Automated SIEM Detection Coverage Lookup to MITRE ATT&CK

Trigger A

Implementation Details

Workflow Architecture



The n8n workflow consists of 14 interconnected nodes organized into a logical pipeline:

Phase 1: Initialization and Data Extraction

- Manual Trigger node to start the workflow on demand
- Pagination initialization to prepare for large-scale data retrieval
- API connection to Kibana detection engine

Phase 2: Rule Processing

- Iterative pagination handling to retrieve all rules
- Data parsing and field extraction
- Conditional routing based on MITRE mapping status

Phase 3: AI Enhancement and Storage

- AI-powered MITRE mapping for unmapped rules
- Data transformation and standardization
- Google Sheets storage for final inventory

Step-by-Step Implementation

Step 1: Workflow Initialization

Node: "Start Trigger A"

- Type: Manual Trigger
- Purpose: Provides on-demand execution control for the workflow

Node: "Initialize Pagination"

- Type: Code (JavaScript)
- Purpose: Sets up initial parameters for paginated API calls

```
return {
  json: {
    kibana_url: 'http://208.73.204.77:5601',
    page: 1,
    per_page: 100,
    all_rules: [],
    continue_loop: true
  }
};
```

This initialization establishes:

- SIEM endpoint URL
- Starting page number
- Rules per page limit (100)
- Empty array to accumulate all rules
- Loop continuation flag

Step 2: Paginated Rule Extraction

Node: "Fetch Rules Page {{$json.page}}"**



- Type: HTTP Request
- Method: GET
- Authentication: HTTP Basic Auth
- Endpoint: `/api/detection_engine/rules/_find?per_page=100&page={{$json.page}}&filter=alert.attributes.enabled:true`

Key configuration:

- Custom headers: `kbn-xsrf: true` (required by Kibana API)
- Filter parameter: `alert.attributes.enabled:true` (only enabled rules)
- Dynamic page number from previous node

Node: "Log Progress"**

- Type: Code (JavaScript)
- Purpose: Provides visibility into extraction progress

```
const response = $input.first().json;
const page = response.page || 1;
const total = response.total || 0;
const dataLength = (response.data || []).length;

console.log(`📄 Fetched page ${page} - Got ${dataLength} rules out of ${total} total`);

return $input.all();
```

Step 3: Pagination Control

Node: "Process Page & Check Continue"**

- Type: Code (JavaScript)
- Purpose: Manages pagination state and determines when to stop

```
const currentState = $('Initialize Pagination').first().json;
const apiResponse = $input.first().json;

const rulesInPage = apiResponse.data || [];
const total = apiResponse.total || 0;
const currentPage = apiResponse.page || currentState.page;
const perPage = apiResponse.per_page || currentState.per_page;

const totalPages = Math.ceil(total / perPage);
const hasMorePages = currentPage < totalPages;

const allRules = [ ... currentState.all_rules,  ... rulesInPage];

return {
  json: {
    kibana_url: currentState.kibana_url,
    page: currentPage + 1,
    per_page: perPage,
    all_rules: allRules,
    continue_loop: hasMorePages,
    current_page: currentPage,
    total_pages: totalPages,
    total_rules: total,
    rules_fetched: allRules.length
  }
};
```

Node: "Has More Pages?"**



- Type: IF Condition
- Logic: Compares current page against total pages
- True branch: Loops back to fetch next page
- False branch: Proceeds to rule processing

This creates a loop that continues until all pages are retrieved.

Step 4: Rule Data Splitting



Node: "Split rules"**

- Type: Split Out
- Field: `all_rules`
- Purpose: Converts array of rules into individual items for processing

Node: "extract specific Fields"**

- Type: Set (Edit Fields)
- Purpose: Extracts essential fields from each rule for downstream processing

Fields extracted:

- `id` : Internal rule identifier
- `rule_id` : External rule identifier
- `name` : Rule name
- `description` : Rule description
- `threat` : MITRE ATT&CK mappings (array)
- `required_fields` : Fields needed for rule to execute
- `index` : Target log sources/indexes
- `type` : Rule type (query, eql, threshold, etc.)
- `framework` : Threat framework (MITRE ATT&CK)
- `query` : Detection query logic

Step 5: MITRE Mapping Decision



Node: "Check if Rule Needs MITRE Mapping"**

- Type: IF Condition
- Condition: `{{ $json.threat }} is empty`
- Purpose: Routes rules based on existing MITRE mappings

Logic:

- If `threat` array is empty → Route to AI mapping
- If `threat` array has data → Route to direct processing

This optimization prevents unnecessary AI API calls for rules that already have MITRE mappings.

