about the tasks of a theory of imposters, we get a total of four desiderata. Here they are.

i. **two senses**: the account needs to recover the imposter sense and the regular sense of the noun phrases with third-person surface features;
ii. **anaphora**: the account has to do justice to the *de jure* identity (or coreference) determined by imposter utterances;
iii. **contrast**: the account has to rule out failed imposters and rule in successful imposters;

[26] Cf. Collins (2007), Neale (2007), Recanati (2010), and the observation made by an anonymous referee with regard to Collins and Postal's (2010) syntactic theory (p. 10). This referee says: "Given that the notional view has some immediate advantages for syntax, and complications for reference are needed anyway, I am left still thinking that the notional hypothesis is probably to be preferred over the authors' theory". Collins and Postal (pp. 10-11) go on to document their observation that the notional view is the default among linguists.

iv. **pragmatism**: the account has to cover both indexical and non-indexical imposters via an independently motivated pragmatic mechanism (without postulating ambiguities).

The first three desiderata are criteria of adequacy, while the fourth is optional yet appealing from a pragmatist standpoint. I contend that all the desiderata fall out of my pragmatic account coupled with a standard semantics of definites and a promising lexical semantics for nominals. As everyone should agree, noun phrases such as *daddy*, *the president* etc. do have the imposter-reading just emphasised as well as a regular, non-imposter reading. The two senses can be captured without positing ambiguity by taking seriously the lexical semantics of definites. Secondly, I follow Collins and Postal in claiming—and this is a substantial claim—that what distinguishes the imposter readings from other readings is that they are anaphoric. (We will see why the anaphoric constraint is desirable in §2.3.) But unlike Collins and Postal, I argue that the anaphora is semantic and pragmatic, rather than syntactic. Thirdly a proper account of imposters should determine why noun phrases are not always felicitous under imposter readings. This prediction can be achieved by using an off the shelf semantics for definites and some reasonable pragmatic assumptions.

Tracing the ways of meeting the four desiderata will make up the constructive part of my paper, which spans sections 4-7 of the paper. The negative part is the critique of the syntactic view and what I will call the perspectival view. Regarding the latter, it is worth asking whether imposters are perspectival in any theoretically interesting sense, as it is a common intuition that the imposters in (1) have a perspectival character. Although I share this intuition, it is not clear how the notion of perspective enters an explanation of imposters, if at all. I will remain agnostic as to the best perspectival view of imposters. Yet I want to rule out some accounts that might seem plausible at first sight. (I do this in §3.)

Since the paper is about definite imposters, I will naturally have to make assumptions about the semantics of definites. I take definites to be singular terms with the syntax of definite descriptions, whereby the (covert or overt) determiner within the definite description takes a property within the same definite description as argument, and yields an individual entity as value—the semantic value or denotation of the definite description. I will offer this treatment for two main types of definites, namely definite descriptions and proper names. As the extensive literature proves, there are multiple possible analyses of such definites. I ultimately want to remain neutral as to what the right analysis is, so I adopt a purely instrumentalist approach to the semantics of definites. I suspect that any analysis that can account for the anaphoric property that is characteristic of definite imposters would be a good analysis for

present purposes.[27]

2 The syntactic view

To get a taste for the imposter phenomena as well as their challenges, I will first go through several ways of approaching imposters, stressing their various limitations (§§2–3). Then I develop my own approach to imposters (§§4–8).

We begin with a reconstruction of the most prominent view: the syntactic view. The main task is to get a clear picture of the logical forms of the sentences in (1a-b), repeated here as (11a) and (13a). Let us first look at the more interesting case of *indexical* imposters, (11a-b). What is conspicuous about the way the syntactic view construes the logical form of indexical imposters in (11b) is that the view represents some aspects of the speech act made with an utterance of (11 a) in its logical form rather than some other level of representation.

(11) a. *Mummy* is going to buy *Johnny* ice cream. (mummy = the speaker, Johnny = the addressee)
b. $[s_3^{1p}\ [h_4^{2p}]\ [_{CP}\ [_{NP}$ Mummy $x_3^{1p}]$ is going to buy $[_{NP}$ Johnny $y_4^{2p}]$ ice cream]].

The logical form corresponding to indexical imposter utterances, (11b), exhibits two sorts of hidden variables. First, the 'speech act' variables *s* and *h* stand, respectively, for the speaker and the hearer of the utterance, and have first- and second-person presuppositions, marked with the superscripts *1p* and *2p*. These variables encode part of the speech act structure of the logical form. (We abstract away from the structure that encodes the mood of the speech act, e.g. the assertive or subjunctive mood; cf. fn. 25.) Second, the 'imposter' variables *x* and *y* are part of the logical form of the definite imposters *mummy* and *Johnny*. These variables too are hidden indexicals since they presuppose that their individual denotations are the speaker and the hearer or, more accurately, the individuals playing the roles of speaker and hearer

[27] I assume a singular term analysis of definites (definite descriptions and proper names) along the lines of Elbourne (2005) and von Fintel (1994). Other analyses of definite descriptions may be made compatible with the coherence-driven account offered here. In particular, analyses of definite descriptions as quantifiers (Neale (1990), Hawthorne and Manley (2012)), predicates (Fara (2001), Coppock and Beaver (2015)) or variables (Santorio (2013), Schoubye (2013)) may fit the bill as long as they provide a way of analysing definites as anaphorically dependent. And all these accounts have strategies to account for the anaphoricity of imposters. Likewise, analyses of names as quantifiers (Hawthorne and Manley (2012)), predicates (Fara (2015)), variables (Cumming (2013), Schoubye (2015)) can also provide ways of (discourse) binding names, making them potentially compatible with the present pragmatic account.

in the context of utterance—the individuals that fill in the indexical variables. Thus, according to the syntactic view, the identity between the denotation of indexicals and the speaker/hearer is given via syntactic coindexation. So what are the semantic implications of this view?

Collins and Postal (2012, 38) suggest a semantics of indexical imposters in line with their syntactic assumptions. We will build on their suggestions. In particular, the semantics of indexical imposters can be cashed out via indexical variables (12b-c), along the more familiar lines of non-indexical variables (12a), taking the person features to introduce presuppositions.

(12) a. $[\![\text{he}_2]\!]^g = g(2)$ if $g(2)$ is male different from the speaker and the hearer, undefined otherwise.
b. $[\![\text{I/me/myself}_5]\!]^g = g(5)$ if $g(5)$ is the speaker of the utterance, undefined otherwise.
c. $[\![\text{you/yourself}_9]\!]^g = g(9)$ if $g(9)$ is the addressee of the utterance, undefined otherwise.

The person-presupposition of e.g. (12b) constrains the felicitous use of *I* to denote (via the assignment g which maps 5 to a certain individual) an individual that plays the role of the speaker in the context of utterance. Basically, (12) is the result of building the semantics of person features presented in §1.2 in the semantics of the pronouns having those features.[28] Of course, the semantics of pronouns itself is special in the sense that it construes indexical pronouns as bound via the same mechanism as third person pronouns (see fn. 50for some further advocates of this view).

Collins and Postal (2012, 47ff.) motivate the chosen imposter forms by deriving them from (non-restrictive) predicative structures of the form *I, mummy* and *you, Johnny*. They argue on syntactic grounds that imposters are deformations of such predicative structures. Since my ultimate interest is semantic and pragmatic, I will not look any deeper in the syntactic mechanism that crafts imposter deformations. I will also abstract away from the semantic implications of the non-restrictive predicative forms at the origin of imposters according to the syntactic view. Suffice it to say that in virtue of the predicative structure at the origin of indexical imposters, these

[28] This is true modulo the following qualification. As Collins and Postal (2012, 38) point out, the presupposition of the third-person pronoun in (12a) causes trouble in cases where the pronoun is anaphoric on indexical imposters (which indeed makes that pronoun itself an indexical imposter). They see this as a reason not to posit the troublesome presuppositional content in the semantic value for third-person pronouns. In this paper, I assume that such presuppositions are indeed triggered on third-person pronouns and other indexical imposters, but are then obviated for pragmatic reasons; see §2.3, §8, and fn. 39.

imposters inherit the denotation provided by the variables. We can represent the resulting semantic structures of imposters as definite descriptions containing indexical variables: the x_1 mummy x_1 and $x_1 = x_7^{1p}$. The first conjunct within the scope of the determiner *the* represents the predicative clause while the second represents the indexical character of the imposter and is the source of the aforementioned identity assumption (assuming that x_7 is bound by the speaker variable). When accuracy with regard to the predicative structure implied by the syntactic view is not at issue, we can abbreviate this to the form "the mummy x_7^{1p}".

Similar syntactic and semantic posits apply to the more mundane logical form of the non-indexical imposters. Here is our previous third-person imposter utterance along with its logical form.

(13) a. Oscar$_1$ is now paying the lawyer who tricked *the idiot*$_1$. (the idiot = Oscar)
b. [s_3^{1p} [h_4^{2p}] [$_{\text{CP}}$ Oscar$_1$ is now paying the lawyer who tricked [$_{\text{NP}}$ the idiot x_1]]].

Note that the 'speech act' variables *s* and *h* do not play any role in determining non-indexical imposter readings. What induces the imposter reading is a variable hidden within the third-person imposter *the idiot*. For concreteness, I assume on behalf of the syntactic view that the semantic structure of a non-indexical imposters shares its form with definite descriptions: the x_1 idiot x_1 and $x_1 = x_7^{3p}$.[29] So on the syntactic view the identity assumption between the referent of the idiot and the individual made salient by an utterance of an imposter sentence is encoded in the syntax via the identity in the second conjunct (with x_7 bound by the expression denoting the salient individual, e.g. by *Oscar*).

The chief implication of the syntactic view is that definites are *ambiguous* between their imposter readings and their regular non-imposter readings. This is obvious in the case of indexical imposters. For instance, the definite *mummy* will have at least the two readings below.

(14) a. Mummy
b. [~~the~~ Mummy x_9^{3p}] regular reading
c. [~~the~~ Mummy x_7^{1p}] imposter reading

When *mummy* is disambiguated as shown in (14b), the third-person presupposition has to be satisfied, and so the individual referent of *mummy* has to be different from

[29] I'm advancing this logical form on behalf of the syntactic view, which is mainly aimed at indexical imposters and does not make explicit the logical form of third-person imposters, although it includes the suggestion that the definites like *the idiot* have atypical logical forms along the lines of indexical imposters.

the speaker or hearer. In contrast, when *mummy* is disambiguated as shown in (14c), the presuppositional content will confine the potential referents of *mummy* to referents that play the speaker-role in the context of utterance. (I omitted here the second-person imposter reading on which *mummy* gets a second person feature, yet it is clear that the syntactic view would need to posit this reading as well in order to cover cases in which a person addresses her mother using the definite *mummy*. So in fact we are talking about a three-way ambiguity.)

For the case of third-person definites, the ambiguity will depend on how we tease out their specificity features, which get defeated when imposter readings are available. The notation that I'm using below—namely, `[+def]` or `[-def]`—represents the two features of definites that make a definite liable to or free from the specificity requirement.[30]

(15) a. the idiot.
b. [the idiot x_2 [+def]] regular reading
c. [the idiot x_4 [−def]] imposter reading

When the definite *the idiot* is disambiguated as having the `[+def]` feature, its referent has to be distinct from the referent of any antecedent expression that is less specific than the definite *the idiot*. In contrast, when the definite *the idiot* is disambiguated as having the `[-def]` feature, the definite *the idiot* is absolved from the specificity requirement.

The ambiguity view has it that the two semantic interpretations are made possible by the existence of several lexical entries with different syntactic forms for each definite; basically, one form for each person. What sort of ambiguity are we talking about in the case of imposters? According to the syntactic view imposters encode distinct bundles of lexical information, including functional information about their referential indices and their constituent syntactic features. So the ambiguity of imposters is lexical to the extent that the different readings require definites to carry different indices—or some such syntactic feature—and *also* require them to carry different features of the variables within the definites, viz. indexical and non-indexical features. (This ambiguity is different from that concerning the assignment of individual denotations to anaphoric expressions. That kind of ambiguity is pragmatic to the extent that the assignment function—or some such device—which takes us from the indices into a determinant of the definites' semantic values is given contextually rather than by lexical encoding.)

[30] I state the lexical entries in therms of ± definiteness labels on behalf of the syntactic view, which is not explicit on this front. Of course, these labels need not represent syntactic features but are rather place-holders for whatever will turn out to account for the specificity of noun phrases and its obviation. I favour the aforementioned semantic view; see §1.2, fn. 5and §4.2.

By positing ambiguity the syntactic view satisfies the first desideratum: it accounts for the existence of the two senses of apparently third-person noun phrases, the regular sense and the imposter sense. By further assuming that definite imposters are not only agreeing in person features with other syntactically represented items but also that they are syntactically bound to (or anteceded by) these items, the syntactic account immediately meets the second desideratum, since it thereby represents imposters as anaphoric. To see why the anaphoric desideratum is worthwhile, we proceed to the next section.

2.1 Anaphora and identity

An advantage of the syntactic view is that it meets the anaphoric desideratum. To see why the anaphoric desideratum is desirable in the first place, take a look at the following sentences.[31]

(16) *The winner* is *yours truly* (= *John, the speaker*).

(17) a. *Mr. Meyers* recklessly led his students to think that *the tallest man in the school* (= Mr. Meyers) cannot teach.
b. *Mr. Meyers* recklessly led his students to think that *the idiot* (= Mr. Meyers) cannot teach.

Let us assume, irrespective of the communicative intentions behind utterance of such sentences, that these statements exhibit definites which, in fact, refer to either John the speaker in (16) or Mr Meyers in (17). For instance in inspecting (17a) we assume that the definite *the tallest man in the school* refers to Mr Meyers in virtue of him being the tallest man in the school. And likewise for the other examples.

Obviously, on this assumption, the sets of italicised expressions in each example come out as coreferential. To understand imposters it is crucial to note that these expressions exhibit different kinds of coreference. Insofar as their respective coreferential patterns are concerned, there is a subtle difference between *the winner* (denoting John) and *the tallest guy in the school* (denoting Mr Meyers) on the one hand, and *yours truly* (denoting John) and *the idiot* (denoting Mr Meyers) on the other hand. Both pairs of expressions refer to John and Mr Meyers. But the latter expressions exhibit a connection with their referents that is not exhibited by the former. The connection between *yours truly* and the speaker, and the connection between *the idiot* and Mr Meyers are necessary. In contrast, the connection of *the winner* and *the tallest man in the school* is merely accidental.

[31] The argument of this section is a development of the point that Collins and Postal (2012, 12) make on the basis of very similar data.

You may have recognised the contrast as the familiar one between necessary and accidental identity. The major observation is that the contrast concerns the distinction between imposters and non-imposters. The denotation of indexical imposters is necessarily identical with the speaker, while the denotation of non-imposter definites can only be accidentally identical with the speaker. Thus, it may be the case that the winner is distinct from the person denoted by *yours truly*, but it cannot be that the person denoted by *yours truly* is distinct from the speaker (as long as the expression receives a referential use).[32]

I was being a bit sloppy when I said that the denotation of *yours truly* must be John, the actual speaker. In fact, what this denotation must be is the speaker, no matter who impersonates him. That John is the speaker is not necessary, but that the intended referent of *yours truly* is the speaker is certainly necessary. So what I should have said is that the connection between John and the denotation of *yours truly* is modally stronger than the connection between John and the winner, *if* we assume that John is the speaker. All the worlds in which John is the speaker make the former true but some of these worlds will make the latter false. (I will later propose one source that affects the modal strength of these identities and thus draws a line between imposters and non-imposters.)

Generalising from the case of first-person imposters, we can observe that imposter readings determine identities (e.g. Mr Meyers = the idiot) that are epistemically stronger than the identities following from their non-imposter counterparts (e.g. Mr Meyers = the tallest man in school). In terms of coreference this means that imposters are not just accidentally coreferent but dependently coreferent with—and thus anaphoric on—some other expression, the speaker or the addressee.

