

# Bringing in the far right:

## The electoral impact of the French Algerian repatriates

Camille Remigereau\*

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### Abstract

This paper examines how repatriated populations from former colonies affect election outcomes in the mainland. Algeria became independent on July 3, 1962, after more than a hundred years under French colonial rule. Fearing for their safety, the French Algerians of European descent fled the country massively and suddenly. I assemble a dataset consisting of census and electoral data stretching from 1945 to 2022. I exploit the uneven distribution of the repatriates from Algeria across municipalities and within electoral districts to measure their impact on vote shares. I find that an increase in the share of repatriates led to a lasting increase in far-right vote shares within districts. I provide direct evidence on how the political preferences of the repatriates fueled this rise that persisted over time and generations. Analyzing the dynamic impact of the repatriation shock from the 1965 to 2022 elections reveals a shift in repatriates' motivations: initially rooted in appeals to their material interests, their support for the far right later became primarily driven by anti-immigration concerns.

**JEL-Codes:** D72, N44, R23, Z13

**Keywords:** displacement, political economy, identity, extremism, voting

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\*University of New South Wales. Email: c.remigereau@unsw.edu.au

# 1 Introduction

The legacy of colonization continues to impact former colonies long after empires have dissolved. This influence is evident in various aspects, including institutions (Acemoglu et al., 2001), growth (Bertocchi and Canova, 2002; Besley and Burgess, 2000), fertility (Dupas et al., 2023), health (Salem, 2022; Lowes and Montero, 2021) and human capital (Cagé and Rueda, 2016; Huillery, 2009). Decolonization brought profound changes and challenges not only to former colonies but also to the colonial powers themselves, with repercussions that included migration from former colonies and debates over the legacy of colonialism (Cogneau et al., 2024; Cogneau, 2023; Cogneau et al., 2021). The end of colonial rule also spurred large-scale return migrations, such as the repatriation of *Indische Nederlanders* from Indonesia or the arrival of the *retornados* in Portugal following the decolonization of its African territories. These populations faced challenges integrating into the mainland after their lives had been uprooted. Yet, relatively little research has been conducted on the electoral impact of these returning migrants.

In this paper, I study the political impact of the repatriation of the French Algerians of European descent (sometimes referred to as *pieds-noirs*) on the regions they settled in, both in the short and the long term.<sup>1,2</sup> Algeria became independent on July 3, 1962, after more than 100 years under French rule.<sup>3</sup> Consequently, about 600,000 French from Algeria fled to mainland France that year, leading to a 1.28% increase in the mainland population and a 1.71% increase in the electorate.

Following their repatriation after the war, French Algerians showed significantly higher support for the far right—characterized by strong nationalism and xenophobia—compared to the general population (IFOP, 2014; Comtat, 2009). On one side, Benjamin Stora, a historian of colonial Algeria, argues that these tendencies were partly rooted in the colonial status of Algeria. According to Stora, as settlers in a colony, the French Algerians enjoyed a privileged position over the Algerians, who were denied basic rights and freedoms. This led to a sense of superiority among the French Algerians, who came to see themselves as the rightful rulers of Algeria (Stora, 1999). On the other side, the trauma of the war and the repatriation further contributed to the repatriates’ embrace of far-right political parties and movements. Stora (1999) and Comtat (2009) have shown that the French far right pandered to the French Algerian electorate, fueling their resentment of the mainstream political parties for renouncing French Algeria and their animosity towards Algerian immigrants. Cefalà (2022)

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<sup>1</sup>In French, the term *pieds-noirs* translates to ‘black feet’. Though its origins remain uncertain, historians suggest that the term initially referred to the indigenous Algerian population as a derogatory expression. In rural areas, many Algerians walked barefoot, resulting in dirty feet. Over time, this term is believed to have been adopted in mainland France to describe French citizens from Algeria, labeling them as second-class citizens.

<sup>2</sup>I define the repatriates from Algeria as the French who were living in Algeria as of January 1, 1962, and migrated from Algeria to France due to the Algerian independence (i.e., between 1962 and 1968). In this paper, I will refer to the ‘French from Algeria’ or ‘French Algerians’. I define them as the French (from mainland France, other European states, or Sephardic Jews) who settled in Algeria from 1830 to 1961 and their descendants born in Algeria. The French Algerians should not be confused with Algerian immigrants in France.

<sup>3</sup>French President Charles De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country on 3 July. Algerian leaders declared Independence Day on 5 July.

documents that far-right parties engaged in pork-barrel strategies targeted at repatriates. However, it remains uncertain whether the far right political gains after the repatriation were primarily driven by its pandering efforts or by the repatriates’ own preferences (i.e., the supply versus demand effects). In this paper, I leverage highly granular voting data at the municipal level, allowing me to capture the preferences of repatriates within electoral districts by keeping the political supply, i.e., the candidates, constant.<sup>4</sup> Doing this enables me to establish how the political preferences of the repatriates durably changed electoral preferences in France.

I assemble a large dataset consisting of the 1968 French census and electoral data from 1945 until 2022 (Cagé and Piketty, 2023). The 1968 census is the only French administrative dataset that allows me to identify the repatriates from Algeria. I merged census and electoral data at the municipality level. Thus, I analyze a sample of 34,400 municipalities grouped within 1,609 districts over 77 years.<sup>5</sup> This dataset covers 31 parliamentary and presidential elections, enabling analysis of the full dynamic impact of the repatriation shock on the voting shares for the far right, right, center, left, and far left.<sup>6</sup>

I exploit the uneven distribution of the repatriates from Algeria across municipalities and pre-shock electoral data (1945-1958) to estimate their impact on voting outcomes. I rely on generalized difference-in-differences with a continuous treatment, i.e., the share of repatriates from Algeria in municipality  $m$ , to identify the causal effect of the repatriation on voting outcomes. Additionally, I incorporate election-district fixed effects to assess the impact of the repatriation shock within districts. In my sample, districts are relatively small: they comprise an average of just 17 municipalities and span 268 square kilometers.<sup>7</sup> My key identifying assumption is that had there been no repatriation, all municipalities within a district—regardless of how many repatriates they received—would have seen similar changes in far-right voting. This assumption would be violated if repatriates systematically chose to settle in municipalities where far-right support was already increasing faster than in other municipalities within the same district. I show that, at the district level, repatriation patterns were not systematically directed toward municipalities with existing far-right political leanings. Specifically, repatriates did not disproportionately move to municipalities that had previously seen stronger growth in far-right or right-wing voting, nor were they more likely to settle in areas that, as of 1956, already exhibited above-average far-right support relative to their district peers. Furthermore, there is no correlation between the share of repatriates and the vote shares for nationalist parties in 1919 and 1936 (specifically, *Action Française* and *Francisme*). Lastly, I find no evidence that repatriates settled

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<sup>4</sup>A municipality (*commune* in French) is an administrative unit that typically includes a single town, village, or city. With an average population of 1,850, it is smaller than a US census tract, which usually contains around 4,000 residents. While US census tracts rarely exceed a population of 10,000, many French municipalities have populations larger than this number.

<sup>5</sup>I refer to *cantons* as districts, while *circonscriptions électorales* will be referred to as constituencies. Each constituency is composed of districts, which themselves are composed of municipalities.

<sup>6</sup>Over the years, the French far right has been represented by various parties, including the *Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans* (1956–1958), the *Alliance Républicaine pour les Libertés et le Progrès* (1965–1969), and the *Front National* (now *Rassemblement National*, from 1973 on). See Parties Classification in Appendix I.

<sup>7</sup>To put this in perspective, the single city of Marseille covers 241 square kilometers.

in areas with a higher per capita number of Nazi collaborators during World War II (Cagé et al., 2023).

My results indicate that, in the short term, municipalities with higher proportions of repatriates experienced a significant increase in far-right voting, driven by the repatriates themselves. The far right was the only political party supporting French Algeria until Algerian independence. Several prominent far-right figures were involved in the Algerian War, including Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, the far-right presidential candidate in 1965. As a lawyer, he defended members of the *Organisation Armée Secrète* (OAS), a paramilitary group that used violence to oppose Algerian independence. His 1965 campaign director, Jean-Marie Le Pen, served in the French military during the Algerian War and faced allegations of involvement in the torture of Algerian nationalists. After the repatriation, the far right appealed to repatriates by, among other things, advocating for financial compensation for their lost property. Additionally, some repatriates voted for the far right in the 1965 presidential election as a rejection of the right-wing incumbent, Charles de Gaulle, whom they blamed for ‘abandoning’ French Algeria. The far right’s strong support for their cause and resentment toward mainstream parties spurred repatriates’ alignment with them in the 1960s. In the short term, an increase in the repatriate population in municipality  $m$  also led to a significant decline in support for left-wing parties, which had backed Algerian independence.

The connection between repatriates and the far right declined from the late 1960s to the early 1980s as the political focus on repatriates’ concerns diminished, especially after the compensation laws were enacted in the 1970s. However, in the 1980s, my results show a resurgence in the far right among places that received repatriates. It paralleled the growing prominence of immigration as a political issue in France and the political rise of the *Front National*, founded by Jean-Marie Le Pen, along with former members of the OAS and the Waffen SS. I use data from the ‘Pieds-Noirs 2002’ survey to show that French Algerians were more concerned about immigration than other voters (Comtat, 2009).

I implement a series of tests to rule out other potential drivers of short- and long-term far-right voting. Hunt (1992) and Edo (2020) show that in the short term, the repatriation shock led to an increase in native unemployment. Yet, unemployment was not a central issue for the far right at the time. In line with this, I show that unemployment did not positively impact far-right vote shares in 1956 and 1958, i.e., before the repatriation shock. In the long term, my results are not explained by subsequent migration and unemployment shocks in municipalities where repatriates settled in 1968. I also demonstrate that internal migration among repatriates was minimal, ruling out concerns that it could confound the analysis of long-term persistence. To mitigate potential bias from the repatriates’ non-random settlement patterns, I use the 1954 distribution of French Algerians in mainland France as an instrument for their 1968 settlement, following Edo (2020). Although my main analysis is conducted at the municipal level, the small size of these units—just 15 square kilometers on average—poses a methodological challenge. At this fine level of geographic detail, I was unable to identify an instrument

that correlates strongly enough with the repatriates' settlement patterns. As a result, I conduct the analysis at the broader constituency level. The instrumental variable estimates at the constituency level align with my main findings in the short and medium term. In the long term, however, the effect of repatriation on far-right voting weakens more noticeably at the constituency level than at the municipal level, likely due to increasing positive local spillovers. Indeed, I find that the repatriation shock raised far-right voting not only in the municipalities where repatriates settled, but also in neighboring areas, both in the short and long term. This suggests that repatriates influenced political outcomes beyond their immediate places of residence.

My results show that the direct effect of repatriation on far-right voting has declined over the past two decades. Nevertheless, questions remain about the broader political legacy of the repatriates. To explore this, I analyze the 2022 presidential and parliamentary elections, focusing on two far-right candidates and parties, one of which has a stronger anti-immigration stance. I find that, in both elections, the share of votes for the more anti-immigrant party/candidate—relative to the total far-right vote—increases significantly with the intensity of the repatriation shock.

Finally, I use the Trajectories and Origins Surveys (TeO and TeO2) from 2008-09 and 2019-2020 to study the political opinions of the repatriates' children. These surveys offer unique individual-level data on second-generation repatriates. I find that, on average, the offspring of repatriates are less likely to identify with left-wing political views than other mainland natives. The effect is more pronounced among individuals whose parents were both repatriates. I find further evidence suggesting that the repatriates passed down their political views to their children, particularly regarding immigration. Second-generation repatriates oppose opening up immigration to France more strongly than children of mainland natives. However, they do not exhibit more conservative stances on other matters like gay rights and gender equality, underscoring the significance of immigration in shaping their voting preferences.

This paper contributes to the broader literature on migration and politics. Previous studies have focused on how immigration influences the voting preferences of native populations (e.g., Halla et al., 2017; Dustmann et al., 2019; Edo et al., 2019; Steinmayr, 2021). However, I add to the more recent literature on how migrants bring their preferences to the host community. Whereas earlier work has addressed migrants' influence on norms (e.g., Miho et al., 2024) and public policy (e.g., Chevalier et al., 2024), I study the electoral impact of the migrants' voting preferences. This paper studies forced migrants in contrast to analyses of voluntary migrants (e.g., Calderon et al., 2022; Bazzi et al., 2023). Furthermore, I examine a broader, indiscriminate group of people affected by mass repatriation, unlike studies focusing on individuals who were specifically displaced due to their political activism (e.g., Ochsner and Roesel, 2020; Dippel and Heblich, 2021). In related research, Lang and Schneider (2023) and Menon (2022) examine the political impact of the German expellees from the Eastern Territories who settled in West Germany after World War II. Lang and Schneider (2023) employ a spatial regres-

sion discontinuity design to analyze regions along the border between American and French occupation zones in post-war Germany. In contrast to my findings, their study reveals a weaker nationalist backlash against recent immigration in American-occupied areas, where expellees were allowed to resettle, compared to French-occupied areas, where resettlement was prohibited. Unlike Lang and Schneider (2023), which focuses on regions with differing post-war institutional structures, I study areas where institutional structures remained the same over time and space. Meanwhile, Menon (2022) finds a sustained increase in far-right voting in West German communities that received expellees. While Menon (2022) only considers post-war electoral outcomes, my study also includes pre-shock data, providing a more comprehensive evaluation of shifts in far-right voting behavior. Additionally, this paper extends the analysis to the descendants of repatriates, providing suggestive evidence of the intergenerational transmission of political preferences (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2012; Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017). Studying the political impact of the repatriation shock at the *département* level, Cefalà (2022) finds higher far-right vote shares in high-inflow *départements* in the short term (from 1962 to 1974) and long term (from 1982 to 2012). These results align with my findings. While Cefalà (2022) emphasizes supply-side effects—specifically, how far-right parties catered to repatriates—this paper focuses on demand-side effects, examining the impact of repatriates’ voting preferences. Because my data is at the municipal level, I am able to incorporate election-district fixed effects in my analysis. This approach offers two key advantages: first, by holding the far-right supply constant within districts, I can accurately measure the impact of the repatriates’ preferences on vote shares. Second, examining within-district variation helps mitigate potential self-selection biases that could arise at more aggregated levels. I present evidence that immigration concerns played a crucial role in driving repatriates’ far-right voting, shedding light on Cefalà’s findings regarding the long-term effects of the repatriation shock on far-right support. My findings help explain how the far right maintained its appeal within the repatriate community, even after the most extensive compensation laws for repatriates were enacted in the 1970s.<sup>8</sup> Finally, analyzing the opinions of repatriates’ children reveals heterogeneity within the community based on parental education level. I find that right-leaning tendencies and anti-immigration views are not driven by children of either low- or highly-educated parents; instead, these opinions are predominantly concentrated among those with parents of middle-level education.

I also contribute to the literature on the factors driving far-right voting, including economic insecurity and marginalization (e.g., Malgouyres, 2017; Colantone and Stanig, 2018; Autor et al., 2020; Colantone and Stanig, 2019; Dehdari, 2022), terrorism (e.g., Berrebi and Klor, 2008; Getmansky and Zeitzoff, 2014; Sabet et al., 2023), cultural attitudes and identity (e.g., Inglehart and Norris, 2016; Bonomi et al., 2021), and education (Gethin et al., 2022). However, this study examines the enduring patterns of far-right voting brought by a community of forced migrants. As such, this paper highlights

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<sup>8</sup>The two most comprehensive compensation laws were passed in 1970 and 1978. In 1970, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing served as Finance Minister under conservative president Georges Pompidou. In 1978, he was serving as the center-right president himself.

that regional responses to immigration often vary based on historical factors, especially the political preferences of residents in those areas (Cantoni et al., 2019; Schindler and Westcott, 2021). It also provides additional evidence on the persistent impact of political conflict on political preferences and how it can be reactivated by political cleavages (Fouka and Voth, 2023). Similar to Ochsner and Roesel (2024), I find that shared traumas can reignite far-right voting. I further link the experience of displacement in the decolonization context with the preference for the far right.

Others have used this specific migration shock to analyze other outcomes. Hunt (1992) and Edo (2020) have investigated its impact on native labor market outcomes and found a positive effect on native unemployment in the short term. I provide complementary evidence on the economic integration of the repatriates contributing to the existing, multidisciplinary literature on repatriates from Algeria (e.g., Baillet, 1975a,b; Couto, 2013, 2014; Veugelers et al., 2015). I supplement those studies by quantifying the political impact of the repatriates in the regions that welcomed them. More generally, this study is part of the literature on the consequences of forced migration (see Becker and Ferrara (2019) and Becker (2022) for a review).

The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 explains the historical background. In Section 3, I describe who the repatriates were and how they integrated into the mainland economy. Section 4 describes the data and presents the empirical framework. Sections 5 and 6 include the results and robustness tests in the short term and the long term, respectively. 7 provides additional robustness tests. In Section 8, I further study the political legacy of the repatriates. I conclude in Section 9.

## **2 Historical background**

### **2.1 French Algeria and the Algerian Independence War**

The French colonization of Algeria in the 19th century created a society of juxtaposed communities, with the European colonizers and the Algerian people living largely separate lives. The colonial society fostered institutional racism, and the Algerian population was denied the full rights of French citizenship (Stora, 1991).

The Algerian War of Independence was formally initiated on November 1, 1954, when Algerian nationalists from the National Liberation Front (FLN) launched attacks on military and civilian sites across Algeria. The French government in Paris grew increasingly vulnerable as the conflict endured, prompting a government change. In 1958, Charles de Gaulle assumed the French presidency to resolve the Algerian conflict. Initially advocating for maintaining Algeria as part of France, de Gaulle's stance eventually shifted due to mounting national and international pressures. In 1959, he announced his intention to submit the question of self-determination for Algerians to a referendum. On January 8, 1961, the referendum on the self-determination of Algeria was held, with 75% of the voters approving it.

Many French Algerians, integral to the colonial system and its perpetuation, felt the referendum's results were a betrayal. In response, the *Organisation de l'Armée Secrète* (OAS), a far-right terrorist organization, was created. To prevent Algeria's independence from French colonial rule, the OAS carried out terrorist attacks mainly in Algeria and mainland France. Convinced that the OAS was best able to ensure their protection, the French from Algeria largely backed the organization. The 'Pieds-Noirs 2002' survey indicates that 70% of the polled French Algerians supported the OAS (Comtat, 2009).<sup>9</sup> Despite the OAS's efforts, the Évian Accords were signed on March 18, 1962, officially ending the Algerian War. On July 3, 1962, Charles de Gaulle declared the independence of Algeria.

## 2.2 The exodus

The end of the war and the independence of Algeria led to a massive and sudden out-migration of the French population. Of the 1,024,000 French Algerians living in Algeria in 1960, only 91,276 lived in Algeria in 1965 (Scioldo-Zürcher, 2010). The majority of the French from Algeria sought refuge in France.<sup>10</sup>

Figure 1 shows the migrant inflows of French citizens of European descent from Algeria to mainland France from 1954 until 1968. In the 1968 Census, 1,103,153 individuals indicated living in Algeria on January 1, 1962. Of those migrants from Algeria, 926,000 had French nationality in 1968. 884,206 (85.49%) were French Algerians of European descent, while 41,794 (4.51%) were French Algerians of North African descent (indigenous Algerians). Finally, 157,803 (17.04%) declared having Algerian nationality.<sup>12</sup> It has been estimated that 15% of the French Algerian repatriates were Jewish (Guillon, 1974). However, since French administrative data does not include information on religion, it is impossible to specifically identify Jewish repatriates using the available census data.

I estimate that around 581,723 French citizens of European descent arrived from Algeria between March and December 1962 using the 1968 Census supplementary data. The repatriates largely arrived in southern France, with Marseille being the principal port of entry. The government had estimated the number of repatriates to be around 400,000 over four years (Esclangon-Morin, 2007). Taken by surprise

<sup>9</sup>The 'Pieds-Noirs 2002' survey - PACTE / CIDSP (UMR 5194) - is a self-administered survey launched in 2002. It was carried out among 6,000 Algerians of European descent born in Algeria before 1962 and living in Isère, Alpes-Maritimes, and Hérault. The contact details of the persons were obtained by drawing lots from the electoral rolls showing the place of birth of those registered. The questionnaire focuses on the political behavior of the French Algerians in Algeria and France since 1962, their professional paths, and their memory.