Step 6: AI-Powered MITRE Mapping



Node: "Message a model"**

- Type: Google Gemini AI
- Model: `models/gemma-3-1b-it`
- Purpose: Analyzes rule and returns MITRE ATT&CK mapping

AI Prompt Structure:

```
## System Context
You are a cybersecurity expert specializing in SIEM detection engineering and MITRE ATT&CK framework mapping. You work for a SOC team that needs to
automatically map detection rules to MITRE techniques.

## Task Description
Analyze the given SIEM detection rule and identify which MITRE ATT&CK technique(s) it detects. Consider the rule logic, query patterns, and context.

## Output Requirements
Return ONLY a JSON object with this exact structure:
{
    "rule_id": "ded09d02-0137-4ccc-8005-c45e617e8d4c",
    "rule_name": "Query Registry using Built-in Tools",
    "rule_description": "This rule identifies the execution of commands that can be used to query the Windows Registry. Adversaries may query the registry to
gain situational awareness about the host, like installed security software, programs and settings.",
```

```
    "rule_type": "new_terms",
    "mitre_framework": "MITRE ATT&CK",
    "mitre_tactic_id": "TA0007",
    "mitre_tactic_name": "Discovery",
    "mitre_techniques": "T1012",
    "mitre_technique_names": "Query Registry",
    "mitre_subtechniques": "",
    "required_fields": "event.category, event.type, host.os.type, process.args, process.command_line, process.name.caseless",
    "required_fields_count": 6,
    "log_sources": "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
    "log_source_count": 1,
    "query_type": "new_terms",
    "has_query": true,
    "coverage_status": "PENDING",
    "last_checked": null,
    "original_rule_id": "dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652bb6bbe",
    "original_rule_name": "Query Registry using Built-in Tools"
  },


## Critical Rules
1. **ONLY return valid JSON**, no additional text
2. **Use exact MITRE IDs** from official ATT&CK framework
3. **If uncertain**, use parent technique instead of sub-technique
4. **Never** return multiple techniques in one mapping
5. **Always** include all four fields in the JSON

## Ready for Analysis
Now analyze the following rule and provide MITRE mapping:
id:{{ $json.id }}
rule_id:{{ $json.rule_id }}
name:{{ $json.name }}
description:{{ $json.description }}
required_filed:{{ $json.required_fields }}
index :{{ $json.index }}
query: {{ $json.query }}
```


The prompt provides:

- Rule context and metadata
- Query logic for analysis
- Strict JSON output format requirements
- Guidelines for accurate MITRE mapping

Node: "Split Out Ai response"



- Type: Split Out
- Field: `content.parts`
- Purpose: Extracts the AI response text from the API response structure

Node: "text -> json"



- Type: Code (JavaScript)
- Purpose: Cleans and parses AI response into JSON

```
const items = $input.all();

for (const item of items) {
  const rawText = item.json.text;

  const cleanedText = rawText
    .replace(/```json/g, '')
    .replace(/```/g, '')
    .trim();

  item.json = JSON.parse(cleanedText);
}

return items;
```

This handles:

- Removal of markdown code blocks
- Trimming whitespace
- JSON parsing with error handling

Step 7: Rule Requirements Extraction

Node: "Extract Rule Requirements"**



- Type: Code (JavaScript)
- Purpose: Parses and structures rule metadata for rules with existing MITRE mappings

Key processing logic:

```
// Extract MITRE technique(s) - handle multiple techniques
let mitreTechniques = [];
if (ruleData.threat && Array.isArray(ruleData.threat)) {
  for (const threat of ruleData.threat) {
    if (threat.technique && Array.isArray(threat.technique)) {
      for (const tech of threat.technique) {
        const technique = {
          id: tech.id || '',
          name: tech.name || '',
          subtechnique: tech.subtechnique && Array.isArray(tech.subtechnique)
            ? tech.subtechnique.map(st => ({ id: st.id, name: st.name }))
            : []
        };
        mitreTechniques.push(technique);
      }
    }
  }
}

// Parse required_fields from JSON string
let requiredFields = [];
try {
  if (ruleData.required_fields && ruleData.required_fields !== '[]') {
    const fieldsJson = JSON.parse(ruleData.required_fields);
    if (Array.isArray(fieldsJson)) {
      requiredFields = fieldsJson.map(field => field.name || 'unknown');
    }
  }
} catch (error) {
  requiredFields = ['ERROR_PARSING_FIELDS'];
}
```

The code handles:

- Nested MITRE technique arrays
- Sub-technique extraction
- JSON string parsing for required fields
- Error handling for malformed data
- Array formatting for log sources

Output structure:

```
{
  rule_id: "...",
  rule_name: "...",
  rule_description: "...",
  rule_type: "...",
  mitre_framework: "MITRE ATT&CK",
  mitre_tactic_id: "...",
  mitre_tactic_name: "...",
  mitre_techniques: "T1012, T1082",
  mitre_technique_names: "Query Registry, System Information Discovery",
  mitre_subtechniques: "T1012.001",
  required_fields: "event.category, host.os.type, process.name",
  required_fields_count: 3,
  log_sources: "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
  log_source_count: 1,
  query_type: "query",
  has_query: true,
  coverage_status: "PENDING",
  original_rule_id: "..."
}
```