An important advantage of the syntactic view (Collins and Postal (2012)) is that it is able to draw the distinction between imposters and non-imposters. The syntactic view has the identity assumption follow from the anaphoric properties of imposters. The dependence of the imposters' reference, on this view, is a syntactic one. It is a matter of how imposters are indexed relative to other lexical items in their linguistic contexts. Since imposters are actually coindexed with these other lexical items, the implied identities are necessary. So the syntactic view forges the needed distinction at the syntactic level.

[32] We have to assume that the modalities relevant for distinguishing imposters from non-imposters are epistemic, since otherwise we would need to count all sorts of definites as giving rise to imposter readings, e.g. *the sum of 3 and 4*, *the successor of 6*. This would be not so much a bad result as a pointless one—as long as we acknowledge that some such 'metaphysical' imposters will not be 'epistemic' imposters and thus that there are imposter readings that no competent speaker would grasp. My concern here is with readings that competent speakers can figure out on the fly.

I think that Collins and Postal (2012) are right in endorsing an anaphoric view of imposters. But although I agree that imposters are anaphoric, I favour a pragmatic understanding of anaphora on which imposters are the result of discourse anaphora rather that syntactic binding. In my view, for a noun phrase to be anaphorically dependent, the utterer needs to felicitously presuppose identity between the denotation of the noun phrase and a salient individual in the context of utterance. I understand the ability to presuppose identity as part of pragmatic competence with anaphora. More on this in §4.

2.2 Problems with the syntactic view

An initial problem with the syntactic view is that ambiguous expressions show more flexibility in interpretation than definites. This seems to run counter to the ambiguity view of definites, which casts imposters as just one of the ways of disambiguating defintes. Definites simply do not seem to allow for the flexibility that the standard ambiguous expressions do.

To illustrate, note that when faced with a standard ambiguity competent speakers can ask for clarification and suggest alternatives that would disambiguate the utterance, as suggested in the interrogative sentences (b). (I italicise the expressions that are—or are deemed to be—ambiguous.)

(18) a. I went to *the bank*.
b. ^{ok}Do you mean the river bank or the financial institution?
c. Which bank do you mean?

(19) a. *The tank* is broken.
b. ^{ok}Do you mean the container or the military vehicle?
c. Which tank do you mean?

The (b)-sentence in each example targets the lexical ambiguity of definites rather than just some more general form of indeterminacy regarding their referent, which is targeted by the (c)-sentences. So (18 b)–(19b) confirm that we can ask a question that targets the various ways of disambiguating a standardly ambiguous definite. Nevertheless, it does not look like definites can disambiguate to imposter readings as easily as they can disambiguate to other aspects of their lexical meanings.

(20) a. *The semanticist* is ready for the course.
b. #Do you mean you, me or some other person?
c. Which semanticist are you talking about?

(21) a. Joe saw Sally when *the nice man* tripped over her.

b. #Do you mean Joe or some other person?
c. Which nice man?

As the infelicity of the interrogative sentences in (b) confirms, definites do no give rise to questions about which of the imposter or non-imposter readings is the one the speaker had in mind. The syntactic view is hard to reconcile with this fact. If grammar endows us with the ability to make these utterances more felicitous, what keeps us from choosing—by disambiguation—the imposter reading on which *the semanticist* is the speaker and *the nice man* is Joe?

Furthermore, the syntactic view does not appear to have resources to meet our third desideratum. It is not clear how the syntactic view accounts for the infelicity of the sentences in (7) and (20b)–(21b), since according to this view there should be grammatically acceptable disambiguations of utterances of such sentences. It seems that the syntactic facet of definite imposters is not sufficient for predicting the contrast between successful and failed imposters, which means that the syntactic view of imposters fails the third desideratum. One reaction is to cling to the syntactic view, while stipulating our way out of the trouble: only noun phrases with intuitive imposter readings are ambiguous in the relevant sense and the rest are not. But the move will strike many readers as ad hoc, and in any event it misses a generalisation, since *any* third person noun phrase can receive imposter readings in the appropriate context. (This will become clearer as we advance with our discussion.) A more secure answer is say that the job of a syntactic account is not to predict the unacceptability of imposter utterances. Such utterances may be seen as syntactically acceptable and, at the same time, pragmatically infelicitous. It is open to the advocate of the syntactic view to maintain that our judgements about imposters track pragmatic rather than syntactic properties. Yet, on this line of response, the syntactic view is at the very least incomplete, since the view is left without the means to determine what is going wrong with such sentences as (7). Failed imposters will then need a pragmatic explanation.

Perhaps just as important for a view of imposters is to explain why many definite imposters are open to the criticism of unsympathetic hearers. The ambiguity view has a hard time doing that. When Donald Trump refers to himself in the third person, critics grasp the intended imposter reading but can immediately comment on or take issue with the imposter use of the name. But if imposters are the result of disambiguation, it is mysterious why comment and criticism is possible at all. After all, on the syntactic view the name disambiguates to a first-person reading with additional descriptive material (*trumpiness*?), and there does not seem to be anything wrong with such first-person readings. There do not seem to be any other disambiguated denotations with the feature of being liable to criticism.

I left the classical objection against ambiguity views to the end. The objection goes as follows. There can hardly be a three-way ambiguity of noun phrases with imposter readings, since we do not find such ambiguity systematically spelled out via separate lexical entries in other natural languages. There do not seem to be any languages with specialised, purely imposter forms. Given that there is no evidence of cross-linguistic variation in how imposters are expressed and no specialised imposters forms,[33] the syntactic theorists' thesis that imposterhood involves disambiguation remains unsupported.

2.3 Polysemy can handle the first desideratum

The existence of the two relevant senses of definites (the imposter sense and the regular sense) is the basic fact that needs to be vindicated by any theory of imposters. Since the assumption of lexical ambiguity is questionable, we need another hypothesis to explain the existence of imposters and non-imposter readings. I think that lexical ambiguity can be replaced by a more plausible lexical mechanism that recovers the basic prediction of the ambiguity view and fits neatly with the pragmatic view that I will put forward later on.

We can see imposterhood as a form of polysemy, namely sense extension as conceived by theorists like Copestake and Briscoe (1995) and Asher and Lascarides (2003, 253–73). A familiar form of senses extension is figurative speech. I take figurative speech to be a paradigm for understanding imposters. Imposters, like other forms of figurative speech, override default grammatical requirements, extending the use of expressions in ways that would not have been available under the stricture of the default grammatical requirements. Competent speakers can pick up contextual cues that override the default implication that a third-person definite needs to refer to only certain kinds of individual (namely, to someone other than the speaker, hearer or, in the case of third-person imposters, a salient third person that could have been more neatly picked out by a pronoun). Thus imposter interpretations of definites appear to be on a par with figurative interpretations in the way they override default lexical requirements.

Lexical semanticists have argued that the lexicon is hierarchically organised, taking a tree-like form. The hierarchy consists of a rich body of semantic types, that place constraints on the lexical items (viz. the things at the bottom of the hierarchy) that have those types. Sometimes the type constraints are incompatible, making it the

[33] One potential exception is *yours truly* which in its referential use has no non-imposter reading. But given that this has a predicative use as well, we can analyse it as an idiom similar to the figurative sense of e.g. *kick the bucket*.

case that some of them should be given up. In other cases the type constraints are defeated for pragmatic reasons. Thus the type hierarchy imposes *defeasible* constrains on the lexical items placed at the lower level of the hierarchy.[34]

Conflicting constraints make for the shifty character of polysemous nominals.[35] Metaphorical uses of expressions instantiate a pattern of sense extension running against the lexical constraints of these expressions. To understand e.g. *Juliet is the sun* in its proper metaphorical sense is to have the lexical requirements—or type constraints—of the noun phrase *the sun* (viz. the 'animacy' requirement) defeated in the service of drawing an analogy between Juliet's features and other features of the sun (which may or may not be lexically encoded). Setting most semantic details aside, it is clear that any account of figurative speech should come to terms with similar kinds of flexibility. For giving up grammatical requirements is a matter of flexibility. Arguably, this flexibility should be located in the lexicon. If this is true, we do not need to assume that definites are ambiguous.

Recasting imposter interpretations as polysemous sense extensions solves the problems noted with the ambiguity view. One benefit is that the polysemy view makes good on the speakers' inability to enumerate the meanings of imposters outside more fully specified contexts. The comparison with figurative speech shows why. Barring our cultural reflexes, we cannot determine in advance of knowing the issue under discussion whether the sentence *Juliet is the sun* is to be interpreted literally or metaphorically. In particular we cannot list the meanings of the definite *the sun* unless we have more information about the topic of discussion. This makes the case of polysemy like that of imposters, since imposter meanings cannot be listed in advance of providing specific contexts either. Recall our discussion of (18)-(21).

[34] Pustejovsky (1995), Pustejovsky and Boguraev (1996), Asher and Lascarides (2003), Geeraerts (2010, 147ff).

[35] By the shifty character or lexical flexibility of lexical items I understand one of two things: (i) the shift from one constraint to another, incompatible constraint, e.g. shifting *London* from the 'population' to the 'set of buildings' sense; and (ii) the overriding (or defeasibility) of a lexical feature for the communicational purposes at hand, e.g. for metaphorical purposes. The second sense (viz. sense extension) is discussed in the text below. Relevant to (i) is Chomsky (2000) 's observation about the typical referential uses of proper names like *London*. "Referring to London," Chomsky points out "we can be talking about a location or area, people who sometimes live there, the air above it (but not too high), buildings, institutions, etc., *in various combinations* [my emphasis]." The point is that we talk about these different things in various combinations *at the same time*. It should be clear that when we talk in the same breath about e.g. London *qua* population and London *qua* collection of buildings some of the lexical features of *London* should be shifted, since many properties of buildings will not hold of humans, and (vice-versa) many properties of humans will not hold of buildings. Chomsky argues that this referential shiftyness of linguistic expressions is at odds with the idea that reference should play an explanatory role in linguistic theory. But here it is the very datum of shiftyness that is crucial.

Another advantage of the polysemy view is that it can account for some of the semantic and pragmatic effects of imposters that stem from their third-person features. Imposters keep on wearing their third-person garb without behaving semantically as if they were third-person. Yet some traces of their third-personality remain. It is important that we notice when e.g. LeBron James (or Donald Trump) refers to himself using his name rather than an indexical. Why is he talking about himself in the third person? Is he a narcissist? Plausibly, we notice it not because we disambiguate the name and pick between the two genuine senses ending up favouring the indexical sense and disregarding the third-person sense, but we notice it because LeBron James refers to himself *despite* the third-person feature of his name (which makes it suitable for reference to a person other than those engaged in conversation).

This means that we can answer the 'unsympathetic hearer' objection that imposter utterances are open to the criticism or comments of unsympathetic audiences (see §2.1). The ambiguity view cannot explain this without stipulation. If a word (e.g. *bank*) means two things and a person coherently means one of them by using the word, it doesn't look like that particular disambiguation is open to criticism, even from the most cynical of interlocutors. Although some cynicism is still required on the part of the unsympathetic hearer, polysemous extensions are crucially different.

Take e.g. the sentence *I followed him moving away until he turned into a dot*. We can hear a cynical critic retorting *What? That's impossible … a person cannot turn into a dot*.[36] Certainly, the intended meaning is an extension of the meaning that the critic exploits. It is, at the very least, an extension from properties of inanimate objects to animate ones. Living things can hardly turn into dots. The critic refuses to adjust to the intended extension. Yet, once again, he doesn't seem to be able to refuse intended disambiguations. If I'm saying that I'm going to the bank to withdraw some money the cynical hearer can hardly respond, with the same degree of confidence, that I'm confused about river-banks, as these do not come with cash dispensers. This difference in the availability of unsympathetic comments stems from the fact that in the polysemy case the two senses of an expression can be more or less central (or marginal) relative to each other, but in the ambiguity case no such order of priority exists, both senses being equally central. Imposters pattern with the polysemous cases, since unsympathetic hearers can easier pick up on the asymmetry between these two senses. But the ambiguity view does not allow for the required kind of asymmetry.[37]

A more general advantage of the current view relative to the ambiguity view is that

[36] A very similar example is cited in Yablo (2014, 14) and credited to Saul Kripke.

[37] To be sure, all sorts of saliency asymmetries may still occur with ambiguous expressions, but this would not make the disambiguations that we are in fact able to grasp the object of disapproval.

it is more congenial to the foundational assumptions of generative grammar and Gricean pragmatics. Polysemy is a *productive* phenomenon, while ambiguity is not. One derives the multiple meanings of words from more general principles, while the other simply lists them.

On this lexical story imposters are not grammatically hidden indexicals. Rather, they are simply figurative uses of third-person noun phrases, trading on the polysemy mechanism. Indexical imposters are third-person noun phrases with (i) *defeated* third-person requirements and with (ii) *extended* denotations—denotations that are more typically associated with grammatically indexical reference. (Likewise, non-indexical imposter utterances defeat specificity requirements on the anaphoric behaviour of imposters and thus extend their class of denotations to individuals that are typically picked out by pronominal forms.)

Developing the analogy between imposter utterances and figurative speech is beyond the scope of this paper. However, the underlying strategy is clearly more promising. The lexical polysemy strategy offers us the minimal lexical assumption needed to account for imposters, since it captures the basic lexical prediction of the ambiguity view, namely that there are two relevant senses of noun phrases, one of which is the imposter sense and the other—the regular sense. The rest will be done by pragmatic principles.[38][39] We will invoke, in particular, principles of conventionality and

[38] Collins and Postal suggest that deferred reference is a species of imposters and can be reduced to their account of imposters. If we are right that imposters are polysemous, rather the opposite is true. Imposters are like deferred reference, since they both are species of polysemy. To be sure, the two are different kinds of polysemy. It is worth pointing out that since the identity assumption is essential to getting imposter readings, Nunberg (1995) 's *deferred reference* noun phrases—e.g. 'The hamburger (≈ the hamburger orderer) left without paying'—and the related case of what Collins and Postal (2012, 75ff) call *camouflage DPs*—e.g. 'My ass (≈ the speaker) must been crazy'—both come out as being distinct from the prototypical cases of imposters considered here. Neither of the two cases involves an identity assumption. The referent of *the hamburger* is not identical to the hamburger orderer, and the referent of *my ass* is not identical to the speaker. Consequently, the interpretation of such expressions goes beyond what can be accounted for in terms of the bridging-identity, coherence-driven mechanism. (Pagin (2014, 84ff.) makes a similar claim aimed at pragmatic phenomena in general rather than imposters.) I do think, however, that the cases of deferred reference can be explained within a coherence-driven account, but showing this goes beyond my purposes here.

[39] We can see the theoretical posits of the ambiguity view as approximations of the current view. The ambiguity theorists were primarily motivated by the idiosyncratic pronominal agreement that imposters give rise to. For instance, once concern in Collins and Postal (2012, 97) is that the agreement of imposters with first- or third-person pronouns seems to be optional in constructions like *The present authors$_i$ are proud of themselves$_i$/ourselves$_i$*. Because of this optional agreement pattern, the existence of imposters poses further problems for accounts that posit third-person presuppositions for pronouns, since when the latter are anaphoric on imposters their denotations cannot be distinct from the speaker or the hearer. But this is surely not the whole story. Singular definites do no exhibit the same agreement patterns. For instance, *#Nina likes myself* cannot receive an imposter reading. Kratzer

coherence. But before that, there is another set of views to look at.

3 Two perspectival views of imposters

We examined the syntactic account of imposters and we found it problematic and incomplete. We can move now to semantic approaches to the imposter issue. There is a sense in which the imposters *mummy* and *the idiot* in (1) are perspectival, since they identify their referent using significant information that could not have been expressed by regular definites (e.g. pronouns) in the same contexts. There are several ways of semantically spelling out the relevant notion of perspective underlying imposters. In this section, I evaluate two perspectival ideas about imposters. One of these ideas is pursed in the literature on what I called third-person imposters (see §3.2), and the other (discussed in §3.1) is more like an immediate theoretical reaction to the imposter problem, a reaction that has worked to some extent for similar phenomena. I want to argue that these ideas offer unsatisfactory accounts of imposters, since they all fail one or another of our adequacy criteria.

