A Unified Breakdown Analysis for Byzantine Robust Gossip

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




Context

Many data providers (i.e. nodes) aim to train collaboratively a model using peer-to-peer synchronous communications. Some of them are omniscient adversaries called *Byzantine*.

Setting



- Honest nodes \mathcal{H} and Byzantine nodes \mathcal{B} communicate in a graph $\mathcal{G}=(\mathcal{H}\cup\mathcal{B},\mathcal{E}).$
- μ_{max} and μ_2 are the largest and second smallest eigenvalue of the Laplacian matrix of the *honest subgraph*:

$$L = Diagonal(degrees) - Adjacency.$$

Distributed optimization problem.

Minimize
$$f_{\mathcal{H}}(\boldsymbol{x}) := \frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} f_i(\boldsymbol{x}).$$

Average consensus problem. Each node holds a parameter $x_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$.

Get close to
$$\boldsymbol{x}_{\mathcal{H}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \boldsymbol{x}_i.$$

Assumption: Each honest node has at most b Byzantines neighbors.

Notation: $\operatorname{Var}_{\mathcal{H}}(\boldsymbol{x}) := \frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i - \overline{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\mathcal{H}}\|^2$, i.e. the variance of honest parameters.

r-Robust Communication

For r < 1, the communication algorithm is r-robust on \mathcal{G} if, for all $\boldsymbol{x}_i \in \mathbb{R}^d$, the outputs $(\boldsymbol{x}_i^+)_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ satisfies

$$\frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} \|\boldsymbol{x}_i^+ - \overline{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\mathcal{H}}\|^2 \le r \operatorname{Var}_{\mathcal{H}}(\boldsymbol{x}).$$

Takeaway

- → We combine 'any' robust average with gossip communication.
- \rightarrow The second smallest eigenvalue of the graph's Laplacian & the number of adversarial neighbors measures the robustness of the resulting algorithm.
- \rightarrow Our breakdown point is optimal up to a factor 2.

The Robust Gossip framework

Robust Aggregators

Let $b, \rho \geq 0$. An aggregation rule $F: (\mathbb{R}^d)^n \to \mathbb{R}^d$ is a (b, ρ) -robust summation if, for any vectors $(\boldsymbol{z}_i)_{i \in [n]} \in (\mathbb{R}^d)^n$, any $S \subset [n]$ such that $|S| \geq n - b$,

$$\left\|F((\boldsymbol{z}_i)_{i\in[n]}) - \sum_{i\in S} \boldsymbol{z}_i \right\|^2 \le \rho b \sum_{i\in S} \|\boldsymbol{z}_i\|^2.$$

 \hookrightarrow Weaker than (f, κ) -robustness^[1]: it relies on a *second moment* instead of a variance.

Algorithm: F - Robust Gossip

Let F an aggregation rule, and $\eta \geq 0$ a communication step-size. At each iteration all honest nodes $i \in \mathcal{H}$ perform

$$\boldsymbol{x}_i^{t+1} = \boldsymbol{x}_i^t + \eta F\left((\boldsymbol{x}_j^t - \boldsymbol{x}_i^t)_{j \in \text{neighbors}(i)}\right).$$
 (F-RG)

- The robust aggregation is performed on the differences of the parameters!
- If F is a simple sum, F-RG recovers the usual gossip update.

Instances of Robust Summation

Assume wlog that $\|\boldsymbol{z}_1\| \geq \ldots \geq \|\boldsymbol{z}_n\|$.

•Clipped Sum₊ (CS₊). Denote Clip $(z, \tau) = \min(\tau, ||z||) \frac{z}{||z||}$

$$CS_+((\boldsymbol{z}_i)_{i\in[n]}) = \sum_{i\in[n]} Clip(\boldsymbol{z}_i; \tau) \text{ with } \tau = \|\boldsymbol{z}_{2b}\|.$$

Geometric Trimmed Sum (GTS)

$$GTS((\boldsymbol{z}_i)_{i \in [n]}) = \sum_{i > b+1} \boldsymbol{z}_i.$$

The following aggregator is called oracle since it requires knowing S.