Step 8: Data Storage



Node: "Store Rules in Google Sheet" (for rules with existing MITRE mappings) ##### Node: "Store Rules in Google Sheet1" (for AI-mapped rules)

- Type: Google Sheets
- Operation: Append
- Document ID: `1VQQuZZRuMVy4yWgNLMdcDXDQuDzJLgjN-GEmYQHxrjM`
- Sheet: "الورقة1"

Column mappings:

```
Rule ID → rule_id
Rule Name → rule_description
Description → rule_description
Rule Type → rule_type
MITRE Framework → mitre_framework
MITRE Tactic ID → mitre_tactic_id
MITRE Tactic Name → mitre_tactic_name
MITRE Technique IDs → mitre_techniques
MITRE Technique Names → mitre_technique_names
MITRE Subtechniques → mitre_subtechniques
Required Fields → required_fields
Required Fields Count → required_fields_count
Log Sources → log_sources
Log Source Count → log_source_count
Query Available → has_query
Coverage Status → coverage_status
Last Checked → last_checked
Original Rule ID → original_rule_id
```



	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P	Q	R	S	T	U
1	rule_name Rule ID	Rule Name	Description	Rule Type	MITRE Framework	MITRE Tactic ID	MITRE Tactic Name	MITRE Technique IDs	MITRE Technique Names	MITRE Subtechniques	Required Fields	Required Fields Count	Log Sources	Log So	Query Av	Last Checked	Original Rule ID	Notes	Coverage Status	Missing Fields	Missing Log Sources
2	aab184d3-72b3	This rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	T1012	Discovery	T1012.001	event.category, event.type	6	auditbeat-*,en	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
3	29531d20-0e80	This rule uses al	This rule uses al	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Query Registry	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
4	0272ad70-a9e4	This rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Email Analysis	event.category, event.type	6	filebeat-*,logs-	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
5	000a8e2e-a0c4	This rule uses al	This rule uses al	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0117	Threat Intelligence	T1012	Threat Intelligence	T1012.001	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
6	c062a600-cf97-	This rule correlat	This rule correlat	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Query Registry - Comm	event.category, event.type	7	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
7	a1b2c3d4-e5f6-	This rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Query Registry	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
8	ef527524-7250-	This rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery		event.category, event.type	6	auditbeat-*,en	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
9	a91809f3-fb5b-	This rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Registry Indicator	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
10	895e0f17-447c-	This rule uses al	This rule uses al	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0001	Incident Response	T1072	Incident Response	T1071.004	event.category, event.type	8	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
11	ab25369e-ea5e	This rule uses al	This rule uses al	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Query Registry - Comm	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
12	8b42849d-9775	Detects repeatec	Detects repeatec	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Query Registry - Comm	[{"name":"Esql.ml_policy_t	2	logs-aws_bedi	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
13	94770ebf-af4d-	Identifies multipl	Identifies multipl	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Query Registry - Comm	[{"name":"Esql.ml_respons	6	logs-aws_bedi	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
14	fb16f9ef-cb03-4	Detects when Az	Detects when Az	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Azure OpenAI API Res	[{"name":"Esql.event_coun	2	logs-azure_op	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
15	f2c653b7-7daf-	Identifies multipl	Identifies multipl	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Query Registry - Command Execution						2025-12-23T20:51:47.1122		painding			
16	5610b192-7f18-	Detects a seque	Detects a seque	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0003	Persistence	Modify Authentication I	Modify Authentication Proc	T1556.006	event.dataset, host.os.type	5	filebeat-*, logs	4	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	254aaa25-1ff4-4c77-beb3-4cff94bfa	painding			
17	ded0bd02-0137	This rule identifie	This rule identifie	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Query Registry		event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	dc94235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	painding			
18	cd89602e-9db0	Detects multi-fac	Detects multi-fac	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0003	Persistence	Modify Authentication I	Modify Authentication Proc	T1556.006	event.dataset, okta.event_	5	logs-okta.syst	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	ec6028b2-ed54-4b2b-b4e0-155ff9	painding			
19	36188365-f68f-	Identifies sign-in	Identifies sign-in	esql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Use Alternate Authenti	Use Alternate Authenticati	T1550.001, T1566.002	Esql.o365_audit_Applicatio	7	unknown	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	8235bc7f-ae77-43a4-a040-41269b	painding			
20	1fa350e0-0aa2-	This rule detects	This rule detects	esql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0011	Command and Contr	Application Layer Proto	Application Layer Protocol		Esql.agent_id_count_distir	5	unknown	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	915c8097-8383-4b1f-afbd-ab6e5b	painding			
21	b81bd314-db5b	Enrich process e	Enrich process e	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	System Information Dis	System Information Discovery		event.action, event.type, p	4	logs-endpoint.	5	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	afb9c171-a87b-46c7-a26e-b0c40d	painding			
22	0d8ad79f-9025-	Identifies an exe	Identifies an exe	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0002	Execution	Phishing	Phishing	T1566.001, T1566.002	event.type, file.extension, f	9	logs-endpoint.	3	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	69ffb5ea-7b20-432b-9843-73e064	painding			
23	53ded83-1be7	Attackers may ai	Attackers may ai	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Deobfuscate/Decode F	Deobfuscate/Decode Files	T1059.003	event.type, host.os.type, p	4	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	39474298-a970-4b97-a634-2e91af	painding			
24	5297b7f1-bcod-	Identifies the exe	Identifies the exe	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Trusted Developer Utili	Trusted Developer Utilities	T1218.011	event.action, host.os.type,	5	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	399d8a1f-5b8d-430a-8de6-7d4a15	painding			
25	1f460f12-a3cf-4	Identifies unusu	Identifies unusu	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Masquerading	Masquerading		event.type, host.os.type, p	4	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	c8b572d7-0778-4a8f-8197-4ff786d	painding			
26	fd9484f2-1c56-	Identifies binarie	Identifies binarie	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Masquerading	Masquerading	T1036.001	dll.Ext.relative_file_creatio	8	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	b1f97abb-e3f1-4074-add4-d5b9cbf	painding			
27	75dcb176-a575	Identifies attemp	Identifies attemp	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Modify Registry. Servic	Modify Registry. Service Stop		event.type, host.os.type, p	6	logs-endpoint.	2	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	9b8254bc-8fdc-4d09-b74d-bb4a0f	painding			
28	1e0a3f7c-21e7-	Identifies the usi	Identifies the usi	query	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	System Service Discov	System Service Discovery	T1087.001, T1087.002	event.category, host.os.typ	4	winlogbeat-*,	2	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	0646781f-bb8a-43d0-a348-80cd33	painding			
29	6b341d03-1d83	This rule detects	This rule detects	esql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Network Service Disco	Network Service Discovery		Esql.agent_id_count_distir	8	unknown	1	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	46b4b2cf-a5e4-46a1-a468-63e9eb	painding			
30	90abaaa8-5216	InstallUtil is a co	InstallUtil is a co	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	System Binary Proxy E	System Binary Proxy Exec	T1218.004	event.type, host.os.type, p	4	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	0aa8a506-5f03-4caa-9fcf-4ce8bbb	painding			
31	c8077997-f75b-	Identifies attemp	Identifies attemp	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Modify Registry. Creati	Modify Registry. Create or	T1543.003, T1543.003	event.type, process.args, r	3	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE	2025-12-23T20:	8a741e7c-2215-4b13-a363-41f488	painding			

