

# Counterfactuals

## 220530 Q2

"Lewis's treatment of 'might' counterfactuals provides a decisive reason to prefer his account of counterfactuals over Stalnaker's." Discuss.

## 210611 Q6

Carefully explain the differences between Stalnaker's theory of counterfactuals and Lewis's. Which of these is preferable, and why? Does either theory provide an adequate account of English counterfactuals? [100%]

## 200528 Q4

'While Stalnaker's theory of counterfactual conditionals cannot properly handle disjunctive consequents, neither his theory nor Lewis's can properly handle disjunctive antecedents. Hence we should reject these theories as accounts of English counterfactual conditionals.' Discuss.

## 190604 Q6

What is the best account of the logic of English counterfactuals of the form 'If it had been the case that P, it would have been the case that Q'? Justify your answer. [100%]

## 180608 Q4

'The cost of respecting [ordinary intuition about Conditional Excluded Middle] is too much.' (LEWIS) Discuss.

## 170603 Q4

Philosophically assess the claim that the Lewis/Stalnaker approach to English counterfactuals provides a better account of their logic than one that treats them as strict conditionals.

## 160610 Q2

"The principal virtue and the principal vice of Stalnaker's theory is that it makes valid the law of Conditional Excluded Middle" (LEWIS). Discuss.

## 150609 Q2

"There are decisive reasons to prefer Lewis's semantics for  $\Box \rightarrow$  to Stalnaker's." [50%]