<sup>10</sup>Few went to Spain (est. 50,000), Canada (est. 12,000), Israel (est. 10,000), or Argentina (est. 1,500) (Palacio, 1968).

<sup>11</sup>The census only records the year of migration between Algeria and mainland France between censuses. Hence, the 1962 census only indicates the year of migration if the individual moved after the 1954 census. I cannot identify French citizens born outside of Algeria who might have lived there before 1954.

<sup>12</sup>Within the Algerian immigrants (with and without French nationality) were the *harkis*, i.e., indigenous Algerians who fought on the side of France during the war and faced persecution in Algeria. They did not receive benefits upon arrival since the government wanted to avoid their massive resettlement in France. Since many settled in France clandestinely, the number of *harkis* who fled persecution is difficult to estimate precisely. Thénault (2008, p.86) estimates that approximately 60,000 *harkis* and their families migrated to France after 1962. Even though they are now considered repatriates, I will exclude them from my analysis to focus on a more homogeneous group. Furthermore, I want to avoid the confusion between the political reaction to migrants (i.e., racism against the *harkis*) and the political behavior brought by migrants.



Figure 1: Inflows of French of European descent from Algeria to mainland France by Year of Arrival



Sources: 1962 and 1968 censuses.

Notes: The columns of the graph show the inflows of French of European descent from Algeria to France between 1954 and 1968 (see values on the left y-axis). The number of migrants between 1954 and 1961 is calculated from the 1962 census. The number of migrants between 1962 and 1968 is calculated from the 1968 census. The red line represents the share of French from Algeria in the mainland population (see values on the right y-axis). The French from Algeria are defined as French citizens of European descent living in Algeria at the time of the last census (i.e., the 1954 census for those between 1954 and 1961 and the 1962 census for those between 1962 and 1968) and in mainland France in the subsequent census. The French from Algeria also included those who migrated before 1954. In that case, the French from Algeria are defined as French citizens of European descent born in Algeria.<sup>11</sup>


by the massive influx of repatriates, public authorities were unable to prevent their concentration in southern France.

In 1968, 68.34% of repatriates from Algeria lived in 7 southern regions, accounting for 27.37% of the total population.<sup>13</sup> Figure 2 shows the concentration of French Algerian repatriates in the southern regions and around Paris and Lyon. Several factors contributed to the repatriates' settlement in the South of France. Some initially planned to return to Algeria once the unrest subsided, which led them to remain in the Mediterranean region. The climate and lifestyle closely resembled Algeria's, and many had family connections to these areas (Guillon, 1974). The measures implemented by the government at the time to prevent the concentration of the repatriates in the south mostly failed (Esclangon-Morin, 2007).<sup>14</sup>

<sup>13</sup> Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur, Corse, Languedoc-Roussillon, Midi-Pyrénées, Aquitaine, Rhône-Alpes and Poitou-Charente.

<sup>14</sup> The details of the government incentives are described in Appendix B.

Figure 2: Distribution of repatriates from Algeria in 1968



Sources: 1962 and 1968 censuses.

Notes: The map presents the share of repatriates defined as the number of repatriates from Algeria, i.e., French living in Algeria as of January 1, 1962, divided by the number of French voters in municipality  $m$  in 1962. The unity of observation is at the municipality level.

### 2.3 French Algerian repatriates and politics

Historians and political scientists shed light on the special relationship between the French far right and the French Algerian repatriates (e.g., Stora, 1999; Comtat, 2009). Yet, the relationship between the two is neither automatic nor straightforward. The affinity of a part of the repatriate community towards the far right can be explained through two main channels: their relationship with the Algerians and their resentment towards French politicians.

**Before the War** Using pre-Algeria War electoral data and interviews with French Algerian repatriates, Comtat (2009) argues that political opinions and behaviors were not homogeneous in Algeria. The left-wing parties were popular at certain times in Algeria.<sup>15</sup> The ‘Pieds-Noirs 2002’ survey indicates that around 52% of the French Algerian repatriates in the sample were leaning right before the Algerian War, 21% were leaning left, and 4% were far-right leaning (see Figure 3).<sup>16</sup>


Table 1 presents the 1951 election results for the French mainland and Algeria separately.<sup>17</sup> It shows that the population of European descent in Algeria leaned more to the right (+7.69pp) and the

<sup>15</sup>French Algerians (of European descent) elected 4 (out of 10) left-wing MPs as a national left-wing coalition (the *Front Populaire*) came to power in 1936 (Marynowar, 2014).

<sup>16</sup>The ‘Pieds-Noirs 2002’ survey took place 48 years after the beginning of the Algerian War in 1954. One should consider the possibility that some French Algerians might have had a revisionist memory, considering their age, the time lapsed, and the events during and after the war.

<sup>17</sup>At the time, there were two electoral colleges in Algeria. One was made up of French from Algeria of European descent, and the other of French from Algeria of Arab descent. Since Algeria was fully integrated into France as a *département*, all were considered French. The results presented here are those for the former college. French from Algeria of Arabic descent were allowed to vote in mainland France without separate electoral colleges.

Figure 3: Distribution of the political opinions of the French Algerians before the Algeria war



Source: ‘Pieds-Noirs 2002’ survey (Comtat, 2009, p. 69).

Notes: The ‘Pieds-Noirs 2002’ survey - PACTE/CIDSP (UMR 5194) - is a self-administered survey launched in 2002. It was carried out among 6,000 French citizens of European descent born in Algeria before 1962 and living in Isère, Alpes-Maritimes, and Hérault. The contact details of the persons were obtained by drawing lots from the electoral rolls showing the place of birth of those registered. The questionnaire focuses on the political behavior of the French Algerians in Algeria and France since 1962, their professional paths, and their memory. Hence, the survey includes repatriates and French Algerians who migrated before 1962. The French children from Algeria might be born in Algeria or mainland France. Gaullism is a French political stance based on the thoughts and actions of Charles de Gaulle. It is aligned with the right on the political spectrum.

center (+5.01pp) than the mainland population before the war. Stora (1999) argues that the colonial system in Algeria may have played a role in the formation of racism. Under this system, French Algerians experienced racial domination, which led to the propagation of negative stereotypes about Algerians. Europeans were seen as superior to the indigenous population and were granted significant economic, social, and political privileges. While the connection between the French Algerians and the far right in Algeria before the Algerian War was not as strong as it became after the conflict, the colonial system in Algeria laid the groundwork for the rise of the far right within the repatriates’ community after the war.

**During and after the War** The war disrupted traditional political alignments (Stora, 1999; Comtat, 2017). The French from Algeria were first supportive of De Gaulle, who they saw as a defender of French Algeria. Feeling betrayed by him following his renunciation of French Algeria, they turned to the far right. As discussed in Section 2.1, most French Algerians supported the OAS, a far-right terrorist group established to maintain French control over Algeria. For many French from Algeria, the far right was the only political group that stood by them during and after the crisis. In the 1960s, far-right candidates strongly supported the amnesty of crimes committed during the Algerian War and financial compensation for their property lost in Algeria. In the 1965 presidential election, the far-right candidate was Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignacour, a supporter of French Algeria and

Table 1: Results of the 1951 parliamentary elections

	Mainland		Algeria	
Registered to vote	24,530,523		540,348	
Votes counted	19,129,064		369,112	
Far left	5,056,605	27.05%	77,609	21.03%
Left	3,219,470	17.23%	37,726	10.30%
Center	4,207,967	22.51%	100,819	27.52%
Right	6,118,757	32.74%	148,142	40.43%
Others	87,346	0.47%	2,103	0.57%

Source: *Élections législatives du 17 juin 1951*, Ministère de l'Intérieur.

Notes: no far-right political party took part in the elections that year. See Table C1 for more details on the parties and their classification.

fervent critic of President De Gaulle. Though the far right's rhetoric might have attracted a large share of the community, another share was not.<sup>18</sup> Yet, the repatriates' experience of colonialism and decolonization created a legacy of political and cultural alienation that has made them susceptible to the appeal of the far right. Comtat (2009) gathered some qualitative evidence of the repatriate's resentment of mainstream parties.

*'At the start, they were mostly protest votes, for sure, when you have a trauma, it doesn't go away just like that!... In relation to the Algerian War! In relation to what happened with those politicians!... We weren't punishing the person, we were punishing the party, the idea, we were punishing everything, really! All of that, without taking sides, neither right nor left!'*<sup>19</sup> Male, 70 years old, retired from the semi-public sector, from Algiers, Alpes-Maritimes. (Comtat, 2009)

*'De Gaulle, that, I could never forget what he did... especially since they [the Gaullists of the RPR] still claim to follow de Gaulle. For me, it's the same, it's the same family.'*<sup>20</sup> Female, 59 years old, administrative officer in the National Education, from Algiers, Isère. (Comtat, 2009)

*'It's partly because of them that we lost Algeria, because of the socialists, the communists!... In 54-55, in Montpellier, the socialists and communists were marching... They called us 'colonialists'... It wasn't true! I had Arab friends... I know I'm not a socialist... It's true that they... along with the communists, they did a lot of harm to Algeria... They pushed for independence... They didn't support*

<sup>18</sup>Esclangon-Morin (2007) notes that the center coalitions had the most repatriates (fifteen) on their lists in the 1965 municipal elections.

<sup>19</sup>*'C'étaient pour la plupart, au départ, des votes sanctions, il est certain, quand on a un traumatisme, il ne s'évacue pas comme ça !... Par rapport à la guerre d'Algérie ! Par rapport à ce qui s'est passé avec ces hommes politiques !... On ne sanctionnait pas l'homme, on sanctionnait le parti, l'idée, on sanctionnait tout, quoi ! Tout ça, sans parti pris, ni droite, ni gauche !'*

<sup>20</sup>*'De Gaulle, ça, je pourrais jamais oublier ce qu'il a fait... surtout qu'ils [les gaullistes du RPR] se réclament toujours de de Gaulle. Pour moi c'est pareil, c'est la même famille.'*

us! Mitterrand... we lost a lot because of him, we lost Algeria!’<sup>21</sup> Male, 65 years old, retired municipal employee, from Algiers, Hérault. (Comtat, 2009)

Circumstantially, the *Front National* took over a local branch of the *Cercle National des Rapatriés*, a repatriate organization, in 1987. The long-term preference for the far right in the repatriate community has been documented through surveys. A 2002 exit poll found that 30% of French from Algeria voted for far-right candidates in the first round of the presidential election, i.e., around 10 points over the national far-right vote share. Table H1 presents the voting intentions for the first round of the 2012 presidential elections. 21.5% of French repatriates from Algeria expressed an intention to vote for Marine Le Pen, the far-right candidate, in the presidential elections, compared to 14% of non-French Algerian voters over the age of 50. The French from Algeria display a stronger preference for right-wing candidates overall, with a 10.5pp increase compared to non-French from Algeria. Descendants of French from Algeria appear slightly more inclined to vote for the far-right candidate and less inclined to vote for the moderate left than individuals with no French Algerian ancestry (+2pp and -3pp, respectively).

## 2.4 The French far right

The French far right’s ideology throughout the 20th century consistently centered on nationalism and xenophobia, even as the movement evolved. In 1899, the nationalist and monarchist movement *Action Française* emerged, advocating for the restoration of the monarchy while espousing anti-republican, anti-democratic, and anti-Semitic views. Later, in 1933, the *Franciste* movement appeared, drawing inspiration from Italian Fascism and promoting an authoritarian, nationalist, and anti-communist state. During World War II, the French far right actively collaborated with the Nazis, both within the Vichy regime and independently.<sup>22</sup> Notable figures such as Jacques Doriot and Marcel Déat formed collaborationist parties that actively supported the Nazi occupation and adopted fascist ideologies. In the aftermath of the war, its extensive collaboration with the Nazi regime led to widespread discreditation of the far-right movement (Marcus, 2000; Shields, 2007).

The Algerian War served as a catalyst for the resurgence of nationalism in France (Cohen, 1980). This far-right revival was initially facilitated by the Poujadist movement, led by Pierre Poujade. Founded in 1954 as the *Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans* (UDCA), it began as a grass-roots movement of small shopkeepers opposing government inspectors. Over time, Poujade redirected

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<sup>21</sup> ‘C’est un peu par rapport à eux qu’on a perdu l’Algérie, par les socialistes, les communistes !... En 54-55, à Montpellier, les socialistes, les communistes, ils défilaient... On nous traitait de ‘colonialistes’ ... C’était faux ! Moi, j’avais des copains arabes... Je sais que je suis pas socialiste... C’est vrai qu’eux... entre les communistes, ils ont fait beaucoup de mal à l’Algérie... Ils ont poussé pour l’indépendance... Ils ne nous ont pas soutenus ! Mitterrand... on a perdu beaucoup par rapport à lui, on a perdu l’Algérie !’

<sup>22</sup>The Vichy regime was the authoritarian government that ruled France from 1940 to 1944 after the country’s defeat by Nazi Germany in World War II. Led by Marshal Philippe Pétain, it collaborated with the Nazis, implementing policies that included deporting Jews and suppressing resistance efforts.

its focus towards defending French Algeria (Marcus, 2000). Although Poujadism eventually faded, it had served as a crucial platform for nationalists to consolidate their efforts. Several far-right figures with connections to the Nazi-collaborationist Vichy regime became active in the pro-Algeria far-right movement. Among them were Jacques Isorni, who had served as Marshal Pétain’s lawyer; Pierre Bousquet, a former member of the Waffen SS Charlemagne Division; and Jean-Louis Tixier-Vignancour, a former Under-Secretary of State for Information in Vichy France.

In 1965, Tixier-Vignancour ran for president with Jean-Marie Le Pen, a former Poujadist deputy and paratrooper in the Algerian War, serving as his campaign director. Seven years later, Le Pen founded his own far-right party, the *Front National* (FN). Although the FN initially struggled to gain substantial electoral support, the party experienced a breakthrough in the 1980s (see Table C2). From then on, the FN gradually grew in popularity. The party’s discourse on immigration encompassed xenophobic and discriminatory rhetoric. In 2011, Marine Le Pen, daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, assumed the party leadership, aiming to rebrand the FN into a mainstream political entity by toning down its xenophobic image. This strategy proved successful, as evidenced by Marine Le Pen’s presence in the second round of the presidential elections against Emmanuel Macron in 2017 and 2022. However, she was ultimately defeated in both instances, losing 66.1% to 33.9% in 2017 and 58.55% to 41.45% in 2022.

### 3 The economic integration of the repatriates

As the repatriates arrived in mainland France, they faced considerable challenges integrating economically. Table C3 compares the French Algerian repatriates and natives in the 1968 Census. The French Algerian repatriates were, on average, four years younger than the natives. Moreover, they were more educated than natives, i.e., 11.89% of the repatriates had a high school diploma or more (5.77pp more than natives). They were also more likely to be in university at age 18 or more. 9.45% of the repatriates were working in higher managerial and intellectual positions. Only 23.03% of repatriates were blue-collar workers, compared to 31.54% of mainland natives. The colonial economy had a poorly developed industry. The French from Algeria worked in the tertiary sector, such as office workers, civil servants, salespeople, small business owners, artisans, etc. (Esclangon-Morin, 2007). The repatriates were overrepresented in the public sector, with 28.79% of the repatriates working in public administration (19.30pp more than the natives). They were also more likely to be unemployed (+1.38pp) and out of the labor force (+4.94pp) six years after their arrival.

I use the data from the Permanent Demographic Sample (*Échantillon Démographique Permanent* or EDP) to look at the economic integration of the repatriates from Algeria in the short and medium term. The EDP is a large-scale socio-demographic panel established with census data to study the birth rate, mortality, relationships, and geographical migrations within the national perimeter. Since

it contains the 1968 census data, the EDP is a unique dataset that allows one to identify repatriates directly and follow them from census to census. I can identify 6,194 French individuals living in Algeria as of January 1, 1962. In Table C4, I estimate the unemployment gap between repatriates and natives, controlling for education level, birth year, gender, and region. Despite government efforts to ease the repatriates' integration into the labor market, they faced higher unemployment risks in the 1990s. This challenges earlier studies that depicted their economic integration as a success (Baillet, 1975a; Rowley, 1990).<sup>23</sup> Nevertheless, my results align with the findings of Couto (2014). Similarly, Bauer et al. (2013) finds that expellees from the Eastern Territories after WWII were more likely to be unemployed 25 years after they arrived in West Germany. My findings shed light on the similarities between the repatriates and the expellees. The repatriates' fragile attachment to the labor market might have further fed their resentment.

## 4 Data & Methodology

### 4.1 Data

I use data from the 1968 French census to identify French Algerian repatriates. The 1968 census is a unique dataset that distinguishes repatriates from Algeria from indigenous Algerians living in Algeria in 1962 who were French as of 1968. I define the repatriates from Algeria as the French who were living in Algeria as of January 1, 1962, and in mainland France in 1968 (as explained in Section 2.2, I exclude the *harkis* from my analysis). The data for the 1968 census have been provided by the French Statistical Office (INSEE) and the Secure Access Data Center (CASD).

I merge the census with municipality-level data from Cagé and Piketty (2023), which includes electoral data from 1945 to 2022 and municipal indicators from 1961 (the number of French voters, proportion of foreign residents, share of high-school graduates aged 25 and over, percentages of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and percentile ranking of municipality size). Using this combined dataset, I calculate the share of repatriates at the municipality level, defined as  $AlgRepShare_m$ :

$$AlgRepShare_m = \left( \frac{Repatriates_{m,1968}}{Voters_{m,1961}} \right) \times 100 \quad (1)$$

The numerator captures the number of repatriates from Algeria in municipality  $m$  in 1968, while the denominator represents the number of voters in 1961—prior to the repatriation shock—ensuring that the measure reflects the impact of the repatriation on the existing electorate.<sup>24</sup> My final dataset includes 34,400 municipalities and spans 31 elections from 1945 to 2022.

<sup>23</sup>The government created a list of job vacancies where repatriates were given priority (Hunt, 1992).

<sup>24</sup>The results remain unchanged when using the number of individuals with French nationality as the denominator.

## 4.2 Specification

First, I estimate the following specification to estimate the overall effect of the repatriation shock on political outcomes:

$$VoteShare_{me} = \beta(AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}) + \gamma(X_{m,1961} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}) + \lambda_m + \phi_{de} + \epsilon_{me} \quad (2)$$

$VoteShare_{me}$  is the vote share for candidates from a given political group (Far right, Right, Center, Left, and Far left) in municipality  $m$  in district  $d$  in the first round of election  $e$ .<sup>25</sup> The results are conditional on having a candidate for one of the political groups in the constituency of municipality  $m$  in election  $e$ .<sup>26</sup> There were no far-right candidates in the elections held in 1945, January and November of 1946, 1951, 1969, and 1981 (refer to Table C2). Additionally, no far-left candidates participated in the 1965 presidential election.  $X_{m,1961}$  includes the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I include election-district fixed effects ( $\phi_{de}$ ) to control for unobserved shocks at the district level. This ensures that within each district, municipalities share the same candidate.<sup>27</sup> Thus, I measure the demand-side effect—specifically, the influence stemming from the voters themselves—on voting in the municipalities that received repatriates. I also control for municipality fixed effects ( $\lambda_m$ ) to exploit time-invariant variation across municipalities. Because candidate entry, party coordination, and most campaign activities operate at the district level, I cluster standard errors by electoral district throughout the analysis to account for any correlation of the residuals within each district.

Second, I also estimate  $\beta_e$  to observe the evolution of the impact of the repatriation shock on vote shares:

$$VoteShare_{me} = \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \beta_e(AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \gamma_e(X_{m,1961} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \lambda_m + \phi_{de} + \epsilon_{me} \quad (3)$$

## 4.3 Identification

In specifications (2) and (3), I rely on generalized difference-in-differences with a continuous treatment, i.e., the share of repatriates from Algeria in municipality  $m$ , to identify  $\beta$  and  $\beta_e$ . Callaway et al.

<sup>25</sup>The classifications of parties and candidates into political groups are presented in the appendix.

<sup>26</sup>This analysis focuses on the intensive margin—that is, the vote share achieved—rather than the extensive margin, which concerns whether a candidate is present at all. Although the decision to field a candidate could also be influenced by the repatriation shock, the actual choice to run a candidate is also determined by the existing political supply in the electoral district. In particular, for marginal parties, the presence of a candidate in a constituency not only reflects the demand of the voter but also the availability of potential candidates.

