

Revealing the Zone Of Possible Agreement between parties in conflict: an application to peace agreements between Israelis and Palestinians

Elisa Cavatorta¹, Ben Groom², and Gilead Sher³

After Hamas' attack on October 7, 2023 and Israel's subsequent war, a pressing question is the nature of a post-war peace agreement. Peace negotiations often deadlock due to difficulties in identifying mutually advantageous agreements. This study designs a large-scale survey task and method to identify the strength of preference for components of potential peace deals and changes to the status quo. Analyzing pre-October 7 representative samples of Israelis and Palestinians reveals a Zone of Possible Agreement, demonstrating shared preferences for deals improving daily life. Violence exposure hampers compromise among Israelis, emphasizing the importance of abstaining from violence for constructive conflict resolution.

After the trauma inflicted on Israel by Hamas' massacre on October 7, 2023 and the devastation in Gaza resulting from Israel responding with war on Hamas and Islamic Jihad, a key question in the mind of many concerns the 'day after' the war ends: what sort of peace agreement, if any, would Israelis and Palestinians find mutually acceptable? Short of the dream that the diplomatic process that failed for over three decades will suddenly succeed, serious re-thinking about peace agreements that resolve the contentious issues is required and needed more now than ever before.

Designing peace agreements is a complex process, all the more so in intractable conflicts with numerous disputed issues. When parties do negotiate, peace negotiations become frequently deadlocked because the parties aren't able to identify mutually advantageous agreements. Even when such configurations exist, at least in principle, they are often not immediately visible. Finding mutually acceptable agreements requires understanding of the ordering of priorities of one's own group, the acceptable give-and-take one party is willing to make to attain a deal and the priorities and trade-offs acceptability of the other party.

At times, what is acceptable to negotiators is rejected by the public outside the negotiation room. When the public interests and priorities aren't adequately addressed, negotiations are delegitimized (1). Peace processes that are more inclusive and take due understanding of public opinions makes peace agreements more effective and sustainable (2–4, e.g.). Yet, grassroots involvement or public consultation on the design of prospective peace agreements is fraught with difficulty and as a result is seldom, if at all, undertaken.

Public opinion surveys on support for the peace process and acceptability of negotiations play an important role in summarising what people think and want. Yet, traditional public opinion surveys are ill suited to inform about peace deal acceptability for several reasons. First, questionnaires that ask whether one supports peace negotiations cannot speak to what compromises are acceptable or unacceptable. Secondly, even when respondents express acceptance or rejection of a particular peace deal configuration, such as the 'two state' solution, it doesn't necessarily imply that no other configuration is acceptable. Questions on support for specific peace deal configurations need to be carefully worded because details matter and respondents may have different ideas about how details left implicit are resolved. For example, supporting a 'two-state solution' doesn't explicitly outline the type of freedom of movement implied for labor and goods. Thirdly, there could be numerous compensatory combinations between components of peace agreements which result in as many peace deal configurations, making direct survey questions impractical.

Author affiliations: ¹King's College London; ²University of Exeter; ³Rice University

²Corresponding author:
elisa.cavatorta@kcl.ac.uk

E-mail:

1 In this paper we design a task suitable for large surveys that identifies the components of potential peace deals regarded as
2 most important for each side, the relative strength of preferences for them and the strength of support for agreements that
3 deviate from the status quo. The task overcomes the difficulty of traditional questionnaires. We implement it in two nationally
4 representative samples of Palestinians living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Israelis living in Israel and the occupied
5 territories. We exploit the bilateral nature of our analysis to visualize the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA): the set of
6 agreements preferred by both groups to the status quo; and the Pareto frontier of peace deals: the set that maximizes the
7 gains achievable by combining concessions and demands on components of a peace deal. We also visualize the zones where
8 unacceptable agreements lie.

9 We then study how the experience of violence among respondents alters support for prospective peace agreements. This
10 information is important to inform campaigns that tries to support peacemaking efforts, and are crucial after the heights of
11 violence on and after October 7th. Previous studies suggest that violence exposure can harden public opinions about the
12 perceived enemy (5), reduce support for peace, at least in the short term (6), and makes retaliatory inclinations more likely (7).
13 However, previous studies lack evidence on why violence exposure makes support for peace more difficult. Are violence-exposed
14 people rejecting compromise altogether? Or do they become more sensitive to certain concessions? This method is able to
15 answer these questions.

16 **Method: Finding the mutually acceptable agreements**

17 In this method individuals are asked to rank hypothetical peace agreements based on their preference. These peace agreements
18 comprise of ‘components’ representing different aspects of the conflict. Each component signifies either maintaining the current
19 situation (the status quo) or introducing a change from the status quo. Consequently, configurations of peace deals are a
20 mix of these binary ‘components’, representing variations from or continuations of the existing status quo. We manipulate
21 these combinations experimentally to ensure that each respondent receives a set of peace deals with orthogonal components.
22 This approach enables the causal assessment of the strength of preference for various components within hypothetical peace
23 agreements and their relative desirability. Preferences for individual components are estimated for Israelis and Palestinians,
24 and these preferences are then aggregated for each potential peace agreement. This aggregation identifies peace agreements
25 that are preferred over the status quo, those mutually acceptable to both parties: the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA), and
26 among them, the ‘best’ agreements that achieve the highest gains for both parties, as well as ‘fairer’ agreements, that distribute
27 gains equally. Additionally, agreements acceptable only to one party and those unacceptable to both are also identified.

28 In this application, each peace deal comprises of eight components. The choice of a total number of eight components was
29 driven by methodological considerations of statistical ability to estimate the strength of preference for each component causally
30 (i.e. not confounded), power calculations, and feasibility tests, with the understanding that comparing and ranking multiple
31 deals with 8 components was feasible for respondents based on field tests (details reported in SI sections A and B). These
32 eight dimensions of the conflict were selected based on their significance according to public opinion surveys in the region (e.g.
33 <https://www.pcpsr.org/>, The Peace Index, The Israeli Voice Index, <https://en.idi.org.il>) and interviews with scholars from the region
34 (further details on issue selection are in the SI, section C). The components include important topics such as Jewish settlements,
35 the recognition of Israel as a nation-state for the Jewish people, the existence of an independent Palestinian State, freedom
36 of movement, right to access the holy sites, the location of capital cities, treatment of prisoners, allocation of water rights.
37 Table 1 outlines the specific wording of each component, which can be either a variation from the status quo (left column) or a
38 continuation of the status quo (right column), each of them supplemented with an explanation SI.1. All components can occur
39 together or separately, and the occurrence of one component does not preclude the occurrence of another.

