


Texplained

Hardware Reverse-engineering Tools new threats – new opportunities

Texplained

Bio


- 8 years in a security lab
- Technology lover
- Analysis techniques // exploits
- Involved from sample preparation to report writing
 - Optical systems setup
 - Sample preparation
 - Delayering
 - Imagery
 - Software developments



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Bio

- Semi-invasive attacks
- Invasive attacks – circuit edit
- Micro-probing
- Various experiments
 - Photoemission
 - AFM techniques
 - Electrical glitch



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Talk Description

- Focus on Hardware reverse engineering
- Evolution of the all process
 - Sample preparation
 - Imaging
 - Study
- Change in evaluation criterias
- Future evolutions

Talk
description

context

Future
developments

HRTs as the
next step

HRT outcomes

Texplained

Context

- Attacks summary
- Chip classification

context

HRTs as the
next step

HRT outcomes



Future
developments

Texplained

Non invasive attacks - VCC and Clk glitch

- Take advantage of the RTL technology
 - Used to skip instructions or to disturb the normal execution
- ⇒ Finding the glitch pattern is empirical
- ⇒ The real effect stays hidden



Context – Attacks summary



Context – Attacks summary

Semi-invasive attacks - Sample preparation techniques




Partial opening - frontside



Context – Attacks summary

Semi-invasive attacks - Sample preparation techniques



Rerepackaging



Context – Attacks summary

Semi-invasive attacks - Sample preparation techniques

In situ:



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Semi-invasive attacks – Principle

- 1064 nm laser spot can induce transistor switch
- Silicon is « transparent » @1064 nm
- Metal planes prevent laser fault injection
- Fault is injected at a precise given location

Context – Attacks summary


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Semi-invasive attacks – Tests

Fishing :

- . Unknown timing
 - . Vague localization
 - . Trial and Error
- => Working ;-)

Context – Attacks summary




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Semi-invasive attacks – Tests

Automated fishing (a first step toward laser scan) :


- . XY stages for chip positioning



- . One position – several laser pulses



- . Pass-fail from data returned by the device

- . One scan per timing of interest



=> Different effects

Context – Attacks summary



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
Semi-invasive attacks – Tests

Targeted shot :

- . Precise localization from laser scan image
- . Timing still critical



Context – Attacks summary




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Invasive attacks

Get access to the circuitry itself and apply modification for

- Shield bypass
- Embedded counter-measures deactivation
- Data extraction

Context – Attacks summary



Acceleration: 50 kV Aperture: 37.50 nm


Texplained

Invasive attacks

The process : delayering and imaging

- Delayering requires skills and machinery
- Optical and / or SEM scan
- Pictures stitching is key
- Alignment of layers must be precise

Context – Attacks summary



Texplained

Invasive attacks

The process : optical imaging

Optical scans are fast to perform but :

- Good tilt setup for high resolution scan is a nightmare (narrow depth of field)
- Small features become invisible with technology size reduction
- Oxide layers are light transparent (every deeper layer is visible)
- Pictures lack information such as vias

Context – Imaging techniques



Texplained


Invasive attacks

The process : SEM imaging

SEM scan are slow (hours range) and pictures are distorted but :

- Depth of field is bigger
- Resolution is higher
- Oxide layers are not transparent
(one visible layer at a time)

Context – Imaging techniques




Texplained


Invasive attacks

The process : “Reverse-engineering”

- Intensive use of pictures
- Generate a test procedure
- Localize points of interests










Context – Attacks summary



Texplained

Invasive attacks

The process : Fib edit




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Invasive attacks

The process : Micro-probing

Context – Attacks summary



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Invasive attacks

Linear Code Extraction

- 2 major types of instructions : sequential / jumps
 - Provide only one instruction to the core of sequential type
 - Core will execute something useless
 - Address will be incremented
 - The entire code will be outputted from NVM memory
- => Most successful invasive attack


Context – Attacks summary

Texplained

Invasive attacks

Linear Code Extraction

- Cut and setup an instruction for the core (ex. nop)
- Read data before the cut



Context – Attacks summary


Texplained

Invasive attacks

Linear Code Extraction : Less FIBing – more options

- Use buffer or register / latch signal to prevent read buffer output update
 - Read data before the buffer (register / latch)
- ⇒ Running code extraction is straight forward
- ⇒ Modification of the code is possible
- ⇒ Skipping instruction is possible (jumps...)