Trigger B



Trigger B Implementation Report: Telemetry Inventory and Coverage

Trigger B is the second phase of the automated detection coverage system. Its primary responsibility is to build a comprehensive telemetry inventory from the SIEM and validate which detection rules can actually function based on available log sources and fields.

Workflow Architecture

The Trigger B workflow consists of 8 interconnected nodes that work sequentially to gather, process, and validate telemetry data against detection rules.

Node 1: Start Trigger B (Schedule Trigger)

This node initiates the entire Trigger B workflow on a scheduled basis. It runs at regular intervals to ensure the coverage status remains up-to-date as the SIEM environment changes.

Configuration:

- Type: Schedule Trigger
- Webhook ID: trigger-b
- Execution: Interval-based

Node 2: Get Available Telemetry Fields (HTTP Request)



This node connects to the Kibana API to retrieve all available data views (index patterns) from the SIEM.

Configuration:

- URL: `http://208.73.204.77:5601/api/data_views`
- Authentication: HTTP Basic Auth
- Headers: Content-Type application/json
- Method: GET

Purpose: Fetches the complete list of data views that represent the log sources configured in the SIEM.

Node 3: Split Out



This node takes the array of data views returned from Kibana and splits them into individual items for processing.

Configuration:

- Field to split: data_view
- Purpose: Enables processing each data view separately in subsequent nodes

Node 4: Edit Fields



This node extracts and standardizes the key attributes from each data view.

Extracted Fields:

- id: Data view identifier
- title: Index pattern or data source name
- name: Human-readable name
- timeFieldName: Timestamp field used for time-based queries

Purpose: Normalizes the data structure for consistent processing downstream.

Node 5: Filter



This node applies a validation check to ensure only valid data views proceed through the workflow.

Filter Condition:

- Checks if the "name" field exists
- Case sensitive validation
- Strict type checking enabled

Purpose: Removes any malformed or incomplete data view entries.

Node 6: Get_data_view (HTTP Request)



This node performs a detailed retrieval of each individual data view to access its complete field mapping.