40 All components, whether expressed as a change from the status quo or a continuation, are purposefully described in objective
41 and concrete terms (with explicit descriptions, see Figure SI.1) to avoid the pitfall that support on the broad ‘issue’ masks
42 disagreement on how the issue is resolved in practice. Moreover, we carefully avoided nomenclatures and expressions that,
43 despite being in common usage, can be interpreted differently by different people (such as ‘Two-state solution’, ‘multinational
44 arrangements’, ‘economic peace’).

45 With eight issues in each peace deal, there are $2^8 = 256$ possible deals. Given the impracticality of asking respondents to
46 rank all 256 possible deals, we employed an orthogonal fractional (block) design (8). This design optimally reduces the 256
47 possible deals to 8 blocks of 8 peace deals each, allowing respondents to rank a manageable subset of peace agreements while
48 still enabling the reliable estimation of the average causal effects of each component.

49 In practice, the respondent task proceeds as follows: each respondent is randomly allocated to a block. Each block contains
50 8 hypothetical deals. The respondent is then shown 4 deals, randomly selected from the 8, and visualized as physical or virtual
51 cards (see SI, section E and Figures therein) with each component explained by a tool-tip or the enumerator: the respondent is
52 asked to compare and rank the deals on a ‘preference rack’ from the most preferred to the least preferred. Then, the remaining
53 deals are shown to them one by one in random order. The respondent is asked to add them to their ranking. The ranking
54 can be modified by moving deals along the rack until the final ordering is confirmed by the respondent. There is no time
55 limit. The sequential way in which deals are shown makes the task easier to do. When the ranking of the 8 deals is confirmed,
56 the respondent is shown a ninth card, representing the status quo, and asked to add it to their ranking according to their
57 preference.*

58 The ranking exercise combined with fractional design has a number of features that represent advances on previous conjoint
59 experimental designs and make it particularly suitable for multi-attribute and multi-party applications like ours.

60 * A video-demo of the task in English language, using a 16 deals instead of 8, is available here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kY2SfCTB2Ec>

Component	Change from status quo	Status-quo
1	Freezing of all settlement building, evacuation of those inside the West Bank. Settlements adjacent to the 1967 line become part of Israel.	Israel's settlement building continues
2	Palestinians recognise Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish People	Palestinians do not recognise Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish People
3	An independent Palestinian State over the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem with equitable (1:1 in value) land swaps with Israel and no Israeli military presence	The civil and military jurisdiction over Israel, the West Bank and Gaza remains as today
4	Freedom of movement for people (no checkpoints/permits), vehicles and goods between West Bank, Gaza and State of Israel for both Palestinians and Israelis	Current freedom of trade between West Bank, Gaza and State of Israel. Permit system for labour and vehicles
5	Unrestricted right to access to holy sites and freedom of worship for anyone	Current restricted rights to access to holy sites and pray
6	Palestinian capital in Jerusalem's Arab-majority neighbourhoods and Israeli capital in Jewish-majority neighbourhoods. Old City is undivided	Israeli capital in West and East Jerusalem and Palestinian capital de-facto in Ramallah
7	Mutual amnesty and release for an agreed number of current prisoners in Israeli and Palestinian jails	Current practices of imprisonment, pre-trial detention and occasional prisoner release, continue
8	Water rights in proportion to the population: 60% Israel, 40% Palestinian Authority	Oslo II water rights (the same as today): 71% Israel, 29% Palestinian Authority

Table 1. List of components of peace agreements.

First, the ranking approach provides more information on the structure of preferences compared to ‘pairwise-choice’ designs – which ask respondents to choose (or vote for) one option among two (e.g. 9, 10) – and ‘rating’ designs – which ask respondents to rate one choice against another on a grading scale (e.g. 11). Ranking of all deals in a set, as in this study, provides information on the *relative* preferences over all alternatives. For example, a deal configuration could be a close second best in terms of preferences: a ranking exercise captures that preference structure, while a ‘pairwise-choice’ design provides no information.[†] Second, ranking of all deals in a set explicitly reveals which deal is ‘best’ or ‘worst’ (most preferred or least preferred) for each individual, without requiring modelling assumptions, e.g. on the shape of the utility function, and it allows the study of the positioning of specific deals of interest within the ranking. This is not possible in designs using pairwise comparisons of a random set of deals, in which each respondent sees different sets. Third, ranking, as opposed to rating, only assumes comparability of ordering and not of rating scale values, which can be subject to framing (e.g. 12). Fourth, and unlike previous studies, including the ranking of an explicitly defined status quo for all respondents avoid imposing the assumption that everyone has a preference for an agreement.[‡] The rank position of the status-quo can be interpreted as a stated-preference measure of the desirability of change from the status-quo for each individual. To identify acceptable deals the only requirement is that they are preferred over the status-quo by each party. Since both parties observe and rank the same peace deals and the same status-quo, this also makes possible to compute measures of support for any specific deal in comparison to the status-quo. Fifth, by design, each respondent is presented with a set of deals with uncorrelated components. This allows to study variations of preferences in sub-groups causally since sub-group analysis does not compromise the orthogonality of the design.[§]

We assume that the individual rankings of deals reflect ordinal rankings of preference and the desirability of a peace agreement can be represented by an utility function u_{nj} , for individual n and peace deal j , which depends on a vector of agreement components x'_j and their desirability. Using the property that the utility distribution of the most preferred choice is independent of the ordering of the less preferred choices (13, 14), the joint probability of a ranking (i.e. from the top position $r = 1$ to the last $r = R$) can be written as a product of the logit probabilities and estimated by maximum likelihood.[¶]

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[u_{r=1} > u_{r=2} > u_{r=3} > \dots > u_{r=R}] \\ &= \Pr[u_{r=1} > u_{r=2}] \Pr[u_{r=2} > u_{r=3}] \dots \Pr[u_{r=R-1} > u_{r=R}] \\ &= \prod_{j=1}^R \left[\frac{\exp(V_j(x))}{\sum_{m=h}^R \exp(V_m(x))} \right] \end{aligned}$$

The parameters of interest are the vector β in $V_j(x) = x'_j \beta$, one parameter per component: they can be interpreted as the expected *difference* in utility for Israelis or Palestinians when a deal’s component is changed from the status quo to an

[†]A simple example might be that in a set of 3 deals, the binary choice may elicit that A is preferred to B and C, but not the relative preference for B compared to C (unless this specific pair combination is also randomly selected); instead, the ranking approach taken here makes all comparisons within the same set.

[‡]Our design explicitly reveals the percentage of people who consider the no-agreement status-quo a preferable scenario over all other alternatives.