3.1 Distinct guises

We can take discourse referents to be guises or individual concepts. Guises are very much like Kaplanian characters, except that guises can be sometimes given contextually rather than lexically encoded. They are functions from worlds (or situations) to individuals in those worlds (or situations).[40] Since for each individual there will

(2009) 's theory of binding under feature transmission explicitly makes this prediction, which suggests that the agreement phenomenon discovered by Collins and Postal is pragmatic.

We can try to justify that idiosyncratic agreement pragmatically in the following way. In the first case (*the present authors$_i$ … themselves$_i$*), the third-person agreement pattern is obtained via the transmission of the defeated third-person features. Thus we get agreement at the cost of a non-catastrophic presupposition failure (cf. Yablo (2006)). In the more atypical case of feature incompatibility between the third-person antecedent and the first-person anaphor (*the present authors$_i$ … ourselves$_i$*), coreference is preserved but the second noun phrase (the anaphor) adjusts the person features of their anaphoric antecedent. At the point in derivation where the anaphoric link is completed, some speakers opt for agreement with the antecedent and others opt for the satisfaction of the person presupposition (the agreement between the person features of the noun phrase and the conversational role of its referent). We thus get presupposition satisfaction (for the anaphor) at the costs of disagreement with the person features of the antecedent. Whichever of the two situations is chosen, we have a trade-off between the costs and effects of assuming the imposter interpretation of the anaphor, and some people give priority to feature agreement while others give priority to 'referential agreement' (viz. presupposition satisfaction).

[40] Cf. von Fintel (1994), Elbourne (2005).

be multiple functions that yield that individual as a value, such functions can be employed to represent the different descriptive information that a competent user of language possesses and makes use of in order to refer to that individual. Since guises are more complex semantic objects, they can be employed to represent information which is richer than the information represented by bare referents.

A vivid case of reference under guises is the case of descriptive indexicals.[41] Suppose that someone says (22), nodding at pope Francis who is giving his first speech in the United States.

(22) He is usually an Italian and takes himself seriously.

According to the intended meaning of (22), it is not Francis, the current pope, who is usually an Italian. Rather it is the pope—whoever occupies the pontifical function throughout the history of Vatican—who is usually an Italian. The sentence (22) comes to mean in its context that for most situations the pope in that situation is Italian. And there may be different popes in different situations. So both *he* and *himself* will come to have `the pope` guise as semantic value, namely, the function that takes a world as argument and returns the pope in that world as value—in short, λw . the pope in w.

Note that a similar guise should be posited for first- and second-person pronouns. Overhearing the assertion in (22), someone may report to the pope: *They say you are usually an Italian*. Or if the pope himself overhears it, he may think to himself: *They say that I'm usually an Italian*. In these situations too the pronouns would take guises as semantic values and would provide information that is more general than the information provided by referring directly to a particular individual.

It is also well-known that directly referential expressions are not generally as informative as guise-denoting expressions. For instance, indexicals do not have full informational value for people that have no access to the context of utterance or the event being reported. The following sentences convey different information.

(23) a. We had to go to the departmental meeting on *the 24th of January at 12:05pm*.
b. We had to go to the departmental meeting *then*.

If the indexical *then* in (23b) refers directly to a point in time that can be identified only by people who took part in the meeting, then (23b) cannot identify that point in time for people that are not privy to that event. In contrast, the definite description in (23a), which may be interpreted as a guise-denoting expression, conveys more information. A description is the best way of discriminating between unknown

[41] Such examples are discussed (inter alia) by Recanati (1993), Nunberg (1993), and Elbourne (2008).

individuals that are not present in our immediate environment. Guises are pieces of information that enable one's access to a particular individual. They encapsulate the descriptive information that narrows down our search for the intended referent. In this sense, reference under guises represents one's informational perspective on that referent.

This might seem suggestive to someone seeking an account of imposters. She might reason as follows. Due to the richer information provided by guises and due to the value of such information in communication, one may hypothesise that it is guises which save imposters from being infelicitous. Perhaps imposters are okay because they present a certain referent, e.g. the speaker, under *different guises*, which enhances communication in one way or another. Call this the different guises strategy.[42]

Unfortunately the strategy overgenerates. Why can't a definite like *the short woman* be saved by the new guise that it introduces? If no further constraint is put on guises, we are left with no way of accounting for the difference between imposters and the rest of the definites which fail to play the imposter role. See for instance the contrast between (1) and (7) above. This shows that the 'different guises' account fails the criterion of adequacy (ii) above.

One natural move is to try to mitigate the problem by appeal to the pragmatic effects of guises. Take for instance (24).

(24) James Madison took the floor, but almost nobody could see *the poor little president*.

The guise expressed by the definite description *the poor little president* seems to be relevant to why almost nobody could see Madison when he took the stage. It is plausible that only certain guises will be communicatively relevant in this way. The suggestion is reasonable, and I will advance a way of spelling out the sense of communicative relevance exhibited by (24). Yet the 'different guises' strategy does not offer us any handle on how to understand the relevance of definites, and so the perspectival character of imposters does not account for their felicity or infelicity.

There is another reason that the different guises approach does not capture the notion of imposter. We have argued in §2.1 that the italicised noun phrases in utterances like 'Are you *Ted*?' and '*The winner* was yours truly' cannot be imposters. Yet if all we have to rely on in explaining imposters is distinct guises, we remain without the

[42] For similar strategies advanced to solve different problems with anaphora, see Büring (2005, 118ff.), Heim (2011, 204ff), Heim (1998), Reinhart (2006, 165ff.), Schlenker (2004a), Schlenker (2005, 7). In fact, Schlenker (2005, 15, fn. 15) adopts precisely this strategy to tackle an imposter reading of a temporal expression, but he does not offer a systematic account of the availability guise-valued imposter readings of such expressions.

resources needed to explain the difference between noun phrases such as *Ted* and *the winner*, and imposters such as *yours truly*. It is clear that the denotations of these phrases are distinct guises (different from the addressee or the speaker), and since these phrases may well refer to salient individuals (e.g. the speaker or the hearer), they may end up coreferring with an indexical or imposter. Still, even in such cases, these expressions would not themselves be imposters.

This is because imposters *necessarily* refer to the salient individual they were intended to pick out (e.g. the speaker), i.e., they refer to that individual in any context of utterance. (Indeed they share this feature with indexicals, this being one of the main motivations for the hidden indexical view.) When one is saying *Yours truly had a nice vacation*, the imposter *yours truly* necessarily depends as to its referent on who the speaker is. In contrast, the sentences above are cases of accidental coreference, which are by definition cases where utterances of the noun phrases (e.g. *Ted* and *the winner*) may pick out referents different from the present ones. So it is not necessary that if I utter the sentence 'The winner was yours truly', *the winner* refers to me, while it *is* necessary that the imposter *yours truly* does. See §2.1 for further discussion. Arguably, the same necessary connection occurs with third-person definites that occur in utterances under imposter readings. I will capture the sense of necessity behind imposter utterances by positing that imposters have denotations that are anaphorically dependent on (rather than just coreferential with) a salient individual. As I argue in §4 imposters are a species of discourse anaphors.

Since the different guises strategy does not delineate the definite imposters such as *yours truly* from the non-imposter definites like *the winner*, the strategy fails on both criteria of adequacy (ii-iii). It does not account for the anaphoricity of imposters and fails to dissociate imposters from failed imposters.

3.2 Subjective perspectives

The 'different guises' strategy is driven by the familiar idea that different descriptive information can end up picking out the same salient individual at a possible world. Another perspectival view links imposters not to different descriptions of the same individual, but rather to *subjective* perspectives on—and descriptions of—that individual. A subjective perspective is a special kind of descriptive information, that only specific parties in communication can adopt. Subjective guises are those used, in contexts, by a unique person (and not by others) for the purposes of identifying a salient individual.

Typically, such perspectival information reflects the subjective attitude of the speaker.

Mary notices that she was short-changed, but it is too late. She has already boarded the bus. *The bastard tricked me*, she tells her friend thinking about the shop assistant who short-changed her. In this way Mary expresses her negative subjective attitude about the referent of *the bastard* in addition to asserting the proposition that the referent in question, the shop assistant, tricked her.[43] Her friend may grasp all there is to the meaning of Mary's utterance, but still she may not fully endorse it. Mary may have been too quick in jumping to the conclusion that the shop assistant fooled her. Her friend doesn't think that shop assistant is a bastard. That negative perspective is only Mary's.

Phrases like *the bastard*, *the idiot*, *the poor little president* are called expressives or epithets, and, in our terms, they express subjective perspectives.

Noting the expressive character of imposters like *the idiot* in (1b), one may try to capture imposters through their expressive character. The expressive strategy would have limited coverage though. Imposters do *not* need to be expressives. This is clear for the case of first-person imposters like the one in (1a), but the claim generalises to any indexical imposter. Think of John, a philosopher, talking to Sally, a semanticist. John utters the following sentences.

(25) a. *The semanticist* forgot her syntax 1.01. (the semanticist = Sally, the addressee)
b. *The philosopher* is overwhelmed by strings of lambdas. (the philosopher = John, the speaker)

It seems that the definites *the semanticist* and *the philosopher* may felicitously refer to Sally and John in the minimal context provided.[44]

Then one may try to defend the more modest claim that *third-person* imposters are expressives. However, third-person imposters do not need to be expressive either. Here is a non-expressive version of (24), involving a (non-expressive) third-person imposter:

(26) James Madison took the floor, but almost nobody could see *the little president*. (the little president = James Madison)

It is easy to see that *the little president* may felicitously refer to James Madison himself. So the explanation of indexical or third-person imposters should not be tied to their expressive character.

[43] The subjective attitude is typically considered to be semantically independent from what is said with an utterance (its truth conditional content). See e.g. Corazza (2005), Horn (2013), Potts (2005).

[44] See e.g. Jaszczolt (2013) for a more comprehensive discussion of expressions referring to the speaker (including what I have called indexical imposters).

Some theorists favour another way of drawing a link between imposters and expressions conveying subjective attitudes. The link is based on a contrast between the so-called *de se* pronouns and certain imposters. Suppose someone tells me that I have a red 'thing' on my nose. Realising that wearing a clown nose is just a tad too bizarre, I try to justify myself by saying this.

(27) I know I have a red thing on my nose. It's the Red Nose Day!

The embedded pronouns *I* and *my* are *de se* pronouns. The agent of the knowing state, *I*, is aware that the referent of the embedded pronouns (*I* and *my*) are referring to that very agent rather than any other person. But how can I, as the agent of an attitude, fail to know *that*? Well, I'm not omniscient and some things can escape me, including things about the identity of certain pronouns' referents, even when some such referent is me. So we can imagine contexts where I don't know that my nose is painted with a thick red ink, since my room mates have played a summer camp prank on me. By watching a blurry CCTV footage, I can even come to know that there is someone among us summer camp fellows that has a red nose, without realising that I am the victim. Then on being informed that my nose is red, I can report my previous thoughts in a way parallel to (27): I didn't know that I (rather than another) had a red nose, although I knew that a certain person (who turned out to be me) had a red nose. So if I just say *In a sense, I knew that I had a red thing on my nose*, the embedded pronouns are not *de se*, even if the states of affairs being described seem to be essentially the same as when the pronouns are *de se*.

So *de se* pronouns within the scope of attitude verbs express self-awareness on the part of the agent having the attitude, given that she is the referent of the *de se* pronoun. They convey that a person is aware that she is having an attitude about herself rather than about what she takes to be another person. There are sophisticated theories of *de se* attitudes that go in much detail about what distinguishes such attitudes from others.[45] Here though we are only concerned with a contrast between *de se* meanings and expressive meanings that will help us relate self-awareness to imposterhood.

Several authors remarked that *de se* pronouns are in complimentary distribution with third-person imposter epithets when they are in the scope of logophoric predicates such as *say*, *ask*, *agree*, *think*, *want*, *be happy*, *be proud*, *know*, *see that* and the like (Dubinsky and Hamilton (1998), Corazza (2005, 29), and Collins and Postal (2012, 135ff.)). Here are examples from Corazza (2005) that illustrate the pattern. To emphasise that the contrast is between imposter and pronouns under readings that imply self-awareness (which are triggered, according to this account, by a logophoric predicate), I use the "de se" superscript on the relevant noun phrases.

[45] See e.g. Lewis (1979), Chierchia (1989), Anand (2006), and Ninan (2010).

(28) a. John$_1$ run over a man who was trying to give the *idiot*$_1$/*#him*$^{\text{de se}}{}_1$ directions.
b. John$_1$ told us of a man who was trying to give *#the idiot*$^{\text{de se}}{}_1$/*him*$^{\text{de se}}{}_1$ directions.

(29) a. Marvin$_1$ claims that *#the bastard*$^{\text{de se}}{}_1$/*he*$^{\text{de se}}{}_1$ was honest.
b. John$_1$ thinks that I admire *#the idiot*$^{\text{de se}}{}_1$/*him*$^{\text{de se}}{}_1$.

We can see that expressive imposters are allowed in grammatical configurations where *de se* pronouns are not allowed, and, vice-versa, *de se* pronouns are allowed where expressive imposters are not allowed. So the generalisation seems to be that one cannot take expressive, self-aware attitudes towards oneself in using the expressive definite (e.g. *the idiot* or *the bastard*), if the expressive is understood as refering to the agent of the attitude (e.g. *John* or *Marvin*). The generalisation can be stated as an *anti-logophoricity* constraint on expressive imposters: expressive imposters, unlike *de se* pronouns, are not allowed in the scope of logophoric verbs. This constraint forges a negative link between expressiveness and imposterhood.

A *prima facie* advantage for this perspectival view is that it seems to extend favourably to indexical imposters, thus ruling out expressive forms of such imposters. Expressive indexical imposters do not seem to be available. On the face of it, we cannot use an expression like *the super-nice person* or *the bastard* in uttering things about ourselves or our interlocutors. This means, perhaps surprisingly, that a person must take a detached non-expressive perspective when referring (back) to oneself or one's interlocutors. We thus seem to have a perspectival hypothesis covering epithet imposters in general.[46]

This is all very well but independently of whether or not epithets are anti-logophoric,

[46] Perhaps a more secure generalisation would be that the anti-logophoric constraint holds in environments that do not involve quotation (or similar perspectival devices, e.g. free indirect speech). In environments that allow for quotation, it does seem acceptable to interpret epithet imposters as implying self-awareness.

(30) a. Marvin thinks he can be a bastard sometimes, but he is always direct and he doesn't tell lies. He may offend people, as he did today. But… Marvin$_1$ claims that *the bastard*$_1$ was honest.
b. John thinks that he can be an idiot sometimes, but he also realises he is a charming person, and a very talented artist. That's why… John$_1$ thinks that I admire *the idiot*$_1$.

Similar data are explicitly provided by Maier (2015, 349) as instances of free indirect discourse.

But I think that not even this qualification helps. There are clear instances of expressive imposters. When the author of the 34th Psalm says *This poor man cried, and the Lord heard him, and saved him out of all his troubles* the definite *this poor man* refers to him and thus is an expressive imposter. See https://www.biblegateway.com/passage/?search=Psalm+34&version=KJV for references to this (the King James version) and alternate translations of the Psalm.

the perspectival view does not quite explain imposters, since it fails on two of our criteria of adequacy. The view does not explain (i) why not all definites (including epithet definites) are coreferential in examples like (7) . Recall that one of the tasks is to explain why some definites fail to be imposters. But definites like *the short woman* and *the short guy* cannot freely refer to the speaker, the hearer or some other salient person. Note also that many epithet definites fail to be imposters both within logophoric and non-logophoric environments, as is the case with utterances like

(31) a. #John$_1$ thinks of (/run over) a man who was trying to give *the nice man*$_1$ directions.
b. #John$_1$ thinks of (/run over) a man who was trying to give *the poor fellow*$_1$ directions.

whereby the epithets cannot be felicitously used to refer back to John, no matter whether the verb is logophoric or not. Thus we encounter again cases where the definites in question are not communicatively relevant, and yet the perspectival view remains silent on what it is that confers communicative relevance on definites.

