

FedCM Update

where we are and where we are going


Why Federated Credentials?

What is it?

Users sign-in to an RP (relying party) with an IdP (Identity provider)

Why do we think it's important?

- Ease of use
 - passwordless
- Security
 - resistance to phishing
- Trustworthiness
 - per-site username and password




The problem

By design, identity federation was built on top of low-level primitives*.

By accident, the same primitives also enable cross-site tracking.

Unfortunately, we can't distinguish tracking from federation.

The classification Problem






Browser



IDP

^{*} iframes, third party cookies, redirects

How?



How?

O(10s)

Browsers

Heavy change

O(100s)

Identity Providers

Moderate change

O(M)

Relying Parties

Backwards compatible

O(B)

Users

No behavioral changes

Demo time!




Demo time!




How? The JavaScript API

How? The HTTP API



https://developer.chrome.com/blog/fedcm-origin-trial/

When?





Ecosystem Feedback

- Federated Identity Community Group
- Identity Providers
 - Better understanding of the use cases (<u>primitives by use cases</u>)
 - Firmer validation that front-channel logout is important to them
 - Better understanding of the alternatives and trade-offs (alternatives considered)
 - First Party Sets, CHIPS, Storage Access API, FedCM, CNAMES, Back channel logout, etc.
 - Increasingly more concerned about bounce tracking mitigations longer term
- Browsers
 - Edge: no institutional position yet. currently running the origin trial too.
 - Safari: <u>early institutional position</u>: generally supportive, but still very early / shallow
 - Firefox: <u>no institutional position yet</u>. informally, supportive of development, concerned about <u>a few privacy issues</u> which we are working on together.

The Timing Attack

- Tracker can learn about which website a user is visiting without user permission by conducting the timing attack







Proposal - pull accounts iff it's necessary

- Site engagement score: users must have interacted with the provider origin in the past
 - { provider: "https://idp.example/", client id: "123" }
- Aggregate metrics to penalize suspicious "providers"
 - Click-through rate
 - Invisible UI rate

- We want the timing attack to be economically impractical, not mathematically impossible

What's next: Multiple IDPs?






What's next: Branding?

Company logos are illustrative only





























What's next: Other IdP use cases

- Personalized button
- Early explorations
 - Access tokens
 - Refresh tokens (silent access)
 - DPoP API (proof of possession)
 - Non-email user identification (e.g. phone number)
 - Multiple iframes sharing one login prompt



Q & A