<sup>27</sup>An electoral constituency encompasses multiple districts; in other words, constituencies for legislative elections are made up of districts.



(2024) show that in cases where the treatment is continuous and not binary, one requires a ‘strong’ parallel trends assumption.<sup>28</sup> Here, the strong parallel trends assumption means that changes in voting behaviors in municipalities with low shares of repatriates provide a good counterfactual for the changes in voting behaviors that would have happened in municipalities with high shares of repatriates within the same districts.

Table 2: Balancing tests for observable municipal characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Levels			Trends	
	Mean	Within regions	Within districts	Mean	Within regions	Within districts
	<i>Observations</i>			<i>Observations</i>		
<b>Political outcomes</b>						
Voting shares for the ...						
... far right (1956)	13.94	0.065**	-0.000	-9.76	-0.024	0.006
	<i>26,907</i>	(0.0309)	(0.0098)	<i>24,922</i>	(0.0389)	(0.0156)
... right (1956)	24.42	-0.150**	0.001	16.00	0.146	0.040
	<i>27,476</i>	(0.0738)	(0.0098)	<i>39,416</i>	(0.1142)	(0.0557)
... <i>Action Française</i> (1919)	1.60	0.006	0.003			
	<i>31,967</i>	(0.0043)	(0.0032)			
... <i>Francisme</i> (1936)	1.32	0.004	0.003			
	<i>32,433</i>	(0.0025)	(0.0023)			
Ratio of collaborators (1944)	0.09	0.000	0.000			
	<i>33,129</i>	(0.0004)	(0.0003)			
<b>Other municipal indicators</b>						
Relative to the national average						
Average income (1961)	80.83	0.202**	-0.091**	247.4	0.229	0.577*
	<i>34,725</i>	(0.0834)	(0.0449)	<i>69,450</i>	(0.8934)	(0.3388)
Real estate capital per capita (1961)	84.33	0.245**	-0.068	2.97	0.021	0.004
	<i>34,500</i>	(0.1112)	(0.0641)	<i>69,000</i>	(0.0282)	(0.0094)
Percentile rank of homeownership rate (1961)	78.16	-0.026	-0.035	0.33	0.019	0.005
	<i>34,700</i>	(0.0567)	(0.0680)	<i>69,400</i>	(0.0134)	(0.0140)
Share of higher-level professionals (1961)	0.64	-0.001	-0.001			
	<i>34,709</i>	(0.0023)	(0.0023)			
Share of middle-level professionals (1961)	3.24	0.001	0.011			
	<i>34,709</i>	(0.0072)	(0.0081)			
Share of employees (1961)	9.19	0.017	-0.009			
	<i>34,709</i>	(0.0132)	(0.0119)			
Share of refractory priests (1791)	44.80	0.237***	0.023			
	<i>29,452</i>	(0.0763)	(0.0146)			

Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients from regressing municipal indicators as well as the changes in these indicators on the 1968 share of repatriates ( $AlgRepShare_m$ ). The year indicated in parentheses next to each indicator represents the measurement year for the level regressions. For the trend regressions, the vote share changes are calculated between 1956 and 1958 for the far right and between 1945 and 1958 for the right-wing, as these years are the furthest available from 1961. Changes in municipal indicators are measured between 1956 and 1961. The share of higher-level professionals includes individuals in roles such as senior managers, doctors, professors, lawyers, and other advanced intellectual professions. These roles align with the French category ‘*cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures*’, which encompasses highly skilled and managerial positions across various sectors. The share of middle-level professionals includes individuals in roles such as middle managers, technicians, school teachers, and nurses. These roles correspond to the French category ‘*professions intermédiaires*’, representing occupations that require a combination of technical skills and supervisory responsibilities but are below the senior management level. ‘Refractory priests’ refers to clergy who refused to pledge allegiance to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy during the French Revolution, which aimed to bring the Church under state control. I use this as an indicator of religious adherence. Columns (2) and (5) include region fixed effects, while Columns (3) and (6) incorporate district fixed effects. The regressions control for  $X_{m,1961}$ , which includes the proportion of foreign residents, the proportion of high school graduates among individuals aged 25 and older, the proportions of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile rank of municipality size in 1961. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

I provide evidence in line with the identification assumption by showing that after controlling for  $X_{m,1961}$  and district-election fixed effects, municipalities with different shares of repatriates had similar levels and trends in various observables that may affect voting behavior. Columns (2) and (3) in Table 2 present estimated coefficients from regressions of various pre-shock variables on the 1968

<sup>28</sup>In the case of a DiD with continuous treatment, the Two-Way Fixed Effects estimator ( $\beta_{TWFE}$ ) equals the weighted average of the  $ACRT(d|d)$ , i.e., the average causal response for units receiving treatment dose  $j$ , plus another positively-weighted average of ‘selection bias’ terms coming from heterogeneous treatment effects across dose groups. The assumption of ‘strong’ parallel trends can eliminate selection bias.

share of repatriates. First, I assess pre-shock political outcomes, including vote shares for far-right and right-wing candidates in 1956, for *Francisme* in 1936, for *Action Française* in 1919, and the ratio of Nazi collaborators during World War II (Cagé et al., 2023).<sup>29</sup> Notably, many Nazi collaborators later aligned with the pro-Algeria far right, contributing to its revival in the 1970s (see section 2.4).

The analysis reveals that the 1968 repatriate share is not significantly related to either Nazi collaboration or nationalist voting patterns before 1956. This suggests that municipalities receiving repatriates were not inherently predisposed toward right-wing extremism. However, in 1956, municipalities that welcomed repatriates were more likely to vote for far-right parties and less likely to support right-wing parties than other municipalities in the same region. However, this pattern disappears when comparing municipalities within the same district. Next, I regress other municipal indicators on the 1968 share of repatriates. Within regions, the 1968 repatriate share correlates with real estate capital, average income, and the share of refractory priests, a proxy for religiousness.<sup>30</sup> However, these correlations mostly disappear when controlling for district fixed effects, except for the relationship between the 1968 repatriate share and average income at the municipal level.

I further analyze the correlation between the 1968 share of repatriates and both political and economic trends before the repatriation shock. To begin, I examine whether the repatriates' settlement was linked to pre-shock political trends by analyzing changes in right-wing vote shares from 1945 to 1958 and changes in far-right vote shares from 1956 to 1958 (since no far-right candidates ran before 1956). Column (6) shows that a 1pp increase in the 1968 repatriate share corresponds to a 0.006pp rise in far-right vote share between 1956 and 1958—a small change, given that the far-right vote share dropped by an average of 9.76pp during this period. At the district level, the repatriate share is not significantly associated with changes in right-wing voting. In addition, I assess the impact of the 1968 share of repatriates on changes in municipal indicators between 1956 and 1961. The results suggest no significant correlation, except for a rise in average income relative to the national average, which I later control for in my main specification. This adjustment does not alter the primary findings.<sup>31</sup>

## 5 Short term

### 5.1 Results

Table 3 presents the estimates for  $\beta$  from specification (2), focusing on elections held between 1945 and 1968. These estimates aim to capture the short-term effects of the repatriation shock. The coefficients in Column (1) show the average effect of the repatriation shock on voting outcomes over that period. The coefficient in Column (1) shows an expected 0.18pp increase in the far-right vote shares resulting

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<sup>29</sup>Collaboration in France during World War II refers to the cooperation between the Vichy regime and Nazi Germany following the occupation of France in 1940.

<sup>30</sup>Refractory priests' refers to clergy who refused to pledge allegiance to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy during the French Revolution, which aimed to bring the Church under state control.

<sup>31</sup>See Table F5 in the Appendix.

from an increase in the share of repatriates by 1pp.

Table 3: The impact of the repatriation shock on vote shares (1945 - 1969)

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Far right	Right	Center	Left	Far left
$AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.180*** (0.0523)	-0.013 (0.0171)	0.020 (0.0126)	-0.057** (0.0252)	-0.026 (0.0167)
Observations	76,291	255,852	290,147	239,132	252,811
Number of municipalities	30,066	34,497	34,547	34,543	34,544

Notes: The table presents the estimated  $\beta$  from specification (2) for both parliamentary and presidential elections between 1945 and 1968. The coefficient  $\beta$  represents the expected change in  $VoteShare_{me}$ , measured in percentage points (pp), for every 1pp increase in  $AlgRepShare_m$ . I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The number of observations varies, as the outcome depends on the presence of a candidate from a specific political orientation in each election. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

I argue that the effect observed is not a reaction from pre-existing natives to the repatriates but rather due to the voting of the repatriates themselves. As explained in Section 2.3, not only were the French Algerians slightly more conservative than the mainland voters, but the far right campaigned in the repatriates' favor in the 1960s. It criticized the decision of the French government to leave Algeria and supported financial reparations for the repatriates. Hence, the far right was widely recognized as promoting the political demands of the repatriates. During the 1965 presidential election campaign, Tixier-Vignancour, a former lawyer for the OAS and an ardent defender of French Algeria campaigned against De Gaulle (the sitting president and conservative candidate). In this election, a vote for the far right was also a vote of opposition to De Gaulle. A repatriate interviewed by Emmanuelle Comtat reported: *'Of course, all the repatriates voted against de Gaulle! That's for sure, absolutely! Yes! A guy who throws you out, you're not going to vote for him, right?'*<sup>32</sup> (Comtat, 2009).

The impact of the repatriation shock on left-leaning parties is non-negligible. As explained in Section 2.3, the repatriates held the left-leaning parties responsible for the loss of French Algeria. As one repatriate said: *'The pieds-noirs also harbored a lot of resentment towards the far-left parties, which did everything to make us leave Algeria.'*<sup>33</sup> (Comtat, 2009). Subsequently, left-leaning parties were not particularly supportive of the repatriates. In the summer of 1962, as two-thirds of the French Algerian repatriates arrived in Marseille, the city's socialist mayor, Gaston Defferre, famously declared, "Have them reintegrate elsewhere" (*"Qu'ils aillent se réadapter ailleurs"*). This statement captured the sentiment of many mainland natives who viewed the repatriates as opportunistic settlers.

<sup>32</sup> *'C'est sûr que tous les rapatriés ont voté contre de Gaulle ! ça, c'est sûr et certain, ah oui ! Un type qui vous fout dehors, on va pas voter pour lui, hein !'*

<sup>33</sup> *'Les pieds-noirs en voulaient aussi beaucoup à des partis... aux partis d'extrême gauche, qui ont tout fait pour qu'on quitte l'Algérie.'*

The mainland population did not always welcome the repatriates with open arms. According to a Sofres survey, 53% of the French population thought that the French Algerian repatriates did not do what it took to integrate into French society in September 1962. Table D1 presents the opinions on government aid to the repatriates by political affiliation. 26% and 23% of the far-left and left-wing voters thought that the State had spent too much money on the resettlement of repatriates. Compared to only 19% and 13% of far-right and right-leaning voters.<sup>34</sup> Regarding financial reparation for the repatriates, 14%, and 9% of the far-right and right-wing voters thought the State should compensate all of them for their lost assets. On the other side of the political scale, 48% and 43% of the far-left and left-wing voters believed the French government should only compensate the most disadvantaged repatriates. Only 17% of the far-right voters thought so. Natives who were critical of the repatriates would have been unlikely to vote for the far right.

## 5.2 Robustness tests

In the following section, I explore alternative explanations of the short-term positive effect of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares.

**Natives' unemployment and potential far-right voting** Hunt (1992) and Edo (2020) found that the repatriation shock increased unemployment in the receiving areas.<sup>35</sup> This rise in unemployment could have caused the observed increase in far-right voting, i.e., unemployed natives might have voted for the far right. I use the 1954 and 1962 census data to determine whether the far-right rhetoric might have attracted unemployed voters.<sup>36</sup> I regress the share of far-right votes on the unemployment rate in 1954 and 1962. Table D2 shows that unemployment was not positively correlated with far-right vote shares in the pre-shock years. Finally, since the far right supported the repatriates, the short-term increase in natives' unemployment caused by the repatriation shock is difficult to link with the short-term rise in far-right voting in high-inflow districts.

**In- and outmigration** The repatriation shock could have impacted migration flows in and out of the municipalities that received repatriates. Individuals opposed to repatriates may have migrated from receiving municipalities to non-receiving ones, while those sympathetic to repatriates may have moved from non-receiving into receiving municipalities. Thus, I investigate the impact of the repatriation shock on natives' migration patterns and estimate the specification model following Peri and

<sup>34</sup>Those statistics are from a Sofres survey carried out between May 6 and May 14, 1970 with a national sample of 1,000 people - men and women - aged 21 and over.

<sup>35</sup>Hunt (1992) studied the impact of the repatriates on the natives' labor outcomes in 1968 and found that the 1962 migration shock increased unemployment and reduced the natives' wages. Yet, Hunt could not differentiate natives and repatriates in her wage data. A more recent paper by Edo (2020) uses wage survey data for 1962, 1969, and 1972 to measure the impact of the repatriates on natives' wages and unemployment. He doesn't find a significant effect of the repatriates on pre-existing natives' wages during the 1962 - 1976 period. However, the results hide two opposite effects: the shock-induced wage reduction (1962 - 1968) was followed by a wage increase (1968 - 1976).

<sup>36</sup>Unemployment was not a primary political concern at the time. Unemployed individuals are not identified in the electoral surveys in the 1950s and the 1960s (specifically the post-election surveys of 1958 and 1962).

Sparber (2011) and Edo (2020):

$$\frac{\text{Natives}_{m,1968} - \text{Natives}_{m,1962}}{\text{Population}_{m,1962}} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \frac{\text{Repatriates}_{m,1968}}{\text{Population}_{m,1962}} + \epsilon_e \quad (4)$$

I define natives as individuals born in mainland France. I only consider individuals who were French citizens and were born before 1944, both for the repatriates and for the natives. Thus, I intend to measure the impact of the repatriation shock on the in- and outmigration of likely voters. I divide the number of repatriates by population in municipality  $m$  in 1962 to avoid an artificial correlation between the dependent and independent variables.  $\text{Natives}_{1968}$  corresponds to the number of pre-existing natives (i.e., natives living in mainland France in 1962) that lived in municipality  $m$  in 1968. Estimates in Table F1 indicate an immigration of natives to districts with a larger share of repatriates.<sup>37</sup> I find that for every 100 incoming repatriates, there were 125 incoming natives. I also find that for every 100 incoming repatriates, 9 pre-existing French from Algeria migrated into the district.<sup>38</sup> I identify the individuals who migrated between 1962 and 1968 using the 25% sample of the 1968 census (see Table F2). Using 1968 census data, I can reconstruct family units and identify the children and spouses of French Algerians who were born on the mainland. I find that French Algerians and French Algerian family members were 14.6pp and 12.7pp more likely to move between 1962 and 1968 than other mainland-born natives. They also settled in districts that had, on average, higher shares of repatriates than the ones natives settled in (Table F2, Column (2)). Table F2, Columns (3) and (4) also show that the family of French Algerians had more children and were more likely to have had children between 1962 and 1968. It appears that French Algerians already living in France before 1962 moved to regions with higher shares of repatriates to reunite with their community. If this were the case, my results might be upwardly biased. Therefore, I extend the specification by incorporating the change in the share of French Algerians residing in mainland France before 1962 within municipality  $m$  between 1962 and 1968. The results, displayed in Table F3, show that this addition does not affect the findings presented in Table 3. Furthermore, I demonstrate that repatriates often settled in areas where natives also migrated between 1962 and 1968. If these incoming natives were more right-wing, it could create an upward bias in my estimates. To account for this, I include the change in the share of natives living in municipality  $m$  over the same period. The estimates, shown in Table F4, confirm that this adjustment also does not affect the main results.

**The military veterans' sentiments** During the Algerian War, some 1,200,000 young French men were drafted and deployed as *appelés du contingent* to restore order to and pacify Algeria. From 1956 to 1962, between 400,000 and 470,000 of these soldiers were permanently stationed in Algeria

<sup>37</sup>Note that Hunt (1992) and Edo (2020) did not find any significant natives in- or out-migration as a result of the repatriation shock. However, they looked at bigger geographical entities, i.e., *départements* and *régions* respectively. Furthermore, they restrict their sample to individuals in the labor force.

<sup>38</sup>Pre-existing French from Algeria are French of European descent born in Algeria and living in mainland France as of January 1, 1962.

(Laribi, 2021). The conscription system affected young men aged 20 nationwide, with no particular regional concentration in recruitment. Resistance to military service was minimal—only 1% of soldiers refused deployment (Quemeneur, 2022). After completing their service, these conscripts returned to municipalities throughout France, carrying their wartime experiences with them. Given the nationwide scope of conscription and the shared nature of these experiences across France, pro-French Algeria attitudes formed during military service alone cannot account for the regional variations in political outcomes shown in Table 3.

## 6 Long term

### 6.1 Results

Table 4: The impact of the repatriation shock on vote shares (1945 - 2022)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
VARIABLES	Far right	Right	Center	Left	Far left
$AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.053*** (0.0139)	-0.014 (0.0139)	0.018* (0.0104)	-0.020 (0.0163)	-0.019 (0.0130)
Observations	686,394	975,181	1,037,825	907,522	991,877
Number of municipalities	34,451	34,522	34,572	34,572	34,572

Notes: The table presents the estimated  $\beta$  from specification (2) for both parliamentary and presidential elections between 1945 and 2022.  $\beta$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1pp. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.


Table 4 presents the estimates for  $\beta$  from specification (2), using data from elections held between 1945 and 2022. These estimates aim to capture the long-term effects of the repatriation shock. A 1pp increase in the share of repatriates led to an average 0.05pp increase in the vote share for the far right in the 1965 - 2022 period. This is accompanied by a 0.02pp increase in the vote share for the centrist party. Although the effect is not statistically significant, an increase in the share of repatriates is associated with lower vote shares for left and far-left parties.

Figure 4 presents the estimates  $\beta_e$  from specification (3). Specifically, it shows the estimated impact of the repatriation shock on the vote shares for the far-right, right-wing, and centrist parties.<sup>39</sup> After the surge in far-right voting in 1965 and 1967, the relationship between the repatriation shock and far-right voting weakened from the late 1960s until the early 1980s. Although a 1pp increase in the share of repatriates resulted in an average increase of 0.03pp in Jean-Marie Le Pen’s vote share in

<sup>39</sup>Figure 5 shows the estimated impact of the repatriation shock on the vote shares for the far-right, left-wing, and far-left presidential candidates.

1974, the coefficient is much smaller than in 1965 and 1967. This reduced impact may be due to the limited public recognition of the newly formed *Front National* (FN) and its leader, J.-M. Le Pen, who received only 0.75% of the vote in the 1974 presidential election. Furthermore, no significant effect of the repatriation shock on far-right voting is observed in parliamentary elections during this period, likely due to the limited number of FN candidates in these elections (see Table C2).

Figure 4: The impact of the repatriation shock on vote shares (1945 - 2022)



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from specification (3). The figure shows the estimated impact of the repatriation shock on the vote shares for the far-right, right-wing, and centrist parties. Presidential election years are highlighted in bold.  $\beta_e$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$  in election  $e$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1pp. The 1958 parliamentary election serves as the baseline. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The far-right voting impact estimation is based on 686,208 observations from 34,399 municipalities. The right-wing voting impact estimation is based on 974,555 observations from 34,400 municipalities. The centrist voting impact estimation is based on 1,036,984 observations from 34,400 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.

The increase in support for centrist parties shown in Table 4 can be traced to elections from 1968 to 1981, when the far right was underrepresented. Notably, the 1968 share of repatriates in a municipality led to increased centrist-party voting in the 1969 and 1981 presidential elections, both of which lacked a far-right candidate. The effect was the strongest in the 1969 presidential election. In this case, the center appeared to be a reasonable alternative for repatriates reluctant to support either the left or the right. Furthermore, in the 1974 and 1981 presidential elections, the centrist candidate was Valéry

Giscard d’Estaing, who had a strong connection to repatriate interests. He was pivotal in passing two major compensation laws for repatriates, enacted in 1970 and 1978—first as Finance Minister under President Georges Pompidou and later as president (see Table C5). However, once Giscard d’Estaing exited the political stage, the support for centrist parties among repatriates diminished.