Configuration:

- URL: `http://208.73.204.77:5601/api/data_views/data_view/{{ $json.id }}`
- Authentication: HTTP Basic Auth
- Headers: kbn-xsrf: true
- Dynamic URL construction using data view ID

Purpose: Fetches the complete field schema for each data source, including all available fields and their properties.

Node 7: Get-rule-sheet (Google Sheets)



This node retrieves the detection rules from Google Sheets that were populated by Trigger A.

Configuration:

- Document ID: 1VQQuZZRuMVy4yWgNLMdcDXDQuDzJLgjN-GEmYQHxrjM
- Sheet Name: الورقة1 (Sheet 1)
- Operation: Read all rows

Retrieved Data:

- Rule ID
- Rule Name
- Required Fields
- Log Sources
- MITRE ATT&CK mappings
- All other rule metadata

Node 8: Code in JavaScript (Coverage Analysis Engine)



This is the core processing node that performs the intelligent matching between available telemetry and rule requirements.

Key Functions:

1. Build Telemetry Source Map

```
- Collects all available log sources from data views
- Extracts source titles and index patterns
```

```
- Builds a normalized set of available sources
```

2. Build Field Inventory

```
- Flattens nested field structures from Kibana
- Creates comprehensive field catalog
- Adds ECS field variations (lowercase, .keyword, .text)
- Handles complex object field paths
```

3. Mapping Layer

```
- Maps generic source patterns to specific implementations
- Handles common source naming conventions:
  * logs-* → logs-endpoint.events.process-*
  * winlogbeat-* → logs-windows.*
  * endgame-* → logs-endpoint.events.security-*
  * auditbeat-* → logs-system.*
  * filebeat-* → logs-*
```

4. Source Matcher Function

```
- Implements wildcard matching for source patterns
- Handles prefix-based matching (e.g., logs-*)
- Performs exact matching for specific sources
```

5. ECS-Aware Field Matcher Function

```
- Performs case-insensitive field matching
- Handles ECS field variations (.keyword, .text)
- Implements field equivalence mapping:
  * process.name.caseless ↔ process.name
  * event.type ↔ event.action
  * event.category ↔ event.kind
  * host.os.type ↔ host.os.name
- Handles flattened field name mismatches
```

6. Rule Coverage Evaluation Logic For each detection rule, the code:

a) Parses Rule Requirements:

- Splits comma-separated log sources
- Splits comma-separated required fields
- Trims and filters empty values

b) Evaluates Source Coverage:

- Checks if any required source exists in telemetry
- Tracks missing sources
- Sets sourceCovered flag

c) Evaluates Field Coverage:

- Checks each required field against field inventory
- Uses ECS-aware matching
- Categorizes fields as present or missing

d) Determines Coverage Status:

- **COVERED:** All sources and fields available
- **PARTIALLY COVERED:** Source available but some fields missing
- **NOT COVERED:** Required source not available

