

# Infinity in Predicate Logic

- Some set  $\Gamma$  of sentences is finitely satisfiable iff each finite subset of  $\Gamma$  is satisfiable.

## Natural Numbers

- In predicate logic with identity, the sentence "there is at least one  $F$  thing" can be formalised as " $\exists xFx$ ". The sentence "there are at least two  $F$  things" can be formalised as " $\exists x\exists x' : (Fx \wedge Fx' \wedge x \neq x')$ " (where " $x \neq x'$ " abbreviates " $\neg x = x'$ "). Similarly, the sentence "there are at least three  $F$  things" can be formalised as " $\exists x\exists x'\exists x'' : (Fx \wedge Fx' \wedge Fx'' \wedge x \neq x' \wedge x \neq x'' \wedge x' \neq x'')$ ". This strategy generalises. Let " $\exists_n F$ " abbreviate the formalisation of "there are at least  $n$   $F$  things".
- $\{\exists_n F : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$  is the set of sentences that formalise "there is at least one  $F$  thing", "there are at least two  $F$  things", and so on.

## Inequality

- The sentence "there exists a one-to-one mapping from the  $F$  things to the  $G$  things" can be formalised in second-order logic as
$$\exists R[\forall x\forall y(Rxy \rightarrow Fx \wedge Gy)$$
  - " $\wedge \neg\exists x\exists y_1\exists y_2(Rxy_1 \wedge Rxy_2 \wedge y_1 \neq y_2 \wedge Fx \wedge Gy_1 \wedge Gy_2)$ ".
$$\wedge \neg\exists x_1\exists x_2\exists y(Rx_1y \wedge Rx_2y \wedge x_1 \neq x_2 \wedge Fx_1 \wedge Fx_2 \wedge Gy)]$$
$$\exists R[\forall x\forall y(Rxy \rightarrow Fx \wedge Gy) \wedge \forall x(Fx \rightarrow \exists yRxy)$$
    - " $\wedge \neg\exists x\exists y_1\exists y_2(Rxy_1 \wedge Rxy_2 \wedge y_1 \neq y_2)$ " seems more accurate.
$$\wedge \neg\exists x_1\exists x_2\exists y(Rx_1y \wedge Rx_2y \wedge x_1 \neq x_2)]$$
- This reads as "there exists binary relation  $R$ , from  $F$  things to  $G$  things, whose domain is all the  $F$  things, no  $F$  thing is mapped to two distinct  $G$  things (this relation is functional), and no two distinct  $F$  things map to the same  $G$  thing (this relation is one-to-one). Let " $F \leq G$ " abbreviate the formalisation of "there exists a one-to-one mapping from the  $F$  things to the  $G$  things".
- The sentence "there are strictly more  $F$  things than  $G$  things" can be formalised as " $(G \leq F) \wedge \neg(F \leq G)$ ". Let " $F < G$ " abbreviate this formalisation.

## Subsets

- The sentence "the  $F$  things are a subset of the  $G$  things" can be formalised as " $\forall x(Fx \rightarrow Gx)$ ". Let " $F \subseteq G$ " abbreviate this formalisation.
- The sentence "the  $F$  things are a strict subset of the  $G$  things" can be formalised as " $(F \subseteq G) \wedge \neg(G \subseteq F)$ ". Let " $F \subset G$ " abbreviate this formalisation.

## Infinity

- The sentence "there are (Dedekind) infinitely many  $F$  things" can be formalised as " $\exists F'[F' \subset F \wedge (F \leq F') \wedge (F' \leq F)]$ ". Let " $\infty F$ " abbreviate this sentence.
  - Some set  $S$  is Dedekind infinite iff there is some proper subset  $S' \subset S$  such that  $|S| = |S'|$ , i.e.  $S$  and  $S'$  have the same number of elements.
- So, for example, the argument "there are finitely many earthlings, there are infinitely many aliens, so there are more aliens than earthlings" can be formalised as " $\neg\infty E; \infty A; E < A$ ".

## Existence in First-Order Logic

- In first-order logic (with identity) the set  $\{\exists_n F : n \in \mathbb{N}\} \cup \{\neg\infty F\}$  is not satisfiable, but is finitely satisfiable. So if " $\neg\infty F$ " exists in first-order logic, then first-order logic is not compact. Given that first-order logic is compact (finite satisfiability implies satisfiability), by reductio, " $\neg\infty F$ " does not exist in first-order logic. Because " $\neg\infty F$ " exists iff " $\infty F$ " exists, " $\infty F$ " does not exist in first-order logic either.
- In first-order logic (with identity) the set  $\{F > G\} \cup \{\exists_n F : n \in \mathbb{N}\} \cup \{\exists_n G : n \in \mathbb{N}\}$  is satisfiable in a model with an uncountably infinite domain, but not in a model with a countably infinite domain, or a model with a finite domain. Given

that in first-order logic satisfiability in an uncountably infinite domain implies satisfiability in a countably infinite domain, by reductio, " $F \supset G$ " does not exist in first-order logic.