As France entered difficult economic times, the far right gained in popularity. Figure 4 shows that in 1988, a 1pp increase in the repatriate share led to a 0.09pp rise in the vote shares for J.-M. Le Pen in the presidential election. This increase aligns with the rise of anti-immigration rhetoric by the FN, which became a prominent feature of the far right during the 1980s. Notably, J.-M. Le Pen’s 1974 manifesto for the presidential election did not mention the word ‘immigration’ once.<sup>40</sup> In 1993, his manifesto contained the word *immigration/immigrants* 8 times, the word *foreigners* 5 times, and *undocumented immigrants* twice (see Table E1). Stora (1999) and Comtat (2009) argue that the far right’s fierce anti-immigrant rhetoric solidified its connection with a segment of the repatriate community that harbored strong resentment toward Algerian immigrants. Figure E2 shows that the French Algerians were not only preoccupied mainly with criminality and immigration but also seemed more concerned by those issues (especially immigration) than the rest of the voters.<sup>41</sup> In Figure 4, one can see a clear drop in far-right voting in 2007. It was accompanied by a steady rise in right-wing voting between 1997 to 2007. This could be partly due to the conservative party’s strategy to compete with the far right on their territory: immigration. Nicolas Sarkozy, Interior Minister and 2007 presidential candidate, campaigned with a hardline position on immigration.<sup>42</sup>

Though the impact of the repatriation shock has been weakening over time, in recent years, there has been a strong relationship between the repatriation shock and far-right voting in parliamentary elections.<sup>43</sup> Table G2 highlights that far-right voters systematically vote at a lower rate than other voters in parliamentary elections. However, the French from Algeria vote significantly more often than the natives (see Table G1 in the Appendix). This is further suggestive evidence that voters from the repatriates’ community might drive the effect observed in parliamentary elections in Figure 4.

Finally, Figure 5 illustrates a persistent negative impact of the repatriation shock on far-left vote shares up to 2012. This coincides with the first time Jean-Luc Mélançon was a candidate in the

<sup>40</sup>His campaign focused primarily on fighting communism and strikes, opposing abortion rights, and protecting the pension system.


<sup>41</sup>Excerpts from interviews with repatriates on their far-right voting conducted by E. Comtat are included in Appendix E.

<sup>42</sup>Speaking at a conservative party conference in 2006, he said ‘*if there are people who are not comfortable in France, they should feel free to leave a country which they do not love*’. This contained echoes of the slogan first used by Le Pen in the 1980s, ‘*Love France or leave it*’ (Marthaler, 2008). The results presented in Figure E1 in the Appendix appeared to validate Sarkozy’s decision to target the far-right electorate.

<sup>43</sup>The election of the president is always followed by the election of the parliament. In general, the party that won the presidential election wins more than 50% of the seats in parliament as voters prefer giving the government the power to implement its ideas.



Figure 5: The impact of the repatriation shock on vote shares (1945 - 2022)



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from specification (3). The figure shows the estimated impact of the repatriation shock on the vote shares for the far-right, left-wing, and far-left parties. Presidential election years are highlighted in bold.  $\beta_e$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$  in election  $e$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1pp. The 1958 parliamentary election serves as the baseline. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The far-right voting impact estimation is based on 686,208 observations from 34,399 municipalities. The left-wing voting impact estimation is based on 906,800 observations from 34,400 municipalities. The far-left voting impact estimation is based on 991,044 observations from 34,400 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

presidential election.<sup>44</sup> The decline in left-wing voting is only a short-term phenomenon, with the repatriation's impact on left-wing voting becoming negligible in later periods.

## 6.2 Robustness tests

My results indicate a long-term impact of the repatriation shock on far-right voting. In this section, I eliminate other potential factors influencing far-right voting.

**Subsequent migration and unemployment shocks** I use the census data from 1945 until

<sup>44</sup>Jean-Luc Mélenchon co-founded and served as the primary candidate for the *Front de Gauche* (Left Front), a coalition of left-wing parties in France established in 2009. The Front de Gauche sought to unite the alternative left as an opposition to the Socialist Party and the traditional right. Although I have classified Mélenchon and his subsequent party, *La France Insoumise*, as far-left based on the Front de Gauche's initial stance, they could also be categorized within the broader left-wing spectrum.

2022 to replace the 1961 share of foreigners with the share of foreigners in municipality  $m$  in election  $e$  in specification (2). I further interact the  $ShareForeign_{me}$  with  $\mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$  to account for the impact of migration after the repatriation shock. Similarly, I also replace the 1961 unemployment rate with the unemployment rate in municipality  $m$  in election  $e$ . Finally, I control for both post-shock migration and unemployment. The estimated coefficients are presented in Table F6. The average effect observed in Table 4 stays unchanged when accounting for subsequent shocks. I also account for subsequent shocks in specification (3). Figure F1 shows the estimates  $\beta_e$  in the specification including  $Unemployment_{me}$  and  $Unemployment_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{election=e}$ . Figure F2 presents the estimates  $\beta_e$  in the specification including  $ShareForeign_{me}$  and  $ShareForeign_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{election=e}$ . Finally, the estimated coefficients in Figure F3 result from a specification accounting for subsequent migration and unemployment shocks. The estimates in Figures F1, F2 and F3 indicate that the results observed in Section 6.1 cannot be explained by a reaction to subsequent migration to and/or unemployment in municipalities where the repatriates settled in 1968.

**Movement of the repatriates after 1968** The claim that the rise in far-right voting stems from the repatriates' community depends on the distribution of repatriates across electoral districts remaining relatively stable over time. Using the EDP, I can estimate the number of repatriates at the electoral district level after 1968.<sup>45</sup> Figure F4 shows the estimated share of repatriated voters among all potential voters from 1968 until 2017. As expected, the share of repatriates decreases over time but remains relatively high in southern France, suggesting they tended to remain in their initial settlement areas.

**The *harkis*** As explained in Section 2.2, alongside French Algerians of European descent, Algerian auxiliaries known as *harkis* - who had supported the French Army during the Algerian War - also migrated to France following Algeria's independence (Thénault, 2008). The *harkis* faced serious threats, including violence and persecution, in the newly independent Algeria. Many were initially housed in isolated camps in mainland France, e.g., Rivesaltes (Pyrénées-Orientales), Saint-Maurice-l'Ardoise (Gard), Bias (Lot-et-Garonne), and Bourg-Lastic (Puy-de-Dôme). Many were later assigned to forest work sites, living and working in isolated forest hamlets (*hameaux de forestage*). Using data from the 1968 French census, I estimate that there were approximately 86,054 *harkis* in mainland France in 1968. Figure F5 shows that including the share of *harkis* in municipality  $m$  in the specification (3) does not alter the results. This probably reflects two factors: their numbers were small compared to the larger wave of repatriates, and they were primarily settled in remote and sparsely populated parts of France, for example, Saint-André-les-Alpes, Lapradelle-Puilaurens, Valbonne.

**The Jewish repatriates** A potential concern with interpreting the repatriation's effect on far-right voting is that it might reflect antisemitic reactions to the repatriates. This concern arises

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<sup>45</sup>The EDP is a small sample drawn from the census, and I do not have enough observations to estimate the repatriates' locations at a more detailed level.

because approximately 15% of French Algerian repatriates were Jewish, and the Front National has a documented history of antisemitism (Guillon, 1974).<sup>46</sup> However, French administrative data do not record religious affiliation, making it impossible to directly identify Jewish repatriates in the dataset. To address this limitation, I exploit the geographic distribution of the Jewish population in France, which is heavily concentrated in urban areas. After the repatriation, France’s Jewish population was estimated at roughly 550,000. A guide to Jewish communities published on July 1, 1966, reported that 250,000 of these lived in the Paris region, 65,000 in Marseille, just over 20,000 in Lyon, 20,000 in Toulouse, 15,000 in Nice, and 12,000 in Strasbourg. In total, 95% of the Jewish community lived in 113 cities (Levitte, 1966). To test whether the effects observed in Sections 5.1 and 6.1 stem from antisemitic reactions to Jewish repatriates, I divide the sample into urban and rural municipalities. If antisemitism was driving the results, I would expect weaker effects in rural areas where Jewish repatriates were unlikely to settle. Figure F6 shows that the repatriation effects persist even when focusing exclusively on rural municipalities, suggesting that antisemitic reactions cannot fully explain the observed patterns.

**Other French Algerians** I show in Section 5.2 that the repatriation shock was accompanied by the in-migration of French Algerians who arrived before 1962 and their families in municipalities where the repatriates settled. Figure F7 shows that including them in the specification does not reduce the effect shown in Figure 4. Similarly to the results presented in Section 5.2, including French Algerians who arrived before the shock does not impact the main results.

**Leave-one-out** Figure F8 shows that the results presented in Section 6.1 are robust to leaving each one of eight broadly defined regions out. I exclude the possibility of the results being driven by one region specifically.

## 7 Further robustness tests

**The stable unit treatment value assumption (SUTVA)** The identification strategy in Section 4.2 relies on the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption (SUTVA), which implies that a municipality’s potential outcomes are not influenced by the treatment status of any other municipality. In practice, however, this assumption could be violated in two opposing ways. First, municipalities that did not receive any repatriates might respond to nearby inflows by shifting their vote to the left in opposition—causing an overestimation of the effect of repatriation on far-right support. Alternatively, these same municipalities might shift rightward in solidarity with neighboring areas that did receive repatriates, which would attenuate the estimated effect by reducing the contrast between municipalities with and without repatriates. To assess whether municipalities without direct repatriation experience spillover effects from nearby repatriation flows, I calculate the share of repatriates located within var-

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<sup>46</sup>Jean-Marie Le Pen notably dismissed the Holocaust gas chambers as a ‘detail of history,’ and the party attracted former collaborationists.

ious distance bands around each municipality. Specifically, I construct four variables measuring the repatriate share within 10km, 15km, 20km, and 25km radii around municipality  $m$ :  $AlgRepShare_m^{10km}$ ,  $AlgRepShare_m^{15km}$ ,  $AlgRepShare_m^{20km}$ ,  $AlgRepShare_m^{25km}$ . I calculate  $AlgRepShare_m^r$  as follows:

$$AlgRepShare_m^r = \frac{\sum_{n \neq m} \mathbf{1}\{d_{mn} < r\} R_n}{\sum_{n \neq m} \mathbf{1}\{d_{mn} < r\} P_n}, \quad (5)$$

where

$d_{mn}$  = distance (in km) between municipalities  $m$  and  $n$ ,

$R_n$  = # of repatriates in  $n$ ,

$P_n$  = total population of  $n$ .

I add  $AlgRepShare_m^r$  to specification (2) and I standardize both  $AlgRepShare_m^r$  and  $AlgRepShare_m$  to allow for coefficients comparison. In the short term, Table F7 shows that the repatriation shock increased far-right voting in neighboring municipalities within a 20 km radius, but this effect fades beyond 25 km. In the long term, however, the effect on neighboring municipalities is larger than in the short term. Interpreting these long-term effects as spillovers to native populations is complicated by two factors: repatriates may have relocated, and political preferences may have been passed down across generations. In both the short and long term, the impact of the repatriation shock declines with distance, supporting the interpretation that these represent spillover effects. The estimated spillover coefficients are generally larger than those for the direct effect, especially in the long term. This pattern is expected because a 1pp increase in repatriate share within a single municipality represents a smaller change than a 1pp increase in the average repatriate share across multiple neighboring municipalities.

**The 1968 settlement of repatriates** Despite the government's incentives aimed at discouraging settlement in southern *départements*, the repatriates had a relatively unrestricted choice when deciding where to settle in mainland France (see Section 2.2).<sup>47</sup> Since my main analysis includes election-district fixed effects and Table 2 shows no significant correlation between the 1968 share of repatriates and pre-1962 voting trends within districts, it is unlikely that unobserved factors driving political outcomes are biasing the main results. While this research design is robust, an instrumental variable approach could offer an additional strategy to address residual endogeneity concerns. However, identifying a suitable instrument at the municipal level is particularly challenging due to the highly granular nature of the analysis. France has approximately 35,000 municipalities, which are generally small: around 15% cover less than 5 square kilometers, and 31% fall between 5 and 10 square kilometers. Thus, it requires me to run the analysis at a higher administrative level: the constituency level. Certain

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<sup>47</sup>See Appendix B for an exact description of the government measures.

potential instruments are excluded due to methodological limitations. Temperature data cannot serve as a reliable instrument at the constituency level because the 1962 *Météo France* dataset contains only 82 mean temperature observations in 362 constituencies in the sample. Additionally, using latitude or longitude as proxies for temperature results in a weak instrument that does not meet the relevance condition required for a valid estimate of instrumental variables. Thus, I opt for a shift-share instrument using the distribution of French Algerians in mainland France in 1954 to predict the settlement of the repatriates (Edo, 2020). I exploit the maximum timespan in the data to distance the shift-share instrument from any shocks that coincide with the repatriation shock. Using a sufficiently long time interval helps ensure that the predicted regional distribution of migrants is exogenous to post-1962 political developments (Dustmann et al., 2005). Table F8 compares the repatriates to French Algerians who were already living in France in 1954. On average, the latter group was five years older, more educated, and less likely to be unemployed. They were also 6.62pp less likely to have settled in the South of France.

I predict the number of repatriates in constituency  $c$  in 1968.

$$\widehat{\text{Repatriates}}_{c,1968} = \frac{\text{French from Algeria}_{c,1954}}{\text{French from Algeria}_{1954}} \times \text{Repatriates}_{1968} \quad (6)$$

I use  $\widehat{\text{Repatriates}}_{c,1968}$  to calculate the instrumental variable,  $\widehat{\text{AlgRepShare}}_c$ . I further use the following specification at the constituency level to estimate the effect of the repatriation shock on far-right voting:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FarRight}_{ce} = \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \beta_e (\text{AlgRepShare}_c \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \gamma_e (X_{c,1961} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) \\ + \lambda_c + \phi_{re} + \epsilon_{ce} \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

I cluster standard errors at the *d'epartement* level to account for potential correlations in the residuals arising from shared administrative policies or media exposure within each *d'epartement*.  $\text{FarRight}_{ce}$  is the vote share for far-right candidates in constituency  $c$  in region  $r$  in the first round of election  $e$ . The key identifying assumption is that, once I control for other factors, the local conditions that influenced the settlement of the French from Algeria in 1954 are unrelated to changes in voting behavior after 1962. The historical distribution of immigrants is a good predictor of subsequent inflows because established networks make it easier for newcomers to settle (Bartel, 1989; LaLonde and Topel, 1991). I study the predicted shares of French Algerian repatriates in constituency  $c$  and run the same balancing tests as I did in Table 2. In Table F9, I compare the actual share of repatriates with the predicted share, examining both levels and trends. In both cases, the predicted share exhibits weaker correlations with constituency-level indicators than the actual share. Both the actual and predicted repatriate shares are negatively correlated with right-wing vote shares. Notably, the predicted share is associated with a slight decline in right-wing voting between 1956 and 1958. Importantly, there is no strong evidence of a

relationship between the predicted repatriate share and far-right voting tendencies. Between 1956 and 1958, the predicted share of repatriates is correlated with a decrease in both far-right and right-wing vote shares. Additionally, the predicted repatriate share is positively correlated with higher income levels, which generally runs counter to far-right voting patterns. Although the predicted share of repatriates is correlated with a decrease in homeownership rates, constituencies with higher predicted repatriate shares tend to have higher baseline ownership levels. Overall, there is no indication of a major concern regarding bias in the predicted share. Figure F9 shows that the IV estimates are larger than the OLS estimates. The IV strategy captures the effect of repatriates in areas where historical settlement patterns strongly predict contemporary ones, suggesting that a stronger local community presence may amplify the impact of the repatriation shock on far-right voting. This could be because repatriates who settle in historically familiar areas may feel a stronger sense of community, making them more susceptible to far-right views. Alternatively, existing strong community ties may reinforce and spread far-right preferences among repatriates. The OLS results also differ from those in Section 6.1: notably, the constituency-level effects disappear after 2002. When aggregating data to a higher level, results change only in the presence of spillover effects—either positive or negative. As shown in Table F7, negative spillovers in neighboring municipalities are unlikely to explain the pattern. Instead, positive spillovers appear to diffuse far-right tendencies over time and space, weakening the long-term correlation between the 1968 share of repatriates and far-right voting.

## 8 The political legacy of the repatriation

Over time, the impact of the repatriation shock on far-right voting has weakened. As the repatriate population naturally declines, questions remain about its political legacy.

### 8.1 The 2022 election and the repatriates

The growing presence of the far right over the past decade provides valuable insights into what drives repatriates to back these parties. In the 2022 presidential election, Éric Zemmour, a far-right pundit nostalgic of Nazi Collaboration and himself the son of French Algerians, directly competed with Marine Le Pen for votes.<sup>48</sup> While Le Pen focused her campaign on social issues such as inflation and its effect on the purchasing power, Zemmour entered the race with a platform centered on strict immigration policies, the role of Islam in France, and national identity. To examine this further, I conducted a cross-sectional analysis of vote shares for both Zemmour and Le Pen. Table E2-(i) shows that an increase in the proportion of repatriates did not result in higher vote shares for Marine Le Pen (see Column (4)). Yet, a 1pp increase in the share of repatriates in 1968 in municipality  $m$  corresponds to an estimated 0.014pp increase in Éric Zemmour’s vote share (Column (3) in Table

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<sup>48</sup>Éric Zemmour’s parents were Arabic-speaking Berber Jews from Algeria, who moved to metropolitan France in 1952, before the Algerian War. He was born in 1958.


E2-(i)). Zemmour’s French Algerian background may have contributed to his appeal among repatriates. Following his loss in the presidential race, he founded a new far-right party, *Reconquête*. No significant relationship is observed between the repatriation shock and *Reconquête*’s vote share in the parliamentary elections. Yet, in both the presidential and parliamentary elections, the share of votes for Éric Zemmour/*Reconquête* as a portion of the combined vote for Zemmour/*Reconquête* and Le Pen/*Rassemblement National* (previously *Front National*) increases significantly with the repatriation shock (+0.041pp and +0.065pp, respectively). This suggests that the stronger support for *Reconquête* in municipalities where repatriates settled is not solely due to Zemmour’s heritage. The regression coefficients are also larger when using constituency fixed effects instead of district fixed effects, further indicating positive local spillover effects.

## 8.2 The political preferences of the repatriates’ children

While the French Algerians represented around 1.8% of the French electorate (approximately 800,000 voters) in 2012, Fourquet and Pratviel (2012) estimated that their descendants constituted 5.2% of the electorate, i.e., 2.3 million voters. In this section, I present suggestive evidence that repatriates transmitted their political preferences—including their opposition to left-wing politics and anti-immigration attitudes—to the next generation. The absence of data on the political preferences of one’s parents does not allow me to show the direct transmission of political preferences between the repatriates and their offspring. Nevertheless, previous literature has shown strong correlations between parents and their children’s attitudes (e.g., Dohmen et al., 2012). Moreover, the literature on trauma suggests that it is transmitted across generations (Lupu and Peisakhin, 2017).

First, I provide summary statistics on the voting intentions of the French Algerians and their children for the 2012 presidential election (see Table H1). In line with the results presented in Section 6.1, the share of French Algerians who said they intended to vote for the far-right candidate was 7.5pp higher than the share of natives (aged more than 50) who planned to do the same. Furthermore, 20% of the descendants of French from Algeria intended to vote for the far-right candidate in the presidential election (+2pp in comparison to individuals without French Algerian ancestry), whereas 28% of the descendants of French from Algeria intended to vote for the left-wing candidate (-3pp compared to other voters). Table H1 highlights a potential mechanism of diffusion of political preferences from the repatriates to their children. Yet, the table only presents means at the national level.

