

# VE475 Homework 6

Yiwen Yang

## Ex. 1 - Application of the DLP

1. (a) With  $r$ , Alice can calculate  $\alpha^r$ , which should be the same as  $\gamma \bmod p$ .  
With  $x + r \bmod (p - 1)$ , since  $\alpha^{p-1} \equiv 1 \bmod p$ , then  $\alpha^{x+r \bmod (p-1)} \equiv \alpha^{x+r} \equiv \alpha^x \alpha^r \bmod p$ , which should be the same as  $\beta \cdot \gamma$ .  
So  $r$  and  $x + r \bmod (p - 1)$  are considered so that Alice can operate on it to verify the results.  
(b) If Alice requests  $r$ , she will never know  $x$ ; If Alice requests  $x + r$ , she cannot know  $x$  either without knowing  $r$ , because she only knows  $\beta = \alpha^x$  and  $\gamma = \alpha^r$  separately both of which is hard to solve. So Alice cannot cheat to get  $x$  by requesting  $r$  or  $x + r$ .  
If Bob does not know the true  $x$ , there is no way to answer  $x + r$ , thus Bob cannot cheat either. On the other hand, if Bob can correctly answer both  $r$  and  $x + r$ , then he definitely knows  $x$ , so he can prove his identity.
2. (a) 128 times.  
(b) 256 times.
3. Digital Signature.

## Ex. 2 - Pohlig-Hellman

Let  $g$  be a generator of a cyclic group  $G$  with order  $n$ , for  $h$  in  $G$ , find  $x \in \{0, \dots, n - 1\}$  such that  $g^x = h$ .

1. Factorize  $n = \prod_{i=1}^r p_i^{e_i}$ .
2. Repeat Step 3 to 5 for all  $i \in \{1, \dots, r\}$ .
3. Compute  $g_i = g^{n/p_i^{e_i}}$ .
4. Compute  $h_i = h^{n/p_i^{e_i}}$ .
5. Find  $x_i \in \{0, \dots, p_i^{e_i} - 1\}$  such that  $g_i^{x_i} = h_i$ .
6. Use Chinese Remainder Theorem to solve  $x \equiv x_i \bmod p_i^{e_i}$ .

In this example,  $n = 28 \times 29^2 = 2^2 \times 7 \times 29^2$ ,  $g = 3$ ,  $h = 3344$ .

1.  $p_0 = 2$ ,  $e_0 = 2$ ,  $g_0 = 10133$ ,  $h_0 = 24388$ ,  $x_0 = 2$ .
2.  $p_1 = 7$ ,  $e_1 = 1$ ,  $g_1 = 7032$ ,  $h_1 = 4850$ ,  $x_1 = 2$ .
3.  $p_2 = 29$ ,  $e_2 = 2$ ,  $g_2 = 11369$ ,  $h_2 = 23114$ ,  $x_2 = 260$ .

Then calculate  $7 \times 841 \times 3 \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$ ,  $4 \times 841 \times 2 \equiv 1 \pmod{7}$ ,  $4 \times 7 \times 811 \equiv 1 \pmod{841}$ , so  $x \equiv 7 \times 841 \times 3 \times 2 + 4 \times 841 \times 2 \times 2 + 4 \times 7 \times 811 \times 260 \equiv 18762 \pmod{23548}$ .

### Ex. 3 - Elgamal

1. Suppose that  $X^3 + 2X^2 + 1$  is irreducible in  $F_3[x]$ , then

$$X^3 + 2X^2 + 1 = (X + A)(X^2 + BX + C) = X^3 + (A + B)X^2 + (AB + C)X + AC$$

$$AC = 1$$

If  $A = C = 1$ , then  $B + 1 = 2$ ,  $B + 1 = 0$  contradicts.

If  $A = C = 2$ , then  $B + 2 = 2$ ,  $2B + 2 = 0$  also contradicts.

So  $X^3 + 2X^2 + 1$  is irreducible in  $F_3[x]$  with degree 3, and we can conclude that  $F_{3^3}$  is a finite field with  $3^3 = 27$  elements.

2.  $X$  is a generator of  $F_{3^3}$ . First let  $a = 1, b = 2, \dots, z = 26$ , then the map can be defined as  $c \rightarrow f(c) : f(c) = X^c \pmod{X^3 + 2X^2 + 1}$ .
3. The order is 26.
4.  $X^{11} \equiv X + 2 \pmod{X^3 + 2X^2 + 1}$ , then public key is  $X + 2$ .
5. First convert "goodmorning" into  $F_{3^3}$ , yielding  $\{1+X^2, 2X^2, 2X^2, 2+2X+X^2, 2, 2X^2, 1+X, 2X, 2+2X+2X^2, 2X, 1+X^2\}$ .

Randomly pick  $k = 23$ ,  $r \equiv X^{23} \equiv (2+X+2X^2) \pmod{X^3+2X^2+1}$ ,  $t \equiv (X+2)^{23}m \equiv (X+X^2)m \pmod{X^3+2X^2+1}$ . Then the cipher text is  $\{1, 2+X+X^2, 2+X+X^2, 2+X+2X^2, 2X+2X^2, 2+X+X^2, 2+X, 1+X^2, X^2, 1+X^2, 1\}$ , mapping to "zhhwfhkbgz".

To decrypt, calculate  $r^{-1} = 2+X^2$ ,  $tr^{-x} \equiv t(2+X^2)^{11} \equiv 1+X^2 \pmod{X^3+2X^2+1}$ . The result plain text is  $\{1+X^2, 2X^2, 2X^2, 2+2X+X^2, 2, 2X^2, 1+X, 2X, 2+2X+2X^2, 2X, 1+X^2\}$ , mapping to "goodmorning", which is correct.

## Ex. 4 - Simple Questions

1. (a)  $h$  is pre-image resistant. To reversely find  $x$  is to solve Quadratic Residuosity Problem, which is very difficult with large primes  $p$  and  $q$ .  
(b)  $h$  is not second pre-image resistant. Given  $x$ ,  $h(-x) = h(x)$ .  
(c)  $h$  is not collision resistant. For every  $x$ ,  $h(-x) = h(x)$ .
2. (a)  $h$  can be efficiently computed for any input.  
(b)  $h$  is not pre-image resistant. To reversely find  $m$ , simply calculate  $h(h(m))$ .  
(c)  $h$  is not second pre-image resistant. Given  $m$ , let  $n = m \parallel \{160'b0\}$ , then  $h(m) = h(n)$ .  
(d)  $h$  is not collision resistant. For every  $m$ , let  $n = m \parallel \{160'b0\}$ , then  $h(m) = h(n)$ .

## Ex. 5 - Merkle-Damgård Construction

See in **H7**.

## Ex. 6 - Programming

See in folder **ex6**.