Even in cases that are favourable to the perspectival view, nothing in this view suggests (ii) how—viz. through what mechanism—the epithets that succeed in coreferring *get* to corefer. The perspectival view takes the form of a possibility claim: imposters *can* only appear in environments that do not involve self-awareness. The possibility claim cannot offer any grip on why—and how—imposters get to refer to a salient individual (e.g. the speaker). It just puts forward a constraint on this referential pattern. So it seems that the perspectival view does not answer any of our starting questions.[47]

To sum up the discussion so far, in §2 we found fault with the ambiguity claim following from the syntactic view and suggested that a semantic or pragmatic account would better bear out our data and desiderata. In §3 we turned to semantic approaches that appeal to various notions of perspective. Guises—the semantic values of regular definites—convey informational perspectives, while the semantic values of

[47] This is not to deny the possibility of interesting interactions between imposters, expressives, and perspectival expressions in general. Recall that Collins and Postal (2012) consider imposters as deformations of predicative structures of the form *You, daddy*. Since the descriptive predicate is non-restrictive, we need to interpret it as contributing some additional content, separate from truth-conditional content, e.g. conventional implicatures in the sense of Potts (2005). There is another paradigm for understanding imposters, namely vocatives. An example of vocative statement is this: *Daddy, you should buy me some ice cream.* (See Portner (2005) for more details on vocatives.) Indexical imposters can be considered a sort of short-circuited vocatives, in which *daddy, you* comes to be pronounced simply as *daddy*.

expressives (e.g. *the idiot*, *the bastard*) convey subjective perspectives. We concluded that neither perspectival view satisfies our criteria of adequacy and the suggestions that there may be in their favour stand in need of a more concrete pragmatic account of the definites' felicity conditions.

The task that lies ahead of us is thus to say more about the interaction between definites and their linguistic and extra-linguistic contexts and identify what makes some definites into imposters.

4 Imposters as coherence-driven devices

I think that an account of imposters in terms of two basic ideas—bridging and coherence—fares better with our desiderata. On my account we get imposter readings by a bridging inference that identifies the denotation of a definite imposter with a salient individual only if doing this raises the coherence of the discourse exhibiting imposters. In the rest of the paper I develop a coherence-driven account of pragmatic inference to imposter readings, and argue that the ensuing view meets the minimal desiderata (i-iii), and, since it makes use of independently motivated pragmatic principles, it also meets our fourth desideratum.

4.1 Bridging identity

Recall that a failed imposter is a noun phrase that fails to refer to the intended salient individual. In principle, this failure can be blamed on either the grammatical or the pragmatic inappropriateness of the noun phrase. As per our third desideratum, it is key to an account of imposterhood to identify the linguistic features that are specific only to imposters and are not shared by other definites.

We can get closer to our theoretical goals by starting with the innocent observation that a richer context saves otherwise *failed* imposters. Note that the (a)-sentences below contain failed imposters, while the (b)-sentences, considered (as they are) in a more informative context, contain much improved uses of imposters.

(32) a. #John$_1$ thinks that *the fastest guy in town*$_1$ is unstoppable.
b. [John is the fastest guy in town.] (?)John$_1$ thinks that *the fastest guy in town*$_1$ is unstoppable.

(33) a. #The semanticist is tired.
b. [You are a semanticist.] (?)The semanticist is tired.

The key observation is that by adding an identity assumption (32b) or an assumption that helps us derive an identity assumption (33b), definite noun phrases get to refer to the intended salient individual, although they failed to do so in the previous linguistic contexts. Indeed, the very same definite noun phrases failed to refer to the individuals salient in their linguistic context in (32a) and (33a).

This change in referential potential suggests that what distinguishes successful imposters from failed imposters is the fact that we can accommodate an identity assumption in the former case while we cannot do so in the latter case.[48] So sometimes we can accommodate the identity assumption ourselves, thus getting successful imposters as in (1b), repeated here as (34).

(34) Oscar is now paying the lawyer who tricked *the idiot*. [→ Oscar is the idiot.]

The accommodation of identity in (34) results in a third-person imposter. Corresponding identity assumptions, which involve the speaker or the hearer, help us derive indexical imposter readings too. So the suggestion is that when (and only when) an identity assumption is licensed we get imposter readings of definites.

To pursue this suggestion, we need a *communicative rationale* for establishing an identity assumption, as otherwise we have no way of differentiating cases where the identity assumption is licensed (i.e., imposter cases) from cases where it is not licensed (i.e., failed imposter cases). There are two ways in which we can get a communicative rationale for using imposters. One, I will argue, simply falls out of the semantics of definites and the appropriate background information. The other way of licensing imposters is more complex, since it needs to appeal to an additional discourse mechanism. The two ways of licensing identity determine two types of imposters, which I will call conventional and unconventional imposters respectively.

(35) **conventional imposters** are those definite imposters licensed via the semantics of definites, and further local pragmatic constraints, e.g. conventionality. See §§4.2-4.3.

(36) **unconventional imposters** are those definite imposters whose licensing needs, in addition to the factors needed for conventional imposters (except for conventionality), a raise in discourse coherence. See §§6-7.

I discuss the two ways of licensing identity and the corresponding types of imposters below, in §4 and §7, after introducing the necessary theoretical background.

[48] In light of the account I will be proposing later, the identity assumptions added to the context help establishing a coherence relation. The failed imposters in contexts where the identity assumption is missing are illustrating the problem that, as Kehler (2002, 14) puts it, "the greater extent to which information [should] be assumed renders the passage marginal". This remark goes some way to explain why failed imposters become better when we add an identity assumption or indirectly imply it.

Successfully adopting the identity assumption amounts to *bridging* the gap between the unfilled denotation of the definite and a salient individual that can become that denotation. This is part of the reason why I take the identity assumption to be a *bridging* assumption.[49]

The identity assumption is part of a system of discourse anaphora. Recall the contrast between the two kinds of coreference underlying imposters and non-imposters. The identity assumption gives rise to necessary coreference, given the knowledge shared by interlocutors. An utterance of the sentence *The winner is yours truly* does not presuppose identity between the winner and the speaker, but rather asserts it. It may well be false. The interlocutor is under no linguistic obligation to accept it. But this interlocutor does have to accept the other identity—that between the speaker and the individual responding to *yours truly*—because this is what is linguistically required.

Since every utterance makes the speaker salient, and imposters are anaphorically dependent on salient individuals, the imposter *yours truly* necessarily refers to the speaker (in all contexts of utterance).[50] A similar sense of necessity obtains, mutatis mutandis, for the other types of imposter. In contrast, the definite *the winner* is only contingently—rather than necessarily—referring to the speaker in an utterance context. And the same sense of contingency of coreference (if coreference obtains at all) carries over to non-imposter definites in general.[51]

[49] The identity assumption provides bridging in yet another sense, to be discussed after spelling out the two basic ways of licensing the identity assumption.

[50] A natural extension of this view would be to say that the speaker and the hearer do not bind just indexical imposters, but also indexicals. See Bittner (2012), Hunter (2014), Schlenker (2005), Schlenker (2004b), for the latter view. My claim here is weaker, as it concerns only imposters.

[51] I would further maintain—though I cannot argue here—that e.g. first-person imposters can be bound to either (i) the *speaker role* (the variable for the speaker, not matter what individual gets assigned to the variable) or (ii) to the content of that variable (the actual speaker herself). Likewise for other imposters. Binding option (i) generates monstrous imposters, while option (ii) generates non-monstrous ones.

One way of representing the idea formally building on the type of representation introduced in sections 1-2 (without endorsing Collins and Postal's assumption wholesale) is to assume a perspective on anaphora similar to Schlenker (2005) 's whereby an utterance makes available two roles—the speaker and the hearer—that can be filled by distinct individuals. These roles and the individuals that play them are part of the sequence used for the evaluation of anaphoric elements, including imposters. We can write these as i_1^s and i_2^h, where i_1 is the individual having the speaker role and i_2 is the individual having the hearer role. The monstrous imposter readings are obtained when the binding mechanism operates on the speaker or the hearer *role*, viz. on $\_^s$ or $\_^h$, no matter who happens to play that role (_ is an empty position that does the same job as unassigned variables). The non-monstrous imposter readings are obtained when the binding mechanism operates on the speaker or hearer role when this role is filled by a particular individual, e.g. i_5^s and i_7^h. On a sequence-driven account like Schlenker (2005) 's, the binding mechanism will pull one or the other kind of representation (e.g. $\_^s$ or i_5^s) to a

4.2 Saliency

Imposters, we said, are anaphoric on salient individuals. In the case of third person imposters, the relevant salient individual is the referent that has already been introduced in a preceding phrase. For instance, in (1b)—*Oscar is now paying the lawyer who tricked the idiot*—the salient individuals that can serve as antecedents for the definite imposter *the idiot* are Oscar and the lawyer. A pragmatic theory of discourse anaphora needs to identify which of these salient individual is more apt for serving as antecedent for the definite imposter.

The case of indexical imposters is different, since indexical imposter sentences—(1a)—do not have surface forms that contain lexical items referring to salient individuals. There are two ways to explain where the salient individuals come form. The syntactic ('hidden indexical') view had it that *covert*—rather than surface—forms of indexical imposter sentences contain lexical (including functional) items introducing the speaker and the hearer of the utterance. On the syntactic view it is the semantic values of these hidden indexicals that procure the needed salient antecedents for indexical imposters. Instead of endorsing the syntactic view we can endorse the more minimal assumption that speakers and hearers are salient at the moment of utterance as a matter of pragmatic (rather than syntactic) necessity. So even if there were no speaker and hearer variables in the logical forms of indexical imposter utterances, it is still pragmatically (if not syntactically) plausible to assume that since utterances are made by speakers who address hearers, utterances make salient the individuals playing the roles of speakers and hearers. The individuals playing these roles will correspond to the discourse referents accompanying every utterance by default. So discourse referents corresponding to speakers and hearers spring into existence as the result of performing utterances. (Similar positions are taken by Stalnaker (1978, 323), Roberts (forthcoming, 5), Bittner (2012, 10), and Schlenker (2005).)

Imposter readings are thus obtained via the licensing of (presuppositional) assumptions that state the identity between the discourse referent corresponding to definite imposters and the salient individuals introduced by a lexical item in the preceding discourse or by the imposter utterance itself.

4.3 Our question is how singular imposters get bound

We are concerned with a species of *long distance* anaphora, including some of the non-local instances of the so-called c-command configurations, where imposters

position at the end of the sequence—this is the position corresponding to the anaphoric element being interpreted. Of course, other views of imposter binding are available.

can nevertheless be bound.[52] Imposters do no sit well in local environments. For instance, John cannot say *John loves the president* and understand *the president* as an imposter anaphoric on *John*. Among the non-local configurations, there will be some that enable imposter readings and some that prevent them. These non-local configurations are the target of a theory of imposters.

There is another anaphoric facet of imposters that will fall outside the scope of this paper. Imposters are not only bound by antecedent expressions but can in turn bind other expressions as well. This binding comes with very intricate agreement patterns that differ depending on the number features of the relevant noun phrases (and on a host of other factors). So for instance, *Nina will defend myself* grates one our ears even on a first person imposter reading of *Nina*. In contrast, a plural form of a definite imposter—e.g. *The present authors will defend ourselves*—sounds considerably better in the same configuration. We will not discuss here how definites enter as antecedents in binding and agreement relations. Instead we focus on how imposters get to be bound. (This is implicit in the way we stated the identity assumptions figuring in our second, anaphoric desideratum.)

Also, due to the intricacies pertaining to number features, we focus on singular imposters rather than on the corresponding plural forms. Plural definites take imposter forms as well. Think, for instance, of the so-called royal *we*. When the queen says *we* she might in fact be referring to herself—a non-plural object. Another example is that of a group's representative use of *we* in such a way that the referent of the pronoun does not include the speaker. Speaking on behalf of my community, I can say *we eat meat*, and be truthful, even if in fact I am a vegetarian. The complexities introduced by plurals should certainly be part of a complete account of imposters, but we cannot address this project here.

Given these ways of circumscribing our topic, the major question which remains for us to wrestle with is how singular imposters come to be non-locally bound.

[52] In a binary branching tree representing the syntactic structure of a linguistic expression, one constituent c-commands another if the latter is sister to the former or the child of that sister. This c-command relation defines the scope of syntactic binding. The idea is that only if an expression c-commands another can it syntactically bind that other expression. As we are about to see, not only non-local c-commanding configurations admit imposters. Presumably, this is because that arguments of non-reflexive verbs are by default assumed to have disjoint referents. A similar constraint on anaphora is proposed in Beaver (2004, 14).

5 Accounting for conventional imposters

I begin with the easy case of licensing identity assumptions. This is the easy case because it can be accounted for just by making the right assumptions, without requiring much further work. One such assumption is revealed by the very name of conventional imposters: these imposters are *conventional*. Their conventionality is grounded in socio-linguistic facts—facts to do with the social relations that are intimately tied to certain words of our language. The result of their being conventional is that these imposters are allowed to refer to their intended salient referent. Thus conventionality wins over the specificity requirement that encourages disjoint reference between the definite imposter and the (notional or syntactically represented) expression standing for a salient individual. I discuss the notion of conventionality in a later section (§6.1). Assuming that the notion is cogent, the current task will be to supply the key elements responsible for the anaphoric behaviour of conventional imposters that make it possible for conventional imposters to refer back to the intended salient individual.

5.1 The definiteness of conventional imposters

Sometimes it is just obvious who the referent of an imposter is, since the descriptive information in the imposter is instantiated by a salient individual in the context. When a mother refers to herself using *mummy*, the descriptive part of that expression is a good clue for identifying its already salient referent. In such cases, the licensing of the identity assumption behind imposters falls out of a standard semantics for definites and some plausible assumptions about the contexts where imposters are used. According to a standard view definites look for a familiar antecedent, the descriptive information indicates the property the antecedent should have, and the relevant relation (that is also responsible for the familiarity of the antecedent) is resolved to identity by default. For instance, the meaning of a definite such as *the idiot* is given below in (37) and is to be read like this: the x such that x is an idiot, given that x is identical with a salient individual a which has the property of being an idiot. The property of being an indiot is the guiding descriptive material and a is the familiar individual.

I assume that semantic statements for third-person and indexical definite imposters given below. I'm using the ι-operator as a device that makes a singular term out of a predicate, and so is a semantic object of type $\langle\langle e, t\rangle, e\rangle$—cf. Elbourne (2013)—rather than an operator that makes a second-order property.

(37) $[\![\textit{the idiot}_5]\!]^{g,c} = [\iota x\ \textit{idiot}\ x]^c$ if there an individual a having the relevant property (of being an idiot) in c and a relation R (identity by default) such that Rxa in c; undefined otherwise.

(38) $[\![\textit{mummy}_5]\!]^{g,c} = [\iota x\ \textit{mother}\ x]^c$ if there is an individual a having the relevant property (of being an idiot) in c and a relation R (identity by default) such that Rxa in c; undefined otherwise.