e) Generates Detailed Output:

```
{
  mode: "DEBUG COVERAGE",
  rule_id: string,
  rule_name: string,
  coverage_status: "COVERED" | "PARTIALLY COVERED" | "NOT COVERED",

  // Source Information
  required_sources_count: number,
  required_sources: array,
  telemetry_sources_available: array,
  missing_log_sources: array,

  // Field Information
  required_fields_count: number,
  required_fields: array,
  present_fields_count: number,
  present_fields: array,
  missing_fields_count: number,
```

```
  missing_fields: array
}
```


```
{
    "mode": "DEBUG COVERAGE",
    "rule_id": "aab184d3-72b3-4639-b242-6597c99d8bca",
    "rule_name": "This rule is triggered when a hash indicator from the Threat Intel Filebeat module or integrations has a match against an event that contains file hashes, such as antivirus alerts, process creation, library load, and file operation events.",
    "coverage_status": "COVERED",
    "required_sources_count": 5,
    "required_sources": [
      "auditbeat-*",
      "endgame-*",
      "filebeat-*",
      "logs-*",
      "winlogbeat-*"
    ],
    "telemetry_sources_available": [
      "logs-network_traffic.*",
      ".alerts-security.alerts-default",
      "security_solution-*.vulnerability_latest",
      "logs-cloud_security_posture.vulnerabilities_latest-default",
      "security_solution-*.misconfiguration_latest",
      "logs-*",
      "apm-*-transaction*",
      "auditbeat-*",
      "endgame-*",
      "filebeat-*",
      "packetbeat-*",
      "traces-apm*",
      "winlogbeat-*",
      "-*elastic-cloud-logs-*",
      ".kibana-event-log-*",
      "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
      "logs-endpoint.events.security-*",
      "logs-windows.*",
      "logs-system.security*",
      "logs-system.*"
    ],
    "missing_log_sources": [],
    "required_fields_count": 6,
    "required_fields": [
      "event.category",
      "event.type",
      "host.os.type",
      "process.args",
      "process.command_line",
      "process.name.caseless"
    ],
    "present_fields_count": 6,
    "present_fields": [
      "event.category",
      "event.type",
      "host.os.type",
      "process.args",
      "process.command_line",
      "process.name.caseless"
    ],
    "missing_fields_count": 0,
    "missing_fields": []
  },
  {
    "mode": "DEBUG COVERAGE",
    "rule_id": "29531d20-0e80-41d4-9ec6-d6b58e4a475c",
    "rule_name": "This rule uses alert data to determine when multiple alerts in different phases of an attack involving the same host are triggered and where the accumulated risk score is higher than a defined threshold.",
    "coverage_status": "COVERED",
    "required_sources_count": 1,
    "required_sources": [
      "logs-endpoint.events.process-*"
    ],
    "telemetry_sources_available": [
      "logs-network_traffic.*",
      ".alerts-security.alerts-default",
      "security_solution-*.vulnerability_latest",
      "logs-cloud_security_posture.vulnerabilities_latest-default",
      "security_solution-*.misconfiguration_latest",
      "logs-*",
      "apm-*-transaction*",
      "auditbeat-*",
      "endgame-*",
      "filebeat-*",
      "packetbeat-*",
      "traces-apm*",
      "winlogbeat-*",
      "-*elastic-cloud-logs-*",
      ".kibana-event-log-*",
      "logs-endpoint.events.process-*",
      "logs-endpoint.events.security-*",
      "logs-windows.*",
      "logs-system.security*",
      "logs-system.*"
    ],
    "missing_log_sources": [],
    "required_fields_count": 6,
    "required_fields": [
```

```
      "event.category",
      "event.type",
      "host.os.type",
      "process.args",
      "process.command_line",
      "process.name.caseless"
    ],
    "present_fields_count": 6,
    "present_fields": [
      "event.category",
      "event.type",
      "host.os.type",
      "process.args",
      "process.command_line",
      "process.name.caseless"
    ],
    "missing_fields_count": 0,
    "missing_fields": []
  }
```


Node 9: Update row in sheet (Google Sheets)

This final node writes the coverage analysis results back to Google Sheets.