Second, I use the Trajectories and Origins Surveys (TeO and TeO2) to compare the political opinions of the children of French Algerians to the opinions of similar children of natives. The TeO surveys are unique datasets in two crucial aspects: they identify second-generation repatriates and provide information on the interviewees’ political opinions. More specifically, the interviewees were asked to position themselves on the following political scale:



Furthermore, the TeO2 (2019-20) survey provides additional information on the interviewees' opinions on immigration (information that was not provided in the first TeO survey). Indeed, during the interview, respondents were asked to provide their level of disagreement with the following statements:

- 'France should be more open to immigration.' (Immigration)
- 'Homosexual couples should have the same rights as heterosexual couples.' (Gay rights)
- 'When there is little work, men have more of a right to employment than women.' (Gender equality)
- 'A woman can have an abortion for non-medical reasons.' (Abortion rights)

The TeO2 respondents could answer with four different options:

1. Strongly agree
2. Somewhat agree
3. Somewhat disagree
4. Strongly disagree

I can identify 798 individuals with at least one parent being an Algerian repatriate of European descent. I compare the children of repatriates to children of natives, i.e., individuals born in mainland France without a migration background.<sup>49</sup> I use the answer to the question on political opinions to generate four dummies ( $Right_i$ ,  $Center_i$ ,  $Left_i$ , and  $Neither\ left\ nor\ right_i$ ). Responses of 'Very right' and 'Rather right' are aggregated into 'Right', while responses of 'Very left' and 'Rather left' are combined into 'Left'. Finally, I generate four dummy variables based on whether survey participants agreed or not with the statements presented above ( $Immig_i$ ,  $GayRights_i$ ,  $Gender_i$ , and  $Abortion_i$ ).<sup>50</sup>

Table H2 shows the results of t-tests comparing the characteristics of both children of repatriates and children of natives. They were, on average, 2.5 years older than their native counterparts. Both groups exhibited similar levels of labor force participation and unemployment. Similar to their parents, the children of repatriates were more likely to have at least a high school diploma at the time of the interview. Finally, they lived in households with a monthly income that exceeded that of native children's households by 641EUR, on average. 20.89% of the repatriates' children considered

<sup>49</sup>Unfortunately, I cannot analyze the Algerian repatriates' political position as I can only identify 43 of them in the TeO and TeO2 samples.

<sup>50</sup>I exclude those who did not answer the question.



themselves to be ‘rather left’, while 24.55% of the children of natives did so. A larger share of the repatriates’ children considered themselves to be ‘rather right’, i.e., 4.79pp more than their counterparts without migration backgrounds. Finally, the data suggest that, on average, repatriates’ children opposed opening up immigration to France more than natives’ children (+4.77pp).

I investigate the difference in political opinions between the children of repatriates and those of natives using the following specification:

$$y_i = \alpha + \beta \text{RepatriateChild}_i + \delta X_i^{\text{indiv}} + \gamma X_i^{\text{par}} + \text{TeO2}_i + u_i \quad (8)$$

with  $y_i$  representing the political opinions of individual  $i$  in the TeO Survey.  $\text{RepatriateChild}_i$  is a dummy for whether at least one parent of the individual was a repatriate born in Algeria.<sup>51</sup> I control for a wide range of economic and social characteristics.  $X_i^{\text{indiv}}$  represents dummies for age, education, socio-professional category, employment status, and region of birth.  $X_i^{\text{par}}$  contains information on parents’ education and their socio-professional category.  $\text{TeO2}_i$  is a dummy for the second TeO survey.

Table 5 presents the estimated coefficients  $\beta$  from specification (8). On average, the children of repatriates were 6.5pp less inclined to describe themselves as either rather left or very left-leaning (Column (3)). On average, children of repatriates were 3.7pp more likely to define themselves as ‘neither left nor right-wing’ (Column (4)). They were also 3pp more inclined to describe themselves as either rather right or very right-leaning (Column (1)), though the coefficient is not statistically significant. Since individuals tend to vote following their expressed political opinions (see Figure H1), my findings suggest that the children of repatriates were less likely to vote for left parties than their native counterparts without migration backgrounds. Table H4 offers additional insights that differentiate between offspring born to couples where both parents are repatriates and those born to a repatriate and a native parent. In Column (3), it becomes evident that children born to two repatriate parents exhibited a more pronounced right-leaning inclination. They were also 8.8pp less inclined to identify as left-leaning. This suggests that repatriates who formed couples within their community were more likely to have children with right-leaning political orientations. Additionally, I examine how parental education shapes the political preferences of children of repatriates, providing insight into their socio-economic background. As shown in Table H5, the effects appear to be primarily driven by those with parents of middle education levels. Children with low-educated parents were more likely to lean left and less likely to lean right. In contrast, those with highly educated parents were more likely to position themselves in the political center. These findings implied that resentment had been strongest among middle-educated repatriates, who may have felt they lost social status when relocating from Algeria to France. Finally, I use an alternative control group and compare the children of repatriates

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<sup>51</sup>The survey does not provide information on the place of residence as of January 1, 1962, as in the census. However, I have information on the country of birth and the parents’ nationalities.

Table 5: Political differences between children of repatriates from Algeria and children of mainland natives

VARIABLES	(1) Right	(2) Centre	(3) Left	(4) Neither left nor right
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>	0.030 (0.020)	-0.002 (0.016)	-0.065*** (0.021)	0.037* (0.020)
Observations	5,829	5,829	5,829	5,829
Mean	0.240	0.126	0.297	0.337
Adjusted $R^2$	0.046	0.021	0.041	0.079

Source: Trajectories and Origins Surveys (TeO and TeO2).

Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients  $\beta$  from specification (8). The outcome variables correspond to individuals' self-placement on the political spectrum: 'Right', 'Center', 'Left', and 'Neither left nor right'. The categories 'Right' and 'Left' aggregate responses from 'Very right' and 'Rather right,' and from 'Very left' and 'Rather left,' respectively. In addition to the standard p-values, I calculated p-values corrected for testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously, following Romano and Wolf (2005). While the corrected p-values are somewhat larger, the overall conclusion from the analysis remains unchanged. I control for the age, education level, socio-professional category, employment status, and region of birth of the interviewee, as well as the education level and socio-professional category of their parents. The TeO surveys have a clustered survey design. The sample comprises persons residing in a municipality in the master sample and identified in the annual census survey. Throughout the analysis, I account for a potential dependence of observations within the same sampling units by clustering at the year-municipality level. Since sampling districts are very small, there are several hundred clusters. I also calculate the bias-adjusted  $\beta$  using the method by Oster (2019) to account for a possible omitted bias. The results can be found in Table H3. The bias-adjusted estimators presented in Columns (3) and (4) remain large. The coefficients presented in Column (1) indicate that the estimators for the right presented in Table 5 are biased upwards. However, my conclusions remain unchanged. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

to children of immigrants from Spain, Italy, or Portugal (see Table H6). This comparison reveals that children of repatriates were 5.3pp more likely to identify as somewhat or strongly right-leaning.

To uncover the reasons behind the right-leaning voting tendencies among children of repatriates, I turn to the second TeO survey (TeO2), which provides insights into the views of these children on immigration and other conservative issues. Table 6-(i) shows that, on average, repatriates' children opposed opening up immigration to France more than similar natives' children (+4.6pp). In Table 6-(ii), I compare the opinions of right-leaning children of repatriates and natives. Again, the children of repatriates were more likely to oppose immigration to France (+9.6pp). While the children of repatriates were more likely to hold anti-abortion views compared to children of natives, there is no apparent evidence of them having more pronounced conservative opinions regarding gay rights and gender equality. In Table H7, I also examine the impact of parental education on the opinions of the children of repatriates. Consistent with my previous findings, I observe that children of both low- and high-educated parents were not significantly more likely to oppose immigration. Instead, the effect is concentrated among those with middle-educated parents, as shown in Table H5. Based on the results in Tables 6 and H7, anti-immigrant sentiment plays a key role in explaining the right-wing orientation

Table 6: Other opinions

VARIABLES	(1) Opposes opening up immigration	(2) Opposes gay rights	(3) Opposes gender equality	(4) Opposes abortion
<b>(i) Full sample</b>				
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>	0.046* (0.024)	-0.013 (0.016)	0.008 (0.017)	0.023* (0.012)
Observations	3,482	3,566	3,645	3,614
Mean	0.627	0.158	0.137	0.071
Adjusted $R^2$	0.090	0.046	0.014	0.046
<b>(ii) Right-leaning individuals</b>				
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>	0.096** (0.044)	0.004 (0.047)	-0.057 (0.037)	0.032 (0.028)
Observations	713	711	721	718
Mean	0.853	0.269	0.144	0.084
Adjusted $R^2$	0.032	0.057	0.011	0.067

Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey 2 (TeO2).

Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients  $\beta$  from specification (8). The outcome variables measure individuals' level of agreement with four following statements: 'France should be more open to immigration' (1), 'Homosexual couples should have the same rights as heterosexual couples' (2), 'When there is little work, men have more of a right to employment than women' (3), and 'A woman can have an abortion for non-medical reasons' (4). In addition to the standard p-values, I calculated p-values corrected for testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously, following Romano and Wolf (2005). While the corrected p-values are somewhat larger, the overall conclusion from the analysis remains unchanged. I control for the age, education level, socio-professional category, employment status, and region of birth of the interviewee, as well as the education level and socio-professional category of their parents. The TeO survey has a clustered survey design. The sample comprises persons residing in a municipality in the master sample and identified in the annual census survey. Throughout the analysis, I account for a potential dependence of observations within the same sampling units by clustering the standard errors accordingly. Since sampling districts are very small, there are several hundred clusters. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

of repatriates' children.

## 9 Conclusion

This paper studies the political impact of repatriates from Algeria on receiving areas in France. I use the sudden arrival of the repatriates to compare pre- and post-shock political outcomes at the municipality level. An increase in the share of repatriates in 1968 led to a persistent increase in far-right vote shares. Initially, the repatriates' alignment with the far right was motivated by trauma and support for their cause, but later, it was fueled by anti-immigration sentiments. In the last 20 years, the impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares has decreased. Yet, I find suggestive evidence that the repatriates' political preferences have been transmitted to their children. I show that children of repatriates are less likely to position themselves on the left of the political scale, suggesting that the dislike for the left could have been transmitted between generations. I also find that the repatriates' children oppose immigration more strongly than other children of natives. This aligns with the repatriates from Algeria reacting positively to anti-immigration political messaging and is significant in the context of immigration debates and policies in France.

As far-right populists are gaining popularity in developed economies, understanding the roots of far-right voting has become crucial to designing policies that address individuals' fears and dissatisfaction. Like many European neighbors, France has seen its main far-right party, the *Rassemblement National* (previously *Front National*), grow from a fringe movement to a mainstream party in the last fifty years. First, this paper highlights the heterogeneity of political experiences and preferences across communities. When investigating the drivers of far-right voting, the persistent preferences of voters must be taken into account. Second, this paper explains current voting behaviors. As of 2012, the repatriates' community represented 3.2 million potential voters in the presidential election (Fourquet and Pratviel, 2012). Politicians are aware of the political power that this community holds. Sixty years after the repatriation, they continue to address their preferences and concerns.

## **Declaration of generative AI and AI-assisted technologies in the writing process**

During the preparation of this work the author used ChatGPT (OpenAI) in order to improve clarity and style. After using this tool, the author reviewed and edited the content as needed and takes full responsibility for the content of the published article.

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## Appendix A: French political system

The French political system under the Fifth Republic is characterized by a semi-presidential system, combining elements of both a presidential and parliamentary system. Established in 1958, the Fifth Republic was designed to provide stability and strong executive leadership.

A powerful presidency is at the system's core, with the President of the Republic as the head of state. The President is elected by popular vote for a five-year term (seven-year term until 2002) and holds significant executive powers, including the ability to appoint the Prime Minister and dissolve the National Assembly, the lower house of the French Parliament. The Prime Minister, appointed by the President, is responsible for day-to-day governance and leads the government. The government is collectively accountable to the National Assembly, which comprises members elected through a two-round system. The National Assembly holds legislative power, and its approval is necessary for the government to implement policies and pass laws.

France operates under a multi-party political system, wherein numerous political parties make it almost inevitable for any single party to engage in negotiations with others to wield power. Historically, the French government has alternated between two relatively stable coalitions:

1. The center-left coalition, led by the Socialist Party, has partnered with minor parties like The Greens and the Radical Party of the Left.
2. The center-right coalition, led by The Republicans (and previously its predecessors, the Union for a Popular Movement and the Rally for the Republic), has collaborated with the Union of Democrats and Independents.

This pattern persisted until the 2017 presidential election when Emmanuel Macron from the centrist party *La République En Marche!* emerged victorious in the second round. This marked the first instance of a third party winning the presidency and the first time neither of the major coalitions appeared in the second round of a presidential election.

## Appendix B: The government incentives and repatriates' settlement

By June 1964, 25% of the repatriates were located in the Provence-Côte-d'Azur-Corse region, 10% in Midi-Pyrénées, 10% in Languedoc, 9% in Rhône-Alpes, and 6% in Aquitaine. The only northern region capable of competing with these southern areas was the Paris region, hosting 18% of the repatriates. Initially, an incentive policy was implemented to encourage settlement in less populated *départements*. The law of December 26, 1961, introduced a geographical allowance based on the location of the repatriate's residence. This allowance varied, reaching a maximum of 200 French Francs per month. The Zero Zone consisted of the following regions: Côtes-du-Nord, Finistère, Morbihan, Seine and Seine-et-Oise, and the metropolitan areas of Marseille, Nice, Lyon, Toulouse, and Bordeaux. The 200 French Francs Zone included Ain, Ardennes, Aube, Bas-Rhin, Cher, Côte d'Or, Doubs, Eure-et-Loir, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Moselle, Nord, Oise, Orne, Pas-de-Calais, Saône-et-Loire, Sarthe, Seine-Maritime, Somme, Territoire de Belfort, and Yonne. When this measure proved ineffective, authorities shifted to a more restrictive approach, banning repatriates from settling in southern regions.

As of July 4, 1962, Algerian refugees arriving in France were prohibited from settling in Marseille. Violators would lose access to return and subsistence benefits. This restriction expanded on July 23, 1962, to cover the *départements* of Bouches-du-Rhône, Hérault, Var, and Alpes-Maritimes, and further extended on August 31, 1962, to include Aude, Vaucluse, and Pyrénées-Orientales. In addition, prefectural and regional authorities were instructed to deny free transport permits to these *départements* for repatriates without a legitimate residence. Exceptions were allowed for spouses, descendants, and ascendants joining family members who had established residence in these departments before the designated dates, as well as for those with verified employment. This policy persisted beyond the summer of 1962, with further expansions in December 1962 to Vaucluse and in July 1963 to Haute-Garonne and Basses-Pyrénées. By late 1963, however, authorities observed renewed migration towards the Mediterranean *départements*. Hunt (1992) finds a very small impact of the government incentive on the repatriates' settlement.

## Appendix C: Additional descriptive statistics

Table C1: Results of the 1951 parliamentary elections

	Mainland		Algeria*	
Registered to vote	24,530,523		540,348	
Votes counted	19,129,064		369,112	
<b>Far-left</b>	<b>5,056,605</b>	<b>27.05%</b>	<b>77,609</b>	<b>21.03%</b>
Communists	4,910,547	26.27%	77,609	21.18%
Various far-left	146,058	0.78%		
<b>Left-wing</b>	<b>3,219,470</b>	<b>17.23%</b>	<b>37,726</b>	<b>10.30%</b>
Socialists (S.F.I.O.)	2,660,544	14.24%	37,726	10.30%
Left-wing coalitions	186,714	1.00%		
Various left-wing	38,393	0.21%		
Democratic and Socialist Union of the Resistance <i>Union Démocratique et Socialiste de la Résistance</i>	40,266	0.22%		
Radical Socialists <i>Radicaux Socialistes</i>	293,553	1.57%		
<b>Center</b>	<b>4,207,967</b>	<b>22.51%</b>	<b>100,819</b>	<b>27.52%</b>
Rally of Republican Left <i>Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines</i>	1,104,279	5.91%	1,684	0.46%
Center coalitions	769,855	4.12%	78,008	21.29%
Rally of French Republican and Independent Groups <i>Rassemblement des Groupes Républicains et Indépendants Français</i>	223,409	1.20%	14,544	3.97%
Popular Republican Movement <i>Mouvement Républicain Populaire</i>	2,110,424	11.29%	6,583	1.80%
<b>Right-wing</b>	<b>6,118,757</b>	<b>32.74%</b>	<b>148,142</b>	<b>40.43%</b>
Union of Independents, Farmer, and National Republicans <i>Union des Indépendants, Paysans et Républicains Nationaux</i>	1,349,207	7.22%		
Moderate <i>Modérés</i>	288,089	1.54%	31,067	8.48%
Center-right coalitions	403,516	2.16%		
Taxpayer Defense Group <i>Groupe de Défense du Contribuable</i>	90,899	0.49%		
Right-wing coalitions			72,202	19.71%
Rally of the French People <i>Rassemblement du Peuple Français</i>	3,987,046	21.33%	44,873	12.25%
<b>Others</b>	<b>87,346</b>	<b>0.47%</b>	<b>2,103</b>	<b>0.57%</b>

Source: Élections législatives du 17 juin 1951, Ministère de l'Intérieur (CEVIPOF).

Table C2: Timeline of the French far right (1945 - 2022)

Year	Parliamentary elections		Presidential elections	
	Far-right vote shares (in %)	Number of constituencies with at least one far-right candidate	Far-right vote shares (in %)	Number of far-right candidates
1945	0	0		
1946 (January)	0	0		
1946 (November)	0	0		
1951	0	0		
1956	11.83	438		
1958	2.50	208		
1965			4.87	1
1967	0.54	68		
1968	0.08	9		
1969			0	0
1973	0.61	135		
1974			0.72	1
1978	0.75	222		
1981	0.31	109	0	0
1986*	9.47			
1988	9.64	546	13.82	1
1993	12.28	555		
1995			15.97	2
1997	14.60	555		
2002	12.39	555	18.71	2
2007	4.70	554	10.96	2
2012	13.97	539	18.52	2
2017	14.77	538	22.13	2
2022	24.17	539	32.53	3

Source: Own calculations. CDSP (Center for Socio-Political Data) at Sciences Po and the French Ministry of the Interior.

Notes: This table provides an overview of far-right candidates and vote shares in parliamentary and presidential elections from 1945 to 2022. There were no far-right candidates in parliamentary elections between 1945 and 1951, nor in the 1969 and 1981 presidential elections.

\* Unlike other parliamentary elections of the Fifth Republic, the electoral system used was that of party-list proportional representation. A brief description of the French political system is presented in the Appendix.

Table C3: Comparison between French Algerian repatriates and mainland natives in 1968

VARIABLES	Mean		Difference (1) - (2) (3)
	Repatriates (1)	Natives (2)	
Female	0.5035	0.5195	-0.0160***
Age	31.07	34.98	-3.91***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>192,526</i>	<i>10,939,341</i>	
High Qualification	0.1189	0.0611	0.0577***
Med. Qualification	0.1319	0.0666	0.0652***
Low Qualification	0.3723	0.4000	-0.0277***
Missing Qualification	0.3718	0.4692	-0.0974***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>108,845</i>	<i>6,474,387</i>	
Unemployed	0.0243	0.0105	0.0138***
Out of the labor force	0.3033	0.2539	0.0494***
Student	0.0504	0.0353	0.0151***
Retired	0.0981	0.1451	-0.0470***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>127,284</i>	<i>7,708,693</i>	
Farmer	0.0206	0.1430	-0.1223***
Business Owner	0.0811	0.1145	-0.0334***
Higher managerial and intellectual position*	0.0945	0.0507	0.0437***
Middle managers	0.1845	0.1091	0.0754***
Employee	0.1950	0.1358	0.0592***
Worker	0.2303	0.3154	-0.0851***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>58,688</i>	<i>3,375,161</i>	
Worked in public administration	0.2879	0.0949	0.1930***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>66,715</i>	<i>4,360,232</i>	
Lives in the South	0.6230	0.3316	0.2915***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>192,526</i>	<i>10,939,341</i>	

Source: 1968 census.

Notes: The table presents means by repatriate status and the difference between the means. Column (1) shows the means for the repatriates, defined as French citizens living in Algeria as of January 1, 1962. Column (2) shows the means for the mainland natives, defined as French citizens born in mainland France and living in mainland France as of January 1, 1962. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Column (3) shows the difference between the means.

\*in French, *cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures*. This category brings together professors, scientific employees, arts and entertainment information professionals, administrative and commercial company executives, highly qualified and/or high-level employees, engineers, and technology company executives.



Table C4: Unemployment gap between repatriates and natives

VARIABLES	(1) 1968	(2) 1975	(3) 1981	(4) 1990	(5) 1999
<i>Repatriate<sub>i</sub></i>	0.020*** (0.0038)	0.006 (0.0038)	0.002 (0.0077)	0.016*** (0.0045)	0.014*** (0.0057)
Observations	103,060	113,707	36,240	160,941	124,085
Mean	0.0179	0.0316	0.0608	0.0801	0.0858
Adjusted $R^2$	0.0105	0.0284	0.0416	0.0299	0.0238

Source: *Échantillon Démographique Permanent* (EDP).