The key part of the semantics for definites is the relation variable R. The interpretation of the relation variable R reflects two basic theoretical posits about definites. First, definites refer to familiar individuals, viz. objects that were either previously introduced in the discourse or are simply known to the speaker and the hearer.[53] The relation variable has two argument places: the first, x, stands for the value of the definite and the second, a above, stands for its antecedent. It is the object a—which is existentially quantified in (37) above—that is supposed to be familiar. Second, the relation variable takes the identity relation as its *default* value. Since the relation variable is part of the presuppositional content of the definite (viz. the content of the *if*-clauses in our definitions), the default value of this variable is a presupposed identity assumption, which is the very bridging assumption that generates the imposter reading. Indeed, this makes imposters a matter of presupposition projection: the identity assumption triggered by the imposter definite projects under pragmatic constraints (such as conventionality and coherence).[54]

We diverge from the syntactic analysis by invoking no indexical variable (or feature) in our semantics for definites. We simply use the saliency property of individuals, which is independently needed anyway, and the assumption of familiarity encoded by R. If the strategy can be carried out successfully, this is an advance since we eschew an idiosyncratic syntax and semantics for definite imposters. Moreover, although our semantic assumptions are not yet sufficient to account for conventional imposters (even less so for unconventional ones), we already get a better handle on our desiderata.

Our third desideratum is to pin down what sets imposters apart from failed imposters. One way in which a conventional imposter may fail is through presupposition failure. Here is why. If the bridging relation takes its default identity value, we have to check that the potential antecedent satisfies the property expressed by the imposter.

[53] That definites denote familiar individuals is most explicitly proposed in Heim (2011), Roberts (2003), Roberts (2005) and Szabó (2000), but some looser notion of familiarity is built in the relation posited to be part of the lexical meaning of definites on various other accounts, e.g. Prince (1992), Chierchia (1995), von Fintel (1994), Heim and Kratzer (1998). The relation in question holds between the referent of the definite and an independently given, familiar object.

[54] See Van der Sandt (1992) and Asher and Lascarides (1998) among others.

It is clear that the referent of an imposter, like the referent of any definite, has to satisfy some additional properties beyond those required by pronouns. For instance, indexical imposter utterances cannot be felicitously uttered by anyone. Nor can they be addressed to anyone. The agents of the context must have the appropriate property. If I'm saying to you:

(39) a. #Mummy (=I) is going to buy the kids (=the addressees) ice cream.
b. #The kids (=the addressees) are going to receive coffee after the next talk.

I would not make a successful indexical imposter utterance. I'm not a mother, and you readers are not kids. So, figurative interpretations aside, presupposition failure results in the failure of the imposter utterance.[55] (The same idea generalises naturally to third-person imposters, which will then fail when the property that they encode does not hold true of the salient individual that is the definte's intended referent.)

So imposters may fail due to presupposition failure, but how do they succeed? How does, for instance, (1a), repeated below as (40), succeed?

(40) *Mummy* is going to buy you ice cream. (mummy = the speaker)

Assuming that the speaker is pragmatically competent, we have a straightforward explanation. On our view of definites, the definite imposter *mummy* has a referent that is related in some significant manner to a salient individual who is a mother. If sentence (40) is competently uttered with the intended imposter reading, the speaker is a mother. The hearer is given a good reason to accommodate the speaker's identity assumption to the effect that the mother is the speaker, because the speaker is in fact a mother, and speakers are always salient as a result of making an utterance. This is as it should be. The identity assumption underpins the anaphoric dependence between the imposter and the salient individual who uttered (40).

In general, if the salient antecedent does not satisfy the property encoded by the definite imposter, we get failed imposter readings. Consequently, assuming conventionality (as stated in the next section), the readings of definites that go through the

[55] Consider an utterance of *Cinderella (= the speaker) is going to buy you ice cream*. This can be uttered by a speaker even if she knows that her kid is not able to understand the reference to exploitation via which the speaker intends to talk about herself. (Thanks to xxxxx for making this point). This is a more general phenomenon that applies to communication with any kind of linguistic construction. The epistemic standards for what counts as good communication in certain contexts vary considerably; a filibuster will be droning on forever, knowing full well that his speech doesn't make sense to the speakers; even so, he would be reaching his goal of preventing proper legislative work being done (cf. Sperber and Wilson (1995)). In this paper, I raise the epistemic standard of communication to a higher level, and so ask that the semantic content of the speaker's utterance make a difference to what the hearer understands.

presuppositional tests are successful conventional imposter readings. In the cases where conventionality is not a key factor, the good readings of definites will be imposter readings only if they raise the coherence of the discourse in which the definite occurs. What it means to raise the coherence of discourse is the object of the next couple of sections.

5.2 Conventionality

The major assumption that frames the present proposal about imposters is that conventional and unconventional imposters should be treated differently. We thus need a way of implementing the notion of convention, on pain of leaving the distinction between conventional and unconventional imposters look dubious.

But why do we need this notion of convention in the first place? Here is some initial motivation.

A troubling observation about our pragmatic divide between imposters and failed imposters is that in interpreting (8a)—*John$_1$ is angry at the nun who sold the snobbish guy$_1$ a fake bible*—one may figure out that John is snobbish (if one is acquainted with him) and therefore be in a position to accommodate the identity assumption. Likewise, the addressee of (8b)—*The semanticist (=the addressee) is tired*—would presumably know that she is a semanticist and therefore be in a position to accommodate the identity assumption that the speaker has in mind in uttering the sentence. So we need a further condition on imposters in order to explain why the corresponding definites nevertheless fail to take on imposter interpretations.

Merely invoking saliency won't do. There doesn't seem to be any robust saliency difference (for the relevant parties) between the property of being a mother (in 1a) and the property of being a semanticist (in 8 a). Yet the two get very different degrees of acceptability. I think that a better response is to do with how *conventional* these uses of definites are. Some factor falling under the concept of convention should be responsible for the difference between definites like *mummy* (in 1a) and definites like *the semanticist* (in 8 a), and, in particular, for the presence (in 1a) or absence (in 8a) of a felicitous coreference reading.

On my favourite view of convention, the kind of conventionality behind conventional imposters is a scalar pragmatic property—or a scale—of forms of expression, rather than lexical information encoded in noun phrases as the advocates of the syntactic view would have us think.[56] The scale establishes a hierarchy of conventional *qua*

[56] Collins and Postal (2012) endorse the straightforward view that the conventionality of imposters

stereotypical formulations. The lower a certain form is ranked on the scale, the harder it is to assume that it has its intended referential property, and, in the case of imposters, the property of referring back to a salient individual. Of course, we can hardly expect all the noun phrases in the lexicon to be ordered by the conventionality scale—conventionality certainly is a vague property—but it is important that some be so ordered. Here are two definites that occupy obviously different positions on the conventionality scale.

(41) a. *Daddy* (= the speaker) will buy you ice cream.
b. #*Your mother's husband* (= the speaker) will buy you ice cream.

Why do the two definites behave differently despite their having the same referent, with the very same properties? On the pragmatic view, we can say this. One needs additional reasons to use definites that have less stereotypical—and phonologically or descriptively richer—forms (as in 41b) yet refer to individuals for which there are more stereotypical or conventional forms (as in 41a). Hence one needs additional reasons for referring to one's father as one's mother's husband or for using a less conventional definite imposter to refer to a salient individual.

This restriction is widely assumed in the pragmatic literature. Grice (1989, 27) included a version of this restriction as one of his maxims of Manner: be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity. Levinson (2000) construes the restriction as an M-implicature. More recently, Pagin (2014, 77) enforces a restriction on the accessibility of an expression's interpretation in terms of its complexity or the complexity of its content. This recovers part of Grice's manner implicature. And we too have assumed a related specificity constraint on the anaphoric potential of definites, which made definite imposters appear puzzling in the first place.

Crossing differences in implementation, these versions of the restriction all point to a pragmatic way of understanding the notion of conventionality that separates successful imposters from failed ones on the basis of the degree of conventionality with respect to their anaphoric or referential properties and the interaction of this conventionality with the specificity requirement. In short, failed imposters are definites whose unconventional forms cannot obviate the disjoint reference inference triggered by the specificity requirement.

This requirement is similar to a conventional implicature triggered by definites in the sense that it is based on conventions concerning the use of definites. But unlike conventional implicatures the requirement is a defeasible constraint on the anaphoric

consists in different pieces of lexical information for noun phrases, namely their incompatible person features. Since I have argued that the position is questionable, I need a different view of convention. I understand convention pragmatically.

behaviour of imposters and other definites. In §2.2, we have made a case for the defeasibility of grammatical requirements associated with definites. On this line of thought, the specificity requirement (as well as person requirements) can be obviated or defeated due to the very lexical nature of noun phrases. If certain specific definites encode stereotypical reference to salient persons, these definites will escape the specificity requirement. These definites are conventional imposters. If conventionality is a scalar pragmatic constraint, then conventional imposters are those definite noun phrases that obviate the specificity and person requirements in virtue of their ranking high on the conventionality scale—assuming that the other felicity conditions on definites (e.g. presuppositions) are satisfied.

Conventionality is, in my view, a use-property of the conventional definite imposters.[57] It is most plausibly based on socio-linguistic facts. There is nothing precluding communities of users to conventionalise more verbose definites for particular referential purposes. For instance, given the intimate relation between persons and their names, and given the relation of certain individuals and their social roles, it is no surprise that names like *LeBron James* and definite descriptions like *the president* can play imposter roles in virtue of convention. So definites like *mummy*, *the author*, *the president*, *LeBron James*, *Hamlet* etc. represent prominent social statuses or relations, and thus are not equal with other definites in respect to their potential to refer back to certain salient individuals.[58]

I encapsulate all this in the following principle:

(42) **Conventionality**: Expressions have a use-property that marks them as more or less apt to refer to certain types of individuals. In particular, this conventionality property will make a definite expression apt to refer back to a unique

[57] This use-property of linguistic expressions might strike the advocates (or regular users) of model-theoretic semantics as an odd property to invoke, perhaps because there is a felt inconsistency between use-theoretic and model-theoretic properties of linguistic expressions. However, though there surely is a foundational disagreement between the advocates of the two views, invoking use-properties is problematic only if we think that natural language should realise (or be primitively grounded in) either just model-theoretic properties or just use-theoretic properties. Apart from debatable reasons of simplicity, I see no other reason why we should assume the uniformity of meaning properties. (Use-theories of meaning inspired in part by Wittgenstein (1953) are developed by e.g. Brandom (1994) and Horwich (1998); see Speaks (2014) for an overview of the foundational theories of meaning in the philosophy of language.)

[58] Note that endorsing a version of the conventionality assumption is inescapable if we want to account for imposters at all. Indeed, the syntactic view implies a form of conventionality for *all* imposters. On this view imposters are ambiguous between grammatical forms consisting of hidden variables with various presuppositional person or specificity features. These forms effectively encode atypical reference to a salient individual (the speaker, the hearer or a third person) in the lexical entries of definites. I have argued that the assumption that definites are multiple-way ambiguous is questionable, so I prefer construing conventionality as a use-property rather than a lexical one.

salient individual that satisfies the expression's descriptive content.

In other words, if $\iota x \,.\, Px : \exists y Rxy$ is the denotation of the definite e and e is conventional, e can refer back to a salient individual a that satisfies the existential and uniqueness presuppositions of e and has the property P. Thus the semantic interpretation of e overrides any potential specificity or person requirements following from expression e's other grammatical properties. For instance, in virtue of its conventional character, e may denote a even if e has a third person feature and a is the speaker.

5.3 Proper names as conventional imposters

The current view of *conventional* imposters is that the specificity requirement is blind to—or can be overridden by—certain definites which are marked as conventional means of referring to salient individuals. Even if the specificity requirement generally keeps specific forms from being anaphoric, conventionality can license exceptions to the specificity requirement. Hence definites picking out central and unique social functions (e.g. *the author*, *the president*) will be more prone to imposter readings than other definites. More generally, imposters will exhibit the defeasible patterns that are common with other nominal expressions (as argued in §2.2).

So far we focused on definite descriptions, though the account was advertised as targeting definites in general. Indeed, proper names too can be imposters. Typically, they are conventional ones. Names (e.g. *Hamlet*, *Nixon*) will generally be more conventional devices for self-reference (or reference to the addressee or a salient third person) than other definites, in virtue of their socio-linguistic status.[59]

Consider the following example, which comes very close to what Nixon said in a press conference.

(43) Nixon: You won't have *Nixon* to kick around any more.[60]

Here the proper name *Nixon* refers to the speaker, that is, to Nixon himself. There are many more examples of proper name imposters, chiefly uttered by athletes, politicians and fictional (or fictionalised) characters. See also §2.1.

We have all the resources we need in order to account for proper name imposters. If

[59] Complex names like *Bob the builder* (cf. Jaszczolt (2013)) are not conventional in this sense, but get to be imposters in virtue of their additional descriptive material, like other unconventional imposters.

[60] The example is mentioned in Collins and Postal (2012, 1) in the same form as the one presented here, but according to https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Richard_Nixon, what Nixon said is "You *don't* have Nixon to kick around any more". In any case, the tense difference is unimportant.

the above analysis of definite imposters as discourse anaphors is on the right lines, it is appealing to offer a similar treatment of proper name imposters. For continuity with the previous semantics of definites, I will then treat proper name imposters as referential definite descriptions. On this analysis, *Nixon* means something akin to the definite *the man called Nixon*. As in the case of other definites, the proper name imposters refer to familiar individuals. Hence the relation variable inside the definite—cf. (37)–(38)—is resolved to identity by default if there is a salient individual who satisfies the descriptive material. We get the following semantic analysis of names.

(44) $[\![\text{Nixon}_7]\!]^{g,c} = [\iota x \,.\, x = x]^c$ if there is a unique person a having the property of being called Nixon in c such that Rxa (interpreted as $x = a$ by default), undefined otherwise.[61]

As in the case of definite imposters, an obvious restriction on imposter uses of names is that these names and their referents should be known to the audience. If nobody knew the name of the person speaking in (43), an utterance of that sentence would fail to exhibit an imposter. But unlike unconventional definite imposters (e.g. *the semanticist* in 54), the utterance (43) could still be felicitous even when the audience would not be able to identify the speaker, since the audience may have heard of Nixon though they don't know that he himself is speaking. In this case an assertion of a sentence containing *Nixon* would not be an imposter utterance, since it would no convey coreference to the hearer. Yet, intuitively, it would not create the communicative problems specific to other failed imposters. This is the mark of conventionality. Like other conventional imposters (e.g. *mummy* and *the president*), the name *Nixon* would be pragmatically more appropriate than other failed imposters when failing to establish the identity between their referent and a salient individual.

If the present approach to conventional imposters is correct, we have to conclude that the right semantics for definite imposters has been under our noses for a long time. Rather than making special syntactic provisos for definite imposters, we would better assume one of the standard semantics for definites and explain their imposter readings through pragmatic principles. One such principle, I have argued, is conventionality. This gives rise to conventional imposters. I will shortly argue that a more complex set of principles is responsible for unconventional imposter readings. We thus move away from conventional imposters and introduce the new mechanism of licensing unconventional imposters.

[61] The self-identity $x = x$ is just a trivial descriptive condition posited for the sake of maintaining a uniform semantic analysis of definite descriptions.

6 Coherence

Let us proceed with the more intricate way of licensing a bridging identity, which determines unconventional imposter readings of definites. Sometimes we do not have enough relevant information to spot the antecedent that helps us construct the denotation of a definite, so the identity assumption cannot be adopted on the grounds provided by the properties of salient individuals, either because these properties are not themselves salient or because it is difficult to see the communicative point of referring to such properties. We need extra-reasons—and additional inference—to secure an appropriate antecedent for the definite imposter and to be able to make the identity assumption between the antecedent and the denotation of the definite. My claim is that coherence-driven reasoning provides the missing link between the salient individual and the denotation of the imposter definite. In these cases, the identity assumption should be a bridge not only (locally) for anaphoric purposes, but also (globally) for establishing a coherent discourse.[62] It is the raise in coherence which justifies the identity assumption. And the identity assumption determines, in turn, unconventional imposters.[63]

I have in mind a technical notion of coherence. I assume that natural language discourse realises a limited number of coherence relations. Kehler (2002), building on Hobbs (1985), divides coherence relations in three categories: cause-effect, resemblance, and contiguity. Two of the key coherence relations are `Explanation` (a cause-effect relation) and `Parallel` (a resemblance relation).

