

## Reverse Engineering MineSweeper Windows Application

Final report for the Software Reverse Engineering Project

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
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## ABSTRACT

Reverse Engineering is the process by which a product is understood by deconstructing it without having any prior information about products architecture, internal working details. As a Cryptology student, Reverse Engineering a product can help us in identifying any vulnerabilities in the product that hackers can take advantage of, and act on that accordingly.

## MINESWEEPER VIDEO GAME (WINDOW APPLICATION)

- For this project, we chose to reverse engineer windows Minesweeper application.
- Minesweeper is a single-player puzzle computer game.
- It is based on the concept of Land mines. Land mine is an explosive mine laid on or just under the surface of the ground.
- The objective of the game is to clear a rectangular board containing hidden "mines" or bombs without detonating any of them, with help from clues about the number of neighboring mines in each field.
- How to win the game?
  - A player can win the game if he can identify all the squares without clicking the mines.



## WHY MINESWEEPER FOR SOFTWARE REVERSE ENGINEERING PROJECT ?

- For this project, we chose to reverse engineer windows Video game application Minesweeper.
- Minesweeper: A game which we played a lot, but do not know much about the logic that goes behind it. We wanted to know about its logic.
- Games can often times be very frustrating. This frustration stems from the inherent fact that games, by design, present many unknowns to the player. Many develop cheats to obtain an unfair advantage. For us, however, have an entirely different motivation – the challenge it involves.
- Some bad features of a game need to be designed out.

- Resulting knowledge gained through the reverse-engineering this game can be applied to the design of similar games.
- We can learn from the shortcomings of existing designs.

## TOOLS USED

- IDA Pro – For static analysis
- OllyDbg – For dynamic analysis

## APPROACH

Suppose we have a minefield somewhere in the memory of the Minesweeper process. This minefield must contain the information regarding mine locations. If we manage to somehow change this information, so that a square with a mine will be marked with a flag we can know the location of mines and avoid clicking the mines.

In order to achieve this, we need to find information regarding mines in memory dump.

## VULNERABILITIES FOUND

### 1. Random Function:

Finding the Minefield:


How would we determine which squares contain mines and which do not in a minefield? Since this decision should yield different results with every run of the game, we can assume that some randomization function is used to generate the minefield.

Import tab in IDA pro

Address	Ordinal	Name	Library
01001168		PlaySoundW	WINMM
01001170		_controlp	msvcrt
01001174		_set_app_type	msvcrt
01001178		_p_fmode	msvcrt
0100117C		_except_handler3	msvcrt
01001180		_adjust_ldiv	msvcrt
01001184		_setusematherr	msvcrt
01001188		_initem	msvcrt
0100118C		_getmainargs	msvcrt
01001190		_acmdln	msvcrt
01001194		exit	msvcrt
01001198		_p_commode	msvcrt
0100119C		_cexit	msvcrt
010011A0		_XcpFilter	msvcrt
010011A4		_exit	msvcrt
010011A8		_c_exit	msvcrt
010011B0		stand	msvcrt
010011B0		rand	msvcrt

**rand\_caller Function:**

- rand\_caller function is used to draw a flag, a mine or an empty square
- It receives one argument which IDA calls arg\_0.
- It calls rand which returns a random integer in the EAX register.
- Then cdq is called. It expands the value in EAX such that this value is stored in EDX:EAX.
- EDX is moved to EAX right before the function returns implies that the relevant value is the division remainder .
- When idiv is called, it takes the value in EDX:EAX and divides it by the function's argument So, after this division, the quotient resides in EAX whereas the remainder (modulo) is in EDX.
- To sum up, rand\_caller randomizes a number and then performs a modulo, which makes sure the result does not exceed the value in arg\_0



```
rand_caller proc near
arg_0= dword ptr 4
call    ds:rand
cdq
idiv   [esp+arg_0]
mov     eax, edx
retn   4
rand_caller endp
```

Fig. 1

2. Using IDA Pro, we can identify the rand function and see the references to the rand function. In Figure 2, we can see that rand\_caller is being called twice.

```

loc_10036C7:
push    dword_1005334
call    rand_caller
push    dword_1005338
mov     esi, eax
inc     esi
call    rand_caller
inc     eax
mov     ecx, eax
shl     ecx, 5
test    byte_1005340[ecx+esi], 80h
jnz    short loc_10036C7

shl    eax, 5
lea    eax, byte_1005340[eax+esi]
or    byte ptr [eax], 80h
dec    dword_1005330
jnz    short loc_10036C7

```

Fig. 2

- We went to the second location in the code where rand\_caller is called
- The call appeared in a block which was a part of a loop
- This strengthened our assumption that the initial board was drawn using this function
- eax + esi is used as an offset of some memory location **byte\_1005340**