Clipped Sum [2] (CS_{He}).

$$ext{CS}^{ ext{or}}_{ ext{He}}ig((oldsymbol{z}_i)_{i\in[n]}ig) = \sum_{i\in[n]} ext{Clip}(oldsymbol{z}_i; au) \quad ext{with} \quad au = \sqrt{rac{1}{b}\sum_{i\in S}\|oldsymbol{z}_i\|^2}.$$

- > If \mathcal{G} is fully connected, GTS-RG corresponds to NNA^[1].
- > CS^{or}_{He}-RG corresponds to ClippedGossip^[2].

Robustness Results

Theorem 1 - Convergence

If F is a (b, ρ) robust summand, and $\mu_2 \geq 2\rho b$, then for $\eta \leq 1/\mu_{\text{max}}$, one step of F-RG verifies

$$\frac{1}{|\mathcal{H}|} \sum_{i \in \mathcal{H}} ||\boldsymbol{x}_i^1 - \overline{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\mathcal{H}}^0||^2 \le (1 - \eta (\mu_2 - 2\rho b)) \operatorname{Var}_{\mathcal{H}}(\boldsymbol{x}^0).$$

Furthermore the additional bias is controlled

$$\|\overline{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\mathcal{H}}^{1} - \overline{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\mathcal{H}}^{0}\|^{2} \leq 2\rho b \eta \operatorname{Var}_{\mathcal{H}}(\boldsymbol{x}^{0}).$$

NB: In fully-connected graphs, $\mu_2 = |\mathcal{H}|$ and $\mu_2 \ge 2\rho b$ boils to

$$|\mathcal{B}|/|\mathcal{H}|+|\mathcal{B}| \leq 1/2\rho+1.$$

Breakdown point assumption also written as $\delta := 2\rho b/\mu_2 < 1$.

Corollary

For t steps of F-RG, with $\eta = 1/\mu_{\text{max}}$ and $\gamma = \mu_2/\mu_{\text{max}}$:

$$\operatorname{Var}_{\mathcal{H}}(\boldsymbol{x}^t) \leq (1 - \gamma(1 - \delta))^t \operatorname{Var}_{\mathcal{H}}(\boldsymbol{x}^0) \xrightarrow[t \to \infty]{} 0,$$

Consensus is reached, and

$$\|\overline{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\mathcal{H}}^{t} - \overline{\boldsymbol{x}}_{\mathcal{H}}^{0}\|^{2} \leq \frac{4\delta}{\gamma(1-\delta)^{2}} \operatorname{Var}_{\mathcal{H}}(\boldsymbol{x}^{0}).$$

Theorem 2 - Tightness

Let $b \in \mathbb{N}$. For any algorithm ALG and any $h \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a graph \mathcal{G} , in which all honest nodes are neighbors to h other honest nodes, and for which $\mu_2 = 2b$, such that, for any r < 1, ALG is not r-robust on \mathcal{G} .

 \hookrightarrow the breakdown assumption $\mu_2 \geq 2\rho b$ is tight for $\rho = 1$.


Theorem 3 - Robust Summation

 CS_+ , GTS, CS_{He}^{or} and CS_+^{or} are (b, ρ) -robust:


Experiments

Graph with two cliques of honest nodes weakly connected to each other, such that $\mu_2/2 = 8$ and $|\mathcal{H}| = 26$. Attacks tested are $Dissensus^{[2]}$, $ALIE^{[4]}$, $FOE^{[5]}$, and $Spectral\ Heterogeneity$ (Ours).

Average Consensus problem with gaussian initialization of the parameters.



•Optimization of a CNN on MNIST with local heterogeneity, using F-RG + momentum SGD.



More in the paper!

- Results stated with weighted graphs.
- Convergence results for D-SGD with F-RG communications.
- A new attack tailored to decentralized systems named Spectral Heterogeneity (SpH).

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