Before saying what these coherence relations are, some general remarks will be helpful. I am modifying the coherence framework in several important ways in order to bring it in tune with possible world semantics. This is not because possible worlds semantics is so much better than the semantic frameworks assumed in the coherence framework, but because many concepts invoked in the coherence literature have been studied more extensively in the possible worlds literature, and are given a more perspicuous representation in the possible worlds semantics. For all these changes, the coherence-driven thinking will shine through.

[62] By local and global here I do not mean the same notion as the one mentioned in §4.3, namely the (non)locality of anaphora. That was a syntactic notion whereas here I want to draw a distinction between the semantically triggered interpretations and the pragmatically licensed ones. So what I mean by locality here is a semantic requirement that must be met by pragmatically filling in the free parameters. And by globality I the relational property of a proposition that can render a system of beliefs more coherent.

[63] There is an extensive literature on bridging (Bittner (2001)) and coherence (Kehler (2002), Pagin (2014)), and some accounts use both notions (Asher and Lascarides (1998), Asher and Lascarides (2003), Lascarides and Asher (2007)).

I am also adapting the existing coherence terminology to my theoretical and expository needs. It would be better to understand the cause-effect relations as *dependence* relations, so as not confuse explanation with causal explanation. I will sometimes use the generic `Dependence` relation for the category of cause-effect relations as well as for the explanation relation, thus blurring the difference between categories of coherence relations and the coherence relations themselves. I will also shift freely from `Dependence` *qua* type and dependence relations understood as tokens of that type (and likewise for the other coherence relations). For explaining imposters, the dependence and resemblance relations take centre stage, but contiguity relations will come to the forefront later on.[64]

The use of the natural language counterparts of coherence relations, namely, clausal conjunctions such as *and*, *but*, and *because*, are a good starting point for understanding the notion of coherence that we will later invoke to explain unconventional imposters. It is crucial that although these words trigger coherence relations, coherence relations can effectively organise discourse even in the absence of such words. Coherence relations may be *implicit* in discourse and triggered purely pragmatically for the purposes of raising the coherence of the discourse.[65]

6.1 Dependence

The `Dependence` relation is typically introduced by *because*. Take a look at the following explanations.

(45) a. The speaker got annoyed; [this is because] his friend John got tricked by a lawyer. `Dependence`-driven
b. The sugars melted in John's Americano; [this is because] sugar is soluble in hot liquids. `Dependence`-driven

Under a salient reading, the two sentences express a dependence between two propositions. The speaker is annoyed because his friend was tricked, and the sugars melted because they are soluble. As already mentioned, dependence relations need not be explicitly stated, since they can be easily inferred. The inference proceeds according to the procedural rule (46a), given the understanding of dependence sketched in the

[64] The three-fold terminology as well as some of the basic intuitions behind the three categories of coherence relations go back to several remarks made by David Hume (1748), and yet Hobbs, Kehler and others have developed these ideas to the point of making them relevant to current linguistic investigation.

[65] To see that this is so, we need only remove the expressions *and*, *but* and *because* from our examples below and note that they still have the relevant reading.

semantic rule (46b).[66]

(46) a. If two propositions are stated without an explicit coherence relation, infer a dependence relation if this is plausible given your background knowledge.

b. `Dependence`: $[\phi \Rightarrow \psi] = \lambda w.\forall w' : Rww' \wedge \phi_{w'} \rightarrow \psi_{w'}$

The idea of *inferring* a coherence relation—as invoked in the procedural clause for dependence (46a) and the procedural clauses for the other coherence relations—conceals a crucial assumption about the pragmatic interpretation of noun phrases, including imposters. What the imperative of inferring a coherence relation means is that all anaphoric links, quantificational domain restrictions, ambiguity resolution, generation of polysemous interpretation etc. that can be plausibly settled one way or another in order to establish a coherence relation *should* be so settled. In other words, inferring a coherence relation involves settling all sorts of local matters of interpretation. (Inferring a coherence relation is itself a global affair, as it involves at least two propositions for which some particular relation should be established. But to work out this global relation we have to obtain full propositions and thus to (un)set certain parameters—a local matter.)

This settling of the local matters of interpretation will be especially significant for choosing your favourite theory of imposters. If you believe, for instance, that imposter readings are obtained via syntactic disambiguation (as the advocates of the syntactic view surely do), you can also endorse the coherence-driven account by arguing that the resolution of ambiguity determines a relevant coherence relation and thus offers additional pragmatic motivation for imposter readings. So the coherence account of pragmatic inference offers the additional pragmatic motivation that the syntactic view could not offer (cf. §2.1). More generally, the coherence account can be in principle adopted to do its pragmatic job irrespectively of what are your views on the syntax and semantics of definite imposters.

Moving to the second clause of our definition, I understand dependence—defined in (46b)—as the denotation of a Kratzer-conditional (or restricted modal), assuming that the suitable restrictors have been contextually provided. The restrictors, represented here simply as the accessiblity relation R over possible worlds, are an epistemic or circumstantial modal base and a stereotypical ordering source. Nothing here will depend on the details of how we set these parameters and how the two interact (that is why we are hiding them behind the R variable), but it is worth saying

[66] I am building on the general framework of Kehler (2002), and I'm taking inspiration from Toosarvandani (2014) 's account of contrastive *but* to provide a more standard semantics for coherence relations.

a bit more about them in order to understand `Dependence`.

In Kratzer's framework, the former represents either the facts of the actual world or our state of knowledge (see e.g. Kratzer (2012)). I will stick to the latter epistemic understanding for the purposes of this paper. Thus the aforementioned modal base reflects our state of knowledge, which in possible worlds terms is the set of worlds that are possible as far as we know. The epistemic modal base restricts the information relative to which the consequent of the conditional (the dependent proposition) is to be evaluated. The other parameter—the ordering source—further restricts this information. It does that by ordering the pieces of information in our knowledge state according to assumptions of *plausibility*[67] (or stereotypicality), selecting the most plausible pieces of information. By piecing together our knowledge state and plausibility assumptions—which once again are represented by the accessibility relation R in (46b)—we obtain information (understood semantically as the intersection of sets of possible worlds) that is relevant to the evaluation of the dependence relation. In particular, asserting a dependence relation amounts to asserting a conditional which is true iff all the epistemically possible worlds that make the antecedent ϕ true also make the consequent ψ plausibly true. If this is the case, then ψ depends on ϕ.[68]

For instance, if all the worlds in which it is epistemically possible that the speaker's friend gets tricked are worlds in which, plausibly, the speaker becomes annoyed, then (45a) will be understood as expressing a dependence relation between the speaker's annoyance and his friends' being tricked.

[67] Like all theories of discourse interpretation, the coherence-driven account has to assume plausibility constraints. So the coherence relations that are to be established should be plausible. One might wonder if the notion of plausibility—or some such notion—would not be enough to deal with utterance interpretation, thus making coherence relations superfluous. For an argument that plausibility cannot do the job of coherence see Asher and Lascarides (2003, 63–67), Lascarides and Asher (2007, 11–12). Other theorists—and in particular relevance-theorists such as Wilson and Matsui (1998)—argue that a notion of relevance makes coherence superfluous. However, I think that Pagin (2014, 88–92) is right to be sceptical about the superiority of the relevance-theoretic approach over the coherence-theoretic one (although of course there is room for compatibility between the two approaches; see e.g. Asher and Lascarides (1998, 85, 101) and Asher and Lascarides (2003, 75–76)).

[68] Note that, in (46a), the condition of plausibility relative to background knowledge is redundant given the fact that we also build plausibility and the restriction to what is known in the definition of dependence relations (qua denotation of a Kratzer-conditional). Nevertheless, I will leave such conditions in the first, procedural clause for emphasis.

6.2 Relevance

With some rare exceptions, discourses do not just fall out of the sky. They address certain topics or questions implicit (or explicit) in the context of conversation. I assume, with Roberts (2012), that discourses provide answers to questions under discussion. For instance, in interpreting the discourse in (45), we are setting it up in the context of a general question e.g. *what happened to such and such speaker at such and such time?* and on parsing the first sentence—*The speaker got annoyed*—we are left wondering why the speaker got into that state of mind (a more refined question). This latter question under discussion can be answered by filling in a dependence relation whose dependent element is the proposition that the speaker got annoyed.[69]

A question *?(α)*, where α is of the form $wh(\beta)$ with β a predicate is defined in terms of α's alternatives, namely the set of possible answers p, $\texttt{Alt}(\alpha)$. So a question $?\alpha$ and the corresponding issue under discussion will denote the set of possible answers. Formally, a question $(?\alpha)$ is just a partition over a set of possible worlds, a partition whose cells represent alternative ways of filling in the unsaturated proposition α.

(47) `Question`: $?\alpha = \texttt{Alt}(\alpha) = \{p \mid \exists u \in D : \beta(u)\}$, a set of disjoint propositions p that exhausts the logical space W. That is, $p \cap q = \varnothing$ and $\bigcup p \in Q = W$ for all distinct $p, q \in Q$.

The conditions under which propositions answer questions under discussion reflect the relevance of utterances expressing those propositions, the fact that these utterances answer questions that fix some of the contextually relevant factors and thus also reflect the terms in which an acceptable answer should be given. So, for instance, we can assume that the question under discussion that is answered by the second sentence of (45b)—*Sugar is soluble in hot liquids*—is something like *In virtue of what facts the sugars dissolved in John's Americano* rather than *Who put the sugars in John's Americano thus causing their melting?* That sugar is soluble in hot liquids is relevant in the context of (45b) because it answers the actual (*why*) question under discussion rather than some other question. The thin notion of relevance reflected by the questions under discussion in relation to their possible answers will be useful for

[69] I end up saying that dependence relations are the denotation of Kratzer-conditionals as well as answers to *why*-questions, and many would feel that they cannot be both. This is right, but my intention is not to tackle the syntax/semantics interface of dependence relations, but just their discourse role, which is certainly constrained by their semantics. What I need is a perspicuous representation of dependencies, whether or not they are syntactically accurate. A stronger view is possible as well. For instance, Starr (2014) argues, building on Austin's observations, for the intriguing conclusion that conditionals involve interrogative antecedents which are answered by the consequent.

thinking about other coherence relations, since the coherence relata should be not only plausibly connected by also relevantly so.

We can see `Relevance` as a more general kind of coherence relation, including `Dependence` as a special case. Relevance concerns all types of questions, while dependence concerns only *why*-questions (and their relation to their answers).[70]

6.3 Parallel

We turn now to resemblance coherence relations, consisting of parallel and contrast relations. Following are discourses that instantiate the `Parallel` relations.

(48) a. One thug distracted Oscar, and the other poached him. `Parallel`-driven
b. Some monks and nuns engage in teaching and some do hospital work. `Parallel`-driven

Each of these sentences presents us with two conjuncts, and each conjunct makes reference to several individuals. A parallel relation assigns similar properties to these individuals. In (48a) the two thugs are involved in an act of stealing from Oscar. In (48b) the monks and nuns are presented as engaging in two forms of service to the community, namely teaching and hospital work. One of the points of the coherence-driven theory (in e.g. Kehler (2002)) is that the search for parallel structures sways us to interpret the pronoun *him* in (48 a) as coreferent with *Oscar*, i.e., as having the same individual denotation. Seeking parallelisms, we are steered into establishing that particular anaphoric link between *Oscar* and *him*. I will later argue that coherence relations are behind the anaphoric character of unconventional imposters. To anticipate: just substitute a more specific definite noun phrase for *him* in (48a), e.g. *the unlucky man*, and you will get a parallel-driven imposter.

We can define the parallel relation as follows.

[70] As far as I know, the other coherence-driven accounts do not posit a similar relevance relation, but still such a relation is needed and can be seen as a conservative extension of the existing coherence accounts. Relevance relations are needed in order to makes sense of the similarities between the interpretations of the following discourses:

i. He was angry. [Why?] She dumped him.
ii. She found the keys. [Where?] He put them in the fridge.

The requirements on the appropriate answers for *why*- and *where*-questions are similar, so the (relevance) relations between the two kinds of questions and answers should be subsumed under a common category (whence `Relevance`).

(49) a. If two propositions are stated without an explicit coherence relation but exhibit parallel denotations, infer a parallel relation to extend parallelism to other pairs of denotations, if this is plausible given your background knowledge.

b. `Parallel`: ϕ is parallel with ψ = $\begin{cases} (\phi \wedge \psi) \\ \text{at issue content, viz. assertive content} \\ \exists p \in Q : (\phi \Rightarrow p) \wedge (\psi \Rightarrow p) \\ \text{presuppositional content} \end{cases}$

Parallel sentences assert a conjunction of two propositions (viz. the at issue content) along with a presupposition drawing one or more similarities or parallelisms between the two propositions and their constituents (viz. the presuppositional content). According to the first procedural clause, in order to decide matters of interpretation raised by an utterance, we can help ourselves of certain particular interpretations (e.g. resolutions of anaphora) as long as those interpretations increase the parallelism between the sentences being uttered.

The second clause of (49) defines the relevant sense of parallelism assumed in the first procedural clause. Basically, for two denotations to be parallel is for them to participate in propositions that have a non-trivial entailment in common. Notice that the non-triviality condition is built in the assumption that the relevant entailment p is a member of the question under discussion Q. In this way, we remove all the tautologies implied by the propositions built out of the denotations in question. For instance, the question under discussion in (48b) may well be, How are monks and nuns helping their communities? Then the answer given through (48b) will have to entail that monks and nuns are engaging in instances of *helping* activities. In the context set up by the previous question under discussion, the tautological proposition that e.g. monks and nuns are helping the poor or they aren't does not entail that they engage in a relevant activity, so it can hardly serve as a basis for the parallelism of the conjuncts in (48b).

The first clause of the definition, (49a), ensures that once we grasp the parallelism (if there is any to begin with[71]) we extend it by trying to find additional parallel entities or properties. In the nuns-and-monks example, the extension from parallel helping activities to other parallelisms will make us infer that the second conjunct is about the same kind of individuals, and thus that *some* refers to certain monks and nuns.

[71] The first, imperative clause of the definition is a little more complicated than the other imperative clauses presented so far because parallelism is a matter of degree. Two syntactic/semantic structures (e.g. propositions) can be more or less parallel or analogical.

6.4 Contrast

`Contrast` relations share some of the properties of the parallel relations, reversing a crucial feature. These relations are more complex though. Consider, for instance, the relations between the clauses of the following stretches of discourse.

(50) a. One thug distracted Oscar, but a vigilant nun helped him.
b. Lawyers are bad. Nuns are good.

We sense some sort of opposition between the two pairs of clauses. But we may not be so aware that this opposition is conveyed in different ways in these two cases. Contrast relations, as any other coherence relations, may be either explicit or implicit in the discourse. While the sentence (50a) explicitly triggers a contrast relation via the contrastive *but*, sentence (50b) represents a contrast only implicitly through the opposing predicates *good* and *bad*.

For all its explicitness, the contrast in the example (50a) is more indirect. The most plausible place to look for the contrast is at verbal level. It is the verbs *distract* and *help* that are the contrast-triggering elements in (50a). Since there is no clear semantic opposition between the denotations of these verbs, the identification of the relevant contrast must take into account the contextual implications of the two verbs. So the rule for inferring the contrast relation, (51 b), must be defined in terms of the *implications* of the two potentially contrasting propositions, as in the case of parallel relations.

(51) a. If two propositions are stated with (or without) an explicit coherence relation, infer a contrast relation if this is plausible given your semantic or background knowledge.

b. `Contrast`: ϕ contrasts with $\psi = \begin{cases} (\phi \wedge \psi) \\ \text{at issue content} \\ (\exists p \in Q : \phi \Rightarrow p) \wedge (\exists p \in Q : \psi \Rightarrow \neg p) \\ \text{presuppositional content} \end{cases}$

(Toosarvandani (2014))

As with the other type of resemblance relation (parallel), the asserted content of contrasting discourses is conjunctive. The novelty here lies in the second clause, which follows Toosarvandani (2014) 's definition of contrastive *but*. I elevate this definition to the rank of definition of contrast relations in general, covering contrasts even when they are not triggered by a contrastive *but*.