Context – Attacks summary



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Context – Chip classification

3 different kind of security levels :

- **Weak** : code can be extracted by old techniques or LCE
- **Adequate** : old techniques do not work // LCE can be done at the costs of Hardware Reverse-engineering
- **Advanced** : Hardware Reverse-engineering is mandatory for a code extraction + hardware functions have to be found and studied

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Context – Chip classification

3 different kind of security levels :

Chip manufacturer	Pirates	Customer	
Weak	Trivial	Dangerous cheap	No way
Adequate	Tricky	Balanced	Dangerous cheap
Advanced	Headache provider	Overkill expensive	Mandatory expensive

Hardware Reverse-engineering Tools

the next step

HRTs as the
next step

HRT outcomes

Future
developments

Texplained

HRTs as the next step

Analysis techniques evolution :

- Laser fault injection
- ROM code extraction
- LCE
- Other techniques

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

- Sample preparation
- SEM imaging
- Accurate correlation
- All chip features become visible and usable

Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :

Laser fault injection

Usual tests target registers or memory output

- Where are the working registers?
 - Is the memory encrypted?
- ⇒ Results can be achieved but hardly exploited

Fishing tests are also effective

- Needed equipment price can be quite low
 - Effect can not be predicted
 - Timing and spot localization have to be found
- ⇒ Results can be achieved but can't be fully understood therefore exploits are difficult to build
- ⇒ Fishing is a real threat

HRTs as the next step

Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :



Laser fault injection : examples

- Reading extra bytes from RAM while glitching during the ATR routine
- Number of extra bytes depends on glitch location

- Change mode of execution
- Effect is “stored”
- Original mode can be restored
- Instruction skip

⇒ Registers can be found by fishing
⇒ Fault injected inside the core – what happened?

HRTs as the next step




Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution : *LCE evolution*

- Principle does not change
- Memory encryption
- Multiplexers mixed with the core

HRTs as the next step




Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :

LCE evolution : hidden mux

8 bits processor

32 bits FLASH output going to the core




Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :

LCE evolution : hidden mux

Lines have to be traced inside the core to find the 8 bits data bus.



HRTs as the next step



Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :
LCE evolution : hidden mux

3 paths can be followed :
 2 of them can not be exploited




Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :

LCE evolution : hidden mux

- Finding the correct spot took some time
- Multiplexers were hidden
- Data was not encrypted

HRTs as the next step



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Analysis techniques evolution :

LCE evolution : state of the art










- Multiplexers are hidden
- NVM content is scrambled
- NVM content is encrypted
- Hardware custom functions are implemented as part of the core
- Several thousands gates have to be reversed

HRTs as the next step

Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :

ROM reading : ROM “optical reading”



HRTs as the next step


Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :

ROM reading : principle

- Define 4 corners for alignment
- Affine transformation to compensate “tilt deformation”
- Define horizontal bit spacing
- Define vertical bit spacing
- Choose criteria for bit value
- Extract defined zone

HRTs as the next step




Texplained

Analysis techniques evolution :

ROM reading : correlation issue

HRTs as the next step

As ROMs are getting bigger, correlation errors have to be considered



4700 pictures have to be stitched



Texplained




Analysis techniques evolution :

ROM reading : correlation issue

Smarter procedure :

- Do not try correlating pictures (especially SEM pics) of a large scan
- Do not try to tell your script where the bits are
- Find bits corresponding to a noticeable value
- Extract a grid from their position
- From the grid, recover the missing bits
- Correlate bits from an image with those of the adjacent one and so on

HRTs as the next step





Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

Deprocessing :

By using plasma etching as the only technique for deprocessing, picture quality is poor





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Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

Deprocessing :

Using combination of techniques such as Plasma etching, Chemical Mechanical Polishing and wet chemical etching leads to “perfect” deprocessing, suitable for SEM scan.





Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

Deprocessing :

- One layer visible at a time
- Vias also visible
- Custom process to distinguish vias and lines has been defined



HRTs as the next step



Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

SEM imaging :

Major issue was found and solved : SEM picture distortion

- Tilt adjustment table has been machined
- Fast scan
- Distortion is calculated for a given scan and reversed




HRTs as the next step

Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

Features on grid :


HRTs as the next step



Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

Find vias :




HRTs as the next step

Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

Find lines :

HRTs as the next step





Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

HRTs as the next step

Accurate correlation



- Correlation is performed on feature coordinates “grid pattern”
- At worst, lines are “jittering” around the calculated grid position

Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

HRTs as the next step


Accurate correlation



Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :
2 layers example:

HRTs as the next step




Texplained

Sample preparation and imaging evolution :

All information available

- Vias and lines are extracted on a grid
- Gates are detected from the same mechanics
- No correlation error
- Layers are aligned “perfectly” without further picture transformation
- No more pixels – polygons only
😊

HRTs as the next step



Texplained

Hardware Reverse-engineering Tools outcomes

HRT outcomes

Future developments

Texplained

New possibilities :

Some possible studies

- semi-invasive preparation
- LCE preparation
- Shield global bypass
- Other embedded counter-measures bypass

HRTs' outcomes

Texplained

New possibilities :

Other techniques

- Photoemission
- EMA
- Dynamic voltage contrast

HRTs as the next step

Texplained


New possibilities :

New tools

FIB navigation files can be generated

- Planarised chip
- Backside edit

HRTs' outcomes



Texplained

New threats :

Laser fault injection :

HRTs' outcomes


Particular gates can be highlighted without any further study

- Fire at the located registers and see the effects

Tracing signals is easy as a click

- Fire first, with for example a pass-fail scan
- Look at what you hit at “fail” location
- Understand the effect

=> From laser glitching to laser fault injection.