Notes: The table presents the unemployment gap between repatriates and mainland natives in 5 separate regressions. In each regression, I regress the unemployment dummy (1: unemployed; 0: employed) on the repatriate dummy (1: repatriate; 0: mainland native), education level, birth year, gender, and regional dummies (22 categories). I limit the sample to individuals in the sample since its first wave, i.e., the 1968 census. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.

Table C5: Overview of the State spending towards the repatriates from Algeria (1962-2002)

Measures	In millions of Euros (in 2021 Euros)	Number of beneficiaries
<i>Reception and resettlement</i>	<b>18,698</b>	42,500 (families)
<i>Indemnities and allowances</i>		
Compensation law of 15/07/1970	11,068	325,000
Compensation law of 02/01/1978	10,395	230,000
Compensation law of 06/01/1982	485	150,000
Compensation law of 16/07/1987	7,158	440,000
Allowances law of 16/07/1987	669	29,946
Total	<b>29,775</b>	
<i>Resettlement</i>		
Moratorium (law of 06/11/1969)	2,405	
Discounts (decree of 26/09/1977)	38	900
Discounts (law of 06/01/1982)	166	3,500
Discounts (law of 31/12/1986)	220	10,000
CONAIR exceptional aid (decree of 26/03/1994)	38	546
CONAIR exceptional aid (decree of 04/06/1999)	5	40
Total	<b>2,872</b>	
<i>Pensions</i>		
Law of 04/12/1985	1,506	101,165
Groupama	154	
Total	<b>1,660</b>	
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>53,005</b>	

Source: Author's translations from Esclangon-Morin (2007, p. 387).

## Appendix D: Natives' reaction to the repatriates

Table D1: Opinions on the financial help to the repatriates by the French State

<b>Since 1962, the French State has spent approximately 1,600 billion Francs to facilitate the resettlement of repatriates in France. This sum corresponds to approximately 10% of the French budget for this year. In your opinion,..</b>					
		... the State has made too much financial effort for the repatriates.	... the State has made a sufficient financial effort for the repatriates.	... the State has made an insufficient financial effort for the repatriates.	No opinion
Total		18%	48%	16%	18%
<i>Political opinion</i>					
Far left		26%	42%	17%	15%
Left		23%	49%	13%	15%
Center		15%	56%	19%	10%
Right		13%	56%	16%	15%
Far right		19%	40%	19%	22%
No political opinion		16%	44%	16%	24%
<b>Many repatriates abandoned their property in the territories they had to leave. In your opinion, what should the French State do?</b>					
	Fully compensate all owners of these assets.	Do not compensate anyone but help repatriates obtain compensation from the countries where they were living.	Prioritize and fully compensate the more deprived repatriates while compensating the others later and only partly.	Only compensate the most disadvantaged repatriates.	No opinion
Total	7%	22%	23%	37%	11%
<i>Political opinion</i>					
Far left	6%	19%	22%	48%	5%
Left	7%	19%	26%	43%	5%
Center	6%	27%	37%	30%	0%
Right	9%	20%	24%	34%	13%
Far right	14%	34%	17%	17%	18%
No political opinion	6%	25%	19%	33%	17%

Source: Replication and translation from a Sofres survey carried out between May 6 and May 14, 1970 with a national sample of 1,000 people - men and women - aged 21 and over.

$$FarRight_{ce} = \alpha + \beta UnemploymentRate_{ce} + \gamma X_{ce} + \tau_e + \lambda_c + \epsilon_{ce} \quad (11)$$

Table D2: Effect of unemployment on far-right vote shares in 1956 and 1958

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Far-right vote shares		
Unemployment rate	-0.183** (0.091)	-0.074 (0.088)	-0.118 (0.116)
Constituency fixed effects	✓	✓	✓
Election fixed effects	✓	✓	
Election × Area fixed effects			✓
Control variables		✓	✓
Adjusted $R^2$	0.665	0.676	0.698
Observations	739	739	739
Number of constituencies	371	371	371

Sources: 1954 and 1962 French censuses. 1956 election data digitalised from the *Liste des candidats aux élections législatives, 23-30 novembre 1958*. 1958 election data from the CDSP.

Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficient,  $\beta$ , from equation (11). Control variables include the share of immigrants, the share of individuals with a high school diploma or higher, the share of individuals employed in agriculture and manufacturing, population density, and the native unemployment rate in 1962. Area fixed effects are represented by dummies for seven broad geographical regions, while  $\lambda_c$  and  $\tau_e$  capture constituency and election fixed effects, respectively. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

$$\overline{FarRight}_{m,1965} = \frac{\text{far-right votes}_{m,1958} + \Delta \text{right-wing votes}_{m,(1958-1956)}}{\text{all votes}_{m,1958} + 0.9 \cdot \text{estimated number of repatriates 21 and older}_{m,1965}} \quad (9)$$

where

$$\Delta \text{right-wing votes}_{m,(1958-1956)} =$$

$$\begin{cases} \text{right-wing votes}_{m,1958} - \text{right-wing votes}_{m,1956} & \text{if right-wing votes}_{m,1958} > \text{right-wing votes}_{m,1956} \\ 0 & \text{if right-wing votes}_{m,1958} \leq \text{right-wing votes}_{m,1956} \end{cases}$$

and

$$\overline{RightWing}_{m,1965} = \frac{\frac{\text{right-wing votes}_{m,1956}}{\text{all votes}_{m,1956}} \cdot \text{all votes}_{m,1958}}{\text{all votes}_{m,1958} + 0.9 \cdot \text{estimated number of repatriates 21 and older}_{m,1965}} \quad (10)$$

## Appendix E: The far right and the anti-immigrant rhetoric


Table E1: Frequency of words used in Jean-Marie Le Pen's manifesto for the presidential elections

	Presidential elections	
	1974	1995
Immigration/Immigrants	0	8
Foreigners	0	5
Undocumented immigrants	0	2
France/French	23	43

Source: Archives électorales du CEVIPOF Sciences Po.


Notes: This table presents the frequency with which the following words are used in Jean-Marie Le Pen's manifestos for the 1974 and 1993 presidential elections.

Figure E1: Voting intentions of 2002 Le Pen voters in the 2007 presidential election



Notes: The graph presents the distribution of the self-reported probability of voting for Jean-Marie Le Pen (far-right presidential candidate) and Nicolas Sarkozy (conservative presidential candidate) in the fourth wave of the French Political Barometer 2006-2007. The sample is restricted to those who indicated having voted for Jean-Marie Le Pen in the first round of the 2002 presidential election, i.e., far-right voters.

Figure E2: Political concerns of French Algerians and voters over 40 in 2002



Source: 'Pieds-Noirs 2002' survey (Comtat, 2009, p. 204) and 2002 French Electoral Panel (First wave).

Notes: The graph presents themes of political discussion and the share of French Algerians who listed those as their discussion themes. The French Algerians could list more than one item; hence the shares add up to more than 100%. As a comparison, I use the first wave of the 2002 French Electoral Panel to compare the French Algerian political concerns with those of all French voters born before 1962. I use the question in the survey: 'Of the following issues, which three are going to be the most important when it comes to your vote?'. 'Social protection' was not listed in the 2002 French Electoral Panel, while the following subjects: 'School system', 'European construction', 'Fight against terrorism', 'French sovereignty', and 'Political scandal' were not themes listed in the 'Pieds-Noirs 2002' survey.

Table E2: Effect of the repatriation shock on the far-right vote shares in 2022

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	Vote shares				
	É. Zemmour	M. Le Pen	É. Zemmour	M. Le Pen	É. Zemmour Vote Proportion (vs. Le Pen)
<b>(i) Presidential election</b>					
<i>AlgRepShare<sub>m</sub></i>	0.006 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.018)	0.014*** (0.005)	0.000 (0.020)	0.041* (0.023)
Observations	34,310	34,310	34,586	34,586	34,569
Mean	6.687	28.69	6.69	28.61	18.26
Adjusted $R^2$	0.207	0.529	0.193	0.482	0.251
	Reconquête	Rassemblement National	Reconquête	Rassemblement National	Reconquête Vote Proportion (vs. RN)
<b>(ii) Parliamentary election</b>					
<i>AlgRepShare<sub>m</sub></i>	-0.000 (0.004)	0.018 (0.018)	0.009 (0.006)	0.026 (0.022)	0.065** (0.031)
Observations	34,310	34,310	34,586	34,586	34,493
Mean	3.69	23.66	3.69	23.59	14.53
Adjusted $R^2$	0.235	0.530	0.234	0.494	0.317
District fixed effects	✓	✓			
Constituency fixed effects			✓	✓	✓
2022 communal indicators	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Note: The table displays the point estimates from the regression of voting outcomes in 2022 on the share of repatriates in 1968. Columns (2) to (4) show the regression results of the vote shares for É. Zemmour/*Reconquête* and M. Le Pen/*Rassemblement National* over all votes in the election. Column (5) presents the regression of É. Zemmour/*Reconquête*'s share over the combined vote share of both É. Zemmour/*Reconquête* and M. Le Pen/*Rassemblement National*. The control variables include the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, as well as the percentile ranking of municipality size in 2022. Statistical significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels is indicated by \*\*\*, \*\*, and \*, respectively. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.

## Testimonies of French Algerians on immigration gathered by Comtat (2009)

*‘Jean-Marie Le Pen has some issues where I agree with him... stopping immigration, jobs for the French... After that, I don’t see what else could interest me! France for the French, that’s it. [...] I agree with him on the issue of immigrants, but there are other things I don’t agree with him on, so I can’t vote for him.’*<sup>52</sup> Male, 76 years old, retired from the semi-public sector, from Algiers, Alpes-Maritimes.

*‘Listen, they kicked us out of their country, so they should stay there now, especially since we left behind all our possessions, unbelievable infrastructure... We left them everything! We came back with empty pockets. So, if they could at least manage and make the most of what we left there and live with it, that would be good... We need to be a bit realistic... they kicked us out of their country, it was the suitcase or the coffin, and here, they are welcomed with open arms!’*<sup>53</sup> Female, 65 years old, shopkeeper, from Constantine, Isère.

*‘We’re not in favor of everything, though! But when we talk about social laws for the French, I agree. When we talk about immigrants, well, if they want to come to work, fine, otherwise they should stay home. But the other points, no, I’m not in favor of killing everyone, you know!’*<sup>54</sup> Male, 65 years old, retired municipal employee, from Algiers, Hérault.

*‘The socialists, they’re the same, you know. The socialists, pro-Arab, pro-immigrant!’*<sup>55</sup> Male, 67 years old, retired from the private sector, from Oran, Isère.

*‘People are tired of living in insecurity! All of this is why I disagree with the Socialist Party! The Socialist Party should take responsibility and say: ‘It’s over... France can’t take on all the misery of the world, we’re willing to welcome people who want to integrate, we’re willing to accept girls in our schools who are willing to take off the headscarf because those are the laws of the Republic.’*<sup>56</sup> Male, 66 years old, retired commissioner, from Oran, Hérault.

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<sup>52</sup> *‘Jean-Marie Le Pen a des questions où je suis d’accord avec lui... stopper l’immigration, le travail pour les Français... Après, je ne vois pas ce qui peut m’intéresser plus ! La France aux Français, voilà. [...] Je suis d’accord avec lui pour le principe des immigrés, mais il y a d’autres choses que je ne suis pas d’accord avec lui, donc je ne peux pas voter pour lui.’*

<sup>53</sup> *‘Écoutez, ils nous ont mis dehors de leur pays, ils devraient y rester maintenant, surtout qu’on a laissé là-bas tous nos biens, des infrastructures invraisemblables... On leur a laissé tout ! On est rentré les poches vides. Alors, si au moins ils pouvaient se débrouiller et faire fructifier ce qu’on a laissé là-bas et vivre avec, ça serait bien... Il faut être un peu lucide... ils nous ont mis dehors de leur pays, c’était la valise ou le cercueil, et ici, ils sont accueillis à bras ouverts!’*

<sup>54</sup> *‘On n’est pas pour toutes les idées quand même ! Mais quand on dit les lois sociales pour les Français, je suis d’accord. Quand on dit, les immigrés, bon, s’ils veulent venir pour travailler, autrement qu’ils restent chez eux. Mais les autres idées, non, je ne suis pas pour tuer tout le monde, hein !’*

<sup>55</sup> *‘Les socialistes, ils sont pareils, hein. Les socialistes, des proarabes, des proimmigrés !’*

<sup>56</sup> *‘Les gens en ont marre de vivre dans l’insécurité ! Tout ça fait que le PS, je suis en désaccord ! Que le PS prenne ses responsabilités et dise : ‘C’est terminé... la France ne peut pas assumer toute la misère du monde, on veut bien recevoir les gens qui veulent s’intégrer, on veut bien recevoir les filles dans nos écoles qui veulent bien enlever le tchador parce que c’est les lois de la République.’*

## Appendix F: Robustness tests

Table F1: Repatriation shock and in-migration

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)
	<b>In-migration</b>	
	Natives	Born in French Algeria
$\text{Repatriates}_{m,1968}$ $\text{Population}_{m,1962}$	1.252*** (0.241)	0.089* (0.048)
Observations	34,036	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.033	0.009

Sources: 1968 and 1962 French censuses.

Notes: The table presents the estimate  $\alpha_1$  from equation (4). \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table F2: Characteristics of the 1962-1968 in-migrants

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	<b>Full sample</b>	<b>Migrants only</b>	<b>Family head and partners only</b>	
	Migrated between 1962 and 1968	Share of repatriates in the new district	Number of children	Number of children born in 1962 and later
(i) French from Algeria	0.146*** (0.00174)	0.0184*** (0.00125)	0.170*** (0.00645)	0.0450*** (0.00327)
Observations	9,204,397	1,341,813	5,287,119	5,287,119
$R^2$	0.077	0.009	0.291	0.319
(ii) Child/partner of French from Algeria	0.127*** (0.00162)	0.0142*** (0.00110)		
Observations	8,835,601	1,273,750		
$R^2$	0.077	0.009		

Source: 1968 French census.

Notes: Column (1) shows the estimated coefficients of the regressions of the migrant dummy (1: Changed constituency between 1962 and 1968; 0: Did not change constituency) on the (i) French Algerian dummy (1: Born in Algeria; 0: Born in mainland France) and (ii) the dummy for the child or partner of French Algerian (1: Parent or partner born in Algeria; 0: Parent or partner born in mainland France). Column (2) shows the estimated coefficients of the regressions of the share of repatriates in the constituency of residence in 1968 on the (i) French Algerian dummy and (ii) the dummy for the child or partner of a French Algerian. Columns (3) and (4) show the estimated coefficients of regressions of the total number of children and the number of children born between 1962 and 1968 on the (i) French Algerian dummy. Control variables account for age dummies, gender, education level (6 categories), and status in the family. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. The sample is limited to individuals with French nationality.



Table F3: The impact of the repatriation shock on vote shares (1945 - 1968)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Vote shares		
VARIABLES	Far right	Right	Center	Left	Far left
$AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.164*** (0.0492)	-0.014 (0.0174)	0.018 (0.0125)	-0.053** (0.0250)	-0.024 (0.0167)
$\Delta FrenchAlgShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.004 (0.0085)	-0.016 (0.0253)	0.009 (0.0131)	0.002 (0.0231)	0.003 (0.0097)
Observations	75,293	253,689	287,897	237,635	251,337
Number of municipalities	29,920	34,493	34,545	34,543	34,542

Notes: The table presents the estimated  $\beta$  from specification (2) for both parliamentary and presidential elections between 1945 and 1968. The coefficient  $\beta$  represents the expected change in  $VoteShare_{me}$ , measured in percentage points (pp), for every 1pp increase in  $AlgRepShare_m$ . I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). I calculate  $\Delta FrenchAlgShare_e$  as follows:  $\Delta FrenchAlgShare_m = \frac{\text{pre-existing French from Algeria}_{m,1968} - \text{pre-existing French from Algeria}_{m,1962}}{Voters_{m,1961}}$ . I control for the following variables: the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, as well as the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The number of observations varies, as the outcome depends on the presence of a candidate from a specific political orientation in each election. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table F4: The impact of the repatriation shock on vote shares (1945 - 1968)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
			Vote shares		
VARIABLES	Far right	Right	Center	Left	Far left
$AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.208*** (0.0197)	-0.004 (0.0212)	0.017 (0.0157)	-0.070** (0.0284)	-0.030 (0.0193)
$\Delta FrenchAlgShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.007 (0.0090)	-0.015 (0.0252)	0.009 (0.0131)	0.002 (0.0229)	0.002 (0.0097)
$\Delta NativeShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.002*** (0.0007)	0.001 (0.0005)	-0.000 (0.0003)	-0.001*** (0.0004)	-0.000 (0.0002)
Observations	75,293	253,689	287,897	237,635	251,337
Number of municipalities	29,920	34,493	34,545	34,543	34,542

Notes: The table presents the estimated  $\beta$  from specification (2) for both parliamentary and presidential elections between 1945 and 1968. The coefficient  $\beta$  represents the expected change in  $VoteShare_{me}$ , measured in percentage points (pp), for every 1pp increase in  $AlgRepShare_m$ . I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). I calculate  $\Delta FrenchAlgShare_e$  as follows:  $\Delta FrenchAlgShare_m = \frac{\text{pre-existing French from Algeria}_{m,1968} - \text{pre-existing French from Algeria}_{m,1962}}{Voters_{m,1961}}$ . I calculate  $\Delta NativeShare_e$  as follows:  $\Delta NativeShare_m = \frac{Natives_{m,1968} - Natives_{m,1962}}{Voters_{m,1961}}$ . I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The number of observations varies, as the outcome depends on the presence of a candidate from a specific political orientation in each election. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table F5: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Far right			
	1956 - 1968		1956 - 2022	
$AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.180*** (0.0523)	0.183*** (0.0526)	0.053*** (0.0139)	0.054*** (0.0139)
$AverageIncome_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$		0.006*** (0.0017)		-0.010*** (0.0019)
$AverageIncome_{me}$		0.008 (0.0234)		0.004*** (0.0019)
Observations	76,291	76,291	686,394	686,394
Number of municipalities	30,066	30,066	34,451	34,451


Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients from the regression of  $FarRightVoteShare_{me}$  on  $AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$ . I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). The  $AverageIncome_{me}$  is the average income per capita relative to the national average. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table F6: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Far-right vote shares			
$AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	0.053*** (0.0139)	0.053*** (0.0138)	0.055*** (0.0142)	0.056*** (0.0142)
$Unemployment_{me}$		0.021 (0.0158)		0.021 (0.0159)
$Unemployment_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$		-0.022 (0.0160)		-0.022 (0.0161)
$ShareForeign_{me}$			-0.005 (0.0086)	0.070 (0.0554)
$ShareForeign_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$			-0.036*** (0.0088)	-0.111* (0.0588)
$Unemployment_{m,1962} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	✓		✓	
$ShareForeign_{m,1962} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	✓	✓		
$\bar{X}_{m,1961} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$	✓	✓	✓	✓
Observations	686,394	683,983	685,491	683,974
Number of municipalities	29,920	34,430	34,449	34,429

Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients from the regression of  $FarRightVoteShare_{me}$  on  $AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e \geq 1965}$ . I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). I account for the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers and workers, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I control for election-district fixed effects ( $\phi_{ce}$ ) and municipality fixed effects ( $\lambda_m$ ). \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.