The presuppositional content of the contrast relation has several notable features. First, the entailments (or implications) p and $\neg p$ of the contrast-triggering elements should be in question in the context; that is, p must be a member of the question

under discussion (Q). Second, these propositions need *not* be the same, as they are bound by different quantifiers. In fact, in analysing the discourse (50)—*Lawyers are bad. Nuns are good*—we need these two propositions to be distinct. This is because there is no logic, semantic or metaphysical incompatibility between the lawyers' badness (the first p) and the nuns' goodness (the second p, which once negated comes to mean that nuns are good, viz. not bad).[72] The opposition is only in the properties that are predicated of these distinct classes of individuals (lawyers and nuns). And this non-logical opposition percolates to the propositional level.

So in the lawyers-and-nuns discourse the two implied propositions—p and the proposition that is denied in $\neg p$—are distinct propositions, which serve as the basis of the contrast. The other case of contrast, (50), is different. There the implied propositions that build up the presuppositional content of the contrast relations are the same, and thus the implications of the contrast-triggering propositions are logically and semantically incompatible. Indeed the proposition that one thug distracted Oscar implies (in the intended context) that the thug was actively involved in stealing from Oscar (p), while the proposition that the vigilant nun helped him implies that she kept the thugs from stealing, and thus that he was not the victim of stealing ($\neg p$).[73] Hence, the conditions for contrast are met.

The relevant notion of implication ($\Rightarrow$) is also a Kratzer-conditional, defined along the lines of (46b) above. Toosarvandani (2014) argues that the two implications in the presuppositional content of contrastive *but* come, in certain contexts, with different modal forces, making it possible for one implication to override the other. The predictions of imposter readings will not rely on such subtleties so I will pass them in silence here.

There would be much more to say about coherence relations, and in particular about the cognitive origin of these relations, the specific number and forms of such relations, as well as their semantics.[74] But we have to move on to our main target: the coherence

[72] This is not the whole story since there are degrees of goodness and badness, so a more elaborate scale would be needed in order to capture the opposition between nuns and lawyers according to (50b). It is clear that goodness is not just the absence of badness, represented semantically by negating the badness predicate. But I simplify here.

[73] This is at least the case if we require that acts of stealing end in an object being stolen, and thus exclude acts exercised with an ultimately unsuccessful intention of stealing from the class of acts of stealing.

[74] A more elaborated semantics (and pragmatics) of coherence relations is to be guided by the linguistic analyses of the natural language counterparts of these relations, e.g. conjunctions like *and* and *but* (in their relevant configurations), as well as *because*. This is very much work in progress in the linguistic and philosophical literature. It is a further question whether the semantics and pragmatics of such words will fully overlap with the analysis of coherence relations, since, as I said, the latter can be implicit in discourse and are supposed to have independent cognitive reality.

of imposters utterances. The different forms of coherence exemplified by coherence relations constitute most of the pragmatic significance of imposters, which has so far escaped the syntactic and perspectival accounts of imposters.

7 Accounting for unconventional imposters

Before analysing the coherence structure of the paradigmatic cases of imposters surveyed earlier, let us see what type of information matters to the coherence mechanism and how to represent the relevant information.

7.1 Two assumptions

The pragmatic story of unconventional imposters begins in a familiar fashion but quickly changes course, taking a more complicated route. As with conventional imposters, an unconventional imposter utterance increments the information that the interlocutors share in the context of utterance with the underspecified semantic content of the imposter utterance. But there are no quick means to specify that content in order to determine a proposition. Since we are dealing with unconventional imposters, there is no conventionality-based reason (as stated in §5.2) or of other nature to assume identity between the denotation of the imposter and a salient individual, so the semantic content of the imposter utterance would incorporate disjoint reference, in line with the specificity requirement. To get the imposter reading we need the licensing of the identity assumption (which will then entail coreference). I claim that this licensing occurs when the additional incrementation of the context with the identity assumption brings about a significant raise in the coherence level of discourse.

I need two assumptions to proceed with my analysis. First, the coherence-driven inference is informationally encapsulated and does not spawn other side effects except for the resolution of anaphora. Second, the exact processing of the identity assumption is not crucial.

To expand, the first point is that the identity assumption has no impact on the informational structure of the discourse beyond entailing coreference and the relevant sense of coherence. This is to say, it makes no difference to interpreters of imposter utterances whether they assume an identity of the form 'the idiot is John' or one of the reverse form 'John is the idiot'. These are not expected to determine different meanings when interpreters, in the course of computing the meaning of definite imposters, are trying to figure out in which way definite imposter utterances make

sense (and are coherent). In natural speech the two forms of identity often determine different emphases and meanings. But here they don't. When we compute coherence, the identity is symmetrical and the reversal of the order of elements in the identity relation has no semantic or pragmatic effect.

It will make life easy to represent such identity assumptions using individual constants rather than definite descriptions, although the latter is the more linguistically accurate representation. So I will write $j = i$ rather than $\iota x \,.\, Jx = \iota x \,.\, Ix$, where I and J within the definite descriptions stand for the properties of being called 'John' and of being an idiot respectively.

Regarding the second point note that in interpreting imposter utterances consisting of the definite *the idiot* whose intended antecedent is (say) John, it is natural to assume that John is *an* idiot (viz. a predicative statement) and, in virtue of that assumption, to infer that John is *the* idiot referred to in the context of utterance (viz. an identity statement). This is just one plausible aetiology of the inference leading to imposter readings of definites. I will in fact assume another aetiology which gets us equivalent results for all intents and purposes. I assume that the identity assumption is primitive and the predicative statement is derived from the identity assumption. The derivation is obvious. If John is *the* idiot in a properly restricted domain of individuals, then plainly John is *an* idiot in the same domain.

In line with the simplifying notation introduced two paragraphs above, I will write both the identity and predicative statements using constants, as in Ij and $j = i$, although the official notation should instead involve definite descriptions: the predicative statement should be officially written as $I(\iota x \,.\, Jx)$, and the identity statement should be written as $\iota x \,.\, Jx = \iota x \,.\, Ix$, as shown in the second paragraph above.

7.2 Unconventional non-indexical imposters

We are now in a position to analyse the unconventional imposters in terms of coherence. We look first at uses of third-person imposters (a) trading on `Explanation` (i.e. `Dependence`) coherence relations between the propositions in (b). The (a) sentences would sound familiar by now. Their coherence relations (b) are new. As with all the other examples in this paper, the coherence relations are derived from my own reading of the examples. Hopefully you will get the same readings too. So take a look at the following examples and their schematic coherence structures.

(52) a. John$_1$ is angry at the nun who sold *the idiot*$_1$ a fake bible.
b. The idiot is John ($i = j$). John bought a fake bible (Fj). John is angry (Aj).

Coherence relations: $i = j$ because Fj; and Aj because Fj.

(53) a. The president$_1$ took the floor but *the (poor) short guy*$_1$ could not reach the microphone.

b. *The short guy* is the president ($s = p$). The president took the floor (Fp). The short guy could not reach the microphone ($\neg Ms$). (He is a poor guy (Ps).)
Coherence relations: Fp contrasts with $\neg Ms$, assuming $s = p$; Ps because $\neg Ms$.

The (a) sentences can be made more coherent with the aid of the dependence relations in (b), and the latter are made possible by accommodating identity assumptions.

According to the coherence relations for (52), the bridging assumption that John is the idiot ($i = j$) holds *because* John bought a fake bible (Fj). Semantically, the content of the implicit *because*-claim is the content of the Kratzer-modal, as defined in (46b). This content is expressed by asserting that according to our beliefs (or according to the facts) the typical worlds whereby John buys a fake bible are worlds in which John is an idiot.[75] (Of course, the pragmatic role of this dependence-driven content is distinct from the pragmatic role of Kratzer-modals in general.)

Similarly, the coherence relations that we find for (53) establish that the bridging assumption that the short guy is the president ($s = p$) makes possible a contrast (signalled by *but*) between taking the floor (Fp) and not reaching the microphone ($\neg Ms$). What the speaker of (53) presumably does is to implicitly convey a contrast with the aid of the identity assumption. The identity assumption makes available this contrast. We can specify this relation between the contrast and the identity in terms of entailment.[76] The identity assumption ($s = p$) *entails* the contrasting propositions, against the background of the assumptions that are part of the assertive content of (53) (namely, the assumptions Fp and $\neg Ms$).[77]

[75] I have abstracted away from the expressive content of the definite *the idiot*, but adding the expressive dimension wouldn't change our verdict that the identity assumption makes the utterance more coherent. In other words, the content of the *because*-claim is the essential part of the inference as far as the resolution of anaphora is concerned.

[76] Entailment is itself a form of dependence—logical dependence. We can spell out its truth conditions by evaluating the consequent of the Kratzer-modal in worlds that agree with the logical laws, whatever these turn out to be.

[77] There is some leeway in specifying the relevant coherence relations. On another interpretation, what expressions like 'makes possible' and 'in virtue of' signal is that the (contrast) coherence relation is determined via another (dependence) coherence relation which takes the form of a possibility modal claim, to be defined along the lines of (46a) with existential quantification instead of the universal quantification (cf. also Pagin (2014)). This is to say, a contrast is made available by the identity assumption,

What is the relevant contrast in (53)? The contrast is between taking the floor (Fp) *qua* trying to complete an action, e.g. giving a speech (call this t), and not reaching the microphone ($\neg Mp$) *qua* failing to complete that action (call this $\neg f$). That Fp contrasts with $\neg Ms$ follows from our definition of contrast (51b). The contrasting propositions imply propositions t and $\neg f$ respectively. Note that these propositions are not inconsistent. Still their conjunction is precisely what is required of the presuppositional content of a contrast relation, according to the second clause of (51b). (The reason why the two propositions—about trying and failing—give rise to a contrast is not built into the definition (51), but this is as should be, as such a reason falls within the scope of practical rationality rather than linguistic pragmatics.)

There are two features to bear in mind in assessing the predictive power of our coherence-driven model.

First, we may not expect all competent speakers to be equally satisfied with the unconventional imposter utterances above. There are good reasons for judging (52)–(53) to be only marginally felicitous in their rather stripped down contexts. Recall that we adopted as a measure of relevance for an utterance the fit between the question under discussion and the utterance. Yet in our present cases there is no *unique* question under discussion that the whole utterance addresses. Rather there are a couple of questions. To make sense of (52), we need to ask, How is John doing? Who is John angry at? Why is John angry at the nun? And tentatively assuming the identity assumption, Why would John be an idiot? A first reason for dissatisfaction with the previous imposter utterances is that they presuppose too much. Their felicity depends on their answering all these questions which are not previously raised and so are not properly speaking 'under discussion' at all. The hearer has to contrive these questions by herself. Even if these questions were raised, another reason for dissatisfaction with unconventional imposter utterances is that the task of coming up with a coherent answer that addresses all of the questions is quite demanding. But to the extent that such imposter utterances are found felicitous—many theorists assume that they are—the coherence account can tell us why. They are felicitous in virtue of their coherence structure.

Second, as (52)–(53) illustrate, there is some freedom in the specification of the coherence relations and their relata. For any given sentence, we can specify in multiple ways the contrasting, parallel, and causally dependent features of the accessible propositions or events. I am pleading guilty only for my choice of examples, which

and so we get a coherence relation (namely, dependence) between an identity statement and another coherence relation (namely, the contrast). An equivalent way of looking at the coherence-structure of (53) (and other contrast-driven imposter utterances) without giving this 'in virtue of'-modal primitive status is to replace the modal with the entailment relation. This is what we opted for in the text.

are indeed unconstrained in various ways. But this freedom in interpretation is what we already expect of natural language, rather than a shortcoming of the coherence-driven account. Indeed in interpreting imposter utterances we do not need to operate with a unique set of coherence-making features. In general there will be several ways of specifying the propositions that are the relata of the coherence relations. And sometimes there may be more than one set of coherence relations that can make an imposter utterance coherent.[78] Yet all that matters for the purposes of grasping imposter readings is that among the many potential coherence structures (viz. sets of coherence relations and their relata) there be some salient and plausible coherence structure that vindicates the referential dependencies specific to imposter readings, following from the relevant identity assumptions.

7.3 Unconventional indexical imposters

Coherence also plays a crucial role in the interpretation of (unconventional) *indexical* imposters. Here is a familiar example of an indexical imposter utterance turning, as it does in my interpretation of the example, on a `Contrast` coherence relation.

(54) a. The semanticist (= the addressee) forgot her syntax 1.01?!
b. You are the semanticist ($a = s$). As a semanticist, you must have taken a syntax course, and you should know the elementary notions (Ks). Yet, you forgot your syntax 1.01 (Is).
Coherence relation: the contrast Ka vs Ia, since $s = a$.

We can interpret this utterance in the context of the broadest possible question, such as *What's your comment on your interlocutor?* In order to vindicate the imposter reading, there should be some plausible coherence relation introduced by the imposter definite.

The sentence (54) seems to be uttered in an ironical fashion here. This can be done through a contrast between a desired state of affairs and the actual state of affairs. The contrast that is most plausibly conveyed by (54a) on my reading of it is the contrast between the duty of a semanticist according to our background knowledge, viz. the duty of having elementary notions of syntax (Ks), and the facts according to

[78] One source of multiplicity is determined by the type of proposition entering the coherence relation. For instance, on one possible reading of (53), the president's not reaching the microphone explains the *attribution* of 'poorness' to the president, rather than the proposition that the president is poor. Moreover, cases like (52) may well involve a metalinguistic aspect, since the hearer may introduce among the propositions for which she seeks a coherence relation the proposition that the speaker uses the definite 'the idiot' to refer to a certain individual. Here I abstract away from such matters since they are not relevant to the prediction of imposter readings.

the speaker's presumed observation, viz. ignorance of syntax (*Is*). Counting in the identity assumption $s = a$ we get the further contrast between Ka and Ia. These contrasting propositions are the implications of the contrast-triggering expressions (along background assumptions), represented in our definition of contrast (51) as the presupposed propositions p and $\neg p$. (As in the case (53) above, which also involved the `Contrast` coherence relation, the current implications do not contradict each other but are rather in a practical opposition—to be elucidated by accounts of practical rationality.)

The first contrast-triggering expression in (54a) is the definite imposter referring to the semanticist. Alongside the identity assumption that the semanticist and the interlocutor are identical and background assumptions about semanticists, this implies Ka. The asserted content that the semanticist forgot the elementary notions of syntax and the identity assumption imply Ia. We thus get all the key elements figuring in the definition of contrast. In virtue of digging up a contrast among the set of propositions that could potentially be what the speaker had in mind to communicate, the hearer concludes that the identity assumption to the effect that the semanticist is the addressee is a reasonable assumption to make. This assumption advances the coherence of the speaker's utterance.

If speakers are really after coherence when interpreting utterances, we expect any coherence relation to generate imposter readings, not just dependence and contrast. The expectation is borne out. We can easily construe examples of parallel-driven imposters on the model of our preceding example, (48). Two examples that come to mind are these.

(55) a. One thief distracted John$_1$ and the other poached *the nice man*$_1$. = (6b)
b. Devine advises Sanders$_2$ and Weaver campaigned for *the senator*$_2$ virtually all his life.

These examples corroborate our hypothesis that any coherence relation can motivate imposter utterances, if judged against the background of some relevant knowledge. If the identity assumption that Sanders is the senator is plausible given our knowledge of American politics *and* if this identity raises the coherence of the discourse by establishing a parallel relation, our account predicts the occurrence of a successful definite imposter in (55b), namely *the senator*. Specific world knowledge is often not necessary. For instance, we do not need to have previously ascertained that John in (55a) is a nice man to be able to infer that the identity holds. The contribution of the identity assumption to the raise in (parallel-driven) coherence seems to be enough to license the identity *John = the nice man*. The imposter reading of the definite *the nice man* follows immediately from the parallel-driven licensing. (Our sympathy for

John matters as well, I suspect.)