Texplained

New threats :

Laser fault injection become cheaper

Context – Attacks summary




Texplained

New threats :

Scan chains analysis :

- Path chain are very easy to spot
- Used to debug / program the device

HRTs' outcomes



Texplained

Timing consideration :

Real world example :

- ROM chip
 - ROM is scrambled
 - Multiplexers are hidden inside the logic
 - ROM is encrypted
 - Data encryption based on address and hard-wired key
-
- > Clear data bus location ?
 - > Custom encryption reverse ?

HRTs' outcomes

Texplained

Timing consideration :

Image preparation : “manual process”

Correlation is based on pixel value :

- From 10 minutes to several hours
- Errors are inevitable

Image stitching is not reliable

- One picture = one photoshop layer
- Local adjustments are performed when needed

Alignment of 2 layers almost unfeasible but fast

- Local adjustments are performed when needed

HRTs' outcomes




Texplained

Timing consideration :

Finding data bus : “manual process”

- Tons of layers are used and moved for local adjustment : Errors
- A schematic must be drawn to avoid being lost : Errors + you will get lost anyway



HRTs' outcomes



Texplained

Timing consideration :

Finding data bus : “manual process”

- Each found gate must be analyzed even if already studied : Errors + stay patient
- Equations have to be written in “mathematical form” : Many errors

*cell_3_12 = (cell_9_24 xor cell_9_18) xor cell_1_18
cell_3_13 = (cell_9_20 xor cell_9_19) xor cell_1_23
cell_3_13bis = (cell_3_14 xor cell_9_25) xor cell_5_2
cell_3_14 = (cell_8_4 xor cell_g_1) xor cell_6_7
cell_3_15 = (cell_alpha_1 xor cell_9_40) xor cell_13_6
cell_3_16 = (cell_a_1 xor cell_1_19) xor cell_13_3
cell_3_17 = (cell_9_21 xor cell_9_22) xor cell_1_24*

Texplained

Timing consideration :

Finding data bus : “manual process”

-> Finally, with help of vhdl software (for example), schematic can be rearranged to understand the functions.

- Localization of the clear data bus is possible
- LCE is working

-> My FIB is down but I have reverse-engineered every single gate, I can read the ROM...

- VHDL simulations will show.... that there are errors ☹
- Localizing the errors can partially be made from simulations
- Where are the last errors?

HRTs' outcomes


Texplained

Timing consideration :

Deprocessing

- Deprocessing for hardware reverse-engineering takes extra steps
- This process is not suited for optical imaging
- Complete deprocess can be achieved in about a week

HRTs' outcomes



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Timing consideration :

Image preparation : with HRT

- Select area of interest and selection of rejected features(10 minutes per layer)
- Find vias (> 100 images per minutes)
- Find grid and lines (< 1 hour per layer)
- Extract gates (1 hour)
- Correct one layer : (1 day)
- Correlate and transform pictures + generates layer netlist (< 1 hour)
- Align 2 layers together (2 minutes)

HRTs' outcomes



Texplained

Timing consideration :

Reverse-engineering custom logic : with HRT

- One layer per layer
 - No stitching problem
 - No local layer adjustment
- One click to follow net(s)
- Equations are generated automatically as well as schematic
 - No re-writing errors, software is highlighting what is missing

HRTs' outcomes



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Timing consideration :

Timing :

- After 2-3 weeks, every features are detected with good HRT
- 2 weeks later (average), LCE can be started
- Same work with « manual process » would take months


HRTs' outcomes

Texplained


Timing consideration :

Timing difference : reversing custom logic

- 6 months after start of the study, results are still not exploitable
- With first generation of HRT, same study was performed in 2 months
- With next generation of the tool, time will be reduced to 1 month
 - * With classical method, you would not have found the correct spots for LCE at this stage



HRTs' outcomes



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New threats : Possible “achievements” :

HRTs' outcomes

- 100 % success rate for hackers (excluding customized chip)
 - 6 to 12 microcontrollers a year (first extraction)
 - XX customized chip a year
- ⇒ The advanced security level becomes at best adequate
Custom hardware functions become a new kind of ROM that could be
extracted from pictures only
- ⇒ Piracy
- ⇒ Counterfeiting
- ⇒ Patent violation

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New opportunities :

HRTs' outcomes

Better security level : in depth security evaluation with new techniques

Design and routing new strategies to make invasive work more complicated


Anti-piracy by changing the nature of the hardware custom functions

Affordable patent violation studies

Counterfeiting characterization

ICs' obsolescence

Future developments



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Future developments

- Schematic creation and interaction
- From gates to functions : automatic gates grouping to reduce number of blocs to study
- Fast detection of « non aligned » features : from core to chip
- Simulator, specific analysis
- ...

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Hardware Reverse-engineering Tools new threats – new opportunities

Q&A...

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