### 3. Using OllyDbg we can find out which values are passed as parameters to rand\_caller

```

EB 09 JMP SHORT winmine.01003673
6A FE PUSH -2
E8 61FBFFFF CALL winmine.01003104
E8 09 JMP SHORT winmine.01003673
6A FE PUSH -2
E8 61FBFFFF CALL winmine.01003104
5F POP EDI
5E POP ESI
5B POP EBX
C9 LEAVE
FF 0000 REFERENCE
A1 AC560001 MOU EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[10056AC]
8B0D A8560001 MOU ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[10056AB]
53 PUSH EBX
56 PUSH ESI
57 PUSH EDI
3FF XOR EDI,EDI
BB05 34530001 CMP EXX,DWORD PTR DS:[1005334]
89D0 64510001 MOU DIWORD PTR DS:[1005164],EDI
75 0C JNZ SHORT winmine.0100364
8B00 38530001 CMP ECX,DIWORD PTR DS:[1005338]
75 04 JNZ SHORT winmine.0100364
6A 00 PUSH EBX
6A 02 PUSH SHORT winmine.010036A6
6A 06 PUSH EBX
5B POP EDI
A3 34530001 MOU DIWORD PTR DS:[1005334],EXX
89D0 38530001 MOU DIWORD PTR DS:[1005338],ECX
E8 1EF8FFFF CALL winmine.01002ED5
A1 A4560001 MOU EXX,DIWORD PTR DS:[10056A0]
89D0 60510001 MOU DIWORD PTR DS:[1005160],EDI
A3 30530001 MOU DIWORD PTR DS:[1005338],EXX
FF35 34530001 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[1005334]
E8 6E020000 CALL winmine.01003940
FF35 38530001 PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[1005338]
8BF0 MOU ESI,EXX
46 INC ESI
E8 60020000 CALL winmine.01003940

```

- In the disassembly window, the first push instruction is stored at address 0x10036C7
- Hit F2 to put a breakpoint
- Run minesweeper.exe until the breakpoint we just placed is hit
- The call which follows the push is the call to rand\_caller
- we randomized a memory location and read the byte stored in this location

4. By examining the memory address in hex dump, we can easily find out mine location and empty location





Figure 3

We examined the address 0x1005340 in memory and found something that looked a lot like a minefield

- 11 times 10 followed by 21 times 0F (32 bytes in total)
- a single 10 (row delimiter)
- a sequence of 9 times 0F (9 squares)
- another single 10
- a sequence of 21 times 0F
- the base address - 0x1005340 - is the address of our minefield
- First square of the board =  $0x1005340 + 33 (0x21) = \text{0x1005361}$
- 0F is an empty square**
- 8F is a mine**

## 5. We can place the flags at the location of mines



- Right-click on this address 0x1003E61 in the memory window and choose breakpoint > memory, on write.
- Now whenever a value is written to this location - the program will stop right before executing this write
- we placed a mine by:  
0xF or 0x80 -> 0x8F (10001111)


At this location we have to place a flag.

```
-----DEC EAX
MOV BYTE PTR DS:[EAX+10053401],0F
JNZ SHORT winmine.01002EDA
MOV ECX, DWORD PTR DS:[1005334]
MOV EDX, DWORD PTR DS:[1005338]
LEA EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+2]
TEST EAX, EAX
PUSH ESI
JE SHORT winmine.01002F11
MOV ESI, EDX
SHL ESI,5
LEA ESI, DWORD PTR DS:[ESI+1005360]
DEC EAX
```


- Run the Minesweeper and Right-click on your chosen square to put a flag on it

## ADDING A PATCH

- Goal – to print flags where there are mines
  - Find in OllyDbg the address **0x10036FA** where the OR instruction is executed and click on it
  - Hit the spacebar while the line is highlighted. A popup titled "Assemble at 010036FA" will appear.
  - **0x8F in binary** - 10001111  
**0x0F in binary** - 00001111
  - We wanted to turn 0x0F into 0x8E (10001110)
  - Type in XOR instead of OR, and 81 instead of 80
  - **0x0F XOR 0x81 -> 0x8E**  
00001111 XOR 10000001 =10001110




- Right-click on the disassembly window and choose "Copy to executable"
  - Click on "Copy all".
  - Right-click again, choose "Save file" and specify location and name of the newly patched file.
  - Open the new patch exe. file from its location



## PATCHED MINESWEEPER

In the patched version of minesweeper, mines are highlighted with flags. Thus, we can know the location of mines in the game before only and avoid clicking them to win the game.



## HOW THE ORIGINAL DEVELOPER CAN PATCH THESE VULNERABILITIES ?

As we have seen the Vulnerabilities and they can be taken advantage of, in the previous section, now we can think about what a developer can do so that his software is more secure to such vulnerabilities.

- As we remember, we started with finding rand keyword in the code. This is because the developer has used previously defined random function in his logic. Instead of that a developer can implement his **own random function** that does not use any keywords.
- Also, we were able to decode a lot of information from the memory window as explained above. So, developer can be careful and use **Address Space Layout randomization (ASLR)** for the memory protection process.
- Since, the location of mines was determined when the game is loaded only, we were able to see the mines location in the hex memory window. Here, developer can implement it in such a way that mines position is determined dynamically during the runtime not statically. That is the location of mine might change as the game progress or as player keeps identifying plane grids. This way, the attacker cannot determine about the mine location, prior to the game.
- Developer could obfuscate the various functions which give the hacker the hint of program workflow.

## CONCLUSION

Throughout this document the many concepts required to successfully locate, comprehend, and manipulate the Minesweeper playing grid has been exposed. As such, many details surrounding these concepts were neglected for the sake of brevity. In order to obtain a more holistic view of the covered concepts, it is encouraged to read those items articulated in the reference section and seek out additional works.

## REFERENCES

- <https://www.hex-rays.com/products/ida/>
- <http://www.ollydbg.de/>
- [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft\\_Minesweeper](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Microsoft_Minesweeper)
- <https://www.i-programmer.info/news/150-training-a-education/12772-a-reverse-engineering-workshop-for-beginners.html>