[§]The typical conjoint analysis with options from the full factorial combination selected at random only guarantees orthogonality at the sample level.

[¶]The assumption of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives is not restrictive in our ranking task, as respondents are permitted to change their ranking multiple times until confirmation, ensuring that the introduction of additional alternatives does not constrain the relative preferences between two options.

249 alternative arrangement. The size of the coefficients identifies the relative strength of preferences for the change, with utility
250 as the common metric (the SI, section F discusses methodological considerations regarding the comparability of preferences
251 between components and between societies). The parameters can be aggregated to yield the desirability of each deal *compared*
252 to the status quo, for both parties in the conflict. This provides the ‘coordinates’ to map each agreement on the utility space,
253 with the utility of the status quo normalized at zero. Peace deals mutually acceptable to both parties are those who yield
254 higher utility compared to the status quo (i.e. are preferred to the status quo) for both parties. Unacceptable deals are those
255 that yield negative utility to one or both parties.

260 Data

261 We collect data from representative samples of Israelis and Palestinians, during approximately the same period of time (end of
262 March 2022-May 2022), and using the same design. Due to low levels of education and computer literacy among the Palestinians
263 population, we adopted an in-person field interview with Palestinians carried out by a professional survey organization[¶] on a
264 sample representative of the Palestinian population in terms of geographical district of residence, gender and age distribution
265 (n=1,197). Israeli respondents were drawn from the database of an Israeli poll company^{**} and interviewed via an online
266 interactive web-application we created^{††}. We set quotas on participation and used a greedy algorithm of (15) to generate a
267 sample of 679 Israelis that matches as close as possible census statistics on ethnicity (Arab and Jews), district of residence,
268 gender and age distribution from the Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics. Table SI.3 in SI shows the descriptive statistics of
269 the samples alongside the benchmark Census statistics of reference.

270 For both samples, we used similar instructions and visual devices to make comparisons and ranking of peace deals intuitive
271 to respondents and appropriately designed for each implementation mode. We designed physical cards for the on-the-field
272 application and comparable virtual cards for the online application (see SI, section E). What makes this design compelling
273 is the collection of arguably complex information using visual instruments that make a quantitative task intuitive and easy
274 to complete for many. This is confirmed by the small percentages of people who provide invalid responses. We embedded
275 two neutral quality checks: i) we numbered the cards to check whether individuals rank the cards in a numerical sequence
276 (e.g. from card 1 to 9 or viceversa) or in the exact (random) order in which they are presented to them. In the Palestinian
277 fieldwork, plausibly the more complex of the two due to the lower levels of literacy, only 3 respondents have ranking and
278 numerical sequences that coincide. In the Israeli sample, 12 respondents display this pattern. ii) We consider responses valid if
279 the task completion time was at least 240 seconds. In pilot testing of the interactive web-application using a longer set of
280 cards, sixteen, it took 240 seconds to read the instructions and order the cards sequentially. This result informed our choice to
281 consider responses valid if the task completion time was at least 240 seconds. We excluded responses that do not satisfy points
282 (i) and (ii).

283 Acceptability of deals

284 All respondents ranked the status quo in addition to the 8 peace deals. Therefore, the position of the status quo in the ranking
285 of deals can serve as a general, unconditional measure of deal acceptability. In Figure 1, it is evident that 75% of Israelis and
286 95% of Palestinians find at least one deal preferable to the status quo. There is a noticeable difference in the mode of the
287 distribution of the status quo position in the ranking between the two samples. For Palestinians, 41% rank the status quo as
288 the least preferred scenario, making it the most frequently chosen position. In contrast, the Israeli sample appears polarized,
289 with 25% ranking the status quo as the most preferred scenario and 17% ranking it as the least preferred. The demographic
290 composition of these groups differs significantly. The 25% of Israelis favoring the status quo are predominantly male (60%
291 compared to the expected 50%), Jewish Israelis (86% compared to the expected 81%), relatively young (median age 37.5 vs.
292 expected 43 year old in the sample). On the other hand, the 17% who rank the status quo last are older (median age 44),
293 predominantly female (64%), and include a higher proportion of Arab Israelis (56% instead of expected 19%).

294 In the Palestinian sample, the demographic composition of those who rank the status quo as the most preferred compared
295 to those who rank it as the least preferred scenario is similar in terms of gender composition (gender ratio are equal), mean age
296 (39 years old in both cases, as the sample average) and geographical origin of the respondents (as expected in the sample).

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308 ¶ Palestinian Center for Policy and Social Research
309 **iPanel, www.ipanel.com

310 †† A demo from pilot testing in English language is available on <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uaiO8pO.f3k>




Fig. 1. Ranking position of the status quo scenario: 1 (first)=most preferred to 9 (ninth)= least preferred.

Visualizing the Zone of Possible Agreements

Figure 2 displays the strength of preferences for Israelis (blue) and Palestinians (green) for each of the eight components of prospective peace agreement. These preferences are visualized as the preference for a *change* from the status quo, which is normalized at zero, and represents the alternative arrangements in column 1 of Table 1. The metric of the x-axis represents the desirability of each component: positive (negative) values indicates that the component being change from the status quo is valued positively (negatively), and thus increase (decrease) the acceptability of a deal. The horizontal lines indicate the 95% confidence interval. For Israelis the most desirable component is ‘Palestinians recognizing Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people’. For Palestinians the most desirable component is the ‘freezing of all settlement building’. Some changes from the status quo are valued in an opposing way, as would be expected among parties in conflict. However, the results show points of compromise: the component ‘unrestricted rights to access holy sites’ is valued positively by Palestinians and is not detrimental for Israelis.




Fig. 2. Strength of preferences for Israelis (blue) and Palestinians (green) for each of the eight components of prospective peace agreement expressed as the preference for a change from the status quo (zero).

Aggregating the strengths of preference for each component of the peace agreements yields a measure of the acceptability for each one of the 256 prospective peace agreements. Figure 3(a) maps the preferences for peace deals of Israeli and Palestinian

people into the space for agreement. The point (0,0) indicates the status-quo. The x-axis measures utility changes arising from each peace agreement compared to the status quo for Israelis. Positive values on the x-axis represents an improvement from the status quo and negative values represents a worsening. The y-axis measures the same for Palestinians. From the status quo, the North-East quadrant of the diagram (i.e., positive x- and y-axis) illustrates the set of peace deals that would be preferred over the status-quo by both parties and, given the estimated preferences, are mutually acceptable to both sides. This is the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA). The ZOPA between the two people is populated by 55 deals out of the 256 deal configurations that our design considers: these deals are preferable over the status-quo for both parties. All other areas of the diagram contain deals that are unacceptable to at least one party.