Rule Name	Description	Rule Type	MITRE Framework	MITRE Tactic ID	MITRE Tactic Name	MITRE Technique IDs	MITRE Technique Names	MITRE Subtechniques	Required Fields	Required Fields Count	Log Sources	Log Source	Query Av	Last Checked	Original Rule ID	Notes	Coverage Status	Missing Fields	Missing Log Sources
s rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	T1012.001	Discovery	T1012.001.001	event.category, event.type	6	auditbeat-*,en	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule uses al	This rule uses all	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	T1012	Discovery		event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Email Analysis	event.category, event.type	6	filebeat-*,logs-	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule uses al	This rule uses all	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Query Registry	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule uses al	This rule uses all	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Threat Detection	T1012	Threat Detection	T1012.001	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	IP Address Indicator	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	Registry Indicator	event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery		event.category, event.type	6	auditbeat-*,en	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule uses al	This rule uses all	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Incident Response	T1076	Incident Response	User Account Compron	event.category, event.type	8	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652	NOT COVERED	["alert.source.type	["logs-endpoint.events.alert-*"]	
s rule is trigg	This rule is trigg	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Discovery	CVE Analysis	event.category, event.type	6	auditbeat-*,en	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
tects a seque	Detects a sequen	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0003	Persistence	Modify Authentication F	Modify Authentication Proc	T1556.006	event.dataset, host.os.type	5	filebeat-*, logs	4	TRUE		254aaa2f-1ff4-4c77-beb3-4cf84bfa	PARTIALLY COVERE	["okta.event_type"	[]	
s rule identifie	This rule identifie	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Query Registry	Query Registry		event.category, event.type	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		dc944235-222b-4fa6-8e7c-4d0652		COVERED	[]	[]
tects multi-fac	Detects multi-fac	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0003	Persistence	Modify Authentication F	Modify Authentication Proc	T1556.006	event.dataset, okta.event_	5	logs-okta.syste	1	TRUE		ec80288b2-ed54-4b2c-b4e0-155ff6f	NOT COVERED	["okta.event_type"	["logs-okta.system*"]	
ntifies sign-in	Identifies sign-in	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Use Alternate Authentic	Use Alternate Authenticati	T1550.001, T1566.002	Esql.o365_audit_Applicatio	7	unknown	1	TRUE		8238bc7f-ae77-43a4-a040-41265fc	NOT COVERED	["Esql.o365_audit_	["unknown"]	
s rule detects	This rule detects	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0011	Command and Contr	Application Layer Protc	Application Layer Protocol		Esql.agent_id_count_distir	5	unknown	1	TRUE		915c8097-8383-4b1f-afbd-ab6e5b	NOT COVERED	["Esql.agent_id_cc	["unknown"]	
ich process e	Enrich process e	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	System Information Dis	System Information Discovery		event.action, event.type, p	4	logs-endpoint.	5	TRUE		afb9c171-a87b-46c7-a26e-b0c40d		COVERED	[]	[]
ntifies the exe	Identifies the exe	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Trusted Developer Util	Trusted Developer Utilities	T1218.011	event.action, host.os.type,	5	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		399d8a1f-5b8d-430a-8de6-7d4a15		COVERED	[]	[]
ntifies unusu	Identifies unusu	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Masquerading	Masquerading		event.type, host.os.type, p	4	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE		c8b572d7-0778-4a8f-8197-4ff766d		COVERED	[]	[]
ackers may al	Attackers may al	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Deobfuscate/Decode F	Deobfuscate/Decode Files	T1059.003	event.type, host.os.type, p	4	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE		39474298-a970-4b97-a634-2e91a		COVERED	[]	[]
ntifies an exe	Identifies an exe	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0002	Execution	Phishing	Phishing	T1566.001, T1566.002	event.type, file.extension, f	9	logs-endpoint.	3	TRUE		69ffb5ea-7b20-432b-9843-73e064		COVERED	[]	[]
ntifies binarie	Identifies binarie	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Masquerading	Masquerading	T1036.001	dll.Ext.relative_file_creatio	8	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		b1f97abb-e3f1-4074-add4-d5b0cbf	NOT COVERED	[]	["logs-endpoint.events.library-*"]	
ntifies attemp	Identifies attemp	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Modify Registry, Servic	Modify Registry, Service	Stop	event.type, host.os.type, p	6	logs-endpoint.	2	TRUE		9b8254bc-8fdc-4d09-b74d-bb4a0ff		COVERED	[]	[]
ntifies potenti	Identifies potenti	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0011	Command and Contr	Application Layer Protc	Application Layer Protocol	T1071.001, T1573.001	destination.ip, destination.p	4	logs-endpoint.	2	TRUE		07fb496d-f211-48ce-a0a1-6e2f7d0		COVERED	[]	[]
s rule detects	This rule detects	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Network Service Disco	Network Service Discovery		Esql.agent_id_count_distir	6	unknown	1	TRUE		c78f2e36-cac5-4ef6-bcb9-7e031fe	NOT COVERED	["Esql.agent_id_cc	["unknown"]	
ntifies the use	Identifies the use	query	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	System Service Discov	System Service Discovery,	T1087.001, T1087.002	event.category, host.os.typ	4	winlogbeat-*, l	2	TRUE		0646781f-bb9a-43d0-a348-80cd33	COVERED	[]	[]	
ntifies child p	Identifies child p	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	System Binary Proxy E	System Binary Proxy Exec	T1218.011	event.type, host.os.type, p	9	logs-endpoint.	4	TRUE		79d020eb-4d76-4c94-a35c-ef07a5	COVERED	[]	[]	
adable Kernel	Loadable Kernel	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	System Information Dis	System Information Discovery		event.action, event.catego	5	auditbeat-*, lo	2	TRUE		5e19b19d-22ab-4348-8c17-b49071	COVERED	[]	[]	
