

Product Differentiation Case Studies, Data

Belleflamme and Peitz, 2010

Cabral, 2017

[Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977](#)

[Shaked and Sutton, 1982](#)

[Schmalensee, 1978](#)

- The ready-to-eat breakfast cereal market in the U.S. was heavily concentrated from 1950 to 1972, with a 4-firm concentration ratio of 85% and a 6-firm concentration ratio of 95%. Throughout this period, no new firm achieved a non-negligible market share. Incumbents enjoyed very high profits, that could not apparently be explained as compensation for risk-bearing, given limited fluctuation in sales and profits. Over this period the 6 leading incumbents introduced over 80 brands into distribution beyond test market. Minimum efficient scale in this industry is thought to be small, at 3 – 5% market share, neither patents, ownership of raw material sources, production knowhow, advertising, nor capital costs seems to constitute a significant barrier to entry (by introducing a new brand) (especially for the potential entrants Pet and Colgate, which are large, diversified food processing firms).
- The ready-to-eat breakfast cereal industry exhibited increasing returns to scale, since there is some fixed cost associated with advertising and research and development incurred in launching a new brand. Rivalry is localised. And each brand is relatively immobile in product space since re-locating a brand in product space is at best very costly. In fact, established brands often withdraw entirely when sales decline while new brands are being launched at the same time.

[Salop, 1979](#)

[Hausman, 1997](#)

[Anderson et al., 1992](#)