Fig. 3. (a) Acceptability of 256 prospective peace agreements for Israelis (x-axis) and Palestinians (y-axis). Point (0,0) is the status quo. (b) Deals in the ZOPA. Labels indicates whether a component is changed from the status quo with '1' and a continuation of the status quo with '0'. The Nash zone groups the three deals with highest joint utility gains, $\Delta u_{Pj}^{0.5} \cdot \Delta u_{Ij}^{0.5}$ (red dots). The deals in orange are 'fair' deals that share utility gains equally.

621 Figure 3(b) provides a focused view of the ZOPA with each deal labelled as a sequence of '1's and '0's indicating that the
622 relevant component is a change from the status quo ('1') or a continuation of the status quo ('0') ordered as in Table 1. Deals
623 furthest away from the status quo increase the acceptability for both parties.

624 Within the ZOPA, theoretical solutions suggest deals of interest as focal points embodying principles of efficiency and
625 fairness. The Nash solution with equal bargaining power maximizes efficiency (i.e. maximizing the joint utility gain, $\Delta u_{Pj}^{0,5}$.
626 $\Delta u_{Ij}^{0,5}$) and represents a mutually desirable deal in the ZOPA that exhausts the 'integrative potential' gains over the status
627 quo. In our empirical application, we refer to deals closely approximating this solution as the 'Nash zone'. In Figure 3(b), the
628 three red-marked deals exemplify these options. As an illustration, the highest gains for both parties are achieved by a deal
629 in the Nash Zone that has four components changed from the status quo: 'Palestinians recognize Israel as a nation-state of
630 the Jewish people', 'freedom of movement for people, vehicle and good between the West Bank, Gaza and the State of Israel
631 for both Palestinians and Israelis', 'unrestricted right to access the holy sites and freedom of worship for anyone', 'mutual
632 amnesty and release for an agreed number of current prisoners' and the remaining components unchanged from the status quo:
633 settlements building continues, the civil and military jurisdiction is like today, the Israeli capital in East and West Jerusalem
634 and the Palestinian capital de-facto in Ramallah, today's unequal distribution of water rights. These components made up a
635 deal configuration reminiscent of the confederal model as a framework for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (16).

636 Assuming the metric of acceptability are comparable between Israelis and Palestinians, deals that lie close to the 45 degree
637 line of the ZOPA are all characterized by the property of fairness: these deals share gains from compromise evenly among
638 the two parties.^{††} We consider deals 'close' if the 45 degree line is less than 1 standard error from the location of the deal
639 in the ZOPA.^{§§} Figure 3(b) shows them in orange. These deals have two or three components changed from the status-quo.
640 Among these deals, the deal displaying 'An independent Palestinian state with equitable land swaps' and 'per capita water
641 rights' alongside 'Palestinians recognizing Israel as a nation-state of the Jewish people' (and all other issues unchanged from
642 the status quo, deal 01100001) is less preferred by *both* parties compared to an agreement in which 'Palestinians recognize
643 Israel as a nation-state of the Jewish people' and the 'freedom of movement between Gaza, West Bank and Israel for everyone'
644 and 'unrestricted right to access holy sites for anyone' are guaranteed (deal 01011000).

645 All deals in the ZOPA include 'Palestinians recognizing Israel as a nation-state of the Jewish people'. Deals that include
646 'freezing of all settlement building' are favored by Palestinians and lie above the 45 degree line; while deals favored by Israel
647 and below the 45 line have at most one concession to Palestinians.

648 Does violence facilitate or hinder compromise?

649 In an ongoing conflict, understanding how direct or indirect experiences of violence influence the perspectives of individuals on
650 prospective peace agreements is crucial. To capture these individual experiences, we crafted a bespoke questionnaire tailored
651 to discern whether the respondent, any of their family members, friends or acquaintances were victim of an incidence of
652 violence related to the conflict, the timeline of the incident, and its outcomes (e.g. whether a person died, remained physically
653 impaired, remained traumatized, or recovered). We were able to collect this information exclusively on the Israeli sample due
654 to contractual constraints on the length of the survey on the Palestinian side. For Palestine, we use the geographical residence
655 of the respondent, the Gaza Strip or West Bank, to distinguish different levels of exposure to violence related to the conflict.
656 Gaza has 4 times the number of casualties compared to the West Bank in the period 2008-2022^{¶¶}: this means that, once the
657 population count is taken into account, there is roughly a 6 times higher probability of casualties in Gaza compared to the
658 West Bank.

659 Approximately 6.2% of the Israeli sample report being victim of an incident of violence related to the conflict with the
660 Palestinians. A total of 30% report knowing someone who was a victim. Out of this 30% nearly half of the incidents (42%)
661 concerned a person who died. Reported incidents occurred between 1986 and 2022 (up to the time of the data collection),
662 with the highest number of violent events recorded in 2022 (11%), 2021 (9%) and cumulatively during the years of the second
663 Intifada (20% between 2000-2005, see Figure SI.4). The demographic background of the victimized group is diverse, but with a
664 notably higher proportion of residents in the Jerusalem and Central districts (which border the West Bank) and Judea and
665 Samaria area (i.e. Israeli settlements) and younger respondents (Table SI.4). Figure 4(a) shows a reduced ZOPA for victimized
666 Israelis (black dots): only 23 deals are acceptable for this group, compared to 99 for the non-victimized (hollow dots). The
667 analysis of preferences (Figure SI.5(a)) reveals that the deviation into non-ZOPA quadrants is primarily influenced by two
668 components: the freezing of settlements and the arrangement over the capital. Victimized individuals express a significantly
669 stronger aversion to these changes from the status quo compared to their non-victimized counterparts, six times and twice as
670 much, respectively. Within the group of victimized people, those who report knowing someone who died tend to have stronger
671 aversion than the average individual (Figure SI.5(b)). These latter results should be interpreted with caution because standard
672 errors are large due to the small sample size of the sub-group who knows a casualty (n=85). Yet, the result is replicated in a
673 larger (n=392) yet non-representative sample of Israeli citizens (Figure SI.5(c)). With the due limitations, the results suggests
674 violence negatively influences the willingness to compromise, with most traumatic experiences reducing it most.

675 For Palestinians, Figure 4(b) shows the ZOPA is almost equally populated for Gaza and West Bankers, with 56 and 53
676 deals respectively. This is explained by the analysis of preferences: Gazans value all changes from the status quo positively,
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678 ^{††}Identification of fair deals as those along the 45 degree lines relies on the assumption of inter-group comparability between utilities of Israelis and Palestinians. Assumptions on inter-personal comparability
679 of utility are commonly made in the egalitarian solution by (17), as explained in (18) and (19). For further discussion, see SI. section F.