versaries may	Adversaries may	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0008	Lateral Movement	Remote Services	Remote Services	T1021.001	destination.ip, destination.p	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		9bf5ec4-2f3b-4342-87c0-deeed74	NOT COVERED	[]	["logs-endpoint.events.network-*"]	
s rule identifie	This rule identifie	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Indicator Removal	Indicator Removal	T1070.004	event.type, host.os.type, p	5	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		889eab49-2fc5-4e9e-830d-ee0da9	COVERED	[]	[]	
ndows Backup	Windows Backup	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0011	Command and Contr	Ingress Tool Transfer, I	Ingress Tool Transfer, BITS Jobs, BITS Jobs		event.type, host.os.type, p	4	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE		6abfe83e-ae8b-491c-b4fc-93f4448	COVERED	[]	[]	
tallUtil is a co	InstallUtil is a co	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	System Binary Proxy E	System Binary Proxy Exec	T1218.004	event.type, host.os.type, p	4	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE		0aa8a508-5f03-4caa-8fcf-4cc8bbbf	COVERED	[]	[]	
s rule detects	This rule detects	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Network Service Disco	Network Service Discovery		Esql.agent_id_count_distir	8	unknown	1	TRUE		46b4b2cf-a5e4-46a1-a498-53e9eb	NOT COVERED	["Esql.agent_id_cc	["unknown"]	
ntifies attemp	Identifies attemp	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Modify Registry, Create	Modify Registry, Create or	T1543.003, T1543.003	event.type, process.args, p	3	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE		6a7d1e7c-321f-4e13-a363-41f488f	COVERED	[]	[]	
ntifies the exe	Identifies the exe	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	System Binary Proxy E	System Binary Proxy Execution		event.action, host.os.type,	6	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE		a5e2e5ed-b3e2-42ad-b382-20cf6c	COVERED	[]	[]	
ntifies the chi	Identifies the chi	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	File and Directory Perm	File and Directory Permiss	T1222.001	event.type, host.os.type, p	6	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		5a68ec7c-5217-44ed-b15e-dbb58(	COVERED	[]	[]	
s rule monitor	This rule monitor	threshold	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	Process Discovery, Syst	Process Discovery, System	Information Discovery	event.action, event.catego	6	auditbeat-*, lo	2	TRUE		1b7150a7-2be6-4332-9e08-96166	COVERED	[]	[]	
ntifies indirec	Identifies indirec	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Indirect Command Exe	Indirect Command Execution		event.type, host.os.type, p	3	endgame-*, lo	5	TRUE		c0bfe937-f934-4714-aad3-265555	COVERED	[]	[]	
ntifies suspici	Identifies suspici	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	System Binary Proxy E	System Binary Proxy Exec	T1218.007	event.action, host.os.type,	12	logs-endpoint.	4	TRUE		19417a7c-7dd1-4dac-a10d-fc3a3b	COVERED	[]	[]	
ntifies the use	Identifies the use	query	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0008	Lateral Movement	Remote Services, Com	Remote Services, Comma	T1021.006, T1059.001	event.category, file.director	5	winlogbeat-*, l	2	TRUE		9d355cda-5fcf-4c3c-a80b-478708a	COVERED	[]	[]	
ntifies unusu	Identifies unusu	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	System Binary Proxy E	System Binary Proxy Exec	T1566.001, T1566.002	event.type, file.Ext.window	7	logs-endpoint.	1	TRUE		6710dc7d-5031-463e-ba74-af3e7e	NOT COVERED	[]	["logs-endpoint.events.file-*"]	
nitors file eve	Monitors file eve	new_terms	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0007	Discovery	System Information Dis	System Information Discovery		event.action, event.catego	5	auditbeat-*, lo	2	TRUE		8b3c4cb3-d3bf-49fb-99d0-43136e1	COVERED	[]	[]	
ntifies files wr	Identifies files wr	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0009	Collection	Data Staged	Data Staged	T1074.001	event.type, file.name, file.p	4	logs-endpoint.	4	TRUE		3fc8cd31-b3bb-4420-9dbe-704509	COVERED	[]	[]	
s rule detects	This rule detects	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0003	Persistence	Server Software Comp	Server Software Compone	T1505.003, T1059.004	Esql.agent_id_count_distir	7	unknown	1	TRUE		2a7a1aff-c1c5-4e2b-86fc-6585be8	NOT COVERED	["Esql.agent_id_cc	["unknown"]	
ntifies separa	Identifies separa	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0001	Initial Access	Valid Accounts, Phishir	Valid Accounts, Phishing,	T1078.004, T1566.002	Esql.azure_signinlogs_pro	31	unknown	1	TRUE		5c55606c-53fb-4430-bcaf-069ff64	NOT COVERED	["Esql.azure_signi	["unknown"]	
ntifies the use	Identifies the use	query	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0003	Persistence	Server Software Comp	Server Software Compone	T1505.002, T1059.001	event.category, host.os.typ	4	winlogbeat-*, l	2	TRUE		25c7402e-27c6-44ca-ad3a-3b9361	COVERED	[]	[]	
s rule leverag	This rule leverag	eql	MITRE ATT&CK	TA0005	Defense Evasion	Obfuscated Files or Inf	Obfuscated Files or Inform	T1059.004, T1204.002	Esql.agent_id_count_distir	6	unknown	1	TRUE		ee658824-41df-4950-9ddd-9a3d40	NOT COVERED	["Esql.agent_id_cc	["unknown"]	

Configuration:

- Operation: Update
- Matching Column: Rule ID
- Document: Detection_Rules spreadsheet

Updated Columns:

- Coverage Status: COVERED/PARTIALLY COVERED/NOT COVERED
- Missing Log Sources: Array of unavailable sources
- Missing Fields: Array of unavailable fields

Purpose: Persists the coverage analysis results for reporting and visibility.

Data Flow Summary

1. **Trigger initiation** → Scheduled execution begins
2. **API call to Kibana** → Retrieves all data views
3. **Split data views** → Separates into individual items
4. **Field extraction** → Normalizes data view attributes
5. **Validation filter** → Removes invalid entries
6. **Detailed field retrieval** → Gets complete field mappings per data view
7. **Rule retrieval** → Fetches detection rules from Google Sheets
8. **Coverage analysis** → Intelligent matching of requirements vs. availability
9. **Results persistence** → Updates Google Sheets with coverage status