Figure F1: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares accounting for subsequent unemployment



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from the specification below.  $\beta_e$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$  in election  $e$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1 percentage point. The 1958 parliamentary election serves as the baseline. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The baseline estimation is based on 686,208 observations from 34,399 municipalities. The robustness estimation is based on 683,919 observations from 34,399 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

$$FarRight_{me} = \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \beta_e (AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \zeta Unemployment_{me} + \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \delta_e (Unemployment_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \gamma_e (\bar{X}_{m,1961} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \lambda_m + \phi_{ce} + \epsilon_{me}$$


Figure F2: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares accounting for subsequent migration



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from the specification below.  $\beta_e$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$  in election  $e$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1 percentage point. The 1958 parliamentary election serves as the baseline. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The baseline estimation is based on 686,208 observations from 34,399 municipalities. The robustness estimation is based on 685,421 observations from 34,415 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

$$FarRight_{me} = \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \beta_e(AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \zeta ShareForeign_{me} + \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \delta_e(ShareForeign_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \gamma_e(\bar{X}_{m,1962} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \lambda_m + \phi_{ce} + \epsilon_{me}$$


Figure F3: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares accounting for subsequent unemployment and migration



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from the specification below.  $\beta_e$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$  in election  $e$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1 percentage point. The 1958 parliamentary election serves as the baseline. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The baseline estimation is based on 686,208 observations from 34,399 municipalities. The robustness estimation is based on 683,912 observations from 34,399 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

$$\begin{aligned}
 FarRight_{me} = & \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \beta_e (AlgRepShare_m \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \zeta ShareForeign_{me} + \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \delta_e (ShareForeign_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) \\
 & + \chi Unemployment_{me} + \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \theta_e (Unemployment_{me} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \\
 & \sum_{j \neq 1958}^J \gamma_e (\bar{X}_{m,1961} \cdot \mathbb{1}_{e=j}) + \lambda_m + \phi_{ce} + \epsilon_{me}
 \end{aligned}$$


Figure F4: Long-term distribution of the Algerian repatriates



Source: *Échantillon Démographique Permanent* (EDP).


Notes: The graph presents the estimated share of repatriates overall potential voters, i.e., the number of repatriates aged over 17 divided by the number of individuals possessing French citizenship aged over 17. The 1954 map shows the distribution of French Algerians, i.e., individuals of European ancestry born in French Algeria.

Figure F5: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from specification (3). The figure shows the estimated impact of the repatriation shock on the vote shares for the far-right parties. Presidential election years are highlighted in bold.  $\beta_e$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$  in election  $e$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1pp. The 1958 parliamentary election serves as the baseline. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). I also account for the share of harkis  $HarkisShare_m$  in municipality  $m$  in 1968. The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The estimation is based on 685,150 observations from 34,379 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.


Figure F6: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares in urban and rural municipalities



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from specification (3). The figure shows the estimated impact of the repatriation shock on the vote shares for the far-right parties. Presidential election years are highlighted in bold.  $\beta_e$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$  in election  $e$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1pp. The 1958 parliamentary election serves as the baseline. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). I classify municipalities as urban if their population size exceeded the median population of all agglomerations in the 1961 distribution. The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The estimation in the urban sample is based on 44,121 observations from 2,208 municipalities. The estimation in the rural sample is based on 638,269 observations from 32,044 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.




Figure F7: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from specification (3). The figure shows the estimated impact of the repatriation shock on the vote shares for the far-right parties. Presidential election years are highlighted in bold.  $\beta_e$  is the expected percentage point (pp) change in  $VoteShare_{me}$  in election  $e$ , when  $AlgRepShare_m$  increases by 1pp. The 1958 parliamentary election serves as the baseline. I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). I add  $\Delta FrenchAlgShare_e \mathbb{1}_{election=e}$  to the estimation and calculate  $\Delta FrenchAlgShare_e$  as follows:  $\Delta FrenchAlgShare_{m,1968} = \frac{\text{pre-existing French from Algeria}_{m,1968} - \text{pre-existing French from Algeria}_{m,1962}}{Voters_{m,1961}}$ . The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The estimation is based on 669,959 observations from 33,631 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Figure F8: Leave-one-out analysis



Notes: The figure presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  in the specification (3). I use the definition of  $AlgRepShare_m$  from equation (1). The baseline estimation is based on 686,208 observations from 34,399 municipalities. The graphs show the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table F7: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	1956-1968				1956-2022			
	Far right							
$AlgRepShare_m$	0.621*** (0.1807)	0.617*** (0.1789)	0.617*** (0.1788)	0.619*** (0.1793)	0.182*** (0.0474)	0.179*** (0.0469)	0.178*** (0.0464)	0.180*** (0.0467)
$AlgRepShare_m^{10km}$	0.862** (0.3445)				1.273*** (0.4405)			
$AlgRepShare_m^{15km}$		0.673*** (0.2236)				0.995*** (0.2702)		
$AlgRepShare_m^{20km}$			0.289** (0.1469)				0.600*** (0.2047)	
$AlgRepShare_m^{25km}$				0.153 (0.1133)				0.403*** (0.1538)
Observations	76,217	76,277	76,287	76,289	685,490	686,246	686,351	686,373
Number of municipalities	30,034	30,059	30,064	30,065	34,409	34,443	34,449	34,450

Notes: The table presents the estimated  $\beta$  from specification (2) for both parliamentary and presidential elections between 1956 and 1968 (Columns (1) to (4)) and between 1956 and 2022 (Columns (5) to (8)). The coefficient  $\beta$  represents the expected change in  $VoteShare_{me}$ , measured in percentage points (pp), for a one standard deviation increase in  $AlgRepShare_m$  or  $AlgRepShare_m^r$ . I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-district fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The number of observations varies, as the outcome depends on the presence of a far-right candidate in each election. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. The standard errors are clustered at the district level.

Table F8: Balancing tests by timing of migration

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Mean		Difference
	French Algerians living in France in 1954	Repatriates	(1) - (2)
Female	0.4685	0.4811	-0.0126
Age	30.392	25.4496	4.9424***
Lives in the South	0.5372	0.6034	-0.0662***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>3,334</i>	<i>152,056</i>	
High Qualification	0.2451	0.1892	0.0558***
Medium Qualification	0.1991	0.2099	-0.0108
Low Qualification	0.5559	0.5927	-0.0368***
Unemployed	0.0081	0.0259	-0.0177***
Out of the labor force	0.0052	0.2373	-0.2321***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>1,718</i>	<i>86,814</i>	

Source: 1968 census.


Notes: The table compares means between repatriate and non-repatriate groups, along with the differences between these means. Column (1) shows the means for 1954 French Algerians, defined as French citizens who were born in Algeria and had been living in France since 1954 according to the 1962 Census. Column (2) shows the means for the repatriates, defined as French citizens living in Algeria as of January 1, 1962 according to the 1968 Census. Column (3) shows the difference between the means. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table F9: Balancing tests for observable constituency characteristics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
		Levels			Trends	
	Mean	Share of repatriates	Predicted share of repatriates	Mean	Share of repatriates	Predicted share of repatriates
	<i>Observations</i>			<i>Observations</i>		
<b>Political outcomes</b>						
Voting shares for the ...						
... far right (1956)	11.56	0.207	0.188	-9.04	-0.095	-0.238
	<i>360</i>	(0.2057)	(0.1699)	<i>706</i>	(0.2133)	(0.1749)
... right (1956)	20.77	-0.881	-0.921*	22.87	0.651	-0.009
	<i>360</i>	(0.6129)	(0.5081)	<i>708</i>	(0.4805)	(0.4788)
... <i>Action Française</i> (1919)	0.621	-0.044**	-0.028*			
	<i>326</i>	(0.0174)	(0.0139)			
... Francisme (1936)	0.616	0.034	0.038			
	<i>348</i>	(0.0649)	(0.0412)			
Ratio of collaborators (1944)	0.17	0.008	0.005			
	<i>349</i>	(0.0053)	(0.0040)			
<b>Other constituency indicators</b>						
Relative to the national average						
Average income (1961)	89.08	0.703	0.920***	1.06	0.171**	-0.108
	<i>362</i>	(0.5510)	(0.2478)	<i>724</i>	(0.0827)	(0.1084)
Real estate capital per capita (1961)	93.72	0.731	-0.144	2.00	0.206	-0.169
	<i>362</i>	(1.0039)	(0.6462)	<i>724</i>	(0.4110)	(0.4253)
Percentile rank of homeownership rate (1961)	71.04	-0.939***	0.106	0.37	-0.003	-0.036**
	<i>362</i>	(0.2911)	(0.4233)	<i>724</i>	(0.0249)	(0.0169)
Share of higher-level professionals (1961)	1.08	-0.051***	-0.015			
	<i>362</i>	(0.0108)	(0.0145)			
Share of middle-level professionals (1961)	4.00	-0.056*	0.029			
	<i>362</i>	(0.0280)	(0.0269)			
Share of employees (1961)	11.73	0.142***	0.043			
	<i>362</i>	(0.0366)	(0.0459)			
Share of refractory priests (1791)	48.03	0.331	-0.139			
	<i>317</i>	(0.5191)	(0.4514)			

Notes: The table presents the estimated coefficients from regressing constituency indicators as well as the change in these indicators on the share of French Algerian repatriates (Columns (2) and (5)) and the predicted share of French Algerian repatriates using the 1954 distribution of French Algerians in mainland France (Columns (3) and (6)). The year indicated in parentheses next to each indicator represents the measurement year for the level regressions. For the trend regressions, the vote share changes are calculated between 1956 and 1958 for the far right and between 1945 and 1958 for the right, as these years are the furthest available from 1961. Changes in constituency indicators are measured between 1956 and 1961. The share of higher-level professionals includes individuals in roles such as senior managers, doctors, professors, lawyers, and other advanced intellectual professions. These roles align with the French category '*cadres et professions intellectuelles supérieures*', which encompasses highly skilled and managerial positions across various sectors. The share of mid-level professionals includes individuals in roles such as middle managers, technicians, school teachers, and nurses. These roles correspond to the French category '*professions intermédiaires*', representing occupations that require a combination of technical skills and supervisory responsibilities but are below the senior management level. 'Refractory priests' refers to clergy who refused to pledge allegiance to the Civil Constitution of the Clergy during the French Revolution, which aimed to bring the Church under state control. I use this as an indicator of religious adherence. The regressions control for  $X_{m,1961}$ , which includes the proportion of foreign residents, the proportion of high school graduates among individuals aged 25 and older, the proportions of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile rank of municipality size in 1961. Columns (2) and (4) include region fixed effects. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the *département* level.

Figure F9: The impact of the repatriation shock on far-right vote shares



Notes: The graph presents the point estimates  $\beta_e$  from specification (3). The figure shows the estimated impact of the repatriation shock on the vote shares of far-right parties. I use the predicted share of repatriates ( $\widehat{AlgRepShare_c}$ ), based on the 1954 distribution of French Algerians, as an instrumental variable for the actual share of repatriates. The graph displays the 95% confidence intervals for the estimates. I control for the proportion of foreign individuals, the proportion of high school graduates among those aged 25 and older, the proportion of farmers, workers, and unemployed individuals, and the percentile ranking of municipality size in 1961. I also control for election-region fixed effects and constituency fixed effects. The estimations are based on 8,307 observations from 362 municipalities. The standard errors are clustered at the *département* level.

## Appendix G: Parliamentary elections

Table G1: Voter turnout of the French from Algeria (in %)

Votes ...	always	often	occasionally	never
<b>Born before 1947</b>				
French from Algeria	78	19	1.5	1.5
All French	59	26	5	0
<b>Born between 1947 and 1962</b>				
Children of French from Algeria	70	28	1	1
All French	45	42	12	1
<b>Total</b>				
French from Algeria and their children	76	21	2	1
All French born in 1962 and earlier	52	39	8	1

Source: ‘Pieds-Noirs 2002’ survey and 2007 French Electoral Panel. Replication and translation from Comtat (2009).

Notes: The ‘Pieds-Noirs 2002’ survey - PACTE/CIDSP (UMR 5194) - is a self-administered survey launched in 2002. It was carried out among 6,000 French of European descent born in Algeria before 1962 and living in Isère, Alpes-Maritimes, and Hérault. The contact details of the persons were obtained by drawing lots from the electoral rolls showing the place of birth of those registered. The questionnaire focuses on the political behavior of the French Algerians in Algeria and France since 1962, on their professional paths, and on their memory. Hence, the survey comprises repatriates and French Algerians who migrated before 1962. The children of the French from Algeria might themselves be born in Algeria or in mainland France.

Table G2: Voter turnout by party affinity (1986 - 2017)

Year	Election data	Survey data										
	Turnout rate	Turnout rate			Turnout rate			Turnout rate			Turnout rate	
	All	All	Close to a far-right party		Observations		Difference	Voted for a far-right candidate/party		Observations	Difference	
	$mean_{all}$ (1)	$mean_{all}$ (2)	$mean_{yes}$ (3)	$mean_{no}$ (4)	$N_{yes}$ (5)	$N_{no}$ (6)	$mean_{yes} - mean_{no}$ (7)	$mean_{yes}$ (8)	$mean_{no}$ (9)	$N_{yes}$ (10)	$N_{no}$ (11)	$mean_{yes} - mean_{no}$ (12)
1986	0.7849	0.715	0.7434	0.7137	152	3,880	0.0296					
<b>1988</b>	<b>0.6616</b>	<b>0.913</b>	<b>0.9507</b>	<b>0.9113</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>3,688</b>	<b>0.0394</b>	<b>0.9590</b>	<b>0.9113</b>	<b>122</b>	<b>3,708</b>	<b>0.0477*</b>
1993	0.6929	0.771	0.7752	0.8291	129	2,036	-0.0538					
<b>1995</b>	<b>0.7948</b>	<b>0.860</b>	<b>0.8741</b>	<b>0.8849</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>2,137</b>	<b>-0.0108</b>	<b>0.9160</b>	<b>0.8561</b>	<b>131</b>	<b>3,620</b>	<b>0.0599*</b>
1997	0.6847	0.814	0.7933	0.8148	150	2,857	-0.0215	0.7885	0.8131	156	2,649	-0.0246
<b>2002</b>	<b>0.7284</b>	<b>0.877</b>	<b>0.9187</b>	<b>0.8753</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>1,837</b>	<b>0.0434</b>					
2002	0.6512	0.798	0.6911	0.8062	123	1,837	-0.1151***	0.8063	0.8765	191	1,490	-0.0702***
<b>2007</b>	<b>0.8533</b>	<b>0.956</b>	<b>0.9714</b>	<b>0.9580</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>1,714</b>	<b>0.0134</b>					
2007	0.6099	0.829	0.8000	0.8378	35	1,714	-0.0377	0.8036	0.8399	56	1,761	-0.0363
<b>2012</b>	<b>0.8137</b>	<b>0.903</b>	<b>0.8889</b>	<b>0.9085</b>	<b>90</b>	<b>1,868</b>	<b>-0.0196</b>	<b>0.9065</b>	<b>0.9419</b>	<b>139</b>	<b>1,481</b>	<b>-0.0354*</b>
2012	0.5874	0.906	0.8605	0.9094	86	1,800	-0.0488	0.8982	0.9534	285	1,395	-0.0552***
<b>2017</b>	<b>0.8002</b>	<b>0.850</b>	<b>0.8456</b>	<b>0.8542</b>	<b>149</b>	<b>1,619</b>	<b>-0.0085</b>	<b>0.9181</b>	<b>0.8946</b>	<b>171</b>	<b>1,214</b>	<b>0.0235</b>
2017	0.5022	0.855	0.8299	0.8600	147	1,579	-0.0301	0.8972	0.9455	282	1,174	-0.0483***

Source: own calculations. Election data from the CDSP and the French Interior Ministry. Survey data from the French Electoral Survey (1988 - 2017) and the 2002 French Electoral Panel.

Notes: This table presents turnout rates for the presidential and parliamentary elections from 1986 until 2017. The lines in bold indicate presidential elections. Columns (3) and (4) differentiate turnout rates for those who identified a far-right party as a response to ‘*Here is a list of political parties or movements. Can you tell me which one you feel closest to or say least distant from?*’ and those who did not. For the 2012 and 2017 surveys, the question was changed to ‘*Could you give each of the following parties a score from 0 to 10, where 0 means you don’t like that party at all and 10 means you like it very much.*’. Individuals who rated their sympathy towards the FN at 9 or 10 were considered close to the party. Columns (8) and (9) differentiate turnout rates for those who voted for a far-right candidate or party in the previous election and those who did not. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table H1: Voting intentions in the 1st round of the 2012 presidential election


	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	French from Algeria	Natives aged more than 50	Descendants of French from Algeria	Individuals with no French Algerian ancestry
Candidates				
Far left	5%	12.5%	13.5%	13%
Left	23.5%	31%	28%	31%
Moderate	7%	9.5%	9%	9%
Right	42%	31,5%	29%	29%
Far right	21,5%	14%	20%	18%

Source: Replication from IFOP (2014). Author's translation.

Notes: The table presents the results of a rolling poll that took place from January until Mai 2012. 33,400 individuals were asked about their voting intentions for the first round of the presidential election that took place on May 22, 2012. An individual is considered a descendant of a French Algerian if they had at least a parent or a grandparent who was French Algerian. The IFOP classification of candidates is somewhat different than the classification used in my analysis (see Table I6). Marine Le Pen (*Front National*) is considered a far-right candidate. Nicolas Sarkozy (Union for a Popular Movement) and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan (France Arise) are right-wing candidates; François Bayrou (Democratic Movement) is classified as a centrist candidate; François Hollande (Socialist Party) and Eva Joly (Greens) are accounted as left-wing candidates; and Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Left Front), Philippe Poutou (New Anticapitalist Party) and Nathalie Arthaud (Workers' Struggle) are far-left candidates.

## Appendix H: Intergenerational transmission of political preferences

Figure H1: Self-reported political position and voting decisions in 2007



Source: French Electoral Panel 2007 (*Panel Electoral Français 2007*).

Notes: The graph presents the distribution of voters over political parties by their self-reported political position. The numbers in the circle indicate the percentage of interviewees who voted within a political category over all the interviewees who positioned themselves in the same position on the political scale, i.e., adding up the numbers vertically will give out a total of 100%. The classification of candidates into political categories is described in Table I6 (year 2007).



Table H2: Balancing tests by parental background

VARIABLES	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Mean Children of repatriates	Mean Children of natives	Difference (1) - (2)
Age	41.53	39.03	2.49***
<b>Employment</b>			
Employed	0.7970	0.7715	0.0254
Unemployed	0.0551	0.0562	-0.0011
Student	0.0351	0.0386	-0.0035
Out of the Labor Force	0.0802	0.0825	-0.0023
<b>High Qualification</b>			
Individual	0.5050	0.3452	0.1598***
Mother	0.1679	0.1082	0.0597***
Father	0.1642	0.0952	0.0690***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>798</i>	<i>6,579</i>	
Monthly income of the household (in EUR)	3765.58	3124.78	640.80***
<i>Observations</i>	<i>567</i>	<i>4,547</i>	
<b>Politics</b>			
Very right	0.0353	0.0347	0.0006
Rather right	0.2473	0.1995	0.0479***
Center	0.1475	0.1227	0.0247*
Rather left	0.2089	0.2455	-0.0366**
Very left	0.0384	0.0553	-0.0169*
Neither left, nor right	0.3226	0.3423	-0.0197
<i>Observations</i>	<i>651</i>	<i>5,475</i>	
<b>Opinions</b>			
Opposes opening up immigration	0.6504	0.6028	0.0477**
<i>Observations</i>	<i>575</i>	<i>3,323</i>	
Opposes gay rights	0.1337	0.1546	-0.0209
<i>Observations</i>	<i>591</i>	<i>3,396</i>	
Opposes gender equality	0.1346	0.1439	-0.0094
<i>Observations</i>	<i>602</i>	<i>3,460</i>	
Opposes abortion right	0.0694	0.0698	-0.0004
<i>Observations</i>	<i>605</i>	<i>3,437</i>	

Source: Trajectories and Origins Surveys (TeO and TeO2).

Notes: The table presents means by parental background and the difference between the means. The sample is limited to individuals born in mainland France to French citizens. Column (1) shows the means for the children of repatriates defined as having at least one parent being a repatriate from Algeria. The TeO surveys provide information on whether one's parent was a repatriate. I select children from repatriates born in Algeria. If only one parent was a repatriate from Algeria, the other parent was born in mainland France. Column (2) shows the means for children of natives, i.e., whose parents were born in mainland France. Column (3) shows the difference between the means. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table H3: Bias-adjusted political differences between children of repatriates from Algeria and children of mainland natives

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Right	Center	Left	Neither right, nor left
<hr/>				
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>				
Uncontrolled estimator ( $\dot{\beta}$ )	0.048	0.025	-0.054	-0.020
$R^2$ ( $\dot{R}$ )	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
Controlled estimator ( $\tilde{\beta}$ )	0.030	-0.002	-0.065	0.037
$R^2$ ( $\tilde{R}$ )	0.066	0.042	0.061	0.098
Bias-adjusted estimator ( $\beta^*$ )	0.024	-0.013	-0.070	0.058
$R_{max} = 1.3\tilde{R}$	0.086	0.054	0.079	0.128

Source: Trajectories and Origins Surveys (TeO and TeO2).

Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients  $\beta$  from specification (8). The outcome variables correspond to individuals' self-placement on the political spectrum: 'Right', 'Center', 'Left', and 'Neither left nor right'. The categories 'Right' and 'Left' aggregate responses from 'Very right' and 'Rather right,' and from 'Very left' and 'Rather left,' respectively. The uncontrolled estimator  $\dot{\beta}$  results from the regressions of political opinions on the *RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub>* dummy.  $\dot{R}$  represents the  $R^2$  of those regressions. The controlled estimator  $\tilde{\beta}$  results from the regression of political opinions on the *RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub>* dummy and both individual and parental characteristics.  $\tilde{R}$  represents the  $R^2$  in those regressions. Following Oster (2019), the bias-adjusted estimator can be approximated as  $\beta^* = \tilde{\beta} - \delta[\dot{\beta} - \tilde{\beta}] \frac{R_{max} - \tilde{R}}{\tilde{R} - \dot{R}}$  where  $R_{max}$  is the  $R^2$  from a hypothetical regression of the outcome on treatment and both observed and unobserved controls and  $\delta$  is the value for the relative degree of selection on observed and unobserved variables. As suggested in Oster (2019), I assume  $\delta = 1$  and I fix the  $R_{max} = 1.3\tilde{R}$ .

Table H4: Political differences between children of repatriates from Algeria and children of mainland natives

VARIABLES	(1) Right	(2) Center	(3) Left	(4) Neither left nor right
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>	0.063 (0.043)	0.008 (0.034)	-0.088** (0.037)	0.018 (0.039)
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub> × MotherRep<sub>i</sub></i>	-0.032 (0.052)	-0.034 (0.040)	0.036 (0.045)	0.030 (0.046)
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub> × FatherRep<sub>i</sub></i>	-0.051 (0.052)	0.006 (0.043)	0.025 (0.047)	0.021 (0.047)
Observations	5,829	5,829	5,829	5,829
Mean	0.240	0.126	0.297	0.337
Adjusted $R^2$	0.0462	0.0214	0.0408	0.0791

Source: Trajectories and Origins Surveys (TeO and TeO2).

Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients  $\beta$  from specification (8). The outcome variables correspond to individuals' self-placement on the political spectrum: 'Right', 'Center', 'Left', and 'Neither left nor right'. The categories 'Right' and 'Left' aggregate responses from 'Very right' and 'Rather right,' and from 'Very left' and 'Rather left,' respectively. In addition to the standard p-values, I calculated p-values corrected for testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously, following Romano and Wolf (2005). While the corrected p-values are somewhat larger, the overall conclusion from the analysis remains unchanged. I control for the age, education level, socio-professional category, employment status, and region of birth of the interviewee, as well as the education level and socio-professional category of their parents. The TeO surveys have a clustered survey design. The sample comprises persons residing in a municipality in the master sample and identified in the annual census survey. Throughout the analysis, I account for a potential dependence of observations within the same sampling units by clustering at the year-municipality level. Since sampling districts are very small, there are several hundred clusters. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table H5: Political differences between children of repatriates from Algeria and children of mainland natives

VARIABLES	(1) Right	(2) Centre	(3) Left	(4) Neither left nor right
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>	0.051* (0.028)	0.012 (0.022)	-0.076*** (0.028)	0.012 (0.028)
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub> × Low educated parents<sub>i</sub></i>	-0.041 (0.040)	-0.058** (0.029)	0.039 (0.039)	0.061 (0.043)
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub> × High educated parents<sub>i</sub></i>	-0.034 (0.057)	0.054 (0.050)	-0.029 (0.056)	0.010 (0.048)
Observations	5,829	5,829	5,829	5,829
Mean	0.240	0.126	0.297	0.337
Adjusted $R^2$	0.047	0.023	0.041	0.079

Source: Trajectories and Origins Surveys (TeO and TeO2).

Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients  $\beta$  from specification (8). The outcome variables correspond to individuals' self-placement on the political spectrum: 'Right', 'Center', 'Left', and 'Neither left nor right'. The categories 'Right' and 'Left' aggregate responses from 'Very right' and 'Rather right,' and from 'Very left' and 'Rather left,' respectively. I classify parents as low-educated if their highest diploma is below the HSD level (*CAP* or *BEP* in French). High-educated parents are defined as those who completed at least two years of tertiary study and hold a diploma. I control for the age, education level, socio-professional category, employment status, and region of birth of the interviewee, as well as the education level and socio-professional category of their parents. The TeO surveys have a clustered survey design. The sample comprises persons residing in a municipality in the master sample and identified in the annual census survey. Throughout the analysis, I account for a potential dependence of observations within the same sampling units by clustering at the year-municipality level. Since sampling districts are very small, there are several hundred clusters. However, my conclusions remain unchanged. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table H6: Political differences between children of repatriates from Algeria and children of immigrants from Portugal, Italy or Spain

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
VARIABLES	Right	Centre	Left	Neither left nor right
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>	0.053** (0.023)	0.003 (0.018)	-0.065*** (0.024)	0.010 (0.025)
Observations	3,838	3,838	3,838	3,838
Mean	0.182	0.123	0.298	0.397
Adjusted $R^2$	0.055	0.012	0.038	0.071

Source: Trajectories and Origins Surveys (TeO and TeO2).

Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients  $\beta$  from specification (8). The outcome variables correspond to individuals' self-placement on the political spectrum: 'Right', 'Center', 'Left', and 'Neither left nor right'. The categories 'Right' and 'Left' aggregate responses from 'Very right' and 'Rather right,' and from 'Very left' and 'Rather left,' respectively. The control group comprises children with one or both parents who immigrated from Spain, Italy, or Portugal. In cases where only one parent is an immigrant, the other is a native of mainland France. I control for the age, education level, socio-professional category, employment status, and region of birth of the interviewee, as well as the education level and socio-professional category of their parents. The TeO surveys have a clustered survey design. The sample comprises persons residing in a municipality in the master sample and identified in the annual census survey. Throughout the analysis, I account for a potential dependence of observations within the same sampling units by clustering at the year-municipality level. Since sampling districts are very small, there are several hundred clusters. However, my conclusions remain unchanged. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

Table H7: Other opinions

VARIABLES	(1) Opposes opening up immigration	(2) Opposes gay rights	(3) Opposes gender equality	(4) Opposes abortion
<b>(i) Full sample</b>				
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>	0.086*** (0.032)	0.003 (0.024)	0.003 (0.024)	0.037* (0.019)
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i> × Low educated parents <sub>i</sub>	-0.123*** (0.045)	-0.050 (0.035)	0.021 (0.034)	-0.024 (0.028)
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i> × High educated parents <sub>i</sub>	0.053 (0.061)	0.026 (0.045)	-0.030 (0.047)	-0.026 (0.031)
Observations	3,482	3,566	3,645	3,614
Mean	0.627	0.158	0.137	0.071
Adjusted $R^2$	0.092	0.046	0.013	0.045
<b>(ii) Right-leaning individuals</b>				
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i>	0.159** (0.062)	-0.039 (0.069)	-0.060 (0.059)	0.045 (0.039)
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i> × Low educated parents <sub>i</sub>	-0.085 (0.078)	0.053 (0.103)	0.021 (0.085)	-0.015 (0.059)
<i>RepatriateChild<sub>i</sub></i> × High educated parents <sub>i</sub>	-0.177 (0.116)	0.095 (0.120)	-0.011 (0.097)	-0.034 (0.085)
Observations	713	711	721	718
Mean	0.853	0.269	0.144	0.084
Adjusted $R^2$	0.031	0.054	0.007	0.061

Source: Trajectories and Origins Survey 2 (TeO2).

Notes: The table shows the estimated coefficients  $\beta$  from specification (8). The outcome variables measure individuals' level of agreement with four following statements: 'France should be more open to immigration' (1), 'Homosexual couples should have the same rights as heterosexual couples' (2), 'When there is little work, men have more of a right to employment than women' (3), and 'A woman can have an abortion for non-medical reasons' (4). In addition to the standard p-values, I calculated p-values corrected for testing multiple hypotheses simultaneously, following Romano and Wolf (2005). While the corrected p-values are somewhat larger, the overall conclusion from the analysis remains unchanged. I classify parents as low-educated if their highest diploma is below the HSD level (*CAP* or *BEP* in French). High-educated parents are defined as those who completed at least two years of tertiary study and hold a diploma. I control for the age, education level, socio-professional category, employment status, and region of birth of the interviewee, as well as the education level and socio-professional category of their parents. The TeO survey has a clustered survey design. The sample comprises persons residing in a municipality in the master sample and identified in the annual census survey. Throughout the analysis, I account for a potential dependence of observations within the same sampling units by clustering the standard errors accordingly. Since sampling districts are very small, there are several hundred clusters. \*\*\*, \*\*, and \* denote significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent level, respectively.

## Appendix I: Parties classification

Table I1: Classification of parties in parliamentary elections (1945 - 1951)

	Far-right parties	Conservative parties	Centrist parties	Social-democrat parties	Far-left parties
1945		Parti républicain de la liberté Parti Paysan et Action Démocratique Union Républicaine et Démocratique Divers droite	Radicaux Mouvement républicain populaire Parti républicain, radical et radical-socialiste	S.F.I.O. Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance Radicaux-Socialiste Divers Gauche	Parti Communiste Français Autre Extrême Gauche
1946 (January)		Parti républicain de la liberté Parti paysan d'union sociale Républicains indépendants Divers Droite	Mouvement républicain populaire Rassemblement des gauches républicaines	S.F.I.O. Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance Radicaux Socialistes Divers Gauche	Parti Communiste Français
1946 (November)		Gaullistes Républicains indépendants Parti républicain de la liberté Parti paysan d'union sociale Divers Droite	Mouvement républicain populaire Rassemblement des gauches républicaines Radicaux Socialistes	S.F.I.O. Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance Divers Gauche	Parti Communiste Français Parti communiste internationaliste
1951		Union des Indépendants Paysans Républicains Nationaux Rassemblement du peuple français Union des Nationaux et des Indépendants pour la République Divers Droite	Mouvement républicain populaire Rassemblement des gauches républicaines	S.F.I.O. Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance Radicaux-Socialiste Divers Gauche	Parti Communiste Français

Notes: I classified the parties according to Cagé and Piketty (2023) own classification as well as the classification by Salmon (2018). Finally, I used the categorization by ParlGov.org. 'Autre Extrême Droite' (Other far right) and 'Autre Extrême Gauche' (Other far left) are categories generated by the Cagé and Piketty (2023).

Table I2: Classification of parties in parliamentary elections (1956 - 1968)

	<b>Far-right parties</b>	<b>Conservative parties</b>	<b>Centrist parties</b>	<b>Social-democrat parties</b>	<b>Far-left parties</b>
1956	Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans  Autre Extrême Droite	Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans Rassemblement du Peuple Français - Gaullistes Divers Droite	Mouvement Républicain Populaire Rassemblement des Gauches Républicaines	S.F.I.O.  Union démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance Radicaux Socialistes FRREP (Front Républicain) Divers Gauche	Parti Communiste Français
1958	Union de Défense des Commerçants et Artisans  Autre Extrême Droite	Union pour la Nouvelle République  Divers Gaullistes  Center National des Indépendants Center Réformateur Républicain Modérés	Radicaux Centristes  Mouvement Républicain Populaire	Union des Forces Démocratiques Radicaux - Union des Forces Démocratiques Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière Union Démocratique et Socialiste Radicaux Socialistes	Parti Communiste
1967	Alliance Républicaine pour les Libertés et le Progrès  Autre Extrême Droite	Union des Démocrates pour la Cinquième République  Divers Gaullistes  Radicaux de Droite Républicains Indépendants Modérés	Center Démocrate  Centristes Ralliés	Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste –	Parti Communiste  Parti Communiste Apparentés Parti Socialiste Unifié  Autre Extrême Gauche
1968	Alliance Républicaine pour les Libertés et le Progrès  Autre Extrême Droite	Union des Démocrates pour la Cinquième République  Divers Gaullistes  Radicaux de Droite Républicains Indépendants Modérés	Center Démocrate	Fédération de la gauche démocrate et socialiste –  Radicaux Socialistes	Parti Communiste  Parti Communiste Apparentés Parti Socialiste Unifié

Notes: I classified the parties according to Cagé and Piketty (2023) own classification as well as the classification by Salmon (2018). Finally, I used the categorization by ParlGov.org. 'Autre Extrême Droite' (Other far right) and 'Autre Extrême Gauche' (Other far left) are categories generated by the Cagé and Piketty (2023).

Table I3: Classification of parties in parliamentary elections (1974 - 1986)

	<b>Far-right parties</b>	<b>Conservative parties</b>	<b>Centrist parties</b>	<b>Social-democrat parties</b>	<b>Far-left parties</b>
1974	Front National  Autre Extrême Droite	Divers droite Union des Démocrates pour la Cinquième République Républicains Indépendants Center Démocratie et Progrès	Mouvement réformateur	Parti Socialiste  Mouvement Radical de Gauche	Parti Communiste  Parti Socialiste Unifié  Lutte Ouvrière  Organisation Communiste Internationaliste Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire
1978	Front National  Autre Extrême Droite	Opposition Gaulliste  Rassemblement pour la République Divers Droite	Union pour la Démocratie Française	Parti Socialiste  Mouvement Radical de Gauche Divers Gauche	Parti Communiste  Autre Extrême Gauche
1981	Front National  Autre Extrême Droite	Rassemblement pour la République  Divers Droite	Union pour la Démocratie Française Union pour la Démocratie Française - Rassemblement pour la République	Parti Socialiste  Radicaux de Gauche  Divers Gauche	Parti Communiste  Autre Extrême Gauche
1986	Front National  Autre Extrême Droite	Divers Droite  Rassemblement pour la République	Union pour la Démocratie Française	Parti Socialiste  Radicaux de Gauche  Divers Gauche	Parti Communiste  Autre Extrême Gauche

Notes: I classified the parties according to Cagé and Piketty (2023) own classification as well as the classification by Salmon (2018). Finally, I used the categorization by ParlGov.org. ‘Autre Extrême Droite’ (Other far right) and ‘Autre Extrême Gauche’ (Other far left) are categories generated by the Cagé and Piketty (2023).



Table I4: Classification of parties in parliamentary elections (1988 - 2002)

	<b>Far-right parties</b>	<b>Conservative parties</b>	<b>Centrist parties</b>	<b>Social-democrat parties</b>	<b>Far-left parties</b>
1988	Front National	Divers Droite	Union pour la Démocratie Française	Majorité Présidentielle	Parti Communiste
	Autre Extrême Droite	Rassemblement pour la République		Parti Socialiste Radicaux de Gauche Divers Gauche	Autre Extrême Gauche
1993	Front National	Divers Droite	Union pour la Démocratie Française	Parti Socialiste	Parti Communiste
	Autre Extrême Droite	Rassemblement pour la République		Les Verts Génération écologie Majorité Présidentielle Radicaux de Gauche	Autre Extrême Gauche
1997	Front National	Divers Droite	Union pour la Démocratie Française	Parti Socialiste	Parti Communiste
	Autre Extrême Droite	Rassemblement pour la République		Parti Radical Socialiste Divers Gauche	Autre Extrême Gauche
2002	Front National	Divers Droite	Union pour la Démocratie Française	Parti Socialiste	Parti Communiste
	Autre Extrême Droite	Mouvement pour la France		Parti radical de gauche	Autre Extrême Gauche
	Mouvement National Républicain	Rassemblement pour la France		Divers Gauche	Ligue Communiste Révolutionnaire
		Union pour la Majorité Présidentielle Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Tradition Democratie Libérale		Pôle Républicain  Les Verts	Lutte Ouvrière

Notes: I classified the parties according to Cagé and Piketty (2023) own classification as well as the classification by Salmon (2018). Finally, I used the categorization by ParlGov.org. ‘Autre Extrême Droite’ (Other far right) and ‘Autre Extrême Gauche’ (Other far left) are categories generated by the Cagé and Piketty (2023).

Table I5: Classification of parties in parliamentary elections (2007 - 2022)

	Far-right parties	Conservative parties	Centrist parties	Social-democrat parties	Far-left parties
2007	Front National	Divers Droite	Union pour la Démocratie Française - Mouvement Démocrate	Parti Socialiste	Parti Communiste
	Autre Extrême Droite	Majorité Présidentielle Mouvement pour la France Chasse, Pêche, Nature et Tradition Union pour un Mouvement Populaire		Radicaux de Gauche Divers Gauche Les Verts	Autre Extrême Gauche
2012	Front National	Divers Droite	Le Center pour la France	Parti Socialiste	Front de Gauche
	Autre Extrême Droite	Parti Radical Union pour un Mouvement Populaire Alliance Centriste Nouveau Center		Radicaux de Gauche Divers Gauche Les Verts	Autre Extrême Gauche
2017	Front National	Divers Droite	République en Marche	Parti Socialiste	France Insoumise
	Autre Extrême Droite Debout la France	Les Républicains Nouveau Center	Mouvement Démocrate	Radicaux de Gauche Divers Gauche	Autre Extrême Gauche Parti Communiste
2022	Rassemblement National	Les Républicains	Ensemble	Radicaux de Gauche	Nouvelle Union Populaire écologique et Sociale
	Reconquête	Union des Démocrates et des Indépendants	Mouvement Démocrate	Divers Gauche	Autre Extrême Gauche
	Autre Extrême Droite Droite Souverainiste	Divers Droite			

Notes: I classified the parties according to Cagé and Piketty (2023) own classification as well as the classification by Salmon (2018). Finally, I used the categorization by ParlGov.org. ‘Autre Extrême Droite’ (Other far right) and ‘Autre Extrême Gauche’ (Other far left) are categories generated by the Cagé and Piketty (2023).

Table I6: Classification of presidential candidates (1965 - 2022)

	<b>Far-right candidates</b>	<b>Conservative candidates</b>	<b>Centrist candidates</b>	<b>Social-democrat candidates</b>	<b>Far-left candidates</b>
1965	J.-L. Tixier-Vignancour	C. De Gaulle	J. Lecanuet P. Marcilhacy	F. Mitterrand M. Barbu	
1969		G. Pompidou	A. Poher	M. Rocard L. Ducatel	A. Krivine J. Duclos G. Defferre
1974	J.-M. Le Pen	J. Chaban-Delmas J. Royer	V. Giscard d'Estaing	F. Mitterrand é. Muller B. Renouvin	A. Laguiller A. Krivine J.-C. Sebag G. Héraud
1981		J. Chirac M. Debré M.-F. Garaud	V. Giscard d'Estaing	F. Mitterrand M. Crépeau	G. Marchais A. Laguiller H. Bouchardeau
1988	J.-M. Le Pen	J. Chirac	R. Barre	F. Mitterrand	Pierre Boussel A. Laguiller A. Lajoinie P. Juquin
1995	J.-M. Le Pen P. de Villiers	J. Chirac	é. Balladur	L. Jospin	R. Hue A. Laguiller
2002	J.-M. Le Pen B. Mégret	J. Chirac C. Boutin J. Saint-Josse	F. Bayrou  A. Madelin	L. Jospin C. Taubira J.-P. Chevènement	R. Hue A. Laguiller O. Besancenot D. Gluckstein
2007	J.-M. Le Pen P. de Villiers	N. Sarkozy F. Nihous	F. Bayrou	S. Royal J. Bové	A. Laguiller M.-G. Buffet O. Besancenot G. Schivardi
2012	M. Le Pen N. Dupont-Aignan	N. Sarkozy	F. Bayrou	F. Hollande	J.-L. Mélenchon P. Poutou N. Arthaud
2017	M. Le Pen N. Dupont-Aignan	F. Fillon J. Lassalle F. Asselineau	E. Macron	B. Hamon	J.-L. Mélenchon P. Poutou N. Arthaud
2022	M. Le Pen É. Zemmour N. Dupont-Aignan	V. Pécresse	E. Macron	A. Hidalgo	J.-L. Mélanchon F. Roussel N. Arthaud P. Poutou

Notes: I used the candidate's party to classify them according to Cagé and Piketty (2023) own classification as well as the classification by Salmon (2018). Finally, I used the categorization by ParlGov.org. 'Autre Extrême Droite' (Other far right) and 'Autre Extrême Gauche' (Other far left) are categories generated by the Cagé and Piketty (2023).