680 ^{§§}Figure 3(b) shows confidence intervals using the standard errors from the point of view of Palestinians (y-axis). One could use the standard errors from the point of view of Israelis (x-axis). It makes no
681 difference in our case.

682 ^{¶¶}<https://www.ochaopt.org/data/casualties>




Fig. 4. ZOPA by exposure to violence in (a) Israel and (b) Palestine

including the ‘recognition of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people’, albeit with significantly smaller strengths of preferences compared to West Bankers for ‘freezing of all settlement building’, ‘freedom of movement for people, vehicle and good between the West Bank, Gaza and the State of Israel for both Palestinians and Israelis’ and ‘Palestinian capital in Jerusalem’s Arab-majority neighbourhoods and Israeli capital in Jewish-majority neighbourhoods’. These results chime with the finding from Palestinian polls, which find Gazans historically being more supporting of permanent peace settlements and more critical of Hamas than West Bankers (20, Figure 13).

Conclusions

This study develops a method to reveal the Zone of Possible Agreement (ZOPA) between parties in conflict. Using representative samples of Israelis and Palestinians we show that a ZOPA existed: out of 256 potential deals considered, 55 are valued superior to the status quo by both groups. The most favored deals by both parties include changes from the status quo that hold tangible benefits for the daily lives of the people involved. Elements such as freedom of movement for everyone, unrestricted access to holy sites for all, prisoner releases, and recognition of Israel as a nation state for the Jewish people emerge as common ground. Deals that include these components are generally valued more favorably than deals advocating the constitution of an independent Palestinian state with territorial gains. However, the findings also reveal that exposure to violence hampers the prospects of achieving compromise among Israelis, reducing the ZOPA to 29 deals. For Palestinians, people from Gaza, where historically violence has been higher, appear to value positively all changes from the status quo, including the recognition of Israel as a nation state for the Jewish people. One message prevails from these findings: at the time of the study, Palestinians and Israelis harbored a genuine desire for peace and constructive steps towards a permanent resolution of the conflict involve abstaining from violence.

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1000	Informed consent was obtained from all participants. The study was pre-registered AEARCTR-0008259. The responsibility for	1062
1001	any error or omission is our own.	1063
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1005		1067
1006	Author contribution. Conceptualization: EC, BG	1068
1007	Data curation: EC	1069
1008	Design: EC, GS	1070
1009	Power calculations: BG	1071
1010	Implementation (fieldwork instruments): EC	1072
1011	Software: EC (and Research Assistant Alex Burtusel)	1073
1012	Formal Analysis: EC	1074
1013	Visualization: EC	1075
1014	Funding acquisition: EC, BG	1076
1015	Project administration: EC	1077
1016	Supervision: EC	1078
1017	Writing – original draft: EC	1079
1018	Writing – review editing: EC, BG, GS	1080
1019		1081
1020	Competing interests. The authors have no competing interests.	1082
1021		1083
1022	Data and materials availability. : All data and codes used in the analysis will be deposited in a public repository and be available	1084
1023	to any researcher for purposes of reproducing or extending the analysis.	1085
1024		1086
1025	Supporting Information Appendix (SI). Supplementary material includes:	1087
1026	Sections A to F	1088
1027	Figs. SI.1 to SI.5	1089
1028	Tables SI.1 to SI.3	1090
1029		1091
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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

1117		1179
1118		1180
1119	Article: "Mutually acceptable peace agreements between Palestinians and Israelis exist but violence hinders their acceptability"	1181
1120		1182
1121	by Elisa Cavatorta, Ben Groom and Gilead Sher	1183
1122		1184
1123		1185
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1241 **A. Reasons for choosing 8 components.** The choice of 8 components is a trade-offs between the ability to estimate the
 1242 desirability of each component separately and unconfounded, and feasibility tests with respondents on the field. Using a
 1243 fractional design in 8 blocks of 8 deals, each with 8 binary components, allows to achieve Resolution IV in which no main
 1244 effects are confounded with any other main effect or 2-factor interactions. Four main effects are potentially confounded with
 1245 3-factor interactions, the effect of which is commonly assumed null. These components are: right to access the holy sites,
 1246 the location of capital cities, treatment of prisoners and allocation of water rights. Adding a ninth component would have
 1247 compromised identification: some main effects which would have been confounded with 2-factor interactions. Opting for a
 1248 design in which main effects are confounded with 3-factor interactions (Resolution IV) is typically preferable compared to
 1249 selecting a design where main effects are confounded with 2-factor interactions (Resolution III).
 1250

1251 **B. Power analysis.** For the purpose of the power calculations, the ranking task can be seen as an ‘exploded’ choice experiment
 1252 in which the ranking of the 8 peace deals consists of a number of decisions between different alternatives. (13) This allows us
 1253 to calculate the power according to the approach outlined in (21, Section 4) for binary choice experiments. If a respondent has
 1254 to rank n cards, there are $(n(n - 1))/2$ pairwise comparisons possible and all of these would be required in order to reveal
 1255 the complete ordering of the n cards. This means that 36 pairwise comparisons would be required to be equivalent to our
 1256 ranking task of 9 deals. Table SI.1 shows the sample size calculation for an orthogonal design with 36 pairwise comparisons of
 1257 peace deals. This might be an overestimate of the required number of paired comparisons if preference transitivity is assumed.
 1258 Therefore Table SI.2 shows the power calculation for an orthogonal design where each person faces 18 pairwise choices. In the
 1259 former case the sample size required to be able to detect an effect size of 0.05 (0.1, 0.15) at 5% significance level in at least 80%
 1260 of the cases is 289 (73, 33). In the latter the sample sizes are 583 (148, 67). Our sample sizes are therefore sufficiently powered
 1261 for these effect sizes.
 1262

α	$1 - \beta$	ES = 0.05	ES = 0.1	ES = 0.15	ES = 0.2	ES = 0.3
0.10	0.8	211	54	24	14	7
0.10	0.7	152	39	18	10	5
0.10	0.6	110	28	13	7	4
0.05	0.8	289	73	33	19	9
0.05	0.7	220	56	25	15	7
0.05	0.6	168	43	19	11	6
0.01	0.8	469	119	54	32	15
0.01	0.7	380	96	44	26	12
0.01	0.6	311	79	36	21	10

1273 **Table SI.1. Minimum sample size to obtain power $1 - \beta$ when testing at significance level $1 - \alpha$ from an orthogonal design with 36 pairwise
 1274 choices**
 1275