7.4 Failed unconventional imposters are incoherent

We can now delineate a fuller range of factors that turn definites into failed imposters.[79] Failed imposters need to fail on one of two counts and this corresponds to one of the two ways in which the identity assumption gets licensed. First, when the descriptive material that they encode is not applicable to any salient individual in the context, the identity assumption cannot be licensed. Have a look at §4.2 where we covered this case. Second, when no coherence relation can be established by making the identity assumption, the identity-bridging fails again. To illustrate the second kind of failure, we can construct failed imposters corresponding to the successful ones in (52) and (54). Here they are.

(56) a. #John$_1$ is angry at the nun who sold *the short guy*$_1$ a fake bible.
b. The short guy is John ($s = j$). The short guy bought a fake bible (Fs). John is angry (Aj).
Coherence relation: #$s = j$ because Fs.

(57) a. #*The semanticist* (=the addressee) is tired.
b. You are the semanticist ($a = s$). The semanticist is tired (Ts).
Coherence relation: #contrast $a = s$ and Ts; #Ta because $a = s$.

These definites fail to become imposters because there is no reasonable coherence relation that would support a bridging identity assumption formulated in terms of the denotation of the definites and a salient entity. (The assumption at work here is that the salient entities in this context can be the speaker, the hearer, or John, since these are made salient by utterances of the sentences above.) There is no coherence

[79] We have not exhausted the ways in which definite imposters can fail. Another type of failure is due to factors pertaining to the syntax/semantics interface (rather than pragmatic factors). The definites in the sentence *#The lawyer$_1$ told the idiot$_1$ to get lost* cannot be interpreted as imposters, presumably because it does not respect the constraint that the referents of the arguments of a non-reflexive verb need to be different (cf. fn. 51). Syntactic and semantic considerations would also explain the unacceptability of imposter readings of the noun phrases in sentences like *#Mary$_2$ (=the speaker) likes myself$_2$*. See Kratzer (2009) for explanations of the latter kind of unacceptability. Yet another type of failure—this time pragmatic in nature—stems from the processing features of imposters and anaphors more generally. Imposter readings must be resolved locally, otherwise disjoint reference is entailed via the specificity requirement. So even if information that favours an imposter reading comes later in the discourse, this would not license an imposter reading due to the local (rather than global) impact of information in generating imposter readings. As Kehler (2002, 164) points out, we should be able to interpret an anaphor at a time close to the time of processing it, on pain of not being able to bind it to an antecedent at all.

relation to support the relevant identity assumptions because utterances of (56) and (57) do not convey enough material for constructing a plausible coherence relation. Even the somewhat contrived thought that John is angry (Aj) because a certain guy is short (Fs) could not help us in ellucidating (56), since it does not favour the identity between John and the short guy ($j = s$). Nothing is thereby said or implied about why shortness is predicated of John. The utterance of (57) fails in a similar fashion, since there is no contrast between the addressee's being a semanticist (which is entailed by $a = s$) and his or her being tired (which is entailed by $a = s$ and Ts). Nor is there a dependence relation between one's being tired (Ta) and one's being a semanticist ($a = s$). The upshot is that none of these cases display a plausible and accessible coherence relation between the propositions semantically expressed by utterances of (56) and (57). The identity assumption does not make the utterance and the corresponding context cohere with each other, and thus the identity assumption cannot play its bridging role.

8 Putting everything together

And this is about the whole story of definite imposters. The coherence-making definites turn into imposters while the definites that do not raise coherence are either conventional forms of imposters (if further socio-linguistic conditions obtain) or wind up failing to take on imposter interpretations (but at least they stay true to themselves). In this section I want to fix the major notions in the explanation of imposterhood by piecing them together in a tighter web of principles and constraints. The staring point for this is a conceptual tweak that will ease my work.

Pursuing the strategy just rehearsed, we have effectively split our data in two, drawing a line between a set of cases that requires coherence relations (the set of unconventional imposters) and one that doesn't (the set of conventional imposters). This captures the relevant facts about the behaviour of definites with respect to their potential imposter readings. And yet such a split is not particularly elegant. There is a better way of capturing the same facts. Making good use of the full range of coherence relations enables us to formulate a more uniform account. For this purpose we draw on theorists like Pagin (2014) and Sanders and Spooren (2007) who propose that coherence relations are hierarchically organised. These theorists suggest that—keeping accessibility and plausibility fixed—cause-effect (or, more generally, dependence) relations are stronger than resemblance relations, which are in turn stronger than contiguity relations. Stronger relations constitute affordances for interpretation; they give better incentives for adopting them in interpreting utterances. So let us adopt the suggested ranking of coherence relations.

(58) **Coherence scale**: `Dependence` > `Resemblance` > `Contiguity`.

So far we have seen in action only the stronger, dependence and resemblance relations. We have had no use for the lower ranked, contiguity relations. My contention, now, is that these relations supply the missing link between the two cases. Contiguity relations should be familiar.

They are spatio-temporal relations, as expressed by sentences like *They had a baby and got married* or *In the room there was a couch and on the couch a baby*. The former implies that the marriage succeeds the baby's birth in time; the latter implies that the room, the couch and the baby bear a close spatial relation rather than some arbitrary one. Contiguity relations marginally (yet non-trivially) raise the coherence of the situations reported by the above sentences by supplying relations in time and space between objects and events.

We can restate our account of the cases which were reported in §4 and §5 not to involve coherence relations as cases that do not involve the stronger (dependence or resemblance) relations, but just the weaker (contiguity) ones plus something else. I will return to this additional element shortly. For now let us focus on the impact of contiguity. These weaker contiguity relations play a genuine role in communication. When I'm uttering out of the blue *The philosophy assistant is ready*, the failure of finding a suitable antecedent for the definite in the subject position is not only a failure to grasp a full proposition but also a failure of establishing a coherence relation and in particular a contiguity relation. The fact that I'm making an utterance and the fact that some particular (but yet unidentified) philosophy assistant is ready are in no particular relation. You cannot even establish a spatial relation between these two situations. Were you to know that *I* am the philosophy assistant, you could at least establish a weak coherence relation, spatial contiguity. For the identity of two individuals entails that they occupy the same spatio-temporal regions.

To impart this information is more than nothing. The world as described by the two sentences—that I'm making an utterance and that the philosophy assistant is ready—is more cohesive when the two sentences have singular terms referring to the same individual.[80] Now the key point is that the raise in contiguity is small enough to cause a felicity dilemma. Grasping the contiguity relation between the two propositions would make our utterance better, and yet not perfectly felicitous out of context, since it does not establish any stronger coherence relation and thus fails to considerably raise the coherence of the utterance. The higher we go on the

[80] Similar principles that defeasibly favour coreference readings are proposed in e.g. Levinson (2000, 267ff.) (viz. I-implicature), Asher and Lascarides (2003, 21), and Lascarides and Asher (2007, 13) (viz. the second clause of the Maximise Discourse Coherence). However, I propose that the pressure towards coreference is contiguity-driven.

coherence relations scale, the more felicitous the resulting utterance. (This explains why we are reluctant to accept as felicitous the cases (7) and (32a)–(33a) in contexts where the hearers know that the intended salient individual has the properties that the definite imposters attribute to him or her. Contiguity relations do not suffice to warrant felicity.)

Indeed I conjecture that coreference readings are marginally encouraged by the speakers and hearers' drive towards shared contexts that are spatially and temporally more coherent (viz. contiguous). The conjecture is substantial, but its appeal for me derives not from its undebatable truth (since I don't know how to defend it) but from its other theoretical consequences. The claim is natural, for once we make the plausible assumption that coherence enhances communication in the ways that we have traced earlier, why not assume that *all* coherence relations bring communicative gains, thus incrementing the felicity of an otherwise indeterminate utterance? The claim is also appealing for another reason, as it gives a more general application to coherence principles, while keeping the empirical scope of the account untouched. In particular, the claim does not deny the dichotomy between conventional and unconventional imposters or the scalar and lexical properties of imposters. Nor does it say that speakers will always maximise the contiguity of their world (contiguity relations provide weak reasons to do so). The purported role of contiguity gives our account more unity since it endows all imposters with coherence properties which may (or may not) play a role in licensing them.

We also gain in generality. We are now in possession of a uniform *coherence-driven* account of bridging inference that generates definite imposter readings. I sum up the pragmatic import of coherence with a general economy principle governing all imposters.

(59) **Economical Imposters**: Imposters are economical in the sense that they provide communicative payoffs (i) with more reduced communicative means (ii).
   i. For interpretive reasons (adjusting to hearer knowledge, figurative expression and other reasons), certain conventional requirements (like specificity and person requirements) are defeated and imposter readings are thus generated. (cf. Reinhart (2006))
   ii. For economy reasons, the speaker of imposter utterances 'collapses' the two sets of propositions related by the intended coherence relation into one proposition, which is then implicitly conveyed by a short-circuited utterance consisting of imposters. (cf. Horn (2004), Levinson (2000)).

This economy principle embodies, in the most general terms, the pragmatic motivation for the specific set of principles handling imposters.

The common trait of all imposter readings is that they are obtained via deriving *implicit* forms of coherence. This contrasts with the explicit forms of coherence surveyed in (45), (48) and (50), where the coherence relations were triggered by lexical items and structural properties that were explicitly represented in the surface form of the utterances in question. Hence according to (59), imposter utterances convey an implicit form of coherence which is economical from the point of view of the speaker and serves their communicative purposes (cf. (59 ii)). Moreover imposters bring communicative gains which constitute good pragmatic reasons for the overriding grammatical requirements following from the person and specificity features of noun phrases (cf. (59i)). Thus imposters are devices of anomalous reference that, on balance, prove to be beneficial for both speakers and hearers.

Assuming that certain imposter readings are sanctioned by a conventionality constraint on the referential properties of definites, we can state a general condition on the licensing of the bridging identity assumption, which is at the origin of the coreferential properties of imposters.

(60) **Licensing** (L): a bridging identity assumption is licensed just in case it is contextually consistent and raises the coherence of discourse in one of the following ways:
   i. *Weak Coherence (contiguity) & Conventionality*: The bridging assumption is contiguity-coherent due to raising the level of contiguity between the propositions contextually available and is conventional in the sense of the conventionality principle (42), repeated just below. Crucially, conventionality is necessary for the felicity of definites that are only contiguity-coherent.
      - **Conventionality**: Expressions have a use-property that marks them as more or less apt to refer to certain types of individuals. In particular, this conventionality property will make a definite expression apt to refer back to a unique salient individual that satisfies the expression's descriptive content.
   ii. *Strong Coherence (resemblance & dependence)*. The bridging assumption $[\iota x \,.\, Px : \exists y Rxy] = a$ raises the level of resemblance- or dependence-driven coherence.

The identity assumption projects from the default interpretation of the relation, $\exists y Rxy$, within the presuppositional content of the definite; see e.g. (38a). Also bear in mind that the division between weak and strong coherence relations is read off the ordering of categories of coherence relations according to their strength (59), keeping all the facts about their accessibility and plausibility fixed.

According to (L) in (60), the identity assumption gets licensed only if it raises the

coherence of discourse. That is, the update of the context with the identity assumption determines a more cohesive set of propositions compared to the case in which there would be no particular coherence relation between such propositions. To state this more precisely I use the following notation. Let a coherence relation variable C range over the usual coherence relations `Parallel`, `Contrast`, `Explanation` etc., as defined in section 6.

These relations can be established between a set of possible worlds propositions $P = \{p_1, p_2, \ldots p_n\}$ one of whose members, p_i, is the identity assumption. Apart from the identity assumption, P includes the propositions semantically expressed by a potential imposter utterance that satisfies the specificity requirement, as well as their entailments, presuppositions and potential implicatures. I use K to represent the background knowledge shared by the speaker and hearer. K is a conjunction of propositions assumed prior to making the potential imposter utterance.

So the coherence-raising feature involved in checking whether the identity assumption is licensed (L) amounts to verifying whether the identity assumption has the property stated just below in (61).

(61) **Coherence raising**. We say that the identity assumption $p_i \in P$ raises the coherence of discourse in a context K iff the number of plausible and accessible coherence relations realised by the propositions in context $K_0 = K \cap \{P - p_i\}$—viz. the number $|C_0|$—is lower than the number of plausible and accessible coherence relations in the context updated with the identity assumption p_i, $K_1 = K \cap P$—viz. the number $|C_1|$. In short, coherence raises when $|C_0| < |C_1|$.

To say that the identity assumption raises the coherence of discourse is also to say that an imposter utterance raises coherence when that utterance is obtained by competently accommodating that identity assumption.

Finally, let us return to our desiderata and check that the present account meets them. I have argued that the two senses of third-person imposters are the result of nominal polysemy, whereby the sense of the nominal is extended beyond the third person requirements, thus overriding them, in order to meet certain communicative aims (cf. first desideratum). The second desideratum asks for a way of licensing the identity assumption behind imposters. We went through such a process of licensing and summarised our licensing mechanism in (60). The third desideratum was to sever successful imposters from failed imposters. We offered at the very beginning a way of ruling out failed imposters, via the specificity requirement (3), but the problem was that this principle, unconstrained, ruled out all the imposter readings, including the successful ones. Now we have a discriminate licensing mechanism that lets some identity assumptions escape the specificity and person requirements

in a systematic way. In other words, the specificity and person requirements rule out some imposter readings, while the coherence-driven licensing principle (60) saves some other imposter readings. Finally, the fourth desideratum asked for a pragmatic view that avoids an idiosyncratic syntax, and the coherence-driven account of bridging inference is precisely such a view. Imposter utterances help the speaker convey forms of discourse coherence implicitly and concisely. Moreover imposters utterances convey new information, which is what they need to contribute in return for having overridden certain grammatical requirements (cf. 59).

9 Conclusion

As Collins and Postal (2012) point out, there has been surprisingly little work on imposters, considering their pervasiveness in natural languages. Collins and Postal put forward an account of imposters that assumes that imposter readings are the result of disambiguation plus anaphora. They also provide an account of agreement between imposters and the lexical items bound by imposters. We have focused on the former. Our task in the present paper has been to develop a pragmatic account of how imposters are bound (rather than on how they bind other noun phrases).

On this account, definite imposters are nothing else than discourse anaphors occurring in special syntactic and semantic configurations, e.g. long-distance condition C configurations or discourse initial positions, as those exemplified by (1). Definite imposters are different from other definites not in their syntactic or semantic structure but just in the way their special grammatical status (person and specificity) gets overridden by principles of coherence and other pragmatic constraints such as conventionality. The identity bridging inference that gives rise to definite imposters (and their anaphoric behaviour) is speaker-oriented insofar as it conveys implicit forms of coherence with minimal forms of expression. And since imposters have communicative impact similar to figurative speech and other forms of sense extension, they are beneficial for the hearer too.

An advantage of this view over the syntactic one is that we derive imposter readings through independently motivated pragmatic principles and standard syntactic and semantic assumptions about definites. To echo Rushin's article, there is no 'I' in 'Steve', and, in general, we need not venture any odd syntactic posit in order to vindicate the anomalous reference of definite imposters. But the key advance is that we now have the missing pragmatic perspective on imposters that can be measured against the syntactic view.[81]

[81] Acknowledgements: I wrote this paper during my stay at xxxx . Many thanks to xxxx, xxxx,

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and xxxx for making this possible. For effective help with the paper, thanks primarily to xxxxx for sustained discussion of the topic. The discourse oriented thinking about anaphora backing this paper was cultivated by sitting in xxxx's seminar on syntax and pragmatics at XYZ in the winter term of 2014/2015. I thank xxxx for that. Thanks to the audiences of xxxxx , and especially to xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx xxxx . Thanks to the organisers of xxxx for inviting me to give a talk. Thanks to xxxxx for organising the YYY , and to xxxx, xxxx, xxxxx, xxxxx, xxxxx for discussions at that event. All remaining mistakes should be credited to yours truly.

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