α	$1 - \beta$	ES = 0.05	ES = 0.1	ES = 0.15	ES = 0.2	ES = 0.3
0.10	0.8	425	108	49	28	14
0.10	0.7	307	78	35	21	10
0.10	0.6	222	56	26	15	7
0.05	0.8	583	148	67	39	19
0.05	0.7	444	112	51	30	14
0.05	0.6	340	86	39	23	11
0.01	0.8	946	240	109	63	31
0.01	0.7	766	194	88	51	25
0.01	0.6	627	159	72	42	20

1288 **Table SI.2. Minimum sample size to obtain power $1 - \beta$ when testing at significance level $1 - \alpha$ from an orthogonal design with 18 pairwise
 1289 choices**
 1290

1365	C. Reasons for choosing the components' topics. Since the focus was on citizens preferences, the components' reflect a selection of issues 'on the ground' that are considered important by Palestinians and Israelis themselves. For this reason, we prioritize issues perceived as important for the quality of citizens' daily life over issues related to the diplomatic process or international politics (e.g. the role of international mediators, external guarantees, membership of international organizations, ending of Israel boycott, etc.).	1427
1366		1428
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1370	The selection of issues was guided by available data in the Peace Index and the priorities identified in the Palestinian-Israeli Pulse data: a joint poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research and the Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Management at Tel Aviv University. For example, in September 2018, the Peace Index found that 83% of Jewish-Israelis think "the Palestinians must recognize Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people before peace talks with them can be revived". ⁽²²⁾ The changes from the status quo on settlements, borders and access to holy sites was informed by past peace proposals and consultation with negotiators. The water distribution issues was informed by research in warfare ecology and consultation with Prof Michael Mason ⁽²³⁾ .	1432
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1377	Two notable issues were not included among the list of eight components: a resolution on the (over 6 millions) Palestinian refugees living abroad and the issue is Israeli security. The decision regarding the situation of Palestinian refugees was guided by the results of Palestinian surveys which shows that the Palestinian refugee issue is not among the top-priorities in the mind of the people. In a 2018 survey of conditions required by Palestinians to support a peace agreement with Israel, the condition that 'Israel acknowledges responsibility for refugee problem' ranked last out of 10 conditions ⁽²⁴⁾ , p.8). In 2020, studying the hierarchy of priorities of demands on each sides, the survey findings show again that only between 6-7% of Palestinians selected the request to 'allow Palestinian citizens, such as refugees, to live in Israel without becoming Israeli citizens' in exchange for various Israeli demands ⁽²⁵⁾ , p.21).	1439
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1385	The exclusion of a component focusing on Israeli security was methodological. At the time of the survey, the Palestinian-Israeli security cooperation was in place and Israel controlled border crossings, airspace and sea waters. This security cooperation arrangements and Israel control represents the status quo. Looking at previous peace proposals, the most reasonable expectation in any peace agreement proposal is that Israel would continue to maintain its security apparatus and a security cooperation with any future Palestinian State. In our design, unless the attribute on security could be conjugated as a change different from the status quo, the valuation of security would not have been an identifiable parameter.	1447
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1391	Our design also omits the monetary dimension, which removes one common source of incommensurability of strength of preferences and potential taboo ⁽²⁶⁾ .	1453
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1489	Freezing of all settlement building, evacuation of those inside the West Bank. Settlements adjacent to the 1967 line become part of Israel. Explanation: The expansion of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem will cease. Settlement adjacent to the 1967 line will be part of Israel. West Bank settlements east of wall/fence will be evacuated.	1551
1490		1552
1491		1553
1492	Israel's settlement building continues. Explanation: Building of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem continues at the same rate as in recent years.	1554
1493		1555
1494	Palestinians recognise Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People. Explanation: Recognition by all Palestinians (those currently living in Israel and those elsewhere) that the territories of Israel are the Land of the Jewish civilization, alongside non-Jewish minorities, with equal rights and duties.	1556
1495		1557
1496	Palestinians do not recognise Israel as the nation state of the Jewish People. Explanation: No recognition by Palestinians of the Jewish customs, religion and traditions of the State of Israel.	1558
1497		1559
1498	An independent Palestinian State over the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem with equitable (1:1 in value) land swaps with Israel and no Israeli military presence. Explanation: An independent Palestinian State is established as a single territorial unit and connected territories within the 1967 borders. Land swaps based on 1:1 value, with value based on size and economic factors.	1560
1499		1561
1500		1562
1501	The civil and military jurisdiction over Israel, the West Bank and Gaza remains as today. Explanation: The administrative jurisdiction remains as today: Areas A, B and C in the West Bank, current jurisdiction for the Gaza Strip and in Israel. No land swaps compensation.	1563
1502		1564
1503	Freedom of movement for people (no checkpoints/permits), vehicles and goods between West Bank, Gaza and State of Israel for both Palestinians and Israelis. Explanation : Free movement means removal of work permit system, checkpoints and other movement restrictions to allow people to work, travel and trade between the current territories of the West Bank, Gaza, Jerusalem and State of Israel.	1565
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1506	Current freedom of trade between West Bank, Gaza and State of Israel. Permit system for labour and vehicles. Explanation : Goods are free to move between Israel and the West Bank, there are restrictions of trade of goods to and from Gaza; work permit regime for labour movement (as of today).	1568
1507		1569
1508	Unrestricted right to access to holy sites and freedom of worship for anyone. Explanation : Anyone (Jewish, Muslim, Christian or other) from Israel and the Palestinian territories can access and pray in all holy sites (including Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif and the Holy Sepulchre).	1570
1509		1571
1510		1572
1511	Current restricted rights to access to holy sites and pray. Explanation : Access and right to pray as today: e.g. Haram al-Sharif/Temple Mount: Muslims can pray and non-Muslims allowed to visit but not pray.	1573
1512		1574
1513	Palestinian capital in Jerusalem's Arab - majority neighbourhoods and Israeli capital in Jewish - majority neighbourhoods. Old City is undivided. Explanation : The Arab majority neighbourhoods in Jerusalem will be under Palestinian control and form the capital of Palestine; Jewish-majority neighbourhoods in Jerusalem will be under Israeli control and be the capital of Israel. The Old city administered by a council representing Christians, Muslims and Jews.	1575
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1516	Israeli capital in West and East Jerusalem and Palestinian capital de-facto in Ramallah. Explanation : Israeli capital designated as being West and East Jerusalem and Palestinian capital being de-facto located in Ramallah.	1578
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1518		1580
1519	Mutual amnesty and release for all current prisoners in Israeli and Palestinian jails. Explanation : All Palestinian prisoners held by Israel and all Israelis prisoners held by Palestinians will receive amnesty and be released.	1581
1520		1582
1521	Current practices of imprisonment, pre-trial detention and occasional prisoner release continue. Explanation : The use of imprisonment, administrative (pre-trial) detention and prisoner release and prisoner exchanges continues as seen in recent years.	1583
1522		1584
1523	Water rights in proportion to the population: 60% Israel, 40% Palestinian Authority. Explanation: The water from the aquifers is allocated proportional to the current population in the Palestinian territories (approx. 5m people) and Israel (approx. 9m).	1585
1524		1586
1525	Oslo II water rights (the same as today): 71% Israel, 29% Palestinian Authority. Explanation: The water from the aquifers is allocated according to the Oslo II Accord (1995, Article 40): 71% Israel, 29% Palestinian Authority.	1587
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1529	Fig. SI.1. Components and related descriptors given to respondents.	1591
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1613 **D. Data and national representativeness.** Table SI.3 shows the descriptive statistics of the Israeli and Palestinian samples
 1614 alongside the benchmark Census statistics of reference. 1675

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1645 **Table SI.3. Sample statistics and target population statistics.** The table shows the descriptive statistics for the Israeli citizens sample (column 1677

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1667 **E. Task and application interface.** The Palestinian sample was collected via in-person interviews conducted in Arabic by trained

1668 enumerators hired by a professional poll company. The fieldwork used a nationally representative sampling frame. The task

1669 was implemented using physical cards, like the one in Figure SI.2. 1728

1670 To collect the data on the Israeli sample we designed a bespoke interactive online application. Two versions of the application

1671 were made available: one in Hebrew for Jewish-Israeli respondents and one in Arabic for Arab(Palestinian)-Israeli respondents.

1672 The data collection used the database of respondents of an Israeli poll company. The task interface looks like the one in Figure

1673 SI.3. Respondents were given written instructions to complete the ranking exercise and instruction videos always available to

1674 them throughout the task. 1729

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	Sample of Israeli citizens (n=679)	Population Statistics from CBS	Sample of Palestinians (n=1,197)	Population Statistics from PCBS
Population group (%)				
Arab Israelis	19.0	19.0		
District of residence (%)				
Jerusalem	10.7	11.2		
Northern	19.7	16.2		
Haifa	15.0	12.2		
Central	23.1	25.1		
Tel Aviv	15.0	17.4		
Southern	13.4	13.9		
Judea and Samaria	3.0	3.6		
West Bank		65.83	61.91	
Gaza Strip		34.17	38.09	
Sex (%)				
Male	46.5	48.7	49.83	50.50
Female	53.5	51.3	50.17	49.50
Age (%)				
Age (mean years of age)	42.9	44.7	37.46	36.54
Between 18-29 yrs old	26.8	25.5	35.93	41.94
Between 30-39 yrs old	21.8	19.6	24.29	21.98
Between 40-49 yrs old	17.5	17.5	16.67	16.01
Between 50-59 yrs old	13.4	13.6	13.32	10.95
Between 60-69 yrs old	11.1	12.1	6.70	5.51
Equal and above 70 yrs old	9.4	11.6	3.10	3.61

1645 **Table SI.3. Sample statistics and target population statistics.** The table shows the descriptive statistics for the Israeli citizens sample (column 1677

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1674 them throughout the task. 1729

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
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1737	المستوطنات: يتم تمجيد بناء المستوطنات ويتم إخلاء الضفة الغربية، ولكن تصبح المستوطنات المجاورة لحظة 1967 جزءاً من إسرائيل.	1799
1738	يهودية إسرائيل: يعترف الفلسطينيون بإسرائيل كدولة قومية للشعب اليهودي.	1800
1739	الولاية: تقوم دولة فلسطينية مستقلة في الضفة الغربية وقطاع غزة والقدس الشرقية مع تبادل أراضي عادل (1:1 من حيث القيمة) مع إسرائيل وتنهي الوجود العسكري الإسرائيلي.	1801
1740	النقل: يكون هناك حرية في التنقل للأفراد (بدون نقاط تفتيش / تصاريح) والمركبات والضائع بين الضفة الغربية وغزة ودولة إسرائيل لكل من الفلسطينيين والإسرائيليين.	1802
1741	الأماكن المقدسة: يكون هناك حق غير مقيد في الوصول إلى الأماكن المقدسة وحرية العبادة لأي شخص.	1803
1742	القدس: تكون عاصمة إسرائيل في القدس الغربية والشرقية وتكون عاصمة فلسطين بحكم الأمر الواقع هي رام الله.	1804
1743	الأسرى: الغفران المتبادل والإفراج عن جميع الأسرى الحاليين في السجون الإسرائيلية والفلسطينية.	1805
1744	المياه: حقوق المياه في اتفاقية أوسلو الثانية (كما هي اليوم): 71٪ إسرائيل ، 29٪ السلطة الفلسطينية.	1806
1745		1807
1746		1808
1747		1809
1748		1810
1749		1811
1750		1812
1751		1813
1752		1814
1753		1815
1754		1816
1755		1817
1756		1818
1757		1819
1758		1820
1759		1821
1760		1822
1761		1823
1762		1824
1763		1825
1764	Fig. SI.2. An example of the cards representing peace agreements for the in-person fieldwork in Arabic language.	1826
1765		1827
1766		1828
1767		1829
1768		1830
1769	לחץ על הkartotis לקריאת התוכן. גורר ושרחרר כל kartotis לסדרת kartotis אחר כדי להשווות ביניהם. גלוש מעל הטיקסט לקריאת פרטים נוספים.	1831
1770		1832
1771		1833
1772	יציד משחקים	1834
1773	1	1835
1774	3 מ 8	1836
1775	5 2 3	1837
1776	המועדן ביזיר	1838
1777		1839
1778	היכי פחתות מודרך	1840
1779	5	1841
1780	הקפאת כל בנייה التנחלوية،Sophia כל הבניה הקיימת בתוך הדאה המערבית התנחלויות הסמוכות לקו 1967 יהו חלק מישראי.	1842
1781	הפלסטינים מכירים בישראל כמדינת הלאום של העם היהודי.	1843
1782	הSHIPOT האזרחי והבאני נותר כפי שהוא כיום בישראל, בגדה המערבית ובנורו.	1844
1783	עצמאו לאבדינה פלאטיטטיב בשטחיה הגדרה המערבית, עזה או ירושלים, עם החלפת שיטות הוגות (ללא מתחסומי רוחניים) בין 1:1 ליחסות אוטומטיות / ליניאריים (ולא נוכחות של תבניות הרשות).	1845
1784	השיפוט המוגבלת לлокומוטה הקדושים נשארת כפי שהיא.	1846
1785	choshef התגענה הקים למעבר שגורות בין הדאה המערבית ונעה לבן מדינת ישראל, מדיניות היהודים לעובדה ולכבודם.	1847
1786	choshef חופשית לשל אנשים, לי-רכב וסוכחות (לא מתחסומי או הרוחניים) בין הדאה המערבית, עזה וישראל, עבר פלסטינים וישראלים.	1848
1787	הגשה המוגבלת לлокומוטה הקדושים נשארת כפי שהיא.	1849
1788	מערב וזרחה ירושלים כבירת ישראלית ומאלה כבירת פלסטינית דה-פקטו.	1850
1789	מערבה במקומות קדושים ומוקמות פולחן ללא הגדלה כלל-אות.	1851
1790	מערבה וזרחה ירושלים כבירת ישראלית ומאלה כבירת פלסטינית דה-פקטו.	1852
1791	גינה והזרחה של מספר מוסכים האסירים המוחזקים בכלא השורייל ובכלא הפלסטיני.	1853
1792	נדיבות למים לנפש: 60% לישראל ו-40% לרשות הפלסטינית.	1854
1793	71% לישראל ו-29% לרשות הפלסטינית.	1855
1794		1856
1795		1857
1796		1858
1797	Fig. SI.3. An example of user interface of the online application in Hebrew language.	1859
1798		1860



1861 **F. Considerations on the comparability of preferences.** The model assumes that the individual rankings of peace agreements
 1862 reflect ranking of preference/utility from peace agreements as in a Random Utility model. Utility of a deal j is assumed
 1863 linear, $V_j(x) = x'_j \beta$, where x'_j is a vector of the agreement (binary) components – and separable in the contributions of each
 1864 component. In the empirical model, the joint probability of a ranking is estimated as the product of logit probabilities: the
 1865 estimated vector of parameters β s in the rank-ordered logit model can be interpreted as the expected *change* in utility for
 1866 Israelis or Palestinians when a deal's component is changed from the status quo to an alternative arrangement.
 1867

1868 Two linear utility functions are estimated, one for Israelis and one for Palestinians, and the two vectors of estimated β s are
 1869 plotted in Figure 2 using a single metric: utility changes from the status quo. This process gives rise to two sets of considerations
 1870 of commensurability/comparability of preferences: i) Between components; and, ii) Between Israelis and Palestinians.
 1871

1872 **Commensurability/comparability between components.** Comparability between components means that if $\beta_m = 2\beta_k$, a
 1873 change away from the status quo on component m is worth twice as much or is twice as desirable as a change from k . Under the
 1874 assumptions made above, this statement is possible and components can be evaluated in the same metric. When preferences for
 1875 components are aggregated into preferences for deals, commensurability between components implies that a deal that changes
 1876 component m from the status quo compensates for the absence of a change from the status quo on component k if changes
 1877 from the status quo in both m and k are valued positively.
 1878

1879 The concern on commensurability/comparability between components arises when trade-offs between components cannot
 1880 be done, for example because some component is considered a taboo (27) or an inviolable principle (28). It is worth noting
 1881 that trade-offs among different dimensions of peace deals are an inevitable part of the process of negotiation. However, to
 1882 shed light on the potential commensurability problem, we ask Israeli respondents to indicate whether conceding on the list of
 1883 agreement's components (e.g. giving up the recognition of Israel as a Jewish state, conceiving the re-allocation of water rights
 1884 between Israel and Palestinians under some mutually agreed criterion, etc.) was a list of 'inviolable principles, meaning that
 1885 they can never be justified or be permissible under any circumstance, no matter what the material or human benefits, costs
 1886 or consequences (e.g. no matter the monetary implications, efforts and resources required etc.)'. Only 2.5% of respondents
 1887 indicated that the actions underpinning concessions on the eight components could never be justified.
 1888

1889 **Comparability between Israelis and Palestinians.** It is known that utility functions are equivalent under positive affine
 1890 transformation, that is $u'(x) = au(x) + b$, where a is a positive scale parameter and b is a translation/shift constant, and $u(x)$
 1891 reflect the same preferences. This implies that statements like 'Israelis prefer component X twice as much as Palestinians' are
 1892 impossible to make because a and b for each group remain unidentified. As a result, mere differences in utility of a single deal
 1893 between Palestinians and Israelis cannot be pinned down, because of scale, but differences in utility of a deal from a commonly
 1894 valued deal, e.g. the status quo, can. We are merely concerned with these differences, hence the shift constant can be ignored.
 1895 The differences in utility between each deal and the status quo are what is estimated by the rank-ordered logit model and then
 1896 plotted in Figure 3. To identify the mutually acceptable deals and Pareto efficient deals in the sense of a Nash bargaining
 1897 solution all that is required is the comparison of the utility of the peace deal with the utility of the status quo for each party.
 1898 Ratios of differences in utility for Palestinians (P) and Israelis (I) can also be evaluated: $\frac{u^P(j) - u^P(sq)}{u^I(j) - u^I(sq)}$, for deal j and status
 1899 quo sq , meaning that statements saying: 'it is X times as good to go from the status quo to deal j for Palestinians as to go
 1900 from the status quo to deal j for Israelis' are reasonable.
 1901

1902 Identification of fair deals as those along the 45 degree line in the sense that they achieve an egalitarian split of utility gains
 1903 rely on stronger inter-group comparability between Israelis and Palestinians, namely that the positive scale parameter a
 1904 for each group is identical.
 1905

1906 Demographic profile of Israelis exposed and not exposed to violence

	Know someone victim of an incidence of violence	Does not know anyone
Male (%)	52.76	43.96
Age (mean)	38.41	44.79
Aged 25 (%)	23.10	16.04
Arab (%)	16.58	20.00
Jerusalem (%)	18.09	7.71
Northern (%)	18.59	20.21
Haifa (%)	13.57	15.63
Central (%)	19.10	24.79
Tel Aviv (%)	13.07	15.83
Southern (%)	12.56	13.75
Judea and Samaria (%)	5.03	2.08

1907 **Table SI.4. Demographic characteristics of Israeli respondents who report knowing someone who was victim of an incident of violence related
 1908 to the conflict with the Palestinians and those who did not know any victim.**

1909 G. Heterogeneity by violence exposure (Israeli sample).




Fig. SI.4. Timeline of reported violent incidents, Israeli sample.




Fig. SI.5. Relative strengths of preference for components in sub-groups of (a) Israelis who know a victim or don't; (b) Israelis who know a victim, a victim who died or don't know anyone; (c) Replication of results in (b) using a non-representative sample of Israeli respondents.